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Text Printed by:— M. S. Sathe, at the Prajna Press, Wai.

AND

*Published by:— Dr. R. N. Sardesai for the Oriental Book Agency,
15 Shukrawar, Poona (India)*

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INTRODUCTION

I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gain say the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Sāstra is recognised by all the systems. Śāṅkarācārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read— "There is no knowledge like that of Sāṃkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṃkhya being the highest knowledge." (S'ānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word *Sāṃkhya* is found first of all in the S'vet. Up.—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाविगम्यं etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṃkhya reflections are found even in the R̥gveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṃkhya is derived from the word *sāṃkhyā*. The word *sāṃkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atuṣṭi*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṃkhya-pravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh —

"संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशतेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥"

So, *Sāṃkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāṃkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to *Sāṃkhya* in *Saṃskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṃkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 *S'aka*, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

speaking, since the word *Kapila* stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṃkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of *Īśvara* in the Sāṃkhya-system, have maintained that it is *vedaviruddha*, or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). S'āṅkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṃkhya is opposed to *advaita*, avers that Sāṃkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

"Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṃkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṃkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (S've. Up. VI, 13). we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṃkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297-8). In deciding also the *vaidika* or the *non-vaidika* character of Sāṃkhya, the great S'āṅkara says—"The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294.).

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṃkhya to S'ruti. Truly speaking, Sāṃkhya could be divided into two—one *śeś'vara*, the other *nirīś'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīś'vara-Sāṃkhya*, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in S'ruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *śeś'vara-Sāṃkhya* as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across '*yathā-s'rutini-dars'ana*' as a synonym of Sāṃkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।

चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥

(Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūti*s of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṃkhya are met with; e. g., ब्राह्मणास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः (v. 1) तत्त्वार्थ-दर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगनिदर्शिनः, (5) यथा-श्रुतिनिदर्शिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वबुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदाः, (11) तत्त्वनिदर्शिनः, (12) यथावदभिदर्शिनः, (13). Here the word '*Yathā-s'rutinidars'inaḥ*' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāṃkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṃkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṃkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. vide Int. Gott p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāṃkhya in the offering to R̥ṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṃkhya. (s. s., p. 214). This could not have been possible if Sāṃkhya was not founded on S'rutis.

111. *Germes of Sāṃkhya in the Vedas, etc.*

The "presence of Sāṃkhya categories in the S'ruti in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṃkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṃkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the R̥gveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळहमग्रेऽप्रकेतं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkāryavāda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* (the unborn) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिदमं प्रथमं दध्न आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे ।

अजस्य नाभावध्येकमर्पितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्युः ॥

(R̥gveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I., p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kauṣītaki.

2. *Ancient* : as, Kāthaka, Īśa, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇī and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvaṇa Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything, (in

reality) as in “स वा एष एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा” दृष्ट्व..... असङ्गे ण्यं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतयाज्ञवल्क्य” (IV. 3, 15 ff.). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāṃkhya word *Buddhi* in “स यथा सञ्चव.....यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतं सूक्ष्मतमपारं विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय etc.” (Br. Up. II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*. [Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṃkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. vide, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra “बुद्धिरूपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्” (I. 15).]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in “सदेव सोम्येदमय आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” the S'ruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in “तदैक आहुरसदेवेदमय आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायत”. It then advances in the next *mantra satkāryavāda* that is, (सतः सज्जायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement, e. g., “कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होशच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति, सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमय आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” (VI. 2, 2). Here the difference from S'āṅkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विशातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्” (Ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the *Parīṇāmavāda* of the Sāṃkhyas (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in “यदग्रे रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं, यच्छुक्लं तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्यापागादग्रेऽग्निस्त्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्” (Ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna*=Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See, *Bāla*, p. 3. What has been propounded by *Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri* in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* “अजमेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्” (S’v. Up. IV 5; *Mahānārāyaṇa Up.*, p. 141, *Īsādi*). The *trivṛtkarana* (trebling) *S’ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word, *trivṛta* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in “तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतम् etc.” (S’v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. *Jacobi* has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The *Sāṅkhya* categories are clearly stated in the later *Upaniṣads*, e. g., in *Katha* “मनस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः” (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahankāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* in “महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः। पुरुषात् परं किञ्चित्सा काश मा परा गतिः॥” (*Ibid*, III, 11). Prof. *Radhakrishnan* believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in “द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वति अनभ्रान्यो अभिचारशीति॥” in the *Muṇḍaka Up.* (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that *S’vetās’vatara* is essentially a *Sāṅkhya Upaniṣad*. It abounds in the *Sāṅkhya* categories. For instance in this alone, the words *Sāṅkhya* and *Kapila* have been used for the first time. “तत्कारणं संख्य-

योगाधिगम्यम्" (VI. 13), " ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे " (V. 2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* are found, e. g., " संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः etc." (I. 8); also " ज्ञाज्ञो द्वावजावीशानीशवजा ह्येका etc." (I. 9). *vide* also the Mbh. " अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः " (III. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gaudā. on the 61st Kārikā). Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, e. g. " श्वरं प्रधानम् " (I, 10), " मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान् " (IV, 10), " देवात्मशक्तिं स्वर्गुर्णनिगुह्याम् " (I, 13), etc. Also, the mantra " तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतं षोडशान्तं शतार्थारं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः । अष्टकैः पञ्चभिर्विंशरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदै द्विनिमित्तैकमोहम् ॥ " (S'v. Up. I, 4) propounds the categories of Sāṅkhya. The word *trivṛta* refers to the three *guṇas*, the word *ṣoḍaśānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *s'atārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties of *pratyaya-sarga*. Keith's doubt about the Sāṅkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, " The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools. " But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṅkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṅkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like " मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् " (S'v. Up. IV, 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṅkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṅkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣads, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṅkhya categories of *kṣetrajñā*, *saṃkalpa*, *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna* and *linga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṅkhya system. As—“तमो वा इदमेकमात्रं, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणोरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद् रजसो रूपं.....सोऽशोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानलिङ्गः प्रजापतिः etc.” (*Maṭṭrāyaṇī*, Up. IV, 5), “पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते पञ्चमहाभूतानि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते etc. (*Ibid* III, 2), “पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्राः etc. (*Pr up* IV, 8) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṅkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *gunas* (Mbh. III, 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in *S'āntiparvan* (285, 33-40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* (S. S., p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—“मृजते हि गुणान् सत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञः परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ध्रुवः ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावमिदमवैतथ्यदिमान् मृजते गुणान् । ऊर्णानामिर्यथा सूत्रं विशेषास्तन्नुवद् गुणाः ॥ ३८ ॥ ”. We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṅkhya knowledge being called *Vaiśeṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pāṇḍasikha of Parāśara gotra, e. g., “यस्माच्चैतन्मया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा ” (*S'ānti*. 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṃkhya lays down a third kind of path, *viz.*, a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, *vide* my article, P. O. C., Lahore, 11, 1027 f).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāṃkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, —“ मांक्ष्यं मांक्ष्यकर्म चोभौ निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः । पञ्चतान्यर्थ-
जानानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागतः ।
कंचिदर्थमभिप्रत्य ना संख्येत्युपधार्यताम् ॥ ” (S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82). But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been mentioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṃkhya philosophy *e. g.*, (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6-10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Ahaṃ-kartā*, (15) *Sāmagrya*, (16) *Sanghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21-25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'ukra* and (30) *Bala* (S'ānti 320, 97-112). So it has been said —“ विंशति-
द्वैशचवं हि गुणाः संख्यानतः स्मृताः । समया यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥ ” (*ibid*, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṃkhya books. They are as given below :—

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahamkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “ connected with the senses (*aindriyaka*), ” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pāñcas'ikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṃkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṃkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or *Īśvara*. Even though the plurality of *puruṣas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (*vide*—“ब्रह्मनां पुरुषाणां स यथैका योनिरुच्यते,” S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṃkhya to Pāṇcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*—“यत्तदेकाक्षरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते । आसुरिर्मण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तदव्ययम् ॥” (S'ānti, 218, 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṃkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṃkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gītārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kāpila, the pioneer of Sāṃkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory, *e. g.* “सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः” (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṃkhya path without *karman* is only a synonym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *kṛtānta* as “कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परिसमाप्तिर्यत्र स कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतन् ॥” (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *gunasāṃkhyāna* (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *guṇas*, *viz.* *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṃkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṃkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2-8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13-15 ; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary, with the Mbh. (s. s, p. 52) there is a detailed description of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (XII. 24-52) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* (*ibid*, 105). But the word Sāṃkhya is not found

in it. Medhātithi, commenting on “आकाशात् विकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्ध वहः श्रुतिः । (1. 76), says—विकुर्वाणादहङ्कारादाकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus indicates the presence of Sāṅkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One of the stanzas (XX, 25) of this Smṛti very closely correspond with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda (S S. p. 52). In the S’ankha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five categories, but *Puruṣa* is identified with *Viṣṇu* (VII 21-25). Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṅkhya, e. g. बुदेरूपतिरव्यक्ताततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः । तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्कारादेकोत्तरगुणानि च ॥ ” (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṅkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to *Īśvara* (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out five stages of the evolution of Sāṅkhya doctrines.)

IV. Sāṅkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṅkhya teachers are met with in the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:—

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pāñcas’ikha, (4) Vindhyavāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsini, (5) Vārṣaganya, (6) Jaiṣavya, (7) Voḍhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra, (13) Bhṛgu, (14) S’ukra, (15) Kāś’yapa, (16) Parāś’ara, (17) Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25) Vālmiki and (26) S’uka.

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the S’v. Up. (5, 2) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage.* But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists (S. Y., 2, § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with *Agni* or *Viṣṇu* or *S'iva*, and is, therefore, another name for *Hiraṇyagarbha* (S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 339, 66-67; 342. 92-93). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamaṅgalā published by me (p. 3). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।" says :—

"(1) आदिविद्वान्=सर्गादावाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभूः, निर्माणचित्तं=योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमधिष्ठाय=स्वांशेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा कारुण्याजिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ (3) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतश्च । प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् । (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, I. 3. 11). इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतार-त्वोक्तेर्विष्णोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः । 'अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्र-प्रवर्तकः' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं' इति कपिलपदे-नापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव गृह्यते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं इत्यादिबहुपूर्वोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः ॥' (Ch. S. S. p. 62).

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an *asura* Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the *s'rāddha*, *vivāha*, *prāyasa*, *citta* ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'āṅkarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṅkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṅkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva taught the Sāṅkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Sāṅkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1.

p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3. 25. 1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūtī कपिलस्तत्त्वसंख्याता भगवानात्ममायया । जातः स्वयमजः साक्षा-दात्मप्रज्ञतये नृणाम् ॥ ”

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3). Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha-Bṛāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Mātharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pāñcas'ikha “तत्र पञ्चशिखो नाम कापिलेयो महामुनिः ।... आसुरेः प्रथमं शिष्यं etc.” (S'ānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz. “विविक्ते दृक्परिणतो बुद्धो भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Śaddars'anasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pāñcas'ikha

Pāñcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) “एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम्” [१. ४] । (आ) “आदि-विद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमपरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच” । [१. २५] । (इ) “तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्याऽस्मीत्येवं तावत्संप्रजानीते” [१. ३६] । (उ) “व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सर्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य सम्यग्दमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुज्ञोचत्यात्म-व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः” [२. ५] । (ऊ) “बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन ” [२. ६]
 (क) “स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः। कुशलस्य नापकर्षायाम्
 कस्मान्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं
 करिष्यति ” [२, १३] । (क) “रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण
 विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते ” [३. १३] । (ल)
 “ तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति ” [३. ४१.] ॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

B. S. Sū.—

(ए) “ आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः ” [५. ३२] । (ऐ) “ अविवेक-
 निमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [६. ६८] ”

C. S. S. B.—

(ओ) “ सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपान-
 न्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो
 दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् ”
 १. १२७] ।

D. Bhāmati.—

(औ) “ तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ” [ब्रह्म-
 सूत्र, २. २. १०] .

E. Gauḍa. (Kār. 1) and Māṭh. (Kār. 22)—

(क) “ पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः । जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि
 मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥ ”

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāgaṇes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana and by Haribhadrāsūri in S'āstravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Māṭharavṛtti). Bhāvāgaṇes'a was the disciple of Vijñānabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrāsūri is about 725 A.D.

century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Mātharavṛtti we find : “ यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासहानौ ” a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Śāṅkarācārya (i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanaga-sattari. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṁkhyikārikā, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsin and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣaganya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣaganya as about the former teachers of Sāṁkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) “ मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूल-पृथक्त्वं इति वार्षगण्यः । ” (III 53, (2) “ गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति । यत् दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥ ” (Ibid. IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Śaṣṭitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmātī with the remarks : “ अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्ष-गण्यः । ” (on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣaganya, “ पञ्चपर्वो अविद्या इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः । ” is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—“ पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते । ” found in the Gauḍ., and the Māth. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣaganya by Keith (S. S. 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Śaṣṭitantra to Pāñcasīkha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣaganya being the author of the Śaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-6; Hiriyanna: “ Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganya ”.

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pāṇas'ikha (S, S. 51). This Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtukatātparyatikā as the author of Dhāraṇās'āstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parās'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṃkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rṣitarpaṇa, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pāṇas'ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *pariśiṣṭas* of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Ch., 274). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* (*bhāva*, *abhāva*, *kāla*, *prthvī*, *āpas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa* and *tejas*); and *kāla* impelled by *bhāva* creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi* and the highest of all is *puruṣa*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांख्यज्ञानं विधीयते । तत्क्षये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्म-
भावे परां गतिम् ॥ (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṅkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Anandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, viz., Brhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayaviraśāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr S'āstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvṛtti : “ कपिलादामुरिणा प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्माद् भार्गव-बलूक-वाल्मीकि-द्वारित-देवद प्रभृतीनागतम् ”, (p. 84), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharavṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9-26. Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (S'ānti. 340, 67-69), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः । (S. Su VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛiti, in the Nīrnayasindhu and the Tristhalīsetu (H., Dh., I, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, S'ukra, Kāśyapa, Parāś'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛitis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parāś'ara and Janaka named the Parāś'ara gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Chs., 290-299), deals with the duties of the *varnas* and *ās'ramas* and has no vestige of Sāṃkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parāś'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāṃkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'ānti., 320-23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Is'varakṛiṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay Int p. 2. 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and S'uka as teachers of Sāṃkhya.

V. *Standard Works on Sāṃkhya*

A Available :—

Of the standard works on Sāṃkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāṃkhya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāṃkhya-Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्" (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV. 3; "वृत्तयः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः" (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the *sūtras* establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40-51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9). Moreover, the commentator on the *Sarvopakāriṇī*, a commentary on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of "Sāṃkhya-Sūtras" is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas'ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68-69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article "Antiquity of the Sāṃkhya Sūtras" (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several *sūtras* have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the *sūtras* 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th *sūtra* is literally the same as the 55th *sūtra*, and because the 53rd and 54th *sūtras* are identical with the 15th and 16th *sūtras*. And as we find the names of *Srughna* and *Pātaliputra* in these interpolated *sūtras*, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The *sūtras* 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 *sūtras* are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when S'āṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṃkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the *Sūtras* did not exist in their time. Had the S. sū., been existent, then S'āṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a *ṛṣi* and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkṛṣṇa

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. sū. His contention is :—

(1) “ प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पात्तिवर्मकं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् = कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किञ्चिदुपादेयम् ” (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48)—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from “ उपादाननियमात् ” (S. sū., I, 115). This very *sūtra* has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., *viz.*, “ यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् इति ”. Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after “ उपादाननियमात् ” in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) quoted above ? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only “ उपादाननियमात् ” but the whole passage, *viz.*,—“ प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नासत् उपादाननियमात्. ” Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāyas'cittādhyāya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the *sūtras* in S. sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—“ षडभिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनु-

पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादि-
न्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमाणादिति ॥” On this, Kaiyyata says in his gloss
Pradipa—इतरं विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-
पद्मभिरिति ।”—According to Kaiyyata, Patañjali here quotes
from some other work. It seems that he took this view from
“सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः” (S. Sū., I. 109) and “कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः”
(S. Sū., I. 110). Moreover, we find only five causes of non-
perception in the S. Sū., but in the Mahābhāṣya, there are six
causes of non-perception and in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, there
are eight. Therefore, the S. Sū. are the oldest of these
three. Moreover, the passage of Kaiyyata viz., “सदपि लिङ्गं
सूक्ष्मत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणाशक्यं ग्रहीतुं, तत्कृतकार्यदर्शनादनुमीयते ।” seems to be
based on the two sūtras quoted above.

In reply to Mr. Sāstri's arguments, the following may
be stated. In the first place, the word इति is not a necessary
and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author.
Here, the word इति denotes conclusion of his remarks. How
can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patañ-
jali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the
word इतर used by Kaiyyata, it is even admitted that Patañjali
quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove
that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most
probable that he borrowed the view from some other work.
(See H. I. P., I, 218-219). Again, there is nothing to oblige
Kaiyyata, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. I.,
p. 431), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed
from the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā. Moreover, the causes of non-per-
ception as given by Patañjali tally more with those in the
Sāṅkhya-Kārikā than in the S. Sū.

(4) The following sūtras agree verbatim with the Kārikās
(a) “हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सन्निकर्षमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्” (S. Sū., I. 124 =
Kār., 10). (b) “सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वृत्ताद्द्वारात्” (S. Sū., II.
18 = Kār., 25). (c) “सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाया वायवः पञ्च” (S. Sū.,
H. 31 = Kār. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

Avyāpi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word *pravartate* in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession.

The arguments of Mr. S'āstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word *avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Viṇṇānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. S'āstri says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाय वायवः पञ्च" and read it as "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायः पञ्च वायवः" we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'āstri has failed to disprove that the S. Sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557-569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175-178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhmitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāṃkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣaganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣaganya composed *Hiraṇyasaptati*. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of *Hiraṇyasaptati* and, Īśvarkṛṣṇa, the author of Sāṃkhya-Kārikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das Gupta also thinks Īśvarkṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two

different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īś'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp 328-334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya "Some Problems of Sāṃkhya Philosophy and Sāṃkhya Literature", J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519-520. According to Bhattacharya Īś'varakṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D.] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Svapneś'vara, identifying Īś'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken. (See I. P., II, 255, In.).

The work of Īś'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the *bhāṣya* of Gauḍapada running upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṃkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, "The Problem of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikās", I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177-181). He says— (1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "परवादविवर्जिताः" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply : In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase परवादविवर्जिताः means the exclusion of the expounding of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स अविशुद्धिद्वयतिशययुक्तः" would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas. (2) Īś'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own 'āryās'. Now in the Saṣṭi-tantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (viz., making one of Brahman, Puruṣa S'akti, Niyati, and Kāla, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this.

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent *S'akti*—To this we reply: *Is'varakṛṣṇa* has summarised the work of *Pañcas'ikha*. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is the work of *Pañcas'ikha*. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon *Is'varakṛṣṇa* to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. Unavailable

(1) *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding *Pañcas'ikha* or *Vārṣaganya* as the author of *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to *Ṣaṣṭitantra* in Jay.

(a) “तेषु च षष्टितन्त्रादिव्यातेष्विति । विस्तरत्वात् षष्टितन्त्रस्य संक्षिप्त-
रुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहार्थं सप्ततिकारम्भः ।” (p. 1). (b) “‘त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम्’
इति षष्टितन्त्रे व्याख्यातम् । पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोद्दिष्टमिति ।” (p. 7).
(c) “एतं षष्टि [:] पदार्थाः । तदर्थं शास्त्रं षष्टितन्त्रमुच्यते ।” (p. 56).
(d) “‘तेन’ इति । पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् । षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टि-
खण्डं कृतमिति । तत्रैव हि षष्टिरर्था व्याख्याताः ।” (p. 68). (e) “ननु च
षष्टितन्त्रमेवास्तु किं सप्तत्येति ।” (p. 69). (f) “अत्र षष्टितन्त्रे बहवोऽर्थाः
तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्याह ।” (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See—“*Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganya*”, J. O. R., April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112).—(a) *Ṣaṣṭitantra* has 60 parts, (b) its author is *Pañcas'ikha* and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called “*Ṣaṣṭitantra*”. *Vārṣaganya* is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।

यत्तु दृष्टिपथं यातं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmatī, *Vācaspati* alludes it to *Ṣaṣṭitantra* in Tatt. V., and to *Vārṣaganya* in Bhāmatī. On the basis of these two references, people have come to

the conclusion that Vārṣaganya is the author of Śaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmati is मायैव सुतुच्छकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., “कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतपठितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेः” (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Śaṣṭitantra is the real Sāṃkhya-dars'ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pāñcaś'ikha in his Śaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhatta-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṃhitā, quotes the verses (22-30) from Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark “तथाह, कपिलाचार्यः”. As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायैव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्षगण्यः. The opinion of Vārṣaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharma-kos'a (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kārya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣaganya altered मायेव into मायैव. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of *Saṣṭitantra* is still undecided.

(2) *Rājavārtika*. In the *Tatt. K.*, we find the following three verses from *Rājavārtika*—

“ प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
 पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
 शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।
 विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥
 करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
 इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ” ॥

The first verse is quoted also in the *Sarvopakāṇṇī* (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā* (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of *Rājavārtika*. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y. p. 7). These *maulikārthas* are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māth., *Sāṁkhya-tattva-vivecana* (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22), *Tattva-yāthārthya-dīpana* (ibid, p. 80) and *Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti* (ibid, p. 135).

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE SĀṂKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

Gaṅgānātha Jhā

The lucid writing of Vācaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this *resume* would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudī abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sāṁkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive—and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither—Productive—nor Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattvas,—Prakṛti or Nature being the purely *productive*, since the Sāṁkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The *Productive—and—produced* are the other Principles—Buddhi, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus Buddhi is *productive* in as much as out of it evolves Ahaṁkāra, and it is *produced* in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakṛti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely *non-productive* because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Puruṣa (Spirit) is *neither productive nor produced*. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Guṇas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful productive agent of the Sāṅkhya or more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, *i. e.* when the Adīṣṭa of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattva giving rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.

The three attributes—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituted that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

Here an objector comes forward and says—"How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting

properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe?"

The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;—e. g. the wick and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties—of 'happiness', 'unhappiness' and 'delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—Nature—must be imbued with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Guṇas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakṛti, Nature—the Key-stone of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakṛti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic "Māyā"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and It is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni-

verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Guṇas. In short, Prakṛti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) imbued with the three Attributes and evolving through these, every kind of entity—save the *Puruṣa*, Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sāṅkhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternity of this Prakṛti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *causality*, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the *effect*. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is a nonentity can never be made an entity. —That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity :

for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.

Thirdly.—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists

Fourthly.—The effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g., a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify?"

If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing.... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause "

—*Lectures on Metaphysics*—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṃkhyas employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakṛti, Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahamkāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sāṃkhyas give the names "Pradhāna," "Prakṛti", "Avyakta." (Nature).

Secondly, we find that all entities—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakṛti.

Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Sāṃkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference.

In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakṛti. These are *caused*, and as a necessary consequence of this—*transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent* (on the activity of the Prakṛti), *made up of parts*; these are the characteristics where the Prakṛti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakṛti is the *uncaused* root of the Universe, and as such, must be *eternal*. And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be *all-pervading*; as a necessary consequence of this it is *immoveable* i. e., it cannot *move*, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be *one*. It is *independent*—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Guṇas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that Prakṛti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the various actions and interactions of the three Guṇas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such *common*. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common object of observation by all, and it is *common* in that sense. Fifthly, they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, i. e., endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakṛti on one hand and its Products on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the *Spirits* and see what the Sāṅkhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence, sentience. Intelligence cannot belong to the *Buddhi*, the Cosmic Mind, for it is material, being the product of *Prakṛti* which is essentially insentient and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct *Principle of Sentience*.

Secondly.—We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from *Prakṛti* downwards are *composites*. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards *Prakṛti*, *Buddhi* and *Ahaṁkāra*, yet we must not forget that the body of these apparently immaterial entities is made up of the three *Guṇas* which are as material as anything. Such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is *Puruṣa*, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be *composite* because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the *Guṇas* that is found to be *composite*.

Thirdly.—We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from *Prakṛti* downwards are made up of the three *Guṇas*, and as such necessarily affected by pleasure, pain and delusion; so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape *a regressus ad infinitum* this supervisor must be himself unaffected in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above *Prakṛti*. And this is *Puruṣa*, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakṛti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an *enjoyer* who again must not be an *object* himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the *enjoyer*. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest.—These latter being made up as they are of the three Guṇas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the *enjoyer* of these ; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory action—one “made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained ; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakṛti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakṛti or Buddhi. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Puruṣa, over and above Prakṛti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Puruṣa?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Puruṣa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the *mind*. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

it is the necessary factor in all these. It is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as material. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially *consciousness*. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated: it is *free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive*. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become purposeless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain, etc.,—which in reality do not touch him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Puruṣa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Puruṣa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakṛti and Puruṣa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakṛti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakṛti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of *Mahat* or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceeds *Ahaṃkāra* or the I-principle. From this again emanate the eleven, senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour, taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa. First in this scale comes *Buddhi*. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasāya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to *will*. But the Sāṃkhya *Buddhi* is not mere *will*. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Sāṃkhyas attribute both these functions

to their *Buddhi*. That *Buddhi* resembles *will*, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sāṃkhya. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already, *will* decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that *wisdom* is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to *Buddhi* is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find *Buddhi* cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined. We have, therefore, called it the *Cosmic Mind*.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism, the I-principle. It is the principle to which all notions of the 'I' are due. It corresponds with Kant's "*apperception*" and Hamilton's "self-consciousness;" that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "*I have the consciousness,*" "*I feel, etc.*" As immediate effects of this I-principle we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) *viz.*—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is *Manas*, (individual mind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and *Ākāśa*; and these have the subtle rudimentary elements for their essential properties.

Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the *mind* or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call *mind* a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

to seek. The Sāṃkhyas define *sense* as the immediate effect of the I-principle under the influence of the Sattva Attribute ; and this differentia we find in Mind as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as *senses*. What are the functions of this eleventh sense? *Manas*, mind, is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may, for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in *Sāṃkhya* “reflection” . When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विकल्प). This indefinite and vague impression is soon rendered definite, and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the “reflection” of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of eagerness for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the functioning of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—experience and subsequent discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Puruṣa, Spirit. If there were no functioning of the different emana-

tions of Prakṛti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between himself and the inanimate Prakṛti. The only impetus from without is thus supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own inherent eagerness.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhi, Ahamkāra and Manas, and the ten external—the ordinary ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones operate only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of substances, and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—*viz.*, the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakṛti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.

Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the 'Great' substances. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and the third are fading and transient.

This "subtle body" of the Sāṃkhyas is born before the visible body and lasts till dissolution; and till then it remains the 'body' of the Spirit in all its incarnations during

that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Linga-S'arīra", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtle counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga-S'arīra is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit ;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtle in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtle substratum.

Let us now see how the Sāṃkhya treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions; Vice leads the other way; Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thralldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

from the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed sentience. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If, on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stinging darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sāṃkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddha: dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of *impediments*, twenty-eight of *incapacity* (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of *contentment* and eight of *perfection*. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.

So much for '*mental*' creation. The '*material*' creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scene like an actress who has

played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

तत्त्वकौमुदी.

(सांख्य.)

(१) मङ्गलाचरणम् ॥

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः ।
अजा ये तां जुषमाणां भजन्ते जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥
कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये ।
पञ्चशिखाय तथेश्वरकृष्णायैतान्नमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिताऽवधेयवचनो
भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं तु प्रतिपाद-
(२) शास्त्रविषयक- यन् ' नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ' इति प्रेक्षाव-
जिज्ञासावतरणम् ॥ द्विरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्षयेत । स चैषां प्रतिपित्सितोऽर्थो यो
ज्ञातः सन् परमपुरुषार्थाय कल्पते । इति प्रारिप्सित-
शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति-

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।

दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

“ दुःख-” इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम
जगति न स्यात्, सद्वा न जिहासितम्, जिहासितं

(३) शास्त्रविषयक- वा अशक्यसमुच्छेदम् । (अशक्यसमुच्छेदता च द्वेधा,
जिज्ञासाया आवश्यक- दुःखस्य नित्यत्वात्, तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा) ।
कत्वशङ्का ॥ शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानु-
पायभूतत्वाद्वा, सुकरस्योपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा ॥

त. कौ. १

तत्र न तावद्दुःखज्ञास्ति नाप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तम् — “दुःखत्रयाभिघातात्”

इति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् । तत् खलु आध्या-

(४) त्रयाणां दुःखानां त्मिकम्, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राध्या-
व्युत्पादनम्, तदस्ति- त्मिकम् द्विविधम्, शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं वात-
साधनं च ॥ पित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम्, मानसं कामक्रोधलोभ-

मोहभयेर्ष्याविषादविषयविशेषादर्शननिबन्धनम् । सर्व-

ञ्चेतदान्तरिकोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखम् । बाह्योपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा,

आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुमृगपक्षिसरी-
सृपस्थावरनिमित्तम्, आधिदैविकं तु यक्षराक्षसविनायकप्रहाद्यावेशनिबन्ध-

नम् । तदेतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्या-

तुम् । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना चेतनाशक्तेः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया

ऽभिसम्बन्धोऽभिघात इति । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः ।

यद्यपि न सन्निरुध्यते दुःखम्, तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्ठादु-

पपादयिष्यते । तस्मादुपपन्नम्, “ तदपघातके हेतौ ” इति । तस्य दुःखत्र-

यस्य अपघातकः तदपघातकः^१ । उपसर्जनस्यापि^२ बुद्ध्या सन्निकृष्टस्य

‘ तदा^३ ’ परामर्शः । अपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यो, नान्य इत्याशयः ॥

अत्र शङ्कते— “ दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत् ” इति । अयमर्थः । अस्तु तर्हि

दुःखत्रयम्, जिहासितं च तद्भवतु, भवतु च तच्छ-

(५) सुकरस्य दृष्टस्यो- क्यहानम्, सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायस्तदुच्छेत्तुम् ।

पायस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्रविष- तथाऽप्यत्र प्रेक्षावतां जिज्ञासा न युक्ता, दृष्टस्यैवो-

यकजिज्ञासाया वैय्य- पायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुकरस्य विद्यमानत्वात्,

र्थ्यापत्तिः ॥ तत्त्वज्ञानस्य तु अनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायास-

साध्यतयाऽतिदुष्करत्वात् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाणकः,

‘ अत्के^४ चेन्मधु विन्देत् किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।

इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ’ इति ।

१. अनागतसूक्ष्मदुःखनिवृत्तौ तात्पर्यमिति केचित् । २. समासगौणावयवस्य ।

३. समासस्थतत्पदेन । ४. ‘ अत ’ सातत्यगमने-इत्यस्माद्वातोर्निष्पन्नोऽयं शब्दः-

अतोऽस्य स्वरूपम् ‘ अत्क ’ इति । अर्थश्चास्य ‘ यस्मिन्स्थाने सततं गच्छन्ति
लोका ’ इति ।

सन्ति चोपायाः शतशः शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेषत्करा भिषजां वैरूपदिष्टाः । मानसस्यापि सन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः । एवमाधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीति-शास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः । तथा ऽऽधिदैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौषधाद्युपयोगः सुकरः प्रतिकारोपाय इति ॥

निराकरोति—“ न ” इति । कुतः ? “ एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ” ।

“ एकान्तो ” दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भावः; “ अत्यन्तो ”

(६) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिरा- निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्त-करणम्—परिगणितो- योरभावः “ एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावः ” । षष्ठीस्थाने पायेभ्य आत्यन्तिकै- सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिः । एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधि रसा-कान्तिकदुःखनिवृत्ते- यनादिकामिनीनीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपाययोगेऽपि रदर्शनम् ॥ तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनात्

अनैकान्तिकत्वम्, निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अनात्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति नाऽपार्था जिज्ञासेत्यर्थः ॥

यद्यपि दुःखममङ्गलम्, तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थत्वेन

(७) दुःखापघातकीर्त- तदपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तन- नम् मङ्गलमेव ॥ मिति ॥ १ ॥

(८) वैदिकस्य दुःखाप- र्स्यादेतत् । मा भूद्दृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योति-कषातकस्य सुकरस्य सत्त्वे- ष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्त- कर्मकलापस्तापत्रयमे-शास्त्रविषयजिज्ञासायाः कान्तमत्यन्तञ्चापनेष्यति । श्रुतिश्च, “ स्वर्गकामो पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः ॥ यजेत ” इति । स्वर्गश्च—

“ यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम् ” इति ।

१. एतत् (वक्ष्यमाणम्, आशङ्कितम्) स्यात्—इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः । अथवा- एतत् (भवतोक्तम्) स्यात् (भवतु), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्काकृदुक्तिः । उभ-यथाऽपि युज्यते ।

दुःखविरोधी सुखविशेषश्च स्वर्गः । स च स्वशक्त्या समूलघातमपहन्ति दुः-
खम् । न चैष क्षयी । तथा हि श्रूयते—“अपाम सोमममृता अभूम” इति [अथर्व-
शिरस् ३] । तत्क्षये कुतोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः ? तस्माद्वैदिकस्योपायस्य तापत्रय-
प्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रमाससंवत्सरनिर्वर्तनीयस्यानेकजन्मपरम्पराया-
ससम्पादनीयात् विवेकज्ञानात् ईषत्करत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याश-
ङ्क्याह—

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

“ दृष्ट—” इति । गुरुपाठादनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवो वेदः । एतदुक्तं भवति-

‘ श्रूयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत ’ इति । तत्र भव आनु-
(९) वैदिकानाम- श्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्नो ज्ञात इति यावत् । आनुश्रविको-
प्युपायानां दृष्टोपा- ऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकात्य-
यैस्सह तुल्यत्वम् ॥ न्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् ।

यद्यपि च “आनुश्रविक” इति सामान्याभिधानं, तथापि
कर्मकलापाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्, विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुश्रविकत्वात् । तथा च
श्रूयते— “ आत्मा वा ऽरे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेक्तव्यः ” [बृहदारण्यक,
२।४।५], “ न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते ” [छान्दोग्य ८।१५] इति ॥

अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह— “ स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ” इति ।

“ अविशुद्धिः ” सोमादियागस्य पशुबीजादिवधसाध-
(१०) दृष्टवैदिकयो- नर्ता । यथाऽऽह स्म भगवान्, पञ्चशिखाचार्यः—“ स्व-
रूपाययोः अविशु- ल्पसङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः ” इति । ‘ स्व-
द्विक्षयातिशययुक्त- ल्पसङ्करो ’ ज्योतिष्टोमादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्वस्य
त्वम् तुल्यम् ॥ स्वल्पेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना ऽनर्थहेतुनाऽपूर्वेण सङ्करः ।

‘ सपरिहारः, ’ कियताऽपि प्रायश्चित्तेन परिहर्तुं शक्यः । अथ च प्रमादतः
प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकसमये स पच्यते । तथाऽपि
यावदसावनर्थं सूते तावत् प्रत्यवमर्षेण (सहिष्णुतया) सह वर्तते इति

“सप्रत्यमवर्षः” । मृत्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहाहदावगाहिनः
कुशलाः पापमात्रोपसादितां दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ॥

न च— “मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि” इति सामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण
“अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत” इत्यनेन बाध्यत—

(११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया इति युक्तम्, विरोधाभावात् । विरोधे हि बलीयसा
अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वासाधनम् ॥ दुर्बलं बाध्यते । न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, भिन्नविष-
यत्वात् । तथा हि—“ मा हिंस्यात् ” इति निषेधेन
हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो ज्ञाप्यते, न त्वक्तृत्वैवमपि, “अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमाल-
भेत” इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिंसायाः कृत्वर्थत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः,
तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात् । न चानर्थहेतुत्वकृतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चि-
द्विरोधोऽस्ति । हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावक्ष्यति, क्रतोश्चोपकरिष्यतीति ॥

क्षयातिशयौ च फलगतावप्युपाय उपचरितौ । क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे
(१२) वैदिकोपायस्य सति कार्यत्वादनुमितम् । ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रस्य
सातिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ साधनम्, चाजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्त-
त्वम् । परसम्पदुत्कर्षो हि हीनसम्पदं पुरुषं दुःखा-
करोति ॥

“अपाम सोमममृता अभूम” इति चामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुप-
लक्षयति । यदाहुः— “आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं
(१३) अमृतत्वश्रुति- हि भाष्यते” इति (त्रिष्णुपुराणे) ॥ अत एव च श्रुतिः—
विरोधपरिहारः-अमृत- “ न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमा-
त्वस्य चिरस्थेन उप- नशुः । परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतथो
लक्षकत्वात् ॥ विशान्ति ” इति [महानारायण १०।५] । तथा
“ कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमानाः । तथा परे
ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वमानशुः ” इति च ॥

१. विषेयद्वयापत्तेः । हिंसा यागसाधिका अनर्थशून्या चेति वाक्यभेदः ।

तदेतत् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—“तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्”
इति । तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकोपायात्
(१४) लौकिकवैदिको- सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात्)
पायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञा- विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिंसादिसङ्कराभावात्, नित्यनिर-
नस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः । न च
कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य
तथाभावात्, दुःखप्रध्वंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्वैपरीत्यात् । न च दुःखा-
न्तरोत्पादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्त-
त्वाच्च कारणप्रवृत्तेः । एतच्चोपरिष्ठादुपपादयिष्यते ॥

अक्षरार्थस्तु-तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हेतोः) विपरीतः
(सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो) दुःखापघा-
(१५) “तद्विपरीतः तको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान् । आनुश्रविको हि वेद-
श्रेयान्” इत्यस्याक्षरार्थः ॥ विहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशस्यः ।
सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशस्यः । तदनयोः प्रश-
स्ययोर्मध्ये सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान् ॥

कुतः पुनरस्योत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—“व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्” इति ।
व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां
(१६) शास्त्रविषयस्य विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम् ।
दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञा- व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्कारणस्य ज्ञानम् । तयोश्च
नस्योत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनम् ॥ पारार्थ्येनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधा-
नम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो
व्यक्तादीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्वा, शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य दीर्घकालादरनैरन्तर्य-
सत्कारसेवितात् भावनामयात् विज्ञानादिति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

१ अनित्यत्वात् । २ अभावरूपत्वात् । ३ (६६) कारिकायाम् । ४
व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन । व्यक्ताव्यक्ते अचेतने कस्यचिच्चेतनस्यार्थाय वर्तेते
स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमेण ।

“ एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासाच्चास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ” इति [कारिका, ६४] ॥ २ ॥

(१७) शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपः— तदेवं प्रेक्षावदपेक्षितार्थत्वेन शास्त्रारम्भं समाधाय प्रकृति-प्रकृतिविकृति- शास्त्रमारभमाणः श्रोतृबुद्धिसमवधानाय तदर्थं संक्षे- विकृत्यनुभयरूपक्रमेण ॥ पतः प्रतिजानीते—

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

“मूल—” इति । संक्षेपतो हि शास्त्रार्थस्य चतस्रो विधाः । कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिदर्थो विकृतिरेव, कश्चित्प्रकृतिविकृतिः, कश्चिदनुभयरूपः ।

तत्र का प्रकृतिरित्युक्तम्— “मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः” इति । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः

(१८) प्रकृतिकथनम् ॥ प्रधानम्, सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था, सा अवि- कृतिः, प्रकृतिरेवेत्यर्थः । कुत इत्युक्तम्— “मूलेति” मूल- ङ्चासौ प्रकृतिश्चेति मूलप्रकृतिः । विश्वस्य कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम्, न त्वस्या मूलान्तरमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न चानवस्थायां प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः ॥

कतमाः पुनः प्रकृतिविकृतयः, कियत्यश्चेत्यत उक्तम्— “महदाद्याः प्रकृति- (१९) प्रकृतिविकृति- विकृतयः सप्त ” इति । प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च ता इति कथनम् ॥

“ प्रकृतिविकृतयः ”, सप्त । तथा हि महत्तत्त्वम् अह- ङ्कारस्य प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतेः । एवमहङ्कारतत्त्वं तन्मात्राणामिन्द्रि- याणां च प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च महतः । एवं पञ्चतन्मात्राणि तत्त्वानि भूताना- माकाशादीनां प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥

अथ का विकृतिरेव, कियती चेत्यत उक्तम्— “षोडशकस्तु विकारः” इति ।

षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । ‘ तु ’ शब्दो

(२०) विकृतिकथनम् ॥ उवधारणे भिन्नक्रमः—पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रि- याणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, न प्रकृतिरिति ।

यद्यपि पृथिव्यादीनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाराः, एवन्तद्विकारभेदानां पयो- बीजादीनां दृश्यङ्कुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादि-

भ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ॥

अनुभयरूपमाह—“ न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ” इति । एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्ठा-
(२१) अनुभयरूपकथनम् ॥ दुपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमभिमताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः । न च
(२२) प्रमाणसामा- सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम् ।
न्यलक्षणम् ॥ इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति—

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।

त्रिविधम्प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

“ प्रमाणमिष्टम् ” इति । अत्र—च ‘प्रमाणम्’ इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम् ।
तन्निर्वचनं च लक्षणम् । प्रमीयते ऽनेनेति निर्वचनात्
(२३) प्रमाणपदस्य— प्रमां प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते । तच्चासन्दिग्धाविपरीता-
निर्वचनम् ॥ नधिगतविषया चित्तवृत्तिः । बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलम्
प्रमा, तत्साधनम् प्रमाणमिति । एतेन संशयविपर्य-
यस्मृतिसाधनेष्वप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति— “ त्रिविधम् ” इति । तिस्रो विधा
यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनम्,
(२४) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥ नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणानन्तरञ्चैतदुपपाद-
यिष्यामः ॥

कतमाः पुनस्तास्तिस्रो विधा इत्यत आह—“ दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम् ”
(२५) प्रमाणत्रय- इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणाभिप्रायम्, लोकव्युत्पादना-
परिगणनम् ॥ र्थत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवान्नाधिकारात् । आर्षं तु विज्ञानं
योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां न लोकव्युत्पादनायालमिति सदपि
नाभिहितम्, अनाधिकारात् ॥

१ नैयायिकानामनुव्यवसायः—घटज्ञाने ‘ घटमहं जानामीति ’ —पुरुषगतः ।

स्यादेतत्—मा भून्यूनम्, अधिकं तु कस्मान्न भवति ? सङ्गिरन्ते हि प्रति-
 वादिन उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत आह—
 (२६) प्रमाण- “सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ” इति । एष्वेव दृष्टानुमानास-
 संख्याऽऽधिक्यशङ्का, वचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात्, अन्तर्भावा-
 तत्परिहारश्च ॥ दित्यर्थः । एतच्चोपपादयिष्यत इत्युक्तम् ॥

अथ प्रमेयव्युत्पादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च-
 (२७) प्रमेयवर्ण- लक्षयति ? इत्यत आह— “प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि”
 नात् प्रागेव प्रमाण- इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥
 निर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

(२८) कारिका- सेयमार्याऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादृत्यैव व्या-
 पाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥ ख्याता ॥ ४ ॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधी-
 (२९) प्रमाणानां नत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च,
 विशेषलक्षणम् ॥ तदेव तावल्लक्षयति—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।

तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

“प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् ” इति । अत्र “ दृष्टम् ” इति लक्ष्यनि-
 र्देशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः ॥

अवयवार्थस्तु—त्रिविधवन्ति, विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं
 कुर्वन्तीति यावत् = “विषयाः,” पृथिव्यादयः सुखा-
 (३०) प्रत्यक्ष- दयश्चास्मदादीनाम् अविषयाः तन्मात्रलक्षणाः योगिना-
 लक्षणावयवार्थः ॥ मूर्ध्वस्तोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते
 इति प्रतिविषयम् = इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च सान्निर्कर्षः ।

अर्थसंज्ञिकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः ।
 अध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्तौ

सत्याम्, बुद्धेस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्रेकः सोऽध्यवसाय^१ इति ।
वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चाख्यायते । इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्ते-
रनुग्रहस्तत्फलं प्रमाबोधः ॥

बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनो,
घटादिवत् । एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयोऽपि परिणाम-
(३१) ज्ञानानाम- भेदा अचेतनाः । पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्यननुषङ्गी चेतनः ।
चेतनत्वम् ॥ सोऽयं बुद्धितत्त्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रति-
बिम्बितस्तच्छायापत्या ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीति-
चेतनोऽनुगृह्यते । चित्तिच्छायापत्याऽचेतनाऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायोऽप्यचेत-
नश्चेतनवद्भवतीति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

“ तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ ” इति [कारिका, २०].

अन्नाध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिनत्ति, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेना-
निश्चितरूपत्वात् । निश्चयोऽध्यवसाय इति चानर्थान्तरम् । विषय-
(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणा- ग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विपर्ययमपाकरोति । प्रतिग्रहणेन
न्तर्गतानां शब्दानां चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता
व्यावृत्तिः ॥ भवन्ति ॥

तदेवं समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् “ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय ” इति
(३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम् । तन्त्रान्तरेषु लक्षणान्तराणि
पर्यवसितं लक्षणम् ॥ तैर्थिकानां न भूषितानि, न दूषितानि, विस्तरभयादिति ॥

नानुमानम्प्रमाणमिति वदता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपक्षः सन्दिग्धो विपर्यस्तो
(३४) अनुमानस्य वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपद्येत ? न च पुरुषान्तरगत
प्रमाणत्वसाधनम् ॥ अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्या अर्यागदृशा प्रत्यक्षेण
प्रतिपत्तुम् । नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, अनभ्युपगमात् ।

अनवधृताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु यं कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानोऽनवधेयवचनतया

प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्षेत । तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरुषवर्तिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदा-
द्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम् । तत्रापि
(३५) अनुमानस्य सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्यं
सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ तावलक्षयति— “ तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् ” इति ।
लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम् । लिङ्गि व्यापकम् । शङ्कितसमारोपि-
तोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम्, येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्व्यापकम् ।
लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति । धूमादिव्याप्यो
वह्न्यादिव्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकः । लिङ्गग्रहणं चावर्तनीयम् । तेन
च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि दर्शितम्भवति । तद्व्याप्यव्यापकभाव-
पक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥

अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान् स्मारयति — “ त्रिवि-
(३६) अनुमानस्य धमनुमानमाख्यातम् ” इति । तत् सामान्यतो
विशेषलक्षम् त्रैविध्यम् नुलक्षितमनुमानं विशेषतस्त्रिविधं, पूर्ववत्-शेषवत्-
पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्चेति ॥
दृष्टभेदात्

तत्र प्रथमं तावत् द्विविधम्—वीतमवीतं च । अन्वयमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं
(३७) वीतावीतरूपेणा- विधायकं वीतम्, व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेध-
नुमानस्य द्वैविध्यम् ॥ कमवीतम् ॥

तत्रावीतं शेषवत् । शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्या-
(३८) अवीतनि- स्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत् । यदाहुः—“ प्रसक्त-
रूपणम् प्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः
परिशेष ” इति [वात्स्यायन-न्यायभाष्य १. १. ५.]—
अस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रे ऽभिधास्यते ॥

१. एकेन विभागप्रकारेण अनुमानम् द्विविधमिति भावः । २. अत्राहू राघवा-
नन्दतीर्थाः—“सतां सम्प्रतिमाह यथाहुरिति-गुणत्वात् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति
प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम्, अपाकजविशेषगुणत्वात्, तद्विशेषगुणेन
गन्धेन च सहावृत्तित्वात् । एवं निषेधे कृते आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्पाद्यष्टवप्रसङ्गात्,
शिष्यमाणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्यक्प्रत्ययः ” - इति ॥

वीतं द्वेधा-पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं
यत्तत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति
(३९) वीतनिरूपणम् यावत्, तदस्य विषयत्वेनास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्व-
—तद्द्वैविध्यम् ॥ वत् । यथा धूमाद्वह्निवत्सामान्यविशेषः पर्वतेऽनुमी-
यते, तस्य वह्निवत्सामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं

वह्निविशेषो दृष्टो रसवत्याम् । अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वल-
क्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानानां
क्रियात्वेन करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणत्वसामान्यस्य छिदादौ वास्यादि
स्वलक्षणमुपलब्धम्, तथाऽपि यज्जातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणत्वमनुमीयते
तज्जातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम्,
न चेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रत्यक्षगोचरोऽर्वाङ्गदृशम्,
यथा वह्निवत्सामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निः । सोऽयं पूर्ववतः सामान्यतो दृष्टात्
सत्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः । अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम्, सामान्यत इति
सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य
दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्य-
टीकायां व्युत्पादितमिति नेहोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥

प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकत्वा-
(४०) शब्दप्रमाण- च्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानसहकारि-
लक्षणम् ॥ णश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमा-
नानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति— “ आसश्रुतिरासवचनं तु ”

इति । आसवचनमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आसा प्राप्ता युक्तेति
यावत् । आसा चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति ‘ आसश्रुतिः ’ । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थ-
ज्ञानम् ॥

तच्च स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषाशङ्कावि-
(४१) तस्य स्वतः- निर्मुक्तैर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतीतिहासपुराण-
प्रामाण्यम् ॥ १ वाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं युक्तं भवति ॥

१. दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं यस्य सामान्यस्य-तत् सामान्यं विषयो यस्येति विग्रहः ।

आदिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्पदौ कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुस-

(४२) कपिलस्य पूर्व- प्रबुद्धस्येव पूर्वद्युरवगतानामर्थानामपरेद्युः । तथा
जन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम्। चावट्यजगीषव्यसंवादे भगवान् जैगीषव्यो दश-
महाकल्पवर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच “ दशसु
महाकल्पेषु विपरिवर्तमानेन मया ” इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥

आप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यभिक्षुनिर्ग्रन्थकसंसारमोचकादीनामागमाभासाः
(४३) आगमाभास- परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानात्
निरूपणम् विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात्प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च कैश्चिदेव
म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बो-
द्धव्यम् ।

‘ तु ’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छिनत्ति । वाक्यार्थो हि भ्रमेयो, न तु तद्धर्मो
(४४) आप्तश्रुतेरनु- वाक्यम्, येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत् । न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं
मानाद्यवच्छेदः ॥ बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य
वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकत्वादिति ॥

१. अत्राहुर्भारतीयत्यादयः—“कथं ‘तु’ शब्देनानुमानाद्यवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्ये-
त्यत आह—‘वाक्यार्थोहि’ इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता
कथमनुमानाद् व्यवच्छेदः स्यात्, शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात्, यथा धूमेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी
वह्निर्ज्ञायते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्गयनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्क्याह—“न तु
तद्धर्म” इति । धूमस्य वह्निधर्मत्वात् तल्लिङ्गत्वम्, न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम्, येन
तल्लिङ्गं वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत् । ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्धर्मधर्मि-
भावो नास्ति, तथाऽपि यथा धूमोऽग्निना सम्बन्धिना सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव
तद्गमकः, तथा वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घटकुट्या-
मेव प्रभात इति चेत्तत्राह—‘न च’ इति । औत्पत्तिकसूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोर्नित्य-
सम्बन्धे साधितेऽपि शब्दस्यैव वृद्धव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैवबोधकत्वात्,
पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात् वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थ-
सप्रत्ययो हि वाक्यार्थः” इति । यदि वाक्यार्थज्ञानेऽनुमानं स्यात् तर्हि वाक्य-

(४५) शास्त्रान्तरोक्त- एवं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विशेषलक्षणेषु च सत्सु, प्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तेष्व- यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिरभ्यु- न्तर्भावः ॥ पेयन्ते तान्युक्तलक्षणेऽप्येव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥

तथा हि-उपमानं तावद्यथा गोस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यम् । तज्जनिता धीरा-

(४६) उपमानस्य गम एव । योऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक इति प्रत्ययः, सोऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते, सोऽसति वृत्त्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, यथा गोशब्दो गोत्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो

गोसदृशो, इति तस्यैव वाचक, इति तत् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसन्निकृष्टस्य गोसादृश्यज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । न त्वन्यद्वि सादृश्यमन्यच्च गवये । भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगो हि जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादृश्यमुच्यते । सामान्य-योगश्चैकः । स चेद्वयवे प्रत्यक्षो, गवयपि तथेति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानं भवेत्, इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

वाक्यार्थयोर्व्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धोऽपेक्षितः स्यात् । न च तथा । तथाहि वाक्यं प्रमाणं वाक्यार्थः प्रमेयः । एवं च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मो न भवति-यथा भवति धूमो वह्नेर्धर्मः । अतो वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगं न भवतीत्याशयः ।

शाब्दज्ञानं येऽनुमानेऽन्तर्भावयन्ति तेषां मते-यथा व्याप्तिज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानं तथैव शब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकं शाब्दं ज्ञानम् । तत्र चेत्तमनुमानस्वरूपम्-यत्र यत्र घटमानयेति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तत्र तत्र घटानयनं बोध्यते-यथा मम बाल्यावस्थाया-मुच्चरितोक्तशब्दः-अधुनाऽपि स एव शब्दः प्रयुज्यते-तस्मादधुनापि घटानयनमेव बोध्यत इति ॥ अस्यैव मतस्य परिहारोऽत्र ग्रन्थे प्रदर्श्यते न च वाक्यमित्यादिना । व्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धज्ञानं विनाऽनुमानं नैव प्रसरति । शाब्दज्ञाने त्वेव विधिशब्दार्थ-सम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं न सार्वत्रिकम्-अभिनवकविरचितवाक्यस्या-श्रुतपूर्वत्वात्तत्र तादृशसम्बन्धज्ञानस्यासम्भवः । तथा च सति पूर्वपक्षिमतेन तत्र शाब्दज्ञानं नैवस्यादिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

एवमर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणान्तरम् । तथा हि—जीवतश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन
(४७) अर्थापत्ते- बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरभिमतता वृद्धा-
नुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः ॥ नाम् । सा ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यदा खल्वव्यापकः सङ्केतः
नास्ति तदा ऽन्यत्रास्ति । यदा ऽव्यापक एकत्रास्ति तदा-
ऽन्यत्र नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च सतो गृहाभावदर्शनेन
लिङ्गेन बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव । न च चैत्रस्य क्वचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः
शक्योऽपह्नोतुम्, येनासिद्धो गृहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च
गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्नयते, येन सत्त्वमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न बहिरव-
स्थापयेत् । तथा हि—चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरुध्यते, गृहसत्त्वं वा ?
न तावद्यत्र कचन सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गृहासत्त्वेन, भिन्नविषयत्वात् । “देश-
सामान्येन^१ गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक इति समानविषयतया विरोध” इति
चेत्, न, प्रमाणविनिश्चितस्य गृहे ऽसत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृहसत्त्वेन
प्रतिक्षेपायोगात् । नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितो गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य गृहसत्त्वं
प्रतिक्षेपन् सत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेपन्तुं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यपनेतुमर्हतीति युक्तम् ।

१. “देशसामान्यप्रविष्टग्रहविशेषमादाय समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते ”
इति राघवानन्दाः । सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिस्साधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तं विशेषगृहासत्त्वेन
विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भवः । क्वचिदस्तीति कथनेन स्थलविशेषविनिगमनाविरहात्
गृहाभावोऽपि बाध्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदेऽन्तर्भावात्, अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध
इति हृदयम् ।

“ देशसामान्येनेति ” सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया
उच्चैस्तरत्वज्ञानेन स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन चैत्रे संशये
गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहाभावज्ञानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोर्ज्ञानं न
सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । शब्दार्थस्तु “ देशसामान्येन ” देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, “ गृह-
विशेषाक्षेपः ” गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, “ पाक्षिकः ” संशयविषयः, “ समानविषय-
तया ” गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नतया, “ विरोधः ” एकसत्त्वे ऽपरा-
सत्त्वनियमः ।

“ प्रमाणेति ” प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकानिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया
संशयस्य न विरोधितेत्यभिसन्धिः, अक्षरार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ।

१६ अभावसम्भवयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरन्तर्भावः । [सौ. त.

गृहावच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसत्त्वं विरुद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सत्त्व-
मात्रम्, तस्य तत्रौदासीन्यात् । तस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहि-
र्भावोऽनुमीयत इति युक्तम् । एतेन 'विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोर्विषयव्यवस्थया-
ऽविरोधापादनमर्थापत्तेर्विषय' इति निरस्तम्, अवच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधा-
भावात् । उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमानेऽन्तर्भावनीयानि ।
तस्मान्नानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमर्थापत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ॥

एवमभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षमेव । न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविशेषात् कैवल्य-
लक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम । प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि
(४८) अभावस्य सर्व एक भावाः, ऋते चितिशक्तेः । स च परिणाम-
प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ भेद ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानवच्छिन्नो विषयो
यत्राभावाह्वयं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति ॥

सम्भवस्तु, यथा-खायां द्रोणाढकप्रस्थाद्यवगमः । स चानुमानमेव ।
(४९) सम्भवस्यानु- खारीत्वं हि द्रोणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतम् खायां द्रोणा-
मानेऽन्तर्भावः ॥ दिसत्त्वमवगमयति ॥

यच्चानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यमात्रम्- ' इति होचुर्बुद्धाः, ' -इत्यै-
तिह्यम्, यथा ' इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति ' इति,
(५०) ऐतिह्यस्य न तत् प्रमाणान्तरम्, अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांश-
प्रमाणत्वाभावः ॥ यिकत्वात् । आसवक्तृकत्वनिश्चये स्वागम एव ।
इत्युपपन्नम् " त्रिविधम्प्रमाणम् " इति ॥ ५ ॥

एवं तावद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञलक्षणप्रमेयसिद्धयर्थं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र व्यक्तं
पृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पांसुलपादको हालिकोऽपि प्रत्य-
(५१) प्रमाणानां क्षतः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववता चानुमानेन घूमादिदर्शनात्
शक्तिनिर्णयः ॥ बह्वयादीनि चेति, तद्व्युत्पादनाय मन्द्रप्रयोजनं
शास्त्रम् इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम् । तत्र यत्प्र-
माणं यत्र शर्कम् तदुक्तलक्षणेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो निष्कृत्य दर्शयति--

१. धूलिधूसरचरणः हलवाही, ग्राम्यजन इति यावत् ।

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

“ सामान्यत ” इति । ‘ तु ’ शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्भयां विशिनष्टि । सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां प्रतीतिः—चित्तिच्छायापत्तिर्बुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः । सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः ॥ उपलक्षणं चैतत्, शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

तत्किं सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतो दृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते ? । तथा च यत्र तन्नास्ति, महदाद्यारम्भक्रमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादौ च, तत्र तेषामभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह— “ तस्मादपि ” इति । तस्मादित्येतावतैव सिद्धे ‘ च ’ कारेण शेषवदित्यपि समुच्चितम् ॥ ६ ॥

स्यादेतत्, यथा गगनकुसुमकूर्मरोमशशविषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम् (५४) प्रत्यक्षाभावात् तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिष्वपि । तत्कथं प्रधानादीनामभावशङ्का ॥ तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्याद्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

१. यथा कौमुद्यां तथैवेयं कारिका व्याख्याता गौडपादेनाथ जयमङ्गलायाम् ॥ इदमपरमपि व्याख्यानमुपलभ्यते चन्द्रिकायाम्—‘ सामान्यतः ’ साधारणस्य वस्तु-जातस्य प्रतीतिः ‘ दृष्टात् ’ प्रत्यक्षात् भवति ‘ अतीन्द्रियाणां ’ तु प्रतीतिः ‘ अनुमानात् ’ भवति—‘ तस्मात् ’ अनुमानात् अपि केचित् पदार्थाः प्रत्येतुं न शक्याः—तेषां प्रतीतिस्तु ‘ आप्तागमात् ’ सिध्यति—इति ॥

त. कौ. २

“ अतिदूरात् ” इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनन्याये (५५) तन्निरासः, नानुषङ्गनीयम् । यथा उत्पतन् वियति पतस्त्रि अतिदूर- अतिदूरातिसामी- तथा, सन्नपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामीप्यादित्यत्रा- प्येन्द्रियघातमनो- प्यतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमञ्जनमतिसामीप्याच्च ऽनवस्थानसौ- दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्धत्वबधिरत्वादिः । “ मनोऽन- क्षम्यव्यवधानाभि- वस्थानात्, ” यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमध्य- भवसमानाभि- वर्तिनमिन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । “ सौक्ष्म्यात्, ” हारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षा- यथेन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टम् परमाण्वादि प्रणिहितमना अपि न भावः ॥ पश्यति । “ व्यवधानात्, ” यथा कुड्यादिष्व्यवहितं राजदारादि न पश्यति । “ अभिभवात्, ” यथाऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभि- भूतं ग्रहनक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । “ समानाभिहारात्, ” यथा तोयद- विमुक्तानुदबिन्दून् जग्गशये न पश्यति ॥

‘ च ’ कारोऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः । तेनानुद्भवोऽपि संगृहीतः । तद्यथा (५६) अनुद्भवादपि क्षीराद्यवस्थायां दध्याद्यनुद्भवान्न पश्यति ॥ प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्राद्वस्त्वभावो भवति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । (५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्ति- तथा हि गृहाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं रेव नाभावस्य कारणम् । विनिश्चिनुयात्, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष- अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्ष- निवृत्तेरयमभावं विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरुषा- दीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तन्नित्वृत्तिमात्रा- त्तदभावनिश्रयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥

कतमत्पुनरेतेषु कारणं प्रधानादीनामनुलब्धावित्यत आह—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।

महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

१. यथा सिंहः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथाऽग्निमपदस्य यत्र प्रागतशब्दैः सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्य प्रवृत्तिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलतिकायां द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

“सौक्ष्म्यात्” इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमरसवदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः कस्माच्च भवतीत्यत आह— “ नाभावात् ” इति । कुतः ?
 (५८) प्रधानानुप- “कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः” इति । ‘तत्’ इति प्रधानं परा-
 लब्धौ सौक्ष्म्यम् कार- मृशति । पुरुषोपलब्धौ तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति “ सङ्गा-
 णम् । तपरार्थत्वात् ” (कारिका १७) इति । इदतरप्रमाणा-
 वधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वाच्च प्रवर्तते
 इति कल्प्यते । सप्तमस्तु रसो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्वा-
 योग्यता शक्याऽध्यवसितुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥

किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह—“महदादि तच्च कार्यम्”
 इति । एतच्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्ठादुपपादयिष्यते ।
 (५९) प्रधानास्ति- तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यवैरूप्ये
 त्वसाधनकारणभूतम- आह— “ प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ” इति । एते
 हदादिकार्यम् ॥ तूपरिष्ठाद्विभजनीये इति ॥ ८ ॥

कार्यात् कारणमात्रं गम्यते । सन्ति चात्र वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः । तथा हि
 केचिदाहुः, ‘ असतः सत् जायते ’ इति, ‘ एकस्य
 (६०) कार्यकारणस- सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत् ’ इत्यपरे, अन्ये
 मन्धे वादिविप्रति- तु ‘ सतः असत् जायते ’ इति, ‘ सतः सत् जायते ’
 पत्तयः ॥ इति वृद्धाः ॥

तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पत्रये प्रधानं न सिध्यति । सुखदुःखमोहभेदवत्स्वरूप-
 परिणामशब्दाद्यात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य
 (६१) सत्कार्यपक्ष प्रधानत्वं सत्त्वरजस्तमस्वभावत्वमवगमयति । यदि
 एव प्रधानास्तित्वसाधकः॥ पुनरसतः सज्जायेत असन्निरुपाख्यं कारणं सुखदिरूप-
 शब्दाद्यात्मकं कथं स्यात्, सदसतोस्तादात्म्यानुप-
 पत्तेः ? अथैकस्य सतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपञ्चः, तथाऽपि सतः सज्जायत
 इति न स्यात् । न चास्याद्वयस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकत्वम्, अपि त्वप्रपञ्चस्त्व
 प्रपञ्चात्मकतया प्रतीतिर्भ्रम एव । येषामपि कणभक्षाक्षचरणादीनां सत एव
 कारणादसतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकत्वानुपपत्तेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति
 न तन्मते प्रधानसिद्धिः

(६२) सत्कार्यप्रति- अतः प्रधानसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रथमं तावत्सत्कार्यं प्रति-
पादनम् ॥ जानीते—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

“ असदकरणात् ” इति । “ सत् कार्यम् ”—कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति
शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतनयैरुद्भा-
(६३) बौद्धसिद्धान्त- वनीयम् । यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरम-
निरासः ॥ ड्कुरघटाद्युत्पत्तिरूपलभ्यते, तथाऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य
कारणत्वम्, अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाद्यवयवस्य ।

अभावात्तु भावोत्पत्तौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग
इत्यादि न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

(६४) वेदान्तमत- • प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदि-
निरासः ॥ तुम् इति ॥

कणभक्षाक्षचरणमतमवशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञानम्, “ सत् कार्यम् ”
इति । अत्र हेतुमाह “ असदकरणात् ” इति । असत्
(६५) न्यायमतनिरासः । चेत् कारणव्यापारात् पूर्वं कार्यम्, नास्य सत्त्वं कर्तुं
असतः करणायोग्यत्वात् केनापि शक्यम्, न हि नीलं शिल्पिसहस्रेणापि पीतं
सत् कार्यमपि प्रथमो कर्तुं शक्यते । ‘सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धर्मौ’ इति चेत्, तथा-
हेतुः (१) ॥ ऽप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव ।

तथा च नासत्त्वम्, असम्बद्धेनातदात्मना चासत्त्वेन
कथमसन् घटः ? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्य-
मिति । कारणाच्चास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपन्ना,
यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन धान्येषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु

१. धर्मिणि (घटे) नासत्त्वम् (घटस्य धर्मः) ॥ “ असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं
तदामकं भवति न वा ? आद्ये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्त्वं धर्मो न स्यात् ।
सम्बन्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसापेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव ।
द्वितीयं प्रत्याह— ‘ असम्बद्धेन ’ इति, तस्यासत्त्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽतिप्रसङ्गः
स्यादित्युभयथाऽपि सत्त्वं घटस्येति ” भारतीयत्यादयः ॥

पयसः । असतः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न खल्वभिव्यज्यमानं
चोत्पद्यमानं वा क्वचिदसद्दृष्टम् ॥

इतश्च कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सदेव कार्यम्— “उपादानग्रहणात्” ।

(६६) कार्यकारण- उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्बन्धः ।
सम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं
द्वितीयो हेतुः (२) ॥ भवति-कार्येण सम्बद्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम्,
सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यासतो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्बद्धमेव कार्यं कारणैः कस्मान्न जन्यते ? तथा चासदेवो-

(६७) कार्यकारण- त्यस्यत इत्यत आह—“सर्वसम्भवाभावात्” इति ।
योर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे असम्बद्धस्य जन्यत्वे, असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषेण सर्वं
सर्वकार्यकारणभाव- कार्यजातं सर्वस्माद्भवेत् । न चैतदस्ति, तस्मान्ना-
विप्लवापत्तिः ॥ सम्बद्धमसम्बद्धेन जन्यते अपि तु सम्बद्धं सम्बद्धेन
जन्यत इति । यथाहुः सार्वभौमः—

“असत्त्वे नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।

असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः” इति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्बद्धमपि सत् तदेव करोति यत्र यत् कारणं शक्तम् ।

शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनादवगम्यते । तेन नाव्यवस्थेत्यत
(६८) कारणशक्तेः आह “शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्” इति । सा शक्तिः शक्त-
कार्यपरत्वाच्च सत्कार्यम् कारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात्, शक्ये एव वा ? सर्वत्र
(३) ॥ चेत्तदवस्थैवाव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत्, कथमसति शक्ये

तत्र, इति वक्तव्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः
किञ्चिदेव कार्यं जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत्, हन्त भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्य-
सम्बद्धो वाऽसम्बद्धो वा ? सम्बद्धत्वे नासता सम्बन्धः इति सत् कार्यम् ।
असम्बद्धत्वे सैवाव्यवस्था, इति सुष्ठूक्तं “शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्” इति ॥

इतश्च सत् कार्यमित्याह—“कारणभावाच्च” । कार्यस्य कारणात्म-
(६९) कारणात्मकत्वात् कत्वात् । नहि कारणाद्भिन्नं कार्यम्, कारणं च
कार्यस्य सत् कार्यम् (४) ॥ सत्, इति कथं तदभिन्नं कार्यमसत् भवेत् ॥

कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१) न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भिद्यते,
तन्तुधर्मत्वात् । इह यत् यतो भिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मो
(७०) कार्यकारणा- न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य । धर्मश्च पटस्तन्तूनां, तस्मा-
भेदसाधनानि ॥ नार्थान्तरम् । (२) उपादानोपादेयभावाच्च नार्था-

न्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः । ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरुपा-
दानोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः । उपादानोपादेयभावाच्च तन्तुपटयोः ।
तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वम् । (३) इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगाप्राप्त्य-
भावात् । अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डबदरयोः, अप्राप्तिर्वा यथा
हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोः । न चेह संयोगाप्राप्ती, तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वमिति । (४)
इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात् । इह यत् यस्मा-
भिन्नम्, तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कार्यं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्ति-
कस्य गुरुत्वकार्योऽवनतिविशेषस्तस्माद्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो-
ऽवनतिभेदोऽधिकः । न च तथा तन्तुगुरुत्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं
दृश्यते । तस्मादभिन्नस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति । तान्येतान्यभेदसाधनान्यवीतानि ॥

एवमभेदे सिद्धे, तन्तव एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न
तन्तुभ्योऽर्थान्तरं पटः । स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधसंब-
(७१) कार्यकारण- न्धबुद्धिव्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाश्च नैकान्तिकं भेदं साध-
योरभेदात् कारणपरि- यितुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविर्भावतिरो-
णामभेद एव कार्यम् । भावाभ्यामेतेषामविरोधात्, यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि
तन्मते विरोधादिपरि- कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति
हारः ॥ चाविर्भवन्ति । न तु कूर्मस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वं-

सन्ते वा । एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटा-
द्वयो विशेषाः निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते, निविशमाना-
स्तिरोभवन्ति विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते । न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः ।
अथाह भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनः—

१ व्यतिरेकानुमानानि । २. स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणविरुद्धक्रिया, इह
तन्तुषु पट इति । अत्र तन्तुपटयोः सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानं भासते तादृशी चोक्तिर्भवति ।
व्यपदेशः, प्रावरणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च ।

“ नासतो विद्यते भवो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ” इति । (भगवद्गीता, २।१६)
 यथा कूर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविकासिभ्यो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुकुटादयोऽपि
 मृत्सुवर्णादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः । एवञ्चेह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह वने
 तिलका^१ इत्युपपन्नः । न चार्थक्रियाभेदोऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नाना-
 र्थक्रियादर्शनात् । यथैक एव वङ्किर्दाहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति । नाप्यर्थक्रि-
 याव्यवस्था वस्तुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यस्तानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात् ।
 यथा प्रत्येकं विष्टयो वर्त्मदर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति, न तु शिबिकावहनम् ।
 मिलितास्तु शिबिकामुद्वहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येकं प्रावरणमकुर्वाणा अपि
 मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ॥

स्यादेतत्—आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सन् असन् वा ?
 असंश्चेत् प्राप्तं तद्वत्सदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन्, कृतं तर्हि कारणव्यापारेण । नहि
 (७२) कार्यस्य कारणपरि- सति कार्ये कारणव्यापारप्रयोजनं पश्यामः । आवि-
 णामविशेषत्वे कारण- भावे चाविर्भावान्तरकल्पनेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादा-
 व्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्व- मनवस्थापत्तिश्च ॥ विर्भूतपटभावास्तन्तवः क्रियन्त इति रिक्तं वचः ॥

मैवम् । अथासदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयमसदुत्पत्तिः ? सती, असती
 (७३) तत्परिहारः । उक्त- वा ? सती चेत्, कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्,
 दोषस्थोभयमते तुल्यत्वम् ॥ तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था^२ ॥

अथ^३—‘ उत्पत्तिः पटाज्ञार्थान्तरम्, अपि तु पट एवासौ ’, तथाऽपि
 यावदुक्तं भवति ‘ पट ’ इति तावदुक्तं भवति
 (७४) पटतदुत्पत्त्योरैक्य- ‘ उत्पद्यते ’ इति । ततश्च ‘ पट ’ इत्युक्ते, ‘ उत्पद्यते ’
 शङ्का—तत्परिहारश्च ॥ इति न वाच्यम्, पौनरुक्त्यात् । ‘ विनश्यति ’ इत्यपि
 न वाच्यम्, उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्युगपदेकत्र विरोधात् ॥

१. तिलकबुक्षमयवनविषये यथा “ इह वने तिलका ” इति सङ्गच्छते तथा
 तन्तुमयपटेऽपीति ! २. एवं च शङ्काकृदुद्भाविता दोषः समान एव पक्षद्वये ।
 ततश्च नैकेनापरम्प्रत्युद्भावनीय इति । यथादुर्ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराः—स्वपक्षद्रोषाच्चेति— ।
 ३. उक्तानवस्थालक्षणदोषपरिजिहीर्षया पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शङ्कते ‘ पट एवासौ ’
 ततश्च नानवस्थेति शेषः ॥ तर्हि पर्यायशब्दावेतावित्यभिप्रेत्य परिहरति च ।

तस्मादियं^१ पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभयथा-
ऽपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते ।

(७५) पटोत्पत्तौ सत्या- एवं सत एव पटादेराविर्भावाय कारणपेक्षेत्युपपन्नम् ॥
मपि कारणव्यापारा- न^२ च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रिया-
पेक्षा ॥ त्वात्, क्रियासम्बन्धित्वाच्च कारणानाम्, अन्यथा
कारणात्वाभावात् ॥

(७६) कारिकोप- तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ ९ ॥
संहारः ॥

१. पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनमित्यभिप्रेत्याह- ‘तस्मात्’
इति । न्यायमतेऽपि पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिरयुतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामात्रेणा-
युतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभयथाऽपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्ति-
रुपपद्यते । न चाभिव्यक्तेरपि जन्यत्वे सत्कार्यबाधोऽनवस्था चेत्यादि वाच्यम् ।
व्यवहारोपयोगितत्तत्कार्याभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तत्कार्यनिष्ठसत्त्वगुणरूपतया नित्यत्वेऽपि
तमसा प्रतिबद्धत्वान्न व्यवहारोपयोगित्वम् । अभिव्यञ्जकसामग्र्या तु तमसः
प्रतिबन्धः । उत्तेजकस्याप्युत्तेजनमात्राङ्गीकारान्न सत्कार्यबाधः । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदे-
ऽपि व्यवहारक्षमता कार्यात्मनाभिव्यक्तस्यैव नान्यथा इत्यादि चन्द्रिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥
“उपसंहरति ‘तस्मादिति’ उत्पत्त्युत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गेनानुत्पन्नाया
अप्युत्पत्तेः कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्ववदस्मन्मतेऽपि सत एव घटस्याविर्भावाय
कारणव्यापारापेक्षा । घटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणेन घटे कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्व-
रूपस्यैवादरणीयतयाऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारेण,
युक्तं चैतत्, अन्यथोत्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्यैव कारणसापेक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्वा-
भावे क्रियासम्बन्धित्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्कार्यवाद एव
साधीयानित्याशयः” इति केचित् । २. न्यायमते कारणस्य सत्तायाः सकलस्य सम-
वायस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशयः । ‘नोत्पद्यते’, अपि तु आविर्भवत्येवेति शेषः । ३.
भवन्मतेऽपीति शेषः ॥ ४. ननु ‘अस्मत्पक्षे-पटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति इति
सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका’ इति चेत्, तत्राह “न च” इति । तद्रूपं चानित्य-
मेवेति भवति तस्योत्पत्तिरिति हृदयम् ।

तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सत् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं
(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्त- तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी व्यक्ताव्यक्त-
सारूप्यवैरूप्ये ॥ सारूप्यवैरूप्ये तावदाह—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सारू- “ हेतुमत् ” इति । व्यक्तं हेतुमत्, हेतुः कारणम्,
प्यम् । तत्र हेतुम- तद्वत्, यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यति ॥
त्वम् ॥ (१)

(७९) अनित्य- “ अनित्यम्, ” विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥
त्वम् ॥ (२)

“ अव्यापि ”, सर्वं परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम्,
(८०) अव्यापि- न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानं वेवि-
त्वम् ॥ (३) षन्तीत्यव्यापकाः ॥

“ सक्रियम् ”, परिस्पन्दवत्^१ । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं
(८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४) त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाददत्, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः ।
शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।

“ अनेकम् ”, प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्ध्यादीनां भेदात् पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटा-
(८२) अनेकत्वम् ॥ (५) दिभेदेनानेकमेव ।

“ आश्रितम् ”, स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामभेदेऽपि कथ-
(८३) आश्रित- द्विभेदविवक्षयाऽऽश्रयाश्रयिभावः, यथेह वने तिलका
त्वम् ॥ (६) इत्युक्तम् ॥

“ लिङ्गम्^३ ” प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तथो-
(८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) परिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम्
पुरुषस्य लिङ्गम्भवदपीति भावः ॥

१. ‘ सक्रियम् ’ अध्यवसायादिरूपनियतक्रियाकारित्वमिति • भाष्ये । २.
अथवा सर्गभेदेन भिन्नम् । ३. ‘ लिङ्गयति ’ अनुमानेन भोक्तारं ज्ञापयतीति
लिङ्गम् ।

“सावयम्” अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथ वा अवयवनम् अवयवः,
 अवयवानामवयविनां मिथः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संयोग
 (८५) सावयव- इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन
 त्वम् ॥ (८) सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्यादयः
 परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्येऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य
 बुद्ध्यादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सत्त्वरजस्तमसां परस्परं संयोगः,
 अप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥

“ परतन्त्रम् ” बुद्ध्यादि । बुद्ध्या स्वकार्येऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्या
 पुरोऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती नालमहङ्कारं
 (८६) परतन्त्र- जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । एवमहङ्कारादिभिरपि
 त्वम् ॥ (९) स्वकार्यजनने । इति सर्वः स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरम-
 पेक्षते । तेन परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि
 स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्रं व्यक्तम् ॥

“ विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ”—व्यक्तात् । अहेतुमन्नित्यं व्यापि निष्क्रियम्,
 (८७) अव्यक्तस्य [यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथाऽपि
 वैपरीत्यम् ॥ परिस्पन्दो नास्ति ॥] एकमनाश्रितमलिङ्गमनवयवम्
 स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयो- तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्वैधर्म्यमुक्तम्, सम्प्रति
 साधर्म्याणि पुरुषाच्च तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरुषाच्च वैधर्म्यम्, आह-
 तयोर्वैधर्म्यम् ॥

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

(८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् “ त्रिगुणम् ” इति । त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा
 प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ अस्येति त्रिगुणम् । तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम्
 (१) पराभिमतमपाकृतम् ।

“अविवेकि” । यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवममहदादयोऽपि न प्रधानात् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा (९०) अविवेकित्वम् सम्भूयकरिताऽत्राविवेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं द्वितीयम् ॥ (२) पर्याप्तम् स्वकार्ये, अपि तु सम्भूय । तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचित् केनचित्सम्भव इति ॥

ये^१ त्वाहुः—‘विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्, न पुनरितोऽन्यस्तद्धर्मा’ इति—तान् प्रत्याह—“विषय” इति । (९१) विषयत्वम् ‘विषयो’ ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्वहिरिति यावत् । अत सामान्यत्वं च तृतीय-चतुर्थे (३) (४) एव “सामान्यम्” साधारणम्, अनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीतमित्यर्थः । विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां वृत्तिरूपाणां, तेऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः । विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । तथा च नर्त्तकी-भूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन् बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानं युक्तम् । अन्यथा तन्न स्यात् इति भावः ॥ (९२) अचेतनत्वम् “अचेतनम्” । सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्ध्यादयोऽचेतनाः, पञ्चमम् ॥ (५) न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यम्बुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

“प्रसवधर्मि” । प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सोऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि । [प्रसव- (९३) प्रसवधर्मित्वम् धर्मेति वक्तव्ये मत्वर्थीयः प्रसवधर्मस्य नित्ययोग-षष्ठम् ॥ (६) साख्यातुम्] । स्वरूपाविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि वियुज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

(९४) उक्तव्यक्तधर्मा-व्यक्तवृत्तमव्यक्तेऽतिदिशति, “तथा प्रधानम्” गामव्यक्तेऽतिदेशः ॥ इति । यथा व्यक्तं तथाऽव्यक्तमित्यर्थः^३ ॥

(९५) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः ताभ्यां वैधर्म्यं पुरुषस्याऽऽह — “तद्विपरीतः पुरुषात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥ पुमान्” इति ॥

१. विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धाः । २. तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे । ३. त्रिगुणत्वादिसाधर्म्यं व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरिति यावत् ।

स्यादेतत्-अहेतुमत्त्वनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमने-
कत्वं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते 'तद्विपरीतः
(९६) साधर्म्यं च ॥ पुमान् ' इति ? अत आह- " तथा च " इति ।
चकारोऽप्यर्थः । यद्यप्यहेतुमत्त्वादिकं साधर्म्यम्,
तत्राप्यत्रैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमस्त्येवेत्यर्थः ॥ ११ ॥

त्रिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्यत
आह—

(९७) गुणनिरूपणम् ॥

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।

अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

“ गुणाः ” [परार्थाः] “ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् ” [कारिका १३]
(९८) गुणानां स्वरू- इत्यत्र निर्देक्ष्यन्ते । तदनागतावेक्षणेन तन्त्रयुक्त्या वा
पाणि, सुखदुःखयोः पर- प्रीत्यादीनां यथासंख्यं वेदितव्यम् ॥
स्परभावरूपता व्युदासश्च ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति-प्रीतिः सुखम्, प्रीत्यात्मकः सत्त्वगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्,
अप्रीत्यात्मको रजोगुणः; विषादो मोहः, विषादात्मक-
(९९) उक्तलक्षणस- स्तमोगुणः इत्यर्थः । ये तु मन्यन्ते “ न प्रीतिर्दुःखाभा-
मन्वयः ॥ वादतिरिच्यते एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीत्यभावादभ्य-
दिति, ” तान् प्रति “ आत्म ”-ग्रहणम् । नेतरेतरा-
भावाः सुखादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आत्मशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात् । प्रीतिः
आत्मा भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यात्मानः । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम् । भावरूपता
चैवामनुभवसिद्धा । परस्परभावात्मकत्वे तु परस्परश्रयापत्तेरेकस्याप्यसिद्धे-
रुभयासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

१. च = अपि । २. आर्जवश्रद्धादीनां प्रीतावान्तर्भावः, द्वेषमोहविप्रलम्भभ-
यादीनां चाप्रीतौ ।

स्वरूपमेषामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह— “ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ” इति ।
 (१००) गुणानां प्रयो- अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघु
 जनम् यथासंख्यं प्रकाश- सत्त्वं प्रवर्तयेत्, यदि तमसा गुरुणा न नियम्येत ।
 प्रवृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥ तमोनियतन्तु क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो
 नियमार्थम् ॥

प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह— “ अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च ”
 इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते ।
 (१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, ‘ अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः ’ । एषामन्यतमेनार्थवशादु-
 अन्योन्याभिभव- अन्यो- द्भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सत्त्वं रजस्तमसी
 न्यापेक्षा-अन्योन्यापेक्ष- अभिभूय शान्तामात्मनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः
 जनन-अन्योन्यमिथुन- सत्त्वतमसी अभिभूय घोरात्, एवं तमः सत्त्वरजसी
 वृत्तिरूपाः ॥ अभिभूय मूढामिति । ‘ अन्योन्याश्रयवृत्तयः ’ ।

यद्यप्याधाराधेयभावेन नायमर्थो घटते, तथा ऽपि
 यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः । तथा हि, सत्त्वं प्रवृत्तिनियमावाश्रित्य
 रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावाश्रित्य प्रवृत्त्येतरयोः, तमः
 प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रित्य नियमेनेतरयोरिति । ‘ अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः ’ ।
 अन्यतमो ऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां
 सदृशरूपः । अत एव न हेतुमत्त्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरस्य हेतोरसम्भवात्; नाप्य-
 नित्यत्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात् । ‘ अन्योन्यमिथुनवृत्तयः ’ । अन्योन्य-
 सहचराः, अविनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत् । ‘ चः ’ समुच्चये । भवति चात्रागमः—

“ अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगामिनः ।

रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ॥

तमसश्चापि मिथुनै ते सत्त्वरजसी उभे ।

उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिथुनं तम इच्यते ॥

नैषामादिः सम्प्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते ” ॥ इति देवी-

भागवते-३।८. ॥ १२ ॥

“ प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ” इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते इत्थम्भूताः कुतश्चेत्यत
(१०२) गुणत्रयनिरूप- आह—
णम्, तेषां पृथक्स्वभावश्च॥

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

“ सत्त्वम् ” इति । सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्—सांख्याचार्यैः । तत्र
कार्योद्गमने हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवप्रतिद्वन्द्वि यतो
(१०३) सत्त्वगुणस्व- ऽग्रेरुर्ध्वज्वलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्तिर्य-
भावः—लाघवम्, प्रका- गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः । एवं करणानां वृत्ति-
शक्तम् ॥ पटुत्वहेतुर्लाघवम्, गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति
सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥

सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टभ्येते
अवसादात् प्रच्याव्य स्वकार्ये उत्साहं प्रयत्नं कार्येते ।
(१०४) रजोगुणस्व- तदिदमुक्तम्— “ उपष्टम्भकं रजः ” इति । कस्मा-
भावः—उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, दित्यत उक्तम्— “ चलम् ” इति । तदनेन रजसः
चलत्वम् ॥ प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दर्शितम् ॥

रजस्तु चलतया परितस्त्रैगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणाऽऽवृण्वता च तमसा तत्र
(१०५) तमोगुणस्व- तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन क्वचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति तत-
भावः—गुरुत्वम् आवर- स्ततो व्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्— “ गुरु
त्वम् ॥ वरणकमेव तमः ” इति । एवकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नक्रमः
सम्बध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ॥

ननु ‘ एते परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंसन्त
इत्येव युक्तम्, प्रागेव त्वेतेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृता’—इत्यत
(१०६) परस्परविरु- आह—“ प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ” इति । दृष्टमे-
द्धानामपि गुणानामर्थ- वैतत्, यथा वर्तितैले अनैलविरोधिनी, अथ मिलिते
वशात् सहवृत्तित्वम् ॥ सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरुतः; तथा च वात-
पित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षण-

१. अर्थावभासकमिति यावत् ॥ २. प्रकाशकत्वमिति यावत् । ३. दूर
एव । का कथा परस्परध्वंसकानामेकक्रियाकारिताया इति भावः ।

कार्यकारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोविरुद्धान्यप्यनुवर्त्यन्ति स्वकार्य करिष्यन्ति च । “ अर्थत ” इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

“ पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ” इति ॥ [कारिका ३१]

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहा-
त्मकान्येव निमित्तानि^१ कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्पर-

(१०७) सुखदुःख- मभिभाव्याभिभावकभावान्नातात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव मोहानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वा- स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसम्पन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति; तेषां निमित्तरूपेण गुण- तत्कस्य हेतोः ? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमु- त्रयस्या ऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ॥ द्रवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति, तत् कस्य हेतोः ? ताः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति; तत् कस्य हेतोः ? तम्प्रति तस्याः मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत् सुखहेतुः तत् सुखात्मकम् सत्त्वम्, यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः, यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं तमः । सुखप्रकाशलाघवानां त्वेकस्मिन् युगपदुद्- भूतावविरोधः, सहदर्शनात् । तस्मात् सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अवि- रोधिभिरेकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवैर्न निमित्तभेदा उच्यीयन्ते । एवं दुःखोपष्टम्भकत्वप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः—इति सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यमिति ॥ १३ ॥

स्यादेतत्—अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवसिद्धाः भवन्त्वविवेकि- (१०८) अननुभवसि- त्वादयः । ये पुनः सत्त्वादयो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति द्वेषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकि- तेषां कृतस्त्यमविवेकित्वम्, विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् त्वाद्विगुणासम्भवशङ्का ॥ प्रसवधर्मित्वं च ? इत्यत आह—

१. सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि । २. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम्, सुख- प्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानीत्याशङ्क्या ऽह— “ सुखेति ” । ३. तथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि कल्पयन्ति—न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामैकैकगुणवृत्तित्वे कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधि- नामपि भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवस्थाऽपि ॥

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।

कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“ अविवेक्यादेः ” इति । अविवेकित्वमविवेकि-यथा ‘ द्वेकयोर्द्विवचनै-
कवचने ’ [पाणिनिस्मृ. १।४।२२] इत्यत्र द्वित्वै-
(१०९) तन्निरासः- कत्वयोरिति अन्यथा द्वेकेष्विति स्यात् । कुतः पुनरवि-
गुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाध- वेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह-“ त्रैगुण्यात् ” इति ‘ यद्यत्
नान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥ सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वादियोगि यथेदमनु-
भूयमानं व्यक्तम् ’-इति स्फुटत्वादन्यथो नोक्तः ।
व्यतिरेकमाह-“ तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ” इति । अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुरुषे
त्रैगुण्याभावात् । अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीत एव
हेतुस्त्रैगुण्यादिति वक्तव्यः ॥

स्यादेतत्-अव्यक्तसिद्धौ सत्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः सिध्यन्ति ।
अव्यक्तमेव त्वद्यापि न सिध्यति, तत्कथमविवेकित्वा-
(११०) अव्यक्तसा- दिसिद्धिरत आह-“ कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् ” इति ।
धनम् ॥ अयमभिसन्धिः-कार्यं हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा
तन्त्वादिगुणात्मकं पटादि । तथा महदादिलक्षणेनापि
कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहात्मना भवितव्यम् । तथा
च तत्कारणं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥

स्यादेतत्-‘ व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते ’ इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः ॥ पर-
(१११) व्यक्तादेव माणवो हि व्यक्ताः, तैर्ब्रह्मणकादिक्रमेण पृथिव्यादि-
सर्वकार्यकारणभावोपप- लक्षणं कार्यं व्यक्तमारभ्यते । पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुण-
त्तेरव्यक्तकारणकल्पना- क्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः । तस्मात् व्यक्तात् व्यक्तस्य तद्गु-
वैयर्थ्यशङ्का ॥ णस्य चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टचरेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह-

१. सत्त्वादयोऽविवेकित्वादियोगिनः त्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादिति स्वरूप-
मनुमानस्य । २. पृथिव्यादि । ३. ‘ यत्राविवेकित्वाभावस्तत्र त्रैगुण्याभाव ’
इत्येवंरूपम् ।

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

“ भेदानाम् ” इति । भेदानाम् विशेषाणां महदादीनां भूतानां कार्याणां (११२) तत्परिहारः । कारणं मूलकारणमस्यव्यक्तम् । कुतः ? “कारणकार्य-
अव्यक्तकारणसाध- विभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ” । कारणे सत् कार्य-
नानि । तत्र कारण- मिति स्थितम् । तथा च यथा कूर्मशरीरे सन्त्येवा-
कार्ययोर्विभागाविभागा- ज्ञानि निःसरन्ति विभज्यन्ते—‘ इदं कूर्मशरीरं, एता-
भ्यामव्यक्तसिद्धिरिति न्येतस्याज्ञानि ’—इति; एवं निविशमानानि तन्मिन्
प्रथमम् (१) ॥ अव्यक्तीभवन्ति । एवं कारणान्मृत्पिण्डाद्धेमपिण्डाद्वा

कार्याणि घटमुकुटादीनि सन्त्येवाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते ।
सन्त्येव पृथिव्यादीनि कारणान्त्तन्मात्रादाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते, सन्त्येव च
तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारात् कारणात्, सन्त्येवाहङ्कारः कारणान्महतः, सन्त्येव च
महान् परमाव्यक्तात् । सोऽयं कारणात्, परमाव्यक्तात् साक्षात् पारम्पर्येणा-
न्वितस्य विश्वस्य कार्यस्य विभागः । प्रतिसर्गे तु मृत्पिण्डं सुवर्णपिण्डं वा
घटमुकुटादयो विशन्तोऽव्यक्तीभवन्ति । तत्कारणरूपमेवानव्यक्तं कार्यमपे-
क्ष्याव्यक्तं भवति । एवं पृथिव्यादयस्तन्मात्राणि विशन्तः स्वापेक्षया तन्मात्रा-
ण्यव्यक्तयन्ति, एवं तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कार विशन्त्यहङ्कारमव्यक्तयन्ति, एवमह-
ङ्कारो महान्तमाविशन् महान्तमव्यक्तयति, महान् प्रकृतिं स्वकारणं विशन्
प्रकृतिमव्यक्तयति । प्रकृतेस्तु न कचिन्निवेश इति सा सर्वकार्याणामव्यक्त-
मेव । सोऽयमविभागः प्रकृतौ वैश्वरूप्यस्य नानारूपस्य कार्यस्य [स्वार्थिकः^२
प्यञ्] । तस्मात् कारणे कार्यस्य सत् एव विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तं कारण-
मस्ति ॥

इतश्चाव्यक्तमस्तीत्यत आह—“ शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च इति ” । कारणशक्तिः
कार्यं प्रवर्तत इति सिद्धम्, अशक्तात् कारणात् कार्य-
(११३) कारणस्य स्यानुपपत्तेः, शक्तिश्च कारणगता न कार्यस्याव्यक्त-
शक्तिस्तिस्मिन् कार्य- त्वादन्या । न हि सत्कार्यपक्षे कार्यस्याव्यक्तताया
स्याव्यक्ततया स्थितिरे- ऽन्यस्यां शक्तौ प्रमाणमस्ति । अयमेव हि सिकताभ्य-
वेति च द्वितीयम् (२) ॥ स्तिलानां तैलोपादानानां भेदो यदेतेष्वेव तैलमस्य-
नागतावस्थं न सिकतास्त्विति ॥

१ अनवस्थाभयात् । २. वैश्वरूप्यपदे । ३. कारणे कार्यस्याव्यक्तरूपेण
स्थितिरेव तस्य (कारण-) शक्तिरितिभावः ॥

सां. का. ३

स्यादेतत्-शक्तिः प्रवृत्तिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत् एव परमा-
व्यक्तत्वं साधयिष्यतः, कृतं ततः परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यतः
(११४) महदादिपर्य- आह - “ परिमाणात् ” इति । परिमितत्वात्,
न्तस्य कार्यजातस्य अव्यापित्वादिति यावत् । विवादाध्यासिता महदादि-
परिमितत्वाच्चेति तृती- भेदा अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः, परिमितत्वात्, घटादिवत् ।
यम् (३) ॥ घटादयो हि परिमिताः सृष्ट्याव्यक्तकारणका दृष्टाः ।
उक्तमेतद्यथा कार्यस्याव्यक्तावस्था कारणमेवेति, यन्म-
हतः कारणं तत् परमाव्यक्तम्, ततः परतराव्यक्तकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्^१ ॥

इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदाः अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः— “ समन्वयात्^२ ” ।
भिन्नानां समानरूपता समन्वयः । सुखदुःखमोहस-
(११५) समन्वयाच्चेति मन्विता हि बुद्ध्यादयोऽध्यवसायादिलक्षणाः प्रती-
चतुर्थम् (४) ॥ “ यन्ते । यानि च यद्रूपसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावा-
व्यक्तकारणानि, यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगताः घट-
मुकुटादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं भेदानामिति
सिद्धम् ॥ १५ ॥

अव्यक्तं साधयित्वा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।

परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

“ प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः ” इति । प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सर्वं रजस्तमश्च सदृश-
परिणामानि भवन्ति । परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नाप-
(११६) प्रकृतेस्त्रि- रिणमग्न्य क्षणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते । तस्मात् सर्वं सर्वरूप-
गुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा तथा रजो रजोरूपतया तमस्तमोरूपतया प्रतिसर्गा-
(१) ॥ वस्थायामपि प्रवर्तते । तदिदमुक्तम् “ त्रिगुणतः ”
इति ॥

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह—“ समुदयाच्च ” इति । समेत्य उदयः ‘ समुदयः’ सम-
वायः । समुदयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्रधानभावमन्त-
(११७) प्रकृतेस्समु- रेण सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना,
दयात् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया न च वैषम्यमुपमदोपमर्दकभावाद्गते । इति मह-
(२) ॥ दादिभावेन प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया ॥

स्यादेतत्—कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह—“परिणा-
मतः सलिलवत् ” इति । यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुद-
(११८) प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः कमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालता-
परिणामतो नानाप्रकाराः॥ लीबिल्वचिरबिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थ-
फलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटुतया
विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति ।
तदिदमुक्तम्—“ प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ” । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेष-
स्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

ये तु तौष्टिका अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहङ्कारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि
वा ऽऽत्मानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्येवोपासते तान्
(११९) पुरुषास्तित्व- प्रत्याह—
साधनम् ॥

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषो ऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

“ संघातपरार्थत्वात् ” इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः । कुतः ?
“ संघातपरार्थत्वात् ” । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः
(१२०) संघातानां परार्थाः, संघातत्वात्, शयनासनाभ्यङ्गादिवत्,
परार्थत्वादिति प्रथम- सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया ऽव्यक्तादयः सर्वे
साधनम् (१) ॥ संघाताः ॥

१ यदर्थः सङ्घाताः सोऽत्रिगुणविवेकित्वादियोग्यवश्यं स्यात् । स च पुरुष एव ।

स्यादेतत्—शयनासनादयः संघाताः संहतशरीरार्था दृष्टाः, न त्वात्मानम-
 व्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः । तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव
 (१२१) संघातानां परं गमयेयुः, त त्वसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आह—
 संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनव- “ त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ” इति । अयमभिप्रायः—
 स्था त्रिगुणादिविपर्य- संघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि
 यश्च ॥ संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम् ; एवं तेन तेनेत्यनवस्था
 स्यात् । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता,
 कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गात् । न च ‘ प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनागौरवमपि मृष्यत ’ इति
 युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्वयात् । दृष्टान्तदृष्टमवधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनु-
 मानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका-
 यामस्माभिः । तस्मादनवस्थाभिया ऽस्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वं विवेकि-
 त्वमविषयत्वमसामान्यत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वव्याभ्युपेयम् । त्रिगुणत्वादयो
 हि धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः । तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यादि
 व्यावर्तयति, ब्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कठत्वादिकम् । तस्मादाचार्येण
 ‘ त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ’ इति वदता ऽसंहतः परो विवक्षितः, स चास्मेति
 सिद्धम् ॥

इतश्च परः पुरुषो ऽस्ति—“ अधिष्ठानात् ”, त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमान-
 त्वात् । यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीय-
 (१२२) त्रिगुणात्मका- मानं दृष्टम्, यथा रथादिर्यन्त्रादिभिः । सुखदुःख-
 नामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिति मोहात्मकं चेदं बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठा-
 द्वितीयं साधनम् (२) ॥ तव्यम् । स च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य आस्मेति ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुषो—“ भोक्तृभावात् ” । भोक्तृभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उप-
 लक्षयति । भोग्ये हि सुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये
 (१२३) भोक्तृभावा- प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते । तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन प्रतिकूलनी-
 दिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥ येन च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम् । न चानुकूलनीयाः
 प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मक-

१. सुखदुःखादयो भोगाः । अतो भोक्तरि पुरुषे सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकत्वञ्च
 सम्भवति । तस्मात् पुरुषे त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययः ॥

त्वेन स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽसुखाद्यात्मा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः
प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा ऽऽस्मेति ॥

अन्ये स्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता
तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्ध्याद्यतिरिक्तः, स
(१२४) भोक्तृभावा- चा ऽऽस्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन
दित्यस्य द्रष्टृभावादि- द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां सुखा-
त्यर्थोऽपि सम्भवति ॥ द्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवदनुमितम् ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याहु—“कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां
दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रशम-
(१२५) शास्त्राणां कैव- लक्षणं न बुद्ध्यादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि दुःखाद्या-
त्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थ त्मकाः कथं स्वभावाद्वियोजयितुं शक्यन्ते । तदतिरि-
साधनम्—(४) ॥ तस्य स्वतदात्मनस्ततो विभोगः शक्यसम्पादः,
तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाभियां चास्ति
बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७ ॥

तदेवं पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमनेकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति
संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति—
(१२६) पुरुषबहुत्व-
साधनानि ॥

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

जननेत्यादिना । “पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्” । कस्मात् ? “जननमरण-
करणानां प्रतिनियमात्” । निकायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वा-
(१२७) जन्ममरण- भिर्देहेन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्कारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभि-
प्रतिनियमादिति प्रथ- सम्बन्धो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परिणामः, तस्यापरि-
मम् (१) ॥ णामित्वात् । तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो
मरणम्, नस्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वात् ।
करणानि बुद्ध्यादीनि त्रयोदश । तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमो व्यवस्था ।

सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायन्, म्रियमाने च म्रियेरन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्वे एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्वे एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-भेदाद्व्यवस्था' इति युक्तम्, पाणिस्तनाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्था-प्रसङ्गात् । न हि पाणौ वृक्षे, जाते वा स्तनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च” इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि (१२८) पुरुषाणाम- पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयत-युगपत्प्रवृत्तेरिति द्विती- माने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत, यम् (२) ॥ ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्चालयेत् । नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—“त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव” इति । एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः 'सिद्धम्' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः; सिद्धमेव नास्ति- (१२९) त्रैगुण्यविपर्य- दम् । त्रयो गुणास्त्रैगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययोऽन्यथात्वम् । यादिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥ केचित्खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, यथोर्ध्वस्रो-तसः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमो-बहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः । सो ऽयमीदृशस्त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् यथेकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

(१३०) पुरुषधर्माः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया धर्मानाह—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।

कैवल्यममाध्यस्थं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

“ तस्माच्च ” इति । ‘ च ’ शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । ‘ विपर्यासादस्मात् ’ इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्य-
 (१३१) तस्मात्पदस्य विपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तन्निरासाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ ‘ तस्मात् ’ इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हि सन्निधानादि-
 दमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुण-
 मविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्येते ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वम-
 साधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेना-
 (१३२) अत्रैगुण्यादेः विषयत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि
 पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति;
 द्रष्टृत्वं च ॥ यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोके-
 ऽर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं
 प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो
 विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चैतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति
 साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टाऽपि भवति ॥

अत्रैगुण्याच्चास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च
 (१३३) कैवल्यम् ॥ तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहि-
 तत्वासिद्धम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं
 (१३४) माध्यस्थ्यम्, द्विषन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु
 अकर्तृत्वं च ॥ मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वा-
 दप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

स्यादेतत्-प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य ‘ चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि ’ इति
 (१३५) चैतन्यकर्तृ- कृतिचैतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यनुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-
 त्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्ति- तस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुश्चाचैत-
 शङ्का ॥ न्यात् इत्यत आह—

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

“ तस्मात् ” इति । यतश्चेतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तितः सिद्धे, तस्मात् (१३६) इष्टापत्तिः । भ्रान्तिरियमित्यर्थः । ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं वक्ष्यति । भ्रान्तिबीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्सन्निधानम् । भ्रान्तिविलसितम् ॥ अतिरोहितार्थमन्यत् ॥ २० ॥

‘ तत्संयोगात् ’ इत्युक्तम्, न च भिन्नयोः संयोगोऽपेक्षां विना, न चेय-
(१३७) पुरुषप्रधानयोः सुपकार्योपकारकभावं विनेत्यपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाह-
संयोगे शङ्का ॥

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

“ पुरुषस्य ” इति । प्रधानस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी । प्रधानस्य सर्वसाधारणस्य
(१३८) प्रधानस्य यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम् । तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य
पुरुषापेक्षा-भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥ दर्शिता । ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्तारमन्तेण न
सम्भवतीति युक्ताऽस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥

“ पुरुषस्यापेक्षां दर्शयति-“ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम् ” इति । तथाहि भोग्येन
प्रधानेन सम्भिन्नः पुरुषस्तद्वतं दुःखत्रयं स्वात्मन्यभि-
(१३९) कैवल्यार्थं मन्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते । तच्च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यता-
पुरुषस्य प्रधानापेक्षा ॥ ख्यातिनिबन्धनम् । न च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः
प्रधानमन्तरेणेति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते
अनादित्वाच्च संयोगपरम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यत
इति युक्तम् ॥

१. गुणानां कर्तृत्वे उदासीनोऽपि पुरुषः कर्तेव भवति । न च स तत्त्वतः
कर्तेत्येवकाराभिप्रायः । २. कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः स्पष्टा एवेत्यर्थः । ३. पुरुषो
निष्क्रियत्वात् ‘ पङ्गुः, ’ प्रधानमचेतनत्वात् ‘ अन्धम् ’ ।

ननु भवत्वनयोः संयोगो, महदादिसर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह— “ तत्कृतः
(१४०) भोगापवर्गार्थ- सर्गः ” इति । संयोगो हि न महदादिसर्गमन्तरेण
मेव महदादिसर्गस्या- भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगाप-
वश्यकत्वम् ॥ वर्गार्थं सर्गं करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

“ प्रकृतेः ” इति । प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम् । महदहङ्कारौ । वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ । एका-
दशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सो
(१४१) प्रकृतेर्महानि- ऽयं षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । तस्मा-
त्पादिः सर्गक्रमः ॥ दपि षोडशकादपकृष्टेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च
भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्रा-
द्वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहिताद्रूपत-
(१४२) तन्मात्रेभ्यो न्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मा-
गुणक्रमेण भूतसर्गः ॥ त्रसहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः,
शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्रन्धतन्मात्राच्छब्द-
स्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥

अव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् “ तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ” (कारिका १०)
इत्यनेन; विशेषतश्च “ सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् ”
(१४३) बुद्धिलक्षण- (कारिका १३) इत्यनेन । व्यक्तमपि सामान्यतो
प्रस्तावः ॥ लक्षितम् “ हेतुमत् ” (कारिका १०) इत्यादिना ।
सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धिं

लक्षयति—

अभ्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

“अध्यवसाय” इति । ‘अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः’ क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविवक्षया । सर्वो व्यवहर्ता ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमत्राधि-
(१४४) बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् कृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, ततश्च
अध्यवसाय इति ॥ प्रवर्तत इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति
विनिश्चयश्चित्तिसन्निधानादापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सो-
ऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः । स च बुद्धेर्लक्षणम्
समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् ॥

तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सात्त्विकतामसानाह-
“धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं,
(१४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ” इति । धर्मो ऽभ्युद-
धर्माः धर्मज्ञानविरागैश्वर्याः यनिःश्रयसहेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनितो धर्मो
भिधानाः । तत्र धर्मज्ञान- ऽभ्युदयहेतुः, अष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रयस-
वैराग्याणां निरूपणम् ॥ हेतुः । गुणपुरुषान्यताख्यातिर्ज्ञानम् । विरागो वैरा-
ग्यम् रागाभावः ॥

तस्य-यतमानसंज्ञा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा एकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा वशीकारसंज्ञा-इति
चतस्रः संज्ञाः । रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः,
(१४६) विरागस्य यत- तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्मा ऽत्र
मानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियव- प्रवर्तिषत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनायारम्भः
शीकाररूपाश्चतस्रः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचि-
संज्ञाः ॥ त्कषायाः पक्काः, पक्ष्यन्ते च केचित्, तत्रैवं पूर्वापरी-

भावे सति पक्ष्यमाणेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पक्कानां व्यतिरे-
केणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया पक्कानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण
मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । औत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेष्वापि
दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु, या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामञ्ज-
भगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयाम्बकार-“दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा
वैराग्यम् ” इति [योगसूत्र-१।१५] । सोऽयं बुद्धिधर्मो, विराग इति ॥

ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधर्मो, यतो ऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः । (१) अत्राणिमा-
 ऽणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति । (२) लघिमा
 (१४७) ऐश्वर्यनिरूपणे लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्ब्य सूर्यलोकं यति ।
 अष्टसिद्धिनिरूपणम् ॥ (३) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुर्भवति । (४)
 महिमा महतो भावः, यतो महान् भवति । (५)
 प्राप्तिः, यतो ऽङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृशति चन्द्रमसम् । (६) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिघातो
 यतो, भूमाद्युन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके । (७) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतभौ-
 तिकं वशीभवत्यवश्यम् । ईशित्वम् यतो भूतभौतिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीष्टे ।
 (८) यच्च कामावसायित्वम् मा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सङ्कल्पो
 भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति । अन्येषां मन्त्र्याणां निश्चयाः निश्चेतव्य-
 मनुविधीयन्ते, योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम् । इति चत्वारः
 सात्त्विका बुद्धिधर्माः ॥
 (१४८) बुद्धेस्तामसा तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः । अधर्माज्ञानावैरा-
 धर्मा अधर्मादयः ॥ ग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चत्वारः इत्यर्थः ॥ २३ ॥

अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह—

अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।

एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

“ अभिमान ” इति । ‘ अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः ’ । यत् खल्वालोचितम्मतं
 च तत्र ‘ अहमधिकृतः ’, ‘ शक्तः खल्वहमत्र ’, ‘ मदर्थो
 (१४९) अहङ्कारस्य एवामी विषयाः, ‘ मत्तो नान्यो ऽत्राधिकृतः
 लक्षणम् ॥ कश्चिदास्ति ’, ‘ अतो ऽहमस्मि ’ इति यो ऽभिमानः
 सो ऽसाधारणव्यापारत्वादहङ्कारः । तमुपजीव्य हि
 बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति— ‘ कर्तव्यमेतन्मया ’ इति निश्चयं करोति ॥

तस्य कार्यभेदमाह — ‘ तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ’ इति । प्रकारद्वयमाह

(१५०) अहङ्कारस्य “ एकादशकश्च गण. ” इन्द्रियाहः तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ।
 कार्यभेदाः ॥ द्विविध एव सर्गो ऽहङ्कारात् न त्वन्य इति ‘ एव ’—
 कारणावधारयति ॥ २४ ॥

स्यादेतत्—अहङ्कारादेकरूपात्कारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशकौ गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत
इत्यत आह—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः सः तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

“सात्त्विक” इति । प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विको
(१५१) एकरूपस्याप्य- वैकृतादहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात्त-
हङ्कारस्य गुणभेदाद्विकार- न्मात्रो गणः प्रवर्तते । कस्मात् ? यत् ‘स तामसः’ ।
भेदाः—सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, एतदुक्तम्भवति ‘यद्यप्यको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुण-
तामसात्तन्मात्रगणः ॥ भेदोद्भवाभिभवाभ्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति ’ ॥

ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमकिञ्चित्करणे रजसे-
त्यत आह—“तैजसादुभयम्” इति । तैजसाद्राज-
(१५२) सत्त्वतमसोः- सादुभयं गुणद्वयं भवति, यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तर-
प्रवर्तकतया रजसः सा- मस्ति तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रिये समर्थे अपि
र्यक्ता ॥ न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चाल-
यति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति । तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये
सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न व्यर्थं रज
इति ॥ २५ ॥

१. भाष्यमतेन मनस एवैकस्य सात्त्विकत्वम् इतरेषां दशानां राजसत्त्वमेवेति ।
२।१८ सूत्रे द्रष्टव्यम् । अहङ्कारतत्त्वं त्रिधा विभक्तम्—‘वैकृत’—‘भूतादि’—‘तैजसं-
संज्ञाभेदात्’—तदुक्तं गौडपादेन—“सत्त्वेनाभिभूते रजस्तमसी यदा अहङ्कारे भवतः
तदा सो ऽहङ्कारः सात्त्विकः—तस्य संज्ञा कृता ‘वैकृत’ इति ॥ एवं च तमसाऽभिभूते
सत्त्वरजसी यदा ऽहङ्कारे भवतस्तदा सोहङ्कारस्तामसः—तस्य संज्ञा कृता ‘भूतादिः’
इति ॥ एवमेव यदा ऽहङ्कारे सत्त्वतमसी रजसाऽभिभूते तदा सोऽहङ्कारो राजसः
‘तैजस’ इति संज्ञां लभते”—इति

सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाह —

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।

वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

“ बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि ” इति । सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च । उभयमप्येतदि-
(१५३) बाह्येन्द्रियदश न्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते । तानि च स्वसं-
कम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पद- ज्ञाभिश्चक्षुरादिभिरुक्तानि । तत्र रूपग्रहणलिङ्गं चक्षुः,
व्युत्पत्तिश्च ॥ शब्दग्रहणलिङ्गं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलिङ्गं घ्राणम्,
रसग्रहणलिङ्गं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्गं त्वक्, इति
ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा । एवं वागादीनां कार्यं वक्ष्यति (कारिका २८) ॥ २६ ॥

एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह —

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।

गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

“ उभयात्मकम् ” इति । एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्,
(१५४) मनसो बुद्धिक- बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च चक्षुरादीनां वागादीनां च
मोभयात्मकत्वसाधनम् ॥ मनोऽधिष्ठितानामेव स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः ॥

तदसाधारणेन रूपेण लक्षयति—“ सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः ” इति । सङ्कल्पेन
रूपेण

(१५५) मनसो लक्ष- मनो लक्ष्यते । ‘आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्तिवदम्’ इति
गम्—सङ्कल्पकम्, लक्ष- सम्मुग्धम् ‘इदमेवम्, नैवम्’ इति सम्यक्कल्पयति
गसमन्वयश्च ॥ विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत् । यदाहुः—

सम्मुग्धं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्णन्त्यविकल्पितम् ।

तत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः ’ ॥ इति ॥ तथाहि,

१. ‘ इ ’ विषयाः, तान् प्रति द्रवन्तीति ‘ इन्द्रिय ’ शब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कैश्चित्
क्रियते ।

अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमभिर्विकल्पकम् ।

बालमुकादिविज्ञानसदृशम् मुग्धवस्तुजमिति ॥

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यथा ।

बुद्ध्या ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥

सो ऽयं सङ्कल्पलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानासमानजातीयाभ्यां
व्यवच्छिन्दन् मनो लक्षयति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असाधारणव्यापारयोगिनौ यथा महदहङ्कारौ नेन्द्रियम्, एव

मनो ऽप्यसाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्ह-
(१५६) मनस इन्द्रिय- तीत्यत आह—“ इन्द्रियं च ” इति । कुतः ? --
त्वसाधनम्—इन्द्रियैः “ साधर्म्यात् ” । इन्द्रियान्तरः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारो-
सह सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपा- पादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम् नस्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्, महदह-
दानत्वरूपसाधर्म्यात् ॥ * ङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्मा-
द्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥

अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीत्यत आह-- “ गुणपरि-
(१५७) एकस्याहङ्का- णामविशेषात् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ” इति शब्दाद्युप-
रस्य गुणपरिणामवि- भोगसम्प्रवर्तकाद्दृष्टसहकारिभेदात्कार्यभेदः । अदृष्ट-
शेषात्कार्यभेदः ॥ भेदोऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव ।

(१५८) बाह्यभेदाश्चेति ‘ बाह्यभेदाश्च ’ इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्—यथा बाह्य-
दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥ भेदास्तथैतदपीत्यर्थः ॥ २७ ॥

(१५९) दशेन्द्रियवृ- त्तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्य-
क्तिकथनम् ॥ साधारणीवृत्तीराह—

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।

वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां सम्मुखवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम् । “ वचनादानविहरणोत्स-
र्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ” कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम् । कण्ठनाल्वादिस्थानमिन्द्रियं वाक्,
तस्या वृत्तिर्वचनम् । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिमाह—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

“ स्वालक्षण्यम् ” इति । स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य । स्वमसाधारणं लक्षणं येषां तानि स्वलक्षणानि महदहङ्कारमनोसि, तेषां (१६०) अन्तःकरणत्र- भावःस्वालक्षण्यम्, तच्च स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव । यस्य स्वस्वलक्षणरूपमे- तद्यथा—महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारस्याभिमानः वासाधारणं वृत्तित्रयम् ॥ सङ्कल्पो मनसो वृत्तिर्व्यापारः ॥

वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणासाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह— “ सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ” असाधारणी । “ सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः (१६१) पञ्चवायुरूपा- पञ्च ” । सामान्या चासौ करणवृत्तिश्चेति । त्रयाणा- साधारणी वृत्तिः ॥ मपि करणानां पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहणा- भिपादाङ्गुष्ठवृत्तिः, अपानः कृकाटिकापृष्ठपादपायूपस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो हृन्नाभिसर्वसन्धिवृत्तिः, उदानो हृत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रमध्यवृत्तिः, व्यानस्त्वग्वृत्ति- रिति पञ्च वायवः ॥ २९ ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यासाधारणीषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाक्रमौ सप्रकारावाह—

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।

दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

“ युगपत् ” इति, दृष्टे यथा—यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पातमात्रा- द्वाग्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्या- (१६२) चतुर्विधकरण- लोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भ- स्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपद्वृत्तिः । वन्ति, यतस्तत उत्प्लुत्य तत्स्थानादेकपदेऽपसरति ॥

“ क्रमशश्च ” यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमात्रं सम्मुग्धमालोचयति,
अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिञ्जिनीमण्डली-
(१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥ कृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटच्चरोऽयमिति निश्चिनोति,
अथ च माम्प्रत्येतीत्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरा-
मीतः स्थानादिति ॥

परोक्षे त्वन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्जं वृत्तिरित्याह- “ अदृष्टे त्रयस्य
तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ” इति । अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य युगप-
(१६४) अन्तःकर- त्क्रमेण वृत्तिर्दृष्टपूर्विकेति । अनुमानागमस्मृतयो हि
णत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्ति- परोक्षे ऽर्थे दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथा । यथा दृष्टे
द्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥ तथा ऽदृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥

स्यादेतत्-चतुर्णां त्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां सदातन-
(१६५) करणानां स्व- त्वेन वृत्तीनां सदोत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, आकस्मिकत्वे तु
तन्त्रत्वे दोषाः ॥ वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।

पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

“ स्वाम् ” इति । करणानीति शेषः । यथा हि बहवः पुरुषाः शाक्ती-
कयाष्टीकधानुष्कार्पाणिकाः कृतसङ्केताः परावस्कन्द-
(१६६) तन्निराकर- नाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकृतमवगम्यान्यतमः
णम्-परस्परापेक्षाण्ये- प्रवर्तते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते न तु
व करणानि स्वस्ववृ- यष्टयादिकम्, एव याष्टीकोऽपि यष्टिमेव, न शक्त्या-
त्तिषु ॥ दिकम् । तथा ऽन्यतमस्य करणस्याकृतात् स्वकार्य-
करणभिमुल्यादन्यतमं करणं प्रवर्तते । तत्प्रवृत्तेश्च
हेतुत्वाच्च वृत्तिमङ्करप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्—“ स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ” इति ॥

स्यादेतत्—याष्टीकादयश्चेतनत्वात् परस्पराकूतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्त इति युक्तम्
 करणानि स्वचेतनानि, तस्माच्चैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते ।
 (१६७) करणानाम- तेनैषामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वरूपसामर्थ्योपयोगाभिज्ञेन
 चेतनत्वे ऽपि पुरुषार्थ- भवितव्यमित्यत आह—“पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केन-
 स्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥ चित्कार्यते करणम्” इति । भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरु-
 षार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमग्न
 तस्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्त्रा । एतच्च “वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” (कारिका ५७)
 इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

(१६८) करणवि- “न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्” इत्युक्तम् । तत्र करणं
 भागः ॥ विभजते—

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।

कार्यं च तस्य दशधा, हार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

“करणं त्रयोदशविधम्” इति । इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति त्रयो-
 (१६९) त्रयोदश- दशप्रकारं करणम् । कारकविशेषः करणम् । न च
 विधकरणपरिगणनम् । व्यापारावेशं विना कारकत्वमिति व्यापारावेशमाह—
 “तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्” इति यथायथम् । तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्या-
 हरन्ति, यथास्वमुपाददते, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीति यावत् । बुद्ध्यहङ्कार-
 मनांसि तु स्ववृत्त्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति । बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति ॥

आहरणधारणादिक्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं चेत्त्यत आह—
 (१७०) करणव्या- “कार्यं च तस्य” इति । कार्यं तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य
 पारपरिगणनम् ॥ करणस्य दशधा, आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च । आहार्यं
 व्याप्यम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः;
 ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दश—इत्याहार्यं दशधा । एवं धार्यमप्यन्तः-
 करणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृत्त्या शरीरम्, तच्च पार्थिवादिपाञ्चभौतिकम् ।
 शब्दादीनां पञ्चानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति धार्य-
 मपि दशधा । एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते
 च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥

(१७१) त्रयोद-

शविधकरणेऽवान्तर- त्रयोदशविधकरणेऽवान्तरविभागं करोति-
विभागः—बाह्यान्तर-
भेदात् ॥

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।

साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

“अन्तःकरणम्” इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्-

(१७२) अन्तः- ‘बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन’ इति; शरीराभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वा-
करणस्य त्रैविध्यम् ॥ दन्तःकरणम् ॥

“दशधा” बाह्यकरणम् “त्रयस्य” अन्तःकरणस्य “विषयाख्यम्” ।

(१७३) बाह्य- विषयमाख्याति विषयसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायेषु
करणानां दशधात्वम् ॥ कर्तव्येषु द्वारीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन,
कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण^१ ॥

बाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह—“साम्प्रतकालम्” इति । वर्तमान-

(१७४) बाह्या-
न्तरकरणयोर्भेदः बाह्य-
करणानां वर्तमानका-
लीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणा-
नां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥

कालं बाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीत-
मपि वर्तमानम्; अतो वागपि वर्तमानकालविषया
भवति । “त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम्” इति ।
तद्यथा—नदीपूरभेदादभूद्वृष्टिः; अस्ति धूमादग्निरिह
नगनिकुञ्जे, असत्युपघातके पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणाद्भ-
विष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुरूपश्च सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्य-

वसाया भवन्ति ॥

कालश्च वैशेषिकाभिमत एको न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति ।

(१७५) सांख्य-
मतं कालस्य न तत्त्वा-
न्तरत्वम् ॥

तस्मादयं यैरुपाधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु
त एवोपायाः, येऽनागतादिव्यवहारहेतवः, कृतमत्रा-
न्तर्गदुना कालेनेति सांख्याचार्याः, तस्मान्न काल-
रूपतत्त्वान्तराभ्युपगम इति ॥ ३३ ॥

(१७६) बाह्येन्द्रि- साम्प्रतकालानां बाह्येन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवे-
यविषयविवेचनम् ॥ चयति—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।

वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

“बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि” इति । “बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि” तेषां दशानामिन्द्रियाणा-
मध्ये “पञ्च” “विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” विशेषा

(१७७) बुद्धीन्द्रि- स्थूलाः शब्दादयः शान्तघोरमूढरूपाः पृथिव्यादि-
याणां विषयाः स्थूल- रूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः,
सूक्ष्मरूपाः ॥ मात्रग्रहणेन स्थूलभूतमपाकरोति । विशेषाश्च अवि-

शेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया येषां बुद्धी-
न्द्रियाणां तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रोर्ध्वस्तोतसां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्र-
विषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवन्तेष
त्वक् स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयैव । एवञ्चक्षु-
रादयो ऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ॥

एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये “वाग्भवति शब्दविषया” स्थूलशब्दविषया, तद्धे-
तुत्वात् । न तु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहङ्कारिकत्वेन

(१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वागिन्द्रियेण सहैककारणकत्वात् । “शेषाणि तु”
विषयाः ॥ चत्वारि पायूपस्थपाणिपादाख्यानि “पञ्चविषयाणि”

पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकत्वा-
दिति ॥ ३४ ॥

साम्प्रतं त्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाञ्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह—

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।

तस्मात्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

१. तन्मात्रपदे । २. ‘भूतभाविनावपाकरोति’ इति पाठान्तरम् ।

“ सान्तःकरणा ” इति । “ द्वारि ” प्रधानम् । “ द्वाराणि ” करणानि
(१७९) सर्वविधक- बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरूपनीतं सर्वं विषयं
रणेषु अन्तःकरणानां समनोऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहतेऽध्यवस्यति
प्राधान्यम् तस्माद्बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तः-
करणा बुद्धिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु येऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी
द्वारिणी ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह—

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।

कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाशय बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

“ एते ” इति । यथा हि ग्रामाध्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषया-
(१८०) अन्तः- ध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स
करणेष्वपि बुद्धेः प्राधा- च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्प-
न्यम् ॥ यन्ति, मनश्च सङ्कल्प्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमत्य
बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां, तदिदमुक्तम्— “ पुरुषस्यार्थं
प्रकाशय बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ” इति ॥

बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च “ गुणविशेषाः ” गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां विकारा,
(१८१) परस्पर- ते तु परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगापवर्ग-
विरोधशीलानामपि रूपेणैकवाक्यताज्ञीताः, यथा वर्तितैलवह्नयः सन्तम-
गुणानां पुरुषार्थरूप सापनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपः, एवमेते
एककार्ये प्रवृत्तिः प्रदी- गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३६ ॥
पवत् ॥

कस्मात्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहङ्काराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेत्यत
आह—

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।

सैवं च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

“ सर्वम् ” इति । पुरुषार्थस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् तस्य यत्साक्षात्साधनं तत्

(१८२) बुद्धेः प्राधान्यसाधनम्-साक्षात्-पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वात् ॥ प्रधानम् । बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सैव प्रधानम् । यथा सर्वाध्यक्षः साक्षाद्राजार्थसाधनतया प्रधानमितरे तु ग्रामाध्यक्षादयस्तम्प्रति गुणभूताः । बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषसन्निधानात् तच्छायापत्त्या तद्रूपेव

सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति । सुखदुःखानुभवो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपैवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति । यथा ऽर्थालोचनसङ्कल्पप्रतिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्धानुपसङ्क्रांताः तथेन्द्रियव्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवसायेन सहैकव्यापारीभवन्ति, यथा स्वसैन्येन सह ग्रामाध्यक्षादिसैन्यं सर्वाध्यक्षस्य भवति । “ सर्व ” शब्दादिकं “ प्रति ” य “ उपभोगः ” “ पुरुषस्य ” तं साधयति ॥

ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगसम्पादिका यदि बुद्धिः तर्ह्यनिर्माक्ष इत्यत आह—पश्चात् “ प्रधानपुरुषयोरेन्तरं ” विशेषं “ विशिनष्टि ” करोति-यथौदनपाकं पचतीति, -करणं च प्रतिपादनम् । ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरेन्तरस्य कृतकत्वाद-नित्यत्वम्-करणस्या-नित्यत्वम्, तत्कृतस्य मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत आह—“ विशिनष्टि ”-“ प्रधानं सविकारमन्यदहमन्य ” इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमिव बुद्धिर्बोधयति, न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेनापवर्गः पुरुषार्थो दर्शितः, “ सूक्ष्मम् ” दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥

तदेवं करणानि विभज्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।

एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

“ तन्मात्राणि ” इति । शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि, । न चैष (१८४) अविशेष- शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति (सूक्ष्म) कथनम् ॥ मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

अविशेषानुक्त्वा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेषामाह—“तेभ्यो भूतानि” इति ।
 (१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो
 कथनम्—तदुत्पत्तिप्रद- भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलवाविरूपाणि “पञ्च”
 “पञ्चभ्यः” तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥

अस्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषस्वे किमायातमित्यत आह—“एते स्मृता विशेषाः”
 इति । कुतः—“शान्त घोराश्च मूढाश्च” । चकार
 (१८६) भूतानां स्थू- एको हेतौ द्वितीयः समुच्चये । यस्मादाकाशादिषु
 लत्वे हेतुकथनम् ॥ स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा
 लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधान-
 तया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते ऽमी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या ऽनुभूयमाना ‘विशेषा’ ।
 इति च ‘स्थूलाः’ इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि त्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृ-
 त्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥

विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाह—

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।

सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

“सूक्ष्मा” इति । “त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः” इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारा-
 नाह—“सूक्ष्माः” सूक्ष्मदेहाः, परिकल्पिताः, “माता-
 पितृजाः” षाट्कौशिकाः । तत्र मातृतो लोमलोहित-
 मांसानि, पितृतस्तु स्नाय्वस्थिमज्जान इति षट् कोशाः ।
 प्रकृष्टानि महान्ति भूतानि “प्रभूतानि”—तैस्सह ।
 सूक्ष्मं शरीरमेको विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः; महा-
 भूतवर्गे च घटादीनां निवेश इति ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममा- सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्देहयोर्विशेषमाह— “सूक्ष्मा-
 तापितृजयोर्भेदः नित्य- स्तेषाम्” इति । विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते “नियताः” ।
 त्वानित्यत्विनिबन्धनः ॥ “मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते” इति, रसान्ता वा
 अस्मान्ता वा विडन्ता वेति ॥ ३९ ॥

सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतमहदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

‘पूर्वोत्पन्नम्’ इति । “पूर्वोत्पन्नम्” प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकै-
कमुत्पादितम् । “असक्तम्” अव्याहतम् शिलाम-

(१८९) सूक्ष्म-
शरीरोपपादनम्-तस्य
लक्षणानि-(१)असक्त-
त्वम्-(२)नित्यत्वम्॥
निवतत्वाद्विशेषः ॥

प्यनुविशति । “नियतम्” आ चादिसर्गादा
च महाप्रलयादवतिष्ठते, —“महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्”
महदहङ्कारैकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम् । एषां
समुदायः सूक्ष्मं शरीरम्, शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैर-

नन्वस्वेतदेव शरीरं भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन षाट्कौशिकेन
(१९०)(१) संसर-
णम् निरुपभोगत्वं च
ततश्च षाट्कौशिक-
शरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥
शरीरेणेत्यत आह—“संसरति” इति । उपात्त-
मुपात्तं षाट्कौशिकं शरीरं जहाति हायं हायं चोपादत्ते-
कस्मात् इति “निरुपभोगम्” यतः, षाट्कौशिकं
शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं
यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति ॥

ननु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं
(१९१) धर्माधर्मादि-
भावैरधिवासितत्वमूलकं
तत्संसरणम् ॥
संसरतीत्यत आह—“भावैरधिवासितम्” इति ।
धर्माधर्मज्ञानाज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानि भावाः-
तदन्विता बुद्धिः, तदन्वितञ्च सूक्ष्मं शरीरमिति तदपि
भावैरधिवासितम्, यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्पर्का-

द्वञ्च तदामोदवासितमभवति । तस्माद्भावैरेवाधिवासितत्वासंसरति ॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलये ऽपि तच्छरीरञ्च तिष्ठतीत्यत आह—
(१९२) महाप्रलये
तस्य लयं गमितत्वा-
लिङ्गत्वम् ॥
“लिङ्गम्” इति । लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्-हेतुमत्त्वेन
चास्य लिङ्गत्वमिति भावः ॥ ४० ॥

स्यादेतत्—बुद्धिरेव साहङ्कारेन्द्रिया कस्मान्न संसरति ? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणा-
प्रामाणिकेनेत्यत आह—

‘चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया ।

तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

“चित्रम्” इति । लिङ्गनात् ज्ञापनात् बुद्ध्यादयो ‘लिङ्गम्’, तत् अना-
श्रयञ्च तिष्ठति । जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्ध्यादयः प्रत्यु-
(१९३) सूक्ष्मशरीर- त्यन्मशरीराश्रयाः, -प्रत्युत्पन्नपञ्चतन्मात्रवत्त्वे सति
स्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ बुद्ध्यादित्वात् — दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिबुद्ध्यादिवत् ।
“विना विशेषैः” इति, सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैरित्यर्थः ।

आगमश्चात्र भवति—

“ततः सत्यवतः कायात् पाशबद्धं वशङ्गतम् ।

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चर्षं बलाद्यमः” (महाभारत वनपर्व-अध्याय
२९६.) इत्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वेन सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वमुपलक्षयति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भ-
वात् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् ‘पुरुषः’, तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे शेते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाद्य यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च-तदुभयमाह—

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।

प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

“पुरुषार्थहेतुकम्” इति । पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम् । “निमित्तम्”
धर्माधर्मादि, “नैमित्तिकम्” तेषु तेषु निकायेषु
(१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीर- यथायथं षाट्कौशिकशरीरग्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्त-
संसरणप्रकारः ॥ प्रभवः । निमित्तञ्च नैमित्तिकञ्च-तत्र यः प्रसङ्गः

प्रसक्तिस्तथा “नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्” सूक्ष्म-
शरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिकां विधाय परशुरामो वा ऽजातशत्रुर्वा

१. केचिदिमां कारिकां स्थूलशरीरपरतया व्याख्याय ‘लिङ्गम्’ लिङ्गशरीरं
‘विशेषैः’ स्थूलशरीरैरित्याहुः ॥ अन्ये तु ‘लिङ्गम्’ लिङ्गशरीरं ‘विशेषैः’ लिङ्ग-
शरीराधिष्ठानभूतैः सूक्ष्मशरीरैरिति । एतन्मते शरीरत्रयम्-लिङ्गशरीरम्, तद-
धिष्ठानभूतं सूक्ष्मशरीरम्, तदधिष्ठानभूतं च स्थूलशरीरमिति ।

वत्सराजो वा भवति, एवन्तत्तस्थूलशरीरपरिग्रहणाद्देवो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुर्वा वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मं शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

कुतस्त्यः पुनरस्येदृशो महिमेत्यत आह—“ प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात् ” इति ।
(१९५) सूक्ष्मशरीर- तथा च पुराणम्—
संसरणे हेतुः—प्रकृतेर्वि- “ वैश्वरूप्यात् प्रधानस्य परिणामोऽयमद्भुत ”
भुत्वम् ॥ इति ॥ ४२ ॥

“ निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ” इत्युक्तम्—तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभजते—

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।

दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

“ सांसिद्धिकाश्च ” इति । “ वैकृतिकाः ” नैमित्तिकाः पुरुषस्य जातस्यो-
(१९६) निमित्तनै- त्तरकालदेवताराधनादिनोत्पन्नाः । “ प्राकृतिकाः ”
मित्तिकविभागः धर्मादि- स्वाभाविका भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः^१ । तथा हि—सर्गा-
रूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिक- दावादिविद्वानत्र भगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञान-
वैकृतिकभावकथनम्, वैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवेति स्मरन्ति । वैकृताश्च
तस्य च करणाश्रयित्व- भावा असंसिद्धिकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोत्पन्नाः,
वर्णनम् ॥ यथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनाममहर्षीणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञाना-
वैराग्यानैश्वर्याण्यपि ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तदाश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललबुद्बुदमांसपेशीकरणडाद्यङ्ग-
(१९७) शरीरग्रह- प्रत्यङ्गव्यूहाः गर्भस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य
रूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्या- बाल्यकौमार्यौवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥
श्रयित्वकथनम् ॥

अवगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि । कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमन्नैमि-
त्तिकमित्यत आह—

(१९८) निमित्त-
विशेषाणां कार्यविशेष-
निरूपणम् ॥

१. करणमत्र बुद्धिः । २. ‘ स्वाभाविकाः ’ यावद्वस्तुभाविनः, ‘ वैकृतिकाः ’
कादचित्कवृत्तयः ॥ गौडपादभाष्ये तु—‘ भावास्त्रिधा चिन्त्यन्ते—सांसिद्धिकाः, प्राकृताः,
वैकृताश्चेत्युक्तम् ।

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।

ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

“ धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् ” द्युप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु । “ गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ” (१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्व- सुतलादिषु^१ लोकेषु । “ ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः । ” तावदेव गमनं प्रति अधर्मस्या- प्रकृतिभोगमारभते न यावद्विवेकख्यातिं करोति; अथ धोगमनम्प्रति, ज्ञानस्या- विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां कृतकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्त- पवर्गम्प्रति, अज्ञानस्य म्पुरुषम्प्रति निवर्तते । यथाहुः—

च बन्धनम्प्रति-कारण-
त्वम् ॥

“ विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिचेष्टितम् ” इति ॥

“ विपर्ययात्^२ अतत्त्वज्ञानात् “ इष्यते बन्धः ” ॥

स च त्रिविधः—प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्म- (२००) बन्धत्रैविध्य- ज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः निरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वै- पुराणे प्रकृतिलयान् प्रत्युच्यते । कृतिक-दाक्षिणकरूपम् ॥

“ पूर्णं शतसहस्रं हि तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः ” इति ॥

वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारबुद्धीः पुरुषधियोपासते, तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते—

“ दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।

भौतिकास्तु^३ शतम्पूर्णं, सहस्रन्त्वाभिमानिकाः ॥

बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।

ते खल्वमी विदेहा^३ येषां वैकृतिको बन्धः ” इति ॥

१. भूतलेति पाठान्तरम् । २. ‘ भौतिकाः ’—ये भूतान्येव पुरुषधियोपासते । ‘ आभिमानिकाः ’—येऽहङ्कारमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । ‘ बौद्धा. ’—ये बुद्धिमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । ३. विदेहाः वैकृतिकबन्धवतां संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् ।

इष्टापूर्तेन दाक्षिणकः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो ह्रीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना
बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।

ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

“वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः” इति—पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रात्
(२०१) वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूते-
प्रकृतिलयः । न्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्व्वात्मबुद्धयोपास्यमानेषु लयः ।
कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति” ॥

“संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्” इति । ‘राजसात्’ इत्यनेन रजसो
(२०२) राज- दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥
साद्रागात् संसारः ।

“ऐश्वर्यादविघात” इति—इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति ।
(२०३) ऐश्व- “विपर्ययात्” अनैश्वर्यात् “तद्विपर्यासः” सर्वत्रे-
र्यादिच्छानभिघातः, च्छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥
अनैश्वर्याच्चेच्छाभिघातः ॥

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनष्टौ भावान् समासव्यासाभ्यां मुमुक्षूणां हेयोपादेयान्
दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तावत् समासमाह—

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।

गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

१. वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पूतमर्थाः
प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्निकर्महवनं त्रेतायां यच्च हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्यां च यद्दानमिष्टन्तदभि-
धीयते । २. यः प्रकृतिलयं गच्छति ।

“ एषः ” इति । प्रतीयते ऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । तत्र
 “ विपर्ययः ” अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः
 (२०४) विपर्ययादि- “ अशक्तिः ” अपि करणवैकल्याहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव ।
 बुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन “ तुष्टिसिद्धी ” अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव ।
 कथनम् ॥ तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मा-
 दीनां ज्ञानवर्जमन्तर्भावः; सिद्धौ च ज्ञानस्येति ॥

व्यासमाह- “ तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ” इति । कस्मात् ? “ गुण.
 वैषम्यविमर्दात् ” इति । गुणानां वैषम्यमैकैकस्या-
 (२०५) तस्यैव व्यासेन धिकबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयो-
 कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः ॥ द्वयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमात्रतया
 यथाकार्यमुन्नीयेते । तदिदं गुणानां वैषम्यम् तेनोपमर्दः
 एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्भाऽभिभवः । तस्मात्तस्य भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥

तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।

अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

“ पञ्च ” इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमो-
 मोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्त्रसंज्ञकाः पञ्च विपर्यय-
 (२०६) विपर्ययादीनां विशेषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितादीनां विपर्यय-
 पञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम् ॥ स्वभावत्वात् । यद्वा—यदविद्यया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते
 वस्तु, अस्मितादयस्तत्स्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिवि-
 शन्ते । अत एव पञ्चपर्वविद्येत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥

(२०७) विपर्ययादीनां सम्प्रति पञ्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह --
 प्रत्येकमवान्तरभेदकथ-
 नम्—तत्र प्रथमं विपर्य-
 यस्य द्वाषष्टिः ॥

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

“भेदः” इति । भेदस्तमसोऽविद्याया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमहदहङ्कार-
(२०८) अविद्यारूप- पञ्चतन्मात्रेण्वात्मस्वात्मबुद्धिरविद्या तमः, अष्टविध-
विपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥ विषयत्वात्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

“मोहस्य च” इति, अत्राप्यष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुषज्यते । देवा
(२०९) अस्मितारूप- ह्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्य मृतत्वाभिमानिनोऽणिमादिकमा-
विपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥ त्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सेयमस्मिता मोहो
अष्टविधमैश्वर्यविषयत्वादष्टविधः ॥

“दशविधो महामोहः” इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया दश-
(२१०) रागरूपवि- विधविषयेषु रञ्जनीयेषु राग आसक्तिर्महामोहः, स
र्यस्य दशविधत्वम् ॥ च दशविधविषयत्वादशविधः ॥

“तामिस्रो” द्वेषो “अष्टादशधा” । शब्दादयो दशविषया रञ्जनीयाः
स्वरूपतः, ऐश्वर्यन्स्वणिमादिकञ्च स्वरूपतो रञ्जनी-
(२११) द्वेपरूपविपर्य- यम् । किं तु रञ्जनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय
यस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥ उपस्थिताः परस्पररेणोपहन्यमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः
स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दाभिर्दशभिः
सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विषयो द्वेषस्तामिस्रो अष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टा-
दशधेति ।

“तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः” । अभिनिवेशोऽन्धतामिस्रः । तथेत्यनेनाष्टा-
दशधेत्यनुषज्यते । देवाः खल्वणिमादिकमष्टविधमै-
(२१२) अभिनिवेश- श्वर्यमासाद्य दश शब्दादीन् विषयान् भुञ्जानाः—
रूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादश- ‘शब्दादयो भोग्यास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयोऽस्माकम-
विधित्वम् ॥ सुरादिभिर्मोषघानिषत’ इति—बिभ्यति । तदिदं
भयमभिनिवेशोऽन्धतामिस्रो अष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टा-
दशधेति ॥

(२१३) विपर्ययावा- सोऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययोऽवान्तरभेदाद्
न्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या- द्वाषष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥
द्वाषष्टिः ॥

(२१४) अष्टाविंशति- तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुक्त्वा ऽष्टाविंशतिभेदाम-
प्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥ शक्तिमाह--

एकादशेन्द्रियबधाः सह बुद्धिबधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।

सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

“ एकादश ”—इति । इन्द्रियबधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिबधहेतुत्वेन, न त्वशक्ति-
(२१५) एकादशेन्द्रि-
यबधजन्यैकादशविधा- • भेदपूर्णत्वेन “ एकादशेन्द्रियबधाः ”—
ऽशक्तिः ॥

बाधिर्यं कुष्टिता ऽन्धत्वं जडता ऽजिघ्रता तथा ।

मूकताकौण्यपङ्गुत्वक्लैब्योदावर्तमन्दताः ॥

यथासंख्यं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां बधाः । एतावत्येव तु तद्धेतुका बुद्धेर-
शक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेतुकत्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते ।
हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥

तदेवमिन्द्रियबधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतो ऽशक्तीराह--“ सह-
(२१६) बुद्धेः साक्षा- बुद्धिबधैः ” इति । कति बुद्धेः स्वरूपतो बधा इत्यत
दशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥ आह--“ सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेः ” । कुतः ? “ विपर्य-
यात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् । ” तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययास्त-
न्निरूपणात्तवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धयो ऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तन्निरूपणादष्टौ
भवन्तीति ॥ ४९ ॥

(२१७) नवविधतु- तुष्टिर्नवधेत्युक्तम्, ताः परिगणयति--
ष्टिकथनम् ॥

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,—नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

“ आध्यात्मिकाः ” इति । आध्यात्मिकाः—‘ प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा ऽस्ति’

इति प्रतिपद्य, ततो ऽस्य श्रवणमननादिना विवेक-
(२१८) चतुर्विधा- साक्षात्काराय त्वसदुपदेशतुष्टो यो न प्रयतते तस्या-
ध्यात्मिकतुष्टिकथनम् ॥ ध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति; प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त-
मात्मानमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः ।
कास्ना इत्यत आह—“ प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ”, प्रकृत्यादिराख्या यासां
तास्तथोक्ताः ॥

तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—‘ विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि प्रकृति-
(२१९) अध्यात्मि- परिणामभेदस्तञ्च प्रकृतिरेव करोतीति कृतन्तद्ध्या-
कतुष्टिषु प्रथमा प्रकृ- नाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवंमेवास्तु वत्स,—इति सेयमुपदेश-
त्याख्या अम्भः ॥ व्यस्य तुष्टिः प्रकृतौ, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या अम्भ
उच्यते ॥

या तु,—‘ प्राकृत्यपि^२ विवेकख्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति,^३ माभूःसर्वस्य
(२२०) द्वितीया उपा- सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात्; प्रवज्या-
दानाख्या सलिलम् ॥ यास्तु सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रवज्यामुपाददीथाः,
कृतन्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन्’—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः
सोपादानाख्या ‘ सलिलम् ’ उच्यते ॥

या तु,—प्रवज्याऽपि सद्योनिर्वाणदिति सैव कालपरिपाकमपेक्ष्य सिद्ध्यन्ते
(२२१) तृतीया काल- विधास्यति, अलमुत्तप्ततया तव’—इति उपदेशे या
ख्या मेघः ॥ तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या ‘ मेघ ’ उच्यते ॥

१. अत्रायं सङ्ग्रहश्लोकः—अम्भः सलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः पारं तथा सुपारं च ।
अन्यच्च पारापारमनुत्तमाम्भ उत्तमाम्भश्च’ इति । २. प्रकृत्या निवृत्ता । ३. प्रकृति-
मात्रादिविवेकख्यातौ सत्या प्रकृतेः सर्वे प्रति तुल्यसम्बन्धत्वात् सकलजनस्य विवे-
कख्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ४. ‘ ओष ’ इति पाठान्तरम् ।

या तु,—‘ न प्रकृतेन कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव ।
 (२२२) चतुर्थी भा- अत एव मदालसापत्यान्यतिबालानि मातुरुपदेशादेव
 ग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥ विवेकख्यातिमन्ति मुक्तानि बभूवुः, तस्मात्ख्याद्भाग्य-
 मेव हेतुर्नान्यत्’-इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या
 ‘ वृष्टिः’ उच्यते ॥

बाह्या दर्शयति-“ बाह्याः ” तुष्टयः “ विषयोपरमात्, पञ्च ” । याः
 खल्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारादीनात्मेत्यभिमन्य
 (२२३) पञ्चविधबाह्य- मानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता बाह्याः, आत्मज्ञाना-
 तुष्टिकथनम् ॥ भावे सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति । ताश्च वैराग्ये
 सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपञ्चत्वाद्वैराग्याण्यपि पञ्च,
 तत्पञ्चत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति । उपरम्यते ऽनेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम्, विषयादुपरमो
 विषयोपरमः । विषयाभोग्याः शब्दादयः पञ्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥

तथा हि-अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा
 (२२४) बाह्यतुष्टिषु भवन्ति । तथा हि-सेवादयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च
 प्रथमा, पारम् ॥ सेवकादीन् दुःखाकुर्वन्ति,

“ दृष्यद्दुरीश्वरद्वाःस्थदण्डचण्डार्धचन्द्रजाम् ।

वेदनां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः सेवास्वनुषज्जते ” ॥

एवमन्ये ऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सैषा ‘ पारम्’
 उच्यते ॥

तथा ऽर्जितन्धनम् रजैकागारिकाग्निजलौघादिभ्यो विनङ्क्ष्यतीति तद्रक्षणे
 (२२५) द्वितीया महदुःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा
 सुपारम् ॥ द्वितीया ‘ सुपारम्’ उच्यते ॥

तथा महता ऽऽयासेनार्जितन्धनं भुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति तत्प्रक्षयम्भावयतो
 (२२६) तृतीया पारा- विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया ‘ पारापारम्’
 पारम् ॥ उच्यते ॥

एवं शब्दादिभोगाभ्यामात् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयप्राप्तौ कामिनं (२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्त- दुःखाकुर्वन्तीति भोगदोषम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे या माम्भः ॥ तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते ॥

एवञ्चानुपहृत्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोषदर्शनाद्विषयो- (२२८) पञ्चमी उत्त- परमे या तुष्टिः सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते ॥ माम्भः ॥

एवमाध्यात्मिकीभिश्चतसृभिः बाह्याभिश्च पञ्चभिः 'नव तुष्टयो ऽभि- मताः' ॥ ५० ॥

(२२९) सिद्धिभेदक- गौणमुख्यभेदैः सिद्धीराह—
थनम् ॥

ऊहः शब्दो ऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयो ऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वो ऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

"ऊह" इति । विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य त्रिधा तद्विघातास्त्रय इतीमा मुख्यास्तिस्त्रः सिद्धयः, तदुपायतया त्वितरा गौण्यः (२३०) सिद्धिभेदक- पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमत्तया व्यवस्थिताः ।
थनम् ॥ तत्राद्या ऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिर्हेतुरेव । मुख्यास्तु सिद्धयो हेतुमत्य एव । मध्यमास्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यः ॥

विधिवद्गुरुमुखादध्यात्मविद्यानामक्षरस्वरूपग्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धि- (२३१) अध्ययनरूपा स्तारमुच्यते ॥
प्रथमा सिद्धिः, तारम् ॥

तत्कार्यम् शब्दः; 'शब्द' इति पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति, (२३२) शब्दरूपा कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतार-
द्वितीया, सुतारम् ॥ मुख्यते । पाठार्थाभ्यान्तदिदन्दिधा श्रवणम् ॥

“ऊहः” तर्कः आगमाविरोधिन्यायनागमार्थपरीक्षणम् । परीक्षणञ्च सशय-
(२३३) ऊहरूपा- पूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम् । तदिदमन-
तृतीया तारतारम् ॥ नमाचक्षते आगमिनः । सा तृतीया सिद्धिस्तार-
तारमुच्यते ॥

“सुहृत्प्राप्तिः” । न्यायेन स्वयम्परीक्षितमप्यर्थं न श्रद्दधते; न यावद्गुरु-
(२३४) सुहृत्प्राप्तिरूपा शिष्यसब्रह्मचारिभिस्सह संवाद्यते । अतः सुहृदां गुरु-
चतुर्थी-रम्यकः ॥ शिष्यसब्रह्मचारिणां संवादकानां प्राप्तिः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः सा
सिद्धिश्चतुर्थी ‘रम्यक’ उच्यते ॥

“दानं” च शुद्धिविवेकज्ञानस्य, ‘दैर्घ्ये शोधने’ [पाणिनि ६।४।६८]
इत्यस्माद्धातोर्दानपदव्युत्पत्तेः । यथाह भगवान् पत-
(२३५) दानरूपा ङजलिः—“विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवो दुःखत्रयस्य हानो-
पञ्चमी, सदामुदितम् ॥ • पायः” इति [योगसूत्र २।२६] । ‘अविप्लवः’
शुद्धिः, सा च सवासनसंशयविपर्ययानां परिहारेण
विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्य स्वच्छप्रवाहे ऽवस्थापनम् । सा च न विना ऽऽदरनैर-
न्तर्यदीर्घकालसेविताभ्यसपरिपाकाद्भवतीति दानेन (विवेकख्यात्याः कार्येण)
सो^३ ऽपि संगृहीतः । सेयम्पञ्चमी सिद्धिस्सदामुदितमुच्यते ॥
(२३६) दुःखविधात- तिस्रश्च मुख्याः सिद्धयः प्रमोदमुदितमोदमाना,
त्रयरूपास्तिस्रो मुख्याः- इत्यष्टौ सिद्धयः ॥
प्रमोदमुदितमोदमानाः ॥

अन्ये व्याचक्षते—विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भावीयाभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं
यत् सा सिद्धिरूहः । यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीय-
(२३७) गौणसिद्धि- माकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः शब्दः, शब्द-
पञ्चकस्य प्रकारान्तरेण पाठादनन्तरम्भावात् । यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन
व्याख्यानम् ॥ सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थतो ऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा
ऽध्ययनहेतुका सिद्धिरध्ययनम् । सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति

१. “मननम् अमननमेवासुहृत्सम्मतम्, इति द्वितीयं मननमाह सुहृत्प्राप्ति-
रिति” इति पाठान्तरम् ।

२. “निबिडादेव नैरन्तर्यम्” इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. अभ्यासो ऽपि ।

यस्याधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ज्ञानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । दानञ्च सिद्धिहेतुः, धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानमप्रयच्छति । अस्य च युक्तयुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतम्परदोषोद्भावेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति ॥

सिद्धितुष्टिविपर्ययेणाशक्तिर्बुद्धिबधस्सप्तदशधा द्रष्टव्यः । अत्र प्रत्ययसर्गे (२३८) प्रत्ययसर्गे विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टीनां सिद्धेरङ्कुशत्वम् ततश्च तासां हेयत्वम् सिद्धेश्रोपादेयत्वम् ॥ सिद्धिरुपादेयेति प्रसिद्धमेव । तज्जिवारणहेतवस्तु विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्याह—“सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः” इति । ‘पूर्व’ इति विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टीः परामृशति । ताः सिद्धिकरिणीनामङ्कुशो, निवारकत्वात् । अतः सिद्धिपरिपन्थित्वात् विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्यर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥

स्यादेतत्-पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता सृष्टिः । स च पुरुषार्थः प्रत्ययसर्गाद्वा (२३९) उभयसर्गा- तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा सिध्यतीति कृतमुभयसर्गेणेत्यत वश्यकत्वशङ्का ॥ आह—

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः ।

लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥५२॥

“न विना” इति ।^१ “लिङ्गम्” इति तन्मात्रसर्गमुपलक्षयति, “भावैः” इति च प्रत्ययसर्गम् । एतदुक्तम्भवति-तन्मात्र- (२४०) उभयविध- सर्गस्य पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वं स्वरूपञ्च न प्रत्ययसर्गाद्विना सर्गावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥ भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसर्गस्य स्वरूपं पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वञ्च न तन्मात्रसर्गादहते, इत्युभयथा सर्गप्रवृत्तिः । भोगः पुरुषार्थो न भोग्यान् शब्दादीन् भोगायतनं शरीरद्वयञ्चान्तरेण सम्भवतीत्युपपन्न-स्तन्मात्रसर्गः । एवं स एव भोगो भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणानि चान्तरेण

१. चन्द्रिकायामन्यथा वर्णनम्-। ‘लिङ्गाख्यः’ लिङ्ग्यते अनुमीयत एव न साक्षात् क्रियेत-स महदाद्यतीन्द्रियवर्गः । ‘भावाख्यः’ भूयते प्राप्यते इन्द्रियेणेति विषयवर्गः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः ॥

न सम्भवति । न च तानि धर्मादीन् भावान् विना सम्भवन्ति । न चापवर्ग-
हेतुर्विवेकख्यातिरुभयसर्गं विना । इत्युपपन्न उभयविधः सर्गः ॥

अनादिस्वाच्च बीजाङ्कुरवन्नान्योन्याश्रयदोषमावहति, कल्पादावपि प्राचीन-
(२४१) उभयविधसर्गे कल्पोत्पन्नभावलिङ्गसंस्कारवशाद्भावलिङ्गयोरुत्पत्तिर्ना-
अन्योन्याश्रयदोष- नुपपन्नेति सर्वमवदातम् ॥ ५२ ॥
परिहारः ॥

(२४२) भूतसर्ग- विभक्तः प्रत्यसर्गः । भूतादिसर्गं विभजते-
विभागः ॥

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुषश्चैकविधः, समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

“ अष्टविकल्प ” इति । ब्राह्मः, प्राजापत्यः, ऐन्द्रः, पैत्रो, गान्धर्वो, याक्षो,
(२४३) तत्र-(१) राक्षसः, पैशाचः, इत्यष्टविधो “दैवः” सर्गः ॥

दैवो ऽष्टविधः ॥

(२४४) (२) तैर्य- “तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति,” पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृप-
ग्योनःपञ्चधा ॥ स्थावराः ॥

“ मानुषश्चैकविधः ” इति, ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरजातिभेदाविवक्षया, संस्था
(२४५) (३) मानुष नस्य चतुर्वर्षेपि वर्णेष्वविशेषात् । इति “ समासतः ”
एकविधः ॥ संक्षेपतः “ भौतिकः सर्गः ” । घटादयस्त्वशरीरत्वे-
ऽपि स्थावरा एवेति ॥ ५३ ॥

(२४६) भौतिकसर्गे
गुणभेदादूर्ध्वाधोमध्य-
भावकथनम् ।

भौतिकस्यास्य सर्गस्य चैतन्योत्कर्षानिर्कर्षतारतम्या-
भ्यामूर्ध्वाधोमध्यभावेन त्रैविध्यमाह --

ऊर्ध्वं सर्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।

मध्ये रजोविशालो, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

“ ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः ” इति । द्युप्रभृतिसत्यान्तो लोकः सत्त्वबहुलः ।
 ‘ तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ’, पश्चादिस्थावरान्तः
 (२४७) ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्व- सोऽयम्मोहमयत्वात्तमोबहुलः । भूर्लोकस्तु सप्तद्वीप-
 प्रधानाः-मध्ये रजः- समुद्रसन्निवेशो “ मध्ये रजोविशालो ” धर्माधर्मानुष्ठा-
 प्रधानाः-अन्ते तमः नपरत्वादुदुःखबहुलत्वाच्च । तामिमां लोकसंस्थितिं
 प्रधानाः ॥ संक्षिपति “ ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ”, स्तम्बग्रहणेन
 वृक्षादयः संगृहीताः ॥ ५४ ॥

तदेवं सर्गं दर्शयित्वा तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैराग्योपयोगिनीं दुःखहेतुतामाह-
 (२४८) सर्गस्य दुःख-
 हेतुता ॥

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।

लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

“ तत्र ” इति । ‘ तत्र ’ शरीरादौ । यद्यपि विविधा विचित्रानन्दभोग-
 भागिनः प्राणभृद्देहाः, तथा ऽपि सर्वेषां जरामरणकृतं दुःखमविशिष्टम् ।
 सर्वस्य खलु कर्मरूपं मरणत्रासो-‘ मा न भूवम् ’ ‘ भूयामम् ’ इत्येवमात्मको-
 ऽस्ति । दुःखं च भयहेतुरिति दुःखम्मरणम् ॥

स्यादेतत्-दुःखादयः प्राकृता बुद्धिगुणाः तत्कथमेते चेतनसम्बन्धिनो
 (२४९) प्राकृतगुणभूत भवन्तीत्यत आह-“ पुरुष ” इति । पुरि लिङ्गे शेते
 दुःखादीनां पुरुषेण सह इति पुरुषः, लिङ्गञ्च तत्सम्बन्धीति चेतनो ऽपि
 सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥ तत्सम्बन्धी भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

कुत पुनर्लिङ्गसम्बन्धि दुःखम्पुरुषस्य चेतनस्येत्यत आह-“ लिङ्गस्या
 (२५०) पुरुषप्रकृति- विनिवृत्तेः ” - पुरुषाद्भेदाग्रहलिङ्गधर्मानात्मन्यध्यव-
 भेदाग्रहनिबन्धनपुरुषे स्यति पुरुषः । अथवा दुःखप्राप्तावधिराडा कथ्यते
 दुःखाध्यवसायः ॥ लिङ्गम् यावन्न निवर्तते तावदिति ॥ ५५ ॥

१. आविनिवृत्तेरित्यत्र ‘ आङ् ’-उपसर्गेणेत्यर्थः ।

(२५१) सृष्टिकारणवि- उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीर्निराकरोति—
प्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।

प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

“ इत्येष ” इति । आरम्भ्यते इति “ आरम्भः ” सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृ-
(२५२) चार्वाकवेदान्त- त्यैव कृतो नेश्वरण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारणः ।
न्यायमतदूषणम् ॥ आकारमन्त्रे ह्यत्यन्ताभावो ऽत्यन्तभावो वा स्यात् ।
न ब्रह्मोपादानः चितिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेश्वराधि-
ष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठातृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्तक्षा
वास्याद्यधितिष्ठति ॥

ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या नित्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशीलाया अनुपरमात् सदैव
सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्येतेत्यत आह—“ प्रति-
(२५३) नित्यप्रवृत्ति- पुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ” इति ।
शीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे यथौदनकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ
संसृतिनित्यत्वस्यानिर्मो- निवर्तते,— एवं प्रत्येकम्पुरुषान् मोचयितुमप्रवृत्ता प्रकृ-
क्षस्य च प्रसङ्गशङ्का- तिर्यं पुरुषम्मोचयति तम्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते—तदिद-
तन्निरासश्च ॥ माह—‘ स्वार्थं इव, ’ स्वार्थे यथा तथा परार्थे, आरम्भ

इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥

स्यादेतत्—‘ स्वार्थं परार्थं वा चेतनः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवं भवितु-
(२५४) अचेतनप्रधान- मर्हति तस्मादस्ति प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता चेतनः । न च
प्रवृत्तिशङ्का । क्षेत्रज्ञाश्चेतना अपि प्रकृतिमधिष्ठातुमर्हन्ति, तेषां प्रकृति-
स्वरूपानभिज्ञत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति सर्वार्थदर्शी प्रकृते
रधिष्ठाता, स चेश्वर ’—इत्यत आह —

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।

पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

“वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजनम्प्रवर्तमानम्,
(२५५) तत्परिहारः- यथा वत्सविवृद्धयर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एव-
क्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्र- मप्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तिष्यते ॥
वृत्तिः ॥

न च-‘क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वाच्च साध्यव्यभि-
चार’ इति, साम्प्रतम्प्रेक्षावतः प्रवृत्तेः स्वार्थकारु-
(२५६) ईश्वराधिष्ठित- ण्याभ्यां व्याप्तत्वात् । ते च जगत्सर्गादव्यावर्तमाने प्रेक्षा-
प्रधानसृष्टौ दोषाः ॥ वत्प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्यावर्तयतः । न ह्यवाससकले-
प्सितस्य भगवतो जगत् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषित-
म्भवति । नापि कारुण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाजीवानामिन्द्रियशरी-
रविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखाभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारुण्यम् ? सर्गोत्तरकालं
दुःखिनो ऽवलोक्य कारुण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वन्दूषणम्, -कारुण्येन
सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारुण्यमिति । अपि च करुणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन
एव जन्तून् सृजेन्न विचित्रान् । ‘कर्मवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम्’ इति चेत्-कृतमस्य
प्रेक्षावतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तदनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्त्यनुप-
पत्तेस्तत्कार्यशरीरेन्द्रियविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि सुकरत्वात् ॥

प्रकृतेस्त्वचेतनार्याः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारुण्यम्प्रयोजकमिति
(२५७) प्रकृतिसृष्टौ नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारार्थ्यमात्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुप-
पद्यते । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तम्-“वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्”
तद्दोषा भावः ॥ इति ॥ ५७ ॥

“स्वार्थ इव” इति दृष्टान्तितम् [कारिका, ५६] तद्विभजते—
(२५८) पुरुषविमोक्षा-
र्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः ॥

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

“ औत्सुक्य- ” इति । औत्सुक्यमिच्छा, मा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निवर्तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वात् फलस्य । दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति-
“ पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थम्प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ” इति ॥ ५८ ॥

ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्तया प्रकृतेः
(२५९) विवेकख्यात्य- इत्यत आह—
नन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः॥

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।

पुरुषस्य तथा ऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

“ रङ्गस्य ” इति, स्थानेन स्थानिनः पारिषदानुपलक्षयति । ‘ आत्मानम् ’
शब्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषान्देदेन च प्रकाश्येत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

स्यादेतत्-‘ प्रवर्तताम्प्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृतात्प्रकृतिर्लप्स्यते कञ्चि-
(२६०) गुणवत्याः प्रकृतेः दुपकारम्, आज्ञासम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भु-
प्रत्युपकारं विनैव जिष्या । तथा च न परार्थोऽस्या आरम्भः ’-इत्यत
पुरुषोपकारः ॥ आह—

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपाकरणः पुंसः ।

गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

“ नाना- ” इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्गुणे ऽत एवानुपकारिणि
स्वामिनि निष्फलाराधनः, एवमियम्प्रकृतिस्तपस्विनी गुणवत्युपकारिण्यनुपाका-
रिणि पुरुषे व्यर्थपरिश्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतते न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्यादेतत्— नर्तकी नृत्यम्परिषद्भयो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनस्तद्वृष्टिकौत्-
(२६१) विवेकख्यात्यन- हलात् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषार्थात्मानं
न्तरम् प्रधानस्यात्य- दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनः प्रवर्त्स्यति '—इत्यत
न्तिकी निवृत्तिः ॥ आह—

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरन्न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।

या दृष्टा ऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥'

“ प्रकृतेः ” इति । सुकुमारतरता ऽतिपेशलता, परपुरुषदर्शनासहिष्णुतेति
यावत् । असूर्यम्पद्या हि कुलवधूरतिमन्दाक्षमन्थरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिञ्चया-
म्बला चेदालोक्यते परपुरुषेण, तदा ऽसौ यथा प्रयतते, अप्रमत्ता यथैनां पर-

१.—अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्ययैकया कारिकया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्ग-
तस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगङ्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु—

“ सप्तयां किल येऽर्थाः ” इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्थाणां सप्तया भाष्यम् ।
किन्तु गौडपादभाष्ये त्वेकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकप्रष्टितमाया उपरि
नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकप्रष्टितमाया अनन्तरमेवानया लुप्तया कारिकया
भाष्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन चैषा कारिकैवं निर्मातुं शक्यते—

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।

प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च
केनचिदसहिष्णुना च्यावितेयम् । किन्तु भाष्यच्यावनमसौ विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेषां मते
स्वभावस्य, कालस्य ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलत्वमिति श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रेण द्योत्यते—

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ।

देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते बाह्यचक्रम् ॥ ” इति

अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वाद्धर्मस्मन्मतानुसारेण त्वेवं पठनीयम् ।--

‘ कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावं वा । ’

सूर्यनारायणशास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकाखण्डनं न सयुक्तिकम् । तन्मतानुरोधे-
नैकप्रष्टितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, वृत्तौ च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमिति-
शब्दस्य परामर्शः, प्रकृतकारिका विहायान्यस्याः कारिकाया भाष्यवृत्तयोः सम्भावनां
निराकरोति । एतदत्र विचारणीयम्--

पुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति, - एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलबधूतो ऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनर्द्रक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ६१ ॥

भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठ्यते--‘अहमनेन पुरुषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयातीत्यर्थः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति--’ एतदनन्तरं भाष्यचरमभागः--‘न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य’ इति पठनीयः । ‘सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति’ इत्यनन्तरं ‘केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते’ इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव । नहीश्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरत्ववर्णनम् । अतो ध्रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुना कारिकेयं लोपिता । अन्येन च केनचिद्द्वाराकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति मत्वा तथैकषष्टितमकारिभाष्यान्तर्निवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनैरपि विभाव्यते । अत एव ‘न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य’ इत्येतदनन्तरं तेन ‘अतः प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति’ इति सङ्गत्यर्थं प्रक्षिप्तम् । यथा च नैतत्सङ्गच्छते तथा स्फुटमेव । परं च, ईश्वरादीनां सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि भृशमनर्थकम् । एवं माठरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चित् संग्रन्थनमेव । अतो वाचस्पत्यादीनां पुरत एव लुप्त्यं कारिका ।

यस्तु ‘ननु ईश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेत्, कथं नाम तद्भाष्यविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात्’ इति सूर्यनारायणशास्त्र्यभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः--यस्य खलु कुटिलमतेः स्वानभिमत्यं कारिका दृष्टिपथं याता, न तस्य भाष्यं दृग्गोचरी-भूतमिति सम्भाव्यते । न खलु भाष्यकारिकयोरव्यभिचारि सहावस्थानं, येन कारिकां निस्तारयन् भाष्यमपि बहिः कुर्यात् । भाष्यं चास्मद्भाष्यवशान्न तद्वस्ते पतितम् । अतस्तादृशकुटिलमत्यनन्तरमाविभिर्लेखकैर्लेखकेन वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेतद्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिदेषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्ये नियोजितमिति राद्धान्तः ॥

अधुनापि प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रन्थः टीकाग्रन्थश्च पृथक् पृथक् लेखनावस्थितित्वेन दृश्यते । तेन मूलग्रन्थस्थिता कारिका च्यावितैव । भाष्यग्रन्थस्य तत्समये अप्राप्तत्वात् भाष्यस्य अद्यापि स्थितिरेति । [हरदत्तशर्मा]

स्यादेतत्—“ पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? मुचेर्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात्, सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानाञ्च बन्धनसमा-
(२६२) निर्गुणपुरुषमो- ख्यानां पुरुषे ऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवास्य च
क्षसंसारद्यसम्भवशङ्का ॥ पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रि-
यत्वात् । तस्मात् ‘ पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् ’ इति रिक्तं
वचः—”इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नपाकरोति ॥

तस्मान्न बध्यते ऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।

संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

“ तस्मात् ” इति । अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति;
न कश्चिन्मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती
(२६३) तत्परिहारः- बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते चेति । बन्धमोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषे-
प्रकृतिगतानां संसारा- धूपचर्यन्ते यथा जयपराजयौ, भृत्यगतावपि स्वामि-
दीनां पुरुषे उपचारः॥ न्युपचर्येते, तदाश्रयेण भृत्यानान्तद्भागित्वात्, तत्फ-
लस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात् । भोगा-
पवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपपादित इति सर्व-
म्पुष्कलम् ॥ ६२ ॥

नन्ववगतम् ‘ प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारापवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते ’ इति ।
(२६४) प्रकृत्या धर्मादि- किंसाधनाः पुनरुक्ते प्रकृतेः ? इत्यत आह—
सत्त्वरूपैर्बन्धनमेकरूपेण
तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्ष-
णम् ॥

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।

सैव च पुरुषार्थम्प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

“ रूपैः ” इति । तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जं बध्नाति धर्मादिभिस्सप्तभी रूपैर्भावैरिति ।
“ पुरुषार्थम्प्रति ” भोगापवर्गम्प्रति “ आत्मनाऽऽत्मानम् ” एकरूपेण तत्त्व-
ज्ञानेन त्रिवेकख्यात्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गौ न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

१. ‘ आत्मना ’ बुद्धिरूपेण, ‘ आत्मानम् ’ पुरुषमिति चन्द्रिका ।

अवगतमीदृशं तत्त्वम्, ततः किमित्यत आह—

एवन्तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।

अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

“एवम्” इति । तत्त्वेन विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति । उक्तरूपप्रका-

(२६५) अभ्यासात्तत्त्वज्ञान- तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासाद्गहनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितात्
नोत्पत्तिः ॥ सत्त्वपुरुषान्यतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यद्विषयश्चा-

भ्यासस्तद्विषयकमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति, — तत्त्ववि-
षयश्चाभ्यास इति तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारं जनयति । अत उक्तम् — “विशुद्धम्”
इति ॥

कुतो विशुद्धमित्यत आह—“अविपर्ययात्” इति । संशयविपर्ययौ हि

(२६६) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्रहितम् विशुद्धन्तदिदमुक्तम्—
विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्ययत्वम् ॥ “अविपर्ययात्” इति । नियतमनियततया गृह्यन्
संशयो ऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन ‘अविपर्ययात्’ इति

संशयविपर्ययाभावो दर्शितः । तत्त्वविषयत्वाच्च संश-

यविपर्ययाभावः ॥

स्यादेतत् — ‘उत्पद्यतामीदृशाभ्यासात् तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तथा ऽप्यनादिना

(२६७) अनादेर्मिथ्या- मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारेण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम् तथा

ज्ञानसंस्कारस्यादिमत्या च तन्निवन्धनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्यत उक्तम्—

तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेण “केवलम्” इति=विपर्ययेणासम्भिन्नम् । यद्यप्य

समुच्छेदः ॥ नादिविपर्ययवासना तथा ऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानवासनया-

तत्त्वविषयसाक्षात्कारमादधत्या ऽऽदिमत्या ऽपि शक्या समुच्छेत्तुम् । तत्त्वपक्ष-

पातो हि धियां स्वभावः, यदाहुर्बाह्या अपि—

“निरूपद्रूपभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः ।

न बाधो ऽयत्नवत्त्वे ऽपि बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः” इति ॥

ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम् — “ नास्मि, न मे, नाहम् ” इति । ‘ नास्मि ’ इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रनिषेधेति । यथाहुः ‘ कृभ्वस्तयः क्रियासामान्यवचनाः ’ इति [सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.] । (२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूप- क्रियासामान्यवचनाः । प्रदर्शनम्—सर्वविधाहङ्कारा- तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पालोचनानि चान्तराणि रनिवृत्तिः ॥ बाह्याश्च सर्वे व्यापारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि । यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो ‘ नाहम् ’ । अहमिति कर्तृपदम्, अहञ्जानाम्यहं जुहोम्यहन्ददे ’ इति सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामर्शात् । निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः । ततः सुष्ठूक्तम्—“ नाहम् ” इति । अत एव “ न मे ” । कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः । अथवा “ नास्मि ” इति “ पुरुषो ऽस्मि, न प्रसवधर्मा ” । अप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृत्वमाह—“ नाहम् ” इति । अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यत आह—“ न मे ” इति ॥

ननु ‘ एतावत्सु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चित् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्ति, तदज्ञानवज्जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति ’ इत्यत आह—“ अपरिशेषम् ” (२६९) तत्त्वज्ञानस्या- इति । नास्ति किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६४ ॥

(२७०) तत्त्वसाक्षात्कार- किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण सिध्यतीत्यत फलम् ॥ आह—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।

प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्छः ॥ ६५ ॥

“ तेन ” इति । भोगविवेकसाक्षात्कारौ हि प्रकृतेः प्रसोतव्यौ । तौ च प्रसूताविति नास्याः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः । विवेकज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थस्तस्य वशः सामर्थ्यम् तस्मात् । अतस्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानिश्वर्याणि । वैराग्यमपि केवलतौष्टिकानामतस्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव । तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधित्वेनातस्त्वज्ञानमुच्छिनत्ति । कारण-

१. ‘ नाहमिति ’ तादात्म्यनिषेध इति केचित् २. “ सुस्थ ” इति पाठान्तरम् । ३. विशुद्धकेवलज्ञानेनेति यावत् ।

निवृत्त्या च सप्तरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति “सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः”
 “अवस्थित” इति निष्क्रियः, “स्वच्छः” इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषया
 बुद्ध्याऽसम्भिन्नः । सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्ध्या तदाऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदोऽस्त्येव,
 अन्यथैवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्यादेतत्—‘निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न मृष्यामहे । संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम्,
 (२७१) एकविषय- योग्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य
 पक्ष्य निवृत्ताया अपि चैतन्यम्, भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषय-
 प्रकृतेर्विषयान्तरं प्रति त्वञ्च । न चैतयोरस्ति निवृत्तिः । न च करणीया-
 प्रवृत्तिशङ्का ॥ भावास्तिवृत्तिः, तज्जातीयस्थान्यस्य करणीयत्वात् पुनः
 पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत्—इत्यत आह—

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टाऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।

सति संयोगेऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

“दृष्टा” इति । करोतु नाम पौनःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगम्प्रकृत्यया विवेक-
 ख्यातिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकख्यातिस्तु शब्दाद्युपभोगज्ञ
 (२७२) तन्निरासः ॥ जनयति । अविवेकख्यातिनिबन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो,
 निबन्धनाभावे न तद्भवितुमर्हति, अंकुर इव बीजा-
 भावे । प्राकृतान् हि सुखदुःखमोहात्मनः शब्दादींस्तदविवेकात् ‘ममैतत्’ इत्य-
 भिमन्यमान आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा
 ‘मदर्थेयम्’ इति मन्यते । उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिस्तु तदसंसर्गाच्छब्दादीन्पुनःपुनः
 मर्हति नापि विवेकख्यातिम्प्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम् । ततो विविक्त^१ आत्मा न
 स्वार्थमभिमन्तुमर्हति पुरुषार्थौ च भोगविवेकौ प्रकृत्यारम्भप्रयोजकावित्यपुरुषार्थौ
 सन्तौ न प्रकृतिं प्रयोजयतः । तदिदमुक्तम्—“प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य” इति ।
 अथ प्रयुज्यते सर्वे प्रकृतिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम्, तदपुरुषार्थं नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥

स्यादेतत्—“ उत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेत्तदनन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देह-
पातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रकृतिम्पश्येत् । अथ
(२७३) विविक्तस्या- तत्त्वज्ञाने ऽपि न मुच्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात् ? तेषां
त्मनो देहपातात्प्रकृति- कुतः प्रक्षयः ? ‘ भोगात् ’ इति चेत्, हन्त भोस्त-
दर्शनासम्भवशङ्का ॥ त्वज्ञानान्न मोक्षसाधनम्—इति ‘ व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञान-
जन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ग ’ इति रिक्तं वचः । ‘ भोगेन
चापरिसंख्येयः कर्माशयप्रचयो ऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतव्यः, ततश्चापवर्ग-
प्राप्तिः ’ इत्यपि मनोरथमात्रम् ” इत्यत आह—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

“ सम्यक् ” इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदयादेव ज्ञानादिरप्यनियतविपाक-
कालो ऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दग्धबीजभावतया न
(२७४) तन्निरासः- जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणाय फलाय कल्पते । क्लेशसलिला-
विविक्तस्यापि संस्कार- वमित्यायां हि बुद्धिभूमौ कर्मबीजान्यङ्कुरं प्रसुवते ।
यशाच्छरीरधारणम् ॥ तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिपीतसकलक्लेशसलिलायामूषरायां
कुतः कर्मबीजानामङ्कुरप्रसवः ? तदिदमुक्तम् “ धर्मा-
दीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ” इति, अकारणत्वप्राप्तादित्यर्थः । उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानो ऽपि च
संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथोपरते ऽपि कुलालव्यापारे चक्रं वेगाख्यसंस्कारवशात्
भ्रमत् तिष्ठति । कालपरिपाकवशात्तूपरते संस्कारे निष्क्रियम्भवति । शरीर-
स्थितौ च प्रारब्धपरिपाकौ धर्माधर्मौ संस्कारौ । तथा चानुश्रूयते—“ भोगेन
वितरे क्षपयित्वा ऽथ सम्पद्यते ” इति “ तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न
विमोक्ष्ये ऽथ सम्पत्स्ये ” इति च [छान्दोग्य, ६।१।४।२] । प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्या-
संस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् धृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ॥

स्यादेतत्—“ यदि संस्कारशेषादपि धृतशरीरस्तथा ऽपि कदा ऽस्य मोक्षो
(२७५) शरीरनाशे ऐ- भविष्यति ? इत्यत आह—
कान्तिकात्यन्तिकमुक्तिः ॥

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।

ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

“प्राप्ते” इति । अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञाना-
भिना बीजभावो दग्धः । प्रारब्धविपाकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षये सति, “प्राप्ते,
शरीरभेदे” इति=विनाशे—“चरितार्थत्वात्” इति=कृतप्रयोजनत्वात् । प्रधानस्य
तत्पुरुषम्प्रति विनिवृत्तौ—“ऐकान्तिकम्”=अवश्यम्भावि “आत्यन्तिकम्”=
अविनाशि—इत्युभयं “कैवल्यम्” दुःखत्रयविगमम्प्राप्नोति पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥

(२७६) सांख्यशास्त्र- प्रमाणेनोपपादिते ऽप्यत्यन्तश्रद्धोत्पादनाय पर-
स्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम् मर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह—

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

“पुरुष” इति । “गुह्यम्” गुहानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति
यावत् । “परमर्षिणा” कपिलेन तामेव श्रद्धाभागमिकत्वेन द्रढयति—
“स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम्” इति । ‘यत्र’ ज्ञाने=यदर्थम्,
यथा ‘चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति’ इति । “भूतानाम्”=प्राणिनां “स्थित्यु-
त्पत्तिप्रलयाः” आगमैः “चिन्त्यन्ते” ॥ ६९ ॥

(२७७) सांख्यशा- स्यादेतत्—“यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तच्छू-
रस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा दधीमहि, यत्पुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र कुतः
कपिलादारभ्य पञ्चशिख- श्रद्धा ?”—इत्यत आह—
पर्यन्तम् ॥

एतत् पवित्रमग्न्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।

आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतन्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

“एतत्” इति । “एतत् पवित्रम्”=पावनम्— दुःखत्रयहेतोः पाप्मनः
पुनातीति—“अग्न्यम्”=सर्वेभ्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुख्यम्, “मुनिः” कपिलः

आसुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ, आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ” ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।

संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७८) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य “ शिष्य ” इति । आरात् याता तत्त्वेभ्य इत्यार्याः, गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥ आर्या मतिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् “ आर्यमतिः ” इति ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७९) सप्ततिका- एतच्च शास्त्रम्, सकलशास्त्रार्थसूचकत्वात्, न तु काणां शास्त्रत्वम् ॥ प्रकरणमित्याह—

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।

आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चपि ॥ ७२ ॥

“ सप्तत्याम् ” इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥

“ प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।

विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥

करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।

इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ” ॥ इति ॥

स्यं षष्टिपदार्थी कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनान्नेदम्प्रकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवे-
दमिति सिद्धम् । एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वम् पारार्थ्यञ्च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वम-
कर्तृत्वम् बहुत्वञ्चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अस्तित्वम् वियोगे योगश्चेत्युभयमधि-
कृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ ७२ ॥

मनांसि कुमुदानीव बोधयन्ती सतां सदा ।

श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्राणां कृतिः स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादशदर्शनटीकाकृच्छ्री-

मद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकृता सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

THE TATTVA—KA

[SĀṂKHYA

An English Translation.

(1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.

To the Great Sage Kapila, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pañcaśīkha and Īś'varakṛṣṇa—to these we bow in reverence.

(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject-matter :—

* The translation of the Tattvakaumudī was done by me as a class-exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an improvement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. [Ganganath Jha.]

Kārika I

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this scientific enquiry world; or (2) if, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible—such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. **The three-fold division of pain** This is what is meant by the words: *There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain.* The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the “triad of pain.” These are : (1) the intrinsic (*Ādhyāt-mika*), (2) the extrinsic (*Ādhibhautika*) and (3) the divine or superhuman (*Ādhidaivika*). Of these the *intrinsic* is two-fold, *bodily* and *mental*. *Bodily* pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and *mental* pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called *intrinsic* on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold : *extrinsic* and *superhuman*. The *extrinsic* are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the *superhuman* ones are due to the evil influence of

planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of *Rajas*—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. *Impediment* (*Abhigāta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—*as* will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) *into the means of alleviating* the three kinds of pain. In the compound *tadapaghātake*, the pronoun *tat* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (*duḥkhatraya* etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound).—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,—none other.

(5) *An objection is raised* : “ *On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous.* That

Objection : Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means is to say : We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible; we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain ; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences,—which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim : ‘ When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains ? So, when

the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?' Hundreds of remedies for *bodily* pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for *mental* pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of *extrinsic* pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of *superhuman* troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest. "

(6) This objection is answered as follows—*Not so—*
why ?— Because these are neither absolute

Reply: Obvious means are not absolute nor final *nor final.* *Absoluteness* of the means consists in the certainty of its effect; and its *finality* consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression, "*Ekāntātyantatobhāvaḥ.*" The universal affix *tasi* has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

(7) Though the mention of the word *pain* in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

**Auspiciousness
of the beginning
word**

(8) The following argument might be put forward:—

Objection: Vedic means adequate to removal of pain

“We grant the inadequacy of the obvious remedies; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—in the shape of a host of such acts as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the *S'ruti*: ‘Desiring heaven one must perform sacrifices,’ and *Heaven* is thus described: ‘Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it is what is denoted by the word *Heaven*.’ *Heaven* thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived,—for, declares the *S'ruti*: “We drank the *Soma* and became immortal.” [*Atharvaśiras* III]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be ‘immortality’? Hence the Vedic remedies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous.”

The answer to this is suggested in the following *Kārikā*.

Kārikā II

The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).*

* This *Kārikā* embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.

(9) *Anus'rava* is Veda, that which is *heard* during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher—and not *done* (written). *Anus'ravika* is that which is related to *Anus'rava* or *Veda*, i. e. which is derived or known therefrom. The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious (remedies mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the *absolute* and *final* removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "*Vedic*" (*Anus'ravaika*), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return (into this world)". (*Chūndogya*, 8-15).

(10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: *since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess.* The impurity lies in the fact of the *Soma* and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pañcas'ikhācārya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The 'slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect (*Apūrva* i. e. merit) of the *Jyotistoma* and other sacrifices, with the minor *apūrva* due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet '*remediable*' implies that the sin is removable by certain expiatory rites; but if somehow these are neglected, then at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (merit), the evil element (demerit caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification '*bearable*'. Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin (involved in the rituals).

(11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law —“ Kill not any animal, ” is set aside by the specific one, “ Kill the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma* ”—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law “ Kill not etc., ” only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil (and hence pain); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction “ Kill the animal etc., ” declares that the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [*i. e.* the sentence “ Kill the animal etc., ” would bear two predicates—(1) ‘ The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice, ’ (2) and that ‘ it is not conducive to sin ’]. Nor is there any contradiction between the *productivity of sin* and the capability of *helping the performance* of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice.

(12) The properties—‘ *decay* ’ and ‘ *inequality* ’—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This *liability to decay* is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a positive entity and a product. Further, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of *Heaven* only, whereas the *Vājapeya* and others lead to the attainment of the *kingdom of Heaven* (or ‘ self-

The impurity of animal slaughter in a sacrifice established

Decay and excess shown to apply to the results of Vedic action

sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the *inequality* spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13) In the passage "Drinking *Soma*, we became immortal"—*immortality* stands for *long-duration*,—as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'ruti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad X—5], and again "Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."

(14) With all this in view it is declared : *That which is contrary to that is preferable—proceeding from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser.*

The only means is discriminative wisdom

The term *that* stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method—contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results,—is pure *i. e.* unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the S'ruti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect—the removal of pain—though a product, is a negative entity. And when the productivity of the cause (ignorance) has been destroyed (by discriminative knowledge) there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the efficiency of the

cause lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on (under Kārikā LXVI).

(15) The literal meaning of the words of the *Kārikā* is as follows : The means of removing pain, consisting in the direct discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as apart from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is *good* inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also *good*; and of these two, the latter is *better*, superior.

(16) *Question* :—“ Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise ?

Source of discriminative knowledge *Answer*—From the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. Cognition of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the cognition thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this : The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from right cognition—consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the Manifested, etc., the character of these latter having been previously learnt from the *Veda*, the *Smṛtis* and the *Itihāsas*, and duly strengthened by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail later on in Kārikā LXIV.

(17) Having thus established the fact of the undertaking of scientific enquiry being useful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to focus the attention of the enquirer.

Fourfold division of categories.

Kārikā III

Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

(18) To the question—What is the *productive*?—the answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a **The Productive** *product*; ‘Root-matter’ (*Prakṛti*)* is that which *produces* (*prakaroti*); it is also called ‘*Pradhāna*’ (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of *Sattvas*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* in the state of equilibrium, — that is purely *productive*. Why it is so is explained by the term ‘*Mūla*’, ‘Root’; *i. e.* it is that ‘Matter’ which is the ‘Root’; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regresus ad infinitum*.

(19) How many are the objects that are *both proauctive and products*, and which are these? **The Productive-Products** answer is—The group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both; *i. e.* they are *products* as well as *productive*. The Great Principle (*Buddhi*) is the root of Egoism (*Ahāṅkāra*), and the product of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the

* What the term ‘*prakṛti*’ stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as ‘Root-matter’ or simply as ‘Nature.’

five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven sense-organs, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.

(20) How many are the *products*, pure and simple, and what are they? Answer:—*The products*
The Products *are sixteen—i. e., sixteen in number; the five gross substances (earth etc.,) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications, not productive; this is what is emphasised by the particle 'tu', which should be taken as coming after 'vikārah' (in the text). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, " Prakṛti " stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.*

(21) That which is *neither productive nor product*, is now described :—*the Spirit is neither a product nor productive*. All this will be explained later on.
The non-product-productive

(22) In order to prove the above statement, the different kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition)
Three kinds of proofs have to be described. Nor can there be a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:—

Kārikā IV

Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition. It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised.

(23) *Means of Cognition are accepted*:—here the term ‘Means of Cognition’ only states the thing **Proof defined** to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of ‘Means of Cognition;’ this explanation being that the *Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised.* Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the *Instrument* of Right Cognition. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the ‘Means of Cognition.’ Thus the ‘Means of Cognition’ become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, viz. doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the ‘Means of Right Cognition.’

(24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramāṇas: “*Of three kinds*”;—that is, of the Means of Right Cognition in general there are three kinds,—neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.

(25) Now, there arises the question—which are the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition? **Only three kinds of proof** The answer is—*Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion.* The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The *intuition* or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,—though realities,—do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.

(26) *Objection*:—"We grant that the number of *Pramāṇas*

The inclusion of all other proofs in the above-mentioned is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, such as Analogy (*Upamāna*) and the rest". *Reply*—*Because*

these three include all forms of Means of Right Cognition. That is, all forms of Right Cognition are included—i. e. comprehended—under these three, Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.

(27) *Question*:—"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the *Prameyas*, i. e. the *objects* of Right Cognition?" *Answer*—*It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised*. *Siddhi* means *apprehension*—Cognition.

(28) The explanation of the *Kārikā* follows the sense, **The order of explanation** not the order of words.

(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the *Kārikā*, **The specific definition of the proofs** first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.

Karika V

'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses; 'Inference' has been declared to be of three kinds; and it is led up to by (based upon) the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term; and 'Valid Assertion' is Right Revelation.

'Perception is definite sense-cognition.'—The term 'Perception' means what is defined; the remainder of the sentence is the *definition*; by which word is meant the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes.

(30) The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through senses) — '*prativīṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*') may be thus explained: *Vīṣaya* (object) stands for that which bears upon the *Vīṣayin* (cognition); that which impresses its own form upon the Cognition.

The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are 'objects' for us; but things in the form of the *Elemental Substances* are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the *Yogin* and the divine beings.—The term '*prativīṣaya*' denotes that which bears upon each particular object, i. e. the sense-organ;—'bearing upon' means contact so that what the term '*prativīṣaya*' stands for is the sense-organ in contact with the object.—'*Prativīṣayādhyavasāya*' ('sense-cognition') is the *adhyavasāya*, definite cognition in i. e. through, the sense-organ in contact with the object; '*adhyavasāya*' is Cognition, the function of *Buddhi* (Will); in fact *adhyavasāya* stands for that exuberance of the attribute of *Sattva* which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of '*Tamas*' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects;—this is what is called *vṛtti* and also '*jñāna*,'—i. e. 'Cognition'.—This *sense-cognition* is a means

of cognition and what is brought about by this *means* is the *Right Cognition* which is a form of assistance rendered to the *Sentient Faculty*.

(31) In its essence the *Buddhi* is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the *Cognition* which is a function of the *Buddhi* is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of *Buddhi* also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient; this Spirit appears as if having the *Cognition* and the *Pleasure* and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the *Cognition* and the *Pleasure* which really subsist in *Buddhi*; also it is in this manner that the *Sentient Being* (Spirit) comes to be favoured (by *Buddhi*); and *Buddhi* as also its *Cognition*, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the *Sentience* (of the Spirit). This is what is going to be described under *Kārikā* 20, below.

(32) The use of the term '*adhyavasāya*,' 'Definite Cognition,' in the text excludes *Doubtful Cognition*, as *Doubt*, being of the nature of uncertainty, is never positive; and 'definite' is the same as 'positive'.—The use of the term '*viṣāya*,' 'object,' excludes *Wrong Cognition*, the object of which is non-existent.—The use of the particle '*prati*' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes *Inference*, *Remembrance* and other forms of *Cognition*.

(33) Thus it follows that '*prativīṣayādhyavasāyo drṣṭam*,' 'Perception is definite cognition of objects through the contact of the sense-organs,' is the complete definition of *Perception*,—

**Final Definition
of Perception**

excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity.

(34) The *Lokāyatika* (materialist) says that Inference is not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he know whether the person he was addressing was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Certainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception,—Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random—he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be *inferred* from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means of Cognition.

(35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it is only right that it should be defined after Perception; then again, inasmuch as a definition of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general.—*It is led up to by the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term*;—the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance (with the Major Term) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious-

Inference, a distinct Means of Cognition

Definition of Inference general

accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which are really denotative of the *objects* (of Cognition) stand for the *Cognition* of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive' than the Fire which is 'more extensive';—*i. e.* 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [*i. e.* Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]'—The term '*līngi*' (which has been taken above as standing for the *Major Term*) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the '*Līnga*' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the *Middle Term* (*Smoke*) is present in the *Minor Term* (*Hill*).—Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this—Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (*i. e.* the *Major Premiss*) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (*i. e.* the *Minor Premiss*).

(36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (*Nyāya*)—'*Inference has been declared to be of three kinds*'; *i. e.* Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) '*Pūrvavat*,' *A priori*, (2) '*S'eṣavat*,' *A posteriori*, and (3) '*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*,' based on general observation.

(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds—*Vīta* and *Avīta*;—that which functions through an affirmation is the *Vīta-affirmative*; and that which functions through negation is the *Avīta, Negative*.

First division of
Inference into
Vīta and *Avīta*

(38) Of these two, the *Avīta* is also called ' *S'eṣavat*,
Inference, A posteriori.—' *S'eṣa* ' is that which
Avīta, the nega- remains, the residue; hence that Inference is
tive Inference ' *S'eṣavat* ' which has this residue for its
defined object. This has been thus described (in
 the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1, 1. 5)—' The *S'eṣavat* Inference is
 that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely
 properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no
 likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the
 Cognition of *that which remains* (undenied and uneliminated)'.
 An example of this negative *Avīta* will be cited later on
 (under *Kārikā* 9, Para 70).

(39) The *Vīta* Inference is of two kinds—(1) The
Pūrvavat, A Priori, and (2) the *Sāmānya-*
toḍṛṣṭa, 'Based on general observation.' Of
 these the first ' *Pūrvavat*, ' has for its object
 that ' universal ' of which a specific ' individual ' has been
 perceived; the term ' *Pūrvavat* ' (contained in the name
 ' *Pūrvavat* ') means *well-known*,—i. e. that ' universal ' of which
 the ' specific individual ' has been perceived;—and that In-
 ferential Cognition of which such a ' universal ' is the object is
 called ' *Pūrvavat* '; e. g. when, from the presence of *Smoke*,
 we infer the presence of the particular ' *Universal Fire* ' in the
Hill; and in this case this ' *Universal Fire* ' is one of which a
 ' specific individual ', in the shape of a particular Fire, has been
 previously perceived in the kitchen.—The second form of *Vīta*
 Inference is the *Sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa*, which is the inferential Cogni-
 tion having for its object a ' universal ' of which a ' specific in-
 dividual ' has *not* been perceived; e. g. when we have an Infe-
 rential Cognition of the *sense-organ*; what is inferred in this case
 is the fact of the Cognition of colour and such things being
 brought about by the instrumentality of an organ [i. e. 'there
 must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition
 of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about'];—though of

the 'Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific individuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of 'instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been *perceived*; that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal' 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that *Universal* sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision,—in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the *Universal* 'Fire' is seen.—This is what distinguishes the *Pūrvavat* from the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, though both are equally '*Vita*'.—In the term '*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*,' '*drṣṭa*' stands for '*dars'ana*,' Cognition—'*Sāmānyataḥ*' stands for '*Sāmānyasya*', of the '*Universal*',—the affix '*taḥ*' being capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings;—thus the term '*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa— anumāna*' stands for the '*Anu māna*,' Inferential Cognition, of that particular 'universal' of which a 'specific individual' has not been perceived.—All this has been fully explained by us in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāṭikā*, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.

(40) When an experienced person, directing another experienced person, utters a few words (such as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus directed, acts in a certain manner (*i. e.* brings the cow),—the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person,—and therefrom he comes to recognise the connection between the words used and the action performed;—further, a word is found to express its meaning only when there is recognition of the connection between that word and its meaning;—from these two facts it follows that Verbal Cognition is led up to by Inference;—consequently, after having defined Inference, the author de-

**Definition of
Valid Assertion**

finer Valid Assertion—'Valid Assertion is right revelation'; 'Valid Assertion' 'āptavacanā' is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term 'āptas'ruti' means that 'S'ruti', revelation, which is 'āpta': 'right'; the term 'revelation' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

(41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its authority; i. e. it is always right, in as much as it is brought about by the words of the Veda which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the Itihāsa and the Smṛti, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right.

Reliability of the words of Kapila

(42) As regards the primeval sage Kapila (the founder of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy), it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; just as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Āvaṭṭya, and Jaigīṣavya, where the revered Jaigīṣavya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles—in the text—'while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc.'

Pseudo-Revelations

(43) The introduction of the epithet 'āpta' 'Right', in the term 'Right Revelation' ('āptavacanam') serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such as the scriptures of the 'S'ākyā-Bhikṣu' (Buddhist) the 'Nirgranthaka' (Jaina), the 'Sāṃsāramocaka' (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal

contradictions, (b) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons *Mlecchas* and others.

(44) The particle 'tu' (' and ') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence 'Valid Assertion' expresses* (the meaning) is an *object cognised* distinct from 'Inference' (by means of that Sentence); but the *Sentence* is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*, and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the *Sentence* expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection (concomitance) between itself and the meaning; as we find that in the case of the work of a new poet, the sentence is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition, —such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the Cow so the *gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal assertion), the cognition brought about by its means must be regarded as purely *Verbal*.—As for the notion that 'the term *gavaya* is

'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference' and 'Perception'

denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from **Analogy**],—this is purely *inferential*; the inference being in the following form—

' When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as *denoting* it,—specially, when there is no function other than *Direct Denotation*, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing); —as is found in the well-known case of the term ' cow ' applied to the animal genus ' cow ' ; (*Major Premiss*).

' The term *gavaya* is used (by experienced persons) in reference to *the animal similar to the cow* ' ;—(*Minor Premiss*).

' Therefore, ' the term *gavaya* must be regarded as denotative of that animal. ' (*Conclusion*)

This cognition is purely *inferential*.

Lastly, the notion that ' the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow ' ,—this is purely *perceptual*. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the *gavaya*, this is perception pure and simple ; certainly the *resemblance* or *similarity* in the cow is not something different from that in the *gavaya* ; for it is regarded to be a case of ' *Resemblance* ' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another ; and this *same conglomeration* can be one only ; so that when it has been *perceived* in the *gavaya*, it must be the same in the cow also.—Thus then, (every notion involved in what has been regarded as *Analogical Cognition* being found to be either *verbal* or *inferential* or *perceptual*), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of ' **Analogy** '. We conclude therefrom, that ' **Analogy** ' is not a distinct means of Cognition

(47) Similarly 'Presumption' also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the 'Presumption' included under 'Inference'—example of 'Presumption' that has been cited by the Ancients is the case where on finding that *Caitra*, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place,—and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';—when, therefore, we find that 'the living *Caitra* is not in the house,'—and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that ~~he~~ *he* must be somewhere outside the house,—this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of *Caitra* somewhere in the world cannot set aside his *absence in the house*; and when it is not so set aside this *absence in the house* cannot fail to be a valid reason for *his presence outside the house*. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does *Caitra's absence in the house* set aside his *existence* entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this *existence* be unable to establish itself *outside the house*. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explain—Is *Caitra's non-existence in the house* inconsistent with his *existence* itself? Or only with *his existence in the house*?—It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the house*; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different.—It might be argued that—"When it is asserted that *he must be somewhere*, his existence in *some place in general* being asserted (without any particular place being specified),—in as much as the *House* also would be included under 'place in general', the assertion might imply *existence*

in the house also; and in this manner the subject-matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the House*."—This, however, cannot be right. *Non-existence in the house* is known definitely and for certain, while (even in the manner shown) the notion of *existence in the house* (as implied by *existence somewhere*) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition.—And though the definitely ascertained *non-existence in the House* sets aside the implied and doubtful *existence in the House*, it cannot set aside the man's *existence*; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied in the general notion of *existence somewhere*). What is set aside by the *Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House* is his *existence in the House*; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his *existence in general*; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of *non-existence in the House*, as the only ascertained reason (Middle term), we deduce the man's *existence outside*,—it is a case of *Inference*.

This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in 'the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter of fact, there is no inconsistency between *what is restricted* (*non-existence in the House*) and *what is not restricted* (*existence somewhere*).

Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.

From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference.

(48) Similarly, *Abhāva*, 'Absence', is only a form of Perception. *The absence of the Jar*, at a certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of *vacancy*; all entities—with the sole exception of the Sentient Faculty,—are consequently undergoing modifications; and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses; hence there can be no object, not already covered by these modifications, which could form the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'.

(49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as that of the presence of the lesser weights—such as the '*Droṇa*' the '*Āḍhaka*' the '*Prastha*'—in the heavier weight the '*Khārī*'—This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the *Khārī* has been found to be invariably concomitant with the lesser weights of the *Droṇa* etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights.

(50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot be traced; it generally appears in the form 'the old people have said so and so'; such assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost living on this banyan tree'.—This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of 'Verbal Cognition' pure and simple.

Thus it becomes established that *there are three Means of Cognition.*

(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of the existence of the 'Manifest', the 'Un-manifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest,—even the dusty,—footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible) things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of a *priori* Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge.—Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things.—

Karik VI

The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observation,' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation.

(52) The particle 'tu' (in the text) distinguishes the 'Inference based on general observation from 'Perception' and from the '*A priori* Inference'.—'The knowledge of supersensuous things,'—such as Primordial Matter, Spirit and the rest—'is obtained through Inference based on general observation;' what is meant by this 'knowledge' is the definitive operation of the *Buddhi* in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the *A posteriori* Inference also.

(53) **Question**—“Is it only the *Inference based on general observation* that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things? If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the *Mahat* and the other Principles,—in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable.”—In answer to this it is added—‘*That imperceptible thing etc.*’ what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term ‘*Tasmāt*’ only; hence the presence of the particle ‘*ca*’ is to be taken as meant to include the *A Posteriori* Inference also.

(54) **Objection** “Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as ‘sky-flowers,’ ‘tortoises’ hair,’ ‘hare’s horns’ and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This, being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?”

The answer to this is as follows—

Kārikā VII

(Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects.

(55) ‘*From excessive distance*’—The “non-perception” of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the ‘Lion’s back-ward glance’*—

* “The maxim of ‘the lion’s back-ward glance’ is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows.”

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its *extreme remoteness*. 'Excessive' (*ati*) must also be taken with 'proximity' (*sāmīpya*)—*e. g.* the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of *extreme nearness*.

"*Destruction of organs*"—*e. g.*, blindness, deafness, etc.

"*From absence of mind*"—*e. g.*, a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.

"*From subtlety*"—*e. g.*, however much one may concentrate one's mind (*i. e.*, however attentively one may look) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes.

"*From Intervention*"—*e. g.*, one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.

"*From suppression*"—*e. g.*, the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"*From intermixture*"—*e. g.*, one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(56) The particle 'ca' in the Kārikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned; such as '*non-manifestation*' also becomes included (among the causes of non-perception)—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested.

(57) The upshot of the whole then is this :—The non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only

with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this *capability of being perceived* can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.

Question—Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature etc. ?

The answer is—

Kārikā VIII

The non-perception of these (Nature and the rest)

The non-apprehension of Nature is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is actually apprehended due to subtlety through its effects. These effects and not to non-existence. Its are the Great Principle, and the rest—existence verified effects (some of) which are similar, and by its effects (some) dissimilar to Nature.

(58) “Why should we not,” continues the objector, “attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa (in eatables) ? ”

The Author replies.—“*Not due to its non-existence*”. Why? “*Because it is apprehended through its effects.*” ‘It’ refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of knowledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense-perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).* The seventh

* This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition “Every effect must have a cause.” The effects, Mahat etc., are perceptible; these must have a cause and this cause is Nature.

Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge; and hence the *incapacity* of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text.

(59) *Question*.—"What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature?"

Answer.—"The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects." This will be explained later on (Kārikā XXII):

Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom:—"Similar and dissimilar to Nature."

This will be further explained in Kārikā XXIII *et. seq.*

(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is that there is a Cause; in regard to this subject (of cause and effect) there is a difference of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some people assert that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'non-existent' (cause); (2) others represent all effects as mere illusory evolutions from out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves; (3) others again hold that the 'non-existent' (effect) emanates from the existent (cause); (4) lastly, the revered ones declare that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'existent' (cause).

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1) The **Bauddha** view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2) The **Vedānta** view of the whole series of effects being a mere evolution from a single real entity. (3) The **Nyāya** and **Vaiśeṣika** view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4) The **Śāṃkhya** view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity

(61) Under the first three of these theories, the existence of Nature (Primordial Root-Matter) cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the world is found to consist of Sound and other Elements which are only different forms and modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter (Nature) whose 'primordially' must consist in its being of the nature of the three Attributes, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (which alone are the essence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion). Such being the case, if the 'existent' effect were the product of the 'non-existent' cause (the first view above),—then, how could the *non-existent Cause* which must be characterless, be of the nature of Sound and other Elements consisting of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion? As, certainly the non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent.—If (as under the *second* view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent' Being,—then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect emanates from the existent cause'; and the second view is open to the further objection that the *One Being* could never constitute what is *phenomenal*; in fact the conception of the *non-phenomenal* as constituting the *phenomenal* must be wrong.—Even under the theory of Kaṇāda and Gautama,—that 'the non-existent effect is born out of the existent cause,'—as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature).

(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation).

Karikā IX

The effect is existent; (1) because what is 'non-existent' cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly), because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

(63) *Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. 'The effect is existent,'—even before the operation of the cause,—this is what is meant.* The followers of *Nyāya* cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of 'doing what is already done' (i. e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [for reasons to be explained later on].

[As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the *sprout* and the *jar* are found to be produced after the *destruction* of the *seed* and *clay-lump* [so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this *Destruction*, which is *non-existent*],—yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to *Destruction*, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the *seed* and the *clay-lump*. If a positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such *negation* (of things) would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyāṭikā*.

(64) [As regards the Vedānta theory] the belief in the existence of the phenomenal world can. **The Vedānta view met** not be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.* [Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere 'illusory evolution'].

(65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaṇāda, with reference to which the author asserts—**The Nyāya and Vais'eṣika view criticised; and the Sāṃkhya view established** " *The effect is existent.* " In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced —(1) "*What is non-existent cannot be produced.*" If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists *blue* can never be made *yellow*. If it be held that "'existence' and 'non-existence' are mere properties belonging to the jar," even so, if the *object to which the property* belongs is 'non-existent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence' of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because if the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, *ex-hypothesis*), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent'?—Hence it follows that, as *after* the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [*i. e.*, its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience; *e. g.* there

* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.

is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,—of rice from paddy by thumping,—and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'non-existent' is never found to be either manifested or produced.

(66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause: "*Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect.*" The term '*Upādāna*' (in the text) stands for *Cause*,—and the '*Grahaṇa*' of the cause stands for its *relation to the effect*: so that the compound '*Upādānagrahanāt*' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect'. What is meant is that the cause produces the effect only when in relation with it; and there could be no such relation with the effect if the latter were 'non-existent'; hence [the effect must be regarded as 'existent']

(67) *Objection*: "Granted all this; but why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced."

In answer to this we have the next clause—

(3) "*Because all is not possible.*"—If the effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), as all would be equally unrelated to the cause.—But such is not the case. Hence a related effect only can be produced by a related cause, and not an unrelated effect by an unrelated cause. This is thus asserted by the teachers of Sāṃkhya—'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all'.

(68) *Objection*: "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from

actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction (such as has been argued above)".

Answer : (4) "*Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient.*"—Now then, asks our author, does this 'efficiency' subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things—or upon that effect only which is amenable to that efficiency? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted that "the (causal) efficiency itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not all",—then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours connected with the particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent'; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.—Thus it is rightly argued that '*because the efficient cause can do only that for which it is efficient*' [the effect cannot be 'non-existent'].

(69) (5) For the following reason also the effect should be regarded as existent:—" *Because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.*"—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is existent; then how can the effect, non-separate from this latter, be 'non-existent'?

(70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following : (a)
Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect—The cloth (an effect) is not different from the yarns (constituting it),—because it subsists in the yarns;—an object differing in its essence from another, can never subsist in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth does subsist in the yarns;—hence it follows that it is not different from the cause.

(b) *The Cloth* and the *Yarns* cannot be different things, because the latter is the constituent cause of the former;—where any two things are entirely different, one is never found

to be the constituent cause of the other, *e.g.*, in the case of the *Jar* and the *Cloth*; as between the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, the *Yarns* are the constituent cause of the *Cloth*;—hence it follows that the two are not different.—(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the *Cloth* and *Yarns*: because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them;—‘conjunction’ is found to take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to ‘separation’, as between the *Himavān* and the *Vindhya*;—in the case of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, there is neither ‘conjunction’ nor ‘separation’,—hence it follows that they are not different.—(d) For the following reason too, the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* are not different things: because the *Cloth* does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it,—as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—*e.g.*, the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *palas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pala*;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the *Cloth* and that of the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it;—hence the *Cloth* is not different from the *Yarns*. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference—[*Avitānumāna*—see, *Kārikā* V] establishing the non-difference (of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* in particular, and of *cause* and *effect* in general).

(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the *cloth* is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as—(a) “If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [that is, when the ‘cloth’ is.

torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being *destroyed* on the part of the *cloth* and that of being *produced* on the part of the *threads* or yarns; the identity of the *cloth* and the *yarns* would thus mean that the same thing is both *destroyed* and *produced* at the same time];—(b) there is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being *related* [which means that the two members of the relationship are different]; (c) the function of the useful purpose served by the cause is different from that served by the effect [e. g., the *cloth* serves the useful purpose of *covering* things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns]. These arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors: (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise *disappear* on entering its body and *appear* again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either *produced* from, or *destroyed* by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be *produced* on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be *destroyed* on entering them again (i. e., being formed into clay, etc.,) and disappearing. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no 'production' or birth for what is 'non-existent', nor 'destruction' for what is 'existent';—as has been declared by the revered Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana (Vyāsa in the Bhagavadgītā, 2. 16)—'There is no *being* for the non-existent, nor *non-being* for the *existent*.'—In the instance cited, the *Tortoise* is not different from its *appearing* and *disappearing* limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.—(b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

analogous to the assertion 'There are *Tilaka* trees in the forest'.—(c) As for the *difference in the useful purpose served*, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of *burning, cooking and lighting*. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of *covering*, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the *cloth*, they can serve the purpose of *covering*.

(72) *Opponent*.—" [You say that the cloth is already existing in the cause, the yarns; and when it is supposed to be *produced*, it is only *manifested*.]—Now, was this *manifestation* of the cloth existent, before the operation of the cause? Or was it non-existent? If the latter, then the production of what was *non-existent* becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the *manifestation of the cloth*) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the *manifestation* is 'existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed),'—then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations'. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."

An objection based
on the nature of
the *manifestation*
of the effect

(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the *non-existent* effect is produced, what is this 'production'? Is it *existent* or *non-existent*? If it is *existent*, then there is no need for the causes. If it is *non-existent*, then there should be *production* of that 'production' also,—so that there would be an endless series of 'productions'.

Reply—The objection set aside as common to both theories

(74) If, in order to avoid the endless series of 'productions', you hold that the 'production' is nothing more or less than the 'cloth' itself,—then the term 'cloth' would be synonymous with 'production'; so that, when the term 'cloth' has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced' (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say '*the cloth is destroyed*'; because *destruction* and *production* (denoted by *cloth*) can never co-exist.

(75) Thus, [Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'production of the cloth' must consist either in 'the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in 'the inherence of the cloth in its *Being*'; in either case, the said 'Production' cannot be *produced* (as *Inherence* is eternal); and yet for the purposes of that 'production' several causes have to be set into operation. And (just as you need the causes for the bringing about of the 'production' which is eternal), so would there be need for causes for the *manifestation* of the already existent products like the *cloth*.—The causes cannot be related to the *form* of the cloth; because the *form* is not an *operation*, and it is only to an *operation* that causes are directly related; as otherwise (without being related to operation) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.

(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever *existent*.

(77) Having thus proved the effect to be 'existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.

Kārikā X

The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'component', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and 'dependent'.—The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

Points of dissimilarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest

(78) '*With cause*' (Product). The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).

(79) '*Not eternal*'—destructible, i. e., evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.*]

(80) '*Not pervasive*',—that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade over all evolutes. It is the effect that is pervaded over by the cause,—not the cause by the effect; e. g., the Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and other products can never pervade Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.

(81) '*Active*'—i. e., mobile. The Sentient Faculty (Buddhi), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation).

(82) '*Multiform*';—as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.

(83) '*Component*',—of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in

* Since the Sāṃkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

the relation of 'composite and component' has been made on the basis of some sort of assumed difference; just as in the case of such assertions as 'There are *Tilaka* trees in this *forest*' (when the *trees* have no existence apart from the *forest*).

(84) '*Soluble*',—into Nature. The Sentient Faculty and the rest are soluble into Nature, as is going to be explained later on.—Nature cannot be soluble in itself though it may be so regarded in its relation to the Spirit.

(85) '*Conjunct*'.—Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [Unsatisfied with this explanation on the the ground of the relationship between the *whole* and its *parts* being eternal,—the author offers another explanation].—Or, the term '*avayava*' (in the compound '*Sāvayavam*') may be explained as equivalent to '*avayavana*', i. e., the mutual adhesion, contact,—i. e., *Conjunction*,—between *wholes* and *parts*. '*Conjunction*' consists in *union* following on *disunion*; and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word '*Sāvayavam*'. For instance, there is such mutual *conjunction* among earth, water and other substances; there can be no such *conjunction* between *Nature* on the one hand and (its products) Sentient Faculty and the rest; because these latter are essentially the same as Nature. Nor can there be any *conjunction* between the three Attributes of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, because there is no *disunion* (absence of contact) among these.

(86) '*Dependent*',—the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the *I-principle*, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature: without such assistance it would be too weak to produce the *I-principle*. Similarly, the *I-principle* and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products.—Thus, in the producing of its product, 'everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the *Mani-*

fest is *dependent*, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.

(87) '*The Unmanifest is the reverse*,'—of the Manifest. That is to say—the Unmanifest is *without cause, eternal, pervasive, and inactive*—[though to Nature does belong the *action* of evolution, yet it can have no *mobility*]—*one, not-component, not-soluble, unconjunct and independent*.

(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit :

Kārikā XI

The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Gūṇas),

The points of similarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

'undistinguishable' (or 'non-separative'), 'objective', 'common', 'insentient' and 'productive'. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

(89) '*With the three Attributes*.'—That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90) '*Undistinguishable*':—just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi), being connate with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature. Or '*aviveki*' may stand for '*non-separativeness*', i e., for the character of being co-operative, among the 'manifest' things, there is no one thing that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself.

(91) Some people have held that it is *Idea* (Viññāna) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this *Idea* that could possess these (pleasure, etc.,) as its attributes.

An objection based on the Idealism of the Bauddhas

In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is 'objective'; 'objective' here stands for 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.—And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common'—i. e., apprehended (simultaneously) by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the *Idea*, then in that case,—in as much as *Ideas*, being in the form of 'functions', belong specially to particular individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the *Idea* of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [Manifest substance such as the] glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case if it were otherwise (i. e., if the *glance* were a mere *Idea*).

(92) '*Insentient*'—Nature (*Prakṛti*), Sentient Faculty (*Buddhi*) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the *Buddhi* as held by the *Vaiṇāṣ'ika* (Buddhist).

(93) '*Productive*'—i. e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been '*prasavadharmā*', but the author has used the particular possessive affix (*ṛini*), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of *productiveness* as belonging to the Manifest; the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.

(94) The author attributes the properties of the *Manifest* to the *Unmanifest*—'*So also is Nature*',—i. e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the *Manifest*, just enumerated, belong to Nature also]. •

(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated—'*The spirit is the reverse.*'

(96) 'Objection':—"How can you assert the Spirit to be the *reverse* of the *Manifest* and the *Unmanifest*;

Objection—There are points of similarity also between the soul and the Manifest as well as the Unmanifest when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifest—such as being 'without cause', 'eternal' and so on—as also between the Spirit and the Manifest—such as being 'multiform'?"

The objection conceded to—there are points of similarity as well as of dissimilarity *Answer: 'Yet also similar';*—that is to say, though there are points of *similarity*, such as being 'without cause' and the rest, yet there are points of *dissimilarity* also, in the form of being devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.

(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arises—What are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text:—

* This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation. It stands for the *Guṇas* of the Sāṃkhyas—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;—as says Colebrooke—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the *Guṇas*, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of *Rajas*. Davies has rendered this important word—'*Guṇa*'—by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For *Mode*, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, "a quality which it may have or not, without effecting its essence or existence." The *Guṇa* of the Sāṃkhyas, however, is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate '*Guṇa*' as '*Attribute*'—using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between *Attribute* and *Mode*: "By *Attribute*, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by *Mode*, I understand the affections of substances, etc."

Kārikā XII

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint; and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive and co-operative.

The Character of the three Attributes (Gunas)

(98) These are called *Guṇas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kārikā. And according to the maxim of presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the 'pleasure' ('pain' and 'delusion') of this Kārikā are to be taken in the same order (as '*Sattva*, etc.,' in the next).

(99) Thus then, the meaning is that '*Prīti*' being *Pleasure*, the *Sattva* attribute is of the nature of *pleasure*; '*Aprīti*' being *Pain*, the *Rajas* attribute is of the nature of *pain*; and, lastly, '*Viṣāda*' being *Delusion*, the *Tamas* attribute is of the nature of *delusion*. The word '*Ātman*', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "*pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa.*" As a matter of fact, *Pleasure* and *Pain* are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term '*ātman*' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are '*prītyātman*', whose nature, *i. e.*, *Existence*, is in the form of *pleasure*; similarly with the other terms ('*aprītyātman*' and '*viṣādātman*'). The idea of *Pleasure*, *Pain* and *Delusion* being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

(100) Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next describes their several functions:—"They serve the purpose of illumina-

Their functions

nation, action and restraint.”—Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The *Rajas*-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant *Sattva*-attribute to action, if it were not *restrained* by the sluggish *Tamas*-attribute—by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the *Tamas*-attribute becomes a restraining force.

(101) Having thus described their functions, the author proceeds to describe the method of their operation—“*They are mutually subjugative and supporting and productive and co-operative.*” The term ‘*ṛtti*’ at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound [thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) *anyonyā-bhibhavavṛttayaḥ*, (2) *anyonyās’rayavṛttayaḥ*, (3) *anyonya-jananavṛttayaḥ* and (4) *anyonyamithunavṛttayaḥ*].

Now to explain, (1) “*Mutually subjugative*”—The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other; e. g., the *Sattva* attribute attains its calm state only after having subdued the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes. Similarly the *Rajas* attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes; and the *Tamas* attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Rajas* attributes.—(2) “*Mutually supporting.*”—Though this epithet is not applicable here, in the sense of *the container and the contained*, yet what is meant by ‘support’ (*As’raya*) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the *Sattva* attribute helps the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes through the help of *activity* and *restraint* (which are the functions of the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes). [Or else, the *Sattva* attribute by itself, without the help of *Rajas*, would remain inert, and never be moved to action].

Similarly the *Rajas* attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of *illumination* and *restraint*,—and the *Tamas* attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of *illumination* and *activity*. (3) “*Mutually productive*.” That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By *production* here is meant *modification*, and this is always of the same character as the parent Attribute. This is the reason why this ‘modification’ is not regarded as ‘caused’ (*produced*), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it *non-eternal*, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) “*Mutually co-operative*.” That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another. The particle *ca* has the cumulative force.

In support of the above, we have the following Smiti text: “All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; *Sattva* is the consort of *Rajas*, *Rajas* of *Sattva*, both of these again of *Tamas*, which latter again of both, *Sattva* and *Rajas*. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived.” (*Devī-Bhāgavata*, 3. 8).

(102) It has been said that the Attributes “*serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint*.” Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so :—

Kārikā XIII

The *Sattva*-attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the *Rajas*-attribute exciting and mobile; and the *Tamas*-attribute sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.

The three Attributes named and their nature explained

(103) *The Sattva-attribute, etc.*—The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of Sāṅkhya, to be *buoyant* and *illuminating*. **The Properties of Goodness (Sattva)** *Buoyancy*—as opposed to *sluggishness*—is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In **Buoyancy** some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, *buoyancy* may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); *sluggishness*, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. **Illuminativeness** The *illuminative character* of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Kārikā XII).

(104) *Sattva* and *Tamas*, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects; the driving force is supplied by *Rajas*, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. **Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas)—activity and excitingness** It is for this reason that *Rajas* is said to be *exciting*. This exciting character of *Rajas* is next accounted for—“(it is also) *mobile*.” This shows that the operation of *Rajas* is necessary for all activity.

(105) On account of its ‘mobility’, *Rajas* would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the **Necessity of the properties of Darkness (Tamas), sluggishness and envelopingness** “sluggish and enveloping” *Tamas*, which obstructs its activity, which is operative in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active *Rajas*, *Tamas* has been said to be the *restrainer*—“*Darkness is sluggish and enveloping*.” The particle ‘*eva*’ is to be construed—not only with ‘*Tamas*’ but with ‘*Sattva*’ and ‘*Rajas*’ also.

(106) The enquirer objects: "Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endowed as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champions); there can be no possibility of their combining for a single purpose." The author replies—
Objection—The Attributes of contradictory natures cannot co-operate "Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of the lamp." We have all observed how the *wick* and the *oil*—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; similarly, the three humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end;—'for the single purpose', of the emancipation of the Spirit. This will be further explained in Kārikā XXXI.

(107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual contradictions, lead to the assumption of three different causes connate with themselves respectively, (and it is these causes that we have postulated the three Attributes). These three causes also must be multiform, since, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As an example (of the multiform character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or

stupefies another man who is unable to get at her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the *Attribute of Sattva*, the essence of which is Pleasure; the cause of pain is the *Attribute of Rajas*, the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the cause of delusion is the *Attribute of Tamas*, the essence of which is Delusion.

Goodness the cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain, and Darkness of Delusion

As regards Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to *Sattva*), these are not mutually contradictory, and as such, not incapable of co-existing in a single substratum; in fact, they are actually found together (subsisting in *Sattva*). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminateness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally)—as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of *Rajas*),—as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of *Tamas*), [do not necessitate the assumption of several causes]. Thus it is established that there are *three*—and only *three*—Attributes.

(108) *Objection*:—"As regards earth, and other things known to us, we actually perceive the properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the rest (described in Kārikā XI) as belonging to them, and we admit them so far. But the *Sattva* and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri-

Question—Indiscernibility, etc., of the Attributes, how proved?

bute to these latter, the said properties of being 'undistinguishable,' 'objective,' 'insentient' and 'productive' (as described under Kārikā XI above)? "

Answer :

Kārikā XIV

The properties of being 'undistinguishable' and the rest are proved by the existence of the three Attributes, and by the non-existence of these (the three Attributes) in their absence. And the existence of the Unmanifest (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause.

Two reasons for
the above given.
Existence of
Nature proved

(109) By "*aviveki*" in the Kārikā is to be understood the abstract form '*avivekitva*'; just as '*dvi*' and '*eka*'—in the Sūtra "*Dvye kayordviva-
naikavacane*" (Pāṇini 1-IV-22)—stand for '*dvitva*' and '*ekatva*' respectively; if it were not so, then the form of the compound would be "*dvye kesu*" (and not "*dvye kayoh*").* *Question*.—How do you prove the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest?—*Answer*.—"By the existence of the three Attributes." That is, in the case of *manifested* entities known to us, it has been found that 'whatever is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, is endowed with the properties of *being undistinguishable* and the rest';—this affirmative universal proposition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many words because it is clearly known,—It proceeds to state the negative premiss in the next term—'*by the non-existence of these in their absence*'; that is, where the said properties of

* For if the compound were analysed into '*dvi*' and '*eka*', the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making '*dvi*' and '*eka*' stand for '*dvitva*' and '*ekatva*' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

'being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent,—as in the *Spirit*,—the three Attributes of *Sattva* etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the *Manifest and the Unmanifest* (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"By the existence of the three Attributes"—as a purely negative inference* (*Avīta*), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle term—existence of the Attributes).

(110) *Objection*:—"The existence of the properties of 'being undistinguishable' and the rest, cannot be proved before the object possessing these properties (the Unmanifest) has been proved to exist. The existence of the *Unmanifest* itself has not yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved?"

Answer:—"The existence of the *Unmanifest* is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause. The sense of the argument is as follows: All effects are found to possess properties similar to those of their respective

Question—How is Nature proved to exist?
Reply: From the properties of the effect being due to those of the cause.

* The syllogism has been previously explained as—"Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substances."—and here we have the affirmation (*Anvaya*) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "All things having pleasure etc." Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus "All things besides the Spirit (the Manifest and the Unmanifest) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes, and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for the minor term *The Manifest and the Unmanifest* which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifest and the Unmanifest can be said to have the three Attributes.

causes; e. g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;—it is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the *Unmanifest*, Primordial Matter (Nature) is established.*

(111) Says the enquirer, “ the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vais’eṣikas) and Gautama (the Naiyāyikas) assert that Manifest is produced out of the *Manifest* ; According to them Atoms are manifest, and these produce the *manifest* product, from the binary compound onwards to the Earth, Water and other substances ; and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the

Why not accept the atomic theory which discards the necessity of an Unmanifest Entity ?

* And consequently *Nature* too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before—“What-ever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also.” The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms.—

Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).

Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect (Intellect)

∴ Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause (Nature).

And again :—

Whatever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc.

Nature has pleasure, etc., (as first proved).

∴ Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

(constituent) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the *Manifest* what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature ?) "

We reply—

Kārika XV

(i) Because of the finite nature of specific objects,

Reply—we must
postulate an Un-
manifested Reality—reasons given

(ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects), —there is the Unmanifest as the cause (next Kārikā).

First proof of
the existence of
Prakṛti ' Since
there is separa-
tion of cause and
effect, and reunion
of the whole
Universe "

(112) " *Of specific objects* " i. e., of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the rest—the cause, root-cause is the *Unmanifest* (Nature). Why so ?—(iv) " *because of the separation between the cause and effect and because of the merging of the whole Universe* " ;—It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause ; the

* The atomic theory of Kanāda and Gautama may be thus summed up—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Ākāśa, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endowed with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds By some agency or other—mainly that of Adṛṣṭa, the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else, they could not be permanent. But as far as I know, no Naiyāyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to S'āṅkarācārya in his refutation of the atomic theory. See *S'ārīraka-Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* II—11-12-17.

already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it—'this is the *Body* of the Tortoise and these are its limbs' and on again entering the body, they become unmanifest, hidden; similarly, the already existing products, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, on emerging out of the cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, come to be distinguished from this cause;—similarly, the already existing products in the shape of the Earth and other substances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmātras) become distinguished from them; the already existing Primary Elements on emerging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be distinguished from it; the already existing 'I-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest (Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This 'distinguishing' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately (as with Earth, etc.) or immediately (as with Great Principle)—is what is meant by the "distinction between the cause and its product". Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears, *i. e.*, becomes *Unmanifest*; which means that it is a form of the cause itself which becomes *unmanifest*, so far as the particular product is concerned. Thus also when the Earth and the other substances merge into the Primary Elements, they render these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned;—similarly, when the Primary Elements merge into the I-principle, they render these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as their own form is concerned;—when the I-principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

concerned;—and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple. This is what is meant by *'the non-separation or merging of the whole world of effects'*, of all kinds. The term '*Vaiśvarūpya*' is formed by the adding of the reflexive affix '*syāñ*' (to the term '*viśvarūpa*'). From all this it follows that, in as much as there is 'distinction' and also 'merging of the already existing product in the cause, there must be *Unmanifest* as the cause.

(113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause—'*Because of evolution being due*

Second proof Be- *to the efficiency of the cause;*"—It is a well-
cause Evolution known fact that the evolution of the effect
is due to Energy is due to the efficiency of the cause; for
 certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent 'efficiency' in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being existent, there can be no other form of causal efficiency, apart from the fact of the effect being latent in the cause. The difference of *sand* from *sesamum*—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114) *Objection:* "The above two reasons that you have urged—the fact of evolution being due to the

Objection: These efficiency of the cause and that the separa-
two reasons might tion and merging of the cause and effect—
rest with Intellect might be taken as proving the supreme
 'Unmanifest' character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?"

Answer: "*Because of the finite nature of specific*

Reply—Third objects";—'*parimāṇāt*' stands for '*parimitat-*
proof—"From *vāt*', 'because of being measured, i. e., finite'.
finiteness" [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic
(of form]—The specific objects in question, the
all manifested
existence)

Great Principle and the rest, have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (*i. e.*, they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state),—because, they are finite,—like the jar and other things:—the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Unmanifest which must be the *final* cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

(115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie unmanifested:— ‘*Because of Homogeneity*’.—**Fourth proof—** ‘*Because of homogeneity*’ ‘Homogeneity’ consists in the similarity of the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest—manifesting themselves as ‘volition’ and the rest—are found to be ‘homogeneous’ in the sense that they consist in Pleasure Pain and Delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.**

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:—

* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of the Great Principle) is not finite, as its effects, ‘I-principle’ and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes *ad infinitum*.

** Thus we have in the present case: The Great Principle and the rest are invariably connected, with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; and as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its constituent elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in Pleasure, Pain and Delusion.

Kārika XVI

There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before);
it operates through the three Attributes,
The method of Nature's operation **by blending and modification, like water,**
on account of the difference arising from
the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

(116) "*Operates through the three Attributes*".—At the
 time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the
Through the Attributes three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,
 continues its homogeneous modifications.
 Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as
 such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified.
 Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes,
 Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form*
 [This is at the period of dissolution].

(117) Another method of operation (which comes in at
 the creative period) is next stated—"By
By a blending of the Attributes *blending*". The term '*samudaya*' signifies
 '*sametya udaya*', *appearing in combination,*
i. e., blending. This blending of the Attributes is not possible
 without some sort of relative subserviency among them; and
 this relative subserviency again is not possible without some
 diversity among the Attributes;—this diversity again is not
 possible without one being suppressive of the other (*i. e.,*
 unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress
 one another).—This is the second method of operation
 which brings about the Great Principle and other products.**

* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which
 no evolution is possible.

** The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of
 equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant,
 evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations
 —Intellect and the rest.

(118) The enquirer objects—"How can diverse methods of operation belong to the Attributes, when each of them is of one uniform nature?" We **Objection—How can an Attribute of uniform nature bring about diverse actions** reply—"By *modification like water*;"—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though naturally of itself, having one taste,* becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and hot, according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth; **Reply:—"By modification as water."** in the same manner, (owing to the *blending* and the *mutual suppression* of the Attributes), the Attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications (in the state of various products). This is what is meant by the phrase: "*on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.*" That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

(119) There are some self-contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the 'I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. 'As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.

Kārikā XVII

(a) **Because all composite objects are for another's use, (b) because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties, (c) because there must be control, (d) because there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards**

Reason for the existence of Spirit

* 'Sweet' according to the Naiyāyikas.

'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.

(120) The Spirit must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (a) "*Because the Spirit exists : because all compound objects are for another* fest (Nature) and other things. (a) "*Because all composite objects are for another's use*"—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things.—Nature and the rest are all 'composite', being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*).

(121) "*But*" says the objector, "the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body which is itself a composite thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing—(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit.

Objection : The above reasoning would only lead to another set of compounds, not to an Elementary Spirit

We reply—" *Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties.*"—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being for another's use', we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite

Reply—*Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes must exist*

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

objects *ad infinitum*; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. And when we can escape this *regressus ad infinitum* by postulating a reasonable terminus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that "Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the 'composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with 'being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects); in fact if one were to insist upon the Inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),—then there would be an end to all Inference (no Inference being possible).^{*} We have explained this in our *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā*.^{**} Thus then, in order to escape the *regressus ad infinitum*, if we accept the non-composite nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being "without the three Attributes", "distinguishable", "non-objective".

^{*} Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the *Naiyāyikas*—"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

^{**} This is a commentary on Udyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* (a gloss on the *Vātsyāyanbhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama). This work with the *Parīśuddhi* of Udayanācārya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient *Nyāya*,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Ganges'a *Upādhyāya*, in his *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*.

(subjective), “ uncommon (specific) ”, “ sentient ”, and “ not productive ”. Because ‘ being with three Attributes ’ and other properties are always accompanied by that of ‘ being composite ’, which latter being absent in the Spirit, must lead to the inference of the *absense of the three Attributes*, &c., just as when a certain individual is not a ‘ Brāhmaṇa; he cannot be a ‘ katha ’ (a special class of Brāhmaṇas). Hence when he laid down that “ there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.,” he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit. .

(122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: “ *Because there must be be ‘ control ’*”; that is to say, because the **Because there must be superintendence.** objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as ‘ are always controlled ’;—as a matter of fact it is found that everything *consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion*, (*i. e.* in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—*e. g.*, the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to ‘ consist in pleasure, pain and delusion ’; therefore, they must have a ‘ controller ’—and this ‘ controller ’ must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent;—and this is the Spirit.

(123) Again there must be the Spirit “ because there must be some one to experience ”. The term **Because there must be one to feel** ‘ some one to experience ’ indicates the *objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must*

* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*.

be something other than the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products; as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.* Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the Spirit.

(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kārikā thus: The term '*Bhogya*' stands for *visible*; and the *visibility* of the Great Principle and the rest not being possible without an *observer*, there must be one outside of, and beyond them; and this is the Spirit. What the word '*bhoktṛbhāvāt*' of the text means is 'because the *observer* is to be inferred from the *visible*'. The *visibility* of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,—like the Earth and other substances,—of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there—"because there is tendency towards Isolation."—The '*Iso-*lation' which is found in all scriptures and is recognised by great sages and others possessed of divine insight—as the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain—can never belong to the Great Principle and other products; because, by their very nature, the pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved,

* That is to say—the Great Principle, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to *feel* pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of *pleasure* by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and *vice versa*, which is absurd.

since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element.—It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest,—and this is the Spirit.

(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one* (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body ? And in reply he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

Kārika XVIII

(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

(127) "*Because etc.*"—The plurality of Spirits is established,—why ? "*Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs. The 'Birth' of the Spirit consists in its connection with a new set of body, sense-organs, mind, 'I-principle', Great Principle and feeling** (Vedanā)—all these latter forming a composite*

* As the Vedāntin asserts.

** "*Vedanā* might be taken severally with 'body' etc., In that case the passage would be translated thus: 'bodily' sensuous, mental egoistic and intellectual cognitions ; but the translation given above is preferable, for certainly there can be no cognition through body etc., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind etc., and so on with the rest.

of a particular character; it does *not* mean *modification*; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). *Death* also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The 'organs' are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The *definite adjustment* of these—birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these—Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit,—and this cannot be explained on the hypothesis of there being only one Spirit; for, if the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then on the *birth* of one, all would be *born*.—on the *death* of one, all would *die*.—on one becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind or deaf,—on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,—so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing (on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. This, however, can never be right, for a girl does not become 'dead' by the derangement of her hands, or 'born' on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body.

(128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different with different bodies: "*Because activity is not simultaneous*." Though 'Activity' in the form of effort, is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men—as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man would

lead to the moving of all others at the same time—a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothesis of *plurality*.

(129) Again, the Spirits must be many—“*because there is diversity due to the three Attributes.*” The **Because the modifications of the Attributes are different** particle ‘*eva*’ should be constructed with ‘*siddham*’, not with ‘*viparyayāt*’; the sense being that ‘the plurality of Spirits must be taken as *proved*, not as *unproved*.’ The term ‘*traiguṇya*’ stands for the ‘three Attributes’;—by the ‘diversity’ of these is meant ‘differentiation.’ Some persons abounding in the Sattva—attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute—*e. g.* the deities and saints; others abound in the Rajas-attribute,—such as men; others again in the Tamas-attribute,—such as beasts. This ‘diversity’ or ‘differentiation’ due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

(130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states the properties of the Spirit—as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom:—

Kārikā XIX

And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is
The properties of the Soul ‘Witness,’ and has ‘Isolation,’ ‘Neutrality,’ and is the ‘Seer,’ and ‘Inactive.’
 ‘*From that* &c.’—The particle ‘*Ca,*’
 “*And*” connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

(131) If it were said—“And from *this* contrast,” then it would refer to ‘*the diversity due to the three Attributes*’, of the last Kārikā. In order to avoid this, it is said—“and from *that*, etc.”
Why that contrast?

A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that*; hence the *that* here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132) Thus, the 'contrast' of the character of "having the three Attributes, etc.", and the rest (which **The necessity of so many properties. Their Inter-dependence** have been set forth in Kārikā XI as belonging to the *Unmanifest*, Nature, as also to the *Manifest*, Products.)—connotes the Spirit's property of *being without the three Attributes* and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', 'not common', 'sentient' and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being 'witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a 'seer', and one can be 'seer', and one can be a 'witness' only when the things have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute *showing* the object of their dispute to the *witness*; similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the *witness*. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an *object* and insentient; and since the Spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the '*witness*'. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

(133) Further, from the *absence of the three Attributes* in the Spirit follows its *Isolation*—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this property, as belonging to the Spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the Spirit being by its very nature *without the three Attributes*, and hence without *Pleasure, Pain* or *Delusion*.

(134) From the *absence of the Attributes*, again, follows *neutrality*; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

and pain, who can be called *neutral*—also called *Udāsina* (indifferent). Lastly, the *inactivity* of the Spirit follows from its being ‘distinguishable’ and ‘non-productive.’

(135) *Objection.* “We grant all this; but in ordinary experience, we first decide, what is to be done by us and then think in the following strain—‘I, who am a sentient being, wishing to do a certain act, am going to do it;’ so that, we find by our experience that ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ are co-existent in the same person. And this goes against the Sāṅkhya’ tenets which make the ‘Sentient’ being ‘inactive’ and the ‘active’ agent ‘insentient.’

Objection-Intelligence and activity always found co-existent

Answer .—

Kārikā XX

Reply :—The apparent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Puruṣa

Thus from this union, the insentient ‘Evolute’ appears as if ‘sentient’; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, which is neutral appears as if it were active.

(136) The sense is that in as much as ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word ‘Līṅga’ ‘Evolute’, here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the ‘union’ *i. e.*, proximity of the Spirit with the ‘Evolute.’ The rest is clear enough.

(137) *Objection* :—“ You say that the feeling is due to Union, etc. But no union between two dis-

Objection :— tinct things is possible, without some need,
What is the need which again is not possible without the
of the Union ? relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute ?]’

In reply, the author explains the ‘help’ or ‘benefit’ which forms the basis of the need.

Kārikā XXI

For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for
Reply :—The need the Isolation of the Spirit, there is union
is that of final of both,—like that of the, halt and the
Emancipation blind; and from this union proceeds
 evolution.

(138) In the term “ *Pradhānasya* ” the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—“ for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things, ”—thus implying the fact of Nature being an *object—something to be enjoyed*. This *enjoyability*, however, is not possible without an *enjoyer*, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature.

(139) The author next explains the need of the Spirit (for Nature)—“ *For the Isolation of the Spirit* ”—The Spirit, while in union with the ‘enjoyable’ Nature, believes the three kinds of pain—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this (self-imposed bond) he seeks liberation, Isolation; this Isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus discrimination is not possible without the Nature (and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

of any kind is possible);—thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions (between the Spirit and Nature) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of ‘enjoyment’, should be united with it again, for the purpose of ‘Isolation’.

(140) “ Granted that there is this *union* between these two ; but whence the evolution of the Great Principle and the rest ? ” *Answer* “ *From this union proceeds evolution.* ” The said ‘ union ’ (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for ‘ enjoyment ’ or ‘ Isolation ’ if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the *union* itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of ‘ enjoyment ’ and ‘ Isolation. ’

The process of Evolution is now explained.

Kārikā XXII

From the (Prakṛti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Principle) ;
The process of Evolution from Prakṛti downwards **from this issues Ahankāra (I-principle);**
from which proceed the ‘set of sixteen’
from five of this ‘set of sixteen’ proceed
the five elementary substances.

(141) *From Prakṛti, etc.,—Prakṛti* is the Unmanifest (Nature); *Mahat* (Great Principle) and *Ahankāra* (I—Principle) will be described later. The ‘ set of sixteen ’ is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five *primary elements*. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākās’a, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

(142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds *Ākāśa*, having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound' proceeds *Air*, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of 'colour' combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds *Fire*, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch' and 'colour' proceeds *Water*, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', 'colour' and 'taste' proceeds *Earth* with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in *Kārikā X*, and specifically in *Kārikā XIII*; the Manifest also has been generally defined in *Kārikā X*; now the author defines *Buddhi*, a particular form of the Manifest, the *Buddhi*—the knowledge of which is helpful towards discriminative wisdom.

Kārikā XXIII

Buddhi, the Great Principle, 'is determination' (i. e. determining Principle, Will)*; Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, constitute its form when abounding in the Sattva-attribute,—and the reverse of these when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.

**Buddhi defined.
Its properties
stated**

*Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that *Adhyavasāya* means 'determining' and of all the faculties *will* appears to be the only determining principle in Man.

(144) *Buddhi* is described as “determination”—on the principle that there is no difference between the action (of determining) and the active agent (that which determines). It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now ‘determination’ consists in the notion that ‘this should be done,’ and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of *Buddhi* (the ‘Great Principle’ Will), which acquires sentience from its proximity to the Sentient Faculty (of the Spirit); and ‘*Buddhi*’ is regarded as *not different* from the said ‘determination’ (on the principle that the action is not different from the active agent); this also constitutes the ‘definition’ (differentia) of *Buddhi*, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things.

(145) Having thus defined *Buddhi*, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom states the properties of *Buddhi*, as abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attributes: “*Virtue*, etc., etc.”. ‘*Virtue*’ leads to prosperity and the Highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold *Yoga* lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of Attachment (Love).

(146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named
 (1) ‘*Yatamāna-Samjñā*,’ (2) *Vyatireka-Samjñā*
 (3) *Ekendriya-Samjñā* and (4) *Vas’ikāra-Samjñā*. (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and

**The properties of
Buddhi-Virtue,
Wisdom, Dispas-
sion and Power,
and the reverse
of these**

**The four kinds of
dispassion •**

they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects; in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards their objects, it is necessary that the said impurities should be cured; the effort made to effect this cure constitutes the first form of Dispassion, '*Yatamāna-Saṁjñā*', the 'Endeavour-stage.' (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured; this sequence being there, those got to be cured have to be discriminated from those already cured; this discrimination constitutes the second stage of Dispassion, the '*Vyatireka-Saṁjñā*,' the 'Discrimination-stage.' (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing' (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the '*Ekendriya-Saṁjñā*,' the 'One-organ stage.' (4) The suppression of even this longing towards all perceptible objects-sensuous as well as super-sensuous—is the fourth stage called '*Vas'ikāra-Saṁjñā*,' the 'control-stage'; this is superior to the first three stages, this has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: "The dispassion named '*Vas'ikāra-Saṁjñā*' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or super-sensuous objects." [Yoga-Sūtra I-15].—Such is Dispassion, a property of *Buddhi*.

(147) *Power* also is a property of *Buddhi*, and it is to this that the perfections, Attenuation and the rest (*Animā* etc.) are due.* Of these (1) **The eight kinds of power** *Animā* (Lit. Atomic character), 'Attenuation' is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) *Laghimā*, 'Buoyancy' is that to which

* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear *nine*; but they ought to be *eight* only; hence I have taken *Vas'utva* and *Is'itva* as one.

is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) *Garimā*, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) *Mahimā*, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) *Prāpti*, 'Approach' is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) *Prākāmya*, *Fulfilment of desires*, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7) *Vas'itva*, 'supremacy'—by this all matter and material things come under one's control; this differs from '*Īs'itva*' 'sovereignty', which consits in the power to create and maintain matter and material things. (8) *Kāmāvasāyitā*, *Infallibility of purpose* is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course. †

(148) These four are the properties of Buddhi, abounding in the Sattva-Attribute. Those abounding in the Tamas-attribute are the reverse of these—*viz.*, Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

The author next defines Ahankāra—the 'I-Principle'—

Kārikā XXIV

The 'I-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that proceeds a two-fold evolution—the set of eleven and the five rudimentary substances.

The principle of Ahankāra defined. Its effects

(149) "*The I-principle is egotism*" and this 'I-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as— "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled,—'I am able to do this'—'all these things are for my use'—'there is no one else entitled to it'—'hence I am;'—the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle':—it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter-

minative function appearing in such decisions as “this is to be done by me.”

(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—“*From that proceeds a two-fold evolution.*” The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—“*The set of eleven*” consisting of the sense organs, and “*the five rudimentary substances,*”—only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle ‘eva’.

Objection :—“The I-principle itself being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of evolution the dull and inert (elements) and the illuminative (the sense organs) proceed from it?”

Objection—How can two diverse kinds of creation proceed from a uniform Egotism?

Answer.

Kārikā XXV

The ‘set of eleven’ abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the ‘Vaikṛta’ form of the ‘I-principle’; the set of Rudimentary substances from the ‘Bhūtādi’ form of the ‘I-principle’; and both of them from the ‘Taijasa’ form of the ‘I-principle.’*

Reply—The difference due to the diversity of the operating Attributes.

(151) ‘The set of eleven’, sense-organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;

* (a) ‘*Vaikṛta*,’ (b) *Bhūtādi* and (c) *Taijasa* are purely technical terms-names applied to the three forms or states of the ‘I-principle’ When the ‘I-principle’ is dominated by the *Sattva-attribute*, it is called ‘*Vaikṛta*’, when it is dominated by the *Tamas-attribute*, it is called ‘*Bhūtādi*’ and when it is dominated by the *Rajas-attribute*, it is called ‘*Taijasa*’. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.

and it proceeds from the ' *Vaikṛta* ' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so ? Because these substances abound in Sattva-attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

(152) *Objection* :—When all the necessary products are brought about by the action of the attributes of *Sattva* and *Tamas* only, have done with the attribute of *Rajas*, which serves no useful purpose.

Objection . The purposelessness of Passions

Answer :—“ And both of these from the ' *Taijasa* ' form of the I-principle” i. e., from the ' *Taijasa* Form', that is from the form abounding in the *Rajas*-attribute, proceed both, the 'set of eleven' as also the 'set of rudimentary substances.' Even though there is no separate product from the *Rajas*-attribute exclusively by itself, yet (it is a necessary factor. as) the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not perform their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the *Rajas*-attribute, that they perform their functions; thus the *Rajas*-attribute is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, *Sattva* and *Tamas*. Thus it is not true that the *Rajas*-attribute serves no useful purpose.

Reply-Passion necessary for urging the other Attributes to action

In order to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

Kārika XXVI

The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms and the generative organ.

The ten External Organs

(153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which has, for its constituent cause, the 'I-principle' abounding in the Sattva-attribute. The organs are of two kinds 'of sensation (sensory)' and 'of action (motor)'. Both of these are called '*Indriya*', in the sense that they are characteristics of '*Indra*' (the Spirit).

Sense defined

The Sense-organs are named. "*The eye etc.*"—Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the 'Sensory' sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārikā XXVIII.)

Named. Functions

The eleventh sense-organ is next described—

Kārikā XXVII

Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (*Sensory and Motor*): it is the 'Observing' principle; and is called a 'sense-organ' since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes.

The eleventh sense Mind defined

(154) "*Partakes, etc.*"—Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both—i. e., it is an *organ of sensation*, as well as *one of action*; Since the eye and the other *sensory*

The double nature of mind

organs, as well as speech and other *motor* organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind.

(155) The author next gives specific definition of the *Mind*—"It is the observing principle"—That is to say Mind is defined by *observation*; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as 'a thing', there follows the definite cognition in the form 'it is such and such a thing, not that'; and it is this *observing* i. e., the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended,—that is done through the *Mind*. This has been thus described by an ancient writer—"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a *thing* and then the *mindful* people *observe*—cognise—it definitely as belonging to a certain *genus* and possessing certain well-defined properties".—Again (says another writer) —"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that *it is a thing*, this idea being indeterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as *sense-perception*"—This function of *observing* belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its *differentia*.

(156) *Objection*:—"Granted all this: But we have seen that the I-principle and the Will, having distinct functions of their own, are not classed among 'sense-organs'; in the same manner, the Mind also, having a distinct function of its own, should not be classed among 'sense-organs'."

Objection:—Why make Mind a sense when it has distinct function of its own?

The author replies—“ *It is a sense-organ* ’. Why ?

“ *Because it has properties common to sense-organs.* ” The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause, the ‘I-principle’ abounding in the Sattva-attribute, and not in its *being a characteristic of Indra (Spirit)*: for this latter property belongs to the Will and the ‘I-principle’ also; and as such these two also would have to be classed among ‘sense-organs’. Thus then “ *being the characteristic of the Spirit* ” should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *Indriya*; it cannot be said to form its connotation.

(157) Question—“ How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape of the ‘I-principle’ abounding in the “*Sattva-attribute*?” ” Answer:—“ *Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes* ”—The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the ‘Unseen Force’ which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the ‘Unseen Force’ also is only a ‘modification’ of the Attributes.

(158) The ‘diverse external forms’ has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that *just as the diverse external forms*, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.

(159) Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

Kārikā XXVIII

The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving'; 'speaking,' 'handling', 'walking', 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of) the other five.

The functions of the external organs

Observation.—the function of the five intellectual senses Speech, handling, walking, excretion pertain to the senses of action

By "Perception" here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa) through the sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the functions of the other five," i. e., of the five motor organs (of action). The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, etc., and the function of this organ is 'Speaking'. The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear.*

The functions of the three 'Internal organs' are next described:—

Kārikā XXIX

Of the three (the internal organs), the functions consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in the five Prāṇa and the rest.

Function of the internal organs

Reflection of Manas, Self-Consciousness of Ahṅkara and determination of Buddhi

(160) "The functions of the three consist of their respective characteristics." In the compound term 'Svālakṣaṇyam', the term 'Svalakṣaṇa' stands for 'those that have their own distinctive characteristics',—that is, the Will, the I-principle and the Mind; 'Svālakṣaṇya' (formed with the reflexive affix 'ṣyañ')

* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions e. g., the ear is defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.

stands for those *distinctive characteristics* themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus 'determination' of the Will, 'egoism' of the I-principle and 'observation' of the Mind.

(161) The next sentence describes the dual character of these functions based on the fact of their

**The five vital
airs, the common
function of the
three internal
organs**

being *specific* or *common*—" *These are peculiar,*" etc. "*The five Breaths constitute the common function*". The five 'vital

airs' i.e., the *Life* itself—forms the common function of the three internal organs; since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called '*Prāṇa*', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the generative organ; that called '*Samāna*' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called '*Udāna*', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye-brows; and that called '*Vyāna*', in the skin.—These are the 'five vital airs.'

The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (*the external organs* and the *three internal organs*).

Kārikā XXX

With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said

**The instantaneous
and the gradual
character of these
functions**

to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible (as well as perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by that: (i. e., the cognition of some perceptible object.)

(162) “*Simultaneous*,”—“*With regard to perceptible things*”; e. g., when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his *perception* (by the Eye), *observation* (by the Mind), *Egoism* or *self-consciousness* (by the I-principle) and *determination* (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163) “*Gradual*”; e. g., in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then fixing his Mind intently he *observes* that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the *self-consciousness* that ‘the robber is advancing against me’; and lastly follows the *determination* to run away from the place.

(164) With regard to imperceptible things, on the other hand, the (three) internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—“*The function of the three is preceded by that,*” i. e., the *instantaneous* as well as the *gradual* functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and Remembrance—
 The functions of internal organs preceded by those of the external ones—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things,—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things). The sense is that in regard to ‘perceptible’ as well as ‘imperceptible’ things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

(165) *Objection* : “ The functions, either of the four or of the three (organs), cannot depend on

Objection : **Functions permanent or otherwise ?** themselves alone; for in that case, as these organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them.”

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXI

They (the organs) betake themselves to their respective functions, through mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.

Reply—Functions of the organs due to mutual impluse. Soul purposes the incentive

The word ‘*Karanāni*,’ ‘organs’, has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).

(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons,—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,—combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other’s ‘impluse’ (motive),—and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs operates only by the reason of the ‘impluse’—i. e., proneness to action—of the other; since this impulse is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any commingling of the functions.

(167) Another objection—"The lancers, etc., being sentient beings, it is only right that they

Objection—How can the non-intelligent organs understand each other's motives?

should comprehend each other's 'impluse' (motive) and act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses."

Answer :—"The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act."

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action

What urges the organs to act is the 'Spirit's purpose'—in the shape of 'Experience' and 'Isolation',—prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

(168) It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs :—

Kārikā XXXII

Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions

The organs divided—their functions—seizing, retaining and manifesting

of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminating.' The objects of these are of ten kinds,—the 'seized', the 'sustained' and the 'illuminated.'

(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will.

The thirteen organs—the ten external organs, *Manas*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Buddhi*.

***Seizing*—the function of the senses of action.**

***Retention*—the function of *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas*.**

***Manifestation*—of the intellectual organs**

An organ is a particular kind of active agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' unless it has a function; hence the author next states the functions of the organs—"Having the functions of *seizing*, *sustaining* and *illuminating*,"—respectively; that is to say, the *Motor* organs have the function of *seizing*; that is, they *take up* their respective objects; *i. e.*, extend their activities over them;—the Will, the I-principle and the Mind 'sustain' things through their function

in the shape of the Vital Airs and the rest (mentioned before); and lastly, the *sensory* organs 'illumine' (render perceptible) their respective objects.

(170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions

The objects of these functions, tenfold

are next named and classified—"The *seized*" etc. These objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be

seized, to be sustained and to be illumined. By '*seizure*' here is meant *pervasion* (extension). The five motor sense-organs 'extend' over *Speaking*, *Handling*, *Walking*, *Excretion* and *Gratification*; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects become *tenfold*. Similarly the object 'to be sustained' by the three internal organs through their functions in the shape of the 'Vital Airs' etc., is the *body*, which is *fivefold*, being an aggregate of the five elementary substances; of these the Earth being an aggregate of *sound*, *touch*, *colour*, *taste* and *odour*. Each of these five being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be *tenfold*. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five—*sound*, *touch*,

colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become *tenfold*.

(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated :—

Kārikā XXXIII

The *internal* organs are three; and the *external*, ten, exhibiting objects to the former three. The organs numbered and the difference between the external and internal in point of time noted

The 'external' organs act at the present time and the 'internal' at all the three points of time.

(172) "*The internal organs are three:*" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called *internal* because located *inside* the body.

(173) *The external organs are ten; viz., the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs; i. e., they supply the means for observation, self-consciousness and determination regarding objects;—the sense-organs doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective functions.*

(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the *internal* and *external* organs.

The external senses acting at time present; the internal with reference to all three divisions of time

"*The external organs act at the present time.*" The "present" here includes also the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. "*The internal*

* The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the *present* if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as 'present.'

organs at all the three points of time." e. g., the idea that "there has been rain, because the river has risen—" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"— (for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"—(for the future).

(175) According to the Vais'eṣikas, Time is one (indivisible) and hence it cannot admit of such divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future'. They attribute these divisions to certain 'accidents' (adventitious conditions): but what the Teachers of Sāṅkhya hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future,' 'present' and 'past,' and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.

(176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present :—

Kārikā XXXIV

Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. Speech is concerned with sound; the rest are concerned with five objects.

The intellectual sense touching specific as well as unspecific objects; speech touching sound; the rest regarding the five objects of sense

(177) Of the ten external organs, the five sensory ones are concerned with 'specific' as well as 'non-specific' objects:—The term 'specific' here stands for the gross Sound (Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their 'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding' forms, as manifested in the form of *Earth* (Water, Air, Fire and *Ākāśa*);—and

'*non-specific*' stands for the subtile forms of Sound etc., manifested as the *Rudimentary Elements*. (*Tanmātrās*); in this name '*tanmātra*,' the particle '*mātra*' serves to exclude the *Gross* forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs are those that have for their objects the *gross* and *subtile* things. For instance, the Ear of deities and sages can perceive the *subtile* Rudimentary-Sound as also the *gross* Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive only the *gross* Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive *gross* as well as *subtile* Touch, while our organ can perceive *gross* Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their *gross* as well as *subtile* forms, while our organs can perceive these in their *gross* forms only.

(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the I-principle (*Ahankāra*); and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself (which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the I-principle).

"*The rest*" i. e., the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are '*concerned with five objects*'; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the *five* primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.

Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given :

Kārikā XXXV

The superiority of internal over external organs Since the Will along with the other internal organs extends over all things, these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates.

(179) 'Warders' i. e., most important, superior, 'Gates', i. e., mere instruments; the external organs are mere instruments. Since the Will along with the 'I-principle' and the Mind 'extends over', (i. e., determines)—all objects exhibited by the external organs, therefore, these latter are mere 'gates' (secondary organs), and the Will along with the other internal organs, is the 'warder' (chief).

The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said:—

Kārikā XXXVI

The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the Attributes, resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will.

(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which 'observes' it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre-

sents it to the 'I-principle,' which takes personal cognizance of them, and finally delivers it to the chief officer, Will. Hence it is said: "*These having illumined the whole of the Spirit's purpose present it to the Will.*"

(181) The external organs, the Mind and the I-principle are various modifications of the Attributes *i. e.*, phases of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Even though these are mutually nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire (though variously opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the *modifications of the Attributes*; such is the connection.

Objection—Why not make Buddhi sub-ordinate to the others? *Objection :—*"Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to the *Will*? Why should not we make it the other way : the Will presents its impressions to the I-principle and the Mind, which latter being 'superior'?"

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXVII

Reply: the superiority of Buddhi accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul-purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter. *In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit [it is Will that is regarded as superior to the other two].*

(182) In as much as the 'purpose of the Spirit' is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is the Will alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the Governor of the Country is the immediate and direct agent of the king, is supreme over the village officer and other officials who are subordinate to him. By reason of its proximity to the Spirit, the Spirit becomes reflected in the Will, whereby the Will assumes the form of the Spirit and thus accomplishes the Spirit's experiencing of all things. 'Experiencing' consists in the feeling of Pleasure and Pain,—this feeling takes place in the Will,—the Will has assumed the form of the Spirit ;—it is thus that the Will makes the Spirit go through the experience. Just as the Perception, Observation and 'Self-consciousness' of things take the form of the things and become transferred to the Will, in the same manner the functions of sense-organs also become mingled with the 'determining' which is the function of the Will. Just as the army of the village-officer is joined with the army of the Governor,—it is thus that the Will 'accomplishes' 'Sādhayati'—The Spirit's 'experience' 'Upa—bhoga' of 'prati'—'all things'—*Sarvam*—in the shape of Sound and the rest,

(183) *Objection*—"If the Will serves to accomplish the Spirit's experience of all things then no emancipation (Isolation) is possible."*
Objection—Buddhi supplying the soul with pleasure, no Mukti is possible

* For Buddhi would continue to help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude—which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

Answer—" *It afterwards discriminates the difference between Spirit and Nature.*" — 'Descrimina-

Reply—It latterly shows to the soul its distinction from Matter
Viṣinaṣṭi here stands for 'bringing about' the construction of clause '*Antaram Viṣinaṣṭi*' — 'discriminates the difference'; and is similar to that of '*Odanpākam pacati*'* (cooks the cooking of rice); and 'bringing about' in this context stands for 'showing' or 'expressing'.

The objector retorts: "*The difference between Spirit and Nature* being thus, according to your-
The difference being caused, will end and thus would emancipation cease with it self, something that is produced, it must have an end in time; and hence the Isolation or Emancipation brought about by that difference would also be transitory."

The answer to this is contained in the word 'discriminates'; the meaning is that the idea that
Reply—the difference is permanent, Buddhi only serving to expose it to the soul's view
 'I am one thing and Nature with its evolutes is different thing' is always there. What the Will does is to make known this already existing *difference*, which through non-discrimination, has appeared to be non-existent; the Will does not *produce* the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that *Emancipation* (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.

'*Subtile*—the said difference is' subtile *i. e.*, 'hard to perceive.'

The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):—

* *Viṣinaṣṭi* itself has been explained as "expresses the difference", then the mention of *Antaram* would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

Kārikā XXXVIII

The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be 'specific,' because they are calm, turbulent and deluding.

The division of objects into specific and non-specific

(184) The Rudimentary Elements *i. e.*, Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Mātra' (in the term '*tanmātra*,' which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,) connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.

(185) Having thus described the 'non-specific' things, the author, with a view to describing the 'specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production: "*From these etc.*," from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākās'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth—these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.

(186) *Objection* :—"We grant that these are thus produced; but what about their being 'specific'".

Specific because soothing terrific and deluding *Answer* : "*These are said to be specific;*"—why? because "*they are calm, turbulent and deluding.*" The first च indicates the reason (meaning *because*) and the second च has the cumulative force (meaning that the things have *all* the three characteristics). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākās'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant; others abounding in the Rajas-attribute are turbulent, painful and unstable; the rest abounding in the Tamas-attribute are deluded, confounded and sluggish. These gross elements, thus

perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be *specific* and *gross*. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be *non-specific* and *subtle*.

A further sub-division among the 'specific' objects is next stated :—

Kārikā XXXIX

(1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', and (3) the 'gross' elements,—these are the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these the 'subtle' bodies are everlasting, and 'those born of parents' are perishable.

Specific objects divided into (1) subtle bodies, (2) bodies produced of parents and (3) the great elements

(187) "*The specific objects are of three kinds*". these three forms are mentioned : (1) *subtle bodies* which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) *Those born of parents*, i. e., those consisting of the six 'sheaths' (Kośas). Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six 'sheaths' (of the physical body); (3) The last are the '*prabhūta*' i. e., the '*prakṛṣṭa*', Great, '*bhūta*', Elements; along with these, the other two constitute the 'specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents,' the second kind and the 'gross elements' the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last.

(188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and the body 'born of parents' is next explained—

The subtle bodies are permanent, those produced of parents perishable

"*The subtle bodies are permanent and those born of parents, perishable*"; that is to say, among the specific things, those that are *subtle* are lasting, while those 'born of

parents', are *perishable*, i. e., ending in (dissolving into) either fluids or ash or dirt.

The subtle body is described—

Kārikā XL

The nergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, unconfined, lasting, composed of Will and the rest down to Rudimentary Elements,—migrates, is devoid of experiences, and is invested with dispositions.

The Body is unconfined, permanent and migrating, invested with dispositions

(189) 'Formed primevally':—when the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, was the subtle Body, one for each Spirit. This body is "unconfined" untrammelled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "lasting"*: since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements". That is to say, it is an aggregate consisting of the Will, I-principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Rudimentary Elements; it is also *specific*, equipped with sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.

(190) *Objection*:—"This Subtle body might be the only vehicle of experience for the Spirit;—what is need of the Physical Body comprised of the six 'sheaths'?"

Objection:—unnecessariness of postulating two bodies, subtle and gross

* The word *nyata* is differently interpreted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (in his *Sāṅkhya-Candrikā*). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" i. e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gauḍapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumudī.

Answer:—“ It migrates ” *i. e.* the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.—“ But why ? ” —Because it is “ *devoid of experience* ”, that is to say, because the subtle body by itself—without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience—would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

(191) Objection:—“ As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit); then how can this Subtle Body migrate ? ”

Answer:—(Because) “ *it is invested with dispositions.* ” The ‘dispositions’ are Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Passion and Dispassion, Power and Weakness; and it is the *Will* which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions: just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the *Campaka* flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is *invested with dispositions*, that the Subtle Body migrates.

(192) Question:—“ Why should not the Subtle Body—
The subtle Body dissolving at each pralaya like Nature—last even after the Final Dissolution ? ”

Answer:—(Because it is) “ *mergent*, ” that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; *i. e.*, having a cause it must merge into it.

Objection :—" We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to the Will itself as equipped with the I-principle and sense-organs? There is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority. "

Objection—Why not attribute migration to Buddhi etc. ?

Answer :—

Kārikā XLI

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the pillar,—so neither does the 'Linga' (Will etc.) subsist supportless, without 'Specific Bodies'.

Reply—the Buddhi cannot rest without substrate

(193) The term 'Linga' here stands for the Will, the I-principle and the Rudimentary Elements, *because they are the means of knowing* (linganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism—During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with the five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body.

"Without specific bodies" i. e., without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the following scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata). "Then Yama extracted from Satyavān's body the thumb-sized body which he had entrapped and under his control." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit

The existence of the Subtle Body corroborated by the Mahābhārata

* Cf. The *Pañcikarāṇa-vivaraṇa-Tattvacandrikā*—where a similar explanation of the word is given.

could have been so extracted. 'Puruṣa' in the above extract, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that *it sleeps (lies—s'ete) in the body (puri)*.

Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration.—

Kārikā XLII

Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of 'causes and effects' and by union with the all-embracing power of Nature.

Reasons and manner of the migration of the Subtle Body

(194) "*Formed for the Spirit's purpose*", the Subtle Body acts like a *dramatic actor*, on account of its connection with the '*causes*' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc.,—and '*effects*' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paraś'urāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree.

(195) **Question** :—"Whence this capacity of the Subtle Body?" **Answer** :—"By union with the all-embracing Power of Nature." As is declared in the Purāṇa :—"All this wonderful evolution is the all-embracing Power of Nature."

The capacity of the Subtle Body is due to the Power of Nature

It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on account of connection with *causes* and *effects*"; the author next describes the *causes* and *effects* :—

Kārikā XLIII

Virtue and other dispositions are—(a) natural, which are innate and (b) incidental, and these are related to the 'cause'; and the ovum etc., related to the 'effect.' *

The means and consequences
Dharma, etc.

(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; *i. e.*, brought about after the man's birth, by the subsequent propitiating of the deities and such other causes.

I. Incidental dispositions

"*The natural dispositions are innate,*" *e. g.*, it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The '*incidental*' dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Vālmiki and other great sages.

II Essential, innate
The opposites of Dharma etc., similarly explained
The same is to be understood with regard to Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

(197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.**

Flesh, blood, etc., related to the Gross Body

* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place he renders *Samsiddhikah* by "transcendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders *Karaṇās'rayiṇah* by "including cause," though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the *Kaumudī* as well as the *Candrikā*.

** Gauḍapāda has taken the kārikā as setting forth 'three kinds of dispositions—(1) '*Sāmsiddhika*' innate, (2) '*Prakṛtika*' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) '*Vaiṅṛtika*' incidental.

(198) *Question* :—“ We have understood what are ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ in general ; what are the particular *effects* of particular *causes* ? ”

Answer :—

Kārikā XLIV

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes ,
by vice, descent to the lower ; from
Consequences of the various means wisdom (results) the Highest Good ;
and bondage from the reverse.

(199) “ *By virtue etc* ” i. e., to the Heaven and other
Virtue leads to higher planes regions

“ *By vice, etc* , ” i. e., to the nether regions known as
Vice to lower *Sutala* etc.

“ *From wisdom, the Highest Good.* ” Nature ministers
to the experience of the Spirit only so long
Wisdom brings about beatitude as discriminative wisdom is not brought
about ; after, however, this has been accom-
plished, Nature finds its work in connection with that parti-
cular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from
activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared,
“ The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment
of discriminative knowledge.” “ *From the reverse, etc.* ”
i. e., from wrong knowledge, results *bondage*.

(200) This bondage is of three kinds : ‘ Natural ’
‘ Evolutional ’ and ‘ Personal ’, (1) The
From the reverse of the above, res-pectively, contra-
dictory results. The three kinds of bondage
‘ Natural ’ bondage is that of those who
worship Nature as the Spirit, with reference
to such men, who are called ‘ Prākṛtika ’
(‘ Merged into Nature ’), it is said in the
Purāṇas : “ The contemplators of the Un-

manifest (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years"; (2) The 'Evolutional' bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature,—the elements, the sense-organs, the I-principle, and the Will-as Spirit. With regard to these it is said . " The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras , those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand, and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under this incidental bondage are *Videhas*. (3) The 'Personal' bondage is due to *Iṣṭāpūrta* (actions like charities, sacrifices, digging of tanks etc., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

Kārikā XLV

**From Dispassion results 'mergence* into Nature';
Consequences of from Attachment which abounds in the
various means Rajas-attribute, transmigration; from
Power, non-impediment, and from the
reverse, the contrary.**

* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks " It (the *Sāṃkhya*) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free . . . Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quite true; but it is not clear how this affects the position of the 'Hindu Commentators,' who, at least *Vācaspati Miśra*, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the subtle body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again.

(201) “ *From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature.*”

I Absorption into Prakṛti from dispassion Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, become merged into nature. ‘Nature’ here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as ‘Spirit’, become absorbed into these (i. e., those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202) “ *From attachment which abounds in the Rajas-attribute, results transmigration.*” The epithet **II Transmigration from passion-ate attachment** “ Rājasa ” implies the painful character of transmigration, because (as has been previously described) the Rājas attribute is the source of pain.

(203) “ *From power, non-impediment*”, i. e., the non-**III. Non-impediment from power** obstruction of desires. A man with power can do whatever he likes.

“ *From the reverse*”, i. e., from absence of Power “ *the contrary* ” i. e., the obstruction of one’s desires everywhere **IV Obstruction of desires from weakness**

With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will—Virtue, Vice etc.,—in order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation—the author first describes them collectively :—

Kārikā XLVI

Such is the ‘ volitional ’ (Subjective) Evolution distinguished by Error, Disability, Contentment and Success. By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become *fifty*.

The intellectual creation described

(204) '*Pratyaya*' is that by which anything is known i. e., Will; and '*pratyayasarga*' is the '*sarga*' i. e., evolution proceeding from the Will i. e., evolution. I. Error the volitional or 'Subjective' evolution.
 II. Disability
 III. Contentment
 IV. Success
 "Error" i. e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also "disability" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;—"contentment" and "success" also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—"*error*," "*disability*" and "*contentment*"—include Virtue and the other six dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which is included in "*success*".
 Virtue &c., included in the above four

(205) These properties are next described severally. "The forms of these are fifty." How so?
 Subdivisions of the above are fifty "By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities." This 'inequality' may consist either in the individual *strength* of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third, or in the individual *weakness* of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this 'inequality' are assumed in accordance with the requirements of particular cases, and it leads to the suppression of Attributes by one another or by one of them of the other two—thus giving rise to the *fifty forms* of 'Subjective Evolution.'

The 'fifty forms' are next enumerated:

Kārikā XLVII

There are five forms of Error; twenty eight of 5 forms of Error. Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine 28 of Disability, 9 of Contentment, 8 of Perfection forms; and Success eight.

(206) The five forms of Error are *ignorance*, *egotism*, *love*, *hate* and *clinging*, respectively named 'obscurity' (*Tamas*), 'delusion' (*Moha*), 'extreme delusion' (*Mahāmoha*) 'gloom' (*Tāmisra*) 'blind gloom' (*Andhatāmisra*). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or, the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of *Error* that *Egotism* and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Vārṣaganya has declared that 'Ignorance is five-jointed.'

(207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error—

Kārikā XLVIII

Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion,
 Sixty-two subdivisions of Error Extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is
 eighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'.

(208) "Of Error"; i. e., of Ignorance. "there are eight
 of Ignorance forms".
 eight forms

Of 'Darkness' i. e., Ignorance, there are eight forms;
 Eight of Delusion it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with
 regard to (1) Nature, (2) Will, (3) I-principle,
 (4-8) the Five Rudimentary Elements,—all eight of which
 are *not-Spirit*, it is this eight-fold notion that constitutes
 'Darkness' or Ignorance.

(209) The particle 'ca' connects 'eight forms' with Delusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—'animā' and the rest—also to be everlasting; this is the error of *Egotism*, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be *eight-fold*.

(210) “*Extreme Delusion is ten-fold*”. By *Extreme Delusion* is meant the attachment to the **Ten of Extreme Delusion** objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object, *Extreme Delusion* is said to be *ten fold*.

(211) “*Gloom*”, i. e., Hatred, “*is eighteen-fold*.” The ten objects of sense, sound, &c are loveable by themselves; the eight occult ‘powers’—Attenuation &c., however are not loveable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,—in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become *eighteen*, and these being the objects of *Gloom* or *Hatred*, make it *eighteen fold*.

(212) “*So is Blind Gloom*”—[‘*Blind Gloom*’ stands for *Clinging*]. The word “*tathā*” applies **Eighteen of Utter Darkness** *eighteen-fold-ness* to *Blind Gloom*. The deities having attained the eight occult powers—Attenuation and the rest—and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,—Sound and the rest—live in continual dread of these (powers and objects) being wrested away from them by the Rākṣasas; and this dread constitutes the ‘Clinging’ or solicitude which is ‘Blind Gloom’; and this latter having for its objects the aforesaid eighteen things,—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be *eighteen-fold*.

(213) Thus the five forms of Error—which is a sort of Fancy,—with their sub-divisions become sixty two.

(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty-eight forms of Disability.

Kārikā XLIX

Twenty-eight forms of Disability The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen—due to the reversion of ' contentment ' and ' success '.

(215) The ' injuries of the organs ' are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—Deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,—consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs—auditory and the rest—are the eleven forms of disability. The *disability* of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the senses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to *eleven* causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of *Buddhi* (itself) in accordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect.

(216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the injury of the sense-organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next described.—“ *With injuries of the Will.*” Question—“ How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself ?” Answer —“ *Seventeen are the injuries of the Will;*” why? “ *due to the reversion of contentment and success.*” Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly success being eight-fold,—the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,—thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will.

(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:—

Kārikā L

The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:—Four internal named 'Prakṛti' (Nature), (2) 'Upādāna' (Means), (3) 'Kāla', (Time) and (4) 'Bhāgya' (Luck); and five external due to the abstinence from objects.

Nine forms of
Acquiescence

The four internal
forms

(218) The four 'internal' forms of Contentment belong to those who have understood that the Spirit is different from Nature, but being illadvised, do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference, by such means as 'Hearing', 'Contemplating' and the like;—these forms are called internal (Ādhyātmika) because they presuppose the difference of *Ātman* (Spirit) and *Prakṛti* (Nature). It being asked—which are these?—the reply is—those "named 'Nature', 'Means', 'Time' and 'Luck' i. e., whose names are 'Nature' and the rest

(219) The *Contentment* called "Nature" consists in that feeling of satisfaction which the disciple has on being told that 'discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to every one in the *natural* course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, &c. So, my child, remain as you are! This *Contentment* is called 'Ambha'.

II. Salila

(220) The second form of *Contentment* arises from the following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of *nature*; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of nature functions equally for all individuals; such wisdom can only be attained through

Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named ' *Upādāna* ' (Means), also called ' *Salila* .

(221) The *Contentment* that follows upon the feeling of satisfaction arising from the instruction that "' Renunciation ' also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of ' Renunciation. ' " This is the *Contentment* named ' Time ', also called ' *Ogha* ' .

(222) The fourth form of *Contentment* is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following ;
 IV *Vṛsti* " " Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from *nature* nor from any other *means* (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon *time*, but it comes only by *luck*; thus it was through mere *luck* that the children of Madālasā obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named ' Luck ' also called ' *Vṛsti* ' .

(223) The *external* forms of *Contentment* are next described The *external* forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.,—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits—Nature, Will, I principle and the rest—to be Spirit. These forms are called *external* because they presuppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of *Contentment* appear only when there is absence of attachment,—and as the sources of such absence are five. —the absence also is *five-fold*; and as the absence of attach-

The five external forms

ment is *five-fold*, the forms of Contentment in question also are *five* in number.—The term '*Upama*' here stands for *absence of attachment*; and the compound '*Viṣayopama*' means '*absence of attachment to objects*'. So that the objects of sense being five, the '*abstinence*' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinenances are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment—involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.

(224) To explain —The means of acquiring wealth

I. *Para* consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants;—as is declared in the following words —“ who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master ?” Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called '*Pāra*'.

(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called '*Supāra*'.

(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with great effort (and safely hoarded), there arises the fear of its being spent up,—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called '*Pārāpāra*'.

(227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called '*Anuttamāmbha*'.

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 suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is;
 and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these
 forms of *Contentment* appear only when there is absence
 of attachment,—and as the sources of such absence are five,
 —the absence also is *five-fold*; and as the absence of attach-

ment is *five-fold*, the forms of Contentment in question also are *five* in number.—The term '*Upama*' here stands for *absence of attachment*, and the compound '*Viṣayopama*' means '*absence of attachment to objects*'. So that the objects of sense being five, the '*abstinence*' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinenances are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment—involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.

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(227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called '*Anuttamāmbha*'.

(228) Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel process of killing animals; and contentment due to the abstinence arising from this perception of cruelty of the process, is the fifth one, called '*Uttamāmbha*'.

Thus the five *external* forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of *success*:—

Kārikā LI

The eight forms of success are—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4-6) three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acquisition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success.

(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the *three-fold suppression of pain*—*three fold*, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.

The other 'successes' mentioned are only the means to said *suppression of pain*, and as such are regarded as *secondary* in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects; e. g., of these *study* is only a *cause*; those of the more important kind are only effects; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect.

(231) The first *study* consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; this is also called '*Tāra*'.

(4) Tāra

(232) Following from this last is *oral instruction*, which term implies the comprehension of the meaning of the texts studied—the cause (distinction) standing for the effect (comprehension of the meaning). This constitutes the second *success* also called ‘*Sutāra*’.

(2) **Sutāra** —These two—reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the ‘*Śravaṇa*’ (Hearing) [which along with *manana* and *nididhyāsana* is the means of realising the highest Truth.]

(233) *Reasoning* consists in the investigating of the meaning of the scriptures by a process of reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures themselves. This ‘investigation’ consists in establishing the ultimate Truth by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it. This process is also called ‘*Manana*’ (meditation) by writers on the Vedas. This success is called ‘*Tāratāra*’.

(3) **Tāratāra**

(234) The fourth is the *acquisition of friends*. Even though one has arrived at the truth by the right process of reasoning, yet one has no confidence in his conclusions until he has discussed them with, and won the agreement of, his teacher and fellow-students. Hence the ‘acquisition’ of such ‘friends’ as the teacher and fellow-students is said to be the fourth success called ‘*Ramyaka*’.

(4) **Ramyaka**

(235) By *dāna* here is meant *purity*, of discriminative wisdom—the word being derived from the root ‘*Daip*’, to purify. This ‘purity’ has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: “An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain” (*Yoga-Sūtra* II—26). By *unimpededness* in the *Sūtra* is meant *purity*, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with

(5) **Sadāmudita**

different kinds of cravings or desires. This *purity* is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice, hence the word *Dāna* 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this *practice* also. This the fifth success called '*Sadā-mucita*'.

(236) The aforesaid three primary 'successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, '*Prāmāṇya*', '*Mudita*' and '*Modamāna*'. And these three with last five are eight forms of *Success*

(237) Other people explain the text as follows —(1) the perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of practices during past lives, is what is the *first* 'success' meant by *ūha*, (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, is the 'second success' called '*Śabda*', because it follows solely from the verbal text (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sāṅkhya texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher's,—it is the third form of success, due to study, and is called '*adhyāyana*'. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got at it. This form of *Success* distinguished by knowledge, is called '*Saṁprāpti*'. (5) Fifthly, *Dāna* (*Generosity*) is said to be means to 'Success' because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution', Success is the most desired by all; and *Error*, *Disability*, and *Contentment* are impediments to Success; this is what is said in the words: "*The aforesaid three are checks to Success.*" 'The aforesaid three' are Error, Disability and Contentment. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success,—because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the *goad*, '*Ankus'a*,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.

(239) *Objection* — "Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the 'Subjective Evolution' or by 'Objective Evolution' alone. Why have both the Evolutions?"

Answer —

Kārikā LII

Without the 'Subjective', there would be no 'Objective', and without the 'Objective' there would be no 'Subjective.' Therefore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the 'Objective' and the 'Subjective'.

Necessity of two-fold creation

(240) The term '*Linga*' 'Objective' stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and '*Bhāva*' 'Subjective' for the evolution out of the Will.

The meaning of the Kārikā is that the 'Objective' Evolution cannot manifest itself or accomplish the purpose of the Spirit without the 'Subjective Evolution'; nor conversely can the latter manifest itself or serve the Spirit's purpose without the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution.

That is to say, *Experience*, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies (Subtle and Physical). Hence the necessity of the *objective* evolution;—conversely that same *Experience* is not possible without the *organs of experience*, in the shape of the Sense-organs and the Internal organs; and these are not possible without Virtue and the other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established.

(241) The possible objection of 'mutual interdependence' is explained away on the analogy of the seed and sprout, due to the fact of Evolution having had no beginning in time, the 'subjective' and 'objective' evolutions at the beginning of the present cycle are due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle.—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.

(242) The various forms of the 'subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:—

Kārikā LIII

The 'celestial' evolution has eight forms, the 'animal' has five; the 'human' has only one form; thus in brief is the 'material' evolution.

(243) The eight 'celestial' forms are those pertaining to
 (1) the Brahmā, (2) the Prajāpati, (3) the
The eight divine Indra, (4) Pitr, (5) Gandharva, (6) Yakṣa,
sorts (7) Rākṣasa and (8) Pis'āca.

(244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird,
 reptile, and the immobile things.
Five of the lower
animals

(245) *Mankind is single*, not counting its sub-divisions—
 Brāhmaṇas &c. as separate, as the bodily
Mankind single form is the same in all classes of men.

Such, in brief, is the *material* evolution. Such objects
 as the *Jar* and the like,—though not having a 'body' in the
 ordinary sense,—are all included under the category of the
 'Immobile'.

(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of
 this 'material evolution', based on the higher and lower
 degrees of intelligence,—in the form of the 'higher', the
 'middle' and the 'lower'.

Kārikā LIV

The 'higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva-attri-
 bute; the 'lower' evolution abounds
The different divi- in the Tamas-attribute; and the 'Middle'
sions of beings evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute;
based on the —all these comprising the entire Uni-
predominance of verse, from Brahmā down to the tuft of
the Attributes grass.

(247) All the Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Svah,
 Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya—abound in
 the Sattva-attribute.—*The 'lower' evolution*
The six Heavenly *abounds in the Tamas-attribute; that all*
Regions

things from the cattle down to the *Immobile* things, abound in the Tamas-attribute, as full of 'Delusion'. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvipas (continents) and Oceans—form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the Rajas-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actions, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.

The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "*from Brahmā to the tuft of grass*"—the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things.

(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain,—a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that 'Dispassion' (Freedom from attachment) which is helpful in attaining the Final Goal.

Kārikā LV

Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body]. thus Pain is in the very nature of things.

The sources of pain

Pain of decay and death, the common lot of all creatures

'*Therein*'—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of Pleasure, and yet the pain of 'decay and death' is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—“may I not cease to be; may I continue to be” &c.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.

(249) *Objection* :—“Pleasure and pain, (according to the Sāṃkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?”

Answer —The term “Puruṣa,” literally means “one who lies in the subtle body;” and this latter being connected with the Will and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them

Explanation of the word Puruṣa

(250) *Question* .—How can pain which is related to the *body* be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply :—“Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body;” the Spirit cognising its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the आ in आविनिवृत्ते may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit’s pain—the meaning being, “Until the subtle body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain.”

(251) The author next deals with the different views that have been held regarding the cause of ‘Evolution’ or ‘Creation’.

Kārikā LVI

This evolution from the Will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the (modifications of) Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit, and thus is for another’s sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

The question as to the Maker of the Universe decided

Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for *pity* consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of 'interdependence', creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deeds, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of an intelligent agent would mean (according to the opponent) that the *deeds* of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced,—and the result of this would be that there would be no *pain*; so that the *removal of pains* would be very easy! [and there would be no ground for God's compassion].

(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the above incongruities arise, the only motive of Nature is the *fulfilment of another's purpose*. Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

(258) It has been said—"as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:—

Kārikā LVIII

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does
The Spirit's end— the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the
the motive of the emancipation of the Spirit.
Nature

'*Autsukya*' is 'icchī,' desire. Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attainment of the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent, because the end of an action is that which is desired.

The analogy is pointed out. "*So does the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the Emancipation of the Spirit*."

(259) *Objection* — "We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?"

Answer —

Kārikā LIX

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the
The cause of the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance,
cessation of so does Nature cease to operate when
Nature's operations she has made herself manifest to the
Spirit.

The word "Stage",—the place—implies the spectators—the occupiers of the place. Having *manifested herself*, i. e., having shown that her different modifications, sound, &c., are different from the Spirit.

(260) *Objection* :—"We grant that the action of Nature is for the Spirit's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit,—just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for *another's purpose*."

Answer .—

Kārikā LX

Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings about by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return.

Nature excepts no compensation

'As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master—who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits,—through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established.

(261) *Objection* :—" We grant all this . But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators, similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit."

Answer.—

Kārikā LXI

Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my conviction, once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions

By *modesty* here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the *Puruṣa's* view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature also—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the *Puruṣa* (Spirit) will in no case show herself again.

(262) *Objection* —“ This may be so. But *Puruṣa* (Spirit), being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is any emancipation possible for him? For *emancipation* consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the Karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying *Puruṣa*. And as the *Puruṣa* is devoid of action, it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for *Rebirth*. Hence it is meaningless assertion that ‘Evolution’ is for the purpose of the ‘*Puruṣa*’ ”

The author meets the above objection by accepting it in the course of winding up his disquisition

Kārikā LXII •

Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated: nor does he migrate; it is Nature alone that having many vehicles is bound, or is released, or migrates.

Bondage and
release in reality
apply to Nature

(263) Verily no Spirit is bound, nor does any migrate; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. *Bondage, migration* and *release* are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers, because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—grief or profit—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature, as has been already explained. So our doctrine is entirely sound

(264) *Objection* .—“ We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature herself? ”

Answer :—

Kārikā LXIII

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit.

Nature binds and releases herself by means of her own developments

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"; i. e. by Virtue and other dispositions (all properties of the Will) except wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit in the shape of Experience and Final Release, she releases herself by herself, 'by means of one form', i. e. by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.

Objection — "We have understood all this; what then?"

Kārikā LXIV

Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows wisdom in the form,—“I am not, naught is mine, and not—I”—which is complete, pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.

The form and character of discriminative wisdom

(265) The term “truth” stands for the knowledge of Truth.—From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,—there follows the *wisdom*, manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice pertains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called ‘*pure*.’

(266) “Why pure”?—“On account of the absence of Error.” Doubt and Error are the two impurities of wisdom; and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called *pure*. This is what is meant by the term ‘*aviparyayāt*’. Doubt consists in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of *Error*. Thus ‘*absence of Error*’ means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this ‘absence of Error’ also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth.

(267) *Objection* —“It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end.”

In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is ‘*Absolute*’, i. e., unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge, even though it has a beginning in time. For, partiality towards *truth* is natural to the Will, *buddhi*, as declared by outsiders also (here, the Bauddhas). “No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the Will.

(268) The form of the said knowledge is stated:—*I am not, naught is mine, and Not—I*. ‘*I am not*’ merely precludes all action from the Spirit; as is declared (by grammarians), “The root *as* (as in ‘*asmi*’) together with *bhū* and *kr* signify action in general.” Hence all actions, external as well as internal,—such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension—all become precluded from the

Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea of 'Not-I;' "I" here stands for *active agency* in general, such as in "I give", "I eat", "I offer libations", in all of which the active agent is represented by "I"; because wherein there is no action, there can be no *active agent*; hence it is rightly expressed as 'Not—I.' From this follows the idea that "*Naught is mine*;" for it is only an active agent that can be a *possessor*; and hence the preclusion of action implies the *preclusion of possession* also.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I am not," means that "I am the Spirit, *not productive*;" and because non-productive, "I have no action"—'Not I;' and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

(269) *Objection* :—"Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage."

Answer :—"It is complete," i. e. there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage

(270) *Question* :—"What is it that is accomplished by the said *knowledge of truth*?"

Answer :—

Kārikā LXV

Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, which has ceased to be productive and has turned back from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose (of the Spirit).

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operation

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were *experience* and the *perception of truth*; so

that when these two have been produced there is nothing left to be produced by her; hence, Nature "*ceases to be productive*".

"Under the influence of purpose"; i. e., by the force of discriminative Wisdom. The seven forms of Evolution,—Virtue, Vice, Error, Dispassion, Passion, Power and Weakness—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion also as of those who have it through mere contentment is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its opposite—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects in the shape of the 'seven forms' are also removed, and thus is Nature '*turned back from the seven forms of evolution.*'

"At ease", i. e. inactive, "Pure", i. e., unmixed with the impurities of the Will due to *Rajas* and *Tamas* Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in slight touch with the Will abounding in the *Sattva* Attribute;—as otherwise no vision of the Nature in the said condition would be possible.

(271) *Objection* —"This may be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature *ceasing to be productive*. But Evolution has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Nature); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the 'sentience' of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the 'insentience' and 'objectivity' of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; it cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done; because though one set of objects may have been experienced by the Spirit, there might be others of the same kind still to be experienced; as is found to be the case with the perception of sound and other objects of sense". (Thus no emancipation is possible).

Answer:—

Kārikā LXVI

"She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution

No birth after attainment of wisdom for want of motive

(272) So long as Nature has not brought about discriminative wisdom, she might continue to bring about the enjoyment of sound and other objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. It is only on account of the want of discrimination, that the Spirit regards as his own and enjoys the pleasing, displeasing and deluding modifications of Nature, the objects of sense,—the sound and the rest. Similarly discriminative wisdom also, which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as 'for himself'—only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a modification* of Nature. Thus the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot regard any purpose as his own. Further, experience and emancipation being the 'purpose of the Spirit', supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the 'purpose of the Spirit', there is no motive for the operation. This is what is

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

meant by the words—" *There is no motive for evolution.*" A 'Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no 'purpose of the Spirit.'

(273) *Objection* :—" We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that "emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds"—then, we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? , If by mere fruition (i. e. by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation, and hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit," becomes meaningless. The hope too—that "emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of *Karma*, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"—is too sanguine ever to be realised."

Answer .—

Kārikā LXVII

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy ;

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom

yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted

to it.

(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic residuum'—even though it is beginningless and its time of fruition is uncertain,—has its productivity destroyed and is unable to produce any 'fruit' in the shape of 'birth, life and life's experiences'. It is only when the 'soil of the Will' is watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (i. e. Ignorance, Egotism, Love, Hate and Clinging), that the 'Karmic seeds' give out sprouts; so that when the said soil is rendered barren by reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having been sucked up by the heat of the 'knowledge of Truth',—how could there be any possibility of the 'Karmic seeds' sprouting up? With this view it is said—"*Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy*;"—i. e., they cease to be causes. Even, so, when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse, just as, even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it becomes *inactive*. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced; as is declared in *S'ruti*—"Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [*Chāndogya* VI, 1, 2]. The 'impulse' (to which the continuance of the Body is due) is in the remnant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this impulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a time.

(275) *Question*—"This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LXVIII

When the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,—then he attains eternal and absolute Isolation.

The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,—the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute 'Isolation,' i. e. cessation of the three kinds of pain.

(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated.

Kārikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein (wherefore) the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.

"Absūse",—*guhya* (lit. in a case) i. e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.

"By the great sage" i. e. by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. *"Wherein are considered, etc.; 'in which' knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge;* as in the expression *'Carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti'*, the word *'carmani* (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean *'for the sake of the skin, one*

kills the tiger',—*'Bhūtānām;* of living beings,—*'the origin, duration and dissolution'* are considered;—which is done in the scriptures.

(277) *Objection*:—"Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great sage (Kapila); wherefore should we have every regard for the assertion made by Īśvarakṛṣṇa?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LXX—LXXI

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the Sage imparted to Āsuri, who taught it to Pañcas'ikha, by whom the philosophy was extensively propagated.

Importance of the Science Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in the Āryā metre by the noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa who has thoroughly understood the philosophical doctrine.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all evils causing the three kinds of pain.

Supreme, i. e. the most important of all purifying doctrines.

'Sage'—Kapila—*Imparted to Āsuri &c.*

(278) "Ārya"—that which has arrived at truth, and one whose mind is such is '*noble-minded*'.

(279) This philosophy is one organic whole in itself,—not a mere section—as it treats of all branches of knowledge:—

Kārikā LXXII

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete 'Philosophy of the Sixty Topics,' excluding the illustrative tales, and omitting the doctrines of other people.

The sixty topics of science

The sixty topics are thus enumerated in the *Rājas Vārtika*: 1 The existence of Nature (Kārikā XIV). 2 Its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (XI); 4 Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit) (XI); 5 Subordination (of Nature to Spirit) (XVII); 6 Plurality (of Spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Nature in the end) (XX); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Nature in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Duration (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX); these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of Error, (XLVII), nine of Contentment (L), and twenty-eight of Disability of the organs (XLIX); these together with the eight forms of Power (LI) make up the sixty "topics". All these sixty topics are treated of in the above distichs, which therefore form a complete Philosophy and cannot be said to be only a section thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories) *singleness*, *objectivity* and *subordination* relate to Nature; *distinctness*, *inactivity* and *plurality* to Spirit; and *existence*, *disjunction* and *conjunction* to both; and *duration*—i. e. continuance relates to the gross and subtle things.

May this work of Vācaspati Miś'ra, *Tattva-Kaumudī* (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men !

Thus ends the *Tattva-Kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miś'ra.

END

TATTVA - KAUMUDĪ

NOTES

I

The first benedictory stanza—अजामेकां etc., is taken from श्वे० (४. ९). वाच० has changed the readings as follows —

(b) नमामः in place of सरूपाः; (c) अजा ह्येते जुषमाणा भजन्ते in place of अजोऽद्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते; (d) जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां उमस्तान् in place of जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः। The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in सांख्य, which is not favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदान्तिव्यस explain this verse quite differently. शङ्कराचार्य has refuted the claim of the सांख्य that this verse lays down the principles of the सांख्य system. For fuller discussion, see शङ्करभाष्य on चमसवद्विशेषात् (ब्र. सू. १. ४. ८). It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three गुणः. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by वाच० for मङ्गलाचरण.

About कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण, see Introduction.

आधिभौतिक. The word भूत stands for living beings according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिदैविक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं दैवं, Davies remarks—" But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rīg-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Grtsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*). " (p. 15).

The reading adopted by गौड०, *vis.*, तदभिघातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदपघातके of वाच० (See, S. N. S., 1, 1n.). cf. तत्र त्रिविध-दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः (सां. सू. १. १). The reading of जय०

viz., तदवघातके does not materially differ from तदपघातके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading.

विष्णुपुराण describes the three दुःखs in the following verses :

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।

शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते श्रूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥

शिरोरोगप्रतिश्रयाज्वरशूलभगन्दरैः ।

गुल्मार्शःश्वयथुश्वासलघ्यादिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥

तथाक्षिरोगातीसारकुष्ठङ्गामयसंज्ञितैः ।

भिद्यते देहजस्तापो मानसं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥ ४ ॥

कामक्रोधभयद्वेषलोभमोहविषादजः ।

शोकासूयावमानेर्ष्यामात्सर्यादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥

मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ठ तापो भवति नैकधा ।

इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ह्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥

मृगपक्षिमनुष्याद्यैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः ।

सरीसृपाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिभौतिकः ॥ ७ ॥

शीतवातोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिसमुद्भवः ।

तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठैः कथ्यते चाधिदैविकः ॥ ८ ॥ (६. ५)

The reading अके, (found in some editions), in the verse अके चेन्मधु etc., has अर्के as its variant. On this बालराम remarks—अके इति पाठे तु—समीपे—गृहकोणे, इति वार्थो बोध्यः। वस्तुतस्तु जैमिनी-यस्त्रभाष्ये शबरस्वामिभिः पथि जातेऽर्के मधूत्सृज्य तेनैव पथा यथा मध्वर्षिनः पर्वतं न। गच्छेयुरित्यभिधाय 'अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत' इत्येवमुपन्यासाद् अर्के-इत्येव पाठः साधीयान् ॥ (p. 14, note 1).

II

The quotation 'यत्र दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं' etc., is ascribed to श्रुति by वाच०. On this बालराम remarks—'यत्र दुःखेन सम्भिन्नम्' इति भट्टवार्तिकीति केचित्, स्मृतिरियमिति विज्ञानभिक्षवः, परिमलादिषु प्रामाणिक-ग्रन्थेषु श्रुतित्वेन व्यवहारादर्थवादरूपा श्रुतिरियमिति मादृशाः ॥ (p. 16, note 3). The word स्वर्ग in this quotation has been variously

explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बालराम (pp. 39-40) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.

अपाम सोमममृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, माठर and जय०

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च दृष्टवद्दृष्टं स्पर्धासूयात्ययव्ययैः ।

बहन्तरायकामत्वात् कृषिवच्चापि निष्फलम् ॥ (११.१०.२१)

एवं लोकं परं विद्यान्नाश्वरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।

सतुल्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ (११.३.२०)

It is interesting to compare —जय०— अस्या आर्याया वक्ष्यमाणा याः, सर्वा एवार्थेन भाष्यस्थानीया द्रष्टव्याः (p. 4), with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation (p. 5).

The quotation of पञ्जशिख, viz., स्वल्पः सङ्करः etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on यो० सू० २. १३. See Introduction also.

The reconciliation of वैदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, 1n. ; Sovani, p. 400). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24-36).

न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावकार्यस्य तथात्वात् etc., (para 14)—Says an objector : Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be अनित्य, because it is an effect (ययत्कार्यं तदनित्यम्), similarly, this दुःखध्वंस should also be अनित्य, because it is an effect. To this वाच० replies that this maxim of अनित्यत्व holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दुःखध्वंस. But how can दुःखध्वंस be called मोक्ष according to the सांख्य philosophy, which advocates सत्कार्यवाद ? To this बालराम replies—यद्यपि सांख्यनये सत्कार्यवादाङ्गीकारेण दुःखप्रध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्वाभिधानं व्याहतं, तथापि दुःखप्रध्वंसपदेनात्र दुःखातीतावस्थाया एव तात्पर्यविषयत्वेनाभिधानात् व्याहत्यभावोऽवसेयः ॥ (p. 43).

Compare the notion of मुक्ति according to the वैशेषिक philosophy—दुःखनिवृत्तेश्चात्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमकालीनत्वं. युगप-दुत्पन्नसमानाधिकरणसर्वात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमानकालीनत्वं वा, अशेषविशेषगुण-ध्वंसावाधिकदुःखप्रागभावो वा ॥ (उपस्कार on वैशेषिकसूत्र १. ४)

The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सां. सू. —स्थूलान् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य (१. ६२); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाद्वद्भारस्य (१. ६३); तेनाद्वद्भारस्य (१. ६४); ततः प्रकृतेः (१. ६५); and संहतपरार्थत्वान् पुरुषस्य (१. ६६).

Sovanī is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यक्त. Some call the महाभूतs as व्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकाs seems to regard everything व्यक्त (and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य), except the प्रधान and पुरुष. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says —सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word आदि (See बालराम p. 16 ln.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः । प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्संयोगा नित्यानुमेया इत्युक्तेः (वंशीधर, p. 183) 1 See Sovanī, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.

III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṅkhya (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. " Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्यजन्य इत्यर्थः । आद्यविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिरासः, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिरासः । Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—"If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिन्, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (शुद्धब्रह्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन् does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः (सां सू. १. ४२.).

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog-

nised by other schools. The चार्वाक materialist recognises only प्रत्यक्ष, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the माध्वs also recognise only two प्रमाणs, but they are प्रत्यक्ष and शब्द according to them. The followers of रामानुज, the जरनैयायिकs, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नैयायिकs and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थापत्ति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिलभट्ट school and the अद्वैतवेदान्तिन्s recognise one more, viz., अनुपलब्धि or अभाव. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संभव and ऐतिह्य to the list. Some तान्त्रिकs recognise चेष्टा also in addition to the above; others add प्रतिभा to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिका, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

वाच० splits it up into प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द;

माठर regards it to be अनुमान;

जय० includes it under अनुमान and शब्द;

गौड० includes it under शब्द;

and चन्द्रिका under अनुमान.

2. अर्थापत्ति—

All the commentators include it under अनुमान.

3. अभाव—

वाच० and जय० regard it as प्रत्यक्ष;

माठर includes it under अनुमान. Although गौड०'s remark—सम्भवाभावप्रतिभेतिह्योपमाश्चाप्तवचने, suggests its inclusion under शब्द, yet another remark of his, viz., शुक्लान्यदर्शनाद्बुद्धेरभावो गम्यते, would lead us 'to infer that he will have it under अनुमान;

चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्यक्ष, and, therefore, no independent प्रमाण.

4. संभव—

वाच०, जय० and माठर include it under अनुमान ;
गौड० and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्द.

5. ऐतिह्य—

वाच० opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is शब्द, otherwise it is no प्रमाण;
गौड० and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्द;
माठर includes it under अनुमान.

6. प्रतिभा—

वाच० and चन्द्रिका do not mention it;
जय० includes it under प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, when it is correct, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; माठर includes it under अनुमान ; and गौड० includes it under शब्द.

7. चेद्य—

Noticed only by चन्द्रिका and माठर, and included under अनुमान.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसकs do recognise six प्रमाणs, yet गौड०'s remark that they are अर्थोपपत्ति, संभव, अभाव, प्रतिभा, ऐतिह्य and उपमान, is not correct; for संभव, ऐतिह्य and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणs by the मीमांसकs; rather, " the author of शास्त्रदीपिका excludes expressly संभव, प्रतिभा and ऐतिह्य from the character of proofs. " (p. 28). जैमिनि nowhere mentions the प्रमाणs, but the six प्रमाणs (viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, शब्द, उपमान, अर्थोपपत्ति and अभाव) are discussed by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य on मीमांसासूत्र 1. 1. 5. प्रभाकर does not recognise अभाव, but कुमारिल does.

The word समाख्या (in para 23) is a technical term of मीमांसा; cf. श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थवि-प्रकर्षात् (मी० सू० ३. ३. १४). It means a name, the sense of which depends upon its derivation, unlike other proper names cf. आख्या चैवं तदर्थत्वात् (मी० सू० ३. ३. १३), and शाबरभाष्य on it—समाख्या सति सम्बन्धे भवति, यथा पाचको लावक इति । तत्र पाचकशब्द-मुपलभ्य पचतिना अस्य सम्बन्ध इति गम्यते ॥

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says—बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्र—‘द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः’ (II. 20) and ‘चित्तेरप्रतिसंक्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वरूपद्वित्वसंवेदनम्’ (IV. 22).

V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोद्दृष्टं च । (1, 1, 5), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :

अनुमान

शतं

अवीत or शेषवत्

पूर्ववत्

सामान्यतोद्दृष्टं

The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वात्स्यायन himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (a) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,— e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्रा-प्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः परिशेषः). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC., Poona, pp. 251-280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But अवीत or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning.

वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, viz. शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by वाच० in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु ; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुणः cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्यः are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth द्रव्य, viz., आत्मन्. So there being no सपक्ष of आत्मन् it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. जय० and गौड० agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड० and माठर explain शेषवत् differently—समुद्रादिकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गौड०) ॥

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच० would read one more लिङ्ग i. e. लिङ्ग-लिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड० has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गा अनुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः । लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा दृष्ट्वा यतिं, अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय० agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धः which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गिन्. They are—

- | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------|---------|-----|---------------|
| (1) स्वस्वामिभाव | as between | राजा | and | पुरुष. |
| (2) प्रकृतिविकार | „ „ | यव | „ | सक्तु. |
| (3) कार्यकारणभाव | „ „ | धेनु | „ | वत्स. |
| (4) पात्रपात्रिक | „ „ | परिवृद् | „ | त्रिविष्टम्भ. |
| (5) साहचर्य | „ „ | चक्रवाक | „ | चक्रवाकी. |
| (6) प्रतिद्वन्द् | „ „ | शीत | „ | उष्ण. |
| (7) निमित्तनैमित्तिक | „ „ | भोज्य | „ | भोजक. |

The conversation between आवव्य and जैगीषव्य, referred to by वाच०, occurs in व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. ३. १८.

The अयुक्तः mentioned by वाच० are—

(a) शाक्यभिक्षुः or the Buddhist monks, described in the विवेकविलास, vii 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह) as—

कृत्तिः कमण्डलुमौण्ड्यं चीरं पूर्वाह्णभोजनम् ।

संघो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिश्त्रिये बौद्धभिक्षुभिः ॥

(b) निर्घन्थिक्स or the Jains, and

(c) संसारमोचक्स or the materialists. बालराम observes—
संसारमोचकाः—(संसारमोचकादेश्च हिंसा पुण्यत्वसंमता) इत्याभिहिता हिंसादि-
परायणाः घटभङ्गे तदन्तर्वर्तिसलिलविलयवद् देहभङ्गे तदन्तर्गतजीवभङ्ग एव मोक्ष
इत्येवं बुवाणाश्चार्वाकविशेषाः ॥ (p. 82).

‘ तु ’ शब्देनानुमानाद् व्यवच्छिनत्ति—As pointed above, the Bud-
dhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise
शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच०
says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of
लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्नि. वाक्यार्थ, being only
an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known
by inference.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिकस (प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधन-
सुपमानम्—न्या० सू० 1 1 6), उपमान is that sentence which esta-
blishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac-
cording to the सांख्यस, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge
(ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is
प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included
under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकस, उपमान is the सादृश्य-
ज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the direct-
ly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now
observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded
of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly
perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this
उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य
is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गो, so we have
गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गो,
so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. There-
fore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानफल) both
are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should
reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, the

existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गोत्व; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects—देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिकः etc. He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः कचिदस्ति, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly चैत्र's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, घटाभाव-वद्भूतल is merely a modification of भूतल. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? Answer. Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः यो० सू० III. 13), व्यास has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति—i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूतल, then it was सङ्घटितपरिणाम of भूतल; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अङ्घटितपरिणाम of भूतल.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now "things beyond the senses are not

only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes " (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाच० regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोदृष्ट (and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच०), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जय० rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p. 9).

VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जय०—

(1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अतिसामीप्य.

(2) इन्द्रियदोष „ इन्द्रियघात and मनोऽनवस्थान.

(3) विषयदोष = सौक्ष्म्य, and

(4) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two— इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष (See p. 405). माठर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of असत् (non-existent) things even— इदानीमसतां चतुर्था भवति । तत्रोच्यते- प्राक्प्रध्वंसेतरेतरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्..... एवमियं द्वादशानुपलब्धिः । सतामष्टया असतां चतुर्था ॥

VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—'Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं (having its own form), from the सांख्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect (महत्). All the Mss. but one have सरूपं (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile " . ' (p. 27, 1n).

IX

वाच० here lays down the opinions of (1) the बौद्धs, (2) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and (3) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

(1) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into being from *non-existence* (असतः सजायते).

(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect (सतोऽसज्जायते).

(3) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत्). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धात्. But जय०, गौड०, माडर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड०'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच०'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात्. "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." (S. N. S. p. 28, 1n).

कारणभावाच्च—जय० gives two explanations of this phrase—कारणस्य सत्त्वादित्यर्थः । यद्यसत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति । भवति च । तस्माच्छक्तिरूपेणावस्थितामिति गम्यते । अथवा—कारणभावादिति कारणस्वभावात् । यत्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम् । यथा स्निग्धस्वभावभ्यस्तिष्ठेभ्यः स्निग्धमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्स्वभावो घटः ॥ (p. 12). माडर and गौड० agree with the latter explanation. वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

तस्मादिदं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभयथापि नोत्पद्यते etc. (para 75). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect (उत्पत्ति), वाच० proceeds further—Now, what is your उत्पत्ति ? Is it the समवाय (Inherence) of the effect in its cause ? That is, is it the समवाय which is

produced ? If you say yes, then your उत्पत्ति produces only the समवाय and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता (existence) in the effect ? That is, सत्ता is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this सत्ता (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as गो is गो, because she is related to गोत्व, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the नैयायिक is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of सत्ता in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बाळराम, how can you establish the समवाय relation of the non-existent पद with the existent तन्तुs ? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असत् पद, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects ?

Thus, it will be seen that a कारण is related with the आविर्भाव of कार्य. The opponent asks—why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य ? वाच० replies.—Because आविर्भाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण—क्रियतेऽनेनेति कारणम्—implies its relation with क्रिया.

X

हेतुम्—, i. e., caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to माठर, is of two kinds : कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्च-तन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्राs are हेतुs and हेतुमत्s both, whileas, अव्यक्त (i. e. प्रधान) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतुs are five-fold, viz., विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तृप्ति, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तृप्ति and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गs (i. e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वs. (But what is this अनुग्रह ?) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—**भाषः कारणलयः** (सां० सू० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of **सत्कार्य**, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. **प्रधान** is **नित्य**, because it has no **कारण** to which it could return.

अव्यापि—The twenty-three **तत्त्व**s are not all-pervading, like **प्रधान** and **पुरुष**; “each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form.” (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the **महत्तत्त्व** all-pervading? To this **वंशीधर** replies—**महदादेः स्वस्वकारणाव्यापकत्वादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः** (p. 201),—the pervading-ness of **महत्**, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as **प्रधान** has no cause to pervade, it is **व्यापि**.

सक्रियम्—**परिस्पन्द** means the action of leaving one body and entering another. **विज्ञान**°, on the other hand, says—**सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्**। **प्रधानस्य तु सर्वकियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वात् कार्यैकदेशमात्रकारित्वम्**। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। **प्रकृतिक्षोभात् सृष्टिश्रवणेन प्रकृतेरपि कर्मवत्तयात्र सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति** (१. १२४). On this **बालराम** remarks—**क्षोभादिपरिणामलक्षणक्रियायाः प्रधाने सत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमनलक्षणपरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया असत्त्वात् प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिक्षोः प्रयास इति बोध्यम्** (p. 121).

अनेकम्—i. e. **सजातीयभेदवत्**, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has **सजातीयभेद**, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, **बुद्धि**, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But **विज्ञान**° explains it otherwise—**अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत्**। न पुनः **सजातीयानेकव्यक्तिकत्वम्**, **प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तेः**। **प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वाद्यनेकरूपत्वात्**। The fallacy of **विज्ञान**° is pointed out by **बालराम**—**प्रकृतेरनेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतावसम्भवात्**, किञ्च —‘**अजामेकाम्**’ इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं **प्रकृतेरनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभिधानमित्यस्थान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति**। (pp. 121-122).

लिङ्गम्—According to **गौड**° and **माठर**, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, **जय**° and **विज्ञान**° give another alternative explana-

tion. *viz.*, that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic (लिङ्ग) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it " seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved. " (p. 32, 1n.)

Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोग between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (=identity or तादात्म्य), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पट produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गोड०, माठर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc.,. But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (*viz.*, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc.) cannot be called as शब्दस्पर्शादिसम्पन्न. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्यादयः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्राs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium.

The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—“ In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes : (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कपिल and is probably an importation from India.” (p. 37, 2n.)

विषयः—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् बौद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; “cf. ‘ सङ्गोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्वियोः । भेदश्च भ्रान्ति-विज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्द्राविवाद्वये ॥’ (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), वाचस्पति’s refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालराम—यत्र किलैकस्मिन्नेव योषिदूपे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमृदानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलभ्यन्ते तत्र प्रमातृणां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानाद् वस्तुवैक्येऽपि ज्ञाननानात्वं दृश्यते । यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यासाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत् । अतः वस्तुसाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तदभ्युपेयमिति । (p. 128).

अचेतनम्—बुद्धि (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चेतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त

त्रिगुण
अविवेकि
विषय

पुरुष

अगुण
विवेकी
अविषय

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त

सामान्य

अचेतन

प्रसवधर्मि

पुरुष

असामान्य

चेतन

अप्रसवधर्मि

Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमत्	अहेतुमत्	अहेतुमान्
अनित्य	नित्य	नित्य
अव्यापि	व्यापि	व्यापी
सक्रिय	निष्क्रिय	निष्क्रिय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
आश्रित	अनाश्रित	अनाश्रित
लिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग
सावयव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that गौड^० and माठर say पुरुष एकः, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व. जय^० and वाच^०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनेकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—“Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), ‘individual’. So in the Sūtras it is said, ‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels’ (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes ‘one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)’. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.” (p. 65)

XII

गुणः do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems. They are of the nature of substance ; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुणः (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

तन्त्रयुक्ति literally means ' device of science ', and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकः known as स्थान (position or order). So it will mean that प्रीति, अप्रीति and विषाद stand for सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् respectively.

गौड०, माठर and जय० mention अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः also, while वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योऽन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिभव, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation). जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, i. e. are reciprocally present. माठर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—" वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect. " (p. 36, 1n.)

The quotation, अन्योऽन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच०, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd स्कन्ध of देवी-भागवत. गौड० माठर and जय० quote only one verse, viz., रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc., जय० ascribes this verse to विष्णुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिगीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमश्चाभिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत । रजः सत्त्वं तमश्चैव तमः सत्त्वं रजस्तथा ॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अथमेव-पर्वन् of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः । रजसश्चापि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (३६. ६).

XIII

सांख्याचार्यैः—stands for पञ्चशिख and others. विज्ञान० quotes पञ्चशिख on प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यर्गुणानामन्योऽन्यं वेधर्म्यम् (सां. सू. I. 127)—
 “ सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः
 सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि
 निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् । ”

अर्थतः—जय० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थतः, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माठर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुणः, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिभव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणः perform functions of so different a nature ? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणः. गौड०, माठर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्वं by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous woman (and therefore, a सात्त्विक type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रजस्) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तामस type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणः (= प्रकृति or मूलकारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकः who also assume the plurality of causes ? Cf.—नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नासंख्यव्यक्तिकत्वे वैशेषिकमतादत्र को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्वयस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ॥ ‘ शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् । त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥ ’ इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विज्ञान० (I. 128).

But are not these गुणः opposed to one another ? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वर्ति and दीप in spite of

the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशत् तैलमपि दीप-
विरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच०
gives another example of this विरोध,—viz., यथा वा वात्तपित्त-
श्लेष्माणः etc., बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवी-
भागवत (3. 9)—“ “प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम् । वर्तिस्तैलं यथाचिंश्च
विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्धं हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैलं वर्ति-
विरोध्येव पावकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकत्रस्थाः पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम् ॥ ”
(pp. 139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of
these गुणs in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at
all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था
i. e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणs in equal quantity.
On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the
others. So, there is न तुल्यबलत्व in the विकारs. Cf. रूपातिशया
तुल्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयः सह प्रवर्तन्ते—(व्यास-
भाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15).

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहा परस्परविरोधिनः etc.—Here वाच० has in
his view the attack of the वेदान्तिन् against the सांख्य philosophy.
According to the latter, all the objects (or evolved entities)
are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्तिन्
(वाच० himself) retorts—आन्तराः खल्वमी सुखदुःखमोहविषादा बाधे-
भ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्योऽतिविच्छिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अध्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते । यदि
पुनरेत एव सुखदुःखादिस्वभावा भवयुस्ततः स्वरूपत्वात् हेमन्तेऽपि चन्दनः सुखः-
स्यात् । न हि चन्दन. कदाचिदचन्दनः ।.....तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि
चन्दनकुङ्कुमादयो जातिकालावस्थायपेक्षया सुखदुःखादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं सुखादि-
स्वभावा इति रमणीयम् ॥ (भामती on ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1). To this argu-
ment वाच० (as an exponent and defender of सांख्य) replies
—स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । Although
सुख, दुःख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are
not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one
or the other of these (सुख, दुःख and मोह), they stand in need
of excitant causes, which themselves are of the nature of सुख,
दुःख and मोह. For example, सुख, for its own experience,
stands in need of the predominance of धर्म, which is of the
nature of सत्त्वगुण (or सुख).

XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गोड० and माठर explain it as—‘on account of the absence of the contraries of त्रैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.’ वाच० offers an alternative explanation—‘on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, i. e., पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.’ चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it. cf. त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् (?) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् त्रैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ (p. 20). The explanation of गोड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, (संसर्गिन्) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मादेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा भवितव्यम् । यत्रैतेषां संसर्गस्तदव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्युगम (i. e. belonging to one genus), according to जय०. गोड० understands समन्वय in the sense of ‘inference—’ यथा व्रतधारिणं बद्धं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयान् (तां. सू. I. 131) as offered by विज्ञान०, viz., उपवासादिना क्षीणं हि बुद्ध्यादितत्त्वमन्नादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते (i. e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc.), ‘does not directly fit in this Kārikā,’ as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence',—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. जय०, माठर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect;—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात्). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable) :—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, ' कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम् ' इत्यनेनैवसिद्धत्वादित्यन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, ' तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः । यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता [पायिता] स्यात्, कुतश्चेत्यं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः ॥ (pp. 21-22).

अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य—According to वाच०, गौड० and माठर, the term अविभाग means 'merging';—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading अविभागे, where अविभाग means लय. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and explains the phrase as—' because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिष्टद्रव्यादसफाणितगुहखण्डशर्करादिवैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते..... एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम् । तस्मादेषामविभक्तेनैकेन भवितव्यम् । (p. 22).

प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च—According to वाच० and जय०, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रवृत्ति of गुणs, because गुणs are in constant modification—cf. परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. IV. 33). The first kind of modification is that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. Here, the साम्यावस्था is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विषमपरिणाम (or समुदय), we have creation. Here सत्त्व and the rest combine with one

another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुदयान् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति.

XVII

तौष्टिकाः—Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of तुष्टिs (dealt with in कारिका 50). But वाच० here refers to only the five external (बाह्य) तुष्टिs. The internal (आध्यात्मिक) तुष्टिs are gained after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal तुष्टिs are not referred to here. Therefore, वाच० says—अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा, etc.

The reading संहतपरार्थत्वात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गौड०, who reads संघातपरार्थत्वात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सां. सू.—संहतपरार्थत्वात्, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन, etc. In order to prove that a संघात is परार्थ, शय्या, etc., are given as an illustration.—Just as शय्या, आसन and the rest, being संघातs, are परार्थ, so अव्यक्त and its constituents are for another person, viz., पुरुष. But in this illustration, पर is शरीर, which is itself a संघात; and thus पुरुष also becomes a संघात. On this वाच० remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a दृष्टान्त with all the qualities found in a पक्ष, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the न्यायवार्तिक (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 344-345) and the न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका (Kāshī Sanskrit Series, No. 24, p. 600).

अधिष्ठानात्—पुरुष is the अधिष्ठाता of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question :—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण=निष्क्रिय, is not active, how can he become an अधिष्ठाता? Reply :—It is not essential that only an

active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवद् (सां. सू. 1. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुक्ते च्छेदनं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
राजा सान्निध्यात्त्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥
तस्माच्चलतोऽपि स्याच्चलने कर्तृतात्मनः ।

(कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक on मी. सू. 1. 5,
Chowkhamba edn., p. 710).

बालराम thinks that this argument about the अधिष्ठातृत्व of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by बाङ्गराचार्य in his भाष्य on रचनानुपपत्तेश्च and प्रवृत्तेश्च (ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2).

स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात्—It is very succinctly explained by बालराम as follows—न ह्यसिंधारात्मानं छिनत्ति वह्निर्वात्मानं दहतीति भावः ।

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यदयः etc. अन्ये refers to those who cannot reconcile the निःसङ्गता of पुरुष with his भोक्तृत्व. They would, therefore, explain भोक्ता as द्रष्टा. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.—पुरुष being निःसङ्ग can be a द्रष्टा, only through बुद्धि; see व्यासभाष्य on द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपपद्यः (यो. सू. II. 20). Similarly, he can be a भोक्ता also through बुद्धि.—“एवं च द्रष्टृत्ववद् भोक्तृत्वस्यापि सम्भवादाद्यव्याख्यानमपि समीचीनमेवेति ध्येयम् ॥ ” (बालराम, p. 160).

कैवल्यार्थः—प्रवृत्तेश्च—माठर assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रधान, whileas, वाच० and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—आगमानां महाधियां च ॥

XVIII

निकाय—The word is derived from नि + चि + घञ् (संघे चानौत्तरार्थे—पाणिनि III. 3. 42), “in the sense of a multitude or assembly (of living beings possessing some common characteristics), but not merely a confused crowd of men.” (S. C. Vasu’s translation of सिद्धान्तकौमुदी, p. 347). ‘निकायः = देव-मनुष्यतिर्यगादीनामनौत्तरार्थेणावस्थितः संघातः, तद्विशिष्टाभिरित्यर्थः’ इति तात्पर्यटीकायाम्मिश्राः (बालराम, p. 161).

On जन्म and मरण, विज्ञान० says—जन्ममरणे चात्र नोत्पत्तिविनाशौ पुरुषनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । किन्त्वपूर्वदेहेन्द्रियादिसंघातविशेषेण संयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभावनियामकाविति (सां. सू. I. 149).

न चैकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपधानभेदात् etc. The view of the वेदान्तिन् is that one and the same आत्मन् assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. ‘उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ।’ “उपाधिभिष्यते न तु तद्गान् ।” “एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ।” (सां० सू० I. 150-152). माठर sets the पूर्वपक्ष in the following words :—इह केचिदाचार्या वेदवादिन इति मन्यन्ते—, एकोऽयं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषु पलभ्यते मणिसूत्रवत् । इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सूत्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं मणिभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेकः सूत्रभूतः परमात्मा, आहोषित् जलचन्द्रवत् पुरुष इत्येक एव बहुषु नदीकूप-तडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति ॥ Cf. पिमानन्द (सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):— “आकृतिगर्भाशयभावसङ्गतिशरीरविभागाल्लिङ्गबहुत्वात् सांख्याचार्याः कपिलासुरिपञ्चशिखपतञ्जलिप्रभृतयः पुरुषबहुत्वं वर्णयन्ति । वेद-वादिन आचार्या, हरिहरादिरण्यगर्भव्यासादय एकमात्रमानं, तथा च श्रुतिः..... एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूतं भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥” (This verse from ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद्, १. २, is quoted by विज्ञान० also on सां. सू. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व contradict the श्रुतिः which lay down the unity of soul (i. e. आत्मैक्य)? The सां. सू. says, No.—“नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् (I. 154).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मन् in the sense of class notion. वाच० also tries to reconcile the अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोध as follows—

“ एकत्वश्रुतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधान् कथंचिद्देशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्युपपत्तेः । प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानात्वयोश्च श्रुत्यैव साक्षान् प्रतिपादनात् । ‘ अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः । अजो लोको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां मुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥ ” (तै. आ. ६. १०) ॥ ” तत्त्ववैशारदी, on यो. सू. II. 22.

Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्व by उपाधिस, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs (अवयवस) are the उपाधिस of a body (a संघात). And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or ओदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०:— सप्तविधं चास्यादासीन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं प्रसङ्गं च नापि । स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्युदासीनः ॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष is माध्यस्थ्य and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता ?—ननु च ययकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः ? तथा चाहुः— बालदुताशनतरवः स्वयमकृतानां यथा हि भोक्तारः । पुरुषोऽपि विषयफलानां स्वयमकृतानां तथापि भोक्ता ॥ इति ।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—‘ I know ’ be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सानिध्यात् (सां. सू. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—‘ यथाग्निसंयोगात् लोहमणिरित्युच्यते । (जय०) ‘ अनुष्णाशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति । ’ (माठर) ॥ ‘ यथान्ययसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषात् परस्परमन्यत्रह्वार

औपाधिको यथा वा जलसूर्ययोः संयोगात् परस्परधर्मांरोपस्तर्धेव बुद्धिपुरुषयोरिति भावः । (विज्ञान०, सां. सू. I, 164) ॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं करोमीत्यबुधोऽभिमन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः ॥ This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 124) and सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन also (ibid, p, 12) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थं (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य) with प्रधानस्य, and कैवल्यार्थं with पुरुषस्य. The other commentators take the line as it stands, i. e. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं and प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थम्. While explaining ' विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा ' (सां. सू. II, 1). विज्ञान० also connects कैवल्य with प्रधान.

XXII

In the भाष्य (on यो. सू. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as the products of महत्तत्त्व (—एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महतः षड्विशेषपरिणामाः). But there the महत् should not be taken as the immediate cause (i. e. producer) of these तन्मात्रs. व्यास has himself said at another place (यो. सू. I, 45) that these तन्मात्रs are the products of अहङ्कार.

माठर and गौड० hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that the each succeeding महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायुः; शब्दतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by कल्पतरुकार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् ।

तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाचस्पतिमतं शुभम् ॥

पृथिव्यनलात्मत्वं गगने पवने ऽपि चेत् ।

रूपवत्त्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां चाक्षुषत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥

अर्द्धभूयस्त्वतः श्रित्याद्यविभावनकल्पने ।
 व्यवहारयथाप्राप्ता मुधा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥
 अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदसिद्धयेवेप्यते यदि ।
 त्रिवृत्कृतिः श्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न कचन श्रुता ॥

(quoted by वंशीधर in his comm. on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293 Chow. S. S.).

माठर gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहङ्कार—चतुःषष्टिवर्णैः परादिवैखरीपर्यन्ताभिधेयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्ध्या समर्थं तत्सकलमायन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयग्रहणेनोपरिस्थितपिण्डानुकारिणा विन्दुना भूषितः प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ॥

XXIII


गौड० and माठर curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुरुषान्यताज्ञान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर-वैराग्य (viz., प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशमिति विरक्तस्य मोक्षेप्सोर्यदुत्पद्यते) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to the बाह्यवैराग्य also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेप्सु ?

बालराम does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय०, माठर and गौड० mention nine kinds of ऐश्वर्य although each one (except वाच०) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्. It seems, therefore, that बालराम's text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीधर's edition, however, combine ईशित्व and अशित्व and thus make the total eight.

जय० reads यत्रकामावशावित्वम् in place of यत्रकामावसायित्वम्, and derives it as—कामेनेच्छयावशेन शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशायी । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशावित्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वात् धातूनां ' शी ' श्रित्तौ वर्तते ।

XXV

अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds —




the eleven इन्द्रियs

तन्मात्रापञ्चक

This is the scheme adopted by वाचु° and others. But विशान° (on सां. सू. II. 18) would have—

अहङ्कार



In support of his classification, विशान° quotes from some स्मृति—

वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
 अहं तत्त्वाद्विकुर्वाणामनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥
 वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।
 तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्मभयानि च ॥
 तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्त्व and तमस् are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस्. वंशीधर's explanation, viz.,—‘सम-
 द्धीन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽल्पसत्त्वत्वेन राजसकार्यत्वेनैव स्मृतिषु निर्दिष्टान्यत्र
 तु व्यधीन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्त्वत्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्कारकार्यतयोरुक्तानीत्यविरोधः ।’ is
 very lame (See सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदीटीका of वंशीधर. Chow. S. S.,
 p. 343; see further बालराम, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415).

XXVII

The first phrase उभयात्मकं, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पकं मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गौड^० interprets संकल्पकं as प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति, i. e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of इन्द्रियस). वाच^० understands संकल्पकं as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति i. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जय^० and चन्द्रिका agree with वाच^०. What वाच^० means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or complex-perception. The first is नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं, and, therefore, निर्विकल्पक; the second is नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं, and, therefore, सविकल्पक. In his support, वाच^० cites अस्ति द्वालोचितज्ञानं etc., from कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक (on मी. म. I. 4, verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.). The phrase ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मेजात्यादिभिर्यया । बुद्ध्यावसीर्यते, has been thus explained by पार्थसारथि in his commentary on the above—ततो निर्विकल्पादुत्तरकालं जात्यादिनिर्विकल्प्य वस्तु यया बुद्ध्या गृह्यते—, which is the same as विशेषण-विशेष्यभावेन विवेचयति of वाच^०. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to वाच^० “ mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind.” (p. 61). For, according to the author of the श्लोकवार्तिक whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of सामान्य and विशेष both in the निर्विकल्पक stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the सविकल्पक stage. We are cognisant of both, वद and वदत्व in the निर्विकल्पक stage, but separately; but we cognise

घटत्वविशिष्टो घटः in the सविकल्पक stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of कुमारिल, is evident from his own verse in this context :—“ निर्विकल्पकबोधेऽपि ब्यात्मकस्यापि वस्तुनः । ग्रहणं लक्षणाख्येयं ज्ञाना शुद्धं तु गृह्यते ॥ ११८ ॥ ” (p. 171). पार्थसारथि explains it— ब्यात्मकस्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्येत्यर्थः । सामान्यावभासोऽपि प्रतीतिसिद्ध एव । न हि निर्विकल्पकेनाऽगृहीतस्य सविकल्पकेनापि ग्रहणं सम्भवति, न वाऽगृहीते सामान्ये व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञा संभवति । तस्मात् सामान्यं विशेषश्च निर्विकल्पेऽपि प्रकाशत एव etc.

इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्—जय० remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् । महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

माठर reads ग्राह्यभेदाच्च in place of बाह्यभेदाच्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माठर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नानात्व of इन्द्रियस्य, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and ग्राह्यभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियस्य whose functions differ? This question is raised by उद्योतकर in his न्यायवार्तिक (Chow S. S., p. 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादैकात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वे सर्वार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमिति स्यात् । The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणस्य, accompanied by धर्म and अधर्म, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (i. e. the इन्द्रियस्य) differ in their functions.

XXVIII

माठर reads रूपादिषु in place of शब्दादिषु in the text. बालराम also adopts this reading and observes :—चक्षुरादिक्रमेण पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात् ‘ शब्दादिषु ’ इति पाठो न सम्भवेति : । (p. 184, 1n.)

XXIX

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च । Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण ? While वाच^० adopts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place —समस्तस्यान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः । विज्ञान^० also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सां. सू. II 31). But वाच^०, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., स हि प्रयत्नभेदः शरीरोपगृहीतमास्तकियाभेदे हेतुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः ' सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ' इति । बालराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशब्देनान्तःकरणत्रयमेव ग्राह्यं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियस्य, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरणस and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिकस there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानायौगपद्योदकं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदेक-नियोपलब्धेः (ibid, III. 2. 58), अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिरागुप्तञ्चारात् (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिकस, the mind is अक्षुपरिमाणं. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपद्वृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and लब्ध, only the three अन्तःकरण function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses *at that particular moment*.

XXXI

आकूत—Davies observes:—‘*Ākūta* is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by *Absicht* (= purpose), *Antrieb* (= motive). Colebrooke’s translation is “incited by mutual invitation.”... ..The meaning of “incitement to activity,” mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *ākūta*.....It is composed of *ā*, to, towards, and *kū*, to cry. Gaudapāda says that it means *ādarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in action).’ (p. 68, 1n).

Davies is wrong in considering that गौड० is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, 1n). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for पुरुषार्थ.

The spirit of the सां. सू., “ स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता ” (III. 56) and “ ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ” (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कारिकाs, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान०’s remark, *viz*, प्रकृतिहीनस्य जन्मेश्वरस्य सिद्धिः ‘ यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः सर्वसम्मतैव, नित्यस्येश्वरस्यैव विवादास्पदत्वादित्यर्थः ॥नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधविरोधस्तत्राह—‘ ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ’ । साभिध्यमात्रेणेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु सर्वसम्मतैत्यर्थः । (सां. सू. III. 57).

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus “ the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to *manas*. ” (*ibid*). According to गौड०, आहरण and धारण

belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. मातर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs.

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच० takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects *seized* by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is *retained* by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects *manifested* by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects *seized, retained and manifested* are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाच० explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकसूत्र “अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपच्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति लिङ्गानि” (II. 2. 6), काल is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रज्ञस्तपाद् clarifies this point—“एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृतिस्थिति-निरोधोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचारः; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच० replies—Why should we first assume one काल and then assume differ-

ent circumstances or उपायिs to make this काल multifarious ? Why should we not recognise the उपायिs only ? Cf. स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवाभासते-योगभाष्य on III, 52.

XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तन्मात्राs. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतs.

पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चाशब्दायात्मकत्वात्—Here वाच० suggests that the विषयs of the कर्मेन्द्रियs (except वाच्) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of पञ्चीकरण, which is opposed to वाच०'s view on कारिका XXII, where he says आपः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः. Can a person not bring water with his hands ? If so, then water must also be पञ्चशब्दायात्मक. See notes on Kārika XXII and S. N. S., pp. 72-73 with footnotes.

XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase द्वाराण्यस्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुष, as is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one).

XXXVII

वाच० interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौह०, on the other hand, inter-

pretends the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माठर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार.—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैत्रं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।
 प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥
 मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।
 तत्त्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥
 योऽसौ सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
 देहीति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

माठर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांख्यानं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च निःश्रेयसहेतुः । उक्तं च—

इह पिब लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षसौख्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि.

Why तन्मात्राs are called अविशेषs?—This has been explained by गौड० and माठर as देवानामेते मुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राs, being evolved out of त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, viz., न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—“(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.....

It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तशोरमृदैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः (Kār. 40);—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. सू. समदशैकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०. लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गादौ समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषात् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्व्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भावः ।

XLI


A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अणुमात्रः पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०. •

The reading of गौड० and माठर is विना अविशेषैः, whileas वाच० has विना विशेषैः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL.

So विना विशेषैः means विना सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैः. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राs) is not logical. गौड^०'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषs viz., the five subtle elements. चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator :—केचित्तु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकमिदमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषैः स्थूलदेहैर्विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाश्रित्यैव तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यथासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

XLIII

According to वाच^० and जय^० dispositions may be divided like this—



The प्राकृतभावs, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिल only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिणः) are eight viz., धर्म, अधर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, ऐश्वर्य and अनैश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्याश्रयिणः) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड^० and माठर, however, divide the भावs into three kinds—सांसिद्धिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसिद्धिक or cognate in his case; but they come to समक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनरकुमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

XLIV and XLV

According to माठर, the सूक्ष्मशरीर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य, ऐन्द्र, विन्ध्य, तैन्निर्व, याक्ष, राक्षस and पैशाच. गौड० gives सौम्य for विन्ध्य, and याक्ष has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूक्ष्मशरीर sinks to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सरीसृप and स्थावर. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माठर includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिस) in this bondage. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारs of प्रकृति (i. e. the evolutes); but according to माठर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three kinds of bondages are explained by वाच० at length in his तत्त्ववैशारदी on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच०; but, according to गौड० and माठर, the word denotes प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्राः

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड० and माठर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अज्ञप्ति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is बुद्धि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the

post. The explanation of वाच० is better. विपर्यय is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacity (अशक्ति) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue." (Davies, pp. 84-85).

XLVII

विपर्यय or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वेष and अभिनिवेश, which are called तमस्, मोह, महामोह, तामिस्र and अन्यतामिस्र by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस् or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the *summum bonum*.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामिस्र or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense (mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अन्यतामिस्र or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवेशः स्वरासवादी कुमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्रासोऽप्येवदृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वं जन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 9). " मरणत्रासोऽन्यतामिस्र इत्युच्यते । " (जय० p. 51).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विपर्ययः.

XLIX

The quotation in वाच०, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant (मृग्यताः for मन्दताः) in the सांख्यसंग्रह (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77). गौड० uses प्रसुप्ति (or paralysis) for कुष्ठ, and उपजिह्विका for जडता. Cf. “ जिह्वाया जाड्यम्,” in जय०, p. 52. माठर and गौड० adopt गुदावर्त for उदावर्त (= obstruction of bowels).

L

माठर (and not गौड०, as S N. S. says, page 91, 1n) reads आध्यात्मिकः in place of आध्यात्मिकाः. आध्यात्मिकाः is grammatically wrong, as आध्यात्मिक is derived from अध्यात्म + ठ् (“ अध्यात्मादेशमिष्यते ” वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3, 60). आत्मनि = अध्यात्मात्, is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to “ अव्ययं विभक्तिः ” पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination ङीप् (and not दाप्) is added to आध्यात्मिक by the सूत्र of पाणिनि, “ दिङ्गणञ् ” IV. 1. 15 and the form will be आध्यात्मिकी.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators :—

	वाच०	जय०	माठर	गौड०
1.	पारम्	सुतारम्	तारम्	सुतमः
2.	सुपारम्	सुपारम्	सुतारम्	पारम्
3.	पारापारम्	lost	सुनेत्रम्	सुनेत्रम्
4.	अनुत्तमांभः	अनुत्तमांभः	समरीचम्	अनुत्तमांभासकम्
5.	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभसिकम्	नारीकम्

If अर्जन, रक्षण, क्षय, भोग (or संग, according to गौड०) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गौड० calls the last two as नारीक and अनुत्तमांभसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Rāmāvatāra Śarma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows :—
धनार्जनदुःखपारप्रापयितृत्वात् पारारूप्यं तुष्टिः । अर्जनदोषदर्शनेऽपि


कदाचिद्भोगाभिलाषेण प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणभयार्तस्य तु प्रवृत्तेरतितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयतः कदाचित् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिदप्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पारावाराख्या (read पारापाराख्या ?), भोगे रोगभयं भावयत-स्तुष्टिः स्वार्थपरेति तस्या उत्तरेतराम्भस्त्वम्, हिंसादोषतस्तस्यास्तुष्टेस्तु कारुण्य-मूलकत्वादुत्तमाम्भस्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219-220.

LI

No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः; जय० which gives them—तासां चासिद्धीनां मोक्षमुष्णमानरमित्यायाः (?) संज्ञाः—, has a defective reading.

वाच० criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article (" Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to जय०; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to वाच०



The last three are the effects of all the remaining five added together.

While वाच° construes अङ्गुश as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्यय, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान° (on सां. सू. III. 44) explains अङ्गुश as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three सिद्धिs, viz. ऊह शब्द and अध्ययन, leaving सुदृष्टाप्ति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच° as follows—कश्चित्त्वेतासामष्टसिद्धीनामङ्गुशो निवारकः पूर्वजिविधो विपर्ययाशक्तिस्तुष्टिरूपो भवति बन्धकत्वादिति व्याचष्टे तन्न । तुष्ट्य-भावस्याशक्तितया बाधिर्यादिवत् सिद्धिविरोधितालाभेन तुष्ट्यतुष्ट्योः सिद्धिविरोधित्वासंभवात्. In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि are not mutually contradictory, but positive धर्मs. See Sovani p. 427.

LII

The word लिङ्ग has been explained as महत्त्वं इदिरिति by विज्ञान (on सां. सू. III 45). But this is ~~not~~ correct. वाच° is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks :—“Some commentators make the *linga* itself to be *Buddhi* (intellect) and *bhāvas* to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i. e. वाच° H.) is preferable, for the *linga*, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’.” (p. 90).

LIV

सत्त्वविज्ञान means where सत्त्व predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the सूत्र replies :—आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगादेयः (सां. सू. III 52). विज्ञान explains it as—तत्राप्यूर्ध्वगतावपि सत्यामावृत्तिरस्त्यत्र उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगादधोऽधोयोनि-जन्मनः सोऽपि लोको हेय इत्यर्थः This very idea is expressed in the next कारिका.

According to गौड° there are sixteen forms of creations—“that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings

proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtle rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements." (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गौड० takes दैव, मानुष and तैर्यग्योन (= two, जङ्गम and स्थावर), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अभौतिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.

LV

पतञ्जलि also expresses the same idea—' परिणामतापसंस्कार दुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (यो. सू. II. 15). Compare also , समानं जरामरणजं दुःखम् ' (सां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः, विवेकिनामिति शेषः ।

माठर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as त्रिषु लोकेषु and the latter as संक्षेपेण.

LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाच० and the (सां. सू. III 63)—विविक्तबोधात् मृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात् पाके, has got this disadvantage that सूक्ष्म is चेतन. The illustration of गौड० viz., यथा कश्चित् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकार्याणि करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड०, viz., तथा चोक्तं कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, is better, because कुम्भ is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगवृत्तस in support of the purport of this कारिका—" तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा " (II 21) and " कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् " (II 22).

LVII

साध्यव्यभिचारः । The syllogism of the प्रतिपक्षिन् is चेतनानधिष्ठितं अचेतनं प्रवृत्तिश्चून्यम्, अचेतनत्वात्, रथादिवत्

Now, the साध्य is प्रवृत्तिशून्यम्. The सिद्धान्तिन् says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is,

चेतनानधिष्ठितं अचेतनं अपि प्रवृत्तियुक्तम्, अचेतनत्वात्, क्षरिवत् ।

Here we have साध्यव्यभिचार. Now, the प्रतिपक्षिन् says that your case does not bring about the साध्यव्यभिचार, because, even in your case we shall assume ईश्वर as the cause of प्रवृत्ति. To this the सिद्धान्तिन् replies:—Your argument is not sound, because a चेतन or प्रेक्षावान् can act only with the motive of स्वार्थे or कारुण्य. But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives.

माठर, गौड० and जय०, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति (of प्रधान) both, while वाच० speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.

LVIII

आत्मसुक्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुणs in सांख्य philosophy. It is not the इच्छा of the नैयायिकs according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being.

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे ? Is it पुरुष which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than myself ? The first meaning is adopted by माठर ; वाच० and गौड would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुकुमारता. जय० explains it by 'subtlety', वाच० and माठर, by 'bashfulness', and गौड० by 'enjoyability'.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नदी but here to a कुलवधू.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गौड०, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

“ पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ”—वाच० explains it as—अप्रमत्तां यथैनां परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति । This is not a good interpretation. गौड० is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमनेन परपुरुषेण दृष्टास्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति ।

LXII

यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतौ etc., (वाच०) is evidently derived from व्यासभाष्य—“ यथा जयः पराजयो वा योद्धुषु वर्तमानः स्वामिनि व्यपदिश्यते ” (यो. सू. I. 24).

LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय०, गौड० and माठर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वंs. वाच० clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम्, as given by various commentators.—

	वाच०	माठर	गौड०	जय०
नास्मि	अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि ।	नास्मि तत्त्वानि ।	नाहमेव भवामि ।	सूक्ष्मशरीरे भौतिके च न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः ।
न मे	न मे स्वामितास्ति ।	न मे तत्त्वानि ।	न मम शरीरम्, यतोऽहमन्यः, शरीरमन्यत् ।	न ममेदमपि तु प्रकृतेः ।
नाहम्	अहं कर्ता न	नाहं तत्त्वानाम् ।	अहङ्काररहितोऽहम् ।	नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः ।

The quotation—"निरुपद्रवभूतार्थः, etc., " given by वाच०, is also found in this तत्त्ववैशारदी on यो. सू. I. 50, where, वाच० reads न बाधोऽनादिमत्त्वेऽपि in place of न बाधोऽयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि. The meaning of the verse is—निरुपद्रवः यो भूतार्थः, तदुपलक्षितः स्वभावो यस्य, तस्य ज्ञानस्य विपर्ययः, अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि न बाधः, बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः। निरुपद्रव = free from all (the) flaws (of प्रवृत्ति, etc., according to the बौद्धs). भूतार्थः = truth (आल्यविज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs). विपर्ययैः = contradictions (in the shape of प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs). अयत्नवत्त्वेऽपि, etc., = although there is no effort to free this आल्यविज्ञान from the flaws of प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान, yet this आल्यविज्ञान is not contradicted because बुद्धि is partial to it. वाच०'s introduction here favours the reading अनादिमत्त्वेऽपि, which will mean—"although विपर्ययवासना is अनादि."

LXVI

" एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा 'मदर्थेयम्' इति मन्यते "। (वाच०, para 271) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, viz., sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature (and hence a product of Nature) is also for my sake.

प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य—The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (i. e., पुरुषार्थs). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more पुरुषार्थs. So, in the case of *this particular Spirit*, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXVII

" भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वाऽथ सम्पद्यते " is ब्रह्मसूत्र, IV. I. 19. शङ्कराचार्य explains it as—अनारब्धकार्ययोः पुण्यपापयोर्विद्यासामर्थ्यात्क्षय उक्तः, इतरेत्वारब्धकार्ये पुण्यपापे उपभोगेन क्षपयित्वा ब्रह्म संपद्यते ' तस्य तावदेव चिरं शान्तं विमोक्षेऽथ संपत्स्ये ' (छान्दोग्य—६।१।१२)।

LXXVII

The ten मौलिकार्थs are—

(१) प्रधानास्तित्व, (२) प्रधानेकत्व, (३) प्रधानस्य अर्थवत्त्वम् (= विषयता), (४) प्रधानस्य अन्यता (= पुरुषाद्भेदः), (५) प्रधानस्य पारार्थ्यम्, (६) अनैक्यम् (= पुरुषबहुत्वम्), (७) वियोगः (= पुरुषात् प्रकृतेः), (८) योगः (= पुरुषेण सह प्रकृत्याः), (९) शेषवृत्तिः (= संस्कारवशात् स्थूलसूक्ष्मशरीरद्वयस्थितिः) and (१०) अकर्तृत्वम् (= पुरुषस्य). For this quotation and राजवार्तिक, see introduction.

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