

## A Comparative Study of the Jaina and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga Theories of Parīṇāma

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THE concept of *Parīṇāma* is very old and its beginnings can be traced as far back as the Ṛgveda. It has passed through many stages of development before it assumed its finally finished form. Today it occupies a very important place in Indian Philosophy. So much so that it has been commonly accepted as a fundamental doctrine by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy with slight modifications here or there. Though the concept has thus found almost universal recognition, we shall here confine ourselves to a comparative study of the *Parīṇāmavāda* as postulated in the Jaina and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems because these two systems show close resemblance in this respect.

Both the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Jaina seem to have followed Yāska's definition of *Viparīṇāma*, in their doctrine of *Parīṇāma*, i.e., they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding entity or entities (*viparīṇamate iti apracyavamānasya tattvād vikāram*).

Umāsvāti the author of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* analyses the *Parīṇāma* nature of reality into *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. Vyāsa the commentator of the *Yoga-sūtra* defines *Parīṇāma* as '*avasthitasya dravyasya pūrva-dharma-nivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ*'. These two views are, in substance, identical.

Vyāsa has analysed *Parīṇāma* into *Dharma-Parīṇāma*, *Lakṣaṇa-*

*Pariṇāma* and *Avasthā-Pariṇāma*.<sup>1</sup> The Jaina has not analysed *Pariṇāma* in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his *Dravya-Paryāya* and *Guṇa-Paryāya*. Every *Dravya-Paryāya* (such as a pot in the case of *Pudgala* and manhood (*manuṣyatva*, in the case of *Jīva*) and *Guṇa-Paryāya* (such as darkness or yellowness in *Pudgala* or *Jñāna-Paryāya* in *Jīva*) of the Jaina represents *Dharma-Pariṇāma* or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time variations of past, present and future, it is *Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma*. The oldness and newness or *tivratā-mandātā* in the case of *Jīva* which a *Dravya-Paryāya* or a *Guṇa-Paryāya* suffers, as a result of time-process, is its *Avasthā-Pariṇāma*. This *Avasthā-Pariṇāma*, it must be noted, is possible only in the *Vyañjana-Paryāya* of the Jaina which abides for a certain length of time. There cannot be such *Avasthā-Pariṇāma* in the *Artha-Paryāya*<sup>2</sup> as it is momentary.

Both the Sāṃkhya and the Jaina understand *Pariṇāma* as a wide concept including the material change in time (*Aparispandātmaka-Pariṇāma*) as well as physical movement in space, technically called *Parispanda*. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of *kriyā*, viz., *pariṇāmātmikā kriyā* and *parispandātmikā kriyā*. In the Jaina view, the *Parispanda* is possible only in *Jīva* and *Pudgala*, as each *Jīva* and *Pudgala*, that is atom, is limited and, therefore, capable of movement. In *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* which are indivisible wholes and pervade this *loka* (universe), there is evidently no scope for *Parispanda*. In the Sāṃkhya, *Parispanda* has to be negated in *Prakṛti* which is one homogeneous whole and all-pervading. It becomes possible in the different products of *Prakṛti*, from *Buddhi* onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the *Prakṛti*.

There is, however, one difficulty in understanding *Parispanda* in the Sāṃkhya, viz., that it has to be visualized without *Ākāśa*. Vijñānabhikṣu<sup>3</sup> felt this difficulty and hence, he clarified that *Prakṛti* subsumes *Ākāśa*. But this interpretation is not vouchsafed by the older Sāṃkhya texts which derive *Ākāśa* from the *Śabda-Tan-Mātrā*. So we must understand

1 See *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra*, III. 15.

2 When we conceive the man as devoid of his subdivisions—as simply a man, it is the one indivisible *Vyañjana-Paryāya*. If, however, along with the conception of a man, we at the same time are conscious of the variations of a boy, a youth, etc., these latter are said to be *Artha-Paryāyas* of the *Vyañjana-Paryāya* of a man.

3 *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* on the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, II. 12. ‘*Nityau yau dikkālau tau ākāśa-prakṛti-bhūtau prakṛter guṇa-viśeṣau eva.*’

*Parispanda* in Sāmkhya before the production of *Ākāśa* as something which is possible without space. For the Jaina, however, there is no such difficulty as *Ākāśa* is accepted as an underived entity.

The Sāmkhya and the Jaina show certain affinity in regard to the concept of *Kāla*. The Sāmkhya does not recognize *Kāla* as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of *Prakṛti*, i.e. identical with the *Parināmas* of *Prakṛti*. A moment is identified with the unit of change of the *Guṇas*. In the Jaina system, there are two divergent views of *Kāla* since the *Āgama* period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth *Dravya*, while the other identifies it with the changes of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*.<sup>4</sup> The second view is similar to that of the Sāmkhya.

Next, the Sāmkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of *Parināma* from the point of view of place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), form (*ākāra*) and extraneous cause (*nimitta*)<sup>5</sup> finds a certain parallel in the Jaina view according to which the *Parināma* of every object is conditioned by substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and the essential characteristics which constitute a thing (*bhāva*). This is illustrated, by means of an illustration of a pot, in the *Rāja-vārtika* thus: 'Yathā ghaṭo dravyataḥ pāṭhivātvena utpadyate na jalātvena. Deśataḥ ihatyatvena na pāṭalīputrakātvena. Kālataḥ vartamānakālatayā nātītānāgatābhyām. Bhāvataḥ mahattvena na alpatvena (athavā bhāvataḥ raktatvādinā)'—pp. 180-182.

4 'Kālaś ca iti eke'—*Tattvārtha-sūtra*, V. 38.

5 In the Sāmkhya-Yoga, all things being composed ultimately of the three *guṇas*, there are no intrinsic differences between them (*sarvaṁ sarvātmakam*). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the *guṇas*. Theoretically, therefore, it is possible to change anything in the world to any other provided the necessary collocations could be arranged. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree for in the constitution of the relations of the *guṇas*, there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. 'These limitations may generally be counted in the phenomenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmir being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pāñcāla country even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly, there are no rains in the summer season, therefore, the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer.'—*Tattvavaiśārādī* on the *Yoga-sūtra*, III. 14.

'*Sarvaṁ sarvātmakam iti. Deśa-kālākāra-nimittāpabandhāt na khalu samānakālam ātmanām abhivvyaktir iti.*'—*Vyāsa-bhāṣya* on the *Yoga-sūtra*, III. 14.

'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pāṭaliputra, etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present and not in the past or future. From the standpoint of *Bhāva*, it comes to have the *Mahat-Pariṇāma* and not the *Alpa-Pariṇāma* (or it comes to have the qualities of redness, etc.).'

The causal theory of the Sāṃkhya is the *Satkāryavāda* which is deducible from his doctrine of *Pariṇāma*. It means that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jaina, even though accepting the doctrine of *Pariṇāma*, calls his causal theory *Sadasatkāryavāda*, i.e., the effect is both pre-existent and pre-non-existent. It is existent in so far as it potentially pre-exists in the cause, and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jaina, too, in the way of the Sāṃkhya, regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase *Satkāryavāda* being suggestive of 'Ekāntism', the Jaina as an 'Anekāntist' brings in *Asat* along with *Sat*. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaiśeṣika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaiśeṣika sense. For the Sāṃkhya, too, it must be noted, the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) is non-existent (*asat*) and is brought about by the operation of the *Kāraṇas* but he does not use the term *Asat*. Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasahasrī* draws attention to this by stating that the Jaina view is really meant by the Sāṃkhya even though he does not profess it, and that the Sāṃkhya cannot maintain his *Satkāryavāda* in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics.<sup>6</sup>

The differences in the application of the theory of *Pariṇāma* between the Sāṃkhya and the Jaina are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Sāṃkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the principle of 'Sentience' (*Cetana*), and 'Non-sentience' (*Jada*) and the second way is to view reality as *Pariṇāmi* and *Apariṇāmi* or *Kūṭastha*. He identifies the sentient with the *Kūṭastha* and all change, physical and mental, is relegated to the non-sentient *Prakṛti*. The Jaina dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz., Sentience (*Jīva*) and Non-sentience (*Ajīva*) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Sāṃkhya and the

Jaina. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing *Parināma*. For him, all reality (*Sat*) has the characteristic of *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* and so both the *Jīva* and the *Ajīva* must possess this characteristic.

Next, the Sāmkhya regards the transforming *Prakṛti* as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three *tattvas* from *Prakṛti* and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative combination and separation of the twenty-three *tattvas*. The primary derivation is, in Sāmkhya phraseology, called *Tattvāntara-Parināma*; while the subsequent *parināma* is called *Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avasthā Parināma*. For the Jaina, it was not necessary to have *Tattvāntara-Parināma* because he starts with the five or six *tattvāntaras* as fundamental and underived entities. The Jaina is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of *Jīvas*, he assumes four underived *Ajīva* categories, viz., *Pudgala*, *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa*. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the *Parināmas* of *Jīvas*, all material phenomena from the *Parināmas* of *Pudgala*—consisting of infinite atoms; while *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* make possible the movement (*gati*), staticity (*sthiti*) and occupation (*avagāha*) respectively of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*.

As just said, the essential difference between the Sāmkhya and the Jaina lies in the fact that the principle of *Parināma* is not applied to *Puruṣas* by the Sāmkhya, while the Jaina would apply it both to *Jīvas* and *Ajīvas*. From this difference ensue various differences of views between the Sāmkhya and the Jaina.

The denial of *Parināma* in the *Puruṣas* has made it highly difficult for the Sāmkhya to relate them to the changing *Prakṛti* and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world-phenomena. In fact, *Prakṛti*, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such *Puruṣas* whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of *Prakṛti* teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity with sentient beings.

Another consequence of this assumption is that *jñāna*, *bhoga*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*, etc., which appear as of *Puruṣa*, become really so many transformations of *Prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is never bound and, therefore, has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of *Prakṛti*. Thus, in Sāmkhya, truly speaking, *bandha* and *mokṣa*, are the transformations of *Prakṛti*.

The above difficulties do not confront the Jaina. The application of *Parināma* to *Jīvas* enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., *Jīva*

and *Pudgala*, and explain their mutual influence and interaction. The Jaina theory of *Pariṇāma*, which in the case of *Jīva* takes the form of *bhāva-karma* and in the case of *Pudgala*, that of *dravya-karma*, makes it possible to attribute *jñāna*, *bhoga*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*, etc., to *Jīvas* directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to *Jīvas*, as objects of knowledge or enjoyment and as objects from which *Jīvas* have to be free, are consistently explained by the Jaina theory of *Pariṇāma*.

The only difficulty that the Jaina will have to face is that, if by definition, *Jīva* and *Pudgala* are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (*pariṇāmas*) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the Sāṃkhya, there is no such difficulty, because the *Puruṣas* and *Prakṛti* are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The *bhoga* and *mokṣa* in the *Puruṣa* are always '*aupacārika*' (i.e., are only a way of speaking).

The Sāṃkhya is thus metaphysically in a stronger position, while the Jaina's position is empirically more comprehensible.

