

STUDIES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY


A MEMORIAL VOLUME IN HONOUR OF
PANDIT SUKHLALJI SANGHVI

L. D. SERIES 84

GENERAL EDITORS
DALSUKH MALVANIA
NAGIN J. SHAH



L.D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 380 009



PANDIT SUKHLALJI SANGHVI (1880-1978)

STUDIES IN

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

A MEMORIAL VOLUME IN HONOUR OF
PANDIT SUKHLALJI SANGHVI

L. D. SERIES 84

GENERAL EDITORS

DALSUKH MALVANIA

NAGIN J. SHAH



L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD 9

Printed by

K. Bhikhalal Bhavsar

**Shri Swaminarayan Mudran Mandir
21, Purushottam Nagar, Nava Vadaj
Ahmedabad-380013**

and Published by

Nagin J. Shah


Director

**L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-380009**

FIRST EDITION

June 1981

PRICE Rs.60-00



PREFACE

Pandit Dr. Sukhlalji Sanghvi who has enriched Indian Philosophy by his searching, thoughtprovoking, manifold writings, passed away on 2nd March, 1978, leaving a vacuum in the field. He was associated with the L. D. Institute of Indology from its very inception; he ably guided the academic pursuits of the Institute, in his capacity of an academic adviser. As a mark of our appreciation of his remarkable, singular contribution to Indian Philosophy and as a token of our love and respect for him, we are publishing *Studies in Indian Philosophy—a memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi* in the year of his centenary.

I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude towards the learned professors and scholars who have contributed their research papers to this memorial volume and thus helped us in our project. I hope the volume will be of immense value to those interested in the studies of Indian Philosophy.

L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad-380009.
15th June, 1981.

Nagin J. Shah
Director

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

- 1 Dr. C. S. Prasad
Nava Nalanda Mahavihara,
Nalanda-803111 INDIA
- 2 Prof. K. R. Norman
Faculty of Oriental Studies
Sidwick Avenue,
Cambridge CB3 9DA
England.
- 3 Dr. K. K. Dixit
Ajoy Bhavan,
15 Kotla Marg,
New Delhi, INDIA.
- 4 Prof. E. A. Solomon
Department of Sanskrit,
School of Languages,
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad-380009, INDIA.
- 5 Professor J. L. Shaw
Philosophy Department,
Victoria University of Wellington,
Private Bag, Wellington,
New Zealand.
- 6 Professor George Cardona
Department of Linguistics,
Room 619, Williams Hall CU
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia-19104.
- 7 Professor Douglas Dunsmore Daye
Department of Philosophy,
Bowling Green University,
Bowling Green, OHIO, 43403, USA
- 8 Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal
All Souls College, OXFORD,
OX1 4AL, England.
- 9 Professor Lal Mani Joshi
Guru Govind Singh Depart-
ment of Religious Studies,
Punjabi University,
Patiala, INDIA.
- 10 Shri Y. Krishan
C II/55, Dr. Zakir Hussain
Marg, New Delhi-11003.
- 11 Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi
23, Savanur Nawab Plots
Dharwar-580008, INDIA.
- 12 Professor Yun-hua Jan,
Department of Religious Studies,
McMaster University,
1280, Main Street West,
Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada L8S 4K1.
- 13 Elisabeth Strandeborg
Nitivej 11,
DK-2000 Copenhagen F.,
Denmark
- 14 Professor K. Krishna Moorthy
Department of Studies in
Sanskrit,
Karnatak University,
Dharwar-580003.

- 15 Professor S. S. Barlingay
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Ganeshkhind,
Pune-411007.
- 16 Dr. V. M. Kulkarni
5, Suruchi Society,
Dixit Road, Extension,
Vile Parle (East)
Bombay-400057.
- 17 Professor Harvey B. Aronson
Department of Religious
Studies, Cocke Hall,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia-22903
U.S.A.
- 18 Dr. Karel Werner
School of Oriental Studies,
Elvet Hill, Durham,
DH3 2NB, England.
- 19 Professor Herbert V. Guenther
Far Eastern Studies,
University of Saskatchewan,
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan,
Canada S7N 0W0.
- 20 Dr. Suzuko Ohira
2-29-6 Kamiya, Kitaku,
TOKYO, JAPAN.
- 21 Prof. Hans G. Herzberger
Radhika Herzberger,
C/o. All Souls College,
Oxford OX1 4 AL,
England.
- 22 Dr. S. D. Joshi,
Director, Centre of Advanced
Study in Sanskrit,
University of Poona,
Ganeshkhind, Poona-7.
- 23 Professor Leonard Zwilling
Department of South Asian
Studies, University of Wis-
consin-Madison, 1242 Van
Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive,
Madison, Wisconsin 53706.
- 24 Ven. Dr. H. Saddhatissa
Head of the Loudon
Buddhist Vihara,
5, Heathfield Gardens,
London, W4 4JU, England.

*

CONTENTS

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Page</i>
<i>Preface</i>		iii
<i>List of Contributors</i>		v
<i>Contents</i>		vii
<i>Champion of Justice and Truth</i>	S. Mookerjee	ix
<i>Original Thinker</i>	T. R. V. Murti	xiii
<i>Pandit Sukhalalji - A Dynamic Litterateur</i>	A. N. Upadhye	xv
<i>Pt. Sukhlalji (A biographical Sketch)</i>	D. D. Malvania N. J. Shah	xix
1 Attitude of Buddha and Early Buddhism towards Metaphysics	C. S. Prasad	1
2 A Note on <i>Atta</i> in the Alagaddūpama-sutta	K. R. Norman	19
3 Materialism, Idealism and Dualism in Indian Philosophy	K. K. Dixit	31
4 <i>Tamas</i> and <i>Chāyā</i> in the Jaina view	E. A. Solomon	39
5 Negation : Some Indian Theories	J. L. Shaw	57
6 On Reasoning from <i>Anvaya</i> and <i>Vyatireka</i> in Early Advaita	George Cardona	79
7 Circularity in the Inductive Justification of Formal Arguments (<i>Tarka</i>) in Twelfth Century Indian Jaina Logic	Douglas Dunsmore Daye	105
8 Memory	Bimal Krishna Matilal	125
9 Notes on Religious Merit (<i>Punya</i>) in Comparative Light	Lal Mani Joshi	135
10 The Unique Jaina Doctrine of Karma and its contribution	Y. Krishan	145
11 Right Understanding - some Hurdles	T. G. Kalghatgi	155
12 The Chinese Buddhist Wheel of Existence and Deliverance	Jan Yun-hua	165
13 Some remarks on the role of the lay followers in the Jaina Community	Elisabeth Strandberg	181

14 Indian Aesthetic Terminology : An Integral Analysis	K. Krishna Moorthy	187
15 What did Bharata mean by <i>Rasa</i> ?	S. S. Barlingay	197
16 Sanskrit Thinkers on Logic in Relation to poetry	V. M. Kulkarni	225
17 <i>Brahman</i> , Masculine and Neuter, in the Pre-Buddhist Upaniṣads	Harvey B. Aronson	231
18 Mysticism and Indian Spirituality	Karel Werner	241
19 Preliminaries for Spiritual Growth Psychological Implications of the preparatory stage in Buddhism	D. V. Guenther	257
20 Śukla Dhyāna	Suzuko Ohira	267
21 Bhartṛhari's paradox	Dans G. Herzberger Radhika Derzberger	279
22 Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa on the Meaning of the Negative particle	S. D. Joshi	301
23 Sa sKya Paṇḍita's Version of <i>Pramāṇavārtti-</i> <i>kam</i> III. 3 - A Case Study on the Influence of Exegesis upon Translation in Tibet	Leonard Zwilling	304
24 The <i>Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha</i> and its <i>Tikā</i>	Hammalaya Saddhātissa	315

CHAMPION OF JUSTICE AND TRUTH *

Satkari Mookerjee

Our scholars, thinkers and philosophers, who have been nurtured in the the ageold tradition of India, are still living example of what India has aspired to achieve in the past. It is undersirable that the majority of the scholars of the indigenous tradition have failed to reach the standard required. But of the very few who still embody the ideal in their character and achievements, Pandit Sukhlalji is an outstanding representative. I wish to stress some of the traits in his character as a man and as a scholar, which mark him out from the majority and place him in a class apart. Fortunately for us, even in these degenerate days, Panditji has a few companions, and fellow-members who together with him form an illustrious band.

His stupendous scholarship is too obvious. His learned editions of philosophical classics, his selections of correct readings from the mess of scribes' errors, his illuminating comments and annotations are unmistakable proofs of his mastery of the philosophical technique of the different schools of Indian thought. It is an object of admiration to scholars. Pandit Sukhlalji has set an example of learning and scholarship and insight, which is difficult to emulate. In precision of thought and speech, in the grasp of fundamentals, and in mastery of details, in the discrimination of subtle nuances of thought and expression which are apt to elude the grasp of even a careful scholar, Pandit Sukhlalji stands in the front rank. I do not know of many who can compete with him in these matters.

What, however, distinguishes him in his extensive grasp of the cultural background laying behind the different epochs of upheavals of thought. He has before his mind's eye a clear pictures of the *milieu* of Vedic, Upanisadic, the Buddhistic, the Jainistic and the later philosophical development, and his elucidation of the logical and psychological interrelations among these types of culture, almost compels acquiescence. What, further, has roused my admiration is his discovery of the unity in the midst of apparantly irreconcilable diversity in India's thought movement in the past. He also has discovered for us the etymology of the diverse courses

* From the address delivered on the occasion of unveiling the portrait of Panditji at the Divyāthā Vidyārama, Banaras, April 1949.

of thought. His long introductions to his editions are each a thesis, which can entitle a scholar to the highest doctorate degree of my University. They amply testify to his historical insight, which is born of objective knowledge and correct appraisal of India's thought-movements. The professional historian, who takes pride in the chronological data, should do well if he calmly studies the interconnexions of the thought-life of India in the past as has been unfolded by Panditji. Real history of India can be written only by those who can understand the inner life of a people. Mere chronicle of external events is more often than not calculated to give a misleading picture. I hope and trust that the future historian of India will not shirk the labour involved in the task, and the learned contributions of Panditji will show him the way.

I cannot decide what is the strongest point of Panditji's scholarship. His mastery of the obtruse arguments of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā is on a par with that of Buddhist and Jaina philosophy. It is difficult for me to accord the palm of superiority to this or that side. His written contributions do not represent a fragment of his learning. His knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, poetics, and *belles-lettres* has not had an opportunity for self-expressions. Here the man is incomparably greater than what his recorded contributions show. He is really versatile scholar, and his versatility is all the more astounding because of the thoroughness and depth of knowledge of the specialist in each branch. India ought to be proud of such a man with such a capacious intellect. I am afraid that in this attempt at the assessment of his erudition and scholarship, I have not been able to do a particle of justice to the savant.

As a man he is unique. I feel puzzled when I try to compare his intellectual greatness with his moral elevation. He does not hanker after celebrity. He successfully parries all attempts of his admirers to express their appreciation of his merits. Personal honour does not appeal to him. Nobody can hope to win him by flattery, even when it is based upon genuine recognition of his worth. What he wants is the triumph of truth and love of knowledge. If a man is to be known by the company he keeps, a scholar is to be judged by the students, he has trained. Meet any student of Pandit Sukhlalji and test him and you will invariably find in him a disinterested love of knowledge. I have known from personal experience that his students are indifferent to worldly prospects and are imbued with a passion for knowledge. Such an achievement of success will not be easily believed in the present day academic circles.

Panditji loves a life of voluntary poverty. Being a lifelong bachelor, and leading a scrupulously celibate life, he has narrowed down his material needs to the minimum limit. He fails to understand why a scholar should

get money and material possessions. Sometimes his standard appears to us as too exacting. But it has conferred an inestimable privilege upon him, viz., immunity from humouring the rich, or the man in power. I wish that we could approximate to his standard even from a respectable distance.

Pt. Sukhlalji is an outspoken man. No false courtesy or sense of etiquette deters him from speaking a truth, because it may not please a rich man or an ambitious scholar who want to win cheap-laurels, Naturally, rich men who are accustomed to approval of all their acts and fads and also easy-going scholars, scrupulously avoid him from a distance. He will on no account lower his standard. He insists on thorough knowledge of Sanskrit and thorough study of texts in his students. He does not believe in the gathering of references, and quotations, without study of the texts in which they occur, which is regrettably the fashion among cheap researchers of our time.

As a thinker he is absolutely independent. His allegiance is always to truth, and never to a fashionable opinion. He holds brief for none and does not hesitate to champion the cause which he thinks, stands for justice and truth. He will not flatter even men of his own community by praising their system and customs beyond their due. He will not denounce other schools simply because they uphold views different from those championed by Jaina philosophers. Pt. Sukhlalji is not only in the habit of not humouring the rich but also is not afraid of criticising the custodians of Jaina faith for any remissness in their conduct or their failure to live up to the standard. It is not a matter of surprise, therefore, that neither the Jaina community nor the academic bodies have come forward to honour him in public. We know that Panditji is far above the weakness of average academic men of our class, who have a real liking for the appreciation of their scholarship. But whatever may be the attitude of the scholar himself, no excuse can exempt us from the charge of dereliction of duty, that we have failed to show our recognition of the services of a savant, to whom the immortal gratitude of the Jaina community and of the students of Indian thought is due. I must congratulate the authorities of the Jaina Ashram of Banaras Hindu University on the wisdom, though belated, for a public demonstration of their appreciation of this unostentatious scholar of whom the whole of India should be proud. Had he been born in the time of Vikramāditya, or of Bhojarāja, nothing would have been withheld from him. It is better that we have turned the corner and let us hope that this is rather a beginning and not the end. It behoves all those who are interested in Jainology to perpetuate his memory in a fitting fashion. I may suggest one or two measures in this direction. We should endow a chair in his name in the Banaras Hindu University and should found a

college bearing his sacred name. We ought to erect a statue in his honour. By these measures we can show that the present generation is capable of honouring a scholar equally with our political heroes. I know that these things are superfluous, so far as Panditji is personally concerned. He has made himself immortal by his contributions. But unless and until we do something grand and stupendous conformably to his prodigious scholarship, we shall not be able to escape the censure from posterity of being dubbed as a generation of philistines.

*

ORIGINAL THINKER¹

T. R. V. Murti

I come into contact with the Revered Panditji nearly twenty years ago when he was actively teaching in the Benares Hindu University as the incumbent of the Jain chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya. I have been privileged to enjoy his valued friendship all these years. Numerous were the occasions when we have had lively philosophical discussions on the roadsides or in his study; most of these just occurred without pre-arrangement or set purpose. And seldom have I come back from these discussions without receiving new light or striking interpretations even on subjects which I thought I understood quite well. Of course, Panditji's scholarship of Indian thought is surprisingly comprehensive and deep; and his memory is phenomenal. I should however like to record what has specially impressed me in his personality Pandit Sukhlalji is an original thinker, a restless one. He would look at a theory now from this, now from that angle; he would often-times reverse his own previous conclusions on the subject. The open-mindedness of his spirit, his sensitivity to all aspects of a problem and his indefatigable persistence in the search of truth have impressed me as worthy of emulation. I have no manner of doubt that Panditji is an authentic and worthy representative of the spiritual line of Indian seers. It is not surprising that his outspoken and independent views have not found favour with some sections of Hindus and Jainas. A fearless thinker, a seeker of truth is not worried, as Panditji is not, by the thought of secular gains and losses. I have not known him utter an unfair or uncharitable remark about any person or get upset by adverse happenings. With few easily satisfied wants and as equanimous temperament, he has been a living example of a true philosopher, a *Sthitaprajña*. As an original thinker and as a man of striking spiritual virtues, Panditji has been successful in inspiring a circle of young men like Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya and others. This is not one of the least of the many services that he has rendered to our cultural life.

¹ Written for the occasion of the felicitation of Pt. Sukhlalji at Bombay University in 1957 under the presidentship of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

PANDIT SUKHALALJI—A Dynamic Litterateur

A. N. Upadhye

Prajñācakṣu Pandit Sukhalalji is one of the great Indian authors and thinkers ; he has enriched contemporary learning and thought by his manifold writings in Hindī and Gujarātī. If some of us do not know him, it is because our study and reading, nowadays, do not go beyond our specialised branches of learning and favourite languages : that is a hurdle which we must cross and understand and appreciate a writer like Pandit Sukhalalji who has rendered a progressive, purposeful and fruitful contribution to the wealth of human thought.

The personality of Pandit Sukhalalji has manifold aspects. Those who have met him know that he has lost his eyesight at an early age. His figure is frail; and left to himself, he would not catch the attention of anybody. But if one gets an opportunity to discuss any serious topic with him, one will come to know within a few minutes that behind his frail figure there is a mighty spirit full of power, founded on extensive learning and equipped with an all round vision of multitudinous problems about life and literature. Pandit Sukhalalji's physical disability going with an outstanding scholarship and abiding literary output reminds me of that great English poet, John Milton. What Panditji really is, is not easily indicated from what he appears to be at the first sight. He is a gem of great lustre and value, but it is a matter of surprise that they are concealed behind a simple appearance.

By his age Panditji belongs to the last generation; but by his vision and thoughts he not only lives in the living present but he is also ahead of his times. Those who have steadily read his articles and studied his works know that by his education, obviously of the traditional type, he is a Naiyāyika (theologian-logician), a Vaiyākaraṇa (grammarian), a Dārṣanik (philosopher) and a Dharmajña (religious expert), as far as his basic equipments go. But his format is something different from the hackneyed type. His studies of Nyāya and Darśana works like the Sanmatitarka, Parmānamimāṃsā, Jñānabindu, Hetubindu and Tattvopaplavasimha clearly indicate that his equipments and consequent discussions have something characteristic

about them. Nowadays the terms 'Indian' and 'Bhāratīya' are very often used but with a limited import. There are many writers who talk of Indian philosophy, but basically they do not go beyond the Vedānta of one school or the other. Whenever Panditji writes on any topic, it may be the theory of knowledge, the path of Yoga or the means of liberation, one finds in his writings a comprehensive study and a cosmopolitan outlook; and the material from the Brāhmanic, Buddhist and Jaina systems of thought is ably marshalled and relevently focussed with a view to elucidating a certain topic. The keen intellect of Panditji pierces to the very core of signification behind the varied terminology employed in different systems of Indian thought. In our land there are few Pandits who have such a vision as is evidenced by the writings of Pandit Sukhalalji.

It has become customary with our Pandits to find weak points in other systems than the one which they stand for and then criticise them with all the vehemence at their command. But Pandit Sukhalalji generally adopts the Anekānta mode of thinking and arguing, and he is an exception. As a Dārśhanika he finds in different religions a common ground which is conducive to the welfare of humanity. He worthily represents the line of great Indian Dārśhanika like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Haribhadra and Hemachandra. Panditji possesses an insatiable thirst for knowledge and is out for an earnest search for Truth.

Pandit Sukhalalji is one of the living authorities on Jainism. His studies in Jainism are all along carried on in the broad perspective of the Indian pattern of thought and learning. His exposition of the Sanmati-tarka and the Tattvārtha-sūtra, his studies in the Jaina Karma doctrine, his elucidation of Yoga, his appraisal of the personalities of Vṛṣabha and Mahāvīra are solid contributions towards a sympathetic understanding of Jainism. Howsoever difficult a subject might be, in the hands of Pt. Sukhalalji its exposition becomes lively and thought-provoking. His interpretations of the Stutis of Siddhasena and of the Adhyardha-śataka of Mātṛcheṭa clearly show that here is a scholar who can put himself at the point of view of the author himself and try to understand the circumstantial setting and the world of thought and learning which were responsible for the mental make-up and literary expressions of the author.

Panditji has a typical method of study of his own. The realm of knowledge for him recognises no religious, racial, temporal and geographical barriers; and the human thought process, as he understands it, is a continuous and connected flow. Naturally, unlike most of the Pandits, with whom he shares a thorough grounding in traditional learning, he brings to bear upon his studies the modern instruments of the historical and compa-

rative method of study. This endows the writings of Panditji with an abiding and universal appeal.

Pandit Sukhalalji has contributed a number of paper on religion and its effect on society. Religion for him is not a time-worn instrument only to be worshipped, but he wants it to be a living force to be employed for the amelioration of the society as a whole. He has never hesitated to explode the myths of credulity and exploitation in one form or other. He would always insist upon the basic in the Religion, but not hesitate to allow the amplifications to fall in line with the progressive forces of the present-day times. The thoughts of Pandit Sukhalalji in this respect deserve special attention from all serious thinkers of religious values and social progress.

There is something characteristic about the style of Panditji, whether he writes in Hindi or Gujarātī. There is a simplicity : it is like himself : simple in expression but pregnant with signification. There is precision, and there is a pointed appeal in all that he writes. His Gujarātī style reminds me of the chaste and simple expression in which Mahātmāji wrote his Ātmakathā. Unlike Mahātmāji, Panditji is really a Pandit by traditional learning and training but when he writes on any social topic, his thoughts and expressions run very parallel to those of Mahātmāji; and one has to admit that these two great men, though working in different fields, have forcefully strengthened the Gujarātī expression and style in this century. Their names will be remembered as successful moulders of Gujarātī language as a vehicle of higher thoughts. If Pandit Sukhalalji meant, he could have loaded his Gujarātī expression with high sounding Sanskrit words, as was done by some contemporary writers in Mahārāṣṭra; but he is a cosmopolitan by his Anekānta method of study : he has never written just for a handful of intellects but always addressed a wider society in a simple language with a view to make his thoughts as widely appealing and popular as possible.

Panditji has a dynamic personality : not only is he an embodiment of simple living and high thinking, but he sheds round him an effulgent reflection of his mode of living and of his height of thinking. It is a pleasure to differ from him. When Panditji finds that there are basic differences, he lays them bare with searching arguments, with appealing illustrations and with humorous anecdotes; and then with a fund of worldly wisdom, with a sense of fairness and justice and in a persuasive tone he argues out the entire situation. And when you leave Panditji, after such a treat, you find that you have returned definitely wiser and soberer. Panditji is a light of learning which enkindles your thinking

power : wherever he stays, he creates round him atmosphere of study and progressive thinking.

The enormous literary output which we owe to Pandit Sukhalalji is an outcome of extensive study and intensive thinking. Whatever subject he takes up for study, he invests it with originality of thought and cosmopolitan outlook. His expositions of Ahimsā and Anekānta are at once unique, and they present an essence of his deep learning. Panditji is a scholar, a teacher and even a preacher embodying in himself the best of their qualities; and he is all along struggling to educate the society round about him.¹

¹ Written for the occasion of the felicitation of Pt. Sukhalalji at Bombay University in 1957 under the presidentship of Dr. Radhakrishnaan.

PANDIT SUKHLALJI

D. D. Malvania

Nagin J. Shah

Pandit (Dr.) Sukhlalji Sanghavi, an eminent Indologist and great thinker, expired on 2nd March 1978, rendering Indology an irreparable loss, for the reason that he had dominated world of Indian Philosophy and religion for the last sixty years and more by his deep scholarship and noble personality.

Born on 8-12-1880 in a Jaina *Sthānakvāsī* family in a small village Limbali in Pt. Surendranagar, Saurashtra, he lost both the eyes at the age of sixteen owing to a virulent type of smallpox. He left the idea of marriage and remained a *naiṣṭhika brahmacāri* throughout his life. His real education began after his unfortunate blindness. He had a genuine love for learning. He went to Benaras at the age of eighteen where he studied *Nyaya* under the late Mm. Pt. Vamacharana Bhattacharya. For the study of *Navya-Nyaya* he travelled to Mithila where he found a proper teacher in Mm. Pandit Balakrishan Mishra. Then he came back to Benaras where, for some years, he studied different branches of Sanskrit philosophy and literature. From Benaras he went to Agra and engaged himself in editing, with Hindi translation and annotation as well as his own valuable introduction some highly interesting religious and philosophical books, such as *Pañcapratīkramaṇa*, *Karmagranthas*, *Yogadarśana* and *Yogoviṃśikā*. In 1922 he joined, as Professor of Indian Philosophy, the Purātattvamandira of the Gujarat Vidyapith, a National University established by Mahatma Gandhi. During his tenure in the said institution he undertook and completed a critical edition of Abhayadeva's commentary on the *Sanmatitarka* of Siddhasena Divākara, a work which extended to over 900 pages.

From Gujarat Sukhlalji shifted, in 1933, to the Benaras Hindu University, as the Professor of Jaina Philosophy and retired in 1944. During this period he wrote and edited number of works in Sanskrit, Hindi and Gujarati, generally enriched with his own translation, commentary and introduction. Among these might be mentioned the *Tattvārthasūtra*, *Jñānabindu*, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, *Tattvopaplavasīmha* of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa, and Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* with Arcaṭa's commentary and Durveka Mīṣra's sub-commentary.

After voluntary retirement from BHU in 1944, Pt. Sukhlalji lent, for three years, his services to the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. In 1947 he joined the B. J. Institute of Research and Learning, Ahmedabad, and functioned, till his demise, as an Academic Adviser to the L. D. Institute of Indology.

The learned world was not tardy in appreciating the erudite and extensive literary and research work being churned out by this blind saint. In 1947 he was awarded the *Vijayadharmasūri Jaina Sāhitya Gold Medal* by Shri Yashovijaya Granthamala, Bhavanagar for his distinct contribution to Jaina Literature. He was elected President of the Prakrit and Jainism Section of the 16th Session of All India Oriental Conference which met in Lucknow in 1951. In 1955 he delivered a series of three lectures on *Adhyātmavicāraṇā* in *Shri Popatlal Hemachand Adhyātma Vyākhyānamālā* under the auspices of Gujarat Vidyasabha, Ahmedabad. In 1956 he was awarded the Gandhi Prize by Wardha Rashtra-bhasha Prachara Samiti for his contribution to philosophical and spiritual literature in Hindi.

He delivered, in 1957, a series of five lectures on *Bhāratīyatattvavidyā* (Indian philosophy) in *Sir Sayajirao Gaekwad Honorarium Lecture Series* under the auspices of the M. S. University, Baroda. He delivered a series of five lectures on 'Samadarśi Ācārya Haribhadra' under the auspices of Bombay University in 1959. In 1957 he was honoured by the Gujarat University, which bestowed upon him the honorary D. Litt. Degree.

In 1955 *Pandit Shri Sukhlalji Sanmān Samiti* was formed in Ahmedabad which collected and Published, in three volumes, his original writings in Gujarati and Hindi under the general title *Darśana ane | aur Cintana*. On the occasion of the release of three volumes, Panditji was honoured with a purse of Rs. 70,000. With this amount he founded the *Jñānodaya Trust* for the dissemination of knowledge.

Sukhlalji was elected president of the Gujarati Section of the Indian Philosophical Conference which met in Ahmedabad in 1958. In 1959 he was elected president of the Tattvajñāna section of the Gujarati Sahitya Parishad which met in Ahmedabad.

Again, in 1959 he was awarded a prize of Rs. 5,000 by the Sahitya Akadami, New Delhi, and Rs. 2000 by the Gujarat Government for his work *Darśana ane | aur Cintana*.

He was elected President of the Religion and Philosophy Section of the All-Indian Oriental Conference held in Srinagar in 1961. In the same year he was awarded by the President of India a *Certificate of honour* for his scholarship in Sanskrit. In 1963 he was awarded a prize of Rs. 2,000 by the Government of Gujarat for his work *Samadarśi Ācārya Haribhadra*.

Two Universities honoured him with the D. Litt. degree, the Sardar Patel University, Vallabh Vidyanagar, in 1967 and the Saurashtra University in 1973. The title of *Padmabhūṣaṇa* was bestowed upon him by the Government of India in 1974, while in 1975 Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, honoured him with honorary *Vidyāvaridhi* Degree. From among the major works of Pt. Sukhlalji the following deserve special mention :

1. *Ātmānuśāstīkulaka*, (Pkt.)ed. with Gujarati translation and notes (1914-15)
- 2-5 *Karmagrantha*, (Pkt.) by Devendrasūri, ed. with Hindi Tr., Com., Intro. and App. (Agra; 1917-20).
6. *Danḍaka*, (Pkt.) ed. with Hindi Summary, (Agra, 1921).
7. *Pañcapratikramaṇa*, (Pkt.) ed. with Hindi Tr., Com. and Intro., (Agra; 1920).
8. *Yogadarśana* (Skt.) of Patañjali with *Vṛtti* by Yaśovijaya and Haribhadra's *Yogavimśikā* (Pkt.) with Skt. Com. by Yaśovijayji, ed. with Hindi Summary, Com. and Intro. (Agra, 1922).
9. *Sanmatitarka* (Pkt.) by Siddhasena Divākara, with Skt. Com. by Abhayadevasūri ed. (in collaboration with Pt. Becharadasaji Doshi) with notes and appendices, 5 vols., (Ahmedabad, 1925-32), Vol. VI containing the Sanmatitarka (Pkt.) with Gujarati Tr. and explanation and Intro. by Sukhlalji (Ahmedabad, 1932). Vol. VI is translated into Hindi and English.
10. *Jaina Dṛṣṭie Brahmācaryavicāra* (Guj.), in collaboration with Pt. Becharadasji (Ahmedabad).
11. *Tattvārthasūtra* by Umāsvāti, ed. with summary, Com., Intro., (in Gujarati and Hindi), (Ahmedabad, 1930). tr. into English by Dr. K. K. Dixit, (L. D. Series, Ahmedabad, 1979).
12. *Nyāyavatāra* by Siddhasena Divākara (Skt) ed. with Tr., Notes and Intro. (1925).
13. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* by Hemacandra, (Skt.) ed. with Intro., and Notes (Bombay, 1939). Eng. tr. of Intro. and Notes (Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics), Indian Studies, Past and Present, Calcutta, 1961.
14. *Jaina-Tarkabhāṣā* by Yaśovijayaji, (Skt.) ed. with Hindi Intro. and Skt. Notes (Bombay).
15. *Jñānabindu* by Yaśovijayaji, (Skt.) ed. with Hindi Intro. and Skt. Notes (Bombay).
16. *Tattvopaplovasimha* by Jayarāsi Bhaṭṭa, (Skt.) ed. with English Intro. (Baroda, 1940).

17. *Hetubindu* by Dharmakīrti (Skt.) ed. with Com. by Arcaṭa and Sub-Commentary by Durveka Miśra (Baroda, 1949).
18. *Vedavādadvātriṃśikā* by Siddhasena Dīvākara, (Skt.) ed. with summary, Com. (Bombay, 1949). (Hindi translation has also been published in the *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, Bombay).
19. *Ādhyātmika-vikāśakrama* a comparative study of the Jaina conception of spiritual development (Guj.) (Ahmedabad, 1927).
20. *Nigrantha-sampradāya* a study of some historical problems (Hindi), (Benaras, 1947)
21. *Cār Tirthāṅkara* (Hindi and Guj.), a collection of his essays on Ṛsabhadeva, Nemināth, Paṛśvanātha and Mahāvīra (Benaras, 1956).
22. *Dharma aur Samāj* (Hindi), (Bombay, 1951).
23. *Adhyātma-vicāraṇā* (Guj.) (Ahmedabad).
24. *Bhāratiya-Tattvavidyā* (Guj.), (Baroda, 1957), Eng. tr. L. D. Series, (Ahmedabad, 1977).
25. *Darśana ane Cintana* (2 vols.), (Guj.), (Ahmedabad, 1957).
26. *Darśana aur Cintana* (Hindi), (Ahmedabad, 1957).
27. *Samadarśi Ācārya Haribhadra* (Guj., Bombay University), (Hindi. Jodhpur, 1966).
28. *Jaina-Dharmāno Prāṇa* (Guj.), (1962).
29. *Māruṃ Jivanavṛtta* (Autobiography upto 1921) (Guj.), (Parichaya Trust, Bombay, 1981).

*

**STUDIES IN
INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY**

ATTITUDE OF BUDDHA AND EARLY BUDDHISM TOWARDS METAPHYSICS

C. S. Prasad

Some called Buddha agnostic or even nihilist, while some others recognized him as a man with ethical bias and not as a metaphysician. Countering these views it is held that he was well conversant with the metaphysical speculations of his time and was himself a metaphysician of no mean order. Contradictory opinions formed by scholars have had in the background Buddha's silence on certain questions of metaphysical nature. By maintaining silence, Buddha kept himself aloof from entering into the problems of transcendental beyond the empirical or metaphysical substratum underlying the phenomenon or thing-in-itself, although he did not fight shy of discussing such problems as the real nature of things or things as they are in their real nature, the principle regulating the process of becoming, the cessation of individual's process of becoming, the state of cessation (Nirvāṇa) and so on. In course of its development, the Buddhist thought took a round about turn and a section of monks raised the problem of thing-in-itself or substratum behind the phenomenon, though not in the context of soul and body. They formed the school of Realists rightly known as the Sarvāstivāda after their doctrine of 'Sarvamasti—Everything always exists.' The Realists were followed by the Vibhajyavādins (Relativists), the Pudgalavādins and later in Mahāyāna, by the Absolutists of Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda. In this paper we would confine ourselves to assess the attitude of Buddha and Early Buddhism towards metaphysical problems and the *raison d'être* behind Buddha's attitude and behind the change in attitude in Early Buddhism.

SP-1

Buddha's Silence

Buddha is silent on the existence of noumena. In fact, he was asked some questions, to which he declined to reply and on the contrary, he termed them as indeterminables (*Avyākṛtāni*). These questions are set as follows :

1. Whether the *Loka* is eternal or not;
2. Whether the *Loka* is infinite or finite,
3. Whether the Tathāgata exists after death or does not exist or both exists and does not exist or neither exists or does not exist;
4. Whether the *Jiva* is identical with the body or different from it.¹

In the later Buddhist Scriptures, the first and second sets each have two more alternatives—one affirming the thesis and the negative antithesis. The fourth set may also be expanded in the same way. But the number is not so important as their import and Buddha's silence. As stated at the outset, the silence led the scholars to interpret him differently. The import of questions has been brought to light by the great Pali commentator, Buddhaghosa and later by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*. As N. M. Tatia has observed, Buddhaghosa "does not analyse or define the meanings of the words with unmistakable clarity or logical precision." Candrakīrti is faithful to the tradition and his interpretation is logically intelligible. According to the latter, the *Loka* in the first set is to be understood in the sense of totality of individuals and also the world process, whereas in the second set it is limited to 'any particular individual without any particular reference to the world process.'² Thus the first two sets are concerned with eternity or otherwise of the world and the soul. The third set brings to the forefront the question of existence of the soul when a being is liberated and no more. And the fourth set brings in the question of relation between the soul and the body. If both are identical, the soul partakes of the

corporal organism and disintegrates with the destruction of body in death. And if both are different, the soul exists independently of the body, and is thus eternal noumenal entity.

The metaphysical speculations are grounded in the human thirst for the real, permanent, security and have bearing upon the issue of the means and end in spiritual persuasion. As the questions are of far-reaching import and profound religious interest, Buddha's silence throws ample light on his attitude towards the metaphysical problems, though he did not explicitly stated as to why he refused to answer those questions. But necessarily, it was not due to his agnosticism or sheer ethical bias or mere indifference; it was, as Lama Anagarika Govinda puts it, "due to his profound insight into the real nature of things."⁸

Metaphysical Speculations of his time

Buddha was very much conversant with the metaphysical speculations of his time. In the Brahmajāla Sutta, he presented an account of such speculations, sixtytwo in all, advocated by the Eternalists and the Nihilists. They are the assertions regarding the world and the soul and are as follows :

1. The soul and the world are eternal;
2. The soul and the world are partly eternal;
3. The world is infinite or finite;
4. Escape any definite reply by resorting to equivocation;
5. The soul and the world are fortuitous in origin;
6. The soul after death is conscious;
7. The soul after death is unconscious;
8. The soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious;
9. A being is annihilated in death;
10. A being may attain complete salvation in this life.

These speculations deal with more or less the same problems of the eternality of the soul and the world and their antinomies. Commenting on these, Buddha said that the Tathāgata knew how those speculations were arrived at and what

adverse effect they had on the future condition of those who believed in them. He also added that the Tathāgata knew also other things far beyond and having that knowledge he discovered the way of liberation and set himself free. And those other things are 'profound, difficult to understand, tranquilizing, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle comprehensible by the wise.'⁴

Limitation of Media of Knowledge

Buddha did not deny the validity of sensory or extrasensory perceptions as media of knowledge. He himself acquired extrasensory powers and has affirmed that with such powers one can perceive things, even of the past, as they were. But he has also warned against the fact that the things so presented in extrasensory perceptions may not always lead to right inference unless one is objective, free from all attachments including attachment to one's ideas and beliefs, likes and dislikes, and so on. The Brāhmaṇas and Samaṇas, who started with the position that continuity to be a fact, something eternal as substratum or substrata should underlie the ever-changing phenomenal world, inferred the eternality of the soul and the world inductively from the continuous chain of births and deaths running into the past. But the totality of finites is not infinite; going back perceiving births and deaths, however countless in number, of beings would not prove the eternality of the soul and the infinitude of the world, would not lead to the ultimate beginning of the soul and the world. To Buddha, the continuous chain of births and deaths in the past simply suggests the beginninglessness of the process of becoming. It is stated in the scriptures that incalculable is the beginning of the process of becoming, unknown is the extreme end of the process of becoming of individuals working under ignorance and craving.⁵ From the continuity of the chain of births and deaths of individuals, the inference of the eternality of soul as noumenal substratum is a fallacious inductive leap.

The extrasensory perception is not a revelation but a causal occurrence. It is a sort of sensory perception with the difference that at a stage the senses become, through the practice of concentration, so fine, sensitive, penetrating that they can perceive the objects of distant past, ordinarily veiled by the time and space and not perceptible through senses. The objects of the extrasensory perceptions are also of phenomenal world and not of the noumenal world. The noumenon is no object (*aviṣaya*).

In the extrasensory perceptions, the objects are presented as they are in their real nature. Things in their real nature are conditionally originated and in a state of flux; nothing of them remains static even for two consecutive moments. To perceive things as they are in their real nature is not an attainment of the ultimate truth which is to be realised and not to be perceived or abstracted. The acquisition of extrasensory perceptions is not an end in itself, but just a means to an end, the end being the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*. When one gets insight into the real nature of things, one conducts oneself to eliminate all attachments, even attachment to doing good deeds, even attachment to eliminating all attachments. When one's action remains mere action free from motivating factors, good or bad, the state of *Nirvāṇa* is realised. The extrasensory perceptions acquaint us with things in their real nature, but not things in themselves.

Sensory perceptions are the major source of our knowledge, but they are at times elusive. The knowledge so gained is not always of the things as they are in their real nature, unless one has developed an eye to see things as they are in their real nature. When an ordinary person perceives a thing, he perceives it as it appears to him and takes it to be as such. But, when an *Ārya* perceives a things, he perceives it as it is, and therefore does not take it to be as such.⁶

Through logic and reasons also, some reached the same conclusions which were arrived at on the basis of extrasensory

perceptions. Buddha did not deny the validity of logic and reasons as media of knowledge. He asked his disciples not to accept anything whatever its tradition might have been, whoever its advocate might have been, unless it appeals to their logic and reasoning. But he was also conscious of its limitations. It is illustrated amply and clearly in the Suttas that consistency and soundness of reasoning does not guarantee the validity of a conclusion. It so happens that many a time a well argued theory comes out false and an ill-argued theory holds good.

Relative Value of Metaphysical Speculations

Buddha's silence has given occasion to interpret him differently but it has never been taken to mean outright rejection of metaphysical speculations as false. He did not deny their value, although he declared himself to know something far beyond. He accepted them to be partially true when he aptly compared them with the descriptions of elephant by born-blinds as winnowing fan, pillar, etc. As the born-blinds called to see an elephant formed the idea of him from the parts they touched with their hands, the Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas formulated their theories on the basis of what they could arrive at through logic and reasons.⁷

In the formation of the doctrine of no-soul, Buddha was benefitted by the knowledge of the speculators of his time. To quote the Pali sources, the Upaniṣadic thinkers posited a permanent immutable eternal and non-changing (*nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmi*) soul which survives death and goes on transmigrating bearing the moral responsibility of good and bad deeds until one attains final liberation. On the other hand, the Nihilists did not accept the existence of such a soul and advocated disintegration of a being in death and moral inefficacy of deeds. Buddha denied the existence of such a soul giving a sense to continuity or transmigration of beings, but accepted the transmigration and continuity of beings and also accepted the moral responsibility. Seen from the extremists'

position, Buddha seemed to put himself in a paradoxical situation by accepting both the transmigration and moral responsibility and also no-soul. But it is not the case; he explained the continuity of the life process convincingly through the law of *Pratītya Samutpāda* (or the law of dependent origination or the law of causation as may be called in translation).

Futility of Metaphysical Speculations

Buddha was a pragmatist abounding in compassion. Out of compassion, he taught all through his life the way to make an end of sufferings. It had dawned upon him that everything is fraught with suffering; even the very life of an individual is called suffering. Suffering is universal and with impermanence and substancelessness form the threefold character of a thing. In the Scriptures it is said that "impermanent indeed are the composite things; they are of the nature of rising and passing away. Having come into being, they cease to exist."⁸ That which is impermanent is also suffering, because when a thing goes otherwise, the otherwiseness is always seen in relation to I and Mine and consequently there arises the feeling of pain and pleasure. Pleasure also has at its core anxiety for preserving it for ever, hence it is also suffering. That which is impermanent and suffering cannot be thing-in-itself, noumenal entity, hence it is also soulless.⁹

In the scheme for eliminating sufferings and attaining a state free from all sufferings, unveiling the curtain of ignorance is an essential factor and it comprises in developing an insight into the real nature of things or things as they are in their true character and in trying gradually and steadily to eliminate craving for things. Givenness to knowing the ultimate beginning of the world and noumenal substratum or soul is futile, for, as Buddha says, "whether the world is eternal or not, the fact remains that man is suffering."¹⁰ Further the belief in these metaphysical assertions produce adverse effects, for the belief in eternity leads one ultimately to a belief in

the notion of I and Mine, and consequently attachment to oneself and things around and all ills of life. Even the belief in impermanence makes one more engrossed in the world in the vain hope of eliciting maximum pleasure out of life, but the consequent result is more suffering. In either case, the practice of *Brahmacariya* is not possible.¹¹

It is wise to leave the futile attempt to decode metaphysical truths and to work with oneness of mind and in all earnestness for getting rid of sufferings once for all. If one does not do so, one will act like a person pierced with deadly arrow who instead of getting himself treated, uselessly engages himself to know about the person who shot at, etc., before he agrees to be treated. The result of his foolish action would be that before the information is gathered he will pass away. So is the fate of one seeking for a solution of metaphysical problems.¹²

Being aware of the above difficulties and futility of theorising about metaphysical things, Buddha refused to answer the questions put to him. He says that to hold that the world is eternal or to hold that it is not, or to agree to any other of the propositions is "the wilds of views, the wriggling of views, the scuffling of views, the fetter of views; it is accompanied by anguish, distress, misery, fever; it does not conduce to turning away from, nor to dispassion stopping, calming, super knowledge, awakening, nor to nibbāna. I, Vaccha, beholding that this is a peril, thus do not approach any of these (speculative) view."¹³ It is further added that a Tathāgata is free from all speculative views; "by the destruction, dispassion, stopping, giving up, casting out all imaginings, all supposings, all latent pride that 'I am the doer, mine is the doer,' a Tathāgata is freed without clinging."¹⁴

Thirst For Real Transformed

The human thirst for the real has found its expression in the metaphysical speculations aiming at decoding the substratum underlying the phenonemon which gives a sense to

the continuity of the impermanent. Buddha denied the existence of any substratum and explained the continuity of the process of becoming on the basis of the law of causation. The discontinuity of the process of becoming results in tranquillity. He thus transformed the thirst for knowing the real into knowing the things as they are in their real nature, the law of causality at work and the nature of tranquillity.

Buddha did not deny the validity of the experiences of our day-to-day's life. But he asserted what is empirically true is not also ultimately true. All activities are thought in terms of I and Mine — I am born, I shall die. This is mine. I and Mine are mere verbal expressions, not verifiable to any I — substance which is to be born or to die.¹⁵ Buddha had to get his disciples rid of the wrong notion of I and mine. To lay bare this fact, he analysed the phenomenal world and individual into their constituents and showed how the doctrine of causation governs the process of becoming.

The phenomenal world includes both the physical and the conceptual. In the Scriptures, it is represented by twelve *Āyatanas* (spheres) — six senses and six respective objects; or more elaborately by eighteen *Dhātus* (elements) — six senses, six respective objects and six respective consciousnesses. An individual is a complex of *Nāma* (mind) and *Kūpa* (matter), which is further analysed into five *Skandhas* (aggregates), viz., *Vedanā* (feeling), *Saññā* (perception), *Saṅkhāra* (disposition) *Viññana* (consciousness) and *Kūpa* (form). Each of them is again analysed and shown to be subject to rise and fall. But the passion for analysis did not stop here and in the formative period of Abhidharma (Abhidhamma), an individual is seen ultimately reduced to indivisible units of function, potency, energy, etc. Each of these units is called *Dharma*, generally translated as element.

The law of causation brings in the notion of becoming. As a universal principle it applies to all spheres, viz., physical, conceptual, spiritual and moral, and is presented in the

form of 'it being so, it will so happen; it not being so, it will not so happen.'¹⁶ Because of its universal application it is equated with the Dhamma itself; one who perceives the law of causation perceives the Dharma.¹⁷

In its specific application, it brings in the notion of dependent origination and explains the cycle of individual's birth and death, given in the form of a wheel with twelve spokes. It generally begins with *Avijjā* (ignorance) and ends with *Jarāmaraṇa* (oldage, death), and is followed by *Samkhāra* (disposition), *Viññāna* (conception-consciousness), *Nāma-rūpa* (mind and body), *Salāyatana* (six senses), *Phassa* (contact), *Vedanā* (feeling), *Taṇhā* (craving), *Upādāna* (grasping), *Bhava* (process of becoming) and *Jāti* (birth) in between. Of these twelve factors, the preceding one becomes an antecedent to the succeeding one. *Avijjā* in the past leads to the formation of dispositions which again lead to the conception in the present; then follow the other factors, one after the other in succession, upto *Bhava*, which is here the determination of the process of becoming in the future. After death there again comes the *Jāti* and *Jarāmaraṇa*. In the reverse order, if *Avijjā* is removed, the formation of *Samkhāras* will stop and then the other factors one after the other will stop. The roots of the process of becoming (ignorance and craving) being uprooted, the process of becoming will thus be cut off and the sufferings of life will thus be eradicated once for all.

The tranquillity is attained in *Nirvāṇa Nirvāṇa* literally means 'without craving'; it is a state free from ignorance, craving, suffering, birth and death, but it is not a void. It is best illustrated by the simile of a flame blown out.¹⁸ But what happens to the stream of life-process of an individual when he is liberated and no more? As we have seen at the outset, it brings in one of the questions which Buddha declined to answer. However, the nature of the state of *Nirvāṇa* has been discussed at a great length; it is to be realised in this very life and the realisation is a state of peace (*santam-padam*), a state of immortality (*amatam padam*).

Back To Metaphysical Speculations

There is no soul beyond the cognizables. Eagerness to lay bare the non-existence of soul in the complex of body and mind, Buddha's disciples went on analysing this complex into psychophysical constituents and developed an intricate system of elements. These elements are the smallest, indivisible but distinct units. But reaching this stage, the thirst for the real impelled them to enquire into what these elements in themselves are and this marked the process of breaking into and developments of philosophical schools of Buddhist thought.

Inconsistency in conceiving the units of function, potencies, etc. without substrata was felt and a section of the Buddhist community recognized as the Sarvāstivādins accepted the elements as reals. These elements are, for them, simple, discrete, separate entities existing in their own right in all the three divisions of time – past, present and future, But, as we have seen above, the elements are the result of intricate analysis of an individual and they are utmost the ultimates in analysis. To accept the ultimates in analysis as the ultimates in reality amounts to a kind of misplaced reality. The Sarvāstivādins met this criticism by differentiating between the elements and their functions, modes (*Kāritra*). The elements are reals and are precisely distinguished through their functions or modes. An element rises to function, stays and ceases to function. Rising, staying and ceasing to function constitutes the smallest units of time called a moment. After a moment's function, an element becomes antecedent to another element's course of functioning and in this sense the process of becoming is momentary (*Kṣaṇika*). There is no discontinuance of of the process of becoming (*Kṣaṇābhāṅga*).

The functioning of elements account for their transition from one state to another. An element is called past when it has ceased to function, it is called present when it is functioning, and it is called future when it has not risen to function.

But a change in the state of functioning does not in any way affect the elements themselves; whether they function or not, they exist in their own right.¹⁹ Functioning of an element simply means its coming into a combination (*Saṅghāta*) with other elements complying with the principle of causes and conditions (*Hetupratyaya*).

The Sarvāstivādins' doctrine of elements is a sort of Realism and is subject to similar criticisms which a realistic doctrine is. The elements' rising to function and forming a combination bring in the question of necessity for them to do so. The Sarvāstivādins point to the element of *Jāti*, but itself being an element it needs another element of *Jāti* to make it rise to function, and this leads to infinite regress. The Sarvāstivādins also bring in the elements of *Prāpti* and *Aprāpti-Prāpti* is "a force which controls the collection of elements in an individual stream of life" and *Aprāpti* is "a force which occasionally keeps some elements in abeyance in an individual *santāna*,"²⁰ but they lead to infinite regress, too.

The Sarvāstivādins accepted the *Pudgalanairātmya* (substanceless character of individual) advocated by Buddha, but their realistic doctrine violated the spirit of *Anātmavāda*. In the Council held at Pāṭaliputra, the orthodox Theravādins opposed them and declared Buddha to have been a *vibhajjavādi*. *Vibhajjavāda* is a line of analysis and relativity as a basis of approach to understanding and stating the nature of things. There sprang up several schools, one by the name of *Vibhajjavāda*, which constructed their doctrine of elements on the line of *vibhajya*.²¹ The Theravādins hold that the elements which are resultants and result-producing functions, have only relative conditional existence, that is, so long they are capable of producing results.²² The time an element takes in discharging its function is called present (*Paccupanna*), so the elements exist in the present only.²³ According to the Kāśyapiyas, not all of the past and the future elements but a part of the past elements which have not borne fruits and a part of the future elements whose course has been determined, do exist.²⁴ And

according to the Vibhajyavādins, the present elements and those of the past which have not exhausted their fruits do exist and those of the past elements which have exhausted their fruits and the future elements do not exist.²⁵ Refuting the Kāsyapiyas, the Theravādins argue that the past and future elements are mere names, verbal expressions : the past elements that have ceased, gone otherwise neither exist nor will exist and the future elements that have not yet been born, come into being, neither existed nor exist. To say that the past ceased elements with immature results and the future unborn elements with potent results exist, is self-contradictory.²⁶ Unlike the Sarvāstivādins' doctrine of elements, the others' doctrine of elements accept the efficiency of producing result as a criterion of existence; the elements do not exist in their own right, their existence is conditional relative to their efficiency to produce a result.

In their zeal for analysis and classification in order to drive away the wrong notion of self, the Ābhīdharmists reduced the personality of an individual to a mechanical combination of elements. But just as a chariot is not simply a combination of different parts, but an organism or a result of parts combined in an organismic whole, so also the personality of an individual is, apart from being a combination, an organismic whole. The Pudgalavādins accepted a type of organismic personality.²⁷

The current of life of an individual is flowing uninterrupted till death. The consciousness arising at the time of death (*Cuticitta*) is succeeded by the consciousness of conception (*Paṭisandhi viññāna*) which is also known as *Gandhabba* precisely in this context. The conception in the mother's womb is possible when the *Gandhabba* coincides with the other two factors—mother being in the period of fertility and there being an union of her with her man.²⁸ After copulation, the fertilized period extends for several days during which the consciousness of conception, which is a momentary flash, is combined with the matter (*Rūpa*). In the development of the Ābhīdharmika

systems, the tenet of *Antarābhava* was put forward; it is a period of suspension between the moment of death and the moment of conception in the mother's womb. In this period the current of life-process flows without any physical support until it is suitably combined.²⁹ The conception of *Antarābhava* enhances the possibility of suitable combination, for the period during which a combination is formed becomes lengthened.

It is not in the scope of this paper, but we may spare a little space to the trend of Absolutism in the later Buddhist thought of Mahāyāna – Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda. Through the method of *reductio ad absurdum*, the Mādhyamika showed the absurdities in holding a position of realism or otherwise. The positions of 'is, is not, both is and is not, and neither is or is not' are the categories of knowledge and the Absolute which is not relative to the relative, is not to be known through any of these categories of knowledge and so they do not hold any position of their own. For them the Absolute is termed variously as *Śūnyatā*, *Nirvāṇa*, etc., is neither different nor identical with *Samsāra*; the difference between the two lies in looking at things.

To accept the Absolute without holding a position of one's own, though not lacking in consistency, was feared to lead to a life of inaction in practical life. The Absolute of Mādhyamika was substituted by a sort of subjective idealism in the Vijñānavāda which accepted 'Consciousness only' as the ultimate truth, and as Absolute. The external world is the transformation of the consciousness and this consciousness, when purified to the extent to remain 'Consciousness only', is realisation of Absolute, *Nirvāṇa*.

Conclusion

Concluding the discussions, we may say that Buddha by denying the existence of soul denuded the phenomena of their metaphysical substratum. He was allergic to the metaphysical speculations because of epistemological difficulties involved and their futility, inconduciveness to the immediate

problem of eliminating sufferings in life and hence to the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*. He tried to keep his disciples away from whiling away their time in such speculations and to divert the attention to working in all earnestness for their *Nirvāṇa*. But the method of analysis which Buddha took recourse to for exhibiting the non-substantiality of individual, which his disciples carried to its extreme in constructing the doctrine of elements, recoiled to bring in again the question of substantiality of elements. The Sarvāstivādins accepted the elements as reals and this generated much heat in the Buddhist community and gave filip to the development of Buddhist thought and philosophical schools. The Buddha's attitude towards metaphysical speculations changed in favour of speculative philosophy in Early Buddhism and later in Mahāyāna.

Notes

- 1 *Majjhima Nikāya* (Roman ed.). pp. 427-18 : Cūla Māluṅkya Sutta,
- 2 "The Avyākṛtas or Indeterminables" in *The Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication Volume II* (Nalanda, 1960), pp. 142-43.
- 3 *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* 2nd imp., (London, 1970). p. 40.
- 4 *Digha Nikāya* (Roman ed.), pp. 16-17; *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, trans. T. W. Rhys Davids, Reprint, (London, 1956), pp. 29-30.
- 5 *Samyutta Nikāya* (Roman ed.), II, pp. 178, 187 sq. : Anamataggoyamaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro. Pubbakoṭi na paññāyati avijjānivaranaṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṃhāsamyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarataṃ.
- 6 *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 1, 4 : Idha bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano... paṭhavim paṭhavito sañjānāti, paṭhavim paṭhavito sañjānātva paṭhavim maññati. Yo pi so bhikkhave bhikkhu arhaṃ khmāsavo paṭhavim paṭhavito abhijānāti, paṭhavim paṭhavito abhiññāya paṭhavim na maññati'ti.
- 7 *Khuddaka Nikāya* (Deva Nāgari ed), I, pp. 143-45.
- 8 *Digha Nikāya*, II, p. 157 : Aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino uppajjitvā nirujjhanti tesam upasamo sukho'ti.
- 9 *Samyutta Nikāya*, IV, p. I : Yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ, yaṃ dukkhaṃ tadanattā, yadanattā taṃ netam mama nesohamasmiṃ, na me so attā'ti.

- 10 *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 430 : Sassato loko'ti Māluṅkyaputta diṭṭhiyā sati asassato loko'ti va diṭṭhiyā sati attheva jāti, atthi jarā, atthi maraṇaṃ, santi sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyasa'ti.
- 11 *Ibid.*, I, p. 430 : Sassato loko ti Māluṅkyaputta diṭṭhiyā sati...Asassato loko ti Māluṅkyaputta diṭṭhiyā sati brahmacariyavāso abhavissati.
- 12 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 428-30.
- 13 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 485-6 : Sassato loko ti kho,... Vaccha, diṭṭhigataṃ etaṃ diṭṭhigahaṇaṃ diṭṭhikantāro diṭṭhivisukaṃ sapaṇilāhaṃ, na nibbidāya na virāgāya na nibbānāya samvattati.
- 14 *Ibid.*, I, p. 486 : Diṭṭhigataṃ ti kho Vaccha apanitaṃ etaṃ Tathā-gatassa. . Tasmā Tathāgato sabbamaññitānaṃ sabbamathitānaṃ sabba-ahimkāramamīkāra manānusayanaṃ khayavirāga nirodha cāgā palini-saggā anupādā vimutto'ti vadāmi.
- 15 *Digha Nikāya*, I, p. 202 : Ima kho loko samaññā loko niruttiyā loka-vohārā lokapaññātiyo. ya hi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasanti.
- 16 *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 32 : Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjati; imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.
- 17 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 190-91 : Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādam passati'i.
- 18 *Khuddaka Nikāya*, I, p. 303 : Nibbanti dhira yathāyaṃ padipo.
- 19 *Sphuṭārthā*, ed. U. Wogihara (Tokyo, 1934), p. 470 : Yasyāṃ avasthāyāṃ so dharmah karitraṃ karoti. tasyāṃ anāgatā ucyte. yasyāṃ karoti, tasyāṃ vartamānaḥ. yasyāṃ kṛtvā niruddhaḥ. tasyāṃ atīta ity avasthāṃ avasthāṃ prāpya anyo'nyo nirdiśyate...avasthāntaraḥ. na dravyāntaraḥ itī abhinna-lakṣano'nāgatādyavasthā-prāpto'nāgat'ādi-śabdānirdeśaḥ kevalaṃ bhavatītyarthaḥ.
- 20 Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Third Edition. Calcutta, 1961), pp. 90-91.
- 21 C.S.Prasad, 'Theravāda and Vibhajjavāda: A Critical Study of the Two Appellations' in *East and west*, March-June 1972; 'Vibhajjavāda An Examination into Its Identity as a Separate School' in *Transactions of the International Conference of Orientalists in Japan*, No. XVII, 1972.
- 22 *Milindapañho*, ed. R.D.Vadekar (Bombay, 1940), p. 52 : Ye dhammā vipākā ye vipāka dhammadhammā ye ca aññatra paṭisandhi deti so addhā atthi.
- 23 *Majjhima Nikāya*, III, p. 187 : Yadatītaṃ bahinaṃ taṃ, paṇiṇaṇṇaṃ appattaṃ ca anāgataṃ. Paccuppanaṃ ca yo dhammaṃ, tatha tatha vi passati.

- 24 *Kathāvatthu* (Deva Nagari ed.) pp. 143-47
- 25 *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya*, ed. P.Pradhan (Patna, 1967), v 25c-d : Ye tu kiñcid asti yat pratyutpannam adattaphalam cā 'titam kamma, kiñcin nāsti yad dattaphalam atitānāgatam ceti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajyavādinaḥ.
- 26 *Samyutta Nikāya*, III. pp. 71-72 : Yam bhikkhave, rupam atitam niruddham vipariṇatam....na tassa saṅkhā 'atthi' ti, na tassa saṅkhā 'bhavissati' ti.....Yam, bhikkhave, rupam ajātam apātubhūtam..na tassa saṅkhā 'atthi' ti 'na tassa saṅkhā 'ahosi' ti.
Kathāvatthu, pp. 145, 146 ; Na vattabbam—'atita-avipakkavipākadhammate atthi' ti; Na vattabbam—' anāgata-uppādinō dhammā ajātā-te atthi' ti.
Milindapañha, p. 52 : Ye te mahāraja saṅkhārā atitā vigatā niruddhā vipariṇatā so addhā natthi.
- 27 K. Venkataramanan, 'Sāmmitiyanikāya Sāstra' in *Visva-Bharati Annals*, vol. V, pp. 135-242. 'Did the Buddha Deny the Self' in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XXVIII, No. 4.
- 28 *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, pp. 265 sq. : Yato ca kho, bhikkhave, mātapitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca utuni hoti, gandhabbo ca paccupaṭṭhito hoti evam tinnam sannipātā gabbhssāvakkanti.
- 29 *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya*. ch. III, v. 10 ; Gamyadesānupetatvānnopapanno antarābhavaḥ.



A NOTE ON ATTĀ IN THE ALAGADDŪPAMA-SUTTA

K. R. Norman

So much has been written¹ about the Buddhist view of *attā* that it may be thought unnecessary for anything further to be written about it. Nevertheless, although a number of scholars have commented upon the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*(=AS)², it seems to have escaped the notice of them that in that sutta the Buddha makes certain comments about *attā* in the context of a refutation of particular non-Buddhist philosophical doctrine. It seems worthwhile discussing these comments in detail, and considering whether they are applicable to the other contexts in which *attā* occurs in the Pāli canon. Such a discussion may be of help to those who still find difficulty with the Buddhist interpretation of *attā*.

In the AS the Buddha states that there are six *diṭṭhi-ṭṭhānāni*. The first of these is when an untrained person says when regarding *rūpa* : *etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me attā*, 'That is mine, I am that, that is my *attā*'.³ The second is when he says the same thing about *vedanā*; the third, about *saññā*; the fourth, about *saṃkhārā*; the fifth, about whatever is *diṭṭha suta muta viññāta patta pariyesita anuvicarita manasā*; the sixth is when he regards the view *so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṃ tath' eva ṭhassāmi*, 'The world and the *attā* are the same; having passed away I shall be eternal, fixed, everlasting, of an unchangeable nature; I shall remain for ever exactly so' as *etaṃ mama, eso 'ham asmi, esa me attā*.

Here then we have six wrong views, this being the usual meaning of *diṭṭhi*. It is wrong to look at material form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, sensory perceptions (elsewhere

this group of five khandhas has the word *viññāṇa* in place of the list of words given above), and the last mentioned view with the thought 'That is mine, I am that, that is my *attā*'.

To take the last view first. The idea that the world and the *ātman* (=brahman) are the same is found in the Upaniṣads, and it is possible to find actual verbal echoes of the Upaniṣads in this passage,⁴ e.g. *eṣa ma ātmā* (Chānd. Up. III. 14. 3-4), and *yathākratur asmiml loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati, sa kratum kurvita.. etam itaḥ pretyābhisambhavitāsmi* (ibid. III. 14. 1 and 4).

In contrast to this false view the Buddha states that someone who is cognisant with the *ariya-dhama* looks at *rūpa* etc. with the thought: *na etaṃ mama n' eso 'ham asmi, na m' eso attā*,⁵ 'That is not mine, I am not that, that is not my *attā*'. Consequently he is not anxious about something which does not exist.

The Buddha's audience ask if it is possible to be anxious about something which does not exist externally. The Buddha points out that it would be possible for someone to be anxious about an external object which he once possessed but which now no longer existed. He is then asked whether there might be no anxiety about something which did not exist externally. The answer is 'Yes'. The third question is whether there might be anxiety about something which does not exist internally. The Buddha quotes the case of a man who holds the view that the world and the *attā* are the same, and that after passing away he will become eternal, fixed, etc. He hears the *dhamma* which is taught for the destruction of such wrong views, and thinks, 'I shall surely be annihilated, I shall surely be destroyed I shall surely not be in the future' (*ucchiḥḥissāmi nāma su, vinassissāmi nāma su, na su nāma bhavissāmi*). His grief for this is grief for something which does not exist internally. Someone who does not hold this view does not think that he will be annihilated when he hears the Buddha's doctrine, and therefore does not grieve for something which does not exist internally.

The Buddha then continues : ‘ You might obtain a possession which, being eternal, fixed, etc., might last for ever. Can you see that possession which, being eternal, fixed, etc., might last for ever ? ’ The audience agree with the Buddha that they cannot see such a possession. He says : ‘ You might embrace a view of the doctrine of *attā*, for whose embracers grief etc, would not arise. Can you see such a view ? ’ They agree that they cannot. ‘ You might depend upon a view where grief etc, does not arise for those who depend upon it. Can you see such a view ? ’ Again they agree that they cannot.

The Buddha has therefore suggested, and his audience has agreed, that there is no possession which would last for ever, nor is there any doctrine of *attā* nor dependence upon a view which does not bring grief to those who hold it. No proof of this is offered, and the statement seems to be purely empirical. Neither the Buddha nor his audience have seen anything which is eternal, nor they have seen a doctrine which frees an adherent from grief. They have, therefore, agreed that everything is *anicca* and *dukkha*, and nothing is *nicca* and *sukha*. We shall see the importance of this below.

The Buddha then goes on to consider *attā*. He states : ‘ If *attā* existed, could there be the view “ I possess something belonging to *attā* ” (*attani vā sati, attaniyam me ti assa*) ? ’ They agree. He continues : ‘ If something belonging to *attā* existed, would it be possible to have the view “ I possess *attā* ” (*attaniye sati, attā me ti assa*) ? ’ They agree. He asks : ‘ If *attā* and something belonging to *attā* really and truly cannot be found, then is not the view that the world and the *attā* are the same, and that after passing away one will be eternal..., entirely the view of a fool ? ’ ‘ How can it be otherwise ? ’

The Buddha then proceeds with his proof. He asks : ‘ Is material form eternal or non-eternal ? ’ His audience state that it is non-eternal, presumably basing their answer on their experience of life, where material form all around them decays. ‘ But ’, says the Buddha, ‘ is what is non-eternal *dukkha* or *sukha* ? ’ The answer is *dukkha*, again presumably based

upon experience of life. The Buddha concludes : ‘ What is impermanent and *dukkha* and subject to change, is it right to look at that and say, ‘That is mine, I am that, that is my *attā* ?’ The answer is ‘No.’

It is important to note that this answer can only be given by those who know, in advance, that the term *attā* is by definition *nicca* and *sukha*, and therefore anything which is *anicca* and *dukkha* cannot be *attā*. This gives us a clear indication of the type of *attā* which is being discussed. It is the Upaniṣadic idea of an *ātman* which is *nitya* and *sukha*, and this is in complete agreement with the fact, noted above, that some of the phraseology of the non-Buddhist view which is being rejected has Upaniṣadic echoes. It seems undeniable that the Buddha’s audience were aware of the Upaniṣadic view, and realised that it could be refuted simply by pointing out that the world around us, which consists of material form, etc., is obviously non-eternal and *dukkha*, and not eternal and *sukha*, as would be essential if the doctrine that the world and the *attā* are the same were correct.

The Buddha then asks his audience the same question about being *anicca* or *nicca*, and *sukha* or *dukkha*, of *vedanā*, *saññā*, *saṃkhārā*, and finally *viññāṇa* (which here replaces the list of sense impressions given above), i.e. the five khandhas. He sums up by stating that the khandhas are properly to be regarded as ‘that is not mine, I am not that, that is not my *attā*.’ He tells his audience that an *ariya-sāvaka* who sees this is freed, and becomes *vimutta-citta*, i.e. he is a Tathāgata.

The Buddha then exhorts his audience to abandon what is ‘not yours’ (*yaṃ na tumhākaṃ taṃ pajahatha*) In answer to his own question ‘what is not yours?’, he explains that those things which he had already spoken of as being ‘not mine’, i.e. the five khandhas, were not theirs. That is to say that he is rephrasing his earlier statement that *rūpa*, etc., were (from their point of view) not ‘mine’.

As a final proof of the fact that the khandhas are not their *attā*, i. e. a final refutation of the view that the external world and the khandhas and the *attā* are the same around thing, he points to the wood being collected and burned them in the Jetavana, where the discussion is taking place, and he asks his audience if they think, when people do this, that they are carrying them (his audience) away and burning them. The answer is 'No', and the reason is that they do not have *attā* or anything belonging to *attā* in them. The Buddha closes by saying that they are to abandon everything which is not theirs, and what is not theirs is *rūpa*, etc.

We are now in a position to assess the basis of the Buddha's refutation. The doctrine that the world and the *attā* are the same (*so loko so attā*) also affirms the oneness of the individual *attā* and the world-*attā*. The phrase *eso 'ham asmi* 'I am that' is the *tat tvam asi* 'Thou art that' of the Upaniṣada looked at from the point of view of the first person instead of the second person. Since *loko=attā*, then the Buddha's argument is : 'If there is world-*attā*, then there is something belonging to world-*attā* in me. If there is something belonging to world-*attā* in me, i.e. if there is a world-*attā*, then I (and all other things) would have *attā* which is part of the world-*attā*, and I would have all the "things" that go to make up world-*attā*. Material form (*rūpa*), etc., would be "mine". If, however, each individual *attā* were part of the world-*attā*, then each painful sensation felt by one part of the world-*attā* would be felt by every other part of the world-*attā*, i.e. when wood is burned the *attā* in us would feel the pain suffered by the *attā* in it. We do not feel any such pain because there is no world-*attā*'.

E. J. Thomas seems to have overlooked this reference to the world-*attā* when he wrote : 'The Vedic religion had developed on the philosophical side into the doctrine of the soul (*ātman*) as an ultimate reality, either as the one universal soul, or as an infinity of souls involved in matter. Buddhism appears to know only this second form...., and this it denied by

asserting that there was nothing behind the physical and mental elements that constitute the empirical individual'. Richard Gombrich, in his review of Bhattacharya's book *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien*, states⁷ that 'in his voluminous sermons [the Buddha] never mentions the world soul, either under one of its Upaniṣadic names or under any other', but as Choudhury stated, 'The meaning [in AS] is not clear if the word is not used as universal Self'.⁸

It is interesting at this point to indicate a close parallel to the rejection of the Upaniṣadic view in a Jain text. We find in *Sūyagaḍaṃga* I.I.I. the following pair of verses :

- (9) *jahā ya puḍhavi-thūbhe ege nāṇāhi dīsai*
evam bho kasiṇe loe vinnū nāṇāhi dīsai.
- (10) *evam ege tti jappanti mandā ārambha-nissiyā*
ege kiccā sayam tivvaṃ dukkham niyacchai.

'And as the mass of earth, with all its manifold nature, is seen as one, so the whole world, with all its manifold nature, is seen as the intelligent principle. Some fools, intent upon their (bad) activities, say that it is so with the individual. (But) the individual who does an evil deed goes himself to a harsh misery'.

The Cties upon *Sūyagaḍaṃga* call this view *ekātmādvaita* and *ātmādvaitavāda*⁹, and Jacobi explains¹⁰ : 'If there were but one *ātman* common to all men, the fruit of works done by one man might accrue to another. For the *ātman* is the substratum of merit and demerit'. Although it is expressed somewhat succinctly, it is clear that the last line is intended as a refutation of the idea set out in the first verse – that there is a world-*ātman* (*vinṇū=ātman*) which appears in different forms. The refutation follows the line that if this were so then every one who partook of the world-*ātman* would be jointly responsible for any evil committed by any other portion of the world-*ātman*, i.e. any other 'individual'. Our experience of the world, in which we see individuals being punished or rewarded for demerit or merit performed earlier, proves that this is not so.

Not only is it of interest to find Buddhist and Jain text giving a similar argument when rejecting the *ātman* theory, but it is also helpful as a means of assessing exactly what sort of *ātman* the Buddha was rejecting in the AS. The Jains differ from the Buddhists in that they do believe in a personal *ātman*, although not an unchanging one. The *ātman* being rejected in the *Sūyagaḍaṅga* is therefore the world-*ātman*. The close similarity of the two arguments makes it clear that the Buddha in the AS is not merely refuting the individual *ātman*, but also the concept of the world-*ātman*.

It is noteworthy that the argument used by the Buddha in the AS to refute the idea of a world-*attā* form part of the proof put forward in the *Anattalakkhaṇasutta*,¹² traditionally the second sermon he preached after the enlightenment, to show that the five khandhas are *anattā* 'non-*attā*'.¹² In that sermon he states : 'Material form (*rūpa*) is non-*attā*, for if it were *attā* then it would not be conducive to disease and we should have complete mastery over it'. Similarly for the other khandhas. He continues : 'Is *rūpa* eternal or non-eternal ? Is something which is non-eternal pleasant or unpleasant ? Is it right to regard something which is non-eternal, unpleasant and subject to change as " That is mine, I am that, that is my *attā* " ?'

As in the AS, the Buddha's ability to reject the idea that the khandhas are *attā* depends upon his audience knowing that *attā* is, by definition, *nicca* and *sukha*. If it were, then we should not suffer disease (which is *dukkha*), and if the *rūpa*, etc., were *attā* then it would be 'ours' and we should have full control over it. All this proves that the khandhas are not *attā*, they are *anattā* 'non-*attā*'.

The same argument that something is *anattā* because it is non-eternal is also seen in the *Chachakka-sutta*,¹³ where the Buddha states : ' If anyone should say that eye, etc., is *attā*, then that is not fitting, for the coming into existence of eye, and its passing away, is seen. Since it is not fitting

to say of something whose coming into existence and passing away is seen "My *attā* comes into existence and passes away", therefore eye is non-*attā*'.

Buddhaghosa points out¹⁴ that the Buddha proves the fact of non-*attā* in three ways : sometimes by showing that something is non-eternal; sometimes by showing that it is *dukkha*; and sometimes by both. So in the *Anattalakkhaṇa sutta* he shows that *rūpa* etc. are *dukkha*; in the *Chachakka sutta* by showing that eye, etc., are *anicca*; in the *Arahanta-sutta*¹⁵ he shows that *rūpa*, etc., are both : *rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ; yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkham; yaṃ dukkham tad anattā. yad anattā, taṃ n' etaṃ mama n' eso 'ham asmi na m' eso attā* The same argument is set out in its simplest form in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* : *yaṃ aniccaṃ, taṃ dukkham; yaṃ aniccaṃ ca dukkhaṃ ca, taṃ anattā.*¹⁶

As is well known, the three terms *anicca*, *dukkha*, and *anattā* also occur in the *ti-lakkhaṇa* formula :¹⁷

*sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā,
sabbe saṃkhārā dukkhā,
sabbe dhammā anattā.*

'All compounded things are non-eternal, all compounded things are unpleasant, all things are non-*attā*'. In a truncated form this occurs as *sabbe saṃkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā.*¹⁸

Our previous conclusions enable us to see that the third phrase of the formula is a conclusion which arises from the first two phrases : 'Because all compounded things are non-eternal and unpleasant, therefore all things are non-*attā*'. The difference between *saṃkhārā* and *dhammā* in this context has been well explained by Nyanatiloka :¹⁹ '[*saṅkhāra*] in the sense of anything formed (= *saṅkhata*), or created, includes all things whatever in the world, all phenomena of existence. It is, however subordinate to the still wider and all-embracing term '*dhamma*' (thing), for *dhamma* includes even the Unoriginated ('*Nibbāna*').' So *dhamma* includes all the *saṅkhata* things (= *saṅkhārā*) which are *anicca* and *dukkha*, and also the

asaṅkhata thing (=nibbāna) which is *nicca* and *sukha*. All these are non-*attā*. The distinction between the two is made in the Vinaya : *aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhānattā ca saṅkhatā, nibbānañ c' eva paññatti anattā iti nicchayā*,²⁰ 'Impermanent are all constructs painful, not self, and constructed, and certainly *nibbāna* is a description meaning not-self'.²¹

The *saṅkhārā* are, of course, *anattā* as is made clear from such statements as *sabba-saṅkhāresu aniccaṃ anattā ti ti-lakkhaṇam āropetvā*,²² but the possibility of adding the *asaṅkhata nibbāna* to the *saṅkhatā saṅkhārā* arises because although *nibbāna* is neither *anicca* nor *dukkha*, it is nevertheless *anattā*.²³

If there had been any other reference in the Pāli canon to the world-*attā* besides the one in the AS, we might have expected it to be with reference to the *saṅkhārā*, but even when referring to these the Buddha's followers seem to have regarded their *anattā* nature from the ego-centric point of view, i.e. from the point of view of the individual *attā*. So we find the Buddha stating *ayaṃ kāyo aniccato dukkhato . . parato . . anattato samanupassitabbo*,²⁴ 'This body is to be regarded as non-eternal, as unpleasant,...as other...as non-self'. The Thera Mahāmoggallāna stated—

*ye pañca khandhe passanti parato no ca attato;
ye ca passanti saṅkhāre parato no ca attato.*²⁵

'Who see the five khandhas as other not as self; and who see compounded things as other not as self'.

The commentary upon Mahāmoggallāna's verses makes it clear that there is no effective difference between *parato* and *anattato*; *parato ti anattato, tassa attaggāha-paṭikkhepa-dassanaṃ h' etaṃ*²⁶ These passages which include the word *parato* offer us help in the problem of deciding how best to translate the word *attā*. There seems to be no other way of translating *parato* than 'as other', and we must therefore translate *attato* as 'as self', since English recognises the opposition between 'self' and 'other', but not between 'soul'

and 'other'. If we have to translate *attā* as 'self' in these contexts, then for the sake of consistency we must do the same elsewhere. To distinguish it from the normal reflexive use of 'self' for *attā*, which is, of course, widely used in *Pāli*, we should rather adopt the translation 'permanent self' for the individual *attā* whose existence the Buddha rejected.

As E. J. Thomas states,²⁷ in the *Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta* the Buddha does not specifically deny the existence of the *attā*. The sutta is merely a denial that the khandhas were *ātman*, whatever that term means. It may be true to say that the Buddha does not specifically deny the existence of the *attā* anywhere in the Pāli canon, in the sense that he does not state explicitly 'The *attā* does not exist'. As stated above, however, in the AS he does speak of the men who grieves over the loss of his *attā* as grieving about something which does not exist internally. He also draws attention to the folly of someone who holds the view that the world and the *attā* are the same if it can be shown that *attā* and some thing belonging to *attā* are not to be found, and he then goes on to prove to the satisfaction of his audience that they are not to be found.

I think it is correct to conclude that by implication, if not explicitly, the Buddha denied the existence of the permanent individual self-

Notes

- 1 Abbreviations of Pāli texts are those adopted by the *Critical Pāli Dictionary* (=CPD). Editions quoted are those of the Pali Text Society. Cties=commentaries.
- 2 M I 130-42.
- 3 The Pāli word *attā* is usually translated as either 'self' or 'soul'. I leave it untranslated here, but try to decide between the two at the end of this article.
- 4 I think E. J. Thomas is too cautious when he states: 'There may be here some reference to upanishadic doctrine, though it is still not the identity of self and Brahma' (*History of Buddhist Thought*, London 1933, p. 103).

- 5 Some editors, e.g. at Vin I 14, 19, read *na me so attā*. This is shown to be incorrect by the positive *eso me attā*, and by the Sanskrit version : *naitan mama, naiṣo' ham asmi, naiṣa me ātmeti* (JRBS 1907, p. 376)
- 6 E. J. Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, London 1927, p. 35.
- 7 *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, 1978, pp. 128-29.
- 8 R. P. Choudhury, 'Interpretation of the "Anatta" doctrine of Buddhism: a new approach', *IHQ* XXXI (1955), p. 58, n. 23.
- 9 Referred to by W. B. Bollee, *Studien zum Sūyagada*, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 63
- 10 H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras Part II*, Oxford 1895, p. 237. n. 2.
- 11 Vin I 13-14.
- 12 *Pali-English Dictionary* takes *anattā* to be both a noun and an adjective. *CPD* takes it as a noun, but points out that the *Cties* alternatively take it as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound. Choudhury (op. cit., p. 53) emphasises that it is a *Karmadhāraya* compound in which the word remains as a noun, although (grammatically speaking) when it is in agreement with a plural subject it could be an adjective.
- 13 M III 280-87
- 14 Ps II 114, 24-25.
- 15 S III 82-83.
- 16 Paṭis II 106, 13-15.
- 17 e.g. at Dhp 277-79=Th 676-78.
- 18 e.g. at M I 228, 13-15=S III 133, 1-2.
- 19 Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, Colombo 1950, s.v. saṅkhāra(4).
- 20 Vin 86, 3-4.
- 21 I. B. Horner, *Book of the Discipline*, VI, London 1966, p. 123.
- 22 Ja I 275, 22'-23'
- 23 See also I. B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, I, London 1954, p. 281, n. 2.
- 24 M. 500,1 foll.
- 25 Th 1160-61. Cf. *saṅkhāre parato ñatvā dukkhato no ca attato*, A II 18, 10.
- 26 Th-a III 168, 30-31.
- 27 E. J. Thomas, *History of Buddhist Thought*, London, 1933, p. 101, n. 2.

*

MATERIALISM, IDEALISM AND DUALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

K. K. Dixit

In Indian philosophy we come across three distinct trends of thought in connection with answering the question as to which among matter and mind (also called 'soul') is the primary reality. Thus here there arose the materialist Lokāyata school which advocated the primacy of matter over mind, the idealist Vijñānavāda Buddhist school and the lot of idealist Vedānta schools which advocated the primacy of mind over matter and the rest of the schools (including the Madhvide Vedānta school) which maintained that matter and mind are two co-eternal reals; (in this classification the nihilist Śūnyavāda Buddhist school constitutes a class by itself inasmuch as it repudiates the reality of matter as well as mind). It is the schools of Indian philosophy positing matter and mind as two co-eternal reals which we propose to designate 'dualist' and the hope is that the proposal will meet with no serious opposition. The question worth considering is as to what contribution was made by the materialist, idealist and dualist schools of Indian philosophy towards the solution of the so many outstanding problems of philosophy in general. Let us take up the three cases one by one.

The materialist Lokāyata school vehemently contested the position that mind is an independent real – this position as advocated by the idealists as also it as advocated by the dualists. For according to it all that exists is made up of matter. Not that it denied the reality of the mental properties like cognition, emotion and volition but its contention was that these properties are somehow the properties of body itself. The anti-materialist philosophers retorted that if that was so

these properties should be exhibited even by a dead body. The Lokāyata philosophers defended their position by maintaining that a body exhibiting mental properties possesses a characteristic sort of organisation which a dead body totally lacks. In this connection it was easy for them to mention the bodily functions like breathing and palpitation of heart which are present in a living body and are absent in a dead one, but the difficulty is that the anti-materialist philosopher would submit that these bodily functions are there owing to the presence of an extra-corporeal reality mind there. Thus the controversy remained inconclusive but it can certainly be seen that the logical defect called 'heaviness of hypothesis' vitiates the anti-materialist position. Really, the Lokāyata philosophers were criticised not so much because of the basic ontological position they advocated as because of the supposedly dangerous ethical implication inherent in this position. For the position that mind is no independent real implied the position that there takes place no transmigration of mind from one body to another – whereas it was in terms of the dogma of transmigration of mind that the anti-materialist philosophers explained a man's worldly sufferings and enjoyments. Thus the Lokāyata philosophers were charged with having preached a denial of all ethical behaviour. They of course did not plead guilty to the charge and sought to explain all ethical behaviour in terms of this worldly happenings, but their voice was drowned in the din of denunciation and as a result their position remained on the whole misunderstood.

Then we come to the positions maintained by the idealist philosophers of India. In this connection it might be noted that here there were current two varieties of idealism – one a rather mild one and the other a rather rabid one. The mild variety of idealism was preached as early as the times of the old Upaniṣads where it was maintained that a mental reality *Brahman* is the ultimate cause of all material and mental worldly phenomena, a position also maintained by Bādarāyaṇa

in his *Brahmasūtra* and by all the Vedānta schools excepting those headed by Śaṅkara and Madhva; (as we shall see, Śaṅkara in a way endorsed the rabid variety of idealism and Madhva dualism). This position was an idealist one inasmuch as it posited a mental reality in the form of the root cause of all worldly phenomena, but it was not a rabid idealist position inasmuch as it refused to dismiss all material phenomena as an illusory show. Really, the rabid idealist position that all material phenomena are an illusory show was first advocated by the Vijñānavāda Buddhist school and was in fact an improvement upon the earlier Śūnyavāda Buddhist school's position that all material as well as mental worldly phenomena are an illusory show. Thus as against the sheerest nihilism of the Śūnyavāda Buddhist school the Vijñānavāda Buddhist school advocated rabid idealism. Śaṅkara on his part maintained a position which rather lay midway between the Śūnyavādin's nihilist position and the Vijñānavādin's rabid idealist position. For he sided with the Śūnyavādin in treating all material as well as mental worldly phenomena as an illusory show but he sided with the Vijñānavādin in maintaining that the ultimate reality is somehow mental in character—this because like all Vedāntins Śaṅkara declared a mental reality *Brahman* to be the ultimate reality. (As for Madhva, his adherence to Vedāntism was but nominal inasmuch as he refused to endorse the general Vedānta position that *Brahman* is the ultimate cause of all material as well as mental worldly phenomena; instead he, like other dualists, maintained that mind — be it supreme mind of the form of *Brahman* or an ordinary mind — is co-eternal with matter.) In this background it will be useful to distinguish between three (rather than two) varieties of idealism preached in India, viz. the mild idealism of the non-Śaṅkarite and non-Madhvite Vedāntins, the rabid idealism of the Vijñānavāda Buddhists, the near-nihilistic idealism of Śaṅkara. And all these three varieties of idealism are basically misconceived inasmuch as the hypothesis of a mind *without* body is even more untenable than the hypothesis of

a mind *independent of* body – the latter being the dualist hypothesis to which we turn our attention.

All the schools of Indian philosophy except the materialist, idealist and nihilist ones are dualist inasmuch as they all posit matter and mind as two co-eternal reals. To mention them by name, they are non-Vijñānavāda and non-Śūnyavāda Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. In their capacity as so many dualist schools they of course criticised both materialism and idealism but certain important positive aspects of their performance are not little noteworthy. Thus even if they posited mind as an independent, real existing by the side of matter – a position which was doubtless untenable – they offered a more or less cogent account of the mental properties in the form they become an object of everyday experience. In this connection their discussion of the nature of cognition was their solid contribution to the science of epistemology while their discussion of the nature of emotion and volition was their solid contribution to the science of psychology. A parallel performance coming from the side of materialists and idealists is simply absent from the side of materialists because their texts have not come down to us, from the side of idealists because with their denial of the reality of the material world they were in no position to offer a cogent account of the mental world. A convincing example of the idealist's discomfiture on this count can be had in the works of the Buddhists who following in the footsteps of Dīrṅga and Dharmakīrti argued in favour of both idealism and dualism but who made their deservedly famous contributions to the sciences of epistemology and psychology only when arguing from a dualist standpoint and not also when arguing from an idealist standpoint. Of course, the different dualist schools adopted different – and very often conflicting – positions as to the questions of epistemology and psychology but this was only to be expected inasmuch as these schools were patronised by scholars who had followed mutually different traditions. Be that as it may, the disciplines to be called

'Indian Epistemology' and 'Indian Psychology' are to a very great extent – almost exclusively the achievement of India's dualist philosophical schools. Nor did these schools make insignificant contribution towards the development of what might be called 'Indian Physical Science'. For stoutly rebuffing the idealist's contention that the material world is an illusory show they bestowed utmost attention upon the delineation of the characteristic features of this world. Here again they came out with different – and very often conflicting – theses because they were patronised by the scholars following mutually different traditions, but their total output in this connection was in no way unimpressive. Thus, for example, the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Jaina and Buddhist schools espoused the doctrine of atom though they advanced divergent arguments in support of it; (the Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools posited no atoms). Similarly, the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools posited God – conceived as a supreme mind – as one who creates the material world out of pre-existing atoms, but the Buddhist, Jaina, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā schools refused to endorse this position. Again a section of Buddhists maintained that everything lasts for but one moment but the position was countered by the other dualist schools. And there were plenty of other doctrines – more or less cogent – relating to the constitution and functioning of the material world which were upheld by the various dualist schools either in agreement with one another or in opposition to one another.

Even such a cursory treatment as was undertaken above of the materialist, idealist and dualist trends that emerged within the fold of Indian Philosophy raises the pertinent question as to what is signified by all this. And it has to be answered by saying that the materialist, idealist and dualist schools of Indian philosophy evinced different degrees of rationalism. Thus most rational of all the Indian philosophers were materialists, less rational than them were dualists, less rational than the dualists were mild idealists, less rational than the mild idealists were rabid idealists, least rational of all were nihilists. Here the nihilists were least rational of all because

they dismissed as an illusory show the material as well as mental phenomena – certainly a highly fantastic procedure. The rabid idealists were more rational than the nihilists because the former dismissed as an illusory show the material phenomena but not the mental phenomena – a procedure considerably fantastic. The mild idealists were more rational than the rabid idealists because the former dismissed as an illusory show no sort of phenomena whatsoever; however they too adopted a rather fantastic procedure when they made a mind – the supreme mind *Brahman* – into the root cause of the material as well as mental worldly phenomena. The dualists were more rational than the mild idealists because the former did not declare matter to be a product of mind; however, their position too involved an element of fantasy inasmuch as they made mind into an independent real existing by the side of matter. The materialists were most rational of our philosophers because they posited no mind by the side of matter and instead declared mental phenomena to be a property of a very specially organised piece of matter. This is however not to say that the ancient Indian materialists had at their disposal all those rich findings with the help of which the modern biological sciences interpret mental phenomena without positing a mind supposedly existing by the side of matter; for what is merely being suggested is that the ancient Indian materialists' determined refusal to posit mind by the side of matter makes them a worthy predecessor of the modern stalwarts of biological sciences. Certainly, mental phenomena are a function of body and it alone while to posit an extra corporeal mind as a repository of them is highly speculative.

Religious factors concomitant with the emergence of materialism, idealism and dualism within the fold of Indian philosophy are also worth studying. Thus all dualists, idealists and nihilists were actively associated with some religious sect or other while the materialists stood opposed to all religion whatsoever; for religion is inconceivable without belief in some sort of supersensuous causation but the materialists summarily

rejected all such causation. Here belief in the dogma of transmigration of mind was a clearest case of belief in super-sensuous causation and this dogma was subscribed to by all the religious sects of ancient India, so much so that even those who declared the world to be an illustory show somehow – that is, through some shifting of ground – found room for this dogma within the body of beliefs entertained by them. Thus defending the dogma of transmigration of mind was one great occasion when the anti-materialist philosophers – all religious minded – would undertake a more or less elaborate refutation of materialism. And this alliance of philosophy and religion forged by the anti-materialist philosophers proved the greatest hindrance in the path of propagation of materialism. For in those ancient times religion was a much more mighty social force than it is in our days, and hence opposition to religion was then an act of great courage undertaken by but few doughty souls. This partly explains why in ancient India materialism as a full-fledged school of philosophy remained a pretty much stunted growth. On the other hand, the reason why a particular religious sect lent support to dualism, idealism or nihilism remains rather obscure. For all religious belief is a combination of an ontology, an ethics and a ritual, but there seems to be no ready explanation as to why in ancient India this or that ontology went with this or that ethics or this or that ritual. For example, Mahāyāna Buddhism endorsed a rabid idealist or nihilist ontology, an altruistic ethics and a ritual of idol-worship, but there is observable no logical nexus between these three aspects of its religious belief. More or less similar – though not so strikingly obvious – was the case with other religious sects prevalent in ancient India. What was common to them all was their antimaterialism and their belief in the dogma of transmigration of mind – which were in fact two aspects of the same ideological phenomenon while for the rest they could well differ from each other as widely as earth from heaven and for no cognisable reason. Be that as it may, the most striking feature of the ancient India's religious life

was a struggle between materialism and anti-materialism where inner differences dividing the anti-materialist camp were of a rather secondary character. Even so, these inner differences are worth taking note of if only in order to form a clear idea of what form was assumed by the religious life of our people in this or that region and in this or that period because of the prevalence in their midst of this or that religious sect.

*

TAMAS AND CHĀYĀ IN THE JAINA VIEW
(as discussed in the *Syādvādaratnākara*)

E. A. Solomon

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *tamas* (darkness) is not a distinct substance, but is of the nature of negation of light.¹ To prove this, the thinkers of this school argue : 'Darkness is of the nature of negation because it is an effect different from substance, quality and action; just like the posterior negation (destruction) of jar'. This is true of *chāyā* (shade, shadow) also according to these thinkers.

It may be argued against this, that if *chāyā* (shade, shadow) is not accepted as a distinct substance, then there would not be the cognition of it as a positive entity different from umbrella, etc. Just as sprout is different from seed so the shadow should be different from umbrella etc. To this the Vaiśeṣika replies : *Chāyā* cannot possibly be a separate substance because it is of the nature of absence of light; yet its cognition as something positive can be very well justified as due to a false conception. To wit, whatever region light does not come into contact with being obstructed by an umbrella or the like, in that place shadow or shade (*chāyā*) is cognised. But when the obstructing factor is removed, light is seen in its own nature, and therefore *chāyā* is but the absence of light. Had it been an independent substance, it would have been cognised along with light even if the umbrella or the like were removed.²

Vādi-Devasūri, refuting this position makes a query here : Is it meant to be said that *tamas* (darkness) is of the nature of just negation or that it is also of the nature of negation ?³ If the former stand is taken, there would be contradiction

of perception. *Tamas* is positively perceived—‘this is *tamas* (darkness)’—just like a pillar or a pot—‘this is a pot’. Had it been of the nature of just negation, its cognition would only be a negative one. Moreover, negation is never cognised independently. It can be cognised only as a qualifying factor of a substance like the surface of the earth, negating something else there. But when *tamas* is cognised, it is cognised independently. In a dark night in a room the interior of which is densely stuffed with a mass of darkness because of the doors being tightly fastened, the qualified substance, wall, or the like, is not cognised at all. And it is not just the non-perception of light, because what is apprehended is apprehended as having dark shape and as something that is outside.

It may be argued that if darkness is really dark or black in character, then it should require light for its perception; blue lotus, cuckoo, *tamāla* tree and all such dark things are perceived with the help of light. But it is not so in the case of darkness. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the perception of darkness is not a perception of something dark (black) in character.

Vādi-Devasūri’s answer to this is that this argument also is not sound. The above mentioned things are visible to an owl or the like even without light. It should not be pleaded that the above argument was advanced keeping in view creatures like us, because even though blue lotus, cuckoo, etc. cannot be seen by creatures like us without the help of light still darkness can certainly be seen even without light, – for things are diverse in character. (What is true of one thing need not necessarily be true of other things). Otherwise, because gold, pearl, etc though yellow, pure white etc. respectively cannot be seen without the aid of light, lamp, moon, etc. would require another light for being perceived. But things have diverse natures as vouchsafed by valid means of proof, and this cannot be questioned. Therefore, when darkness is perceived as of dark (black) shape, the nature of *tamas* as pure negation stands refuted and so if the first

alternative that *tamas* is of the nature of just negation is accepted, perception would evidently be contradicted. And the reason advanced would be a *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* (mistimed or contradicted) one as it would be one employed after a reference to the thesis as one contradicted by perception. And there would also be the fault of *Sādhyavaikalya*, as here in this stand it is not tenable that the example put forth, viz. destruction of jar, be of the nature of just negation. For it has been established in Jaina philosophy that destruction or posterior negation of jar is but the earth-substance, which giving up its prior mode called *ghaṭa* (jar) is now qualified by the subsequent mode called *kapāla* (potsherd). Therefore one should not adhere to the view that *tamas* is of the nature of just negation.

But if the stand is taken that it is also of the nature of negation, then it amounts to *siddha-sādhyatā*—proving what is already proved, for there would be no reason for there being any difference of opinion. The Jainas themselves accept the substance *tamas* as in a way (or from one point of view) of the nature of the negation of light for all things are of the nature of both *bhāva* and *abhāva*.

Moreover, the probans and the probandum being mutually dependent are unreal and so the reason is unreal (*asiddha*). Only if *tamas* be of the nature of negation (*abhāva*), could it be said to be an effect different from substance, quality and action, and only when the latter is proved could *tamas* be known as of the nature of negation. And the thesis here (i.e. the one put forth by the Vaiśeṣika) is one that is sublated by inference. To wit, the inferential argument is :

“Darkness is positive in character, as it covers pot, etc., like a piece of cloth”. And that it covers pot, etc. is not something that is not proved, for *tamas* is something that serves as a cover for pot etc. as it checks or arrests the operation of the eye in respect of the object, even as the curtain does.

Moreover, if *tamas* be the negation of light, it could be the *prāg-abhāva* (prior negation) or the *pradhvaṃsābhāva* (posterior negation), or the *itaretarābhāva* (mutual negation) or the *atyantābhāva* (absolute negation) of light. *Tamas* could not be the prior negation of one light, for it is seen to be destroyed even by the light of the sun as it is destroyed by the light of the lamp. The *prāg-abhāva* of a thing can be destroyed by that very thing; e.g. the prior-negation of cloth is destroyed by cloth alone. Nor can *tamas* be said to be the prior negation of a number of lights, for it is seen to be destroyed by one light only, just like the prior negation of cloth (—if it be the prior negation of a number of lights it could be removed by that every number of lights and not by just one).

It may be argued that *tamas* destroyed by one particular light is different from the *tamas* destroyed by another particular light, that is to say, each *tamas* is the negation of the corresponding counter-entity light, and so even when a particular darkness is destroyed by a lamp or the like, another darkness that can be destroyed by the sun or the like is not destroyed in the absence of the sun or the like, and therefore the reason put forth, viz. 'because darkness is destroyed by one light' is an *asiddha* (unreal) one.

This argument is not proper. In a place where darkness has been removed by a lamp or the like, the darkness which is capable of being removed by the sun or the like and which is capable of being seen (i.e. is perceptible in character, or amenable to sense-perception) is yet not perceived like any other thing the two parties are in agreement about that if it is amenable to perception and is still not perceived it does not exist. And if *tamas* were of the nature of *prāg-abhāva* then on there being the destruction of a series of lamp-flames, there could not be the origination of darkness, for *prāg-abhāva* is beginningless (— it has no origination).

Nor could *tamas* be regarded as of the nature of *pradhvaṃsābhāva* (posterior negation) of light, for it is destroyed

by light only, just like *prāg-abhāva* of light (whereas *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is endless, it cannot be destroyed and at least not by its counter-entity.) Nor is it of the nature of mutual negation (*itaretarābhāva*), for in that case even when the strong light of the sun be spread all over, *tamas* (darkness) should have been seen during the day-time also, as it is seen at night because of its presence. Nor is it of the nature of the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) of light, for light is produced on there being the assemblage of its own causal factors. If *tamas* (darkness) were of the nature of absolute negation of light, then light would be like a sky-flower, and the three worlds would be drowned in beginningless, endless dense darkness. Thus the opponent's thesis is sublated by the inference, "*Tamas* is not of the character of negation, because it is not of the nature of prior negation, etc., like the sky." And the sublation of the opponent's thesis by the following inference also cannot be prevented under any circumstance: "*Tamas* is positive in character, for being some thing that is produced it is non-eternal, like pot." It may be noted that 'being something that is produced' is inserted to keep *prāg-abhāva* out of the range of this argument, and 'is non-eternal' is inserted to keep out *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, and so the argument is saved from being an inconclusive one.

Śaṅkara (— a forgotten Naiyāyika) and Bhāsarvajña (the author of the *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*) have put forth the argument, "Negation of a thing is perceived by the very apparatus (causal complex) by which that thing is perceived. So darkness perceived by the very apparatus by which light can be perceived is its negation"⁴. This argument is trivial, for it is an inconclusive one. On the same ground it could be said that light is negation of darkness, because it is perceived by the very apparatus by which darkness is perceived. Or because pot and cloth are perceived by a common apparatus, one would have to say that pot is negation of cloth, and cloth is negation of pot. Therefore, darkness appearing in perception as having the distinctive character of an independent entity is definitely a positive thing that is opposed in character to light.

The insinuation should not be attempted that if darkness and light have this contrary character, it could sometimes happen that darkness overpower light. One should bear in mind that things have their fixed natures—light always overpowers darkness, and not vice versa—for otherwise, just as fire burns cotton-wool, so cotton-wool should burn fire for both are alike opposed to each other.

Therefore, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika should accept, says Vādi-Devasūri, that *tamas* is not just absence of light, but is a distinct entity.

The author of the *Kandali* (i.e. Śrīdhara) has put forth a fancy of his own : “*Tamas* is a particular colour which is superimposed everywhere on there being the complete absence (or negation) of light.⁵ But he is on the wrong track. In the earlier part of the night on there being the complete absence of light all things without exception – the surface of the ground, etc. which would serve as the substratum of superimposition, are not perceived, and when no such thing is perceived, a particular colour could not possibly be superimposed. Yellowness is known to be superimposed only on a conch which is perceived. So what Śrīdhara says cannot be accepted.

This as a matter of fact refutes what has been said against *chāyā* (shade, shadow) also being regarded as a *dravya* (substance). The opponent moreover argues that when *chāyā* is just the absence of light it cannot possibly be another substance, and so if it is apprehended as a substance it is due to an erroneous conception. But it is actually because of the opponents own erroneous conception that he is saying this. If there were anything to contradict *chāyā*'s being a substance, then it would be proper to say that its apprehension as a substance is a false one. *Pratyakṣa* or perception does not contradict its being a substance; on the contrary it is perception which is the direct witness of its being an independent substance. If inference be said to be a contradicting factor, could the inference be as follows : ‘*Chāyā* is of the nature of negation, because it is an effect other than substance, quality or action, or could there be another inference ? It could not be the former

for it has already been refuted; and no other inference is noticed which could contradict *chāyā*'s being a substance. On the contrary, there certainly is an inference establishing that *chāyā* is a substance, 'Chāyā is a substance, because it has motion, like a jar'. We see with our eyes the *chāyā* (shade, shadow) moving; and its motion can be determined by inference also "Chāyā has motion, because it reaches from one place to another, like Maitra".

Vyomaśiva says in respect of this argument, "This is not true, for shadow is of the nature of negation of light. To wit, where the presence of light is warded off by an obstructing substance, we say that there is *chāyā* (shade, shadow). And superimposing the movement of the obstructing substance on the absence of light we say, 'Chāyā is moving'. Had it not been so the movement of the *chāyā* would not have been dependent on the movement of the obstructing substance.⁶ Vādi-Devasūri says in answer to this that this feat of Vyomaśiva's can be compared to the ambition of a lame man to gain a victory over the speed of a race-horse. For superimposition finds a place only when the primary meaning (of an expression) is contradicted. And we do not see the littlest thing that could contradict the fact of the shadow's movement. Perception evidences that a boy cannot be fire, and so when someone says 'The boy is fire', it is meant to be a figurative or secondary usage. But perception does not go against the fact of *chāyā*'s having movement, for it has been put forth as cognising the movement of shadow.

It might be argued: "Perception dependent on the functioning of the sense-organ which cannot be otherwise established is a valid means of proof. Here the functioning of the sense-organs can be otherwise established as giving rise to the cognition of the movement present in the obstructing substance, and so it is not a cause in respect of the knowledge of the movement of the *chāyā*".

But this is not a correct stand. For if the umbrella and its *chāyā* (shade, shadow) simultaneously become visible (- the

objects of eye perception), then it could be possible for the operation of the eye to be otherwise established. But when at midday, the shadow of a bird moving in the middle of the sky is seen to be moving by a person moving on the earth with his head bent downwards, it is only the movement of the *chāyā* that becomes the object of the operation of the sense-organ, and the movement of the bird is just inferred, and so there is not even the slightest chance of the operation of the sense-organ being otherwise established, for the bird is not seen at all by the eye.⁷

Moreover if it were already proved that shadow is of the nature of negation, then movement would not be possible in its case and so it would be proper to say that the functioning of the sense-organ in respect of it could be otherwise established. But that is still something frowned upon by fortune (*daiva-kaṭākṣita*). And if it is argued that the movement of the *chāyā* is something that has come to happen thanks to superimposition, then when a maidservant with a pot on her head is walking, it is the movement of the maid-servant that appears in the jar due to superimposition and the jar should be then devoid of action (or movement). And if it is urged that it too is seen to be moving and so cannot be motionless, then it should be understood that the same argument holds good in the case of *chāyā* also. Further, there is no inference contradicting movement in *chāyā*, unlike the case where there certainly is inference contradicting blueness in the sky.

It may be argued that the fact of its being of the nature of negation is itself contrary to its having motion. But this is not proper for this argument suffers from the fault of mutual dependence. If its being of the nature of negation is established, contradiction of its having movement could be established, and if the latter is established could its being of the nature of negation be established. And even if movement is admitted as something superimposed on it, still from this only it follows that *chāyā* is positive in character and this cannot be denied.

So even what the opponent resorts to for self-defence become the cause of his undoing. To wit, *Chāyā* is positive in character, because it is something on which movement is superimposed, like a tree". A person in a boat pushed ahead by the force of a powerful wind superimposes his own movement on the trees on the shore which are positive in character, and not of the nature of negation. So even for rendering tenable the superimposition of movement on *chāyā*, it should be accepted as positive in character. And therefore it is very well proved by inference that it has movement because it reaches from one place to another.

Vyomaśiva further argues, "When it is said that *chāyā* reaches another place, does it signify contact (*saṃyoga*) with that other places or inherence (*samavāya*) in it? It could not be contact for that also is something that is yet to be proved. Only if *chāyā* is established as a substance could its contact be established, and if its contact is established, could its being a substance be established. Thus, there would be the fault of mutual dependence. If reaching signifies inherence, that too is not established. That which has inhaled in one does not inhere in another, whereas *chāyā* which has been seen to be connected with one is seen to be connected with another."⁸

Vādi-Devasūri's reaction to this argument is that it is trivial, for here the *prāpti-saṃyoga* (contact in the form of reaching) is spoken of. And if the fault of mutual dependence is urged, that is because the opponent has lost his moorings—he has lost the grip over the link in the argument. We are not trying to establish that *chāyā* is a substance because it reaches another place. But we are trying to prove that it has movement, and from that to prove that it is a substance.

It may be argued that thus we would be landed into a greater calamity of *cakraka* (argument in a circle)—from contact with another place its having motion would be proved, from its having motion its being a substance would be proved and from its being a substance contact with another place

would be proved. But Vādi-Devasūri feels that all this is wishful thinking, for the fact of reaching another place is directly known by perception in the case of *chāyā* and so does not require any proof by means of inference. If by its being established as a substance its reaching another place is established, then the above-mentioned fault would be there. But *chāyā* is proved to have movement because it reaches another place, and on the basis of its movement it is proved to be a substance; and one must bear in mind that *chāyā*'s change of place is known by perception—it is something visible.

Moreover, since it has qualities, *chāyā* is a substance, like jar. And it cannot be said that it does not have qualities for we have the apprehension 'dark shade (*chāyā*)' and the like. (Some lines are missing here. The argument here seems to be that *chāyā* has the quality of touch which the opponent does not accept).

It may be contended that we do not feel any touch of *chāyā* however much we may stretch our arms in each direction. But has anyone apprehended the touch of light? It may be argued that bald men moving about at midday have too much of the experience of the hot touch of *āloka* (heat, light). But do not the travellers whose bodies are tormented by the cluster of rays of the sun constantly falling on them and who come with great hopes to a mango grove pleasant with dense clusters of leaves, experience very well the cool touch of *chāyā* (shade)? If it is argued that *chāyā* appears as cool because of the superimposition of the cool touch of drops of water penetrating it, being carried thither by waves or currents of the wind, then could it not be similarly said that the experience of hot touch in the cluster of rays of the sun is because of the superimposition of the hot touch of the atoms of the submarine fire which have penetrated being carried there by the wind? It may again be argued that even in a windless place we have the same experience of hot touch so it is known for certain that it is the hot touch of sunlight only. But it can be similarly argued that in a place where

the heat of sun-light is kept away by the dense grove of trees, we have the experience of cool touch though the place is windless, and so it is known for certain that the cool touch belongs to *chāyā* only. There is no reason for any preferential treatment here and so one cannot just accept one argument and not the other one. Moreover, it is said in Āyurveda, “*Ātapa* (sunlight) is *kaṭu* (pungent) and dry; *chāyā* (shade) is sweet and cool, moon-light is astringent and sweet, darkness is the remover of all diseases”. (This shows that *chāyā* and *tamas* are positive substances).

Vyomaśiva has tried to explain away the sweetness and coolness of *chāyā* by arguing that *chāyā* is said to be sweet and cool only secondarily, because the benefit that one derives from a sweet and cool substance can be had by resorting to shade, since it does the same work as a sweet and cool substance, it is (secondarily) said to be sweet and cool. Vādi-Devasūri feels that this is a statement not backed by proper consideration, for figurative or secondary meaning holds the ground only when the primary meaning is contradicted, but this is not what we find here.

It may be argued, “Shade is not sweet and cool, because it is not something that can be eaten or drunk, like fire”. The non-apprehension of the pervader (*vyāpaka*—being something that can be eaten or drunk) is the contradicting factor here, whatever substance is sweet and cool is invariably something that can be eaten or drunk, as for example, sugar, milk; but this pervader (being something that can be eaten or drunk) not being found here, the pervaded (viz. sweet taste and cool touch) also cannot be present.

Vādi-Devasūri says in answer to this that this argument is not sound, for the pervasion of a sweet and cool substance by ‘being something that can be eaten or drunk’ is not established. Moonlight, for example, is a sweet, cool substance but it is not something that can be eaten or drunk. It may be contended that moonlight is not sweet or cool and so the

rule of pervasion or invariable concomitance is not contradicted. But how can it be established that sweet taste and cool touch are not there in moonlight? Not by this very inference, for it is not included in the *pakṣa* (subject) and now it does not obtain to do so. The opponent may say, "If it is made the *pakṣa* even in the beginning, what fault could there be?" Vādi-Deva-Sūri would retort, "Then what fault could there be if in order to establish absolute eternality in the context of this *pakṣa* only, another *pakṣa* is employed or singing, dancing, etc. are indulged in?"

If it is said that this would amount to doing something that is utterly irrelevant, then this is equally true elsewhere also. The opponent should give dispassionate thought to this problem. He was attempting to contradict sweetness and coolness of *chāyā* put forth by the proponent (Jaina thinker). Then what was the need of bringing in moonlight? If it is contended that there cannot be sweet taste and cool touch in moonlight for it is *taijasa* (a product of *tejas*, igneous, fiery), that is not true, for it is not established that it is *taijasa*. It may be argued. 'Moon-light is fiery, for of (the qualities) colour, etc. it manifests only colour, like a lamp'. But this argument is not valid for the reason is an inconclusive one—*añjana* (collyrium) etc. manifest colour and yet are not fiery. And so when we say that *chāyā* is sweet and cool, since there is no possibility of the primary meaning being contradicted, we cannot say that sweetness and coolness are spoken of *chāyā* only secondarily. Therefore, *chāyā* is certainly sweet and cool in the primary sense of the terms.

It may be argued, "If *chāyā* has cool touch, it must be a product of water (*āpya*), for only what is aqueous (*āpya*) is seen to have cool touch. Vādi-Devasūri says in answer to this that this is not true, for in the Jaina view, cool touch is possible in wind also and so the restriction that an aqueous thing alone has cool touch is not established. Even according to the opponent, *chāyā* is not the substrate of the specific white colour (peculiar to water) for he admits that it

is known to be dark, and so on; so it cannot be established as being aqueous in character. And once it is established that it is not aqueous in character there is nothing against even cool touch which is different in characteristic from the cool touch of water being present here. Even as the neither hot nor cool touch though present in earth (*pr̥thivī*) is with some sub-peculiarity present in wind, even so in this case also a special kind of cool touch can be present in *chāyā*. Otherwise there would be the contingency of wind having to be subsumed under earth. Thus it is established that *chāyā* does have touch. Thus the argument, ‘*Chāyā* does not have the quality of dark colour, because it is devoid of touch’ is not proper; and therefore the quality of dark colour is established. Similarly, it can be said to have number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, priority, momentum, etc. Therefore also because *chāyā* has qualities, it is proved to be a substance.

In this connection, a Prābhākara (follower of Prabhākara) says : “*Chāyā* may be a substance but it cannot properly be a substance over and above light, earth, space, etc.” Vādi-Devasūri’s retort to this is that it is only a gesture of his showing off his upstart, capricious scholarship. For this could be said if only the portion of earth and the like were apprehended as *chāyā*, or if there were no proof in support of the existence of *chāyā* as distinct from the portion of the earth and the like. The first is not proper, as it is not established. We do not see *chāyā* as in apposition with the portion of the earth or the like—‘the portion of earth is *chāyā*’. On the contrary we have the apprehension, ‘*Chāyā* is on the portion of the earth or the like’ which shows that they are two distinct things. It cannot be said that this latter apprehension is a false, one, whereas an apprehension of the former sort would be non-erroneous—for such an apprehension is not there at all. This stand of the Prābhākara is like giving up a morsel in hand and wanting to lick the toes, and so deserves to be ignored by the intelligent. And this is really strange that though this one is proud of being a

follower of Prabhākara, he speaks of the falsity of apprehension (—whereas according to Prabhākara all apprehension is right).

It may be argued that it is not false knowledge, but it is the non-knowledge of the non-difference between the portion of the earth or the like and *chāyā* (a case of omission which is admitted by Prabhākara), just as we have the non-cognition of sweetness in the apprehension of 'bitter sugar'. The answer to this is that it may be so. But how is it that the non-cognition of the non-difference is in the form, '*Chāyā* is on the portion of the earth or the like' (which clearly shows that the difference is cognised) ?

It is not also proper to say that there is no proof in support of the existence of *chāyā* over and above the portion of the earth or the like, for it is perception itself which determines *chāyā* like light as different from the portion of earth. And it cannot be said that this perception is of the nature of illusion in respect of it, for in that case even the perception determinately cognising light would have to be regarded as an illusion in respect of it for the two cases are similar.

It may be contended that the perception apprehending light cannot be regarded as an illusion in respect of it, because light of luminous character, which is perceived by it as distinct from the portion of the earth or the like, is actually present; whereas there is nothing like *chāyā* and therefore the perception apprehending *chāyā* is just an illusion. Answering this, Vādi-Devasūri asks how the non-existence of *chāyā* is established—because of only the portion of earth or the like being apprehended as *chāyā* or because of there being no proof in support of *chāyā* being distinct from the portion of the earth or the like ? An answer on the basis of either of these alternatives has been refuted above, and so the objection stands. Moreover, if the portion of the earth or the like is itself *chāyā*, why is it spoken of as devoid of light. It may be said that this is meant for speaking of the portion of the earth or the like which is qualified by the departure of light (*ālokā-pagama*) as '*chāyā*'. Vādi-Devasūri in his turn puts the ques-

tion, “By the expression ‘*ālokāpagama*’ do you want to denote the negation of light or just the portion of the earth or the like?” In the first case the punishment could be only the crushing of the Vaiśeṣika view (—according to which *chāyā* is absence of light and not a portion of the ground qualified by absence of light). In the event of the second alternative being admitted, if without negation, the portion of the earth is alone spoken of, then it would be a case of *atiprasaṅga* (absurd over-extension), for even when the place is encompassed by light there would be the contingency of its being spoken of as just alone. And if by ‘*ālokāpagama*’ just the surface of the earth or the like is spoken of, then the expression ‘portion of the earth qualified by ‘*ālokāpagama*’ should only mean ‘the portion of the earth or the like qualified by just the surface of the earth or the like’—which is simply inconsistent talk.

This refutes even what Śālikanātha has said in the ‘*Tattvāloka-prakarāṇa*’ of the *Prakarāṇapañcikā*, viz. “We admit that when light is warded off we have *chāyā*. No *chāyā* having another colour is seen as distinct from the portion of the earth, from which light has departed. So we hold that the portion of earth or the like from which light has been kept away is itself *chāyā*.”¹ •

The argument of the opponent that if it were another substance, even in the absence of the umbrella, *chāyā* would be apprehended as existing along with light—is not proper. For some *chāyā*-atoms, being related to the umbrella, spreading in view of the absence of light, and so transformed are accepted as *chāyā*-substance, So the contingency urged of *chāyā* remaining along with light even when the umbrella is removed is not proper, for the persistence of the effect in the absence of the modifying cause is something that is contrary to our experience. Verily we never see even for a moment the Nipa tree, etc. remaining in the absence of earth etc. Therefore it is established that *chāyā* is a substance over and above earth, etc.¹¹

Notes

This article is based on *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR) pp. 849 ff of Vādi-Devasūri. This work presents at length and with proper care the rival views on a philosophical topic before refuting them and putting forth the Jaina view in regard to it.

- 1 Na hi tamo nāma dravyāntaram asti bhāsām abhāvasya tamastvāt—SVR, pp. 489. Compare *Vyomavati*, pp. 46 ff.
- 2 SVR, pp. 849–850.
- 3 Atra brūmaḥ—Abhāvarūpaṁ tama ity atra kim abhāvarūpam eva tama iti sādhyam vivakṣyate kim vā'bhāvarūpam apiti—SVR, p. 850.
- 4 See *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 543; *Jñānaśrinibandhāvali*, p. 153. Śāṅkara – A Forgotten Naiyāyika—E. A. Solomon—*Vidya*, 1978 (Gujarat University Journal).
- 5 See *Kandali*, pp. 24–25—Tasmād rūpaviśeṣo'yam atyantam tejo'bhāve sati sarvaṭaḥ samāropitas tama iti pratīyate. Divā cordhvaṁ nayana-golakasya nīlimāvabhāsa iti vakṣyāmaḥ. Yadā tu niyatadeśādhikaraṇo bhāsām abhāvas tadā taddeśa-samāropite nīlimni chāyety avagamaḥ; aṭa eva dīrghā hrasvā mahati alpiyasī chāyety abhimānaḥ taddeśa-vyāpino nīlimnaḥ pratīteḥ, abhāvapakṣe ca bhāvadharmādhyāropo'pi durupapādaḥ.
- 6 *Vyomavati*, pp. 46–47.
- 7 Yadā tu madhyandine madhye'ntarīkṣam paribhrāmyataḥ śakuneṣ chāyā gacchanti pṛthivyām avanatavaktreṇa pramātrā prekṣyate tadā tad-gataiva gatiḥ indriyavyāpārasya gocaraḥ; śakunigatis tv anumānagamyai-vety nātrendriyavyāpārasyānyathāsiddhisambhāvanā'pi śakunes tadānim atyantam locanāgocaravāt—SVR, pp. 853–4.
- 8 *Vyomavati*, p. 47.
- 9 *Vyomavati*, p. 47.
- 10 *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 322.
- 11 Chatrasya sambandhinaḥ chāyāṇavo hi kecid ālokābhāvam apekṣya prasāriṇas tathāparīṇatāḥ chāyādravyatayā svikriyante, tataḥ chatrāpāye'py ālokena sahāvasthāna-prasañjanam asamañjasam eva, pariñāmīkaraṇā-pāye kāryasyāvasthānavirodhāt: na khalu mṛdādīprakṣaye kṣaṇam api nīpader avasthītir upalabdharitī siddhā chāyā dravyāntaram—SVR, p. 858.

Books

- 1 *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR) of Vādi-Devasūri, (Ārhatamata Prabhākara, Puṣyapattana).
- 2 *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* with *Sūkti* (by Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra), *Setu* (by Padmanābha Miśra) and *Vyomavati* (by Vyomaśivācārya) (Chowkhamba (Sankrit Series, 1924).
- 3 *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* with *Nyāyakandali* of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa (Gaṅgānātha Jhā Granthamālā, Vārāṇaseya Samskr̥ta Viśvavidyālaya, Vārāṇasi 1963 A.D.)
- 4 *Prakaraṇapañcika* of Śālikanātha (—Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series, No. 4, 1961).
- 5 *Jñānaśrinibandhāvali*—Ed. Anantlal Thakur (K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1957).
- 6 *Nyāyabhūṣana* of Bhāsarvajña (Vārāṇasi).

*

NEGATION : SOME INDIAN THEORIES

J. L. Shaw

The aim of this paper is to discuss the different types of negation mentioned in the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya system of philosophy in the light of some contemporary discussions on negation.

In the first section we shall note that contemporary philosophers confine their attention to propositional negation rather than to term-negation. In this context the views of Prior and Strawson will be discussed.

In the second section we shall discuss the view of Mīmāṃsā philosophers. These philosophers have drawn a distinction between a prohibition type of negation and an exclusion type of negation in the context of a negation of a positive injunction.

The third section will deal with the view of the Nyāya philosophers. In this context we shall discuss whether the Nyāya concept of negation is a term-negation or a proposition-negation or a propositional function-negation. According to our positive thesis the Nyāya concept of negation cannot be captured by any of these concepts.

I

Arthur Prior¹ in his article on "Negation" has nicely summed up the views of contemporary logicians on negation. He says,

" By the use of open sentences all the varieties of negation are reduced to the placing of 'not' or 'it is not the case that' before some proposition or propositionlike expression, the whole being either contained or not contained within

some wider propositional context. This reduction assumes that with the basic singular form 'x is an A' or 'x ϕ 's' there is no real distinction between the internal negation 'x is not an A' (or 'x is non-A') or 'x does not ϕ ' and the external negation 'Not (x is an A)' or 'Not (x ϕ 's)'.²

From this remark of Prior it follows that all types of negation are ultimately reducible to the negation of a proposition or a propositional function. The distinction between an external and an internal negation is important in the context of a complex proposition. The negation of the proposition 'If p, then q' should not be taken as 'If p, then not-q', but as 'Not (if p, then q)'. Similarly, in the context of a definite description we must distinguish an internal negation from an external negation. The contradictory negation of the proposition 'The present King of France is bald' is not the proposition 'The present King of France is not bald', but the proposition 'It is not the case that the present King of France is bald.' The symbolic counterparts of these propositions reveal the distinction between an external and an internal negation and substantiate the thesis that a negation is ultimately applied to a proposition or a propositional function.

$$(1) (\exists x) (Kx.(y) (Ky \supset x=y) . Bx)$$

$$(2) \sim [(\exists x) (Kx.(y) (Ky \supset x=y) . Bx)]$$

$$(3) (\exists x) (Kx.(y) (Ky \supset x=y) . \sim Bx),$$

where 'Kx' stands for 'x is a King of France',

'Ky' for 'y is a King of France', 'Bx' for 'x is bald'

and ' \sim ' for negation.

Here (3) is an internal negation of (1), and (2) is an external negation of (1).

Similarly, the apparent term-negations are ultimately reduced to proposition-negations or propositional function-negations. The proposition 'Every non-F is non-G' is reduced to 'For any x, (it is not the case that x is an F) implies (it is not the case that x is G)'.

From the above distinction it follows that all the varieties of negation are ultimately reducible to proposition-negations or propositional function-negations. In the context of Indian theories of negation we shall point out that some negations are not reducible to proposition-negations or propositional function-negations.

Now let us discuss whether a subject-term can be negated. It is claimed that the negation of a proposition of the form 'Fx' is equivalent to ' $\sim Fx$ '. Here both 'F' and ' $\sim F$ ' are considered as predicate expressions. But the negation of 'x' in 'Fx' does not yield another subject-expression. On the contrary ' $\sim x$ ' is considered as an ill-formed expression. Some arguments have been put forward to show the asymmetry between a subject and a predicate in a basic proposition in terms of negation of a predicate and a subject.

Anscombe³ says,

"What signally distinguishes names from expressions for predicates is that expressions for predicates can be negated, names not. I mean that negation, attached to a predicate, yields a new predicate, but when attached to a name it does not yield any name."⁴

Geach also says,

"What distinguishes predicates from subjects, I suggest, is... that by negating a predicate we can get the negation of the proposition in which it was originally predicated (plainly there is nothing analogous for subject terms);"⁵

Another argument for the asymmetry between subject and predicate has been stated by Strawson.⁶ It could be summarized as follows :

Our logic can be enriched with negative and compound predicate-terms, but it cannot be enriched with negative and compound subject-terms. Let us consider the subject-predicate proposition 'Fa'. The negation of this proposition, namely, ' $\sim(Fa)$ ' is logically equivalent to ' $\sim Fa$ ', but ' $F\bar{a}$ ' is not equivalent

to $\neg(Fa)$. Similarly, (Fa) and (Ga) is equivalent to $(F \text{ and } G)a$ in which 'F and G' is a compound predicate. The logic of propositions is applicable to the predicate-expressions without involving any inconsistency. But this does not hold good with respect to subject-terms. It has been shown in the following way :

- (1) Fa and Ga
- (2) $\neg\neg(Fa \text{ and } Ga)$ [From (1) by double negation]
- (3) $\neg\neg((F \text{ and } G)a)$ [From (2) by introducing a
conjunctive predicate]
- (4) $\neg((F \text{ and } G)\bar{a})$ [From (3) by introducing a negative
subject]
- (5) $\neg(F\bar{a} \text{ and } G\bar{a})$ [Expansion of (4)]
- (6) $\neg\neg(Fa)$ and $\neg\neg(Ga)$ [From (5)]
- (7) Fa or Ga [From (6)].

Now (1) is not equivalent to (7). So the logic of propositions cannot be applied to the subject-terms. Strawson tries to substantiate the asymmetry between subject and predicate in terms of concepts and particulars. According to him a predicate-term specifies a concept, but a subject-term specifies a particular. Moreover, a concept can be incompatible with another concept or can involve another concept, but a particular cannot have such relations with another particular. This follows from the nature of particulars and concepts. From the nature of a particular it follows that the negation of a subject-term which specifies a particular becomes an ill-formed expression. In the context of Indian theories of negation we shall discuss whether we can negate a name or a subject-expression.

II

The aim of this section is to discuss the different types of negation mentioned in the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy. Since the Mīmāṃsā philosophers have emphasised injunctions rather than indicative sentences, they have developed a logic of injunctions. The various types of negation have been discussed in the context of injunctions.⁷

Let us consider the injunction *na bhakṣayet* 'he shall not eat'. It is said that this type of injunction should not be translated as 'he shall not eat', but as 'he shall-not eat'. This injunction does not prescribe an action different from eating. It simply prohibits eating. If the positive injunction *bhakṣayet* 'he shall eat' is symbolized by 'N[F(x)]', where 'N' stands for the obligation operator, then its negation would be symbolized by 'N ~ [F(x)]'. This type of negation is called '*prasajya-pratiśedha*' or '*niśedha*' type of negation. In this context it is to be noted that the negative injunction has not been symbolized by ' \sim N[F(x)]' but by 'N ~ [F(x)]'. In standard deontic modal logic ' \sim N[F(x)]' would be equivalent to 'P ~ [F(x)]', where 'P' stands for the permissibility operator. So ' \sim N[F(x)]' would not express a negative injunction.

Now let us discuss whether negations of the form 'N[~ F(x)]' or 'N[F(~ x)]' are permissible according to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers.

According to these philosophers all cases of negation other than *prasajya-pratiśedha* which is symbolized by the form 'N ~ [F(x)]', are called '*paryudāsa*' 'exclusion' type of negation. It is also said that the *paryudāsa* 'exclusion' type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected either with the verbal root or with the noun, and the *prasajya-pratiśedha* 'prohibition' type of negation is to be understood where the negative is connected with the verbal ending.

In the injunction *nekṣeta* 'he shall not look', the 'not' is attached to the verb or the verbal root. Hence the sentence *nekṣeta* should be translated as 'he shall not-look', and this type of negation is to be considered as a *paryudāsa* 'exclusion' type of negation. In this case the injunction positively prescribes something other than looking. This type of negation can be symbolized by the form 'N[~ F(x)]'.

Now let us consider the injunctions where a noun is negated. As an example of this type of negation the Mīmāṃsā philosophers have discussed the injunction *nānuyājesu ye-ya-jāmahom karoti* 'at the after-scrifices he shall not say

ye-yajāmahe'. Here 'not' is applied to the name of a sacrifice called 'after-sacrifice'. Hence this injunction means 'at sacrifices other than the after-sacrifice he shall say *ye-yajāmahe*'. This type of injunction can be symbolized by the form 'N[F(~x,y)]', and the negation involved in this type of injunction is to be called '*paryudāsa*' 'exclusion' type of negation.

From the above discussion of negation with respect to an injunction it follows that '[~N(F(x))]' is not equivalent to (1) N~[F(x)] or (2) N[~F(x)] or (3) N[F(~x)]. If '~[N(F(x))]' represents the negation of an injunctive sentence as a whole, then (1), (2) and (3) represent the negation of different constituent parts of an injunction. The generalized version of the Mīmāṃsā view can be formulated in the following way :

If the expression of a positive injunction involves a plurality of expressions, the negation of the [modal operator which is an] obligation operator would represent the *prasajya-pratiśedha* 'prohibition' type of negation, and the negation of any other component would represent the *paryudāsa* 'exclusion' type of negation.

III

In this section we shall discuss the Nyāya concept of negation which cannot be said to be either a term-negation or a proposition-negation or a propositional function-negation. Since the Nyāya concept of negation is closely linked up with the Nyāya concepts of cognition and relation, we would like to mention a few points about these.

According to the Nyāya there is a fundamental distinction between a qualificative and a non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be expressed by a complex expression of the form 'a R b', where 'a' stands for the qualificand, 'b' stands for the qualifier and 'R' stands for the qualification relation. A qualificative cognition is also called 'a relational cognition'. In a qualificative cognition an object is cognised under some mode of presentation, but in a non-qualificative cognition an object is cognised without any mode of presentation.

According to the Nyāya the simplest qualificative cognition has as its object, say, a pot together with potness in a certain relation. The whole complex is expressed by the expression 'a pot', and described by a more complex expression 'potness inheres in a particular pot-individual'.

In a qualificative cognition the qualifier represents the mode of presentation of the qualificand. So in a qualificative cognition an object is cognised under some mode of presentation. In a non-qualificative cognition the ultimate elements of a qualificative cognition are cognised by themselves.

Let us consider the cognition^a of a pot expressed by the expression 'a pot'. The expression 'a pot' expresses a qualificative cognition. In this cognition the qualificand is an individual pot, the qualifier is potness, i.e., the mode of presentation of a pot, and the qualification relation is inherence. In this qualificative cognition an individual pot is cognised under the mode of potness in the relation of inherence. In the technical language of the Nyāya this relation of inherence in this context is called the '*prakāratā-avacchedaka-sambandha*'. This expression can be translated as 'the limiting relation of the property of being the qualifier'. This concept can be explained in the following way. In the cognition a R b, 'a' is the first member of the relation 'R' and 'b' is its second member. We can therefore say that b has the property of being its second member. This property is limited by R. This is what is meant by saying that R is the limiting relation of the property of being the qualifier.

In this context it is to be noted that the mode of presentation of an object need not be an essential property of an object. But when we are talking about the meaning of an expression, the mode of presentation, according to the Nyāya, is to be taken as 'the reason for applying an expression to whatever object or objects it applies.

From the above discussion of the Nyāya concept of cognition it follows that any qualificative cognition can be described by the form 'a R b', where 'a' is a qualificand, 'b' is a

qualifier and 'R' is a qualification relation between them. When this description of a cognition is expanded in the technical language of the Nyāya, it takes the following form :

The cognition in which the property of being the qualificand resident in *a* is limited by a-ness and determined by the property of being the qualifier resident in *b* and the latter property is limited by b-ness and R.

This description of a cognition can be brought closer to our understanding in terms of the role and the mode of presentation of an object of cognition. The object *a* is playing the role of a qualificand under the mode of a-ness. In some other context the same object might play some other role under the same mode or some other mode of presentation. Similarly, the object *b* is playing the role of qualifier under the mode of b-ness and the relation R. In this context it is to be noted that this expansion of the cognition a R b is applicable to those cases where the qualificand and the qualifier are cognised under some mode of presentation which is expressed by a property-denoting expression. In the cognition expressed by the expression 'a blue pot', a pot is the qualificand, a blue colour is the qualifier and the inherence relation is the qualification. Here the property of being the qualificand is limited by potness and the property of being the qualifier is limited by both blueness and the inherence relation. But in the cognition expressed by the expression 'a pot', the property of being the qualificand resident in a pot-individual is not limited by another property and the property of being the qualifier resident in potness is not limited by another property. The property of being the qualifier is limited by the relation of inherence only. So there are two types of the property of being the qualificand and the property of being the qualifier depending upon whether they are limited by a property or not.

The distinction between the relation *limited by* and the relation *determined by* can be expressed in the following way :

- x is limited by y iff (a) both x and y are properties,
 (b) x is a relational property
 and (c) the property y is a mode of
 presentation of the object where
 the relational property x resides.

In this context it is to be noted that the term 'property' is used in a very wide sense. When all the above conditions are satisfied, x is the entity limited and y is the entity limiter. It is also to be noted that the term 'limited by' has been used in different senses in different contexts. Let us enumerate some of the senses of the term 'limited by' or 'limitor of'.⁹

- (A) x is a limitor of y iff (z) (if y occurs in z, then x occurs
 in z).
 (B) x is a limitor of y iff (z) (y occurs in z iff x occurs in z).
 (C) x is a limitor of y iff (z) (if x occurs in z, then y occurs
 in z).

In addition to these senses the concept of limitor has also been defined in terms of an unanalysable relational property called 'limitor-ship', which is a self-linking (*svarūpa*) relation. But our use of the term 'limited by' is different from all these senses. Our use of this term might be called an 'Epistemic use' as opposed to all other senses which might be called 'Ontological uses'. This epistemic use of this term is predominant in the later development of the Nyāya philosophy.

The relation *determined by* might be defined in the following way :

x is determined by y iff both x and y are relational properties of correlatives.

Now let us classify the different types of relations cognised in different relational cognitions. The Nyāya concept of relation is very important for understanding the Nyāya concept of negation. According to the Nyāya all relations are dyadic. All higher order relations are reduced to a set of dyadic relations. A relational or qualificative cognition has the form 'a R b', where a is the first term and b is the

second term of the relation R. The Nyāya terminology for the first term is 'subjunct' and for the second term 'adjunct'. Relations have been classified into two classes, viz. occurrence-exacting and non-occurrence-exacting. A relation is called 'occurrence-exacting' if the second term occurs in the first term. Otherwise it is called 'non-occurrence-exacting'. The relation of conjunction or inherence is called 'occurrence-exacting', because the second term of these relations occurs in the first term. But relations like identity, pervasion, non-pervasion, contentness, content-possessorship are called 'non-occurrence-exacting', because the second term of these relations does not occur in the first term. In this context we would like to mention another important aspect of the Nyāya concept of relation. In some context a term itself plays the role of a relation. This type of relation is called 'self-linking relation' (*svarūpa-sambandha*). The relation of an imposed property to its possessor is considered as a self-linking relation. Most of the relational abstracts are also considered as self-linking relations. In a relational situation a R b, a has the property of being the first term of R and b has the property of being the second term of R. The property of being the first term of R and the property of being the second term of R are considered as self-linking relations. Another way of describing this situation is to say that the relation of R to a or the relation of R to b is a self-linking relation. A self-linking relation is ontologically identical with either of its terms or with both. It is, however, usual to take this relation to be ontologically identical with its first term. The self-linking relation plays a very important role in the context of a negation. What the proposition 'the absence of a is in b' describes is the fact that the absence of a is related to b which is its locus by an absential self-linking (*abhāvīya-viśeṣaṇatā*) relation.

Now let us discuss the Nyāya concept of negation. The following points will be discussed in this context :

A. The criteria for a significant negative expression :

According to Nyāya the negation of an expression would

be significant if the following conditions are satisfied :

(a) If 't' is a meaningful expression, then the expression 'negation of t' or 'not-t' would not be significant if 't' stands for a universal property. According to the Nyāya the terms 'existence', 'knowability' and 'nameability' refer to a universal property. But their negations would not be significant expressions. From this criterion it follows that the Nyāya does not accept the thesis that if an expression is meaningful, then its negation is also meaningful. If this thesis is called 'the significance criterion of negation', then the Nyāya does not accept this criterion as universally valid. According to the Nyāya the terms 'existent' and 'nameable' are considered as significant, but the terms 'non-existent' and 'unnameable' are not considered as significant. Hence sentences like 'no existent thing is unnameable' or 'all unnameable things are non-existent' are considered as non-significant, although sentences like 'all existent things are nameable' are considered as true. This shows that the Nyāya does not accept the rules of obversion, contraposition and double negation as universally valid rules.

(b) If 'the negation of t' is a significant expression, then 't' must not be an empty term. Terms like 'a hare's horn', 'Pegasus', and 'unicorn' are considered as empty, because they do not refer to any real object. If 't' is an empty term, then the expression 'negation of t' cannot be considered as a significant term. From this condition of negation one should not conclude that according to the Nyāya any expression which contains an empty term is non-significant.^{1•}

(c) The expression 'negation of t' will be meaningful if we know what it is for t to be present somewhere. In this context it is to be noted that the 't' is non-empty. If we know what it is for t to be present somewhere, then we know the manner of presentation of t. The manner of presentation of t in the cognition *negation of t* is the limiter of the property of being the counterpositive of the negation. The t which is the counterpositive of negation of t is cognized as present

somewhere by some relation. The relation in which *t* is present in some locus is called 'the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness resident in *t*'. There must be a limiting relation of the counterpositiveness resident in *t*.

In this context it is to be noted that the first two restrictions are applicable to all types of negation and the third restriction is applicable only to the 'never' type of absence (*atyantābhāva*) and mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*).

B. The counterpositive of a Negation :

In the negation of *t*, *t* (not the expression 't') is the counterpositive and *t* has the property of being the counterpositive. Since there are two terms in this context, the question of the relation between them would arise. It is said that the relation of the negation of *t* to *t* is counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*). It is also said that the relation of counterpositiveness is a self-linking relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*). The property of being the counterpositive is limited by a property and a relation. So the property of being the counterpositive is limited by a mode of presentation and a relation. In an extended sense the term 'mode of presentation' might include the limiting relation in which *t* is present in its locus. Unless we specify the limiter or the limitors of the property of being the counterpositive we cannot draw a distinction between a generic negation and a specific negation or a distinction between two specific negations. The distinction between the negation of a pot and the negation of the pot which was in my kitchen is to be drawn in terms of their respective limiter or limitors. In the former case the property of being the counterpositive is limited by potness and in the latter case the property of being the counterpositive is limited by potness as well as by the property of being in my kitchen. Similarly, unless we specify the limiting relation both the absence and the presence of the same object might be located in the same locus. For example, the pot is present in its parts by the relation of inherence and absent in its parts by the

relation of contact. So the Nyāya technique for drawing the distinction between different negations is in terms of the mode of presentation of the negatum.

Now let us discuss the question whether the counterpositiveness which is a self-linking relation is to be identified with the counterpositive or something else.

First of all, it cannot be identified with the limiter or the limitors of the counterpositiveness. If it is identified with its limiter, then there cannot be any distinction between the entity limited and the entity limiter. Since a limiter is a mode of presentation of an entity limited, there is a fundamental epistemic distinction between these two entities. Hence the counterpositiveness which is limited by a limiter cannot be identified with its limiter.

Secondly, the counterpositiveness cannot be identified with the negation of *t* which is the second term of the relation called 'counterpositiveness'. The relation of *t* to the negation of *t* would be the converse of the relation of counterpositiveness. In the case of the converse of the relation of counterpositiveness the first term is the negation of *t* and the second term is *t*. Moreover, the converse of the relation of counterpositiveness is said to be a self-linking relation. So it is to be identified with a term. If both the relation of counterpositiveness and its converse are identified with the negation of *t*, then we ignore the direction of a relation, which is very important for the Nyāya concept of relation. So this move is not tenable. On the same ground the relation of counterpositiveness cannot be identified with both the negation of *t* and *t*.

Thirdly, if the counterpositiveness which relates the negation of *t* to *t* is considered as a separate entity, then we require another relation to relate counterpositiveness to *t* on the one hand, and to relate counterpositiveness to negation of *t* on the other. In order to avoid all these problems it is claimed that the counterpositiveness is to be identified with

the t or the negatum, and the converse of the relation of counterpositiveness is to be identified with the negation of t . So two things have been said about t and the negation of t . Since counterpositiveness is a relation which relates the negation of t to t , t is a term of this relation. Secondly, since this is a self-linking relation and it is to be identified with t , t is also a relation. So t is playing two roles in this context. It is both a term of a relation and a relation. By a parallel argument it can be shown that the negation of t is also playing two roles in this context. Not only the negation of t or t plays two roles in this context, but also the locus of the negation of t . The relation of the negation of t to its locus is also a self-linking relation. This type of self-linking relation is called 'the absential self-linking relation', and this relation is identified with the locus which is the first member of this relation. So the locus of a negation is both a term of a relation and a relation.

Now let us discuss how the cognition of t is related to the cognition of the negation of t . According to the Nyāya the cognition of negation of t presupposes some previous cognition of t . The Nyāya concept of presupposition in this context is to be distinguished from Strawson's concept of presupposition. According to Strawson¹¹ if p presupposes q , then the truth of q is a precondition of the truth or falsity of p . If q is false, then p cannot be said to be true or false. So from p we can't deduce q . So $\sim q$ does not contradict p . But according to the Nyāya the cognition of negation of t is dependent upon or presupposes the cognition of t , and in the cognition of the negation of t , t is the qualifier and the negation of t is the qualificand. From this fact it follows that if a person has cognised the negation of t , then he must have cognised t prior to the cognition of the negation of t . This concept of presupposition cannot be said to be fully semantic or pragmatic. Since the relation of dependence is at the level of cognition and not at the level of truth-value, this concept cannot be said to be a fully semantic concept. If the pragmatic concept of the presupposition relation is not between

propositions, but between a person and a proposition, then different persons can have different presuppositions or the same person can have different presuppositions at different times. The Nyāya rules out this possibility in the context of a negation. The Nyāya concept might be expressed in the following form¹² :

- (x) (If x has cognised the negation of t at time y, then x has cognised t at time y'), where 'y' means 'prior to y'.

C. Types of Negation :

According to the Nyāya there are two main types of negation. The difference between them at the level of language might be represented by the following forms :

- (1) x is not in y, or x does not occur in y, or the absence of x occurs in y;
- (2) x is not y, or x is different from y; where 'x' and 'y' are non-empty terms.

Now (1) represents relational absence and (2) represents mutual absence. The positive counterpart of (1) is

- (1') x is in y, or x occurs in y,
and the positive counterpart of (2) is
(2') x is y.

According to the Nyāya in (1') the denotation of 'x' occurs in the denotation of 'y', and the relation of x to y is an occurrence-exacting relation. But in (2') 'x' and 'y' refer to the same thing. So x and y are related by the relation of identity. At the cognitive level (1') represents the type of cognition where x appears as superstratum and y appears as substratum, but (2') represents the type of cognition where the relation of identity is cognised between x and y.

Now let us discuss the different types of relational absence. There are three types of relational absence.

(a) The absence of an object before its production is called the 'not-yet type of relational absence'. It is claimed

that the absence of a pot before its production is present in its parts. With the production of the pot this absence ceases to exist.

(b) The absence of an object after its destruction is called the 'no-more type of absence'. The absence of a pot occurs in its parts when it is destroyed. Both the not-yet type of absence and the no-more type of absence are limited in time. The former has no beginning but has an end, while the latter has a beginning, but no end.

(c) The type of relational absence which has neither beginning nor end is called the 'never type of relational absence'. For example, the absence of a colour in air, or the absence of a pot on the ground. Some of the early Naiyāyikas do not consider the absence of a pot on the ground as an example of a never type of absence. They are inclined to treat it as a fourth type of absence which has both a beginning and an end. But the later Naiyāyikas on the ground of ontological simplicity do not accept the fourth type of relational absence. The property of being the counterpositive of a never type of relational absence is limited by both a property and an occurrence-exacting relation; but the property of being the counterpositive of a not-yet and no-more type of relational absence is limited by a property only. This may be considered as one of the distinctive features of a never type of relational absence. Since this feature is very important for our discussion of negation let us explain the never type of absence with an example¹³. Consider the sentence

(a) A pot is on the ground.

From the negation of (a) we will get either

(b) The ground has an absence of a pot, or

(c) The pot has (the property of) absence-from-the-ground.

In (b) what is negated is a pot and the limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive resident in a pot is the relation of contact. But in (c) what is negated is the ground

along with the converse of the relation of contact. By using symbols the difference between (b) and (c) can be explained in the following way :

(b') $a S_1 (b) - \text{neg}$, where a is the ground, b is a pot, $b - \text{neg}$ is the absence of a pot, R is the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness resident in b , and S_1 is a self-linking relation which relates the absence of b to a .

(c') $b T_1 (\check{R}a) - \text{neg}$, where b is a pot, a is the ground, \check{R} is the converse of the relation of contact, ' $\check{\sim}$ ' stands for the scope of the counterpositive, $(\check{R}a) - \text{neg}$ is the absence of the $(\check{R}a)$, S (inherence) is the limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive resident in $(\check{R}a)$, and T_1 is a self-linking relation which relates the $(\check{R}a) - \text{neg}$ to b .

What (b') says is that a has the absence of b , but what (c') says is that b has the absence of being the second member of the converse relation R which has a as the first member.

Now let us discuss the nature of a mutual absence. In a mutual absence the counterpositiveness is limited by the relation of identity. According to the Navya-Nyāya when it is said that A is different from B , what is negated is B and the relation of identity is the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness resident in B . But Udayana¹⁴ in his *Lakṣaṇāvāhī* claims that what is negated in this case is not B , but the supposed-relation-of-identity-with- B . The difference between these two views can be expressed in the following way :

Df I

(D1) A is different from $B \stackrel{=}{=} A S_1 (B) - \text{neg}$, where A is the first number of the relation S_1 which is a self-linking relation, $(B) - \text{neg}$ is the absence of B , and I is the relation of identity which is the limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive resident in B .

Df

T_1

(D2) A is different from $B \stackrel{=}{=} A T_2$ (the-supposed-identity-with- B)

– neg, where T_2 is a self-linking relation, A is the first member of this relation and (the-supposed-identity-with-B)–neg is the second member of this relation, ‘ \sim ’ stands for the scope of the counterpositive, and T_1 is a self-linking relation which is the limiting relation of the counterpositiveness resident in the supposed-identity-with-B.

Now let us discuss another interesting feature of the Nyāya concept of negation. The question is whether a never type of absence of a mutual absence of x is identical with x. According to most of the Nyāya philosophers a never type of absence of a mutual type of absence of x is not identical with x, but with x-ness. So instead of the law

(1) $\sim - x = x$, where ‘ \sim ’ stands for the never type of absence and ‘-’ stands for the mutual absence, they accept the following law :

(2) $\sim - x = x\text{-ness}$

(2) can be explained in the following way. Let x be a pot.

The property difference from a pot or the mutual absence of a pot is present in all things other than a pot. But the property the never type of absence of the mutual absence of a pot is present in all pots only. According to the Nyāya the property which occurs in all and only members of a class is identical with its class character. Hence, the property the never type of absence of a mutual absence of a pot is identical with the class character of a pot or potness. This shows how a property can be expressed by a term when a double negation involving two different types of negation is applied to a term.

D. The nature of Negation :

Now let us discuss whether the Nyāya concept of negation corresponds to any Western concept of negation. Some of the contemporary interpreters of the Nyāya philosophy have equated the Nyāya concept of negation with a term-negation, and some other interpreters have equated this concept with a propositional function-negation. According to our

positive thesis the Nyāya concept of negation cannot be equated with a term–negation or with a proposition–negation or with a propositional function–negation.

According to the Nyāya what is negated is the second member of a dyadic relation. A relation itself can be negated provided it is a second member of another dyadic relation. Let us explain in terms of the form 'a R b', where a is the first member, b is the second member, and R is the relation between them. According to the Nyāya what is negated is not b in insolation, but *b as the second member of the relation R*. This concept is expressed when it is said that the property of being the counterpositive or the counterpositiveness resident in b is limited by the limiting relation R. We cannot state a never type of absence and a mutual absence without mentioning a limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive. The negation of a R b, according to the Nyāya, cannot be represented by any of the following forms :

- (1) a R not–b,
- (2) a not–R b,
- (3) not–a R b,
- (4) not–(aR) b,
- (5) a not–(Rb),
- (6) not–(a R b),
- (7) not–(....R b) or not–(x R b)

If by a term–negation we mean any expression of the form (1) or (3), then the Nyāya concept of negation is not a term–negation. If by an element–negation we mean any expression of the form (1) to (5), then also the Nyāya concept of negation is not an element–negation. If by a proposition–negation we mean any expression of the form (6), then also the Nyāya concept of negation is not a proposition–negation. Moreover, the Nyāya concept of negation cannot be represented by (7) which is a propositional function–negation, because '....Rb' or 'xRb' is not the second member of

the relation R in the form 'aRb'. The negation of aRb can only be represented by the form :

(8) $a S_1 (\text{not-}b)$, where a is the first member of the self-linking relation S_1 , not-b is the second member of S_1 and R is the limiting relation of the property of being the counterpositive resident in b. This relation R must be an occurrence-exacting relation in a never type of absence, and it would be the relation of identity in a mutual absence. From the above discussion it follows that the Nyāya concept of negation cannot be captured by any Western concept of negation.

Notes

- 1 A. N. Prior (1967), Vol 5, pp, 458-463.
- 2 Prior (1967), pp. 458-459.
- 3 Anscombe (1965), quoted in Strawson (1971), p. 96.
- 4 Anscombe (1965), p. 33.
- 5 Geach (1965), p. 461, quoted in Strawson (1971), p. 96.
- 6 Strawson (1974), pp. 6-7.
- 7 Staal (1962), pp, 52-71.
- 8 In this context I am using the expression 'cognition' in the sense of object of cognition.
- 9 Matilal (1968), pp, 71-81.
- 10 For a discussion on empty terms see Matilal (1971), pp. 123-145, Shaw (1974), pp. 332-343, and Shaw (1978), pp. 261-264.
- 11 Strawson (1952), p. 175.
- 12 Matilal (1968), pp. 128-129.
- 13 Raghunātha Śiromani, *Nañ-Vāda*, translated with commentary by Matilal (1968). pp. 153-154.
- 14 *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* with *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharyya, p. 80.

References

- Anscombe, G. E. M., 'Retraction', *Analysis*, December, 1965, pp. 33-36.
- Ayer, A. J., 'Negation', *Philosophical Essays*, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., pp. 36-65.
- Bhattacharyya, S., 'Some Features of Navya-Nyāya Logic' *Philosophy East and West*, July, 1974, pp. 329-342.
- Bhattacharyya, S., 'Some Principles and Concepts of Navya-Nyāya Logic and Ontology', *Our Heritage* (forthcoming).
- Bhattacharyya, Panchanan, (ed. and trans.), *Bhāṣāpāricchedaḥ* with *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandar, Calcutta, Bengali year 1377.
- Frege, G., 'Negation', *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, edited by P. Geach and M. Black, Basil Blackwell, 1952, pp. 117-135.
- Geach, P. T., 'Assertion', *Philosophical Review*, 1965, pp. 449-465.
- Guha, D. C., *Navya Nyāya System of Logic*, Bhāratiya Vidyā Prakāśan, Varanasi, 1968.
- Ingalls, D. H. H., *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Jackendoff, R. S., 'An Interpretive Theory of Negation', *Foundations of Language*, 1969, pp. 218-241.
- Jha. Ganganath, *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mimāṃsā*, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1978.
- Johnson, W. E., 'Negation', *Logic*, Part 1. Dover Publications, 1964, pp. 66-79.
- Matilal, B. K., *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Matilal, B. K., *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, Mouton 1971.
- Matilal, B. K., 'On the Navya-Nyāya Logic of Property and Location', *Proceedings of the 1975 International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic*, Indiana University, 1975.
- Nyāyaratna, Maheṣa Chandra, *Navyanyāya-Bhāṣāpradīpaḥ*, Edited with Commentary *Suprabhā* and Bengali translation by Kalipada Tarkāchārya, Sanskrit college, Calcutta, 1973.
- Prior, A. N., 'Negation', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol 5, edited by Paul Edwards, 1967, pp. 458-463.
- Shaw, J. L., 'Empty Terms: The Nyāya and the Buddhists', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol 2, 1974, pp. 332-343.

- Shaw, J. L., 'The Nyāya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability,,
Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 5, 1978, pp. 255-266.
- Shaw, J. L., 'Nagation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning', *Journal
of Indian Philosophy*, Vol 6, 1978, pp. 59-77.
- Staal, J. F., 'Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought :
A Comparative Study', BSOAS, 1962, pp. 52-71.
- Strawson, P. F., *Introduction of Logical Theory*, Methuen, 1952.
- Strawson, P. F., *Logic-Linguistic Paper*, Methuen, 1971.
- Strawson, P. F., *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar*, Methuen 1974.

ON REASONING FROM ANVAYA AND VYATIREKA IN EARLY ADVAITA

George Cardona

Indian thinkers have used a mode of reasoning that involves the related presence (*anvaya* 'continued presence') and absence (*vyatireka*) of entities as follows :

- (1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.
- b. When X is absent, Y is absent.
- (2) a. When X occurs, Y is absent.
- b. When X is absent, Y occurs.

If (1a, b) hold in all instances for X and Y, so that these are shown consistently to occur together, one is entitled to say that a particular relation obtains between the two. Either (1a) or (1b) alone will not justify this, and a claim made on the basis of either can be falsified by showing that (2a) or (2b) holds. One relation that can be established by (1) is that X is a cause of Y.¹ A special instance of the cause-effect relation involves the use of given speech units and the understanding by a hearer of given meanings. If (1a, b) hold, the speech unit in question is considered the cause of ones comprehending a meaning, which is attributed to that speech element.² For example, consider

- (3) a. गामानय 'Bring the cow'.
- b. गाम् बधान 'Tether the cow'.
- (4) a. अश्वमानय 'Bring the horse'.
- b. अश्वम् बधान 'Tether the horse'.

Each of the sentences within each pair has a constant element : *gām* in (3), *aśvam* in (4). The second sentence of each pair differs from the first in having *badhāna* instead of

ānaya. The meaning common to (3a, b) is attributed to *gām*, the one common to (4a,b) is attributed to *aśvam* : 'cow' and 'horse.' In the same manner, one concludes that *ānaya*, which is found in (3a), (4a) but is absent from (3b), (4b), and *badhāna*, present in the latter but not in the former, respectively mean 'bring' and 'tether'. It would not do to reach other conclusions from (3), (4), for example, to say that *gām* means 'bring.' To be sure, part of the meaning of (3a), which has this item, is 'bring'. However, *gām* also occurs in (3b), which does not involve this meaning, and (4a) does have this meaning, though it lacks *gām*. That is, a tentative conclusion based on (1a) alone is refuted, since (2a,b) hold.

From the consistent cooccurrence established by (1), it is also possible to conclude that certain features are proper to a given thing, which is characterized by these properties. Thus, an ancient could use this reasoning to say that heat and light are properties of fire.³ In this connection, consider part of what Śaṅkara says in his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 3.3.53-54. At issue is an argument attributed to materialists defending their position that the self (*ātman*) others say is separate from the body is not really distinct from this. According to these materialists, this self is nothing more than the body qualified by the power of intelligence, which itself is said to result from the modification of the elements earth, water, fire and wind. Though one does not find such power in these external elements, whether together or singly, one may say this is found in them when they are modified to form a body, just as one finds intoxicating power in the modified form of juices.⁴ The argument supporting this position involves reasoning by (1) to show that properties said to pertain to a self different from the body by those who accept that there is such a distinct self in reality pertain to the body (cf. note 3). Life breath, purposeful activity, intelligence, memory etc. should be treated as properties of the body, since they are perceived to be only in a body, not outside it, and a possessor of such properties other than

the body is not established.⁵ That is,

(5) a. When there is a body, life breath etc. occur.

b. When that body is absent, life breath etc. are absent.

are said to hold for the properties in question in respect of any individual. Hence, properties which some say belong to a self considered to be distinct from the body belong to the body, so that the entity some call *ātman* is identical with the body. Now, true properties of the physical body, such as form or colour, do indeed persist so long as the body exists : There is no body without some shape or color. On the other hand, life breath etc. can be absent even when there is a body, a dead body. Thus, the properties at issue are different from true properties of the physical body, so that they should be said not to pertain to the body.⁶ That is, (5a) fails to hold in all instances, and

(6) When there is a body, life breath etc. are absent. also holds, in the case of a corpse. Hence, one must at least modify (5a) to

(5a') when there is a live body, life breath etc. occur.

However, even this will not do absolutely. For, though (5a') could be known to hold, it is not possible to determine that (5b) always holds : The properties in question, viewed as pertaining to a self distinct from the body, could recur in another live body after this one has perished.⁷

The arguments presented by Śāṅkara clearly show an awareness that entities which are identical have the same properties. In addition, it is patent that if the values of X and Y in (1), (2) are identical, one can stand in place of the other. Let (1a, b) and (2a, b) be rewritten as : (1a) X, Y; (1b) $\sim X, \sim Y$; (2a) X, $\sim Y$; (2b) $\sim X, Y$. If, then, X and Y are the same, we have also : (1a') Y, X; (1b') $\sim Y, \sim X$; (2a') $\sim Y, X$; (2b') Y, $\sim X$. It is possible to refute the assumed identity of two entities by showing that (2a), (2b); (2a') or (2b') holds.

With this background, let us now consider how Advaitins, mainly Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, use reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka in connection with their teaching. Sureśvara speaks of removing words from utterances and thereby knowing, through anvaya and vyatireka, the meanings of words used in normal communication, so that one knows the meaning of an utterance upon hearing it.⁸ This obviously refers to the procedure outlined above in connection with (3)–(4). Śaṅkara also knows of reasoning from (1) to draw conclusions and that such conclusions can be refuted by showing that (2a) or (2b) holds. Indeed, he formulates (1a, b) explicitly (see note 3). Not unexpectedly, he also mentions reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka in connection with terms and their meanings. Thus the word order of

(7) तत्त्वमसि 'You are that one.' (Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.8.7 et seq.) is defended against an objection. It is usual in speech that a word comes first in a sentence if it denotes something known, in connection with which something is predicated or taught, and that there follow words which give the predication or teaching. However, in (7) this is reversed: *tvam* 'you' comes second, though it refers to someone (Śvetaketu) who is taught that he is that (*tad*) ultimate being spoken of earlier. Against this objection, Śaṅkara notes that there is no such restriction for Vedic utterances. The way words are to be construed is a function of their meanings. For one remembers the meanings of words one hears used in an utterance, so that the meaning of a sentence is understood through anvaya and vyatireka.⁹ No one can perceive the meaning of a sentence unless he recalls upon hearing it the meanings of the words in that sentence. Hence, anvaya and vyatireka are invoked, to allow this recall of word meanings.¹⁰ That is, by reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka as described, one can determine that given terms have certain meanings and not others, and these meanings are recalled when one hears these terms used in an utterance, so that one understands the meaning of the utterance.

Of course, reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka does not concern only words in respect of what meanings may be attributed to them. It also concerns things and their properties. Now, one to whom (7) is said should understand from this that he is being taught something about himself, which he can express as—

∞) अहं तदस्मि 'I am that one'.

Moreover, *aham* clearly means 'I', as can be seen from examples like

(9) a. गौरोऽहम् 'I am light'.

b. कृष्णोऽहम् 'I am dark'.

c. अयमहम् 'This is I'.

(10) a. नीलोऽश्वः 'The horse is black'.

b. नीलमुत्पलम् 'The lotus is blue'.

The meaning 'I' is common to (9a,b,c), which also contain *aham*, but is lacking in (10a,b), which also lack this term. By anvaya and vyatireka, as shown for (3)–(4), one is entitled to say *aham* means 'I'. By the same token, *aham* does not of itself signify such properties as light or dark. Indeed, it has no specific referent. Of course, one might be content to say *aham* is deictic, as are other pronominals. However, an Advaitin such as Śaṅkara or Sureśvara cannot be content with this. He must insist that one must consider just what a term such as *aham* in (8) or *tvam* in (7) designates. Nor is it sufficient to say *aham* is used with reference to oneself, *tvam* with reference to another. The question remains, just what this self is. The use of anvaya and vyatireka is said to be a mode of reasoning (*yukti*) with respect to terms and their meanings which serves to determine just what one means by *aham*.¹¹

It is necessary to use reasoning for this because there is room for doubt and confusion. To be sure, no one doubts that something like a water pot, external to one physically and referred to by *idam* 'this', is not oneself. Nor does one doubt that this self is an intelligent conscious being that perceives. However, there is confusion regarding what lies between

these two extremes. People use sentence such as (9c), understood to mean that this body is the self, but they also say

(11) ममेदं शरीरम् 'This is my body',

from which one understands ones body and oneself to be distinct related things.¹²

In everyday life, the body and the self are not discriminated. No one grasps them as totally distinct objects. No one says, 'This is the body, this is the self,' as though he had grasped the two as objects of fully discriminated cognitions. Thus, people are indeed confused concerning just what sort of thing this self is.¹³ From examples such as (9), one can see that linguistic usage contributes to this confusion. Such sentences are acceptable. People see nothing strange in talking of themselves as physical beings with properties like colors.¹⁴

Reasoning with anvaya and vyatireka in connection with the self serves in the first instance to show that certain things are not properly the self. As shown earlier, Śaṅkara refutes an argument of materialists by showing that (5a, b) do not hold in all instances. Sureśvara uses similar reasoning to demonstrate that certain entities should not be treated as being the self (*anātman* 'other than the self'). Consider two reasons he gives for concluding that the physical body is not the self.¹⁵ The first has to do with properties. It is taken for granted that people have no doubts concerning two extremes: Things like water pots are not the self, and whatever else the self may be, it is a perceiving entity.¹⁶ Now a pot has the property of being to be seen, of being an object of perception, but it is never an agent of perceiving. In addition, it must be granted that the physical body is no less susceptible of being seen than a pot, and by the same means. Suppose, then, one claimed the physical body to be the self. For this to be acceptable, it would have to be demonstrated that the body too has the property of being a perceiving agent. But of course it does not. In other words, (1a, b) do not hold if the values of X and Y, respectively, are the physical

body and the property of being a perceiving agent. On the contrary, (2a) holds. Hence, the body cannot be the self. Sureśvara also says the physical body is not the self because it does not continue to occur in a dream, though the perceiving being that dreams continues therein. In other words, were the body and the self the same, (1a, b) and (1a', b') would hold with them as values. But this is not the case, since there is an instance where the self occurs without the body. Sureśvara gives a similar argument against considering ego-consciousness (*ahāṅkāra*) a property of the self.¹⁷ If this were so, (1a, b) would hold with the self and ego-consciousness as values of the variables, so that ego-consciousness would continue to accompany the self in two states : final release and deep dreamless sleep. However, it is accepted that this is not so. Hence, (1a) fails to hold in all instances.

Reasoning in this manner, one can see that certain things one might otherwise be led to consider oneself cannot be this. Now, if one says

(12) अहं घटमद्राक्षम् 'I saw a water pot'.

one obviously uses *aham* with reference to an agent of perception who has seen an object. On the other hand, upon awakening from a deep dreamless sleep, one can say

(13) अस्मिन्सुषुप्तेऽन्यन्मनागपि नान्नाक्षमहम् 'I didn't see anything else at all in this deep sleep'.

again using *aham*, (13) denies that one perceived anything, that one was aware of anything but oneself, in this sleep. However, it does not deny the capacity of seeing (*dr̥ṣṭi*), the conscious intelligence which is the true constant when one considers oneself.¹⁸ This persists in the absence of other things such as ego-consciousness. It is to be accepted that these cannot be the self, since (2a') holds : The self persists even without them. Moreover, these are in a dependency relation with the self : As perceptible entities, they have no statue without it.¹⁹ Thus, this persistent conscious intelligence in and of itself is treated as the true inner self (*pratyagātman*).

The question arises whether a term such as *aham* can refer to this inner self directly. To put it differently, does (13) call for some special explanation or not? In this connection, consider the nominal *go*, which denotes a cow or a bull. Any individual *go* may refer to is a member of the bovine class and as such bears the generic property (*jāti*) of being a bovine (*gotva*). For *go* to be used properly of a referent, the latter must have this property, which is thus said to be the cause for the word's use in this meaning.²⁰ The term *nīla* can be used of anything that has a particular colour, so that a referent's having this property is a necessary condition for ones using this word of it. Similarly, *pācaka* 'cook' is properly used of someone who takes part in the act of cooking. Again, *gomat* 'rich in cows' denotes someone who bears a particular relation to cows, has many of them. Even the pure ether, though it is unique, hence not a member of a class with a generic property, bears a conventional relation (*rūḍhi*) with the term *ākāśa*, which refers to it. On the other hand, the inner self taken alone in its pure state does not have any generic property, is not qualified, does not take part in any action, does not bear any relation with any entity, and is not known to have any conventional association in everyday speech with a given term. Consequently, a word such as *aham*, though one can conclude it means 'I,' cannot be considered to refer directly to the inner self.²¹ On the contrary, such a term can and does refer, in ordinary discourse, to a qualified entity: the self qualified by ego-consciousness or the inner instrument of thought.²² Yet (13) does speak of the unqualified self, which does not take part in the act of perceiving. In such a sentence, then, *aham* must be considered to refer indirectly to this self, which requires a secondary signifying relation (*lakṣaṇā*) between *aham* and the inner self. There can be a secondary relation such that the primary meaning of the term is set aside. In this case, the use of *aham* in (13) is comparable to the use of *ayas* ('iron') in

(14) अयो बहति '....is burning.'

where *ayas* is understood to refer indirectly to fire in iron, since iron cannot burn of itself.²³ Alternatively, *aham* may be considered to refer indirectly to the inner self because of properties (*guṇa*) said to be shared by this and the primary meaning of the term. Compared to other things, one's ego-consciousness is interior and subtle, thus being like the inner self. Moreover, the awareness which is the inner self is reflected in ego-consciousness.²⁴

In sum, reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka serves to discriminate between what is and is not the self as well as to show what meanings may be attributed to given terms. In addition, terms like *aham*, *tvam* cannot refer directly to the self. Instead, they refer first to beings with ego-consciousness and only secondarily to the pure inner self.

In light of the above, let us consider now how Sureśvara interprets a mahāvākya such as (7). He says a person who has reasoned from anvaya and vyatireka with respect to the terms of such a sentence and the meanings of these terms can understand from the sentence that he is the ultimate being Brahman. Once he has eliminated the distinction of 'I and 'mine,' and understood that he is Brahman, he has attained a state beyond the scope of speech and thought.²⁵ That is, (7) teaches that there is no distinction between oneself and the ultimate Self, a teaching which can be understood properly only by one who has reasoned from anvaya and vyatireka. For (7) to be understood in the manner shown, *tad* and *tvam* respectively should here refer to the ultimate Self spoken of earlier in the same text and to the inner self. Linked in (7), the two terms serve to preclude possible referents of each other : for *tvam*, and individual susceptible of suffering; for *tad*, one that is not identical with the inner self. In this respect, (7) is like (10b), where *nilam* linked with *utpalm* cannot refer to just any blue thing, and *utpalm* linked with *nilam* cannot refer to just any lotus.²⁶ Both these sentences are of the type 'X is Y,' in which one term may be a quality-word. According to an analysis known already from

Pāṇini's time,²⁷ terms that are values of X and Y in this sentence type have the same referent. Thus, *nīlam* and *utpalam* which have distinct meanings of themselves, refer to a single thing in (10b), a lotus which is blue. In addition, of course, (10b) involves a qualifier-qualificand relation. Now, since (7) is of the same sentence type as (10b), it too should involve a qualifier and a qualificand, and the terms *tad*, *tvam* also should have a single referent. Further, in order to interpret (7) as noted, one must let a secondary relation hold between the terms *tad*, *tvam* and an indirect referent, the inner self, through the intermediary of the primary referents of these terms.²⁸ In this respect, (7) is different from (10b). One does not need any secondary meaning relation to interpret (10b). It is obvious that a lotus can be qualified as blue. On the other hand, it is not possible immediately to relate the referents of *tad* and *tvam* in (7) if these terms retain their primary senses. Both of these are deictic terms, which can have various referents, but every referent of *tad* has one property and every referent of *tvam* has another. Whenever *tad* is used one understands that what is referred to is not directly before one's eyes, that is, is separated from one in time or space. The term *tvam* is used with reference to a single person to whom one speaks directly, an individual who is part of the cycle of life and susceptible of suffering.²⁹ If, then, *tvam* in (7) refers to a qualificand of whom it is predicated that he is what *tad* designates, a problem arises. One cannot rightly say of the person to whom *tvam* refers that he is not before one's eyes and not subject to pain. But if the referent of *tvam* keeps these properties, he cannot enter into a qualifier-qualificand relation with the referent of *tad*.³⁰ The conflict of qualities which precludes this relation is resolved, however, if one considers that having the entities which *tad*, *tvam* directly designate stand in an apparently impossible relation serves an ulterior motive : to have these significands related to another entity, which is to be signified secondarily, namely the inner self.³¹ That is, one concludes that the speaker who

uses (7) does not intend to say that things which, because of their conflicting properties, cannot be related as qualifier and qualificand, are so related. Since the significand of *tvam* is said to be qualified by what *tad* signifies, the former has to be something not susceptible of suffering; since *tad* is linked with *tvam* in (7), it cannot be understood to refer to something that is removed, so that it must refer to the inner self.³² In other words, the conflict is eliminated by ones understanding to be set aside the conflicting properties in the significands of *tad* and *tvam*. Once this is done, one is left with a single unqualified entity, the self. Thus interpreted, (7) teaches that there is no distinction between one self and the ultimate self, Brahman. As (7) speaks of a single self, so

(15) घटाकाशो महाकाशः 'The ether in the pot is the great ether.' speaks of a single ether. This sentence too is of the type 'X is Y', in which two terms have a single referent. The terms of (15) immediately refer to ether which is in a water pot and the great ether. There is an obvious conflict of qualities, so that the significands in question cannot properly be qualifier and qualificand. To understand (15), then, one must set aside these conflicting properties. Thus, one is left with ether pure and simple, so that (15) is understood to say there is no difference between the ether in a pot and the great ether.³³

In that they speak of unqualified entities, (7) and (15) are obviously different from (10b), which speaks of a qualified thing, a blue lotus. Now, any sentence such as (10b) has a relational meaning proper to the sentence (*vākyārtha*) over and above the meanings of its components. There are two major views concerning such a sentence meaning. According to some, it is a differentiation of one entity from another, an exclusion of possible entities (*bheda*); others say it is a combining of entities (*samsarga*). Suppose that *nila* of itself signifies any blue-black thing at all, *utpala* any lotus at all. Linking the two terms in (10b) has the effect of narrowing down possible referents, excluding blue things other than lotuses and a lotus

that is not blue. Suppose, on the other hand, that *nīla* signifies the property of being blue-black, *utpala* the property of being a lotus. Relating the terms in (10b) then has the effect of showing that the two properties are combined in an individual.⁵⁴ Under either view, (10b) has a relational sentence meaning. Since (7) as interpreted does not speak of a qualified entity, however, it does not have such a relational meaning. In this way, the meaning of (7) is said to be devoid of differentiation or combining (*bhedasamsargarahitavākyaārtha*).⁵⁵ Indeed, Sureśvara says one gets from (7) a meaning which is not a sentence meaning (*avākyaārtha*), that is, one which is not relational meaning of the sort noted.⁵⁶

Sureśvara also emphasizes that only one who can reason from anvaya and vyatireka can achieve this understanding.⁵⁷ For, as one sees that such things as the body are not oneself and therefore sets these aside in seeking to find out what the self is, one gets more and more to the interior of oneself, so that the entity designated by *tad* in (7) becomes more apt to enter into an identity relation with what *tvam* designates,⁵⁸ in that one becomes more capable of understanding that the inner self and the ultimate Self are identical. Unless one has, through reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka, understood the distinction between what is and is not the self, one cannot grasp the import of (7). Indeed, for one who does not know this distinction, such a sentence is as useless as is singing to the deaf.⁵⁹

In all essential points concerning the use of anvaya and vyatireka and the import of a mahāvākya like (7), Sureśvara agrees with his teacher Śāṅkara. Let us now consider briefly what Śāṅkara says. Obviously, one cannot know what a sentence means without knowing the meanings of terms in that sentence.⁴⁰ The meanings of two words in (7) are immediately known to anyone. As noted earlier, one knows from what was said before in the text that *tad* refers to the ultimate being. In addition, any Sanskrit speaker knows from ordinary usages that *asi* means 'you are (2nd pers. sg.)'. However, (7) could

not convey any knowledge to a hearer who did not also know, by some means, precisely what *tvam* can designate.⁴¹ The hearer must have a discriminatory knowledge of what is meant by *tvam*; he must discriminate between what is and what is not the self. If such discrimination is lacking, the import of (7)—namely that the person to whom this is addressed is thereby to know that he is ever liberated—is not manifested to the hearer.⁴² It is precisely to allow such discrimination that reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka is invoked, since once a person has thereby discriminated among the possible referents of *tvam*, the import of (7) is as clearly manifest to him as a bilva fruit put in his hand.⁴³ Thus, (7) is meaningful only to one who, having reasoned from anvaya and vyatireka, knows the distinction between what is and is not his self, who can grasp that he is the true being Brahman.⁴⁴ And, for reasons given earlier,⁴⁵ the inner self is not directly signified by a word such as *aham* or *tvam*, which is used ordinarily of an individual who has ego-consciousness. Such terms may only indirectly refer to the inner self.⁴⁶ Thus, one who is to grasp the import of (7) must have discriminated between the true self and other things and must know not only that *tad* of (7) refers to the ultimate Self spoken of earlier in the text but also that *tvam* can have both a primary and a secondary referent. Syntactically, (7) is of the type 'X is Y'. The copula, here *asi*, serves to show that *tad* and *tvam* have a single referent,⁴⁷ as do *nīlaḥ* and *aśvaḥ* in (10a).⁴⁸ Thus, since *tvam* in (7) is connected with *tad*, which refers to a being that is not susceptible of suffering, one understands that *tvam* here also refers to such a being, the inner self; and since *tad* is linked with *tvam*, one understands that it too refers to the inner self.⁴⁹ In other words, to get over a conflict between irreconcilable properties, one must understand that qualities of entities which *tad* and *tvam* designate in the first instance are set aside : *tad* refers to the ultimate Self, which is removed from an individual, and *tvam* directly refers to an individual susceptible of suffering; the properties of

not being interior and of being susceptible to suffering are set aside.⁵⁰ One thus sees that (7) speaks of the inner self alone, in its pure state (*kevala*),⁵¹ so that this serves to teach that one is ever free, free of suffering and actionless,⁵² since one is Brahman. In brief, (7) teaches that there is no distinction between the inner self and the ultimate Self. Of course, what (7) thus speaks of, an unqualified entity, is not a relational sentence meaning. Indeed, Śaṅkara explicitly says that the ultimate being Brahman that is spoken of is not a *vākyārtha*.⁵³

Śaṅkara and Sureśvara thus agree on the following main points. One uses reasoning by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* to determine what meanings may be attributed to given terms and to see what properties may be said to characterize given things. Reasoning thus, one learns to discriminate between what is and is not the self. One also sees that terms like *aham*, *tvam* refer primarily to qualified entities and can be used of the inner self only secondarily. A person who has learned to discriminate between what is and is not the self and who knows what *tvam* can refer to is capable of grasping the import of a *mahāvākya* such as (7). The terms *tad* and *tvam* stands here in the same relation as holds between terms in (10a, b): the relation of having the same referent (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*, *tulyanīḍatva*). This being so, the referents of *tad* and *tvam* should be related as qualifier and qualificand. However, this is not immediately possible, since the primary referents of the terms have incompatible properties. Hence, one must resort to a secondary meaning relation (*lakṣaṇā*)⁵⁴ between these terms and entities which lack these conflicting properties. In this manner, (7) is understood to speak of the inner self (*pratyagātman*), teaching that this is identical with the ultimate Self, Brahman.

Later Advaitins also accept, though not unanimously, that *tad* and *tvam* in (7) refer to a single unqualified referent, through a secondary signifying relation.⁵⁵ This relation is *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, one such that part of the primary mean-

ing of a term is set aside, part retained. Although later Advaitins do not generally discuss details of reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka to discriminate between what is and is not the self, Vidyāraṇya does demonstrate how, reasoning in this manner, one separates oneself from five things commonly equated with the self and then realizes Brahman.⁵⁶ Thus, given that in a dream the self appears while the gross body does not and the body fails to appear while the self does, one concludes that the body is not identical with the self. The appearance and non-appearance of the self and ego-consciousness in deep dreamless sleep similarly serves to discriminate these. Vidyāraṇya specifies what he means by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* here: the continued appearance of the self conjoined with the non-appearance of the body or the ego-consciousness and, conversely, the non-appearance of these conjoined with the appearance of the self.⁵⁷

Two points in what I have sketched out above merit stressing. First, reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka is precisely that, a mode of reasoning. It is not “a kind of meditation”.⁵⁸ Secondly, this reasoning is used to discriminate between what is and is not the self and to determine what meanings may be attributed to speech units. It is not used directly to exclude in (7) parts of what *tad* and *tvam* refer to. These points require emphasis because some modern scholars have—wrongly, in my opinion—interpreted these matters quite differently. In a famous monograph,⁵⁹ Paul Hacker devoted one section to Sureśvara’s method of determining meanings of terms (*Die Methode der Bedeutungsbestimmung*, p. 1980 [4]), another to his logical method (*Die logische Methode*, pp. 1999–2000 [93–4]). In the first of these sections, he says: The understanding of the sacred utterance (7) proceeds from the understanding of the words which constitute the sentence, and one attains this understanding by the logical method of anvaya and vyatireka, that is, through reflecting on the fact that the contents of the words and the sentence are well grounded and that the contrary is logically impossible.⁶⁰ This

is vague, sufficiently so to have prompted another scholar to clarify what Hacker meant. After citing Hacker's description, J. A. B. van Buitenen says :⁶¹ "More precisely : the proposition [(7), G. C.] is first considered positively by *anvaya*, whereby the connexion is realised between that in *tat* which is in *tvam* and contrariwise; then it is considered negatively by *vyatireka*, whereby that in *tvam* which is not *tat* is excluded from *tvam* and contrariwise." In a more recent study of the topic by a former student of Hacker's we find a similar description:⁶² "'That' refers to the inner *Ātman*. This is the meaning which is present (*anvaya*) in, or compatible with, the two words. This is the *anvaya* method, that of positive formulation. On the other hand, the word 'Thou' ordinarily means 'a sufferer of pain'. This is the meaning absent (*vyatireka*) in, or incompatible with, the word 'That.' Therefore, this meaning is excluded (*apoha...*) or removed (*vārayetām...*) from the word 'Thou.' Further, the word 'That' may mean here 'something other than the inner *Ātman*' (*apratyagātman...*), but this meaning is absent (*vyatireka*) in, or incompatible with the word 'Thou.' For this reason the meaning 'something other than the inner *Ātman*' must be removed from the word 'That'.. This is the *vyatireka* method, a negative formulation used to exclude all the incompatible meanings." The same author notes that "...Śaṅkara's *anvayavyatireka* method was inherited by his disciple Sureśvara. Though Sureśvara has tried to theoretically strengthen it, his use of the method does not seem to be very much different from that of his *guru*."⁶³ However, this scholar also claims the method was replaced by another: "In later Advaitins' works, Śaṅkara's *anvayavyatireka* came to be replaced by another method, *jahadaajahallakāṣaṇā*."⁶⁴ Similarly, after referring briefly to the Pañcapādikā and Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, he remarks: "These facts may allow us to suppose that Śaṅkara's method was already neglected at the time of his own pupils, or at any rate of Sureśvara's."⁶⁵ In addition, he proposes two reasons for "Śaṅkara's *anvayavyatireka* method" thus having been supplanted: "One

reason is that the method contains a defect in logical exactitude, and the other is that his technical terms are loanwords from Grammarians or Naiyāyikas.”⁶⁶ The logical defect is said to arise because (7) and (10a) are not precisely comparable, since the primary meanings of *nīla* and *aśva* are compatible. There are, then, two major points to discuss: (a) Reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka serves, according to the scholars cited, to keep those senses of terms in utterances like (7) which are compatible and to exclude those which are not compatible. (b) According to one scholar, later Advaitins gave up “Śāṅkara’s *anvayavyatireka* method” in favour of another “method”, *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.

There is no evidence to support points (a). Śāṅkara does indeed say that the two terms linked in (7) preclude (*vārayeṭām* ‘keep from each other’) as properties of the referents of *tvam* and *tad* respectively being one who suffers pain and not being the inner self; see above with note 50. He also says this is because *tvam* is connected with (*yogāt*) a word, *tad*, which signifies one devoid of pain and because *tad* is connected with (*yuteḥ*) *tvam*, which signifies an inner self; see above with note 49. It is remarkable that he does not mention anvaya and vyatireka as means of bringing about such exclusion. Similarly, Sureśvara says *tvam* in (7) signifies someone with the property of not suffering pain because the referent of *tad* is here a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇāt*) of *tvam*’s referent and that *tad* here refers to a being with the property of innerness because it is juxtaposed (*samnidheḥ*) with *tvam*; see above with note 32. He does not mention anvaya and vyatireka as a means of bringing this about. Moreover, as I have pointed out, Sureśvara does go into details on how one uses anvaya and vyatireka. Thus, he says adept thinkers should recognize that the physical body is not the self because it does not continue to be present (*ananvyayāt*) in a dream; see above with note 15. Similar, in showing that ego-consciousness is not a property of the true self, he says this does not continue to be present (*nānveti*) in two states,

hence cannot be such a property; see above with note 17. Clearly, *anvaya* in such contexts refers to the continued occurrence of something, *ananvaya* to the absence of this. Sureśvara's arguments involve instance of (2a) used in refuting a possible claim which could be justified only if (1a, b) always held. Further, Sureśvara speaks of removing (*uddhṛtya* 'after removing') words from utterances and reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka*; see above with note 8. As I have remarked, this can only refer to the procedure outlined in connection with (3)–(4). Neither the passages referred to above nor others which could be cited in any way support the contention that reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka* serves directly to exclude incompatible meanings and to retain compatible ones in sentences like (7).⁶⁷ Point (b) also cannot be supported by evidence. Śāṅkara explicitly says that terms such as *aham* may not directly signify the inner self, but that they may refer to this indirectly; see above with note 46. In (7), *tvam* does indirectly refer to the inner self. For this to be so, it must also be true, as Śāṅkara himself says, that part of what *tvam* ordinarily designates is set aside in this context. In other words, Śāṅkara no less than his successors operates with a secondary meaning relation (*lakṣaṇā*) such that part of a term's ordinary signification is set aside and part retained in a given context, that is, the relation called *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*.⁶⁸ Hence, there is no question of any *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* "method" having supplanted Śāṅkara's method. This being so, there is no need to consider reasons alleged to have prompted this development.

Summary

I have presented evidence showing that Advaitins used a mode of reasoning, also used by other Indian thinkers, which involves the continued presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) of things between which a relation is to be established. If

- (1) a. When X occurs, Y occurs.
- b. When X is absent, Y is absent.

hold for two entities in all instances, so that

(2) a When X occurs, Y is absent.

b. When X is absent, Y occurs.

do not hold, one is entitled to conclude that X is the cause of Y or that Y is a property of X. Further, if X and Y are identical, it is not only the case that all the properties of one should pertain to the other, but that (1a') and (1b') also should hold, where X and Y are interchanged. Of course, (2a') and (2b'), with X and Y again interchanged, should not hold. Such reasoning is used by Advaitins to demonstrate that things one is apt to consider oneself, such as the physical body, are not truly the self (*ātman*), that this is, instead, a pure conscious intelligence. The discrimination thus obtained between what is and is not the self is necessary if one is to grasp the import of a mahāvākya such as (7), which teaches that the inner self and the ultimate Self, Brahman, are not distinct but one and the same. In addition, reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka is used to show that given meanings pertain to given terms. The claims that early Advaitins' uses of anvaya and vyatireka differ from the mode of reasoning described above is not justified by the evidence.

Notes

- 1 For example, Nyāyasūtravārttika (Nyāyadarśana of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyatīkā of Vācaspati and the Pariśuddhi of Udayana, volume I, chapter 1, edited by Anantalal Thakur; Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1967), p. 152 : कारणं हि नाम तस्य तद् भवति यस्मिन् सति यद् भवति यस्मिन् चासति यन्न भवति ।
- 2 On the use of reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka in Indian grammar, with parallels from other śāstras, see ALB 31-32 (1967-68) : 313-352.
- 3 Śāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya with the commentaries Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala, edited by Anantakriṣṇa Śāstri, second edition, re-edited by Bhārgav Śāstri; Bombay : Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1938), p. 851 : यदि यस्मिन् सति भवत्यसति च न भवति तदाहर्तृत्वेनाध्यवसीयते ययान्निघर्मावौष्ण्यप्रकाशौ ।

- 4 **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 850-851** : अत्रैके देहमात्रात्मदर्शिनो लोकायतिका देहव्यतिरिक्त-
स्यात्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु प्रथिव्यादिष्वहश्चैतन्यं शरीराकारपरिणतेषु
भूतेषु स्यादिति संभावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवद्विज्ञानं चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुष इति चाहुः ।
- 5 **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 851** : प्राणचेष्टाचैतन्यस्मृत्यादयश्चात्मधर्मत्वेनाभिमता आत्मवादिनां
तेऽप्यन्तरेव देह उपलभ्यमाना बहिष्चानुपलभ्यमाना असिद्धे देहव्यतिरिक्ते धर्मिणि देहधर्मा
एव भवितुमर्हन्ति ।
- 6 **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 852-853** : यदि देहभावे भावाद्देहधर्मत्वमात्मधर्माणां मन्येत ततो
देहभावेऽप्यभावादतद्गर्भत्वमेवैषां किं न मन्येत देहधर्मवैलक्षण्यात् । ये हि देहधर्मा रूपादयस्ते
यावद्देहं भवन्ति । प्राणचेष्टादयस्तु सत्यपि देहे मृतावस्थायाम् न भवन्ति ।
- 7 **Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 854** : अपि च सति हि तावद्देहे जीवदवत्थायामेषां भावः शक्यते
निश्चेतुं न त्वसत्यभावः । पतितेऽपि कदाचिदस्मिन्देहे देहान्तरसंचारेणात्मधर्मा अनुवर्तेरन् ।
- 8 **Naiṣkarmyasiddhi (The Naiṣkarmya -siddhi of Sureśvarācārya with the
Candrikā of Jñānottma, edited by G. A. Jacob, revised edition by M.
Hiriyanna; Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1925), 3.31** :
पदान्युद्धृत्य वाक्येभ्यो अन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
पदार्थाल्लोकतो बुद्ध्वा वेत्ति वाक्यार्थमञ्जसा ॥
- 9 **Upadeśasāhasri padyabhāga 18.177-178 (M 175-176)** :
इदं पूर्वमिदं पश्चात्पदं वाक्ये भवेदिति ।
नियमो नैव वेदेऽस्ति पदसांगत्यमर्थतः ॥
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ततो वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ।
वाक्ये हि श्रूयमाणानां पदानामर्थसंस्मृतिः ॥
- References are to D. V. Gokhale's edition with Rāmatīrtha's Padayo-
janikā (Bombay : The Gujarati Printing Press, 1917) and, in parenth-
eses, to Sengaku Mayeda's edition (Śaṅkara's Upadeśasāhasrī, critically
edited with introduction and indices; Tokyo : The Hosukeido Press,
1973 [Originally a University of Pennsylvania doctoral dissertation; 1961]).
The published version of Mayeda's edition was not available to me
when I was writing this paper, but I did consult his dissertation.
Henceforth, references to the Upadeśasāhasrī's verse section are prefixed
with 'P', those to the prose section with 'G'.
- 10 **Upadeśasāhasrī P 18.180 (M 178)** :
अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिः पदार्थस्मरणाय तु ।
स्मृत्यभावे न वाक्यार्थो ज्ञातुं शक्यो हि केनचित् ॥
- 11 **Upadeśasāhasrī P 18.96 (-Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 4.22)** :
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि पदार्थस्य पदस्य च ।
स्यादेतदहमित्यत्र युक्तिरेवावधारणे ॥

- 12 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 4.4, 6 ;
 अनात्मत्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं देहाद्भिन्नस्य वस्तुनः ।
 ज्ञातुरप्यात्मता तद्वन्मध्ये संशयदर्शनम् ॥
 इदिमित्येव बाह्येऽर्थे ह्यहमित्येव बोद्धरि ।
 द्वयं दृष्टं यतो देहे तेनायं मुह्यते जनः ॥
- 13 Upadeśasāhasri G 54 : नित्यमेव निरन्तराविविक्तप्रत्ययविषयतया प्रसिद्धौ । न ह्ययं
 देहोऽयमात्मेति विविक्ताभ्यां प्रत्ययाभ्यां देहात्मानौ गृह्णाति यतः कश्चित् । अत एव हि
 मोमुह्यते लोक आत्मानात्मविषये एवमात्मानेवमात्मेति ।
- 14 Upadeśasāhasri G 52 : गौरोऽहं कृष्णोऽहमिति देहवर्त्मस्याहं प्रत्ययविषय आत्मनि
 अहंप्रत्ययविषयस्य चात्मनो देहेऽयमहमस्मीति ।
- 15 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.19
 घटादिवच्च दृश्यत्वात्तैरेव करणैर्दृशेः ।
 स्वप्ने चानन्वयाज्ज्ञेयो देहोऽनात्मेति सूरिभिः ॥
- 16 See above with note 12.
- 17 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.32 :
 आत्मनश्चेदहं धर्मो यायात्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः ।
 यतो नान्वेति तेनान्यदीयो भवेदहम् ॥
- 18 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 4.23 (=Upadeśasāhasri P. 18.97) :
 नाद्राक्षमित्यस्मिन्सुषुप्तेऽन्यन्मनागपि ।
 न वारयति दृष्टिं स्वां प्रत्ययं तु निषेधति ॥
 Cf Upadeśasāhasri G 92 : ...पश्यंस्तर्हि सुषुप्ते त्वं यस्माद् दृष्टमेव प्रतिषेधसि न
 दृष्टिम् । या तव दृष्टिस्तच्चैतन्यमिति मयोक्तम् ।
- 19 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.97 :
 ऋते ज्ञानं न सन्त्यर्था अस्ति ज्ञानमृतेऽपि तान् ।
 एवं धियो हिरुज्योतिर्विविच्य्यादनुमानतः ॥
- 20 In Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.103 (see note 21), Sureśvara uses *śabdahetu* 'cause
 (for the use) of a word.' In his commentary on Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.1
 (Works of Shankaracharya, vol. II, part I : The Upanishadbhashya,
 edited by Hari Raghunath Bhagavat, 2nd ed.; Poona : Ashtekar and
 Cor, 1927, p.359), Śaṅkara uses *śabdapravṛtīhetu*, and in his commentary
 on Māṇḍūkīyopaniṣad 1.7 (op. cit., p.432), he uses *śabdapravṛtīnimitta*.
 The last of these synonymns is, of course, the term regularly used by
 grammarians with reference to properties designated by affixes such as
iva; for example, Kāśikā (edited by Aryendra Sharma, Khanderao
 Deshpande and D. G. Padhye, Hyderabad : Sanskrit Academy, Osmania
 University, 1969-70) on Pāṇini 5-1-119 (vol. II, p. 493) : शब्दस्य
 पवृत्तिनिमित्तं भावशब्देनोच्यते । अश्वस्य भावः अश्वत्वम् अश्वता । गोत्वम् गोता ।

21 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.103;

षष्ठीगुणक्रियाजातिरुदयः शब्दहेतवः ।
नात्मन्यन्यतमोऽमीषां तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते ॥

22 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.56.

आत्मना चाविनाभावमथवा विलयं ब्रजेत् ।
न तु पक्षान्तरं यायादतश्चाहंधियेच्यते ॥

'That is, the ego-consciousness must be in a dependency relation with the self, without which it cannot be, or not exist; there is no other possibility. Hence, the term *aham*, which conveys the concept of ego-consciousness (*ahamdhīyā*), is used to refer to oneself, specifically a qualified self.

23 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.54 :

नाज्ञासिषमिति प्राह सुषुप्तादुत्थितोऽपि हि ।
अयोदाहादिवत्तेन लक्षणं परमात्मनः ॥

24 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 2.55 :

प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्टयनुशीलनात् ।
अतो वृत्तीर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्येवपलक्ष्यते ॥

25 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi p. 108, lines 2-3 and verse 3.1 : तत्र यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण

तत्त्वमस्यदिववाक्योपनिविष्टपदपदार्थयोः कृतान्वयव्यतिरेकः
यदा ना तत्त्वमस्यादेर्ब्रह्मास्मीत्यवगच्छति ।
प्रध्वंस्ताहंममो नैति तदा गीर्भनसोः सृतिम् ॥

26 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.2 :

तत्पदं प्रकृतार्थं स्यात्त्वंपदं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
नीलोत्पलवदेताभ्यां दुःख्यनात्मत्ववारणे ॥

27 Cf. Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.2.42 : तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः कर्मधारयः ।

28 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.3 :

सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम् ॥

29 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.23-24 :

तदित्येतत्परं लोके बह्वर्थप्रतिपादकम् ।
अपरित्यज्य पारोक्ष्यमभिधानोत्थमेव तत् ॥
त्वमित्यपि पदं तद्वत्साक्षान्मात्रार्थवाचि तु ।
संसारितामसंत्यज्य सापि स्यादभिधानजा ॥

30 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.25 :

उद्दिश्यमानं वाक्यस्थं नोद्देशनगुणान्वितम् ।
आकाङ्क्षितपदार्थं न संसर्गं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

31 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.26 :

तदेा विशेषणार्थत्वं विशेष्यत्वं त्वमस्तथा ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धस्तयोः स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मना ॥

32 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.10 :

निर्दुःखित्वं त्वमर्थस्य तदर्थेन विशेषणात् ।
प्रत्यक्ता च तदर्थस्य त्वपदेनास्य संनिधेः ॥

33 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.9 :

सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्घटेतरखयोरिव ।
व्यावृत्तेः स्यादवाक्यार्थः साक्षानस्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ॥

34 On bheda and saṃsarga as described, see Kumārila, Tantravārttika on Śabarabhāṣya 2.1.46 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series edition [vol. 97.2,] 2nd ed.; Poona, 1970), pp. 436–437; Helārāja's commentary on Vākya-pādiya 3.1.5 (Vākya-pādiya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja, kāṇḍa III, part 1, critically edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer [Deccan College Monograph Series 21]; Poona : Deccan College, 1963), p. 15, lines 2–5. Earlier, Patañjali, in the Mahābhāṣya (edited by F. Kielhorn, 3rd revised edition by K. V. Abhyankar; Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962, 1965, 1972) on 2.1.1 (vol. I, p. 364, lines 24–28), mentions that bheda and saṃsarga are considered to constitute the relation (called *sāmarthya*) which holds between the meanings of terms that are eligible for composition. In his commentary on Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.3, Jñānottama remarks that bheda obtains between two things signified by nominal forms with different endings, saṃsarga between things signified by nominal forms with the same ending. Other details need not be considered here. See Hiriyanna's note on this passage (pp. 254–255).

35 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi p. 123, line 2.

36 See verse 3.9 and, to mention only two additional passages from the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, p. 109, line 5 and p. 124, line 1 (see note 37). In the same context, other Advaitins speak of an indivisible unqualified sentence meaning (*akhaṇḍavākya-rtha*, *akhaṇḍārtha*). Some pertinent passages are briefly discussed in my review of An encyclopaedic dictionary of Sanskrit on historical principles, volume one, part 2, appearing in Indian Linguistics.

37 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi p. 124, line 1 : इयं चावाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिरन्वयव्यतिरेकाभिज्ञैश्चैव ।

38 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 3.28 :

यावथावन्निरस्यायं देहादीन्प्रत्यगञ्चति ।
तावत्तावत्तदर्थेऽपि त्वमर्थः प्रविविक्षति ॥

39 Naiṣkarmyasiddhi 4.21 :

युष्मदस्मद्विभागज्ञे स्यादर्थवदिदं वचः ।
यतोऽनभिज्ञे वाक्यं स्यादबधिरेष्विव गायनम् ॥

The first half of this verse is taken from the Upadeśasāhasrī (see note 44).

40 See above with note 10.

41 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.195 (M 193) :

वाक्ये तत्त्वमसीत्यस्मिन्-ज्ञातार्थं तदसिद्धयम् ।
त्वमर्थे सत्यसाहाय्याद्वाक्यं नोत्पादयेत्प्रमाम् ॥

42 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.181 (M 179)

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येषु त्वंपदार्थाविवेकतः ।
व्यज्यते नैव वाक्यार्थो नित्यमुक्तोऽहमित्यतः ॥

43 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.182 (M 180) :

अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिस्तद्विवेकाय नान्यथा ।
त्वंपदार्थविवेके हि पाणावर्षितविल्ववत् ॥

44 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.90 :

सदस्मीति धियोऽभावे व्यर्थं स्यात्तत्त्वमस्यपि ।
युष्मदस्मद्विभागज्ञे स्यादर्थवदिदं वचः ॥

45 See above with note 21.

46 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.28-30 :

जातिकर्मादिमत्वाद्धि तस्मिन्शब्दास्त्वहंकृति ।
न कश्चिद्वर्तते शब्दस्तदभावात्स्व आत्मनि ॥
आभासो यत्र तत्रैव शब्दाः प्रत्यागृह्णन्ति स्थिताः ।
लक्षयेयुर्न साक्षात्तमभिदध्युः कथंचन ॥
न ह्यजात्यादिमान्कश्चिदर्थः शब्दैर्निरूप्यते ।

47 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.196 (M 194ab) :

तत्त्वमोस्तुल्यनीडार्थमसीत्येतत्पदं भवेत् ।

48 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.170 (M 169ab) :

त्वंसतोस्तुल्यनीडत्वान्नीलाश्वदिदं भवेत् ।

49 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.171 (M 169cd, 170ab) :

निर्दुःखवाचिना योगात् त्वंशब्दस्य तदर्थता ।
प्रत्यगात्माभिधानेन तच्छब्दस्य युतेस्तथा ॥

50 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.197 (M 194cd, 195ab) :

तच्छब्दः प्रत्यगात्मार्थस्तच्छब्दार्थस्त्वमस्तथा ।
दुःखित्वाप्रत्यगात्मत्वं वारयेतामुभावपि ॥

51 Upadeśasāhasrī P. 18.183 (M 181) :

वाक्यार्थो व्यज्यते चैवं केवलोऽहंपदार्थतः ।
दुःखीत्येतदपोहेन प्रत्यगात्मविनिश्चयात् ॥

52 Upadesasāhasrī P 18.190-191 (M 188-189)

नित्यमुक्तविज्ञानं वाक्याद्भवति नान्यतः ।
वाक्यार्थस्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् ॥
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थः स्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ।
एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानमक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

53 Bhāṣya on Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.1 (op. cit. [note 20], p. 359) : अतः सिद्धं यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अग्राह्य मनसा सह अनिरुक्तेऽनिलयने (तै.उ. २-४,६) इति चावाच्यत्वं नीलोत्पलवदवाक्यार्थत्वं च ब्रह्मणः ।

I think it should be obvious that Śaṅkara here contrasts *nilotpalam* or (10b) with other utterances, which involve the indivisible referent Brahma. In his *Vedāntasāra* (The *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, together with the commentaries of Nṛsimhasarasvatī and Rāmātīrtha edited by G. A. Jacob, fifth edition; Bombay : Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1934), Sadānanda expressly notes (p. 34) that (7) cannot have a sentence meaning like that of (10b) : अस्मिन्वाक्ये नीलमुत्पलमिति वाक्यवद्वाक्यार्थो नसङ्गच्छते ।

54 See the passages cited in notes 23, 24, 28, 46.

55 For example, Saṃkṣepaśārīraka, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series edition [vol. 83], Poona ; 1918) 1.157d, Vedāntasāra pp. 31-34; see the review alluded to in note 36.

56 Pañcadaśī (edited by Nārāyaṇa Rāma Ācārya, 7th edition; Bombay : Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1949) 1.37 :

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पञ्चकोशविवेकतः ।
स्वात्मानं तत उद्धृत्य परं ब्रह्म प्रपद्यते ॥

57 Pañcadaśī 1.38-39 :

अमाने स्थूलदेहस्य स्वप्ने यद्भानमात्मनः ।
सोऽन्वये व्यतिरेकस्तद्भानेऽन्यानवभासनम् ॥
लिङ्गाभाने सुषुप्तौ स्यादात्मनो भानमन्वयः ।
व्यतिरेकस्तु तद्भाने लिङ्गस्याभानमुच्यते ॥

Recall that (1a, b) and (2a, b) are rewritten as (1a) X,Y; (1b) ~ X, ~ Y; (2a) X, ~ Y; (2b) ~ X,Y, and that, where the entities in question are identical, one has also (1a') Y,X, (1b') ~ Y, ~ X, etc. If we let the appearance of the body and the appearance of the self be values of X and Y, respectively, what is said in Pañcadaśī 1.38 is the following : (2b) ~ X,Y and (2b') Y, ~ X together demonstrate that the two are not identical. Now, (2b) and (2b') appear to be a statement and its contraposition, as are : where there is smoke there is fire, Where there is no fire there is no smoke. Moreover, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are also used of the presence and absence of things in such instances. However, the reasoning in question here invo-

ives inferring from the presence of something like smoke that another thing, such as fire, must be present. Vidyāraṇya is certainly not doing anything comparable. Hence, I think his statements are to be interpreted in the manner shown.

- 58 In the introduction to his translation of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (A thousand teachings, The *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śaṅkara, translated with introduction and notes; Tokyo : University of Tokyo Press, 1979), Sengaku Mayeda says the following about reasoning from *anvaya* and *vyatireka* : “Furthermore, it seems to be a meditational method rather than an exegetical method (p. 52).” “When we examine it more closely, we find that the *anvayavyatireka* method is a means of realizing the true *Ātman* excluding non-*Ātman* and, in essence, a kind of meditation... (p. 56).”
- 59 Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavāda, I. Die Schüler Śaṅkaras. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literature in Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1950, Nr. 25, pp. 1907–2072 (1–166).
- 60 Hacker, op. cit., p. 1980 (74) : “Das Verständnis des heiligen Satzes [(7), G.C.] geht aus vom Verständnis der Wörter, die ihn konstituieren. Man erreicht es durch die logische Methode des *Anvaya* und *Vyatireka*, d.h. durch Reflexion darüber, dass der Inhalt der Wörter und des Satzes wohlbegründet und das Gegenteil logisch unmöglich ist.”
- 61 J. A. B. van Buitenen, *Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasaṃgraha*, introduction, critical edition and annotated translation (Deccan Colloge Monograph Series, 16); Poona : Deccan College, 1956; p. 63, note 174.
- 62 Mayeda (op. cit. [note 58]) p. 33. Mayeda gives textual references in the places where I show lacunae.
- 63 Mayeda 54. 64 Mayeda 53. 65 Mayeda 55. 66 Mayeda 55.
- 67 Note also that Śaṅkara explicitly says reasoning by *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is meant to allow a discrimination with respect to what is designated by *tvam* (see note 43). Mayeda (p. 191) translates the verse in question as follows ; “The method of agreement and difference has been mentioned for the purpose of analyzing out the [meaning of the word ‘Thou’] and for no other purpose...”. This gives to the word *viveka* (‘discrimination’) a meaning which is not justified but is forced on translator because of his conception of what *anvaya* and the *vyatireka* meant to Śaṅkara. If the reasoning in question was meant for “analyzing out” the meaning of *tvam* in (7), why could Śaṅkara not also say it was meant for “analyzing out” the meaning of *tad* in this sentence ?
- 68 This was seen by van Buitenen, op. cit. (note 61), pp. 62–63. Note also that Mayeda (p. 57) says, “Therefore, Śaṅkara’s method can be said to be essentially the same as *jahada jahallakṣaṇā*.”

CIRCULARITY IN THE INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF FORMAL ARGUMENTS (TARĀKA) IN TWELFTH CENTURY INDIAN JAINA LOGIC

Douglas Dunsmore Daye

1. Introduction

In this Article I shall examine first the Jaina concept of *tarka* which constitutes a rational justification for the legitimacy of logical concomitance (*vyāpti*) a necessary condition for the Jaina inference schema (*parārthānumāna*, inference-schema-for-other). Second, I shall show that to perform such justification one must presuppose the reliability of an *implicit* theory of inductive logic or at least some significant inductive rules. Third, I shall show that the justification for such formulations involves the old philosophical problem of generating dependable universal-warrant statements which expresses the concomitance (*vyāpti*) of two properties (*dharma(s)*) such that the individual is thus authorized by the warrant and the implicit metalanguage rules to draw the conclusion; this is justified by appeal to a warrant in a manner somewhat akin to the *function* of the Rule of Detachment in modern logic, but with significant differences.¹ Fourth, I shall very briefly illustrate that such activities are somewhat analogous with some contemporary discussions of the justification of inductive arguments. However what is most important here, and which to my knowledge has not been made clear before, is that *tarka* is used in two nonmutually exclusive senses: (1) *tarka* as a *theory* which is circular and presupposes various theoretical levels of rules; that is, to justify a warrant-*dṛṣṭānta* one must pre-

This article previously appeared in *Philosophy East and West* 29, No. 2, April 1979 .

suppose the *general* reliability of *tarka* (as a general theory) in order to authorize one to justify a *specific* disputed logical concomitance (*vyāpti*) in a specific inference schema; (2) note also that this latter specific *tarka*-justification is a philosophical, argumentative *process*, something one *does* to evaluate alleged *vyāpti(s)* in certain context-restricted epistemological (*pramāṇa*) discussions. Thus we see '*tarka*' as (1) a multileveled, rule-governed *theory*, and (2) "*tarka*" as the name of the *process* of traditional argumentation *about* the empirical evidence and/or relevant metaphysical presuppositions between the *darśana(s)* (philosophical schools) which constitute the sources for the evaluation of disputed arguments. Fifth, these problems are also philosophically interesting from the point of view of comparative philosophy, obviously because the problems of the justification of inductive arguments have been the object of great concern of *both* Indian and Western philosophers, too. Hence I shall very briefly note a form of the problem of the rational justification of induction noted so perceptively by Hume; we shall also find here in the twelfth-century Jainas, an implicit form of the pragmatic justification of induction.²

"Concomitance" or "pervasion" will perhaps do for "*vyāpti*" but "*tarka*" defies translation. *Vyāpti* designates that two properties (*dharmā(s)*) consistently occur together in our public repeatable experience and thus provide the basis for a general universally quantified warrant-statement (*drṣṭānta*), for example, "where there is smoke, there is fire." The metalanguage term designating this concomitance of these two properties (here, smoke and fire) is "*vyāpti*". *Tarka* is the metalanguage discussion (*tarka* as process) *about* the reliability and thus the justification of this purported concomitance.³ I shall consider in this article only its use by the twelfth-century Jaina logician Vādi Devasūri.⁴ However, we cannot ignore the Indological significance that the Jainas were the *only* Indian logicians to hold that *tarka* (as a theory of justification) was a unique separate *pramāṇa* (legitimate means and source of

reliable knowledge); interesting as this is, it is not directly relevant to my discussion of justification of *vyāpti*.

2. Justifications of Tarka

There are three alternative justifications for *tarka* offered in the *Pramāṇanaya-tattvālokāṅkāra* of Vādi Devasūri : (1) a pragmatic justification which appeals to the absence of counter examples to a *vyāpti* claim (hereafter cited as NCE); (2) a metaphysical presuppositional justification (the omniscience of the saints, *sarvajña*);⁵ and (3) as epistemological justification, that is, the particular-in-the-general (*viśeṣa-in-the-sāmānya*).⁶ All three justifications are used to support the Jaina claim that *tarka* is a legitimate means of generating reliable *vyāpti*(s).⁷

Apart from the no-counter-example (=NCE) argument to justify *tarka*, further calls for justification by the *prativādin* (opponent) may be relegated to the two other justifications, that is, to the epistemological theory of the *viśeṣa-sāmānya* and/or to authoritative texts (*āgama*),⁸ the total knowledge of a Jaina omniscient (*Sarvajñu*) saint.

The claim to exhaustive, complete knowledge (*sarvajñatva*) is possessed by only an omniscient one, the legitimacy of which appeals to the authority of *āgama*. The theory of omniscience is one rather transcendental Jaina solution of the problem of justifying *tarka*; the pragmatic, NCE justification is a more “empirical” Jaina response to this problem. The transcendental justification seems to presuppose a correspondence theory of epistemology;⁹ that is, the omniscience theory appeals, first, to a metaphysical theory of which the *empirical* verification seems quite problematic to both non-Jainas and to many Jainas. The NCE justification is not problematically nonempirical. Second, since this theory also appeals to experiences of a nonpublic religious nature, it generates formidable philosophical difficulties although it still remains religiously interesting, but *beyond* the realm of public evaluation and non-circular presuppositions. Generally speaking, there are two

major difficulties with such a correspondence theory; first, to justify it one must either posit possible points of view (ad infinitum), quite independent of either legs of the correspondence such that this independent point of view can give conclusive evidence that the alleged correspondence is in fact a true one; an alternative theory is that one opts to remain content with repeated successive (*paramparā*) confirmations of the postulated concomitance such that one's confidence in the high degree of probability of the alleged *vyāpti* constitutes a pragmatic claim of certainty free from "reasonable" doubt, and so on. Thus the *tarka* justification of NCE offers just the later, that is, it offers pragmatic "certainty". In addition, the pragmatic NCE justification does so within the public repeatable domain and offers a reasonable hope of public evaluation and empirical confirmation and possible falsification.

3. The function of the Jaina concept of Tarka

To use the old Nyāya chestnut of "smoke and fire,"¹⁰ I shall illustrate the function of *tarka*. Controversies are generated when an opponent (*prativādin*) in the *vivāda* (debate whether oral or in prose) disputes the various premises or evidential support for a thesis or conclusion.¹¹ Debate about the evidence generates a metalogical discussion concerning the legitimacy and strength of specific evidence of the *vyāpti* in question. In the desired use of the Indian *parārthānumāna* (inference schema),¹² the crucial area of dispute centers on the alleged concomitance (*vyāpti*) of two specific properties, which is a necessary, not a sufficient condition of using and justifying the disputed inference schema. *Tarka* is the careful gathering and shifting of supporting evidence and the counter evidence for a specific *vyāpti* claim; this shifting involves appeals to both *specific* evidence, and, implicitly, the use of a *general* theory concerning the *means* of evaluating disputed *vyāpti*-claims, a *meta-argument about the vyāpti* claim in the disputed (object language) inference schema. Such an activity *presupposes* (1) a general (nonspecific) *tarka* theory, (2) which again presupposes the use of concomitance (*vyāpti*), (3) the

inductive generalizations of the warrant-*dṛṣṭānta* (that is, the *tarka* justification which appeals to the lack of counter examples, NCE).¹³ (4) Note that (2) uses and *presupposes* a general theory of inference (*parāthānumāna*). That is, in the justification a specific *vyāpti* relation one *must utilize other* inductive generalizations as a larger theoretical (meta)argumentative framework, a *general* theory of *vyāpti*, by means of which one justifies the *specific vyāpti* claim in a specific inference schema. The legitimacy of the general theory of concomitance (*vyāpti*) is then a necessary condition for the justification of the *specific* concomitance which, in turn, when accepted, constitutes a necessary condition for the acceptance of the specific *vyāpti* of the specific inference schema in question. Hence, we have here *obvious*, if implicit, circularity. However, to evaluate the significance of such circularity, I shall further analyze the pragmatic NCE justification of *tarka*.

The justification member (*hetu*) of the inference schema is offered as direct evidence, “there is smoke.” The general warrant (*dṛṣṭānta*) of the schema,¹⁴ “where there is smoke there is fire,” is offered to support the conclusion (*pratijñā*) that the presense of a specific fire is a warranted and a “licensed” “sanctioned” conclusion. We should note is passing that the controversy here is *not* about the structure or form of the inference schema as in case of the deductive meta-logical concept of formal validity; rather the controversy is about the legitimacy of both the general and specific grounds for its inferential basis, that is, the warrant-*dṛṣṭānta* which states the concomitance (*vyāpti*). The *hetu* (smoke) given here as empirical evidence is easily verified by our normal perception; thus the legitimacy of the metalanguage *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant in the justification argument which presupposes the metalevel *vyāpti*, is the crucial point. *Tarka*, so claim the Jainas, is a *unique* means of legitimate knowledge (*pramāṇa*) which legitimizes the *vyāpti* claimed in the *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant. *Tarka* then is the explicitly reasoned procedure which authorizes the inductive generalization generated from the many experiential

instances of *particular* perceptions (*viśeṣa*) of smoke to the inductive generalization in the *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant. This, in turn, states that the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the two general (*sāmānya*) properties (*dharmas*) of smoke and fire is both accurate and explicit, for example, as in the universalized *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant, "where there is smoke, there is fire". *Tarka* is thus the necessary intermediary procedure which must authorize one to pass from the particular (*viśeṣa*) instance of perception (*pratyakṣa*) to the universalizable (*sāmānya*) knowledge necessary for the *general* authorization of the desired *specific* *vyāpti* of smoke and fire; *vyāpti* thus concerns *sāmānya* not *viśeṣa*. Hence it is clear that there must be a *general* (metalanguage) theory of *anumāna* (inference) which presupposes the legitimacy of the *general* *vyāpti* relations which, in turn are used to legitimize *specific* disputed concomitances (*vyāpti*). We are concerned here with (at least) two theories. This *tarka* step is not possible through only a *particular* (*viśeṣa*) perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor without presupposing a general theory of inference (*anumāna*), that is, *vyāpti*, which uses a general *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant. *Tarka* is then a *metatheory* about the utility of the inference schemas as authorized by the general theory of *vyāpti* which, in turn, authorizes in the *vyāpti* of a general argument, the *specific* *vyāpti* questioned by the disputant (*prativādin*).

The quickly summarize, *tarka* is second-order, higher-level theory, a metatheory, which uses and presupposes both (a) the general pragmatic evidence for the *authorization* of the general *vyāpti* theory presupposed in (b) the justification of a specific *vyāpti* relation so necessary in justifying a specific inference schema (*parārthānumāna*).

The Jainas are the *only* Indian philosophers to posit *tarka* as a *specific* *pramāṇa*. Epistemologically, they hold that every entity is cognized as both a particular- (*viśeṣa*)-in-the-universal (*sāmānya*); that is, in questions of *vyāpti cum-anumāna*, the *sāmānya* is prominent; in *pratyakṣa* (perception) the *viśeṣa* is prominent. Since this epistemological theory of universals constitutes an independent argument for *tarka*, what is important

in this context is that the necessary authorization for this constitutes an inductive generalization from the specific or particular (*viśeṣa*) to general *sāmānya* which *requires* the logically *prior* establishment of the legitimacy of the *general vyāpti (sāmānya)* relations. Note that this is a general theory, and *not* a particular one; however, it is always in a particular case where we must *utilize* the general theory of *vyāpti* in order to claim the legitimate concomitance of two *particular* instances, that is, the specific *vyāpti*. *Tarka* supplies *both* these authorizations. The general theory of *tarka* is then inductive *and* circular, because the general theory itself presupposes the legitimacy of *vyāpti* and appeals to the absence of counter examples (NCE) to justify its *own general utility* (see Part IV). However this consistent use of inductive generalizations should not be considered as a logical *theory* of inductive *logic*. For example, there is no *explicit* concept of probability in *tarka* as there is in contemporary inductive theory and thus neither entails nor substantiates that the use of *tarka* constitutes an explicit *theory* of inductive *logic*.

4. Specific circularity and the grounds for accepting tarka

Now that we have sifted out some of the more obvious intermeshed presuppositions in the purpose and *uses* of *tarka*, let us consider the grounds claiming that *this* procedure is a desirable one on which we can rely. That is, why should we accept that the exhaustive search for counter examples to a specific warrant-*dr̥ṣṭānta* is sufficient ground for our confidence? In a nutshell, the Jaina answer regarding this NCE justification is that the absence of counter examples gives us confidence (1) if and *only if* the search *has* been exhaustive, and (2) there are no reasonable alternatives. (Remember that the *sarvajña* and *viśeṣa-cum-sāmānya* theories constitute independent justifications.)

The Jainas hold that one must have a strong conviction, solid, undoubting confidence that one is right,¹⁵ that is, that one has searched for all instances of counter examples as is

humanly possible (since few of us have *sarvajñatva*) within the available and relevant epistemological intersubjective sources (*pramāṇas*) at hand for each of us. Therefore, if the content of a given *tarka* statement refers to such relations as “where there is smoke, there is fire,” where, for all things “x,” where there is smoke x there is a fire x, or, (x) (sx ⊃ fx), in which cognitions are confined to one or more specific *pramāṇas*, then the range of possible instances of the specific *tarka* search for counter examples is confined to the range of those field-dependent possible cognitions; that is, one does not look for smoke without fire in a lake. Thus for a “good”, conclusive *tarka* argument, one should be able to say that one has fully exhausted the search for counter examples in one’s *tarka vyāpti* justifications. But the noncontroversial *criteria* for judging that one has searched *exhaustively* (a) presuppose the methods at issue here *and* (b) are empirically impossible to attain. Thus the conviction that one has an exhaustive search may be psychologically convincing but its completeness will remain empirically undemonstrated. That is in case no counter examples are found *and* further justifications for the NCE grounds of *tarka* are still requested, one must simply suggest that there are finite limits to the range of intersubjective experiences within which the legitimacy and probability of one’s *tarka*-statements-being-true are humanly capable of being confirmed. The nonexhaustive absence of counter example is then claimed to be a sufficient condition for accepting the *specific vyāpti* in question in the NCB authorization argument.¹⁶

Furthermore, the *tarka* generalization generated from NCE seems to represent merely simple enumeration. This is a simple type of inductive generalization which can be refuted by one specific counter example. If one is not forthcoming after an exhaustive search, one may hold (as do the Jainas) that the specific *tarka* claim of *vyāpti* is to be accepted. Then the authorized *vyāpti* is made the content of the *application* of the general *dr̥ṣṭānata*-warrant to a specific inference schema

(*parārthānumāna*). Thus *anumāna* is used to establish the legitimacy of *tarka*, and *tarka* is used to establish the legitimacy of *anumāna* and *pratyakṣa*.¹⁷ Consider the following named relationships.

Names : A : that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is legitimate is guaranteed by inference (*anumāna*), and

V : that *anumāna* is legitimate is guaranteed by *vyāpti*, and

T : that *vyāpti* is legitimate is guaranteed by *tarka*, and

N : that *tarka* is legitimate is guaranteed by NCE (*bādha-varjita*).

That is, that the *vyāpti* is legitimate, is claimed only for a finite restricted field-dependent *range* of possible instances; and with no counter examples, *tarka* is to be accepted. Therefore, only the lack of counter examples remains relevant as a *logically oriented* justification. That the argument of NCE is legitimate is justified by appeal to the general rule that if there are NCE and *tarka* is “consistent” or “agreeable” with perception,¹⁸ then a specific *vyāpti* claim is to be accepted. Therefore to justify A, T, V, and N (as just named) one must presuppose (in a different sequence) all N, T, V, A, and NCE.

Thus : (1) NCE must be held with both *anvaya vyāpti* ($p \supset q$) and *vyatireka-vyāpti* ($\sim q \supset \sim p$) (somewhat akin to Mill’s joint method of agreement and disagreement), that is, a “pragmatic” justification.

(2) If one has exhaustively investigated the finite *range* of possible counter example and if one *knows* that one has done so (*svaprakāśa svasamvedana* “self-revelatory knowledge”) then the “degree” of one’s conviction of certainty can be only as strong as the confidence one has in the exhaustiveness of search for NCE. However, the exhaustiveness for counter examples presupposes :

(3) The future regularity of causal laws—nonformal logical, nonfield restricted assumption which can only be justified by *more* inductive reasoning; that is, one must use *parārihānumāna* in a *tarka prediction*, which implicitly presupposes that future *vyāptis* will resemble the past ones and thus will confirm the *degree* of confidence one has in the exhaustiveness of NCE. To assume that there is no counter example, and that, *that* assumption will hold long enough for one to jump from the *viśeṣa* to the *sāmānya* to get the universal *dṛṣṭānta*-warrant for the future, is to *presuppose* the general *vyāpti* theory. This will be made explicit in the following four arguments.

5. Circularity and levels of implicit theories and rules

*Argument No. 1 : General Justification of General Vyāpti Theory*¹⁹

pratijñā : Conclusion : Therefore, the *next* x will be followed by y.
This constitutes a general inductive prediction.

dṛṣṭānta : First PREMISE : (x) all x (*sāmānya*) in past have “*vyāpti*” (ed) with a subsequent y and will do so in the future.

hetu : Second PREMISE : (∃x) this particular x (*viśeṣa*) has occurred so in the past and it is of the general type (*sāmānya*), or, (x) will have “*vyāpti*” so in the future.

This argument presupposes that the degree of confidence in the conclusion is greater than chance and that the future will *resemble* in the past; that is, the use of such inductive inferences about the future will be at least as “predictively successful,” or “accurate” as they have been in the past. Notice that one must *presuppose* such an implicit inductive argument *in order to argue* that the *vyāpti* jump from *viśeṣa* to *sāmānya*

is greater than chance. In other words, Argument No. 1 guarantees that the general *vyāpti* theory *will be* legitimate in all three times : past, present, and future; and *this* is one of the explicit necessary conditions of a legitimate *vyāpti* and thus of *tarka* as *pramāṇa*.²⁰

Without presupposing certain assumptions, you cannot predict for the future and thus justify the continuing soundness of *vyāpti* relations. These relations, in turn, implicitly depend on a grounding in an implicit inductive argument, such as above, plus the assumption of the regularity of causal laws. These assumptions are exactly the points in question here. One cannot *justify* the use of these causal laws without presupposing (a priori) *tarka* and *vyāpti* relationships, that is, the jump from *viśeṣa* to *sāmānya* in both general and specific *vyāpti* justifications. Thus *tarka* cannot prove any *specific vyāpti* without implicitly presupposing a *general vyāpti* theory prior to such discussion. It is in these multileveled metadiscussions and implicit arguments that we find the circularity of *tarka*. Consider the following three arguments, an expansion of the concept of *tarka* and which continues from sArgument No. 1.

Argument No. 2 : NCE Justification of General vyāpti Theory

pratijñā : The general theory of *vyāpti* is established :

(that is, authorized for *anumānas* which use a specific *vyāpti*).

hetu १ Because (ablative case) of finding NCE in the appropriate field-dependent range of viable *pramāṇas*.

dṛṣṭānta : (If) No counter example \supset (then) *vyāpti* can be established.²¹

Argument No. 3 : An Authorization for the Application No. 2 to Specific Cases (for example, Argument No. 4) that is the TARKA JUSTIFICATION for argument 4.

pratijñā : This specific *vyāpti* (“where there is smoke \supset there is fire”) claim should be accepted.

hetu : Because the general theory of *vyāpti* is applicable to the alleged *vyāpti* in the specific claims “I see smoke” and “smoke \supset fire.”

dr̥ṣṭānta : Where the general theory of *vyāpti* (Argument No. 1) has been used, specific *vyāpti* claims have been correct.

Argument No. 4 : A specific Argument of Which the Necessary *Vyāpti* has been Justified Both by Arguments No. 2 and 3.

pratijñā : x has fire.

hetu : Because x has smoke,

dr̥ṣṭāntā : Where there is smoke (“ \supset ”) there is fire.

These four arguments generate the following two (normative) rules based on and justified by the above four arguments.

(A) A General Rule :

One *should* use the above inference schemas, Arguments No. 2 and 3, as good grounds for claiming a specific *vyāpti* if and only if NCE, since NCE yields conclusions of more than chance probability.

(B) Specific Rule :

If a specific argument such as the *viśeṣas* claimed in Argument No. 4 are legitimate members of the general class of Arguments Nos. 1, 2, and 3, then *one should* use Argument No. 3 as a *model* to authorize a specific *vyāpti* claim, for example, of smoke/fire as in Argument No. 4.

Here in Rule A you are using the *general vyāpti theory*; however, in Argument No. 4, the *specific vyāpti* of smoke and fire does presuppose Rules A plus B and Arguments 1, 2, and 3; the use of the “Specific Rule B” presupposes the General theory of Rule A. In other words, one *presupposes* the legitimacy of the general *vyāpti theory* of concomitance in the general warrant-*dr̥ṣṭānta* of Arguments 1–3 to justify a specific *vyāpti* claim in Argument No. 4. Argument No. 3 appeals to the *dr̥ṣṭānta*-warrant in Argument No. 2; and that in turn

appeals to Argument No. 1. But arguments 1 and 2 do not refer to any cases of specific (*viśesa*) *vyāpti* claims; they constitute the uses and justifications of the *general* theories in Arguments No. 1 and 2 and in General Rule A.

Therefore, I claim that Arguments 1–4 plus Rules A and B constitute an analysis of what is logically *implicit* in the Jaina concept of *tarka* as a theory of justification of inductive argumentation.

To briefly recapitulate the preceding let us ask the following question to which my analysis is the answer. What would be a sufficient condition for justifying the general *vyāpti*-warrant? The answer (a) is the absence of counter examples (NCE), the general pragmatic justification in Argument No. 1. But to show that NCE was sufficient to justify the *general* *vyāpti* theory as yielding an authorizing Rule in Argument No. 1, one *presupposes* : (a) the exhaustiveness of the search for counter examples, and (b) the concomitance of both NCE and legitimate inductive predictions in Argument No. 2, which (c) *once again, presupposes* the same *general* *vyāpti* theory-rule, that is, as found in Arguments No. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus to show that a general or a specific *vyāpti* is warranted you must *use* *vyāpti* to justify either the general (Rule A) or specific (Rule B) *vyāpti* theory; this is circularity.

6. A *tarka* analogue with some contemporary justification of induction

Is it reasonable to require additional independent justification of the *general* theory of *vyāpti*? I think not. P. F. Strawson noted the confusion between (A) that inductive arguments have been successful in past and are so in the present, and (B) that inductive generalizations (here such as the legitimacy of *vyāpti*) constitute “good reasons” for the general reliability of inductive argumentation.²² The former, (A), refers to facts; the latter, (B), refers to what constitutes “good grounds” for adopting such a schema and practicing such basic methodological assumptions. To get “good grounds” one must first

distinguish between a *statement* of more than chance probability (=MCP), and second, one must distinguish such a statement which is the conclusion (*pratijñā*) of a “strong” inductive *argument*. If the probability that the (second) conclusion–statement is false, is significantly less than chance, given that the supporting evidence gathered by a *tarka* process in the premises (*hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*) is true, then such a procedure may be generalized and given expression in a normative metalogical rule, that is, the *tarka* protoinductive theory. Third, such a rule authorizes that you *should* rely and act on such a conclusion–statement of MCP when so formulated as in the preceding argument. Compare the Jainas requirement of “conviction”; it is based on the second justification, (B), but ignores the *absence* of an alleged “absolute certainty” concerning the future of the first, (A). That is, the first (MCP), is “legitimate” and worthy of our confidence, and, in effect (and because of NCE), it should not be further doubted. To have doubts (*saṃśaya*) about it is to violate one’s conviction of the NCE exhaustive-ness claim as exemplified in *dr̥ṣṭānta*–warrant. It seems clear that one can act with great (psychological) “confidence” on the basis of a high probability statement (MCP), perhaps just as much as one can on an analytic statement, if and only if an *implicit presupposed* rule authorizes you so to act. That is, “confidence” here is a matter of being authorized by the Jaina metalogical rule of evidence (NCE): therefore, one is to be confident in one’s actions with the assurances of MCP results.

I do not claim that the Jaina philosophers/logicians used or were aware of the concept of *semiquantified* probability; but I do hold that their implicit line of reasoning may be so “rationally reconstructed.” I also do claim that I have so done. Thus to claim that one has exhausted the field–dependent range of possible counter example *is to claim* that “good reasons” or legitimate “grounds” have been given for both the general and specific theories of *vyāpti* and their appropriate applications.

In the Jaina context having “good reasons” here presupposes NCE; having “confidence” entails having no doubts (*saṃśaya*); having “good reasons” is a necessary condition for authorizing one to act on certain allegedly reliable *vyāpti*(s). Therefore I conclude that having these “good reasons,” and thus confidence to support and justify one’s empirical claims *and* to justify the uses of the logical machinery of inference-schema-for-another (*parārthānumāna*), does justify the use of inductive reasoning. This in turn *entails* the use of such circular presuppositions. Having confidence in *tarka* entails the highly probable *expectation* of successful outcomes. Thus the *prativādin*’s (disputant’s) call for successive, independent justifications of the general theory of *vyāpti* is as logically circular and as methodologically unreasonable as asking “Is the Law Legal?”²³ Also it should be pointed out that, although we have here a case of logical circularity, it is *not* a vicious one; the plane of discourse remains firmly tied down to verifiable and empirical reality in most cases and *prima facie* empirical falsification is always theoretically possible.²⁴

Thus this article is *not* a case, as often claimed by those philologists ignorant of *any* philosophy of logic, of projecting modern logical theories *upon* ancient texts;²⁵ rather, both *some* twelfth-century Jainas and *some* modern philosophers were/are interested in logic theory and the age old global problems of grounds for reasonable reliable knowlege. The ancient Jaina vocabularies and *explicit* procedures are obviously exciting and quite different, but, I would hold they are implicitly compatible with similar types of investigation in the Western philosophical traditions. However, these cross-cultural analyses have just begun; and most *comparative* “philosophers” seem neither prepared for nor interested in such formalistic topics.

If we are to suppose, as I do suppose, that the cross-cultural investigation of patterns and methods of philosophical reasoning are worth investigating, then I find here a particularly interesting example of some problems in inductive reasoning; and by this I mean the pragmatic justification of the funda-

mental grounds for reasonable confidence in our arguments, expectations, and recommendations about the everyday world. Independent of world geography, history, and cultural provincialisms, few texts, subject to such *cross-cultural* logical analyses, yield comparisons so logically fundamental and so indicative of the global *practice* of philosophy.

Notes

- 1 The general form of the Indian inference schema is “q because of p, and if p then q”; I have noted some of the obvious incompatibilities of this form with the common use of material implication (“ \supset ”) in my article “Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist Logic” in *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 18. no. 2 (April, 1977); 221-231.
- 2 For an excellent, succinct account of these modern philosophical problems, see B. Skyrms, *Choice and Chance*, 2d ed. (Encino, California : Dickenson Publishing Co. 1975), pp. 24-56.
- 3 This word, however common to *technical* philosophy in the sevenhundred-year history of *systematic* analyses of Indian logic and epistemology (that is, *pramāṇavāda*) has been used in several significantly different technical senses. For an excellent survey, see S. Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning : A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1953).
- 4 Vādi Devasūri, *Pramāṇa-Naya-Tattvālokāṃkāra*, Commentary by Ratnaprabhasūri, English translation by Dr. Hari Satya Bhattacharya (Bombay : Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1967), hereafter cited as PNT. The Sanskrit for the commentary is available in the Ratnaprabhasūri’s *Ratnākarāvātārikā*, ed. Pandit Dalsukh Malvania, 3 vols. L. D. Institute of Indology (Ahmedabad, India :), hereafter cited as R.
- 5 PNT, especially chapter V and p. 185ff. For an overview see R. Singh, *The Jaina Concept of Omniscience* (Ahmedabad : L. D. Institute of Indology, 1974). For an excellent comparison of Sarvajña in both the Jaina and the Buddhist traditions, see “On the Sarvajñatva (Omniscience) of Mahāvira and the Buddha,” by Professor P. Jaini, in *Buddhist Studies in Honor of I. B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins, et al. (Dordrecht-Holland : Reidel Publishing Co., 1974). pp. 71-90.
- 6 This *viśeṣa-in-sāmānya* theory constitutes an interesting but independent justification for *tarka*, which I do not include in this article. However, see PNT, pp. 184ff. Also see Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghvi’s masterful

Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics (reprint of *Indian Studies : Past and Present*, Calcutta, 1961); also very valuable here are S. Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning : A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1953); and R. R. Dravid, *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy* (Varanasi, 1972), particularly pp. 131-149.

- 7 PNT, pp. 182ff.
- 8 PNT, chapter IV, pp. 266ff.
- 9 PNT, I. Sūtra 18, p. 73, “prameyāvyaabhicāritvam” (“...agreeable with the knowable”).
- 10 PNT, pp. 182ff. However, this “smoke-fire” example, which is empirically contingent, is not typical of much Indian *tarka*-discussions; see my “Remarks on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism (logic) and Mr. Tachikawa’s Translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*,” in *The Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3, (nos. 3/4 September / December, 1975), especially pp. 310ff.
- 11 To illustrate these controversies for those unfamiliar with these venerable philosophical questions, imagine the following informal dialogue :
 - A. I see smoke over there, and since wherever there is smoke there is always fire, I know then that there is fire over there too.
 - B. Why should I believe that ?
 - A. Because I have never found any instances in which it was not true that if there was no fire there was no smoke. So where there is smoke, there is fire, too. And I see smoke, so there is fire.
 - B. OK. I see the smoke there too, but why should I believe that if seeing that two general things, like smoke and fire, have been constantly seen together, why should *that guarantee* anything for the future ? That is *just* a forecast based on past experience.
 - A. I know that it is a forecast; but what else have we ? If *that* general rule about two things constantly occurring together in the past is not enough on which to base your actions and expectations, then *what* is ?
 - B. I know, but when you say that if that general rule is not enough then nothing else is either, you are still *assuming*, that the general rule *itself* which you claim worked OK in the past, is still going to work well

in the future. So you are assuming what you are trying to prove to me. I do mean that when you have to *use* the general rule to prove that (first, the general rule if two things going together in the past, and so on) is a *good* rule to use, you have to use *it* in order to prove that, (second), that is, two things such as smoke and fire constantly occurring together *is a good reason* to forecast their occurring so in the future, just as the general rule states.

- A. So what ? it is the only game in town. What else can I show you ? God ?
- B. No, there are too many conflicting claims about too many different gods. That does not help here.
- A. Well, then, this general rule about two things occurring together, and so on, is the only "proof" I know.
- B. Yes. But I want *real proof*, a guarantee of what will happen.
- A. So would I, but who can guarantee what has not yet happened ? Evidence of what happened in the past is all we have from which to predict the future.
- B. But don't you feel insecure now ? I do.
- A. No, because this kind of "proof" is all we have *ever* had. The world has not changed by knowing this, only your naive attitude about certainty has changed. I can feel just as secure with these rules as I can with anything.
- B. I guess so (!).
- 12 See PNT, Chapter III, pp. 187ff. The general Indian schema (it is *not* an Aristotelian "syllogism") may be exemplified below in a drastically simplified (and overworked) example.

Pratiñā : (Thesis) "X (locus) has fireness (the *property* of fire)"

Hetu (Justification) "because of smokeness"

Dṛṣṭānta (Exemplification) "wherever there is fireness there is smokness."

Sapakṣa "as in a kitchen."

Vipakṣa (and) "not as in a lake."

For the reader unfamiliar with Indian logic and the sizable scholarly literature on it, one might peruse the *introductory* article on "Buddhist Formal Logic" by D. D. Daye in *Buddhism : A Modern Perspective*, ed. C. Prebish (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1974). In I. M. Bocheński's *A History of Formal Logic*, (Notre Dame, 1961), pp. 416-447

there is an excellent non-Indologists' introduction to *anumāna* by a well-known logician-philosopher.

- 13 On NCE, see PNT, III, *Sūtras* 7 and 8. pp. 181ff, *Sūtra* 10 and the commentary in PNT, pp. 192 and 200.
- 14 Roughly synonymous with *udāharana*. PNT p. III, 181ff and p. 216.
- 15 PNT, I discuss this in VI, however, such lack of doubt (*samśaya*) is freedom from faulty superimposition (*samāropa*) PNT, *Sūtras* 9, 11 and 13, pp. 37-48, with a similar lack of illusion (*viparyāya*) PNT, pp. 37ff and inattention (*anadhyavasāya*) PNT, p. 48; confidence or certain knowledge (*vyavasāya* or *nirṇaya*), PNT, chapter I, is generated, the purpose of which is to allow us to accept the agreeable and discard the disagreeable, PNT, *Sūtra* 2, pp. 13 and 33 and *Sūtra* 3, p. 22 and 'agreement with the knowable' (*avyabharitam prameyam*), Chapter I, S. 18, p. 73. Thus, removal of doubt yields certainty, that is, *vyavasāya* and constitutes verifiability.
- 16 See Part V. Argument. ≠ 3 (p. 183-184).
- 17 PNT. the *legitimacy* of *pratyakṣa* (perception) is dependent on the legitimacy of *anumāna* (inference), pp. 183, 191.
- 18 PNT, ch. I, *Sūtra* 19, p. 174.
- 19 Obviously I did not 'reverse' the order of the *parārthanūmāna* to conform to modern formalistic expectations; that reversal generates certain crucial metalogical difficulties which, altogether not directly relevant here, are detailed in my article 'Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist Logic', see note 1. p. 186.
- 20 PNT. p. 182.
- 21 '⇒' is very roughly equivalent, in my simple use here, to the English 'if...then,' Sanskrit 'yat...tat.'
- 22 P. F. Strawson, *An Introduction to Logical Theory* (Oxford, 1952), p. 256ff...=ILT.
- 23 Ibid., 257.
- 24 But only in most cases, not in all. See my remarks on the restricted rules of legitimacy and substitution inherent in the fallacies (*ābhāsa*) where there are nonempirical, but logically prior incompatible metaphysical

ontological, and epistemological presuppositions, for example, on the fallacy of *ubhayatrāvyabhicāra* (mutually exclusive [and] mutually undecidable concepts). See note 10, 'Remarks on Early Buddhist Proto-Formalism,' especially pp. 387ff.

- 25 I examine this theory problem in my 'Some Methodological Comments and Criticisms Concerning Comparative Philosophy,' forthcoming in *Philosophy : East and West*.

MEMORY

Bimal Krisbna Matilal

Sukhlalji Sanghavi was called by members of his circle "Panditji". Dr. K. K. Dixit in his "Translator's Introduction to the Philosophical Notes" (*Advanced studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*; S. Sanghavi) refers to him invariably as Panditji. But what is rather surprising is that being an erudite Pandit in the śāstras, Sukhlalji was perhaps the first one I know, who had realized more than any of his compatriots the limitation and barrenness of the old Pandit way of studying the Sanskrit philosophical texts. In his *Preface* to the above-mentioned book, he discusses the problem and very convincingly argues for a revision of our outlook in the study and research of the śāstras. He recommends explicitly "a non-partisan, historical, comparative study" of any Sanskrit philosophical text. He says :

"I became firmly convinced that the study of any philosophical system inevitably demands certain prerequisites and that these prerequisites include a fairly accurate understanding of the historical inter-relationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of India."

I think Panditji's *Preface* should be read by all young scholars of our country who wish to work on any system of Indian philosophy. As I myself was deeply influenced by Panditji's comments, when I started my research work in Indian philosophy, I wish to pay my tribute to his memory by choosing a topic from his above-mentioned work.

One of the main disagreements of the Jaina epistemologist (*pramāṇa*-theorist) from all the non-Jaina philosophers was in the theory of knowledge. Memory-experience was

never regarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyāyika or a Buddhist) to constitute a piece of knowledge, a *pramā*, a cognitive awareness which amounts to truth. Or, to put it in another way, while perception and inference were regarded as valid means or ways of knowing, memory was never considered such a means. The Jaina philosopher, on the other hand, contested this position and regarded memory as another source of non-perceptual knowledge by refuting the arguments of the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. Pandit Sukhlalji argued, in his above-mentioned book, that this dispute was primarily due to the reluctance of the non-Jaina philosophers to extend the use of the term '*pramā*' to memory-experience. All philosophers agree with the Jainas on the point that if a memory-experience happens to be a revival of a veridical past experience, perceptual or non-perceptual, then it is also veridical. But they apparently want to use the term *pramā* in a restricted sense such that a veridical experience would be called a *pramā* only if it is not the repeat or revival of a past experience. To quote Sukhlalji :

“ That mnemonic cognition is true of facts is acceptable to all (Indian logicians), and so there is no material difference of opinion on this issue; the difference only arises when some agree and others refuse to call memory a *pramāṇa*.” (p. 46)

Panditji, however, tried to give a historical explanation of this reluctance on the part of the Hindus, and a doctrinal explanation of the same on the part of the Buddhist. In the Hindu tradition, *smṛti*, the term for memory-experience, was also used to denote the *dharmaśāstras* as opposed to *śruti*, the Vedas. Now, since it is the cardinal doctrine of the Hindus that the *dharmaśāstras* are dependent upon the Vedas for their authoritativeness on *dharma* and are not independent sources of knowledge about *dharma*, *smṛti* cannot be called a *pramāṇa*. To wit : There is a systematic ambiguity in the word (= *pramā*) *pramāṇa*, for it can mean either a means of knowing or an authority, or a source for knowledge. There-

fore, if *smṛti* which meant *Dharmaśāstras* was not an independent *pramāṇa*, then by extension *smṛti* which also meant memory-experience, could not also be a *pramāṇa*.

The Buddhists, however, had a different reason, according to Sukhlalji. In Buddhist theory, any cognitive experience that involves thought or construction (*vikalpa*) would be excluded from being a *pramā* or *pramāṇa*. Thus, since memory involves thought, it cannot be a *pramā*.

While Sukhlalji's explanation is ingenious, it does not certainly seem to be the whole story. If from above one surmises that the dispute between the Jaina and non-Jaina philosophers on the status of memory was mainly terminological, it would be wrong. I believe that was not certainly the intention of Sukhlalji. I shall try to focus upon the deeper reasons for the dispute over memory-experience, and the consequent difference in theories of knowledge between the opposing parties.

There is something odd in calling a memory-experience an event of knowing, for the description of this experience is usually prefixed with "I remember". What I remember is another experience, another (past) cognitive event. If the past event amounted to knowing and if my memory is not "playing tricks" on me, I can remember now correctly what I had experienced. My present experience is also aware of the fact that what is coming to my mind along with my awareness of it is a past event. But an event of knowing is different from an event of remembering the first event of knowing. If the first event amount to knowing, it does not follow the second would be veridical, for I may remember incorrectly. The converse is also not true. If I remember correctly, i.e., my memory is "fully" revived, it does not follow that the first event was an event of knowing. If veracity is allowed to function as a qualifying property of a cognitive event when and only when it amounts to an event of knowing (a *pramā*), it cannot be regarded as automatically transmissible from the first type of events (events of cognition) to

the second type of events, events of remembering a past cognitive event. This is, at least one of the good reasons for the reluctance of the non-Jaina philosophers to regard a memory-experience as a *pramā*, an event of knowing.

I wish to connect the above argument with the traditional arguments found in the *śāstras*. The tradition of the non-Jaina philosophers (in this, the Mīmāṃsakas, some Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists agree, see Sukhlalji, p. 45) argues that a cognitive event becomes an act of knowing if it grasps or reveals a fact that has not been revealed or grasped before (cf. *a-grhītagrāhitva*). In other words, a fact not known before is supposed to be grasped by an act of knowing. An act of remembering therefore can hardly qualify to be an act of knowing unless, of course, the very fact of my knowing the original fact was not known to me before. If the veracity of a cognitive act is made dependent upon its grasping a novel fact, then another act, which *repeats* the first in the sense that the fact grasped in the first is the same as that in the second, cannot claim the property 'veracity'. For we cannot kill a bird more than once. An act of correct remembering is thought generally to be a *repeat* performance in the above sense. But the property 'veracity', as we have already seen, is not transmissible from the first act to the second. The second act may copy or repeat the first as far as the grasping of the same fact is concerned, but it cannot copy the other property, viz., that of grasping a hitherto ungrasped fact. For then it would not be a copy or repeat performance, and not an act of what we call 'remembering'.

Take the case of an original painting by one of the masters. There may be bad copies or even a set of 'perfect' copies of the painting. But the 'perfect' copy can copy everything of the original but not its originality, for then it could not be a copy by definition. Remembering in this way can never have the 'novelty' that is expected of an act of knowing. But there is something more to this point. Suppose, in our example, a doubt arises whether the first painting, which

has been copied by several copiests, good or perfect ones and bad ones, is a fake one, i.e., not by one of the masters. Now, nothing will be gained by looking at the second set of the copies, to investigate whether it is a true replica or not. To resolve the doubt one way or other one has to investigate the first painting. Thus, by making sure that a memory-experience is a correct and “full” revival of a previous act, we do not gain any insight into the problem of deciding whether the original act was a knowing act or not. The problem of an exact remembrance, like the problem of an exact reproduction, is quite separate from the problem of ensuring the first act to be an act of knowing. This analysis, therefore, shows that there is a good reason, not just a terminological dispute, for resisting the inclination to call a memory-experience a knowing act.

What I have argued here can be well supported by quoting a passage from Udayana’s *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi* (p. 110). This passage was Udayana’s comment on Vācaspati’s rather enigmatic statement in reply to the question why memory-experience is not regarded as a *pramā*. (*Tātparyatikā*, p. 35);

“The relation between word and object is determined by people’s convention (*loka*). And people call such cognitive event *pramā* as is non-promiscuous with the object or fact (*artha*) and different from such memory-experience as is produced only from mnemonic impression (*saṃskāra*).”

This might have given the impression that it is a matter of arbitrary choice of the language-users that memory is not to be called a *pramā*. But Udayana sets the matter straight as far, at least, as the Nyāya view is concerned. A *pramā* is a cognitive awareness that is in accord with the object or fact, but memory can hardly be said to have such an accord, and hence it is not a *pramā*. I quote:

“Moreover, how can memory-experience be in accord with the object/facts? For it is not true that when a object

is remembered in a particular way, it is in that same state at that time. For the previous state has now ceased. If it did not, it would not be called 'previous'. It is also not true that memory "hangs on" to that object as one whose previous state has ceased. For we do not have the awareness of the cessation of the previous state. If we do not have (prior) awareness of something, we cannot have a memory of it. If we did 'remember' such a thing, it would not be a memory. Besides, we need to search for another unique (causal) condition [for memory, viz., first impression=*samskāra*]. But we are not aware of it (i.e. such a condition), for there is no past impression of it.

[Opponent :] How is it that although both a (prior) cognitive awareness and a memory–experience have the same object (revealed in both alike), we say the prior cognitive awareness may be in accord with the object but not the (later) remembering of it?

[Answer :] At the time of (prior) awareness, the object was in that state in which it was, but at the time of (later) remembering of it, it was not in the same state.

[Opponent :] Our later cognition (i.e., remembering) may be said to be in accord with the object if it cognizes that the object *was* in that state before as it was.

[Answer :] No. Then our (present) awareness of dark–colour with regard to an earthen pot that [was dark before but now] is red due to its being baked (with fire), would be said, by this argument, to be in accord with the object. [Read "yathārtha..." for "yathārta..."]

[Opponent :] But a cognition that dark–colour has ceased is certainly in accord with the object.

[Answer :] This is true. For that object is in that state at that time. But the remembered object is not in the same state at that time. Therefore memory–experience is certainly not in accord with the object. But a cognitive (non–

mnemonic) experience may be in accord with the object. [Read ‘yathārthānubhava’ for ‘yathānubhava’]. If, however, a cognition is in accord with the object and we have a memory–experience of the same object, then such memory–experience is said to be in accord with the object. Similarly, if the (prior) cognition is not in accord with the object, the exact (undistorted) remembering of it is also not so. For example, when a man has fled after cognizing a rope as a snake, he remembers it as a snake. Therefore the memory–experience has ‘veracity’ (the property of being in accord with the object) only to the extent of its being *borrowed* from a prior veracious cognitive experience; it is not natural (= *ājānika*) to memory. This (unnaturalness of veracity with regard to memory) is what is expressed as (memory’s) ‘dependence upon another’, and this has been confused by some philosophers who were lazy to make the point explicit (I think this is an oblique reference to Vācaspati by Udayana).’

Udayana, in fact, has given two arguments in the above. First, he has argued that memory–experience cannot be said to be in accord with the object in the strictest sense in the way an ordinary (non–mnemonic) cognitive awareness can be. Next, he has shown, in recognition of the point that we may use such expressions as ‘true memory’, that the memory–experience can have accord with the object in a less strict sense, but such a property is only a transferred epithet from the original non–mnemonic past awareness in which the present memory is grounded.

What then is the sense in which the Jaina philosophers have argued that memory–experience is to be called a *pramā*, a true cognitive event? Does it simply mean that the Jaina philosophers use the term “*pramā*” in a less strict sense? It is tempting to say so, but I will suggest another way to understand the problem. If I had seen the pot to be dark when it was unbaked and now, when it is red after being baked, I remember truly that it was dark, the claim of the Jainas

is that it is a 'true' memory and hence a *pramā*. But Udayana has argued that this claim hides a confusion. For, if 'true memory' means, as it should, an exact reproduction or full revival of the past experience, then the verbal report expressed as "it *was* dark" cannot be a report of what we call a memory-experience. For, the portion of the experience expressed by "was", i.e., the pastness of the fact, cannot be any part of the past experience (the verbal report of the past experience was "it *is* dark"). And if it cannot be a part of the past experience, it cannot be part of present memory. Therefore, the verbal report "it was dark" is not that of memory, but a present experience aided by memory. I think the dispute here lies mainly in deciding what experience we should call memory, my remembering a past fact (that the pot was blue) or a present experience that the pot was blue based upon such remembering? We can also ask: whether these two are at all distinguishable experiences in the sense of being two cognitive events? I will skip an answer to this question and instead point out that the ordinary use of 'remember' is ambiguous enough to cover both.

There is a further point which takes us into the heart of this dispute. The problem of determining the truth of a non-mnemonic cognitive experience is quite different from the problem of determining the truth of a memory. Truth may be seen as a property of a cognitive experience, a property that is generated by factor or factors that are either concomitant with (if we accept *paratah*), or included in, if we accept *svatah*, the set of factors that generates the experience in question. But the correctness or accuracy or "truth" of a memory is generated, not by a similar set of factors, but by different ones, such as the intensity of the previous experience such that passage of time would not render it vague and inaccurate. If, however, it is argued that a memory in copying exactly a past true experience can also copy its truth, then we have to say that it is only a *copy* of the property truth or *pramātva*, and not *the* property truth.

Bibliography

- Sanghavi, Sukhlalji : *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*. Indian Studies Past and Present Reprint, Calcutta, 1961.
- Udayana : *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-parisudhi*. Ed. A. Thakur, *Nyāya-darśana* Mithila Institute Series, Darbhanga, 1967.
- Vācaspati, Miśra : *Tātparyaṅikā*. See Udayana.

✧

NOTES ON RELIGIOUS MERIT (*PUNYA*) IN COMPARATIVE LIGHT

Lal Mani Joshi

Our aim in this paper is to briefly elucidate the general significance of the notion of *puṇya* or religious merit in Indian tradition. In Indian tradition, ethics, religion, and philosophy are almost inseparably connected. The concept of *puṇya* is thus at once ethical, religious, and philosophical. As an ethical concept, it implies voluntary obedience to moral rules of conduct which carry the sanction of a system of reward and punishment. As a form of religious belief, it indicates the practice of pious and ascetic life. As a philosophical concept, it is connected with the transhistorical doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. Conceived as a religious value *puṇya* is the subtle result of a righteous action which influences not only the doer's present life but also his or her eschatological status. This is a general Indian belief attached to the notion of *puṇya*.

The Sanskrit word *puṇya* is derived from the root *pu*, meaning 'to purify' or 'to make clear'. *Puṇya* is that which purifies the stream of life; in another context, that which purifies the self (*ātman*) is called *puṇya*. Thus pure deeds, pure words, and pure thoughts constitute *puṇya*. The consequence of a pure action is pleasant and purifying not only to the doer but also to others. That which brings about desirable results, such as peace, prosperity, and happiness; that which is good in the beginning, good in the middle and good in the end, is indeed *puṇya*. In the sacred literature and lexicons of India we find this word used as a synonym of *guṇa*, *śubha*, *kuśala*, *sukṛta*, *dharma*, *pāvana*, and *śreya*.

Translated into English these words mean 'virtue', 'auspicious', 'good', 'noble deed', 'righteousness', 'pure', and 'preferable', respectively. For the purpose of this article we may translate the word *puṇya* as 'merit', especially as 'religious merit', keeping in mind, at the same time, that this English word is quite inadequate in expressing the wide range of ideas embodied in *puṇya*.

Puṇya or merit refers to both the concrete action, which is blameless, as well as to its abstract result. In this latter sense it is a 'power' born of goodness (*puṇya-bala*). The word virtue approaches this sense. But it must be pointed out here that *puṇya* is a generic word, and may include Christian virtues, viz. faith, hope, and love; cardinal virtues of classical European tradition, viz., prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude; practical virtues like courage; intellectual virtues like wisdom, and many other good qualities known to Indian tradition. Inoffensiveness towards living beings, truth, liberality, mercy, love, morality, control of the mind and the senses, contentment, austerity, humility, tending the sick and helping the poor, fear of the sin, faith in the law of *karma* and in the ultimate Reality, study of sacred texts, company and service of sages, and even physical purity, are some of the practices cherished by Indians as religiously meritorious.

The importance of the doctrine of meritorious activities is recognized in all the great religions of the world. It is the distinction of Indian religious traditions that they have developed this doctrine to a highest degree. Another distinguishing feature of this doctrine is its rôle in the technology of spiritual awakening and final beatitude as conceived in the faiths of Indic origin.

The word *puṇya* is known to the *Ṛgveda* although its later religious meaning hardly found in this text. The *Atharvaveda*¹ mentions 'pure worlds' (*puṇyāśca lokān*) while the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*² refers to the 'religious work' (*puṇya karma*) or horse-sacrifice performed by the Pāriḷḷitas. In the Vedic age, animal sacrifice was considered a 'righteous' work. The

*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*³ lays down the rule that *ahiṃsā* should be practised towards all beings except at 'sacred spots' (*tīrthas*). The place of animal sacrifice was considered 'sacred' during this age. This text⁴ attributes birth in higher states of humans to good conduct (*ramaṇīya-caraṇa*). The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁵ states that a person becomes pious (*puṇya*) by pious deeds (*puṇyena karmanā*). The early Upaniṣads also mention austerity (*tapas*) as a virtue. Study of the Veda, almsgiving, sacrificing and fasting are considered meritorious but they are said to be inferior to the knowledge of God or the Absolute (*brahman*).

It is in the early Buddhist sources that the doctrine of merit is clearly made for the first time an essential element of religious culture. Here a clear distinction is made between virtues or good qualities and their merits. Thus it is stated in the *Dīghanikāya* that "the merit (*puṇya*) grows by the cultivation of good qualities (*kuśala-dharma*)."⁶ Three 'foundations of meritorious deed' (*puṇya-kriyā-vastu*) are discussed again and again in the Buddhist texts. These three virtuous practices that contribute to merit are liberality (*dāna*), good conduct (*śīla*), and meditation (*bhāvanā*).⁶ Merit is often represented as the foundation and condition of birth in good states (*sugati*) and in heaven (*svarga*).⁷ Liberality, self-denial, self-restraint, truthful speech, austerity, continence, study of the Doctrine; renunciation, friendliness, loving kindness, impartiality, sympathetic joy, knowledge, right views, pure intention, forbearance and meditational achievements are some of the qualities contributing to merit. The Buddha is honoured as the embodiment of the supreme perfection of all the meritorious virtues. Those bereft of merit are compared to the wood in the cremation ground. Absence of greed, of delusion and of hatred is auspicious (*śubha*) and it leads to good states (*sugati*) and happiness (*sukha*). *Puṇya* is often compared to the nectar,⁸ the antidote to hellish life and death. The human beings are purified not by birth or wealth, but by good deeds,

knowledge, righteousness, and moral conduct. *Śīla* or pure conduct is the basis of entire religious life.⁹ Emperor Aśoka taught one could obtain infinite merit (*anantaṃ puṇaṃ*) by the gift of righteousness (*dhamma-dāna*).¹⁰ The idea of transfer of merit is an important feature of Buddhist religious practice.

The Jaina attitude towards merit (*puṇya*) deserves particular notice. Beings have three dispositions (*bhāva*): good (*śubha*), bad (*aśubha*) and pure (*śuddha*). First is the cause of religious merit (*puṇya*); second of sinfulness (*apuṇya*), and the third of liberation (*nivṛtti*). The sage (*yogin*), leaving both good and bad, establishes himself in pure disposition.¹¹ According to the Jaina theory *karma*, whether meritorious or demeritorious, results in bondage. For those who desire Ultimate Release (*mokṣa*), even *puṇya* is an obstacle; a shackle whether of iron or of gold, is indeed a shackle which binds.¹² The argument is that the doer will have to remain in transmigration (*saṃsāra*), even if he be born in heavenly states, in order to enjoy the fruition of his good works. The religions of Indian origin do not consider life in heaven as the highest goal.

But *puṇya* is not worthless even in Jainism. It certainly contributes towards spiritual progress; a being born in higher states, such as those of gods and men, will have better opportunities of working out his final emancipation than the one who is born in lower states of existence, such as those in hells or in brute form. *Mokṣa* being too high an ideal for the vaster sections of pious humanity, birth in good states of existence, whether in divine or in human world (*loka*), is the commonly cherished ideal. Merit (*puṇya*) is a sure means to get into these existences. Hence, mercy towards beings, liberality, devotion, renunciation, fasting, penance, sense control and almsgiving etc. are recommended to the laity.¹³ Some Jaina texts distinguish between two types of merit. One founded on 'right view' (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) and other founded on 'false view' (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*); the former leads to liberation, while the latter only to heavenly life.

The *Mahābhārata*, the Brahmanical Smṛtis and the Purāṇas describe in detail means of producing merits and promise rewards to be derived from them. Going on pilgrimage to holy places (*tirthas*), bathing in sacred rivers (*snāna*), and keeping various vows (*vratas*) and fasts (*upavāsas*) are not the only ways of earning merit. Great emphasis is laid on the cultivation of moral qualities. According to these texts one obtains full reward of pilgrimage and ablution only when one is compassionate towards all beings and is pure and keeps his senses in control. Truthfulness, austerity, charity, celibacy, contentment, forbearance, sweet speech, and straightforwardness are the real *tirthas* that purify a being and beget merits.¹⁴ It may be noted in passing that the *Bhagavadgītā* insists that one should perform one's assigned duty (*svadharma*) in order to obtain the excellent rewards. Among other things, death in the battle is declared to be meritorious and resulting in birth in a heaven. An enlightened sage (*sthita-prajña*), however, is described as being untouched by good (*śubha*) and evil (*aśubha*) things.¹⁵

The belief that merits travel with a person's life wherever it is reborn, is common to all the religions of Indian origin. The spiritual merit (*dharma*) is the only companion of a being in the next world (*paraloku*). Therefore, one should accumulate merits¹⁶ by practicing *dharma*.

In the middle of the seventh century the pious Chinese Buddhist pilgrim-scholar, Hsüan-tsang, found in India "numerous *punyaśālās* or free rest-houses for the relief of the needy and distressed; at these houses medicine and food were distributed and so travellers having their bodily wants supplied, did not experience inconvenience." The same authority describes the belief of some Indians of his time in the merit derived from bathing into the Gaṅgā at Hardwar in the following words: "Accumulated sins are effaced by a bath in the water of the river; those who drown themselves in it are reborn in heaven with happiness."¹⁷

Happy life in heaven (*sarga*) is the usual reward of merits. Happiness (*sukha*) is that which is desirable, which pleases. The hallmark of heaven is that there is only happiness. In contrast to heaven, hell has only sorrow, while in this world of ours there are both happiness and sorrow. Desire for happiness and fear of suffering and hell may be considered as the two important factors which inspire beings towards practice of moral virtues.

It will be incorrect to assume, however, that merits are accumulated only for the enjoyment of rewards in a future life. Some people may earn merits by doing good work with a view to gaining a good reputation and glory in this very life. Some people may perform meritorious deeds for eradicating their sins, while a few might be inspired to pursue merits out of love and reverence for piety or with a view to growing in holiness. An important reason behind the accumulation of merits may be desire to get and possess enormous supernatural powers. This is especially true of numerous figures of India's legendary and mythical past. The names of a king like Harīścandra, a *brāhmaṇa* seer like Viśvāmitra, or an ascetic sage like Kapilamuni, represent a whole series of beings, either historical, semi-historical or wholly imaginary, whose supernatural exploits, almost incredible to a modern mind, occupy hundreds of pages of the *Mahābhārata* and the Viṣṇuite Purāṇas. Like the practice of *yoga*, merits were stored for secular purposes also - victory in war, immunity from a disease or curse, control over the forces of nature, such as rain and storm, and so on.

A critic has observed that "the doctrine of the merit of good works has fared poorly. Some religions practically ignore it, notably the Bhakti-mārga of India and the Sūfism of Persia."¹⁸ This, in our opinion, is an exaggeration of a fact; although faith and love are the dominant notes of the sects of Bhakti tradition of India, it will be too much to maintain that they overlooked virtues like ethical excellence, compassion, and liberality. Kabīr, Nānaka and Tulasīdāsa are the most

brilliant luminaries in the firmament of the medieval Indian Bhakti tradition, and in their teachings the value of good works, of altruistic ethics, has never been lost sight of.

All those deeds of the body, mind and speech which conduce to a being's constant mindfulness of the reality of God are meritorious from the standpoint of Gurumata or Sikhism. The ideal religious person, called *guramukha* is believed to be an embodiment of moral and religious virtues. He is called 'God-faced' or 'turned towards the Teacher', because he lives, moves, and has his being in the Timeless Person (*akāla-purakha*). In verse after verse of the *Gurugrantha* he is eulogized for his moral life and blameless behaviour towards his fellow-beings.

The 'religious person' is not only a devotee or 'a sharer in divine glory' (*bhagata*), but also a 'holy person' (*punnī*), 'a doer of good works' (*karamī*), and 'a servant' (*dāsa*) engaged in the service of God.¹⁹ The Sikh Scripture refers to meritorious work as *punna*, *sukrita*, *guṇa*, *bhakti-kāra* and *nāmasimaraṇa*, 'merit', 'pious action', 'virtue', 'good deed', and 'the mindfulness of (God's) name' respectively.²⁰ The message of the teachers of Sikh tradition is that faith in and love of one God creator must go along with morally good works of the body, mind and speech.

The foremost work of merit (*punna*), according to all the saints represented in the Sikh Scripture, is constant awareness of God. This is the root of all other merits; without this other good works are of little avail. According to Guru Nānaka, a person gets little honour through pilgrimage, (*tratha*), austerity (*tapu*), mercy (*daia*), and liberal gifts (*datu-dānu*); it is the hearing, accepting, and meditating on the name of God which is the essence of religious life; therefore, let one drown oneself into the innermost sanctum (*antargati trathi*).²¹ Without cultivating virtues there can be no devotion to God;²² and without devotion to God there can be no liberation.²³

The fact is that the *guramukha* or the follower of the *bhakti-mārga* is described as 'undefiled' (*nirmalu*), pure (*sūcā*), 'self-controlled' (*sañjami*), 'self investigator' (*pārakhu*), 'contented' (*santokhiā*), possessed of the knowledge of sacred texts (*sāstra-simriti-veda*), one who has forsaken hatred (*vairu*) and opposition (*virodhu*), one who has eradicated all accounts of complaint, hostility and revenge (*sagali gaṇata miṭṭavai*) against others, and as the one who is rejoicing in the fervour of God's name (*rāmanāma-raṅgi-rātā*)²⁴

The *Gurugrantha* refers repeatedly to the importance of God's compassionate attitude or favourable disposition (*prasāda*). For instance, it is declared that "He blesses him whom He chooses"; "What pleases Him, comes to pass"; "All knowledge and virtue is obtained by submitting to His ordinance"; "Without Guru's favour one's efforts bear no fruit"; "Without Guru's help, passions are not removed"; "Those who are excluded from the favour (*nadari bāhare*) are unable to practice liberality and devotion"²⁵ The sum total of such scriptural statements seems to be that it is through God's favour or direction that one becomes virtuous, that religious merit is accumulated through Divine assistance. It is interesting to note that even in the Advaita vedānta highest value seems to be attached to God's favourable disposition. Thus according to Śaṅkara (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, verse 3), human birth, desire for liberation, and protecting company of sages, are obtained through God's merciful disposition (*devānugraha*). Such a view comes close to Jewish-Christian-Islamic doctrine of predestinarianism or determinism.

It is clear that the theology of *puṇya* in theistic religions, whether of Indian or West Asian origins, differs significantly from the notion of its nature and function in the Śramaṇic systems of Indian origin. A discussion of this aspect, however, is not our intention at this place.

Notes and References

- 1 *Atharvaveda*, XIX, 54.4
- 2 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, XIII, 5.4.3
- 3 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. 17.4
- 4 *Ibid.*, V. 10.7
- 5 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, VI. 5.4
- 6 *Dighanikāya* (Nalanda Edition), vol. III, pp. 46, 171;
Aṣṭasāharikā Prajñāpāramitā (Darbhāṅgā Edition) pp. 34, 69-70.
- 7 *Ratnāvali* (of Nāgārjuna), I, 21, 44, 57
- 8 *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, VII, 64.
- 9 *Majjhimanikāya* (Nalanda Edition), vol. III, p. 262;
Samyuttanikāya (Nalanda Edition), vol. I, p. 14.
- 10 Rock Edict No. XI; see R.G. Basak, *Aśokan Inscriptions*, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, pp. 55-56.
- 11 *Yogasāraprābhṛta*, IX, 62
- 12 *Samuyasāra*, IV. 145-147.
- 13 See *Vasunandī-Śrāvākācāra*, ed. by Hiralal Jain, Varanasi, Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha, 1944.
Pravacanasāra, chapter III on conduct (*Cāritra*).
- 14 *Mahābhārata, Vanaparvan*, chapter 82, verses 9-12;
Anuśāsana-paravan, chapter 108, verses 3-4; *Skanda Purāna, Kāśikhanda*, VI. 3; *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāna*, III. 272. 7, 9.
- 15 *Bhagavadgītā*, 37, 57; III. 35, VI. 41.
- 16 *Monuṣṃti*, 238-239; *Mahākarmavibhāṅga* (Darbhanga Edition), p. 197
verses 21-24.
- 17 Tomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, (reprinted), 1961. Vol. I, pp. 286, 139, 328; vol. II. P. 286.
- 18 Louis H. Gray in *The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. by J. Hastings and others, vol. VIII, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, (reprinted), 1964, p. 559.
19. *Sabdāratha Sri Gura Grantha Sāhib*, (Amritsar). especially *Sidhugosaṭi*, p. 942.

20 *Ibid* , pp. 4, 13, 17, 361 and 1134.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 4, *Japu*, verse 21.

22 *Loc. cit.*

23 *Sabdāratha Sri Guru Grantha Sahib*, p. 260.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 353, 153, 148, 18, and 942.

25 *Ibid*, pp. 209, 285, 944, 942, 18 and 14.

THE UNIQUE JAINA DOCTRINE OF KARMA AND ITS CONTRIBUTION

Y. Krishan

The Jainas, as a rule, are extremely ascetic and puritanical in their life and conduct. In fact practice of asceticism and penances are the distinguishing features of the Jaina way of life when compared to that of the followers of Hinduism and Buddhism.

This is somewhat intriguing inasmuch as the code of ethics enjoined by all these religious sects is the same.

Jainism enjoins the practice of right conduct. This consists in observance of five *mahāvratas* by the monks and five *aṇuvratas* by the laymen. The *mahāvratas* are—(1) *ahiṃsā* (non-violence); (ii) *satya* (truthfulness); (iii) *asteya* (not to take what is not given or non-stealing); (iv) *brahmacarya* (sexual continence); and (v) *aparigraha* (non-possession or renunciation).

The lay Jainas observe the same vows but their obligations are less rigorous and intense. For instance, in their case, *brahmacarya* is modified to prohibition against unlawful sexual inter-course (adultery).

Thus the ethical discipline of the monks and laymen is virtually the same except in the extent and degree to which it is expected to be practised. In the case of the monks, these vows are to be practised to the highest degree of perfection subject to the limitations of human body such as the need of the body for food. But in the case of the laymen, practice of these *vratas* is necessarily modified further by social limitations, the obligation to rear and maintain a family, make a living etc. The laymen seek to make up, at least partially,

this modified and somewhat restricted practice of five *aṇuvratas* by supplementary or auxiliary vows: (i) almsgiving; (ii) limiting the sphere of one's activity; (iii) limiting the area of movements so that minimum violation of vows is involved and (iv) practising moderation and (v) practising meditation.

The ethical discipline of the Jainas is identical to that of the Buddhists and Hindus. In order to follow the eight-fold path of the Buddha, the Buddhists enjoin the observance of *pañcaśīla* which is identical with the *mahāvratas* except that *aparigraha* is replaced by *apramāda* (not taking intoxicants).

Similarly the Buddhist laymen are expected to observe *daśaśīla*, ten vows. The first four vows are the same as the *aṇuvratas*, the fifth being eschewing intoxicants. The supplementary five vows of laymen are : abstinence from slander, harsh, frivolous and senseless talk, covetousness (*aparigraha*), molevolence and heretical views.

The supplementary vows as in the case of the Jainas, help to counterbalance, to the extent possible, the inability of Buddhist laymen to practice perfectly the *pañcaśīla*.

The Brahmanical ascetics and Hindu laymen observe the same *vratas* and *śīlas* – *ahmīsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya*, *dāna*; the minor vows being : abstention from anger, obedience to Guru, avoidance of rashness, cleanliness, and purity in eating.

Even though the essential code of conduct was common among all the three religious communities, yet there are material differences in their approach to life as stated at the outset.

This difference has arisen because of the Jaina doctrine of *karman*.

According to the Jainas, *karma* is a material entity, a *dravya-karma skandha*. It is subtle; when a person acts, there is inflow (*āsrava*) of *kārmic* matter into the soul (*jīva*). Accumulated *karman* in the soul forms *karman-śarīra*. It is this *śarīra* which transmigrates at death into a new birth. It also exercises *bandha* or binding force or attraction on the *kārmic*

matter and makes inflow (*āsrava*) into the soul. *Nāyādhammakahāṭṭhī*¹ compares *karman* to mud. The *jīva* is like a gourd. When it is coated with mud (*karman*), it sinks to the bottom of water (hell); when the mud is removed (*karma-nirjarā*), the gourd floats up (attains liberation).

So “*Karman* is the root of birth and death” *Uttarādhyayana*² XXXII. 7. Again *karma* or action produces results. *Karmas* “are all the causes of sin” *Ācārāṅga*³ I.1.1.4.

Intent or motive is not an essential ingredient of all *kārmic* sins in Jainism. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*⁴ II. 2. 3 enumerates 13 kinds of *karmas* or activities which include accidental (*akasmāt*) sin and sin committed through an error of sight. In the same text II. 4.1.3. Mahāvīra avers “Though a fool does not consider the operation of his mind, speech and body, nor does see even a dream, still he commits sins” and this is asserted in face of the opposite view that “there can be no sin if (the perpetrator of an action) does not possess sinful thoughts, speech and function of the body...”. But Mahāvīra repeats “...there is sin though (the perpetrators of the action) do not possess sinful thoughts...”

As Jacobi⁵ emphasises “The doctrine of the Jainas is that *karman* is the result of every being, even of those whose intellect or consciousness is not developed, as with the *ekendriyas* or beings who possess one organ of sense”. Kundakunda (1st Century A.D.) in his *Pravacanasāra*⁶ III. 17 maintains that “the sin of *himsā* is caused by carelessness or negligence...”. Umāsvāmi (2nd century A.D.) in the *Tattvārthasūtram* VII-4 suggests that the sin of *himsā* can be caused by carelessness of speech, thought, in working, lifting or in taking food and drink. In short, *karma* is “a sort of poison that infects the soul.” Thus, while violation of the prescribed code of conduct can be committed unintentionally, intent, motive and passions affect the duration of *karman* or the period of operation of its consequences. The means of escape from *punarjanma* or transmigration is stopping (*saṁvara*) the influx of *kārmic*

matter and liquidation or purging (*nirjarā*) of the accumulated *kārmic* matter thereby bringing about a dissolution of *karman-śarīra*.

A reduction in the creation of fresh *kārmic* matter is achieved through limiting or restricting *karma* or activity by practicing *yama*, restraint in lay life. As the *Uttarādhyayana* XXIX 27 says "By austerities he (the soul) cuts off the *karman*." Again *ibid* XXIX 13 "By self denial he shuts as it were, the doors of the *āsravas*...". A *nirgrantha*, a person without ties, i.e. a monk, however, undertakes minimal activity and thereby causes minimal inflow of new *karmas* and hence is better equipped to stop the formation of new *karma*. As *Uttarādhyayana* XXIX 32 observes : "By turning from the world he will strive not to do bad actions and will eliminate his already acquired *karman* by its destruction...". Again *ibid* XXIX 37 "...by ceasing to act he acquires no new *karman*, and destroys the *karman* he had acquired before."

Liquidation of accumulated *karma* is achieved through penances and self mortification—fasting (*anasaṇa*), voluntary physical torture, *kāya kileśa* and *sallekhanā* or voluntary suicide and other *prāyaścittas*.

The texts are unambiguous. "By austerities he cuts off *karman*" *Uttarādhyayana* XXIX 27. "By renouncing activity, he obtains inactivity; by ceasing to act he acquires no new *karman* and destroys the *karman* he has acquired before" *ibid* 37. Again "The sinners cannot annihilate their works by new works; the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works..." *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* I. 12. 15.

Besides physical asceticism, Jainism, also, in common with other religious sects, teaches *dhyāna yoga*, mental asceticism involving practice of exercises in concentration aimed at temporary dissociation of soul from *karman śarīra*. Here *dhyāna yoga*⁹ was not aimed at obtaining supernormal powers as the exercise of such powers only leads to more activity, *kārmic* actions. It is an aid at stopping or curbing one of the sources

of *karma* or activity, that is the mind. It could, as stated earlier, enable the *yogi*, in the state of *samādhi*, to experience the state of enlightenment, or *nirvāṇa* or of *kevalin* for a duration of time.

Asceticism, both physical and mental, and renunciation were thus essential to neutralise and overcome *karman*. The practice of *tapas* and *sannyāsa* therefore are an essential and enduring features of Jainism and Jaina way of life.¹⁰

In the case of Buddhists and Brahmins, on the other hand, *karmas* or acts which produce reaction or consequences are essentially mental in character depending on the motive or intent of the doer. *Āṅguttaranikāya*¹¹ iii. VI. 63 says : *Cetanā aham, bhikkave kammam vadāmi; cetayitā kammam karoti, kāyena vācāya, manasā*; determinate thought or will or intention is action; it is will that acts through body, speech and mind. *Āṅguttaranikāya*¹² i, III. 33 is more explicit: the *karmas* or deeds born of lust, malice and delusion (infatuation) ripen and come to fruition whereas deeds free from these are barren. *Dhammapada* 1 and 2 describe *karmas* as *manomaya* or mental in their nature and that good and bad deeds of speech or body and born of intent pursue the door relentlessly. *Milindapañha*¹³ IV, 5, 18 makes *mens rea* as the essential ingredient of an offence; "Now an evil act done, O King, by one out of his mind is even in the present world not considered as a grievous offence; nor is it so in respect of the fruit that it brings about in future life.....there is no sin in the act done by a mad man, it is a pardonable act...". Similarly the *Bhagavad Gītā* XVIII. 2 speaks of *kāmya karmas* actions produced by desires and in IV. 19 speaks of *karma sankalpa*, action oriented desire and teaches *niṣkāma karma*, desireless or motiveless action.

Since the *karmas* are essentially mental in character, they considered mind control as the only means of obtaining *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* and Buddha denounced bodily mortifications as "painful, ignoble and fruitless (*Mahāvagga* 1, 6. 17).¹⁴

Since austerities *per se* were of no avail, and control of mind and renunciation were easy to practice, both the Buddhists and Hindus sought to obtain escape from the rigour of the relentless and inescapable law of *karma*, which had made an individual exclusively responsible for his acts. by devising certain expedients. There were *bhakti*, *dhyāna yoga* and the cult of *avatāras*. The Hindus believed in an omnipotent and omnipresent God who is also of compassionate nature. Consequently the grace of God is invoked through *bhakti*, intense devotion. *Bhagavad Gītā* XVIII 56 states ‘While doing all actions, if he takes refuge in Me, he attains the eternal, immutable abode through My grace.’ Again in *Bhagavad Gītā* XVIII 62, Arjuna is told ‘Seek refuge in Him alone with all your being. Through His grace you shall obtain supreme peace and eternal abode.’ In *ibid* XVIII 66, it is added ‘Surrendering all duties to Me, seek refuge in Me alone, I shall absolve you of all sins...’. Thus the devotee, *bhakta*, is not expected to give up *karma*; in fact, he can lead the life of a householder and still obtain salvation through *bhakti*.

The doctrine of *avatāras* or incarnation of God in human form from who redeems his devotees was another facet of *bhakti*. The *Bhagavad Gītā* IV. 7 and 8 says that He takes bodily form whenever there is decline of *dharma* or righteousness and evil is dominant and that He is incarnated from time to time for the destruction of evil doers and for the protection of the virtuous.

Similarly the Buddhists found an answer to the inflexibility of the law of *karma* in the cult of *bodhisattva mahāsattva*, who was endowed with the power to free his devotees from the consequences of their evil actions and who undertook a mission of mercy for the redemption of mankind by foregoing personal *nirvāṇa*.

There is ample textual evidence to support this conclusion; a few examples are given by way of illustration.

In the *Saddharmapuṇḍurīka*¹⁵ XXI it is said that Avalo-

kiteśvara will infallibly destroy all suffering of those who hear, see and regularly and constantly think of Avalokiteśvara. In the *Amitāyurdhyāna sūtra*¹⁶ §19 it is said that meditation on Avalokiteśvara will “utterly remove the obstacle that is caused by *karma* and will expiate sins which will involve them in births, deaths, for numberless *kalpas*”. The *ibid sūtra* §32 repeats that the mere hearing of the names of the Buddha and *bodhisattvas*, Avalokiteśvara and Mahāsthāmprāpta, would expiate sins that cause repeated births and deaths. Śāntideva¹⁷ in his *Śikṣāsamuccaya* reiterates that the *bodhisattva* resolves:

“All the mass of pain and all evil *karma* I take in my own body... ..”.

Again certain schools of both the Hindu and the Buddhists sought to obtain liberation, *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* through *nirvikalpa samādhi*, that state of concentration when all thought activity is eliminated.

Thus the doctrine of *bhakti*, the concepts of *avatāra* and *bodhisattva mahāsattva* and the technique of *dhyāna yoga* in Hinduism and Buddhism made inroads into the inexorable and relentless law of *karma*.

The *tāntrics*, Hindu and Buddhists, carried these subtle attacks on the law of *karma* and on the usefulness of *tapas* to their logical conclusion. They discounted the utility of bodily mortifications and demolished the distinction between good and evil, moral and immoral conduct, *yoga* and *bhoga*. In fact they substituted ‘a *yoga* of enjoyment (*bhoga*) for the *yoga* of abstinence and asceticism.’¹⁸

*Vāmācāra*¹⁹ justified and encouraged physical enjoyment, indulgence in passions and repudiated austerities. Saraha in his *Dohākośa* 9 specifically attacks the Jaina monks thus :

“For these Jaina monks, there is no release.
Deprived of the truth of happiness,
They do not but afflict their own bodies.”

In Jainism, however, the peculiar conception of *karma* as

a material entity wherein motive is not an essential ingredient, did not make room for any compromise with the operation of the law of *karma*. So *bhakti*, *avatāras* and *bodhisattvas* play no part in Jainism. For the same reasons, while *tantric* philosophy flourished in Hinduism and Buddhism, it did not find Jainism congenial which could permit any deviation from its ethics.

The Jaina doctrine of *karma* has remained severely individualistic. The Jains along with Hindus and Buddhists strongly believe in *ahimsā* in fact Jainism excels the other two its rigorous practice of *ahimsā*; to its extreme limits. *Tattvārtha sūtra* VII II specifically enjoined meditation upon *maitri* (benevolence) and *karuṇā* (compassion). But the materialistic nature of the *karma* in Jainism did not permit the more positive aspects of *ahimsā* viz. *maitri* (benevolence) and *karuṇā* (compassion) to degenerate into the Buddhist doctrine of *puṇyapariāvarta*, transference of merit, which is the very negation of individual moral responsibility for one's *karma*. Thus the Buddhist doctrine of *bodhisattva*²⁰ remained alien to Jaina thought.

To sum up, *tapasyā* as a vital factor in the Indian way of life survives in spite of the cults of *bhakti*, of divine grace, of the teaching of the Buddha that austerities are futile, and *tāntric* philosophy which not only discounts all austerities but but encourage a bohemian and permissive way of life because of the unique Jaina doctrine of *karma*.

Notes

- 1 Quoted by S. B. Deo : *History of Jaina Monachism*, Poona, 1955, p. 212 f.n. 375.
- 2 H. JACOBI. *Sacred Books of the East* Vol. XLV.
- 3 Jacobi : *ibid* Vol. XXII.
- 4 Jacobi : *ibid* Vol. XLV.
- 5 Jacobi : *S.B.E.* Vol. XLV p. 399 fn. 6.
- 6 A. N. Upadhyae (ed) *Pravacanasāra*, Agas, Gujarat 1964.

- 7 J. L. Jaini (ed) *Tattvārthasūtram*. Delhi, 1956.
- 8 Renou : *Religions of Ancient India*, New Delhi, 1972, p. 132.
- 9 The aim of *dhyāna yoga* in the Hindu schools of thought was to achieve miraculous powers (*riddhi* and *siddhi*) through controlling the mind and more importantly union of *ātman* with *paramātman* by suppressing the mind. Among the Buddhists, the meditational practices were specially intended to still the mind and thereby to demolish the sense of duality and realise that the nature of ultimate reality is *śūnya* (*śūnyavāda*) or *vijñaptimātratā* pure consciousness (*yogācāra*).
- 10 The terms used for a Jaina ascetic truly reflect his character. He is called *śramaṇa*, *yati* and *kṣapaṇa* or *kṣapaṇaka*. *Śramaṇa* means one who exerts himself especially in performing acts of austerity; *yati* means one who has restrained his passions and abandoned the world; *kṣapaṇa* means 'fasting', *ksapaṇam* means abstinence, chastisement of the body. Monier Williams : *Sanskrit English Dictionary*.
- 11 See also E. M. Hare : *The book of the Gradual sayings*, London, 1952 Vol. III, p. 294.
- 12 Hare : *ibid* London, 1932, Volume I, pp. 117-119. See also H. C. Warren : *Buddhism in Translation*, London, 1963 pp. 215-217.
- 13 Rhys Davids ; *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXVI, Pt. II, p. 18-19.
- 14 *Ibid*, Vol. XIII, 94.
- 15 *Sacred Books of the East* Vol. XXI, p. 433.
- 16 *S.B.E.* Vol. XLIX pp. 183 and 185.
- 17 Theodore de Bary (ed) : *Sources of Indian Tradition*, New York, 1958, p. 164.
- 18 P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmśāstras*, Poona, 1962. Vol. V, Pt. II p. 1017.
- 19 *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* VV 24-94 and 37-38.... "Those who know.... remove passion by means of passion itself.... the wise man renders himself free of impurity by means of impurity itself." Again in the *Guhyasamāja tantra* Ch. 7 it is maintained ; " By enjoyment of all desires..one may speedily gain Buddhahood" and "One does not succeed by devoting oneself to harsh discipline and austerities, but by devoting oneself to the enjoyment of all desires one rapidly gains success."
- Saraha in the *Dohakośa* 64 says " Enjoying the world of sense, one is undefiled by the world of sense.
One plucks lotus without touching water
so the *yogin* who has gone to the root of things
not enslaved by senses although he enjoys them."

Quoted in Conze : *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, London, 1954 pp. 220-239.

The Hindu *tāntric* works teach the same.

The *Rudrayāmala* enjoins the use of five *makāras* (wine, women, flesh, fish and cereals) in *sādhonā* for becoming a perfect *yogin*. (Kane; *ibid* p. 1034). The *Kulārṇava tantra* states that “*siddhi* (‘perfection’) results from those very substances by which men incur sin.” (Kane : *ibid* p. 1064). *Kaularahasya* maintains that *mukti* is secured by drinking wine, eating flesh and indulging in sex (*maithuna*) (Kane *ibid* p. 1087).

- 20 As A. L. Basham in ‘Doctrines of Jainism’ *Sources of Indian Tradition* ed. Theodore de Bary, New York 1958 p. 53 observes that “The Jaina scriptures contain nothing comparable for instance to the *Metta sutta* of the Buddhists and the intense sympathy and compassion of the *Bodhisattva* of Mahāyāna Buddhism is quite foreign to the ideals of Jainism ...”

*

RIGHT UNDERSTANDING – SOME HURDLES

T. G. Kalghatgi

I. Right understanding (*Samygdarśana*), right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*) and right conduct (*Samyagcāritra*) constitute the triple path towards self-realisation.¹ There is need to a harmonious blending of the three paths. Right understanding is the basis; it leads to right knowledge. This is faith rooted in intuitive grasp of the truth and not related to superstitious uncritical acceptance of truth. It is looking inward and it may be referred to as the “mental set” in the psychological sense.

²Ācārya Samantabhadra has mentioned 8 characteristics of *Samygdarśana* : 1. *Niḥśankita* is the deeprooted faith in the persons who are authorities and in the validity of the sacred texts.

2. *Niḥkānkṣita* spirit of non-attachment towards the fruits of *Niḥkānkṣā*. It should be purely spiritual craving.

3. *Nirvicikitsā* : is to be free from illusions and stupor.

4. *Amūḍhadṛṣṭi* is to be free from the perversity of beliefs, which may be called *amūḍhatva*.

5. *Upagūhana* refers to the emphasis on the right aspect of the *samyagdṛṣṭi* in the sense that we should discourage to aim at partial and half-hearted right-mindedness.

6. *Sthitikaraṇa* is to secure steadfastness and to lead towards rightness of understanding. The ‘fallen angels’ in the path have to be restored to the path of right direction.

7. *Vātsalya* emphasises that we should have love and kindness towards those leading the path of righteousness, without of course showing ill-will towards the fallen. “Those who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled.”³

8. *Prabhāvanā* is to kindle the light of right understanding,

by removing many misconceptions, inadequacies and deficiencies. The hurdles in the path of right understanding are many and varied. Some of the difficulties are psychological. *Ācārya* Samantabhadra has given an enlightened and able descriptions of the psychological and sociological impediments in the acquisition of rightness of outlook and right understanding.

II. *Ācārya* Samantabhadra says that right understanding and right faith would be vitiated by the two psychological and sociological processes :⁴

1. Eight types of vanity (Arrogance) and 2. three types of folly. We may also class them as forms rooted in ignorance. The first distinction refers to the 8 forms of *Mada* (vanity) and the second has reference to the 3 types of *mūḍhatā*.

The 8 types of vanity are primarily psychological. They vitiate the working of the mind and create perversity of outlook which becomes an obstacle in the development of right understanding. We lose the balance of understanding and are strayed away from the right path of grasping the truth. We live in the world of self-created illusions about ability and achievements. We are lost in the jungle of subjective phantasies. The 8 types of vanity are :

- (i) *Jñāna mada* : In this we live in the world of our own creation that we are the wisest men on the earth. It is the Vanity of knowledge. Vanity (arrogance) of knowledge is born out of the immaturity of mind. We gloat over our own intellectual achievements and suffer from the illusion of vanity of knowledge.
- (ii) *Pājanīyatā mada* : In this we become blind to our shortcomings and failures because some people respect us. Respect and admiration for whatever little we have achieved, sometimes takes us off the rails of the right perspective of our personality. We gloat in our glory and we move with half open eyes in the illusion of superiority. This is the *Vanity of superiority*.

- (iii) *Kula mada* refers to the arrogance of the status of the family and birth. A person born in a high family and endowed richly with the emenities of life is likely to lose the balance of his mind in the matter of estimating his personality in the right perspective. He thinks no end of himself and he develops an attitude of conceit for his way of life and disdain for the lower rung of society, He looks at the lowliest and the lost with sneering disdain. He is far away from the path of rightness of understanding and righteousness
- (iv) *Jātimada* is the arrogance of birth in a particular 'higher' society and community. This also makes him lose the balance of the perspective of life and society. It leads him towards the disdain of the lowly in society and exploit them to his advantage.
- (v) *Bala mada* In this, one develops the sense of superiority for strength and valour. He may become a tyrant and maniac. Adolf Hitler is an example of a person who suffered from the illusion of racial snperiority and of the need for the extermination of the Jewish people. He was so full of arrogance of power and authority, that when, once, it is reported, Lord Chamberlain asked him how he was so confident of winning the war for which he was so greatly clamouring, Adolf Hiter called a few of his guards of the suicide squad and ordered them to jump from the 4th floor and die. The Guards did jump and die. They had to sacrific their lives for the sake of glorifying the power of Adolf Hitler. This is the arrogance of strength and power.
- vi) *Ṛddhimada* : This is the vanity of the possession of some extra-ordinary power. The possession of miracles and supernormal powers through the *tapas* and yogic practices may bring some powers. But one, pursuing the path of spiritual perfection, should desist from using them. Otherwise, one is likely to lose the balance of mind and become arrogant towards the fellow mortals. There are numerous

instances. *Rṣis* who have fallen from the height of spirituality because of their arrogance of the attainment of certain power.

- (vi) *Buddhimada* refers to the arrogance of wisdom. Wisdom sometimes brings fall from the height of integrated personality, because one becomes vain, loses sight of the right goal. Knowledge, wisdom and humility should go together.
- (vii) *Tapo mada* refers to the vanity of ascetic practices. One feels superior because he, unlike the 'lowly fellow mortals', practises penance. That gives arrogance of *tapas*, and he strays away from the true path of perfection.
- (viii) *Śarīra mada* is the arrogance of having a beautiful body. We forget that the form and the physical beauty are temporary. They fade. We forget that we get old and that in old age and in accidents, deficiencies and deformities are formed. To forget this and to love and admire one's beautiful body creates an illusion of superiority and a disdain for the less fortunate fellow mortals.

The 8 types of vanity vitiate the mind, make us forget the real nature of the pursuit of truth. We do not get back the perspective of life and personality and we 'lose the soul'.

2. We now turn our attention towards understanding the 3 types of folly (*Mūḍhatā*). They are :⁵

- (i) *Loka-mūḍhatā* : It refers to the superstitious practices in social and religious matters. These practices are based on blind irrational foundations coming from generations. These refer to the customs and mores which are not directly relevant to the purpose of achieving the personal, social and spiritual excellence. For example, we take the holy dips in the river and in sea for the sake of washing off our sins. If taking bath in the holy rivers were to wash away our sins, the Buddha asked, then the fish and crocodiles living permanently in the river would have washed all their

sins and would have been assured of a seat in heaven. Similarly, practices like jumping from the top of the mountain for the same reason would be blind practice. Men worship all sorts of deities made of sand and stone. Going 'sati' after the death of the husband is also irrational. All these practices are rooted in ignorance and blind superstitious beliefs regarding the good of man. They constitute the ignorance of the populace –*Lokamūḍhatā*.

- (ii) *Devamūḍhatā*⁶ refers to the worship of the fierce and benevolent deities from whom we expect protection, punishment or rewards. We worship the deities for the sake of propitiating them so that the fierce deities may not harm us and benevolent may reward us with prosperity. We forget the fact that the god is a spiritual force. He neither rewards nor punishes. If he or she were to indulge in such tasks of rewarding and punishment, they would be steeped in the baser impulses and emotions of the animal world. Such gods are no gods. We should free ourselves from such superstitious practices. They are rooted in the practices of the primitive man handed down to us for centuries on end. This is an anthropological problem for study.
- (iii) *Gurumūḍhatā*⁷ is the following a *guru* (teacher or preceptor) who does not possess the requisite excellence of a *guru*. A true teacher is one who has mental, moral and spiritual excellence. He must, have knowledge and wisdom. He is selfless and compassionate. He is a seeker after truth. But very often we run after persons who do not possess these qualities and who are not fit to be called *guru*. They indulge in all sorts of unseemly activities. To follow such *gurus* constitutes *Gurumūḍhatā*. This type of analysis of the folly has great social significance. In our age, we find we run after those mediocre men who profess

to have knowledge and power and who dote on authorities. In our academic institutions like colleges and the Universities, we rarely find real scholars who are devoted to their studies, pursuit of knowledge and teaching. They are more interested in their personal benefit and they run after administrative and political power. They indulge in unacademic and unseemly activities. They are the teacher politicians. Such men should be avoided and be kept away from the young impressive minds. However, it is not to be said that this type of intellectual and social climate is to be found in our time only. Socrates railed against the sophists and the academic and political brigands. He crusaded against hypocrisy. And he had to drink *hemelok*.

III. We are, here, reminded of similar attempts made by eminent philosophers in the middle ages and in the modern period in the West to clear the cobwebs of thought for the sake of establishing the truth. Socrates aimed at defining terms. Some theologians in the middle ages sought to give the guide lines for thought. But we should note that till the beginning of the era, philosophy was tied down to the apron strings of Aristotle's philosophy. One who deviated was condemned. There is a story of a serious attempt made by eminent philosophers to find out the number of teeth a horse has. They referred to the Classical texts and the books of Aristotle. But when a young scientist, imbued with the modern spirit of investigation, humbly suggested that a horse be brought to the Conference hall to count the teeth instead of pouring the ancient classical texts, the elderly scholars looked at him with surprise and derision, because "Aristotle never did that".

It was against this type of stagnation of knowledge and academic slavery that Francis Bacon protested. He said that if we have to pursue truth, we have per force to be free from the follies arising out of the fallacies in thought and due to the purely deductive approach towards the seeking of truth.

Truth needs to be sought in the world outside and not merely in the deduction of conclusions from the premises in the Aristotalian syllogisms. Francis Bacon started the movement of induction in the scientific investigation as a methodology of investigation.

Francis Bacon wanted to remove the cobwebs of thought in order to get the correct picture of reality. Bacon put more life into logic making induction an epic adventure and a conquest. Philosophy needed a new method. In order to seek the truth in the real sense of the term, Bacon urged us to free ourselves from the traditional stagnations and the fallacies of thought "Expurgation of thought is the step." We must become as little children, innocent of 'isms' and abstractions, washed clear of prejudices and preconceptions. We must destroy the *Idols of the mind*. Idol is a picture taken for a reality, a thought mistaken for a thing. Bacon mentions 4 *Idols of the mind* we should scrupulously avoid in seeking truth.

The 4 Idols of the mind are : i. Idols of the tribe, (ii) Idols of the Cave, (iii) Idols of the market place and (iv) Idols of the Theatre.

(i) The idols of the tribe constitute the fallacies natural to humanity in general. "For man's sense is falsely asserted to be standard of things—Our thoughts are pictures rather of ourselves than of their objects. For instance human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order in the Universe than it really finds. Hence, the fiction that the celestial bodies move in perfect circle."⁸ "All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of Astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgement or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much more common."⁹

(ii) The *Idols of the cave* are errors peculiar to the individual man. "For every one...has a cave or den of his

own, which refracts or discolours the light of nature.”¹⁰
 The judgements are vitiated by individual moods and the personal factor in the constitution of the mind. Some minds are synthetic, and some analytic. Some show unbounded enthusiasm for antiquity, some others eagerly embrace novelty. Only a few can have a just perspective. Truth has no parties.¹¹

- (iii) The *Idols of the Market Place* arise from the commerce and association of men with one another. They use language as the medium, but they forget that words are sometimes misleading, as they are imposed according to the understanding of the crowd. We in the present day have used the word ‘socialism’ without understanding the connotation of the word. Philosophers have used the phrases like “The Infinite”, or “The first mover unmoved”. But these are Fig-leaf phrases used to cover naked ignorance and perhaps indicative of a guilty conscience in the user.¹²
- (iv) The *Idols of the Theatre* have migrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas of philosophers and also from the wrong laws demonstration. All the systems of philosophy are so many stage plays representing worlds of their creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. And in the plays of this philosophic theatre you may observe the same thing which is found in the theatre of poets,—that stories invented for the stage are more compact and elegant, and more as we would wish them to be, than true stories out of history. The world as Plato described it is merely a world constructed by Plato, and pictures of Plato rather than the world.¹³
- (iv) We shall never get far along the path of truth if these idols are still tied to us. We should free ourselves from the subjective elements in the pursuit of truth. Truth is not any man’s monopoly. It is universal and objective. The philosophers and the seers from times immemorial have striven to reach the highest through the means of reason and intuition. Reason leads us to the understanding

of empirical reality, while it is the highest experience which leads us to the Truth. Francis Bacon had the limited objective of providing the methodology of scientific investigation. Ācārya Samantabhadra has taken the perspective of spiritual reality and has shown the pitfalls in the path to self-realisation. It is the seers, the Ṛṣis, who constitute the leaders of thought, and like kindly light, they lead us on. Such enlightened ones or the 'sages' are the first hand exponents of philosophy.¹⁴

References

- 1 (a) *Tattvārtha-sūtra* : 1, i. (b) *Dravyasamgraha* 36
(b) *Pañcāstikāyasāra* : 106.
- 2 *Ratnakaraṇḍakaśrāvākācāra* : 11-18.
- 3 *The Holy Bible : Mathew* : 5 : 6.
- 4 *Ratnakaraṇḍakaśrāvākācāra* : 25, 26.
- 5 *Ibid.* 22
- 6 *Ibid.* 23
- 7 *Ibid.* 24
- 8 Francis Bacon ; *Novum Organum* : I, 45
- 9 *Ibid* I, 43
- 10 *Ibid* I, 56
- 11 *Ibid* I, 55
- 12 *Ibid* I, 43
- 13 Will Durant : *The Story of Philosophy*
(The pocket library : 1960) p. 134
- 14 Aldous Huxley : *Perennial Philosophy* (1959) pp. 10, 11.

*

THE CHINESE BUDDHIST WHEEL OF EXISTENCE AND DELIVERANCE

JAN Yun-hua

The Buddhist Wheel or the Dependent Origination (*prattiyasamutpāda*) has been regarded by scholars as one of the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism. From a soteriological angle, it illustrates the formation of deeds (*karma*), its consequence and its way to freedom from the circle of Life-death (*samsāra*). From a philosophical view-point, the doctrine explains the process of becoming, hence explains the middle path of Buddhism, distinguishes itself from eternalistic as well as the nihilistic positions. And, as a symbol, it is one of the most rich and significant examples in the history of religions. Though the Wheel has been variously understood and sometimes been different even in number, yet many scholars believe that it "have been in Buddhism since earliest times".¹

The Chinese Buddhists have followed the Indian tradition in most cases, but they also modified certain items to serve their own religious needs. In this respect, one finds a modified wheel formulated by Tsung-mi (780-841), a distinguished Buddhist thinker.² An enquiry into his formula will not only be important for an understanding of his philosophy, but also be significant to define Chinese Buddhism, a term that is frequently used in scholarly research, but has yet to be defined systematically.

Although Tsung-mi, like many of his religious forerunners in India, did not adopt the term wheel, nevertheless, what he wrote is undoubtedly concerned with the wheel of existence and deliverance. He himself entitled his formula the "tenfold delusion and tenfold awakening". A rough translation of this formula has been published by A. Verdu.³ A new translation

based on Kamata Shigeo's edition has been done by J. L. Broughton; another based on the Gozamban, the oldest existing printed edition of the work, has been completed by this author.⁴

The Three Motions of The Wheel : First – Forward

The tenfold delusion is the first and the forward motion of the Wheel. Its contents has been listed by Tsung-mi as follows : (1) Original Enlightenment,⁵ (2) Nonenlightenment, (3) Arising of thought,⁶ (4) Arising of characteristics,⁷ (5) False notions of phenomena, (6) Obstinate view on dharma,⁸ (7) Obstinate view on Self,⁹ (8) The three poisons : attachment, hatred and delusion,¹⁰ (9) Formation of deed,¹¹ and (10) Receiving retribution.¹²

In the notes to the tenfold delusion, is the process of man's entanglement in bondage, hence the suffering thereby has been explained with an analogy of dream : The Original Enlightenment resembles a rich nobleman who lives in his own house, an analogy of the Buddha-nature which is innately and fully within every sentient being. The nonenlightenment like the rich man falls into a sleep. The arising of thought resembles a dream. What one experiences in a dream is analogical to the arising of characteristics. As the experiences in the dream are vivid and seem very real, the rich man thinks that he himself is really living in poverty. He consequently suffers from his attachment, hatred and delusion; and has to act under these influences; and the action leads to its consequence. Therefore the rich nobleman remains in a nightmare of poverty and suffering in spite of his wealth and comfortable position.

Second Motion : The rollback

If the tenfold delusion is responsible for man's sufferings in bondage, then the tenfold awakening provides the solution. The tenfold awakening explains why and how man can be freed from the suffering by the attainment of Buddhahood. The process of the tenfold delusion demonstrates how man has been misled by ignorance, departs, step by step from the subtle to the obvious, and finally remains in the world and

consequently suffers from it. The tenfold awakening reverses the order as it began from the obvious, the empirical experiences, step by step negates the unwholesome, further removes subtle obstacles and finally sees the falsity, thus returning to the real.

The tenfold awakenings are as follows; (1) The early editions of the text lists the meeting of a religious teacher as the first item. Later editions have, however, placed the original Enlightenment as the head which is more logical but questionable in authenticity.¹³ (2) Aspiration of Compassion and Wisdom, and vowed to attend buddhahood. (3) Perfection of practices and faith. (4) The arising of the great Thought of Enlightenment.¹⁴ (5) Negation of greediness. (6) Negation of Self and *dharma* by means of Concentration and Wisdom. (7) Unhindered by matters. (8) Illumination of mind. (9) Skilful in means and the attainment of initial enlightenment. (10) The Final and Complete enlightenment.

We have seen how our author has moved the Wheel forward into bondage; and how he rolled the Wheel backward towards enlightenment. The forward and backward motion of the Wheel creates a conflict. Evil and illusion are negated through this conflict. This process of conflict and negation are nothing else but what religious life is supposed to be. The conflict between the two motions presents a third motion of the Wheel, namely, the tenfold cultivation.

The Third Motion : Spiritual Life

After the two sets of tenfold motions, Tsung-mi states that both the enlightenment have their respective tenfolds. The accord and the conflict of the two sets are obvious. When these two are put together, the first item in the set of the enlightenment, i.e., the meeting of a religious teacher, counterbalances and overcomes the first two items of the first tenfold. The remaining eight of the first tenfold will be negated counter-clockwise by the eight items of this tenfold : (i) The realization of original Enlightenment negates the non-

enlightenment. (ii) The fear of suffering inspires the Three Thoughts, i.e., Compassion, Wisdom and Resolve; and consequently frees oneself from the Six Ways of existence. (iii) The Five perfections negate the formation of deed.¹⁵(iv) The arising of the three thoughts negate the three poisons. Except for the Gozamban edition, the remaining versions of the text read as follows: "These are the aforementioned thoughts of Compassion, Wisdom and Resolve which are now arising. The *śāstra* (i. e., *The Awakening of Faith*) states "in developing the aspiration for enlightenment through the perfection of faith...three kinds [of mind are to be cultivated]: The first is the mind characterized by straightforwardness, for it correctly meditates on the principle of Suchness. The second is the mind of profoundness, for there is no limit to its joyful accumulation of all kinds of goodness. The third is the mind filled with great compassion, for it wishes to uproot the sufferings of all sentient beings."¹⁶The Gozamban edition reads: "The wish of ferrying the sentient beings to the other shore as aspired by the Mind of Compassion negates hatred; the wish for a thorough understanding of all dharmas as aspired by the Mind of Wisdom negates delusion; and the wish for cultivating of myriad practices as aspired by the Mind of Resolve negates attachment."¹⁷ The Korean edition which Kamata has translated into Japanese stands in the middle: it is identical with Gozamban in the text and identical with other editions in the charter.¹⁸(v) The realization of the emptiness of the Self negates the obstinate attachment of the Self. (vi) The realization of the emptiness of dharma negates the obstinate grasping of dharma. (vii) Unhindered by matters negates the attachment to phenomena. (viii) Illuminations of mind negates wordly characteristics. (ix) Freedom of mind from thoughts negates arising of thought. (x) The attainment of Buddha-hood.

Of the aforementioned three motions of the Chinese Buddhist Wheel only the first and third are usually discussed by scholars because, to a certain extent, the second and the

third motion are very similar; and because they are dramatically presented in the charter of Tsung-mi's book. However, when one looks into the text itself, all the three motions are there. From a soteriological viewpoint, the three divisions seem more explicit than the two.

Comparing the ten spokes of the Chinese Wheel with the well-known twelve links of the Indian Wheel, the differences between the two are not merely in numbers, but also in content and in characteristics. The most important item is, of course, the Original Enlightenment which is placed very prominently at the highest point of Tsung-mi's system.

The earlier usage of the term 'Original Enlightenment' occurs in *The Awakening of Faith*,¹⁹ where the term has been defined as "The essence of Mind is free from thoughts." It is "none other than the undifferentiated Dharmakāya," and it is "called the original enlightenment" because the Mind is grounded on the Dharmakāya. Thereafter, the term became one of the most important concepts in Hus-yen (*Avatamsaka*) Buddhism. Tsung-mi himself explained the term in this words: "The Original Enlightenment" meant "all sentient beings originally and fully possess pure wisdom, [Buddha] Nature and innumerable excellent qualities."²⁰ The Ming edition which Ui has translated into Japanese reads as follows: "This means all the sentient beings possess the True Mind of Original Enlightenment".²¹ In other words, the term is a synonym of other Buddhist terms on Absolute.

Whenever the term Absolute comes, it is always a troublesome problem. Disciples from the Theravāda school, along with some other scholars are afraid of using absolute terms for understanding Buddhism as it would conflict with the Middle position. However, there is no doubt that a positive attitude towards the religious goal, *bodhi* or *nirvāṇa*, has persistently been maintained by all Buddhist schools throughout their histories. Otherwise there would be no need for religious knowledge and cultivation. The problem is how to define the

word absolute, not whether it is in Buddhism. As far as religion is concerned, the term of absolute should be understood in terms of religious experience, but cannot be in the term of physics. That is why the Mind became very central in the discussion. The Buddhists, I think, were trying to solve their problems, but not for the sake of analysing the external world. Even when the world is discussed, it is always in the context of subjective understanding rather than scientific and objective endeavour. It is primarily experiential rather than naturalistic experimental. It is precisely because of this subjective and experiential nature that expression and communication are difficult. As long as the absolute is not understood in the terms of god or being, the problem will be less perplexing.

With this in mind, the item of Original Enlightenment of the Chinese Wheel may be understood in the light of its Indian forerunners. It is a result of Mahāyāna philosophy as well as religious experience gained by Ch'an Buddhism. Nevertheless, there is no mistake that Original Enlightenment is a new development.

The rest of the spokes of the Chinese Wheel are in agreement with the spirit of the Indian Wheel, namely that the becoming and the release are both causal, yet the Chinese system is more concrete. Taking the second spoke from the first motion of the Wheel as an example, our author adopts 'nonenlightenment' as the subtitle²³ which is very close to the item of Ignorance (*avidyā*) in the Indian Wheel. In the explanation of the term, Tsung-mi says "Because of not having met a well-learned friend (*kalyāṇamitra*) who is able to show them the law, they naturally remain unenlightened."²⁶ From this explanation, it is clear that the term is a descriptive, practical and concrete situation that most people might experience every day.

It is true that in the *Nikāya* of Pali literature, *avijjā* has been defined as 'not knowing the four Truths', which lead A. B. Keith to believe and to state that "it is certain, a purely limited sense and no cosmic significance...."²⁴ However, when

one reads the statement such as "Avidyā hides the real from us and in its place puts forth the unreal appearance" as stated in *Bodhi Caryā Avatāra*,²⁵ as it is understood by our author, it is sufficient to demonstrate the concreteness of Chinese expressions. There is no doubt that as far as Mahāyana Buddhism in India is concerned, the concept of *avidyā* becomes more and more metaphysical and abstract.

Similarly, out of the twelve links in the Indian Wheel, there are a few other terms such as *saṅkhārā*, *viññāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *vedanā*, *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava* which are more psychological and abstract, but are not found in the Chinese Wheel. In the case of the latter, a more concrete term, such as 'obstinate view of Self' (*ātmagrāha* or *wo-chih*) is adopted. Furthermore, it is traditionally known that out of the twelve links in Indian Buddhism, "two factors are assumptions relating to the past existence of a being" and "two more links... to explain...the root of all our future existence."²⁶ When this is compared with the Chinese Wheel it will be seen that except for the first and the last, the remaining eight are all concentrated on the present life. In the case of the first item, the Original Enlightenment, which is both immutable and mutable though not simultaneously, it is ever present no matter whether we are aware of it or not. Henceforth, it includes the present. On this matter Tsung-mi has been influenced by Ch'an Buddhism. We may recall an early statement by Tsung-mi : "that though all the sentient beings innately possess the Buddha-nature, yet the Nature cannot be seen as it is veiled by the beginningless ignorance... As Buddhas have eliminated false thought, they could see the Nature fully and clearly."²⁷ One may also recall the *Analects* 11:11 where Confucius refuses to discuss death. Nakamura has noted a similar expression in Ch'an master Hui-hai, and regards it as 'strikingly Chinese' though he misunderstands the tendency as 'utilitarian'.²⁸

Though not referred to in the Ming edition of the work, both the Korean and Gozamban editions of the work have

classified the stages of spiritual life into two categories; the Sudden enlightenment and the Gradual cultivations. Such a division is not found in Indian Buddhism, but was the central focus in the Ch'an controversy in medieaval China. Furthermore, under the heading of the Gradual cultivations, Tsung-mi has divided the contents into three stages : the Position of Faith, the Position of Virtue, and the Position of Sage.

The Position of Faith (*hsin wei*) comprises the third spoke of the third motion, the five perfections of practice. The element of Faith was, of course, in Indian Buddhism. It is one of the two classes between the Family of the Elect (*gotrabhū*) and the Stream-winner (*sotāpanna*) known as *Saddhānusāri*²⁹ in the Theravadin tradition. Faith had a prominent place in Mahāyāna tradition, nevertheless, it had never been regarded as a stage in Bodhisattva systems. Tsung-mi's classification is obviously influenced by *The Awakening of Faith* which has been referred to by him constantly.³⁰

The Position of Virtue (*hsien-wei*) comprises the fourth and the fifth spokes of the third motion of the Wheel, namely, the aspiration of Bodhi-mind and the six *pāramitas*. The word 'Virtue' is a rendering of the Chinese word *hsien*, usually understood as an equivalent of the Sanskrit word *bhadra*.³¹ However, when one reviews the usage of *bhadra* in Indian Buddhism, one would find that the term has been used mostly as names of persons, etc., never as a stage of Bodhisattvas progress.³²

The third position in the classification of Tsung-mi is the Position of Sage (*sheng-wei*). It comprises the 6th to the ninth spokes as mentioned in the third motion of the wheel. The word *sheng* or Sage is the Chinese equivalent of Sanskrit word *ārya*, which is usually rendered as the 'Noble Ones'.³³ Though the Pali literature has a different classification of *āryas*, its usage in Sanskrit literature is rather dubious.

If these terms had never been used in India for classifying spiritual progress both in Theravādin and Mahāyāna

traditions, where did our author pick them up? And for what purpose? Except for the term of Faith, *sheng-jen* and *hsien-che* are well known phrases in the *Chinese Classics*.³⁴ Because Confucianists respected the sagehood as the highest attainable position of man; and since our author was very familiar with Confucian texts, he seems to have borrowed it from that source. This borrowing not only provided him with well-known terms, but it also implied that Buddhism was higher than Confucian sagehood as the position is below the highest attainment in Buddhism, the Enlightenment or Buddhahood.

For sometime, interest in how Buddhist doctrines were accepted by various cultures has been shown by scholars. In the case of the Wheel, the Tibetan illustration is an interesting example. Both Thomas and Wayman have pointed out that a blind man, a monkey, an empty town, a kiss or man and woman embracing, etc., were the depiction of the Wheel of *samsāra*.³⁵ When the Tibetan illustration is compared with the dream of the rich and nobleman, an analogy of the Wheel is given by our author. The approach of the latter is absolutely confined to human activities. This does not mean that the Chinese do not use animal or other things to illustrate their religious life. One can easily pick up the novel *Hsi-yu-chi* or the *Monkey* as translated by A. Waley as an example, where the monkey has been prominently described as a depiction of an untrained mind. Nonetheless, we have to remember that Tsung-mi was very learned in Confucian classics. Though he renounced the Confucian tradition, the learning had deep imprints on him which probably made him more humanistic oriented.

When the Chinese Wheel and its three motions are reviewed, and its differences compared with the Indian Buddhist Wheel, one may ask that old question, did the Chinese really know Indian Buddhism? This old question has been a popular theme with many Indologists in the past. It is a reasonable as well as presumptuous question, depending on the context. As far as our author is concerned, he knew the Indian Wheel

very well. In the same book where he discussed his formula, he has twice referred to the Dependent Origination : one finds in his summary of Mādhyamika philosophy “ no twelve links of Dependent Origination.. no wisdom to attain, no deed nor retribution.”³⁶ In another place in the same book, when discussing the intention of Buddha's teachings, he states that the Buddha has “discussed the twelve links of Dependent Origination (*dvādaśāṅga pratīyosamutpāda*) for those who seek the Pratyekabuddhahood”.³⁷

Before the compilation of this book, Tsun-mi had a more detailed description of his understanding of the Dependent Origination, which shows that he did not only know the link itself, but also the assessment of the link made by Indian Mahāyāna schools. The description is contained in his *Great Commentary on the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment*.³⁸

First, let us glance over his description of the twelve links : (1) *avidyā* or ignorance, for which Tsung-mi followed the traditional translation, used the term *wu-ming* or unenlightened. (2) *saṃskāra* or motivation which traditional Chinese translation is *hsing* or action. The translation is closer to Nyanatiloka's rendering ‘ karma-formation ’³⁹ as Tsung-mi explains that ‘this is the good or evil karma that is brought into being by bodily, verbal and mental actions’.⁴⁰ (3) *viññāna* or consciousness. (4) *nāma-rūpa* or name and form, which Tsung-mi noted that “name means the grasp of a body; form refers to the state when one becomes a material being. They are the five defiled aggregations”.⁴¹ (5) *ṣaḍāyatana* or six bases. (6) *sparśa* or contact. (7) *vedanā* or feeling (8) *trṣṇā* or craving. (9) *upādāna* or grasping. (10) *bhava* or existence. (11) *jāti* or birth. (12) *jarāmaraṇa* or old age and death.

Apart from the list of the twelve links, Tsung-mi has commented on the links as a whole. His comments indicated that he understood the religious purpose and the philosophical significance of the Dependent Origination very well. He states :

From the beginningless past, the root [of existence] is craving (*trṣṇā*). Craving produces desires, desires produce the

birth. When this is enforced by the infections of the passions, one falls into the endless circle of life-death (*samsāra*).⁴²

While remaining in worldly life, one faces happy or unhappy encounters which lead to good or evil karmic deeds. They consequently will produce corresponding retributions. The conclusion can be nothing else. One must remain in *samsāra* and is therefore unable to accomplish the holy path (*āryamārga*).

In other words, our author understands the theory of causal production (*yin-yuan-sheng*) very accurately. This understanding is absolutely congruent with the accepted interpretation of Theravādin Buddhism. It is well-known that the concept of Dependent Origination or Dependent Arising is often discussed in the context of the second truth, "*samudaya*: The Arising of Suffering".⁴³ It is interesting to note that Tsung-mi's view on the subject corresponds to the 'forward order' of the Dependent Origination as reconstructed from the scriptural statement, 'when this exists, that comes to be' by Buddhaghosa. However, he did not touch the 'reverse order' of Buddhaghosa which is concerned with the cessation of suffering.⁴⁴

Tsung-mi further explains that—

The general title [of the twelve links] is called the Arising from conditional causation (*yuan-ch'i*) or the Production by conditional causation (*yuan-sheng*). It means that the doer and the receiver [of retribution] are the same but without a Lord. One is born from causation, and depending on various conditions, arises. Thereupon, existence comes from nothingness, and perishes from existence. One is capable of influencing what is influenceable, falls into the dharmas of continuity (*hsiang-hsu-fa*), henceforth, it is called a production of causation.⁴⁵

With the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, the moral emphasis of the Dependent Origination shifted to logical interest. All Mahāyāna schools offered new interpreta-

tions of this important idea for their own purposes. Tsung-mi understood the situation and he summarized it as follows :

However, as Aggregations (*skandha*), Bases (*āyatana*) and sphere (*dhātu*) are dependent on other factors for their existence, and, therefore their substance is [considered by the School of Dharma characteristics as] discrete Moments [of consciousness]. They are nothing but false thoughts [as considered by the School of Emptiness of Characteristics]. And it is also considered as the True Mind itself [by the School of Dharma Nature].⁴⁶

His understanding of the concept and its evolution seemed quite accurate with scriptural information as well as with recent research. As far as Yogācāra or Dharma-characteristic school is concerned, they considered "One moment of consciousness emerges because of the preceding one". Hence "the moments of consciousness, as governed by this law, are real".⁴⁷ Tsung-mi's school of Emptiness of Characteristics means the Mādhyamikas. Their concept of the Dependent Origination, as pointed out by Murti as "the dependence of things on each other, they having no nature or reality of their own (*nissvabhāvatva*)".⁴⁸ This is what Tsung-mi called 'false thought.'

The Dharmatā school mentioned by our author refers to "the exoteric teaching revealing that the True Mind itself is the Buddha Nature", which has been identified by him with the doctrine of Suchness (*tathatā*) as interpreted in the *Awakening of Faith*.

The aforementioned summary of his understanding on the evolution of Dependent Origination is very significant to our discussion. It means that he knew the Indian tradition quite well and his new formula was intentional. If this was the case, why did he abandon the Indian Wheel? it is clear that at the time of our author, the Indian Wheel had already become controversial among Indian Buddhist schools, and no longer had a universally acceptable interpretation. Moreover, his belief in the True or Absolute Mind which had almost an

ontological status, had no place in any Indian interpretation. Because of this need and because of the complication which existed in the interpretation of Indian tradition, he structured a new formula which continued the Indian concern of causation on the one hand, and the Chinese outlook on the other. It is from this viewpoint that his Wheel is worthy of consideration as one of the typical examples of Chinese Buddhism.

Notes

- 1 Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination", *History of Religions* 10/3 (1971), 185-203.
- 2 Cf. author's paper, "Tsung-mi, his analysis of Ch'an Buddhism", *T'oung Pao*, LVIII (1972), 1-54.
- 3 Verdu, *Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought, Studies in Sino-Japanese Mahāyāna Idealism* (Kansas City, 1974).
- 4 See author's paper, "Ch'an-yuan chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsu" tsui-hsu-tsau yin-pen te fa-hsien ho cheng-shih" (The discovery and identification of the earliest printed edition of *Ch'an-yuan chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsu*"), *The Eastern Miscellany*, n.s. VIII/2 (1974) 38-40.
- 5 Verdu has wrongly rendered as 'Original Knowledge', *op. cit.* p. 83.
- 6 This has been wrongly translated as 'rise of mindfulness'. Verdu, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
- 7 In the other version, this item is called *chien-eh'i* or the emergence of views (*dṛṣṭi*).
- 8 Modern version has altered the term *fa-chih* (dharma seizing) into *chih-fa* (seizing dharma).
- 9 The other version has again reversed the order of *wo-chih* into *chih-wo*
- 10 The other version called the item *fan-nao* or *kleśa*.
- 11 The word *tsao* (to make) has been mistranslated as 'performing' by Verdu, *op. cit.*, p. 87. How can deed (*karma*) be performed?
- 12 Verdu translates the term *shou-pao* as "karma remuneration or *karma fruit*" *op. cit.*, p. 87, which seems questionable. Remuneration usually concerns "reward, pay for service rendered"; the present case stands exactly in the opposite. Retribution is a better word as it is rarely used for good done. In the usage of the latter, one has, of course, to remember that in Buddhism, retribution is an automatic reaction produced by the deed and without an administrator.

- 13 See Gozamban edition *Ch'an-yuan chu-ch'uan-chi tu-hsu'* printed in 1358 and preserved in the British Museum, p. 196, lines 3-4.
- 14 Verdu has wrongly translated this as the "development of knowledge and perfection". *op. cit.*, pp. 93 f. Tsung-mi has clearly indicated that he quoted the term from *The Awakening of Faith* (New York, 1967) which Hakeda renders as "Types of Aspiration for Enlightenment, pp. 80-91. The subject comprises Faith, Deeds and Insight; and these should be distinguished from the technical terms such as *pāramitās*.
- 15 Verdu incorporates the teaching of Hui-neng for an explanation of this item, the fact is that *The Awakening of Faith*, cf. Hakeda. *op. cit.*, pp. 93-100. Instead of the six, the five perfections of practice is a peculiar term of the *Faith* which never occurred in Hui-neng's teaching. Similarly, the term *chih-kuan* or 'Cessation and Insight' is a well-known term in the text of *Faith* and in T'ien-t'ai Buddhism; whereas in Hui-neng, the term '*samādhi* and *prajñā*' as referred to by Verdu is *ting-hui* which Yampolsky has translated as 'meditation and wisdom' (*The Platform Sutra* (New York, 1967), pp. 135, etc.). The term *chin-kuan* mentioned here is not found in the *Platform Sutra*.
- 16 Hakeda, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
- 17 Gozamban edition, *op. cit.*, p. 23b.
- 18 Kamata, *Zen no goroku 9: Zengenshosenshutojo* (Tokyo, 1971), p. 223; 235.
- 19 Hakeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff.
- 20 Gozamban edition, p. 24a.
- 21 T. 2015, p. 410a, Ui, *Zengenshosenshutojo* (Iwanami Bunko, Tokyo, 1939) p. 279.
- 22 Verdu has wrongly translated it as non-knowledge.
- 23 See Gozamban, p. 18a.
- 24 *Buddhist Philosophy India and Ceylon* (Varanasi, 1963), p. 99. The quotation is from the *Samyutta Nikāya*, XII, 4.
- 25 p. 352, quoted from T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhist* (London, 1960). p. 238. Cf. A. K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism* (Varanasi, 1962), p. 186 f., for similar statement on the "beginningless ignorance", Kamata ed., *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- 26 N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* (Calcutta, 290) pp. 220, 221.
- 27 Kamata ed., pp. 86-87.
- 28 H. Nakamura, *The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples* (Honolulu, 1966), pp. 240-241.
- 29 N. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, pp. 254 ff.
- 30 See Gozamban edition, p. 24b and Kamata ed., p. 235.

- 31 W. E. Soothill, *et. al.*, ed. *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (Taiwan reprint), p. 444.
- 32 F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* (Indian ed. 1970) p. 406 a.
- 33 Soothill, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 410a (Colombo 1972.) p. 20.
- 34 See Yeh Shao-chun, *shih-san-ching so-yin* (Shanghai, 1957 reprint, pp. 1429-30, 1566-67.
- 35 E. J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London, 1963), p. 70; A. Wayman, *op. cit.*, *History of Religions*, X/3 (1971), p. 186.
- 36 Kamata, ed. 121.
- 37 *Ibid*, 201.
- 38 *Yuan chueh-ching Sa-shu*, in *Hsu-tsang-ching* (Taiway reprint, 1968), vol. XIV, pp. 160bff. Hereafter, it is referred to as the Great Commentary.
- 39 *Buddhist Dictionary* (Columbo, 1972), p. 129.
- 40 *The Great Commentary op. cit.*, p. 160 b.
- 41 *Ibid*.
- 42 *Ibid*, p. 160b.
- 43 See Piyadassi, *The Buddha's Ancient Path* (London; 1964), pp. 56 ff.
- 44 Nyanamoli, trans. *The Path of Purification* (Colombo, 1964), XX, 98-101, pp. 736-737.
- 45 *The Great Commentary op. cit.*, p. 160 b.
- 46 *Ibid*.
- 47 A. K. Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
- 48 T. R. V. Murti, *The Central philosophy of Buddhism* (London, 1960), p. 122.

*

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE & JAPANESE

1. Names & Terms

Ch'an 禪	<u>sheng-wei</u> 聖位
<u>chih-fa</u> 執法	<u>shou-pao</u> 受報
<u>chih-kuan</u> 止觀	T'ien-t'ai 天台
<u>chih-wo</u> 我執	<u>ting-hui</u> 定慧
<u>fa-chih</u> 法執	<u>tsao</u> 造
Gozamban 五山板	Tsung-mi 宗密
<u>hsiang-hsü-fa</u> 相續法	Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽
<u>hsien-che</u> 賢者	<u>wo-chih</u> 我執
<u>hsien-wei</u> 賢位	<u>wu-ming</u> 無明
<u>hsin-wei</u> 信位	Yeh Shao-chun 葉紹鈞
<u>hsing</u> 行	<u>yin-yuan-sheng</u> 因緣生
Hui-neng 慧能	<u>yuan-ch'i</u> 緣起
Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄	<u>yuan-sheng</u> 緣生
<u>sheng-jen</u> 聖人	

2. Titles

<u>Ch'an-yuan chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsu</u>	禪源諸詮集都序
<u>Hsi-yu-chi</u>	西遊記
<u>Hsu-tsang-ching</u>	續藏經
<u>Shih-san-ching so-yin</u>	十三經索引
<u>Yuan-chueh-ching Ta-shu</u>	圓覺經大疏
<u>Zengenshosenshūtojo</u>	禪源諸詮集都序
<u>Zen no goroku</u>	禪の語録

SOME REMARKS ON THE ROLE OF THE LAY FOLLOWERS IN THE JAINA COMMUNITY

Elisabeth Strandberg

From the time it was established that Jainism is an independent teaching, and not a mere offshoot of Buddhism,¹ a certain amount of attention has been paid to the fact that these two heterodox movements came to experience very different fortunes on Indian soil. The idea has been put forward that it was because the Buddhist saṅgha cared little for lay people that Buddhism lost its foothold in India at the time of political adversity. The Jaina saṅgha, on the other hand, embraced within its social structure the two wings of lay male and female followers along with, and as preparatory stages for, the order of monks and nuns. This accounted for Jainism undergoing particularly few changes, and for the resistance which the lay community 'members-of-the-church' were able to put up against pressure that was coming from outside, thus saving their religion from becoming extinct. This is the reasoning commonly advanced²

The only existing detailed study of the Jaina lay discipline, by R. Williams,³ raises sharp criticism against the main idea. He states: 'Initially the lay estate was admitted by the Jina only in deference to human frailty'.⁴ and 'The changelessness of Jainism is no more than a myth'.⁵ Williams also touches upon the history of Jainism vis-a-vis Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism without mentioning at all the role which the Jaina lay followers might possibly have played in order to preserve their teaching. Nor do scholars like Schubring⁶ and Frauwallner⁷ mention the historical importance of the Jaina lay community in their otherwise broad studies of Jainism.

The weakness of the generally propounded argument seems to be that it is built on late, even modern, evidence. On the other hand, to go as far as Williams and to state that the canonical texts are silent on this matter⁸ is not quite tenable either. It is the aim of this article to draw attention to a few passages in the canonical text about the layman, the *Uvāsagadasāo*,⁹ which elucidate the standpoint of the canon in this matter.

Among the vows taken by the lay disciple is one called *disivaya*,¹⁰ 'the vow of the quarters', the promise to circumscribe one's area of action by limits. There is also restricted version of it, called *desāvagāsiyavaya*,¹¹ 'the keeping within a certain place', by which the lay disciple fixes for his abode a definite very small spot within the area previously circumscribed. These vows are in their effect conservative; the layman who impose them on himself thereby strengthens his ties with the local saṅgha. The saṅgha can rely on his contribution to its activities, but is also bound to feel more dependent on him since no influx of new layman is likely to come. In the event of hostile outward influences the layman cannot therefore take recourse to flight to save life and saṅgha. How then was self-preservation possible? The answer lies in the application of the escape clauses which follow the exposition of the laws of the householder : *nannatha rāyābhiogeṇaṃ gaṇābhiogeṇaṃ balābhiogeṇaṃ devayābhiogeṇaṃ guruniggahenaṃ vittigantāreṇaṃ*¹² 'except it be by the command of a king, a crowd,¹³ a powerful man, a deva, or by the order of an elder,¹⁴ or by the exigencies of living'. In such cases one may have to pay deference to a non-Jaina community—without losing one's status of a Jaina lay disciple. The commentary takes these escape clauses to be valid only in the last mentioned instance of paying deference to the non-Jaina community, namely supplying them with food, drink, etc. Nothing in the canonical text itself excludes the application of the escape clauses to all the instances of religious contact with non-Jaina men, devas or objects of reverence. In his explanation of *guruniggaha* 'the

order of an elder', the commentator presents a somewhat farfetched but interesting interpretation : *caityasādhūnām nigrahaḥ* = *caityasādhūnām pratyānikakṛtopadravaḥ* 'a frontal attack on temple and monks'. This shows, at least, that the canonical escape clauses were used. Thus, the mediaeval double notion of religious dharma, *laukika* 'worldly' and *pāralaukika* 'other-worldly',¹⁵ has clear justification in the canon. It must have been this type of flexibility of the rule which prevented the imposed creeds such as Hinduism and Islam from eradicating the teaching of the other-worldly religious dharma, Jainism. Of course, it is true that the escape clauses do not say anything about the lay people's role in the fourfold saṅgha; on the other hand, it should be clear that a canonical text would hardly deal with the precise circumstances under which the lay followers must pay deference to outer hostile pressure groups, unless the Jaina saṅgha as a whole relied on and was aware of the importance of the lay followers for the survival of the entire community. Moreover, the monks would hardly prescribe such rules unless they knew that the lay followers had good reason to remain loyal to the teaching, such as playing an active and responsible role within the Jaina saṅgha.

If that is so, one might expect that the Jaina saṅgha would stress the importance of formal entrance to the lay part of the community by conferring a special qualification on the lay follower who has taken upon himself the twelve vows. In fact, Hoernle in his translation renders the pious house-holder before entrance by 'disciple of the Samaṇa' and after entrance by 'the servant of the Samaṇa' (§ 1-58 versus § 59ff.) This has, however, no explicit justification in the Prakrit text, since the lay follower at both stages is termed *samaṇovāsaa*. It is difficult to see how far Hoernle's introduction of a new term for the later stage is implicitly justified. It is also noteworthy that the narrator of the *Uvāsagadasāo* does not take the opportunity of explaining the relationship between layman and monk, or of stating the difference between them. Thus in § 12 when the lay follower states that he is not in a position to

become a monk it would only be natural to expand on their respective positions within the fourfold saṅgha. Again, in reply to the question whether the lay followers will in the course of time enter the monastic state, Mahāvīra merely says that he will be reborn as a certain class of deva (§ 62), and in a much later continuation of this reply Mahāvīra adds that the lay follower will be reborn and attain perfection (§ 90) but does not say whether it will be via the stage of monkhood.

We may therefore conclude that this canonical text is silent on certain theoretical points in favour of the idea that the basic structure of the Jain saṅgha granted a relatively important position to the lay followers; in practice, however, this source offers evidence that the standpoint of the lay followers was already considered to be of determining importance for the preservation and survival of the entire spiritual community. That the tradition was kept and the lay followers acted upon it, is corroborated by later evidence, both inscrip-tional and literary.

Notes

- 1 H Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, Part I. Oxford 1884, New York 1968.
- 2 To quote only a few : J. Ch. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons*. Bombay 1947, p. 30; K. K. Handiqui, *Yaṣastilaka and Indian Culture*. Sholapur 1949, p. 246 etc; V. A. Sangave. *Jaina Community, A Social Survey*. Bombay 1959, p. 45 et al.; D. Bhargava, *Jaina Ethics*, Delhi 1968, p. 146; C. Della Casa, *Jainism*. In *Historia Religionum*, Vol. II. Leiden 1971, p. 352.
- 3 R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga, A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvaka-cāras*. London Oriental Series, Vol. 14. London 1963.
- 4 op. cit. p. xvi.
- 5 op. cit. p. xix.
- 6 W. Schubring, *Die Lehre der Jainas. Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, III. Band, 7. Heft Berlin und Leipzig 1935; W. Schubring, *Der Jainismus*. In *Die Religionen Indiens*, Vol. III. Stuttgart 1964.
- 7 E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I-II. Delhi 1973.

- 8 R. Williams, *op. cit.* p. xvi.
- 9 A. F. R. Hoernle, *The Uvāsāgadasāo*. Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. I. Text and Commentary. Calcutta 1890. Vol. II. Translation. Calcutta 1888.
- 10 Vol. I. p. 19, § 50. Commentary, p 13, § 50. Vol. II. p. 26, § 50 with footnote 65.
- 11 Vol. I, p. 21, § 54. Commentary, p. 18, § 54. Vol. II. p. 31-2, § 54 with footnote 85.
- 12 Vol. I. p. 23-4, § 58. Vol. II. p. 35-6, § 58.
- 13 For *gana* Hoernle has 'priesthood', Abhaydeva '*samudāya*'.
- 14 For Abhayadeva's special interpretation on this point, see below.
- 15 V. A. Sangave, *op. cit.* p. 406.

*

INDIAN AESTHETIC TERMINOLOGY : AN INTEGRAL ANALYSIS

K. Krishna Moorthy

In Sanskrit there are several synonyms of 'beauty'—'Saundarya', 'Cārutā', 'ramaṇīyatā', 'Saubhāgya', 'śobhā', 'lāvaṇya', 'kānti', 'vicchitti', and so forth. But the most frequently adopted keyterm of aesthetics is *alaṅkāra*. That is why *Alaṅkāra-śāstra* should be translated as the science of beauty. Its widest meaning is adequately stressed by Vāmana who aphoristically states—"Saundaryam alaṅkāraḥ". Since 'alaṅkāra' can also mean a 'means of beauty' it can denote poetic and artistic devices also.

The first accredited philosopher to note that beauty (*śobhā*) in poetry is *not* due to mechanical aspects like grammatical accuracy, but to the natural beauty of the thing described is Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. He states categorically in his *Tantravārttika* (Benares Edn., p. 205) that good poetry could be composed even in languages without any grammar; and in Sanskrit too, he feels that grammar, far from adding to its beauty (*śobhā*) has contributed to its worst defect namely, cacaphony (*kaṣṭa-śabda*).

Again, it is Śabara, the celebrated predecessor of Kumārila and author of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtrabhāṣya* that quotes an example from secular poetry and shows how its concern is exaggerated praise (*arthavāda*) through the medium of *lakṣaṇā* or indirect use of language. The verse cited is a lovely *svabhāvokti* of black swans singing and moving gaily amidst dark lilies, as if dansesuses dressed in black silk :

nilotpalavaneṣyadya carantaḥ cārusamśrvāḥ
nilakauśeyasamvītāḥ pranṛtyantīva kādambāḥ.

(Ibid. I. 1.24)

From all this it will be seen that Nature may have beauty of its own and it can be faithfully represented or artistically transformed in art, according to Indian thinkers. Now this is not at all different from the views of western thinkers from Plato down to C. E. M. Joad. The artist need not always create beauty. But he has to discover it with his gift of sensitive taste or imagination. Just as in Plato's theory of forms or Ideas, our knowledge of number is a *priori* to our function of counting three apples, five chairs, etc. so too our knowledge of beauty as a perfect value is the precondition for our regarding objects x, y and z in Nature as beautiful or otherwise. The Indians would agree with Joad when he says that an artist has aesthetic insight or vision by which he is enabled to discern the characteristic of beauty even in circumstances in which its presence escapes the ordinary man. He does not create beauty as such; he is the midwife who brings to birth the beauty that is latent in things by giving them a significant form by his skill (*kalā*). We might state our finding epigrammatically thus : *Alaṅkāra* is the body of all art whose *guṇa* or invariable property is beauty discernible to a man of taste. Beauty is a value discovered in Nature or refashioned by a gifted artist. It is a value like truth and goodness because it is an aspect of reality and well worth man's quest after it and without which his life should be less than perfect.

Faith in man's ability to attain perfection, emotional as well as intellectual, is a singular characteristic of the Indian mind down the ages. But it was only after a hard battle that, in India too, the artist could wrest an honoured place for himself. Like Plato in Greece, the orthodoxy in India also banned the arts like poetry, music and dance in their *smṛtis*, or law-books, because they thought these would excite sensuality by pandering to the passions, if they were not harnessed to serve the cause of religion. The ban "*Kāvya-lāpāṃśca varjayet*" is often alluded to by our men of letters like Mallinātha, and the only way they know of exonerating their favourite poets is by affirming that they are conformists upholding the

accepted ethical norms and not sensualists. This stand is by no means a vindication of the autonomy of art; it is a servile submission to the dictates of orthodoxy. It is once again in Kumārila that we are able to trace the origin of this compromising attitude. He observes that even Vālmīki and Vyāsa deserve to claim our attention only because of their loyalty to Vedic scriptures :

“*Vedaprasthānābhyāsenā hi Vālmīki-Dvaipāyana-
prabhṛtibhiḥ tathaiḥ svavākyaṇi praṇītāni*”.

(*Tantravārttika*, I.ii.7, Ben, Edn. p. 16)

This is all right so far as religious art or literature is concerned; but what about secular art? Has it no place in the Indian scheme of things? Is not beauty or aesthetic value an end in itself?

Europe had to await the dawn of Renaissance and Reformation before humanism could assert itself in all directions. But in India, even before the Christian era, Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* and Bharata in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* upheld the autonomy of the secular values of *arth* (political power) and *kāma* (sensual pleasure) even like the first framers of the *Kāmaśāstra* anterior to Vātsyāyana. In popular folk-literature represented by Hāla's *Gāthāsaptasati* and Guṇāḍhya's *Bṛhatkathā*, we have ample room for extra-marital love-affairs and adventurous careerists, a tradition which continued in the later *Daśakumāracarita* of Daṇḍin and the still later *Śuka-saptati*. In the field of lyric too, rank eroticism characterises Mayūra's *aṣṭaka* as well as Amaru's *Śataka*. In the genre of drama, we have bawdy *bhāṇas* and obscene *prahasanas* produced as late as the 18th century. Though all these may be regarded as exceptions to the general rule of conformity to ethical norms, the question remains whether they deserve to be rated as artistic, exclusively by their aesthetic value. Only two theorists have attempted their defence in all seriousness. One is Rājaśekhara whose facetious or specious argument is that even Vedic texts are tarred with same brush and hence poetry should not be singled out for attack. The second is

Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the mentor of Abhinavagupta, who categorically states that passion in life and aesthetic emotion are two different things; and the dross of the former can be wiped out by the latter's healing touch. His words are :

“Just as dust is used to clean up a dusty mirror, the mind of the connoisseur is purified of passion through passion itself.”

*Yathādarśānmalenaiva malamevopahanyate |
tathā rāgābodhena paśyatām śodhyate manaḥ ||*

(cited by Śrīdhara in his commentary on Kāvya prakāśa).

This purification theory of Tauta rings like an echo of Aristotle's theory of “Katharsis” in tragedy and explained by Milton in homeopathic terms :

“As fire drives out fire, so pity pity.”

Again it was Tauta who vindicated the autonomy of aesthetic relish by declaring that “a state of passion for a woman in life is not *śṛṅgāra* of literature” (*Kāmāvasthā na śṛṅgāraḥ*)—cited in *Abhinavabhāratī*. Vol. III, p. 199). This was a much needed corrective to the popular misconception that passionate love is the *leitmotif* of lyrics, a misconception shared even by writers like Rudrabhaṭṭa. He states the hierarchy of values as under :

*dharmādarthaḥ, arthataḥ kāmāḥ, kāmāt sukhaphalodayaḥ |
sādhyāneṣu tatsiddhyai śṛṅgāro nāyako rasaḥ ||*

(*Śṛṅgāratilaka*, I. 20).

This dual attitude to *Śṛṅgāra* by Indian writers, some holding that it is a stepping stone to hedonistic pleasure, and others declaring that it is symbolic of mystic love of the devotee for his God (as in the schools of Viṣṇu-bhakti) has its parallels in modern writers on aesthetics who proscribe art like Tolstoy or who advocate it like Rabindranath Tagore. But for a viable *via media* or golden mean. Tauta stands as its best spokesman even like Aristotle ranged against Plato's banishment of poets from his ideal Republic.

It is against this background that Bharata's theory of *rasa* becomes meaningful, a theory which touches all the problems of aesthetics in its boundless sweep, though it has started more controversies than it has silenced, in ancient as well as modern times. Bharata's *rasa* is primarily beauty in the composite arts of Nāṭya made up of many elements like music, dance, gesture, poetry and painting. In the art representing natural beauty, *alaṅkāra* or decorative skill of the artist as displayed in manipulating his medium or raw material, whether spontaneous or stylized – is like the body of art. We should now add that its vital essence or soul is *rasa* or aesthetic emotion or sentiment. We said that beauty was a *guṇa* or inner quality of the body of nature or art discernible to a sensitive beholder; *rasa* is something even more far-reaching than the *guṇa* of beauty because it can transform by its magic touch as it were even ugliness into beauty, and endow form even to the formless. This theory of *rasa*, especially as amplified by Dhvani philosophers, is a typically Indian contribution to aesthetics; and it has its parallelisms in the most modern thinking on the subject in the West like that of Susanne K. Langer, Cassirer, and T. S. Eliot.

It needs to be reiterated that all Indian aesthetic concepts are inter-related and interfused. They all revolve around the pivotal axis of *rasa*. *Alaṅkāra*, *guṇa*, *riti*, *vṛtti*, *dhvani* and *aucitya* are telling instances in point. Some modern studies of these in isolation have resulted in obscuring the issues and their relevance as never before, though they have often been hailed as 'learned research'. Professor Hiriyanna has rightly decried this research mentality which shuts out new thought and prevents right understanding. But we have yet to learn this lesson, it seems! Indian aesthetics underscored the organic unity of these concepts by offering the analogy of a beauty queen. Her natural beauty also adorns her so to say; and is *alaṅkāra* which is of the *svataḥ-sambhavi* type. But she might add to her natural beauty of limbs by adorning herself with multiple ornaments each one best suited to set off her charm

to better advantage. That is the realm of *alañkāras* coming under the class *vakrokti* or *atiśayokti* in literature. Both these aspects of her beauty are externally open to view; they are *bāhya*. These may excite the beholder's admiration. But they cannot explain the inner springs or character. Her qualities of head and heart like liveliness or sweetness of disposition, grace in movement and speech, and pure or spirited feelings i.e. *mādhurya*, and *lāvaṇya*, *prasāda* or *ojas* - deserve to be distinguished from external *alañkāras*; they are rightly termed *guṇas* or qualities of the beautiful damsel. Now all this assemblage of *alañkāras* and *guṇas* would become purposeless if they do not win for her the love a suitable husband of her choice. As Kālidāsa would say—"priyeṣu saubhāgyaphalā hi cārutā"; 'the end of beauty is the love of a chosen beloved'. Pārvatī had all the *alañkāras* and *guṇas* of a bewitching beauty, and even the maddening Lovegod himself on her side when she proudly displayed her charms before Śiva. But Śiva was unmoved. He did not reciprocate her love. Then Pārvatī realised the futility of her vaunted beauty : "nininda rūpam hṛdayena Pārvatī". But she did not give up her mission; she took to *tapas* to win Śiva's love, and triumphed by her changed heart. That is the story.

It is the same story in art also. *Alañkāras* and *guṇas* are the indispensable accompaniment of the beautiful damsel of art in general and literature in particular. But the end value or culmination of all these consists in *rasa* or aesthetic experience of the connoisseur. Her own emotions and feelings are *bhāvas* and these play key role in eliciting the intended *rasa* from the onlooker. The circumstances of time and place and so on provide the required background or *vibhāva*. Her gay movements of limbs and blandishments indicative of her mental disposition might be termed *anubhāvas*. Her fleeting or shifting moods like anxiety, doubt and shyness only serve to emphasize the nucleus of a ruling sentiment like love within her heart and this is crystal-clear to her admirer, however much she might strive to hide them. In other words

the end-value of beauty is witnessed only when the beholder is enraptured by the interplay of passing moods or *vyabhicāribhāvas* illustrated by *anubhāvas* and occasioned by *vibhāvas*—all suggesting the ruling passion of a *sthāyibhāva*.

We see thus our aesthetic terminology growing. We started with two-fold *alaṅkāra*, viz. the natural and the super-added; those which lie on the surface of beauty and those that are inner still; we finally landed in the inmost or vital centre of *sthāyibhāva* or *rasa* which can be understood only by way of its attendant accompaniments like *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. A state of mind is termed long-lasting or *sthāyin* in contrast to another which is momentary (*vyabhicārin*), not in any absolute sense, but only in a functional or relative sense. For example, love is a *sthāyibhāva* in the story of Śakuntalā; but the same love is a *vyabhicāribhāva* in the story of the Buddha or Jīmūtavāhana. When functionally a *sthāyibhāva* gets scope for progress in all the recognised five stages of seed, sprout, plant, flower and fruit, it comes to be called *rasa*. If it does not get such a scope for full-fledged development, it will remain a mere *bhāva* without becoming *rasa*. Such indeed is the theory of *rasa* in a nutshell. *Alaṅkāra*, *guṇa* and *rasa* are the tripods of Indian aesthetics.

Let us now take a look at some other aesthetic terms which are complimentary to these. Earlier we referred to the movements, gay or graceful and spirited, of our metaphorical beauty queen of art, which catch the beholder's attention. These partake of beauty in their own way no doubt and they are not *alaṅkāras* or *guṇas* or even *anubhāvas* because they are typically natural and uniform unlike the latter which vary with every varying mood. These are rightly called *ṛitis* or styles—'the sweet' or *Vaidarbhi* affording a clear contrast from 'the striking' or *Gauḍi*. Of course, their mixture can itself be termed a third *Pāñcālī*, as suggested by some. This is true of Poetry alone among the arts.

But the other arts too have to reckon with this phenomenon. The art of dance-drama will talk of *ṛttis*, viz. *Kaiśikī*

the gay, *ārabhaṭi*, the spirited and *sāttvati*, the heroic, besides *bhāratī* or mode of the spoken word, because the spoken word in dramatic prose is again distinct from lyrical poetry.

While some theorists equate *Riti* and *Vṛtti* in poetry as synonyms stray writers like Udbhaṭa would restrict the concept of *Vṛtti* to types of alliteration possible in poetry. In such a case, we could say that they correspond to the rhythmic movements natural to our beauty queen of art.

Such are the fundamental key-terms in Indian aesthetics *Alaṅkāra*, *Guṇa*, *bhāva*, *rasa*, *riti* and *vṛtti*—which are all interinvolved since each explains an aspect of beauty in the poetic art, and our idea of overall beauty would remain but partial and incomplete if we ignore any of these aspects. That is why almost all attempts at a definition of literature have become instances of so may failures in India as well as in the West. The content of poetry is as wide as Nature and human nature or life at all levels. The form of poetry cannot be neatly brought under any one of the categories already noticed. If we emphasize the body, we might ignore the soul or *vice versa*. The truth is that literature is an inseparable composite of both as the very term *sāhitya* connotes. Even if we agree that the body is made of *alaṅkāra* and *guṇa*, the choice of the soul between *riti* and *rasa* goes difficult, because both are essential, each in its own way. All that we can unquestionably accept is that poetry is language suffused with beautiful meaning; but it is too general to be of much use. Indeed it is the final way Jagannātha found, out of this difficulty. His seemingly simplistic definition is—“*ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kā-vyam*”. But he had to write pages and pages of explanation to make it precise and accurate and all-inclusive. On the other hand, much earlier than Jagannātha, the doyen of our aestheticians, viz. Ānandavardhana, and after him, his admirer Kuntaka, had found two sustainable methods of giving an all-inclusive definition by creating a new aesthetic category which could cover all the aspects of beauty. Ānandavardhana's find was *dhvani* while that of Kuntaka was *Vakrokti*. Both these have greater claims on our attention than all the rest.

'Dhvani' does full justice to the pivotal place of *rasa* and allows the entry of *alaṅkāra* as well as *vastu* in its sweep of *vyāṅgyārtha* or primarily suggested content, hence it can be termed the *fiferentia* or *sine qua non* of literature as a whole. Since *dhvani* is defined only as the soul (*ātman*), the referential use of *alaṅkāras* as well as qualites associated with the soul can be accommodated as the body of *kāvya*. *Rasa* will now become the *raison de etre* of *rutis* and *vṛttis* too. No wonder the theory of *dhvani* was applauded by posterity as the most adequate and acceptable aesthetic principle.

But to Ānandavardhana's immediate contemporaries and successors it did not appear so. It posited a power of language exclusive to poetry in order to explain *rasa*; and in the same breath allowed almost an equal status to suggested ideas and figures of speech. Its new explanation of *guṇas* as properties of *rasa* was riddled with difficulty because *rasa* as soul is no concrete object according to Advaita Vedānta and should really be *nirguṇa*. More than all, the very plea of Ānandavardhana for accommodating all recognised literature under two heads—viz. *dhvani* of first-grade and *guṇibhūta-vyāṅgya* or second-grade, depending upon the primacy or otherwise of suggested sense, contained the seeds of a self-contradiction in his admission of a category like *rasavad-alaṅkāra*. If by definition *rasa* is that which is wholly and solely suggested, how can it be even functionally equated with a stated *alaṅkāra*? As literary critics know only too well, wide differences in literary taste do exist and how can a definition summarily prescribe that 'x' category is the best and 'y' category is the next best? A really valid definition should only distinguish poetry from non-poetry. It cannot speak of degrees of beauty. Last, but not least important is the need for a new linguistic function like *vyañjanā* or *dhvāni*. If all meaning other than referential can be explained by logicians and semanticists either as a kind of inference (*anumāna*) or as a kind of presumption (*arthāpatti*) or as a metaphorical function (*lakṣaṇā*), why should one be so particular about an exclusively poetic function of language like *vyañjanā*?

These and other considerations against *dhvani* prompted Kuntaka to cut the Gordian knot of Indian aesthetics by proposing the least controversial and most comprehensive definition of poetry by making his all embracing principle of *vakrokti* the differentia of *sāhitya* or singular unity of form and content. *Vakrokti* in its myriad forms could account for all the aesthetic categories adequately, assigning all of them an important place, *vastu* and *rasa* on the content-side (*alañkārya*), *alañkāras* on the form-side, and varying *guṇas* as rooted in the varied types of poetic temperament, leading to different styles (*mārgas*). Even this bare sketch of the different Indian concepts is an unavoidable preliminary to understand any one of them in proper perspective. Almost all the modern literary critics in the West who believe in analytico-critical analyses of poetic imagery and who accept like I. A. Richards the emotive use of language in poetry, or like William Empson talk of 'seven types of ambiguity' or like E. M. W. Tillyard admit types of poetry 'direct and oblique' are anticipated in essence both by Ānandavardhana and Kuntaka. We might content ourselves here with a single quotation :

Poetry strives for a conviction begotten
of the emotions rather than of the reason.
The approach of poetry is indirect. It proceeds
by means of suggestion, implication, reflection.
Its method is largely symbolical. It is more
interested in connotations than in denotations.

(Harold R. Walley and J. Harold Willson.)

The Anatomy of Literature. New York, 1934, pp. 143-144)

Yet, there is one remarkable difference too. The modern West has not yet found experimental Psychology confirming the existence of anything like a soul in man. The very analogy of Indian aestheticians might therefore appear anathem to them.

WHAT DID BHARATA MEAN BY 'RASA' ?

S. S. Barlingay

In one of his works, 'Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinava Gupta', R. Gnoli writes, "In this way, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta rescued the idea of *Rasa* from the primitive and too concrete form which it had been given by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka. *Rasa* is not a thing in itself, formed previous to the act of consciousness by which it is perceived, but the consciousness itself (and therefore, the perception) which, freed from external interference and from all practical desires, becomes *Rasa* or aesthetic consciousness. The subject, when immersed in this state, finds in it, the fulfilment of all his desires; in this sense, therefore, *Rasa* is pleasure, beatitude, rest, lysis!"¹ The remark is based on the present Indian tradition and perhaps correctly describes a particular aspect of aesthetic consciousness. But did Bharata mean *Rasa* by this particular experience, or was the theory fathered on him by Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and their followers? It is not my object in this paper to criticise Abhinavagupta's theory of Aesthetic consciousness, for it may correctly depict the aesthetic experience. It is my object, however, to show that there are reasons for believing that by '*Rasa*', Bharata meant an entirely different thing which is, in fact, an essential element in his whole theory of dramatic art or *Nāṭya*.² The following study is an attempt to disentangle this extremely important theory of artistic creation which Bharata seems actually to have held from the theories of later ages.

I shall begin by asking the meaning of the word '*Nāṭya*'. The word '*Nāṭya*' should be distinguished from the word *Nāṭaka*, though it is not often done. Both these words are

derived from the word 'Nāṭa', but on account of the different terminations added to 'Nāṭa' the word stands for two entirely different concepts. The word *Nāṭya* is formed by adding *Śaṅ* to *Nāṭa* and means the action or performance of the actor. *Nāṭya* is thus concerned with the staging of a drama or *Nāṭaka*. Bharata himself defines *Nāṭya* as the imitation of that which takes place in the real world: *Nānābhāvopasampannam nānāvasthāntarātmakam, lokavṛttānukaraṇam Nāṭyametat mayā kṛtam* (I. 112 N.S.). The word *Nāṭaka*, on the other hand, is formed by adding 'Aka' (iNvul) to the word 'Nāṭa' and is to be classed under the genus 'poetry', e.g. in "*Kāvyeṣu Nāṭakam ramyam*". It can very well be seen that though of course 'Nāṭya'³ and 'Nāṭaka'⁴ are closely related to each other, 'Nāṭaka' is connected more with the content or story aspect (e.g. in "*Nṛpādīnām yaccaritam nānārasabhāvasambhṛtam bahudhā sukhaduḥkhotpattikṛtam, bhavati hi tannāṭakam nāma*")⁵ and *Nāṭya* with the manifestation of the story on the stage. It should be borne in mind that when a *Nāṭaka* is not staged it still remains a 'nāṭaka' even if it has been reduced to spoken or written symbols. But it cannot be a *nāṭya* unless it is staged.

This stage medium then, is an important aspect of *Nāṭya*. It is a medium in which the poets' or rather the artists' mental states become, so to speak, objectified; in *Nāṭaka*; they become objectified in a different way, in written letters or spoken sounds. In Sanskrit this medium is called *śabda*, "sound".⁶ Let us call the written or spoken symbols the language of poetry or *Nāṭaka*, and the stage-medium the language of *Nāṭya*. All the constituents of stage performances will thus form the language of *Nāṭya*. It may be objected, and perhaps rightly, that at the time of Bharata this was not the conception of *Nāṭaka*. But at any rate this was the conception of poetry or *Kāvya*, and the language or medium of *Kāvya* was *śabda*. What is relevant for my purpose is to show that just as *śabda* is a medium for poetry, it is not a medium for *Nāṭya*. Bharata was interested in giving us a

system of rules about *Nāṭya*. He wanted to show us how to transform the content that was in a poet's mind into the stage language. It was this language or at least a part of it that, I hold, was called *Rasa* by Bharata. I shall try to explain in the following paragraphs my reasons for thinking so.

In almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy, the words *Śabda*, *Sparśa*, *Rūpa*, *Rasa*, and *Gandha* occur; in the Vedas and Upaniṣhads too. But, I think, the earliest technical use of these words can be found in the *Sāṃkhya* system. Unfortunately almost all the literature on *Sāṃkhya* is lost and the only commentaries on the *Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that exist are written from the Vedāntic point of view. In spite of these difficulties, it is possible to discuss the place of the concepts of *śabda* etc, in *Sāṃkhya*. I have, of course, to base my view on the scanty material that is available to me in the *Kārikas* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, with the commentaries thereon by Gaudapāda and Vācaspati Miśra and *Yuktīdīpikā*, an anonymous commentary on it and exposition of *Sāṃkhya* in other systems such as Buddhism and Vedānta. From the information *Śabda*, that is available, it can be safely asserted that for *Sāṃkhya*, *Sparśa*, *Rūpa*, *Rasa* and *Gandha* are 'Tanmātra', and that 'tanmātra' is a word that is indigenous to *Sāṃkhya* system.⁷ 'Tanmātra' means 'that itself': 'Tadeva iti tanmātram'. The concept is something like Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself. The world as it is known to us is a product of the mind and the *Tanmātras* together (not the product of mind alone). This world, therefore, consists of five gross elements or *Pañca Mahābhūta*. *Mahābhūtas* are, thus the knowable or epistemic objects, and *Tanmātras* are the ontological objects which reach us as *Mahābhūtas*. It is in this sense then that we can say that *Mahābhūtas* are born out of *Tanmātras*. But the language of *Sāṃkhya* should not be literally understood. It is on account of the difficulty of expressing the thought the *Sāṃkhya* has to use such a language. The *Tanmātras* can not be known to us, their existence is postulated in order to distinguish real knowledge from false. Thus a knowledge process would

consist of three elements : (1) the knower or the subject, (2) the thing in itself that is known and (3) the thing as it is known to the subject.⁸ Whenever a knower comes in contact with a *tanmātra*, what he knows is a *Mahābhūta*. *Tanmātra* is thus logically prior to *Mahābhūta* and serves in the realm of Sāṃkhya ontology as an intermediary between the knower and *Mahābhūta*. It is necessary to remember that neither the *tanmātras*, nor the *mahābhūtas* are psychological in nature, though they are usually so thought. *Mahābhūtas* are sensible objects and since the sense organs are five, at least in the Sāṃkhya conception of the term, *Mahābhūtas* are divided into five classes. Naturally the nucleus (or the physical things) on which our sense organs act are also regarded as five. The idea is that each sense organ has a separate object for acting on. (Of course, one could as well think that the object of five organs is one. But the prejudice that each sense organ has a separate object does not seem to be uncommon, as can be seen from the sense–datum theory. *Tanmātras* could even be regarded as the sense–data as in one sense both of them can be regarded as the elementary physical object. For Sāṃkhya the physical object and the *Tanmātras* are not different. The five *Tanmātras* are named after five senses because (1) no other convenient names are available and (2) they are connected, in a sense, with sense organs.

In some broad sense at least, a work of art is a thing, an entity. On one side it is connected with its creator, the artist, on the other side it is connected with the appreciator. Art, thus, may be called a process, with three distinct stages involved in it. This may roughly be represented as (1) The states of artist's mind (2) the objectified expression (of the artist) and (3) the appreciation or the states of the mind of the appreciator. This process may also be subdivided into two sub-processes, as their functions are entirely different. The first sub-process may be called the process of creation of art and the second may be termed the process of appreciation of art. In the terminology of Bharata, the first one is known as

‘*Rasa-nirmiti-Prakrityā*’ and the second one as ‘*Rasāsvāda-Prakrityā*’. These processes may be represented in the following schemata :

(1)_____ (2)_____ (3)

(It could also be seen that, in some sense at least, the sub-process (1)_____ (2) is an inversion of the process (2)_____ (3), such that poles (1) and (3) may resemble each other in many respects.)

The pole (2), that is the objectified expression (of art) in a sense is independent of the poles (1) and (3). That is, though it is dependent on 1 for its creation, it is not dependent on it for its existence. Similarly it i.e. (2) is also independent of (3) for its existence, though it is related to it for being appreciated. On the other hand pole (3) cannot exist if pole (2) does not exist.

There appears to be an interesting parallel in this account and Sāṃkhya account of knowledge. The pole (2) appears to be similar to the ‘*Tanmātras*’ of the Sāṃkhya or the world that is absolutely independent of our knowledge, the only difference being that the ‘*tanmātras*’ belong to the real world whereas⁹ pole (2) belongs to the world of art. The pole (3) appears to be something like the *Mahābhūta* of Sāṃkhya which is a sort of the construction of a knower. The sub-process with the poles (1) and (2) is again very similar to the Sāṃkhya process from *Tanmātras* to *Mahābhūta*, with, of course, a difference that the art process of creation is more or less an inverted process of the one that is represented in Sāṃkhya. It is very similar to the process by which the Sāṃkhya philosopher, starting from the world of *Mahābhūtas* arrives at an entity called *Tanmātras*. The artist also, draws his material from the world of *Mahābhūtas*, a material which has been transformed into his individual experience. This individual experience starts¹⁰ as a background for the artistic creation and is sometimes known is the Indian theory of Art as ‘*Sthāyībhāva*’,¹¹ although I have reasons to think that

Bharata called this, 'the state of poet's mind or Intention (*Kavi-antargata-bhāva*). He used the word '*sthāyi*' for the total meaning of the state-continuum. In a sense the intention and the meaning would be indetical. The problem before an artist is to reduce his 'individual' experience to a medium which will be impersonal, independent of him, and knowable to all people who want to know it. This is pole (2) in our terminology and represent in the world of art a concept which is similar to that of *Tanmātra* of the Sāṃkhya. The influence of the Sāṃkhya system on Nāṭyaśāstra is well known and several passages from Nāṭyaśāstra can be quoted for proving that in Nāṭyaśāstra the language of the Sāṃkhya is used. In fact the word '*Rasa*' (*Tanmātra*) and *Bhāva* used in Nāṭyaśāstra and the two processes to which I refer above have been actually mentioned in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. I quote below the fifty-second Kārikā from Īśvarakṛṣṇa which will indicate that the words *Rasa*, *Bhāva* etc., are borrowed from Sāṃkhya.

*Na vinā bhāvair liṅgam na vinā liṅgena bhāva-nirvṛtīḥ ।
Liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyah tasmāt dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ ॥*

The kārikā when translated means :

Without *Bhāva* there cannot be *liṅga* i.e. *Tanmātras* (fortunately commentator Gauḍapāda is very clear on this point in his commentary of this kārikā. He clearly says that *liṅga* refers to *tanmātras* (*liṅgam na tanmātrasargaḥ na*), though in his commentaries on other kārikās he has confused the meanings). And without *Liṅga* or *tanmātra* the *Bhāvās* cannot come into existence (the word '*Nirvṛtti*' also is used in *Nāṭya*). Therefore there are two kinds of creative process, by name *Bhāva* and by name *Liṅga*.

I, therefore, think that the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge is used in the Indian theory of Art in general and the Nāṭyaśāstra in particular, in the way I suggest. It, thus, appears to me that the terms referring to *tanmātras* in the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge, such as *Śabda*, *Rūpa* and *Rasa*, were borrowed by the theory of art to designate the pole (2) or

nucleus in the media of particular arts. *Śabda* was applied to the medium for literary arts like poetry, *Rūpa* for *Citra* and *Śilpa* and *Rasa* was used for *Nāṭya*. There could not, in any real sense, be any fine art connected with *Sparśa* and *Gandha* as their fields, too, are covered by *Śabda*, *Rūpa* and *Rasa*.¹² I believe at the time Bharata wrote his *Nāṭyaśāstra*, this tripple scheme must have been the basis for the classification of the arts. This is also, perhaps, the reason why we do find a special discussion of *Rūpa*, in connection with the visual theory of art—or *Kalā*—in the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta himself. It is evident that the works, *Śabda*, *Rūpa* and *Rasa* should stand on the same level and if one designates a class of media, so should the others. I think it is likely that in the course of history the originally intended meanings of these words were lost, perhaps under the influence of certain schools of philosophy. Thus *Rasa*, which was originally intended to refer to an object (or medium or language) or *Nāṭya*, became in the post-Abhinavagupta era, a mental state, a pleasure and aesthetic consciousness, and was applied not only to *Nāṭya* but also to *Kāvya* in general. As Professor Hacker, of the University of Bonn, pointed out to me, later Sanskrit dramas were most unsuitable for staging and were most likely meant simply to be read. This factor also must have contributed to the change in the meaning of *Rasa*. The fact that Abhinavagupta identified *Kāvya* with *Nāṭya* should also corroborate the fact that *Nāṭya* had lost its distinction from *Nāṭaka* and *Kāvya* in his time, that is about 10th or 11th century A.D.

Abhinavagupta was, indeed, a very profound scholar; but it still appears to me that he has completely missed the point which Bharata wanted to convey. When Bharata talks about, *Nāṭya* it is clear from his use of the word that *Kāvya* or poetry cannot be intended. This is very plain, even from the text of *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Whenever he wanted to speak of what we now call *Kāvya* he has specifically used the terms, *Nāṭaka* and *Kāvya*.¹³ He also defines *Nāṭya* and *Nāṭaka* in different

terms. This clearly indicates that Bharata did not intend to use these terms indiscriminately. In spite of this clear distinction Abhinavagupta repeatedly says that *Nāṭya* is poetry. *Kāvyaṃ Nāṭyameva*.¹⁴ This clearly shows that while writing his famous commentary on *Nāṭyasāstra*, Abhinavagupta did not have the same concern with the staging of drama (*Prayoga*) as did Bharata.

It is necessary at this stage, to dilate further on the meaning of *Nāṭyā*. Abhinavagupta himself defines *Nāṭya* as follows : *Yattu daśarūpakam tasya yo arthaḥ tadeva nāṭyam*.¹⁵ That is the 'Artha'¹⁶ of *Daśarūpaka* is *nāṭya*. This definition, though in a sense correct, is very ambiguous and is likely to be misused, unless the primary meaning of 'nāṭya' is borne in mind. The object or '*Viśaya*'¹⁷ of *Daśarūpaka* may change inasmuch as the artistic medium changes. If the medium is word or ordinary language, this object could be easily identified with poetry; *Nāṭya* would thus be equated with poetry. This is what Abhinavagupta is trying to do. It appears to me that he wrongly quotes from *Nāṭyasāstra* in supporting his point. He says : "*Yat vakṣyate – Nāṭyasya eṣā tanuḥ*". The chapter from which this passage is taken, really deals with the importance of speech in acting. Separated from its context, the quotation¹⁸ is likely to be misleading. The passage runs thus :

*Yo vāgabhinayaḥ prokto mayā pūrvam dvijottamāḥ,
Lakṣaṇam tasya vakṣyāmi svaravyaṅjanasambhavam.
vāci yatnastu kartavayo, Nāṭyasyeyam tanus smṛtā
aṅga-nepathya-tattvāni vākyārtham vyaṅjayanti hi*.¹⁹

To use this passage for proving that *Nāṭya* is the same as *kāvya* is, therefore, not quite fair. It is much better to define *Nāṭya* as *Anukaraṇa*, following Bharata as I have done. It appears to me that Abhinavagupta and R. S. Ramaswami Shastri, the learned editor of *Abhinavabhāratī*²⁰ are both wrong in insisting that *Nāṭya* should not be defined as *Anukaraṇa*.²¹ Once, however, the distinctiveness of the medium that is employed in *Nāṭya* is recognised it can easily be seen

that *Nāṭya* can substantially be the object or *viṣaya* of Daśa-ūrpaka. In a sense even *Nāṭaka*, (including the representation of it in verbal symbols) may be thought to form a part of *Nāṭya*; for it is the *Nāṭaka* or the story of *Nāṭaka* that is exhibited through the far more extensive resources of *Nāṭya*.

Abhinavagupta seems to have over-looked a very crucial point in Bharata's theory. It appears to me and this has been pointed out earlier—that for Bharata, *Nāṭya*, *Nāṭaka*, or for that matter any art was essentially communicative and consisted of three stages : the first stage is that when the art is still potentially in the poet's or artist's mind. It is this stage which is sometimes referred to as *sthāyī bhāva*.²² The second stage is when the first stage becomes objectified and becomes independent of the artist. It is at this stage that the arts become distinct from each other because their media are different. The third stage is that when the art is experienced by the appreciator.

'*Nānārasam*' qualifies '*Lokacaritam*' and the last line is merely a generalisation or *Arthāntaranyāsa*. But even if you take '*nānārasam*' as qualifying '*nāṭyam*', even then compound would be what is known as *Bahuvrīhi* and *Rasa* which is only a part of the compound could not be identified with *Nāṭyam*. But what is more interesting is to know how from this verse Mr. Shastri draws the conclusion that for Kālidāsa '*Nāṭya*' did not mean *Anukaraṇa*. I quote below the actual passage from Mr. Shastri :

"Abhinava, therefore, concludes in his statement often repeated in this work, that the word *Nāṭya* stands as a synonym of *Rasa*, and continuously warns us not to take *Nāṭya* either as imitation, or as histrionics or as gestures, or as *Vibhāvas* as generally understood by common people or spectator; the art so to speak becomes a part of the spectator's mind. This stage is the interpretation of the second and is more or less analogous to the first. For Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, the first two stages – the creative element in art – are relatively less important or perhaps in a metaphysical sense non-existent.

That is why they restrict their discussion of art to the third stage, which in one sense is not an effect of any earlier stage. This explains why Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta think that *Rasa*, which they place in this third stage, is not created, nor is it experienced : “ *Raso na prattiyate; na utpasyate; na abhivyajyate.*”²³ On account of this peculiar point of view, the problem of how to transform the first stage into the second, or the mental content into object—which in a sense is a real problem of all arts, and much more so in the case of *nāṭya*—does not arise for Abhinavagupta. The same idea has been already indicated by Kālidāsa also when he says in his *Māla-vikāgnimitra* :

*Traiguṇyodbhavamātralokacaritam nānārasam dṛśyate
Nāṭyam bhinnarucerjanasya bahudhāpyekam samārādhnam.*

(pp. 27–28 preface to N.S. G.O.S. II Eou.)

This, however, was the problem which Bharata definitely faced and which he tried to solve in *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

Bharata points out : “ *Ekonapañcāśat ime yathāvat bhāvāḥ tryavasthāḥ gaditā mayā vaḥ*”.²⁴ And again, “ *Evam rasāśca bhāvāśca tryavasthāḥ nāṭake smṛtāḥ*”.²⁵ The significance of the word ‘*tryavastha*’ does not seem to have been noticed by any commentator. Even Abhinavagupta²⁶ does not comment on it and in several editions of *Nāṭyaśāstra* the word is replaced by another word ‘*vyavastha*’. But the word ‘*tryavastha*’ is a key word for the understanding of Bharata’s theory. Bharata is pointing out that *Bhāvās* or *Rasas* have three stages or three transformations. But for these transformations, *Rasa* and *Bhāva*—a term that will be discussed later—would be identical. What are these three stages ? What is it that Bharata wants to convey by the expression ‘*Tryavastha*’ ? As has been pointed out above, Bharata is here referring to three different stages in the theory of *Nāṭya*. The theory, however, will hold good for any art or for that matter for language.²⁷ Let me try to explain it further.

It must be admitted that art, like language, is in a very important sense, communicative. This communication is between the artist and the appreciator and is carried on through a certain medium (an art object). The state (or content) of mind (feelings ?) which the artist is impelled to express, as well as the the effect on the mind of the appreciator are both mental and perhaps in some way, similar or equivalent. But in the realm of art there cannot be any direct transmission of the contents of the artist's mind to the mind of the appreciator. There cannot be any direct transition from the artist to the appreciator. The content of the artist's mind must take some form which acts as a medium between the artist and the appreciator and may vary from art to art. "In fact it is on account of the variations of medium that one art differs from another. *Nāṭya* differs from *Kāvya* in respect of this medium : the medinm of *Kāvya* or literature is "ordinary language or word or *Śabda*", the medium of drama that is staged (*Nāṭya*) is something different – not *abhinaya* or acting alone : is it not entirely *Nāṭya*.²⁸ It is in a sense the stage with all its constituents. A suitable word is to be found for it." To express this idea, I believe Bharata employed the word '*Rasa*' on the analogy of the word '*Śabda*', borrowing it from the metaphysics of *Sāṅkhya*.

Before proceeding further, let the relations that exist between the three stages be noted. Let me call them S1, S2 and S3. S1 refers to the content of the artist's mind, all that he wants to convey or express. S2 represents symbols—the mental facts or S1 as transformed into symbols S3 again depicts them as they are in the mind of the appreciator. S3 constitutes the meaning that the symbols S2 have for the appreciator. Let this 'meaning' be symbolised by the letter 'M'. I can, then express myself in the following way :

$$(1) \quad \begin{matrix} S1 \\ M \end{matrix} = S2 \qquad (2) \quad M(S2) = S3$$

If the above equations are roughly correct, then it will be the object of any artist to put forward his ideas, or the content

of his mind in S2. It must, however, be remembered that S2 may differ according to the difference in Medium. Let this difference in media be represented by letters "D...D'...D''...Dⁿ". I may, then, say that the form of all arts may be expressed by the following notations :

$$D_{S_2} \dots D'_{S_2} \dots D''_{S_2} \dots D'''_{S_2} \dots D^n_{S_2}$$

It can be very easily seen that the creative function of the artist ceases with the creation of a member of the series $D_{S_2} \dots D^n_{S_2}$. Any art must be located only within this series. It is this series which the appreciator knows and when he knows it, knows it with the meaning attached to one or the other of the series, that is, knows it as S3. The relation between the D_{S_2} series and the S3 could easily be interpreted as analogous to the knowledge process as visualised by Sāṅkhya. S3 is something like the world as we know it—to use Kant's terminology, a phenomenal world. In order to know this world we assume that in the physical reality, there must be some datum. This datum can be compared to 'D_{S2}' series. The Sāṅkhya concepts of *Tanmātra* and *Mahābhūta* can, in exactly the same way, be regarded as parallel with the D_{S_2} series and S3. The real world of physics consists only of *Tanmātras*, though it is perceptible to us as consisting of *Mahābhūtas*. Similarly the world created by the artists consists only of the 'D_{S2}' series, though when it is known by the appreciator it is invested with its meaning, and is called S3.

How are you going to interpret and describe the D_{S_2} series in the context of *Nāṭya* and what name are you going to give to this intermediary series? What will be the *Nāṭya* language for expressing the ideas of the artists? What will be the material of such a language?

The language of *Nāṭya* will differ from that of poetry; the material of this language will consist of visible and audible symbols, it will consist of actions and the cast of actors themselves along with the environment. All these together will form a *Nāṭya* language and it is into this language that the

thoughts or the ideas of the artists, that is 'S1' will have to be translated.

Let me illustrate the point. Suppose an artist, has to express a love episode between a hero and a heroine, say Śaṅkara and Pārvatī. It cannot simply be in written or spoken symbols; one party making an offer and the other accepting it. With this mental event – love – certain bodily events are necessarily concomitant. The mental content is expressed through bodily expressions and behaviour, very peculiar to the situation. In the actual world, too, if a lover expresses his love to his beloved and the beloved accepts the love, the whole situation cannot be simply verbal and devoid of proper signs of emotion. The beloved's acceptance of love – at least in Indian tradition—will be accompanied by certain bodily postures, or throbbing of the lips, or tremor of the body. The beloved will usually blush. She may not look straight into the lover's eyes, but may look downward, and in many cases, may not utter a word but remain silent. Usually such a scene may occur at some beautiful place near a lake where there are lotuses. The dramatist, the creator of the art, has to conceive the whole of this complex situation with all its mental implications before expressing it in words or symbols. And in the act of staging of this drama, if the stage director is different from the dramatist, he has to construct on the stage, with the help of the set of actors and situations, all that the dramatist has to convey. The stage director thus makes use of this material in order to give concrete form to the ideas of the artist i.e. the dramastist. The set of actors and environment, and the acting and the bodily expression, the direction and the director—all these form the material of the *Nāṭya* language, just as the meaningful words and their syntax form part of poetry. I think it was this *Nāṭya* language or rather language medium that was called '*Rasa*' by Bharata, in the same way as the language medium of literature or poetry was called '*Śabda*'. Just as ordinary language or a sentence²⁹

consists of words, similarly this language consists of *Vibhāva* (i.e. set of actors and environment), *Anubhāva* (the expressions connected with acting which again is of three varieties, *Vācika*, *Āṅgika* and *Sāttvika*) and *Vyabhicāribhāva* (mental, bodily and organic states, poses and movements). Bharata thought that such *Nāṭya*-language patterns would be of eight types and classified them under different *Rasas* like *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vira* etc.

I have stated that any art can be conceived as having three stages, S1, S2 (or D_{S2}) and S3. I have also stated that S1 is mental and is concerned with the states of the artist's or poet's mind. I have further said that the stages of the poet's mind are given a concrete form in S2 (or D_{S2}). I have also suggested that S1 is what Bharata thought to be *Sthāyibhāva*. Now it may be objected here that this analysis, though adequate for arts like 'Readable poetry' or painting or sculpture is not adequate for *Nāṭya*. The art of *Nāṭya*, unlike other arts, is concerned with a set of four different kinds of persons-(1) the dramatist, (2) the stage director, (3) the actor and (4) the person who is played by the actor. Each one in its turn tries to express what he conceives in his mind and so a problem arises: whose mental state it is that is manifested in ' D_{S2} '? In other words what is S1, is it concerned with the mental states of the dramatist, as I have earlier suggested, or with the stage director, (3) the actor or (4) or the person, the person who is being played? In *Abhinavabhāratī*, a lot of discussion has been centred round the problem, the problem of location of *Sthāyibhāva*, as it is called, and the theories of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Saṅkuka, at least, as they are represented by *Abhinavagupta*, have contributed considerably to carry the discussion on wrong path.

It is true that in *Nāṭya*, each of these four agents in a sense contribute to the manifestation of ' D_{S2} '. ' D_{S2} ' is in some sense mentally conceived by the dramatist, the stage director and also in most cases the actor. But to locate S1, in either the stage director, or the actor or the real hero is based on certain misconception. The mistake lies in the fact

that the complexity of the human mind was not properly conceived by any of the commentators of Nāṭyaśāstra. A man can not only experience some experience, but can also experience that someone else experiences some experience. He can imagine such or more complex situations and try to objectify them. A man who does it is a dramatist. He alone conceives the drama. It is he who conceives that his hero should behave in a particular way in a particular situation. It is not really material whether the real hero has ever existed or if he has existed whether he behaved in a similar way in that situation. It is this creativeness of the dramatist which is accepted and carried out by the stage director and the actor. Their work is not original, but is rather that of expressing the ideas of the dramatist. In this sense, then, both the stage director and the actor are only factors in 'D_{S2}'. Even if they improve on the original ideas of the dramatist, it would mean that they have shown better understanding of the situation and that their mental states were just the improved editions of the original. The 'S1' or *Sthāyibhāva* must, therefore, be referred to the mind of the dramatist alone.

I believe, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta (as also Bhaṭṭa Lollata and Śaṅkuka) missed this point that all Bharata wanted to describe was the language and technique of expressing the ideas in the mind of the artist – in this context, the dramatist. They, therefore, centred their attack against Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, who discussed theories about *Śthāyibhāva* as to whether it was in the mind of the actor or of the real hero. Since '*Rasa*' is supposed to succeed *Sthāyibhāva*, the real notion of *Rasa* was misconceived as soon as *Sthāyibhāva* was located at a wrong place. They, therefore, missed the point that Bharata was interested mainly in the production or *Niṣpatti* of *Rasa*, in the production 'D_{S2}'. Since they identified *Rasa* with the aesthetic consciousness of the appreciator, they thought that there could not be any process like the production of *Rasa* (*Rasaniṣpatti*). They, thus, further missed the point that Bharata distinguished between the process of the produc-

tion of *Rasa* (*Rasaniṣpatti*) and the experiencing or tasting of *Rasa* (*Rasāsvāda*). They, therefore, thought that '*Rasa*' intrinsic to the appreciator (*rasikagata*), and manifested only in him—was, therefore mental in nature (*Āsvādarūpa*). They thus completely neglected the keyword in Bharata's theory, that *Rasa* and *Bhāva* are '*tryavastha*', that is, are manifested in three stages. Bharata, as a matter of fact, clearly distinguished '*Rasa*' from another stage—a fourth one—happiness, which he called '*Harṣa*'. He talks of '*harṣa*'³⁰ while dealing with the process of the experience of *Rasa*. It seems clear that these great scholars imposed their own theories on Bharata, oblivious of his profound concern with the actual staging of a drama. Their theories may be important in the history of poetics and aesthetics; but they should not be allowed to replace Bharata's older theory which has its own great virtues. It is only by misinterpreting Bharata's intentions and misreading Bharata's texts that a theory like that of Abhinavagupta could be super-imposed on *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The problem before Bharata was relatively simple; it was how to stage a drama. All that he tries to do is to explain the different aspects of this technique which concerns the body of *Nāṭya*. The problem for Abhinavagupta was purely philosophic and I believe that Bharata's concern with the technique of production has been sacrificed entirely for the sake of philosophic speculation. Indeed a genuine theory of aesthetic consciousness did emerge from it, but a theory of art was also lost.

For Bharata state 1 and state 3 or as I called them, S1 and S3, were definitely mental. For him the state S1 was mental or internal can be seen from his words : "*Kaveḥ antargatam bhāvam*". State S3, was the meaning of *Rasa* and could in one sense be termed as *Sthāyibhāva*, and so would be the State S1 as the state is equivalent to it. The state of *Rasa* came in between the two, S1 and S3, i.e. it succeeded the *Sthāyibhāva* in the (dramatist's) artist's mind. But if the *Sthāyibhāva* in artist's mind is confused with a '*bhāva*' in the mind of the appreciator i.e. S3, then *Rasa* which, Bharata

says, succeeds *Sthāyībhāva*, i.e. S1 could easily be misunderstood as something succeeding S3. Now this S4 could be a state of pleasure or happiness, and all that Abhinavagupta says may be perhaps true of S4. Since for Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka there could not be any 'production' of *Rasa*, S1 and S2 (or Ds_2) could not exist. S3 is, then, a *Sthāyībhāva* and the of *Rasa* which succeeds *Sthāyībhāva* is, therefore, pleasure or aesthetic consciousness. But this kind of logic is based on a fundamental error that *Sthāyībhāva* was state S3 and not S1 or something else. This, in turn, is based on the failure to distinguish between the process of production of *Rasa* (*Rasa-nispatti*) and the process of tasting or experiencing of *Rasa* (*Rasāsvāda*). It is on account of this confusion that *Rasa*, which with Bharata was not mental at all, became dogmatically mental for Abhinavagupta and his followers and was identified with *Artha* (meaning) or *Āsvāda*, which Bharata, as I see it, used, to convey the S3. This paved the way for the condensation of *Rasa-dhvani* theory. The *Dhvani* theory is, in fact, a theory about 'Artha'³¹ i.e. S3. As soon as *Rasa* was identified with S3, the condensation could easily take place. It is, however, interesting to note that though the meaning of *Rasa* was, thus, transformed, the meaning of *Śabda* and *Rūpa* which belonged originally to the same universe as *Rasa*, did not undergo any such transformations.

Whether all that I say is right or wrong can be verified from the text of Bharata itself. I therefore propose to offer in translation an important passage from Bharata. After giving the list (*saṁgraha*) of all the constituents of *Nāṭya* he says :

"We shall, therefore, first describe the *Rasas* (for) without *Rasa* there could not be any *Artha*.³² This *Rasa* is produced there (i.e. on the stage) on account of the combination of *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva*, and *Vyabhicāribhāva* (this combination should not be understood as a mechanical combination, but should be understood as a combination of parts and a whole or rather of a sentence (*vākya*) and words (*padas*)). (The *Vibhāvas* are the set of actors and the environments, *Anubhāvas*

are different kinds of supplementary states like 'smiling' etc., which are useful in acting, and the *Vyabhicāribhāvas* are different bodily and mental states etc.) (How do you explain this process of the production of *Rasa* ?) What is your illustration ? It will be explained by us. Just as on account of the combination (chemical) of many spices, medicinal herbs and things (ores), *Rasa* (i.e. either mercury or juice) is produced or from things like jaggery, spices and medicinal herbs *Rasas* (essences), *ṣāḍava* etc. are extracted, similarly the *Sthāyībhāvas*, (evidently in the mind of the dramatist) even when they approach the different *Bhāvas*. (*Vibhāvas*, *Vyabhicāribhāva* and *Anubhāva*) they become *Rasa*. Here it is said. What kind of object is *Rasa* ? (What is the object of the word *Rasa* ? i.e. How do you know that it stands for something ? We shall say. Because it is that objectified, which can be tested (experienced). (2nd process) **How is it tasted ?** Just as good men eating the food prepared with different spices taste the *Rasas*³³ (essences or juices that exist in the food) and attain happiness, so a good minded *Prekṣaka*³⁴ (i.e. observer) taste or experience the *Sthāyībhāvas*,³⁵ which have been spiced with (i.e. which have been transformed to) different kinds of *bhāvas* (i.e. *Vyabhicāribhāvas* etc.) and *Abhinayas* and have thus come nearer to (i.e. have taken the shape of) *Vāk*, *Aṅga*, and *Sattva*³⁶ (the spectator perceives or experiences the *Sthāyībhāvas*, not in the form that is mental (for this is impossible) but perceives them in an objectified form or *Rasa*) and attains happiness³⁷ etc. In this way the *Rasas* in *Nāṭya* are defined.³⁸

The passage of *Nāṭyaśāstra* that follows the one rendered above, again of crucial importance, is also the subject of erratic comment in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. I, therefore, propose to translate it.

“ Here it is said, whether the *Bhāvas* are born of *Rasas* or *Rasas* are born of *Bhāva*. According to some they are born out of one another. But that is not so. Why ? It is seen that *Rasas* are born out of *Bhāvas* and *Bhāvas* are not born out of *Rasa*.” Here the point to note is that Bharata is referring to the

process of **creation** or production of *Rasa*. It is evident that the "*Bhāva*" here cannot mean the *Sthāyibhāva* in the view of the spectator, but the *Sthāyibhāva* in the mind of the poet – the *Vyabhicāribhāva*, *Anubhāva*, and *Vibhāvas* — which are stipulated elsewhere as necessary for the production of *Rasa*. This is clear from an earlier *Kārikā*,

Bhāvābhīnayasambaddhān
Sthāyibhāvānstathā budhāh
Āsvādayanti manasā,
*Tasmāt nātyarasāḥ smṛtāh.*⁵⁹

Of this *kārikā* too, usually a wrong rendering is given. It is said that because the *Rasas* i. e. the *Sihāyibhāvas* which are connected with the other *Bhāvas* such as *vibhāva* etc., and acting are experienced by mind, therefore the *Rasas* are also mental. In the first place everything that is experienced by mind need not be mental. But in this particular case, the experience of the *Sthāyibhāvas* is not a direct experience and so it is quite correct to say that they are experienced by mind. I have drawn a distinction between the *Sthāyibhāva*, that is a state of the poet's mind and that which is a state of the appreciator's mind. I have called them S1 and S3 respectively. I have also said that S3 is similar to S1 and that S3 is the **meaning** of S2 (or Ds₂). The stage of S3 should not be confused with *sthāyibhāva*. It appears to me that Bharata is quite conscious of this fact. Whenever he talks of the stage S3 he uses the word '*Artha*' for it; e.g. in the *kārikā* *Yo'rtho hṛdayasamvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ*. (VII 7 N.S.) i.e. that meaning which appeals to the heart, it is produced by *Rasa*. (It must be noted that the word '*Bhāva*' is used here not in its technical sense. It simply means existence as it commonly does in Sanskrit.)

What Bharata meant by *Rasa* cannot be fully realised unless the meaning he gives the term *Bhāva* is properly understood. Perhaps Bharata himself has used the word in a loose way or his commentators have interfered with the original text⁴⁰ and abused it to the maximum. This has led

to the following confused interpretations and all sorts of views have been associated with the doctrine. Some of these views are :

(1) that all *bhāvas* are mental. (2) that *Rasas* and *Bhāvas* are synonymous. (3) that both of them are mental but *Rasas* are the effects of *Bhāvas* and are synonymous with pleasure or *Ānanda*. (4) that the *sthāyībhāvas* are the emotions and the *Rasas* are the sentiments as these terms are understood in modern psychology. (5) that the *sthāyībhāvas* are the instincts and the *Rasas* are the emotions, (6) that *sthāyībhava*, *sañcāri-bhāva* and *Anubhāva* are psychological terms and stand for sentiment, derived emotion and expression of emotion. These views have been held by great scholars, ancient and modern, oriental and occidental. At the present time the names of some very eminent scholars like Dr. S. K. De, Dr. Pandey and Dr. K. N. Watve and several others are associated with one or the other of the views mentioned above. The suggested interpretations are so heterogenous that the scope of the present paper does not allow each of them to be examined in detail. All cannot be correct simultaneously, nor in fact need any one of them to be correct. I shall, therefore, confine myself to the presenting of what I believe to be Bharata's own theory of *Bhāva* as it is found in *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and shall refer to the writings of Abhinavagupta alone, wherever necessary, for it is upon them that all the differently held theories concerning *Bhāva* ultimately repose.

Bharata discusses *Bhāvas* in the seventh chapter of *Nāṭyaśāstra*. It is necessary to bear in mind that by the word '*Bhāva*' Bharata does not necessarily mean something mental as Abhinavagupta stipulates. In Sanskrit of Bharata's day and still in modern usage *Bhāva* means anything that exists. Any existent can be called *Bhāva*. Thus both mental and nonmental existents may be included under *Bhāvas*. Moreover it was in this sense, and primarily in a nonmental sense that the word *Bhāva* was used in *Āyurveda*. Mr. D. K. Bedekar has very ably brought out this point in his articles on *Rasa*⁴¹ and I

think this point does not require further elaboration. Bharata starts his whole enquiry with the definition of *Bhāvas*. He asks : *kim bhavanti iti bhāvāḥ kim vā bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ ucyate vāgaṅgasattvopetān bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ iti*⁴². He asks whether those that exist are *bhāvas* or those that create are *bhāvas*, and answers that those that create objects of poetry – objects which are reduced to (acting of the types of) *vāk*, *aṅga*, and *sattva*, are *bhāvas*. There is no doubt that by the phrase ‘*vāgaṅgasattvopetān kāvyārthān*’ Bharata means *Rasas*. Abhinavagupta also accepts that these words refer to *Rasas*, but from his quotation of this passage, he very cleverly omits the words ‘*vāgaṅgasattvopetān*’. Only by resorting to this subterfuge and ignoring the implications of these words can he make his phrase ‘objects of poetry’ designate *Rasa* of his concept. Not simply any object of poetry, but that object (of poetry) which has taken that form of acting etc., Bharata holds to be *Rasa*. Without the qualifications ‘*vāgaṅgasattvopetān*’ the ‘*kāvyārtha*’ would not stand for ‘*Rasa*’ but would merely be another name for *Sthāyībhāva*. Bharata himself uses the words as synonymous in chapter VI (p. 93 N. Sagar Ed.). Of course, Abhinavagupta would have no objection to such an interpretation as he identifies ‘*sthāyībhāvas*’ with ‘*Rasa*’ relying on the misinterpretation of Bharata’s text which follows. This simple omission makes a world of difference to the whole theory of *Rasa*. For it immediately reduces *Rasa* to merely mental status, as the meaning of poetry. Thus instead of designating a member of the D_{S2} series it comes to designate S_3 . It is a pity that Bharata’s use of language is somewhat loose. Abhinavagupta exploits this to the full, but even then it is only by omitting a crucial part of Bharata’s sentence, that he can make the text mean what he wishes.

There is another defect in Bharata’s definition of *Bhāva*. It no doubt points out that *Bhāvas* are the causes of *Rasas*. But even though they create (*Bhāvayanti*), Bharata does not bother to point out that they may still exist (*Bhavanti*). There

is no contradiction whatsoever in these two positions. But in emphasising the creative aspect, Bharata has either forgotten the existence aspect or his original text has been interfered with. In fact, there are a few places where Bharata himself has used the word 'bhāva' in the sense of 'that which exists': *bhavanti iti bhāvāḥ*. e.g. in the kārikā, "*kaveḥ antargatam bhāvam bhāvayan bhāva ucyate⁴⁵*". Also in the kārikā : "*yo artho hṛdaya-samvādī⁴⁴ tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ*. The word 'Bhāva' is used in the sense of existence. In fact there is no objection to holding that all *bhāvas* which Bharata defines as "...creating" (*Bhāvayanti*) can equally be described as 'existing' (*Bhavanti*). In fact *Bhāvas* exhibit both the qualities, of existing and creating or manifesting, and the point should not be neglected.

By describing 'Bhāvas' as the prior conditions of 'Rasa' he means by *bhāvas* both the mental states as well as the expressions of these in bodily and organic symptoms. 'Bhāva' is a genus to which mental and not mental facts belong as species. Unfortunately the form of the Sanskrit language makes misinterpretation possible. Only some 'bhāva' – the *Antargata-bhāva* are mentals⁴⁵. Abhinavagupta has taken it that all *bhāvas* are mental and has woven his own psychological theory round the 'Bhāvas' and 'Rasas' calling them 'particular mental attitudes' or *Cittavṛttiviśeṣāḥ*.⁴⁶

Bharata defines the 'bhāvas' as '*kāvya-rasa-abhivyakti-hetus* i.e. the conditions for the expression of *Rasa* in poetry'. He enumerates them as forty nine and classifies them under three categories, (1) *Sthāyibhāvas*, (2) *Vyabhicāribhāvas* and (3) *Sāttvika bhāvas*. The two points to be noted here are (a) that the list need not be regarded as very exhaustive and scientific and (b) the division need not be regarded as exclusive and trichotomous, though it should be useful.

Of these 'bhāvas' *Sthāyibhāvas* are definitely the most important and they definitely refer to the states in an artist's (i.e. dramatist's) mind. I do not wish to conjecture whether they stand for instincts, emotions, sentiments, ideas or imagery

or the like. It is most unlikely that this wide range of distinctions which are drawn today would have been known in Bharata's day. At any rate, they would not have been necessary for his purpose. It might well do violence to Bharata's work to identify his concept of '*sthāyībhāva*' with anyone of these concepts of psychology. I, therefore, prefer to think that by '*sthāyībhāva*' Bharata referred to all those mental states which give rise to 'art'. Perhaps this mental gestalt may be much richer and comprehensive than any of the proposed states taken in isolation. '*Sthāyī*' literally means standing. I am therefore, inclined to think that, by *sthāyībhāvas* Bharata meant those '*bhāvas*' which stand as the ground or primary motives of artistic creation. Bharata has nowhere defined the '*sthāyībhāvas*'. It appears to me that he must have defined them in his work as it originally stood. But in the text that has come down to us this passage is lost. This is clear from the structure of the text itself. Bharata in the seventh chapter begins by defining the concepts. First he defines the *Bhāvas*. Then he defines *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* etc. Then he comes to *sthāyībhāvas*; but instead of a definition, there follows a discussion of how the *sthāyībhāvas* are transformed into *Rasas*. After this comes a passage⁴⁷ where it is said that the '*Lakṣaṇas*' of the *sthāyībhāvas* are already told, i.e. they are already defined and that now the particular *sthāyībhāvas* will be discussed. In some books, the first sentence of this passage (that is *lakṣaṇam khalu* etc.) is dropped and instead of the second another sentence 'that we shall now define *Sthāyībhāvas*' is substituted. Unfortunately, however, this definition is never given. This suggests that some omission and substitution has been made in the original manuscript. In default of the proper definition we can, however, infer from Bharata's treatment of *sthāyībhāvas* in other passages that he definitely meant by them the materials of art as they are conceived by the artist in his mind before expressing them in some form. Sentences like "*Kaveḥ antargatam bhāvam*"⁴⁸ suggest this.

The second point to note in this connection is that

Bharata expressly states that '*Sthāyibhāvas*' become *Rasās*; not that they are *Rasas*. This suggests that artistic creation is a process and that, in some sense, *Sthāyibhāvas* precede the *Rasas*. The words, '*āpnuvanti*'⁴⁹ and '*labhate*' suggest this.

The '*Vyabhicāribhāvas*' and the '*Sāttvikabhāvas*' are those states in which the *Sthāyibhāvas* are expressed. Some of the states, therefore can be mental and some of them can be otherwise. For this reason, perhaps, in Bharata's list of *Vyabhicāribhāvas* both the mental and nonmental states are included. By *Sāttvika bhāvas*, I believe, Bharata meant what we now term organic sensations. That both the *vyabhicāribhāvas* as well as the *Sāttvikabhāvas* are very useful in *Nāṭya* can easily be seen.

The real difficulty occurs with regard to *Sthāyibhāva*, and for reasons given above I am inclined to think that the *Sthāyibhāvas*⁵⁰ represent the first of Bharata's three stages and which I represent by S1.

From what has been said above the following characteristics of *Rasa* will be clear, (1) that it designates a medium just as *Rūpa* or *śabda* designates a medium; (2) that it is composite in nature, that is it combines characteristics of both *śabda* and *Rūpa*, in that both audible and visible symbols form part of this medium; (3) that essentially it represents movement and is extended in time. The *Rasa* has as one of its basic meanings "flow" and more familiar meanings juice and flavour imply this. On account of its peculiar nature, it is, in fact, not possible to translate *Rasa* into another medium that is static in nature, or something which only exhibits partial characteristics as do audible or written poetry or pictures. Perhaps the nearest approach to '*Rasa*' would be a cinematographic film where several poses and conversations form one whole. Any momentary glimpse of *Rasa* would be the *Rūpa*, that which you find in Painting and Sculpture, any non-visual section of it would be *śabda*, which is found in poetry. If you could imagine that all the different pictures,

printed here produce only one dynamic image before you, and if you could further imagine that all the images in the picture are living images and that you are able to listen to them, it would be the nearest approach to *Rasa*. This will clearly suggest that it is futile to locate *Rasa* either in poetry or in pictures – one cannot translate a sentence from one language into another and retain at the same time the name of the old language. *Rasa* is the language of staging and it is there alone that it can be manifested at all,

I then conclude that by *Rasa*, Bharata did not mean what Abhinavagupta took him to mean. A term conveying the sense which Bharata gave to *Rasa* is anyway necessary for any understanding of true dramatic art. It is, therefore wrong to hold as Gnoli does, that before Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta *Rasa* was a crude and primitive notion, that it was Abhinavagupta who made it profound and understandable. I conclude that *Rasa* as used by Abhinavagupta is an entirely different concept from that designated as *Rasa* by Bharata, and though what Abhinavagupta conveys by his concept of *Rasa* may be useful and valuable for the theory of poetics, Abhinavagupta was completely wrong in foisting his notion of *Rasa* onto Bharata's; though Abhinavagupta's theory may be useful, his commentary as a commentary is wrong. For Bharata, *Rasa* is only 'previous to the act of consciousness' a thing in itself, not 'the act of consciousness', as Abhinavagupta, according to Gnoli, defines it.

Notes

- 1 Introduction XXII : Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinava Gupta Raniero Gnoli, published by Instituto Italiano Per It Medio Ed Estrenio, Oriente, 1956.
- 2 Mr. Kavi the Editor of *Nāṭyaśāstra* has translated it by the word 'Theatronics'. I think this would help to bring about the distinction between *Nāṭaka* and *Nāṭya*.
- 3, 4 The words, however, are not always used in this precise sense. They could be used in their wider and narrower sense. Thus, in one sense,

Nāṭaka will be a wider concept, and *Nāṭya* only a staging part of it. On the other hand, if *Nāṭaka* is taken as one consisting of spoken or written symbols, *Nāṭaka*, in a sense, will be a part of *Nāṭya*. Such loose use of words is even unwittingly made by Bharata and has left the door open for misinterpretation.

- 5 N.S. VIII 12. Nirṇaya Sāgar Edn. pp. 287-88.
- 6 The word *Śabda* should not be confused with 'word', a Sanskrit equivalent of which is 'pada'.
- 7 (1) a reference to *Tanmātra* is traceable to Īśvarkṛṣṇa's *kārikā*.
(2) this concept is peculiar to Sāṃkhya system alone.
- 8 This should be distinguished from knowledge.
- 9 Sāṃkhya is an atheistic system and does not believe in God as creator.
- 10 The similarity between the words *Bhūta* and *Bhāva* is very striking. Both mean the same thing. *Bhūta* is formed by adding 'ka' (*Napūm-sake Bhāve ka*) to the root 'Bhū' and *Bhāva* is formed by adding 'Ghañ' to the same root in the same sense.
- 11 Note the word 'Sthāyi' which means standing. In my later analysis I have distinguished between 'Sthāyi' and *Kavī Antargata-bhava*. Vide 'A critical introduction to Bharata's theory of art'.
- 12 Mr. P. S. Rawson, Ass. keeper, Museum of Eastern Art, Indian Institute, Oxford, however, tells me that in Japan, there is an art connected with *Gandha* which is practised in the confection and enjoyment of incenses.
- 13 'Kāvyaṃ ca Nāṭyameva', p. 291. N.S. (G.O.S.) publication.
- 14 (a) *Vagaṅgasattvopetān kāvyārthān* (N.S.P.) (b) *Tryavasthāḥ Nāṭake smṛtāḥ* (N.S.P.)
- 15 N.S., p. 291. (G.O.S. 2nd edn.)
- 16 The word 'Artha' is again ambiguous. It may mean the 'content' of Daśarūpaka, may mean the story or it may mean the symbolic manifestation which may also be either (1) verbal or (2) theatrical.
- 17 *Artha* means 'Viśaya'.
- 18-19 N. S. XIV 1-2 p. 221. (N.S.P.)
- 20 G.O.S. 2nd Edition.
- 21 Mr. Shastri seems to be further wrong in supposing that Kālidāsa also indicated that *Nāṭya* did not mean *Anukaraṇa* but meant *Rasa*, when he writes in *Mālavikāgnitira* :
Traigunyoḍbhavamātralokacaritaṃ nānārasaṃ drśyaṭe
Nāṭyam bhīnnarucerjanasya bahudhāpyekam samārādhanaṃ.

- 22 This will be discussed later.
- 23 N.S. p. 276 (G.O.S. 2nd Edn.)
- 24 VII 107 N.S. p. 2. VII 121 Ibid.
- 25 I think language and art are similar in many respect.
- 26 At least his commentary is not available.
- 27 It must be admitted that the transition from stage 1 to stage 2 is extremely complicated and has problems of its own.
- 28 The word '*Nāṭya*' is ambiguous. By it we may understand something less than *Rasa*, or even something more. We can also use the words *Rasa* and *Nāṭya* as synonymous, as suggested by Abhinavagupta : *Tena rasaḥ eva nāṭyam.* (p. 267. N.S., G.O.S. 2nd edition). But while doing so, we must be aware that we are employing them in a sense which is given to them by our definition and that we are employing them for an art which is distinct from literature or *kāvya*.
- 29 Refer to Professor Brough's remarkable article on "Some Indian Theories of Meaning" published in Transaction of the Philosophical Society, 1953.
- 30 N.S. VI, N.S. p. 93. *Harṣādīnśca adhigacchanti* (please note the '*ca*').
- 31 Like all words the word '*Artha*' also has its technical and non-technical uses. When we say 'what is the meaning of this word' we simply mean what is the 'bearer' of this word. This was evidently in the mind of Abhinavagupta when he commented on the sentence of Bharata - *Rasaḥ iti kaḥ padārthaḥ*, by, '*Rasaḥ iti padasya, śṅgārādīpravartitasya kaḥ arthaḥ.* (N.S. G.O.S. 2nd edition. p. 288). But for his modern followers like Dr. K. N. Watve the word '*Artha*' used here stood for S3.
- 32 This may either mean *kāvyaṛtha* as some passages show, and I am inclined to take i.e. S3, or may mean an object - and in that case the object or, *visaya* or *Nāṭya*. The verb '*pravartate*' suggests that *Rasa-Artha* represents a process and justifies my use.
- 33 Here again it must be remembered that the relation between *Rasa*, as it occurs here, and *Anna* or food is the same as exists between a *Tanmātra* and a *Mahābhūta*. *Rasa* does not stand for the sensation of tasting, but stands for the object of sensation. It is true that the sentence appears ambiguous. But it is because we are now accustomed to understand by the word '*Rasa*' a taste sensation.
- 34 Note that the word here is *Prekṣaka* who is necessary for *Nāṭya* and not a reader (*Vācaka*) or audience (*Śrotā*).
- 35 The ideas in dramastist's mind or S1.

- 36 These are three types of 'abhinayas' or acting.
- 37 Note here the 'ca' (and) which separates happiness etc. from *Rasa*. Also note that the word '*Sthāyibhāva*' in this passage must only refer to what is in the dramatist's mind, and not in the spectator's, for the *Sthāyibhāvas* in the spectator's mind cannot possibly be said to be *vāk-āṅga-sattvopeta*.
- 38 Abhinavagupta, however, says that, Rasas are only in the *Nāṭya* and not in the actual world : *Tena nāṭya eva rasāḥ na loke ityarthāḥ* (N.S. p. 291 G.O.S. Baroda). But this is surely because by *Rasa* he understands a peculiar kind of happiness or joy. It is, however, clear from the above passage itself, that for Bharata *Rasa* is applicable to the *lokadharmi* or the ordinary world as well as to the *nāṭyadharmi* or the world of art. For he refers '*Nāṭya-rasa*' as proper to the *Nāṭyadharmi* world. This is borne out in the Sāṃkhya philosophy from which Bharata borrows certain concepts and also in Atharva Veda from which he illustrates his point. In Pratyabhijñā school too, *Rasa* is accepted as one of the basic categories of reality, though the meaning of *Rasa* is evidently changed there perhaps under the influence of Vajrayāna Vāda.
- 39 N.S. VII 2.
- 40 There is no doubt that the text has been interfered with. For there exist different readings in different editions.
- 41 Nava Bharata Nov. 1950, published from Pune (now from Wai).
- 42 N.S. VIII, N.S. p. 104.
- 43 N.S. VII 7.
- 44 N.S. VII, page 342, G.O.S. 2nd edn.
- 45 In this article I have held *sthāyibhāvas* as mental. But elsewhere I have given a more elaborate explanation. I have regarded *sthāyibhāvas* as meaning and *antargata-bhāva* alone as mental.
- 46 N.S. page 106 (N.S. ed.).
- 47 p. 107 N.S. (N.S. ed.) *Lakṣaṇam khalu pūrvam abhikītam....etc.* and *Tatra sthāyibhāvan vākṣyamah.*
- 48 Ibid. VII p. 106.
- 49 Ibid page 107.
- 50 In a more recent article I have stated that *sthāyibhāva* only means 'meaning' or *kāvyaṛtha*. The present article is based on my earlier views. But the two views are not conflicting.

SANSKRIT THINKERS ON LOGIC IN RELATION TO POETRY

V. M. Kulkarni

Śrīdhara, a Commentator of Mammaṭa's *Kāvya Prakāśa* quotes a very important verse from Bhaṭṭa Tota's *Kāvya-Kautuka* which distinguishes between philosophy and poetry.

“There are two paths of (Sarasvatī), the goddess of speech : One is philosophy (Śāstra) and the other is poetry (Kavi-Karma, i.e. Kāvya). The first of these two arises from intellect (prajñā) and the second from creative or artistic imagination (pratibhā)¹

The philosophers and logicians, generally speaking, have nothing but scorn for poets and their poetry. Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great logician, for instance, attacked the doctrine of dhvani, enunciated by Ānandavardhana, the author of that famous prasthānagrantha, *Dhvanyāloka*. He dubbed him as a pedant who fancies himself to be a paṇḍita (paṇḍitaṁ-manya) and declared : “There is no point in arguing with poets.”²

Ānandavardhana treats of the prima facie view that there is no need to postulate the new doctrine of Dhvani as it is identical with the well-known anumāna (inference) of the logicians and establishes his theory of Vyañjanā-vṛtti and the doctrine of Dhvani. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka specially wrote his *Hṛdaya-(or Sahṛdaya-)Darpaṇa* to demolish Ānandavardhana's new-fangled doctrine of dhvani. This work is unfortunately not extant. Mahimabhaṭṭa, a formidable critic of Ānandavardhana's new theory of Vyañjanā-vṛtti and of dhvani, wrote his *Vyakti-Viveka* stoutly refuting the theory of Dhvani (and vyañjanā) and vigorously defending that the so-called dhvani

is nothing but *anumiti* or *anumāna* of the logicians. The followers of Ānandavardhana like Mammaṭa,⁵ Ruyyaka⁴ (and Jayaratha, his commentator), Hemacandra⁵ and Viśvanātha⁶ briefly refer to Mahimabhaṭṭa's criticism and answer it saying that the *anumāna* in poetry does not satisfy the conditions or requirements of a valid inference that are laid down by the science of Logic and therefore it cannot displace *dhvani*.

So far I have come across two papers on Logic and its influence on *Alamkāra-śāstra*, one by Professor Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya⁷ and the other by Professor Anantalal Thakur.⁸ The approach, aim and treatment adopted in this paper is however, markedly, nay, wholly different.

Although the ancient thinkers like Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa nowhere speak of the *vyañjanā-vṛtti* or the *dhvani*, they were certainly aware of the existence of the *pratyamāna artha* (additional sense over and above the denoted sense (*mukhyārtha*, *vācyārtha* or *saṅketitārtha*) as well as the connotated sense (*lakṣyārtha*) in poetry. It was Ānandavardhana (or the Dhvanikāra) who for the first time postulated the new *vyañjanā vṛtti* and the novel theory of *dhvani* in his epoch-making work, the *Dhvanyāloka*. His great commentator, Abhinavagupta, the Locanakāra, and celebrated followers like Mammaṭa, the Vāgdevatāvātāra or Vyutpanna-śiromaṇi, of *Kāvyaṭīkā* fame gave their powerful and solid support to Ānandavardhana's *vyañjanā-vṛtti* and the theory of *dhvani* demolishing and defeating strong opposition and fierce attacks from the worthy opponents like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa, Dhanamjaya and Dhanika. In this paper we do not propose to go into the merits and defects of the arguments advanced by the two sides in refuting the rival's point of view and establishing one's own. We are mainly interested in knowing what place, according to the Sanskrit thinkers, Logic has in poetry or in other words what role it is expected, according to them, to play in poetry.

Now the Sanskrit thinkers, one and all, proudly declare that the poetic universe excels the real universe and that it

is unique (alaukika). It, therefore, follows that the two criteria of truth, the two pramāṇas of the logicians, pratyakṣa and anumāna are not valid in poetry. Then how are we to judge truth in poetry? We find a convincing answer to this question in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyaśāstra* (Chapter V : Nyāyanirṇaya) and Rājasekhara's *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (Chapter IX : Arthavyutpatti, pp. 44-46). Bhāmaha clearly distinguishes between the two pramāṇas Pratyakṣa and Anumāna dealt with in Logic (Nyāyashāstra) and their counter-parts in poetry. The śāstras exclusively deal with truth and nothing but truth, with scientific truth or objective reality whereas the *Kāvya*s are founded on the ways and characteristics of both the stationary or inanimate world (sthāvara) like trees, rivers and mountains and the movable or animate world like human beings and lower animals.⁹ We accept, for instance the following statements of poets as true : "The sky resembles a sword (in its blue colour); this sound comes from a distance, the water of the river stream is ever the same and the huge flames (or the Great Lights, the Sun, the Moon, the Planets and the stars) are wonderfully steady (or eternal)." But these statements of poets are incorrect according to the śāstras : For, the sky has no colour; sound is a special quality of *Ākāśa* and has its place in the outer part of the ear and it cannot have action (kriyā : coming from a distance); the water of the river stream changes every moment and that the flames of fire are ever-changing (or the Great Lights of the Universe are not eternal as they are destroyed at the time of world-dissolution). Rājasekhara too echoes Bhāmaha's thoughts in his *kāvya-mīmāṃsā* : "Poetic truth is founded on appearance (pratibhāsa) and scientific truth, on the objective reality. If appearance were the real nature of things, then the orbs of the sun and moon which appear to measure twelve aṅgulas (aṅgula = a finger's breadth) could not have been of the measure of the globe of the earth as described in the āgamas like the Purāṇas, etc.¹⁰ Bhāmaha discusses at length the topic of anumāna as set forth in the Science of Logic and its counter-part (Kāvyanumāna)

in the province of poetry. Bhāmaha's whole treatment of this topic is novel, interesting and illuminating and deserves to be read in the original.¹¹ He first defines and illustrates the two *pramāṇas*, *pratijñā*, its *doṣas*, *hetu* and *hetvābhāsas*, *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*, *dūṣana* and *dūṣaṇābhāsa* as set forth in the Science of Logic. Then he treats of *pratijñā*, *pratijñābhāsa*, *hetu* and *hetu-doṣas* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*, its varieties in accordance with *Loka-vyavahāra* and as found in poetry. From Bhāmaha's treatment of *nyāya* in accordance with the *sāstras* and in accordance with the 'loka' (or *loka-vyavahāra*) it is clear that in the province of poetry he does not insist on the strict, rigid or rigorous form in respect of *anumāna*, and its members like *pratijñā*, *hetu*, and *dr̥ṣṭānta*. This Bhāmaha's stand would seem to be perfectly reasonable. Śrī Śaṅkuka, one of the commentators of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, when explaining the famous *rasa-sūtra* assigns a major role to *anumiti* or *anumāna*.¹² Abhinavagupta, who vehemently criticises the *anumāna* theory recognises the importance of *laukika anumāna* in the equipment of a *sahṛdaya*.¹³ Some of the Sanskrit thinkers unhesitatingly accept the *alāmkāras* like *Kāvya-liṅga* and *anumāna*.¹⁴

The thinkers who approvingly quote 'Citratraga-nyāya' or 'maṇi-pradīpa-prabhā-dr̥ṣṭānta' in explaining the process of *rasa* experience, who sing of the glories of the unique nature of poetic creation, and who accept *āhārya-jñāna* as the very basis of the various figures of sense should have, in fact, unhesitatingly accepted *Kāvya-numāna* or *laukika-numāna* as the source of the additional sense, the so-called suggested sense. These thinkers ungrudgingly accept *Kāvya-pratyakṣa* as advocated by Bhāmaha but vehemently criticise the *Kāvya-numāna* as the source of revealing the additional sense. This *ardha-jaratrya* won't do. Mahimabhaṭṭa's view that there is no need to postulate a new-fangled *vṛtti* called *vyañjanā* and the new theory of *dhvani* as their purpose is perfectly served by *anumāna* (of course, *Kāvya-numāna*) deserves a more sympathetic and dispassionate consideration at the hands of the

enthusiastic followers of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata. For Mahimabhāṭṭa's advocacy of anumāna as the source of the so-called suggested sense is really well-argued and reasoned.

Notes

- 1 दवे वर्त्मनी गिरां देव्याः शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।
प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोराद्यं प्रतिभाभवमन्तिमम् ॥
- 2 यमन्यः पण्डितमन्यः प्रपेदे कञ्चन ध्वनिम् ।.....
अथवा नेदृशी चर्चा कविभिः सह शोभते ॥ —*Nyāyamañjari* (K.S.S.), p. 45.
- 3 *Kāvyaṭprākāśa* V (Jhalakikar's ed., 1950), pp. 252-256.
- 4 *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* (with *Alaṃkāra-vimarśinī*), *Kāvyaṃālā* ed. 1939, pp. 15-16.
- 5 *Kāvyaṅuśāsana I* (Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay, 1964 ed.), p. 52.
- 6 *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (P. V. Kane ed., 1923, Appendix E, pp 59-60).
- 7 The Neo-Buddhistic Nucleus In *Alaṃkāra Śāstra*, *JASB*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1956, pp. 49-66.
- 8 Influence of Buddhist Logic On *Alaṃkāra-Śāstra*, *Journal*, *Oriental Institute, Baroda*, Vol VII, No 4, June 1958, pp. 257-261.
- 9 तत्र लोकाश्रयं काव्यमागमास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ।—*Kāvyaṅalaṃkāra* V-33cd. Cf. with this view : “ अस्तु नाम निःसीमार्थसार्थः । किन्तु द्विरूप एवासौ विचारितसुस्थोऽविचारित-रमणीयश्च [इति] । तयोः पूर्वमाश्रितानि शास्त्राणि तदुत्तरं काव्यानि ” इत्यौद्भटाः । —*Kāvyaṃimāmsā* IX, p. 44.
- 10 “ न स्वरूपनिबन्धनमिदं रूपमाकाशस्य सरित्सालिलादेर्वा किन्तु प्रतिभासनिबन्धनम् । न च प्रतिभासस्तादात्म्येन वस्तुन्यवतिष्ठते । यदि तथा स्यात् सूर्याचन्द्रमसोर्मण्डले दृष्टया परिच्छिद्यमानद्वादशाङ्गुलप्रमाणे पुराणायागमनिवेदितधरावलयमात्रे न स्तः ” इति यायावरीयः ।—*Kāvyaṃimāmsā*, IX, p. 44.
- 11 *Bhāmaha* : *Kāvyaṅalaṃkāra* (V. 5-60).
- 12 तस्माद् हेतुभिर्विभावाख्यैः कार्यैश्चानुभावात्मभिः सहचारिरूपैश्च व्यभिचारिभिः प्रयत्नाजिततया कृत्रिमैरपि तथानभिमन्यमानैरनुकर्तृस्थत्वेन लिङ्गबलतः प्रतीयमानः स्थायी भावो मुख्यराभादिगत स्थाय्यनुकरणरूपः ।
—*Abhinavabhāratī* (I) 6, 32-22, p. 172
- 13 तत्र लोकव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहचारात्मकलिङ्गदर्शने स्थाय्यात्मपरचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यासपाठवात्
—*ibid* (p. 284)

- 14 Udbhaṭa : *Kāvyaśāstra* VI. 4 (Kāvyaśāstra and the *Laghu-vṛtti* on it).

And, Mammaṭa : *Kāvyaśāstra* X.31. In his *Vṛtti* Mammaṭa, it deserves to be noted, speaks of the 'Trirūpa' hetu and not of 'Pañcārūpa' hetu. One may be justified from this reference to infer that Mammaṭa does not insist on the regular, rigid, logical hetu in poetry. Jagannātha's discussion about 'anumāna' śāstra in the context of *Milita śāstra* also shows that he does not insist on the rigorous anumāna in the field of poetry.

*

BRAHMAN, MASCULINE AND NEUTER, IN THE PRE-BUDDHIST UPANIṢADS

Harvey B. Aronson

A. Brahman and the World of Brahman in the Pre-Buddhist Upaniṣads

In the "Discourse to Those Who Possess the Threefold Knowledge" it is told how two *Brāhmaṇa* youths named Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja came to the Buddha wishing to learn the path to communion with Brahman (*Brahmasahavyatā*, D.i. 236). The Buddha is shown teaching them to relate to all beings with love, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity in order to achieve communion with Brahman. In the "Discourse Concerning Mahāsudassana" it is said that Mahāsudassana related to all beings with love, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity and after his death he was reborn in the pleasant fate of the world of Brahman (*sugatiṃ Brahmalokaṃ uppajji*, D.ii. 196).

What did Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja have in mind when they were seeking the path to communion with Brahman? In the period preceding the formulation of the canon, what thoughts did new students have in mind when they heard that through relating to beings with love, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity an individual could achieve communion with Brahman, or he could be reborn in world of Brahman? The answers to these questions can be inferred from the pre-Buddhist *Upaniṣads*. A. K. Warder in *Outline of Indian Philosophy* says that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Chāndogya* and the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣads* can all be assigned to the period of 850-750 B.C.E. (Warder, p. 21). This would place these *Upaniṣads* two hundred years before the time of the Buddha,

during which time the ideas discussed in them could certainly have achieved a large degree of popular dissemination and acceptance.

According to these *Upaniṣads* there are two paths possible at death, one which leads to the world of Brahman, and one which leads to rebirth back in this world (Brh. 6.2.15-16; Cha. 5.10; Kau. 1.1-7). The attributes of the world of Brahman are described in various ways in these texts. According to Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* the world of Brahman is the highest bliss (*parama ānanda*, Brh. 4.3.32). According to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it is always radiant (*sakrd vibhāta*, Cha.8.4.2), and those who possess it move as they desire in all worlds (Cha. 8.4.3).

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Pravāhaṇa Jaivali is shown explaining the path which leads to the world of Brahman to the *Brāhmaṇa* Gautama Āruṇi in the following way :

Those individuals who understand this [doctrine of the five fires] as it has been explained pass into a flame [when they die]. So do those who contemplate, in the forest, on [their] faith as being true. From the flame [they pass] into the day, from the day into the waxing moon, from the waxing moon into those six months in which the sun progresses to the north, from the months into the world of the gods (*devaloka*), from the world of the gods into the sun, and from the sun into the flames of lightning. A spiritual being comes to those flames of lightning and leads them to the world of Brahman (*Brahmaloka*). They live exaltedly in those worlds of Brahman for a long time. They do not return (Brh. 6.2.15).

It is worth noting that the end of this path, which in other passages is called the path leading to the gods, the individuals are said to live for a long time without returning. This does not rule out death and rebirth from that world after a long time. We will soon see that immortality

unequivocally replaced life in the world of Brahman for a long time as to the end of the path leading to the gods.

This same episode, in which Pravāhana Jaivali instructs Gautama Āruṇi appears again in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The instructions in the latter occur with the following variation :

From the months [they pass] into the year, from the year into the sun, from the sun into the moon, and from the moon into lightning. Then a non-human being leads them to Brahman [neuter]. This is called the path which leads to the gods. (Cha. 5.10.2)

This highly informative variation shows that in this context Brahman (neuter) and the world of Brahman *Brahmaloka* are interchangeable as the end of the path which leads to the gods.

In the earliest *Upaniṣads* both Brahman (neuter) and the world of Brahman (*Brahmaloka*) are associated with immortality. Yājñavalkya quotes the following verse with regard to Brahman (neuter) in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* :

When all desires contained in the heart are given up,
A mortal becomes immortal.

In which case he attains Brahman [neuter]. (Bṛh. 4.4.7.)

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the following is said with regard to the world of Brahman :

Now, that which is the self is a boundary. It divides the worlds in order to keep them distinct. Day and night do not cross this boundary, nor do old age, death, sorrow, wrong action or right action. All evils turn away from there, for the world of Brahman (*Brahmaloka*) is free from evil, (Cha. 8.4.1.)

Swami Nikhilananda understands the self of the first sentence to mean that which creates all diversity and limitation (Nikhilananda, 1959, p. 368). He equates this self with the world of Brahman. Though the self, or the world of Brahman has created diversity and limitation, it itself is

untouched by any of these. Day, night, sorrow and death do not affect it. Being free from death we can understand that the self, or the world of Brahman (*Brahmaloka*) is immortal according to this quote from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.

As Brahman (neuter) and the world of Brahman were both said to be at the end of the path leading to the gods, immortality which was associated with both of these could be understood to be attained there as well. This condition of immortality no doubt became associated with the end of the path leading to the gods as one of the explicit goals of the religious life. In the Pali scriptures people are described as coming to the Buddha seeking communion with Brahman (*Brahmasahavyatā* D. i. 235) as well as freedom from the grips of mortality (*amaccudheyya*, S. i. 123). We can assume, on the basis of the material presented above, that in both cases these people were seeking the immortality which had become associated with the end of the path leading to the gods, though their goals were articulated in different ways. It is stated in one discourse that the goal of attaining the immortal world of Brahman existed before the time of the Buddha. In the "Discourse on the Great Cow Herder" the god Brahmā Saṃkumāra is shown instructing the Bodhisatta Jotipāla on the way to reach the immortal world of Brahmā (*amataṃ Brahma-lokam*, D. ii. 241).

(B) Brahman (masculine and neuter) and the World of Brahman

The nature of the Sanskrit and Pali languages are such that compound word *Brahmaloka* can mean either the world of Brahman (neuter), or the world of Brahman (masculine). In some contexts it may be impossible to determine the gender of Brahman originally intended. It is on the basis of this ambiguity that individuals actually discussing different phenomena could use exactly the same words. The compound "world of Brahman" (*Brahmaloka*) could refer to the "world of Brahman" (neuter) which is the undifferentiated consciousness at the root of all knowing (Bṛh. 4.3.19–32 in conjunction with Bṛh. 4.4.18). or, it could refer to the highly differentiated

heavenly world of the god Brahman (masculine, Kau. 1.1-7). Because of this ambiguity, some of the passages in the *Upaniṣads* are open to various interpretations. In order to make this ambiguity manifest I have left the genders off all those instances of Brahman which are ambiguous in the texts. From this point onward I will be using *Brahma* when it is clear that the neuter Brahman was intended and *Brahmā* when it is clear that the masculine Brahman was intended. These are the nominative case forms of Brahman neuter and masculine respectively.

There is only one example in the earliest *Upaniṣads* of a clear difference in *status* between Brahman masculine and neuter. This occurs when Yājñavalkya is shown teaching King Janaka that those individuals who are free from desire become immortal and attain *Brahma*, while those individuals who possess desire create the forms of *Prajāpati*, *Brahmā* and so forth, from whose worlds they eventually return to this world (Brh. 4, 4.3-7). This contrast between mortal *Brahmā* and immortal *Brahma* occurs nowhere else in the earliest *Upaniṣads*.

In the Theravada discourses the students who came to the Buddha asking for the path to communion with Brahman were asking for the path to communion with *Brahmā* (masculine). Similarly, according to the discourses, the Buddha and his disciples had only *Brahmā* in mind when they discussed the path to communion with *Brahmā* in so far as the neuter noun Brahman never occurs in the discourses. It can also be noted that, according to the discourses, the Buddha completely rejected the possibility of a fundamental consciousness separated from causes and conditions, called Brahman in the *Upaniṣads*, even if he did not call such an entity *Brahma* (M.i.256-260). Below I will show that in the *Kausītaki Upaniṣad* the term *Brahmā* combined aspects which were later exclusively attributed to *Brahma* or *Brahmā*. The Buddha's statements in the discourses may have been following this usage or some variant of it. This possibility could explain the absence of any mention of *Brahma* in the Pali scriptures.

(c) The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* :

So far we have seen that there are the following possibilities, with regard to Brahman and the world of Brahman. Brahman may be masculine or neuter, the world of Brahman may be related to Brahman or Brahmā, this world may be differentiated or undifferentiated, and finally Brahma may be considered to have a higher status than Brahmā. The *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* presents a synthesis of several of these elements into a unique vision of the glories of the world of Brahmā (Kau. 1.1-7).

In this *Upaniṣad* Citra Gāṅgyāyani teaches Gautama Āruṇi about the path which leads to the gods. Gautama Āruṇi is also the name of the priest who received instructions on the same topic from the ruler Pravāhana Jaivali in two other contexts in the earliest *Upaniṣads* (Bṛh. 6.2.15: Cha. 5.10.1-2). The repeated occurrence of highly similar passages concerning the path which leads to the gods shows the importance of these teachings during the period of the earliest *Upaniṣads*.

Citra Gāṅgyāyani explains that at death all go to the moon which asks who they are. If they can not answer they are reborn again in this world according to their deeds and their knowledge (*yathākarma yathāvidyam*, Kau. 1.2). If they can trace their birth back to the moon they may proceed. We can see here the decisive role of profound wisdom as compared to mere deeds and common knowledge. This is a distinction which pervades the *Upaniṣads*.

The individual who answers the moon successfully then passes through various worlds, such as the worlds of Agni, Varuṇa and Prajāpati. He finally comes to the world of Brahmā which is described as having the lake Āra, the river Vijaṛā (ageless), the dwelling Aparājita (unconquerable), celestial nymphs offering flowers, perfumes and so forth. Citra Gāṅgyāyani states that if an individual knows all this about the the world of Brahmā he comes to it (*tam itthamvid āgacchati*, Kau. 1.3). Brahmā tells the individual that, "He, who has come to the river Vijaṛā (ageless) on account of my glory will not grow old" (Kau.1.3).

It is actually at this passage that we see the unequivocal presence of Brahmā in the world of Brahman in this *Upaniṣad*. It is because of this that I have used "Brahmā" throughout the discussion of this *Upaniṣad*. We also see here that one of the characteristics of the highly differentiated world of Brahmā is the river Vijaṛā (ageless). When the individual seeking the glory of Brahmā reaches the river, he is assured of never getting old. This is another way of saying he has attained immortality. In so far as Brahmā rules over the river Vijaṛā he was probably considered ageless or immortal himself by the followers of this text.

In explaining the individual's progress through the world of Brahmā Citra Gāṅgyāyani notes that, "An individual who knows Brahma, indeed approaches Brahma" (*brahmavidvān brahmaivābhīpraiti*, Kau. 1.4.). This statement is interesting in view of the fact that the whole chapter on the path leading to the gods discusses the approach to Brahmā and a conversation with Brahmā. The interjection of this statement concerning Brahma in the midst of the discussion concerning the approach to Brahmā seems to point to the possibility of total identification of Brahma and Brahmā in this text. This statement is also one more example which shows the recurrent concern for profound knowledge in the *Upaniṣads*. Earlier we saw that knowledge was essential for entering the path leading to the world of Brahmā. Here we see that it is necessary for approaching Brahma. In the Theravāda scriptures it is certain qualities or factors of mind, such as love, which when developed can create a state in which one is equal to Brahmā in this very life and can lead to communion with Brahmā after death.

The individual who is being described in the *Kauṣītaki* finally comes to Brahmā who is sitting upon a couch. It is stated that Brahmā asks him who he is (Kau. 1.5). In the course of an extended reply the individual states that he is identical with Brahmā in this way:

'I am the self of every being. You are the self of every being. What you are, I am.'

He [Brahmā] says to him, 'Who am I?'

He should answer, 'The truth.' (Kau.1.6)

The individual goes on to explicate that the truth is equal to all that is. Brahmā continues the conversation probing the individual's understanding of Brahmā's identity as well as asking him the means for apprehending the various aspects of Brahmā. If the individual answers successfully, he, "conquers whatever is Brahmā's conquest, and attains whatever is Brahmā's attainment" (Kau.1.7.)

This *Upaniṣad* is quite interesting in that Brahmā is described in a way which combines attributes which are later exclusively applied to either Brahma or Brahmā. In so far as Brahmā is described as being the self of every being, and the truth which encompasses all that exists, he has attributes which are later associated only with Brahma. In so far as Brahmā is described as existing in a highly differentiated world, and is pictured as sitting on a couch and talking he has attributes later associated only with Brahmā.

If this broad usage of Brahmā or one similar to it were still current at the time the canon was established this could explain the appearance of just Brahmā in the Pali scriptures to the exclusion of Brahma. It would have been unnecessary to mention Brahma as its attributes would have been included in the concept of Brahmā. The persistence of the wide meaning of Brahmā in the Pali scriptures is supported by the fact that Buddha is shown criticizing the view that Brahmā is eternal in the "Brahma-net Discourse" (D.i.17). This particular wrong view would have been based on the broad usage of Brahmā.

Bibliography

(A) Works cited by Abbreviation :

- Bṛh—"*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*", in *The Principal Upanisads*. Ed. S. Radhakrishnan. London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, pp. 147-133.

- Cha. "Chāndogya Upaniṣad," in *The Principal Upaniṣads*. Ed. S. Radhakrishnan. London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, pp. 335-51a.
- D. *Dīgha Nikāya*. Eds. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter. London : Pali Text Society, I, 1980; rpt., 1967, II, 1903, rpt., 1966.
- Kau. "Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad," in *The Principal Upaniṣads*. Ed. S. Radhakrishnan. London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969; pp. 751-791.
- M. *Majjhima Nikāya*. Ed. V. Trenckner. London : Pali Text Society, I, 1888; rpt., 1964.
- (B) *Work Cited by Author :*
Warder, A. K. *Outline of Indian Philosophy*. Delhi : Motilal Banarstdas, 1971.

*

MYSTICISM AND INDIAN SPIRITUALITY

Karel Werner

Although the term mysticism is of Western origin, it has been used in the context of Indian spiritual tradition both by European and Indian authors, sometimes without any attempt to define it. This is perhaps because there is a certain broad consensus about its meaning among scholars concerned with religious studies which overcomes the ambiguity of the term as it is frequently exhibited in its popular usage. I have tried elsewhere¹ to trace the beginnings of mysticism in Europe and summarise its historical development. Its origin clearly points to the mystery cults in the twilight of Greek history and goes back perhaps to even earlier times in Indo-European antiquity. Later, mysticism developed in ancient Greece in close connection with some philosophical teachings and still later it was influenced also by Judaic experience and by mystical teachings from the East, particularly from India.

Christian mysticism combined all these trends with the mystical dimension of Christ's mission and developed its specific terminology stemming from Christian theological doctrines, but it never lost its strongly neo-Platonic flavour which it acquired through pseudo-Dionisios Areopagita (cca 500 A.D.). In view of all this one has to conclude that European mysticism has nothing specifically European in its origin, which only illustrates the universality of the phenomenon of mysticism.

In its subsequent historical development European mysticism appears to have proceeded along three interconnected and interwoven yet distinguishable lines. First there is what can be described as the direct experience, communion or union

with God, the Divine or the ultimate reality. Second comes a theological or metaphysical doctrine which may be based on such an experience or on a tradition which started by someone who had mystical experiences. In this context experience is primary and mystical doctrines are secondary, derived from a mystical experience or from a tradition pointing to such an experience. Third we find formulations of a mystic way, path or method through which a follower, instructed and prepared by the doctrine, may hope to reach his own experience which the doctrine has promised him.

The way was outlined in mediaeval times as proceeding in three stages : the path of purification (*via purgativa*) which was to cleanse the heart and mind from entanglement in the shackles of the sensory world, the path of illumination (*via illuminativa*) which was to bring inner understanding of a higher nature than reason or intellect can offer and, finally, the path of unification (*via unitiva*) which is supposed to bring the mystic to the point where he no longer sees any difference between himself and his goal—the epistemological and ontological spheres are no longer separate for him.

It seems to me that the threefold division of mysticism is both useful and universally valid. Its usefulness lies particularly in its hermeneutical value : it enables the scholar as someone standing outside a particular mystical tradition or movement to assess its basic nature and find out which of the three elements dominates it. The fact that the threefold division is universally applicable speaks in favour of the view that all mystical or deeper spiritual systems possess a certain structural correspondence and probably even an identity of purpose and final goal.

In a sense it may be said that mysticism is the heart of every religion lending it the dimension of depth. It is usually possible to trace the beginning of a religious tradition to mystical experiences of its founder(s). In the course of the subsequent development of a given religious tradition its mystical dimension may go through times when it is at a low

ebb, but if it disappears entirely to become only a vestige of the past, the religious tradition in question is in a crisis and may be in danger of perishing entirely.

India offers us an example of a religious development whose phases are marked by the emergence of ever-renewed mystical experiences, ever freshly formulated mystical doctrines and periodically reformulated mystical paths. In that respect the Indian religious tradition provides us with yet another concrete illustration of the thesis about the universality of mysticism and its overall structural unity across cultural boundaries.

In the first of his six Norman Wait Harris Foundation lectures on Hindu mysticism at Northwestern University, U.S.A., which Professor S. N. Dasgupta delivered in 1926 he dealt with the oldest Indian spiritual phase, the Vedic tradition, under the heading "Sacrificial Mysticism".² In a survey of the whole of Indian religious tradition one always has to start with the Vedas. But to find in them only mysticism surrounding sacrificial rites and their mysterious link to cosmic forces and human events which could be manipulated "for the advantage of the individual" is, to my mind, a rather inadequate introduction to the subsequent obviously peak achievements of Indian mysticism which start already with the Upaniṣads a few centuries later. There must be more to mysticism in the Vedas than that. Dasgupta's poor assessment of their value for Indian mysticism can be explained only by the fact that he slavishly followed early European Sanskrit scholarship which looked upon the Vedas as predominantly sacrificial lore and regarded their more obviously valuable hymns at best as lyrical nature poetry.⁵ My further objection to Dasgupta's lecture on the sacrificial mysticism of the Vedas is the inappropriate use of the word mysticism for the sacrificial view of the world in the context of all the subsequent genuinely mystical teachings. Even from Dasgupta's account of them it clearly transpires that they all invariably transcended the ritual approach which they regarded either as preliminary or even inferior.

Although the ritualistic links of the Vedic hymns with sacrifice, which was a major or even the central concern of the Brāhmanic religion in the later Vedic period, are obvious the inspiration which lies behind them was of a much deeper nature. The bulk of the R̥gvedic hymns originated before the ritualistic period anyway and even though they were later used and sometimes further adapted for ritual, their original purpose was spiritual.

In all high religions the ritualistic and ecclesiastic phase in their history followed the original spiritual beginnings of a movement which formed around or in the wake of a teacher who was a prophetic figure or a spiritually enlightened personality, sometimes regarded as an incarnation of God. There is no clear reason why the Vedic religion should be regarded as an exception to this rule. Hinduism has always claimed that the Vedas are a product of divine revelation which was transmitted to the people by ancient *ṛṣis*. These ancient seers were already in Vedic times regarded as ‘path-finders’ (RV 1,72, 2; 1, 105, 15) who had won immortality and thereby become equal in status and power to gods (RV 10, 56, 4).⁴ Thus they become elevated far above ordinary people to whom they transmitted some of their insights through their inspired hymns. They reached the heights of immortality through the development of a special faculty of a visionary or meditative character called *dhṛiti* to whose investigation Jan Gonda dedicated a whole book.⁵ It was this mystical vision which enabled them to grasp the substance and meaning of the eternal law (*ṛta*, cf. RV 4, 23, 8) which governed the whole of manifested reality as well as its emergence from the unmanifest.

In the process of transmitting this vision of *ṛta* to their less spiritually minded contemporaries, the seers produced their message on more than one level. The transmission of a vision is not the vision itself, it is a projection of the original vision into a specific area of human activity and understanding. Besides the poetical, mythological and legendary projection of this vision there was also the area of religious

activity which was very close to the heart of archaic man and was capable of exercising a strong influence on his character and behaviour, much more so than words, images and stories. This was ritual action. In performing a rite modelled on mythical or cosmic events Vedic man was able to take in into himself archetypal patterns of thought and behaviour which reflected the hierarchy of the world order and created in him a sense of belonging and an awareness, however dim, that the cosmic law was also the moral law which told him what was right and wrong and that it further was also the social law which determined his place in the structure of the Āryan society.

It was only later in the course of several centuries that Vedic ritual deteriorated into an over-elaborated system of ceremonial observances of the Brāhmaṇa period in which the original mystical vision became buried. We can certainly speak of the mystical experiences of the ancient ṛṣis as the basis and starting point of the Vedic religion and we need not doubt that for some generations these experiences were kept alive. But it is true that it is more difficult to speak about a mystical doctrine in Vedic times since that would imply the existence of a systematic exposition and interpretation of the mystical experiences in the context of a philosophical or theological world picture expressed in well-defined concepts. However, although the language of the Vedas is poetical, symbolical and mythological and the hymns do not aim at systematic instruction of the listeners, they nevertheless convey a sufficiently clear picture of an ordered universe with a vast spiritual dimension behind it. That is expressed repeatedly by Vedic cosmogonic myths of creation — that of Aditi, the mother of all that is, has been and will be (RV 1, 89, 10), that of the cosmic *puruṣa* (RV 10, 90), of *hiraṇyagarbha* (RV 10, 121), of *skambha* (AV 10, 7) and that of the Indra-Vṛtra combat. It was later expressed also in terms almost devoid of mythological imagery in the *nāsadiya sūkta* (Creation hymn, RV, 129)⁶ whereby began the process of conceptualisation of

the Vedic vision of reality which then continued in the Upaniṣads and eventually produced fully formulated mystical doctrines and philosophical systems.

As to the path, once it was found by the ancient seers it must undoubtedly have been handed down and taught in some way by them to their disciples and this process would certainly have gone on for a number of generations. The actual method can hardly be ascertained from the hymns, but one could say with Aurobindo that it must have been some kind of progressive self-culture⁷ and assume with Hauer that it comprised some technique of meditative absorption.⁸ A personal discipline and meditational practice have been the pillars of the mystic way in all times and all traditions.

When eventually the elaborate structure of Brāhmanic ritualism which grew around and out of the original mystical vision of the ancient seers very nearly stifled all spirituality there came a new eruption of mystical experience which is documented in the Upaniṣads. The approach to the transcendent through the worship of gods was largely brushed aside and a direct encounter with the ultimate reality was sought. In the final break-through it amounted to an overwhelming and all-embracing experience expressed in bold statements, such as "I am *brahman*" (*ahman brahmāsmi*, BU 1, 4, 10), "You are that" (*tat tvam asi*, ChU 6, 15, 3) and "I am all this" (=this whole universe, *aham evedam sarvam*, ChU , 25, 1). This appears to be a genuine expression of an experience of *unio mystica* if ever there was one. It came as a culmination of a search which involved both intellectual questioning and a strong emotional need for security and certainty in face of an uncertain world in which man was the victim of successive deaths. As a result the final experience found a ready expression in what we can classify as the metaphysical gnosticism of the Upaniṣads. The philosophical search progressed far enough to be able to supply adequate and appealing metaphysical terms to the mystic when his experience overwhelmed him.

As is well known this search proceeded first into the cosmic dimension and its inspiration must have been derived from the distant echoes of the Vedic cosmological mythology, all pointing in the direction of the original unity as the source of the cosmic diversity. That unity understood to be the source and the directing agency of everything that is was called by Yājñavalkya at a certain stage the imperishable (*akṣara*, BU 3, 8, 8-11), but eventually it obtained the name *brahman* which became universally accepted. When the line of inquiry turned from the cosmic perspective to the inner dimension of man's own personality, *brahman* was found again lurking behind all life functions and mental faculties, behind the mind and behind the heart (BU 4, 2, 1-7). And in the course of further search it was eventually discovered to be man's very essence, his inner self (*ātman*, BU 4, 2, 4). This was a great discovery which was new to most participants in the dialogues of the older Upaniṣads, but it was readily accepted. The great unborn *ātman*, the inmost self of man, was identical with *brahman*, the source and essence of the whole universe and all things.

One could argue that this identification was first achieved as a result of a philosophical speculative process which was then translated into contemplative mystical experience or one can take the opposite view and regard the experience of the *unio mystica* as primary and as preceding the conceptual understanding which then followed and led to the *brahman-ātman* doctrine in its familiar formulation. It is of course equally possible that the two went together. In any event, in the Upaniṣads we have, side by side, both the experience and the doctrine and we have here, also for the first time, a clear formulation of the ontological nature of the final experience of the true knowledge of the ultimate : to know *brahman* is to be *brahman* (Mund. U. 3, 2, 9). True knowledge is here understood as being beyond the senses and the intellect. It is a non-dual process of knowing, without the split between object and subject.

The Upaniṣads are also very keen on transmitting this true and higher knowledge, this non-dual state of being-cum-knowing which is also the only true bliss (BU 7, 23). And so we get in them also the first formulations of a path to realisation. It is said, however, that it is a difficult path (Kaṭha U. 1, 3, 14) which leads away from the senses and goes inward (Kaṭha U. 2, 1, 1). As such it is a path of renunciation and Yoga. The word Yoga appears here for the first time in its technical meaning, i.e. as a systematic training and it already receives a more or less clear formulation in some of the older Upaniṣads, such as Kaṭha, Maitrī and Śvetāśvatara. A further step towards its systematisation is obvious in subsequent Yoga Upaniṣads and the culmination of this endeavour is represented by Patañjali's codification of this path into his *aṣṭāṅga yoga*. Thus, all the three ingredients of mysticism emerged out of the Upaniṣads, several centuries earlier than in Europe.

Simultaneously with this development there was an independent process of search going on, outside the reasonably well documented Vedic tradition, which has not left behind its own literary sources. But there can be little doubt that at the time of the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism this outsiders' stream of spiritual quest was already very old. This is particularly clear from the Fali Canon. But how far into the past it reaches cannot be ascertained. It is even impossible to speculate about its existence at the time of the ancient seers, the path-finders and originators of the Vedas who were themselves already legendary when the hymns were actually being composed. However, at the later Vedic time, before the final redaction of the R̥g Veda there is good evidence about accomplished sages roaming the country and teaching their "path of the wind". They were known as *munis* and *keśins* and regarded themselves as immortals who were equally at home in the higher spiritual world and in this world of mortals, celestial beings and sylvan beasts.⁹ The Hymn of the Long-haired One clearly depicts a Yogi with the highest mystical achievements. Besides *keśins* there were other wanderers, some

of them of the solitary type, known as *vrātyaṣ*, regarded by Hauer as the original Yogic (Uryogins)¹⁰. The tradition of wandering ascetics, later known as *śramaṇas*, outside the Vedic and Brāhmanic establishment continued for centuries in relative obscurity while ceremonial religion flourished. But it was obviously gradually gaining more recognition and power of attraction for those who became weary of Brāhmanic sacrificial ritualism and sought some clearer solution of the riddle of existence. As the Vedic tradition preserved the memory of the accomplished *ṛṣis* of old, so this unorthodox *śramaṇa* movement harboured memories of enlightened *munis* of the past. It was not, of course, a unitary movement. It was apparently a broad trend manifesting itself in individual truth-seekers and teachers with groups of followers around some of them. This trend eventually reached its peak in the great achievement of Buddhism and also of Jainism and other minor schools of Yoga, now mostly forgotten. The memory of two of them has been preserved in the Pali Canon in connection with the Buddha's life story.

Some might object to regarding the Buddhist (and possibly also Jainist) top achievement of *nirvāṇa* as mystical whilst admitting to the mystical character of *jhānic* states of mind. But this is only a terminological problem. May be it is not correct to speak about *unio mystica* when describing the attainment of *nirvāṇa* in early Buddhism since the term originated in the context of theistic theology. But both terms to the highest achievement of what is seen as the ultimate reality in the two respective systems. In both cases it is also admitted that the designation of the goal – God, *nirvāṇa* – does not really convey the true nature of the ultimate reality which is felt to be beyond descriptions and, as I tried to explain elsewhere¹¹, beyond the conceptual dichotomy of the personal and the impersonal. If we agree that the goal of mysticism is the final and ultimate truth achieved by direct experience, then the *nirvāṇa* of Buddhism falls within that heading. When Carl A. Keller tried to define mystical writings

he arrived at a criterion for them by saying that they are texts "which discuss the path towards realisation of the ultimate knowledge which particular religion has to offer and which contain statements about the nature of such knowledge".¹² Frederick J. Streng defined the meaning of mysticism as "an interior illumination of reality that results in ultimate freedom".¹³ Both these definitions include the Buddhist nirvāṇa.

Of the three constituents of mysticism, experience is the one most emphasised and the path the one most elaborated in early Buddhism. The doctrine on the other hand was kept low. The Buddha avoided doctrinal formulations concerning the final reality as much as possible in order to prevent his followers from resting content with minor achievements on the path in which the absence of the final experience could be substituted by conceptual understanding of the doctrine or by religious faith, a situation which sometimes obtains, in both varieties, in the context of Brāhmanic systems of doctrine.

The peak achievements of Upaniṣadic and Buddhist mysticism were truly elitist, but they also had popular appeal even though they were out of reach of most people, because of most people's lack of total practical commitment. But the best minds among earnest truth-seekers were attracted by them, as they appreciated the promise of a relatively speedy realisation of the goal. This was made possible by their careful concentration on the elaboration of the path. This feature of Indian mysticism of some schools accounts for the unique form it took which became known as Yoga. The Buddha's eightfold path and Patañjali's *aṣṭāṅga yoga* are the two most highly systematised techniques of mystical training. One can almost say that Yoga, as a methodological device, is mysticism gone scientific.

However, because of the wider appeal of the goal of Yoga as a special individual achievement which did not require the mediation of priests, but involved at most a special relation to a teacher, usually believed to be an accomplished master,

the popularisation of Yoga inevitably followed. In that context it had to satisfy the emotional involvement people normally have in religious matters and so it found its natural expression in theistic mysticism which opened the gate to the Divine for large numbers of people to whom a methodical approach and solitary meditation did not mean much. Their attitude was one of devotion which could be nourished only on mutuality. And thus appeared on the scene *bhakti yoga* which found its early exposition in the Bhagavad Gītā which also popularised some of the more technical methods of Yoga as well as the doctrines of the Upaniṣads.

On the Buddhist side it was the compassion expressed in the Bodhisattva approach which gave the opportunity to masses of followers, previously left out of the immediate liberation scheme of the strict eightfold path, to have an outlet for their emotional need for an all-embracing and assisted path.

All this meant that mystical experience at least in its elementary forms, became almost universally available. This, obviously, does not represent a peak in the development of Indian approaches to spirituality, but it did give both Hinduism and Buddhism as religions a certain awareness of the mystical dimension on all levels of worship which is still alive in them to a large degree and which is not easily found in other religions.

However, there is no escaping the fact that the mystic way is an exclusive way. Its true aim is the realisation of the ultimate reality which requires detachment from the immediate relative reality and this can never become the prevailing concern of multitudes. Consequently, the elitists character of mysticism made itself felt again very quickly. A Bodhisattva may have compassion for all creatures and sacrifice his final release for the sake of helping them, but he nevertheless aims at complete enlightenment which includes the perfect skill of an accomplished teacher and spiritual powers which will enable him to pursue his mission. All this points to a mystical expe-

rience of the highest order arrived at on an arduous path through several stages (*bhūmis*) involving the development of superhuman perfections (*pāramitās*) which is a very individualistic and elitist achievement.

Thus the eightfold path of a follower of the Buddha was replaced by the Bodhisattva path and the description of the goal was also reformulated. At the same time the doctrinal component of Buddhism grew in the context of Mahāyāna mysticism more and more until it developed into new and lofty metaphysical systems in which both the impersonal and personalised approaches found full and elaborate expression. On the one hand we have the *tri-kāya* doctrine of layers of reality converging in the *dharmā-kāya* and on the other we are faced with the overwhelming hierarchy of cosmic *buddhas* and *bodhisattvas* presided over by Ādi Buddha. The dichotomy and the inevitable coexistence of the personal and the impersonal in the attempted conceptual and symbolical descriptions of the experience of the ultimate reality again make their unavoidable appearance.

The mystical doctrines of Mahāyāna have quite a number of features which were developed in a somewhat similar way and almost simultaneously by European mystical theology based as it was on the neoplatonic philosophy as transmitted by pseudo-Dionisios Areopagita. It is hardly possible to imagine a better example of corresponding development in two mystical traditions.

Within the Hindu system mysticism as doctrine and experience as well as path reached its new peak in Śaṅkara's system of *advaita vedānta*. The experience of oneness dominated Śaṅkara's thinking and understanding of older sources, particularly the Upaniṣads, and it completely determined his doctrinal formulations which partly overshadowed Śaṅkara as practical mystic and teacher of a Yoga path. In his commitment to a specific doctrinal formulation Śaṅkara was dependent on Gauḍapāda, his teacher's teacher, on Bādarāyaṇa, the

founder of Vedāntism, and possibly on an older tradition of *Varāha-sahodaravṛtti*.¹⁴ It would therefore be difficult to decide whether Śaṅkara's uncompromising monism was an outcome of his experience for which he found confirmation in his predecessors' interpretations of the Upaniṣads or whether his previous acceptance of monism on philosophical grounds found subsequent support in the overwhelming experience of oneness in *samādhi*. The Upaniṣads, of course contain materials which enabled other schools also to claim their support for their own different interpretations. It has, however, been an undisputed tenet within Śaṅkara's school for centuries that "this world of diversity is false; reality, myself included, is non-dual *brahman*; the evidence for it is *vedānta* (Upaniṣads), gurus as well as direct experience".¹⁵

I think that we have here an almost inextricable symbiosis of doctrine and experience, but what is important is that Śaṅkara most emphatically insisted on the actual realisation of personal experience without which the doctrine means nothing. One has to know the truth directly; all else, including verbal knowledge of the doctrine, is still within the sphere of ignorance. Again : to know *brahman* is to be *brahman*. The practical way to this realisation is the way of knowledge, the *jñāna yoga*. Śaṅkara's Yoga path follows in many details the older schemes of Yoga training as known particularly from Patañjali's account, but it also has its own specific techniques of developing the discriminatory faculty of the mind whereby it could sift through its experiences and eliminate from them those which are concerned with transitory, unreal features as compared with those which point to the eternal and real.

The inevitable differences in descriptions of the ultimate and its real nature, well known already from the Upaniṣads themselves, led quite naturally to the establishment of different schools of Vedāntism of which there are at least five. The most important one after Śaṅkara's is *viśiṣṭa advaita* of Rāmānuja. In it the previously mentioned popular *bhakti mārga*

received an elaborate doctrinal backing in which a certain relative or qualified status is allowed for individual beings also in the context of ultimate reality which is conceived in personalised terms. Thus Vedāntism, like Buddhism, reflects the ineffability of the ultimate experience which does not lend itself to simple descriptions. That does not mean that clear-cut descriptions are necessarily wrong as opponents in the polemics of rival schools would have us believe, rather it indicates the simple fact that the ultimate truth is bigger than words and that therefore every logically straightforward and consistent description of its experience must appear to be a simplification. This, in turn, does not mean that such a description is entirely useless, since it does convey a certain idea about the ultimate to the totally inexperienced and may act as an encouragement and motivation for entering the mystic path. A variety of descriptions addresses a variety of minds according to their dispositions.

There have been objections to this kind of interpretation of differing mystical doctrines and the consequent claim of a common core in all mystical traditions. Steven T. Katz expressed it bluntly saying that mysticism promises "something for everybody if not everything to everybody" ¹⁶ But that is an ill-founded criticism. The differing interpretations merely express the infinite richness of the ultimate which must be bigger than individual minds which can therefore approach it from a large variety of starting points. Various simplified descriptions of the ultimate goal become wrong only if taken literally and if they are individually believed in to the exclusion of other descriptions. That can happen only when the doctrine, accepted on authority, becomes more important than the experience, which means that the mystic path is not really being followed. Then we are in the province of theological or philosophical polemics. These do occur also, of course, among historians of religions if they bring into their inquiry personal preferences or beliefs.

With Mahāyāna Buddhism and Vedāntism Indian spiri-

tuality reached its latest peak, particularly in the elaboration of mystical doctrines. But the whole process of mystical endeavours did not stop there. Although Buddhism eventually disappeared from the Indian scene to flourish elsewhere, Hindu Yoga and broader mystical movements as well as doctrinal creativity have continued to live in India till modern times as shown by the lives and work of such personalities as Ramakrishna, Ramana, Aurobindo, Ananda Mayi Ma and others.

Notes

- 1 Karel Werner, "Mysticism as Doctrine and Experience". *Religious Traditions*. Bandoora, Australia (forthcoming).
- 2 S. N. Dasgupta, *Hindu Mysticism*, New York 1027 (repr. 1959), pp. 3-30. (Repr. also in Delhi 1976.)
- 3 Cf. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy I*, Cambridge 1951 (1st ed. 1922), p. 17. Cf. also Werner, "On Interpreting the Vedas", *Religion, Journal of Religion and Religions*, London, vol. 7 (1977), pp. 189-200
- 4 I have dealt with the question of immortality in the Vedas as a special achievement of ancient *ṛṣis* as distinct from the limited reward of the ordinary worshipper in my article "The Vedic Concept of Human Personality and its Destiny", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 5 (1978), pp. 275-289.
- 5 Jan Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, The Hague 1963.
- 6 I have analysed the myth of Aditi in relation to the *nāsadiya sūkta* in my paper "Symbolism in the Vedas and its Conceptualisation", *Numen* XXIV (1977), pp. 223-240. For the Indra-Vṛtra myth and other cosmogonies see Norman W. Brown, "The Creation Myth of the Ṛg Veda", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 62 (1942), pp. 85-98. Also ; Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, New York 1959, pp. 19ff and again in *A History of Religious Ideas*, vol. I, London 1979 (French 1976), pp. 205-208. Cf also : F. B. J. J. Kuiper, "Cosmogony and Conception : A Query", *History of Religions*, Chicago, vol. 10 (1970), pp. 91-138.
- 7 Aurobindo Ghosh, *The Secret of the Veda*, Birth Centenary Library, vol. 10, Pondicherry 1971, p. 8.
- 8 J. W. Hauer, *Der Yoga, Ein indischer Weg zum Selbst*, Stuttgart 1958, p. 19.

- 9 Werner, "Yoga and the R̥g Veda : An Interpretation of the Keṣiu Hymn (RV 10, 136)", *Religious Studies*, vol. 13 (Cambridge University Press 1977); pp. 289-302.
- 10 Cf. Hauer, *Das Vr̥tya. Untersuchungen über die nicht-brahmanische Religion An-Indiens*, Stuttgart 1927, Also : R. Choudhari, *Vr̥tyas in Ancient India*, Varanasi 1964, and : Werner, "Religious Practice and Yoga in the Time of the Vedas, Upaniṣads and Early Buddhism ", *Annal of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, vol. LVI, pp. 179-194, Poona 1975.
- 11 "Symbolism in the Vedas .", pp. 229-230.
- 12 "Mystical Literature", pp. 77, in : ST. T, Katz (ed.), *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, London 1978, pp. 75-100.
- 13 "Language and Mystical Awareness", p. 142, in Katz, *Mysticism etc* , pp. 141-169.
- 14 Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, London 1960, p. 26.
- 15 Cf. A. J. Alston, *Śaṅkara on the Absolute*, London 1980, p. 62 and 112.
- 16 The editor's Introduction to *Mysticism and Phil. Analysis*, p. 1.

Abbreviations

AV	Atharva Veda
BU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
ChU	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
RV	R̥g Veda

*

**PRELIMINARIES FOR SPIRITUAL GROWTH—PSYCHO-
LOGICAL IMPLICATION OF THE PREPARATORY
STAGE IN BUDDHISM**

H. V. Guenther

People in all ages have been under stress and have devised and tried various means to escape from it only to find to their dismay that the stress did not disappear but reasserted itself in other forms as threatening as before, if not even worse. This shows that escape is never an answer to the basic question of how to be a human being. Escape, whether it is into the mechanical uniformity and monotony of social conformity or into a fictitious world of some transcendental make-belief, is but an admission of having failed in the ever-present task of growing up. The latter form of escape is particularly dangerous as it leads a person to believe that he has enlarged the scope of awareness while actually he has run away from it and, instead of having gained insight, has blurred his view and diminished his capacity for thought by clinging to such fetish words as science, or creativity, or even intelligence. The attempted escape from stress has brought no vision which alone would have provided a basis for dealing with the problem at hand. Vision brings a new appreciation of what there is, it makes a person see things differently, not to see different things. After all nobody can ever escape Being, least of all his own being. It is the vision that gives meaning to our experiences and our actions by making us face the problem, and therefore also it alone gives us a sense of direction and enables him to sketch a map which will guide him in his task of finding himself, not to run away from himself.

However, vision does not come on demand; it requires for its birth sustained intellectual effort which is, above all, the act of being appreciative and, for that reason also, discriminative; it also involves unflagging diligence, and a firm foundation on which the unificatory processes leading to an integrated personality, can rest. There is a gradation in this preliminary build-up, one step leading to the other; hence the attempt to make light of or even to skip the preliminaries, because modern man is in a hurry and must have instant results, is as intelligent or stupid as trying to prepare a succulent meal without having the necessary ingredients.

It is for this reason that the preparatory stage of the Buddhist 'path'¹ has been given considerable attention in the indigenous works, while it has been more or less neglected by those who approached Buddhist ideas from outside. The preparatory stage is graded into three sections which present a gradation and intensification of awareness. The first section begins with four kinds of inspection. Inspection, in the strict sense of the word, is the attempt to keep a perceptual situation as constant as possible and to inspect the objective constituent of that perceptual situation as closely as possible. However, keeping a perceptual situation constant is intimately intertwined with the attempt to learn more about the qualities of the perceived object, the objective constituent and the epistemological object of the perceptual situation so that we may say that, on the one hand, we keep an idea or an image or an 'object' of the mind constant and, on the other, we apply the appreciative and discriminative capacity of the mind to the idea or image or object held as constant as possible. In other words, 'inspection' presupposes appreciative discrimination just as 'appreciative discrimination' presupposes inspection.

The objective constituent of an inspective situation is said to be what, for all practical purposes, we may call 'the body'. With it we associate the notion of 'physical object' and this widens the range of what is meant by 'body' in Buddhist texts, it comprises everything that is subsumed under the term *rūpa*-

skandha (*gzugs-kvi phung-po*) which may be rendered freely as 'everything that has colour – form'. More precisely, the term *rūpa* indicates an epistemological object of a perceptual situation which we would further characterize as 'of the physical kind'; it does not say anything about whether there is or is not an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological one. In this wider sense 'body' is now classified as 'external', 'internal', and 'intermediate'. These three specifications refer to what we are wont to call 'objective', 'subjective' and 'ambiguous'. There is no difficulty about the connotations of 'subjective'. It is our body – 'my body' as the capacity for feeling and thinking. 'Objective' does not refer to another's body, as might be concluded from the use of the term 'body', but it refers to the physical environment which is constituted by the interaction of elemental forces. 'Ambiguous' ('intermediate') is another's body; it is 'ambiguous' because the other is at once subject and object—he is subject, and as such is and has his own body, while he is object for me being and having 'my body'. This distinction between three kinds of 'body' is important as it has distinct consequences for man's dealings with others and, implicitly, himself.

In the same way as the 'body' may be the objective constituent of an inspective situation, so also a feeling may be something about which I want to learn more. Inasmuch as feelings are pleasant, unpleasant or neutral, their qualifications in this manner are, more precisely, inspective judgments based on the inspection of the objective constituent which is both an objective and non-referential mental event.

This leads to the inspection of 'mind' which is a complex of a specific kind, not an isolated event. It is this complex that becomes the objective mental situation which I then know directly.

Lastly, there are the 'meanings' which are defined by concepts and motivations. What something *means* for somebody depends upon what he is doing or is planning to do. A person, in a situation described as 'seeing a red light', treats

his visual sensum as the appearance of a physical object and acts as if there is a causal connection between the colour red and danger. At a later stage he may even make reflective judgments about these 'meanings'.

It is one thing how to pinpoint the objective constituent of inspective situations, it is another what to learn from them. It is here that the difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna becomes most marked :

“The follower of the Hīnayāna deals with the ‘body’ as impure, with ‘feeling’ as unpleasant, with ‘mind’ as impermanent and with ‘meanings’ as having no ontological status; the follower of the Mahāyāna deals with these four topics, when in a state of composure, as if they were like the sky beyond all propositions about them and, in a post-composure state, as if they were an apparition or a dream.”²

The traditional axioms of the impermanence, unpleasantness (frustration), and essencelessness of all that we normally encounter are readily recognizable and need no further elaboration. Impurity, however, presents a problem as it may easily lead to a dissociation of the personality by everevaluating one aspect of man's Being and denigrating another; above all it creates an opposition between ideas or postulates and experiences. To see the body as impure may consolidate into a rejection of the body, and since its 'impure' image is an abstraction that becomes superimposed on the living body, a person cannot but feel frustrated and will attempt to escape into a 'purer' realm which is no less an abstraction. This, of course, is an extreme case, but it also reveals the intellectualistic and basically ego-centred approach to Being. When the body is pictured as a rotting corpse it becomes an object of disgust and easily engenders a host of negative emotions which eventually will blot out the value of being, even of being human. The same holds good for feelings, as well as for the other topics of inspection.

However it would be wrong to conceive of the insistence on the impurity of the body merely in this negative way. Inasmuch as also the Hīnayāna aims at man's health and at an integrated personality, the idea of impurity may have some therapeutic effect in releasing the person from his bondage to the physical side of his being and in enabling him to discover the deepest and most intrinsic values he is pursuing. But because of his ego-centredness these values are much more difficult to find. The ego is steeped in images and roles and averse to experience, if not afraid of it. Even if we admit that it is an experience that prompted us to label our body as impure or our feelings as frustrating, in so classifying the experience we have cut ourselves off from the possibility of seeing our being with complete freshness. There again the difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna becomes evident, the former preoccupied with judgments of perception and its abstractions, the latter starting from and attempting to maintain vividness of experience :

“The followers of the Hīnayāna take as their objective reference merely the four topics of inspection as they relate to themselves and others. The concrete form they give to the pursuance of these ideas is that the followers of the Hīnayāna contemplate them in terms of impurity and so on, while the followers of the Mahāyāna contemplate them in their openness of being. The aim they have is that the followers of the Hīnayāna contemplate these topics in order to become detached from the disturbingly frail and fragile body and so on, while the followers of the Mahāyāna do not contemplate them for the sake of being or not being detached from it, but for the sake of realizing a Nirvāṇa that is in no way localizable.”³

Thus, in one case, a person remains within the limits of a dichotomous way of thinking which implies something 'higher' as contrasted with something 'lower' that is spurned and repudiated, while, in the other, the person is capable of an integrative way of thinking which does not imply a cutting

off of the 'outer' world so as to permit the 'inner' world to come into play, but in living them simultaneously.

Inspection as a means to learn more about a given situation is indispensable for any progress on the path. By virtue of it being the capacity to hold a situation as constant as possible it also leads to concentration which is one of the phenomena on the second phase in the preparatory stage. This second phase is known as the 'four abandonings' which actually is a summary term for the elimination of negative factors as well as the intensification of positive factors, both processes going hand in hand. Thus, by 'elimination' the intention not to allow negative factors to arise and the intention to put an end to their presence is understood, while 'intensification' is to allow the positive factors to come into operation and to develop and intensify their presence.

At the beginning of this phase stands 'interest' which is followed by four other processes. 'Interest' is, as it were, a first stirring of a self-awakening by which we are given the chance to get out of the 'normal' attitude of apathy and inner emptiness so characteristic of the prevailing mood of boredom. All of a sudden, so it seems, 'interest' lets us look at life more keenly and this involves a willingness to differentiate which is rooted in a conviction that gives man a sense of purpose and meaning. Thus

“‘interest’ comes by one’s faith in one’s ability to differentiate, that is, to accept and to reject.”⁴

Interest is certainly short-lived if it is not followed by efforts to affirm a way of acting as part of his vision of reality which is his life’s meaning. Such an effort is a decision. It implies that an action has been chosen and that the person will stay with his decision. Again,

“‘decision’ is not to let the mind elsewhere.”⁵

Any decision involves a risk. Things may go well and we may be lured into a false sense of elation or they may go wrong and we may be swallowed up by a mood of depression

Not to succumb to these mood swings needs 'sustained effort'. More precisely, 'sustained effort' serves to strike a balance to build a firm ground on which a person can proceed. Elation takes a person off the ground, it makes him overexcited and produces an ego inflation. But every feeling of elation is bound to collapse and a depressive reaction will ensue. Depression makes a person fall through the ground into an abysmal hole. Thus,

"sustained effort serves to calm such occurrences as elation and depression."⁶

Since there is sustained effort 'to calm' does not mean to make a person passive and without feelings. Rather, it makes him strong so that when that which might turn into feelings of elation or moods of depression is about to occur, he can cope with the situation.

This coping with the situation takes two different lines of action. The one is to pull the mind back from becoming immobilized and engulfed in utter gloom directing it towards man's existential reality which is his inner potential, not a fantasy world of unreal goals. The other is to confront the mind with the harsh and undisputable facts of the world in which we live. This is another way of bringing a person back and putting him on solid ground. Man's existential reality is the quality and meaning life has for him. It comes to him in symbolic form as the Buddha personage, infinitely rich in qualities. It is the beacon light guiding and directing the traveller on his journey to his inner strength; and as such it is heartening and comforting and energizing; it can give what the depressed person is in need of;

"Taking a firm grip on mind is to direct it towards something which is to make it feel happy such as the Buddha personage and his qualities, when it has slipped into the gloominess of depression."⁷

Similarly, it is as important to keep the mind in touch with reality, to 'put it down' when it is flying off into the

illusion that everything will work out splendidly, that things could never be better :

“Putting the mind down to direct it towards something that is distasteful such as the frustration of Samsāra, when it has taken off into over excitement and elation.”⁸

The second phase of this preparatory stage is therefore what we would call a kind of balancing which, precisely because here the individual is not torn one way or another, offers the chance for a wider perspective. In particular, this is opened upon the third phase which involves supernormal perceptions and wholeness experiences. Supernormal perceptions include such phenomena as multiple personality which is more easily understandable in view of the Buddhist concept of mind as a structure rather than as a single particle. A structure can well be multi-dimensional and be something that has size and shape by analogy, and it also can intersect with other similar structures. Another phenomenon on this level is the ‘knowledge of other minds’. The argument for it is one by analogy. It assumes that

“there is another mind animating a body as my mind is animating my body.”⁹

and there certainly are situations about which we believe that there are in it certain mental states which are not ours but belong to other minds. Although we ordinarily proceed without questioning or being aware of this assumption, it is here raised to a ‘conscious’ affirmation which enables us to deal with others as ‘subjects’ rather than as objects.

Another phenomenon is the activation of mnemonic persistents. As has been pointed out, ‘mind’ in Buddhist psychology is a complex that, among other structural elements, includes a factor that is capable to carry modifications of experiences which happened to a person while he was alive. If such a ‘psychic factor’ unites with a new body or enters into an intimate relationship with a new situation, it will not be surprising that there are ‘memories’ of a previous life. In no

way does this necessitate the assumption of an 'eternal' principle such as a 'self' or 'pure ego'.

While such phenomena as those mentioned may occur they are not of paramount importance, rather emphasis is put upon wholeness experiences, of which four are most significant for the development of the personality. In each of them a specific operation takes place and each of them constitutes a 'foothold' for the above phenomena and their experience. They are 'interest', 'sustained effort', 'focussedness' and 'scrutiny'. These operations essentially serve to preserve the wholeness experiences by counteracting whatever threatens to disrupt them. Thus, we are told, there are five disruptive forces and these are countered by eight 'eliminating operation' The following diagram show their interaction :

five disruptive forces

Eight eliminating operations

laziness

- ←

1. serious interest,
2. inner conviction,
3. sustained effort,
4. cultivation of the
inner potential

forgetfulness (letting the object of one's concern slip from one's mind)

← inspection

depression and elation

← alert awareness

not doing anything about either states ← intent and focussing
 overdoing things when wither state has subsided ← equanimity¹⁰

The above three phases, each having a specific set of operations, deal only with what is necessary for setting out on one's life-long quest for meaning and what is merely the preparatory stage of the path. It already demands the utmost of us and yet, since it is only a first step in the direction of self-growth, does not guarantee that we will succeed in our quest. Only the barest ingredients have been presented, now it depends upon us what we are doing with them. It is as if we have made ready all that is necessary for a delicious meal,

still we have to make the meal ready and at this moment we can spoil everything. The complexity of the preparatory stage and all that is involved in it leaves no room for transcendental mystification, and the effort that is needed is the opposite of any cheap commercial recipe.

Notes

- 1 The 'path' as a whole comprises five stages, a preparatory one, a stage of application which links all that has been done and experienced with the third stage, the 'path of seeing', which, in turn, merges into the 'path of cultivation' which is to live one's life in the light of the vision, and, finally, the 'stage of no-more learning', which means that we cannot act but as fully integrated personalities.
- 2 bDen-gnyis gsal-byed zla-ba'i sgron-ma, a detailed commentary on Kunmkhyen 'Jigs-med-gling-pa's Yon-tan-mdzod, by mKhan-po Yon-dga' Vol. I p. 274.

mKhan-po Yon-dga' seems to have been a contemporary of gZhan-dga' (1871-1927). He derives much of his information from the works of Klong-chen rab' byams-pa (1308-1363), the foremost rNying-ma-pa sage.

- | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|----------------|---|-------|
| 3 | ibid., p. 274. | 4 | ibid., p. 275. | 5 | ibid. | 9 | ibid. |
| 7 | ibid. | 8 | ibid. | 9 | ibid., p. 276. | | |
- 10 For further details see H. V. Guenther and L. S Kawamura, *Mind in Buddhist Psychology*, Dharma Publishing 1975, pp. 118f.

*

ŚUKLA DHYĀNA

Suzuko Ohira

Śukla dhyāna of the Jainas consists of four stages, i.e., *prthaktva vitarka*, *ekatva vitarka*, *sūkṣma kriyā* (*sūkṣmakriyā-pratipāti*) and *sammucchinna kriyā* (*vyuparatakriyānivṛtti*), in due order, of which *ekatva vitarka dhyāna* is said to yield omniscience to a *dhyātā* and *sammucchinna kriyā dhyāna* do liberation. However, even the first two stages are entitled to be practised by the 14 *pūrvadhara*s alone who are known as no more existent since the time of Bhadrabāhu I. This means that no one is any more qualified to perform *śukla dhyāna* in reality, and there is none who can attain omniscience and liberation in this world except in the mythological place called Mahāvīdeha. *Śukla dhyāna* of the Jainas to be performed for the sake of liberation in the utopian land is therefore no more than an ideation or a mystical theory, which should be clearly distinguished from the empirical mysticism of *dhyāna* and *yoga* in the other schools.

Umāsvāti systematized the Jaina accounts of *dhyāna* for the first time at the end of the Āgamic period. In the *Tattvārthasūtra* X.7 *bhāṣya*, he explains that by performing either one of the 1st and the 2nd stages of *śukla dhyāna*, sages attain various types of *īddhis* such as *aṇimā*, *laghimā*, *mahimā* up to *vidyādharaṭva*, *āśivīṣatva*, *bhinnākṣara* and *abhinnākṣara*. He continues to explain that he who has attained the capacity of such *īddhis* but has no desire or attachment to them destroys all the *mohanīya karmas*. He is now the sage on the 12th *guṇasthāna*. Then within *antarmuhūrta*, he eradicates the rest of three *ghātika* karmas and becomes the *sayogi kevali*. Finally, upon expelling four *aghātika* karmas, he becomes the *ayogi kevali* and gets liberated.

At a first glance, his performance in bringing these *ṛddhis* in these early two stages of *śukla dhyāna* strikes us very strange.¹ *Ṛddhis* or the supernatural powers of this and that kind make their fashionable appearance, for instance, in the *Bhagavatisūtra*, which are generally conditioned to be possessed by the spiritually advanced monks, but they are the heretics who practise them. These *ṛddhis* are well-known among the other systems of thoughts (e.g. *abhijñā* of the Buddhists and *aiśvarya* of the Sāṅkhyas) to be the actual capacities brought about by the *dhyāna-yoga* practice or penance on the advanced level of spirituality, and they commonly regard that the users of such capacities cannot advance to the stage of achieving liberation.

The *Yogasūtra*, of which Chapter III is devoted to the supernatural powers attainable by a *yogi* through the operation of *saṃyama*, says in its III. 50 that *kaivalya* is revealed to the *yogi* who has overcome the worldly desire to the attained capacity as such.² Then, Umāsvāti's performance mentioned above is not at all strange. Nay, he gives us a hint for further penetrating into the mechanism of *śukla dhyāna* and the relevant concepts which are to a great extent based on the established ideas relevant to the ascetic practice in those days.

The performers of the 1st and the 2nd stages of *śukla dhyāna* are the sages on the 11th and 12th *guṇasthānas*, i.e. *upaśāntakaṣāya-vitarāga-chadmastha* and *kṣīṇa-kaṣāya-vitarāga-chadmastha*. The 11th *guṇasthāna* forms the *upaśama śreṇi*, and the sage who climbs the ladder is destined to fall to the bottom of the 1st stage of *mithyātva* due to the activation of his *kaṣāyas* which have been so far suppressed. The 12th *guṇasthāna* forms the *kṣapaka śreṇi*, and the sage who climbs this ladder straightaway from the 10th *guṇasthāna* necessarily ascends to the 13th *guṇasthāna* by destroying the total *kaṣāyas*. The Jainas obviously borrowed the concept of these *guṇasthānas* from the Buddhist classification of Eight *Ārya Pudgalas*, wherein the *sakṛdāgāmi* corresponds to the sage on the 11th *guṇasthāna*, the *anāgāmi* to the sage on the 12th

guṇasthāna, and the *arhats* to the sages on the 13th and 14th *guṇasthānas*. Both the Buddhist and Jaina concepts of spiritual stages are thus based on the common understanding that there are two kinds of sages, one who falls from the spiritual path and the other who can attain arhatship or kevaliship.

According to Umāsvāti's exposition above, it occurs exactly on the 11th stage (stage of *sakṛdāgāmi* of the Buddhists) that a sage who hankers on the procured capacity of *ṛddhis* falls down but a sage who shows no *kaṣāyas* as such destroys all his *mohanīya karmas* and advances to the 12th stage (stage of *anāgāmi* of the Buddhists). Here the possession of such *ṛddhis* by the sages on these high stages of spirituality has a weighty implication that it is an indispensable tool or touchstone to see whether these sages are with or without *kaṣāyas* (*kleṣas* of the Buddhists and *doṣas* of the Yoga school). In another word, it is a test to find out whether their spiritual purity has really satisfied the standard to proceed to the stage which assures their liberation. This is also quite evident from the *Yogasūtra* III. 50 above. The concept of the Jaina *guṇasthānas* involving two *śreṇis* and the corresponding Buddhist concept were thus based on the common understanding of the ascetic practice involving *ṛddhis*.

Beside this, the possession of the capacity of *ṛddhis* by the sages on the 11th and 12th *guṇasthānas* is indispensable for the Jainas, because the *sayogi kevali* has to perform *kevali samudghāta*. In order to equalize the lengths of three other *aghātika karmas* with that of his *āyus karma*, the *sayogi kevali* has to perform *samudghāta* by way of expanding his body as large as the universe. This capacity is no other than *mahimā ṛddhi*, the *capācity* to expand a *tapasvi*'s physical body as large as Mt. Meru (*Yogasūtra* III. 50 *bhāṣya*...as large as the sky also), and the *sayogi kevali* has to have this capacity in order to attain liberation. *Ṛddhi* thus came out as an indispensable means of liberation for the Jainas. The aforementioned Umāsvāti's performance patently reveals the important position of *ṛddhis* played in the mechanism of liberation of the Jainas arrived at the Āgamic period.

In the good olden days, liberation was naively considered to be achievable if one does not kill the beings by the intentional activities of body-speech-mind activated by *kaṣāyas* while performing the established disciplinary rules, and if all his accumulated *karmas* were scraped off by the performance of penance. However, the Jaina doctrinal theory of *jīva-ajīva* took its own course of development to the extent which, in fine, could not any more allow to maintain the naive old concept of liberation based on *ahimsā*. For, in the system of karma theory, the Jaina concept of liberation came to demand the sage to be endowed with *kevala jñāna-darśana* which can at any moment perceive all the phenomena occurring in the universe in the three tenses of time. This is an absolute impossibility in reality. Thus liberation came to be theoretically admitted impossible to be achievable by anyone any more. Even then, the Jaina authorities had to defend the *raison d'être* of the Jaina School, and had to advocate that the Jainas are ever able to be salvated by being born in Mahāvideha. In the consequence, they had to create an impossible condition that the 14 *Pūrvadhara*s alone can achieve liberation. The problem of the *Pūrvas* must have arisen in this connection. Thus the Jainas naturally had to escape into the mythological and mystical spheres in solving the critical problem of the method of liberation by keeping a logical consistency with the then developed theory of *jīva-ajīva* or *karma* doctrine.

The archaeological evidences show that the lay Jaina practice of Jina image worship dates back as early as the Mauryan age. The lay Jainas used to worship Jina images in *kāyotsarga* posture that is peculiar to the Jainas and in meditation posture that is universal practice to all the sects. Sitting images of Jinas in the posture of meditation make their appearance already in the *Āyāga-paṭas* unearthed at Mathurā. Therefore, a common understanding that liberation is achievable by *dhyāna* was deeply rooted in the minds of the Jainas since the considerably olden days. Under this historical circumstances, it was only natural that the Jaina theoretic-

ticians were sooner or later compelled to formulate the Jaina method of *dhyāna*. Here they faced the problem of liberation at the late canonical age. And the *śukla dhyāna* of the Jainas came to be formulated in this context. With this background in mind, let us see what is the nature and mechanism of *śukla dhyāna* with a view to finding out how it came to be formulated.

The sage on the *upaśama śreṇi* performs *prthaktva dhyāna* and acquires *ṛddhis*. But his suppressed *mohantya karmas* get activated due to his attachment to the acquired *ṛddhis*, and he immediately falls to the 1st stage of *mithyātva*. All this is said to occur within a *samaya - antarmuhūrta*. The sage who takes the *kṣapaka śreṇi* likewise performs *prthaktva vitarka dhyāna* and acquires *ṛddhis*, then he roots out his *mohantya karmas*. Now he has crossed the 11th *guṇasthāna* and entered the 12th *guṇasthāna*. Here he performs *ekatva vitarka dhyāna* and destroys all the rest of the three *ghātika karmas* and attains omniscience. Or it is possible that the total operations on this *kṣapaka śreṇi* are performed by *ekatva vitarka dhyāna*. *Kṣapaka śreṇi* is said to end within *antarmuhūrta*.

In brief, *prthaktva vitarka dhyāna* is capable to produce *ṛddhis* and is possibly able to eradicate *mohantya karmas*. But *ekatva vitarka dhyāna* is able to produce *ṛddhis*, eradicate *ghātika karmas* and produce omniscience to a sage. Now, *prthaktva vitarka* and *ekatva vitarka dhyānas* roughly correspond to the beginning stages of *saṃprajñāta samādhi* in the Yoga System and to the rudimentary stages of the first *dhyāna (ārūpya)* of the Buddhists. It is very curious here why the then Jaina theoreticians had to adopt these comparatively lower stages of *dhyāna* in the other schools and allot to them the high capacities as such.

Logically speaking, the manifestation of *kevala jñāna* and *darśana* should require the eradication of *jñānāvaraṇa* and *darśanāvaraṇa karmas*. However, the then Jaina karma specialists had to add to them *antarāya karma* also, because all the

ghātika karmas are to be wiped out before the 13th *guṇasthāna*. At any rate, we may theoretically assume that the object of *dhyāna* which should produce *kevala jñāna* and *darśana* is something depending on the scriptural knowledge of the Jainas.

Vitarka is defined as *śruta* (*Tattvārthasūtra* IX. 45). The *Yogasūtra* I.42 explains *savitarka samādhi* that it is a mental state accompanied by the discriminative knowledge of words, objects and meanings. Then, *prthaktva vitarka dhyāna* is said to be *savicāra* but *ekatva vitarka dhyāna* is *avicāra* (*Tattvārthasūtra* IX.43–44), and *vicāra* is explained as shifting objects, words and *yogas* (*Tattvārthasūtra* IX. 46). According to the *Yogasūtra* I 44, *vicāra* has a subtler object than *vitarka* does. And in the case of *vicāra samādhi*, the subtler object is understood in its commentary to appear as a phenomenal *dharma* conditioned by time, space, causation, etc. of the empirical categories, but in the case of *avicāra samādhi*, the subtler object is understood to manifest itself in the state of *dharmin* or thing-in-itself, not confined by time, space, causation, etc. of the empirical categories.

Ekatva vitarka avicāra dhyāna which is the mental concentration accompanied by the discriminative capacity on the subtler object should manifest it in the form of *dharmin* unlimited by the empirical conditions such as time, space, causation, etc. This comes somewhat close to the state of having *kevala jñāna* and *darśana*. Then, this stage of *ekatva vitarka dhyāna* without *vicāra* is exactly what was wanted to be postulated by the then Jaina theoreticians in order to yield omniscience immediately out of it.

And from this standpoint the Jainas seem to have attached all the rest of the aforementioned capacities to *ekatva vitarka dhyāna*. *Prthaktva vitarka dhyāna* was also logically manipulated in this connection involving the device of *śreṇi*. But how actually these *dhyānas* were considered to destroy *ghātika karmas* is not at all known to us. The *Yogasūtra* IV. 30, for instance, reads that upon the appearance of *dharma*

medha, *kleśa* and *karma* disappear. But this occurs at the final stage of *Yoga* in this School.

Then come 3rd and the 4th stages of *śukla dhyāna*, i.e. *sūkṣmakriyā* and *samucchinna kriyā*. Here *samucchinna kriyā dhyāna* is the state of *dhyāna* revealed in the immediate sequel of *sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna*, therefore it is called *dhyāna* in the sense of formality alone, for it does not involve any effort for its performance. Then *sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna* alone should take the actual role in leading a sage to salvation. And this 3rd stage of *dhyāna* involves the other important preparatory activities.

The *sayogi kevali* enjoys omniscient activities in the state of *jivanmukti*, however he is said to stop all his activities in preparation for liberation *antarmuhūrta* prior to the expiration of his *āyus karma*, of which time point he is of course capable to know. There are three stages of performance that he has to go through before becoming the *ayogi kevali* who immediately becomes the *siddha*, i.e. (1) performance of *kevali samudghāta*, (2) performance of stopping all his activities of body–speech–mind excluding his subtle bodily activities and (3) performance of stopping his subtle bodily activities which is formally called *sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna*.

Kevali samudghāta is performed so that the lengths of *vedantya*, *nāma* and *gotra karmas* remaining in him become equal to the length of his *āyus karma* in order that their fruits are enjoyed by him without residue. The lengths of the *sayogi kevali's vedantya*, *nāma* and *gotra* are calculated to be longer than the length of his *āyus karma*. He first places himself or fixes the center of his body at the center of the universe which is a cubic point consisting of eight *pradeśas* (*aṣṭa-pradeśika-rucaka* which is situated in the middle of the two small layers at the top of *Ratnaprabhā*).⁶ Then he expands the spatial units of his soul above and below like a stick at the first instant, to left and right like a door at the 2nd instant, to

back and forth in the oblong way at the 3rd instant, and finally fills up the remaining parts in the cosmic space at the 4th instant. Then taking another 4 instants, he returns to the original size by retracing the above steps. This operation enables him to have the same length of *aghātika karmas* which are invariably ripened and expelled soon. This is called *kevali samudghāta*. Then the *sayogi kevali* is said to stop his gross activities of speech-mind by the gross bodily activities, and stop his gross bodily activities by his subtle activities of speech-mind. Now he is ready to perform *sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna* which stops his subtle bodily activities. He is then found in the state of *ayogi kevali* in the midst of *samucchinna kriyā dhyāna* wherein all the *karmas* are rooted out. He is now liberated.⁴

The idea of *kevali samudghāta* is indeed fantastic. We do not know how exactly the then Jaina theoreticians fancied such an idea, but it is commonly observed that a small metal ball, for instance, can be flattened to a huge size of extremely thin sheet, which then becomes easily breakable. And when the Indian ladies make a *capāṭi* cake out of a dough ball, they flatten it with a small wooden stick something like lengthwise, breadthwise or breadthwise, lengthwise, then all the remaining parts, of course mixing and repeating these processes. In like manner, if the *karma* matters were expanded to the extremely huge sizes, they become brittle enough to be broken at any time. It should mean that this operation enables the sage to change tight binding (*gūḍha-bandha*) of these karmas to loose binding (*śliṣṭa-bandha*).⁵ In this case, the *āyus-karma* of which length should not be altered cannot involve this operation. Whatever it may be, the fascinating idea of expanding oneself to the cosmic size came from the sphere of *ṛddhis* which enable the *yogis* to attain almost anything they want to have in the universe, for instance, becoming as large as the sky (*mahimā*) or creating and controlling the world at will as so illustrated in the *Yogasūtra* III.

It is ironical, however, that the Jainas here came out to allow the *sayogi kevali* to make use of his capacity of *ṛddhis*, even though it is for the sake of liberation. And in order to have a logical consistency with the then developed Karma theory, there was no way for the Jaina theoreticians but formulate the Jaina method of liberation by making use of the power of *ṛddhis*. The *sayogi kevali* places himself in the center of the universe so that his entire soul *pradeśas* can be equally expanded throughout the universe. (A strange theory of direction which is found in the *Bhagavati* XIII. 4.479–80, for instance, must be the outcome of efforts in locating the center of the universe in this connection.) This seems to have given rise to the idea that the universe of the Jainas is made in the form of a meditating man. The Jaina *loka* must have been considered in the *Kāyotsarga* form of a standing man at first in order that the *kevali samudghāta* could be performed without difficulty, which then came to be assumed in the form of a meditating man in the sitting posture, symbolizing the final posture for liberation.

The technical operation to stop the gross and subtle activities of body–speech–mind including *sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna* resembles to the meditation practice wherein mental activities are stopped by the other streams of mental activities. Due to this technical resemblance the Jainas must have given the name of *dhyāna* to the operation as such. *Sūkṣma kriyā dhyāna* represents the last operation of this series (3), but theoretically speaking, the previous series of operation (2) should be likewise considered in terms of *dhyāna* in the same context. (We should note here that the operations as such also attract some negligible amount of *karma* matters. These are however *īryāpatha karmas* which do not get bound anew, thus their treatment can be neglected on the theoretical level.) We should also note here that the rule of the duration of *dhyāna* as *antar-muhūrta* (*Tattvārthasūtra* IX. 28) was obviously framed by Umāsvāti on the basis that all the four types of *śukla dhyāna* last for *antarmuhūrta* at the maximum.

Now, the performance of *kevali samudghāta* naturally promises the sage to be liberated within a short time, because the *karma* theory prescribes that the maturization of all these *aghātika karma* including *āyus* mechanically causes him to cut his bondage with *samsāra*. Then, the postulation of the final two stages of *śukla dhyāna* which are to be performed after *kevali samudghāta* is logically unnecessary. In another word, the last two stages of *śukla dhyāna* have no substantially functional value in the Jaina theory of liberation based on the *karma* theory. And we have mentioned already that the final stage of *samucchinna kriyā dhyāna* can be called *dhyāna* in the nominal sense alone. Then the Jainas must have created these last two stages of *śukla dhyāna* only to glorify the liberating soul with the formality of *dhyāna* performed by the Jaina way in annihilating three *yogas*. In another word, only the first two stages of *śukla dhyāna* and *kevali samudghāta* play important roles in the Jaina concept of liberation. This attests that the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.6 16–17 relevant to *suśukla-śukla dhyāna* which is said to have been practised by Mahāvīra is an obvious later interpolation.⁶

All this reveals that the strange nature and mechanism of *śukla dhyāna* was theorized by the Jainas to solve their critical problem of the method of liberation which arose in the late canonical age. Indeed, Mahāvīra himself practised meditation, and the lay Jainas used to worship the images of Jinas in the posture of meditation since the considerably early days. However the Jaina concept of *dhyāna* must have evolved when the need arose to theorize the Jaina method of liberation. And the rest of the three lower classes of *dhyāna*, i.e. *ārta*, *raudra* and *dharma*, must have been brought together in connection with *śukla dhyāna* with a view to giving a systematic outlook to the Jaina *dhyāna* as was so done in the other schools.

Notes

- 1 Schubring comments on this point in his *Doctrine of the Jainas*, Sec. 181, p.316, "This, however, is but an attempt to incorporate the magic faculties (*iddhi, labdhi, siddhi*) frequently mentioned in the canon into the system, by the way, in a rather unfitting place, for he who has come to reach the "pure" grade of meditation may be supposed to be above those magic tricks presently to be mentioned. For not only that they do not belong to this grade of meditation, they have nothing at all to do with the road leading to salvation."
- 2 *Yogasūtra* III.50 *tad-vairāgyād-āpi doṣa-bija-kṣaye kaivalyam*
- 3 *Sarvārthasiddhi* V.8
- 4 These processes are outlined in the *Prajñāpanā* XXXVI and *Aupapātika*. We used here *Jñānārṇava* 42.48ff in order to clarify their exposition in further details.
- 5 Refer to the *Bhagavati* I.1.18, for instance, for *śliṣṭa-gāḍha bandha*.
- 6 *aṇuttaram dhammam-ūtrāittā aṇuttaram jhāṇavaram jhiyāi|
susukka-sukkam apagaṇḍa-sukkm saṅkh-indu-egāntavadāya-sukkam ||16||
aṇuttaraggam paramam mahesi asesā-kammam sa visohāittā|
siddhim gae sāim-aṇanta-patte nāṇeṇa sileṇa ya dāmsaṇeṇa||17||*
In fact, the entire Chapter 6 of this *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* I belongs to the later age when the Jaina Cosmography began to be outlined.

*

BHARTṚHARĪ'S PARADOX ***Hans G. Herzberger****Radhika Herzberger**

Assuming that many things in our experience and in the world can be named, one may consider whether there are any limits to this process, and whether there are any things which cannot be named. This was a standing question in traditional Indian philosophy, with some schools of thought affirming that everything could be named while others denied it. The affirmative position was especially characteristic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school:¹

“Naiyāyikas are found of a saying, which is sometimes found at the head of their works; whatever is, is knowable and nameable”.

The negative position was characteristic of the Buddhist philosophers and may have been held by others as well. In its most general terms it may be cast in the form of an existential statement : *Unnameability thesis* : *There are some things which are unnameable.*

While it may be surprising and to some extent counter to commonsense, this unnameability thesis pertains to the theory of language and should be subject to rational inquiry. But perplexities arise as soon as one tries to verify it by positive instances, for any positive instance of the unnameability thesis seems bound to name that which it declares to

* We are indebted to Professor K. Kunjuni Raja and Bimal K. Matilal for discussing with us certain problems of translation and exegesis. We are also grateful to the Rishi Vally School and to Vasanta Vihar, Madras, for their hospitality while this paper was being written; and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its support.

be unnameable. This is the problem we call "Bhartṛhari's paradox", after the fifth century grammarian and philosopher of language, who clearly enunciated it in his *Vākyapadīya*.

Whether or not Bhartṛhari himself actually held the unnameability thesis is a difficult problem which we shall examine at some length. Some of his remarks at least suggest the unnameability thesis, without definitively committing him to it. Those who have studied the *Vākyapadīya* will perhaps appreciate how studiously noncommittal its author tends to be on matters of philosophical doctrine. Inasmuch as the texts are inconclusive, the most we can do here is to formulate the exegetical problems with as much clarity as present understanding of Bhartṛhari's theory of language seems to permit.

To make the problem vivid to modern readers, we will then introduce some arguments of our own in favour of the unnameability thesis. To the extent that these arguments provide some support for that thesis, they strengthen the paradox. For it is in the nature of the problem that every argument advanced to support any instance of the unnameability thesis, drives one still more firmly into the paradox. This is one of the most perplexing features of our problem: the stronger those arguments, the more firmly they undercut their own conclusions; for they naturally tend to involve repeated reference to the very things whose unnameability they undertake to establish.

II

In this section we will examine some textual grounds for attributing the unnameability thesis to Bhartṛhari, and weigh these against conflicting interpretations. This examination will leave unresolved problems on both sides. But we hope the discussion will serve to focus the textual issues. In any case it will provide us with several interesting candidates for examples of things which cannot be named. Whether or not Bhartṛhari himself regarded these particular things to be strictly unnameable, he did single them out and seemed to be very

well aware of their problematic status in connection with names and other denoting expressions.

Our text consists of the opening verses of the *sambandha-samuddeśa* (SS) which is part of the third Chapter of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP). VP is a treatise on Grammar, the science on which the interpretation of the Vedas depends. The topic of SS is the power of words to convey their meanings and one of its themes is the doctrine that this power is no less "eternal" and "unchanging" than the Vedic injunctions themselves. In the course of discussing this theme, Bhartṛhari devotes some verses to the problem of using language to speak about its own fundamental powers.

The first verse of our text mentions several things and then comments on "their relation"² :

From words which are uttered, the speaker's idea,
an external object and the form of the word itself are
understood. Their relation is fixed. (SS 1)

This highly comprehensive and so far nameless relation is Bhartṛhari's primary candidate for something unnameable. He explicitly says that it cannot be signified *in a certain way* (*svadharameṇa* = on the basis of a property belonging to it). The main exegetical question is whether or not Bhartṛhari's semantic theory affords any *alternative* way of naming or signifying the relation in question. And, short of a full-scale reconstruction of that theory, as expounded throughout the nearly two thousand verses of the *Vākyapadīya*, it seems to be very difficult to settle that question in any definitive way. The problem is compounded by several difficulties of reconciling Bhartṛhari's linguistic practice with his own linguistic theory. For he uses various linguistic devices to identify and denote the relation in question; and it is by no means clear how his own linguistic theory could accommodate some of those devices.

The relation in question connects "words" with "meaning", where each of these two terms covers a heterogeneous

variety of things. Under ‘words’ may be included morphemes, words and compounds of various grammatical categories : simple and compound nouns, verbs, particles, prefixes, and so forth.⁵ Under “meanings” may be included individual substances, processes, powers, classes of these things, properties and ideas of any of the foregoing, and perhaps other things as well.⁴ To cover this kind of range in English one needs to resorts to one of the most general and flexible semantic terms like “meaning” or “signification”.

The third verse of our text tells us that the word-meaning relation is closely connected with the genitive case and with something (*vācya-vācaka*) which we render in English as “significance”⁵ :

The relation between words and meanings is by means of the genitive :

‘ This is the signifier (*vācaka*) of that,
that is the signified (*vācya*) of this’.

Thus the thatness (*tattvam*) of the relation is signified.(SS 3)
We cannot give a full account of this relation, and above all it should not be hastily identified with any modern counterpart from philosophical or commonsense semantics. We have chosen the word ‘signifies’ as a placeholder for a very comprehensive semantic relation whose content could be gradually unfolded by developing Bhartṛhari’s full theory of language in its surrounding philosophical framework. The main thing for present purposes is to observe that the same Sanskrit term (*vācakam*) recurs in the next verse, modifying the term ‘expression’ (*abhidhānam*) :⁶

Of the relation there is no signifying expression (*vācakam abhidhānam*) on the basis of a property belonging to it.
(SS 4a)

Now we want to examine the logical bearing of this verse on the proposition :

B1 The significance relation is unnameable.

which is an instance of the unnamability thesis. There are several differences of wording between *BI* and the textual passage *SS 4a*, and the exegetical problem is whether or not the passage taken in the larger context of Bhartṛhari's semantic theory, implies *BI*. We will comment on each of three points of difference.

In the first place, *BI* explicitly identifies "the relation" mentioned in *SS 4a* as the signifier–signified relation, under discussion in these verses of *SS*. The text is quite clear on this point and we do not regard it as controversial

In the second place, *BI* has "name" where *SS 4a* has "signifying expression". Given the very comprehensive character of the signifying relation, it is natural to regard names as a special kind of signifying expression. For our purposes, the most prominent distinguishing feature of names is their grammatical status as singular nouns or singular nounphrases. On this usage one would not regard prepositions, suffixes or verbs as names of what they signify. We shall provisionally regard singular pronouns and demonstratives as names, on the understanding that this treatment is eminently open to revision.

In the third place, *BI* omits the qualifying phrase "on the basis of a property belonging to it". The justifying argument for this omission would be that the phrase in question is not understood in context as a restrictive qualification, for in Bhartṛhari's semantics all naming is "on the basis of a property". Thus *VP III. 14. 274* states that words have no applications without "occasioning grounds"; and other passages suggest that even proper names and perhaps demonstratives as well denote through some fixed or contextually determined individuating property.⁷

The last of these points is one of the most important in evaluating the claim that *SS 4a* in its textual context implies *BI*. If Bhartṛhari's semantics could accommodate names with some mode of significance other than that "on the basis of property", then *SS 4a* would not commit Bhartṛhari to the

unnameability thesis. But we have not been able to find any direct evidence that he did admit names with any alternative mode of significance. Could there be some indirect evidence ?

One might look for indirect evidence in Bhartṛhari's own linguistic practice. He uses various Sanskrit expressions to introduce the significance relation and identify it to his readers. The first verse of our text introduces it as *teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ* (their relation) the third verse calls it *yogaḥ śabdārtthayoḥ* (the relation of word and meaning), and so on. These are nominal expressions and so may be classified as names in our broad sense, with are *prima facie* counterexamples to *B1*. And so, the argument would run, had Bhartṛhari been committed to *B1* in full strength, and not merely to the weaker proposition *SS 4a*, he would have been committed to a principles which was inconsistent with his own linguistic practice. Therefore, the argument continues, we should regard the phrase " on the basis of a property (etc.) " as a restrictive clause, and construe the various names Bhartṛhari uses for the significance relation, as names which signify on some other basis.

This indirect argument against attributing *B1* to Bhartṛhari, cannot be dismissed lightly. But a fuller reflection will show that it cannot be taken to be decisive either. In the first place at least one other verse of our text apparently implies an unqualified instance of the unnameability thesis, in connection with the inherence relation :⁸

The relation called inherence, which extends beyonds the signifying function (*vācyadharmātivartini*) cannot be understood through words either by the speaker or by the person to whom the speech is addressed. (*SS 19*)

Helārāja's commentary on this verse ends with the statement : " Therefore it (inherence) is truly unsignifiable (*avācya*). " ⁹ This provides some evidence that Bhartṛhari was committed to :

B2. The inherence relation is unnameable.

Since the text supporting *B2* makes no reference to properties as the basis of naming, the indirect argument advanced against *B1* would not apply here in the same form,

We are well aware that some new indirect argument might be advanced against *B2*, once more on the basis of a conflict between principles and practice. For Bhartṛhari does use the word *samavāya* throughout to name that which *B2* declares to be unnameable. And so, the new indirect argument might run, had Bhartṛhari been committed to *B2* in full strength, and not merely to some weaker proposition, he would have been committed to a principle which was inconsistent with his own linguistic practice.

We are now in a position to recognize the ground of these indirect arguments in the very phenomenon of Bhartṛhari's paradox. According to that paradox, any statement of any instance of the unnameability thesis is bound to use some name or expression to identify that which it declares to be unnameable. So any statement of any such principle seems bound to conflict with linguistic practice at some point. The very inevitability of such a conflict to some extent weakens these indirect arguments and justifies a demand for textual evidence of a more direct kind. One cannot rule out the possibility that Bhartṛhari really did hold some instance of the unnameability thesis and thereby really was committed to a linguistic theory which he himself couldn't reconcile with his own linguistic practice. That would after all be poetic justice for the author of our paradox.

Some remarks of Helārāja suggest yet another reading of Bhartṛhari's position on the unnameability thesis. The commentary to the fourth verse of *SS* in effect treats the genitive locution as if it were an *exception* to the rule :¹⁰

...There, apart from the genitive locution, there is no signifying, i.e. elucidating, expression for it...and Subramania Iyer's translation of Bhartṛhari's verse incorporates this reading :¹¹

There is no verbal element (besides the genitive suffix) which denotes this relation in its essential property.

by interpolating the parenthetic phrase although it does not appear explicitly in the Sanskrit text. Once again, Helārāja's reading would suffice to detach the verse *SS 4a* from the special unnameability thesis *BI*.

It is our view, however, that a closer examination of the genitive locutions in question will make it clear why they are not exceptions to *BI*. There is a matched pair of these genitive locutions. One describes a certain demonstrated word (this) as *vācaka*, and the other describes a certain demonstrated meaning (that) as a *vācya* :

- i. This is the signifier of that.
- ii. That is the signified of this.

Each has the grammatical structure : demonstrative+copula+singular nounphrase, or in our provisionally simplified terminology name+copula+name.¹² Four names are involved :

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| a. this (word) | c. the signifier of that |
| b. that (meaning) | d. the signified of that |

and inspection will show that none of them names the significance (*vācyavācaka*) relation. Two of them (*a* and *c*) name a certain *word*, and the other two (*b* and *d*) name a certain *meaning*, or thing signified. So the constituent names of (i) and (ii) name arguments ("relata") of the relation in question. Two of them (*c* and *d*) are names of that special sort which in traditional grammar were called "relative terms" : they denote some thing by reference to the relation it bears to something else. The relation figures in the process of understanding those relative terms, but not as denoted or named by those terms.

This analysis may help us to sharpen the contrast between what *SS 3* says that the genitive locution *can* signify, and what *SS 4* says that locutions in general *cannot* signify. What the genitive locution signifies, according to the last clause of *SS 3*, is something connected with the significance relation (its "thatness"), not the relation itself. We have no full account of what Bhartṛhari meant by "thatness" (*tattvam*), but we offer the following interpretation of the way it applies to the

case at hand : the "thatness" of a relation resides in its concrete manifestations, that particular individuals which stand in that relation to one another—in short, its arguments.

To justify this interpretation one need look no further than the genitive locutions offered by Bhartṛhari to signify "the *tattvam* of the relation." These locutions in fact name a particular argument, or pair of arguments, of the significance relation : a particular word (*vācaka*) and its meaning (*vācya*). From the standpoint of grammatical analysis this is very different from naming a relation in which those particular individuals stands, even when the names employed for those individuals are relative term. From the standpoint of logical analysis, a relation is ontologically distinct from any pair of its arguments, and naming the one is a different matter from naming the other. A given word can stand in various relations to different things : it can be a *vācaka* of one thing, a synonym of another, and an antonym of a third. And yet significance, synonymy and antonymy are obviously three distinct relations. In the present context there is another logical difference of considerable importance. In Section IV we will examine some logical reasons why the naming relation cannot be named; but these reasons clearly do not carry over to the particular names which are among the arguments of that relation. Nor do they carry over to the particular individuals which bear those names and are the remaining arguments of that relation. They can of course be named, by using their individual names. Logical problems arise only in connection with naming the naming relation itself; and this highlights a rather striking contrast between the logical status of a relation and that of its arguments.

From both a grammatical and a logical standpoint then, we can see how Bhartṛhari might state in one verse that the genitive locution signifies the thatness of the significance relation, and in the very next verse deny that any expression can signify that relation. So we find no reason to regard the genitive locutions as exceptions to the unnameability thesis,

and we conclude our examination of the claim that Bhartṛhari held that thesis and asserted *B1* as an instance of it.

III

Enough has been said to indicate the complexity of the exegetical problems surrounding the question of the strength of Bhartṛhari's commitment to the unnameability thesis. His statement of the paradox is perhaps somewhat less problematic, atleast to the extent that he presents it unmistakably and without qualifications. Several consecutive passages in our text clearly testify to Bhartṛhari's awareness of the paradoxical character of instances of the unnameability thesis. Following his statement that inherence "cannot be understood through words", Bhartṛhari writes. ¹³

That which is signified as unsignifiable, if determined to have been signified through that unsignifiability, would then be signifiable. (SS 20)

If (the word) 'unsignifiable' is being understood as not signifying anything, then its intended state has not been achieved. (SS 21)

Of something which is being declared unsignifiable that condition (of being signifiable) cannot really be denied by those words, in that place, in that way, nor in another way nor in any way. (SS 22)

These verses address themselves to some statement like :

B3. The inherence relation is unsignifiable.

and treat of the mode of signification of the predicate of that sentence ' *avācyam* ' = ' unsignifiable '). We take them as offering an explanation of the paradoxical character of statements like *B3*.

To obtain a somewhat sharper view of the paradox, attention must also be paid to the subject terms of such statements. *B3* is self-refuting on account of an opposition between its subject and predicate terms. In order for *B3* to

be true, its subject term must signify something, and its predicate term must be true of that thing: so its subject term must signify some unnameable thing. Because that condition cannot be satisfied, *B3* cannot be true. By a parallel line of reasoning, neither *B1* nor *B2* could be true, and perhaps more generally one might conclude that no instance of the unnameability thesis could be true.

In our view the very fact that Bhartr̥hari devoted several verses to such a careful formulation of the paradox, covering all cases ("in that way, nor in another way, nor in any way"), indicates that the unnameability thesis or some variant of it was at least under serious consideration at that point in his discussion. But Helārāja's commentary to these verses brings out an exegetical problem on a different plane from those we have so far considered. We will call this the problem of *attribution*.

The exegetical problems discussed in, Section II concerned matters of explication of the content, understood in context, of several passages in the text. But one need not assure that Bhartr̥hari intended to *assert* every proposition contained in those verses. Some he may have been simply entertaining in the course of developing his position or arguing for it. Among these latter may be propositions he was voicing on behalf of others, as *objections* or *criticisms* to be answered; and so forth.

This general problem of attribution which is familiar to Bhartr̥hari scholars, interacts with the semantic problems of elucidation in a very tangible way, inasmuch as one's interpretation of a particular passage "in context" depends on one's understanding of Bhartr̥hari's overall theory of language, which in turn is woven out of various propositions one attributes to Bhartr̥hari from the passages in his text. We have illustrated this interaction in the previous section in the course of examining Bhartr̥hari's commitment to the unnameability thesis. By and large, however, the emphasis there was on matters of elucidation. In this section, matters of attribution come into prominence. The content of the verses 20 to 22

seems to us relatively unproblematic in comparison with various matters concerning their role in the discourse. Whether *Bhartrhari* should be taken as having asserted those propositions or merely as having voiced them on behalf of others, is a problem too complex to be resolved here.

It was *Helārāja*'s view that the propositions expressed in verses 20 to 22 of *SS*, making up what we have called *Bhartrhari*'s paradox, were not asserted by *Bhartrhari* but were merely voiced on behalf of certain actual or potential critics. In his commentary to the next Verse 23, *Helārāja* describes the preceding three verses as "Nyaiyāyika casuistry" (*vākchala*), and he describes the subsequent verses as "an answer" to them.¹⁴ Our own view is that those verses cannot be lightly dismissed as "casuistry", however the problem of attribution is ultimately decided. There seems to us to be a genuine paradox here, which offers no easy way out. This will be argued in the next two sections.

IV

We have put before ourselves two instances of the unnameability thesis, concerning two fundamental semantic relations significance (*B1*) and inherence (*B2*). One passage of the text states that these two relations are distinct ("inherence...extends beyond the signifying function"): (*SS 19*) and another passage states that they are closely interconnected (*SS 13*). Without trying to work out the exact connections between them, we have examined with some care the textual basis for each of these two instances of the unnameability thesis. Now we propose to move the discussion to a more analytical level on which we will begin to open for ourselves the question of the unnameability thesis and its grounds in the structure of language. In this section we will follow what we take to be *Bhartrhari*'s insights, but deal with them using analytical resources beyond those that were available to *Bhartrhari*.

Examining the unnameability thesis as a contemporary issue in the philosophy of language, we believe that thesis

can be supported by some arguments of rather considerable strength and generality. We will present these arguments informally at first, making use of commonsense notions. Then they will be related to modern ideas from the theory of sets, with the aim of making the arguments more rigorous. No historical claims should be read into the discussion of this section. Its purpose is to examine Bhartṛhari's paradox as a living problem, and in the process to make an effort to crystallize from it the sharpest possible formulation.

The proposition that the significance relation is unnameable can most easily and directly be derived from a still more general proposition :

R1. The significance relation is unsignifiable.

What this means in the context of the present paper is that there is no expression, of any grammatical category, which bears the significance relation to the significance relation. Equivalently : the *vācya-vācaka* relation has no *vācaka*, and is not itself a *vācya*. Once unsignifiability of the relation has been established, its unnameability will follow as a special case.

We will now sketch a *proof* for *B4* from the still more general proposition that no relation can be one of its own relata. If this holds for all relations, it holds for the significance relation as a special case (*R1*); and from that special case, *B1* would follow as a still more special case.

To build up some intuition concerning the problem, consider the naming relation, which obtains between names and their bearers : between the name 'Kṛṣṇa' and the playful blue god, between the name 'Gauriśaṅkara' and the highest mountain on earth, and so forth. It takes its place as one relation among others : the parent-child relation among humans, the dominance relation within a herd of elephants, the natural ordering relation of the positive integers. In general there is no semantic problem about naming various relations : we fix the relation in our mind and then discover or invent some name for it. However a specific problem does

arise in the case of the naming relation itself. The first step presents no difficulty : we can fix the relation as an object of thought. Nor is there any obstacle to selecting a name; on the contrary, various languages incorporate several syntactic devices capable of forming names of relations. In the first place one can specify the characteristic domain and counterdomain of the relation, as in forming the name 'the parent-child relation.' Secondly one can nominalize one of the verb-forms which express the relation, as in forming the name 'the dominance relation' from the transitive verb 'dominates'. Thirdly one can find a uniquely descriptive phrase, as in forming the name 'the natural ordering relation among the positive integers' for the relation.

Having fixed the relation as an object of thought, and having selected one or another suitable expression to name it, the only thing left would be tying the two together within the naming relation. And the last stop is the hardest, for in the special case at hand, one is called upon to make a relation one of its own relata; and this almost invariably binds one in a conceptual knot. The parent-child relation is neither a parent nor a child; no elephant dominates the dominance relation; no number is greater than or less than the natural ordering relation among the positive integers. Nor does this seem to be an historical accident of classification or usage, How could it be otherwise? How could *any* relation be one of its own relata?

To sharpen this question a bit, let us consider a parallel question that has received much attention in the theory of sets : could any set be a member of itself? As Bertrand Russell observed at the beginning of this century, sets are not ordinarily members of themselves; but there might be thought to be some extraordinary sets which are members of themselves.¹⁵ Let us consider this possibility. The set of all mangoes is certainly not itself a mango. But its complement, the set of all non-mangoes isn't a mango either, and so we have a set that "should" belong to itself. This line of thought leads

directly into what is known as Russell's paradox concerning the set of all sets which are not members of themselves. In order to resolve this and allied paradoxes, standard axiomatic set-theories deny the existence of any sets which are members of themselves. In accordance with those theories, there is no set of all things which are not mangoes ; for it there were, *per impossibile* it would have to be a member of itself.

The problem of sets being members of themselves is only part of a larger problem, and the theories in question have been framed in such a way as to preclude the existence of any set which is a member of itself once removed (i.e. a member of a member of itself), or a member of itself twice removed, etc. In general, the set-membership relation is required to be "acyclic", by a principle called the *axiom of regularity*.¹⁶

This doctrine has consequences for our problem as soon as we take into account that every relation has some set for its "extension"; some set or ordered pairs. Let N be the set of all ordered pairs $\langle n, b \rangle$ consisting of a name, n , and the bearer of that name, b . For example, the pair \langle the name 'Kṛṣṇa' the playful blue god \rangle belongs to N , as does the pair \langle the name 'Gauriśaṅkara', the largest mountain on earth \rangle , and so forth. The set N is the "extension" of the proper-name relation. Now the question of whether or not the naming relation can be named, is connected with the question of whether or not the set N could contain some pair $\langle n, N \rangle$. Such an eventuality would not require N to be strictly a member of itself, but more precisely would require N to be 'part of' a member of itself. According to the usual set-theoretical construal of relations, the ordered pair $\langle n, N \rangle$ would itself be treated as a set of sets.¹⁷ Consequently, the naming relation could be named only if N could be a member twice removed of itself, and this is incompatible with the regularity axiom.¹⁸

By this reasoning a general theorem about relations can be derived from the standard principles of the mathematical theory of sets.

Regularity Theorem : No relation can be one of its own relata.

The label attached to this theorem underscores its reference to some "regular" theory of sets, that is some theory incorporating the axiom of regularity or an equivalent principle.¹⁹

Without committing ourselves to any special assumptions regarding the nature of language or the naming process, but only to some more fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of sets, a substantial case can now be built up to support the unnameability thesis. In the first place, *RI* is an immediate corollary to the regularity theorem, quite independently of any questions about the exact interpretation or English translation of 'vācya-vācaka', so long as it is treated as a relation having some regular set for its extension. In the second place, *BI* is a consequence of *RI* assuming only that whatever can be named can be signified.

V

Having approached the unnameability thesis now from more general considerations, it is possible to reinforce our paradox by establishing a whole family of variations on *BI*. As an introduction to these variations, let us reflect briefly on one natural response to the paradox. Up to this point we have used the term "name" in an unusually extended sense, to include proper names, definite descriptions, and even demonstratives. In accordance with this broad usage, one could hardly deny that *BI* contains a name (the phrase 'the significance relation') for that very thing which *BI* declares to be unnameable. Now someone might suggest that what drives one into the paradox is just this policy of using the term "name" in an extended sense.

Consider the alternative policy of restricting the term "name" to proper nouns like 'Kṛṣṇa' or 'Gauriṣaṅkara'. One way of implementing this policy might be to use the term "denote" for the more extended concept, so that definite descriptions and demonstratives would be said to denote but not to name that which they signify. Now, taking a

closer look at *B1*, we see that under the new policy it would no longer name that which it declares to be unnameable; rather, it would quite legitimately denote that which it declares to be unnameable, and the paradox would be resolved. This line of reasoning may seem to turn Bhartṛhari's paradox as so far discussed into "casuistry" or some sort of verbal trap constructed out of the extended usage of "name". And indeed, common usage may well favour some more restricted usage and thereby offer what seems to be a natural resolution of problem.

We shall now suggest that no such resolution can be satisfactory, for its apparent success must depend on a very limited view of the whole matter. Any sharply drawn boundary between names and denoting phrases, transfers the paradox from *B1* to :

R2. The significance relation is undenotable.

which on the one hand could be derived from the regularity theorem, and on the other hand would, according to the new policy, denote that which it declares to be undenotable. Nor will the drawing of any number of additional boundaries within the field of what we originally called "names", ever be able to fully resolve the problem.

Furthermore, in the presence of certain minimal assumptions regarding the connections between naming, denoting and signifying, additional consequences can be derived. The regularity theorem can be generalized in several ways. One simple generalization is :

Indirect Regularity Theorem : No relation can be one of the relata for any one of its own subrelations.

The sense here is that if *Q* is included in *R* as a subrelation, then *R* cannot be a relatum for *Q*. Therefore, under the assumption that naming is a case of denoting which in turn is a case of signifying :

R3. The significance relation is unnameable.

R4. The denoting relation is unnameable.

In the presence of an additional assumption connecting significance with inherence, *B2* and *B3* can also be derived from the indirect regularity theorem. The assumption is that signifying is a subrelation of inhering. This assumption is suggested by verse 13 of our text :^{2*}

On the basis of the relation of inherence (a word's) own substratum and own universal are understood. On the basis of inherence in a single substratum, on the other hand, the quality which belongs in its own substratum alone is understood. (SS 13)

and is consonant with other passages such as "inherence..., extends beyond the signifying function" (SS 19). Conditional upon this assumption and the previous one that naming and denoting are subrelations of signifying, we could derive:

R5. The inherence relation is unnameable.

R6. The inherence relation is undenotable.

R7. The inherence relation is unsignifiable.

These seven special unnameability, undenotability, and unsignifiability results, are just a few examples to illustrate the stability of Bhartṛhari's paradox when it is understood more broadly as a theme with many variations.

Notes

- 1 See Potter, 1977, p. 48. Further discussion is to be found in Potter, 1968, which also describes a contradiction having some affinity with Bhartṛhari's paradox, but arising within a rather different philosophical context.
- 2 *jñānam prayoktur bāhyo'rthaḥ svarūpaṃ ca pratīyate,
śabdair uccāritais teṣāṃ saṃbandhaḥ samavasthitaḥ.*
Except for the word 'jñānam' which is translated as 'idea' in order to accommodate the complexity read into it by Helārāja, the translation is Subramania Iyer's: Iyer, 1971, p. 76. Unless specifically stated the translations are ours.
- 3 See, for instance Helārāja's introductory remarks to VP III.1.1.
- 4 See Helārāja's remarks on VP III.1.2.

- 5 asyāyam, vācako vācya iti ṣaṣṭhyā pratīyate,
yogaḥ śabdārthayos tattvaṃ ity ato vyapadiṣyate.
- 6 nābhidhānaṃ svadharmeṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam.
- 7 In the *jātisamuddeśa* the properties on the basis of which names are given to objects are identified with universals (*jāti*): *VP* III. 1.6-8; in the *dravyasamuddeśa* with limiting features (*upādhi*): Helārāja on *VP* III.2.2, p. 108. 1-9; in the *guṇasamuddeśa* with qualities (*guṇa*): Helārāja on *VP* III.5.1, p. 192-203. The lack of a uniform vocabulary is not surprising in the context of Bhartṛhari's commitment to a metaphysically neutral semantic theory (*sarvaparśadasāmānyam śāstram*). There is evidence in support of our view that for Bhartṛhari proper names do not name their subjects directly. For instance Helārāja on *VP* III 1.2, p. 9.6-7 says: "It will be established that even (proper) names like Dittha express universals (*saṃjñāsabdānām api Ditthādiśabdānām jātivācivum samarthayīsyate*)", a remark which is elaborated on by him in *VP* III. 5.1, p 193. 17-20; see also *VP* II. 366 and the discussion of the proper name 'Kharāṇāsa' (long-nosed) in *VP* II. 364-365. Our evidence for the demonstrative is indirect and is drawn from Bhartṛhari's analysis of negative sentences. The sentence 'This is not a Brahmin' is not meaningful if the reference is to a clod of earth. It becomes meaningful only if the reference is to someone who bears a resemblance to a Brahmin, to someone who for instance has tawny hair (*pingalakeśin*): see *VP* III 14.263, 281, 301. This would seem to suggest that the demonstrative refers to its object through a property which is determined by the adjoining predicate expression. The property would therefore not be fixed (*dhruvam*) but would be context dependent. The demonstrative would signify its object in the same way in which a crow signifies the house on which it sits: *VP* III. 2.3.
- 8 prāptiṃ tu samavāyākhyāṃ vācyadharmātivartinim
prayoktā pratipatā vā na śabdair anugacchati.
- 9 iti avācya eva bhāvato'yam; Helārāja on *VP* III. 3. 19, p. 137. 1-2.
- 10 tatra... vācakam pratyāyakam, abhidhānam ṣaṣṭhivyatiriktaṃ nāsti.
Helārāja on *VP* III. 3.4. p. 123. 10-11.
- 11 Iyer, 1971 p. 80 (Iyer's translation)
- 12 Since Sanskrit does not have a copula the Sanskrit counterparts for *a* and *d* have the grammatical structure: demonstrative + implicit verb + noun phrase.

The four names involved would be :

a. ayam

b. ayam

c. asya vācakaḥ

d. asya vācyaḥ

- 13 avācyam iti yad vācyam tad avācyatayā yadā
vācyam iti avasiyeta vācyam eva tadā bhavet.
athāpy avācyam ity evam na tad vācyam pratiyate
vivakṣitāsyā yāvasthā saiva nādhyavasiyate.
tathānyathā sarvathā ca yasyāvācyatvam ucyate;
tatrāpi naiva sāvasthā taiḥ śabdaiḥ pratiṣidhyate.
- 14 Helārāja on *VP* III. 3.3.p. 138. 12-13.
- 15 See Russell, 1908. 16 See Suppe s, 1960.
- 17 The ordered pair $\langle n, N \rangle$ would be defined as the set $\{ \{n\}, \{n, N\} \}$ whose members are the set $\{n\}$ whose only member is n , and the set $\{n, N\}$ whose members are n and N : so it would follow that N would be a member of a member of $\langle n, N \rangle$. See Suppes, 1960 (Chapter 2 Definition 10, and also Chapter 3).
- 18 What is in question is the proposition that N might be a member of some set $\{n, N\}$ which is a member of $\langle n, N \rangle$ which is a member of N .
- 19 It should be remarked that there do exist some rather special axiomatic set theories in which the axiom of regularity does not hold; one well-known example is W. V. Quine's system *NF* ("New Foundations") described in Quine, 1963. These systems show the possibility of operating consistently with nonregular sets; but it is not easy to see how they could provide any intuitively satisfactory resolution for Bhartṛhari's paradox.
- 20 samavāyāt sva ādhāraḥ svā ca jātiḥ pratiyate
ekārthasamavāyāt tu guṇaḥ svādhāra eva ye.

Bibliography

Note : We have used two editions of *Vākyapadiya*. For references to Book III Chapters 1 through 7 (*VP* III. 1-7) see Iyer, 1963; for all other references to *VP* see Rau, 1977.

Iyer, Subramania

- 1963 *Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja Kāṇḍa III, part I* (Deccan College, Poona).
- 1969 *Bhartṛhari; a study of the Vākyapadiya in the light of ancient commentaries* (Deccan College, Poona).
- 1971 *The Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari, Chapter III, Part I: English translation* (Deccan College, Poona).

Potter, Karl

1968 "Astitva Jñeyatva Abhidheyatva", in *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie*, Wien : 275-280.

1977 *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Volume 2 (Princeton).

Quine, W. v. O.

1963 *Set Theory and Its Logic* (Harvard).

Rau, Wilhelm

1977 *Bhartrhari's Vākyapadiya* (Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft)

Russell, Bertrand

1908 "Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types", reprinted in R. Marsh, editor, *Logic and Knowledge* (Allen and Unwin).

Suppes, Patrick

1960 *Axiomatic Set Theory* (Van Nostrand).

*

KONDA BHATTA ON THE MEANING OF THE NEGATIVE PARTICLE

S. D. Joshi

According to the first view proposed by Konda Bhatta (=KB) (in connection with the negative *tatpuruṣa* compound), the reference of the compound is determined by the second member. The negative particle *nañ* (*na* or *a* or *an*) suggests the sense of *āropitatva* 'superimposition'. The function of *nañ* in *abrāhmaṇa* is to convey the secondary sense that the word *abrāhmaṇa* is used with reference to a *kṣatriya*, etc. One superimposes brahminhood on a *kṣatriya*, etc. on account of the fact that the *kṣatriya*, etc. shares a number of characteristics with a brahmin. To convey that the word *brāhmaṇa* is used in the sense of *kṣatriya* etc. the speaker uses *nañ* along with the word *brāhmaṇa* (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 201).

If the negative particle stands for *abhāva* 'nonexistence' then *abrāhmaṇa* would mean 'a person not existing as a brahmin'. In this view, the first member represents the main meaning. But this view is not correct because it involves various difficulties. According to this view in the negative *tatpuruṣa* compound *asaḥ* 'other than he' the second member *sa* (*tat*) will be subordinate. Therefore it will not be called *sarvanāman*. Consequently we cannot apply the operations prescribed for pronominal stems. The result is that the compound-form will be *atad* instead of *asaḥ*. Therefore this view should be discarded (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 201).

There are six meanings in which the negative particle *nañ* (*na* or *a*) is used in compounds :

- (i) similarity (*sādṛśya*) as in *abrāhmaṇaḥ* 'like a brahmin',
- (ii) absence (*abhāva*) as in *apāpam* 'absence of sin'

- (iii) being other than something (*tadanyatvam*) 'mutual absence' as in *anaśvaḥ* 'other than a horse'.
- (iv) smallness of something (*tadalpatā*) as in *anudurā kanyā* 'a girl with a thin belly'.
- (v) impropriety or unfitness (*aprāśastya*) as in *apaśivaḥ* 'unfit animals (for sacrifice)'
- (vi) contrariness (*virodha*) as in *adharmā* 'contrary to *dharma*'.
(*Sāra*, p. 515)

Of these six meanings only one meaning is primarily denoted by *nañ*, namely, *abhāva*. The rest are secondary to this primary meaning (*Sāra*, p. 515).

According to the Naiyāyikas there are two primary meanings of *nañ*, namely, *abhāva* 'absence' as in *apāpam* 'absence of sin' and *anyonyābhāva* 'mutual absence' as in *asaḥ* 'other than he.' But according to KB the basic meaning of *nañ* is only absence (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 201–202).

Patañjali explains that the function of *nañ* is to convey the sense *nivṛttapadārthaka*, i.e., bringing the absence of something to our notice. In other words the function of *nañ* is to convey the absence of something in physical reality. Kaiyaṭa interprets the *Bhūṣya* to mean that a word like *brāhmaṇa* in *abrāhmaṇa* is used in a secondary sense, namely, that of *kṣatriya*, etc. upon whom brahminhood has been superimposed. The function of *nañ* in *abrāhmaṇa* is only to bring out to our notice that *brāhmaṇa* in *abrāhmaṇa* is used in the secondary sense (*Bhūṣaṇa*, p. 203).

KB criticises Kaiyaṭa's view. In instance like *ghaṭo nāsti* 'there is no jar', *abrāhmaṇa* '(he is) not a brahmin', the particle *nañ* has not two different meanings : (i) absence, (ii) superimposition (*āropitvatva*). In both the cases *nañ* denotes the sense *nivṛttapadārthaka* which implies that *nañ* brings to our notice that something is absent. In other words, according to Patañjali *nañ* denotes absence. He further argues that if superimposition would be the meaning of *nañ* as Kaiyaṭa thinks, then *nañ* also

would denote the *sādrśya* 'similarity'. In that case there would be six different denotations as stated earlier. This involves complexity (*Bhūṣaṇa* p. 203).

The negative particle *nañ* expressing absence may be sometimes subjunct (*viśeṣya* 'qualified') and sometimes adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa* 'qualifier'). In the form *asa* 'other than him', *atvam-bhavasi* '(somebody) other than you become', *anekam* 'more than one', the second member is principal. That explains the pronominal operations, the number and the person which are determined by the predominance of the second member. Thus the view of the *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* 'meaning predominance of the second member' explains these examples. But according to the other view the particle *nañ* denotes 'absence which stands as a qualified (*viśeṣya*). In this view the meaning of *nañ* is the main meaning. In the above referred special cases the predominance of the 2nd member is retained by resorting to the *lakṣaṇā* 'secondary function' which conveys the sense of 'difference' or 'mutual absence'. In such cases the negative particle denies the relation of identity in the form of denying reference to the meaning of the second member (*Bhūṣaṇa*, pp. 203–204).

Note

Pages refer to the *Vāiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prākṛit Series, 1915.

*

**Sa sKya Paṇḍita's VERSION OF PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKAM III.3
—A Case Study on the Influence of Exegesis upon Translation
in Tibet¹**

Leonard Zwilling

Despite the reputation for literalness and accuracy which Tibetan translations generally enjoy it cannot be automatically assumed that any particular translation is, in fact, a faithful rendering of the original. In those instances where a Sanskrit text is lacking the question of accuracy may be difficult if not impossible to resolve, as for example in the case of the conflicting testimony of the two translations of Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-sammucaya*;² however, where an original is available any deviation is comparatively easy to recognize. Although it was the customary practice of Tibetan translators (lo.tsā.ba. = Skt. *lokacakṣu* ?) to make a word rendering without willful alteration of their text one cannot be certain that a knowledge of the Sanskrit equivalents for the Tibetan will give an accurate account of what stood in the manuscript, as E. H. Johnston has observed.³ Since many of the more prominent translators were also important teachers and founders of schools of interpretation of the texts they translated, it becomes necessary in ascertaining the accuracy of a particular translation to acquire not only a grasp of an individual translator's style but also a familiarity with the literature bearing upon the text in question such as commentaries, subcommentaries, criticism, etc. as well as the historical, that is doctrinal, context in which the translator was working and that translator's line of interpretation. It is only when these desiderata are met that one can then judge the status of any deviation and come to a decision on the question of accuracy and the offering of emendations.

SP-39

A case in point is provided by the translation of *Pramāṇavārttikam (PV)* III. 3. The *PV* has been translated into Tibetan three times. The first translation was prepared some time prior to the early 9th century by an unknown hand.⁴ The second translation was prepared by the famous translator dGe Ba'i bLo Gros (1044–1090) a.k.a rMa Lo Tsā Ba assisted by the *paṇḍita* Subhūtiśrīśānti. This translation was revised by rMa's younger contemporary bLo lDan Ses Rab (1059–1109) a.k.a rNgog Lo Tsā Ba assisted by Bhavyarāja of Kashmir.⁵ These two individuals, rMa and rNgog, are regarded as the founders of the study of *pramāṇa* in Tibet.⁶ The third and final translation was prepared by the illustrious Sa sKya Paṇḍita Kun dGa' rGyal mTshan dPal bZang Po (1182–1251) in collaboration with Śākyaśrībhadrā (1127–1225), the last abbot of Vikramasīlāvihāra. It is this version which, having been incorporated into the *bstan. 'gyur*, has attained "official" status and thus has become the basis for all future study of that work.

The Sanskrit of that verse which is the subject of these remarks with its "official", that is, Sa sKya Paṇḍita's version reads as follows :

arthakriyāsamartham yat | |tad atra paramārthasat ||
anyat samvṛtisat proktaṃ | |te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe ||

don.dam.don.byed.nus.pa.gang/ |de.'dir.don.dam.yod.pa.yin//
 gzan.ni.kun.rdzob.yod.pa ste//de.dag.rang.spyi'i.mtshan.nid.bsad//

The importance of this verse lies in the fact that it is a statement by Dharmakīrti on the fundamental ontological category of the two truths (*satyadvaya*),⁷ but the question of which school the view stated belong, and whether it does or does not represent Dharmakīrti's own opinion has made this verse one of the most controversial in his entire corpus, and one of the most important in the attempt to integrate the philosophy of Dharmakīrti into that grand synthesis of all Indian Buddhist thought which is one of the goals of the Tibetan *siddhānta* tradition.

In comparing the two texts the diversion of the Tibetan from the Sanskrit is obvious. In Sanskrit the verse says; "Here,

whatever is causally efficient exists ultimately; the opposite exists conventionally. These are the characteristics of the particular and universal [or: these are the particular and universal.]” However, in the Tibetan version of *pāda a*, *arthakriyāsamartham* is qualified by the predicate *paramārtha* (Tib. *don.dam.*), that is, “Here, whatever is causally efficient *ultimately* exists ultimately, etc.” This discrepancy did not go unnoticed by native Tibetan scholars. In his commentary upon the *PV* mKhas Grub rJe dGe Legs dPal bZang Po (1385–1438) cites the opinion of the translator of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Tīkā* on the *Pramāṇasammucaya*, bLo Gros brTan Pa (1276–1342) a.k.a dPang Lo Tsā Ba that the predicate *paramārtha* is not to be found in the manuscript and should therefore be rejected, to which mKhas Grub adds that the expression *don.dam don.byed.nus pa* is not to be met with anywhere in the works of Dharmakīrti.⁸ With the final displacement of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in the monastic curriculum by the *PV* in the mid fifteenth century there appears to have been no discussion of the discrepancy until ‘Jam dbYangs bZed Pa Ngag dBang brTson ‘Grus (1648–1722). In his pedagogical exegesis (*mtha’ dpyod*) of rGyal Tshab Dar Ma Rin Chen’s (1364–1432) commentary upon the *PV* he attacks the opinion of dPang Lo Tsā Ba and supports the official translation by appealing to the translations of Indian commentaries upon the *PV* in which the first *pāda* is rendered with the predicate *paramārtha*.⁹ Now it is significant that in Sa sKya Paṇḍita’s *Tshad.Ma.Rigs.gTer*, a work which represents the culmination of his logical studies with Śākyaśrībhadrā, the controversial *pāda* is rendered literally as *don.byed.nus.pa.gang.yin pa*¹⁰ contrary to the practice of his predecessors rMa and rNog in their translations of Devendrabuddhi’s and Śākyamati’s commentary and subcommentary upon the *PV* done by the former, and Jāmāri’s commentaty on Frajñākara-gupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* made by the latter.¹¹ Does not then Sa sKya Paṇḍita’s reversion to the translation of his predecessors prove that rMa’s and rNgog’s manuscripts differed

from that utilized by Sa sKya Paṇḍita when composing the *Tshad.Ma.Rigs.gTer*? We do not believe so and propose to show that Sa sKya Paṇḍita was guided by doctrinal rather than textual considerations as were rMa and rNgog before him.

We have previously alluded to the fact that *PV* III. 3 was of importance in the development of different lines of interpretation concerning the final import of Dharmakīrti's thought. These different interpretations have already been signalled by Stcherbatsky in *Buddhist Logic* with his treatment of what he termed the "philological" school of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati, the Kashmir or "philosophical" school of Dharmottara (which does not concern us here as this school ignored the *PV*), and the "religious" school of Prajñākaragupta and his followers Jina (or Jetavān), Ravigupta, and Jāmāri.¹³ The basic tendency of the "philological" school was to regard Dharmakīrti as an exponent of the Yogācāra while recognizing his desire to formulate an epistemology acceptable to both realists (Sautrāntika) and idealists, whereas the "religious" school interpreted the *PV* as being Mādhyamika in intent.¹⁵ We may take the lines of interpretation followed by the two schools to be most clearly exposed in their approach to *PV* III. 4 which treats an objection raised against the ontology of the preceding verse. Objection; nothing is causally efficient (*aśaktam sarvam iti cet.*) Reply : the efficiency of seeds is seen in the sprouts (*bījāder aṅkurādisu/dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ.*) Objection : it is so conventionally (*matā sā cet/samvṛtyā*). It is the interpretation of the reply : *astu yathā tathā* that most clearly exposes the exegetical approach of the two schools. Both Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati make it clear that what the objector, who is identified as a Mādhyamika, is arguing against when denying causal efficiency is *ultimate* causal efficiency,¹⁴ from the Mādhyamika position that nothing exists in an ultimate sense. According to the "philological" school Dharmakīrti's final reply simply means that one cannot disavow causal efficiency, regardless of what one calls it; the efficient entity to which the Mādhyamika applies the qualification "conven-

tional" must also be accepted by them since to deny the existence of an efficient entity is to go against perception, inference, and common experience.¹⁵ The "religious" school however takes *yathā* as an expression of affirmation¹⁶ and thereby claims Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika.¹⁷

Can we accept from the interpretation of *PV. III. 4* by the "philological" school that Dharmakīrti would not have objected to the qualification Of *arthakriyāsamartham* by *paramārtham*? Most probably not, for if *PV. III. 3* be taken as representing Dharmakīrti's own view then *pāda c* of that same verse would imply that for Dharmakīrti the opposite of the ultimately efficient, that is, the conventionally efficient, exists conventionally; this would contradict *PV. III. 5* which denies any efficiency at all to the conventionally existent.¹⁸ Thus, for Dharmakīrti entities are either efficient or they are not and he did not draw a distinction between the ultimately efficient and the conventionally efficient as the Mādhyamika did.

How then is one to account for the presence of the predicate in the translations made by Sa sKya Paṇḍita's predecessors? According to Stcherbatsky the "religious" school of commentators had no continuation in Tibet¹⁹ but strictly speaking that was not the case, as we are informed by Kong sPrul bLo Gros mTha' Yas (1813-1899) in his *Śes Bya Kun Khyab*. In his treatment of the study of *pramāṇa* in Tibet he observes that it was customary for Tibetan scholars to interpret the *PV* from the point of view of the Mādhyamika. He singles out for particular mention both rNgog Lo Tsā Ba and Sa sKya Paṇḍita, the former having interpreted the *PV* as "Mādhyamika" and the latter as a Yogācārasvāntrikamādhyamika.²⁰ The implication of this for the problem before us is that those translators (and we should include rMa here as well), in regarding Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, added the predicate *paramārtha* to their translations of *PV. III. 3a* in order to turn it into a *pūrvapakṣa* which is then refuted in the following verse. That the "religious" school did not have a text before them incorporating the predicate may

be assumed on the basis that the text of the *PV* which has come down with the commentaries of Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin do not have it. Therefore we may conclude that the difference in the two translations of that same pāda by Sa sKya Paṇḍita, first literal and then interpretive, represent a change in his view concerning Dharmakīrti's doctrinal affiliation.

From the late 8th century Tibetan Mādhyamika was dominated by the Yogācārasvātantrika of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as a consequence of a royal decree following the victory of the Indian party in that long series of philosophical exchanges known to Tibetan tradition as 'the Debate at Lhasa.'²¹ It was not until the generation preceding Sa sKya Paṇḍita that the shift began away from the Svātantrika and towards the Prāsaṅgika primarily as a consequence of the work of Pa Tshab Ni Ma Grags, the translator and propagator of the primary works of the Indian Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika school, the *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti. This process was to culminate in the adoption of the Prāsaṅgika by Tsong Kha Pa bLo bZang Grags Pa (1358-1419) and eventually through a combination of political and philosophic factor, it came to be well nigh universally accepted as the official interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. We consider it likely that the basis for Sa sKya Paṇḍita's change of opinion vis a vis the translation of *PV* III. 3a was due to the influence that this new doctrinal trend had upon his philosophical outlook.

Towards the conclusion of his *Madhyamakāvatāra* Candrakīrti criticizes those who regard the ultimate entities of either the Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika as the conventional entities accepted by the Mādhyamika.²² But Sa sKya Paṇḍita, after citing Candrakīrti on the two truths in his *gZung Lugs Legs bŚad*²³ with approval, upholds the very view that Candrakīrti himself criticizes, offering in support passages from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*²⁴ and *Bodhicaryāvatāra*²⁵, as well as the following verse from Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, which in the *Panjikā* ascribed to Śāntarakṣita is attributed to Nāgārjuna himself²⁶ :

gz'an.gyi.mar.'dod.gang.yin.pa /
 gz'an.gyi.chung.mar.yang.'dod.bz'in //
 gz'gn.gyi.don.dam.gang.yin.pa /
 de ni.gz'an.gyi.kun.rdzob.'dod //

“Just as the mother of one (person) is the wife of another, (so is) the ultimate of one (system) the conventional of another.”

While rMa and rNgog had added the predicate *paramārtha* in the belief that it represented a *pūrvapakṣa*, Sa sKya Paṇḍita's subsequent addition of the predicate, in contradiction to his own prior rendering, represents his belief in the justification of the addition and that justification was provided by what he considered to be the opinion of Candrakīrti, whose works were not available to his predecessors.

Thus this is a case in point how shifting trends in Tibetan thought influenced the translation of a major Indian *śāstra*, the result of which was the generation of philosophical problems which was to occupy succeeding Tibetan doxologists.²⁷

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this paper was read at the Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University, October 1978, under the title : “The Tibetan Translation of Pramāṇavārttikam III. 3.”
- 2 On this point see the introduction to Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga On Perception*, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1968.
- 3 E. H. Johnston, *The Buddhacarita, Part I*, Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, p. xi.
- 4 Marcelle Lalou, “Les Traite's Bouddhiques au Temps du Roi Khri-Sroñ-Bde-Bcan,” *Journal Asiatique*, 1953, p. 337. According to the IDan-Kar catalogue (the subject of the article) the PV is listed as a translation in progress (*sgyur.'phro*).
- 5 rNgog also translated Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and was the author of a commentary on the PV, the *Śes Rab 'Grel Chung*, which is no longer extant; see the *Blue Annals*, tsld. by George Roerich, Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1972. p. 69.

- 6 According to the *Blue Annals* p. 70 rMa was the founder of the “Old Nyāya (*tshad. ma. rñing. ma*)” and rNgog the “New Nyāya (*tshad.ma. gsar.ma.*)”
- 7 See Jāmāri’s *Ṭikā* on the *Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra* in the P(eking) T(ibetan) T(ripitika) reprint published under the supervision of Otani University, Tokyo–Kyoto, 1956, Vol. 135 p. 91 plate 4 line 4.
- 8 See mKhas Grub’s *rGyas Pa’i bsTan bCos Tshad Ma rNam ’Grel Gyi rGya Cher bSad Pa Rigs Pa’i rGya mTsho Las mNgon Sum Leu’i rNam bSad*, Zhol edition, ff. 9a 4–5, 10a1.
- 9 See the *Tshad Ma rNam ’Grel Gyi mTha’ dPyod Thar Lam gSal Byed Tshad Ma’i ’Od brGya ’ Bar Ba Las Leu gSum Pa’i mTha’ dPyod bLo gSal mgul rGyan sKal bZang ’ Jug Ngogs* in *The Collected Works of ’Jam Dbyangs Bzad Pa’i rDo rJe*, Vol. 13, New Delhi, 1974, plates 862–865.
- 10 *Tshad.Ma Rigs Pa’i gTer Gyi Rang ’Grel* in Volume 5 of *The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect*, Tokyo, 1968, page 197, plate 4 line 4.
- 11 rMa translates : *dod.dam.par.kon.byed.nus.gang*; see PTT Vol. 130 page 276 plate 1 line 2. (Devendrabuddhi’s *Vṛtti*) and PTT Vol. 131 page 277 plate 5 lines 1–2 (*Ṭikā* of Śākyamati.) For the relevant portion of rNgogs translation of Jāmāri see PTT Vol. 135 page 91 plate 3 line 8.
- 12 Th.Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, New York; Dover Publications. n.d., Vol.I, pp. 39–45. To Stcherbatsky’s list of members of the “religious” school we should add Manorathanandin whose work was not accessible to him at the time he wrote *Buddhist Logic*.
- 13 According to Ngag dBang dPal IDan (1797–?) the “religious” school focussed primarily on such verses as *PV. II.255* wherein emancipation is said to come about through the vision of emptiness. See the *Grub mTha’ bZi’i Lugs Kyi Kun rDzob Dang Don Dam Pa’i Don rNam Par bSad Pa Legs bSad dPyid Kyi dPal Mo’i gLu dbyangs*, New Delhi, n.d. pp. 39·7–40·2.
- 14 See PTT Vol.130 page 276 plate 2 line 4, PTT Vol. 131 page 277 plate 5 line 7.
- 15 See PTT Vol. 130 page 276 plate 2 line 7, PTT Vol. 131 page 277 plate 5 line 7 to page 278 plate 1 line 1.
- 16 Pāṇini VIII. I. 37.

- 17 For Jina see PTT Vol. 133 page 185 plate 2 lines 5-6, Jāmari PTT Vol.135 page 104 plate 3 line 8 to plate 4 line 1, Ravigupta PTT Vol.134 page 146 plate 1 line 7 to plate 3 line 6. In the *Pañjikā* to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* Prajñākaramati takes PV.III.4 to be a Mādhyamika verse; see *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1960, p. 223 lines 24-31.
- 18 See PV.III.5 and Manorathanandin's comment thereon. (In Manorathanandin's ordering of the chapters, the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter is chapter I.)
- 19 Stcherbatsky, op. cit. p. 45
- 20 *Kongtrul's Encyclopedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture*, Parts 1-3, ed. Lokesh Chandra, International Academy of Indian Culture, n.d. plates 562 line 7 to plate 563 line 6.
- 21 See Bu Ston, *History of Buddhism, part II*, tsld. by E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1932 p.155. For the most recent offering on the "Debate" see Y. Imaeda, "Documents Tibétains de Touen-Huang", *Journal Asiatique*, 1975.
- 22 *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*. The Tibetan Publishing House, Sehare, 1968, p. 325.
- 23 See Volume 5 of *The Complete Works of the Masters of the Sa Skya Sect*, page 71 plate 4 line 1 to page 73 plate 2 line 4.
- 24 *Lankāvatārasūtra*, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1963, page. 124 lines 11-14.
- 25 *Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, op. cit., p. 178 line 25.
- 26 Tsong Kha Pa rejects the attribution of the *Pañjika* to Śāntarakṣita; see *Drang Nges Legs bśad sNing Po*, Sarnath : Treasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973, p.141
- 27 For example rGyal Tshab's difficulties with PV.I. 40 and the use of the term *svabhāva*, a problem which I hope to take up in the future.

*

THE ABHIDHAMMATTHASAṄGAHA¹ AND ITS TĪKĀ

Hammalava Saddhātissa

The collection of Pali canonical works is called Tipiṭaka (= Skt. Tripiṭaka) or 'Triple Basket' : the *Suttapiṭaka* deals with the teachings of the Buddha on ethical and moral principles, the *Vinayapiṭaka* deals with the monastic rules and the Saṅgha, and the *Abhidhammapiṭaka* deals with philosophy and psychology. The last named and deepest aspect of the Buddha's teaching was preserved by the Theravāda School in Pali and consists of seven books; the Sarvāstivāda School did likewise in Sanskrit (later translated into Chinese). The names of the seven books of both Schools are as follows :

Theravāda	Sarvāstivāda
1 <i>Dhammasaṅgani</i> (Buddhist Psychological Ethics) ²	<i>Sangitiparyāyapada</i>
2 <i>Vibhaṅga</i> (The Book of Analysis) ³	<i>Dharmaskandha</i>
3 <i>Dhātukathā</i> (Discourse on Elements) ⁴	<i>Dhātukāyapāda</i>
4 <i>Puggalapaññatti</i> (Designation of Human Types) ⁵	<i>Prajñaptipāda</i>
5 <i>Kathāvatthu</i> (Points of Controversy) ⁶	<i>Vijñānapāda</i>
6 <i>Yamaka</i> (The Book of Pairs) ⁷	<i>Prakaraṇapāda</i>
7 <i>Paṭṭhāna</i> (Conditional Relations) ⁸	<i>Jñānaprasthāna</i>

It is not possible to ascertain the date of compilation of these books of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*. Judging from the internal evidence, the *Dhammasaṅgani*, *Vibhaṅga* and *Paṭṭhāna* are the earliest and were probably recited at the Second Council held in the fourth century B.C. The *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti* and *Yamaka* were recited at the Third Council held during Emperor Aśoka's reign (c. 269–232 B.C.). The *Kathāvatthu* was composed by the President of the Third

Council, Arahant Moggaliputta Tissa, to refute the schismatic views then prevalent, Available evidence, therefore, indicates that all seven books were composed before 250 B.C.

In order to facilitate the study of the Abhidhamma, which is divided into these seven books, scholars in ancient days started to write compendia. These works were classed under a group of manuals entitled in Burmese, *Letthan*, or "Little Finger Summaries" and were nine in number. Most of them are exegetical literature dealing with psychology and philosophy.

- 1 *Paramatthavinicchaya* (The Solution of Philosophical Problems) by Anuruddha.⁹
- 2 *Nāmarūpapariccheda* (the Distinction between Mind and Body) by Anuruddha.¹⁰
- 3 *Abhidhammāvātāra* (Introductory Philosophy) by Buddhadatta of India, a contemporary of Buddhaghosa¹¹
- 4 *Rūpārūpavibhāga* (the Division between Body and Mind) by Buddhadatta, while residing in a monastery in the port of Kāvira.¹²
- 5 *Saccasāṅkhepa* (Outlines of Truth) by Dhammapāla,¹³ the author of the *Visuddhimaggaṅkā*.
- 6 *Mohavicchedanī* (the Dispelling of Ignorance) by Mahākassapa of Chola country.¹⁴
- 7 *Khemappakarāṇa* (the Manual of Khema) by Khema of Sri Lanka.¹⁵
- 8 *Nāmācārādīpaka* (the Actions of Mind) by Saddhamma Jotipāla (Chapada of Pagan, Burma).¹⁶
- 9 *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* (Compendium of Philosophy) by Anuruddha.¹⁷ This has been a most popular work, especially in Burma and Sri Lanka, as well as throughout the entire Buddhist world. This being the case, I propose to make it the subject of this Paper.

There are six main sub-commentaries (*ṭīkā*) written by erudite scholars :

- 1 *Porāṇa-ṭīkā*, the Commentary of Kassapa of Dimbulāgala, the Forest Monastery in Sri Lanka.

- 2 *Abhidhammatthavibhāvinī*,¹⁸ by Sumaṅgala of Sri Lanka. As this is the most popular and authoritative *ṭīkā*, I propose to deal with it in this article.
- 3 *Saṅkhepavaṇṇanā* by Saddhamma Jotipāla (Chapada of Pagan, Burma).¹⁹
- 4 *Paramatthadīpani-ṭīkā* by Ledi Sayadaw of Manywa, Upper Burma.²⁰
- 5 *Maninsāramaṇjūsā* by Ariyavaṃsa of Sagaing, Burma,²¹ is a key to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*.
- 6 *Navanīta-ṭīkā*, which was written in this century by Dhammānanda Kosambi of Goa in India who became a monk and studied Buddhism under Ven. Śrī Sumaṅgala at the Vidyodaya Oriental College, Colombo. It was published by the Mahābodhi Society of India in 1933.

Among the compendia on Abhidhamma, Venerable Anuruddha's *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* ranks very high in the world's philosophical literature, being the most popular exposition of its kind. It consists of nine chapters and many exegeses grew up around this masterpiece. For over eight centuries it has served the students of Buddhist philosophy in Ceylon, Burma and other neighbouring countries. Among the Sinhalese paraphrases of this book, the *Sanne* of Saṅgharāja Sāriputta is supposed to be the most authentic one.

In Burmese literature, over 40 exegeses and paraphrases have been composed around this work. For the Burmese student who begins to study Abhidhamma, this was the first book made available to commit by heart. Without mastering this book, trying to study Abhidhamma is like trying to construct a house without a suitable foundation. Studying this manual seems necessary to the extent that it is necessary to study Abhidhamma. The ancillary works of literature relating to this book are commentaries, sub-commentaries and paraphrases, and they are similarly popular. It is so popular in Burma that if anyone mentions the word *senjo* (compendium) without any adjectival aid, educated people would immediately realise the

Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha is intended. Therefore, the word *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* is seldom used by the Burmese to convey the idea, the expression *senjo* being sufficient. Anuruddha is also regarded as the author of two other compendia on Abhidhamma : *Nāmarūpapariccheda* and *Paramatthavinicchaya*²².

Born in South India, this monk was mostly resident in the city of Thanjor. Substantial evidence points to the fact that he also lived in Ceylon. In the colophons of all three compendia (*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, *Nāmarūpapariccheda* and *Paramatthavinicchaya*), the author's name is not mentioned. However, towards the conclusion of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* and *Nāmarūpapariccheda*, mention is made of his place of residence, wishing success for all the activities conducted therein. But there is no mention of the author himself. In the colophon of the *Paramatthavinicchaya*, he is mentioned as follows :

“ He was born in noble Kāñcipura in the Kāveri Province to a noble clan and that clan was very popular, well versed and endowed with invincible knowledge and incontrovertible fame. At the request of the noble fraternity of the monks of the Mahāvihāra, this *Paramatthavinicchaya* was written by Venerable Anuruddha, well versed in Abhidhamma, according to the guidelines of their clear tradition.”

He was an erudite scholar of Buddhist philosophy living in the city of Thanjor in the country of Thamba. This situation clearly indicates the fact that when writing the *Paramatthavinicchaya* he was living in the city of ‘Thamba’ which is now known as ‘Thanjor’. When he was composing the other two books (*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* and *Nāmarūpapariccheda*), it seems he was living in Ceylon. The author, aspiring for the prosperity of the place where he wrote the work, states in the colophon to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* : “ The Mūlasoma Vihāra is extremely popular because of being a residence of virtuous people who abide by a strong conviction that the blessings emanated by that great virtue will have a powerful influence, with the effect that all the monks who reside at that place will be endowed with erudite knowledge and pious

qualities, and that this vihāra will flourish until the aeon as a place of merit.”²³

Moreover, the above verse further denotes the fact that, during the time of writing this book, he was resident at the Mūlasoma Vihāra. Although some are of the opinion that this vihāra was situated in South India, the evidence available until now does not reveal that it could be justifiably substantiated. Stone inscriptions which date back to the time of the King Dhappula IV (924–935 A.C.) records that the Mūlasoma Vihāra was built by King Vattagāmani (88–76 B.C.) and his minister, Mūla, at Polonnaruwa in honour of Somādevī, the queen. Anuruddha may have lived in Ceylon earlier than the twelfth, and later than the eighth century A.C. However it may be, a very popular tradition has built up around the belief among historians of today that the Munneśvara Hindu Temple near Bingiriya, in Sri Lanka, was the original Mūlasoma Vihāra where Anuruddha used to reside. The historical facts leading to this conclusion were documented at the request of a pious devotee named Nabba. This is the conclusion of the work which states that it was written at the request of Nabba. Nabba came from a very respectable family of unimpeachable integrity and honesty. It seems that Nabba grew up subject to the strong persuasions of traditions that made him cast reflections and nurture beliefs about things that can only be considered as virtuous. Thus, due to sheer compassion for others, the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* was completed.²⁴

Among the commentaries on the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, this is the second, the first being the *Porāṇa-ṭikā* of Dimbulāgala Kassapa. This commentry has become immensely popular in both Ceylon and Burma. The Burmese call it the *Ṭikā-gyaw*, meaning the famous or superb sub-commentary. When the term *Ṭikāgyaw* is mentioned without an adjective, educated people understand the exact meaning intended. Venerable Sumaṅgala *Mahāsāmi*, the head of the Nandipariveṇa in the neighbourhood of Pulatthipura, was the pupil of the Saṅgharāja Sāriputta and it seems that Sumaṅgala

wrote this commentary based on the Sinhalese paraphrases written by his guru, the Saṅgharāja. The opening verses of this book are as follows :

1. Having worshipped the Buddha, the Noble One, endowed with pure compassion and wisdom and the doctrine which was venerated by the Buddha and the Saṅgha which originated from the doctrine and free from defilements.
2. Having saluted with my head bowed in obeisance to my teacher, great elder Sāriputta, who is well versed in the Scriptures, who deserves veneration and is endowed with great knowledge.
3. I comment on the Compendium of Buddhist Philosophy, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, for the monks learned in Abhidhamma, increasing in joy.
4. Although there are commentaries written by earlier writers, it is rather difficult to understand the meanings conveyed thereby.
5. Therefore, I will write a short comprehensive commentary without leaving unexplained words profound with ideas.²⁶

The fourth verse makes it abundantly clear that there were many commentaries to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* in Ceylon. However, we can now only find one early sub-commentary, apart from the expository sub-commentary (the *Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā*). Not a single Sinhala paraphrase is extant in Ceylon apart from the one written by Sāriputta. This makes it clear that he lived at the time of King Parākramabāhu the Great (1153–1186 A.C.). This book was compiled and completed within 24 days because the Sinhalese paraphrase had only to be translated into Pali. He was also the author of a well-known *ṭīkā* on the *Adhidhammāvatāra*²⁷ called the *Abhidhammatthavikāśinī*²⁸, to which he often referred for the details of some points in his *Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā*. In fact, the *Abhidhammāvatāraṭīkā* the author's independent work, vividly depicts Sumaṅgala's profound erudition with regard to the entire Abhidhamma literature. There is ample reason to

believe that the *Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā* was written by Sumaṅgala because at the end of the *Abhidhammāvātāra-ṭīkā* there are three verses which are absolutely identical to those in the *Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā*. The latter states that the meanings which are not clear are to be found in the *Abhidhammāvātāra-ṭīkā*, written earlier by Sumaṅgala.

Notes

- 1 Text edited by T. W. Rhy Davids, *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, London 1884, repr. 1978. Translations by : Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids; PTS 1910, repr. 1979; J. Kashyap, Banares 1942, repr. Delhi 1979; Nārada Mahāthera, Colombo 1956 and Kandy 1975.
- 2 Ed. by E. Müller, PTS 1885, repr. 1978; tr. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Royal Asiatic Society, London 1900, PTS 1974.
- 3 Ed. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS 1904, repr. 1978; tr. by U Thittila, PTS 1969.
- 4 Ed. with Commentary by E. R. Gooneratne, PTS 1892, revised repr 1963; tr. by U Nārada of Burma, PTS 1962, repr. 1977.
- 5 Ed. by R. Morris, PTS 1883, repr. 1972; tr. into English by B.C. Law, PTS 1922, repr. 1969.
- 6 Ed. by A. C. Taylor, PTS 1894-97, repr. 1979; tr. by S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS 1915, repr. 1969.
- 7 Ed. by Mrs. Rhys Davids et al., PTS 1911-13.
- 8 *Tikaṭṭhāna*, Parts I-III, ed. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS 1921-23; *Dukaṭṭhāna*, I, ed. by Mrs. Rhy Davids, PTS 1906. The contents of the *Dukaṭṭhāna* are given in the *Tikaṭṭhāna*, Part III, pp. 336 ff. The *Paṭṭhāna*, Vol. I, tr. by U Nārada, PTS 1969 (Vol II in the press). Cf. Foreword to Part I, p.v, and Editorial Note to Part II of the *Tikaṭṭhāna*.
- 9 *JPTS*, 1910, p. 123 (repr. 1978); *The Pali Literature of Ceylon* (henceforth referred to as *PLC*) by G. P. Malalasekera, London 1928, Colombo 1958, pp. 169, 173 ff., 205.
- 10 *JPTS*, 1910, p. 123 f. (repr. 1978); *PLC*, pp. 169 ff., 173, 202, 204. Ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta, *JPTS*, 1913-14, repr. 1978.

- 11 Ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta, PTS 1915, repr. 1980, Introd. pp. xii ff.
- 12 *Ibid.* Tr. by Robert Exell in *Visakha Puja 2507*, The Buddhist Association of Thailand, Bangkok, pp. 43-9. See *PLC*, pp. 108, 202.
- 13 *PLC*, pp. 112, 205, 217; *JPTS*, 1910, p. 124 (repr. 1978). Ed. by P. Dhammārāma, *JPTS*, 1917-19, repr. 1978.
- 14 Ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta and A. K. Warder, PTS 1961. See *PLC*, pp. 160, 179.
- 15 Khema of Anurādhāpura gave his name to this compendium which he wrote. *JPTS*, 1910, p. 124 (repr. 1978). *PLC*, pp. 156, 202, 205.
- 16 It is known as *Nāmācārādīpanī* in Burma. Forchhammer, *Essay*, p. 35; *Piṭakatthamain*, Rangoon 1906, p. 45. Unpublished MS ed. by H. Saddhātissa for PTS.
- 17 See note 1.
- 18 Ed. by Paṇṇāsāra and Wimaladhamma in Vidyodaya Ṭīkā Publication, vol. 1, in Sinhalese characters, Colombo 1933. Edition in the course of preparation by H. Saddhātissa for the PTS.
- 19 This was written while the author was in Ceylon. See *FLC*. pp. 197, 201, and *The Pali Literature of Burma* by Mabel Haynes Bode, Royal Asiatic Society, London 1909, repr. 1966, pp. 18, 54, 56.
- 20 *Compendium of Philosophy* by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS 1910, repr. 1979, p. ix, and *Pali Literature of Burma*, op. cit., p. 97.
- 21 *Compendium*, p. x; *JPTS*, 1910 (repr. 1978), p. 126.
- 22 See notes 9 and 10.
- 23 *Puñṇena tena vipulena tu mūlasomam/ dhaññādhivāsam uditotam āyugantam/ pañṇāvadātaguṇasobhitala j jibhikkhū / maññantu puñṇāvibhavodayamaṅga-
lāya || Cf. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and its Sanne*, ed. by Toṭgamuve Paṇṇāmolī, Colombo 1950, p. 275.
- 24 *Cāriṭṭasobhita-visālakulodayena / saddhābhivuddhaparīsuddhaguṇodayena /
nabbavhayena pañidhāya parānukampam / yaṃ patthitam pakaraṇam
pariniṭṭhitam tam ||*
Ibid. p. 295.
- 25 See note 18.

- 26 *Visuddhakarūṇāñānaṃ buddhaṃ sambuddhapūjitaṃ | dhammaṃ saddhamma-sambhūtaṃ ñatvā saṅghaṃ niraṅgaṇaṃ || Sāriputtaṃ mahātheraṃ pariya-ttīvisāraḍaṃ | vanditvā sirasā dhīraṃ garuṃ gāravabhājanam | Vaṇṇayissam samāsenā abhidhammatthasaṅgahaṃ | ābhidhammikabhikkhūnaṃ param pītivivaḍḍhanaṃ || Porāṇehi anekā pi katā yā pana vaṇṇanā | na tāhi sakkā sabbattha aṭṭho viññātave idha || Tasmā linapadānettha sādhippāyamahā-payam | vibhāvento samāsenā racayissāmi vaṇṇanaṃ ||*
Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha and its Sanne, op. cit., p. 37.
- 27 Ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta, PTS 1915, repr. 1980.
- 28 Ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta, Colombo 1961.
-

OUR IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS

- 1 The Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra : A Critical Study : By Dr. K. H. Trivedi (1966) 50/-
- 2 Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy : A study by Dr. Nagin J. Shah (1966) 50/-
- 3 Kalpalatāviveka (by an anonymous writer). Editors Dr. Murari-Lal Nagar and Pt. Harishankar Shastri (1968) 32/-
- 4 Āc. Haribhadra's Nemināhacariu Pts. I-II : Editors M. C. Modi and Dr. H. C. Bhayani (1970) 100/-
- 5 Dictionary of Prakrit Proper Names. Parts I-II by Dr. M. L. Mehta and Dr. K. R. Chandra (1970) 67/-
- 6 Jaina Ontology, by Dr. K. K. Dixit (1971) 50/-
- 7 Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga : Editor Dr. Nagin J. Shah (1972) 50/-
- 8 Jain Conception of Omniscience by Dr. Ram Jee Singh 50/-
- 9 Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on the Tattvārthasūtra Translated into English by Dr. K. K. Dixit 50/-
- 10 Atonements in Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks by Dr. Colette Caillat, pp. 8+210 (1975) 50/-
- 11 Śaṣadhara's Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa Edited by Dr. B. K. Matilal (1976) 45/-
- 12 Indian Philosophy by Dr. Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi (1977) 30/-
- 13 Vasudevahiṇḍi-An Authentic Jaina Version of the Bṛhatkathā by Dr. J. C. Jain, (1977) 150/-
- 14 Sādhāraṇa's Vilāsavaikahā (Apabhramṣa Kāvya), Edited by Dr. R. M. Shah, (1977) 40/-
- 15 Amṛtacandra's Laghutattva-sphoṭa (Sanskrit Jaina Philosophical Kāvya) Edited with English translation and Introduction by Dr. P. S. Jaini 50/-
- 16 Early Jainism by Dr. K. K. Dixit (1978) 28/-
- 17 Śramaṇa Tradition-Its History and Contribution to Indian Culture by Dr. G. C. Pande (1978) 20/-
- 18 Treasures of Jain Bhaṇḍaras Ed. Dr. U. P. Shah (1979) 250/-
- 19 Wall Paintings of Rajasthan by Y. K. Shukla (1980) 66/-
- 20 Central Philosophy of Jainism by Dr. B. K. Matilal (1981) 16/-

