

## Svabhāvavāda (Naturalism) : A Study

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THE *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*<sup>1</sup> gives a list of first causes of the variety of the world according to some thinkers. This list includes Time, Nature, Destiny, Chance (Accident), the Elements and *Puruṣa*. This paper will confine itself mainly to an investigation of the real nature of the doctrine of *Svabhāva* (Naturalism as opposed to Accidentalism) by scrutinising available references to it in Sanskrit and Prakrit literature.

In the commentary to the *Svetāśvatara* Śaṅkarācārya<sup>2</sup> explains *svabhāva* as inherent nature of a thing, as, for instance, heat of fire. In the *Buddhacarita*<sup>3</sup> Aśvaghoṣa clearly sets forth the views of the supporters of *Svabhāvavāda* :

- 1 कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्या ।  
संयोग एषां न त्वात्मभावादात्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ॥  
स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिसुहृन्मानाः ।  
देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम् ॥

—*Svetāśvatara* I. 2, VI. 1

- 2 स्वभावो नाम पदार्थानां प्रतिनियता शक्तिः । अग्नेरीष्णमिव ।  
3 अग्नेर्यथा ह्योष्णमपां द्रवत्वं तद्वत्प्रवृत्ती प्रकृति वदन्ति ॥  
केचित्स्वभावादिति वर्णयन्ति शुभाशुभं चैव भवामवी च ।  
स्वाभाविकं सर्वमिदं च यस्मादतोऽपि मोघो भवति प्रयत्नः ॥

“..... They teach that there is an essential force of nature at work in the continuance of activity, like the essential heat of fire and the essential liquidity of water. Some explain that good and evil and existence and non-existence originate by natural development (*Svabhāva*); and since all this world originates by natural development, again therefore effort is vain. That the action of each sense is limited to its own class of object, that the qualities of being agreeable or disagreeable is to be found in the objects of the senses, and that we are affected by old age and afflictions, in all that what room is there for effort? Is it not purely a natural development? The oblation devouring fire is stilled by water, and the flames cause water to dry up. The elements, separate by nature, group themselves together into bodies and, coalescing, constitute the world. That, when the individual enters the womb, he develops hands, feet, belly, back and head, and that his soul unites with that body, all this the doctors of this school attribute to natural development. Who fashions the sharpness of the thorn or the varied nature of beast and bird? All this takes place by natural development. There is no such thing in this respect as action of our own will, *a fortiori* no possibility of effort.”<sup>4</sup>

In the *Nyāyasūtra*<sup>5</sup> Gautama states by way of *Pūrvapakṣa* that things originate without any cause like the sharpness of thorns. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary to the *Nyāyasūtra*, explains the *sūtra* by adding a few examples.

In the *Māṭhara-vṛtti*<sup>6</sup> to the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (v. 61), along with

यदिन्द्रियाणां नियतः प्रचारः प्रियाप्रियत्वं विषयेषु चैव ।  
संयुज्यते यज्जरायतिमिश्रं कस्तत्र यत्नो ननु स स्वभावः ॥  
अद्भिर्हुताशः शममभ्युपैति तेजांसि चापो गमयन्ति शोषम् ।  
मित्रानि भूतानि शरीरसंस्थान्यैक्यं च गत्वा जगदुद्वहन्ति ॥  
यत्पाणिपादोदरपृष्ठमूर्ध्नी निर्वर्तते गर्भगतस्य भावः ।  
यदात्मनस्तस्य च तेन योगः स्वाभाविकं तत्कथयन्ति तज्ज्ञाः ॥  
कः कण्टकस्य प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां वा ।  
स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तं न कामकारोऽस्ति कुतः प्रयत्नः ॥

—*Buddhacarita* IX. 57(b)-62

4 Translation by E. H. Johnston, Calcutta, 1936

5 अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् ।

अनिमित्ता शरीराद्युत्पत्तिः । कस्मात् । कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादिदर्शनात् । यथा कण्टकस्य तैक्ष्ण्यम्, पर्वतधातूनां चित्रता, ग्रान्थां श्लक्ष्णता, निर्निमित्तं चोपादानवच्च दृष्टं तथा शरीरादिसर्गोऽपीति ।

—*Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya* IV. 1. 22

6 अपरे स्वभावमाहुः । स्वभावः कारणमिति । तथा हि—

येन शुद्धीकृता हंसाः शुकाश्च हरितीकृताः ।

*Īśvara* and *Kāla*, *Svabhāva* is mentioned as the cause of the world, of course, from others' point of view and dismissed as non-existent.

In his commentary to the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (v. 61) Gauḍapāda<sup>7</sup> writes : "Others say, *Svabhāva* is cause of the world : By what (or whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours ?"; that is, they are so naturally . . . for *Pradhāna*, from its universal creative power, is the cause of even *Kāla* (time) ; even *Svabhāva* merges into it ; and, therefore, neither *Kāla* nor *Svabhāva* is cause. *Prakṛti* (= *Pradhāna*) alone, therefore, is cause.

Thus according to Gauḍapāda *Svabhāva* merges into the all-embracing cause called *Prakṛti*.

In the commentary<sup>8</sup> to *Bṛhatsamhitā* (Bhaṭṭa) Utpala writes : The world with its variety originates and gets destroyed through *Svabhāva* alone and none else. They (*Svabhāvavādins*) declare : "What fashions the sharpness of thorns, and the varied nature of beasts and birds, the sweetness of sugar-cane and the bitter taste of *nimba* ? All this comes about by *Svabhāva*."

It may be noted, in passing, that this verse bears close resemblance to Aśvaghoṣa's verse cited above.

In the *Sarva-Siddhānta-Saṅgraha*<sup>9</sup> Śaṅkarācārya briefly states the doctrine of *Svabhāva* thus :

मयूराश्चित्रिता येन स नो वृत्तिं विधास्यति ॥

...स्वभावो नाम न कश्चित्पदार्थोऽस्ति यतः प्रजानामुत्पत्तिसङ्गतिः स्यात् तस्माद्यो ब्रूते स्वभावः कारणमिति तन्मिथ्या ।

—*Māṭhara-Vṛtti to Sk. 61*

- 7 अपरे स्वभावकारणिकां ब्रुवते । केन शुद्धीकृता हंसा मयूराः केन चित्रिताः । स्वभावेनैवेति । .....कालस्यापि प्रधानमेव कारणम् । स्वभावोऽप्यत्रैव लीनः । तस्मात् काले न कारणं नापि स्वभाव इति । तस्मात् प्रकृतिरेव कारणं न प्रकृतेः कारणान्तरमस्तीति ।

—*Gauḍapādabhāṣya to Sāṃkhyakārikā 61*

- 8 अपरे अन्ये लौकायतिकाः स्वभावं जगतः कारणमाहुः । स्वभावादेव जगद्विचित्रमुत्पद्यते स्वभावतो विलयं याति । तथा च तद्वाक्यम् ।

कः कण्टकानां प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां च ।

माधुर्यमिक्षोः कटुतां च निम्बे स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तम् ॥

—*Bhaṭṭotpala's Commentary to Bṛhatsamhitā I. 7*

- 9 न कल्प्यौ सुखदुःखाभ्यां धर्माधर्मौ परैरिह ।  
स्वभावेन सुखी दुःखी जनोऽन्यत्रैव कारणम् ॥  
शिखिनश्चित्रयेत् को वा कोकिलान् कः प्रकूजयेत् ।  
स्वभावव्यतिरेकेण विद्यते नात्र कारणम् ॥

—*Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha II. 4-5*

“In consequence of the existence of pleasure and pain, merit and demerit should not be here (in this connection) postulated by others. A man feels pleasure or pain by nature and there is no other cause for it. Who colours wonderfully the peacocks, or who makes the cuckoos coo so well ? There is in respect of these things no cause other than nature.”

In his commentary<sup>10</sup> to the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* Maladhārī Hemacandra quotes three verses giving the views of *Svabhāvavādins*. “The supporters of the doctrine of *Svabhāva* (nature, inner nature, natural development) teach that all things originate without any cause. They do not regard even ‘*Sva*’ (own, itself) as cause. What makes the varied nature of lotuses and of thorns and the like ? What has fashioned the variegated plumage of peacocks ? Whatever is found in this world is all without cause and due to mere accident. Like the sharpness of thorns human happiness and grief come about by *Svabhāva* only.”

In the course of his discussion about the *Svabhāvavāda* (Introduction to *Gaṇadharavāda*) Malvania quotes two verses<sup>11</sup> on *Svabhāvavāda* as well-known.

“It is due to the all-controlling nature (*Svabhāva*) that some things are ever-existing, some others ever non-existing and still some others varied in nature. Fire is hot, water is cool, wind is neither hot nor cool

- ~~~~~
- 10 सर्वहेतुनिराशंसं भावानां जन्म वर्ण्यते ।  
 स्वभाववादिभिस्ते हि नाहुः स्वमपि कारणम् ॥  
 राजीवकण्टकादीनां वैचित्र्यं कः करोति हि ।  
 मयूरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः केन निर्मितः ॥  
 कादाचित्कं यदत्रास्ति निःशेषं तदहेतुकम् ।  
 यथा कण्टकतैक्ष्ण्यादि तथा चैते सुखादयः ॥

—Maladhārī Hemacandra’s Commentary to  
*Gaṇadharavāda* II, v. 1963

Note : The text reads ‘मयूरचन्द्रिकादिर्वा विचित्रः’. Shri Malvania renders it as “The plumage of the peacock is variegated and the moonlight is bright white . . .” (*Gaṇadharavāda* (p. 45) : Gujarat Vidyasabhā, Ahmedabad). It appears to me, however, that the text originally must have read ‘मयूरचन्द्रकादिर्वा विचित्रः’—which reading eminently suits the context.

- 11 नित्यसत्त्वा भवन्त्यन्ये नित्यासत्त्वाश्च केचन ।  
 विचित्राः केचिदित्यत्र तत्स्वभावो नियामकः ॥  
 अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः ।  
 केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात् स्वभावात् तद्व्यवस्थितिः ॥

—Quoted by Shri Malvania in his *Introduction to*  
*Gaṇadharavāda*, p. 114

(by itself). By whom or what came this variety? We, therefore, conclude that all this came about by nature (*Svabhāva*)."

Of these two verses, the second is quoted in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*<sup>12</sup>, which briefly puts the case of *Svabhāvavādins* thus :

But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow *adṛṣṭa*, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said :

"The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn ;  
By whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born."

In his commentary<sup>13</sup> to *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra* (Agaḍadatta, v. 75) Devendra gives a verse in Prakrit hinting at *Svabhāvavāda* : "Who paints the peacock? Who provides the swans with their graceful gait? Who infuses the sweet fragrance in lotuses and modesty in those who are born in noble families?"

In his commentary to *Śaḍdarśana-Samuccaya*<sup>14</sup> (st. 50), as mentioned by Hiriyanna, Guṇaratna quotes as the view of others :

"Others again say : All the variety of this world is explained by its own nature and there is no *karma* whatever serving as its basis."

In the *Mahābhārata*<sup>15</sup> (Śānti-parvan) there are many references to

12 नन्वदृष्टानिष्टौ जगद्विचित्र्यमाकस्मिकं स्यादिति चेत्—न तद् भद्रम् । स्वभावादेव तदुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तम्—

अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः ।

केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात्स्वभावात्तदव्यवस्थितिः ॥

—*Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*, *Cārvākadarśanam*, p. 13  
(BORI, Poona, ed. 1951)

13 को चित्तेइ मऊरं गइं च को कुणइ रायहंसाणं ।

को कुवल्याण गंधं विणयं च कुलप्पसुयाणं ॥

—*Sukhabodhā-Laghuvṛtti* to *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra*  
(Agaḍadatta, v. 75)

14 अन्ये पुनराहुः—मूलतः कमैव नास्ति, स्वभावसिद्धः सर्वोऽप्ययं जगत्प्रपन्न इति ।

—Guṇaratna's Commentary to *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (st. 50)

15 हन्तीति मन्यते कश्चिन्न हन्तीत्यपि चापरः ।

स्वभावतस्तु नियती भूतानां प्रभवाप्ययी ॥

पश्य प्रहाद भूतानामुत्पत्तिमनिमित्ततः ।

हासं वृद्धिं विनाशं च न प्रहृष्ये न च व्यथे ॥

स्वभावादेव संदृश्या वर्तमानाः प्रवृत्तयः ।

स्वभावनिरताः सर्वाः परितुष्यन्त केनचित् ॥

the doctrine of *Svabhāva*; this passage declares how everything comes about by *Svabhāva*.

The next passage<sup>16</sup> is from the same source describing the ultimate source of material universe. The *Mahābhārata* records evidence, as pointed out by Hiriyanna<sup>17</sup> in support of two opposite views—the ultimate source was conceived as one and as many.

The *Bhagavadgītā*<sup>18</sup> contains many passages which lend support to the doctrine of *Svabhāva*. It is pressed into service to explain the difference in the duties of different castes; and its irresistible force is brought to the forefront now and again to persuade Arjuna to fight.

In the commentary<sup>19</sup> to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* Śīlāṅka puts forward by

स्वभावभाविनो भावान् सर्वानेवेह निश्चयात् ।  
बुध्यमानस्य दर्पो वा मानो वा किं करिष्यति ॥  
स्वभावाह्वयते प्रज्ञां शान्तिमेति स्वभावतः ।  
स्वभावादेव तत्सर्वं यत्किञ्चिदनुपश्यसि ॥

—*Mbh, Śāntiparvan* : 25. 16 ; 179. 10-11 ; 222. 27, 35

- 16 पृथिवी ज्योतिराकाशमापो वायुश्च पञ्चमः ।  
एतद्योनीनि भूतानि तत्र का परिदेवना ॥  
केचित्पुरुषकारं तु प्राहुः कर्मसु मानवाः ।  
देवमित्यपरे विप्राः स्वभावं भूतचिन्तकाः ॥  
विकारानेव यो वेद न वेद प्रकृतिं पराम् ।  
तस्य स्तम्भो भवेद्वाल्यान्नास्ति स्तम्भोऽनुपश्यतः ॥  
प्रकृतौ च विकारे च न मे प्रीतिर्न च द्विषे ।  
द्वेष्टारं च न पश्यामि यो मामद्य ममायते ॥

—*Mbh, Śāntiparvan* : 224. 17 ; 232. 19 ; 222. 26, 31

- 17 *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 105.

- 18 .....प्रकृतिस्त्वां नियोक्ष्यति ॥  
स्वभावजेन कौन्तेय निबद्धः स्वेन कर्मणा ।  
कर्तुं नेच्छसि यन्मोहात् करिष्यस्यवशोऽपि तत् ॥  
कार्यते ह्यवशः कर्म सर्वैः प्रकृतिजैर्गुणैः ॥  
प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि..... ॥  
.....स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते ॥

—*Bhagavadgītā* XVIII. 59-60 ; III. 5 ; III. 33, V. 14

- 19 तत्कथमेतज्जगद्विचित्रं घटते ?, तद्यथा—कश्चिदीश्वरोऽपरो दरिद्रोऽन्यः सुभगोऽपरो दुर्भगः सुखी दुःखी सुरूपो मन्दरूपो व्याधितो नीरोगीति, एवंप्रकारा च विचित्रता किंनिबन्धनेति ?, अत्रोच्यते, स्वभावात्, तथा हि—कुत्रचिच्छलाशकले प्रतिमारूपं निष्पाद्यते, तच्च कुङ्कुमागरुचन्दनादिविलेपनानुभोगमनुभवति धूपाद्यामोदं च,

way of the view of others the *Svabhāva* to explain the variety of the world ; the doctrine of *Svabhāva* obviously dismisses the conception of *punya* and *pāpa* for explaining the variety of the universe.

In his commentary<sup>20</sup> on *Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra* Jñānavimala thus writes about this doctrine : “Some believe that the universe was produced by *Svabhāva* and that everything comes about by *Svabhāva* only.”

In his commentary<sup>21</sup> to *Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra* Abhayadeva attempts to distinguish between *Yadr̥cchā* and *Svabhāva*. He explains all kinds of happiness and grief and every event taking place in the world as due to accident, mere chance. *Svabhāva* he explains, after *Aśvaghōṣa*, as ‘natural development’.

Siddhasena Divākara<sup>22</sup>, Haribhadra and later Jaina writers hold that

अन्यस्मिन्तु पाषाणखण्डे पादक्षालनादि क्रियते, न च तयोः पाषाणखण्डयोः शुभाशुभे स्तः, यदुदयात्स तादृग्विधावस्थाविशेष इत्येवं स्वभावाज्जगद्वैचित्र्यं । तथा चोक्तम्—

कण्टकस्य च तीक्ष्णत्वं, मयूरस्य विचित्रता ।

वर्णाश्च ताम्रचूडानां, स्वभावेन भवन्ति हि ॥

—Śīlāṅka's Commentary to *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, folio 21 (a)

20 केचित् स्वभावभावितं जगद् मन्यन्ते स्वभावनैव सर्वः संपद्यते ।

—Jñānavimala to *Praśnavyākaraṇa* 7, fol. 29 (cited by Basham)

कः कण्टकानां प्रकरोति तैक्ष्ण्यं विचित्रभावं मृगपक्षिणां च ।

स्वभावतः सर्वमिदं प्रवृत्तं न कामचारोऽस्ति कुतः प्रयत्नः ॥

—Guṇaratna : *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* to *Śaddarśana-Samuccaya*, p. 13 (cited by Basham)

Note : Referring to this verse Basham writes : “Guṇaratna quotes a verse which he attributes to the supporters of this doctrine.” It will be evident by comparing this verse with *Aśvaghōṣa*'s (which is already quoted above) that barring slightly variant readings, it is the same as that of *Aśvaghōṣa*.

21 अनभिसंधिपूर्विकार्थप्राप्तिर्यदृच्छा ।

अतर्कितोपस्थितमेव सर्वं चित्रं जनानां दुःखदुःखज्ञातम् ।

काकस्य तालेन यथाभिवातो न बुद्धिपूर्वोऽत्र व्याभिमानः ॥

सत्यं पिशाचाः स्म वने वसामो भेरीं कराग्रैपि न स्पृशामः ।

यदृच्छया सिद्ध्यति लोकयात्रा भेरीं पिशाचाः परिताडयन्ति ॥

स्वभावः पुनर्वस्तुतः स्वत एव तथा परिणतिभावः ।

“कः कण्टकानाम्” इत्यादि ।

—Abhayadeva's Commentary to *Praśnavyākaraṇa Sūtra*

22 काले सहाव णियई पुनवकम्म पुरिसकारणेगंता ।

मिच्छन्तं तं चेव उ समासओ हुति सम्मत्तं ॥

to look upon any one out of many causes—*Kāla*, *Svabhāva*, *Niyati*, *Karma*, *Puruṣakāra*—as the only cause is wrong and to regard them all as causes—some more important and some less important—is the right belief.

Before we take up passages refuting *Svabhāvavāda*, it is necessary to examine the interrelation between *Yadṛcchāvāda* and *Svabhāvavāda*, and *Ājīvikism*.

### YADṚCCHĀVĀDA AND SVABHĀVAVĀDA

*Yadṛcchāvāda* is also known as *Ahetu-Animitta-Akasmāt-vāda*. Gautama and Vātsyāyana [*Nyāyasūtra* (iv. 1.22) *Bhāṣya*] give '*Kaṇṭaka-taikṣṇya*' as an illustration of *Animittavāda*. This illustration has been highly popular with, and very often cited by *Svabhāvavādins* in support of their doctrine. We would not, therefore, be wrong if we drew the conclusion that Gautama and Vātsyāyana regarded these two doctrines as identical. *Svetāśvatara*, Siddhasena Haribhadra and many later writers mention these two doctrines separately and distinguish between them. Hiriyanna<sup>23</sup> very well brings out the distinction between these two doctrines : "While the one maintains that the world is a chaos and ascribes whatever order is seen in it to mere chance, the other recognizes that 'things are as their nature makes them'. While the former denies causation altogether, the latter acknowledges its universality, but only traces all changes to the thing itself to which they belong."

### SVABHĀVAVĀDA : A SMALL SUB-SECT OF AJIVIKISM ?

In the course of his exposition of the doctrine of *Niyati* Basham writes : "... Hence it appears that the *Svabhāvavādins* agreed with the *Niyativādins* on the futility of human efforts. They were classed in the group of *Akriyāvādins*, or those who did not believe in the utility or effectiveness of *puruṣakāra*. It would seem that the *Svabhāvavādin* differed from the *Niyativādin* in that, while the latter views the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself, for the former he was rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature. These ideas have much in common and we suggest therefore that *Svabhāvavāda* was a small sub-sect of *Ājīvikism*."<sup>24</sup> Granting that "these ideas have much in common" we cannot persuade ourselves to accept Basham's suggestion for from all the references to *Svabhāvavāda* culled in this paper we find

23 *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 103–104.

24 *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p. 226.



that it was more intimately connected with Materialism or *Cārvāka-darśana*. It is much more allied to *Cārvākadarśana* in as much as both deny a transmigrating soul, whereas *Niyativāda* believes in an immortal soul. Further, in view of the fact that the *Ājivikas* ultimately merged with the Jains—which indicates that they had much in common—it would be more proper to regard *Svabhāvavāda* as part and parcel of Materialism as has been done by tradition.

### SVABHĀVAVĀDA DIALECTIC

That the *Svabhāvavāda* must once have been well-known is evident from the numerous references to it in Sanskrit and Prakrit literature. No detailed exposition of it is to be found in any single treatise. The only account of this doctrine we have is in the *prima facie* argument or view (*Pūrvapakṣa*) given in the works of its opponents for purposes of refutation. It is not improbable that the opponents ascribed to the *Svabhāvavādin's* arguments which were easy of refutation. So we have to be cautious in judging the *Svabhāvavādin's* powers of logical argument and dialectic skill.

In the course of his commentary to *Gaṇadharavāda*<sup>25</sup> Jinabhadraṇi more than once mentions *Svabhāvavāda* and refutes it. He explains the variety of the world on the basis of the doctrine of *Karman*, which is

- 25 होज्ज सहावो वत्थुं निक्कारणया व वत्थुधम्मो वा ।  
 जह वत्थु णत्थि तओऽणुवल्होओ खुपुप्फं व ॥  
 अच्चंतमणुवल्हो वि अहतओ अत्थि नत्थि किं कम्मं ।  
 हेऊ व तदत्थिते जो णणु कम्मस्स वि स एव ॥  
 कम्मस्स वाभि हाणं होज्ज सहावो त्ति होउ को दोसो ।  
 निच्चं व सो सभावो सरिसो एत्थं च को हेऊ ॥  
 सो मुत्तोऽमुत्तो वा जह मुत्तो तो न सव्वहा सरिसो ।  
 परिणामओ पयं पिव न देहहेऊ जह अमुत्तो ॥  
 उवगरणाभावाओ न य हवइ सुहम्म सो अमुत्तो वि ।  
 कज्जस्स मुत्तिमत्ता सुहसंवित्तादिओ चेव ॥  
 अहवाकारणउ चिय सभावओ तोवि सरिसया कत्तो ।  
 विमकारणओ न भवे विसरिसया किं व विच्छित्ती ॥  
 अहव सहावो धम्मो वत्थुस्स न सो वि सरिसओ निच्चं ।  
 उप्पायट्ठिभंगा चित्ता जं वत्थुपज्जाया ॥  
 कम्मस्स वि परिणामो सुहम्म धम्मो सपोगलमयस्स ।  
 हेऊ चित्तो जगओ होइ सहावो त्ति को दोसो ॥

—*Gaṇadharavāda* vv. 1786-1793

the cornerstone of Jaina philosophy. Śīlāṅka<sup>26</sup>, writing as an advocate of *Niyativāda*, disposes of *Svabhāva* as follows :

“Moreover the causing of joy and sorrow cannot be ascribed to inherent character (*svabhāva*). For is this different from a man or the same as he? If it is different it is not capable of causing the joy and sorrow which befall him, on account of that difference. Nor (if it is) the same (as he). For, if it were, it would be a mere man.

“If happiness is experienced as a result of human activity there should be no difference in the reward (of equal exertion), nor should there be lack of reward when equal effort is exerted, whether by servants, merchants or peasants, etc. Yet it is often seen that even when no means of livelihood such as service, etc., is followed, rich reward is obtained. So nothing is achieved by human effort.”

In the *Nyāyamañjarī*<sup>27</sup> Jayanta dismisses this doctrine of *Svabhāva* and establishes that of *Adṛṣṭa* or *Karman*. Jayanta is well-known as a superb writer on *Nyāya*. This great logician, however, succumbs to the temptation of ascribing a manifestly weak argument to the *Svabhāva* adin, who argues : “The opening of a babe’s mouth is spontaneous—natural like the blooming of a lotus bud.” The *Siddhāntin* refutes it saying that the blooming of a lotus bud is caused by the touch of the sun’s rays and that it is not spontaneous or natural.

That the doctrine of *Svabhāva* once enjoyed immense popularity and exerted great influence on the thinkers of those times would be patent to any impartial student of the *Bhagavadgītā*. The *Gītā* takes recourse to the doctrine of *Svabhāva* in defending the difference in respective func-

26 तथा स्वभावस्यापि सुखदुःखादिकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिः । यतोऽसौ स्वभावः पुरुषाद् भिन्नोऽभिन्नो वा । यदि भिन्नो न पुरुषाश्रिते सुखदुःखे कर्तुमलं तस्माद् भिन्नत्वादिति । नाप्यभिन्नः । अभेदे पुरुष एव स्यात् तस्य चाकर्तृत्वमुक्तमेव ।

—Śīlāṅka’s Commentary to *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* : folio 31 (a)

यदि पुरुषकारकृतं सुखाद्यनुभूयेत ततः सेवकवणिक्कर्षकादीनां समाने पुरुषकारे सति फलप्राप्तिसदृश्यं फलप्राप्तिश्च न भवेत् । कस्यचित्तु सेवादिव्यापाराभावेऽपि विशिष्टफलवासिद्ध्यत इति । अतो न पुरुषकारात् किञ्चिदासाधते ।

—Śīlāṅka’s Commentary to *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* : folios 30 (b) and 31 (a)

27 ननु कमलमुकुलविकासादिवत्स्वाभाविकमेव शिशोर्मुखविकाशादिकार्यं स्यात्, स्वाभाविकं नाम किमुच्यते किमहेतुकमविज्ञातहेतुकमनियतहेतुकं वा ।.....

न चायस्कान्तदृष्टान्तसमाश्रयेण स्वाभाविकमेतद्वाल्क्यस्य कुचकलशानिमित्तोपसर्पणमिति वक्तुमुचितमनन्तरमेव निरस्तत्वात् ।

—Jayanta’s *Nyāyamañjarī* (Prameyaprakaraṇa, pp. 41-42, KSS ed. 1936)

tions of the four different castes and emphatically asserts the inherent and irresistible strength of *Svabhāva*.

The Jainas, no doubt, criticize this doctrine of *Svabhāva* in their works of philosophical nature but this criticism applies to it only when *Svabhāva* is presented as the only cause of the variety of the world. The Jainas find a place for this doctrine under their wide umbrella of *Syādvāda* or *Anekānta*. In this connection we draw the attention of the readers to *Silāṅka's* passage<sup>28</sup>, quoted below, accepting *Svabhāvavāda*.

### ADDENDUM

In the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the *Pañjikā* (commentary) of Kamalaśīla who flourished in the first half of the eighth century A.D. we find an exposition as well as refutation of *Svābhāvika-jagadvāda* (vv. 110-127). The three verses embodying the *Svabhāvavāda*, which are quoted by Maladhārī Hemacandra, very well compare with the corresponding verses in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (vv. 110-112) and it is not unlikely that they are derived from a common source. Hemacandra reads '*Rājivakaṇṭha-kādinām*' in place of '*Rājivakesarādinām*'; '*Mayūracandrikādir va*' in place of '*Mayūracandrakādir vā*'—it is gratifying that the emendation in the text of Hemacandra that I have suggested above is supported by the text of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*; the third verse although identical in thought-content differs in its expression. The verse of Hemacandra is already cited above. Here I quote the verse from the *Tattvasaṅgraha* :

यथैव कण्टकादीनां तैक्ष्ण्यादिकमहेतुकम् ।

कादाचित्कतया तद्बहुःखादीनामहेतुता ॥

The refutation of *Svābhāvika-jagadvāda* by Śāntarakṣita may very briefly be summarised thus :

"The filaments of the lotus, etc., have the seed, mud and water as the causes. Why then should we search for other causes which are not to be found? If all things come about by '*svabhāva*' why should they appear at particular times and particular places only? It is clear, therefore, that they have particular causes for their origin and development. The *Svābhāvika-jagadvāda* thus stands refuted by *Pratyakṣa-pramāna* itself."

28 तथास्ति स्वभावोऽपि कारणत्वेनाशेषस्य जगतः, स्वो भावः स्वभाव इति कृत्वा तेन हि जीवाजीवमन्यत्वामन्यत्वा-  
मूर्तत्वामूर्तत्वानां स्वस्वरूपानुविधानात् तथा धर्माधर्माकाशकालादीनां च गतिस्थित्यवगाहपरत्वादिस्वरूपादानादिति,  
तथा चेत्तम्—कः कण्टकानामित्यादि ।

—Śilāṅka's Commentary to *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, folio 213 (b)