

PT. SUKHLALJI'S COMMENTARY ON

TATTVĀRTHA SŪTRA

OF VĀCAKA UMĀSVĀTI

L. D. Series : 44

General Editor
Jitendra B. Shah

Translated by :
K. K. DIXIT



L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY, AHMEDABAD-9.

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Tattvārtha Sūtra

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Published By

L. D. Institute of Indology

AHMEDABAD

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First Edition : August, 1974

Second Edition : April, 2000

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ISBN 81-85857-04-0

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Price : Rs. 300/-

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Typesetting

Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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Printer

Pooja Offset

Mehdi Kuva,

Shahpur, Ahmedabad-1

वाचक उमास्वाति रचित

तत्त्वार्थसूत्र

(पं. सुखलालजी के विशेष विवरण के साथ)

ला. द. ग्रंथश्रेणी ४४

प्रधान संपादक

जितेन्द्र बी. शाह

अनुवादक

कृ. कु. दीक्षित



लालभाई दलपतभाई भारतीय संस्कृति विद्यामन्दिर
अहमदाबाद-९

तत्त्वार्थसूत्र

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अनुवादक

कृ. कु. दीक्षित

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प्रकाशक

डॉ. जितेन्द्र बी. शाह

नियामक

लालभाई दलपतभाई भारतीय संस्कृति विद्यामन्दिर

अहमदाबाद

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प्रथम आवृत्ति : अगस्त, १९७४

द्वितीय आवृत्ति : अप्रैल, २०००

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मूल्य : रु. ३००/-

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मुद्रक :

पूजा ऑफसेट

मेंहदी कुवा

शाहपुर, अहमदाबाद-१.

FOREWORD

I feel happy at the publication of the second printing of the English translation of Pandit Sukhlalji's commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Its first edition was published back in 1974. The book was for long out of print and was in demand from several quarters. It was, therefore, decided to reprint it, which is herewith released for circulation.

The *Tattvārthasūtra* is the most famous work of Vācaka Umāsvāti on Jaina darśana. There exist several commentaries on it in both Śvetāmbara and the Digambara tradition. And several books have also been published on it in languages such as Gujarātī, Hindī, English and Kannaḍa. A large number of editions based on the original Sūtra-text and its commentaries testify to the importance of this work. Among the critical editions on this famous work, Pandit Sukhlalji's commentary on it in Gujarātī is simple as well as lucid. It was translated into English by Dr. K. K. Dikshit and the editor of that version was Pt. Dalsukh Malvania. It is indeed tragic that none of the three scholars is today with us. We hope that, with the publication of this second printing, the scholars studying Jaina doctrine and philosophy will once more get a ready access to the work.

Thanks to laser-printing, the second edition looks more attractive and handsome. Shri Akhilesh Mishra and Smt. Purviben Shah had diligently typeset the book. And Shri Naranbhai Patel had carefully read the proofs. They all are on the staff of the Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre, Ahmedabad. I am thankful to them all.

L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-380009
24-4-2000.

Jitendra B. Shah
Director

FOREWORD

(To the First Edition)

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing the English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* on the auspicious occasion of 2500th year on Nirvāṇa of Lord Mahāvīra whose teachings were, probably for the first time, epitomised in Sanskrit by Umāsvāti.

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* has attracted the attention of the prominent Jaina Ācāryas from the date of its composition (4th-5th Century) upto the modern times. This is the reason why numerous commentaries have been written on it in different periods of time. Hence these commentaries clearly reflect the development of Jaina philosophy through all these periods of time. In order to introduce the students to this vast literature Pt. Sukhlalji had written a commentary both in Hindi and Gujarati. The commentary in Gujarati was published in A. D. 1930, and the same in Hindi was published in V. S. 1996 (A. D. 1939). This Commentary in Gujarati and Hindi has run into many editions. But the English translation of this Commentary is being published here by us for the first time. And the credit of this has to go to Dr. K. K. Dixit. It is he who translated the work and wrote a brilliant preface entitled '*Tattvārthasūtra—A Historical Evaluation*'. Through this English translation the English-knowing readers will have a glimpse into the deep learning and patient work of Pt. Sukhlalji.

Pt. Sukhlalji has made corrections, additions and subtractions in all the previous editions of the commentary and in the Introduction whenever he found it necessary, and in this present edition (in English) too he has made some corrections, additions and alterations. Thus in this English translation we have his final views about the author and other allied subjects.

I am most thankful to Pt. Sukhlalji for agreeing to the publication of the English translation of his Commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Even at the age of 94 he was ready to revise his views. This is something very rare.

The Jñānodaya Trust established by Pt. Sukhlalji has donated Rs. 6,000/- for the publication of this work. For this I am grateful to the Trust.

Our thanks are due to Dr. Jesalpura of Swati Printing Press for bringing out the book within a short period of time.

This translation will be of great benefit to the students of Jaina philosophy and religion; and it may even serve as a handbook of Jainism in many respects.

L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-380009
15th June, 1974.

Dalsukh Malvania
Director

TATTVĀRTHA SŪTRA

A Historical Evaluation

Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsvāti is a compendium of the theoretical positions related to several branches of learning and adopted by the Jainas upto the author's time which could have been C. 3rd-4th centuries A. D. Thus divided into ten chapters it takes up in its first chapter problems pertaining to epistemology, in the second those pertaining to an empirical study of the animate world, in the third and fourth those pertaining to mythological cosmography, in the fifth those pertaining to ontology, in the sixth to tenth those pertaining to ethics. Particularly noteworthy is the framework it chooses to arrange the traditionally received material. For at the very outset of the first chapter it announces that right faith, right cognition and right conduct constitute the three ingredients of what constitutes the pathway to *mokṣa* (1.1) and then goes on to make clear that right faith means faith in the seven fundamental verities *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *mokṣa* (1.2,4)—the rest of the first chapter being devoted to a treatment of cognition—right and otherwise; the remaining nine chapters can be viewed in two alternative ways. Thus one might say that the chapters two to five continue the treatment of cognition by telling us as to what might be the possible objects of right cognition while the chapters six to ten undertake a treatment of right conduct; or one might say that the chapters two to five undertake a treatment of the two verities *jīva* and *ajīva*, the chapter six that of the verity *āsrava*, the chapter eight that of the verity *bandha*, the chapter nine that of the verities *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*, the chapter ten that of the verity *mokṣa* (the position of the chapter seven remaining anomalous inasmuch as it in effect partly treats a problem related to *āsrava* and partly one related to *saṁvara*). In any case, one is bound to form the impression that the position that right faith, right cognition and right conduct jointly constitute the pathway to *mokṣa* as also the position that right faith means faith in the seven verities *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *mokṣa* must have been with the Jainas since the very beginning, and yet the fact is that both were very recent positions in Umāsvāti's time. The two cases might be considered one by one.

Since the very beginning the Jaina authors were discussing as to what type of conduct on a monk's part is conducive to *mokṣa*, and

in due course they also began to discuss as to what type of conduct on a pious householder's part is conducive to a happy rebirth—there being no question of one attaining *mokṣa* without having become a monk; at this later stage it also began to be emphasized that all right conduct presupposes faith in the correctness of the Jaina scriptures—also that one must listen to the Jaina scriptures in order to develop faith in them. A classical popular exposition of this final position occurs in *Uttarādhyayana* chapter three where the author mourns that it is very difficult to be born as a man, still more difficult to listen to the Jaina scriptures, still more difficult to develop faith in these scriptures, still more difficult to act in conformity to the teaching of these scriptures. A somewhat technical exposition of the same position occurs in *Daśāśrutaskandha* chapter ten where human beings are ethically graduated inasmuch as some do not even listen to the Jaina scriptures, some listen to them but do not develop faith in them, some develop faith in them but do not act in conformity to them, some develop faith in them and act in conformity to them. Umāsvāti himself refers to this very position when he declares that right faith might be generated in one either naturally or as a result of being taught (1.3)—the first case being an exceptional type of case while the second being a case where one develops faith in the Jaina scriptures as a result of these scriptures being taught to him; so while propounding the thesis that right faith, right cognition and right conduct jointly constitute the pathway to *mokṣa* he must be meaning by 'right cognition' something different from a mere listening to the Jaina scriptures. However, there was not only no Jaina tradition of thus positing right cognition by the side of right faith, but in view of another position adopted by the Jaina theoreticians it was impossible for a Jaina to treat right cognition as a new acquisition over and above right faith. For these theoreticians came to maintain that whatever cognition one has is a case of false cognition so long as one has no faith in the Jaina scriptures while the same automatically becomes a case of right cognition as soon as one has faith in them, a position elucidated by Umāsvāti himself (1, 32-33). It is therefore difficult to see what Umāsvāti means when he speaks as if right cognition is a new acquisition over and above right faith (that he does consider right cognition to be a new acquisition becomes evident from his argument [bhāṣya on 1.1] that it is possible to have right faith without right cognition but not vice versa). It is suggested that by 'right cognition' Umāsvāti means a full comprehension of the Jaina scriptures,

and that might be so; but the point is that to thus emphasize that a full comprehension of the Jaina scriptures is a condition necessary for the attainment of *mokṣa* was no part of the Jaina's theoretical heritage. What seems to have happened is that near about the time of Umāsvāti the Jaina theoreticians became aware of the anomaly that among the Indian philosophers they were almost alone not to recognize right cognition as a means necessary for attainment of *mokṣa*. In view of their specific historical background it was impossible for them not to mention right faith and right conduct in this connection; so they just added right cognition to those two and declared the three to be a joint means of *mokṣa*. Of course, when the non-Jaina philosophers declared right cognition to be the sole means of *mokṣa* they had an implicit understanding that this right cognition is to be accompanied by something like the Jaina's 'right faith' and 'right conduct'; but the point was never made explicit. Similarly, when the Jaina philosopher spoke as if right faith and right conduct constitute a joint means of *mokṣa* they had an implicit understanding that these right faith and right conduct are to be accompanied by something like the non-Jaina philosopher's 'right cognition'; but the point was made explicit at so late a stage, and when it was made explicit difficulties arose on account of the rather technical position that right cognition never arises before the rise of right faith while after the rise of right faith it arises automatically.

Similarly, the Jaina authors were obviously and naturally conscious that there was something characteristic about the ideas they were propounding, but they had no tradition of saying that these ideas in their totality stood covered by a definite set of concepts. Some move in this direction was made in a passage like *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, II. 5.12-28 and *Aupapātika*, I.33 where an impressive catalogue of theoretical concepts was framed and the point emphasized that it is proper to posit these concepts and improper not to posit them. But subsequently it was realized that such a catalogue of concepts must be standardized in a manageably brief form, and hence came into existence an adjectival phrase describing the theoretical equipment of an ideal pious Jaina householder. The phrase occurs in the course of an account of the ideal pious Jaina householder that first makes its appearance in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.2.24 and is then repeated in *Bhagavati* 2.5, *Aupapātika* 2.20 and at so many other places. Here the ideal Jaina householder is said to be conversant with the following twelve concepts :

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| (1) <i>jīva</i> | (2) <i>ajīva</i> |
| (3) <i>puṇya</i> | (4) <i>pāpa</i> |
| (5) <i>āsrava</i> | (6) <i>saṁvara</i> |
| (7) <i>vedana</i> | (8) <i>nirjarā</i> |
| (9) <i>kriyā</i> | (10) <i>adhikaraṇa</i> |
| (11) <i>bandha</i> | (12) <i>mokṣa</i> |

All these concepts except *kriyā* and *adhikaraṇa* also occur in those two earlier lengthy catalogues found in *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Aupapātika* (the former in fact having *akriyā* instead of *adhikaraṇa*); moreover, the concept *vedana* occurring in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* catalogue of 12 concepts is missing in the subsequent texts which in fact contain only 11 concepts.* All this apparently jumbled information is relevant for a historical evaluation of the doctrine of nine *tattvas* (=fundamental verities) inasmuch as this doctrine could not have been current at the time when the text-passages in question were written. For according to this doctrine the entire body of Jaina theoretical positions stands covered by the nine fundamental concepts *jīva*, *ajīva*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *bandha*, *mokṣa*, concepts which are invariably present in these passages without attracting any special notice. Certainly, the context of these passages makes it clear that if the doctrine of nine *tattvas* was current at the time when they were written they would have mentioned not these and those concepts they do but just the nine concepts brought to special notice by this doctrine. As for this doctrine itself, it was formulated with a view to satisfying a strongly felt theoretical urge, for now was not the question cataloguing as many of characteristic Jaina concepts as possible but of cataloguing just those concepts which would cover the entire body of Jaina theoretical positions without being redundant. And hence it was that that catalogue of twelve concepts which was latest to arrive on the scene was subjected to a scrupulous pruning. So far as ontological positions were concerned the two concepts *jīva* and *ajīva* obviously took complete care of them, but the remaining ten concepts which had all to do with ethical positions contained redundancies. Here the concept *bandha* standing for involvement in transmigratory cycle and the

* In view of what we are going to say on the subject this omission must have been the result of a careless handling of the text on the part of later copyists.

concept *mokṣa* standing for emancipation from this cycle were understandably of use, but what was needed besides was just one concept standing for what causes *bandha* and another one standing for what causes *mokṣa*. However, certain extraneous considerations necessitated the positing of not two but five concepts besides the fundamental concepts *bandha* and *mokṣa*. Thus since fairly olden days *āsrava* was understood as an ordinary man's everyday conduct responsible for involvement in transmigratory cycle, *saṁvara*, for an ideal monk's disciplined conduct responsible for emancipation from this cycle; but in the meanwhile were introduced two new concepts *puṇya* and *pāpa*, the former standing for good acts bringing about a happy rebirth the later for evil acts bringing about an unhappy one. Now it was felt that the two concepts *āsrava* and *saṁvara* had one use, the two concepts *puṇya* and *pāpa* another; and so all the four were retained besides those fundamental concepts *bandha* and *mokṣa*. The fifth concept *nirjarā* was retained for another special reason. Originally the concepts *vedana* and *nirjarā* stood organically related and the two were prominently emphasized as a Jaina speciality. Thus the Jainas came to conceive karma as a type of physical stuff that got attached to a man's soul as a result of his good and evil acts and get purged off from this soul after the fruit of these acts was reaped. The process of reaping the fruit of a past act was called *vedana*, the process of karmic physical stuff purging off from a soul was called *nirjarā*. Since it was believed that *mokṣa* cannot come about unless all past karma is purged off the idea was always understood that a monk's ideal conduct works out massive *nirjarā*; but in gradual course it began to be emphasized that penance undertaken by a monk (or anybody) is exclusively instrumental in working out massive *nirjarā*—this type of *nirjarā* being distinguished from the ordinary type resulting from the fruit of a past act being reaped in an ordinary fashion. In the doctrine of nine *tattvas* *nirjarā* was posited besides *saṁvara* because the former was taken to stand for the massive *nirjarā* resulting from a monk's penance, the latter for the mere prevention-of-new-karmic-accumulation resulting from his remaining ideal conduct (as also from his penance). It is this understanding that is behind Umāsvāti's aphorism 9.2 which says about certain ascetic acts that they bring about *saṁvara* and his aphorism 9.3 (cf. 8.24) which says about penance that it brings *nirjarā* as well. This aspect of the matter was so much emphasized by certain theoreticians that they went to the extent of maintaining that the pathway to *mokṣa*

has for its ingredients not only right faith, right cognition and right conduct but penance as well—a position (for example) taken in *Uttarādhyayana* chapter 28 which is one of the rare (and presumably late) texts where the doctrine of nine *tattvas* too makes its appearance. As we have seen, this position would not be endorsed by Umāsvāti who in addition introduced an amendment in the doctrine of nine *tattvas* itself. He must have argued to himself that if *āsrava* is what brings about rebirth, *puṇya* what brings about a happy rebirth, *pāpa* what brings about an unhappy rebirth then *puṇya* and *pāpa* must be just two sub-species of *āsrava*; hence his elimination of *puṇya* and *pāpa* from the catalogue of concepts retained by the doctrine of nine *tattvas*. However, reducing from seven to five the number of the fundamental ethical concepts was not the end of Umāsvāti's task but its mere beginning. For his real task was to arrange within the framework of the five concepts *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *mokṣa* the entire mass of old and new ethical discussion he had received in heritage. How he accomplished the task deserves close scrutiny.

Since the very beginning the Jaina authors were speaking of so many evil acts that bring about man's involvement in transmigratory cycle. In gradual course these acts were catalogued in several ways, and in one context one catalogue would be held out prominently in another context another one. In his aphorism 6.6 Umāsvāti makes report about four such catalogues, and an independent perusal of the texts available to him does reveal that all these four catalogues were in a more or less extensive use. Thus here there are passages saying that five *avratas* bring about karmic bondage, passages saying the same thing about four *kaṣāyas*, passages saying the same thing about five-fold indulgence in sense-pleasure, passages saying the same thing about five *kriyās* (in fact about five pentads of *kriyās* thus numbering twenty-five). True, Umāsvāti evinces no realization that each of these catalogues had a history of its own; e.g. the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, II. 2 discussion on *kriyā* must belong to a period when no pentad of his was yet formulated while three of his pentads must be so late that no earlier discussion mentions them—they being only recorded in that catalogue-collection *Sthānāṅga* where they must be a recent addition. But in this Umāsvāti was erring in the company of all our old authors who all lacked a sense of history in almost equal measure. Then in the aphorism under consideration Umāsvāti speaks not of karmic bondage as such but of the *sāmparāyika*

type of karmic bondage, but for our present purpose that is not a material point. For the *sāmparāyika* type of karmic bondage was contrasted to the *īryāpathika* type (6.5) which was supposed to be brought about by an ideal monk's everyday acts and whose alleged speciality is that the fruit concerned is reaped off then and there so that no rebirth is required for this reaping off. But since for our present purpose a karmic bondage that requires no rebirth is no karmic bondage we are justified in supposing that in the aphorism under consideration Umāsvāti is speaking of karmic bondage as such and not of a particular type of karmic bondage. Another difficulty of Umāsvāti is more serious. Thus in aphorisms 6.3-4 he tells us that good acts bind down good karmas and evil acts bad karmas. But if, as we have been just told, all karmic bondage is due to evil acts like *avrata*, *kaṣāya*, indulgence in sense-pleasure, *kriyā* it is difficult to see how any sort of good acts can bring about any sort of good karmic bondage. In aphorisms 6.11-26 the difficulty is solved as if by implication, for there we are told about different types and sub-types of karmas that they are bound down through these and those types of acts of which some are obviously good and some obviously evil. Really, however, the difficulty remains unsolved inasmuch as one fails to see how the good acts thus mentioned are a case of *avrata*, *kaṣāya*, indulgence in sense-pleasure or *kriyā*. In fairness to Umāsvāti let it however be admitted that this particular difficulty is there even in the karma-specialists' treatment of the problem. For even if they pointedly divided karmas into good and bad ones (a division reported by Umāsvāti in aphorism 8.26) and even if in the aphorisms 6.11-28 Umāsvāti has simply followed in their very foot-steps their own standard list of acts supposed to bring about karmic bondage has for its items exclusively evil acts as much as that empirically drawn list of Umāsvāti. For this standard list has for its items *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *pramāda*, *kaṣāya* and *yaga* (8.1)—where the first four items are of the form of an evil act while the fifth item—meaning an act as such—is ethically neutral and is there to allow for an ideal monk's acts supposed to bring about such karmic bondage as involves no rebirth. It might be pleaded that items in this list are graded in terms of their increasingly less evil character—which is not the case with Umāsvāti's list; that might be so, but since the items of this list are all of the form of an evil act the difficulty urged against Umāsvāti's list will remain there in this list too. Nor can it be said that Umāsvāti was not much seriously interested in the problem of good

karmic bondage; for with importance having been attached to the ethical performance of a pious householder this problem had come to the forefront in a big way—it being presupposed that such a performance brings about not *mokṣa* (as does an ideal monk's ethical performance) but happy rebirth. That is why the doctrine of nine *tattvas* posited *puṇya* and *pāpa* by the side of *āsrava* and *saṁvara*, and that is why Umāsvāti in spite of having eliminated *puṇya* and *pāpa* from the list of *tattvas*, deals at length with the ethical performance of a householder; his procedure is revealing in its own manner. Thus he devotes the whole of chapter seven to the problem of *vratas*—discussing under the title '*mahāvratā*' an ideal monk's ethical performance, under the title '*aṇuvratā*' a pious householder's ethical performance. That had to be done because his general framework would not allow the twofold problem of *vratas* to be treated either under the title '*āsrava*' or under the title '*saṁvara*'—not under the former title because *mahāvratā* was a case of *saṁvara* not *āsrava*, not under the latter title because *aṇuvratā* was a case of *āsrava* not *saṁvara*. As for the problem of *saṁvara* itself (treated in chapter nine) Umāsvāti adopts in its case the same procedure as he does in the case of the problem of *āsrava*; that is, here too he makes report about the various catalogues of an ideal monk's disciplined acts supposed to bring about *mokṣa*, catalogues that had been drawn in different texts and were more or less old. Thus there was a catalogue of three *gūptis* and five *saṁitis*—apparently oldest, a catalogue of twenty-two *parīśahas*—considerably old, a catalogue of five *cāritras*—not much old; then three was a catalogue of twelve *anupreksās* and one of ten *dharma*s which both must have been very recent. In addition there was a catalogue of twofold *tapas* with further subdivisions—which could have been old but not much so. The problem of *nirjarā* is taken up in 9.47 where we are in effect told that the more ethically upright a man the more massive *nirjarā* he works out—Umāsvāti's basic understanding on the question being what we have already hinted earlier. The details of how karmic bondage takes place and the details of how *mokṣa* takes place involve no problem of principle and stand described in chapters eight and ten respectively. This is how Umāsvāti arranged within the framework of the five concepts *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, *mokṣa*, the entire mass of ethical discussion he had received in heritage. The material thus collected was pretty comprehensive and the arrangement to which it was subjected was pretty systematic, but one fault of all this was that

the author lacked a historical approach—as a result of which things old, new and intermediate got badly mixed up. But as things stood, what Umāsvāti has been able to offer us was perhaps the utmost that was possible under circumstances. [As for the material collected in chapters one to five, the author's lack of a historical approach does not affect the over-all situation much—this being why these chapters are an extremely worthwhile introduction to the Jaina positions pertaining to the problems here under discussion].

In the following pages is being offered (besides certain appendices prepared by others) an English version of Pt. Sukhlalji's Hindi-Gujarati translation of and commentary on Umāsvāti's text as also an English version of his general introduction to this text. Each part of Panditji's performance has its own outstanding merit. Thus his translation of Umāsvāti's text enables us to unmistakably follow the wording of this text while his commentary enables us to correctly grasp the purport of what this text says. The commentary in fact incorporates the best that was contained in the old standard commentaries—particularly the *Bhāṣya*, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, *Vṛtti* and *Rājavārtika*. As such this commentary can be used by an elementary student of Jainism as a very good substitute for those old commentaries, by an advanced student of Jainism as a very good stepping-stone to those commentaries. About these old commentaries themselves and their relative merit much detailed and valuable information is conveyed by Panditji himself in the course of his general introduction. However, the chief merit of this general introduction lies in the historical assessment here made of Umāsvāti's text, and of his personality—as also in the critical comparison here instituted between so many Jaina positions developed by Umāsvāti and certain parallel positions maintained in various non-Jaina (i. e. Brahmanical and Buddhist) circles. All this can form a very good starting point for a serious research work on Jaina positions in general and on those positions as presented by Umāsvāti in particular.

K. K. Dixit



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THE AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

(From the Hindi Edition of 1952)

The present explanation of *Tattvārtha* was first published in Gujarātī in 1930 by the Gujarāt Vidyāpīth (Ahmedabad). A Hindi version of the same was published in 1939 in the form of the first volume of *Shri Atmānanda-janma-Satābdi-smāraka-granthamālā* (Bombay). In this version some revision had been made in the Introduction; and its editors *Shri Krishnachandraji* and *Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania* had respectively added to it a word-index and the text of aphorisms along with the available alternative readings. In the Introduction the question of *Umāsvāti's* sect was particularly reconsidered and it was maintained that he belonged to the *Śvetāmbara* sect. On the basis of this Hindi version the second edition of the Gujarātī *Tattvārtha* was published in 1940 in *Shri Punjabhai Jaina Granthamālā* (Ahmedabad); and with an addition of two or three special elucidations in the Explanation part the third edition of the same was published in the same *granthamālā* in 1949.

The present second edition of the Hindi version including the just mentioned elucidations is being published by *Shri Jaina Sanskriti Sanshodhaka Maṇḍala* (Banaras).

In the Introduction to the present edition there has been made some new revision based on the available material—as can be noted by comparing this Introduction with that of the earlier edition.

The essential part of the foreword to the first Gujarātī edition (1930) is given below in a Hindi translation—from which three things can be chiefly gathered. First, what type of

Explanation was originally intended to be written out and in what form was it actually written out in the end ? Secondly, even if the writing of the Explanation had begun in Hindi why and under what circumstances was it first completed in Gujarati and why afterwards was the whole of this Explanation first published in Gujarati ? Thirdly, what type of readership has been had in mind while writing the Explanation, on what basis has it been written and what are its form and style ?

The Original Plan :

“Some twelve years back when I along with my good-hearted friend Shri Ramanikālāl Maganlal Modi B. A. was at Poona we both jointly, after having entertained so many ideas about undertaking literary composition, formulated a clear-cut plan to write out three books. For as the need was felt to teach Jaina philosophy in the *pāṭhaśālās*, hostels and colleges daily growing in number among both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects the demand simultaneously arose for books on Jaina philosophy written in a vernacular language and following a modern style and such as are acceptable to both the sects. In view of this we decided that the two texts ‘*Tattvārtha*’ and ‘*Sanmati*’ should be supplied with an explanation while a third book should be written independently under the title ‘*Jaina Pārībhāṣika Śabdakoṣa*’ (= A Dictionary of the Jaina Technical Terms). In accordance with this original plan of ours we began work on the explanation to *Tattvārtha*—eleven years back and at Agra.

“We began work in accordance with that elaborate plan of ours and the needed collaborators went on becoming available at the spot, but even before they could settle down there they got scattered in various directions like birds in the sky. And subsequently to that in the nest of Agra I was left behind severely alone. The work on *Tattvārtha* that had already been begun—as also the work on other projects—was beyond the capacity of myself alone, but on the other hand the determination that the work in hand has to be completed at any cost whatsoever was

such as would allow no rest. Attracted by the prospect of collaboration and the availability of friends I left Agra for Ahmedabad. There I took up work on *Sanmati* and whatever had been written at Agra on two or three aphorisms of *Tattvārtha* remained suspended just where it was.

"At Bhāvanāgar in 1921-22 while I was working on *Sanmati* the idea of that uncompleted work on *Tattvārtha* would occur to me now and then and would make me a worried man. Even if the necessary mental equipment was there but since the needed friends were not available I had already set aside that originally formulated elaborate plan; to that extent the burden was no doubt reduced but otherwise the determination to complete the work was absolutely intact. So when on account of indisposition and with a view to taking rest I retired to the village Balukar near Bhāvanāgar I resumed the work on *Tattvārtha* and having curtailed the elaborate plan related to it, followed a moderate course. During this period of rest the writing was done at various places. Of course, what could then be written out was rather little but an outline—a pattern of the whole work—now got fixed in my mind and a confidence was built up that at some future date I should be able to do the writing even if left alone.

"At that time I would stay and do the writing in Gujarat. The originally formulated plan had already to be curtailed; but the earlier mental impressions never vanish all at once—this psychological rule too was holding me in subjection. So the mental impression pertaining to the Hindi language that had been thought of and employed at Agra was yet present in my mind; hence it was that I had started writing in that very language. Thus two chapters were written out in Hindi. But in the meanwhile the wheel of work on *Sanmati* that was so long at rest started turning once more, and on account of its momentum the work on *Tattvārtha* had to be left where it was. There was now no hope of physically continuing with this work, but the mind was nevertheless ever more active. Some amount of concretized form of it made its appearance two years afterwards at Calcutta during a vacation; and it progressed upto four chapters. After

that, the mental and bodily pressures of various sorts went on augmenting and it became difficult to carry forward the work on *Tattvārtha*; three years at a stretch thus passed while I was busy with other jobs. During the summer vacation of 1927 I left for Limbadi; then the work on *Tattvārtha* was taken up once more, it made some progress and reached upto some six chapters. But ultimately I found that it would now be wise to resume work on *Tattvārtha* only after completing that on *Sanmati*. Hence I began working on *Sanmati* with a redoubled speed. But since I had stayed in Gujarat so long and since that is what the friends suggested I felt that a Gujarati edition of *Tattvārtha* should be published first. This new mental impression was certainly strong while that old one had made me write out as many as six chapters in Hindi. Though I could myself translate Hindi into Gujarati and though that was also desirable, yet there was no time for that. But if I wrote the remaining portion in Gujarati what use was to be the early portion written in Hindi ? And it was no easy task to get hold of a competent translator. All these inconveniences were there, but fortunately an end came to them too. My good-hearted scholar friend Rasiklal Chhotalal Parikh translated Hindi into Gujarati and the remaining four chapters I wrote out in Gujarati itself.¹

“Thus it was that the determination made eleven years back got fulfilled in the end.

The Style :

“When the plan was originally formulated to supply an explanation to *Tattvārtha* the idea at the back of it was that there should be made available at one place to a specialist student an account of Jaina philosophy and Jaina ethics written in an authoritative form and following the order of evolution that has been traversed. The wall created between the specialists on Jaina and non-Jaina philosophies on account of the narrow difference of

1. The Hindi translation of these four chapters has been made by Shri Krishnachandraji.

technical terminologies should break down as a result of a comparative treatment of topics, and the Jaina treasure-house should be enriched through an incorporation of the important principles that have so far been demonstrated and elucidated in the Indian systems of philosophy as also within the body of the western philosophical thought—with these aims in view was an explanation to be supplied to *Tattvārtha*. In this plan there was no room for the translation or summary of just one commentary belonging to either sect; rather it provided not only for the essentials of the so many commentaries in question but also for a summary of the other important Jaina texts. But when this elaborate plan assumed the form of a moderate performance, then the idea that was at the back of it also got somewhat narrowed down. Even so, while working out the present explanatory style which follows a moderate course I have chiefly kept the following things in mind :

“(1) Not giving the translation or summary of some one text and not following the views of some one sect to write out the explanation making an impartial use of all that has been so far studied or thought out in connection with Jaina philosophy.

“(2) So that it satisfies the curiosity of the students of the universities and colleges and so that it is also liked by the students following the old style of teaching to retain the sectarian technical terminology but to analyse it out by making it simple.

“(3) To the extent that it seems proper and is proper to conduct discussion by adopting the dialogue style while in the remaining part to do so in a simple form and without resorting to the dialogue style.

“(4) In connection with the explanation to accept just one reading of an aphorism and that too the one accepted by the *bhāṣya*; but where an important difference of meaning is noticeable, there also to give the aphorism with a different meaning and to provide meaning in a footnote¹.

1. Such footnotes are now supplied in the ‘Text-of-Aphorisms.’

“(5) To take up at a time one aphorism or many of them as might seem proper from the standpoint of meaning, then to give the meaning, and lastly to offer the explanation. While doing so, if the topic is lengthy then to analyse out the explanation by dividing it into subsections with their respective titles.

“(6) To compare the Jaina technical terminology with the non-Jaina—where the comparison is too obvious and avoiding complications.

“(7) When on some topic the Śvetāmbaras, the Digambaras, or both hold so many positions then what is to be accepted and what to be left out this decision to be taken independently and without succumbing to the position maintained by some one sect but following what Jaina philosophy or what the aphorist says on the point—in this connection keeping in mind what stands closer to the intention of the aphorist as also the natural limitation of the explanation.

“However, though so many things have been kept in mind, even then it is natural that the present explanation should particularly contain portions only from the *Bhāṣya*, its *Vṛtti*, *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika*. For it is only these texts that offer an elucidation by entering into the very heart of an original aphorism. However, from among these too I have given prominence to the *Bhāṣya*, for being old and being a composition of the aphorist himself it much reveals the intention of the aphorist.

“In the present explanation comparisons are not instituted—as was the part of the original elaborate plan. So with a view to making good this deficiency to some extent as also with a view to following the interesting present-day style of teaching that gives prominence to comparisons the task of comparison has been undertaken in the Introduction. Outwardly viewing the reader might feel that this work of comparison is too small in extent—that is true, but those making a minute study can see that even if small in extent this comparison is much worthy of consideration. In a comparison worked out in the course of an

Introduction there is no scope for lengthy topics and treatments. So the topics worthy of comparison have been first selected out and then in connection with them a comparison has been made with the Vedist and Buddhist systems—as was possible in this or that case. To facilitate a detailed consideration of these topics reference has been made to the relevant portions of the texts pertaining to the systems concerned. Thus the specialist student will have an occasion to employ his own intelligence, and the pretext will open out for him the path to a perusal of the other systems—this is what I hope.”

Some 21 years after the Gujarati Explanation this second edition of the Hindi Explanation is being published. In the meanwhile literature pertaining to *Tattvārtha* has been published in an adequate quantity. As for language it covers Sanskrit, Gujarati, English and Hindi—these four languages. And here too is included not only the publication of old texts but also a multifarious literature of the form of criticism, translation, research and explanation.

Among the old commentary-texts the credit for publishing and getting published in their entirety both the commentaries on the *Bhāṣya*—that by Siddhasena and that by Haribhadra—really goes to Shri Sagarānand Sūrishvara. He has also published in Hindi a critical essay in which he chiefly discusses the question whether Vācaka Umāsvāti was Śvetāmbara or Digambara. There have also been published a Gujarati translation of the original aphorisms of *Tattvārtha* by Shri Hiralal Kapadiya M. A. and a Gujarati translation along with explanation to the chapter one of *Tattvārthabhāṣya* by Pt. Prabhudas Bechardas Parekh. A Hindi translation of *Tattvārtha*—which is in fact a literal translation of my Gujarati explanation—has been published by Shri Megharajaji Munot of Phalodhi (Marwar). The Sthānakavāsi Muni Atmaramji Upādhyaya (now Acharya) has published two books entitled '*Tattvārtha-Jaināgama Samanvaya*'—one containing the Āgamic texts along with a Hindi translation, the other containing the same without a translation.

Shri Ravajibhai Doshi has published from Sonagarh a

Gujarati explanation of *Tattvārtha*. Prof. G. R. Jaina's explanation of the chapter five of *Tattvārtha*—undertaken from the standpoint of modern sciences—has been published in English from Lucknow. Śrutasāgarācārya's commentary on *Tattvārtha* edited by Pt. Mahendrakumarji, a Hindi translation of *Tattvārtha-sūtra* by Pt. Lalbahadur Shastri and a Hindi explanation by Pt. Phulchandji have been published from Benaras. Bhāskaranandin's *Sukhabodhāvṛtti* on *Tattvārtha*—edited by Pt. Shantiraj Shastri—has been published in the form of the eighty-fourth volume of the Sanskrit series of the Oriental Library publication. This *vṛtti* belongs to the 14th century. And the commentary entitled *Tattvārtha-trisūtriprakāśikā* which is written by Shri Vijaya Lavanya Sūri and is published in the form of the twenty-second volume of Śrī Vijayanemisūri-granthamālā is a detailed explanation of the three aphorisms *utpādayaya* etc. of the chapter five (5.29-31), the *Bhāṣya* on these and Siddhasena's commentary on the *Bhāṣya*.

A mention is here made of the literature pertaining to *Tattvārtha* that has been published and prepared within the space of the last twenty-one years, so that one might form an idea of how much more widespread now after twenty-one years is the practice of studying and teaching *Tattvārtha* and what are the prospects of its further spread day by day. And how much credit goes to my Gujarati explanation of *Tattvārtha* for the study pertaining to *Tattvārtha* that has been undertaken during these last years within the fold of all the three sects—that is not for me to demonstrate. Even so, I can say this much that the competent authorities from all the three sects have owned my Gujarati explanation to an extent that was beyond my imagination even.

Since the publication of the first Hindi edition of *Tattvārtha* a good number of articles have been published dealing with *Tattvārthasūtra*, its *Bhāṣya*, *Vācaka Umāsvāti*, the so many commentaries on *Tattvārtha* etc.¹ But here I have to say some-

1. See *Anekānta* Vol. 3, Nos. 1, 4, 11, 12; Vol. 4, Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12; Vol. 5. Nos. 1-11. *Jaina Satyaprakāśa*, Vol. 6. No. 4. *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, Singhī *Smāraka Aṅka*.

thing only about Shri Nathuramji Premi's article. "*Vācaka Umāsvāti ka Sabhāṣya Tattvārthasūtra aur unkā sampradāya* (= *Vācaka Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra along-with-its-bhāṣya* and his sect)" that has appeared in *Bhāratiya Vidyā, Singhī Smāraka Aṅka*. After a prolonged consideration of the issue he has come out with the view that *Vācaka Umāsvāti* was a master belonging to the *yāpanīyas* order. Many of his arguments are such as incline one to endorse his view; so with a view to examining this view of his a special study of *Bhagavatī Ārāadhanā* along with its commentaries was made by Shri Dalsukh Malvania. Whatever notes he took down as a result of his study have been considered by me too in his company. And while undertaking this consideration a necessary perusal was also made of the texts like *Bhagavatī Ārāadhanā*, its commentaries, *Brhatkalpabhāṣya* etc. The question was considered with an open mind as far as that was possible. And in the long run we both arrived at the conclusion that *Vācaka Umāsvāti* was not a *Yāpanīya* but one belonging to the *sacela* sect (= the sect allowing for the wearing of clothes)—as we have demonstrated in the Introduction. The conclusion of our perusal and consideration is in brief as follows :

(1) If the text *Bhagavatī Ārāadhanā* and its commentator Aparājita both belong to the *Yāpanīya* sect, then the following turn out to be the characteristic views of the *Yāpanīya* order on the questions of conduct :

(a) The general recommendation of the *Yāpanīya* code of conduct is a renunciation of clothes or nakedness.

(b) In the *Yāpanīya* order just like the monks the nuns too have a room as an aspirant for *mokṣa*; and under special circumstances nakedness is recommended for the latter as well.

(c) The *Yāpanīya* code of conduct recommends eating things placed on one's palm and as a general rule it recommends the carrying of no external instrument except a *kamaṇḍalu* (= a bowl-like waterpot carried by the ascetics) and a *piccha* (= bird's feather meant for cleaning things and places.)

Now these characteristic views do not at all tally with the

account occurring in texts like Umāsvāti's *Bhāṣya*, his *Praśamarati*, etc; for these texts clearly speak of a monk's clothes and utensils, nor do they recommended nakedness as a general rule. And as for the external instruments like *kamaṇḍalu* and *piccha* they are not even mentioned in them.

(2) It is also one of the arguments advanced by Shri Premiji that Umāsvāti's position on the question of the auspicious karma-types etc. is found maintained in Aparājita's commentary. But the history of the philosophical positions maintained by the sub-sects and sects reveals that even within the fold of one and the same sect there are often found maintained such general and minor positions as are mutually contradictory. Not only that, even two sects considered to be mutual rivals are often found agreeing as to certain general and minor positions of this nature. In view of this it should not be surprising if as regards certain positions Umāsvāti—a supporter of clothes-and-utensils—agrees with the Yāpanīya order—an opponent of clothes-and-utensils.

Pt. Phulchandji, in the Introduction to his explanation of *Tattvārtha*, has endeavoured to make out that *Ḡḍhrapiccha* composed the aphorisms and Umāsvāti the *Bhāṣya*. But this endeavour is as much contradicted by logic as it goes against the findings of history. Thus when he says that among the preliminary *Kārikās* there is not a single one which indicates Umāsvāti to be the author of the aphorisms, then it seems that he is so much bent upon establishing his position that a clear meaning of words either does not occur to him or is ignored by him. Even ignoring the rest of these *kārikās* those numbered 22 and 31 are so transparent as to leave not the least doubt about Umāsvāti being the author of the body of aphorisms and the same being the author of the text devoted to the pathway to *mokṣa*.

Tattvārthasūtra along with a Hindi translation by Pt. Kailashchandraji has come out only recently. In the Introduction to it the views expressed by him as to Umāsvāti's authorship of *Tattvārthabhāṣya* and about the date of this *Bhāṣya* are such as cannot be treated as authoritative by an impartial historian

examining the matter closely. Thus when Panditji anywhere comes across a possible reference to the *Bhāṣya* being a work of the aphorist or when he comes across a possible reference to the *Bhāṣya* in *Rājavārtika* etc. he baselessly surmises that these references relate to another commentary—thus seeking to demonstrate that the *Bhāṣya* is a late text. On this question the other Pandits like Pt. Phulchandaji etc. too follow the same procedure.

When the first Hindi edition was out of stock and yet the demand for it was on the increase Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, the secretary of the Jaina Samshodhaka Mandal (Benaras) and a friend of mine, was thinking of bringing out a second edition. In the meanwhile he was introduced to the good-hearted Shri Rishabhdasji Ranka. The latter pressed home the idea that the Hindi edition be published and be made available at as cheap a price as possible, and he also made arrangement that was necessary. For this I am thankful to him.

Shri Jamnalalji Jain—the editor of 'Jainajagat'—has done the proof-reading from the beginning uptil end. The press was at Wardha while Shri Malvania was at Benaras—so every thing considered the proof-reading could have been done with particular convenience only at Wardha, a task which Shri Jamanalalji has performed with all possible attention. For this we are indebted to him.

Since very long I have lost all interest in taking a direct part in the work of re-publishing not only the Hindi *Tattvārtha* but any of my books, booklets or articles in Gujarati or Hindi. For since long I have made up my mind that if for whatever reason what I have so far thought out and written out appears useful to any institution or any set of persons then it is upto them to do for it whatever they have to. Why should I now remain entangled with these articles etc. of mine ? And having made up my mind thus I have been devoting to the needed new thinking etc. whatever length of time or energy is yet my lot. In view of this it was not possible at least for me to take chief interest in the

publication of the second edition of the Hindi *Tattvārtha*. There is no doubt that if the burden was entrusted to me alone then this second edition would have never come out at all.

However, whatever responsibility in this connection was to be imposed on me was imposed on himself by Pt. Shri Malvania—voluntarily and enthusiastically; and uptil the end he also discharged it extremely well. Thus when literature had to be perused to make possible a proper publication of this new edition, when a consideration of issues had to be undertaken with a view to making needed alterations, when other practical problems had to be solved—then all that was needful was done by Shri Malvania on his own inspiration. Relation between ourselves being what it is I do not feel like expressing an obligation. Yet I am mentioning these things so that the readers might know the situation for what it is.

This year during summer vacation Shri Malvania came to Ahmedabad chiefly because I was here. Having gone through the necessary literature—new and old—whatever notes he had already taken down were considered by me in his very company and with as much impartiality as was possible; then whatever appeared worthy of reduction, expansion or alteration was duly treated for the sake of this new edition. This edition is now before the inquisitive readers; let them make use of it—as suits their inclination, as suits their understanding.

24-5-51

—Sukhlal



INTRODUCTION

(1) *Umāsvātī*—the Author of *Tattvārthasūtra*

Family in respect of birth and family in respect of learning—these are the two types of family.¹ Thus when a person's history of birth is to be considered then thought has to be given to the lineage comprising those having blood-relationship with this person—that is, his father, grand-father, great grand-father, son, grand-son, great grand-son; on the other hand, when the history of a person's learning—of the theoretical text composed by him—is sought to be known then thought has to be given to the preceptorial lineage comprising those having educational relationship with this person—that is, his preceptor, grand-preceptor, great grand-preceptor, disciple, grand-disciple, great grand-disciple.

“*Tattvārtha*” is a theoretical text pertaining to the Jaina branch of the Indian Philosophical Science; so its history comes within the purview of the lineage related to ‘family in respect of learning.’ What learning the author of ‘*Tattvārtha*’ has incorpor-

1. Both these types of family have been well known to the Āryan tradition and the Āryan literature for thousands of years. Since prominence is given in connection with it to the maternal relationship ‘family in respect of birth’ is dependent on *grhastha-āśrama*—that is, the life-stage characteristic of a householder; on the other hand, since prominence is given in connection with it to the educational relationship, ‘family in respect of learning’ is dependent on the preceptorial lineage. Both the types of family find clear mention at least in the grammatical aphorisms of Paṇini. Thus we there have *Vidyāyonī-sambandhebhyo vuñ*—4.3.77. Hence a clear envisagement of these two types of family ought to be much earlier than Paṇini even.

ated in his text he has received from his preceptorial lineage, and with a view to making it specially useful he has given it a particular arrangement in conformity to his own way of looking at things. Of course, the particular arrangement given by him to the learning in question in this text called *Tattvārtha* did not remain unchanged in the subsequent ages. For its specialist students and its commentators have, as per their respective capacities, borrowed much material from the current contemporary traditions and thus improved, augmented, supplemented and developed this learning. Hence what need being introduced in this Introduction are not only *Tattvārtha* and its author but also the commentaries on it—grown out of it in the form of a family-creeper—and their respective authors.

Since beginning and upto this day the author of the text called *Tattvārthādhigama* has found equal recognition with all the sects developed within the Jaina community. Thus the Digambaras count him as one belonging to their branch, the Śvetāmbaras as one belonging to theirs. In the Digambara sect he is known by the names Umāśvāmin as well as Umāsvāti while in the Śvetāmbara sect the only name current is Umāsvāti. By some moderns belonging to the Digambara sect Umāsvāti, the author of the text *Tattvārtha*, is understood to be a disciple of Kunda-kunda¹ while among the Śvetāmbaras the view is somewhat current that 'Svāti' belonging to the Hārīta-gotra who was the preceptor on Syāmācārya, the author of *Prajñāpanāsūtra*, was the same person as Umāsvāti, the author of *Tattvārthasūtra*². Both these types of position lack on authoritative basis and seem to have been a later growth. For no reliable Digambara text, *Paṭṭāvalī*, rock-inscription etc. composed earlier than the 10th century contain on the one hand a mention to the effect

1. See *Svāmī Samantabhadra* p. 144 and further.

2. *Āryamahāgires tu śiṣyau bahulabalissahau yamalabhrātarau tatra balissahasya śiṣyaḥ svātiḥ, tattvārthādayo granthāstu tatkr̥tā eva sambhāvyante, tacchiṣyaḥ śyāmācāryaḥ prajñāpanākṛt śrīvīrāt śatṣaptatya-dhikaśatatrāye (376) svargabhāk—Dharmasāgarīya paṭṭāvalī.*

that Umāsvāti was the author of *Tattvārtha* and on the other hand one to the effect that the same Umāsvāti was a disciple of Kundakunda¹. All the mentions to this effect that have so far been found in the Digambara literature belong to a period subsequent to the 10th-11th centuries and seem to have no old trustworthy basis. And particularly noteworthy is the circumstance that the famous and great Digambara commentators of *Tattvārthasūtra* who flourished from the 5th to 9th centuries nowhere in the course of their commentary avow that *Tattvārthasūtra* is a composition of Umāsvāti, nor do they mention this Umāsvāti as a Digambara, a Śvetāmbara or a neutral². On the other hand, in the Śvetāmbara literature texts written in the 8th century A. V. contain trustworthy mention to the effect that *Tattvārthasūtra* is a composition of Vācaka Umāsvāti and the authors of these texts seem to be of the view that Umāsvāti was a Śvetāmbara³. However, if exception be made of *Dharmasāgara's*

1. The rock-inscriptions from Śravaṇa-belgola which call Umāsvāti both the author of *Tattvārtha* and a disciple of Kundakunda were all composed after the 11th century of the Vikrama era; see '*Jaina Śilālekhasaṅgraha*' published by the Māṇikacandra Granthamālā, inscriptions numbered 40, 42, 43, 47, 50 and 108.

The Paṭṭāvalī of the Nandisamgha too, being very incomplete and devoid of historical facts, cannot be relied upon—this has been demonstrated by Pt. Jugalkishoreji in his examination of the matter. See *Svāmī Samantabhadra* p. 144 and further. Hence the mentions available in this *Paṭṭāvalī* and in the other such ones cannot be treated as historical in the absence of other trustworthy evidences.

Similarly,

tattvārthaśāstrakartāraṃ gr̥dhrapiṇḍhopalakṣitam |
vande gaṇīndrasaṃjātāṃ umāsvāmimuniśvaram ||

this couplet and the other Digambara quotations to the same effect—be they in prose or in verse—are devoid of all trustworthy and old basis; hence they too cannot be put forward as a final support.

2. For a special clarification see the 'Appendix' added to the present Introduction.

3. See the present Introduction *infra*.

Paṭṭāvalī of the *Tapāgaccha*—composed in the 16th and 17th centuries—then no Śvetāmbara text, *paṭṭāvalī* etc. contain even an indication to the effect that Vācaka Umāsvāti, the author of *Tattvārthasūtra*, was the preceptor of Śyāmācārya.

It is a matter of veritable puzzlement how so much misunderstanding could have become current when there was all the while available that eulogy-to-the-text appended to *Tattvārthasūtra*, eulogy which was composed by Vācaka Umāsvāti himself, which yields information about his familial as well as preceptorial lineage, which is vitiated by not even a trace of doubt. However, the riddle gets resolved when attention is bestowed on the sectarian befuddlement and the absence of a historical attitude that were characteristic of those older times. Really, for working out the history of Vācaka Umāsvāti the sole true means placed at our disposal is this brief eulogy composed by himself. Of course, there are numerous other incidents¹ regarding which the two sects believe that they took place involving him, but the traditions connected with them are yet to be examined and cannot be taken to be literally true. Here is the eulogy in question followed by a summary of its content.

Vācakamukhyasya śivaśriyaḥ prakāśayaśasaḥ praśiṣyeṇa |
śiṣyeṇa ghoṣanand iḥṣamaṇasyaikādaśāṅgavidāḥ ||1||

vācanayā ca mahāvācakakṣamaṇamuṇḍapādaśiṣyasya |
śiṣyeṇa vācakācāryamūlanāmaṇaḥ prathitakīrteḥ ||2||

nygrodhikāprasūtena viharatā puravare kusumanāmnī |
kaubhīṣaṇinā śvātitanayena vātsīsutenārghyam ||3||

arhadvacanāṃ samyaggurukrameṇāgataṃ samupadhārya |
duḥkhārtāṃ ca durāgamavihitamatim lokamavalokya ||4||

idam uccair nāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā drbdham |
tattvārthādhigamākhyam spaṣṭam umāsvātīnā śāstram ||5||

1. E. g. the Digambara narration related to *grdhra-piccha* (Vulture's feature) and the Śvetāmbara narration related to the composition on his part of 500—texts.

yas tattvādhigamākhyam jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam |
so'vyābādhasukhākhyam prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham ||6||

“He whose preceptor in respect of initiation was Ghosānandi—*kṣamāśramaṇa*—an expert in the eleven *Āṅga*-texts—and the grand-preceptor—i. e. the preceptor's preceptor—*Vācaka-mukhya Śivaśrī*, whose preceptor in respect of teaching—i. e. education—was the *Vācakācārya* named ‘Mūla’ and the grand-preceptor *Mahāvācaka* ‘Muṇḍapāda’, who was ‘Kaubhīṣaṇi’ by *gotra*, who was the son of the father ‘Svāti’ and the mother ‘Vātsī’, who was born at Nyagrodhikā, and who belonged to the branch ‘Uccanāgara’—that Umāsvāti Vācaka, having properly assi-

1. The branch ‘Uccanāgara’ has got ‘Uccānāgara’ for its Prākṛit equivalent. Now it seems obvious that this branch was so designated after the name of some village or city. But it is difficult to decide as to what particular village or city this was. In numerous parts of India there are numerous cities and villages which bear either the name ‘nagara’ or a name ending in ‘nagara’. E.g. ‘Baṛa nagara (*Vaḍanagara*)’ is an old and famous town of Gujarat. ‘Baṛa’ means big and ‘big’ can perhaps be treated also as a synonym for ‘high’ (Sanskrit *Ucca*). But the scholars are also of the view that the name ‘Baṛa nagara’ was adopted in Gujarat in imitation of the same or a similar name borne by some city in the Eastern parts. Hence it cannot be emphatically asserted that the branch Uccanāgara has relation with Baṛanagara itself. Besides, it is also worth considering as to whether at the times when the branch Uccānāgara originated Baṛanagara was or was not in existence and if it was, how far it was associated with the Jainas. Evidences go to prove that at the time when the branch Uccanāgara originated the Jaina masters used to tour about in the country parts neighbouring Gaṅgā and Yamunā. Hence the surmise that the branch Uccanāgara has relation with Baṛanagara does not retain much weight. In this connection Cunningham writes : “This geographical name is akin to that of the fort named ‘Uccānāgara’ situated in the modern district Bulandshahar of the North-Western Province.”—see *Archeological Survey of India Report*, Volume 14, p. 147—(re-translated from Hindi-tr.)

In his article devoted to the origin of the Nāgaras Shri Manashankar, while tracing relationships of the word ‘Nāgara’, mentions numerous villages bearing the name ‘nagara’. So that too is a matter worthy of consideration in the present context—See *Report of the sixth Gujarati Sahitya Parishad*.

milated the supreme preaching of the *Arhats*—a preaching received through the preceptorial tradition—and having found that people were being miserable with their intellect dulled by the petty scriptural texts, composed this lucid text designated *Tattvārthādhigama* with a view to doing a favour to the people at large and while on tour in the great city of 'Kusumapura.' Whoever will gain acquaintance with this text designated *Tattvārtha* and will act in conformity to its precepts will soon attain the summum bonum of *mokṣa* designated *avyābādhasukha* (lit. happiness devoid of all disturbance)."

This eulogy contains the following six chief references which bear testimony to the historical situation :

(1) The name of the preceptor-in-respect-of-initiation and that of the grand-preceptor, also the competence of this preceptor.

(2) The name of the preceptor-in-respect-of-education and that of the grand-preceptor.

(3) *Gotra*, the father's name, the mother's name.

(4) The name of the place-of-birth and that of the place where the text was composed.

(5) Indication as to the branch and the title.

(6) The name of the author-of-the-text and that of the text.

The eulogy whose summary has been given above and which is now available at the end of the *bhāṣya* is not composed by Umāsvāti himself—for this supposition there is no foundation whatsoever. Even a thinker like Dr. Hermann Jacobi takes this eulogy to be a composition of Umāsvāti himself—as can be gathered from the Introduction which he has supplied to his German translation of *Tattvārtha*. So to treat as fact this historical situation here referred to and to examine in the light of that the views traditionally current among the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects—that is the only royal road to truth open for the present.

Of the six references above pinpointed the first and second

demonstrate to be false the Digambara supposition as to Umāsvāti's relationship with Kundakunda. Of the numerous names available for Kundakunda there is none which is the same as attributed by Umāsvāti either to his preceptor-in-respect-of-initiation or to his preceptor-in-respect-of-education. So there remains no scope whatsoever for the supposition that there obtains between Umāsvāti and Kundakunda the preceptor-disciple relationship either in respect of initiation or in respect of education. Similarly, this eulogy clearly mentions Umāsvāti as belonging to the Vācaka-tradition and to the branch Uccanāgara while it is a Digambara view that Kundakunda belonged to the Nandisaṃgha¹; and there has been no information up to date that a branch designated Uccanāgara ever flourished within the fold of the Digambara sect. So even if Umāsvāti whom the Digambara sect treats as a disciple of Kundakunda be a historical figure the idea that it is he who composed the text designated *Tattvārthādhigama*, since it lacks a trustworthy basis, seems to be a later fabrication².

The third of the above references demonstrate to be false the Śvetāmbara supposition as to Umāsvāti's relationship with Śyāmācārya; for Vācaka Umāsvāti, by calling himself 'Kaubhīṣaṇi', indicates that his gotra was 'Kaubhīṣaṇa' while Svāti mentioned in the *Paṭṭāvali* as 'Śyāmācārya's preceptor has been said to belong to the gotra Hārīta³. Besides, the author of *Tattvārtha* is clearly mentioned as 'Vācaka' in the eulogy but the *Paṭṭāvali* does not attribute the adjective 'Vācaka' either to Śyāmācārya or to Svāti said to be his preceptor. Thus this eulogy on the one hand refutes the mistaken notions that had been traditionally current among the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbāras while on the other

1. See *Svāmī Samantabhadra* p. 158 and further, also Appendix to the present Introduction.

2. See the present Introduction, p. 17, footnote 1; also Appendix to the present Introduction.

3. *hāriyaguttam sāim ca vaṃḍimo hāriyam ca sāmajjam* 26—*Sthavirāvali* pertaining to *Nandi-sūtra*.

hand it presents a brief but true history of the author of our text.

(a) The Date of *Vācaka Umāsvāti* :

The above eulogy says nothing about the date of *Vācaka Umāsvāti*, nor is yet there at our disposal some other material that might enable us to correctly determine this date. Under such conditions the following three things are being made use of with a view to giving some consideration to the problem in question.

- (1) The mention of the branch.
- (2) The date of the oldest commentators.
- (3) A comparison with the other philosophical texts.

(1) It is difficult to say definitely as to when the branch mentioned in the eulogy as 'Uccairnāgara Śākhā' originated; yet the *Sthavirāvalī* pertaining to *Kalpasūtra* does mention a branch designated 'Uccānāgarī'¹. This branch originated from Ārya Śāntiśreṇika. Now Ārya Śāntiśreṇika belonged to the fourth generation coming after Ārya Suhasti. Thus Ārya Suhasti had for his disciples Sūthita-Supratibuddha, the latter for their disciple Indradinna, the latter for his disciple Dinna, the latter for his disciple Śāntiśreṇika. In his turn this Ārya Śāntiśreṇika was the preceptor of Ārya Vajra and a co-disciple of Ārya Sīṃhagiri; hence he belongs to the first generation preceding Ārya Vajra. And it is found mentioned that Ārya Suhasti died 291 years after Mahāvīra, Ārya Vajra 584 years after Mahāvīra. That is to say, within the period of 293 years that intervened in between the death of Ārya Suhasti and that of Ārya Vajra there are found to have flourished five generations in all. Thus on roughly assigning a period of sixty years for each generation it turns out that Śāntiśreṇika who belonged to the fourth generation coming after Suhasti began his career 471 years after Mahāvīra. At about this

1. *therehīṃto ṇaṃ aḷḷasaṃtiseṇiehīṃto māḍḍharasaguttehīṃto ettha ṇaṃ uccānāgarī sāhā niggayā.*—*Mūla Kalpasūtra-sthavirāvalī*. p. 55.

For the earlier lineage of Śāntiśreṇika see the preceding pages of *Kalpa-sūtra*.

time—may be somewhat earlier or somewhat later—the branch Uccanāgara might have originated from Śāntiśreṇika. However, even while assuming that *Vācaka Umāsvāti* belonged to the branch Uccanāgara originating from Śāntiśreṇika and even while accepting the date that has been conjectured for its origination it is difficult to say as to how long after this origination of the branch *Vācaka Umāsvāti* actually flourished ! For the names attributed in the eulogy by him to his preceptor-in-respect-of-initiation and his preceptor-in-respect-of-education—neither of them is to be found in the *Sthavirāvali* pertaining to *Kalpasūtra* or in any other similar *Paṭṭāvalī*. So if anything has to be said about the date of *Umāsvāti* on the basis of the *Sthavirāvali* in question the utmost will be that he flourished near about 471 years after Mahāvīra—that is, near about the beginning of the Vikrama era—and not earlier. All further information in this connection is still in the dark.

(2) A ray projecting some obscure light in this darkness is represented by the date of the old commentaries that were written on *Tattvārthasūtra*, a date imposing a hitherto undefined later limit to the date of *Umāsvāti*. For if exception be made of the *Bhāṣya* which is of the form of an auto-commentary then *Śarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda turns out to be the oldest among the presently available direct commentaries on *Tattvārthasūtra*. Now the date of Pūjyapāda has been determined by the scholars to be the 5th-6th centuries A. V. So on the basis of that we can say that *Umāsvāti* flourished at some period before the 5th century A. V.

In accordance with the above manner of consideration the earliest date appropriate for *Vācaka Umāsvāti* turns out to be the 1st century A. V., the latest such date the 3rd-4th centuries A. V. The task of locating the definite date of *Umāsvāti* within this period of 300-400 years remains to be undertaken.

(3) Certain particular points emerge also from instituting a comparison between *Tattvārtha* and its *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and the other philosophical systems and the Jaina *Āgāmas* on the other, points likely to be of use in solving the problem of date

that is at hand as also in further research work. These points are being put forward in the following. Of course, they are not such as can directly help us today in determining the correct date that is under search, but there is no doubt that in case other powerful evidences become available then they too on their part can render valuable help of their own. For the present, however, these points only lead us towards that very date which was conjectured just above.

(a) The Jaina Āgamic text 'Uttarādhyayana' ought to be earlier than the aphorisms of Kaṇāda—this possibility emerges from a consideration of the tradition as also in certain other ways. It is mostly maintained that the aphorisms of Kaṇāda were composed in the 1st century B. C. Now among the aphorisms of Tattvārtha composed on the basis of the Jaina Āgamas, there are three such as betray besides a reflection of Uttarādhyayana a kinship with certain aphorisms of Kaṇāda. Of these three the first pertains to the definition of *dravya*, the second to that of *guṇa*, the third to that of *kāla*.

Thus in the *gāthā* 6 of the *adhyayana* 28 of Uttarādhyayana the definition of *dravya* is merely to the effect : *guṇāṇāmāsao davvaṃ=guṇāṇām āśrayo dravyaṃ* (= *dravya* is that which is the support of *guṇas*). On the other hand, Kaṇāda's definition of *dravya* introduces *kriyā* and *samavāyikāraṇatā* in addition to *guṇa* and thus says : *kriyāguṇavat samavāyikāraṇam iti dravyalakṣaṇam*—1. 1. 15 (= *dravya* is that which is possessed of *guṇa*, is possessed of *kriyā*, and is a *samavāyikāraṇa*). Now Vācaka Umāsvāti, while retaining the word 'guṇa' occurring in the definitions of Uttarādhyayana, replaces the word 'kriyā' occurring in Kaṇāda's aphorism by the word 'paryāya' well-known in the Jaina tradition and thus formulates the definition of *dravya* in the form "*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*"—5.37 (= *dravya* is that which is possessed of *guṇa* and is possessed of *paryāya*¹).

1. For particular information concerning the definition of *dravya* see *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā bhāṣāṭīppaṇa* p. 54; Introduction to *Nyāyavātāravārttika vṛtti*, p. 25, 104, 119.

In the *gāthā* 6 of the *adhyayana* 28 of *Uttarādhyayana* the definition of *guṇa* is to the effect *egadavvassiā guṇā = ekadravyāśritā guṇāḥ* (= *guṇās* are those which stand supported in one *dravya*). On the other hand, Kaṇāda's definition of *guṇa* is particularly elaborate; thus it says :

“*dravyāśrayy aguṇavān samyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam*”—1. 1. 6 (= *guṇa* is that which stands supported in a *dravya*, is devoid of *guṇa*, is not an independent cause of *samyogavibhāga*). Now within the body of Umāsvāti's definition of *guṇa* there occurs besides the *Uttarādhyayana* definition of *guṇa* also the element *nirguṇa* which is a feature of Kaṇāda's definition of *guṇa*; thus he says : “*dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ*”—5.40 (= *guṇas* are those which stand supported in a *dravya* and are devoid of *guṇa*).

In the *gāthā* 10 of the *adhyayana* 28 of *Uttarādhyayana* the definition of *kāla* is merely to the effect “*vattanālakkhaṇokālo*”= *vartanālakṣaṇaḥ kālaḥ* (= *kāla* is that which is of the nature of perduration). As for Kaṇāda's definition of *kāla* it does not contain the word ‘*vartanā*’ but it does contain the word ‘*apara*’ among others; thus it says : “*aparasmīn param yugapacciram kṣipram iti kālalingāni*”—2. 2. 6. Now in Umāsvāti's definition of *kāla* ‘*paratva*’ and ‘*aparatva*’ are two among the words that occur there besides the word ‘*vartanā*’; thus he says : “*vartanā kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya*”—5.22.

The above-quoted three aphorisms of *Tattvārtha* laying down the definition of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *kāla* do not receive from an ancient Śvetāmbara Āgamic text—that is, from an *Aṅga*—as much verbal support as they do from *Uttarādhyayana*. However, with the Prākṛt utterances of Kundakunda—supposed to have flourished in the 1st-2nd centuries A. V.—the Sanskrit aphorisms of Umāsvāti bear at times complete similarity, at time very little. For example, the Śvetāmbara reading of the aphorisms contains just two aphorisms devoted to a definition of *dravya* viz. “*utpādavyayadhrauvyayukta-mṣat*”—5. 29. “*guṇaparyāyavad dravyam*”—5. 37. but the Digambara reading of aphorisms

contains besides these a third aphorism devoted to the same, viz. “*sad dravyalakṣaṇam*” -5. 29. Now all these three aphorisms belonging to the Digambara reading are present in their entirety in the following Prākṛt *gāthā* of Kundakunda’s *Pañcāstikāya*-

davvaṃ sallakkhaṇīyaṃ uppādavvayadhuvattasaṃ juttaṃ |
guṇapajjayāsayaṃ vā jaṃ taṃ bhaṇṇamīti savvaṇhū ||10||

Besides, the verbal and conceptual similarity that obtains between *Tattvārthasūtra* on the one hand and the well-known writings of Kundakunda on the other can in no way be accidental.

The author of the presently available *Yogasūtra* is understood to be Patañjali, but it is not yet ascertained as to whether Patañjali, the author of *Vyākaraṇa—Mahābhāṣya*, is or is not the same person as the author of *Yogasūtra*. If Patañjali who composed *Mahābhāṣya* is the same person who composed *Yogasūtra* then it can be said that the *Yogasūtra* is a work belonging to the 1st-2nd centuries before Vikrama. It too is not certain as to when Vyāsa’s *Bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* was composed, but, there is no treat it as having originated earlier than the 3rd century A. V.

Between *Yogasūtra* and its *bhāṣya* on the one hand and the aphorisms of *Tattvārtha* and the *bhāṣya* thereon on the other the verbal and conceptual similarity is very close and it is attractive too.¹ Even so, it is not possible to say definitely that either of these is influenced by the other. For the aphorisms of *Tattvārtha* and the *Bhāṣya* thereon are in possession of the heritage received from the Jaina Āgamic texts that are earlier than *Yogadarśana* (= *Yogasūtra*) even; similarly, *Yogasūtra* and its *bhāṣya* are in possession of the heritage received from the ancient traditions like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Buddhist etc. Nevertheless, there is one discussin in *Tattvārtha* which is not at present available in the Jaina Aṅga—texts and is yet available in the *bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*.

1. For a detailed treatment of the question see the Introduction to my Hindi *Yogasūtra*, pp. 52 ff.

The life-quantum earned earlier can be reduced—that is, can be interrupted in the middle—and also not be reduced—a discussion pertaining to this problem is found in the Jaina Aṅga-texts. But by way of supporting the view which concedes the possibility of the interruption in question the illustrations of wet cloth and dry hay have not been offered in the Aṅga-texts; on the other hand, in connection with this discussion these illustrations have been offered in the *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha* and the same has been done also in the *bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*. The beauty of the illustrations is that verbal similarity obtaining between the two *bhāṣyas* is extremely close. Another speciality noteworthy in this connection is that the *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya* has also got a third illustration, viz. one pertaining to arithmetic that is not found in *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya*. The wordings of the two *bhāṣyas* are respectively as follows.

Tattvārthasūtra

“..Śeṣā manuṣyās tiryagyonijāḥ sopakramā nirūpakramāś cāpavartyāyuṣo napavartyāyuṣaś ca bhavanti | ...apavartanam śīghram antarmuhūrtāt karmaphalopabhogāḥ, upakramo pavartananimittam | saṁhataśuṣkatṛṇarāśīdahanavat | yathā hi saṁhataśya śuṣkasyāpi tṛṇarāser avayavaśaḥ krameṇa dahyamānasya cireṇa dāho bhavati tasyaiva śīthilaprakīrṇāpacitasya sarvato yugapadādīpitasya pavanopakramābhihataśyāśudāho bhavati | tadvat | yathā vā saṅkhyānācaryaḥ karaṇalāghavārtham guṇakārabhāgahārābhyām rasim chedād evāpavartayati na ca saṅkhyeyasyārthasyābhāvo bhavati tadvad upakramābhihato maraṇasamudghātaduḥkhārtaḥ karmāpratyaṣyam anābhogapūrvakam karaṇaviśeṣam utpādyā phalopabhogalāghavārtham karmāpavartayati na cāśya phalābhāva iti | kim cānyat | yathā vā dhautapaṭo jalārdra eva saṁhataś cireṇa śoṣam upayāti sa eva ca vitānitaḥ sūryaraśmivāyavabhihataḥ kṣipram śoṣam upayāti na ca saṁhate tasmin prabhūtasnehāgamo nā pi vitānite’ kṛtsnaśoṣaḥ tadvat yathoktanimittpavartanaiḥ kārmaṇaḥ kṣipram phalopabhogobhavati | na ca kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamāphalyāni”

—Tattvārthabhāṣya 2, 52

Yogasūtra

“āyurvīpākam karma dvividham sopakramam nirupakramam
ca / tatra yathārdram vastram vitānitam hrasīyasā kālena
śuśyeta tathā sopakramam / yathā ca tad eve sampiṇḍitam
cireṇa samśuśyeta evam nirupakramam / yathā vāgniḥ śuśke
kakṣe mukto vātena samantato yuktaḥ kṣepīyasā kālena dahet
tathā sopakramam / yathā va sa evāgniḥ tṛṇarāsau kramaśo,
avayaveṣu nyastaś cireṇa dahet tathā nirupakramam /
tadaikabhavikam āyuskaram karma dvividham sopakramam
nirupakramam ca /”

—Yogabhāṣya 3, 22

Akṣapāda's 'Nyāyadarśana' (=Nyāyasūtra) is understood to have been composed nearabout the beginning of the Christian era. Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* on it is one of the earliest works belonging to the *Bhāṣya*-period dated 2nd-3rd centuries A. D. Certain words and topics characteristic of this text are found in *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*. E.g. the doctrine of four *pramāṇas* advocated by Nyāya-darśana is referred to in the *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha* 1.6 and 1.35.¹

In the *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha* 1.12 the refutation of the alleged *pramāṇas arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, *abhāva*, etc. is similar to that found in *Nyāya-darśana* (2.1.1) etc. The *Nyāyadarśana* definition of *pratyakṣa* contains the phrase “*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam*” (1.1.4); the same has been employed in the *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha* 1.12. While seeking to incorporate within the fold of *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* the allegedly independent *pramāṇas* like *arthāpatti* etc.; thus we read there

“*sarvāṇyetāni matiśrutayor antarbhūtāni indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt /*”

1 “*pratyakṣānumānopamāṇasābdāḥ pramāṇāṇi*”

—*Nyāyadarśana*, 1, 1, 7

“*caturvidham ity eke nayavādāntareṇa*”—*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1, 6
and “*yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamāṇāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko'rthaḥ
pramīyate,*”
—*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1, 35.

Similarly, the mannerism of employing the word 'anarthāntara' instead of 'paryāya' (both meaning synonym) is found in *Tattvārtha* 1.13. just as it is found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and *Nyāyadarśana* (1.1.15).¹

The views and words characteristic of the branches of Buddhist philosophy like *Sūnyavāda*, *Vijñānavāda* etc. are not found in *Tattvārthabhāṣya* as they are found in *Sarvārthasiddhi*; even so, certain common views of Buddhist philosophy are here referred to at one or two places in the form of views upheld by an alien system. Whether these views have been borrowed from the Pāli-piṭaka or from the Mahāyāna Sanskrit Piṭaka or from some other text with the same topic—that is worth considering. Of such views the first mention has been made while giving out what according to the Jainas is the number of *Naraka-bhūmis* and in this connection rejecting the corresponding number suggested by the Buddhists; we thus read

“*api ca tantrāntarīyā asaṁkhyeyeṣu lokadhātuṣvasaṁkhyeyāḥ prthivīprastārā ity adhyavasitāḥ.*”

—*Tattvārthabhāṣya*. 3, 1.

And the second mention has been made while giving out what according to the Jainas' is the definition of *pudgala* and in this connection rejecting the meaning attributed to the word 'Pudgala' by the Buddhists; we thus read :

pudgalān iti ca tantrāntarīyā jīvān paribhāṣānte.

—Introductory *bhāṣya* to 5. 23.²

1. See *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.1.56; 2.3.1 and 5.1.59.

2. Though in the Jaina Āgama (*Bhagavatī* 8.3 and 20.2) the word 'pudgala' has also been used as meaning *jīva* (=living being), yet in the technical terminology of Jaina philosophy it is current only as meaning the inanimate atoms and the aggregates made thereof; On the other hand, in the technical terminology of Buddhist philosophy this word is current only as meaning *jīva*. It is keeping this difference of view in mind that the Vācaka here speaks of *tantrāntarīya* (=one upholding an alien system).

(b) The Competence of Umāsvāti

Had not the Jaina masters preceding Umāsvāti developed the capacity to write in Sanskrit and had they not already struck the path of writing in that language, could then too Umāsvāti knit out in so lucid a Sanskrit style the sectarian views that had been traditionally elaborated in the technical terminology of Prakrit ?—that certainly is a question; but the history of the entire presently available Jaina literature does on its part declare that the first among the Jaina masters to write in Sanskrit is Umāsvāti himself. The lucid, terse and flawless style of his works stands witness to his mastery over Sanskrit language. The brief collection presented by him in the *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* of the views related to epistemology, ontology, ethics, geography, astronomy etc. that has been developed in the Jaina Āgama testifies to the fact that he belonged to the family of *Vācakas* (lit. the studious ones) and that the title '*Vācaka*' borne by him was meaningful. The introductory verses of *Tattvārtha* as also his other verse-compositions indicate that he was an accomplished author of verse as of prose. A minute perusal of his aphorisms along with the *bhāṣya* thereon reveals his close, all-comprehensive study of the Jaina Āgama as also his close study of the philosophical literature pertaining to the systems like Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Yoga, Buddhist etc. The grammatical aphorisms quoted by him in *Tattvārtha bhāṣya* (1.5; 2.15) testify to his close study of Pāṇini's grammar.

Though in the Śvetāmbara sect he is famous as an author of 500 works¹ and though at present certain works are even current as his alleged writing, yet we are not in possession of material that might enable us to say something satisfactory in this connection. Even under such conditions one can definitely say

1. *Jāmbūdvīpa Samāsa-prakaraṇa*, *Pujā-prakaraṇa*, *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti*, *Kṣetravicāra*, *Prasamarati*. Siddhasena in his *Vṛtti* (p. 78, line 2) refers to his work named *Śauca-prakaraṇa* which is however not available at present.

that 'Praśamarati' is a work by Umāsvāti¹—as is evident from its language and its line of thought, as also from the relevant references made by Siddhasena etc.

Umāsvāti calls himself 'Vācaka;' understanding this term to mean 'Pūrvavit' (= a connoisseur of Pūrvā-texts) the Śvetāmbara masters have, since quite an early period, been taking Umāsvāti to be a pūrvavit.²

In the Digambara tradition too he has been called a śruta kevalideśīya (= a part-connoisseur of the scriptures).²

1. Siddhasena, the author of the *Vṛtti* speaks of 'Praśamarati' as a work by the author of the *bhāṣya*. E.g.:-

"yataḥ praśamaratau (kā. 208) anenaivoktam—paramāṇur apradeśo, varṇādiguṇeṣu bhajānīyaḥ", "vācakena tv etad eva balasañjñayā praśamaratau (kā. 80) upāttam." *Bhāṣya Vṛtti* on 5.6 and 9.6.

And it goes without saying that in Siddhasena's eyes the author of the aphorisms and that of the *bhāṣya* are one and the same person. E.g. "svakṛtasūtrasanniveśamāśrityoktam."—9.22.

"iti Śrīmadarhatpravaṇane tattvārthādhigame umāsvātivācākopa-jñasūtrabhāṣye bhāṣyānusārīnyām ca tīkāyām siddhasenagaṇiviracitāyām anagārāgāridharmaprārūpakāḥ saptamo'dhyāyaḥ." Enclosure to the *Vṛtti* on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, Chapter seven. For other similar mentions, see the next section on Umāsvāti's sect.

The *Kārikā* 120 of *Praśamarati* has been quoted in *Nisītha-cūrṇi* after saying 'ācārya āha.' The date of Jinadāsa Mahattara, the author of this *cūrṇi*, is the 8th century A. V.—as has been mentioned by himself in his *cūrṇi* to *Nandī-sūtra*; and on the basis of that one can say that *Praśamarati* is a specially old work. For this reason—as also for those given above—it might well be the case that 'Praśamarati' is a work by our Vācaka.

2. That the Pūrvā-texts are fourteen in number—this information has been conveyed in the Āgamic-texts *Samavāyāṅga* etc. It too has been mentioned that they constituted the fifth section of the twelfth *Āṅga* named *Dṛṣṭivāda*. The traditional view is that Pūrvā-Śruta means the preaching delivered by Lord Mahāvīra first of all. On the other hand, the western scholars have in this connection surmised that the earlier mass of scriptures belonging to the tradition of Lord Pārśvanātha which Lord Mahāvīra and his disciples received in heritage is what is

His work *Tattvārtha* well acquaints us with his scriptural knowledge pertaining to the eleven Āṅga-texts, and so there remains no doubt whatsoever as to his this much competence. All the tenets upheld in the Jaina scriptures received by him in heritage have been compiled by him in *Tattvārtha*¹—without leaving unmentioned even a single topic that might appear to be important. Hence it is that Ācārya Hemacandra evaluates Umāsvāti as the topmost among the authors of a compendium.²

Again, it is on account of this competence of his that so many Śvetāmbara and Digambara masters have been impelled to write a commentary on *Tattvārtha*.

(C) The Sect of Umāsvāti

The Digambaras, treating Vācaka Umāsvāti as one belonging to their own sect, accept as his composition just one work *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*; on the other hand, the Śvetāmbaras, treating him as one belonging to their own sect, accept as his composition not only *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, but also the *bhāṣya* on it. Now the question arises as to which sect—the Digambara, the

called *Pūrva-Śruta*. Gradually, this scriptural mass got mixed up with that originating from Lord Mahāvīra and began to be counted as a part of the latter. Obviously, therefore, those who were in possession of twelve Āṅgas originating from Lord Mahāvīra were conversant with this *Pūrva-Śruta*. However, since it used to be retained in oral memory alone as also for other reasons the *Pūrva-Śruta* gradually got lost and is to-day found quoted only as a nominal remnant in the form of a *Pūrvagata-gāthā*—that is, a stray verse that originally belonged to a *Pūrva* text. Moreover, we have got several works composed on the basis of a *Pūrva*-text.

A Digambara rock-inscription—one numbered 46—received from the Nagara taluk calls him *Śrutakevali-deśīya*, this as follows :

Tattvārthasūtrakartāram umāsvātimuniśvaram /
śrutakevalideśīyaṃ vandēhaṃ guṇamandiram //

1. For the scriptural origin of the topics dealt with in *Tattvārtha* see *Tattvārtha-Jaināgama-Samanvaya* edited by Upādhyāya Ātmārāmji.

2. 'upomāsvāti saṅgrahītārah'—*Siddhahema*, 2. 2. 39.

Śvetāmbara or some third one—Umāsvāti actually belonged to. The question gets answered once it is decided as to who wrote the *bhāṣya* in question. And that the *bhāṣya* is a work by Umāsvāti himself is incontrovertibly proved on the grounds stated below.¹

1. Among the available commentaries on the *bhāṣya* the oldest is that by Siddhasena. And the following mentions made in it presuppose that the author of the *bhāṣya* is the same as that of the original aphorisms.

“*pratijñātām cānena, jñānam vakṣyāmaḥ*’ iti / *atas tad anurodhenaikavacanam cakāra ācāryaḥ*”, Part I, p. 69

“*śāstīti ca granthakāra eva dvidhā ātmānam vibhajya sūtrakāra-bhāṣyakāra-kāreṇaivam āha.*” p. 72.

“*śūtrakārād avibhakto’pi hi bhāṣyakāraḥ*”, p. 205.

“*iti śrīmadarhatpravacane tattvārthādhigame umāsvātivāca-kopajñāsūtrabhāṣye bhāṣyānusārinyām ca tikāyām.*”, part II, p. 120.

2. The eighth from among the concluding verses of the *bhāṣya* has been quoted by Yākinīsūnu Haribhadrācārya in his *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* as a composition by Umāsvāti.

3. Even Ācārya Devagupta in the course of his commentary on the initial verses that form a part of the *bhāṣya* itself indicates that the *bhāṣya* and the original aphorisms come from the same author. See verses 1 and 2.

4. Within the body of the initial verses²—as also at certain

1. See Shri Premji’s essay in the Singhi Memorial Number of ‘*Bhāratiya Vidyā*’, p. 128.

He too has demonstrated that the *bhāṣya* is a work by the author of the aphorisms himself.

2. *tattvārthādhigamākhyam bahvartham saṅgraham laghugra-ntham /*

vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya // 22 //

narte ca mokṣamārgād vratopadeśo’sti jagati kṛtsne’smin /

tasmāt param imam eveti mokṣamārgam pravakṣyāmi // 31 //

other places in the *bhāṣya*¹—there occur verbal forms “*vakṣyāmi* (I shall speak)” etc. in the first person, and in a subsequent aphorism things have been said in conformity to the promise thus made.

5. While one peruses the *bhāṣya* from beginning to the end one thing strikes one's mind viz. that nowhere are farfetched meanings attributed to the words of an aphorism, nowhere has been a doubt expressed or alternatives formulated while giving out the meaning of an aphorism, nowhere has been an aphorism explained keeping in mind an earlier commentary on the same, and nowhere has been an alternative reading adopted for an aphorism.

This state of affairs justifies the idea so long current² that the aphorisms and the *bhāṣya* thereon come from the same author. Certainly, such state of affairs does not obtain in the case of such texts dealing with philosophical matters as are well established and have found recognition with a number of sects. Take for example, the text ‘*Brahmasūtra*’ well established within the fold of Vedicist philosophy. Had its author been also a commentator of it then the far-fetched construction of words, alternative explanations, doubt as to an explanation, alternative readings of an aphorism, which all characterize a *bhāṣya* on it would never have been possible. Similarly, had the author of *Tattvārtha-sūtra* also written a commentary such as ‘*Sarvārthasiddhi*’, ‘*Rājavārtika*’, ‘*S’lokavārtikā*’, or the like, then too the attribution of far-fetched meanings, distortion of words, words superadded from one's own side, doubt as to an explanation,

1. “*guṇān lakṣaṇato vakṣyāmaḥ*”—the *bhāṣya* on 5.37, the concerned subsequent aphorism 5.40. “*anādirādīmāṁs ca tam parastād vakṣyāmaḥ*”—the *bhāṣya* on 5. 22, the concerned subsequent aphorism 5.42.

2. Agastyasimha in his *Cūrṇi* on *Dasakāliya* quotes *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* giving the name of the author Umāsvāti, p. 85. In *Nayacakra*-text the *Bhāṣya* is quoted, p. 596, and its *Ṭīkā* also quotes *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, p. 17, 114, 596. The *Nayacakra* is dated Vikram 484, see *Introduction* by Muni Jambuvijaya p. 60.

alternative reading of an aphorism¹—which all are found in these commentaries would never have been possible.

All these can be well understood by having a glance at texts in whose case the author of the original and that of a commentary are definitely known to have been identical. So much consideration leaves us with the definite conviction that the author of our aphorisms and that of its *bhāṣya* are one and the same person.

An ascertainment to the effect that the author of the aphorisms and that of its *bhāṣya* are one and the same person is of much help in answering the question as to which sect this author belonged to.

The following arguments are adequate to yield the conclusion that Umāsvāti did not belong to the Digambara sect.

(1) There is not a single proof to substantiate the suggestion that a branch named Uccanāgara or Nāgara—the branch mentioned in that eulogy—ever pertained to the Digambara sect.

(2) The aphorism (5.38) to the effect that *kāla* is a real substance according to some, as also the account of it given in the *bhāṣya*, stand opposed to the Digambara view of the matter (5.39). Again, the simple view maintained in the *bhāṣya* (9.11) that eleven *parīṣahas* pertain to a *kevalin* and the clear mention made in the same of clothes, utensils etc. equally go against the corresponding traditional Digambara positions—9.5, 9.7, 9.26. Lastly, while treating of a *siddha* what is said in *bhāṣya* in connection with the items *liṅga* and *tīrtha* is opposite of what the Digambara sect would maintain in this connection.

1. See example, Sarvāthasiddhi “*caramadehā iti vā pāṭhaḥ*” -2, 53 / “*athavā ekādaśa jīne na santīti vākyaśeṣaḥ kalpanīyaḥ sopaskāratvāt sūtrāṇām*”—9, 11. and “*liṅgena kena siddhiḥ ? avēdatvena tribhyo vā vedebhyaḥ siddhir bhāvato na dravyataḥ, dravyataḥ puṁliṅgenaiva athavā nirgranthaliṅgena sagranthaliṅgena vā siddhir bhūtapūrvanayāpekṣayā*”—

(3) The difference of opinion as to the presence in a *kevalin* of another type of *upayoga* besides *kevalajñāna*—a difference of opinion referred to in the *bhāṣya* (1.31)—is not found in the Digambara texts.

The above arguments go to prove that Vācaka Umāsvāti did not belong to the Digambara sect, yet it remains to be seen as to which sect he in fact belonged to. The following arguments would tend to make out that he belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect.

(1) The branch Uccanāgarī mentioned in the eulogy is found referred to in a Śvetāmbara *paṭṭāvalī*¹.

(2) Even while evincing difference of opinion—or even opposition—in connection with a particular view mentioned in the *bhāṣya* there have been no ancient or modern Śvetāmbara masters who—like their Digambara counterparts—have altogether denied recognition to this text.

(3) In a text like *Prasāmaratī*²—whose authorship on the part of Umāsvāti admits of not the slightest doubt—there occurs a systematic account of a monk's clothes and utensils, an account acceptable to the Śvetāmbara sect without dispute.

(4) The mention of the lineage Vācaka to which Umāsvāti belonged as also that of other masters belonging to the same are found in the Śvetāmbara *paṭṭāvalis*, *Pannavaṇa* and the *Sthavirāvali* pertaining to *Nandī*.

These arguments demonstrate that Umāsvāti belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, and all the Śvetāmbara masters up to date have been already treating him as one belonging to their own sect. My own understanding that Vācaka Umāsvāti belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and not to the Digambara has remained unshaken after much reading and pondering over the matter. With a view to rendering this understanding particularly clear light ought to be thrown on certain questions related to the history of the Digambara-Śvetāmbara split. The first question is as

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1. See the present Introduction, p. 19 and 22.
 2. See *kārikās* 135 onwards.

to how far back goes the ancient root of the Digambara-Śvetāmbara difference or opposition as to the validity of a scriptural mass or an item of conduct—also as to what was the issue around which this ancient root was centred. The second question is as to whether there ever was a mass of scriptural texts commonly acceptable to both these sects and if there was one how long it continued to receive allegiance of both—also as to when a difference of opinion arose on this question and when as a result of this difference there came into existence such scriptural mass as was wholly acceptable to one sect and wholly unacceptable to the other. The third and the last question is as to the code of conduct characteristic of which sect was observed by Umāsvāti himself and as to whether the scriptural mass on whose basis *Tattvārtha* was composed was wholly acceptable to both the sects in question or it was wholly acceptable to one of them and wholly unacceptable to the other.

(1) Whatever historical material has been available upto now indisputably makes it clear that Lord Mahāvīra belonged to the tradition of the Pārśvites¹ (lit. descendents of Pārśva.) and that through his own personality tempered by a journey on the path of severe renunciation he imparted a new life to the hitherto customary loose or moderate path of renunciation.¹ A number of Pārśvite monks and house-holders who were hostile or indifferent to begin with subsequently joined the order of Lord Mahāvīra.² In conformity to his liberal yet truth-oriented outlook—befitting a leader—Lord Mahāvīra provided definite room in his order for both the parties in question³—viz. to one that went stark naked

1. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, *Sūtra* 178.

2. *Kālāsavesiyaputta* (*Bhagavatī* 1.9), *Keśi* (*Uttarādhyayana*, *Adhyayana* 23), *Udakapedhalaputta* (*Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, 2.7), *Gaṅgeya* (*Bhagavatī* 9.32) etc. For details see *Utthāna Mahāvīrāṅka* p. 58. Certain Pārśvites went to the extent of accepting even nakedness along with the five *Mahāvratas* and *Pratikramaṇa*—information to his effect is yet preserved in the *Aṅga*-texts; for example, see *Bhagavatī* 1.9.

3. In *Ācārāṅga* we find an account of both the types of monks—viz. those who put on clothes and those who went without them. For

and pursued a severe code of conduct and to one that did not go entirely naked and pursued a moderate code of conduct. These two parties had among themselves difference on the question of going naked or otherwise as also on a few other questions of conduct,¹ yet on account of the personality of the Lord it could not assume the form of a conflict. It is in this old synthesis of the severe and moderate paths of renunciation that there lies the root of the Digambara-Śvetāmbara split.

In that older time there were not current in the Jaina tradition words like Digambara, Śvetāmbara etc. Yet words indicative of a difference in code of conduct are actually found employed there—e. g. those like *nagna*, *acela* (*Uttarādhyayana* 23. 13, 29), *jinakalpika*, *pāṇi-pratigraha* (*Kalpasūtra* 9. 28), *pāṇipātra* etc. for the party of severe renunciation; those like *sacela*, *pratigrahadhārin* (*Kalpasūtra* 9. 31), *sthavirakalpa* (*Kalpasūtra* 9. 63) etc. for the party of moderate renunciation.

(2) Even while the two parties in question had differences as to the code of conduct they had none whatsoever as to the scripture that constituted the very life-breath of the Lord's order; for both equally gave recognition to the scripture which was then current and was reckoned to be of the form of twelve *Aṅga*-texts. This situation characterized by some difference as to the code of conduct and total unanimity as to the scripture continued to prevail, to a greater or lesser extent, for some hundred-and-fifty years after the Lord. However, let it be remembered that even in the meanwhile a number of competent masters belonging to the two parties composed works, big and small, based on that very scripture-of-the-form-of-the-*Aṅga*-texts, works which found recog-

an account of the monks who went without clothes see the sūtras 183 onwards of the sixth *adhyayana* of the first *Śrutaskandha*; for the rules of conduct pertaining to clothes binding on the monks who put on clothes see the fifth *adhyayana* of the second *Śrutaskandha*. And an interesting account of how a monk—whether putting on clothes or going without them—should gain victory over delusion is given in *Ācārāṅga* 1.8.

1. See *Uttarādhyayana*, *adhyayana* 23.

dition generally with the followers of both the parties and particularly with the disciples of the author of such a work who would lay special emphasis on it treating it as a composition of their preceptor or grand-preceptor. It is these works which found currency under the title *Aṅga-bāhya*, *Anaṅga* or *Upāṅga*.¹ And the two retained so much reverent and loyal attitude towards the scripture that even while both the *Aṅga*-texts and the *Aṅgabāhya*-texts were treated as equally authoritative by them neither ever minimized the importance of the line dividing an *Aṅga*-text from an *Aṅgabāhya*-text, a line that remains firmly drawn in the present day literature of both the parties.

What then happened was that the earlier arisen difference of opinion on the question of conduct like going naked, wearing clothes, etc.—a difference uptil now suppressed owing to the spirit of tolerance and synthesis shown towards one another—got gradually accentuated. The result was that in connection with this difference of opinion the two parties began to seek support for their respective stands chiefly in the scripture-of-the-form-of-the-*Aṅga*-texts; at the same time each began to employ for the same purpose the particular scriptural texts of the *Aṅga-bāhya* type that had been composed by its own members. Thus the party-difference that got perpetuated on the basis of a difference that chiefly pertained to the questions of conduct gave rise to so many types of confusions within the fold of the order. Hence was convened (c. 160 A. M.) a recitation-session at Pāṭaliputra². Till the time of this recitation-session and even afterwards there was in existence a common scripture-of-the-form-of-*Aṅga* which was acceptable to our two parties, both of which however went on lamenting that the original mass of scriptural texts was gradually undergoing diminution. At the same time both went on composing works that would lend support to their respective

1. *Daśavaikālika*, *Uttarādhyayana*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Anuyogadvāra*, *Āvaśyaka*, *Ṛṣibhāṣita* etc.

2. *Parīṣiṣṭaparva* Canto 9, Verse 55 onwards; *Vīranirvāṇa Saṁvat* Aur *Jaina-kālgaṇanā* p. 94.

stands on the question of conduct. This scriptural mass aimed at buttressing party-stands on the questions of conduct ultimately gave rise to a difference of opinion as to the old common Aṅgic scripture itself, a difference which originally consisted in merely offering an alternative interpretation but which culminated in surmising an alternative reading, an interpolation and the like. Thus the difference of opinion that had produced difference on the questions of conduct also produced difference in the hitherto common understanding maintained by the two parties as to the common Aṅgic scripture. As a result, one of the parties began to hold—and make others hold—that the common original Aṅgic scripture had veritably disappeared to a very great extent while what had remained of it was not free from artificialities and later interpolations. However, even while saying all this the party did not altogether renounce the original Aṅgic scripture; at the same time it began to specially compose the scriptural texts that would lend support to its own code of conduct and through them to propagate its partisan views. The other party on its part noticed that the first one complained that the artificialities had gained entrance into the original Aṅgic scripture but that it neither renounced this scripture altogether nor joined in the task of safeguarding it. Noticing all this it held a gathering at Mathurā.¹ Here finalization of the textual reading, classification, contractions, expansion etc. were undertaken in relation to the original Aṅgic scripture as also in relation to the *Aṅga-bāhya* scripture acceptable to the party in question, a performance remaining on the whole authoritative in the eyes of the elders who took part in that gathering. Even if this edition of the Aṅgic-cum-Anaṅgic Scripture was rather new and in spite of drawing a dividing line between Aṅgic and Anaṅgic texts it contained in the Aṅgic-texts insertions from and references to the Anaṅgic texts² — a state of affairs

1. Some time in between 827 and 840 A. M. See *Vīranīrvāṇa Saṁvat Aur Jaina Kālagāṇanā*, p. 104

2. For example, *Bhagavatī* refers to *Anuyogadvāra*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Jambūdvīpaprājñapti*, *Jīvābhigamasūtra* and *Rājaprasaṅgiya*. See *Bhagavatī* part, IV, *Parīṣiṣṭa*.

indicative of the equally authoritative character of the two sets of texts—and even if its classification and its finalization of the textual reading were different from what they might have been originally, yet this new edition was extremely close to that original Aṅgic Scripture; for all those positions contained in this original scripture which went to support the opposite party's code of conduct were retained in this edition. After the time of this Mathurā edition our two parties began to differ greatly so far as it concerned their understanding—hitherto maintained in common—as to the original Aṅgic scripture, a circumstance that laid the foundation of a sharp difference of opinion as to what texts are genuinely scriptural. The party advocating the renunciation of clothes began to declare that the original Aṅgic Scripture had disappeared altogether while all the scriptural texts that were in possession of the party advocating the wearing of clothes as also those that were in its own possession were not original—that is, not composed by the *Gaṇadharas*—but a composition or compilation of the latter-day masters belonging to one or the other party. The adherents of the party advocating the wearing of clothes would retort that the latter-day masters had certainly composed so many types of new scriptural texts and had also made new compilations but that they had introduced no change or purging in the ideas of original Aṅgic scripture. Viewing minutely and judging by the historical criterion one apparently finds much truth in the contention made by the party advocating the wearing of clothes; for even while being a partisan and an advocate of the wearing of clothes this party has not purged out from within the Aṅgic Scripture a passage advocating or dilating on the renunciation of clothes.¹ Thus just as the party advocating the renunciation of clothes maintained that the original Aṅgic scripture had disappeared, similarly the party advocating the wearing of clothes confronted the former with the position that *jinakalpa*—that is, the code of conduct characteristic of a Jina according to which hands are used as utensils and

1. See the present Introduction, p. 38, foot-note 3.

clothes are renounced—had only disappeared the times being different now.¹ Even so, we find that in the scriptural texts revised, collected and newly compiled by the party of clothes all the passages basic for an advocacy of no-clothing—as also the commentaries favouring the same—have been left intact. Certainly, the strongest proof in support of the fact that the Aṅgic scripture favoured by the party of clothes stands extremely close to its original version is the circumstance that this scripture takes up the standpoint of a general prescription—where all the exceptional or specific ways of conduct advocated by the party of no-clothing stand fully recommended upto this day. On the contrary, the scripture favoured by the party of no-clothing—a scripture advocating the practice of going stark naked—is not of the form of a general prescription; for it exclusively recommends the practice of no-clothing. The scripture pertaining to the party of clothes treats as pathway to *mokṣa* both the practice of wearing clothes and that of no-clothing—nay, it even attributes real primacy to it; its specificity only consists in its denial of the timeliness of this latter practice. On the contrary, the scripture pertaining to the party of no-clothing does not treat as pathway to *mokṣa* the practice of wearing clothes—nay, it even considers this practice to be a hindrance obstructing *mokṣa*.²

In view of this all it is obvious that the scripture pertaining to the party of clothes stands much closer to the original Aṅgic scripture than does that pertaining to the party of no-clothing.

The scripture was again revised at Valabhi³ after it had been at Mathurā. And whatever difference of opinion was left

1. *gaṇa-paramohi-pulāe āhāraga-khavaga-uvasame kappe / samjama-tiakevali-sijjhaṇā ya jambummi vucchiṇṇā //*

Viśeṣā. 2593.

2. *Sarvārthasiddhi* declares no-clothing to be the chief and unobstructed cause of *mokṣa*, p. 248.

3. Some time in between 827 and 840 A. M. See *Viranirvāṇa Saṃvat Aur Jaina Kālagāṇanā*, p. 110.

unresolved within the fold of the party of elders—the party of clothes—was but nominal. But on the other hand, this party now faced a much strong opposition from the side of the party of no-clothing. For certain members belonging to this latter party now resolved to give up the lingering attitude of indifference and advocate a total discarding of the scripture pertaining to the party of clothes.

(3) Vācaka Umāsvāti certainly practised the code of conduct advocated by the party of elders—the party of clothes; otherwise his *bhāṣya* and his *Praśamarati* could not have contained an account that is in line with the duties prescribed by the party of clothes. For no prominent monk belonging to the party of no-clothing could possibly have offered an account that allows for the practice of wearing clothes. Even Kundakunda—the chief monk belonging to the party of no-clothing—has exclusively advocated the practice of no-clothing.¹ So the idea makes no sense that a monk favouring no-clothing and belonging to the lineage of Kundakunda should offer an account that is compatible with the practice of wearing clothes. The attributing of the authorship of *Praśamarati* to Umāsvāti, too, is trustworthy. Similarly, the mention of the branch Uccānāgara and the title Vācaka—both appropriate to Umāsvāti—in an old and trustworthy genealogy of the party of elders indicates that he belonged to this very party. Whatever might have been the period in between the 3rd and 5th centuries A. V. when Umāsvāti actually flourished the fact remains that the Aṅgic-cum-Anaṅgic scripture which he adopts as the basis for the composition of his *Tattvārtha* had found recognition with the party of elders.² As for those belonging to the party of no-clothing they were either indifferent

1. See *Pravacanasāra*, *adhikāra* 3.

2. The scripture pertaining to the party of elders which was followed by Siddhasena—the author of the *Vṛtti*—was that compiled at Valabhī recitation-session while the version of the same which was followed by Umāsvāti originated in an earlier period and was probably one compiled at the Mathurā recitation-session. Hence it is that Siddhasena often senses an anti-Āgamic note in the *bhāṣya*.

towards this scripture or had already renounced it altogether. Thus if Umāsvāti flourished some time before the Mathurā recitation-session then one should say that the Aṅgic-cum-Anāṅgic scripture followed by him was subjected to an attitude of almost indifference on the part of the party of no-clothing; on the other hand, if he flourished nearabout the time of the Valabhī recitation-session then one should say that the same scripture was subjected to an attitude of not only indifference but positive hostility on the part of certain ones belonging to the same party.

Here the question must arise as to why, when the scripture followed by Umāsvāti was not acceptable to a certain section of the party of no-clothing, his *Tattvārtha* was so much favoured by the adherents of the same party. The answer is got from a comparison of the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthsiddhi* and a perusal of the original aphorisms. That scripture followed by the party of clothes which Umāsvāti had adopted described and respected nakedness—as is indicated by the word *nāgnya* (= nakedness) occurring in an aphorism (9.9). Notably, not the entire lot of scriptural texts which in his *bhāṣya* is referred to as *Aṅga-bāhya* has found mention in *Sarvārthsiddhi*. For the texts like *Daśāśrutaskandha*, *Kalpa Vyavahārā* etc. do not favour the party of no-clothing; what they clearly lend support to is the party of clothes. However, *Sarvārthsiddhi* does mention *Daśavaikālīka* and *Uttarādhyayana* which even while not definitely the works of a master belonging to the party of no-clothing are not clearly hostile to this party.

Having found that Umāsvāti's original aphorisms were so attractive and that a mere discarding of the *bhāṣya* would render them capable of lending support to his own party Pūjyapāda composed such a commentary on those aphorisms as would exclusively delineate the duties appropriate to the practice of no-clothing and would clearly refute those appropriate to the practice of wearing clothes. Not only that, but Pūjyapādaswāmin also clearly hinted at the un-authoritative character of the eleven Aṅga-texts and the *Aṅgabāhya* scriptural texts followed by the party of clothes, texts that have been given their present form at

the Valabhī recitation-session. Thus he said that to admit that a *Kevalin* consumes gross food and to speak to meat-eating are respectively the cases of a defamation of the *Kevalin* and a defamation of the scripture.¹ The situation seems to be that subsequently to the composition of Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi*—a text which in the main clearly expounds duties appropriate to the practice of no-clothing—the entire lot of scriptural texts followed by the party of clothes was so finally and absolutely discarded by a section of the Party of no-clothing as had not been done before. Hence it is that subsequently to the composition of *Sarvārthasiddhi* the acceptance on the part of the party of no-clothings of scripture pertaining to the party of clothes remained but nominal—as is evident from the pursuit of scriptural studies undertaken by the latter-day Digambara scholars. If there are exceptions to it they are negligible.² Really, nearabout the time of Pūjyapāda the mutual tug-of-war and rank partisanship so much characterised the party of no-clothing and that of clothes that subsequently to the composition of *Sarvārthasiddhi Tattvārthabhāṣya* ceased to receive even that little regard from the party of no-clothing which it had managed to retain by that time. Even much consideration does not yet provide an answer to the question as to why, when the party of clothes could somehow or other, in some form or other, and upto this day keep intact the Aṅgic scripture, the party of no-clothing—a party not inferior to the party of clothes as regards intellect, devotion to the scripture, lack of negligence—allow the

1. Keeping in mind the passages related to meat-eating that occur in *Bhagavatī* (Śataka 15), *Ācārāṅga* (along with the commentary of Śīlāṅka pp. 334, 335, 348, 352, 364), *Praśnavyākaraṇa*, (pp. 148, 150), etc. the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi* declared that to admit the occurrence of such passages in the *Āgama* is to defame the scripture. And keeping in mind the account of a *kevalin*'s taking of food that occurs in *Bhagavatī* (Śataka 15) he declared that that is tantamount to defaming the *Kevalin*.

2. Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda etc. continued to be conversant with the writings of Siddhasena. See *Rājavārtika*, 8.1.17, *Slokavārtika*, p. 3.

whole of this scripture to fade away. When the party of no-clothing could keep intact so vast expanse of the scriptural texts composed by its leaders like Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda, Samantabhadra etc. then there is no reason why it could not do the same in relation to some section of the Aṅgic scripture. And leaving aside the Aṅgic scripture, even when we cast a glance at the *Aṅga-bāhya* texts the question arises as to why the small texts like *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana*—texts referred to by Pūjya-pāda—could disappear from among the scripture pertaining to the party of no-clothing—this at a time when even bigger texts remained intact with this party. Considering all this I have arrived at the definite conclusion that the flow of the original Aṅgic scripture, even while subject to the strokes of inevitable change, has been yet current and is to-day totally accepted by the Śvetāmbara sect though totally rejected by its Digambara counterpart.

In connection with this problem of the scripture the attention of the historical minded scholars ought to be drawn towards one question. Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka refer to *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana*. Not only that, so far as *Daśavaikālika* is concerned even a commentary on it was composed by Aparājita-Ācārya, a supporter of nakedness.¹ He has also composed a commentary on *Bhagavatī-ārāḍhanā*. In spite of all this how did it come about that *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana* ceased to remain current within the Digambara sect? And when we find that numerous texts like *Mūlācāra* and *Bhagavatī-ārāḍhanā* which by way of exception recommend for a monk external possessions like clothes etc., which even expound a code of conduct appropriate to nuns, and whose practical recommendations for a monk are in no way severe than those of *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana* are unanimously accepted by the Digambara sect and have commentaries in Sanskrit and vernacular (Hindi) composed on them by famous Digambara scholars—then the question just posed by us becomes still more

1. See *Bhagavatī-Ārāḍhanā*, p. 1196; also 'Anekānta', Vol. 2; no. 1, p. 57.

pressing. The Digambara sect which includes within the scripture texts like *Mūlācāra* and *Bhagavatī-ārāḍhanā*—why does it not accord recognition to *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana* ? To put it in another way, the Digambara sect which has discarded *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana*—how can it accord recognition to *Mūlācāra* etc. ? This question indicative of an anomaly is easy to answer and also difficult to answer. For when considered from the standpoint of history it is easy to answer, when considered exclusively from the standpoint of a closed-door sect it is difficult to answer.

Those who are not conversant with history often think that the Digambara sect—the party of no-clothing—does or can accept only nakedness as a part of a monk's practice. So on their view the acceptance of even a slight external possession is no part of the practice characteristic of a Digambara. And ever since the ideas advocated by the sub-sect Terāpantha have gained upper hand within the fold of the Digambara sect—the remaining sects having been forced either to lead a nominal existence or to be overwhelmed by the influence of Terāpantha—since then those closed-door sectarians have become still more confirmed in their conviction that nakedness alone—and not the acceptance of even a slight external possession—is a part of monk's practice and that precisely because of the impossibility of nakedness on her part a woman is not entitled to the practice of a nun. Such closed-door sectarians can in no way find a true solution for the anomaly above hinted at. For them the only way open is to declare that all the texts which recommend external possessions for a monk are either outright Śvetāmbarite or are composed by scholars who were under the influence of the Śvetāmbara-sect or they are not aimed at expounding the code-of-conduct appropriate to a full-fledged Digambara monk. However, even declaration cannot save them a number of complications. So it is difficult for them to get at a correct answer to our question.

On the other hand, there is no such difficulty for one who studies and ponders over the many aspects of the history of the Jaina tradition. The history of the Jaina tradition reveals that

even within the fold of the sect called advocate-of-no-clothing or Digambara there have been numerous orders or sub-sects which are not unanimous on the question as to whether the absolute renunciation of an external possession is or is not a part of a monk's practice. Thus here there have been sub-sects which while theoretically advocating nakedness and the use of hands as utensils in practice did accept some external possession or other. In a way they represented the mild or moderate wing of the party of no-clothing. Side by side, there were other sub-sects which theoretically advocated just nakedness and in practice too adopted the same. It is they who represented the hard or extreme wing of the party of no-clothing. It too appears that all these sects adopted in common the practice of using hands as utensils—which is why they were all considered to be Digambara. It was natural that in the texts composed by the scholars or monks belonging to these different sub-sects representing a moderate or an extreme wing mutually conflicting views be expressed on the questions of nakedness, clothes etc. Besides, there were orders like *Yāpanīya* which were not considered either a full-fledged adherent of the party of clothes or that of the party of no-clothing. And when such orders disappeared from the scene then several texts composed by the masters belonging to them which specially favoured the Śvetāmbara sect were chiefly safeguarded by this sect while several of them remained current only within the fold of the Digambara sect and in due course came to be looked upon as Digambarite. So if in the texts composed by the scholars belonging to the different Digambara sub-sects—some old and some medieval, some moderate and some extremist—there is at places found an absolute defence of nakedness and at places a defence of a limited acceptance of external possessions—then there is nothing anomalous about it. At present there is predominance within the Digambara sect of the ideas advocated by the subsect Terāpantha with its absolute defence of nakedness, ideas which are a growth of the past two to three hundred years. Exclusively on the basis of these ideas it is never possible to find an explanation for all the old texts

supposed to be Digambarite. The texts like *Daśavaikālika* etc. are so much well established within the fold of the Śvetāmbara sect that their rejection on the part of the Digambara sect came about automatically. Perhaps, had the texts like *Mūlācāra* etc. too been fully owned by the Śvetāmbara sect then it would have been hardly likely that they occupied in the eyes of the Digambara sect the status they do at present.

(a) The caste of *Umāsvāti* and His Place of Birth

The eulogy contains no mention clearly referring to caste; even so, the designation 'Vātsī' indicative of the mother's gotra is present there in it, and the adjective *Kaubhīṣaṇi* too is indicative of gotra. This mention of gotra indicates that *Umāsvāti* belonged to the Brahmin-caste—an assertion to this effect would hardly sound objectionable to one who has closely studied the familial lineages of the Brahmin-caste so tenacious about its claim of relatedness to a particular gotra-tradition. In the form of *Vācaka* *Umāsvāti*'s place of birth the eulogy mentions the village 'Nyagrodhikā'. Where this Nyagrodhikā lies, what has been its history, what is its present state—all this is shrouded in darkness. And an investigation into it should prove interesting. In the form of the place where *Tattvārtha* was composed the eulogy mentions 'Kusumapura'. This very Kusumapura is Patna of the present-day Bihar. Again, the eulogy says that *Tattvārtha* was composed while the author was on tour in Patna; on the basis of it the following ideas strike the mind.

(1) At the time of *Umāsvāti*—also somewhat earlier and somewhat later—there must have been a good deal of touring on the part of Jaina monks in Magadha; and in that part of the country the Jaina order must be possessing some considerable amount of strength and power-of-attraction.

(2) The Jaina monks writing on a particular branch of theoretical learning had kept intact their tradition of non-regular residence—thus turning their family (= entourage) into a veritable 'seminary on the move.'

(3) Generally speaking, the place of birth Nyagrodhikā should not have been much far from the touring region of Pāṭaliputra (Patnā) and Magadhadeśa.

2. The Commentators of *Tattvārthasūtra*

The commentators of *Tattvārtha* have belonged to both the sects Śvetāmbara and Digambara; but the difference is that in Śvetāmbara sect there has been a predominance of commentaries on *Tattvārtha*-along-with-the-*bhāṣya* while in the Digambara sect there have only been composed commentaries on the original aphorisms. Of these commentators belonging to both the sects some are such competent scholars as deserve to be counted among the Indian philosophers in general; so it is only some of such competent commentators that are being briefly introduced below.

(a) *Umāsvāti*

The author of a commentary on *Tattvārtha* in the form of a *bhāṣya* is the aphorist Umāsvāti himself; hence there is no need to write about him separately—things about him having been said already. Like Siddhasena-gaṇin¹ Ācārya Haribhadra² too identifies the author of the *bhāṣya* with that of the aphorisms—this becomes clear on a perusal of his *bhāṣya-tīkā*. And Praśamarati is treated by Haribhadra as a work by the author of this *bhāṣya* himself.³ In view of this all the present-day supposition to the effect that the *bhāṣya* is not of the form of an auto-commentary turns out to be mistaken. No old Digambara commentator like Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka etc. has said a thing that might go against the *bhāṣya* being of the form of an auto-commentary.

1. See the present Introduction p. 31, foot-note 2 and p. 33.

2. "Etannibandhanatvāt saṁsārasyeti svābhīprāyam abhidhyāya matāntaram upanyasann āha—eke tvityādinā" p. 141.

3. Praśamarati *Kārikās* 210 and 211 have been quoted by Haribhadra in his *bhāṣya-tīkā* after saying 'Yathoktam anenaiva sūriṇā prakaraṇāntare.'

(b) *Gandhahastin*¹

In the form of an author of a commentary or *bhāṣya* on Vācaka Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* two Gandhahastins are famous in the Jaina tradition. Of these, one is supposed to have been a Digambara master, the other a Śvetāmbara one. Now the term '*gandhahastin*' is an adjective. And this adjective is understood to have been borne by Samantabhadra, the famous scholar of the Digambara sect—so that the implied assertion is that Svāmi-samantabhadra, who wrote *Āptamīmāṃsā* and who bore the title *gandhahastin* composed a commentary on Vācaka Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. On the other hand, in the Śvetāmbara sect the view is now current that Siddhasena Divākara, the disciple of Vṛddhavādin, bore the adjective '*gandhahastin*'—so that the implied assertion is that Siddhasena Divākara, the author of *Sanmāti* and the disciple of Vṛddhavādin, composed a commentary on Vācaka Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. Both these understandings and the respective assertions implied by them lack authorization and so cannot be accepted. The adjective '*gandhahastin*' is found attributed to a work by the Digambara master Samantabhadra—as can be clearly seen in *Laghu-Samantabhadra's Aṣṭasaṃskṛti-tippaṇa*. This *Laghu-Samantabhadra*² is understood to have been flourished nearabout the 14th-15th centuries A. D. But no definite proof corroborative of his present statement has yet been available. As a result of my up-to-date reading and reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that we have in the Digambara literature only stray references at places to *bhāṣya*, at places to *mahabhāṣya*, at places to *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*

1. In the old hymn '*Namothuṇam*'—famous as *Śakrastava*—the adjective '*gandhahastin*' has been assigned to the revered *tīrthaṅkara* by referring to him as '*Purisavaragamdhahatthiṇam*.' And in the Digambara rocks-inscriptions belonging to the 10th—11th centuries of the Śaka era an alias '*gandhahastin*' is found to have been assigned to a valiant soldier. The name of a Jaina temple, too, is '*Savati gandha-vāraṇa Jinālaya*'; see '*Jaina-Śilālekha-Saṅgraha*' edited by Dr. Hiralal Jain, pp. 113 and 129, Rock-inscriptions from the mountain Candragiri.

2. See Jugalkishoreji's Swāmi Samantabhadra, pp. 214-20.

while at places the name of Svāmi-samantabhadra has been mentioned in the company of *Tattvārtha-mahābhāṣya*. Seeing all this the later, modern authors formed a mistaken conviction that Svāmi-samantabhadra had composed a *mahābhāṣya* called *gandhahastin* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. And this conviction misled them into making corresponding assertions. As a matter of fact, they had before them neither an old basis nor such a work as would prove that a commentary called *gandhahastin* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* was composed by Samantabhadra. The high-sounding words like *bhāṣya*, *mahābhāṣya*, *gandhahastin* etc. were, of course, there; and so the idea naturally to occur was that none except a great master like Samantabhadra could compose a work such as that—this particularly at a time when no work composed by a later master like Akalaṅka etc. could be definitely ascertained to be designated *gandhahasti-bhāṣya*. Had an author like Samantabhadra composed a work, big or small, on Umāsvāti's so well-known *Tattvārtha* then utter absence of a mention of it or a quotation from it in the highly theoretical commentaries like *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, *Rājavārtika* etc. would never have been possible. It too is not possible that a work like that disappeared altogether by the time of *Sarvārthasiddhi* etc., a time when the other famous works of Samantabhadra were yet in existence. Be that as it may, I am now in no doubt whatsoever that there never was a *bhāṣya* named *gandhahastin* on *Tattvārtha* composed by Samantabhadra.

Pt. Jugalkishoreji says—in *Anekānta* (Vol. I, p. 216)—that *Dhavalā* mentions *gandhahasti-bhāṣya*, but we have reliably learnt from Pt. Hiralalji Nyāyatīrtha who has made the original copy of *Dhavalā* that there is in *Dhavalā* no mention of *gandhahasti-bhāṣya*.

The Śvetāmbara understanding that it is Siddhasena Divākara, the disciple of Vṛddhavādin, who is *gandhahastin*, has become current on the basis of a reference¹ made by the famous

1. "ancnaivābhiprāyeṇāha *gandhahastī sammatau*"—*Nyāyakhanda-khāḍya* verse 16, p. 16.

scholar Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaḥ belonging to the 17th-18th centuries A. D. In his 'Mahāvīrastotra' Yaśovijayaḥ has quoted a *gāthā* from Siddhasena Divākara's 'Sanmati' in the form of an utterance by *gandhahastin*. On the basis of that one nowadays maintains that it is Siddhasena Divākara who is *gandhahastin*. But this reference made by Yaśovijayaḥ is a product of mistake, and to prove this two clear evidences are at hand. The first is the circumstance that no old or modern author come before Yaśovijayaḥ employs the adjective *gandhahastin* while referring to Siddhasena Divākara, or to the works definitely known to be his composition, or to a quotation from his works. It is only Yaśovijayaḥ who has employed the adjective *gandhahastin* while referring to a quotation from a work of Siddhasena Divākara. So the reference made by him is devoid of all old basis. Besides, whatever old and modern *prabandhas*¹ containing a life-sketch of Siddhasena Divākara are now available nowhere employ the term *gandhahastin* while, on the other hand, the term Divākara is found employed in the old *prabandhas* as also in the works of other masters.² The other powerful and irrefutable evidence is the circumstance that whatever quotations from *gandhahastin* are found in so many works³ composed before Yaśovijayaḥ are also

1. *Siddhasena-prabandha* in Bhadrēśvara's *Kathāvalī*, *Siddhasena-prabandha* by another author, *Siddhasena-prabandha* within *Vṛddhavādi-prabandha* in *Prabhāvaka-carita*, *Vikrama-prabandha* in *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi* and *Caturvīṃśati-prabandha*.

In the life-sketches of Siddhasena we come across the alias Divākara as also a supporting evidence for the same, but nothing of the sort is found in connection with the term *gandhahastin*. Had the term *gandhahastin* been in use since so olden times the question is as to why the old authors did not employ the term *gandhahastin*—as they did employ the term Divākara—while referring to Siddhasena or to a work definitely known to be his composition.

2. See Haribhadra's *Pañcavastu-gāthā* 1048, p. 156.

3. For a comparison observe : "*nīdrādayo yataḥ samadhigatāyā eva darśanalabdheḥ upayogaghāte pravartante cakṣurdarśanāvaraṇā-dicatuṣṭayam tūdgamoccheditvāt mulaghātam nihanti darśanalabdhim*" iti *Tattvārthabhāṣya Vṛtti*, p. 135, line 4, part II.

found—either without the slightest alteration or with an agreement as to meaning—in the commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* composed by Siddhasena, the disciple of Bhāsvāmin and grand-disciple of Simhasūri. On the basis of that this much is irrefutably proved that the person treated as *gandhahastin* is not Siddhasena Divākara as is understood by the current tradition but Siddhasena, the disciple of Bhāsvāmin, who wrote the presently available commenatary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*. On account of the similarity of names as also on account of a consideration that only Siddhasena Divākara famous as a mighty disputant and a

“*āha ca gandhahastī nidrādayaḥ samadhiḡatāyā eva darśana-labdher upaghāte vartante darśanāvaraṇacatuṣṭāyaṃ tūḡgamoccheditvāt samūlaghātam hanti darśanalabdhim iti*”—*Siddhasenīya Vṛtti* on *Pravacanasāroddhāra*, p. 358, line 5. Malayagiri's *Sittaritikā*, *gāthā* 5. Devendra's *Tikā* on *Karmagrantha I*, *gāthā* 12.

“*yā tu bhavasthakevalino dvividhasya sayogāyogabhedasya siddhasya vā darśanamohanīyasaptakṣayād apāyasaddravyakṣayāc codapādi sādīr aparyavasānā iti*”—*Tattvārthabhāṣya Vṛtti*, p. 59.

“*yad āha gandhahastī—bhavasthakevalino dividhasya sayogāyogabhedasya siddhasya vā darśanamohanīyasaptakṣayāvīrbhūtā samyag-drṣṭiḥ sādīr aparyavasānā iti*”—*Navapadavṛtti*, p. 88.

“*tatra yāpāyasaddravyavartinī śreṇikāḡdīnām saddravyōpagame ca bhavati apāyasahacāriṇī sā sādīsaparyavasānā*.”—*Tattvārthabhāṣya Vṛtti*, p. 59, line 27.

“*yad uktam gandhahastinā—tatra yāpāyasaddravyavartinī—apāyo matijñānāmśaḥ saddravyāṇi—Śuddhasamyaktvaḡalikāni tadvartinī śreṇikāḡdīnām ca saddravyōpagame bhavatyapāyasahacāriṇī sā sādīsaparyavasānā iti*”—*Navapadavṛtti*, p. 88.

“*prāṇāpānāv ucchvāsaniḡśvāsakriyālakṣaṇau*”—*Tattvārthabhāṣya vṛtti*, p. 161, line 13.

“*yad āha gandhahastī—prāṇāpānau—ucchvāsaniḡśvāsau iti*”—*Dharmasaṅgrahaṇīvṛtti*, p. 42, line 2.

“*ata eve ca bhedaḥ pradeśānām avayavānām ca, ye na jātucid vastuvyatirekenopalabhyante te pradeśāḥ, ye tu viśakalitāḥ parikalita-mūrtayaḥ prajñāpatham avataranti te'vayavā iti*”—*Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti*, p. 328, line 21.

“*yad apy avayavapradeśayor gandhahastyādiṣv bhedo'sti*”—*Syādvādamāñjari*, p. 63, verse 9.

competent author could be *gandhahastin* Yaśovijayajī was misled into committing the mistake of applying the adjective *gandhahastin* to Divākara—that is quite possible.

The above arguments clearly enable us to see that the person famous as *gandhahastin* in the Śvetāmbara sect is none but Siddhasena, the author of the presently available voluminous commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*. Thus we are provided with definite reasons to maintain that when Abhayadeva, the commentator of *Sanmati*, who had flourished in the 9th-10th centuries, in the course of his commentary¹ twice refers to *gandhahastin* and recommends a perusal of his commentary on *Tattvārtha*, he is referring to none but the author of the presently available commentary on the *bhāṣya*. So in search for the commentary by *gandhahastin* on *Tattvārtha* recommended by Abhayadeva in his commentary on *Sanmati* we need not now cast a glance at the perished or unavailable literature. This very investigation also makes it necessary to maintain that the *vivarāṇa* by *gandhahastin*² referred to by Śīlāṅka³—of the 9th-

1. At the end of his commentary on the 1st *gāthā* of the *Kāṇḍa* two of *Sanmati* Abhayadeva quotes the aphorisms 9 to 12 of the chapter one of *Tattvārtha* and while recommending *gandhahastin* for a commentary on the same says :

“*asya ca sūtrasamūhasya vyākhyā gandhahastiprabhṛtibhir vihiteti no pradarsyate*” p. 595, line 24.

Similarly, while explaining the term ‘*hetuvāda*’ occurring in the *gāthā* 44 of the *Kāṇḍa* three he quotes

“*samyagdarsanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ*” and about it too says :

“*tathā gandhahastiprabhṛtibhir vikrāntam iti neha pradarsyate vistarabhayāt*” p. 657.

2. “*Śastraparijñāvivaraṇam atibahugahanam ca gandhahastikṛtam*” and “*Śastraparijñāvivaraṇam atibahugahanam itīva kila vṛtam pūjyair / śrīgandhahastimiśrair vivṛṇomi tato’ham avaśiṣṭam //*”

—*Ācārāṅgatikā*, p. 1 and p. 82.

3. See the Introduction to “*Jītakalpa*” edited by Ācārya Jinavijayajī, p. 19; and also ‘Appendix for further details about Śīlāṅkācārya.

10th centuries—in his commentary on *Ācārāṅgasūtra* ought to be a work of Siddhasena, the author of the commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*; for it is impossible that Śīlāṅka and Abhayadeva who had flourished at so close an interval should apply the adjective *gandhahastin* to two different masters. And it is difficult to suppose that a highly learned scholar like Abhayadeva did not come across the commentary on *Ācārāṅgasūtra*—the foremost among the Āgamic texts—composed by Śīlāṅka who had flourished only a little earlier than himself. Moreover, when Śīlāṅka himself in the course of his commentaries quotes *gāthās* from Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmati* he nowhere employs the term *gandhahastin*; hence the person understood by Śīlāṅka to be *gandhahastin* is not Divākara—this much is clear. The conclusion here reached on the basis of the above mode of argumentation¹ now stands fully corroborated by a reference made by Yaśobhadrasūri's disciple who had completed the incomplete commentary of Haribhadra. Thus he says;

*sūriyaśobhadrasya [hi] śiṣyeṇa samuddhṛtā svabodhārtham /
tattvārthasya hi ṭikā jadakāyarjanoddhṛtāntyārdhā //1//*

*haribhadrācāryeṇārabdha vivṛtārdhaṣaḍadhyāyāṁś ca /
pūjyaiḥ punar uddhṛteyaṁ tattvārthārdhāḥ ṭikāntyā //2//*

iti “*etad uktam bhavati-haribhadrācāryeṇārdhaṣaṇṇām
adhyāyānāmādyānām ṭikā kṛtā, bhagavatā tu gandhahastinā
siddhasena navyā kṛtā tattvārthaṭikā navyair vādasthānair vyākulā,
tasyā eva śeṣam uddhṛtam cācāryeṇa (śeṣam mayā) svabodhārtham
sāṭyāntagurvī ca dupḍupikā niṣpannety alam prasaṅgena*”², p. 521.

(c) Siddhasena

At present two commentaries on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* composed by Śvetāmbara masters are available in their entirety. Of these one is comparatively bigger, the other comparatively smaller. It is Siddhasena, the author of this bigger commentary,

1. See Gujarati *Tattvārthavivecana, Paricaya*, p. 36.

2. This reading has been corrected with the help of another manuscript.—see *Ātmānandaprakāśa*, 45. 10., p. 193.

who is under consideration here. He was the disciple of Bhāsvāmin who in his turn was the disciple of Simhasūri,¹ the disciple of Dinnagaṇin—as is evident from the eulogy supplied by him at the end of his commentary on the *bhāṣya*.

From the arguments offered in connection with considering the identity of *gandhahastin* it can be gathered that it is this Siddhasena who is *gandhahastin*. So long as no new evidence particularly pressing is forthcoming there ought to be no doubt about taking two works to be his composition—one the *vivarāṇa* on *Ācārāṅga* which is at present unavailable and the other the bigger commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* which is at present available. Who gave him the title *gandhahastin* and why—that is only a matter for conjecture. He himself on his part has not employed the term *gandhahastin* in the eulogy composed by him; and from this it appears likely that what has taken place in the case of so many others has taken place in his case as well—viz. that some of his disciples and devoted followers made him famous under the title *gandhahastin*. This becomes still clearer from the above quoted reference made by Yaśobhadrasūri's disciple. The reason for the state of affairs seems to be that this Siddhasena was a Siddhāntist (= advocate of the positions maintained in the *Siddhānta*—i. e. Āgamic-texts) and besides being in possession of a vast knowledge of the Āgamic texts was in the habit of vehemently refuting whatever positions, howsoever logical in themselves, seemed to go against the Āgamic texts and of thus vindicating the corresponding Siddhānta (i. e. Āgamic) positions. Besides, the commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* which he composed, being equivalent to 18000 *śloka*s in extent, must have been the biggest of all commentary on this text. Keeping in mind such vastness of the commentary and the advocacy of the Āgamic positions undertaken therein some disciple or devoted follower of his attributed to him, during his life-time or afterwards, the adjective '*gandhahastin*'—that appears to be the situation. It is not

1. It is this Simhasūri who is the famous commentator of *Nayacakra*. See *Ātmānandaprakāśa* 45.10., p. 191.

yet possible to say anything definitive about his date but doubtless he must have flourished some time in between the seventh and ninth centuries A.V. For in his commentary on the *bhāṣya* he has mentioned numerous Buddhist scholars like Vasubandhu etc.¹ Of these one is Dharmakīrti² who belonged to the 7th century, and that makes it definite that he did not flourish before the 7th century. On the other hand, the 9th century scholar Śīlāṅka refers to him under the name 'gandhahastin'³—on which ground he ought to have flourished some time before the 9th century. Siddhasena was the grand-disciple of Simhasūrigaṇi-kṣamāśramaṇa, the commentator of *Nayacakra*. And Simhasūri was certainly alive about the middle of the 7th century. So it appears that the time of Siddhasena was some period lying in between the last quarter of the 7th century and the middle of the 8th. In his commentary Siddhasena refers to a text named *Siddhiviniścaya* (p. 37) which may be of Akalaṅka or more probably of Śivasvāmī. Śivasvāmī's *Siddhiviniścaya* is quoted by Śākaṭyāyana in his commentary on *Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa*, p. 19.

(d) Haribhadra

Haribhadra, the author of the above-mentioned small commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* is here under consideration. This small commentary has been published by the organization Shri Rishabhadevaji Kesarimalji of Ratlam. This commentary is not a

1. The famous Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu has been referred to by him as 'Āmiṣagrddha'; thus he says : "*tasmādenaḥpadam etat vasubandhor āmiṣagrddhasya grdhrasyevāprekṣyakāriṇaḥ*" "*jātir upanyastā vasubandhuvaidehyena*"—*Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti*, p. 68, lines 1 and 29. The five sins designated *Ānantarya* which are dealt with in Nāgārjuna's *Dharmasaṅgraha*, p. 13 and which are described by Śīlāṅka in his commentary on *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (p. 215) are also mentioned by Siddhasena—*Bhāṣyavṛtti* p. 67.

2. "*bhikṣuvaradharmakīrtinā'pi virodha uktuḥ pramāṇaviniścayādaḥ*"—*Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti*, p. 397, line 4.

3. See the present Introduction, p. 57, footnote 1.

work of Haribhadra alone, but three masters at least¹ have taken part in its composition. Of these Haribhadra too is one and it is this Haribhadra who is under consideration here. In the Śvetāmbara sect there have been numerous masters of the name Haribhadra² of whom one famous under the title *Yākinīsūnu* (= the son of the Yākinī) and the author of hundreds of works is supposed to be the author of the present small commentary. But no evidence free of doubt is yet at hand on this score. Muni-shri Jambuvijayaji has compared with one another the commentaries of Haribhadra and Siddhasena and has maintained that Haribhadra has followed the commentary of Siddhasena.³ If that be so then Haribhadra's commentary ought to have been composed after that of Siddhasena.

(e) Devagupta, Yaśobhadra and Yaśobhadra's Disciple

Devagupta has written a commentary only on the *Sambadha-kārikās* of the *Bhāṣya*. There have been many Ācāryas having the name of Devagupta and in the absence of the name of his preceptor it is difficult to identify him.

The above Haribhadra had composed commentary on five chapters and a half. And commentary on the subsequent chapters of *Tattvārthabhāṣya* seems to have been certainly composed by two persons at least—of whom one is the master named Yaśobhadra and the other his anonymous disciple. This anonymous disciple of Yaśobhadra has composed commentary on the *bhāṣya* pertaining to just the last aphorism of the chapter ten;

1. The commentary can have for its authors even more than three persons. For the names of three of them—viz. Haribhadra, Yaśobhadra and Yaśobhadra's disciple are certain but on the basis of the enclosure supplied to the chapters 8 and 9 an additional author can as well be thought of; thus it says : “*iti śrī tattvārthatīkāyām haribhadra-cārya-prarabdhyām dupḍupikābhidhānāyām tasyām evānyakārṭrīkāyām navamo'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ*”.

2. See the Introduction to *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇī* by Muni Kalyanavijayaji, pp. 2 ff.

3. See *Ātmānandaprakāśa*, Vol. 45, No. 10, p. 193.

the entire earlier portion of the *bhāṣya* left uncommented by Haribhadra has been commented on by Yaśobhadra. All this is evident from the words of that disciple of Yaśobhadra himself.¹

In the Śvetāmbara sect there have been numerous authors of the name Yaśobhadra.² As to who among them is our present Yaśobhadra is unknown. There is nothing decisive to prove that he was a disciple of Haribhadra, the author of that incomplete commentary on the *bhāṣya*. Nay, as against a conjecture to that effect it might be argued that if this Yaśobhadra was a disciple of that Haribhadra then the disciple of Yaśobhadra who completed the commentary in question and who has informed us that his preceptor Yaśobhadra had completed the incomplete commentary of Haribhadra could have hardly omitted to attribute to his preceptor an adjective 'Haribhadra's disciple' or the like. Be that as it may, it yet remains to be considered as to where this Yaśobhadra flourished and whether or not he composed certain other works as well. It too is to be considered as to why Yaśobhadra could not compose commentary on just the last aphorism—a task that had to be undertaken by his disciple.

On comparison it appears that the commentary on *bhāṣya* by Yaśobhadra and his disciple was based on the commentary by *gandhahastin*.

There has been one Yaśobhadra who composed commentary on Haribhadra's monograph *Ṣoḍaśaka* and it is a question worth consideration whether he is the same person as our present Yaśobhadra or someone else.

(f) Malayagiri

The commentary on the *Tattvārthabhāṣya* composed by Malayagiri is unavailable.³ He was one of the most prominent

1. See the present Introduction, p. 57.

2. See M. D. Desai. *Jaina Sāhityano Saṅkṣipta Itihāsa*—the Appendix part pertaining to Yaśobhadra.

3. The view that Malayagiri had composed a commentary on *Tattvārtha* has become current on the basis of the following mention

Śvetāmbara scholars of the 12th-13th centuries A.V. He is famous as a contemporary of Ācārya Hemacandra and the best among the commentators. Scores of works by him are available.¹

(g) Cirantanamuni

Cirantanamuni is an anonymous Śvetāmbara monk. He has composed an ordinary *Ṭippaṇa* on *Tattvārtha*. He flourished some time after the 14th century A. V., for in his *Ṭippaṇa* on the aphorism 31 of the chapter five he mentions *Syādvādamāñjarī*, a work by Malliṣeṇa of the 14th century.

(h) Vācaka Yaśovijaya

Of the commentary on the *bhāṣya* composed by Vācaka Yaśovijaya an incomplete part pertaining to the chapter one is available. He is famous as the last authoritative scholar of not only the Śvetāmbara sect but the Jaina community in general. His numerous works are available². Assimilating the development of logic that had taken place by the 17th-18th centuries he has given a logical form to the Jaina scriptural positions, and composing monographs on different topics he has smoothed the way for a minute study of Jaina philosophy.

(i) Gaṇi-Yaśovijaya

Gaṇi-Yaśovijaya is different from the just mentioned Vācaka Yaśovijaya. As to when he flourished is not known. And any other historical information about him is equally unavailable. In the form of his work just the Gujarati *Tabā-Ṭippaṇa* on *Tattvārtha* is available upto now. As to whether he also composed any other work is not known. In view of the language and style of his *Ṭippaṇa* he seems to have belonged to the 17th-18th centuries. Two of his specialities are worth mentioning.

made by himself in his commentary on *Prajñāpanā*—as also on the basis of similar other mentions : “*tac cāprāptakāritvaṃ tattvārthaṭīkādaḥ vistareṇa prasādhitaṃ iti tato'vadhāraṇīyam*”, Pada 15, p. 298.

1. See the Introduction to *Dharmasaṅgrahaṇi*, p. 36.

2. See the Introduction to *Jainatarkabhāṣā*, Singhī Series.

(1) Just as the Śvetāmbara scholars like Vācaka Yaśovijaya etc. have composed commentaries on the Digambara texts like *Aṣṭasahasrī* etc. so also Gaṇi-Yaśovijaya adopted the Digambara reading of the text—the reading accepted in *Sarvārthasiddhi*—and has composed *Ṭippaṇa* (= explanatory note) on it by way of just supplementing the meaning of aphorisms; and in the course of composing this *Ṭippaṇa* whenever he came across a case of difference or conflict between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras he has offered an explanation that is in line with the Śvetāmbara tradition. Thus even while his reading of the text is Digambarite his explanation is Śvetāmbarite.

(2) Of those writing a *Ṭippaṇa* on *Tattvārtha* in Gujarati language this Yaśovijaya is the only one. For nothing written by any one else in Gujarati on *Tattvārtha* has yet come to light.

That Gaṇi-Yaśovijaya is a Śvetāmbara is definite, for a mention to that effect¹ occurs at the end of his *Ṭippaṇa*. And a second powerful corroborative evidence for the same is the *Ṭippaṇa* itself named *Bālāvabodha*. Thus even while accepting the same reading of aphorisms² and their number as the Digambaras uphold he nowhere offers an explanation that is in line with the Digambara tradition. Nevertheless, the question does arise, “How could Yaśovijaya, being himself a Śvetāmbara, adopt the Digambara reading of aphorisms? Was he not acquainted with the Śvetāmbara reading or even if he was did he find greater merit in Digambara reading than in its Śvetāmbara counterpart?” A proper answer to the question would be that he must have

1. *iti śrī śvetāmbarācārya-śrī-umāsvāmigaṇa(i)kṛtatattvārthasūtram, tasya bālāvabodhaḥ śrīyaśovijayaganikṛtaḥ samāptaḥ* /- The manuscript of the *Ṭippaṇa* preserved in the text-collection of Pravartaka Shri Kirtivijayaji.

2. To this there are of course exceptions though slight. For example, the aphorism 19 of the chapter four is not adopted by him from the Digambara reading. According to the Digambaras the number of heavens is sixteen and so on adopting the Digambara reading of the aphorism in question loyalty to Śvetāmbara tenets could not have been retained. Hence at this place he has adopted the corresponding Śvetāmbara reading with its mention of twelve heavens.

been acquainted with the Śvetāmbara reading and in his eyes this reading would have possessed merit too; for otherwise he would not have composed a *Ṭippaṇa* that was in line with the Śvetāmbara tradition. Even then if he adopted the Digambara reading of aphorisms the reason must be that he wanted to impress upon the partisans of Digambara tenets that it was quite possible and tenable to give an explanation exactly in line with the Śvetāmbara tradition to that very reading of aphorisms on the basis of which the Digambara scholars had been, for one thousand years, offering an explanation that was in line with the Digambara tradition¹ and opposed to the Śvetāmbara *Āgāmas*. At the same time he wanted to say to the Śvetāmbara students, "Whether you adopt the Digambara reading of aphorisms or its Śvetāmbara counterpart the meaning yielded in spite of this difference of reading is the same and one in line with the Śvetāmbara tradition. So there is no necessity to get excited against the Digambara reading of aphorisms and to throw it aside as something belonging to the rival camp. Whether you learn the reading of aphorisms accepted by the *bhāṣya* or you commit to memory that accepted by *Sarvārthasiddhi*, the essential thing is the same in both cases." Thus on the one hand with a view to telling the Digambara scholars as to what true meaning is simply yielded by their own reading of aphorisms and on the other hand with a view to teaching the Śvetāmbara students that goaded by a partisan spirit they should not get excited against the Digambara reading of aphorisms this Yaśovijaya seems to have composed his *Ṭippaṇa* discarding the Śvetāmbara reading of aphorisms and accepting its Digambara counterpart.

(j) Pūjyapāda

Pūjyapāda's real name is Devanandin. He flourished in 5th-6th centuries A. V. He has composed works on numerous topics like grammar etc. of which some are available.² The information

1. See *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 2.53; 9.11; 109.

2. See *Jaina Sāhitya Saṁśodhaka*, Part I, p. 83.

is that Śivakoṭi¹ is the only Digambara commentator of *Tattvārtha* coming before Pūjyapāda. It is his commentary on *Tattvārtha* named *Sarvārthasiddhi* and lending support to Digambara tenets which acted as basis for the entire lot of the latter-day Digambara scholars.

(k) Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka is a scholar of the 7th-8th centuries A. V. After *Sarvārthasiddhi* it is his commentary on *Tattvārtha* that is now available, and it goes under the title *Rājavārtika*. He is one of the foremost scholars who laid the foundation of the Jaina school of Logic. His numerous works are available² and they are of value for every student of Jaina Logic.

(1) Vidyānanda

This Vidyānanda flourished in the 9th-10th centuries A. V. His numerous works are available.³ He was a proficient student of the systems of Indian philosophy; composing a detailed verse-commentary-called *Śloka-vārtika*-on *Tattvārtha* he has vied with the famous Mīmāṃsā scholars like Kumārila etc. and has offered a powerful reply to the terrible attack launched by the Mīmāṃsakas against Jaina philosophy.

(m) Śrutasāgara

The Digambara savant named Śrutasāgara has composed a commentary on *Tattvārtha*. He is a scholar of the 16th century. He has composed numerous works.⁴

1. The commentary composed by Śivakoṭi on *Tattvārtha* or quotations etc. from it are not now available. The information that he had written something on *Tattvārtha* is conveyed by the eulogy pertaining to certain rock-inscriptions. The view is that Śivakoṭi was a disciple of Samantabhadra. See *Svāmi Samantabhadra*, p. 96.

2. See the Introduction to *Nyāyakumudacandra*.

3. See the Introduction to *Aṣṭasahasrī* and *Tattvārthasloka-vārtika*.

4. See the Introduction to Śrutasāgara's commentary published by Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, p. 98.

(n) Vibudhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmideva, Abhayandisūri etc.

Numerous Digambara scholars have composed ordinary commentaries on *Tattvārtha*. I myself have not been able to collect special information regarding them. Besides these so many Sanskrit commentaries there have been Digambara scholars who composed on *Tattvārtha* commentaries in vernacular languages—of whom some write in Kannada, some in Hindi.¹

(3) *Tattvārthasūtra*

With a view to getting specially familiarized with the exterior and the interior of the text called *Tattvārtha* the following four topics are being considered below on the basis of the original text.

- (a) the material serving as the source of inspiration;
- (b) The purpose of composition;
- (c) the style of composition;
- (d) The treatment of subject-matter.

(a) The Material Serving as the Source of Inspiration

The material which inspired the author to compose *Tattvārtha* can be briefly divided into four classes :

(i) The heritage of Āgamic Knowledge

Like Vedas in the case of the Vedicist systems of philosophy the Āgamic texts are considered to be the chief authority by the Jaina system of philosophy; as for the remaining texts their authoritative character consists only insofar as they follow the Āgama. And the heritage of this Āgamic knowledge—a heritage till then transmitted by way of a historically developed tradition—Vācaka Umāsvāti had received in a proper manner; hence his knowledge of all the Āgamic topics was clear and systematic.

1. See the Introduction by Shri Nathurāmji to the Hindi translation of *Tattvārtha bhāṣya*.

(ii) The* Sanskrit language

Since he used to tour in the regions of Kāsī, Magadha, Bihar etc.—also perhaps since he belonged to the Brahmin caste—Vācaka Umāsvāti had made a thorough study of Sanskrit which was the chief language of his time. As a result of the door of Sanskrit language—besides that of Prākṛit language—having been opened for him he gained an opportunity to study the Vedicist and Buddhist philosophical systems; and making a meaningful use of this opportunity he well augmented his stock of learning.

(iii) The Influence of the Other Systems of Philosophy

As a result of gaining entrance into the Vedicist and Buddhist philosophical literature he got acquainted with ever newer contemporary writings—from which he came to learn of new subject-matters and new modes of thought; all this exerted a deep influence on him, and this influence inspired him to compose a text in a concise aphorist style and in Sanskrit language—a style and a language till then unknown to the Jaina literature.

(iv) Genius

Even if the just mentioned three causes were operative but he was devoid of genius, then *Tattvārtha* could not have come into existence in its present form. So it will not do not to include his genius too—just like the just mentioned three causes—in the material that served as his source of inspiration.

(b) The Purpose of Composition

Whenever an Indian theoretician composes a text dealing with his subject-matter he presents *mokṣa* as the ultimate aim to be served by his treatment of the subject-matter concerned—be this subject-matter something pertaining to things material like economics, erotics, astronomy, medicine or something pertaining to things spiritual like philosophy or yoga. So in the case of the theoretical texts dealing with any of the chief subject-matters

mokṣa has been declared, at the very beginning, as the ultimate aim to be served by the discipline concerned; and at the end too it is asserted that the discipline concerned is ultimately aimed at *mokṣa*.

Kaṇāda, the author of Vaiśeṣikadarśana, before undertaking his treatment of the world of cognisibles, first avers that this branch of learning is a means of *mokṣa* and then takes it up.¹ Similarly Gautama, the aphorist (lit. stage-manager) of Nyāyadarśana, only after submitting that a knowledge of the means of valid cognition is the pathway to *mokṣa*, takes up the treatment of these means.² The systematizer of Sāṅkhyadarśana too undertakes a treatment of his cosmogony by way of supplying knowledge that serves as a means of *mokṣa*.³ Similarly, the account of the *Brahman* and the world in *Brahma-mīmāṃsā* is there by way of supplying a means of *mokṣa*. In *Yogadarśana* the account of the yoga-procedure as also that of some incidental matters is there exclusively by way of serving the aim that is *mokṣa*. Similarly, the theoretical texts of those adhering to the path of *bhakti* (= devotion)—texts undertaking a treatment of the topics like soul, world, God etc.—are aimed at nourishing *bhakti* and thereby ultimately bringing about the attainment of *mokṣa*. The treatment of things material as well things spiritual finding place in the doctrine of momentarism or that of four noble truths pertaining to the Buddhist system of philosophy is aimed at nothing save *mokṣa*. The theoretical texts of the Jaina system of philosophy too have been composed adopting this very procedure. Thus Vācaka Umāsvāti too, having presented forth *mokṣa* as the ultimate aim, undertakes in his *Tattvārtha* a treatment of the totality of certain particular selected topics just by way of supplying a means for this very aim.⁴

1. See *Kaṇādasūtra*, 1.1.4

2. *Nyāyadarśana* 1.1.1.

3. See *Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā*, *kārikā* 2.

4. Vācaka Umāsvāti's plan for composing *Tattvārtha* seems to have been indebted to the chapter 28 of *Uttarādhyaṇa*. The title of

(c) The Style of Composition

Since early days the style of composition of the Jaina Āgāmas—like that of the Buddhist Piṭakas—was that of long descriptive sūtras; and the language it adopted was Prakrit. On the other hand, the style of composition of the form of brief sūtras initiated by the Brahmin scholar in Sanskrit language gradually became extremely well established; Vācaka Umāsvāti was attracted by this style and was inspired to write adopting the same. So far as our knowledge goes Umāsvāti is the first in the Jaina tradition to have composed brief sūtras in Sanskrit; after him, such a sūtra-style became extremely well established in the Jaina tradition and the scholars belonging to both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects composed adopting this style and in Sanskrit language works on so many topics like grammar, rhetorics, ethics, polity, logic etc.

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha* aphorisms are divided into ten chapters like Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika aphorisms; the number of aphorisms with him is 344 while that of Kaṇāda's aphorisms is 333. These chapters are not sub-divided into *Āhnikas* as are aphorisms of Vaiśeṣika etc. and they are not sub-divided into *pādas* as are Brahmasūtras etc. The tradition of writing *adhyāyas*

this chapter is '*Mokṣamārga*' (=the pathway to mokṣa)"; and in it there occurs an indication of the pathways to *mokṣa* followed by a very brief account of Jaina philosophy in the form of the specific subject-matter, of those pathways. This very subject-matter has been expanded by Vācaka Umāsvāti who in this connection systematically compiled the topics treated in the totality of Āgamic texts. In the very beginning of his text of aphorisms there occurs the aphorism laying down the pathways to *mokṣa*. And in the Digambara tradition *Tattvārtha* is extremely well-known under the title '*Mokṣa Śāstra*' (=the treatise on *mokṣa*). In the Buddhist tradition there is a very famous text *Visuddhimārga* which was composed near about the 5th century by Buddhaghosa in Pāli and which contains the essence of the totality of Pāli Piṭakas; a work preceding it and named *Vimuktimārga* too was there in the Buddhist tradition and it is available to-day in its Chinese version. Both *Visuddhimārga* and *Vimuktimārga* are a synonym for *mokṣamārga* (all meaning 'pathway to *mokṣa*').

instead of *adhyayanas* too was initiated in the Jaina literature by none but Umāsvāti. And the division into *Āhnikas* and *pādas*—a division not initiated by him—was also initiated by his followers like Akalaṅka etc. However, even while particularly akin to *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* as regards its external construction *Tattvārtha-sūtra* also exhibits a noteworthy difference—such as throws light on the traditional mentality that has found expression in the Jaina system of philosophy. Thus Kaṇāda, having put forward his thesis in the aphorisms, does not—as does Akṣapāda Gautama—prove his case by speaking of a *prima facie* view and the corresponding final view and yet often enough he does offer reasons by way of substantiating those theses of his; on the other hand, Vācaka Umāsvāti nowhere offers an argument, illustration or reason by way of proving even a single one of his theses. He rather goes on describing—as does Patañjali, the author of *Yogasūtra*—his view in the form of a finally established thesis without offering an argument or reason and without speaking of a *prima facie* view and the corresponding final view. On comparing the aphorisms of Umāsvāti with those of the Vedicist systems of philosophy an impression is left on the mind—viz. that the Jaina tradition chiefly relies on faith and literally accepting a statement made by the personage believed by it to be omniscient, it sees no occasion to resolve a doubt raised in this connection. The result is that so many intelligible topics capable of revision, supplementation or development remained undiscussed even in the age of Logic and are yet intact on the basis of faith alone.¹

1. Of course, it cannot be denied that the development of Logic and logical discussion undertaken by so many profound logicians like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra etc. occupied a prominent place in the development of Indian thought; so the assertion made above has to be understood from the stand-point of the predominant and the subordinate and from that of a difference of outlook. If that is to be grasped with the help of a few illustrations then compare the *Tattvārthasūtras* with *Upaniṣads* etc. The commentators of *Tattvārtha*—even when they are profound logicians and are divided into different sects—undertake a treatment and employ the power of logic only with a view to elucidating or supporting earlier established Jaina thesis.

On the other hand, the Vedicist philosophical tradition, chiefly relying on intellect, examines the theses upheld by itself; it undertakes discussion with a view to resolving some doubt that has been raised and too often it so happens that on the basis of logical reasoning the earlier accepted theses are thrown overboard and new ones established instead or the former are subjected to revision and supplementation. The sum and substance of the whole matter is that the Jaina tradition has not taken as much part in new creation as in keeping intact the traditionally inherited views on the questions of philosophy and ethics.

(d) The Treatment of Subject-matter

(i) *The Choice of the Subject-matter*

In so many systems of philosophy the subject-matter is chiefly an investigation into the sphere of cognisables; this for example in the Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta systems of philosophy. Thus the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy while offering from its own standpoint an account of the world, tells us as to how many chief substances there are in the world, what they are, how many and what are the other entities standing related to these substances etc.—in this manner chiefly undertaking an investigation into the cognisables pertaining to the world. And the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, too, through its account of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, chiefly undertakes an investigation

None of these commentators created a new thought or introduced a difference in the essential understanding of the Śvetāmbara or Digambara sect. On the other hand, the commentators of *Upaniṣads*, *Gītā* and *Brahmasūtra* undertake so much independent discussion based on the power of logic that they have become polar opposites of each other so far as it concerns an essential understanding of the matter. What is the merit and what the defect of this state of affairs—that is not our present concern; for just now we are only interested in presenting the state of affairs as it obtains. So far as merits and defects are concerned they can well be present in both the traditions and they can also well be absent in both.

into the basic cognisable verities pertaining to the world. Similarly, the Vedantic system of philosophy chiefly offers an investigation into the verity *Brahman* lying at the basis of the world. However, in certain other systems of philosophy the chief thing is an investigation into conduct; this for example in the Yoga and Buddhist Systems of philosophy. Thus what is purity of life ? How to realize it ? what are the obstacles standing in the way—these and similar questions pertaining to life have been answered by the yoga system of philosophy through its account of the four *vyūhas*—viz. what is worthy of rejection (i. e. misery), the cause of what is worthy of rejection (i. e. the cause of misery), rejection (i. e. the *mokṣa*), the means of rejection (i. e. the cause of *mokṣa*)—and by the Buddhist system of philosophy through its account of the four noble truths. That is to say, the former class of philosophical systems has got for its subject-matter an investigation into the cognisable verities, the latter class an investigation into conduct.

Lord Mahāvīra has, in his investigation, provided equal room for the cognisable verities and conduct; so his investigation into verities, through an account of *jīva* (=soul) and *ajīva* (=not-soul), describes the nature of the world while on the other hand, through an account of the verities *āśrava* (=inflow), *śamvara* (=protection) etc., it demonstrates the nature of conduct. This his investigation into verities amounts to an equally emphasized consideration of the cognisables and conduct. In connection with this investigation the Lord has presented forth nine verities and an unshakable faith in the same has been described by him as the first condition of being a Jaina. Thus whether a world-renouncer or a house-holder a person can be treated as a true follower of Mahāvīra's path only in case he is possessed at least of a faith in these nine verities—if not also of an adequate knowledge regarding the same; that is to say, this person must be possessed of an inclination to the effect 'whatever verities have been described by the Jina—they alone are true verities.' That is why the Jaina system of philosophy attaches to nothing whatsoever as much weight as it does to the

nine verities in question. It is on account of this very consideration that Vācaka Umāsvāti chose these nine verities as the subject-matter of his present text and reducing their number to seven he offered an account of them in his aphorisms—to which he gave the meaningful title *Tattvārthādhigama*. In an investigation of these nine verities Umāsvāti found a synthesis of both the above classes of philosophical systems—i. e. of the class laying emphasis on the cognisables and that laying emphasis on conduct. Even then he realized the utility of undertaking an investigation into the means of valid cognition—an investigation particularly current in his times. So with a view to making his text full with all the investigations that were likely to draw attention he incorporated within the body of his own aphorisms in the form of his subject-matter besides an investigation into those nine verities an investigation into cognition—thus making it clear as to what that Jaina investigation into cognition was which was to replace the Nyāya investigation into the means of valid cognition. Thus taken as a whole, the subject-matter chosen for his aphorisms by Vācaka Umāsvāti is an investigation—undertaken from the Jaina standpoint—into cognition, the cognisables as well as conduct.

The classification of the subject-matter

The subject-matter chosen by Umāsvāti has been divided by him into his ten chapters as follows :

(i) The chapter one is devoted to an investigation into cognition;

(ii) The next four chapters—i. e. the chapters two to five are devoted to an investigation into the cognisables; and

(iii) The last five chapters—i. e. the chapters six to ten—are devoted to an investigation into conduct. In the following we take up these three investigations one by one, in each case first giving its essential points and then comparing it with the corresponding of the other systems of philosophy.

The essential points of the investigation-into-cognition

In the chapter one there are eight chief points related to cognition and they are as follows :

- (1) The classification of cognition into *naya* and *pramāṇa*;
- (2) The five types of cognition *mati* etc. well known from the *Āgama* and their classification into two types of *pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*;
- (3) The causes of origination in the case of *mati-jñāna*, its types and sub-types, and the classification indicative of the order of their origination;
- (4) The description in the form of *śruta-jñāna* of the *Āgamic*-texts considered to be authoritative in the Jain tradition;
- (5) The three types of divine (=extra-ordinary) perception, their types and sub-types, and their mutual difference;
- (6) The indication of the object of these five types of *jñāna* with a view to laying down the mutual relativity of their extent; the simultaneous possibility of these different types of *jñāna*;
- (7) The position that certain types of *jñāna* can possibly be mistaken, and the causes responsible for the truth and falsity of a piece of *jñāna*;
- (8) The types and sub-types of *Naya*.

Points of Comparison

The treatment of *jñāna* found in the present investigation into—*jñāna* is not of that logical and philosophical style which is characteristic of the corresponding treatment found in the *Jñānādhikāra* of *Pravacanasāra*.

It is rather akin to the treatment found in *Nandīsūtra*—a treatment which, being of the *Āgamic* style, simply describes all the types and sub-types of *jñāna* and their respective objects while also drawing the dividing line between *jñāna* and *a-jñāna*.

The order of origination of the ordinary types of *jñāna*

āvagraha, *ihā* etc.¹ indicated here reminds of the process of *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka jñāna* described in the *Nyāyasūtra*² and the process of origination of *jñāna* described in the Buddhist *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaho*.³ And its account of the three types of divine perception *avadhi* etc.⁴ reminds of the *jñāna* characteristic of a *siddha*, a *yogin* and God that is found described in the Vedicist⁵ and Buddhist systems. Its account of *manahparyāya*—a type of divine perception—reminds of the *paracittajñāna* (=knowledge of another person's mind) that is found described in the Yoga⁶ and Buddhist⁷ systems. Its twofold classification of *pramāṇa* into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*⁸ is a synthesis of the two-fold classification of the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist systems⁹, the threefold classification of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems,¹⁰ the four-fold classification of the Nyāya system¹¹, the sixfold classification of the Mīmāṃsa system¹², etc. etc. The distinguishing between *jñāna* and *a-jñāna* in this investigation-into-*jñāna*¹³ is akin to that between *yathārtha* and *ayathārtha buddhi* in the Nyāya system¹⁴ and that between *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya* in the Yoga system.¹⁵

1. 1.15-16.
2. See *Muktāvali Kārikās*, 52 ff.
3. See *pariccheda* 4, paras 88 ff.
4. 1.21-26, 30.
5. *Praśastapāda-Kandalī*, p. 187.
6. 3, 19.
7. *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho pariccheda* 9, para 24 and Nāgārjuna's *Dharmasaṅgraha*, p. 4,
8. 1.10-12.
9. *Praśastapāda-Kandalī*, p. 213, line 12 and *Nyāyabindu* 1.2.
10. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā*, *kārikā* 4 and *Yogadarśana*, 1.7.
11. 1.1.3
12. Śabara's *bhāṣya*, 1.5.
13. 1.33.
14. *Tarkasaṅgraha-buddhinirūpaṇa*,
15. *Yogasūtra*, 1.6.

A clear account of Naya as is found in it¹ is not found in any other system. In brief we can say that in the present investigation-into-cognition Vācaka Umāsvāti has demonstrated in details as to what is the Jaina system's substitute for the investigation-into-*pramāṇa* found undertaken in the Vedicist and Buddhist systems.

The essential points of the investigation-into-the-cognisables

The investigation-into-the-cognisables contains an account of the two basic verities of the world—viz. *jīva* (=soul) and *ajīva* (=not soul). Of these, the verity *jīva* alone is found treated in these two to four chapters—i. e. in three chapters in all. In the chapter two we find besides an account of the general nature of the verity *jīva* an account of its types and sub-types as also numerous allied matters. In the chapter three there is an account of the hellish beings residing in the lower *loka*-region and that of the human beings, animals and birds residing in the middle *loka*-region—it thus yielding besides multifarious information regarding these species of living beings also a complete geographical account of the neither world and the world of human beings. In the chapter four there is an account of the species of heavenly beings—it thus yielding besides an astronomical account—an account of the heavenly quarters and the prosperity characteristic of them. In the chapter five there is an account of the general nature of substances through describing the qualities and properties characteristic of this substance and that—at the same time there being presented a detailed treatment of all the substances by way of pointing out their similarities and dissimilarities.

This investigation-into-the-cognisables covers sixteen points and as follows—

Chapter two :

1. The nature of the verity *jīva*;

1. 1. 34, 35.

2. The types of worldly *jīvas*;
3. The types and sub-types of sense-organs, their names, their respective objects, and the distribution of sense-organs among the mass of *jīvas*;
4. The state intervening in between death and a new birth;
5. The types of births and birth-places and their distribution among the various species of living beings;
6. The types of bodies, their relative superiority and inferiority, their respective possessors, and the possibility of their simultaneous presence;
7. The distribution of sexual characteristics among the species of living beings, and the mention of those enjoying such a life-quantum as is incapable of being interrupted in the middle.

Chapters three and four :

8. The sub-regions of the lower *loka*-region, and the general condition, life-extent etc. of the hellish beings residing in it.
9. A geographical account of the middle *loka*-region by way of describing the oceans, continents, mountains, continental sub-regions etc., and a mention of the life-extent of the human beings, animals, birds etc. residing in it.
10. The different species of the heavenly beings, their entourage, the gradation of the pleasures enjoyed by them, their prosperity, their life-extent, and an astronomical account by way of describing the heavenly bodies.

Chapter five :

11. The types of substances, their mutual similarities and dissimilarities, their area of occupation, their respective functions;
12. The nature of *pudgala* (=matter), its types, and the causes of their origination;
13. A reasoned account of the nature of what is real and

what is unreal;

14. The capacity and incapacity for *paudgalika* combination;

15. The definition of substance in general, the view held by some that *kāla* (=time) is a substance, and the nature of *kāla* according to these some;

16. The definitions of quality and transformation, and the types of transformations.

Points of comparison

Of the above points many are covered in the Āgamic and monographic texts; however, in those texts—unlike in the present one—they are not found briefly compiled and at the one place but lie scattered here and there. The *jñeyādhikāra* of *Pravacanasāra* and the *dravyādhikāra* of *Pañcāṣṭikāya* have got the same subject-matter as the chapter five as above described, but their treatment of the same is different from that of the present text. Thus in *Pañcāṣṭikāya* and *Pravacanasāra* there is a development of the logical mode of argumentation while the present chapter five merely has a brief and simple description.

The above given essential points of the chapters two, three and four—nothing akin to them is found in so continuous, systematic and comprehensive a manner in any of the original philosophical aphoristic texts of the Brahmins or Buddhists. Nevertheless, the account given by Bādarāyaṇa in chapters three and four of *Brahmasūtra*¹ is in many respects comparable to what has been said in the present chapters two, three and four; for the former chapters contain an account of the post-mortem state, of transmigration, of the different species of living beings, of the different world-regions.

In the present chapter two *upayoga* is presented as the definition of *jīva*² and it is nothing different from *jñāna* or *cait-*

1. See *Hind-Tattvajñānana Itihāsa*, p. 162, ff.

2. 2.8.

anya which is presented as such a definition by all the philosophical systems positing soul. And though the account of sense-organs offered in the present chapter two¹ is apparently different from that offered by the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems, the types of sense-organs posited by it, their nature and their respective objects are all almost literally the same as found in these latter systems.² Similarly the account offered by the Vaiśeṣika system of the earth-made, water-made, fire-made, and air-made bodies³ and the account offered by the Sāṅkhya system of the subtle and gross bodies⁴ though apparently different from the account of bodies offered in *Tattvārtha*,⁵ are in fact indicative of the different aspects of one and the same experience. Lastly the account offered in *Tattvārtha*⁶ of the life-quantum capable of being interrupted in the middle and that not thus capable, and the reasoning advanced by it in this connection are literally similar to those found in *Yoga-sūtra*⁷ and its *bhāṣya*. And though the geographical information contained in the present chapters three and four is not touched upon by the aphorist of any other philosophical system, yet we have in the *bhāṣya* to *Yoga-sūtra* 3.26 a detailed account of the hellish-grounds, the elements water, air, *ākāśa* etc. supporting these grounds, the hellish beings residing in those grounds, the middle *loka*-region, the mountains Meru, Niṣadha, Nīla etc., the world-regions Bharata, Ilāvṛta etc., the continents and ocean like Jambūdvīpa, Lavaṇasamudra etc., the various heavens belonging to the upper *loka*-region, the species of heavenly beings residing in those heavens, the life-extent of these heavenly beings, their means of enjoyment like women, entourage etc., their manner of living—an account which

1. 2.15-21.

2. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1,1.12 and 14.

3. See *Tarkasaṅgraha*, the account of earth, water, fire air.

4. *Sāṅkhya kārikās*, *kārikās* 40-42.

5. 2.37-49.

6. 2.52.

7. 3.22; for details, see the present Introduction, pp. 23-29.

however appears to be less extensive than the description of the three *loka*-regions found in the chapters three and four of *Tattvārtha*. Similarly, the account offered by the various Buddhist texts¹ of the continents, oceans, nether-worldly regions, cold and hot hells, and the various heavenly beings—that too is brief as compared to the description of the three *loka*-regions found in *Tattvārtha*. Nevertheless, the verbal similarity and the similarity of thought-process exhibited by these different accounts inspire one to seek for the common root of the different branches of the Āryan philosophical systems.²

The chapter five, in respect of its style and technical terminology, exhibits greater similarity with the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya systems than with any other. Its doctrine of six *dravyas* reminds of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the six *padārtha*³. The style that consists of exhibiting similarities and dissimilarities—a style employed here—seems to be a reflection of *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.⁴ Again, though the two substances *dharmāsti-kāya* and *adharmāsti-kāya*⁵ have not been posited by any other system-builder and though the nature of soul posited by the Jaina system⁶, too, is different from that posited by all others, yet so many things said here in connection with the doctrine of soul and that of *puḍgala* exhibit much similarity with the systems like Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya etc. Like

1. *Dharmasaṅgraha*, pp. 29.31 and *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, *pariccheda* 5, *paras* 3 ff.

2. In his Introduction to Śrutasāgara's commentary on *Tattvārtha* Pt. Mahendrakumāra has quoted a detailed account of *Loka* culled from the different Buddhist and Vedicist texts, an account worthy of perusal on the the part of those interested in the ancient geography and astronomy.

3. 1.1.4.

4. *Prāśastapāda*, p. 16 onwards.

5. 5.1 and 5.17; for details see *Jaina Sāhitya Samśodhaka*, Volume III, nos. 1 and 4.

6. *Tattvārtha*, 5.15-16.

the Jaina, system¹ the systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika,² Sāṅkhya³ etc. too posit a plurality of souls. The Jaina system's doctrine of *pudgala*⁴ gives the impression of being a synthesis of the Vaiśeṣika system's doctrine of atom⁵ and the Sāṅkhya system's doctrine of *prakṛti*;⁶ for it combines the features of the doctrine of *ārambha* (=new creation) as well as the doctrine of *pariṇāma* (=transformation). On the one hand *Tattvārtha* refers to a sectional view according to which *kāla* is a substance while on the other it mentions features which on this view characterize *kāla*⁷—noticing which both one is tempted to surmise that the systematizers of Jaina philosophy were clearly influenced by the Vaiśeṣika⁸ as well as Sāṅkhya views as to the substantial character of *kāla*; for on the Vaiśeṣika system's view *kāla* is an independent substance while on the Sāṅkhya system's view it is not. The two views indicated in *Tattvārtha* as to an independent existence or otherwise of *kāla*—views which were later on respectively upheld by the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects⁹—were there in the Jaina system from the very beginning or they found room there at some later date as a result of the thought-struggle going on between the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya systems—this question is worthy of investigation. However, one thing is as clear as daylight—viz. that the account of the features of *kāla* found in the original *Tattvārtha* and commentaries¹⁰ is literally similar to

1. *Tattvārtha* 5.2.

2. "vyavasthāto nānā", 3.2.20.

3. *Puruṣabāhutvaṃ siddham*—*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 18.

4. *Tattvārtha*, 5. 23. 28.

5. See *Tarkasaṅgraha*, the account of the elements earth etc.

6. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, *kārikās* 22 ff.

7. 5. 22.

8. 2.2.6.

9. See the account of *Pravacansāra*, and *Pañcāṣṭikāya*, and *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 5.39.

10. See *Bhāṣya-vṛtti*, 5.22, and the present Introduction, p. 26.

that found in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. As for the *Tattvārtha* definition of what is real and what is eternal, if it exhibits similarity with any system of philosophy it is with the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems; for the account of what is *pariṇāmi-nitya* (=eternal amidst transformations) that is found in these systems is literally similar to the account of what is real and what is eternal that is found in *Tattvārtha*. The capacity for originating the substances attributed to atoms by the *Vaiśeṣika* system¹ is altogether different from the capacity for *paudgalika* combination—that is, for originating the substances—described in *Tattvārtha*². The *Tattvārtha* definition of *dravya* and *guṇa*³ is much similar to the corresponding, definition offered by the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*.⁴ The definitions of *pariṇāma* offered by *Tattvārtha* on the one hand and the Sāṅkhya Yoga system on the other are pretty similar. The *Tattvārtha* demarcation of a *sat* (lit. real) entity as being of the form of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* reminds the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *sat* and *pariṇāma* as also of the *Vaiśeṣika* tendency to treat *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* as the chief types of *sat*.

The Essential Points of the Investigation-into-conduct

What tendencies observable in life are worthy of rejection, what is the basic root of such tendencies, what consequences are reaped in life by those nurturing such tendencies, if the renunciation of such tendencies is at all possible then what are the means for the same, in place of such tendencies what positive ones are to be introduced in life and what consequence is produced—gradually and in the end—by these latter tendencies—all these considerations are present there in the investigation-into-conduct occurring in the chapters six to ten. Since these considerations are couched in an altogether unique technical terminology and follow a sectarian style it outwardly appears as

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1. *Prāśastapāda*, the account of air, p. 48.
 2. 5.32.35.
 3. 5. 37 and 40.
 4. The present Introduction, pp. 25 and 26.

if they have no similarity whatsoever with the views of any other system, but those making a minute study of the Buddhist and Yoga systems cannot help noticing that the Jaina investigation-into-conduct exhibits a maximum and surprising similarity with the corresponding views of 'these two systems characterized by an emphasis on the problems of conduct. This similarity conveys an idea of the common ethical heritage of the Āryan community—a heritage divided into different branches, organized around different technical terminologies, and more or less developed within the fold of the branches in question.

There are eleven chief points related to this investigation-into-conduct and they are as follows :

Chapter six :

(1) The nature of *āsrava* (=karmic inflow), its types, and an account of what karmas are bound down as a result of succumbing to what *āsrva*.

Chapter seven :

(2) The nature of *vrata* (=ethical vow), the gradation among those adopting a *vrata*, and the means for stabilizing a *vrata* that has been adopted;

(3) The nature of defilements like violence etc.;

(4) The possible defilements of a *vrata*;

(5) The nature of donation and the causes for a gradation within it.

Chapter eight :

(6) The basic causes of karmic bondage and the types of karmic bondage.

Chapter nine :

(7) *Samvara* (=protection against karmic inflow), its various means and their types and sub-types;

(8) *Nirjarā* (=cleansing-off of the accumulated karmas)

and its means;

(9) The spiritual realizers with different degrees of competence and the gradation of these degrees;

Chapter ten :

(10) The causes of *kevala-jñāna* (=all-comprehensive cognition) and the nature of *mokṣa* (=emancipation);

(11) An account of what is the destination of an emancipated soul and how it proceeds towards it.

Points of Comparison

The *Tattvārtha* investigation-into-conduct is different from the account of conduct found in *Pravacanasāra*. For this latter text—unlike *Tattvārtha*—does not undertake a treatment of the verities like *āsrava*, *saṁvara* etc.; it rather offers an account of the life-situation of a monk and that too in such a way as particularly suits a Digambara monk. On the other hand, *Pañcāṣṭikāya* and *Samayasāra* undertake an investigation into conduct on the basis of the verities like *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *bandha* etc.—as is done in *Tattvārtha*. However, these two investigations, too, differ from one another. Thus in the *Tattvārtha* account there emerges a picture that has been drawn from the practical rather than definitive standpoint; hence here there are said all things connected with the verities in question and here there are described such rules and regulations of conduct as are appropriately meant for a renunciation-minded house-holder and a monk—this being indicative of the actual organizational situation of the Jaina order. On the other hand, *Pañcāṣṭikāya* and *Samayasāra* do nothing of the sort; for they merely offer a treatment of the verities like *āsrava*, *saṁvara* etc. that has been undertaken from the definitive standpoint and is full of demonstrative reasoning—thus unlike in *Tattvārtha* here there being no description of the current vows of a house-holder and of those of a monk.

The comparison of the present investigation-into-conduct

with *Yoga-sūtra* is as much interesting as it is wide in scope. However, a detailed such comparison, since it is a fit subject-matter for an independent essay, is not in place here. Even then, with a view to drawing the attention of the specialists and with faith in their own power of drawing comparison we are giving below a catalogue of essential points that are worthy of comparison.

Tattvārtha-sūtra

(1) *Āsrava* (=karmic inflow) pertaining to body, speech and *manas*. (6.1)

(2) Mental *āsrava*. (8.1)

(3) The two types of *āsrava*—that possessed of *kaṣāya* (=passion) and that devoid of it. (6.5)

(4) The auspicious and inauspicious *āsrava* productive of pleasure and pain. (6.3-4)

(5) The five causes of bondage—viz. *mithyādarśana* (=false faith) etc. (8.1)

(6) *Mithyādarśana* being the chief of the above five.

(7) The peculiar association of a soul and karmas—that is bondage. (8.2-3)

(8) Bondage is the cause of the auspicious and inauspicious fruit-of-karma—that is to be got rid of it.

Yoga-sūtra

(1) *Karmāśaya* (=the accumulated stock of karmic impressions). (2.12)

(2) The modes of *citta* supposed to be the object of suppression. (1.6)

(3) The two types of *karmāśaya*—that possessed of *kleśa* (affliction) and that devoid of it. (2.12)

(4) The auspicious and inauspicious *karmāśaya* productive of pleasure and pain. (2.14)

(5) The five *kleśas* productive of bondage—viz. *avidyā* (=nescience) etc. (2.3)

(6) *Avidyā* being the chief of the above five. (2.4)

(7) The peculiar association of a *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*—that is bondage. (2.17)

(8) The association of a *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is the cause of misery—that is to be got rid of. (2.17)

(9) The beginningless bondage depends upon *mith-yādarśana*.

(10) In the case of a karma the basis of bondage-in-respect-of-intensity-of-fruit is *kaṣāya*. (6.5)

(11) The cessation of *āsrava*—that is *saṁvara* (=protection). (9.1)

(12) *Gupti*, *saṁiti* etc. and the various penances etc.—these are the means of *saṁvara*. (9.2.3)

(13) The great *vratas* (=vows) like non-violence etc. (7.1)

(14) Having noted the this-worldly and other-worldly dangers following from the acts like violence etc. to desist from such acts. (7.4)

(15) Renouncing the defilements like violence etc. by reflecting that they are of the form of but misery. (7.5)

(16) The four reflections *maitrī* (=friendliness) etc. (7.6)

(17) The four sub-types of the *śukla* type of *dhyāna*—viz. *prthaktva-vitarka-savicāra, ekātva-vitarka-nirvicāra* etc. (9.41-46)

(9) The beginningless association depends on *avidyā*. (2.24)

(10) In the karmas the basis of fruit being yielded is *kleśa*. (2.13)

(11) The suppression of the modes of *citta*—that is *Yoga*. (1.2)

(12) *Yama, niyama* etc. and the constant-practice, dispassion etc.—these are the means of *Yoga*. (11, 2 to 2.29)

(13) The universal *yamas* (=restrains) like non-violence etc. (2.30)

(14) To suppress the reflections pertaining to violence etc. by means of constantly presenting before mind their respective counter-positives. (2.33-34)

(15) In the eyes of the wise the entire *karmāśaya* is of the form of but misery. (2.15)

(16) The four reflections *maitrī* (=friendliness) etc.¹ (1.33)

(17) The four *samprajñāta samādhis*—viz. *savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra, nirvicāra*.² (1.16 and 41-44)

1. In the Buddhist tradition these four reflections are called "*Brahmavihāra*" and are much emphasized.

2. These four types of *dhyāna* are also known to the Buddhist system.

(18) *Nirjarā* and *mokṣa*.
(9.3 and 10.3)

(19) Conduct along with
knowledge is the cause of
nirjarā and *mokṣa*. (1.1)

(20) The superordinary
acquisitions of the form
jāṭismaraṇa (=recollection of
the past birth), the divine
cognition like *avadhi* etc.
cāraṇavidyā (=superordinary
capacity for movement) etc.
(The *bhāṣya* on 1.12 and 10.7)

(21) All-comprehensive
cognition. (10.1)

(22) The four alternative
types of karma—viz. auspicious,
inauspicious, auspicious-cum-
inauspicious neither-auspicious-
nor-inauspicious.

(18) Partial riddance (cess-
ation of bondage) and total
riddance.¹ (2.25)

(19) Discriminatory know-
ledge along with *yoga*-
including-all-its-means is the
means of a total riddance of
misery. (2.26)

(20) The similar sort of
superordinary acquisitions born
of *saṁyama*.² (2.29 and 3.16
ff.)

(21) The emancipatory
knowledge born of discrimin-
ation. (3.54)

(22) The four species of
karma—viz. white, black,
white-cum-black, neither-white-
nor-black. (4.7)

Besides, there are so many things from among which one
is emphasized by one system another by another—the result
being that they have become famous as the respective special
subject-matters or specialities of these systems. Take for example
the doctrine pertaining of karma. The basic doctrines pertaining
to karma are of course present there in the Buddhist and Yoga

1. In the Buddhist tradition the same is called *nirvāṇa* and is
of the form of the third noble truth.

2. In the Buddhist tradition there occur five *abhijñās* in the
place of these. See *Dharmasaṅgraha*. p. 4 and *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*,
pariccheda 9, para 24.

systems; in the Yoga system¹ they are even described in details. Even so, it is in the Jaina system that there has come into existence a detailed and thoroughgoing discipline devoted to these doctrines—something that has not happened in the case of any other system. That is why in the course of his investigation-into-conduct Vācaka Umāsvāti, while offering an account of the karma-doctrine, introduces, though briefly, the entire Karmaśāstra (=the discipline devoted to karmas) of the Jainas.² Likewise though from the standpoint of the essentials the investigation-into-conduct undertaken by the three systems Jaina, Buddhist and Yoga pursues an identical course, yet for certain reasons they are found to differ from one another as to the question of practice. And it is this difference that has assumed the form of the speciality of the adherents of these systems. Thus according to them all right conduct consists of a renunciation of *kleśa* (=affliction) and *kaṣāya* (=passion); but from among the so many possible means for realizing it one lays emphasis on one, another on another. Within the body of the ethical discipline of the Jainas bodily torture seems to dominate,³ within that of the Buddhists emphasis is laid on meditation instead of bodily torture, within that of the mendicants adhering to the Yoga system emphasis is laid on breath-control, purity etc. If bodily torture, meditation and breath-control etc. are properly made use of with a view to realizing right conduct—which is the main thing—then each of them is as important as another; but when these external subsidiaries turn into practical routine and there vanishes from them the aspect of being a means of realizing right conduct—an aspect which is their very soul—then they smack of mutual conflict and then one sect dismisses as useless the conduct recommended by another. Thus in Buddhist literature the Jaina's penance dominated by bodily torture is found condemned before the adherents of Buddhism,⁴ while in the Jaina literature

1. See 2.3-14.

2. *Tattvārtha*, 6-11-26 and 8.4-26.

3. '*dehadukkham mahāphalam*'—*Daśavaikālika*, 8. 27.

4. *Majjhimanikāya*, *sūta* 14.

the Buddhist's ease-loving life and meditation and the mendicant's breath-control, purity etc. are found subjected to ridicule before the adherents of Jainism.¹ In view of this it is but natural that the account of practical life found in the texts devoted to one system's investigation-into-conduct is particularly different from that found in the texts devoted to another system's investigation-into-conduct. That is why in the *Tattvārtha* investigation into conduct we find not a single aphorism on breath-control or purity; and as for meditation though a detailed account of it is given here there does not occur here—as it does in the Buddhist and Yoga systems—an account detailing the practical means necessary for undertaking meditation. Similarly, the type of detailed and thorough-going account of *parīṣaha* (=hardships) and penance that is there in *Tattvārtha* is absent from the Yoga or Buddhist investigation-into-conduct.

Besides, in connection with the investigation-into-conduct one thing is particularly noteworthy—viz. that even while all the three systems in question allow room for knowledge as well as conduct (=practice) the Jaina, treating conduct as the direct means of *mokṣa*, accepts knowledge as but a subsidiary to it while the Buddhist and Yoga, treating knowledge as a direct means of *mokṣa*, accept conduct as but a subsidiary to it. This state of affairs cannot help being noted by one undertaking a minute study of the literature belonging to these three systems as also of the life-practice pursued by the adherents of these systems. In view of this it is but natural that the *Tattvārtha* investigation-into conduct should describe at length the practices aimed at realizing right conduct and the types and subtypes of these practices.

To render the comparison complete it is also necessary to note as to how the systems thus far taken into consideration view *mokṣa* that is the ultimate aim of all investigation-into-conduct. Since the idea of *mokṣa* has arisen out of the idea of getting rid of pain all the systems view *mokṣa* as but a state of absolute

1. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* commentary on 3.4.6. and the original 7.14 ff.

cessation of pain. Now the four systems Nyāya,¹ Vaiśeṣika,² Yoga and Buddhist are of view that besides cessation of pain there is no positive factor whatsoever in *mokṣa*; hence on their view if there at all be present some sort of pleasure in *mokṣa* it cannot be something positive but something just of the form of that cessation of pain itself. On the other hand, the Jaina system—just like the Vedāntā system—maintains that the state of *mokṣa* is not a state of mere cessation of pain but that there is present in *mokṣa* an independent something of the form of a natural pleasure born independently of all object; nay, the Jaina system posits in *mokṣa* not only the manifestation of pleasure but also that of certain other natural qualities like cognition etc., a position not in accord with the line of thinking adopted by the other systems. As for the place where *mokṣa* is to be realized the Jaina view is utterly singular. Since the Buddhist system does not clearly provide room for an independent verity of the form of soul there is altogether no scope for the hope that it should consider the question related to the place where *mokṣa* is to be realized. As for the entire lot of the old Vedicist systems, since they view soul as something ubiquitous they too can in no way conceive of a separate place where *mokṣa* is to be realized. But the Jaina system posits soul in the form of an independent verity and yet does not view soul as something ubiquitous; so it is bound to consider the question as to where *mokṣa* is to be realized and it has actually considered it. Thus towards the close of *Tattvārtha* Vācaka Umāsvāti says, “The emancipated souls, having got rid of each type of body, move upwards ultimately to get seated at the end—part of *loka* and they stay there for ever.”

4. The Commentaries on *Tattvārtha*

In connection with its sectarian commentaries *Tattvārthā-dhigama-sūtra* stands comparison with *Brahmasūtra*. Just as numerous masters holding utterly different views on so many

1. See 1.1.22.

2. See 5.2.18.

question composed commentaries on *Brahmasūtra* and sought to demonstrate their respective views from within it itself and on the basis of the Upaniṣadic texts, similarly, the scholars belonging to both the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects have composed commentaries on *Tattvārtha* and have sought to derive even their mutually conflicting views from within it itself and on the basis of the Āgamic texts. From this consideration just one common point emerges. Thus finding *Brahmasūtra* to be a text of well established repute within the fold of Vedānta literature brilliant masters holding mutually different views felt the necessity of demonstrating their special views basing themselves on *Brahmasūtra* and with the help of this very text; similarly, finding *Tattvārthā-dhigama* to be a text of well established repute within the fold of Jaina literature the scholars of both the sects have felt the necessity of expressing their views basing themselves on this text. However, inspite of this much broad similarity there is one important difference between the sectarian commentaries of *Brahmasūtra* and *Tattvārtha*. Thus as regards the basic topics of philosophy like world, soul, God etc. the famous commentators of *Brahmasūtra* hold very different views and often enough their views seem to be polar opposite of each other; but that is not the case with the commentators of *Tattvārtha* belonging to the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects. For as regards the basic topics of philosophy they exhibit no difference whatsoever and whatever little difference does obtain in this connection pertains to extremely ordinary matters and is not such as excludes compromise—that is, such as obtains between views that are polar opposite of each other. Really speaking, as regards the basic principles of philosophy there has not been at all any particular difference of opinion between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects; hence the difference of opinion, observable in their commentaries on *Tattvārtha*—that too is not counted as much serious.

There are numerous commentaries on *Tattvārtha*—some ancient, some modern, some small, some big, some in Sanskrit, some in local vernaculars. But only four of them that are

presently available are such as are of historical importance, as have taken prominent part in systematizing and developing Jaina philosophy, as are of particular philosophical importance. Of these three belong to the Digambara sect and have been composed by the Digambara scholars at a time when not only the difference-among-sects but also the antagonism-among-sects had already become acute; and the fourth is the auto-commentary by the aphorist Vācaka Ūmāsvāti himself. So it seems proper that first of all some thought be given to these very four commentaries.

(a) The *Bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi*

Before saying anything about the two commentaries *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* it is necessary to consider their respective readings of aphorisms. Though really the reading was just one, yet as a result of a sectarian difference two of them have become current—of which one is known as the Śvetāmbara reading, the other as the Digambara reading. However, the alleged Śvetāmbara reading, since it exactly tallies with the *bhāṣya*, can be designated '*bhāṣya-mānya*' (= one acceptable to the *bhāṣya*) while the alleged Digambara reading since it exactly tallies with *Sarvārthasiddhi*, can be designated '*Sarvārthasiddhi-mānya*' (= one acceptable to *Sarvārthasiddhi*).

And all the Śvetāmbara masters¹ follow the *bhāṣyamānya* reading of aphorisms while all the Digambara masters follow its *Sarvārthasiddhi-mānya* counterpart. In connection with the reading of aphorisms it is necessary to note the following four things : (1) The number of aphorisms; (2) The difference of meaning; (3) The difference as to an alternative reading; (4) The genuineness.

(1) The Number of Aphorisms

The number of aphorisms in the *bhāṣyamānya* reading is 344, that in the *Sarvārthasiddhi-mānya* reading 357.

1. Here Yaśovijayagaṇin forms one exception; see the present Introduction, pp. 63-65.

(2) The difference of Meaning

Though the number of aphorisms is different in the two readings and though at places even the respective verbal constructions are mutually different in them yet there are only three cases where an important difference of meaning obtains between them; (for the rest there obtains no particular difference of meaning even when the readings concerned happen to be mutually different). Of the three cases in question the first pertains to the heavens being sixteen in number (4.19), the second to the independent existence or otherwise of *kāla* (5.38), the third to the inclusion or otherwise of the four karma-types *hāsyā* etc. among the auspicious karma-types (8.26).

(3) The Difference as to an Alternative Reading

Besides the mutual differences obtaining between the two readings-of-aphorisms there are differences as regards the reading of individual aphorisms. If exclusion is made of the alternative readings indicated by the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi*¹, then it can generally be said that no Digambara commentator indicates an alternative reading in relation to *Sarvārthasiddhi-mānya* reading-of-aphorism. So it can be said that at the time of composing *Sarvārthasiddhi* whatever reading of aphorisms Pūjyapāda had before him or whatever improvement and expansion he introduced in it—the same was accepted by all the latter-day Digambara commentators. But that is not the case with the *bhāṣyamānya* reading-of-aphorisms; for though this reading is certainly one in the form of the Śvetāmbara reading it at times presents a *bhāṣya*-sentence in the form of an aphorism, at times presents an aphorism in the form of a *bhāṣya*-sentence, at times presents one aphorism in the form of two aphorisms, at times present two aphorisms in the form of one aphorism—which all can be clearly gathered from the discussion as to an alternative reading of aphorism that is present there in the two presently available commentaries on the *bhāṣya*.²

1. See 2.53.

2. See 2.19, 2.37, 3.11, 5.2-3, 7.3 and 5 etc.

(4) The Genuineness

The question naturally arises as to which of the two readings of aphorisms is genuine and which has undergone a transformation. My own upto-date reflection convinces me that it is the *bhāṣya-mānya* reading of aphorisms that is genuine—or rather it is this reading that is very much closer to the genuine reading than is its *Sarvārthasiddhi-mānya* counterpart.

After so much discussion about the readings of aphorisms it seems necessary to give some thought to the two commentaries first composed on them—viz. the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi*. That the *bhāṣyamānya* reading of aphorisms is genuine or close to genuine and that (as already shown) Vācaka Umāsvāti himself is the author of the *bhāṣya*—on both these questions it is natural for the Digambara masters to keep silent. For all the Digambara masters coming after Pūjyapāda have for the basis of their respective commentaries the very *Sarvārthasiddhi* and the reading-of-aphorisms accepted by it. So if they concede that the *bhāṣya* or the *bhāṣyamānya* reading of aphorism is a composition of Umāsvāti then the reading of aphorisms accepted by Pūjyapāda and his commentary cease to remain fully authoritative. Certainly, in the eyes of the Digambara sect *Sarvārthasiddhi* and the reading of aphorisms accepted by it are an acme of authoritativeness. Hence the present Introduction will remain incomplete if the relative authoritativeness of the *Bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* is not subjected to a searching examination.

Now even if there is no doubt whatsoever as to the *bhāṣya* being a work of the aphorist himself, yet granting for argument's sake that that is not the case one can certainly say without fear of contradiction that the *bhāṣya* is older than *Sarvārthasiddhi* and is the very first commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra*; for it is not sectarian in the manner of *Sarvārthasiddhi*. To grasp this essential point the following three things are being considered below :

- (a) The difference of style;
- (b) The development of meaning;
- (c) Sectarianism.

(a) The Difference of Style

One keeping before himself the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* on one and the same aphorism and studying the two from a comparative standpoint cannot help feeling that the style of the *bhāṣya* is older than that of *Sarvārthasiddhi* and that on each step *Sarvārthasiddhi* betrays a reflection of the *bhāṣya*. So long as no adequate evidence is available to the effect that there was a third commentary different from and older than the two in question, till then those comparing the *bhāṣya* with *Sarvārthasiddhi* cannot help saying that *Sarvārthasiddhi* has been composed with the *bhāṣya* before eyes. Though the style of the *bhāṣya* is lucid and thoughtful, yet it seems doubtless that from the standpoint of philosophical content the style of *Sarvārthasiddhi* is more developed and more learned than that of the *bhāṣya*. The writing in Sanskrit language in general and the philosophical style, cultivated in the Jaina literature in particular had reached a certain level of development by the time *Sarvārthasiddhi* was composed, and that level of development is not observable in the *bhāṣya*; even so, the fact that the language of one of these texts betrays a reflection of that of the other clearly indicates that the *bhāṣya* is older of the two.

For example, the *bhāṣya* on the first aphorism of the chapter one says about the word 'samyak' that it is either a particle or a formation of the verbal root 'añca' with the prefix 'sam' added to it. On the same subject the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi* says : The word 'samyak' is either without an etymology—that is, impartite or it is possessed of an etymology—that is, is formed as a result of the coming together of a verbal root and a suffix; thus when the suffix 'kvip' is added to the verbal root 'añca' then we have 'samyak' in the form of 'sam+añcati'. Of these two styles of accounting for the word 'samyak' that adopted by *Sarvārthasiddhi* is marked by greater clarity than that adopted by the *bhāṣya*. Similarly, by way of offering the etymology of the word 'darśana' the *bhāṣya* only says that the word is a formation of the verbal root 'dṛṣṭi' whereas in *Sarvārthasiddhi* a threefold etymology of the same has been clearly presented. Again, the *bhāṣya* offers no etymology of the

words 'jñāna' and, 'cāritra' whereas in *Sarvārthasiddhi* a threefold etymology of each has been clearly presented and in the end this etymology has been vindicated from the Jaina standpoint. Similarly, the *bhāṣya* contains no discussion of the question as to which of the two words 'jñāna' and 'darśana' should come first in a compound, but this discussion is clearly present in *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Lastly, in the *bhāṣya* on the second aphorism of the chapter one there are only indicated two meanings whereas *Sarvārthasiddhi* offers the rationale of both the meanings while also demonstrating as to how the verbal root 'drsi' is to be taken to mean faith, a topic absent in the *bhāṣya*.

(b) The Development of Meaning¹

Viewed from the standpoint of meaning too *Sarvārthasiddhi* appears to be more modern than the *bhāṣya*. When a topic already occurs in the *bhāṣya* then *Sarvārthasiddhi* presents it in an expanded form—that is, by discussing it in greater details. And the discussions pertaining to grammar as also those pertaining to the other systems of philosophy are not as frequent in the *bhāṣya* as they are in *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Similarly, a brief yet firm elucidation of the Jaina technical terminologies and an analytical exposition of the theses maintained are undertaken in *Sarvārthasiddhi* in a manner whose barest rudiments are visible in the *bhāṣya*. The logical content of *Sarvārthasiddhi* is richer than that of the *bhāṣya* and, unlike the latter, it refers to the views of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins etc. while its refutation of the rival systems is particularly pronounced. All this goes to prove that the *bhāṣya* is older than *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

(c) Sectarianism²

As compared to the just discussed two points that related to sectarianism is more important. Thus *Sarvārthasiddhi* has been

1. For example, compare the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* on 1.2, 1.12, 1.32, 2.1 etc.

2. See the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* on 5.39, 6.13, 8.1, 9.9, 9.11, 10.9 etc.

composed at a time after the acute difference of opinion on the questions related to the verity *kāla*, the food-intake on the part of the *kevalin*, the renunciation of clothes, woman's competence for *mokṣa*, etc. had not only arisen but had also assumed the form of a sectarian dogmatism; on the other hand, this element of sectarian dogmatism is absent in the *bhāṣya*. In connection with all those questions where the Digambara sect comes in conflict with the dogmatized Śvetāmbara sect the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi* has made the sectarian endeavour to derive out of the relevant aphorisms a meaning favourable to the Digambara sect—this even at the cost of altering the wordings of an aphorism or assigning a far-fetched meaning to these workings or introducing in the form of implied insertions untenable insertions from his own side or at any cost, an endeavour absent in the *bhāṣya*. From this it clearly appears that *Sarvārthasiddhi* has been composed after the atmosphere of sectarian conflict had been created while the *bhāṣya* is free from such an atmosphere.

But now the question arises as to why, if the *bhāṣya* was thus an old text, the Digambara sect discarded it. The answer should be that a refutation of the Śvetāmbara views which the author of *Sarvārthasiddhi* was looking for was not there in the *bhāṣya*; not only that, in most cases the *bhāṣya* was not such as should lend support to the dogmatized Digambara sect while in many cases it rather went much against the Digambara sect¹. Hence leaving the *bhāṣya* on one side Pūjyapāda composed an independent commentary on the aphorisms; while doing so he introduced needed improvements and expansions in the reading of aphorisms² and when in the course of commenting he came

1. The *bhāṣya*, on 9.7 and 24 mentions clothes, that on 10.7 mentions *Tīrthakarītūrtha* (=the era of a female *Tīrthāṅkara*'s spiritual overlordship).

2. The question arises as to why those aphorisms were not altogether removed away where a far-fetched meaning had to be assigned to the wording or where—as in the case of one related to *pulāka*—the explanation did not fit the wording. The probable answer is that the concerned reading of aphorisms was extremely well establis-

across a point that involved a difference of opinion he clearly upheld the Digambara position, a performance in connection with which Kundakunda seems to have served as basis for him. In view of this the Digambara sect accepted *Sarvārthasiddhi* as its chief authority while, naturally, the *bhāṣya* remained acceptable, only to the Śvetāmbara sect. No Digambara monk composed a commentary on the *bhāṣya* and so it remained unavailable to the Digambara sect. On the other hand, numerous Śvetāmbara masters have composed commentaries on the *bhāṣya* and even while at places dissenting from the views maintained in it they have treated it as authoritative on the whole; hence it is that in the eyes of the Śvetāmbara sect it is an authoritative text. Even so, we have to remember that the attitude now-a-days taken by the Digambara sect towards the *bhāṣya* was not that of the old Digambara masters. For even the famous Digambara masters like Akalaṅka have, when possible, sought to demonstrate the compatibility of their own view with that of the *bhāṣya*, thus indicating the authoritativeness of this text (See *Rājavārtika*, 5.4.8); moreover, they nowhere refute the *bhāṣya* making an express mention of it or seek to demonstrate its unauthoritativeness.

(b) Two Vārtikas

Even the naming of texts is not an accidental act, for if search be made it too reveals a history of its own. It is taking inspiration from the feeling harboured by the preceeding and contemporary scholars as also from the current of naming-process following in literature that the authors assign names to their texts. Thus the reputation of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on grammar exerted influence on numerous latter-day authors—this we can gather from the name '*bhāṣya*' assigned by them to their works. It is likely that this very influence inspired Vācaka Umāsvāti to assign the name '*bhāṣya*' to his own work. I have memory that in

hed and a removal of aphorisms was open to the charge of unauthoritativeness.

the Buddhist literature there has been a text bearing the name 'Sarvārthasiddhi'—where chronological relationship with the present *Sarvārthasiddhi* is however unknown. But as regards the *Vārtikas* this much is certain that in the Indian literature there once ensued the age of *Vārtikas* and then numerous works bearing the name *Vārtika* were composed within the fold of different sects and on different topics. The influence of the same is observable on the name assigned to the present *Vārtikas* on *Tattvārtha*. Thus Akalaṅka named his commentary '*Tattvārthavārtika*'—which is famous as *Rājavārtika*,¹ And that Vidyānanda's commentary on, *Tattvārtha* is named '*Ślokavārtika*' in imitation of Kumārila's '*Ślokavārtika*' admits of no doubt whatsoever.

Akalaṅka's '*Rājavārtika*' on *Tattvārthasūtra* and Vidyānanda's '*Ślokavārtika*' on the same—both these texts have for their basis the very *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Had Akalaṅka not had *Śarvārthasiddhi* at his disposal his *Rājavārtika* would not have had the excellent form it actually has and had not Vidyānanda had *Rājavārtika* for his basis his *Ślokavārtika* too would not have exhibited the excellence it actually does—this much is certain. Though both *Rājavārtika* and *Ślokavārtika* are indebted to *Sarvārthasiddhi*—either directly or through intermediaries—they are definitely more developed than the latter. Like Uddyotakara's '*Nyāyavārtika*' *Tattvārthavārtika* is in prose while like Kumārila's '*Ślokavārtika*', Dharmakīrti's '*Pramāṇavārtika*' and Sarvajñatmami's '*Śaṅkṣepasārīrakavārtika*' '*Ślokavārtika*' is in verse. As compared to Kumārila, a speciality of Vidyānanda is that he has himself composed also a commentary on his verse-*vārtika*. Though almost the whole of *Sarvārthasiddhi* is incorporated within the body of *Rājavārtika* the latter is possessed of so much novelty and brilliance that even when read side by side with *Sarvārthasiddhi* it gives no impression of being a repetitive performance. Thus all the special sentences taken from *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Pūjyapāda—who was an expert in coining definitions—have been turned into

1. In the Sāṅkhya literature too there was a text named *Rājavārtika*.

Vārtikas by Akalaṅka through analysis and classification; at the same time, he has composed new *Vārtikas* dealing with points worthy of expansion and with similar questions. And to all the prose-*vārtikas* he has himself supplied a lucid explanatory comment. Thus taken as a whole, *Rājavārtika*—even while being of the form of an explanatory comment on *Sarvārthasiddhi*—is in fact an altogether independent text. The level of philosophical expertise observable in *Sarvārthasiddhi* attains a much greater height in *Rājavārtika*. Thus it is a constant practice of *Rājavārtika* that whatever statement dealing with whatever topic it has to make it does on the basis of the doctrine of *anekānta* (=non-extremism). Really, the doctrine of *anekānta* is the very key for each and every discussion undertaken in *Rājavārtika*. Akalaṅka has raised the noble structure of his *Rājavārtika* with a view to refuting the objections raised against and the deficiencies pointed out in the doctrine of *anekānta* by the scholars belonging to the different sects uptil his own time and with a view to presenting forth the true nature of this doctrine—this on the basis of the reputed *Tattvārthasūtra* and with the help of *Sarvārthasiddhi* with its well chiselled definitions. Too much expansion of the Āgamic topics observable in *Sarvārthasiddhi* has been reduced by the author of *Rājavārtika*¹—who on his part has given exclusive prominence to the philosophical topics.

Residing in Southern India Vidyānanda noted that there remained much to be answered in the attacks launched on Jaina philosophy by the numerous non-Jaina scholars—of an earlier time as of his own time; in particular, he could in no way help answering the refutation of Jaina philosophy that had been undertaken by the Mīmāṃsaka Kumarila etc. Hence it is that he composed his *Ślokavārtika*; and we see that he has in fact realized his aim. The refutation of Mīmāṃsa philosophy as has been undertaken—and so strongly—in *Ślokavārtika* is not to be found in any other commentary of *Tattvārtha*. No important topic discussed in *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika* has been left untou-

1. Compare *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika* on 1.7-8.

ched in *Ślokavārtika*; nay, in many cases the *Ślokavārtika* discussion is more extensive than the corresponding performance of *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika*. And the discussion of so many topics is altogether a novelty of *Ślokavārtika*. If the philosophical expertise of *Rājavārtika* is characterized by elaborateness then in *Ślokavārtika* an element of subtlety appears in addition to this element of elaborateness. Certainly, *Rājavārtika* and *Ślokavārtika* are two of those few works belonging to the Jaina literature which are truly important. Among the commentatorial texts related to *Tattvārthasūtra* that we find in the whole Śvetāmbara literature there is not a single one which can stand comparison with *Rājavārtika* or *Ślokavārtika*. The ordinary philosophical expertise observable in the *bhāṣya* becomes somewhat deep in *Sarvārthasiddhi*, it becomes particularly intensified in *Rājavārtika* and gets thoroughly entrenched in *Ślokavārtika*. A historical minded student of *Rājavārtika* and *Ślokavārtika* can easily see that in the Southern India there came a time of philosophical learning and competition and there was developed a multifarious scholarship, a situation which we find mirrored in these two texts. These two *Vārtikas* are an adequate means for an authoritative study of Jaina philosophy; but of these *Rājavārtika*, being in prose, easy and detailed is such as serves whatever need might be served by the entire lot of commentary-texts. Certainly, had these two *Vārtikas* been not composed then the excellence developed and reputation gained by the Digambara literature by the tenth century would have remained incomplete. Even if sectarian in character, these two *Vārtikas* are in many respects such as should occupy a place of prominence in the Indian philosophical literature in general. A perusal of them throws a historical light on so many topics and so many texts pertaining to the Buddhist and Vedicist traditions.

(C) Two Vṛttis

Having got briefly familiarized with the commentaries composed on the original aphorisms it is now time to do the same about the commentaries composed on these commentaries.

Two such sub-commentaries are now available in their entirety and both are Śvetāmbarite. In brief the chief similarity of the two lies in that both take up word by word the *bhāṣya* that is Umāsvāti's own composition and explain the same. And while explaining the *bhāṣya* always to expound the Āgamic matter on the basis of the *bhāṣya* and whenever the *bhāṣya* goes against the Āgama to lend support to the Āgamic tradition in the end—this is the common aim of the two *ṛttis* in question. However, in spite of this much similarity there also obtains one difference between the two. Thus one of them—which is bigger in size—is a work by one single master, while the other—the smaller one—is a joint work of three masters. At the end of the chapters of the bigger *Ṛtti*—about 1800 *śloka*s in extent—we mostly find mention to the effect that it is *bhāṣyānusārīṇī* (=one following the *bhāṣya*); but the smaller *ṛtti* has got at the end of its different chapters mentions that are somehow or other different from one another. Thus at one place (i. e. in the closure of chapter one) we have *Haribhadraviracitāyām* (=in the one composed by Haribhadra), at another place (i. e. at the end of the chapter two, four and five) we have *Haribhadroddhṛāyām* (=in the one recovered by Haribhadra), at a third place (i. e. at the end of chapter six) we have *Haribhadrārabdhāyām* (=in the one begun by Haribhadra), at the fourth place (i. e. at the end of chapter seven) we have 'prārabdhāyām' instead of 'ārabdhāyām'; again at one place (i. e. at the end of chapter six) we have *Yaśobhadrācāryaniryūdhāyām* (=in the one restored by the master Yaśobhadra), at another place (i. e. at the end of chapter ten) we have *Yaśobhadrasūrisiṣyanirvāhitāyām* (=in the one got restored by Yaśobhadrasūri's disciple); and meanwhile at one place (i. e. at the end of chapter eight) we have *taccaivānyakarṭṛkāyām* (=in the same composed by someone else), at another place (i. e. at the end of chapter nine) we have *tasyām evānyakarṭṛkāyām* (=in that itself composed by someone else).

In the view of linguistic style of these mentions and the absence of a proper compatibility among the same one is

compelled to maintain that they are not made by the concerned author himself. Thus had Haribhadra himself composed the closures to his five chapters he would not have employed two words—meaning two things—*viracita* and *uddhṛta*—so that one cannot unambiguously make out whether the portion concerned was a new composition by Haribhadra himself or it represented a recovery—brief or detailed—on his part of one or more old commentaries. Similarly, there is no compatibility among the closures supplied to the chapters composed by Yaśobhadra; thus when there already occurs the phrase ‘*Yaśobhadranirvāhitāyām*’ then further mention of *anyakarṭṛkāyām*’ is either useless or indicative of some other meaning.

In view of all this confusion I am led to surmise that the mentions made at the end of the chapters have been interpolated by one or more copyists at one or different times. And the basis of all these mentions is that verse-cum-prose passage of Yaśobhadra’s disciple which he gives at the beginning of his part of composition.

The surmise that mentions in question are a later interpolation is also supported by the circumstance that the word ‘*dupaḍupikāyām*’ found at the end of the chapters is missing in many cases. Be that as it may, for the present the following points emerge from these mentions :

(1) Haribhadra composed a commentary on *Tattvārtha* which is of the form of a recovery of the earlier or contemporary smaller commentaries—available in their entirety or but in parts; for in this commentary these latter one have been duly incorporated.

(2) The incomplete commentary of Haribhadra was completed by Yaśobhadra and his disciple on the basis of that by Gandhahastin.

(3) This commentary was named—if it was really so named and by the authors concerned—‘*dupaḍupikā*’ possibly because it was composed piecewise and was not a single complete work by some one author. The word *dupaḍupikā* has

not been seen or heard of anywhere else besides here. Maybe it is a corrupt reading, maybe it is a vernacular word.

My first guess was that the word perhaps means boat¹ and a scholar friend of mine too had suggested that it is a corrupt reading for *udūpikā*. (=small boat). However, on further reflection it now appears that that guess and that suggestion are not to the point. And positively, the sentence written by Yaśobhadra's disciple at the end rather gives the impression that this small commentary, since one part of it was composed by one author—another part by another, assumed the form of a *dupaḍupikā*—i. e. a rag in patches—so to say.

As for Siddhasena's *vṛtti*, when it is compared with *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika* then it becomes clearly apparent that it lacks the lucidity of language, the clarity of construction, and the analysis of meaning that are characteristic of these latter texts. For this there are two reasons—viz. the different mental make-up of each different author and the circumstances that one of these texts is a dependent composition. Thus what the authors of *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika* have to say about the aphorisms they say in an independent fashion. On the other hand Siddhasena, since he follows the *bhāṣya* word by word, has to move in a dependent fashion. But in spite of this much difference a perusal of Siddhasena's commentary does indeed leave on the whole two impressions on the reader's mind. Thus firstly the philosophical competence of Siddhasena's commentary is not inferior to that of *Sarvārthasiddhi* and *Rājavārtika*. Certainly, in spite of a difference of style it taken as a whole exhibits the same heritage of the discussion pertaining to the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Buddhist systems as the latter two texts. And secondly, even while undertaking a philosophical and logical discussion in the course of his commentary Siddhasena, like Jinabhadraḡaṇi-Kṣamāśramaṇa in the end powerfully vindicates Āgamic tradition and the vindication gives ample demonstration of his comprehensive study of things Āgamic. From a perusal of

1. The Introduction to my Gujarati *Tattvārthavivaraṇa*, p. 84.

Siddhesena's commentary it appears that by his time numerous commentaries on *Tattvārtha* had been composed. Thus sometimes while explaining the *bhāṣya* on one single aphorism he refers to even five or six alternative views on the question under consideration,¹ a situation that provides ground for the supposition that at the time when Siddhasena composed his commentary he had before him at least five other commentaries on *Tattvārtha*. The developed heritage of ideas as well as language pertaining to the topics of *Tattvārtha* that one finds exhibited in Siddhasena's commentary—from that one well gathers that by the time this commentary—was composed a good amount of literature pertaining to *Tattvārtha* had been composed and been propagated.

(d) An Incomplete Vṛtti

The third *vṛtti* on the *bhāṣya* is by Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya; had this been available in its entirety then it would have served as a model of the development attained by the Indian philosophical science by the 17th-18th centuries—this one feels like saying as one merely goes through that small portion of this commentary which alone is available at present. This portion does not cover even chapter one in its entirety, and in it—as in the just described two commentaries—explanation is offered following the *bhāṣya* word by word; even then the deeply logical treatment of problems, thoroughgoing learning, the application of hidden ideas—these features of it convey a definite idea of the logical proficiency of Yaśovijaya. Had this commentary been composed by him in its entirety then one hesitates to concede that it altogether perished within a space of just 250 years; so the endeavour to be made by way of searching for it should not go waste.

(e) The Ṭippaṇa of Ratnasimha

In *Anekānta*, Vol. 3, Kiraṇa 1 (1939 A. D.) Pt. Jugalkishoreji has introduced a manuscript of *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra*

1. See Siddhasena's commentary on 5.3, p. 321.

along with a *Ṭippaṇa*. From that one gathers that this *Ṭippaṇa* touches upon the original aphorisms alone. The date of the author of the *Ṭippaṇa*—the Śvetāmbara Ratnasimha—is not known but from the language and style of the passages quoted in the introduction in question it appears that he hardly could have flourished before the 16th century. This *Ṭippaṇa* is as yet unpublished and the manuscript consists of eight leaves.

The introduction here given to the few texts pertaining to *Tattvārtha* that are important and worth study—that is only by way of rousing the curiosity of serious students. For as a matter of fact, the introduction to each one of these texts demands an independent essay while a joint introduction to them all demands a big volume which all lies beyond the limit here imposed at present. So content with this much introduction I deem it proper to take leave of the reader.

Sukhlal



APPENDIX

Certain questions related to Umāsvāti and *Tattvārtha* I had placed before Pt. Nathuramji Premi and Pt. Jugalkishoreji Mukhtar. The main part of the answers that I have received from them I am giving below in their own language¹—this along with my own questions. Both these dignitaries are historical-minded among the present-day Digambara scholars and their competence regarding historical matters is of a high grade. So in view of the usefulness of their ideas for a specialist student they are being presented here in the form of an Appendix. What I myself have to say about a certain portion of Pt. Jugalkishoreji's answer I say below under the title 'My Own Understanding' immediately after having presented forth this answer itself :

(a) Questions

(1) Umāsvāti was a direct disciple—or a later descendant—of Kundakunda—a mention to this effect you have so far come across in which oldest text, *paṭṭāvalī*, rock-inscription etc. ? To put it in other words, which text, *paṭṭāvalī* etc. earlier than the 10th century has been so far found to mention Umāsvāti as a direct disciple—or a later descendant—of Kundakunda ?

(2) What according to you is the date of Pūjyapāda ? The Śvetāmbara *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha*—is it or is it not, according to you, a composition of the aphorist himself ? If it is not, what are your important arguments in support of a view like that ?

(3) Has there ever been in the Digambara sect a branch

1. Original letters are in Hīndī language.

named Uccanāgara ? And has there ever been in ancient time a community of monks belonging to the family Vācaka or bearing the title Vācaka ? If there has been such a community where is it found described or mentioned ?

(4) I myself doubt that Umāsvāti, the author of *Tattvārtha*, was a disciple of Kundakunda—for I have not yet come across an old evidence corroborative of a view like that. Whatever evidences are actually with me in this connection are all the later than the 12th century. Hence my question posed above. Let me have whatever broad answer occurs to you.

(5) The well known text *Tattvārtha* is a composition of Umāsvāti, a disciple of Kundakunda—in support of a view like this are there any evidences or mentions older than the 10th century ? If there are what are they ? Is there in the the Digambara literature a mention older than the 10th century which hints or asserts that *Tattvārtha* was composed by Umāsvāti, a disciple of Kundakunda ?

(6) The verse “*Tattvārthasūtra-kartāraṃ gr̥dhrapiṇḍo-
palakṣitam*” etc—where does it occur and how old is it ?

(7) Do the old commentators like Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda etc. anywhere mention Umāsvāti as the author of *Tattvārtha* ? If they do not, why did a view like that become current later on ?

(b) Premiji's Letter

“Received your kind letter dated 6th instant. I do not in the least believe that Umāsvāti was a descendant of Kundakunda. The idea of his being such a descendant originated at a time when the commentaries on *Tattvārtha* like *Sarvārthasiddhi*, *Śloka-vārtika*, *Rājavārtika* etc. had already been composed and the Digambara sect had thoroughly owned this text. No mention made in this connection earlier than the 10th century I have yet come across. I am convinced that hardly any of the great scholar-authors produced by the Digambara sect occupied the post of

headship at a *maṭha* or with a family-of-disciples. But the people who wrote out *gurvāvalis* and *paṭṭāvalis* had their head filled with the idea that whoever is a master or an author must be the head of some family-of-disciples or other. Misled by this mistaken notion they concocted information-registers about all the earlier scholars and turned them into the heads of this or that family-of-disciples. They had no inkling as to when Umāsvāti and Kundakunda had actually flourished, but since both were great masters and were ancient they were brought into relationship with one another and the former made into a disciple of the latter or vice versa. They did not take the trouble of considering the circumstance that Kundakunda was a resident of the village Kundakunda of the Karnataka region while Umāsvāti would tour about in the region of Bihar. Really, any idea of a mutual relationship between the two is well nigh impossible.

The lineage of old masters that is given in the old texts like *Śrutāvatāra*, *Ādipurāṇa*, *Harivaṃśapurāṇa*, *Jambūdvīpaprajñapti* etc. does not at all mention Umāsvāti. *Śrutāvatāra* does mention Kundakunda and there he is said to be a great commentator, but there too we find no mention of Umāsvāti either before or after him. This *Śrutāvatāra* of Indranandin is not particularly old but it appears to be a transformation of some old work and in view of that a statement made by it is to be deemed authoritative. *Darśanasāra* is a work of 990 A. V. and it mentions Padmanandin or Kundakunda but not Umāsvāti. By the time of Jinasena *Rājavārtika* and *Ślokaṇvārtika* had already been composed but he too while eulogising scores of masters and authors makes no mention of Umāsvāti—for he did not treat the latter as belonging to his own tradition. One point more. The authors of *Ādipurāṇa*, *Harivaṃśapurāṇa* etc. do not mention even Kundakunda, a circumstance that is worth consideration.

My own understanding is that Kundakunda was the founder of a particular ideological sub-sect; he sought to shape Jaina religion after the mould of Vedānta. It appears that till the time of Jinasena etc. his standpoint had not won universal

recognition and so he was not held in regard by these authors.

The verse “*Tattvārthasūtrakartāraṃ ṛḍhrāpicchopalakṣitam*” etc. occurs where and how old it is—this I do not know. It is found in the original manuscripts of *Tattvārthasūtra*. At places even Kundakunda has been given out as *ṛḍhrāpiccha*; and another master of the name *ṛḍhrāpiccha* too has been found mentioned. Please also get read out the articles on Kundakunda in *Jainahitaiṣī*, Vol. 10, p 369 and Vol. 15, No. 6.

Please also get read out the Introduction to *Śaṭpāhuḍa*.

Śrutasāgara has completed his commentary on Āśādhara's *Mahābhīṣeka* in 1582 A.V. So he belongs to the 16th century A.V. It is he who is the author of a *Vṛtti* on *Tattvārtha* and a *tīkā* each on *Śaṭpāhuḍa* and *Yaśastilaka*. I know of no other Śrutasāgara.

(c) Mukhtar Jugalkishoreji's Letter

“To your questions a broad answer of some sort I am giving below :

(1) Whatever Digambara *paṭṭāvalis*—different from the *gurvāvalis* given in the texts etc.—that have been available so far appear to have been composed later than the 12th century A.V.—to say this will be correct. Of these which one is the oldest and when it was composed—about this I cannot say anything just now. In most *paṭṭāvalis* there is no mention at all of the date of composition etc. and it too is discovered that in some of them the closing portion or some other portion is a later interpolation.

There are so many rock-inscriptions and eulogies speaking of the relationship between Kundakunda and Umāsvāti but they are not all with me at present. However, I do have the collection of Jaina rock-inscriptions from Śravaṇa-belgola—a collection which is the 28th volume of the *Manikchand Grathamālā*. Here the inscriptions numbering 40, 42, 43, 47, 50, 105 and 108—that is seven of them in all—mention the name of both as also their mutual relationship. Thus the first five employ the phrase ‘*tadanvaye*’ and the last the phrase ‘*vaṃśe tadīye*’ while

mentioning Umāsvāti as a descendant of Kundakunda. The relevant passages have also been quoted in foot-note to 'Svāmīsamantabhadra', p. 158. Of these, the oldest inscription is that numbered 47, it being a composition of the year 1037 of the Śaka era.

(2) The date of Pūjyapāda is the 6th century A.V.; for further details of the matter please see *Svāmīsamantabhadra*, pp. 141-43. As for the Śvetāmbara *bhāṣya* on *Tattvārtha*, I am not yet convinced that it is a composition of the aphorist himself. So many doubts arise in this connection, but I am not just now prepared to mention them all.

(3) I do not yet know whether among the monks of the Digambara sect there has been a branch named Uccanāgara, nor do I know anything particular about the monks belonging to the family named 'Vācaka' or bearing the title 'Vācaka'. But in the text *Jinendrakalyāṇābhyudaya* in the course of its account of 'anvayāvali' the adjective Vācaka has been employed for both Kundakunda and Umāsvāti—as is evident from the following verse occurring there :

*puṣpadanto bhūtabalirjinacandro munīḥ punaḥ /
kundakundamunīndromāsvātivācākāśamjñītau //*

As for the relationship between Kundakunda and Umāsvāti, it has already been referred to in the above para 2. I am yet of the view that Umāsvāti was a close descendant of Kundakunda—not this direct disciple. Maybe he was a grand-disciple of the latter, and the matter has already been taken up by me in *Svāmīsamantabhadra*, pp. 158, 159. Please make a reading of two articles—viz. 'Umāsvātisamaya' and 'Kundakundasamaya'—included in the said history.

(5) I have not come across any mention earlier than the 10th century according to which Umāsvāti was a disciple of Kundakunda.

(6) The verse *Tattvārthasūtrakartāraṃ gr̥dhrāpicchopala-kṣitam* etc. is found at the end of so many manuscripts of

Tattvārthasūtra, but where it first occurs and how old it is—that cannot be made out for the present.

(7) I cannot yet say anything exact about Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka but Vidyānanda has certainly mentioned Umāsvāti as the author of *Tattvārthasūtra*; in *Ślokovārtika grāhṛapiccha* has been given as his alternative name and in the *Āptaparīkṣa*—commentary etc. the name Umāsvāti too is perhaps mentioned.

Here is an answer to both your letters that was just now possible. A detailed consideration should be possible some time later on.”

(d) My Own Understanding

The Digambara master Vidyānanda belonging to the 9th-10th centuries in his auto-commentary on *Āptaparīkṣā* (śloka 116) says ‘*tattvārthasūtrakārair Umāsvamiprabhṛtibhiḥ*’ and the same master in his auto-commentary on *Tattvārthaslokovārtika* (p. 6, line 31) says “*etena grāhṛapicchācāryaparyant-amunisūtreṇa vyabhicāritā nivāritā*”. These two statements indicate that the text named *Tattvārtha* is a composition of Umāsvāti and that Umāsvāti and Grāhṛapicchācārya are one and the same person—this seems to be the view of Pt. Jugalkishoreji. But the view is open to consideration and so it will be proper if I briefly place forth my own understanding of the matter.

In the first statement the adjective *Tattvārthasūtrakāra* (=The author of *Tattvārtha* aphorisms) qualifies the masters like Umāsvāti etc. and not Umāsvāti alone. So if it is understood as Mukhtarji suggests then its net meaning ought to be that the masters like Umāsvāti etc. are an author of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. Now if the word *Tattvārthasūtra* here stands for the text named *Tattvārthādhigama* then the net meaning in question proves to be defective, for the text named *Tattvārthādhigama* is understood to be a composition by just Umāsvāti and not one by the numerous masters like Umāsvāti etc. So the word *Tattvārtha* occurring in the adjective in question should stand not just for the text designated *Tattvārtha* but for the totality of texts expounding the

fundamental principles laid down by the *Jina*. And now the net meaning of the statement in question would be referring to the masters like Umāsvāti etc. who composed texts expounding the fundamental principles laid down by the *Jina*. Then in the light of this net meaning we can only say that in the eyes of Vidyānanda Umāsvāti too was the author of some text expounding the fundamental principles laid down by the *Jina*.

It might well be that in the eyes of Vidyānanda this text was that named *Tattvārthādhigama*, but the statement in question unless supported by additional evidences does not directly yield this idea. So this statement of Vidyānanda occurring in *Āptaparīkṣā* directly allows us to gather only this much that Umāsvāti must have composed some text dealing with the Jaina fundamental principles.

The second of the statements above referred to occurs in connection with the inference-based discussion seeking to prove that the first aphorism of the text named *Tattvārthādhigama*—an aphorism dealing with the pathway to *mokṣa*—is composed by a personage who is omniscient and is devoid of passion. The subject is 'aphorism dealing with the pathway to *mokṣa*', the probandum 'being composed by a personage who is omniscient and is devoid of passion', the probans 'being an aphorism'. It is while dispelling the logical defect *vyabhicāra* (=the case of too extended a probans) which might possibly vitiate the probans in question that Vidyānanda makes the statement '*etena*' etc. Now the logical defect *vyabhicāra* possibly occurs in a locus that is different from the subject concerned. And in the present case the subject is that *Tattvārtha*-aphorism dealing with the pathway to *mokṣa*. So in the eyes of Vidyānanda the aphorism composed by the sages down to Grdhrapicchācārya—an aphorism which is here a possible locus of the logical defect *vyabhicāra*—must be different from Umāsvāti's first aphorism dealing with the pathway to *mokṣa*—an aphorism which is here the subject—this is something which an expert in logic is hardly to be told about. Since in Vidyānanda's eyes Umāsvāti's aphorism acting as the subject is different from the aphorism possibly acting as a locus

of the logical defect *vyabhicāra*, that is why, when after dispelling this logical defect he seeks to dispel that called *asiddhatā* (=the case of an impossible probans), he uses the words '*prakṛtasūtre*'. '*Prakṛta*' means that which is under consideration—so that *prkṛtasūtre* means Umāsvāti's aphorism dealing with the pathway to *mokṣa*. Thus while dispelling the logical defect *asiddhatā* he assigns the adjective '*prakṛta*' to the aphorism and does not do so while dispelling the logical defect *vyabhicāra*; nor does he say that *vyabhicāra* does not characterize the aphorism which is here acting as the subject. Nay, he on the contrary clearly says that *vyabhicāra* does not characterize the aphorisms composed by the sages down to *Gr̥dhrāpicchācārya*. All this incontrovertibly proves that in the eyes of Vidyānandā *Gr̥dhrāpicchācārya* is a different person from Umāsvāmin, not the same person as the latter. In support of this view an additional argument would be that if in the eyes of Vidyānanda *Gr̥dhrāpiccha* and Umāsvāmin were one and the same person then he would not have referred to the latter by the name Umāsvāmin at one place and by a mere adjective *gr̥dhrāpiccha* at another; rather at the latter place he would have added the word Umāsvāmin to the adjective *Gr̥dhrāpiccha*. If this my understanding of the two statements in question is not mistaken then the net situation is that in the eyes of Vidyānanda Umāsvāmin could well have been the author of the text named *Tattvārthasūtra* but *Gr̥dhrāpiccha* and Umāsvāmin must have been two different persons.

The construction of the adjectives like *gr̥dhrāpiccha*, *balākapiccha*, *mayūrapiccha* etc. became current because of that advocacy of the renunciation of clothes—an advocacy rooted in the endorsement of utter nakedness. So in case Vidyānanda was definitely of the view that Umāsvāmin was a Digambara, then he must have employed along with the latter's name one of the latter-day adjectives *gr̥dhrāpiccha* etc. One must therefore conclude that Vidyānanda has not at all indicated whether Umāsvāmin was a Śvetāmbara, a Digambara or an adherent of some third sect.

Sukhlal

HINTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

A student or a teacher, Jaina or otherwise, desirous of making an authoritative special study of Jaina philosophy asks as to what one book is there which can be studied in brief or in details and whose study should familiarise one with all the points related to the topics dealt with in Jaina philosophy. By way of answering this question one cannot refer to any other book except *Tattvārtha*. It is on account of this capacity of *Tattvārtha* that now a days here and there it occupies the foremost place in the curriculum of Jaina-philosophy. Even so, the general technique of study that is currently pursued in this connection does not seem to be much fruitful. So it will not be out of place to offer here a few hints about the requisite technique of study.

Generally speaking, the Śvetāmbara students of *Tattvārtha* do not go through its Digambara commentaries and the Digambara students of it do not go through its Śvetāmbara commentaries. The cause of this over-all situation might be a narrow outlook, a sectarian prejudice, an absence of relevant information, or whatever else. But if this impression of mine is correct than as a result of this over-all situation how much narrow remains the knowledge of a student, how much unsatisfied remains his curiosity, how much blunted remains his capacity for a comparative study and a weighing of issues, and hence how little authoritativeness attaches to what is learnt of *Tattvārthasūtra*—to see all this one need not go much far away from the students coming out of any Jaina institute whatsoever functioning at present. If the path of knowledge, the field of inquisitiveness, the investigation of truth are vitiated by a closed-

door attitude—that is, by a narrowness of the outlook and a sectarian befuddlement—then the aim set forth remains altogether unrealized. Those who get afraid by a mere idea of comparative study—they are either doubtful as to the authoritativeness or strength of their position, or they lack energy to face a rival position, or they hesitate to accept a true position after having given up a false one, or they are not possessed of the intellectual power and patience adequate for vindicating even a true position of theirs. The very meaning of knowledge is that one broadens one's spiritual vision by overcoming narrowmindedness, restrictions and obstacles and delves deep into what is true. That is why I am below placing forth before teachers a technique of study. They are not to treat it as the last word but to introduce in it whatever improvement is suggested by their own experience; really, it is they who are to get themselves readied—by employing as instrument the students seeking instruction from them.

(1) First take up an original aphorism and assign to it whatever meaning is easily possible.

(2) Of the two commentaries the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* treat one as main, teach it first and the other immediately afterwards.

In connection with this teaching the following particular points must be brought to the notice of students :

(a) What topics are similarly treated in the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* ? And in spite of this similarity what difference has arisen there as to language and the style of exposition ?

(b) What topics are present in one but not in the other or are present in the latter in an altered form ? What topics of one are left out in the other and what topics are newly introduced in the latter ? How to account for this state of affairs ?

(c) When in the line with the just offered suggestions both the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* have been analyzed out, then the specially competent students should be inspired to look for points of comparison with the other systems of Indian philosophy—in

this connection following the procedure adopted in the 'Introduction'. As for the moderately competent students, they should be provided with a good number of interesting points of information—so that they are in a position to take up the task of comparison some time afterwards.

(d) After they are given a lesson in line with the just offered suggestions the students should be asked to read out for themselves *Rājavārtika* related to the aphorism under study. They on their part, after they have completed the reading, should note down on a paper the questions to be asked and the points needing clarification and these questions and these points should be placed before the teacher the next day. At the time of discussing them the teacher should, as far as possible, make the students themselves say in the course of a mutual exchange of thought all that he ought to have said (in this connection himself acting as a mere neutral helper). The aim is to polish out the understanding of the students so that they can see for themselves as to what points of the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* have been left out in *Rājavārtika*, what points have been additionally introduced in it, what is new about these additional points.

(3) After the special study of the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* is thus buttressed by a perusal of *Rājavārtika*, then a catalogue should be made of the points that are absent in all these three texts, are worthy of attention and are discussed in *Ślokavārtika*; and then as might be convenient these points should be taught to the students or they should be asked to read them out for themselves. All this done, it should be explained to the students as to how much and what advancement has been gradually made by the four commentaries in question and in doing so how much profit each has derived from the other systems of philosophy—and how much contribution has been made by each commentary to the other systems of philosophy.

(4) If for some reason the self-reading or teaching of *Rājavārtika* is not possible, then too a catalogue should be made of such points of *Ślokavārtika* as are also well discussed in

Rājavārtika and are of extreme importance from the Jaina standpoint; and these points at least should be taught to the students. That is to say, the two texts the *bhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi* must be a compulsory part of the curriculum and so also the specially important topics of *Rājavārtika* and *Ślokavārtika* that are not taken up in these two; all the remaining topics ought to be an optional part of the curriculum. For example, the discussion in *Rājavārtika* of *saptabhaṅgī* (=the doctrine of sevenfold predication) and *anekāntavāda* and the discussion in *Ślokavārtika* of *sarvajña* (=omniscient), *āpta* (the authoritative personage), *jagatkartā* (=the world-creator) etc., *nayavāda*, *prthvībhramaṇa* (=rotation-of-the-earth). Similarly, from within Siddhasena's commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya* portions dealing with specially important topics should be selected out and they too should be taught. For example, the commentary to the *bhāṣya* on 1.1, 5.29, 31 etc.

(5) Before starting his teaching the teacher should give his students an interesting talk introducing them to the interior and exterior of *Tattvārtha*, and thus should create in them an interest for the subject. And from time to time as occasion arises suitable talks should be organized with a view to drawing the attention of the students to the history and the gradual evolution of the different systems of philosophy.

(6) As regards teaching the chapters three and four devoted to an account of geography, astronomy, heavens and hells, there are two views strongly opposite of one another. Thus one view insists that a teaching of these chapters be denied a place in the curriculum while the other view feels that without teaching them a special study of the philosophy propounded by an omniscient personage remains but incomplete. Both these are extreme views. So the teacher while teaching these chapters should seek to introduce a change in the outlook related to them—this is the only course proper for our time. All the accounts contained in the chapters three and four have come from an omniscient personage, they cannot be altered in the least, the present-day scientific discoveries and views, since they

go against the Jaina scriptural texts, are all false and worth discarding—instead of offering these grounds by way of emphasizing the desirability of teaching the chapters in question, if they are taught from a historical standpoint laying bare as to what views pertaining to heavens, hells, geography and astronomy were once current among the Āryan systems of philosophy and what stand the Jaina system takes vis-a-vis these views then much worth learning remains in the disciplines recommended to be thrown aside as false and a new field of inquisitiveness is created for the search of truth. And it is thus that one is inspired to test on the touchstone of intellect whatever is in fact true.

(7) Keeping in view the high grade students and researchers I might offer two more suggestions. First adopting a historical standpoint one should find out as to what ancient Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts contain the source-point of the topics occurring in *Tattvārthasūtra* and its *bhāṣya*; and then one should make a comparative study of the two versions of the topics in question. Secondly, one should find out as to what the Buddhist *Piṭakas* and certain Mahāyāna texts have to say regarding those very topics and how they develop them. At the same time, one should seek in this connection a direct information from the original aphorisms and *bhāṣyas* of all the Vedicist Systems of philosophy; and here too the relevant points of comparison should be noted. Having done so I have myself learnt from experience that in the field of philosophy and ethics the Indian soul is but one. Be that as it may, the full significance of *Tattvārtha* cannot be grasped without undertaking a specialized study of this sort.

(8) If *Tattvārtha* is to be taught with the help of the present English explanation itself, then the teacher should take the aphorisms one by one and first orally explain all that is there. And when the students have thus well assimilated the material they should be asked to read out the present explanation for themselves. With a view to making sure that the students have really grasped the points the teacher should put to them a question or two.

(a) When with the help of the present explanation aphorisms upto the end of a particular topic or upto the end of a chapter have been taught, then the teacher should neatly place before the students the relevant points of comparison—in this connection following the procedure adopted in the Introduction.

Certainly, if lessons are given in line with the suggestions just offered then an additional burden is imposed on the teacher, but unless such a burden is assumed enthusiastically and intelligently the teacher cannot attain a high status and the student community too remains poor in thought. So it is incumbent on the teachers that they should make the best possible preparations and if they are to render fruitful these preparations of theirs it is indispensable that they should prepare the mind of their students. From the standpoint of acquiring pure knowledge all this is of course indispensable but it is also indispensable from the practical standpoint of attaining a status of equality with others and at a time when the current of knowledge is flowing all around as mightily as at present.

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॥ तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्रम् ॥

ABBREVIATIONS

भा.	The aphorisms published along with	<i>Bhāṣya</i>	= सभाष्यतत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्राणि, -आर्हतमतप्रभाकर, पूना, वीरसं. २४५३
रा.	„	<i>Rājavārtika</i>	= तत्त्वार्थराजवार्तिकम्, -सनातनजैनग्रंथमाला, बनारस ई. १९१५
श्लो.	„	<i>Ślokavārtika</i>	= तत्त्वार्थश्लोकवार्तिकम्, -गांधीनाथारंगजैनग्रंथमाला मुंबई, ई. १०१८
स.	„	<i>Sarvārthasiddhi</i>	= सर्वार्थसिद्धिः, -जैन मुद्रणालय, कोल्हापुर, शक सं. १८३९
सि.	„	<i>Siddhasena-Vṛtti</i>	= तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्र- सिद्धसेनकृतटीका -दे. ला. पुस्तकोद्धार नं. ६७, ७६, सुरत, ई. १९२६, १९३०
हा.	„	<i>Hārībhadrī-vṛtti</i>	= तत्त्वार्थसूत्रं-हरिभद्रकृतवृत्ति, ऋ. के. जैन श्वे. संस्था, रतलाम, ई. १९३६
टि.	„	<i>Tattvārtha-ṭippaṇa</i>	(not published. see Anekānta 3.1)
रा. पा.	= An alternative reading indicated in	रा.	
स-पा.	„	स.	
सि-वृ-पा.	„	सि.	
सि-पा.	The reading in an alternative ms. of	सि.	
सि.-भा.	The reading in the Bhāṣya according to	सि.	
हा-भा.	„	हा.	
सि-वृ.	„	approved by सि.	
हा-वृ.	„	हा.	

प्रथमोऽध्यायः

सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ॥१॥
तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् ॥२॥
तत्रिसर्गादधिगमाद्वा ॥३॥
जीवाजीवास्त्रवबन्धसंवरनिर्जरामोक्षास्तत्त्वम् ॥४॥
नामस्थापनाद्रव्यभावतस्तत्र्यासः ॥५॥
प्रमाणनयैरधिगमः ॥६॥
निर्देशस्वामित्वसाधनाधिकरणस्थितिविधानतः ॥७॥
सत्संख्याक्षेत्रस्पर्शनकालान्तरभावाल्पबहुत्वैश्च ॥८॥
मतिश्रुतावधिगमः पर्यायकेवलानि ज्ञानम् ॥९॥
तत् प्रमाणे ॥१०॥
आद्ये परोक्षम् ॥११॥
प्रत्यक्षमन्यत् ॥१२॥
मतिः स्मृतिः संज्ञा चिन्ताऽभिनिबोध इत्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥१३॥
तदिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियनिमित्तम् ॥१४॥
अवग्रहेहावायधारणाः ॥१५॥
बहुबहुविधक्षिप्रानिश्रितासंदिग्धधुवाणां सेतराणाम् ॥१६॥

१. आश्रव-हा. ।

२. मनःपर्यय-स. ग. श्लो.

३. तत्र आद्ये-हा. ।

४. *हापाय. भा. हा. सि. Akalaṅka says that both the readings *apāya* and *avāya* are proper.

५. *निःसृतानुकधु-स. ग. । *निःसृतानुकधु-श्लो. ।- *क्षिप्रनिःसृतानुकधु स-पा. ।
*प्रानिश्रितानुकधु भा., सि-वृ. ।- *श्रितनिश्चितधु सि-वृ-पा. ।

- अर्थस्य ॥१७॥
 व्यञ्जनस्यावग्रहः ॥१८॥
 न चक्षुरनिन्द्रियाभ्याम् ॥१९॥
 श्रुतं मतिपूर्वं द्वयनेकद्वादशभेदम् ॥२०॥
 द्विविधोऽवधिः ॥२१॥
 भवप्रत्ययो नारकदेवानाम् ॥२२॥
 यथोक्तनिमित्तः षड्विकल्पः शेषाणाम् ॥२३॥
 ऋजुविपुलमती मनःपर्यायः ॥२४॥
 विशुद्धप्रतिपाताभ्यां तद्विशेषः ॥२५॥
 विशुद्धिक्षेत्रस्वामिविषयेभ्योऽवधि^{१०}मनःपर्याययोः ॥२६॥
 मतिश्रुतयोर्निबन्धः सर्वद्रव्येष्वसर्वपर्यायेषु ॥२७॥
 सपिष्ववधेः ॥२८॥
 तदनन्तभागे मनःपर्यायस्य ॥२९॥
 सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायेषु केवलस्य ॥३०॥
 एकादीनि भाज्यानि युगपदेकस्मिन्नाचतुर्भ्यः ॥३१॥
 मतिश्रुता^{१३}ऽवधयो विपर्ययश्च ॥३२॥
 सदसतोरविशेषाद् यदृच्छेपलब्धेरुन्मत्तवत् ॥३३॥
 नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारजुसूत्रशब्दा नयाः ॥३४॥
 आद्यशब्दौ द्वित्रिभेदौ ॥३५॥

६. In स. ग. श्लो. not in the form of an aphorism, in स. and ग. occurs in the introductory part.

७. तत्र भव-सि. । भवप्रत्ययोऽवधिर्देवनारकाणाम्-स. ग. श्लो. ।

८. क्षयोपशमनिमित्तः-स. ग. श्लो. । The Bhāṣya says by way of Comment यथोक्तनिमित्तः क्षयोपशमनिमित्त इत्यर्थः ।

९. मनःपर्ययः-स. ग. श्लो. ।

१०. मनःपर्यययोः-स. ग. श्लो. ।

११. निबन्धः द्रव्ये-स. ग. श्लो. । The Part of this aphorism quoted in Bhāṣya to 1. 20 does not contain 'सर्व'.

१२. मनःपर्ययस्य-स. ग. श्लो. ।

१३. -श्रुताविभङ्गा विप-हा. ।

१४. 'शब्दसमभिरूढैवम्भूता नयाः-स. ग. श्लो. ।

१५. Does not occur in स. ग. श्लो.

द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

औपशमिकक्षायिकौ भावौ मिश्रश्च जीवस्य स्वतत्त्वमौदयिकपारिणामिकौ च ॥१॥

द्विनवाष्टादशैकविंशतित्रिभेदा यथाक्रमम् ॥२॥

सम्यक्त्वचारित्रे ॥३॥

ज्ञानदर्शनदानलाभभोगोपभोगवीर्याणि च ॥४॥

ज्ञानाज्ञानदर्शनदानादिलब्धयश्चतुस्त्रिपञ्चभेदा यथाक्रमं सम्यक्त्वचारित्रसंयमासंयमाश्च ॥५॥

गतिकषायलिङ्गमिध्यादर्शनाऽज्ञानाऽसंयताऽसिद्धत्वलेश्याश्चतुश्चतुस्त्र्येकैकैकैकषड्भेदाः ॥६॥

जीवभव्याभव्यत्वादीनि च ॥७॥

उपयोगो लक्षणम् ॥८॥

सं द्विविधोऽष्टचतुर्भेदः ॥९॥

संसारिणो मुक्ताश्च ॥१०॥

समनस्काऽमनस्काः ॥११॥

संसारिणस्त्रसस्थावराः ॥१२॥

पृथिव्यम्बुवनस्पतयः स्थावराः ॥१३॥

तेजोवायू द्वीन्द्रियादयश्च त्रसाः ॥१४॥

पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि ॥१५॥

द्विविधानि ॥१६॥

निर्वृत्युपकरणे द्रव्येन्द्रियम् ॥१७॥

लब्ध्युपयोगौ भावेन्द्रियम् ॥१८॥

१. दर्शनलब्धय* - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२. भेदाः सम्य* - स. ग. श्लो. ।

३. 'सिद्धलेश्या' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

४. 'त्वानि च' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

५. सि-वृ-पा. does not contain 'स'.

६. Transposition of this aphorism on the part of some has been criticised by Siddhasena.

७. पृथिव्यमेजोवायुवनस्पतयः स्थावराः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

८. द्वीन्द्रियादयस्त्रसाः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

- उपयोगः स्पर्शादिषु ॥११॥
 स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्राणि ॥२०॥
 स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णशब्दास्तेषामर्थाः ॥२१॥
 श्रुतमनिन्द्रियस्य ॥२२॥
^{११}वाय्वन्तानामेकम् ॥२३॥
 कृमिपिपीलिकाभ्रमरमनुष्यादीनामेकैकवृद्धानि ॥२४॥
 संज्ञिनः समनस्काः ॥२५॥
 विग्रहगतौ कर्मयोगः ॥२६॥
 अनुश्रेणि गतिः ॥२७॥
 अविग्रहा जीवस्य ॥२८॥
 विग्रहवती च संसारिणः प्राक् चतुर्भ्यः ॥२९॥
 एकसमयोऽविग्रहः ॥३०॥
 एकं द्वौ वाऽनाहारकः ॥३१॥
 सम्पूर्जनगर्भोपपाता^{११} जन्म ॥३२॥
 सचित्तशीतसंवृताः सेतरा मिश्राश्चैकशस्तद्योनयः ॥३३॥

९. Does not occur in स. ग. श्लो. Siddhasena says : 'Some do not recognize it as an aphorism and opine that here a *Bhāṣya*-sentence has been turned into an aphorism', p. 169.

१०. तदर्थः - स. ग. श्लो. Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda answer the objection that the compounded phrase 'तदर्थः' is not proper, on the other hand, the Śvetāmbara commentators have elucidated as to why an un-compounded phrase has been employed here.

११. वनस्पत्यन्तानामेकम् - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१२. Siddhasena says that according to some the word 'मनुष्य' in this aphorism is unauthorised (lit. unscriptural).

१३. Siddhasena says that after this aphorism some insert another one अतीन्द्रियाः केवलिनः ।

१४. एकसमयाऽविग्रहा - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१५. द्वौ त्रीन्वा - स. ग. श्लो. । According to some the word 'वा' occurring in the aphorism suggests the inclusion of 'three' as well—this is what Siddhasena and Haribhadra say.

१६. -पाताज्जन्म - स. । -पादा जन्म - ग. श्लो. ।

जराध्वण्डपोतजानां गर्भः ॥३४॥
^{१८}नारकदेवानामुपपातः ॥३५॥
 शेषाणां सम्मूर्छनम् ॥३६॥
 औदारिकवैक्रियाऽऽहारकतैजसकर्मणानि शरीराणि ^{२०}॥३७॥
^{२१}परं परं सूक्ष्मम् ॥३८॥
 प्रदेशतोऽसंख्येयगुणं प्राक् तैजसात् ॥३९॥
 अनन्तगुणो परे ॥४०॥
^{२२}अप्रतिघाते ॥४१॥
 अनादिसम्बन्धे च ॥४२॥
 सर्वस्य ॥४३॥
 तदादीनि भाज्यानि युगपदेकस्या ^{२३}चतुर्भ्यः ॥४४॥
 निरुपभोगमन्थम् ॥४५॥
 गर्भसम्मूर्छनजमाद्यम् ॥४६॥
^{२४}वैक्रियमौपपातिकम् ॥४७॥
^{२५}लब्धिप्रत्ययं च ॥४८॥

१७. जरायुजाण्डपोतजानां गर्भः - हा० । जरायुजाण्डपोतानां गर्भः - स० ग० श्लो० । ग० and श्लो०. raise objection against reading 'पोतज'. To Siddhasena the objection does not appeal to be proper.

१८. देवनारकाणामुपपादः - स० ग० श्लो० ।

१९. वैक्रियिका - स० ग० श्लो० ।

२०. Siddhasena says that according to some the word 'शरीराणि' constitutes a separate aphorism.

२१. In Bhāṣya the word 'तेषां' is printed as a part of the aphorism but according to the commentators on the Bhāṣya it occurs in the Bhāṣya-sentence.

२२. अप्रतीघाते - स० ग० श्लो० ।

२३. 'देकस्मिन्ना चतु' - स० ग० श्लो० । But from the commentaries it appears that the intended reading is 'एकस्य'.

२४. औपपादिकं वैक्रियिकम् - स० ग० श्लो० ।

२५. After this स० ग० and श्लो०. have an aphorism 'तैजसमपि'. In the भा० it is not printed in the form of an aphorism. In हा० it comes in the form of an aphorism after the aphorism 'शुभम्' etc. In सि० this aphorism is an alternative reading of mss. क and ख. In टि० it is an aphorism but comes after the next one. Its occurrence here is improper according to the author of *Ṭippaṇa*.

शुभं विशुद्धमव्याधाति चाहारकं चतुर्दशपूर्वधरस्यैव ॥४९॥

नारकसम्पूङ्गिनो नपुंसकानि ॥५०॥

न देवाः ॥५१॥

औपपातिकचरमदेहोत्तमपुरुषाऽसंख्येयवर्षायुषोऽनपवर्त्यायुषः ॥५२॥

तृतीयोऽध्यायः

स्तृशर्करावालुकापङ्कधूमतमोमहातमःप्रभा भूमयो घनान्बुवाताकाशप्रतिष्ठाः सप्ताधोऽधः पृथुतराः ॥१॥

तासु नरकाः ॥२॥

नित्याशुभतरलेश्यापरिणामदेहवेदनाविक्रियाः ॥३॥

परस्परोदीरितदुःखाः ॥४॥

संक्लिष्टसुरोदीरितदुःखाश्च प्राक् चतुर्थ्याः ॥५॥

तेष्वेकत्रिसप्तदशसप्तदशद्विविंशतित्रयस्त्रिंशत्सागरोपमाः सत्त्वानां परा स्थितिः ॥६॥

जम्बूद्वीपलवणोदयः शुभनामानो द्वीपसमुद्राः ॥७॥

द्विर्दिर्विष्कम्भाः पूर्वपूर्वपरिक्षेपिणो वलयाकृतयः ॥८॥

२६. -“कं चतुर्दशपूर्वधर एव-सि” ।-“कं प्रमत्तसंयतस्यैव-स. ग. श्लो. । Siddhasena says that here some add another adjective ‘अकृत्स्नश्रुतस्यर्द्धमतः’ ।

२७. After this स. ग. श्लो. have an aphorism ‘शेषास्त्रिवेदाः’. In the Śvetāmbara reading it is not counted as an aphorism, for here this sense is conveyed by a Bhāṣya-sentence.

२८. औपपादिकचरमोत्तमदेहाऽसं - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२९. “चरमदेहोत्तमदेहपु” - स-पा. ग-पा. । Siddhasena says that according to some aphorist has not employed in this aphorism the word ‘उत्तमपुरुष’. With Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda ‘चरम’ is an adjective of ‘उत्तम’.

१. While breaking this compound Sarvāthasiddhi speaks of a ‘सिद्धान्तपाठ’ (explicit reading) and ‘सामर्थ्यगम्यपाठ’ (implicit reading).

२. स. ग. श्लो. do not contain the word ‘पृथुतराः’. Akalaṅka demonstrates the futility of this word. After this the टि. has an aphorism ‘घर्मावंशा शैलाञ्जना पिष्टा माघव्या माघवीति च’.

३. तासु त्रिंशत्पञ्चविंशतिपञ्चदशत्रिपञ्चोत्तमचरकशतसहस्राणि पञ्च चैव यथाक्रमम्- स. ग. श्लो. । The enumeration incorporated in this aphorism is there in the Bhāṣya.

४. तेषु नारका नित्या. - सि. । नारका नित्या. - स. ग. श्लो. ।

५. लवणोदादयः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

तन्मध्ये मेस्ताभिर्वृत्तो योजनशतसहस्रविष्कम्भो जम्बूद्वीपः ॥९॥
 तत्र भरतहैमवतहरिविदेहस्यकहैरण्यवतैरावतवर्षाः क्षेत्राणि ॥१०॥
 तद्विभाजिनः पूर्वापरायता हिमवन्महाहिमवन्निषधनीलरुक्मिशिखरिणो वंशधरपर्वताः ॥११॥
 द्विर्धातकीखण्डे ॥१२॥
 पुष्करार्धे च ॥१३॥
 प्राङ् मानुषोत्तरान्मनुष्याः ॥१४॥
 आर्या म्लेच्छाश्च ॥१५॥
 भरतैरावतविदेहाः कर्मभूमयोऽन्यत्र देवकुरुत्तरकुरुभ्यः ॥१६॥
 नृस्थिती परापरे त्रिपत्योपमान्तर्मुहूर्ते ॥१७॥
 तिर्यग्योनीनां च ॥१८॥

चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

देवाश्चतुर्निकायाः ॥१॥

तृतीयः पीतलेश्यः ॥२॥

६. टि. स. ग. श्लो. do not have the word 'तत्र'.

७. 'वंशधरपर्वताः'—सि. ।

८. Siddhasena says that according to some the Bhāṣya sentence 'तत्र पञ्च' etc. coming after this aphorism is an aphorism itself. In स. this sense is conveyed by the aphorism 24. Haribhadra and Siddhasena say that here some scholars compose so many aphorisms on their own so as to expand the material. Possibly this statement of theirs has in view the reading of aphorism accepted by स., for there we find after this aphorism 12 more which are not found in the Śvetāmbara reading. And even the aphorisms 24 and 25 then coming there are in fact Bhāṣya-sentences-from the Bhāṣya on the aphorism 11 of the reading accepted by Bhāṣya. Even the aphorism 26 to 32 of स. ग. are but additional. The aphorism 13 of स. has been broken into two in श्लो. For the reading of all these additional aphorisms स. ग. श्लो. ought to be consulted.

९. आर्या म्लेच्छाश्च - भा. हा.

१०. परापरे - ग. श्लो. ।

११. तिर्यग्योनिजानां च - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१. देवाश्चतुर्निकायाः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२. आदितस्त्रिषु पीतान्तलेश्याः - स. ग. श्लो. । See note on 4. 2, p. 151.

दशाष्टपञ्चद्वादशविकल्पाः कल्पोपपन्नपर्यन्ताः ॥३॥

इन्द्रसामानिकत्रायस्त्रिंशपारिषदात्मरक्षलोकपालानीकप्रकीर्णकाभियोग्यकिल्बिषिकाश्चैकशः ॥४॥

त्रायस्त्रिंशलोकपालवज्र्यो व्यन्तरज्योतिष्काः ॥५॥

पूर्वयोर्द्वीन्द्राः ॥६॥

पीतान्तलेश्याः ॥७॥

कायप्रवीचारा आ ऐशानात् ॥८॥

शेषाः स्पर्शरूपशब्दमनःप्रवीचारा द्वयोर्द्वयोः ॥९॥

परेऽप्रवीचाराः ॥१०॥

भवनवासिनोऽसुरनागविद्युत्सुपर्णाग्निवातस्तनितोदधिद्वीपदिक्कुमाराः ॥११॥

व्यन्तराः किन्नरकिम्पुरुषमहोरगगान्धर्वयक्षराक्षसभूतपिशाचाः ॥१२॥

ज्योतिष्काः सूर्याश्चन्द्रमसो ग्रहनक्षत्रप्रकीर्णतारकाश्च ॥१३॥

मेरुप्रदक्षिणा नित्यगतयो नृलोके ॥१४॥

तत्कृतः कालविभागः ॥१५॥

बहिरवस्थिताः ॥१६॥

वैमानिकाः ॥१७॥

कल्पोपपन्नाः कल्पातीताश्च ॥१८॥

उपर्युपरि ॥१९॥

सौधमैशानसानत्कुमारमाहेन्द्रब्रह्मलोकलान्तकमहाशुक्रसहस्रारेष्वानतप्राणतयोरगरणाच्युतयोर्नवसु

३. -पारिषदा - स. ग. श्लो. ।

४. 'त्रिंशल्लो' स ।

५. वर्जा - सि. ।

६. Does not occur in स. ग. श्लो. ।

७. स. ग. श्लो. do not contain the words 'द्वयोर्द्वयोः'. By way of answering somebody's objection that these words ought to be there Akalaṅka says that to do so will be unauthorized (lit. something going against the scripture.)

८. गन्धर्व - हा. स. ग. श्लो. ।

९. -सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१०. -'प्रकीर्णकता' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

११. 'ताराश्च' - हा. ।

१२. -माहेन्द्रब्रह्महोत्तरलान्तवकापिष्ठशुक्रमहाशुक्रशतारसहस्रा. - स. ग. श्लो. । श्लो. has the reading 'सतार'. In the Digambara sect too the old texts speak of there being but 12 Kalpas. See *Jaina Jagat*, Vol. 4, No. 6; p. 2. 2, Anekānta 5.10-11, p. 342.

ग्रैवेयकेषु विजयवैजयन्तजयन्ताऽपराजितेषु सर्वार्थसिद्धे^{१३} च ॥२०॥

स्थितिप्रभावद्युतिलेश्याविशुद्धीन्द्रियावधिविषयतोऽधिकाः ॥२१॥

गतिशरीरपरिग्रहाभिमानतो हीनाः ॥२२॥^{१४}

पीतपद्मशुक्ललेश्या द्वित्रिशेषेषु ॥२३॥

प्राग् ग्रैवेयकेभ्यः कल्पाः ॥२४॥

ब्रह्मलोकालया लोकान्तिकाः^{१५} ॥२५॥

सारस्वतादित्यवह्न्यरुणार्दतोयतुषिताव्याबाधमरुतोऽग्निश्च^{१६} ॥२६॥

विजयादिषु द्विचरमाः ॥२७॥

औपपातिकमनुष्येभ्यः शेषास्तिर्यग्योनयः ॥२८॥

स्थितिः^{१७} ॥२९॥

भवनेषु दक्षिणार्धाधिपतीनां पल्योपममध्यर्धम् ॥३०॥

शेषाणां पादोने ॥३१॥

असुरेन्द्रयोः सागरोपममधिकं च ॥३२॥

सौधर्मादिषु यथाक्रमम्^{१८} ॥३३॥

सागरोपमे ॥३४॥

अधिके च ॥३५॥

सप्त सानत्कुमारे^{१९} ॥३६॥

१३. -सिद्धौ च-स. ग. श्लो. ।

१४. After this टि. has an aphorism “उच्छ्रसाहारवेदनोपपातानुभावतश्च साध्याः” ।

१५. पीतमिश्रपद्ममिश्रशुक्ललेश्या द्विद्विचतुष्टयः शेषेष्विति - ग-पा. ।

१६. लया लौका - स. ग. श्लो. । सि-पा. ।

१७. व्याबाधाग्निश्च - स. ग. श्लो. । See note on 4. 26, p. 169.

१८. -पादिक- स. ग. श्लो. ।

१९. In place of this aphorism upto 32nd स. ग. श्लो. have but one aphorism ‘स्थितिरसुरनागसुपर्णद्वीपशेषाणां सागरोपमत्रिपल्योपमार्धहीनमिता’ । As for the maximum life-duration of *Bhavanapatis* the Śvetāmbara and Digambara Sects hold different views.

२०. In place of this aphorism upto 35th स. ग. श्लो. have but one aphorism- “सौधर्मेऽनयोः सागरोपमे अधिके च-” The two Sects also differ as to quantity of life-duration.

२१. सानत्कुमारमाहेन्द्रयोः सप्त - स. ग. श्लो. ।

- ^{२२}विशेषत्रिसप्तदशैकादशत्रयोदशपञ्चदशभिरधिकानि च ॥३७॥
 आरणाच्युतादूर्ध्वमेकैकेन नवसु ग्रैवेयकेषु विजयादिषु सर्वार्थसिद्धे ^{२३}च ॥३८॥
 अपरा पत्योपममधिकं च ॥३९॥
^{२४}सागरोपमे ॥४०॥
 अधिके च ॥४१॥
 परतः परतः पूर्वा पूर्वानन्तरा ॥४२॥
 नारकाणां च द्वितीयादिषु ॥४३॥
 दशवर्षसहस्राणि प्रथमायाम् ॥४४॥
 भवनेषु च ॥४५॥
 व्यन्तराणां च ॥४६॥
 परा पत्योपमम् ^{२५}॥४७॥
^{२६}ज्योतिष्काणामधिकम् ॥४८॥
^{२७}ग्रहाणामेकम् ॥४९॥
 नक्षत्राणामर्धम् ॥५०॥
 तारकाणां चतुर्भागः ॥५१॥
^{२८}जघन्या त्वष्ट्रभागः ॥५२॥
^{२९}चतुर्भागः शेषाणाम् ॥५३॥

२२. त्रिसप्तनवैकादशत्रयोदशपञ्चदशभिरधिकानि तु - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२३. सिद्धौ च - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२४. स. ग. श्लो. do not have this aphorism and the next.

२५. परा पत्योपममधिकम् - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२६. ज्योतिष्काणां च - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२७. स. ग. श्लो. do not have this aphorism and the aphorisms 50 and 51.

२८. तदष्टभागोऽपरा - स. ग. श्लो. । The aphorisms pertaining to the life-duration of the *Jyotiṣkas* which do not occur in the Digambara reading of aphorisms—their subject-matter has been supplied by Akalaṅka in his *vārtikas* to this very aphorism.

२९. This does not occur in स. ग. श्लो. स. and ग. have last of all one more aphorism. “लौकान्तिकानामष्टौ सागरोपमाणि सर्वेषाम्-४२. This does not occur in श्लो.

पञ्चमोऽध्यायः

अजीवकाया धर्माधर्माकाशपुद्गलाः ॥१॥

द्रव्याणि जीवाश्च ॥२॥

नित्यावस्थितान्यरूपाणि ॥३॥

रूपिणः पुद्गलाः ॥४॥

आकाशादेकद्रव्याणि ॥५॥

निष्क्रियाणि च ॥६॥

असङ्ख्येयाः प्रदेशाः धर्माधर्मयोः ॥७॥

जीवस्य ॥८॥

आकाशस्यानन्ताः ॥९॥

सङ्ख्येयासङ्ख्येयाश्च पुद्गलानाम् ॥१०॥

नाणोः ॥११॥

लोकाकाशेऽवगाहः ॥१२॥

धर्माधर्मयोः कृत्स्ने ॥१३॥

एकप्रदेशादिषु भाज्यः पुद्गलानाम् ॥१४॥

१. In place of this one 'aphorism स. र. श्लो. have two—viz. 'द्रव्याणि' and 'जीवाश्च'. Siddhasena says : 'Some read it as two aphorisms in the above manner, that is not proper'. Before Akalanka too somebody has raised the objection : 'Why not have one aphorism 'द्रव्याणि जीवाः' without an inclusion of the word 'च' ? Vidyānanda says that the two aphorisms have been composed just for the sake of a clear comprehension.

२. Siddhasena says : "Some break this aphorism into two—viz. 'नित्यावस्थितानि' and 'अरूपाणि'. In his commentary he also gives an alternative reading 'नित्यावस्थितारूपाणि'; again, he indicates a third reading : 'नित्यावस्थितान्यरूपीणि'. He further says : "according to some the word 'नित्य' is an adjective of 'अवस्थित'. For the alternative views relating to the explanation of this aphorism, Siddhasena's commentary ought to be consulted.

३. See note on 5. 5, p. 179.

४. धर्माधर्मैकजीवानाम् - स. र. श्लो. ।

५. स. र. श्लो. do not have it as a separate aphorism. Why it has been given as a separate aphorism—this secret is revealed by Siddhasena.

- असङ्ख्येयभागादिषु जीवानाम् ॥१५॥
 प्रदेशसंहारविसर्गाभ्यां प्रदीपवत् ॥१६॥
 गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोस्मकारः ॥१७॥
 आकाशस्यावगाहः ॥१८॥
 शरीरवाङ्मनःप्राणापानाः पुद्गलानाम् ॥१९॥
 सुखदुःखजीवितमरणोपग्रहाश्च ॥२०॥
 परस्परुपग्रहो जीवानाम् ॥२१॥
 वर्तना परिणामः क्रिया परत्वापरत्वे च कालस्य ॥२२॥
 स्पर्शसगन्धवर्णवन्तः पुद्गलाः ॥२३॥
 शब्दबन्धसौक्ष्म्यस्थौल्यसंस्थानभेदतमश्छयातपोद्द्योतवन्तश्च ॥२४॥
 अणवः स्कन्धाश्च ॥२५॥
 संघातभेदेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते ॥२६॥
 भेदादणुः ॥२७॥
 भेदसंघाताभ्यां चाक्षुषाः ॥२८॥
 उत्पादव्ययधौव्ययुक्तं सत् ॥२९॥
 तदभावाव्ययं नित्यम् ॥३०॥
 अर्पितानर्पितसिद्धेः ॥३१॥

६. - 'विसर्पा' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

७. - 'उपग्रहो' - सि. स. रा. श्लो. । Akalaṅka argues in support of the dual number. See note on 5. 17, p. 191.

८. वर्तनापरिणामक्रियाः पर - स. । वर्तनापरिणामक्रिया पर - रा. ।

९. भेदसंघातेभ्य उ. - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१०. चाक्षुषः - स. रा. श्लो. । Siddhasena points out somebody's difference of opinion on the question of explaining this aphorism.

११. Before this aphorism स. and श्लो. have another one, viz. सद्व्यवस्थानाम् रा. did not have that but the new edition of रा. by Dr. M. K. Jaina has it. The *Bhāṣya* contains a statement conveying the same sense.

१२. There is difference of opinion on the question of explaining this aphorism. In this connection Haribhadra's explanation is most peculiar of all. The type of explanation Haribhadra offers has been referred to by Siddhasena in the form of an alternative view.

स्निग्धरूक्षत्वाद् बन्धः ॥३२॥

^{१३} न जघन्यगुणानाम् ॥३३॥

गुणसाम्ये सदृशानाम् ॥३४॥

द्व्यधिकादिगुणानां तु ॥३५॥

^{१४} बन्धे समाधिकौ पारिणामिकौ ॥३६॥

गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् ॥३७॥

^{१५} कालश्चेत्येके ॥३८॥

सोऽनन्तसमयः ॥३९॥

द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः ॥४०॥

तदभावः परिणामः ॥४१॥

^{१६} अनादिरादिमांश्च ॥४२॥

रूपिष्वादिमान् ॥४३॥

योगोपयोगौ जीवेषु ॥४४॥

षष्ठोऽध्यायः

कायवाङ्मनःकर्म योगः ॥१॥

स आस्रवः ॥२॥

^१ शुभः पुण्यस्य ॥३॥

^२ अशुभः पापस्य ॥४॥

१३. For the Śvetāmbara-Digambara difference on the question of the bondage-process see p. 215ff.

१४. बन्धेधिकौ पारिणामिकौ - स. श्लो. । य. has an additional word 'च' at the end of the aphorism. Akalaṅka argues against the reading 'समाधिकौ'.

१५. See note on 5. 38, p. 224.

१६. स. य. श्लो. do not have these three last aphorisms. The view of the Bhāṣya has been refuted by the author of Rājavārtika. For details see p. 228. Before it टि. has an aphorism : 'स द्विविधः'.

१. See note on 6.3, p. 230.

२. ह. does not have it as an aphorism, in place of it it has an aphorism : 'शेषं पापम्'. In सि. 'अशुभः पापस्य' is printed as an aphorism but from the commentary it appears that it is a Bhāṣya sentence.

- सकषायाकषाययोः साम्प्रथिकैर्यापथयोः ॥५॥
 अव्रतकषायेन्द्रियक्रियाः पञ्चचतुःपञ्चपञ्चविंशतिसंख्याः पूर्वस्य भेदाः ॥६॥
 तीव्रमन्दज्ञाताज्ञातभाववीर्याधिकरणविशेषेभ्यस्तद्विशेषः ॥७॥
 अधिकरणं जीवाजीवाः ॥८॥
 आद्यं संस्मभसमारम्भारम्भयोगकृतकारितानुमतकषायविशेषैस्त्रिस्त्रिस्त्रिश्चतुश्चैकशः ॥९॥
 निर्वर्तनानिक्षेपसंयोगनिसर्गा द्विचतुर्द्वित्रिभेदाः परम् ॥१०॥
 तत्प्रदोषनिह्वममात्सर्यान्तरायासादनोपघाता ज्ञानदर्शनावरणयोः ॥११॥
 दुःखशोकापाक्रन्दनवधपरिदेवनान्यात्मपरोभयस्थान्यसद्वेद्यस्य ॥१२॥
 भूतव्रत्यनुकम्पा दानं सरागसंयमादियोगः क्षान्तिः शौचमिति सद्वेद्यस्य ॥१३॥
 केवलिश्रुतसङ्गधर्मदेवावर्णवादो दर्शनमोहस्य ॥१४॥
 कषायोदयात्तीव्रात्मपरिणामश्चारित्रिमोहस्य ॥१५॥
 बह्वारम्भपरिग्रहत्वं च नारकस्यायुषः ॥१६॥
 माया तैर्यग्योनस्य ॥१७॥
 अल्पास्मभपरिग्रहत्वं स्वभावमार्दवार्जवं च मानुषस्य ॥१८॥
 निःशीलव्रतत्वं च सर्वेषाम् ॥१९॥
 संरागसंयमसंयमासंयमाकामनिर्जराबालतपांसि दैवस्य ॥२०॥

3. 'इन्द्रियकषायाव्रतक्रियाः' - हा. सि. टि. स. रा. श्लो. । In the reading accepted by *Bhāṣya* 'अव्रत' comes first. But when Siddhasena offers his commentary the reading before him has 'इन्द्रिय' first. However the *Bhāṣya* to the aphorism has 'अव्रत' first. Siddhasena has taken note of the incompatibility obtaining between the aphorism and the *Bhāṣya* and has also sought to remove the same.

४. -भावाधिकरणवीर्यविशेषः - स. रा. श्लो. ।

५. भूतव्रत्यनुकम्पादानसरागसंयमादियोगः - स. रा. श्लो. ।

६. -तीव्रपरि - स. रा. श्लो. ।

७. 'त्वं नार' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

८. In the place of it the Digambara sect has two aphorisms : 'अल्पास्मभपरिग्रहत्वं मानुषस्य' and 'स्वभावमार्दवं च'. The Digambara commentators also answer the objection as to why just one aphorism was not composed in this connection.

९. See note on 6. 19, p. 243.

१०. See note on 6. 20, p. 243. After this टि. has an aphorism : 'सम्यक्त्वं च'.

योगवक्रता विसंवादनं चाशुभस्य नाम्नः ॥२१॥

विपरीतं शुभस्य ॥२२॥

दर्शनविशुद्धिर्विनयसंपन्नता शीलव्रतेष्वनतिचारोऽभीक्ष्णं ज्ञानोपयोगसंवेगौ शक्ति-
तस्त्यागतपसी सङ्घसाधुसमाधिवैयावृत्त्यकरणमर्हदाचार्यबहुभृतप्रवचनभक्तिरावश्यक-
परिहाणिमार्गप्रभावना प्रवचनवत्सलत्वमिति तीर्थकृत्त्वस्य ॥२३॥

परात्मनिन्दाप्रशंसे सदसद्गुणाच्छदनोद्धावने च नीचैर्गोत्रस्य ॥२४॥

तद्विपर्ययो नीचैर्वृत्त्यनुत्सेकौ चोत्तरस्य ॥२५॥

विघ्नकरणमन्तरायस्य ॥२६॥

सप्तमोऽध्यायः

हिंसानृतस्तेयाब्रह्मपरिग्रहेभ्यो विरतिर्नतम् ॥१॥

देशसर्वतोऽणुमहती ॥२॥

तत्स्थैर्यार्थं भावनाः पञ्च पञ्च ॥३॥

हिंसादिष्विहामुत्र चापायावद्यदर्शनम् ॥४॥

दुःखमेव वा ॥५॥

११. तद्विप - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१२. -“भीक्ष्णज्ञा” - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१३. “सी साधुसमाधिवै” - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१४. तीर्थकृत्त्वस्य - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१५. -“गुणोच्छ”-स. । गुणोच्छ - ग. श्लो. । सि-वृ. approves the reading ‘गुणोच्छ’.

१. ‘पञ्च पञ्चशः’ - सि-वृ-पा. । Before Akalaṅka a doubt has been raised that the reading is ‘पञ्चशः’. After this aphorism स. ग. and श्लो. have the following five aphorisms whose sense is conveyed in the *Bhāṣya* to this very aphorism :

‘वाङ्मनोगुतीर्यादाननिक्षेपणसमित्यालोकितपानभोजनानि पञ्च ॥४॥ क्रोधलोभभीरुत्व-
हास्य-प्रत्याख्यानान्यनुवीचिभाषणं च पञ्च ॥५॥ शून्यागारविमोचितावासपरोपरोधाकरणभैक्ष (क्षय-
रा.) शुद्धिसद्धर्मा (सधर्मा-श्लो.) विसंवादाः पञ्च ॥६॥ स्त्रीसगकथाश्रवणतन्मनोहराङ्गनिरीक्षणपूर्व-
रतानु-स्मरणवृष्णेष्टस्वशरीरसंस्कारत्यागाः पञ्च ॥७॥ मनोज्ञामनोज्ञेन्द्रियविषयरागद्वेषवर्जनानि पञ्च ॥८॥

२. -“मुत्रापाया” - स. ग. श्लो. ।

३. Siddhasena says that according to some the following two sentences of the *Bhāṣya* to this very aphorism are two aphorisms :
व्याधिप्रतीकारत्वात् कण्डूपरिगतत्वाच्चाब्रह्म and परिग्रहेष्वप्राप्तप्राप्तनष्टेषु काङ्क्षाशोकौ प्राप्तेषु च
रक्षणमुपभोगे वाऽविवृतिः ।

मैत्रीप्रमोदकास्त्रयमाध्यस्थानि सत्त्वगुणाधिकवित्तश्यमानाविनेयेषु ॥६॥

जगत्कायस्वभावौ च संवेगवैराग्यार्थम् ॥७॥

प्रमत्तयोगात् प्राणव्यपरोपणं हिंसा ॥८॥

असदभिधानमनृतम् ॥९॥

अदत्तादानं स्तेयम् ॥१०॥

मैथुनमब्रह्म ॥११॥

मूर्च्छा परिग्रहः ॥१२॥

निःशल्यो व्रती ॥१३॥

अगार्यनगाश्च ॥१४॥

अणुव्रतोऽगारी ॥१५॥

दिग्देशानर्थदण्डविरतिसामाधिकपौषधोपवासोपभोगपरिभोगपरिमाणातिथिसंविभागव्रतसंपन्नश्च ॥१६॥

मारणान्तिकीं संलेखनां जोषिता ॥१७॥

शङ्काकाङ्क्षाविचिकित्साऽन्यदृष्टिप्रशंसासंस्तवाः सम्यग्दृष्टेरतिचाराः ॥१८॥

व्रतशीलेषु पञ्च पञ्च यथाक्रमम् ॥१९॥

बन्धवधच्छविच्छेदातिभारारोपणान्नपाननिरोधाः ॥२०॥

मिथ्योपदेशरहस्याभ्याख्यानकूटलेखक्रियान्यासापहारसाकारमन्त्रभेदाः ॥२१॥

स्तेनप्रयोगतदाहतादानविरुद्धराज्यातिक्रमहीनाधिकमानोन्मानप्रतिरूपकव्यवहाराः ॥२२॥

४. -माध्यस्थानि च स - स. रा. श्लो. ।

५. -वौ वा सं - स. रा. श्लो. ।

६. - 'यिकप्रोषधो' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

७. 'परिभोगातिथि' - भा. । The part of the *Bhāṣya* to this aphorism that is given in Siddhasena's Commentary—that too does not contain the word 'परिणाम'.

८. See Foot-note 1, p. 281.

९. संलेखनां - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१०. 'रतीचाराः' - भा. स. रा. श्लो. ।

११. 'वधच्छेदाति' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१२. 'रहोभ्या' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

परविवाहकरणेत्वरिगृहीतापरिगृहीतागमनानङ्गक्रीडातीव्रकामाभिनिवेशः^{१३} ॥२३॥

क्षेत्रवास्तुहिरण्यसुवर्णधनधान्यदासीदासकुप्यप्रमाणातिक्रमाः^{१४} ॥२४॥

ऊर्ध्वाधस्तिर्यग्व्यतिक्रमक्षेत्रवृद्धिस्मृत्यन्तर्धानानि^{१५} ॥२५॥

आनयनप्रेष्यप्रयोगशब्दरूपानुपातपुद्गलक्षेपाः^{१६} ॥२६॥

कन्दर्पकौतुक्यमौख्यासमीक्ष्याधिकरणोपभोगाधिकत्वानि^{१७} ॥२७॥

योगदुष्प्रणिधानानादस्मृत्यनुपस्थापनानि^{१८} ॥२८॥

अप्रत्यवेक्षिताप्रमाजितोत्सर्गादाननिक्षेपसंस्तारोपक्रमणानादस्मृत्यनुपस्थापनानि^{१९} ॥२९॥

सचित्तसंबन्धसंमिश्राभिषवदुष्प्रववाहारः^{२०} ॥३०॥

सचित्तनिक्षेपपिधानपरव्यपदेशमात्सर्यकालातिक्रमाः^{२१} ॥३१॥

१३. 'रणेत्वरिकापरि' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१४. 'डाकामतीव्राभि' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१५. Siddhasena says that in place of this some have another aphorism : 'परविवाहकरणेत्वरिकापरिगृहीतापरिगृहीतागमनानङ्गक्रीडातीव्रकामाभिनिवेशः(शाः)' This aphorism tallies somewhat—though not entirely—with the Digambara reading. See the preceding foot-note. Siddhasena also says that some break this compound as 'परविवाहकरणम्, इत्वरिकागमनम्, परिगृहीतापरिगृहीतागमनम्, अनङ्गक्रीडा तीव्रकामाभिनिवेशः'. That this complaint is directed against the Digambara commentaries does not appear to be the case. The meaning assigned to the word 'इत्वरिका' by those supporting the breakage-of-compound in question—that too is not acceptable to Siddhasena.

१६. स्मृत्यन्तराधानानि - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१७. Siddhasena says that according to some the reading is 'आनायन'.

१८. पुद्गलप्रक्षेपाः - भा. हा. । However in हा. comm. the reading is 'पुद्गलक्षेपाः'. In सि-वृ. the word 'पुद्गलप्रक्षेप' is taken for explanation.

१९. - 'कौतुक्यं' - भा. हा. ।

२०. - 'करणोपभोगपरिभोगानर्थक्यानि' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२१. स्मृत्यनुपस्थानानि - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२२. अप्रत्युपेक्षि' - हा. ।

२३. 'दानसंस्तरो' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२४. -स्मृत्यनुपस्थानानि - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२५. -सम्बन्ध- स. ग. श्लो. ।

२६. Does not occur in टि. ।

२७. -'क्षेपापिधान' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

जीवितमरणाशंसाभिन्नानुसंगसुखानुबन्धनिदानकरणानि ॥३२॥

अनुग्रहार्थं स्वस्यातिसर्गो दानम् ॥३३॥

विधिद्रव्यदातृपात्रविशेषात् तद्विशेषः ॥३४॥

अष्टमोऽध्यायः

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगा बन्धहेतवः ॥१॥

सकषायत्वाज्जीवः कर्मणो योग्यान् पुद्गलानादत्ते ॥२॥

स बन्धः ॥३॥

प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभार्वप्रदेशास्तद्विधयः ॥४॥

आद्यो ज्ञानदर्शनावरणवेदनीयमोहनीयायुष्कनामगोत्रान्तरायाः ॥५॥

पञ्चनवद्व्यष्टाविंशतिचतुर्द्विचत्वारिंशदिद्वपञ्चभेदा यथाक्रमम् ॥६॥

मत्यादीनाम् ॥७॥

चक्षुरचक्षुरवधिकेवलानां निदानिद्वानिद्राप्रचलाप्रचलाप्रचलास्त्यानगृद्धिवेदनीयानि च ॥८॥
सदसद्वेद्ये ॥९॥

दर्शन-चारित्र्यमोहनीय-कषाय-नोकषाय-वेदनीयाख्यास्त्रिद्विषोडशभेदाः सम्यक्त्व-
मिथ्यात्व-तदुभयानि कषाय-नोकषायावनन्तानुबन्ध्यप्रत्याख्यान-प्रत्याख्यानावरण-
संज्वलनविकल्पाश्चैकशः क्रोध-मान-माया-लोभा हास्य-रत्यरति-शोक-भय-जुगुप्सा-
स्त्री-पुं-नपुंसकवेदाः ॥१०॥

२८. 'निदानानि- स. रा. श्लो. ।

१. - 'दत्ते स बन्धः ॥ २ ॥ - स. रा. श्लो. ।

२. - 'त्यनुभव' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

३. - 'नीयायुर्नाम' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

४. - भेदा- रा. ।

५. मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानाम् - स. रा. श्लो. । To Siddhasena this reading seems to be void of mark. But Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda justify this very reading in preference to the abbreviated one approved by the Śvetāmbara sect.

६. -स्त्यानर्द्धि- सि. The reading of the सि-भा. appears to be 'स्त्यानगृद्धि', for Siddhasena says : 'स्त्यानर्द्धिरिति वा पाठः'.

७. -स्त्यानगृद्धयश्च- स. रा. श्लो. । Siddhasena argues in support of the word 'वेदनीय'.

८. दर्शनचारित्र्यमोहनीयाकषायकषायवेदनीयाख्यास्त्रिद्विषोडशभेदाः सम्यक्त्वमिथ्यात्वतदु-
भयान्यकषायकषायौ हास्यरत्यरतिशोकभयजुगुप्सास्त्रीपुंनपुंसकवेदा अनन्तानुबन्ध्यप्रत्याख्यानप्रत्याख्यान-
संज्वलनविकल्पाश्चैकशः क्रोधमानमायालोभाः - स. रा. श्लो. ।

९. Somebody had demurred that an aphorism ought not be so lengthy; the following answer given to him by an earlier master has been quoted by Siddhasena :

नारकतैर्यग्योनमानुषदैवानि ॥११॥

गतिजातिशरीराङ्गोपाङ्गनिर्माणबन्धनसङ्घतसंस्थानसंहननस्पर्शसगन्धवर्णानुपूर्व्यगुरुत्नघूपघात-
पराघातातपोद्द्योतोच्छ्वासविहायोगतयः प्रत्येकशरीरत्रससुभगसुस्वशुभसूक्ष्मपर्याप्तस्थिरा-
देययशांसिसेतराणि तीर्थकृत्त्वं च ॥१२॥

उच्चैर्नीचैश्च ॥१३॥

^{१२}दानादीनाम् ॥१४॥

आदितस्तिष्ठणामन्तरायस्य च त्रिंशत्सागरोपमकोटीकोट्यः परा स्थितिः ॥१५॥

सप्ततिमोहनीयस्य ॥१६॥

^{१३}नामगोत्रयोर्विशतिः ॥१७॥

त्रयस्त्रिंशत्सागरोपमाण्यायुष्कस्य ॥१८॥

अपरा द्वादशमुहूर्ता वेदनीयस्य ॥१९॥

नामगोत्रयोःष्टौ ॥२०॥

शेषाणामन्तर्मुहूर्तम् ॥२१॥

विपाकोऽनुभावः ॥२२॥

स यथानाम ॥२३॥

ततश्च निर्जरा ॥२४॥

नामप्रत्ययाः सर्वतो योगविशेषात्सूक्ष्मैकक्षेत्रावगाढस्थिताः सर्वात्मप्रदेशेष्वनन्तानन्त-
प्रदेशाः ॥२५॥

^{१४}सद्वेद्यसम्यक्त्वहास्यसतिपुरुषवेदशुभायुर्नामगोत्राणि पुण्यम् ॥२६॥

“दुर्व्याख्यानो गरीयांश्च मोहो भवति बन्धनः ।

न तत्र लाघवादिष्टं सूत्रकारेण दुर्वचम् ॥”

१०. - “नु पूर्व्यागु” स. ग. श्लो. । In सि-वृ. the reading is ‘आनुपूर्व्य’. Siddhasena says that on another view the reading is ‘आनुपूर्वी’ ; He also shows how the aphorism would take different forms on the two views.

११. -देययशास्की(शः की)र्तिसेतराणि तीर्थकृत्त्वं च-स. ग. श्लो. ।

१२. दानलाभभोगोपभोगवीर्याणाम् - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१३. विशतिर्नामगोत्रयोः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१४. - ण्यायुषः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१५. -मुहूर्ता- स. ग. श्लो. ।

१६. - “नुभवः - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१७. - “वगाहस्थि” - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१८. See note on 8. 26, p. 317.

नवमोऽध्यायः

आस्त्रवनिरोधः संवरः ॥१॥

स गुप्तिसमितिधर्मानुप्रेक्षापरीषहजयचास्त्रैः ॥२॥

तपसा निर्जरा च ॥३॥

सम्यग्योगनिग्रहो गुप्तिः ॥४॥

ईर्याभाषैषणादाननिक्षेपोत्सर्गाः समितयः ॥५॥

उत्तमः क्षमामार्दवार्जवशौचसत्यसंयमतपस्त्यागाकिञ्चन्यब्रह्मचर्याणि धर्मः ॥६॥

अनित्याशरणसंसारकत्वान्यत्वाशुचित्वास्त्रवसंवरनिर्जरा लोकबोधिदुर्लभधर्मस्वाख्यातत्वानु-
चिन्तनमनुप्रेक्षाः ॥७॥

मार्गाच्यवननिर्जरार्थं परिसोढव्याः परीषहाः ॥८॥

क्षुत्पिपासाशीतोष्णदंशमशकनाग्न्यासितस्त्रीचर्यानिषद्याशय्याक्रोशवधयाचनाऽलाभरोगतृणस्पर्शमल-
सत्कारपुरस्कारप्रज्ञाज्ञानादर्शनानि ॥९॥

सूक्ष्मसंपरायच्छब्दस्थवीतरागयोश्चतुर्दश ॥१०॥

एकादश जिने ॥११॥

बादसंपराये सर्वे ॥१२॥

ज्ञानावरणे प्रज्ञाज्ञाने ॥१३॥

दर्शनमोहान्तराययोरदर्शनालाभौ ॥१४॥

चारित्र्यमोहे नाग्न्यासितस्त्रीनिषद्याक्रोशयाचनासत्कारपुरस्काराः ॥१५॥

वेदनीये शेषाः ॥१६॥

१. उत्तमक्ष. - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२. - "शुच्यास्त्रव" - स. ग. श्लो. ।

३. "अपरे पठन्ति अनुप्रेक्षा इति अनुप्रेक्षितव्या इत्यर्थः । अपरे अनुप्रेक्षाशब्दमेकवचनान्तम-
धीयते"- सि-वृ. ।

४. There is 'ष' in all Śvetāmbara and Digambara printed texts. It is grammatical error caused by similarity with 'ष' in the word 'परीषह'. Correct grammatical form is 'परिसोढव्याः'. See Siddhasena 2.3.44 and Pāṇinīya 8. 3. 115.

५. -प्रज्ञाज्ञानसम्यक्त्वानि - हा. । But हा-भा. seems to have the reading 'अदर्शन'.

६. - "साम्यराय" - स. ग. श्लो. ।

७. See Foot-note 1, p. 336.

८. See Foot-note 2, p. 336.

एकादयो भाज्या युगपदैकोनविंशतेः ॥१७॥
 सामायिकच्छेदोपस्थाप्यपरिहारविशुद्धिसूक्ष्मसंपराययथाख्यातानि चारित्रम् ॥१८॥
 अनशनावमौदर्यवृत्तिपरिसंख्यानरसपरित्यागविविक्तशय्यासनकायक्लेशा बाह्यं तपः ॥१९॥
 प्रायश्चित्तविनयवैयवृत्त्यस्वाध्यायव्युत्सर्गध्यानान्युत्तरम् ॥२०॥
 नवचतुर्दशपञ्चद्विभेदं यथाक्रमं प्राग्ध्यानात् ॥२१॥
 आलोचनप्रतिक्रमणतदुभयविवेकव्युत्सर्गतपश्छेदपरिहारोपस्थापनानि ॥२२॥
 ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्र्योपचाराः ॥२३॥
 आचार्योपाध्यायतपस्विशैक्षकग्लानगणकुलसङ्गसाधुसमनोज्ञानाम् ॥२४॥
 वाचनाप्रच्छन्नानुप्रेक्षाप्रायधर्मोपदेशाः ॥२५॥
 बाह्याभ्यन्तरोपध्योः ॥२६॥
 उत्तमसंहननस्यैकाग्रचिन्तानिरोधो ध्यानम् ॥२७॥
 आ मुहूर्तात् ॥२८॥
 आर्तरीदधर्मशुक्लानि ॥२९॥
 परे मोक्षहेतू ॥३०॥
 आर्तममनोज्ञानां सम्प्रयोगे तद्विप्रयोगाय स्मृतिसमन्वाहारः ॥३१॥

१. - 'देकात्रविंशतेः' - हा. । - युगपदेकस्मिन्नेकात्रविंशतेः - स. । युगपदे-
 कस्मिन्नेकोनविंशतेः - रा. श्लो. । But the two vārtikas have the very same
 reading as स.

१०. - 'पस्थापनापरि' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

११. सूक्ष्मसाम्पराययथाख्यातमिति चा. - स. रा. श्लो. । Akalaṅka seems to
 support the reading 'अथाख्यात', for he gives out 'यथाख्यात' as an
 alternative reading. Siddhasena too supports the reading 'अथाख्यात'. See
 सि-वृ., p. 235.

१२. केचित् विच्छिन्नपदमेव सूत्रमधीयते - सिद्धसेनवृत्ति ।

१३. - 'वमोदर्य' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१४. - 'द्विभेदा' - स. श्लो. ।

१५. - 'स्थापनाः ।' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१६. - 'शैक्षग्लान' - स. । 'शैक्षग्लान' - रा. श्लो. ।

१७. - 'धुमनोज्ञानाम्' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

१८. स. रा. and श्लो. have 'ध्यानमान्तमुहूर्तात्'. So they do not have the
 aphorism 28 separately. See Foot-note 2, p. 345.

१९. - 'धर्म्यशु' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

२०. - 'नोज्ञस्य' - स. रा. श्लो. ।

वेदनायाश्च ॥३२॥

विपरीतं मनोज्ञानाम् ॥३३॥

निदानं च ॥३४॥

तद्विस्तृतदेशविस्तृतप्रमत्तसंयतानाम् ॥३५॥

हिंसानृतस्तेयविषयसंरक्षणेभ्यो रौद्रमविस्तृतदेशविस्तृतयोः ॥३६॥

आज्ञाऽप्रायविपाकसंस्थानविचयाय धर्ममप्रमत्तसंयतस्य ॥३७॥

उपशान्तक्षीणकषाययोश्च ॥३८॥

शुक्ले चाद्ये पूर्वविदः ॥३९॥

परे केवलिनः ॥४०॥

पृथक्त्वैकत्ववितर्कसूक्ष्मक्रियाप्रतिपातिव्युपस्तक्रियानिवृत्तीनि ॥४१॥

तत्त्वैककाययोगायोगानाम् ॥४२॥

एकाश्रये सवितर्के पूर्वे ॥४३॥

अविचारं द्वितीयम् ॥४४॥

२१. स. ग. and श्लो. have this aphorism after 'विपरीतं मनोज्ञानाम्' : that is to say, according to them it describes not the second but the third sub-type of *dhyāna* under consideration.

२२. मनोज्ञस्य - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२३. - 'चयाय धर्म्यमप्र' - हा. । - 'चयाय धर्म्यम् ॥ ३६ ॥ - स. ग. श्लो. । In the Digambara reading the portion 'अप्रमत्तसंयतस्य' indicative of those authorized is absent. Not only that, it also does not have the next aphorism 'उपशान्तक्षीण'. - Those authorized have been mentioned in Sarvārthasiddhi, and keeping that mention in mind Akalaṅka also refutes the corresponding mention occurring in the Śvetāmbara reading. He has been followed by Vidyānanda as well. See p. 352.

२४. See p. 352. Foot-note 1. In भा. हा. the portion 'पूर्वविदः' has been published neither as a portion of this aphorism nor as separate aphorism, in सि. it has been published as a separate aphorism but Siddhasena does not treat it as a separate aphorism. The Digambara commentaries publish it as a portion of this very aphorism.

२५. 'निवृत्तीनि' - हा. सि. । स. ग. श्लो. । An alternative ms of स. also has the reading 'निवृत्तीनि'.

२६. 'तत्' is missing in स. ग. श्लो. ।

२७. - 'तर्कविचारे पूर्वे' - स. । - 'तर्कविचारे पूर्वे' - ग. श्लो. ।

२८. Due to a mistake of the editor this aphorism has not been printed separately in सि.; ग. and श्लो. have the reading 'अविचारं'.

वितर्कः श्रुतम् ॥४५॥

विचारोऽर्थव्यञ्जनयोगसंक्रान्तिः ॥४६॥

सम्यग्दृष्टिश्चावकविरतानन्तवियोजकदर्शनमोहक्षपकोपशमकोपशान्तमोहक्षपकक्षीणमोहजिनाः
क्रमशोऽसङ्ख्येयगुणनिर्जराः ॥४७॥

पुलाकबकुशकुशीलनिर्ग्रन्थस्नातका निर्ग्रन्थाः ॥४८॥

संयमश्रुतप्रतिसेवनातीर्थलिङ्गलेश्योपपातस्थानविकल्पतः साध्याः ॥४९॥

दशमोऽध्यायः

मोहक्षयाज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयाच्च केवलम् ॥१॥

बन्धहेत्वभावनिर्जराभ्याम् ॥२॥

कृत्स्नकर्मक्षयो मोक्षः ॥३॥

औपशमिकादिभव्यत्वाभावाच्चान्यत्र केवलसम्यक्त्वज्ञानदर्शनसिद्धत्वेभ्यः ॥४॥

तदनन्तरमूर्ध्वं गच्छत्या लोकान्तात् ॥५॥

पूर्वप्रयोगादसङ्गत्वाद्बन्धछेदात्तथागतिपरिणामाच्च तद्गतिः ॥६॥

क्षेत्रकालगतिलिङ्गतीर्थचारित्रप्रत्येकबुद्धबोधितज्ञानावगाहनान्तरसङ्ख्याल्पबहुत्वतः
साध्याः ॥७॥

२९. 'लेश्योपपादस्था' - स. ग. श्लो. ।

१. 'भ्यां कृत्स्नकर्मविप्रमोक्षो मोक्षः ॥ २ ॥ - स. ग. श्लो. ।

२. In place of it स. ग. and श्लो. have two aphorisms : 'औपशमिकादिभव्यत्वानां च' and 'अन्यत्र केवलसम्यक्त्वज्ञानदर्शनसिद्धत्वेभ्यः'.

३. 'तद्गतिः' is missing in स. ग. and श्लो., and they also have after this aphorism two more—viz. 'आविद्धकुलालचक्रवदव्यपगतलेपालाबुवदेरण्ड-बीजवदग्निशिखावच्च' and 'धर्मास्तिकायाभावात्'. The sense of these latter two aphorisms is already conveyed in the *Bhāṣya*. After this aphorism ८ has an aphorism 'धर्मास्तिकायाभावात्'.

TATTVĀRTHA SŪTRA
WITH
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF
PT. SUKHLALJI'S COMMENTARY

CHAPTER ONE

The Subject-matter under Investigation

Infinite is the number of living beings and all without exception desire happiness. And even though not all share the same notion of happiness it is possible to divide into two classes the living beings and the happiness appropriate to them—keeping in view the lesser or greater development attained by these beings. The first class comprises those beings with a lesser development whose notion of happiness is confined to but external means. On the other hand, the second class comprises those beings with a higher development who, not identifying happiness with the acquisition of external or physical means, identify it with the attainment of meritorious spiritual qualifications alone.

Here the happiness envisaged by one class differs from that envisaged by the other in that the former is dependent on what is other than oneself, the latter dependent on oneself alone.

The happiness dependent on what is not oneself is called *kāma* or worldly enjoyment, that dependent on oneself alone *mokṣa* or disentanglement from worldliness. *Kāma* and *mokṣa*—these two alone are the possible *puruṣārthas* or goals of human aspiration, for nothing save them can be a thing chiefly aimed at by a being. Thus when *artha* or economic possession and *dharma* or religious conduct are enumerated among the *puruṣārthas* they are viewed not as something chiefly aimed at but as means of *kāma* and *mokṣa* respectively. Certainly *artha* is the chief means of *kāma*, *dharma* that of *mokṣa*. The treatise under consideration

has *mokṣa* for its chief subject-matter. Hence the author divides into three departments the *dharma* that is the means of *mokṣa* and thus refers to it in his first aphorism.

***Samyak-darśana* or right inclination, *samyak-jñāna* or right cognition, *samyak-cāritra* or right conduct—these three combined are the means of *mokṣa*. 1.**

In this aphorism there is a bare indication of the means of *mokṣa*. Although the nature and the possible sub-types of each are in the sequel going to be described in details here is a brief account of their essential nature.

The Nature of *Mokṣa*

The perfect spiritual development resulting from an absence of bondage and of its causes is called *mokṣa*. That is to say, the supreme level of knowledge and of the state of dispassion is *mokṣa*.

The Nature of the Means of *Mokṣa*

That qualification or power whose development brings about a realization of truth—that is, of the nature of things as they are—or whose development brings about an inclination towards valid discrimination between what is worthy of rejection and what is worthy of acceptance is *samyak-darśana* or right inclination. A valid comprehension of the fundamental verities like soul etc.—a comprehension arrived at through the instrumentality of *naya* and *pramāṇa*¹—is *samyak-jñāna* or right cognition.

The free enjoyment of one's own nature that results from a cessation of all defined mental states, that is, of all attachment

1. The cognition which is expressible through words—that is, in which a thing is reflected in the form of a subject and a predicate—is *naya*, the cognition in which a thing is validity apprehended—completely or in part—without bifurcation into a subject and a predicate is *pramāṇa*. For further details see chapter one, aphorism 6; also Nyāyavatāra vv 29-30 Gujarati translation.

and aversion, and of all *yoga*¹—a cessation preceded by right cognition—is *samyak-cāritra*² or right conduct.

The Concomitance of the Means of *Mokṣa*

When all the above three means are available in a perfect form only then is complete *mokṣa* possible, never otherwise. So long as imperfection vitiates even a single of these three means complete *mokṣa* remains an impossibility. For example, in the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* *samyak-darśana* and *samyak-jñāna* are available in a perfect form and yet there is no complete *mokṣa*—that is, no realization of the state of disembodiment—because *samyak-cāritra* is here still imperfect;³ on the other hand, there is possibility of complete *mokṣa* in the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* because here there is available perfect *cāritra* in the form of the state of *śaileśī*,³ an availability that signifies the perfection of all the three means in question.

The Necessary Concomitance

Of the above three means the first two—i. e. *samyak-darśana* and *samyak-jñāna* necessarily go together.⁴

1. Yoga stands for activity, be it of a mental, vocal or bodily type.
2. A renunciation of the vices like violence etc. is usually called *samyak-cāritra*. That is so because through it is brought about the cessation of all attachment and aversion while such a cessation automatically results in a renunciation of the vices and an implementation of the great vows.
3. In the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* *cāritra* is perfect in so far as it is of the form of a state of dispassion, but it is imperfect because perfect *cāritra* is supposed to comprise both a state of dispassion and an absence of *yoga*. Perfect *cāritra* thus conceived is available in the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* and it immediately brings about the state of disembodiedness. The state of *Śaileśī* is that particular state of a soul in which as a result of the supreme performance of meditation there comes about a Meru-like absence of all wavering. For further details see—Hindi *Dūsarā Karma-grantha*-p.30.
4. There is also a view according to which *darśana* and *jñāna* go together not necessarily but only optionally. On this view it is well

Just as the heat and light of the sun cannot be found in isolation from each other so also do *samyak-darśana* and *samyak-jñāna*; but it is not necessary for these two to be accompanied by *samyak-cāritra*, for even in the absence of *samyak-cāritra*, *samyak-darśana* and *samyak-jñāna* can be present there for a while. On the other hand, it is a demand of the law of successive progress that *samyak-cāritra* must necessarily be preceded by *samyak-darśana* and *samyak-jñāna*.

Question : If *mokṣa* consists in a development of spiritual qualifications and its means like *samyak-darśana* etc. too consist in a development of such and such spiritual qualifications then where is the difference between *mokṣa* and its means ?

Answer : There is no such difference at all.

Question : If so, then how to speak in this connection of the relation of means and end—that is, how to say that *mokṣa* is an end while the triple jewel in the form of *samyak-darśana* etc. is its means ? For certainly, the relation of means and end can obtain only between things that are mutually different ?

possible that there is no *jñāna* at the time when *darśana* takes its rise. The meaning is that in the case of the gods, the hellish beings, the animals and certain human beings it so happens that even when they come to acquire *samyaktva* (*-samyak-darśana*) they are devoid of the special scriptural cognition—i. e. of cognition of the texts like *Ācārāṅga* etc. which go to constitute the class called *Aṅga*. Thus according to this view the absence of *jñāna* possibly obtaining at the time of the rise of *darśana* is the absence of the special scriptural cognition.

As against this the view according to which *darśana* and *jñāna* go together necessarily is purported to maintain that the same wrong cognition of the form of *matī* etc. which was present there before the rise of *darśana* is transformed into right cognition of the form of *matī* etc.—as soon as right *darśana* takes its rise with wrong *darśana* coming to a stop. On this view, by right cognition is to be understood not just the special scriptural cognition but whatever type and whatever quantity of cognition of determinate form that might be present there at the time of the rise of *samyaktva* (*-samyak-darśana*).

Answer : When it is said that the relation of means and end obtains between the triple jewel and *mokṣa* it is done from the standpoint of the state of the seeker not from that of the state of the accomplished. For the seeker has for his aim *mokṣa* which is of the form of the triple jewel like *samyak-darśana* etc. brought to perfection, and the attainment of *mokṣa* thus conceived takes place through a gradual development of the triple jewel. The present treatise is meant for the seeker not for the accomplished. Hence it speaks of the difference obtaining between an end and its means, a difference that is certainly of use to a seeker.

Question : In the worldly life we actually see that happiness is attained through means like wealth, woman, progeny etc., why then recommend not this happiness but that which is of the form of *mokṣa* and as such is beyond the ken of vision ?

Answer : *Mokṣa* is recommended because it yields real happiness. The worldly life, on the other hand, yields happiness no doubt but that is pseudo-happiness not real happiness.

Question : *Mokṣa* yields real happiness while the worldly life yields pseudo-happiness—how is it so ?

Answer : The worldly happiness arises through the fulfilment of desire. But it is the very nature of desire that as soon as—rather even before—one of them is fulfilled hundreds of others crop up. Now it is impossible for all these new desires to be fulfilled, and even if that be possible there will meanwhile arise thousands of other desires whose fulfilment will remain certainly impossible. All this means that in the worldly life the unhappiness born of the non-fulfilment of desires always weighs heavier than the happiness born of the fulfilment thereof. Hence it is that the happiness in question is called pseudo-happiness. On the other hand, *mokṣa* is so conditioned that it involves an absence of all desires and an emergence of natural contentment. This *mokṣa* time happiness born of contentment is alone happiness, real happiness. 1.

The definition of *Samyak-darśana* :

The inclination towards validity determining the nature of things is *samyak-darśana*. 2

The causes of the origination of *samyak-darśana* :

That (i.e. *samyak-darśana*) originates either by nature, that is, in the automatic course of affairs—or through attainment—that is, through external means like instruction etc. 3

The inclination towards validly cognizing the nature of the things of the world might be the result of a worldly ambition or of a spiritual one. That curiosity to cognize the nature of things which is aimed at fulfilling a worldly passion like wealth, honour, etc. is not *samyak-darśana*, for that brings about not *mokṣa* but an entanglement in worldliness. On the other hand, that inclination towards determining the nature of things which is aimed at sheer spiritual satisfaction, spiritual development is verily *samyak-darśana*.

The Definitive and Practical Standpoints Differentiated

That qualitative transformation of a soul—resulting from spiritual development—which is of the form of an inclination towards validly cognising all that is cognizable, renouncing what is worthy of rejection, taking up what is worthy of acceptance is *samyak-darśana* as viewed from the definitive standpoint. On the other hand, the faith in things religious resulting from the inclination in question is *samyaktva* (= *samyak-darśana*) as viewed from the practical standpoint.

The Distinguishing Marks of *Samyaktva* (= *Samyak-darśana*)

The distinguishing marks of *samyak-darśana* are understood to be five viz. *praśama* or spiritual calmness, *saṁvega* or spiritual agitation, *nirveda* or spiritual detachment, *anukampā* or compassion, *āstikya* or religiosity etc. Here (i) the calming down of the vices like wrong insistence etc. that result from a misplaced partisanship of philosophical views—that is *praśama*; (ii) the fear

of worldly bondage—that is *saṁvega*; (iii) the lessening of attachment towards things worldly—that is *nirveda*; (iv) the desire to remove the misery of those in misery—that is *anukampā*; (v) the belief in the existence of entities like soul etc. which are supersensuous and yet rationally demonstrable—that is *āstikya*.

The Different Causes

As soon as the level of spiritual evolution capable of producing *samyak-darśana* is reached *samyak-darśana* makes its appearance. However, in the case of one soul this appearance requires the aid of some external means, in the case of another one it does not. It is only too wellknown that one person learns an art like sculpture etc. with the aid of an instructor etc., while another one does the same by himself and without requiring the aid of someone else. Thus even though the internal cause of *samyak-darśana* is identical in all cases the present aphorism divides it into that originating by nature, and that originating through attainment keeping in view its dependence or non-dependence on an external means. And the external means in question are of various types. Thus one person attains *samyak-darśana* through a mere sight of some religious article like image etc., another one does so through listening to the instructions of the preceptor, another one through reading or listening to the scriptural texts, another one through entering into the company of saintly personages.

The Order of Origination¹

Experiencing various sorts of miseries in the beginningless course of its worldly career a worthy soul sometimes comes to attain such a purified qualitative transformation as is unprecedented for it. The attainment of this purified qualitative transformation is called *apūrva-karaṇa* or accomplishing the unprecedented. *Apūrva-karaṇa* puts an end to that acuteness of

1. For an elucidation of the order of origination see Hindi *ūsarā Karmagrantha* p. 7 and the introduction to *cauthā Karmagrantha* p. 13.

attachment and aversion which is a hindrance to the partisanship of right ascertainment—to the *āgraha* or insistence on *satya* or truth. And as soon as this acuteness of attachment and aversion disappears the soul concerned becomes wide awake to the reception of truth. It is this spiritual awakening that is called *samyaktva* (= *samyak-darśana*). 2-3.

The fundamental verities mentioned by name :

Jīva or soul, *ajīva* or non-soul, *āsrava* or inflow, *bandha* or bondage, *saṁvara* or protection, *nirjarā* or cleansing off and *mokṣa* or emancipation—these are the fundamental verities¹. 4.

In many texts *puṇya* or spiritual merit and *pāpa* or spiritual demerit are counted among the fundamental verities which are thus total nine. But here their number is seven because here both *puṇya* and *pāpa* are included in the verity *āsrava* or the verity *bandha*. And the inclusion in question is to be understood as follows. Both *puṇya* and *pāpa* are of two types—viz. a *dravya*-type i. e. physical type and a *bhāva*-type i. e. mental type. The auspicious Karmic matter is *puṇya* of the physical type, the inauspicious Karmic matter is *pāpa* of the physical type. Hence *puṇya* and *pāpa* of the physical type are included in the verity *bandha*—for it is the Karmic matter adjoined to a soul or the specific adjunction of the Karmic matter to a soul that is called *bandha* of the physical type. On the other hand, the auspicious mental endeavour that causes *puṇya* of the physical-type is *puṇya* of the mental type while the inauspicious mental endeavour that causes *pāpa* of the physical type is *pāpa* of the mental type—and

1. What the Buddhist philosophy understands by the four *āryasatyas* (or noble truths) viz. *duḥkha* or misery, *saṁudya* or the cause of misery, *nirodha* or the cessation of misery, and *mārga* or the path to the cessation of misery, what the Sāṁkhya and Yoga philosophies understand by the four *vyūhas* (or arrays)—viz. *heya* or that to be rejected, *heyahetu* or the cause of that to be rejected, *hāna* or rejection, and *hānopāya* or the means of rejection, and what the Nyāya philosophy understands by the term *artha* (or object worthy of investigation)—the same is understood by the Jaina philosophy by the five of the verities here catalogued—viz. those from *āsrava* upto *mokṣa*.

these two also are included in the verity *bandha*, for it is a soul's state of the form of passionate mental endeavour—a state which causes bondage that is called *bandha* of the mental type.

Question : The five verities from *āsrava* upto *mokṣa* are, unlike *jīva* and *ajīva*, neither independent nor beginningless and endless. For they are simply either a possible state of a *jīva* or a possible state of an *ajīva*. Why then are they counted as fundamental verities along with *jīva* and *ajīva* ?

Answer : That precisely is how things stand. This is to say that in the present context by a fundamental verity is to be understood not an entity that is beginningless, endless and independent but an entity whose cognition is useful in attaining *mokṣa*. Certainly, *mokṣa* being the chief subject-matter of the present treatise only those things are here enumerated as fundamental verities whose cognition is extremely necessary on the part of those desirous of knowing about *mokṣa*.

As for *mokṣa* it is the chief end to be aimed at and so it goes without saying that without knowing it as also its causes one desirous of attaining *mokṣa* cannot take up the path leading to *mokṣa*. Similarly, in case such a one does not know the entity that stands opposed to *mokṣa* or that which causes this entity he cannot proceed on his chosen path without stumbling. And one desirous of attaining *mokṣa* has to know first of all that if he is competent to attain *mokṣa* then what are the entities that share features characteristic of him and what are those that do not do so. It is in order to make this knowledge available that the seven fundamental verities have been mentioned. By mentioning the verity *jīva* it is made out as to who is competent to attain *mokṣa*. By mentioning the verity *ajīva* it is indicated that there is also in the world an entity which being inanimate is incompetent to receive instruction regarding the path leading to *mokṣa*. By mentioning the verity *bandha* is pointed out the entity that stands opposed to *mokṣa*, by mentioning the verity *āsrava* that which causes this entity. By the verity *saṁvara* is indicated the cause of *mokṣa*, by the verity *nirjarā* the procedural order of *mokṣa*. 4

The *nikṣepas* or manners of positing indicated by name :

They—that is, *samyak-darśana* etc. on the one hand, *jīva* etc. on the other—are subjected to the process of *nikṣepa* or *nyāsa* (i.e. positing) or *vibhāga* (i. e. classification) in the form of *nāma* or name, *sthāpanā* or representation, *dravya* or potency, and *bhāva* or reality. 5.

All practical intercourse or exchange of knowledge has language for its chief instrument. And a language is made up of words. Now one and the same word is employed to yield several meanings depending on the purpose or context. In any case, four meanings at least are had by each and every word. It is these four meanings that are the four classifications of its general meaning. And these classifications are what are called *nikṣepas* or *nyāsas*. Knowing them one finds it easy to follow the intention of a speaker. Hence it is that in the present aphorism there is made mention of those four *nikṣepas* pertaining to meaning, so that it might be clearly specified as to what meaning—and no other—is to be assigned to the words standing for *samyak-darśana* etc. that are of the form of the pathway to *mokṣa* and for *jīva* etc. that are of the form of the fundamental verities. Here are the four *nikṣepas* in question : (i) The meaning that is not derived etymologically but is gathered on the basis of the convention set up by the father, mother or some other people is meaning of the type called *nāma-nikṣepa*; for example, a person who possesses no qualification appropriate to a *sevaka* (Sanskrit for servant) but whom somebody has given the name *Sevaka*. (ii) The thing which is a copy, statue or picture of the real thing or which is conventionally made to stand for this real thing is what signifies meaning of the type called *sthāpanā-nikṣepa*; for example, the picture, photograph or statue of a *sevaka*. (iii) The thing which is an earlier or a later form—that is, an earlier or a later condition—of the thing signifying *bhāva-nikṣepa* is what signifies meaning of the type called *dravya-nikṣepa*; for example, a person who, though not performing a *sevā* (Sanskrit for service) for the present, has done so in the past or is going to do so in the future. (iv) The thing which properly satisfies the ground of

etymology or the ground of usage¹ of the corresponding word is what signifies meaning of the type called *bhāva-nikṣepa*; for example, a person who is performing acts appropriate to a *sevaka*.

Also in the case of the words standing for *samyak-darśana* etc. that constitute the pathway to *mokṣa* and for *jīva* etc. that constitute the fundamental verities it is possible to discover four *nikṣepas* each. But in the present context they are to be taken in their *bhāva*-form (i. e. as yielding meaning that corresponds to *bhāva-nikṣepa*).

1. Briefly speaking, words are of two types—*yaugika* or composite and *rūḍha* or conventional. 'Cook', 'goldsmith' etc. are *yaugika* words, 'cow' 'horse' etc. are *rūḍha* words. Thus he who cooks is a cook, he who fabricates things out of gold is a goldsmith. Here the act of cooking and that of fabricating things out of gold constitute the ground of etymology for the words 'cook' and 'goldsmith' respectively. That is to say, the words in question are formed on the very basis of the acts in question—which is why such an act is called the ground of etymology for such a word. Applying the same rule to Sanskrit words we are to understand that the words like *pācaka* (cook, lit. he who cooks,) *kumbha-kāra* (potter, lit. he who makes a jar) etc. have for their ground of etymology the acts like cooking, making a jar etc. The idea is that in the case of *yaugika* words the concerned ground of etymology is also the ground of usage, but that is not so in the case of *rūḍha* words. For the *rūḍha* words are employed not on the basis of their etymology but on the basis of convention. Thus the words like 'cow' (Sanskrit *go*), 'horse' (Sanskrit *aśva*) etc. have got no particular etymology and even if they are somehow assigned an etymology the fact remains that they are employed on the basis of conviction, not on the basis of an etymology. In the case of the *rūḍha* words like 'cow', 'horse' etc. the ground of employment is the corresponding form or class-character; hence in their case this form or class-character is called not the ground of etymology but the ground of usage.

In the case of *yaugika* words (standing as an adjective) the meaning of the form of the ground of etymology should be treated as *bhāva-nikṣepa*, while in the case of *rūḍha* words (standing as a class-name) the meaning of the form of the ground of usage should be so treated.

The means of knowing the fundamental verities :

Things are cognised through the instrumentality of *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. 6.

The Difference Between the *Pramāṇas* and *Nayas*

Both a *naya* and a *pramāṇa* are certainly of the form of cognition but they differ from each other inasmuch as the former acquaints us with but one aspect of a thing while the latter with a number of them. That is to say, a thing is possessed of numerous properties and when it is ascertained on the basis of but one of these properties the ascertainment concerned—e.g. the ascertainment, on the basis of the property eternity, in the form ‘A thing—e.g. a soul, a lamp or the like—is eternal’—is *naya*. On the other hand, when a thing is ascertained on the basis of numerous properties the ascertainment concerned—e.g. the ascertainment, on the basis of the properties eternity, transience etc. in the form ‘A thing—e.g. a soul, a lamp or the like—is multiformed because of its multifarious properties like eternity, transience etc.’—is *pramāṇa*. In other words, a *naya* is but a part of the corresponding *pramāṇa* while a *pramāṇa* is but an aggregate of the corresponding *nayas*; for a *naya* grasps a thing from but one viewpoint while a *pramāṇa* does the same from numerous viewpoints. 6

The mention of certain ‘gateways to consideration’¹ conducive to a detailed knowledge of the fundamental verities :

1. To penetrate into a thing means to acquire knowledge concerning it and to consider over it. The chief means of doing so is to raise various questions relating to it. The better these questions are answered the greater will be the penetration into the thing in question. Hence it is questions that are the gateways to a penetration into things—that is, to the process of reaching their depth by means of consideration. Thus the phrase ‘gateway to consideration (=investigation), should be taken to stand for questions. In the scriptural texts (=theoretical treatises) they are called *anuyogadvāras*; here *anuyoga* means interpretation or elucidation, *dvāra* means question (so that the whole phrase means questions relating to interpretation or elucidation).

Things like *samyak-darśana* etc. are known on the basis of (questions relating to) *nirdeśa* or mention, *svāmitva* or possessorship, *sādhana* or instrument, *adhikaraṇa* or location, *sthiti* or duration and *vidhāna* or classification; again, on the basis of (questions relating to) *sat* or existence, *saṅkhyā* or number, *kṣetra* or field of occupation, *sparsana* or field of touch, *kāla* or time, *antara* or interval, *bhāva* or condition resulting from the presence or otherwise of *karma* and *alpabahutva* or relative numerical strength. 7-8.

Whenever a person, big or small, who is eager to gain knowledge sees or hears about a new thing—say, an aeroplane—his curiosity is aroused and he raises various questions regarding this thing hitherto unseen or unheard of. Thus he raises questions as to the name of this thing, its colour and form, its owner, its means of construction, its seating quarter, its maximum durability, its types—and receiving an answer to his questions augments his stock of knowledge. Similarly an internally oriented person, when he hears about the pathway to *mokṣa* or about the spiritual verities that are worthy of rejection or acceptance raises various questions regarding these all and through them augments his stock of knowledge. It is this idea that is expressed in the present two aphorisms. For example, the following is a brief consideration of *samyak-darśana* made on the basis of the fourteen questions—i. e. questions relating to *nirdeśa* etc.—catalogued in the aphorisms in questions :-

(1) *Nirdeśa* or mention—i. e. *svarūpa* or nature—*samyak-darśana* is of the nature of an inclination towards truth. (2) *Svāmitva* or possessorship—i. e. *adhikāritva* or the state of being authorized—one authorized to attain *samyak-darśana* must be a soul, not a not-soul, for it is a property or state of but soul. (3) *Sādhana* or instrument—i. e. *kāraṇa* or cause—the subsidence, the destruction-cum-subsidence and the destruction of the *darśanamohanīya karma*—these three are the internal causes of *samyak-darśana*. On the other hand, its external causes are numerous—e. g. the scriptural knowledge, the recall of a past birth, the sight of an image, the company of saintly personages.

(4) *Adhikaraṇa* or 'locus—i. e. *ādhāra* or substratum—the substratum of *samyak-darśana* is a soul, for being a state of soul it resides in a soul.

Since *samyak-darśana* is a property its possessor and locus are not mutually different, but when consideration is bestowed on the possessor and the locus of a substance like soul etc. the two can well be mutually different. For example, viewed from a practical angle the possessor (i. e. owner) of a soul must be another soul but its locus must be the place where it is seated or its own body—(5) *Sthiti* or duration i. e. *kāla-maryādā* or temporal limit—the minimum duration of *samyak-darśana* is a period measuring less than a *muhūrta*, its maximum duration a period that is possessed of a beginning but is endless. All the three types of *samyaktva* (= *samyak-darśana*) originate at a particular time and so they are all possessed of a beginning or an early limit. However, the *aupaśamika* and the *kṣayopāśamika* types (i.e. the first two types) do not endure for ever and so they two are also possessed of an end or a later limit; on the other hand, the *kṣāyika* type (i.e. the third type), when once born, never disappears, and so it is without an end. It is on the basis of these considerations that *samyak-darśana* has to be generally understood as 'possessed of both a beginning and an end', and 'possessed of a beginning but of no end.' (6) *Vidhāna* or classification—i.e. *prakāra* or type—*samyaktva* (= *samyak-darśana*) is of three types—*aupaśamika*, *kṣayopāśamika*, *ksāyika*. (7) *Sat* or existence : the property *samyaktva* quā something existent is present there in all the souls but its manifestation as such is possible only in the 'worthy' souls (i.e. souls destined to attain *mokṣa*) not in the unworthy ones (i.e. souls destined not to attain *mokṣa*). (8) *San̄khyā* or number : the number of *samyaktva* is the same as the number of those who have attained it. Uptil now *ananta* (=infinite) souls have attained *samyaktva* and in future too *ananta* of them will do so. Viewed thus *samyak-darśana* is *ananta* in number. (9) *Kṣetra* or field of occupation : the field of occupation of *samyak-darśana* is not the total *lokākāśa* (i. e. that portion of space which is the locus of the portion of the universe

called *loka*), but only this total divided by the number *asaṅkhyāta* (=innumerable). Whether we consider the case of one soul that has attained *samyak-darśana* or that of the *ananta* souls that have done so the field of occupation of *samyak-darśana* will turn out to be the total *loka* divided by *asaṅkhyāta*. For even the field collectively occupied by all the souls that have attained *samyak-darśana* measures but the total *loka* divided by *asaṅkhyāta*. Of course, there will be found a difference inasmuch as the field collectively occupied by all the souls that have attained *samyak-darśana* is bigger than that occupied by one such soul, for the number *asaṅkhyāta* is itself of *asaṅkhyāta* types all mutually differing in quantity. (10) *Sparsana* or field of touch—by touching is to be understood the touching of those space-units that surround the portion of space acting as the locus of the thing concerned. Thus the field of occupation covers only that part of space which acts as the locus of the thing concerned, while the field of touch covers also those space-units which surround the space acting as locus and so are touched by the thing concerned. Herein lies the difference between the field of occupation and the field of touch. In the case of *samyak-darśana* its field of touch too would measure the total *loka* divided by *asaṅkhyāta*, but its extent will be somewhat bigger than that of the concerned field of occupation inasmuch as the former field also includes the borderline units that surround the latter field. (11) *Kāla* or time : when the period of *samyak-darśana* is calculated in the case of one particular soul it turns out to be either a period that is possessed of both a beginning and an end or a period that is possessed of a beginning but of no end. But when the same is calculated in the case of all the souls taken together it ought to be a period that is possessed of neither a beginning nor an end. For throughout the past there was no period of time when there was no soul possessed of *samyaktva*, and the same is true of the future. That is to say, *samyak-darśana* has been making its appearance since a beginningless time and it will continue to do so till an endless time. (12) *Antara* or interval : when the empty interval—i. e. interval devoid of *samyak-darśana* is calculated in

the case of one particular soul it turns out to be *antarmuhūrta*¹ at the least and *apārdhapudgala-parāvarta*² at the most.

For *samyaktva*, when vomitted—that is, lost once, can be regained after an *antarmuhūrta* at the earliest; and if that does not happen it must necessarily be regained by the end of an *apārdha-pudgalaparāvarta*. However, when calculation is made in the case of all the souls taken together then there is no empty interval at all so far as *samyak-darśana* is concerned, for amongst the so many souls there must always be some that are possessed of *samyak-darśana*. (13) *Bhāva* or condition-resulting from the presence or otherwise of *karma-samyaktva* is to be found under three karmic conditions—viz. that resulting from the subsidence of a karma, that resulting from its subsidence-cum-destruction that resulting from its destruction. These conditions are respectively generated by the subsidence, subsidence-cum-destruction and destruction of the *darśanamohaṇīya* karma that acts as concealment of *samyaktva*. It is these conditions that are indicative of the relative purity of the different cases of *samyaktva*. Thus *samyaktva* resulting from the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma in question is purer than that resulting

1. *Antarmuhūrta* is the period of time greater than an *āvali* and less than a *muhūrta*. An *āvali* plus one *samaya* makes up the minimum *antarmuhūrta* a *muhūrta* minus one *samaya* makes up the maximum *antarmuhūrta*, the intermediate periods constitute the medium *antarmuhūrta*. This is according to the Digambara tradition. See *Tilopa-pannatti* 4-2-88; *Jivakāṇḍa gāthās* 573-575. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition nine *samayas* make up the minimum *antarmuhūrta* all the remaining periods being treated as the same (i. e. as non-minimum *antarmuhūrta*).

2. A soul appropriates material particles and transforms them into body, speech, *manas* or internal organ, and breath. When in the case of a particular soul it so happens that it appropriates all the existing material particles of the universe and releases them after transforming them into each of the types of body except the *āhāraka* type—also into speech, *manas* and breath—then the period of time required for all this is the period, technically called *pudgalaparāvarta*. A period somewhat lesser than this is called *apārdha pudgalaparāvarta*.

from its subsidence¹ while that resulting from its destruction is purer than the former.

Besides the above three there are two more conditions—viz. that resulting from the manifestation of a Karma and that which is natural (i. e. that which has nothing to do with Karma.) But *samyaktva* is not to be found under either of these conditions. That is to say, *samyaktva* cannot make its appearance at a time when the *darśanamohanīya karma* is manifesting itself; similarly, inasmuch as it is not found in a soul unconcealed since a beginningless time—this in contrast to the class-character soul-ness that is actually so found in a soul—*samyaktva* is also not a natural condition of soul. (14) *Alpabhutva* or the relative numerical strength—of the above three types of *samyaktva* that resulting from subsidence is numerically smallest, for the souls possessed of this type of *samyaktva* are always fewer than those possessed of the other two types. *Samyaktva* resulting from subsidence-cum-destruction is *asankhyāta* times greater than that resulting from subsidence while that resulting from destruction is *ananta* times greater than the former. *Samyaktva* resulting from destruction is *ananta* times greater because it characterizes all the souls that have attained *mokṣa* while the number of such souls is *ananta*. 7-8.

Types of Right Cognition :

Mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala—these five are the types of cognition. 9.

1. Here when *samyaktva* resulting from subsidence-cum-destruction is declared to be purer than that resulting from subsidence what is had in mind is not the quality but the duration of the two. For so far as quality is concerned it is the latter that is purer; that is so because *pradeśodaya* (i. e. a particularly mild type of manifestation) of *mithyātva* (i. e. the Karma in question = the *darśanamohanīya karma*) is possible at the time when the former is present, but no type of *udaya* (i. e. manifestation) of *mithyātva* is possible at the time when the latter is present. However, the possible duration of the former is much greater than that of the latter, and in this respect the former can even be said to be purer than the latter.

Unlike *samyak-darśana*, *samyak-jñāna* has not been defined through a special aphorism. That is because when the definition of *samyak-darśana* is once known that of *samyak-jñāna* can be known as a matter of course. To wit, it can well happen that a particular soul is devoid of *samyak-darśana* but it never happens that it is devoid of cognition; thus this soul must possess some cognition or other and the same is turned into right-cognition or *samyak-jñāna* as soon as *samyak-darśana* makes its appearance. So the only difference between the cognition of the form of *samyak-jñāna* and that of the form of not-*samyak-jñāna* is that the former is accompanied by *samyaktva* while the latter is devoid of the same—that is, the latter is accompanied by *mithyātva* (i.e. the quality opposed to *samyaktva*.)

Question : What is it that lends so much competence to *samyaktva* that so long as it is absent all cognition, howsoever extensive and howsoever free from illusion, is called false cognition or not-*samyak-jñāna*, while on the other hand, as soon as it appears there even that cognition which is somewhat indistinct and illusory is called *samyak-jñāna* ?

Answer : The present treatise is concerned with matters spiritual. And so the discrimination between *samyak-jñāna* and not-*samyak-jñāna* is made here from a spiritual view-point and not, as in the science of logic or epistemology, from an objective viewpoint. Thus in the science of logic only that cognition is called *samyak-jñāna* or *pramāṇa* whose object is true to the concerned factual situation while that cognition is called not-*samyak-jñāna* or pseudo-*pramāṇa* whose object is false to the same. On the other hand, in the present treatise concerned with matters spiritual the distinction between *samyak-jñāna* and not-*samyak-jñāna* that is proposed by the science of logic is no doubt admitted but is treated as secondary. For in such a treatise that distinction is primary according to which *samyak-jñāna* is the cognition that is conducive to spiritual upgrading or development while not-*samyak-jñāna* is the cognition that is conducive to an increment in worldly entanglement or spiritual degradation. Thus it is just possible that owing to a lack of necessary means a

person who is possessed of *samyaktva* might perchance be in doubt concerning the nature of an object or be under illusion concerning it or be having indistinct cognition concerning it, but inasmuch as he is a seeker after the truth and one free from all false prepossessions he is always eager to correct himself—and does correct himself—with the help of an expert personage who is superior to and more authoritative than himself; besides, he chiefly employs his knowledge not for a satisfaction of his carnal desires but in the interest of his spiritual development. In contrast, the nature of a person devoid of *samyaktva* is just the opposite of it. Thus owing to the availability of all necessary means such a person might have cognition that is definitive, more extensive and distinct, but being by nature under the grip of false prepossessions he assumes arrogance and belittles the ideas even of an expert personage—all this culminating in his employing his knowledge not in the interest of his spiritual progress but for the satisfaction of his worldly ambitions. 9.

A Discussion related to *Pramāṇas* or Instruments of Valid Cognition :

The above mentioned cognition of five types is of the form of two *pramāṇas*. 10.

Of these, the first two types are *pramāṇa* of the *parokṣa* or indirect variety. 11.

The remaining types are *pramāṇa* of the *pratyakṣa* or direct variety. 12.

The Classification of *Pramāṇas*

The five types of cognition—viz. *mati*, *śruta* etc. that are mentioned above are broadly divisible into two varieties of *pramāṇa*—viz. *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*.

The Definition of *Pramāṇas*

The general definition of *pramāṇa* has already been offered—viz. that cognition is *pramāṇa* which comprehends so many aspects of the object concerned. The particular definitions

run as follows :

(i) That cognition which originates without the aid of the sense-organs and *manas* (i. e. the internal organ) and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone is *pratyakṣa* or direct;

(ii) On the other hand, that cognition which originates with the aid of the sense-organs and *manas* is *parokṣa* or indirect.

Of the above-mentioned five types of cognition the first two—that is, *mati*, and *śruta*—are called *parokṣa* because they both originate with the aid of the sense-organs and *manas*.

On the other hand, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*—these three types of cognition are *pratyakṣa* because they originate without the aid of the sense-organs and *manas* and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone.

In the science of logic *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* are defined in a different fashion. Thus there the cognition born of sense-organs is called *pratyakṣa*, while that born of probans and words etc. is called *parokṣa*; but these definitions are not accepted here. For here the cognition depending on a soul alone is to be called *pratyakṣa*, while that depending on the sense-organs and *manas*—i. e. depending on something other than a soul—is to be called *parokṣa*. According to this all, the two types of cognition *mati* and *śruta* ought to be treated as *parokṣa* because depending on the sense-organs and *manas*, while the remaining three types of cognition *avadhi* etc. ought to be treated as *pratyakṣa* because originating without the aid of the sense-organs and *manas* and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone. In certain places¹ the type of cognition *mati* born of the sense-organs and *manas* is called *pratyakṣa* but that is in accordance with the above definition proposed by the science of logic—that is, in accordance with the standpoint of common-sense. 10-12.

1. In the treatises on logic like *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* etc. *avagraha* etc. born of the sense-organs and *manas* are described as *sāṃvayavahārikā pratyakṣa*—i. e. *pratyakṣa* practically speaking. For special details see—Introduction to the Gujarati translation of the *Nyāyavivarta*, the section 'Evolution of the Jain Treatment of *Pramāṇa*.'

Synonyms Standing for the Type of Cognition *Mati* :

Mati, smṛti, saṃjñā, cintā, abhinibodha—these words are synonyms with each other. 13.

Question : What type of cognition is called *mati* ?

Answer : That type whose object is something present.

Question : Do *smṛti, saṃjñā* and *cintā* also have something present for their object ?

Answer : No. To recall an object experienced earlier is *smṛti* or memory; so that has something past for its object. Again, to detect identity between an object experienced earlier and one that is being experienced at present is *saṃjñā* or *pratyabhijñāna* i.e. recognition; so that has something past as well as something present for its object. Lastly, to think of an object that is to appear at a later time is *cintā* or anticipation; so that has something future for its object.

Question : But then the words *mati, smṛti, saṃjñā* and *cintā* cannot be synonymous inasmuch as they mean mutually different things.

Answer : Of course, the respective objects of the types of cognition *mati, smṛti, saṃjñā* and *cintā* are mutually different and so also some of their means of origination. But in the case of each the internal means of origination is one and the same,—viz. the subsidence-cum-destruction of the *matijñānāvaraṇīya karma*. It is keeping this commonness in mind that *mati* etc. are here said to be mutually synonymous.

Question : But nothing has yet been said about *abhinibodha*. What type of cognition is that ? That too should be explained.

Answer : *Abhinibodha* is a generic term and it stands for each of the types of cognition, *mati, smṛti, saṃjñā* and *cintā*; that is to say, all the types of cognition that originate as a result of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the *matijñānāvaraṇīya karma* are commonly called *abhinibodha*, while the words *mati* etc. stand for this or that particular type of cognition thus originating.

Question : But then *abhinibodha* turns out to be a general class whose several ~~species~~ *are mati* etc. How then are these words mutually synonymous?

Answer : Here the words in question are called mutually synonymous by ignoring the difference that obtains between a class and its species. 13.

The Nature of the Type of Cognition *Mati* :

The *mati-jñāna* originates through the instrumentality of the *indriyas* or sense-organs and *anindriya* or not-sense-organ. 14.

Question : Here the *indriyas* and *anindriya* these two are declared to be the cause of *mati-jñāna*. Now it is well-known that eye etc. are the sense-organs. But what is to be understood by the not-sense-organ ?

Answer : By the not-sense-organ is to be understood *manas* or internal organ.

Question : When eye etc. on the one hand and the *manas* on the other are equally an instrument of *mati-jñāna*, then why call the former sense-organs and the latter not-sense-organ ?

Answer : Eye etc. are an external instrument while the *manas* is an internal instrument. This distinction is the ground of the distinction obtaining between the designations *indriya* and *anindriya*. 14.

The Sub-Types of *Mati-jñāna* :

Avagraha, *ihā*, *avāya*, and *dhāraṇā*—these four are the subtypes of *mati-jñāna*. 15

All *mati-jñāna*, whether born of a sense-organ or born of the not-sense-organ, has four sub-types. Thus considering that each of the four sub-types *avagraha* etc. might be born either of one of the five sense-organs or of the *manas* it turns out that the total sub-types of *mati-jñāna* are twenty-four in all. The following is how they are to be named.

Tactile	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>
Gustatory	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>
Olfactory	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>
Visual	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>
Auditory	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>
Manas-born	<i>avagraha</i>	<i>īhā</i>	<i>avāya</i>	<i>dhāraṇā</i>

The above Four Sub-types Avagraha etc. Defined

(1) The cognition of a thing as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc. is *avagraha*. For example, when in deep dark one suddenly strikes against something one has cognition to the effect that something ought to be here. In this cognition one does not realize as to what particular thing it is that has been touched; so this unspecified cognition is called *avagraha*.

(2) The thought-process that is indertaken with a view to specifically ascertaining the general object that has been grasped by *avagraha* is called *īhā*. For example, as soon as a doubt arises as to whether the touch in question belongs to a snake or to a rope the thought intervenes that it ought to belong to a rope; for—so one cognitates—had it belonged to a snake the reptile could not help hissing when struck so hard. It is this thought-process that is called *sambhāvanā* i. e. entertaining a possibility—or *īhā*.

(3) When through further attentiveness or concentration final ascertainment takes place as to the particular feature grasped at the stage *īhā* that is *avāya*. For example, when after thinking over the matter for a while and examining it one finally ascertains that the touch in question must belong to a rope not to a snake—that is *avāya*.

(4) The final ascertainment of the form of *avāya* stays there for a while and then disappears because the mind then switches over to some other object; however, while thus disappearing it leaves behind such an impression as makes

possible the memory of the object concerned at a later occasion in case necessary accessories are available. The constant stream of this final ascertainment, the impression left behind by it, and the memory made possible by this impression—all this operation of the form of *mati-jñāna* is *dhāraṇā*.

Question : Is there some meaning or not behind the order that has been followed above while naming the four sub-types ?

Answer : There is a meaning : For the idea is that the order followed by the aphorism in naming these sub-types is also the order of their successive origination. 15.

The Sub-Types of *Avagraha* etc. :

Mati-jñāna of the forms *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* has for its object something that is many in number or one in number, possessed of many forms or possessed of one form, grasped fast or grasped slowly, grasped on the basis of a ground or grasped not on the basis of a ground, grasped without doubt or grasped with some doubts, grasped inevitably or grasped not inevitably. 16.

The four forms of *mati-jñāna*—viz. *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*—are each possibly born of one of the six means—viz. the five sense-organs and *manas*—and thus we have twenty-four sub-types in all of *mati-jñāna*. Now each of these twenty-four is possibly of twelve varieties depending on the variation of the object concerned or of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned. Thus we have

<i>Bahu-grasping</i>	Six types of <i>avagraha</i>	Six types of <i>īhā</i>	Six types of <i>avāya</i>	Six types of <i>dhāraṇā</i>
<i>Alpa-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Bahuviddha-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Ekavidha-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Kṣipra-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Akṣipra-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Aniśrita-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"
<i>Niśrita-grasping</i>	"	"	"	"

Asandigdha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Sandigdha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Dhruva-grasping	"	"	"	"
Adhruva-grasping	"	"	"	"

Here *bahu* means many, *alpa* means one. Thus the successively arising four forms of *mati-jñāna*—viz. *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. that have two or more books for their object will be called *bahu*—grasping *avagraha*, *bahu*-grasping *īhā*, *bahu*-grasping *avāya*, *bahu*-grasping *dhāraṇā*. On the other hand, the same having one book for their object will be called *alpa*-grasping *avagraha*, *alpa*-grasping *īhā*, *alpa*-grasping *avāya*, *alpa*-grasping *dhāraṇā*.

Bahavidha means that possessed of many forms, *ekavidha* means that possessed of one form. Thus the successively arising four forms of *mati-jñāna* in question having for their object books differing in size, colour, thickness etc. will be called *bahavidha*-grasping *avagraha*, *bahavidha*-grasping *īhā*, *bahavidha*-grasping *avāya*, *bahavidha*-grasping *dhāraṇā*. On the other hand, the same having for their object books agreeing in colour, size, thickness etc. will be called *ekavidha*-grasping *avagraha*, *ekavidha*-grasping *īhā*, etc. That is to say, *bahu* and *alpa* have to do with the number of units, *bahavidha* and *ekavidha* with that of forms or types. That is how the two pairs differ among themselves.

The four forms of *mati-jñāna* in question that cognize their object fast will be called *kṣipra*-grasping *avagraha* etc., those that cognize it slowly will be called *akṣipra*-grasping *avagraha* etc. It is often found that even when the external means like the sense-organ, object etc., are equally available to two persons, one of them, on account of the intensity of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned, cognizes the object concerned fast, while the other, on account of the mildness of this subsidence-cum-destruction, cognizes the object slowly.

*Aniśrita*¹ means that grasped not on the basis of a ground—

1. The above given meaning of the terms *aniśrita* and *niśrita* is to be found also in the commentary to the *Nandī-sūtra*; but there the

that is that not demonstrated through a probans, *niśrita* means that grasped on the basis of a ground. Thus the successively arising four forms of *mati-jñāna* in question that cognize *juhi*-flowers (*juhi*—the name of a flower) employing as probans their earlier experienced cold, soft, smooth touch will be called *niśrita*-grasping *avagraha* (i. e. *avagraha* etc. grasping on the basis of a probans); on the other hand, the same in case they cognize these flowers without employing this probans will be called *aniśrita*-grasping *avagraha* etc. (i.e. *avagraha* etc. grasping not on the basis of a probans).

*Asandigdha*¹ means definitive, *sandigdha* means non-definitive.

author Malaygiri has offered another meaning as well—viz. that grasping a thing as mixed with alien properties is *niśrita*—grasping, grasping it as not thus mixed is *aniśrita*-grasping. See p. 183 of the edition published by the Āgamodaya Samiti.

The Digambara texts have the reading *aniḥśṛta*. Accordingly, they offer explanation to the effect that grasping material particles that are not fully manifest is *aniḥśṛta*-grasping, grasping material particles that are fully manifest is *niḥśṛta*-grasping. See *Rājavārtika* no. 15 on this very aphorism.

1. Here the Digambara texts have the reading *anukta*. On their explanation, *anukta*-grasping covers the case of a person who has heard just one syllable of a word surmising the whole word and telling the speaker that the latter is going to pronounce that particular word—or that of a person who has listened just to the first stroke of a lute, i. e. even before a tune has been set on it, telling the musician that the latter is going to strike that particular tune. The opposite of *anukta*-grasping is *ukta*-grasping. See *Rāja-vārtika* No. 15 on this very aphorism.

Among the Śvetāmbara texts the *Nandi-sūtra* has only the reading *asandigdha* and in its commentary the term has been explained as above, see p. 183. But the commentaty to the *Tattvārthabhāṣya* also gives the reading *anukta* and explains it in the manner of the *Rājavārtika* passage just quoted. But the commentator goes on to add that on accepting the reading *anukta* it will turn out that the type of *avagraha* etc. in question will cover only the cases of auditory *avagraha* etc. and not also those of tactile *avagraha* etc. and the rest. It is keeping this shortcoming in mind that the other authorities have accepted the reading *asandigdha*. See *Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti* p. 58 edited by Mansukh Bhagubhai, Ahmedabad.

Thus the four forms of *mati-jñāna* in question that cognize a touch in a definitive form—e.g. cognize it asserting that it must belong to a piece of sandal-wood not to a flower—will be called *asandigdha avagraha* etc.; on the other hand, the same in case they, on account of not detecting a distinguishing mark, cognize this touch in a doubtful form—e.g. cognize it asserting that it must belong either to a piece of sandal-wood or to a flower inasmuch as both are cold—will be called *sandigdha*-grasping.

Dhruva means that happening inevitably, *adhruva* means that happening possibly. It is often found that even when the means of cognition in the form of sense-object contact and attentiveness are equally available to two persons one of them cognizes the object concerned inevitably while the other sometimes cognizes it and sometimes does not. The four forms of *mati-jñāna avagraha* etc. in case in the presence of the necessary means of cognition they cognize the object concerned inevitably will be called *dhruva*-grasping; on the other hand, the same in case under these very conditions they, on account of the mildness of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned, sometimes cognize it and sometimes do not will be called *adhruva*-grasping.

Question : Of the above twelve varieties which ones are based on a variation of the object concerned and which ones on a variation in the form of relative intensity or mildness of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned ?

Answer : *Bahu, alpa, bahuvidha* and *ekavidha*—these four are based on a variation of the object concerned, the rest on that of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned.

Question : So how many sub-types in all do we have by now ?

Answer : Two hundred and eighty eight.

Question : How ?

Answer : The four forms *avagraha* etc. each possibly born of one of the six means—viz. the five sense-organs and *manas*—

make the total twenty-four ($6 \times 4 = 24$), and these twenty-four each possibly varying in twelve ways as just elaborated make the total two hundred eighty eight ($24 \times 12 = 288$). 16.

The general object of *avagraha* etc. :

The four forms of *mati-jñāna*—viz. *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya*, *dhāraṇā*—grasp an *artha*—that is, an entity. 17.

Artha means entity. Now an entity is inclusive of a *dravya* or substance that is something generic and the corresponding *pariyāyas* or modes that are something specific. And so the question arises whether *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. that are born of the sense-organs and *manas* grasp an entity in the form of a substance or the same in the form of the corresponding modes.

Answer : The above described cognitions of the form of *avagraha*, *īhā* etc. chiefly grasp modes and not a substance as a whole. The substance itself they only notice through the medium of its modes. That is so because the sense-organs and *manas* have modes for their chief object. Of course, the modes are but a part of a substance. And so when a sense-organ or *manas* notices the modes that constitute its particular object it partly notices the corresponding substance itself in the form of these modes. For a mode is not to be found apart from the corresponding substance, nor a substance apart from the corresponding modes. For example, the particular object of the visual sense-organ are colour, configuration etc. which are so many modes of the material substance. So when an eye grasps a mango fruit what happens is that it notices the latter's modes like colour, configuration etc. And since its colour, configuration etc. are not separate from a mango it can roughly be said that the mango has been seen by the eye, but we should remember that the eye has not grasped the mango as a whole. For apart from colour, configuration etc. the mango contains numerous other modes like touch, taste, smell etc. which an eye is incapable of grasping. Similarly, when the tactile, gustatory and olfactory sense-organs grasp an entity like hot *jalebi* (a sweetmeat) they really only notice its several modes—viz. hot touch, sweet taste and good smell respectively.

For no sense-organ taken singly can grasp all the modes belonging to an entity. Even the auditory sense-organ grasps only the mode of the form of sound belonging to the material particles that have assumed the shape of speech and no other mode belonging to them. Similarly, the *manas* too reflects over only some particular aspects of an object; for certainly it is incapable of simultaneously reflecting over all the aspects of this object. All this goes to prove that all the four forms of cognition *avagraha* etc. that are born of a sense-organ, or *manas* chiefly have a mode for their object while they notice the corresponding substance only through the medium of this mode.

Question : How does the present aphorism stand related to the preceding one ?

Answer : The present aphorism gives out something general, the preceding one something specific. For the present aphorism generally lays down that cognition of the form of *avagraha* etc. grasps an entity in the form of a mode or of a substance, while in the preceding aphorism the same entity has been specified in the form of *bahu*, *alpa* etc. through an analysis based on the consideration of number, form etc. 17.

The sub-classes of *avagraha* resulting from the difference that obtains between the different sense-organs as to their respective modes of producing cognition :

The contact of a sense-organ—acting in its capacity as what is technically called *upakaraṇedriya*—with its object is called *vyañjana* and when *vyañjana* takes place there ensues but *avagraha*. 18.

In the case of the visual sense-organ and of the *manas* there takes place no *vyañjana* to be followed by *avagraha*. 19.

Just as a lame man needs the assistance of stick for walking, so also does a soul's concealed power of consciousness need—on account of its dependence on something other than itself—an assisting medium for producing cognition. An external such medium are the sense-organs and *manas*. However the different sense-organs and *manas* are not all of the same nature

and so the successive order exhibited in the course of the emergence of the stream of cognition is also not the same in the case of them all. Thus this successive order is of two kinds—a slow one and a fast one.

In the slow order of succession the cognition concerned ensues as soon as the object concerned comes in contact with the appropriate sense-organ acting in its capacity as *upakaraṇ-endriya*¹—this contact being technically called *vyañjana*.

However, in the beginning the degree of the cognition in question is so meagre that it does not allow even a general apprehension to the effect 'there is something here', but with the maturation of the sense-object contact in question there is an increment in this degree. After a while this contact—technically called *vyañjana*—grows so much mature that there takes place a general apprehension—technically called *arthavagraha*—to the effect 'there is something here'. Here the entire cognitive operation preceding *arthāvagraha*—an operation which is born of a *vyañjana* and which grows mature with the maturation of this *vyañjana*—is called *vyañjanāvagraha* inasmuch as it needs a *vyañjana* for its production. This prolonged cognitive operation of the form of *vyañjanāvagraha*, in spite of its ever growing maturation, is so meagre in strength that it does not allow even a general objective apprehension to the effect 'there is something here.' Hence it is called a most indistinct, a relatively indistinct, an indistinct cognition. And when this cognitive operation grows so much mature that it allows a general apprehension to the effect 'there is something here' then that very sector of cognition which allows this general apprehension is called *arthāvagraha*.

Really speaking, *arthāvagraha* is but the utmost mature sector of *vyañjanāvagraha* itself, for the former too stands in need of a sense-object contact. Even then it is mentioned apart from *vyañjanāvagraha* and is given the designation *arthāvagraha* because the cognizer concerned is in a position to pay attention to the type of objective apprehension made possible by this sector

1. For the details of this concept see Chapter 2, aphorism 17.

of cognition. In the wake of *arthāvagraha* there successively take place a curiosity to cognize the particular features of the object apprehended by *arthāvagraha*, an ascertainment of these particular features, a continuous stream of this ascertainment, an impression left behind by this stream of ascertainment, a memory engendered by this impression—a whole lot of cognitive operation which has earlier been described in its triple division *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. Here it should not be forgotten that when in the case of this slow order of succession mention has been made of the need for a sense-object contact—to be precise, an *upakaraṇendriya*—object contact this need is understood to persist only upto *arthāvagraha* that is the ultimate sector of *vyañjanāvagraha*. After *arthāvagraha* has taken place—that is to say, during the course of the cognitive operation comprising *īhā*, *avāya* etc.—the contact in question is not needed inevitably, for inasmuch as this cognitive operation is directed towards particular features it is characterized by a dominance of mental attentiveness. That is why the present aphorism has been above interpreted in an exclusive fashion by saying ‘when *vyañjana* takes place there ensues but *avagraha*’, the idea that *vyañjana* is needed only for *avagraha*—that is, for indistinct cognition—not for *īhā* etc.

In the fast order of succession the contact of a sense-organ—in its capacity as *upakaraṇendriya*—with its object is not needed at all. In this case the sense-organ, even when distant, far distant from its object, grasps this object by its mere presence at a suitable place, and as soon as this grasping takes place there arises at the very beginning through the instrumentality of the sense-organ in question a general cognition of the form of *arthāvagraha* in relation to the object in question. Thereafter, the cognitive operation comprising *īhā*, *avāya*, etc. ensues in due order in this case as in that of the slow order of succession. The idea is that in the case of the fast order of succession the stream of cognition emerges without there being a contact of the sense-organ with the object to be grasped, a stream whose initial sector is *arthāvagraha* and the ultimate sector *dhāraṇā* in its capacity as memory. On the contrary, in the case of the slow order of

succession the stream of cognition ensues only after there has been a contact of the sense-organ with the object to be grasped, a stream whose initial sector is a most indistinct, relatively indistinct cognition of the form of *vyañjanāvagraha*, the second sector a cognition of the form of *arthāvagraha* and the ultimate sector a cognition of the form of *dhāraṇā* in its capacity as memory.

Illustrations

The stream of cognition pertaining to the slow order of succession—a stream whose emergence requires sense-object contact—can be clearly understood with the help of the illustration of an earthen bowl. Thus the extremely dry earthen bowl that has just been taken out of a kiln absorbs the single drop of water inserted inside it—so much so that no trace whatsoever is left of this drop. In a like manner this bowl absorbs numerous other drops that have been subsequently inserted inside it one by one. However, in the end there comes a time when the bowl is incapable of absorbing the drops inserted inside it and becomes wet with those drops which are now there to be seen in the form of an accumulated mass.

When the wetness of the bowl became apparent for the first time, even earlier than that there was water in the bowl but it had been so much absorbed by the bowl that it had disappeared altogether and so was invisible; nevertheless, the water was certainly there in the bowl all the while. Only when there was an increase in the quantity of water and a decrease in the bowl's capacity to absorb water did the wetness become visible; then it so happened that the water that had not been absorbed within the body of the bowl began to accumulate at its bottom and became visible. In a like manner, when a sleeping person is addressed the words uttered seem to disappear in his ears. But when as a result of his being addressed twice or thrice his ears become full enough with the words of the form of material particles then like the earthen bowl first becoming wet with the drops of water these ears full with words become

capable of cognizing these words in a general form 'there is something here'; it is this general cognition that first clearly apprehends the words in question. Then ensues the ordered succession of the cognitions of a particular form. All this is to say that just as the dry earthen bowl, as a result of receiving the drops of water for a while, gradually becomes wet and the water becomes visible inside it so also do the ears of a sleeping person, as a result of coming in contact for a while with words of the form of material particles, become full with these words and so are capable of cognizing them in a general form while later on they come to cognize their particular features. This ordered succession of cognitive processes takes place in the case of a waking person as much as it does in that of a sleeping person, but in the former case it is so swift that one hardly takes note of it. That is why it is the similarity of a sleeping person with the earthen bowl that is pointed out.

For the fast order of succession the illustration of a mirror is apt. Thus as soon as a thing finds itself in front of a mirror its reflection appears in this mirror and is visible; for this there is no need of a contact between the mirror and the thing reflected—just as there is need of a contact between the ears and the words heard. All that is needed is the co-presence in a suitable place of the mirror that is to reflect and the thing that is to be reflected; as soon as such a co-presence is available the reflection appears there and is immediately visible. In a like manner, as soon as a coloured thing is placed in front of an eye the former is immediately seen in a general form. For this there is no need of a contact between this eye and this thing—just as man is in need of a contact between the ears and the words heard. All that is needed is the co-presence in a suitable place of this eye and this thing—just like the co-presence of the mirror and the thing reflected. That is why in the case of the fast order of succession it is *arthāvagraha* that is treated as the starting-point.

The stream of cognition pertaining to the slow order of succession has a place for *vyañjanāvagraha* but not so that pertaining to the fast order of succession. Hence the question

arises : “Through which sense-organs does *vyañjanāvagraha* take place and through which it does not ?” It is this question that has been answered in the present aphorism. No *vyañjanāvagraha* takes place through the eye and *manas*, for these two cognize their appropriate object without coming in contact with it—that is, through a mere suitable co-presence with this object and through attentiveness. Certainly, who does not know that an eye grasps the tree, mountain etc. that are distant, far distant and that, similarly, a *manas* reflects over a thing that is far, far distant ? That is why the eye and *manas* are classified as *aprāpyakārin* or ‘active-without-coming-in-contact’ and the stream of cognition produced by them is treated as that characterized by the fast order of succession. On the other hand, four sense-organs—viz. the auditory, gustatory, olfactory, tactile—give rise to the stream of cognition that is characterized by the slow order of succession, for these four are *prāpyakārin* or ‘active-through-coming-in-contact’—that is, they grasp their object only through coming in contact with it. Certainly, it is the experience of everybody that unless the word enters an ear, the sugar touches a tongue, the dust of flower enters a nose, the water touches a body there will be no hearing of this word, no tasting of this sugar, no smelling of this dust, no feeling of a cold or hot sensation in relation to this water.

Question : So how many sub-types does *mati-jñāna* have in all ?

Answer : Three hundred and thirty six.

Question : How ?

Answer : The four forms *arthāvagraha* etc., each possibly produced by one of the six instruments—viz. the five sense-organs and *manas*, yield the number twenty-four ($4 \times 6 = 24$). To them are to be added four *vyañjanāvagrahas* produced by the four sense-organs belonging to the class *prāpyakārin*, thus the total number becomes twenty-eight ($24 + 4 = 28$). Each of these twenty eight can possibly have objects belonging to those twelve varieties *bahu*, *alpa*, *bahuvidha*, *alpavidha*, etc. and thus we get

the grand total three hundred thirty six ($28 \times 12 = 336$). Of course, this enumeration of sub-types is based on a rough consideration. For as a matter of fact there are innumerable such sub-types depending on the clarity or otherwise of the accessories like light etc., the multiplicity of objects, the diversity of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned.

Question : Those earlier enumerated twelve varieties *bahu*, *alpa* etc. are applicable only to the particular objective features; on the other hand, *arthāvagraha* has for its object something that is utterly general. How can then one speak of those twelve varieties in the case of *arthāvagraha* ?

Answer : To tell the truth, *arthāvagraha* is understood to be of two types—viz. *vyāvahārika* or that considered from a practical standpoint, and *naīścayika* or that considered from a definitive standpoint. And when one speaks of those twelve varieties *bahu*, *alpa* etc. they ought to refer to the former type, not to the latter. For in the latter type what is reflected is something utterly general—that is, something devoid of the particular features like class, quality, action; so there is no possibility of the particular features like *bahu*, *alpa* etc. being grasped by this type.

Question : What distinguishes the *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha* from the *naīścayika* ?

Answer : The *arthāvagraha* which for the first time grasps something in general is *naīścayika arthāvagraha*. On the other hand, the *avāya*-cognition which grasps some one particular feature and is followed by a curiosity as to some other particular feature and by an *avāya*-cognitions of it is to be called an *avāya*-cognition grasping both the general and the particular. It is this type of *avāya*-cognitions which are called *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha*. Thus only that *avāya*-cognition is not a *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha* which is not followed by a curiosity as to some new particular feature; on the other hand, all *avāya*-cognitions which produce curiosity as to ever newer particular features are to be treated as *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha*.

Question : As to the twelve varieties *bahu*, *alpa* etc. belonging to *arthāvagraha* it has just been said that they ought to be treated as belonging to its *vyāvahārika*, not to its *naiścayika* type. Even then the question remains as to how we get three hundred thirty six sub-types of *matī-jñāna*. For it is the twenty-eight forms of *matī-jñāna* each possibly belonging to twelve varieties that yield the number three hundred thirty six. But these twenty-eight forms also include the four *vyāñjanāvagrahas* which inasmuch as they come earlier than even the *naiścayika arthāvagraha* are of an extremely indistinct nature. Thus the forty-eight sub-types ($4 \times 12 = 48$) belonging to them will have to be excluded from the total three hundred thirty-six.

Answer : In the case of *arthāvagraha* those twelve varieties can be clearly exhibited by positing the type *vyāvahārika*. And so the above answer was given based on a rough consideration. But really speaking, even in the case of *naiścayika arthāvagraha* and of *vyāñjanāvagraha* preceding it the varieties in question will have to be assumed. And that on the basis of the principle of the identity of the cause and the effect. Thus *naiścayika arthāvagraha* is the cause of the *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha* while *vyāñjanāvagraha* is the cause of the former—so that if the particular features *bahu*, *alpa* etc. are clearly reflected in *vyāvahārika arthāvagraha* then a similar reflection will have to be assumed also for *naiścayika arthāvagraha* which is its immediate cause and for *vyāñjanāvagraha* which is its proximate cause, however difficult to be noticed because indistinct be this latter reflection. But whether distinct or otherwise inasmuch as a reflection like this is possible in the case of these the twelve varieties in question will have to be assumed also in their case. 18-19.

The nature of *Śruta-jñāna* or Verbal Cognition and Its Sub-types :

Śruta-jñāna is invariably preceded by *matī-jñāna*. It is of two types, many types, twelve types. 20.

Matī-jñāna is the cause while *śruta-jñāna* is its effect, for it is from *matī-jñāna* that *śruta-jñāna* is produced. That is why it is said about *matī-jñāna* that it nourishes and supplements *śruta-*

jñāna. However, even while *mati-jñāna* is a cause of *śruta-jñāna* it is only an external such cause; as for the internal cause of *śruta-jñāna* it is nothing save the subsidence-cum-destruction of the concerned *śrutajñānavaraṇīya karma*. For even when *mati-jñāna* has taken place in relation to some object there will be no *śruta-jñāna* in relation to it in case there has been no subsidence-cum-destruction of the concerned *śrutajñānavaraṇīya karma*.

Question : As in the production of *mati-jñāna* so also in that of *śruta-jñāna* the assistance of the sense-organs and *manas* is needed; wherein then does lie the distinction between the two ? So long as this distinction is not made clear it does not make much sense to say that *śruta-jñāna* is invariably preceded by *mati-jñāna*. This distinction is not made better understood even by the statement that the cause of *mati-jñāna* is the subsidence-cum-destruction of the *mati-jñānavaraṇīya karma* while that of *śruta-jñāna* the subsidence-cum-destruction of *śruta-jñānavaraṇīya karma*, for the concept of subsidence-cum-destruction is not comprehensible to common sense.

Answer : *Mati-jñāna* has for its object something that exists at present time while *śruta-jñāna* has for its object something that exists at any of the three periods of time present, past, future. Apart from this distinction that has to do with their respective objects another one is that there is an employment of words in *śruta-jñāna* while there is no such employment in *mati-jñāna*. So by way of final definition we might say that, that cognition born of the sense-organs and *manas* which is accompanied by an employment of words¹ is *śruta-jñāna* while the same which is not so accompanied is *mati-jñāna*.

1. 'Being accompanied by an employment of words' means being in practice produced as a result of grasping the connotative potency of the words concerned. That is to say, while at the time of the production of *śrutajñāna* it is required that the conventional meaning of the words concerned be remembered and the text concerned that is heard be followed at the time of the production of the forms of *mati-jñāna*, *īhā* etc. nothing like that is required.

The idea is that *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* are similar as both require the assistance of the sense-organs and *manas*, but the objective sphere of *śruta-jñāna* is definitely greater than that of *mati-jñāna* and it is also characterized by greater clarity. For there being a predominance of mental operation in *śruta-jñāna* there is also in it a great proportion of reflection and a greater clarity as to this reflection; similarly, there is also in it a proper contextual adjustment of what comes earlier and what comes later. Or in other words it might be said that a prolonged cognitive operation born of the sense-organs and *manas* has *mati-jñāna* for its initial immature sector and *śruta-jñāna* for a later mature and clear sector. Hence it might also be said that the cognition which is capable of being expressed through words is *śruta-jñāna* while the same insofar as it, being inadequately mature, is incapable of being so expressed is *mati-jñāna*. Thus if *śruta-jñāna* stands for a milk preparation *mati-jñāna* stands for milk.

Question : It has been said that *śruta-jñāna* is of two types, many types, twelve types. How is that ?

Answer : *śruta-jñāna* is of two types—viz. *aṅga-bāhya* or that excluded from the class of texts called *aṅga* and *aṅga-praviṣṭa* or that included in the class of texts called *aṅga*. Of these, the former is of many types depending on whether it is *utkālika*—that is, that which may be studied at any time—or *kālika*—that is, that which must be studied at a particular time. And the latter is of twelve types in the form of *Ācārāṅga*, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* etc.

Question : What is the ground for distinguishing the *aṅga-bāhya* from the *aṅga-praviṣṭa* ?

Answer : The ground is the difference as to the speaker. Thus the knowledge revealed by the *tīrthaṅkaras* which was received by their highly intelligent direct disciples designated *gaṇadharas* and was given by them the form of the twelve *Sūtra*-texts technically called *aṅga* is *aṅga-praviṣṭa*. On the other hand, the pure-witted masters coming after the *gaṇadharas* took into consideration the deficiency in intellect, power and age-limit which is a result of the bad times that are prevalent and hence

composed systematic treatizes on various topics taken from the twelve *aṅga*-texts and with a view to benefitting the common folk; it is these systematic treatizes that are called *aṅga-bāhya*. That is to say, the systematic treatizes which have *gaṇadharas* for their authors are *aṅga-praviṣṭa*, the same which have the other masters for their authors are *aṅga-bāhya*.

Question : Which are the twelve *aṅga*-texts ? And which of the ancient texts are prominently included in the multifarious class *aṅga-bāhya* ?

Answer : *Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta, Sthāna, Samavāya, Vyākhyāprajñapti (Bhagavati), Jñātrdharmakathā, Upāsakadaśā, Antakṛddāśā, Anuttaraupapātikadaśā, Praśnavyākaraṇa, Vipākasūtra* and *Drṣṭivāda*—these twelve are the *aṅga*-texts. Similarly *Sāmāyika, Caturviṃśatistava, Vandanaka, Pratikramaṇa, Kāyotsarga* and *Pratyākhyānā*—these six *Āvaśyaka* texts on the one hand and *Daśavaikālika, Uttarādhyayana, Dasāśrutaskandha, Kalpa, Vyavahāra, Niśītha* and *Ṛṣibhāṣita*,¹ etc.—these treatizes on the other are included in the class *aṅga-bāhya*.

Question : This classification has to do with the systematic treatizes that collect knowledge in an organized fashion. But then are there only so many systematic treatizes ?

Answer : No. There were many systematic treatizes, there are many of them; many of them are being composed, many of them will be composed. However, here only those of them are enumerated which constitute the chief support of the Jaina canonical discipline. But even besides these many systematic treatizes have been composed, many of them are being composed. And they all ought to be included in the *aṅga-bāhya*. The only requirement is that they should have been composed by an intelligence that is pure and in a spirit of even-handedness.

Question : These days so many systematic treatizes are

1. That which is uttered by the ṛṣis or saintly personages like *pratyeka-buddhas* etc. is *ṛṣibhāṣita*. E.g. in the *Uttarādhyayana* the eighth *adhyayana* called *Kāpiliya*.

composed relating to various sciences and to the secular pursuits like poetry, drama etc. Are they too to be treated as *śruta* ?

Answer : Of course, they too are *śruta*.

Question : But then being of the nature of *śruta* they too ought to be of use for attaining *mokṣa* ?

Answer : To be or not to be of use for attaining *mokṣa* is not the fixed nature of a systematic treatise, for that depends on the capacity of the connoisseur concerned. If the connoisseur concerned is competent and is desirous of attaining *mokṣa* then he can make use of even secular treatises for attaining *mokṣa*; on the other hand, if he is not a fit person then he would downgrade himself even with the help of the treatises that are generally considered spiritual. Nevertheless, the super-ordinary *śruta* holds a special position on account of its subject-matter as also the competence of its author.

Question : *Śruta* is of the nature of knowledge. Why then is the designation *śruta* given to the systematic treatises of the form of language as also to the paper etc. on which they are written down ?

Answer : All that is done figuratively. For as a matter of fact *śruta* is but of the nature of knowledge. But language is a means of revealing such knowledge and it is also a product of such knowledge; similarly, paper etc. are a means of writing down this language and of retaining it in an organized form. That is why language and the paper etc. are figuratively called *śruta*. 20.

The Sub-types of *Avadhi-jñāna* and Those Authorized to Acquire It :

Avadhi-jñāna is of two types. 21.

Of these two, one—viz. *bhava-pratyaya* or that owing to birth is found among the hellish beings and the heavenly beings. 22.

On the other hand, the other type which owes its origin to a particular cause—that is, the type originating as a result

of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned—is of six kinds and is found among the remaining types of beings—that is, among the animals and the human beings. 23.

Avadhi-jñāna is of two types—viz. *bhava-pratyaya* or that owing to birth and *guṇa-pratyaya* or that owing to a meritorious qualification. The type of *avadhi-jñāna* which appears there as soon as the being concerned is born—that is to say, the type for the appearance of which there is no need of an implementation of the ethical vows, the self-imposed restrictions etc.—is present there ever since birth and is called *bhava-pratyaya*. On the other hand, the type of *avadhi-jñāna* which is not present there ever since birth but which appears there after the being concerned is born and as a result of an implementation of the meritorious requirements like ethical vows, selfimposed restrictions etc. is called *guṇa-pratyaya*—that is, *kṣayopasāma-janya* or the type originating as a result of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned.

Question : Does the *bhava-pratyaya* type of *avadhi-jñāna* originate without *kṣayopasāma* ?

Answer : No. *Kṣayopasāma* is certainly required for it too.

Question : But then even the *bhava-pratyaya* type of *avadhi-jñāna* turns out to be *kṣayopasāma-janya*. So wherein lies the distinction between the types *bhava-pratyaya* and *guṇa-pratyaya* ?

Answer : Whatever be the type of *avadhi-jñāna* it cannot appear without there taking place the appropriate *kṣayopasāma*. Hence *kṣayopasāma* of the *avadhi-jñānāvaraṇīya karma* is the common cause of all *avadhi-jñāna* whatsoever. Thus even while *kṣayopasāma* is the common cause of all of them some cases of *avadhi-jñāna* are called *bhava-pratyaya* and others *kṣayopasāma-janya* or *guṇa-pratyaya* on account of the variation in the cause that produces the required *kṣayopasāma*. Among the embodied beings there are some classes the birth in which is immediately followed by a generation of the necessary *kṣayopasāma* and of the consequent *avadhi-jñāna*. That is to say, the beings belonging to

these classes have to undertake no meritorious performance like penance etc. by way of acquiring the *kṣayopasāma* necessary for the *avadhi-jñāna*. Hence it is that all the beings belonging to the classes in question must possess some quality or other of such *avadhi-jñāna* as is present there ever since birth and stays there throughout life. On the other hand, there are also classes of beings concerning which it is not necessary that birth in them must be followed by an acquisition of *avadhi-jñāna*. Those belonging to these latter classes must undertake meritorious performances like penance etc. by way of acquiring the *kṣayopasāma* necessary for the generation of *avadhi-jñāna*. Hence it is that *avadhi-jñāna* does not invariably appear in all the beings belonging to these classes; it appears in only those of them who have developed in themselves the meritorious qualifications necessary for the generation of *avadhi-jñāna*. Thus even while all the cases of *avadhi-jñāna* have a common internal cause in the form of *kṣayopasāma* it is for the sake of convenience that some of them are called *bhava-pratyaya* and others *guṇa-pratyaya* in view of the fact that the beings belonging to certain classes acquire *avadhi-jñāna* just as a result of being born in these classes while those belonging to certain others acquire it as a result of undertaking meritorious performances like penance etc.

The embodied beings are divided into four classes viz. *nārakas* or hellish beings *devas* (i.e. gods) or heavenly beings animals, human beings. Of these, the beings belonging to the first two classes possess the *bhava-pratyaya* type of *avadhi-jñāna*—that is, they possess *avadhi-jñāna* ever since birth; on the other hand those belonging to the last two classes possess the *guṇa-pratyaya* type of *avadhi-jñāna*—that is they possess *avadhi-jñāna* as a result of some meritorious performance.

Question : When all the beings possessing *avadhi-jñāna* are embodied beings then why is it that some of them happen to possess it ever since their birth—that is, without any special endeavour on their part—while others come to possess it as a result of some special endeavour on their part ?

Answer : It is a matter of common experience that the effects are of multifarious types. Who does not know that a being born in the class of birds acquires the capacity to fly in the air as soon as it is born in this class, while, on the other hand, one does not acquire the capacity to fly in the air by a mere birth in the class of human beings—unless, of course, one takes recourse to an aeroplane etc. ? Or take another example. Certain persons happen to possess poetic power ever since their birth, while certain others do not come in possession of it except through a special endeavour on their part.

Avadhi-jñāna to be found among the animals and human beings is of six kinds viz.—*ānugāmika* or that which accompanies, *anānugāmika* or that which does not accompany, *vardhamāna* or that which increases, *hīyamāna* or that which decreases, *avasthita* or that which remains constant, *anavasthita* or that which does not remain constant.

(1) Just as the colour applied to a thing like a piece of cloth etc. when placed at a particular place remains attached to this thing even when it is transferred to another place, similarly, *avadhi-jñāna* which continues to belong to the being concerned even when he leaves the place where this *jñāna* was generated and transfers himself to another place is *ānugāmika*.

(2) Just as some person's knowledge of astrology is such that he can correctly answer a question when seated at one particular place but not when seated at another place, similarly *avadhi-jñāna* which ceases to belong to the being concerned when he leaves the place where this *jñāna* was generated is *anānugāmika*.

(3) Just as the spark of fire produced by a match-stick or a piece of churning wood is extremely small in bulk and yet it undergoes gradual augmentation as a result of consuming more and more dry fuel etc., similarly *avadhi-jñāna* which covers few objects at the time of its generation but gradually comes to cover more and more of them as there is augmentation in the spiritual purification of the being concerned is *vardhamāna*.

(4) Just as the fire feeding upon a limited number of burning objects undergoes gradual diminution when it no more receives new such objects, similarly *avadhi-jñāna* which covers more objects at the time of its generation but gradually comes to cover less and less of them as there is diminution in the spiritual purification of the being concerned is *hīyamāna*.

(5) Just as the sex like male etc. or certain numbers of good or bad impressions left by past deeds accompany a soul in its next birth or stay with a soul throughout one life, similarly *avadhi-jñāna* which persists in a soul even in its next birth or stays in it till the generation of omniscience or throughout one life is *avasthita*.

(6) Like the waves of water *avadhi-jñāna* which now increases, now decreases, now appears, now disappears is *anavasthita*.

Even though a *tīrthaṅkara* as such and so also certain other persons happen to possess *avadhi-jñāna* ever since their birth this *avadhi-jñāna* should be treated as belonging to the type *guṇa-pratyaya*, for in the absence of an appropriate meritorious qualification this *avadhi-jñāna* fails to remain there throughout one life—just as it does so remain in the case of the heavenly beings and the hellish beings. 21, 22, 23.

The sub-types of *Manaḥparyāya* and their Mutual Difference :

Rjumati and *vipulamati*—these two are the types of *manaḥparyāya*. 24.

They differ from one another in respect of purity and of an absence of fall back. 25.

The living beings possessed of a *manas*—technically called *sañjñin*—think over an object with the help of their *manas*. Now at the time of thinking the *manas* engaged in thinking process assumes different shapes corresponding to the different objects that are thought of. It is these shapes that are the *pariyāyas* or modes of a *manas* and the cognition which directly apprehends these shapes of a *manas* is *manaḥparyāya-jñāna*. Thus with the

help of this type of cognition what is apprehended are the shapes of the *manas* engaged in thinking but not objects thought of.

Question : Is it then that the person possessed of *manahparyāya-jñāna* is altogether incapable of apprehending the objects thought of by a *manas* ?

Answer : No, he can certainly apprehend them but only later on and with the help of an inference.

Question : How is that ?

Answer : Just as an expert in psychology directly perceives the face or facial expressions of a person and on the basis of it makes inference as to the mental states or capacity of this person, similarly a person possessed of *manahparyāya-jñāna* directly perceives the states of *manas* belonging to a person and then as a result of constant practice is in a position to make inference to the effect. "This person has thought of such and such an object because his *manas* is associated with shapes that invariably appear when this object is thought of."

Question : What is meant by *rjumati* and *vipulamati* ?

Answer : The type of *manahparyāya* which apprehends the general form of an object is *rjumati* that which apprehends its particular features is *vipulamati*.

Question : But if *rjumati* apprehends the general form of an object then it turns out to be a type of *darśana*. Why then treat it as a type of *jñāna* ?

Answer : When we say that *rjumati* apprehends the general form of an object we only mean that it apprehends the particular features of this object though not so many of them as does *vipulamati*.

The *vipulamati* type of *manahparyāya* is purer than the *rjumati* type inasmuch as it is in a position to clearly apprehend the subtler and more numerous particular features of an object than is the latter. Besides, another difference between the two is that the latter type when once produced can possibly take leave of the being concerned but not so the former type; for the former

type necessarily persists in a soul upto the time of the attainment of omniscience.

The Difference Between *Avadhi* and *Manahparyāya* :

Avadhi and *manahparyāya* differ in respect of purity, spatial extent, person authorized, object. 26.

Though both *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* are of the nature of genuine perception of a partial type, they differ from one another in so many respects. Thus they differ as to purity, spatial extent, person authorized, object.

(1) *Manahparyāya-jñāna* apprehends its object much more clearly than does *avadhi-jñāna*, hence the former is purer than the latter.

(2) The spatial extent of *avadhi-jñāna* stretches from a finger-measure divided by *asamkhyāta* upto the entire *loka*, but that of *manahparyāya-jñāna* stretches only up to the mountain *Mānuṣottara*.

(3) Beings belonging to all the four classes are authorized to acquire *avadhi-jñāna* but only human beings who have undergone a certain measure of discipline are authorized to acquire *manahparyāya-jñāna*.

(4) All the coloured substances along with the several of their modes can possibly be an object of *avadhi-jñāna*, but only one out of *ananta* of them—that is to say, only the substances in the form of *manas*—can possibly be an object of *manahparyāya-jñāna*.

Question : So *manahparyāya* has got a less extensive sphere of objects than *avadhi*. Why then is it considered to be purer than the latter ?

Answer : The ground of purity is not a lesser or greater extent of the sphere of objects but the knowledge of a lesser or greater number of subtle features of the objects concerned. Thus if among two persons one is conversant with a number of disciplines and the other with only one and if the latter is better

conversant with the subtleties of his discipline than the former is with those of his then it is the latter's knowledge that is considered to be purer; similarly, *manahparyāya* is considered to be purer than *avadhi* because even if its sphere of objects is less extensive than that of the latter it is better conversant with the subtleties of the objects concerned. 26.

Objects to be Grasped by the Five Types of Cognition :

Mati-jñāna and *śruta-jñāna* operate in relation to—that is, have for their object—all the substances along with not all their modes—that is, along with a limited number of their modes. 27.

Avadhi-jñāna operates only in relation to the coloured—that is, tangible—substances along with not all their modes. 28.

Manahparyāya-jñāna operates in relation to one out of *ananta* coloured substances along with not all their modes. 29.

Kevala-jñāna operates in relation to all the substances along with all their modes. 30.

Through *mati-jñāna* and *śruta-jñāna* can be cognized all the substances, whether coloured or otherwise, but thus can be cognized only several—not all—of the modes belonging to these substances.

Question : From what has been just said it appears as if there is no numerical difference between the objects to be grasped by *mati-jñāna* and those to be grasped by *śruta-jñāna*. Will that be correct ?

Answer : There is of course no numerical difference between the objects to be grasped by the two insofar as these objects are viewed in their capacity as substances, but there is certainly such a difference insofar as they are viewed in their capacity as modes. But even while there is a numerical difference between the modes grasped by the two there is a similarity between them insofar as both grasp only a limited number of the modes in question—not all of them. Since *mati-jñāna* grasps only

what is present it, in accordance with the power of the sense-organs and the capacity of the soul concerned, cognizes several of the present modes of the substances; on the other hand, since *śruta-jñāna* grasps what might be present, past or future it cognizes several of such modes as might be present, past or future.

Question : *Mati-jñāna* is produced through the instrumentality of the sense-organs like eye etc. while these sense-organs are capable of grasping only the tangible substances. How then is it that all substances whatsoever are declared to be a possible object of *mati-jñāna* ?

Answer : *Mati-jñāna* is produced through the instrumentality of *manas* also—just as it is produced through that of the sense-organs. And one's *manas* can think of all the substances whether perceived by oneself or learnt by one from the scriptural texts, whether tangible or otherwise. Hence keeping in view *mati-jñāna* that is produced by *manas* one finds no difficulty about declaring that all substances whatsoever are a possible object of *mati-jñāna*.

Question : But then in relation to the objects perceived by oneself or learnt by one from the scriptural texts one's *manas* will produce *mati-jñāna* as well as *śruta-jñāna*. So what will distinguish the two ?

Answer : When thinking on the part of *manas* is accompanied by an employment of words the result is *śruta-jñāna*; when it is not so accompanied the result is *mati-jñāna*.

Even *paramāvadhi-jñāna*—which is *avadhi-jñāna* of the supreme type and can even cognize *asaṅkhyāta* such material particles as are situated in *aloka* and are collectively equivalent to *loka* in size—can perceive only tangible substances, not the intangible ones. Similarly, even of these tangible substances it cannot perceive all the modes.

Manah-paryāya-jñāna too perceives only tangible substances but not as many of them as does *avadhi-jñāna*. For while *avadhi-jñāna* can grasp all the material substances *manahparyāya* can

grasp only those among them that are of the form of *manas*; and these latter too are grasped by *manahparyāya* only insofar as they happen to lie within the limits of the area called *Mānuṣottara* (i.e. the area surrounded by the mountain *mānuṣottara*.) That is why the sphere of objects pertaining to *manahparyāya-jñāna* is said to be equivalent to that pertaining to *avadhi-jñāna* divided by *ananta*. Again, even *manahparyāya-jñāna*, howsoever pure it might be, cannot cognize all the modes belonging to the substances it can possibly grasp. Lastly *manahparyāya-jñāna* directly perceives only a tangible *manas* engaged in the process of thinking but with the help of a subsequent inference it is possible to cognize all the objects—tangible or otherwise—which this *manas* thinks of.

The four types of cognition *mati* etc., howsoever pure they might be, are incapable of grasping all the states of even a single object and that is because they are of the form of but incomplete development of the power of consciousness. On the other hand, it is a rule that the type of cognition which grasps all the states of even a single object can grasp all the states of all the objects; it is this type of cognition that is complete cognition, and it is this that is technically called *kevala-jñāna*. This type of cognition makes its appearance at the time when there takes place a complete development of the power of consciousness. That is why this type of cognition is not divided into sub-types, a division born of incompleteness. There is no object or a state of it which is incapable of being grasped by the type of cognition in question. That is why it is maintained that *kevala-jñāna* operates in relation to all the substances along with all of their modes. 27-30.

An Account of the Types of Cognition that can be Simultaneously Present in a Soul :

In a soul there can possibly be present from one to four types of cognition alternatively—that is, without any of the four alternatives being necessarily present there. 31.

In some soul there can possibly be present only one type of cognition, in some other two types, in some other three, in some even four; but all the five types of cognition cannot possibly

be present in a soul. When only one type of cognition is present in a soul it must be *kevala-jñāna*; for *kevala-jñāna* being a complete type of cognition no incomplete type of cognition whatsoever can co-exist with it. When two types of cognition are present in a soul they must be *mati* and *śruta*, for among the five types of cognition they alone necessarily go together; so far as the remaining three types are concerned they can well exist in isolation from one another. When three types of cognition are present in a soul they must be either *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* or *mati*, *śruta* and *manaḥparyāya*; for three types of cognition are possible only in an incomplete state of perfection, while in such a state *mati* and *śruta* must be present irrespective of whether the third coexisting type is *avadhi* or *manaḥparyāya*. When four types of cognition are present in a soul they must be *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*; for all these four types being possible in an incomplete state of perfection all of them can exist together. The reason why *kevala-jñāna* does not co-exist with any other type of cognition is that the former is possible only in a complete state of perfection while the remaining types are possible only in an incomplete state of perfection. Certainly, a complete state of perfection and an incomplete such state being mutually contradictory cannot coexist in a soul.

Again, when two, three or four types of cognition are declared to be possibly coexistent they are so declared only in respect of potency not in respect of activity.

Question : What does that mean ?

Answer : For example, at the time when a person possessing the two types of cognition *mati* and *śruta* or one possessing the three types *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* is actively engaged in cognizing some object through *mati-jñāna* he is certainly possessed of the potency to have *śruta-jñāna* or of that to have *avadhi-jñāna*, but at that same time he cannot put either of these potencies to use with a view to cognizing objects through the corresponding type of *jñāna*. Similarly, at the time of being actively engaged with *śruta-jñāna* he cannot put to use the

potency to have *mati-jñāna* or that to have *avadhi-jñāna*. The same applies to the potency to have *manahparyāya*. The idea is that even when there exist in a soul the maximum number of cognitive potencies—that is, four of them—then too an active engagement in the form of having cognition is possible on the part of just one of them at a time; for at that time the remaining potencies lie defunct.

At the time *kevala-jñāna* there do not take place the four types of cognition *mati* etc.—this principle is admitted on all hands but it is interpreted in two ways. Thus some authorities are of the view that at the time of *kevala-jñāna* the four cognitive potencies—corresponding to *mati* etc.—are certainly present there but being overpowered by *kevala-jñāna*—just as the light of planets, stars etc. is overpowered by solar light—they are not in a position to undertake active engagement in the form of having cognition. That is why at the time of *kevala-jñāna* there arise no cognitive mental states of the form of *mati* etc. even while the corresponding potencies are then certainly present there.

The other authorities are of the view that the four cognitive potencies *mati* etc. are not natural to a soul but being of the form of the *kṣayopaśama* of the *karma* concerned they are something accidental—that is, something dependent on *karma*. Hence when there is a total disappearance of the *jñānavaraṇīya-karma* as it is there at the time of *kevala-jñāna* there is no possibility whatsoever of the accidental potencies in question being present. Hence it is that at the time of *kevala-jñāna* no cognitive potency except that pertaining to *kevala-jñāna* is possibly present—nor an active engagement in the form of having cognition on the part of one such potency. 31.

Laying Down the Nature of False Cognition and the Causes of Falsity in Cognition :

Mati, *śruta* and *avadhi*—these three are also of the form of false-cognition, technically called *ajñāna*. 32.

Since the cognizer concerned does not know how to

discriminate the real from the unreal, even true cognition on his part is in fact false cognition because it is thus a case of accidental—i.e. thoughtless-cognition just like a madman's cognition. 33.

The five forms of cognition *mati*, *śruta* etc. are so many modes of the power of consciousness, and to illumine their respective objects is their specific function. Hence it is that they are all designated cognition. But the first three of them are understood to be of the form of *jñāna* as well as *ajñāna*. Thus we have *mati-jñāna* as well as *mati-ajñāna*, *śruta-jñāna* as well as *śruta-ajñāna*, *avadhi-jñāna* as well as *avadhi-ajñāna*—technically called *vibhaṅga-jñāna*.

Question : When the three modes *mati* etc. are called *jñāna* inasmuch as they make possible the apprehension of their respective objects then why are the same also called *ajñāna* ? For the two words *jñāna* and *ajñāna*, being mutually contradictory, cannot apply to the same object—just as light and darkness cannot exist at the same place.

Answer : All the above three modes are to be called *jñāna* so far as the worldly convention is concerned but when they are here called *jñāna* as well as *ajñāna* that is done in conformity to the convention of a systematic discipline. For it is a convention of the spiritual discipline that the three cognitive modes *mati*, *śruta* and *avadhi* as belonging to a *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* person (i. e. a person devoid of *samyak-darśana*) are but *ajñāna* while the same as belonging to a *samyak-dṛṣṭi* person (i.e. a person possessed of *samyak-darśana*) are *jñāna*.

Question : It is not possible that only the *samyak-dṛṣṭi* persons carry on authentic cognitive intercourse and not also the *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* ones. It is also not possible that a *samyak-dṛṣṭi* person never has false cognition in the form of doubt or illusion while a *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* person always has nothing but false cognition of this sort. Nor is it possible that the instruments of cognition like sense-organs etc. must be perfect and free from defect in the case of a *samyak-dṛṣṭi* person while the same must be imperfect in the

case of a *mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi* person. And who can say that all the persons who happen to throw unprecedented light on subjects like science, literature etc. and who arrive at authentic conclusions regarding the same are *samyak-dr̥ṣṭi* ? So the question arises as to what is the basis of the present convention as to the terms *jñāna* and *ajñāna* resorted to by the spiritual discipline.

Answer : The basis of the spiritual discipline is the spiritual standpoint and not the worldly one. Thus souls are of two types—viz. those directed towards *mokṣa* and those directed towards a worldly life. The persons directed towards *mokṣa* are possessed of a sense of impartiality and self-discrimination, hence they make use of all their cognition with a view to buttressing their sense of impartiality—not to buttressing the worldly cravings. And that exactly is why their cognition is to be called *jñāna* even in case it is meagre from the worldly standpoint. On the contrary, the cognition belonging to the person directed towards a worldly life, howsoever extensive and lucid it might be from the worldly standpoint, is to be called *ajñāna* precisely to the extent it tends to buttress not the sense of impartiality but the worldly cravings. Just as a madman by taking gold to be gold and iron to be iron does occasionally attain true cognition, but on account of his madness he is incapable of discriminating the true from the false and so all his cognition—whether true or false—is deemed thoughtless or false cognition, similarly the person directed towards a worldly life, howsoever extensive might be his stock of knowledge, is in the dark as to the nature of soul and so all his worldly knowledge is but ignorance from the spiritual standpoint.

The idea is that even if a madman is in possession of much property and even if on occasions he attains true cognition his madness is always on the increase; similarly, the *mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi* person, who suffers from an intensity of attachment and aversion and is ignorant as to the nature of soul, employs even the vast stock of his knowledge just for buttressing his worldly cravings. That is why his cognition is to be called *ajñāna*. On the contrary, the *samyak-dr̥ṣṭi* person, who suffers from no intensity of attachment and aversion and is possessed of knowledge

concerning soul, employs even the small stock of his knowledge just for spiritual satisfaction. That is why his cognition is to be called *jñāna*. This is how things are viewed from the spiritual standpoint. 32-33.

The types of *Naya* :

Naigama, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra* and *śabda*—these five are the types of *naya*. 34.

Of these, the first—that is *naigama*—and *śabda* have got two and three sub-types respectively. 35.

There is no one fixed tradition as to the number of types pertaining to *naya*. Rather three traditions are found to be current in this connection. The first of these directly posits seven types—viz. *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *ṛjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha*, *evambhūta*; it is upheld by the Jaina Āgamic texts and by the Digambara texts. The second tradition is upheld by Siddhasena Divākara; he posits only six types—that is, the above seven minus *naigama*. The third tradition is upheld by the present aphorism and by the *bhāṣya* on the same; according to it, there are five basic types of *naya* while among these the first type *naigama* has got (according to the *bhāṣya*) two sub-types—viz. *deśaparikṣepin* and *sarvaparikṣepin*—and the fifth type *śabda* three sub-types—viz. *sāmprata*, *samabhirūḍha*, and *evambhūta*.

The idea Behind the Delineation of *Nayas* :

Concerning one thing or many things the views of one person or many persons are of diverse kinds. That is to say, if the views concerning even one single thing are enumerated they will appear to be limitless. And hence it becomes impossible to make acquaintance with all of these views concerning this thing. So to undertake not a very brief nor a very detailed but a medium elaboration of these views is what the delineation of *nayas* comes to. Thus the delineation of *nayas* means a classification of views; and the doctrine of *naya* means an investigation into views. The doctrine of *naya* not only discusses what the respective causes of the different views are, what their respective consequences are,

what their respective subject-matters are, but its chief aim is to look for the seed of compatibility among views that appear to be mutually contradictory but are not really so. So the doctrine of *naya* can be briefly interpreted as follows. It is the discipline which looks for the seed of real compatibility among views that appear to be mutually contradictory and which thus synthesizes these views. For example, mutually contradictory views are found propounded concerning soul itself. Thus at some place it is said 'the soul is one,' at another place it too is said 'the souls are many !' Now oneness and manyness appear to be mutually contradictory, and so the question arises : 'Is this mutual contradiction among these statements real or not ? If it is not real, why ?' The answer to this query has been found out by doctrine of *naya* and the following is the syntheses it has worked out. Quâ individual units the soul are many but if attention is fixed on the aspect of pure consciousness they are all one. Working out such syntheses the doctrine of *naya* demonstrates the mutual compatibility—the possibility of standing together—among even such statements as are mutually contradictory. Thus on the basis of the doctrine of *naya* there is demonstrated the mutual compatibility among so many views concerning soul that appear to be mutually contradictory—e.g. the view that it is permanent and the view that it is transient, the view that it is active and the view that it is inactive, and so on and so forth. The seed of such compatibility lies in the viewpoint—the intention of the thinker concerned. And the word *apekṣā* appearing in this discipline stands just for viewpoint thus understood; hence the doctrine of *naya* is also called the doctrine of *apekṣā*.

Why the Separate Enunciation of the Doctrine of *Naya* and How Is It a Specializing Feature of Jainism :

In the earlier given account of cognition the type called *śruta* has already been discussed.¹ Now *śruta* is a cognition of the nature of considered views and since *naya* too is a variety of

1. See Chapter One, aphorism 20.

cognition of the same nature the latter turns out to be a part and parcel of the former. So first there arises the question as to why when account of *śruta* has already been offered there should follow apart from this account an enunciation of the doctrine of *naya*. Again, one specializing feature of Jaina philosophy owes its origin to its doctrine of *naya*, but the doctrine of *naya* is of the nature of *śruta* while *śruta* is a name for *āgama-pramāṇa* that is, the valid cognition called scripture. Now the non-Jaina systems of philosophy too discuss *pramāṇa* or valid cognition and in that connection they offer an account of *āgama-pramāṇa*. So naturally a second question arises as follows : When an account of *āgama-pramāṇa* is available even in other systems of philosophy then why should it be treated as a specializing feature of the Jaina system that it enunciates the doctrine which is included in *āgama-pramāṇa* ? In other words, the question is as to what was the intention of the founders of the Jaina system of philosophy behind propounding the doctrine of *naya* apart from *śruta-pramāṇa*.

Both *śruta* and *naya* are certainly of the form of a cognition of the nature of considered views. And yet they differ from one another as follows : A considered view which touches upon—or attempts to do so—some subject-matter in all its aspects is *śruta* while a considered view which is content to touch upon some one aspect of the same subject-matter is *naya*. That is why *naya* cannot be independently called a *pramāṇa* and yet it is not a case of no *pramāṇa*. Just as the tip of a finger—cannot be called a finger and yet we cannot even say that it is no finger—for after all it is a part of a finger—similarly, *naya* too is a part of *śruta-pramāṇa*. The order followed by the origin of considered views and the practice resulting from it—these two are the viewpoints in accordance with which *naya* has been treated apart from *śruta-pramāṇa*. For whatever be the thing under consideration it is the considered views relating to its various aspects that culminate in hugeness or completeness. And the same order which is followed by the origin of the considered views in question should be followed by an account of them quâ a means of ultimate enlightenment. When this is conceded a treatment of

naya apart from *śruta* naturally turns out to be in place. Again, however complete be a piece of cognition relating to a thing, in practice this cognition is invariably employed part by part. And this too is why it is in place to treat apart from each other *naya* that is of the nature of considered views taken partwise and *śruta* that is of the nature of the same taken in their totality.

Though *āgama-pramāṇa* has been discussed even by the non-Jaina systems of philosophy, yet the doctrine of *naya* which is included in the same *pramāṇa* is established separately by the Jain system and that for the following reason, a reason sufficient to account for something that is special for this system. Generally, a man's cognitive operation is but partial in its coverage while he suffers from too much egoism and conceit. The result is that whatever little consideration he bestows on a subject tends to be treated by him as final and complete. And on account of the tendency in question he loses patience to give thought to the views of others. So ultimately he comes to mistakenly view his partial cognition as complete cognition. This mistaken view, in its turn, renders impossible a feeling of accord among persons holding true but different views concerning one and the same thing. The net result is that the door to a complete and true cognition is effectively barred.

When on any topic—e.g. the nature of soul—a system of philosophy treats as totally true the partly true view of a person deemed authoritative by it, then the other systems of philosophy which hold views that are true but opposite to its own are held in contempt by it as unauthentic. Similarly, some other system of philosophy holds this first system in contempt, and both hold in contempt some third system. The result is that in place of mutual accord there crop up discord and conflict. So it is with a view to opening the door for a true and complete cognition and with a view to eliminating conflicts that the doctrine of *naya* has been established. Thereby it is indicated that each thinker, before he attributes the status of *āgama-pramāṇa* to a view of his, should make sure whether or not this view manages to cover all aspects of the matter under consideration and as such deserves to be

classified as *pramāṇa*. The indication in question made through the doctrine of *naya* is a speciality of Jaina philosophy.

A General Definition :

Whatever be the subject-matter a view which offers a relatively true account of it is *naya*.

In brief the *nayas* are divided into two types—viz. *dravyārthika* and *pariyāyārthika*.

The so many things of the world, big and small, are neither absolutely similar to one another nor absolutely dissimilar. Thus they all contain in their make-up both an aspect of similarity and one of dissimilarity. This exactly is why it can be said that all things whatsoever are of the form of both something generic and something specific. And man's intellect inclines sometimes towards the generic aspect of things, sometimes towards their specific aspect. When it grasps the generic aspect its view is called *dravyārthika naya*, when it grasps the specific aspect the same is called *pariyāyārthika naya*. However, not all the views pertaining to the generic nor all of them pertaining to the specific are of an identical nature; each group has got internal differences. To make this out the two viewpoints are briefly subdivided once more. Thus there are three divisions of the *dravyārthika* and four of the *pariyāyārthika*—that is to say, seven divisions in all; and these very are the seven *nayas*. Of course, it is not the case that the *dravyārthika* view takes no account whatsoever of *pariyāya* or the specific aspect or that the *pariyāyārthika* view takes no account whatsoever of *dravya* or the generic aspect. For the division of view-points is to be understood on the basis of a consideration of the chief and the subordinate.

Question : Please explain both the above mentioned *nayas* with the help of convenient illustrations.

Answer : When at any time, at any place or under any condition eye is fixed on the ocean and what is attended to are not the specific features of water like its colour, taste, depth or shallowness, extent and limits but only water as such, then we

have before us a generic consideration having only water for its subject-matter; and this precisely is the *dravyārthika naya* pertaining to water.

On the contrary, when what is attended to are the specific features of water like its colour, taste etc. then the consideration in question, inasmuch as it has the specific features of water for its subject-matter, is called the *pariyāyārthika naya* pertaining to water.

What has just been said concerning water can be understood also in the case of all other physical things. Thus just as in relation to the different things of an identical nature that are located in different places—e.g. in relation to all water—it is possible to have both a generic and a specific consideration, similarly in relation to a single thing that is spread out on the limitless time-plank with its three divisions past, present and future—e.g. in relation to a soul—it is possible to have both a generic and a specific consideration. When the different formations resulting from a difference of time and condition are disregarded and attention is fixed on pure consciousness then we have before us the *dravyārthika naya* pertaining to consciousness; when attention is fixed on the different states of consciousness resulting from a difference of place, time etc. then we have before us the *pariyāyārthika naya* pertaining to consciousness.

The Nature of the Particular Types of Naya :

(1) The view which results from following the popular convention or the popular worldly course is *naigama naya*.

The two sub-types of *naigama* indicated by Umāsvāti are to be interpreted as follows : When on the basis of a word like 'jar' or 'cloth' that is indicative of something generic just a few of the corresponding specimens—i.e. just a few jars or a few pieces of cloth—are called to mind the resultant view is *deśaparikṣepi-naigama* i.e. *naigama* encompassing a part; on the other hand, when on the basis of the same word the entire corresponding class—i.e. the entire class of jars or the entire class of pieces of

cloth—is called to mind then the resultant view is *sarvaparikṣepi-naigama*, i.e. *naigama* encompassing the whole.

(2) The view which on the basis of some one generic feature whatsoever subsumes under one form the things of various types or the numerous particular units of them is *saṅgraha naya*.

(3) The view which with some practical purpose in view distinguishes from one another the things subsumed under one form on the basis of some one generic feature is *vyavahāra-naya*.

All these three *nayas* have their origin in the grounds of the *dravyārthika* and so they are all understood to be of the nature of the *dravyārthika*.

Question : Before proceeding on to interpret the remaining *nayas* please explain well with the help of illustrations these three *nayas* themselves.

Naigama Naya

Answer : Depending on the variety of types of place, time and the nature of peoples the popular conventions as also the impressions left behind by them are of numerous types. Hence the *naigama naya* originating from them too is of numerous types—which is why its illustrations of various types are to be met with. And new illustrations of the same sort can well be construed.

A person going there with a view to undertaking some job is asked by someone 'where are you going ?' And the former replies 'I am going to fetch an axe or a pen.'

Here the person replying is in fact going to fetch either wood for preparing an axe-handle or reed to prepare a pen and yet he formulates his reply as above and the person enquiring too immediately catches his meaning. This is just a form of popular convention.

When a person who having given up caste rules has become a monk is introduced in terms of the Brahmin caste to which he belonged in his earlier life-stage, then too the statement concerned 'Here is a Brahmin monk' is understood immediately.

Similarly, the ninth and thirteenth dates of the bright half of the month *Caitra* are treated by people as the birthday of Rāmacandra and Mahāvīra respectively who were actually born thousands of years back, and treating these dates as such they organize corresponding festivals in this connection. This too is a form of popular convention.

When certain particular human groups happen to be engaged in fight among themselves then others think as if it is the respective residing places of these human groups that are fighting, and so, they say 'India is fighting', 'China is fighting' etc. The intention behind such statements is immediately understood by the hearers.

Thus whatever views originate on account of the impressions left behind by the popular conventions are collected together in the first category under the title *naigama naya*.

Saṅgraha Naya

When one keeps in view the one generic feature 'existence' that is common to the numerous particular things of a physical or a conscious type—thus disregarding the other specific features that are equally present there—and treating all these things as of one form reflects 'The entire universe is of the form of existence—for there is nothing that is devoid of existence', then what we have before us is *saṅgraha naya*. Similarly, when paying no attention to the variety of types and the multiplicity of units characterizing the pieces of cloth that are present there one keeps in view just one generic feature clothness and reflects 'Just cloth is present here', then too what we have before us is *saṅgraha naya*.

In accordance with the greater or lesser extent of the concerned generic feature one can construe numberless illustrations of *saṅgraha naya*. Thus the more extensive the concerned generic feature the more extensive will be the resultant *saṅgraha naya*; similarly, the less extensive the concerned generic feature the less extensive will be the resultant *saṅgraha naya*. The idea is that whatever views operate by unifying various things on

the basis of a generic feature are fit to be placed in the category *saṅgraha naya*.

Vyavahāra Naya

Even after various things have been subsumed under one form if it is required that they be introduced to someone in a specific form—or if the occasion arises for making a practical use of them—then they have to be distinguished from one another on the basis of a specific form. For example, by being told of just cloth one cannot be made acquainted with the various types of cloth taken separately. Again, he who wants *khādī*—that is, the handspun-and-woven cloth—cannot get it without introducing distinction among clothes; for certainly clothes are of numerous types. Hence it is that distinctions like the *khādī* cloth, the mill-made cloth, etc. too have to be introduced. Similarly, in the field of philosophy one says : ‘The thing of the form of existence is of two types—viz. the physical and the conscious; again, the conscious thing is of two types—viz. one entangled in the worldly life and one emancipated from it.’ And further distinctions of the same sort have to be made. All such views with a tendency towards making distinction are to be placed in the category *vyavahāra naya*.

In the above illustrations it can be seen that the basis of *naigama naya* is popular convention while popular convention in its turn is based on a transfer of epithet; and a transfer of epithet has for its basis something that is generic. This being the case it becomes absolutely clear that *naigama naya* is something that grasps the generic. Similarly, *saṅgraha naya* being of the form of a unificatory cognitive operation is obviously something that grasps the generic. As for *vyavahāra naya* even though it involves a cognitive operation which tends towards making distinctions the basis of its activity is something generic; hence it too should be treated as something that grasps the generic. All this explains why the three *nayas* in question are regarded as divisions of the *dravyārthika naya*.

Question : What is the mutual distinction among these

three *nayas* and what is the mutual relationship among them ?

Answer : The sphere of *naigama naya* is most extensive of all, for in accordance with the concerned popular convention it grasps both the generic and the specific—sometimes in a chief form, sometimes in a subsidiary form. And since *saṅgraha* is directed only towards the generic its sphere is less extensive than that of *naigama*. As for *vyavahāra*, its sphere is less extensive than even that of *saṅgraha*, for on the basis of certain particular features it only introduces distinctions in that very sphere that has been covered by *saṅgraha* and is therefore something that is directed only towards the specific. Thus there is a relative order of succession among these three *nayas* inasmuch as their sphere is growingly less extensive. *Naigama naya* familiarizes us with the generic, the specific and the relation between the two; from this originates *saṅgraha* while it is on the wall of *saṅgraha* that the painting of *vyavahāra* is drawn.

Question : In this very manner please interpret the remaining four *nayas* as well, adduce illustrations relating to them, and give other information regarding them.

Answer : (1) The view which, disregarding the past and the future, grasps only the present is *ṛjusūtra*.

(2) The view which chiefly depending on words keeps its attention fixed on so many properties of words and posits a corresponding difference of meaning is *śabda-naya*.

Of the three sub-types of *śabda-naya* indicated by Umāsvāti in the aphorism the first is *sāmprata*. That is to say, the generic word *śabda-naya* singly covers all the three sub-types, *sāmprata*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*; but in all the current traditions the word *śabda-naya* conventionally stands for the first sub-type *sāmprata* and so the word *sāmprata-naya* is there replaced by the word *śabda-naya*. That is why we have given a general interpretation of *sāmprata-naya* at just this place and have employed the word *śabda-naya* while offering a special elucidation of the same. And this elucidation is the same as the elucidation of *sāmprata* offered in the *bhāṣya*.

(3) The view which posits a difference of meaning on the basis of the etymology of the word concerned is *samabhirūḍha-naya*.

(4) The view which applies a word to a thing only in case this thing satisfies the meaning yielded by this word—never otherwise—is *evambhūta*.

Rjusūtra-Naya :

Though man's imagination cannot absolutely ignore what is past or what is future is often happens that man's intellect, keeping its attention fixed on an immediately present consequence, begins to operate only in relation to what is present. Under such a situation man's intellect begins to suppose as if only that which is present is real, is efficacious while that which is past or that which is future, being not efficacious at present, is as good as void. Thus a prosperity that is present can alone be called prosperity because it alone is a means of happiness; on the other hand, the memory of a past prosperity or the anticipation of a future prosperity cannot at all be called prosperity—because neither is a means of happiness at present. Similarly, a son of who is present and who serves his parents is a son; on the other hand, a son who existed in past or will exist in future but does not exist at present is not at all a son. Thus the views which exclusively pertain to the present phase of time are to be placed in the category *rjusūtra*.

Śabda-Naya :

When an understanding penetrating into the depths of thought is once bent upon rooting out the past and the future, then at another time it proceeds still further and gets ready to root out something else as well. Hence sometimes it operates on the basis of words alone and reflects that if the present is alone real on the simple ground that it is different from the past and the future then why a word should not yield a different meaning when associated with a different gender, tense, number, case-ending, person or prefix. Just as there is no one single thing

running like a thread into all the three phases of time but the thing that exists at present is alone a thing, similarly the things denoted by words that involve different gender, number, tense etc. are to be understood to be really different. Thinking thus the understanding in question comes to posit a difference in meaning on the basis of a difference in tense, gender etc.

For example, in a scriptural text there occurs the statement—‘There was a town named Rājagṛha.’ The broad meaning of this statement is that the town named Rājagṛha existed there in the past but does not exist there at present. However, as a matter of fact, Rājagṛha existed there even at the time of the statement in question. But if it was present there at that time, then why was it written ‘It was there ?’ This question is answered by *śabda-naya* by maintaining that Rājagṛha that exists at present is different from Rājagṛha that existed in the past, and that since the context requires an account of the latter the statement ‘Rājagṛha was there’ was made. This is an illustration of the difference of meaning based on a difference of tense.

As an example of the difference of meaning based on a difference of gender take the words ‘*kuā*’ (Hindi for the Sanskrit *kūpa*—i.e. ‘well’) and ‘*kuīn*’ (Hindi for the Sanskrit *kūpikā*—i.e. diminutive well). Here the first word is in masculine gender, the second in feminine gender. And the difference of meaning supposed to underlie them too is well known in practice. Again, so many *tārās* or heavenly bodies are called *nakṣatras* or specific constellations of stars, but according to *śabda-naya* one is not authorized to make statements like ‘That particular *tārā* is *nakṣatra*’ ‘That is the *nakṣatra maghā*’ for according to this *naya* since a difference of gender yields a difference of meaning no one thing can be referred to by both the words *tārā* and *nakṣatra* or by both the words *maghā* and *nakṣatra*.

Similarly, when the same verbal root yields a different meaning when associated with a different prefix—e.g. in the case of the words *saṁsthāna* (=shape), *prasthāna* (=moving away),

upasthāna (=presence) etc. or in the case of the words *ārāma* (=grove), *virāma* (=rest) etc.—then we have something that builds a ground for *śabda-naya*. Thus the so many suppositions that are current as to the difference of meaning based on the different properties of words are all to be placed in the category *śabda-naya*.

Samabhirūḍha Naya :

The same understanding which posits a difference in meaning on the basis of a difference in some property of words now proceeding still further takes its stand on a difference in etymology and goes to the extent of maintaining that even in those cases where certain different words are supposed to yield the same meaning they cannot in fact have the same meaning but must have different meanings. Its argument is that when a difference in gender, number etc. can form the basis at a difference in meaning then why a difference in the word employed should not do the same.

Thus arguing it attributes on the basis of etymology different meanings to the synonymous words like *rājā*, *nṛpa*, *bhūpati* etc. (all meaning 'king'); its contention is that one who is decorated with royal insignia is *rājā*, one who protects the people is *nṛpa*, one who maintains the earth—i.e. makes it prosperous—is *bhūpati*. Thus this view which on the basis of etymology posits differentiation within one and the same thing that is denoted by the three synonymous words in question is called *samabhirūḍha-naya*. All the suppositions which posit a difference of meaning in the case of the different synonymous words are to be placed in this very category.

Evambhūta Naya :

When the understanding specially accustomed to penetrate into the depths of the matter reaches the ultimate depth it reflects that when a difference in etymology can yield a difference in meaning then it too should be conceded that a word stands for a thing only in case this thing satisfies the etymology of this word

and that only in such a case—not otherwise—has this thing to be denoted by this word.

On this supposition a man is not to be called *rājā* if he has only earned the right to be decorated by royal insignia at some time or other, nor is he to be called *nṛpa* if he has only been entrusted with the responsibility to protect the people. But to add a further requirement, he is to be called *rājā* only in case he is actually carrying the royal sceptre and is shining with glory on that account; similarly, he is to be called *nṛpa* only in case he is actually protecting the people. All this is to say that it would be proper to call a man *rājā* or *nṛpa* only in case he is actually satisfying the etymology of the word concerned.

Similarly, only at a time—or at the times—when a person is actually performing some service is he to be called *sevaka* (Sanskrit for 'one who serves'). Thus all the suppositions which employ a word standing for some qualifier or one standing for some qualificand only in case the activity with which this word is related is actually being undertaken are to be called *evāmbhūta-naya*.

Remaining Remarks :

The difference that obtains among the just described four categories of views should be obvious from the illustrations cited in connection with each. So there is no need for pointing that out separately. Only this much has to be understood that each succeeding *naya* is subtler than the one preceding it; hence it is that the subject-matter of a succeeding *naya* depends on that of the preceding one. And the basis of all these four *nayas* is *pariyāyārthika-naya*. This has to be said because *ṛjusūtra* accepts only the present phase of time—not the past or the future; hence it is obvious that its subject-matter comes into view not as something generic but as something specific. That is to say, it is really from *ṛjusūtra* that *pariyāyārthika-naya*—that is, the view directed towards the specific—makes its start. The three *nayas* coming after *ṛjusūtra* are increasingly more directed towards the specific; hence their being *pariyāyārthika* is but obvious.

Here it too must be understood that even among these *nayas* when a succeeding one is said to be subtler than that preceding it then to that extent this preceding *naya* is more directed towards the generic than that succeeding one. Similarly, the three *nayas*, *naigama* etc. which take their stand on the ground of *dravyārthika* are increasingly more subtle and to that extent among them too a succeeding one is to be taken to be more directed towards the specific than that preceding it.

Nevertheless, when the first three *nayas* are called *dravyārthika* and the last four *paryāyārthika* then the idea is that in the first three the generic element and a consideration of it are relatively more obvious inasmuch as they are relatively crude; on the other hand, the last four *nayas* are relatively subtle and in them the specific element and a consideration of it are relatively more obvious. It is on the basis of this obviousness or non-obviousness of the generic and specific elements—and on the basis of their dominant or subordinate status—that the seven *nayas* are divided into two types—viz. *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*. But when consideration is bestowed on the real state of affairs then it is found that the generic and specific elements being two indissoluble aspects of one and the same thing it is impossible to absolutely distinguish the subject-matter of one *naya* from that of another.

Naya-dr̥ṣṭi or the viewpoint of *naya*, *vicārasaraṇi*, or the methodology of consideration, *sāpekṣa*, *abhiprāya* or the relative purport—these three phraseologies mean one and the same thing. From the above account it ought to be clear that in relation to one and the same subject-matter whatsoever there can be a number of methodologies of consideration. However, whatever be the number of such methodologies they have been briefly divided into seven types in the manner indicated. Among those seven too the second exhibits greater subtlety than the first, the third greater than the second. The greatest subtlety is to be found in the last methodology that has been designated *evam̐bhūta*. That precisely is why the seven methodologies in question are divided into two types in another manner also—that is, they have been

divided into the types designated *vyavahāra-naya* and *niścaya-naya*. *Vyavahāra* means that directed towards the crude or that in which there is the predominance of a transfer of epithet, *niścaya* means that directed towards the subtle or that which touches upon what is essential. Really speaking, the final limit of *niścaya* is reached in *evambhūta*.

In a third manner too seven *nayas* are divided into two types—that is, they are divided into the types *śabda-naya* and *artha-naya*. Thus that which chiefly considers an *artha* or a thing is *artha-naya*, that which chiefly considers a *śabda* or a word is *śabda-naya*. Thus the first four *nayas* upto *ṛjusūtra* belong to the type *artha-naya*, the remaining three to the type *śabda-naya*.

There are good many more viewpoints besides those described above. Thus life has got two divisions—one that is devoted to recognising the truth, the other that is devoted to digesting the truth. The division which only thinks over the truth—that is, which makes acquaintance with what is essential—is *jñāna-naya* or the viewpoint of knowledge; on the other hand, the division which attaches finality to the digesting of one's acquaintance with truth is *kriyā-naya* or the viewpoint of action.

The above described seven *nayas*, inasmuch as they are all devoted to a consideration of truth, are to be placed in the category *jñāna-naya*. And the viewpoint of realizing in life the truth investigated through the instrumentality of these *nayas* is the viewpoint of action. Here action means rendering life replete with truth. 34, 35.



CHAPTER TWO

In the first chapter the seven fundamental verities have been indicated by name; in the next nine chapters they have to be specially described one by one. Hence first of all the essential nature of the fundamental verity soul has been delineated in the present chapter while an account of the various topics connected with it—e.g. its sub-division into types—continues upto the fourth chapter.

The five *bhāvas*—that is, the characteristic conditions resulting from the presence or otherwise of the *karma* concerned—, their types and illustrations :

Aupaśamika (i.e. that which results from a subsidence of the *karma* concerned), *kṣāyika* (i.e. that which results from a destruction of the *karma* concerned), the mixed or *kṣāyopaśamika* (i.e. that which results from a subsidence-cum-destruction of the *karma* concerned)—these three plus two more—viz. *audayika* (i.e. that which results from a manifestation of the *karma* concerned) and *pāriṇāmika* (i.e. that which having nothing to do with *karma* appears naturally)—thus five in all are the types of *bhāva* and they constitute the nature of a soul. 1.

These five types have got 2, 9, 18, 21 and 3 sub-types respectively. 2.

Samyaktva or right inclination and *cāritra* or right conduct—these two are *aupaśamika*. 3.

Jñāna or determinate cognition, *darśana* or indeterminate cognition, *dāna* or donation, *lābha* or gain, *bhoga* or immediate consumption, *upabhoga* or recurrent consumption, *vīrya* or endeavour, and *samyaktva* or right inclination and *cāritra* or right conduct—these nine are *kṣāyika*. 4.

Four types of *jñāna* or right determinate cognition, three types of *ajñāna* or false determinate cognition, three types of *darśana* or indeterminate cognition, the five above enumerated fortunes *dāna* etc., *samyaktva* or right inclination, *cāritra* or complete discipline and *saṁyamāsaṁyama* or partial discipline—these eighteen are *kṣāyopaśamika*. 5.

The four types of *gati* or birth-species, the four types of *kaṣāya* or passions, the three types of *liṅga* (also called *veda*) or sexual feeling, one *mithyādarśana* or wrong inclination, one *ajñāna* or lack-of-cognition, one *asaṁyama* or lack-of-discipline, one *asiddhatva* or state-of-non-emancipation, and the six types of *leśyā* or spiritual colouring—these twenty-one are *audayika*. 6.

Jīvatva or being a soul, *bhavyatva* or being worthy of *mokṣa* and *abhavyatva* or being unworthy of *mokṣa*—these three, as also several others, are *pāriṇāmika*. 7.

The present aphorism is aimed at elucidating the difference of opinion as to the nature of soul that obtains between the Jaina system of philosophy on the one hand and the other systems on the other. Thus the *Sāṅkhya* and *Vedānta* systems treat a soul as absolutely permanent and so posit in it no transformation whatsoever; according to them, the transformations like cognition, pleasure, pain etc. belong rather to *prakṛti* or *avidyā*. The *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems do treat cognition etc. as qualities of a soul, but still a soul is according to them absolutely permanent—that is, such as undergoes no transformation whatsoever. The *neo-Mīmāṃsā* view too is akin to that of the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Nyāya*. According to the Buddhist system, a soul is but a flow of transformations that are absolutely momentary—that is, such as leave no residue whatsoever.¹

1. At different moments there is an experience of the transformations like pleasure and pain, or of those like the cognitions with their objects mutually differing more or less; now to treat these transformations as alone real and not to admit the existence of a continuously abiding substance as running to their midst like a thread—that is the notion of a flow of such transformations as leave no residue whatsoever.

As against all these, the Jaina system maintains that just as in the physical objects of nature there is neither absolute permanence nor absolute momentariness but permanence in the midst of transformations,¹ similarly a soul is permanent in the midst of transformations.

Hence the modes like cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. ought to be treated as pertaining to a soul itself.

Not all the modes of a soul are found characterized by one and same condition; thus some of them are found characterized by one condition, some others by another. It is these different conditions possibly characterizing a mode that are called *bhāva*; and the modes of a soul can be characterized by five types of *bhāva* at the most. These five types are as follows :- (1) *aupaśamika*, (2) *kṣāyika*, (3) *kṣāyopaśamika*, (4) *audayika*, (5) *pāriṇāmika*.

The Nature of *Bhāvas*

(1) The *aupaśamika bhāva* is that which is born of *upaśama* or subsidence. *Upaśama* is a sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of a complete cessation of the manifestation of some *karma* which is yet in existence—just like the clarity appearing in water in which dirt has gathered at the bottom.

(2) The *kṣāyika bhāva* is that which is born of *kṣaya* or destruction. *Kṣaya* is the supreme sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of a complete dissociation from *karma*—just like the clarity appearing in water that has been rendered absolutely free of dirt.

1. However frequently might a hammer strike against the anvil the latter remains fixed in its place; in the same manner, not to suffer any change whatsoever in spite of the change pertaining to place, time etc.—that is the state of *kūṭasthanīyatā* (the Sanskrit word for 'absolute permanence'). When the basic entity persists there in all the three phases of time and yet there is change pertaining to place, time etc.—that is the state of *pāriṇāmīnīyatā* (the Sanskrit word for permanence in the midst of transformations).

(3) The *kṣāyopasāṃika bhāva* is that which is born of both *kṣaya* and *upaśama*. *Kṣayopasāma* is a sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of a destruction through *pradeśodaya* or nominal manifestation¹ of a part of some *karma*. This purification is a mixed sort—just like that of the water-washed rice *kodrava* whose intoxicating power partly vanishes and partly remains.

(4) The *audayika bhāva* is that which is born of *udaya* or manifestation. *Udaya* is a sort of spiritual blemish or pollution that comes about at the time of an effective manifestation of *karma*—just as dirtiness appears in water in which dirt has been mixed.

(5) The *pāriṇāmika bhāva* is that transformation of a substance which is automatically called forth by a mere existence of this substance. That is to say, the natural self-transformation undergone by a substance is called its *pāriṇāmika bhāva*.

It is these five types of *bhāva* that constitute the nature of soul; that is to say, whether a soul be worldly or emancipated its modes must be characterized by one of these five types of *bhāva*. On the other hand, modes characterized by these five types of *bhāva* cannot possibly be found in a not-soul and so these five types of *bhāva* cannot constitute the nature of a not-soul. Of course, it is not necessary that all these five types of *bhāva* be found together simultaneously in all the souls that are there. Thus all the emancipated souls are possessed of just two types of *bhāva*—viz. *kṣāyika* and *pāriṇāmika*. As for the worldly souls, some among them are possessed of three of these types, some possessed of four, some possessed of five; however, none of them is possessed of just two types of *bhāva*. All this is to say that the modes of an emancipated soul are characterized by the just mentioned two types of *bhāva* while those of a worldly soul are characterized by three to five types. So when it is said that the five types of *bhāva* constitute the nature of a soul the statement

1. The experiencing of karmic particles rendered void of flavour is *pradeśodaya* or nominal manifestation; the experiencing of those yet possessed of flavour is *vipākodaya* or effective manifestation.

is to be understood either to refer to the whole lot of souls that are there or to refer to the possibility of these five types in one particular soul.

The modes characterized by *audayika bhāva* are accidental, those characterized by the remaining four types of *bhāva* are natural. 1.

The present aphorism enumerates 53 sub-types of the above five types of *bhāva* while the next aphorism name these sub-types group by group and tell us as to how many and which modes are characterized by this or that type of *bhāva*. 2.

The Sub-types of *Aupaśamika-bhāva* :

Right inclination results from a subsidence of the *darśana-mohaṇīya karma*, right conduct from that of the *cāritra-mohaṇīya karma*. Hence right inclination and right conduct, these two modes are alone to be treated as characterized by *aupaśamika bhāva*. 3.

The Sub-types of *Kṣāyika-bhāva* :

Kevala-jñāna or all-comprehensive determinate cognition results from a destruction of the *Kevala-jñānāvaraṇīya karma*, *kevala-darśana* or all-comprehensive indeterminate cognition from that of the *kevala-darśanāvaraṇīya karma*. Again, the five fortunes, donation, gain, immediate consumption, recurrent consumption and endeavour result from a destruction of the five types of *antarāya karma*, right inclination from that of the *darśanamohaṇīya karma*, right conduct from that of the *cāritramohaṇīya karma*. Hence these nine modes *kevalajñāna* etc. are to be treated as characterized by *kṣāyika bhāva*. 4.

The Sub-types of *Kṣāyopāśamika-bhāva* :

Mati-jñāna, *śruta-jñāna*, *avadhi-jñāna*, and *manahparyāya-jñāna* result from a *kṣayopāśama* of the *mati-jñānāvaraṇa karma*, *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa karma*, *avadhi-jñānāvaraṇa karma* and *manahparyāya-jñānāvaraṇa karma* respectively; false *mati-jñāna*, false

śruta-jñāna, false *avadhi-jñāna* (also called *vibhanga-jñāna*) from that of the *mati-jñānāvaraṇa karma*, *śruta-jñānāvaraṇa karma*, *avadhi-jñānāvaraṇa karma* respectively; visual indeterminate cognition, non-visual indeterminate cognition, *avadhi*-type of indeterminate cognition from that of the *caḥṣurdarśanāvaraṇa karma*, *acacṣurdarśanāvaraṇa karma* and *avadhidarśanāvaraṇa karma* respectively; the five fortunes donation etc. from that of the five types of *antarāya karma*. Again, right inclination results from a *kṣayopasāma* of the *anantānubandhī* sub-type of four *kaṣāya karmas* on the one hand and that of the *darśanamohanīya karma* on the other; *cāritra* or right conduct (of a complete type)—or *sarvavirati*—i.e. complete discipline—results from a *kṣayopasāma* of the three sub-types—viz. *anantānubandhī*, *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*, *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa kaṣāya karmas*; *saṁyamā-saṁyama*—i.e. restrain-cum-unrestrain—or *deśavirati*—i.e. partial discipline—from that of the two sub-types—viz. *anantānubandhī* and *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*—of four *kaṣāya karmas*. Hence the eighteen modes *mati-jñāna* etc. are alone to be treated as characterized by *kṣāyopasāmanika bhāva*. 5.

The Sub-types of *Audayika-bhāva* :

The four types of *gati* or birth-species, hellish, animal-type, human and heavenly result from a manifestation of the *gatināmakarma*; the four *kaṣāyas* or passions from that of the *kaṣāyamohanīya karma*; the feminine, masculine and neuter sex-feelings from that of the *vedamohanīya karma*; *mithyādarśana*—i.e. wrong inclination—or *tattva-aśraddhā*—i.e. non-belief in truth—from that of the *mithyātvamohanīya karma*; *ajñāna*—i.e. lack of cognition from that of the *jñānāvaraṇa karma*. Again, unrestrain or a complete lack of discipline results from a manifestation of the twelve sub-types *anantānubandhī* etc. of *cāritramohanīya karma*; *asiddhatva*—i.e. non-emancipation—or *śārīradhāraṇā*—i.e. embodiment—from that of the *vedaṇīya*, *āyu*, *nāma* and *gotra karmas*. Lastly, the six types of *leśyā*—viz. the black, blue, grey, red, yellow and white—(which are of the form of an activity produced by passion) result from a manifestation of the *kaṣāya* or

from that of the *śarīra-nāma-karma* responsible for activity. Hence it is that the above twenty-one modes *gati* etc. are to be treated as characterized by *audayika bhāva*. 6.

The Sub-types of *Pāriṇāmika-bhāva* :

Jīvatva or being a soul—i.e. being conscious, *bhavyatva* or being worthy of *mokṣa*, *abhavyatva* or being unworthy of *mokṣa*—these three modes are natural; that is to say, these modes result neither from a subsidence, nor from a destruction, nor from a subsidence-cum-destruction of *karma* but are present there since a beginningless time—that is, their presence follows from the existence of a soul. Hence it is that these modes are to be treated as characterized by *pāriṇāmika bhāva*.

Question : These three modes—are they alone characterized by *pāriṇāmika bhāva* ?

Answer : No, there are also others that are such.

Question : Which ones ?

Answer : There are so many of them; e.g. existence, separateness, actorship, enjoyership, being possessed of qualities, being possessed of constituent-units, being possessed of an *asaṅkhyāta*—number of constituent-units, being-non-ubiquitous, being devoid of colour.

Question : Why then are those three alone enumerated here ?

Answer : The purpose here is to lay down the nature of a soul and that can be done only through a mention of its unique properties. Hence along with the modes characterized by *aupaśamika bhāva* etc. only those modes characterized by *pāriṇāmika bhāva* are here mentioned which are unique to a soul. The modes existence etc. are no doubt characterized by *pāriṇāmika bhāva* but they belong to a not-soul as much as they do to a soul. So they are not unique to a soul. And that is why they are not mentioned here. Even so, it is they that are indicated by the word *ādi* (=etc.) occurring at the end of the concerned word-compound; and the same meaning is derived by the

Digambara sect from the word *ca* (=and) occurring in the aphorism. 7.

The Defining Characteristic of a Soul :

***Upayoga* or cognitive operation is the defining characteristic of a soul. 8.**

The *Jīva* or soul—also called *ātman* or conscious entity—is an independent substance existing there ever since a beginningless time. Since ultimately speaking it is devoid of colour its knowledge cannot be had through sense-organs—though it can well be had through a self-cognitive perception or an inference. Even so, to an average investigator such a defining characteristic ought to be pointed out as should enable him to recognise a soul. It is with this end in view that the defining characteristic of a soul has been laid down in the present aphorism. The soul is what is to be defined—the object to be known, *upayoga* its defining characteristic—the means of knowing. The universe is a conglomerate of numerous entities, physical and conscious. Among these if a discriminative ascertainment is to be made as to what is physical and what is conscious that can be done only through the instrumentality of *upayoga*. For to some extent or other *upayoga* is invariably found in all souls. Certainly, a physical entity is one that is devoid of *upayoga*.

Question : But what is this *upayoga* ?

Answer : It is nothing but an operation of the form of cognition.

Question : The activity designated cognition is found in a soul but not in a physical entity. Why is it so ?

Answer : The cause of cognition is the power of consciousness; so cognition can be found only in that which is possessed of this power. And this power is possessed only by a soul, not by a physical entity.

Question : A soul is an independent substance and so it ought to be possessed of a number of qualities. Why then is *upayoga* alone declared to be its defining characteristic ?

Answer : Certainly, a soul is possessed of an infinite number of qualities and modes, but *upayoga* is the most prominent of them all. For being of such a nature as enlightens itself as well as what is not itself *upayoga* is alone in a position to acquaint us with itself as also with the remaining modes. Besides, whatever things present or absent are cognized by a soul, whatever ascertainments and reservations are made by it, whatever pleasure and pain are experienced by it are so dealt with by it through the instrumentality of *upayoga*. Hence *upayoga* is the most prominent of its modes.

Question : Is the defining characteristic of a thing different from its nature ?

Answer : No.

Question : But then those five types of *bhāva* which are above declared to be constituting the nature of a soul are equally its defining characteristic. What is the use then of mentioning another defining characteristic in this connection ?

Answer : The unique properties too are not all alike. Thus some of them are such as doubtless reside in the definiendum concerned but they sometimes do so and sometimes do not; again, some are such as do not reside in all the cases of the definiendum. As against these, some unique properties are such as reside in all definiendum in all the three phases of time and reside in all of its cases. Now *upayoga* is alone to be found in all the cases of the definiendum in question—that is, in all the souls—in all the three phases of time. That is why it alone is separately mentioned as the defining characteristic and thereby it is indicated that the types of *bhāva upaśama* etc. doubtless constitute the nature of a soul but that neither are they found in all the souls nor are they found there in all the three phases of time. Thus the one *pārīṇāmika bhāva, jīvatva* or being a soul—which is tantamount to *upayoga*—is alone what is found in all the souls and found there in all the three phases of time. That is why it is it alone which is here separated out from the remaining types of *bhāva* and mentioned as the defining characteristic of a soul.

As for the remaining types of *bhāva*, inasmuch as they are occasional—that is, are sometimes to be found and sometimes not—, are found only in some cases of the definiendum, and are dependent on *karma*, they can only be an *upalakṣaṇa* or indicative mark of a soul but not its *lakṣaṇa* or defining characteristic. Here is what distinguishes a *lakṣaṇa* from an *upalakṣaṇa*. A *lakṣaṇa* is that which is found in all the cases of the definiendum, is found there entirely and in all the three phases of time; e.g. heat as a *lakṣaṇa* of fire; on the other hand, an *upalakṣaṇa* is that which is found in some cases of the definiendum and not in the rest, which is sometimes found and sometimes not, which is not natural; e.g. smoke as an *upalakṣaṇa* of fire. Thus the above-mentioned fifty two sub-types of *bhāva*—that is, all of them minus *jīvatva*—are in fact so many *upalakṣaṇas* of a soul. 8.

The Multiformity of *Upayoga* :

This *upayoga* is of two types, eight types and four types. 9.

Even though the power of cognition—that is, consciousness—is equally present in all the souls the cognitive activity or operation—that is, *upayoga*—is not similar in the case of all the souls. The multiformity of cognitive operation depends on the variety of the concerned causal aggregate, external as well as internal. The difference as to object, the difference as to the means like sense-organ etc., the difference as to place and time—these among others constitute the variety of causal aggregate of the external type. The lesser or greater intensity or mildness of the concealment concerned—this constitutes the variety of causal aggregate of the internal type. On account of this diversity as to the concerned causal aggregate one and the same soul undertakes different cognitive activities at different times—so also do the different souls undertake different cognitive activities at one and the same time. This difference as to cognitive activities is a matter of common experience. And to briefly put it down through a classification is the aim of the present aphorism.

All cognitive operation is generally divided into two types—viz. *śākāra* or determinate and *anākāra* or indeterminate. On further specification the determinate cognitive operation is divided into eight sub-types, the indeterminate one into four. Thus it is that cognitive operation has got twelve sub-types in all.

The following are the eight sub-types of determinate cognitive operation; *mati-jñāna* or right determinate cognition of the nature of *mati*; *śruta-jñāna* or right determinate cognition of the nature of *śruta*; *avadhi-jñāna* or right determinate cognition of the nature of *avadhi*; *manaḥparyāya-jñāna* or right determinate cognition of the nature of *manaḥparyāya*; *kevala-jñāna* or right determinate cognition that is all-comprehensive; *mati-ajñāna* or wrong determinate cognition of the nature of *mati*; *śruta-ajñāna* or wrong determinate cognition of the nature of *śruta*; *vibhaṅga-jñāna* or wrong determinate cognition of the nature of *avadhi*. Similarly, the following are the four sub-types of indeterminate cognitive operation; *caḥsur-darśana* or indeterminate cognition had through the visual sense-organ, *acaḥsur-darśana* or indeterminate cognition had through a non-visual sense-organ, *avadhidarśana* or indeterminate cognition of the nature of *avadhi*, *kevaladarśana* or indeterminate cognition that is all-comprehensive.

Question : What is meant by determinate cognition and indeterminate cognition ?

Answer : The cognition that apprehends the object concerned in a specific form is determinate cognition, the cognition that apprehends the same in a generic form is indeterminate cognition. The determinate cognition is also called *jñāna* or *savikalpaka-bodha*, the indeterminate cognition is also called *darśana* or *nirvikalpaka-bodha*.

Question : Of the above mentioned twelve sub-types, how many are a function of a fully developed power of consciousness and how many that of a partly developed power of consciousness ?

Answer : *Kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana*—these two are a function of a fully developed power of consciousness, the

remaining types a function of a partly developed power of consciousness.

Question : When development is incomplete a diversity of cognitive operation is possible on account of a diversity of the incompleteness in question, but how can there be a diversity of cognitive operation at a time when development is complete ?

Answer : The reason why a twofold diversity of cognitive operation in the form of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* is attributed to the state of complete development is that all object of cognition is possessed of two forms—that is, it is possessed of a general form and a specific form—from which it follows that the all-comprehensive conscious operation pertaining to them two is also possessed of a twofold diversity in the form of *jñāna* and *darśana*.

Question : Among the eight sub-types of determinate cognition, how is *jñāna* distinguished from *ajñāna* ?

Answer : In no other way except on the basis of the co-presence or otherwise of *samyaktva* or right inclination.

Question : Then why do the two remaining types of *jñāna* have no counter-positive in the form of two corresponding types of *ajñāna* and why does *darśana* have no counter-positive in the form of *adarśana* ?

Answer : The two types of *jñāna* *manahparyāya* and *kevala* are never possible except in the presence of *samyaktva*, and so there is no question of there being a counter-positive corresponding to them. Among the types of *darśana* *kevala* is not possible except in the presence of *samyaktva*. However, the remaining types of *darśana* are possible even in the absence of *samyaktva*; but even in their case the corresponding counter-positives in the form of types of *adarśana* are not posited because *darśana* is a form of cognition that grasps something merely generic—with the result that no difference can be pointed out between *darśana* had by one possessed of *samyaktva* and that had by one devoid of the same.

Question : How are the twelve sub-types in question to be defined ?

Answer : The nature of the eight sub-types of *jñāna* has already been laid down¹.

And the following is an account of the nature of the four sub-types of *darśana* : 1. That cognition of something merely generic which is had through the visual sense-organ is *cakṣurdarśana*. 2. That cognition of something merely generic which is had through a non-visual sense-organ is *acakṣurdarśana*. 3. That cognition of something merely generic pertaining to things tangible which is had through the super-ordinary power of *avadhi* is *avadhi-darśana*. 4. That cognition of something merely generic pertaining to all things that there are which is had through the superordinary power of *kevala* or omniscience is *kevaladarśana*. 9.

The Classification of the World of Souls :

The *saṁsārin* or worldly and *mukta* or emancipated—these two are the classes of souls. 10.

The souls are infinite in number. And they are all similar insofar as the possession of consciousness is concerned. So when they are here divided into two classes that is done on the basis of the presence or otherwise of a particular mode; that is to say, here one class consists of the souls possessed of the mode called *saṁsāra*, the other class consists of those not possessed of this mode. Thus the souls belonging to the first class are called *saṁsārin*, those belonging to the second class *mukta*.

Question : But what is *saṁsāra* ?

Answer : *Saṁsāra* is but the bondage of the *dravya* and *bhāva* types—that is, of the physical and mental types. A specific associatedness with the karmic particles is the *dravya* or physical type of bondage, an associatedness with the cravings like attachment, aversion etc. is the *bhāva* or mental type of bondage. 10.

1. See Chapter One, aphorisms 9 to 33.

The Types and Sub-types of the Worldly Souls :

The worldly souls are those possessed of *manas* or internal organ and those devoid of it. 11.

Again, they are of the type *trasa* or mobile and the type *sthāvara* or static. 12.

The earth-bodied, the water-bodied and the plant-bodied souls belong to the type static. 13.

The five-bodied and the water-bodied souls on the one hand and the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed souls on the other belong to the type mobile. 14.

The worldly souls are infinite in number. In brief they are divided into two types and that in two ways. The first division depends on the possession or otherwise of *manas*; that is to say, in this case one type includes the souls possessed of *manas*, the other type those devoid of it, and these two types cover the whole lot of worldly souls. The other division depends on the character of being static and that of being mobile; that is to say, in this case one type includes the static souls, the other the mobile ones, and these two types too cover the whole lot of worldly souls.

Question : But what is this *manas* ?

Answer : *Manas* is that spiritual capacity through which reflection is undertaken, and a kind of subtle atoms which are of help to this capacity in its task of reflection—they too are *manas*. The former is called *bhāva-manas* or *manas* quâ something mental, the latter *dravya-manas* or *manas* quâ something physical.

Question : And what is meant by the character of being mobile and that of being static ?

Answer : To be possessed of a capacity to purposely move about or turn away from one place to another—that is being mobile; not to be possessed of this capacity is being static.

Question : The souls that are declared to be devoid of *manas*—are they devoid of all *manas*, whether of the *dravya* type or of the *bhāva* type ?

Answer : No, they do possess *manas* but only of the *bhāva* type.

Question : But then all the souls turn out to be possessed of *manas*. Why then declare some of them to be possessed of *manas* and the rest to be devoid of it ?

Answer : In that connection what is had in mind is *dravya*—*manas*. Just as an extremely old man, even if possessed of legs and of the capacity to move about, cannot move about without the assistance of a stick, similarly *bhāva-manas* cannot undertake clear reflection without the assistance of *dravya-manas*. Thus assigning prominence to *dravya-manas* and keeping in mind the presence or otherwise of this type of *manas* the souls are divided into those possessed of *manas* and those devoid of it.

Question : Is not it the case that the second twofold division is meant to suggest that all the mobile souls are possessed of *manas*, while all the static ones are devoid of it ?

Answer : No. Among the mobile souls too it is only some—not all—that are possessed of *manas*; as for the static souls, they are all devoid of *manas*. 11, 12.

The type static is subdivided into the earth-bodied, the water-bodied, the plant-bodied souls; the type mobile is divided into the fire-bodied and air-bodied souls on the one hand and the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed souls on the other.

Question : What is meant by a mobile soul and by a static one ?

Answer : The soul in which there is a manifestation of the karma type designated *trasa-nāma* is a *trasa* or mobile soul, that in which there is a manifestation of the karma type designated *sthāvara-nāma* is a *sthāvara* or static soul.

Question : How to recognize the state characterized by a manifestation of the karma type *trasa-nāma* and that characterized by a manifestation of the karma type *sthāvara-nāma*.

Answer : The clear-cut exhibition and otherwise of a

tendency to renounce pain and to attain pleasure—these two respectively are the signs of a manifestation of the karma type *trasa-nāma* and of that of the karma type *sthāvara-nāma*.

Question : The fire-bodied and the air-bodied souls—are they too—just like the two-sensed souls and the others—seen to make a clear-cut exhibition of the tendency in question, so that it might be proper to place the former too under the type mobile ?

Answer : No, they are not.

Question : Why then are they not placed under the type static, just like the earth-bodied souls and the others ?

Answer : So far as the present definition is concerned they are in fact static. However, keeping in view the similarity in respect of motion that they exhibit with the two-sensed souls and the others they have been placed under the type mobile. That is to say, the *trasa* or mobile souls are of two varieties—viz. *labdhi-trasa* or full-fledged *trasa* and *gati-trasa* or *trasa* in respect of motion. The souls characterized by a manifestation of the karma-type *trasa-nāma* are *labdhi-trasa* and it is they alone who are *trasa* in a true sense of the term; such are the souls possessing two to five sense organs. On the other hand, the souls which though characterized by a manifestation of the karma-type designated *sthāvaranāma* are called *trasa* on account of their *trasa*-like motion or *gati-trasa*. Those are *trasa* in a figurative sense of the term; such are the fire-bodied and air-bodied souls. 13, 14.

The number of *indriyas* or operative organs, their types and sub-types, and their names :

The *indriyas* are five in number. 15.

Each of them is of two types. 16.

The type *dravyendriya* is of the form of *nirvṛtti* and of the form of *upakaraṇa*. 17.

The type *bhāvendriya* is of the form of *labdhi* and of the form of *upayoga*. 18.

Upayoga takes place in relation to the objects like tangible etc. 19.

The tactile, the gustatory, the olfactory, the visual and the auditory—these are the names of the five *indriyas*. 20.

Here the number of *indriyas* is mentioned with a view to making it possible to find out on its basis as to how many are the possible divisions of the worldly souls. The *indriyas* are five in number. However, not all the worldly souls possess all the five *indriyas*. For some of these possess one *indriya*, some two, some three, some four and some five. Those who possess one *indriya* are designated *ekendriya*, those who possess two *dvīndriya*, those who possess three *trīndriya*, those who possess four *caturindriya*, and those who possess five *pañcendriya*—thus it is that there are five divisions of the worldly souls.

Question : But what is meant by an *indriya* ?

Answer : That through the instrumentality of which one can attain cognition is *indriya*.

Question : Are there are no *indriyas* more than five ?

Answer : No, there are not. For there are but five *jñānendriyas* or organs of cognitive operation. Though in disciplines like *Sāṅkhya* etc. speech, hands, feet, anus, procreative organ—these too are called *indriya*, but they are *karmendriyas* or organs of active operation. In the present context, on the other hand, the organs of cognitive operation are alone sought to be mentioned, and they are certainly not more than five in number.

Question : Now what is meant by a *jñānedriya* and by a *karmendriya* ?

Answer : That through the instrumentality of which one chiefly attains cognition useful in daily life is *jñānedriya*, that through the instrumentality of which one undertakes activity useful in daily life—e.g. nourishment, locomotion, evacuation—is *karmendriya*. 15.

Each of the five *indriyas* is of two types—viz. the *dravya* type and the *bhāva* type. The inanimate *indriya* made up of

physical particles is the *dravyendriya* type, the *indriya* of the form of a transitory spiritual state is the *bhāvendriya* type. 16.

The *dravyendriya* is again of two sub-types—viz. that of the form of *nirvṛtti* and of the form of *upakaraṇa*. Those shapes of the cognitive organs which are outwardly visible in a body and which are of the form of a specific construct made out of physical aggregates are called *nirvṛttīndriya*, that external and internal capacity of a *nirvṛttīndriya* without which it is not in a position to produce cognition is *upakaraṇendriya*. 17.

The *bhāvendriya* too is of two sub-types—viz. *labdhi* and *upayoga*. That *kṣayopaśama* of the karmas like *mati-jñānāvaraṇīya* etc. which is a sort of transitory spiritual state is *labdhīndriya*, that indeterminate and determinate cognition which takes place in relation to objects like visible etc. at a time when *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti*, and *upakaraṇa*—these three combine together is *upayogendriya*. The *upayogendriya* is of the form of the *jñāna*-type *mati* and the *darśana*-types *cakṣu* and *acakṣu*. 18.

The *upayoga* of the form of the *mati-jñāna* which has been called *bhāvendriya* cannot cognize objects devoid of colour (i.e. intangible objects). It can certainly cognize objects possessed of colour (i.e. tangible objects) but it cannot cognize all their qualities and modes; for what it is in a position to cognize are only the modes of touch, taste, smell, colour and sound.

Question : Each of the cognitive organs has been said to be of two types—viz. the *dravya*-type and the *bhāva*-type; again, the *dravya*-type has been said to be of two sub-types—viz. [*nirvṛtti* and *upakaraṇa*—while the *bhāva*-type has been said to be of two sub-types—viz.] *labdhi* and *upayoga*. Now please tell what successive order is followed in the acquisition of these types and sub-types.

Answer : Only when the *labdhīndriya* has been acquired is the acquisition of the *nirvṛtti* possible. Similarly when the *nirvṛtti* has been acquired is the acquisition of the *upakaraṇa* and *upayoga* possible while when the *upakaraṇa* has been acquired is the acquisition of *upayoga* possible. The idea is that a later type can

be acquired only when an earlier type has already been acquired, but it is not the case that an earlier type can be acquired only when a later type has already been acquired.

The Names of the Cognitive Organs :

The tactile cognitive organ—skin, the gustatory cognitive organ—tongue, the olfactory cognitive organ—nose, the visual cognitive organ—eye, the auditory cognitive organ—ear,—each of these five is of four types in the form of *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti*, *upakaraṇa* and *upayoga*. That is to say, it is the collective totality of these four types that constitutes a cognitive organ—e.g. the tactile—taken in its entirety. Thus precisely to the extent this collective totality is deficient the corresponding cognitive organ too is deficient.

Question : But *upayoga* is a specific form of cognition that is something resulting from a cognitive organ; how then is it itself called a cognitive organ ?

Answer : Though *upayoga* is in fact something resulting from the collective totality of *labdhi*, *nirvṛtti* and *upakaraṇa* it has been called a cognitive organ in a figurative sense—that is, as a result of attributing to an effect a feature which in fact belongs to its cause¹. 20.

The Respective Cognizables or Objects of the Cognitive Organs :

Touch, taste, smell, colour and sound—these five are the respective cognizables or objects in the case of the above-mentioned five cognitive organs. 21.

In the case of *anindriya* or *manas* the corresponding object is *śruta*. 22.

Not all the objects of the world are of the same nature. For some of them are tangible, some intangible. Those possessed of colour, smell, taste, touch etc. are tangible and it is tangible

1. For a special consideration of all this see, Hindi *Chauthā Karmagrantha*, p. 36, the appendix pertaining to the term 'indriya'.

objects alone—not the intangible ones—which can be cognized through the cognitive organs. The five things that have been separately mentioned as the respective objects of the cognitive organs are not absolutely different from each other nor of the nature of a basic stuff—that is, of the nature of a substance; on the contrary, they are different aspects—that is, modes—of one and the same substance. That is to say, the different cognitive organs are engaged in cognizing the mutually different specific states of one and the same substance. Hence the five things which in the present aphorism are enumerated as the respective objects of the five cognitive organs should be treated not as mutually different entities but as aspects of one and the same tangible—that is, physical-substance. Thus, for example, a *laḍḍū* (a sweetmeat) is cognized by all the five cognitive organs in mutually different forms. Here the finger through touching indicates its touch like cold, hot etc., the tongue through tasting indicates its taste like sour, sweet etc., the nose through smelling its good or bad smell, the eye through seeing its colour like red, white etc.; similarly, the ear cognizes the noises resulting from the eating etc. of that hard sweetmeat. It is not the case that here in one and the same sweetmeat the five objects in question—viz. touch, taste, smell etc.—are seated in different quarters of their own; for in fact they are all co-present in all its different parts. That is so because they are so many inseparable modes of one and the same substance. In their case differentiation is made by intellect and that is done through the instrumentality of the cognitive organs. Certainly, the cognitive organs have got different capacities. Thus howsoever efficient one of them might be it is never in a position to cognize an object that is not its own specific cognizable. That is why the five objects of the five cognitive organs are mutually unmingled—that is, mutually separated.

Question : When the five cognizables touch etc. invariably go together, then why is it that in certain objects there are not available all the five of them but just one or two ? For example, in the light of the sun etc. colour is apparent but not touch, taste, smell etc. Similarly, in the air unmingled with flower etc. touch

is apparent but not taste, smell etc.

Answer : The above-mentioned five modes touch etc. are present there in each and every physical substance, but only that among them is grasped by a cognitive organ which is intense in measure. In certain objects all the five modes touch etc. are manifested in an intense measure, in certain others just one of them, two or so on. In the case of the latter the remaining modes, being present in a mild measure, are not grasped by the corresponding cognitive organs; but they are present there nevertheless. Even the efficiency—the grasping power—of a cognitive organ is not the same in the case of all the species of living beings. Nay, even in the case of the being belonging to one and the same species the efficiency of a cognitive organ is of various forms. So a consideration of the intensity and mildness of touch etc. also depends on the greater or lesser efficiency of the corresponding cognitive organs. 21.

Besides the above-mentioned five cognitive organs there is one more which is called *manas*. Certainly, the *manas* is a means of cognition; however, unlike the tactile organ etc. it is not an external such means but an internal one. That is why it is called *antahkaraṇa* or internal organ. Unlike what is the case with the external cognitive organs the object cognized by the *manas* is not limited in extent. Thus the external cognitive organs grasp just tangible entities and those too only in part; on the other hand, the *manas* grasps all entities whatsoever, whether tangible or otherwise, and those too in various ways. The function of the *manas* is to reflect and depending on its level of development—that is, on its capacity—it reflects over all objects whatsoever, whether grasped by the cognitive organs or not. It is this reflection that constitutes *śruta*. That is why it has been said that the object of the *anindriya* is *śruta*; that is to say, the nature of all elements whatsoever, whether tangible or otherwise, constitutes the field of operation in the case of *manas*.

Question : If what you call *śruta* is a function of the *manas* and it is a lucid cognition and one that grasps something

specific then why does *mati-jñāna* not take place through the instrumentality of the *manas* ?

Answer : It does take place. But the general grasping of an object which initially takes place through the instrumentality of the *manas* and which involves no consideration of the word-meaning relation or of the contextual succession, nor a speciality of the form of conceptualization—that precisely is the *mati-jñāna* in question. On the other hand, the subsequently arising stream of reflection that involves the said speciality is *śruta-jñāna*; that is to say, in the case of the cognitive operation produced by the *manas* the initial minor portion is of the form of *mati-jñāna* while the subsequent major portion is of the form of *śruta-jñāna*. The crux of the matter is that through the instrumentality of the five cognitive organs tactile etc. *mati-jñāna* alone takes place but through that of the *manas* *mati* as well as *śruta*. But in the latter case *śruta* is more prominent than *mati*. That is why in the present context *śruta* has been said to be the object of the *manas*.

Question : But why has the *manas* been called *anindriya* ?

Answer : Though it too, being a means of cognition, is an *indriya*, yet in order to operate in relation to the objects like colour etc. it has to depend on the *indriyas* like eyes etc. It is on account of this dependence that it has been called *anindriya* or *no-indriya*—that is, part-*indriya* or *indriya*-like.

Question : Does the *manas* too like eyes etc., reside in some particular part of the body, or is it present throughout the body ?

Answer : It is present everywhere inside the body¹ not at some particular part of it. For the *manas* operates in relation to all objects whatsoever grasped by the cognitive organs present in the different parts of the body, a phenomenon that is unaccountable except on the supposition that the *manas* is co-extensive with body. That is why it has been said '*manas* is present wherever there is breath.'

1. This is how the Śvetāmbara tradition views the matter. According to the Digambara tradition, on the other hand, the seat of the *manas* is not the entire body but heart alone.

Those Possessed of the Cognitive Organs :

The living beings upto the air-bodied ones are possessed of but one cognitive organ. 23.

An insect, an ant, a black bee, a man or the like—those respectively possess one plus one, one plus two, one plus three and one plus four cognitive organs. 24.

The Possessors of *sarījñā* are those who are the possessors of *manas*. 25.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth aphorisms the worldly beings are divided into two types—viz. the static and the mobile. There are of them nine species in all; that is, the earth-bodied beings, the water-bodied, the plant-bodied, the fire-bodied and the air-bodied—these five on the one hand and the beings possessed of two cognitive organs, those possessed of three, those possessed of four, those possessed of five—these four on the other. Of these, the species upto the air-bodied are possessed of but one cognitive organ—viz. the tactile.

An insect, a leech, etc, are possessed of two cognitive organs—viz. the tactile and the gustatory. An ant, a gnat, a bug etc. are possessed of those two plus the olfactory organ—that is, three of them in all. A black bee, a fly, a scorpion, a mosquito, etc. are possessed of those three plus the visual organ—that is, four of them in all. A man, an animal, a bird, a heavenly being, a hellish being possess those four plus the auditory organ—that is, five of them in all.

Question : Do these numbers concern the *dravya* type of cognitive organs, or the *bhāva* type, or both the types ?

Answer : These numbers concern the *dravya* type of cognitive organs; for so far as the *bhāva* type of them are concerned all the five of them are possessed by all the species of living beings.

Question : Is it then possible for the insects etc. to see or to hear with the help of the concerned *bhāva* type of cognitive organs ?

Answer : No. A *bhāva* type of cognitive organ taken alone is not in a position to perform its appropriate function; for that it requires the help of the corresponding *dravya* type of cognitive organ. That is why even if in possession of all the cognitive organs of the *bhāva* type of insects, the ants, etc. are not in a position to see or to hear—for they possess no cognitive organs of the *dravya* type in the form of eyes and ears. However, on account of the efficiency of whatever cognitive organs of the *dravya* type they happen to possess they do manage to conduct their specific course of life.

The eight species of beings—viz. from the earth-bodied ones upto those possessed of four cognitive organs—are not at all possessed of *manas*; but even in the case of those possessed of five cognitive organs not all are possessed of it. Thus there are four sub-species of those possessed of five cognitive organs—viz. the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings, the animals. Of these, the first two sub-species are such that all their members are possessed of *manas*; but in the case of the last two only those members are possessed of it who are born of a womb. That is to say, the human beings and the animals are, each, of two sub-types—viz. those born of a womb and those born as a result of an agglutination of matter. Of these, the human beings and animals born as a result of an agglutination of matter are devoid of *manas*. To sum up the matter, among the beings possessed of five cognitive organs all the heavenly beings, all the hellish beings, those human beings and animals that are born of a womb—these alone are possessed of *manas*.

Question : This particular species is possessed of *manas* and that one is not, how to recognize that ?

Answer : The recognition takes place on the basis of the existence or otherwise of *saṃjñā*.

Question : Now *saṃjñā* means behaviour and behaviour of a more or less advanced type is exhibited by all beings whatsoever. For the insect, the ants, etc. too exhibit behaviour that is impelled by a need for nourishment, fear and the like.

Why then is it not conceded that they too are possessed of *manas* ?

Answer : In the present context *saṃjñā* means not ordinary behaviour but a specific type of it.¹ This specific type of behaviour is of the form of that reflection over the merits and demerits of things which enables one to attain what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. It is this specific type of behaviour which the theoretical texts designate *saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*. This form of *saṃjñā* is the function of *manas* and is such as is clearly found to be exhibited only in the case of the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings born of a womb, the animals born of a womb. That is why they alone are considered to be possessed of *manas*.

Question : Is it not the case that the beings like insects, ants etc. too undertake endeavour with a view to attaining what they desire and avoiding what they disdain ?

Answer : They do.

Question : Then why are they not considered to be possessed of the *saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā* and *manas* ?

Answer : In the case of the insects etc. too *manas* of an extremely subtle type does exist². And it is on account of it that they manage to move towards what is beneficial and to move away from what is undesirable. But this *manas* of theirs is of use for a bare maintenance of body—not for any thing else. In the present context, on the other hand, by *manas* is understood such an advanced type of it as enables one, when suitable means are available, to undertake reflection that goes beyond the question of a bare maintenance of body—that is, such as enables one even to recall one's past birth. It is the capacity to undertake reflection of this type that is called *saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā*. And such *saṃjñā* is

1. For the details of the question see Hindi *Chauthā Karm-agrantha*, p. 38, the appendix pertaining to the term *saṃjñā*.

2. See *jñānabindu-prakarṇa* (Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamālā), p. 144.

possessed only by the above enumerated species of beings—that is, by the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings born of a womb, the animals born of a womb. That is why it is they alone who are here counted as those possessed of *manas*. 23-25.

With a view to specially acquainting with the transmigratory motion¹ an account offered of the five topics *yoga*—that is, activity—etc. :

At the time of the transmigratory motion there takes place only one type of *yoga* or activity—viz. that pertaining to *karma*. 26.

All motion takes place following a *śreṇī* or a straight line. 27.

The motion of a soul—meaning, that of a soul which is in the process of being emancipated—is invariably devoid of a turning. 28.

On the other hand, the motion of a worldly soul may be devoid of a turning or it might exhibit the same. And the number of possible turnings is less than four—that is, three at the most. 29.

The duration of the absence of turning is but one *samaya*—that is to say, the motion devoid of a turning is of the duration of one *samaya*. 30.

A soul remains without nourishment for a duration of one *samaya* or two. 31.

All the systems of philosophy that posit rebirth are faced with the following five questions related to the transmigratory motion :

(1) At the time when a soul undertakes motion either with a view to assuming a new birth or with a view to attaining *mokṣa*

1. For a particularly clear understanding of the matter see Hindi *Chauthā Karmagrantha*, p. 143, the appendix pertaining to the term *anāhāraka*.

—that is, at the time when it undertakes transmigratory motion—it being devoid of a gross body how is effort possible on its part ?

(2) When a mobile body undertakes motion what is the rule that it follows in doing so ?

(3) How many are the types of motion and which souls are entitled to one of these types and which to another ?

(4) What is the minimum and maximum duration of the transmigratory motion and what is the rule that determines this duration ?

(5) Does a soul take nourishment at the time of transmigratory motion or it does not; if it does not, what is the duration of this period of no nourishment and what is the rule that determines this duration ?

These questions ought to be considered even by those systems of philosophy which posit an ubiquitous soul; for with a view to accounting for rebirth they are bound to posit the moving of a subtle body and transmigratory motion. But these questions must necessarily be considered by the Jaina system inasmuch as the soul posited by it is body-sized. It is this consideration that is here undertaken in an ordered fashion, and it runs as follows :

Yoga or Activity :

The transmigratory motion is of two types—viz. straight and curved. While migrating to another place through straight motion a soul has not to undertake a new effort; for when it leaves the former body it receives a momentum produced by that body and with the help of this momentum it, without undertaking a new effort, straightaway reaches the new place like an arrow shot from the bow. The other type of motion is curved and so a soul moving through this type requires a new effort; for the momentum produced by the former body is effective only upto the place where the soul has to take a turning. As soon as the place of turning is reached, the momentum produced by the former body gets slowed down. So from this place onward effort is undertaken with the help of the subtle body which happens to

be accompanying the soul even at this juncture. It is this effort produced by a subtle body that is called *kārmaṇa-yoga*, or activity pertaining to *karma*. Hence it is that it is said in the aphorism that at the time of transmigratory motion there takes place only *kārmaṇa-yoga*. The idea is that a soul moving through the curved type of motion cannot reach a new place only with the help of the effort produced by the former body; but a new effort on its part is possible only with the help of the karmic body—that is, a subtle type of body, for at that time it is possessed of no body of a gross type. Because of the absence of a gross body there also then does not take place an activity through *manas* or an activity of the form of speech. 26.

The Rule of Motion :

The mobile bodies are of two types—viz. soul and matter. Both these possess the capacity to undertake motion and so when suitable occasion is available they, undergoing appropriate transformation, actually undertake motion. Now on account of the prevailing extraneous circumstances they might well undertake a curved motion but the motion natural to them is invariably straight. By straight motion is meant motion in a straight line beginning from the *ākāśa*-portion earlier occupied by the concerned soul or material particle and proceeding in an upward, downward or transverse direction. It is keeping this natural motion in view that the present aphorism lays down that motion takes place following a *śreṇī*. By *śreṇī* is meant a straight line drawn in *ākāśa* and possessing thickness just equivalent to—that is, neither more nor less than—the size of the seat earlier occupied. From this account of the natural motion it also gets indicated that when a counter-acting cause is available a soul or a material particle can also undertake motion in a curved line rather than in a straight one. The idea is that the motion undertaken by mobile bodies takes place in a straight line of the size of the seat earlier occupied when a counter-acting occasion is absent while it takes place in a curved line when such an occasion is present. 27.

The Manners of Motion :

It has already been said that motion is of two types—viz. straight and curved. The straight motion is that in which while proceeding from the earlier place towards the new one the straight line is not broken—that is, in which there is not undertaken even a single turning. The curved motion is that in which while proceeding from the earlier place towards the new one the straight line is broken—that is, in which there is undertaken at least one turning. It has also been said that both soul and matter are entitled to both the types of motion in question. However, in the present context the main question relates to soul. The souls which leave an earlier place and proceed towards a new one are of two types. One type comprises such ones as proceed towards a new place after leaving for good all body, whether gross or subtle—they being called *mucyamāna* or those in the process of being emancipated. The other type comprises such souls as assume a new gross body after giving up the old one. At the time of transmigratory motion these latter type of souls are invariably accompanied by a subtle body and it is they who are designated worldly souls. The souls in the process of being emancipated proceed towards the affixed place of *mokṣa* by straight motion—not by curved one; for they get seated in that particular place of *mokṣa* which happens to lie in the direction of the straight line drawn from their earlier worldly place—not in one which even slightly deviates from the direction of this straight line. But in the case of a worldly soul there is no rule about the place of birth. Sometimes it so happens that the new place where it has to assume birth lies in the direction of the straight line drawn from its earlier place but sometimes it lies in the direction of a curved line drawn from the place. For the decisive factor determining the new place for rebirth is the earlier accumulated *karma* and such *karma* is of various sorts. That is why the worldly souls are entitled to both the straight and curved types of motion. The idea is that the souls proceeding towards a place of *mokṣa* undertake only the straight type of motion while those proceeding towards a new place for rebirth undertake both the straight and

curved types of motion. Another name for straight motion is *iṣugati* (lit. arrow-like motion), for it is straight on account of the momentum produced by the earlier body just like the motion of an arrow impelled by the momentum imparted to it by a bow. Three names for curved motion are *pāṇimuktā*, *lāṅgalikā*, *gomūtrikā*¹. The *pāṇimuktā* is motion in which the straight line is broken but once, the *lāṅgalikā* that in which it is broken twice, *gomūtrikā* that in which it is broken thrice. In the case of a soul there is not possible such a curved motion as involves more than three turnings; for a soul's new place of rebirth—however out of *śrenī* it might lie—that is, however curved might be the direction in which it lies—must be reached after three turnings at the most. So far as the curved motion of matter is concerned there is no rule as to the number of turnings possibly involved in it, for in that case this number is determined by the nature of the concerned impelling force. 28, 29.

The Duration of Motion :

The minimum duration of transmigratory motion is one *samaya*, its maximum duration is four *samayas*.

What has to be understood is that this duration is of one *samaya* when the motion concerned is straight while it is of two, three or four *samayas* when the motion concerned is curved. The increment in the number of *samayas* is determined by the increment in the number of the turnings involved. Thus the curved motion involving one turning is of a duration of two *samayas*, that involving two turnings is of a duration of three, that involving three turnings is of a duration of four. The idea is that when the new place of birth is to be reached by a motion involving one turning then one *samaya* is required for reaching the place of turning from that of earlier birth while another *samaya* is required for reaching the place of new birth from that of turning. This very rule implies that the motion involving two

1. The names *pāṇimuktā* etc. are well current in the Digambara commentary texts.

turnings requires three *samayas*, while that involving three turnings requires four.

In this connection it must also be noted that in a soul proceeding by straight motion to assume a new birth the new contingent of the *karma* types *āyus*, *gati* and *ānupūrvī* is manifested as soon as the earlier body is given up; but in a soul proceeding by a curved motion the new contingent of the *karma* types *āyus*, *gati* and *ānupūrvī* is duly manifested at the place of the first turning; for the *āyus* etc. pertaining to the earlier birth remain manifested only upto the place of the first turning. 30.

The Duration of Absence of Nourishment :

In the case of a soul that is in the process of being emancipated there is no question of nourishment being undertaken during the course of transmigratory motion; for such a soul is devoid of all body—whether subtle or gross. But in the case of worldly soul the question of nourishment does arise; for during the course of transmigratory motion, such a soul is invariably accompanied by a subtle body. By nourishment is to be understood the process of receiving physical particles appropriate for the formation of a gross body. Nourishment thus understood is found and also not found in the case of worldly souls while in the course of transmigratory motion. Those souls which are proceeding by straight motion or by motion involving one turning and requiring two *samayas* are not devoid of nourishment. For in the case of the souls proceeding by straight motion the same *samaya* which is the *samaya* of leaving the earlier body is also the *samaya* of assuming the new one—thus there being transversed no further *samaya* in the process. Hence in their case the *samaya* of straight motion is either the *samaya* of undertaking nourishment through the body of the earlier birth or that of undertaking nourishment through the body of the new one. The same applies to the motion involving one turning; for out of its two *samayas* the first is that of undertaking nourishment through the body of the earlier birth, while the second is that of reaching the place of new birth—during which latter *samaya* nourishment is

undertaken with a view to putting up a new body. However, in the case of motion requiring three *samayas* and involving two turnings as also in that of motion requiring four *samayas* and involving three turnings such a situation does arise as is characterized by absence of nourishment. That is so because among the *samayas* constituting the duration of these two motions—three *samayas* in the case of the first, four in that of the second—the first is that of undertaking nourishment through the body left behind, while the last that of undertaking nourishment at the place of new births but the period lying in between these two *samayas* is characterized by absence of nourishment. That is why in the case of a motion involving two turnings souls are considered to be devoid of nourishment for a period of one *samaya*, while in the case of that involving three turnings they are considered to be devoid of nourishment for a period of two *samayas*. It is this very idea that is expressed in the present aphorism. The sum and substance of the matter is that in the case of straight motion and of motion involving one turning the state of undertaking nourishment persists throughout, while in the case of motion involving two turnings and of that involving three the period lying in between the first and the last *samaya*—to be explicit, a period of one *samaya* in the first case, that of two *samayas* in the second—is characterized by absence of nourishment. Certain texts go on to speak of a period of three *samayas* characterized by absence of nourishment; there the possibility is conceded of motion requiring five *samayas* and involving four turnings.

Question : We thus learn about the absence during transmigratory motion of a reception of gross physical particles by way of nourishment needed for building body, but what about the karmic physical particles ? Are they received during that stage or are they not ?

Answer : They are received.

Question : How ?

Answer : At the time of transmigratory motion the worldly

souls are invariably possessed' of a karmic body. Hence that wavering of a soul-units produced by a body which is called *kārmaṇa yoga* or karmic activity is also invariably present then. And when activity is there the reception of karmic physical particles is inevitable; for it is but activity that is the cause of the attraction of the groupings of karmic particles. Thus just as at the time of rainfall a thrown forth heated arrow proceeds receiving or absorbing within its body the particles of rain-water, so also during transmigratory motion, a soul rendered unsteady by karmic activity proceeds towards a new place receiving the groupings of karmic particles and assimilating them within its body. 31.

The Types of *Janma* or Birth and *Yoni* or Seat of Birth :

Agglutination, coming out of a womb, and sudden manifestation—these three are the types of birth. 32.

That possessed of living entities, cold and concealed—these three, their corresponding opposites—viz. that devoid of living entities, hot and revealed—, plus three mixtures of the members of the first and second triads—viz. that partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities, partly cold, partly hot, and partly concealed and partly revealed—thus nine in all are the types of seat of birth. 33.

The *jarāyuja* or beings born wrapped with the *jarāyu* coverage, the *aṇḍaja* or those born out of an egg and the *potaja* or those born in a bare state—these three types are born coming out of a womb. 34.

The hellish beings and heavenly beings are born by way of sudden manifestation. 35.

The remaining types of beings are born by way of agglutination. 36.

The Types of Birth :

When their earlier worldly career is over the worldly beings assume a new one; for that they have to take birth. But not in the case of all the beings is birth of one and the same

type—it is this point that has been brought forth in the present aphorism. When after having given up the gross body pertaining to the earlier worldly career and after having undertaken transmigratory motion as accompanied by the karmic body alone a soul first receives physical particles appropriate for the gross body suited to the new worldly career—that is called birth. Birth thus understood is of three types—viz. agglutination, coming out of a womb, and sudden manifestation. Birth of the form of agglutination is that where without requiring parental intercourse the physical particles of the *audārika* type existing at the place of birth are first transformed into a body. Birth of the form of coming out of a womb is that where the physical particles comprising the semen and blood (=pertaining to ovum) existing at the place of birth are first received for the sake of building a body. Birth of the form of sudden manifestation is that where the physical particles of the *vaikriya* type existing at the place of birth are first transformed into a body. 32.

The Types of Seat of Birth :

Birth requires a place. And the place where the physical particles first received for the sake of building a gross body get mixed with a karmic body—as water gets mixed with hot iron—that is designated 'seat of birth'. The seat of birth is of nine types—viz. that possessed of living entities, cold, concealed, that devoid of living entities, hot, revealed, that partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities, partly cold and partly hot, partly concealed and partly revealed.

(1) That possessed of living entities : the seat where soul-units are in position.

(2) That devoid of living entities : the seat where no soul-units are in position.

(3) That partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities : the seat where in one part soul-units are in position, while in another part they are not.

(4) Cold : the seat characterized by cold touch.

(5) Hot : the seat characterized by hot touch.

(6) Partly cold and partly hot : the seat where one part is characterized by cold touch, another by hot.

(7) Concealed : the seat which is under a lid or covered.

(8) Revealed : the seat which is not under a lid but is open.

(9) Partly concealed and partly revealed : the seat where one part is covered, another open.

The following are the details as to which species of living beings are born at one type of seat of birth, which species at another type :

The Species	The Type of the Birth
The hellish beings and heavenly beings.	That devoid of living entities.
The human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb.	That partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities.
The Rest—that is, the five species of static beings, the three species with deficient sense-organs (i.e. the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed beings), the five-sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb.	All the three—viz. that possessed of living entities, that devoid of living entities, that partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities.
The human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb, the heavenly beings ¹ .	Partly cold and partly hot. -

1. In the Digambara commentary texts the heavenly beings and the hellish beings are alone said to be entitled to a partly cold and partly hot seat. So according to them, those entitled to all the three types of seat—viz. cold, hot and partly cold and partly hot—should not include the hellish beings and they should include the human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb.

The fire-beings.

Hot.

The Rest—that is, the four species of static beings, the three species with deficient sense-organs, the five-sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb, the hellish beings.

All the three—viz. cold, hot and partly cold and partly hot.

The hellish beings, the heavenly beings, the one-sensed beings.

Concealed.

The five-sensed human beings and animals born of a womb.

Partly concealed and partly revealed.

The Rest—that is, the three species with deficient sense-organs, the human beings and the animals not born of a womb.

Revealed.

Question : What is the difference between birth and seat of birth ?

Answer : The seat of birth is support, birth is that which is supported. That is to say, the first reception of physical particles appropriate for a gross body is birth, the place where this reception takes place is the seat of birth.

Question : But they say the types of seat of birth are 84 lac in number. Why then is the number nine give here ?

Answer : The mention of number 84 lac relates to a detailed statement. Thus all the seats of birth belonging to the species earth-bodied etc. and differing from one another as to the degree of colour, smell, taste, touch would amount to 84 lac as so many types of seat of birth belonging to the species of beings taken in their entirety. It is these 84 lac types that are here briefly presented as nine types—viz. that possessed of living entities, etc. 33.

Those Entitled to a Particular Type of Birth :

Of the above-mentioned three types of birth which one takes place in the case of which species of beings—this specification stands as follows :

The species *jarāyuja*, *aṇḍaja* and *potaja* are born coming out of a womb, the heavenly beings and the hellish beings are born by way of sudden manifestation, the rest—that is, the five species of static beings, the three species with deficient sense-organs, and the five-sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb—are born by way of agglutination. The *jarāyuja* are those species which are born from *jarāyu*—e.g. men, cows, buffallows, goats etc. *Jarāyu* is a form of net-like coverage which is filled with blood and flesh and which enwraps the newly born young. The *aṇḍaja* are those species which are born out of an egg—e.g. serpents, peacocks, birds, pigeons etc. The *potaja* are those species which are born without being wrapped in a coverage—e.g. elephants, rabbits, mongooses, rats etc. These last species are born neither as covered by *jarāyu*, nor are they born out of an egg, but they are born in the form of an uncovered body. In the case of the heavenly beings and hellish beings there is a particular fixed place where birth takes place and which is called *upapāta* (i.e. the region of sudden manifestation). A place situated on the surface of a divine couch covered by divine clothing is the *upapāta*-region for the heavenly beings; a ventilator situated in a hard mortar wall is the *upapāta*-region for the hellish beings. For these two species of beings receive for the sake of building a body the physical particles of the *vaikriya* type existing in those two *upapāta*-regions. 34-36.

An Account Pertaining to the Types of Body :

Audārika, *vaikriya*, *āhāraka*, *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—these five are types of body. 37.

Among these five types one mentioned later is subtler than one mentioned earlier. 38.

¹Among the three types mentioned before *taijasa* one mentioned later is made up of *asaṅkhaḥayāta* times bigger atomic-aggregates than one mentioned immediately earlier. 39.

The last two types—viz. *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—possess *ananta* times bigger atomic aggregates than the earlier mentioned ones. 40.

Both the body types *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* are without resistance. 41.

They happen to be in association with a soul since a beginningless time. 42.

And they are possessed by all the worldly souls without exception. 43.

A soul can simultaneously possess either the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of body, or these two plus one more, or these two plus two more. 44.

Only the last type of body—viz. *kārmaṇa*—is devoid of an experience of pleasure, pain etc. 45.

The first type of body—viz. *audārika*—is exclusively produced either in the case of birth out of a womb or in that of birth by way of agglutination. 46.

The *vaikriya* type of body is produced in the case of birth by way of sudden manifestation. 47.

²And it is also produced through *labdhi* or super-ordinary power. 48.

1. Here in the *vṛtti* to the *Bhāṣya* the word '*pradeśa*' has been explained as 'aggregate made up of *ananta* atoms.' But in the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* etc. it is explained as 'atom'.

2. After this aphorism another one—viz. *taijasam api*—is found in the Digambara tradition but not in the Śvetāmbara. In the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* etc. the new aphorism is explained as follows : the *taijasa* type of body too is capable of being produced through *labdhi* or super-ordinary power—that is to say, just as the *vaikriya* type of body can be produced through super-ordinary power so too can be the *taijasa* type; of course, this does not mean that the *taijasa* type of body can be produced through super-ordinary power alone.

The *āhāraka* type of body is holy—that is, made up of auspicious physical particles—, pure—that is, effective in a blameless fashion—, and one without resistance; and it is possessed only by a monk versed in the fourteen texts belonging to the class called *Pūrva*. 49.

Birth constitutes the beginning of a body; so an account of body is offered after that of birth. In this connection numerous questions are taken up for consideration one by one as follows.

The Types of Body and How to Understand Them :

The embodied souls one *ananta* in number, and their bodies too, being separate from one another, are, individually taken, *ananta* in number. However, from the viewpoint of the similarity of their function, cause etc. they are briefly subdivided and said to be of five types—viz. *audārika*, *vaikriya*, *āhāraka*, *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*.

Body is a soul's instrument of functioning. (1) That type of body which can be burnt, pierced, cut into pieces is *audārika*. (2) That type of body which is now small, now big, now thin, now thick, now one, now many—in short, the type of body that can assume various forms—is *vaikriya*. (3) The type of body which can be produced only by a monk versed in the fourteen *Pūrva*-texts is *āhāraka*. (4) The type of body which, being made up of fire, causes on the one hand digestion of the consumed food and on the other a glow is *taijasa*. (5) The total aggregate of karmas constitutes the *kārmaṇa* type of body. 37.

The Character of Being Gross and Subtle :

Among the above-mentioned five types of body *audārika* is the grossest while *vaikriya* is subtler than it; on the other hand, *āhāraka* is still subtler than *vaikriya*; similarly, *taijasa* is subtler than *āhāraka*, *kārmaṇa* is subtler than *taijasa*.

Question : Here what is meant by gross and subtle ?

Answer : By grossness and subtlety are respectively meant the looseness and tightness of construction, not the bigness and

smallness of size.

Now *vaikriya* is subtler than *audārika* but it is grosser than *āhāraka*; similarly, *āhāraka* etc. too are subtler than a type mentioned earlier and grosser than one mentioned later. That is to say, the character of being gross and subtle is but relative. This means that a body-type is subtler than another—and the latter grosser than the former—in case the construction of the latter is looser than that of the former.

On their part, the looseness and tightness of construction depend on physical transformation. For the physical particles are possessed of a multifarious power of transformation; so when, even if small in quantity, they are transformed into a loose body they are called gross, and when, even if large in quantity, they are transformed into an increasingly tight body they are called increasingly subtle. For example, if we take a bean of lady's finger and a piece of ivory, both equal in size, then it will be found that the former's construction is relatively loose, the latter's relatively tight. Thus it is that even in the case of size being equal the physical stuff constituting ivory is greater in amount than that constituting lady's finger. 38.

The Quantity of the Originating—that is, Constituting-Stuff :

On the above understanding of gross and subtle it follows that the originating stuff of a later mentioned body-type is greater in quantity than that of an earlier mentioned one. But what that quantity actually is, is told in the two present aphorisms.

Those aggregates made up of atoms out of which a body is built are called the originating stuff of this body. So long as atoms lie separate from one another they cannot go to build a body. It is only the aggregates—which are of the form of an accumulated lot of atoms—that can do that. Moreover, even these aggregates ought to be made up of *ananta* atoms. Thus the originating aggregates of a *vaikriya* body are *asaṅkhyāta* times greater than those of an *audārika* body; that is to say, the originating aggregates of an *audārika* body are made up of *ananta*

atoms and the originating aggregates of a *vaikriya* body too are made up of *ananta* atoms; but the latter number *ananta* is *asaṅkhyāta* times larger than the former. A similar relative numerical superiority is to be understood in the case of the number *ananta* that characterizes the atoms making up the aggregates of a *vaikriya* body and the number *ananta* that characterizes those making up the aggregates of an *āhāraka* body.

The number *ananta* that characterizes the atoms making up the aggregates of a *taijasa* body is *ananta* times larger than that characterizing the atoms making up the aggregates of an *āhāraka* body; similarly, the atoms making up the aggregates of a *kārmaṇa* body are *ananta* times larger in number than those making up the aggregates of a *taijasa* body. Thus it is obvious that the originating stuff of a later mentioned body-type is larger in quantity than that of an earlier mentioned one; even so, owing to the peculiarity of the transformation concerned a later mentioned body-type is tighter in construction than an earlier mentioned one and so is called subtler than it.

Question : The aggregates of an *audārika* body are made up of *ananta* atoms and so also are the aggregates of a *vaikriya* body and the rest made up of *ananta* atoms. How is then it possible that a member of the former set of aggregates is smaller than a member of the latter set ?

Answer : The number *ananta* is of *ananta* types—so that even while both are made up of *ananta* atoms it is not impossible that the aggregate of a *vaikriya* body and the rest is *asaṅkhyāta* times larger than that of an *audārika* body. 39-40.

The Last Two Types of Body—Their Nature, Temporal Duration and Those Entitled to Them :

Among the above-mentioned five types of body the last two, as compared to the first three, possess a certain speciality—in connection with which three points are respectively laid down in the present aphorism.

The Nature :

The *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—these two types of body suffer no resistance anywhere in the world; that is to say, even an entity as hard as diamond cannot prevent them from gaining entrance—for they are subtle in the extreme. Even though it is normally found that a tangible entity suffers resistance at the hands of another such entity, this rule of resistance is applicable to gross entities alone—not also to the subtle ones. For a subtle entity gains entrance everywhere and suffers no resistance whatsoever—thus behaving as fire does in relation to an iron-ball.

Question : But then being subtle the *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* types of body too should be declared to be such as suffer no resistance ?

Answer : Certainly, they too gain entrance without suffering resistance, but in the present context by motion devoid of resistance is to be understood motion that suffers no resistance right upto the end of the *loka*-region. So far as the *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* types of body are concerned they are doubtless such as suffer no resistance; however, unlike the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of body they exhibit this feature not throughout the *loka*-region but only in the sub-region of it called *trasa-nāḍi* (lit. the tunnel containing the mobile beings).

Their temporal Duration :

The connection of the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of body with a soul is beginningless in the form of a stream, something which is not the case with the first three types of body. For these three types of body cease to remain connected with a soul after a particular period of time is past. That is why the three types of body *audārika* etc. are declared to be such as are connected with a soul occasionally or temporarily, while the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types such as are connected with a soul since a beginningless time.

Question : When they are connected with a soul since a beginningless time they should cease to be never at all. For that

which is beginningless never suffers destruction ?¹

Answer : The two types of body in question are beginningless not quâ individual entities but quâ streams of entities. Hence they too undergo increment as well as diminution. Only that entity of a positive form which is beginningless quâ an individual entity never suffers destruction; e.g. an atom.

Those Entitled to Them :

The *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of body are possessed by all the worldly souls whatsoever but not so the *audārika*, *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* types. Hence those entitled to the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* types of body include all the worldly souls, while those entitled to the types *audārika* etc. include only some among them.

Question : Let something be told by way of distinguishing between a *taijasa* type of body and a *kārmaṇa* type.

Answer : The *kārmaṇa* type of body is the root-cause of the remaining types. For this body is of the form of karmas while karmas constitute the occasioning cause of all bodily functioning whatsoever. On the other hand, the *taijasa* type of body is not in this way the occasioning cause of all bodily functioning whatsoever; it rather remains connected with all souls whatsoever and as such renders assistance in acts like digesting the consumed food. 41-43.

The Number of Bodies Simultaneously Available to a Soul :

The *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—these two types of body are in possession of the worldly souls throughout the period of their worldly existence; but the types *audārika* etc. are exchanged for one another and hence they are sometimes available to a soul, sometimes they are not. So the question arises as to what is the maximum and what is the minimum number of bodies that can be simultaneously in possession of a soul. The question is answered in the present aphorism. Thus a worldly soul can possess two bodies at the least and four at the most; it cannot

1. The same idea is expressed also in the *Gītā* : *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*. / 2.16.

possess all the five of them. When two bodies are possessed they are *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—for they stay with a soul so long as its worldly existence lasts. Such a situation arises only at the time of transmigratory motion, for at that time no other body is possessed by the soul concerned. When three bodies are possessed they are either *taijasa*, *kārmaṇa* and *audārika* or *taijasa*, *kārmaṇa* and *vaikriya*. The former combination is available to the human beings and animals from birth till death, the latter combination is similarly available to the heavenly beings and hellish beings. When four bodies are possessed they are *taijasa*, *kārmaṇa*, *audārika*, *vaikriya*, or *taijasa*, *kārmaṇa*, *audārika*, *āhāraka*. The former combination is available only to some of the human beings and animals at the time when they happen to exercise their super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*-formation, the latter combination is available to a monk versed in the fourteen *Pūrva*-texts at the time when he happens to exercise his super-ordinary power of *āhāraka*-formation. No soul can simultaneously possess all the five bodies; for it is not possible to simultaneously exercise the super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*-formation as also that of *āhāraka*-formation.

Question : At the time when in the above stated fashion two, three or four bodies are possessed how is it possible for one and the same soul to be simultaneously connected with so many of these bodies ?

Answer : Just as the light of one and the same lamp can fall on a number of things, similarly, the constituent-units of one and the same soul can be indivisibly connected with a number of bodies.

Question : Is it the case that no soul ever possesses just one body ?

Answer : Yes. For the general rule is that the *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa* bodies are never found separate from one another; hence it is never possible that a soul should possess just one body. However, certain authorities¹ are of the view that the *tāijasa*

1. This view is referred to in the *Bhāṣya*. See chapter 2, aphorism 44.

body, unlike the *kārmaṇa*, does not last so long as the worldly existence lasts, but that, like the *āhāraka* body, it is acquired only through a super-ordinary power. On this view, at the time of transmigratory motion there remains with a soul just the *kārmaṇa* body. Thus in that case there arises the possibility of a soul possessing just one body.

Question : It has been said that the super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*—formation and that of *āhāraka*-formation these two are never exercised simultaneously. Why is that so ?

Answer : At the time when the super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*-formation is exercised and when a *vaikriya* body is thus formed the soul concerned is necessarily in a state of negligence¹. But such is not the case with the *āhāraka* body; for even if the exercise of the super-ordinary power of *āhāraka*-formation takes place in a state of negligence when the *āhāraka* body is thus formed a state of lack of negligence ensues on account of the possibility of spiritual purification. Hence it is that the simultaneous exercise of the two super-ordinary powers in question is impossible. The idea is that when it is said that five bodies do not exist simultaneously the reference is to these bodies appearing in a manifested form. On the other hand, so far as the capacity to form these bodies is concerned all the five of them can well appear simultaneously; for a monk possessing the super-ordinary power of *āhāraka*-formation can well possess that of *vaikriya*-formation as well. 44.

Purpose :

Every thing serves some purpose or other, so the bodies too must serve some purpose. But the question is as to what is their chief purpose and as to whether this purpose is common to all the bodies or it exhibits some peculiarity in one case or another. It is this question that is answered here. The chief purpose of a body is *upabhoga* which is possible only on the part

1. The idea occurs in the *Bhāṣyavṛtti* on chapter 2, aphorism 44.

of the first four bodies. Contrarywise, the last body—viz. the *kārmaṇa*—does not serve this purpose and so is called *nirūpabhoga* or 'devoid of *upabhoga*.'

Question : What is meant by '*upabhoga*' ?

Answer : To receive objects like good or bad sound etc. through the cognitive organs like ear etc. and then to experience pleasure or pain, to perform good or bad actions like donation, violence etc. through hands, feet etc., to suffer the good or bad consequence of earlier accumulated karmas, to cleanse off—i.e. to destroy—the earlier accumulated karmas through holy performances—all this is called *upabhoga*.

Question : The *audārika*, *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* bodies are possessed of cognitive organs and of bodily parts, and so *upabhoga* thus understood is well possible on their part. But the *taijasa* body is possessed neither of cognitive organs nor of bodily parts; how then is *upabhoga* possible on its part ?

Answer : Even though the *taijasa* body is not possessed of cognitive organs or bodily parts like hands, feet etc. it can well be of use in tasks like digestion etc.; and hence *upabhoga* understood as an experience of pleasure, pain and the like becomes possible on its part. Moreover, this body has another function in the form of inflicting curse and bestowing benefit. That is to say, all without exception make use of the *taijasa* body for tasks like digesting food etc. but the specially competent ascetics who through their penance happen to acquire a super-ordinary power are in a position to burn down the person with whom they are angry and to shower calm on the person with whom they are pleased. Thus insofar as the *taijasa* body is of use in tasks like inflicting curse and bestowing benefit it is treated as possessed of *upabhoga* in the form of experiencing pleasure and pain, accumulating good and bad karmas, and so on and so forth.

Question : If things are viewed so minutely then the *kārmaṇa* body too which, like the *taijasa*, is without cognitive organs and without bodily parts can be shown to be possessed of *upabhoga*. For it is this body that is the root-cause of all the remaining ones. Hence *upabhoga* exhibited by the remaining

bodies should in fact be treated as *upabhoga* appropriate to the *kārmaṇa* body. Why then is this body said to be devoid of *upabhoga* ?

Answer : That is right. As thus understood even the *kārmaṇa* body is certainly possessed of *upabhoga*. However, when in the present context it is declared to be devoid of *upabhoga* the idea simply is that without receiving assistance from the remaining bodies the *kārmaṇa* alone is not in a position to make possible *upabhoga* as described above. That is to say, for realizing *upabhoga* as thus understood it is four bodies *audārika* etc. that are directly instrumental; that is why they are said to be possessed of *upabhoga* while the *kārmaṇa* body is said to be devoid of *upabhoga* because it is thus instrumental only indirectly. 45.

Bodies Available Since Birth and Those Created Artificially :

Lastly there arises the question as to which bodies are available since birth and which are created artificially—also the question as to which body is available since birth in the case of which type of birth and as to what causes the artificial creation of a body.

An answer to all this comes in the present four aphorisms.

The *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*—these two bodies are neither available since birth nor are they created artificially. That is to say, these bodies are there immediately after birth and yet they are connected with a soul since a beginningless time. The *audārika* body is exclusively available since birth and emerges in the case of birth out of a womb as also in that of birth by way of agglutination; and those entitled to this body are none but the human beings and animals. The *vaikriya* body is of two types—one that is available since birth and the other that is created artificially. Of these, that available since birth emerges in the case of birth by way of sudden manifestation and those entitled to it are none but the heavenly beings and hellish beings. As for the *vaikriya* body created artificially its cause is a super-ordinary power. The super-ordinary power in question is a sort of capacity born of penance and is possible only

in certain human beings born out of a womb and animals born out of a womb. Thus those entitled to the *vaikriya* body created through the super-ordinary power in question are none but the human beings born out of a womb and animals born out of a womb. Another sort of super-ordinary power too is considered to be the cause of an artificially created *vaikriya* body, a power which however is not born of penance but is available since birth. This sort of super-ordinary power is said to be possessed only by certain gross-formed air-bodied beings; hence they too turn out to be ones entitled to the type of *vaikriya* body created artificially. The *āhāraka* body is exclusively an artificial creation. Its cause is but a special super-ordinary power which is found in no species other than human beings, and among human beings too it is found only in certain specially competent monks.

Question : Which specially competent monks ?

Answer : Those versed in the fourteen *Pūrva*-texts.

Question : When do they exercise the super-ordinary power in question and for what purpose ?

Answer : When a doubt arises as to some subtle question in order to get this doubt removed they do so. That is to say, when a monk versed in the fourteen *Pūrva*-texts happens to harbour a doubt as to some difficult subject-matter and no omniscient personage is available to him in the neighbourhood then in case he finds it impossible to reach another world-region through his *audārika* body he exercises his special super-ordinary power and creates a small body of the size of a cubit which on account of being made up of auspicious physical particles is handsome, on account of being created for a praiseworthy purpose is blameless, on account of being extremely subtle is devoid of resistance—that is, such as obstructs nothing and is obstructed by nothing. Through such a body the monk in question approaches an omniscient personage available in some other world-region, gets his doubt removed at the hands of the latter, and returns back to his original seat. All this takes place well within the space of a *muhūrta*.

Question : Is no other body acquired through a super-ordinary power ?

Answer : No.

Question : From *upabhoga* in the form of inflicting curse and bestowing benefit that has been described in the case of the *taijasa* body it obviously seems to be a type of body acquired through super-ordinary power. Why then is it said that no other type of body is acquired through super-ordinary power ?

Answer : When we speak of a body acquired through super-ordinary power we mean a body produced through such power not a body made use of through such power. The *taijasa* body, unlike the *vaikriya* and *āhāraka*, is not produced through super-ordinary power; it is only sometimes made use of through such power. That is why in the present context the *taijasa* body is not said to be a type of body acquired through super-ordinary power—that is, a type of artificially created body. 46-49.

The Apportionment of *Veda* or *Linga*-

That is, Sexual Characteristic :

The hellish beings and beings born by way of agglutination are necessarily neuter. 50.

The heavenly beings are in no case neuter. 51.

After an account of bodies has been offered there arises the question of *liṅga* or sexual characteristic. It is this that has been clarified here. *Liṅga* literally means characteristic sign. It is found in three forms—as has already been earlier laid down in connection with enumerating the *audayika bhāvas*¹. The three *liṅgas* or sexual characteristics are the masculine, the feminine, the neuter. Another name for *liṅga* is *veda*. Each of these three *vedas* is of two types—viz. the *dravya* type and the *bhāva* type²

1. See chapter 2, aphorism 6.

2. For mutual relationship between the *dravya* and *bhāva* types of *veda* as also for certain other allied matters of importance see the Hindi *Chauthā Karmagrantha*, p. 53, Note.

By the *dravya* type of *veda* is understood the external sign, by the *bhāva* type of *veda* the concerned specific desire. (1) That bodily sign through which a man is recognized as such is masculine *veda* of the *dravya* type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a woman is masculine *veda* of the *bhāva* type. (2) That bodily sign through which a woman is recognized as such is feminine *veda* of *dravya* type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a man is feminine *veda* of the *bhāva* type. (3) The collective of bodily signs in which some constituents are characteristic of a man some characteristic of a woman in neuter *veda* of the *dravya* type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a man as well as a woman is neuter *veda* of the *bhāva* type. *Veda* of the *dravya* type is of the form of physical configuration such as results from the manifestation of a particular *nāma-karma*; *veda* of the *bhāva* type is of the form of a mental unease such as results from the manifestation of a particular *mohaṇīya-karma*. The relation between the *dravya* and *bhāva* types of *veda* is that of the means and end or that of the sustainer and sustained.

The Apportionment of *Veda* :

The hellish beings and beings born by way of agglutination are possessed of neuter *veda*. The heavenly beings are not possessed of neuter *veda* but are possessed of the remaining two. The rest—that is, the human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb—are possibly possessed of all the three *vedas*.

The Relative Intensity and Mildness of the Concerned Mental Unease :

The mental unease born of masculine *veda* is least durable, that born of feminine *veda* is more durable than that, that born of neuter *veda* is still more durable. The idea is thus explained with the help of an illustration :

The mental unease born of masculine *veda* is like hay fire which calms down soon but also manifests itself soon. The mental unease born of feminine *veda* is like cow-dung fire which does

not calm down soon but also does not manifest itself soon. The mental unease born of neuter *veda* is like a heated brick which takes extremely long time to calm down.

In a woman the soft disposition is predominant and it stands in need of a tough element, in a man the tough disposition is predominant and it stands in need of a soft element. In a neuter person, on the other hand, both these dispositions are found mixed and they stand in need of both those types of elements. 50-51.

The Types of Life Quantum and Those Entitled to Them :

The beings born by way of sudden manifestation (i.e. the hellish beings and the heavenly beings), those possessing a body for the last time, the highly noble personages and the beings destined to live for *asaṅkhyāta* years—these are necessarily possessed of an *anapavartanīya* life-quantum, that is, one whose temporal duration is irreducible. 52

When one finds that in the course of calamities like wars etc. thousands of bright young men meet death simultaneously while on the other hand even old persons and persons with a shattered body clean escape a terrible disaster one feels doubtful whether there is or is not a thing like untimely death—so that in one case a number of persons die simultaneously while in the other none dies. The question is here answered in the affirmative as also in the negative.

The life-quantum is of two types—viz. *apavartanīya* or one whose temporal duration is reducible and *anapavartanīya* or one whose temporal duration is irreducible. Thus *apavartanīya āyus* is the life-quantum that can possibly be enjoyed away even before that period is past which was its due period at the time when it was earned by way of karmic bondage, while *anapavartanīya āyus* is the life-quantum that cannot be thus enjoyed away. That is to say, *apavartanīya āyus* is that life-quantum whose period of enjoyment is less than the period that was due at the time of the concerned karmic bondage, while *anapavartanīya āyus* is the life-quantum

whose period of enjoyment is equivalent to this latter period.

Whether the life-quantum earned by way of karmic bondage will be earned in an *apavartanīya* or an *anapavartanīya* form is not something that happens automatically but it depends on the intensity or mildness of the mental perturbation of the time concerned. Thus life-quantum for the immediately next birth is earned by way of a karmic bondage some time during this birth. And if at this time the prevailing mental perturbation happens to be mild the resulting bondage of life-quantum is loose—so that when an occasion is available the period that was its due at the time of bondage can well be reduced. On the contrary, if at that time the prevailing mental perturbation happens to be intense the resulting bondage of life-quantum is tight—so that even when an occasion is available the period that was its due at the time of bondage is never reduced, nor is it possible to enjoy it away at one go. Just as the row of persons standing in an extremely tight formation is unbreakable while that of persons standing in a loose formation is breakable or just as the plants born of the denser sown seeds prove hard of entry for the animals while those born of the seeds sown with a wide spacing prove easy of entry for them—similarly, the life-quantum that was subject to tight bondage on account of the intensity of the then prevailing mental perturbation is not exhausted before its due period is over however much one might employ weapon, poison etc. against the person concerned, while on the other hand the life-quantum that was subject to loose bondage on account of the mildness of the then prevailing mental perturbation can well be enjoyed away—may be within the space of one *muhūrta*—even before its due period is over but as soon as one happens to employ weapon etc. against the person concerned. It is this sudden enjoying away of life-quantum which is called *apavartana*—that is, time-reduction—or *akāla-mṛtyu*—that is, untimely death; on the other hand, the enjoyment of life-quantum for a period that was its fixed due is called *anapavartana*—that is, impossibility of time-reduction—or *kāla-mṛtyu*—that is, timely death. The life-quantum open to time-reduction is necessarily

characterized by *upakrama*—that is, availability of a hastening agent. The availability of the things like a sharp weapon, a deadly poison, a violent fire which cause untimely death is called *upakrama*. And the life-quantum open to time-reduction is necessarily characterized by *upakrama* thus understood; for this life-quantum is necessarily capable of being enjoyed away before its due period is over. On the other hand, the life-quantum not open to time-reduction is of two-types-viz. that characterized by *upakrama* and that not so characterized; that is to say, in the case of this life-quantum the agents of untimely death are sometimes available and sometimes not. However, even when those agents are available this life-quantum is never exhausted before its due period is over. The idea is that the beings possessed of the life-quantum open to time-reduction do happen to encounter some means or other like a weapon etc. that hastens death—with the result that they meet an untimely death—with the result that they meet an untimely death. On the other hand, the beings possessed of the life-quantum not open to time-reduction never meet untimely death however powerful might be the means of hastening death that they might possibly encounter.

Those Entitled to the Different Types of Life :

The beings born by way of sudden manifestation are necessarily hellish beings or heavenly beings. The beings possessing a body for the last time and the highly noble personages are necessarily human beings. The beings who, without assuming another birth, attain *mokṣa* through this very body are called beings possessing body for the last time, the *tīrthankaras*, *cakravartins*, *vāsudevas* etc. are called highly noble personages. The beings destined to live for *asāṅkhyāta* years¹ are some of the human beings and animals.

1. The human beings destined to live for *asāṅkhyāta* years are doubtless born in the 30 *akarmabhūmis*, the 56 *antardvīpas* and the *karmabhūmis*. On the other hand, the animals destined to live for *asāṅkhyāta* years are to be found not only in the just mentioned world-regions but also in the continents and oceans lying outside the innermost circle of two world-continent and a half.

Among these the beings born by way of sudden manifestation and the beings destined to live for *asāṅkhyāta* years are possessed of a life-quantum not open to time-reduction and not characterized by *upakrama*; on the other hand, the beings possessing a body for the last time and the highly noble personages are possessed of a life-quantum not open to time-reduction but either characterized or not characterized by *upakrama*. Leaving aside these, all the remaining human beings and animals are possessed of a life-quantum open to time-reduction.

Question : If life-quantum is enjoyed away before its due period is over then there would arise the contingencies of a loss of the done, an attainment of the undone, futility, contingencies which the scriptural texts as undesirable. How are these contingencies to be evaded ?

Answer : The above difficulty does not arise in the case of a sudden enjoying away of life-quantum. For the same karma which was to be enjoyed taking a long time is now enjoyed all at once; but no part of it is left without its consequence being experienced. Hence here there is involved neither a loss of the karma that was earned nor its futility. Similarly, what occurs here is death arising owing to a karma that was earned; hence here there is involved no attainment of the consequence of a karma that was not earned. All this is just as a spark of fire dropped on one side of a tightly bound mass of hay manages to burn down this entire mass blade by blade and taking a long time while a number of such sparks dropped on all sides of a loose and scattered mass of hay burn down the entire mass all at once.

In order to elucidate this very idea the theoretical texts offer two more illustrations, one pertaining to an arithmetical operation, the other pertaining to the act of drying piece of cloth. Thus if we are to find out the least common multiple of a particular set of numbers there are a number of ways for doing so suggested by the science of arithmetic. Now one highly expert in arithmetic employs such a method in this connection as yields

the desired result within a very short time while an ordinary student of arithmetic gets the same result after a long time and through a prolonged operation involving division etc. Here the result yielded in the two cases is the same but the expert arithmetician gets it soon while the ordinary one gets it after a long time. Similarly, of two pieces of cloth equally wet if one is dried in a bundled form the other in a spread out form, the former will take a long time to get dried, the latter will get dried soon. Here even if the quantity of water is equal and the process of drying up the same in the two cases the process takes a long or short time depending on whether the concerned piece of cloth is in a bundled or a spread out state. Similarly, two equivalent masses of life-quantum—one open to time-reduction, the other not so open—differ from one another only as to the longness or shortness of the time required for their respective enjoyments. And so the above urged contingencies like a loss of the done etc. do not really arise in this case. 52.



CHAPTER THREE

In the second chapter the worldly souls, so far as it concerns their life-species, have been divided into four types—viz. the hellish beings, human beings, animals and heavenly beings. In the third and fourth chapters their special nature is to be delineated through an account of their place of residence, life-duration, body-size etc. The third chapter is devoted to an account of the hellish beings, animals and human beings, the fourth to that of the heavenly beings.

An Account of the Hellish-Beings :

Ratnaprabhā, śarkrāprabhā, vālukāprabhā, paṅkaprabhā, dhūmaprabhā, tamaḥprabhā, mahātamaḥprabhā—these seven are grounds. These grounds are situated on dense water, air and *ākāśa* and they lie one below another while the further down a ground is the more extensive it is. 1.

The hells are situated in those grounds. 2.

These hells are ever characterized by an increasingly more inauspicious *leśyā* or soul-colouring, *pariṇāma* or physical transformation, body, *vedanā* or tactile feeling, and *vikriyā* or self-wrought bodily transformation. 3.

Moreover, they suffer from the pain caused to each other by each other. 4.

And in the grounds earlier than the fourth—that is, in the uppermost three grounds—they also suffer from the pain caused by the evil-hearted *Asurās*. 5.

The maximum life-duration of the beings residing in

those hells is 1, 3, 7, 10, 17, 22 and 33 *Sāgaropamas* respectively. 6.

The *loka* is divided into three portions—viz. the lower, middle and upper. The lower portion is understood to start from a distance of 900 *yojanas* down below the level of the mountain *Meru*; it stands in *ākāśa* like a down turned earthen bowl—that is to say, it is found to be increasingly more extensive as one moves downwards. The volume covering 900 *yojanas* above the level of the mountain *Meru* and 900 *yojanas* below it—that is a volume 1800 *yojanas* thick—constitutes the middle *loka*-portion whose length is equal to its breadth and which is like a *jhālara* (a musical instrument) in shape. The entire *loka* lying above its middle-portion constitutes its upper-portion which in shape is like a *mrdaṅga* (also a musical instrument).

The grounds constituting the residing place of the hellish beings are called hellish-grounds and are situated in the lower *loka*-portion. Such grounds are seven in number and they rather than standing side by side with one another lie one below another. They are not equal to one another in length and breadth but the further down a ground is situated the greater are its length and breadth. Thus the length and breadth of the second ground are greater than those of the first, those of the third greater than those of the second, and so on till we find that the length and breadth of the seventh ground are greater than those of the sixth.

These seven grounds are situated one below another but they do not stand tightly close to one another. For a very huge gap divides one of those grounds from another. And this gap is occupied by dense ocean, dense air, rarefied air and *ākāśa* arranged in this very order one below another. That is to say, down below the first hellish ground there lies dense ocean, down below the dense ocean dense air, down below the dense air the rarefied air, and down below the rarefied air *ākāśa*. After *ākāśa* comes the second hellish ground. In between the second and third hellish grounds too dense ocean etc. lie in exactly the above order. And similarly upto the seventh hellish ground it is found

that down below a hellish ground dense ocean etc. lie arranged in the order in question¹. The further down a hellish ground is situated the less thick it is—that is, the lesser distance separates its top level from its bottom level. Thus the thickness of the first hellish ground is 180,000 *yojanas*, that of the second 132,000 *yojanas*, that of the third 128,000 *yojanas*, that of the fourth 120,000 *yojanas*, that of the fifth 118,000 *yojanas*, that of the sixth 116,000 *yojanas*, that of the seventh 108,000 *yojanas*. The seven rings of ocean that are situated below the seven hellish grounds are all equal in thickness—that is, they are all 20,000 *yojanas* thick. On the other hand, the seven rings of dense air and the seven of rarefied air that are thus situated are each *asaṅkhyāta* *yojanas* thick but they are not mutually equivalent; for the number *asaṅkhyāta* measuring the thickness of the rings of dense air and rarefied air situated below the second ground is

1. In the *Bhagvatīsūtra* the nature of the elemental arrangement pertaining to *loka* has been very clearly described as follows :

“The support of all the living beings—whether mobile or static—is earth, the support of the earth is ocean, the support of the ocean is air, the support of the air is *ākāśa*. But how can the ocean stand supported by air and the earth supported by ocean ? The question is to be answered thus. Let a leather-bag be filled with air and thus expanded in size. Let the mouth of this bag be tightly tied with a leather ribbon; let the middle part of this bag be similarly tied. As a result of this the air filling the bag will be divided into two parts and the bag will look like a *ḍugḍugī*. (a small musical instrument). Next, let the mouth of the bag be opened and air expelled from its upper part; then let this upper part be filled with water and the mouth of the bag be tied once more. Lastly, let the tie occurring at the middle part of the bag be loosened aside. Now it will be found that the water filled in the upper part of the bag remains fixed in that very part—that is, it stays in the part situated above that carrying air, in other words, it stays above air without ever reaching a point situated below it. This will happen because the water situated in the upper part of the bag stands supported by the air situated in its lower part. That is to say, just as in the leather bag the water stays in the upper part it being supported by air similarly earth etc. stand supported by air.” *Śataka* 1, *Uddeśaka* 6.

bigger than that measuring the thickness of similar rings situated below the first ground, and so on till we find that the thickness of the rings of dense air and rarefied air situated below the seventh hellish ground is grater than that of the similar rings situated below the sixth hellish ground. The same consideration applies to the rings of *ākāśa* situated below the different hellish grounds.

The first ground, owing to a predominance of *ratnas* or jewels, is called *ratnaprabhā*. Similarly, the second, owing to a predominance of *śarkarā* or gravel, is called *śarkarāprabhā*. The third owing to a predominance of *vālukā* or sands, is called *vālukāprabhā*. The fourth, owing to an excess of *pañka* or mud, is called *pañkaprabhā*. The fifth, owing to an excess of *dhūma* or smoke, is called *dhūmaprabhā*. The sixth, owing to a marked possession of *tamas* or darkness, is called *tamaḥprabhā*, while the seventh, owing to a high concentration of *mahātamas* or dense-darkness, is called *mahātamaḥprabhā*. These seven are respectively designated *gharmā*, *vaṁśā*, *śailā*, *añjanā*, *riṣṭā*, *māghavyā* and *māghavī*.

The ground *ratnaprabhā* has got three *kāṇḍas* or parts. The upper most part—called *kharakāṇḍa*—has a predominance of jewels and is 16000 *yojanas* thick. The part down below it has a predominance of mud and is 84000 *yojanas* thick. The lower most part has a predominance of water and is 80000 *yojanas* thick. Thus the three parts taken together turn out to be 180,000 *yojanas* thick. However, the grounds beginning from the second and lasting upto the seventh are not thus divided into parts, for in their case the substance concerned—viz. gravel, sands etc.—is equally found at each place. In the case of *ratnaprabhā* the first part stands supported by the second, the second by the third. The third part on its part, stands supported by the ring of dense ocean, the dense ocean by the ring of dense air, the dense air, by the ring of rarefied air, the rarefied air by *ākāśa*. However, the *ākāśa* stands supported by nothing else; it is rather self-supported, for such is the nature of *ākāśa* that it stands in need of no other

support. Similarly, the second ground stands supported by its own ring of dense ocean, this ring stands supported by the related ring of dense air, the dense air stands supported by the below lying ring of rarefied air, the rarefied air stands supported by the below lying *ākāśa*; this *ākāśa* is self-supported. The same order obtains in the case of each ground upto the seventh and of the ring of dense ocean etc, pertaining to it.

Even if the further down a ground is situated the less thick it is, the length and breadth of a below lying ground are greater than those of an above lying one. That is why their collective shape has been likened to that of a *chatrātichatra* (i.e. an umbrella-over-umbrella series)—that is, a shape where extension is found to be greater as one looks further downwards. 1.

In each of the seven grounds barring an uppermost strip and a lowermost strip of 1000 *yojanas* each the entire remaining thickness has hellish residing places (i.e. hells) situated within it; thus for example in the case of *ratnaprabhā* the total thickness of 180,000 *yojanas* minus an upper strip and a lower strip of 1000 *yojanas* each amounts to a thickness of 178,000 *yojanas* and it is within this that hells are situated. The same consideration applies to the remaining grounds upto the seventh. The hells bear names like *raurava* (lit. terrifying), *raudra* (lit. frightening), *ghātana* (lit. killing), *śocana* (lit. worrying) etc. which are fearsome even to hear. Beginning from the hellish residing place named *sīmantaka* situated in *ratnaprabhā* and lasting upto that named *apratīṣṭhāna* situated in *mahātamahprabhā* all the hellish residing places are with a floor akin to diamond-knife. They are not all similar in shape; for some of them are circular, some triangular, some looking like a cooking vessel, some looking like an iron jar—they thus being of mutually different shapes. The *prastaras* or strata which are like storeys of a multistoreyed building—are to be counted as follows : thirteen in *ratnaprabhā*, eleven in *śarkarāprabhā* and similarly decreasing by two in each ground—so that there is only one *prastara* in the seventh ground *mahātamahprabhā*. It is in these *prastaras* that hells are situated.

The Number of the Hellish Residing Places in Different Grounds :

There are 30 lacs hellish residing places in the first ground, 25 lacs in the second, 15 lacs in the third, 10 lacs in the fourth, 3 lacs in the fifth, one lac minus five in the sixth, just five in the seventh.

Question : What is meant by saying that hells are situated in the *prastaras* ?

Answer : In the space intervening in between two *prastaras* there are situated no hells; but within each *prastara* the entire thickness measuring 3000 *yojanas* has situated in it the hells of various shapes.

Question : What relation obtains between a hell and a hellish being ?

Answer : The hellish beings are a type of souls while hells are the place where these souls reside. It is precisely on account of their association with the residing place called hell that these souls are called hellish beings. 2.

The second ground is of a more inauspicious construction than the first, the third of a more inauspicious construction than the second, and so on till we find that the seventh ground is of the most inauspicious construction. Similarly, in the case of the hellish beings residing in these hells the *leśyā* or soul-colouring, the *pariṇāma* or physical transformation, the body, the *vedanā* or tactile feeling, the *vikriyā* or self-wrought bodily transformation are increasingly more inauspicious.

Leśyā or Soul-colouring :

The *kāpota* or grey *leśyā* obtains in *ratnaprabhā*, the same obtains in *śarkarāprabhā* but it is comparatively more impure there, the grey and blue *leśyās* obtain in *vālukāprabhā*, the blue *leśyā* obtains in *pañkaprabhā*, the blue and black *leśyās* obtain in *dhūmaprabhā*, the black *leśyā* obtains in *tamaḥprabhā* and the same does in *mahātamaḥprabhā* but it is comparatively more impure in the latter.

Pariṇāma or Physical Transformation :

The physical-transformations like colour, smell, taste, touch, sound, shape etc. are found to be increasingly more inauspicious in the grounds as one moves further downwards.

Body :

The bodies of the hellish beings residing in the different grounds, on account of a manifestation of the karma designated *asubhanāma*, are found to be increasingly more inauspicious in colour, smell, taste, touch, sound, shape and increasingly more impure and terrifying as one moves further downwards.

Vedanā or Tactile Feeling :

In the seven grounds the hellish beings experience a tactile feeling increasingly more sharp. Thus in the first three grounds there obtains a hot tactile feeling, in the fourth a hot tactile feeling supplemented by cold, in the fifth a cold tactile feeling supplemented by hot, in the sixth a cold tactile feeling, in the seventh a still colder tactile feeling. These hot and cold tactile feelings are so intense that if the hellish beings suffering from them happen to reach the region of human beings during an extremely hot or an extremely cold season they can enjoy a sound sleep with utmost ease.

Vikriyā or Self-wrought Transformation :

Their *vikriyā* too is increasingly more inauspicious. Fed up with suffering they endeavour to get rid of it but what results is just the opposite. While seeking to work out a means of pleasure what they actually achieve is a means of pain. Thus with the help of their super-ordinary power of *vikriyā*-formation they seek to build up something auspicious but what is actually built up is something inauspicious.

Question : What is meant by saying that in the cases under consideration the increasingly more inauspicious phenomena like *leśyā* etc. are ever there ?

Answer : By saying that they are ever there what is meant is that they are there without cessation. Thus as a result of a manifestation of the karmas designated *gati-*, *jāti-*, *śarīra-*, and *aṅgopāṅga-nāma* the phenomena like *leśyā* etc. obtaining in a hellish birth remain inauspicious throughout life—that is to say, not even for a moment do they undergo a change nor do they ever turn auspicious. 3.

From the very nature of its location a hell is characterized by a terrible pain of heat and cold, but still more terrible is the pain of hunger and thirst. Thus so acute is the pain of hunger that it does not subside even when the person concerned, behaving like fire, consumes everything whatsoever; on the contrary, the act only results in a further intensification of the fire of hunger. Similarly, the pain of thirst is so acute that no satisfaction is reached however much be the quantity of water gulped down. Besides the pain of this nature a great one results to the hellish beings from their mutual animosity and beating up. For just as a crow and an owl, a snake and a mongoose are born-enemies, so also are the hellish beings born-enemies to one another. That is why as soon as they see one another they quarrel like dogs, bite one another and burn with anger. Hence it is said about them that they suffer from the pain caused to each other by each other. 4.

The hellish beings are understood to suffer from three types of painful tactile feeling. Of these, that owing to the very nature of their residing place and that caused to each other by each other have already been described. The third type is that owing to an extremely acute demerit. The first two types are common to all the seven hellish grounds, but the third is found only in the first three of them. For it is only in them that the *paramādhārmikas* (lit. the extremely demeritorious ones) are found. The *paramādhārmikas* are such a species of *asura*-gods as are extremely cruel by nature and ever engaged in sinful activities. There are fifteen subspecies of them like *amba*, *ambariṣa* etc. By their very nature they are so cruel and frivolous, that they find pleasure in inflicting pain on others. Hence it is that they make the hellish beings miserable through striking them

in various ways. They make the latter fight against each other like dogs, buffaloes and wrestlers; and when they see the latter fighting against and beating each other they derive immense pleasure out of the spectacle. Though these *paramādhārmikas* are a kind of gods and though so many other means of pleasure are already available to them, it is owing to the terrific demerit earned by them in a past life that they derive pleasure out of the oppression caused by them to others. As for the poor hellish beings they are helpless owing to their own past karmas and as such they lead the entire life suffering terrific tactile feelings. But however acute might be the painful tactile feeling suffered by the hellish beings there is no shelter for them against it, nor does their life come to an early close, it being the case that the life-quantum enjoyed by them belongs to the *anapavartanīya* type—that is, to a type not open to time-reduction. 5.

Life-duration of the Hellish Beings :

In the case of each species of living beings life-duration is mentioned in two ways—viz. as maximum and as minimum. The life-duration less than which it is not possible for the species concerned to have is minimum, the one more than which it is not possible for it to have is maximum. In the present context there is a mention of the maximum life-duration of the hellish beings, their minimum life-duration will be mentioned subsequently¹. This maximum life-duration is one *sāgaropama* in the first hellish ground, 3 in the second, 7 in the third, 10 in the fourth, 17 in the fifth, 22 in the sixth, 33 in the seventh.

Here closes a general account of the lower portion of the *loka*. In this connection two things have to be specially learnt—viz. the situation as to *āgati-gati*—that is, coming and going—and the possibility of their being continents, oceans etc.

Āgati-gati or Coming and Going :

The beings devoid of *sañjñā* can, after their death, be born upto the first hellish ground, the beings which crawl on arms

1. See chapter 4, aphorisms 43-44.

uptil the second, the birds upto the third, the lions upto the fourth, the serpents upto the fifth, the women upto the sixth, the fishes and human beings upto the seventh. The idea is that only the animals and human beings—not the heavenly beings and hellish beings—can be born in a hellish ground, the reason for it is that the heavenly beings and hellish beings are devoid of such (spiritual) states as are responsible for birth in a hellish ground. As a matter of fact, the hellish beings can, after their death, be born neither among the hellish beings nor among the heavenly beings; they can be born only among the animals or among the human beings.

The hellish beings belonging to the first three grounds can, when they are born among the human beings, even attain the status of a *tīrthankara*; those belonging to the first four grounds can then even attain *mokṣa*; those belonging to the first five grounds can then attain total discipline; those belonging to the first six grounds can then attain partial discipline; those belonging to any of the seven grounds can then attain right-inclination.

The Possibility of Continents, Oceans etc. :

In none of the hellish grounds, except *ratnaprabhā*, are there to be found either continents, oceans, mountains, ponds, or villages, towns etc; or the gross plant-bodied beings like trees, creepers etc., or the beings from two-sensed upto the five-sensed ones, or the human beings, or any of the types of heavenly beings. Here an exception is made in the case of *ratnaprabhā* because a small part of it is situated in the middle *loka*-portion—the *loka*-portion that is transverse—and in that part there can well be found the just mentioned phenomena like continents, oceans, villages, towns, plants, animals, human beings, heavenly beings. In the six grounds that remain there after excluding *ratnaprabhā* there are to be found only the hellish beings and certain one-sensed beings. To this general rule there are however several exceptions; for in the case of these six hellish grounds sometimes and at some places it can possibly happen that they are occupied also by certain human beings, heavenly beings and

five-sensed animals. The possibility of a human being occupying them arises because a person engaged in *kevali-samudghāta*, being spread out throughout the *loka*, stretches his soul-units also in those six hellish grounds. Besides, also the human beings possessed of the super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*-formation can reach these grounds. As for the animals they can certainly reach these grounds but exclusively as possessed of the super-ordinary power of *vaikriya*-formation. In the case of heavenly beings there is a possibility that they visit such hellish beings as are their friends of a former life and that with a view to removing the suffering of the latter. However, even such heavenly beings can proceed only upto the third hellish ground—not beyond. The *paramādhārmikas* who are a type of heavenly beings and wardens of the hell are found in the first three hellish grounds ever since their birth, but the other types of heavenly beings can be found ever since their birth only in the first hellish ground. 6.

An Account of the Middle *Loka*-portion :

The continents are *Jambūdvīpa* etc., each bearing an auspicious name. Similarly, the oceans are *Lavaṇa* etc., each bearing an auspicious name. 7.

All these continents and oceans are like a bracelet in shape; of them, an inner lying one is surrounded by the immediately outer lying one and the breadth or diameter of the latter is double that of the former. 8.

In the middle of them all is situated the continent *Jambūdvīpa* which is of the shape of a full circular disc, is 1 lac *yojanas* in diameter, and has the mountain *Meru* situated in its middle. 9.

In the *Jambūdvīpa* there are seven regions—viz. *Bharatavarṣa*, *Haimavatavarṣa*, *Harivarṣa*, *Videhavarṣa*, *Ramya-kavarṣa*, *Hairanyavatavarṣa*, and *Airāvatavarṣa*. 10.

Separating these regions from one another and running from east to west there are here six mountains designated *varṣadhara* (lit. holder of the region), their names being

Himavat, Mahāhimavat, Niṣadha, Nīla, Rukmin, and Śikhariṇ. 11.

In the continent *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* the number of mountains and regions is double that of those in the *Jambūdvīpa*. 12.

The same is true of the inner half of the continent *Puṣkaradvīpa*. 13.

The human beings are to be found only upto the mountain *Mānuṣottara*. 14.

These are either *arya* or *mleccha*. 15.

The entire regions *Bharata, Airāvata* and *Videha* barring the sub-regions *Devakuru* and *Uttarakuru* are *Karmabhūmis* (lit. fields of action). 16.

In the case of the human beings the maximum life-duration is 3 *paḷyopamas*, the minimum a period measuring less than a *muhūrta*. 17.

The same is true of the animals. 18.

Continents and Oceans :

It has already been said that the shape of the middle *loka*-portion is like that of a *jhālara* (a cymbal like musical instrument); the same is here elucidated through an account of the continents and oceans.

In the middle *loka*-portion there are situated *asaṅkhyāta* continents and oceans. They are so arranged that there first lies a continent, surrounding this continent an ocean, surrounding this ocean a continent, surrounding this continent an ocean, and so on and so forth. All of them bear but auspicious names. In the present context information is conveyed about three things related to them—viz. their diameter, their relative arrangement, their shape. Knowing this one comes to know the shape of the middle *loka*-portion.

Diameter :

The extent of the continent *Jambūdvīpa* is 1 lac *yojanas* in

the east-west direction, 1 lac *yojanas* in the north-south, the extent of the ocean *Lavaṇa* is double that of *Jambūdvīpa*, that of the continent *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* double that of *Lavaṇa*, that of the ocean *Kālodadhi* double that of *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa*, that of the continent *Puṣkarāvara* double that of *Kālodadhi*, that of the ocean *Puṣkarodadhi* double that of *Puṣkarāvara*. The same relation as to extent obtains uptil the end; that is to say, the extent of the ocean *Svayambhūramaṇa* is double that of the last continent *Svayambhūramaṇa*.

Relative Arrangement :

The relative arrangement of the oceans and continents is akin to that of the mill-stone and the surrounding mill-railing (in the domestic grinding apparatus). That is to say, the continent *Jambūdvīpa* is surrounded by the ocean *Lavaṇa*, the ocean *Lavaṇa* by the continent *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa*, the continent *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* by the ocean *Kālodadhi*, the ocean *Kālodadhi* by the continent *Puṣkarāvara*, the continent *Puṣkarāvara* by the ocean *Puṣkarodadhi*. The same relative arrangement obtains upto the ocean *Svayambhūramaṇa*.

Shape :

The continent *Jambūdvīpa* is circular like a plate, the remaining continents and oceans are shaped like a bracelet. 7-8.

Jambūdvīpa and an Account of Its Regions and Chief Mountains :

Jambūdvīpa is a continent that comes first of all and lies in the middle of all the continents and oceans; that is to say, it surrounds no other continent or ocean. *Jambūdvīpa* is 1 lac *yojanas* in breadth. It is circular in shape like a potter's wheel and is not shaped like a bracelet as *Lavaṇa* etc. are. In the middle of it is situated the mountain *Meru*; the following is an account of *Meru* :

The height of *Meru* is 1 lac *yojanas*, of which 1000 *yojanas* are invisible—that is to say, they lie below the surface of the

earth. As for its remaining height measuring 99,000 *yojanas* it lies above the surface of the earth. The 1000 *yojanas* thick volume lying below the surface of the earth has everywhere a length and a breadth of 10,000 *yojanas*. But the volume lying above the surface of the earth has in the uppermost portion, where a *Cūlikā* or pinnacle juts forth, a length and a breadth of 1000 *yojanas*. *Meru* has got three sub-divisions. It stands occupying all the three *Loka*-portions and is surrounded by four groves. The first sub-division is 1000 *yojanas* thick and lies below the surface of the earth, the second is 63,000 *yojanas* thick, the third 36,000 *yojanas* thick. In the first sub-division there is a predominance of pure earth, gravel etc., in the second that of silver, rock-crystal etc., in the third that of gold. The four groves are respectively named *Bhadraśāla*, *Nandana*, *Saumanasa* and *Pāṇduka*. After the height of 1 lac *yojanas* is past there is situated in the uppermost portion a *Cūlikā* or pinnacle which is 40 *yojanas* high and has a length and a breadth of 12 *yojanas* at the bottom, 8 *yojanas* in the middle and 4 *yojanas* at the top.

Jambūdvīpa has got seven chief regions which are designated *Varṇśa*, *Varṣa* or *Vāśya*. Of these, the first is *Bharata* which lies in the extreme south, north of *Bharata* is *Haimavata*, north of *Haimavata* *Hari*, north of *Hari* *Videha*, north of *Videha* *Ramyaka*, north of *Ramyaka* *Hairanyavata*, north of *Hairanyavata* *Airāvata*. As per the practical rule for determining direction¹ the mountain *Meru* is situated in a northerly direction in relation to all these seven regions.

Situated in the midst of the seven regions and dividing them from one another are six mountains which are designated

1. The practical rule for determining direction depends on the sun-rise and sun-set. Thus when one stands facing the direction of sun-rise one finds that *Meru* lies to the left hand side and in the North. Now what is the direction of sunset in *Bharata* that precisely is the direction of sunrise in *Airāvata*. Hence in the latter region too one who stands facing the direction of sunrise will find that the mountain *Meru* lies in the North. Similarly is to be understood how *Meru* lies in a northerly direction in relation to all the remaining regions.

Varṣadhara. They all run from east to west. The mountain *Haimavata* divides the region *Bharata* from *Haimavata*, the mountain *Mahāhimavat* divides *Haimavata* from *Harivarṣa* the mountain *Niṣadha* divides *Harivarṣa* from *Videha*, the mountain *Nīla* divides *Videha* from *Ramyaka*, the mountain *Rukmin* divides *Ramyaka* from *Hairanyavata*, the mountain *Śikharin* divides *Hairanyavata* from *Airāvata*.

In *Jambūdvīpa* shaped like a plate the above mentioned seven regions are situated one close to another and spread out like a sheet of cloth running from the eastern end upto the western. The region *Videha* lies in the middle of them all; and hence it is that the mountain *Meru* lies just in the middle of this region. It has just been stated that the mountain *Nīla* divides the region *Videha* from *Ramyaka* while the mountain *Niṣadha* divides it from *Harivarṣa*. Now that crescent-shaped portion of the region *Videha* which lies in between the mountains *Meru* and *Nīla*—a portion whose eastern and western limits are defined by two local mountains—is designated *Uttarakuru*; and the similar crescent-shaped portion lying in between the mountains *Meru* and *Niṣadha* is designated *Devakuru*. The two tracts *Uttarakuru* and *Devakuru* are a part and parcel of the region *Videha* (also called *Mahāvideha*), but being a residing place of the human beings born as a doublet they are distinguished from the rest. The whole of *Mahāvideha* that is left after *Uttarakuru* and *Devakuru* are excluded is divided into sixteen parts in its eastern flank and into sixteen in the western. Each of these parts is designated *Vijaya*. Thus there are 32 *Vijayas* in all—sixteen standing on the eastern side of the mountain *Meru*, sixteen standing on its western side.

In *Jambūdvīpa* the mountain *Haimavata* situated on the border of the region *Bharata* has its two ends extended in the eastern and western *Lavaṇa*-ocean. The same is the case with the mountain *Śikharin* situated on the border of the region *Airāvata*. Since each of these mountain-ends is divided into two parts we have in the case of the two mountains eight parts in all that are situated in the *Lavaṇa*-ocean. And since they are shaped like a canine-tooth they are called *daṁṣṭrā* (Sanskrit for 'canine tooth').

On each *daṁṣṭrā* there are located seven regions populated by human beings. Inasmuch as these regions lie within the confines of the *Lavaṇa*-ocean they are known as *antardvīpa* or intermediate continents. Such *antardvīpas* are 56 in all and in them too there reside the human beings born as a doublet. 9-11.

The Continent *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* and Inner Half of the Continent *Paṣkara* :

As compared to *Jambūdvīpa* the number of *Merus*, *Varṣas* and *Varṣadharas* found in *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* is double; that is to say, the latter contains 2 *Merus*, 14 *Varṣas* and 12 *Varṣadharas*. But they bear the same name; that is to say, the same names that are borne by the *Meru*, *Varṣadharas* and *Varṣas* situated in *Jambūdvīpa* are also borne by those situated in *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa*. The bracelet-shaped *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* is divided into two parts—viz. an eastern half and a western half. The division into an eastern half and a western half is executed through two mountains which run from North to South and are *īṣvākāra* or arrow-like—that is to say, which run straight like an arrow. In each half there is one *Meru*, seven *Varṣas* and six *Varṣadharas*. That is to say, whatever rivers, regions, mountains etc. there are in *Jambūdvīpa* are also in *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* but double in number. There are two mountains—running from north to south and arrow-like—which divide *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* into an eastern half and a western half, while in each half there are six *Varṣadhara* mountains that run from east to west. All these mountains touch the *Lavaṇa*-ocean on one side and the *Kālodadhi*-ocean on the other. If the six *Varṣadharas* situated in the eastern half and six situated in the western half are likened to the spokes inserted in the nave of a wheel then the regions *Bharata* etc. resulting from the separation caused by these *Varṣadharas* should be likened to the blank space lying in between those spokes.

Whatever is the number of *Merus*, *Varṣas* and *Varṣadharas* situated in *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa* is also that of those situated in the inner half of the continent *Paṣkara*. That is to say, in the latter too there are found 2 *Merus*, 14 *Varṣas* and 12 *Varṣadharas*—

which are situated in an eastern half and a western half, the two divided from each other by 'arrow-like' mountains. Thus in two continents and a half there are in all 5 *Merus*, 30 *Varṣadharas* and 35 *Varṣas*. Among these 35 *Varṣas* there are 5 (*Mahā*) *Videhas* with 5 *Devakurus*, 5 *Uttarakurus* and 160 *Vijayas*. As for the 'intermediate continents' they are found only in the *Lavaṇa*-ocean and hence are only 56 in number. In the continent *Puṣkara* there is a mountain *Mānuṣottara* which, circular in shape, is situated just in the middle of it—like fortification running around a town—and which surrounds the *Manuṣyaloka* or 'region where human beings are found.' *Jambūdvīpa*, *Dhātakikhaṇḍa* and the inner half of *Puṣkara*, these two continents and a half on the one hand and the ocean *Lavaṇa* and *Kālodadhi* on the other—only this much *loka*-part is called *manuṣyaloka*. This *loka*-part is called *manuṣyaloka* and that mountain surrounding it *mānuṣottara* because outside this *loka*-part no man is ever born and no man ever dies. Only a super-ordinarily skilled monk or a person possessed of the super-ordinary power of *Vaikriya*-formation can proceed beyond these two continents and a half; but even they are born and die only in the region lying this side of the mountain *Mānuṣottara*. 12-13

The Seat of Human Race and Its Types :

The two continents and a half and two oceans lying within the limits set by the mountain *Mānuṣottara* are no doubt a seat of man but not on every point of this *loka*-part is man to be found. For a seat by birth of the human race are only those 35 regions and 56 'intermediate continents' situated within the two continents and a half in question, but carried away by a super-ordinary personage or himself exercising a super-ordinary skill or capacity a man might well be found in any part of the two continents and a half and two oceans in questions. Nay, in that capacity a man can even be found on the top of the mountain *Meru*. Even so, it is on account of his association with a particular region that a man is called *Bhāratīya* (i.e. one belonging to *Bharata*), *Haimavatīya* (i.e. one belonging to *Haimavata*) etc.

while on account of his association with a particular continent that he is called *Jambūdvīpin* (i.e. one belonging to *Jambūdvīpa*), *Dhātakīkhaṇḍin* (i.e. one belonging to *Dhātakīkhaṇḍa*). 14.

The human race is chiefly divided into two classes—viz. *Āryas* and *Mlecchas*. Depending on the distinguishing circumstances the *Āryas* are of six types. Thus some are *Āryas* owing to location, some *Āryas* owing to race, some *Āryas* owing to family, some *Āryas* owing to activity, some *Āryas* owing to industrial skill, some *Āryas* owing to language. *Āryas* owing to location are those who are born in one of the fifteen *Karmabhūmis* and there too in what are called *Ārya-lands*¹. *Āryas* owing to race are those who are born among the races like *Ikṣvaku*, *Videha*, *Hari*, *Jñāta*, *Kuru*, *Ugra* etc. *Āryas* owing to family are the *Kulakaras*, *Cakravartins*, *Baladevas*, *Vāsudevas* as also those others who are born in highly dignified families. *Āryas* owing to activity are those who earn their livelihood through performing *Yajña* and making others perform it, through undertaking studies and making others undertake them, through agriculture, penmanship, trade etc. *Āryas* owing to industrial skill are the weavers, barbers, potters, etc. who earn their livelihood through a profession that involves meagre violence and is blameless. *Āryas* owing to languages are those who conveniently speak and otherwise make use of a language given recognition to by cultured personages². All those who lack features characteristic of these *Āryas* of six types are *Mlecchas*³.

1. In each of the five *Bharatas* and five *Āirāvatas* there are enumerated twenty-five and a half *Ārya-lands*. Thus these amount to 255 *Ārya-lands* in all and, besides, the 160 *Cakravarti-Vijayas* situated in the five *Videhas* are also *Ārya-lands*. It is only in these lands that the *tīrthaṅkaras* are born and preach religion. The entire area of the fifteen *Karmabhūmis* that remains there after excluding these *Ārya-lands* is denied the status of an *Ārya-land*.

2. By cultured personages are to be understood *tīrthaṅkaras*, *gaṇadharas* etc. who are possessed of superior capacities and languages that are theirs are *Sanskrit*, *Ardhamāgadhī* etc.

3. According to this definition those residing in one of the 30 *bhogabhūmis* (lit. fields of enjoyment) or *akarmabhūmis* (lit. fields of non-action) like *Haimavata* etc. are all veritably *Mlecchas*. 15.

The *Karmabhūmi* Mentioned :

A *Karmabhūmi* is a place where there are born *tīrthaṅkaras* conversant with the path leading to *mokṣa* and actively engaged in preaching it to others. Within the limits of those two continents and a half 35 regions and 56 intermediate continents are the places where human beings are born; but among these there are only fifteen to fulfill the description of a *Karmabhūmi* just given : These are 5 *Bharatas*, 5 *Airavatas*, 5 *Videhas*. The remaining 20 regions and all the intermediate continents are but *akarmabhūmis* (= *bhogabhūmis*). And though the two sub-regions *Devakuru* and *Uttarakuru* lie within the limits of *Videha* they are not *Karmabhūmis*; for persons born there are born as a doublet and so are not in a position to practise *Cāritra* or an ideal conduct—just as those born in the *akarmabhūmis* like *Haimavata* etc. are not. 16.

Life-duration of the Human-beings and Animals :

In the case of the human beings the maximum life-duration is 3 *palyopamas*, the minimum life-duration a period measuring less than a *muhūrta*. The same is true of animals; that is to say, in their case too the maximum life-duration is 3 *palyopamas*, the minimum life-duration a period measuring less than a *muhūrta*.

Life-duration is of two types—viz. *bhavasthiti* and *kāyasthiti*. The maximum or minimum life-duration that a being can enjoy after being born in a particular species is *bhavasthiti* appropriate to that species; the period for which a being continues to be born in a particular species rather than any other is *kāyasthiti* appropriate to that species. The just mentioned life-duration appropriate to the species human beings and animals is in fact *bhavasthiti* appropriate to them. As for *kāyasthiti* appropriate to them the situation is as follows : In the case of human beings as well as animals the minimum *kāyasthiti*, like the minimum *bhavasthiti*, is a period measuring less than a *muhūrta*. The maximum *kāyasthiti* appropriate to human beings measures a period of seven or eight births; that is to say, a being who is

continuously born in the human species must take leave of it after seven or eight births.

Not all the animals have the same *kāyasthiti* or the same *bhavasthiti*, and so in their case the two require to be mentioned in details. Thus *bhavasthiti* appropriate to the earth-bodied beings is 22000 years, that appropriate to the water-bodied beings 7000 years, that appropriate to the air-bodied beings 3000 years, that appropriate to the fire-bodied beings 3 days and nights. In the case of all these four *kāyasthiti* measures a period of *asaṅkhyāta utsarpiṇī-cum-avasarpiṇī*. *Bhavasthiti* appropriate to the plant-bodied beings is 1000 years, *kāyasthiti* appropriate to them a period of *ananta utsarpiṇī-cum-avasarpiṇī*. *Bhavasthiti* appropriate to the two-sensed beings is 12 years, that appropriate to the three-sensed beings 49 days and nights, that appropriate to the four-sensed beings 6 months. In the case of all these three *kāyasthiti* measures a period of *asaṅkhyāta* thousand years. In the case of the five-sensed animals *bhavasthiti* is different for those born out of a womb and those born by way of agglutination. Thus among those born out of a womb *bhavasthiti* appropriate to the water-born beings, the *uragas* (a species of serpent), the *bhujagas* (a species of serpent) is 1 crore *pūrvas*, that appropriate to birds one by *asaṅkhyāta palyopama*, that appropriate to the land-born quadrupeds 3 *palyopamas*. Similarly, among those born by way of agglutination *bhavasthiti* appropriate to the water-born beings is one crore *pūrvas*, that appropriate to *uragas* 53000 years, that appropriate to *bhujagas* 42000 years, that appropriate to birds 72000 years, that appropriate to the land-born beings 84000 years. In the case of five-sensed animals *kāyasthiti* appropriate to those born out of a womb measures a period of seven or eight births, that appropriate to those born by way of agglutination measures a period of seven births. 17-18.



CHAPTER FOUR

The third chapter chiefly offered an account of the hellish beings, human beings and animals; the present one chiefly offers an account of the gods or heavenly beings.

The Types of gods :

The gods are divided into four *nikāyas*. 1.

Nikāya means a particular group of species. The four *nikāyas* or species of gods are as follows :

Bhavanapati, *Vyantara*, *Jyotiṣka* and *Vaimānika*. 1.

The *leśyā* or soul-colouring appropriate to the third *nikāya*.

¹The third species of gods is possessed of yellow *leśyā*. 2.

Of the above four *nikāyas* of gods the third are *Jyotiṣkas*. They are possessed of just yellow *leśyā*. Here *leśyā*² means *leśyā* of the *dravya* type—that is, *leśyā* of the form of bodily colour not

1. The Digambara tradition attributes four *Leśyās*—from black upto yellow—to the three species of gods—viz. *Bhavanapati*, *Vyantara* and *Jyotiṣka*; but the Śvetāmbara tradition attributes these four *leśyās* only to the two species *Bhavanapati* and *Vyantara* while to the species *Jyotiṣka* it attributes a single *leśyā* yellow. Owing to this difference of opinion the present aphorism as also the seventh read differently in the Śvetāmbara tradition; for the Digambara tradition has in the place of these two aphorisms just one—viz. *ādītas triṣu pītāntaleśyāḥ*.

2. For a special account of *leśyā* see the *Hindi Chauthā Karmagranthā*-Appendix pertaining to the term *leśyā* p. 33.

leśyā of the *bhāva* type which is of the form of a particular spiritual endeavour; for so far as the latter type of *leśyās* are concerned all the six of them are found in all the four species of gods. 2.

The Sub-Types of the Four *Nikāyas* :

The four *Nikāyas* of gods—upto those residing within the zone of *Kalpas*—have got 10, 8, 5, and 12 sub-types respectively. 3.

The *Bhavanapati-nikāya* has got ten sub-types, the *Vyantara-nikāya* eight, the *Jyotiṣka-nikāya* five and the *Vaimānika-nikāya* twelve—as will be detailed later. The twelve sub-types in question of the *Vaimānika-nikāya* relate to those *Vaimānika* gods who reside within the zone of *Kalpas*; for there are *Vaimānika* gods who reside beyond the zone of *Kalpas* and who therefore are not included among these twelve sub-types. The twelve heavens—lands of gods—from *Saudharma* upto *Acyuta* are called *Kalpa*. 3.

An Inner Classification of the Four *Nikāyas* of gods :

Each of those sub-types numbering ten etc. belonging to the four *nikāyas* of gods are of the form of *indras*, *sāmānikas*, *trāyastrimśas*, *pāriṣadyas*, *ātmarakṣas*, *lokapālas*, *anīkas*, *prakīrṇakas*, *ābhiyogyas* and *kilviṣikas*. 4.

The *Vyantaras* and *Jyotiṣkas* do not include the classes *trāyastrimśa* and *lokapāla*. 5.

The gods of the *Bhavanapati-nikāya* are of ten sub-types *asurakumāra* etc. Each of these sub-types is divided into the classes *indra*, *sāmānika* etc. (1) *Indras* are those who act as lord in relation to the classes *sāmānika* etc. (2) *Sāmānikas* are those who are akin to *indras* as regards life-duration etc.—that is to say, who are venerable like a chief minister, father, preceptor etc. but who are only devoid of the status of an *indra*. (3) *Trāyastrimśas* are those who act as a minister or a chaplain. (4) *Pāriṣadyas* are those who act as companion. (5) *Ātmarakṣakas* are those who,

weapons in hand, stand at the back like a body-guard. (6) *Lokapālas* are those who guard the border-lines. (7) *Anīkas* are those who act as soldiers and army-chiefs. (8) *Prakīrṇakas* are those who are akin to the rank-and-file townsmen and countrymen. (9) *Ābhiyogyas* (= *sevakas*) are those who are akin to slaves. (10) *Kilviṣikas* are those who are akin to the *antyajas* or the lowermost stratum of the human society. Also the so many types of *Vaimānika* gods residing in 12 heavens are divided into these ten classes *indra*, *sāmānika* etc.

The eight sub-types of the *Vyantara-nikāya* and the five of the *Jyotiṣka-nikāya* are divided into just eight classes, for in these *nikāyas* there are not found the classes *trāyastriṃśa* and *lokapāla*. 4-5.

The Rule Regarding the Number of *Indras* :

The first two *nikāyas* have got two *indras* each. 6.

In each of the 10 sub-types *asurakumāra* etc. belonging to the *Bhavanapati-nikāya* and in each of the 8 sub-types *kinnara* etc. belonging to the *Vyantara-nikāya* there are two *indras*. Thus among *asurakumāras* they are *Camara* and *Bali*, among *nāgakumāras* *Dharaṇa* and *Bhūtānanda*, among *vidyut-kumāras* *Hari* and *Harisaha*, among *suparṇakumāras* *Veṇudeva* and *Veṇudhārin*, among *agnikumāras* *Agniśikha* and *Agnimāṇava*, among *vātakumāras* *Velamba* and *Prabhañjana*, among *stanita-kumāras* *Sughoṣa* and *Mahāghoṣa*, among *udadhikumāras* *Jalakānta* and *Jalaprabha*, among *dvīpakumāras* *Pūrṇa* and *Vāśiṣṭha*, among *dikkumāras* *Amita-gati* and *Amitavāhana*. This as regards the *Bhavanapati-nikāya*; as regards the *Vyantara-nikāya* the situation is as follow : Among *kinnaras* the *indras* are *Kinnara* and *Kimpuruṣa*, among *kimpuruṣas* they are *Satpuruṣa* and *Mahāpuruṣa*, among *mahoragas* *Atikāya* and *Mahākāya*, among *gāndharvas* *Gītarati* and *Gītaśāsas*, among *yakṣas* *Pūrṇabhadra* and *Mañibhadra*, among *rākṣasas* *Bhīma* and *Mahābhīma*, among *bhūtas* *Pratirūpa* and *Apratirūpa*, among *piśācas* *Kāla* and *Mahākāla*.

When it is said that the two *nikāyas* *Bhavanapati* and

Vyantara have got two *indras* each, then it is implied that the remaining two *nikāyas* have not got two *indras* each. In the case of *Jyotiṣkas*, *Candra* (i.e. the moon) and *Sūrya* (i.e. the sun) act as *indra*. And since *Candras* and *Sūryas* are *asaṅkhyāta* in number the same is the number of *indras* pertaining to the *Jyotiṣka-nikāya*. In the case of the *Vaimānika-nikāya* each *Kalpa* has got one *indra*. Thus in the *Saudharma-kalpa śakra* is *indra*, in *Aisāna Isāna*, in *Sānatkumāra Sanatkumara*; similarly, in the heavens further upwards there is an *indra* bearing a name corresponding to that of the heaven itself. The only noteworthy point in this connection is that the two *Kalpas Ānata* and *Prānata* have got a common *indra* whose name is *Prānata* while the two *Kalpas Āraṇa* and *Acyuta* have got a common *indra* whose name is *Acyuta*. 6.

The Situation as to *Leśyā* in the First Two *Nikāyas* :

The gods of the first two *nikāyas* possess *Leśyās* upto the yellow. 7.

The *Bhavanapatis* and *Vyantarās*—these two species of gods are said to possess just four *dravyaleśyās*, *leśyās* which are of the form of bodily colour. These are black, blue, grey and yellow. 7.

An Account of Sexual Enjoyment on the Part of Gods :

The Gods residing upto *Aisāna* are *Kāyapracāra*—that is, such as experience sexual enjoyment through body. 8.

As for the remaining *Kalpas* the gods residing in the first two experience sexual enjoyment through touch, those residing in the next two do so through form, those residing in the next two do so through sound, those residing in the next two do so through thought. 9.

The rest of the gods are all immune from sexual enjoyment. 10.

The *Bhavanapatis*, *Vyantarās*, *Jyotiṣkas* and the *Vaimānikas* residing in the first two heavens—these gods derive pleasure from a sexual enjoyment experienced through body just as do men.

The *Vaimānika* gods residing in the heavens third upward

do not experience sexual enjoyment through a wholesale touch of body—as do men; they rather experience such enjoyment in a different manner. E.g. the gods residing in the third and fourth heavens satisfy their sexual hunger—and thus derive pleasure—through a mere touch of the goddesses. The gods residing in the fifth and the sixth heavens derive satisfaction born of sexual enjoyment through a mere look at the decorated form of the goddesses. The gods residing in the seventh and eighth heavens have their sexual passion calmed down through a mere listening to the various sounds produced by the goddesses, and it is thus that they derive pleasure born of an experience of sexual enjoyment. The gods residing in the two pairs of heavens ninth-tenth and eleventh-twelfth have sexual satisfaction through a mere thought of the goddesses; for this satisfaction they require neither to touch the goddesses; nor to have a look at their form, nor to listen to their songs etc. The idea is that the goddesses are to be found only upto the second heaven, not further upwards. Hence it so happens that when the goddesses find that the gods residing in the third heaven and further upwards are eager for sexual enjoyment and hence regardful towards them they straightaway approach those gods; and as soon as they approach them the gods residing in the third and fourth heavens have sexual satisfaction through a mere touch of the hands etc. of these goddesses, those residing in the fifth and sixth heavens do so through a mere look at the finely decorated handsome body of these goddesses, those residing in the seventh and eighth do so through a mere listening to the beautiful musical sound of these goddesses. The access of the goddesses is possible only upto the eighth heaven, not further upwards. The gods residing in the heavens ninth upto the twelfth have sexual satisfaction through a mere thought of the goddesses. The gods residing in the heavens beyond the twelfth are calm and immune from sexual desire; that is why they do not require to experience enjoyment through touching the goddesses, through looking at their form, through listening to the sounds produced by them or through thinking of them—and yet they feel more satisfied and more joyous than the remaining gods. The reason is

obvious and is as follow. The greater the intensity of sexual passion the greater is mental perturbation, and the greater the mental perturbation the greater is the amount of sexual enjoyment required to get rid of it. The gods residing in the third and fourth heavens have milder sexual passion than those residing upto the second, those residing in the fifth and sixth heavens have milder sexual passion than those residing in the third and fourth, and so on we find that the further upwards a god resides the milder is his sexual passion. Hence it is that the gods residing further upwards suffer from lesser mental perturbation; and hence it is that they require fewer means of sexual enjoyment. The gods residing in the heavens beyond the twelfth have their sexual passion calmed down and so they require no sexual enjoyment whatsoever, whether born of touching, or of looking, or of listening, or of thinking. These gods ever remain submerged in the great joy born of satisfaction. This explains why the joy experienced by a god residing further upwards is said to be greater than that experienced by one residing further down-wards. 8-10.

An Account of the above-mentioned
Types of the Four *nikāyas* of Gods :

The *Bhavanvāsi-nikāya* consists of the types *Āsurakumāra*, *Nāgakumāra*, *Vidyutkumāra*, *Suparṇakumāra*, *Agnikumāra*, *Vātakumāra*, *Stanitakumāra*, *Udadhikumāra*, *Dvīpakumāra* and *Dikkumāra*. 11.

The *Vyantara-nikāya* consists of the types *Kinnara*, *Kimpuruṣa*, *Mahoraga*, *Gāndharva* *Yakṣa*, *Rākṣasa*, *Bhūta* and *Pisāca*. 12.

The *Jyotiṣka-nikāya* consists of the types *Sūrya* (i.e. the sun), *Candra* (i.e. the moon), *Graha* (i.e. planet), *Nakṣatra* (i.e. constellation), *Prakīrṇatārā* (i.e. stray star). 13.

In the *Manuṣyaloka* (i.e. the *loka*-part where alone the human beings are born) the *Jyotiṣka*-gods make round about the mountain *Meru* and are ever on the move. 14.

The division of time is worked out by these *Jyotiṣka*—gods on the move. 15.

Outside the *Manuṣyaloka* the *Jyotiṣka*—gods remain static. 16.

The fourth *Nikāya* of gods consists of those called *Vaimānika*. 17.

They are such as reside within the zone of *Kalpas* as also such as reside outside this zone. 18.

They reside one above another. 19.

¹Their residing places are *Saudharma*, *Aiśāna*, *Sānat-kumāra*, *Māhendra*, *Brahmaloka*, *Lāntaka*, *Mahāśukra* *Sahasrāra*, *Ānata*, *Prānata*, *Āraṇa* and *Acyuta*, the nine *Graiveyakas*, as also *Vijaya*, *Vaijayanta*, *Jayanta*, *Aparājita* and *Sarvārthasiddha*. 20.

The Ten Types of *Bhavanapatis* :

All the ten types of *Bhavanapatis* reside down below the the mountain *Meru* situated in *Jambūdvīpa*, this residence being in a southerly as well as a northerly direction related to this mountain; as for the transverse direction this residence is extended upto crore multiplied by crore lacs *yojanas*. The *Asurakumāras* reside mostly in *āvāsas* and sometimes in *bhavanas*, but all the remaining types *Nāgakumāra* etc. usually reside in *bhavanas*. The *āvāsas* are everywhere found in the 178,000 *yojanas* thick volume of the land-mass *Ratnaprabhā* that remains there after excluding its uppermost and lowermost strata each 1000 *yojanas* thick; on the other hand, the *bhavanas* are found only in the lowermost 90,000 *yojanas* thick volume pertaining to

1. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition there are twelve *Kalpas*, but according to the Digambara tradition they are sixteen. For the latter tradition adds to the above list four more members—viz. *Brahmottara*, *Kāpiṣṭha*, *Śukra* and *Śatāra*, members which respectively occupy in the newly emergent list the 6th, 8th, 9th and 11th serial position. For the Digambara reading of the present aphorism see the Appendix pertaining to the comparative reading of aphorisms.

Ratnaprabhā. The *āvāsas* look like huge canopies, the *bhavanas* look like towns. The *bhavanas* are shaped like a circle on the exterior side, like a square on the interior, while their bottom is shapped like a *Puṣkara-karṇikā* (=the finger on the tip of an elephant's trunk).

All the *Bhavanapatis* are called *Kumāras* like a *Kumāra* (i.e. a youngster) they are handsome to look at and delicate; moreover, their movement is light and lovely and they are of a playful disposition. All the types of *Bhavanapatis* have got since their very birth a natural property comprising symbol etc., a property that is different in the case of a different type. For example, in the crown of the *Asurakumāras* there is affixed the symbol of head-jewel. With the *Nāgakumāras* the symbol is that of serpent, with the *Vidyutkumāras* that of thunderbolt, with the *Suparnakumāras* that of *garuḍa*, with the *Agnikumāras* that of jar, with the *Vātakumāras* that of horse,¹ with the *Stanitakumāras* that of *vardhamāna* or a pair of earthen bowls, with the *Udadhikumāras* that of crocodile, with the *Dvīpakumāras* that of lion, with the *Dikkumāras* that of elephant. In the case of *Nāgakumāras* etc. the symbol concerned is affixed in their ornament. All the types have got a different clothing, weapon, ornament etc. 11.

The Types and Sub-types of the Vyantaras :

All the *Vyantaras* reside in the *bhavans* and *āvāsas* situated in the upper, middle as well as lower *Loka*-portions. On their own or as impelled by others they visit different places. Some of them even go to the extent of attending upon the human beings. They are called *Vyantara* because they reside in the various *antaras* or intervening spaces that come to be formed within the mountains and caves as also within the forests. Of these the type *Kinnara* is divided into ten sub-types—viz. *Kinnara*, *Kimpuruṣa*, *Kimpuruṣottam*, *Kinnarottam*, *Hṛdayaṅgama*, *Rūpaśālin*, *Anindita*, *Manorama*,

1. The text *Sangrahaṇī* attributes the symbol of horse to the *Udadhikumāras* and that of crocodile to the *Vātakumāras*. *Gāthā* 26.

Ratipriya, Ratiśreṣṭha. The type *Kimpuruṣa* is divided into ten sub-types—viz. *Puruṣa, Satpuruṣa, Mahāpuruṣa, Puruṣavṛṣabha, Puruṣottam, Atipuruṣa, Marudeva, Maruta, Meruprabha* and *Yaśasvat*. The type of *Mahoraga* is divided into ten sub-types—viz. *Bhujaga, Bhogaśālin, Mahākāya, Atikāya, Skandhaśālin, Manorama, Mahāvega, Maheṣvakṣa, Merukānta* and *Bhāsvat*. The *Gāndharvas* have got twelve sub-types—viz. *Hāhā, Hūhū, Tumburava, Nārada, Rśivādika, Bhūtavādika, Kādamba, Mahākādamba, Raivata, Viśvāvasu, Gītārati, Gītayaśas*. The *Yakṣas* have got thirteen sub-types—viz. *Pūrṇabhadra, Mañibhadra, Śvetabhadra, Haribhadra, Sumanobhadra, Vyatipātikabhadra, Śubhadra, Sarvatobhadra, Maṇuṣyayakṣa, Vanādhipati, Vanāhāra, Rūpayakṣa* and *Yakṣottama*. The *Rākṣasas* have got seven sub-types—viz. *Bhīma, Mahābhīma, Vighna, Vināyaka, Jalarākṣasa, Rākṣasa, Brahmarākṣasa*. The *Bhūtas* have got nine sub-types—viz. *Surūpa, Pratirūpa, Atirūpa, Bhūtottama, Skandika, Mahāskandika, Mahāvega, Praticchanna, Ākāśaga*. The *Piśācas* have got fifteen sub-types—viz. *Kūsmāṇḍa, Paṭaka, Joṣa, Āhnaka, Kāla, Mahākāla, Caukṣa, Acaukṣa, Tālapiśāca, Mukharapiśāca, Adhastāraka, Deha, Mahāvideha, Tūṣṇika, Vanapiśāca*.

The eight types of *Vyantarās* have respectively got for their symbol *Aśoka, Campaka, Nāga, Tumbaru, Vata, Khaṭvāṅga*¹, *Sulasa, Kadambaka*. All these symbols, barring *Khaṭvāṅga*, are of the form of a species of tree and all are affixed in the ornament etc. of the type of *Vyantara* concerned. 12.

The Five Types of *Jyotiṣka* :

The region of the circle of *Jyotiṣkas* begins at a height of 790 *yojanas* above the even ground-level of the mountain *Meru*; beginning from there the region is 110 *yojanas* thick, while in the transverse direction its extent equals that of *asaṅkhyāta* continents and oceans. At a height of ten *yojanas* within this region—that is, at a height of 800 *yojanas* above the even ground-level of the mountain *Meru* — there are situated the *Vimānas* or celestial

1. *Khaṭvāṅga* is a particular instrument employed by an ascetic.

quarters of the *Sūryas*. At a height 80 *yojanas* above the *Vimānas* of the *Sūryas*—that is at a height of 880 *yojanas* above the ground-level of *Meru*—there are situated the *Vimānas* of the *Candras*. Upto a height of 20 *yojanas* above the *Vimānas* of the *Candras*—that is, upto a height of 900 *yojanas* above the level of *Meru*—there are situated the *Grahas*, *Nakṣatras* and *Prakīrṇatārās*. By *Prakīrṇatārās* are understood such stars as are possessed of no fixed path of motion and so are found to move sometimes above the *Sūryas* and *Candras*, sometimes below them. Within the 20 *yojanas* thick space rising above the *Candras* *Nakṣatras* are situated at the end of the first 4 *yojanas*, the planets *Budha* at the end of the next 3, the planets *Śukra* at the end of the next 3, the planets *Guru* at the end of the next 3, the planets *Maṅgala* at the end of the next 3, the planets *Śanaiścara* at the end of the next 3. When a star with no fixed path of motion moves below a *Sūrya* it moves within that 10 *yojanas* thick space which lies within the region of *Jyotiṣka*-gods. The *Sūryas* etc. are called *Jyotiṣka* because they reside in *Jyotiṣa* or luminous celestial quarters. In the crown of them all is affixed a symbol luminous like a circle-of-rays and shaped like solar disc etc.; to be precise, in the case of *Sūrya* the symbol is shaped like solar disc, in the case of *Candra* it is shaped like lunar disc, in the case of *tārā* it is shaped like astral disc. 13.

The Mobile *Jyotiṣkas* :

That the *Manuṣyaloka* extends upto the mountain *Mānuṣottara* has already been stated¹. Now the *Jyotiṣkas* to be found in this *Manuṣyaloka* are always on the move. And movement on their part takes place around the mountain *Meru*. In all there are in the *Manuṣyaloka* 132 *Sūryas* and 132 *Candras*. Thus in *Jambūdvīpa* there are two of them each, in the *Lavaṇa*-ocean four each, in *Dhātakikhaṇḍa* twelve each, in the *Kālodaya*-ocean forty-two each, in *Puṣkarārdha* seventy-two each. The companionship of one *Candra* consists of 28 *Nakṣatras*, 88 *Grahas*

1. See chapter 3, aphorism 14.

and 66975 crores multiplied by crore *tārās*. Although it follows from the precisely fixed nature of the loka itself that the *Vimānas* of *Jyotiṣkas* are always automatically on the move, yet with a view to making manifest their specific prosperity as also owing to the manifestation of the *nāma-karma* designated *ābhiyogya* or *sevaka* certain gods of a playful disposition raise those *Vimānas* as if to support them and thus move about. Thus in the front the lion-shaped gods, on the right side the elephant-shaped ones, at the back the bull-shaped ones, on the left side the horse-shaped ones keep touching those *Vimānas* from below and thus move about. 14.

The Division of Time :

The various types of usage as to time—e.g. *muhūrta*, day and night, fortnight, month etc., past, present etc., as also numerable, non-numerable etc. take place only within the confines of the *Manuṣyaloka* and not outside it. Even if there be someone outside the *Manuṣyaloka* to resort to the usage in question as to time and even if he actually resorts to such usage all this happens in accordance with the corresponding usage current in the *Manuṣyaloka*; for the chief basis of a practical division of time is but determinate activity and this activity is nothing but the motion of the *Jyotiṣkas* like *Sūryas*, *Candras*, etc. However, motion does not characterize the *Jyotiṣkas* seated at whatever place but only those seated within the confines of the *Manuṣyaloka*. Hence it is upheld that the division of time depends on but a specific motion of the *Jyotiṣkas*. The gross divisions of time like day, night, fortnight etc., since they depend on a determinate motion of the *Jyotiṣkas*, can be known through this motion; but the subtle divisions of time like *samaya*, *āvalikā* etc. cannot be known through it. At a particular place the usage as to day takes place on the basis of an activity of the form of motion on the part of the sun beginning from the time it first comes in sight and continuing upto the time it goes out of sight—that is, during the interval of time that stretches from sunrise upto sunset. Similarly, the usage as to night takes place on the basis of an activity of the

form of motion on the part of the sun during the interval of time that stretches from sunset upto sunrise. A *muhūrta* is the thirtieth part of one day-and-night. A fortnight consists of fifteen days and nights. Two fortnights make a month, two months make *ṛtu*, three *ṛtus* make an *ayana*, two *ayanas* make a *varṣa*. All this and similar everyday division of time takes place on the basis of an activity of the form of motion on the part of the sun. An activity that still goes on makes the present phase of time, an activity that is yet to take place makes its future phase, an activity that has already taken place makes its past phase. The duration of time that can be subjected to enumeration is *saṅkhyeya* or numerable, the duration that cannot be subjected to enumeration but can only be known with the help of similes is *asaṅkhyeya* or non-numerable—e.g. *palyopama*, *sāgaropama* etc. The duration of time that has no end is *ananta* or endless¹. 15.

The Static *Jyotiṣkas* :

Outside the *Manuṣyaloka* the *Vimānas* of the *Jyotiṣkas* like *Sūrya* etc. are static; for by their very nature these *Vimānas* stay at one place rather than move about from place to place. This precisely is why their *Leśyā* and their light too are of an uniform, static type. That is to say, since *Rāhu* etc. do not cast their shadow on the *Jyotiṣkas* seated there the natural yellow colour of the latter ever remains the same and since there is no rising and no setting on the part of these *Jyotiṣkas* their light ever retains its extent of one lac *yojanas*. 16.

The *Vaimānika*-gods :

The gods belonging to the fourth *nikāya* are called *Vaimānikas*. However, this name *Vaimānika* is a mere technicality, for as a matter of fact even gods belonging to the other *nikāyas* move by *Vimānas*. 17.

The *Vaimānikas* are of two types — viz. *Kalpopapanna* or

1. This only gives a literal meaning of the term *ananta*. For the full idea, at the back of it see *Chauthā Karmagrantha*.

those lying within the zone of *Kalpas* and *Kalpātīta* or those lying beyond the zone of *Kalpas*. The *Kalpopapannas* are those who reside inside the *Kalpas*, the *Kalpātītas* are those who reside above the *Kalpas*. These *Vaimānikas* reside neither at one and the same place nor by the side of one another but one above another. 18-19.

There are twelve classes of *Kalpas*—viz. *Saudharma*, *Aiśāna*, etc. Of these, *Saudharma-kalpa* is situated at a height of an *asāṅkhyāta* *yojanas* above the circle of *Jyotiṣkas* and in the *ākāśa*—part indicated by the southerly side of *Meru*. Much above it but in a northerly direction is situated the *Aiśāna-kalpa*. Situated much above the *Saudharma-kalpa* and in a single straight line is the *Sānatkumāra-kalpa* while situated above the *Aiśāna-kalpa* and in a single straight line is the *Māhendra-kalpa*. Situated in between them but above them is the *Brahmaloka-kalpa*. Above it are situated one above another and in a single straight line the three *Kalpas*, *Lāntaka*, *Mahāsūkra* and *Sahasrāra*. Above them are situated in the fashion of *Saudharma* and *Aiśāna* the two *Kalpas* *Ānata* and *Prānata*. Above them are situated in the fashion of *Sānatkumara* and *Māhendra* and in a single straight line the two *Kalpas* *Āraṇa* and *Acyuta*. Above the *Kalpas* are situated one above another the nine *Vimānas* which, because they act like neck (Sanskrit, 'grīvā') in relation to *loka* conceived after the figure of a man, are called *grāiveyaka*. Above them are situated one above another the five *Vimānas*, *Vijaya*, *Vaijayanta*, *Jayanta*, *Aparājita* and *Sarvārthasiddha* which, because they are best (Sanskrit, *uttara*) or chief among all, are called *anuttara*.

The gods residing from *Saudharma* upto *Acyuta* are *Kalpopapanna* while those residing above them are *Kalpātīta*. The relation of servant and lord obtains among the *Kalpopapanna* gods but not among the *Kalpātīta* ones; the latter, since they are all akin to *indra*, are called *ahamindra* (lit. 'I am *Indra*'). If an occasion arises for visiting the *Manuṣyaloka* it is the *Kalpopapanna* gods who undertake the venture; as for the *Kalpātīta* ones, they never leave their place with a view to visiting another quarter. 20.

The Relative Superiority and Inferiority of Gods in Respect of Certain Matters :

As for *sthiti* or life-duration, *prabhāva* or efficacy, *sukha* or pleasure, *dyuti* or glow *leśyāviśuddhi* or purity of soul-colouring, *indriyaviṣaya* or object of sensuous cognition, *avadhiviṣaya* or object of *avadhi*-cognition—a god has more of it the higher he is seated. 21.

As for *gati* or movement, *śarīra* or body *parigraha* or appropriation, *abhimāna* or arrogance—a god has less of it the higher he is seated. 22.

So far as seven things are concerned a higher seated god has more of them than a lower seated one.

This as follows :

1. *Sthiti* or Life-duration :

The special details as to this question are offered in the aphorisms 30 to 53.

2. *Prabhāva* or Efficacy :

The power to punish and to benefit, the power to superordinary realization like *aṇimā* or turning small, *mahimā* or turning huge, etc., the power to attack others and thus make them act in one's own interest—these are the components of efficacy. And though a higher seated god has got more of efficacy thus understood he makes a lesser use of it because he suffers less from arrogance and mental perturbation.

3. 4. *Sukha* or Pleasure and *Dyuti* or Glow :

To experience through sense-organs the objects graspable through them is *sukha* or pleasure. The brightness radiating from body, clothes, weapons etc. is glow. The reason why a higher situated god has more of pleasure and glow thus understood is that owing to the very nature of its location a higher situated *loka*-region is characterized by a more auspicious type of physical transformations.

5. *Leśyāvisuddhi* or the Purity of Soul-colouring :

The rule as to *leśyā* will be elucidated in the next aphorism 23. Here only this much has to be understood that even among those gods who stand on the same footing so far as *leśyā* is concerned one seated higher has got a purer *leśyā* than one seated lower because the former suffers less from mental perturbation.

6. *Indriya-viṣaya* or Object of Sensuous Cognition :

The power of a sense-organ to grasp a desirable object from afar is greater in a higher seated god because he is more copiously equipped with meritorious qualifications and suffers less from mental perturbation.

7. *Avadhijñāna-viṣaya* or Object of *avadhi*-cognition :

The power of *avadhi*-cognition too is greater in a higher seated god. Thus the gods of the first and second heavens are in a position to grasp through *avadhi*-cognition in the downward direction a region down to *ratnaprabhā*, in the transverse direction a region one *asaṅkhyāta* lacs *yojanas* wide, in the upward direction a region upto their own *bhavana*; those of the third and fourth heavens are in a position to similarly grasp in the downward direction a region down to *Śarkarāprabhā*, in the transverse direction a region one *asaṅkhyāta* lacs *yojanas* wide, in the upward direction a region upto their own *Vimāna*. Thus gradually increasing it is ultimately found that the gods of the *Anuttaravimānas* are in a position to grasp through *avadhi*-cognition the entire *loka* of the form of a tunnel. Even among those gods whose area of *avadhi-jñāna* is equally extensive one seated higher has a purer cognition than one seated lower. 21.

So far as four things are concerned a higher seated gods has less of them than a lower seated one. This as follows :

1. *Gati* or Movement :

The capacity to undertake activity of the form of movement and actual indulgence in such activity are both found

less in a god who is seated higher; for a higher seated god, being more high-souled and disinterested, is less enamoured of the pleasure-seeking available in a foreign land. Thus the gods belonging to the heavens *Sānatkumāra* etc. whose minimum life-duration is 2 *sāgaropamas* possess the capacity to move down to the seventh hell in the lower *loka*-portion and to move upto one *asaṅkhyāta* thousand crores multiplied by crore in the transverse direction. But in the case of the gods with a higher minimum life-duration the capacity to move is so much reduced that those belonging to the uppermost heavens are in a position to move down to the third hell at the most. Of course, even if possessed of a great capacity no god has ever gone nor will he ever go beyond the third hell in the lower *loka*-portion.

2. Śarīra or Body :

The size of body is seven cubits in the first and second heavens, six cubits in the third and fourth, five cubits in the fifth and sixth, four cubits in the eighth, three cubits in ninth upto twelfth, two cubits in the nine *graiveyakas*, one cubit in the *anuttaravimānas*.

3. Parigraha or Appropriation :

32 lacs *vimānas* constitute *parigraha* or appropriation in the first heaven, 28 lacs in the second, 12 lacs in the third, 8 lacs in the fourth, 4 lacs in the fifth, 50,000 in the sixth, 40,000 in the seventh, 6000 in the eighth, 700 in the ninth upto twelfth, 111 in the lower three *graiveyakas*, 107 in the middle three, 100 in the upper three, just 5 in the *anuttaras*.

4. Abhimāna or Arrogance :

Abhimāna or arrogance means *ahaṅkāra* or self-conceit. Arrogance originates in respect of location, retinue, power, object-of-cognition, super-ordinary possession, life-duration etc. A higher seated god possesses less of arrogance thus understood because he suffers less from passion.

There are five further things related to gods which are not

mentioned in the aphorism but are worth knowing. They are (1) *ucchvāsa* or breath. (2) *āhāra* or nourishment. (3) *vedanā* or feeling. (4) *upapāta* or ability for birth. (5) *anubhāva* or inherent *loka*-nature.

1. *Ucchvāsa* or Breath :

As the life-duration of a god increases so also increases the duration of his breath. Thus the gods with a life-duration 10,000 years have breath with a duration 7 *stokas* while those with a life-duration one *palyopama* have one breath a day. As for the gods with life-duration measured in *sāgaropamas* the rule in their case is that as many *sāgaropamas* be one's life-duration so many fortnights is the duration of one's breath.

2. *Āhāra* or Nourishment :

As for nourishment the rule is that the gods with a life-duration 10,000 years take it on alternate day, while those with a life-duration one *palayopama* take it an interval of days numbering *prthaktva*.¹ As for the gods with life-duration measured in *sāgaropamas* the rule in their case is that as many *sāgaropamas* be one's life-duration so many thousand years constitute the interval at which one takes nourishment.

3 *Vedanā* or Feeling :

Generally speaking, the gods experience only a pleasant feeling. And if per chance a painful feeling does attack them it does not last longer than a period of *antarmuhūrta* (i.e. a period measuring less than one *muhūrta*). As for a pleasant feeling it persists in an identical form for a period of six months and then undergoes a change.

4. *Upapāta* or Ability for Birth :

Upapāta means ability for birth in a particular place. One

1. *Prthaktva* is a technical term standing for the numbers two to nine.

bearing the outward signs of a non-Jaina and suffering from *mithyātva* (i.e. wrong inclination) can be born only upto the twelfth heaven; one bearing the outward signs of a Jaina and suffering from *mithyātva* can be born upto the *graiveyakas*. One possessed of *samyaktva* (i.e. right inclination) can be born anywhere from the first heaven upto the *sarvārthasiddha*. However, a disciplined personage well-versed in the 14 *Pūrva*-texts is in no case born below the fifth heaven.

5. *Anubhāva* or Inherent *loka*-nature :

Anubhāva means inherent *loka*-nature. It is on account of it that all the *vimānas* and *siddhaśīlā* (i.e. the rock acting as seat of location for the emancipated souls) etc. remain fixed in *ākāśa* even in the absence of a support.

At the time of the birth-ceremony of a Lord *Arhat* there is a quivering of the seat of the gods—this too is a manifestation of *loka-anubhāva*. Soon after the quivering of their seat some gods, employing their *avadhi*-cognition, come to realize the greatness of the *Tīrthaṅkara* concerned, approach him and benefit themselves through offering him hymns of praise, obeisance, worship etc. On the other hand, some gods, while staying back at their own place, worship the *Tīrthaṅkaras* through acts like getting up, raising folded hands, lying prostrate, making obeisance, offering gifts. All this too is a manifestation of *lokānubhāva*. 22.

The Rules as to *Leśyā* Among the *Vaimānikas* :

In two, three and the remaining heavens there reside gods respectively having yellow, red and white *leśyās*. 23.

The gods residing in the first two heavens are possessed of yellow *leśyās*, those residing from the third upto the fifth are possessed of red-*leśyā*, while those residing from the sixth upto the *sarvārthasiddha* are possessed of white-*leśyā*. This rule applies to a *leśyā* of the *dravya* type—which is of the form of a bodily colouring; for so far as *leśyās* of the *bhāva* type—which are of the form of a spiritual state—are concerned all the six of them are found in all the gods. 23.

The Enumeration of Kalpas :

The Kalpas are situated before the graiveyakas. 24.

Those heavens in which there is posited (posit=*kṛp*) a division of gods in the form of *indra*, *sāmānika*, *trāyastrimśa* etc. are designated *kalpas*. Such *kalpas*—from *Saudharma* upto *Acyuta*—all situated before the *graiveyakas*, are twelve in number.

The heavens beyond the *graiveyakas* are *kalpātīta* (i.e. those lying beyond the zone of *kalpas*), for in them there is posited no division of gods in the form of *indra*, *sāmānika*, *trāyastrimśa* etc., that is to say, in them the gods, since they all enjoy an equal status, are called *ahamindra*. 24.

An Account of the Gods Designated *Lokāntika* :

***Brahmaloka* is the residing place of the gods designated *Lokāntika*. 25.**

Sārasvata, *Āditya*, *Vahni*, *Aruṇa*, *Gardatoya*, *Tuṣita*, *Avyābādha*, *Maruta* and *Ariṣṭa*¹—these classes of gods are *Lokāntika*. 26.

The *Lokāntika* gods, who on account being immune from sexual passion are called *devarṣi* (i.e. divine ascetics), who since they suffer from no inequality among themselves are all independent, who at the time when a *Tīrthaṅkara* renounces his home observe the custom of appearing before him and enligh-

1. In the edition published by the Royal Asiatic Society the wording '*ariṣṭās ca*' is not definitely given as a part of the aphorism but is inserted within brackets. However, in the edition published by the Manasukh Bhagubhai the corresponding wording is '*riṣṭās ca*' and is definitely given as a part of the aphorism. And though in the Śvetāmbara tradition the original text of this aphorism contains the wording '*ariṣṭās ca*' the *Tīkā* on the *bhāṣya* to it says "*sūrinopāttāḥ riṣṭavimānaprastāravartibhiḥ*" on the basis of which it might be argued that the wording in question is '*riṣṭās ca*' rather than '*ariṣṭās ca*'. On the other hand, in the Digambara tradition the last part of the aphorism reads '*vyābādhāriṣṭās ca*'. This clearly gives out the name '*ariṣṭa*' and not '*riṣṭa*'; besides, here there is no mention of '*maruta*'.

tening him through calling out 'bujjhaha bujjhaha' (i.e. please understand, please understand), reside at no other place but around the fifth heaven *Brahmaloka* in the cardinal directions and mid-directions. Released from there they are born as human beings and attain *mokṣa*.

Since of these gods one species each resides in the four directions, the four mid-directions and the middle-region there are nine species of them in all. Thus in north-east there resides the *Lokāntika* species designated *sārasvata*, in east that designated *āditya*, in south-east that designated *vahni*, in south that designated *aruṇa*, in south-west that designated *gardatoya*, in west that designated *tuṣita*, in north-west that designated *avyābādha*, in north that designated *maruta* and in the middle region that designated *ariṣṭa*. These names *sārasvata* etc. have gained currency on the basis of those of the corresponding *Vimānas*. In this connection one particularity has to be further noted. Thus the original *bhāṣya* on these two aphorisms enumerates just eight—not nine—classes of *Lokāntika*-gods. Likewise, the reading of aphorism current in the Digambara tradition yields the number eight, for it makes no mention of 'maruta'. Of course, the *sūtra*-texts' *Sthānāṅga* etc. do speak of nine classes of the gods in question; for that matter, the text *Uttamacaritra* speaks of even ten classes in this connection. But from all that is said above it appears that the word 'maruta' is a later interpolation in the present aphorism. 25-26.

The Specific Peculiarity of the Gods

Residing in *Anuttara Vimānas* :

In the heavens *Vijaya* etc. the gods concerned are *dvicaramas*—that is, such as attain *mokṣa* after being twice born as a human being. 27.

Of the *anuttaravimānas* there are five types. And the gods residing in four of them—viz. *Vijaya*, *Vaijayanta*, *Jayanta* and *Aparājita*—are *dvicaramas*—that is, such as attain *mokṣa* after being born as a human being twice at the most. The order of the process

is as follows : released from one of the four *anuttaravimānas* one is born as a human being, at the end of this life one is again born as a god in an *anuttaravimāna*, released from there one is again born as a human being and attains *mokṣa* in this very life. However, the gods residing in the *vimāna Sarvārthasiddha* are born as a human being but once; that is to say, released from that *vimāna* they are born as a human being and attain *mokṣa* in this very life. In the case of gods other than those residing in an *anuttaravimāna* there is no hard and fast rule in this connection; for among them some attain *mokṣa* after being born as a human being but once, some after being thus born twice, some thrice, some four times, some more than four times. 27.

The Nature of Animals :

All the beings which are not men and are not born by way of sudden manifestation belong to the species animal. 28.

‘What beings are to be designated animal ?’—this question has been answered in the present aphorism. Leaving aside those born by way of sudden manifestation—that is, the heavenly beings and hellish beings—as also the human beings all the worldly souls are to be designated animal. The heavenly beings, hellish beings and human beings are necessarily five-sensed; but the animals might be from one-sensed upto five-sensed ones. The animals are unlike the heavenly beings, hellish beings and human beings who are necessarily confined to certain particular *loka*-regions, for they might be found in any and every *loka*-region. 28.

An *Adhikāra-sūtra*—that is, an Aphorism with Its Jurisdiction Running Over the Several Next :

Now begins an account of life-duration. 29.

The maximum and minimum life-duration in the case of the human beings and animals has been stated, the same in the case of the heavenly beings and hellish beings remains to be stated. This latter enunciation, beginning from the next aphorism, continues upto the end of the chapter. 29.

The Maximum Life-duration in the
Case of the *Bhavanāpati-nikāya* :

In the *bhavanas* the *indras* belonging to the southern half have a life-duration of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *palyopama*. 30.

The remaining *indras* have a life-duration of $1\frac{3}{4}$ *palyopama*. 31.

The two *asurendras* respectively have a life-duration of one *sāgaropama* and somewhat more than one *sāgaropama*. 32.

Here life-duration mentioned in the case of the *Bhavanāpati-nikāya* must be treated as maximum such duration; for the corresponding minimum duration is going to be mentioned in the coming aphorism 45.

The ten types of the *Bhavanāpati-nikāya*—viz. *Asurakumāras*, *Nāgakumāras* etc.—have already been described; each of those types has got two *indras* in the form of a chief of the southern half and a chief of the northern half—that too has been described. Of these the two *asurendras*—one belonging to south, the other to north—have a maximum life-duration as follows : The *asurendra* who is a chief of the southern half and is named *Camara* has a maximum life-duration of one *sāgaropama*, while the *asurendra* who is a chief of the northern half and is named *Bali* has a maximum life-duration of somewhat more than one *sāgaropama*. And leaving aside the *Bhavanāpati*-type *asurakumāra* there are nine others—viz. *Nāgakumāra* etc.; among them the nine *indras* *Dharaṇa* etc. who belong to the southern half have a maximum life-duration of $1\frac{1}{2}$ *palyopama* while the nine *indras* *Bhūtānanda* etc. who belong to the northern half have a maximum life-duration of $1\frac{3}{4}$ *palyopama*. 30-32.

The Maximum Life-duration in the Case of the *Vaimānikas* :

In the case of the heavens *Saudharma* etc. the situation as regards life-duration is as follows : 33.

In the case of *Saudharma* the life-duration is that of 2 *sāgaropamas*. 34.

In the case of *Aiśāna* the life-duration is that of somewhat more than 2 *sāgaropamas*. 35.

In the case of *Sānatkumāra* the life-duration is that of 7 *sāgaropamas*. 36.

From *Māhendra* upto *Āraṇācyuta* the life-duration is respectively that of somewhat more than 7 *sāgaropamas*, 3 plus 7 *sāgaropamas*, 7 plus 7 *sāgaropamas*, 11 plus 7 *sāgaropamas*, 13 plus 7 *sāgaropamas*, 15 plus 7 *sāgaropamas*. 37.

In the case of the heavens situated above *Āraṇācyuta*—that is, in the case of the nine *Graiveyakas*, the four heavens *Vijaya* etc., the heaven *Sarvārthasiddha*—life-duration gradually increases by one *sāgaropama*. 38.

Life-duration here mentined in the case of the *Vaimānika*-gods is the maximum such duration; the corresponding minimum duration will be mentioned later on. This life-duration measures 2 *sāgaropamas* in the first heaven, somewhat more than 2 in the second, 7 in the third, somewhat more than 7 in the fourth, 10 in the fifth, 14 in the sixth, 17 in the seventh, 18 in the eighth, 20 in the ninth and tenth, 22 in the eleventh and twelfth; the same measures 23 *sāgaropama* in the first *graiveyaka*, 24 in the second and so on uptil it measures 31 in the ninth; in the first four *annuttaravimānas* it measures 32¹ in the *Sarvārthasiddha* 33. 33-38.

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the *Vaimānikas* :

The minimum life-duration measures one *palyopama* and somewhat more than one *palyopama*. 39.

It measures 2 *sāgaropamas*. 40.

It measures somewhat more than 2 *sāgaropamas*. 41.

1. In the *Digambara* commentaries and at places even in *Śvetāmbara* texts the maximum life-duration in the case of the four heavens *Vijaya* etc. is said to be 33 *sāgaropamas*. See *bhāṣya* on the aphorism 42 of the present chapter. In the text *Sangrahaṇī* also the life-duration in question is said to be 33 *sāgaropamas*.

Hence onwards the maximum life-duration of an immediately preceding heaven is the minimum life-duration of an immediately succeeding one. 42.

The minimum life-duration in the case of *Saudharma* etc., is respectively as follows : In the case of the first heaven it is one *palyopama*, in that of the second it is somewhat more than one *palyopama*, in that of the third it is 2 *sāgaropamas*, in that of the fourth it is somewhat more than 2 *sāgaropamas*. From the fifth heaven onwards the minimum life-duration in the case of a heaven is the same as the maximum life-duration in the case of the immediately preceding one. According to this rule the maximum life-duration in the fourth heaven and the minimum in the fifth both measure somewhat more than 7 *sāgaropamas*; the maximum in the fifth and the minimum in the sixth both measure 10, the maximum in the sixth and the minimum in the seventh both measure 14, the maximum in the seventh and the minimum in the eighth both measure 17; the maximum in the eighth and the minimum in the ninth and tenth both measure 18; the maximum in the ninth and tenth and the minimum in the eleventh and twelfth both measure 20; the maximum in the eleventh and twelfth and the minimum in the first *graiveyaka* both measure 22. Similarly, the maximum life-duration in an immediately preceding *graiveyaka* is the minimum life-duration in an immediately succeeding one; this way the minimum life-duration in the case of the ninth *graiveyaka* turns out to be 30 *sāgaropamas*. In the case of the first four *anuttara-vimānas* the minimum life-duration is 31 *sāgaropamas*. In the case of the *sarvārthasiddha* there is no difference between the maximum and the minimum life-duration; that is to say, in its case both measure 33 *sāgaropamas*. 39-42.

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the Hellish-Beings :

In the hellish grounds second onwards the maximum life-duration of an immediately preceding one is the minimum life-duration of an immediately succeeding one. 43.

In the case of the first hellish ground the minimum life-duration is 10,000 years. 44.

The same order of succession which in the aphorism 42 has been described for the minimum life-duration of the heavenly beings obtains for the minimum life-duration of the hellish beings residing in the grounds second onwards. According to this rule the maximum life-duration in the first ground and the minimum in the second both measure one *sāgaropama*, the maximum in the second and the minimum in the third both measure 3, the maximum in the third and the minimum in the fourth both measure 7, the maximum in the fourth and the minimum in the fifth both measure 10, the maximum in the fifth and the minimum in the sixth both measure 17, the maximum in the sixth the minimum in the seventh both measure 22. As for the minimum life-duration in the first hellish ground, it measures 10,000 years. 43-44.

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the *Bhavanapatis* :

In the *Bhavanas* also the minimum life-duration measures 10,000 years. 45.

The Life-duration in the Case of the *Vyantaras* :

The minimum life-duration in the case of the *Vyantaras* is 10,000 years. 46.

And the maximum life-duration in their case is one *palyopama*. 47.

The Life-duration in the Case of the *Jyotiṣkas* :

In the case of the *Jyotiṣkas*—that is, *Sūryas* and *Candras* the maximum life-duration is somewhat more than one *palyopama*. 48.

In the case of *grahas* it is one *palyopama*. 49.

In the case of *nakṣatras* it is $\frac{1}{2}$ *palyopama*. 50.

In the case of *tārās* it is $\frac{1}{4}$ *palyopama*. 51.

The minimum life-duration in this case—that is, in the case of *tārās*—is $\frac{1}{8}$ *palyopama*. 52.

The minimum life-duration in the remaining cases—that is, in the case of the remaining *Jyotiṣkas* like *grahas* and *nakṣatras*—is $\frac{1}{4}$ *palyopama*. 53.



CHAPTER FIVE

The chapters second to fourth have offered an account of the fundamental verity *jīva* or soul; the present chapter offers an account of the fundamental verity *ajīva* or not-soul.

The Types of *ajīva* :

The *aṣṭikāya dharma*, the *āṣṭikāya adharma*, the *aṣṭikāya ākāśa* and the *aṣṭikāya pudgala*—these four are *ajīva-kāyas* or bodies of the form of not-soul. 1.

The methodology of treatment requires that a thing should be defined first and then there should follow an enumeration of its types. But when in the present context the author without offering a definition of the fundamental verity *ajīva* enumerates its types his idea is that the definition of *ajīva* becomes understood on the basis of a definition of *jīva* itself; hence there is no particular need to offer a separate definition of *ajīva*. Certainly, the construction of *jīva* demonstrates that that which is not *jīva* is *ajīva*. Now *upayoga* or cognition constitutes a definition of *jīva*—so that the verity devoid of *upayoga* is *ajīva*; and from this it automatically follows that absence of *upayoga* constitutes a definition of *ajīva*.

Ajīva is a positive verity standing opposed to *jīva*; it is not merely of the form of negation.

When *dharma* etc.—the four verities of an *ajīva* type—are called *aṣṭikāya* the idea is that they are not of the form of a single unit or a single component but of a combination or collection. *Dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa*, these three are of the form of a collection of units, while *pudgala* is either of the form

of a component or of the form of a collection of components.

Kāla or time has not been counted among the types of the fundamental verity *ajīva*. That is because there obtains a difference of opinion as to whether *kāla* is or is not a fundamental verity. Even those authorities who treat *kāla* as a fundamental verity consider it to be of the form of loose units not of the form of a collection of units; hence according to them too it is not proper to enumerate *kāla* along with the *aṣṭikāyas*. As for those authorities who do not at all treat *kāla* as a fundamental verity, there is according to them no question of enumerating *kāla* among the types of a fundamental verity.

Question : Are these four fundamental verities of an *ajīva* type admitted also by the other philosophical systems ?

Answer : No. The two verities *ākāśa* and *pudgalas* are admitted by the systems like *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya*, *Sāṅkhya* etc.; but the remaining two verities *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmaṣṭikāya* are admitted by no system other than the Jaina. The same verity which is called *ākāśaṣṭikāya* by the Jaina system is called *ākāśa* by the non-Jaina ones. The designation *pudgalāṣṭikāya* is current only in the Jaina theoretical treatises; as for the non-Jaina theoretical treatises, in them the verity standing in place of *pudgala* is known by the names like *pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, *paramāṇu* etc. 1.

Enunciation of the Fundamental Substances :

The above mentioned four fundamental verities of an *ajīva* type—viz. *dharmāstikāya* etc.—and *jīva* or soul—these five are substances. 2.

According to the Jaina viewpoint this universe is not exclusively of the form of modification or change but in spite of being subject to change it is beginningless and endless. According to the Jaina viewpoint there are in this universe just five fundamental substances of the form of *aṣṭikāya*; it is they that are mentioned in the present aphorism.

In the present aphorism and certain coming ones the generic and specific properties of the substances are described and

thus are laid down the *sādharmya* and the *vaidharmya* obtaining between them. *Sādharmya* means agreement as to a property—that is, similarity—, *vaidharmya* means dis-agreement as to a property—that is, dis-similarity. *Dravyatva* or the character of being a substance that is predicated in the present aphorism is the similarity in respect of being a substance, a similarity that characterizes the five entities *dharmāstikāya* etc. Such a similarity can only be constituted by qualities and modes, for qualities and modes are not themselves substances. 2.

The Similarity and Dissimilarity Obtaining
Between the Fundamental Substances :

The above mentioned substances are *nitya* or eternal, *avasthita* or immutable and *arūpin* or devoid of form. 3.

The *pudgalas* are possessed of *rūpa*—that is, are *mūrta* or tangible. 4.

¹Of these five substances those upto *ākāśa* are one each. 5.

And they are devoid of *kriyā* or activity. 6.

All the five substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. are eternal—that is, they never give up the general and the specific nature that is theirs. They are also immutable, for there is never a reduction or increment in their number. However, so far as being devoid of *rūpa* is concerned, that characterizes just four substances—viz. *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaśtikāya*, *ākāśāstikāya* and *jīvāstikāya*. The idea is that being eternal and being immutable—these two similarities characterize all the five substances, but being devoid of *rūpa*—this one similarity characterizes just four substances that remain there after excluding *pudgala*.

Question : What is the difference between being eternal and being immutable ?

1. The *bhāṣya* has the reading '*ā ākāśāt*'—that is, a reading without the word-conjunction in question. In the Digambara tradition even the aphorism has this reading without word-conjunction.

Answer : Not to give up the general and the specific nature that is one's—that means eternal; while retaining one's own nature not to assume a nature that belongs to some other verity—that means being immutable. For example, the verity *jīva* never gives up its general nature of the form of being a substance and its specific nature of the form of being conscious—this constitutes its being eternal. And while not giving up its above nature it never assume the nature of the verity *ajīva*—this constitutes its being immutable. The idea is that not to give up one's own nature and not to assume the nature of something else—these two aspects are common to all substances whatsoever. Of these, the first aspect is called 'being eternal', the second 'being immutable.' When the substances are declared to be eternal what is indicated is that the universe is ever-lasting, when they are declared to be immutable what is indicated is that they are mutually un-mingled. That is to say, these substances even while subject to change ever retain their own characteristic nature and even while standing by the side of one another they are untouched by the characteristic nature of one another. That is why the universe is beginningless and endless while at the same time the number of the fundamental verities belonging to it ever remains constant.

Question : When the *ajīva* entities *dharmāstikāya* etc. are substances and are also fundamental verities, then they must be having some *svārūpa* or other. Why then are they declared to be *arūpa* or devoid of *rūpa* ?

Answer : Being devoid of *rūpa* does not here mean being devoid of *svārūpa*; for even the verities *dharmāstikāya* etc. must possess some *svārūpa*—that is, nature—or other. For had they been devoid of a *svārūpa* they would have turned out to be nonentities like the horn of a horse. When mention is here made of *arūpitva* or the character of being devoid of *rūpa* what is denied is *mūrti*. So *rūpa* here means *mūrti*. And *mūrti* means either 'the emergent configuration of colour etc' or 'the collective of the properties colour, taste, smell and touch.' *Mūrti* thus understood is absent in the four verities *dharmāstikāya* etc.—this

very information is conveyed by calling these verities *arūpin*. 3.

The words *rūpa*, *mūrtatva* and *mūrti* are all mutually synonymous :

The properties colour, taste etc. that are capable of being grasped through sense-organs—they verily are called *mūrti*. The properties of *pudgalas* are capable of being grasped through sense-organs, hence *pudgalas* are alone *mūrta* or *rupin*. No other substance except *pudgala* is *mūrta* because none of them can be grasped through sense-organs. Hence possession of *rūpa* constitutes the dissimilarity that obtains between *pudgala* on the one hand and the four verities *dharmāstikāya* etc. on the other.

Although a number of subtle substances like atoms etc. and so also their properties are, on account of being supra-sensuous, incapable of being grasped through sense-organs, yet under some specific condition which is of the form of some specific transformation they do develop the capacity to be grasped through sense-organs. That is why even if suprasensuous they are doubtless *rūpin* or *mūrta*. As for the four substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. that are called *arūpin* they are utterly devoid of the capacity to be grasped through sense-organs. This is what distinguishes the suprasensuous *pudgala* from the suprasensuous substances like *dharmāstikāya* etc. 4.

Of the above-mentioned five substances those upto *ākāśa*—that is, the three substances *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya*, and *ākāśāstikāya*—are of the form of one instance each. In their case there are not to be found two or more instances.

Similarly, these very three substances are all devoid of *kriyā*. Thus being of the form of one instance and being devoid of *kriyā* these two features constitute the similarity that obtains between the three substances in question; they also constitute the dissimilarity that obtains between these three substances on the one hand and *pudgalāstikāya* as well as *jīvāstikāya* on the other. In the case of the substances *pudgala* and *jīva* numerous instances are to be found and they are also possessed of *kriyā*. For unlike

Vedānta the Jaina system of philosophy does not consider the substance soul to be of the form of one instance and unlike the entire lot of the Vedic systems like *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika* etc. it does not consider it to be devoid of *kriyā*.

Question : According to the Jaina viewpoint all substances are characterized by a transformation of the form of modification—that is, by origination and destruction. Now such a transformation is possible only in the case of substances that are possessed of *kriyā*. So if the three substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. are treated as devoid of *kriyā*, then how will it be possible to posit in their case a transformation of the form of modification ?

Answer : By declaring something to be devoid of *kriyā* what is here denied to it is *kriyā* of the form of motion—not *kriyā* as such. So according to the Jaina viewpoint the phrase 'substance devoid of *kriyā*' simply means substance devoid of motion. Certainly, even in the case of the substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. that are devoid of motion the Jaina system does posit *kriyā* of the form of transformation-into-something-similar-to-oneself. 5-6.

A Consideration of the Number of
Pradeśas or Constituent-units :

In the case of *dharma* and *adharma* the *pradeśas* are *asaṅkhyāta* in number. 7.

In the case of one particular *jīva* the *pradeśas* are *asaṅkhyāta* in number. 8.

In the case of *ākāśa* the *pradeśas* are *ananta* in number. 9.

In the case of the substance *pudgala* the *pradeśas* are *saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta* or *ananta* in number. 10.

In the case of *aṇu* or atom there are no *pradeśas*. 11.

When earlier the four *ajīvas* *dharma*, *adharma* etc., on the one hand and *jīva* on the other—these five substances were called *kāya* or body then it was indicated that these five substances are

of the form of *aṣṭikāya* or a collection of *pradeśas*. However, it was not mentioned there as to what is the particular number of *pradeśas* to be found in each case; it is this number that is mentioned here.

In the case of the two substances *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmaṣṭikāya* the number of *pradeśas* is *asaṅkhyāta* each. By *pradeśa* is understood a subtle constituent-part in whose case it is not possible even to posit through intellect a further constituent-part. Such an indivisible subtle part is also called partless part. *Dharma* and *adharma*—these two substances are of the form of one instance each, and in their case the number of *pradeśas* or partless parts is *asaṅkhyāta* each. This amounts to saying that these two substances are of the form of such an impartite aggregate in whose case an *asaṅkhyāta* number of indivisible subtle parts can only be posited through intellect but cannot be taken out of the objectively existing aggregate concerned.

The substance *jīva* is of the form of *ananta* instances. And each particular *jīva* is an impartite entity which, like *dharmāstikāya*, is made up of *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*.

Of all the substances *ākāśa* constitute the biggest aggregate, for in its case the number of *pradeśas* is *ananta*.

The aggregates pertaining to the substance *pudgala*—unlike the other four substances *dharna*, *adharma* etc.,—are not of a definite form; for one *pudgala*-aggregate might be made up of *saṅkhyāta pradeśas*, another made up of *asaṅkhyāta*, a third made up of *ananta*, a fourth made up of *anantānanta*.

There is one difference between *pudgala* and the other substances—viz. that the *pradeśas* of *pudgala* can be separated from the aggregate concerned while the *pradeśas* of the other four substances cannot be so separated. For the four substances other than *pudgala* are non-*mūrta* and it is the nature of a non-*mūrta* entity that it is not broken into pieces. As for the substance *pudgala* it is *mūrta* and a *mūrta* entity can well be broken into pieces; for the *mūrta* substances are found to possess the capacity to join together as a result of association and the capacity to

separate from one another as a result of dissociation. It is on account of this difference that all parts—whether big or small—of a *pudgala*-aggregate are called *avayava* or component. By *avayava* is meant a part that can be separated off.

Though being *pudgala* an atom too is *mūrta*, yet it cannot be further divided into parts; for like a *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* it is the smallest part of *pudgala*. The magnitude of an atom is the smallest possible magnitude and hence it too belongs to the category indivisible part.

When it is here said that an atom is not divisible into parts, then what is spoken of is an atom in the form of an instance of substance not that in the form of modes. For so far as an atom in the form of modes is concerned parts are posited in its case too. Certainly, in one and the same atom there exist numerous modes like colour, smell, taste, etc., and in relation to this substance they all behave like parts of the form of *bhāvas* or modal states. Hence it is maintained that to a single atom there belong numerous *bhāva* atoms or atoms of the form of modal states.

Question : What is the difference between a *pradeśa* of *dharma* etc. and an atom of *pudgala* ?

Answer : So far as magnitude is concerned there is no difference. For that much area which is occupied by an atom is called *pradeśa*. And since an atom is an indivisible part the area occupied by it too will be but indivisible. Hence so far as their magnitude is concerned an atom on the one hand and the area called *pradeśa* occupied by it on the other are mutually similar. Even so, they differ from one another insofar as an atom can be separated from the aggregate of which it is a part while the *pradeśa* of the substances *dharma* etc. cannot be separated from their respective aggregates.

Question : In the aphorism 9 there occurs the word '*ananta*'—on the basis of which it can be made out that the substance *pudgala* can possibly be made up of *ananta pradeśas*. But what word yields the meaning—derived above—that it can

possibly be made up of *anantānanta pradeśas* ?

Answer : The word 'ananta' is of a general significance and can stand for all the types of numbers *ananta*. Hence it can also yield the meaning *anantānanta*. 7-11.

A Consideration of the Seat of Occupation in the Case of Substances :

Whatever substances act as occupant they do so in relation to the *lokākāśa* or *ākāśa*-portion confined to *loka*. 12.

The substances *dharma* and *adharma* occupy the entire *lokākāśa*. 13.

The *pudgala*-substances occupy indefinitely—that is, as might be the case—one *pradeśa* or more of the *lokākāśa*. 14.

The *jīvas* occupy one by *asaṅkhyāta* part or more of the *lokākāśa*. 15.

For a like a lamp their *pradeśas* undergo contraction and expansion. 16.

The universe is of the form of five *aṣṭikāyas*. So the question arises : what acts as support or seat of occupation in relation to the five *aṣṭikāyas* ? Does some substance other than these act as support for them all or does one of these do so for the rest of them ? The question is here answered by maintaining that *ākāśa* acts as support for the remaining substances which act as occupant. This answer should be understood as given from a practical standpoint, for viewed from a definitive standpoint all substances are verily self-supporting. Fundamentally speaking, it is not possible for one substance to act as support for another. But the question might be asked : Viewed from a practical standpoint *ākāśa* acts as support for the remaining substances, but what similarly acts as support for *ākāśa* itself ? The answer would be that *ākāśa* has got no further support, there being no other verity greater than it or equivalent to it in magnitude. Thus viewed from both a practical standpoint and a definitive standpoint *ākāśa* is but self-supporting.

And when *ākāśa* is declared to be support in relation to the remaining substances the reason is that it is greater in magnitude than them all.

Even the four substances *dharma* etc., acting as occupant do not reside in the entire *ākāśa*; they in fact are seated in but a particular limited portion of *ākāśa*. And that portion of *ākāśa* in which they are seated is called *loka-ākāśa*. *Loka* means the five *aṣṭikāyas*. Round about the portion in question there exists *ākāśa ananta* units in extension. And since in this surrounding portion of *ākāśa* there exist no other substances it is called *aloka-ākāśa*. Here when the relation of support and occupant is considered in connection with the *aṣṭikāyas* that should be understood as pertaining to but *loka-ākāśa*.

The two *aṣṭikāyas dharma* and *adharma* are each of the form of an impartite aggregate such that they occupy the entire *loka-ākāśa*. The same idea can also be expressed as follows : When in the really impartite *ākāśa* two parts *loka* and *aloka* are posited through intellect that is done only on the basis of its association with the substances *dharma* and *adharma*. Thus the region where association with these substances obtains is called *loka*, that where it does not is called *aloka*.

As for the substance *pudgala* its appropriate seat of occupation, viewed generally, is doubtless *loka-ākāśa*; even then the magnitude of the seat of occupation is different in the case of different *pudgala*-substances. For unlike the substances *dharma* and *adharma*, the substance *pudgala* is not of the form of one instance—so that there is no question of there being just one seat of occupation in the case of this substance. The different *pudgala*-substances are different individual bodies and they differ rather than agree as to their magnitude. That is why the magnitude of their seat of occupation is here described in the form of alternatives. Thus one *pudgala* occupies one *pradeśa* of *lokākāśa*, another occupies two of them; similarly, some *pudgala* occupies a portion of *loka-ākāśa* measuring *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*. The idea is that the number of *pradeśas* constituting the seat of occupation

can be equal to or less than—but not more than—the number of atoms constituting the *pudgala*-substance acting as occupant. That is why one atom can occupy only one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* but a *dvyanuka* or diad¹ can occupy either one *pradeśa* or two. And then gradually increasing the number of constituent-atoms by one we find that *tryanuka* can occupy one upto three *pradeśas*, a *caturanuka* one upto four, a *saṅkhyātānuka* one upto *saṅkhyāta*. A substance made up of *saṅkhyāta* atoms does not require a seat of occupation made up of *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*. An aggregate made up of *asaṅkhyāta* atoms can at the least occupy a seat made up of one *pradeśa* and at the most one made up of *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*. Even the aggregates made up of *ananta* and *anantānanta* atoms occupy one upto *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*; they do not require for that purpose *pradeśas* numbering *ananta*. Even the biggest possible aggregate of the substance *pudgala* which is designated *acitta mahā-skandha* and is made up of *anantānanta* atoms manages to seat itself in a portion of *loka-ākāśa* made up of *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*.

According to the Jaina system of philosophy the magnitude of a soul is neither all-pervading like that of *ākāśa* nor atomic like that of an atom but is medium. However, even though the medium magnitude is the same in the case of all the souls so far as it concerns the number of their *pradeśas* these souls do not have the same length, breadth etc. And hence arises the question as to what is the maximum and what the minimum seat of occupation in the case of the substances *jīva* or soul. The question is here answered by maintaining that the seat of occupation in the case of a *jīva* is one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of *loka-ākāśa* upto the whole of it. Even though the magnitude of *ākāśa* measures *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*, yet since the number *asaṅkhyāta* is of *Asaṅ-*

1. The aggregate or composite made up of two atoms is called *dvyanuka*, that made up of three *tryanuka*; similarly, the aggregate or composite made up of four atoms is called *caturanuka*, that made up of *saṅkhyāta* atoms *saṅkhyātānuka*, that made up of *asaṅkhyāta* atoms *asaṅkhyātānuka*, that made up of *ananta* atoms *anantānuka*, that made up of *anantānanta* atoms *anantānantānuka*.

khyāta types one can conceive of *asaṅkhyāta* such *loka-ākāśa* parts whose magnitude is one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of a finger; even such a tiny single part is made up of *asaṅkhyāta pradeśas*. A *jīva* can occupy one such single part, it can also occupy two; similarly, gradually increasing the number by one we find that a *jīva* can occupy even the whole of the *loka-ākāśa*. The idea is that the minimum seat of occupation in the case of a substance *jīva* is a *loka-ākāśa* portion measuring one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of a finger, a portion which is one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of the entire *loka-ākāśa*. The same *jīva* at a later time or another *jīva* can have a seat of occupation double of the above in magnitude; similarly, the same *jīva* at a later time or another *jīva* can have a seat of occupation three times the above in magnitude, four times the above, five times the above and in the last count *asaṅkhyāta* times the above—that is to say, in the last count the entire *loka-ākāśa*. A *jīva* can have the entire *loka-ākāśa* for its seat of occupation only in case it is experiencing the state technically designated *kevali-samudghāta*. When it is here said that the magnitude of the seat of occupation in the case of a *jīva* is more or less depending on whether the magnitude of this *jīva* itself is more or less the statement should be taken as referring to one single soul. For so far as the entire lot of *jīvas* is concerned its seat of occupation is doubtless the whole of the *loka-ākāśa*.

Now the question arises as to why it is that the same soul-substance assumes different magnitudes at different times or that the different soul-substances assume different magnitudes at the same time. It is here answered by maintaining that the same *jīva* assumes different magnitudes or so many of them do so on account of an association with the karmic body which has accompanied a *jīva* since beginningless time and which is of the form of a collection of *anantānanta* atoms. The karmic body does not always remain of the same form, and the other body-types *audārika* etc. which are acquired on account of the karmic body are greater or lesser in magnitude corresponding to the concerned karmic body. The substance *jīva* is in fact *amūrta* or non-tangible but on account of its association with a body it behaves as if it

is *mūrta* or tangible. That explains why it possesses the same magnitude as is possessed by the body which might belong to it at this occasion or that.

When the substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. are *amūrta* just like the substance *jīva* then why is it that there is a change of magnitude in the case of the latter but not in that of the former ? This question is answered by pointing out that all this is due to nothing else but nature. For it is the very nature of the substance *jīva* that when suitable conditions are available to it, it undergoes contraction and expansion just like a lamp. Thus the light of a lamp placed in the open sky possesses a certain magnitude but when it is placed inside a chamber its light assumes exactly the same magnitude as is that of this chamber; again, when it is placed down below a through it illumines just the region lying down below this through and when it is placed down below a jug its light assumes exactly the same magnitude as that of this jug. In this manner the substance *jīva* is liable to contraction and expansion just like a lamp. Hence it is that its magnitude becomes greater or lesser according as it assumes a greater or lesser body.

Here arises the following question : If a *jīva* assumes a small magnitude on account of its nature for contraction then why does it not manage to occupy a region smaller than one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of the *loka-ākāśa*—that is, why does it not occupy one, two, four or five *pradeśas* of *loka-ākāśa* ? Similarly, if a *jīva* possesses a nature for expansion then why does it not cover also the *aloka-ākāśa* just as it covers the entire *loka-ākāśa* ? The answer is that the extent of contraction undergone by a *jīva* depends on the extent of the concerned karmic body while it is impossible for a karmic body to be smaller than one by *asaṅkhyāta* part of a finger; hence the contraction of a *jīva* remains limited to this very magnitude. As for the expansion undergone by a soul its limit is defined by the *loka-ākāśa*. For this two reasons are adduced. The first is that a *jīva* possesses just as many *pradeśas* as does the *loka-ākāśa*; and since even in the state

of utmost expansion one *pradeśa* of *jīva* can occupy one *pradeśa* of *ākāśa* at the most—not two or more *pradeśas* of it—a *jīva* even in the state of utmost expansion cannot cross the limits of the *loka-ākāśa* and occupy a region lying beyond the same. The second reason is that expansion is a result of motion while motion is impossible in the absence of *dharmāstikāya*; hence there arises no question at all of a *jīva* expanding beyond the limits of the *loka-ākāśa*.

Question : How is it possible for the embodied *jīvas* numbering *ananta* to occupy the *loka-ākāśa* with *pradeśas* numbering *asaṅkhyāta* ?

Answer : On account of getting transformed into a subtle state the *jīvas* numbering *ananta* and sharing a common body together reside in one and the same *ākāśa*-portion, a portion occupied by a body of the type designated *nigoda*. Moreover, inside one and the same *audārika* body of men etc. there are found to reside a number of *jīvas* born by way of agglutination. Hence there is nothing contradictory about the *loka-ākāśa* being occupied by *jīvas* numbering *anantānanta*.

Even though the substances *pudgala* are *anantānanta* in number and are *mūrta* they manage to occupy the *loka-ākāśa* because they possess the capacity to get transformed into a subtle state. When such a transformation takes place then atoms numbering *anantānanta* and aggregates numbering *anantānanta* occupy one and the same region without obstructing one another just as the light of thousands of lamps occupies one and the same place without obstruction of any sort. The substance *pudgala*, even if *mūrta*, proves obstructive only when it is transformed into a gross state; on the other hand, in a state of subtle transformation it neither obstructs anything nor is itself obstructed by anything. 12-16.

The Definition of *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* Enunciated on the Basis of their Respective Functions :

To act as an occasioning cause for motion and to do so

for stoppage¹—these two respectively are the functions of the substances *dharma* and *adharma*. 17.

To act as an occasioning cause for the provision of room is the function of *ākāśa*. 18.

Dharma, *adharma* and *ākāśa*—all these three are suprasensuous, and so their existence cannot be proved on the basis of ordinary preception. It is on the basis of scriptural testimony that their existence is admitted but a reasoning is also available which lends support to the scriptures and proves the existence of the substances in question. The reasoning runs as follows : In the universe *jīva* and *pudgala* these two are the substances that are liable to undertake motion as also stoppage-subsequent-to-motion. Now even though motion and stoppage, being the states and functions of the substances in question, are born to those substances themselves—that is, the material cause of motion and stoppage are nothing save *jīva* and *pudgala*, yet an occasioning cause, which is invariably required for the production of an effect, must be different from the concerned material cause. Hence in the form of an occasioning cause for the motion of *jīva* and *pudgala* *dharmāstikāya* is proved to exist, while in the form of an occasioning cause for their stoppage *adharmāstikāya* is proved to exist. It is with these considerations in view that theoretical treatises define *dharmāstikāya* as ‘that which is an occasioning cause for the motion of things liable to move’ and *adharmāstikāya* as ‘that which is an occasioning cause for stoppage.’

All the four substances *dharma*, *adharma*, *jīva* and *pudgala* must stay at some place or other; that is to say, to act as occupant or to seek room is a function of theirs. But to provide room—a place—within itself is the function of *ākāśa*; hence it is that the provision of room is admitted to be a defining characteristic of *ākāśa*.

1. The reading *gati-sthityupagrahau* too is found at places, but on consulting the *bhāṣya* the reading *gati-sthityupagraho* appears to be more proper. In the Digambara tradition the reading *gati-sthityupagrahau* alone is unanimously approved.

Question : The substance *ākāśa* is admitted in the systems of philosophy like Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika etc. but the substances *dharma* and *adharma* are admitted nowhere else. Why then are they posited by the Jaina system alone ?

Answer : The physical and conscious substances are a specific part of the visible-cum-invisible universe, and their mobility is a matter of plain experience. Now if no constraining verity is available there, then these substances, on account of their natural mobility, will move on to any place whatsoever in the *ananta*-unit extent of *ākāśa*. And if they actually move on to any place whatsoever in the *ananta*-unit extent of *ākāśa* then that fixed configuration of the visible-cum-invisible universe which always appears there bearing the same general form will remain utterly unaccountable; for in that case the *puṅgava* numbering *ananta* and the *jīvas* numbering *ananta*, as a result of moving about without restraint in the *ākāśa*-region of an *ananta*-unit extent, will be so separated from one another that a reunion on their part and an appearance in the form of a fixed world-picture will turn out to be hardly possible if not actually impossible. That is why the Jaina system admits the existence of a verity supposed to define the limit of motion in the case of those mobile substances; it is this verity that is designated *dharmāstikāya*. And when the verity in question is admitted in the form of a definer of the limit of motion then the same reasoning enables the Jaina system to admit the verity *adharma*stikāya in the form of a definer of the limit of stoppage-of-motion.

The usage as to east, west etc. which is supposed to be a function of the substance *dik* is well accountable on the basis of *ākāśa*, and so there is no need to posit a substance *dik* apart from *ākāśa*. But the function of *dharma* and *adharma* is not accountable on the basis of *ākāśa*; for if *ākāśa* be admitted to be a definer of motion and stoppage then being of an *ananta*-unit extent and impartite it would not be able to prevent the physical and conscious substances from moving about anywhere and everywhere within itself, and that being the case the fixed configuration of the visible-cum-invisible universe will remain

unaccountable. Hence to posit the substance *dharma* and *adharma* apart from and independent of *ākāśa* is proper. When the things physical and conscious are mobile by nature then motion on their part within a limited *ākāśa*-region should not be accountable on the basis of their own nature—that is, without positing a definer in this connection; hence the existence of the substances *dharma* and *adharma* is reasonably demonstrated. 17-18.

The Definition of *Pudgala* on the basis of its Function :

Body, speech, *manas* or internal organ, in-breath and out-breath—these are benefits due to *pudgala*, that is, these are functions of *pudgala*. 19.

Again, pleasure, pain, life and death—these too are benefits due to *pudgala*. 20.

Of the numerous functions of *pudgala* some are enumerated here which prove beneficial or harmful to the *jīvas*. All the bodies of the types *audārika* etc. are certainly *paudgalika*—that is, are certainly made up of *pudgala*. And though the karmic body is suprasensuous it yields fruits like pleasure, pain etc. when conjoined with another *mūrta* substance of the type *audārika* etc.—just as paddy-seed yields fruit when conjoined with water etc.; hence it too should be considered to be *paudgalika*.

Of the two types of *bhāṣā* or speech that of the *bhāva* type is a specific capacity which is acquired as a result of the *kṣayopāśama* of the karmas *vīryāntarāya*, *matijñānāvaraṇa* and *śrutajñānāvaraṇa* and of the manifestation of the *nāmakarma* designated *aṅgopāṅga*; this capacity, since it is dependent on *pudgala*, is *paudgalika*. And the aggregates belonging to the material-grouping of the form of speech that are converted into speech when impelled by a soul possessed of the capacity in question constitute speech of the *dravya* type.

Manas of the *bhāva* type in the form of *labdhi* and *upayoga* is *paudgalika* because it is dependent on *pudgala*. On the other hand, those aggregates belonging to the material-grouping of the form of *manas* which, as a result of the *kṣayopāśama* of the

karmas *jñānāvaraṇa* and *vīryāntarāya* and of the manifestation of the *nāmakarma* designated *aṅgopāṅga*, prove beneficial to a soul in its task of considering the merits and demerits, memory etc.—that is, which stimulate the capacity of this soul—constitute *manas* of the *dravya* type. Similarly, *niśvāsavāyu* or *prāṇa*—that is, out-breath—which a soul expels outwards from the abdomen and *ucchvāsavāyu* or *apāna*—that is, in-breath—which a soul conveys inwards into the abdomen are both *paudgalika*; and inasmuch as they are life-giver they prove beneficial to a soul.

Bhāṣā, *manas*, *prāṇa* and *apāna*—these are all found to suffer obstruction and suppression. Hence just like body they are all doubtless *paudgalika*.

The transformation of a *jīva* of the form of easement is pleasure and it is produced through an internal cause of the form of *sātāvedaṇīya karma* and an external cause of the form of the concerned substance, place etc. Distress, verily is pain and it is produced through an internal cause of the form of *āsatāvedaṇīya karma* and an external cause of the form of the concerned substance etc.

The continuance of out-breath and in-breath in the case of an embodied soul as a result of the manifestation of *āyukarma* is life, the discontinuance of out-breath and in-breath is death. All these modifications pleasure, pain etc. are produced in *jīvas* through the instrumentality of *pudgala*. Hence in relation to *jīva* they are treated as benefits due to *pudgala*. 19-20.

The Definition of *Jīva* Enunciated on the Basis of its Function :

Acting as an occasioning cause in relation to one another—that is a benefit due to *jīvas*. 21.

This aphorism describes the mutual benefits that are due to *jīvas*. One *jīva* benefits another through instruction as to what is gainful or what is harmful. The employer benefits the servant through paying him money, the servant benefits the employer through speaking to him what is gainful or what is harmful. The teacher benefits the disciple through instruction as to good deeds

and through himself practising them, the disciple benefits the teacher through acting as instructed by him. 21.

The Definition of *Kāla* or Time Enunciated on the Basis of its Function :

Perduration, transformation, activity and superiority-cum-inferiority—these are benefits due to *kāla*. 22.

Here benefits due to *kāla* are enumerated by treating it as an independent substance. When the substances like *dharma* etc. are by themselves engaged in practising their respective modifications then the impelling them to do so on the part of *kāla* acting as an occasioning cause is called perduration. When a substance without giving up its specific form and without undertaking motion undergoes a modification that is of the form of the cessation of an earlier state and the origination of a new one, then this modification is called transformation. Such transformations in the case of a *jīva* are cognition etc. and anger etc., those in the case of *pudgala* blue-colour, yellow-colour etc., those in the case of the remaining substances like *dharmāstikāya* etc. the increment and diminution of the quality designated *agurulaghu* or neither-light-nor-heavy.¹ By activity is meant but

1. In the Jaina tradition the term *agurulaghu* has been employed at three places in three different senses :

(1) Of the eight qualities *jñāna*, *darśana* etc. belonging to a soul and considered liable to concealment at the hands of eight karmas one is the quality *agurulaghutva* which receives concealment at the hands of *gotrakarma*. The function of *gotrakarma* is to attribute to a being a high or low status in life. In practical life the *jīvas* are treated as high or low on the basis of a consideration of birth, family, race, country, complexion and so many similar circumstances. But as a matter of fact, all the souls stand on the same footing and among them there is none high and none low. Thus in souls there resides an equality based on capacity or ability and that natural quality or capacity which keeps this equality intact is called *agurulaghutva*.

(2) There is a karma called *agurulaghu* which is counted among the sub-types of the sixth karma-type *nāma-karma*. Its function will be described in the sequel in connection with an account of *nāma-karma*

and should be learnt from there.

(3) The *agurulaghutva* for which interpretation is above offered in the first para pertains exclusively to a soul, but that which is going to be described just now pertains to all the substances—*jīvas* as well as *ajīvas*. The question is : If a substance is by nature liable to undergo transformation then why does it not sometimes happen that a substance of one type should transform itself into a substance of another type ? Similarly, there arises another question : If the various capacities or qualities residing in a substance go on producing transformations appropriate to themselves then why does it not happen that some one of these capacities crosses the limit of the definite stream of transformations appropriate to itself and produces transformations that are appropriate to another such capacity ? So also there arises a third question : In the case of various capacities posited in a substance why does it not happen that giving up their fixed concomitance they scatter away all round ? All these three questions are answered in terms of the quality *agurulaghu*. In the case of all the substances this quality enjoys the status of a restrainer on account of which one type of substance does not become a substance of another type, one quality does not perform the function appropriate to another quality, the qualities characterized by a fixed mutual concomitance do not turn away from one another.

Even in the absence of a very clear support of authoritative texts I gave thought to the last of the above interpretations of the quality *agurulaghu*. At the same time I was in search of a corroboration for it. In case somebody made from me an enquiry in this connection I would offer the above interpretation but eagerness to get at a corroboration was nevertheless ever awake. When the time came for writing the present note, I suddenly came across the booklet '*Śrī Jainasiddhānta-Praveśikā*' by the late Gopaldaśji Baraiya. In this Śrī Baraiyaji too has expressed a similar idea. It can therefore be said that to this extent my idea has received a corroboration. And hence I make a mention of the fact here. Let further investigation be made by the specialists. Śrī Baraiyaji on his part was an extra-ordinary connoisseur of Jaina philosophy.

A reasoning similar to the one above offered in support of positing the quality *agurulaghu* is offered in support of the bodies *dharmāstikāya* and *adharmaṣṭikāya* admitted in the Jaina tradition. From a comparative standpoint that is worth knowing. Since the physical and

motion. By superiority is meant being older, by inferiority being younger. Though the functions perduration etc. are really functions on the part of the concerned substances *dharmāstikāya* etc. they are here described as benefits due to *kāla* because in the case of them all *kāla* acts as an occasioning cause. 22.

The Characteristic Modes of *Pudgala* :

The *pudgalas* are characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour. 23.

They are also characterized by sound, binding, subtleness, grossness, configuration, splitting, darkness, shadow, hot radiation and non-hot radiation. 24.

The Buddhists employ the word *pudgala* to mean *jīva*. And in the systems like *Vaiśeṣika* etc. the tangible substances earth etc.

conscious substances are liable to motion the bodies in questions are posited to act as restrainer with a view to preventing these substances from moving away to any place whatsoever; and it is maintained that it is on account of these bodies that motion and stoppage characterizing the mobile substances remain confined within the limits of the *loka*-region. Now just as these bodies are considered to be restrainer in the case of motion and stoppage, *agurulaghu* ought to be so considered in the case of qualities.

A question naturally arises. What is wrong if the two bodies in question are not posited and it is declared that the factor responsible for fixing the limit of motion and stoppage is the very nature of the things undertaking motion and stoppage or that *ākāśa* is such a factor? But here is a subject-matter that lies outside the sphere of reasoning—so that what remains to be done in this connection is to lend support to what has been laid down. And since this subject-matter does not lie within the sphere of reasoning it will not do to accept or reject the bodies in question on the basis of reasoning alone. In the case of the quality *agurulaghu* too one should mainly adopt an approach characteristic of what lies beyond the sphere of reasoning.

One cannot help conceding in the last count all reasoning is meant to lend support to what lies beyond the sphere of reasoning. Thus in the case of all the systems of philosophy it turns out that certain subject-matters lie within the sphere of reasoning, certain others lie beyond it.

are not supposed to be equally possessed of the four qualities touch, taste etc; rather on their view earth is possessed of the four qualities in question, water possessed of three qualities—viz. those four minus smell, fire possessed of two qualities—viz. those four minus smell and taste, and air possessed of the single quality touch. Similarly, they altogether deny to *manas* the four qualities in question. So the present aphorism is aimed at pointing out a difference of opinion with those Buddhists etc. Thus this aphorism indicates that according to the Jaina system *jīva* and *pudgala* are two mutually different verities; hence the word *pudgala* is here not employed to mean the verity *jīva*. Similarly, earth, water, fire and air—these insofar as they are *pudgala* are all mutually similar, that is, they are all possessed of the four qualities touch etc. Furthermore, according to the Jaina system *manas* too being made up of *pudgala* is possessed of the qualities touch etc. Touch is admitted to be of eight types—viz. hard, soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, smooth, rough; taste is of five types—viz. pungent, bitter, astringent, sour, sweet; smell is of two types—good smell and bad smell; colour is of five types—viz. black, blue, green, red, yellow and white. In this way there are twenty types in all of touch etc.; but each one of them depending on its degree is of *saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta* and *ananta* sub-types. Thus whatever thing is soft has its softness characterized by some degree or other. Hence even if generally speaking softness represents but one touch it has *saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, and *ananta* types depending on its degree. The same consideration applies to the other touches hard etc. and to the other modes taste etc.

Sound is not a quality as is maintained by the Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas etc. It is rather a particular transformation of the *pudgalas* belonging to the physical-groupings-of-the-form-of-speech. Depending on an occasioning cause it is divided into various types. The sound produced through effort on the part of a soul is *prayogaja* or voluntary, that produced without such an effort is *vaisrasika* or non-voluntary. For example, roar of clouds is *vaisrasika*. The *prayogaja* sound is declared to be of six types, viz. (1) *Bhāṣā*—the various speeches, explicit in the case of men

obscure in that of animals, birds etc. (2) *Tata*—sound produced by the leather-covered musical instrument like *mṛdaṅga* (a drum-like musical instrument) (3) *Vitata*—sound produced by stringed instruments like lute, *Sāraṅgī* (a violin-like musical instrument) etc. (4) *Ghana*—sound produced by *jhālara* (a cymbal-like musical instrument), bell etc. (5) *Śuṣira*—sound produced by the musical instruments like conch-shell, flute etc. that are blown. (6) *Sangharsa*—sound produced by rubbing as in the case of wood etc.

Binding of the form of mutual sticking together is likewise of two types—viz. *prāyogika* and *vaisrasika*. The association of *jīva* with body and of lac with wood, inasmuch as they both depend on an effort, are cases of *prāyogika* binding. The sticking together of *pudgalas* as is found in the lightening, cloud, rainbow etc, inasmuch as it is independent of all effort, is a case of *vaisrasika* binding.

Subtleness and grossness are each of two types—viz. absolute and relative. The subtleness and grossness which cannot both characterize one and the same thing as viewed in relation to certain other things are absolute subtleness and absolute grossness; those which can do so are relative subtleness and relative grossness. Thus subtleness characterizing the atoms and grossness characterizing the universe-wide *mahāskandha* or great-aggregate are each absolute; for as viewed in relation to nothing whatsoever can an atom be characterized by grossness and as viewed in relation to nothing whatsoever can a *mahāskandha* be characterized by subtleness. On the other hand, both subtleness and grossness characterizing the intermediate aggregates diad etc. are relative. Take for example, the subtleness characterizing an *āmalaka* (a fruit) and the grossness characterizing a *bilva* (a fruit). As compared to a *bilva* an *āmalaka* is small and hence subtle, as compared to an *āmalaka* a *bilva* is gross. But the same *āmalaka* as compared to a berry is gross, the same *bilva* as compared to a pumpkin is subtle. Thus the two contradictory modes subtleness and grossness, insofar as they are relative, can both characterize one and the same thing; on the contrary, the

absolute type of subtleness and grossness cannot both characterize one and the same thing.

Configuration is of two types—viz. *ittham̐tva-rūpa* and *anittham̐tva-rūpa*. The shape that can be compared with something else is *itthantva-rūpa*, one that cannot be so compared is *anitthantva-rūpa*. The configuration or construction of cloud etc. is *anitthantva-rūpa*, for being of an indefinite form it cannot be described in some one single manner; on the other hand, the configuration of the remaining things is *itthantva-rūpa*—e.g. that of a ball, a *siṅghārā* (a triangle-shaped small fruit). etc. There are many sub-types of a configuration of the *itthantva-rūpa* type—e.g. circular, triangular, rectangular, long, ring-like etc.

When a *pudgala*-body of the form of a unit or an aggregate is disjoined or dissociated that is called splitting. It is of five types—viz. (1) *Aukrika*—the splitting like that of a piece of wood when sawn off or of a piece of stone when sculptured. (2) *Caurṇika*—being powdered down as in the case of *sattū* (i.e. powdered parched grain), flour etc. (3) *Khaṇḍa*—being broken into pieces like that of a jar broken into potsherds. (4) *Pratara*—gradually chopping off layers as in mica, birch etc. (5) *Anutaṭa*—removing the bark as in bamboo, sugar-cane etc.

Darkness is that particular transformation which stands opposed to light and obstructs vision.

Dimming makes its appearance when light undergoes a coverage. It is of two types.

The reflection of a face which is cast in some shining object like mirror etc. and in which the colour, shape etc. of this face are to be seen as they are in the original is dimming of the form of a transformation consisting of modes like colour etc.; on the other hand, the mere shadow that is cast on some non-shining object is dimming of the form of shadow.

The hot light pertaining to the sun etc. is hot-radiation, the non-hot light pertaining to the moon, jewel, glow-worm etc. is non-hot radiation.

All the above modes touch etc. as well as sound etc., inasmuch as they are of the form of effects produced by *pudgala* are treated as modes pertaining to *pudgala*.

By separating the aphorisms 23 and 24 from one another it is indicated that the modes touch etc. are to be found in both atoms and aggregates but that the modes sound binding etc. are to be found exclusively in the aggregates. Though subtleness too is a mode that pertains to both atoms and aggregates it is enumerated not along with touch etc. but along with sound etc., for it is deemed proper that mention of it be made in the company of grossness which is the mode standing opposed to it. 23-24.

The Chief Types of *Pudgala* :

Pudgala is of the form of an atom and of the form of an aggregate. 25.

Individually taken the *pudgala*-substances are *ananta* in number and their variety too is unlimited; even so, since in the next two aphorisms there are going to be formulated the various causes that lead to the origination of transformations appropriate to *pudgala* and since that would be of use in this formulation mention is here being made of the two broad types of *pudgala*—viz. atoms and aggregates. The entire lot of *pudgala*-substances belongs to one or the other of these two types.

That *pudgala*-substances which is the form of a cause and not of the form of an effect is called an ultimate substance. Such a substance is an atom which is permanent, subtle, and possessed of some one taste, one smell, one colour and two touches. Certainly, knowledge regarding such an atomic substance cannot be had through sense-organs; rather this knowledge is to be had through scriptural testimony or through inference. The inference proving the existence of an atom is of the type where an effect acts as probans. Thus one infers : whatever effects made up of *pudgala* are visible all around are possessed of a cause; similarly, the last invisible effect too must be possessed of a cause; it is this

cause which is an atomic substance. Since no other substance acts as cause to it, it is called an ultimate substance. An atomic substance neither is nor can be possessed of an inner division; hence it is its own beginning, middle as well as end. An atomic substance is not of the form of something tied together—that is, not of the form of a collection.

The second type of *pudgala*-substance is an aggregate. All the aggregates are of the form of something tied together—that is, of the form of a collection. In relation to the substance that acts as their cause they are a substance of the form of an effect; in relation to the substance that acts as their effect they are a substance of the form of a cause. For example, a two-atomed or a bigger aggregate is an effect in relation to the atoms concerned but it is a cause in relation to a three-atomed or a bigger aggregate. 25.

The Ordered Statement of what Causes an Aggregate and what Causes an Atom :

The aggregates are caused through combination, split and combination-cum-split. 26.

An atom is caused through split alone. 27.

An aggregate or a composite substance originates in three ways. Thus some aggregate is caused through combination, that is, through transformation of the form of becoming one; some is caused through split, while some is caused through a joint undertaking of the two operations combination and split. The two atomed aggregate resulting from the coming together of two atoms existing separately is an aggregate caused through combination. Similarly, a mere coming together of three, four, *saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, *ananta* or *anantānanta* atoms results in a three-atomed, four-atomed, *saṅkhyāta*-atomed, *asaṅkhyāta*-atomed, *ananta*-atomed or *anantānanta*-atomed aggregate; all these are aggregates caused through combination. The smaller aggregates that result from the mere disruption of a bigger aggregate are aggregates caused through split. These too can possibly be two-

atomed upto *anantānanta*-atomed. When an aggregate undergoes disruption while at the same time some other substance gets conjoined to a component of it then the new aggregate thus coming into existence is an aggregate caused through split-cum-combination. Such aggregates too can be two-atomed upto *anantānanta*-atomed. In the case of aggregates made up of more than two atoms it should be noted that a three-atomed aggregate can come into existence either through a combination of three atoms or through the combination of one atom with a two atomed aggregate; similarly, a four-atomed aggregate can come into existence either through a combination of four atoms or through the combination of two atoms with a two-atomed aggregate or through the combination of one atom with a three-atomed aggregate; similar considerations apply to bigger aggregates.

An atomic substance is not an effect of some other substance; so its origination cannot possibly be due to a combination of two substances. Really speaking, an atom is admitted to be permanent; even so, its origination is here spoken of from the standpoint of modes. That is to say, an atom viewed as a substance is certainly permanent but from the standpoint of modes it is an originated entity as well. Thus when an atom sometimes acts as a component of some aggregate and there stays in a state of combination and when subsequently the same atom splits away from this aggregate and stays in a state of disruption—then what we are having before us are but two particular modes or states of one and the same atom. Now for the atom the state of disruption originates exclusively from a split. So when it is above said that an atom is caused through split the idea only is that an atom characterized by a state of disruption—not an atom as such—is a product of split.

The Cause for an Invisible Aggregate Becoming Visible :

The visible aggregates are caused only through split and combination occurring together. 28.

This aphorism is aimed at demonstrating that depending

on conditions even an invisible aggregate can become visible.

Various are the transformations of *pudgala*; hence it is that some *pudgala*-aggregates are invisible—that is, not cognizable through the visual sense-organ—while some are visible—that is, cognizable through the visual sense-organ. Thus the same aggregate which being subtle was earlier invisible becomes visible when through the availability of appropriate conditions it gives up the transformation of the form of subtleness and assumes that of the form grossness. For this aggregate behaving in this manner just two causes are required—viz. split and combination. When in an aggregate the transformation of the form of subtleness ceases and that of the form of grossness emerges then certain new atoms must necessarily get combined with this aggregate. However, not only is there such a combination, but certain atoms must also necessarily split away from the aggregate in question. Thus a cessation of the transformation of the form of subtleness followed by an emergence of the transformation of the form of grossness never results either from just combination—that is, the combining of atoms—or from just split—that is, the splitting away of atoms. Now no aggregate can ever become visible unless there emerges in it the transformation of the form of grossness; hence it is here laid down as a rule that a visible aggregate is caused through split and combination occurring together.

The word 'split' (Sanskrit '*bheda*') means two things : (1) The disruption of an aggregate—that is, the splitting away of atoms from it. (2) The cessation of an earlier transformation followed by the emergence of a new one. Of these the first meaning was accepted while offering the above interpretation of the aphorism; on accepting the second meaning the interpretation should be as follows : When an aggregate assumes the transformation of the form of grossness, a transformation cognizable through the visual sense-organ—that is, when an aggregate ceasing to be invisible becomes visible—then that is due to the transformation of the form of grossness, a transformation which in its turn is dependent on *saṅghāta* or the particular number *ananta* characterizing the atoms concerned. Thus for an aggregate becoming visible the

cause is not just a cessation of the transformation of the form of subtleness followed by an emergence of the transformation of the form of grossness, nor is it just the particular number *ananta* characterizing the atoms concerned; for this cause comprises both the transformation in question—this being the meaning of the word '*bheda*' or '*split*'—and the number in question—this being, the meaning of the word '*saṅghāta*' or '*combination*'.

Though, through the word '*cākṣuṣa*' or '*visible*' occurring in the aphorism just such an aggregate is directly meant as is cognizable through the visual sense-organ, yet the word '*cakṣus*' or '*visual sense-organ*' should here be taken in a broad sense to mean a sense-organ as such. Accordingly, the aphorism should mean that for any suprasensuous aggregate becoming cognizable through sense-organs the required cause are split and combination occurring together. Now owing to the unlimited variety of the transformations appropriate to *pudgala* just as an aggregate that was earlier suprasensuous subsequently becomes cognizable through sense-organs when appropriate conditions in the form of split and combination are available there, similarly a gross aggregate too can become subtle. Not only that, owing to this very variety of transformations it can so happen that an aggregate that was earlier cognizable through a larger number of sense-organs subsequently remains cognizable through a lesser number of them. For example, things like salt, *hiṅgu* (a strong-smelling spice) etc. are cognizable through four sense-organs—viz. the visual, tactile, gustatory and olfactory—but when dissolved in water the same remain cognizable through just two sense-organs—viz. the gustatory and olfactory.

Question : For an aggregate becoming visible a twofold cause has been mentioned, but why has no cause been mentioned for the origination of an invisible aggregate ?

Answer : In the aphorism 26 a general mention has been made of the three causes required for the origination of an aggregate as such. As for the present aphorism it only lays down causes for the origination of a particular type of aggregates—that

is, for the invisible aggregates becoming visible. Hence in accordance with that earlier general statement there ought to be just three causes in the case of the origination of an invisible aggregate. The idea is that from the statement contained in the aphorism 26 it follows that the invisible aggregates originate through all the three possible causes—viz. split, combination and split-cum-combination. 28.

The Term 'Real' Interpreted :

That thing alone which is associated with—that is, is characterized by—all the three features origination, destruction and permanence is called 'real'. 29.

As regards the nature of the real the different systems of philosophy maintain different views. Thus according to one system¹ the real taken as a whole (that is *Brahman*) is exclusively permanent. According to another one², it is momentary without a residue (that is, is exclusively characterized by origination and destruction). According to a third³, the real in the form of the conscious verity is exclusively permanent while the same in the form of the verity designated *prakṛti* is permanent-admixture-transformations (that is, permanent-cum-transitory). According to a fourth⁴, of the so many real entities some like atoms, time, soul etc. are exclusively permanent while some like a jar, a piece of cloth etc. are exclusively characterized by origination and destruction. But the view maintained by the Jaina system as to the nature of the real is different from all these and it is this that is put forward in the present aphorism.

On the Jaina view, what is real or entitative that taken as a whole cannot be exclusively permanent or exclusively transitory-without-a-residue nor is it possible that a certain part of it is exclusively permanent while a certain other part is permanent-

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1. Vedānta (Aupaniṣada) following Saṅkara.
 2. The Buddhist.
 3. Sāṅkhya,
 4. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

admixt-transformations, nor is it possible that one part of it is exclusively permanent while another one is exclusively transitory. Rather on this view all things deserving to be designated 'real'—be they conscious or physical, tangible or intangible, gross or subtle—are possessed of a triple form—that is, are possessed of three features origination, destruction and permanence.

Each and every real entity is possessed of two aspects—one such as proves lasting throughout the three phases of time, the other such as proves ever transitory. It is on account of its lasting aspect that an entity is called permanent while it is on account of its transitory aspect that it is called something characterized by origination and destruction. When of these aspects one alone is kept in view while the other is kept out of view while the other is kept out of view the entity appears to be exclusively permanent or exclusively transitory. But when both these aspects are kept in view then alone can the complete and real nature of the entity be known. Hence according to both the standpoints in question is the nature of the real propounded in the present aphorism. 29.

The Rebuttal of the Charge of Contradiction and the Nature of Permanence-Amidst-Transformations :

That certainly is permanent which does not deviate from its essence—that is, from its specific nature. 30.

In the last aphorism it has been said that one and the same entity is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence—that is, that it is characterized by the two features permanence and transience. But then it might be asked how is that possible. That which is permanent how can the same be transient ? And that which is transient how can the same be permanent ? It is not tenable that the two features permanence and transience—mutually contradictory like hot and cold—should simultaneously belong to one and the same thing. Is it not therefore self-contradictory to interpret the real as that which is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence ? To delineate the nature of permanence as acceptable to the Jaina system and thus to rebut the charge of contradiction here levelled

is the aim of the present aphorism.

If the Jaina system, like certain others, had described the nature of a real entity by maintaining that without undergoing any change whatsoever it ever retains one and the same form, then since transience would have been impossible in an entity thus alleged to be absolutely permanent it would have been self-contradictory to attribute to this entity permanence as well as transience. Similarly, if the Jaina system maintained that a real entity is exclusively transitory—that is, if on the ground that a real entity originates and perishes every moment the system denied that this entity is possessed of a permanent basis—then too since permanence would have been impossible in an exclusively transitory entity experiencing origination and destruction the same self-contradiction as above would have had been faced. But as a matter of fact, the Jaina system, refusing to attribute either absolute permanence or absolute transience to any thing treats everything as permanent-cum-transitory. Hence according to it all verities, while remaining fixed within the bounds of their respective specific natures, experience change—that is, origination and destruction—depending on conditions. Hence there is nothing self-contradictory about a real entity being found characterized by permanence when viewed from the standpoint of specific nature—that is, substance—and the same being found characterized by origination and destruction when viewed from the standpoint of transformation. The Jaina doctrine of permanence-cum-transience, unlike its *Sāṅkhya* counterpart, is not limited to the physical sphere—the sphere of *prakṛti*—but is applicable to the conscious verity as well.

For the admission that the doctrine of permanence-cum-transience is universally applicable to all verities whatsoever the chief means of support is experience. When matters are viewed minutely it turns out that no such verity is ever experienced as is exclusively permanent or exclusively transient. Certainly, all things whatsoever—whether external or internal—are found to be but permanent-cum-transitory. If all things are exclusively momentary then since a new thing originates and perishes every moment and

since this thing has got no permanent basis there should never have been experience of likeness in relation to the concerned series of momentary transformations—that is, on seeing again a thing that was seen earlier there should in no way take place recognition in the form ‘this is the same thing’, for recognition requires on the one hand permanence in the thing that acts as its object and on the other hand permanence in the soul that acts as seer. Similarly, if either the physical or conscious verity is exclusively changeless then in the universe that is of the form of a commixture of these two verities there should never crop up that variety which is there to be seen every moment. Hence it is that the doctrine of permanence-cum-transience is treated as tenable by the Jaina system of philosophy.

A Description of the Constancy of the Just Mentioned Real Based on an Alternative Interpretation :

The real since it never gives up its being is constant. 30.

To be characterized by origination, destruction and permanence—this verily is the nature of a thing as such. It is this nature that is called real. And this real nature is constant—that is, it persists in the same form throughout the three phases of time. It never so happens that a particular thing or a thing as such is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence at one time and not characterized by them at another time. The three aspects origination, destruction and permanence are necessarily there all the time—and it is just this that is meant by the constancy of the real. Not to give up one’s specific nature is the *dhrauvya* or permanence that characterizes all substances whatsoever, to originate and perish in the form of a different transformation every moment is the *utpāda-vyaya* or origination-cum-destruction that characterizes them. Thus the cycle of *dhrauvya* and *utpāda-vyaya* always operates in a substance as such.

And that in this cycle no aspect ever vanishes is stated in the present aphorism. Thus *dhrauvya* spoken of in the earlier aphorism refers to just the aspect of permanence belonging to a

substance while *nityatva* spoken of in the present aphorism refers to the non-cessation of all the three aspects origination, destruction and permanence. Herein lies the difference between *dhrauvya* spoken of in the earlier aphorism and *nityatva* spoken of in the present. 30.

Defending the Tenet of *Anekānta* or Non-extremism :

Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory. 31.

How the mutually contradictory but validly cognized properties can be co-present in one and the same thing and why from among the many properties that are present there in it one is taken account of at one time another at another time—these two questions are answered in the present aphorism.

The character 'being existent' that makes itself felt in connection with the cognition or statement 'the soul is existent' cannot maintain itself irrespective of everything else. For could it do so a soul should prove to be existent as possessed of an alien nature like that of a jar etc. as it proves to be existent as possessed of its own nature like consciousness etc.; that is to say, in that case jar-ness too should be apparent in a soul just as consciousness is actually apparent in it—which in its turn would mean that a soul possesses no characteristic nature of its own. Certainly, it is the very essence of a characteristic nature that it is existent in the form of the own nature of the thing concerned and non-existent in the form of an alien nature. Thus depending on the standpoint adopted both the properties existence and non-existence are proved to characterize a soul. And just like the properties existence and non-existence the properties permanence and transience too are proved to characterize it; for permanence is proved from the standpoint of substance or the general transience from the standpoint of mode or the specific. Similarly, the properties like oneness, manyness etc. which appear to be mutually contradictory but which are proved to be actually

present there when the standpoints adopted are taken into consideration coexist in all the things like a soul etc. and there is no difficulty about the matter. Hence it is that all entities are to be treated as possessed of many properties.

An Alternative Interpretation :

Each thing is liable to be a subject-matter of usage in various ways; for usage is accounted for on the basis of *arpaṇā* and *anarpaṇā*—that is, on the basis of a consideration of chief or subordinate status depending on the desire of the speaker concerned. 31.

Of the many properties proved to occur in a thing depending on different relationships sometime some one and at another time its direct opposite is made the basis of making usage as regards this thing—this is not an unproved or a self-refuted proposition; for even those properties which do actually occur in a thing are not all simultaneously desired to be spoken of. Thus depending on the purpose aimed at sometimes some one property sometimes some other is desired to be spoken of. When a particular property is desired to be spoken of that becomes chief while its counterpart becomes subordinate. Thus he alone who performs an act enjoys its fruit—when this sameness of substratum for an act and its fruit is sought to be demonstrated then the permanence of a soul is desired to be spoken of, permanence proved to occur from the standpoint of substance. At that time its transience which is proved to occur from the standpoint of mode is not desired to be spoken of and is therefore subordinate. However, the state of soul at the time of enjoying the fruit of an act is different from its state at the time of performing this act—when with a view to demonstrating this difference between a soul's state at the time of performing an act and its state at the time of enjoying its fruit the transience of this soul—proved to occur from the standpoint of mode—is spoken of, at that time the permanence of this soul proved to occur from the standpoint of substance is no more chief. Thus depending on the desire to speak or not to speak a soul is sometimes called permanent sometimes transient. However, when these properties are

simultaneously desired to be spoken of then since there exists no single word connotative of them both the soul is said to be indescribable. And apart from the sentential constructions based on a desire to speak, a desire not to speak and a desire to speak simultaneously there are four more that result from the various combinations of those three. Thus a soul can be characterized as permanent-cum-transient, permanent-cum-indescribable, transient-cum-indescribable, permanent-cum-transient-cum-indescribable. These seven sentential constructions are designated *saptabhaṅgī* or 'sevenfold predication.' Of these seven sentences the first three—and of these three the first two—are basic. And just as on the basis of the properties permanence and transience proved to occur from different standpoints and depending on the desire of the speaker concerned sevenfold predication is applied to a thing, similarly sevenfold predication should be applied to it on the basis of the pairs of properties existence and non-existence, oneness and manyness, describable and indescribable which too appear to be mutually contradictory but are proved to occur from different standpoints. Hence it is that one and the same thing is treated as characterized by various properties and as a subject-matter of the usages of various types. 31.

Stating the Cause for Combination among *Pudgalas* :

Combination takes place on the ground of smoothness and roughness. 32.

A *pudgala*-aggregate does not originate merely from a mutual conjunction of its components like atoms etc. For that something else is required apart from conjunction—to point out this is the aim of the present aphorism. Besides a conjunction of the components concerned what is further required is that these components should possess the qualities smoothness and roughness. When smooth and rough components join together then there takes place combination—that is, transformation of the form of becoming one; it is on account of this combination that there emerge into being aggregates like two-atomed etc.

A conjunction of smooth and rough components can be of

two types—viz. similar or dissimilar. A conjunction of the smooth with the smooth or that of the rough with the rough is a similar conjunction; a conjunction of the smooth with the rough is a dissimilar conjunction. 32.

Exception to the General Rule as to Combination :

Combination does not take place between smooth and rough components of a minimum degree (that is, between components whose smoothness or roughness—as the case might be—is of a minimum degree). 33.

When the degrees concerned are equal combination does not take place between similar components—that is, between one smooth component and another, as also between one rough component and another. 34.

Combination well takes place between components whose degrees differ by two wits or more. 35.

Of the present aphorisms the first prohibits combination. According to it mutual combination does not take place between atoms whose smoothness or roughness is of a minimum degree—such atoms being called atoms of a minimum degree. This prohibition implies that mutual combination takes place between all such smooth and rough components whose degree is medium or maximum; but this rule too has an exception which is pointed out in the next aphorism. According to it, mutual combination does not take place between similar components whose degrees are equal to one another; that is why smooth atoms of the same degree do not form an aggregate, nor do rough atoms of the same degree. This prohibition, in its turn, implies that combination can well take place between similar components of unequal degrees. This implication is further restricted in the third aphorism where in the case of similar atoms a limit is laid down within which unequal degrees are conducive to combination. According to it, even in the case of similar components of unequal degrees combination takes place only when the degree of smoothness or roughness characterizing one component differs

from that characterizing the other by two, three, four or more units. Hence it is that in case the degree of smoothness or roughness characterizing one component differs from that characterizing the other by just one unit, then combination cannot take place between those two similar components.

The Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions do not differ as to the reading of these three aphorisms but they do differ as to their meaning. In connection with this difference of meaning three things are noteworthy :

(1) To concede or not the possibility of combination in the case where just one atom is of a minimum degree.

(2) To take or not the word 'etc.' occurring in the aphorism 35 to mean the numbers three etc.

(3) To maintain or not that the rule of combination laid down in the aphorism 35 applies only to the cases of similar components.

(1) According to both the *Bhāṣya* and *Vṛtti* combination is denied only in case both the atoms are of a minimum degree; that is to say, according to both these texts combination is well possible in case just one atom is of a minimum degree while the other is not. But according to all the Digambara commentaries like *Sarvārthasiddhi* etc. just as combination is denied in the case of two atoms of a minimum degree it is also denied in the case where just one atom is of a minimum degree though the other is not.

(2) According to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vṛtti* the word 'etc.' occurring in the aphorism 35 is taken to mean the numbers three etc. Hence according to them combination is deemed possible in case the degree of smoothness or roughness characterizing one component differs from that characterizing the other by two, three, four...*saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, *ananta* units; it is deemed impossible only in case the difference in question is just one unit. But according to all the Digambara commentaries combination is deemed possible only in case the difference in question is two units; that is to say, according to them it is deemed impossible

not only when the difference in question is one unit but also when it is three, four,....*saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, *ananta* units.

(3) According to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vṛtti* the rule of combination laid down in the aphorism 35 according to which combination is possible when the difference concerned is two, three or more units applies only to the cases of similar components. But according to the Digambara commentaries it applies not only to the cases of similar components but also to those of dissimilar ones.

The following charts give out the net regulations as to the possibility or otherwise of combination which emerge out because of the difference of meaning attributed by the two traditions to the present set of aphorisms :

The Chart Following the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vṛtti* :

Degree	Similar	Dissimilar
1. Minimum + minimum	No	No
2. Minimum + one unit more	No	Yes
3. Minimum + two units more	Yes	No
4. Minimum + three or a larger number of units more	Yes	Yes
5. Non-minimum + non-minimum of equal degree	No	Yes
6. Non-minimum + non-minimum with one unit more	No	Yes
7. Non-minimum + non-minimum with two units more	Yes	Yes
8. Non-minimum + non-minimum with three or a larger number of units more	Yes	Yes

The Chart Following *Sarvārthasiddhi* etc. :

Degree	Similar	Dissimilar
1. Minimum + minimum	No	No
2. Minimum + one unit more	No	No

3. Minimum + two units more	No	No
4. Minimum + three or a larger number of units more	No	No
5. Non-minimum + non-minimum of an equal degree	No	No
6. Non-minimum + non-minimum with one unit more	No	No
7. Non-minimum + non-minimum with two units more	Yes	Yes
8. Non-minimum + non-minimum with three or a larger number of units more	No	No

Smoothness and roughness are both a particular type of touch. Though each is of one form so far as its specific nature is concerned it is of numerous types depending on the larger so smaller degree of the transformation concerned. This difference of degree is so much emphatic that in between the minimum smoothness and the maximum—so also in between the minimum roughness and the maximum—there are inserted *anantānanta* units of degree. Take, for example, the difference of degree obtaining between the milk of the goat and that of a she-camel. Both of them do possess smoothness, but there is so little of it in one case so much of it in the other. Of the transformations of the form of smoothness and roughness characterized by a difference of degree that which is smallest of all—that is, that which is indivisible—is called a minimum degree.

And leaving aside the minimum all the rest are called non-minimum. Thus non-minimum includes the medium as well as maximum. That transformation of the form of smoothness which is largest of all is maximum; all the transformation lying in between the minimum and the maximum are medium. Since maximum smoothness is *anantānanta* times greater than the minimum, if the minimum smoothness is called one unit the maximum ought to be called *anantānanta* units. And the units two, three, *saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, *ananta*, the maximum minus

one—all these ought to be called medium.

Hence 'similar' signifies the fact the smooth is combined with the smooth or the rough with the rough, 'issimilar' the fact that the smooth is combined with the rough. 'Minimum' signifies one unit, 'one unit more (than the minimum)' two units; similarly, we can have 'two units more', 'three units more', 'four units more'....'anantānanta units more.' 'Of an equal degree' means 'of an equal, number' when the number of units is the same on both sides we have a case of 'of an equal degree.' 'Non-minimum of the form of two units' is of an equal degree in relation to 'non-minimum of the form of two units,' 'non-minimum of the form of three units' is one unit more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of four units' is two units more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of five units' is three units more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of six units' is four units more in relation to the same. Similarly, in relation to the 'non-minimum of the form of three units' upto 'non-minimum of form of *ananta* units' we can work out what is 'non-minimum of an equal degree', what is 'non-minimum one unit more', what is 'non-minimum two units more', what is 'non-minimum three units more' and so on. 33-35.

The Nature of Transformation :

¹At the time of combination an equal or a larger degree transforms an equal or a smaller degree. 36.

After rules and prohibitions have been laid down for combination the question arises : Of the similar or the dissimilar atoms that enter into combination which transforms which ? It is answered here.

1. In the Digambara tradition the aphorism reads *bandhe'dhikau pārīnāmikau ca*. So here it is not desired that a quality of a particular degree should assimilate into itself another of the same degree; what is desired is that a quality of a larger degree should assimilate into itself another of a smaller degree.

When the parties to combine are of an equal degree a 'similar' combination does not take place at all, what then takes place is a 'dissimilar' combination : For example, two units of smoothness might combine with two units of roughness, or three units of smoothness with three of roughness. In such cases either of the parties might lend its own form to the other; that is to say, in accordance with the nature of the concerned substance, place, time, mode it so happens in such cases that sometimes smoothness converts roughness into smoothness sometimes roughness converts smoothness into roughness. But when the parties to combine are of an unequal degree it is one with a larger degree that lends its own form to one with a smaller degree. For example, the five-unit smoothness lends its own form to the three-unit smoothness; that is to say, as a result of combining with the five-unit smoothness the three-unit smoothness too becomes five-unit smoothness. Similarly, the five-unit smoothness lends its own form to the three-unit roughness; that is to say, roughness is here converted into smoothness. And when roughness is of a larger degree it too lends its own form—viz. the form of roughness—to the smoothness of a smaller degree. 36.

The Definition of *Dravya* or Substance :

A *dravya* or substance is possessed of *guṇas* or qualities and *paryāyas* or modes. 37.

Substance has been earlier mentioned a number of times; so a definition of it is being offered here.

That which is possessed of qualities and modes is called substance. Since to undergo transformation is the very nature of a substance it goes on being variously transformed—that is, goes on undergoing various transformations—from *samaya* to *samaya*. The capacity of a substance to produce transformations is called its quality while the transformations produced by a quality are called modes. Thus the quality is a cause, the modes its effect. Now qualities of the form of a capacity residing in a substance are *ananta* in number and they are in fact inseparable from the substance acting as their support as also from one another.

Similarly, in the case of each quality of the form of a capacity the modes that emerge from *samaya* to *samaya* throughout the three phases of time are *ananta* in number. A substance as well as the capacities in question that act as its aspects, since they never originate or perish, are eternal—that is, beginningless and endless. On the other hand, all the modes, since they originate and perish every moment, are individually transitory—that is, such as are possessed of a beginning and an end; however, viewed as a stream of successive states even modes are beginningless and endless. Certainly, all those modes which are produced in a substance by one and the same capacity acting as a cause and which flow in the form of a stream running throughout the three phases of time belong to one and the same class. The *ananta* capacities residing in a substance give rise to *ananta* streams of modes and all these streams run their course simultaneously. Naturally, different modes belonging to different classes because produced by different capacities can be found to exist in a substance simultaneously, but different modes belonging to the same class because produced by the same capacity cannot be found to exist in a substance simultaneously.

A soul and a *pudgala* are substances because they are respectively possessed of *ananta* qualities like consciousness etc. and colour etc., and they are respectively possessed of *ananta* modes like *upayoga* in the form of *jñāna* and *darśana* and blue, yellow etc. A soul on account of its capacity for consciousness undergoes transformation of the form of various *upayogas*, a *pudgala* on account of its capacity for colouration undergoes transformation of the form of blue, yellow etc. The capacity for consciousness cannot be separated from the substance soul or from the other capacities residing in a soul; similarly, the capacity for colouration cannot be separated from the substance *pudgala* or from the other capacities residing in a *pudgala*. The stream of various *upayogas* like *jñāna*, *darśana* etc. occurring at different *samayas*—a stream running throughout the three phases of time—has for its single cause the capacity for consciousness, and the stream of modes that acts as an effect of this capacity is of the

form of *upayoga*. Similarly, in a *pudgala* the capacity for colouration resides in the form of a cause while the stream of modes of the form of various colours like blue, yellow etc. is an effect of this single capacity. In a soul just like the stream of modes of the form of *upayoga* there simultaneously flow *ananta* such streams of modes—e.g. the stream of modes of the form of feelings like pleasure and pain, the stream modes of the form of effort. And when just like the capacity for consciousness one capacity each—e.g. the capacity for *ānanda* or joy, the capacity for *vīrya* or endeavour—is posited for the various streams of modes—belonging-to-the-same-class *ananta* capacities are proved to reside in a soul. Similarly, in a *pudgala* just like the stream of modes of the form of colour there always flow *ananta* streams of modes—e.g. the stream of modes of the form of smell, that of modes of the form of taste, that of modes of the form of touch. Hence when one capacity each is posited for these various streams of modes then just like the capacity for colouration *ananta* capacities are proved to reside in a *pudgala* too—e.g. the capacity for smell, that for taste, that for smell. In a soul there can be simultaneously found the different modes belonging to the different capacities like consciousness, joy, endeavour etc; but there cannot be simultaneously found the different modes of the form of *upayoga* belonging to the capacity for consciousness or the different modes of the form of feeling belonging to the capacity for joy; for in the case of each capacity just one mode at a time can make itself manifest. Similarly, in a *pudgala* there can be simultaneously found the different modes belonging to the different capacity like colouration, smell, etc., but there cannot be simultaneously found the different modes blue, yellow etc. belonging to the capacity for colouration. Just as the substances soul and *pudgala* are permanent so also are their capacities like consciousness etc. and colouration etc. However, a mode of the form of *upayoga* produced by the capacity for consciousness, and the mode blue or yellow produced by the capacity for colouration are not permanent; since they originate and perish all the time they are individually transient but the stream of modes of the

form of *upayoga* and the stream of modes of the form of colour, since they persist throughout the three phases of time, are permanent.

A substance verily is an indissoluble collection of *ananta* qualities. However, in the case of a soul not all its qualities but just a few of them like consciousness, joy, moral conduct, endeavour are open to the comprehension of a worldly being with ordinary intelligence; similarly, in the case of a *pudgala* not all its qualities but just few of them like colour, taste, smell, touch etc. are open to comprehension. The reason for it is that the totality of streams-of-modes belonging to a soul or such totality belonging to a *pudgala*-substance cannot be comprehended in the absence of a supra-ordinary cognition. Only those qualities are made a subject-matter of usage which act as a cause to the stream of modes comprehensible to ordinary intellect; hence these qualities are to be characterized as comprehensible. Thus the qualities consciousness, joy, moral conduct, endeavour etc. belonging to a soul are comprehensible—that is, are amenable to thought and verbal communication; similarly, the qualities colour etc. belonging to a *pudgala* are comprehensible. All the remaining qualities are incomprehensible and open to the cognition of an omniscient alone.

When it is said that each of the streams of *ananta* modes has for its cause one capacity or quality and that a substance is but a collection of *ananta* such capacities—then the statement is taking cognizance of difference. For viewed from the standpoint of non-difference a mode is of the form of the quality that acts as its cause while a quality is of the form of the substance concerned—which in its turn means that a substance is to be considered to be itself of the form of qualities and modes.

Not all the qualities belonging to a substance are of the same type. For some of them are common—that is, such are found in all the substances—e.g. existence, being made up of units, being cognizable etc.; on the other hand, some of them are unique—that is, such as are found in just some one particular

substance—e.g. consciousness, colour etc. It is only on account of their unique qualities and modes produced by them that substances differ from one another.

Similar considerations should be applied to the qualities and modes belonging to the substances *dharmāstikāya*, *adharmaṣṭikāya* and *ākāśāṣṭikāya*. In this connection the following thing should be understood. Since the *pudgala*-substance is *mūrta* or tangible the qualities as well as modes belonging to it are called *gurulaghu* or heavy and light but since the remaining substances are *amūrta* or non-tangible the qualities as well as modes belonging to them are called *agurulaghu* or neither heavy nor light. 37.

Consideration Relating to *kāla* or Time :

¹Certain authorities maintain that *kāla* too is a substance. 38.

It possesses *ananta samayas* (as modes). 39.

So many modes like perduration etc. have been earlier attributed to *kāla*² but unlike in the case of *dharmāstikāya* etc. substance-hood has not been predicated of it. So the question arises : Since substance-hood has not been attributed to *kāla* is it the case that it is not a substance ? Or since the modes like perduration etc. have been attributed to *kāla*, is it the case that it is a substance ? The answer is forth-coming here.

1. In the Digambara tradition the aphorism reads '*kālas ca*'. Accordingly, those following it treat *kāla* as an independent substance. Then they maintain not that the present aphorism puts forth the view of a limited section of authors but that the aphorist himself intends to view *kāla* as an independent substance. Those who treat *kāla* as an independent substance and those who do not, how they lend support to their respective views, how they view *kāla*, what further difference of opinion has arisen in this connection—for a detailed information on all these and allied matters see *Hindī Chauthā Karmagrantha*, appendix pertaining to the term *kāla* p. 157.

2. See chapter 5, aphorism 22.

The aphorist conveys the information that certain authorities treat *kāla* as a substance. So he seems to maintain that there is no unanimity about viewing *kāla* as an independent substance.

The aphorist does not refute the position of the authorities who view *kāla* as an independent substance, he simply describes it. In connection with this description he says that it possesses *antanta* modes. Now the modes perduration etc. have already been mentioned earlier. But modes of the form of *samayas* too belong to *kāla* itself. The mode of the form of a present *samaya* is necessarily single, but modes of the form of a past or a future *samaya* are *ananta*. Hence it is said that *kāla* possesses *ananta samayas*. 38-39.

The Nature of *Guṇa* or Quality :

Those which always reside in a substance and are themselves devoid of qualities are qualities. 40.

Quality has been mentioned in connection with defining substance¹; so its nature is being delineated here.

Though modes too reside in a substance and are devoid of qualities they, being subject to origination and destruction, do not reside in a substance always. The qualities, on the other hand, being permanent do always reside in a substance. Herein lies the difference between a quality and a mode.

Those very capacities which, ever residing in a substance, produce modes in it are qualities.

If further qualities or capacities are attributed to those qualities there will arise an infinite regress; hence it is that the qualities which are of the form of a capacity residing in a substance are treated as devoid of qualities. In the case of soul the qualities are consciousness, right inclination, moral-conduct, joy, endeavour etc.; in the case of *pudgala* they are colour, taste, smell, touch etc. 40.

1. See chapter 5, aphorism 37.

The Nature of *Pariṇāma* or Transformation :

One's being—that is, one's retaining one's specific nature and yet undergoing origination and destruction—is transformation. 41.

Pariṇāma or transformation too has been mentioned earlier at so many places¹. Hence its nature is being delineated here.

The Buddhists maintain that every thing whatsoever is momentary and such as perishes without leaving a residue. So on their view *pariṇāma* or transformation turns out to mean utter destruction following origination—that is, non-persistence of any element whatsoever subsequent to destruction. On the other hand, the system like Nyāya etc. which uphold the doctrine of difference and according to which a substance is utterly different from its qualities would give out that *pariṇāma* or transformation means the origination and destruction of qualities in a substance which itself remains utterly unchanged. As against both these views as to the nature of *pariṇāma* or transformation the maintenance of the corresponding Jaina view—this is the aim of the present aphorism.

There is no such substance or quality as remains utterly unchanged. However, even while undergoing change—that is, even while assuming ever new states—no substance or quality gives up its original specific nature. The idea is that all substances as well as qualities, without giving up their respective specific natures, assume ever new states every moment depending on the conditions available. It is this that is called the *pariṇāma* or transformation undergone by the substances and qualities.

A soul, whether it assumes the form of a man or that of an animal or that of a bird, ever retains its soulness in the midst of all these various states. Similarly, whether it be determinate *upayoga* of the form of *jñāna* or indeterminate *upayoga* of the form of *darśana*, whether it be cognition grasping a jar or that grasping a piece of cloth—in the midst of all these modes of the form of *upayoga* the quality consciousness retains its identity.

1. See chapter 5, aphorisms 22, 36.

Again, a *pudgala*, whether it be in a two-atomed state or in a three-atomed state, never gives up its *pudgala*-ness in the midst of these various states. Lastly, the white colour might change into the black, the black colour might change into the yellow—but in the midst of all these various modes of the form of colour the specific nature colourness retains its identity. The same considerations should apply in the case of each and every substance and each and every quality. 41.

The Types of *Pariṇāma* and the Mention
of Their Respective Seats :

It is of two types—viz. that without a beginning and that having a beginning. 42.

In the case of substances possessed of colour—that is, *pudgala*-substances—it is possessed of a beginning. 43.

In the case of *jīvas* it is *yoga* and *upayoga* that are possessed of a beginning. 44.

The period of time whose early end is unknown is that without a beginning, that whose early end is known is that having a beginning. When this well-known and universally accepted meaning of the phrases 'time without a beginning' and 'time having a beginning' is accepted, then in connection with considering the seat of the two types of *pariṇāma* the conclusion is established that all substances whatsoever, whether coloured or otherwise, are characterized by both the types of *pariṇāma*—that is, by *pariṇāmas* without a beginning as well as by those having a beginning. Thus in the case of each of the substances it can be said that its *pariṇāmas* viewed as a continuous stream are without a beginning while the same taken individually are possessed of a beginning. Even so, not only in the present aphorisms but even in the *Bhāṣya* on the same why has all this not received a clear and complete formulation ?—this question has been raised by the author of the *Vṛtti* and he has ultimately conceded that as a matter of fact all substances whatsoever possess both the types of *pariṇāma*—that is, *pariṇāmas* without a beginning as well as those

having a beginning.

In the Digambara commentary-texts like *Sarvārthasiddhi* it has clearly been maintained that all the substances are possessed of both the types of *pariṇāma*; and in support of this contention it has been argued that from the standpoint of substance or the general a transformation is without a beginning while from the standpoint of mode or the specific it is possessed of a beginning.

The Digambara commentaries do not include in their text-reading the three aphorisms 42-44; they instead offer a complete and clear formulation as to the types of *pariṇāma* and as to their respective seats in the course of their commentary on the aphorism '*tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ*'. From this it appears that they must have felt that there was an error or at least obscurity in the present aphorisms mentioning the respective seats of the two types of *pariṇāma*; hence it was that instead of completing the aphorisms that were incomplete in their meaning they thought it better to state their own views in an independent manner. 42-44.



CHAPTER SIX

An account of *jīva* and *ajīva* has already been offered, that of *āsrava* or inflow is now due.

The Nature of *Āsrava* Defined through a Description of Yoga or Activity :

The activity of body, speech and *manas* is yoga. 1.

That—on account of being the factor responsible for an association with karma—is designated *āsrava* or inflow. 2.

That activity of the form of the wavering of the constituent-units of a soul which results from a *kṣayopasāma* or *kṣaya* of the *vīryāntarāya-karma* and which proceeds on the basis of *pudgalas* is called *yoga*. There are three types of it, differing according to the difference of basis—viz. *yoga* pertaining to body, *yoga* pertaining to speech, *yoga* pertaining to *manas*. That *yoga* which proceeds on the basis of the *pudgalas* belonging to the physical groupings that go to constitute a body of the *audārika* type or the like is *yoga* pertaining to body. The wavering of the constituent-units of a soul that is on the point of undergoing a transformation of the form of speech—a wavering which occurs when internal speech has been acquired as a result of a *kṣayopasāma* of the karmas like *matijñānāvaraṇa*, *akṣaraśrutavarāṇa* etc. and which proceeds on the basis of the physical groupings that go to constitute speech—is *yoga* pertaining to speech. The wavering of the constituent-units of a soul that is on the point of undergoing a transformation of the form of *manas*—a wavering which occurs when there has been an acquisition of internal *manas* of the form of a *kṣayopasāma* of the *no-indriya*

matijñānāvaraṇa karma and which proceeds on the basis of the physical groupings that go to constitute a *manas*—is *yoga* pertaining to *manas*.

It is this very threefold *yoga* that is called *āsrava* or inflow. The reason why *yoga* is called *āsrava* or inflow is that it is through *yoga* that the physical groupings which go to constitute *karma* flow into a soul—that is, get associated with it in the form of *karma*. Just as the mouth of a tunnel etc. through which water enters a pond is called *āsrava* or inflow because it is the cause of *āsrava* or inflow (of water), similarly, *yoga* is called *āsrava* or inflow because it is the cause of an *āsrava* or inflow of *karma*. 1-2.

¹The auspicious *yoga* is *āsrava* or cause-of-bondage in the case of *punya* or good *karmas*. 3.

And the inauspicious *yoga* is *āsrava* in the case of *pāpa* or evil *karmas*. 4.

All the three *yogas*—viz. body-*yoga* etc. are auspicious as well as inauspicious.

The auspicious or inauspicious character of *yoga* depends on the auspicious or inauspicious character of the accompanying mental feeling. The *yoga* directed towards an auspicious purpose is auspicious, that directed towards an inauspicious purpose is inauspicious. The auspicious or inauspicious character of *yoga* does not depend on the auspicious or inauspicious character of the effect concerned—that is, the concerned karmic bondage; for had that been so all the *yoga* would have turned out to be inauspici-

1. In the place of the aphorisms 3 and 4 the Digambara texts have a single aphorism in the form '*subhaḥ puṇyasyāsubhaḥ pāpasya*'. But in connection with a discussion of these aphorisms the *Rājavārtika* says, '*tataḥ sūtradvayam anarthakam*', (see p. 248, commentary on the *Vārtika* 7.) From this statement it appears that the commentators wrote these aphorisms together and then commented on them while those responsible for the copying or printing of the text, when they saw that the aphorisms in question and so also the comments on them went together, thought that these are not two aphorisms but a single one and so gave a single serial number to them both.

ous and none auspicious. For in the *guṇasthānas* eighth etc. even the auspicious *yoga* causes the bondage of the inauspicious karmas like *jñānāvaraṇīya* etc.¹

The bodily operations like violence, theft, incontinence etc. are cases of inauspicious body-*yoga*; those like mercy, donation, continence etc. cases of auspicious body-*yoga*. True but blameworthy speech, false speech, harsh speech and the like are cases of inauspicious speech-*yoga*; blameless true speech, soft speech, civilized speech and the like are cases of auspicious speech-*yoga*. Thinking ill of others, thinking of injuring others and the like are cases of inauspicious *manas-yoga*; thinking well of others, feeling happy on seeing others flourish and the like are cases of auspicious *manas-yoga*.

The auspicious *yoga* brings about a bondage of good karmas, the inauspicious *yoga* that of evil karmas—this statement made by the present aphorisms is of a relative import. For *yoga* occurring at the time when there is mildness of mental perturbation or passion is called auspicious *yoga* while that occurring at the time when there is acuteness of mental perturbation is called inauspicious *yoga*. Now just as at the time of inauspicious *yoga*—that is, while in the *guṇasthānas* first etc.—all the karmas like *jñānāvaraṇīya* etc., whether good or evil, are bound down depending on the occasion, similarly at the time of auspicious *yoga*—that is, while in the *guṇasthānas* sixth etc.—all the karmas, whether good or evil, are bound down depending on the occasion. How then is it justified to make a separate mention of the auspicious *yoga* as cause-of-bondage in the case of good karmas and of the inauspicious *yoga* as cause-of-bondage in the case of evil karmas ? By way of answering this question it should be understood that the present statement chiefly relates to karmic bondage in respect of *anubhāga* or flavour. Thus at the time of the intensity of the auspicious *yoga* it so happens that the quantity

1. For this see Hindi *Chauthā-Karmagrantha* : A consideration of bondage in the case of different *guṇasthānas*; also Hindi *Dūsarā Karmagrantha*.

of *anubhāga* characterizing the good karmas is relatively larger while the quantity of *anubhāga* characterizing the evil karmas is relatively smaller. On the contrary, at the time of the intensity of the inauspicious *yoga* the quantity of *anubhāga* characterizing the evil karmas is relatively larger while the quantity of *anubhāga* characterizing the good karmas is relatively smaller. So keeping in view the relatively larger quantity of the *anubhāga* characterizing the good karmas caused by the auspicious *yoga* and the relatively larger quantity of the *anubhāga* characterizing evil karmas caused by the inauspicious *yoga*—that is to say, keeping in view what is predominant in the two cases—it has been maintained that the auspicious *yoga* is cause-of-bondage in the case of good karmas and inauspicious *yoga* cause-of-bondage in the case of evil karmas. The relatively smaller quantity of the *anubhāga* characterizing the evil karmas caused by the auspicious *yoga* and the relatively smaller quantity of the *anubhāga* characterizing the good karmas caused by the inauspicious *yoga* are here not taken into account; for just as in everyday intercourse so also in theoretical treatises it is a rule that usage takes place on the basis of what is predominant¹. 3-4.

Statement as to a Difference in the Result of Yoga
Depending on a Difference in the Agent Concerned :

Yoga on the part of a soul possessed of *kaṣāya* or passion and yoga on the part of a soul devoid of *kaṣāya* are respectively *āsrava* or cause-of-bondage in the case of *sāmparāyika* karmas and *īryāpatha karma*. 5.

The beings in whom there takes place a manifestation of the *kaṣāya* or passion like anger, greed etc. are those possessed of *kaṣāya*, the beings in whom it does not take place are those devoid of *kaṣāya*. All the souls situated in the *guṇasthānas* first to

1. *prādhānyena vyapadeśā bhavanti* (that is, designations take place on the basis of predominance)—this is how the rule runs. For example, the village where there is a predominance or numerical superiority of Brahmins is called a Brahmins' village even if other castes reside in it as well.

tenth are more or less possessed of *kaṣāya* while those situated in the *guṇasthānas* eleventh onwards are devoid of *kaṣāya*.

The karma that brings about the *sāmparāya* or downfall of a soul is called *sāmparāyika karma*. Just as the airborne dust falling on a wet piece of leather gets stuck to it similarly that karma attracted towards a soul through *yoga* which on account of a manifestation of passions gets associated with this soul and acquires some duration is *sāmparāyika karma*; on the other hand, just like a wooden sphere striking against a dry wall the karma which is attracted towards a soul through *yoga* but which on account of the absence of a manifestation of passions touches this soul and is immediately released away from it is *īryāpatha karma*. An *īryāpatha karma* is understood to be possessed of a duration of just one *saṁaya*.

The karmas which the souls possessed of a manifestation of *kaṣāya* bind down to themselves through the three types of *yoga*—viz. body-*yoga* etc.—of an auspicious or an inauspicious type is *sāmparāyika karma*; that is to say, depending on the acuteness or mildness of *kaṣāya* this karma is possessed of a greater or smaller duration and it yields a good or bad consequence as might be made possible. But the karma which the souls devoid of passion bind down to themselves through the three types of *yoga*, since it makes appearance in the absence of all passion, neither yields a consequence nor is possessed of a duration of more than one *saṁaya*. The reason why this karma of a duration of one *saṁaya* is called *īryāpathika* is that in the absence of all passion it is bound down merely through the *patha* or instrumentality of *īryā* or acts like coming and going. The idea is that even if the three types of *yoga* are equally present there the karma acquired will lack bondage in respect of duration and bondage in respect of flavour in case a passion is not present there at the same time. Certainly, passion is the cause of bondage in respect of both duration and flavour; hence passion it is that is true cause of worldly existence. 5.

The Type of *Āsrava* Pertaining to *Sāmparāyika karmas* :

The first of these—that is, of the two *āsravas* that

pertaining to *sāmparāyika karma*—has got for its types *avrata*, *kaṣāya*, *indriya* and *kriyā* which are respectively 5, 4, 5 and 25 in number 6.

The causes that lead to the bondage of *sāmparāyika karma* are called *āsravas* pertaining to *sāmparāyika karma*. Such *āsravas* can possibly be found only in the souls possessed of *kaṣāyas*. The types of *āsrava* enumerated in the present aphorism are certainly cases of *āsrava* pertaining to *sāmparāyika karma*, for they are all rooted in passions.

Violence, untruth, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness—these are five *avratas* which are described in the chapter seven, aphorisms 8-12. Anger, pride, deceit and greed—these are four *kaṣāyas* whose specific nature is delineated in the chapter eight, aphorism 10. The five *indriyas* like tactile etc. have already been described in the chapter two, aphorism 20. In the present context *indriya* means the operation of an *indriya* actuated by attachment and aversion—for the mere presence of an *indriya* is no cause of karmic bondage, nor such an operation of *indriyas* as is free from attachment and aversion.

The 25 *kriyās* are named and defined as follows :

I (1) *Samyaktvakriyā*—*kriyā* which being of the form of homage paid to a deity, a preceptor or a scriptural text nourishes *samyaktva*.

(2) *Mithyātvakriyā*—*kriyā* which is of the form of homage paid to a passion-ridden deity and which results through the instrumentality of *mithyātvamohanīya-karma*.

(3) *Prayogakriyā*—*kriyā* of the form of a bodily operation like coming, going etc. vitiated by passion.

(4) *Samādānakriyā*—*kriyā* of the form of an inclination towards worldly enjoyment on the part of one who has renounced the world.

(5) *Iryāpathakriyā*—*kriyā* which causes either the bondage or the experiencing of *iryāpathakarma*—that is, karma of a duration of one *samaya*.

II (1) *Kāyikīkriyā*—undertaking some endeavour—that is, getting ready to perform some job—with an evil mental feeling.

(2) *Ādhikaraṇikīkriyā*—getting hold of the instruments of violence.

(3) *Prādoṣikīkriyā*—action undertaken under the impulse of anger.

(4) *Paritāpanikīkriyā*—action of the form of inflicting pain on the living beings.

(5) *Prāṇātipātikīkriyā*—action of the form of depriving the living beings of their *prāṇas*¹ or vital elements.

III (1) *Darśanakriyā*—under the influence of attachment the tendency to view lovely forms.

(2) *Sparsanakriyā*—under the influence of carelessness the tendency to touch things that are open to touch.

(3) *Prātyayikīkriyā*—The forging of new weapons.

(4) *Samantānupātanakriyā*—to evacuate, urinate etc. at a place frequented by women, men, animals etc.

(5) *Anābhogakriyā*—to seat one's own body etc. at a place not properly inspected and not properly cleansed of dust.

IV (1) *Svahastakriyā*—to do oneself what is to be done by someone else.

(2) *Nisargakriyā*—to give consent to an evil performance.

(3) *Vidārakriyā*—to make public an evil act performed by someone else.

(4) *Ājñāvyāpādikīkriyā* or *Ānayanakriyā*—because of one's own incapacity to follow a scriptural injunction to preach something contrary to this injunction.

(5) *Anavakāṅkṣakriyā*—out of roguishness or lethargy to evince disregard for an injunction laid down in scriptures.

V (1) *Ārambhakriyā*—to indulge in acts like wounding,

1. The five sense-organs, the three energies—viz. *manas*, speech and body—out-breath and in-breath, life-quantum—these are ten *prāṇas*.

beating, killing and to take joy in the same when performed by others.

(2) *Pārigrahikīkriyā*—action undertaken with a view to preventing the destruction of one's acquisitions.

(3) *Māyākriyā*—to deceive others in respect of qualifications like *jñāna*, *darśana* etc.

(4) *Mithyādarśanakriyā*—if there be a person who indulges in himself performing and making others perform acts befitting a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, then to praise him by saying to him 'yes, you are right' and thus to further confirm him in his *mithyātva*.

(5) *Apratyākhyānakriyā*—under the influence of the karmas destructive of *saṁyama* or discipline not to refrain from performing evil acts.

Of the *kriyās* included in the above five pentads—each containing five members—there is only one—viz. *īryāpathakriyā*—that is not *āsrava* for a *sāmparāyika karma*; as for the remaining ones since they are all impelled by *kaṣāya* they are all cause-of-bondage for *sāmparāyika karma*. And when all these *kriyās* are here called *āsrava* for a *sāmparāyika karma* that is done simply because most of them (really, all of them except the *īryāpathikī*) are in fact so. Again, even though in the case of the *avratas*, the operation of *indriyas*, and the above enumerated *kriyās* the capacity to cause bondage really belongs to the accompanying attachment and aversion—and so really speaking, attachment and aversion are the only cause-of-bondage for a *sāmparāyika karma*—yet they are mentioned as a cause-of-bondage apart from *kaṣāyas* simply in order to make it clear as to what operations born of *kaṣāyas* are chiefly met with in practical life and as to what operations should be sought to be prevented by one desirous of *saṁvara*—that is protection against the karmic inflow. 6.

Even When the Cause-of-bondage is the Same there
Being a Peculiarity in Karmic Bondage Depending on a
Difference in the Accompanying Mental State :

There is a peculiarity in it—that is, in karmic bondage

—depending on a difference as to acuteness, mildness, knowingliness, unknowingliness, exertion, *adhikaraṇa*. 7.

The present aphorism is aimed at demonstrating as to what brings it about that even in case the above-mentioned *āsravas* or causes-of-bondage like violence, operations of *indriyas*, *samya-ktvakriyā* etc. are equally present there the resulting karmic bondage displays a peculiarity.

Thus even when the external cause-of-bondage is the same the resulting karmic bondage is different depending on whether the accompanying mental state is acute or mild. For example, when two persons view the same spectacle, one with a sense of mild attachment, the other with a sense of acute attachment, then there is a relatively more acute karmic bondage in the case of the latter. Knowingliness means undertaking an operation intentionally, unknowingliness means undertaking it unintentionally. Here again even when the external operation is the same there is a difference in the resulting karmic bondage depending on whether this operation is undertaken knowingly or unknowingly. For example, one person taking a deer to be a deer shoots it down with an arrow and another person, while aiming at a lifeless target, shoots down by mistake a deer that comes in between; here karmic bondage in the case of the conscious killer is more acute than that in the case of the mistaking one. A difference as to exertion or energy too is a cause of difference in the karmic bondage concerned. For example, whether it be a good performance like donation, service etc. or an evil performance like violence, theft etc. an energetic person undertakes it more conveniently and enthusiastically than a weakling. Hence karmic bondage—whether good or evil—in the case of a weakling is relatively milder than that in the case of an energetic person.

So many *adhikaraṇas* of the form of *jīva* and *ajīva* are going to be described just below; depending on a difference as to them there is a difference as to karmic bondage. For example, in connection with performing evil acts like violence, theft etc. and good acts like protecting others etc. suppose one person is in

possession of highly effective instruments another in possession of ordinary ones; then it is likely that karmic bondage in the case of the former is relatively more acute, for being in possession of highly effective instruments he is more imbued with a certain type of impulsiveness.

Though the present aphorism lays down that when inspite of the sameness of an external *āsrava* there is a difference as to the resulting karmic bondage the cause lies in the difference obtaining as to exertion, *adhikaraṇa* etc., yet in point of fact the chief cause for a difference as to karmic bondage is the acuteness or mildness of the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. But even when the fact of acting knowingly or unknowingly or a difference as to energy acts as a cause of the difference as to karmic bondage that too happens owing to a difference as to the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. Similarly, when it is said that a difference as to karmic bondage is due to a difference as to the instrument employed, then too the statement should be understood to mean that the difference in question is due to a difference as to the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. 7.

The Two Types of *Adhikaraṇa* :

Adhikaraṇa is of the form of *jīva* and *ajīva*. 8.

The first—that is, *adhikaraṇa* of the form of *jīva*—is of three types depending on whether it is of the form of *saṁrambha*, *saṁārambha* or *ārambha*, of three types depending on a difference of the *yoga* concerned, of three types depending on whether it is *krta*, *kārita* or *anumata*, of four types depending on a difference of the *kaṣāya* concerned. 9.

The second—that is, *adhikaraṇa* of the form of *ajīva* is of the form of *nirvartanā*, *nikṣepa*, *saṁyoga* and *nisarga*, they being respectively of two, four, two and three types. 10.

All acts, whether good or evil, are accomplished through the instrumentality of *jīva* as well as *ajīva*. Nothing can be done by a *jīva* alone or an *ajīva* alone. Hence both *jīva* and *ajīva* are

called *adhikaraṇa*—that is to say, a means, implement or weapon of karmic bondage. Both these *adhikaraṇas* are of two types—viz. a *dravya* type and a *bhāva* type. A *jīva* in the form of an individual person and an *ajīva* in the form of an inanimate thing are *adhikaraṇa* of a *dravya* type. The mental states like *kaṣāya* etc. belonging to a *jīva* and the potency-in-the-form-of-sharpness etc. belonging to an inanimate thing are *adhikaraṇa* of a *bhāva* type. 8.

A worldly *jīva* at the time of performing a good or evil act must experience some one of certain 108 states. Hence these states are *adhikaraṇa* of a *bhāva* type. These states are as follows : *Krodhakṛta kāya saṁrambha* or 'saṁrambha pertaining to body undertaken through anger' '*mohakṛta kāya saṁrambha*' or 'saṁrambha pertaining to body undertaken through pride', '*māyākṛta kāyasaṁrambha*' or 'saṁrambha pertaining to body undertaken through deceit', '*lobhakṛta kāyasaṁrambha*' or 'saṁrambha pertaining to body undertaken through greed'—these make four states. Here replacing the word *kṛta* by *kārita* (so that the meaning is not 'undertaken through anger etc.' but 'caused-to-be-undertaken through anger etc.,) and replacing it by *anumata* (so that the meaning is 'consented-to-be-undertaken through anger etc.,) we have eight more states. So in all we have twelve states by now. Then in all replacing the word *kāya* by *vacana* (so that the meaning is not 'saṁrambha pertaining' to body but 'saṁrambha pertaining to speech') and replacing it by *manas* (so that the meaning is 'saṁrambha pertaining to *manas*') we have twenty-four more states. So in all we have thirty-six states by now. Lastly, in all these replacing the word *saṁrambha* by *samārambha* (so that the meaning is not 'saṁrambha pertaining to body' but 'samārambha pertaining to body') and replacing it by *ārambha* (so that the meaning is 'ārambha pertaining to body) we have seventy-two more states. So in all we have one hundred and eight states finally.

An impulsion to undertake acts like violence etc. on the part of a careless *jīva* is called *saṁrambha*, to collect means for the performance of those acts is called *samārambha*, while

ultimately to actually undertake these acts is called *ārambha*. That is to say, an act has got three stages beginning from the subtle state of the form of an intention to perform it and culminating in its actual performance, stages that are respectively called *saṁrambha*, *saṁārambha* and *ārambha*. The three types of yoga have already been described earlier. *Kṛta* means undertaking to perform an act oneself, *kārita* means causing someone else to perform an act, *anumata* means giving consent to an act performed by someone else. The four *kaṣāyas* anger, pride etc. are well known.

When a worldly soul performs a good act like donation etc. or an evil act like violence etc. he does so impelled by either anger or pride or some other *kaṣāya*. And even when impelled by a *kaṣāya* he either performs it himself or causes someone else to perform it or gives consent to someone else performing it. Similarly, in connection with the performance of this act he is engaged in either *saṁrambha* or *saṁārambha* or *ārambha*—each pertaining to either body or speech or *manas*. 9.

The *mūrta* or tangible things like atoms etc. are *ajīvādhikaraṇa* of a *dravya* type. And all the states in which is to be found a *mūrta* substance useful in connection with a good or evil act on the part of a *jīva* are *ajīvādhikaraṇa* of a *bhāva* type. Here four chief types are enumerated of the *ajīvādhikaraṇa* of a *bhāva* type—viz. *nīrvartanā* or constructing, *nikṣepa* or placing, *saṁyoga* or combining and *nisarga* or operating. *Nīrvartanā* has got two sub-types—viz. *mūlaguṇanīrvartanā* and *uttaraguṇanīrvartanā*. When *pudgala*-substance is constructed in the form of a body of the *audārika* type or the like, construction which acting as an internal means proves useful to a *jīva* in its good or evil acts—then we have before us what is called *mūlaguṇanīrvartanā*; on the other hand, when *pudgala*-substance undergoes transformation of the form of wood, stone etc., transformation which acting as an external means proves useful to a *jīva* in its good or evil act—then we have before us what is called *uttaraguṇanīrvartanā*.

Nikṣepa has got four sub-types—viz. *apratyavekṣita-nikṣepa*, *duṣpramāṛjita-nikṣepa*, *sahasā-nikṣepa* and *anābhoga-nikṣepa*. To place a thing at some spot without properly inspecting this thing is called *apratyavekṣita-nikṣepa* (*pratyavekṣaṇa*=inspection). To place a thing at some spot after properly inspecting it but without cleansing it of dust is called *duṣpramāṛjita-nikṣepa* (*pramāṛjana* = to cleanse of dust). To place a thing at some spot without properly inspecting it or cleansing it of dust is called *sahasā-nikṣepa* (*sahasā* = suddenly). To inattentively place a thing at some spot is called *anābhoga-nikṣepa* (*anābhoga* = inattention).

Samyoga has got two sub-types—viz. *bhaktapāna-samyogādhikaraṇa* and *upakaraṇa-samyogādhikaraṇa*. The former consists in combining or producing foodstuffs like cereal, water etc., the latter in combining or producing implements like clothes, utensils. etc.

Nisarga has got three sub-types—viz. *kāyanisarga*, *vacanani-sarga* and *manonisarga*. They respectively consist in operating body, operating speech, and operating *manas*. 10.

Enumeration of the Respective Causes-of-bondage in the Case of the Eight Types of *Sāmparāyika-karma* :

Jealousy in respect of it (i.e. *Jñāna* or *darśana*), concealment, ungenerosity, obstruction, denial, false accusation—these are *āsrava* or cause-of-bondage in the case of *jñānāvaraṇa-karma* and *darśanāvaraṇa-karma*. 11.

Pain, sorrow, heart-burning, crying, killing, bewailing, each caused to oneself, to someone else or to both—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *asātāvedaṇīya karma*. 12.

Compassion for beings as such, compassion for those leading a disciplined life, donation, proper attentiveness towards disciplined-life—yet-accompanied-by-attachment etc., forbearance, purity—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *sātavedaṇīya karma*. 13.

Speaking ill of the omniscient, the scripture, the religious order, the religion, the deity is cause-of-bondage in

the case of *darśanamohanīya karma*. 14.

The acute mental state resulting from the manifestation of *kaṣāya* is cause-of bondage in the case of *cāritramohanīya karma*. 15.

Too much infliction of injury and too much accumulation of possession—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *narakāyus*. 16.

Deceit is cause-of-bondage in the case of *tiryagāyus*. 17.

Meagre infliction of injury, meagre accumulation of possession, softness and simplicity of nature—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *manusyāyus*. 18.

To be devoid of *śīla* (i.e. the subsidiary vows of discipline), to be devoid of *vrata* (i.e. the chief vows of discipline)¹, as also the just mentioned features ‘meagre infliction of injury’ etc.—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of all *āyus* whatsoever. 19.

Disciplined-life-yet-accompanied-by-attachment, life of discipline-cum-indiscipline, refraining from evil acts out of compulsion, childish penance—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *devāyus*². 20.

1. According to the Digambara tradition this aphorism means that lack of *śīla* and lack of *vrata*—these two features ordinarily cause the bondage of the three types of *āyus nāraka* etc. while the same features as belonging to the human beings born in a *bhogabhūmi* cause the bondage of *devāyus* as well. It is in this sense that mention is here made of the cause-of-bondage appropriate to *devāyus*, a subject-matter not touched upon in the *Bhāṣya*. However, in the *Vṛtti* to this *Bhāṣya* the author has thoughtfully taken note of this shortcoming of the *Bhāṣya* and has requested the learned readers to make it good on the basis of the scriptural texts.

2. In the Digambara tradition apart from the causes-of-bondage appropriate to *devāyus* enumerated in the present aphorism another one is mentioned and for that the present aphorism is followed by another one—viz. *samyaktvaṃ ca*. According to this tradition this new aphorism means that *samyaktva* is the cause-of-bondage in the case of *āyus* that pertains to the deities residing in the *kalpas saudharma* etc. The *Bhāṣya*

The crookedness of acts and causing false behaviour (alternatively, creating dissensions)—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *aśubhanāma karma*. 21.

The opposite of the just-mentioned features—that is, the straightforwardness of acts and causing genuine behaviour (alternatively, healing a dissension)—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *śubhanāma karma*. 22.

Purity of inclination, respectful attitude towards things highly spiritual, non-violation of *śīla* and *vrata*, ever-wakefulness as to the acquisition of knowledge regarding verities, ever present fear of worldly joys, renunciation as per one's capacity, penance as per one's capacity, providing means of easement to the fourfold religious order—particularly the order of monks, offering services to the competent personages, feeling of devotedness towards a *tīrthaṅkara*, preceptor, a highly learned personage, a scriptural text, not missing a performance of the daily religious service designated *āvaśyaka*, to cultivate the path of *mokṣa* and to make others traverse it, feeling of disinterested love towards the co-religionists—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *tīrthaṅkaranāmakarma*. 23.

To condemn others, to praise oneself, to turn a blind eye towards even existing merits of others, to make a display of even the non-existing merits in oneself—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *nīcagotra karma*. 24.

The opposite of the just mentioned features—that is, to condemn oneself, to praise others, to make a display of one's own shortcomings, to turn a blind eye towards one's own merits—as also humility and non-arrogance—these are cause-of-bondage in the case of *uccagotra-karma*. 25.

To cause obstruction to others engaged in the task of donation etc. is cause-of-bondage in the case of *antarāya karma*. 26.

makes no mention of it. Even so, the author of the *Vṛtti* to the *Bhāṣya* has included *samyaktva* too in the list of additional causes-of-bondage enumerated by him in this connection.

From here upto the end of the present chapter there runs an account of the respective causes-of-bondage obtaining in the case of the different basic types of karma. Even though in the case of all karma-types the common cause-of-bondage are *yoga* and *kaṣāya*, yet the present section is aimed at separately laying down as to which of the many tendencies born of *kaṣāya* is likely to cause the bondage of which karma.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Jñānāvaraṇīya* karma :

(1) To harbour a feeling of jealousy towards *jñāna*, towards a possessor of it, towards a means of it is called jealousy in respect of *jñāna*. That is to say, when a learned personage communicates to others his *jñāna* relating to the fundamental verities then there are certain people who feel jealous of this *jñāna*, of one who communicates this *jñāna*, of the means of this *jñāna*; it is this feeling of jealousy on the part of these people that is called jealousy in respect of *jñāna*.

(2) When someone makes from a person an enquiry or asks this person for a means of *jñāna* then in case this person even if possessed of the *jñāna* or of the means of *jñāna* asked for, replies—and does so from a defiled motive—‘I do not know’ or ‘I do not have that means of *jñāna*’ then we have a case of concealment in respect of *jñāna*.

(3) When a piece of *jñāna* is such as has been repeatedly practised and is ripe, also such as is fit to be communicated to others, then the defiled tendency not to communicate it to others even though a competent receiver be at hand is ungenerosity in respect of *jñāna*.

(4) Impelled by a defiled motive to obstruct one in one’s endeavour to receive *jñāna* is obstruction in respect of *jñāna*.

(5) When someone is communicating *jñāna* to others then to deny this fact through one’s speech or through one’s body (i.e. bodily gesture) is denial in respect of *jñāna*.

(6) When someone has made a proper statement then if

owing to one's own perverse intellect it sounds improper to one who then levels false accusation against the speaker we have a case of accusation in respect of *jñāna*.

When the above enumerated features jealousy, concealment etc. pertain to *jñāna* (=determinate cognition), to a possessor of *jñāna*, to a means of *jñāna* they are called jealousy in respect of *jñāna*, concealment in respect of *jñāna* etc. When they pertain to *darśana* (=indeterminate cognition), to a possessor of *darśana*, to a means of *darśana* they are called jealousy in respect of *darśana*, concealment in respect of *darśana* etc.

Question : What is the difference between denial and false accusation ?

Answer : Even when *jñāna* is present there not to pay respect to it, not to disclose it before others, not to demonstrate its merits—that is denial; on the other hand, when *jñāna* itself is perversely mistaken to be lack of *jñāna* and is sought to be destroyed then we have a case of false accusation. This is how the two features differ from one another. 11.

The Nature of the Cause-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Asātāvedaṇīya karma* :

(1) To experience suffering owing to an external or an internal cause is pain. (2) To feel troubled and worried on having been deprived of the company of a well-wisher is sorrow. (3) When on being insulted one's mind is defiled and one experiences an acute distress that is heart-burning. (4) To weep and wail shedding tears and with a choked voice is crying. (5) To deprive some being of its life is killing. (6) The pitiful weeping that ensues on recalling the merits of a departed one is bewailing.

When the above six features—as also certain others similar to them, e.g. beating, threatening—are caused to oneself, to someone else or to both then in relation to the person who does the causing they act as cause-of-bondage for the *asātāvedaṇīya karma*.

Question : If the above stated features pain etc. as caused

to oneself or to someone else act as cause-of-bondage for the *asātāvedaṇīya karma*, then acts like plucking of hair, fasting, observing the vows and the similar regulations too, since they prove to be a cause of pain, ought to act as cause-of-bondage for the *asātāvedaṇīya karma*. And if that be so then why not a renunciation of those regulations like vows etc.—rather than a performance of them—be deemed proper ?

Answer : The above features pain etc. act as cause-of-bondage only when they are produced under the impact of an impulse like anger etc. not they as such—that is, not they merely as a cause of pain. For a true world-renouncer or ascetic a performance of even the harshest vows and regulations does not cause a bondage of the *asātāvedaṇīya karma*. That is due to two reasons. Firstly, however harsh be the vows whose observance causes suffering to a true world-renouncer he suffers this pain not as impelled by anger or any such evil motive but as impelled by a noble tendency of conduct and noble understanding. He observes harsh vows but however painful contingencies might arise in this connection since they are not accompanied by passions like anger, distress etc. they do not prove to be a cause-of-bondage for him. The second reason is that it frequently happens that those world-renouncers rather experience real joy at the time of observing the harshest vows and regulations; so in such cases there arises no question of the personages concerned suffering pain, sorrow etc. It is well known that there is no hard and fast rule that a contingency which causes pain to one must necessarily cause pain to others as well. Hence since in the case of the personages in question the observation of those vows and regulations imparts a feeling of mental joy this observation in their case is of the form of pleasure rather than pain. Just as a kind physician, even when through his act of surgery he causes pain to someone else, does not prove guilty of sin because he is impelled by a feeling of compassion, similarly the world-renouncer too, since with a view to removing the worldly pain he gladly resorts to means appropriate for this removal, does not bind down evil karmas because of his noble tendencies of conduct. 12.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Sātāvedaṇīya karma* :

(1) To harbour a feeling of compassion towards all the living beings in compassion for beings as such; and to treat the pains caused to others as pains caused to oneself is compassion.

(2) A householder who observes the vows partially and a world-renouncer who observes them completely—when a feeling of compassion is harboured towards both these we have a case of compassion for those leading a disciplined life.

(3) To offer to others with a feeling of humility the things belonging to oneself is donation.

(4) Proper attentiveness towards disciplined-life-yet-accompanied-by attachment etc., means proper attentiveness towards disciplined-life-yet-accompanied-by attachment, life of discipline-cum-indiscipline, refraining from evil acts out of compulsion, childish penance. When with a view to renouncing obsessive desire that is the cause of the worldly entanglement one adopts a disciplined life and yet the impressions left in one's mind by one's past experience of attachment are not attenuated then the disciplined life in question is disciplined-life-yet-accompanied-by-attachment. The life of a partial adoption of discipline is life of discipline-cum-indiscipline. When worldly enjoyments are renounced not voluntarily but under external pressure then we have a case of refraining from evil acts out of compulsion. An act of penance like entry into fire, diving into water, eating cowdung etc., on the part of a child—that is, a *mithyādr̥ṣṭi* devoid of genuine knowledge—is called childish penance.

(5) To suppress defilements like anger etc., out of a religious motive is forbearance.

(6) To suppress the tendency towards greed and the like defilements is purity. 13.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Darśanamohaṇīya karma* :

(1) Speaking ill of the omniscient means a pervert intellect

levelling false charges against the omniscient; e.g. not admitting the possibility of omniscience and asking : 'If he was really omniscient then why did he not preach easy pathways to *mokṣa* rather than such difficult ones as are impossible of pursuance ?'

(2) Speaking ill of the scripture means a jealous intellect levelling false charges against the scripture—e.g. saying that this scripture is useless because it is composed in Prakrit which is a language of the illiterate—alternatively, because it is composed in a complication-ridden language of the pedant—or that it contains a futile and bothersome description of the various vows, regulations, expiations etc.

(3) Speaking ill of the religious order means levelling false charges against the religious order composed of four divisions—viz. monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen—e.g. saying that these monks unnecessarily take the trouble of observing vows, regulations etc., since monkhood is in fact an impossibility nor is it conducive to a wholesome result, or saying about the laymen that they undertake no cultured performances like bath, donation etc. nor do they lead a life of purity.

(4) Speaking ill of the religion means levelling false charges against the great religious acts like non-violence etc. or saying that a religious act is not open to perception while what is not open is perception cannot possibly exist, or saying that non-violence has led to the downfall of the entire human race or that of a particular nation.

(5) Speaking ill of the deities means denigrating them—e.g. saying that the deities do not exist at all or that even if they exist they are of no use—for when they are allegedly so powerful there is no reason why they should not help us or why they should not remove the misery of their earthly relatives. 14.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Cāritramohanīya karma* :

(1) To produce a *kaṣāya* in oneself or in others and to undertake unworthwhile acts under the influence of a *kaṣāya*—

these are cause-of-bondage for the *kaṣāya-mohaṇīya karma*.

(2) To ridicule the true religion, to make fun of a poor or helpless person, to develop the habit of frivolous joking—these and similar acts involving laughter are cause-of-bondage for the *hāsyā-mohaṇīya karma*.

(3) Indulging in various recreations evincing disinclination towards the proper moral restrains like vows and regulations—this and similar acts are cause-of-bondage for the *rati-mohaṇīya karma*.

(4) To cause worry to others, to disturb someone in one's rest, to keep the company of petty persons—these and similar acts are cause-of-bondage for the *arati-mohaṇīya karma*.

(5) To maintain a sorrowful demeanour, to arouse a feeling of sorrow in others—these and similar acts are cause-of-bondage for the *śoka-mohaṇīya karma*.

(6) To feel afraid and to frighten others are cause-of-bondage for the *bhaya-mohaṇīya karma*.

(7) To despise a beneficial act and a beneficial general conduct is cause-of-bondage for the *jugupsā-mohaṇīya karma*.

(8-10) A habit for cheating, finding fault with others, and the like are cause-of-bondage for the *strīveda karma*. Moreover, to nourish mental impressions that are appropriate to male sexual feeling, to nourish those that are appropriate to female sexual feeling, and to nourish those that are appropriate to neuter sexual feeling are respectively causes-of-bondage for the *strīveda karma*, the *puruṣaveda karma* and the *napuṃsakaveda karma*. 15.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Nārakāyuṣ-karma* :

(1) To undertake such an act accompanied by *kaṣāya* as causes pain to others is infliction of injury.

(2) An emphatic assertion to the effect that this thing is mine while I am its owner is accumulation of possession. When the tendency to inflict injury and that to accumulate possession

are extremely acute, when there is constant indulging in violent and cruel acts, when the property of another person is snatched away, when there is an excessive attachment for worldly enjoyments—then there operates a cause-of-bondage for the *narakāyus karma*. 16.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Tiryagāyus-karma* :

A ramified act of deception or harbouring a crooked feeling is deceit. For example, in the name of preaching things religious to introduce sheer falsity and propagate them with a selfish motive, to keep one's life devoid of disciplined conduct—these and similar acts are called deceit which constitutes cause-of-bondage for the *tiryagāyus karma*. 17.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Manusyāyus-karma* :

To reduce the tendency to inflict injury and that to accumulate possession, to exhibit softness and simplicity out of one's very nature—that is, without an external motivation—these constitute cause-of-bondage for *manusyāyus karma*. 18.

The Common Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Above Three types of *Āyus-karma* :

Apart from the various separate causes-of-bondage just enumerated for the three types of *āyus-karma*—viz. *nāraka*, *manuṣya* and *tiryak*—there are certain causes-of-bondage that commonly obtain in the case of all the three. It is these latter that are enumerated in the present aphorism; they are to be devoid of *śīla* and to be devoid of *vrata*.

(1) The five chief regulations non-violence, truth etc., are called *vrata*. (2) The subsidiary *vratas* that are observed with a view to buttressing those chief *vratas* are called *śīla*—e.g. the three *guṇavratas* and four *śikṣāvratas*. Similarly, the renunciation of anger, greed etc., which one resorts to for the sake of the observation of those very *vratas* is also called *śīla*.

For *vrata* to be absent is called to be devoid of *vrata*, for *śīla* to be absent is called to be devoid of *śīla*. 19.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Devāyus-karma* :

(1) When even after there has been a resort to discipline in the form refrainment from the great defilements like violence, untruthfulness, theft etc., there yet persist certain remnants of *kaṣāyas* then we have disciplined-life-yet-accompanied-by-attachment. (2) When *vratas* like non-violence etc., are observed only partially then we have a life of discipline-cum-indiscipline. (3) When either under external pressure or simply for the sake of imitating others one renounces unsalutary acts or food etc., then we have refraining from evil acts out of compulsion. (4) When bodily torture like entry into fire, diving into water, falling from the mountain-top, taking poison, fasting etc., are resorted to in a childish fashion—that is, without a proper understanding of the issues—then we have childish penance. 20.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Aśubha* and *Śubha Nāma-karmas* :

(1) Crookedness of acts means fraudulence as to *manas*, speech and body. When one thinks in one way, speaks in another way and acts in a third way—then we have fraudulence. (2) Causing false behaviour means making someone act in a fraudulent manner; (on alternative interpretation, creating dissension means causing misunderstanding between two friends). Both these are cause-of-bondage for the *aśubhanāmakarma*.

Question : How do the two differ from one another ?

Answer : The difference lies in that the former refers to oneself while the latter refers to someone other than oneself. Thus when there is fraudulence as to *manas*, speech and body in one's own case we have crookedness of acts, when there is a similar fraudulence in the case of someone else we have causing false behaviour. For example, one who is going the right way is perversely advised 'Go not this way but that' and is thus misled to

a wrong path.

The features opposite of the just mentioned ones—viz. straightforwardness as to *manas*, speech and body (i.e. uniformity of acts) and healing a dissension (that is, removing the rift from between the two and thus uniting them), [on alternative interpretation, to lead on to the right path one who is going the wrong way]—are causes-of-bondage for the *śubhanāma-karma* 21-22.

The Nature of the Cause-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Tīrthāṅkaranāma-karma* :

(1) Purity of inclination means a blameless and firm inclination towards the verities propounded by a personage devoid of attachment. (2) Respectful attitude towards things highly spiritual means an appropriate feeling of a right regard towards *jñāna* etc. that constitute the pathway to *mokṣa* and towards the means thereof. (3) Non-violation of *śīla* and *vrata* means exhibiting no negligence as to the observation of *vratas* like non-violence, truth etc., that constitute basic meritorious qualifications and as to the observation of the other regulations like *abhigraha* (=self-imposed restriction) etc., that are called *śīla* and are useful for the observation of the just mentioned *vratas*. (4) Ever-wakefulness as to the acquisition of knowledge regarding verities. (5) Ever present fear of the worldly joys means always fearing—that is, never being allured by—the worldly joys which are in fact conducive to pain rather than pleasure. (6) Renunciation as per one's capacity means offering gift of food, safety, knowledge etc., discriminately and without concealing an iota of one's capacity. (7) Penance as per one's capacity means practising tolerance of all sorts discriminately and without concealing an iota of one's capacity. (8) Providing means of easement to the fourfold religious order—particularly the order of monks—so as to keep them fit. (9) Offering services to the competent personages—that is, seeking to ably remove whatever difficulties such a personage might happen to face. (10-13). Feeling of devotedness towards a *tīrthāṅkara*, a preceptor, a highly learned personages, a scriptural text—that is, a feeling of devoted affection towards all these. (14)

Not missing a performance of the daily religious service designated *āvaśyaka*—that is, not missing a devoted performance of the six *āvaśyakas*, *sāmāyika* etc. (15) To cultivate the path of *mokṣa* and to make others traverse it—that is, to practise in one's daily life and without a feeling of arrogance *jñāna* etc. that constitute the path of *mokṣa*, as also to preach the same to others so as to augment their efficacy. (16) Feeling of disinterested love towards the co-religionists—as of a cow towards its calf. 23.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Nīcagotra-karma* :

(1) To condemn others : To condemn others means a pervert intellect publicly pointing out as belonging to another person's defects that might or might not exist in him. (2) To praise oneself : To praise oneself means to publicly point out as belonging to oneself merits that might or might not exist in oneself. (3) To turn a blind eye towards even the existing merits of others—that is to say, to conceal even such merits as exist in another person and not to publicly mention them even when occasion arises for that. (4) To make a display of even the non-existing merits in oneself. 24.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Uccagotra-karma* :

(1) To condemn oneself means to take cognizance of one's own defects. (2) To praise others means to admire the merits belonging to others. (3) To make a display of one's own shortcomings. (4) To turn a blind eye towards one's own merits. (5) Humility means developing an humble attitude towards the venerable personages. (6) Non-arrogance means not feeling arrogant even when one is superior to others in respect of knowledge, property etc. 25.

The Nature of the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Antarāya-karma* :

To cause obstruction to others means intending to place or

placing obstacles before others in their act of donation, their act of reception, their act of immediate consumption of something, their act of long-term consumption of something. 26.

Some Special Considerations as to the Causes-of-bondage Obtaining in the Case of the *Sāmparāyika-karma* :

The causes-of-bondage enumerated in the aphorisms 11-26 in connection with each of the various types of karma are to serve as a mere indicator; that is to say, the cause-of-bondage similar to those actually enumerated in connection with a particular type of karma are to be understood as mentioned even when they are not actually mentioned. For example, lethargy, negligence, false-preaching have not been enumerated as causes-of-bondage for the *jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya karmas* and yet they have to be enumerated in that connection. Similarly, evil performances like killing, binding, beating etc. have not been enumerated as cause-of-bondage for the *asātāvedaṇīya karma* and yet they have to be enumerated as such.

Question : In the case of each type of karma a different set of causes-of-bondage has been mentioned. Hence the question arises : Cause-of-bondage like jealousy in respect of *jñāna* have been enumerated in connection with the karma types like *jñānāvaraṇīya*; now does such a cause-of-bondage bind down just one karma-type like *jñānāvaraṇīya* or is it able to bind down other karma-types as well ? If a cause-of-bondage enumerated in connection with one karma-type can bind down other karma-types as well then it is futile to mention different causes-of-bondage for the different karma-types; for now it turns out that a cause-of-bondage already appropriate to one karma-type is operative in connection with another karma-type as well. And if a cause-of-bondage enumerated in connection with one karma-type binds down just this karma-type and no other then there ensues conflict with a particular scriptural rule. For there is a scriptural rule to the effect that generally speaking all the karma-types minus the *āyus-karma*—that is, seven karma-types in all—are bound down simultaneously. Following this rule one must admit that at the

time when there is a bondage of the *jñānāvaraṇīya* karma there is also a simultaneous bondage of the six karma-types *vedaṇīya* etc. Thus so far as cause-of-bondage is concerned there is available at one time just that which is appropriate to one particular karma-type; but on the other hand, there is bondage at this particular time also of the other karma-types not standing in conflict with this particular one. That is to say, the alternative that a particular cause-of-bondage causes the bondage of just one particular karma-type stands cancelled by the scriptural rule in question. What then is the purpose behind enumerating separate causes-of-bondage for the separate karma-types ?

Answer : The separate mention of causes-of-bondage that we find here must be understood as referring to bondage in respect of flavour. The idea is that the scriptural rule to the effect that at the time of experiencing the cause-of-bondage appropriate to one karma-type there is also a bondage of the other karma-types should be understood as referring to bondage in respect of karmic particles not to that in respect of flavour. So the net conclusion is that the separate mention of causes-of-bondages refers not to bondage in respect of karmic particles but to that in respect of flavour. So on conceding that experiencing bondage in respect of karmic particles is simultaneously possible for a number of karma-types there remains no difficulty about the just quoted scriptural rule. On the other hand, the different causes-of-bondage enumerated in connection with the different karma-types are responsible only for the bondage-in-respect-of-flavour pertaining to those karma-types; so the separate mention of causes-of-bondage that we find here remains equally free from difficulty.

When things are thus specified the just quoted scriptural rule and the separate mention of causes-of-bondage that we find here both remain equally free from difficulty. Even so, it has been further understood that when the separate mention of causes-of-bondage is defended by suggesting that the mention refers to bondage-in-respect-of-flavour then this defence too has in view just the equality of bondage. That is to say, at the time of experiencing a cause-of-bondage like jealousy-in-respect-of-*jñāna*

there is chiefly bondage-in-respect-of-flavour of a karma-type like *jñānāvaraṇīya*; as for the other karma-types that are simultaneously bound down there is bondage-in-respect-of-flavour in their case too but it obtains in a subordinate measure. For it is impossible to maintain that bondage-in-respect-of-flavour obtains for just one karma-type and not for the others that are simultaneously bound down. The reason is that whatever karma-types experience on account of *yoga* bondage-in-respect-of-karmic-particles the same simultaneously experience on account of *kaṣāya* bondage-in-respect-of-flavour. Hence the separate mention of causes-of-bondage we find here can be defended in no other way except by suggesting that it refers to bondage-in-respect-of-flavour and that obtaining chiefly. 26.



CHAPTER SEVEN

As causes-of-bondage for the *sātāvedaṇīya karma* compassion for those leading a disciplined life (Sanskrit-Vratins) and donation—these two features have been enumerated. Now with a view to offering a particular elucidation of the same a detailed account is being presented in this chapter relating to *vratas* or disciplinary vows and donation, both occupying an important place in the Jaina tradition.

The Nature of *Vrata* :

To refrain—through *manas*, speech and body—from violence, untruth, theft, sexual intercourse, and attachment-for-possession—that is called *vrata*. 1.

The nature of the moral defilements like violence, untruth etc., will be described in the sequel. To understand the nature of the defilments, to take a vow to renounce them, and then not to resort to them—that precisely is *vrata*.

Since non-violence is chief of all the *vratas* is comes first of all. Just as fence is meant for the protection of a field, so also are the remaining *vratas* meant for the protection of non-violence; hence it is that the greatest importance is attached to non-violence.

Refrainment and a positive activity—these are two aspects of a *vrata*; when both these aspects are present there then alone is a *vrata* complete. To be engaged in a virtuous activity means a prior refrainment from the evil activities that are its opposite; formulation to this effect follows as a matter of course. Similarly, refrainment from an evil activity means engagement—through

manas, speech and body—in virtuous activities that are its opposite; formulation to this effect too follows as a matter of course. Though refrainment from a defilement is here explicitly described as *vrata*, yet it does include within itself the aspect of positive virtuous activity. Hence it has to be understood that *vrata* is not simply of the form of inactivity.

Question : There is a well-known *vrata* that goes by the name of *rātribhojanaviramāṇa* or refrainment from eating during night-time. Why has that not been mentioned in the aphorism ?

Answer : Since long a separate *vrata* has gained currency under the name *rātribhojanaviramāṇa* but as a matter of fact that is not a fundamental *vrata*; it rather is a sort of necessary *vrata* that is implied by a fundamental *vrata*. So many others are such *vratas* and still more than can be conceived of. But what is sought to be offered in the present context is an account of just the fundamental *vratas*. Derivative *vratas* implied by the fundamental ones are certainly covered by a broader account of the fundamental ones. And *rātribhojanaviramāṇa* is merely one of the numerous *vratas* that are implied by the *vrata* of the form of non-violence.

Question : Keeping in view the destruction of living beings that is occasioned on account of the non-visibility obtaining during darkness as also keeping in view the numerous types of injury that are occasioned when an earthen lamp is lighted *rātribhojanaviramāṇa* turns out to be a part and parcel of the *vrata* of the form of non-violence. But what is the difference between the night-time eating and day-time eating in the case of a cold country where there is no darkness nor occasion for an injury due to the lighting of an earthen lamp or in the case of a place where electric light is available ?

Answer : Keeping in view the countries that are predominantly hot and keeping in view the obviously visible violence that obtains in an arrangement involving the old type earthen lamps etc. the night-time eating is said to occasion more violence than the daytime eating. When this is admitted and at

the same time proper consideration is given to the possibility that under certain conditions the night-time eating might not occasion more violence than the daytime eating, then too from the point of view of the masses in general—particularly, from the point of view of an ascetic life—the daytime eating is particularly praiseworthy. Briefly speaking, the following are the reasons in support of a view like this :

(1) From the point of view of health electric light, moonlight or the like might well be advantageous but it is not universal, indivisible and health-giving like sunlight. Hence where both are available then from the point of view of health it is sunlight that is more useful for the masses in general.

(2) The religion of renunciation lies rooted in contentment—from this point of view too it is proper to finish during daytime eating just like other activities appropriate to daytime and to contentedly give rest to the digestive system during night-time. This facilitates proper sleep and the observance of continence—all this resulting in an augmentation of healthiness.

(3) If with a view to contentment either the daytime eating or the night-time eating has to be chosen then a wakeful, skilled intellect will definitely choose the former. This is the testimony of the life-history of the great saints that have lived upto this day. 1.

The Types of *Vrata* :

Partial renunciation is *aṇu-vrata* or **minor-scale vow**, **total renunciation** is *mahā-vrata* or **major-scale vow**. 2.

Every person desirous of renunciation refrains from defilements; but not in the case of all such persons is renunciation of one and the same form, and from the point of view of the evolutionary order of stages that is only natural. Hence treating as *vrata* all refrainment—large or small—from defilements like violence etc. the author briefly divides *vratas* into two types, viz. (1) Through *manas*, speech and body to get rid of all forms of a defilement like violence etc.,—that is *mahā-vrata* of the form of

non-violence etc. (2) To get rid of the above defilements on a partial scale, howsoever small—that is *aṇu-vrata* of the form of non-violence etc. 2.

The *Bhāvanās* or Practical Accessories
Pertaining to the Different *Vratas* :

In the case of each of these *vratas* there are five *bhāvanās*¹ that are meant to render them steady. 3.

Unless certain special types of suitable activities are undertaken most attentively the *vratas* would not gain a standing in one's soul simply on the ground that one has formally accepted a *vrata* (that is, has formally committed oneself to the implementation of a *vrata*). Hence certain activities that prove suitable to the different *vratas*—so that an accepted *vrata* penetrates deep into the life of the person concerned—are broadly enumerated; it is they that go by the name of *bhāvanā*. If behaviour is properly maintained in conformity to these *bhāvanās* then an accepted *vrata* will bring about salutary consequences in the life of a preserving person—just in the manner of a highly effective medicine; taken in proper order of these *bhāvanās* are as follows :

(1) Attentiveness as to movement, keeping one's *manas* under guard, attentiveness as to procuring things, attentiveness as to receiving and placing things, proper inspection of things eaten and drunk—these five are the *bhāvanās* appropriate to the *vrata* of non-violence.

(2) Speaking after proper consideration, renunciation of anger, renunciation of greed, renunciation of fear, renunciation of laughter—these five are *bhāvanās* appropriate to the *vrata* of truthfulness.

1. The *bhāvanās* referred to in this aphorism are, according to the Śvetāmbara tradition, described only in the *bhāṣya*; hence here there are no separate aphorisms mentioning them. But in the Digambara tradition there are five additional aphorisms—viz. 4-8 mentioning these *bhāvanās*. See the relevant appendix.

(3) Begging for shelter after proper consideration, frequently begging for shelter, fixing a limit of shelter, begging shelter from a co-religionist, eating and drinking as per permission—these five are the *bhāvanās* appropriate to the *vrata* of non-theft.

(4) To refrain from the use of bedding etc. used by a woman, an animal, an impotent person, to refrain from passionate talks about women, to refrain from looking at the beautiful bodily organs of a woman, to refrain from recalling the sensuous enjoyments earlier experienced, to refrain from taking delicious food—these five are the *bhāvanās* appropriate to the *vrata* of continence.

(5) To accord similar treatment to an agreeable and a disagreeable touch, an agreeable and a disagreeable taste, an agreeable and a disagreeable smell, an agreeable and a disagreeable form, an agreeable and a disagreeable sound—these five are the *bhāvanās* appropriate to the *vrata* of non-attachment for possessions.

Details Concerning the *Bhāvanās* :

(1) To cautiously move about so as not to cause inconvenience either to oneself or to others—that is attentiveness as to movement; to withdraw one's *manas* from evil preoccupations and to engage it in good ones—that is keeping one's *manas* under guard; to look for a thing, to receive it and to utilize it—these three constitute 'procuring' and so to act that none of these three types or procuring is vitiated by a defect—that is attentiveness as to procuring things; to inspect a thing while receiving it or placing it somewhere and to take care of it through cleansing it of dust etc.—that is attentiveness as to receiving and placing things; to receive an eatable or a drinkable after proper inspection and likewise to consume it after proper inspection—that is proper inspection of things eaten and drunk.

(2) Speaking after proper consideration—that is one *bhāvanā*, renunciation of anger, greed, fear, laughter—these are

the remaining four.

(3) Only after proper consideration to beg for a place needed for shelter—that is begging after proper consideration. In the case of a place of shelter many sorts of owners are possible—e.g. a king, a chief householder, a *śayyātara* (i.e. any person in possession of a place that has been begged for), a co-religionist; now it is particularly proper that this place be begged from whoever be its proper owner; however, it is possible that an owner has taken back the place he had earlier offered but that it is again required owing to illness etc; in that case to frequently beg this place from its owner—so that he might not be put to inconvenience is called ‘frequently begging for shelter’; at the very time when a place for shelter is begged from its owner if a limit is fixed to it then it is called ‘fixing a limit to shelter’; if a place for shelter has already been begged by a co-religionist but an occasion arises for it to be used by oneself then to beg it from this co-religionist is called ‘begging shelter from a co-religionist’; when eatables, drinkables etc. have been properly procured and shown to the preceptor then to partake of them only after receiving the preceptor’s permission is called ‘eating and drinking as per permission.’

(4) For a man or woman practising continence not to use a bedding or a seat used by a being of a different sex—that is refraining from the use of bedding etc. used by a woman, an animal, an impotent person; for a person practising continence not to indulge in talks rousing sexual passion—that is refraining from passionate talks about women; for a person practising continence not to look at such bodily parts of a person belonging to a different sex as rouse sexual passion—that is refraining from looking at the beautiful bodily organs of a woman; not to recall the sensuous enjoyments that one experienced before adopting the life of continence—that is refraining from recalling the sexual enjoyments earlier experienced; not to consume eatables and drinkables that rouse sexual passion—that is refraining from taking delicious food.

(5) Not to feel attraction towards such touch, taste, smell, colour and sound as rouse an agreeable feeling and not to feel aversion against such touch, taste etc. as rouse a disagreeable feeling—that is, according similar treatment to an agreeable and a disagreeable touch, taste etc.

Jainism being a religion directed towards renunciation a monk practising *mahāvratas* occupies the most important place in the Jaina religious order. Hence the *bhāvanās* have been described here as pertaining to *mahāvratas* and so that they are in conformity to a monk's duties. Even so, their nature is such that any and every practiser of *vratas* can increase or reduce their number as might suit his own level of spiritual development. Hence keeping in view the specific conditions of place and time as also the inner capacity of the practiser concerned the *bhāvanās* can be increased, reduced or ramified—as to their number and as to their meaning—, all this being done from the pure motive of rendering steady a *vrata* that has been accepted. 3.

A Number of other *Bhāvanās* :

To view in relation to the five defilements violence etc. the this-worldly troubles as also the other-worldly undesirable contingencies. 4.

Or to develop in relation to these violence etc. a feeling that they are of the nature of but misery. 5.

To develop a feeling of friendliness in relation to beings in general, a feeling of gladness in relation to those superior to oneself in merits, a feeling of compassion for those in misery, a feeling of neutrality in relation to those who in an idiot-like fashion are unworthy of instruction. 6.

To reflect over the nature of the world in general and of body so as to develop a feeling of fear and of dispassion in relation to things worldly. 7.

When defects are correctly viewed as belonging to the things that are to be renounced, then alone can a renunciation of these things be of a lasting character. Hence with a view to the

steadiness of the *vratas* like non-violence etc., it is deemed necessary that defects be viewed as belonging to violence etc. This viewing of defects is here described in two ways—viz. a this-worldly viewing of defects and an other-worldly viewing of defects. A this-worldly viewing of defects is an ever present realization of the this-worldly troubles that are experienced by oneself or by others as a result of resorting to violence, untruthfulness etc. Similarly, an other-worldly viewing of defects consists in a realization of the other-worldly undesirable contingencies that might be envisaged as possibly resulting from violence etc. To nourish the mental impressions pertaining to both these types of ‘viewing’—that makes up the *bhāvanā* appropriate of the *vratas* like non-violence etc.

In an exactly like manner, when constant practice has been made of viewing the character ‘being of the form of misery’ as belonging to the tendencies that are to be renounced, then alone can a renunciation of these tendencies be particularly lasting. Hence instruction is here offered to the effect that constant practice should be made of the tendency to regard violence etc. as things of the form of misery (the practice being called *duḥkha-bhāvanā*). The person accepting the *vratas* of non-violence etc. thinks of the misery caused to others by violence etc.—just as he thinks of the misery caused to oneself by them—that practice is *duḥkha-bhāvanā*. And this *bhāvanā* is useful too for rendering these *vratas* steady.

As for the four *bhāvanās* friendliness, gladness etc., they being of utmost use in the practice of any virtuous merit whatsoever are doubtless of particular use in the task of rendering steady the *vratas* like non-violence etc.; hence it is that instruction relating to these four *bhāvanās* has been offered here. The respective referential objects of these four *bhāvanās* are to some extent different from one another; for in case each of these *bhāvanās* is practised in relation to its specific referential object then alone is it able to bring about the mental state aimed at. Hence it is that these *bhāvanās* have been described through mentioning their respective referential objects.

(1) When the feeling of friendliness is practised in regard to all living beings whatsoever then alone is it possible for one to act in relation to each living being as non-violent, truthful, etc. Friendliness means to view others as one views oneself and hence the tendency or desire not to cause pain to others just as one does not cause pain to oneself.

(2) Often it so happens that one develops a feeling of jealousy on seeing someone superior to oneself. Now so long as this tendency is not exterminated it is not possible for non-violence, truthfulness etc. to find a firm standing. Hence as against jealousy one is instructed to practice the *bhāvanā* of the virtuous merit gladness. Gladness means to evince respect for one superior to oneself in merit and to feel pleased on seeing him flourishing. The referential object of this *bhāvanā* is a person superior to oneself in merit, for evil tendencies like jealousy, envy etc. are possible only in relation to such a person.

(3) If on seeing someone suffering pain a feeling of compassion is not roused in one, then it is impossible for one to observe the *vratas* like non-violence etc. Hence it is that the *bhāvanā* of compassion has been deemed necessary. Its referential object is a miserable person suffering pain; for it is a miserable, poor, helpless person who stands in need of considerate regard and assistance.

(4) It is not on every occasion and at every place that *bhāvanās* of the form of a positive activity prove effective; for only too often the maintenance of an attitude of mere neutrality is of use in rendering steady the *vratas* like non-violence etc. Hence it is that one is instructed to practise the *bhāvanā* of neutrality. Neutrality means indifference or standing aloof. Thus when one comes across a person with an utterly idiotic mental background and one who is incapable of receiving into his head even a single salutary subject-matter—moreover, when all attempt at reforming him ultimately comes to utter nought—then it is only worthwhile that an attitude of neutrality be maintained by one in relation to such a person. Hence the referential object of the

bhāvanā of neutrality is a person unworthy of instruction—that is, an incapable person.

In the absence of fear for things worldly and of dispassion in relation to the same *vratas* like non-violence etc. are not possible at all; hence one practising these *vratas* first of all requires such fear and such dispassion. As for the seed of these fear and dispassion, that is sown through a reflection over the nature of the world in general and of body. Hence it is that one is instructed to practise a *bhāvanā* in the form of a reflection over the nature of these two.

All living beings whatsoever do suffer pain—much or little. Life is utterly perishable, nor is any other thing of perdurable nature. Such a reflection over the nature of the world in general puts an end to one's infatuation with this world and generates in one fear in relation to it. Similarly, through a reflection over the transitory impure and worthless nature of body there is generated in one a feeling of non-attachment or dispassion towards objects internal as well as external. 4-7.

The Nature of Violence :

The destruction of life due to an act involving negligence is violence. 8.

The five *vratas*, non-violence etc. that have been described earlier—if they are to be properly understood and implemented during the course of one's life-activity then it is necessary that the nature of the defilements standing opposed to them be correctly comprehended. Hence begins this section dealing with the five defilements in question; of these the first—viz. violence—is defined in the present aphorism.

The present definition of non-violence has been rendered complete through two constituents; of these the first is *pramattayoga* (translated as 'an act involving negligence') meaning an act that involves attachment-cum-aversion and is careless, the second *prāṇavadha* (translated as 'the destruction of life'). Here the first constituent is of the form of a cause, the second of the

form of its effect. Hence the net meaning of the aphorism is that whatever *prāṇavadha* is due to *pramattayoga* that is *himsā* or violence.

Question : To deprive a living being of its life or to inflict injury on it—that is violence. This meaning of violence is comprehensible to every one and is also much well known. Why then is the element yielded by the phrase *pramattayoga* superadded to this meaning ?

Answer : So long as thought and action characterized by high refinement do not gain entry within the human society there is no particular difference between such a society and the other species of living beings so far as their practice is concerned. Just like animals and birds, a man belonging to such a society impelled by a prepossession deprives a living being of its life—knowingly or unknowingly, feeling a need or feeling no need whatsoever. When in this primitive stage of human society—so replete with violence—the thought of some individual is roused to reflect over the nature of violence, then he pronounces as a defilement the violence that is current—that is, violence of the form of depriving a living being of its life—and preaches that no living being should be deprived of its life. Thus on the one side there is a well-established tendency born of a custom like violence and on the other side the rise of the new attitude of non-violence, and when there ensues a conflict between the two certain questions—raised from the side of the tendency to violence—automatically pose themselves before the opponent of violence; and these questions are also posed before him by others. In brief the questions are three :

(1) Even the advocates of non-violence have to maintain life after all, and it is impossible for one to maintain life without resorting to violence in one form or another. So the violence resorted to in connection with maintaining life—is that or is that not covered under the defilement designated violence ?

(2) So long as it is not proved that it is possible for mistake and ignorance to be utterly absent from man's actions it

is quite possible to envisage that some being is deprived of life at the hands of an advocate of non-violence through mistake or ignorance. So violence of this description—is it or is it not covered under the defilement designated violence ?

(3) Often it so happens that one committed to non-violence seeks to save some one from a danger or to provide him with a pleasure or convenience but that the result is just the opposite—that is to say, the person sought to be helped happens to lose his very life. Now such violence taking place under conditions like these—is it or is it not covered under the defilement designated violence ?

When such questions are posed then an endeavour to answer them results in a deeper consideration bestowed on the nature of violence and non-violence and in a further extension of the meaning of the terms concerned. To deprive a being of its life—at the most, to cause pain to a being—that was the meaning of violence upto now; similarly, not to deprive a being of its life—at the most, not to cause pain to a being—that was the meaning of non-violence upto now. But the theoreticians of non-violence now entered into subtleties and instead declared that a mere deprivation of life or a mere causing of pain must not necessarily be treated as a cause of defilement designated violence; thus besides the act of deprivation of life or of causing of pain what has to be further investigated is as to what was the mental feeling that actuated the agent concerned—whence along it being possible to decide whether the act of violence in question was or was not a case of defilement. The mental feeling to be looked for in this connection is made up of the various impulses of attachment and aversion as also carelessness—a totality for which the technical designation is *pramāda* or negligence. When deprivation of life or causing of pain results from an evil or petty mental feeling of this sort then alone is it a case of violence and such violence alone is of the form of defilement. On the other hand, deprivation of life or causing of pain taking place in the absence of the mental feeling in question might well be called violence on account of its outward appearance but is not a case

of defilement. Thus when the refined attitude of non-violence gained currency in the midst of a society accustomed to violence and consequently when the thought pertaining to the matter underwent development, then it was not deemed sufficient that violence be defined as mere deprivation of life but an important element in the form of *pramattayoga* or 'act involving negligence' was superadded to the proposed definition.

Question : In connection with the above definition of violence the question arises whether deprivation of life taking place in the absence of an act of negligence is or is not a case of violence. Similarly, the question is whether when deprivation of life does not take place but an act of negligence is present there we have or do not have a case of violence. And if both these are actual cases of violence then a further question is whether they are cases of violence born of an act of negligence or of violence of some other sort.

Answer : A mere deprivation of life, being a gross state of affairs, is certainly violence of a visible sort while a mere act of negligence, being a subtle state of affairs, is something invisible. But besides this difference as to being visible or otherwise there is another important difference between the two, and it is on this latter difference that it depends whether a case of violence is or is not a case of defilement. Thus as viewed outwardly deprivation of life is certainly a case of violence but it is not necessary that it must be a case of defilement; for its character of being a defilement is not dependent on itself. In the case of violence its being a defilement depends on the mental feeling of the person indulging in violence; hence this its character is dependent on something other than itself. If the mental feeling in question is itself evil then the deprivation of life resulting from it is a case of defilement; but if this mental feeling is not of that kind then this deprivation of life is not a case of defilement. Hence it is that in the technical terminology such violence not of the form of a defilement is called *dravya himsā*—that is, formal violence—or *vyāvahārika himsā*—that is, violence practically speaking. *Dravya himsā* or *vyāvahārika himsā* only means violence whose character

of being a defilement is not-open to cancellation. On the contrary, the subtle mental feeling of the form of an act of negligence itself being of the form of defilement its character of being a defilement is dependent on itself—that is to say, this its character is not dependent on a gross deprivation of life or on any other external happening. Thus even if deprivation of life did not take place and even if pain was caused to no being—nay, even if, while seeking to deprive a being of its life or to cause pain to it one actually lengthened the life-duration of this being or caused pleasure to it—but if the mental feeling obtaining on the occasion was evil then it is to be treated as an absolute case of defilement. Hence it is that in the technical terminology such a mental feeling is called *bhāva himsā*—that is, material violence—or *nīścaya himsā*—that is violence definitively speaking. *Bhāva himsā* or *nīścaya himsā* only means violence whose character of being a defilement, being dependent on itself, is not-open to cancellation during all the three phases of time. Thus when once it is understood that a mere act of negligence and a mere deprivation of life—though each of them is called a case of violence their character of being a greater or lesser defilement is as just stated then an answer is automatically given to the question whether these two are cases of violence born of an act of negligence or of violence of some other sort. And the answer is to the effect that even if not visible to gross eyes it is a mere act of negligence that is a case of violence born of an act of negligence while a mere deprivation of life is not a case of violence of this sort.

Question : If as stated just above the root-cause of violence being a case of defilement is merely an act of negligence, then by way of defining violence one must simply say that it is of the form of an act of negligence. And if this reasoning be valid then the question naturally arises as to why the definition of violence contains a mention of deprivation of life.

Answer : Certainly, it is an act of negligence that is in truth a case of violence, but its renunciation on the part of people at large is not possible suddenly and for the most part. On the contrary, a mere deprivation of life—even if it is a gross act its

renunciation is desirable for the sake of a balanced maintenance of popular life; besides, such renunciation is possible for the most part. Thus even if there has been no renunciation of all act of negligence but if the tendency towards a gross deprivation of life has been reduced—then too there often prevail happiness and calm in popular life. Certainly, in virtue of the stagewise evolution of the tendency to non-violence it becomes possible that among the people at large there takes place first the renunciation of a gross deprivation of life and gradually the renunciation of all act of negligence. Hence even though the renunciation of violence of the form of an act of negligence is recommended to be adopted as an instrument of high spiritual evolution, yet from the point of view of popular life the gross deprivation of life too is treated as a case of violence and its renunciation as a case of non-violence.

Question : Understood that non-violence means refrainment from what the theoretician has called violence. But let it be further told as to what duties aimed at building up life are incumbent on one who has accepted the *vrata* of non-violence as thus understood.

Answer : (1) To keep on rendering life simpler and simpler and to keep on reducing its requirements more and more.

(2) Whatever might be the scope of ignorance within the sphere of human activity there is yet place in it for knowledge as per one's endeavour. Hence to be ever vigilant and to be careful that no mistakes are committed, and if a mistake has been actually committed then to develop such a view that it is not thrust away out of sight.

(3) Even while reducing one's requirements and even while aiming at vigilance to constantly endeavour to reduce the craving for a gross life—craving that is one real defilement of mind—as also the other defilements like attachment and aversion that are born of this one defilement.

Question : The character of being a defilement is above attributed to violence. What is meant by that ?

Answer : Whatever reduces the softness of mind and

augments its harshness, whatever prolongs the craving for a gross life—therein lies the character-of-being-a-defilement as attributed to violence. On the other hand, whatever does not augment the harshness in question and does not in the least disturb a natural loving disposition of mind and a life oriented inwards—all that, even if outworldly appearing like violence, is of the form of not-a-defilement. 8.

The Nature of Untruthfulness :

To speak what is *a-sat* (that is, false or improper) that is untruthfulness. 9.

Though in this aphorism speaking the *a-sat* has alone been called untruthfulness the phrase should be understood in a broad sense so that its meaning equally includes both thinking the *a-sat* and practising the *a-sat*; hence it is that the defilement designated untruthfulness covers speaking the *a-sat*, thinking the *a-sat* as well as practising the *a-sat*. Just as in the definition of violence so also in that of untruthfulness and of the remaining defilements like taking-what-is-not given (i.e. theft)¹ etc. the qualification 'due to an act involving negligence' has to be understood as superadded. Thus the net meaning of the aphorism is 'speaking the *a-sat*, thinking the *a-sat* or practising the *a-sat* which is due to an act involving negligence—that is untruthfulness.'

Here it will do to attribute two chief meanings to the word *a-sat* :

(1) To utterly deny the existence of a thing that does actually exist or while not denying its existence to describe it as it does not in fact exist—that is speaking the *a-sat*.

(2) To speak what is true but what causes distress to another person, it being accompanied by a mental ill-feeling directed

1. The qualification is not to be superadded in the case of the defilement of incontinence; for it is quite impossible for this defilement to occur in a state of non-negligence. That exactly is why the *vrata* of continence is said to be such as brooks no exception whatsoever. For details of the matter see the Gujarati essay "*Jainadr̥ṣṭie Brahmacarya*."

against the latter—that is speaking the *a-sat* (that is, speaking what is reprehensible).

According to the first meaning there is a case of speaking the *a-sat* when a person who, while having money, says to his creditor that he has got no money or who, while not denying that he has got money, offers such an account of it that the creditor is unable to realize his dues. According to the second meaning there is a case of speaking the *a-sat* when referring to a person who is illiterate or simpleton one says that he is illiterate or simpleton, a statement which, though true, has been made with a view to slighting this person and so as to cause him distress.

As a result of this understanding of untruthfulness the following duties turn out to be incumbent on one who accepts the *vrata* of truthfulness :

(1) To renounce all acts of negligence.

(2) To maintain uniformity in the activity of *manas*, speech and body.

(3) Not to speak, think or practise—out of ill-feeling—what is true but what proves disagreeable to another person. 9.

The Nature of Theft :

To take what has not been given—that is theft. 10.

A thing which is under the ownership of someone else—be it as lowly in worth as a blade of hay—to take it away stealthily without the permission of its owner—that is theft.

As a result of this definition of theft the following duties turn out to be incumbent on one who accepts the *vrata* of non-theft.

(1) To renounce the tendency to greediness towards any and every thing.

(2) So long as one is not rid of a greedy habit, to earn legitimately and through one's own endeavour the thing that is the object of one's greed—at the same time not to even think of taking without permission a thing of this description belonging to

another person. 10.

The Nature of *A-brahma* or Incontinence :

The act of *maithuna*—that is copulation—constitutes *a-brahma* or incontinence. 11.

Maithuna or copulation means an act on the part of a *mithuna* or couple. The word '*mithuna*' or 'couple' ordinarily stands for a pair of a woman and a man, but here it is to be understood in a somewhat broader sense. The pair in question can be made up of a woman and a man, a man and a man, or a woman and a woman; moreover, it can be homogeneous (that is, made up of two beings belonging to some one species, e.g. two men) or heterogeneous (that is, made up of two beings belonging to two different species, e.g. a man and an animal). An act of *manas*, speech or body impelled by sexual passion on the part of such a couple is called *maithuna* or copulation—that is, *a-brahma* or incontinence.

Question : When there exists no couple but a single man or a single woman impelled by sexual passion indulges in sexual misconduct making use of some inanimate object or his / her own bodily parts like hands etc.—would that be a case of copulation according to the definition just proposed ?

Answer : Of course, for copulation only means any act whatsoever impelled by sexual passion. And this description certainly applies to the said misbehaviour on the part of a single person; hence it too is a case of defilement designated copulation.

Question : Why has copulation been called *a-brahma* ?

Answer : What is not *brahma* is *a-brahma*. And *brahma* means that whose observance is conducive to an augmentation of virtuous merits; on the other hand, a course of action which, when followed, results not in an augmentation of virtuous merits but in a nourishment of defilements is *a-brahma*. Now copulation is an act involvement in which immediately initiates the process of an augmentation of all defilements and a diminution of all merits; hence it is that it is given the designation *a-brahma*. 11.

The Nature of *Parigraha* or Attachment-for-possessions :

Mūrcchā constitutes *parigraha*. 12.

Mūrcchā means attachment. Thus whether a thing be small or large, inanimatic or animatic, external or internal—nay, even in case the thing in question does not exist at all—getting entangled with it—that is to say, losing all sense of discrimination out of a pinning for it—that is called *parigraha*.

Question : True it is that the five defilements from violence upto attachment-for-possessions, when viewed outwardly, seem to differ as to their nature, but on minute consideration it appears that they exhibit among themselves no difference whatsoever. For in the case of all these five defilements the character of being a defilement depends on nothing except attachment, aversion and infatuation. Certainly, attachment, aversion and infatuation constitute the poison that vitiates the activities like violence etc.—and it is on account of them that these activities are called defilement. Now if all this is correct then it should be sufficient to make declaration to the effect that attachment, aversion etc. are the cases of defilement. Why then undertake a description of the five—or more or less—defilements like violence etc. ?

Answer : Granted that all worldly activity proceeds from attachment, aversion etc. Hence attachment, aversion etc. are alone chiefly a defilement and to refrain from this defilement is the sole chief *vrata*. Even so, when one is to be instructed as to refrainment from attachment, aversion etc. then it is only through an elucidation of the activities proceeding from them that one can be asked to refrain from those activities as also from attachment, aversion etc. that impel them. Certainly, while dealing with the gross-witted people no other order of procedure can possibly be adopted. Now of the innumerable activities proceeding from attachment and aversion violence, untruthfulness etc. are the chief ones. And it is these activities that chiefly eat up into the vitals of life—spiritual or worldly; hence it is that these activities like violence etc. have been divided into five types and thus an

account offered of the five defilements in question. Of course, from time to time and depending on the difference of country there has been in past and there is to be in future a difference as to the number of defilements brought under consideration. However, without bothering our heads as to the number of these defilements or their gross names this much is to be chiefly understood that through a delineation of them what is indicated is but a refrainment from the defilement of the form of attachment, aversion and infatuation. And hence it is that there remains no question as to which among the five defilements violence etc. is chief, which subordinate, which of them, is to be renounced first, which later on. As a matter of fact, the defilement of violence, as broadly understood, includes within itself all the remaining ones. Hence it is that one who views non-violence as the chief of virtues includes within the defilement of violence all the remaining defilements untruthfulness etc., and thus feels that a refrainment from mere violence means a refrainment from all the defilements. Similarly, one who views truthfulness as the chief of virtues includes within the defilement of untruthfulness all the remaining defilements and feels that a refrainment from mere untruthfulness means a refrainment from all the defilements. The same reasoning is adopted also by those who view contentment, continence or the like as the chief of virtues. 12.

The First Requirement of a True *Vratin*-
that is, of One Truly Committed to *Vratas* :

Only he who is devoid of a thorn can be a true *vratin*. 13.

Through a mere formal acceptance of the *vratas* like non-violence, truth etc. one does not become a true *vratin*; rather in order to become a true *vratin* one has to observe a minimum or first condition—which is mentioned here. The condition is the renunciation of a thorn. In brief, the thorns are three in number.

(1) False pretension, deception, or a tendency to cheat; (2) Greed for worldly enjoyments; (3) Not to have faith in what is true or to insist on what is false. All the three are of the form

of a mental defilement. So long as they are there they eat up into the vitals of the mind and the body and they do prevent the soul from retaining its balance. Hence a person possessed of a thorn, even if he formally accepts a *vrata*, cannot concentrate on its observance. When a thorn or some such sharp thing is kept thrust within a bodily part then the body and the mind of the person concerned are deprived of their balance by this irritant and as a result this person is prevented from concentrating on any task; in a like manner do the mental defilements in question act as a cause of unease—which is why a renunciation of them is the first condition of becoming a *vratin*. 13.

The Types of *Vratin* :

There are two possible types of *Vratin*—Viz. *agārin* (lit. one with a house) or householder and *anagārin* (lit. one without a house) or world-renouncer. 14.

Not all those accepting *vratas* are possessed of similar capacities. Hence corresponding to the greater or lesser effectiveness of their capacities the *vratins* are divided into two types—viz. (1) *agārin* and (2) *anagāra*. *Agāra* means house. And he who stands associated with a house is *agārin*. So *agārin* means householder. Similarly, he who does not stand associated with a house is *anagāra*—that is, a world-renouncer, a monk. Though the direct meaning of the words *agārin* and *anagāra* refers to residing in a house and not residing in a house yet what has to be adopted here is the corresponding intended meaning, and viewed from that end an *agārin* is one afflicted with worldly desires while an *anagārin* one free from worldly desires. When this intended meaning is adopted the net purport of the aphorism turns out to be as follows : If a person, even while residing in a house, is free from all worldly desires then he is in fact an *anagāra*; on the other hand, if a person, who has renounced his house and resides in a forest, is not yet free from worldly desires then he is in fact an *agārin*. Thus the true and chief criterion of being an *agārin* and being an *anagāra* is just one, and it is on the basis of it that the *vratins* are here classified into two types.

Question : If an *agārin* is so called because he is afflicted with worldly desires then how can such a one be called a *vratin* ?

Answer : Broadly speaking, just as a man in fact resides in his own house or in some such fixed place and yet under certain definite conditions it is said about him that he resides in that particular city, similarly a person who while yet afflicted with worldly desires is associated with *vratas* in a small measure can on that account be called a *vratin* even. 14.

An Account of the *Vratin* of the Type *Agārin* :

He who is *aṇuvratadhārin*—that is, one committed to a minor-scale observance of the *vratas*—is a *vratin* of the type *agārin*. 15.

He is also committed to an observance of the *vratas* designated *digvirati*, *deśavirati*, *anarthadaṇḍavirati*, *sāmāyika*, *pañadhōpavāsa*, *upabhoga-paribhoga-parimāṇa*, *atithisaṁvibhāga*. 16.

And he also undertakes a performance of *saṁlekhanā*—unto death. 17.

The householder who is not in a position to undertake a full-scale observance of the *vratas* like non-violence etc. but who is possessed of a tendency to refrainment from worldly enjoyment, such a person, while yet conforming to the limitations imposed on a householder accepts the *vratas* on a small scale; such a householder is called a layman committed to a minor-scale observance of the *vratas*.

The *vratas* accepted with a view to full-scale observance are called *mahāvratas* and since the vow taken in connection with them refers to a total commitment there obtains no difference of degree in the case of such a *vrata*; but when these *vratas* are accepted on a small-scale then since smallness can be of various degrees the vow taken in connection with one of them is possibly of many different types. However, the aphorist, without entering into the variety that thus pertains to each single minor-scale *vrata*, describes as one minor-scale *vrata* each of the *vratas* non-violence

etc. accepted by a householder. Such minor-scale *vratas* are five which, inasmuch as they serve as root or foundation-stone for world-renunciation, are called *mūlaguṇa*—that is fundamental virtue—or *mūlavrata*—that is, fundamental *vrata*. And with a view to protecting, nourishing and purifying these fundamental *vratas* a householder also accepts certain other *vratas* known as *uttraguṇa*—that is, subsidiary virtue—or *uttaravrata*—that is, subsidiary *vrata*.¹

Such subsidiary *vratas* are here briefly enumerated to be seven. And there is also reference here to a *vrata* that a householder *vratin* is impelled to adopt right at the end of his life; that *vrata* is designated *saṃlekhanā*. The following is a summary delineation of the nature of all these *vratas*.

1. Generally speaking, the entire tradition of Lord Mahāvīra is without a difference of opinion as to the number five of the minor-scale vows, or as to their name or their order of enumeration. Only in the Digambara tradition certain authorities have enumerated 'refrainment from nightly eating' as a sixth minor-scale vow. But as regards the householder's *vratas* treated as secondary virtues there are current a number of traditions, old and new. In the Śvetāmbara sect two such traditions are observable, one that pertaining to the *Tattvārthasūtra*, the other that pertaining to the texts like *Āgamas* etc. The first enumerates not *upabhogaparibhogaparimānavrata* but *deśaviramaṇavrata* after *digviramaṇavrata*, while the second enumerates *upabhogaparibhogaparimānavrata* after *digviramaṇavrata* and *deśaviramaṇavrata* after *sāmāyikavrata*. But in spite of this difference as to the order of enumeration there is here no difference at all as to designating a particular set of three of these *vratas* as *guṇavrata* and the set of the remaining four as *śikṣāvrata*. On the other hand, in the Digambara sect as many as six traditions are current as to subsidiary virtues; thus different views are held on the question by the authorities like Kundakunda, Umāsvāti, Samantabhadra, Svāmi-Kārtikeya, Jinasena, Vasunandin. In connection with this difference of views the divergence pertains sometimes to name, sometimes to the order of enumeration, sometimes to number, sometimes to the development-of-meaning. Those desirous to familiarize themselves with the details of the matter must go through Babu Jugalkishoraji Mukhtar's Hindi book '*Jainācāryon ka Śāsanabheda*' from p. 29 onwards. Publisher Jainagrantharatnakar Karyalaya, Hirabag, Bombay.

The Five Minor-scale Vows :

(1) Not being in a position to refrain from all violence—whether undertaken through *manas* or through speech or through body—directed against any thing, big or small, to refrain from all violence that goes beyond the limit set for oneself by oneself keeping in view the needs of one's life as a householder—that is the minor-scale vow of non-violence.

(2-5) Likewise, to refrain from all untruthfulness, all theft, all incontinence, all attachment-for-possessions that goes beyond the limit set for oneself by oneself keeping in view one's specific conditions of life—these are respectively the minor-scale vows of truthfulness, non-theft, continence, non-attachment.

The Three *Guṇavratas* :

(6) In conformity to one's capacity to refrain from the worldly enjoyment, to fix a limit in all the directions east, west, etc. and not to undertake any un-virtuous act whatsoever beyond this limit—that is called *digvirati-vrata*.

(7) Even when a limit has been fixed in a particular direction to impose from time to time a further limit within this limit and not to undertake any un-virtuous act whatsoever beyond the inner limit thus imposed—that is called *deśavirati-vrata*.

(8) Making an exception of all un-virtuous act that might be necessary for the fulfilment of some worldly need of one's own to refrain from all un-virtuous act whatsoever—that is to say, to refrain from all unvirtuous act that serves no purpose—that is *anarthadaṇḍavirati-vrata*.

The Four *Śikṣāvratas* :

(9) Making a mental fixation of time—that is, for a fixed period of time—to refrain from all un-virtuous act whatsoever and to remain engaged in a virtuous act—that is *sāmāyika-vrata*.

(10) On the 8th, 14th or full-moon date of the lunar month—or on any other date—to keep fast, to refrain from bodily decoration, to keep awake during night time engaged in virtuous

acts—that is called *paṇḍadhōpavāsa-vrata*.

(11) To refrain from such a use of food-and-drink, ornaments, clothing, utensils etc. as involves much un-virtue and to fix a limit even for such a use of these things as involves little un-virtue—that is *upabhogaparibhogaparimāṇa-vrata*.

(12) To donate with a feeling of pure devotion to a worthy recipient things of daily need like food-and-drink etc. such as have been earned legitimately and are in a usable condition, a donation so made as to prove advantageous to both the parties concerned—that is, *atithisaṁvibhāga-vrata*.

With a view to putting a complete end to the *kaṣāyas*, to weaken them through reducing the causes that make them come into play and nourish them—that is *saṁlekhanā*. Since the *vrata* of *saṁlekhanā* is accepted for a period lasting upto the end of the present body it is called *saṁlekhanā*—unto—death. The *saṁlekhanā-vrata* of this description can be accepted in full faith and fully implemented even by a householder; hence it is that a householder has been said to be a performer of this *vrata*.

Question : One accepting the *vrata* of *saṁlekhanā* puts an end to one's body through fasting etc., but that amounts to suicide while suicide is a case of violence against oneself. How far then is it proper to accord it the status of a *vrata* within the fold of a religion of renunciation ?

Answer : Simply on the ground that the *vrata* in question is apparently of the form of suffering or apparently of the form of destruction of life it does not become a case of violence.

The nature of violence proper is essentially constituted by a tendency to attachment, aversion and infatuation; now in the *vrata* of *saṁlekhanā* there certainly takes place a destruction of life but since this destruction does not come about through attachment, aversion or infatuation the *vrata* does not become a case of violence. Nay, this *vrata* is born out of a constant practice of the feeling of lack-of-infatuation and of lack-of-passion and it attains completion only when this feeling is sought to be fully mastered; hence it is a case not of violence but of *śubha-dhyāna*—

that is, auspicious meditation—or *śuddha-dhyāna*—that is, ultra-pure meditation—and it is as such that is accorded a place within the fold of a religion of renunciation.

Question : Even in certain non-Jaina sects there was and is current the custom of putting an end to one's life and treating it as a religious act—e.g. the custom called *Kamalapūjā*, *Bhairvajapa*, *Jalasamādhi* etc.; how does the custom differ from that of *saṁlekhanā* ?

Answer : So far as the gross appearance of destruction of life is concerned all these acts are doubtless similar, hence if at all they can differ from one another that can be only as to the mental feeling actuating them. Thus if at the back of *Kamalapūjā* etc. there is present no material aspiration or some other such greed but a mere impulse of devotion or a mere tendency to surrender, then a situation like this differs from that of *saṁlekhanā*—where neither an impulse nor a greed is present—only as to the feeling of devotion built up on the basis of a metaphysics. Thus in conformity to the metaphysics lying at its back the Jaina devotion is aimed not at surrendering oneself before someone else or pleasing someone else but at a mere self-purification. Thus a refined version of the various old established religious customs involving a destruction of one's own life—a version devised for the sake of fulfilling the aim in question—is present with the Jaina sect in the form of the *vrata* of *saṁlekhanā*. Hence it is that the *vrata* of *saṁlekhanā* has been recommended as suitable for particular occasions.

When the end of life appears to be drawing near for certain, when the religion and such other necessary duties are in the danger of perishing through non-observance, when no sort of vicious meditation is present there at all—these are conditions under which this *vrata* is deemed worthy of observance. 15-17.

The *Aticāras* or Failures of Conduct Connected with *Samyak-darśana* or Right-inclination :

Doubt, longing, inconstancy of understanding, praising

those holding an alien view, developing intimacy with those holding an alien view—these five are failures of conduct connected with *samyak-darśana*. 18.

The type of moral deviations on account of which a *vrata* that has been accepted gets bedimmed and gradually diminishing ultimately perishes are called 'failures of conduct'.

Now *samyaktva* is the fundamental basis of all code of right conduct, and it is on its purity that the purity of conduct is dependent. Hence the failures of conduct that are likely to disturb the purity of *samyaktva* are here described by being divided into five classes.

(1) After having adopted the viewpoint of the Jaina scriptures to raise as regards certain subtle or suprasensuous entities—which in fact are cognizable only by an omniscient or on the basis of scriptural testimony—doubt as to whether they exist or do not—that is failure of conduct of the form of doubt. In Jaina metaphysics there is full scope for doubt as also for investigation based on it; if nevertheless doubt is here described as a failure of conduct then the intention is to discourage all attempt at applying the criteria of rational viewpoint to matters that lie outside the field of reasoning. Such an attempt results in a situation that the spiritual realizer, having failed to rationally comprehend a field amenable to faith alone, ultimately loses interest even in the field actually amenable to rational comprehension. Hence only that doubt which obstructs the progress of spiritual realization is to be given up as a failure of conduct.

(2) A wish for this-worldly and other-worldly objects—that is called 'longing'. When such a longing begins to take place the spiritual realizer can any time give up his adopted doctrine without having reflected over its merits and defects. Hence it is called a failure of conduct.

(3) Even when there obtains for occasions for a difference of opinion or a difference of view then too not to take a decided stand oneself but to say out of sheer dull-wittedness 'this position

is correct and that too is correct'—this sort of unsteadiness of intellect is called 'inconstancy of understanding'. Such unsteadiness of intellect does not allow the spiritual realizer to remain firm on some one principle and is therefore of the nature of a failure of conduct.

(4-5) To praise and to develop intimacy with those holding a perverted view are respectively called 'praising those holding a false view' and 'developing intimacy with those holding a false view.' Even in persons suffering from the defect of holding a deluded view virtues like thoughtfulness, renunciation etc. are quite often present. When on the basis of an attraction towards those virtues of his and without discriminating between merits and defects such a person is praised or intimacy is developed with him then the danger is that the spiritual realizer not yet ripe in discrimination might deviate from his adopted doctrine. Hence it is that praising those holding an alien view and developing intimacy with those holding an alien view are called failures of conduct. The spiritual realizer who with a feeling of impartiality and discrimination views merits as merits and defects as defects, in his case it is not necessary that the praise in question or the intimacy in question must prove harmful. These five failures of conduct are common to all *vratis*—whether laymen or monks—for *samyaktva* is a characteristic common to them both. 18.

The Failures of Conduct Connected with the *Vratas* and *Śīlas* Enumerated and Described :

Connected with the different *vratas* and *śīlas* there are five failures-of conduct each. Taken in order they are as follows : 19.

Binding, injuring, piercing the body, loading excessive burden, denying food and drink—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale *vrata* of non-violence. 20.

False instruction, false accusation in private, forgery, mis-appropriating a pledged property, divulging someone's

secret—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor-scale *vrata* of truthfulness. 21.

To encourage someone to commit theft, to receive what has been brought by a thief, to violate the taxation regulations of an opposite kingdom, to measure out more or less than the proper quantity, to deal in counterfeit commodities—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor-scale *vrata* of non-theft. 22.

To arrange someone else's marriage, to enjoy a woman kept by someone else, to enjoy a woman looked after by none, unnatural sexual act, intensive desire for sexual act—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor-scale *vrata* of continence. 23.

To exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of fields and residential quarters, similarly to exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of manufactured and raw gold-and-silver, for that of cattle-wealth and corn, for that of servants and maid-servants, for that of clothes and utensils—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor-scale *vrata* of non-attachment-for-possession. 24.

To violate the regulation prescribed for the upward direction, to violate that prescribed for the downward direction, to violate that prescribed for the transverse direction, to make addition to the sphere of regulation, not to keep in memory a regulation, that has been prescribed—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *digvirati-vrata*. 25.

To get a thing brought by someone from outside the prescribed sphere, to send a servant to bring something from outside the prescribed sphere, to make a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere, to make a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere, to make a bodily gesture for the same purpose, to throw outwards some physical stuff for the same purpose—these five are the failures of conduct connected with

the *deśa-virati-vrata*. 26.

Uncultured talks, jokes etc., unbecoming boldly gestures, talkativeness, lending things to others without a proper thought, possessing in excess the things of daily requirement—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *anarthadaṇḍavīramāṇa-vrata* 27.

Improper bodily movement improper speech, improper mental act, feeling of disregard, lack of requisite memory—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *sāmāyika-vrata*. 28.

To evacuate, urinate etc. at a place not properly inspected and not properly cleansed of dust, to receive and place things at such a place, to arrange bedding at such a place, feeling of disregard, lack of requisite memory—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *pañcādhopavāsavrata*. 29.

To eat what possesses life, to eat a thing containing what possesses life, to eat a thing mixed with what possesses life, to eat what causes intoxication, to eat what is not properly cooked—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *upabhogaparibhoga-parimāṇa-vrata*. 30.

To place the thing to be donated inside what possesses life, to cover it by what possesses life, to say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else, malice, violating the fixed time—these five are the failures of conduct connected with the *atithisamvibhāga-vrata*. 31.

To wish for life, to wish for death, affection for friends, refreshing the memory of past pleasures, to wish for some sort of enjoyment as a result of penance and renunciation—these five are the failures of conduct connected with *saṃlekhanā unto-death*. 32.

The rule of conduct that is accepted in full faith and with a full understanding—that is called *vrata*. In accordance with this meaning of the word *vrata* all those twelve *vratas* of a householder are properly called *vrata*. However, in the present

context by an employment of the two words *vrata* and *śīla* it has been indicated that the fundamental rules pertaining to a code-of-right-conduct are just five—viz. non-violence, truthfulness etc.—while the remaining rules—viz, *digviramaṇa* etc.—are only meant to buttress those fundamental ones. And when in connection with each *vrata* and each *śīla* five failures of conduct have been enumerated that has to be understood from a moderate standpoint; for from the standpoint of brevity this number can be further reduced while from that of expansion it can be further increased.

Cāritra or right conduct means the constant development of the feeling of equanimity resulting from an absence of the mental perturbances like attachment, aversion etc. And in order to realize this fundamental nature of *cāritra* whatever rules of conduct like non-violence, truthfulness etc. are adopted in practical life—they too are called *cāritra*. However, since practical life is built up in accordance with the conditions of place and time and with the level of refinement of human intellect when there is a difference in these conditions and in this level of refinement there comes about a difference in the practical arrangement of life; the result is that even while the fundamental nature of *cāritra* is one and the same the number and nature of the rules supposed to buttress it are bound to be different under different conditions. This exactly is why the *vratas* and regulations prescribed for the laymen are variously described in the scriptural texts, and in future too they are bound to undergo changes. However, in the present context the author has divided the duties of a householder into thirteen types and has described the failures-of-conduct connected with each. Taken in order they are as follows :

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Vrata* of Non-violence :

(1) To check a living being from proceeding to its desired place or to bind it—that is binding.

(2) To thrash with a stick, a whip or the like—that is injuring.

(3) To tear or to prick the bodily parts like ear, nose, skin etc.—that is piercing the body.

(4) To load on a man or a beast burden which it is beyond his or its capacity to bear—that is loading excessive burden.

(5) To check someone from receiving his food or drink—that is denying food and drink.

When no particular purpose is to be served thereby these five evil acts are in no case to be undertaken by a house-holder—that is the general rule; but in case as a part of the householder's duty they are to be undertaken for some purpose or other then the need is to proceed in a soft-natured manner. 19-20.

Failure-of-conduct Connected with the *Vrata* of Truthfulness :

(1) By telling one things true and false to mislead one into a wrong path—that is false instruction.

(2) Impelled by passion and out of fear to separate from one another a husband and a wife or two friends, alternatively, to level accusation against someone in the presence of someone else—that is false accusation in private.

(3) To produce a false document through seal, signature etc. or to circulate a counterfeit coin—that is forgery.

(4) If the person who has pledged a security forgets something connected with the fact then taking advantage of his forgetfulness to misappropriate a small or large part of the property concerned—that is misappropriating a pledged property.

(5) With a view to terminating friendship between two persons to speak ill of one to the other, alternatively, to divulge someone's secret—that is divulging someone's secret. 21.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Vrata* of Non-theft :

(1) To rouse someone to commit theft or to get him roused to do so through someone else, or to give consent to

someone's act of theft—that is encouraging someone to commit theft.

(2) To receive from someone what he has brought through stealing though without oneself rousing him to commit theft or approving his act of theft—that is receiving what has been brought by a thief.

(3) The different kingdoms impose restrictions on the export and import of commodities or they levy some tax on them; now to violate regulations connected with all this—that is violating taxation regulations of the opposite kingdom.

(4) To give or take things employing faulty means, weights, balances—that is measuring out more or less than the proper quantity.

(5) To deal in counterfeit commodities. 22.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the Vrata of Continence¹ :

(1) Not being content with arranging the marriage of one's own children to do the same in the case of someone else's children either out of affection or with a view to reaping the beneficial fruit of *kanyādāna* or a girl's marriage (lit. making gift of a virgin)—that is arranging someone else's marriage.

(2) When someone else has reserved for oneself a prostitute or some such common woman for a certain period then to enjoy her during that very period—that is enjoying a woman kept by someone else.

(3) To enjoy a woman who is a prostitute, or whose husband has gone out, or who is helpless, or who is in possession of no man—that is called enjoying a woman looked after by none.

(4) Unnatural sexual act.

(5) To indulge in multifarious sexual act by frequently rousing passion—that is intensive desire for sexual act. 23.

1. For details of the matter see the Gujarati essay *Jainadr̥ṣṭie Brahmacarya*.

**Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Vrata* of
Non-attachment-for-possession :**

(1) To exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of fields and residential quarters—thus the quantity fixed at the time of accepting the *vrata* being subsequently exceeded out of greed.

(2) The same relating to the possession of manufactured and raw gold-and-silver.

(3) The same relating to the possession of cattle-wealth like cow, buffaloes etc. and corns like wheat, *bājarī* etc.

(4) The same relating to the possession of servants and maid-servants.

(5) The same relating to the possession of the various sorts of clothes and utensils. 24.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Digviramaṇa-vrata* :

(1) After having fixed the limit of height for climbing a tree, mountain etc. to violate this limit out of greed or some such mental perturbation—that is called violating the regulation prescribed for the upward direction.

(2-3) Likewise, violating the regulation prescribed for the downward direction or that prescribed for the transverse direction.

(4) When spheres with different limits have been fixed for different directions then at some occasion as per need to make reduction from the sphere pertaining to one direction and to make an equivalent addition to that pertaining to another direction—that is called making addition to the sphere of regulation.

(5) Not to keep in memory a regulation that has been prescribed—memory being the basis of all observance of a regulation. 25.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Deśaviramaṇa-vrata* :

(1) When a thing lying outside the prescribed sphere is got

in case of need not by oneself going outside this sphere but through someone else present outside this sphere to whom a message etc. has been sent—that is called getting a thing brought by someone from outside the prescribed sphere.

(2) Likewise, when such a thing is got not by oneself going outside the prescribed sphere or by inviting someone from outside this sphere but by ordering a servant etc. to bring it—that is called sending a servant to bring something from outside the prescribed sphere.

(3) When in case of need a person present outside the prescribed sphere is cautioned to come near oneself through making a sound like that of coughing etc.—that is called making a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere.

(4) Likewise, when such a person is cautioned to come near oneself through making a bodily gesture—that is called making a bodily gesture with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere.

(5) Likewise, when hint is given to a person to come near oneself through throwing towards him a gravel, stone, a lump of dry mud or the like—that is called throwing outwards some physical stuff with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere. 26.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Anarthadaṇḍaviramāṇa-vrata* :

(1) Uncultured talks, jokes etc.—undertaken out of passion.

(2) The same when there are added to them unbecoming bodily gestures—like those of a buffoon.

(3) To talk much shamelessly and without coherence—that is talkativeness.

(4) When sinful instruments of act are lent out to someone else without taking into consideration one's own requirements connected with them—that is called lending things to others without proper thought.

(5) Possessing in excess the things of daily requirement—like clothes, ornaments, oil, sandalwood etc. 27.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Sāmāyika-vrata* :

(1) To move in an useless and improper manner the bodily parts like hands, feet etc.—that is called improper bodily movement.

(2) To utter a speech that is devoid of word-refinement and is meaningless as well as harmful—that is called improper speech.

(3) To undertake mental acts like thinking etc. under the influence of the mental perturbances like anger, enmity etc.—that is called improper mental act.

(4) Not to feel enthused about performing the *sāmāyika*—that is to say, not to take it up even when the time for it arrives or to take it up in a slovenly manner—that is called feeling of disregard.

(5) On account of an absence of concentration—that is, on account of the unsteadiness of mind—loss of the memory related to the *sāmāyika*—that is called lack of requisite memory. 28.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Pauṣadhopavāsa-vrata* :

(1) To evacuate, urinate, cleanse the running nose etc. at a place not properly inspected—with a view to detecting living bodies—and not properly cleansed of dust through some soft implement.

(2) Likewise, to receive and place things—like stick, wooden-seat etc.—at such a place.

(3) Likewise, to arrange bedding or seating at such a place.

(4) Not to feel enthused about the *pauṣadha* and to take it up in a slovenly manner—that is called feeling of disregard.

(5) Not to remember as to when and how the *pauṣadha* has to be or not to be performed—or as to whether it has already been

performed or not—that is called lack of requisite memory. 29.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Bhogopabhogaparināṇa-vrata* :

(1) To eat any type of vegetable etc. that possesses life—that is called eating what possesses life.

(2) To eat ripe fruits like mango, berry etc. that contain seed, stone etc. which possess life—that is called eating a thing containing what possesses life.

(3) To eat things like *laḍḍū* (a sweetmeat) etc. that are mixed with sesamum etc. which possess life, or to eat things mixed with ants, worms etc.—that is called eating a thing mixed with what possesses life.

(4) To consume any type of intoxicating substance or a drink like wine etc. prepared through a mixture of various substances—that is called eating what causes intoxication.

(5) To eat what is not properly cooked—or what is half-cooked. 30.

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Atithi-samvibhāga-vrata* :

(1) A food or drink meant for donation when placed inside something possessing life—and so placed so that it becomes unfit for use—that is called placing the thing to be donated inside what possesses life.

(2) Likewise, such a thing when covered by something possessing life—that is called covering the thing to be donated by what possesses life.

(3) To say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else.—so as to absolve oneself honourably from the duty to donate it.

(4) Even while making a donation not to have a feeling of respect for the donee, or to undertake donation out of a feeling of envy towards someone else's virtue as a donor—that is called malice.

(5) To finish eating while it is no time for alms so as to avoid the chance of offering a donation—that is called violating the fixed time. 31

Failures-of-conduct Connected with the *Samilekhanā-vrata* :

(1) On viewing the fortunes like worship, honour etc. done to oneself to get tempted by them and to long for life—that is called wishing for life.

(2) On viewing that nobody comes to offer worship, honour etc. to oneself, to get bored and hence to long for death—that is called wishing for death.

(3) Affection for friends—or for sons etc. as for friends.

(4) Refreshing the memory of past pleasures.

(5) To wish for some sort of enjoyment as a result of penance and renunciation.

All the failures of conduct enumerated above, when they are practised intentionally and out of crookedness, are of the form of an utter violation of the *vrata* concerned and hence are in fact the cases of misconduct; on the other hand, when they are practised out of carelessness which in its turn is born of forgetfulness they are the cases of failure-of-conduct proper. 32.

An Account of *Dāna* or Donation :

For the sake of rendering benefit to renounce a thing belonging to oneself—that is called donation. 33.

The special merit of a donation depends on the special merit of the procedure adopted, the thing donated, the donor and the donee. 34.

The duty of donation is the very root of all the five virtues of life. Hence a development of it is, from the ultimate point of view, the basis for an enhancement of the remaining virtues while from the practical point of view it is the basis for the balance obtaining in human arrangements.

Donation means offering to someone else a thing come in

one's possession through legitimate means. The offering must prove beneficial both to the person making the offer and to the person receiving it. The benefit accruing to the donor consists in that he is rid of the attachment felt for the thing concerned—as a result of which he comes to develop a feeling of contentment and equanimity. The benefit accruing to the donee consists in that the thing concerned proves helpful to him in his life-journey—as a result of which his virtues receive proper unfolding.

Though all donations quâ donation are akin to one another the result yielded by them is characterized by degrees; these degrees are accounted for by the special merit of the duty of the form of donation. This special merit, in its turn is due to the special merit of the four elements of the duty of donation. The following is an account of the special merit of these elements :

(1) The special merit of the procedure adopted : Here are included considerations like offering such a thing as suits the concerned place and time and such as proves no obstruction to the principle of the donee.

(2) The special merit of the substance : Here is included the merit of the thing donated.

The thing offered by way of donation must be such as proves beneficial in the life journey of the donee and hence such as proves a cause for development of his meritorious qualities.

(3) The special merit of the donor—e.g. a feeling of respect towards the donee, absence of a feeling of contempt or malice towards him, not to feel regret for the act of donation—either at the time of performing it or afterwards.

(4) The special merit of the donee : The donee must always remain wide awake to undertake endeavour of a right sort—this is the sole merit requisite in a donee. 33-34.



CHAPTER EIGHT

An account of the *vratas* and donation having been offered in connection with the account of the fundamental verity *āsrava* or inflow there now begins an account of the fundamental verity *bandha* or bondage.

First of all the causes of bondage are mentioned :

***Mithyātva* or absence of right faith, *avirati* or absence of discipline, *pramāda* or negligence, *kaṣāya* or passion, *yoga* or activity—these five are the causes of bondage. 1.**

The nature of bondage is going to be described in the next aphorism; only its causes are being mentioned here. As regards the number of the causes of bondage three traditions are observable. According to one tradition *kaṣāya* and *yoga*—only these two are the causes of the bondage; according to another *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga*—these four are the causes of bondage; as for the third tradition it adds *pramāda* to these latter four causes and thus makes their number five. Thus even if these traditions differ from one another as to the number and hence as to the names concerned they do not at all differ as to the essentials of the matter. E. g. *pramāda* is but a type of *asaṁyama* or un-restrain and so is included either in *avirati* or in *kaṣāya*; and it is from this viewpoint that in the texts like *Karmaprakṛti* etc. there have been enumerated just four causes of bondage. Viewed minutely both *mithyātva* and *avirati* are not essentially different from *kaṣāya*; so in the last count *kaṣāya* and *yoga* these two are the only causes of bondage.

Question : If this is how things stand then the question is

as to what is the basis for these different traditions as to the number of causes of bondage having been current.

Answer When any karma whatsoever is bound down then four elements at the most are built up into it; and it is as the separate causes of these four that the two causes of bondage—viz *kaṣāya* and *yoga*—make their appearance. To be precise, its belonging to a certain basic type and its being made up of certain number of physical particles is due to *yoga*, while its possessing certain duration and certain intensity is due to *kaṣāya*. Thus it is with a view to analysing the causes of the above four elements produced in one and the same karma that the theoretical treatises make mention of the two causes of bondage—viz. *kaṣāya* and *yoga*; and it is with a view to accounting for the greater or lesser number of karma-types bound down in the different *guṇa-sthānas*—which are of the form of the graduated stages of spiritual progress—that there have been mentioned the four causes of bondage—viz. *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga*. Thus the greater is the number of the causes of bondage from among these four present in a *guṇasthāna* the greater the bondage of karma-types taking place in it; on the other hand, when the causes of bondage are fewer in number then the bondage of karma-types too is lesser. Thus the tradition of mentioning the four causes of bondage *mithyātva* etc. is meant to account for the greater or lesser karmic bondage taking place in the different *guṇasthānas*; on the other hand, the tradition of mentioning the two causes of bondage—viz *kaṣāya* and *yoga*—is meant to separately lay down the cause of the four elements possibly present in one and the same karma. As for the tradition of mentioning the five causes of bondage its purport is not different from that of mentioning the four; at the most it might be said that the former tradition is meant to impart to the inquisitive students a more detailed information as regards the causes-of-bondage.

An Interpretation of the Causes-of-bondage :

Mithyātva :

Mithyātva means *mithyādarśana*—that is, that which stands opposed to *samyak-darśana*. Now *samyak-darśana* being of the

form of a right faith as regards the nature of things the *darśana* (that is, the faith) that stands opposed to it turns out to be of two types—viz. (i) the absence of a right faith as regards the nature of things, and (ii) a wrong faith as regards the same. The two types differ in that the former is possible even in a state of utter absence of thought while the latter is possible only in a state of positive thought. Even when there has been a development of the capacity for thought, in case a person impelled by a prejudice sticks to some one single standpoint then since there is a partisanship of untruth inspite of the presence of a state of positive thought the standpoint in question is a case of *mithyādarśana* or wrong faith. And since this state of affairs is something born of instruction it is called *abhigrahita* or 'something taken up'. In the period when the state of positive thought is not yet stirred up there is present only an absence of thought resulting from the beginningless concealment-pertaining-to-thought. At that time there is not present faith in what is wrong, just as there is not present faith in what is right; rather since there is then a mere absence of thought what is then present is a mere absence of faith-in-what-is-right. And since this state of affairs is something natural—that is, something not a result of instruction—it is called *anabhigrahita* or 'something not taken up'. All the one-sided prejudiced attachments for a standpoint or a sect are cases of *abhigrahita-mithyādarśana*—that is, absence-of-right-faith that has been taken up; they are possible only in a developed species like man. As for the *anabhigrahita-mithyādarśana*—that is, absence-of-right-faith that has not been taken up, it is possible even in species like worm, moth etc. with consciousness lying dormant.

Avirati :

Avirati means not to desist from vicious acts.

Pramāda :

Pramāda means self-forgetfulness—that is, having no feeling of regard for virtuous acts. Not to remain cautious as to the memory of what has to be done and what has not to be done.

Kaṣāya :

Kaṣāya means violating the limit of equanimity.

Yoga :

Yoga means an act of *manas*, speech or body.

The causes of bondage *tatpradoṣa* etc. enumerated in the chapter six and the causes-of-bondage *mithyātva* etc. enumerated here differ from one another in that the former are a special cause-of-a special karma-type while the latter are a common cause-of-bondage obtaining in the case of all the karma-types. From among the five causes-of-bondage *mithyātva* etc. when an earlier mentioned one obtains a later mentioned one must obtain; for example, when *mithyātva* obtains the four causes *avirati* etc. must obtain when *avirati* obtains the three causes *pramāda* etc. must obtain. On the contrary, when a later mentioned member of the series in question obtains an earlier mentioned one might or might not obtain; for example, when *avirati* obtains then in the first *guṇasthāna* *mithyātva* too obtains, but in the second, third and fourth *guṇasthāna* there obtains no *mithyātva* in spite of *avirati* obtaining. The same conditions should be applied to the remaining cases as well. 1.

The Nature-of-bondage :

On account of its association with a *kaṣāya* a *jīva* receives into itself physical particles liable to become karma. 2.

That is called bondage. 3.

There are numerous *vargaṇās* or groupings of *pudgala*. From among them the grouping that possesses the capacity to undergo transformation of the form of karma is received into itself by a *jīva* and is attached by it to its constituent-units in a particular fashion. That is to say, even while *amūrta* or non-tangible by nature a *jīva* since it has been associated with karmas since a beginningless time has become akin to something *mūrta*; and it is as such that it receives into itself the karmic particles that are *mūrta*.

Just as a lamp draws up oil through its wick and through the instrumentality of its own heat makes this oil undergo transformation of the form of flame, so also does a *jīva* through the instrumentality of its mental perturbances of the form of *kaṣāya* receive into itself the appropriate physical particles and make them undergo transformation of the form of karma. The association with the constituent-units of a soul of the physical particles that have undergone transformation of the form of karma—that is called 'bondage'. For this bondage so many factors like *mithyātva* etc. act as a cause; even so, when it is here said that a *jīva* receives physical particles on account of its association with a *kaṣāya* then the intention is to emphasize the prominence of *kaṣāyas* as compared to the remaining factors in question. 2-3.

The Types of Bondage :

Prakṛti or nature, *sthiti* or duration, *anubhāva* or intensity, *pradeśa* or constituent-unit—these four are the types of it (that is, of bondage). 4.

That certain physical particles received by a *jīva* undergo transformation of the form of karma means that at that time four elements are produced in them; it is these elements that constitute the types of bondage. For example, when the grass etc. eaten by a she-goat, cow, buffalo etc. undergo transformation of the form of milk then there is a binding of the nature of sweetness in this milk; then there is also worked up in relation to this sweetness the time-limit up to which it is to remain there in the milk; again, this sweetness is possessed of the specialities like intensity, mildness etc; lastly, the physical quantity of the milk is built up alongside all this. Similarly, in the karmic-particles received into itself by a *jīva* and got combined with its constituent-units there are produced four elements—viz nature, duration, intensity, constituent-units.

(1) The binding of the nature—e.g. the nature to conceal *jñāna*, the nature to obstruct *darśana*, the nature to cause the experience of pleasure, pain etc.—that takes place in the karmic particles is called *prakṛtibandha* or bondage in respect of nature.

(2) Along with a nature there is produced in the karmic particles a limitation as to time-period up to which the nature in question is not to disappear from them; this production of time-limit is called *sthiti-bandha* or 'bondage in respect of duration.'

(3) Along with a nature there is produced in the karmic particles certain specialities on account of which the experience of the fruit concerned is characterized by intensity, mildness etc; the production of these specialities is called *anubhāvabandha* or 'bondage in respect of intensity.'

(4) The physical particles that have been received and have been transformed into various types of karma naturally undergo a corresponding quantitative distribution; it is this quantitative distribution that is called *pradeśa-bandha* or 'bondage in respect of constituent-units.'

Of these four types of bondage the first and the last are due to *yoga*; for the degrees of *prakṛti-bandha* and *pradeśa-bandha* depend on the degrees of the *yoga* concerned. On the other hand, the second and the third type of bondage are due to *kaṣāya*; for the largeness or smallness of *sthiti-bandha* and *anubhāva-bandha* depends on the intensity or mildness of the *kaṣāya* concerned. 4.

The Various *Mūla-prakṛtis* or Basic
Karma-types Mentioned by Name :

Of these types of bondage the first-i.e. *prakṛti-bandha* or 'bondage in respect of nature'-is of eight types-viz. *jñāna-varaṇa*, *darśanavarāṇa*, *vedaṇīya*, *mohaṇīya*, *āyuska*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *antarāya*. 5.

In the mass of karmic particles received into itself by a *jīva* through its specific endeavour various natures are simultaneously created depending on the variety of the concerned capacity to endeavour. These natures are in themselves invisible but they can be enumerated simply on the basis of the effects produced by them. In one worldly *jīva* or in many of them innumerable effects are observed to have been produced by the karmas. The natures that produce these effects are in point of fact innumerable, yet on

the basis of a summary classification they have been divided into eight types. This state of affairs is called 'bondage' in respect of basic types'. If is the eight basic karma-types in question that have been mentioned here; they are *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *vedaṇīya*, *mohaṇīya*, *āyuska*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *antarāya*.

(1) On account of which *jñāna* or determinate cognition gets concealed—that is called *jñānāvaraṇa*.

(2) On account of which *darśana* or indeterminate cognition gets concealed—that is called *darśanāvaraṇa*.

(3) On account of which pleasure and pain are experienced—that is called *vedaṇīya*.

(4) On account of which a soul suffers from delusion—that is called *mohaṇīya*.

(5) On account of which birth into a worldly career takes place—that is called *āyus*.

(6) On account of which *gati* (i.e. membership of a species of livings), *jaṭi* (i.e. possession of a definite number of sense-organs) etc. are attained—that is called *nāma*.

(7) On account of which a higher or a lower status is attained—that is called *gotra*.

(8) On account of which obstacles are placed in the way of giving, taking etc.—that is called *antarāya*.

Though from the standpoint of brevity the various natures of karma have been divided into the above eight types, these eight types themselves have been further divided into subtypes by adopting a middle course and for the benefit of the reader eager for details. These sub-types are known by the name of *uttaraprakṛti* or derivative karma-type, and they are 97 in number. Just below they are being enumerated as belonging to the *mūlaprakṛti* to which they do. 5.

The Various *Uttaraprakṛtis* or Derivative

Karma-types Enumerated and Mentioned by Name :

The eight basic karma-types have sub-types respectively

numbering five, nine, two, twenty-eight, four, forty-two, two and five. 6.

Those acting as concealment for the five *jñāna*-types *mati* etc.—They are the five sub-types of *jñānavaraṇa*. 7.

Those acting as concealment for the four *darśana*-types *cakṣur*-, *acakṣur*-, *avadhi*—and *kevala-darśana*, as also the five to be experienced in the form of *nidrā*, *nidrānidrā*, *pracalā*, *pracalāpracalā*, and *styānagrddhi*—these are the nine sub-types of *darśanamohaṇīya*. 8.

That to be experienced in the form of pleasure and that to be experienced in the form of pain—these are the two sub-types of *vedaṇīya*. 9.

Darśana-mohaṇīya, *cāritramohaṇīya*, *kaṣāyavedaṇīya*, and *nokaṣāyavedaṇīya*—these sub-types (and still lower divisions) of *mohaṇīya* are respectively of 3, 2, 16 and 9 kinds. *Samyaktva*, *mithyātva* and a combination of two (i.e. *Samyak-mithyātva*)—these are the three kinds of *darśanamohaṇīya*, *kaṣāya* and *nokaṣāya*—these are the two kinds of *cāritramohaṇīya*. Of these, *kaṣāyacāritramohaṇīya* is further divided into sixteen kinds—viz. anger, pride, deceit and greed, each of these four divided into four kinds—viz. *anantānubandhin*, *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa*, *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* and *sañjvalana*. Similarly, *nokaṣāyacāritramohaṇīya* is further divided into nine kinds—viz. *hāsyā*, *rati*, *arati*, *śoka*, *bhaya*, *jugupsā*, *strīveda*, *puruṣaveda* and *napuṃsakaveda*. 10.

Nāraka, *tiryak*, *manuṣyā* and *deva*—these are the four sub-types of *āyus*. 11.

Gati, *jāti*, *śarīra*, *aṅgopāṅga*, *nirmāṇa*, *bandhana*, *saṅghāta*, *śamsthāna*, *saṃhanana*, *sparśa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *varṇa*, *ānupūrvī*, *agurulaghu*, *upaghāta*, *parāghāta*, *ātapa*, *uddyota*, *ucchvāsa*, *viḥāyogati*, the ten couples-of-opposite—viz. *sādhāraṇā* and *pratyeka*, *sthāvara* and *trasa*, *durbhaga* and *subhaga*, *duḥsvara* and *susvara*, *aśubha* and *śubha*, *bādara* and *sūkṣma*, *aparyāpta* and *paryāpta*, *asthira* and *sthira*, *anādeya* and *ādeya*, *ayaśas* and *yaśas*-, *tīrthaṅkaratva*—these are the forty-two sub-types of *nāmakarma*. 12.

Higher and lower—these are the two sub-types of gotra. 13.

Those pertaining to donation etc.-these are the five sub-types of antarāya. 14.

The Five Sub-types of the Jñānavaraṇa-karma and the Nine Sub-types of the Darśanavaraṇa-karma :

The five jñāna-types like *mati*, *śruta* etc. and the four darśana-types like *caḥṣurdarśana* etc. have already been described.¹ Now the karmas possessing the nature of concealing one of them are respectively called *matijñānāvaraṇa*, *śrutajñānāvaraṇa*, *avadhijñānāvaraṇa*, *manahparyāyajñānāvaraṇa*, *kevalajñānāvaraṇa* these being the five sub-types of jñānāvaraṇa-and *caḥṣurdarśanāvaraṇa*, *acacṣurdarśanāvaraṇa*, *avadhidarśanāvaraṇa*, *kevaladarśanāvaraṇa* these being the four subtypes of darśanāvaraṇa. Besides these four there are five more subtypes of darśanāvaraṇa and as follows : 1. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep from which one can be easily awakened is called *nidrāvedaṇīya*. 2. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep from which one can be wakened with difficulty is called *nidrānidrāvedaṇīya*. 3. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep which overtakes one while sitting or standing is called *pracalāvedaṇīya*. 4. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep which overtakes one while walking is called *pracalāpracalāvedaṇīya*. 5. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep when one comes to possess the energy enabling one to accomplish a task thought of during the waking state is called *styānagrddhi*; (during such a sleep one comes to possess many times more efficient energy than one does during the waking state). 7-8.

The Two Sub-types of the Vedaṇīyakarma :

(1) The karma whose manifestation makes a being experience pleasure is called *sātavedaṇīya*.

1. See chapter one, aphorisms. 9 to 33 and chapter two, aphorisms 9.

(2) The karma whose manifestation makes a being experience pain is called *asātavedaṇīya*. 9.

The Three Kinds of the Sub-types *Darśanamohaṇīya* :

1. The karma whose manifestation obstructs an inclination towards the real nature of the fundamental verities is called *mithyātvamohaṇīya*. 2. The karma whose manifestation brings about neither inclination nor a disinclination towards the real nature of the fundamental verities but a state of wavering between the two is called *miśramohaṇīya*. 3. The karma whose manifestation while bringing about an inclination towards the real nature of the fundamental verities obstructs an appearance of the *aupaśamika* or *kaṣāyika* type of such inclination is called *samyaktvamohaṇīya*.

The Twentyfive Kinds of the Sub-types *Cāritramohaṇīya* :

The sixteen *kaṣāyas* : Anger, pride, deceit and greed—these are the four chief types of *kaṣāya*. Each of these has been said to be of four types depending on the degree of its intensity. The karmas which bring about the appearance of the above four *kaṣāyas* anger etc. in such an intensive degree that the *jīva* concerned has to wander about from one worldly state to another for an infinite period of time are respectively called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the *anantānubandhī* type. The karmas whose manifestation brings about the appearance of *kaṣāyas* in such a degree of intensity as is just sufficient to obstruct moral discipline are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the *apratyākhy-ānāvaraṇa* type. The karmas whose fructification obstructs not a partial moral discipline but a complete moral discipline are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* type. The karmas whose fructification is of such a degree of intensity as does not obstruct complete moral discipline but simply produces a minor deviation or blemish in it are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the *saṃjvalana* type.

The Nine *Nokaṣāyas* :

(1) Then karma whose nature it is to bring about the

appearance of laughter is *hāsyamohanīya*. (2-3) The karma which brings about liking towards someone is '*ratimohanīya*', that which brings about dislike towards someone is '*aratimohanīya*'. (4-6) The karma which brings about a fearing disposition is '*bhāyāmohanīya*', that which brings about a sorrowing disposition is '*śokamohanīya*', that which brings about a despising disposition is '*jugupsāmohanīya*'. (7-9) The karma which brings about sexual perturbation appropriate to a man is *puruṣaveda*, that which brings about sexual perturbation appropriate to a woman is *strīveda*, that which brings about sexual perturbation appropriate to a neuter is *napuṃsakaveda*. All these nine, since they accompany the chief *kaṣāyas* and simulate them, are called '*nokaṣāya*'. 10.

The Four Sub-types of the *Āyus-karma* :

The karmas whose manifestation compels a being to lead the life of a heavenly being, a man, an animal, a hellish being are respectively called *deva-āyus-karma*, *manuṣya-āyus-karma*, *tiryak-āyus-karma*, *nāraka-āyus-karma*. 11.

The Fourtytwo Subtypes of the *Nāma-karma* :

The fourteen subtypes designated *piṇḍaprakṛti* :

(1) The karma which causes birth in the four *gatis* or species *deva* etc.—species that are of the form of a state of transformation making possible the experience of pleasure and pain—that is called *gati-nāma*.

(2) The karma which causes the experiencing of the five generic states of transformation from possession-of-one-*īndriya*-upto-possession-of-five-*īndriyas*—that is called *jāti-nāma*.

(3) The karma which causes the assumption of the body-types *audārika* etc.—that is called *śarīra-nāma*.

(4) The karma which causes the having of the bodily parts and sub-parts—that is called *aṅgopāṅga-nāma*.

(5-6) The karma which causes the newly received physical particles to be associated with the earlier received similar particles *audārika* etc.—that is called *bandhana-nāma*, while the karma

which bestows on these newly received physical particles the form of the body-type concerned—that is called *saṅghāta-nāma*.

(7-8) The karma which causes the having of a particular type of bone-structure in a body—that is called *saṁhanana-nāma*, while the karma which causes the having of a particular bodily shape—that is called *saṁsthāna-nāma*.

(9-12) The karmas which cause the presence in a body of five colours white etc., the two smells good-smell etc., the five tastes bitter etc. and the eight touches cold etc.—these are respectively called *varṇa-nāma*, *gandha-nāma*, *rasa-nāma* and *sparsā-nāma*,

(13) The karma which in the case of a *jīva*, proceeding to take on a new birth causes its motion to follow the serial line made up of the constituent-units of *ākāśa*—that is called *ānupūrvī-nāma*.

(14) The karma which causes a living body to move in a well-conducted or an ill-conducted manner—that is called *viḥāyogati*.

These fourteen are designated *piṇḍa-prakṛti*—the reason being that each of them is further subdivided into classes.

The ten sub-types designated *sthāvara-daśaka* :

(1-2) The karma whose manifestation causes the possession of a capacity to move about independently—that is called *trasa-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation makes impossible the possession of such a capacity—that is called *sthāvara-nāma* :

(3-4) The karma whose manifestation causes the possession of such a gross body as is observable to ordinary eyes—that is called *bādara-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes the possession of such a subtle body as is not observable to ordinary eyes—that is called *sūkṣmanāma*.

(5-6) The karma whose manifestation makes it possible for a being to attain all the *paryāptis* (*paryāpti*—the technical name for

certain bodily capacities) appropriate to it—that is called *pariyāpta-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation makes it impossible for a living being to attain all the *pariyāptis* appropriate to it—that is called *apariyāpta-nāma*.

(7-8) The karma whose manifestation causes the different *jīvas* to possess different bodies—that is called *partyeka-nāma*; On the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes *ananta jīvas* to share one common body—that is called *sādhāraṇa-nāma*.

(9-10) The karma whose manifestation causes the having of the steady bodily parts like bones, teeth etc.—that is called *sthira-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes the having of the unsteady bodily parts like tongue etc.—that is called *asthira-nāma*.

(11-12) The karma whose manifestation is responsible for the fact that the bodily parts situated above the navel are deemed auspicious—that is called *śubha-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation is responsible for the fact that the bodily parts situated below the navel are deemed inauspicious—that is called *aśubha-nāma*.

(13-14) The karma whose manifestation causes a *jīva*'s voice to appear agreeable to the audience—that is called *susvara-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes a *jīva*'s voice to appear disagreeable to the audience—that is called *duḥsvara-nāma*.

(15-16) The karma whose manifestation brings it about that a being, even when he does no good to others is loved by all—that is called *subhaga-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation brings it about that a being, even when he does good to others, is loved by no body—that is called *durbhaga-nāma*.

(17-18) The karma whose manifestation causes one's speech to be highly respected—that is called *ādeya-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes one's speech not to be highly respected—that is called *anādeya-nāma*,

(19-20) The karma whose manifestation causes fame in the world—that is called *yaśah-kīrti-nāma*; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes a lack of fame—that is called *ayaśah-kīrti-nāma*.

The eight sub-types designated *pratyeka-prakṛti* :

(1) The karma whose manifestation causes a body to be characterized not by a transformation of the form of heavy or light but by that of the form of neither-heavy-nor-light—that is called *agurulaghū-nāma*.

(2) The karma responsible for the growth of obstructing bodily parts like an additioned tongue, a tooth hidden behind another, a neck-tumour etc.—that is called *upaghāta-nāma*.

(3) The karma on account of which one beats down others through one's appearance or through one's speech—that is called *parāghāta-nāma*.

(4) The karma which causes the appearance of the capacity for in-breathing and out-breathing—that is called *śvāsocchvāsa-nāma*.

(5-6) The karma which causes in a non-hot body the appearance of a hot light—that is called *ātapa-nāma*, while the karma which causes the appearance of a cold light—that is called *uddiyota-nāma*.

(7) The karma which causes the placement of the different bodily parts and sub-parts at their respective proper places—that is called *nirmāṇa-nāma*.

(8) The karma which causes the appearance of a capacity to establish a ford-in-the-form-of-religion—that is called *tīrthan-kara-nāma*. 12.

The two Sub-types of the Gotra-karma :

The karma which causes birth in a family that brings about prestige—that is called *uccagotra*, while the karma which causes birth in a family that fails to bring about fame even in spite of competence—that is called *nīcagotra*. 13.

The Five Sub-types of the *Antarāya-karma* :

The karmas which places obstacle in the way of offering something, receiving something, a once-for-all consumption of something, a repeated consumption of something, making display of one's power—these are respectively called *ānāntarāya*, *lābhāntarāya*, *bhogāntarāya*, *upabhogāntrāya*, *vīryāntarāya*. 14.

An Account of *Sthitibandha* or
'Bondage-in-respect-of-duration :

For the first three karma-types—that is, *jñānavaraṇa*, *darśanavaraṇa* and *vedaṇīya* as also for *antarāya* the maximum duration is 30 crore-multiplied-by-crore *sāgaropamas*. 15.

For *mohaṇīya* the maximum duration is 70 crore-multiplied-by crore *sāgaropamas*. 16.

For *nāma* and *gotra* the maximum duration is 20 crore multiplied-by-crore *sāgaropamas*. 17.

For *āyus* the maximum duration is 33 crore-multiplied by-crore *sāgaropamas*. 18.

As for the minimum duration, it is 12 *muhūrtas* for *vedaṇīya*. 19.

For *nāma* and *gotra* the minimum duration is 8 *muhūrtas*. 20.

For the rest—that is, for the *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *antarāya*, *mohaṇīya*, *āyus*—the minimum duration is a period less than one *muhūrta*. 21.

For each karma-type the maximum duration that has been mentioned obtains in the case of a being who possesses five *indriyas* and is *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*, *pariyāpta*, as well as *saṃjñin*; as for the minimum duration, it obtains differently for different karma-types. Thus the minimum duration of *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *vedaṇīya* obtains in the tenth *guṇasthāna* designated *sūkṣma-sāmparāya*, that of *mohaṇīya* obtains in the ninth designated *anivṛtti-bādara-sāmparāya*, while that of *āyus* obtains in the case of animals and men destined to live for *sāṅkhyāta* years. Lastly,

the medium duration in question is of *asāṅkhyāta* types and it obtains in the case of *asāṅkhyāta* types of beings depending on the degree of *kaṣāyas* over-powering their mind. 15-21.

An Account of *anubhāva-bandha* or
'Bondage in Respect of Intensity :

Vipāka-that is, the capacity to yield fruits of different types-that is called *anubhāva*. 22.

Such *anubhāva* is experienced in conformity to the nature of the karma concerned. 23.

And such an experiencing of *anubhāva* brings about *nirjarā* or cleansing-off. 24.

An Analysis of *Anubhāva* and of Bondage in Respect of it :

At the time of bondage there is produced in each karma a capacity to yield a more or less intense fruit depending on the more or less intense mental-endeavour-afflicted-by-*kaṣāya* that causes this bondage. This capacity to yield fruit is called *anubhāva* and its production *anubhāva-bandha*.

The Mode of an *Anubhāva* Yielding Fruit :

Anubhāva yields fruit when the proper time arrives. But in this connection one thing has to be understood-viz. that an *anubhāva* yields fruit in conformity to the nature of that very karma in which it itself resides-not in conformity to the nature of any other karma. For example, the *anubhāva* residing in the *jñānāvaraṇa-karma* yields a more or less intense fruit in conformity to the nature of this karma-type-that is, it performs the task of concealing *jñāna*; on the other hand, it does not yield fruit in conformity to the nature of the other karma-types like *darśanāvaraṇa*, *vedanīya* etc.—that is, it does not conceal the capacity for *darśana*, nor does it produce effects like an experience of pleasure or pain, etc. Similarly, the *anubhāva* residing in *darśanāvaraṇa* conceals in a more or less intense form the capacity for *darśana* but it does not perform tasks like concealing *jñāna*, etc.

However, the rule of *anubhāva-bandha* according to which fruit is yielded in conformity to the nature of the karma concerned applies only to the basic karma-types, not also to the derivative ones. For when a derivative karma-type belonging to some basic karma-type is, as a result of a mental exertion, converted into another derivative karma-type, then the original *anubhāva* yields fruit in conformity to the nature of the new derivative karma-type. For example, when *matijñānāvaraṇa* gets converted into a collateral derivative *karma-prakṛti śrutajñānāvaraṇa* or the like then the original *anubhāva* appropriate to *matijñānāvaraṇa*, now functioning in conformity to the nature of *śrutajñānāvaraṇa* etc., performs the task of concealing the *jñāna*-type *śruta*, *avadhi* etc. However, even among the derivative karma-types there are such as do not get converted into one another. For example, *darśanamoha* does not get converted into *cāritramoha* or vice versa; similarly, *nāraka-āyus* does not get converted into *tiryak-āyus* or any other type of *āyus*. Like conversion of nature a subsequent mental exertion also brings about a change in the flavour (=intensity) or the duration that obtained at the time of bondage. Thus a strong flavour becomes mild or vice versa; similarly, a maximum duration becomes minimum and vice versa.

The State of Karma Subsequent to the Appearance of Fruit :

After a more or less intense fruit of a karma has been experienced in accordance with the *anubhāva* concerned this karma gets released from the soul-units and no more remains attached to them. This very process is called cessation of karma or *nirjarā* (i.e. cleansing off). Just as the *nirjarā* of a karma comes about through an experiencing of its fruit, so also does it quite often come about through penance as well. Thus by the force of penance a karma gets released from the soul-units even before it has yielded fruit in accordance with the *anubhāva* concerned. This very thing is indicated in the present aphorism through an employment of the word *ca* (i.e. 'and'). 22-24.

An Account of *pradeśa-bandha* or 'Bondage in Respect of Constituent-units' :

The *pudgalas* which are a cause of the nature-of-karma, are subtle, are situated at the same place, and are made up of *anantānanta* constituent-units are, as a result of a specific activity, bound down with all the constituent-units of a soul and from all the sides. 25.

Since *pradeśa-bandha* is a kind of relation and since this relation has got two bases—viz. the karmic physical aggregates on the one hand and the soul on the other—eight questions arise in connection with it and it is they that are answered in the present aphorism. The questions are as follows :

(1) When the karmic physical aggregates are bound down what appears in them—that is, what is built up into them ?

(2) These physical aggregates are received into themselves by what soul-units—by those situated in the upward direction or by those situated in the downward direction or by those situated in the transverse direction ?

(3) Is karmic bondage similar in the case of all the souls—or is it dissimilar ?

(4) Those karmic physical aggregates—are they gross or subtle ?

(5) The karmic physical aggregates that are bound down with the soul-units—are they situated at the same place as these soul-units or at a different place ?

(6) At the time of bondage—are those physical aggregates static or mobile ?

(7) Those karmic physical aggregates—are they bound down with all the soul-units or only with some of them ?

(8) Those karmic physical aggregates are made up of how many constituent-units—*saṅkhyāta*, *asaṅkhyāta*, *ananta* or *anantānanta* ?

The following is how these eight questions have been respectively answered in the present aphorism.

(1) In the physical aggregates that are bound down with the soul-units there appears the nature-of-karma—that is, natures like *jñānavaraṇa*-ness etc. That is to say, these natures are built up into these physical aggregates. Hence it is that these aggregates are said to be a cause of all these natures.

(2) Those physical aggregates are received into themselves by the soul-units situated in the upward, downward as well as transverse direction—not by those situated in some one direction alone.

(3) The karmic bondage is dissimilar in the case of all the different souls because they are dissimilar as regards their activity of *manas*, speech and body. Hence corresponding to the degree of activity there is degree in *pradeśa-bandha*.

(4) The physical aggregates liable to become karma are not gross but subtle. Such physical aggregates are taken in from among the physical-groupings-pertaining-to-karma.

(5) Only such physical aggregates are bound down as are situated at the same place as the soul-units concerned, not such as are situated outside the sphere of these soul-units.

(6) Only when they are static do the physical aggregates experience bondage, for the aggregates that are mobile are unsteady and as such incapable of entering into bondage.

(7) The *ananta* units of each karma are bound down with each of the soul-units concerned.

(8) All the physical aggregates—liable-to-become-karma that enter into bondage are made up of *anantānanta* atoms—none of them is made up of *sāṅkhyāta*, *asāṅkhyāta* or *ananta* units. 25.

A Division into the Auspicious and Inauspicious Karma-types :

Sātavedaṇīya, *samyaktvamohaṇīya*, *hāsya*, *ratī*, *puruṣaveda*, *śubha-āyus*, *śubha-nāma*, *śubha-gotra*—these karma-types alone are auspicious; the rest are inauspicious.¹ 26.

1. In the Digambara tradition there are two aphorisms in place of this one. They are as follows :

Whatever karmas are bound down the fruit of them is in no case either exclusively good or exclusively evil; for in accordance with the good or evil character of the mental exertion acting as the cause-of-bondage the fruit that is built up is either good or evil. Thus the fruit built up as a result of good mental exertion is good—that is, desirable—while that built up as a result of evil mental exertion is evil—that is, undesirable. Now the lesser the amount of perturbation afflicting a mental state the more particularly good it is, while the greater the amount of perturbation afflicting it the more particularly evil it is. Thus there is no mental state whatsoever that can be said to be exclusively good or exclusively evil. However, even while all mental states are good-cum-evil they are in practice called good or evil in accordance with what character predominates in them. Thus the same good mental state which produces good capacity-for-fruit in the good karma-types produces evil capacity-for-fruit in the evil ones, on the contrary, the same mental state which produces evil

Sadvedyaśubhāyurnāmagotrāṇi puṇyam. 25.

Ato'anyat pāpam. 26.

The first of these aphorisms—unlike our present one—contains no mention of *samyaktva*, *hāsyā*, *rati* and *puruṣaveda*; as for the second, the Śvetāmbara tradition has it not in the form of an aphorism but in the form of a *Bhāṣya*-sentence.

The 42 auspicious karma-types-enumerated in our comments are well known from the texts like *Karma-prakṛti*, *Navatattva* etc. In the Digambara texts too it is they alone that are considered to be auspicious. The four karma-types—viz. *samyaktva*, *hāsyā*, *rati*, *puruṣaveda*—enumerated as auspicious in the present aphorism of the Śvetāmbara tradition are described as such in no other text.

It appears that the view which treats as auspicious the four karma-types in questions is very old. For apart from its occurrence in the present aphorism the author of the *Bhāṣya-vṛtti* too has quoted verses which indicate a difference of opinion and has confessed that the purport of the present view is incomprehensible to him—the tradition connected with it—presumably known to those who had been conversant with the fourteen *Pūrva*-texts—having been cut short at an earlier date.

capacity-for-fruit in evil karma-types produces good capacity-for-fruit in the good ones. The only difference is that the good capacity-for-fruit produced by an intensely good mental state is intensely so, while the evil capacity-for-fruit produced by it is mildly so; similarly, the evil capacity-for-fruit produced by an evil mental state is intensely so, while the good capacity-for-fruit produced by it is mildly so.

The 42 Karma-types Treated as Auspicious :

Sātavedaṇīya, manuṣya-āyus, deva-āyus, triyak-āyus, manuṣya-gati, deva-gati, pañcendriya-jāti, the five body-types audārika, vāikriyā, āhāraka, taijasa, kārmaṇa, the three aṅgopāṅga-types, audārika, vaikriya, āhāraka, samacaturasra-saṁsthāna, vajrar-ṣabhanārāca-saṁhanana, the auspicious varṇa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, manuṣya-ānupūrvī, deva-ānupūrvī, agurulaghu, parāghāta, ucchvāsa, ātapa, uddyota, the auspicious viḥāyogati, trasa, bādara, paryāpta, pratyeka, sthira, śubha, subhaga, susvara, ādeya, yaśaḥkīrti, nirmaṇa-nāma, tīrthaṅkara-nāma, uccagotra.

The 82 Karma-types Treated as Inauspicious :

The five *jñānāvaraṇa*, the nine *darśanāvaraṇa*, *asātā-vedaṇīya, mithyātva*, the 16 *kaṣāyas*, the nine *nokaṣāyas*, the *nāraka-āyus, nāraka-gati, tiryak-gati, ekendriya-, dvīndriya-, trīndriya-, caturindriya-jāti*, the five *saṁhananas*—that is, all minus the first—viz. *arthavajrarṣabha-nārāca, nārāca, arthanārāca, kīlikā, sevārta*, the five *saṁsthānas*—that is, all minus the first viz. *nyagrodha-parimaṇḍala, sādī, kubja, vāmaṇa, huṇḍa*, the inauspicious *varṇa, gandha, rasa, sparśa, nāraka-ānupūrvī tiryak-ānupūrvī, upaghāta-nāma*, the inauspicious *viḥāyogati, sthāvara, sūkṣma, aparyāpta, sādharmaṇā, asthira, aśubha, durbhaga, duḥsvara, nīcagotra, ayaśaḥkīrti*, the five *antarāyas*. 26.



CHAPTER NINE

In the chapter eight there has been offered an account of the fundamental verity bandha or bondage; in the present chapter there is being offered an account of the fundamental verity *saṁvara* or protection, an account occurring at a place demanded by the serial order.

The Nature of *saṁvara* :

The cessation of āsrava or inflow—that is called *saṁvara* or protection. 1.

The causes due to which a karma is bound down—that is called *āsrava*; this definition of *āsrava* has already been offered earlier. It is the cessation—that is, prevention—of such an *āsrava* that is called *saṁvara*. The 42 types of *āsrava* have already been enumerated earlier; the extent to which a cessation of them takes place that exactly is the extent of the *saṁvara* attained. The graduated order of spiritual progress is due to the progress of the cessation-of-*āsrava*; hence the greater is the cessation-of-*āsrava* the higher is the *guṇasthāna* attained.¹

1. In a particular *guṇasthāna* whatever causes-of-bondage out of the four—viz. *mithyātva*, *avirati* etc.—are operative and whatever be the karma-types that are bound down as a result of them when these causes-of-bondage and the bondage of karma-types brought about by them cease to be there in a higher *guṇasthāna* then it is this cessation that is *saṁvara* appropriate to this higher *guṇasthāna*. In other words, the absence of the *āsrava* and of the resultant bondage appropriate to a lower *guṇasthāna* is what is *saṁvara* appropriate to a higher *guṇasthāna*. For this see the *bandha-prakaraṇa* of the second *Karmagrantha* and the fourth *Karmagrantha* (verses 51-58), also *Sarvārthasiddhi* on the present aphorism.

The Means of *Samvara* :

That—that is, *saṁvara*—takes place through the instrumentality of *gupti*, *saṁiti*, *dharma*, *anuprekṣā*, *parīśahajaya* and *cāritra*. 2.

Tapas brings about *saṁvara* as well as *nirjarā*. 3.

The nature of *saṁvara* is in general but one; however, its numerous types have been formulated depending on the difference of means employed for its attainment. In brief such means are enumerated to be 7, in details 69. This enumeration of types is based on the scriptural injunctions laid down in connection with religious performances.

Tapas or penance is a means of *nirjarā* inasmuch as it is a means of *saṁvara*. Generally, penance is considered to be a means of *abhyudaya* or worldly enjoyment, but it has to be understood that it can as well act as a means of *niḥśreyas* or spiritual enjoyment. For even if all penance is of one nature it is of two types—viz. *sakāma* or that seeking a fruit, and *niṣkāma*, or that seeking no fruit—depending on the mental feeling standing at the back of it. The *sakāma* type of penance brings about *abhyudaya*, the *niṣkāma* type *niḥśreyas*. 2-3.

The Nature of *Gupti* :

Such a restriction of yogas or activities as is auspicious—that is called *gupti*. 4.

Any and every type of restriction related to yoga—that is, to the activity of body, speech and *manas*—that is not what is called *gupti*; for only that such restriction which is auspicious is *gupti* and hence a means of *saṁvara*. An auspicious restriction means a restriction that has been accepted after proper comprehension and in right faith—that is to say, impelled by right understanding and right faith to prevent *manas*, speech and body from proceeding on a wrong path and to make them proceed on a right one. Since yoga is briefly of three types the *gupti* too which consists in a restriction related to it is of three types; that as follows :

(1) While receiving or placing anything whatsoever, while

sitting, getting up, or walking, in all such acts so to restrict bodily operations that discrimination is maintained between what is to be done and what is not to be done that is called *gupti* pertaining to body.

(2) Whenever there arises an occasion to speak then to restrict speech—if needs be to keep silent altogether—that is called *gupti* pertaining to speech.

(3) To give up volitions that are evil or are a mixture of good and evil, as also to cultivate volitions that are good—that is called *gupti* pertaining to *manas*. 4.

The Types of *Samiti* :

Right—that is, blameless—*īryā* or moving about, **right** *bhāṣā* or speech, **right** *eṣaṇā* or procurement of provisions, **right** *ādāna-nikṣepa* or receiving and placing of things, **right** *utsarga* or disposal of refuse—these are five *samitis*. 5.

All the *samitis*, being of the form of an activity inspired by a sense of discrimination, act as a means for *saṁvara*. The five *samitis* are as follows :

(1) To move about cautiously so as to cause trouble to no living being—that is called *īryā-samiti*.

(2) To speak what is true, beneficial, measured and free from doubt—that is called *bhāṣā-samiti*.

(3) To act cautiously while seeking to procure such means necessary for the conduct of life-journey as are free from defects—that is called *eṣaṇā-samiti*.

(4) To receive and place any thing whatsoever after a proper inspection and a proper cleansing-of-dust—that is called *ādānanikṣepa-samiti*.

(5) To dispose of things that are of no use at a place free from living bodies and after proper inspection—that is called *utsarga-samiti*.

Question : What is the difference between a *gupti* and a *samiti* ?

Answer : In *gupti* the aspect of refraining from what is wrong is dominant, in *samiti* the aspect of undertaking what is right. 5.

The Types of *Dharma* :

Kṣamā or forbearance, *mārdava* or softness, *ārjava* or sincerity, *śauca* or absence of greed, *satya* or truthfulness, *saṁyama* or restraint, *tapas* or penance, *tyāga* or renunciation *akiñcanya* or absence of a feeling of ownership, *brahmacarya* or studentship—these ten are the types of what is supreme *dharma*. 6.

When the meritorious qualities forbearance etc. are practised in daily life, then alone is it possible to get rid of the defilements like anger etc.; hence it is that these qualities are said to be a means of *saṁvara*. The tenfold *dharma* consisting of forbearance etc., when it appears in the company of a high development of the basic meritorious qualities like non-violence, truth etc. and of the derivative meritorious qualities like purity of residence and food, etc. then alone does it assume the form of a monk's duty—otherwise not. That is to say, when the meritorious qualities forbearance etc. appear in the absence of a high development of the basic meritorious qualities non-violence etc. and of the derivative meritorious qualities associated with them, then they might well be called an ordinary man's duty but never a monk's duty. The ten items of *dharma* are as follows :

(1) *Kṣamā* means maintaining a forbearing disposition—that is to say, not to permit anger to take its rise and in case it does so then to render it ineffective through a power of discriminatory consideration. For cultivating forbearance five ways have been suggested—viz. (a) by way of considering whether or not the cause of anger lies in oneself, (b) by way of considering the harms that follow from an angry conduct, (c) by way of considering the childish nature of the offender concerned, (d) by way of considering the whole affair to be a result of one's own past karma, (e) by way of considering the merits of forbearance.

(a) When one succumbs to anger then one must look for its cause in oneself. If the cause of one's own anger is detected to lie in oneself then one must say to oneself : 'I am certainly in the wrong. What is wrong with what this man says ? And if the cause of one's anger is not detected to lie in oneself then one must say to oneself : 'This poor fellow finds fault with me out of ignorance.' This is called considering whether or not the cause of anger lies in oneself. (b) 'He who succumbs to anger loses his memory and hence overpowered by an impulse develops a feeling of hostility towards another one, then kills him or does him some harm, thus putting an end to his own *vrata* of non-violence'-this pondering over a successive series of disasters is called considering the harms that follow from an angry conduct. (c) If a person speaks ill of one at one's back then one should say to oneself : 'That is the very nature of the childish—the ignorant—people. What is new about it ? Nay, it is rather good of this poor wretch that he abuses me at my back, not in my presence. That certainly is something to be pleased about.' And when a person abuses one in one's presence then one should say to oneself : 'That is how the childish people are bound to behave. What they do is what follows from their nature—nothing more. Moreover, this person only abuses me in my presence but does not attack me—that certainly is something to my advantage.' Similarly, when a person attacks one then one should feel grateful to him that he has not deprived one of one's life and when a person deprives one of one's life then one should feel pity for him in return for the advantage that one could not be after all driven away from the path of religiosity. Thus the greater becomes one's difficulty the greater generosity and sense of discrimination must one exhibit and one must treat as insignificant the difficulty that is present there. All this is called considering the childish nature of the offender concerned. (d) If a person gets angry with one then one should say to oneself : 'In this connection this person is a mere occasioning cause while all that is happening is but a result of my own past karma'. That is called considering the whole affair to be a result of one's own past karma. (e) If a person gets angry

with one then one should say to oneself; 'He who cultivates forbearance has his mind at ease. All the energy to be wasted in revenge or confrontation can well be utilized for leading a virtuous life.' That is called considering the merits of forbearance.

(2) The softness of heart and humility even in external conduct—that is called *mārdava* or softness. For the cultivation of this quality what is required is that one should not feel puffed up at one's superiority as to race, family, beauty, prosperity, intellect, scriptural knowledge, achievement, exertion; on the contrary, taking into account the perishing nature of these possessions one should extract out from one's heart the thorn of pride.

(3) The purity of mental makeup—that is, uniformity as to thought, speech and act—that is called *ārjava* or sincerity. For the cultivation of this quality what is required is that the defects of crookedness be pondered over.

(4) Not to have attachment even for the means of *dharma*—nay, even for one's own body—that is called *śauca* or absence of greed.

(5) Such a true speech as proves beneficial to the virtuous personages—that is called *satya* or truthfulness. A slight difference between *bhāṣā-samiti* and the presently described *satya* has been spoken of; that is as follows : to maintain a sense of discrimination while speaking to any person whatsoever—that is called *bhāṣā-samiti*, to utter beneficial, measured, and true words while speaking to the virtuous personages who are one's own equal in conduct—that is called the monk's duty designated *satya*.

(6) To discipline *manas*, speech and body—that is, to cultivate caution as regards thought, speech as well as motion, stoppage etc.—that is called *saṁyama* or restraint¹.

1. The seventeen types of *saṁyama* are well known but they are found described variously. Thus a control over five *indriyas*, a renunciation of five *avratas*, a victory over four *kaṣāyas*, a freedom-from-attachment of *manas*, speech and body—these constitute one set of seventeen items. Similarly, restrain in relation to the five types of static beings and the four types of mobile beings, as also what are designated

(7) Self-suppression that is practised with a view to developing energy adequate for the extirpation of the vicious mental tendencies—that is called *tapas* or penance¹.

(8) To bestow meritorious qualifications like *jñāna* etc. on a worthy recipient—that is called *tyāga* or renunciation.

(9) Not to harbour an attitude of ownership in relation to anything whatsoever—that is called *akiñcanya* or absence of a feeling of ownership.

(10) With a view to removing shortcomings, cultivating meritorious qualifications like *jñāna* etc., as also to practising the state-of-dependence in relation to the preceptor², a residence (Sanskrit *caryā*) at the preceptor's quarters (Sanskrit *brahma*)—that is called *brahmacarya* or studentship.

prekṣyasamīyama, *upekṣyasamīyama*, *apahrīyasamīyama*, *pramrjyasamīyama*, *kāyasamīyama*, *vāksamīyama*, *manahsamīyama*, *upakaraṇasamīyama*—these constitute another set of seventeen items.

1. A special description of it occurs in the aphorisms 19-20 of this very chapter. Besides, various penances to be practised by various ascetics in various manners are well-known in the Jaina tradition. For example, the two called *yavamadhya* and *vajramadhya*; one called *cāndrāyana*; the three called *kanakāvalī*, *ratnāvalī* and *muktāvalī*; the two called *ksullaka* and *mahā*; one called *simhavikrīḍita*; the four *pratimās* designated *saptasaptamikā*, *aṣṭa-aṣṭamikā*, *nava-navamikā*, *daśa-daśamikā*; one called *sarvatobhadra*—of two types—viz. *ksudra* and *mahā*; one called *bhadrottara*; one called *ācāmla*; one called *vardhamāna*; also the twelve *bhikṣupratimās*, etc. For a special description of these see *Śrītaporatnamahodadhī* published by the Ātmānanda Sabhā.

2. The *guru* or *ācārya*—that is, preceptor—is said to be of five types: *pravrajaka*, *digācārya*, *śrutoddeṣṭā*, *śrutasamuddeṣṭā*, *āmnāyārth-avācaka*. He who offers *pravrajyā* (i. e. the title to enter the monastic order) is called *pravrajaka*. He who sanctions the use of any and every thing is called *digācārya*. He who gives first lessons in the scriptural texts is called *śrutoddeṣṭā*. He who with a view to bringing about steady acquaintance with the scriptural texts gives special lessons in those texts is called *śruta-samuddeṣṭā*. Lastly, he who reveals the secret of the rules and exceptions laid down in the scriptural texts is called *āmnāyārth-avācaka*.

The Types of *anuprekṣā* or Deep-reflection :

The constant reflection as to *anitya* or the transient, *aśaraṇa* or the helpless, *saṃsāra* or the world of transmigrations, *ekatva* or soleness, *anyatva* or separateness, *aśucitva* or impurity, *āsrava* or the fundamental verity designated inflow, *saṃvara* or the fundamental verity designated protection, *nirjarā* or the fundamental verity designated cleansing-off, *loka* or the universe, *bodhidurlabha* or the fact that right thought-and-conduct is difficult of achievement, *dharma-svākhyātatva* or the fact that religious message has been well delivered—that is called *anuprekṣā* or deep-reflection. 7.

Anuprekṣā means deep-reflection. In case a piece of reflection happens to be veracious and deep it prevents the onset of the tendencies like attachment and aversion. Hence it is that such reflection has been described as a means of *saṃvara*.

Of the subject-matters which when reflected over prove specially useful for a purification of life twelve have been preferred and the reflection conducted in relation to them has been given the designation twelve *anuprekṣās*. An alternative designation for *anuprekṣā* is *bhāvanā*. These *anuprekṣās* are as follows :

(1) In order that the loss of a thing received earlier causes no sorrow attachment has to be reduced in relation to all things whatsoever. And with a view to such reduction of attachment to think as regards the things like one's body, residential quarters etc.—as also as regards one's relationship with them—that none of them whatsoever is lasting or permanent—that is called *anitya-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the transient.

(2) In order that pure religion is alone accepted as a help in life the feeling of ownership in relation to everything else has to be discarded. And with a view to such discarding of the feeling of ownership to think as regards oneself that just as a deer caught in the clutches of a lion is without a help so also is oneself caught in the clutches of mental pains, bodily pains, external disturbances, helpless for ever—that is called *aśaraṇa-anuprekṣā* or

reflection as to the helpless.

(3) In order that craving for the world of transmigration is done away with a feeling of resignation or indifference has to be cultivated in relation to the things of the world. And with a view to diverting attention from such things one must reflect as follows : 'In this beginningless cycle of births and deaths there is in fact none who is own to me and none who is alien to me. For in the course of so many births all sorts of relations have been established between me and all the beings that are there. Similarly, the beings of the world burning with attachment, aversion and delusion and out of craving for things sensuous are out to devour one another and suffer unbearable hardship as a result of a behaviour of that sort. Really speaking, this world is a garden nurturing the couples-of-opposites like joy-and-sorrow, pleasure-and-pain, etc., and is truly full of tortures.' That is called *saṃsāra-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the world of transmigration.

(4) In order to attain *mokṣa* a feeling of aloofness has to be constantly evoked on the occasion of attachment and aversion. For that the attachment developed in relation to things considered to be one's own and the aversion developed in relation to those considered to be alien to oneself have to be discarded and so one must reflect : 'I am born alone, I die alone, and alone do I reap the fruits of the form of pleasure, pain etc. yielded by the karmic seeds sown by myself.' That is called *ekatva-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to soleness.

(5) Out of an onrush of delusion man commits the mistake of regarding as his own rise and fall the rise and fall of his body and of the other things belonging to him; and the result is that he fails to have a realization of his true duty. In order to forestall a contingency like this the false imposition of ownership in relation to the alien things like body etc. has to be done away with. For that the separateness from another of the properties belonging to the two has to be reflected over as follows : 'This body is gross, possessed of a beginning and an end, and is something inanimate, while I myself am subtle, possessed of no

beginning or an end, and am something conscious'. That is called *anyatva-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to separateness.

(6) One's body being most eminently an object of craving one must, with a view to reducing attachment for one's body, reflect : 'This body is itself impure, it is born out of things impure, it is nourished by things impure, it is a seat of things impure, it is the ultimate cause of a series of things impure.' That is called *aśucitva-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to impurity.

(7) With a view to reducing attachment for the enjoyment of *indriyas* one must take up these *indriyas* one by one and reflect over the undesirable consequences following from an attachment for the enjoyment appropriate to each. That is called *āsrava-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the fundamental verity inflow.

(8) With a view to closing the door for evil conduct one must reflect over the merits of virtuous conduct. That is called *saṁvara-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the fundamental verity *saṁvara*.

(9) With a view to strengthening the tendency to annihilate all bondage of karma one must, in the following manner, reflect over the various fruits of karma : 'The occasions for pain are of two types : one those arising without a volition or conscious effort—e.g. birth like that of an animal, a bird, a deaf-and-dumb where pain predominates, poverty received in inheritance—, the other those made available by oneself to oneself out of a noble motive and through a conscious effort—e.g. poverty or bodily weakness resulting from penance and renunciation. In the first case there takes place no feeling of satisfaction and so is caused a sense of distaste-which brings about consequence that are inauspicious. As for the second case, it is born of a noble feeling and so its consequences are exclusively auspicious. Hence it is to one's good that one develops a feeling of satisfaction in relation to the bitter fruits of karma brought about involuntarily and that as far as possible one reaps the fruit of the accumulated karmas through penance and renunciation—so as to meet with consequences that are auspicious. That is called

nirjarā-anuprekṣā or reflection as to the fundamental verity cleansing-off.

(10) With a view to purifying one's knowledge concerning the fundamental verities to reflect over the real nature of the universe—that is called *loka-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the universe.

(11) When the pathway to *mokṣa* has been attained then with a view to cultivating an attitude of non-negligence in relation to it one must reflect : 'For a *jīva* caught up in the beginningless jungle of tangles, in the stream of multifarious afflictions, and suffering the mighty strokes of the karmas like moha etc. it is difficult to attain a right viewpoint, and right conduct.' That is called *bodhidurlābha-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the fact that right thought-and-conduct is difficult of achievement.

(12) So as not to deviate from the path of religion and so as bring about steadiness in one's practice of it one must reflect : 'How highly fortunate it is that a religion full of doing good to the entire mass of living beings has been preached by the virtuous personages'. That is called *dharmasvākhyātatva-anuprekṣā* or reflection as to the fact that the religious message has been well delivered. 7.

An Account of *Parīṣaha*—The Class of Discomforts Technically so Designated :

What has to be put up with so as not to deviate from the right path and so as to annihilate karma- that is called *parīṣaha*. 8.

Parīṣaha are twenty two in all—viz, those related to *kṣudhā* or hunger, *tr̥sa* or thirst, *śīta* or things cold, *uṣṇa* or things hot, *darśamaśaka* or gadflies and mosquitos, *nagnatva* or nakedness, *arati* or distaste, *strī* or woman, *caryā* or moving about, *niṣadyā* or seating, *śayyā* or bedding, *ākrośa* or harsh words, *vadha* or beating-and-threatening, *yācanā* or begging, *alābha* or non-receipt, *roga* or disease, *tr̥ṇasparśa* or the touch of grass, straw etc., *mala* or dirt, *satkāra-puraskāra* or honour-

and-reward, *prajñā* or miraculous intellect, *ajñāna* or ignorance, *adarśana* or non-vision. 9.

In the *guṇasthāna* designated *sūkṣmasamparāya* and in the person designated *chadmastha-vitarāga* (who occupies two particular *guṇasthānas*) fourteen *parīśahas* are possible. 10.

In an omniscient person (who occupies two particular *guṇasthānas*) eleven *parīśahas* are possible. 11.

In the *guṇasthāna* designated *bādarasāmparāya* all the *parīśahas* are possible. 12.

Prajñā and *ajñāna*—these *parīśahas* take places with the *jñānavaraṇa-karma* acting as a cause. 13.

Adarśana and *alābha*—these *parīśahas* take place with the *darśanamoha-karma* and *antarāya-karma* respectively acting as a cause. 14.

Nagnatva, *arati*, *strī*, *niṣadyā*, *ākrośa*, *yācanā* and *satkāra-puruskāra*—these *parīśahas* take place with the *cāritramoha-karma* acting as a cause. 15.

The rest of the *parīśahas* take place with the *vedaṇīya-karma* acting as a cause. 16.

From one upto nineteen *parīśahas* can simultaneously occur in one and the same soul. 17.

While describing *parīśaha* as a means of *saṁvara* the aphorist has discussed five topics—which are as follows : The definition of *parīśaha*, the number of *parīśahas*, the classification of *parīśahas* according to the types of persons likely to suffer them, the respective causes of the different *parīśahas*, the number of *parīśahas* capable of simultaneously occurring in a soul. The details of these topics are given below.

The Definition :

So as to remain steady in the path of religiosity that has been adopted and so as to annihilate the accumulated karmic bondages whatever contingencies are to be put up with, with a sense of equanimity—those are called *parīśaha*. 8.

The Number :

Though, briefly considered a less number of *parīṣahas* can be thought of and considered in details a greater number of them can be similarly thought of, yet the scriptural texts have enumerated 22 of them such as are particularly necessary for developing a sense of renunciation. They are as follows :

(1-2) However intense might be the sensation of hunger and the sensation of thirst disturbing one, one should not take food and drink in a quantity greater than that fixed by one for oneself and should thus suffer these sensations with a sense of equanimity. These are respectively called the *parīṣaha* related to *kṣudhā* or hunger and that related to *trṣā* or thirst.

(3-4) However intense might be the un-ease caused by cold and heat one must not seek to remove it by using a prohibited thing but should rather put up with the sensations concerned with a sense of equanimity. These are respectively called the *parīṣaha* related to *śīta* or things cold and that related to *uṣṇa* or things hot.

(5) In face of the disturbance caused by gadflies and mosquitos one must not grief but should rather put up with it with a sense of equanimity. That is called the *parīṣaha* related to *daṁśamaśaka* or gadflies and mosquitos.

(6) To put up with nakedness with a sense of equanimity—that is called the *parīṣaha* related to *nagnatva* or nakedness.¹

1. As to this *parīṣaha* there is an important difference of opinion between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions; and it is this very difference of opinion that is responsible for the respective names borne by these traditions. The Śvetāmbara scriptural texts, while approving absolute nakedness in the case of certain special spiritual realizers, sanction a limited quantity of clothes and utensils in the case of the rest and in accordance with this sanction they treat as a genuine monk him too who keeps possession of clothes and utensils though with a sense of non-attachment. On the other hand, the Digambara scriptural texts uniformly recommend absolute nakedness for all the spiritual realizers deserving to be called a monk. An alternative name

(7) When in the course of the path adopted there arises, owing to the difficulties that crop up, an occasion for developing a feeling of distaste then not to develop such a feeling but to patiently take interest in the path in question—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *arati* or distaste.

(8) For a spiritual realizer—man or woman—not to succumb to the attraction of a member of the opposite sex—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *strī* or woman.

(9) With a view to keeping well nurtured the life of religiosity that has been adopted to move from place to place with a feeling of non-attachment and not to take up residence at one fixed quarter—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *caryā* or moving about.

(10) When one is seated in a lonely place fit for spiritual exercises—seated for a limited period of time and with a definite bodily posture adopted—then to conquer without wavering the fears that crop up and not to give up the posture in question—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *niṣadyā* or seating.

(11) Whatever place—soft or hard, high or low—is available with ease to sleep there with a feeling of equanimity—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *śayyā* or bedding.

(12) When a person approaches one and says to one things harsh and disagreeable then to treat the affairs as an act of honour done to oneself—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *ākrośa* or harsh words.

(13) When a person beats or threatens one then to treat the affair as an act of service done to oneself—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *vadha* or beating-and-threatening.

for *nagnatva-parīṣaha* is *acelaka-parīṣaha* (*acelaka*=one without clothing). In the tradition current with the Śvetāmbara sect which permits the use of clothes and utensils the modern researchers see the root of the tradition of Lord Pārśvanātha characterized by a use of clothes, while in the tradition current with the Digambara sect which insists on absolute nakedness they see the root of the tradition of Lord Mahāvīra characterized by no use of clothes.

(14) Without exhibiting an attitude of cringing or arrogance to adopt the career of a beggar just with a view to enabling oneself to carry out tasks religious—that is called *darīṣaha* related to *yācanā* or begging.

(15) If in spite of begging one does not receive the thing desired then to treat this non-receipt as a greater penance than that earlier expected receipt and thus to remain content with the situation—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *alābha* or non-receipt.

(16) Not to get agitated when attacked by any disease whatsoever but to put up with it with a feeling of equanimity—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *roga* or disease.

(17) When within the body of one's sleeping apparatus or somewhere else one experiences the sharpness or harshness of grass etc. then to maintain a sense of joy as if one were lying in a soft bed—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *tṛṇasparśa* or the touch of grass, straw etc.,

(18) However great might be the mass of dirt accumulated on one's body not to feel disgusted by it and not to look for embellishments like bath etc.—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *mala* or dirt.

(19) However much might be the honour received by one not to feel puffed up on account of that and when no honour is received not to feel worried—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *satkāra-puraskāra* or honour-and-reward.

(20) When in possession of a miraculous intellect not to feel arrogant on account of that and when not in possession of it not to feel worried—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *prajñā* or miraculous intellect.

(21) Not to feel arrogant at one's special knowledge of scriptural texts and not to despise oneself when not in possession of such knowledge—that is called *parīṣaha* related to *jñāna* or knowledge (alternatively, *parīṣaha* related to *ajñāna* or ignorance).

(22) When on account of not being able to see things subtle and suprasensuous it appears to one as if the renunciation

practised by one so far was all futile then to cultivate faith characterized by a sense of discrimination and to remain joyful even in a situation like that—that is called *parīśaha* related to *adarśana* or non-vision. 9.

The Classification According to the Types of Persons Coming in Picture :

In the *guṇasthānas* designated *śūksmasāmparāya*—so designated because a very small amount of *sāmparāya* or *kaṣāya* of the form of greed is possible in it—and in those designated *upaśāntamoha* and *kṣiṇa moha* just fourteen *parīśahas* are possible and they are as follows : *kṣudhā*, *pipāsā*, *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *darśamaśaka*, *caryā*, *prajñāna*, *alābha*, *śayyā*, *vadha*, *roga*, *tr̥ṇasparśa*, *mala*; the remaining eight *parīśahas* are not possible in them—the reason being that they are born of *moha* while in the eleventh and twelfth *guṇasthānas* there is an absence of the manifestation of *moha*. As for the tenth *guṇasthāna*, *moha* is doubtless present in it, but it is present there in such a small amount that it is as good as not present; hence even in the case of this *guṇasthāna* there is no mention of the *parīśahas* born of *moha* but only of the remaining fourteen.

In the thirteen and fourteenth *guṇasthānas* just eleven *parīśahas* are possible and they are as follows : *kṣudhā*, *pipāsā*, *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *darśamaśaka*, *caryā*, *śayyā*, *vadha*, *roga*, *tr̥ṇasparśa*, *mala*¹; the remaining eleven *parīśahas* are born of the karmas

1. As regards the *parīśahas* occurring in these two *guṇasthānas* there is a difference of opinion between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions. This difference of opinion is due to that relating to the possibility or otherwise of the intake of gross food on the part of an omniscient. Hence it is that the Digambara commentary texts, even while accepting for the aphorism the reading '*ekādaśa jīne*' offer an interpretation of it that seems to be distorted. And the interpretation too is not one. Thus two interpretations have been offered in this connection and both obviously seem to be a product of the period subsequent to the emergence of a sharp difference of opinion between the sects in question. According to the first interpretation the aphorism is supposed to mean the following. The eleven *parīśahas* (born of the

designated *ghātin* and since these karmas are absent in the *guṇasthānas* in question these *parīśahas* too are absent there.

In the ninth *guṇasthāna* designated *bādarasamparāya*¹—and so designated because *sāmparāya* or *kaṣāya* is present in it in a particularly manifest form—all the twenty-two *parīśahas* are possible, for all those karmas that cause a *parīśaha* are present in it and when twentytwo *parīśahas* are said to be possible in the ninth *guṇasthāna* then it automatically follows that as many are possible in the preceding *guṇasthānas* sixth etc. 10-12.

The Respective Causes of the Different *Parīśahas* :

Four karmas in all are understood to be the cause of a *parīśaha*. Of these, *jñānāvaraṇa*² is the cause of the *parīśahas* *prajñā* and *ajñāna*. The *antarāyakarma* is the cause of the *parīśaha* *alābha*. From among *moha darśanamoha* is the cause of the *parīśaha* *adarśana* while *cāritramoha* is the cause of the seven *parīśahas* *nagnatva*, *arati*, *strī*, *niṣadyā*, *ākrośa*, *yācanā*, *satkāra*. Lastly, the *vedaṇīyakarma* is the cause of those eleven *parīśahas* which were above said to be possible in an omniscient. 13-16.

vedaṇīya-karma) are certainly present in an omniscient, but since he is devoid of *moha* those *ksudhā* etc. in his case are not of the form of a disagreeable experience and are therefore *parīśahas* only in a figurative sense—that is, are *parīśahas* of the *dravya* type. According to the second interpretation the word *na* (=not) is understood to be present in the aphorism and the meaning of it therefore is that even if the *vedaṇīya-karma* is present in an omniscient yet since he is devoid of *moha* the eleven *parīśahas* born of the *vedaṇīya-karma* prove no disturbance to him and so are not present in him at all.

1. The Digambara commentary-texts take the word *bādarasamparāya* not as a noun but as an adjective—so that it stands for four *guṇasthānas*—viz. the sixth etc.

2. A miraculous intellect, however extensive it might be, is after all of a limited extent and so is due to *jñānāvaraṇa*; hence it is that the *parīśaha* *prajñā* is to be understood to be a product of *jñānāvaraṇa*.

The Number of *Parīśahas* Capable of Simultaneously Occurring in a Soul :

Among the twentytwo *parīśahas* there are many which are opposite of each other in case supposed to occur simultaneously. Take for example *śīta*, *uṣṇa*, *caryā*, *śayyā*, *nīṣadyā*. Of these the first two cannot occur simultaneously, nor can the last three do so. Thus when *śīta* occurs *uṣṇa* cannot and vice versa; similarly, from among *caryā*, *śayyā* and *nīṣadyā* just one can occur at a time. Hence keeping in view the circumstance that from among the five *parīśahas* in question just two are possible at a time and three not possible it has been declared that nineteen *parīśahas* at the most can occur in a soul at one time. 17.

The Types of *Cāritra* or Right Conduct :

Sāmāyika, *chedopasthāpāna*, *parihāraviśuddhi*, *sūkṣma-sāmparāya*, *yathākhyāta*—these five are the types of *cāritra*. 18.

The endeavour to remain steady in a state of spiritual purity—that is called *cāritra*. Keeping in view the degrees of spiritual purity obtaining in different cases *cāritra* has been divided into the above five classes *sāmāyika* etc. This as follows :

(1) With a view to persisting in the attitude of equanimity to give up all impure activity—that is called *sāmāyika cāritra*. The remaining four types of *cāritra*—viz. *chedopasthāpāna* etc.—are doubtless of the form of *sāmāyika*, but in view of certain speciality as to conduct and meritorious qualification characterizing them the four have been described as different from *sāmāyika*. The initiation ceremony signifying entry into a monk's career, when the period of intended monkhood is brief, is called *itvaṛika* or temporary *sāmāyika*, the same ceremony, when the period in question is life-long, is called *yāvatkathita* or life-long *sāmāyika*.

(2) When after first undergoing the initiation ceremony for a monk's career certain special scriptural texts have been studied and then the ceremony is repeated with a view to retaining the monk's career for the whole life—that is one case of *chedopasth-*

āpana cāritra; similarly, when the initiation ceremony for a monk's career that was earlier undergone is vitiated by some defect and so has to be undergone de novo—that is the other case of *chedopasthāpana cāritra*. The first is called *niraticāra chedopasthāpana* or *chedopasthāpana* characterized by no failure of conduct, the second *sāticāra chedopasthāpana* or *chedopasthāpana* characterized by a failure of conduct.

(3) That which is characterized by a course of conduct dominated by certain special types of penance is called *parihāra-viśuddhi-cāritra*.¹

(4) That in which the *kaṣāyas* like anger etc. do not manifest themselves at all but there is present an extremely small amount of greed is called *sūkṣmasāmparāya-cāritra*.

(5) That in which no *kaṣāya* whatsoever manifests itself is called *yathākhyāta* or *vītarāga-cāritra*.² 18.

An Account of *Tapas* or Penance :

Anaśana or a complete giving up of food, *avamaudarya* or a partial giving up of food, *ṛttiparisāṅkhyāna* or a reduction of greed, *rasaparityāga* or a giving up of delicacies, *vivikta-śayyāsana* or a lonely residence, *kāyakleśa* or a mortification of body—these constitute external *tapas*. 19.

Prāyaścitta or atonement, *vinaya* or veneration, *vaiya-ṛttya* or rendering a service, *svādhyāya* or self-study, *vyutsarga* or renouncing selfish feelings, *dhyāna* or mental concentration—these constitute internal *tapas*. 20.

With a view to developing the spiritual power adequate for reducing passions whatever means are adopted for placing under burning hardship one's body, *indriyas* and *manas*—they are called *tapas* or penance. Penance has been divided into two types—viz. external and internal. That in which there is a predominance of

1. See Hindi *cauthā karmagrantha* p. 59-61.

2. Two alternative designations found for it are *athākhyāta* and *tathākhyāta*.

bodily activity and which, being dependent on things external, is capable of being seen by others is called external penance; on the contrary, that in which there is a predominance of mental activity and which, not being chiefly dependent on things external, is incapable of being seen by others is called internal penance. Though external penance is a gross affair and one open to the comprehension of common people its significance is understood to lie in that it is of use for strengthening internal penance. In this classification of penance into an external and an internal type there are included all the gross and refined rules pertaining to religiosity.

The External Penance :

(1) For a limited period of time or till death to give up all sorts of food—that is called *anaśana* or a complete giving up of food. Of these, the former is to be understood to be of a temporary type the latter to be of a life-long type.

(2) To eat less than what is needed to fill the belly—that is called *avamaudarya* or a partial giving up of food.

(3) To reduce greed in relation to the various sorts of things—that is called *vr̥ttisaṃkṣepa* or a reduction of greed.

(4) To give up *ghī*, milk etc. as also wine, honey, butter etc. which when consumed cause evil mental tendencies—that is called *rasaparityāga* or a giving up of delicacies.

(5) To reside in a lonely place free from all disturbances—that is called *viviktaśayyāsanasaṃlīnatā* or a lonely residence.

(6) To place one's body under stress through cold or heat, through adopting diverse postures and the like—that is called *kāyakleśa* or a mortification of body.

The Internal Penance :

(1) That through which it is possible to make clean sweep of the defects born of negligence arisen in connection with a *vrata* that has been accepted—that is called *prāyaścitta* or atonement.

(2) To hold in great regard the virtuous qualifications like knowledge etc.—that is called *vinaya* or veneration.

(3) To render service to somebody either through providing him with necessary means or through personally acting for his sake—that is called *vaiyāvṛtṭya* or rendering a service. *Vinaya* and *vaiyāvṛtṭya* differ from one another in that the former is a mental act the latter a bodily one.

(4) To undertake various practices with a view to acquiring knowledge—that is called *svādhyāya* or self-study.

(5) To renounce the feeling of 'I' and 'my'—that is called *vyutsarga* or renouncing selfish feelings.

(6) To renounce the distractions of mind—that is called *dhyāna* or mental concentration. 19-20.

The Number of Subtypes Falling Under the Types
Prāyaścitta etc. Belonging to Internal Penance :

The types of internal penance mentioned before *dhyāna* have respectively got 9, 4, 10, 5 and 2 subtypes. 21.

Since discussion pertaining to *dhyāna* is going to be lengthy it has been left out to be treated at the end, while there has been here indicated the number of sub-types that fall under the five types *prāyaścitta* etc. belonging to internal penance and mentioned before *dhyāna*. 21.

The Sub-types of *Prāyaścitta* :

Ālocana, *pratikramaṇa*, both *ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa*, *viveka*, *vyutsarga*, *tapas*, *cheda*, *parihāra*, *upasthāpana*—these are the nine sub-types of *prāyaścitta*. 22.

There are various ways for remedying a failing—a mistake, and they are all called *prāyaścitta*. In brief there are nine sub-types of it and as follows :

(1) To confess one's mistake in the presence of the preceptor and with a pure heart—that is called *ālocana*.

(2) To repent for the mistake that has been committed and

to refrain from it, as also to remain alert that no new mistakes are committed—that is called *pratikramaṇa*.

(3) When these *ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa* are performed together—that is called ‘both (*ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa*)’ or ‘a combination (of *ālocana* and *pratikramaṇa*)’.

(4) When prohibited food and drink happen to have been received and the fact comes to light later on, then to discard these food and drink—that is called *yiveka*.

(5) Adopting an attitude of concentration to give up the operations of body and speech—that is called *vyutsarga*.

(6) To perform external penances like *anaśana* etc.—that is called *tapas*.

(7) Corresponding to the gravity of the offence committed to reduce the reckoned period of monkhood by a day, a fortnight, a month or a year—that is called *cheda*.

(8) To keep an offender at a distance from oneself and not to have with him dealings of any sort for a fortnight, a month or the like as might suit the gravity of his offence—that is called *parihāra*.¹

(9) When on account of a violation of the earlier accepted *mahāvratas* (=major-scale *vratas*) non-violence, truthfulness, continence etc. they are accepted de novo—that is called *upasth-āpāna*. 22.

The Sub-types of *Vinaya* :

That pertaining to *jñāna*, that pertaining to *darśana*, that pertaining to *cāritra* and that pertaining to *upacāra* (i.e. formality)—these are the four sub-types of *vinaya*. 23.

1. In many texts there occur in place of the two items *parihāra* and *upasthāpana* three others—viz. *mūla*, *anavasthāpya* and *pārāñcika* and so according to them the sub-types of *prāyaścitta* are ten in all. For a special elucidation as to which of these sub-types of *prāyaścitta* is due in the case of what sort of offences one must consult texts like *Vyavahāra*, *Jitakaḥpa-sūtra* etc. that mainly deal with *prāyaścitta*.

In the form of a virtuous qualification *vinaya* is but one, and yet if it is here classified into sub-types that is in view of its referential objects. Thus the object of *vinaya* is here chiefly divided into four kinds; this as follows :

(1) To acquire knowledge, to continue a practice of it, and not to forget it—that is true *vinaya* pertaining to *jñāna*.

(2) Not to deviate from *samyakdarśana* that is of the form of a true apprehension of the fundamental verities, to remove doubts that arise in this connection, and thus to cultivate an attitude of freedom-from-doubt—that is *vinaya* pertaining to *darśana*.

(3) To keep one's mind steady while practising any of the earlier described types of *cāritra sāmāyika* etc.—that is *vinaya* pertaining to *cāritra*.

(4) If as regards any virtuous qualification whatsoever a person happens to be superior to oneself then to behave with him in various suitable ways—e.g. to present oneself before him, to get up when he comes, to offer seat to him, to pay obeisance to him, etc.—that is *vinaya* pertaining to *upacāra*. 23.

The Sub-types of *Vaiyāvṛttya* :

Those offered to an ācārya, an Upādhyaya, a tapasvin, a śaikṣa, a glāna, a gaṇa, a kula, a saṅgha, a sādhu, a samanojña—these are the ten sub-types of vaiyāvṛttya. 24.

Vaiyāvṛttya being of the form of a service rendered it is of ten types, corresponding to the ten types of objects worthy of a service. These objects are as follows :

(1) He whose chief task is to preside over the acceptance of a *vrata* or of some other rule of conduct is *ācārya*.

(2) He whose chief task is to teach the scriptural texts is *Upādhyāya*.

(3) He who performs a great and severe penance is *tapasvin*.

(4) He who being a new entrant to the monastic order is

a candidate for receiving instruction is *śaikṣa*.

(5) He who has grown weak owing to a disease or the like is a *glāna*.

(6) A group of such monks who though disciples of various *ācāryas* study together and so are sharers in a common reading-of-the-scriptural-texts is *gaṇa*.

(7) The group of disciples who have received initiation into the monastic order at the hands of a common *ācārya* is *kula*.

(8) The followers of a religion constitute a *saṅgha*; it has four divisions—viz. monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen.

(9) He who has been initiated into a monastic order is *sādhu*.

(10) He who is one's equal as regards qualifications like knowledge etc. is *samanojña*—that is, one enjoying the same status. 24.

The Sub-types of *Svādhyāya* :

Vācanā, pracchanā, ānuprekṣā, āmnāya and dharmopadeśa—these are the five sub-types of *svādhyāya*. 25.

To acquire knowledge, to render it free from doubt, lucid and ripe and to seek to propagate it—all this being comprehended under *svādhyāya* it has been divided into five sub-types corresponding to the order followed in a course of study, they are as follows :

(1) To take first lessons in the wording or the meaning of a text—that is *vācanā*.

(2) To make enquiries with a view to removing doubt or with a view to being particularly certain—that is *pracchanā*.

(3) To mentally ponder over the wording or the meaning of a text—that is *anuprekṣā*.

(4) To correctly repeat the wording of a text that has been learnt—that is *āmnāya* (meaning repetition).

(5) To grasp the secret of a text that has been learnt—that

is *dharmopadeśa*; alternatively, to preach things religious—that is *dharmopadeśa*. 25.

The Sub-types of *Vyutsarga* :

To renounce *bāhyopādhi* or the alien belongings of an external type and *ābhyantaropādhi* or the alien belongings of an internal type—these are the two sub-types of *vyutsarga*. 26.

Really speaking, renunciation of the form of a cessation of the feelings of 'I' and 'my' is but one; yet since the things to be renounced are of two kinds—viz. external and internal—the *vyutsarga* or renunciation related to them too is said to be of two kinds; they are as follows :-

(1) To set aside the feeling of ownership in relation to the external things like money, corn, house, field etc.—that is *vyutsarga* related to *bāhyopādhi* or the alien belonging of an external type.

(2) To set aside the feeling of ownership in relation to one's own body, as also to give up absorption in the mental perturbances born of *kaṣāyas*—that is *vyutsarga* related to *ābhyantaropādhi* or the alien belongings of an internal type. 26.

An Account of *dhyāna* or Mental Concentration :

Fixing the attention of mind on some one object¹ on the part of a person possessing a superior type of bone-structure—that is *dhyāna*. 27.

It lasts upto one *muhūrta*—that is, it lasts for less than one *muhūrta*. 28.

1. According to *Bhāṣya* two types of *Dhyāna* are mentioned here in this aphorism—*Ekāgracintā* and *Nirodha*. But it seems that no other commentator took notice of this. So we also have followed here the old commentators. As for the fact that these two types are really intended by the author, see *Cūrṇī* on *Daśavaikālika* by Agastya, page 16, published by Prakrit Text Society and also see an article by D. Malvania in *Vidya* (Gujarat University), Vol. XV, No. 2, August, 1972, p. 61.

The Persons Authorised :

Of the six types of *saṁhanana*¹—that is, bodily set-up—three—viz. *vajraṣabhanārāca*, *ardhavajraṣabhanārāca*, *nārāca*²—are considered to be superior. Only a person who is possessed of a superior type of *saṁhanana* is authorised to perform *dhyāna*. For the bodily power capable of yielding mental power requisite for performing *dhyāna* can possibly be found only in a body with the just mentioned three types of *saṁhanana*—not in a body with the remaining three types of it. After all, it is well known that the chief basis of mental power is body while bodily power depends on bodily set-up; hence it is that none except those possessing a superior type of *saṁhanana* or bodily set-up is authorized to perform *dhyāna*. To the extent that bodily set-up is weak to the same extent is mental power meagre; and to the extent that mental power is meagre to the same extent is the steadiness of mind meagre. Hence persons with a weak bodily set-up—that is, persons with an inferior type of *saṁhanana*—can bestow on any object, whether auspicious or otherwise, so little concentration that it does not deserve to be treated as a case of *dhyāna*.

The Nature :

Generally speaking, a stream of cognition having at this moment one thing for its object, at the next moment a second thing, at the next moment after that a third thing is unsteady like the flame of a lamp left in the midst of wind blowing from different directions. To withdraw such a stream of cognitions—such a thought-process—from all the remaining objects and to fix it on some one desired object—that is to say, to prevent a stream of cognitions from becoming such as it out to grasp numerous

1. In the Digambara texts persons possessing any of the three superior types of *saṁhanana* are considered to be competent to practise *dhyāna*. However, the *Bhāṣya* and the *vṛtti* on it maintain the view that only persons possessing the two superior types of *saṁhanana* are so competent.

2. For this see chapter 8, aphorism 12.

objects and to make it grasp just one object—that is *dhyāna*. This description of *dhyāna* applies only in the case of a non-omniscient person—technically designated *chadmastha*. Hence it is that *dhyāna* so described is to be found only up to the twelfth *guṇasthāna*.

Even in the state posterior to the attainment of omniscience—that is, even in the thirteenth and fourteenth *guṇasthānas*—the possibility of *dhyāna* has been admitted; but the nature of this *dhyāna* is different. Thus when at the end of the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* the operations of *manas*, speech and body begin to cease, and when in this connection after the cessation of the gross bodily operations there remain only subtle bodily operations to pursue their course then there takes place a *dhyāna* designated '*sūkṣmakriyāpratipātin*'—which is the third sub-type of the type called *śukla-dhyāna*. And in the fourteenth *guṇasthāna* when at the time of an absolute cessation of the operations of *manas*, speech and body the operation called '*saileśīkaraṇa*' pursues its course then there takes place a *dhyāna* designated '*samucchinakriyānivr̥tti*'—which is the fourth sub-type of the type called *śukla-dhyāna*. Now neither of these types of *dhyāna*, since each is characterized by an absence of all mental operation, is of the form of a mental concentration on some one object—as is the case with the *dhyāna* performed by a non-omniscient person; hence with a view to making it applicable even to these two types the meaning of the word *dhyāna* has been expanded in a particular manner. Thus it is maintained that an endeavour just to put a stop to the gross bodily operations—that too is *dhyāna*, and that a state of non-wavering assumed by the constituent-units of a soul—that too is *dhyāna*. However, there still remains one question outstanding in this connection and that as follows : From the beginning of the thirteenth *guṇasthāna* right upto the time when the operations of *manas*, speech and body begin to cease—that is to say, throughout that period of life when the career of an omniscient is pursued—does any sort of *dhyāna* take place ? And if it does what sort of *dhyāna* is that ? The question is answered in two ways :

(1) This state of a wandering omniscient having been designated *dhyānāntarikī*—that is, a state devoid of all *dhyāna*—the possibility of no *dhyāna* whatsoever is admitted in its case.

(2) The firm endeavour pertaining to the activities of *manas*, speech and body that is undertaken in this state has itself been admitted to be the *dhyāna* characteristic of this state.

The Time-Limit :

Any of the above *dhyāna*-types can last for a period of *antarmuhūrta* at the most; and since it is difficult to prolong a *dhyāna* beyond this period an *antarmuhūrta* is said to be the time-limit of a *dhyāna*.

According to some, *dhyāna* consists in an absolute cessation of all inbreathing and outbreathing; according to others, it consists in measuring duration according to *mātrā*¹. But neither of these views is acceptable to the Jaina tradition. Its argument is that if inbreathing and outbreathing cease altogether then the body itself will succumb in the end; hence on its view the act of breathing, however slow, does proceed during the state of *dhyāna*. Similarly, it argues that when a person measures duration according to *mātrā* then his mind is busy conducting so many operations connected with measurement that he would in all probability be a distracted rather than a concentrated self. Likewise, the popular notion that *dhyāna* might well be prolonged for a day, a month or a still longer period is not acceptable to the Jaina tradition. The reason suggested is that if *dhyāna* is prolonged for a much long period then the danger is that the *indriyas* might suffer damage—which is why it is difficult to prolong *dhyāna* beyond *antarmuhūrta*. And when it is said that

1. The time required to pronounce a short vowel *a*, *i*, etc. is called *mātrā*. And when a consonant is pronounced without the accompaniment of a vowel the time required is half a *mātrā*. Now if somebody develops the practice of recognizing a *mātrā* long or half a *mātrā* long period of time and then measures the duration of other activities in terms of *mātrās* and half-matras that is called measuring duration according to *mātrā*.

dhyāna was performed for a day, a day-and-night, or a still longer period then the meaning is that the course of *dhyāna* was prolonged for that much period. Thus what happened was that first *dhyāna* was performed in relation to some one object, then it was performed in relation to the same object taken in some other form or in relation to some other object, and the process was continued still further—all this being called prolonging the course of *dhyāna*. Of course, this time-limit of *antarmuhūrta* pertains to the *dhyāna* of a non-omniscient; for so far as the *dhyāna* appropriate to an omniscient is concerned, its time-limit can be still longer—the reason being that the firm endeavour pertaining to the activities of *manas*, speech and body can be sustained by an omniscient for a pretty long period. One more point to note, the object in relation to which *dhyāna* proceeds is not of the form of a substance taken in its totality but only some one part—some one mode—of it; for reflection in relation to a substance is possible only through the medium of one or another of its modes. 27-28.

Ārta, raudra, dharma, śukla—these are the four sub-types of *dhyāna*. 29.

Of these, the last two are a cause of *mokṣa*. 30.

Of the above four types of *dhyāna*, *ārta*, and *raudra* these two, since they are a cause of the worldly transmigration, are evil-*dhyāna* and so are worthy of rejection; on the other hand, *dharma* and *śukla* these two, since they are a cause of *mokṣa*, are noble-*dhyāna* and so are worthy of acceptance. 29-30.

An Account of the *Ārta* Type of *Dhyāna* :

If a disagreeable thing has come in one's possession then a constant reflection as to how to get rid of it—that is the first *ārta-dhyāna*. 31.

If an ailment has attacked one then a constant reflection as to how to get rid of it—that is the second *ārta-dhyāna*. 32.

If an agreeable thing has gone out of one's possession

then a constant reflection as to how to get it back—that is the third *ārta-dhyāna*. 33.

If a thing has failed to come in one's possession then a volition or a constant reflection as to how to get hold of it—that is the fourth *ārta-dhyāna*. 34.

This *ārta* type of *dhyāna* is possible in the *guṇasthānas avirata, deśasaṃyata* and *pramattasaṃyata*. 35.

The sub-types of *ārta-dhyāna* and the persons susceptible to it—these two topics have been discussed here. That which produces *ārti*—that is, distress or pain—is *ārta*. The causes that produce pain are four in all—viz. (1) The getting of what is not desired. (2) The losing for what is desired. (3) A disagreeable sensation. (4) A hankering after enjoyment. Depending on these causes the *ārta-dhyāna* is of four sub-types :

(1) When an undesirable thing comes in one's possession then one distressed at the pain caused thereby constantly thinks of removing away this thing—of how to get rid of this thing—; that is called *ārta-dhyāna* related to *aniṣṭasaṃ-yoga* or the getting of what is not desired.

(2) Again, when a desirable thing goes out of one's possession then one constantly thinks of getting it back; that is called *ārta-dhyāna* related to *iṣṭaviyoga* or the losing of what is desired.

(3) Similarly, when one develops a bodily or a mental pain then one experience worry caused by a pathetic eagerness to get rid of it; that is called *ārta-dhyāna* related to *rogacintā* or the worry at an ailment.

(4) On account of an intense hankering after enjoyment one develops a strong volition to get hold of things not yet in one's possession; that is called *ārta-dhyāna* related to *nidāna* or a hankering after enjoyment.

The *dhyāna* in question is possible in the first four *guṇasthānas*, the *deśavirata guṇasthāna* and the *pramattasaṃyata*

guṇasthāna—that is, in six *guṇasthānas* in all. In this connection a special point to note is that in the *guṇasthāna pramatta-saṁyata* all the sub-types minus that related to *nidāna*—that is, three sub-types in all—are possible. 31-35.

An Account of the *Raudra* Type of *Dhyāna* :

A constant reflection related to violence, untruthfulness, theft and protection-of-an-acquisition—that is *raudradhyāna*; It is possible in the *guṇasthānas avirata* and *deśavirata*. 36.

In the present aphorism there is an account of *raudradhyāna* and of the persons susceptible to it. As in the case of *ārtadhyāna* the four sub-types of *raudradhyāna* correspond to the four possible causes of it. He whose heart is cruel or hard is *rudra* and *dhyāna* performed by such a one is *raudra*. Cruelty or hardness of heart takes its rise from a tendency to commit violence, to speak the untruth, to commit theft and to seek security for the things acquired, and the constant reflection that proceeds in connection with them is respectively called *raudradhyāna* promoting violence, that promoting untruthfulness, that promoting theft and that promoting the protection-of-an-acquisition. And the persons occupying the first five *guṇasthānas* are such as are susceptible to this type of *dhyāna*. 36.

An Account of the *dharma-dhyāna* :

The concentration of the attention of mind on *ājñā*, *apāya*, *vipāka* and *saṁsthāna*—that is called *dharma-dhyāna*; It is possible in the *guṇasthāna apramattasaṁyata*. 37.

And this *dharma-dhyāna* is also possible in the *guṇasthānas upaśāntamoha* and *kṣīṇamoha*. 38.

Here there is an indication of the types of *dharma-dhyāna* and of the persons authorized to perform it.

The Types :

(1) What is the commandment of an omniscient personage

and one devoid of passion ? What sort of commandment it ought to be ? To apply one's mind to an investigation like this and thus to lay bare the commandment in question—that is called *dharma-dhyāna* devoted to a consideration of *ājñā* or commandment.

(2) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the nature of defilements and of the question as to how to get rid of them—that is called *dharma-dhyāna* devoted to a consideration of *apāya* or disaster.

(3) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the question as to what consequences that are being experienced are due to what karmas and of the question as to what karmas that are being accumulated are to yield what consequences—that is called *dharma-dhyāna* devoted to a consideration of *vipāka* or the consequence-of-a-karma.

(4) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the nature of the universe—that is called *dharma-dhyāna* devoted to a consideration of *saṁsthāna* or structure (of-the-universe).

The Persons Authorized :

On the question as to who is authorized to perform *dharma-dhyāna* the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions do not maintain an identical view. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition the three *guṇasthānas*—viz. the 7th, 11th and 12th;—explicitly mentioned in the present aphorisms and the intervening three—viz. the 8th, 9th and 10th implicitly admitted thereby—that is to say, the entire lot of *guṇasthānas* from the 7th upto 12th—are the six *guṇasthānas* where *dharma-dhyāna* is possible. On the other hand, the Digambara tradition maintains that *dharma-dhyāna* is possible only in the four *guṇasthānas* from the 4th upto the 7th; its argument is that since a *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* can perform *dharma-dhyāna* only before the process designated *śrenī* takes its start and since this process takes its start in the 8th *guṇasthāna* there can be no *dharma-dhyāna* at all in the *guṇasthānas* 8th onwards. 37-38.

An Account of *Śukla-dhyāna* :

¹The first two *śukla-dhyānas* are possible in the *guṇasthānas upśāntamoha* and *kṣīṇamoha*; and both these *śukla-dhyānas* are to be performed only by one versed in the *Pūrva*-texts. 39.

The last two *śukla-dhyānas* are to be performed by a *kevalin* or omniscient. 40.

Prthaktvavitarka, *ekatvavitarka*, *sūkṣmakriyāpratipātin*, *vyuparatakriyānivṛtti*—these are the four *śukla-dhyānas*. 41.

These *śukla-dhyānas* are respectively performed by one possessed of all the three *yogas*, by one possessed of any of three *yogas*, by one possessed of the bodily *yoga*, by one possessed of no *yoga* whatsoever. 42.

The first two have got a common seat and both have to do with *vitarka*. 43.

Of these the second is *avicāra*²—devoid of *vicāra*—that is, the first of them is possessed of *vicāra*. '44.

By *vitarka* is meant *śruta* or a scriptural text. 45.

By *vicāra* is meant a transition from one to another object, word or *yoga*. 46.

In the present account three topics connected with *śukla-dhyāna* have been taken up—viz. the persons authorized to perform it, its types, its nature.

1. The wording *pūrvavidaḥ* is a part of the present aphorism and not a separate aphorism—this is what the commentator on the *Bhāṣya* informs us. The Digambara tradition too does not read this part as a separate aphorism. Hence it is that the same practice is followed by us as well. But a reading of the *Bhāṣya* makes it clear that *pūrvavidaḥ* is by itself a separate aphorism.

2. At this place the reading *avicāra* too is to be met with quite frequently. However, with a view to maintaining uniformity between the word occurring in the aphorism and that used by us in our comments a short *vi* has been preferred here.

The Persons Authorized :

The statement as to the persons authorized to perform the *dhyāna* in question has been made here in two ways—viz. from the standpoint of *guṇasthāna* and from that of *yoga*. From the standpoint of *guṇasthāna* the persons authorized to perform the first two of the four subtypes of *śukla-dhyāna* turn out to be those occupying the eleventh and twelfth *guṇasthānas* and they too in case they happen to be versed in the *Pūrva*-texts. From the qualification 'versed in the *pūrva*-texts' it has to be generally understood that in case a person is versed not in the *Pūrva*-texts but in the eleven *Aṅga*-texts or the like then while occupying the *guṇasthānas* eleventh and twelfth he performs not *śukla-dhyāna* but *dharma-dhyāna*. However, to this general rule there are exceptions possible inasmuch as personages like *Māṣaṭuṣa* and *Marudevī* even while not versed in the *Pūrva*-texts can well perform *śukla-dhyāna*. As for the last two subtypes of *śukla-dhyāna* the person authorized to perform them in only a *kevalin*—that is, only one occupying the thirteenth or fourteenth *guṇasthāna*. From the standpoint of *yoga* only one possessed of all the *yogas* is authorized to perform the first of the four subtypes of *śukla-dhyāna*. Again, one possessed of any one of the three *yogas*—viz. those pertaining to *manas*, speech and body is authorized to perform the second subtype of *śukla-dhyāna*. Lastly, only one possessed of the bodily *yoga* is authorized to perform the third subtype of *śukla-dhyāna* while only one devoid of all *yoga* whatsoever is authorized to perform the fourth subtype of it.

The Types :

Like the other types of *dhyāna* *śukla-dhyāna* too is divided into four subtypes. The four are designated as follows :

- (1) *Pr̥thaktvavitarka-savicāra*.
- (2) *Ekatvavitarka-nirvicāra*.
- (3) *Sūkṣmakriyā-pratipātin*.
- (4) *Vyuparatakriyānivṛtti* (or *Samucchinna-kriyānivṛtti*)

The Nature :

The first two subtypes of *śukla-dhyāna* have got a common seat—that is to say, both are performed by a person versed in the *Pūrva*-texts; and that exactly is why both have to do with *vitarka* or scriptural knowledge. However, even if they are mutually similar inasmuch as *vitarka* is present in both they are dissimilar inasmuch as the first is characterised by *prthaktva* or difference but the second by *ekatva* or non-difference. Similarly, the first subtype is characterized by *vicāra* or transition while the second is devoid of it. Hence it is that the first is given the designation *prthaktva-vitarkasavicāra*, the second the designation *Ekatvavitarka-avicāra*. Thus when a performer *dhyāna*—in case he happens to be versed in the *Pūrva*-texts then on the basis of such a text, otherwise on the basis of whatever scriptural text he is conversant with—takes up for consideration an inanimate entity like atom etc. or a conscious entity like soul and undertakes in relation to its numerous modes like permanence, destruction, tangibility, non-tangibility etc. and with the help of the various *nayas* like *dravyāstika*, *paryāyāstika* etc. a reflection dominated by difference—at the same time when on the basis of whatever scriptural knowledge is available to him he in the interests of reflection switches on from one object-of-the-form-of-substance to another, from a substance to a mode, or from one mode to another, or when similarly in the interests of reflection he switches on from a meaning to a word or from a word to a meaning, or, lastly, when he gives up one of *yogas*—e.g. that pertaining to *manas* in order to take up another, then the *dhyāna* concerned is called *prthaktvasavitarkasavicāra*. For in this *dhyāna*, on the basis of *vitarka* or scriptural knowledge and in relation to one substance the variety—*bheda* or *prthaktva*—of its modes is reflected over from various viewpoints, again likewise on the basis of scriptural knowledge there is in it a transition from one meaning to another, from one word to another, from the meaning to the word, from the word to the meaning, also from one type of *yoga* to another. On the contrary, when a performer of *dhyāna* on the basis of whatever scriptural knowledge is available to him

takes up for consideration some one object-of-the-form-of-mode and undertakes in relation to it a reflection dominated by oneness or non-difference, again when sticking to some one of the three types of *yoga*—viz. those pertaining to *manas*, speech, body—he introduces no change in the form of a transition from word to meaning or vice versa or from one type of *yoga* to another, then the *dhyāna* concerned is called *ekatvavitarka-avicāra*. For in this *dhyāna* even if it is based on scriptural knowledge, there is mainly a reflection over *ekatva* or oneness—that is, over *abheda* or non-difference and there is introduced in it no change as to meaning, word or *yoga*. As for these two subtypes of *dhyāna* when one's practice of the first that is dominated by difference has become firm, only then is one enabled to perform the second that is dominated by non-difference. Thus just as the poison of a snake etc. circulating throughout the body is, by means of a magical chant or the like, concentrated on the spot stung, similarly, one's mind unsteadily wandering about amidst the multifarious objects of the world is, by means of *dhyāna*, made steady by being concentrated on some one object. When the steadiness of mind thus becomes firm then just as a burning mass of fire becomes extinct in case all fuel minus a little one—or all fuel whatsoever—is withdrawn away from it so also does the mind, which in the above manner has been made steady by being concentrated on some one object, ultimately becomes absolutely calm. That is to say, its fickleness is done away with and it becomes free of all wavering—with the result that all concealment vitiating knowledge is dissolved and omniscience makes its appearance. And when the omniscient Lord, during the course of the process called cessation-of-*yoga*¹, ultimately takes recourse to just a subtle bodily *yoga*

1. The course of the process is supposed to run as follows : First of all, with the help of the gross *yoga* of body the gross *yogas* of speech and *manas* are rendered subtle. Then with the help of the subtle *yogas* of speech and *manas* the gross *yoga* of body is rendered subtle. Then with the help of the subtle *yoga* of body the subtle *yogas* of speech and *manas* are stopped altogether. Lastly, the subtle *yoga* of body too is stopped altogether.

while putting an end to all the remaining *yogas*, then this act of his is called *sūkṣmakriyāpratipāti-dhyāna*. For at this stage there proceed on only the subtle bodily activities like inbreathing and outbreathing—and there is no possibility of a downfall from it. When even the subtle bodily activities like inbreathing and outbreathing cease altogether and the constituent-units of the soul concerned become free of all wavering then the state is called *śamucchinnakriyānivṛtti-dhyāna*. For in this state there takes place no activity whatsoever—whether gross or subtle and whether pertaining to *manas*, or to speech or to body; nor does this state ever come to an end. Through the instrumentality of this fourth subtype of *dhyāna* all *āsrava* and all *bandha* cease altogether, all karma is annihilated, and *mokṣa* is attained. In the third and fourth subtypes of *śukla-dhyāna* no sort of scriptural knowledge is made a basis; hence the two are also called *anālambana* or ‘those devoid of a basis.’ 39-46.

The Degrees of *Karma-nirjarā* or Cleansing-off of Karma in the Case of the Various Types of *Samyagdr̥ṣṭis* :

Samyak-dr̥ṣṭi, *śravaṇa*, *virata*, *anantānubandhivijojaka*, *darśanamohakṣapaka*, *upaśamaka*, *upaśantamoha*, *kṣapaka*, *kṣīṇamoha*, *jina*—in this series of the ten types of persons an immediately later member has *asaṅkhyāta* times greater *nirjara* than an immediately earlier one. 47.

The total annihilation of all karmic bondage is called *mokṣa*, a partial annihilation of it is called *nirjarā*. In view of these two definitions it becomes obvious that *nirjarā* is but an earlier occurring integral part of *mokṣa*. And since in the present treatise the chief subject-matter is the fundamental verity *mokṣa* it is proper that thought be given here to *nirjara* which is an integral part of this variety. Hence even if in the case of all the worldly souls whatsoever the process of *karmanirjara* goes on for ever, what is here considered is the process of *karmanirjara* taking place in the case of certain special types of souls. These special types of souls are the souls directed towards *mokṣa*. The true process of being directed towards *mokṣa* starts with the

attainment of *samyak-dṛṣṭi* and it is brought to completion in the state appropriate to *jina* or omniscient. The character of being directed towards *mokṣa* has been broadly divided into ten types beginning from the attainment of *samyak-dṛṣṭi* and ending with the attainment of omniscience; in this series a later member is characterized by a greater spiritual purity than an earlier one. And the greater the purity of a spiritual state the more worthwhile the *karmanirjarā* effected in connection with it. Hence it is that on account of the greater purity of the concerned spiritual state the *karmanirjarā* effected in the case of an immediately later member of the series in question is *asaṅkhyāta* times greater than that effected in the case of an immediately earlier member. Thus proceeding it ultimately turns out that the amount of *nirjarā* is greatest in the state of omniscience. So in this arrangement of degrees the smallest *nirjarā* is that pertaining to a *samyak-dṛṣṭi* and the greatest that pertaining to an omniscient. The nature of the ten successive states in question is as follows :

(1) The state in which *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* goes off and *samyaktva* makes its appearance—that is *samyak-dṛṣṭi*.

(2) The state in which on account of *kṣayopasāma* of the *apratyākhyānāvaraṇa-kaṣāya virati* or renunciation makes its appearance in some measure—that is *śrāvaka*.

(3) The state in which on account of a *kṣayopasāma* of *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa-kaṣāya virati* makes its appearance in full measure—that is *virata*.

(4) The state in which there appears purity adequate for an annihilation of the *anantanubandhi-kaṣāya*—that is *ananta-viyojaka*.

(5) The state in which there appears purity adequate for an annihilation of the *darśanamoha*—that is *darśanamoha-kṣapaka*.

(6) The state in which there continues an *opasāma* of the remaining sub-types of the *moha*—that is *opasāmaka*.

(7) The state in which the *opasāma* just mentioned is

brought to completion—that is *upaśāntamoha*.

(8) The state in which there continues a *kṣaya* of the remaining sub-types of the *moha*—that is *kṣapaka*.

(9) The state in which the *kṣaya* just mentioned is brought to completion—that is *kṣīnamoha*.

(10) The state in which omniscience makes its appearance—that is *jina*. 47.

The Types of *Nirgrantha* or 'One Devoid of a Knot' :

Pulāka, *bakuśa*, *kuśīla*, *nirgrantha*, *snātaka*—these are the five types of *nirgrantha*. 48.

The real meaning of the word '*nirgrantha*'—that is a meaning yielded by the definitive standpoint—is something different from its practical-sectarian meaning. Combining these two meanings into one a *nirgrantha* in general is here spoken of and is divided into five types. The real meaning of the word '*nirgrantha*' is one who is utterly devoid of the knot-of-attachment-and-aversion; and the person who is not yet a complete *nirgrantha* but is a candidate for the status of a real *nirgrantha*—that is, one who intends to attain such a status in future—he is *nirgrantha* in a practical sense. Of the five types of *nirgrantha* the first three are such in a practical sense, the last two such in a real sense. The nature of these five types of *nirgrantha* is as follows :

(1) He who has not yet developed full proficiency in the basic and derivative virtues of a monk but who never wavers in his faith in the scriptures composed by the personages devoid of passion—he is called *pulāka*.

(2) He who indulges in decorating his body and his implements, who desires miraculous powers and fame, who is ease-loving, who while not leading a lonely life keeps the company of an entourage, who suffers from the moral defects designated *cheda*—that is, degradation of conduct—and *śabala*—that is, failure of conduct—he is called *bakuśa*.

(3) Of the two sub-types of *kuśīla* he who being a slave of his *indriyas* acts in violation of some of the derivative virtues of a monk is called *pratisēvanākuśīla* whereas he who while never succumbing to an intense degree of a *kaṣāya* is sometimes attacked by a mild degree of it is called *kaṣāya-kuśīla*.

(4) He in whom omniscience has not yet made its appearance but who is utterly devoid of attachment and aversion and who will acquire omniscience within a period of *muhūrta* is called *nirgrantha*.

(5) He in whom omniscience has made its appearance is called *snātaka*. 48.

A Special Consideration of the *Nirgranthas* as
Regards Eight Qualifying Features :

The *nirgranthas* have to be considered keeping in view their mutual difference as regards *saṁyama* or discipline, *śruta* or scriptural knowledge, *pratisēvanā* or violation of a rule-of-conduct, *tīrtha* or spiritual overlordship, *līṅga* or sign, *leśyā* or soul-colouring, *upapāta* or next birth, *sthāna* or disciplinary stage. 49.

The five types of *nirgrantha* have been described earlier. Now with a view to defining their special characteristics eight items have been taken up and it is shown as to how those types stand in relation to each of these items.

***Saṁyama* or Discipline :**

Of the five types of *saṁyama* *sāmāyika* etc. two—viz. *sāmāyika* and *chedopasthāpaṇīya* are practised by the three types of *nirgrantha*—viz. *pulāka*, *bakuśa* and *pratisēvanākuśīla*. The above two plus the types *parihāraviśuddhi* and *sūkṣmasamparāya*—that is, four types in all—are practised by *kaṣāya-kuśīla*. The only type of *saṁyama* *yathākhyāta* is practised by *nirgrantha* and *snātaka*.

***Śruta* or Scriptural knowledge :**

The maximum scriptural knowledge in the case of *pulāka*,

bakuśa and *pratisēvanākuśīla* consists of ten *Pūrva*-texts, in the case of *kaṣāyakuśīla* and *nirgrantha* it consists of the fourteen *Pūrva* texts. Similarly, the minimum scriptural knowledge in the case of *pulāka* consists of *ācāravastu*¹ in the case of *bakuśa*, *kuśīla* and *nirgrantha* it consists of *aṣṭapracāsanamātā* (i.e. the five *samitis* and three *guptis*). As for *snātaka* he being omniscient is altogether devoid of scriptural knowledge.

Pratisevanā or Violation of a Rule-of-Conduct :

Of the five *mahāvratas* and the sixth *vrata* of 'desisting from nightly eating' any one is violated by *pulāka* under the violent pressure of someone else; on the view of certain authorities *pulāka* violates only the fourth *vrata*. As for *bakuśa* he is of two sub-types—viz. *upakaraṇabakuśa* and *śarīrabakuśa*. Thus he who having developed a deep attachment for implements desires to have various valuable and specialized implements, collects them and embellishes them—he is called *upakaraṇabakuśa*; on the other hand, he who having developed a deep attachment for his body embellishes it with a view to beautifying it—he is called *śarīrabakuśa*. As for *pratisēvanākuśīla* he while not at all violating any of the basic virtues of a monk violates certain of his derivative virtues. Lastly, *snātaka* violates no rule of conduct at all.

Tīrtha or Spiritual Overlordship :

All the five types of *nirgrantha* are to be found in the period of the spiritual overlordship of any and every *tīrthaṅkara*. In the view of certain authorities the three types *pulāka*, *bakuśa* and *pratisēvanākuśīla* are necessarily found in the period of a *tīrthaṅkara*'s spiritual overlordship while the remaining types *kaṣāyakuśīla* etc. are to be found both in such a period and in a period that is not such.

1. The third *prakaraṇa* of the ninth *Pūrva* bears this title and it is it that is to be understood here.

Līṅga or Sign :

The *līṅga* or sign is of two types—viz. a *dravya* type and a *bhāva* type. The virtuous merit of the form of right conduct is *līṅga* of the *bhāva* type, while an external make-up of the form of a special dress etc. is *līṅga* of the *dravya* type. All the five types of *nirgrantha* are possessed of a *līṅga* of the *bhāva* type but any of them might or might not be possessed of a *līṅga* of the *dravya* type.

Leśyā or Soul-colouring :

Pulāka is possessed of the last three *leśyās* yellow, red and white, while *bakuśa* and *pratiśevanākuśīla* are possessed of all the six types of *leśyās*. As for *kaṣāyakuśīla* if he is characterized by *parihāra-visuddhi cāritra* then he is possessed of the above three *leśyās* yellow etc.¹ while if he is characterized by *sūkṣmasamparāya* he is possessed of just white *leśyā*. *Nirgrantha* and *snātaka* are possessed of just white *leśyā*; but if *snātaka* happens to be *ayogin* then he is devoid of all *leśyā*.

Upapāta or Next Birth :

In the case of the four types of *nirgrantha pulāka* etc. the next birth with a minimum life-duration is that in the *saudhar-makalpa* amidst the gods destined to live for a period of *palyopama-prthaktva*². As for the next birth with a maximum life-duration *pulāka* has it in the *sahsrārakalpa* with a life-duration 20 *sāgaropamas*, *bakuśa* and *pratiśevanākuśīla* in the *āraṇa* and *acyuta kalpas* with a life-duration 22 *sāgaropamas*, *kaṣāyakuśīla* and *nirgrantha* in the *vimāna sarvārthasiddhi* with a life-duration 33 *sāgaropamas*. As for *snātaka* his next birth (rather next destination) is *nirvāṇa* itself.

Sthāna or Disciplinary Stage :

The suppression of *kaṣāya* and suppression of *yoga*—these

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1. According to the Digambara texts, four *leśyās*.
 2. In the Digambara texts this life-duration is 2 *sāgaropamas*.

are called *saṁyama* or discipline. Now *saṁyama* belonging to all and belonging to them always cannot be of one and the same form. For corresponding to the degree characterizing the suppression of *kaṣāya* and *yoga* there is a degree characterizing the resultant *saṁyama*. Thus right from the minimum suppression that deserves to be included in the category of *saṁyama* upto the *saṁyama* of the form of a complete suppression there are *asaṅkhyāta* types of *saṁyama* corresponding to the diversity characterizing the intensity or mildness of the suppression taking place; all these different types are called the different *saṁyamasthānas* or disciplinary stages. Now so long as there obtains even the slightest tinge of *kaṣāya* the *saṁyamasthānas* concerned are to be supposed to be due to *kaṣāya*, afterwards they are to be supposed to be due to *yoga*; thus the situation obtaining as a result of a complete cessation of *yoga* is to be understood to be the last of the *saṁyamasthānas*. Thus the earlier occurring is a *saṁyamasthāna* the more vitiated by *kaṣāya* are the mental states characterising it; similarly, the higher (i.e. later occurring) is a *saṁyamasthāna* the less vitiated by *kaṣāya* are the mental states characterizing it. Thus the higher and higher does a *saṁyamasthāna* occur the more and more pure it has to be taken to be. As to the *saṁyamasthānas* supposed to be due to *yoga* alone, even if they are all equally pure inasmuch as they are all devoid of *kaṣāya*, they are more or less steady precisely to the extent that the cessation-of-*yoga* characterizing them is greater or less. Thus due to the variety of the cessation-of-*yoga* the steadiness too is of various types; hence the *saṁyamasthānas* supposed to be due to *yoga* alone are as well of *asaṅkhyāta* types. Of course, the last *saṁyamasthāna* characterized by the supreme purity and supreme steadiness can only be one. Of these types of *saṁyamasthānas* the lowermost pertain to *pulāka* and *kaṣāyakuṣīla*. For a distance of *asaṅkhyāta* *saṁyamasthānas* both of these proceed together, but after that *pulāka* comes to a stop while *kaṣāyakuṣīla* alone covers *asaṅkhyāta* *saṁyamasthānas* more. After that *asaṅkhyāta* *saṁyamasthānas* are covered by *kaṣāyakuṣīla*, *pratisevanākuṣīla* and *bakuṣa* together. After that *bakuṣa* comes to a stop; then after covering

asaṅkhyāta saṁyamasthānas more *pratiśevanākuṣīla* comes to a stop; lastly, after covering *asaṅkhyāta saṁyamasthānas* still more *kaṣāyakuṣīla* comes to a stop. Then come the *saṁyamasthānas* devoid of all *kaṣāyas*—that is, those supposed to be due to *yoga* alone—and they are covered by *nirgrantha*; but he too comes to a stop after covering *asaṅkhyāta* such *saṁyamasthānas*. After that comes the one last, supreme, pure and steady *saṁyamasthāna* which is experienced by *snātaka* before he attains *nirvāṇa*. Though the just described *saṁyamasthānas* are *asaṅkhyāta* in number the purity of an immediately later *saṁyamasthāna* is *anantānanta* times greater than that of an immediately earlier one. 49.



CHAPTER TEN

An account of *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* having been offered in the chapter nine, that of the remaining verity *mokṣa* is in order for the present chapter.

The Causes for the Origination of *Kaivalya* or Omniscience :

As a result of an annihilation of *moha*, as also that of *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa* and *antarāya* there appears *kevala* or omniscience. 1.

Prior to the attainment of *mokṣa* the origination of an all-comprehending cognition (all-comprehending *jñāna*, all-comprehending *darśana*) has been deemed indispensable in the Jaina scriptural texts. That is why while offering an account of *mokṣa* it is here first described as to what are the causes responsible for the origination of an all-comprehending cognition. When as a result of an annihilation of the obstructing karmas the natural consciousness becomes free of concealment then an all-comprehending cognition makes its appearance. These obstructing karmas are four in all—of which *moha* alone is annihilated first and then within a period of *muhūrta* the remaining three—viz. *jñānāvaraṇīya* *darśanāvaraṇīya*, *antarāya*—are annihilated as well. *Moha* being the most powerful of all karmas it is only after its annihilation that an annihilation of the remaining karmas becomes possible. By all-comprehending cognition is to be understood the full comprehension of a generic and a specific type. This verity is the state of an all-comprehending *jñāna* and an all-comprehending *darśana*. 1.

The Causes For an Utter Annihilation of
Karmas and the Nature of *mokṣa* :

On account of an absence of the causes of bondage and on account of *nirjarā* there takes place an utter annihilation of karmas. 2.

The annihilation of all karmas—that is called *mokṣa*. 3.

A karma once bound down does get annihilated at some time or other; but in case it remains possible that a karma of this type will be bound down once more or in case a karma of this type yet remains intact then it cannot be said that an utter annihilation of this karma has taken place. For an utter annihilation of this karma means an absence of karma being bound down anew.

As for the state of *mokṣa* it certainly cannot come about without an utter annihilation of karmas. Hence it is that the causes for such an utter annihilation of karmas are enumerated here. These causes are two, viz.—an absence of the causes of bondage and *nirjarā*. Through an absence of the causes of bondage new karmas are prevented from being bound down, through *nirjarā* there comes about an absence of the karmas earlier bound down. The causes of bondage are five—viz. *mithyādarśana* etc.—which have already been mentioned earlier. An absence of them can be brought about through an appropriate act of *saṁvara*. And through *tapas*, *dhyāna* etc. *nirjarā* too can be accomplished.

When the above-mentioned four karmas *mohaṇīya* etc. are utterly annihilated then there appears the state of absence-of-passion and that of omniscience; but since at that time the four karmas *vedaṇīya* etc. are yet present in an extremely diluted form *mokṣa* does not yet take place. For that it is necessary to annihilate even these remaining karmas of a diluted form. Certainly, when that annihilation takes place, then alone is there an absence of all the karmas—as a result of which the cycle of births and deaths comes to a stop. This is what constitutes *mokṣa*, 2-3.

The other Causes of *Mokṣa* :

Mokṣa takes place when there comes about an absence of the characteristic conditions-of-a-soul *aupaśamika* etc. as also of the condition *bhavyatva*—but not of the conditions *kṣāyika-samyaktva*, *kṣāyika-jñāna*, *kṣāyika-darśana* and *siddhatva*. 4.

Just like an utter annihilation of the karmas of the form of physical particles it is also necessary that on the eve of *mokṣa* there should come about an absence of certain characteristic conditions of a soul that are dependent on these karmas. It is an annihilation of these conditions that is here being described as a cause of *mokṣa*. Such conditions are chiefly of four types in all, viz.—*aupaśamika*, *kṣāyopaśamika*, *audayika*, *pāriṇāmika*. Of these, each and every condition of the first three types viz.—*aupaśamika* etc.—is annihilated absolutely. But there is no such absoluteness about the type *pāriṇāmika*. For from among the conditions of the *pāriṇāmika* type *bhavyatva* alone—and no other condition—is annihilated. The reason is that the other conditions of the *pāriṇāmika* type—e.g. *jīvatva* or soulness, *astitva* or existent-ness—remain there even in the state of *mokṣa*. As for the conditions of the *kṣāyika* type, though they too are dependent on karmas their absence does not come about in the state of *mokṣa*. It is in order to indicate this that the aphorism mentions as the cause of *mokṣa* an annihilation of all the conditions of a soul barring the conditions *kṣāyika samyaktva* etc. And though the aphorism makes no mention of the conditions *kṣāyika vīrya*, *kṣāyika cāritra*, *kṣāyika sukha* etc.—this unlike its mention of the conditions *kṣāyika samyaktva* etc.—these former conditions can be taken to be comprehended under the one condition *siddhatva*—so that an absence of these conditions too can be said to have been denied of *mokṣa*. 4.

The Act Performed by an Emancipated *Jīva*
After it Attains Emancipation :

As soon as all its karmas are annihilated the *Jīva* goes upwards upto the end of the *loka*. 5.

As soon as all the karmas and the conditions *aupaśamika* etc. dependent on them are annihilated the following three things simultaneously take place within one and the same *śamaya*. Separation from the body, motion signifying the process of being emancipated, the reading upto the end of the *loka*. 5.

The Causes of the Motion that Signifies the
Process of Being Emancipated :

¹On account of the impulse imparted earlier, on account of the absence of an associated body, on account of the breaking down of a bondage, on account of that being its natural state of motion an emancipated *jīva* goes upwards. 6.

As soon as a *jīva* is released from karma it undertakes a motion and does not remain static. As for this motion it is directed upwards and it proceeds upto the very end of the *loka*—not upto a point below it. Such is the position maintained in scriptural texts. Now here arise several questions. Without the help of the physical substances like karmas or a body how does an *amūrta jīva* undertake motion ? And if it does undertake motion why only upwards and not downwards or sideways ? These questions have been answered here.

The substance *jīva*—just like the substance *pudgala*—is mobile by nature. The two differ only in that a *pudgala* is such as by nature moves downwards while a *jīva* such as by nature moves upwards. If a *jīva* happens to undertake no motion at all or if it happens to move downwards or sideways then it has to be understood that it does so owing to an association or bondage with some obstructing body. Such an obstructing body is karma. So when the association with karma is done away with and the bondage with it is broken down then there inevitably arises the occasion for the emancipated *jīva* to undertake an upward motion

1. Two aphorisms numbered 7 and 8 following this one occur in the Digambara tradition. However, the meaning of both as also the structure of their wording is already to be found in the *Bhāṣya* to the present aphorism.

in accordance with its very nature. On such an occasion *pūrvaprayoga* acts as a cause on account of which the emancipated *jīva* undertakes upward motion. By *Pūrvaprayoga* is to be understood the impulse imparted by the karma which had been bound down earlier but was released just now. Just as the potter's wheel made to whirl by means of a stick continues to whirl even after the stick has been withdrawn—this because of the impulse earlier imparted to it and in a measure proportional to the quantity of this impulse, similarly, a *jīva* released from karma makes, because of the impulse received from this earlier bound karma, an upward motion in accordance with its very nature. However, its upward motion proceeds not beyond the end of the *loka*, the reason merely being an absence of *dharmāstikāya* in that region.

How as a result of the sliding away of the obstructing karmic substance the upward motion of a *jīva* is facilitated has been elucidated by means of the illustration of the gourd-jar and of the castor-seed. A gourd-jar smeared with various pastes lies at the bottom of water but when these pastes happen to be rubbed away this jar naturally comes up to float on the surface of water. Again, the castor-seed closed within its sheath erupts out as soon as this sheath gives way. Similarly, a *jīva* undertakes upward motion as soon as its karmic bondage is done away with. 6.

A Consideration of the Situation of an
Emancipated Soul in Terms of Twelve Items :

Kṣetra or region, *kāla* or time, *gati* or species, *liṅga* or sign, *tīrtha* or spiritual overlordship, *cāritra* or right conduct, *pratyekabuddhabodhita* or 'whether enlightened through one's effort or through that of another enlightened personage', *jñāna* or cognition, *avagāhanā* or bodily size, *antara* or interval, *saṅkhyā* or number, *alpabahutva* or relative numerical strength—these are the twelve items in terms of which the emancipated souls are made an object of investigation. 7.

With a view to specially considering the nature of the emancipated souls twelve items are here indicated. And it is in terms of each of them that the nature of an emancipated soul is to be considered. Though all the souls that have attained emancipation being devoid of worldly features like *gati*, *līṅga* etc. do not differ from one another in any particular manner, yet in view of their respective past states even they can be differentiated from one another and can be considered as such. The consideration that is to be here undertaken in terms of the twelve items *kṣetra* etc. must concern, as far as possible, the present as well as the past state of the concerned emancipated soul. This as follows :

Kṣetra or Region :

From the viewpoint of the present the place of emancipation for all the souls is the *siddha-kṣetra* (i.e. the region where the emancipated souls reside) or the constituent-units of *ākāśa*. From the viewpoint of the past this place is not one and the same for all the souls. For a soul might attain emancipation while seated in any of the fifteen *karmabhūmis* that can be its possible birth-place and it might rather attain emancipation while seated at any place in the *manuṣya-kṣetra* to which it can possibly be taken away from its birth-place.

Kāla or time

From the viewpoint of the present there is no ordinarily fixed time-cycle for the act of attaining emancipation and all emancipation takes place within a space of one single *samaya*. From the viewpoint of the past one born in *avsarpiṇī*, *utsarpiṇī* or *anavasarpiṇī* *anutsarpiṇī* can attain emancipation. Similarly, a soul taken away from its place of birth can attain emancipation at any of these periods of time.

Gati or species :

From the viewpoint of the present one belonging to the

species emancipated is emancipated. As for the viewpoint of the past, if the immediately past birth is taken into consideration then only one belonging to the species man attains emancipation, if the still earlier past births are taken into consideration then one belonging to any of the four species attains emancipation.

Linga or Sign :

Linga means sexual sign or sign in general. To take the first meaning, from the viewpoint of the present one devoid of all *linga* attains emancipation, while from the viewpoint of the past one possessing any of the three *lingas*—viz. masculine, feminine, neuter—does so. To take the second meaning, from the viewpoint of the present one devoid of all *linga* attains emancipation while from the viewpoint of the past two types of *linga* have to be taken into consideration. Thus if *linga* of the *bhāva*-type—that is, *linga* of the form of a spiritual capacity—is taken into consideration then only one possessing one's own *linga*—that is, only one devoid of all passion—attains emancipation, while if *linga* of the *dravya* type—that is, *linga* of the form of an external make-up—is taken into consideration then one possessing the *linga* characteristic of a *Jaina*, one possessing the *linga* characteristic of a non-Jaina and one possessing the *linga* characteristic of a householder—all these three attain emancipation.

Tīrtha or Spiritual Overlordship :

Some souls attain emancipation in the form of a *tīrthaṅkara*, some in the form of non-*tīrthaṅkara*. As for the latter, some attain emancipation when a *tīrthaṅkara* is in existence some when no *tīrthaṅkara* is in existence.

Cāritra or Right Conduct :

From the viewpoint of the present one attaining emancipation is devoid of all *cāritra*. As for the viewpoint of the past, if the last *samaya* is taken into consideration then only one possessing *yathākhyāta-cāritra* attains emancipation while if the

still earlier periods of time are taken into consideration then one possessing three, four or five *cāritras* attains emancipation. Here *sāmāyika*, *sūkṣmasamparāya*, *yathākhyāta* and *chedopasthāpaṇīya*, *sūkṣmasamparāya*, *yathākhyāta*—these two are the sets of three *cāritras* in question, *sāmāyika*, *parihāraviśuddhi*, *sūkṣmasamparāya*, *yathākhyāta*—this is the set of four *cāritras* in question, *sāmāyika*, *chedopasthāpaṇīya*, *parihāraviśuddhi*, *sūkṣmasamparāya*, *yathākhyāta*—this is the set of five *cāritras* in question.

Pratyeka Buddhābodhita or 'Whether Emancipated through One's Own Effort or through that of another Enlightened Personage' :

Here the two types or persons are *pratyekabodhita* and *buddhābodhita* and both can attain emancipation. He who without someone else's instruction and through his own power of cognition gets enlightenment and then attains emancipation is *svayambuddha* or self-enlightened. He is of two types—viz. an *arhat* or *tīrthaṅkara* and a non-*tīrthaṅkara* who impelled by some external factor acquires renunciation and knowledge and then attains emancipation. Both of these are designated *pratyekabodhita*. On the other hand, those who receiving instruction from a spiritual expert attain emancipation are designated *buddhābodhita*. Of these latter too, some impart enlightenment to others as well while some only look after their own welfare.

Jñāna or Cognition :

From the viewpoint of the present only one possessing *kevala-jñāna* attains emancipation while from the viewpoint of the past one possessing two, three or four types of *jñāna* attains emancipation. Here two types of *jñāna* in question are *mati* and *śruta*, three types *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* or *mati*, *śruta*, *manaḥparyāya*, four types *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi* and *manaḥparyāya*.

Avagāha or Bodily Size :

A person attaining emancipation possesses a minimum bodily size of seven cubits minus *āṅgulaṣṭhaktva* and a maximum bodily size of *dhanuṣṣṭhaktva* plus five-hundred *dhanuṣas*. This from the viewpoint of the past; as for the viewpoint of the present, the bodily size in question is two-thirds of that on the eve of attaining emancipation.

Antara or Interval :

When one attains emancipation immediately after another one has done so the former is designated *nirantara siddha* or emancipated without-a-gap-of-time. *Nirantarasiddhi* or emancipation-without-a-gap-of-time proceeds for two *samayas* at the least and eight *samayas* at the most. On the other hand, when one attains emancipation sometimes after another one has done so the former is designated *sāntarasiddha*. The gap of time intervening between the emancipation of the two is one *samaya* at the least and six months at the most.

Saṅkhyā or Number :

At one time one soul at the least and one hundred and eight souls at the most can attain emancipation.

Alpabahutva or Relative Numerical Strength :

The eleven items *kṣetra* etc. that have been considered above, in connection with them the resultant types are numerically superior or inferior to one another; taking into account this fact is called a consideration of the relative numerical strength. For example, viewed in respect of the region of emancipation those emancipated in the region of their birth are *saṅkhyāta* times more than those emancipated in a region where they have been taken away from their region of birth. Similarly, those emancipated in the *ūrdhvaloka* are smallest in number, those emancipated in the *adholoka* *saṅkhyāta* times more than them,

those emancipated in the *tiryagloka saṅkhyāta* times more than the latter. Lastly, those emancipated in an ocean are smallest in number, those emancipated in a continent *saṅkhyāta* times more than them. In a like manner the relative numerical strength has to be considered in connection with each of the remaining items *kāla* etc.—all which can be learnt by the inquisitive readers from the original texts. 7.



INDEX I

PROPER NAMES

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- Trasanādī* a sub-region of *loka* (lit. tunnel containing the mobile beings)-113
- Trāyāstrīmśa* a god-type-148
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- Trīndriya* a three-sensed soul-88
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- Tryaṇuka* a three-atomed physical aggregate-183
- Darśamaśaka* (*parīṣaha*) gadflies and mosquitos-321
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- Dakṣiṇārdha* the southern half (of *loka*)-168
- Dakṣiṇārdhādhipati* the god-chief belonging to the southern half (of *loka*)-168
- Dambha* false pretension (a *śalya*-type) def.-270
- Darśana* inclination or faith-4
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- Dravyabandha* karmic bondage of the physical type-84
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- Dravyabhāṣā* speech of the physical type-189
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- Dravyamanas* *manas* of the physical type-189
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- Dravyaliṅga* sign of the physical type-352
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- Dravyaveda* characteristic of the physical type-120
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- its triple division-120
- Dravyahimsā* formal violence-263
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- Dvīpasamudra* the world-continent and world-oceans-137
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- they all bear an auspicious name-138
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- Dveṣa* aversion-269
- Dvyaṇuka* a two-atomed physical aggregate (=diad)-183
- Dhanadhānyapramāṇātikrama* to exceed the quantity that has been fixed to the possession of cattle-wealth and corn-279
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- Dharma* a set of ten meritorious qualities-312, 314
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- its four sub-types-339
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- Niḥśalya* one devoid of a thorn-
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- Niḥśīlatva* to be devoid of *śīla*-236
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- Niḥsreyas* spiritual enjoyment-312
- Niḥsṛtagrhin* *niḥsṛta*-grasping-27
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- Nikāya* group or species-147
- Nikṣepa*-(i) manner of positing-12
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- Nigodaśarīra* one common body
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- Niṣkriya* that devoid of activity-175
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- Nihnava* concealment (in respect
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- Nicagotra* a karma-310
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- Nicairgotra* the same as *Nicagotra*-
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- Nicairvṛtti* the same as *Namravṛtti*-
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- Nīlā* Hindi for the blue colour
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- Nyagrodhaparimaṇḍala* a
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- Nyāyadarśana* the *Nyāya* system of
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- Nyāsa* the same as *Nikṣepa*,
meaning manner of positing-12
- Nyāsāpahāra* misappropriating a
pledged property-279
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- Pakṣa* fortnight, a time-unit-157
- Pakṣin* bird-136
- Pañkabahula-kāṇḍa* the middle part
of the hell *ratnaprabhā* (so
called because of its
predominance of mud)-130
- Pañcendriya* a five-sensed soul-88
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on the evidence of scripture
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- Paraliṅga* sign characteristic of a non-Jaina-361
- Paravivāhakarāṇa* to arrange someone else's marriage-279
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- Paravyapadeśa* to say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else-280
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- Parāghāta* a *nāmakarma*-297, 310
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- Pariṇāmīyatā* permanence in the midst of transformations-73
- Pariṇāmīyatavavāda* the doctrine of permanence-cum-transience, it is applicable to physical as well as conscious entities-204
it has experience for its chief means of support-205
- Paridevana* bewailing-235
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- Parihāra* a *prāyaścitta*-type-331
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- Paryāyārthikanaya* its subject-matter-60
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- Paryāyāstikanaya* the same as *Paryāyārthikanaya*
- Palyopama* a non-numerable type

- of time-unit-158
- Pāpa* evil karma-224
- Pāpaprakṛti* inauspicious karma-type-309
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- Piṇḍaprakṛti* a set of 14 sub-types of *nāmakarma*-def.-300
- Pipāsā* the same as *Trṣāparīṣaha*-323
- Pīlā* Hindi for yellow colour (skt. *pīṭa*)-194
- Puraveda* the same as *Puruṣadeva*-297
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 - verities spiritual merit and spiritual demerit-10
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 - their *dravya* and *bhāva* types-8-10
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- Pūrvadhara* one versed in the *Pūrva*-texts-343
- Pūrvatātānusmaraṇavarjana* to refrain from recalling the sensuous enjoyments earlier experienced-255
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- Prthaktva* a technical designation for the numbers two to nine-163
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- Prthaktvavitarka* (-*savicāra*) a *śukladhyāna*-type-344, 345
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- Prthvipiṇḍa* hellish ground (the same as *bhūmi*)
- Potaja* one born in a bare state-104
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- Prakīrṇaka* a god-type-148
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- Prakṛtibandha* karmic bondage in respect of nature-294
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- Prakṛtisaṅkrama* conversion of one karma into another.
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- Pracalā* (-*vedanīya*) a karma-297
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- Prañītarasabhojanavarjana* to refrain from taking delicious food-255
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- Pratara* splitting-type-331
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- Prabhāva* efficacy-160
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- Pramāda* negligence-290
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- Pravacanabhakti* feeling of
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- Pravacanamātr* a common
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- Pravacanavatsalatva* feeling of
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- Pravṛtti* acting-232
- Pravṛtti* of *sajñāna* or *ajāna* (i.e.
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knowingly)-232
- Pravrajaka* an *ācārya*-type
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- Prasāma* spiritual calmness-8

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- Prastara* stratum or story (in the case of a hell)-131
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