

## SYĀDVĀDA-BHĀṢĀ OF ŚUBHAVIJAYA GAṆĪ

N. M. Kansara

Among some of the famous Jaina ācāryas, Śrī Vijayahīrasūri, popularly known as Śrī Hīravijayasūri, flourished in the first half of the 16th century A. D. He is distinguished in the Jaina monarchical tradition as the ācārya who enlightened Akabar the Great, the Mughal Emperor of that period. Pandit Śubhavijaya Gaṇī has mentioned himself as a disciple of this ācārya<sup>1</sup>, who inherited the leadership of the famous Tapā-gaccha after the death of Śrī Vijayadānasūri in V. S. 1621 (A. D. 1665).

Śubhavijaya Gaṇī is recorded to have composed the following works : *Haimī-nāmamālā-bhūjaka* (V. S. 1661 / A. D. 1605), *Mahāvīra-svāmi-saptaviṃśati-bhāva-stavana* (V. S. 1662 / A. D. 1606), *Tarkabhāṣā-vārtika* (V. S. 1663 / A. D. 1607), *Kāvya-kalpalatā-vṛtti-makaranda* (V. S. 1665 / A. D. 1609), *Syādvāda-bhāṣā* with its *vṛtti* (V. S. 1667 / A. D. 1611), and *Kalpasūtra-tīkā* (V. S. 1671 / A. D. 1615)<sup>2</sup>. Thus, he seems to have lived during the latter half of the 17th century of the Vikrama Era, corresponding to the first half of the 17th century A. D.

The *Syādvāda-bhāṣā* has been composed as an introductory monograph meant to enable the beginners to study the *Syādvāda*, the well-known doctrine of Jaina logic. This work is meant to provide a facility for the Jainas, much in the same way as the *Tarkabhāṣā* was composed by Keśava Miśra for introducing the beginners to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Indian philosophy. Obviously, Śubhavijaya Gaṇī seems to have been inspired in the matter when he composed his *Vārttika* on the Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*, about a couple of years ago, before he undertook the task. He seemingly had utilized his proficiency acquired due to his deep study of Miśra's works for composing his *Syādvāda-bhāṣā*.

The *Syādvāda-bhāṣā* was first published in the Pothi form by N. G. Jahveri in the Śreṣṭhī Devacandra Lālbhāi Jaina Pustakoddhāra Series (No.3), Mumbai, in A. D. 1911. It was reprinted and published again by Śrī Jina Śāsana Ārādhana Trust, Mumbai, in Vira Samvat. 2516 (i.e. C.E 1990), along with the *Devadharmā-parīkṣā* and other works of Mahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya. These two editions showed some parts of the text as *sūtras* printed in bold types, while the rest of the text printed in running types was supposed to be the auto-commentary. On close examination it was clear that the editors of both these editions were not sure which portion of the text comprised the *sūtras* and which the commentary. Consequently, the problem was opened anew, and the work has been re-edited and published in the *Sambodhi* Vol. XVIII, Ahmedabad 1992 (pp. 103-122) by the present author. Herein, the *sūtra* portion has been clearly printed in bold fonts in contrast to the commentary portion; and both these parts make a whole homogeneous work. Moreover, in view of the comparative study of the text of this work, since it is declared to be meant also as an introduction to the principles of

*pramāṇa* and *naya* with the alternative title '*Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-prakāśikā*<sup>3</sup>, the work has been duly divided into nine *paricchedas*, and the *sūtras* have been given the numbers in each of the *paricchedas*, although none of the extant MSS. show anything like this division, nor numbering either. But, this expedient was necessary for enabling the scholars to undertake an intensive comparative study of the work with reference to its source, namely the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokālaṅkāra* (PNT) of Vādi Devasūri with his auto-commentary named the *Syādvāda-ratnākara*<sup>4</sup>, which is mentioned by Śubhaviṇaya Gaṇi, and which is a standard work on the Jaina medieval logic, psychology, and epistemology; both these works are very tough<sup>5</sup>.

The *Syādvāda-bhāṣā* (SVB) consists of 282 *sūtras*, suitably divided into nine *paricchedas*, each of which containing (I) 17, (II) 24, (III) 67, (IV) 8, (V) 9, (VI) 67, (VII) 54, (VIII) 25, and (IX) 11 respectively, most of which being drawn from its source work of Vādi Devasūri, and a few of them from the *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra* (PMS) of Māṇikyanandin (about 900-950 C. E.), a Digambara author; this latter work, in its turn is based on that of Akalaṅka. And Vādi Devasūri, a Śvetāmbara scholiast, has closely followed Māṇikyanandin, many of whose *sūtras* are freely adopted by the former, and a few also criticized. The Critical Text of the SVB, edited is based on four MSS., two (Nos. 9164 and 25920) deposited in the L. D. Institute of Indology MSS. Library, Ahmedabad, and two (Nos. 2609 and 11710) deposited in the Vādi Pārśvanātha Bhaṇḍāra in Hemacandrācārya Jñāna Mandir, Patan.

The SVB commences with a salutation to Jina Mahavīra and Śrī Hīravijayasūri, and then the author reveals his intention that he has composed this work for the sake of beginners who are eager to study the system of Syādvāda, and that it is but just elementary<sup>6</sup>. Towards the end of the work, he has made it clear that those who are interested in knowing about the detailed refutations of various systems of Indian philosophy may look for them in the *Syādvādaratnākara*<sup>7</sup>.

At the outset, in the First Paricched, he enumerates nine basic concepts (*padārthāḥ*), namely *Jīva*, *ajīva*, *punya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *bandha*, and *mokṣa*, by the knowledge and activity of which one attains to the highest bliss (*niḥśreyasa*). With I. 2 onwards up to the end of this *pariccheda* are treated the definition of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as that about the self and the non-self, capable of making us accept the agreeable things and discarding the disagreeable ones. This is essentially valid as it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*), which consists in determining a matter to be what it is not (*a-tad*). *Samāropa* is of three kinds, namely illusion (*viparyaya*), doubt (*saṁśaya*), and inattention (*anadhyavasāya*). The certain knowledge of the Self consists in the clear illumination of the Self. The validity of knowledge consists in its agreement with the knowable. The invalidity of knowledge consists in the opposite of that. With respect to their origination, both of these are due to something other than itself while their consciousness is due to itself and the other. Here, in the auto-commentary, the author has refuted the *Mīmāṃsaka* view that it is

the knowledge itself which is responsible for its validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*). And in his elaboration of the the valid knowledge defined in I.2, he has criticized Mānikyanandin's definition.

Out of the 20 *sūtras* of the First *pariccheda* in the PNT, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇi has drawn 17, most of them verbatim, but four with small modifications.

In the second *pariccheda*, valid knowledge is classified into two kinds, namely direct and indirect. The direct is clear, in revealing the details to a greater degree than that done by inference, etc. It is of two modes, namely the practical (*sāṃvyaṅvāhārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*). The first of these is of two kinds, namely the sensual and unsensual, i.e., mental. Each of these two has four modes, namely grasp, attention, determination, and retention. Inquisitiveness (*ihā*) is to be distinguished from doubt (*saṃśaya*) which precedes it. Though these are in some respects one and the same, yet they are to be distinguished owing to the peculiarity in modifications. Their order is such, because they are perceived in such an order and because their origination is due to gradual destruction and abatement of one's own karma. Otherwise the object of knowledge would remain unknown. What is not sensed is never grasped, the ungrasped is not doubted, the non-doubted is not attended to, the non-attended- to is not determined, and the undetermined is not retained. Sometimes this order is not apparent; this is due to the immediate succession of those processes, like the imperceptibility of the order in which the hundred petals of a lotus are pierced. The transcendental perception, on the other hand, is dependent on the soul alone for its genesis. It is wither partial or complete. The partial is of two kinds, namely clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and telepathy (*manahparyāya*). Clairvoyance is knowledge which arises when its enveloping hindrance subsides in a particular way, which is connate with some and in others acquired by means of righteousness, and which has, for its objects things that have a form. Telepathy, which has for its object the mental substance and its modes, arises from the subsidence of its peculiar cover, the subsidence being due to self-control and purity. The complete knowledge is pure one consisting in the direct cognition of all substances and their modes, which arises when, owing to a peculiar group of conditions, all the covering hindrances are annihilated. Arhat is possessed of that, as he has no faults. He is devoid of faults, because his words are unopposed to the valid knowledge. As his doctrine is not contradicted by the valid knowledge, the non-opposition of his words to it is established.

Out of the 27 *sūtras* of the second *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇi has dropped three (11, 13 and 27) and adopted the remaining 23, three of these with slight modifications.

The third *pariccheda* starts with the consideration of indirect knowledge; it is not clear. It is of five kinds—recognition, conception, induction, deduction and authoritative. Recognition is the recollection of an object cognised before, in the form, 'it is that', and is due to the waking up of an impression; as for instance, 'that image of the

Divine Teacher'. Conception is due to apprehension and recollection and consists in a synthetic knowledge of a thing under observation with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essences underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics : for example, 'that cow is of that species; a *Gavaya* is like a cow.' Induction (*tarka* or *ūha*) is the knowledge of the forms 'this being, this is ...', etc., arising from a critical examination of the facts observed and non-observed and consisting in the establishment of relationship, which subsists in all the three times, such as that between the proven and the mark; for example, 'whatever smoke there is, all that is only when there is fire; if it be not there smoke would not be there.'

Inference is of two kinds : for one's own self (*svārtha*) and for others (*parārtha*). Of these, the inference-for-one's-own-self consists in a knowledge of the proven (*sādhya*), through the apprehension of the mark (*hetu*) and the recollection of its inseparable relation to the *Dharma*. The one and the only characteristic of the mark (*hetu*) is that its incapability of being known otherwise than in connection with the *Dharma* is known for certain. The proven (*sādhya*) is what is undetermined, unopposed, and desired. It is a well-known abode (*dharmī*) having that phenomenon; it is otherwise called *Pakṣa*. The *Dharmī* is known to us either through mere supposition or through the *pramāṇas*, or through both. An inference consisting in a statement of the abode and the mark is called the inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārtha*), by transference of epithet. To show that the proven is in the particular occasion connected with the abode, the explicit statement of the abode is certainly necessary, just like the statement showing the inherence of the mark. The mark may be indicated in two ways : 'It is got along with it', and 'otherwise it is not got at all'. The first of these two implies that the mark exists only when the proven exists; and the second implies that the mark does not exist if the proven does not exist; for instance, 'that kitchen has fire in it because only if there be fire, smoke can be perceived there, or if there be no fire, smoke cannot be perceived there.' To establish the proven, the use of one of them being sufficient, the use of the other is unnecessary where one has been used. And since, because of its internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*) the mark is capable or incapable of establishing the proven, the development of the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is valueless. To convince the dull-minded persons, however, the premises of the example, the application and the conclusion, etc., are to be used. Example is the place where the inseparable connection can be known. It is of two sorts : owing to its homogeneity and heterogeneity. In the case, where the nature of the mark being present, the nature of the proven is found to exist as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the homogeneous example; for instance, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in the kitchen.' In the case, however, where the proven being absent, the mark is shown to be absent as a matter of necessity, we have an instance of the heterogenous example; for instance, 'where there is no fire, there can be no smoke, e.g. in the pond'. Application is showing the mark to be

existent in the abode; for instance, 'there is smoke in this place'. Conclusion is applying the proven to the abode; for instance, 'so, there is fire here'. These five propositions, stating the abode, etc., are also described as limbs (*avayava*). The reason, defined above, is of two sorts, it being differentiated on the basis of being positively cognized or negatively cognized. Both prove the affirmation and the negation of some fact.

The affirmation is the aspect of existence; the negation is the aspect of non-existence. The latter is of four kinds, namely prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), reciprocal non-existence (*itaretarabhāva*) and absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). That subsiding, a fact in the form of its effect comes into existence is its *prāgabhāva*; for instance, the lump of clay is the prior non-existence of the pitcher which is formed out of it on its cessation to exist. That arising a fact which was an effect, come to an end as a matter of necessity is its *pradhvaṃsābhāva*; for instance, the collection of pitcher-pieces is the posterior non-existence of the pitcher which is necessarily destroyed on the rise of the pitcher-pieces. Reciprocal non-existence implies the retrogression of the nature of a thing from the nature of its opposite; for instance, the retrogression of the nature of a pitcher from the nature of a pillar. Absolute non-existence is what, in all the three times, contradicts its identical nature; for instance, the conscious and the unconscious.

There are two kinds of the positively cognized (*upalabdhi*) marks, namely the positively-cognized-compatible (*aviruddha-upalabdhi*) and the positively-cognized-incompatibility (*viruddha-upalabdhi*). Of these, the former proves affirmation or existence, and is of six kinds : a mark, compatible-with-the-proven may be positively cognized as pervaded (*vyāpya*), the effect (*kārya*), the cause (*kāraṇa*), the antecedent (*pūrvacara*), the subsequent (*uttaracara*) or the concomitant (*sahacara*) of the proven. Thus, (1) *vyāpya-aviruddha-upalabhi*, (2) *kārya-aviruddha-upalabhi*, (3) *kāraṇa-aviruddha-upalabdhi*, (4) *pūrvācara-aviruddha-upalabdhi*, (5) *uttaracara-aviruddha-upalabhi*, and (6) *sahacara-aviruddha-upalabdhi* are illustrated, respectively, as follows : (1) 'Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product; whatever is a product is seen to be subject to modification, e.g. a pot; and this also is a product, hence subject to modification; that which is not subject to modification is not seen to be a product, e.g. a son of a barren woman; and this is a product, therefore, subject to modification.' (2) 'There is fire on this mountain, because smoke is noticed.' (3) 'There is shadow here, because of umbrella.' (4) The constellation *Śakāṭa* will rise, because of the rise of *Kṛttikā*.' (5) *Bharaṇī* has arisen, because it was preceded by the rise of *Kṛttikā*.' (6) There is a shape in this mango fruit, because of the juice.'

The positive-cognition (*upalabdhi*) of what is incompatible (*viruddha*)-with-pervadable (*vyāpya*), etc. of what is negated is of six types : Therein, (1) positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) of the pervadable (*vyāpya*) by incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g. 'there is no cool touch here, because of warmth'; (2) the mark positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) to be the effect (*kārya*) of incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g.

'this man's temper is not yet cooled down, because he has an angry face'; (3) the mark positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) to be the cause (*kāraṇa*) of what is incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g. 'there is no happiness in this embodied one, because of pain in heart'; (4) the mark positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) to be the antecedent (*pūrvacara*) of incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g. 'the constellation Śakaṭa will not rise after the end of this *muhūrta*, because of the rise of *Revatī*'; (5) the mark positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) to be subsequent to (*uttaracara*) incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g. 'the constellation Bharanī did not rise, because of the rise of Pūṣya before *muhūrta*'; (6) The mark positively cognised (*upalabdhi*) to be the concomitant of incompatible (*viruddha*) with the proven, e.g. 'this man has no false knowledge, for he has got the right faith'.

The negatively cognised (*anupalabhi*) mark also is of two kinds, namely the negatively-cognised compatible (*aviruddha*) and the negatively-cognised incompatible (*viruddha*). Of these the negatively-cognised mark which is compatible (*aviruddha*) and proves negation is of seven modes, as may be differentiated by identity of nature (*svabhāva*), pervader (*vyāpaka*), effect (*kārya*), cause (*kāraṇa*), antecedent (*pūrvacara*), subsequent (*uttaracara*) and concomitant (*sahacara*). Thus : (1) *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, (2) *vyāpākānupalabdhi*, (3) *kāryānupalabdhi*, (4) *kāraṇānupalabdhi*, (5) *pūrvacarānupalabdhi*, (6) *uttaracarānupalabdhi*, and (7) *sahacarānupalabdhi*. The examples are : (1) 'there is no pitcher in this place, for its nature as known is not cognised'; (2) 'there is no śimśapa tree here, for no tree is found here'; (3) 'there is no unimportant fire, for no smoke is found'; (4) 'there is no smoke here, because of the lack of fire'; (5) 'a *muhūrta* after, Śakaṭa star will not rise, for Kṛttikā is not seen to rise'; (6) 'a *muhūrta* before, Bharanī did not rise, for, Kṛttikā is not seen to rise'; (7) 'this man has not got right knowledge, for he is not found to possess right faith'.

A negatively-cognised (*anupalabdhi*) mark which is incompatible (*viruddha*) leading to an affirmative conclusion (*vidhi*) is of five kinds. And thus : (1) *viruddha-kārya-anupalabdhi*; (2) *viruddha-kāraṇa-anupalabdhi*; (3) *viruddha-svabhāva-anupalabdhi*; (4) *viruddha-vyāpaka-anupalabdhi*; and (5) *viruddha-sahacara-anupalabdhi*. The examples are as follows : (1) 'In this person, there is a particular disease; for the operative signs of good health are not found in him.' (2) 'In this embodied being there is pain; for it is not united with what is liked.' (3) 'An object has many aspects; for the nature of having only one aspect is not found (in it). (4) 'There is shade here; for heat is not felt.' (5) 'This man has false knowledge; for, he is not found to have right faith.'

Out of the 109 *sūtras* of the third *Pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī has adopted in all 79 *sūtras*, of which 26 are slightly modified, and 77-82 and 96-102 are combined into 51 and 62, respectively; the rest of them are incorporated verbatim.

The fourth *Pariccheda* starts with the definition of *Āgama*. It is the knowledge arising from authoritative sayings. It is so called by transference of epithet. For instance, 'there is a treasure here; there are things like Meru'. An authority (*āpta*) is he who knows

a thing under consideration as it is and describes it in accordance with his knowledge. He is either of the two, human or superhuman. Here, the father, etc., are the human, while the *Tirthakara*, etc., are superhuman authorities. A word signifies an object by means of both its natural force and applied meaning. Letter-sounds, e.g. A, etc., are atomic.

Here, out of the 47 *sūtras* of the fourth *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviyaya Gaṇī has adopted only 8, two of which (3 and 11) are modified slightly; and the order of the 9th and the 11th has been reversed, as 8th and 7th.

The fifth *pariccheda* begins with the consideration of the object of *pramāṇa*. It is defined as a thing having a nature which has many aspects, namely the general, the particular, and so on; because it is perceived to have a nature corresponding to, and different from, that of some things (of the same class); and because it is capable of producing effects by the modification characterised by the modification of its nature which consists in its persistence through the giving up of its old form and the assuming of a new form. Generality is of two kinds, distinguished by species and substantiality etc. Therein, the specific-idea (*tiryak-sāmānya*) consists in similar features found in each of the individuals of a class; for instance, cowhood in *Śabala*, *Śābaleya* and other individual cows. Persistent substance (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) is the substratum which remains in all its modifications, antecedent and subsequent; as for instance, gold which continues through the ornaments like bracelet, bangle, etc. The particular also is of two sorts, namely the mode and the distinction. Modes are gradually arising evolutes in the same thing; as the feelings of pleasure, pain, etc., in the soul. Distinction is the dissimilar modification, as cow, buffalo, etc.

Out of the 8 *sūtras* of the fifth *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviyaya Gaṇī apparently seems to have adopted 5 of them with slight modifications, but in fact he has adopted all the nine *sūtras* of the fourth *pariccheda* of the *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra* of Māṇikyanandin *in toto* within the fifth one of his SVB.

The sixth *pariccheda* starts with the consideration of the fruit or the result that is effected by the *pramāṇa*; such as, removal of ignorance and discarding, acceptance and disregard. It is of two sorts, namely the direct and the indirect. As regards the direct fruit, that of all the *pramāṇas* is the annihilation of ignorance. As regards the indirect fruits, they are a spirit of avoidance, that of appropriation, and that of indifference. As the fruit cannot otherwise be understood to be as such it is in some respects both separate from and identical with the *pramāṇa*. The fruit is to be judged as not different from the *pramāṇa* as both of them have the same identical knower, because the same self which is modified into *pramāṇa* is found to be modified into the fruit. He that cognises does also appropriate, renounce, and neglect the objects of his cognition, as the case may be; this is the invariable experience of all observers; and because knowledge and its fruit appear as that which does effect and that which is effected. Because of his independence, the doer is he who effects (*sādhaka*) something, while

the act, on the other hand, is what is to be effected (*sādhya*), because it is dependent on the doer for its effectuation.

A *pramāṇa*-fallacy is what is other than a *pramāṇa* and its nature. The fallacies, regarding the nature of the *pramāṇa* are : the view that is essentially unconscious; that it does not reveal the Self; that it reveals the Self only; the theory of the undetermined perception; and the fallacy consisting in ignorance (*samāropa*). It would be fallacious to regard as valid knowledge such phenomena as, for instance, contact etc., knowledge unconscious of the Self, knowledge not revealing any non-Self, pure sensation, illusion, doubt, and inattention. *Pramāṇa*-fallacies are, for instance, cognition of two moons, etc., and of its being broken; this is the fallacy of sensuous perception. Fallacious recollection consists in knowing a thing in which it is not there; for instance, knowing Yajñadatta to be Devadatta. To identify one thing with another which is only similar to it; and conversely to regard one and the same thing as two similar things; cases like these are examples of fallacy regarding assimilation; like the case of twin children. Induction-fallacy consists in the cognition of a thing where no relation exists; e.g. 'whoever is his son is dark-complexioned'. Pervasion (*vyāpti*) is invariable concomitance; e.g. 'He is dark-complexioned, as he is the son of Maitra'. Cognition arising from a false knowledge about the abode, etc., is inference-fallacy. That which is undesirable, etc., is fallacy regarding the abode.

The unproved (*asiddha*), the opposed (*viruddha*), and the doubtful or uncertain (*anaikāntika*) are (the three classes of) the mark-fallacy. The mark whose inseparable connection with the proven is not determined through the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the unproved (*asiddha*). It is of two modes, namely unproved-to-both-parties and unproved-to-one-party. The former is unproved to both the disputant and the opponent; e.g. 'sound is subject to modification, because it is visible.' The latter is unproved to either the disputant or to the opponent; e.g. 'trees are unconscious, because they have not the death characterised by a suppression of the power of cognition of sense-faculty and of vitality. Opposed (*viruddha*) reason is one the invariable connection of which is the opposite of the proven; e.g. 'the soul is eternal or non-eternal, because it is possessed of the faculty of conception, etc.' The doubtful (*anaikāntika*) reason is one whose existence is unopposed even in the dissimilar abode; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' It is of two kinds, namely that of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is known, and that of which it is suspected. The reason of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'sound is eternal, because it is knowable. That of which the connection with the dissimilar abode is doubted is the fallacious reason of the doubtful class; e.g. 'the person in question is not omniscient, because he is a speaker'. The fallacious example is one in which both what effects and what is effected are unproved and in obverse relation; e.g. 'Sound is not-man-made, being endowed with form; like sensual pleasure, an atom and a pot.

Reverse agreement also, e.g. 'whatever is not man-made is unmanifest, being liable to



be overlapped by lightening etc. In the case of inverse relation, those whose difference is unproved; e.g. like the atom, the sensual pleasure and the ether. The one having the reverse difference; e.g. 'that which is not endowed with form is not not-man-made'. In respect of homogeneity, the fallacy of the example is of nine modes, thus : That which is opposed to the proven phenomena (*sādhya-dharma-vikala*); that which is opposed to the reason-phenomena (*sādhana-dharma-vikala*); that which is opposed to both the phenomena (*ubhaya-dharma-vikala*); that which is doubtful with regard to the proven-phenomena (*sandigdha-sādhya-dharmā*); that which is doubtful with regard to the mark-phenomena (*sandigdha-sādhana-dharmā*); that which is doubtful with regard to both the phenomena (*sandigdhaubhaya-dharmā*); that in which the reason and the proven are unconnected (*ananvaya*); that in which the connection between them is unshown (*apradarśitānvaya*); and that in which the connection between them is in inverse order (*viparītānvaya*). (1) The *sādhya-dharma-vikala*; e.g. 'Sound is not man-made, because it is formless, like misery'. (2) The *Sādhana-dharma-vikala*; e.g. The proposition and the reason being the same as above, 'like an atom.' (3) The *Ubhaya-dharma-vikala*; e.g. 'like a pitcher'. (4) The *Sandigdha-sādhya-dharmā*; e.g. 'that man has passion etc., because he is a speaker, like Devadatta'. (5) The *Sandigdha-sādhana-dharmā*; e.g. 'that man is mortal, because he has passions etc., like Maitra'. (6) The *Sandigdha-ubhaya-dharmā*; e.g. 'that man is not an all-seer, because he has passions etc., like a particular vower'. (7) The Unconnected homogeneous example; e.g. 'the person referred to has passions, etc., because he is a speaker'. (8) The one with unshowed connection; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pitcher'. (9) The one with inverse order; e.g. 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product; whatever is non-eternal is a product like a pitcher'.

In respect of heterogeneity also, the fallacy of the example is of nine modes : That in which the negation of the proven is unproved (*asiddha-sādhya-vyatireka*); that in which the negation of the reason is unproved (*asiddha-sādhana-vyatireka*); that in which the negation of both is unproved (*asiddha-ubhaya-vyatireks*); that in which the negation of the proven is doubtful (*sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*); that in which the negation of the reason is doubtful (*sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka*); that in which the negation of both is doubtful (*sandigdha-ubhay-vyatireka*); that in which there is no negative relation between the proven and the reason (*avyatireka*); that in which the negative relation is unshown (*apradarśita-vyatireka*); and that in which the negative relation is in inverse order (*viparīta-vyatireka*). These are illustrated below : (1) *asiddha-sādhya-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Inference is fallacious; because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not fallacious is not valid knowledge; as for instance, the dream consciousness.' (2) *asiddha-sādhana-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Perception is undetermined; because it is valid knowledge; whatever is not undetermined is not valid knowledge; as for instance, inference.' (3) *asiddha-ubhaya-vyatireka*; e.g. Sound is both eternal-and-non-eternal; because it is existent; whatever is not both eternal -and non-eternal is not existent; as for instance, the pillar.' (4) *Sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Kapila is not

omniscient nor an authority; because he upholds the doctrine of absolute unmomentariness; one who is omniscient or an authority upholds the doctrine of unmomentariness; as for instance, Sugata.' (5) *Sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka*; e.g. 'The person referred to is one whose words are not to be accepted; because he has passions, etc.; as for instance, the son of Śuddhodana.' (6) *Sandigdha-ubhaya-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Kapila is not free from passions; because he has not, out of pity, given to beings, who deserve mercy, a piece of flesh from his body; one who is free from passions, gives out of pity a piece of flesh from his body to beings who deserve mercy; as for instance, Tapanā-bandhu.' (7) *avyatireka*; e.g. 'The person referred to is not one who is free from passions; because he is a speaker; one who is free from passions is not a speaker; as for instance, a piece of stone.' (8) *apradarśita-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; as for instance, ether.' (9) *viparīta-vyatireka*; e.g. 'Sound is non-eternal; because it is a product; whatever is not a product is eternal; as for instance, ether.'

Fallacies with regard to application and conclusion consist in stating them in contravention of the principles, implied in their definitions. The examples are as follows : (1) *upanayābhāsa*; e.g. 'Sound is subject to modification; because it is a product; whatever is a product is subject to modification; as for instance, a pitcher.' (2) *nigamanābhāsa*; e.g. in that very instance, (to say) 'So sound is a product', or to say 'So a pitcher is subject to modification.' (3) *Āgamābhāsa* consists in cognition arising from the words of a false authority. For instance : 'On the bank of the Mekalakanyakā, at the foot of the *tāla* and *hintāla*, dates are found in abundance; make haste; go on, go on, O Ye calves!' (4) *Samikhyābhāsa*; e.g. 'Direct perception is the only form of valid knowledge.' (5) *Viśayābhāsa* consists in regarding the class-essence alone or the particular alone, or both of them isolated from each other as the object of valid knowledge. (6) *Phalābhāsa* consists in thinking that the fruit is the same as valid knowledge, or that fruit is different from it.

Out of the 87 *sūtras* of the sixth *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī has adopted 57 *sūtras* for his sixth *pariccheda* of the SVB; out of these, about 15 apparently seem to be slightly modified, but in fact they are adopted from Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra in toto*, along with seven more.

The seventh *Pariccheda* of the SVB opens with the definition of *Naya*. It consists in taking cognition of a part of the object known through the *Pramāṇa*. The *Naya-Fallacy* (*nayābhāsa*) consists in denying the aspects other than the one with which one is concerned for the time being. It is of two kinds : the Expounded (*vyāsa*) and the compounded (*samāsa*). In its expounded form it is of many sorts. In its compounded form it is of two kinds, namely the *Dravyārthika*, i.e. the *naya* which considers the substantial aspect, and the *Paryāyārthika*, e.g. the one which considers a thing in its modifications. The first is of three kinds, namely the *Naigama*, i.e. non-distinguished, the *Samgraha*, i.e. generic, and the *Vyavahāra*, i.e. practical.

The *Naigama* signifies both of either two characteristics or of two substances or of a characteristic and a substance, holding up one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'In soul, there is an ever-existing consciousness' we have an instance of holding up two characteristics, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A thing is substratum, modified' we have an instance of holding up two substances, one as the chief and the other as its adjunct. In the statement 'A self engrossed in the worldly affairs gets happiness for a moment only' we have an instance of holding up a substance as the chief and the characteristic as its adjunct.

Now, their fallacies : (i) *Naigamabhāṣā* consists in a tendency to absolutely separate the two attributes, etc; e.g. to consider that 'in the soul existence and consciousness are absolutely separate from each other'; similarly other instances.

The *Samgraha-naya* takes account only of the common or the general aspect. It is of two kinds : ultimate and non-ultimate : (i) The ultimate (*parasamgraha*) consists in assuming an attitude of indifference to the infinite particulars of a thing and fixing solely upon its barest substratum which is equal to pure existence; e.g. 'The universe is one, for there is no difference in the being of all things'. Its fallacy consists in maintaining the absolute identity of all beings and denying all the particularities; e.g. 'pure existence is the only reality, for particularities apart from that are not apprehended. (ii) The non-ultimate (*aparasamgraha*) consists in taking into consideration such non-ultimate generalities as substantialities, etc., and assuming an attitude of indifference to their various modes; e.g. 'Principles of motion, rest, space, time, matter, soul - all these substances are one, because all of them have substantiality which is identical'; and so on. The fallacy with regard to this consists in recognising the generalities such as substantiality etc., alone and denying the reality of their modes; e.g. 'Substantiality is the only reality, because substances other than it are not perceived'; and so on.

The *Vyavahāra-naya* is that view-point by which matters which are objects of the *Samgraha-naya* are systematically divided; e.g. 'Whatever is existent is either a substance (*dravya*) or a mode (*pariyāya*). The fallacy with regard to it consists in a tendency to divide the substances and the modes into unreal sub-classes; e.g. the Cārvāka philosophy.

The *Paryāyārthika* is of four kinds : the straight-expressed (*Rjusūtra*), the Verbal (*Śabda*), the subtle (*samabhirūḍha*), and the Such-like (*evambhūta*). (i) The *Rju-sūtra-naya* consists in a tendency to fix on, or emphasise, only the mode which is straight, i.e., existent for the present; e.g. 'Now, there is pleasure.' Its fallacy consists in denying the substance *in toto*; e.g. the philosophy of the Tathāgata. (ii) The *Śabda-naya* attributes different meanings to a word in accordance with the difference in tense, etc.; e.g. 'The Sumeru mountain was, is, and will exist in future', and so on. Its fallacy consists in maintaining a real difference in objects in accordance with the difference in tenses, etc.; e.g. In the expression, 'Sumeru was, is, will be', the words

used in different tenses refer to essentially different objects, because they are words used in different tenses, like other words which refer to really different objects. (iii) The *Samabhirūḍha-naya* consists in attributing different meanings to synonyms according to their derivations; e.g. 'Indra' is one who rains; 'Śakra' is one who is potent; 'Purandara' is one who penetrates into (enemy) city-fort, and so on. Its fallacy consists in maintaining the difference in objects in accordance with the difference in synonyms; e.g. To maintain that the words 'Indra', 'Śakra' and 'Purandara', etc. signify really different objects, as they are different words like the words 'elephant', 'deer', 'horse', etc. (iv) The *evambhūta-naya* maintains that words signify those objects which have the activities denoted by them; e.g. 'indra' is so called because he rains; 'Śakra' is so called because he exercises power; 'purandara' is so called because he breaks through the (enemy) city-fort.' Its fallacy consists in refusing to give the object its usual name when it is not functioning; e.g. To hold that the thing called the 'pitcher' should not be so called when it is not doing the particular function indicated by the word; because it is then devoid of the function indicated by the word; like cloth and so on. At this point, Śubhaviḥaya Gaṇī has given seven verses as *saṁgraha-sloka*s in his auto-commentary to summarise their definitions succinctly.

Of these *nayas* enumerated above, the first four are *artha-nayas* as their nature is to determine objects. The last three are *śabda-nayas* as they reveal the significations of words. The contents of each preceding *naya* are fuller and fuller, and those of each succeeding one are more and more limited. The contents of the *naigama* which has within its scope the existents as well as non-existents are fuller than those of the *saṁgraha* which reveals only the existents. The contents of the *saṁgraha* which has within its view all the existents are fuller than those of the *vyavahāra* which reveals only some modes of the existents. The scope of the *vyavahāra* which has for its objects things of the past, the present, and the future is wider than that of the *ṛjusūtra* which considers the things of the present only. The *śabda* signifies different objects in accordance with the difference in tense, etc., but the *ṛjusūtra* indicates the opposite; hence the scope of the latter is wider. The scope of the *śamabhirūḍha* which tends to attribute a different meaning to each of the synonyms is smaller than that of the *śabda* which does quite the different thing. The *evambhūta* indicates different objects in accordance with the difference in functioning. The *śamabhirūḍha* does quite the different thing, and its contents are consequently fuller than those of the former. A *naya* statement also in its application to its object, follows the law of the Sevenfold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*), through affirmation and negation. Its fruit also is to be determined in the same way as that of the *pramāṇa*.

Out of the 57 *sūtras* of the seventh *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviḥaya Gaṇī has adopted 54, of which 11 are slightly modified. And, the *sūtra* 56, slightly modified, is transferred in the next *pariccheda* of the SVB.

The eighth *pariccheda* of the SVB has the statement about the nature of the basic

concepts, called *padārthas*, which are associated with origin, destruction, persistence, and are equal in nature, right from a lamp to the sky. Of these, *jīva* is characterised by consciousness, modifications, difference as well as non-difference from the qualities like knowledge, is a doer, direct enjoyer, having the size of the body possessed by it, different in every body, atomic, and having the *adrṣṭa*. In the auto-commentary on the *sūtra* 3, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī has elaborately discussed the various aspects of the nature of the *jīva* as propounded in the works on Jaina philosophy. This discussion covers about one-fifth of the extent of this entire work. After explaining the meaning of the *sūtra* 3, he has referred to *jīva* as endowed with *prāṇa*, which is further classified under two types, namely *dravya-prāṇa* and *bhāva-prāṇa*; and *jīva* is so called because he lives (*jīvati*) through them. Next, he switches over to the term *ātman* and puts forth logical inferences proving that it is perceptible, creator of body, master of the sense-organs, enjoyer. After proving the existence of *jīva* and showing its two broad types—the liberated and the one subject to rebirth—he proceeds to prove the sub-types of the latter, namely *sura*, *nāraka*, *manuṣya*, and *tiryak*, as also the two sub-types of *manuṣya*, the *garbhaja* and the *sammūrcchaja*, and the five sub-types of *tiryak*, namely *ekendriya*, *dvīndriya*, *trīndriya*, *caturindriya* and *pañcendriya*. Then he proceeds to prove the Jivahood of the earth, water, light, air, and vegetation as sub-sub-types of the *ekendriyas*, in a very detailed and systematically presented sets of logical inferences.

The non-*jīva* is of five kinds : *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, *kāla*, and *pudgala*. Having defined the first two, he discusses the concept of *astikāya* as applicable to these five kinds of *ajīva*, especially in relation to *kāla*. In the *sūtras* 11-20, the nature and types of *pudgalas* are propounded; they are endowed with the qualities of touch, taste, flavour, and colour. They are atomic and found in the form of atoms as well as molecular aggregates (*skandhas*). The atoms of good actions, and those of bad ones are known as merit (*puṇya*) and sin (*pāpa*) respectively. After explaining the concepts of *āsrava*, *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*, that of *mokṣa* is defined in *sūtra* 25, and discussed in detail in the auto-commentary.

Except the 3rd one which is adopted from the PNT, all other *sūtras* here seem to have been formulated by Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī himself on the basis of the verses of the fourth *adhikāra* of the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*<sup>8</sup> (SDS) of Haribhadra Sūri, and the commentary, named the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* (TRD) on it by Guṇaratnasūri. At times it happens that what is supposed to be a *sūtra* in the SVB is a part of a sentence of Guṇaratna Sūri's commentary, and in the *Vṛtti* part of the *sūtra* 3 of the 8th *Pariccheda* of the SVB, especially the elaborate discussion pertaining to the soulness (*jīvatva*) of *prithvī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, and *Vanaspati* has been borrowed verbatim from Guṇaratna Sūri's TRD on verse No. 49 of the SDS, in the fourth *ucchvāsa* propounding the Jaina System of Indian Philosophy in comparison with the Bauddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Jaiminiya ones. And, this is quite justified for the author of the SVB, whose endeavour is to present authentic views.

The ninth *pariccheda* explains the concept of *vāda*, which is expected for arriving at

the final determination on the basis of the *pramāṇas*, *nayas* and *tattvas*. A debate (*vāda*) consists in the system of argumentative statements, *pro-et-contra*, for establishing the subject-matter of one proposition, which is maintained by a party, by refuting the subject-matter of the other, the two subject-matters being opposed to each other. In the debate, the party who begins i.e. either one-who-wants-a-victory (*jigīṣu*) or one-who-wants-to-determine-a-truth (*tattva-nirṇinīṣu*). A seeker-of-victory (*jigīṣu*) is one who wants to defeat another by advancing arguments of proof and refutation in order to establish his own contention. A seeker of-truth (*tattva-nirṇinīṣu*) is one who wants to establish truth in those ways. That is of two classes, namely 'In himself' and 'In others'. The disputant and the opponent are like two wrestlers, the first begins and the other answers. What each of them is to do is to establish his own position and to refute that of the other in accordance with the *pramāṇas*. The members are such as are approved by both the disputant and the opponent and are well aware of the nature of the positions of the disputant and the opponent, have the power of retention, are erudite, intellectually brilliant, forgiving, and strictly impartial. Their businesses are to make the debating parties accept the usual prescribed forms in regard to the points at issue, to determine their right to the priority or the posteriority of speech, to find out the merits and the demerits of the supporting and the contradicting arguments, to stop where necessary the debate by revealing the truth and to declare truly the result of the debate before the assembly. Where both the debaters are desirous of determining the truth, the debaters are to argue, so long as the truth is not determined and so long as argument is possible. Or, in the case of the lack of determination, parties may talk as many times as they can. Then follow the three concluding verses.

Out of the 23 *sūtras* of the eighth *pariccheda* of the PNT, Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī has adopted verbatim the first five, 16th to 19th and the last two ones in his ninth *pariccheda* of the SVB; the order of the last two *sūtras* being reversed as the 11th and 12th. And, in the colophon only has he mentioned the alternative title of his work as the '*Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-prakāśikā*'.

We, thus, find that Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī has chosen to provide a well-knit monograph of Jaina philosophy and Jaina logic by amalgamating the best of both the PNT of Vādi Devasūri and the SDS of Haribhadrāsūri, both of them being the Śvetāmbara luminaries. He has succeeded, with a high degree of authenticity, in presenting a succinct account of all the three aspects—*pramāṇa*, *naya*, and *tattva*—of Jainism, and has in this manner fully corroborated his claim of enlightening the beginners as regards these three aspects.

## REFERENCES :

The present Paper was presented at the All India Oriental Conference (38th Session), Calcutta 1996. It is here published with some small additions and alterations.

1. Śubhaviṣaya Gaṇī - *Syādvāda-bhāṣā* (SVB), Ed. Narayan M. Kansara, *Sambodhi*, Vol. XVIII (1992-93), L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, pp. 103-124, Maṅgala-śloka 1 cd : *Śrī-Hiraviṣayasūri-prasādam āsādyā punar atulam* ; also the Colophon at the end - *Śrī-Hiraviṣaya-sūrisvara-śiṣya-panḍita-śubhaviṣaya-Gaṇinā... Syādvādabhāṣā viracitā //*
2. Mohanlal Dalichand Desai, - *Jaina Sāhitya-no Samksipta Itihāsa* (Gujarātī), (JSSI), Shri Jaina Shvetāmbar Conference Office, Mumbai 1933, para 875, p.594.
3. SVB, Colophon : ... *Pramāṇa-naya-tattva-prakāśikā'paranāmnī syādvāda-bhāṣā...* //
4. SVB, 9.11, auto-commentary, vs.2 : *Bhaṅgaḥ kathā - trayasyāsya nigraha-sthāna-nirṇayaḥ / Śrīmad-ratnākara-granthād dhīdhanair-avadhāryatām //*
5. H. S. Bhattacharya, *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālmkāra*, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay 1967 (Eng. Tr. and Com.), "Preface", p.vi.
6. SVB, Introductory Vs. 2 : *Śiśur-api vāñchati laghudīr alasaḥ syādvāda-śāstram adhyetum/ Tasya kṛte'lpārtha-yutā kriyate syādvāda-bhāṣeyam //*
7. *Ibid.*, Epilogue, Vs. 2, quoted above in Ft. Nt.
8. Ed. Luigi Sualì of Bologna - *Ṣad-darśana-samuccaya* (SDS) by Haribhadra with Guṇaratna's commentary *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* (TRD), Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1905, TRD on Vs. 49, particularly the passage commencing with the words : 'Jivaś ca pṛthivyaptejovāyuvanaspati-dvitricatuḥ'.. up to 'sātmakatvasiddhiḥ' on pp. 153-159 of the SDS.