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INTRODUCTION

I. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Sarisāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. The Significance of Sāmkhya Philosophy

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāmkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Sāstra is recognised by all the systems. Sānkaraṭārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-
difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—

"There is no knowledge like that of Sāṁkhyā, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṁkhyā being the highest knowledge." (Sānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word Śīmkhya is found first of all in the S'vet. Up.—सत्कारण सांख्योगानिगत्वे etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṁkhyā reflections are found even in the Ṛgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Śīmkhya is derived from the word sāmkhyā. The word sāmkhyā is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "वचन संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. v. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'akti, atuṣṭi, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṁkhyā-pravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh—

"सांख्यं प्रहुवलं वैव प्रकृति च प्रचक्षने।
तत्त्वाति च चतुर्विद्यतेन सांख्यं प्रकृतितत्वम॥"

So, Sāṁkhyā means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Sāṁkhyā was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to Sāṁkhyā in Sāṃskṛta-Candrikā, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṁkhyā is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 S'aka., Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really
speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṁkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īśvara in the Sāṁkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha, or opposed to Śruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). S'āńkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṁkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Sāṁkhya is not rooted in the Śrūtis.

“Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṁkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, ‘He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṁkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters’ (S' ve. Up. VI, 43). ........., we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṁkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297–8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Sāṁkhya, the great S'āńkara says—“The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣa has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294).
Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṁkhya to Sruti. Truly speaking, Sāṁkhya could be divided into two—one ses'vara, the other nirīs'vara. Let the theists not take the nirīs'vara-Sāṁkhya, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in Sruti, but who can take exception to the vaidika character of the ses'vara-Sāṁkhya as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across 'yathā-s'rutini- dur'ama as a synonym of Sāṁkhya in—

एतत्तनि नव सर्गाणि तत्वानि च नराधिपति।
चतुर्विशालशिस्तकानि यथाशुरुतिनिदर्श्यतानात्॥

(Mbh., S'ānti, 319, 25)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the vibhūtis of Prakṛti many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṁkhya are met with; e.g., bhaṣyaśāstṛvidhiṁ: (v. 1) tattvārthakaran; (2) yogapadhāniṁ; (3) sambhāvanādāna; (4) yogakaran; (5) yathā-viśyaśāntivadbūdhya; (6, 7, 8 and 9) tattvādhiśāntsārā; (10) yathā-viśyaśāntivadbūdhya; (11) tattvādhiśāntivadbūdhya; (12) yathā-viśyaśāntivadbūdhya; (13). Here the word 'Yathā-s'rutini-durs'inaḥ' being repeated four times establishes the vaidika character of theistic Sāṁkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṁkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṁkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṁkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavādgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. (Bre-Eng. Cott p. 32)]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the acaryas of Sāṁkhya in the offering to Rāis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most theists undertook the study of Sāṁkhya. (G.S., p. 174). This could not have been possible if Sāṁkhya was not founded on Sruti.
INTRODUCTION

Germs of Sāṁkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāṁkhya categories in the Śrutiśas in a germinial form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tamas described in the Rgveda (X. 129, 3) "तम्म आत्मात्मस्तः गुणम्येव सूक्तेर्यकं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very Śruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkāryavāda. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his bhāṣya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Aja (the unborn) as the name of Pradhāna—

तमिद्रभ्यं प्रथमं द्वेश आपो यत्वे देवा: समग्रस्तं विशेषे।
अजस्य नाममथेकपेति यस्मिन् विष्णूं भुजबनानि तस्य: ||

(Rgveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. The most ancient: as, Bhādāranyaka, Chāndogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kauṭitaki.


Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer; devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything, (in
TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ

reality) as in "स वा एक एतत्मिनं संप्रसारे रत्न चरित्रं \[४. ३, १५ ff.\] The word mahat is indicative of the Sāṁkhya word Buddhi in "स यथा लेखनि...यथात् वर्त्तादारीति विन्यमेवं वा अर इसे महदूतम...साधसमारं विज्ञानसम सत्तेत्यो मूर्थयम् सहितयम् etc." (Br. Up. II. 4, 12). The term Vijñānāghana expounds the intelligent nature of Buddhi.

[ Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṁkhya attributes unconsciousness to Buddhi which is by nature intelligence. vide, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on the Gautama-Sūtra "हृदय-हृदलक्षणानमित्यक्तनिछत्र्म" (I. 15).

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of satkāryāvāda in "सर्वेऽसमयं असतिपरमेवाध्वितीयम्" the s'ruti in the same mantra mentions the pūrva-pakṣa of asat-kāryāvāda in "तदेक आहुरसपेत्यसमयं असतिपरमेवाध्वितीयं तस्मादसत: सजायत". It then advances in the next mantra satkāryāvāda that is, (सत् सजायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement. e. g., "सत्तुतं लक्षण समयं स्वाधिति होमसत स्वाधिति: सजायतेरति, सत्तेऽसमयं असतिपरमेवाध्वितीयम्" (VI. 2, 2). Here the difference from S'āṅkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as real and not unreal like mīyā. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds satkāryāvāda. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the mantra यथा सत्तेऽसमयं स्वाधिति सर्ववृत्तस्त्वाधिति स्वाधिति सत्तेऽसमयं असतिपरमेवाध्वितीयम् (Ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the Pariṇāmāvāda of the Sāṁkhya (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in "यथाध्रे राहितम् सत्तेऽतः...ते तेजस्त्तौर्ध्यम्, यथाध्रे तदसत...सत्तेऽतः यथाश्चारांगाधिरागित्वम् वाचारांगम विकारो नामयं नामयं रूपाणीयेव सत्यम्" (Ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates Rajas. Just as
red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna=Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyana Śrīstī in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra “अज्ञेयं जोहितशुक्लः” (S’v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyana Up., p. 141, Īśādi). The trivrtkarana (trebling) S’ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word trivṛta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in “तमकल्यां विन्दुलम् etc.” (S’v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāṅkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, e.g., in Katha “मनस्तु परः जुड़किङ्करात्म महात परः” (III, 10). Mahat is the synonym of Ahankāra. Similarly we find Avyakta and Purusa in “महत् परमायुक्तमय्यक्तान्तरपूरः परः। पुरुषां परं किण्वित्तम कार्त्त्व मा परा गति! II” (Ibid, III, 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of Purusa have been indicated in “द्रयुपरणं समुज्ज सक्षाक्षाय समानं ज्ञातो परिस्तिन्तपि। तयाःस्तम्भि पिप्पलं स्वाहाति अनभावन्या अभिसाक्षाति॥” in the Muṇḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that S’vetās’vatara is essentially a Sāṅkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāṅkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words Sāṅkhya and Kapila have been used for the first time. “तत्कारणं सांख्य-
In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word Kapila. It is again in this Upanishad that the words vyakta, avyakta and jña are found, e.g., “सुंदरक्षेत्रकर्मवर्त | व्यक्ताव्यक्त ज्ञात विश्वाश्च: | etc.” (1. 8); also “श्राक्ष आहुंजानीशाबाजाः श्रीक द्वादशाः | etc.” (1. 9). vide also the Mbh. “अभ्यो जनसनीशोपमात्रमः | मुखः:ख्यो: |” (III. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gauḍa on the 61st Kārikā). Similarly, the use of the words Pradhāna, Prakṛti and gūra is also found here, e.g., “भर्त प्रथांत” (1, 10), “मायाः तु प्रक्रियां | विशिष्ठ” (IV. 10), “देवतामणकेस्तवं गुरानुमादमः |” (1, 13), etc. Also, the mantra “तमसकर्मिनिन्त्रित्वें पोषातानं शतायांर्व | विश्वातिप्रभारः | अष्टकः | प्रसन्नविश्वाकः तस्रायस्म विमार्यमः द्विनिमित्तिकमोहं |” (S'v. Up. I. 4) propounds the categories of Sāńkhya. The word trīvṛta refers to the three gūnas, the word sōdas'ānta refers to sixteen vikāras, the word s'atārdhāra points to the fifty varieties of pratyaya-sarga. Keith's doubt about the Sāńkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, “The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahanical schools.” But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāńkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāńkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like “माया: तु प्रक्रियां विशिष्ठायां तु महेश्वरः |” (S'v. Up. IV. 10) though there is a technical term of Sāńkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāńkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be
any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṅkhya categories of kṣetrajña, samkalpa, adhyavasāya, abhimāna and linga clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṅkhya system. As—“तमो वा इत्येकमां, तत्प्रथात्तपेयं दिक्षित विपर्ययं प्रयायेतं तज्जनो रूपं.............तां संतोषं यथेतनमः: प्रतिपुन्त्रै प्रेताः संक्षिप्तप्रथममायायभिं मानितं: प्रजापतिः एत्यादि मृत्र अनुस्मारयने वृत्ततिष्ठन्ति यन्ति मृत्तक्षवेधनोर्न्यन्ति एत्यादि स्थिरस्यन्ति।” (Maitrāyani, Up. IV, 5), “पञ्चवत्तमाणाः शृवत्ततिष्ठन्ति वृत्ततिष्ठन्ति अनुस्मारयने शृवत्ततिष्ठन्ति एत्यादि मृत्र अनुस्मारयने” (Ibid III, 2), “परिवर्तनीययनः पञ्चवत्तमाणाः अनुस्मारयने शृवत्ततिष्ठन्ति एत्यादि मृत्र अनुस्मारयने” (Pr up IV, 8) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṅkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three guṇas (Mbh. III, 209, 16–21; 211, 4). The distinction between Prakṛti, and Purusa has been extensively expounded in Sāntiparvan (285, 33–40). Here the word sattva stands for Prakṛti and not Brahman. But Keith, seeing that sattva was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that sattva is referring to Brahman (S. S. p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context—”मृत्ततिष्ठति य गुणानः सर्वक्षेत्रवेदः। परिपक्ववेदः सम्प्रयोगस्यार्थस्य सर्वक्षेत्रवेदः। ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावसिद्धिकमपि तपस्यामानुगतिर्गुणाः। ज्ञात्वाभिस्मायतुपस्य विशेषायस्तनुवद्गुणाः। ॥ ३८ ॥”. We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṅkhya knowledge being called Vaiśeṣika which was imparted to Īkṣaka by Pañcaśikha of Parāśara gotra, e. g., “यथासाचर्चन्तम्या प्रांवं नानं विशेषिन्तु पुरा” (Sānti. 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the
context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṅkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, vide my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f.).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word Sāṅkhya in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, — "सांख्यं सांख्यत्वं चोभो निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः।। पूर्णान्तर्यथा जानानि वाक्यमित्युच्यतः नुपै।। शंपाणिन्त च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविष्कारं।। काशिद्वयांभिप्रत्यं शरीरष्टिप्रभायतां।।" (S'ānti, 320, 79 and 82).

But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been mentioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṅkhya philosophy e. g., (1) S'abda, (2) Spars'ā, (3) Rasa, (4) Rūpa, (5) Gandha, (6–10) the five senses, (11) Manas, (12) Buḍḍhi, (13) Sattva, (14) Ahaṁ-kartā, (15) Sāmagrya, (16) Sanghāta, (17) Prakṛti, (18) Vyakti, (19) Dvandvayoga, (20) Kāla, (21–25) the five gross elements, (26) Sadbhāvayoga, (27) Asadbhāvayoga, (28) Vidhi, (29) S'ukra and (30) Balu (S'ānti 320, 97–112). So it has been said: "विद्याति-दक्षर्चनि हि गुणं: संग्राहितं स्थवरात्।। समयं यथा वर्तनते तद्विन्द्रियविधिः स्वरतम्।।" (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of Prakṛti and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same parvan. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṅkhya books. They are as given below:—

(1) The creation of mahat from avyakta, (2) from mahat there is the creation of ahaṁkāra, (3) from the latter of manas, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of "connected with the senses (aṁdriyaka)," (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcas'ikha in S'ānti, 219, are nowhere obtained in the
Sāṁkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96–112 of the Sānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṁkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or Īs'vara. Even though the plurality of puruṣas has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide—'वहनः पुरुषाणां स यथा योनिहृत्ये,' Sānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṁkhya to Pañcas'īkha, got merged in Brahman—'युक्तेकाश्रयं श्रद्धा नानारूपं प्रदत्तवते। आचरणिष्टते तत्सनु प्रतिपे तद्वैतम॥' (Sānti, 218, 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṁkhyaśas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṁkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gitārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṁkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory, e. g. 'सिद्धां कपितो छूँति:' (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṁkhya path without karmā is only a synonym of Jñāna. Therefore S'āṅkarācārya explains the word kṛtānta as 'कृतात्मिति कर्मोऽच्यते। तद्याच्छ: परिलसयित्वं स कृतात्म: कर्मचेति इत्येत्तः॥' (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'āṅkarācārya explains the word gunasāmghyāna (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three gunās, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṁkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṁkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2–8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13–15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary, with the Ṭmbh. (8, 8, p. 52) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24–52) and reference to the three pramāṇas (ibid, 105). But the word Sāṁkhya is not found
in it. Medhātithi, commenting on "Akaśamatu vijñāṇaṃ vartanam
vah: śṛṇu: (1. 76), says—vijñāṇaṃ kartāra dīkṣāyaḥ—, and thū
indicates the presence of Sāṅkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmrta the
distinction of Purusā from the twenty-four categories
preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One
of the stanzas (XX, 25) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds
with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda (S
S. p. 52). In the S’āṅkha-samhitā we find twenty-five cate-
gories, but Purusā is identified with Viṣṇu (VII 21–25).
Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṅkhya, e.g.
vedāntīya-kutūhalaṃ vikramaṃ śṛṇu: (1. 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṅkhya cate-
gories expounded in these books give prominence to Is’vara
(See also Bh. Com. pp. 183–4, where Belvākara points out
five stages of the evolution of Sāṅkhya doctrines.)

IV. Sāṅkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṅkhya teachers are met with in
the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:–
(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcas’ikha, (4) Vindhya-
vāsa, or Vindhya-vāsaka or Vindhya-vāsin, (5) Vārṣaganyā,
(6) Jagis’avya, (7) Vo’dhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9)
Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra,
Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa
Vālmiki and (26) S’uka.

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the S’v. Up. (5, 2) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṅkhya
philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical
personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller
and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down
name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is
another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists (S. Y., 2, § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with Agni or Viṣṇu or S'iva, and is, therefore, another name for Hiranyagarbha (S. S. 9, In.; Mbh. S'āntu. 339, 66–67; 342. 92–93). Kavirāja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamangalā published by me (p. 3). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; “आद्विद्वान् निमाविष्टविष्णियाय कारणाद्विगवान् परमारिन्त्रुरे निजासुमानाय तत्रेऽप्रोवाच!" says:—

“(1) आद्विद्वान्=सर्गवाविष्णियाय हिरण्यगर्भे: स्वयंभू, निमाविष्टविष्णियाय=स्वयंभू प्रविष्टकालाल्पपरामर्शिः कारणाद्विगवान् आसुरे तत्रेऽप्रोवाच। तत्रेऽप्रोवाचेतेथः। (2) ‘कृतिप्रसूतं कपिंतं यस्तमये शास्त्रितं हिरण्यगर्भे: ज्ञाताकिंतं ज्ञाताकिंतं च पथयेत्। ‘इति अस्त्या कारणाद्विगवान् जायमानस्य जान्मानस्य तत्रेऽप्रोवाचेतेथः। (3) पदभागे कपिले नाम सिद्धेऽप्रोवाचेतेथः। अवधारिन्त्रुरे सर्वेऽप्रोवाचेतेथः। तत्वायमविनिर्णयम्। (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, I. 3. II). इति स्वरूपादो पदभागार्थः प्रविष्टकिंतं ज्ञाताकिंतं च पथयेत्। ‘अग्नः स कपिले नाम सांख्यावप्रविष्टकिंतं। इति महाभारतम् तु कपिलेऽणाय महाभारत:। कपिलेऽणाय च कपिले श्रावण:। कपिलेऽणाय तु कपिलेऽणाय इति स्मरयेत्। (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रसूतं नापि हिरण्यगर्भे यव गृहयेत्। इति अस्त्यादो प्रकाशं तद्वधारयम्। ‘इति अस्त्यादो प्रकाशं तद्वधारयम्। ‘इति कपिलेऽणाय नापि हिरण्यगर्भे यव गृहयेत्।” (Ch. S. S. p. 62).*

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an asura Kapila divided the four āsramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the s'rāddha', vivāha, prāyas'citta ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'āṅkara-cārīya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṅkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhaṣya II, 1, 1). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṅkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila alias Vāsudeva taught the Sāṅkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Sāṅkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1.
p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3.25.1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कपिलस्तत्वसंबंधता भगवानात्मकाय। जात: स्वयमज: साशाः-
दातंप्रजस्वे नृणाम।”

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (t. s. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3). Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S’atapatha-Brāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamanḍalā and the Mātharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas’ikha “तत्र पञ्चसिक्षयो नाम काष्ठेयो महामुनिः।…
आसुर: प्रथमं सिंवं etc.” (S’anti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, vis. “विक्रमः एक्षरस्मिनेत्यत्क्रमेऽवै भोगोद्भक्षणः
कथयन्त। प्रतिविभेदः स्वत्तथा यथा चतुर्मांसस्मत:।” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Śaddars’anasaṃuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas’ikha

Pañcas’ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works:

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) “एकेवर्ष दृष्टं व्यासिरेव दृष्टंस्” [1. ४]। (आ) “आहिनी
विद्वन्ते निमां विद्विशिष्याय कारणोपखालान परमपिवरायसये विज्ञानामतः
तत्त्र प्रोचाच।” [1. २५]। (इ) “तमणुमाध्यमाननमुविद्विशिष्येयेव
नावस्तःज्ञानिते।” [१. ३६।।। (उ) “व्यक्तमाऽध्यं वा सर्वमाध्यमज्ञानोऽभिमतीस्य
तत्त्व सम्पदमुन्नद्यायसम्पर्दुर्मन्नानन्तस्य चापुरुषोद्वित्यमाणस्य
चापुर्दु मन्नान: स सर्वोप्रतिष्ठुः।” [२. ५।।। (ऊ) “व्रज्ञित: परं
Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

B. S. Sū.—

(ए) "आधेयवाचित्योगः पञ्चशिखः" [५. २२]। (प्र) "अविभेकनिमितो वा पञ्चशिखः [६. ६८]"

C. S. S. B.—

(आ०) "सत्वं नाम प्रसाददात्वाभिसम्बहिततितितितिन्तितितितिः सत्तोपदिश्यपानन्तमेव समासतः सुकामकम् एवं रजोपी शोकातिनानामेव समासतो दुःखातिमकम् एवं तमोपी निद्रातिनानामेव समासतो मेद्हारवम् " [१. १२३]।

D. Bhāmati.—

(आ०) "तत्संयोगाहंतुविवर्जनास्याद्वायमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः" [बहा-सूत्र, २, २, ४०].

E. Gauḍa. (Kār. १) and Māth. (Kār. २२)—

(कृ) "पञ्चविभक्तिव्यज्यो यथ: कुष्ठाथे रतः। जटी युष्टी शिश्री वापि
मुच्यते नात्र संस्कृयः।"

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas’ikha by Bhāvāganes’ā in his Tattvavātihārthyaadīpana and by Harībhadrāsūri in Sāstravārtasaṃuccaya (see Int. to Mātharavittī). Bhāvāganes’ā was the disciple of Vijñānabhaṅkṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Harībhadrāsūri is about 725 A.D.
century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Mātharavīṭṭha we find: “ग्याधि दश्यामभाव आमात्तलाथि” a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Sāṅkarācārya (i.e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanagasattari. And, if Vyādi alias Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṅkhyaśāstra, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B.C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsinins and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣagānya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣagānya as about the former teachers of Sāṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) “सूतीन्यविज्ञातिभेदभावावास्ति मृठ- पुष्कर्णम: इति वार्षिकं।” (III 53, (2) “सुप्राणां परम: रूप: न द्विपक्षस्वतः। वकृतू द्विपक्षं प्रांस: तन्माद्वितेव महत्तद्वारम्॥” (Ibid. IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Śaśītāntra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmati with the remarks: “अत एत योगशास्त्रम: व्युत्पादिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्षिकं।” (on the Brahmāsūtrasbhāṣya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣagānya, “पञ्चपर्वो आविष्कारितं इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षिकं।” is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—“पञ्चपर्वो अविष्कारितं प्रयासनां प्रवतिते।” found in the Gaud., and the Māth. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣagānya by Keith (S. S., 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Śaśītāntra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣagānya being the author of the Śaśītāntra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanza: “Śaśītāntra and Vārṣagānya”.)
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Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīśavya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīśavya was a class-
fellow of Pañcas’ikha (S, S. 51). This Jaigīśavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vācas-
pati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā as the author of Dhāraṇās’āstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīśavya, Janaka and Parāśāra as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṁkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīśavya.

7. Vodhu

Vodhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rṣitarpana, we find the name of Vodhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcas’ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanis-
ed form of Buddha’s name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhu’s name before that of Āsuri in one of the parīṣṭas of the Atharvaveda (S, S. 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (S’āntu., Ch., 274). There we find eight kinds of bhūtas (bhāva, abhāva, kāla, prthvī, āpas, vāyu, ākāś’a and tejas); and kāla impelled by bhāva creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the kṣetrajña. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhī and the highest of all is puruṣa. The ear, the skin, the eye
the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there: पुनःपापपक्षवाद्य हि सांवम्यां विनायके। तत्कथे श्रम्य प्रश्निति ब्रह्म-भावे परं गातिस। (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sānikhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkyasmṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (see Yājñavalkyasmṛti, Anandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smrūkāras, viz., Brhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayaviraśṭri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr Sāstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharavṛtta: “कपिलदास्मुरिणा यासमिद्य शान्तं तत्: प्रवचिष्ठेन तस्मादृ भग्नं श्रुत-वात्ताके-हरित-देवध प्रस्तीतिनामतय।” (p. 84), where the word prabhṛti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharavṛtta does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9-26. Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. 1), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Vṛddhu and Pañcaśīka. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (Śānti. 340, 67-69), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,
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Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in विन्दुवरिनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः I (S. Sū VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the Nirnayasindhu and the Tristha-lisetu (H., Dh. I, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, Sūkra, Kāśyapa, Parāśāra, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parāśāra and Janaka named the Parāśāra gitā, and found in the Mahābhārata (Sānti., chs., 290–299), deals with the duties of the varnas and āśīramas and has no vestige of Sāmkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parāśāra came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāmkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcasākha (Mbh., Sānti., 320–23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kausīka. In the Chinese translation of the Sāmkhya Kārikā, Īs'varakaśaṇa is referred to as born in the Kausīka family (Jay Int p. 2, 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Sūkka as teachers of Sāmkhya.

V. "Standard Works on Sāmkhya"

A Available:—

Of the standard works on Sāmkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāmkhya-Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāmkhya-Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आत्मिकर्मकुटपदेशायः" (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV. 3; "वृत्त्यः पद्धत्यः हिमाहिर्दः" (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the sūtras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40–51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāmkhya-Krāikā, quoted in the T. i. 3.
Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9). Moreover, the commentator on the Sarvopakārīṇī, a commentary on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of “Sāmkhya-Sūtras” is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tatvā-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas’ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68-69)?

But Udayavīra Sāstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article “Antiquity of the Sāmkhya Sūtras” (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the sūtras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of Srughna and Pātaliputra in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B.C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāmkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. Sāstri thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. Sāstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other
hand, when Śaṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the Sū., been existent, then Śaṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a rṣi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'vākṛṣṇa.

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the Sū. His contention is:—

(1) "प्रायिनिःपरिनिःपतिवंकर नासतु उपासनियमात् कस्यधुतपत्तेऽक्षिचुपादय " (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48)—here उपासनियमात is borrowed from "उपासनियमात्" (s. Sū., I, 115). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vatsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., viz., "यतुस्मरस्ते—प्रायित्तेऽकाय नासतु उपासनियमात् इति". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vatsyāyana put it after "उपासनियमात्" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपासनियमात्" but the whole passage, viz.—"प्रायित्तेऽकाय नासतु उपासनियमात्". Here Vatsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājnavaulkya-Smṛti (Prāyas'cittādhyāya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patanjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—"पद्भिः प्रकारेः सत्तं भावायामुः—
In reply to Mr. S’astri’s arguments, the following may be stated. In the first place, the word इति is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author. Here, the word इति denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patanjali’s own? In the second place if, depending upon the word इति used by Kaiyata, it is even admitted that Patanjali quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I, 218-219). Again, there is nothing to oblige Kaiyata, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. I., p. 431), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed from the Sānīkhya-Kāṅkā. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Patanjali tally more with those in the Sānīkhya-Kāṅkā than in the S. Sū.

(4) The following sūtras agree verbatim with the Kāṅkās (a) “हेतुमदनियमशायपि सारक्यमेत्रकारिन्त विद्यम्” (S. Sū., I. 124 = Kār., 10). (b) “सात्तचमकारिकं प्रवर्तने वक्तव्यादेशारात” (S. Sū., II. 18 = Kār., 25). (c) “सामान्यकरणवस्ति: प्राणाया वायव: पञ्च” (S. Sū., H. 31 = Kār. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.
Avyāpi in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word pravartate in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession.

The arguments of Mr. Sāstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyāpi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijnānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that “the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās,” Mr. Sāstri says that if we change the order of words in “सामान्यन्तरण्यति: प्राणया वायुः पञ्च” and read it as “सामान्य- करण्यति: प्राणया: पञ्च वायुः:” we attain anustubh metre in place of āryā. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. Sāstri has failed to disprove that the s. sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhāmitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyāvāsa, the Sānikhya-teacher; Vindhyāvāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyāvāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyāvāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vṛṣa-ganyā. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vṛṣa-ganyā composed Hiranyakasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyāvāsa, the author of Hiranyakasaptati and Īśvārkrṣṇa, the author of Sānikhya-Kārikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. | Das Gupta also thinks Īśvārkrṣṇa and Vindhyāvāsa as two
different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n.]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īś'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: Early History of India, 3rd edn., pp 328-334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya "Some Problems of Sāṁkhya Philosophy and Sāṁkhya Literature ", J. H. O., Sept., 1932, pp. 519-520. According to Bhattacharya Īś'varakṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Īś'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken. (See I. 1', II, 255, in.).

The work of Īś'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the bhāṣya of Gauḍapada running up to the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṁkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, "The Problem of the Sāṁkhya-Kārikās", I A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177-181). He says—

(1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "पर्वाश्वविवर्जिताधावि" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tīlak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply: In the Kārikā of Mr. Tīlak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase पर्वाश्वविवर्जिता means the exclusion of the expounding of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "ह्रद्वरानुभविकः स अविद्विक्ष्यतिन्तवकः" would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mimāṁsakas. (2) Īś'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own "āryās". Now in the Saśta-tantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (vis., making one of Brahman, Puruśa S'akti, Niyati, and Kāla, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this-
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Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti—To this we reply: Is'varāksṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Saṣṭitaṇtra is the work of Pañca-
s'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varāksṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. Unavailable

(1) Saṣṭitaṇtra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ikha or Vār-
ṣaganyā as the author of Saṣṭitaṇtra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Saṣṭita-
TRA in Jay.

(a) 'तेजुः च पद्धितत्त्वादिक्यातेवति। विस्तरत्वात् पद्धितत्त्वस्य संक्षिप्तम्
विविधत्वानुपातः सम्प्रतिकारम्।' (p. 1).
(b) 'त्रिविधमन्त्रानमाव्यायां म' 
इति पद्धितम्य व्याख्यातम्। पूर्वतन्त्र, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोष्टमित।' (p. 7).
(c) 'एवं धिटः [:] पद्धार्यः। तदः शास्त्रं पद्धितत्त्वमुद्ध्यते।' (p. 56).
(d) 'तेजुः तर्त। पन्चभिंक्षेण मुनिना तत्त्र तत्त्र म। पद्धितत्त्वाह्य मक्खि
लघुत्तमित। तदेव दिक्त्य पद्धितो स्वादिक्यातः।' (p. 68).
(e) 'नूतनः च पद्धितत्त्वानेत्रतु किं समयेति।' (p. 69).
(f) 'अन्तः पद्धितत्त्वानेत्रविषयः तेजः नोक्ता इत्याद।' (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See—"Saṣṭitaṇtra and Vārṣaganyā", J. O.
R., April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112).—(a) Saṣṭitaṇtra has 60 parts, (b) its author is Pañcas'ikha and (c) it deals with 60
topics, and is, therefore, called "Saṣṭitaṇtra". Vārṣaganyā is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

गुणानां परं रूपं न देशितथः स्वयम्।

यतुः शिष्य्यं यातुः तत्त्वायेव सुतुष्टकम्॥

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmati. Vācaspati alludes it to Saṣṭitaṇtra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣaganyā in Bhāmati.
On the basis of these two references, people have come to
the conclusion that Vārsaganyya is the author of Śaṣṭītantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुनुष्ठकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmati is मायेव सुनुष्ठकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārsaganyya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., "कपिलमहिप्रिणात्तपतिनात्यास्यप्रतियः: " (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭītantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Śaṣṭītantra is the real Sāmkhya-dars'ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṣṭītantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcaśikha in his Śaṣṭītantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhatta-Utpala, in his commentary on Bhārat-Samhita, quotes the verses (22–30) from Sāmkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथात् कपिलाचार्यः: " As regards the alteration of भायेव into मायेव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārsaganyya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्ष्याप: . The opinion of Vārsaganyya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharma-kos'ā (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kāra theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāmkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārsaganyya altered मायेव into मायेव. But that requires proof.
Therefore, the question of authorship of Saṣṭitantra is still undecided.

(2) Rājavārtika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

‘‘प्राणान्तत्वमेकत्वमर्थवचनमवाचनयता।
परार्थं च तथास्तरस्त्र बियोगो योगा एव च॥
श्रेयश्चिनिर्मीलवं मातिकार्ध्यं स्थुता द्रव।
वियवस्य: पञ्चविधस्त्रोतानं नव तद्यु:॥
करणासांसामयवेशयविद्वातिवा सतम।
इति परिः पदार्थानामस्मृत्वं सह सिद्धिमिव:’’

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakāṇṭi (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Samhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y. p. 7). These maaulikārthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māth., Sāṅkhyā-tattva-vivecaṇa (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22), Tattva-yāthārthya-dipana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti (ibid, p. 135).
A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF
THE SĀMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY
Gangānātha Jhā

The lucid writing of Vācaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Śaṅkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this resumé would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Śaṅkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive—and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither—Productive—nor Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattvas,—Prakṛti or Nature being the purely productive, since the Śaṅkhyaśas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive—and—produced are the other Principles—Buddhi, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus Buddhi is productive in as much as out of it evolves Aharikāra, and it is produced in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakṛti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely non-productive because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Puruṣa (Spirit) is neither productive nor produced. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Guṇas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.
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Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful productive agent of the Sāṅkhya or more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Gunas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, i.e. when the Ādirāta of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattva giving rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.

The three attributes—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituted that one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—the universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

Here an objector comes forward and says—"How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting
properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe?"

The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;—e. g. the wick and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties—of 'happiness', 'unhappiness' and 'delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—Nature—must be imbued with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Guṇas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakṛti, Nature—the Key-stone of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakṛti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Baudhāyaṇa "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic "Māyā"? To all this we reply—'It is all these, and It is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni-
verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Guṇas. In short, Prakṛti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) imbued with the three Attributes and evolving through these, every kind of entity—save the Purusa, Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Śāṅkhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternity of this Prakṛti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Śāṅkhyā Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Śāṅkhyā doctrine of causality, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is a nonentity can never be made an entity. That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity;
for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of
the effect with the cause were not necessary then every
effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that
case there would be no restrictive qualification which would
confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects.
This would lead to an absurdity.

Thirdly.—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what
does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other
than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent
condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from
sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and
not in the sand, that the oil subsists.

Fourthly.—The effect is non-different from the cause;
and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To
take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads
composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter,
nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible
between the two; and it is only between two different things
that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible.
Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The
difference of properties and actions cannot establish any
difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done
by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection
of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do,
can be done very well by a number of them together; e. g.,
a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can
be performed by a number of men together. Thus then
we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed
cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect.
This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by
Sir William Hamilton also, who says—“When we are aware
of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of
our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause.
But what does the expression, that it has a cause, signify?
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If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing.... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause.

—Lectures on Metaphysics—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṃkhya-śas use this fact in proving the existence of their Prakṛti, Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahamkāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a regressus ad infinitum. In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sāṃkhya-śas give the names "Pradhāna", "Prakṛti", "Avyaktā." (Nature).

Secondly, we find that all entities—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakṛti.

Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Sāṃkhyas proceed to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference.
In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakriti. These are caused, and as a necessary consequence of this—transitory, limited, mobile, many, dependent (on the activity of the Prakriti), made up of parts; these are the characteristics where the Prakriti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakriti is the uncaused root of the Universe, and as such, must be eternal. And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be all-pervading; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable i.e., it cannot move, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-pervading it must be one. It is independent—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that Prakriti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the various actions and interactions of the three Gunas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such common. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common object of observation by all, and it is common in that sense. Fifthly, they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, i.e., endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakriti on one hand and its Products on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the Spirits and see what the Sāṅkhya-s have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must
first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence, sentence. Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi, the Cosmic Mind, for it is material, being the product of Prakṛti which is essentially insentient and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct Principle of Sentience.

Secondly.—We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are composites. Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakṛti, Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra, yet we must not forget that the body of these apparently immaterial entities is made up of the three Guṇas which are as material as anything. Such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be composite because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Guṇas that is found to be composite.

Thirdly.—We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are made up of the three Guṇas, and as such necessarily affected by pleasure, pain and delusion; so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape a regressus ad infinitum this supervisor must be himself unaffected in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above Prakṛti. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit.

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Fourthly.—Prakṛti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhī and the rest.—These latter being made up as they are of the three Guṇas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory action—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhī. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakṛti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakṛti or Buddhī. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Puruṣa, over and above Prakṛti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Puruṣa?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties?—What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Puruṣa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the mind. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhī. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet
it is the necessary factor in all these. It is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as material. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellect and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentence pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated: it is free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become purposeless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain, etc.,—which in reality do not touch him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddha. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.
The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Purusa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sarnkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one’s constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of Mahat or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi proceeds Ahamkara or the I-principle. From this again emanate the eleven senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour, taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akasa. First in this scale comes Buddhi. This is defined as the principle of adhyayasaya. This term literally means “ascertainment” and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that “this is to be done by me.” It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to will. But the Sarnkhya Buddhi is not mere will. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—“Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence.” The Sarnkhyas attribute both these functions
to their Buddhi. That Buddhi resembles will, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sām-khyas. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already, will decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that wisdom is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with Intellect and Will combined. We have, therefore, called it the Cosmic Mind.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism, the I-principle. It is the principle to which all notions of the "I" are due. It corresponds with Kant's "apperception" and Hamilton's "self-consciousness:" that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "I have the consciousness," "I feel, etc." As immediate effects of this I-principle we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) viz.—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (individual mind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Akāśa; and these have the subtle rudimentary elements for their essential properties.

Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the mind or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call mind a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far
to seek. The Sāṁkhyaśas define sense as the immediate effect of the I-principle under the influence of the Sattva Attribute; and this differentia we find in Mind as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. What are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas, mind, is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may, for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in Sāṁkhya "reflection." When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विभक्त). This indefinite and vague impression is soon rendered definite, and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the "reflection" of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of eagerness for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the functioning of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—experience and subsequent discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Puruṣa, Spirit. If there were no functioning of the different emana-
tions of Prakṛti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between himself and the inanimate Prakṛti. The only impetus from without is thus supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own inherent eagerness.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhī, Ahaṁkāra and Manas, and the ten external—the ordinary ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones operate only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of substances, and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—viz., the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again Buddhī is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhī, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhī is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakṛti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhī is supreme.

Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the 'Great' substances. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and the third are fading and transient.

This "subtle body" of the Sāṁkhyaśas is born before the visible body and lasts till dissolution; and till then it remains the 'body' of the Spirit in all its incarnations during
that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Lingga-S’arīra", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtle counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Lingga-S’arīra is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhī to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtle in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtle substratum.

Let us now see how the Sāṁkhyaśas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions; Vice leads the other way: Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit’s perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thralldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free
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from the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed sentience. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If, on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sāṅkhyaśas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddha dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of impediments, twenty-eight of incapacity (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of contentment and eight of perfection. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.

So much for 'mental' creation. The 'material' creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scence like an actress who has
played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.
तत्त्वकौमुदी
( सांहूः )

( १ ) मकळचरणम्
अजामेकं लोहितशुकुङ्कुण्गं बहं: प्रजाः सूज मानां नमाम:।
अजा ये तां जुयमाणं भजनं जहःत्वेनं शुकेरोगं तुमस्तानु॥ १ ||
कपिलाय शहासुनये सुनये शिक्षयत तत्स्य चासुरः।
पञ्चशिखाय तेषवरक्षण्याओताच्चर्ममस्यः॥ २ ||

हस्त्व खल्लू प्रतिपिलिस्तमथ प्रतिपादयनु प्रतिपाद्वित्वाद्विधेयवचनो
मबति मेधावताम्। अप्रतिपिलिस्तमथ तु प्रतिपादः
( २ ) शाश्वविप्यक- यन् ‘ नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ’ हृति मेधावः
ज्ञातावतरम्॥ २ , ज्ञानम्रमवजुपेश्वते । स चैव य प्रतिपिलिस्तेऽथो यो
ज्ञात: सनु परमपुरुषार्थं कल्पते। हृति प्रार्थिततः
शाश्वविप्यङ्गशास्त्र परमपुरुषार्थं साधनं हेतुवात्, तद्विध्यविज्ञासामवतार्थति-
दुःखत्वयाभियाहतातिज्ञाशास्त्रम् तदुपरात्तके हेतु॥
हस्ते साध्याम् चेनैकानात्यतन्तोसभावात्॥ १ ||

“दुःख-” हृति। एवं हि शाश्वविप्यो न ज्ञात्येत, यदि दुःख नाम
जगति न स्थाय, सदा न ज्ञातानस्, ज्ञातानस्
( २ ) शाश्वविप्यक- वा अशक्यसमुचेद्दुम्। ( अशक्यसमुचेद्वतं च द्विधा,
जिज्ञाताय आवस्य- दुःखस्य मल्लबद, तदुच्छदेद्वयायविज्ञानाद्य॥
कल्वदाञ्जा॥ २, शाश्वसमुचेद्वेदापि च शाश्वविप्यवस्य ज्ञानस्यानु-
पापमूतस्वतादा, सुकरस्योपायान्तरस्य सक्षाबादा॥

त कै, १
तत्त्र न ताबद्दुःखायंस्ति नात्यजिहासितमिथुत्कर्षम्—“दुःखाया भिषायात्”
इति। दुःखान्तः खयम्। तत्र खदु भाष्या-
(४) च वाणाः दुःखान्तः सिक्षम्, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिभौवीकक्रमः तत्तत्राध्यात्म
युद्धादनम्, तद्वस्ता कल्युकम्, ठूङ्गीयम्, शारीरिक मानसं च। शारीरिक वाता-
साधनं च।
प्रत्येकमाणं वैषयीनिर्मितम्, मानसं कामकोषकोधमामः शर्वयाविधाश्रयः श्रवणाश्रयः
क्रियाश्रयः। शर्वयाविधाश्रयः श्रवणाश्रयः क्रियाश्रयः। वधुः भावायो विद्याश्रयः। वधुः भावायो विद्याश्रयः।
चतृतदान्तिरकोपायसाधारणार्थार्थिकम् दुःखम्। वालोपायसाधारणं दुःखकं वेधम्,
आधिभौतिकम्, आधिभौवीकक्रमः। तत्तत्वाध्यात्मोक्तमं मानुषपञ्चगांधकिर्तिः
सुप्रस्थावर्तिमितम्, आधिभौवीक्रमं तु यक्षराजसर्वानियमः। वधुः भावायो
णम्। तदेकतु प्रयामेषदेवीण्यं दुःखम् रजः परिमाणादेवहो न शायमे प्रयामेषदेवी-
णम्। तद्वते दुःखज्ञेयान्तः करणवर्तिना। चेतनाशके। प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया
भरस्मन्धोर्निद्रियतः। चेतनाशके। प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया जिहासं हेतुसहरुकः।
यथापि न सचिवर्येते दुःखम्, तथापि तद्भिमसत् शायम्। कतपञ्चमुपरिदारी
पपादिविष्यते। तस्मादुपपचमृ, "तद्भिमसते हेतु " इति। तस्य दुःखतः
वस्य अपथातः। तद्भिमसते हेतु। इति। अपथातः वस्य अपथातः हेतु। शाख्यप्रतिपादो, नात्य इवाखायः।
अन्त साधने—“दृढे साधाराने चेतु”। इति। अयम्। अस्तु तद्हि
दुःखतः, जिहासं हेतु, भवतु। भवतु च तत्त्वः
(५) सुकरस्य दुर्गतः
क्षानां, सहां च शाख्यमयं उपायसमुष्टुः।
पावसे शाख्यविप्रयत्
तथापश्रिन्त प्रेक्षायितम् जिहासं न युक्ता, दुर्गतेऽयो
यक्षजालाया वैध्ये
पावसे तदुद्दृक्कर्षे सुकरस्य विद्यामानविताः
ध्यायितः। तत्वाश्रयः। तु अनेकजनमानस्यपरस्परावासः
साध्यांश्यास्विदुःस्तुलग्रासः। तथा च लौकिकानामाभासः।
‘अन्तःैं चेन्मधू विन्दृते किमतर्पं पर्यं व्यूञ्जे।
दुर्गताय्यांसय साधिनो को विद्यानु विन्दमाचेर ‘ इति।

१. अनंतसमुक्षदुःखान्तिन्यो तात्त्विमति श्रेयित। २. समागमायावस्य।
३. समाङ्गायावस्य। ४. ‘अन्त’सातलयमनैमि—दुर्गतात्त्विस्तिन्यो श्रवणः
अतोद्यो स्वर्पम्। अन्तः। अर्थशास्त्र ‘यथिन्याने सततं गच्छिति
लोकः’ इति।
शास्त्रज्ञासाधनस्यकं

स्त्रितं चोरया: तत्त्वं: शारीरिकायायोक्तक्तम् भिषजं वर्तपदित्वा:।
मानसस्यापि सत्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोक्षेत्रीयात्माभोजनविलेपनवचारङ्कितं राज्यशक्तिसाधनः। सुकरः।
एवमाथिविस्मृतिकस्थापि दुःखस्य नित्येष्यशास्त्रात्मकचन्दनार्कवर्तमा साधनात्मकं बोधिसिद्धायसाधनम्। तथा
संविदेशिकस्थापि मणिमन्त्रोपाययोगं: सुकर: प्रतीकारोपायः इति।

निराकरोत्—“न” इति। कुतं? “एकान्तायत्वंतोऽभवात्”।
“एकान्तो” दुःखनिब्रह्मदिस्यम्बवः; “अत्यन्तो” (६) वैदिक्यपतिनिर्भ: नित्रस्य दु:स्य पुनर्जन्न पायो, तयो: एकान्तायत्वं
कारणम्-परिगमितो- चोरभाव: “एकान्तायत्वं तोऽभवात्”। श्रीस्थाने
पायेय्य आयनिङ्गज्ञातः साबविविधक्रियार्थः। एतदुःखं भवति, यथाविचार रसायनात्
कालिनकदुःखनिर्भ: तयाः हि खण्डनिकोणीनितिशास्त्रात्मकम् यत्रापूतियोगिन्येदियोगिन्येदि
रद्विनाम:।
तथाय क्षणायामौक्तिकमधुःस्य मिन्युत्रस्तिर्दशिनात्म
अनायत्वतिकमधुः, इति सुकराएस पैकात्तिकायत्वतिकन्तु द्याननुभूतेन हि
उपयोगः इति नास्पाधिम ज्ञासात्यः।

यथापि दुःखस्य द्वारकामधुः, तथापि तत्परिलोपार्थ्वेन
(७) दुःखपालिकान्त- तद्वपातो महंखेमेवति युक्त शास्त्राधि तत्कर्ष्यते
नम्न महंखेमेव।।
मित्या।। १।।

(८) वैदिक्यश्च दुःखपदं स्वादैत्यत। मा भूत्वद्वायं, वैदिक्य ज्योि
कथात्रात्मकस्य मुकर्ष्य तद्वपातो महंखेमेव।। धोमादि: संवत्सरपर्यंत।
कर्मकल्पसङ्कीर्त्यात्मके-शास्त्रविषयज्ञापिता: कार्यमयत्वंतत्वपिनाथ्यति।।
श्रुतिः “स्वरूपकामो
Pुनवेष्ठ्यपितः।। यजेत्” इति। स्वरूपः

“यत्नः दु:खेन समेभ्यं च च प्रस्तमान्तरम्।
भिक्षुपक्षोपायं चतुः सुकृत्यद्वारस्य” इति।

१०. एतत् (वक्ष्यमायम्, आश्रवं कितम्) स्यात्-इति प्रस्थ्यकाश्रोतः। अथवा
एतत् (भवमध्यमम्) स्यात् (भवत्), स्वीक्षेत्रमाध्यमितिमितिशंकुक्तः।। उभयथापि युक्तते।।
द्रष्टवैदिकोपयोगसाम्यं।

दु:खविरोधी सुखविशेषत्व स्वर्गः। स च स्वशक्तया समूद्रागतमप्रत्यक्षित हुः:-
कमुः। न च वृहस्य। तथा हि भूयते—“अयम सोमसमुत्ता अश्बूम” इति [अर्थवे-
शिरसः ३]। तथ्यथे कुतोस्मायातुस्वसम्भवः। तस्मात्वदिकोपयोगस्तुत्पत्य तात्पर्यः-
प्रतीकारहतोमुलूण्ठायांग्रह्रात्राःसमवत्त्यरनिवर्तनीयश्चैवकज्ञनमपरस्तराया-
सस्मपादनीयात्। विवेकज्ञानात्। ईष्यकर्मवाचु पुनःपित्य वथिः जिज्ञासा इत्याया-
हृद्याह—

इश्वदानुअविकः। स हविधृत्तिक्षात्तिविविधायुक्तः।

तद्वपरीतः। यौगप्रयायसवेनिविद्धानात्। ॥ २ ॥

“इष्टः” इति। गुप्ताद्विद्वेद्यते इत्यन्त्व्यथो वेदः। एतदुःश्वधति-
‘श्रुयत एव परं न कनान्ति क्रियत’ इति। वज्र भव आयुः-
(९) वैदिकायाः। तत्र प्रासो ज्वात्त इति यावत्। आयुःविको-
प्यवायानां हृद्योप-
नितको। नक्रणवातीकारानुपयोगस्या। भयानापि तुल्यवात्।
यद्विपि च “आयुःविकः” इति सामायाविधियानं। तथापि
कर्मकलापाप्रभांकं इश्वदानु। विवेकज्ञानस्यायात्वाद इश्वदानुविकत्वात्। तथा च
श्रुयते—“ भास्मा वा उरे ज्वात्व:। प्रकृतिस्तो विवेकमः” [बृहदारण्यक,
२४५], “न स पुनराभ्यि स न स पुनराभ्यि” [छान्दोग्य ८.१५] इति।

अर्थां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—“स हविधृत्तिक्षात्तिविविधायुकः” इति।
“हविधृतः” सोमायायांश्च पशुवीजादिरवथः-
(१०) द्रष्टवैदिकः। नाति। यथासह सम भगवान्तः। पल्लवशिखरायः—“स्त्राक्षरायः: अविधृतः-
लघुस्वर्णः। सपि शहः। स्मरणस्मरणः।” इति। “स्त्राक्षरायः अविधृतः-
लघुस्वर्णः। सपि शहः। स्मरणस्मरणः।” ज्योतिषोदानिज्ञानः:
प्रधानपूर्वस्य 
लमू तुल्यम।। स्वयम् पशुहितसादिज्ञानम्। उत्तेण पूर्वस्य रक्षकः।
‘सपि शहः,’ किष्टतापि प्रायस्मित्वं परिहर्तु शक्यः। अथ च प्रमादः
प्रायस्मित्वमिन्तः नागरितं, प्रधानकंमित्वपक्षमयं स पच्यते। तथापि
यादिदासनहरू सूते तात्त्वः प्रवृत्तविषयः (सहिष्णुत्या) सह वृत्तत इति

१. अष्टुपुराणः।
“सम्प्रतिमवर्षः” । सृष्ट्यन्ते हि पुष्पसम्भारोपनिःस्त्राणसुधामहाद्राविगाहिनः । ।
कुशालः पापमारोपसारितं दृःखविश्विणिकामः ।

न च—— “मा हिस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि” हि सामान्यशाखां विशेषशाखेषां
“अश्रीयोमीयं पशुमारङ्गेष्ट” हि लाभने नादयत्——
(११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया हि युक्तमः । विरोधारावातः । विरोधे हि बलीयसा
अप्यनये हेितुसाधनम् । दुःखिथे वायव्यते । न चेताहिस्त कष्टहिरोधः । कष्टविशष
यथावत् । तथा हि——“मा हिस्यात्” हि निस्विषेषे
हिंसाया अनये हेितुभाषे हृष्टये । न त्वंकष्टकृशिवमपि । “अश्रीयोमीयं पशुमारङ्गेष्ट”
हि लाभने वायव्यने च पशुहिंसाया: कष्टविशषमुद्धये । नात्त्वेनेतरावाभावः ।
तथा सति वाणने देशस्यायात् । न चान्ये हेितुविषेनपूर्वः ।
कष्टहि दृष्टिविषेषे हि हिसा पुरुषस्य दोषावशयति । कष्टहि विषेषे ।

क्षयातिषयो च फलगतावपुष्पाय उपचरिती । क्षयिष्य च स्वर्गांडे । सत्वे
(१२) वैदिकोपास्य सातिसाध्यविद्याधरणम् । वैदिकोपास्य सातिसाध्यविद्याधरणम् ।
सति कार्यवादवुद्तितम् । योगतिशोधाय: स्वर्गमात्रस्य
साध्यम: । वाजपेयाद्वसु: स्वराज्यश्चत्वतिश्यवक्ष-वानम् । परस्मादस्त्रकर्षो हि हीनसपदः पुरुषं दृःख-
करोति।

“श्रापम सोममस्त्र स्वरूपाः” हि चार्सद्वावाभिधानां चिरस्थेयमानसुप-
लक्ष्याति। यदाहु:——“आभूतसम्भवं स्थानसमस्ततवं
(१३) अमृतलक्ष्मिन:— हि भाषये” हि (अमृतपुराणे) । न्यात पुष्पाते:—
विरोधप्रभुवै—अमृतलक्ष्मिन:— अमृतलक्ष्मिन्
चिरस्थेयानं उप-लक्ष्यानात्। परेण नाकं निर्मितं युहां विश्राृजते यथाभि
विशार्दिः” हि [ समानग्रहण १०२४ ] । तथा
“कर्षणाः शृणुमुक्षयो निषेधुः: प्रजावन्तो त्रिविविलीमान: । तथा परे
कर्षयो च स्वरूपस: चिरस्थेयामानसुप: ” हि च।
शाश्वविषयकानस्य श्रेयसवम्।

(14) लोकाक्षेत्रस्य शासनात्मकाः अनिवर्तिताः

(15) "तद्विश्रां श्रेयसवम्। व्यक्तात्यक्तविज्ञानम्

(16) शाश्वविषयकानस्य श्रेयसवम्। अनिवर्तिताः

1 अनिवर्तिताः। 2 अनिवर्तिताः। 3 (66) कार्यक्षारोऽनिवर्तिताः। 4 व्यक्तात्यक्तविज्ञानम्। परावर्तिताः। व्यक्तात्यक्तविज्ञानम्।
(१७) शाखार्थक्षेपणः— तद्वै वेद्वाचामहेश्वरायेन शाखार्थः समाधाय प्रकृति-प्रकृतिविकृति— शाखामार्श्माणः श्रोतुबुद्धिसमवधाणय तदृश संक्षेप-विकृत्यनुभयुपक्रमेण। पत्र: प्रतिजानिते—

मूलप्रकृतिविकृतिरिविकृतिरिभूतदायः प्रकृतिविकृतयः ससा।
पोड़शकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिन विकृतिः पुरुषः।

“मूल—” इति। संस्करणो ति शाखार्थस्य चतुर्विधा:। कब्र्द्धिः प्रकृतिरेव, कब्र्द्धियाः विकृतिरेव, कब्र्द्धिर्प्रकृतिविकृति:। कब्र्द्धिनुभयुप्यः।
तथा का प्रकृतिरिविकृतम्। “मूलप्रकृतिविकृति:” इति। प्रकृतिरोत्तरी प्रकृति:।

(१८) प्रकृतिकथनम्।
प्राणनम्, सच्चरजस्तमसां साम्यवस्था, ता अबिकृति:, प्रकृतिरेवाथः। कुत् इन्द्रम्, “सूक्ष्मति” मूल-चक्रासौ प्रकृतिकृतेति मूलप्रकृति:। विश्वस्य कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम्, न ध्वस्या मूलान्तरस्तिः, अनवस्थाप्रस्तर्गताः। न चानवस्थाः प्रमाणमस्तीति भाभः।

कतमाः पुनः प्रकृतिविकृतयः। कियश्रेष्ठे प्रधा उक्तम्।“१८वचा: प्रकृति-

(१९) प्रकृतिविकृति- विकृतयः ससा।“इति। प्रकृतयथः विकृतयथः ता इति कथनम्।
“प्रकृतिविकृतयः।” ससा। तथा हि महत्तरस्मृ अहं-द्वारस्य प्रकृति:, विकृतिश्रु मूलप्रकृते।। एवमहाद्वारस्य तन्मात्रार्गा, भावे तथा परंतपमात्राणि तथवानि भूतानां-माकाशादीनां प्रकृतियो विकृतयथाहीकारस्य।

यथा का विकृतिरेव, कियती चेत्यत उक्तम्।“पोड़शकस्तु विकारः” इति।
पोड़शकस्यापरिमितो गणः पोड़शकः।‘तु’ शब्दः

(२०) विकृतिकथनम्। द्विधार्यो विभक्तम्-पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकाकाश इतिर्यणी। पोड़शको गणो विकार एव, त प्रकृतिरित।

यदग्री दृढ्यदीनां गोपरुप्रार्ध्यो विकारः। एवमहाकृत्येवदानां पथो-बीजादीनां दृष्यसंकुरादः। तथापि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न प्रथिष्ठादिवर्गीयेत्।


संत तत्त्वान्वितं। तत्त्वान्वितोपकारसंबं च प्रक्तिविष्णूमितामित्तम, हि न दोषं। सवें गोथारण्यं स्थूलतंत्रित्रप्राणं च समेत न तत्त्वान्वितां।

अनुभयुप्परमायैं न प्रक्तिनां विक्रियं पुरुषं हि पुरुष सवेषुपरिशं-(२१) अनुभयुप्पकन्थनम।। दुपपादधिष्ठयते।। ३।।

तस्मिनऽर्थं प्रमाणिं कर्तुभमिमतत: प्रमाणेभद्रा लक्षणोऽस | न च (२२) प्रमाणसमानं सामान्यलक्षणमान्तरण शक्ते विशेषलक्षणम कत्मु | न्युलक्षणम।। हि प्रमाणकसामान्यं तावदलक्षयति-

इष्टमत्समाक्षमात्रं च, सर्वप्रमाणासिद्धान्तोऽस। निविधियमप्रमाणिं, मण्यसिद्धं: प्रमाणाद्विः।। ४।।

"प्रमाणमिदम्" हि। अन्तः-च ‘प्रमाणम्’ हि समाल्यं लक्षणपदम्। 
तविभचन्ति च लक्षणम्। प्रमीयते दनेने निविधचनानु (२३) प्रमाणपद्यम्- 
निविधचनम।। प्रमां प्रति करण्णक्षमान्यवचनू। तत्त्वान्तिग्नि विपिनेतात्- 
निविधित्वसिद्धं चित्रवृत्तं।। बोधौ पौर्णेयः: फलम् 
प्रमा, तत्साधनम् प्रमाणमिति। पुते संशयविपयः

यस्यृत्तिसाधनेन च प्रमाणेन प्रममक्षणः।।

संशयविप्रत्यर्थि निराृक्तेति- "निविधियम्" हि। तितो विधा 
यथ ध्रुवमप्रमाणसामान्यस्त तत् निविधियम्, न न्यूनम्,
(२४) प्रमाणज्ञां।। नाश्चिकिमित्यथा:। विशेषलक्षणान्तरस्त्रैतदुपपाद- 
धिष्ठयम।।

कतमां पुनस्ततिस्तो विधा हृत्य भाष।। "इष्टमत्समाक्षमात्रं च (२५) प्रमाणत्व- 
परिकायम।। हि पुरुष सौक्तिकप्रमाणामित्रायम्, भोक्त्रियथिन नर- धिष्ठयाचार्यस्त तस्वैवउपाधिकारार्थ। भाषा तु विषयं 
योगिनामूच्चवल्लोतसां न लोक्युपादनायालिति सदृष्प

नामंिितम, अनधिकारार।।

१ नैयायिकानामनुद्विवसायः-धर्माने ‘धर्मं जानमीति’ –पुरुषगतः।
कृ. ५ ]

प्रमाणनां विशेषङ्क्षणम्।

स्यदेवतत्—मा भूत्यूमस्। अभिकं तु कस्मात् भवति? सक्षिरन्ते न्यूति
वादिन उपमानादीन्यि प्रमाणानि। इत्यत आह—(२६) प्रमाण—
संख्यांसंधिक्यशः, तत्त्वविहारः॥

सरिष्यमासिद्धवात्।" इति। एवेव दष्टानुमानसं
वचनेषु सर्वेऽऽ प्रमाणान्यां सिद्धवात्, अन्तरमोहा
विद्यते। एतत्वोपवाक्यत् इत्युक्तम्॥

अथ प्रमेयवः युवानाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात् प्रमाण सामान्यतः विशेषङ्क्षणं
(२७) प्रमेयवर्णे—
कस्मयति? इत्यत आह—"प्रमेयसिद्धि: प्रमाणादिति"
ह्यति। सिद्धि: प्रदीति:॥

(२८) कारिका—
सेयमार्गार्थकमानुरोपेन पाठकममनात्यापौर्व व्या
पाठकमपरिवर्तनेनहेतु:॥ व्यासा॥ ४॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषङ्क्षणानां राज्यश्च सर्वप्रमाणे ज्येष्ठवात् तद्दैव
(२९) प्रमाणानं नवाचाचारुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववाचारानामविधिप्रेरणे,
विशेषङ्क्षणम्॥ तदैव तत्त्वविद्यति—

प्रतिविशयाध्वस्यस्यो दृष्टं तविधममनात्याठ्याठूम्।
तहिष्कलिप्तिपूर्वकम्। आप्सुतिरायावचनं तु॥ ५॥

"प्रतिविशयाध्वस्यस्यो दृष्टं।" इति। अत्र "दृष्टं।" इति कस्मयि
वेशः। परिवर्तनेतु दृष्टं। समानासनात्याठ्याठूमको कस्मायिः॥

अवयाध्वस्तु—विविधपनि। विषयसनुचिन्द्रपनि। स्वेत रुपेण निरूपणीयं
कुर्विन्तीयं बावतं = "विषयः।" वैदिकवाद्य: सुखाना
(३०) प्रत्यक्ष—
दृष्टास्थानीयानाम्। अविषयव तमाल्स्यात्म: योगिना
कस्मात्याध्वस्तु:॥ मूर्खस्त्रोतस्य प्रविष्ययाः। विषयं विषयं प्रतिविशयाः। इति। प्रतिविशययम् = सत्रिः। वृत्तिः। साक्षरेः॥
अर्थसिद्धकक्ष्मिनिमित्रस्य इत्यत:। तस्मिन् अध्यसायाः। तदावधित इत्यतं॥
अध्यसायश्च वृत्तिस्मारायो ज्ञानम्। उपासनविषयानामिनिमित्रियां वृत्ती।
प्रयोक्तक्षणम्

सति यो: सत्वसमुद्रः सोडध्वसाय ९ इति। बृजित्रिति ज्ञानमिति चाह्याते। इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, अनेन यशेतनाशके-रघुभ्रह्मसारः प्रमाणोऽधि:।

शुभ्रितसवं हि प्राकृतवादचेतनम्, इति तद्वियोध्वसायोद्धप्याचेतनोऽपि प्रणामः। पुरुषस्तु सुखाधनसुपब्धी चेतनः।

शुभ्रितसवं हि प्राकृतवादचेतनम्, इति तद्वियोध्वसायोद्धप्याचेतनोऽपि प्रणामः। पुरुषस्तु सुखाधनसुपब्धी चेतनः।

तथा च वशयितः—

“तस्मात्संयोगाचेतनं चेतनवचिदिव किङ्गम्।”

गुणकर्तवेवपि तथा कतर्य महायुद्धासिनः।” इति [कारिका. २०].

श्रवाध्वसायप्रहणेन संशयं व्यवचिदिवति, संशयस्यानवविष्टप्रहणेनानिनिर्विष्टप्रववात्। निष्ठ्रोध्वसाय इति चार्यानंतरम। विषयः

(३१) प्रयोक्तक्षणम्

प्रहणेन चास्तविष्यं विपर्यमरोपकरति। प्रतिप्रहणेन न्तर्गतानां शाब्दानां चेतित्वयार्थविशिष्टकर्षसुचनादनुमानस्याद्यक्ष पराक्रमम्

तदेव च समानासमानानातीतवव्यवस्थदेवेकाव्यात् “प्रतिवशयाध्वसाय” इति

(३२) प्रयोक्तक्षणम्

दृष्टव्य सम्पूर्ण लक्षणगम्यात्। तत्रानंतरेऽपि लक्षणान्तरार्णी पैर्वविष्टं लक्षणम।।

नालुमानप्रमाणमिति वदलोकायतितेनान्तिप्रकष्ण: सन्निद्धो विपर्यवस्तो

(३४) अनुमानस्य

वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपचित्वः। न च पुरुषान्तरगतः अशानसंभेतिपर्यवस्त्यः। शक्यं अव्याहस्य विप्रमार्गम्।

अनर्घवाचानसंशयविपर्यवस्तु च कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानःनववधेयवचनतया

१, अयमध्वसाय एव च प्रत्यक्षमिति होप:। २, समानाधार्मिकेति।
ಅನುಮಾನದುಳ್ಳಕ್ಷಣಮೂ

(25) ಅನುಮಾನಸ್ಥ ಸಾಮಾಜಿಕಲಕ್ಷಣಮೂ

(26) ಅನುಮಾನಸ್ಥ ಧೂಮನುಮಾನಮಾಧ್ಯಯತ್

(27) ವಿಧಾಯಕ ವಿಧಮ, ವಿಧಾಯಕಸೂಕ್ಷಿಯು ಪ್ರವರ್ತಕರು ನಾಮೀ- ಕಮ್ವಿತು

(28) ಅವತಿತ್ರುಪ್ರಾರಂಭ

ವಿಧಾಯಕಾಯಂ ಪ್ರತಿತ್ರುಪ್ರಾರಂಭಾಯ ಅನುಮಾನಸ್ಥ ಪ್ರತಿತ್ರುಪ್ರಾರಂಭಾಯ

1. ಅಂಕೆನ ವಿಭಾಗಪ್ರಕಾರವಾಗಿ ಅನುಮಾನಸ್ಥ ವಿಧಿವಿಧಭಿತ್ತಿಯಾಗಿದೆ: 2. ಅಂಬಾಲ ರಾಜಾರ್ಥಾನು ನಂತರದ್ದೆಂದರೆ: "ಸಾಮಾನ್ಯತಿಯು ಗುಣವಾತ್ಯ. ಗುಣವಾತ್ಯ. ಯಾದಾದ್ದು ಅನುಮಾನಸ್ಥ ಪ್ರತಿತ್ರುಪ್ರಾರಂಭೆಯ ಮೂಲಕ "—ಇತಿ.
वीतनिरूपनम्।

वीतं वेदां-पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टि च। तत्रैवकम् दशःस्वल्पक्षणसामान्यविवेचं यत्त्वपूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दशःस्वल्पक्षणसामान्यमिति।

(३९) वीतनिरूपनम् यावच, तदस्य विषयचेतनान्वमानुरागान्वेति पूर्व-चतुर्विधम्॥ वथाम् धृमाभिहितसामान्यविवेचः पूर्वेतेनुमौते, तस्य वाहिन्यसामान्यविवेचस्य स्वल्पक्षणं वाहिन्यविवेचो दृष्टि रसवल्पमू। अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टि दशस्वल्पक्षणसामान्यविवेचम्। यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुस्मानम्। अत्र हि रूपानिविवेचानां

कियावेच करणवल्पमः यथा च। युक्तपि करणसामान्यस्य चिदालेन बायार्यः धृमाभिहितस्वल्पक्षणमुख्यम्, तथापि यज्ञात्यें रूपानिबाने करणवल्पमात्ये तजस्यात्यें तजस्य न दृष्टि स्वल्पक्षणं प्रायेक्ष्मानं। इन्द्रियात्यें हि तकरणम्,

न च देवतात्वसामान्यस्य स्वल्पक्षणमिद्धिविवेचः प्रायेक्ष्मानं चेतचरोर्वार्यस्याम्। वथा वाहितसामान्यन्त्री स्वल्पक्षणं वाहित:। सोच्य न पूर्ववत्: सामान्यतो दृष्टि स्वल्पक्षणं वाहितः। अत्र च दृष्टि दशृष्टि, सामान्यत इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वविकस्ततस्तिदः। अदशस्वल्पक्षणस्य सामान्यविवेचस्य दशृष्टि सामान्यतो दशमुनानाधिन्यथः। सर्वेन चैतद्वियसिंहवायवातिकात्यः

टेकायां व्युपालितमिति नैनोऽन्त्र स्वतन्त्रताः॥

प्रयोजकवृढःशब्दाङ्कणसमन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृढःप्रवृत्तिये:पुजानान्मानन्वेकालो-क्षण:।

(४०) शब्दाङ्कण-लक्षणम्॥

चछात्मासंवर्गप्रवृत्ति, स्वार्थम्बन्धानस्थकारे-

णश्च शाब्दस्याङ्कणप्रयोज्यवृढःशमानपूवक्षणमिति

नानान्तरं शाब्दः लक्षणयति: अत्रस्थ्रूतिरावचमः तु॥

होति। अत्रस्थ्रूतिनिदेशः। परिषिद्धं लक्षणम्। आसा प्रासा युक्तिसि यथवत्। आसा चासौ शृविक्षेत्रति आसथ्रूतिः। ॥ शृविक्षेत्: वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थ-अनानम्॥

तथ स्वतः: प्रमाणम्। अपौष्पेदवेदार्थानि विवेचारणः।

(४१) तथ स्वतः: विमुक्तं मयेन। एवं वेदेऽस्वरूप्यतितिहासपुराण: वाक्यजनितमपि नैनोऽन्त्र स्वत:॥

२०. दृष्टि स्वल्पक्षणं यथा सामान्यस्य-तत्त् सामान्यं विषयं यथेश्च विनाशः।
आदिविदुष्क्र कपिलस्य कल्पादृक कलपान्तराधीतःशुभितिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्रभुदंस्येव पूर्वे भुवनाथानामथर्थनामपरेऽहुः। तथा चाचात्त्वजगीश्वसंस्थाने भद्ररावनूँ जैगीविधीयो दशात्महाकपिलार्तिजनमस्मरणमात्रम् उवाच “दुःशयु महाकपिलेषु विपरिवर्तित्माणेन मया।” इत्यदिना प्रत्ययसन्दर्भेण।

आसमोहणेनायुक्तः: शाक्यशिनिन्त्रियकङ्कसंसारमोचकेदृश्यानामामाभासः।

(४२) आगमाभास-निरूपणम्

परिहिता भवन्ति। अयुक्तं चैत्यं विगानातु विशिष्टामानुलिथाय्याध्यात्मानादशक्तिदेवेन क्लेशर्यामिधि: पुरुषंपरा: परिमहाद्रो-वर्षम्।

‘तु’ शंबेदनानुमानायवचिंचनिति। वाक्यार्थं हिंचयेऽयो, न तु तद्भो।

(४४) आसमोहणेन-मानायवचिंचदः।

वाक्यम्, चेन तत्र हिंचां भवेत्। न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं बोधयत सम्बन्धायनमालयते, अभिनवविरचितस्य वाक्यस्यादिपूर्वस्यानुभूतचरायार्थोपधकत्वादिति।

1. अन्नार्मकेरतियुक्तः:—“कथं ‘तु’ शंबेदनानुमानायवचिंचद आत्मचनस्य-लक्ष्यं आहं—‘वाक्यार्थं हि’ इति। नन्दस्य तावदायार्थोऽप्रमेयं वचेत्। एताता कथमुनामायवचिंचदं: स्वातृं, शाब्दस्य तत्कारणलावत, यथा धूमस्य विज्ञेन लिङ्गं विविधत्वं तथा वाक्येन विज्ञेन शाब्दार्थविज्ञेनानां भवेदि त्वार्थात्कशिल्पात्।” न तु तद्भो। इति। धूमस्य विविधार्थविलावत तत्तत्त्वम्, न तु वाक्यं अर्थसम्बन्धम्, चेन तत्तत्त्वं वाक्यं स्थापित यवत्। नन्तु यथि धूमस्य विज्ञेन वाक्यबर्तयार्थविविधार्थविलावतः भाओ नाति, तथापि यथा धूमस्य सम्बन्धं अर्थायनमालयतेऽत्र तद्गमकं; तथा वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धायनमालये तद्गमकं अर्थं विमतिः इति चत्वारित्रात्।” न च ’ इति। अध्योतिकस्य वैलेनिन्त्रिय-सम्बन्धे साधिते पि शाब्दस्य वृद्धस्य वृद्धस्य वातावर्त्यार्थविविधार्थविलावतः, पदार्थाभिपक्षकं अर्थबर्तयार्थस्य सम्बन्धं अर्थायनमालयतेऽत्र विविधार्थ-स्मृतियो हि वाक्यार्थः।” इति। यदि वाक्यार्थार्थ शार्मानु श्यातूः तद्धि वाक्य-
(४५) शाखान्तरोकातः एवं प्रमाणसामान्यवल्क्षणं तद्विशेषवल्क्षणं च सत्तुः,
प्रमाणान्तराणासूचकः यथा प्रमाणान्तराणासूचकाद्वितीय विपरितविन्दुं
न्तिमाख्यः।

तथा हि-उपमान तावद्ध गौतसः गत्व इति वाच्यम्। तदाधीनानि धीराः-

(४६) उपमानस्य
शब्दे सनुमाने चान्त- माखं।

गम एव । योऽध्ययं गवयशाख्ते गोस्यद्वाय वाचकः
इति प्रत्ययः। सोऽध्ययं नुमानेः। यो हि शब्दे यथा
वृद्धे। प्रयुज्यते, सोऽध्यक्षति वृद्धते, तथा वाचकः,
यथा गोशाख्ते गोस्यस्य । प्रयुज्यते नैव गवयशाख्ते
गोस्यसे, इति तस्येव वाचकः, इति तत् शाखान्तराणासूचकः। यथा गवयस्य
चकः; सचिकुटकः गोस्यद्वायां तत्र प्रत्यक्षमेव। अतएव सम्भवतां
गवि, गवयाद्वायां प्रत्यक्षम् । न र्वन्यद्वायः शाखान्तराणासूचकः
गवये । भूयोद्वायवसामान्ययोगो हि जात्यन्तराणां जात्यन्तरे साध्यमुच्यते । सामान्य-
योगश्रृङ्खः। स चैव व वाचकः, गवयको प्रयुज्यते नोपमानस्य
प्रमेयान्तराणासूचकः, यथा प्रमाणान्तराणासूचकां भवेत् । इति न प्रमाणान्तराणासूचकम्।

वाक्यार्थार्थार्थवाक्यार्थपकसमबोधोपकथितः स्वातः। न च तथा। तथाहि वाक्यार्थे
प्रमाण वाक्यार्थः प्रमेयः। एवं च वाक्य वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मां न भवति-यथा भवति
पृथूः वेदार्थस्यः। अतो वाक्य वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगाः न भवतीयास्यः।

शाब्दज्ञानं चेतनुमानेनत्वार्थं तथा मते-यथा व्यासितानपुरुषकमनुमाने
तथैव शाब्दाचराचराचर्णानुवृत्तं शाब्दे ज्ञानम्। तत्र चेतनमुनानसेवस्य-यथा यथा
पहायते तत्र तत्र गवयाद्वायने बोधते-यथा मम बाल्यपञ्चां-गुनुभिन्नतोत्पन्नः-अरुमानती प्रमाणान्तराणासूचकः। न च वाक्यमित्वाद
दिना। व्याक्यार्थपकसमवर्तान विनासुमाने नैव प्रसरति। शाब्दज्ञानं चेतन-विशारांध्रः समवदानपुरुषां न सार्यत्वमार्फ्पम-अभिविचारादिकताः। वाक्यसा-
शुतपूर्वतःतत्ता तात्त्वाचराचर्णामहस्यांमभवः। तथा च सति पूर्वपक्षादिति तात्त्वेव।
प्रमाणपत्रिपि न प्रमाणन्तरस्। तथा हि-चतुर्थेऽऽस्मि गृहाभाववर्ष्णेन
बहिभावस्याद्विषयस्य खण्डनप्रमाणपत्रिपिरः यदृच्छे
नासि स्वयंतु मानमेव। यदृच्छे खल्वेयपकः स्वेषकाढ़ा
नासि तथा स्वयंतु प्राप्ततः। यदृच्छे खल्वेयपकः एकत्रारित तथा
स्वयंत्र नासीति सूक्ष्मः स्वतःसिद्धः। तथा च सतो गृहाभाववर्ष्णेन
हिङ्गेन बहिभावस्याद्विषयस्य मानमेव। न च चतुर्थेऽऽस्मि
शाख्योपप्रहातुम्, चेतानिः गृहाभावो बहिभावान्न हेतुः स्यात्। न च
गृहाभावो वा स्वयंत्रप्रहातुम्, चेतानिः स्वयंत्रप्रहातुम् मानमानान्न न
बहिभावस्याद्विषयस्य गृहाभावः। तथा हि-चतुर्थेऽऽस्मि
गृहाभाववर्ष्णेन स्वयंत्रात्मानः विख्रीत्ते, गृहस्वत्वः वा ?
न तावधात्र चतुर्थेऽऽस्मि स्वयंत्रात्माः विख्रीत्ते गृहस्वत्वेन,
भिस्मविभावः। “देशसामान्येनः” गृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिः पाक्षिक
इति समानविषयतया विरोधः” इति
चेतः च, न, प्रमाणविनिररित्स्य गृहे स्वस्वत्वः पाक्षिकतः, सांशाधिकेन गृहस्वत्वेन
प्रतिष्क्रियायोगात्। नापि प्रमाणविनिरक्तात् गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य
गृहस्वत्वे प्रतिष्क्रियानुस्य स्वत्मापि प्रतिश्चेषष्ठु सांशाधिकां च चिन्तेनमहेतीत्तीति
स्वयंस्।

१। “देशसामान्यविप्रमाणप्रविष्क्रियेशोषर्मामाय समानविषयतया विरोधः इति
इति शास्के।” इति राजवान्नदे। सत्वा हि गृहविशेषाधारणतया समानविप्रनत्ते विरोधगृहस्वत्वेन
विद्वद्विस्मिति शाधकश्रद्धेः। कविचिहः तित्र नेन खलविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिनाविभावः
गृहाभावोपप्रहातुम् बाध्यते, गृहयापि कविचिहेदन्तिमानात्, अतएव गृहस्वत्वेन विरोध
इति द्वायम्।

“देशसामान्येनेन्” समानस्य साधारणपरम्परात् तज्जनस्ता संसारहेतुतया
उच्चस्वरूपः शास्त्रेऽपल्लव्योरः गृहविशेषाधारणेऽपयोगतसः िमे चेते संस्कृते
गृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिनारकशास्त्रया गृहाभावशास्त्रीयोपकोमतया गृहाभावशास्त्रीयोपकोमतान्ने
न समयमाशयोषष्ठिनायाः। शास्के यतीत “देशसामान्ये” “देशसामान्येनेन, “
गृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिः” गृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिनायाः, “पाक्षिकः” संसारविभावः, “समानविप्रयाब
तया” गृहाभावप्रतिष्क्रियागृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठितया, “विरोधः” एकस्ये स्वयमः
संस्कृतिमः।

“प्रमाणेतिः” प्रतिष्क्रियागृहविशेषाश्चेषष्ठिनारकशास्त्रीयोपकोमतान्ने
संस्कृतियाः न विरोधित्तेयोषष्ठिनिः, अध्यायंस्कृतियमः।
अभावसम्भवोऽयोऽत् प्रत्यक्षानुमानस्मरणमभवः।

गृहाचिन्नशेषेन चेत्राभवेन गृहस्वं विरुद्धवात् प्रतिशक्षित्यते, न तु सचि-
मानसम् तस्य तत्रीदासीन्यात् । तस्माद्गृहाभवेन लिङ्क प्रदेण सतो बहि-
मायोदुभायाय दत्त्व सुकम् । पुत्रेनं विरुद्धम् प्रमाणार्थविपश्यवस्थया-
दिविरोधापनमार्थपूर्णमिति हि निरस्तम् । सवचिच्छानविच्छयोऽविरोधापा-
भावात् । उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्येपतेर्वेधवेचानुमानेष्ट्तम्भाववीचायि ।
तस्मात्प्राणानुमानस्मरणस्मरणान्तरमयैः परिशिष्टसम्यकोऽति सिद्धम् ॥

एववा भाववेष्टपि प्रवश्चेव। न दि सुत्तवश्च परिशिष्टविशेषात् कैव्याः-
क्षणादन्त्रो घटाभावो नाम । प्रतिश्वानपरिशिष्टानिन्द्र हि
(४८) अभाववश्च सर्वं एक्षासाः कृते चित्रिताः । स च परिशिष्टम-
प्रयोजनान्तरमवा। मेहदे पृष्ट्वश्च और नसीत प्रत्यक्षानवश्च विपश्यो-
यक्राभवाद्येव प्रमाणान्तरमयैः सुपयोऽवेदेति ॥

सभवभुष्ट, यथा-खण्योऽदृशादकप्रशास्त्राधमग्व। स चानुमानमेव ।
(४९) सम्भवस्तरः खारीतः हि दृशादकप्रशास्त्रमेव प्रतीतस्त्र, खण्यो दृशान-
मासशेषान्तरमवा। दृशादकप्रशास्त्राधमग्व ॥

यथाचार्यार्दयप्रवक्तकं प्रवादार्थप्रवक्त्वात्मक्रम। ' हि त्रोयत्वर्णः ' - हस्येः-
तिभ्राम, यथा ' हि वचे यथः प्रतिवाद्वश्च इति, न तत् प्रमाणान्तरमबः अनिशिष्टवश्च वक्तकेत्ये सांख्य-
प्रमाणवामावः ॥ आत्मवश्च वक्तान्ये तथागम पुरं ।
(५०) यश्च इत्युत्पत्तम " चर्चित्रादमाणम् " इति ॥ ५॥

एवं तदाच्यात्त्वक्षुकतः क्षणप्रश्नमेवसिद्धार्थ प्रमाणानि यक्ष्यितानि । तच्च व्यक्तं
प्राप्तिविश्वादमयं स्वरूपः पार्श्वपदाद्वो हालिकोस्तिपि प्रश्न-
(५१) प्रमाणानग प्रतिपद्धते, पूर्ववतं चानुमानेन गृहाविक्षणार्थं
शक्तिनिरीक्षः ॥ वहुवर्तीन चेत् तद्वभुदानाय मन्द्रप्रयोजनं
शास्त्रम् इति दुर्युपमनायेन शुभोपाधम । तच्च व्या-
प्रमाणं यथं शास्त्रम् तदुपकल्पक्षेमं प्रमाणेर्थ्यं निष्कृत्वं दर्श्यति--

१. पूष्टिधर्मश्रवणं हल्लाही, प्राम्यजनं इति यावत् ॥
सामान्यतः द्यादृश्यान्तरितता प्रतीति: ।
तत्समाद्विधि चासिदं परोक्षमात्मागामात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

“सामान्यत” हि “तु” सब्रः प्रायश्चितोपयोगो विचिनिन्दि। सामान्यत: प्रतीतिः—चित्रितं चायपतिः—धृष्टान्तस्य दृष्ट्यः।
उपलब्ध्यः चैतन्यः, शोभविद्याय पद्ध्यः ॥

तथास्वच्छविद्यस्य सामान्यतो द्यादृश्य प्रवृत्तते ॥ तथा च येष तत्त्वतसितः
महादार्शस्येव स्वयम्भूपद्वेद्वादि च, तत्र तेषांमभावः प्रायश्चित्य आह— “तत्समाद्विधि” हि
तत्समाद्विधेतावतेव सिद्धं च, कारेण शोभविद्याय पद्ध्याय समुचितम् ॥ ६ ॥

स्वादेपतः, यथा गणेनकृषिमूर्तमेत्राश्वशाब्धविवाहान्ति दृश्यक्षमप्रवृत्तमात्
(५६) प्रायश्चित्यानात्, तदभावमरमणम्, पद्धु प्रधानादिरिहिः । तत्काल
प्रधानाद्वीरान्तम्भवान्तः || तेषां सामान्यते द्यादृश्य: सिद्धिरिहित आह—
अतिदूरात् सामिष्यात् इन्द्रिययातान्तत्पन्नवहातान् ||
सौद्ध्यायवहातान् अभिभावते समानाभिन्नाराष ल। ॥ ७ ॥

१. यथा कौमुदीह्व तथैव सारिका व्याख्या गौड़पदेशनाथ जयमंजरायम् ॥
इदमपरम्परा व्याख्यानमुप्लब्ध्येति चन्द्रकायायम्—‘सामान्यत’ साधरणस्य वस्तु
जातस्य प्रतीति: ‘द्यादृश्य’ प्रख्यातान्तु मभवति ‘अतिदूरात्य’ प्रतीतिः—‘अनुमानात्’
भवति—‘तत्समादृश्य’ अनुमानात् अपि केन्द्रम पदार्थां: प्रवेदेतु न शक्यः—तेषां
प्रतीतितत्त्व ‘आसागमात्’ सिद्धतिः—हि ॥
त. कौ. २
१८  

प्रधानान्धप्रलयो हैततः।

“अतिबूढ़ात्” हृति। अनुपस्थितिरिव वच्यमाणं सिद्धव्यक्तकारणन्वये (५५) तत्त्विनात्। नायूपनवन्यम्। यथा उत्पत्ति विषयति पतारिञ्च अतिदूर-अतिउपातितात्मिक्। तथा, सत्पित्र, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपरित्येते। सामीप्यार्थ्यात्-व्येदेश्वरातन्त्रो-प्रत्यक्षुगुणवल्लिन््, यथा लोकन्यात्मकात्मकात्मक्षाः 

ज्ञानाध्यायो द्वयो एव। इन्द्रियवाच्यातोऽन्वयव्यवस्थितवादि। “मनोयन-क्षमायुक्तानुभावम्। विश्वातां,” यथा कामार्पणनात: वस्त्रिलोकमध्य-भवस्मानुभावम्। वार्तिस्मित्विन्दुवल्लिक्षूमयः न पद्धति। “सौथन्यात्,” हरिश्यः प्रवक्ता-व्येदेश्वरायुक्तस्य परमाणवादिप्रणितित्वाः अपि न भावः।। पद्धति। “व्यवधानात्,” यथा कुल-विद्यवाच्यवाहिं राजादनादि न पद्धति। “अभिभवानात्,” यथाद्विति सौरीमित्रोपपरिभ-भूतं प्राणक्रमणमेतकं न पद्धति। “समाधिभवानात्,” यथा तोरू-विसुल्कातुदविन्दूरू जनाशये न पद्धति।।

“च” कारोजलसुलब्धायः। तेनामुद्वृवपि संगृहीतः। तथात (५६) अनुदर्वादपि श्रीराधवस्थायाः द्विव्यासिन्द्रवाव न पद्धति।।

प्रवक्ताद्भवितः।।

पुत्रादिक्षेत्रिव | न प्रत्यक्षभूतालोकास्वभावो भवित, असिस्स्तुकतः।

(५७) प्रवक्तानिवितः- तथा हि गृहादिहिनों गृहजनमपथवस्तुभावं

वेद नाभावस्य कारणम्। विनिविन्दु यमात्। न वेदवस्य। अपि तु योगप्रवक्ता-

निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दुवस्य निविन्दु यमात्। न च प्रधानपुरुषात्रात- 

द्राक्षनिविन्दुयो युकः: प्रामाणिकानासृति।।

कथमपुरुषेऽथु सर्वं प्रधानान्धराजिस्मिनानुभावित भाषा—

सौंदर्यात्सुकप्रतिविन्द्राभावान्, कार्यंसुकप्रतिविन्द्राभावान्।

महादिदि तथा कार्यं प्रत्यक्षितस्तुप्रयुप्ति च।।

१। यथा सिंहः पुरुषो गृहात् पर्यति तथाये प्रभमपद्यस्य यत्र प्राग्यताथात्रेति।

स्थानपुराणस्य न्यायस्य प्रामाणिकायादिकस्मात्र्य-न्यायसाधितपितायां द्वार्यम्।।

[ सां. त. ]
“सौङ्ग्यादृ” हृति। अथाभावादेव सभमसरसवदैवे वामुमपुविद्धः कस्माय  
भवतीत्यत अह— " नाभावादृ " हृति। कः ?

(५८) प्रधानानुप-  
कार्यसतसपुलुकवे। हृति। ‘तत्’ हृति प्रधाना परा-  
लव्यौ शौक्यमू कार-  
णम्।  
पुरुषोपलुब्ध तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति “ सज्जा- 
तपरायणवाद् ” (कारिका १७) हृति। इत्यत्रप्रमाणानाम-  
वधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमपत्तमानमयोऽर्थवाच्च प्रवर्त्ते  
हृति कर्ण्यते। समस्तसु रसो न प्रमाणोनवधारित हृति न तथा प्रत्यक्षस्वा- 
बोध्यता शाख्याद्विधवसित्तुमयित्वाभिवायः।  ||

किम पुनस्तत्कार्य यतः प्रधानानुमाननियत अह— "महाराजः तद्भ कार्यंस्”  
हृति। पुनः यथा गमङ्कमू तथोपरिश्रवीणायते।

(५९) प्रधानानिति-  
तत्स्य च कार्य्यविवेक्षानोपयोगिनी सारहन्यवैति  
बाह्र— " प्रकृतिसरसूप विहृतृं च " हृति। एवे  
हृति तृप्ति दिक्षितमाहणिये हृति। १८  ||

कार्यात् कारणमां मम्ये। सति चात्र वादिना विभृत्तित्वत्:। तथा हि  
केविद्धाः। ‘ असतः सतृ जायते ’ हृति, ‘ एकस्य  
(६०) कार्यकारणस-  
सतो विवर्तः कार्यंजातं न वस्तु सतृ ‘ कित्यपरे, अन्त्ये  
मध्ये वार्तिप्रति-  
तु ‘ सतः असतृ जायते ’ हृति, ‘ सतः सतृ जायते’  
पत्यः। ॥

हृति वुःबा:।

तत्र पूर्वसमि कल्पं ग्राहये। न संध्यति। सुखदुःसमोहवस्त्रबुप्त-  
परियन्तरस्त्रिुद्धारामभक्ती हि जगन्तु कारणद्वय प्रधानश्च  
(६१) सल्कार्यप्रक्षः  
प्रधानत्वं सबस्त्रजस्तमस्त्वम्भवस्तवत्वमयि। वयधि  
एव प्रधानानितिसङ्क्रायक:।। पुनस्तत्व: सजाये मुदिष्ट्रिपण्यं कारणं सुखदिरूप- 
शव्याधारामभक्तं कथं स्थायसं, सदस्तोत्स्तव्यावृत्तुप-  
पसे:। श्रयेतयब्धव ततो विवर्ते: शाहद्रिप्रप्रम्व-  
तथापि सतः सजायत  
हृति न स्थाय।। न चाश्चाव्रयवस्त्र प्रपन्थालम्कर्त्वम्, अपि तवप्रपन्थवब  
प्रम्पामकात्याः प्रतितिः कथं एव। येषामपि कणमश्चार्यवस्त्रराजयां सतं एव  
कारणाधिेजे ज्ञे मे प्रारम्भवे सदस्तोरेकास्त्रूपसादन्ते कार्याय वानस्मिति  
ज तमसे प्रधानसिद्धः।
सत्कार्यपञ्चक्रिंदकपञ्चकाण्य निरासः [ सृ. त. ]

(६२)
सत्कार्यप्रति अतः प्रधानसिद्धार्थन धर्मम् तावस्तकार्यं प्रतिपादनम् ||
असद्वकारणादपादानमहणात् सवर्षसंभवाभावान् ||
शक्तिः शक्तिकरणात् कारणभावाशः सतू कार्यम् || ९ ||
“असद्वकारणात्” हृतः। “सतू कार्यम्”-कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति शेषः। तथा च न सिद्धार्थम् शैवार्थात् येतुभा।
(६३)
बौद्धसिद्धान्त- वनीयम् यथपि बीजाध्यिपिण्डामिद्राहंसाम्वर-मनः।
कृत्यंगतःयत्पि स्थलविके। तथापि न प्रत्येकस्य कारणकाम। अनि तु भावस्वेच्छ बीजाध्ववच्यस्।
भावाभावः भावोऽश्चैः। तस्य सचिन्द सुलभत्वात् सवर्षा। सवर्षा। सवर्षकार्योऽपदप्रसः
हृदादि न्यायचार्यकार्यतंतयार्टीकायः। सवर्षाभावः प्रतिपादितम् ||
(६४) वेदान्तमत- प्रपन्धव्यवस्थासाति वाक्येन न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदि-
निरासः। तथा च हृतम् ||
कणमक्राशक्रणमतमविशिष्यते। तत्कथे प्रतिज्ञानम्। “सतू कार्यम्”
हृतम्। अथ हेतुमाह “असद्वकारणात्” हृतम्। अभस्तू
(६५) न्यायमतनिराः। चेतु कारणव्यापारात् पूर्व कार्यम् नास्य सशवं कर्तृ
असत्। कारणयोग्यवाताः। केनापि शक्तिः न च नीः शिवसंवहंसाणापि पीतं
सतू कार्यमथपि प्रथमोऽपि कर्तृ शक्यते। ‘सदसंस्वे घटस्वे धर्मम्’ हृतम् चेतु तथा-
हेतुः। (१) || व्यवस्थान्तर धर्मिजीन न तस्य धर्मं हृतम्। सत्रेष्ठ तदवस्थमेव।
तथा च नास्त्रचम् असम्बदेनातदाम्ना। वाचस्वेवन
कथमसनूऽ घटः। तस्मात्। कारणव्यापाराद्वधीविचः तत्। प्रागपी सदैव कार्य-
मिति। कारणवधावः सतोसभिव्यक्तिरेवावाचिष्ठ्ये। सतध्वाभिव्यक्तिक्रिया.transl.,
वधाना भीडनेन तत्बुऽत्तैत्कायवधानेन धान्येषु तत्त्वुऽवत् होनेन सारभेदीषु।

१. धर्मिनि (घटे) नास्त्रचम् (घटस्वे धर्मम्) || “असत्रेष्ठ घटे संबंधं
तदात्ममात्र भवति न च यो। अन्ते अंसात्रमक्षे घटस्वे असत्रेष्ठ धर्मम् न यस्तू।
वश्चर्वोऽद्वादमहस्य घटसंपेश्वात् तस्य स्त्रेष्ठ घटस्य भेदवित्त सत्रेष्ठ तदवस्थमेव।
द्वितीयं भावाय–‘असम्बदेन’ हृति। तस्याचेतस्युपगम्यमाने। तिश्रुपजः
स्वदिशिशाय्यारपि सत्रेष्ठ घटस्येति।” भारतीयवादयेः ||
पयसः | असतः करणेः तु न निदर्शिणं किमिचिद्रितः | न खल्वभिन्नवस्थामां चौपय्यारां वा कनिष्ठस्वाव्यक्तः प्रक्ते।

इत्यत् कारणव्यापारात् सृष्टि सदेव कार्यम्—“उपायः रमण्याः”।

(६६) कार्यकारणं— संबन्धाचार साक्षर्वमिति द्वितीयो हेतुः (२)।

उपायानि कारणाति, तेषां भ्रान्तं, कार्येण सम्बन्धं।

भवति—कार्यें सम्बंधं कार्यायु कार्यस्य जनकम्,

सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यास्तो न सम्बन्धं, तस्मादभवति।

स्थायेतस्तु—अस्वार्यनिमेण कार्यं कारणं: कस्माहा जन्यते? तथा चाल्मेवोपरस्य ह्रूपं आहं—“सर्वसंभवाभावाः” हृति।

अस्वार्यत्वं जन्यवर्गः, अस्वार्यानिमेच्छिण सर्वं कार्यजातं सर्वसंभावेन। न चैत्यदिति, तस्मादाः—

सम्बः सम्बलुकः जन्यते क्षण तु सम्बं सम्बलुकेन।

जन्यत हृति। यथाहुः साहृयवृहुः—

“अस्वच्छ नासित सम्बन्धं कारणं: सच्चवस्त्रमिश्रिति।

अस्वार्यस्य चोरपुष्पितिमिच्छितो न व्यवस्त्रिति:” हृति।

स्थायेतस्तु—अस्वार्यनिमेण सत्तु सदेव करोऽति यदय सदः कारणं शक्तम।

शक्तिः कार्ययुक्तवायकमते। तेन नाभेद्वेश्वरः

(६८) कारणः: ‘आहं “शत्रुत्वं शाक्यकर्णात्” हृति। सा शक्ति: शक्—

कार्यपरावर्तकं सकार्यम् कारणश्रया सश्रवः वा स्यात्, शक्येऽपूव वा ङ्सवः

(३)॥

चेत्तावशेषवैवाच्छवस्त्र, शक्याः चेत्त, कथसमति शक्येः

तथा, हृति वक्ष्यम्। शाक्तिः पुर्त्त्वादशो यतः

किमिचिद्रेष्टकार्यं जन्येत्व न सर्वसम्बंधिते चेते, हृतं भोः शाक्तिविशेषः कार्ये—

सम्बंधेऽवाससो सृष्टिः नासताः सम्बन्धः हृति सदः कार्यम्।

अस्वार्यस्य सैवाच्छवस्त्र, हृति सुदृढः “शक्त्र्तु हक्क्यकर्णात्” हृति॥

इत्यत् सदैव कारणमय्याः—“कारणभावाच्।” कार्यस्य कारणातमः

(६९) कारणयुक्तवात् कस्माः। नहि कारणादिभिः कार्यम्, कारण च

कार्यस्य सदैव कार्यम् (४)॥ सदैव, हृति कथतं तदभिः कार्यसत्तः मैथेवेत्।

१. पञ्चविशालदयः।
कार्यकारणेद्वसाधनम्

कार्यस्य कारणां द्वसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१) न पद्सतन्तुमयो भिष्मे, तन्तुपायेन राष्ट्रवान्। इह यत् यतो भिष्मे तदुत्त पद्सतन्तुमयो तस्माद् न भवति, यथा गौरवस्य। यत्र महेश्वरस्य तस्माद् न भवति। (७०) कार्यकारणं

(२) उपादानोपादेशभाववाच नाथान्तरवं तन्तुपायेन ययो भिष्मवान्तरवं न यत्योढ़ा। व्रजोपाधेशभाववाच, यथा भिष्मवाच। उपादानोपादेशभाववाच तन्तुपायेन ययो भिष्मवान्तरवं

(३) इह यत् नाथान्तरवं तन्तुपायेन, संयोगार्थम्भाववाच। यत्र नाथान्तरवं हि संयोगे दृष्टे यथा कुद्धड्डे यथा, भण्मार्थिययो यथा हिमचलेन्यूष्यो। न चेह संयोगार्थशी, तस्माद्यात्मान्तरवं नैसिद्धतिः। (४)

इह यथ। वस्मातिः ततु तस्मात् तस्मातृ गुरुवान्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। इह यथ। वस्मातन्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। वर्धकार्यस्य नाथान्तरवं तस्मातृ गुरुवान्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्।

(५) इह यथ। वस्मातस्तिन्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। तस्मातृ गुरुवान्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। तस्मादभविष्यत्वमकथा: पर्ये इति। तान्त्रेयान्तर्वावधानानाथीका।

एवमेवेदे सिद्धे, तन्तव पव तेन तेन संप्राणमेवेदेन परिणाताः पत्रो, न तन्तुपायेन नैसिद्धतिः।

(७१) कार्यकारणं ष्ठुडिष्ठेर्वपेदेशयाधिकारे नैसिद्धतिः। वेदान्तान्तरवं कारणरिच्छायामेवेदान्तान्तरवं सत्प्रयो, नैसिद्धतिः।

सत्यांत्रवं कार्यमेवेदान्तान्तरवं यशों विद्यानयाया राजेव इति।

वस्मातन्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्, वस्मातन्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। तस्मातृ गुरुवान्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्। तस्मादभविष्यत्वमकथा: पर्ये इति। तान्त्रेयान्तर्वावधानानाथीका।

एवमेवेद सिद्धे, सुवर्णाय वा गरुडुकुर्नेन वायव्य वायव्य, निविष्यवानान्तरत्ते विनिष्यवानान्तरत्ते। न पुनरसतामुपाययायां तत्तां ब्रह्मक्रियारुपस्य नेत्रां निरोधः।

ब्रह्मां भवानां कृत्यानुपाय:—

१) व्यतिरेकानुमाणानि। २) स्वाम्नि उपविवद्वाशलश्चाबिभिन्नेभ्रम्य। इह तन्तुस्य पर्ये इति। अन तन्तुपायेन वस्मातन्तरकार्यमहिमाणात्।

व्यपेदे: प्रावरणांक्रियाभेदं दश।
কারণঘাটায়াপারায়ণন্যক্ত।

"নাসতো বিষতে ভাবঞা নামাদো বিষতে সত।" ইতি। (ভগবানে, ২২১৬)

যথা কুম্ভ: স্বাভবম্ব: সঙ্ক্রকলিকালিঃ ন ভিষঃ, এবং ঘটসুক্তাদীষ্ঠিণি সুসুনির্দিশ্যো ন ভিষাঃ। এবং তন্তু পত্তি ইতি স্থপাতি, যদেহ বহে তত্ত্বকা। ইহুয়পত্তি: ন চার্য্যেহিয়ামেদদীয়িপি সুদুম্পাত্যতি, একস্তাথি নানাধিক্যাদীষ্ঠানাদৃতি, যথেক এব বহিদীষ্ঠাতি পাচক: প্রিয়াকাপ্রযোজিতি।

যথা প্রস্তয়েই বিষ্যঞ্চ বলম্বন্তাভজ্ঞায়িনি কুর্বন্নি, ন তু শিবকায়ঞ্চনাজ।

মিলিতাত্ত্ব শিবিকায়ঞ্চ হানিন্ত, এবং তন্তুব: প্রস্তয়েক প্রাথ্যায়ানকূর্বনাডি অপি মিলিতা আধিপুরুষপত্তানা: প্রাচর্যায়ন্ত।

স্বস্ততেতন—আইইশাবেঃ পত্তলি কারণঘাটায়াপারায়ণন্যক্তাঃ প্রাক্ক সন্ন অসন্ন যা।

অস্বস্ততে প্রাচ তন্তু পত্তলি পত্তানায়ন্ত। অথ চন্ত, তত্ত্ব তাহঃ কারণঘাটায়াপারায়ণন্যক্তাঃ।

(৭২) কার্য্যঞ্চ কারণঘাটায় ইতি সতি কারণঘাটায়াপারায়ণন্যক্তাঃ পত্তলি। ইতি আধিপুরুষে পত্তানায়।

মেবমাণ অথায়পত্ততঃ ইতি মেতে৷ কেথমহাত্তপত্তি: ? তন্ত, অস্ততি (৭৩) তত্ত্বকায়। উক্তভাবে। তন্ত কারণঘাটায়াপারায়ণন্যক্তাঃ।

(৭৪) পত্তলি পত্তলি ধাতুলেখকায়। তত্ত্ব ইতি পত্ত ইতি তত্ত্ব ইতি পত্তলি ইতি শল্যতাত।

শ্বসচীতি বিনিঃজামন্তি ইতি। উত্তপ্ততে ইতি ইতি। তত্ত্ব ইতি পত্তলি ইতি।

১. তিলককৃত্তম্যমেবত্তমিত্তোষ্ঠিতা ইতি ইতি কৃজিত্তে তথা তন্তুরম্যপত্তেটবময়তি।

২. এবং চ শল্যতাতলেক্ষনেতীতোপ্তনিঃ পিনান এব পাষ্টভূমি।

৩. উক্তানি বিন্দুতলেক্ষনেপিতিপত্তলেক্ষনে শল্যতাত।
(७५) पञ्चव्याचारेन च पञ्चनिर्वाचारेन च, तद्विन्यासंनित तीर्थादिर्गुणसञ्चारः।

(७६) कारिकोपसंहारः।

तस्मादिवं तत्त्वत्वत् पञ्चयानिर्वचनं च, तद्विन्यासंनित तीर्थादिर्गुणसञ्चारः।

१. पञ्चव्याचारेन च, पञ्चनिर्वाचारेन च, तद्विन्यासंनित तीर्थादिर्गुणसञ्चारः। तस्मादिवं तत्त्वत्वत् पञ्चयानिर्वचनं च, तद्विन्यासंनित तीर्थादिर्गुणसञ्चारः। तस्मादिवं तत्त्वत्वत् पञ्चयानिर्वचनं च, तद्विन्यासंनित तीर्थादिर्गुणसञ्चारः।
(७७) भवताभ्यक- सारावैयुण्यं तदात्मादश्रिष्ठितं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी भवताभ्यक-
सारावैयुण्यं ततावदाह—
हेतुमद्विनिमयवापि सक्रियमनेकमाधिरितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयनं परतनं व्यक्तं, विपरितमन्वयकम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) भवतानं सारावैयुण्यं । तत्र हेतुमद्विनिमयवापि ॥ (१)
(७९) अनिवलयकम् ॥ (२)
“शक्तितय, ” विनाशि, तिरोभावित् यावत् ॥

“शक्तिपी”, सवं परीणामं न व्यावहितं । कारणेन धि कार्यसाधनम्,
(८०) अवश्यैते- न कारणं कारणम् । न च बुद्धवादयं। प्रवानं वेदव-
त्वम् ॥ (३)
“सक्रियम्”, परिस्परन्वचत् । यथा धि बुद्धवादयं: उपातमयुपाते देहं
(८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४)
शरीरभ्रमावत्रानां च परिस्परन्: मन्दिर एव ।

“अनेकम्”, प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्धवादीनां भेदात् पुष्पकथापि शरीरचद्धाना-
(८२) अनेकलयम् ॥ (५) दिमेदेनानुष्टयैं ॥
“शाक्तितय”, सवकारणांमधिरितम् । बुद्धवादित्वानामेवेदपि कथ-
(८३) आभिनिवयाक्षरयीश्वराश्रिविभयाध्वये । यथेह वने तिलकात्वम् ॥ (६)
“लिङ्गम्” प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्धवादय प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तथो-
(८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) परिस्परावक्षतिः । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम्
पुरुषक्रम लिङ्गभवद्वपपित्तिः भाव: ॥

१. ‘सक्रियम्’ अध्यवसायादिरुपनियतिकारित्वयमिति माणये । २.
अथवा सर्गत्वेदन भिन्नम् । ३. ‘लिङ्गम्’ अनुमाननेन बोधनार ज्ञापयतीति
लिङ्गम्।
"सावयम्" अवयवावयविवसंयोगसंयोगिः। अथ वा अवयवनम् अवयवः
अवयवानवायविवना सिद्धः संक्षेपः मिथ्रमणु संयोगः
(85) सावयवनम्

सह वर्तत्व इति सावयवम्। तथाहि युद्धवादः
परस्परं संयुक्तं तद्वचनं, एवमन्वेदि। न तु प्रधानस्य
बुद्धरात्रिभि: संयोगः। तात्त्विकात्। नापि सत्तरजस्तससि परस्परं संयोगः।
अपरांगेरभावात्।

"परतन्त्रम्" बुद्धरात्रि। बुद्धाय स्वकार्येनह्रो जनयित्यथे प्रकृतया
पूरोपेद्यते, अन्यथा कौशलं सति नाभुर्मह्रोः
(86) परतन्त्रः
जनयित्युमिति स्थिति: | एवमह्रोरारिदिनिर्विश्वम्
लम् || (9) स्वकार्येण प्रतिया पूरमे
पेशते। तेन परं प्रकृतिमन्दिरमाणिं कारणमपि
स्वकार्येन परतन्त्रं स्वतः।

"विपरीतस्मायक्यम्"—व्यक्तकाल। अहेतुमण्डितं व्यापि निक्षिप्यम्,
(87) अवयवस्य [ यच्यायुक्तस्यान्ति परिणामालक्षणा क्रिया तथापि
वैपरीत्यम् || परस्परों नाशित || ] एकमनाप्रितमविधिमनवयवम्
स्वतंत्रमविक्यम् || 10 ||

(88) व्यक्तायुक्तोस्साधयमणि पुरुषाचार
तथोवेधयम् ||

तद्भन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्तायुक्तोऽवेधयमयुक्तम्, सम्प्रति
तयोः साधयम्, पुरुषाओ वैधयम्। आह-

त्रिगुणमविवेकविषय्: सामान्यमचेतनमप्रसववधमिः।
व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्था च पुमान्। ! 11 !

(89) त्रिगुणम् "त्रिगुणम्" इति। तयो गुणाः सुखदकृमोहा
प्रथमम् साधयम् ||
(90) तदनेन सुखादीनामायेन्द्रगुणवम्
परामितमपाक्तम्।

1. अवयवः + अन्तः। 2. नयापिकाचिदिकमतम्।
“अभिवेदिकः”। यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविध्यते, एवमहद्राव्योऽधिपि न प्रधानात् विविध्यते, तदासरस्तवात्। अथ चा
(९०) अभिवेदिक्षाम् सम्भूषयकरिताः सामाजिक्षात्। न हि किचिदेवं दक्षिणीमयम्। (२) पर्यासस् त्राकारं, अष्टि तु सम्भूष। तत्र नैकस्मार्ये वस्य कस्यचित्त, केनचित्सम्भव हृदि॥

७० तवाहुः—‘विज्ञानमेव हर्षचिपन्दक्षक्षणमध्याख्यातंकम्, न पुनरस्त्रौ
(९१) विद्यतमक्षु ‘विषयोऽ’ प्राद्यः, विज्ञानद्विन्द्रिति यावद्। अति
सामान्यतः च ततात्य-चतुः (३) (४) सामान्यवर्तमाना च साधारणम्, अनेके: पुरुषगृहीति
मित्यः। विज्ञानाकारभो तु, असाधारण्ययदिविज्ञानां
दृष्टिरूपाणां, तेष्वसाधारणं। स्तुः। विज्ञानं परमेण
न ग्रहिते परबुद्धप्रत्यक्षवियम्बित्संग्रायः। तथा च नस्तकी—भूलतांभें एकारः
सिमुः बहूः प्रतिस्थानां युक्तम्। अन्यथाः तत्र स्वात् हृदि भावः॥

(९२) अचेतनवर्तम् “अचेतनम्। सवं एव प्रधानबुद्धयाद्योऽचेतनः,
पञ्चमम्। (५) न तु वैनाशिक्षकः चैत्यस्वात्वज्जित्यः॥

“प्रसबर्षमिः”। प्रसबर्षो घर्मो च: सोडस्यास्तीति प्रसबर्षमिः। [प्रसब-
(९३) प्रसबर्षमित्रम् पर्यागंति बच्चये मत्स्ययः, प्रसबर्षस्वयं नित्योऽग-
पञ्चमम्। (६) मात्यादिम्]। स्वस्वात्वज्जित्यपरिनामां न कदाचिदाभि
विद्योऽस्य हृदि॥

(९४) उद्ययक्रमृः—व्यक्तक्रम्यकेवलित्वािति, “तथा प्रधानम्”
णामः। “तथा प्रधानम्”॥ हृदि। यथा व्यक्त तथास्वयम्यमित्यः।
(९५) व्यक्तक्रम्यः तावम् वैधयं पुरुषस्यास्य — “तद्विरिति
पुरुषात् वैधयं म्॥ पुरुषात्” हृदि॥

१. विज्ञानार्थम् बौद्धः। २. तेषां विज्ञानार्थारं। ३. निरुणसाधारम्य
व्यक्तक्रम्योरिति यावत्।
गुणस्वपनिरुपणम्

स्यावेद्वृ-अहेतुमच्चविनित्त्वादि प्रधानसाध्यम्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, पुरांनेकर्तवं व्यक्तसाध्यम्य, तत्कथयुक्ते 'तद्विपरीतः।
(९६) साध्यं च।। पुमान्। हितं अत आहं। "तथा च।" हितं।
चकारोपयथं।। यथपर्येहेतुमच्छविदं साध्यं, तत्त्वाव्यः, गुणावदि वेपरीत्यमस्येवत्थः।। ११।।

त्रिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तन्त्र के ते त्रयो गुणः, किं च तदुपक्षणमित्यत आहं।
(९७) गुणनिरुपणम्।।

प्रीत्यप्राप्तिविधातामकः प्रकाशप्रकृतिनित्तियमाथिः।
अन्योन्याभिभावावश्च यज्ञनित्तियम् गुणः।। १२।।
हितं। "गुणः।" [परार्थोः।] "सच्चं लघु गुणस्य।" [कारिका १३।
(९८) गुणांन्त्र स्वरूपं दृष्टिकोषेऽन्ते। तद्विपरीतात्वेष्णः तन्त्रावक्षणम् च।
पाणि, मुद्रां भयं। परावर्तिणां यथासंग्यं बेदित्वयम्।।
स्वरावरपता व्युदास्य।।

ऐतुतुकं भवति-प्रीति: सुभुम्, प्रीत्यावपमकः सत्कुणः, अप्रीतिनु:खम्, अप्रीत्यावपमको रजोगुणः, विषादो मोहः, विषादावपमको-
(९९) उत्तक्षणं स्तम्भुगुणः। इस्यर्थः। ये सु महत्तते 'न प्रीतिनुतु:खारावमयः।
वादतिरिच्चते एवं हुः प्राणयि न प्रीत्यावपमकोद्विती, "तानु प्रति। "आश्मं"-प्रहणम्। नेतासेराभावः।
शुखादयः। अपि तुन भवः। आश्मानुस्वरूप भाववचनत्वाद। प्रीति:
आश्मा भावो ये भावोऽते प्रीताभावः।। प्रामन्युपि व्याख्येयम्।। भावरूपता
चैत्यानुभवकद्रा। परप्रायावपमकवे तु परप्रायावपमकचरित्यस्यसिद्धे,
हिर्मयासिद्धिरिति भावः।।

१. च = अपि। २. आर्जवप्रदातीनां प्रीतावान्तभावः। द्रष्ट्योहिष्क्रियमभवादीनां चाप्रीति।
गुणानं क्रिया: । ॥

स्वरूपसमासुक्तवा प्रयोजनमाहे—“प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियममाहे:” हृति ॥।

(१००) गुणानां प्रयोजनम् यथासंस्कर्यं प्रकाश-प्रवृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥।

तमोनितवतन्तु कपिलेव्र प्रवत्तीति सबविति तसो नियमार्थवः ॥॥

प्रयोजनसुक्तवा क्रियामाहे—“अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्वयः” हृति ।

वृत्ति: क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिसमवध्यते ॥।

(१०१) गुणानां क्रिया: ‘अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्वयः’ । एवामण्यसमानार्थवशादु-अन्योन्याभिमान-अन्यो-द्वृत्तात्मायुबिमुः ॥।

तथा हि सच्छ रजस्तासासी न्यायेष-अन्यो-पराशासन- अभिभूष शाल्यावर्तमानेऽवृत्ति प्रतिज्ञकेति । एवं रजः सच्छ रजस्तासासी अभिभूष वोरामु, एवं तमः सच्छासी वृत्तिरुपा: ॥।

अभिभूष मूडामाति । ‘अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्वयः’ ।

यथाप्राघराघेयभावन नामयमो घटते, तथा द्विपद्येष्वा यस्य क्रिया स तस्तथाभ्रजः ॥।

तथा हि, सच्छ वृत्तिनियमावांशिल्य रजस्तासासी: प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशिनियमावांशिल्य प्रवत्तेतर्वयः; तमः प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रिय नियमनेतरयोरीरिति । ‘अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्वयः’ ।

अन्यतमो उस्तममपूर्व जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां सहस्राः । तथा एव न हेतुमच्छर, तत्वांतरस्तो हैतोरस्तिमभावः नाप्य- नियमच्छर, तत्वांतरे चत्याभावः । ‘अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्’ । अन्योन्या-सहस्राः, अविनाभाब्यचतवाभ्रजः हृति यावत् । ‘चः’ समुखः ॥ सबविति चात्मागमः—

“अन्योन्याभिमानवाभ्रजननमिन्दुभवत्” सबविति चात्मागमः ।

रजसो मिथुनं सच्छ सच्छस्य मिथुनं रजः ॥।

तमस्त्रापाय मिथुप्रै ते सच्छासी उभे ।

उभयोऽसच्छासीमिथुनं तम हन्यते ॥।

नैषामादि: सम्प्रयोगो बियोगो चोपरभ्यते” ॥। हृति देवी-भागवते-३।८। १२ ॥।
गुणज्योतिरस्त्रपणम् । [ शं. त. ]

“प्रकाशमन्यतिनियमार्यः” इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते इत्यभ्याटः कुलश्रेयत
( १०२ ) गुणज्योति-पणम्, तेषां शुभक्षणभावार्थः]

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमित्रसुपकर्ष्यभक्तं च रजः।
गुरु वरणक्मेव तस्मः, प्रदीपवचार्यस्तो वृत्तिः।। १३ ||

“सत्त्वम्” हृति। सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमित्रसुपकर्ष्यायाचायेः। तत्र
कार्योंमेव नेतृत्वमेव लाल्यम् गौरवप्रतिद्विन्दुः यतो
( १०३ ) सत्त्वः-लाल्यम्, विश्वविश्वविज्ञनं महति, तदेव लाल्यम् कर्मचित्तियर्भावः-लाल्यम्, प्रकाशः
गमने हेतुभवति, तथा वायोः। एवं करणानां वृत्तिः-शक्तम्।
पुरुषोपेक्षालोच्चाम्, गुरुवे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति
सत्त्वेय प्रकाशार्कमक्रमापकुमारम्।।

सत्त्वसमी स्वत्मसंक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रन्तिति प्रक्षणसुन्दरती रजसोपज्यते
अवसादात् प्रच्छण्य स्वकार्यों उद्साहं प्रयत्नं कार्यते।
( १०४ ) रजोगुणस्व-तदेदुक्मक-“उपस्थं रजः” हृति। कर्मासंभवः-उपस्थमकलम्,
विद्यतं उक्मक-“चलम्” हृति। तदनेन रजः
चल्मकः || प्रवृत्तिर्यतं दार्शितम्।।

रजस्तु चलत्या परित्येजः चाल्येत्, गुरुरासुखवच्चता च तमसा तत्र
( १०५ ) तमोगुणस्व-भावः-गुरुवम् आवर-कलम्।।
तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिनिधिवं नन्दादिव सद्व्यते हृति ततः
स्तोत्वा ध्यायत्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्—“गुरु
वरणक्मेव तस्मः” हृति। पुरवार: प्रत्येकं नियामकं
सम्बध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रजः एव, तम एवेति।।

नन्तु ‘एते परस्परविरोधवर्जीता गुणः: सुन्दरसुन्दरवत् परस्परं ध्वस्तं
इत्येव उक्मक, श्रीवेंद्र व्यवेशेष्मकर्मकार्याकरता’—इत्यत
( १०६ ) परस्परविरो-वहः—“प्रदीपवचार्यस्तो वृत्तिः” हृति। देशमें
द्रानामापि गुणानामाध्यं वैतत्त: तथा वातितेर्या अन्नम्यविरोधिनी, अथ स्थिती
बसातु सहवृत्तित्वम्।। सहानुसनुप्रकाशकल्प्तं कार्यं कुलत्; तथा च वात-विष्ठेलभाम्: परस्परविरोधिनिः शरीरधारणलक्षण-

१. अर्थविभाषकमिति यावत्। २. प्रकाशकल्प्तमिति यावत्। ३. दूर
एव। का कथा परस्परविश्वसनाम्यकीकरणकारिताया हृति भावः।।
कौ. १४ ] सत्त्वादिप्विवेकित्वांसमंवशाङ्क ।

कार्यकारिणः एवं सच्चरजस्तमांसि मिथोविवेकित्वांसन्तस्थानिति स्वकार्य करिष्यन्ति च। ‘‘ अर्थत’’ इति पुरुषार्थं इति यावत्, तथा च वक्ष्यति— ‘‘ पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुं संचारित कार्यं करणम्’’ इति। [ कारिका ३१ ]

चतुर्थं च सुखः समोहः परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वावृत्ताणि सुखः समोहः त्वाकार्येव निमित्तानि कल्याणं तेषां च परस्परः ( १०७ ) सुखुः समिभावविभावकभवतानाभ्यानतः। तथथा एकैव मोहान्त परस्परविरोधः। ख्री सूप्योक्तकु ष्टोऽऽोऽस्मात् स्वामिनं सुखारोति; तेषां निमित्तरुपेण गुणं तद्कस्य हेतुः। स्वामिनं प्रति तस्यः सुखरूपसुन्यस्या अस्वकस्यमप्रमृः। इव वातः। सैव ख्री सपतलीः खारोति, तत् कस्य हेतुः। तत् प्रति तस्यः। दुः सुखरूपसुम्रजवातः। एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्द्रान्तं सैव मोहति; तत् कस्य हेतुः। तम्मत्रत तस्यः। मोहरूपसुम्रजवातः। अथुत्त च ख्रीया सबे भावा व्याख्या।। तनं यत् दुःखेतुः तनं सुखामकम् सच्चम्, यत् हुःखेतुः तनं हुःखामकं रजः, यमोहेतुस्तन्मोहाः स्वम्। सुखरूपकाशालावताः। वेक्षितिनू युगपदः स्मृतविरोधः, सहदश्रानात। तत्सत्ता सुखः समोहः हृदिरिविर विरोधिविभिः। अविचारितभिः प्रकाशालावताः निमित्तभद्रा उत्तीचन्त। एवं हुः सुखरूपमकक्त्वप्रवर्त्तते। एवं मोहरूपमवर्त्तते—हतिम सिद्धं श्रेयुप्यमिति। || ११।।

स्यादेतत् अनुभूयमानेऽप पृथिवयादिप्रविवेकित्वांसम्विद्या। भवनविवेकिते ( १०८ ) अनुभवसि— त्वादयः। ये पुनः सत्त्वादियो नातुभवथमिरोहिन्तं हृपुः सत्त्वादिप्विवेकिते तेषां कृतस्यमिरोहितं तम, विपस्यविषमेततन्तरमू त्वादिगुणसमभवशाङ्क॥। प्रसवभिमित्वं च। इति भावः—

१। सच्चरजस्तमोपाणि। २। सच्चरजस्तमांसिव सुधः समोहः, सुखप्रकाशाला वातानापि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कर्माचौजानीलोकाः शह— ‘सुखेतर्त्’। ३। तथा सुधः समोहः परस्परविरोधः। भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सच्चरजस्तमोपाणि कल्याणं तथा सुखप्रकाशालावादीनामकैवमण्डः कृष्णद्विरोधसिद्धिः, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्याणं इति भावः। अविचारितानापि भिन्नानिमित्तकाले सन्नवशाः॥।
अन्यायसाधनानि ।

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिरेवाण्यात्त्रिपिष्यामावात ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्त्वात्यात्थ्यात्मणि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

“अविवेक्यादेः” हृदि । अविवेकिकव्रमविवेकी—यथा ‘वेकोर्द्विन्धचने—
करवचने’ [पाणिनिसूतः, १४२२] हृद्यत्र हिन्दौः
(१०६) तत्त्वतः—कत्वयोररिति अन्यथा वेकेरितित स्वातः। कतः पुनर्विग
ुण्ड्याविभविभिवकवृधाः—वेकित्रादेः सिद्धिरितित आह—“वैगुण्यात्” हृदि—। यथवत
नानव्यवस्थिते।। सुखद्विखमोहामकं तत्त्वविभविभिवकवृधायोगि यथेदमि—
महासूतः व्यक्तम्—हृदि स्नुतवादन्यो नोक्तः।
हृदि तत्त्वा करणाय भवाय भवाय। हृदि । अविवेक्यादिविभविये पुरुषे
ैैगुण्याभावात्। वथोऽव व्यक्तव्यव पश्चात्त्वात्यात्मवाववावावीत पुरुष
हेतुंत्वात्त्वादिविभवति वचन्यः।।

स्यादेवत्त—अव्यक्तसिद्धो सत्यात्वाविभविवयो यथाः सिद्धिन्ति ।
अव्यक्तकेव व्यवहारपि न सिद्धिन्ति, तत्कथमविवेकितां—
(१०६) अव्यक्तस्य दिसिद्दित्र आह—“कारणगुणात्मकस्वात्” हृदि ।
चन्मुः।। अयमभिषिभध्याः—कार्य हि कारणगुणात्मकं दश्मुः, यथा
तत्त्वादिगुणात्मकं पदार्थ। तथा सहादिविभवुत्त्तिपि
कार्येण सुखद्विखमोहप्रेष स्वाक्षारगतसुखद्विखमोहवत्ति। वभिवव्यम्।
तथा
च तत्त्वात्त्ब सुखद्विखमोहामकं प्रधानमध्यस्य सिद्धम् भववति ॥ १४ ॥

स्यादेवत्त—‘व्यक्तस्य व्यक्तमुव्यमुपघे’ हृदि कणभाशक्षिप्तरणनया: ॥ परेषाि
(१०६१) व्यक्तादेव
स्वंवाक्षारकारणमापपप—
वेयथ्याशिष्यः।

१. सत्त्वादिविभविभिविभिविभिवियोगिनः वैगुण्यात् सुखद्विखमोहामकवृधातिति स्वरूप:
मनुष्मानस्य। २. प्रथिव्यादि। ३. ‘यथाविभविभिविभिविभिवियोगिनः वैगुण्याभाव’
इत्यवेत्त्तुपम्।
भेदानां परिमाणात समन्यायात शक्तिः प्रबुद्धेऽ
कारणकार्यविभागाद्विभागःभूपस्यस्

“भेदानाम्” इति। भेदानाम् विसंपर्यां महद्वारीनां सुतानां कार्यान्गोऽ
(१२२) तत्तविहारः। कारणं मूलकारणमस्यव्यत्क्तम्। कुतः? “कारणकार्यां-
अन्यतंकारणान्यानि।” कारणं सत् कार्य-मिति सिद्धम्। तथा च यथा कृत्तारी, सन्येवाकार्ययोगिभागाविभागां-
कार्योनिःसरितं विभजयन्ते — “हतं कृत्तारेः, पुतां-
न्यायाक्षसिद्धिरिति प्रथमम् (१)।”

सन्येव पूर्वविद्याद्रिनि कारणान्तन्मत्राद्विभवति विभजयन्ते, सन्येव च तत्तवार्यप्रकारात् कारणात्, सन्येव च तत्तवार्यप्रकारात्, सन्येव च महानु परमायवकार्। सोद्यं कारणात्, परमायवकार् साक्षात् परस्यपेन-निवासस्य कार्यस्य द्रव्यभागः। प्रतिस्थायं तु सुमिन्द्र सुवर्णविपण्ड्व वा चक्रस्ताद्यो विभागार्यां भ्रष्टिरिति तत्तवार्यभवतिः। कार्यमपे-
स्यायक्तः भवन्ति। एवं प्रविधियायप्रत्यद्विभागां विभागः स्वपेश्यया तत्तवार्य-
स्यायक्तं भवन्ति, एवं तत्तवार्यायप्रकारायप्रक्षेपयायक्तं, एवं महानु शासनात् महानुमयवकार्, महानु एव विभागायक्तं प्रक्षेपयायक्तं। प्रक्षेपयाय न कचिदिवेशे इति सा सन्यादिकारणायमयक-
भबं। सोद्यभागः प्रकृती वैधरुपस्य नानापूर्वस्य कार्यस्य [स्वार्थिकः ३-
प्रयुक्]। तस्मात् कारणेऽकार्यस्य सत् एव विभागाविभागोऽयामवक्तं कारण-
मिति ||

इत्यायक्षस्यस्तितेष्वात् भाहं—“शक्तिः प्रबुद्धेऽइति।” कारणशक्तिः
(१२३) कारणस्य प्रवृत्तेऽइति सिद्धम्। अशक्तात् कारणात् कार्य-
शक्तिसंभन्नं कार्यस्यायक्तयात् स्थितिरिति च (द्वितीयम् (२)॥

संस्कारान् स्तोत्रवादानां मे यदेऽब्रजेतवेव तैलमय-नागतावस्य न सिक्तातिविति ||
अन्यत्रत्र भ्रमत्रिप्रकारः || ॥

स्वादेशतः-शक्तिः प्रकृति: कारणस्वादेशकाराप्राप्तवात् स नहीं एव परमात्मकारात् शास्त्रविद्यत:। क्रृत्य ततः परंतपायेनेवतः

( १९५ ) महादिविपर्ययः ध्यानं-“परिमाणात्” हृदि:। परिमित्तवात्, नस्य कार्य्यात्स्य अवयय्यविनिक्षितम् यावत्। विवादाध्यायिता महादिविपर्ययः मेदामहात्मकारायणात्, परिमित्तवात्, ध्यात्मकारायणात्।

घटात्दयो हि परिमिता: शुद्धाध्यायकारणकाम्। तत: उत्तरेतस्या धार्यायत्ताः धार्यायत्ताः। क्रृत्य ततः परमार्थायत:।

हन्तस्य विवादाध्यायिता मेदामहात्मकारायणात्:—“सम्बन्धायत:”।

भिन्नातां समानायत: समन्वयं:। सुखदुःखोऽस्य (१९६) समन्वयाचेति मनविता हि बुद्धाद्योऽध्वस्यार्डविद्युष्कण:। प्रतीचतुर्थम् (४) || यथा:। यथा सदापसन्नताति तत: सदाध्वस्यार्डविद्युष्कण:।

इति—कारणस्वादेशताः मेदानामाति सिद्धम् || १५ ||

अन्यत्रत्र साध्यात्मको अवश्य प्रकृतिप्रकारसाहन:—
कारणस्वादेशताः, प्रवर्त्ते त्रिगुणत: समुद्यायाः।

परिमाणात्: सहिष्णुत: प्रतिप्रतिगुणात्र्यविशेषात् || १६ ||

“प्रवर्त्ते त्रिगुणत:” हृदि:। प्रतिसारावस्थयाः सर्वं रक्षसमर्थ सदया:।

(१९६) प्रकृतेत्रिगुणत: प्रकृति: प्रथमा (१) ||

इति:।

1. अनवस्यापाताच्यः || 2. बुद्धाद्यीनामपचयायापचयाद्वारादित्या भाष्ये ||
पुरुषार्थसाधनम्। ३५

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह्—"समुदयाच्" ह्रति। समेत्य उदयः 'समुदय:' सम-वयः। समुदयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्राधानभावमन्तः
(११७) प्रकृतेसमु- रंग सम्भवतः, न च गुणप्राधानभावो वैषम्यं विना,
दयात् प्रश्नित्तिऩीया न च वैषम्यसुपमद्विपमद्विभावादते। ह्रति मह-
(२) दानिभावेन प्रश्नित्तिऩीया।

स्मृद्वत्—कथमेकरुपणाम् गुणानामेकरुपया प्रश्नितिरित्य भाह—"परिणामः
मतः सहिष्ठवत्" ह्रति। यथा हि वारिद्रविन्युक्कमुदः
(११८) प्रकृतेः प्रश्नितः कमकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाय नानकेल्ताताता-
परिणामतो नानाक्राम्। लीलिभिवर्चितविद्विन्तुकामकाक्षकानामलकपिथ-
फलसत्यः परिणामम्भुराल्मकत्वातिनिमक्षायकः विकलप्यते, एवमेकक्रमगुणसमुद्वारात् प्रधानगुणः
परिणाममेवदानू प्रवर्तयतः।
तदिदुकम्—"प्रतिप्रतिगुणाध्यविशेषात्"। एक्केकादिगुणाध्यवेणो विशेष-
स्तस्तमादित्यः। १६।।

ये तु तौषित्का अवक्ष वा महान्तं वा सहारां वा हृद्वियाणि वा भूतानि
वा समानमभिमानमानासानायोगोपास्ते तान्
(११६) पुरुषात्मकः प्रत्याह—

संघंतपरार्थवात् त्रिगुणात्तिविपरेयवात् विद्विषादात्।
पुरुषो तत् भोक्तभावावात् वेन्यायायां धर्मोदेशं। १७।।

"संघंतपरार्थवात्।" ह्रति। पुरुषो तत्, अवधकारयैत्यं ह्रतिर्कः। कुतः?
"संघंतपरार्थवात्।" अवधकमेकहुद्वगारादयः
(१२०) संघंतानां परार्थमुद्रा, संघंतवस्त, शरणासनाभ्यान्नरादवा,
परार्थविशेषितति प्रथम- साधनम् (१)।। संघंतां।।

१ यदहः सक्ताः चोऽत्क्रिगुणाविभेच्यदैशोऽयववतः स्वात्। च च पुरुष एव।
पुरुषार्थित्वसाधनम्।

स्मार्तेतव्—शयनासनादयः संघाता: संहतशारिरार्था द्यतः, न त्वागम्यनम्

व्यजाधातिनिः प्रति पराधी।: तस्मात् संघातात्तरार्थमेव

(१२१) संघातान्तरार्थी तवमुखः। त स्वसमहातात्तरार्थम् इत्यत आह्—

“त्रिगुणादिविपययार्थं” इति। अयमसिद्धायाः—

संघातात्तरार्थी तव एव तस्मात् भवितव्यम् परं तेन तेनुयनवस्मता

स्यायः। न च स्यायः सत्यानुवस्मता युक्ता, कल्पनागौरवसम्मातः। न च ‘प्रमाणवैधव कल्पनागौरवविपि द्वृत्यत’ इति

युक्तम्, संहतवस्य पाराधिमात्रे गण्यनवायः। द्यतःत्रिगुणादिविपयसम्मुखः त्वनुरुक्तमानिस्थितः।

सर्वतुमानोऽच्छिद्रप्रसरण ह्यवतवतिकता त्वरिष्टीयोनिहामसम्मातः।

तस्मात्वर्यावस्थाभिः स्यायांसंहतवस्यमिस्थितः। त्रिगुणादिविपयसंयोजने

हि ध्यामि: संहतवचन्यायः। तस्मात्त्वर्यान्तरमिस्थितः। तरयावर्तमानं ख्रियागुणादि

व्यावत्यतः। भाष्यवर्तियाः। व्यायात्मांकं कठवादिक्रिमी। तस्मादाचार्यंण

‘त्रिगुणादिविपययायः’ इति वदता संहतः। परं विवक्षितः। स चालमेति

सिद्धम्॥

इति श्रवः पुखो श्रद्धि—“अधिष्ठानात्।” त्रिगुणात्मकानामविषीयामनर्तात्।

यथासुखदुःखमोहासमकं तस्मात् परेणाविशीयामनर्तात्।

(१२२) त्रिगुणात्मकानामविषीयामनर्तात्। यथा सभाषितयादितिः।

सुखदुःखमोहासमकं चेवदुःखादिति। तस्मानैतदमपरेणाविशीयामनर्तात्मां

द्वितीयासाधनम्। (२)॥ तत्त्वम्। स च परेणशुक्लार्थे आसृतदिति।

इति श्रास्ति पुखो—“भोक्तुभावात्।” भोक्तुभावाः भोग्य सुखदुःखे उप-क्षयति। भोग्यो हिसुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलंवदनीमे

(१२३) भोक्तुभावात् प्रष्ठर्षसमूहयेते। तेनायत्सनुकूलामनियेन प्रतिकूलदिति

तुल्याम्। (५)॥ येन च केवलचिद्रापणीये भवितव्यम्। न चानुकूलनीयाः

प्रतिकूलनीयाः वा बुद्धादयः। तेषाः सुखदुःखादितिः।

१। सुखदुःखादयो भोगः।। अतो भोक्ति पुखे सुखदुःखादितिः।

तस्मात् पुखे ख्रियागुणाविपयसंयोजने।।
लेनें स्वामनि वृत्तिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो स्वसाधारणा सो सन्तुक्षेत्रीयः प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा सस्मेति।

अन्ये ल्वाहुः-भोग्या दस्या बुद्धायाध्वः। न च दृष्टारमणतः दृष्टा सुक्ता तेषामुः। तस्मारस्तिः दृष्टा दृष्ट्वुद्धाध्वागतिरिक्तः; स चा सस्मेति। भोक्त्रभावात् दृष्ट्रभावात्, दहेणे दृष्ट्वेत्रुमानादित्यर्थः। दृष्ट्वेत्र च बुद्धायाध्वः सुखा-चारसमकान्त्याध्वादिब्रह्मादिवृद्धिमितम्॥

(१२४) भोक्त्रभावात-दितिश्च दृष्ट्रभावादि-ल्वाहुः। सस्मेति।

इत्यावस्तिः पुरूष हृदयां- "कैवल्यार्थः प्रभृतिः" उद्वत्तिः। शाख्राणां महर्षिणां विवेकोक्तिनां च कैवल्यमालयनितिकु-खण्डम्--

(१२५) शाख्राणां कैव-ल्वाः। दहेने न बुद्धायाध्वः सस्मेति। ते फळ दृष्टारामण-ल्वाः प्रवेदीतिः चतुर्थः। रक्तः कर्म स्वभावालिकाः। तदुत्तिः। साधनामम्-(४)।।

कर्म ख्यातार्थमस्तो विवोधः शक्यसम्पादः।
तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थः प्रत्येकरागागानां महाविषयां वाचित बुद्धादिब्रह्मादितिरिक्त आस्मेति सिद्धम्॥ १३॥

तद्वें पुरूषावस्तिः प्रतिपादः, स कि सर्वशास्त्रीरेण्वेंकिमेनें प्रतिष्ठानमिति संशये; तस्य प्रतिष्ठानमनक्त्वमुपाद्भवति--

(१२६) पुरूषबहुताः।
साधना(ि)।।

जननमरणकरणाणां प्रतिनिधमादियाः प्रभृत्तृकवेच्छ।
पुरूषबहुतां सिद्धं तैरण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव॥ १८॥

जननेत्राणाः। "पुरूषबहुतां सिद्धम्। कस्मात्? "जननमरण-करणां प्रतिनिधमादियाः।" निकायविविधिभिरश्रवर्ब- (१२७) जननमरण-प्रतिनिधमादितिः प्रभृत्तृकवेच्छ। सम्बन्धो जनम, न तु पुरूषस्य परिणमः, तस्मापर-णिताभावः। तेषामेव च देहादिमाजुराः परिवानो मरणं, नवामनो विनाशः, तस्य कृष्णतिलकवात्।
कर्मानि बुद्धायाध्वः ज्योद्घात। तेषां जननमरणकरणाः प्रतिनिधमो व्यवस्था।
पुरुषधर्मकथनम् ॥

सा खल्वियं सर्वशारीरेऽवेक्षितम् पुरुषे नोपपदते ।
तदा क्षत्रियकिम्बु पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायर्तनु, द्रियमाणे च द्रियेर्तनु, अन्धादृशी कैकिसिनं सर्वं पुव्र
अन्धाद्यो, विचित्री कैकिसिनं सर्वं पुव्र विचित्राः स्वरूपित्ववस्था स्थायं ।
प्रतियोक्ता तु पुरुषमेव बवति व्यवस्था । न च ‘एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादान-
मेरदायवस्था’ हि पुरुषम्, पाणिन्त्यायुष्याधिमेधेनापि जन्ममयंगाहविवस्था-
प्रस्वनागात् । न हि या पाणी बुकणे, जाते वा स्तनादृशी महत्त्रवेच्ये युवतिस्मृता
जाता वा स्वावती ॥

इतः प्रतियोक्ता पुरुषमेव हृदयाहः ‘अयुगप्रम्प्रवृत्तेऽ’ हि प्रवृत्ति:
प्रयत्नलक्षणं यथाप्र्यत्नं करणवर्तिनीं, तथा श्री
( १२८ ) पुरुषाणम्-
युगप्रवृत्ते इति द्वितीयम् (२) ॥

इतः पुरुषमेव हृदयाहः ‘जैगुण्यविपर्ययाखेव’ हि प्रवृत्ति:
एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः
‘सिद्धम्मु’ हृदययानन्तरं दृष्टयः; सिद्धमेव नासिनः
( १२९ ) जैगुण्यविपर्ययः - दृष्टम्। जयो गुणाभ्यामुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययोऽवन्यात्वम्
यादिति तृतीयम् (२) ॥ केचितपर्वत साधविकाया: सत्यभुक्तः, यथोध्वंसोऽ
तसः; केचिद्वर्जोभुक्तः, यथा मतुप्यः; केचिदमो
भुक्तः; यथा तिर्यंयोनिः । सौ तस्मिन्तत्ड्रृगुण्यविपययो सत्यात्वान्यस्तेषु
सत्विकायेऽयु न भवेत् यथेकः पुरुष: स्थायं, पुरुषमेवे त्यमदृष्टान्त हि प्रवृत्ति ||१८||

( १३० ) पुरुषधर्मम्: ॥ पुव्र पुरुषबहुवर्तं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपवोगित्या
धर्मानाहः

तस्मात् विपर्योक्तिसिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य 
कैवल्यमाध्यमस्य द्रष्ट्वात्मलक्ष्मीभावश्च || १९ ||
"तस्माच्" इति। 'च शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुचिनोति। 'विपर्यायसादस्मात्' हस्युक्तेऽश्रेगुणः।
(१३१) तस्मातपरः विपर्यायादितत्त्वनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अवस्तश्चरितसाय सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम्॥
"तस्मात्" हस्युक्तम्। अनन्तरोक्त हि साक्षिधानादि-दसो विषयोऽविप्रकटं च तदः। इति विप्रकटं त्रिगुण-
मविवेकायादि सम्बध्येत॥

तस्मात्त्रेनुगणादेऽविपर्यायः। स पुरुषस्यात्मगुणवत् बिवेकित्तथविषयवस्म-सायारणेयं चेतनलसमस्ववधार्मिकवः। तत्र चेतनवेदः।
(१३२) अत्रेनुगणादेऽविपर्यायवेद च साक्षिधाद्रष्ट्रोक्तं दृष्ठेत। चेतनो हि पुरुषस्त्व साधितमः
दृष्टतं च॥
यत्रें प्रदर्शितेऽविषयः। स साधित, तथा हि लोकस्थिष्यायनं विवादविषयं साधिते दृष्टयतः। एवं
प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषयो दृष्ट्यतीति पुरुषः साधिते, न चाचेतनो
विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दृष्टिनियतूम, इति चेतनायात्विषयवस्म भवति
साधिते॥ अत पुनः दृष्टांिितो भवति॥

अत्रेनुगणात्मचास्य कैवल्यम्। भावनितको दुःखत्वयामाव: कैवल्यम्। चतुः
(१३३) कैवल्यम्॥
तथा तस्य स्वाभाविकादेववात्रेनुगणातु सुखुःखोहर्दि-तत्त्वारसिद्धम्॥

अत एवात्रेनुगणानमाध्यस्मस्म्। सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्त्यन्तु दुःखी हि दुःखनु 
(१३४) माध्यस्मस्म, 
दृष्टतु मध्यस्यो न भवति। तदुभयाहितस्तु
अकृत्यन्तं च॥
मध्यस्य हुःयुद्धासिनः इति चाल्यातेन। चिवेकित्तथा-
मध्यस्यादित्त्वव्याचार्यातिः सिद्धम्॥ १३ इ॥

स्यावेदन्त-प्रमाणेन कल्यंकमथवमवगम्य 'चेतनोऽहं विकीर्णेऽकरोमि' इति
(१३५) चेतनाकृत्ये। कृतिचेतत्त्वयोऽसामानधिकारणवुभवसिद्धम्; तदे-
त्योर्वेदविकारणपति।
तस्मिन्र मते नावंकल्ये, चेतात्याकृत्तवातु कठुःकाचेत-
न्यात् हस्यः भाि—
तस्मात्तसंयोगाद्विते च तथा चेतनाविदिव ठिठ्ठम्।
गुणकृते च तथा कर्तवं भवत्युदासीनः॥ २० ॥

"तस्मात्" इति। यथाविन्यस्तकर्तृत्वे मिश्राधिकरणे युक्तत: सिद्धे, तस्मात्
(१३६) इत्यापि:। आध्यात्मिकायमवः। क्षिप्रां। महा-दासिसूक्ष्मपर्यंते
सामानाधिकारण्यां। वद्यति। आध्यात्मिकीजम् तस्मिन्योगः। तल्लक्ष्मिनान्यम्।
आध्यात्मिकिन्तु। क्षिप्रोपि: विद्यते।॥ २० ॥

'तस्मात्योगाः' हस्यकवम्, न च मिल्योऽसंयोगः पेश्यां चिन्ना, न चेयः
(१३७) पुरुषप्रधानोऽव: सुपकायोंपकारकां हवि-वनिद्वेशांकेतुसुपकारमादः
संयोगे शङ्करः॥

पुरुषस्य पूर्णानियः कैवल्यायः तथा प्रधानस्य
पद्ध्यन्नवदुमयोपिपि संयोगस्तत्त्वः सर्गः॥ २१ ॥

"पुरुषस्य" इति। प्रधानस्येति कर्ममिणि पर्यः। प्रधानस्य सर्वामुसारणुणयः
(१३८) प्रधानस्य
पुरुषोपेशाः-भोक्षेणे॥

यहाशि पुरुषेण तद्भक्षेण। तद्भजने भोग्यता प्रधानस्य
दृष्टिः। तत्तथ भोग्यं प्रधान भोगताममान्यत: न
सम्भवत्ति दृष्टास्य भोक्षेणे॥

"पुरुषस्यापेशाः दृष्टिः"। "पुरुषस्य कैवल्यायम्" इति। तथाहि भोगवेन
प्रधानोपस्थितम। पुरुषस्य तद्भक्षितम। तद्भजने स्वामुसारण्यितः
(१३९) कैवल्यायः
पुरुषस्य प्रधानापेशा॥

मन्यमानः कैवल्यमू प्रार्थयते। तत्च सत्वपुरुषनायता
स्वात्मानिनिवंतदसम्। न च सत्वपुरुषनायतावनातः
प्रधानमन्तरेति कैवल्यायः पुरुष:। प्रधानमन्त्रेत्ते
अनादिकात्मकं संयोगपरमप्रायः। भोगाय संयुक्तोऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः:। संयुक्तत
हृत युक्तम्॥

१. गुणानां कर्तवं उदासीनोपि पुरुषः। कर्तवं भवति। न च स तस्त्वः
कर्तवेयकाराभिमायः। २. कारकायः। पदार्थाः। स्पष्टः। इत्यादिसः। ३. पुरुषोऽपि
निष्टितवातः। 'पद्मः,' प्रधानस्येकतन्तरः।'अन्यम्'॥
नन्द भवत्वनयोः संयोगेः महद्वादिसगर्गस्तु क्रृत हत्यत आहे— “तक्ततः
(१४०) मोगापवर्गाय: सगः।” इति संयोगे हि न महद्वादिसगर्गस्तेण मेव महद्वादिसगर्गस्त्या:-
भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग पुष्प भोगाप-वर्गार्थ सर्ग करोतीथयंः।।२१।।

गर्गकमाहं—

प्रकटेमहान्त्वतोहद्वादसगर्गस्त्राण्या पोशकः।
तस्मादृशी पोशकाकर्ताप्रभ्यः पञ्च मूतानाः पञ्च।।२२।।

“प्रकटः।” इति प्रकटतिरविफः महद्वादिसगर्गस्तु वक्त्यमाणः वक्त्यमाणः इति, तस्मात्
(१४१) प्रकटेमहानानि-उत्पत्तिः पोशकार्त्त्वपरिमितो गणः पोशकः। तस्मात्
क्यालिदिः सर्गकमः।| दृशी पोशकाकर्तापुक्रणेः: परवस्यस्वतमात्रेयम पञ्च
भूतान्याकाशादृशीः।।

तत्र शब्दत्वमादाकारां शब्दगुणाम्, शब्दत्वमाद्रीसहिताय स्वरस्तमाद्रा-
ः न्यायः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शस्वरत्वमाद्रीसहितार्थपुरः
(१४२) तत्मात्रेयोः न्यायात्मेजः शब्दस्पर्शस्पर्शगुणाम्, शब्दस्पर्शस्पर्शस्वरत्वमाद्री-
गुणकमेन भूतानिः। , न्यायात्मेजः शब्दस्पर्शस्पर्शस्पर्शगुणाम्, शब्दस्पर्शस्पर्शस्पर्शस्वरत्वमाद्री-
परस्परस्परस्परस्परस्परस्परस्परांगृहाः पुरंधिती, जायत इत्यार्थं।।२२।।

शब्यतं सामान्यतो लक्ष्मितम” “तविप्रतिमवव्यक्तम” (कारिका १०)
इत्यतः; विशेषस्या “सचं कन्तु प्रकाशकम्”
(१४३) वुद्धिविद्या- (कारिका १२) इत्यतः। व्यक्तिपि सामान्यतो
प्रस्तावं।। लक्ष्मितम” “हेतुमव” (कारिका १०) इत्याविना।
सम्प्रति विवेकान्नोपपोगित्वा व्यक्तिविशेषं न्याये
लक्ष्यति—

अभ्यवसयो वुद्धिविद्यां ज्ञान विराग ऐश्वर्यम्।
सार्वकेमेवद्वृं तामससमाद्विपर्यत्तम्।।२३।।
"अध्यवसाय" हृति। ‘अध्यवसायो बुद्धः’ कियाकियावतोरेदुविवख्य। सवें व्यवहरिता सङ्कोच्यी सत्वा श्रद्धार्थिः कुत् ह्यविस्मय कर्त्थियमेतन्त्मथ्यध्वस्थयिः, तत्र अध्यवसाय इति।

(१४७) बुद्धेन्द्रक्षणम् प्रवतित्त हृति लोकसिद्धम्। तत्र यो संयं कर्त्थिमिति विनिश्चयविचिनितसिद्धायाप्राचैतन्यम्। बुद्धः सोऽध्यवसायो, बुद्धेसप्ताहारो व्यपारः; तदभेदा बुद्धः। स च बुद्धेन्द्रक्षणम् समानासमान जातीयव्यवङ्ककर्त्तव्यः।

तदेव बुद्धि कुश्यावल्लव विशेषकृतानापयोगनस्त्रय धर्मसाधिकताभावकानाहि।

“यमः ज्ञातं विरागं पूर्वक्षमयं साधिकेनिः तूपः;”

(१४५) बुद्धः साधिका तामससमाधिपरस्यस्त्रयम्। हये ज्ञातं हृति। धर्मः सद्युद्धयम्। धर्मः ज्ञानविरागेश्वरः यनि: अयसस्त्रयेत्; ततः यागदानाचापनुष्ठानजनितो धर्मः भिधानः। तत्र धर्मः सद्युद्धयेत्; धर्मः गुप्तायोगाचापनुष्ठानकमिति निःस्यसम्वैराच्यानं निरूपणम्।

गुप्तपुरुषायाच्यात्तिलेनीन्द्रम्। विराङ्गो चैरावः नयम्। रागाभावः।

तस्य यत्मानसंहरं भ्यतिरक्तसंहरं एकेण्यसंहरं वशीकारसंहरं। हृति क्षतिः। संहरं। संहरं। रागाभावः। कायाभिन्नविनिमित्तः।

(१४६) विराणस्य यत्मानविनिरेकेन्द्रियवज्ञमन्यतीर्थिनियमित्तिर्निरारुपारुपः प्रयत्नो यत्मानसंहरं। परिपाणे चानुसीयमाने केवच संहरं।

स्वप्नः। पक्ष्। पक्ष्यन्ते। कोशित्। तदं पर्वतार्पणस्य स्वतः। पक्ष्यन्ते। पश्चिमविद्यायेन भक्तीरक्षायं काेफळश्रेणे।

(१४७) विराणस्य यत्मानविनिरेकेन्द्रियवज्ञमन्यतीविनिरारुपारुपः प्रयत्नो यत्मानसंहरं। परिपाणे चानुसीयमाने केवच संहरं।

स्वप्नः। पक्ष्। पक्ष्यन्ते। कोशित्। तदं पर्वतार्पणस्य स्वतः। पक्ष्यन्ते। ह्यविस्मयविचिनितसिद्धायाप्राचैतन्यम्।
एकादशकः कार्येमाहः। अभिमानो शह्स्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः।

(१४९) अहंकारस्य पुवामी विषयः,’ मचो नान्यो श्राधिकृतः कब्जःश्रास्तिः,’ अतो शह्स्मिः इत्यो अभिमानः सो स्वाधारणव्यापारस्वतःहृद्धृकः। तस्मात्सुब्याहितः हि बुद्धिर्ध्वस्यति—‘ कर्त्तव्यमेतनयः’ इति निष्क्रयं करोति।

तत्थ कार्येमेदाहः—‘तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः’ इति। प्रकारहृद्माहः

(१५०) अहंकारस्य कार्येमेदाः।
अहंकारस्य कार्यभेदः। [सं. ते.

स्मारितात्—भाह्मकारादेकुपाकारणस्य कथं जडमकास्या गणो विलक्षणौ भवत इत्यत भाव्—

सात्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तिते वैकुटादशह्नारात्।
भूतादेशस्तम्भः सः तामसः; तैसादुभयम्। ॥ २५ ॥

“सात्विक” ह्रदित। प्रकाशचारणवामकारस्य ह्रदित्यणां: सात्विको ( १५२ ) एकुपस्याप्—वैकुटादशह्नारात्म्प्रवर्तते। भूतादेशस्वस्वचारसामाययः
ह्नारस्य गुणेभद्विता: नभावो गण: प्रवर्तते। क्षमात्? यत् ‘स तामसः’।
भेदः—सत्त्वादित्यणां: एवदुक्तमिवति ‘चद्धप्यको द्विह्नारस्थः। दिपि गुण—
तामससात्मनात्मगण:। भेदोद्वृत्ताविभववध्यां मिब्यं कार्यः करोतिति।”

ननु यदिः सच्चत्तमोपायेव सर्भ कार्यः जन्यये तदा कुतमाकिनिकोरेन रजसे—
स्मारितात्—“तैसादुभयम्” ह्रदित। तैसाद्राजाः
( १५२ ) सच्चत्तमोः—
सात्त्विक गुणदुर्यभवति, वधिव्रजसे न कार्यान्तर—
प्रवर्तकत्या रजसे साभस्मित तथा दिपि सच्चत्तमी स्वयुक्तिवें समये भविष्यति।
न स्वस्वकार्यमुकृतः; रजस्तु चलित्या ते यद्य चालुक्ति तदा स्वस्वकार्यमुकृत ह्रदित।
तदुभयास्मारेण्यपि कार्यः
सच्चत्तमोः क्रियोपाद्याद्रेणागस्ति रजसे: कारणस्त्राभिषित न व्यथे रज इति। ॥ २५ ॥

१. भाष्यमतेन मनस एवैकस्य सात्विकवेयम् इतरेण दशानां रजसत्तमेवेति।

२१८ सूत्रे इत्यः। अहंकारस्य निव्या स्वाभिष्टस्य—‘वैकुट्”—‘भूतादि’—‘तैंस्य—
संज्ञामेव’—तदूर्त गौरपद्धनेण—“स्वविभावभिन्नसे रजस्तमिं यदा अहंकारे भवत: तदा सो शहङ्कारः सात्त्विकः—तस्य संज्ञा कुतः ‘वैकुट्इ’ ह्रदित। एवं च तमसादभिभूते
सच्चरजस्ती यदा शहङ्कारे भवतस्तदा सोहङ्कारस्तामसे—तस्य संज्ञा कुतः ‘भूतादि’
इति। एवमेव यथा शहङ्कारे सच्चरजसी रजसादभिभूते तदा सोहङ्कारो रजसे: ‘तैंस’ ह्रदित संज्ञा लभते।”—ह्रदित।
बाह्यनिद्रियदशकम्

सार्वभौमकमकादशमाल्याः बाह्यनिद्रियदशकं तावदाह —
बुद्धीनिद्रियाणि चक्षुः श्रोत्राणारसनत्वादीत्यानि।
वाक्यपाणिपारपांपूपस्तानि कर्मनिद्राणां याहुः। २६।।

"बुद्धीनिद्रियाणि " हि त। सार्वभौमकादशमाल्याः कर्मनिद्रियस्त्वम्, तत्त्वदेहविद्धम् बुद्धीनिद्रिय कर्मनिद्रिये च, उभयमण्येति—
(१५३) बाह्यनिद्रियदश कर्मनिद्रियस्त्वम् स्वसंस्कृतादित्यानि। ततै च स्वसंस्कृतादित्यानि। तत्र स्वप्नहनिकिं चक्षुः, व्युपत्तिः।
शाब्दप्रत्येकहिं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धप्रत्येकहिं ग्हाणम्, रसप्रत्येकहिं रसनम्, स्पर्शप्रत्येकहिं त्वक्, हि त।
झानेनिद्रियाणि संज्ञा। एवं बागादीर्यां कार्य क्रयति (कारिका २८)। २६।।

एकादशमीत्रमहा—

उभयात्मकम्ब्र मनः, स्कंकुलकम्ब्रियं च साधस्यायो।
गुणपरिणामविशेषणानां बाह्यवेदांशः। २७।।

“उभयात्मकम्ब्र” हि। एकादशमीत्रियेपु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्ब्रम्,
(१५४) मनो बुद्धी—बुद्धीनिद्रियं कर्मनिद्रियं च चक्षुरार्द्धांनि बागादीर्यां च
मोभयात्मक्षम्वस्थानम्। मनोभिधिततानांमेव स्वस्वविशेष्यं प्रबुद्धे।।

तदसाध्यहासनेन रूपेण लक्षयति—“स्कंकुलकम्ब्र मनः” हि। स्कंकुलपें रूपेण
(१५५) मनो लक्ष—मनो लक्षयते। बालोचितमीत्रियेपण बशित्वद्रम् हि
क्षमां—स्कंकुलकम्ब्र, क्षमां। सम्मुदायस्त् हैदमेवम्, नैवस् हि सम्मुदाय्यति
विशेषणविशेषणात विशेषणविशेषणात। यदाहु—
सम्मुदाय्यति वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राप्तप्रत्यक्षभेदकपित्तम्।
तव सामान्यविशेषायां कल्पयति मनोक्षणः।। हि। तथाहि,

१. "इं" विषयाः, तानृ प्रति द्रव्यतिः "इन्द्रयः" शाब्दयुक्तजः कैश्चित्
क्रियते।
मनस इन्द्रियत्वम्

अस्ति ब्राह्मचित्तजानां प्रथमसिद्धिविकल्पकम्
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसद्वशम् सुभवस्विज्ञितम्
ततः परं पुनर्वसु ध्वंजीवादिभिष्यता

बुध्वा ्सत्सबीते सा उपि प्रख्यतः सम्भवा

सो तथं सहकल्पक्षणो ध्यापारो मनसः समानावमानजायति ध्यायम्
स्वःहित्वक्षणम् मनो लक्ष्यति

स्यादेतस—असाधारणव्यापारोज्ञो यथा महद्दुह्कार्थी नेत्रिद्रमुः, एव
स्वनो व्यस्तावरणाव्यापारोज्ञो नेत्रिद्रमुः भवितमहतः

(१५६) मनस इन्द्रियः

तीर्थान्तर च इति। कृतः ? --
लवसाधनम्—इन्द्रियः

“साधस्यां” । इन्द्रियान्तरः साधवहरकरोऽ

dानलक्ष्योपसाध्यात्

dुह्क्कार्थोप्यामलिङ्गकरोऽनेत्रिद्रविष्कृतात्

(१५७) एक्ष्ठाङ्गः

णासविषेषात् नानां गुणपरिणामविद्याः

dेशपारायंभेंद्र

(१५८) बाय्यदेशे

‘बाय्यमेद्राश्’ इति

(१५९) दशोद्रितं

दशेदेशेनेत्रिद्रियाणि स्वरूपत दश्याव व्यावहारणाम्

शब्दादिपु पञ्चानामालोचनमालोत्सवस्तुरतिकथनम्

वचनादानविहरणोत्सवःगौणन्द्राश् पञ्चानाम् ८८

बुध्वा इन्द्रियाणां समस्वर्यवस्तुदर्शनायामालोचनसुरुवाम्। “वचनादानविहरणोत्स

गौणन्द्राश् पञ्चानाम्” कमेन्द्रियाणाम्। कण्ठाल्पातिधार्मिकणिन्द्रियं तथा,

तत्त्वा वृत्तिवेचनम् | ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणं वृत्तया: स्पष्टा: | ८८
तथापि स्वाधीनगरस्य वृत्तियोऽयस्य
साधनां वृत्तिवधवस्य सैणा भवत्यसामान्या।
सामान्यकरणवट्टिः प्राणाया वायवः पञ्चः || 29 ||

"स्वाधीनगरस्य" इति। स्वाधीनगरस्य वृत्तिवधवस्य। स्वसाधारणं लक्षणं
चेष्टा वानि स्वाधीनगरस्य महद्वेषकारमनविः। तेषां
(160) अन्तःकरणं
भावः स्वाधीनगरस्य, तथा स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव।
येष स्वस्वलक्षणापि-| तथा यो महतो सध्यवसायो सहकारस्य\|भिमानः
वासाधारणं वृत्तियोऽयस्य || सुहक्षणे मनसो वृत्तिवधवपारः।||

वृत्तिवधवपारस्य साधारणसाधारणवधवस्यमाहोऽ\\
साधारणी। "सामान्यकरणवट्टिः प्राणाया वायवः
(161) पञ्चवायुरुपः- पञ्चः। सामान्या चासो करणवृत्तिवधविः। त्रयोणः-\\
साधारणी वृत्तिः। मयि करणानं पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तस्मां\
भवावत तद्भवे चामावतः। तद्र प्राणो नासाध्वाभिमाणेः।\\
भिमाणेः\;, अधिपत् कृकातिकर्मपुष्पवाच्यावपूवर्षिनवृत्तिः, समानोह\\
हजामहसवसस्वसृवृत्तिः, उदानो हस्कष्टातुधर्मवर्षिनवृत्तिः, व्यायस्वर्षिनवृत्तिः\;। पञ्च वायवः। || 29 ||

चतुर्विंशकरस्यांस्यांसाधारणीये वृत्तिये क्रमागतो सप्तकारावाहः

युगप्रस्तरमाय मेघे वर्षिः क्रमागत तस्य निर्दिशा।
हष्टे तथा अष्टपदे तिस्म करण तत्पुर्विकः बृत्तिः || 30 ||

"युगपदः" इति। हष्टे यथा-यदा सन्तमसान्तकारे विद्यमःसमपालमात्रा।
त्रयोणःगममस्यकारसतिसतिः पञ्चति तद्र लक्ष्यस्या।
(162) चतुर्विंशकराः। लोकवाधक स्यामानाध्यवसायः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भ-\
ख्य प्रस्तरे युगपदवृत्तिः। वर्णित, यतस्तत उद्द्यान तत्साधारणेकपदेछरसतिः।||
“करणानं परस्परपेश्चा ।”

“क्रमशः” यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमस्वाभाष्यस्माः समस्मुद्रमहालोकश्याति,
अथ प्रणिनितमना: करणान्तकृत्तकहरसिन्धुरीकृष्णकोऽदुःधि
कृतकोषः प्रचंडः पारस्परिक्रमतिः निश्चितान्तिः,
अथ च मामप्रस्मुद्धिमित्तंमस्यते, भाषायवस्थावप्सरासं
मीत: स्थानाविद्विति ॥

परोक्षे तवन: करणात्मकश्च्य भाषणात्मकयज्ञं चूतिश्रिवाह—“बहुष्टे श्रयस्य
तप्यंपिका वृत्ति:” हि । अन्तःकरणात्मकश्च्य युगप
( १६४ ) अन्तःकर
णात्मकश्च्य परोक्षे वृत्ति
द्रमुद्रात्मकयज्ञं।

स्यादेवत्—चरुः॥ चरुणाना वा वृत्ताः न तावनमाधारीः, तेषां महात्नः
( १६५ ) करणान स्व
व वृत्ताः स्वात्मकाद्यात्मक, श्वाकमबवे तु
तन्मण्डे दोषा: ॥ वृत्तिकस्थ्रिक्को नियममेकतरमवालादिर्यात् आह—

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्परकूट्तेनकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुये केनविकारवेत् करणाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

“स्वाम्” हि । करणानीति शेषः। यथा हि बहवत: पुरुषा: शाक्ति
कषायादिकथानुपाकारपृणिका: कृतसहःक्षेता: परावस्तन
( १६६ ) तत्तिराकर
नाथ प्रतिपादः; तत्तान्तसमश्चूक्तमवास्मालयतमः
प्रवर्तिते, प्रवर्तेमात्रस्तु शाक्तक: शहितेवाते न तु
यष्टादिके वे वाद्यकोशिपि शष्मितेव, न शक्तया
दिकम्। तथा स्वात्म्समश् करणात्मकृतात् स्वात्म
करणाविभूतात्मान्तम तरवर्तिते । तत्त्वानाचेत्
हेतुवाच वृत्तिसहळ्करप्रस्स्थ इस्तुकम्—“स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते” हि ॥

१. मनससहकृतवादानिर्दित्याणाम्। अन्तःकरणायणां वा ॥
कृति ३१-३२] पुरुषार्थास्य प्रवर्तकल्पम्, करणविभागम्।

स्वाभितत्—वाणीकादेश्येतत्स्तवात् परस्पराभितकोमवागम् प्रवर्तनं इति युक्तम्
करणांति श्रेणिततनाननि, तस्मात् इति प्रवर्तनस्यतः
( १६७) करणानाम-
नेत्रबाजारिण्य वाणीनां स्वरूपसामग्रियोपयोगाभिन्निन्यत मवित्तविसित्य भाषा—"पुरुषार्थेन एव हेतुः, न केन-
श्रृङ्खलापुर्वकल्पम्" इति। भोगापवर्गखण्डः युक्तम्
पुरुषार्थेन एवानागातात्: प्रवर्तनं करणानि, कृतमण्डः
तत्त्वसुविभाषनेन कर्मः। पुरुषार्थस्य विश्वेति
युक्तम् (कारिका ५७)
हृद्याणोपाध्यययः॥ ३१॥

( १६८) करणानां
“न केनचित्ता कार्यं करणम्” ह्युक्तम्। तत्र करणं
भागः॥ विभज्ये—
करण त्रयोदशाविधम्, तदावरणाध्यायप्रकाशकर्मम्।
कायै च तस्य दृष्टान्तः, हृद्यां धार्मिक प्रकाशं च ॥ ३२॥

“करण त्रयोदशाविधम्” ह्युक्त। इन्द्रियाणिकादास बुद्धरहस्यार्थेति त्रयो-
( १६९) त्रयोदशान्यं प्रकाशकर्मः। कार्यश्रेण: करणम्। न च
विध्यकरणपरिणामम्। व्यापारिक विना कार्यसवीत्तिर्ब्यापारवेशमाहे—
तद्वर्णाध्यायप्रकाशकर्मम्” ह्युक्त यथायथम्। तत्र कर्मिण्याणि वाणाडीन्या-
हस्तिनं, यथास्वपुष्पवुद्धिम्, स्वयंप्रवेश ह्याप्रजस्वेतिं थावत्।
बुद्धरहस्यार्थं
मनस्ति तु सवृयच्य द्वाराधिदृश्यकणः धार्मिन्न। बुद्धिन्द्रियाणिः रक्षस्यान्तोम्न्।
आहारणाध्यायाणिं दिक्षिणया भक्तम् कर्म कर्तिभिः भेद्यते आहे—
( १७०) करणानां
“कायै च तस्य” ह्युक्त। कार्यः तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य
परिणामम्। करणस्य दुःखः, आहार्योऽर्थम् प्रकाशः
च ॥ भागः॥ कार्योऽर्थम्। करणस्य भावना करणम्। अनेकं
विधिकारणं वचनात्मिकविभेद्यस्यगोरमानं: यथायथं व्याप्या; ते
च यथायथं विवाहन्यविध्यतः दुःख: ह्याहार्योऽर्थम्। एवं धार्मिकः
-करण debts प्राणविध्यकणः बुढ़ा वर्तीम्, तत्च पारिवार्यापरमात्मिति
शब्दार्थान प्रमाणाः समाहः गृहिणी, तेच पञ्च द्वाराधिदृश्यतः दृष्टिं धार्मिकः
प्रवत्तयाः। एवं बुद्धिन्द्रियाणि शब्दस्पन्दकर्माणि यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते
च यथायथं विवाहिदृश्यतः दृष्टिं कर्मप्रकाशमिपि दृष्टं भागः। ॥ ३२॥

त. कृति. ४
(१७१) न्योदः-
शाब्दिकरणे स्वातंत्र-विभागः:-बाङ्गान्तर:-
मेदताः
अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दुःखः बाह्य त्रयस्य विषयालयम्।
सामप्रत्कालं बाह्य त्रिकालमाध्यन्तरं करणम्॥ ३३॥

"अन्तःकरणम्" हृति। अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्-
(१७२) अन्तः:-'वृद्धिरुढ़कारो मनः' हृति; शरीरामन्तरविरूपः-
करणस्य शैविधम्॥ दुःखःकरणम्॥
"दुःखः" बाङ्गाकरणम् "त्रयस्य" अन्तःकरणस्य "विषयालयम्।
(१७२) बाङ्गान्तर-विषयमाध्यतिः विषयसंस्कृतपाभिमानाध्यवसायणूः
करणानं दशाधालम्॥ कर्तेषु द्वारांभवति। तः बुशीनिद्रायणालोकनेन,
कर्मेनिद्रायणं तु यथासंव विषयारणः॥ ३॥

बाङ्गान्तरयोः करणयोविशेषान्तरमाहं-"सामप्रत्कालम्" हृति। वर्तमान-
(१७४) बाङ्गान्तरकरणयोमेवः-बाह्य-
करणानं वर्तमानकालीतं, अन्तःकरणाः त्रिकालीततमुः॥

वल्लभ सार्वायणीकाममवत् पुक्को न बनागतादिव्यवहारसमेव वर्त्तमानमुदंस्तुति।
(१७५) सांख्यमतः काश्चन न तवस्त्रिकालमुः॥

१०. द्वाराभवनीति शेषः॥
(१७६) वार्द्याद् - साम्प्रतीकारणां वार्द्यार्धाणां विषयं विवेकः ययाविषयविवेचनम् ॥
चयति -

लुढीतिर्याणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि।
वार्तवति शाब्दविषया श्रेष्ठाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि। ॥ ३४ ॥

“लुढीतिर्याणि” हर्ति। “लुढीतिर्याणि” तेषां दसानासिद्धिर्याणः-
स्मधे “पञ्च” “विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि” विषेषा
(१७७) लुढीतिर् - स्थूलः शाब्दः शान्तगोर्मूर्धपः - प्रचिह्याविदः
याणं विषयं स्थूलः रूपः, कनिष्ठावस्तमंग्राणि सुक्ष्मः: शाब्दः,
सुक्ष्मरूपः ॥। सार्थमधुरेण सुक्ष्ममूहम पराकरोऽति। विषेषाश्रया नाटि-
कस्यापश्रयं विषेषाश्रयं:; त पव विषयं एषां लुढी-
तिर्याणं तान्ति त्योक्ति। तत्रोपर्य्यऽतोऽस्मि योगिनानां मोरः शाब्दतमाश्रय-
स्वृत्तिशाब्दविषयं च, अक्षमदारीनां तु स्थूलशाब्दविषयमेव। एवते
द्वकु स्थूलस्वरूपस्वरूपविषया, अक्षमदारीनां तु स्थूलस्वरूपविषयात्।
एवमच्छु-राधायो तस्मि तेषामस्मदारीनां च रूपादिषु सुक्षमस्थूलेषु दृष्ट्या।॥

पत्रं क्मेंद्रियेऽतु मधे “वार्तवति शाब्दविषया” स्थूलशाब्दविषया, काते-
तुवात्। त शाब्दतमाश्रयस्य हेतुस्तत्त्वायाकरक्कनेव
(१७८) क्मेंद्रियेऽतु वागिनिद्रियेऽतु सहकराणकरावत्। “संपादणि तु”
विषयाः ॥। चतवारि पायूपस्पर्शाणिपादायथायथानि “पञ्चविषयाणि”
पाण्यथाहायाणां बटादीनां पञ्चशाब्दायात्रः चाराविधानं विवेकाराविधानं
विद्वति ॥ ३४ ॥

साम्प्रतं चुरौवशः करणेषु केषाभिविधानमभावं सहेदुक्तमाहं--
सान्त: करणं गुर्दः सर्व विषयमवगाहते यस्मात्।
तस्मात्त्रिनिविधं करणं द्वारां, द्वाराणि श्रेष्ठाणि। ॥ ३५ ॥

१. तपात्सयेत । २. “भूतभावविक्रियास्थिति” हर्ति पाठवान्तः।
“सान्तःकरणा” हृति। “द्वारी” प्रधानम्। “द्वाराणि” करणाणि।

(१७९) सर्वविविधः  

भाबानिद्रियाणि द्वाराणि। तैरूपनीतं सर्वं विषयं  

समावः शहस्कारं बुद्धि: यस्मादवगाहते सत्त्ववस्तिं  

तस्मादाभाबानिद्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारक्त्वी च सान्तः:  

करण बुद्धिते हृति। ॥ ३५ ॥

न केवलं भाबानिद्रियाण्यपेक्ष हृतां बुद्धि:, अथि तु ये सत्वहस्कारमस्ती  

द्वाराणि ते अपपेक्ष बुद्धि: प्रधानसिद्धाय—

एते प्रदीपकल्प: परस्परविश्वक्षणा गुणविशेषा:।  

कर्त्तं पुरुषस्यार्थ प्रकाशय बुद्धी प्रयच्छिन्ति। ॥ ३६ ॥

“एते” हृति। यथा हि प्रामाण्यक्ष: कोस्तम्बकेभ्य: करसार्याय विषया:।

(१८०) अन्तः।  

ध्यायाय प्रयच्छिन्ति, विषयार्थक्षण सत्त्ववस्तिः स  

च पुण्यते; तथा भाबानिद्रियार्थः हो नसे समयः  

यति, मनस सकार्थवाहकारय, अहुःकाराभिमभय  

बुद्धी सत्त्ववस्तिः भूताय, —सत्त्ववस्तिः— “पुरुषस्यार्थ  

प्रकाशय बुद्धी प्रयच्छिन्ति” हृति।  

भाबानिद्रियार्थः शहस्कारय “गुणविशेषा:” गुणाना सर्वव्रजस्वसां विकारा,  

(१८१) परस्पर-  

विरोधाधीनामपि  

गुणाना पुरुषस्यार्थ  

एकार्यं प्रम्पति: प्रदी-  

पवत्। ॥

कस्मात् धुन्त्वां प्रयच्छिन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहस्कारय द्वारिणे मनसे चेतनत  

बाहि—  

सर्वं प्रत्ययमोऽगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साद्यति बुद्धि:।  

सर्वेऽए च विशेषितं पुनः प्रधानपुरुषपत्रं सूक्ष्मम्। ॥ ३७ ॥

“सर्वम्” हृति। पुरुषस्यार्थ प्रयोजकस्वारत तत्व यस्मात्स्वस्यायानम् तत्,
(१८२) बुद्धि व्यास साक्षात्साधनमू, तस्मात्सैव प्रधानम्।

यथा सवर्ण्यक: साक्षादात्मा साधनान्तरस्वरूप प्रधानमिति तु प्रामाण्यकालस्य तथेन विचारण।

तद्विविषयोपरिषद्धात्तु प्रधानमू वस्तुतः तस्मात्सैव सवर्ण्यक: साधनान्तरस्वरूप प्रधागमनमू, तस्मात्सैव।

(१८३) पुरुषस्य धार्मिक स्वंस्वयं नित्यस्य कृतकलावदृपि निवासस्य कृतकलाप्राप्तिः। न तु प्रधानपुरुषस्य खुलकलस्य नित्यस्य कृतकलाप्राप्तिः। न तु प्रधानस्वत्वस्य स्वपनस्य स्वत्त्बस्य स्वत्त्वस्य।

नमुने नित्यस्य कृतकलाप्राप्तिः। न तु प्रधानपुरुषस्य प्राप्तिः। न तु प्रधानस्य स्वत्त्बस्य।

तदेवं करणानि विभज्य विशेषाविशेषानि विभज्यं

तन्मात्रानुःविशेषं: ते भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चस्य।

पत्रस्य विशेषं: शान्ता शुराक्ष मूढाश्।

"तन्मात्रानिः" हृदी। शब्दानुविशेषानि सूक्ष्मानि। न चैव (१८४) अविशेषं शान्तवादीर्द्विति उपभोगयोगायो विशेष हृदी।

(सूक्ष्म कथनम्) मानसात्मकः।
भिदेशकथनम् ।

(१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) तेष्यस्तमाश्रयो यथासंबंधंमेक्षिणेतस्मपशः
कथनम्-तःशृवतिप्रद-भूतान्यकाशाशिलानिद्धमकिकाविनिरङ्गाणि
“पाच”
“पुष्चयः” 
तन्माश्रयः ॥

रसवेचेष्यम्पति:, विशेषे विंमातानिस्मित्य भाद-“पुते स्मृति विशेषः”
इति । कुतः-“शान्त घोराश्र शूलाश्र” । चकार
(१८६) भूतानां स्थः
एको हेतौ त्रित्यत्समुखः। यस्मादकाशाशिविषु
लवे हेतुकथनम् ॥
स्वूक्तेन सच्चप्रथानत्या केविच्यान्ता: सुखः:, प्रकाशा
रक्षेत:, केविचित्प्रथानत्या घोरः: हुः:। अनवस्थितः:, केविचित्म:प्रथान-
त्या सूक्ता विषण्णा गुरुः: । तेऽस्मि परस्पर्यायार्थया सुभूमाणाः
“विशेषः”
इति च ‘स्थूलः’ इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मालाणि िवस्मादाििविषु
शान्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषः: सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ १८ ॥

विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाइ—
सूक्ष्मा मातापितुः: सहाभूमूत्तिविषयविशेषः: स्यः।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितुः निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

“सूक्ष्मा” इति । “द्रिष्या विशेषः: स्यः” इति, तानु विशेषप्रकारा-
नाह-“सूक्ष्मा” सूक्ष्मदेहः। परिकल्पिताः:, “माता-
पितुः” पात्राणितः। तत्र मातृतो लोमोकासिनः
मांसानि, पितृवस्तु सनात्यस्मिन्मा गंगा, प्रकृतानि
महानि भूतानि “भूमाणि”- तैस्सह ।
सूक्ष्म शारीरस्मिन्विशेषः:, मातापितुः द्रित्यतः; शान्तानि
शृङ्गः: च घटार्तीनि निवेषेः इति ॥

(१८७) अवान्तरविषो-
पकथनम्-सूक्ष्ममातापितुः-
तुजमेदेन ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममातापितुः-एहीविशेषमाइ—“सूक्ष्माणां
स्थिताः” इति। विशेषाणां मध्ये मे ते “नियतः” ॥
“मातापितुः निवर्तन्ते” इति, रसान्ता वा
अभिष्मान्या वा विन्दुतवेति ॥ ३९ ॥

१. नियतः:। २. अभिनियतः:।
सूक्ष्मशारीरिक विभागः

सूक्ष्मशारीरिक विभागः

पूर्वोत्पन्नस्तथा नियतमध्यदाःसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्
संसर्गति निरुपमोंग माहौरिवशिस्तिं चिन्जुम् || ४० ||

'पूर्वोत्पन्नम्' हृति । "पूर्वोत्पन्नम्" प्रधाननादिर्दर्शोंग प्रतिपुरुषमेकोः
कस्मुपाधितम् । "अस्तकम्" अव्याहतम् शिलाम्
(१८९) सूक्ष्म-तथा
शारीरेण्याडनम्-तथा
तथाऽनि-(१)सत्खच-
वम-(२)मित्रवम्।।
समुद्राः सूक्ष्मं शारीरम्
शान्तोधरमूःैरित्रिवियेर-
त्तत्त्वादिहिषेकः ॥

नवस्वेतदेव शारीरं भोगयतं पुनःस्वः
कृतं द्रथयमेणेन पाद्कौशिकेन
शारीरेणेत्यत आहं-"संसर्गति" हृति । उपात्तं
सुपात्तं पाद्कौशिकं शारीरं जहातं हायं हायं चोपाद्वते-
कस्मात् हृति "निरुपमोऽगम्" यतः, पाद्कौशिकं
शारीरं भोगयतं विना सूक्ष्मं शारीरं निरुपमोऽ
स्वत्त्वस्मासूक्ष्मं शारीरं संसर्गति ॥

नन्तु धर्मिष्यमिलिबं: संसारं, न च सूक्ष्मशारीरस्वस्यति तथोऽः, तत्कथं
(१९२) धर्मिष्यमिलि-भावारिविस्तितसुभ।
तत्संसरणम् ॥
संसर्गति तथा-"भावारिविस्तितसुभ।" हृति ।
धर्मिष्यमिलिवातःभावारिविस्तितसुभ।
तद्विषदः, तद्विषदचय सूक्ष्मं शारीरिस्तित तद्वि
भावारिविस्तितसुभ।, यथा सूक्ष्मशारीरस्वस्मासीतसुभ।
द्वारं वादामोक्षितममृति । तस्मात् भावारिविस्तितव्यासवेतसंसर्गति ॥
कस्मात् युनः प्रधाननितिः महाप्रववे सिपम् तत्त्वरिष्टम् तिरितामृत्य आह-"चिन्जुम्" हृति । लयं गच्छतिति चिन्जुम्-हेतुमधवं
(१९२) महाप्रववे
तथ्य लयं गच्छतिति
चास्य चिन्जुममृति भावः || ४० ||

１. प्रथात्मभिमिति कैवितु।
व्यायामादि-बुधिरेव साहकारौरित्र्या कर्ममाण्य संसारति। इत्यं सुझ्मार्गीरूणा-प्रामाणिकेनेतरत भाष—

"चिचिरिय यथाश्रययुते स्थानादिश: विना यथा चढाया।
तद्विद्रिणा विशेषेन तिष्ठति निराश्रय धिञ्ज्ञम्॥ ४७॥

"चिचिरिय" हि तिष्ठसमाना धापवत बुधव्रायसये धिञ्ज्ञम्, तव अनन्य
श्रावणत तिष्ठति। जन्ममयानांतराण बुड्कावद्यः प्रमु-१६३ ( १६३ ) सुझ्मार्गीर-
तप्याराश्रयः। -प्रस्तुपपपपपपचत्तमाराश्रयः। सति
स्थावरुक्ष्यक्ष्यप्रदेशः॥।

"विना विशेषः" हि केशूः केरौन्यत्त: धिञ्ज्ञम॥ ४७॥

माहमायत्त: समायः।
अद्ध्यात्तमात्र पुरुषं विन्ध्यकरण बलायतः।" (महाभारत वनपरव-अध्याय
२९६।) द्युष्टमात्रायेव सुझ्मार्गीरक्ष्यक्ष्ययुति। आठमनो निःश्रावणसम्भ-
वातु सुझ्मावन गालरोऽ पुरुषः।, तद्वप पृथि स्थ्रूलशारीरें शेते हि तिष्ठा॥ ४१॥

एवं सुझ्मार्गीरसृवरुक्ष्यक्ष्यपुपाध: यथा संसारति, इति हेतुना च-तद्भयमान-पुरुषार्थेतत्कालं विन्ध्यनैवमतिकामित्यस्मिनः।

प्रत्यक्तोबिन्धुस्योगाण्तवरुक्ष्यविन्ध्यहृदत्रहिञ्ज्ञम॥ ४२॥

"पुरुषार्थेतत्कालं" हि पुरुषार्थेतत्कालं हेतुना प्रयुक्तम्। "विन्ध्यम्"
वद्धाकाशमासि, "नानामतिकाम्" तेषु तेषु निकाशये।
(१६४) सुझ्मार्गीर-
यथायथ यथोक्षविक्षाराश्रयसहः। स हि वचार्यमिनितेनिनिधान-संस्काराः॥

प्रवश:। निमित्तत्त: नानामतिकामः-तस्मात्र व:। प्रवशः। प्रत्यक्तिक्षारः। "नन्दवद्ध्यविन्ध्यहिञ्ज्ञम्" सुझ्मार-
शारीरम्। यथा हि नन्दवद्ध्यविन्ध्यहि स्थ्रूलाकाशहिञ्ज्ञम्भो तस्मात्

१. केवलं दारिका स्थ्रूलशारीरपरत्तघो व्यायामयक। दिञ्ज्ञम्। दिञ्ज्ञार्थले
विशेषः। स्थ्रूलशारीरिववन्द्य:।। अन्ये दुः। दिञ्ज्ञार्थले। विशेषः। दिञ्ज्ञ-
शारीरिववन्द्य:। सुझ्मार्गीरूणात।। एतत्म्ये शारीरत्यम्-दिञ्ज्ञार्थले। तदन्तमते। शारीरिववन्द्य। तदन्तमते। सुझ्मार्गीरूणात। तदन्तमते। सुझ्मार्गीरूणात।
निमित्रनैमितिकिविभागः ।

वसराजो वा भवति, एवनवतस्थृष्ठस्वारीपरिमिर्गासिद्धो वा सनुच्चो वा पशुवा
वनस्पतिवा भवति सूक्ष्म शरीरस्याँतः ॥

कुलस्यः पुनरावृद्धिः महिमेन भाहे--“प्रकृतेतिःप्रस्वयोगात्” इति ।
( १९५ ) सूतमाराज- तथा च पुराणम्
संसरो इत्युतः-प्रकृतेतिः
“वेषस्वयम् प्रधानस्य परिणामोदयन्त्रम्”
सुखम् ॥

“निमित्रनैमित्तिकिविभागः” हस्यकस्म- तत्र निमित्रनैमितिकि विभज्जते—
सांसिधिकाक्ष्य भावयः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाक्ष्य भान्याः ।
द्धः करणार्थ्यांकः कार्यार्थ्याण्व कल्याणः ॥ ४२ ॥

“सांसिधिकाक्ष्य” इति । “वैकृतिकः” नैमित्तिकः पुरुषस्य जातस्य-
( १९६ ) निमित्रनैमितिकिविभागः धर्मार्दी-
रूपनैमित्तिकस्य प्राकृतिकं
“वैकृतिकंभावकथनम्,”
तत्स्य च करणार्थ्यांत्रिकाः
वर्णान्व ॥

कार्यार्थ्यां तदार्थ्याण्वः, तस्यावस्था: कलधुन्दुरधनंपशिकर्षणद्वायकः
( १९७ ) सारायग्रहवनैमित्तिकस्य कार्यार्थ्यां
अर्थार्थ्यांत्रिकां ॥

अवगतानि निमित्रनैमितिककानि । करमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कर्मश्रेणिकै-
तिकिविभागः ॥

( १९८ ) निमित्त-विशेषाणा कार्यविशेष-विन्यासम् ॥

१. करणमांत्र बुद्धि: । २. ‘स्वामस्विकः’ यावदस्तुमाराजः, ‘वैकृतिकः’
कार्यार्थ्यांत्रिकः ॥ गोइपदाधिकृत्य तु—‘मात्राकृत्रिम बिण्यान्ते-सांसिधिकः’, भान्याः,
वैकृत्यकस्म ॥
धर्मेण गमनमूल्यं, गमनमध्यस्ताद्रव्यत्यर्थस्येन।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिरिष्यते बन्धः॥ ४४॥

“धर्मेण गमनमध्यस्य” दुप्रभृतिपु लोकेषु। “गमनमध्यस्ताद्रव्यस्येन”
(१९९) धर्मस्य धीर-सुतला लोकेषु। “ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः।” तावदेव
गमने प्रति अभ्यक्ष्या-
प्रकृतिभोगमार्गमनस्थते न यावदद्विविषयाति करोति; अथ
विवेकेशया सत्यं कृतकृत्ययथा विवेकेक्षत्यमन्त्रात
मुद्रयम् प्रति निबृत्ते। यथाहुः—

“विवेकेशयं तिन्यते ज्ञेयं प्रकृतिभेतितम्” हृति॥
“विपर्ययात्” ब्रतवचज्ञानात् “हृत्यं बन्धः”॥

स च त्रिविधः—प्राकृतिको वेद्विको दाश्चित्क्षेत्रित। तत्र प्रकृतायातम-
(२००) कर्मस्यनिधि-ज्ञानेच प्रकृतिसम्पाते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः; यः
निरुपणम् प्राकृतिकवै-
पुराणे प्रकृतिभियानु प्रत्युच्छते।
कृतिक-दाश्चित्क्षेत्रितम्॥

“पुष्पं शतसङ्ख्यं हि तिस्तन्यन्यत्यक्षितकः” हृति॥

वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतनिर्द्रयाह्सङ्कुद्रीः पुष्पविशयोपापसे,
तानु प्रतिदुभुच्छते—

“इस मन्वन्तराणीह तिस्तन्यन्यत्यक्षितकः।
भौतिकान्ति शतमूल्यं, सहक्षन्वभिमानिकः।
वैद्या इस सहस्राणि तिस्तन्ति विगतज्वरः।
ते खल्लमी विद्वद्वा येषों वेद्विको बन्धः” हृति॥

१. भुतान्तरम् । २. “भौतिकः”—ये भुतात्मेय पुष्पविशयोपापसे ।
‘आभिमानिकः’—ये दाश्चित्क्षेत्र सुपुष्पविशयोपापसे । ‘वैद्या’—ये दुष्क्षणेय पुष्पविशयोपापसे । ३. वैद्या: वेद्विकान्त्यनवचत्च संज्ञानस्तरामिदं पारिमायिकम्।
वैराग्यातीनं फलकथनम् ॥ ५९ ॥

इष्टापूर्तेन द्राक्षिणकः पुष्पतच्वानभिः हीषापूर्तेकारी कामोपहतनमः
बध्यते हि ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः संसारे भवति राजसाद्रागात् ॥
एष्याद्विद्विधाते विपर्ययात् द्विपर्ययः ॥ ४५ ॥

"वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः" हि-पुष्पतच्वानभिः साधनात्
(२०१) वैराग्यात्
प्रकृतिनिन्यः कक्स्मत्राणेन प्रकृतमहहङ्कारभूते-
(२०२) राजसाद्रागात्
संसारस्य दुःखतुन्वतः सुचिता ॥

"संसारे भवति राजसाद्रागात्" हि । 'राजसात्' इत्यनेन रजसो
एष्याद्विद्विधाते विपर्ययात् द्विपर्ययः ॥ ४५ ॥

"एष्याद्विद्विधाते" हि-इच्छायाः हि यदेवचछति तदेव करति
(२०३) एष्याद्विद्विधाते विपर्ययात् द्विपर्ययः ॥ ४५ ॥

बुद्धिवर्मनं चम्प्रदीन्धैं भावानं समस्स्यातत् सुमुख्यामेन हेयोपदेवयानं
(४५) प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः
दुःखितं प्रथमनंतरं समस्स्यात्
एष प्रख्यवयस्स्यो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिष्टिष्टि-समस्स्यात्
(४५) प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः
गुणवैशम्यमविद्विद्विधात् तथा च भेदास्तु पञ्चस्स्यात् ॥ ४५ ॥

१. वायुप्रतापतागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामः पूतास्माताः
(४५) प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः
प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः
एकानिकम्महवं भेदात्ता तथा हूँते । अन्नवेधाः च यद्रमतिस्मितद्विधानेत्
छितये । २. यः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः प्रकृतिलयः
“पुष:” इति || प्रतीयते दुःनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः || तत्र "विपर्यय: " अज्ञानमधिया, सा दुभिधिमधः
(२०४) विपर्ययादि:- "अशक्ति: " अपि करणवैकल्येहूऽ बुद्धिधिमधः पौर ||
बुद्धिचिन्ता समासेन "तुषिकौदी " अपि वक्ष्यमण्डलक्षणे बुद्धिधिमधांवेव || कथनम् ||
तत्र विपर्ययाभासितुदिष्टिृ यथायोगं सहान्यां धर्मोऽभिनं दीनां ज्ञानवर्जितमन्नतां || सिद्धि च ज्ञानस्येति ||

व्यासाद:- "तस्य च मेद्रास्तु पञ्चाशत् " इति || कस्मात्? "गुण.
वैष्णवविजयत् " इति || गुणानं चैण्यमक्क्रेक्ष्या:-
(२०५) तस्येव व्यासेन धिक्कवलता दुहोऽधोऽवी, कैक्रस्य न्यूनवलता द्वयोऽ
कथनम्-पञ्चाशदि:- || द्वयोऽवी, ते च न्यूनाधिकृ कन्धमयाधिकेश्वरात्मात्त्या
यथाकारायुवीयेत् || तदिवं गुणानं वैष्णवमुन्नपायम:ः एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोऽधोऽवीमभवः ||
तस्मातस्य भेदः: पञ्चाशदिः || ४६ ||

tanv ev pñçñàññadéññu gññayiti--

pñçñ vijññayembda bxchnyññacññkññ karnvaíkánatuu.

abhàviññatiññembda tündññcññya s-foodiññiï. || ४७ ||

"pñçñ" Íiti || abhàviññatiññaràgràññpàññiññya. yathasàṅgàm bhàme -
(२०६) vijññayãdînã:- vijññayàbhàmànàpàññiññyàbhàmànà vijññayà-
pñçñàñndìpredàññanàm ||

śvàbhàvàt, yàdà-yàdàvàya vijññayàbhàmànàbhàmàtà vástu, abhàmiññàdàyàtástववàmà: स्वतस्तवमिनिविश्वान्ते || अत पूः पञ्चपवाविलेयाय हंगवान्त ावर्गण: || ४७ ||

(२०७) vijññayãdînã:- sàmnàtì pñçñàñã vijññayembdrànàmàvàntàrnàmbèrsâãh --

prâkàmbàntarnàmbèrdàññµ- तत्र प्रथमं विपर्य- 
यस्य धार्शिन: ||
मदुसोभिन्दो मोहस्य च, दशविधयो महामोहः।
तामिसः स्वादश्रया, तथा भवयन्धतामिलसः॥ ४८ ॥

"मदुः" हृत्। मदुसोभिन्दो स्विचया अवधिः। अद्वंश्वश्चकमहद्वेष्यारः
( २०८ ) अविदापुर-पल्लवमात्रिकश्मशाद्वहमुदिरविधा तमः, अर्थावधि-
पप्पनेयायस्वाट्साध्विद्वमम्॥

"मोहस्य च" हृति, अत्रावधिधियो मदुस्थकारेणानुपुजये। देवा
( २०९ ) असितारुप-हास्यामेंश्ब्रह्मायासूत्ताभविभार्मण्येनोषितवामिदिकाम:-
विपप्पनेयायस्वाट्साध्विद्वमम्॥

"दशविधयो महामोहः" हृति। शब्दादिनु परमसु विद्याधिवर्गतया दश-
( २१० ) गार्ग्यविविधायश्च दशविधम्। रचनीशेषश्च आतिष्ठतामोहः, स
वर्ण द्वाविष्ठविश्ववार्षिद्विधः॥

"तामिसः" देवो "स्यादस्या।्
शब्दादिनो दष्टविषयः रचनीयाः
( २११ ) द्वापरविवर्णम्। यथात् रचनीयशब्दादिनुः। ते च शब्दादिनु
विधायाद्विद्वमम्। उपाधिनि: परसरोपन्यांमात्रामस्तुपार्यायामिदिकाम्:
वर्णेश्वे कष्टलोकाजयानि वर्णो भवतीति शब्दादिनाद्विधिः:
सहानिमायायकमद्वषाद्वषे, तद्विषयो द्वापराः स्यादाविषयवाद्वषाद्वषे
द्वापर्ये॥

"तथा भवयन्धतामिलः।" अभिनिवेशेऽस्याद्विधम्। तथेत्यनेनाति-
दयाजयानुपुजये। देवा: सहानिमादिकमद्विधिविद्वमे
( २१२ ) अभिनिवेशे-शडार्म्यायात्माद्वः
'शब्दादिनो भोग्यास्तुपार्यायामिदिकादियो समापः
विधिविद्वमम्। तद्विषयानि ब्याहिनिवेशे स्याद्विधमाद्वाद्वाद्विधम्॥

dharmadhikari
(२९३) विपर्ययावान्‌
न्तरमेदसमिष्टिकस्या‌
द्वापांत्रि‌ \(\text{॥ ४८ ॥}\)

(२९४) अपरिविशालिनि‌
तदेव पञ्चविपर्ययमेद्रातुक्तवा‌ श्याबिचारिषिमेद्राम‌
प्रकारकारणकिरणम्‌ \(\text{॥ शक्तिमहे‌—} \)
एकदेशविद्ययथा‌: सह युद्धविधेराशकिरुढिष्या‌।
सवदे‌ बधा बुद्धेविपर्ययानुष्ठितिस्वतीदीनाम्‌ \(\text{॥ ४९ ॥} \)
“एकदेश”-\(\text{इति‌} \) इन्द्रियविधास्य यथा युद्धविधेराशकिरुढिष्या‌।
न त्वसरस्य
(२९५) एकदेशविद्ययथा‌: तेषां यथावति‌ बुद्धेविपर्ययानुष्ठितिस्वतीदीनाम्‌।
बाधिः \(\text{॥} \)

बाधिः \(\text{कुष्ठिता‌ सप्तलं‌ जडता‌ सजिग्रहता‌ तथा‌।} \)
मूकताकौश्यपरुषाकौश्ययोद्वारतंनन्दा‌। \(\text{॥} \)

यथासंख्यं‌ श्रोतारातिनिद्रियानि‌ वधा‌।
एतावतेऽव तु तदेवुद्धे‌
शक्तिः‌ स्वब्याप्तो‌ भवति‌।
तथा चैवहस्तेनतुक्तवधादिकाद्वशा‌ युद्धशकिरुढिष्यते‌।
हेतुहेतुमत्वं‌ नस्तिविद्ध्यता‌।
च सामानाथिकरणम्‌। \(\text{॥} \)

तद्विषिद्रियबधारात्रेण‌ युद्धशकिरुढिष्यकः‌ स्वरूपतो‌ शशकीराहै‌।
“सह-\(\text{युद्धेन‌} \)
(२९६) बुद्धे‌ \(\text{साष्ट्राम्‌} \)
द्वापां निष्ठिकस्य \(\text{॥} \)

(२९७) \(\text{नवविचारु-} \)
\(\text{प्रकारकम्‌} \)।
तुष्टिनवेर्गेत्युक्तम्‌, \(\text{तः‌ परिगणयति‌—} \)
अाथ्यामिकाःकाःक्रतःः प्रकृतिपुपादानकालभाग्यायः।
बाह्य्विषयोपरमानुष्ठ पद्ध,—नव तुष्टयोभिमतः।॥ ५०॥

"अाथ्यामिकः" इति। अाथ्यामिकःः—‘प्रकृतिविव्यतिरिक्त बाध्य दस्ति’
इति प्रतिपदः, ततो ५थ्य अथवाननादिना विवेक-
(२१८) चतुर्विणा-
वाचाकाराय वचसुधुपरेःपुत्रीयो यो न प्रयत्ते तत्थाये
ध्यामिकतत्त्वस्तुध्यो भवनितः; प्रकृतिविव्यतिरिक्त-
मात्मानमपहितक्ष्य यस्मात्तात्त्वस्तुक्ष्यमादध्यामिकः।
कास्ता इत्यत बाह्—‘प्रकृतिपुपादानकालभाग्यायः’; प्रकृतियादिराया यास्वां तास्तथोकाः।॥

तेन प्रकृत्यायाय तुष्टिया कस्यचिदुपदेशे;—विवेकसाधाराय हि प्रकृति-
(२१९) अध्यामि-
कुलिष्य प्रथमा प्रकृतीयाया अम्मः।॥

यथा तु,—‘प्राकृतिपिल’ विवेकवस्तितिनन्, सा प्रकृतितताद्राजतिः, ३ मार्श्वनन्याया
(२२०) द्वितीयाय उपान
दानायाय सत्यिष्यम्।॥

यथा तु,—प्रवज्ञाधिपि सहोदरिवाणृतिः सैव कालपरिपक्षपेश्य सिद्धिनेते
(२२१) तृतीयाय काल
विधास्तिः, अलथ्युतस्या तव।—इति उपदेशे या
थ्या मेघः।॥

अन्य: १. सत्याव: सत्याव:—अम्म: सत्यिष्य मेघो ब्रूढः पार: तथा सुपार: च।
अन्या च पारापर्मनुतममामु उत्तमाममाये। २. प्रकृति निबद्धो । ३. प्रकृति-
मात्रांवेशे प्राप्त: सत्य प्रकृति तुल्यममप्रेक्षानातु सत्यसुन्यस्य विवेक-
क्यायति: स्यादिति द्वृत्यम्। ४. ‘ओध’ इति पादान्तरम्।
(२२२) चतुर्थी भागावलय वृद्धि करते। त्या तु-‘न प्रकृतेन कालाखस्य युपात्रानाक्षेत्रक्ष्यतिः, अपि तु भागावलय। अत्र एवं मद्यवस्थानविवक्ष्यतिः भगुवद्वंद्वाद्रत्र विक्षेप्यतात्मनि सुकृतः समृद्धः, तस्माताभागाय- मेच्र हेतुनिधिः-हृदि उपदेशे त्या वृद्धि सा भागावलय। कालाखस्य युपात्रानायोथितेः, अपि तु भागावलय। अत्र एवं मद्यवस्थानविवक्ष्यतिः भगुवद्वंद्वाद्रत्र विक्षेप्यतात्मनि सुकृतः समृद्धः, तस्माताभागाय- मेच्र हेतुनिधिः-हृदि उपदेशे त्या वृद्धि सा भागावलय।

बाधा दश्ययति-“बाधा: ” तुष्यः “विषयोपरमात, पशुः”। या: खल्वातस्य: प्रकृतिमहाद्वरकाराविद्यमयिमन्यन्। (२२३) पशुविचारहस्य मानसय वैराग्ये सति तुष्यस्ता बाधा:, आभावजाना- तुष्यक्षमात भावं सत्यानानामना: भवति महाकालय वैश्वेति। तार्थ वैराग्ये सति तुष्य हृदि वैराग्येतुपपुजवेतुहास्यपि पशुः। तस्य्यस्ववात् तुष्यः पशुः हृदि वैराग्ये तुपपुजवेतुहास्यपि पशुः। तथा हृ-अर्जनरक्षणयो भोगाद्वित्यदोषद्रश्यनेतृतुजन्मानः पशुपरमाः। (२२४) बाधयतिं भवति। तथा हृ-सेवापाण्य धनार्जनोपय:। ते च प्रथमाः पारस्। सेवकार्यां हृ-ख्याकुविन्ति।

“हृयार्दुरीशःस्थवरकं चण्डाख्युम्बंजां। वेदनां भावयन प्राण: क सेवात्स्वनज्वलते।”

पुष्यमन्ये पव्यायोपय:। तुः ख्याहृि विषयोपरसे या तुष्यः सैपा ‘पारसुः’ उच्यते।

तथा थित्वंदनस्य राजेकाराकाराकाराकिण्डलोहितयो विनिहक्ष्यताय तद्द्रशः। (२२५) द्वितीया महुःक्षितिः भावयन्तो विषयोपरसे या तुष्यः सा सुपारसुः। द्वितीया ‘सुपारसुः’ उच्यते।

तथा यहां स्वयंसेवनानि-अनं स्वेदसानं स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि तद्यक्षमां स्वेदाण्डनं हृि

१. एकागारिकं-चौऽः।
\textbf{अष्टसिद्धिकथनम्}}

एवं शब्दः अभावाय मात्र विश्वासी कामाः, ते च विश्वासी कामिनं (२२७) चतुर्थं, अनुतः दु:खकृत्वेति भोगदीपस्म भावितो विश्वयपरस्य या माम्मः॥

तुष्टि: सा चतुर्थी 'अनुजमाम्म' उच्चयते॥

एवमाध्यात्मिक भवानि विश्वयपोष: सर्वव्रतीति हिन्दौदेशदुर्दशिनादिव्योः।।
(२२८) दशमी उत्तरम् परस्य या तुष्टि: सा पद्मिनी 'उत्तमाम्म' उच्चयते॥

माम्मः॥

एवमाध्यात्मिकी भवानि: वाद्यानिन्द्र पुन:भिन: 'नव तुष्टयो उत्तम: मतः.'॥ ५०॥

(२२८१) सिद्धिदेवक- गौणसुखेभवेदः सिद्धिराह-॥

थनम्॥

उहः शब्दः अध्ययनं दुःखविघाताभ्य: सुहासिनः।

दानं च सिद्धो दशीः सिद्धे: पूर्वो उद्कुशिकविधः।। ५१॥

"उह" इति। विश्वासमास्थ दुःखस्य विष्कारितगुहाभाव इतीमा
(२२९) सिद्धिमेधक- गौणसुखेभवेदः सिद्धिराह-॥

थनम्॥

मुः सिद्धितस्वः सिद्धः, तदुपयायतथा सिद्धे गौणः。

पत्रः सिद्धः, ता अपि हेतुहुस्मच्छ ब्यवस्थिताः।

तत्तत्रादा ऋग्वेदकविष्णु निधानें ते सिद्धैः हेतुस्तु
सिद्धोः हेतुमध्य एव। मध्यमास्तु हेतुहृदस्मलः॥

विविद्या: गौणसुखा श्यामावर्षवर्षवर्षप्रह्लणस्यायनम् प्रथमा सिद्धि-।।
(२२१) अध्ययनः उत्तरस्वरूपः उत्तरस्वरूपः प्रथमा सिद्धि-॥

प्रथमा सिद्धः, तादादृ॥

तत्तकार्येऽम् शब्दः 'शब्दः' इति पदम् शब्दजितसमयेऽनमुपक्रमः।।
(२२२) शब्दप्रयोगः कार्णे कार्णोपचारात्। मा द्वितीया इति: सुधार-॥

द्वितीया, सुधारम्॥

सिद्धे: पाठार्थायंतरानिदिनिवधा अभ्यः॥

त, कौ. ५
“ऊहः” तर्कः भागमानिरोपिन्यायानंगमाध्यपरीक्षणम्। परीक्षणनं शास्त्रः (२३२) ऊहुप्-चूर्णारूपे लोकविनिराकरणोंतरपश्चात्वस्थापनम्। तद्र्विषमन- 
यज्ञीय तारतामुः। न माच्छेदः भागमिनः। सा तृतीया सिद्धस्ता- 
तारसुद्धिये। |

“सुहःप्राप्तं।” न्यायेन स्वयंपरीक्षितकथ्यं न अघीर्षेत्। न वाच्युगः (२३४) सुहःप्राप्तिः। 
शिश्विनेत्रहवाचारिनिःकसंवाचार्य; ध्रुवतः सुहः 
चूर्णारूपे रस्तकः। शिश्विनेत्रहवाचारिणां संवाचार्यसः प्राच्छ्तः सुहः 
सिद्धस्त्वतः रस्तकः उच्चये। |

“दान” च शुद्धिविवेककारास्य, ‘दैपू शोधने’ [पाणिनि ६१४६ त] 
इश्वरास्तरोदारामपुष्यपते। ययाह भगवानू पत- 
(२३५) दानवृपः 
‘सिद्धिः’—‘विवेकस्वरुपि विवेकस्वरुपि विवेकस्वरुपिः। श्रीमान् श्रीमान् 
पञ्चमी, सदामुदिष्टम्।’ प्रायः। इति [योगसूत्र २२६]। ‘अविस्फूर्तः’ 
शुद्धिः, सा च सवासनसंशयनविवायपानां परिहारेऽ 
विवेकस्वरुपेऽकरास्य स्वयथापवाइः स्वस्थापनम्। सा च नवि विना ५५दर्शेऽ- 
न्तयदेवसेवकस्वरुपिः भवात्रतीति दानेन (विवेकस्वरुपः कार्यं) 
सोः पिसंगुधित:। सेवमयानम् सिद्धस्त्वदामुदिष्टमुः वच्चे। |
(२३६) दुःखदिवात- 
तिरुश्रुत जुखः 
सिद्धयः। सिद्धयः। सिद्धसः सुमदुष्टमोदमाना, 
नवरुपाटितो सुखः। 
इश्वरस्ते सिद्धयः। |

प्रभुविद्युदस्मदुष्टमोदमाना। |

अन्ये व्याच्छते-विनोदे देयादिना प्रागमावीयमायासवाध्यक्षवात् वात्वावजः 
यथौ सा सिद्धरूहः। यथौ सांस्कृतकाध्यायानवात्- 
(२३७) गौणसिद्ध- 
वश्चकन्या प्रकाशान्तेरेण 
व्याख्यानम्।। |

१. “मनस्मो अमन्नमेवादुहःस्मात्। इति द्वितीयं मनमाह शुद्धिप्राप्तित। 
" पाठान्तरम्। |

२. “निविदाेदने नीरत्तयम्” इति अभ्यासो दयपि। 

३. अम्बियालो दयपि।
रस्तवालिकंतथं सुहुर्द प्राथ्य ज्ञानमुस्पदते सा ज्ञानलक्षण सिद्दिश्चत्त्व सुहुर्द्याक्षि:। द्रामसा सिद्दिहेतुः, धनादिवननाराजितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानमयकृत्यति।
अत्थ च युक्तायुक्ते सुरीरिषेवानवगात्ये इति कुतस्पदेयोजावनेन न: सिद्दान्तमात्रब्याख्यानप्रबुद्धानामिति॥
सिद्धितुलिपियावेणासिद्धिदिव्यसाधनस्थल्यो इत्ययो। अत्र प्रथ्यसर्गं॥
(२३८) प्रथ्यसर्गं विपर्यायासिद्धितुलिपियाना सिद्धितुलिपियाना सिद्धितुलिपियाना
रुक्कस्मात्मु सत्तत्त्व तत्त्तत्त्वाहैत्यमु सिद्धितुलिपियाना॥

स्यादित्वतु-पुरुषार्थेऽवयुक्तं सृष्टि:। स च पुरुषार्थं विष्णुसर्गाद्वा
(२३९) उभ्यत्वम्-तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा सिद्धितवति कुतसमुखसर्गगौत्तत
वर्णंककुंभस्कर॥ अह—

न विना मावैलिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन मावर्लिङ्गिति:॥
लिङ्गस्या भावास्यसमादुत्र द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गं॥५२॥

'न विना' इति। 'लिङ्गस्या इति तन्मात्रसर्गसर्गप्रक्षयति। 'भावे:"
इति च प्रथ्यसर्गम्। पुरुषस्य भविष्यो-तन्मात्र-(२४०) उभ्यविधो-सर्गस्य पुरुषार्थेऽवयुक्तसंसूचे न प्रथ्यसर्गाद्वा सर्गविठप्रेषणस्थमसंसूचे। भविष्यति, एवं प्रथ्यसर्गस्य सर्गविध पुरुषार्थेऽवयुक्तसंसूचे न तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा: इत्युभयम् सर्गार्थं:। भोगः
पुरुषार्थान् न भोगायुनं सद्वदित्वानुभवस्य संरीरस्याद्वार्ज्जनेश्व सम्भवस्य युपपन्नस्तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा:। एवं स एव महोगायुनाभ्यासिद्धिव्याप्तं: करणार्थानुभवः॥

१. चन्द्रिकात्यात्मानं नानांमूल। 'लिङ्गस्या' लिङ्गेव अनुमीयते एव न
सासान्तु किन्तैसं महद्वादित्तिर्यत्वम्। 'भावास्या' भूव्यते प्राप्ये इतिदीर्घेति
विषयवर्गः प्राय्यकृतद्वः॥
न सम्भवति। न च तानि धर्मांकृति भावानन्द विना सम्भवति। न च अपवर्गः
हेतुचिन्हविक्रुद्धतिसन्नयतः विना। इत्युपशः उषयतिचः सर्गः।
अनालिखितां बीजाङ्कुकुर्वान्योणात् अध्ययोपमोमात्महीतः, कल्पादावधिः प्राचीनः।
( २४१ ) उभयविधिः कल्पोपजरमाभिविक्षणसंरक्षकवशायाविभिन्नयोहिन्यतिनां,
अयोणानाख्यदेश
नुपप्रेति सर्वसंवद्यातूम् ॥ ५२ ॥
परिहारः।

( २४२ ) सूतसर्गः। त्रिभक्तः प्रत्यसर्गः। भूतदृश्यसर्गः त्रिभजते-
विभागः।

अष्टविशिल्पोऽद्वैसत्ययोग्यन्यय पद्धथा भवति।
मानुषश्रेस्त्रविधः, समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः। ॥ ५३ ॥

“श्रवणकल्प” हृदि। श्राहः, प्राचारः, अन्नः, पैठोरे, गान्धर्वो, याक्षः,
( २४२ ) तत्-(१)
राक्षसः, पेशचः, इत्यपिपिवधिः “दृशः” सर्गः।
दृशः रुद्विशि
(२४४) (२) तैयः-
“तैयानस्त्रय पुष्चधा भवति,” पशुसुगप्पक्षिसरीसुप-
ग्योप्राप्तधाः।

“मानुषश्रेस्त्रविधः” हृदि, ब्रह्माण्डःवावततः जातिस्मेत्रविधेऽक्ष्या, संस्था
(२४४) (३) मानुष
नस्स्य चतुश्चैस्य वर्णविक्रुद्धोपात। हृदि “समासतः”
एकविधः।
संक्षेपतः: “भौतिकः सर्गः।” घटदृशःवावारस्येवे-
२वपि स्थावारा पुष्चधा। ॥ ५३ ॥

(२५६) भौतिकत्वं
गुणमेतदृश्योपध्यम-भावकर्मन्म।

मौनिकस्याश्च सर्गः स्यात्त्वोक्ष्यस्मिन्निपत्तितात्त्वमा-
स्यामृत्वाऽधोध्यमावेन त्रावत्यमावेय —

ऊर्व्व सर्वविशाल्यतमोविशाल्य मूलत् सर्गः।
मध्ये रजोविशालो, भ्राह्मदिस्तम्पर्यः। ॥ ५४ ॥
“ऊँ शचविशालः” इति। बुधप्रभुट्टिस्थानो लोकः सचवहुः।
‘तमोविशालः मूलं सगः’, पुष्ठादिष्ठाबरञ्जः।
(२४७) ऊँ शचवालः सोडयमोहमयत्वात्मोबहुः। भूञ्जङ्गस्तु ससदीपः
प्राणाः मध्ये रजः। समुदसचिवेषो ‘सच्चरे जयोविशालः’ धर्मांधर्मानुः
प्राणाः अश्वम तमः। नपरत्वादूः खबहुल्लवचः। तामिमः लोकसंस्थिति
प्राणाः। संक्षिप्ति “पुष्ठादिष्ठावरञ्जांस्य”, सत्यग्रहणान्
वृक्षादयः संगृहिताः। || ५५ ||

tथेवं सर्गः द्रश्यिष्यता तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैराग्योपयोगिनिः खबहुतामाहा
(२४८) सर्गः खबहुतामाहा
हेतुता।

tतत्र जरामरणकृतं खवमाप्राप्तैर्चेतनः पुरुषः।
लिङ्क्ष्याविनिर्देतसमाधुःं स्मवावेन। || ५५ ||

“तत्र” इति। ‘तत्र’ शरीरांति। यद्यपि विविधा विविधान्दन्दभोगो
भागिनः प्राणसुधाहा:, तथा शुप सर्वातं जरामरणकृतं खवमविशिष्यम्।
सर्वस्य खवुः कुमरांग मरणाःसो—‘मा न भूवम्’ ‘भूवाम्’ इस्येवमास्मको-
दस्तिः। हुः च भयंहुर्तिः खवमतमाहम्!

स्यायेदतूः खवादयः। प्राक्षता बुद्धिगुणः: तकथोतेते चेतनसमविनिनो
(२४९) प्राक्ष्यतुसुरमृत भवनतीत्तत भाहे—“पुरुषः” इति। पुरि दिङ्गे शोते
खवातीनां पुरुषेन सह इति पुरुषः, हिङ्ग्रम तत्समविनितिः चेतनो शोपि
सम्बन्धप्रदेशसन्। तत्समवेदी मवतीत्यथः। ||

कुन्त पुनालिङ्क्ष्याविनिर्देतूह खवमपुरुषः चेतनस्वेत्तत भाहे—“हिङ्ग्रम
(२५०) पुराप्रकृति। विनिलिते :”– पुरप्राण्डे धर्माङ्गहिङ्ज्ञराध्मानामन्यध्यायः
मेदाग्रहिनिवेदनपुरुषः स्वतिः पुरुषः। अथवा खवासारावनविरागः कथंते
खवाध्यवसायः। हिङ्ग्रमः वावच निवर्तते तावदिति। || ५५ ||

१. आविनिन्द्रेदिक्ष्र ‘आइ’—उपसर्गेणायः।
इत्येष प्रकृतिक्रमशः महाद्विविशेषभूतयतः।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं हि परार्थं आरम्भः। ॥ ५६ ॥

"इत्येष" इति। भारायते इति। "आरम्भः" सर्गः। महाद्विभूतः प्रकृति

( २५२ ) नार्तकिके दानां
न्यायमतदृष्टिः।
( २५३ ) नियमप्रति
शीलप्रकृतिक्रमसाधिका
संतुष्टिनियच्यवस्थानिमें
क्षय न प्रत्यासः
ततिरिपः।

इत्ययः। ॥ ५६ ॥

स्यादेतद्- 'स्वार्थं परार्थं वा चेतनं: प्रत्येकं। न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवं महत्तु
महत्ति तन्मादिः श्रवणक्रियां चेतनं। न च ( २५४ ) अचेतनप्रवतनां
प्रश्निष्ठाः।

विविद्धः निमित्तमें श्लीरस्य यथा प्रकृतिरक्षयः।
Pुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तमें तथा प्रकृति: प्राधानयं। ॥ ५७ ॥
“वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्” इति। द्वधमाचेतनमपि प्रयोजंप्रवार्तमानम्।
(२५५) तत्परिहारः यथा वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तेश्वरमेतस्मात् प्रवत्तेति। पुष्पयज्ञेश्वरप्रभृतिवितस्याः प्रव-प्रकृतिस्वेच्छन्ति। दपि पुष्पविमोगसणाय प्रवासिद्धते॥

न च। ‘शीर्षप्रश्नेत्पीथराधिष्ठानानविवस्थाव नाथ्यकार्य साधविवत्त साध्वयमित्वाच’ इति। साम्प्रतिप्रस्तावत्। प्रवत्तेति। स्वार्थकारः।
(२५६) ईश्वराधिष्ठित-प्रधानसृष्टि दोषा॥ वत्सविवृद्धिपुर्वकधर्ममपि व्यवस्थितः। न ज्ञातथापरकतः-पितस्य भगवतो जगतृ ज्ञेय: विश्वमिलित-भवति। नावं कारणदृश्य संग्रहप्रवदति। प्राकृत सर्गांजीवात्सर्वदियथारी-रिविवादनवेदमोकः दुःखाभोजति कस्य प्रहाराणेछ। कारणयम्। सर्गांजीवातः
दुःखिनो वर्तकोष्ठय कारणयाः-युगमें दुर्लभस्तितस्तरारंभतरवन्दृष्टमयम्।-कारणयेन अभि। च कस्य ये नैदिने इश्वरः सुखिन एव जन्तृस्य सुखेन विविधानम्। ‘कर्मवैविवृद्धिभृत्तयम्’ इति। चेत्। कलमस्य प्रेष्टात्। कर्मविविधानम्। तदन्निहायमात्रादेव। चेतनस्यापि कर्मण: प्रवृत्तयुप-पत्तेन्त्रकार्यशरीरानविविधायां भुजीती दुःखानुपत्तेरिपुष्पकरश्वास॥

प्रकृतेस्वस्यमेतस्य। प्रवत्तेन स्वार्थानवेदमो। न च। कारणम्ययोजकमिति।
(२५७) प्रकृतिवृष्टि
तहोषा। माव॥ नोक्ष्ठोप्रसारावातः। पारार्थमात्रानु प्रयोजकमुप-पर्वतेति। तत्समात। सुख्युक्तम्। “वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्”
इति॥ ५७॥

“स्वार्थं इव” इति। द्वधमाचेतनम्। [कारिका। ५६।] तद्भवन्ते।
(२५८) पुष्पविमोगसान्।
थम्मु प्रवासन्य कारण॥
औस्तुक्यनिवृत्तमेठयथा क्रियास्य प्रवत्तेति। तोऽपि।
पुष्पस्य विमोगार्थ गतवर्त्ते तद्वुद्व्यक्तम्॥ ५८॥
“और्सुख्य—” इति। और्सुख्यस्वस्त्या, मा स्त्रिज्ञमाण्यस्वस्त्या निवः
तत्त्वे। इस्वमाण्यस्वस्त्या प्रवर्तिते। वृक्षस्वस्त्या, प्रक्षेपणतवात्
फलस्व। दशौत्तिै योजयति।
“पुरुषस्व विमोक्षार्थमिववर्तिते तद्वद्वस्त्यकृतम्” इति। ॥ ५८ ॥

नन्तु भवतु पुरुषार्थं प्रकृते। प्रवर्तकं, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृते।
(२५९) विवेचकाच्यायं। इत्यत आह—
नन्तरम् प्रधाननिःकार्यः।

रक्षस्य दशीयत्वा निवर्तिते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात्।
पुरुषस्य तथा ५५स्मान प्रकार्यविनिवर्तिते प्रकृति। ॥ ५९ ॥

“रक्षस्य” इति। स्थानेन स्थानिनः। पारिषद्दाजुपवक्ष्यति। ’बाह्मान्तः’
शक्तिवाहकमा पुरुषार्धस्ते च प्रकार्यसेवाः। ॥ ५९ ॥

स्वादेतत् प्रवर्ततांप्रकृतिः। पुरुषार्थम्। पुरुषारुपात्मक्तवक्ष्यते कङ्कि—
(२६०) गुणच्यायः। प्रकृते। दुपकार्यः। आहारसाधनाराजितादिवायुवाजापित्यधी—
प्रत्युपकारं विनिवेच्छ जिष्या। तथा च न परार्धस्या आरंभः।’—दृश्यत
पुरुषोपकारः। ॥ आह—

नानाविधैषुपात्मकारिणवनुपाकारिणः। पुंसः।
गुणच्यागुणस्य वस्तुस्स्यार्थमपरार्थशास्त्रवर्तिः। ॥ ६० ॥

“नाहा—“ इति। यथा गुणवत्तापकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्मुख隐形 ५त एवाजुपकारिणि
स्वामिनिः। निष्फलार्धनाः। एवतप्रकृतिलस्तपस्बिनी गुणवत्तापकारिणवनुपकारि
गरिण पुरुषे व्यवहारप्रबर्तित पुरुषार्धमेव चतुर्ते न स्वार्थयमिति सिद्धम्। ॥ ६० ॥
स्यादेवत्—नर्तकी नृत्यपरिष्ठयो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताः अपि पुनः स्नाताः क्रोधः
(२१) विवेकप्राप्यान्—हलात् प्रतिपति यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरस्य पुनः धर्मात्मामान
न्तरम् प्रदाशत्स्याये—
दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता अपि पुनः प्रवृत्ति '—इश्यत
निवृत्तिः। आह—
प्रकङ्ते: सुकुमारजन्म किञ्चिद्वस्तीति मे मतिभेदप्रति।
या ह्यस्मात प्रचिति पुनः दर्शनरूपैति पुनः स्नात ॥ ६१ ॥
“प्रकङ्ते:” इति। सुकुमारजन्म अर्थेऽर्ततः, परपुरस्दर्शनासिद्धेति
यावत्। असूरप्रथाया हि कुलवधूतमनन्त्वतस्य महाकाली
मंडला चेदार्कायते परपुरस्येन, तदा । सौ तथा प्रवृत्तसि, अप्रमोकता चयिभिं पर—

—अथः: कारिकायाः आन्तरेवेच्यैः कारिकाया भवितपथ्यस्मि स्वरे
तस्य तिलकन्यस्य बालग्रामाध्यमप्रिणतस्य सिद्धात्। तसंक्षेपस्तु—

“सत्याः किं ते सः?” इति—करुकणवचनामुरुऽधिन्यन्तिः सत्या भावः।
किंतु गौडपाले लेक्षणस्तिंशेऽपलब्ध्यते। भाष्य वैक्यस्थितमात्त्व परिरे
नैष्कस्या अनि तु कारिकायोः। अत एकाधितमाया आन्तरेवेच्या दुःखाया कारिकाया
भावः। भावधात्प्रतीक्षारूपेन चैत्या कारिकायेऽन्मि शुद्धक्षणाः—
कारणानिर्वाकस्य आवश्यकता च। कालं परे वस्मवायस वा।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुऽतो व्यकः कालं: स्वभावः।

अति चाया: कारिकाया: पूर्वार्थस्यख्यन्ति। निरीक्षार्थप्रतिपदाक्ताच
केतनिवदसेविन्तु ब्याहित्येत्। किंतु भावधार्यावनस्सैरी विमुखवाच। पूर्वान्ते श्वते
स्वभावस्य, काल्य ईश्वरस्य वा जन्मसूत्रविधिः श्रेयास्तरविशेष चोऽत्यस्ते—
स्वभावस्य कन्या वदन्ति कालं परे तथात्त्वेऽपि परिमुद्रामानः।
देवस्याय महिमा तु वेदान्ते भ्राम्यते धार्म्यकृमम्।” इति
अथ नाताया: कारिकाया: पूर्वार्थस्यसन्नातानुस्रोवेण चैव पञ्चमिकृमम्।—
‘कारणानिर्वाकस्य पुरस्ते कालं परे वस्मवायस वा।’
सूर्यायहिन्नाः सूर्यायहिन्नाः च इत्यतमात्कारिकायावेयां न सुङ्किरकृम। तन्मतानुरोक्ते—
नैकस्थितमात्कारिकायाः भाष्यस्तिंिमे कृतं, भृतौ च मात्रं कृतं: सुकुमारजन्ममिति
शाब्दस्य परमेष्टेऽपि, प्रकृतकारिकाविहारस्यशः कारिकायाः भाष्यवृत्योः सम्राह्वानां
निर्करीतिः। एतद्द्वस्त्व विचारानीगमम्—
पुत्रान्तरणे न पुनः पञ्चनिः एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलचूमोचन रक्षिणीकर दशा विचेकेन न पुनरङ्गश्यत हृद्यथः || ६१ ||

भाष्यकाराकम् भाग एव पर्ध्यते -- 'अहमने पुनरङ्ग दशाः समीयम् पुनः पुनर्दर्शिनि नोपैति, पुत्रान्तरणे भ्रमणितत्र ब्रह्मचारी मात्र भक्तिरां च यवनां भ्रमणितर च पुनः पुनर्दर्शिनि नोपैतिता--' अततः पुनर्दर्शिनि वर्णितता--' सुकुमारतः जन्यिति इति पठनीय: 'सुकुमारतः वर्णित ' इत्यन्तरः ' केवलीच्छवी वर्णार्थे ' प्राप्तवानपादस्तु निरतममभवत एव। नहीं श्रावानां कारणं प्रकटं सुकुमारतः वर्णान्तमुखुर्णां च। अते ध्याने केनविद्वद्धरिनिरञ्जारसहि-णु नारिकेन्त बोधिता। अन्येन च केनविद्वद्धरिनिरञ्जारसहि-णु भाष्यमेतमूलकारिकाविहिनिमिति मलय तथापिष्ठितकारिकाभाष्यतृतीविविधतता यथा स्थूलदर्शनार्थि विभाग्यते। अतएव 'न पुनस्नानुपयोगति पुरुषस्य ' इत्येवत्तदन्तरं तेन 'अत प्रकटं: सुकुमारतः सुभोगततः न किर्मिद्विगर्भार्दशाराचाराढ्याः सम्भवति में मतिभवति ' इति समध्य स्वधिकतमाः। यथा च नेत्रस्माः इत्यतस्माः तथा स्तुतं मेव्यति। परं च, इश्वरादीनां सुभोगस्वार्दशारं निर्णयान्तमष्टमसंस्कृतं धृतारं तथास्वत्वादिपरिशिविविधान्तमेव। अतो वाचस्पत्यवदिनां पुत्र एव धृतेऽवर्णितः कारिक।

यस्तु 'न तु इथरिनिरञ्जारसहि-णुवं कर्मकालिपिवं प्रयोजकं चेतु, कथ नाम तद्धाक्षक्षिप्तं प्रणोदकं न स्थात् ' इति सुरद्भुतसुरविनिरञ्जारसहि-णुवं च भ्रमणित: -- वस्त्रिज्ञ कुटिलमेवः स्वारमद्धमीवेव कारिका हङ्किपथि यात, न तस्य भाष्ये हस्तरः-भूमिति सम्भवते। न गद्य भाष्यकारिकोऽर्थभिचारी सहावतस्याः, तेन कारिकां निस्सारायुः माध्यमयाः वहि कुर्याः। वाचस्पत्याद्वारस्वाचार तदस्ते पलितमाः। अतस्ताद्यकुटिलमर्यादायन्तरभिचारविविधः सत्यस्मातिकेन्त व स्वरकारिकविविहाः माध्यमविश्विलोक्य रथतः विश्विलोक्य महत्तितमकारिकाभाष्ये नियोजितमिति राज्यान्त: ||

अध्यापि, प्राचीनकवितिप्रत्येकपुनः मूलस्थतिः तीक्षांशेषः प्रथक्कृ प्रथक्कृ लेखनस्थितिविनतेऽवर्णितः। तेन मूलस्थितिका कारिका व्याख्यात:। भाष्यांशस्य तत्समये अप्राप्तवाचारः माध्यमयाः अध्यापि स्विकतिरस्ति। [ हरदचारानि ]
स्यादेतवः “पुरुषश्वेतमुगोप्रियामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? सुरूपवेण्यमिविक्षे-पार्थस्वरुपः, सदासनैःश्चमांश्चयानावच बन्धनसमान-। (२६२) निगुणपुरुषसः
ह्यानां पुरुषः परिधिभविश्चभवान। अत् पुरुषस्य च
क्षसंसारायस्मामभोजिणः। पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेम्यभावायपरिवारामानासिंहं, निधिक-स्थापत्। तस्मात् तु “पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम्” इति रिक्तार्थव इति।
हतिमा रश्मिमांश्चसहारश्चायालेजायामस्युपरगच्छेदपारसः।
तमात्र वध्यते सदा न मुच्यते नापि संसर्तित संपरिष्टि।
संसर्तित वध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृति। || ६२ ||
“तस्मात्” इति। अब्दा न क्रियः पुरुषः बध्यते, न क्रियः संसर्ति; न क्रियःमुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सति
(२६३) तथविरारः। बध्यते संसर्ति मुच्यते चाचैत। बन्धमोक्षसंसारः: पुरुषे-प्रकृतिगतानां संसारां-पुरुषार्थः यथा जयपराज्यो भृगुगतावपि स्वामिजी
दीनां पुरुषे उपचारः। न्युधारणेऽयथा भृत्यान्तरत्रागितावत्। तत्फ-लस्य च शोककलामादेः। स्वामिनः सम्बवात। भोगाभगणी: प्रकृतिगतयोगिपतिनिवेदकामाहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपासित हिति सवभ-मुष्करम् ॥ ६२ ॥
नान्यवगतम् ‘प्रकृतिगता बन्धसमाविष्ठानां: पुरुषे उच्चरणे’ हिति।
(२६४) प्रकृतिधर्मामि- किस्राधाना: पुनर्ते प्रकृति:। हित्यत भाव—
सत्सैण्डश्चनमेनकरणे। तत्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्ष-पामस।
हृदेषु: सप्तमिदेवतु भावात्मायमात्मना प्रकृति:।
सैव च पुरुषयथ्मप्रितविमोक्षयथेकरणेः ॥ ६३ ॥
“हृदेषु” हिति। तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जन वन्धनाति धर्मांदिरिस्मास्माभः रूपभूपार्थिति।
“पुरुषार्थ्यथ्मप्रिति” भोगार्थरूपभूम्रप्रिति “आत्मनास्वश्चात्मनु” एकौपेण तत्त्व-ज्ञानेन विवेकविषयो विवेचनायति। पुनर्भोगार्थरूपेण न करोतोहित्यः: ॥ ६३ ॥

do not provide a question.
श्रवणोपन्यासप्रकाशनम् । [ सं. त.

भवनमसीद्वं तत्तवम् । ततः किमित्यत भाष—
एवनत्वाभ्यासानान्नि मे नान्मित्यपरिष्करपम् ।
अविपर्यम्यादिद्वृढः केवलमुद्रपर्यन्ते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

"पुच्छ्" हृति । तत्वेन विषयेन तच्छानमुपश्चक्षयति । उक्तःस्त्रयका- (२६) अभयासात्तत्वानोऽहात- रत्तविप्रविधयानाभ्यासामुदारनेत्रस्तर्यदीर्घकालेवितात्
तत्त्वपुष्पनायानाशकारिजानमुखः ॥ यद्विषयान- सत्त्वस्वतंप्रेक्षकेव साशकारसुभुम्यरक्षयति ।— तत्वविक्र-
प्रयणाभ्यास हृति तत्त्वसाधारानं जनयति । अत उक्तम् — "विशृद्धम्" हृति ॥

कुतो विशृद्धमित्य आह—"अविपर्ययात्" हृति । संज्ञानविप्रवेष्यौ हि
(२६६) तत्त्वानाय विशृद्धादिद्वृढः अविपर्ययः
तस्मि ॥ ज्ञानस्याविशृद्धी, तांत्रितमु विशृद्धान्तविद्रस्तुक्षमः—
“अविपर्ययात्” हृति । नियतमानितथात्मा गृह्नु
संशयो सपि विषयं । तेन ‘अविपर्ययात्’ हृति
संज्ञानविप्रवेष्याभावो दर्शितः । तत्त्वविप्रवेष्याभाष्य संह- यविपर्ययाभावः ॥

स्यादेवत | उपपत्तामोदशाभ्यसारत् तत्त्वानाय, तथा द्विनादिना
(२६७) अनादेविम्य- भिधाज्ञानसंस्कारस्य भिधाज्ञानं जनयित्वम् । तथा
शास्त्रसंस्कारस्यादिम्या च तत्त्वश्रवणस्य संसारानुच्छेदमाध्यम इत्यत उक्तम्—
तत्त्वानसंस्कारस्या के वृश्चकम् हृति—विप्रवेष्याभाष्यस्मिनम् । यथव्य
समुख्चेतः ॥ नादेविप्रवेष्याभावाना तथा सपि तत्त्वानास्याय-
तत्त्वविप्रवेष्याभाष्यारमाघ्रं तत्त्वविप्रवेष्याभाष्यारमाघ्रं तत्त्वपक-।
पातो हि विषयां स्वभावः । यद्यावांशा अपि—

"निर्दर्शभूतायम्यस्वभाष्य विप्रवेष्यः ।
न बचो अपनवते सपि बुज्जेत्त्वप्राप्तातः" हृति ॥
तत्त्वाश्चरूपकथनम्

‘नामस्म’ इति। ‘नामस्म’ इश्यामिनि क्रियामात्रान्विताः।

यथाः: ‘कङ्कनस्य: क्रियासामान्यवचना’ इति [सिद्धान्तकौशली।]

(२६८) तत्त्वाश्चरूपकथनम्

पद्धतिः खण्डाविधाः।

तथा चाध्यवसायाभि:।

वाचान्ता संवेद्याय शास्त्रमिनि प्रतिव्याख्यानः बोध-व्यायिनः।

यत्त्वाश्चरूपमिनि व्याप्तार्थो नास्त्यतो ‘नाहम्।’

अहमितस्मि कर्मपद्, अहम्नास्यहं जुझोम्यहन्दुदे’ इति सर्वां इति।

परासां। विरङ्ग्यते च सर्वां कृष्णाभावः।

तत् सुध्दूरकृम्।‘िहम्’ इति।

जत एव ‘िहम्, न मे।’ कर्ति हि स्वामितां च वम्बते, तस्मात् कुन: स्वामार्को

स्वामितेष्यतः। अथवाः ‘िहम्’ इति। पुरुषो इधस्म, न प्रस्ववधमिः।

अप्रस्वधार्मिस्वास्कर्तृवत्वमाहै।‘िहम्।’ इति।

अप्रत्त्वाच न स्वामितेष्यत् शाह‘िहम्, न मे।’ इति॥

नन्ति ‘पुत्राभुषु जगेतेपं कर्मित कद्वाचिच्छाति विषयो िशित, तद्वजान-वज्ञातुन्य वन्धितितः।’ इत्यत बोध:। ‘अपरिशेष्यम्।’

(२६९) तत्त्वाश्चर्याः

इति। नास्ति किंचिददहिमस्मि परिशिष्टमयु जगव्यु

परिशिष्टमयु॥

यद्ज्ञानं बन्धितेष्यतः।॥ ६४॥

(२७०) तत्त्वाश्चर्याः

किं पुनरीद्धों तत्त्वाश्चर्याः। किं पुनरीद्धों

तत्त्वाश्चर्याः। विश्वस्वितेष्यत्

फलम्॥

बोध:।

तेन निवृत्तस्मात्मरामि शास्त्रो तत्त्वाश्चर्याः।

प्रकृत्यमू परिति पुरुषः प्रकृतस्मात्मरामि। ऋचचः॥ ६५॥

‘तेनृ’ इति। सोगिविश्वास्कर्तारी हि प्रकृति: प्रयोत्त्वयः।

तो च प्रत्यूत्त्वय: नास्ति: प्रस्तवस्मात्मरामि। इति। निवृत्तस्मात्मरामि।

विश्वास्कर्तारी यो ध्यास्य: बह: सामाज्ञम् तस्मात्।

तत्त्वाश्चर्याः विरूपाविश्वास्कर्तारी यो ध्यास्य: बह: सामाज्ञम् तस्मात्।

तत्त्वाश्चर्याः विरूपाविश्वास्कर्तारी यो ध्यास्य: बह: सामाज्ञम् तस्मात्।

तत्त्वाश्चर्याः विरूपाविश्वास्कर्तारी यो ध्यास्य: बह: सामाज्ञम् तस्मात्।

कारण:­

१. ‘नाहमिति’ तादात्मस्येष्ठतिः इति केचित्तु। २. ‘सुश्रृ’ इति पादान्तम्। ३. विन्दुकेश्वरस्नेहे यावत्।
निब्रस्त्या च समस्पाणि निवर्गते हृति “समस्पबनिव्रृत्ता प्रकृति:”
“अवस्थित” हृति निधिक्यः; “स्वच्छः” हृति रजस्तरेषविषुकाय
बुझ्या समभिन्नः | सावित्रिक्या तु बुझ्या तदा संयस्य मनकू समभेदो स्वयेव,
अन्यथेवम्भूतप्रकृव्वितविश्लेषानुपपरेति || ६५ ||

स्यादेऽति–“निब्रस्त्प्रस्वामिति न सृष्ट्यमहेष। संयोगकृतो हि सर्गे इत्युक्तम्,
( २७१ ) एकविपयमः प्रेक्ष्य निब्रस्तः अधिष्ठानं प्रकृतेतिविषयान्तरं प्रति
प्रकृतिशिष्यान्तः || प्रति प्रतिचिन्हिता || भावानुवर्तति: || न च करणीयः
व्यवहारानुवर्तति; तत्तत्त्वाद्यान्यस्य करणीयवतः पुनः
पुनः शब्दविशेषमोचवतः”–इसत धाति

dhya मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, dhyā शहिमित्त्युपसमयन्या।
सति संयोगेश्च पति: प्रयोजनन्त्रासित सर्गस्य || ६६ ||

“dhyā” हृति || करोतु नाम पौल:पुन्येन शब्दारुपमोगम्प्रकृतिययाय विवेक-
क्यातनु नुभत्ता, क्षतविवेकक्यातिस्य शव्दारुपमोगः
( २७२ ) तत्वारासः || जनयति। अविवेकक्यातिनिवन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो,
निबन्धनाभ्याते न तद्विविमहति, अंकुर इत्र बीजाभावे।
प्राकृततर् हि सुकुमुखोहायामः शब्दारुपस्वत्विवेकारा ‘ ममैततु’ इत्य-
भिमन्त्यायमा आत्मा भून्ति। एवं विवेकक्यातिमति प्राकृतीमविवेकक्ववस्या
‘ मद्धयेमस्’ हृति मन्त्यते। उपविवेकक्यातितस्य तद्विप्रकृतनांभ्राह्मिकोपमोकु-
महति नापि विवेकक्यातिप्राकृतियमति कर्त्तम् । ततो विविकटः” आत्मा न
स्वार्थमभिमन्त्यमहति पुरुषार्थाः च भोगविवेको भ्राह्ममभ्योजनकविवेकपुरुषार्थाः
सन्ता न प्रकृति प्रयोजयतः। तद्वित्तमुक्तम् “प्रयोजनन्त्रासित सर्गस्य ” हृति
अथ प्रयोजयते सर्गे प्रकृतिविन्दुनेन्ति प्रयोजनम्, तदपुरुषार्थे नास्तिस्यथ: || ६६ ||

१. उत्प्रक्रियवेकक्यातिः
स्यादेतवः “उद्यक्तसङ्गविधाकार्याः संयोगदनमन्तरमेव सुक्स्य तदव देहः। स्यादित तथेतुः प्रकृतिमपक्षेत्। अथ
(२७१) विविधसाः
तत्त्वज्ञाने दिपे न मुख्यते कर्मणामाग्रीप्रीतवात? तेषां
ज्ञाने देहपताः। कुष्ठा प्रश्नः? ‘भोगवत्’ इति बेचू, हत्वा भोगः
दशैयासमभवशास्त्रः। वासनानाथ सोक्ष्मद्रवयमूः। इति ‘व्यक्तिवाक्विज्ञानाः
जन्माना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापि।’ इति रिकं वचः। ‘भोगेन
चारिसंख्येः कर्माणामचयो विनयतविपाकः। केशत्वः, तत्त्वार्पणः
प्राप्तः।’ इत्यः मनोरथमात्रम्।’ इत्यत आह—

सम्मज्ञानानाथायिनामाथ दर्मानीनामकारणास्त्री

तिष्ठति संस्कारवशान, चक्रभ्रमिवधृतशरीरः। ॥ ६७ ॥

“सम्स्र” इति। तत्त्वसायकारोद्यादेशवादादिवसायविनयतविपाकः
कालो दिपे कर्माणामचयो तर्कबीजार्थम् तथा
(२७४) तत्त्वातः।
जावानुभोगव्वर्णम् फलाय कल्पते। कृतसितकाला
विविधसाः। कार्यायाम हि बुद्धसूमो कर्मेऽवज्ञानानन्दकुरु भ्रसते।
वश्वान्तिराद्विदेशितौ नसुकलके कृतसितायामयुंगायामोऽ
कुष्ठः कर्मेऽवज्ञानानन्दकुरु।।” इति, अकारणतमासास्त्रियः। उद्यक्तसङ्गविधातो दिपे च
संस्कारवशान, तिष्ठति, यथोपरे दिपे कुलाल्यकारे चक्कु वेगायवसंस्कारवशान
अभमतु तिष्ठति। कार्यारिपावशाचिपरे संस्कारे निपक्षमभवति। शारिर-
स्थितिः च मार्गसापरिपकृत धर्माच्छिंद्रः संस्कारः। तथा चानुभूतो—“भोगेन
विशे क्षयविहव स्थ सम्पते,” इति “तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावण
विमोक्षे स्थ सम्पत्ते,” इति च [छान्दोग्य, ६.१३२।] प्रक्षयमानमासाविधाः
संस्कारवशेषस्ततः तत्त्वार्पणां दस्तार्पणाः।” ॥ ६७ ॥

स्यादेतवः “यदि संस्कारशोषयाधि दत्तशरीरस्तथा दिपे कहा देहस्य मोक्षो
(२७५) शारिरानावाट्य भविष्यति। इत्यत भाष—
कालत्तिकायनित्वानुकृतिः।॥
प्रासे शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधाननितिवृत्ताः।
ऐकानितकात्मकतत्त्वात् कैलयमारोति। ६८ ॥

"प्रासे" हि तः। अनार्थविपकानान्तावत् कर्मशायां तत्त्वज्ञानादीतिः बीजभावो दुर्गः। प्रारंभिकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षेत्रे सति, "प्रासे, शरीरभेदे" हि-विनाशे-"चरितार्थत्वात्" हि-कृतप्रर्योजनतवात्। प्रधानस्य तमपुरुषप्रती विनिवृत्ताः-"ऐकानितकम्"-अववभावी "आलयनितकम्"-अविनाशे-हत्यघये "कैलयम्"। उद्वत्त्रत्वविरयमारोति पुरुषः। ६८ ॥

( २७६ ) सांख्यशास्त्रः। प्रमणेनोपपाठ्यो ध्यानतध्यानप्रत्य ध्यानस्य परस्य परमित्त्वानीतलम्। मण्डित्वक्रणमाहं।
पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुहमपरमित्वाणा सामास्यायाम्।
स्थित्युत्पतितपरवाक्षिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम्। ६९ ॥

"पुरुष" हि तः। "गुहम्" गुहानिवासिः, स्थूलविभयां दुर्बोधितमिति यावत्। "परमित्वाणा" कपिलनेन तामेव अद्वितामामितिविभन्नें इत्यतः। "स्थित्युत्पतितपरवाक्षिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम्" हि तः। 'यत्र' जाने-वदर्धम्, यथा 'वर्णाणि द्विपिणं हृतिः हि तः। "भूतानाम्" = प्राणिः। "स्थित्युत्पतिरस्वायः" आहम्। "चिन्नन्ते"। ६९ ॥

( २७७ ) सांख्यशास्त्रः। स्यादेतत्। "यत्र परमित्वाणा साधकाक्ष्यतिम् तत्त्वे। ख्रिया गुहातिवपरमरं प्राणीमहिः, यतप्रवृत्तिक्षणाम कथितम् तत्र कुत: कपिलादराह पश्चिमादि-श्रावन्तः॥।
एतत् पवित्रमर्यं मुनिरासुरयेषुनुकम्पया प्रवदौ।
आसुरिरिपि पश्चिमादि, तेन च वहुदा कुलनान्तम्। ७० ॥

"एतत्" हि तः। "एतत् पवित्रम्" = पावनम्। दुःखत्रयते: पापमन: पुनातितः۔ "अर्णम्" = सवैवः। पवित्रायेश्वरमुख्यः, "मुति" कपिलः।


नामस्य जनकमया प्रदृढ़, नामस्यारपि पञ्चशिल्याय, तेन च बदुधा क्रतं तन्त्रम्।

शिष्यपरस्या सतगतमीत्वरः चेतदायोभिः।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमिति सम्यविभाय सिद्धान्तम्।

(२७८) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य “शिष्य” इति। आरात्य याता तत्वेध्य इत्याया, गुरूशिष्यपरस्य। आरात्य मतिर्यस्य सो डयम् “आर्यमिति” इति।

(२७९) सतसिकारिः—प्रत्य शाख्रम्, मकरशाख्रार्थसूचकत्वात्, न तु काणान् शाख्रलम्।
प्रकरणमिल्याह—
समत्वां किल येत्सते तथा: कौलस्य पश्चितन्त्रस्य।
आर्यायिकविविधाः। परवादविनिर्भरता: अरुपाः।

“सस्याम्” इति। तथा च राजवानिकम्।

“प्रधानातित्वमेकवर्त्त्वचमथायतम”।
पारार्थेन च तथानैवेन वियोगेन योगं पुव च॥

शेषप्रतिसमस्यं वृहिकार्यं: स्मृता दुः॥
विपर्ययं: पञ्चविधस्थोत्रं नव तृत्यं॥
कर्णायसामायध्याविन्दशिवाय मतम्।
इति पद्धति: पद्धार्याविनादम: सह सिद्धिं।” इति॥

सेवं विधिपार्थेन कथिति सकलशाख्रार्थकथनान्वित्र: प्रकरणमपि तु शाख्रवेद-देवमिति सिद्धम्। एकवर्त्त्वस्य पारार्थेऽपि प्रधानातित्वमित्वातोक्तम्। अन्त्यतमः
कृत्वम् बहुतेति पुरुपकृतिः। अवस्थवम् वियोगेन योगशेषे बधयमध्योऽक्त्व॥
तृतिः: स्थितिमिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्व॥

मनांसि कुमारानि बोधयन्ति सताम सदां।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिथार्याः कृति: स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदिः॥

इत्यहितलत्न्त्रारपत्त्वन्त्रातिभद्रादशदर्शनार्थाकुच्छी—
महाच्यादिमिथार्या सांयतचक्रोदी॥
THE TATTVA-KAI
[SĀMKHYA

An English Translation.

(1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.

To the Great Sage Kapila, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pañcas'ikha and Īs'vararakṣ'ṇa—to those we bow in reverence.

(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject-matter:

* The translation of the Tattvakaumudi was done by me as a class-exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an improvement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. [Ganganath Jha.]
Karika I

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this world; or (2) if, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible—such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. This is what is meant by the words: There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain. The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "tradm of pain." These are: (1) the intrinsic (Ādhyātmika), (2) the extrinsic (Ādhibhautika) and (3) the divine or superhuman (Ādhidaivika). Of these the intrinsic is two-fold, bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and mental pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called intrinsic on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold: extrinsic and superhuman. The extrinsic are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the superhuman ones are due to the evil influence of
planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. *Impediment* (*Abhīghāta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—this will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) into the means of alleviating the three kinds of pain. In the compound *tadapaghātaka*, the pronoun *tat* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (*duḥkhatraya* etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound).—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,—none other.

(5) *An objection is raised: “On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous.* That is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible; we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences,—which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim: ‘When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains?’ So, when
the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?' Hundreds of remedies for bodily pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest."

(6) This objection is answered as follows—Not so—why?—Because these are neither absolute means are not certain; Absoluteness of the means consists in the certainty of its effect; and its finality consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression, "Ekāntātyantatobhāvah." The universal affix tasi has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

(7) Though the mention of the word pain in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the expitirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.
The following argument might be put forward:—

"We grant the inadequacy of the obvious remedies; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—in the shape of a host of such acts as the Jyotistoma etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the S'ruti: 'Desiring heaven one must perform sacrifices,' and Heaven is thus described: 'Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it is what is denoted by the word Heaven.' Heaven thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived,—for, declares the S'ruti: "We drank the Soma and became immortal." [Atharva'asiras III]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be 'immortality'? Hence the Vedic remedies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous."

The answer to this is suggested in the following Kārikā.

Kārikā II

The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).*

* This Kārikā embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.
(9) Anus'rava is Veda, that which is heard during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher—and not done (written). Anus'ravikā is that which is related to Anus'rava or Veda, i.e. which is derived or known therefrom. The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious (remedies mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the absolute and final removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "Vedic" (Anus'raika), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return (into this world)". (Chāndogya, 8-15).

(10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess. The impurity lies in the fact of the Soma and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pañcas'ikhācārya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The 'slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect (Apūrva i.e. merit) of the Jyotistoma and other sacrifices, with the minor apūrva due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet 'remediable' implies that the sin is removable by certain expiatory rites; but if somehow these are neglected, then at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (merit), the evil element (denīrit caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification 'bearable'. Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven
attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin (involved in the rituals).

(11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law—"Kill not any animal," is set aside by the specific one, "Kill the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma"—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil (and hence pain); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction "Kill the animal etc.," declares that the killing of animals helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [i.e. the sentence "Kill the animal etc.," would bear two predicates—(1) 'The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice,' (2) and that 'it is not conducive to sin']. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the performance of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice.

(12) The properties—'decay' and 'inequality'—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This liability to decay is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a positive entity and a product. Further, the Jyotistoma and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the Vajapeya and others lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven (or 'self-
sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the inequality spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

(13) In the passage "Drinking Soma, we became immortal"—immortality stands for long-duration,—as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'rtti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad X—5], and again "Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."

(14) With all this in view it is declared: *That which is contrary to that is preferable*—proceeding from discriminative knowledge of the Mani-fested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. The term that stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method—contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results,—is pure i.e. unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the S'rtti precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect—the removal of pain—though a product, is a negative entity. And when the productivity of the cause (ignorance) has been destroyed (by discriminative knowledge) there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the efficiency of the
cause lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on (under Kārikā LXVI).

(15) The literal meaning of the words of the Kārikā is as follows: The means of removing pain, consisting in the direct discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as apart from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good; and of these two, the latter is better, superior.

(16) Question:—“Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise?

Source of discriminative knowledge

Answer—From the right cognition of the Manifester, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. Cognition of the Manifester precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifester and Unmanifested) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the cognition thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this: The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from right cognition—consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the Manifester, etc., the character of these latter having been previously learnt from the Veda, the Smārtis and the Itihāsas, and duly strengthened by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail later on in Kārikā LXIV.

(17) Having thus established the fact of the undertaking of scientific enquiry being useful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to focus the attention of the enquirer.
Kārikā III

Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely productive, some merely products, others both productive and products, and others, neither the one nor the other.

(18) To the question—What is the productive?—the answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a product; ‘Root-matter’ (Prakṛti)* is that which produces (prakaroti); it is also called ‘Pradhāna’ (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of Sattvas, Rajas and Tamas in the state of equilibrium,—that is purely productive. Why it is so is explained by the term ‘Mūla’, ‘Root’; i.e. it is that ‘Matter’ which is the ‘Root’; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted regresus ad infinitum.

(19) How many are the objects that are both productive and products, and which are these? The answer is—The group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both; i.e. they are products as well as productive. The Great Principle (Buddhi) is the root of Egoism (Ahaṅkāra), and the product of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the

* What the term ‘prakṛti’ stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as ‘Root-matter’ or simply as ‘Nature.’
five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven sense-organs, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.

(20) How many are the products, pure and simple, and what are they? Answer:—The products are sixteen—i.e., sixteen in number; the five gross substances (earth etc.,) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications, not productive; this is what is emphasised by the particle ‘tu’, which should be taken as coming after ‘vikārah’ (in the text). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, “Prakrti” stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.

(21) That which is neither productive nor product, is now described:—the Spirit is neither a product nor productive. All this will be explained later on.

(22) In order to prove the above statement, the different kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition) have to be described. Nor can there be a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:
Kārikā IV

Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition. It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised.

(23) *Means of Cognition are accepted:*—here the term ‘Means of Cognition’ only states the thing to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of ‘Means of Cognition;’ this explanation being that the *Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised.* Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the *Instrument of Right Cognition.* This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the ‘Means of Cognition.’ Thus the ‘Means of Cognition’ become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, *viz.* doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the ‘Means of Right Cognition.’

(24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramāṇas: ‘*Of three kinds;*’—that is, of the Means of Right Cognition in general there are three kinds,—neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.

(25) Now, there arises the question—which are the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition? *The answer is—Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion.* The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical
system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The intuitions or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,—though realities,—do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.

(26) Objection:—"We grant that the number of Pramāṇas is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, such as Analogy (Upamāna) and the rest. Reply—Because these three include all forms of Means of Right Cognition. That is, all forms of Right Cognition are included—i.e. comprehended—under these three, Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.

(27) Question:—"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the Prameyas, i.e. the objects of Right Cognition?" Answer—It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi means apprehension—Cognition.

(28) The explanation of the Kārikā follows the sense, not the order of words.

(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the Kārikā, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.
Karika V

'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses; 'Inference' has been declared to be of three kinds; and it is led up to by (based upon) the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term; and 'Valid Assertion' is Right Revelation.

'Perception is definite sense-cognition.'—The term 'Perception' means what is defined; the remainder of the sentence is the definition; by which word is meant the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes.

(30) The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception —'prativisayādhyavasāyāḥ') may be thus explained: Viṣaya (object) stands for that which bears upon the Viṣayin (cognition); that which impresses its own form upon the Cognition.

The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are 'objects' for us; but things in the form of the Elemental Substances are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the Yogn and the divine beings.—The term 'prativisaya' denotes that which bears upon each particular object, i. e. the sense-organ;—'bearing upon' means contact so that what the term 'prativisaya' stands for is the sense-organ in contact with the object.—'Prativisayādhyavasāya' ('sense-cognition') is the adhyavasāya, definite cognition in i. e. through, the sense-organ in contact with the object; 'adhyavasāya' is Cognition, the function of Buddhi (Will); in fact adhyavasāya stands for that exuberance of the attribute of Sattva which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of 'Tamas' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects;—this is what is called vr̥tti and also 'jñāna,'—i.e. 'Cognition.'—This sense-cognition is a means
of cognition and what is brought about by this means is the Right Cognition which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient Faculty.

(31) In its essence the Buddhi is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognition which is a function of the Buddhi is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of Buddhi also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient; this Spirit appears as if having the Cognition and the Pleasure and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in Buddhi; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured (by Buddhi); and Buddhi as also its Cognition, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentence (of the Spirit). This is what is going to be described under Kārikā 20, below.

(32) The use of the term ‘adhyavasāya,’ ‘Definite Cognition,’ in the text excludes Doubtful Cognition, as Doubt, being of the nature of uncertainty, is never positive; and ‘definite’ is the same as ‘positive’—The use of the term ‘viṣāya,’ ‘object,’ excludes Wrong Cognition, the object of which is non-existent.—The use of the particle ‘prati’ indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition.

(33) Thus it follows that ‘prativiṣayādhyavasāyo drstam,’ ‘Perception is definite cognition of objects through the contact of the sense-organ,’ is the complete definition of Perception,—
excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity.

(34) The Lokāyatika (materialist) says that Inference is not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he know whether the person he was addressing was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Certainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.—Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random—he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be inferred from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means of Cognition.

(35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it is only right that it should be defined after Perception; then again, inasmuch as a definition of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general.—It is led up to by the ' (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term;—the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance (with the Major Term) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious-
accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which are really denotive of the objects (of Cognition) stand for the Cognition of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive' than the Fire which is 'more extensive';—i.e. 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [i.e. Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]'—The term 'liṅgi' (which has been taken above as standing for the Major Term) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the 'Liṅga' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the Middle Term (Smoke) is present in the Minor Term (Hill).—Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this—Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (i.e. the Major Premiss) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (i.e. the Minor Premiss).

(36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (Nyāya)—'Inference has been declared to be of three kinds'; i.e. Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) 'Pūrvavat,' A priori, (2) 'S'ēsavat,' A posteriori, and (3) 'Sāmānyatodrśta,' based on general observation.

(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds—Vita and Avita;—that which functions through an affirmation is the Vita-affirmative; and that which functions through negation is the Avīta, Negative.
(38) Of these two, the \textit{Avīta} is also called ‘\textit{S'ēsavat}, Inference, \textit{A posteriori}.—‘\textit{S'esa}’ is that which \textit{remains, the residue}; hence that Inference is ‘\textit{S'ēsavat}’ which has this residue for its object. This has been thus described (in the \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} on 1, 1. 5)—‘The \textit{S'ēsavat} Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of \textit{that which remains} (undenied and uneliminated)’. An example of this negative \textit{Avīta} will be cited later on (under \textit{Kārikā} 9, Para 70).

(39) The \textit{Vita} Inference is of two kinds—(1) The \textit{Pūrvavat, A Priori}, and (2) the \textit{Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa}, ‘Based on general observation.’ Of these the first ‘\textit{Pūrvavat,}’ has for its object that ‘universal’ of which a specific ‘individual’ has been perceived; the term ‘\textit{Pūrvavat}’ (contained in the name ‘\textit{Pūrvavat}’) means \textit{well-known,—i. e.} that ‘universal’ of which the ‘specific individual’ has been perceived;—and that Inferential Cognition of which such a ‘universal’ is the object is called ‘\textit{Pūrvavat};’ \textit{e. g.} when, from the presence of \textit{Smoke}, we infer the presence of \textit{the particular ‘Universal’ Fire in the Hill}; and in this case this ‘\textit{Universal’ Fire} is one of which a ‘specific individual’, in the shape of a particular Fire, has been previously perceived in the kitchen.—The second form of \textit{Vita Inference} is the \textit{Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa}, which is the inferential Cognition having for its object a ‘universal’ of which a ‘specific individual’ has \textit{not} been perceived; \textit{e. g.} when we have an Inferential Cognition of the \textit{sense-organ}; what is inferred in this case is the fact of the Cognition of colour and such things being brought about by the instrumentality of an organ \textit{[i. e. ‘there must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about’];—though of
the 'Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific individuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of 'instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been perceived; that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal' 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that Universal sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision,—in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the Universal 'Fire' is seen.—This is what distinguishes the Pūrvavat from the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,, though both are equally 'Vita'.—In the term 'Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa, 'dṛṣṭa' stands for 'dars'ana,' Cognition—'Sāmānyataḥ' stands for 'Sāmānyasya', of the 'Universal',—the affix 'tasil' being capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings;—thus the term 'Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa—anumāna' stands for the 'Anumāna,' Inferential Cognition, of that particular 'universal' of which a 'specific individual' has not been perceived.—All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyāyavārttikatāt-paryatikā, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.

(40) When an experienced person, directing another experienced person, utters a few words (such as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus directed, acts in a certain manner (i.e. brings the cow).—the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person,—and therefrom he comes to recognise the connection between the words used and the action performed;—further, a word is found to express its meaning only when there is recognition of the connection between that word and its meaning;—from these two facts it follows that Verbal Cognition is led up to by Inference;—consequently, after having defined Inference, the author de-
fines Valid Assertion—‘Valid Assertion is right revelation’; ‘Valid Assertion’ ‘āptavacana’ is the term to be defined, and the rest of the sentence is its definition; the term ‘āpta-s’ruti’ means that ‘S’ruti’, revelation, which is ‘āpta’: ‘right’; the term ‘revelation’ stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

(41) This Valid Assertion is self-sufficient in its authority; i.e. it is always right, in as much as it is brought about by the words of the Veda which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the Itihāsa and the Smṛti, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right.

(42) As regards the primeval sage Kapila (the founder of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy), it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; just as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between Āvaiya, and Jaigīśavya, where the revered Jaigīśavya speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles—in the text—‘while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc.’

(43) The introduction of the epithet ‘āpta’ ‘Right’, in the term ‘Right Revelation’ (‘āptavacanan’); serves to exclude all pseudo-revelations, such as the scriptures of the ‘Śākya-Bhikṣu’ (Buddhist) the ‘Nirgranthaka’ (Jain), the ‘Samsāramocaka’ (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are not right is to be inferred from (a) internal
contradictions, (b) being devoid of any sound basis, (c) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (d) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons *Mlecchas* and others.

(44) The particle *tu* ('and') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence expresses* (the meaning) is an *object cognised* (by means of that *Sentence*); but the *Sentence is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*, and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the *Sentence expresses* its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection (concomitance) between itself and the meaning; as we find that in the case of the work of a new poet, the *sentence* is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the *Sentence* and the *Meaning*, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no *Inference*].

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition,—such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the *Cow* so the *gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal assertion), the cognition brought about by its means must be regarded as purely *Verbal*.—As for the notion that 'the term *gavaya* is
denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy],—this is purely inferential; the inference being in the following form—

'When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as denoting it,—specially, when there is no function other than Direct Denotation, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing');—as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus 'cow'; (Major Premiss).

'The term gavaya is used (by experienced persons) in reference to the animal similar to the cow';—(Minor Premiss).

'Therefore, 'the term gavaya must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (Conclusion)

This cognition is purely inferential.

Lastly, the notion that 'the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow',—this is purely perceptional. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the gavaya, this is perception pure and simple; certainly the resemblance or similarity in the cow is not something different from that in the gavaya; for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this same conglomeration can be one only; so that when it has been perceived in the gavaya, it must be the same in the cow also.—Thus then, (every notion involved in what has been regarded as Analogical Cognition being found to be either verbal or inferential or perceptual), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of 'Analogy'. We conclude therefrom, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition.
(47) Similarly ‘Presumption’ also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the example of ‘Presumption’ that has been cited by the Ancients is the case where on finding that Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that ‘when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place,—and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place’;—when, therefore, we find that ‘the living Caitra is not in the house,’—and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house,—this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of Caitra somewhere in the world cannot set aside his absence in the house; and when it is not so set aside this absence in the house cannot fail to be a valid reason for his presence outside the house. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the ‘Unknown’]. Nor again does Caitra’s absence in the house set aside his existence entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this existence be unable to establish itself outside the house. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explain—Is Caitra’s non-existence in the house inconsistent with his existence itself? Or only with his existence in the house?—It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the house; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different.—It might be argued that—“When it is asserted that he must be somewhere, his existence in some place in general being asserted (without any particular place being specified),—in as much as the House also would be included under ‘place in general’, the assertion might imply existence
in the house also; and in this manner the subject-matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between existence somewhere and non-existence in the House."—This, however, cannot be right. Non-existence in the house is known definitely and for certain, while (even in the manner shown) the notion of existence in the house (as implied by existence somewhere) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition.—And though the definitely ascertained non-existence in the House sets aside the implied and doubtful existence in the House, it cannot set aside the man's existence; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of existence in the house implied in the general notion of existence somewhere). What is set aside by the Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House is his existence in the House; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his existence in general; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of non-existence in the House, as the only ascertained reason (Middle term), we deduce the man's existence outside,—it is a case of Inference.

This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in 'the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter fact, there is no inconsistency between what is restricted (non-existence in the House) and what is not restricted (existence somewhere).

Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.

From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference.
(48) Similarly, *Abhāva*, ‘Absence’, is only a form of Perception. The *absence of the jar*, at a certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of *vacancy*; all entities—with the sole exception of the Sentient Faculty,—are consequently undergoing modifications; and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses; hence there can be no object, not already covered by these modifications, which could form the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of ‘Absence’.

(49) ‘Probability’ has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as that of the presence of the lesser weights—such as the ‘Drōṇa’ the ‘Adhaka’ the ‘Prastha’—in the heavier weight the ‘Khāri’—This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the Khāri has been found to be invariably concomitant with the lesser weights of the Drōṇa etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights.

(50) As for ‘Rumour’ it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot be traced; it generally appears in the form ‘the old people have said so and so’; such assertions for instance as ‘there is a ghost living on this banyan tree’.—This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of ‘Verbal Cognition’ pure and simple.

Thus it becomes established that there are three Means of Cognition.
(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of the existence of the ‘Manifest’, the ‘Unmanifest’ and the ‘Knowing’ (Spirit). As for the ‘Manifest’, in the shape of Earth and the rest,—even the dusty—footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible) things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of a priori Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge.—Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things.—

Karik VI

The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through ‘Inference, based on general observation,’ that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation.

(52) The particle ‘tu’ (in the text) distinguishes the ‘Inference based on general observation from ‘Perception’ and from the ‘A priori Inference’.—‘The knowledge of supersensuous things,’—such as Primordial Matter, Spirit and the rest—‘is obtained through Inference based on general observation;’ what is meant by this ‘knowledge’ is the definitive operation of the Buddhi in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the A posteriori Inference also.
(53) **Question**—"Is it only the *Inference based on general observation* that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things? If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the *Mahat* and the other Principles,—in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable."—In answer to this it is added—*That imperceptible thing etc.*; what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term *Tasmāt* only; hence the presence of the particle *ca* is to be taken as meant to include the *A Posteriori* Inference also.

(54) "Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers,' 'tortoises' hair,' 'hare's horns' and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?"

The answer to this is as follows—

**Kārikā VII**

(Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects.

(55) **From excessive distance**—The "non-perception" of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the 'Lion's back-ward glance'—

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* "The maxim of 'the lion's back-ward glance' is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows."
A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its extreme remoteness. 'Excessive' (ati) must also be taken with 'proximity' (sāmipyā)—e. g. the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness.

"Destruction of organs"—e. g., blindness, deafness, etc.

"From absence of mind"—e. g., a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.

"From subtlety"—e. g., however much one may concentrate one’s mind (i. e., however attentively one may look) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one’s very eyes.

"From Intervention"—e. g., one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.

"From suppression"—e. g., the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"From intermixture"—e. g., one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(56) The particle 'ca' in the Kārikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned; such as 'non-manifestation' also becomes included (among the causes of non-perception)—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested.

(57) The upshot of the whole then is this:—The non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only
with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this capability of being perceived can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.

Question—Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature etc.?

The answer is—

Kārika VIII

The non-perception of these (Nature and the rest) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence: since it is actually apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of) which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.

(58) "Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa (in eatables)?"

The Author replies—"Not due to its non-existence". Why?

"Because it is apprehended through its effects." 'It' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kārika XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of knowledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense-perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself). The seventh

* This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahā etc., are perceptible; these must have a cause and this cause is Nature.
Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge; and hence the incapacity of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text.

(59) Question.—“What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature?”

Answer.—“The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects.” This will be explained later on (Kārikā XXII):

Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom:—“Similar and dissimilar to Nature.”

This will be further explained in Kārikā XXIII et. seq.

(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is that there is a Cause; in regard to this subject (of cause and effect) there is a difference of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some people assert that the ‘existent’ (effect) emanates from the ‘non-existent’ (cause); (2) others represent all effects as mere illusory evolutions from out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves; (3) others again hold that the ‘non-existent’ (effect) emanates from the existent (cause); (4) lastly, the revered ones declare that the ‘existent’ (effect) emanates from the ‘existent’ (cause).
(61) Under the first three of these theories, the existence of Nature (Primordial Root-Matter) cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the world is found to consist of Sound and other Elements which are only different forms and modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter (Nature) whose 'primordiality' must consist in its being of the nature of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (which alone are the essence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion). Such being the case, if the 'existent' effect were the product of the 'non-existent' cause (the first view above),—then, how could the non-existent Cause which must be characterless, be of the nature of Sound and other Elements consisting of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion? As, certainly the non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent.—If (as under the second view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent' Being,—then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect emanates from the existent cause'; and the second view is open to the further objection that the One Being could never constitute what is phenomenal; in fact the conception of the non-phenomenal as constituting the phenomenal must be wrong.—Even under the theory of Kanāda and Gautama,—that the non-existent effect is born out of the existent cause,—as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature).

(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation).
Karikā IX

The effect is existent; (1) because what is ‘non-existent’ cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly), because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

(63) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. ‘The effect is existent,’—even before the operation of the cause,—this is what is meant. The followers of Nyāya cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of ‘doing what is already done’ (i.e., if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [for reasons to be explained later on].

[As regards the theory that ‘the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause’] though it is true that products like the sprout and the jar are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump [so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this Destruction, which is non-existent],—yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to Destruction, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay-lump. If a positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such negation (of things) would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā.
(64) [As regards the Vedānta theory] the belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.* [Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere 'illusory evolution'.]

(65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaṇāda, with reference to which the author asserts—"The effect is existent." In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced—(1) "What is non-existent cannot be produced." If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If it be held that 'existence' and 'non-existence' are mere properties belonging to the jar, even so, if the object to which the property belongs is 'non-existent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence' of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because if the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, ex-hypothesis), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent'?—Hence it follows that, as after the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [i.e., its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience; e.g. there

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* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.
is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,—of rice from paddy by thumping,—and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'non-existent' is never found to be either manifested or produced.

(66) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause: "Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect." The term 'Upādāna' (in the text) stands for cause,—and the 'Grahaṇa' of the cause stands for its relation to the effect; so that the compound 'Upādānagrahaṇāt' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect'. What is meant is that the cause produces the effect only when in relation with it; and there could be no such relation with the effect if the latter were 'non-existent'; hence [the effect must be regarded as 'existent']

(67) Objection: "Granted all this; but why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced."

In answer to this we have the next clause—

(3) "Because all is not possible."—If the effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), as all would be equally unrelated to the cause. But such is not the case. Hence a related effect only can be produced by a related cause, and not an unrelated effect by an unrelated cause. This is thus asserted by the teachers of Sānikhyas—'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all'.

(68) Objection: "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from
actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction (such as has been argued above).''

Answer: (4) "Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient."—Now then, asks our author, does this 'efficiency' subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things—or upon that effect only which is amenable to that efficiency? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted that 'the (causal) efficiency itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not all',—then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours connected with the particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent'; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.—Thus it is rightly argued that 'because the efficient cause can do only that for which it is efficient' [the effect cannot be 'non-existent'].

(69) (5) For the following reason also the effect should be regarded as existent:—"Because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.'—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is existent; then how can the effect, non-separate from this latter, be 'non-existent'?

(70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following: (a)

Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect

The cloth (an effect) is not different from the yarns (constituting it),—because it subsists in the yarns;—an object differing in its essence from another, can never subsist in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth does subsist in the yarns;—hence it follows that it is not different from the cause.

(b) The Cloth and the Yarns cannot be different things, because the latter is the constituent cause of the former;—where any two things are entirely different, one is never found
to be the constituent cause of the other, e.g., in the case of the Jar and the Cloth; as between the Cloth and the Yarns, however, the Yarns are the constituent cause of the Cloth;—hence it follows that the two are not different.—(c) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the Cloth and Yarns: because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them:—‘conjunction’ is found to take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to ‘separation’, as between the Himalaya and the Vindhyā;—in the case of the Cloth and the Yarns, however, there is neither ‘conjunction’ nor ‘separation’,—hence it follows that they are not different.—(d) For the following reason too, the Cloth and the Yarns are not different things: because the Cloth does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the Yarns constituting it,—as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—e.g., the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two palas is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single pala;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the Cloth and that of the weight of the Yarns constituting it;—hence the Cloth is not different from the Yarns. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference—[Avitānumāna—see, Kāṅkā V] establishing the non-difference (of the Cloth and the Yarns in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as —(a) "If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [that is, when the 'cloth' is.
torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and that of being produced on the part of the threads or yarns; the identity of the cloth and the yarns would thus mean that the same thing is both destroyed and produced at the same time];—(b) there is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being related [which means that the two members of the relationship are different]; (c) the function of the useful purpose served by the cause is different from that served by the effect [e.g., the cloth serves the useful purpose of covering things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns]." These arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors: (a) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be produced on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be destroyed on entering them again (i.e., being formed into clay, etc.,) and disappearing. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no 'production' or birth for what is 'non-existent', nor 'destruction' for what is 'existent':—as has been declared by the revered Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana (Vyāsa in the Bhagavadgītā, 2.16)—'There is no being for the non-existent, nor non-being for the existent.'—In the instance cited, the Tortoise is not different from its appearing and disappearing limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.—(b) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being
analogous to the assertion 'There are Tilaka trees in the forest'.—(c) As for the difference in the useful purpose served, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of burning, cooking and lighting. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of covering, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the cloth, they can serve the purpose of covering.

(72) Opponent.—"[You say that the cloth is already existent in the cause, the yarns; and when it is supposed to be produced, it is only manifested.]—Now, was this manifestation of the cloth existent, before the operation of the cause? Or was it non-existent? If the latter, then the production of what was non-existent becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the manifestation of the cloth) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the manifestation is 'existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed),'—then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations'. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."
(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the non-existent effect is produced, what is this 'production'? Is it existent or non-existent? If it is existent, then there is no need for the causes. If it is non-existent, then there should be production of that 'production' also,—so that there would be an endless series of 'productions'.

(74) If, in order to avoid the endless series of 'productions', you hold that the 'production' is nothing more or less than the 'cloth' itself,—then the term 'cloth' would be synonymous with 'production'; so that, when the term 'cloth' has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced' (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say 'the cloth is destroyed'; because destruction and production (denoted by cloth) can never co-exist.

(75) Thus, [Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'production of the cloth' must consist either in 'the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in 'the inherence of the cloth in its Being'; in either case, the said 'Production' cannot be produced (as Inherence is eternal); and yet for the purposes of that 'production' several causes have to be set into operation. And (just as you need the causes for the bringing about of the 'production' which is eternal), so would there be need for causes for the manifestation of the already existent products like the cloth.—The causes cannot be related to the form of the cloth; because the form is not an operation, and it is only to an operation that causes are directly related; as otherwise (without being related to operation) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.

(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever existent.

(77) Having thus proved the effect to be 'existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the
Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.

Karikā X

The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'component', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and 'dependent'.—The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

(78) 'With cause' (Product). The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Karikā XXII).

(79) 'Not eternal'—destructible, i.e., evanescent [being absorbed in its maternal cause.*]

(80) 'Not pervasive',—that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade over all evolutes. It is the effect that is pervaded over by the cause,—not the cause by the effect; e.g., the Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and other products can never pervade Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.

(81) 'Active'—i.e., mobile. The Sentient Faculty (Buddhi), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation).

(82) 'Multiform':—as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.

(83) 'Component',—of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in

* Since the Sāmkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.
the relation of 'composite and component' has been made on the basis of some sort of assumed difference; just as in the case of such assertions as 'There are Tilaka trees in this forest' (when the trees have no existence apart from the forest).

(84) 'Soluble',—into Nature. The Sentient Faculty and the rest are soluble into Nature, as is going to be explained later on.—Nature cannot be soluble in itself though it may be so regarded in its relation to the Spirit.

(85) 'Conjunct'.—Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [Unsatisfied with this explanation on the ground of the relationship between the whole and its parts being eternal,—the author offers another explanation].—Or, the term 'avayava' (in the compound 'Sāvayavam') may be explained as equivalent to 'avayavana', i.e., the mutual adhesion, contact,—i.e., Conjunction,—between wholes and parts. 'Conjunction' consists in union following on disunion; and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word 'Sāvayavam'. For instance, there is such mutual conjunction among earth, water and other substances; there can be no such conjunction between Nature on the one hand and (its products) Sentient Faculty and the rest; because these latter are essentially the same as Nature. Nor can there be any conjunction between the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, because there is no disunion (absence of contact) among these.

(86) 'Dependent',—the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the I-principle, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature: without such assistance it would be too weak to produce the I-principle. Similarly, the I-principle and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products.—Thus, in the producing of its product, 'everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the Mani-
fest is dependent, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.

(87) ‘The Unmanifest is the reverse,—of the Manifest. That is to say—the Unmanifest is without cause, eternal, pervasive, and inactive—[though to Nature does belong the action of evolution, yet it can have no mobility]—one, not-component, not-soluble, unconjunct and independent.

(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:

Kārika XI

The Manifest is ‘with the three Attributes’ (Gunas).

The points of similarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

(89) ‘With the three Attributes.—That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90) ‘Undistinguishable’;—just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi), being conative with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature. Or ‘avivek’ may stand for ‘non-separativeness’, i.e., for the character of being co-operative, among the ‘manifest’ things, there is no one thing that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself.

(91) Some people have held that it is Idea (Viśeṣa) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this Idea that could possess these (pleasure, etc.,) as its attributes.
In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is 'objective'; 'objective' here stands for 'what can be apprehended'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.—And because it is 'objective', therefore, 'common'—i.e., apprehended (simultaneously) by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the Idea, then in that case,—in as much as Ideas, being in the form of 'functions', belong specially to particular individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the Idea of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [Manifest substance such as the] glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case if it were otherwise (i.e., if the glance were a mere Idea).

(92) 'Insentient'—Nature (Prakṛti), Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the Buddhi as held by the Vaiṁś'īka (Buddhist).

(93) 'Productive'—i.e., possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been 'prasavadharma', but the author has used the particular possessive affix (ṛini), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of productiveness as belonging to the Manifest; the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.

(94) The author attributes the properties of the Manifest to the Unmanifest—'So also is Nature',—i.e., as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the Manifest, just enumerated, belong to Nature also].

(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated—'The spirit is the reverse.'
(96) 'Objection':—"How can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifest and the Unmanifest; when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifest—such as being 'without cause', 'eternal' and so on—as also between the Spirit and the Manifest—such as being 'multiform'?" Answer: 'Yet also similar';—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as being 'without cause' and the rest, yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of being devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.

(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arises—What are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text:—

* This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation. It stands for the Guṇas of the Sāṁkhya—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter—as says Colebrooke—'These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition.' On this Davies remarks—'Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Guṇas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter.' And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Rajas. Davies has rendered this important word—'Guṇa'—by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For Mode, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, 'a quality which it may have or not, without effecting its essence or existence.' The Guṇa of the Sāṁkhya, however, is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate 'Guṇa' as 'Attribute'—using the latter term in the sense impinged to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between Attribute and Mode: 'By Attribute, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance as constituting its essence; by Mode, I understand the affections of substances, etc.'
The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint; and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive and co-operative.

(98) These are called Guṇas (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kārikā. And according to the maxim of presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the ‘pleasure’ (‘pain’ and ‘delusion’) of this Kārikā are to be taken in the same order (as ‘Sattva, etc.’ in the next).

(99) Thus then, the meaning is that ‘Pṛiti’ being Pleasure, the Sattva attribute is of the nature of pleasure; ‘Apriti’ being Pain, the Rajas attribute is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, ‘Viśāda’ being Delusion, the Tamas attribute is of the nature of delusion. The word ‘Ātman’, ‘nature’ has been added with a view to discard the theory that ‘pleasure is nothing more than mere negation of pain and vice versa.’ As a matter of fact, Pleasure and Pain are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term ‘ātman’ ‘nature’ connotes positive reality, so that those things are ‘prityātman’, whose nature, i.e., Existence, is in the form of pleasure; similarly with the other terms (‘aprityātman’ and ‘viṣāḍātman’). The idea of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

(100) Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next describes their several functions:—"They serve the purpose of illum-
nation, action and restraint.”—Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The Rajas-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Sattva-attribute to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish Tamas-attribute—by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the Tamas-attribute becomes a restraining force.

(101) Having thus described their functions, the author proceeds to describe the method of their operation—”They are mutually subjugative and supporting and productive and co-operative.” The term ‘vr̥tti’ at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound [thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) anyonyābhībhavavṛttiyaḥ, (2) anyonyās’rayavṛttiyaḥ, (3) anyonyajananaṃvṛttiyaḥ and (4) anyonyamithunavṛttiyaḥ].

Now to explain, (1) “Mutually subjugative”—The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other; e.g., the Sattva attribute attains its calm state only after having subdued the Rajas and Tamas attributes. Similarly the Rajas attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the Sattva and Tamas attributes; and the Tamas attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the Sattva and Rajas attributes.—(2) “Mutually supporting.”—Though this epithet is not applicable here, in the sense of the container and the contained, yet what is meant by ‘support’ (Ās’raya) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the Sattva attribute helps the Rajas and Tamas attributes through the help of activity and restraint (which are the functions of the Rajas and Tamas attributes). [Or else, the Sattva attribute by itself, without the help of Rajas, would remain inert, and never be moved to action].
Similarly the Rajas attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of illumination and restraint,—and the Tamas attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of illumination and activity. (3) "Mutually productive." That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By production here is meant modification, and this is always of the same character as the parent Attribute. This is the reason why this ‘modification’ is not regarded as ‘caused’ (produced), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it non-eternal, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "Mutually co-operative." That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another. The particle ca has the cumulative force.

In support of the above, we have the following Smiti text: "All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; Sattva is the consort of Rajas, Rajas of Sattva, both of these again of Tamas, which latter again of both, Sattva and Rajas. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (Devi-Bhāgavata, 3. 8).

(102) It has been said that the Attributes "serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint." Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so:

Kārikā XIII

The Sattva-attribute is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the Rajas-attribute exciting and mobile; and the Tamas-attribute sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.
(103) The Sattva-attribute, etc.—The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of Sānkhya, to be buoyant and illuminating. Buoyancy—as opposed to sluggishness—is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, buoyancy may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); sluggishness, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Kārikā XII).

(104) Sattva and Tamas, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects; the driving force is supplied by Rajas, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. It is for this reason that Rajas is said to be exciting. This exciting character of Rajas is next accounted for—"(it is also) mobile." This shows that the operation of Rajas is necessary for all activity.

(105) On account of its ‘mobility’, Rajas would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the "sluggish and enveloping" Tamas, which obstructs its activity, which is operative in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Rajas, Tamas has been said to be the restrainer—"Darkness is sluggish and enveloping." The particle ‘eva’ is to be construed—not only with ‘Tamas’ but with ‘Sattva’ and ‘Rajas’ also.
The enquirer objects: "Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endowed as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champions); there can be no possibility of their combining for a single purpose." The author replies—
"Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of the lamp." We have all observed how the wick and the oil—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; similarly, the three humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end:—"for the single purpose", of the emancipation of the Spirit. This will be further explained in Kārikā XXXI.

Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual contradictions, lead to the assumption of three different causes connate with themselves respectively, (and it is these causes that we have postulated the three Attributes). These three causes also must be multiform, since, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As an example (of the multiform character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives,—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or
stupifies another man who is unable to get at her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the Attribute of Sattva, the essence of which is Pleasure; the cause of pain is the Attribute of Rajas, the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the cause of delusion is the Attribute of Tamas, the essence of which is Delusion.

As regards Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to Sattva), these are not mutually contradictory, and as such, not incapable of co-existing in a single substratum; in fact, they are actually found together (subsisting in Sattva). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally) —as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of Rajas), —as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of Tamas), [do not necessitate the assumption of several causes]. Thus it is established that there are three—and only three—Attributes.

(108) Objection:—"As regards earth, and other things known to us, we actually perceive the properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the rest (described in Kārka xi) as belonging to them, and we admit them so far. But the Sattva and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri-
bute to these latter, the said properties of being ‘undistinguishable,’ ‘objective,’ ‘insentient’ and ‘productive’ (as described under Kārikā XI above)?"

Answer:

Kārikā XIV

The properties of being ‘undistinguishable’ and the rest are proved by the existence of the three Attributes, and by the non-existence of these (the three Attributes) in their absence. And the existence of the Un-manifest (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause.

(109) By “aviveki” in the Kānikā is to be understood the abstract form ‘avivekita’; just as ‘dvi’ and ‘eka’—in the Sūtra “Dvyekayordovvacanaikavacane” (Pāṇini 1.IV.22)—stand for ‘dvitva’ and ‘ekatva’ respectively; if it were not so, then the form of the compound would be “dvye kesu” (and not “dvye kaih”).* Question.—How do you prove the properties of “undistinguishableness” and the rest?—Answer:—“By the existence of the three Attributes.” That is, in the case of manifested entities known to us, it has been found that ‘whatever is of the nature of Pleasant, Pain and Delusion, is endowed with the properties of being undistinguishable and the rest’;—this affirmative universal proposition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many words because it is clearly known,—It proceeds to state the negative premise in the next term—‘by the non-existence of these in their absence’; that is, where the said properties of

* For if the compound were analysed into ‘dvi’ and ‘eka’, the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making ‘dvi’ and ‘eka’ stand for ‘dvitva’ and ‘ekatva’ making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.
‘being indistinguishable’ and the rest are absent,—as in the 
*Spirit,—the three Attributes of Sattva etc., are non-existent.*
Or, we may have the *Manifest and the Unmanifest* ( both 
together ) as the subject ( minor term ) of the syllogism, and 
then we shall have the reasoning—‘‘By the existence of the 
three Attributes’’—as a purely negative inference* ( Avita ),
there being no other case ( besides the minor term ) where 
there could be an affirmation ( of the reason, Middle term—
existence of the Attributes).

(110) *Objection:*—‘‘The existence of the properties of 
‘being indistinguishable’ and the rest, cannot 
be proved before the object possessing these 
properties ( the Unmanifest ) has been prov- 
ed to exist. The existence of the Unmani-
*fest itself has not yet been proved; how then can the exis-
tence of the said properties be proved?’’

*Question—How is Nature proved to exist ?*

*Reply : From the properties of the effect being due to those of the cause.*

*The syllogism has been previously explained as—‘‘Whatever 
has pleasure etc., is indistinguishable, as the perceptible, material 
substances.‘‘—and here we have the affirmation ( Anvaya ) of the 
reason in the ‘perceptible substances’ whose connotation is 
different from that of the subject of the syllogism, ‘‘All things 
having pleasure etc.’’ Now, what our author proposes is that we 
might explain the reasoning thus ‘‘All things besides the Spirit 
( the Manifest and the Unmanifest ) are indistinguishable, since 
they have the three Attributes, and whatever is not indistinguishable 
does not have the three Attributes.’’ Thus in the latter syllogism, we 
have for the minor term *The Manifest and the Unmanifest* which 
comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) 
could be found; for nothing besides the Manifest and the Unmanifest 
can be said to have the three Attributes.*
causes; e.g., the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;—it is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the Unmanifest, Primordial Matter (Nature) is established.*

(111) Says the enquirer, "the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vais'ēśikas) and Gautama (the Naiyāyikas) assert that Manifest is produced out of the Manifest; According to them Atoms are manifest, and these produce the manifest product, from the binary compound onwards to the Earth, Water and other substances; and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the

* And consequently Nature too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"Whatever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms.——

Properties of the effect (Inteclct) are properties of the cause (Nature).

Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect (Inteclct)

∴ Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause (Nature).

And again:—

Whatever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreeetness, etc.

Nature has pleasure, etc., (as first proved).

∴ Nature has indiscreeetness, etc.
(constituent) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the Manifest what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature?)

We reply——

Kārikā XV

(i) Because of the finite nature of specific objects,
(ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects), —there is the Unmanifest as the cause (next Kārikā).

(112) "Of specific objects" i.e., of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the rest—the cause, root-cause is the Unmanifest (Nature). Why so?—(iv) "because of the separation between the cause and effect and because of the merging of the whole Universe":—It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause; the

* The atomic theory of Kanāda and Gautama may be thus summed up—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Akāśa, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endowed with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds by some agency or other—mainly that of Ādṛṣṭa, the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else, they could not be permanent. But as far as I know, no Naiyāyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to Śaṅkarācārya in his refutation of the atomic theory. See Śāriraka-Bhāṣya on the Brahma-Sūtras II—11-12-17.
already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it—this is the Body of the Tortoise and these are its limbs—and on again entering the body, they become unmanifest, hidden; similarly, the already existing products, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, on emerging out of the cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, come to be distinguished from this cause;—similarly, the already existing products in the shape of the Earth and other substances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmātras) become distinguished from them; the already existing Primary Elements on emerging out of their cause, the "I-principle", come to be distinguished from it; the already existing "I-principle", emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest (Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This "distinguishing" or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately (as with Earth, etc.) or immediately (as with Great Principle)—is what is meant by the "distinction between the cause and its product". Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears, i.e., becomes Unmanifest; which means that it is a form of the cause itself which becomes unmanifest, so far as the particular product is concerned. Thus also when the Earth and the other substances merge into the Primary Elements, they render these latter "unmanifest" in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned;—similarly, when the Primary Elements merge into the I-principle, they render these latter "unmanifest" in so far as their own form is concerned;—when the I-principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is
concerned;—and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple. This is what is meant by 'the non-separation or merging of the whole world of effects', of all kinds. The term 'Vais'varūpya' is formed by the adding of the reflexive affix 'syaṁ' (to the term 'vis'varūpa'). From all this it follows that, in as much as there is 'distinction' and also 'merging' of the already existing product in the cause, there must be Unmanifest as the cause.

(113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause—'Because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause;'—It is a well-known fact that the evolution of the effect is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent 'efficiency' in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being existent, there can be no other form of causal efficiency, apart from the fact of the effect being latent in the cause. The difference of sand from sesamum—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

(114) Objection: "The above two reasons that you have urged—the fact of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause and that the separation and merging of the cause and effect—, might be taken as proving the supreme 'Unmanifest' character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?"

Answer: "Because of the finite nature of specific objects";—'parimāṇāt' stands for 'parimitat-vāt', 'because of being measured, i.e., finite'. [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic form]—The specific objects in question, the
Great Principle and the rest, have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (i.e., they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state).—because, they are finite,—like the jar and other things:—the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Unmanifest which must be the final cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

(115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie unmanifested:—'Because of homogeneity'.—'Homogeneity' consists in the similarity of the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest—manifesting themselves as 'volition' and the rest—are found to be 'homogeneous' in the sense that they consist in Pleasure Pain and Delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inhere), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.**

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:

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* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of the Great Principle) is not finite, as its effects, 'I-principle' and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes ad infinitum.

**Thus we have in the present case: The Great Principle and the rest are invariably connected, with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; and as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all are unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its constituent elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in Pleasure, Pain and Delusion.
Kārika XVI

There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before); it operates through the three Attributes, by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

(116) "Operates through the three Attributes".—At the time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, continues its homogeneous modifications. Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified. Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes, Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form* [This is at the period of dissolution].

(117) Another method of operation (which comes in at the creative period) is next stated—"By blending". The term 'samudaya' signifies 'sametya udaya', appearing in combination, i.e., blending. This blending of the Attributes is not possible without some sort of relative subserviency among them; and this relative subserviency again is not possible without some diversity among the Attributes;—this diversity again is not possible without one being suppressive of the other (i.e., unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another).—This is the second method of operation which brings about the Great Principle and other products.**

* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.

** The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations—Intelect and the rest.
(118) The enquirer objects—""How can diverse methods of operation belong to the Attributes, when each of them is of one uniform nature?"" We reply—""By modification like water;""—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though naturally of itself, having one taste,* becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and hot, according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, (owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes), the Attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications (in the state of various products). This is what is meant by the phrase: "on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes." That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

(119) There are some self-contented (Materialists) who accept, as ‘Spirit’, either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the ‘I-principle’ or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.

**Karikā XVII**

(a) Because all composite objects are for another’s use, (b) because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties, (c) because there must be control, (d) because there must be some one to experience and (e) because there is a tendency towards

* 'Sweet' according to the Naiyāyikas.
'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.

(120) The Spirit must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (a) "Because all composite objects are for another's use"—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things.—Nature and the rest are all 'composite', being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of Sattva; Rajas, and Tamas).

(121) "But" says the objector, "the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body which is itself a composite thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing—(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit.

We reply—"Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties."—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being for another's use', we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.
objects _ad infinitum_; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on _ad infinitum_. And when we can escape this _recessus ad infinitum_ by postulating a reasonable terminus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that “Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence” because when the ‘composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with ‘being for another’s use’ (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects); in fact if one were to insist upon the inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),—then there would be an end to all inference (no inference being possible).* We have explained this in our Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā.** Thus then, in order to escape the _recessus ad infinitum_, if we accept the non-composite nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being “without the three Attributes”, “distinguishable”, “non-objective”.

* Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Nyāyāyikas—“Fiery, because smoking, as the _culinary hearth_”—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

** This is a commentary on Udyotakara’s Nyāyavārtika (a gloss on the Vātsyāyanabhasya on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama). This work with the Paris‘uddhi of Udayanācārya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyāya,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Ganges’a _Upādhyāya_, in his Tattva-Cintāmaṇi.
(subjective), "uncommon (specific)", "sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite', which latter being absent in the Spirit, must lead to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., just as when a certain individual is not a 'Brâhmaṇa; he cannot be a 'katha' (a special class of Brâhmaṇas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit.

(122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: "Because there must be 'control'; that is to say, because the objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as 'are always controlled';—as a matter of fact it is found that everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, (i.e. in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—e.g., the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion'; therefore, they must have a 'controller'—and this 'controller' must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent;—and this is the Spirit.

(123) Again there must be the Spirit "because there must be some one to experience". The term 'some one to experience' indicates the objects of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must

* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a regressus ad infinitum.
be something other than the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products; as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.* Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the Spirit.

(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kārikā thus: The term ‘Bhogya’ stands for visible; and the visibility of the Great Principle and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond them; and this is the Spirit. What the word ‘bhoktrbhāvāt’ of the text means is ‘because the observer is to be inferred from the visible’. The visibility of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,—like the Earth and other substances,—of pleasure, pain and delusion.

(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there—"because there is tendency towards Isolation."—The ‘Isolation’ which is found in all scriptures and is recognised by great sages and others possessed of divine insight—as the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain—can never belong to the Great Principle and other products; because, by their very nature, the pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved,

* That is to say—the Great Principle, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to feel pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of pleasure by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and vice versa, which is absurd.
since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element.—It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards ‘Isolation’, there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest.—and this is the Spirit.

(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one* (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body? And in reply he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

Kārika XVIII

(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

(127) "Because etc."—The plurality of Spirits is established,—why? "Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs. The 'Birth' of the Spirit consists in its connection with a new set of body, sense-organs, mind, 'I-principle', Great Principle and feeling** (Vedānā)—all these latter forming a composite

* As the Vedāntin asserts.
** "Vedānā might be taken severally with 'body' etc., In that case the passage would be translated thus: 'bodily' sensuous, mental egoistic and intellectual cognitions; but the translation given above is preferable, for certainly there can be no cognition through body etc., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind etc., and so on with the rest.
of a particular character; it does not mean modification; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). Death also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The ‘organs’ are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The definite adjustment of these—birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these—Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit,—and this cannot be explained on the hypothesis of there being only one Spirit; for, if the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then on the birth of one, all would be born.—on the death of one, all would die,—on one becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind or deaf,—on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,—so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing (on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. This, however, can never be right, for a girl does not become ‘dead’ by the derangement of her hands, or ‘born’ on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body.

(128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different with different bodies: “Because activity is not simultaneous.” Though ‘Activity’ in the form of effort, is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men—as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man would
lead to the moving of all others at the same time—a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothesis of plurality.

(129) Again, the Spirits must be many—“because there is diversity due to the three Attributes.” The particle ‘eva’ should be constructed with ‘siddham’, not with ‘viparyayāt’; the sense being that ‘the plurality of Spirits must be taken as proved, not as unproved.’ The term ‘traigunya’ stands for the ‘three Attributes’;—by the ‘diversity’ of these is meant ‘differentiation.’ Some persons abounding in the Sattva-attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute—e. g. the deities and saints; others abound in the Rajas-attribute,—such as men; others again in the Tamas-attribute,—such as beasts. This ‘diversity’ or ‘differentiation’ due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

(130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states the properties of the Spirit—as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom:—

Kārikā XIX

And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is ‘Witness,’ and has ‘Isolation,’ ‘Neutrality,’ and is the ‘Seer,’ and ‘Inactive.’

‘From that &c.’—The particle ‘Ca,’ “And” connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

(131) If it were said—“And from this contrast,” then it would refer to ‘the diversity due to the three Attributes’, of the last Kārikā. In order to avoid this, it is said—“and from that, etc.”
A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that*; hence the *that* here refers to Kārikā XI.

(132) Thus, the 'contrast' of the character of "having the three Attributes, etc." and the rest (which have been set forth in Kārikā XI as belonging to the *Unmanifest*, Nature, as also to the Manifest, Products)—connotes the Spirit's property of being *without the three Attributes* and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', 'not common', 'sentient' and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being 'witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a 'seer', and one can be 'seer', and one can be a 'witness' only when the things have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute *showing* the object of their dispute to the *witness*; similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the *witness*. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an *object* and insentient; and since the Spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the *witness*. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

(133) Further, from the *absence of the three Attributes* in the Spirit follows its *Isolation*—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this property, as belonging to the Spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the Spirit being by its very nature *without the three Attributes*, and hence without *Pleasure, Pain or Delusion*.

(134) From the *absence of the Attributes*, again, follows *neutrality*; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure
and pain, who can be called neutral—also called Udāsīna (indifferent). Lastly, the inactivity of the Spirit follows from its being ‘distinguishable’ and ‘non-productive.’

(135) Objection. ‘We grant all this; but in ordinary experience, we first decide, what is to be done by us and then think in the following strain—‘I, who am a sentient being, wishing to do a certain act, am going to do it;’ so that, we find by our experience that ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ are co-existent in the same person. And this goes against the Sāṅkhya tenets which make the ‘Sentient’ being ‘inactive’ and the ‘active’ agent ‘insentient.’

Answer:—

Kārika XX

Thus from this union, the insentient ‘Evolute’ appears as if ‘sentient’; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, which is neutral appears as if it were active.

(136) The sense is that in as much as ‘sentience’ and ‘activity’ have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word ‘Liṅga’ ‘Evolute’, here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the ‘union’ i.e., proximity of the Spirit with the ‘Evolute.’ The rest is clear enough.
(137) Objection:—"You say that the feeling is due to Union, etc. But no union between two distinct things is possible, without some need, which again is not possible without the relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute?]

In reply, the author explains the 'help' or 'benefit' which forms the basis of the need.

Kārikā XXI

For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for the Isolation of the Spirit, there is union of both,—like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution.

(138) In the term "Pradhānasya" the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—"for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things,"—thus implying the fact of Nature being an object—something to be enjoyed. This enjoyability, however, is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature.

(139) The author next explains the need of the Spirit (for Nature)—"For the Isolation of the Spirit"—The Spirit, while in union with the 'enjoyable' Nature, believes the three kinds of pain—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this (self-imposed bond) he seeks liberation, Isolation; this Isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus discrimination is not possible without the Nature (and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge
of any kind is possible);—thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions (between the Spirit and Nature) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of ‘enjoyment’, should be united with it again, for the purpose of ‘Isolation’.

(140) "Granted that there is this union between these two; but whence the evolution of the Great Principle and the rest?" Answer "From this union proceeds evolution." The said 'union' (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for 'enjoyment' or 'Isolation' if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the union itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of 'enjoyment' and 'Isolation'.

The process of Evolution is now explained.

Kārika XXII

From the (Parkṛti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Principle); from this issues Ahāṅkāra (I-principle); from which proceed the 'set of sixteen' from five of this 'set of sixteen' proceed the five elementary substances.

(141) From Prakṛti, etc.,—Prakṛti is the Unmanifest (Nature); Mahat (Great Principle) and Ahāṅkāra (I—Principle) will be described later. The 'set of sixteen' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākāśa, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).
(142) Thus, (a) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds Ākāśa, having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound' proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the primary element of 'colour' combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element 'taste' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch' and 'colour' proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (e) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', 'colour' and 'taste' proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Kārikā X, and specifically in Kārikā XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Kārikā X; now the author defines Buddhi, a particular form of the Manifest, the Buddhi—the knowledge of which is helpful towards discriminative wisdom.

Kārikā XXIII

Buddhi, the Great Principle, 'is determination' (i.e. determining Principle, Will)*; Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, constitute its form when abounding in the Sattva-attribute,—and the reverse of these when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.

*Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that Adhyāyasāya means 'determining' and of all the faculties Will appears to be the only determining principle in Man.
(144) *Buddhi* is described as "determination"—on the principle that there is no difference between the action (of determining) and the active agent (that which determines). It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now 'determination' consists in the notion that 'this should be done,' and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of *Buddhi* (the 'Great Principle' Will), which acquires sentience from its proximity to the Sentient Faculty (of the Spirit); and 'Buddhi' is regarded as not different from the said 'determination' (on the principle that the action is not different from the active agent); this also constitutes the 'definition' (differentia) of Buddhi, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things.

(145) Having thus defined *Buddhi*, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom states the properties of Buddhi, as abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attributes: "*Virtue*, etc., etc.". 'Virtue' leads to prosperity and the Highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold *Yoga* lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of Attachment (Love).

(146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named

1. *Yatamāna-Saṁjñā*,
2. *Vyatireka-Saṁjñā*
3. *Ekendriya-Saṁjñā* and
4. *Vas'ikāra-Saṁjñā*.

(1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and
they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects; in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards their objects, it is necessary that the said impurities should be cured; the effort made to effect this cure constitutes the first form of Dispassion, ‘Yatamāna-Samjñā’, the ‘Endeavour-stage.’ (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured; this sequence being there, those got to be cured have to be discriminated from those already cured; this discrimination constitutes the second stage of Dispassion, the ‘Vyatireka-Samjñā,’ the ‘Discrimination-stage.’ (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere ‘longing’ (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the ‘Ekendriya-Samjñā’, the ‘One-organ stage.’ (4) The suppression of even this longing towards all perceptible objects—sensuous as well as super-sensuous—is the fourth stage called ‘Vas’ikāra-Samjñā,’ the ‘control-stage’; this is superior to the first three stages, this has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: “The dispassion named ‘Vas’ikara-Samjñā’ belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or super-sensuous objects.” [Yoga-Sūtra I.15].—Such is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi.

(147) Power also is a property of Buddhi, and it is to this that the perfections, Attenuation and the rest (Animā etc.) are due.* Of these (1) Animā (Lit. Atomic character), ‘Attenuation’ is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) Laghimā, ‘Buoyancy’ is that to which

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* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear nine; but they ought to be eight only; hence I have taken Vas’itva and Is’itva as one.
is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of
the sun’s rays. (3) Garimā, ‘Gravity’ leads to heaviness;
and (4) Mahimā, ‘Grandeur’ brings greatness. (5) Prāpti,
‘Approach’ is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers.
(6) Prākāmya, Fulfilment of desires, is such as can enable
one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7)
Vas’itva, ‘supremacy’—by this all matter and material things
come under one’s control; this differs from ‘Is’itva’ ‘sovereign-
nity’, which consists in the power to create and maintain
matter and material things. (8) Kāmāvasāyitā, Infallibility
of purpose is that by which all objects follow the course
dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary
mortals follow the course of events, where as those of the
trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.

(148) These four are the properties of Buddhi, abounding
in the Sattva-Attribute. Those abounding in the Tamas-
attribute are the reverse of these—viz., Vice, Ignorance,
Passion and Weakness.

The author next defines Ahankāra—the ‘I-Principle’—

Kārikā XXIV

The ‘I-Principle’ is self-consciousness; from that
proceeds a two-fold evolution—the set of
eleven and the five rudimentary sub-
stances.

(149) “The I-principle is egotism” and this ‘I-principle’
is perceptible in such ideas as—“To what I have observed
and thought of I am entitled,—‘I am able to do this’—‘all
these things are for my use’—‘there is no one else entitled
to it’—’hence I am;’—the egotism involved in all such
notions forms the characteristic function of the ‘I-principle’;—
it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter-
minative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me."

(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—"From that proceeds a two-fold evolution." The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—"The set of eleven" consisting of the sense organs, and "the five rudimentary substances,"—only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle 'eva'.

Objection:—"The I-principle itself being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of evolution the dull and inert (elements) and the illuminative (the sense organs) proceed from it?"

Answer.

Kārikā XXV

The 'set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the 'Vaikṛta' form of the I-principle; the set of Rudimentary substances from the 'Bhūtādi' form of the I-principle; and both of them from the 'Taijasā' form of the I-principle.*

(151) 'The set of eleven', sense-organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;

* (a) 'Vaikṛta,' (b) Bhūtādi and (c) Tājasa are purely technical terms—names applied to the three forms or states of the I-principle. When the I-principle is dominated by the Sattva-attribute, it is called 'Vaikṛta', when it is dominated by the Tamas-attribute, it is called 'Bhūtādi' and when it is dominated by the Rajas-attribute, it is called 'Tājasa'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.
and it proceeds from the ‘Vaikrita’ I-principle. From the ‘I-principle’ as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva-attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

(152) Objection:—When all the necessary products are brought about by the action of the attributes of Sattva and Tamas only, have done with the attribute of Rajas, which serves no useful purpose.

Answer:—‘And both of these from the ‘Taijasa’ form of the I-principle’ i.e., from the ‘Taijasa Form’, that is from the form abounding in the Rajas-attribute, proceed both, the ‘set of eleven’ as also the ‘set of rudimentary substances.’ Even though there is no separate product from the Rajas-attribute exclusively by itself, yet (it is a necessary factor, as) the Sattva and Tamas attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not perform their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the Rajas-attribute, that they perform their functions; thus the Rajas-attribute is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, Sattva and Tamas. Thus it is not true that the Rajas-attribute serves no useful purpose.

In order to describe the ‘set of eleven’ abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.
Kārika XXVI

The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms and the generative organ.

(153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which has, for its constituent cause, the 'I-principle' abounding in the Sattva-attribute. The organs are of two kinds 'of sensation (sensory)' and 'of action (motor). Both of these are called 'Indriya', in the sense that they are characteristics of 'Indra' (the Spirit).

The Sense-organs are named. "The eye etc." — Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the 'Sensory' sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārikā XXVIII.)

The eleventh sense-organ is next described—

Kārika XXVII

Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (Sensory and Motor): it is the 'Observing' principle; and is called a 'sense-organ' since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes.

(154) "Partakes, etc." — Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both — i.e., it is an organ of sensation, as well as one of action; Since the eye and the other sensory
organs, as well as speech and other motor organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind.

(155) The author next gives specific definition of the Mind—"It is the observing principle"—That is to say Mind is defined by observation; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as 'a thing', there follows the definite cognition in the form 'it is such and such a thing, not that'; and it is this observing i.e., the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended,—that is done through the Mind. This has been thus described by an ancient writer—"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a thing and then the mindful people observe—cognise—it definitely as belonging to a certain genus and possessing certain well-defined properties".—Again (says another writer) —"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that it is a thing, this idea being indeterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as sense-perception"—This function of observing belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its differentia.

(156) Objection:—"Granted all this: But we have seen that the I-principle and the Will, having distinct functions of their own, are not classed among 'sense-organs'; in the same manner, the Mind also, having a distinct function of its own, should not be classed among 'sense-organs.'
The author replies—"It is a sense-organ'. Why?
"Because it has properties common to sense- organs." The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause, the 'I-principle' abounding in the Sattva-attribute, and not in its being a characteristic of Indra (Spirit): for this latter property belongs to the Will and the 'I-principle' also; and as such these two also would have to be classed among 'sense-organs'. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term Indriya; it cannot be said to form its connotation.

(157) Question—"How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape of the 'I-principle' abounding in the 'Sattva-attribute'?" Answer:—"Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes"—The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the 'Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification' of the Attributes.

(158) The 'diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that just as the diverse external forms, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.

(159) Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.
Kārikā XXVIII

The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving': 'speaking,' 'handling,' 'walking,' 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of) the other five.

By "Perception" here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa) through the sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the functions of the other five," i.e., of the five motor organs (of action). The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, etc., and the function of this organ is 'Speaking'.

The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear.*

The functions of the three 'Internal organs' are next described:

Kārikā XXIX

Of the three (the internal organs), the functions consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in the five Prāṇa and the rest.

(160) "The functions of the three consist of their respective characteristics." In the compound term 'Svālaksanāya', the term 'Svalakṣaṇa' stands for 'those that have their own distinctive characteristics', — that is, the Will, the I-principle and the Mind; 'Svālaksanāya' (formed with the reflexive affix 'ṣyañ')

* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions e.g., the ear is defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) sound — and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.
stands for those *distinctive characteristics* themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus 'determination' of the Will, 'egoism' of the I-principle and 'observation' of the Mind.

(161) The next sentence describes the dual character of these functions based on the fact of their being *specific* or *common*—"*These are peculiar,*" etc. "*The five Breaths constitute the common function*". The five 'vital airs' i.e., the *Life* itself—forms the common function of the three internal organs; since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called 'Prāṇa', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the generative organ; that called 'Samāna' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called 'Uḍāna', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye-brows; and that called 'Vyāna', in the skin.—These are the 'five vital airs.'

The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the *external organs* and the *three internal organs*).

*Kārikā XXX*

With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible (as well as perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by that: *(i.e., the cognition of some perceptible object.)*

T. 6
(162) "Simultaneous,"—"With regard to perceptible things"; e.g., when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his perception (by the Eye), observation (by the Mind), Egoism or self-consciousness (by the I-principle) and determination (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

(163) "Gradual"; e.g., in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then fixing his Mind intently he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that 'the robber is advancing against me'; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place.

(164) With regard to imperceptible things, on the other hand, the (three) internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"The function of the three is preceded by that," i.e., the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and Remembrance—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things,—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible' as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.
TRANSLATION

(165) Objection: "The functions, either of the four or of the three (organs), cannot depend on themselves alone; for in that case, as these organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them."

Answer:—

Kārikā XXXI

They (the organs) betake themselves to their respective functions, through mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.

The word 'Karanāni,' 'organs,' has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).

(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons,—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.—combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other's 'impluse' (motive),—and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs operates only by the reason of the 'impluse'—i.e., proneness to action—of the other; since this impulse is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any commingling of the functions.
(167) Another objection—"The lancers, etc., being sentient beings, it is only right that they should comprehend each other's 'impluse' (motive) and act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the sentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses."

Answer:—"'The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.'"

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action

What urges the organs to act is the 'Spirit's purpose'—in the shape of 'Experience' and 'Isolation',—prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

(168) 'It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ made to act."' The author next proceeds to classify the organs:—

Kārikā XXXII

Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminating.' The objects of these are of ten kinds,—the 'seized', the 'sustained', and the 'illumined.'
(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will. An organ is a particular kind of active agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' unless it has a function; hence the author next states the functions of the organs—"Having the functions of seizing, sustaining and illuminating,"—respectively; that is to say, the Motor organs have the function of seizing; that is, they take up their respective objects; i.e., extend their activities over them;—the Will, the I-principle and the Mind 'sustain' things through their function in the shape of the Vital Airs and the rest (mentioned before); and lastly, the sensory organs 'illumine' (render perceptible) their respective objects.

(170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next named and classified—"The seized" etc. These objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, to be sustained and to be illumined. By 'seizure' here is meant pervasion (extension). The five motor sense-organs 'extend' over Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object 'to be sustained' by the three internal organs through their functions in the shape of the 'Vital Airs' etc. is the body, which is fivefold, being an aggregate of the five elementary substances; of these the Earth being an aggregate of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be tenfold. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five—sound, touch,
colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become tenfold.

(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated:—

Kārikā XXXIII

The internal organs are three; and the external, ten, exhibiting objects to the former three. The 'external' organs act at the present time and the 'internal' at all the three points of time.

(172) "The internal organs are three:" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called internal because located inside the body.

(173) The external organs are ten; viz., the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs; i.e., they supply the means for observation, self-consciousness and determination regarding objects:—the sense-organs doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective functions.

(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the internal and external organs. "The external organs act at the present time." The "present" here includes also the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. "The internal

* The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the present if by this were meant the present moment only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as 'present.'
organs at all the three points of time." e. g., the idea that
"there has been rain, because the river has risen" (for the
past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"—
(for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to
prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying
their eggs"—(for the future).

(175) According to the Vais'ēvikas, Time is one (in-
divisible) and hence it cannot admit of such
divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future'.
They attribute these divisions to certain
'accidents' (adventitious conditions): but
what the Teachers of Sāṅkhya hold is that these same 'accidents'
themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions
of 'future,' 'present' and 'past,' and there is no need for the
postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the
reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.

(176) The author next discusses the objects of the ex-
ternal senses operating at time present:

Kārikā XXXIV

Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with
objects specific as well as non-specific.

Speech is concerned with sound; the rest
are concerned with five objects.

The intellectual
sense touching
specific as well as
unspecific objects;
speech touching
sound; the rest
regarding the
five objects of
sense

(177) Of the ten external organs, the five
sensory ones are concerned with 'specific'
as well as 'non-specific' objects:—The term
'specific' here stands for the gross Sound
(Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their
'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding' forms, as manifested in
the form of Earth (Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa);—and
'non-specific' stands for the subtile forms of Sound etc., manifested as the Rudimentary Elements. (Tanmātrās); in this name 'tanmātra,' the particle 'mātra' serves to exclude the Gross forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs are those that have for their objects the gross and subtile things. For instance, the Ear of deities and sages can perceive the subtile Rudimentary-Sound as also the gross Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive only the gross Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive gross as well as subtile Touch, while our organ can perceive gross Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their gross as well as subtile forms, while our organs can perceive these in their gross forms only.

(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the I-principle (Ahankāra); and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself (which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the I-principle).

"The rest" i. e., the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are 'concerned with five objects'; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the five primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.

Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given:
The superiority of internal over external organs

Since the Will along with the other internal organs extends over all things, these three are the ‘warders’, and the others are the gates.

(179) ‘Warders’ i.e., most important, superior, ‘Gates’, i.e., mere instruments; the external organs are mere instruments. Since the Will along with the ‘I-principle’ and the Mind ‘extends over’, (i.e., determines)—all objects exhibited by the external organs, therefore, these latter are mere ‘gates’ (secondary organs), and the Will along with the other internal organs, is the ‘warder’ (chief).

The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said:—

Kārikā XXXVI

The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the Attributes, resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit’s purpose, present it to the Will.

(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to the Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having ‘perceived’ an object, present it to the Mind, which ‘observes’ it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre-
sents it to the 'I-principle,' which takes personal cognizance of them, and finally delivers it to the chief officer, Will. Hence it is said: "These having illumined the whole of the Spirit's purpose present it to the Will."

(181) The external organs, the Mind and the I-principle are various modifications of the Attributes i.e., phases of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Even though these are mutually nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire (though variously opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the modifications of the Attributes; such is the connection.

Objection:—"Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to the Will? Why should not we make it the other way: the Will presents its impressions to the I-principle and the Mind, which latter being

'superior'?"

Answer:—

Kārikā XXXVII

In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit [it is Will that is regarded as superior to the other two].
(182) In as much as the 'purpose of the Spirit' is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is the Will alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the Governor of the Country is the immediate and direct agent of the king, is supreme over the village officer and other officials who are subordinate to him. By reason of its proximity to the Spirit, the Spirit becomes reflected in the Will, whereby the Will assumes the form of the Spirit and thus accomplishes the Spirit's experiencing of all things. 'Experiencing' consists in the feeling of Pleasure and Pain,—this feeling takes place in the Will,—the Will has assumed the form of the Spirit;—it is thus that the Will makes the Spirit go through the experience. Just as the Perception, Observation and 'Self-consciousness' of things take the form of the things and become transferred to the Will, in the same manner the functions of sense-organs also become mingled with the 'determining' which is the function of the Will. Just as the army of the village officer is joined with the army of the Governor,—it is thus that the Will 'accomplishes' 'Sādhyati'—The Spirit's 'experience' 'Upa-bhoga' of 'prati'—'all things'—Sarvam—in the shape of Sound and the rest.

(183) Objection—"If the Will serves to accomplish the Spirit's experience of all things then no emancipation (Isolation) is possible." *

* For Buddhhi would continue to help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.
**Answer—** "It afterwards discriminates the difference between Spirit and Nature."—'Descriminates' 'Viṣinaṣṭi' here stands for 'bringing about' the construction of clause 'Antaram Viṣinaṣṭi'—'discriminates the difference'; and is similar to that of 'Odanpākam pacati' * (cooks the cooking of rice); and 'brining about' in this context stands for 'showing' or 'expressing'.

The objector retorts: "The difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to yourself, something that is produced, it must have an end in time; and hence the Isolation or Emancipation brought about by that difference would also be transitory."

The answer to this is contained in the word 'discriminates'; the meaning is that the idea that 'I am one thing and Nature with its evolves is different thing' is always there. What the Will does is to make known this already existing difference, which through non-discrimination, has appeared to be nonexistent; the Will does not produce the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that Emancipation (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.

'Subtile—the said difference is' subtile * i.e., 'hard to perceive."

The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):

* Viṣinaṣṭi itself has been explained as "expresses the difference", then the mention of Antaram would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.
The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be 'specific,' because they are calm, turbulent and deluding.

(184) The Rudimentary Elements i.e., Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle 'Mātra' (in the term 'tanmātra,' which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,) connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.

(185) Having thus described the 'non-specific' things, the author, with a view to describing the 'specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production: "From these etc.;" from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākāś'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth—these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.

(186) Objection:—"We grant that these are thus produced; but what about their being 'specific'". Answer: "These are said to be specific;"—why? because "they are calm, turbulent and deluding. The first च indicates the reason (meaning because) and the second च has the cumulative force (meaning that the things have all the three characteristics). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākāś'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant; others abounding in the Rajas-attribute are turbulent, painful and unstable; the rest abounding in the Tamas-attribute are deluded, confounded and sluggish. These gross elements, thus
perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be
specific and gross. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary
cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and
as such they are said to be non-specific and subtle.

A further sub-division among the 'specific' objects is
next stated:—

Kārikā XXXIX

(1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents',
and (3) the 'gross' elements,—these are
the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these
the 'subtle' bodies are everlasting, and
'those born of parents' are perishable.

(187) "The specific objects are of three kinds": these
three forms are mentioned: (1) subtle bodies which (are not
visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain
phenomena); (2) Those born of parents, i.e., those consisting
of the six 'sheaths' (Kośas). Among these six, hair, blood
and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and
marrow from the father; these six are the six 'sheaths' (of
the physical body): (3) The last are the 'prabhūta' i.e., the
'prakṛṣṭa'. Great, 'bhūta', Elements; along with these, the
other two constitute the 'specific'. Thus subtle bodies form
the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents,'
the second kind and the 'gross elements' the third kind.
Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last.

(188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and
the body 'born of parents' is next explained—
"The subtle bodies are permanent and those
born of parents, perishable"; that is to say,
among the specific things, those that are
subtle are lasting, while those 'born of
parents', are perishable, i.e., ending in (dissolving into) either fluids or ash or dirt.

The subtle body is described—

Kańka XL

The nergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, unconfined, lasting, composed of Will and the rest down to Rudimentary Elements,—migrates, is devoid of experiences, and is invested with dispositions.

(189) ‘Formed primevally’:—when the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, was the subtle Body, one for each Spirit. This body is “unconfined” untrammelled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is “lasting”: since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is “composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements”. That is to say, it is an aggregate consisting of the Will, I-principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Rudimentary Elements; it is also specific, equipped with sense-organs which are ‘calm, turbulent and delusive’.

(190) Objection:—“This Subtle body might be the only vehicle of experience for the Spirit;—what is need of the Physical Body comprised of the six ‘sheaths’”?

* The word nyata is differently interpreted by Nārāyana Tīrtha (in his Sańkhya-Candrika). He takes it in the sense of “restricted” i.e., the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gauḍapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumudī.
Answer:—“It migrates” i.e., the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other. —“But why?” —Because it is “devoid of experience”; that is to say, because the subtle body by itself—without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience—would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

(191) Objection:—“As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit): then how can this Subtle Body migrate?”

Answer:—“(Because) ‘it is invested with dispositions.’ The ‘dispositions’ are Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Passion and Dispassion, Power and Weakness; and it is the Will which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions: just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the Campaka flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is invested with dispositions, that the Subtle Body migrates.

(192) Question:—“Why should not the Subtle Body—The subtle Body dissolving at each pralaya like Nature—last even after the Final Dissolution?”

Answer:—(Because it is) “mergent,” that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; i.e., having a cause it must merge into it.
Objection:—“We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to the Will itself as equipped with the I-principle and sense-organs? There is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority.”

Answer:—

Kārikā XLI

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the pillar,—so neither does the ‘Linga’ (Will etc.) subsist supportless, without ‘Specific Bodies’.

(193) The term ‘Linga’ here stands for the Will, the I-principle and the Rudimentary Elements, because they are the means of knowing (linganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism—During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such. Will and the rest are equipped with the five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body.

"Without specific bodies" i.e., without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the following scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata). “Then Yama extracted from Satyavān’s body the thumb-sized body which he had entrapped and under his control.” Here the mention of the extracted body as “thumb-sized” implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit

* Cf. The Pancaśikaraṇa-viśvarāṇa-Tattvacandrika—where a similar explanation of the word is given.

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could have been so extracted. 'Puruṣa' in the above ex-
tract, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that it sleeps
(lies—s'ete) in the body (puri).

Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body,
the author states the reason and method of its migration.—

Kārikā XLII

Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle
Body acts like a dramatic actor, on
account of the connection of 'causes and
effects' and by union with the all-em-
bracing power of Nature.

(194) "Formed for the Spirit's purpose", the Subtle
Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of its connection
with the 'causes' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc.,—and
'effects' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of
physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc.
That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different
parts, acts like Paras'urāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so
does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act
like a man or a brute or a tree.

(195) Question:—"Whence this capacity of the Subtle
Body?" Answer:—"By union with the
all-embracing Power of Nature." As is
declared in the Purāṇa:—"All this won-
derful evolution is the all-embracing Power
of Nature."

It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on
account of connection with causes and effects"; the author
next describes the causes and effects:—
Kārikā XLIII

Virtue and other dispositions are—(a) natural, which are innate and (b) incidental, and these are related to the 'cause'; and the ovum etc., related to the 'effect.'*

(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; i.e., brought about after the man's birth, by the subsequent propitiating of the deities and such other causes.

"The natural dispositions are innate," e.g., it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The 'incidental' dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Vālmiki and other great sages.

The opposites of Dharma etc., similarly explained

(197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.**

* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place he renders Samsiddhikā by 'transcendental' the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders Karanāśrayānaḥ by 'including cause,' though in reality the compound means 'located in organs'—as explained by the Kaumudī as well as the Candrikā.

** Gaudapāda has taken the kārikā as setting forth three kinds of dispositions—(1) 'Sāmsiddhika' innate, (2) 'Prakṛtika' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) 'Vaiśkr̥tika' incidental.
(198) **Question:** — "We have understood what are ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ in general; what are the particular effects of particular causes?"

**Answer:** —

**Kārika XLIV**

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom (results) the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse.

(199) "**By virtue etc.**" *i. e.*, to the Heaven and other regions

"**By vice, etc.**" *i. e.*, to the nether regions known as Sutala etc.

"**From wisdom, the Highest Good.**" Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long as discriminative wisdom is not brought about; after, however, this has been accomplished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, "**The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge.**" "**From the reverse, etc.**" *i. e.*, from wrong knowledge, results bondage.

(200) **This bondage is of three kinds:** ‘Natural’, ‘Evolutional’ and ‘Personal’, (1) The ‘Natural’ bondage is that of those who worship Nature as the Spirit, with reference to such men, who are called ‘Prākrūtika’ (‘Merged into Nature’), it is said in the Purāṇas: "The contemplators of the Un-
manifest (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years’; (2) The ‘Evolutional’ bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature—the elements, the sense-organs, the I-principle, and the Will—as Spirit. With regard to these it is said. “The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras, those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras, those of the I-principle till thousand, and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under this incidental bondage are Videhas. (3) The ‘Personal’ bondage is due to Iṣṭāpūrta (actions like charms, sacrifices, digging of tanks etc., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

Kārikā XLV

From Dispassion results ‘mergence* into Nature’; from Attachment which abounds in the Rajas-attribute, transmigration; from Power, non-impediment, and from the reverse, the contrary.

* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks ‘It (the Sāṃkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free... Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated.’ All this is quite true; but it is not clear how this affects the position of the ‘Hindu Commentators,’ who, at least Vācaspati Miśra, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the subtle body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again.
(201) "From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature."

Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, become merged into nature. 'Nature' here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as 'Spirit', become absorbed into these (i.e., those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

(202) "From attachment which abounds in the Rajas-attribute, results transmigration."

The epithet "Rajas" implies the painful character of transmigration, because (as has been previously described) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain.

(203) "From power, non-impediment", i.e., the non-obstruction of desires. A man with power can do whatever he likes.

(204) "From the reverse", i.e., from absence of Power, "the contrary" i.e., the obstruction of one's desires everywhere.

With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will—Virtue, Vice etc.,—in order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation—the author first describes them collectively:—

Kārikā XLVI

Such is the 'volitional' (Subjective) Evolution distinguished by Error, Disability, Contentment and Success. By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become fifty.
(204) ‘Pratyaya’ is that by which anything is known i.e., Will; and ‘pratyayasarga’ is the ‘sarga’ ‘evolution’ proceeding from the Will i.e., the volitional or ‘Subjective’ evolution.

‘Error’ i.e., ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also ‘disability’ which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;—‘contentment’ and ‘success’ also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—‘error,’ ‘disability’ and ‘contentment’—include Virtue and the other six dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which is included in ‘success’.

(205) These properties are next described severally.

‘The forms of these are fifty.’ How so?

‘By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities.’ This ‘inequality’ may consist either in the individual strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third, or in the individual weakness of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this ‘inequality’ are assumed in accordance with the requirements of particular cases, and it leads to the suppression of Attributes by one another or by one of them of the other two—thus giving rise to the fifty forms of ‘Subjective Evolution.’

The ‘fifty forms’ are next enumerated:

Kārikā XLVII

There are five forms of Error; twenty eight of
5 forms of Error.
28 of Disability.
29 of Contentment.
9 of Perfection

Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Success eight.
(206) The five forms of Error are ignorance, egotism, love, hate and clinging, respectively named ‘obscurity’ (Tamas), ‘delusion’ (Mohā), ‘extreme delusion’ (Mahāmohā) ‘gloom’ (Tāmisra) ‘blind gloom’ (Andhataćmisra). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of ‘Error’; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or, the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of Error that Egotism and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Vārṣagāṇya has declared that ‘Ignorance is five-jointed.’

(207) The author next describes the subdivisions of the five forms of Error—

Kārikā XLVIII

Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion, Extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also ‘Blind Gloom’.

(208) "Of Error"; i.e., of Ignorance. "there are eight forms".

Of ‘Darkness’ i.e., Ignorance, there are eight forms; Eight of Delusion it consists in the notion of ‘Spirit’ with regard to (1) Nature, (2) Will, (3) I-principle, (4-8) the Five Rudimentary Elements,—all eight of which are not ‘Spirit’, it is this eight-fold notion that constitutes ‘Darkness’ or Ignorance.

(209) The particle ‘ca’ connects ‘eight forms’ with Delusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—‘animā’ and the rest—also to be everlasting; this is the error of Egotism, and since this appertains to the eight Powers it is said to be eight-fold.
(210) "Extreme Delusion is ten-fold". By Extreme Delusion is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten fold.

(211) "Gloom", i.e., Hatred, "is eighteen-fold."

The ten objects of sense, sound, &c. are loveable by themselves; the eight occult 'powers'—Attenuation &c., however—are not loveable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,—in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen fold.

(212) "So is Blind Gloom"—['Blind Gloom' stands for Clinging]. The word 'tathā' applies eighteen-fold-ness to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult powers—Attenuation and the rest—and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,—Sound and the rest—live in continual dread of these (powers and objects) being wrested away from them by the Rākṣasas; and this dread constitutes the 'Clinging' or solicitude which is 'Blind Gloom'; and this latter having for its objects the aforesaid eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be eighteen-fold.

(213) Thus the five forms of Error—which is a sort of Fancy,—with their sub-divisions become sixty-two.

(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty-eight forms of Disability.
Kārikā XLIX

The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability: the injuries of the Will ( itself ) are seventeen—due to the reversion of ‘contentment’ and ‘success’.

(215) The ‘injuries of the organs’ are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—Deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,—consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs—auditory and the rest—are the eleven forms of disability. The disability of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the senses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to eleven causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of Buddhi ( itself ) in accordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect.

(216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the injury of the sense-organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next described.—"With injuries of the Will." Question—"How many Disabilities are there of the Will itself?" Answer—"Seventeen are the injuries of the Will; why? due to the reversion of contentment and success." Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly success being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,—thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the Will.

(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:
Kārika L

The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:—Four internal named ‘Prakṛti’ (Nature), (2) ‘Upādāna’ (Means), (3) ‘Kāla’, (Time) and (4) ‘Bhāgya’ (Luck); and five external due to the abstinence from objects.

(218) The four ‘internal’ forms of Contentment belong to those who have understood that the Spirit is different from Nature, but being illadvised, do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference by such means as ‘Hearing’, ‘Contemplating’ and the like:—these forms are called internal (Ādhyātmika) because they presuppose the difference of Ātman (Spirit) and Prakṛti (Nature). It being asked—which are these?—the reply is—those ‘named’ ‘Nature’, ‘Means’, ‘Time’ and ‘Luck’ i.e., whose names are ‘Nature’ and the rest.

(219) The Contentment called ‘Nature’ consists in that feeling of satisfaction which the disciple has on being told that ‘discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, &c. So, my child, remain as you are! This Contentment is called ‘Ambha’.

(220) The second form of Contentment arises from the following instruction; ‘wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of nature; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of nature functions equally for all individuals; such wisdom can only be attained through
Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named 'Upādāna' (Means), also called 'Salila.'

(221) The Contentment that follows upon the feeling of satisfaction arising from the instruction that "'Renunciation' also cannot bring about Emancipation at once, Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation.'" This is the Contentment named 'Time', also called 'Ogha'.

(222) The fourth form of Contentment is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following:

IV Vṛṣṭi. "'Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature nor from any other means (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck; thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madīlasā obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named 'Luck' also called 'Vṛṣṭi'.

(223) The external forms of Contentment are next described. The external forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.,—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits—Nature, Will, I principle and the rest—to be Spirit. These forms are called external because they presuppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment,—and as the sources of such absence are five,—the absence also is five-fold; and as the absence of attach-
ment is five-fold, the forms of Contentment in question also are five in number.—The term 'Uparama' here stands for absence of attachment; and the compound 'Viṣayoparama' means 'absence of attachment to objects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment—involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.

(224) To explain.—The means of acquiring wealth consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants:—as is declared in the following words—"Who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master?" Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called 'Pāra.'

(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire:—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called 'Supāra'.

(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with great effort (and safely hoarded), there arises the fear of its being spent up,—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called 'Pārāpāra'.

(227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called 'Anuttamāmbha'.
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(228) Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel process of killing animals; and contentment due to the abstinence arising from this perception of cruelty of the process, is the fifth one, called 'Uttamāmbha'.

Thus the five external forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of success:

Kārikā Li

The eight forms of success are—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4–6) three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acquisition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success.

(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the three-fold suppression of pain—three fold, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.

The other 'successes' mentioned are only the means to said suppression of pain, and as such are regarded as secondary in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects; e.g., of these study is only a cause; those of the more important kind are only effects; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect.

(231) The first study consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; this is also called 'Tāra'.
(232) Following from this last is oral instruction, which term implies the comprehension of the meaning of the texts studied—the cause (distinction) standing for the effect (comprehension of the meaning). This constitutes the second success also called ‘Sūtāra’. These two—reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the ‘Śravaṇa’ (Hearing) [which along with manana and nididhyāsana is the means of realising the highest Truth.]

(233) Reasoning consists in the investigating of the meaning of the scriptures by a process of reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures themselves. This ‘investigation’ consists in establishing the ultimate Truth by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it. This process is also called ‘Manana’ (meditation) by writers on the Vedas. This success is called ‘Tāratāra’.

(234) The fourth is the acquisition of friends. Even though one has arrived at the truth by the right process of reasoning, yet one has no confidence in his conclusions until he has discussed them with, and won the agreement of, his teacher and fellow-students. Hence the ‘acquisition’ of such ‘friends’ as the teacher and fellow-students is said to be the fourth success called ‘Ramyaka’.

(235) By dāna here is meant purity, of discriminative wisdom—the word being derived from the root ‘Daip’, to purify. This ‘purity’ has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: “An unimpeached discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain” (Yoga-Sūtra 11—26). By unimpeachedness in the Sūtra is meant purity, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with
different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice, hence the word Dāna ‘purity’ includes (as a means to success) this practice also. This the fifth success called ‘Sadā·maṇita’.

(236) The aforesaid three primary ‘successes’ (three suppressions of Pain) are called, ‘Pruṣomata’, ‘Mudita’ and ‘Modamāna’. And these three with last five are eight forms of Success.

(237) Other people explain the text as follows — (1) the perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of practices during past lives, is what is the first ‘success’ meant by āha, (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sāmikhyā Philosophy, is the ‘second success’ called ‘Śabda’, because it follows solely from the verbal text (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sāmikhyā texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher’s, — it is the third form of success, due to study, and is called ‘adhyaयyana’. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got at it. This form of Success distinguished by knowledge, is called ‘Suhrtprāṣṭ’. (5) Fifthly, Dāna (Generosity) is said to be means to ‘Success’ because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiating with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāmikhyā Philosophy.

(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the ‘reversion of Contentment and Success’ thus become seventeen
in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution,' Success is the most desired by all; and Error, Disability, and Contentment are impediments to Success; this is what is said in the words: "The aforesaid three are checks to Success." 'The aforesaid three' are Error, Disability and Contentment. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success,—because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the āeṇḍa, 'Ankusa,' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.

(239) Objection.—"Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the 'Subjective Evolution' or by 'Objective Evolution' alone. Why have both the Evolutions?"

Answer —

Kārika LII

Without the 'Subjective,' there would be no 'Objective,' and without the 'Objective' there would be no 'Subjective.' Therefore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the 'Objective' and the 'Subjective'.

(240) The term 'Linga' 'Objective' stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and 'Bhūva' 'Subjective' for the evolution out of the Will.

The meaning of the Kārika is that the 'Objective' Evolution cannot manifest itself or accomplish the purpose of the Spirit without the 'Subjective Evolution'; nor conversely can the latter manifest itself or serve the Spirit's purpose without the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution.

T. 8
That is to say, *Experience*, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies (Subtle and Physical). Hence the necessity of the *objective* evolution;—conversely that same *Experience* is not possible without the *organs of experience*, in the shape of the Sense-organs and the Internal organs; and these are not possible without Virtue and the other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established.

(241) The possible objection of 'mutual interdependence' is explained away on the analogy of the seed and sprout, due to the fact of Evolution having had no beginning in time, the 'subjective' and 'objective' evolutions at the beginning of the present cycle are due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle.—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.

(242) The various forms of the 'subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:—

*Kārikā LIII*

The 'celestial' evolution has eight forms, the 'animal' has five; the 'human' has only one form; thus in brief is the 'material' evolution.
(243) The eight ‘celestial’ forms are those pertaining to
(1) the Brahmā, (2) the Prañapatī, (3) the
Indra, (4) Pitr, (5) Gandharva, (6) Yakṣa,
(7) Rākṣasa and (8) Pisāca.

(244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird,
reptile, and the immobile things.

(245) Mankind is single, not counting its sub-divisions—
Brahmaṇas &c. as separate, as the bodily
form is the same in all classes of men.

Such, in brief, is the material evolution. Such objects
as the Jār and the like,—though not having a ‘body’ in the
ordinary sense,—are all included under the category of the
‘Immobile’.

(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of
this ‘material evolution’, based on the higher and lower
degrees of intelligence,—in the form of the ‘higher’, the
‘middle’ and the ‘lower’.

Kārika LIV

The ‘higher’ evolution abounds in the Sattva-attribute;
the ‘lower’ evolution abounds in the Tamas-attribute; and the ‘Middle’
evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute;
—all these comprising the entire Universe, from Brahmā down to the tuft of
grass.

(247) All the Heavenly regions—Bhūvah, Svah,
Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya—abound in
the Sattva-attribute.—The ‘lower’ evolution
abounds in the Tamas-attribute; that all
things from the cattle down to the *Immobile things*, abound in the Tamas-attribute, as full of ‘Delusion’. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvipas (continents) and Oceans—form the ‘middle’ evolution abounding in the Rajas-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actions, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.

The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase “from Brahmi to the tuft of grass”—the ‘tuft of grass’ including the trees and such other things.

(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain.—a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that ‘Dispassion’ (Freedom from attachment) which is helpful in attaining the Final Goal.

*Kārikā LV*

Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the thus Pain is in the very nature of things.

‘Therein”—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of Pleasure, and yet the pain of ‘decay and death’ is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—“may I not cease to be; may I continue to be” &c.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.
(249) Objection:—"Pleasure and pain, (according to the Sāṁkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?"

Answer—The term "Puruṣa," literally means "one who lies in the subtle body;" and this latter being connected with the Will and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them.

(250) Question.—How can pain which is related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply:—"Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body;" the Spirit cognising its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the a in आबिनिहत्ते may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit’s pain—the meaning being, "Until the subtle body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain."

(251) The author next deals with the different views that have been held regarding the cause of ‘Evolution’ or ‘Creation’.

Kārikā LVI

This evolution from the Will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the (modifications of) Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit, and thus is for another’s sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.
Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of 'interdependence'. creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deeds, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of an intelligent agent would mean (according to the opponent) that the deeds of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced,—and the result of this would be that there would be no pain; so that the removal of pains would be very easy! [and there would be no ground for God's compassion].

(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the above incongruities arise, the only motive of Nature is the fulfilment of another's purpose.

Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Karikā is quite appropriate.

(258) It has been said—"as if for its own purpose;" The author proceeds to explain this:—
Kārika LVIII

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does the Spirit's end—the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the emancipation of the Spirit.

'Autsukya' is 'itchā,' desire. Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attainment of the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent, because the end of an action is that which is desired.

The analogy is pointed out. 'So does the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the Emanation of the Spirit.'

(259) Objection—'We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?'

Answer—

Kārika LiX

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit.

The word 'Stage,'—the place—implies the spectators—the occupiers of the place. Having manifested herself, i. e., having shown that her different modifications, sound, &c., are different from the Spirit.

(260) Objection:—'We grant that the action of Nature is for the Spirit's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit, just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for another's purpose.'

Answer.—
Kārika LX

Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings about by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master—who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits,—through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature’s motives is established.

(261) Objection:—“We grant all this. But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators, similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit.”

Answer:—

Kārika LXI

Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my conviction. Once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

By modesty here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the Purusa’s view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature also—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Puruṣa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again.
(262) Objection.—"This may be so. But Purusa (Spirit), being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is any emancipation possible for him? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the Karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying Purusa. And as the Purusa is devoid of action, it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for Rebirth. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution' is for the purpose of the 'Purusa'."

The author meets the above objection by accepting it in the course of winding up his disquisition.

Kaṭikā LXII

Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated: nor does he migrate; it is Nature alone that having many vehicles is bound, or is released, or migrates.

(263) Verily no Spirit is bound, nor does any migrate; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers, because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—grief or profit—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature, as has been already explained. So our doctrine is entirely sound.

(264) Objection.—"We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature herself?"

Answer:—
Kārika LXIII

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit.

"Nature binds herself by means of seven forms"; i.e. by Virtue and other dispositions (all properties of the Will) except wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit in the shape of Experience and Final Release, she releases herself by herself, 'by means of one form', i.e. by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.

Objection — "We have understood all this; what then?"

Kārika LXIV

Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows wisdom in the form,—"I am not, naught is mine, and not—I"—which is complete, pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.

(265) The term "truth" stands for the knowledge of Truth.—From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,—there follows the wisdom, manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice pertains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called 'pure.'
“Why pure”?—“On account of the absence of Error.” Doubt and Error are the two impurities of wisdom; and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called pure. This is what is meant by the term ‘aviparyayät’. Doubt consists in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of Error. Thus ‘absence of Error’ means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this ‘absence of Error’ also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth.

Objection.—“It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the misery of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end.”

In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is ‘Absolute’, i.e., unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge, even though it has a beginning in time. For, partiality towards truth is natural to the Will, buddhi, as declared by outsiders also (here, the Baudhdhas). “No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the Will.

The form of the said knowledge is stated:—I am not, naught is mine, and Not—I. ‘I am not’ merely precludes all action from the Spirit; as is declared (by grammarians), “The root as (as in ‘asmi’) together with bhū and kr signify action in general.” Hence all actions, external as well as internal,—such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension—all become precluded from the
Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea of ‘Not-I; ‘I’ here stands for active agency in general, such as in ‘I give’, ‘I eat’, ‘I offer libations’, in all of which the active agent is represented by ‘I’; because wherein there is no action, there can be no active agent; hence it is rightly expressed as ‘Not—I.’ From this follows the idea that ‘Naught is mine;’ for it is only an active agent that can be a possessor; and hence the preclusion of action implies the preclusion of possession also.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence ‘I am not,’ means that ‘I am the Spirit, not productive;’ and because non-productive, ‘I have no action’—‘Not I;’ and since without action, ‘I can have no possessions,’ hence ‘naught is mine.’

(269) Objection:—‘Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage.’

Answer:—‘It is complete,’ i.e. there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage.

(270) Question:—‘What is it that is accomplished by the said knowledge of truth?’

Answer:—

Kārikā LXV

Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, which has ceased to be productive and has turned back from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose (of the Spirit).

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were experience and the perception of truth; so
that when these two have been produced there is nothing left to be produced by her; hence, Nature "ceases to be productive".

"Under the influence of purpose"; i.e., by the force of discriminative Wisdom. The seven forms of Evolution,—Virtue, Vice, Error, Dispassion, Passion, Power and Weakness—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion also as of those who have it through mere contentment is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its opposite—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects in the shape of the 'seven forms' are also removed, and thus is Nature 'turned back from the seven forms of evolution.'

"At ease", i.e inactive, "Pure", i.e., unmixed with the impurities of the Will due to Rajas and Tamas Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in slight touch with the Will abounding in the Sattva Attribute;—as otherwise no vision of the Nature in the said condition would be possible.

(271) Objection — "This may be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature ceasing to be productive. But Evolution has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Nature); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the 'sentience' of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the 'insentience' and 'objectivity' of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; it cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done; because though one set of objects may have been experienced by the Spirit, there might be others of the same kind still to be experienced: as is found to be the case with the perception of sound and other objects of sense". (Thus no emancipation is possible).

Answer:—
Kārikā LXVI

"She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution.

(272) So long as Nature has not brought about discriminative wisdom, she might continue to bring about the enjoyment of sound and other objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. It is only on account of the want of discrimination, that the Spirit regards as his own and enjoys the pleasing, displeasing and deluding modifications of Nature, the objects of sense,—the sound and the rest. Similarly discriminative wisdom also, which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as "for himself"—only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a modification* of Nature. Thus the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot regard any purpose as his own. Further, experience and emancipation being the 'purpose of the Spirit', supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the 'purpose of the Spirit', there is no motive for the operation. This is what is

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.
meant by the words—"There is no motive for evolution." A 'Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no 'purpose of the Spirit.'

(273) Objection:—"We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that "emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds"—then, we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (i.e. by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation, and hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit," becomes meaningless. The hope too—that "emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of Karma, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"—is too sanguine ever to be realised."

Answer.—

Kārikā LXVII

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted to it.
(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic residuum'—even though it is beginningless and its time of fruition is uncertain,—has its productivity destroyed and is unable to produce any 'fruit' in the shape of 'birth, life and life's experiences'. It is only when the 'soil of the Will' is watered with the waters of the 'Kles'as' (i.e. Ignorance, Egotism, Love, Hate and Clinging), that the 'Karmic seeds' give out sprouts; so that when the said soil is rendered barren by reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having been sucked up by the heat of the 'knowledge of Truth',—how could there be any possibility of the 'Karmic seeds' sprouting up? With this view it is said—"Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy;"—i.e., they cease to be causes. Even so, when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse. Just as, even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it becomes inactive. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced; as is declared in S'ruti—"Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [Chāndogya VI, 1, 2]. The 'impulse' (to which the continuance of the Body is due) is in the remnant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance, it is true that on account of the momentum of this impulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a time.

(275) Question—"This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about?"
Answer—

Karikā LXVIII

When the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,—then he attains eternal and absolute Isolation.

The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,—the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute 'Isolation,' i.e. cessation of the three kinds of pain.

(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated.

Karikā LXIX

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein (wherefore) the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.

"Absiruse"—'guhya' (lit. in a case) i.e. hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.

"By the great sage" i.e. by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. "Wherein are considered, etc.; 'in which' knowledge means for the sake of which knowledge: as in the expression 'Carmani dvipinam hantu,' the word 'carmani (lit. in the skin) is taken to mean 'for the sake of the skin, one
kills the tiger'.—'Bhūtanām;' of living beings,—'the origin, duration and dissolution' are considered;—which is done in the scriptures.

(277) Objection:—"Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great sage (Kapila); wherefore should we have every regard for the assertion made by Īśvarakṛṣṇa?"

Answer:—

Kaṭṭikā LXX—LXXI

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the Sage imparted to Āsuri, who taught it to Pañcasīkha. by whom the philosophy was extensively propagated.

Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in the Āryā metre by the noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa who has thoroughly understood the philosophical doctrine.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all evils causing the three kinds of pain.

Supreme, i. e. the most important of all purifying doctrines.

'Sage'—Kapila—Imparted to Āsuri &c.

(278) 'Ārya'—that which has arrived at truth, and one whose mind is such is 'noble-minded'.

(279) This philosophy is one organic whole in itself,—not a mere section—as it treats of all branches of knowledge:—

Kaṭṭikā LXXII

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete 'Philosophy of the Sixty Topics,' excluding the illustrative tales, and omitting the doctrines of other people.
The sixty topics are thus enumerated in the Rājas Vārtika: 1 The existence of Nature (Kārikā XIV). 2 Its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (XI); 4 Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit) (XI); 5 Subordination (of Nature to Spirit) (XVII); 6 Plurality (of Spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Nature in the end) (XX); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Nature in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Duration (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX): these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of Error, (XLVII), nine of Contentment (L), and twenty-eight of Disability of the organs (XLIX); these together with the eight forms of Power (LI) make up the sixty "topics". All these sixty topics are treated of in the above distiches, which therefore form a complete Philosophy and cannot be said to be only a section thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories) singleness, objectivity and subordination relate to Nature; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit; and existence, disjunction and conjunction to both; and duration—i.e. continuance relates to the gross and subtle things.

May this work of Vācaspati Mis'ra, Tattva-Kaumudi (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men!

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudi of Vācaspati Mis'ra.

END
TATTVA-KAUMUDĪ

NOTES

I

The first benedictory stanza —अजामेकं etc., is taken from बा्् (१.५). बा्् has changed the readings as follows — 
(b) नमाम् in place of तप्या्; (c) अजा थेेते उपमाणा भजन्ते in place of अजोऽ्को उपमाणोऽऽुसैते; (d) जहायेनां ज्ञात्भोगां उपस्वान् in place of जहायेनां ज्ञात्भोगामज्ञान्यः। The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in सांस्क्र्, which is not favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदांतिर् explain this verse quite differently. शाकाचार्य has refuted the claim of the सांस्क्र् that this verse lays down the principles of the सांस्क्र् system. For fuller discussion, see शाकाचार्य on चमस्कन्वितस्वात् (ब्र. म. १.२.८). It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three गुण. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by बा्् for महत्वचरण.

About कपिल, आत्मरी, पद्मशिला and ईशर्कण, see Introduction.

आध्यात्मिक. The word शुन्त stands for living beings according to चन्द्रिका.

आध्यात्मिक, according to गौडो, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On द्वास्नामिं द्वेष, Davies remarks—"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (dāivyā)." (p. 15).

The reading adopted by गौडो, viz., तद्पवातः is more expressive of the सांस्क्र् idea of complete cessation of pain, than तद्पवातः of बा्् (See, S. N. S., 1, 1n.). Cf. तथा तित्तिद्वास्नामित्तिद्वास्नामाः (सां. म. १.१). The reading of जयो-
viz., तद्वचात्के does not materially differ from तद्वचात्के. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6–7; Davies, pp. 13–14, note on this reading.

बिशुपुराण describes the three दु:खs in the following verses:
अथात्मिकोर्यि द्विविध: शारीरो मानसस्तथा।
शारीरो बुद्धिमेिमित्वते श्रृव्यतां च स: || ² ||
शिरोगचित्रममतिव्यापृवर्णवाभ:भागवँ:।
गुल्मार्गः:श्रयुतवाद्यान्तिमितिकेवकथाः || ³ ||
तथाकथिरोगातीसारकु:वायानमयंतिन्तः।
भिखा: देहजस्तानो मानसं भ्रो:नमहेश्वर: || ⁴ ||
कामकोभयंत्वेष्ठः वामोकाभिविषादः।
शोकासुपामानैत्वात्वमास्वात्या:द्विविधस्तथा। || ⁵ ||
मानसोऽष्टि द्विजसङ्ग तापो भवति नैकथा।
इत:ेवःमादित्मितिद्वेस्तापो ज्ञातामिको मतः। || ⁶ ||
सुरमयस्तिविधः विपाधारायकसः।
सरी:सुपाकेशः नृणां जायते चारित्मोकोक: || ⁷ ||
शीतावतोण्याण्वपु:वुवायावदिस्मुःः।
तापो द्विजसङ्गः: कथ्यते चारित्मोकोकः। || ⁸ || ( ⁶, ⁵ )

The reading अके, (found in some editions), in the verse अके चेतन: तथस् etc., has अर्क as its variant. On this बाराद्राम remarks—अके श्रृति पाठे दुकोपरे-मूसकोपे। श्रृति वादोः बोधः। वस्तुतः जैनसनी:-यहां वापि वापि महोदयः तेनेव पथा यथा महानिः: पर्वतं नागवेशेच्छेदिनः भवभियायः 'अके चेतन: विनिद्वत 'इत:ेवःपवनात्मः अर्के-इते वाहः सारींगाः। ( p. 14, note 1 ).

The quotation ' यथा दुकोपरे सस्मितः ' etc., is ascribed to श्रृति by बाराद्राम. On this बाराद्राम remarks—' यथा दुकोपरे सस्मितः ' श्रृति भवासंकालितः केवल, स्त्रितिरबिभिन्निः विज्ञानकेवल; परिमागे: प्राप्ताणि-ज्ञाने श्रुतिलेण व्यवहारस्त्वेवाद्वादु: श्रुतिरविभिन्नि सार्था:। ( p. 16, note 3 ). The word स्त्रित्व in this quotation has been variously
explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बाह्यार (pp. 39-40) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.

अपाम स्यायमस्या अभ्यूम etc., is from कृत्वद्वृत्ते VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड़े, माृतर and जयः।
With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्माराजवत—

शुद्धं च दृष्टवहुः स्मरो स्वयंनिर्यायवच्य: !
बहुंमायकामस्वार्थूः क्रियवधापि निर्णयतः॥ (१९.३०.२१)
पुरूषोऽवधार्यं रूढः स्वयंनिर्मित्तमः।
सतुल्यातितति शर्यं यथा मण्डलविनामाः॥ (१९. ३. २०)

It is interesting to compare --जयः——अस्त्य आर्याय वक्ष्यमाणा याह: स्वै एवायेन आव्यास्वर्णीया दृष्ट्या: (p. 4),*with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation (p. 5).

The quotation of पज्ञिश्च, viz., स्तर्य: शत्वरे: etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on योग सूत्र २. १२. See Introduction also.

The reconciliation of वैदिक हिस्ता with the श्रुति text—एकहिस्तात्वम् सत्री शृवानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, in. ; Sovami, p. 400). बाह्यार has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24–36).

न च कार्यशेषादित्यता विद्वद्य युक्ता, भावाव्यत्न तथात्वात् etc., (para 14)—Says an objector: Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be अन्तित्त, because it is an effect (ययात्यं तदनित्तम्), similarly, this दृष्टव्यांस्त also should also be अन्तित्त, because it is an effect, To this वाचः replies that this maxim of अन्तित्त holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दृष्टव्यांस्त. But how can दृष्टव्यांस्त be called मोक्ष according to the सांत्विक यस्य, which advocates सत्यार्ळाङ्ग? To this बाह्यार replies—पथम् सांत्वनये सत्यार्ळाङ्गार्षे कारण दृष्टव्यांस्त मांसार्वबाह्यजापणम यथाहृत्, तथापि दृष्टव्यांस्तपदेनात्र दृष्टव्यांस्त तीतावस्थायाम् एव तात्पर्यविष्यतेनाभिभाष्यात् यथायत्यायात्त्रवस्याम्॥ (p. 43).
Compare the notion of सुक्त according to the वैशेषिक philosophy —यद्विगुणोत्साहतितिः समाजितिकरणं: लोकनाथार्यसमकालीनाम्। युग- द्वारकासाहितिकरणानलिमकोविशेषणमध्यसमालकार्तीनालं ब्। अवेष्किरेश्वरचण- प्रेसानितिकरणं: लोकनाथार्यसमकालीनाम्। (उपस्कार on वैशेषिकसत्व १. ४)

The order of व्यक्तायज्ञविवाद is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सं. श. —स्थूलतः पद्धतिभाष्य (१. ६२); बाह्याभ्यंतराभ्यं तथाह्रास्त्र (१. ६३); तेनाह्रास्त्र (१. ६४); तत्त: प्रक्षेत: (१. ६५); and संहितपरार्थत्वानु पुरवस्य (१. ६६).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word ब्यक्त. Some call the महत्वसूत्र as ब्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकाय seems to regard everything ब्यक्त (and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षार्थ), except the प्रथम and पुरुष. वाचौ agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says —सामान्यतः उदाहरणामानु अतिरिक्ताणां प्रक्रिया-पुरुषार्थनाम प्रतीती। He would seem to include महत्वसूत्र etc., by the word आदि (See चालाम p. 16 in.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वंशीयर, to mean the union between प्रक्षेत्र and पुरुष. cf. आदिनितत्वस्याय नित्यास्येति इत्युते: (वंशीयर, p. 183) 1 See Sovani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.

III

In connection with Jacobi’s remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the सामिक्षयास (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. “Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for
the same substance.” (Maudsley’s Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पृथ्वी is explained by चार्मिक as अजातसत्त्वे सत्यज्ञ इस्वृ: । आचार्यपाण्डे प्रकृतिमिसारः, द्वितीयेनालोकसामान्यायाधिनिरासः। Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांस्कृतिकs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पृथ्वी as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—“It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light.” (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहंकार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the ‘base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions’ (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcendentalidealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—“If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality.” (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the भेषजमार्ग, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहंकार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (गृहद्रव्य),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-वैदिक also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांस्कृतिक does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानवादी वादप्रस्तीते: (तत् दृ. १०.४२.)

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अहंकार and शर्म, recognised by the सांस्कृतिकs, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog-
nised by other schools. The वार्तक materialist recognises only प्रत्येक, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्येक and अनुमान; the माध्यम also recognise only two प्रमाण, but they are प्रत्येक and शब्द according to them. The followers of रामानुज, the जरायण्याविक, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्येक, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नेपालिक and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थपाति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिवभक्त school and the अंडलविद्वान्तिनs recognise one more, viz., अनुपलब्ध or अभाव. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पीरापिंकs who add संभव and ऐतिहास to the list. Some नेपालिकs recognise चेता also in addition to the above; others add प्रतिभा to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिज्ञा, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

वाचस् splits it up into प्रत्येक, अनुमान and शब्द; माध्यम regards it to be अनुमान;

जयस् includes it under अनुमान and शब्द; गौड़स् includes it under शब्द;

and चान्द्रिका under अनुमान.

2. अर्थपाति—

All the commentators include it under अनुमान.

3. अभाव—

वाचस् and जयस् regard it as प्रत्येक; माध्यम includes it under अनुमान. Although गौड़स् remark—सम्भवाभावप्रतिभायप्रमाणाद्भावचन, suggests its inclusion under शब्द, yet another remark of his, viz., शुद्धाध्ययनाधिकारियो गणगृहः, would lead us to infer that he will have it under अनुमान;

चान्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्येक, and, therefore, no independent प्रमाण.
4. संभव—
वाच०, जयः और मात्र इनमें अनुमान के अधीन शब्द है; गौड़ो "र" और चन्द्रिका इनमें अनुमान के अधीन शब्द है।

5. ऐतिथ्य—
वाच० अनुसार यदि यह अनुभव से अर्थ आये होता तो यह शब्द है; अन्यथा यह अनुभव नहीं है। गौड़ो और चन्द्रिका दोनों के अनुसार इनमें अनुभव के अधीन शब्द है; मात्र इनमें अनुभव के अधीन शब्द है।

6. प्रतिभा—
वाच० और चन्द्रिका दोनों में इनमें अनुभव के अधीन प्रत्यक्ष और अनुभव है, जब यह भी यह अनुभव नहीं है; मात्र इनमें अनुभव के अधीन शब्द है; और गौड़ो इनमें अनुभव के अधीन शब्द है।

7. चेतना—
नोट पर चन्द्रिका और मात्र के अनुसार इनमें अनुभव के अधीन शब्द है।

Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसकs do recognise six प्रमाणs, yet गौड़ो's remark that they are अर्थात्ति, संभव, अभाव, प्रतिभा, ऐतिथ्य and उपमान, is not correct; for संभव, ऐतिथ्य and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणs by the मीमांसकs; rather, "the author of शाखाविद्या excludes expressly संभव, प्रतिभा and ऐतिथ्य from the character of proofs." (p. 28). जैमिनि nowhere mentions the प्रमाणs, but the six प्रमाणs (viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुभव, शब्द, उपमान, अर्थात्ति and अभाव) are discussed by शब्दविनमित्र इन भाष्य on मीमांसासूत्र इन भाष्य में प्रमाणकर does not recognise अभाव, but कुमारिन्द does.

The word समाध्या (in para 23) is a technical term of मीमांसा; cf. शून्यसूत्र यागंत्ययामस्थऽस्माध्यायां शमाध्याय्याया पारिश्रव्यभेदस्य-प्रक्षैत्त (भी १० ३. ३. १४). It means a name, the sense of which depends upon its derivation, unlike other proper names cf. आध्या या तदाद्याया (भी १० ३. ३. १३), and शाखाविद्या on it—समाध्या तत्त्वात्त्विक संवाहे भवति, उधा पापोंह जावक द्वारा। तत्त्व पापकाल वर्षेण पर्वतिता अस्य सम्बन्ध हस्ति गम्यते।
प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाचो says—नोयश्व परिचयः परं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्रस—”द्वादश दृष्टिमात्र: युद्धोपि ‘प्रत्ययानुपस्य: ’ ( 11. 20 ) and ‘चित्तेयप्रतिलक्ष्यायात्सदकारापति स्वंहितंिसवेदनाम् ’ ( IV. 22 ).

V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्त्वार्थं विविधमसुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोहऽ च। ( 1, 1, 5 ), वाचो first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification:

अनुमान

**| शेषवत् | अवीत or शेषवत्

| पूर्ववत् | सामान्यतोहऽ

The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वार्त्यमान himself proposes two alternative explanations.

1. (a) पूर्ववत्—A priori or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

2. (b) शेषवत्—A posteriori, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.
(c) सामान्यतोट्ट—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,— e.g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसत्प्रतिचेेंघरन्या-प्रसत्त्वात् विषयमणे संप्रत्यय्: परिषेवः). The question is,—under which of the seven categories (क्रम, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विषय and the rest, and its inclusion under क्रम has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतोट्ट—Where the relation of the व्यास्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्यास्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वास्त्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva’s paper—‘Trividham anumānam’, POC., Poona, pp. 251–280.

वाषः agrees with the second explanation of वास्त्यायन. But अविष्के or बेचवि according to वाषः is a negative reasoning.
वाट्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, *viz.* शद्व is a गुण, is rejected by वाचो in his तात्पर्यदीक्षा (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसतीरिज.). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेकःपुरुषम्. The inference of शद्व being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेकःपुरुषम् but अन्तव्यतिरेक. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in प्रथिवी, जङ्गल, तेजस् and बायु; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषणस cannot be the qualities of विद्य, कार्तिक and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three जन्मस are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth जन्म, *viz.*, आत्मन्. So there being no सप्तक of आत्मन, it is an instance of व्यतिरेकःपुरुषम्. जयो and गाँडो agree with the first explanation of वाट्स्यायन. गाँडो and मातर explain शेषवत् differently—समुदयादेन्त जटिपल्म भवमाताय शेषवायति भवमातात्वत् (गाँडो)।।

*विद्विद्धिपूर्वकम्—वाचो would read one more विद्विद्ध i. e. विद्विद्धिपूर्वकम्. गाँडो has a curious explanation to offer—सहस्रामां विद्विद्धिपूर्वकं यथ विद्विद्धि अधिकांते, यथा दश्चेत यति। विद्विद्धिपूर्वकं च यथा विद्विद्धिना विद्विद्धिपूर्वकं यते, यथा दश्चेत यति, अत्यधिक विद्विद्धिनम्। गाँडो agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धस which ought to exist between the विद्विद्ध and the विद्विद्धि. They are—

1. स्वस्वासिनि as between राजा and पुरुष.
2. प्रतिपरिवर्तक " " तब " " सक्ति.
3. कार्याकारणानां " " चेदु " " लतस.
4. पूर्वसारपारिक " " " " विद्विद्धि.
5. साहचर्य " " " " चक्षुसार " " चक्षसारकी.
6. प्रतिविद्धि " " " " शीत " " उष्ण.
7. निमित्तालापितिक " " " " भोज्य " " भोजक.

The conversation between आवथ and न्यायिक्, referred to by वाचो, occurs in व्यासाभ्यास्य on यो. सु. 3. १८.

The अंकुर्स mentioned by वाचो are—

(a) शाक्याङ्गिष्ठs or the Buddhist monks, described in the विशेषावलि, vii 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह) as—
(b) निर्विश्वसनीय or the Jains, and

c) संसारमोक्ष or the materialists. वाचक observes—
संसारमोक्षकारिः संसारमोक्षकारिः (संसारमोक्षकारिः हिंस्ता पुष्यत्वसंस्मृता ) हिंसारिः
परायणा: घमन्धः तदन्त्वीतसंरक्षितविद्यवन्दे हेमर्भः तदन्त्वंतजीवभयं एव मोक्ष
हृदयेव बुद्धाभावांविषयिस्ते: || ( p. 82 ).

‘तु’ शब्दविद्वानानादृ त्यवनिद्वानति—As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the वैभविक school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाचक says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of ठिक and नहीं, as between घुम and वहि. वाक्यार्थ, being only an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known by inference.

उपमान. According to the नैवायिक (श्रेवस्थापायत् साध्यसाधन-
सूत्रमम—न्याय सूत्र १ १ ६), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the संस्कारस, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्रतृति alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकस्, उपमान is the साध्य-शाख (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the directly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाचक replies that this उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्येक. For, साध्य is like the साध्य. Just as we have गोत्र in गो, so we have गोसाध्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्र along with गो, so we perceive गोसाध्य and गवयसाध्य along with गवय. Therefore, गोसाध्यशाख (उपमान) and गवयसाध्यशाख (उपमानफल) both are प्रत्येक. साध्य is not a relation (like संयोग ) which should reside on two objects; it is only भूरात्ववसाध्यसाध्ययोग, that is, the
existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This साहस्य is, thus, one like गोम्भ; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गम्य also.

अर्पाणि is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चेत outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the भगत्तक objects—देशसामन्ये गृह्विस्वासक्षेपोपिक पाशिक: etc. He says that when we hear जीवम् चेतः कशीतिः, then the substratum of the existence of चेत in देशसामन्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चेत's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामन्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्पाणि. वाचः replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चेत has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामन्य. Similarly चेत's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, वधाभाव-वृहद् is merely a modification of भूततः. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)?

Answer. Under शेतन भूसत्तिमिः शमृष्ठ्यालक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धायोऽयातः: योर सौ III. 13), यस्य has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्वयस्य पूर्वियोऽविभूत: धरममस्तिरार्थति: परिणाम इतः—i.e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूततः, then it was लक्ष्यत्वपरिणाम of भूततः; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अहक्षितावर्तपरिणाम of भूततः.

VI

Things, directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now “things beyond the senses are not
only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes” (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुभाव, which भवः regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुभाव, from our point of view, is सामान्यतत्त्व (and शेषतः, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by भवः), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But भवः rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषतः both (p. 9).

VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपत्तिथि (महाभाष्य IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपत्तिथि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by भवः—

(1) देशतोष includes अतिदृर and अतिबाहिष्य.

(2) इन्द्रियशोष “, इन्द्रियशात and मनोद्वस्थान.

(3) विषयशोष = सांक्रिय, and

(4) अर्थितर्दशोष includes व्यवस्थान, आभिभव and समाशाब्दिक. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two—इन्द्रियशोष and विषयशोष (See p. 405). मातृ lays down the causes of अनुपत्तिथि of असत (non-existent) things even—इदानीमसता चतुथं भवति। ततोष्टते- प्राकृतप्रायंसतेरतरायणताभावभेदतु।......एवामियं हृदशायानुपत्तिथि। सतामवश्च सतसतं चतुथं॥

VIII

On the reading प्रक्षतिसूष्य, Davies remarks—‘Lassen has in the text लूष्य (having its own form), from the सांक्रियकौण्ड्री, which must be referred to intellect (महत). All the Mss. but one have लूष्य (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has “dissimile et simile”’ (p. 27, 1n).
IX

वाचः here lays down the opinions of (1) the बौद्धs, (2) the नैयायिकs and the वैदेशिकs, and (3) the वेदान्तिन् as पूर्वपक्ष.

(1) The बौद्धs maintain that existence comes into being from non-existence (अस्तः साधारणे).

(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैदेशिकs maintain that an existent cause produces a non-existent effect (सतो इतरसाधारणे).

(3) The वेदान्तिन् maintain that the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सत्तो विवस्तः न कार्यार्थां वस्तु सतः). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानस्थापनात्—वाचः interprets ध्रुवान् as सम्बन्धचः. But जयो, गोहो, माहर and चेदिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गोहो's explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शास्त्रस्य शक्यकरणात्.

वाचः's explanation is also included in सर्वसंबन्धकावात्. “It is also to be noted that while उपादानस्थापनात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शास्त्रस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former.” (S. N. S. p. 28, 1n).

कारणमभाबाः—जयः gives two explanations of this phrase—

कारणस्य सत्तवादित्येत। यथात्वात्वाद्विप्रतिवेदी विभिन्नता कारणात्वेक कार्यस्य भावो भवत। भवति च। तत्समस्यस्तत्ववादित्येती विभिन्नता गम्यते। अध्यात्म-कारणम्भावादित्य कारणस्यभावात्। यत्तवावर्त्तव तत्तत्वाभवं कार्यम्। यथा स्तन्यवात्मकायस्यस्तत्ववादित्यः निम्नोगुणो सूत्रवादो घटः।। (p. 12). माहर and गोहो agree with the latter explanation. वाचः, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

तत्समस्य प्रत्येकम् स्वकारणसमवायो वा स्वसत्समवायो वा, उपाध्यापे नोर्त्याने etc. (para 75). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect (उद्भवति), वाचः proceeds further—Now, what is your उत्तपति? Is it the समवाय (Inherence) of the effect in its cause? That is, is it the समवाय which is
produced? If you say yes, then your उत्पत्ति produces only the समवाय and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता (existence) in the effect? That is, सत्ता is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this सत्ता (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as गो is गो, because she is related to गोत्व, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्ता, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the न्यायिक is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of सत्ता in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बाह्याम, how can you establish the समवाय relation of the non-existent पद with the existent तन्त्र? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असदृ पद, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects?

Thus, it will be seen that a कारण is related with the आविभाव of कार्य. The opponent asks—why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य? वाचो replies.—Because आविभाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण—क्रियेतैनेति कारणम—implies its relation with क्रिया.

X

हेतुमद—, i.e., caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to मात्र, is of two kinds: कारक (producer) and सापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रथम, बुद्धि, अहंकार and पश्चात्नन्दन्त्राः are the कारकहेतुस, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहंकार and पश्चात्नन्दन्त्राः are हेतुस and हेतुमद both, whileas, अव्यक्त (i.e. प्रथम) is only a हेतु. The सापक हेतुs are five-fold, viz., विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, सिद्धि and अहुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययस्पर्गिः (i.e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वम. (But what is this अहुग्रह?) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.
अनित्यम—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—गाप: कारणशय: (सां ५० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रथान is व्यापि, because it has no कारण to which it could return.

अथायि—. The twenty-three तत्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रथान and पुरुष; “each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form.” (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महापर्व all-pervading? To this वंशिन्धर replies—महापर्व: स्वद्वारणायायपकः
ल्लापितायकवत्वभिभिष्येः (p. 201),—the pervading-ness of महापर्व, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रथान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.

सनिक्षयम्—परिश्राम means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञानो, on the other hand, says—सनिस्नियत्वः
तत्त्वसारायादिष्ठत्त्वात्यथार्थिकर्त्तम। प्रथानत्व पुरुषसारायादिष्ठत्वात्यथार्थिकर्त्तम। न च किमं कर्मव अवश्यत। प्रकृतिशोभातु मृडः
अवश्यन प्रकृतिशरण प्रकृतिशरण प्रकृतिशरण प्रकृतिशरण सनिक्षयात्वात् सनिक्षयात्वात् (१. १८४). On this बाठाग्रह remarks—श्रीमादिष्ठत्वार्थार्थविभागीया: प्रथाने सत्त्वशरण गमनागमन
श्रायतिरिप्पन्नामन्त्रिक्षया अस्त्त्वात् प्रकृतिशरण व्यपिन्नव भिभे: प्रथान इति बोधम् (p. 121).

अनेकम्—i.e., सनातीयभेदः, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सनातीयभेदः, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुधि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञानो explains it otherwise—अनेकवस पर्वमेवनं भिष्टम्—सर्गद्यसारायामिति यात्। न चुः
सनातीयभेदत्व भिष्टम्, प्रकृतिशरणामः। प्रकृतिशरण प्रकृतिशरणकृप्ततात्।
The fallacy of विज्ञानो is pointed out by बाठाग्रह—प्रकृतिशशरणसंक्षेपः
प्रकृतिशरणशशरणशशरण बाधवेन प्रकृतिशशरणशशरणशशरण प्रकृतिशशरणशशरणशशरण, किम्
‘अनेकम्’ इति अवश्याद्याचार्याणिक प्रकृतिशशरणकृप्ततात्वाभिभावमित्यस्यान एव व्यापिन्नव भिभे: (p. 121-122).

विदः—According to गापो and माठः, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जपो and विज्ञानो give another alternative explana-
tion. *viz.*, that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रक्षालन. This is the sense taken by वाच्ह* also. But प्रक्षालन itself is a characteristic (विधं) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच्ह remarks—प्रक्षालन पुरुष प्रक्षालन स्थिति पुरुष स्थिति अन्तर्द्विति आच्छाद्य. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it "seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, In.)

Why can there be no अवचाच्याविविषयगत between प्रक्षालन and ब्रह्म, etc.? Because, between these, the relation is समच्छ (＝identity or ताराप्रयोग), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तत्त्वस and the परत produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between ब्रह्म and अहंकार, etc.? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहंकार, being a product of ब्रह्म, stands in समच्छ relation to ब्रह्म. It is for this reason that गोड़, मात्र and ज्ञान explain the word अवचाच्याविविषयगत शब्द, रूप, ध्यानि etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (विधं, ब्रह्म, अहंकार etc.) cannot be called as शब्दसत्ताविविषयगत. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in ब्रह्म and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रक्षालन also. Even वाच्ह, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि प्रक्षिष्ठाय: परस्पर संयोगम् एवमन्येष्नि।

परतन्त्रतम—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वस is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रक्षति. Again, although ब्रह्म is independent in producing अहंकार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियस and the तत्त्वाद्वाद्य, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रक्षति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

श्रीगुणस्मि—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रक्षति; प्रक्षति is nothing but these three गुण in equilibrium.

N. 2
The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—"In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hyllic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कष्ट and is probably an importation from India." (p. 37, 2n.)

विषय:—The viewpoint of the विज्ञानवादिन् चौद is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; "cf. 'सहोपठमभाविमाधेवो छीठतदिनोः। लोक' चालिति-विज्ञानेद्यमेव्यते प्रभाविते॥' (सर्वेदेशीति, p. 32), वाचस्पति's refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालाराम—यथा फिलिडस्मिनेत्र योपिद्वस्य वस्तुनि रत्नदिवविमूर्तानां जनानं विमितानि मुखविद्वानानि जायमानान्यपरम्बुन्ते तत्र प्रमाणाः पररपरप्रतितिसर्वात्तुस्वेत्यति ज्ञानानावतं द्यूतेते। यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानार्थकं भवेत् तद्वष्ट्र विज्ञानस्वाध्यायविद्वानाद्विभविताभिन्बन्ते सागराणं वस्तु न समभवेत्। अतः वर्णस्याध्यायवपत्ततवे विज्ञानतिरितिनः तदभ्येयमिति। (p. 128).

अद्वेतम्र—इत्यदि (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or जैत्य, and not identical with it, because इत्यदि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विपरीतत्तथा च युमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

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<th>पुरुष</th>
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<tr>
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<td>आविष्कार</td>
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Similarity of पुरुष to ब्यक्त and अब्यक्त and difference of ब्यक्त from अब्यक्त—

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<td>इक्षु</td>
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<td>साधकर</td>
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It should be noted that गृहम and मात्तर say पुरुष एक:, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषवहुतम. जयम and वाचम, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to ब्यक्त with regard to अनेकतम. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—

"Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31.), 'individual'. So in the Sūtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65)


XII

_gunas_ do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वेदोपनिषत systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रृति. Hence, वाच says—_गुण इति पत्रियः_. That is, they are called _गुण_ (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

तन्त्रकृति literally means ‘device of science’, and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकs known as स्थान (position or order). So it will mean that प्रृति, अप्रृति and विषय stand for सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् respectively.

गौड़, माठर and जयो mention अन्योपन्न्यूत्तमय: also, whereas वाच and चन्द्रका add अन्योपन्न्यूत्तम before and गृहित after अभिभाव, आभय, जनन and मिथुन each. गृहित according to वाच, means किया (operation). जयो explains गृहित as मुखादिक्षण परिणाति. According to गौड़, अन्योपन्न्यूत्तम means परस्परं वर्तते, i.e. are reciprocally present. माठर, however, seems to take गृहित in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—‘_गृहित_ means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect.’ (p. 36, In.)

The quotation, अन्योपन्न्यामिभु: सत्त्व, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd रूप्त of देवी-भागवत. गौड़ माठर and जयो quote only one verse, viz., रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc., जयो ascribes this verse to विष्णुपीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिपीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजसमयोभिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत। रज: सत्त्वं तमस्वेव तम: सत्त्वं रजस्तथा॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अष्टंक्ष रूप्त of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वं मिथुने रजः। रजस्तथापि सत्त्वं त्यानं सत्त्वं मिथुने तमः॥ (36. 6).
XIII

सांख्याचार्यः—stands for पञ्छविसिक and others. बिजानां quotes पञ्छविसिक on प्रीतितिषोदयर्द्यानामाम्बोधव्यस्य (सां. स. I. 127)—
“सत्त्वा नाम प्रसादाध्वामिभुवित्तितिषोदयर्द्यानामाम्बोधनेष्वर्मभें समासतः मूहात्मकम्। एवं रजोपि मोक्षार्थानामेव समासतो दुःखात्मकम्। एवं तमोपि मोक्षार्थानामेव समासतो मोहात्मकम्।”

अर्थः—जयः and वाचः explain it as धर्मार्थम्, but गौडः takes it in the sense of सांख्या, and मातर explains it as कायाभासात्.

Now, these गुणस्, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योक्त्याभिभवः, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणस् perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाचः gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणस्. गौडः, मातर and जयः, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्व by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous woman (and therefore, a सांख्य type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रजस्) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तमस type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणस् (=प्रकृति or मूहाकारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूहाकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वेशपिस्को who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नक्षेत्रों मूहाकारणस्य परिवर्तनसंस्थायत्रेण वेशपिस्किसमततास्य को विषेष इति चेत—The reply is काराकाल्य रुपायोगितानिहितमित्वात्। गुणस् तथापनोज्जिरलिप्यमाणायः। इति विष्णुपुराणायिण्यः॥ बिजानां (I. 128).”

But are not these गुणस् opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for धर्मार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between सत्त्व, राजस्ति and तमस् in spite of
the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तेर्पतलेन दीपनाशातू तैत्तरि प्रयंप. विरोधिः, एवं वर्तिमाणि स्वतप्नेत दीपनाशातिकतू। For this reason वाचः gives another example of this विरोध,—viz., यथा वा वालापित-श्रेष्ठ्याण: etc., बालापित श्रेष्ठ्याण: etc., ग्रंथम् quotes a parallel passage from the भागवत (3.9)—"प्रदीप्यत् यथा कार्यं प्रकरोप्यवेद्यसिद्धम्। वर्तिमाणि वथाचिह्व विश्वास्य परस्परम्। २६।। विरहिनं हि तथा तैत्तरिणीषा सह सकृतम्। तैत्तरि वर्तिमाणि पावकापि परस्परम्। ३०।। एकत्तिस्या: पद्धर्यानां प्रकन्वित्ति प्रदर्शनम्।।” (pp. 139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of these गुण in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the सामान्यत्वa i.e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुण in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is प्रधानत्वa in the विकारa. Cf. रूपालिका रूपतिकाय धर्मप्रस्ताविनि सामान्यत्वa लोकतिस्यां तह धर्मप्रस्ताविनि। (व्यास-भाष्य on यो. मू. II. 15).

अत च मुखः:खमोहा परस्परविरोधिनि: etc.—Here वाचः has in his view the attack of the वेदान्तिक against the सांख्य philosophy. According to the latter, all the objects (or evolved entities) are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्तिक (वाचः himself) retorts—अन्तरा: संत्वमी मुखः:खमोहविपाल वाचे-व्यवस्थानादिष्योऽतिविचित्रसत्यंप्रभेद्यनियं व्यतिरिक्ता अव्यवस्थीयते। वर्तिमाणि परस्पर: मुखः:खमोहविपाल भवेयस्तता: स्वरूपंत्वात् हैमन्त्विपि चन्दनः मुखः: स्वाभावात्। न हि चन्दन: कृत्यविचित्रचन्दनः।..............तस्मादमुखःनिर्ज्ञचन्दनः अपि चन्दनकुछुमायथं जातिकलावथावपेक्षा मुखः:खमोहविपाल तु स्वायं मुखादिकृतविचित्रचन्दनः इति रामणीयम्।। (भाष्यम् on ब्र. मू. II. 2. 1). To this argument वाचः (as an exponent and defender of सांख्य) replies—सत्यवादुस्मृत्यां मुखः:खमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तिनि कल्पयति। Although मुखः, दुःख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one or the other of these (मुखः, दुःख and मोह), they stand in need of excitant causes, which themselves are of the nature of मुखः, दुःख and मोह. For example, मुखः, for its own experience, stands in need of the predominance of धर्मः, which is of the nature of सत्यमुखः (or मुखः).
XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्वृत्त्याभावात्. गोङ्ग० and मात्र explain it as—‘on account of the absence of the contraries of वेगुण्ण in the प्रधान, अतिवेक्ष्यार्द्ध resides in the प्रधान.’ वाच० offers an alternative explanation—‘on account of the absence of अतिवेक्ष्यार्द्ध in the contrary of व्यक्त, i.e., पुरुष, अतिवेक्ष्यार्द्ध resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.’ चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it. cf. वेगुण्णस्याभावावेक्ष्यादयोरभावात् (?). न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्यावेक्ष्यार्द्धः संभवति। तत्त्वात् वेगुण्ण्यानेवावेक्ष्यार्द्धः सिद्धः। (p. 20). The explanation of गोङ्ग०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument. 

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, (संसर्गिन्) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मादेतेयादेवेन संसर्गिणा अभितव्यम। यथेते शं संसर्गश्चत्वष्ट्वयुक्त चारणभास्ति (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकत्वता, similarity, or एकजात्यायगम (i.e. belonging to one genus), according to जय०. गोङ्ग० understands समन्वय in the sense of ‘inference—’ यथा अत्याचारिण्यं वर्त्ता समन्वयति, नूतनस्य पितारं भ्रात्र्याविविति। The explanation of समन्वयम् (लां. घृ. I. 131) as offered by विशाल०, viz., ‘उपवासायिना क्षीण हि बद्धादित्तत्त्वायादिहि: समन्वयम् सन्तुगतेन पुरुषाचौपते (i.e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc.),' does not directly fit in this कारिका,' as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).
Kāraṇakāyatvibhāgāḥ—Vācō understands the word vibhāga as ‘emergence’,—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. Jayaḥ, Maṭhaḥ and Gāndḥo explain it as ‘separation’ or ‘distinction’ between the functions of the cause and the effect;—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (Prthugṛthkriyakarṇaḥ). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that Tattvādhyāya Kāraṇaḥ Bhavitvam. Jayaḥ here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable):—Oṣṭitaḥ, Vyākhyāne, ‘Kāraṇakāyatvāndraśadetaḥ taḥ Kāraṇaḥ’ Ītyaṇevaśiṣṭādhyāṃṣyaḥ Vyākhyāte—Yudhakarotāḥ taḥ Kāraṇaḥ, Yudhakarṣe tattvādhyāyaḥ, Taṃgośvibhāgauḥ, Upkārāṇāpārākārahāvādītyāḥ. Tathādhyāyaṃkāraṇaṃ bājaṇaṃ ēva kāraṇyāpārākārahāvāḥ, ubhiḥ hi eva āśyate. Tathāsthaṃ kāraṇyo vyavasthāpitā [paryāya] sthātaḥ, kuryāhā vibhāga Ītyaṇevyātyānyayetāḥ: II (pp. 21–22).

Abhivyāgataṃ vṛttiḥ—According to Vācō, Gāndḥo and Maṭhaḥ, the term Abhivyagā means ‘merging’;—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. Jayaḥ also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading Abhivyagā, where Abhivyagā means Tvaḥ. Jayaḥ’s own explanation is different. It takes Abhivyagā in the sense of Abhinātā, and explains the phrase as—‘because this diversity is produced out of unity.’ cf. Eh śekavibhāgaśekmādhiśāntaḥprāśaṅgāṅgāyamahābhārataḥ vṛttihā bhājanāṃ āśyate...Ehābhivyagāṅgākāraṇaṃ bājaṇaṃ ca vṛttihāṃ. Tattvādhyāyaṃkāraṇaṃ vṛttihāṃ. (p. 22).

Pravataṃ trīguṇamḥ: Samudrāc—According to Vācō and Jayaḥ, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of pratītiḥ of guṇaḥ, because guṇaḥ are in constant modification—cf. Parināmāmithilā guṇanāma (Vyākhyā on Yo. Sū. IV. 33). The first kind of modification is that kāraṇaḥ, rajas and tamas modify themselves as sātvaḥ, rajasḥ and tamasḥ. Here, the satāyaśayaḥ is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a vishpariprāyam (or samudraḥ), we have creation. Here sātvaḥ and the rest combine with one
another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take निरूपण: and समुदयाद् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति.

XVII

तैत्तिकः—Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of तुषिः (dealt with in कारिका 50). But वाचः here refers to only the five external (वाष्प) तुषिः. The internal (आय्यातिकः) तुषिः are gained after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal तुषिः are not referred to here. Therefore, वाचः says—अयत्ता वा महान्तत् वा, etc.

The reading संहतपरार्थवात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गीता who reads संघटपरार्थवात्. Wilson’s reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सं. सु.—संहतपरार्थवात्, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

इत्यद्विष्कव्यमानोत्तरोचेन, etc. In order to prove that a संघात is प्रार्थ्य, श्रव्य, etc., are given as an illustration.—Just as श्रव्य, आसन and the rest, being संघात्त, are परार्थ्य, so अयत्ता and its constituents are for another person, विय., पुरुष. But in this illustration, पर is गरीर, which is itself a संघात; and thus पुरुष also becomes a संघात. On this वाचः remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a इत्यद्विष्क with all the qualities found in a पर, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the न्यायवास्तवक्त (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 344-345) and the न्यायवास्तवक्तत्पर्यंतीक्ता (Kāshi Sanskrit Series, No. 24, p. 600).

अधिष्ठाताः—पुरुष is the अधिष्ठाता of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question:—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निरूपण = निष्क्रिय, is not active, how can he become an अधिष्ठाता? Reply:—It is not essential that only an
active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्सिद्धानाविष्काराः अणिवृ ( सं. सृ. I. 96 ). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्ववेव तुव्यवं स्वायात्योजककर्मेनाम्।
चलनेन हासि योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते छेदनः प्रति॥ ९५॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः।
राजा सात्प्रियमात्रे विनियुतः कदाचन॥ ९६॥
तस्मादचलतीर्थी याचचलेन क्रृप्तामणः।

( कुमारिल्स श्रोक्षावातिक on मी. सृ. I. 5,
Chowkhamba edn., p. 710 ).

वाट्राम thinks that this argument about the अविलासत्व of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by श्रुताराम in his भाष्य on रचनात्तपतंत्र and प्रवृत्तेश्व ( ब्र. सृ. II. 2. 1 and 2 ).

स्वायात्मि वृत्तिविरोधान्—It is very succinctly explained by वाट्राम as follows—नेभिष्यारामायान्त छिनिति वाहिवात्त्मानं दृढतीति भावः।

अनेके स्वाभी—भोग्या दृष्या वर्षापूः etc. अनेके refers to those who cannot reconcile the विश्रस्तता of पुरुष with his भोक्तर्तत्व. They would, therefore, explain भोक्ता as देश. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.—पुरुष being निस्पक्ष can be a देश, only through वृद्धि; see व्यासभाष्य on देश विलासमयते: शुद्रोपि प्रत्यावश्यक: ( यो. सृ. II. 20 ). Similarly, he can be a भोक्ता also through वृद्धि.—“येव च दृष्टिस्वाभ्यो श्रुतवल्लभस्य प्राप्ते—वादायण्यक्यामात्रि सम्बन्धवादायण्यक्यामात्रि समीचीनपेति यथेष्ट॥” ( वाट्राम, p. 160 ).

केवलयाभ्य प्रवृत्तेश्व—मात्र assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्राप्त, while as, वाते and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the बाल and the sages—अन्यमानं महापीयां च॥
XVIII

निकाय—The word is derived from नि + चि + वम् ( संस्कर चालूतारथ्य—पाणिनि III. 3. 42 ), “in the sense of a multitude or assembly (of living beings possessing some common characteristics), but not merely a confused crowd of men.” ( S. C. Vasu’s translation of सिद्धान्तकौशल, p. 347 ). ‘निकायः = देव-महत्त्वतिष्ठगानामूत्वार्थ्यानवस्थात्: संघातः, ताहिनिष्ठाभिरित्यः’ इति तात्पर्य्यःकायाप्रियः: ( बाठराम, p. 161 ).

On जन्म and सरण, विज्ञानः says—जन्ममरण चात्र नोत्यतिष्ठवाना पुनरंिष्ठत्वभावानां। किन्तु उद्देशीयादिसंचारतिष्ठविशेषे प्रयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभाविनियामकाविनि ( राय. श. I. 149 ).

न चौक्षयापी पुरुषस्य देहोपाधामेवात् इति। The view of the प्रभारतमें ion is that one and the same आत्मनः assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. ‘उपायमेवेद्यवेष्यं नानायोग आकाशस्येव घण्यथिमः।’ “उपायिनिष्ठेन न हु तथात्।” “एवेक्तत्वेन परिवर्त्तमात्रस्य न विकृत्वामिनायः।” ( राय. श. I 150-152 ). माठर sets the पूर्वपश्चात् in the following words:—इह कैविष्ठाचार्यहेतुवार्ती इति मन्तरस्य-, एकोह रिष्ट्वर्ष: सर्वसारीरेष्वूक्षमेव-मणिशृङ्गतः।

इह रसत्वादिक याभवस्था मणिशृङ्गस्थाये सर्वेक्षमेव सर्वस्य प्रवर्तते। एवं माणिष्ठेतु ज्ञानार्थेन किमेकः सृष्ट्वात्: परस्यस्य, आहोपिष्ठत ज्ञानवभवनं पुरुषेत्येव एव बहुद्व नदीकप- तथागाथिनिष्ठवचनमेवात्ति इति। Cf. विमाननस् (सांवतन्त्वविभेदन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):—“आहोपिष्ठत ज्ञानवभवनान्त्वाः ज्ञानतिश्राविभान्धानहत्तायाः सांवतन्त्वाचार्याः: कपिलसुमुक्ति-विकृत्वाय इति; पुरुषकवर्त्याय र्याद्वमातं, तथा च श्रृंति:----------

एक एव हि भूताश्च भृत्ति भृत्तिः व्यवस्थितः। एकत्र भवहृत् चौवै दस्यस्ते ज्ञानवभवनम्।” ( त्वरि verse from ब्रह्मविन्दुपनिष्ठद्, I. 2, is quoted by विज्ञानः also on लां. श. I. 153 ).

But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषप्रत्त्वत् contradict the अद्वितिः which lay down the unity of soul ( i. e. आत्मकृत् )? The लां. श. says, No.—' नाद्वितिष्ठवाचार्य ज्ञानवभवनं ( I. 151 ).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मनः in the sense of class notion. वाचाः also tries to reconcile the अद्वितिष्ठवाचार्य as follows—
Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नाना व्यवस्था by उपायेः, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाय of आत्म, so the limbs (अंगवर्ग) are the उपाय of a body (a संरचना). And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदांतनान् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or आदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जयोः—
-सामविश्व चार्यादासीन्यम्। तथा चोक्त्रा—पद्यति श्रुणोति श्रवे करोति स्थिरति प्रसूति च नाय। स्त्रियो न पत्रो...तथा विरहवल्लासारोऽधिकारी। जयोऽ, further raises the question that if पुरुष is मध्यस्थ and अक्षर, then how is he a भोज़ा?—कटूर च यथाकाल तत्काल भक्तुभावाद्वत्तिपुरुषः। तथा चाळुः—
-बाळवहता मनोरम: स्वामन्तानां यथा हि भोज़ा:। पुरुषोऽपि विषयकालानं स्वामकालानां तथापि भोज़ा। ॥ इति।

अचेतनं चेतनायांद्रिय छःश्च etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—‘I know’ be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अह्न्वर and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात चन्द्रिकाः स्वित्तानामित्यादि (सू. २०, I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—‘यथाप्रतिस्यवाच्च बोह्मारपरिपुष्टिः। (जयोः)
‘अनुभवशीतो घट: शीताभिप्रदः संस्त्राहं शीतो सविति, अप्रिमा समुप कुम्भोः
अविति।’ (मात्र) ॥ ‘यथाप्रभायतोऽ परम्परं संस्याविशेषात् परम्परान्यम्यतःहार
NOTES

XXII

In the भाष्य (on यो. म. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्राः as the products of महत्त्व (—ऐते सतात्मात्स्यातं महतःपदविशेषपरिणामः). But there the महत् should not be taken as the immediate cause (i.e. producer) of these तन्मात्राः. व्यास has himself said at another place (यो. म. I. 45) that these तन्मात्राः are the products of अहंकार.

मात्र and गौडः hold that these तन्मात्राः singly produce the महाभूताः. The other commentators hold that the each succeeding महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्राः. For example, शाब्दतन्मात्रा and स्पर्शतन्मात्रा produce वायु; शाब्दतन्मात्रा, स्पर्शतन्मात्रा and रूपतन्मात्रा produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाचः violates the orthodox पद्ध्तकरण theory of the वेदांतिनः. The point is noticed by कल्पतंकार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाचार्या पद्धतिकरण यथापि स्थितम्।
तथापि युक्तिद्वहतवाच्चयतिमायं व्रम्मम्।
पूर्विविवलयते गवने गवने दण्डे वेति।
रूपस्तम्भतवाच्चार्यां चाश्चुष्ठव चसदयते।
गाहो and माघू curiously divide माध्व and वराणव into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as माध्व means only प्रामाणपुत्रान्यतामान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आम्यन्तर-वराणव (viz., प्रामाणपुत्र स्वयंहृदजातस्तृत्साहिति विराणव मोहेन्ययादुपयवचारे) is the principal वराणव which leads to the बाण्यवराणव also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोहेन्यय?

बाण्यभाष does not read गणिमा in his text of तत्त्वायुछाय. Our edition of तत्त्वायुछाय, जयो, माघू and गाहो mention nine kinds of ऐन्यास although each one (except वाचो) says अन्यन्तरप्रयाणम. It seems, therefore, that बाण्यभाष's text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वायुछाय and वेणीरे's edition, however, combine दृष्टिल्ल and अन्यन्तर and thus make the total eight.

जयो reads यथकामावशास्थित्वम in place of यथकामावशास्थित्वम, and derives it as—करणेनेक्षयावचेतु शीत यथ्य स यथकामावशायस्य। तस्म भावः यथकामावशायस्य। अनेकार्थत्वात् धारणां 'शी 'शिष्ठोऽवर्तते।
XXV

अहंकार is divided into three kinds —

सार्वय राजस or तांतरिक

the eleven इन्द्रियस


tन्माघातप्रदश

This is the scheme adopted by बाचू and others. But विशाखः (on सं. सू. II. 18) would have—

सार्वय

In support of his classification, विशाखः quotes from some सूत्रति—

वेकारिकश्रेत्जोश्च तांस्वेः श्रेयद्विधा ।
अहंत्वादिकुव्याणांनानो वैकारिकाद्वृहत् ॥
वेकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्पाभिव्यङ्गानं यतः ।
तैजसाधिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
तामसो भूतस्यक्ष्मार्थं खं लिङ्गकर्मन: ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्य and तामस are in-active by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस. वेकारिक's explanation, viz., — "सम्भविन्द्रचिन्हा मनोवेश्यर्त्यस्यस्यमेव रजसकार्यंस्य स्त्रीत्वा निहितनिष्ठ नव व्यदेहिन्द्रियापेश्याचिन्हस्यस्यस्यमेव सार्विकाथार्थस्यन्त्यमानीयीविण्यावः।" is very lame (See सांख्यतत्त्वकार्योत्सरीका of वेकारिक. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further बाह्यम, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415).
The first phrase उभयार्थकेः, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पकं मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गोङ् रू interprets संकल्पकं as प्रमुन्ति कल्पयति, i.e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of श्रवस्त्रो ) व च comprehend संकल्पकं as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति i.e., perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. यवः and चन्द्रका agree with व च. What व च means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निविवक्षकप्रत्यय or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that perception. This is what is called सविवक्षकप्रत्यय or complex-perception. The first is नामज्ञात्यात्मकोज्जियासंग्राहीं आगोरस्यां, and, therefore, निविवक्षक; the second is नामज्ञात्यात्मसापकं शर्यां, and, therefore, सविवक्षक. In his support, व च cites अस्थिर धातृप्रतिंबां etc., from कुमारिन्द्र’s ज्ञानवार्तिक (on मी. म. इ. 4, verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S. ). The phrase तत् परस्य उपर्युतः धमेंज्ञात्याभियंत्या। इत्याचासिैत्य, has been thus explained by पारमात्मण in his commentary on the above—ततौ भविषष्याद्वृत्तरकारः जात्याभियंत्यिः वृत्तं दृष्यं गुणिते—, which is the same as विशेषण-विशेष्यभावेन विवेचयति of व च. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to व च “mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind.” (p. 61). For, according to the author of the श्रीकृष्णालम्ब whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of नामात्म and विशेष both in the निविवक्षक stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the सविवक्षक stage. We are cognisant of both, च and चतुर्थ in the निविवक्षक stage, but separately; but we cognise
गर्भविशिष्टो यदि in the सत्त्वक्ष्य stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of इत्यादि, is evident from his own verse in this context:—“निर्विभक्तकोपेक्षायिष्णु सत्त्वक्ष्यापि वस्तु:। प्राणं भक्ष्यास्यं
गन्धं तु क्षणते॥ ११८॥” (p. 171). पार्थेयारपि explains it—
सत्त्वक्ष्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मक्ष्यापि प्रतीति तिरु क व 
न हि निर्विभक्तकेनादेशीत्य सविविभक्तापि प्राणं सम्भवति, 
न वाचुः की नागायने सामान्ये व्यक्त्यन्ते प्रत्यभिषाः सम्भवति। तस्मात् 
सामान्ये विशेषाथ निर्विभक्तेपि 
प्रकाशत एव एव तथा 

इत्यादि च साधस्यार्थः—जयो remarks:—यथान्यसिद्धाभिविद्या तथा मनोस- 
भोज्याः। भूवास निधिद्वारो- 
वाचुः। च साधस्याः, न विन्द्रिण्यान्तः। 
महद्रार्यायोर्यास्यादिक्षितान्तः ने सर्वान्तः। 
सम्मतायुपत्तिविशेषाप्राधिक्षितां, 
तु प्राणितिर्गिताण्तः। 

माठूर reads प्राणितेन in place of बाणितेन। This is noted 
by चन्द्रिका also. माठूर’s reading is preferable, because the 
second line of the कार्तिका lays down the reasons of the नामालं 
of इत्यादि, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणमविशेषाः and प्राणितेन। 

The question is—how can one अहकार create these mani-
fold इत्यादि whose functions differ? This question is raised by 
उपेन्द्र in his न्यायवाचिक (Chow S. S., p. 70)—यदि 
पुनर्रिद्रियाप्ये- 
कार्तिकानि सुः, कारणस्वाभाविकाग्याविकास्यविक्षयस्थ्रा न स्यात्, सर्व 
सार्वभौमव व सत्त्वभौमसत्त्वभौमस्त्तथा। The reply to it is—गुणपरिणमविशेषाः। 
Although अहकार is one, yet the three गुण, accompanied by-
पम्प and अपम्प, act and react upon one another; therefore, 
the modified effects of अहकार (i.e. the इत्यादि) differ in their 
functions.

XXVIII

माठूर reads पुष्करिण्य in place of सम्भोगितृष्ण in the text. Mādhavam 
also adopts this reading and observes:—चधर्षितन्तर्ष्ण पूर्वमिन्नि- 
यानामभिषिषात। ‘श्रवणं’ इति पाठो न सत्िवेश्वितः। (p. 184, 1n.)

N. 3
XXIX

सामान्यकरणतः प्राणिः बायवः पद्ध। Does the word करण stand for विषध्व अन्तःकरण or वर्णोपविध करण? While बालो adopts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place—समस्तस्वयं करणः येतथायः। विशानो also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सौं. सू. II 31). But बालो, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियतः प्राणिः द्विध्वस्य जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., स हि प्रशान्तेषु: शरीरपृष्ठिकी लघुज्वमेदेषु: सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथात्: ‘सामान्यकरणतः प्राणिः बायवः पद्ध’ हृतः। बाल्राम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशब्देनान्तः करणः व्रयवेष्ट न तु बाल्राम, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांस्कृत philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरणs and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the बौद्धs there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. शास्त्राल्पमत्यमवक मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपत्नेक-अन्तःकरणमः (ibid, III. 2. 58), अत्यतिक्षरश्चतवतः तदुपलुभिताराध्यसवस्चारतः (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the बौद्धs, the mind is अद्विरिमध्यः. The followers of सांस्कृत, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a सुप्रदेहुतिः.
In the case of अन्तःकरण, only the three अन्तःकरण function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

XXXI

आकृति—Davies observes:—‘Ākūta is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Absicht (= purpose), Antrieb (= motive). Colebrooke’s translation is “incited by mutual invitation.”... The meaning of “incitement to activity,” mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of ākūta......It is composed of ā, to, towards, and kū, to cry. Gauḍapāda says that it means ādārasambhrama (respectful eagerness in action ).’ ( p. 68, In ).

Davies is wrong in considering that गोहू is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, In ). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for पुरुषार्थ.

The spirit of the सां. सू., “स हि सर्वण्डः सर्वक्षता” ( III. 56 ) and “इन्द्रियार्थिष्ठ: सिद्धा” ( III. 57 ), goes directly against the theory of the कारिकास, where no इन्द्र is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विजयनो’s remark, vis, प्रकृतित्वस्य जन्ये- वर्गः सिद्धि: ‘य: सर्वम: सर्वविद्य सर्वत्यं सर्वत्यं तप: ’ इत्यादिभिदी: सर्वे- सम्मतेत्व, नित्यस्येवर्षयेव विशाश्यपद्यदिक्षियर्थः। II ........नन्येवमिश्वरप्रतिपेधः- विरोधस्त्राह—‘इन्द्रियार्थिष्ठ: सिद्धा ’। साज्जिधमात्रेणयवर्ग: सिद्धितुः सर्व- सम्मतेत्यर्थः। ( सां. सू. III. 57 ).

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points outs ( pp. 69-70 ), common to all the organs. Thus “the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas.” (ibid ). According to गोहू, आहरण and धारण
belong to कर्मनिद्रियस and प्रकाशन to बुद्धिनिद्रियस. मात्र ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियस in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहंकार and बुद्धि respectively. वाचः followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मनिद्रियस, धारण to बुद्धि, अहंकार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धिनिद्रियस.

The word दशाय थ in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाचः takes दशाय with आहारय, धारय and प्रकाशय each. The objects seized by the इन्द्रियस, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into धिय य and अधिय. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अनुभवय, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also धिय and अधिय, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धिनिद्रियस are also tenfold because of being divided into धिय and अधिय varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाचः explains why काठ is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वेणेशिकसूत्र “अपरस्मार्याय पुराणबाहिनीयथितिप्रमिति ठिकानि” (II. 2. 6), काठ is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रस्तुपाद clarifies this point—“एकत्रापि सर्वकायंपारंमभाविकयथितिविनिरोपयथिभन्दायमणिवत्सकाक्षिविद्ध नामान्योत्सचारः. that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठ र or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काठ. To this वाचः replies—Why should we first assume one काठ and then assume differ-
ent circumstances or उपायि to make this नात्त multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपायि only? Cf. स खल्वमः कालेन वस्तुस्तरः योधिनिमाणः: शब्दावशानुपयाति उक्तिकानां श्रुतितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्तरः हृदावहासते—श्रीग्रामण्य on III, 52.

XXXIV

आवशेष = non-specific, i. e., तन्मात्राः. विशेष = specific, i. e., पञ्चमाहाभूतः.

पञ्चमयायायों पदार्थानं पञ्चमश्च्यात्मकत्वात्—Here वाचः suggests that the विशेष of the कर्मसिद्धां ( except वाच ) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of पञ्चाकरण, which is opposed to वाचः's view on कारिका XXII, where he says अन्तःकरणः: शब्दास्तरपरस्परानुभूतिः. Can a person not bring water with his hands? If so, then water must also be पञ्चमश्च्यात्मक. See notes on Kārika XXII and S. N. S., pp. 72-73 with footnotes.

XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जयः's phrase द्वारिस्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुषः, as is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one).

XXXVII

वाचः interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of इश्वरी. गाहः, on the other hand, inter-
pret's the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. भास्कर quotes the following speech of अहूकार.—

अहूकारो धितं ब्रह्म जैन सुंदर प्रवाधित ।
प्राप्ते परमानन्दे न तवं नाहे न तजगते ॥।
सत्य तितत्त्वात्सरे पुरुषः पञ्चविनशकः ।
त्ववृहतो परिवर्त्य स कथं मोक्षमिस्तति ॥।
योग्याः सवेशरो देवः सवेशयापि जयदुः ।
देहि तत पदसुभाष्य हि मयार्मा ह्वेतुः कुतः ॥।

भास्कर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किंतु कार्त्तिक्यसन्तुष्टेयतया, किं तु सांब्यातः पञ्चत्रित्तितितत्वात्सरभानमे भास्करेऽकिन्न्रे सत्यविनश्य लोकमेण च नि:भैयसहस्तः। उर्दुं च—

हस्त पिन्न लहं मोदं नित्यं विषयादिपुष्करं कुः च मा अहुः । यदि विदितं ते कपिलस्य तत्प्रसादस्ये मोक्षसांवृत्य च ॥। This verse is more of a tirade against the सत्यविनश्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशाणिनानाभिकाबिक्रियास्यां।

Why तत्त्वात्सर is called अविष्करता?—This has been explained by गौहृं and भास्कर as देवानांमेव भावन्यां विषया दुःःसमेवरहिता:, which is wrong. For, तत्त्वात्सर, being evolved out of तितत्वात्सर, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःः and मोह ( = रजस्य and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाचौ, viz., न विन्नं शान्तात्माःसत्तमुपकोषियाः विषेष इति मात्रमहार्थ: is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तत्त्वात्सर, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—
“(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter........
It (subtle body) becomes ‘specific’ by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are ‘non-specific’ or diversified.” (Davies, p. 76). But, according to बाणो, समस्मारीण शान्त्योरुद्धरिष्येतिनित्वािशष्येन (Kār. 40)—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वार्थ—According to बाणो, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सं. स. संसारस्तु विद्वान्त (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञानो. विद्वानार्थ, तथ संसारो विद्वान्त (पदक्षेप) In this שサン the question of how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the श्रवण replies—व्यक्तिकिष्टेनकान्तविवेचान (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान comments—यथापि संसारो हिरण्यगोर्भोपिशीर्ष्यमकेवल विद्वान्, तथापि तस्य प्रथावायुक्तिर्तस्य व्यक्तिकिष्टेनानां नामात्मायां भवति। But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगोर्भे foreign to संसार?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of विद्वानार्थ is eighteen, but according to श्रवण it is seventeen. विज्ञान has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहृतार्थ च दुःखाविविष्यं.

XLI

A distinction should be made between विद्वान् and विद्वानार्थ. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अनुमान्यानुपत्तिः पुरव्यय: in the authority quoted by बाणो.

The reading of गोर्भ and माठर is विना अविषेषे:, while as बाणo has विना विषेषे: बाणo calls the समस्मारीण as विषेष in KārikāXL.
So विना विशेषः means विना छूँमः: शरीरः. But this is confusing because, to say that the छूँमः (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without शरीरः (composed of छूँमः and पालसत्तन्याभासः) is not logical. गोद्वे’s explanation is better when he says that छूँमः cannot exist without अविशेषः viz., the five subtle elements. चेतिक्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator:—केषितु स्थूलशरीरावशक्तवानविप्रशाकारामिहितमिव वर्णयन्ति. तथा हि, छूँमः समुदायार्थतः छूँमः शरीरः विशेषः: स्थूलद्वेष्टिना निराश्रयं सम निश्चिति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरामातिर्यं च निश्चिति। अतो न छूँमः शरीरः स्थूलशरीरस्पान्यास्यसिद्धिविविधसि भावः ॥

**XLIII**

According to वाचः and जयः dispositions may be divided like this—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>भावाः</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>प्राकृताः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>करणाशर्येण:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>कायांशर्येण:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>वेकृताः</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The प्राकृतमात्राः, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., धमेः, शान, वैराग्य and एश्यः. They belong to कपिल only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाशर्येण:) are eight viz., धमेः, अधमेः, शान, अशान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, एश्यः and अनेश्यः. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कायांशर्येण:) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i.e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गोद्वे and मात्र, however, divide the भावाः into three kinds—सांसारिक, प्राकृत and वेकृत. धमेः, शान, वैराग्य and एश्यः are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसारिक or cognate in his case; but they come to समक, सनन्दन, स्वातन्त्र and सन्तुक्षमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मः) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वेकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.
XLIV and XLV

According to माठ, the सूचनिकर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are भाष, प्राणाप्य, एन्द्र, विलिन्त, नीलांगं, याँ, राहत and पेशाच. गाहो gives सौम्य for रिष्य, and यां has been dropped in Wilson’s text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूचनिकर sinks to the five states of पह, पशी, चंग, सरीसृप and स्थावर. The प्राकृतिक, according to वाचो, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माठ includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृति) in this bondage. The वेंकालिक, according to वाचो, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकार of प्रकृति (i.e. the evolute); but according to माठ, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the भाष, प्राणाप्य and others, as the sumnum bonum. These three kinds of bondages are explained by वाचो at length in his तत्त्ववेशार्दी on योगाभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतितथ्यः stands for महाराश्रुतोत्तरसपाणि, according to वाचो; but, according to गाहो and माठ, the word denotes प्रथायुद्धेष्ठारात्मकाः.

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424.). This creation of intellect or “the conduct of the human understanding” (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गाहो and माठ illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अस्फलि, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is लुफ्ति, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is लिफि, when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the
post. The explanation of विवच is better. विवच is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. “Incapacity (अक्षर) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (तिहर) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्ध) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue.” (Davies, pp. 84-85).

**XLVII**

विवच or अविवच is of five kinds:—अविवच, अस्थि, राग, द्वेष and अभिनवेश, which are called तमस्, मोह, महामोह, तामस्य and अनयतामिळ by the नातिका.

**XLVIII**

तमस् or अविवच is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.

मोह or अस्थि is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the sumnum bonum.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामस्य or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense (mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अनयतामिळ or अभिनवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स जायमिविवेशः केदः स्वरस्वाहि कुमेरपि जातमार्ग्य प्रत्यात्मानमेवरंभावितो मरणश्च व्याहुक्रत्यात्त्वः पूर्वमन्यायुक्तं मरणं मरणं समस्मापवति (व्यासायन on यो. मु. प. 9). “मरणासिद्धान्यतामिळ विहये ।” (जयो p. 51).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विवच्य.
The quotation in वाचः, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant (श्रेयता: for मन्दता:) in the सांत्वसंग्रह (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p 77.). गोङो uses प्रसुमि (or paralysis) for दुःख, and उपजिज्ञितृक्ष for जहता. Cf. "जिद्ध्रया जायक्यः," in जयः, p. 52. माठर and गोङो adopt गुहावर्त for उषावर्त (⇒ obstruction of bowels).

माठर (and not गोङो, as S N. S. says, page 91, in) reads आयासिक्षः in place of आयासिकः. आयासिकः is grammatically wrong, as आयासिक is derived from आयास्त + बुध ("आयास्तद्विभिः" वाचः on पाणिनि IV. 3, 60). आयास्त = आयास्तृ, is an अयासेबास compound in the sense of locative case, according to "अयासं विभानि" पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination री त्र (and not दाघ) is added to आयासिक by the स्त्र of पाणिनि, "विद्वाण्यो" IV. 1. 15 and the form will be आयासिकः.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>वाचः</th>
<th>जयः</th>
<th>माठर</th>
<th>गोङो</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>पारमस्</td>
<td>मुतारस्</td>
<td>तारस्</td>
<td>हुताम:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सुपारस्</td>
<td>सुपारस्</td>
<td>सुतारस्</td>
<td>पारस्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>पारपारस्</td>
<td>lost</td>
<td>सुनेत्रस्</td>
<td>हुनेत्रस्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुतामंथ:</td>
<td>अनुतामंथ:</td>
<td>समरीचम्</td>
<td>अनुतामांसाकम्</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>उत्तामंथ:</td>
<td>उत्तामंथ:</td>
<td>उत्तामांसिकम्</td>
<td>नारीकम्</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If अर्जन, रक्षण, क्षय, भोग (or संग, according to गोङो) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गोङो calls the last two as नारीक and अनुतामांसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Rāmāvatāra S’arma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows:—

चन्द्रार्जङ्गःेकप्राप्तिद्वात् पाराश्चेतु तुष्टि: । ........... अर्जनस्यपरक्षेत्रम्
No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः: जयो which gives them—तासं चासिद्धीनां मोष्टणमानवमित्यायः (!) संज्ञः,—, has a defective reading.

वाचो criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, vol. iii, p. 429), belongs to जयो; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धिः according to बाचो

1. अद्ययन
2. रघु
3. उह
4. सुहस्त्राभि
5. शान
6. प्रमोद
7. युद्धिष्ठ
8. मोदमान

The last three are the effects of all the remaining five added together.
While वाचः construes अतुष्ठ as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्यय, असारि and तुषि, विखानः (on sa. च. III. 44) explains अतुष्ठ as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three सिद्धि, viz. उद शब्द and अवयन, leaving सहभागित and षान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाचः as follows—कथितेतात्सामनादशनीनामकुऽ निवारकः पूर्वोपविवशो विपर्ययान्त्रिकुठिद्रूपो भवति बन्यक्तवासिति व्याचर्ये तत्। तुष्ठय- भावयाशक्तिया चार्धियोदिवत्व सिद्धिविवेचितालमन तुष्ठयतुष्ठय: सिद्धिविवेचि- त्वासंभवत्. In reply to this it may be said that तुषि and अतुष्ठ are not mutually contradictory, but positive भर्म्स. See Sovani p. 427.

LII

The word विख्षः has been explained as महत्तवं शिष्ठरित्ति by विखानः (on sa. च. III 45). But this is में correct. वाचः is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks:—"Some commentators make the linga itself to be Buddhi (intellect) and bhāva to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i.e. वाचः H.) is preferable, for the linga, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’. (p. 90).

LIV

सत्सविविषाधि means where सत्य predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the खऱ्क replies:—आत्मसत्तकार्यत्वरोतरोन्योगाष्ट्रि: (सां. च. III 52). विखान explains it as—तत्त्वस्वृत्तीवति सत्यायात्तिकत्त्वत्व उत्तरोतरोन्योगाष्ट्रोपूर्वी- जन्मन: सोपपि छोड़ि हैय इवथे: This very idea is expressed in the next कारिका.

According to गाँधः there are sixteen forms of creations—"that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings
proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements." (Wilson. p. 220). It seems that गौड़ takes देव, मानुष and तैरययन ( = two, जड़ and स्थापर ), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अभावित, तित्तु, भाव and भूत.

LV

पत्रमजलि also expresses the same idea—' विनामसतामतेिस्क्क द्रुतोतघ्नवर्मिनिविरोधादि हुःकमेव सत्तव विवेकिनि:' ( यो. सू. II. 15 ). Compare also , समाने ज्ञानरायणे हुःकम्बः ' ( लां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावन is explained by चन्द्रका as स्वत एव सरोऽ हुःकम्बः,

विवेकिशाबोििरि भेदः।

माथि reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समाने in place of स्वभावन in the text. The former term he explains as विषू लोकेदृ and the latter as संकेतपेण.

LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाचा and the ( सां. सू. III 63 )—विविक्षोजयातु मृदिनिविरि: प्राणायनं सुहवतः पावे, has got this disadvantage that खाद्य is चेतन. The illustration of गौड़ा, viz., वथा कन्धिि स्थायिः त्वस्वत्वा भिन्नायांििगि करोिि, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड़ा, viz., तथा चोज भुनभवत् प्राणां दुर्वाश्च त्वस्वत्वा निवसते, is better, because भुनभव is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रका quotes two योगसुप्रस in support of the purport of this कारिका—" तदर्थे एव इष्टस्वात्मा " ( II 21 ) and " कृत्तस्मं गृहिति नह-मधुवर्ड तदनुवाकारणवातृ ( II 22 ).

LVII

सामविपरििििर:। The syllogism of the प्रतिपादित्र is चेतनानाथिणिसि अचेतनं प्रकृतिपशुमयम्, अचेतनस्वात्, रथादिविवर्
Now, the साध्य is प्रतिपादितम्. The सिद्धान्तिन् says that we can show a case which is the reverse of your syllogism. That is,

चेतनानविविदं अचेतनं अधि प्रतिपादितम्, अचेतनत्वात्, क्रियति।

Here we have साध्यविभार. Now, the प्रतिपादित् says that your case does not bring about the साध्यविभार, because, even in your case we shall assume उपर as the cause of प्रतिपादि. To this the सिद्धान्तिन् replies—Your argument is not sound, because a चेतन or प्रेक्ष्यान् can act only with the motive of स्वायं or कारण. But, it would be absurd to impute any motive to God, much less these two motives.

माठर, गोहो and जयो, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रतिपादि and निग्रंति (of प्राथन) both, while as वाचो speaks of प्रतिपादि only.

LVIII

आंशिक्य means हृद्य; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुण in साध्य philosophy. It is not the दृष्टि of the नैयायिकs according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being.

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे? Is it पुरुष which feels that there is nothing सुक्मातर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुक्मातर than myself? The first meaning is adopted by माठर; वाचो and गोहो would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुक्मातर than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुक्मातरा. जयो explains it by ‘subtlety’, वाचो and माठर, by ‘bashfulness’, and गोहो by ‘enjoyability’.
Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a गळ्ठ बुद्धि. but here to a कुञ्जव्युष्म.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गळ्ठ, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

"पुनः दशुनमुप्यति पुरुषस्य"—वाचो explains it as—अप्रमाणं यथेष्ठं परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति। This is not a good interpretation. गळ्ठ is much nearer the mark when he says—अहस्मं परपुरुषं तद्धस्मीत्वस्य दृशः पुनर्शीर्षन्ति नोपेति।

LXII

"यथा जयपराजयं भृत्तगतां तथाश्च—वाचो is evidently derived from व्यासभाषा—"यथा जय: पराजया वा योद्धे वर्तमान: स्वामिनि व्यप-"" (यो. मु. 1. 24।)

LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय, गळ्ठ and माठ, means the अम्ल or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्व. वाचो clarifies this अम्ल as तत्त्वाभ्यासाजनाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नामिति, न में and नामिति, as given by various commentators.—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>वाचो</th>
<th>माठ</th>
<th>गळ्ठ</th>
<th>जय</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नामिति</td>
<td>अहे क्रियावाचस्य नामिति।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न में</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नामिति</td>
<td>अहे कर्त्तानाम।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न में</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
<td>न में स्वामितात्त्वाच।</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न प्रकृतिः</td>
<td>न प्रकृतिः</td>
<td>न प्रकृतिः</td>
<td>न प्रकृतिः</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न में</td>
<td>न में प्रकृतिः</td>
<td>न में प्रकृतिः</td>
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<td>नामिति</td>
<td>अहे कर्त्तानाम।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
<td>नामिति तत्त्वाच।</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The quotation—"निरपद्वृततां, etc.," given by वाचो, is also found in this तत्त्वज्ञानी on यो. सू. I. 50, where, वाचो reads न बायोजनादिमथ्येदिपिं in place of न बायोजनादिमथ्येदिपिं. The meaning of the verse is—अनिसप्तः यो कृत्यां; तत्त्वस्करित: स्वभावो यस्य, तत्त्व जानस्य विपयंः, अयत्लवस्कारपि न वाचः; बुद्धेत्त्त्वशयातः। निरपद्वृति = free from all (the) flaws (of पूर्वति, etc., according to the बौद्धs). भूतार्थः = truth (आध्यात्मिक, according to the बौद्धs). विपयंः = contradictions (in the shape of पूर्वतित्तिविज्ञान, according to the बौद्धs). अयत्लवस्कारपि, etc., = although there is no effort to free this आध्यात्मिक from the flaws of पूर्वतित्तिविज्ञान, yet this आध्यात्मिक is not contradicted because बुद्ध is partial to it. वाचो’s introduction here favours the reading अनादिमथ्येदिपि, which will mean—“although विपयवासना is अनारि.”

**LXVI**

"एवं विवेकश्वेतिर्मिति प्राक्ततीमित्विकारिवास्मा ‘मार्थ्यम्’ इति मन्यते "। (वाचो, para 271) = on account of ignorance, the Spirit thinks that as the enjoyable products of Nature, viz., sound and the rest, are for my sake, so the discriminative knowledge brought about by Nature (and hence a product of Nature) is also for my sake.

प्रयोजनं नासित सर्गस्य—The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (i.e., पूर्वपर्यंत). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more पूर्वपर्यंत. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

**LXVII**

"भोगन त्वितो श्रयित्वात्य समयते " is बहुस्मत्र, IV. I. 19. बहुस्मत्र explains it as—अनादिमथ्यायो: पूर्वपपयोऽविविज्ञात्यस्मांत्वेऽवादः इत्यत्बत्त्वायो यत्यपयोऽविविज्ञात्यवाद: संपूर्णते " तत्स्य तावदेव चिरं पावन विमोक्षे च चं पावसंधिः ": (छान्दोग्य—६।१४१२)।
LXXVII

The ten मौठिकार्य्स are—

(१) प्रबन्धार्थित्व, (२) प्रयाणिकत्व, (३) प्रणाल्य्य अध्यावत्तमः (=?विषयता), (४) प्रणाल्य्य अन्यता (= पुरुषाद्वेदः), (५) प्रणाल्य्य पाराध्यामः, (६) अनाल्य्यामः (= पुरुषवृत्तिः), (७) निवृत्ति: (= पुरुषात्तृत्ते:), (८) योगः (= पुरुषेण सह प्रकृत्ता:), (९) शेष्यृत्ति: (= संस्कारवशांत्र: स्फूर्तिस्वभावसरीत्रय्य: स्थिति:), and (१०) अक्षयत्समः (= पुरुषस्).

For this quotation and राजवार्तिक, see introduction.