

**VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH
BULLETIN No. I**

Chief Editor

Dr. NATHMAL TATIA

M. A., D. Litt.

PRAKRIT JAIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN

No. 1

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DR. NATHMAL TATIA, M. A., D. Litt.

*Director, Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology
and Ahimsa, Vaishali, Bihar.*

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Ahimsa, Vaishali, Bihar.**

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The Government of Bihar established the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology & Ahimsa at Vaishali (Muzaffarpur) in 1955 with the object, inter alia to promote advanced studies and research in Prakrit and Jainology, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Vaishali Research Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last few years namely the Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga, the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rashtra Bhasa Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna and the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist Learning and Pali (the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara) at Nalanda (Patna).

As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship this is the Research Bulletin No. I, which comprise of several papers mainly by the staff of the Institute. The Govt. of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service to the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

CHIEF EDITOR'S NOTE

A Research Journal was a kinly felt desideratum which is being fulfilled by the publication of this first volume of our Bulletin. All the papers published here are written by the members of the Institute excepting three which are by Sri Devkant Barua, Professor N. K. Devraj and Pandit Sukhlalji.

We are exceptionally fortunate to have a very lucid exposition of Jaina Logic by Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee as the first paper of the Bulletin. This is perhaps the first attempt at a critical evaluation of logical problems from a Jaina philosopher's standpoint. The treatment is based on the *Nyāyavatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara and the commentary on it by Siddharṣi Gaṇi and the *ṭippaṇa* of Devabhadra-sūri. A student of modern logic will derive much benefit from this paper inasmuch as some of the main problems of Indian Logic have been presented in modern terminology which is current in present-day logical treatises. The paper has brought out clearly the epistemological standpoints of the realists, the idealists and the sceptic materialists as propounded in the ancient treatises of Indian logic.

The Bulletin also contains a very illuminating talk in Hindi given extempore by Sri Devkant Barua, Rajyapal of Bihar on 'The root of Religion : Intuition and Reasoning'. Intuition unsupported by reasoning is blind faith which is sometimes likely to be identified with helpless dependence on fate, which has done much harm to religion. Scholars will find here a very penetrating evaluation of intuition and reasoning illustrated by references to the rational outlook of Gautama Buddha as recorded in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Pali canon.

The paper '*Dharma and Tatva*' gives a historical survey of Indian religions in theory and practice the roots whereof are found in the *Sūtras* of Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda. In this paper Pandit Sukhlalji has emphasised the need of historical and comparative study of Indian philosophies in the absence of which our grasp of the subject is bound to remain narrow and partial.

The Bulletin contains papers read at the annual seminar held to date at the Institute on the occasion of Mahāvīra Jayanti.

The Sanskrit text of the *Nyāyavatāra* and its commentaries have been printed at the end of the Bulletin for ready reference by scholars who may like to consult the original text while going through Professor Mookerjee's paper.

Dr. R. P. Poddar and Dr. N. K. Prasad collected and arranged the material of the Bulletin and prepared the Press copy. Dr. Prasad acted as an amenuensis to Professor Mookerjee in preparing his paper. He is a fastidious scholar and played the same role as Gaṇeśa did to Vyāsa, to compare great things with small.

We extend our hearty thanks to Sri Rama Shankar Pandya, the proprietor of the Tara Printing works, Varanasi for his co-operation in the speedy and fine printing of the Bulletin.

Vaishali,
Mahavira Jayanti, 1971.

NATHMAL TATIA

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**A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
JAINA LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY ON
THE BASIS OF THE NYĀYĀVATĀRA
OF SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA**

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

INTRODUCTION

Siddhasena Divākara is an outstanding writer on Jaina logic and epistemology. The *Nyāyavatāra* like other *Dvātriṃśikās* consists of thirty-two stanzas. It is a wonderful achievement that Siddhasena Divākara has comprised within this short compass all the important problems of logic and epistemology in consonance with the fundamental Jaina tenets. Each verse is pregnant with deep significance and it was left to subsequent scholars who wrote commentaries upon this work to bring out the implications. Siddhasena did not propose to write a standard text book on Jaina epistemology. But he has taken full advantage of the works of Dignāga and of the Brāhmaṇical Nyāya school and criticised the Buddhist views in forcible language with cogent arguments. We have given a faithful rendering of the original verses and supplemented them with exhaustive exposition of the implications in the elucidation attached to each verse. Our interest is purely philosophical and we have quoted the views of his predecessors and successors in order to make the recondite statements of Siddhasena intelligible to modern students of philosophy. We have followed the edition of Dr. P. L. Vaidya with the commentary of Siddharṣi and the sub-commentary of Devabhadra Sūri. These two commentaries are very learned works and have gone deep into the import of the original text. In our elucidation we have exploited the commentaries to the fullest extent, though we have not given a literal rendering.

Siddhasena has criticised the Buddhist writers without express quotation of their names. There are pronounced resemblances with the wordings of Dignāga and also Dharmakīrti. Prof. Jacobi and Dr. P. L. Vaidya have expressed their views that Siddhasena criticises Dharmakīrti. Prof. D. Malvania has given full quotations from the previous Buddhist writers to show that the views criticised are older than those of Dharmakīrti and that no decisive proof can be adduced to establish Divākara's posteriority to Dharmakīrti. Powerful arguments have been put forward to prove that Siddhasena Divākara is the author of the *Sanmatitarka* and of the *Nyāyavatāra* and that he was not far removed from the time of Dignāga. We do not propose to enter into this chronological problem which has been discussed by Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. D. Malvania, who have tried to vindicate their position against the views of Jacobi and Vaidya. We have

no additional argument and documentary evidence to make the chronological problem surer and clearer. But there are certain problems which make us hesitate to express our perfect agreement with either side.

Let us take the definition of *Pratyakṣa* (perceptual cognition) as propounded by Dharmakīrti in the *Nyāyabindu*. It is entirely devoid of conceptual construction and is recognised to be a species of valid cognition (*samyag jñāna*). Perceptual intuition (*pratyakṣa*) is directly conversant with a specific particular individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) which stands completely isolated from other individuals and these individuals have again no common character. Class concepts are supposed by the realists to be based upon objective universals inherent in each and all individuals belonging to a class. Dharmakīrti has taken enormous pains to prove that these universals are nothing but conceptual constructions and have no truck with the objective real individuals. So perceptual intuition which envisages the particular is not a judgement. It is an intuition pure and simple which can be felt but not characterized. The character of the individual is entirely particularistic and is not anything distinct and different from the real. So the first negative qualification of perceptual intuition is said to consist in its negation of concepts which are expressed by words. Of course intuition of a self-characterized individual has no pragmatic consequence. It cannot be conceived, much less described as this or that. 'This' points to the individual and each individual is 'this'. But there are so many 'thises'. They become impregnated with a universal concept and an expressive word and thus lose their individuality. The perceptual judgement that follows on intuition say, of blue, delivers itself in the form 'this is blue' or 'this blue'. Thus there is necessarily a dichotomy of the individual blue into this and blue. The predicate implicit or explicit stands for a general concept which is regarded as a subjective construct by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers. Perceptual intuition is thus defined by Dignāga as one which is free from association with concepts and words.¹ This is regarded as the self-sufficient characterization of perceptual intuition. But Dharmakīrti in the *Nyāyabindu* has added another qualifying adjective 'inerrant' or 'non-erroneous' (*abhrāntam*). This innovation has given rise literally to a storm of controversy from a very ancient time. It is not yet free from its liability to misconception. Perceptual intuition being a species of valid cognition (*samyag jñāna*) must be free from error and as such the specific qualification 'inerrant' seems liable to the charge of unwarranted tautology. If it is erroneous it cannot be

1. *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḥham.*

a species of valid cognition since a valid cognition cannot be erroneous and an erroneous cognition cannot be valid, as has been observed by Siddhasena.¹

Vintadeva and Śāntabhadra have explained 'abhrānta' in their commentaries on the *Nyāyabindu* as standing for non-discrepant (*avisamvādi*). But Dharmottara criticises this interpretation as wrong explanation.² *Pratyakṣa* being a species of valid cognition (*samyag jñāna*) must necessarily be free from discrepancy with the fact envisaged by it. Valid cognition is defined as one which is non-discrepant, i.e., consistent with its object. So the meaning of the adjective *abhrānta* cannot be non-discrepancy. It would involve useless tautology since it would be reduced to the proposition: 'A non-discrepant cognition is non-discrepant.' So the meaning of *abhrānta* must be different. It means that perceptual cognition is one which is not contrary to the real individual. But this also involves tautology. A valid cognition cannot be wrong, that is contrary to the real envisaged by it. Dharmottara suggests that this additional adjective is significant and advisedly incorporated in the definition to combat a prevalent misconception. There are certain erroneous perceptions, namely, the perception of the moving tree by a person seated in a fast-running boat which is confirmed by verification. A curious person will alight from the vehicle and go forward and get hold of a tree. Of course the tree that is reached is stationary and not moving. But barring this deviation the attainment of the tree should be regarded as veridical perception. It has been counted as valid cognition by some. This conception of partial verification as the test of truth was prevalent among a section of philosophers and Dharmakīrti felt the necessity of combating this view. According to Dharmakīrti error is total error and truth is total truth. A cognition cannot be partially true and partially false. So a partial error is only a misconception. If it is error it must be so from end to end. It cannot be analysed into a true part and a false part. Further light has been shed on this problem by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. The observation of Siddhasena that perception being a valid cognition cannot be erroneous is not to be interpreted as refutation of Dharmakīrti's position. In fact Dharmakīrti also endorses the truth of the contention. Siddhasena does not seem to refute Dharmakīrti but only the Vijnānavādin, the Buddhist idealist, who regards all cognitions,

1. na pratyakṣam api bhrāntaṃ pramāṇatvavinīśayāt/
bhrāntaṃ pramāṇam ity etad viruddhaṃ vacanaṃ yataḥ//
-*Nyāyāvatāra*, 6.

2. *Dharmottarapradīpa* (edited by D. Malvania), p. 47.

perceptual or non-perceptual, as wrong so far as their reference to external objects is taken into account. Furthermore Buddhist Vijñānavāda is much older than Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. So the refutation of the proposition 'perception is wrong' does not determine the relative chronology of Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti. From internal evidence it may be safely inferred that Siddhasena was posterior to Dignāga and we leave the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Divākara an open question.

I have discussed the logical value of the adjective 'unerring' (*abhrānta*) in the definition of perceptual intuition in my work *The Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux*. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla agree with Dharmottara that this amendment of Dignāga's definition of *pratyakṣa* was made by Dharmakīrti in order to rebut the contention of a section of Buddhist logicians who thought that partial verification was symptomatic of validity.¹ But this is regarded as a facile misconception as no verification is possible for error, partial or total. The verification is due to the previous or succeeding veridical knowledge of the stationary tree or the white conch and not to the false intuition of moving tree or yellow conch. We are not in a position to assess the logical value of the adjective *abhrānta* incorporated by Asaṅga or Maitreya-nātha.² It is quite plausible that this qualifying clause might have been used for rebuttal of idealistic position. As for the contention that Siddhasena Divākara's criticism of the characterization of *enumāna* (inference) as inherently erroneous by Dharmakīrti it should be observed that it is only a deduction from Dignāga's position. Inference deals in concepts and concepts are unreal abstractions. But the probandum though a concept is necessarily bound up with and necessarily derived from and felt to be identical with the real individual. And so it leads to the attainment of a real individual as a matter of universal necessity which shows its objective affiliation. Accordingly inference is regarded as a valid cognition even by the Buddhist. Siddhasena's criticism of the coincidence of error and truth in inference endorsed by the Buddhist logicians need not have a pointed reference to Dharmakīrti.

What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to *antarvyāpti* and the definition of *hetu* (probans) as *anyathānupapanna* in the verses 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing

1. Tathāpyaṃśasaṃvāda-vādinīmāhatya vipratipattinirākaraṇārtham kartavya-nevābhrāntagrahaṇamiti. *Dharmatarapradīpa*, p. 45.
2. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, July 1927, p. 451.

short of an enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakīrti. We have discussed the implications of *antarvyāpti* in our elucidation of verse 20. If *antarvyāpti* is understood to maintain that the concomitance of the probans with the probandum is integral to the constitution of the terms, this will not be any innovation. Dharmakīrti lays exclusive stress on the fact that the relation of concomitance is essentially bound up with the nature of the probans. The probans cannot exist without the probandum by virtue of its very constitution. The concept of internal concomitance (*antarvyāpti*) is a paraphrasis of this *svabhāvapratibandha*.¹

The unitary characteristic of the probans (incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum as proposed by the Jaina logicians) seems to be an improvement.² It is noteworthy that Siddhasena refers to both these concepts, namely, *antarvyāpti* and *anyathānupapannatva* as sponsored by previous Masters of logic and as enunciated by others.³ It is apparent that these amendments are not original creations of Siddhasena who rather sets his seal of approval on them.

For the first time we find in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā* a criticism of the unitary character of the probans 'incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum'. A number of extracts have been quoted from Pātrasvāmin who criticised the triple-character of the probans enunciated by Dignāga and elucidated by Dharmakīrti. Both the forceful language and the logical cogency of the arguments of Pātrasvāmin are arresting. He has proved with convincing logic that the triple-character does not necessarily entail the concept of universal concomitance of the probans with the probandum and the lack of the latter reduces the triple-character to an irrational inflation.⁴ Dharmakīrti has added a qualifying restriction (*eva*) to each character in order to save them from undesirable extension to fallacious instances.⁵ To be fair to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti it must be endorsed that the triple-character is intended to emphasize the element of necessary concomitance. The Jaina logician seems to have secured greater clarity and cogency by his insistence on the unitary character. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have shown that though necessary concomitance is the essential characteristic of the probans it is not alone sufficient to bring

1. *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rthaṃ gamayet. Nyāyabindu, 2. 19.*

2. *Nyāyāvalāra, 22.*

3. *nyāyavido viduḥ. Ibid, 20; and 17itām. Ibid, 22.*

4. *Tattvasaṃgraha & Pañjikā, Anumānaparīkṣā, verses 1363-1428.*

5. *trairūpyaṃ punar liṅgasyānumecyē sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam, asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam. Nyāyabindu. 2. 5 (p. 91).*

home the conclusion. The minor premiss which sets forth the existence of the probans of necessary concomitance, implied by the absence of the probans in the absence of the probandum is liable to be abortive. To cite a concrete instance 'Word is impermanent because it is visible', the concomitance of visibility with impermanence is endorsed by the Buddhist. But it cannot be effective in proving the impermanence of words because the probans 'visible' is not predicable of it. So the existence of the probans in the subject must be admitted as a necessary condition of inference. This gives two characteristics. As for the negative concomitance, 'the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum' (*anyathānupapannatva*) it necessarily presupposes the co-existence of the probans with the probandum. So the negative concomitance implies the necessary existence of the probans in all the cases of the existence of the probandum. So the unitary character 'the non-existence of the probans without the probandum' is only an abbreviation of the dual concomitance, positive and negative, and this plus the minor premiss amounts to the admission of the triple-character.

It must be admitted that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have succeeded in the justification of the triple-character of the probans. But it cannot be gainsaid that this triple-character is of value in so far as it is an exponent of necessary concomitance and this is emphasized by the Jaina logician. It is the element of necessary concomitance which invests a probans with its logical cogency. Though necessary concomitance is the exponent of triple-probans the converse is not necessarily true. The Jaina's insistence on the negative concomitance with its implication of positive concomitance must be regarded as an improvement on Dignāga's formulation of the logical probans.

Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇavārtika* and in the *Nyāyabindu* has not left any loop-hole for misconception. He has made it abundantly clear that necessary concomitance is ultimately reducible to and derives its sanction from causality and essential identity.¹ Mere observation of concomitance in agreement or in disagreement, however frequent or extensive, does not yield fool-proof assurance of its necessity, unless it be shown that in case of succession the causal relation of the probans and the probandum, and in case of non-succession, the essential identity are present at the back. Thus the

1. karyakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt/
avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān no na darśanāt//*Pramāṇavārtika*, 3.31.

inference of fire from smoke is legitimate because smoke is the effect and fire is the cause. It is inconceivable that anything can happen without a cause. The proposition 'Every event has a cause' is a truism. It is the belief in causality that is responsible for advanced and scientific investigation. So if the relation between two events can be explained as one of causality their necessary concomitance will be placed on a secure footing. Secondly between two simultaneous facts if the relation is shown to be founded on identity of essence (*tādātmya*), necessary concomitance of the two will be understood *eo ipso*. All the inferences in Euclid's Geometry are instances of concomitance based on identity of essence. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles follows from the very nature of the triangle. Unfortunately Dharmakīrti did not give instances from geometry or arithmetic (e.g. two plus two make four) and this has made this topic a source of misunderstanding.

The relation of *antarvyāpti* is thus a deduction from Dharmakīrti's conception of natural concomitance (*svabhāvapratibandha*).¹ It is quite plausible that Dharmakīrti may have borrowed this formulation from his predecessors whose works are not available to us. But one thing creates a doubt. The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Jaina logicians have sought to pick holes in the Buddhist position. They are very vocal in their protestations that there are relations other than these two which equally guarantee the universality of concomitance between the probans and the probandum. We shall briefly consider some crucial instances alleged by the non-Buddhist logicians.

The inference of the rise of one constellation from that of another, of sea-tides from the rise of the moon, the inference of shadow on the opposite side of the hill from the lighted front are cases which are neither explicable in terms of causality nor can there be a minor premiss and so on and so forth. These animadversions have been met by Buddhist logicians with convincing arguments.

The occurrence of sea-tides on the rise of the moon in the sky is governed by the relation of causality. The concatenation of causal conditions which leads to the rise of the moon furnishes the auxiliary conditions of the sea-tides. So the rise of the moon and the occurrence of sea-tides are the simultaneous co-effects of a uniform set of causal conditions. As for the shadow and the light on the opposite sides of a

1. svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho' rtham gamayet. *Nyāyabindu*, 2.19.
tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabhicāranīyamābhavat. *Ibid*, 2.20.
sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye 'rthe liṅgasya. *Ibid*, 2.21.

mountain, they are due to interception of light on the other side and the incidence of light on the front. Light illumines an object on which it falls and the absence of light is responsible for darkness which may be understood either as negation of light according to the Vaiśeṣika or a positive substance incompatible with the presence of light. As for the remote succession of one constellation to another this is also capable of explanation only on the basis of causality. The causes of the rise of one constellation continue to operate, eventually giving rise to the causal conditions ushering in the subsequent rise of another. In fact we cannot conceive of any other necessary relation than causality as governing the occurrence of two events in succession. The absurdity of the occurrence of an event without an antecedent cause is irresistibly felt as an *apriori* law. This is the sanction of causality as a necessary and universal relation. Without causality the co-association of events must be looked upon as a coincidence. If a cause be not apparent we have to isolate the accidental associates and find out the true cause. Science has made progress only on the postulation of causality as a determining principle. Science rules out accidents and coincidences of chance as due to ignorance.

The minor premiss shows that an effect *qua probans* is necessarily co-existent with the cause *qua probandum*. The rise of two constellations though separated by gap belongs to an identical period of time. Causality presupposes definite contiguity in spatio-temporal continuum. "Professor Broad has given the example of blowing of hooter both at Liverpool and at London at the same time. The sound of hooter is followed by the exit of the factory workers at both the places. Yet the Liverpool hooter is not regarded as the cause of the departure of the workers in London."¹ The continuum is supplied by the minor term (subject) in which the probans and the probandum ultimately coincide. The objection of Kumārila which is endorsed by Pātrāsvaṃin that the minor premiss is irrelevant is based on superficial reflection. It is contended that a river in spate presupposes rainfall in upper region. The spate is found below and rainfall has occurred a hundred miles apart. There is no common minor term. But why is rainfall inferred in the upper region of the self-same river and not of any other? The flood in the Gaṅgā cannot be accounted for by rainfall in England. So it is the common river connected with the upper and lower regions which is the logical subject. The inference of the Brāhmaṇahood of the child from the Brāhmaṇahood of the parents; or to take a current example the religion of parents determining the religion of the child

1. *Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Vol. I*, pp. 192-93.

are alleged to be cases of inference without minor premiss. But these are not cases of the lack of minor premiss. The relation of the child with the parents is the decisive factor. The religion of the parents determines that of the child on the ground that the child is the progeny and inheritor of the parents' religious persuasion. If the parents are not related to the child it will be a case of *non-sequitur*.

Dharmakīrti's influence on the development of Indian logic and philosophy is unchallengeable. The inductive logic of John Stuart Mill also banks upon causality. Dharmakīrti's formulation of essential identity (*svabhāva*) is a striking illustration of his or his predecessor's genius. It lays unerringly its finger on the logical basis of arithmetical and geometrical deductions.

The affinities of Jaina's speculations with those of Dharmakīrti deserve to be worked out by patient researchers. Fortunately we belong to a scientific age which cares for the discovery of truth more than communal triumph regardless of facts. It will be a bad day for science and philosophy if religious bias or political interests are allowed to subdue the disinterested pursuit of truth which has enabled science to score unexpected triumphs. Dharmakīrti's refutation of a unitary universal objectively inherent in each and every individual of a class has divided philosophers in India into two warring groups, namely, realists and nominalists. The Jaina also does not believe in unitary universal. The universal according to him is only the development of similarity among individuals. But objectively this similarity is inherent in each individual. Thus the conception of common character underlying a number of individuals is nothing better than a subjective construction. This might have been differently interpreted by the Jainas in conformity with their law of *Anekānta* which reconciles one and many without logical contradiction. The contention that a real is the unity of general and particular, individual and universal, thus loses much force. It is only in the individual substance that the law is found to operate on an objective basis. The position of the Mīmāṃsist and that of Sāṃkhya philosopher in the material plane are more faithful to the law of *Anekānta*. The Buddhist is a believer in unrelieved pluralism and the Jaina philosopher has not been able to transcend this pluralistic conception. It is individual substances according to the latter which are objective reals. But each of them stands in its solitary majesty.

Dharmakīrti denies objective relation among individuals, homogeneous or heterogeneous. The Jaina also affirms that there is no objective relation running through the individuals. There is the concep-

tion of relation. But it is not anything in excess of the individuals. The individuals develop certain characteristics which make them appear as related. The denial of common bond either supplied by the trans-individual universal or trans-individual relation makes the items of the universe objectively independent and unrelated. In these two fundamental conceptions one may not be accused of exaggeration or oversight if one finds essential uniformity between the Buddhist and Jaina philosophers. The law of *Anekānta* has been rather given a half-hearted recognition in the ontological plane.

The Vedāntist monist gives us a unified universe without the individuals. The Sāṃkhya gives us the conception of material universe as a unity in diversity. Dharmakīrti does away with the unity and leaves us with pure diversity of diverse individuals. It was expected that this pluralistic bias should have been contested by the law of *Anekānta*. It is a truth that Buddhist pluralism is not repudiated without prevarication. Siddhasena Divākara did not set himself the task of writing a manual on logic like Dignāga or Dharmakīrti. Within the compass of thirty-two stanzas he has given us the salient topics of Jaina logic and epistemology which will continue to be an authoritative work. His deliberate omissions enforced by the consideration of space and time have been supplied by the commentator Siddharṣi. We have exploited the essential materials provided by this commentary and also have added our own data. The present exposition may be regarded as an expanding commentary on comparative and critical lines.

NYĀYĀVATĀRA

The first *karikā* of our text, along with the prefatory proposition, runs as follows :

Text

pramāṇavyutpādanartham idamārabhyate—
pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādhavivarjitaṃ/
pratyakṣaṃ ca parokṣaṃ ca dvidhā, meyaviniścayāt//

Translation

“This (the following) is propounded with a view to the elucidation of *pramāṇa* (valid cognition). A valid cognition is a cognition which illumines itself and an other (object, provided) it is immune from contradiction. It falls under two heads namely, perceptual and extra-perceptual, in pursuance of the way in which cognizables are determined (by the knowing subject).” ... (I)

Elucidation

Each assertion has a deep significance ‘A cognition illumines itself and also an other’ is a proposition which though not an exclusive character of valid cognition has been stated with a view to rebutting the different theories of rival schools. Hemacandra takes exception to the inclusion of the adjectival determination ‘self-illuminative’, as it is common to invalid cognition also. He is of the opinion that the element which is the exclusive property of the defined object should alone be stated in the definition, the sole purpose of which is to set forth the defined object with its distinctive individuality and as such to distinguish it, (that is, the defined object) from similar and dissimilar things. The ancient doctors have stated this characteristic for critical appraisal. This objection of Hemacandra is justifiable on the assumption that the purpose of definition is to set forth an object with its distinctive character so that it may not be confused with others. A definition must possess three characteristics : (i) exemption from over-extension (*ativyāpti*); (2) exemption from the charge of inadequacy (that is to say, its failure to include everything that comes within its sweep, *avyāpti*); (3) exemption from the charge of absurdity (*asambhava*). A defining character must not be one which is not found in the object defined. The presence of any one of these defects makes the definition useless and ineffective.

The definition propounded by Siddhasena is not exposed to any one of these charges. As for the charge of superfluity it should be noted that it does not make it overlap erroneous and doubtful cognitions as the saving clause 'immune from contradiction' rules out such possibility. The adage goes "Distinction from the opposite (*vyāvṛtti*) or full conception (*vyavahāra*) of the object is the consequence of definition".¹ The term *vyavahāra* has a comprehensive significance. It means (1) full conception, (2) a clear statement, and (3) avoidance or acceptance.² Now if one's knowledge of the defined object be confined only to its peculiar and exclusive property, the conception of the object and the consequential statement and physical activity following upon it could not be adequate in all cases. The inclusion of the adjective 'illuminating itself and an other' serves a very useful purpose in that it gives a fuller conception and also serves to combat opposite views entertained by rival philosophers.

Let us sum up the observations of Siddharṣigaṇi on this verse. He endorses the view that a definition serves to distinguish the defined object from homogeneous and heterogeneous species. The definition stated by Siddhasena is devised to edify the philosophers of other schools who have imbibed their pre-conception from their respective tradition (*vipratīpanna*) and also of average people (*avyutpanna*) who are not trained in logic and as such have confused notions. The definition so oriented is sound and adequate. The valid cognition is the subject. Everyone, whether a philosopher or an untutored layman is familiar with what is called valid knowledge. The philosophers have got their own conception of what is valid knowledge and the other qualifying adjectives are stated as the predicate for their consideration. As for the untutored layman, they are also acquainted with a cognition possessing the aforesaid qualification. The subject-predicate relation is to be stated in a reverse way for their enlightenment. Everyman is familiar with a cognition which is immune from contradiction and illumines its own self and an object. If they were lacking in such ideas, their practical life and behaviour would become impossible. Behaviour presupposes knowledge and so such a cognition which illumines itself and an other and is immune from contradiction is not unfamiliar to them also. So the subject of the definition will be the cognition so qualified and the predicate will be valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).

1. *vyāvṛttir vyavahāro vā lakṣaṇasya prayojanam.*

2. See *Pañcapādīkāvivarāṇa* under *adhyāsabhūṣya* of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

In a logical proposition the subject is a fact which is known by the proponent and opponent both. In a debate there are two parties : the proponent (*vādin*) and opponent (*prativādin*). The subject is a known fact and there is no dispute about its factuality. The predicate must be a fact, attribute or action which is under dispute and is either unknown as belonging to the subject or subject to dispute. In Sanskrit terminology the subject is called *anuvādyā* and the predicate is called *vidheya*. *Anuvāda* means statement of a known fact. If the subject were also unknown or unacceptable to the opponent, the debate would shift back to it and there will be no discussion possible so far as the predicate is concerned. The predicate must belong to the subject or be asserted to do so. If the subject is not an established and acknowledged fact the predicate will be a homeless floating attribute. So it must be acknowledged that the subject is a known fact and there is no difference of opinion possible regarding its existence. So it is called *anuvādyā*, the object of statement of a fact already known by independent evidence. The statement of a known fact is superfluous because it will be pointless. There is no point in pressing a fact upon the opponent who accepts it as a fact. The predicate is an unknown or unrecognised attribute and the establishment of its validity is the aim of the proponent. It is called *vidheya* because it is the object of *vidhi*, the statement of a fact unknown or unrecognised.¹

In the interpretation of the definition of valid cognition the commentator asserts *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) as the subject and the cognition as qualified by the two adjectives as the predicate so far as the philosophers are concerned in the debate. All philosophers are unanimous on the existence of valid cognition and they differ only on the predicate under discussion as having relevancy to the subject. So it is the latter clause which should be regarded as the predicate by both the parties. As regards layman, they are not posted in logical terminology such as *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and the like. But they are familiar with valid experience which is the pre-condition also of practical day-to-day activity. Therefore what is stated to be predicate regarding philosophers is made the subject in their case. Such a cognition which is familiar to you is called *pramāṇa* in the logician's parlance. So there is no inconsistency in the double interpretation of Siddharṣi.

The adjectives 'self-illuminative etc.' are stated to rebut the views of rival philosophers. The Buddhist Idealist (*Vijñānavādin*) does not

1. Cf. *pramāṇāntarvagatasya arthasya śabdena saṃkīrtanam anuvādaḥ-
Kāśikā on Aṣṭādhyāyī*, II. 4.3. *ajñātārthajñāpanaṃ vidhiḥ*.

believe in the existence of external objects. It is only consciousness (*vijñāna*) which alone is real. An object purporting to exist outside independent of the subject is as illusory as the object of dream experience or perceptual illusion. The nacre is falsely perceived as silver and in dream one experiences many things which are grotesque and absurd. So these experiences are false as their contents are unreal. Our wakeful experience fares no better than dream-experience. They are illusions pure and simple and are sublated by subsequent experience. Even the realist admits that a false and erroneous experience is not valid knowledge which is endorsed by Siddhasena Divākara in the definition of *pramāṇa*.

Now Siddhasena and other philosophers do not think that our perceptual experience which is not contradicted by a subsequent cognition is to be scouted as erroneous on the analogy of dream and illusion. As a matter of fact there is no contradiction by subsequent experience. Vasubandhu contends that external solid objects which are encountered in general experience are found to be riddled with contradiction. A solid object cannot be ultimate because it is divisible into parts. It cannot be infinitely divisible either. Infinite divisibility presupposes an infinite number of parts. The Himalaya mountain and a mustard seed, if each be composed of infinite parts, must not differ in dimension. One appears big and another small. This can be accounted for on the hypothesis that they are composed of a definite number of indivisible particles called atoms in more or less number. This is the *raison d'être* of the atomic theory propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Vaibhāṣikas. This is also endorsed by the Sautrāntikas. Vasubandhu contends that an atom cannot be indivisible and partless. Six atoms from six quarters—east, west, north, south, above and below—must be supposed to combine with the nuclear atom standing in centre. If they combine in one and the same point it will be a case of total merger. There will be no increase in dimension as all atoms coalesce inside a single atom. The resultant magnitude in that case would not be more than atomic. An atom is invisible to our ordinary vision, so also solid if identified with an atom will be imperceptible. If on the other hand they combine in different points that will amount to the admission that an atom has at least six parts which knocks down the *raison d'être* of the assumption of atomic constitution of matter. The atomic theory thus fails to explain the formation of massive bodies. The hypothesis of the Sautrāntika asserts that atoms stand in close succession without intermingling their identity and such a combination gives rise to the idea

of solids. But this is an argument of despair. The atoms existing side by side without coincidence or merger are not bereft of their size and hence any number of atoms so associated cannot give rise to a bigger dimension. One will have perforce to admit that solidity is only a false appearance.¹ So the solid external objects which we encounter in ordinary experience must be dismissed as unreal figments of a pathological imagination. We are not unacquainted with experience of unreal objects as in dream or error. No body can ascribe to these contents of false experience an objective status independent of the subject. They are subjective appearances pure and simple. But the question necessarily arises 'why should there be so much diversity and multiplicity in the contents if they are all fanciful projections?' The Buddhists answer that they are the outcome of the predispositions and memory traces deposited in consciousness by previous experiences which were also equally false. As these predispositions (*vāsanā*) stem from previous experiences and there is no first initial experience as the individual subjects have a beginningless career, there is no logical incompatibility in their previous existence and coming into existence as perceptual data.

But the realist as represented by Siddhasena poses a crucial question. What is the nature of dispositions (*vāsanās*)? Are they unconscious qualities or unconscious entities? If they are unconscious and independent of the knowing subject why should the Buddhists demur to accept the independent external objects, both being unconscious in nature. The Buddhist's postulate is that there is no reality outside and beyond consciousness. It is consciousness alone which masquerades as subject and object. They are all consciousness pure, simple, compact and there is no justification for the assumption of solid material objects as has been found on examination of the atomic theory.² But if the dispositions are nothing but consciousness why are they not felt as such? Consciousness is known by itself (*svasaṃvedana*). So the postulation of *vāsanās* unperceived and unperceivable as the causes of diversified appearance of contents has no legs to stand upon.

Furthermore the denial of external objects makes nonsense of all our experience and moral and intellectual activities. It makes a holo-

1. *tasmānnārtheṣu na jñāne sthūlābhāsas tadātmanah/
ckatrapratīṣiddhatvād bahuṣvapi na sambhavaḥ//*

Pramāṇavārtika, II. 211.

2. *Cittamātraṃ bho jinaputrā yaduta traidhātukamiti. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,*
p. 1.

caust of all the pre-suppositions of human existence. Not only this but the existence of other subjects as centres of consciousness (*santānāntara*) is exposed to the same charge of absurdity. How can one know that there are other persons, if they are not real entities existing in their own right? They must be dismissed as the contents of the experience of a subject, just like other external objects. And these subjects cannot be other than the knowing subject. The inference of the separate identity of different persons based upon the experience of their vocal and physical activities which are equally suspect, cannot be maintainable. The inevitable consequence of subjectivism is solipsism, 'I alone exist' will be the only sound proposition. Though solipsism has been justified with arguments by the extreme Vedantic monists it does not carry conviction and satisfy our logical and practical conscience. The Buddhists will have to deny the existence of the Buddha as Nāgārjuna has boldly declared. But negativism (*śūnyavāda*) in spite of its plausibility and respectability as a philosophical theory cannot be supposed to be the last word in philosophy.

Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and his followers have developed *Vijñānavāda* as a logical corollary of the doctrine of momentariness of reals. They have arrived at the conclusion that consciousness is momentary and no two consciousness-moments are identical. But because the previous consciousness unit produces a subsequent homogeneous consciousness and the object or content is not different from the cognitive consciousness, the idea of continuity and identity is an illusion generated by the unbroken continuum of the causal series of consciousness-moments. The lack of a perceptible interval between two consciousness-units and the homogeneity of the causal series give rise to the illusion of identity and permanence. In point of fact consciousness is a momentary entity which exists only for a mathematical instant and perishes in the next moment utterly and irrevocably.

The theory of the subjective idealist (Vijñānavādin) has been summed up by Kamalaśīla, the commentator of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* in the following terms. The whole universe consisting of three spheres namely, the sensible world (*kāmadhātu*), the pure material world (*rūpadhātu*) and the immaterial world (*arūpadhātu*) is nothing but consciousness. The centres of consciousness called *santāna* (continuing subjects) are infinite in number. Each inevitably perishes in the next moment. As regards unenlightened subjects this consciousness is contaminated by moral and intellectual defects (*kleśa*), and it is pure

and uncontaminated in the enlightened consciousness centres.¹ There are three propositions distinguishable in the extract quoted above and each of them deserves meticulous examination. The first proposition is that consciousness is momentary and there is no perdurable identical subject. The second one is that the subject consisting in a series of consciousness-units continues without break, one consciousness-unit followed by the subsequent one as its effect. The third proposition is that the subjective centres are numerically different from one another. The first proposition asserts that consciousness-units are momentary and infinite in number forming an unending continuum. Obviously the doctrine of momentariness is borrowed from the Sautrāntikas who make causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) the sole criterion of existence.²

Rival philosophers have advanced powerful arguments against the conception of causal efficiency as the sole criterion of existence. It is found that even illusory experience such as the experience of snake in a rope produces trepidation and the relevant motor activities. The snake appearance makes the erring subject spring back from it to a safe distance and that of silver in the nacre induces a forward movement for its acquisition. The causal efficiency of these illusions is undeniable, yet it cannot be real, belonging as it does to a false appearance. Furthermore causality has been shown by Dharmakīrti in his work *Sambandhaparīkṣā*³ to be a convenient figment of understanding. In brief, causality cannot be an objective relation because the terms, cause and effect, are not synchronous and relation must subsist between two terms. In the present case the cause ceases to be when the effect comes into being. The relation is imposed by the subject as a convenient expedient of systematization of experience. It is a form or way of understanding as Kant maintains. Dharmakīrti has anticipated Kant. It follows that the conclusion of momentariness of existents based on the argument of causal efficiency must collapse with its basis cut asunder.

Let us now examine the second postulate that the subject is an unending continuum of plural consciousness-units, one following on

1. Vijñaptimātramevedam traidhātukam, tacca vijñānam pratītiśattvasantāna-bhedād anantam avīśuddhañcānadhigatatattvānām, viśuddham ca prahīṇāvaraṇānām pratīkṣaṇaviśarāru ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām oḷāyate, *Tattvasaṃgraha* (G.O.S.), p. 550.
2. For detailed discussion the reader is referred to my book *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*.
3. Reproduced in a large number in the *Prameyakaśāstrāṅga* and *Syād vādaratnākara*. See also the Chapter entitled 'Relations' in *The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism*.

the heels of another. It is based on the assumption that one consciousness as cause will produce another consciousness as effect without break and as a matter of inevitable necessity. But causal continua, when frustrated by obstructive agents, are found to cease. For instance, darkness which is a positive entity according to the Buddhist ceases to exist and vanishes into nothingness when confronted with light. Darkness has been regarded as negation of light by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school; but with due deference to these theories we may substitute light for darkness. Furthermore a jar is destroyed when it is crushed with a cudgel. There is no logical or ontological necessity that the series of cause and effect will continue without break. And this has been shown by the examples cited by us. The Buddhist Fluxist (*Kṣāṇikavādin*) and the Idealist (*Vijñānavādin*) cannot prove that consciousness-series, which functions as the knowing subject, will continue as a matter of universal necessity. The possibility of its meeting with extinction makes havoc of the intellectual, moral and religious discipline. The subject will be debarred by powerful disincentives from the pursuit of intellectual, moral and religious activities. So this theory of the *Vijñānavādin* cannot be acceptable as true estimate of subjective consciousness.

The third proposition postulates the existence of other subjects. But we have already shown that it is based on uncritical faith, and solipsism is the logical consequence. The experience of objective facts is not liable to be dismissed in a cavalier fashion. If experience of the object is denied its validity, self-experience of the conscious subject will also be liable to be demolished like the experience of object having nothing to secure its survival. In fact the *Sūnyavādin* has dismissed both consciousness and content as unrelieved appearance. The positive assertion of Siddhasena Divākara that consciousness necessarily illumines an object cannot therefore be challenged on pain of absurd consequences.

Dharmakīrti has produced a novel argument to prove the identity of cognition and the object. The object that is supposed to be standing independent of the subject cannot be apprehended by a cognition for want of a necessary nexus. The *Sautrāntikas* suppose that the object imprints its image on the cognition and the object is inferred to be the original of it just as a person infers the existence of his face from the reflection in the mirror. But this analogy cannot stand scrutiny. A man sees the reflection of another man's image in the original and its reflection and their comparison enables a man to infer the likeness of his face to the image in the mirror. But there is no such comparison

possible between the image or form in the consciousness and the external object which remains always aloof and apart from it. The alleged image is nothing but the content of the cognition and being cognized with the cognition as a matter of universal coincidence, the content must be identical with the cognition. The blue and the cognition of blue must be one and the same thing.¹ The blue content is derived from a previous disposition left by previous cognition. This is the sum and substance of the argument advanced by Dharmakīrti to repudiate the independent existence of external objects.

We have already examined the possibility of disposition (*vāsanā*) and found that it is a halting explanation based on the analogy of false experience. As regards the plea of simultaneous intuition of cognition and its content it will suffice to expose the hollowness of the argument, if it is realised that we do not feel that we see only an image or copy or reflection and not the object. It is the general consensus of all percipients that they see the external object standing outside and not the internal image. This universal agreement ought not to be brushed aside as illusion. The difficulties alleged to arise from the relation of internal cognition and external object are rather creatures of subjective bias. It is argued that the relation cannot be one of identity because the two are felt as distinct and different. It is again contended that it cannot be one of difference, because that will annul the distinction of an object known from an object unknown. If the known object, say tree, is equally different from the cognition concerned and stands in its solitary majesty aloof and apart like the rest of the world, it is difficult to draw the line of demarcation between the alleged known object from an unknown object. Unless a special criterion is propounded in addition to the relation of difference to account for its amenability to the jurisdiction of consciousness and the want of it in case of an unknown object which stands in the same manner of isolation, it is impossible to account for the preferential treatment. But such a criterion is and cannot be formulated by the realist. This is the gravamen of the objection of the Buddhist idealist.

The realist Naiyāyika however posits the relation of *viśayatā*, that is, subject-object relation. He would contend that it is only a perversity of logic to reduce all relation to identity or difference. Identity

1. *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīla-taddhiyoḥ*—Vide *Tattvasaṃgrahpañjikā* (G. O. S.), p. 567.

Also cf: *sakṛt saṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhīyā saha / viśayasya tato' nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa sidhyati*// *Pramāṇavārtika*, II. 388.

is not a relation at all since the very conception of relation presupposes two terms and the supposed identity as a relation will only be tantamount to denial of relation as the other term is *non est*. Nor can the relation be one of absolute difference. According to the Jaina logician the relation is one of identity-cum-difference, It partakes of the dual character and the incompatibility alleged by the Idealist will hold good if identity and difference be absolute. The Jaina endorses non-absolutism and regards all relation as identity-cum-difference, which is enforced and confirmed by experience and as such cannot be rejected on *a priori* grounds. It is experience alone which can be the determinant of the nature of things conceived. One must submit to the final verdict of experience and not dictate terms. Things do not conform to the tastes and preferences of the knower. The knower cannot alter the nature of things, otherwise a man might contend that the blue should be perceived as white. It has been pointed out that the incompatibility of identity and difference is a deduction of the absolutist who regards them as absolutely different and mutually inconsistent. But the non-absolutist maintains that difference and identity are not necessarily incongruous. In deference to experience one must accept that difference and identity are not encountered in experience. They are rather conceived on *a priori* and abstract considerations which exist only in the muddled imagination of the logical purist who does not condescend to take stock of the objects of experience. Like King Canute who ordered the waves of the English channel not to encroach on the coast and felt the humiliation of discomfiture when the sea refused to oblige him, the Idealist logician will meet with similar disappointment. In response to the challenge of the Idealist that no relation between the subject and the object can be trotted out, the Naiyāyika asserts that the subject-object relation is as ultimate as identity and difference. The Naiyāyika and also Kumārila do not subscribe to the view that cognition and its object are perceived together and at the same time. But the Jaina believes in self-awareness of all cognitions and therefore do not seek shelter in the subterfuge. The Jaina philosopher endorses the contention of the Idealist that cognition and its object are perceived at the same time as a matter of universal coincidence. But this synchronism and togetherness of the two awarenesses do not entail their identity. Simultaneous awareness is found to occur in the awareness of light and that of the object, say jar. The light is the auxiliary condition of visual perception of the jar but nobody would assert that light and the jar are identical. So the argument of Dharmakīrti centred upon synchronism does not entail identity as a matter of necessity.

We have finished the examination of the justifiability of the adjective 'illuminating an other' (*parabhāsi*) in the definition of valid cognition. We now propose to subject the other adjectival expression 'illuminating itself' (*svabhāsi*) to critical examination. A cognition can illumine an other (external object) only if it illumines itself. A thing unknown and unilluminated cannot be proved to exist. Besides, from experience we find that the light of the lamp which illumines other things is not unilluminated. On the contrary it can illumine an object if it is self-illuminating.

The Naiyāyika holds that the first cognition is known by a second cognition following on its heels. The first cognition is called *vyavasāya*, that is, the definite knowledge of the object and the second cognition is of the nature of introspection (*anuvyavasāya*). The first cognition is not known at the time when it cognizes the object. It functions like a sense-organ which remains unperceived at the time of the revelation of the object. But this analogy is based on superficial observation. It is not the eye which sees the object but the knowledge produced in the knowing subject. The sense-organs are as material as the objects which they are alleged to take stock of. One insensitive material fact cannot confer the light of cognition on another material fact because both of them are in the same predicament. As for the Naiyāyika's plea that the first cognition is known by the second cognition, the following dilemma will topple the second also. Is it known or unknown when it performs its alleged function of illumination? If it is known why should the first be supposed to remain unknown at the time of its illumination of the object. An unknown thing is as good as non-existent so far as the subject is concerned. The Naiyāyika also subscribes to the dictum that a thing can be proved only by knowledge.¹ In conformity with this law it must be held that the existence of the first cognition, which certifies the existence of its relevant object, cannot function without being known to exist. The assumption of the second cognition is exposed to the same objection and if the second cognition requires a third and if the latter be as unknown as its predecessors it will require a fourth cognition and the process will involve a *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*).²

Citsukhācārya in his *Tattvapradīpikā* criticizes the Nyāya position by a novel argument and shows the absurdity of its stand. The perception of an object takes place according to the theory of the Nyāya-

1. prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇa dḍhi-*Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*.

2. For the logical absurdity involved in infinite regress, Vide *Inductive Reasoning* by Dr. S. Bagchi.

Vaiśeṣika school when there is fourfold contact viz. (i) the contact of the sense with the object, (ii) contact of the sense with the mind, (iii) contact of the mind with the knowing self, and (iv) the consequential contact with the cognition inherent in the subject. When the object to be known, e. g. cognition, pleasure, pain, volition and the like, is internally inherent in the subject, the first threefold contact will suffice. The most essential condition is that there must be contact of the mind with the self (that is attention). And as the mind is close to the self and competent to be in contact, the aforesaid contact takes place without hitch and this is the universal condition of all cognition. If the mind be not functioning or functioning elsewhere on another object, the cognition of the specific object will not take place. In the case of the first cognition the mind-soul-contact (*ātmanamanāḥsaṃyoga*) is present in full force. When the second cognition, supposed to take cognizance of the first one, occurs there must be soul-mind-contact, which is the necessary condition of all mental events. If the first soul-mind-contact as the condition of the first cognition continues it will necessarily cognize the second cognition, because the cognition inheres in the self and the mind which is in conjunction with the self will automatically function on the former and so in every case the introspective cognition will be *eo ipso* cognized. But as this requisite condition is also present at the time of the occurrence of the first cognition, it is passing strange that the first cognition remains uncognized when it occurs and depends on the second cognition for proof of its existence. Cognition is competent to be perceived by the self and when the requisite condition viz. the soul-mind-object-contact is present in full, why should not the effect take place? If on the other hand it is supposed that the first contact ceases and another such contact takes place to make the occurrence of the introspection possible, the result will be a fiasco. The second contact will take place in the following way. The occurrence of the mind-object-contact takes place in the first moment, the contact of the mind with the self occurs in the second and the contact of the former (the mind) with the cognition can take place in the third moment and thus complete the requisite condition. But as cognition and the like are momentary in the sense that they exist only for two moments and perish in the third moment as a matter of necessity, the first cognition will have ceased to exist when the introspective cognition arises. So introspection, even if it takes place in the third moment as supposed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, will have no object. Thus the theory that the first cognition functions as an unknown entity and is proved by a second cognition falls to the ground.

No difficulty arises if it is endorsed that a cognition comes into existence as self-certifying and is never unknown in its career. This is called self-illumination of the cognition (*svaprakāśatva* or *svabhāsitva* as worded by Siddhasena). It means that all cognitions are self-cognitions. A difficulty has been raised by the opponent that if the cognition or the knowing-self is cognized by itself it will come to mean that the subject of cognition is also its object. The object is one that receives a benefit from the act. Though 'I know' is a transitive verb and as such necessarily involves an object to operate upon, the subject cannot be the object as it is not a different thing to receive the benefit of illumination from the cognitive act. If the subject were also the object the sword which cuts the tree will also cut itself. This is obviously absurd. However expert an acrobat may be, he cannot dance on his own shoulder. Such is the case with cognition. This is the line of objection taken by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti who quote statements of scriptures in their support. To avoid prolixity we must say that cognition is not an action though it is enunciated as a verb by the grammarian. But the meaning of all verbs is not action. Cognition is rather regarded as a quality by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Without entering into the controversy whether it is an action or quality, we can dispose of the objection by the observation that the self or cognition (as the Buddhist does not believe in the knowing self) is not the object of the cognition but is self-revealing in the sense that it is never unknown. If the self were unknown at any time it would be subject to doubt. But nobody entertains the doubt about himself as to whether 'I exist or not' or the erroneous perception 'I do not exist'. However much the sceptic may try to deny the existence of the knowing self, he only stultifies himself. The assertion of the doubt or the negation of the self presupposes the very existence of the self as the subject of assertion. He entangles himself in hopeless self-contradiction. When the sceptic asserts 'I do not know the knower', he asserts himself to be the knower of the non-existence of the knower. This means that the knower is known as the knowing subject and never as an alien object.¹

Pramāṇya has been defined as a cognition having the above-noted characteristics. The word *pramāṇya* in Sanskrit means both the result and the instrument of knowledge. A thing is accepted to exist on the basis of the cognition serving as the proof of it. This cognition must be valid, otherwise it will fail to function as proof. But what is the

1. For a further detailed exposition, the inquisitive reader is referred to the author's monograph: *The Absolutist's Standpoint in Logic in the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Vol. I.*

instrumental condition of valid cognition? Siddhasena asserts that it is the cognition that is the instrument of proof. Both the condition of proof and proof as the result must be a cognitive act. Dharmakīrti also asserts that it is cognition which is *pramāṇa quā* act and *quā* instrument. It is the instrument of practical activity and is by itself a cognitive fact. Cognition necessarily means the revelation of an object, say water in a lake and the acts of bathing, drinking and the like are rather the consequences of this revelation. So if it is to be regarded as an instrument, it, that is, cognition, is the instrument of the practical behaviour following upon it. The condition of cognition such as the sense-organ or the sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*) is not regarded as *pramāṇa*, though it is the antecedent condition. If a brute fact like sense or sense-object-contact be regarded as a *pramāṇa* (act of proof or the result of proof), it may be shifted to the entire physical organism which makes the function of sense-organs possible. Accordingly these remote or immediate antecedents of cognition are not given the status of *pramāṇa* which means primarily and principally the act of proof or revelation. Here the Jaina logicians differ from the Naiyāyika, in unison with the Buddhist. *Pramāṇa* (valid cognition) *quā* an act of revelation or an instrumental condition of practical activity must be cognition. This is stressed by the inclusion of 'cognition' (*jñāna*) in the definition.

The next important element in the definition is 'immune from contradiction' (*bādhavarjita*). A set of logicians makes verification (*avisamvāda*) or to be precise, the want of incongruence and disharmony of the content with the object, the test of valid cognition. The successful behaviour resulting from cognition provides the confirmation of the validity of the cognition. But there are certain perceptions which though erroneous, do lead to the successful acquisition of the object considered to be envisaged by them and have been regarded as *pramāṇa*. This is a misconception and as such is rebutted by the adjective 'immune from contradiction'. It is true that the cognition of a moving tree seen from a fast running train, steamer or motor car is not entirely unfounded in the sense that a person so inclined may move forward and perceive stationary tree. There is verification so far as the tree is concerned. Again such instances of doubt, for example, 'whether the object standing before is a man or a tree' is resolved by the perception of hands and feet which settle the doubt as hands and feet can belong to a man and not to a tree. But suppose that the person misperceives the foot for the hand, the cognition of the human being as the object of previous doubt is regarded as valid on account of its verifiability. So also perception of a stick immersed in water as bent while it is straight in fact is also susceptible of verification. So there is congruence of the cognition

with the object and its validity, though partial, cannot be denied. In pursuance of the pragmatic satisfaction of such experiences, verifiable cognition, whether fully authentic or partially authentic, was regarded as *pramāṇa* (valid cognition). Dharmakīrti had to incorporate the adjective 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*) in the definition of valid perceptual cognition formulated by him. He differs from those logicians who pin their faith on verification by successful test as the criterion of valid cognition and accordingly excludes such cases from the purview of validity. Dharmottara and also Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* have offered this defence as the justification of incorporation of the adjective 'non-erroneous' in the definition.

Dharmakīrti and his commentators also make verification a plausible test of validity, but they insist that the verification must be total and relate to all the attributes perceived in the cognition. As a moving tree is not perceived on verification but a stationary tree, the previous cognition of the moving tree, whatever may be its cause—swift locomotion or nervous disturbance due to a blow or wound—must be rejected as erroneous. But the qualifying epithet 'non-erroneous' is an absolutely uncalled for innovation. It is a negative expression and negation is called in request to combat possible erroneous affirmation. Dharmakīrti proposes to define authentic cognition (*samyag jñāna*) which is classified under two heads viz. perception and inference. It follows from the procedure that perception must be an authentic cognition and this alone is sufficient to preclude the disputed instances of verifiable cognition as they are erroneous. An erroneous cognition is error, and irrespective of its practical consequences, cannot be confounded with authentic cognition. This will be clear from our exposition of a subsequent verse of Siddhasena.¹

Siddhasena has not incorporated the adjective 'cognition of a previously uncognized fact' (*anadhigatārtham*) in the definition as has been done in a supplementary clause by Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇavartika*² and the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Siddharṣi discusses the logical necessity of this supplementary qualification of valid cognition. What is the nature of the uncognized object? Is it (i) substance, or (ii) mode, or (iii) substance qualified by mode, or (iv) mode qualified by substance, or (v) the universal, or (vi) the particular, or (vii) the universal qualified by the particular or (viii) the particular qualified

1. *Nyāyavaiśara*, 6.

2. *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam..... // Pramāṇavartika, I. 3 ajñātārthaprakāśo vāPramāṇavartika, I. 7.*

by the universal ? The first alternative is out of the question because it is a permanent entity and an identical principle irrespective of the modes which come and go. So substance cannot be the previously unknown datum of subsequent cognitions. The second alternative is also not tenable because it is momentary and vanishes when the perceptual cognition takes place. It is not plausible that a percipient would perceive the two elements, substance and mode simultaneously, if they are two facts existing side by side. And even if they are related as substantive and adjective the knowledge of either of the two would take place antecedently and so the second cognition will be conversant with a fact previously known. Perception occurs on the sense-object-contact in the second moment but by that time the mode has disappeared. So it does not come within the purview of the cognition of uncognized fact because it is neither cognized before nor attained after. The two other alternatives, namely, mode-qualified-substance or substance-qualified-mode cannot be supposed to be the object of such cognition simply because the mode either as a substantive or an adjective is not amenable to second cognition. If the object of the second cognition be supposed to be the universal common entity then it will be on a par with substance. As for the particular, if it is persistent and identical with substance it will not be amenable to the proposed definition. The other two alternatives are consequential and so cannot be expected to yield better results. Furthermore the qualification 'previously uncognized' cannot have reference to the experience of other people. Everything is cognized by an omniscient whose existence is admitted both by the Buddhist and the Jaina and also by theists who must assert that God is omniscient. Even a thing cognized for the first time by a person may have been cognized by other subjects. So the adjective cannot be understood in an absolute reference. If however it refers to a particular percipient, that also does not make it more intelligible, as has been shown by us immediately in the previous discussion.

The Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntists have insisted on the inclusion of this adjective of valid cognition with a deeper purpose in view. The Mimāṃsakas regard the Vedic text as authoritative because it yields the knowledge of a fact which is not attainable by perception or inference. Heaven, hell or ultimate salvation are facts which are not accessible to perception or inference. It is on the evidence of scriptural texts that a man comes to know that performance of a meritorious act leads to heaven and commission of sinful acts leads to hell or that ultimate salvation is attainable by realization of the ultimate reality. It is for this reason the Vedas are regarded as

authoritative because the knowledge delivered by them is entirely related to facts which are unknown and unknowable by empirical organs of knowledge. This is the *raison d'être* of the incorporation of the qualifying clause in the definition of valid cognition.

So far as the Vedāntists are concerned, the individual subject is identical with the Absolute Brahman impersonal and personal. The Personal Absolute is God and as such is omniscient because nescience (*avidyā*) cannot conceal anything from His ken. The individual also has this prerogative in theory. But as he does not possess this perfection in practical experience, it is postulated that an individual person (*jīva*) suffers from super-imposition of nescience. When this nescience is dispelled by final enlightenment, omniscience dawns upon him automatically. It is this nescience which makes an individual unaware of his natural property, namely, fullknowledge. Knowledge in his case presupposes the removal of nescience. When a man sees a phenomenon, say a pen, a table or a chair and comes to have knowledge of an object, it means not the acquisition of new knowledge but the removal of the veil of nescience. The objects concerned were not previously known by the individual because they were veiled by nescience. So every case of empirical cognition is the discovery of a fact previously shut out from his ken by the barrier of nescience. When a man searches for his pen which he uses on every occasion of writing and finds it out he thinks that he sees it again. The pen though known before has been in the interval again shrouded by nescience and its subsequent knowledge becomes possible on the elimination of the obstructive veil of ignorance. So there is no repetition even when it is a cognition of the substance. The substance and mode are not absolutely different entities as the latter cannot be ontologically separated from the former. That they are distinguished is only due to our failure to envisage them in their proper perspective. Accordingly, the difficulty raised by Siddharṣi will not affect the epistemological position of the Vedāntist.

We think that the Vedāntist and the Jaina philosophers do not hold irreconcilably divergent position. The Jaina philosophers hold that knowledge of all things is inherent in the subject, but the obstruction caused by the *karmic* veil enveloping the potential knowledge makes it unknown. When on the operation of the requisite *pramāṇa*, the *karmic* veil is eliminated (*kṣaya*) or made to subside (*upāśama*), the knowledge takes place. It is rather a case of discovery and not an acquisition of an unattained knowledge. This is the position of the Vedāntists also to all intents. That Siddhasena did not incorporate

this adjective, is not, it appears to us, due to his divergence but the realization of the futility of such a qualification. The removal of the veil of ignorance, whether imposed by karman or nescience, is the universal condition of all knowledge. Therefore he did not think it necessary to add this qualifying element as it follows from the universal presupposition of knowledge.

Now the adjective 'non-discrepant' (*avisamvādaka*) is to be examined in all its bearings. Does it mean that the cognition of a datum must conform to and agree with its objective datum? If so how can such congruence be tested by the subsequent cognition by way of verification. Verification is possible, if the objective datum persists at the time of the occurrence of the verifying cognition. But everything is momentary according to the Buddhist and as such it can neither be perceived nor verified. A momentary entity necessarily ceases when perception takes place. As has been shown, the object does not survive after the sense-object-contact and as perception is the result, it can occur in the second moment, but by that time the datum has ceased to exist. If however we concede that the object of verification is only the continuum (*santāna*), i.e. series of successive moments and as such is amenable to subsequent verificatory cognition, this postulation fails in the case of such data as water-bubbles, lightning-flash which inevitably perish after their emergence and so cannot be verified. Verification means attainment by a physical activity. Not only evanescent entities but also supposed durable entities like the stars and planets are not amenable to verification as they are inaccessible. So the sense-datum cannot be understood either as amenable to actual attainment or possibility of it. This verification is possible if the datum is a persistent entity which is stressed by the realists, namely, the Jainas, the Naiyāyikas and others. The makeshift of *santāna* is only a make-believe and it has no objective reality.

The adjective 'immune from contradiction' is comprehensive enough to embrace the possibility of verification. But verification as understood by academically untrained people is not a proof of the validity of the cognition. The sun is seen and believed to rise in the east and set in the west as attested and repeatedly verified by experience. But on the evidence of astronomical and mathematical calculations we know that it is a false cognition. Furthermore the appearance of the sun, moon, planets, and stars as small bodies is certainly erroneous in spite of repeated experience. So mere verifiability and non-discrepancy shown by the former experiences cannot be the adequate criteria of validity. It must be free from contradiction (*bādhavarjita*). This *bādhā*,

that is, contradiction is furnished by a subsequent accredited cognition with opposite content which may be perceptual, inferential or verbal judgement. That Siddhasena's definition is more accurate than those of other logicians has been shown by the foregoing discussion.

The Vedantist asserts that the concept of contradiction should not mean contradiction by a cognition at the present time or for a finite period. The experience of the moving sun remained uncontradicted till the advent of scientific knowledge. It must therefore be admitted that a cognition which is not contradicted in the three divisions of time past, present and future should be accepted as valid cognition. The fact that such experiences have not been contradicted in the past or in the present time does not give fool-proof assurance of its intrinsic validity. But this insistence on optimum evidence, though theoretically incontestable, is not quite relevant in empirical logic. The logician's approach, though theoretical and scientific, is tempered by pragmatic considerations. Such perfect valid knowledge is not attainable on this side of omniscience. We must submit to our limitations and not postpone our logical and scientific enquiry in the interest of perfection. Perfect enlightenment is infinite in its scope and logical discourse has no place in it. Logic and epistemology deal with perception, inference, verbal testimony which have their restricted sphere of operation and as such have value for persons of limited knowledge and mental equipment. So immunity from contradiction should be understood in a more or less pragmatic reference.

Now this valid cognition falls under two heads, perceptual and extra-perceptual. This statement is a definitive assertion which implies the falsity of opposite assertion. There is wide divergence of views among philosophers regarding the nature, number, objects and results of valid cognition. The assertion that valid cognition is of two kinds means that it is not more or less. We shall embark upon this interesting topic after examining the meaning of the terms *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. The word *pratyakṣa* etymologically means that which is connected with *akṣa*. *Akṣa* means both the self or soul (*ātman*) and also senses. But the real meaning of the term is the direct intuition of the object. In empirical intuition it arises on the operation of the sense (*indriya*). But it is not necessarily dependent on the sense-operation. In transcendental intuition of the emancipated soul it does not depend on the good offices of the senses. *Parokṣa* (extra-perceptual or indirect) refers to cognition of objects which are beyond the range of the senses. Now a cognition is called perceptual when the object of it is directly perceived or perceptible. This conception

of *pratyakṣa jñāna* (perceptual cognition) is not subject to the charge of vicious circle: 'Perceptual cognition is what has a perceptible object and the perceptible object is one which is the object of perceptual cognition'. This is a circular definition, one depending upon the other, and the latter depending upon the former. This is avoided by the formulation of an independent definition of either of the terms. In the definition given in the text, we start with perceptual cognition which will be defined as a vivid, clear and direct intuition. The meaning of perceptual cognition is direct, vivid cognition of a thing which is close to the sense. And the object of this vivid cognition is called perceptible. Perceptibility is an attribute of the object where as perceptuality stands for vivid cognition. The confusion arises from the use of the same word *pratyakṣa* as the description of perceptible object and also of perceptual cognition. The definition of *pratyakṣa jñāna* as a vivid cognition, which cognizes the object as 'this' without the intervention of another cognition, makes it independent of the conception of perceptibility. 'Perceptible' means an object which is envisaged by perception. The independent status of perceptual cognition having intrinsic character of vividness and directness prevents confusion with perceptible object. The definition of perceptibility and that of perceptual cognition as given in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has been a *pons asinorum* to the neophyte. But in the definition of Siddhasena Divākara, there is no room for confusion. Perceptibility of the object is not defined because it derives this character from its status as the content or referent of vivid cognition.

Now the designation of cognition as perceptual or extra-perceptual is not derived from its intrinsic character as modes of consciousness. All cognitions are self-cognized according to the Buddhist and the Jaina as has been demonstrated in the discussion of *svaprakāśatva*, i. e., self-consciousness. This is an invariable characteristic of all cognitions, perceptual or extra-perceptual. Inference and verbal knowledge are also known as cognitions without the service of any other cognition. But this twofold classification has no reference to the intrinsic character of the cognition concerned. It is called perceptual because the object is presented vividly and clearly. The extra-perceptual cognition (*parokṣajñāna*) does not mean that the cognition is *per se* unperceivable. But it is called such because it is a blurred, unclear cognition of an object lying outside the range of senses. Nor can the characteristic 'perceptibility' be an absolute attribute of objects. The object which is not perceptible to one person may be perceptible to others and regarding the omniscient subject everything is perceptible to him. So this characterization and classification of cognitions as perceptual (*pratyakṣa*)

and extra-perceptual (*parokṣa*) and of objects as perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and imperceptible (*parokṣa*) is relative to the knowing subject whose capacity for cognition is circumscribed by the veil of ignorance induced by the past karma of the percipient.

It has been shown that this classification is relative to the knowing subject to whom many things are imperceptible or, to be precise, do not fall within his range of perception. The knowledge of such an unperceived object is secured by inference or verbal testimony of a person of unquestioned veracity and unimpaired capacity who has first-hand cognition of those things which are for the present imperceptible to this specific person.

The materialist Cārvāka does not believe in the validity of extra-perceptual cognition, inference and the like, But this scepticism of Cārvāka is self-stultifying as it involves self-contradiction. As has been shown by Dharmakīrti whose position has been endorsed by the Jaina and other philosophers that the very refutation of the rival thinker who asserts inference as valid cognition presupposes the belief of the Cārvāka in the validity of inference. How can he know that another person entertains the view that inference is as valid as perception? Certainly the thought of another person cannot be known by perception of the sceptic who does not pretend to such occult power. A denial presupposes affirmation. And the denial of the validity of inference necessarily takes for granted the affirmation of such validity by another person. In fact no debate is possible if knowledge of the other person is not subject to dispute. As this knowledge cannot be secured by ordinary perception, extra-perceptual cognition has to be posited as a matter of logical necessity. Furthermore the Materialist who believes only in the validity of direct perceptual knowledge alone cannot distinguish false perception from true perception. A man who has suffered from the illusion of water in the desert regards the appearance of water in the same situation on a subsequent occasion as false beforehand. Why should it be held to be false before actual verification? The sceptic must answer that it is exactly similar to the previous illusion he perceived before. This is a case of inference on the basis of exact similarity or identity (*tadātmya*) as the Buddhist terminology goes. Exact similarity means identity in apparent difference.

This cognition of falsity on the basis of identity with previous illusion is nothing but inferential in character. Again how does the sceptic know that the other party holds the opposite view which he

seeks to refute. From his very assertion, he will say, the person's belief is understood. This is certainly a case of inference of the cause from the effect. It is admitted tacitly or explicitly that the assertion of a man is the exponent of his conviction just as the smoke is the exponent of fire. It is assumed that speech is the effect of corresponding belief. So this is nothing but inference. Again when the sceptic denies the existence of anything he does so on the strength of his non-perception. Well, he would argue that an object is not present because it is not perceived. Had it been present it must have been perceived like the other things present in the situation which are invariably perceived. This is an instance of inference as has been shown by Dharmakirti. So the denial of the validity of extra-perceptual cognition such as inference is only a make-believe and intentional fraud.

The Buddhist believes in perception and inference as valid cognition and also accords to both the same logical status in respect of cogency. The Jaina agrees with the Buddhist so far. But he joins issue with the Buddhist when he denies the validity of verbal testimony. It is on the testimony of scriptures which have been composed by men of extraordinary powers of perception and who have condescended to impart the results of their knowledge to the unenlightened persons out of compassion for their benefit, we come to know of heaven, hell and the existence of angels and gods. That there is life after death is also believed on the authority of such statement. Certainly the knowledge of such imperceptible objects cannot be secured by perception or even inference which derives its conditions, viz., the minor and major premises from perception. Had these been perceptible, there would not have been scope for scepticism. That the statements of veracious persons are true has to be admitted by the sceptic. The field of our perceptual knowledge is limited and we know of other nations and countries and their war and alliance on the testimony of knowledgeable persons whose veracity is not open to doubt. That we rely on such testimony is evident from our acceptance of such knowledge. The denial of the validity of such testimony would make a person a total ignoramus and lead him to absurd situations.

The materialist may contend that such things are believed on the testimony of other persons because they are verifiable by experience, if one takes the trouble of going to those places. But belief in heaven and existence after death stand in a different category. They are not verifiable. This is the stance taken by the present day materialists, sceptics and logical positivists. We would put a counter question

to the sceptic. Are all things that we believe verifiable by ourselves ? Does the sceptic believe that atoms can be fissioned and atom bombs are made by this process ? He may not have seen the atom bombs or the process of fission of atoms in the laboratory. But if a man disbelieves these scientific inventions, he only makes himself a target of ridicule. What is the basis of our belief in the truth of the scientific discoveries ? It is certainly the testimony of trustworthy persons who have first-hand knowledge. If so, why should the sceptic adopt a different attitude to the deliverances of such prophets and seers as the Buddha, the Christ and recent seers like Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa whose veracity cannot be called in question. We know from the character of such exceptional persons that they are incapable of deceiving mankind and also that they must have had unerring knowledge of these facts and they had no interest in bamboozling persons of limited knowledge. To entertain suspicion of their credentials is scepticism *in excelsis*. Such being the case the belief in the truth of assertions of holy persons of extraordinary powers does not argue blind superstition on the part of believers. Extreme scepticism should make a man speechless. He wants to convert other people to his way of thinking and combat illusion and superstition because he believes in his extra-perceptual knowledge of thought of others. It must be admitted that the belief in the infallibility of Karl Marx ultimately reduces itself to faith and not reasoned conviction. If it were open to the test of inference and the like there would not have been difference of opinion among persons whose logical competency is out of question.

The Jaina logicians differ from other philosophers in regard to the admissibility of other types of valid knowledge endorsed by the latter as independent genres. For instance, *arthāpatti* (implication), *upamāna* (comparison), *abhāva* (negation), and others endorsed by the Mīmāṃsakas and other thinkers are not regarded by the Jaina logicians as independent types. They are subsumed by them under extra-perceptual or perceptual knowledge. As regards negation endorsed by Kumārila, they would not recognize its validity and if it is to be valid it must be included under perception. Kumārila holds that a thing is possessed of a positive and negative character (*sadasadātma*) by virtue of which it is hold to be what it is and distinguished from what it is not. So this assertion is a deduction from the existence of a plurality of entities. If there are many things each thing will have its distinctive individuality unshared by the rest. So negation of the opposite is inherent even in the positive entity. But when such an entity is perceived its negation eludes grasp. Kumārila contends

that perception is not competent for negation. Besides perception depends on the operation of senses and sense cannot operate on negation for want of a plausible relation. The knowledge of negation arises when one sees a particular object and remembers its opposite (*pratiyogin*) independently of the sense-object-contact. So knowledge of negation is non-perceptual and as it cannot be reduced to inference or verbal testimony, it must be recognised as a different species of cognition. The Naiyāyika contends that negation of a perceptible object is realised by sense-perception directly and abruptly. As for the contention of Kumārila that there is no relation between negation and sense, and between negation and the locus, the Naiyāyika pleads that the relation is *sui generis*. It is a substantive-adjective relation. The Jaina logician on the other hand maintains that when the sense is in touch with the empty locus, it cognizes negation which is a component factor of the positive locus. The debate between Kumārila and other logicians on this point is too elaborate to be succinctly treated. Each party will stick to his position and not be willing to capitulate. The number of types of valid cognition is a popular subject matter among the philosophers. There is however a general consensus regarding perception, inference and verbal testimony. But the Buddhist refuses to believe in the intrinsic validity of verbal testimony on the ground that a word does not stand in objective relation to its meaning. The relation is rather imposed by convention and as such is not objective. The Jaina along with other respectable philosophers believes that relation between word and meaning is not entirely conventional or entirely natural, but one that partakes of both. No doubt the speaker or the auditor can understand the meaning of word only if he had the knowledge of the convention. But convention is not entirely arbitrary or accidental. The word must not be repugnant to the meaning signified by it. This stand disposes of the objection of Dharmakīrti that there is no compelling relation like causality or identity of essence. A third necessary relation is not conceivable. The relation of denoter and denoted (*vācyavācakabhāva*) is only conventional and ultimately depends upon the option of the original speaker. Here the Jaina joins issue with Dharmakīrti and offers certain convincing observations in support of his position.

The Upamāna, i. e. Comparison has been recognized as an independent species of valid cognition by the Mīmāṃsakas. But the Jaina logician opines that the apprehension of similarity between the distant cow and the wild yak present before the perceiver is secured

by perceptual knowledge. It is a clear intuition and so is not liable to be called in question. The memory impression of the cow perceived before serves rather as a stimulating condition and does not detract from its intuitive character.

This line of reasoning will account for the validity of recognition, recollection and inductive reasoning (*ūha*) because there is no discrepancy between the deliverances of these types of cognition and their referents. They are included under non-perceptual cognition because something more than what is directly perceived is made known by them. Recognition is the apprehension of identity or similarity of a present datum with a past. This identity or similarity is not perceived if the datum previously cognized is not remembered. Thus recognition gives us an additional datum over and above the perceived fact. So it is called non-perceptual. *Ūha* (inductive reasoning) is concerned with the necessary relation between the probans (*sādhana*) and probandum (*sādhya*) in universal reference. As it is cognizant of facts present, past and future, it is placed outside the category of perceptual cognition. So also *arthāpatti* (implication) by means of which the burning capacity of fire is understood on the basis of sharp sounds produced in the process of the combustion of the fuel. These explosive sounds emitted by the combustible fuel can be accounted for on the pre-supposition of the capacity of fire for such combustion. This is a case of inference based on the consideration of the impossibility of the effects in the absence of such capacity in fire. Its validity is to be recognized but the implication or presupposition is only another name of inference and not a separate species.

As regards inductive reasoning which gives us the knowledge of the universal and the necessary relation of the whole class of probantia with the whole class of probanda e. g. the relation between smoke as a class and fire as a class, it is not regarded as an independent species of valid cognition by the orthodox logicians of the Nyāya school and the Buddhist. They assert that the necessary relation is understood by a hypothetical reasoning in the following way : 'If there were not fire there would not be smoke in the hill'. But the absence of fire and the absence of smoke are hypothetical assertions in the context. So reasoning, though it delivers the knowledge of universal concomitance, is not an accredited species of valid cognition since the referents of the hypothetical propositions are only assumptions. But this contention does not satisfy the Jaina logicians. The difficulty of the Naiyāyika arises from the consideration that such hypothetical reasoning is not capable of being subsumed under the four types of valid cognition,

namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*). The recognition of the validity of reasoning on the basis of its efficacy for the comprehension of universal concomitance (*vyūpti*) would necessitate the admission of an additional species which militates against the categorical statement in the *Nyāyasūtra*. This is an intricate problem and it has been discussed threadbare by Dr. S. Bagchi in his momentous work *Inductive Reasoning*. It will suffice for our purpose to observe that the knowledge of universal concomitance cannot be delivered by perception which is necessarily confined to the present data distinct from past and future instances. Nor can it be apprehended by inference because inference is possible on the basis of universal concomitance set forth in the major premiss of Aristotelian syllogism and the third member of the *Nyāya* syllogism called illustration (*udāharaṇa*). If inference were competent to deliver this knowledge it would presuppose another necessary concomitance and if another inference is requisitioned to account for the second concomitance, the result would be an infinite regress. So inductive reasoning (*ūha*) must be recognized as a valid cognition in spite of its hypothetical character. In fact it is not hypothetical as has been shown by Dr. Bagchi, in his exposition of the *Mādhva* position. It is asserted that the formal hypothetical proposition 'If there were no fire there would be no smoke' means that the admission of absence of fire necessarily entails the admission of absence of smoke. And as the smoke in the hill is perceived as a present fact, its absence, though not objective, which is inevitably entailed by the admission of the absence of fire is not a hypothetical assumption. It is highly creditable on the part of the Jain logician that he boldly asserted the validity of inductive reasoning (*ūha* or *tarka*) as an independent separate species.

The assertion of Siddhasena that valid cognition falls under two heads, perceptual and extra-perceptual, is comprehensive of all species of valid knowledge. Siddhasena does not agree with the Buddhist logician in his assertion of perception and inference as the only two species. It has been shown that there are other varieties of extra-perceptual cognition, the validity of which is not liable to denial. Verbal testimony and the like though extra-perceptual cannot be included under inference. If inference is broadly understood as a species of knowledge which derives its possibility from the impossibility of the opposite of the fact to be proved, verbal testimony and other types of extra-perceptual cognition which are also necessarily concomitant with their respective referents and impossible in the absence of the

latter may be subsumed under inference. Even the verbal testimony is based on the relation of word and meaning. This relation, whatever may be the speculations on its character and origin, is a necessary relation so far as we are concerned. That a word denotes a particular meaning and that again by virtue of a relation which is not susceptible to alteration by us is admitted on all hands. This relation is a *fait accompli* and this is asserted in the *Vārtika* of Kātyāyana on *Pāṇinisūtra viz, śiddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe*. The meaning of a word is fixed and must be accepted without demur. You cannot call in question the factuality of this relation of denotation between word and meaning in the same way as you cannot deny the relation between cause and effect. If the independence of such a relation is recognized and its necessity is accepted, Siddharṣi asserts that all kinds of extra-perceptual knowledge are susceptible of comprehension under inference.¹ In other words extra-perceptual cognition and inference will be regarded as synonymous. The treatment of extra-perceptual cognitions like *ūha* (reasoning), *śabda* (verbal testimony), *upamāna* (comparison) and *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) as separate sub-species has been dictated by the consideration of the divergence of opinion either on their validity or their separate status. If extra-perceptual cognition were alone stated, the doubt about the validity of these sub-species would not make them clearly intelligible. The difference of views on particular kinds of extra-perceptual cognition is unresolvable because the philosophers of different schools stubbornly cling to their tradition. Comparison, for instance, has been subsumed under perceptual cognition by the Jaina and some other logicians whereas the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka would insist upon their separate status. There is a necessary reference to the past datum and if the emphasis is placed on this element it would be difficult to reduce it to perception. Similar is the case with recognition. There are two discernible elements in it, the recollection of the past datum and the perception of the present. The Jaina logician gives prominence to the recollection as a component and hence place it under extra-perceptual cognition. The Naiyāyika, on the other hand, lays greater stress on the perception of the present datum and thinks that the memory of the past datum is submerged in the perceptual cognition. There is thus a reasonable basis for divergence of views which is due to the logical and psychological proclivities of the thinkers.

As we have observed before, the division of valid cognition into two classes, perceptual and extra-perceptual, is rather dictated by

1. *yadi punaḥ sādhyārthānyathānupapannahetusanpāditanumanamiṣyeta,... parokṣārthaviṣayapratīterabhāvādīti*, p. 25.

subjective consideration. The perceptual cognition is the outcome of sense operation which is concerned with the fact present before the perceptant. The perceptual cognition takes fuller and richer view of the perceived datum. It is clear, vivid and unequivocal, whereas the data perceived by verbal testimony and the like are situated beyond the ken of the senses and their cognition gives only a blurred generalized picture. But the Buddhist demurs to accept its objective validity and thinks general character as false abstraction. The Jaina position on this point differs *toto caelo* from the Buddhist's view. The Jaina asserts that an object is possessed of a generic and a specific character and they are both objective. The Buddhist's preference for the specific (*svalakṣaṇa*) and rejection of the generic aspect are rather the by-product of a preconception. When both are presented with equal prominence why should one aspect be rejected and another preferred? The Buddhist's arguments for the unreality of generic character and the reduction of it to negation of the opposite (*anyāpoha*) have been challenged by the realists of all schools and they all have criticized the fundamental postulate of the Buddhist that existents are momentary as a matter of necessity. If the generic character be suspect, the validity of inference which is only concerned with the conceptual generality will collapse and no amount of prevarication will save him from the charge of indulging in make-believe. We have alluded to these views in order to show that the logical procedure followed by the Jaina both in the classification of valid cognition and in the examination of different types of the same is not devoid of logical justification.

Valid cognition has been defined in the first verse and this definition is competent to eliminate the ignorance of the untrained novice and rebut the opposite conceptions of persons trained in other traditions. A person of clear understanding who is open to conviction and is not deluded by sophistry or prejudice will understand the nature of valid cognition from this definition and those who have got opposite preconceptions but are open to conviction will also be enlightened by this. But those who are of dull intellect will not be able to understand its full implication and for their edification the opposite views are shown to be erroneous. The refutation of these views will enable such a person to have an indubious conception of valid knowledge. It is with this purpose the author states in the next verse the position of some thinkers who are of the opinion that these definitions are useless intellectual exercises and serve no purpose.

Text

prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāraśca tatkr̥tāḥ/
pramāṇalakṣaṇasyoktau jñāyate na prayoja nam//

Translation

“The species of valid cognition are quite familiar and so also the consequential activity generated by them. The purpose of the statement of the defining characteristic of valid cognition is therefore not known by us (and it is therefore useless, since no result is known to proceed from it.” ... (II)

Elucidation

A wise man should first think whether his statement is calculated to produce an improvement in the knowledge of the person addressed by him or not. If his statement is thoughtlessly made without regard to its consequences, the speaker will not be entitled to serious consideration. In other words a statement should be made for imparting knowledge of a fact unknown to the persons addressed by him. So far as the different species of valid cognition are concerned they are quite well-known to all and sundry, and so there is no necessity of making such pointless observation. The definition of *pramāṇas* is therefore useless waste of one's energy and time as it does not give any benefit. The plural number in *pramāṇāṇi* is used in order to show that species of valid cognition, perceptual and extra-perceptual, are different varieties though they share the common character of validity. The common character is distinct from the particular individual. This is evident from the consideration that when a man sees from a distance a tree or comes to know of it from description by another person, the resultant cognition is of the common tree, i. e., treeness common to all the different individual trees. It is the class-character which is distinct from the individuals and is known distinctly when the tree is cognized in its generic character as tree in general and not as a banyan or a mango or an oak. When the individual trees are perceived, this common class-character is not perceived as distinct and different. This shows that this class-character is both different and not-different from the individuals. The class-character as not different from, i. e., as identical with the individuals is a real entity and capable of producing practical results. Firehood as identical with the individual fire is capable of such effects as burning or cooking. So the individual and class-character as identical and different are two distinct reals blended together and not physically detachable. The Buddhist thinks that this common class-character is only a conceptual construction and not an objective fact as it lacks in causal efficiency. But causal efficiency is not regarded as a criterion of reals by the Jaina philosopher. He further observes that even the class-character which is also called universal has got a causal efficiency in that it produces a general notion

and makes linguistic use possible. The Jaina position is that the universal (class-character) and the particular are both identical and different. It is for this reason that the plural number is used in *pramāṇāni*. The different species of valid cognition have their distinctive identity and also are identical with the universal inherent in each of them.

This discussion has been introduced by the commentator Siddhārṣi to justify the use of the plural number in *pramāṇāni*, though the definition given in the first verse refers to valid cognition in the singular number. Now we have stated the contention of a class of logicians who think that *pramāṇās* are well-known and the definition does not give us a new insight into valid cognition and also its practical consequences. He says therefore 'the purpose and the result of such definition is not known by us' rather in a satirical vein. The implication is that it is useless since no worthwhile meaning is discernible in it.

Furthermore he would pose such questions : Is the defining character definitely known or not ? If not definitely known, it will fail to achieve its purpose like the fanciful utterance of a poet or an insane person. Certainly the poet's utterances are not regulated by logical thinking and so they are as unmeaning to the philosophers as the prattle of a mad man. In this connection we may refer to the opinion of Socrates as recorded in the Dialogues of Plato. If the defining character is definitely known by means of a species of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), the question crops up whether this *pramāṇa* is known by another *pramāṇa* or otherwise. In the latter case it will not produce any conviction since it is known to have been given by an invalid cognition (*apramāṇa*). Again the same question will arise whether the second valid cognition has a defining character or not and what again is the source of its knowledge. Without pursuing this dialectic further and further we may sum up the opponent's position as follows : "The statement of the defining character is perfectly ineffective since the defining character cannot be determined."

It may also be observed that if the defining character is alleged to be known by a species of valid cognition that will also not give us a new insight into the nature of the object defined, as it is known beforehand without such extraneous aid and so the statement of it in a formal definition will be as useless and infructuous as the attempt to paint a lily white.

Such is the position taken by a class of thinkers. It is not an entirely hypothetical problem since we see that Nāgārjuna pursues

a similar line of argument to demolish the tradition that a thing can be proved by a relevant organ of valid cognition and the latter again by definition.' Nāgārjuna poses the problem in this way : "If the defining characteristic is different from the object defined, the latter will be without this characteristic *per se*. If it is not different, it will be one and the same thing with the object intended to be defined". The implication is the statement of a defining characteristic in a formal definition by philosophers is only an exercise in futility.²

The justice of the contention is not totally denied. But formal definitions are not entirely useless.

Text

prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakṣaṇoktau prayojanam/
tadvyāmohanivṛttiḥ syād vyāmūḍhamanasāmiha//

Translation

"The utility of the statement of the defining characteristic (in a formal definition) of the *pramāṇas* which are well-known (by all) is the elimination of the misconception and delusion of those whose minds are clouded by ignorance (or false beliefs)." ... (III)

Elucidation

It has been contended that valid cognition and its different ramifications are quite familiar to all and sundry who must possess a modicum of rationality, whether they are educated or not. So the convention of giving definitions in a scientific treatise (*śāstra*) is useless and inspired by vainglorious pedantry and academic vanity. This contention is not totally untrue but its sweeping character betrays a half-truth, which is more insidious than utter falsehood. It is admitted by all that valid knowledge is a well-known fact and everybody is capable of distinguishing valid knowledge from the invalid one. If men were not endowed with this discerning capacity they would not be in a position to undertake any activity. Our practical behaviour, when successful, is made possible by valid knowledge of different objects. One goes to draw water from a well and is not disappointed. This shows that his knowledge of the situation is unerring.

1. *lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyaṅ vastusiddhiḥ. Also,*
mānūdhinā meyasiddhir
mānasiddhiś ca lakṣaṇāt.

2. *lakṣyaḥ lakṣaṇam anyac cet syāt tallakṣyam alakṣaṇam. tayoḥ abhāvo*
na nyatve viśpaṣṭam kathitam tvayā. --Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 64.

The failure of a plan in practical application disillusion a person and teaches him to exercise vigilance in regard to the choice of ways and means. Failure teaches him that false pre-conceptions are to be avoided and this is the *raison d'être* of the adage : 'Failures are pillars of success'. It is obvious from this consideration that a man with a modicum of common sense is familiar with what is valid knowledge and what is not. The academic procedure of formulation of a definition in a scientific treatise betokens pedantry since it does not give a new insight. This is the sum and substance of the contention of the opponent.

But in spite of the element of truth in the contention it must be pointed out that it fails to take note of persons who have a dull understanding or who are misguided by the erroneous views fostered by philosophers of different schools on account of their uncritical faith in the tradition of the school they belong to. The tradition tends to acquire a character of prescriptive claim for acquiescence. But common sense is not sufficient for the purpose of discrimination of valid cognition from the invalid one. Education serves to clear the common sense from misconception and false notion which make it incapable of the task. Broadly speaking there are two classes of persons who are to be educated with a view to the certitude of valid cognition disentangled from false associations. (1) Professional philosophers who have been misled by wrong instruction of *soi-disant* experts (*tirthya*). These deluded persons are victims of the wrong tradition and they must be disabused of the false notions. The Jaina philosopher is motivated by compassion and sets about the task of disillusioning these misguided persons, and set them on the path of truth. The definition is efficacious in that it enables the misguided fellow to distinguish the valid cognition from the invalid one and truth from superstition. (2) There are other persons who have no definite conception at all. Their dull intellect has not been improved by academic discipline and the definition serves to give them a correct notion of validity.

To sum up : if the defining and distinctive character of valid cognition were known from beginningless correct tradition and as such no person should be incapacitated by contrary beliefs, your contention that the statement of the defining character is a redundant procedure would hold the ground. But this is not universally true because there are persons who are victims of wrong tradition or incapacitated by their dull intellect to tell truth from falsehood, valid knowledge from invalid instances. As for the query whether the knowledge of validity

is secured by another valid cognition or not, it is a case of *petitio principii* or *non sequitur*. Valid cognition is known by itself and is self-proved.¹ So the question of another valid cognition to certify its validity does not arise. Definition does not seek to establish anything new but serves to exorcize the ghost of superstition and error from the minds of pretenders to knowledge and for the enlightenment of persons of poor intellect. That such a procedure is sanctioned by philosophical tradition and logical necessity will be apparent from the consideration of the negative inference based on non-perception of a perceivable fact. It has been shown by Dharmakīrti that such judgement as 'there is no jar on the ground' is and ought to be secured by the perception of empty locus. The perception of the locus with other contents save and except the jar is tantamount to the perception of the absence of the jar. But there may be persons who fail to have this intuition owing to the dullness of their intellect or the false notion fostered by wrong theory. The syllogistic inference, 'The jar is not existent on the ground surface, because it is not perceived in spite of the presence of the full conditions of perception and its competency to be perceived' serves to remove doubt about the jar. The case of the definition of valid cognition is perfectly on a par with the situation. The definition serves, as has been repeatedly observed, to emancipate the victim of wrong tradition or ignorance induced by dull understanding, from the wrong notions.

As for the contention of Nāgārjuna whether the defining character is identical with or different from the object proposed to be defined, and if the former is different from the latter, it will be destitute of the characteristic *per se*, and if identical the two will be a futile dichotomy, it will suffice to observe that the Jaina philosopher holds that the

1. Both the Buddhist and Jaina logicians hold that validity is known in unwonted instances of cognition by verification (*artha-kriyā-saṃvāda*). But the verification is known to be valid by itself and so also self-intuition of cognition. A cognition is known by itself not only as existent but also as valid. Inference which is determined by the assured conviction of the necessary concomitance is not liable to doubt and hence its validity is known by itself. So far as valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is concerned, it is known by itself and its validity is not questionable. But a doubt arises on account of the different conceptions of validity set forth in divergent definitions proposed by rival philosophers. Here mere verification does not suffice. A scientific assessment is necessary for resolving the differences which are the outcome of false notions. Here a scientific treatise is required to dispel the false notion. The arguments of Siddhasena Divākara are perfectly the same. Vide Com. of Manorathanandi on *Pramāṇavārtika*, I. 7.

defining character is both identical and different. The incongruence of identity with difference is the creation of abstract logic and as it is endorsed by incontestable experience, the concept of identity and of difference must be held to be not absolute but partial and not mutually exclusive.

This line of argument is not a new-fangled procedure. Dharmakīrti also observes regarding the question of validity of *pramāṇas* that definitions in a scientific treatise are given to combat the false notion of the persons who want to be enlightened.¹ Dharmakīrti is also not the first philosopher to offer this explanation. Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini's grammar, also makes the same observation on the necessity and utility of scientific investigation.²

Now the definition of perceptual cognition and also of extra-perceptual cognition is given in the following *kārikā*.

Text

aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṃ jñānamīdrśam/
pratyakṣamitarajñeyam parokṣam grahaṇekṣayā//

Translation

“Perceptual cognition is such a cognition of an object which apprehends it as directly presented. A (discursive) cognition other than this is to be known as indirect (non-perceptual) on account of its comprehension (of an object existing outside the range of sense-perception).” ... (IV)

Elucidation

Perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa*) is here the subject (*lakṣya*) and the rest, viz “a cognition which...directly presented” is the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*). In other words, perceptual cognition is one which directly and immediately, that is to say without intervention of any other cognition, takes stock of the object lying ahead. The qualifying clause *aparokṣatayā* etc. in the *kārikā* is not to be taken in its literal sense

1. Śāstraṃ mohanivartanam - *Pramāṇavāritika*, I. 7; Vide also the commentary of Manorathanandi.
2. kimarthaṃ śāstramiti cen nivartakatvāt siddham. *The Bhāṣya* on it reads :
nivartakaṃ śāstram.
katham ?
mṛjirasmāyaviśeṣeṇopadiṣṭaḥ. tasya sarvatra mṛjibuddhiḥ prasaktā,
tatrānena nivṛttiḥ kriyate mṛje akāntsu pratyayeṣu mṛjeḥ prasaṅge mārjih
sādhu bhavati. -Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣyē navāhnikam 1.1.3.
(vṛddhirādie), p. 167.

since it will be a case of mutual dependence (*anyonyaśraya*) or logical see-saw: perceptual (immediate) cognition is not one that is extra-perceptual (mediate) and the latter is one that is not perceptual. Both presuppose one another. Therefore it has been interpreted as what is directly envisaged by Siddharṣi. It is a determinate cognition and not indeterminate as the Buddhist maintains. It is for this purpose that the adjective *īdṛśam* (as such) is added. The assertion that perception is of the nature of cognition is significant and shows the difference of Jaina logician from those of Sāṃkhya and Nyāya schools. The Sāṃkhya defines perception as the transformation of the senses into the form of the objects to be perceived by them. But the senses are in their term the transformation of primordial matter (*prakṛti*) and as such the operations of the senses are also material and unconscious, and consequently they cannot be supposed to take cognizance of the external object. If it is argued that it is the condition of such cognizance and therefore is called *pramāṇa*, that will be to no purpose. It will extend to the other conditions such as light, space, etc., which are also the conditions of perception. It is maintained that it is not the material change but the same when illumined by the light of consciousness is cognizant of the object. But this practically amounts to the admission that perceptual cognition *qua* result or *qua* condition is a form of consciousness. This is the Jaina position. The predicative adjective *cognition of an object* is inserted in order to combat the Vijñānavādin who denies the existence of external objects. The denial of an external object is not however justifiable as the cognition and its external referent are equally felt facts. This form of subjectivism would annul the distinction of cognition from the cognizable object and thus will lay the axe at the root of logic and epistemology. The Buddhist idealist may plead: "My withers are unwrung. I do not believe in the ultimacy of logical and epistemological procedures. They are simply convenient devices for pragmatic, empirical thought. The ultimate reality is subject-objectless consciousness". The realists of all schools have entered their protests against this blanket condemnation of thought-activity. It is held by the realist that our cognitions of external objects are real and valid, and cannot be scouted as objective aberrations. If cognition of an external object be rejected as false subjective projection why should not this doubt also assail the validity of cognition itself. Cognition and its content are both intuited with equal clearness and vividness, and so they should swim or sink together. The Buddhist argues that cognition as a felt fact cannot be denied its reality and validity because that will make the whole world unknown and unknowable. This is against experience. But this very contention will boomerang on the

Buddhist. The denial of the object as unreal will make all our experience unreal and false. If one's experience of the object be suspect there is no ground for preferential treatment of cognition. The consequent deadlock and universal blindness will equally follow the denial of the object as it is alleged to follow on the denial of cognition. So it must be admitted on the strength of experience, that a valid cognition cannot arise without reference to the object. We have already discussed the untenability of the postulation of pre-disposition (*vāsanā*) in our elucidation of the first verse. So we do not elaborate the argument further as it will only result in repetition.

Let us now examine the purport of the definition of perceptual and extra-perceptual cognition as apprehension of an (external) object. Here apprehension should be understood as definite and determinate cognition without which the object will not be determined as known. Perceptual cognition has been determined as determinate cognition of the nature of certitude. But Dharmakīrti's definition of perceptual cognition as one devoid of conceptual knowledge and unerroneous is opposed to this interpretation. Though Dharmakīrti is an intellectual giant, his definition is not supported by reason. We now set forth the arguments adduced by the Buddhist in support of the thesis that perceptual cognition is indeterminate and hence repugnant to the association of concepts.

It is argued by the Sautrāntikas that perceptual cognition is generated by the object standing ahead which is possessed of causal efficiency. The external object is a fact which is bereft of words and it gives rise to perceptual cognition endowed with its form. So such cognition which takes stock of the specific particular object should not be associated with words as there is no cause of such verbal expression. For instance visual perception cognizes an object but not the word expressive of it. Perceptual cognition therefore should take stock of the object *per se*. If it is supposed to wait for the association of a word expressive of it (object) that will make apprehension of the object impossible. Without apprehending the object one cannot remember the word expressive of it (object) and so one cannot associate the word with the object which can be known only by recollection. Without such association of words which mean only generalized concepts, the visual perception cannot take place according to your assertion that perceptual cognition is determinate and definite certitude which can only be secured by a conceptual and verbal judgement. But as there is no cause for such verbal conceptual association with the particular object envisaged, perceptual cognition will not

arise if it is made to depend on verbal association and that will mean that the external object cannot be known at all according to your theory. Moreover, if the cognition generated by senses be associated with conceptual cognition supplied by memory and imagination it would disappear when another conception will arise but this is not the case. The visual cognition of the cow is not found to disappear on the rise of the conception of horse. A conceptual knowledge which is generated by imagination is seen to be superseded by an opposite conception. But sense-perception of an object cannot be dislodged by any amount of imagination. It is again realized that when the mind is free from all conceptions which are imaginary constructs, the object is seen clearly and vividly. A cognition which is directly generated by the senses cannot have any truck with words, i. e., concepts. A word only means a concept which is a general idea and refers to all such objects. The word cow, for instance, does not mean a particular cow but the universal cow which comprehends all the cows near and distant, present, past and future within its sweep. Perception gives the knowledge of the particular because it is generated by a particular fact and if it is conceptualized it will not envisage a particular entity but will only stand for a universal which is an unreal construction of imagination.

The Buddhist position has been explained above; but the Jaina logician does not think that the contention is based on a correct assessment of experience. It has been contended that as word does not form a part of the object to be perceived there is no reason for association of word with the object which generates the cognition. But this does not appear to be sound. An object is no doubt independent of the expressive word. But that cannot mean that the resultant cognition will be unassociated with word. If the cognition is to take note of character of the object why is not the cognition insensitive and unconscious being generated by an unconscious material object? You argue that the cognition of the object is generated by attention which is a conscious mental activity and so the resultant cognition is not material and unconscious. If that is the case why do you insist that the mental activity which produces the cognition, as an auxiliary of the insensitive object, should, in respect of word, be denied its efficacy? Moreover the very constitution of a material object which is nothing but a juxtaposition of a number of atoms existing side by side is supposed to give rise to a cognition of the solid object and this hypothesis knocks down your contention that the perceptual cognition only reflects the constitution of the

object. Atoms certainly do not possess solidity and mass but the cognition in the question envisages such a thing and not atoms. If it is observed that it is an illusion, it follows that only that which is present in the object is envisaged in perception is not true since the solid structure is not present in the object. So you have to concede the possibility that word may be envisaged in perceptual cognition though it is not present in the object. Again it has been argued by the Buddhist that if the cognition of the object has to wait for the association of the word known by memory, there will be no perceptual cognition possible and unrelieved intellectual darkness will be the result. But this contention is suicidal since the difficulty alleged is seen to affect your position also. It is your thesis that the cognition generated by an object is indeterminate. But an indeterminate cognition cannot determine its object as 'this' or 'not this' unless confirmation or negation is provided by the conceptual knowledge following in its wake. It is your position that the indeterminate cognition can serve as the organ of proof of that feature of the object which is confirmed by the conceptual knowledge following in its trail. An indeterminate cognition cannot determine the object as 'this is and not that' which involves a judgement and judgement is necessarily conceptual and also associated with words.¹

We may ask how can the indeterminate cognition can give rise to determinate conceptual judgement. A leap from the particular to the universal, from the indeterminate simple sense-datum to the determinate judgement cannot be intelligible without a connecting bridge. But unless this interpretative judgement arises to distinguish the sense datum from what it is not, the simple cognition will be totally abortive. You may reply that the indeterminate cognition stimulates the memory impression of the word to be associated with it. But if the object is incapable of stimulating a memory impression, how can the indeterminate cognition which is bereft of conception can stimulate the memory-impression. The fundamental position of the Buddhist is that an object cannot give rise to a conceptual judgement which invariably refers to a general idea, i. e., universal. The indeterminate cognition is also in the same position and as such cannot revive the memory-impression and without the revived memory-impression, it cannot give rise to recollection and so unborn recollection cannot associate the word with the object. And if there be no verbal association, the cognition will not be able to determine it as such. Determination means the

1. tathāhi-svalakṣaṇa viśayendriyajānirvikalpakajñānasadbhāve' pi ... tatrai-
vāsya pramāṇatā-iti vacanāt. --*Nyāyavaiśara* vivṛti, p. 31.

negation of the opposite with affirmation of the positive fact, as Spinoza observes *determinatio est negatio*. This is done by judgement which is facilitated by language. Until the indeterminate cognition is determined by judgement, it is as good as non-existent and so the subject will have no knowledge. In order to avoid this deadlock it must be admitted that the indeterminate cognition somehow stimulates the conceptual judgement through recollection of the word. By parity of reasoning it may be argued that the object as the alleged condition of indeterminate cognition may stimulate the memory-impression and give rise to perceptual judgement without the interposition of indeterminate cognition in between them. You have contended that conceptual knowledge is independent of the object and is only an imaginary construction and so like other imaginary constructions it is liable to be superseded by another such subjective judgement. But this is not a fair contention. You cannot place the perceptual judgement on the same level with imaginary construction since it is generated and controlled by the relevant sense-organ and the objective datum.

It has been shown that though word is not a necessary constituent of the object, there is nothing to obstruct its association with the perceived object. The jar concept in the perceptual judgement is associated with its expressive word as a matter of necessity or result of mental habit. If the association of word is banned in perceptual cognition it will not be determined as the cognition of a particular object, say, a jar and not of an other, say, a chair. So the denial of verbal association with a perceived datum culminates in the denial of the possibility of perceptual cognition itself, since it will remain undetermined and undistinguished, and as such be of no avail. It is a surd and the Buddhist has not vouchsafed a satisfactory explanation.

The Naiyāyika theory of perception is not subjected to such a meticulous examination by the commentator. He only differs from the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā school in respect of the nature of emergence of perceptual cognition. The Jaina believes that all cognitions are latently present in the conscious soul and perceptual cognition is not a new product, but rather a case of discovery happening on the elimination of the veil of ignorance. The Jaina holds with the Sāṅkhya that a previously non-existent fact cannot be made existent by any amount of exertion. And this is based on the theory called *satkāryavada*, the production of the pre-existent effect.

We think it necessary to draw the attention to the division of perceptual cognition into (1) indeterminate simple cognition unassociated with verbal designation (*avyapayadeśyam*) and (2) another of the

nature of determinate judgement (*vyavasāyatmakam*) in the Nyāya theory. As we have observed before the Jaina epistemologist does not endorse indeterminate perceptual cognition. The latter-day Naiyāyikas have essayed to establish the necessity of indeterminate cognition as a prelude to perceptual judgement by a novel line of argument. They maintain that a judgement, perceptual or otherwise, necessarily involves the qualification of subject by a predicate. In the first instance, the cognition of an object and its attribute takes place without relation. For instance, the jar and its qualifying attribute say 'jarhood' or 'redness' etc. are not integrated. The integration takes place in the perceptual judgement 'the jar is red' or 'it is a jar possessed of jarhood'. Now unless there be a previous cognition of the predicative adjective 'jarhood' or 'redness', the judgement will not arise as cognizant of a related whole. The knowledge of relation presupposes the cognition of the terms as its condition. The knowledge that a man is possessed of learning cannot arise, if it is not preceded by the knowledge of the adjective 'possessed of learning'. The man is not a simple unqualified individual, but one that is qualified by learning. The position is that the knowledge of a related fact is conditioned by the knowledge of the qualifying adjective. As all our perceptual cognitions are judgemental in character, they presuppose the previous knowledge of the predicate in isolation. If the conditioning knowledge were also relational and judgemental, the result would be an infinite regress. So indeterminate cognition is to be inferred as a pre-condition, though no such cognition is perceivable. In all knowledge of facts they are known as qualified by some adjectival determinations. The indeterminate cognition is thus posited though it is not known by perception.

To be brief it may be observed that this rule that the knowledge of a qualified object is preceded by the indeterminate simple cognition of the qualifying adjective in isolation is not admitted as a universal rule. If the substantive and the adjective are both amenable to the same sense-organ and so also the relation between them, it is unthinkable that they are not perceived together when the conditions of cognition are alike present in respect of both. This is the position of Prabhākara, Rāmānuja and Madhva who do not believe in simple indeterminate cognition and also in the existence of an object which is bereft of a qualifying attribute. The Naiyāyika also is constrained to admit that a negative judgement does not presuppose the knowledge of negation as pre-condition. 'There is no jar' is a negative judgement and the negation cannot be understood without reference to the object negated. So it is always judgemental and relational. The rule propounded by the Naiyāyika derives its plausibility from the previous

cognition of the qualifying attribute which is not amenable to perception by the sense-organ which cognizes the substantive. The Naiyāyika agrees that all perceptual cognitions are judgemental in character and hence determinate. The precedence of indeterminate sense-intuition is only a hypothetical assumption on the analogy of the substantive perceived by different sense-organs. But this is an irrational over-extension. The Jaina position that all perceptual cognitions are determinate and judgemental is also endorsed by the Neologicians on the evidence of psychology.

It is certainly simpler, clearer and most straight-forward to maintain that an object consists of a universal and particular rolled into one and perceptual cognition takes note of this dual character, as both of them are equally present and equally amenable to perception. The Jaina philosopher like Prabhākara, Rāmānuja and Madhva does not believe in indeterminate perception. Thus the leap from the simple to the complex, indeterminate to determinate, non-conceptual to conceptual is not postulated.

Now let us explain the meaning of the phrase 'which apprehends it as directly presented' (*aparokṣatayārthasyagrāhakam*) and 'such' (*īdṛsam*). It means that perceptual cognition is a case of direct acquaintance with sense data. 'Such' (*īdṛsam*) implies that any other definition is not sound. We may also interpret *īdṛsam* (such) as referring to the object as 'this' as has been proposed by Hemacandra.¹ And non-perceptual cognition is different from the perceptual in that it is indirect and mediate being dependent on other cognition. Though cognition by itself is never uncognized and thus amounts to self-cognition, the distinction between direct and indirect cognition is made with reference to the external object. Both direct and indirect cognition have reference to an external fact, but whereas one gives a vivid sense-impression, the other gives a blurred picture. So reference to an external object is not a distinguishing character of non-perceptual cognition, but its want of vividness and dependence on another cognition, as observed by Hemacandra.

This non-perceptual cognition has again been divided into inferential and verbal judgement. In view of the precedent occurrence of the cognition of probans and the emergence of another in the wake of the knowledge of the necessary concomitance, the inference of fire from smoke arises as a sequel to the previous knowledge of the necessary concomitance of smoke and fire. But if we consider the question deeply, the relation of all kinds of indirect knowledge to

1. Vide *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, I. 1. 14.

their objects is fixed and unalterable and as such necessary and so the difference between verbal knowledge and the like from inferential knowledge is stressed for the sake of convenience. It has also been necessitated by the divergence of philosophers who skip over the element of necessity in the relation.⁴

Now the author proposes to formulate the definition of inference (*anumāna*) in the following verse :

Text

sādhyāvinābhuno līngāt sādhyāniścāyakaṃ smṛtam /
anumānaṃ tadabhrāntaṃ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat //

Translation

“*Anumāna* (inference) is that species of knowledge which determines the probandum on the strength of the probans (literally the characteristic mark) which stands to the probandum in the relation of necessary concomitance. It is unerring because it is an organ of valid cognition just like perceptual cognition.” ... (V)

Elucidation

In the proposition stated above, the subject *anumāna* (inference) is the defined object and the predicate “that which determines the probandum on the strength of the probans which stands in necessary relation to the probandum” sets forth the defining character (of it), because it is not definitely known and so stated as the predicate. It is called *anumāna* (inference), literally a cognition which takes place subsequent to (*anu*) the apprehension (*māna*) of the probans and recollection of its necessary relation to the probandum and cognizes the inferable predicate such as fire. Probandum is that which is capable of being proved by inference on the basis of the probans which cannot exist without the presence of the probandum. It cannot be supposed to overlap the definition of perceptual cognition and verbal knowledge because it determines the probandum on the basis of necessarily concomitant probans which is not found in the aforesaid species of valid cognition. The clause ‘which is necessarily concomitant with the probandum’ serves to exclude the definitions of the probans given by

1. sāmānyalakṣaṇasadbhāvād ekākūramapi vipratipattinirākaraṇārtham dvidha bhidyate. tadyathā anumānaṃ śābdam ceti. yato'dyāpi śabda-syārthānyathānupapannatvam eva pare na pratipadyante, na cāpṛthakṛtasya tadviviktaṃ vaktum śakyam, ato bhedenopanyāsaḥ.

Nyāyāntara vivṛti, p. 33.

others. For instance, the Buddhist (Dignāga) asserts that the number of probanses is three only, namely (1) non-perception, (2) essential identity and (3) effect, which are possessed of three characteristics, namely, (1) existence in the subject (minor term) and (2) in the homologous instances (*sapakṣa*) and (3) non-existence in the heterologous instances (*vipakṣa*).¹ The Vaiśeṣika asserts that inference follows on the knowledge of the probans (1) as the effect of, (2) as the cause of, (3) as one which is conjoined with, (4) as one that is inherent in, and (5) as one that is opposed to, the probandum. The aphorism is explained as follows : The effect leads to the inference of the cause. Thus when a river is seen in spate carrying logs of wood etc., it is inferred that there has been rainfall in the upper region through which the river makes its course. The cause also may be the probans of the effect as probandum. The particular gathering of cloud in horizon gives rise to inference of the impending rainfall as its effect. It may be urged that such inference is liable to be set aside on the ground of uncertainty. The emergence of cloud in the horizon is often found to fail in the production of a shower. It is also found that scorpion is generated by a scorpion, a cow-dung and a snake as popular belief goes. So the inference of the cause from the effect and the effect from the cause is found to be contingent. But the Vaiśeṣika observes in defence that the effect and the cause with specific features never fail to produce correct inference of the cause and effect respectively. If one fails to notice this specific character of the effect and the cause and brings forward the charge of inconclusive probans, the fault lies at the door of the superficial observer and not on the part of the probans concerned. The illustration of the probans conjoined to the probandum is inference of fire from smoke which is conjoined with fire. It cannot be contended that conjunction is a relation which qualifies both smoke and fire. Why should then the smoke serve as the probans of fire and not fire as probans of smoke ? This objection, the Vaiśeṣika observes, is nothing but a cavil. The same objection may be raised against the concept of necessary concomitance which subsists between the probans and the probandum and as such belongs to both. So the counter question may arise why should smoke and fire, being possessed of concomitance alike be not regarded as mutually competent ground of inference ? Clearly it is a captious objection and not entitled to serious consideration. The illustration of the inherent

1. anumeye' tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsatī/
nīścitānupalambhāt makāryākhyā hetavaṣ trayah//

Ny āyavalāra vivṛti, p. 34.

probans is furnished by the inference of the existence of fire in water on account of its hot touch. The example of the probans standing in opposition is found in the inference of the presence of the ichneumon on the sight of the snake in desperate fury or of absence of cold from the presence of fire.

The Naiyāyika also takes cognizance of three kinds of probans : (i) The first is known as *pūrvavat* i. e., inference based on the antecedent cause as the probans. The example is the rise of the lowering cloud with thundering sounds as the probans of impending rainfall. (ii) The second is *śeṣavat* i. e., having the probans as the subsequent effect. All cases of inference of cause from the effect fall under this head, e. g., the inference of rainfall from the river in spate or of fire from smoke. (iii) The third is called *samānyatodṛṣṭam*, i. e., one based on a probans which is neither cause nor effect, but yet stands in necessary concomitance. The inference of water in a lake from the sight of an aquatic bird like haron which is neither the cause nor the effect of the inferred lake.

The Jaina observes that this inflated list of probanses is inspired by uncriticized experience. The triple characteristics of the three kinds of probans set out by the Buddhist also suffers from the charge of inflation. In all these cases cited above, it is the presence of necessary concomitance of the probans which is the decisive, crucial condition of inference, in the absence of which the inference is bound to be fallacious.

The three characteristics of the probans namely, (i) existence in the subject (*pakṣasattva*), (ii) existence in the homologous cases possessed of the probandum (*sapakṣasattva*), and (iii) non-existences in heterologous cases (*vipakṣāsattva*) are of no consequence unless there is necessary concomitance at their back. For instance, the inference that the unobserved son of the the lady called Maitreyi must be of swarthy complexion, because he is her son and her other sons are seen to be swarthy. The probans 'sonship of the lady' in question is not found in fairer persons. So here the triple character is present. Yet the conclusion does not follow, because there is no necessary relation between the probans and the probandum. Again the first characteristic (viz., *pakṣasattva*) is not a universal condition of inference. The inference of other trees in flower on the observation of one such blossoming mango tree, of the enlivening of the lilies (*kumuda*) on the ground of the rise of the moon, and of the shadow from the tree, are all cases of the non-existence of the first. The inference of the presence of the moon from its image in the water of the lake and the future rise of one constellation from the rise of another are all cases of inference in which

the first condition, the existence of the probans in the subject, is lacking. If it is argued that the subject is time, space, etc., and so the first condition is fulfilled, that will lead to absurd excesses. If such inevitably present facts may serve as the subject then the inference of impermanence of word from the blackness of the crow may also pass muster. Here also the universe and the like may be cited as a subject because both the probans and the probandum are related to the latter. The argument "word is impermanent because it is audible" is sound, though there is no homologue since audibility can only belong to the subject 'word' and nothing else. The soundness of this argument is however not liable to be impeached because audibility is the quality of a positive entity and as all positive entities are momentary according to Buddhist theory, audibility will also be a cogent reason of impermanence of the word. The existence in the homologue is thus not a universal characteristic of a probans. So the soundness of the argument "A living body is animated by a soul because it is informed with vitality and life; if it were devoid of soul, it would not have vitality like a jar" cannot be called in question on the ground of its lack of concomitance in agreement as illustrated in the homologue. This argument is an instance of purely negative probans being based on the negative concomitance, viz., the absence of soul with the absence of life. The Buddhist of course denies the validity of a probans which stands in exclusively negative concomitance. But the cogency of the argument is realized by unbiased persons. So one cannot deny its validity.

The Buddhist posits essential identity and causality as the conditions of universal concomitance. But in all cases of inference the essential determining factor is found to consist in the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory of the probandum (*anyathā nūpa-pannatva*). If a probans is considered as possessed of cogency and probative force without this incompatibility with the contradictory of the probandum it would necessarily be fallacious. So the triple characteristic of the Buddhist and the quintuple¹ characteristic of the Naiyāyika must be reduced to one single determining condition as shown above.

The Buddhist is confronted with a dilemma when he recognizes the inference as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and at the same time

1. The Naiyāyika adds two other characteristics to the three recognized by the Buddhist. The absence of countervailing probans (*asatpratiṣaṅgatva*), and the absence of a probans having a probandum contradicted by another valid cognition (*abādhitatva*) and thus the probans comes to have five characteristics in general.

condemns it on the ground of its conceptual character (*vikalpātma*). The fire that is inferred is not an existent particular but a general concept which embraces all instances of fire—past, present and future. In other words, the inferable predicate is a universal and a universal is unreal according to the Buddhist. Accordingly this doctrine of the Buddhist enforces the conclusion that the inference is erroneous at bottom. How can it be a valid cognition, since validity and error are mutually contradictory? The Buddhist (Dharmakīrti) has defended the validity of inference on the ground that though the universal concept of fire which is the inferable predicate is unreal abstraction, yet it is remotely derived from the particular fire and also leads to the acquisition of the latter. The relation of causality and identity which makes the probans necessarily concomitant with the probandum is an objective relation. Unless the inference is believed to refer to the real fire, the relation of concomitance based on causality (or identity) cannot be realized. So on the ground of the necessary relation of the probandum with the probans the inference is recognized as valid cognition though it is erroneous *per se*. It has been observed by the Buddhist “A valid cognition differs *toto caelo* from error which is defined as apprehension of one thing as another. The apprehension of A as B which is quite other than A is error. And as such though inference which apprehends the universal as a particular in spite of their numerical and qualitative difference and thus falls within the purview of error, yet it is regarded as valid cognition because the universal stands in necessary relation (to the particular real individual) from which inference derives its genesis. The basic relation is one of causality since the concept of the universal, say fire, is generated by the particular fire in the ultimate resort.

Siddhasena denies this laboured defence of the validity of inference on the ground of its pragmatic verification. As the concept of validity and the concept of error can never coincide without involving self-contradiction, he places inference on the same level with perceptual cognition. The objective existence of the universal has to be admitted on the evidence of experience which cannot be assailed by a barrage of *a priori* arguments under pain of self-contradiction. And as the universal and the particular are necessarily co-existent and one cannot be divorced from the other, the concept of the universal fire is as valid and objective as the perceived individual.

The Jaina logician does not enter into controversy with the Śūnyavādin who denies the existence of everything. Any argument advanced to prove a thesis will simply be dismissed by him on the ground of his

belief that everything is *non est*. But if the Śūnyavādin condescends to advance an argument in support of his position and not merely indulge in the game of refutation of other's views, he will be involved in self-contradiction. His assertion that everything is non-existent must be valid, otherwise it will fail to establish his theory. But the admission of even one valid assertion will contradict his fundamental position 'Nothing exists'.

Now the Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin) maintains that pure consciousness which is absolutely bereft of subject-object-relation and is attested by itself is the only ultimate reality. And all empirical cognitions which have subject-object-character, being the outcome of false pre-dispositions (*vāsanā*) associated with pure consciousness from time immemorial, are entirely erroneous. These pre-dispositions are again erroneous being the traces left by previous false cognitions. And as there is no first cognition, the career of the individual subject being without a beginning, one cannot pose the question why should the original cognition be wrong? The answer is that pre-dispositions which are the outcome of nescience (*avidyā*) are giving a false twist to pure consciousness in the direction of subject-object orientation. Being false *per se* these dispositions cannot affect the purity of consciousness-units in reality. The contamination affected by pre-dispositions is provisional and apparent. On the dawn of transcendental knowledge these dispositions are bound to disappear and pure consciousness will shine forth in its pure unsullied character. The example of perceptual cognition cited as the example of valid cognition is false appearance and thus is bereft of validity. Being itself invalid at bottom, perceptual cognition cannot prove the validity of inference. This theory of the Buddhist idealist is controverted by Siddhasena Divākara in the next verse.

Text

na pratyakṣam api bhrāntaṃ pramāṇatvaviniścayāt /
bhrāntaṃ pramāṇam ity etad viruddhaṃ vacanaṃ yataḥ //

Translation

"Perceptual cognition is also not erroneous because its validity is definitely determined (far beyond the range of doubt). The statement that a valid cognition is erroneous involves contradiction in terms." ... (VI)

Elucidation

Your position that not only inference is erroneous but perception also is in the same predicament is a corollary of the thesis that all

cognitions are wrong in respect of their object. But we differ from it since its validity is asserted beyond doubt. This assertion of validity of the realist may be regarded as futile so far as the idealist is concerned. The latter does not admit the validity of perception and so the mere assertion of validity cannot carry conviction to him. But the assertion of validity is reinforced by the consideration that a valid cognition cannot be erroneous since it is the means of the apprehension of an objective fact and as such it must be regarded as an organ of valid knowledge. The idealist also cannot repudiate its validity since he concedes its validity in the empirical plane. The distinction between empirical and transcendental truth is only dictated by a pre-conception which is not proved by experience. The Jaina realist asserts that to say that an organ of valid cognition is invalid involves contradiction in terms, since his first assertion that perception is a valid cognition is contradicted by a subsequent statement that it is erroneous and invalid. The empirical validity is true in the plane of experience which is said to be valid because of its pragmatic success. Verification which is the test of validity according to the realist is nothing but a case of one cognition being confirmed by another. The objective reference as has been said by the idealist is only the outcome of false dispositions which are the legacy of nescience.

The idealist contends that the realist's objection is too naive to assail the profound philosophical truth of the idealist's position. The assertion that perception and inference are valid organs (*pramāṇa*) is a provisional concession to the popular faith which is incompetent to envisage the distinction between absolute truth and practical empirical truth. The validity of perception and inference is conceded on the ground that their deliverance leads to the attainment of the object envisaged. But this verification is confined to the empirical plane which is only a false appearance. The idealist makes this concession out of compassion for the deluded persons. And when they are persuaded of the relative validity of the cognitive organs, and their false pre-conceptions regarding the reality of the phenomenal world of plurality are weakened by powerful arguments, and their belief in the validity of the cognitive organs is shown to be inspired by superstition, they are made capable of receiving final enlightenment.

The ultimate invalidity of empirical knowledge is asserted from the point of view of ultimate transcendental truth of pure consciousness bereft of subject-object bifurcation. The invalidity of these empirical organs of knowledge is also proved by the consideration of the untenability of external objects supposed to be cognized by them.

This idealistic position is asserted to be unsound since it lacks confirmation. There is no evidence of the subject-objectless pure consciousness, so far as our experience is concerned. In our every day experience we encounter durable solid objects with diverse attributes and this experience cannot be condemned as unreal as that will lead to perfect deadlock of our physical and mental activities. Pure consciousness is not experienced by anyone of us in spite of the protestation of the idealist that such a transcendental unitary consciousness is realized by the mystic. There are mystics in every camp of philosophers and every community of men and the priests and the prophets swear by their experience. But there is vital difference between the experience of one mystic from that of another. So mysticism cannot be absolutely banked upon in our scientific and philosophical investigations. The contention of the idealist, if true, will provide powerful disincentives against cultivation of science and thought. However much may the world have been condemned one cannot escape from it and the limitations and imperfections of this earthy earth are being overcome step by step. The tangible results of science prove that world movements are governed by laws and not by chance. What is called chance is due to our lack of objective knowledge. The greatest charge against religion is that it fosters other-worldliness which is more often than not a device of escapism.

The arguments of the idealist advanced to prove the impossibility of the constitution of solid material reals based on the atomic theory have now become trite and commonplace. As regards the difficulty relating to the combination of atoms one may say that it is only a destructive argument. Modern science has gone beyond the atoms which are proved to consist of electrons and protons. It is still a riddle how the intangible energy gives rise to the tangible material bodies. We must allow the scientist to carry on his researches further and further to throw light on this apparently baffling problem. To say beforehand that the world we inhabit is irrational and cannot be explained by science or philosophy will only beg the question. We may point out to the Buddhist idealist the difficulty consisting in the consciousness-atoms giving rise to the sense of personal identity. The logical difficulties alleged against personal identity are not weightier than those ensuing from denial of it. If consciousness-atoms can give rise to their coherence in personal identity, the material atoms also may have similar efficiency though we do not know how this occurs. The Buddhist asserts that awareness of personal identity and identity of material bodies are false appearances on the basis of his assertion that pure consciousness is the

ultimate truth. But the aforesaid thesis (the ultimacy of pure consciousness) can be established by a *reductio ad absurdum* of the phenomenal plurality, and the latter (the falsity of the external world) can be established on the assumption of the former (the ultimacy of pure consciousness). There is thus a logical see-saw in these arguments. The Buddhist may protest that the truth and reality of ultimate consciousness is attested by the final experience of the saint and as such is not susceptible to denial. But, as has been said before, this is the concern of mystics and not of men of average mental and spiritual resources. Logic and even Buddhist logic is concerned with the empirical reality and steers clear of mysticism which often tends to mystification more than clarification.

Furthermore the Buddhist wants to establish his position by arguments and arguments consist of a plurality of premises showing the incidence of probans, probandum, their relation, freedom from aberrations called fallacies and from contradiction by accredited knowledge. The Buddhist logician also employs these instruments to prove his thesis that these conceptions are wrong and erroneous. The discovery of inconsistencies and self-contradiction in the plurality of the apparatus of logic and science are more inspired by *a priori* considerations than the robust determination to find out the truth by means of our available resources. The arguments on the relation of part and whole are as old as the history of philosophy. They have been tackled by the Naiyāyika realist, the Jaina realist and the Mīmāṃsaka, who believe both in mind and matter, internal and external reals and their interaction. Without taking sides and without holding brief for any one of the contending parties, we may simply assert that these idealistic arguments with their perilous leanings to unrelieved scepticism advocated by the Śūnyavādin have left the academic world cold. The Jaina philosopher and logician is a realist to the core and categorically asserts that a valid cognition or an organ of valid cognition cannot be erroneous. No doubt arises when one comes to have perceptual cognition that it is concerned with fiction. There are no doubt erroneous perceptions such as a perception of the double moon; but these are generated by some defect of the sense-organ. The optical illusions such as perception of silver in an oyster-shell are too notorious. But they are explained by objective conditions such as dimness of light or some defect in the senses inherent or induced by them. The appearance of water in a lake as up and down seen from different angles does not deceive anybody. And even in case of stubborn illusion like the perception of sun-rise and sun-set and solar movement in the horizon, the error has been exposed by the discoveries of science. The blanket

condemnation of all perceptions on the ground of some perception being erroneous does not bespeak a healthy attitude. Verification is the proof of the validity of perception or inference. There is of course verification in dream experience, but that is not accepted as proof because dream experience is false from end to end. If we probe deeply the nature of the dream or illusion we shall find that even in dream we do not come across a datum which has not been seen in wakeful state. The contradiction by a philosophical pre-conception which is neither verifiable nor unverifiable should be kept apart from the province of logic. The Jaina realist does not maintain that metempirical truth necessarily contradicts empirical truth. All experiences should therefore be accepted as valid unless they are set aside by a contradictory experience or incontestable logical consideration. Whatever may be the case there is a sharp line of demarcation between error and truth, and error is only a false imitation of truth, otherwise it will lack its capacity for deception. But an accredited organ of valid cognition cannot be dubbed as erroneous except when it is set aside by contradiction. The discovery of error is of the nature of direct experience in majority of cases and if the validity of the latter is impeached, there will be no distinction between valid and invalid cognition.

Text

sakalapratiḥāsasya bhrāntatvāsiddhitaḥ sphuṭam /
pramāṇam svānyaniścāyi dvayasiddhau prasidhyati //

Translation

“From the consideration of the failure to prove the erroneousness of all (each and every case of) cognitions, it is obvious that a valid cognition which is cognizant of its own self and another (object) can take place if the two (poles) are established (as verities).” ... (VII)

Elucidation

The Buddhist philosopher who propounds the thesis that all cognitions are erroneous can establish his position by adducing some proof, preferably inference in support of his contention. Now if the supporting proof be false coming as it does under the category of cognition, he will fail to establish his position. If on the other hand the supporting argument is admitted to be true it will involve him in self-contradiction. The admission of the validity of one case of cognition will perforce entail that of similar cognition. The dichotomy of cognition as such into metempirical and empirical classes is also to be proved by a valid cognition. So the blanket assertion of invalidity of

all cognitions falls to the ground. Moreover error is a relative term and can be understood in contradistinction to valid cognition. Judged from every possible angle of vision, the idealist's assertion is riddled with self-contradiction. It follows as the corollary from this probe into the idealist's assertion that a cognition which definitely knows itself and its object and is not contradicted by another experience must be accepted as a veritable valid cognition. The validity of the cognition again proves *eo ipso* the objective truth of the two poles of cognition, the self-cognition and the cognition of the object. To be explicit, the knowing cognition which has a necessary reference to the object proves that cognition and object both are true. The existence of cognition is established by self-awareness (*svasamvedana*) and that of the object on pain of absurdity. A cognition without an object is an impossibility. So the existence of both (subject and object) must be accepted as the necessary presupposition of valid cognition. The denial of the truth of the object thus ends in the denial of the validity of the cognition which is alone accepted as true by the idealist. They sail in the same boat and must swim or sink together.

Now the author has dealt with subjective inference, that is to say, inference undertaken for one's own conviction and has also confuted the allegation of erroneousness of such arguments and their advocates. The treatment of syllogistic argument which is undertaken for the edification of other persons should come next in due order. But the author defers this topic for subsequent treatment and proposes to deal with the verbal testimony and its definition since the discussion will occupy lesser time and space, and also because the syllogistic inference involves verbal statement, and the consideration of the larger number of problems connected with the latter.

Text

diṣṭeṣṭāvyaḥatād vākyāt paramārthābhīdhāyinaḥ /
tattvagrāhitayotpannaṃ mānaṃ śabdāṃ prakīrtitaṃ //

Translation

“Verbal testimony has been described (by a long succession of past teachers) as a species of valid cognition which is produced by a sentence apt to communicate its true meaning and is apprehended as cognizant of such truth provided that the meaning intended is uncontradicted by an observed fact.” ... (VIII)

Elucidation

Here ‘verbal testimony’ is the subject which is to be defined, and the rest gives the defining characteristic. ‘An observed fact’ means

the fact observed by means of a valid organ. The word 'uncontradicted' means not contradicted by the deliverance of another organ of valid cognition. 'True meaning' stands for fact which is conducive to the well-being of men and also which is capable of being translated into action. The expression 'the meaning uncontradicted' is significant and serves to exclude the utterances of false teachers and also of ordinary imposters, because the meaning of their statements is contradicted by the deliverance of a valid cognitive organ. The clause 'apt to communicate true meaning' serves to exclude such a verbal proposition, which instruct the acquisition of the crest-jewel of Takṣaka, the king of divine serpents and most poisonous, as a remedy of tubercular fever. But this is humanly impossible to accomplish. So it cannot be true meaning. True meaning is as we have said what conduces to the well-being of man and capable of being accomplished. 'Apt to communicate etc.' implies exclusion of a false meaning understood by a person who is skilled in putting a wrong construction upon the sentence. The expression 'valid cognition' refutes the misconception of invalidity of the meaning of verbal proposition. If a verbal proposition as such is condemned as an invalid organ, the syllogistic inference which consists of words and sentences is to be thrown overboard as useless lumber. The contention that though the verbal propositions are not instruments of valid cognition, the sentences employed in syllogistic argument indicate the triple probans and hence are credited with validity by transference of epithet, cannot be accepted as a convincing explanation. What is invalid *per se* cannot indicate a valid meaning. It has again been urged that if the sentences in syllogistic argument be regarded as capable of communicating the probans, they will depend on other valid propositions for vindication of their validity. If so the latter will suffice to make the probans known and the statement of probans in the syllogism will be redundant. But this contention of the Buddhist will involve him in absurdity as perceptual cognition which is indeterminate will lose its validity because it depends upon the conceptual judgement following upon it for demonstrating its object and so the latter will have to be accepted as valid perception. The probans stated by a verbal proposition to exist in the subject 'minor term' is certainly confirmed by the evidence of another valid cognition, but that does not annul its cogency or validity.

Verbal testimony is of two kinds (i) profane, secular commonplace and pragmatic (*laukika*) and (ii) derived from *śāstra*, sacred canon recognized by the school or sect in question. Now the author defines the kind of authentic knowledge which is derived from scriptural

texts of unimpeachable authority and such scripture is defined in the following verse.

Text

āptopajñam anullaṅghyam adṛṣṭeṣṭavirodhakam /
tattvopadeśakṛt sārvaṃ śāstram kāpathaghaṭṭanam //

Translation

“Śāstra (scripture) is that which is directly composed by a person having first-hand knowledge, is indefeasible and not in conflict with the verdict of other organs of valid knowledge and with the testimony of other accredited texts; and which gives instruction on ultimate truth and is conducive to the benefit of all and is competent to crush the evil paths (inculcated by other sectarian teachers).” ... (IX)

Elucidation

‘Śāstra’, i. e. scripture is called such because it inculcates the ultimate categories.¹ ‘A person having first-hand knowledge’ means one who has completely eliminated the failings, attachment, malice, greed, etc. which disqualify a man for intuition of truth. The word ‘āpta’ is defined in other texts as a person who is freed from intellectual and moral drawbacks and has envisaged the truth face to face. This emphasis on personal authorship implies the repudiation of the contention of the Mīmāṃsaka that the authoritative texts of the *Veda* are uncreated by a person (*apauruṣeya*) and they are eternally existent and eternally true. This belief in the impersonal scripture is regarded by the protestant creeds such as the Jainas and the Buddhists as irrational. It is opposed to the universal experience of mankind that there can be a verbal assertion without an author. Even if such eternal uncreated text is conceded to be possible for the sake of argument that also does not give any advantage. These texts are to be explained by a teacher and there is every likelihood that the teacher who is subject to prejudices and preferences fostered by attachment to these texts and hatred of other scriptures should give a distorted version and the pupils will be misled. So the assertion of uncreated text defeats its purpose. It may be rejoined that this contingency is common to all scriptures of all sects. Whether the scriptural text is created by a person of unimpeachable authority and intellectual capacity or uncreated, the interpretation of such scripture depends on average persons who are subject to human failings. But we should recognize the fact that the Jainas and the Buddhists repudiate the truth of the assertion of the advocate of impersonal scripture.

1. śāsti śikṣayati jivajīvyādi tattvaṃ grāhayati. *Nyāyavātāra vivṛti*, p. 43.

Now we come to the consideration of the second adjective 'inde-feasible'. It means that the scripture accepted by the Jainas is not capable of being challenged and confuted by any person. In other words, it is possessed of unsurpassable authority. The third adjective asserts that it is not in conflict with the deliverances of accredited organs of knowledge and also with the plain meaning of any canonical text. In one word, these texts give voice to truths which are incontrovertible.

The aforesaid adjectives set forth the intrinsic merits of the scripture and its author. Now the rest of the qualifications which are stated in the verse set out the properties which are calculated to promote the well-being of the persons other than the author. The adjectival clause 'which gives instruction on ultimate truth' has pointed reference to the Jaina canon which sets out the categories, *jīva* (living creature), *ajīva* (inanimate objects) and the like. 'Conducive to the benefit of all' stresses the moral necessity of preservation of all living beings from injury and the attainment of the final goal of emancipation. The last clause means that the instruction of the texts sponsored by other rival schools only tends to lead all creatures astray from the right path. These teachers are impostors, conscious or unconscious, and mislead their followers and seek to deceive others for the sake of multiplying their supporters. An authentic scripture should be free from these limitations. It is noteworthy that the stance of each rival school an unbiased modern scholar has to exercise his own judgement on the respective claims.

Now the author proposes to deal with syllogistic inference which is resorted to for the enlightenment of another person. This purpose is served by perceptual cognition also. So the author sets forth the definition of an organ of valid knowledge calculated to benefit all seekers of light and not only the speaker himself, in the next verse.

Text

svaniścayavadanyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanam budhaiḥ /
parārtham mānamākhyātam vākyam tadupacārataḥ //

Translation

"An organ of valid cognition is said by wise men to be one meant for others when it is apt to produce (the same) conviction in other persons in conformity with one's own conviction. It is effected through a verbal proposition (which is the instrument of such conviction and is thus regarded as equivalent to a valid cognitive organ) by transference of epithet (of the effect to the cause)." ... (X)

Elucidation

The subject of the proposition is 'an organ of valid cognition meant for others' and 'when it is apt etc.' is the predicate. The 'conviction' stands for the knowledge of a cognizable fact. 'The same conviction in other persons' means emergence of the cognition of the cognizable fact in conformity with one's own conviction.

It is however knowledge of a fact which is produced in other people's mind by the knowledge of the speaker. Why should a verbal proposition be introduced as an intermediary. The purport is that the knowledge produced in other persons is effected through the instrumentality of a sentence because it is the immediate condition of such knowledge. And as such it is dubbed as an instrument of valid cognition. But a sentence also communicates the perceptual cognition and so perceptual cognition, like inference, is also said to serve the purpose of transference of knowledge.

This assertion of the instrumentality of perceptual cognition as communicable to another person constitutes originality of the author. The Buddhist accepts inference for others through the instrumentality of language and Siddhasena Divākara asserts that in this respect perceptual cognition is on a par with inference.

The Buddhist believes that perceptual cognition envisages the individual particular as a simple indeterminate fact and such a cognition cannot be produced in another person by language which necessarily means concepts and concepts are unreal construction.¹ This contention of the Buddhist is combated in the next verse.

Text

pratyakṣeṇānumānena prasiddhārthaprakāśanāt /
parasya tadupāyatvāt parārthatvaṃ dvayorapi //

Translation

"Perception as well as inference serves to communicate one's knowledge of a fact to others as the necessary means (of the emergence of such knowledge in their minds). And so both of them should be regarded as serving the purpose of other persons." ... (XI)

Elucidation

Perception *also just like* inference communicates a fact, which is cognized by it to another person. So both serving as the instrument of communicating one's own knowledge to another person. The particles

1. vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdāyonayaḥ spṛśantyāpi /
kāryakāraṇatā teṣāṃ nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyāpi //

Nyāyavāra vivṛti, p. 44

api (also) as well as *iva* (like) should be added after *pratyakṣeṇa* (perception) and *anumānena* (inference), though not stated in the original verse, to make the meaning complete and consistent. The contention of the Buddhist is that the content of perception is an indeterminate simple fact, is not communicable by words, and so perception cannot be placed on the same level with inference as equally competent to communicate its contents to other persons. But indeterminate perception has been criticized by the Jaina as an unintelligible invention of the Buddhist logician. According to the former, perception also envisages a determinate fact, i.e. one consisting of an individual and a universal rolled into one. This is also the content of verbal knowledge and as such it is communicable. The vehicle of communication in both cases is language. The inference is expressed as a syllogistic argument for another's conviction in the following way : 'There is fire ahead, because smoke is seen to arise from the place'. This statement of one's personal inference serves to produce the same inference in the person addressed. Similarly when a person communicates a fact envisaged by his own perception by pointing out with his finger : 'See the king is going in procession'. This verbal communication attendant with a physical gesture produces the same perceptual cognition in the other person addressed by him. So both of them serve as the means of communication of personal knowledge and there is no reason to single out inference as the only competent means of such communication. The Buddhist's objection that concepts are subjective and as such cannot be associated with the content of perception which is necessarily a self-characterized individual has been disposed of as an abstraction. But one may contend that the perceptual cognition of the other man is due to the operation of his organ of sight. So the contention that the perceptual cognition of one man can be communicated to others is only a case of over-simplification due to oversight. Were the other man devoid of eye-sight, the communication of the perceptual cognition would not be possible simply because the perceptual cognition would not arise in him. But this contention is not fair. The difficulty may be alleged as regards inference if the addressed person has not the previous knowledge of necessary concomitance between smoke and fire. And even if the person addressed is aware of the necessary concomitance he will infer fire on the perception of smoke pointed out by the arguer, only on the strength of the necessary concomitance recollected by him. Here the argument on the part of the interlocuter may be regarded as not the condition of the inference of the other man. One may say that the statement of the competent probans is the condition of the other man's inferential knowledge, and so the inference of A is the condition of

the inference of B. And thus it becomes inference adduced for another. But the advocate of the communicative perception may also plead that the expression of his perceptual cognition serves to point to the object competent to be perceived. So there is no reason for differentiation between them except one's bias.

The upshot of the discussion of the aforesaid contention is clarified in the following verse which sets forth the manner in which the perceptual cognition serves the purpose of communication.

Text

pratyakṣapratipannārthapratipādi ca yadvacaḥ/
pratyakṣaṃ pratibhāsasya nimittatvāt taducyate//

Translation

“A statement which communicates a fact known by perception is designated as perception inasmuch as it serves as the means of the emergence of such perceptual communication (in another person).”
... (XII)

Elucidation

The meaning of the verse is quite obvious and can be easily deduced from the foregoing discussion. It is of course stated by way of inference for the conviction of a man who entertains a doubt about the possibility of the communication of perceptual knowledge to another person. The probans ‘as the means of emergence etc’ is meant to drive home the validity of the thesis maintained by the author. The designation of verbal statement as perception is a case of transference of epithet of the effect ‘cognition’ to the statement as the cause of it. Such transference of epithet is seen in the statement : ‘Butter is life’ (*āyur vai gḥtam*). Butter is the condition of longevity. But the condition is designated by the epithet of the effect, namely life.

Now the author sets forth the definition of syllogistic inference.

Text

sādhyāvinābhuno hetor vaco yat pratipādakam/
parārtha manumānaṃ tat pakṣādivacanātmakam//

Translation

“A statement which demonstrates a probans standing in the relation of necessary concomitance to the probandum is called inference for the sake of other (i.e. syllogistic argument). It consists in the statement of the subject (*pakṣa*) and others,” ... (XIII)

Elucidation

The necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum has been explained before. So we do not dwell upon the nature of such necessary concomitance which will only end in uncalled for repetition. The statement of the probans standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is designated as inference for the sake of another (*parārtham anumānam*). A statement has necessarily the same true facts coming within its range as referents. These are the contents of the statement. For the satisfaction of the query 'what is the nature of such statement and its contents', the author clarifies the statement as consisting of the statement of the subject and the like (*ādi*).¹ 'The like' has restricted reference to the probans (*hetu*), illustration (*dīṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*), conclusion (*nigamana*) and other relevant facts. These technical terms will be defined in due course

There is apparently an inconsistency between the previous statement that syllogistic argument consists in the statement of the probans and the subsequent statement in the second line of the verse that it (the syllogistic argument) consists of the assertion of the thesis and the like. But Siddharṣi, the commentator, observes that there is no inconsistency or self-contradiction involved in the two apparently different assertions. In fact syllogistic argument is applied for the full conviction of another person and it depends on the latter's equipment and capacity for understanding whether the statement of the probans is adequate or inadequate for facilitating his understanding the drift of the argument. So there are different forms of syllogistic argument in conformity with the requirements of the situation. The fullest syllogism consists of ten members, namely, (i) the proposition or thesis to be proved (*pratijñā*), (ii) the probans (*hetu*), (iii) illustration

1. We have got four meanings of *ādi*:

Cf. *prakāre' tha vyavasthāyāṃ sanāpe' vāyave tathā |*
caturṣvartheṣu medhāvī ādi-śabdaṃ tu lakṣayet ||

They are: (1) similarity (i. e. similar thing), (2) determinate reference, (3) proximity, and (4) constitutive members. For example we cite the following sentences: (1) Grass, plants and the like constitute the vegetable world (*tṛṇavṛkṣādīni udbhijjāni*). Here *ādi* has the literal sense of likeness. All unspecified things coming under the description are the referent. (2) The Brāhmin and the like are castes (*brāhmaṇ-ādāyo varṇā*). Here *ādi* only refers to three other castes and no more. (3) The army is at the commencement of the village (*grāmādau senā*). Here *ādi* means proximity, i. e. near the village. (4) Pillars and the like form the house (*stambhādāyo gṛham*). Here *ādi* (and the like) means the constituent members (*avayavas*).

(*dr̥ṣṭānta*), (iv) application (*ūpanaya*), (v) conclusion (*nigamana*) and a corroborating statement (*śuddhi*) attached to each of these five members—the full syllogism thus coming to consist of ten propositions. The number of propositions may be reduced in consideration of the needs of the party to be convinced. If the latter happens to be a person who apprehends the subject, fully remembers the necessary concomitance and is capable of anticipating other members on account of his training and practice in logical procedure, he is in a position to comprehend the conclusion without further aid. For such a person the statement of the probans only will serve the purpose of the syllogistic argument. To cite a concrete example, the single minor premise, 'The hill is possessed of smoke' will suffice to drive home the conclusion 'The hill is possessed of fire' without the citation of other statements which are usually parts of syllogism. The sufficiency of the abridged syllogism has been noted by Dharmakīrti.¹ For the sake of facilitating the arrival at the conclusion of the interlocutor who has not previous conviction of necessary concomitance of the probans and the probandum on the basis of essential identity or casual relation from experience of their incidence in concrete cases, three facts are set forth by way of example in the syllogism. But so far as the adepts and knowledgeable persons are concerned, the statement of the probans alone will be sufficient to meet the end. The commentator reproduces the argument of Dharmakīrti in defence of the fast statement of Siddhasena Divākara.

But if the person to be convinced happens to be a tyro and as such requires to be posted in the niceties of the logical apparatus, the statement of the full-fledged syllogism becomes imperative. Thus if he has not understood the subject (minor term) and the proposition mooted for proof like the proposition in an Euclidean theorem, the statement of the subject in the proposition becomes a necessity. And if the necessary concomitance is not remembered, the illustration is to be stated for the realization of the cogency of the probans stated in the second member. And if again the party concerned has not the ability to apply the concomitant probans to the subject, such application is stated as the fourth member for helping his understanding. And if further he seems to waver about the upshot, the conclusion is stated to resolve the hurdle. This is the justification of the five propositions stated as necessary members of a syllogism in the *Nyāyasūtra*.²

1. tadbhāva-hetubhāvau hi dr̥ṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ /
khyāpyete, viduṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ // *Pramāṇavārtika*, 3. 29.
2. *Ibid.*, 1.1.32.

If even the statement of all these members do not remove the doubt about the cogency of the members, the removal of such lingering doubt is accomplished by corroborating statements. Thus all the ten propositions are necessarily members of a syllogistic argument employed for establishing the conclusion without hitch, since they serve the purpose of enlightenment of the other party as necessary expedients. The long and the short of this defence is to rebut the charge of inconsistency on the part of the author.

Now another difficulty has been raised by some professors of logic. The author has stated (in the verse x) that the syllogistic argument is an instrument of the emergence of conviction of another person in conformity with the proponent's own conviction. But so far as one's own conviction reached by one's own inference is concerned, there is no such sequence of the judgements as set forth in the syllogistic argument noted above. A person who knows the necessary concomitance at once derives the conclusion from the mere observation of the probans. Certainly such a person does not apprehend the thesis first and then observes the probans and thereafter remembers the concomitance confirmed in a concrete example. Such a procedure is not endorsed by experience. Moreover the conclusion is seen to be entailed by the probans alone as the sole and sufficient condition and this is confirmed by agreement and difference. When this probans is present the conclusion of the probandum follows as a matter of necessity and in its absence no such conclusion follows. The subject, illustration, and the like do not possess this competency because their omission does not affect the establishment of the conclusion. If despite the inefficiency and superfluity of these elements they are asserted to be necessary factors of the syllogism, that will only lead to an infinite regress, because any and every fact can be adduced as part of the argument owing to its remote relation with the probans. If the mere statement of the thesis were competent to drive home the conclusion, the assertion of the probans would be redundant. And so would also be the subsequent members. The competency of the thesis can be established only on this hypothesis. As this is not found to be the case, that alone which necessarily produces the knowledge of the conclusion without waiting for reinforcement by other factors should be regarded as the instrument of proof. As this instrument is the probans and not the subject and others, the statement of the probans alone should constitute the syllogism. The charge of inconsistency therefore stands unchallenged.

The above argument is perfectly plausible and seems formidable. But one may address the objector as follows: Your quotation of the

statement of the author "An organ of valid cognition is said by wise men to be one meant for others when it is apt to produce (the same) conviction in other persons in conformity with one's own conviction" is correct, but you fail to understand the meaning intended by it. The suffix *vati* in *svaniścayavat* (in conformity with one's own conviction) only stresses the sameness or similarity between one's own conviction and that of others. The analogy does not extend to all other factors involved in the psychological process resulting in one's own conviction. If such allround analogy were intended, even the utterance of the sentences in syllogistic arguments had to be ruled out of court since in subjective inference the utterance of the expressive words is not observed. you defend this on the ground that the other person cannot be convinced without resort to utterance of words, and therefore it has only to be admitted as a necessary condition. If so the upshot comes to be the production of conviction in the person addressed and so all factors which are necessary for another's conviction and without which such a conviction does not materialize should be deemed legitimate parts of the syllogistic argument. In the absence of the thesis (*pakṣa*), the incidence of the probans in a concrete instance and so also of the probandum may not be understood by the other party concerned. It is for the enlightenment and conviction of such a person, the thesis etc. are to be demonstrated and as necessary expedients of the enlightenment and conviction of the other party, they should be regarded as legitimate factors of the argument.

Let us consider the objection that it is probans alone which is the necessary condition of the enlightenment of the other party as shown by the joint method of agreement and difference demonstrating the presence and absence of the probans followed by the presence and absence of the probandum. This objection is neither fair nor sound. It is not the probans alone which produces the enlightenment of another person, but also the statement of a person of unquestionable veracity and personality, *viz.*, 'There is fire here' also produces the same certitude. And so probans also will not be the necessary and sufficient condition of syllogistic inference. Let us now consider the contention that if the thesis alone could produce the knowledge of the probandum in another person, the assertion of a probans will be redundant. This objection is more captious than the others. The same difficulty is to be confronted by your insistence on the statement of the probans alone as the self-sufficing condition. The probans is not without a local habitation. Such a homeless attribute proves nothing definitely as the probandum also is not a floating predicate. This incidence of the probans in the subject is made known by the

thesis or any another cognitive organ. Your contention would make the recognition of this necessary relation set forth in the minor premise e. g., 'The hill is possessed of smoke', unnecessarily redundant. If you rejoin, this is necessary for the concrete functioning of the competency of the probans without which the probandum will not be understood as a predicate of the minor term (the logical subject), then the statement of 'the thesis etc.' will not be dispensed with since they are necessary for the enlightenment of a particular set of persons as demonstrated by us before. So 'the thesis etc.' are also necessary factors of argument just like the probans, as it has been shown that the statement of the probans requires the services of such factors in particular situations. The author had foreseen all these consequences and so states that syllogistic argument consists of the thesis etc.¹

Now the author sets forth the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*)² as follows :

Text

sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ pratyakṣādyanirakṛtaḥ /
tatprayoga 'tra kartavyo hetorgocaradīpakaḥ //

Translation

"The thesis consists in the acknowledgement of the probandum as a predicate of the subject (of the proposition to be proved as a theorem) which is not contradicted by the perception and the like. The statement of it (the thesis) should be made since it shows the locus of the probans." ... (XIV)

Elucidation

A syllogistic argument has been defined in verse xiii as consisting of thesis (*pakṣa*) and the rest. Now the author gives the definition of thesis (*pakṣa*) for clear and unequivocal conception of it in the verse under consideration. *Pakṣa* (thesis) is of the nature of the geometrical

1. Dignāga has also adopted, the same procedure. Cf. *Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 1 : tatra pakṣādivacanāṃ sādhanam, pakṣahetu-dṛṣṭāntavacanair hi prāśnikānāṃ apratīto 'rthaḥ pratipādyata iti.
2. The word *pakṣa* defined as the thesis which asserts the proposition to be proved just like the preliminary proposition in the Euclid's theorem, e. g., 'The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'. This is stated as a theorem to be proved. The thesis (*pakṣa*) of Indian *Nyāya* is equally a tentative assertion which is proved in the conclusion by means of the intermediate propositions. The word *pakṣa* is also used to denote the subject (the minor term) which forms a part of it by way of synecdoche.

theorem which propounds the proposition to be proved by argument before the council consisting of the president, judges, and the debating parties both proponent and opponent. The argument of the proponent is introduced by the statement of the thesis in which the logical subject is qualified tentatively by the predicate as one that is to be established to the satisfaction of the council. This initial statement has a logical necessity in that it sets forth the logical subjects as the locus of the probans to be adduced. The logical necessity of the explicit statement of the thesis has been called in question by a few logicians such as Dignāga and his followers. It has been shown in the *Nyāyasūtra* that a syllogistic argument consists of five members of which the statement of the thesis or the proposition mooted for proof (called *pratijñā* or *pakṣa*), is the first. Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers have criticized this member as unnecessary and redundant. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the first or the last three propositions fully meet the purpose of the argument, namely, the establishment of the conclusion i. e., the vindication of the thesis. Dharmakīrti goes one step further and observes that only the premises (i) the *udāharaṇa* setting out the universal concomitance, and the minor premise are quite adequate and the statement of the conclusion involves unnecessary repetition since a person who understands the two premises will necessarily understand the conclusion irresistibly following from them.

But as we have observed in the course of the elucidation of verse xii, the commentator justifies Divākara's statement and also incidentally the five members and the five corroborating statement (*suddhi*) as necessarily helping the person addressed to understand the issue. One may complain that this defence is inspired by pragmatic consideration of convenience. Their value is more psychological than logical. But the author agrees to differ from the Buddhist critic so far as the first member of the syllogism is taken into account. Now let us cite concrete examples. 'The hill is on fire' (*parvato vahnimān*), 'All things are indeterminate' (*sarvaṃ anekāntātmakam*) i. e. to say, they cannot be determined or restricted to a particular determination, being possessed of infinitely multiple phases and attributes according to the Jaina. These are instances of the thesis (*pakṣa*) which are to be established by adducing fitting reason, i. e., probanses. Now the probans assigned must have a subject (*dharmīn*) to belong to. But how can the subject be known without the statement of the thesis? Of course it may be considered that the respondent may understand the subject from the context. But this cannot be assumed as a matter of rule. In sollogistic argument one should not take anything for granted.

Without the subject the probans will be a homeless floating attribute, so also the probandum (major term). It is therefore insisted that the thesis should be explicitly stated, not left to be guessed. The minor premise of Aristotelian syllogism and the *upanaya* (application) state that the subject is possessed of the probans (*pakṣadharmā*).

If the respondent (*prativādin*) for whose edification the syllogistic argument is advanced does not come to know the subject of discourse, the argument will be liable to misunderstanding and erroneous judgement.

Text

anyathā vādyabhipretahetugocaramohinaḥ /
pratyāyyasya bhaveddhetur viruddhārekito, yathā //

Translation

“Otherwise the respondent who is to be convinced happens to be unaware or unsure of the subject intended by the proponent as the locus of the probans (adduced) and so this probans may be doubted as contradictory (belonging to the opposite of the subject), for instance.” ... (XV)

Elucidation

‘Otherwise’ means if the statement of the thesis is not made. ‘The locus of the the probans’ i. e. the logical subject if not definitely assigned in the thesis, the respondent may honestly happen to think that the probans assigned belongs to another possible subject which does not possess the predicate, the fact to be proved as belonging to the intended subject. We may cite a concrete example : ‘It is fiery because it is smoky’. If the probans smoky be misunderstood to belong to a lake in the absence of the statement of a definite subject, hill etc., the probans will be doubted as a case of contradictory fallacious reason. This contingency will be completely eliminated if the subject is definitely stated in the thesis. In a debate nothing should be left to chance or taken for granted as it does not suffice to plug all loopholes of misunderstanding. In one word, a syllogistic argument should be made fool-proof as far as practicable.

It is to be noted that the thesis is also called *sādhya*, matter to be proved, and the terms *pakṣa* (thesis) and *pratijñā* (proposition) are all used to denote the thesis to be proved. But the word *sādhya* is used in the sense of the predicate (*sādhya-dharma*) in the statement of the necessary concomitance. The word *pakṣa* is generally understood as the subject and in the expression *pakṣadharmatāvacaṇa* (statement of

the probans as an attribute of the subject), the word *pakṣa* stands for the subject alone. It is thus a case of synecdoche, the part standing for the whole.

Text

dhānuṣkaguṇasamprekṣijanasya parividhyataḥ /
dhānuṣkasya vinā lakṣyanirdeśena guṇetarau //

Translation

“An archer who omits to declare the target and shoots the arrow and hits the mark (or wide of the mark) his merit or demerit is liable to be doubted as the opposite (of what it is) by the persons assembled to watch the merit (success) or demerit (failure) of the archer.”

... (XVI)

Elucidation

The failure to announce the target on the part of the archer will make his performance liable to doubt. It may be presumed by the spectators or the judges commissioned to adjudicate on the merit of the archers that the archer has hit the bull's eye or missed it as the target was not specified. The failure may be deemed as success and success as failure. Similarly when the proponent advances the probandum only without reference to the subject, it may be regarded as a case of fallacious reasoning or a sound argument owing to the lack of the necessary data for discrimination. The subject or the minor term must be assigned and this is done in the thesis propounded in the way of a theorem.¹

Now the time for the definition of the probans has arrived after discussion of the subject and the thesis. This is the more essential topic but has been postponed for discussing the necessity and utility of the thesis as a member of syllogistic argument. The thesis as we have seen is a proposition tentatively asserted for proof by reason, that is to say,

1. The application of the simile of an archer to an argument and of arrows to the probanses is a favourite and popular device. We find in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (III.8.2) that Gārgī challenges yājñavalkya that she would pose two questions as sharp and pointed as arrows to him. Māgha who flourished in the 6th or 7th century A. D. wrote his celebrated epic the *Śiśupālavadha*, and he uses this very conceit in chapter 2,27:

anirloḍitakāryasya vāgjalam vāgmīno vṛthā/
nimitād aparādheṣor dhānuṣkasyeva valgitam//

A speaker who has not thoroughly analyzed the issues involved in the proposed course of action, who indulges in a volley of meaningless words only likens himself to an archer who indulges in noisy boast after he has missed the mark. The similarity of Divākara's statement with Māgha's use is quite pronounced. This simile has almost become a cliché and so no chronological question may be involved.

by the assignment of the probans. The probans has been defined with all its necessary characteristics in connection with subjective reasoning (*svārthānumāna*). So these characteristics are not repeated, as they are implied, because there can be no probans without these characteristics. A syllogistic argument or literally inference for another (*parārthānumāna*) consists primarily of words. As has been observed before a man can make his own inference communicable to another or to be precise, the emergence of such inference in another man's mind can be effected through the medium of language. One's thought cannot be bodily translated to another man's mind. Hence the necessity of syllogistic argument.

Text

hetostathopapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathāpi vā /
dvididho 'nyatareṇāpi sādhyasiddhir bhaved iti //

Translation

“The verbal expression of the probans may be twofold either in the (positive) form, thus it is consistent (with the probandum, major term) or in the (negative) form since it is incompatible otherwise (i.e. with the contradictory of the probandum, thesis). This proof of the (thesis or probandum) is realized by either way.” ... (XVII)

Elucidation

In our discourse on subjective inference it has been shown that the crucial and the solitary characteristic of a probans is its absence in its entire extension in the absence of the probandum (thesis). Other definitions of the probans proposed by different schools have been shown to be inadequate or fallacious. This characteristic of the probans has to be demonstrated in the syllogistic inference also. As the ways of statement admit of variation it has been stated that the two forms, positive and negative, of the assignment of the probans are admissible. Thus ‘It is consistent and possible only in the existence of the probandum, for example, there is fire in the place since the smoke observed can possibly occur only if fire is present’. This is the positive way of assertion of the probans. The statement ‘otherwise’ in the verse is a case of abbreviation, being the statement of a part for the whole. ‘Otherwise’ means that the existence of the probans is impossible in the absence of the probandum, that is to say, the absence of the probandum necessarily entails the absence of the probans. For instance, if there be no fire there can be no smoke. The concomitance of smoke with fire is understood as a case of necessary coincidence only if the absence of the probandum involves the absence of the probans.

The two forms of statement have been endorsed but the statement of both is not only unnecessary but also will be regarded as a drawback on the part of the arguer, since anyone of these ways of statement will perforce establish the truth of the thesis, that is to say, the presence of the predicate, say fire in the subject. The syllogistic argument as a statement is called in request only for the proof of the thesis to the satisfaction of the Council (*pariṣad*) and the opponent. Either of these statements is sufficient to ensure the emergence of inference in the umpires and the other party. The statement of both on the other hand will be taken as symptomatic of the stupidity of the arguer, since another statement is useless for the purpose of carrying conviction. Superfluity of words is strictly tabooed in logic and even in literary composition it is regarded as a fault.

Now the definition of illustration or example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is given in the next verse. It is of two kinds as it is based on similarity and on dissimilarity. Of these two the example based on similarity is defined as follows :

Text

sādhyasāadhanayor vyāptir yatra niścīyatatarām /
sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambandhasmarāṅnamataḥ //

Translation

“The example, in which the necessary concomitance of probans and probandum is understood *a fortiori* (without leaving any room for doubt), is regarded as one based on similarity. It is endorsed in order to stimulate the memory of the necessary concomitance.” ... (XVIII)

Elucidation

Similarity of the example with the subject is based on the possession of the similar coincidence of the probans and the probandum. To take a concrete instance ‘There is fire in the hill because of the smoke, which can exist only on the existence of the fire, as in a kitchen’. The kitchen is a place where both smoke and fire are observed. The observation of the mere coincidence of smoke and fire even in a large number of cases does not ensure the necessary and universal occurrence of both smoke and fire, since it extends to all such cases past, present and future. The observation in question is a perceptual cognition and as such is confined to the present data. It will be discussed in the course of our deliberation that another organ of knowledge is necessary for the ascertainment of the universality and necessity of the relation between smoke as a class, and fire as a class. An example cited does not serve as proof of it but only as an aid

to memory. When a person has had the knowledge of the necessary concomitance, but owing to lapse of memory fails to recollect it, the example serves to stimulate the memory impression. The citation of the example makes the respondent conscious of the coincidence of the probans with the probandum and on the recollection of the necessary concomitance enables him to infer the presence of fire in the locus of smoke. If on the other hand the respondent is aware of the necessary concomitance and does not require any extraneous aid to stimulate his memory the citation of the example will be redundant in his case.¹ The statement of the probans alone will enable him to infer the probandum.

It has been contended that necessary and universal concomitance of the probans as a class and probandum as a class can never be realized by a man with his limited resources. Perception, as we have already observed, is necessarily confined to the present datum and has no competency for past and future cases. Nor can it be supposed to be realized on the advice of a knowledgeable person, that will make subjective inference impossible. A man infers fire on observing smoke without waiting for instruction by another person. It cannot be supposed that it is known by inference, since inference itself is conditioned by the knowledge of the universal relation between the probandum and if for this purpose another inference is requisitioned it will also presuppose still another inference since an inference is possible only if the knowledge of the necessary relation is at its back. And this will make the process endless. Without the knowledge of the necessary relation between the probans and the probandum no inference can materialize and no ordinary human being has the power to secure it. Inference is thus based on mere analogy of the observed cases with unobserved ones, past or future and it is at the most a case of probability and not assured knowledge. In the practical conduct of our day-to-day business we make such inferences which are a little better than guess work. This has been the contention of sceptics in all ages.

But a knowledge of probability is only a case of presumption which cannot perfectly eliminate the doubt lingering in an inquisitive person. And the impossibility of such knowledge will make any systematic construction impossible. In our experience an anticipation of the probandum is not a case of presumption. A person who is

1. Cf. Dharmakīrti :

tadbhāva-hetubhāvau hi dṛṣṭānte tadavedināḥ /
khyāpyate, viduṣāṃ vācya hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //
--*Pramāṇavārtika*, 3.29.

not a confirmed sceptic is not assailed by the visitation of any such doubt. Doubt is a healthy attitude and Descartes made it the starting point of philosophical enquiry. In India it has been recognized from a very ancient time that inquisitiveness,¹ i. e. desire for further knowledge is generated by doubt. But if it degenerates into unhealthy scepticism it will lay the axe at the very root of the possibility of the progress of knowledge.

In order to obviate such an undesirable and self-stultifying scepticism, the Indian logicians and particularly the Jaina logicians have laid stress on another faculty called *tūha*, inductive reasoning which will come in for discussion at later stage.

Now we shall consider the example based on dissimilarity which is defined in the next verse.

Text

sādhye nivartamāne tu sādhanasyāpyasambhavaḥ/
khyāpyate yatra dr̥ṣṭante vaidharmyēneti sa smṛtaḥ//

Translation

“A concrete instance in which the absence of the probans is shown necessarily to follow the absence of the probandum is known as an example based on dissimilarity.” ... (XIX)

Elucidation

In the case of inference of fire from smoke, a lake is cited as the example in dissimilarity. There is no fire in the lake and consequently no smoke also. It serves to bring home the necessity of the relation of the probans and the probandum by demonstrating the absence of the probans necessarily coinciding with the absence of the probandum. Necessary concomitance is a case of logical entailment. In positive concomitance the knowledge of smoke entails the knowledge of fire because fire necessarily exists in which smoke is present. In negative concomitance the knowledge of the absence of fire entails that of the absence of smoke. It is to be borne in mind that necessary concomitance is not a case of reciprocal concomitance of both probans and probandum. The existence of fire is not necessarily coincident with

1. Cf. *athato dharmajijñāsā* (MD, sūtra 1)

Also : *viśayo viśayaś caiva pūrvapakṣas tathottaram /*

nirṇayaś ceti pañcāṅgam śāstre 'dhi karaṇam smṛtam //

The subject, the doubt, the proposition, the prima facie reply and the final judgement, these are the five members of a discussion of which doubt is the foremost factor.

existence of smoke. The extension of fire is much greater than that of smoke since we see that fire exists in a red-hot iron ball or electric bulb without smoke. Smoke and fire can be totally coincident if fire is associated with a carbohydrate substance. But such association is not universal. We cannot infer smoke from fire though we can infer fire from smoke. The sphere of smoke is included in the sphere of fire which has greater extension. So the relation of concomitance may be a case of partial coincidence as exemplified by smoke and fire and total coincidence as seen in the case of impermanence and the property of being an effect. This is called concomitance in co-equal extension (*samavyāpti*) and the other is called one of an unequal extension (*viśamavyāpti*).

In formal logic the rule that the middle term (probans) must be distributed (taken in its entire extent), though not the major, is the rule based on the recognition of this unequal concomitance. Smoke logically determines fire but not vice-versa.

An example need not be cited for the conviction of a man whose memory of the necessary concomitance is quite fresh and living. But when his memory is revived after temporary lapse an example will be only an otiose appendix. This objection is prelude to the next *karikā*.

Text

antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahir udāhrtiḥ /
vyarthā syāt tadasadbhāve' py evaṁ nyāyavido viduḥ //

Translation

“The establishment of the probandum is secured exclusively by internal concomitance and its citation outside (the subject) will be useless and such will also be the case if (the said concomitance) will be absent (or unknown). Such is the considered verdict of the adepts in logic.” ... (XX)

Elucidation

The problem can be elucidated by a poser. Is the example called in requisition to bring home the necessary concomitance and what will be its service after the recollection of the same? When the concomitance of the probans and the probandum is remembered, the example will have no use for the person, and if it is cited to help a respondent who is ignorant of their concomitance, the example will be of no help. As we have said in our discussion under the preceding verse that the observation of co-existence of the probans and the probandum in an example does not give the knowledge of the necessity of this co-presence, so the citation of an example will be entirely useless to such a person

who has to be convinced of the necessary concomitance *ab initio* and the argument will be effective only after the education of the respondent in necessary concomitance. Considered from every possible point of view the tagging of example to the universal proposition is found to be an otiose appendix which is rather a survival of blind tradition.

A similar line of argument has been followed by Hemacandra in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*.¹

It is therefore concluded that the necessary concomitance is apprehended inside the subject and no example is required for the purpose. Of the five members of syllogism, the first three, viz., the thesis, the probans and the illustration stating the universal concomitance with an example tagged on to it, have been considered by the author. The other two members, viz., 'application' (*upanaya*) and 'conclusion', and their corroborative proofs have not been taken into consideration. The author is not writing a standard book on logic and so he has avoided details which are not necessary conditions of inference. An intelligent student can infer these facts on the strength of his knowledge of what has been stated in the text here. The omission of these members which are endorsed in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣhapāda is due to the author's adoption of the middle path of discussion. There are three forms of syllogistic arguments current in the logical tradition of India: (i) the briefest, (ii) moderate and (iii) elaborate. The first only endorses the second member stating the probans which is regarded as sufficient for the purpose of a knowledgeable person who is posted in the universal concomitance and therefore immediately infers the probandum. The second form is sufficient for a mediocre and the third is resorted to for the enlightenment of a person of slow understanding in whose case the statement of all the ten members is found necessary for his enlightenment.

Hemacandra does not find fault in the contention that the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance. But he justifies the citation of example in special circumstances. We quote his observation :

"That (i. e. the example) is the locus of the apprehension of necessary concomitance.

Now it may be urged, if example is not a condition of inference (on your view), why should you take the trouble of propounding definition of the same. The answer is : (It is in pursuance of the recognition of) illustration which will be allowed for as a case of

1. Ibid, (Singhī Granthamālā edition), 1-2-72. See also A Critique of Organ of Knowledge.

exception out of deference to a pupil (of slow understanding) in syllogistic argument (employed for the conviction of the other party to a debate). And even in the field of subjective inference (for arriving at subjective conviction) the definition of example is not entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that there may be a person who is helped to arrive at the knowledge of internal concomitance from the observation of external concomitance in an example."¹

Now the Jaina logician has made a definite contribution to logical thought by his conception of internal concomitance. It is contended that this concomitance of the probans and the probandum is understood in the minor premise which states the probans belonging to the subject. This theory would thus eliminate the major premise (which is the 'illustration' of the Nyāya syllogism) which states the universal concomitance of the probans and the probandum plus the example. Dharmakīrti has endorsed this position and we have quoted it.² But Hemacandra in the aforesaid quotation only reproduces the view of Dharmakīrti. A person who has already acquired his knowledge of the universal concomitance from experience of the co-presence of the probans and the probandum in concrete instances will necessarily infer the probandum on the basis of his previous knowledge of the universal concomitance, But the position of the Jaina logician is not so clear. Is the concomitance known for the first time in the subject or remembered from past experience? Both the Buddhist and the Jaina logician and so also the modern Neo-logicians of Mithila and Bengal schools are agreed on the point that mere observation of concrete instances of co-presence is not sufficient to bring home the knowledge of necessary universal concomitance. Something else is necessary for the purpose. The Buddhists affirm that it is secured by the realization of the impossibility of the occurrence of the probans without the probandum. In one word the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory is secured by a *reductio ad absurdum*. This is called a case of inference by the Buddhist and inductive reasoning (*tarka*) by the Jaina and the Naiyāyika. The difference between the latter two lies in their recognition of the status of the *reductio ad absurdum* which is regarded as a separate independent organ of valid knowledge by the Jaina and as an auxiliary to perceptual knowledge by the Naiyāyika.

The Jaina position that the concomitance is internal calls for further clarification. If it means that the necessary concomitance is an inherent property of the probans or the probandum or both,

1. *A Critique of Organ of Knowledge*, I, 2.20.
2. *Vide supra*, p. 79.

it is not a new discovery since Dharmakīrti has emphatically asserted that the relation of necessary concomitance is a natural and inherent property of the probans (*hetu*).¹ It is also difficult to maintain how this necessary concomitance is realized for the first time in the minor premise, e. g., the hill is possessed of smoke. It is apparent from the qualifying clause of the probans stated in the Jaina syllogism because of the possibility of the probans (say smoke) with the possibility of the probandum (*tathopapatti*, see verse xvii), say fire; or the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum. This qualification presupposes the logical dependence of the probans on the probandum. The knowledge of this logical entailment is secured by another organ, viz., *ūha*. Accordingly the realization of the necessary concomitance cannot possibly be supposed to follow from the mere observation of the probans or from the mere verbal statement in syllogism. So it must be admitted under pain of absurdity that this knowledge must be antecedently present in the arguer or the inferer. This has been definitely asserted by Dharmakīrti. It is of course true on all accounts that the recollection of the necessary concomitance together with the observation or verbal knowledge of the probans establishes the probandum. Dharmarājadhvarīndra, the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* observes that the knowledge of the necessary concomitance is rather latent which he borrows from the *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācārya. As we have already remarked, the qualifying clause added to the probans in Jaina syllogism only stresses the recollection of the necessary concomitance and not its first realization which is quite improbable in the course of argument, since it must be antecedently present to make the qualification of the probans possible.

We cannot help adverting to the controversy which was popular among English and continental logicians whether the syllogistic argument involves a *petitio principii*. If the major premise, 'All men are mortal' can be true on the condition that all individual men (whose number is practically infinite) are known to be mortal, the minor premise will have automatically been known and so there will be no scope for inference. But the question arises how can this knowledge of the infinite number be secured. And if it is conceded to be possible on the part of an average man, will it not make the minor premise, 'Socrates is a man' and the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal', redundant and nugatory? This contention sets out an evergreen problem. If the

1. Cf. pakṣadharmas tadapṣena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ/
avinābhāvānyamād hetvābhāsas tato'pare //

--Pramāṇavārtika, 3. 1.

knowledge of the universal concomitance of men with mortality be understood to embrace each and every individual, then the knowledge of mortality of Socrates will have been already secured and there is no point in asserting the minor premise and the conclusion 'Socrates is mortal'. So every syllogistic argument will be condemned as vitiated by a *petitio principii* (*siddhasādhanatā*). It only pretends to prove what has already been known and proved. But whatever may be the contention of the logician, it is not felt by any man that the syllogistic or even subjective inference is a case of useless tautology of the logicians and does not provide a new information. Dharmakīrti does not regard any and every knowledge as *pramāṇa* (valid cognition) unless it yields a new information and adds to the stock of knowledge. Inference is regarded as a species of valid cognition or an organ of it and as such is asserted to yield a new information, i. e. knowledge of a fact not known before. If however the universal necessary concomitance which is the invariable condition of inference includes the knowledge of the conclusion, inference will have no scope and must be condemned as a *rechauffe*. It pretends to give new knowledge while as a matter of actual fact it dishes up the old material.

But our logical conscience refuses to acquiesce in this universal condemnation of inference. The argument is more ingenious than convincing. We must therefore refuse to believe that the major premise of Aristotelian syllogism or the *udāharana* of Nyāya syllogism takes stock of all individual instances falling under the universal class concepts set out as the middle and major terms. The Naiyāyika asserts that the knowledge of the universal in the particular, perceptual and extra-perceptual, gives the knowledge of all particulars which are informed with the universal. The universal is necessarily embodied in concrete individuals and so the knowledge of one instance embodying the universal gives the knowledge of all such individuals. Śrīharā has subjected this conception of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*, i. e., the contact of the sense organ with the infinite number of individuals through the medium of the universal to devastating criticism. It has also been condemned by the celebrated Neo-logician Raghunātha Śīromaṇi as an impossible feat. It is true that when a triangle is described on the board and is proved to have its three angles as equivalent to two right angles, the people understand that this is the universal proposition and holds good of all triangles. It is a matter of everyday experience also and rather a truism. If a boy is offered a rupee or a dollar and knows the value of it, he will accept another coin of such denomination spontaneously believing that it has the

same market value. Kumārila and Udayana make such knowledge a case of implicit inference. It has been maintained by Madhusūdana Sarasvati that the knowledge of the universal is not tantamount to the knowledge of all specific individuals coming under the class concept. On the contrary, it is rather the knowledge that any individual possessing this universal class-character will have the same pattern of behaviour. The distinction is between any and all, whole and all. The knowledge that any such individual, say a man is mortal, is to be distinguished from all individual mortals understood distributively. So the knowledge of the *vyāpti* (universal concomitance) does not necessarily entail the knowledge of all specific individuals. It is a fact that the universal concomitance does not yield insight into the specific characteristic of each man or the specific characteristic of the fire, its volume, temperature, colour, etc., but fire as typifying the class-character 'firehood.'

So we deduce the conclusion that inference is not a re-production of a known fact but of an unknown individual or a number of individuals. This is intelligible on the assumption that the knowledge of the universal concomitance relates to the generic character and not the indefinite number of individuals embodying this generic attribute. So the charge of *petitio principii* or *siddhasadhanatā*, proof of a proved fact, is wide of the mark and the criticism by the Jaina logician of the utility of the example smacks of logical puritanism and this has induced him to make the concession.¹

Having discussed the thesis, probans and example, the author proposes to deal with the false and fallacious simulations of each of them. He now defines the *pakṣābhāsa* or the false thesis.

Text

pratipādyasya yaḥ siddhaḥ pakṣābhāsa' sti liṅgataḥ /
lokasvavacanābhyāṃ ca bādhitō' nekadhā mataḥ //

Translation

"A proposition which is known and approved by the respondent and yet contradicted by another probans (inference), popular conviction and one's own statement is a fallacious thesis which has so many varieties." ... (XXI)

Elucidation

A proposition which is stated as a thesis and yet incapable of discharging the function of the latter is called a fallacious thesis or a

1. See the quotation supra, pp. 82-83.

simulation of it. It only has the external appearance of the thesis though it lacks its characteristic features and functions which are set forth expressly or implicitly in the definition of the true thesis. A thesis states that the subject has as its probandum a fact which is to be proved. So if the predicate asserted of the subject of the proposition be a known fact it will be useless since it does not require to be further proved by a probans. The attempt to prove a fact already proved is as silly as the attempt to pound powder, or to paint the lily white. This is also called proving of a proved fact (*siddhasādhanatā*), and though not regarded as a fallacy of reason it makes further argument impossible or unnecessary. We may observe in this connection that the condition and the logical necessity of inference, subjective or syllogistic, lies in the consideration that the probandum, i. e. the predicate to be proved is a fact not known to the party concerned or disputed by it. In fact inference intends to give new knowledge or establish new fact which is either unknown or subject to doubt. An older school of logicians named doubt (as) the condition of such knowledge which is called *pakṣatā*, the nature of the subject of the proposition to be proved. If the predicate is a known and undisputed fact the argument cannot proceed further. If there is difference of opinion regarding the probandum, i. e. the predicate, that gives rise to doubt in a person not committed to any theory, and this doubt is the justification of the argument. In subjective inference the antecedent knowledge of the predicate belonging to the subject also debar inference. The problem of *pakṣatā* has given rise to a heated discussion in the Neo-logical school. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* also stresses this fact, the tentative nature of the predicate to be proved, in his definition of *pakṣa* and in this he rather elaborates the position adumbrated in the definition of *pakṣa* or *pratijñā* in the *Nyāyasūtra*. The upshot is that the probandum must not be antecedently known.

The cases of the false thesis as indicated by contradiction by other accredited evidences are manifold and various. The examples given in the commentary are stated as follows: The thesis 'The earth and jar are made of material atoms' is a case of the attempted proof of a proved fact. The proposition 'All things are momentary' is also redundant if the respondent be a Buddhist. Contradiction by inference is illustrated by the proposition 'There is no omniscient person' which is proved by inference. As the examples given in the commentary are not exhaustive, we take the examples given in the *Nyāyapraveśa*. The proposition 'Sound is inaudible' is contradicted by perception. 'A jar is eternal' is also contradicted by

perception. The assertion 'Sound is eternal' by the Vaiśeṣika is contradicted by the accredited views of the school. Contradiction by popular conviction is illustrated in the statement 'A human skull is ceremonially clean and pure' because it is a part of a past living organism. This is contradicted by popular belief that it is impure and untouchable, which is also endorsed by scriptural texts. Contradiction by one's own statement is 'My mother is barren'. The falsity of the thesis is also constituted by the falsity of the adjective of the predicate. In the assertion 'Word is perishable', the predicate is unproved and deemed false by a respondent holding Sāṃkhya theory according to which nothing is liable to destruction. Likewise a thesis in which the substantive is not endorsed by the respondent is inadmissible. Thus 'A self is a unitary conscious principle (soul)' is inadmissible to the Buddhist who does not believe in soul. When again both the substantive and adjective are not acceptable, it is a false thesis. For instance the argument of the Vaiśeṣika addressed to the Buddhist 'The self is the inherent cause of pleasure, pain, cognition and the like'. The Buddhist believes neither in the 'self' nor in the adjective 'inherent cause'. The assertions 'A jar is visible' and 'A word is audible' are instances of futile thesis being not subject to doubt.

The thesis has been justified as a necessary member of syllogistic argument on the ground that it provides the starting point of discussion. The false thesis being its opposite will only serve to prevent the occurrence of debate. In subjective inference, the thesis is not a necessary constituent of the process but the subject is an indispensable part and so the word thesis should be regarded as the subject or the minor term of which the probans is asserted and the probandum is established as a necessary predicate.

The next topic of discussion is *hetvābhāsa*, i. e. false and fallacious reasons (probanses).

Text

anyathānupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇamīritam /
tadapratītisamdehaviṣayāḥ tadābhātā //

Translation

"The defining characteristic of the probans has been stated to consist in its incompatibility with the contradictory (of the probandum). The aforesaid probans is said to be a fallacious simulation if it is subject to indecision, doubt and definite error." ... (XXII)

Elucidation

The general definition of fallacy has been set forth as the lack of the fundamental character of probans, namely, the absence of the probans entailed by the absence of the probandum, that is, the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory of the probandum. If the alleged probans is not definitely ascertained to have this character, or to be one possible only in the absence of the probandum or doubt of its possibility and consistency with the absence of the probandum, they are regarded as fallacious reasons.

Now the author states the nomenclature of each of these cases of fallacious reasons.

Text

asiddhastvapratiṭo yo yo'nyathaivopapadyate /
viruddho yo'nyathāpy atra yukto' naikāntikaḥ sa tu /

Translation

“(i) Now the (alleged) probans which is not definitely known is called unproved or non-existent (*asiddha*); (ii) a similar probans if found to be compatible only with the contradictory, i. e. the absence of the probandum, is called *viruddha*; (iii) one which is also susceptible of being associated with the contradictory of the probandum, i. e. absence of the probandum, is called inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).”

... (XXIII)

Elucidation

It is true that fallacy as set forth in the two consecutive verses cannot properly be said to affect the probantia defined. A reason cannot be called a probans unless it is valid, and if valid it cannot be fallacious. The so-called fallacies are rather characteristics of reasons which falsely simulate the valid probantia. To call such cases as instances of fallacious probans is therefore a case of contradiction in terms. Hemacandra admits this charge of inconsistency as valid. But he offers the apology that this has been the custom among logicians and he only follows it to avoid a break in the tradition. A fallacy arises only if the alleged probans lacks in character of the valid probans. The three fallacies of reason, namely, unproved, contradictory and inconclusive have been endorsed by Siddhasena Divākara. Hemacandra asserts their number to be three and neither more nor less and in this he is in complete agreement with the Buddhist logician. This marks out the difference from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which admits two other fallacies, namely (i) the probans of which the probandum is contradicted (*bādhita*) and (ii) a reason countervailed by

another (*satpratipakṣa*). The example of the first is 'Fire is not-hot because it is a product like a jar'. The probandum 'not-hot' is contradicted by tactual perception. The Buddhist and the Jaina logicians do not regard them fallacies of reason but as fallacies of thesis. The proposition 'The fire is not-hot' is not a thesis proper since it is contradicted by a perception, an accredited organ of valid cognition. As for the countervailed probans, i. e., one which has an equally competent rival proving the opposite of what is supposed to be proved by the first probans, both Dharmakīrti and Hemacandra and other logicians of the Jaina school who are Hemacandra's predecessors and successors, do not lend countenance to such a fallacy. It is not possible that a valid probans can be countervailed by other reason, valid or invalid. Dharmakīrti however recognizes the tradition which is confined to two contradictory positions maintained by different philosophers. It cannot have any scope in cases of accredited valid probantia.¹

The assertion of the definition of unproved probans of Siddhasena Divākara is rather too wide. Hemacandra points out that indecision, doubt and error are not possible in a valid cognition; when these contingencies occur they will suffice to prove that the cognition in question is invalid. Doubt or error or indecision are rather defects of valid cognition in general and not of any particular species of it. He therefore gives the definition of unproved or non-existent probans (*asiddha*) as follows :

"The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be non-existent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance."²

The fallacy called 'non-existent probans' arises when there is no proof of its existence, that is to say, when the reason is found to be non-existent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent *eo ipso*. "Word is perishable, since it is visible" is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase 'found to lack in necessary concomitance' (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is 'non-existent' not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the (sole and sufficient) characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of

1. Cf. *Nyāyabindu*, III. 110 ff. (concerned with *viruddhāvyabhicārin*).

2. *A Critique of Organ of Knowledge*, p. 144.

a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) also: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a Brāhmaṇa on the ground of the Brāhmaṇahood of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required".

Likewise, a reason 'which is lacking in definite proof of its existence', that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and (also) is lacking in necessary concomitance' is also a case of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called 'doubted-cum-non-existent'. Thus, for instance, (this fallacy occurs when) a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour is adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of 'its having a quality perceived everywhere', (the fallacy being) due to the fact that there is no proof (in support of the truth of the reasons advanced).¹

As neither the original writer Siddhasena nor its commentator has given specific instances of fallacious reasons, we have to quote from other manuals of Indian logic, the examples for the edification of the students uninitiated in the niceties of logical classification. It seems that these authors presume that the readers of the *Nyāyavatāra* will supplement their knowledge with further details from other works. At any event a student who wants to have the knowledge of the fallacies and their sub-divisions will be disappointed as these things are not treated in the *karika*. It was expected that the commentator would supply these details as is done elsewhere. But he presupposes that only advanced scholars who are well posted in the logical discipline and their nice divisions, definitions and classifications will study this work. The commentator engages in the discussion of the philosophical positions of the Buddhist and the logicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools and shows that all their arguments and concrete illustrations are exposed to these fallacies. Let us take a typical example of the Buddhist: 'All existents are momentary, the jar is an existent, therefore the jar is momentary'. The commentator quotes all the arguments of the Buddhist to prove his thesis by making existence equal to causal efficiency. It is argued

1. *A Critique of Organ of Knowledge*, pp. 144-45.

by the Buddhist that a non-momentary permanent entity cannot exercise causal efficiency either simultaneously or successively. If an eternal entity possessing eternal causal efficiency produces all the effects of which it is capable at one and the same particular moment, it will be a *functus officio* in the next moment and thus bereft of causal efficiency which is the only criterion of existence, and it will thus cease to exist since existence is proved by causal efficiency alone. In other words, the so-called eternal entity will cease to exist and thus be momentary in character. All the reasons adduced by rival philosophers will thus be instances of contradictory probantia having proved the opposite of permanence. Nor can it be supposed that a thing discharges its causal efficiency in succession, i. e. in association with other accessory factors. The Buddhist thinks that this is a lame argument since an accessory cannot confer any benefit on the principal entity functioning as the cause. The benefit supposed to be produced will be an event and as such a momentary product. If it coalesces with the entity, it will make it as impermanent as the benefit. Besides if the supposed permanent be causally efficient, it should produce its effect at once and there is no reason that it should lie in wait for the service of others.

The lines of argument of the Buddhist as well as the Naiyāyika are regarded by the Jaina as fraught with fallacies. A real is *anekānta*, i. e. the opposite of *ekānta* having a single character, say permanent or momentary. A thing is possessed of an infinite number of attributes, functions and phases, permanent, impermanent and all the rest. The Naiyāyika's argument to prove that a thing is exclusively permanent and not impermanent at all is bound to be fallacious. It will be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) because a permanent substance is also impermanent in that it is changing its modes every moment. And if the impermanent aspect is denied, the probans implied will prove what is not true i. e., the opposite of the thesis. Thus it will be a case of contradictory reasoning (*viruddha*). It will also be a case of unproved, non-existent reason (*asiddha*) if the probans, say 'bereft of origin and cessation' is adduced for the proof of exclusive permanence. This probans will not belong to the subject, say atom or so, since the supposed permanent is undergoing change every moment and thus coming into being and going out of existence.

Such is the line of argument adopted by the commentator to illustrate the fallacies. But the procedure and method of treatment are not calculated to benefit a neophyte. Furthermore the elaborate divisions and sub-divisions of each fallacy are not thought fit for treat-

ment perhaps on the ground that they are known from the works of logic composed by other authors. We also refer the curious student to the works the *Nyāyapraveśa* of Dignāga or his disciple, *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra and the like.

The fallacies of reason have been disposed of in the foregoing verses, namely 22-23, by the author and the commentator. Now he proposes to deal with fallacious examples in the following verses :

Text

sādharmyeṅātra dṛṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ /
apalakṣaṇahetutthāḥ sādhyādivikalādayaḥ //

Translation

“The fallacies of example based on similarity (positive agreement) arising from probanses lacking in essential part or parts (of the defining characteristic) have been enunciated by experts on logic as consisting of the instances lacking in probandum and the like.”

... (XXIV)

Elucidation

Examples are added in syllogistic arguments to facilitate the comprehension of the necessary concomitance of the probans and probandum and thus indirectly show the cogency of the probans employed for proof of the probandum. According to the Jaina logician necessary concomitance arising from the consideration of the incompatibility of the probans with the absence of the probandum (*anyathānu-papanna*) is the sole and solitary characteristic of a sound probans. Consequently the lack of such necessary concomitance will make the alleged probans fallacious. The examples cited in positive agreement are undisputed cases of the positive concomitance. Counter-examples are the opposite of the positive ones in which the absence of the probandum is seen to be necessarily concomitant with the absence of the probans. The fallacies of the positive examples arise from (1) the lack of the probandum or (2) the probans or (3) both. They also occur if either (4) the probans, (5) probandum or (6) both are liable to doubt. The definite knowledge of the opposite shows that the probans is defective and the case of the indefinite knowledge such as doubt equally thwarts the anticipated inference because the latter can take place only when the elements of necessary concomitance are definitely known to be true. Likewise the fallacies of negative example will also be six which will be defined in the next verse.

Now we are concerned with the defects of the positive examples. The fallacies of positive examples are given as of five types in the

Nyāyapraveśa, namely (i) lacking in the probans, (ii) lacking in the probandum, (iii) lacking in both, (iv) lacking in necessary concomitance, and (v) case of opposite concomitance (of the probandum with the probans stated in the reverse way). (i) The first is illustrated as follows: 'Word is eternal because it is amorphous like an atom'. The atom is regarded as eternal but is not amorphous because it has a definite size however infinitesimal. (ii) The second is the following case: 'Word is eternal as it is amorphous like intellect'. The example is possessed of the probans but not of the probandum as it is known to be perishable. (iii) The example of a jar added to the above illustration instead of the previous ones will be a case of defection of both probans and probandum. For example, 'Word is eternal as it is amorphous as a jar is'. Here the jar lacks both the probans and the probandum. (iv) The fourth is illustrated as follows, namely 'A jar is a product and non-eternal'. The two attributes are stated simply as co-existent in a particular case and not backed by necessary concomitance. (v) The fifth is stated to occur when the concomitance is stated reversewise, e.g. 'Whatever is non-eternal is seen to be a product'. The proper form would be 'Whatever is a product is non-eternal'.

Hemacandra in the *Prāmāṇyamīmāṃsā* sets out eight varieties of fallacies of example in each kind of positive and negative concomitance. (i) The stock example 'The word is eternal because it is amorphous like action' will illustrate the fallacy of lack of probandum, as action is necessarily non-eternal. (ii) The fallacy lacking in probans will occur if an atom is cited as an example. (iii) The example of jar will make it a case of destitution of the probans and probandum both, since jar is non-eternal and also possessed of shape (non-amorphous). The other three types of fallacious examples in agreement occur when the probans and the probandum or both are subject to doubt. (iv) The example of doubtful concomitance with the probandum in agreement is: 'The person under contemplation is subject to attachment (to worldly things), as he makes a speech like the man in the street'. (Here it is doubtful whether the man in the street is actually possessed of attachment because speech is not necessarily concomitant with attachment). (v) The example of doubtful concomitance of the probans in agreement is: 'The person in question is subject to mortality being possessed of attachment like the man in the street'. (It is doubtful whether the man in the street is possessed of attachment). (vi) The example of doubtful concomitance of both in agreement is: 'The person concerned possesses limited knowledge since he is possessed of attachment like the man in the street'. (It is a matter of doubt since the mental conditions

of another person are not easily accessible to an outsider)"¹ (vii) The seventh fallacy of example is found in the case of the reversed statement of the probans and the probandum, e. g., 'Whatever is non-eternal is a product'. It should be stated as 'Whatever is a product is non-eternal'. (viii) The eighth fallacy under question is found when the concomitance in agreement is not set forth in the example. This has been illustrated before (p. 94) from the *Nyāyapraveśa*. The fallacy consists in the omission of the proof of necessary concomitance and not in the unemployment of such expressions as 'all', 'whatever' and the like. In Indian logic the necessary concomitance must be an acknowledged matter of fact, that is to say, must be based on material truth. Mere formal consistency as required in formal logic is not deemed sufficient.

The two other varieties, namely want of necessary concomitance (*ananvaya*) and the reversal of necessary concomitance (*viparītānvaya*) are also set forth by Dharmakīrti in the *Nyāyabindu*. The example of the first is 'Whoever is a speaker is subject to attachment like a specified person'. It lacks in necessary concomitance, though they are found together in the person concerned. The second is illustrated in the following statement of necessary concomitance reversewise 'Whatever is impermanent is a product'. The concomitance holds between the probandum and the probans, and this is reversed in the above proposition.

Though Hemacandra adopts all the instances and illustrations from the *Nyāyabindu*, he does not set out these two cases as instances of fallacious example. He does not differ from Dharmakīrti in respect of the propriety of the two cases in the context, but he asserts that these two cases are covered by the types and instances stated by him.

Our author Siddhasena Divākara does not specify instances. They are supplied by the commentator. The commentator does not recognize the three varieties of fallacies, namely lack of positive concomitance, undemonstrated concomitance in agreement, and the reversal of such concomitance as recognized by Dharmakīrti and Hemacandra. He opines that these are not cases of false example because an example by itself is not competent to prove the probandum. It is the necessary concomitance which can deliver the goods. They are rather cases of fallacious reasons and not of examples. As regards the reversal of the concomitance and non-demonstration of it, they are rather

1. *A critique of Organ of Knowledge*, p. 155.

symptoms of the inefficiency of the arguer. If the personal defects of the arguer be occasions of fallacies, there will be no end of the process because the number of personal defects is legion. It may be argued that whatever be the reason of such statements of deficient examples, they fail to carry full conviction. Siddharṣi rejoins, if such personal drawbacks be taken into account as logical defects, the defects of speech as of a stammerer should be entitled to consideration.

We may observe that this contention of Siddharṣi is more ingenuous than convincing. The defective examples are necessarily cases of fallacious reasons. If the probands employed be correct and possessed of necessary concomitance, they would not be liable to censure. Moreover, an example is needed for the demonstration of the necessary concomitance as has been stated by Hemacandra : 'An example is the locus of the observation of necessary concomitance'. The defects of example are thus derived from fallacious reasons and they serve to bring home the lack of necessary concomitance for the correction of the erring arguer.

Now the fallacies of examples in respect of concomitance in difference are going to be treated in the next verse.

Text

vaidharmyeṇātra dṛṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ /
sādhyasādhanayugmānām anivṛtteśca saṃśayāt //

Translation

"The fallacies of example based on dissimilarity (concomitance in difference) have been enunciated by experts on logic as consisting of the instances lacking in absence of the probandum, the probands and both and also when such absence is subject to doubt." ... (XXV)

Elucidation

In negative concomitance an example is cited to show that the absence of the probandum involves the absence of the probands. If the example cited is found to lack or doubted to lack in the absence of the probandum, or the probands, or both it will be fallacious since it will fail to prove that the probands cited in the main argument is possessed of necessary concomitance with the probandum. As the examples given in the commentary are of controversial nature and not intelligible to the average student of logic who has not cultivated the different systems of philosophy we propose to give the treatment of this topic with the examples from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. The commentator

recognizes six types of fallacies of example not in opposition with (i) the probandum, (ii) the probans, (iii) both, and when the opposition with (iv) the probandum, (v) the probans, and (vi) both is in doubt. We prefer the treatment of this topic and examples given by Hemacandra as they are uncontroversial and more intelligible. Siddharṣi's objection to the two other topics, namely, the want of negative concomitance and non-demonstration of the negative concomitance is on a par with his attitude to the similar cases in respect of concomitance in agreement. As we have dealt with this topic before, we do not think it necessary to dwell on the matter in respect of negative concomitance. We now quote from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* the following passage which gives fuller treatment of the matter. "In the very syllogism 'Sound is eternal being destitute of finite magnitude', atom, action and ether are false examples being not in opposition with the probandum, probans and both. 'Whatever is not eternal is not destitute of finite magnitude (to put it in the positive form: 'Whatever is perishable is possessed of finite magnitude'), for instance (in opposition), an atom'. The example (viz. atom) is not possessed of concomitance in opposition with the probandum (in other words, is not concomitant with the opposite of the probandum), inasmuch as atoms are eternal. Were action cited (as the opposite example), it would be one lacking the absence of the probans since action is destitute of finite magnitude (and not lacking in the probans as it should have been). Were ether (cited as an example in opposition it would be one) lacking the absence of both (the probans and the probandum), for ether is both eternal and bereft of finite magnitude. Thus these three are the types of false examples in opposition".¹

The author has dealt with syllogistic argument and analyses its constituent members into the statement of the thesis, probans, example and also their false simulations. This elaborate treatment of the fallacies is justified because it enables the parties to the debate to expose the defects of other's arguments and avoid them in their own arguments. Now the author proposes to give a definition of confutation and its false simulations in the next verse.

Text

vādyukta-sādhane proktadoṣāṇāmudbhāvanam /
dūṣaṇaṃ niravadye tu dūṣaṇābhāsanāmakam //

Translation

"Confutation consists in the exposure of the aforesaid defects in the syllogistic argument propounded by a debator (for the proof of

1. *A Critique of Organ of Knowledge*, p. 154.

his thesis). But in an argument destitute of these defects, such a procedure is designated as fallacious confutation." ... (XXVI)

Elucidation

The syllogistic argument seeks to produce the conviction of the existence of the probandum (the predicate) in the subject. It assumes various forms as has been shown before. For instance, in specific situation it may consist in the statement of (1) the probans alone, (2) its subject and probans, (3) subject, probans and example, (4) the three with application (the minor premise), (5) the four with conclusion added, and each again may be supplemented by a corroborative argument (*suddhi*), if the situation demands it. The purpose of syllogistic argument is to convince the other party of the truth of the thesis and for this recourse may be had to various steps, otherwise the argument will not be regarded as an instrument of proof. Now confutation of a sound syllogism is not possible and so it relates to a false and fallacious argument. This fallacious argument is not entitled to be considered as an argument proper but on account of its assertion as a false claimant, it passes for an apparent argument before the discovery of the fallacy. The exposure of the defects may consist in the demonstration before the judges of the contradiction of the subject of the thesis by perception and other cognitive organs, demonstration of fallacious reasons or of the defects of the illustrations as consisting in the lack of probans, probandum or both; and if successful it culminates in proving the failure of the argument to bring home the probandum. The exposure of the alleged defects found to be non-existent will be a false, fallacious confutation. The defects alleged or proved must be of a logical nature and such extra-logical drawbacks as grammatical mistakes or rhetorical defects which are worthy of censure in a literary composition should not be trotted out as proof of the incompetency of the arguer, since they have no bearing on the cogency of the argument and so do not detract from its logical efficacy. If such extra-logical defects are allowed to serve as defects of reasoning, the resort to logical defects would be of no purpose.

The author has dealt with the empirical organs of knowledge such as perceptual cognition, extra-perceptual cognition serving the subjective interest of the party or those of the other party, and all their sub-divisions. Now he proposes to establish the ultimate truth of transcendent knowledge which occurs on the elimination of all karmic veils (stemming from nescience) and which is cognizant of all existing facts. This is the true perception par excellence in its own right. The designation and consideration of empirical perception in a logical

treatise is rather a concession to weak intellects. There have been powerful opponents who do not believe in this saving knowledge and accordingly advance plausible arguments by way of opposition. Now this contention is to be refuted and for this purpose the author defines the transcendent intuition as follows:

Text

sakalāvaraṇamuktātma kevalam yat prakāśate /
pratyakṣam sakalārthātmāsataatapatibhāsanam //

Translation

“The transcendent intuition (*pratyakṣam*) which shines in its pure uniformity and is cognizant of all things that exist without interruption or break at any period of time is characterized by its intrinsic nature as emancipated from all obscurative veils.” ... (XXVII)

Elucidation

Our ordinary cognitions are occasioned by the partial elimination and suspension of karmic veils which obscure the knowledge of the self. It is asserted by the Jain philosopher that the self of a man is a pure conscious subject and as such all cognitions that seem to occur are rather revelation of internal cognitions inherent in the self. Knowledge is neither imported from outside nor produced as a new event. When therefore all the obscurative veils are finally eliminated, perfect enlightenment manifests itself. This enlightenment is the birth-right of the self and not a new acquisition. This is the true *pratyakṣa* (perception). The word *akṣa* means the individual self and when this self directly and immediately functions upon the object, the latter is revealed for all the time. The service of the sense-organs or other cognitions as required in perception, inference and the like is not at all in operation. Empirical cognition which depends on the exercise of sense-organs and the presence of accessory condition is dubbed as non-perceptual cognition in the canon. Considered deeply, the so-called empirical cognition is immediately present to the subject but intervened by sense-operation and the like. The soul is possessed of natural capacity for knowledge of all things, but on account of karmic veils which act as barrier, knowledge of things come piecemeal in a graduated scale. Our senses are rather the windows in the prison of the body and as such act more as hindrance than as aids. Transcendent knowledge which is the equivalent of omniscience is a reality.

But what is the proof of it? You have made it subject of the definition and this is unwarranted as the subject must be beyond

dispute, a proved fact. To this contention the Jaina proposes the following consideration as an effective rejoinder. Now it must be admitted that clear, vivid perception of all existent facts is possible, because these facts are amenable to inference. Whatever is inferred must be capable of being known by perception just as fire is inferable and perceivable both. The existence of all things can be proved by inference. Whatever exists is subject to the transition of origin, cessation and continuity, because a thing to be real must have these incidents as inalienable characteristics. The nature of things is like a finger—bent, straightened and so on. In all the states the finger persists as a continued substance through these transitions. This inference of the relativity of all existents points to the possibility of direct transcendent intuition. It may be urged that if a person does not feel inclined to verify this inference by perceptual cognition, the argument of the inevitable co-occurrence of perception and inference breaks down. Well, this is no objection at all since our contention is that a thing which is amenable to inference is also amenable to perception. If perception does not materialize, it does not affect the validity of the argument.

We may arrive at the same conclusion by following another line of argument. The self is susceptible of total purification by the application of suitable expedients. Whatever is susceptible to the application of purificants is competent to reach the state of purification. Gold, jewels and such-like things are susceptible to purification by application of soda, rubbing with mud, and burning heat in a hermetically sealed vessel. The self is susceptible to the application of the purificatory method of repeated contemplation, knowledge and also practice of austerities. But how can you posit that these mental exercises are the competent condition of the purification of the self? The answer is that it is the clear testimony of our experience. We know that by repeated perception a thing is known to become progressively clearer and clearer. By the application of specifically efficient processes of closer perception a thing can be known in its entirety.

It has been contended by Kumārila and his followers that there is no proof of an omniscient person. But the dogmatic denial of omniscience presupposes omniscience on the part of the arguer. A thing can be denied if it is possible and known to be such. When you take the agnostic attitude and deny that all the infinite plurality of things cannot be cognized by any person, your denial betrays your knowledge of those things which you deny. Certainly a man with a modicum of sanity cannot feel the necessity of denying a fiction. It is only a fact and an existent fact at that which can be asserted or

denied. So one should not assume a dogmatic attitude regarding the possibility or impossibility of omniscience. Hemacandra has given other arguments for the proof of omniscience. The progressive development of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere since this is the way of all progression. This argument proves knowledge *ne plus ultra*. We refer the curious student to the works of Jaina logicians, the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, *Syādvādaratnākara*, etc. The Buddhist also believes in the omniscience of the Buddha and has waged a relentless war against the Mīmāṃsakas. I may refer the reader to my paper 'The omniscient as the founder of Religion' published in the third volume of the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Research Publication. It is an intriguing problem of religion and nobody who believes in religion and in the infallibility of a prophet or a scripture has to face the barrage of arguments of the sceptic or the practical work-a-day man who believes in the testimony of his resources. Scepticism is now in the air and anything that smacks of super-sensuous beliefs is held to be suspect. We may observe that if belief in transcendent reality be held to be a dogmatic, superstitious and uncriticized article of faith, the unqualified denial of this possibility is equally open to the accusation of dogmatism. It may not be possible to prove the existence of God, after-life, immortality of soul with mathematical certainty, but the denial of these concepts is also liable to be arraigned on the charge of dogmatism. Arguments of philosophers who exult in their scepticism have not been able to disabuse the honest believer of his unwavering faith. And perhaps these matters are not competent to philosophical treatment. Philosophy is guided by logic and logic, as we understand, is derived from experience. It is empirical *per se* and not competent to prove metempirical facts. It is more rational to hold one's doubt in abeyance and adopt a non-committal attitude, if he is not satisfied with the professions of scriptures.

The author has disposed of the question of definition and number of cognitive organs and the differences of philosophers on these topics. The subject matter of valid cognition now deserves to be treated and so also the consequences of it. But as the former requires elaborate treatment and there is sharp difference of opinion among different schools of philosophers, he defers its treatment and immediately takes up the question of the results and consequences which emerge from valid cognition.

Text

pramāṇasya phalaṃ śākṣādajñānavinivartanam /
kevalasya sukhopekṣe śeṣasyādānahānadhīḥ //

Translation

“The immediate consequence of valid cognition or a cognitive organ (for that matter) is the elimination of ignorance (of the subject). The consequences of transcendent cognition are supernal bliss and equanimity, and the awareness of (feasibility of) acceptance and avoidance are (the consequences) of the rest.” ... (XXVIII)

Elucidation

A cognitive organ or a valid cognition for that matter which are ontologically the same thing produces twofold result, immediate and mediate. The immediate result is the elimination of ignorance of the object of proof. It is apparent that the object was unknown before its revelation by a cognitive organ. This emphasis on the expulsion of ignorance furnishes the *raison d'être* of the inclusion of the adjective ‘previously unknown’ to the object of valid cognition. The object of valid cognition must be one that was not known immediately before the cognition. This is regarded as the universal condition of valid cognition by the Buddhist, the Vedāntist and the Mīmāṃsaka. The admission of the necessity of the expulsion of ignorance as the immediate result of valid cognition on the part of the Jaina logician is tantamount to the admission of the logical necessity of the adjectival clause ‘previously unknown’ as qualifying the object of valid cognition. The objection of the Jaina to this additive qualification is therefore not to be understood as a case of rigid exclusion. It is implied that the object of cognition must be previously unknown; otherwise a cognitive organ would have no specific function of its own which consists in the elimination of antecedent ignorance. The objection of the Jaina logician to the inclusion of the specific adjective in the definition of valid cognition is inspired by the consideration that the previous ignorance of the object is a common universal characteristic of all valid cognition and so specific statement is pointless. The knowledge of a known fact is regarded by the Mīmāṃsaka and so also the Buddhist and the Vedāntist as a useless repetition which does not make any special contribution, though the repetitive experience cannot be convicted of intrinsic invalidity. It is for this reason Dharmakīrti does not accord the status of valid cognition to reflective judgement (*vikalpa*) falling upon immediate perception of the sense-datum. For instance, the jar is perceived as a unique fact (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the perception, though indeterminate, is vivid and lively. It is not analysed into a substantive and adjective, subject and predicate, because the Buddhist thinks that the quality of a thing is not and cannot be sundered without doing violence to the unity of the object.

But without this disintegration the object or sense-datum cannot be used as a concept or a term and thus cannot place it on a basis of certitude. The perceptual judgement 'It is a jar' with its unique character, universal 'jarhood' makes it productive of pragmatic consequences. But it is not regarded as a valid cognition by the Buddhist because of its conceptual character. The admission of validity of inference of fire, for instance, though not intrinsically valid, being conversant with the concept of fire, i.e. the 'fire-universal', by the Buddhist logicians is inspired by the consideration of its pragmatic verification which confirms the deliverance of inference. But the denial of validity to the reflective perceptual judgement involves self-contradiction on the part of the Buddhist. The reflective judgement in the trail of immediate perception of the sense-datum is confirmed by pragmatic test of verification and is thus perfectly on a par with inference. The admission of validity of inference in spite of its conceptual character and denial of validity to perceptual judgement in spite of its confirmation by pragmatic verification savour of self-contradiction. But the Buddhist defends his position on the ground that perceptual judgement does not give a novel insight into a real but only reproduces and clarifies the content of sense-intuition. It is on account of this repetition that perceptual judgment is not accorded the status of valid cognition which is accorded to inference. Inference, though a judgement, points to the individual fire, say on the hill, which was not known before. So it yields knowledge of a fact previously unknown and thus makes an advance on the previous stock of knowledge. Though perceptual judgement also refers to, and leads to the verification of, the individual just like inference, it does not give us any new information and thus lacks in the fundamental characteristic of valid cognition which consists in the new knowledge of an unknown fact.

It should be borne in mind that the question of previous knowledge of the object of valid cognition has relevancy only to perception. The continuous perception of an object (*dhārāvāhika*)¹ is a moot question of epistemology. The difficulty centres on the second and subsequent cognitions which only apprehend the object already known in the first instance. Are these cognitions to be condemned as invalid or not? The Naiyāyika has no difficulty because he does not make absence of previous knowledge, the condition of validity. Hemacandra in the *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* does not hesitate to accord validity to such perceptions as he does not think that previous cognition detracts from validity.

1. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.1.4.

But we may draw the attention of a critical scholar to this epistemological problem by trotting out the question from the point of view of the result. If all valid cognition culminates in the elimination of ignorance, that is, previous absence of knowledge of the object, the difference between the Jaina on the one hand and the Buddhist, Vedāntist and Mīmāṃsaka on the other becomes too tenuous. Besides past writers of logic who preceded Hemacandra added this adjectival clause to the definition of valid knowledge.

Now we should consider the case of transcendent intuition of the enlightened saint. As we have observed before, the Jaina philosopher believes that all knowledge is the knowledge of the self and its properties. The perceptual knowledge of jar is not a new experience. It has been existent in the soul of the subject. The operation of sense-organs or conditions of other species of valid cognition only help to suspend or eliminate the ignorance imposed by karmic veils, and it is rather a question of discovery and not acquisition of a new piece of knowledge. The Jaina position resembles the Vedāntist's theory of knowledge subject to the fundamental difference of the Realist from the Vedāntist that even the objects of empirical knowledge are real according to the Jaina and unreal phenomena according to the Vedāntic Monists. Whatever be the status of the phenomenal objects, there is perfect agreement between the Jaina and the Vedāntist that the result of all valid cognition is the elimination of ignorance. As for the transcendent intuition of the omniscient Arhat saint it is the result of the total elimination of all karmic veils which hide the intrinsic light of the soul, and when such a consummation is reached the entire gamut of reality, be it small and great, gross and subtle, near and distant, all become revealed in one sweep. Nothing remains unknown to such perfect intuition.

We have already alluded to the controversy on the possibility of omniscience. Whether it be an article of faith or a well-reasoned out conclusion, the possibility of infinite knowledge cannot be denied on *a priori* grounds. The irrepressible quest of knowledge on the part of scientists and philosophers is inspired by the tacit or explicit presupposition of this possibility. It is the ideal and final consummation of all enquiries into truth. Now an interesting question crops up. Granted that omniscience is realizable by a person, but what will be the result of it and its benefit to the possessor of such knowledge? As we have said, the content of such intuition is the entire gamut of reality and truth. The enlightened saint has come to the journey's end and comes to have knowledge *ne plus ultra*. As he is free from

attachment and prejudice, he is not affected by the perpetual manifestation of the real universe with its seamy side. According to the Vedāntist the plurality of the phenomena has simply vanished and the perfect saint is fully engulfed in the enjoyment of his infinite plenum of knowledge and joy. The Jaina saint is not in the least disturbed by the noise and discordant voices of the world. His attitude is one of serene unconcern and perfect equanimity. The enlightened saint is restored to his own domain, i. e., his infinite self possessed of infinite intuition, infinite cognition (discursive knowledge), infinite energy and infinite bliss. He has reached the consummation. A man cannot rest content with his limitations of knowledge, bliss and also energy. Frustration is the inevitable outcome of limitation and unless these limitations are totally transcended a man cannot be happy. It is the divine discontent with limited possession, finite power and finite happiness, that supplies the *vis a tergo* of all our ambitious plans and undertakings. Man has dreamed of this perfection from the dawn of civilization. Finitude connotes unhappiness. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (vii. 23) we come across a revealing dialogue between Nārada and Sanatkumāra. Nārada wanted to be released from the bonds and limitations which have engulfed him in grief and misery. The way out of this morass has been pointed out by Sanatkumāra to consist in the attainment of the infinite plenitude. Infinite plenitude is happiness and there can be no happiness in anything finite, "*bhumaiva sukham nālpe sukhamasti*".

The Jain philosopher is in perfect agreement with the Vedāntist in this regard. When one has attained infinite knowledge, ignorance does not cause him distress. He has attained infinite power and energy and so all obstructions and hindrances (*antarāyakarma*) cannot cause frustration of his will. He is in possession of infinite bliss which is part and parcel of his own being. He has now become self-contained and self-sufficient and independent of all extraneous aids. The question 'What is the result of such perfect vision of omniscience?' has been answered in the foregoing paragraph. To be more explicit we should observe that perfect happiness and serenity of disposition are the benefits which accrue from this perfection. His equanimity is perfect and is not liable to disturbance.

As regards the consequences of empirical cognition we have already said that the immediate result is knowledge. The reward of knowledge is the knowledge itself. But as finite living beings are concerned with their environment which they cannot completely control or change according to their desire or needs he has to be

satisfied with partial benefits. Knowledge of an agreeable thing induces his conative impulse for its acquisition to his advantage. As regards unpleasant and disagreeable objects which cause his distress and discomfort, he now comes to have the know-how to get rid of them. So acquisition of a pleasant thing and avoidance of an unpleasant object are the advantages reaped by his achievement of knowledge. These benefits are rather consequential. A person who has no craving for such things will feel no urge to secure possession of it. A saint who is inured to the discomforts and inconveniences caused by climatic conditions and environmental changes does not seek refuge in escapism. He has realized that the acquisition of one material advantage necessarily involves submission to another disadvantage as has been observed by Emerson in his essay *Compensation* "Every advantage has a tax upon it". The saints all over the world and particularly in India have therefore delved deep into their own inner self to find out the wherewithal to combat the evils of this world. To external disadvantages he adjusts himself and does not think it worthwhile to be deflected from his purpose of achieving final remedy. As has been observed in the *Śamkhyakārikā* (kārikā 1), all observable remedies provided by science and human ingenuity are neither infallible nor final.

A cognition has a necessary reference to an object. The truth of this position is inevitably demonstrated by a *reductio ad absurdum*. Suppose a man says that he knows. The question will inevitably arise 'what do you know?' If he says that he does not know anything and yet insists on having knowledge, he reduces himself to an absurd position. To know is to know something. If the knowledge has no referent, it is no knowledge at all. Knowledge therefore must be admitted to have a bi-polar reference to the subject on the one hand and the object on the other. There must be a subject who knows and an object which is known. Though this is an obvious proposition, philosophers have differed from one another regarding the nature of the subject and the object. Now the author introduces the question of the object, common to all cognition.

Text

anekāntātmakaṃ vastu gocaraḥ sarvasaṃvidāṃ /
ekadeśaviśiṣṭo' rtho nayasya viśayo mataḥ //

Translation

"An entity possessed of infinite number of attributes as constitutive factors of its essence is the common object of all sorts of cognition. But a fragment of a real isolated from the rest is the object of a partial assessment which is styled *naya*." ... (XXIX)

Elucidation

An entity (*vastu*) has a multiplicity (*aneka*) of facets and aspects (*anta*) which together constitute its essence (*atma*). An object is therefore multiform in nature. Multiplicity is rather an abbreviated expression for infinity. An entity exists as one unitary substance from infinite past and will continue to do so eternally for future. Change is an essential characteristic and change implies the dissolution of a past mode, the emergence of a novel mode and continuity of the substratum. If a mode comes into being in supersession of its predecessors and without belonging to an underlying reality, the modes will be independent events each occurring and ceasing to be at its own time. There will be no change. A thing is thought to change only if it relinquishes its present mode and appropriates another. The modes by themselves have no history because they have no career, past or future. A change necessarily presupposes a past and a future. A mode was not existent before and will not be existent after and as such is changeless. The Buddhist fluxist swears by change and yet reducing every thing to an atomic moment repudiates the concept of change as a chimera.

The Jaina philosopher asserts change to be the integral character of all reals. As change occurs every moment, the number of modes is infinite. So understood from the perspective of change an entity has an endless series of modes as its characteristic attributes. Again considered as a member of an infinite expanse of reality which is an ordered system the relational attributes of a single entity must be practically infinite. Thus judged both by internal and external standards of calculation, even the smallest unit, say a particle of dust, comes to be known as possessed of an infinite number of qualities and modes which can be fully judged by none but an omniscient. And this fullest knowledge is the aim and objective of all rational beings.

A thing cannot be divorced from its attributes and qualities and modes because they are parts and parcels of its being, and from the point of view of persons of limited vision they appear as so many facets. When one stumbles upon a fact and becomes aware of the whole situation which refuses to be divided into segments and fractions and thus to undergo total disintegration in the process, the thing presented to our view is a total entity with its infinite characteristics. The different aspects in which things seem to present themselves are rather the resultant factors of human judgement and as this judgement is determined and directed by preconceived ideas, interests,

inclinations and dispositional attitudes, the judgement varies from man to man. Our judgements are no better than the blindman's estimation of the elephant. One such blind person touches the trunk, another the leg, the third one the belly and the fourth man touches the ear and each gives a different account. This is called by the Jaina philosopher knowledge by *naya*, i.e. diverse approaches leading to diverse appraisals; we shall presently have occasion to dwell upon this interesting topic at full length.

Now we must face the question 'What is the warrant of the assertion that a thing is possessed of an infinite number of aspects and perspectives and this infinite complex forms a unit which confronts even the meanest understanding'. Why should a thing not be dissolved into infinite particulars. What is the cementing bond holding together these apparently recalcitrant plural units in one integrated whole? The answer to this problem will be found in the course of our deliberation on the different *nayas* which culminate in abstract and partial assessment. The Jaina asserts that not only valid cognition but all cognitions, valid and invalid, alike necessarily confront an indeterminate complex. A cognition is called invalid not because it fails to cognize a complex real but because it disagrees in certain parts and attributes from the valid cognition. Cognition as such irrespective of the logical label must take stock of an indeterminate complex consisting of an infinite number of attributes. A valid cognition has necessarily to apprehend a multiple real in which the parts and the attributes are found together integrated in one whole. Of course there are philosophers who demur to accept the position of the Jaina epistemologist, but it will be found on closer examination that the assessment of reals as definite, determinate and simple entities is due to false pre-conceptions and theories which have received the imprimatur of their respective tradition. But it has to be endorsed that whatever is presented to the perceptual cognition free from defects should be accepted as the true object with all its characteristic features. In all our intuitions internal and external things are apprehended as unitary facts in which the qualities and attributes are blended together. The Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika philosophers assert the existence of substance and attributes and their relation as distinctive entities and so refuse to subscribe to the position of the Jaina logician that all entities are complexes of substance, attributes and relations rolled into one. But their position is not as invulnerable as they think. The flaw in their theory will be exposed by a poser. If the numerically different attributes are supposed to subsist in

one substance though they are different from the substratum, what would be the manner of their existence? If these characteristics exist in a substance without partaking of a common nature with the latter, why should they occur in a particular substance and not another? There is no ontological nexus between the substance and the attributes. It is argued that they belong to the substratum by the relation of inherence. But does this inherence make a change or confer a benefit on the related facts? If there is no such benefaction it could exist anywhere else. If however it is admitted that there is a relation of benefactor and beneficiary, then you will have to admit that inherence confers benefit on the terms and this mode of benefaction must differ with the terms. The way in which inherence benefits the substance must be different from the way in which it benefits the attributes. But this admission would invest inherence with a dual character, if not more, and this also will be the case with the beneficiary which receives an additional attribute from the relation. The postulation of different potencies in the relation and the relata will further complicate the issue. How would this potency relate to the terms in relation? If these terms and the relations are absolutely different from one another and have no intrinsic foundation in their very nature, they will all fall apart and the real qua whole will simply vanish. The Naiyāyika realist who swears by the independence of the categories must admit that an entity is possessed of multiple characters by its very nature. If so the entity under consideration ceases to be a simple fact without intrinsic difference. It is more honest and straightforward to admit that the constitution of entities intrinsically and ontologically is a complex in which these apparently different and recalcitrant facts, substances, attributes and relations are accommodated without conflict. A pure simple with no characteristic attribute and no internal and external relation is uncharacterizable, that is to say, without any character. To erect such a non-descript abstraction into ontological real is condemnable on the very face of it, as neither experience nor logic can vouch for its existence as proof. It must therefore be admitted under pain of self-contradiction that entities which are apprehended by experience without a flaw, that is to say, without any defect in the organs of perception, must be accepted in terms of experience. To deny the validity of experience which is neither vitiated by defective conditions nor superseded by contrary experience will lead to unrelieved scepticism, endorsed by the Mādhyamikas or to a large extent by Vedāntic monism.

So far as the Sāṃkhya philosophers are concerned, the position of *anekānta*, endorsing multiple real with varying conflicting attributes as constitutive elements, will be seen to be endorsed by them in spite of their protestation to the contrary. They believe in the unitary consciousness as reflected in the mental modes (*vṛtti*) which become practically identical with consciousness and each such mode envisages pleasure, pain and indifference in succession or simultaneously. As regards its external referent, say jar, it is found to vary in its transition from novelty by wear and tear. The globular shape of the jar and its colour etc. constitute its very body. The varying states are all predicable of the jar which maintains its identity throughout the transition. Internally the internal modes and externally the objects with their varying multiple character are attested facts of experience. The problem of the unification of one and many raised by the advocates of pure *apriori* logic is present in full in every such content of experience. To say that 'many' is an appearance and the one unitary substance is real essays to cut the Gordian knot and not to untie the tangle-strings. When both sides, the unity and plurality, are equally encountered, why should the plurality be guillotined? There is no ground for preferential treatment of the one at the expense of the other. It has been argued in defence that the substances qua spirit and qua matter are found to be unities without change, whereas the qualities and attributes are found to be transitory phases, and so if either of them is to be sacrificed in the interest of truth, the plurality must be jettisoned. The phases are not constant. They change, i. e. come and go. But the unity is persistent and ineluctable. There is a good deal of plausibility in this argument, but it cannot be accepted as the clincher. In spite of their transitional and temporary character, the reality of modes cannot be impugned. An unbaked jar is black and after its calcination in the furnace it becomes red and the red is relatively more durable. But that does not warrant us to suppose that the black colour of the uncalcinated jar is a false appearance. If one is to go by the rule of unity and persistency as the criterion of reality, one will have to accept a drab, unchanging, colourless and bloodless substance as the only reality. But substance without a quality as its content is equivalent to a blank cartridge with its content eviscerated. It is more straightforward to endorse the uncontradicted deliverance of experience and accept the things as they are found to be. This is the contention of the Jaina and he thinks that the Sāṃkhya has to submit to this conclusion so far as *prakṛti* (*prima materia*), which is asserted to be a unitary principle and at the same time composed of three recalcitrant

factors¹ (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), is taken into account. It is therefore one and many at the same time.

Let us now examine the Sautrāntika position which is noted for its unrelenting opposition to the Jaina theory of *anekānta*. But the Sautrāntika can maintain his position only by ignoring the snags and surds in his own theory. For instance, the Sautrāntika is a believer in extra-mental reality. He believes in the independent existence of *rūpa* (matter) which has a structure (*saṁsthāna*) and colour (*varṇa*) of its own. The structure and colour cannot be dissociated. They are one and at the same time two.² Furthermore the reality of a thing is believed to be tested by its causal efficiency. The *rūpa* produces its own facsimile in the second moment and also its idea in the mind of the spectator. It discharges double causal function at the same time. If this dual operation is explained by references to different causal conditions, mind and matter, i. e., in the mental and material plane, how can the Sautrāntika consistently and honestly controvert the position of the realist that a permanent can also discharge different function in succession under different conditions? The permanent can appropriate the different transitional states without forfeiting its unchanging character. Moreover the Sautrāntika believes that only atoms are real and they exist side by side. The juxtaposition of atoms gives rise to the idea of a massive body such as we encounter in actual experience. The atomic character is not noticed and what is noticed is the abiding gross material form which is believed to be derived from the atoms. This admission of noticeable and unnoticeable character of matter shows that it is possessed of dual character, gross and subtle, though apparently incompatible.

Coming to internal experience we notice the same situation. A cognition is an internal fact and yet has an external referent. Even when it is determinate (*saṁkalpaka*) its self-intuition is indeterminate. When again it is erroneous with reference to the external object, it is believed to be unerroneous qua self-intuition (*svasamvedana*). Thus it is found to comprise contradictory characters and yet is believed to be real. Further when cognition takes stock of a number of things present together in a situation with its white, black, red, blue colours and

1. Prakṛti (*prima materia*) of the Sāṃkhya is an eternal entity but is composed of three forces or factors namely *sattva* (the principle of stability and serenity), *rajas* (the principle of activity) and *tamas* (the principle of inertia and darkness)
2. na varṇavyatiriktaṃ ca saṁsthānam upapadyate—*Tattvasaṅgraha* (kārikā, 1327).

different shapes reflected in the content, the cognition is believed not to shed its unity. The cognition and its contents are not ontologically different and therefore unity and diversity must subsist together without a hitch. So the denial of the multiple character of reals cannot be a true estimation of reals internal and external, as the plurality of contents and the unity of cognition have to be reconciled consistently with extra-mental reality. This is achieved by implicit endorsement of multiformity of reality and the protestation of the Sautrāntika only betrays his desperate attempt to pass the buck.

Let us now examine the position of the Buddhist subjectivist (vijñānavādin). The subjectivist does not believe in the reality of external objects and the perceived plurality, according to him, has no existence outside the mental state. But the unity of consciousness and the plurality of its contents can be accounted for by the supposition that unity and plurality are not irreconcilable opposites. A cognition is neither absolutely one nor absolutely many but both together. This is the position of *anekānta*. But the subjectivist may contend that plurality of contents is only a false appearance and therefore does not affect the integrity of consciousness. This line of defence is adopted by all idealists. The subjectivist cannot therefore refute the claim of the Vedāntic monists that one Absolute Brahman is the only reality and the plurality is only an appearance. But though subjectivism may lead to objective absolutism by natural logical transition, the realist does not accept this transition as the ultimate character of reality. Even in the Monistic theory the unity of consciousness is not directly realized. Were it so, all persons would achieve emancipation. The Vedāntists assert that all our imperfections cease as soon as the unique reality of the Absolute is realized. But though the Absolute Brahman as consciousness compact is not realized, it is not unfelt altogether, since that would make the appearance of plurality impossible as in dreamless sleep. However the Vedāntist also will have to admit that absolute consciousness, though it is the only reality, is noticed as consciousness and at the same time remains unnoticed as one unitary principle. This combination of noticeable and unnoticeable traits will invest the Absolute with dual character in spite of their apparent incompatibility.

As for the Śūnyavādin, the Absolute Negativist, it is unprofitable to enter into a controversy with him since he does not believe in the validity of knowledge. But how can he distinguish between truth and error, valid and invalid cognition? The falsity of the cognition is proved by its subsequent contradiction. One sees water in the mirage,

but as the water is not verified it is believed to be false. But if this be the position of the Negativist, he must honestly admit that the cognition of light is valid. In that case he cannot deny the validity of all cognitions. But it has been contended that even the cognition of the shimmering expanse of sand is not valid because it is not perceived as a series of atoms. But what is the proof of the atomic constitution of things? From the Sautrāntika standpoint it may be answered that the first sense-intuition grasps a real as consisting of a number of atoms existing for a moment and being replaced by another set of similar atoms. But if intuition be cognizant of the momentary atoms, then there would be no need for inference. A thing is perceived as a jar, a chair, a table and the like and not as a series of atoms. The Sautrāntika contends that the first indeterminate intuition apprehends these facts as atoms, but the determinate perceptual judgement misses this fact and concentrates on other characteristics. But why should determinate perceptual judgement which makes the first intuition of things effective be suspect? It is never felt by anybody that he sees only momentary atoms. It is maintained by the Sautrāntikas that the immediate perceptual judgement which clarifies the perceived object as possessed of a distinctive character is only a clarification of the sense-intuition and not a new experience. But it is not necessary that a subsequent judgement should clarify all the facts envisaged in the first sense-intuition. The momentariness though envisaged in the first intuition is not clarified by the perceptual judgement following upon it. So pragmatically considered, the indeterminate intuition is believed to be cognizant of these traits which are clarified by perceptual judgement. As momentariness is not cognized and ascertained in the interpretative judgement, it requires to be proved by inference. But this argument is evidence of an after-thought. It is no use to postulate a fact as a content of intuition when it is not ascertained at all. After all this postulation of indeterminate intuition is devoid of proof. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* affirms at the outset that valid cognition is the pre-condition of the satisfaction of all the aims and objects of human beings.¹ So a cognition which does not lead to successful activity is of no use. Indeterminate intuition can justify its claim to validity by giving rise to determinate judgement which makes activity possible. It is better and simpler to hold that it is determinate perception which satisfies the pragmatic test. That alone should be regarded as valid cognition. And even if indeterminate intuition be regarded as the

1. samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ—*Nyāyabindu*, I. 1.

condition of determinate perception, the former should be regarded as a remote antecedent like sense-object-contact. It has been contended that determinate perception only reproduces the content of the indeterminate intuition and as such has no independent status. But even if this contention be considered to be true, determinate perception and judgement, may be regarded as superfluous. It is on the contrary productive of activity and at any rate of the certitude of the content. Without this certitude indeterminate intuition is of no value and is as good as non-existent. Furthermore it is supposed that the indeterminate sense-intuition fully envisages the real with all its features. The momentariness, for instance, of the real is also cognized by it. But it generates the perceptual judgement in respect of a few specific traits and so momentariness is not judged. But does not this postulation of the indeterminate intuition of which there is no decisive perceptual evidence merely complicate the process? Is it not a simpler explanation of the process to say that the object produces perception of a certain number of its traits in pursuance of the operation of the sense-organ, light, proximity and the like? But it has been objected that these traits such as blueness, non-momentariness, circularity and the like are mutually incompatible in an indivisible unitary entity and so they are not regarded as real facts. But even on your supposition, indeterminate intuition is efficient only in respect of its blue-content and not its momentariness. Furthermore the intuition is held to be a case of consciousness indeterminate, unerroneous and the like. So these different attributes namely efficiency and inefficiency, blueness, indeterminacy and unerroneousness should militate against the simplicity and unity of the intuition. If these different attributes or traits can belong to sense-intuition without jeopardizing its integrity, they should not be regarded as incompatible associates in the external object also. It must be admitted then that so far as our perceptual cognition is concerned it does not prove that things are only a series of momentary atoms. The plain deliverance of perception must not be distorted by sophistical arguments. Even in the case of erroneous cognitions they are not entirely erroneous, and authentic cognitions are also not entirely authentic. We see only the front part and not the inside of an object. The perception of a false thing, say of snake in a rope, is not false in respect of its own self. That it is a cognition in spite of the falsity of its content is obvious. The perception of double moon is false but it is authentic in regard to the whiteness and its location in the sky.

We have examined the Sautrāntika theory of perception which has been employed as an argument by the Negativist. The Śūnyavādin

condemns all conditions of validity on the analogy of dream experience. But this is an irresponsible and unwarranted generalization. As there is no limit to irresponsible assertion one might contend that all cognitions are valid like the cognitions of wakeful experience. The Śūnyavādin may rejoin 'You also admit that dream-experience is false and you cannot challenge the assertion of invalidity of all cognitions on the analogy of dream-experience. But the Śūnyavādin takes the assertion of the opponents regarding the invalidity of dream-experience as true. Why should he not accept his another assertion of validity of wakeful experience? The realist may confront the Śūnyavādin with a dilemma. Do you believe that our beliefs are cognizant of truth or not? On the former alternative, the Śūnyavādin will abandon his theory. On the latter alternative, he should not go further afield to adduce dream-experience as the instance of false belief. But if he does not believe in the authenticity of any proposition, the proposition of universal invalidity will also be exposed to the same charge. If belief in the falsity of all beliefs will end in self-contradiction, this belief at least will not be false according to him. And so at least one belief is found to be true and this makes the blanket contradiction self-contradictory. If he admits that his belief is false, it will not prove the falsity of other beliefs. Even in the assertion of the falsity of all beliefs, the truth of the assertion will remain uncontroverted. The upshot will be the assertion of truth and falsity in the same breath and this will indirectly pay tribute to the fundamental position of the Jaina that things are possessed of dual character which though apparently incompatible has yet to be accepted as the true assessment of facts.

We however think that an argument with the Śūnyavādin is unprofitable because whatever drawbacks may be exposed in his assertion he will simply parry it by the reply that it is not his position. He will always say 'My ridges are unrung'. But there is no scope for doubt whether a thinking person can rest content with contradiction of all assertions, positive and negative and yet refuse to be committed to the opposite alternative. The proposition 'nothing is true' is not a self-contradictory proposition like a barren woman's son or a square circle. But the contradiction is at once encountered when one contemplates it. The contemplation and still more the assertion of the proposition are bound to involve the sceptic in self-contradiction. As Descartes has said that one cannot doubt that he is in doubt. He is anticipated by Gautama and Udayana (of the 10th century A.D.) who asserts that doubt presupposes certitude.¹

1, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Chap. I. *Nyāyasūtra*, II 1-7.

NAYAS

The problem of valid cognition qua organ (*pramāṇa*) understood in the instrumental sense¹ and qua result as understood in the sense of an act or fact² has been discussed from all possible points of view sponsored by the different schools of philosophers. There is sharp difference of opinion on the nature (*svarūpa* or *lakṣaṇa*) of valid knowledge and its number (*saṃkhyā*), function (*vyāpāra*) and scope or jurisdiction (*gocara*). The Jaina philosopher entered the arena of formal logic rather late and thus had the advantage of making criticism of the different theories and propounded his own theory in consonance with his fundamental metaphysical and religious creed. In the course of deliberation and critical appraisal the Jaina logician sharpened and polished his own logical apparatus and with its help has been able to arrive at certain astonishingly original conclusions. Though much has been written on Jaina logic there is still room for elaborate consideration and evaluation of the logical theory. It is a matter of congratulation that many a work on Jaina logic and epistemology has been brought to light in original Sanskrit. The theory of multiform evaluation known as *syādvāda* and the promulgation of *nayas*, i. e. different approaches and ways of assessment are rightly claimed by the Jaina logicians as their original contributions. We shall dwell on *syādvāda* in the next section and pave the way for its correct appraisal by the examination of the different *nayas* which may be tentatively translated as ways of approach and assessment of reals. In the preceding discourse we have shown that each real is possessed of an infinite multiple character and all cognitions, valid or invalid, have to reckon with multiform and multinatured facts. Even illusions and errors are of necessity concerned with reality however much they may go astray. Error is not total error and there is an element of truth coupled with falsehood. The totalitarian conception of error sponsored by the Buddhist Mādhyamikas has not been able to secure adherence from other schools of thought. It has also been shown that even accredited authentic cognitions are by their very nature concerned with segments of a real. And the total reality can be envisaged with all its fullness only by a super-intuition (*kevalajñāna*) transcending all limits and barriers. This supernal intuition culminates in omniscience which is the final consummation of knowledge.

A real has to be approached from all perspectives and the *syādvāda* which is formulated in sevenfold predication is a typical

1. pramiyate anena.

2. pramiyate paricchidyata iti pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ bhāvasādhanaṃ.

sample of total vision. Each perspective takes note of a real trait out of the infinite complex inspired and determined by the psychological interest, logical equipment, environmental influence, pragmatic need, volitional impulse and so on and so forth. So the assessment of an infinite real in respect of a particular aspect yielding logical conviction of its truth is called *naya*, a sectional and partial evaluation. Even a minute fact is possessed of an infinite number of attributes and functional qualities. It will require an infinite number of observations for its fullest assessment. But the Jaina philosopher has classified them under seven denominations and think that the sevenfold categorization will succeed in grasping a full picture of reality. The formulation of this sevenfold categorization in verbal propositions is called *syādvāda*, because of the necessary qualification of each proposition by the prefix *syāt* meaning 'possibly judged from the point of view of substantiality, time, place and unique individuality'. Each proposition of the sevenfold predication represents a particular perspective, *naya*. This *naya* is intrinsically a judgement and not a hypothetical assumption. These *nayas* have been designated (i) *naigama* (pantoscopic), (ii) *saṅgraha* (unitive), (iii) *vyavahāra* (the analytic and particularistic perspective), (iv) *ṛjusūtra* (the straightline perspective) and (v) *śabda* (the verbalistic perspective) which has three sub-divisions, namely (a) *sāmprata*, the present fact with its distinctive appellation. (b) *samabhirūḍha*, etymological evaluation, and (c) *evambhūta*, evaluation by actualized connotation. These *nayas* will be fully distinguished by the consideration of their specific character, scope and application.

The first *naya* called *naigama* has been interpreted variously by writers of established authority. The etymological meaning is not fixed, and from the Prakrit expression it is asserted to be an approach and assessment from more than one direction. The approach adumbrated by the word is pantoscopic. It takes stock of reality in all possible dimensions and the Jaina writers have dubbed the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as pursuant of this *naya*. The school acknowledges the reality of supreme universal (*mahāsā-mānya*) called existence or being (*sattā*) which inheres with other sub-universal in substance, quality and action. It is the highest generalized concept of being and is one in number without any allusion to particularity. Though it inheres in an infinite number of individuals, it is ontologically one and the same principle. It typifies the highest generalization and in this conception it agrees with Monistic Vedānta which regards it as the only category. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school acknowledges other categories, namely, substance-

universal (*dravyatva*), quality-universal (*guṇatva*) and action-universal (*kriyātva*). These universals are equally independent categories and are not to be regarded as subordinate species included under the category of existence. But each higher universal occupies a larger extension than the sub-universals. Existence inheres in all the three categories mentioned above whereas substance-universal inheres only in substances, the quality-universal in qualities and action-universal in action. Substance-universal as a category includes an indefinite number of species. Thus, for instance, there may be cow-universal, man-universal, chair-universal *et hoc genus omne*. This also holds good of the other two universals. If there be more than one individual, that is to say, from two to nth number it must have a universal as its common character. If the individual be *sui generis* entity, it will have no universal. Thus time, space, ether (*ākāśa*) are substances but as they are all singular in number they cannot have any universal. A universal is needed to serve as a unitive bond among an indefinite number of individuals. Thus, for instance, though the number of individual substances is incalculable they share in the substance-universal as the common character. These universals are objective entities and not mere concepts or names as maintained by the conceptualists and nominalists. The problem of universal has very seriously exercised the minds of mediaeval philosophers of Europe, the Schoolmen and also thinkers of India. It is still an evergreen problem and has divided philosophers in rival camps, namely the Realists, the Conceptualists and the Nominalists. Curiously enough, long before the scholastics of Europe began to speculate on this problem, it engaged the minds of philosophers in India. Of course the Schoolmen took their cue from Plato and other philosophers of Greece. But we are not interested in tracing the genealogy of philosophical ideas, which has an irresistible appeal to the antiquarians. We only propose to draw the attention of students of philosophy to the curious phenomenon that almost the same results were achieved in India. Universal as a category has divided philosophers in India also into three antagonistic groups as spoken above. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is marked for its stubborn advocacy of realism. Whatever is an object of thought must be a real object existing in its own right and is capable of being conceived in thought and expressed in language. The extension of universal is confined to the three categories—substance, quality and action. But universals, ultimate differentia (*viśeṣa*) of eternal substances, namely atoms and souls, and inherence as relation are three categories which exist in their own right without participating in the existence-universal. In other words, their existence is integral to their specific character and

not borrowed. Inherence is ontologically a unitary fact which maintains its identity in spite of its incidence in an indefinite number of entities. Again a universal cannot have another universal. Though substance-universal, quality-universal and action-universal are all called universal, yet they have not any super-universal inherent in them. The universal *per se* exists as a unique entity and the postulation of a super-universal to bring the different universals under one class would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*, since the unifying super-universal being a universal *per se* will require another higher universal to bring it into line with other universals. But though existence makes the individuals participating in it existent, the existence pertaining to the three latter categories namely, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* is rather a reflex of the coincidence of existence with the latter. To cite concrete instances, the existence-universal exists in the first three categories in which the other universals substance-hood, quality-hood and action-hood also inhere. The co-inherence of the substance-universal, quality-universal and the action-universal along with existence in their specific loci confer objective existence on those universals without entailing any additional relation.

We are not pursuing the problem further and our interest is to demonstrate the attitude of these realistic philosophers towards reality. The vision ranges from the highest universal-existence to the lowest possible universal in respect of denotation. It then comes down to unique individuals and particulars which have no truck with universal. So its approach is purely synthetic, synthetic-cum-analytic and purely analytic. The first purely synthetic approach results in existence-universal which has no specific particular attached to it; the second method, synthetic-cum-analytic gives rise to substance-hood, quality-hood and action-hood of which the first universal unifies the infinite number of substances and differentiates them from other universals. Substance-universal is different from quality-universal, and they differentiate their substrates from those of the other types. Furthermore a man is a substance, a cow is a substance, a horse is a substance and each of them possesses specific universal, namely, man-universal, cow-universal, horse-universal and so on. In this way the synthetic-cum-analytic method of approach results in discovering so many universals. Ultimately the philosophers of the school come down to *viśeṣas*, the differentiating properties of eternal substances. Atoms of earth are members of one and the same class and their earthiness distinguishes them from water-atoms, air-atoms, fire-atoms and the like. But what will distinguish the atoms of the same class from one another? They possess the same universal and similar qualities. So these cannot serve as the distinguishing properties. But earth-atom number one is

different from the earth-atom number two. What is the differentia ? A red cow is distinguished from a black cow by virtue of difference in quality. But all earth-atoms have same or similar qualities, so the latter cannot be the distinguishing characteristics. They cannot be self-distinguished either as that would rob the qualities and the like of their differentiating function. To solve this problem of differentiation the Vaiśeṣika posits ultimate differentia (*viśeṣas*) in each atom, which is peculiar to each. So the number of *viśeṣas* are numerically as many as the number of atoms. Again emancipated souls have the same universal soulhood and similar qualities. Yet one soul differs from another soul and this is possible because of the *viśeṣas* attached to it. These *viśeṣas* (ultimate differentiae) are pure particulars and co-eternal with their substrates.

It is highly creditable that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher approaches and studies reality from various perspectives. He has discovered generalities, that is, the universals in their varying range from the *summum genus* to the *infima species*. He has also discovered particulars of varying classes combining generality with particularity with their progressive diminution down to the lowest rung of ultimate differentia (*viśeṣa*) with no universal. It has also spotted out individual substances which stand out as pure individuals without any specific universal. Thus ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), inherence (*samavāya*) are specific individuals without the specific universal etherhood and the like. The philosophers of the school have also discovered substances, attributes, including universals and qualities which are eternal, permanent entities and also impermanent. The Jaina philosopher has characterized this approach as multi-track' observation. He also pursues a similar track and has discovered a plurality of categories. But their assessment is quite different and this difference will be clearly demonstrated in the criticism of the different *nayas*.

We now address ourselves to the second *naya* called *saṅgraha* which stands for synthetic, unitive and universalistic approach and perspective. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assessment of reals as a plurality of permanent, impermanent and semi-permanent entities, and infinite, finite, and intermediate entities has produced varying results. The synthetic, analytic, synthetic-cum-analytic approaches have discovered diverse entities and also a thread of unity running through the different groups. On the positive side, it has classified all entities under six

1. *naikena mānena minotiti naikama iti nairuktāḥ.....*
 Auto-Commentary to *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 2657.
naikagamo naikapathaḥ anekamārgaḥ, sāmānyādi-
mārgānekavāt-Auto-Commentary to *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* 2638.

categories, namely, substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*), ultimate differentia (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*), and on the negative side four varieties of negation. It is after all the vision of a pluralistic universe consisting of infinite entities though grouped under several classes or categories. It has not endeavoured to put all the different classes under one comprehensive principle and the different universals are bound to clash and conflict with one another. This constitutes its limitation according to the way of synthetic approach.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers were opposed to the atomic theory of matter which is the corner-stone of the material world according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. It dismissed the infinite plurality of atoms and the six categories as irrational complexities. Broadly speaking, it divides reality under two heads—spirit (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*). The infinite variety of material forms is derived from one *prakṛti* by a graduated scale of evolution. It however endorsed the infinite number of *puruṣas*. The synthetic tendency of thought has triumphed over the pluralistic universals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. But the postulation of two infinities, infinite matter and infinite spirit, was regarded by the Vedāntist as a half-way house between the pluralistic universe of analysts and the monistic tendency of finding the all-round unity amidst the plurality. The Sāṃkhya has failed to bridge the gulf between spirit and matter. The Vedāntists cut the Gordian knot by demolishing insentient matter and relegating it to the realm of appearance. The infinite individual spirits are regarded as a paradoxical concession to popular belief. There must be one infinite, and if two infinities are posited both of them will be reduced to finites. The postulation of two infinities is tantamount to the endorsement of two *bests*. There can be one best and one superlative infinite. So the plurality of spirits was reduced to one Infinite Absolute *Brahman* which embodies infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. The plurality is only an appearance.

But what is the logic behind this monistic conception? The plurality of material forms and also the psychical subjects can pass for real entities in so far as they may appropriate existence. The existence of matter and the existence of spirits are the same common principle qua existence. The absolute unity of existence cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The denial must claim existence as its essential stuff; otherwise it will be non-existent fiction. Each individual must have existence as its unfailing character. So whatever falls outside existence must be a figment of error. One can deny the individual facts and in

point of fact one necessarily ignores the number of individuals when one moves away from one to another. One experiences a jar, a table, a chair and so on and so forth. But the experience of chair is shoved into the background when one experiences the table. These individual facts are even found to come into being and cease to be. So existence cannot be their essential character. Furthermore whenever we perceive an individual fact, we perceive its existence. The individuals vary, come into existence, and pass out of existence and in all our experience existence is the constant factor. Constancy must be the determining criterion of reality. So the plurality of evanescent facts that we come across cannot claim existence as their essential character. Whatever is existent must have existence as its inalienable character and cannot cease to be existent. But the phenomenal world is found to leap into being and cease to be. So the phenomena cannot be existent in their own right. Their existence is only a borrowed reflection. The numerical difference of entities again involves contradiction. They must be one in respect of existence and can be many only in so far as they differ from existence. Difference from existence is tantamount to non-existence. Thus existence is found to be the only reality and plurality must be denounced as false pretenders. Furthermore existence must be identical with consciousness because unconscious existence cannot certify its reality. Uncertified reality has no proof and is thus bound to be relegated to the sphere of non-being. We affirm existence because we are aware of it. But it may be argued, well ! if we cannot do away with consciousness, let it be posited as the sole reality. But consciousness cannot be other than existence as this will amount to the admission of consciousness as non-existent. Consciousness must be an existent fact and as brute existence is bound to be an unproved assumption, existence and consciousness must be rolled into one principle. It is due to the limitation of our thought and capacity for linguistic expression that we use two concepts and two words for describing a self-identical real. Infinite consciousness and infinite existence are thus synonymous. And as regards *ananda* (bliss), it is the concomitant of infinitude. If consciousness be infinite existence, it must be infinite bliss, since want of bliss is only entailed by finitude.

The Vedāntist concludes that infinite consciousness, infinite existence and infinite bliss are the same identical fact and is the sole reality behind and in and through the plurality of appearances.

The Jaina philosopher is a realist to the core of his being and accepts the plurality as undeniable datum. He charges the Vedāntist

with infidelity to experience which alone can be the determinant of reality. Let there be the infinite consciousness, infinite-existence and infinite bliss, but that cannot cancel the plurality of experience. Well, the proof of existence, consciousness and bliss is furnished by experience. Consciousness, existence and bliss are accepted as reals on the strength of experience without which these fundamental data will remain unproved. Accordingly we have to fall back upon experience as the criterion of reality. And when experience endorses the existence of infinite particulars with their infinitely varying complexion and complexity how can we deny their reality and dismiss them as unreal appearance like dream-experience? Dream-experience is denied its validity because it is contradicted by wakeful experience. But our wakeful experience is not found to be contradicted by another more powerful experience. A philosophy which fails to render an explanation of experienced facts and seeks to cover its failure under the camouflage of false appearance cannot be absolved from the charge of imperfect assessment. If the world-order be a false irrational show, it will rob the scientist of his incentive to pursue enquiry and examination of material reality. Science has discovered many laws in Nature and hopes to extend its field of enquiry to utmost limit. But the philosopher who loves to live in his ivory tower and shut out the din and bustle of the world from his vision and affirms that the only hope of peace and bliss is to be found in his sequestered chamber, only gives the counsel of escapism. The Jaina philosopher concludes that this inordinate love for synthetic approach and zeal for unity at the cost of plurality is only an aberration—a false perspective. The unity emphasized by the Vedāntist is not denied, but he denies the plea of its inconsistency with plurality. The plurality is as much a fact as unity. A unity without plurality is a blank and a bleak prospect and plurality without unity is only a chaos. The two must be reconciled by the law of *Anekānta* which avoids extremism. Unity is fulfilled in plurality and plurality owes its vitality to it.

As regards the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika approach, it falls short in spite of its comprehensiveness. The belief in the absolute difference of universal and particular and individual and its changing modes, and the independent status of *samavāya* apart from the terms are snags. They are all integrated into one whole which is a system and not a jumble of isolated units. Each entity from the highest to the meanest particle of dust has a useful function and has a definite assigned place in the hierarchy.

We have disposed of two *nayas*, *naigama* and *saṅgraha*. Now the third *naya*, *vyavahāra*, which stands for the practical, popular approach

and evaluation, will engage our attention. Pragmatism is a necessary and natural reaction against soaring idealism. The total absorption with the One Absolute in direct contempt of experience has everywhere in the world raised a revolt against its banner. Work-a-day people are confronted with various problems and wants and privations which can be satisfied by coming into close grip with the unpleasant reality. No amount of ratiocination and delivery of sermons on the unsubstantiality of the matter-of-fact world can hope to win over the masses. It must fail to afford consolation. The facile repudiation of plurality has produced unexpected reaction. The average people have suspected this extremistic bias for unity as wild chase for the will o'-the-wisp. These abstractions of philosophy are creatures of unpositivism. The so-called universals from the *summum genus* to the *infima species* are simply rejected as non-sense. Practical utility is made the sole test of truth. One requires milk for his nourishment and that of his children and for that purpose acquires a cow. The cow-universal does not give any practical result. One requires a pen for writing a letter and does not bother about penhood. So all common concepts and universals are thrown to the wind. The ideal of heaven and hell, hope of survival after death and all the where-withal of the professional custodian of religion are suspect to him. Whatever satisfies a practical need is deemed real. The practical man does not want to be duped by the promises of eternal heaven and gets down to grapple with hard facts of the world. Science to him is valuable only in so far as it satisfies the needs of the flesh. If this attitude can be given a philosophical label, it may be called particularism and pragmatism of the gross variety. It does not care to build a system of thought which may beguile a contemplative man. No doubt this is an extremistic attitude and encourages philistinism. The poor man will prefer the path of least resistance to enrich himself by despoiling the rich. This weakness of the animal in man is now being exploited by the communistic creed. So long as poverty stalks the world and the majority of people are averse to hard labour and planned enterprise, the preoccupation with particulars and details will make culture an object of hatred. This attitude has been dubbed as behaviouristic and pragmatic approach (*vyavahāranaya*).

This love of particular facts with a view to satisfying the elemental needs is not worthy of condemnation, provided it keeps an open mind to values which may not have an immediate tangible result. The thinking mind will not be satisfied with the rule of thumb. One may not have felt the urge of higher values—intellectual, moral, aesthetic and spiritual—and find his preoccupation with food, drink and clothing

too imperious to have an occasion for the pursuit of these values. But his determined hostility to a man of culture on the score of his pursuit of immaterial ends is dangerous and if it seizes hold of the general mass of people, the consequences will be disastrous. A man of serious disposition and rational frame of mind is not content with the satisfaction of the animal needs. With acquisition of abundant physical resources, he will seek for higher happiness. The satisfaction of the demands of the senses creates other cravings. Temporal prosperity is a good thing, if it prepares the way for the pursuit of higher culture, but cannot be an end by itself. So the practical attitude is only an extremistic reaction against idealism in its extremest form. But, like all extremism, it must be a lop-sided way of life. The aberrations of philosophy cannot be answered by total repudiation of philosophy. It only encourages obscurantism which will shut the door to inquiry and progress.

Extremism tends to give a distorted view of life. The particularistic bias which finds favour with submerged sections of mankind does not stop with the repudiation of universals. The concept of universal emerges after the comparison of the past with the present and anticipation of the future. The common features of these data call for a synthesis which ends in positing universals. The positivistic attitude is impatient with these speculations and in the course of its growth concentrates on the living present. It refuses to take note of the past which it regards as dead and defunct and the future as unrealized and unborn uncertainty. The truth must be found in the immediate present moment. The test of practical utility is capable of being satisfied by the immediate present moment and not by the defunct past or by the hypothetical future.

This approach has given rise to the Buddhist philosophy of flux. The real must be momentary. A thing comes to exist only for a moment and has no link with the past and no truck with the future. The belief in the permanent is only a superstition. The permanent is supposed to have a number of moments as its units. But we do not get permanent satisfaction of our needs from anything. It only gives one result and one advantage or disadvantage. We must avoid the unpleasant and catch hold of the pleasant and not delude ourselves with hopes of future happiness by neglecting the present. This line of approach is dubbed as the straightline approach (*ṛjusūtra*) as performed by the rhinoceros. One must not look behind and sigh for the past joy and not sit idle with crossed fingers for the future millennium.

The Buddhist fluxist has created a wonderful philosophy with its insistence on the momentariness of existents. A thing has neither

past nor future but exists only for present and irrevocably dies in the next moment without any chance of resurrection. The test of reality is found in practical efficiency which boils down to causal activity. A permanent is only a figment of the imagination as it is not found to exercise permanent causal efficiency. The seed in the granary does not produce sprout but one planted in the irrigated soil does it. What is the explanation? If the permanent possesses a permanent capacity, it should produce a series of effects. The seed in the granary does not produce sprout because it does not possess the capacity for it. Possession of capacity is bound to end in the production of an effect. Power kept in abeyance is only a hoax. Why should the seed remain idle? If it is contended that the permanent produces an effect only when it is reinforced by auxiliary factors, the question crops up, what do these auxiliaries contribute to the permanent? The permanent may wait for the auxiliaries if they are of service. A thing which does not confer any benefit, that is to say, an excess on the supposed permanent, it will not be wanted. Only that is wanted which produces a benefit, that is, gives an advantage which the beneficiary lacks. Suppose that the auxiliaries, e. g. soil, irrigation, free air, and light of the sun vest the seed with an additional efficacy, and so long as these auxiliaries are not available the seed will not sprout. But what will be the relation of the benefit concerned with the seed as the supposed recipient of benefit. Unless the benefit becomes identified with the seed it will not be of any avail. If the benefit remains apart and aloof from the seed as it is from other things, it will be useless. But if the benefit, say relaxation of the seed etc., be identified with the seed, the latter will be a momentary event like the benefit produced. So we must conclude that not the past enduring seed but the seed identified with the benefit conferred by auxiliaries produces the sprout. The sprout-producing seed then is a different entity from the past seed. In other words, it is the momentary seed which produces the sprout. It differs materially from the past because it successfully exercises its causal power, whereas the past seed remained absolutely ineffective so far as the sprout is concerned. It is causal efficiency which is the criterion of reality. A fiction has no causal efficiency. The sky-flower gives no scent. Causal efficiency is found in the present momentary entity. The jar that draws water is different from the empty jar in spite of their external physical likeness. The active jar has undergone a constitutional change which makes it capable of drawing water. But unthinking people are deceived by superficial appearance of similarity and think that the entity is permanent with deferred causality. So all that exist must be momentary. The approach is characterized by the

Jainas as the way of the straightline. Its supposed extension into the past and continuity in the future will give it a crooked dimension. Real has only one dimension, the present, and not past or future as the latter dimensions are bereft of causal efficiency. If it is held that an entity has the capacity for a series of causal operation, why should it not produce them all at once and why should it keep power in reserve? Power means execution and the proof of the power is furnished by the result produced. When a thing remains idle and does not exercise its causal power, it means it has not the power. Power and deferred action go ill together. It is only a vain boast if a man affirms that he has power to do a thing but he does not do it for one reason or another. The man must be guilty of braggadocio.

We have dealt with the four *nayas* occupied with the assessment of objective reals. The first *naya* gives a miscellany of independent categories coming into mutual relation. It is synthetic-cum-analytic in character. The second is purely synthetic and concentrates on the unity and simple identity of things with all particulars obliterated from its ambit. The third is the opposite extreme of it and ends in particularism, but stops short with individual substances. This is followed up in the fourth approach which ends in disruption of the individual into its component factors, the present living evanescent atoms. This particularistic assessment is carried on to further stages in the three verbalistic *nayas* which will now engage our attention. These verbalistic appraisals are all called *śabdānaya*. The fundamental line of argument pursued by the advocates of these *nayas* lies in the consideration of words and their meaning. Word is the ultimate principle according to the philosophy of grammar. The fact meant by word is only the other face of the word. Word and meaning are the obverse and reverse of the same coin. This is proved by the fact that whenever a word is presented to the mind its meaning is also invariably presented and vice versa. The word and fact are inseparable. So in the assessment of reals, the contribution of word must be taken into account. It may be urged that a man who does not know the meaning of a word or the word expressive of a fact, does understand the word and meaning in isolation. But this contention is not sound. If the particular word denoting the fact is not known, the latter will be described by a generic word. A man may find a pen but may not know its name. He will call it a substance or something like that. Moreover ignorance is not an argument. The blind man's denial of colour does not prove its non-existence. Besides there is a universal language, the language of concepts. This concept is made definite and externalized by a name which makes it communicable. So it

must be concluded that all things have their definite descriptive names just like a jar or table. Things have been shown by the advocate of the *ījusūtra naya* to be momentary and such is also the case with words which are sounds in point of fact and they are also uttered and perish. So they are equivalents of facts, and facts are the equivalents of words.

The relation of word and fact is known by convention. Words are current coins and their value is fixed and equally made known by convention. But though word and meaning are identical, the synonyms do not denote different entities. They stand for one and the same fact. Thus the word *indra*, *śakra*, *purandara* are different names of the King of gods. But if there is difference of number and gender, then there is difference of meaning. This is in fact the first verbal assessment called *sāmprata śabdānaya*.

The second verbal assessment is called *samabhirūḍha* which identifies the etymological meaning (*vyutpattinimitta*) and the conventional meaning (*pravyūttinimitta*). According to the first *naya*, synonyms denote one and the same entity by convention and the etymological meaning derived from the analysis of a word into a root and a suffix is regarded as a symbolic explanation. But the second *naya* regards this unification of all the synonyms and their meanings as an uncritical appraisal. Thus, the word *indra* is derived from the √*ind* which means 'exercise of sovereignty'. If the person now installed as the sovereign of gods ceases to exercise his paramountcy over gods he will forfeit his claim to this title. Again *śakra* comes from the √*śak* meaning 'exercise of power'. *Purandara* means 'one who shatters the citadel of the enemy'. So the meanings of words are determined by their etymology and usage both. The popular usage, which disregards the etymological meaning and puts a blanket description on all synonyms because of the identity of the substance denoted by them, is an oversimplification which stems from the ignorance of the important nuances of difference which stand for difference of quality and function. A substance without its distinctive function and qualitative content is only an abstraction. The testimony of ignorant people is not accepted as a correct evaluation by the academic bar.

The third verbal appraisal is called *evaṃbhūta*, according to which there is truth in the theory that the etymological meaning should be the conventional meaning. But as words are derived from radicals (verbal roots) which denote particular action, it is the possession and exercise of the action meant which should justify the use of the word. If the etymological meaning, i. e., the function meant by

It is not exercised by the substance, it should not be appropriately expressed by the word. Thus, for instance, the word *ghaṭa* is derived from the $\sqrt{ghaṭ}$ meaning exertion, effort, activity. So a pitcher which actually carries the water, poised on the head of a woman, should be called *ghaṭa*. It is also called *kuta* because of its oblique shape. When bereft of this quality it should not be called by that name. Take for instance another word *kumbha* which being derived from *ku*+ \sqrt{jumbha} stands for the jar filled with water. If anybody calls the empty jar by this name he would be guilty of imprecision of speech. This *naya* is called *evambhūta*, i.e., which actualises the function meant by it. Thus there are no synonyms. The conclusion deduced by this approach is that each thing has got a distinctive name and each name stands for a distinctive entity and further the connotation of a word is always a function and action minus which the word becomes an empty sound, and its indiscriminate use by ignorant people should not be cited as witness for obliterating the difference of semantic value of different words.¹ The use of *double entendre* (*śleṣa*) is a popular rhetorical device with poets. But this indiscriminate identification of words in spite of difference of meanings is only a poetic licence which cannot be justified by a logical evaluation. Mahimabhaṭṭa in the *Vyaktiviveka* and, following him, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra have flatly and unceremoniously denied the logical possibility of paronomasia and their position is justified by the testimony of this last approach, *evambhūta*. The first verbalistic approach centres on the identity of denotation; the second emphasizes the identity of connotation with denotation; and the third lays definite stress upon the actual presence of the connotation as the determinant principle of the use of the words. The past and the future actuality of the connotation is dismissed as an irrational over-extension which, if indulged in, will lead to absurd excesses.

A Critique of the Nayas

It is affirmed by the Jaina philosopher and also proved by him that entities from the smallest to the highest are possessed of an incalculable number of attributes and the cognitive organ which apprehends such entities in their diverse dimensions and in all their bearings and aspects is entitled to the appellation of a valid organ of knowledge. But one-sided apprehension of it focussing on a particular aspect or attribute is called *naya*, i.e, a partial assessment. It does not cease to be valid and true if it makes the simple affirmation or negation without

1. yāvantaḥ śabdāḥ tāvantaḥ arthāḥ, yāvantaḥ arthāḥ tāvantaḥ śabdāḥ /
śabdabhedena arthabhedatḥ, arthabhedena śabdabhedatḥ //

the affirmation or denial of the remaining attributes. But when such an assessment is made categorical and commits itself to that particular aspect as the whole truth and denies the possibility of other attributes, it turns out to be wrong assessment, a false and fallacious *naya* (*na'yābhāsa*). Thus the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika are the advocates of *naigama naya* which takes stock of the plurality of the phenomenal world as real facts and place them under different categories. The Vedāntist and also the Sāṃkhya philosopher to some extent are the advocates of the second *naya*. The positivist and the materialist together with their unthinking blind followers among the unenlightened mass advocate the third *naya* and assess reality in its light. The Buddhist fluxist is the protagonist of the fourth *naya*. All these philosophers are guilty of false assessment, guided as they are by their exclusive approaches. These assessments should not be called instances of true *naya* which takes note of one aspect of a real for the sake of convenience and on account of limited equipment. They are true to the extent of the portion of reality they envisage. But they become false aberrations when the slice of reality envisaged by each of them is dogmatically and peremptorily erected into the whole truth with the implicit or explicit denial of the truth of the remaining aspects. Let us now examine the different *nayas* or rather their aberrations one by one.

The *naigamanaya* as pursued by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has been given a wrong twist. From the sameness of the individuals in respect of being they deduced existence as their common character as the underlying unity of things. And they also take stock of particularities and special features as contradistinguished from existence and other universals. Thus, for instance, the tree-universal is affirmed to be the common property of all individual trees and the individualities of the different species of trees—the oak, the mango, the palm etc.—constitute the distinctive features which distinguish them from one another. The aberration of the *naya* takes place when the universal and the particular are taken apart from one another as independent traits, mutually exclusive. But in actual experience we never find them as dichotomized. They are held together as inseparable facts. A universal without particulars is a mere abstraction and the particulars without the universal are apt to fall apart. So their assertion that these two should not be mixed together, each having an exclusive character, is a wrong evaluation. Moreover a universal has no causal efficiency of its own. It is a particular cow which yields milk and not universal cowhood. Again when a man is ordered to gather fuel by cutting a tree, he cuts any tree he finds convenient for the purpose of the fuel. He does not cut all the trees which fall under the universal

concept. This shows that the universal and the particular are not mutually exclusive. It has however been urged that universal and particular have distinctive characteristics. If they are invariably united and not susceptible of differentiation, then all concepts and common names become unaccountable. The distinctive use of the particular and the universal is not based on ontological difference. It is rather dictated by the theoretical and practical needs of a person. When a person is interested in emphasizing the common character, the universal comes out in relief and the particular occupies a subordinate place in his thought. When however a person is interested in satisfying a practical need such as the procurement of milk, he assigns prominence to the particular relegating the universal to the background. The differentiation of the universal from the particular is rather conceptual and is determined by the theoretical interest or practical utility felt by a person concerned. This does not mean that the differentiation is purely subjective. The two are objective reals and their differentiation and distinction rest upon an objective basis. What the Jaina *anekanta* theory asserts is that the two are not exclusively different nor entirely identical. They stand in the relation of identity-cum-difference. Furthermore the endorsement of mutually independent universal and particular will open the flood-gate of the objections levelled by the Buddhist on the score of relation. The universal is supposed to exist in the whole and its members, but its manner of existence is not intelligible. If the universal exists in each part in its totality, it will not exist in other parts. Nor can it exist piecemeal because a universal has no part of its own. Again the relation of one part to the other part will be open to the same difficulty as parts excepting the atoms are divisible into minuter parts. Secondly the relation of a new-born individual with the universal presents an insurmountable difficulty. The universal is not present in the individual before its existence and it cannot migrate from other individuals. Again the death of the individual will entail the incidence of the universal either in a vacuum or its disappearance. Both these alternatives are unacceptable. Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārtika* has raised formidable objections which stand unrefuted. The Jaina philosopher averts these difficulties by positing the universal as a distinctive property of the individual inseparably combined with the particulars by the relation of identity and difference both. These objections are applicable only to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika conception of universal. We may add that the affirmation of unchanging entities fails to account for their relation with changing particulars. These eternal are not susceptible of change though the relation to changing particulars entails a new relational

quality. When A stands in relation to B, the former necessarily acquires the new quality of relatedness and this entails change. The Jaina philosopher insists in consonance with the Buddhist that causal efficiency is the criterion of normal existence and as such there can be nothing which is not liable to change. Everything changes and yet maintains its identity and identity is not incompatible with difference entailed by change.

The approach of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to reality including spirit and matter is comprehensive and so we have called it pantoscopic. The Jaina metaphysician also follows this way of approach. But they differ in the assessment of the result. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school fails to give an all-round comprehensive system which is claimed by the Jaina as his achievement, directly resulting from the law of *anekānta* which asserts the dynamic nature of all entities by virtue of which things change to accommodate the relational qualities.

We now deal with the *saṅgrahanaya*, the synthetic approach. The Vedāntist monist is the representative advocate of this *saṅgrahanaya*. Existence alone is the real and all the particulars are the pseudo-claimants of existence. If the particulars are different from existence, they will be reduced to fiction. Moreover particulars are found to be and also not to be. Being and not-being are contradictorily opposed, and as the test of truth is non-contradiction, the particular must be dismissed as unreal appearance. Moreover the Vedāntist insists that perception which is the primary source of knowledge of things always takes note of being and not of non-being.¹ A pure negation is a fiction. It is intelligible only with a reference to the object negated and its positive locus. Negation is therefore only an idea and a false idea at that, since negation is never confronted qua negation bereft of its foundation in positive reality. And a positive real is repugnant to negation. The latter must therefore be rejected as a spurious claimant of truth. But the Jaina non-absolutist refuses to be impressed by these arguments. He asserts that each thing is possessed of a double facet, existence and non-existence. For instance, a jar is a jar and not a textile. It is qua itself and *is not* qua another. The two are not irreconcilable opposites as they are endorsed by experience. If experience be denied its validity, the Vedāntist cannot affirm the existence of consciousness of which there is no other proof than experience. If pure *a priori* logic arrogates to itself the authority to dictate terms to reality it will yield the palm of

1. āhur vidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na nisedhṛ kadācana—Mṅḍaṇamīśra.

victory to the Negativist. For instance, the jar is felt distinct from the textile. To be precise, the textile is the negation of the jar and the jar is the negation of the textile. As existence is opposed to non-existence everything felt as distinct particular must be a manifestation of negation. Thus absolute negativism will be the only respectable philosophy. In order to reject the Negativist, the Vedāntist must affirm that uncontradicted experience is the sole evidence of reality. But experience does not endorse pure being as maintained by the Vedāntist. In experience we encounter particulars which are both existent and non-existent, existent as it is by itself and non-existent as another. So neither absolute being nor absolute non-being can be the character of reality. But a question has been raised how can being and non-being co-exist together in one substratum. The answer is given by the Jaina that they exist by relation of identity (*tādātmya*). And being a relation it must subsist between two terms existent and non-existent. The reals as being and non-being are identical as substances. But viewed as attributes they are felt to be different. A thing is existent taken by itself and non-existent as understood with reference to another. Being and non-being are one qua substance and felt as two when considered as attributes. A jar is existent as jar and non-existent as water. Existence and non-existence are therefore felt as attributes of the jar which is numerically one and the same substance. The acceptance of this philosophical appraisal brings about a reconciliation between the warring and conflicting reals and preserves the plurality consistently with their unity of being. Vedānta thrives by excluding non-being and Śūnyavāda gloats over the holocaust of being and non-being both.

The verbalistic approach and its three varieties start with the assumption that word is more fundamental than matter. An entity can be understood thoroughly in the light of word. The monistic conclusion of Bhartṛhari is not accepted by all the advocates of *śabdānaya* (verbal approach). But their whole perspective has been given a uniform orientation by the tradition of the philosophy of grammar. The fundamental contention that each entity must have a descriptive name is rather a too sweeping proposition. The grammarian makes awareness identical with verbal expression. But there are facts which are too subtle to admit of verbal expression. However much one may combat the contention of the Buddhist philosophers headed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that individuals are beyond the range of words, one cannot deny that the idea given by a word is a pale representation of an individual. The full-blooded individual can be known by direct intuition. This is the true assessment of experience. Another consideration also

exposes the weakness of the verbalist. As has been stated by Daṇḍin, the difference of the quality of sweetness in sugarcane, milk, sugar and the like is a felt fact, but it cannot be adequately described by words.¹

As regards the second verbalistic *naya* which denies synonyms and makes out each word to be expressive of a different fact with a different connotation, it has the support of the Māmāṃsist who insists that each word must have a different meaning. But as we have observed, the poets make use of *double entendre* as a striking literary genre. Whatever may be its logical value, the contention that a word should be used for a thing which has the actualized connotation is rather an extreme position. Both the Naiyāyika and Ālaūkārika (literary critic) have classified expressive words under four heads. Thus words are (i) *yaugika*, i. e. entirely derivative. Such words as *pācaka*=cook, *pāthoka*=reader, denote meanings which are derived from the root and the suffix. But there are words called (ii) *rūḍha* which have meanings entirely underived from simpler elements. For instance, *maṇḍapa*=*paṇḍāl* (Hindi) is a whole word. There are words called (iii) *yogarūḍha* which, though they may be derived from verbal roots, have an additional meaning fixed by convention. For instance, the word *paṅkaja*, with its derivative meaning 'one born from mud' or *jalaaja*, 'one born from water', stand for lotus, a particular species of plants, though there are many things which are similarly traceable to the same origin. The contention of the verbalist which becomes more and more particularistic in each succeeding assessment is inspired by extremistic bias and unilateral approach. The Jaina logician does not commit himself to any such appraisal but keeps an open mind and does not seek to offend against the convention of the majority of philosophers. Though language is intimately combined with thought, the former cannot be given a higher status than the latter. Knowledge by description falls short of knowledge by acquaintance because the full-blooded particular refuses to be handled by language. These verbalistic assessments have been given a place in the scheme of *nayas* though their importance is not metaphysically co-ordinate with that of other *nayas*. The recognition of these *nayas* is prompted by the consideration that words may be twisted and turned to the advantage of the speaker and demagogues, politicians, lawyers like the ancient sophists of Greece have distinguished themselves by their notorious manipulation of words. Philosophers are also not immune from this

1. *ikṣukṣiraguḍadināṃ mādhyasyāntaraṃ mahat /
tathāpi na tadākhyātum sarasvatya 'pi śakyāte //*

temptation and so this recognition of the role of verbal assessments is not entirely without a philosophical justification.

I have dealt with the *nayas* and shown that they are to be interpreted with due qualification and unqualified application of them gives distorted version of the truth. But even in a recognized canonical text we come across statements which deal with some particular aspect of reality and these are to be understood as provisional assertions of facts (*nayaśruta*). It is only *syādvāda* unfolded in sevenfold predication which gives insight into the truth of a proposition with all its bearings.

Test

nayānām ekaṇiṣṭhānām pravṛtteḥ śrutavartmani/
sampūrṇārthaviniścāyī syādvādaśrutam ucyate//

Translation

“*Nayas* which are cognizant of one aspect of a real are found to occur in the scriptural canon. The full knowledge of real fact is afforded by the canonical text in the form of *syādvāda*. ... (XXX)

Elucidation

There are three kinds of canon: (i) false or perverted statement; (ii) the statement unfolding a partial appraisal; and (iii) the statement of *syādvāda*, i. e. sevenfold propositions which give a full description of a fact with all its bearings. The special characteristic of *syādvāda* is its freedom from dogmatism. Each proposition in it is qualified by the proviso *syāt*, meaning provided that it should be understood as true in relation to the context determined by the fourfold consideration as substance, its time, place and functional character (*dravya-kāla-kṣetra-bhāva*).

The doctrine of *syādvāda* or sevenfold predication is a difficult subject. We have dealt with this problem in our work *The Jaina philosophy of Non-Absolutism*, and refer the curious reader to it for fuller understanding of the Jaina theory. We quote from the same work the following observation. “The full formulation of the predicates will assume the form as follows: (1) existence (in a specific context); (2) non-existence (in another specific context); (3) successive occurrence of both the attributes; (4) inexpressibility; (5) inexpressibility as qualified by the first predicate; (6) inexpressibility as qualified by the second; (7) inexpressibility as qualified by the third. These are seven attributes which are expressed by seven propositions. The same rule holds good of any other attribute. The seven propositions distinctly stated will be as follows: (1) The pen exists (in certain context);

(2) the pen does not exist (in another context); (3) the pen exists and does not exist (respectively in its own context and in a different context); (4) the pen is inexpressible (qua having both existence and non-existence as its attributes at the same time); (5) the pen exists (in its own context) and is inexpressible; (6) the pen does not exist (in other than its own context) and is inexpressible; (7) the pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible. All these assertions are to be understood as subject to the conditions which objectively demarcate the attributes. Thus, existence can be predicated of the pen only in a definite context. The pen exists in so far as it is a substance and a specific substance at that, that is to say, in so far as it is a pen. Thus, existence can be predicated of it conformably to reality only by qualifying it by a necessary proviso indicated above. Again, the pen exists in its own space which it occupies and in the time in which it is known to endure. Further, the pen has a particular size, colour and shape and so on. The pen is not the pen if it is abstracted from these attributes which give it a definite individuality. Thus, substance (*dravya*), attribute (*bhāva*), time (*kāla*) and space (*kṣetra*) form the context in relation to which an attribute, existence etc. can be predicated."¹

"Thus Jaina asserts that even knowledge of a single attribute in respect of a substance must assume the form of seven modes, if it is to be free from obscurity and inadequacy. The sevenfold predication is, thus, a representation of this sevenfold conception and is expressed in a set of seven distinct propositions from which the knowledge of mutually consistent predicates, affirmative or negative, in respect of one subject, is derived. The full predication of an attribute, it is asserted, requires seven distinct propositions and an additional proposition is superfluous and the suppression of any one results in incomplete knowledge."²

The logical justification of each proposition has been demonstrated in my book under reference and we refrain from dilating on the subject to avoid undue inflation of the present dissertation.

The treatment of *pramāṇa* and *naya* and relevant problems has been attempted in the preceding portion of our dissertation. But it must be incomplete without a discourse on the nature of the epistemic subject (*pramātā*) in which all these epistemological processes find their initial source and final repository. Our author Siddhasena Divākara describes the nature of the self in the next verse.

1. Op. cit. pp. 129-30,

2. Ibid., p. 128.

Text

pramātā svānyanirbhāsī kartā bhoktā vivṛttimān /
svasaṃvedanasasiddho jīvaḥ kṣityādyanātmakaḥ //

Translation

“The epistemic subject reveals its own self and another (object), is the agent, experient, and the unitive bond running through all the different modes and transitions (which occur in it), is attested by self-experience, and is the living principle and is not of the nature of matter consisting of earth and other elements.” ... (XXXI)

Elucidation

The full nature of the self has been summed up by these adjectival predicates. The self is the living principle. So life is the necessary predicate of the self and not of any material fact however subtle and refined it may be. Life has been described as the exercise of five sense-organs and the mind, the speech, the body, the respiratory functions and endurance for the stated period of time (*ayus*) allotted to each embodied self. These ten functions are collectively described as life. But this aggregate of the vital functions cannot be predicated of the emancipated soul and so this characterization is not fully comprehensive, though it holds good of the souls which are held in bondage of *karma*. And as these functions were exercised by the emancipated souls prior to their dissociation from karmic veils, it was their antecedent condition, and so their description as living beings is not incorrect though it is not a necessary concomitant of the pure emancipated self. But if the term life is understood as the exercise of spiritual functions namely, possession of intuition and knowledge consequent upon the total elimination of karmic bondage and as this is the true inner meaning of life, the description of the soul as a living principle may be justified without recourse to metaphorical interpretation. Senses, life, mind, etc. are derived from and ultimately inherent in the consciousness of the self and physical functions are only symptoms of the conscious principle associated with a psychophysical organism.

The self is not numerically different from the principle of consciousness and as such it reveals, i. e., is aware of its own intrinsic nature and extrinsic objects. Consciousness is always self-consciousness and has a necessary reference to an external object. The Jaina conception of self as the very stuff of consciousness, though identical with that of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy, differs from their views in that it has necessary reference to an object. Pure objectless

consciousness is not endorsed by the Jaina at any stage. The emancipated soul being free from all hindrances imposed by karmic limitations is perpetually aware of the entire extent of the subjective and objective planes of the universe. Accordingly, the qualifying adjective 'reveals itself and others' expresses a necessary ontological fact.

Now we propose to examine the logical necessity of the other attributes specified in the original text.

The first adjective 'revealing its own self and another' also serves to rebut the views of the Mīmāṃsaka who believes that the different stages of the evolution of the self as cognition, feeling, and will are unperceivable, and that of the Vijñānavādin who denies the reality of external objects. The self is 'the agent' and also 'the experient' of pleasure, pain, etc. These two adjectives are calculated to rebut the Sāṃkhya theory that an *ātman* is not an agent but is an enjoyer of pleasure and pain. But the Jaina contends that the concept of enjoyment necessarily presupposes the agent of the act of enjoying. It has been, however, contended by the Sāṃkhya that the concept of the enjoyer, experiencer is rather to be understood as the revealer of the reflection of the changes of the intellect (*buddhi*) upon the self. The self is pure spirit and without activity. It only reveals the changes of the intellect as cognition, feeling and the like and this is regarded as the experience of the self by transfer of epithet on account of their close association. But even this act of revelation presupposes some agency and activity on the part of the self. If the self does not relinquish its previous state of inactivity, how can it reveal the content of the intellect as a new event? The example of the crystal which takes the reflection of the red flower and appears as red does not support the position of the unchanging self. The crystal undergoes a change and has the aptitude for such change and therefore its appearance of redness is an actual transition. Certainly other opaque stones do not exhibit such changes. If the self is to be understood as absolutely inactive and totally repugnant to a change, it should not be believed to reveal the mental states.

There are two theories of reflection as quoted by the commentator Siddharṣi. The intellect is compared to a mirror and the images of objects which are the contents of the intellect, presuppose primary reflection. The intellect again endowed with the reflected objects as its contents casts its reflection on the pure self. This second reflection is called enjoyment (*bhoga*) by *Vadamahārṇava*,¹ a work lost, and it is now

1. See *Nyāyāvatāra*, p. 97.

sponsored by Vijñāna-Bhikṣu. The second interpretation is said to be given by Vindhya-vāsin¹ and his followers and is at present sponsored by Vācaspati Miśra in the *Saṃkhyatattvakaumudī*. According to the second interpretation, the self (*puruṣa*) is absolutely static and unchanging, but being transparent, it casts its light on the mind or intellect by its mere presence. The colouring of the crystal owing to its contact with the red flower is an example. The red colour is only an appearance. So also the mental states appear to be conscious on account of the reflection of the self upon them. The self remains absolutely unaffected and there is no reflection of the mental states upon it. The reflection in this case is a false appearance, but the self remains immune from the contamination of false appearance. But whether the self is qualified by the appearance of the mental activity or entirely dissociated from it, the manifestation of the reflection either in the pure self or in the mind cannot be understood without some sort of activity on the part of the self.

The incorporation of the psychical modes and transitions as the properties of the self marks out the Jaina conception of the self from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The latter maintains that cognition, feeling, volition, and their subtle traces actually occur in the self. But they do not induce any change in the cognizer. But the fact that these psychical events emerge and disappear in the very being of the self entails necessarily the transition of the self. It is asserted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that these mental states become related to the self by means of inherence (*samavāya*). But the conception of inherence is not free from logical difficulty. After all it must be admitted that these states are the properties of the self and as they emerge and perish in the self, the self must be believed to have the capacity for appropriation of new mental states and abandonment of the previous ones and this is the connotation of change.

The self is known by its own experience, that is to say, it is always self-conscious. This also constitutes its difference from the self as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

The last adjective 'not of the nature of earth' emphasizes the immateriality of the self. This runs counter to the theory of the materialists who dogmatically assert that consciousness is a by-product of the four or five elements, earth, water, fire, air and also ether (*ākāśa*) when they are combined in the form of the physical organism, in terms of modern physiology in the constitution of the cerebrum and

1. *Ibid.*

connective sensory and efferent nerves. Matter and consciousness are diametrically opposed to one another. Matter is absolutely unfeeling and unconscious and consciousness is an internal spiritual fact. Now the question arises whether each of these material elements is endowed with consciousness or they collectively produce consciousness. But there is no instance of matter giving rise to consciousness. It is particularly in the human body that this causal efficiency of matter is believed to come into play as an emergent evolute. But if the peculiar combination of the material elements constituting the human body be accredited with this causal efficiency, the materialist should explain how the combination takes place. It must be the product of a cause. The Jaina theory of the association of the previously existent self with the new-born body rather furnishes the *raison d'être* of the combination of material elements in a bodily organism. Moreover it is the most satisfactory theory of causation that what is produced is not entirely new. Production means the manifestation of a latent fact.

The materialists are known for their dogmatism. They cannot prove that consciousness is a property of matter. Nor again can they prove that the conscious self suffers total death with the death of the body. The survival of the self after physical death has greater plausibility than the opposite theory. The denial of after-life and of the efficacy of moral virtues robs all the incentives for virtuous life, self-restraint, temperance and justice. As this matter cannot be demonstratively proved with apodeictic certainty of mathematical processes, it will remain more or less an article of faith on either side. If the researches of the Psychological Research Society can reach the certitude of discoveries of other sciences, the scepticism of materialists will be successfully combated. But before this consummation is reached we must agree to differ and not try to convert the unbeliever to this or that creed.

As for the theory of the Buddhists that there is no identical conscious principle known as the self and it is only a congeries of momentary psychical events, it ought to suffice to say that in spite of the ingenuity of the Buddhist arguments, the belief in the identity of the self is not an unfounded article of faith. The Buddhists believe in unrelieved plurality and denies the under-current of unity either in the psychical or in the material plane. But it is an acknowledged fact of experience that unity and diversity are perceived together both in the material bodies and in the psychical subject. The combination of unity and diversity has been accounted for by the law of *anekānta*. The Vedāntist has shown that the consciousness cannot be denied without self-contradiction, though the denial of plurality does not involve any such consequence. Even the Buddhists believe in the

unity of a moment and unity is the presupposition of plurality which means plural units. If either of them is to be sacrificed, the Vedantist jettisons plurality. The realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have tried to reconcile unity with plurality by means of inherence (*samavāya*) and the Jaina theory of *anekānta* succeeds with greater plausibility in preserving the coherence of matter and spirit, unity and plurality.

The author of the *Nyāyavatāra* sums up the net results of his dissertation in the concluding verse.

Text

pramāṇādivyavastheyam anādinidhanātmika /
sarvasamvyavahartṛṇāṃ prasiddhāpi prakīrtita //

Translation

“The determinate conception (and implied classification) of cognitive organs and the like (relevant facts) is without a beginning and without an end. It is much too familiar to all human beings engaged in (theoretical and practical) activities, and this has been discussed (in this treatise).” ... (XXXII)

Elucidation

The science of epistemology dealing with different cognitive organs such as perception, inference, verbal testimony and the rest together with the *nayas* has been surveyed in outline in this treatise. These matters are not entirely unknown even to men of average understanding and are too familiar and favourite objects of discussion by logicians of all schools. In fact scientific investigation and systematization are rather the natural consequence of human thinking as the condition of all purposeful activity. Man is a rational animal and he exercises his faculty of reasoning as a natural process of activity quite as he exercises his respiratory functions. Man is a born logician and the academic training in logic is not the condition of his rationalizing activity. Unless a man exercises his reasoning faculty in the organization of experience and forecasts the probable results of his behaviour, he cannot move an inch. Even day to day activities of the uneducated wage-earner presuppose a modicum of reasoned thinking, evaluation of his past experience, his previous success and failure, truthful verification and disappointment caused by mistakes. Academic education cannot pretend to be a source of such knowledge and activity. But it is not a fruitless waste of time and sisyphian labour. The ideas of uneducated persons are rather confused and not properly distinguished from their opposite counterparts. The academic discipline unavoidably involves an arduous course of intellectual and physical

drill. But one has to pay this price for the sake of precision and proper systematization. As physical exercise properly guided by scientific process results in the improvement and invigoration of the body and its several organs, intellectual exercise also leads to similar improvement in the human intellect. There are men who are chronic victims of indecision and are exploited by clever men who find it profitable to accelerate their tizzy. But professors and teachers are a class of people who help their unfortunate fellow-beings out of this morass of ignorance. They clear away their cobwebs of misconception by imparting true instruction. But unfortunately even among teachers there are found persons who want to derive wealth by sophistical arguments. They also professedly teach their pupils to use sophistry in order to gain undue advantage by putting a wrong complexion on the truthful testimony of honest persons. In ancient Greece, these professional sophists had a respectable place in society. More often than not the professional politicians are found to misguide the uninformed masses and by holding out rosy prospects of easy prosperity hoodwink them to gain their votes in a democracy and lull them into sense of security in a totalitarian state. The effects of such bad education or want of education are eliminated and in most cases mitigated by the gift of true knowledge and stimulation of true insight. The academic processes such as the definitions of the terms and the exhibition of fallacies go a long way in the cultivation of the intellect. Education does not claim to generate new faculties of knowledge, but it regenerates the existing resources and next makes the trainees fitter for the struggle for existence. The religious teachers inculcate the harmful consequences of moral depravity. They show the bright side of life, the wholesome effects of moral discipline. They teach them to be unselfish and compassionate and sympathetic to the people in humbler station of life. Logic like ethics has a practical side. Theoretical knowledge makes the victims of the rule of thumb realize the reasons underlying this success of blindfolded processes. The crucial test of sincerity enlightened by knowledge is the freedom from secular motives of private self-aggrandizement. There have been persons who sacrifice or subordinate their private ambitions for power and wealth and find the fulfilment of their mission in the emancipation of their fellow creatures from the shackles of ignorance, superstition and ego-centric preoccupation. The pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge becomes a passion. They are the salt of the earth as has been said by Jesus Christ. The Jaina Tirthaṅkaras, the Bodhisatvas of the Mahāyāna school and the Sthitaprajñas (men of unwavering wisdom) of the *Gītā* are embodiments of selflessness, for whom the

welfare of living beings is the sole interest and passion. The weal of the common man is their own weal. They do not want to enjoy their own happiness when the rest of mankind is entangled in suffering due to want of the light of knowledge. The unceasing cultivation of knowledge is only a reflex of selflessness. Those who make it an instrument of personal aggrandizement are guilty of committing profanity of a sacred mission. The propagation of science and the cultivation of humanities owe their inception to disinterested love of knowledge and love for fellow-beings. It will be a bad day for mankind if the centres of education are annihilated and men are taught to become misologists. This will lead to total degeneration and atavism to primitive savagery. The present-day wanton crusade against educational centres carried on by teen-agers at the behest of disgruntled politicians in India must be smashed to pieces and no quarter is to be shown to the misguided enemies of culture. We hope that these orgies of madness will prove to be a temporary lapse and not a permanent holiday from sanity.

THE JAIN IDEAL OF AHIMŚĀ AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OTHER INDIAN RELIGIONS AND GANDHI'S AHIMŚĀ¹

NATHMAL TATIA

1. The Jaina saints and philosophers completely identified their religion with ahimsā which is also the keynote of their scripture. Ahimsā is the principal virtue prescribed in the moral code of Jainism, the other virtues—viz. truthfulness, non-stealing, continence and non-possession—being only subordinate in that they are for the purpose of protecting and strengthening ahimsā. Though the moral law *na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni* (one should not cause injury to any living being) is accepted also in Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism, it is only in Jainism that the rule is universally applied and the entire life of its followers, both ascetics and householders, is governed by this ethical principle observed fully or partially according to their spiritual status. Knowledge of botany and biology is inculcated in the disciples to enable them to refrain from doing injury to living beings classified as one-sensed, two-sensed, and the like. The Jaina doctrine of *anekānta* (non-absolutism) is also an outcome of ahimsā as applied in the field of speculative thought. In fact, everything that is Jainistic is directly or indirectly connected with this principle.

2. The Vedic sacrifices (*yajñas*) performed for worldly prosperity and the attainment of heaven gradually gave way to the *yamas* and *niyamas* which were found out as their substitutes. The concept of *dharma* radically changed in course of time. The means must be as lofty as the end. If the means to the attainment of heaven involved killing of animals, it should be discarded. If the end was a transient heaven, it was not an object worthy of pursuit. The meaning of the term *yajña* (sacrifice) was also widened to cover 'acts of selfless service dedicated to God' as exemplified in the following verse of the *Bhagavadgītā* (III, 9).

yajñārthāt karmaṇo'nyatra loko'yaṃ karmabandhanaḥ /
tadarthaṃ karma kaunteya muktasaṅgaḥ samācara //

That is, this world of men suffers bondage from all action save that which is done for the sake of sacrifice; to this end, O Kaunteya,

1. Read at the All India Seminar on "Theory and Technique of Ahimsā" organized by the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, October 11-15, 1969.

perform action without attachment. The Mīmāṃsaka philosopher finally identified his heaven with unhindered and eternal bliss. The Jainas and Buddhists regarded heaven as the fruit of a discipline (consisting of austerity, meditation, etc.) which was impure and motivated, while their highest goal of salvation (*mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*) was achieved by the total eradication of passions through the selfless pursuit of the spiritual discipline which was pure and unmotivated. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosopher's attitude towards the Vedic rituals and his *summum bonum* are expressed in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (verse 2) which runs as follows:

dr̥ṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hyaviśuddhikṣayātīśayayuktaḥ /
tadviparītaḥ śreyān vyaktāvyakta-jñāvijñānāt //

That is, the result of the Vedic rituals is (as useless, as (that of) the customary (remedy), because the former is attended by impurity (due to killing of animals), cessation (after the predetermined period) and gradation as high (and low); the contrary (that is, salvation) is better, which is achieved through the knowledge of the manifest and unmanifest (states of the *prakṛti*) and the principle of consciousness (that is, *puruṣa*). The Vedāntin's position in this respect is represented by the following assertion of the *Bhagavadgītā* (II. 46):

yāvān artha udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake /
tāvān sarveṣu vedeṣu brāhmaṇasya vijānataḥ //

That is, to the extent that a well is of use when there is a flood of water on all sides, to the same extent are all the Vedas of use to an enlightened Brāhmaṇa. The Vedic rites are needless for a person who has realized the *Brahman*.

The foundation of the sacrificial cult was shaken by the relentless crusade by the Jainas (vide *Uttarādhyāyana*, XII and XXV) against it. The Buddhists joined hands with the Jainas in this enterprise (*Suttanīpāta*—*Brāhmaṇadhammikāsutta*) which was continued through the ages of our history. The tenth and eleventh *pacittiya*s (expiatory rules, vide *Vinaya Piṭaka*, *Pācittiya-pāli*, pp. 52-56), which prohibit the digging of earth (*paṭhavi-khaṇana*) and felling of vegetation (*bhūtagāma-pātayata*, *bhūtagāma* being explained as five kinds of seeds, viz. *mūla-bīja*, *khandha-bīja*, *phala-bīja*, *agga-bīja*, and *bīja-bīja*) by a Buddhist monk were prescribed by the Buddha under pressure from the people who believed in earth and vegetation as one-sensed living beings (*ekendriya-jīva*) and were obviously none other than the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. The influence of Jaina *ahiṃsā* on the contemporary religions is, therefore, a truth founded on adequate knowledge and not a mere opinion based on insufficient data.

3. Ahiṁsā as a vow means 'desisting from *hiṁsā*'.

The Jaina philosopher's concept of ahiṁsā is clearly understood from his analysis of *hiṁsā* which he defines as 'the taking away of life under the influence of *pramāda*' (*Tattvārthasūtra*, VII. 13 : *pramattayogāt prāṇavyaparopāṇam hiṁsā*). Here *pramāda* stands for 'unrestraint, passions and perversities and is the most important factor being, indeed, the criterion by which an act is to be judged as *hiṁsā*. Whether a living being is actually killed or not, a person without self-restraint has definitely committed *hiṁsā* (technically called *bhāva-hiṁsā*):

maradu va jiyadu va jīvo ayadācārassa nicchidā hiṁsā

— *Pravacanasāra*, III. 17a-b.

There is, on the other hand, no karmic bondage consequent upon 'a mere act of *hiṁsā*' (technically called *dravya-hiṁsā*) by a person observing unexceptionable self-restraint :

Payadassa ṇatthi baṇḍho hiṁsāmetteṇa samidassa—

— *Ibid*, III 17c-d.

Thus a hunter, on account of his defiled state of mind, is considered a murderer, even though he has not actually committed any murder; but a surgeon, on account of his undefiled and pure condition of mind, is not regarded as a cruel person, even though the patient may feel pain or even die:

aḥaṇṇṇto vi hu hiṁso duṭṭhattaṇṇo mao abhimāro vva/

bāhiṇṇto na vi hiṁso suddhattaṇṇo jahā vijjo//

— *Viśeṣavāsyakabhāṣya*, 1764.

Suppose, again, a person is extremely careful for avoiding injury to life, his mind being saturated with compassion for all living beings. Now if in spite of his freedom from passions and extreme caution and carefulness, he chances to tread upon an insect and injure it, that is not an act of *hiṁsā*.

The Jaina monks and nuns accordingly claim that the strict observance of their moral code which prohibits even the taking of alms prepared for them—thus obviating even their indirect participation in *hiṁsā* involved in the preparation of food, drink, etc.—guarantees the possibility of their lives being absolutely free from any kind of *hiṁsā*. Akalaṅka has raised the interesting problem as to how a monk could be declared absolutely free from *hiṁsā* when there are living beings in land, water and air, and the world is replete with clusters of living beings everywhere :

jale jantuḥ sthale janturākāṣe jantureva ca/

jantumālākule loke katham bhikṣurahimsakah//

— *Tattvārtharājavārtika*, VII. 13.

His ingenious reply will not fail to amuse the discerning reader :

sūkṣmā na pratipiḍyante prāṇinaḥ sthūlamūrtayaḥ/
ye śakyāḥ te vivarjyante kā hiṃsā samyatātmanaḥ//

— *Ibid.*

That is, the micro-organisms are, by nature, unamenable to molestation, and the macroscopic beings that are liable to torture are carefully avoided, and this leaves no occasion of *hiṃsā* for the self-restrained ascetic.

The Jaina laity is required to desist from all kinds of *hiṃsā* that is capable of being avoided and is unnecessary for the maintenance of life. Intentional taking away of life of beings higher than the one-sensed is strictly prohibited for all. Meat-eating is forbidden, because it is not unavoidable and involves killing of animals, which is not permissible even for a householder. Nobody however is absolved from sin consequent upon *hiṃsā*, whether it was avoidable or unavoidable, the degree of seriousness of the sin committed varying with the intensity of passions at the moment of perpetrating the act. Even the unselfish or benevolent acts of *hiṃsā* are not considered free from sin. Some Jaina thinkers have of course defended construction of temples, and other charitable acts as religiously meritorious, but others have unambiguously denounced them as sinful activities. As regards a Jaina layman's participation in war, of which there are many notable instances in history, specific prohibition is not available, though the martial acts of violence are *ipso facto* incompatible with the Jaina philosopher's concept of *ahiṃsā*, and the *Bhagavatisūtra* (VII. 9) categorically rejects the notion that the fearless warrior dead in the battlefield attains heaven. The moral and religious sanction that wars enjoy in orthodox Brāhmaṇism is conspicuous by its absence in Jainism. Justification of the means by the end is not accepted by the Jaina thinkers as a morally valid argument. A good end cannot be achieved by a bad means. The behaviour must be as pure as the intention. The Jainas consequently came to be regarded as staunch advocates of the philosophy of external behaviour as distinguished from the Buddhist and the Brāhmaṇical thinkers who were the protagonists of the doctrine of internal intention. The moral difference between an injury done to a superior life and that inflicted on an inferior creature (*Atthasālinī*, p. 80; *Manusmṛiti*, XI. 140-1) was not recognized in Jainism. The Jainas did not accept the utilitarian view of *ahiṃsā*. These considerations however did not stand in the way of a Jaina layman's participation in the activities of social and national welfare which were pursued by the Jaina laity as zealously as by the followers of other faiths.

The highest ideal of compassion was however developed by the Mahāyāna Buddhists for whom redemption meant redemption of all and not of the individual self. The Buddha, according to them, has not entered into Nirvāṇa at all, but is labouring for the spread of the knowledge of redemption. As long as living creatures suffer, there is no possibility of joy for those who are full of compassion. "All the enjoyments that I possess and all the merits that I earned in the past or am earning at present or shall earn in the future, I give up without hesitation for the welfare of all beings"—such is the determination of the *bodhisattva*:

ātmanbhāvāṃstathā bhogān sarvatryadhvagaṭaṃ śubham/
nirapekṣas tyajāmyeṣa sarvasattvārthasiddhaye//

—*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, III. 10.

4. Let us now look at the orientation that the principle of ahiṃsā received in the life and activities of Mahatma Gandhi. But before doing so, a brief statement of the beliefs and values cherished by him would be found useful. The whole of his activity whether it was social, political, humanitarian or ethical was directed to the finding of Truth which was his God. He had a passion for the service of the suppressed classes. For him the road to salvation lay through incessant toil in the service of his country and therethrough of humanity. There were no politics devoid of religion (*MMG*, p 25). Means and end are convertible terms in Gandhi's philosophy. The means is likened to a seed, the end to a tree. Impure means result in impure end. One cannot reach Truth by untruthfulness. Truthful conduct alone can reach Truth (*ib.*, p. 26). Gandhi was an irrepressible optimist. His aim was not to be consistent with his previous statements on a given question, but to be consistent with truth as it might present itself to him at a given moment. He believed in growth from truth to truth (*ib.*, p. 28). Gandhi wished to live up to the age of 125 years 'while performing service without an eye on result' (*HD*, p. 48). He did not want to be reborn. "But if I have to be reborn," says he, "I should be born an untouchable, so that I may share their sorrows, sufferings, and the affronts levelled at them, in order that I may endeavour to free myself and them from that miserable condition." (*MMG*, p. 33). The Mahāyāna ideal of self-sacrifice and service finds its reaffirmation in this sacred will and testament of Mahatma Gandhi, and also a practical vindication in his life.

Now let us come to the relevant issue of ahiṃsā. Gandhi's exposition of ahiṃsā is as follows :

"*Himsā* means causing pain to or killing any life out of anger or from selfish purpose, or with the intention of injuring it. Refraining from so doing is *ahimsā*."

"The physician who prescribes bitter medicine causes you pain but does no *himsā*. If he fails to prescribe bitter medicine when it is necessary to do so, he fails in his duty of *ahimsā*. The surgeon who, from fear of causing pain to his patient, hesitates to amputate a rotten limb is guilty of *himsā*. He who refrains from killing a murderer who is about to kill his ward (when he cannot prevent him otherwise) earns no merit, but commits a sin; he practises no *ahimsā* but *himsā* out of a fatuous sense of *ahimsā*."

"Let us now examine the root of *ahimsā*. It is uttermost selflessness. Selflessness means complete freedom from a regard for one's body. When some sage observed man killing numberless creatures, big and small, out of a regard for his own body, he was shocked at his ignorance. He pitied him for thus forgetting the deathless soul, encased within the perishable body, and for thinking of the ephemeral physical pleasure in preference to the eternal bliss of the spirit. He therefrom deduced the duty of complete self-effacement. He saw that if man desires to realize himself, i.e. Truth, he could do so only by being completely detached from the body, i.e. by making all other beings feel safe from him. That is the way of *ahimsā*."

"A realization of this truth shows that the sin of *himsā* consists not in merely taking life, but in taking life for the sake of one's perishable body. All destruction therefore involved in the process of eating, drinking, etc. is selfish and therefore *himsā*. But the destruction of bodies of tortured creatures being for their own peace cannot be regarded as *himsā*, or the unavoidable destruction caused for the purpose of protecting one's wards cannot be regarded as *himsā*" (HD. pp. 198-9).

The definition of *ahimsā* given above substantially tallies with the one proposed by the Jainas who, however, would not agree to all the illustrations adduced in this connection. To refrain from killing an otherwise uncontrollable murderer is not a sin according to Jainism. Similarly the destruction of bodies of tortured creatures would also be regarded as *himsā* by the Jainas. The calf-incident and the proposal to kill the monkeys and rabid dogs were also not approved by the followers of Jainism. Referring to the calf-incident, a correspondent wrote:

"Supposing my elder brother is suffering from a terrible and painful malady and doctors have despaired of his life and I too feel likewise, should I in the circumstances put him out of life?"

Gandhi's reply in this connection was in the negative. His arguments were as follows: In the first place, the human body being much more manageable in bulk is always easier to manipulate and nurse; secondly, man being gifted with the power of speech, more often than not, is in a position to express his wishes, and so the question of taking his life, without his consent cannot come within the rule. The question of animal sacrifice was also raised in this connection, on the plea that the animals sacrificed gained merit in the life to follow. But Gandhi rejected the plea on the ground that the sacrificial act, being not altogether disinterested, was to be spelt as *himsā* (*ib.*, pp. 234-6).

The possibility of a purely selfless and disinterested action is also discussed. Even the unavoidable destruction of life that a farmer has to commit in pursuit of his calling is not described as *ahimsā*. One may regard such destruction of life as unavoidable and condone it as such, but it cannot be spelt otherwise than as *himsā*. The underlying motive with the farmer is to subserve his own interest or, say that of society. *Ahimsā* on the other hand rules out such interested action (*ib.*, p. 226). This stand of Gandhi is fully endorsed by Jainism. The killing of the calf, though undertaken with nothing but its good as the motive, is not approved by the Jainas on account of a possible error of judgement on the part of the person taking the decision. But such error is considered 'irrelevant to the fact of the motive prompting the act' (*ib.*, p. 209, though this refers to killing of dogs). It is admitted that there is always a possibility of one's mistaking right for wrong and vice versa, but it is asserted at the same time that "often one learns to recognize wrong only through unconscious error. On the other hand, if a man fails to follow the light within for fear of public opinion or any other similar reason he would never be able to know right from wrong and in the end lose all sense of distinction between the two" (*ib.*, p. 216). And Gandhi is also prepared to take the consequences of his error (*ib.*, p. 224). Things appear as they are "only to a few who have perfected themselves after ages of penance." (*ib.*, p. 196). A critic protested against the killing of the calf as a vain attempt to intervene with the operation of the law of *karma*. Gandhi's reply to the objection is representative of his philosophy of free-will and service as an imperative duty incumbent upon all human beings. "I firmly believe," says he "in the law of *karma* but I believe too in human endeavour. I regard as the *summum bonum* of life the attainment of salvation through *karma* by annihilating its effects by detachment. If it is a violation of the law of *karma* to cut short the

agony of an ailing animal by putting an end to its life, it is no less so to minister to the sick or try to nurse them back to life. And yet if a man were to refuse to give medicine to a patient or to nurse him on the ground of *karma*, we would hold him to be guilty of inhumanity and *himsā*. Without therefore entering into a discussion about the eternal controversy regarding pre-destination and free-will, I will simply say here that I deem it to be the highest duty of man to render what little service he can" (*ib.*, p. 224). The killing of the calf is a case, to use Jaina terminology for a non-Jaina concept, of *dravya-himsā* which is, truly speaking, *bhāva-ahimsā*.

As regards the killing of the murderer, only the *yogin* who can subdue his fury may not kill him. But the duty of a society of ordinary erring human beings cannot but be otherwise (*Cf. ib.*, p. 198). Similarly, although there can be no absolute duty to kill dogs, etc., it becomes a necessary duty for certain people at certain times and certain circumstances (*ib.*, p. 200). The killing of microbes by the use of disinfectants is violence and yet a duty. But why even go as far as that? The air in a dark closed room is full of little microbes, and the introduction of light and air into it by opening it is destruction indeed. But it is ever a duty to use that finest of disinfectants—pure air (*ib.*, p. 194). The non-killing in these cases would be tantamount to, again to employ Jaina terminology for a non-Jaina concept, *dravya-ahimsā*, though in fact it is *bhāva-himsā*.

Gandhi did not believe in the possibility of absolute freedom from *himsā*. "Even the forest-dweller", says he, "cannot be entirely free from violence, in spite of his limitless compassion. With every breath he commits a certain amount of violence. The body itself is a house of slaughter, and therefore *Mokṣa* and Eternal Bliss consist in perfect deliverance from body, and therefore all pleasure, save the joy of *Mokṣa*, is evanescent, imperfect." (*ib.* p. 195). The Jaina ascetic's faith in his absolute observance of *ahimsā* is thus denied. The practical worth of *ahimsā* however remains unaffected in spite of its incompatibility with life in the body. "The very virtue of a religious ideal", says Gandhi, "lies in the fact that it cannot be completely realized in the flesh. For a religious ideal must be proved by faith, and how can faith have play if perfection could be attained by the spirit while it was still surrounded by its 'earthly vesture of decay'? Where would there be scope for its infinite expansion which is its essential characteristic?" (*ib.*, p. 239).

The difference between direct *himsā* such as that involved in agriculture and indirect *himsā* as that involved in the eating of

agricultural produce is not accepted, because then a votary of ahimśā must renounce agriculture although he knows that he cannot renounce the fruits of agriculture, and that agriculture is an indispensable condition for the existence of mankind. "The very idea", says Gandhi, "that millions of the sons of the soil remain steeped in *himsā* in order that a handful of men who live on the toil of these people might be able to practise *ahimsā* seems to me to be unworthy of and inconsistent with the supreme duty of *ahimsā*". (ib., 231). This is yet another argument against the claim of the Jaina monks and nuns that they live a life which is absolutely free from *ahimsā*.

The question of intention or motive also receives a new orientation in Gandhian philosophy. "Whilst it is true", says Gandhi, that mental attitude is the crucial test of ahimśā, it is not the sole test. To kill any living being or thing save for his or its own interest is *himsā*, however noble the motive may otherwise be. And a man who harbours ill will towards another is no less guilty of *himsā* because for fear of society or want of opportunity he is unable to translate his ill will into action. A reference to both intent and deed is thus necessary in order finally to decide whether a particular act or abstention can be classed as ahimśā. After all intent has to be inferred from a bunch of correlated acts." (ib., p. 227).

Gandhi was opposed to flesh-food. He was born and bred in Gujrat where the opposition to and abhorrence of meat-eating were in great strength among the Jainas and Vaiṣṇavas. He however abjured meat out of the purity of his desire not to lie to his parents (MET, p. 36). He held flesh-food to be unsuited to human species (HD, p. 192). But he did not make a fetish of vegetarianism. "It should be remembered", says Gandhi, "that mere *jīvadaya* (kindness to animals) does not enable us to overcome the 'six deadly enemies' within us, namely lust, anger, greed, infatuation, pride and falsehood. Give me the man who has completely conquered self and is full of goodwill and love towards all and is ruled by the law of love in all his action, and I for one will offer him my respectful homage even though he be a meat-eater." (ib., p. 240). One is here reminded of the dialogue between Kāśyapa Buddha and the ascetic Tiṣya as recorded in the Āmagandha Sutta of the *Suttanipāta* (II.2). We reproduce here only two verses (3 & 7), one from the questions asked by Tiṣya and another from the reply given by Kāśyapa Budha.

Question

na āmagandho mama kappatīti icceva tvaṃ bhāsasi brahma bandhu /
 sālinamannaṃ paribhūṇjamāno sakuntamaṃsehi susaṃkhatehi /
 pucchāmi taṃ kassapa etamatthaṃ kathappakāro tava āmagandho //

Thou sayest, O brahma-kinsman, that impure food (*amagandha*) is not acceptable to thee, although thou enjoyest food made of rice together with well-prepared flesh of birds. Of what sort then, O Kāshyapa, is thy impure food ? I ask the this question.

Answer

kodho mado thambho paccuṭṭhāpanā ca
māyā usūyā bhassasamussayo ca /
mānātimāno ca asabbhi santhavo
esāmagandho na hi maṃsabhojanam //

Anger, intoxication, obstinacy, bigotry, deceit, envy, grandiloquence, pride and conceit, intimacy with the wicked—this is impure food, and not the eating of flesh.

As regards war, Gandhi's non-violent substitute for it is *satyāgraha*, self-purification—culminating in the vow of *brahmacarya* which he took in the year 1906—being a preliminary to it (*MET*, p. 389) The original term was 'passive resistance' which was however found 'too narrowly construed'. Maganlal Gandhi coined the word *sadāgraha* (*sat*=truth, *āgraha*=firmness), but in order to make it clearer, Gandhi changed it to *satyāgraha* (*ib.*). In the Boer War in the beginning of this century, in the Zulu Rebellion of 1906, and also in the First World War (1914-1918), Gandhi, however, offered his services for nursing the sick and the wounded soldiers, fully knowing that even 'those who confine themselves to attending to the wounded in battle cannot be absolved from the guilt of war' (*ib.*, p. 429). He participated in the war because he lacked 'the capacity and fitness for resisting the violence of war' (*ib.*, p. 428). *Satyāgraha* was defined by Gokhale as follows (in 1909):

"It is essentially defensive in nature and it fights with moral and spiritual weapons. A passive resister resists tyranny by undergoing suffering in his own person. He pits soul force against brute force; he pits the divine in man against the brute in man; he pits suffering against oppression; he pits conscience against might; he pits faith against injustice, right against wrong." (*MG*, p. 165).

The victory of the moral force over physical violence and injustice is an ancient truth forcefully represented by Gandhi in *The Doctrine of the Sword* published in *Young India* of August 11, 1920. There he declares:

"Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute. The spirit lies dormant in the brute and he knows no law but that of physical might. The dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law to the strength of the spirit.

“I have therefore ventured to place before India the ancient law of self-sacrifice. For satyāgraha and its offshoots, non-cooperation and civil resistance are nothing but new names for the law of self-suffering. The ṛsis, who discovered the law of non-violence were greater geniuses than Newton. They were themselves greater warriors than Wellington. Having themselves known the use of arms they realized their uselessness and taught a weary world that its salvation lay not through violence but through non-violence.

“Non-violence in its dynamic condition means conscious suffering. It does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one’s whole soul against the will of the tyrant. Working under this law of our being, it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire to save his honour, his religion, his soul and lay the foundation for that empire’s fall or its regeneration.”

Gandhi did not approve of the killing of evil-doer or tyrant on the analogy of killing of animal pests that destroy a farmer’s crops, because the former is not considered beyond reform whereas society as yet knows of no means by which to effect a change of heart in the latter. (Cf. *HD*, 226-7).

Gandhi’s self-purification as a pre-condition of satyāgraha and his ‘participation’ in war find their parallel in the life of a lay disciple of Lord Mahāvīra. It is recorded in the *Bhagavatsūtra*, VII. 9, that Varuṇa, the grandson of Nāga, was conscripted by the Ruling Chief of Vaiśālī for service in the Rathamusala War against King Kūṇṇika (Aḷātasastru). In preparation for the war, he started observing his religious penances with redoubled vigour and entered the battlefield with the vow that he would strike in self-defence only at him who will attack him first, and at none else. Being eventually shot with a deadly arrow by the enemy, he drew his bow and killed him. And realizing that the sands of life were running out, he retired to a solitary place, offered prayer, took the vow of absolute observance of ahimśā and drew his last breath to be reborn in heaven. Varuṇa fought the battle in fulfilment of a public duty that he thought he owed to the state, without however compromising his religious ideal of ahimśā. He did not go to war as an aggressor, but purely in self-defence. He retired from the war without the feeling of animosity against anybody and strived for the realization of perfect ahimśā. The example of revengeless war, set by Varuṇa, should be considered as an ancient prototype of Gandhi’s satyāgraha as explained above.

Ahimsā is intertwined with truth, and it is practically impossible to disentangle them. Nevertheless, ahimsā is the means, truth is the end (*MMG*, p. 9). There is no means other than ahimsā to realize truth which is the supreme end. *Hiṃsā* is no alternative to ahimsā as means, because it cannot lead one to truth. The means cannot be dissimilar to the end. The orthodox Brāhmanical view of righteous war as justified by the demands of the situation and as propounded by Lokamānya Tilak (*GR*, pp. 42-3) in modern times is, therefore, not endorsed by Gandhi. End cannot justify the means. Count Hermann Keyserling has given a critical exposition of the problem, from the standpoint of the law of polarity, which will bear quotation *in extenso* :

“This age of ours is one of accepted violence as no previous age ever was, for, this time, the majorities of absolutely all countries inhabited by white men are in some form or other in its favour, as are equally the majorities of most coloured races. Owing to this, it seems to me quite out of the question that this movement demanding change by means of force should end before having exhausted all its chances and possibilities; there will be wars and wars, struggles and struggles, in some place or other of the earth for many centuries to come. But precisely because that is and will be so, a movement inspired by the apparently merely negative ideas of non-violence can gain a vital and a historic importance that it could never have—and as a matter of fact never has—gained under other circumstances. All the more so, as the polar tension between the ideal of non-violence and its opposite implies another polarity; that of the supremacy of the importance accorded to the means employed *versus* the supremacy of importance accorded to the ends attained. And it is this latter polarity which, in my opinion, guarantees the immortality of Gandhi as a *symbol*, whatever may be the eventual success of the movement initiated by him on the plane of facts. Indeed, as long as the Jesuit maxim, “the end sanctifies the means” (a maxim really also accepted by the Puritans in their dealings with Red Indians), prevails, a real and permanent betterment of the world’s condition seems out of the question: destructive means employed engender corresponding counter-means and so forth *ad infinitum*. As the Buddha put it. “If hatred responds to hatred, when and where will hatred end?” (*MG*, p. 133-4).

Gandhi advised violence ‘where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence’ (*MG*, p. 382). He ‘would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonour’ (*ib.*).

It became Gandhi's conviction 'that even venomous creatures may not be killed by a believer in ahimsā (HD, p. 151). He believed that the central teaching of the *Gītā* was not *himsā* but ahimsā. *Himsā* is impossible without anger, without attachment, without hatred, and the *Gītā* strives to carry us to the state beyond *saṭva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, a state that excludes anger, hatred etc. (ib. p. 155). Gandhi also believed that the author of the *Gītā* had extended the meanings of some of the important words. "We are able to discover this", say he, "even on a superficial examination. It is possible, that in the age prior to that of *Gītā*, offering of animals in sacrifice was permissible. But there is not a trace of it in the sacrifice in the *Gītā* sense. In the *Gītā* continuous concentration on God is the king of sacrifices. The third chapter seems to show that sacrifice chiefly means body-labour for service. The third and fourth chapters read together will give us other meanings for sacrifice but never animal-sacrifice. Similarly has the meaning of the word *sannyāsa* undergone, in the *Gītā*, a transformation. The *sannyāsa* of the *Gītā* will not tolerate complete cessation of all activity. The *sannyāsa* of the *Gītā* is all work and yet no work. Thus the author of the *Gītā* by extending meanings of words has taught us to imitate him. Let it be granted, that according to the *Gītā* it is possible to say that warfare is consistent with renunciation of fruit. But after 40 years' unremitting endeavour fully to enforce the teaching of the *Gītā* in my own life, I have in all humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of ahimsā in every shape and form" (ib., p. 164).

Gandhi was an absolutist. "The fact is," says he, "that a votary of ahimsā cannot subscribe to the utilitarian formula. He will strive for the greatest good of all and die in the attempt to realize the ideal. He will therefore be willing to die so that the other may liveThe utilitarian to be logical will never sacrifice himself. The absolutist will even sacrifice himself. The absolutist, when he kills a dog, does so either out of weakness or in rare cases for the sake of the dog himself. That it is a dangerous thing to decide what is or is not good for the dog, and that he may therefore make grievous mistakes is irrelevant to the fact of the motive prompting the act. The absolutist's sphere of destruction will be always the narrowest possible. The utilitarian's has no limit. Judged by the standard of non-violence, the late war (First World War) was wholly wrong. Judged by the utilitarian standard, each party had justified it according to its idea of utility" (ib., p. 209). Here Gandhi is in substantial agreement with the Jaina philosopher who does not believe in the killing of some for the benefit of many, or of the lower species in the interest of a higher one.

5. That the Jaina ideal of ahimsā is the starting point of Gandhi is indisputable. He was born in a society which had intimate connections with the Jainas. On his return from England in 1891, he was introduced by Dr P. J. Mehta to the Jaina Poet Raychandbhai who was a *śatavadhānī*, and at the very first meeting with him, Gandhi was convinced that 'he was a man of great character and learning'. Raychandbhai's 'wide knowledge of the scriptures, his spotless character, and his burning passion for self-realization' cast their spell over him. Gandhi was convinced that the centre round which his life revolved was 'the passion to see God face to face' (*MET*, pp. 112-3). He saw him 'absorbed in godly pursuits in the midst of business, not once or twice, but very often'. "I have since met", says Gandhi, "many a religious leader or teacher. I have tried to meet the heads of various faiths, and I must say that no one else has ever made on me the impression that Raychandbhai did. His words went straight home to me. His intellect compelled as great a regard from me as his moral earnestness, and deep down in me was the conviction that he would never willingly lead me astray and would always confide to me his innermost thoughts. In my moments of spiritual crisis, therefore, he was my refuge." (*ib.*, p. 113). But in spite of this high regard for him, he could not enthrone Raychandbhai in his heart as his Guru (*ib.*). Gandhi was in search of a perfect *jñānī*, a Guru who could guide him in his 'ceaseless striving after perfection as one's right' (*ib.*, p. 114) and lead the way to the Kingdom of Heaven 'through incessant toil in the service of his country and therethrough of humanity' (*Cf. HD*, p 14). This at once sets forth the points of contact and departure between the Jaina and the Gandhian view of life. Gandhi could not reconcile himself to the faith that a particular theory should be the spring of action in any case. "You may commit *himsā*," says he, "not in order that you thereby realize in practice a pet theory of yours, but because you are driven to it as an imperative duty" (*ib.*, p. 206). The Jaina saint's exclusively inward stress on personal perfection was not acceptable to Gandhi. Nevertheless, the impact of the saint on him was deep. "Three moderns," says Gandhi, "have left a deep impress on my life, and captivated me : Raychandbhai by his living contact; Tolstoy by his book, *The Kingdom of God is within You*; and Ruskin by his *Unto this Last*." (*MET*, p. 114). Raychandbhai's remark that 'no other religion has the subtle and profound thought of Hinduism, its vision of the soul, or its charity' pacified Gandhi's mind agitated about the 'pressingly visible defects of Hinduism' (*ib.*, p. 171). The influence of Raychandbhai again was a predominant factor in setting Gandhi's thoughts in the direction of *brahmacarya* (*ib.*, p. 252). It was again from him that

Gandhi first learnt that milk stimulated animal passion (*ib.*, p. 401). It was Raychandbhai's advice to Gandhi that rather than kill the serpent he should allow himself to be killed by it (*HD.*, p. 204).

Some people think that Gandhi's idea of satyāgraha owes its origin to the practice of *dharmā* whereby a creditor at an obstinate debtor's door, an aggrieved person at the door of an oppressor or enemy, sat fasting until death or redress released him (*MG*, p. 225). Whatever the origin, the satyāgraha was forged into a soul force against brute force, the divine in man against the brute in him. This is undeniable and indisputable.

A Jaina *muni* once pointed out that Gandhi was not so much a votary of ahiṁsā, as he was of truth, that he put latter in the first place and the former in the second, and that he was capable of sacrificing non-violence for the sake of truth. Gandhi vouched for the rightness of the statement and averred that it was in the course of his pursuit of Truth that he discovered non-violence (*MMG*, p. 10). The opponent must be weaned from error and established in Truth by patience and sympathy. Pursuit of Truth therefore did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent' (*MMG*, p. 17). Jainism as a religion of individual perfection postulated ahiṁsā as the spiritual means and also the end which was identical with *mokṣa*, whereas Gandhi took a comprehensive view of life in its different aspects, visualizing a comprehensive end which he characterized as Truth. And consequently he discovered the religious principle of ahiṁsā as the means to the realization of Truth. This also explains Gandhi's position that there are no politics devoid of religion, that politics subserve religion, and that politics bereft of religion are a death-trap because they kill the soul (*HD*, p. 14).

I should end my paper by quoting a few verses from the *Himsāṣṭaka* of Ācārya Haribhadra, which would be found to anticipate not only Gandhi's ideal of ahiṁsā, but also his exposition of *himsā* :

avidhāyāpi hi himsāṃ himsāphalabhājanam bhavatyekam /
 kṛtvāpyaparo himsāṃ himsāphalabhājanam na syāt //1//
 ekasyālpā himsā dadāti kāle phalamanalpam /
 anyasya mahāhimsā khalvaphalā bhavati paripake //2 /
 kasyāpi diśati himsā himsāphalamekameva phalakāle /
 anyasya caiva himsā diśatyahimsāphalam vipulam /6//
 himsāphalamaparasya tu dadātyahimsā tu pariṇāme /
 itarasya punarhimsā diśatyahimsāphalam nānyat //7//

The substance is this : One may sometimes have to enjoy the fruit of *himsā* even without having actually performed it. Sometimes one does not reap the fruit of *himsā* even when appearing to have performed it. (1). Sometimes an act which appears as weak *himsā* may produce a mighty result, and on other occasions, an act appearing as *himsā* of considerable dimension may have a result which is slight in proportion. (2). Sometimes an act of *himsā* produces only bad result, but on other occasions the same act could confer immense benefits of *ahiṃsā*. (6). Sometimes, again, *ahiṃsā* can produce the results of *himsā*, and on other occasions, an act appearing as *himsā* could confer exclusively the fruit of *ahiṃsā*. (7).

Abbreviations

GR = Gītā Rahasya by B. G. Tilak, Poona, 1965.

HD = Hindu Dharma—M. K. Gandhi (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1950).

MET = An Autography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth—M. K. Gandhi (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1948).

MG = Mahatma Gandhi—Edited by S. Radhakrishnan (Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1957).

MMG = The Message of Mahatma Gandhi (Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1968).

VALUES AND RELIGION

NATHMAL TATIA

na pūrvāhṇa-madhyandinā-parāhṇān aphaḷān kuryād yathāśakti dharmārthakāmebhyaḥ. teṣu tu dharmottaraḥ syāt.—*Gautamadharmasūtra*, IX. 48-49.

One should not pass the mornings, the middays and the evenings in vain without performing religious duty (*dharma*), acquiring wealth (*artha*), and enjoying the pleasures of life (*kāma*) to the best of one's ability. Among these (three), however, one should place religious duty first and foremost.

1. The nearest Sanskrit equivalent of 'value' is *śreyas* which is defined by Kumārila as human happiness (*śreyo hi puruṣapṛītiḥ—Śloka-vārttika*, codanāsūtra, 191). The *Manusmṛiti* (II. 224) characterizes *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* as *śreyas* and states the different ancient theories about them, along with its own, as follows :

dharmārthāvucyate śreyasḥ kāmārthau dharmā eva ca.
artha eveha vā śreyas trivarga iti tu sthitiḥ.

That is, religious duty and wealth alone are considered *śreyas* 'conducive to human happiness' (by some thinkers); (according to others) it is pleasures and wealth alone (that are *śreyas*); (according to some) religious duty alone (is *śreyas*); wealth alone is *śreyas* here (in this world, according to others). The fact, however, is that the (entire) group of three is (the *śreyas*).

In the *Mahābhārata* (Śāntiparva, Chapter 161, B.O.R.I. Edition, 1954), we find a detailed discussion of these theories. There Vidura places religious duty (*dharma*) at the top and pleasures (*kāma*) at the bottom of the triad. Arjuna considers wealth as the *sine qua non* of both religious duty and pleasures. While endorsing Arjuna's advocacy for a strong economic foundation for the acquisition of pleasures, Nakula and Sahadeva regard religious duty and wealth as co-ordinates, the latter adding favour to the former which confers immortality (*madhvivāmyatanayuktam*). Bhīma's approach to the problem is psychological. He finds *kāma* (desire) at the root of all activities. A man

1. Read at the All India Seminar on "Religion and Changing values" organized by the centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, March 12-14, 1970.

free from desire cannot hanker after wealth, nor can such person perform the religious duty. In fact, a man free from desire is incapable of desiring anything. Desire, therefore, is the supreme determinant of our activities, says Bhīma :

nākāmaḥ kāmayatyartham nākāmo dharmamicchati.
nākāmaḥ kāmayaṅo' sti tasmāt kāmo viśiṣyate.

The consummation of *kāma* (desire) is satisfaction even as nectar (*madhu*) is the essence of blossoms :

puṣpato madhviva rasaḥ kāmāt saṃjāyate sukham.

Even as butter comes out of curds, so does satisfaction (*kāma*) is born of wealth and religious duty :

navanītam yathā dadhnaḥ tathā kāmo'rthadharmataḥ.

Even though he thus analyses *kāma* as the spring as well as the product of the religious duty and wealth. Bhīma strikes a balance between the three when he declares unequivocally that *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are to be evenly pursued; the person addicted to any one of these exclusively is the worst, an adept in two is a mediocre, while a person engaged in the triad is the best :

dharmārthakāmāḥ samameva sevyā
yastvekasevī sa naro jaghanyaḥ.
dvayostu dakṣaṃ pravādanti madhyaṃ
sa uttamo yo niratastrivarge.

Yudhiṣṭhira takes a transcendental view of the problem and decries the triad as of no help in achieving freedom from birth, decay and death, which can be effected only through a selfless pursuit of the highest end of *nirvāṇa* (desirelessness). These (viz. birth, decay and death) are non-existent for a person free from the bond of attachment—thus declared Lord Svayambhū. The wise, engaged in the pursuit of *nirvāṇa*, therefore, counsel that one should neither do what is pleasing nor do what is painful :

snehe nabaddhasya na santi tānī
tyevaṃ svayambhūr bhagavānuvāca.
budhāśca nirvāṇaparā vadanti
tasmāna kuryāt priyamapriyaṃ ca.

2. We have rendered *dharma* as 'religious duty' which should be taken to include moral duty also. The Mahābhārata, the source of our above discussion, forms a vast treasure of moral ideas. It represents more truly than any other similar literary composition the actual standard of morality prevailing at the period, which was a

more powerful trait of Indian religions than faith in the Divine Control of human affairs. The injunctions of the impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) Vedas were the ultimate authority, which were codified in the Dharmasāstras by the Brāhmaṇa sages who virtually ruled the country through the Kṣatriya Kings whom they appointed. The Kṣatriyas and Brāhmaṇas were required to work together in harmony for the protection and prosperity of the country and the development of spirituality. Political power and spirituality went hand in hand (*Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, 74). Neither statecraft could flourish without spirituality, nor could spirituality advance without statecraft (*Manusamhitā*, IX. 332) :

nābrahma kṣatramṛdhnoti nākṣatram brahma vardhate.

The religious motivation of political power in ancient India should be understood in this context. The idea of a jealous God protecting and preserving the rights of a faithful people is conspicuous by its absence in the *Mahābhārata* which embodies the political thought of those days. The term *dharma* which, in common parlance, is used for 'religion', should also be understood here to connote political propriety, social welfare and individual aspirations in addition to spirituality for which it was popularly used. The personal aspect of *dharma* was emphasized by the Buddha who characterized it as of advantage to this life, immediate, to be directly approached and seen, leading to *nirvāṇa*, and to be personally experienced by the wise (*sandiṭṭhiko ayam dhammo akaliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhi 'ti—Samyutta Nikāya*, I, p. 10). Jainism defines *dharma* as the highest good consisting in non-injury to life, self-restraint and penance (*Daśavaikālika*, I. 1), which lay bare its exclusive stress on reverence for life and self-purification. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought, *dharma* is defined as 'what is conducive to *abhyudaya* (prosperity) and *niḥśreyasa* (spiritual salvation)' (*Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, I. 1.1). While the Mīmāṃsā school underlined the *abhyudaya*—aspect, the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yoga schools upheld the *niḥśreyasa*—aspect of *dharma*. In the following statement of the *Mahābhārata* (Śāntiparva, 110.11), we find the famous definition of *dharma* as the sustainer of life and people :

dhāraṇād dharma ityāhur dharmeṇa vidhṛtāḥ prajāḥ.
yatsyād dhāraṇasamyuktaṃ sa dharma iti niścayaḥ.

That is, the *dharma* is so called because it sustains (life). The people are sustained by *dharma*. That which is capable of sustaining (*dhāraṇasamyuktaṃ*) is called *dharma*—this is the considered view (of the sages).

3. Religion was the main source of political power in the ancient world. Professor Mario A. Levi has summarized the role that God or gods played in determining the political authority as follows: "In Egypt the manifestation of the will of God was the word of the Pharaoh-God, in Mesopotamia the word of the delegate of gods. In the Indo-European world there was no such direct way of discovering God's will, and men had to use divination to understand the signs sent by God. Such practices were already known to the Hittites, and by various paths had reached the Etruscans, especially in the form of the interpretation of signs from the heavens, from animals and plants, and from dreams, all of which had been practised in various forms by the Semitic races." (*Political Power in the Ancient World*, 1965, pp. 40-1). The Greek society had its characteristic institution, the oracle, to make sure that in decision of general importance the Greeks should be guided by the will of the Gods to act according to the universal principle of right and justice (op. cit.). The intervention of oracles in human activities, the sovereignty of a supreme God of gods and men, were the solution of a civilization which had no idea of legitimacy apart from that deriving from the gods (op. cit., p. 52). Rome was governed according to a legal code of divine origins. The Romans believed that the validity of their laws was connected with their being formulated for a particular ethnic group, whose members worshipped the deities who belonged to them alone, or who were disposed to favour them particularly. The bonds of faith were the nationalist sentiments of the ancient world; men were linked by the same religion rather than by the same place of birth. In many places this resulted in serious exclusiveness; on the one hand were the elect, faithful to the one true God, and on the other hand, reprobates and infidels. Every war was a religious war, and those who did not belong to the community of the elect could never hope to become members, but were always excluded from the position achieved by the rest (op. cit., p. 142).

The Vedic people did not distinctly recognize the divinity of the King as an individual, though the *Mahābhārata* (Śāntiparva, 68) and the *Manusmṛiti* (VII) ascribe the functions of a number of gods to him. The Jains and the Buddhists, in conformity with their doctrines of *karman*, accepted the superior states of the *cakravartins* (universal kings) and other eminent and powerful personages, due to their meritorious deeds in the past, their number being few, and advent far between. The primitive society is conceived, in all these religions, as regulated by the people themselves out of a spontaneous devotion to religion (Śāntiparva, 59,14 c.d: *dharmeṇaiva prajāḥ sarvā rakṣanti ca parasparam*), the institution of kingship arising at a later period.

Dharma was thus viewed by our ancient sages and lawgivers as an expression of spontaneous love binding one individual to another in a spiritual bond. It was not a lever to exert political power, but an impersonal law to regulate human relations and promote social, economic and spiritual welfare. Politics were required to be based on *dharma* which sanctifies them and also looks to them for its own preservation. The following quotations from the *Mahābhārata* will bear us out :

dharmamevānuvartasva na dharmād vidyate param.

dharme sthitā hi rājāno jayanti pṛthivīmimām. (*Śāntiparva*, 93.6).

sarve dharmāścāśramāṇāṃ gatāḥ syuḥ

kṣātre tyakte rājadharme purāṇe. (*Ibid.*, 63.28 c.d.).

4. While in the field of politics, religion asserted itself through the powers that be, it was directly responsible for the growth of social institutions which however changed from time to time. The system of caste (*varṇa*) is an instance in point. It was intended to stabilize the society by defining the duties and responsibilities of the different strata of the people, best suited for particular tasks expected of them. But protests were voiced against it as early as the times of Mahāvīra and Buddha, although their followers could not but pride themselves upon the Kṣatriya caste of their Masters. The system nevertheless remained effective for centuries with but minor variations and adjustments. What was a virtue in a particular context became a vice in another. The custom of widow-burning which was restricted to the warrior caste in the beginning became a universal practice in later times, though it has now almost completely died out. Untouchability is yet another instance of an irrational custom succumbing to the demands of the age. Religion in its ephemeral character formulates customs which are to be abandoned when their purpose is over.

5. In its aspect of personal experience religion is responsible for the institution of the four stages of life (*āśramas*). One has to reach the highest stage of complete renunciation of worldly interest and asceticism (*sannyāsa*) through a number of others, viz. a life devoted to study (*brahmacarya*), a life dedicated to worldly affairs (*gṛhasthya*), and the life of a forest hermit engaged in acquiring spiritual knowledge (*vānaprastha*). In the religion of the Jains and the Buddhists, and also in Hinduism in the case of an extraordinary aspirant, the order of the stages is however not strictly followed. One is allowed to renounce the world the moment one feels the urge for it from within. Such ideal of renunciation and asceticism is accepted in almost all the religions of the world

although historians are at loggerheads with one another about the effects of this ideal on the well-being of the society and the political aspirations of a nation. Frazer contends that Oriental religions inculcating asceticism upon the spritual aspirants are essentially and incurably anti-social. "The saint and the recluse", says he, "disdainful of earth and rapt in ecstatic contemplation of heaven, became in popular opinion the highest ideal of humanity, displacing the old ideal of the patriot and hero who, forgetful of self, lives and is ready to die for the good of his country. The earthly city seemed poor and contemptible to men whose eyes beheld the City of God coming in the clouds of heaven." (Quoted in Toynbee's *A Study of History*, Abridgement by D. C. Somervell, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 636). Professor Toynbee, however, disagrees with Frazer. "Society has no existence," Says he, "except in the activities of individuals who, for their part, cannot exist except in Society. Nor again is there a disharmony between the individual's relations with his fellow men and his relation with God. In the spiritual vision of Primitive Men there is manifestly solidarity between the tribesman and his gods which, so far from alienating the tribesmen from each other, is the strongest of the social bonds between them. The workings of this harmony between Man's duty to God and his duty to his neighbour have been explored and illustrated at the primitive level by Frazer himself, and disintegrating civilizations had borne witness to it when they had sought a new bond for Society in the worship of a deified Ceasar. Is the harmony converted into a discord by the 'higher religions' as Frazer contends? In theory and in practice alike the answer would be in the negative". "In seeking God," he further asserts, "Man is performing a social act; and, if God's love has gone into action in This World in the redemption of Mankind by Christ, then Man's efforts to make himself less unlike a God who created Man in His own image must include efforts to follow Christ's example in sacrificing himself for the redemption of his followmen. The antithesis between trying to save one's own soul by seeking God and trying to do one's duty to one's neighbour is therefore false." (op. cit., pp. 637-8). The Jaina philosopher's doctrine of standpoints (*nayas*) as applied to the problems of social relations, and the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of *bodhisattva* as the last soul to attain *nirvāṇa* confirm the contention of Professor Toynbee. The salutary effects of a saint's life on the people and the potentates is too palpable to be gainsaid. Mahāvira, Buddha and Śaṅkarācārya were great powers that are to be reckoned with in any assessment of the culture of our country. Professor Toynbee is right when he says about the Christian anchorites

that "in insulating themselves from their followmen, these saints were entering into a far more active relation with a far wider circle than any that would have centred round them if they had remained 'in the World' and had spent their lives in some secular occupation. They swayed the World from their retreats to greater effect than the Emperor in his capital, because their personal pursuit of holiness through seeking communion with God was a form of social action that moved men more powerfully than any secular social service on the political plane," (op. cit., p. 639).

6. We have now discussed the influence of religion on the political, social and personal aspects of life and seen that it permeates all spheres of human activity. Religion, therefore, is an all-pervasive value, or rather the value of all values, if by value, we mean 'whatever is valuable to life'. In its generic aspect, religion also pervades *artha* and *kāma*—the last two kinds of *śreyas* mentioned at the outset of the paper; in its specific aspects, it is limited only to the *śreyas*, viz. *dharma* which stands for religion as applied to different spheres of life. The trinity of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāna* is thus to be viewed as consisting of values subordinate to the supreme value of *dharma* in its generic aspect which is eternal and unchanging. The constituents of the trinity are the three *classes* of values—there being scope for change in each class within its range. Thus the multiplication and diversification of valuable objects by the development of industry and commerce do not necessitate any addition to the list. Similarly, *dharma* in its specific aspects provides full scope for change of values consequent upon an increased socialization of human life. The above classification of values, therefore, may be considered comprehensive and elastic enough to accommodate fresh values that may arise on account the 'change in the enviring medium' and 'changes in ourselves'.

7. The trinity of canonized values known as "the True, the Beautiful and the Good" or the tetrad in which to these three is added the higher unity of God finds its parallel in the Vedāntic trinity of *sat* (existence), *cit* (sentience) and *ānanda* (bliss) as the three aspects of the non-dual *Brahman* (*Tejobindūpaniṣat*, VI. 1-2; 30-31)—a trinity which is a unity in that its components are inalienable, nay, one without the other is unreal. Anything in order to be a value must be existent and of the nature of sentience and bliss. This is a transcendental view of value similar to the one propounded by Yudhiṣṭhira for whom *nirvāṇa* is the only end worthy of attainment (vide supra).

8. There is yet another mode of classification accepting as units those values or groups of values which have acquired an institutional

form, such as cognitive, moral, economic, political, aesthetic and religious values. Perry has characterized this method as 'historical' classification (*General Theory of Value*, 1954, p. 694). All these groups are found, on analysis, to have a religious base. Both the logician who finds truth to consist in the right or obligatory judgment and the pragmatist who finds it to consist in the prudent or useful judgment are evidently using ethical conceptions. Ethics again refers beyond itself to religion when it regards salvation as a supermoral value. The employment of ethical concepts is proved necessary in formulating a programme of economic reform or in dealing with current economic problems. The claim of the humanists that art is the supreme human achievement is disputed by the humanitarians who regard compassion as the highest value, which approximates the Jain saint's principle of non-injury to life (*ahiṃsā*). The great works of art, including literary compositions, were also inspired by religious themes in ancient times. The social and political values have been found by us to be based on or influenced by religious ideals. *Dharma* thus, which is an ethico-religious concept, is the source of all values—a fact which has found a powerful expression in the following proclamation of the *Mahābhārata* (Svargārohaṇaparva, 5.49) with which we conclude our paper :

urdhvabāhur viraumyeṣa na ca kaścicchṛṇoti me.
dharmād arthaśca kāmaśca sa kimarthaṃ na sevyate.

"I cry with arm uplifted, yet none heedeth. From righteousness (*dharma*) flow forth wealth and pleasures. Why then do ye not follow righteousness?"

PROGRESS OF PRAKRIT AND JAINA STUDIES¹

NATHMAL TATIA

Friends,

I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the All-India Oriental Conference for inviting me to preside over the Prakrit and Jainism Section of this, the twentyfourth Session of the Conference, being held in Varanasi, the eternal city of Lord Visvanath. I turn, on this occasion, to my illustrious predecessors for inspiration, and if I fall short of your expectations in discharging adequately the onerous duties of a Sectional President, I know that my learned audience will be indulgent to me and their benevolence will assist me in tiding over my failings.

1. At the outset, I have on your behalf to place on record our deep sense of grief at the premature and sudden death, on December 23, 1967, of the great patron of Jaina learning, Narendra Singh Singhi of Calcutta. A master of Science with a First in the First class in Geology from Calcutta University, celebrated industrialist, and a lover of art, Shri Singhi enhanced the lustre of a family already reputed for its extraordinary collection of rare antiquities, and as the founder of the *Singhi Jaina Series* published from the Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, under the General Editorship of Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. He had a passion for beautiful things and his desire for knowledge was insatiable. His death is an irreparable loss to the patronage of culture and learning.

We have also to record our grief at the passing away on May 12, 1968, of Hirakumariji, Vyakarana-Samkhya-Vedantatirtha, who dedicated her whole life to the study of Prakrit and Jaina philosophy.

The death of Acharya Vijaya-Prema-Surisvaraji Maharaj, on May 22, 1968, is a sad news to the world of Jaina scholars.

May these departed souls rest in peace.

2. We felicitate Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya, Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, on his appointment as Visiting Professor to the Department of East Asian Studies at Toronto University, Canada. Pandit Malvaniya, who belongs to the class of scholars headed by

1. Presidential Address of the Prakrit and Jainism section at the 24th All-India Oriental Conference, Varanasi, October 12-14, 1968.

Pandit Sukhalalji and Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, combines in himself the qualities of a lovable teacher and a dispassionate scholar. He will no doubt promote the cause of Prakrit and Jaina philosophy during his sojourn at the foreign centres of study and research.

The Research Institutes

3. As early as 1937, the Parshwanath Vidyashram was established at Varanasi through the efforts of Shri Harjas Rai Jain on the advice of Pandit Sukhalalji. By 1945, the Vidyashram had developed into a centre of higher studies and research in Prakrit and Jainism, and the present speaker had the privilege of preparing his doctoral thesis at its Library named as Satavadhani Ratnachandra Pustakalaya. At present the institution is known as the P. V. Research Institute with Dr. Mohanlal Mehta as its whole-time Director. Guidance of doctoral research, organization of extension lectures and publication of researches done by their scholars are the main activities of the Institute.

Another centre of Post-Graduate teaching and research in Prakrit and Jaina learning was established by the Government of Bihar in 1956. This is now known as the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa and is functioning at Vaishali, the birthplace of Lord Mahavira. Specialized Post-Graduate teaching in Prakrit Literature, Jaina Philosophy and Jaina Logic and Epistemology, admission of research scholars for Ph. D. and D. Litt. degrees, publication of research works and critical editions of unpublished texts are some of the main functions of the Institute. Foreign scholars from the South-East Asian countries and Japan also come to Vaishali for Post-Graduate studies and doctoral research in Prakrit and Jainism.

A third research and publication centre came into existence in 1959 at Ahmedabad. This is the L. D. Institute of Indology, which has a very fine library of manuscripts as well as printed books. Collection and preservation of manuscripts, works of art, paintings and sculptures, publication of Catalogues of Manuscripts and unpublished texts written by Jaina authors and critical studies and translations prepared by competent men are included in the programme of the Institute.

A band of dedicated scholars, all of whom are monks, under the Pontifical authority of Acharya-Shri Tulsi, constitute a mobile centre of learning, whose scholarly activities are now well known. Their devotion to learning is deep and centred, and the researches conducted by them deserve special attention. Their patience and perseverance which is the *sine qua non* of scholarship is extraordinary. The

research scholars will do well to look up to them for inspiration and emulate their example.

Seminar in Prakrit Studies

4. The organization of a Seminar in Prakrit Studies by the Shivaji University, Kolhapur, with the support of the U.G.C., under the Directorship of Professor Dr. A. N. Upadhye was a momentous event. It was held from May 22 to May 25, 1968, and attended by more than forty scholars working in the field of Prakrit learning. The message from Dr. G. Roth, received on the occasion, emphasized that the scholars in Prakrit should "sit together to cooperate in the field which, in many ways, is undiscovered new land, which deserves much more attention." Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterjee directed attention to the Gandhari and Sinhala Prakrits, while Professor H. W. Bailey referred to the importance of Niyā Prakrit, Dr. Tucci averred that research in Prakrit studies would no doubt lead to a deeper knowledge and understanding of modern languages. The consensus of opinion at the seminar was that the study of Apabhramsa be more intensively cultivated to grasp the essential unity of the modern Indian languages, and that the Prakrit literature stood on an equal footing with Sanskrit and Pali. For the promotion of Prakrit studies, the seminar suggested a number of concrete steps which include enrichment of the contents of the Pre-University syllabus, prescription of a specialized course in Prakrit at the graduate level, and introduction of a research-oriented course for Post-Graduate teaching, fostering the ability for doctoral research. A number of research projects are also suggested, which include a Middle Indo-Aryan Dictionary, an Encyclopaedia of Prakrits and Jainology, critical monographs and comprehensive bibliography.

Another heartening news is of the annual Reports published by the Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Mahasabha, Calcutta, which embody the research papers read at the Jain Darshan aur Samskriti Parisad held every year in the presence of Acharya-Shri Tulsi. Scholars engaged in the field of Prakrit and Jainology all over the country are invited to participate in the deliberations of the Parisad and ventilate their views on the subject.

The third significant occurrence of the period under review is the appearance of the *Jain Journal*—a quarterly on Jainology, published by the Jain Bhawan, Calcutta. The Editor Shri Ganesh Lalwani is an able scholar of wide interests, penetrative power and critical acumen. The background and aims of the quarterly are laid down as follows (Vol. I, No. 1) :

“There is no dearth of Jaina Journals, particularly in vernacular, in this country, but there is hardly any that claim the modern outlook, still less the modern technique of journalism. This Journal intends to fill up this long-felt gap. Its various sections devoted to Jaina art, literature, philosophy, religion, book-reviews and digests, current notes, etc, are carefully prepared under expert supervision so that everyone, no matter whether he be the follower of the Jaina path or not, may benefit from its reading. The outlook is strictly rational.”

The Journal is steadily, though slowly, moving towards its avowed objectives which it is bound to achieve.

The Jaina Agamas

5. A number of schemes of publication of the Jaina Agamas are afoot. Shri Mahavir Jaina Vidyalyaya of Bombay deserves our congratulations for their Ten Year Plan to publish the Jaina Agama texts in 17 volumes with the active assistance of Muni Shri Punyavijayaji.

The Jaina Svetambar Terapanthi Mahasabha of Calcutta sponsored, as early as 1956, a scheme to publish the entire Jaina Agama, critically edited, annotated and provided with scholarly introductions. A Council of Scholars, all of whom are Jaina monks, headed by Acharya-Shri Tulsi as the Vachana-Pramukha and Muni Shri Nathmalji as the editor-in-chief, have started, in all earnestness, the work of collating the texts contained in the manuscripts that are available to them from different parts of the country and made successful progress. Five such texts, critically edited, have already been published by the Mahasabha under the Managing Editorship of Shri Shreechand Rampuria, a reputed author and prolific writer of books and journals. These texts are :

1. *Dasaveāliyam.*
2. *Uttarajjhayaṇāṇi.*
3. *Āyūro taha Āyāra-cūṭā*
4. *Nisīhājhhayaṇam,*
5. *Ovavāliyam,*

In editing these texts, the editors have been cautious about all the possible sources of manuscript corruption, which are enumerated as six by the Agamic Scholiast Abhayadeva Suri, in his *Thaṇaṅga* commentary. viz. (1) absence of a genuine tradition, (2) lack of right reasoning, (3) ignorance of one's own as well as other's *śāstras*, (4) loss of memory, (5) conflicting versions of texts, and (6) corrupt manuscripts.

The editions are enriched with introductions, detailed contents and appendixes including an appendix specifying the *loci* of full texts which usually appear abridged by means of *jāva* (up to), and exhaustive word-indexes which are done for the first time and will provide a solid basis for compilation of the much-needed Prakrit lexicon.

Of the above five texts, the first two are each supplemented by five accessory volumes of (1) critical study, (2) the text with learned pre-faces, Sanskrit rendering, Hindi translation and index of verses or *sūtras*, and (3) annotations based on the *Nijjuttis*, *Chunṇis* and *Tikās*, exploited for the first time for such purpose. (4) The story-contents of the texts are published in a fourth volume, (5) an abridged edition of the text with excerpts classified topicwise constituting the fifth. These volumes are already published, and similar accessories to the other texts are under preparation.

The annotations, critical studies, and translations, as also the skill with which the appendixes are compiled reveal the depth and devotion of the monks and nuns, the profound scholarship of Muni Shri Nathmalji and the genius of Acharya-Shri Tulsi as the learned Vachana-Pramukha. The annotations are prepared with extreme care, clearing many a term of its hoary obscurity. The critical studies are each worth a doctorate.

Publications

6. The outstanding publication of the period is the *Dvādaśāram Nayachakram* of Acharya-Shri Mallavadi-ksamasramana with the commentary *Nyāyagamānusārīṇī* of Shri-Simhasuri-gani-vadi-ksamasramana, Part I, edited with critical notes by Muni Jambuvijayaji. It is published by Shri Jain Atmanand Sabha, Bhavnagar. The editorial art renovated by Pandit Sukhlalji and sedulously pursued by the late lamented Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya and Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya in editing manuscripts and restoring the lost texts, has attained a new dimension in the hands of Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji, which has compelled even the western critics to bow to the scholar in recognition of his learning. In his Introduction to the edition, Dr. Erich Frauwallner, Professor of Indology and Iranian Philology at the University of Vienna, appreciates the intractable difficulties of the work and the Herculean labours of the Editor in reconstructing the original text from Simhasuri's commentary, and commends his achievement in the following words which bear out my appraisal :

“I am very happy to say that the editor of the present edition, Muni Jambuvijaya, has mastered to perfection all these diffi-

culties, and has given us a text as best as can be achieved at the present time. Clarity has been gained on the extant manuscripts and Muni Jambuvijaya's notes to the text give reliable information as to the tradition, so that a stable basis is supplied for further research. His reconstruction of the original makes it possible to follow Mallavadi's trends of thought also in passages, where absolute certainty cannot be achieved...At any rate, the text of the commentary is reliable and has been made legible by means of various corrections. Above all, this text gains greatly by numerous notes and cross-references to related texts, thus aiding in the comprehension of the original itself. Here special mention should be made of the *Bhota-pariśiṣṭam*, which contains the relevant passages from Dignaga's *Pramāṇa-samuccayaḥ*. Thus the author's painfully accurate labours have opened a way of approach to such an extraordinarily difficult text. The warmest thanks of all interested in Indian philosophy and specially in Jaina doctrines are due to the editor who has taken such a tremendous amount of work upon himself".

The *Sugandhadasāmi-kathā* published by the Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Varanasi, bears a stamp of mature editorship of Dr. Hiralal Jain who provides it with an excellent introduction embodying his vast studies in world literature.

The Hindi translation of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, by the nonagenarian savant Acharya Jugalkishor Mukhtar is a work of perfect scholarship.

The *Leśyā-kośa* compiled by Sri Mohanlal Banthia will inspire the scholars of Jainism for a critical study of the subject, leading to a clear formulation and evaluation of the doctrine and its bearing on the metaphysical speculations of ancient India.

The *Gaṇadhara-vāda* by Dr. Esther A. Solomon, published by the Gujrat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad, is based entirely on Maladhari Hemachandra's commentary on the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*.

Dr. Harisatya Bhattacharya's *Reals in Jaina Metaphysics* published by the Seth Santi Das Khetsy Charitable Trust, Bombay, has been reviewed in the *Jain Journal* (Vol. II. 1). His another work, the English translation of the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvā-lokālaṅkāra* of Vadi-Devāsuri with a commentary, mainly following the *Ratnākarāvatarikā* published in 1967 by the Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, is a work of great industry.

The texts with English translation and notes of Haribhadra's *Yogabindu* and *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya* and Dr. Nagin Shah's *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy : A Study* are important publications of the L. D. Institute of Indology.

Pandit Dalsukh Malvaniya's *Āgam Yuga kā Jain Darśan* published by the Sanmati Jnana Pitha, Agra, is an attempt to reconstruct Jain philosophy in its original shape.

Dr. Devendra Kumar Jain's *Apabhraṃsa Bhāṣā aur Sāhitya* and Pandit Kailash Chandra Sastri's *Jain Nyāya* are published by the Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Varanasi.

The P. V. Research Institute has published the first three volumes of *Jain Sāhitya kā Byhad Itihās*, written by Pandit Bechardas Doshi, Dr. J. C. Jain and Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. The first two volumes of the series have been critically reviewed in the *Jain Journal* (Vols. II. 3 and III. 1) and the 3rd awaits review in the January 1969 issue of the same Journal. The Institute has also published *Studies in Hemachandra's Deśnāmamālā* by Dr. H. C. Bhayani, *Jain Āchār* by Dr. Mohanlal Metha, *Bauddha aur Jain Āgamo me Nārījivan* by Dr. Komal Chandra Jain and *Yasastilak kā Sāmskr̥tīk Adhyayan* by Dr. Gokul Chandra Jain—the last two being doctoral theses approved by the Banaras Hindu University.

The publication of Presentation, Commemoration and Jubilee Volumes, which has become an important activity of the intellectuals, is now attracting the attention of the Jainas also. I have before me three such volumes published during the period. The first is *Shri Mahabir Jain Vidyalaya Golden Jubilee Volume*, sumptuously produced, in two parts by the Vidyalaya itself. The other two volumes are the *Babu Chhotelal Jain Smṛti Granth and Marudharkeshari Muni Shri Mishramalji Maharaj Abhinandan Granth*. These publications provide a useful opportunity to the scholars working in the field of Prakrit and Jainism to make their researches available to the people interested in the subject.

We are familiar with the literature on Jainism published in the English, French and German languages, but very few of us know the valuable work done by the Japanese scholars in the field of Prakrit and Jainology. It might not therefore be considered redundant if I add here the following list of Japanese publications on the subject, arranged authorwise:

S. Matsunami : (1) *A Study on "dhyāna" in Digambara Sect*, 1961.

(2) *Ethics of Jainism and Buddhism*, 1963.

- (3) Critical translation of *Isibhāsiyāim* into Japanese, 1966.
- (4) Critical translation of *Dasaveyāliyasutta* into Japanese, 1968.
- (5) Buddhistic Variants of two Portions of the *Isibhāsiyāim*, 1961.
- E. Kanakura : (1) *Introduction to the Original Jainism*, 1939.
 (2) *Study of Spiritual Culture of India*, 1944.
 Contains translation of *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* and that of *Nyāyavatāra*.
- Shigenobu Suzuki : Japanese translation of *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* and *Kalpa-sūtra*, 1921.
- A. Uno : *Karma Doctrine in Jainism*, 1961.

A Japanese scholar, Taiken Hanaki, is preparing an English translation of the *Anyogadāra Sutta*, with annotations and introduction at the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsa, Vaishali. The work is proposed to be published in the near future.

Prakrit and Jainology

7. Prakrit and Jainology are evidently two different subjects. But sometimes the latter is mistaken for the former with the result that researches in Jainism are often carried within the limits of the Prakrit texts which constitute only a part of the literary heritage of the Jainas. The illusion, created by the overlapping characters of the two is too elusive to permit the scholar with a bias towards Prakrit to appreciate the depth and vastness of the contribution of the Jainas to Sanskrit. In fact, the entire literature on Jaina logic developed after the systematization of Jaina thought in Sanskrit language by Umasvati and his successors. The Jaina thinkers had to learn the language to defend their philosophy and logic against the onslaughts of the Buddhist logicians headed by Dignaga. The Jainas as well as Buddhists derived inspiration from Aksapada's *Nyāyasūtra* composed in terse Sanskrit in forging their logical weapon. A wonderful Sanskrit literature, embodying the best in logical thinking of the country, was the consequence. Vidyānanda's *Aṣṭasahasrī* is an example in point, which met the challenge of Dharma-kīrti and Kumarīla with whom Indian logic attained its adolescence. Yasovijaya enriched Jaina logic with the latest achievements of the neo-logicians headed by Gangesa, thus continuing the tradition created by Mallavadi who compassed and presented, in his *Dvādaśāra Nayasakra*, the complete range of thought that had emerged before

his advent. The Jaina philosopher's intense love for new knowledge, irrespective of the language of its revelation, enabled him to bequeath a glorious heirloom of logical literature to posterity,

Language is after all a means to expression and not an end in itself. The early Jaina literature, though mainly written in Prakrit, was the storehouse of all sorts of knowledge. The *Aṅuyogadāra Sutta*, for instance, though primarily concerned with the possible ways of exposition, discusses topics like weights and measures, atoms and molecules, music and musical instruments, grammar, epistemology, logic and a motley of other subjects which are apparently unconnected with its central theme. Likewise, there are other Prakrit texts such as the *Viyahapannatti*, *Thāṅga*, etc., which deal with a number of problems only distantly connected with religion and philosophy. The contents are thus unrestricted, though the vehicle of their expression is limited to Prakrit which appears to have been the popular medium of education. But the growing demand of the intellectuals was also to be satisfied. The Jainas, therefore, had to switch over to Sanskrit much in the same fashion as the Buddhists had to change over to Sanskrit when their Prakrits (Pali being only one among them) had failed to serve their purpose. The Jainas had to write Sanskrit commentaries to explain the Prakrit texts—a phenomenon which reveals the inadequacy of the Prakrits to satisfy the needs of the intellectuals of those days. There is no doubt that, at some stage, the best thought of the time crystallized in Prakrit and Apabhramsa texts. But the necessity to explain even such texts through Sanskrit at a later period shows that those texts had no appeal to the common man. Sanskrit enjoyed constant patronage on account of its being intelligible to the intellectuals of the different parts of the country and being able to function as the lingua franca acceptable to the people engaged in higher learning in art and science. While the Prakrits functioned as regional languages, Sanskrit provided the linguistic norm for the propagation of the essence of our thinking among the people at large. The relation between the Prakrits on the one hand and Jainology on the other is to be appreciated in the context of this wider perspective. The study of Jainism without the knowledge of Prakrits is as much impossible as the researches in Buddhism in the absence of a grounding in Pali, though the relation between Pali and Buddhism is slightly different from that obtaining between Prakrits and Jainology. While the entire Pali literature is Buddhist, all Prakrits do not owe allegiance to Jainism, though the latter comprises the major portion of it. Jainism, like Buddhism, goes to Sanskrit in order to fulfil a larger interest and satisfy the demands of a higher stratum of the society.

Studies in the Prakrits and researches in Jainology will benefit immensely by being viewed from this *naya*, to use a Jaina *terminus technicus*, which means "a way of approach and observation".

The Pressing Needs

8. The most pressing need of the workers in the field of Prakrit and Jainology is a comprehensive Prakrit Dictionary of the nature of the P. T. S. *Pali-English Dictionary*. An Encyclopaedia of Proper Names in Prakrit and Jaina literature is another urgent need.

The dearth of properly qualified students interested in Prakrit learning is vitiating the quality of research in the field. A student without a sound schooling in the Sanskrit language and the fundamentals of Indian thought and culture is incapable of any sort of education in Prakrit and Jainism. But sometimes this axiomatic truth is forgotten and we land ourselves in embarrassing situations by admitting students who, because they lack these basic requirements, are incompetent to conduct higher research independently.

It is futile to expect a flowering where there are no branches, or to expect branches where there are no roots. Advanced research in the very nature of things is the apex of a pyramid : the base must be a widespread interest in the language and the literature concerned. This base has, for Prakrit and Jainology, now almost ceased to exist and only a proper and adequate recognition of it in the curricula can restore it.

Industry and perseverance, which are the pre-conditions of research, are difficult to cultivate. The seeking of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, the relentless pursuit of truth at the cost of comfort, of gain, of convenience—these were the essence of the Indian tradition of scholarship. Alas, we must now turn to other lands, say to Japan and to Germany, for examples of such diligent scholarship and such devotion to truth. Our inability to compile a Dictionary or produce an Encyclopaedia which are the basic needs of the field under review is, I suggest, a manifest instance of our inactivity.

May I thank my learned audience for their patient attention, and resume my seat in the hope that the opinions I have offered and the contentions I have set forth will be received with tolerance.

We, who are assembled here, and countless others in our fraternity of scholars, must sail together on these uncharted seas of knowledge assisting each other, often necessarily criticizing each other, but conscious of the worth of our endeavour and the necessity of co-operation specially in a troubled social milieu often lukewarm to all learning and hostile to all culture.

Thank you, once again, ladies and gentlemen, for your kindness and your patience.

KAMMASACCĀ HU PĀṆIṆO¹

NATHMAL TATIA

The caption of the article is the last foot of the twentieth verse of Adhyayana VII of the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, which runs as follows :

vemāyāhiṃ sikkhāhiṃ, je nara gihisuvvayā /
uvenṭi māṇusaṃ jōṇiṃ, kammasaccā hu pāṇiṇo //

The Adhyayana under reference gives the five similes of the fattened ram, the forgotten farthing (*kāgiṇī*), the unwholesome mango fruit, the capital fund (*mūla*) and the vast ocean in order to deprecate worldly pleasures and glorify heavenly life. Our verse occurs in connection with the simile of the capital fund, which is a parable of three merchants, reminding us of the Biblical parable of the talents. The human life is the capital fund. The dividend earned from it is the state of gods and the loss suffered is the fall from human life into the states of hell and animal life. The continuation of human life stands for mere safeguarding of the capital fund without any kind of gain or loss. In the verse under reference, it is said that the attainment of human birth is effected by the observance of the moral precepts and the vows of a pious householder. The word *vemāyā* has been explained in the commentary of Śrī Śāntyačārya as follows:

vividhā mātṛā parimāṇamāsāṃ vimatrāḥ, vicitrāparimāṇāḥ,
tābhiḥ parimāṇaviśeṣamāśritya visadṛṣṭibhiḥ sikṣābhiḥ
prakṛtibhadrakatvādyabhyāsarūpābhiḥ.

The expression *vemāyāhiṃ sikkhāhiṃ* accordingly means 'through moral precepts observed in various measures'.

But, to us, the word *vemāyā* appears to stand for 'absence of *māyā* (deceit)'. If this is so, the expression '*vemāyāhiṃ sikkhāhiṃ*' would mean 'by (the observance of) the moral precepts, accompanied by the absence of deceit'. This interpretation should appear plausible because deceit is a condition of the birth in animal life (cf. *māyā tairyagyonasya*' TS, VI. 17), which is averted by the absence of deceit in the observance of the moral precepts.

The most difficult portion of the verse is however the last foot, namely, *kammasaccā hu pāṇiṇo*. The commentator gives an alternative reading, viz., *karmasaktāḥ* (Pkt. *kammasattā*). His interpretation of the two words is as follows:

1. Read on June, 23-27, 1969 at the Seminar on Prakṛt Studies organised by the centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Poona.

(a) karmaṇā manovākkāyakriyālakṣaṇena satyā avisamvādināḥ karmasatyāḥ, that is, 'persons who are true by their mental, vocal and physical acts'.

(b) karmasu arthān manuṣyagatiyogyakriyārūpeṣu saktā abhiṣvaṅ-gavantaḥ karmasaktāḥ, that is, 'persons who are engaged in acts that lead to human life'.

None of these two interpretations however directly follows from the word *kammasacca*. Nor do they appear plausible in view of the obvious intention of the author, in this context, to give a general maxim of the doctrine of *karman* in its aspect of a moral force determining the good or bad effects of an action. The word *kammasacca* here is most probably a careless scribe's substitute for *kammasaka*, derived from the Sanskrit expression *karmasvaka* meaning "possessed of the property (heritage) of the *karmans*". In support of our guess, we quote the following from the *Majjhimanikāya*, part III, p. 280 (Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra Edition):

"kammassakā, māṇava, sattā kammadāyādā kammayoni kammabandhū kammappaṭisaraṇā, kammaṃ satte vibhajati yadidaṃ hīnappaṭitatāyā" ti.

This Pali passage lucidly sets forth the view that the *karman* is the property (*sva*), inheritance (*dāya*), creative base (*yoni*), friend (*bandhu*) and shelter (*paṭisaraṇa*) of living beings. It is again the *karman* that divides beings as of low and high status.

The Prakrit expression *kammasacca* is obviously connected with the Pali word *kammasaka* in the above passage, which is derived from Sanskrit *karmasvaka*. The Pali expression *kammabandhu* reminds one of the popular verse of the *Manusmṛiti* (VIII. 17):

eka eva suhrd dharmo nidhane 'py anuyāti yaḥ/
śarīreṇa samam nāśam sarvam anyad hi gacchati//

The meaning of many a technical term in the Prakrit language can similarly be determined with reference to the Pali language. Thus the meaning of the Prakrit word *parisaha* of the *Uttarādhyayanna*. Adhyayana II, could be related to the Pali word *parissaya* of the *Sāriputtasutta* of the *Suttanipāta*, the word *dhuya* of the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, Śrutaskandha I, Adhyayana VI, to the *dhuta* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (*Mahāvagga*, p. 43, and *Parivāra*, p. 338). The study of Prakrit will remain incomplete without the study of Pali, each being considered as essentially complementary to the other. In fact, Prakrit and Pali are languages that embody the thought and culture which originated and developed *pari passu* in respect of both time and place.

PRAKRIT ILLUSTRATIONS IN WORKS ON POETICS¹

R. P. PODDAR

It is often felt, and not without justice, that Prakrit has been neglected in the study of ancient Indian Language and literature. In early times Grammarians of Sanskrit prescribed Sanskrit for the elite and put a discount upon the use of Prakrit. The advocates of Prakrit also condemned Sanskrit as the language of the coterie in contrast with Prakrit which they described as the universal language comprehensible even to birds and beasts. The dichotomy persisted and it persists even today as evidenced in the syllabi of our universities in general and in the establishments of isolated Institutions for the study of Prakrit, Pali and Sanskrit, in particular.

In this context it is encouraging to note that the dramatists and the critics have given due share to the Prakrits in their works and treatises, though their later commentators underlined the *chāyā* vis-a-vis the original Prakrit passages. The dramatists represented different strata of characters by putting into their mouths different sort of languages—Sanskrit or someone of the Prakrits. So with the dramatists use of Prakrit was sort of a necessity which in some cases does not seem to have been relished. With the critics of poetry it was otherwise. They must have been overwhelmed with the exuberance of Prakrit poetry and thus tempted to illustrate their points with Prakrit verses. Hence these illustrations are capable of giving a glimpse into the variety and excellence of Prakrit poetry.

Among the critics of poetry such eminent masters as Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa have quoted abundantly from Prakrit poetry. Most of these quotations pertain to the domain of love poetry and delineate subtle nuances of feelings. A young woman deceived in love bids her lover go to his new love and let her alone with her sighs and lamentations, lest he also suffers the same, in staying away from his new love, just in showing curtesy towards her:

वच्च महव्विअ एवके इहोन्तु णीसास रोइअव्वाई ।

मा तुज्झ वि तीअ विणा दक्खिण्णहअस्स जाअन्तु ॥²

1. Read in the Seminar on Prakrit and Pali held at Bodh-Gaya from 22-3-71 to 25-3-71, 1971.

2. Dhv. 1-4, gāthā 5.

There is a similar context in another verse in which the deceived lady bids her lover go and not wipe her tears. It is just fit that the eyes that turned mad at the first sight and did not care to fathom his heart should be cursed to weep :

अवसर रोउचिअ णिम्मिआइं मा पुंस मे णअणाइं ।

दंसणमेत्तुम्मतेहि जेहि हिअमं तुह ए णाअं ॥¹

In some verses the deceived ladies do not explicitly or even feelingly resent the conduct of their faithless lovers but just throw a hint to assert their knowledge of the perfidy. A lady cautions her lover who has misplaced his love that he will be only laughed at in his errand of offering protection to the thorny berry that stands out of the way and is ugly and devoid of fruit or flower :

उपह जाआए असोहिणीए फलकुसुमपत्त रहिआए ।

वेरीए वई देन्तो पामर हो ओहसिज्जिहिसि ॥²

The verses addressed by their friends to frolicsome young women, sometimes to caution them in the stolen dalliance and sometimes to vindicate their honour, are ingenious, though not always of very refined taste. A lover's bite on the lip is concealed under the pretext of smelling a lotus with a black bee in it, the bee happening to sting the lady's lip :

कसस व ए होई रोसो दट्ठूण पिआए सव्वणं अहरं ।

सभमर पउमगघाइणि वारिअनामे सहसु एहिं ॥³

Most of these verses are extremely sensuous and suggest a mood of wild jubilation. Lovely women are said to captivate the heart with their smiles as well as tears, with their appeasement as well as anger :

कुविआओ पसण्णाओ ओरूणमुहीओ विहसमाणाओ ।

जह गहिओ तह हिअमं हरन्ति उच्छिन्न महिलाओ ॥⁴

The beloved is kissed a hundred times and embraced a thousand times but she never grows stale, age cannot wither her, nor custom stale her infinite variety.

उन्विज्जइ समहुतं अवरुन्धिज्जइ सहस्सहुतं वि ।

विरमिअ पुणो रमिज्जइ पिए जणे णत्थि पुणरुत्तं ॥⁵

Sometimes the amorous sentiment is taken to forbidden heights. One verse describes Parvati stripped of her clothes by Śiva as closing latter's two eyes with her two plams and the third one with a kiss :

1. Dhv. 3-16; 2. Dhv. 3-41; 3. Dhv. 1-4, KP. 135; 4. Dhv. 1-14; 5. Dhv 1-14,

रङ्केलिहिम्निवसण करकिसलयरुद्धमणुजुमलसस ।
रुद्धस तइम गुमणं पव्वईपरिचुम्बिमं जमइ ॥¹

It favourably compared seems to be a calculated improvement upon Kalidasa's—

शूलिनः करतलद्वयेन सा संनिरुद्धच नयने हृतांशुका ।
तस्य पश्यति ललाटलोचने मोघयत्नविधुरा रहस्यभूत् ॥²

In some verse women are shown stooping to conquer. An impatient woman throws a clever hint to a traveller that he could not get a bed in that village, nevertheless, he could spend the night there apprehending the vising clouds or her ponderous breasts:—

पंथिमं सु एत्थ सत्थरमत्थि मणं पत्थरत्थले गामे ।
उण्णम पयोहरं पेविल्लरुण जइ वससि ता वसमु ॥³

The general atmosphere suggested by these quotations is one of love but at times other sentiments also are seen jostling for room. A verse describes a hero in a fix between the tears of the beloved and the war-trumpets:—

एकन्तो रुमइ पिम्रा अण्णन्तो समरतूरणिग्धोसो ।
खेहेण रणरसेण अ भडसस दोलाइमं हिममं ॥⁴

While in another a hero prefers the heads of the elephants painted with vermilion to the breasts of his beloved painted with saffion:—

वीराण रमइ घुसिणारुणम्मि ण तथा पिम्रायणुच्छंने ।
दिट्ठी रिउ-गम कुंभस्थलम्मि जह वहलसिन्दुरे ॥⁵

Some verses are extremely ingenious in their far-reaching suggestions. One such is the oft-quoted:—

मम चम्मिम वीसद्धो सो सुणयो अज्ज मारिमो देश ।
गोलाणइ कच्छ कुडंग वासिणा दरिम सीहेण ॥⁶

In one verse it has been said that the latest wife of a hunter decked with a peacock's feather feels proud among the co-wives, though the latter are decorated with pearls:—

सिहिपिच्छ कण्णरुजा जाम्रा वाहसस गव्विरी भमइ ।
मुत्ताहल रइम पसाहणणं मज्जे सक्तीणं ॥⁷

The fact is that earlier the hunter devoted more time in outdoor sports and killed elephants and hence his former wives are decorated with pearls from the elephants' heads. Now he is engrossed with sporting

1. KP. 97; 2. KS. VIII.7; 3. KP. 58; 4. Dhv. 3-24; 5. Dhv. 2-27;
6. Dhv. 1-4, KP. 138; 7. Dhv. 2-24.

with his latest wife that he can find time and energy only to hunt upon the peacocks and this is time and energy only to hunt upon the peacocks and this is really a matter of pride for her. This verse seems to be a deliberate improvement upon the following similar one :—

वाणिञ्च हृत्थिदन्ता कुदो अम्हाणं वाघकिञ्चि अ ।
जाव लुलिअालअमुही घरमिअ परिसक्कए सुणहा ॥¹

and its variation :—

करिणी वेहव्वअरो मह पुत्तो एकक काण्डविणिवाई ।
हअ सोणहाए तह कअो कण्डकरण्डअं बहइ ॥²

A very subtle hint is thrown to the infirmity of a lover in the following verse in which he has been compared to the full moon in relation to the evening dusk. The relation of the full moon to the evening dusk is a fleeting one and so is his to his lady-loves :

एव पुणिमा मिअंक्खस सुहअ को तं सि भणसु मह सच्चं ।
का सोहग समग्गा पअोस रअणि व्व तुह अज्ज ॥³

In such cases it gives almost a sense of triumph to discover the suggestion which it is difficult to do without the aid of the commentary.

Some verses reveal a wealth of imagery and vie with the finished verses of the great masters of Sanskrit poetry. The following illustrates sahkoti :—

सहदिवसणिसाहि दीहरा सासदण्डा
सह मणिबलएहि वाहधारा गलन्ति ।
तुह सुहअ विअोए तीए उव्विबरीए
सह-अ तणुलदाए दुव्वला जीविदासा ॥⁴

The following shows a wide range of the poet's imaginative activity :—

जे लंकागिरिमेहलाहि खलिदा संभोअखिण्णोरई
फारफुल्लफणावलीकवलणे पत्ता दरिदत्तणं ।
ते एणिह मलआणिला विरहिणीणीसास संपविकरणो
जादा भक्ति सिमुत्तणो वि बहला तारुण्य पुण्णा विअ ॥⁵

The imagery in some cases is worked out to such a subtlety that it assumes the nature of conceit. A lady says to her faithless love that the red threads in her eyes are not on account of anger, they are a

1. Dhv. 3-1. 2. Dhv. 4-4. 3. KP. 88, cf Meehk. IV 15.
4. KP. 495; KM. II 9. 5. KP. 68; KM. I-19.

sort of garment provided by the red nail-scars upon his body given by his new love in amorous sports :

श्रोतलोल करग्रग्रवएहि तुह लोमणेसु मह दिष्ण ।
रत्तंसुओ पसाओ कोवेण पुणो इमे ण भवक्कमिआ ॥¹

A lady though slender bodied yet allows herself to be emaciated further to find accommodation in the crowded corridor of her lover's heart :

महिला सहस्र भरिए तुह हिअए सुहअ सा अमाअन्ती ।
अणुदिणमणणकम्मा अगं तणुअं वि तणुएइ ॥²

There are others which excel in a child-like simplicity as the following :

ए एहि दाव सुन्दरि कण्णं दाऊण सुणसु वअणिज्जं ।
तुज्जं मुहेण कित्तोअरि चन्दो उवमिज्जइ जणेण ॥³

It seems to be an improvement upon the following similar one :

एमेअ जणो तिस्सा देउ कवोलोवमाई ससिविम्बं ।
परमस्थ विअारे उण चन्दो चन्दो विअ वराओ ॥⁴

There are some beautiful verses in praise of poetry and the following tops the list :—

ण अ ताण घडइ ओही ए अ ते दीसन्ति कहवि पुणरूत्ता ।
जे विम्भमा पिआणं अत्था वा सुकइ वाणीणं ॥⁵

The bulk of these quotations is not, however, free from that one great demerit common in all poetry having close kinship with the masses, viz. vulgarity. Not to talk of ordinary women Parvati and Lakshmi themselves are described in the inverse posture of copulation. These verses have survived in spite of their vulgarity on account of the ingenuity of the poets' creative imagination that brings in a pleasant surprise. The following one is worth quoting :

विवरीअरए लच्छी बम्हं दट्ठू णाहि कमलट्ठं ।
हरिणो दाहिण णअणं रसाउला भक्ति ढक्केइ ॥⁶

Here covering of Hari's right eye implies sunset for Hari's right eye is the sun, which implies closing of Hari's naval lotus and hence disappearance of Brahma seated on it.

A complete lack of moral and spiritual ideas is conspicuous in these quotations. Poetry on the evidence of these lines seems to be the

1. KP. 70.

2. KP. 71.

3. KP. 554.

4. Dhv. 3.1.

5. Dhv. 4-7.

6. KP. 137.

least concerned with thoughts. There is no denying that such poetry is incomplete and its cultural background sink in the scale. But they reflect the depth of life where the primeval passions hold their sway and assert their existence defying the so-called higher and sophisticated cultivations of the mind.

Abbreviations

- Dhv.—Dhvanyāloka
 Gāthās.—Gāthā Saptasatī
 K P.—Kāvya prakāśa
 K S.—Kumārasambhava
 Mcchk.—Mṛcchakatika
 KM.—Karpūramañjari.

UPOSATHA

NAND KISHORE PRASAD

There is nothing incredible in the fact that there were some customs which were commonly prevailing in Indian religious life, and *uposatha* was one of such customs. Here follows a study of the same in the light of the three main faiths of India, the Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism.

(a) Brahmanical :

The earliest reference to '*upavasatha*', the Sanskrit original of the Pali '*uposatha*'¹ and Prakrit '*posaha*', is made in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* which prescribes the sacrificial rites called Darśa and Puruṣamāsa on the occasion. The term *upavasatha* stands for a fast-day, specially the day preceding a Soma sacrifice, and also for the period of preparation for the Soma sacrifice.² Again the *Kātyāyana-Śrautasūtra*³ appears to subscribe to the same view when it asserts that the *upavasatha* implies to live close to (the deities) which is possible only by performing certain sacrifices accompanied by *upavāsa* (fast) twice a month, i. e., on the last days of the dark-half (*amāvasyā*) and the bright-half (*paurṇamāsa*) of a month. The fasting is to be observed by the sacrificer on the instruction of the priests, and as such it is the duty of the householder. Hiraṇyakesin,⁴ while dwelling upon the significance of the *upavasatha*, opines that the *upavasatha* means 'to avoid the company of impious and to seek the company of virtuous'.

This much we read about the ceremony of *upavasatha* in the Brahmanical sources. The Jaina as well as the Buddhist sources, on the other hand, contain elaborate rules as regards the different facets of the ceremony which will follow in the coming pages.

(b) Buddhist :

According to an early tradition, the institution of the *uposatha* is ascribed to the request made by Binbisāra, the king of Magadha, to the Buddha. The king himself, according to the same tradition, owed

1. Op. cit, II, 1. 4 ; I. 1.

2. SED, sub voce '*upavasatha*'.

3. Op. cit, IV. 15. 35; Cf DC II. p. 109.

4. upavrittastu pāpebhyo yastu vāso gunaiḥ saha upavāsaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ—as quoted in EBJ, p. 134.

this idea to the *titthiyas* (heretics). On the suggestion of the king, the Buddha enjoined upon the monks to assemble and hold *uposatha*. Novices as the monks were, they kept mum when they assembled, and thus invited scandalous remarks from the people.¹ Consequently, in order to appease the people they were advised to recite the Dhamma² which in due course was replaced by the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* and was known as *uposatha-service* (*uposathakamma*)³.

The obvious reason of the introduction of the ceremony was to acquire lay devotee by promoting faith in them through religious preaching on certain dates of every month as the heretics were doing from before. But not very late, this privilege was denied to the laity as it was converted into out and out a monastic observance. The reason for this abrupt change in its nature from social to monastic seems to be that the monks did not like to expose their omissions and commissions before the laity.

Originally the eighth, the fourteenth and the fifteenth days of a fortnight were regarded as *uposatha* days. But in due course the eighth day was dropped from the list and only the last two were retained. Not only this, the *Pātimokkha* was to be recited only once a fortnight, i.e., on either of the two remaining dates.⁴ But finally, as it appears from the expression, '*ajjuuposatho pannaraso*', it became a fashion with the Order to recite the *Pātimokkha* only on the fifteenth⁵ day of a fortnight.

As a rule, *uposatha* was to be held at a place fixed by the Saṅgha. Five kinds of buildings—a *vihāra*, an *aḍḍhayoga* (a kind of house), a *pāsāda* (storeyed building), a *hammiya* (attic) and a *guhā* (cave) were ordinarily selected for the purpose. Holding *uposatha* in one's own cell or fixing two *uposatha*-halls (*uposathāgrāra*) in one *āvāsa* (residence) was in no case allowed.⁶ If there happened to be several *āvāsas* within the same boundary (*sīmā*), then *uposatha* was to be held at a place unanimously selected or in the *uposathāgāra* of the *āvāsa* inhabited by the senior monks. Under unavoidable circumstances it could be solemnised even at the residence of a monk.⁷

1. *MV*, 2.1, pp. 105-6.

2. *Ibid*, 2.1, p. 106.

3. *Ibid*, 2.2.2, p. 106.

4. *Ibid*, 2.2.5, p. 108.

5. *Vide PM*, Nidāna.

6. *MV*, 2. 5. 10, pp. 109-10.

7. Cf. *sace kho mayam gilānaṃ ṭhānā cāvessāma āvādhō vā abhivaḍḍhissati kālaṃ kiriya vā bhavissati 'ti na, bhikkhave, gilāno bhikkhu ṭhānā cāvetaḍḍho. saṅghena tattha gantvā kammaṃ kātappaṃ*—*Ibid*, 2. 20, 33, pp. 121-22; 2. 21. 34, p. 123.

In this connection, the terms *sīmā* and *āvāsa*, just referred to, deserve some amplification. *Sīmā* was the circuit or the extent of the jurisdiction of an *āvāsa* or a number of *āvāsas*. The Christian equivalent of it is a diocese or parish. The *uposatha* could only be performed, if all the monks living within the *sīmā* of an *āvāsa* were either present or would have sent their consent (*chanda*) in absentia.¹

Sīmā was decided by the usual *kammaṅcā* process by fixing some landmarks on the boundary of the jurisdiction. A mountain, a rock, a wood, a tree, a path, an anthill (*vammika*), a river and a tank (*udaka*), etc. were some of the conspicuous marks generally used for the purpose.² In case the *sīmā* of an *āvāsa* had not been settled, then the boundary of the adjacent village was supposed as its *sīmā*; and if the residence was situated in a forest without any nearby village, then the *sīmā* was extended up to seven *abbhantaras*³ all around.⁴ In case of a river, sea or the like, the *sīmā* ran as far as an average man could throw water⁵ or even to the opposite side of a river, if there was any regular communication.⁶ Normally a boundary either of more than three *yojanas* (*yojana* = a distance of about seven miles) in expanse⁷, or overlapping or incompassing another one⁸ was not to be fixed.

The *uposathagara* was furnished with the necessary articles, before the monks assembled there to hold *uposatha*. The senior members as a rule, were obliged to assemble first,⁹ while the juniors were assigned with the duties of sweeping the hall; providing seats for the assembly; putting a lighted lamp, for most often the *uposatha* was held till very late in the night; and furnishing with drinking water and food for the incoming monks.¹⁰

When all had assembled, a duly qualified monk proclaimed the following *ñatti*—‘Venerable monks should proclaim the *parisuddhi* (purity), I will recite the *Pātimokha*’. Those guilty of any offence

1. Ibid, 2. 21. 34, pp. 122-23.

2. Ibid, 2. 4. 7, p. 109.

3. *Abbhantara* is a linear measure, equal to 28 hands.—*BD*, Part II, Introduction, pp. 51-52.

4. *MV*, 2. 9. 16, p. 113.

5. Ibid, 2. 9. 16, p. 113.

6. Ibid, 2. 4. 9, p. 109.

7. Ibid, 2. 4. 9, p. 109.

8. Ibid, 2. 9. 17, p. 113.

9. Ibid, 2. 6. 11, p. 111.

10. *samajjani padīpo ca udakaṃ āsaṇena ca / uposathassa etāni pubbakaraṇaṃ ti vuccati /*—*Kaṅkhā*, p. 11; *MV*, 2. 18. 28-31, pp. 119-20.

confessed it in course of the recitation of the section concerned, and those who were free remained silent which indicated their purity.¹ The confession of faults (*uposatha*) by one deserving recommencement of the penal discipline (*mūlāyapaṭikassanāraho*)² or the sentence of *mānatta* discipline³ was done according to seniority (*yathāvuddham*). Preaching the Dhamma of one's own accord⁴, putting questions about the Vinaya⁵ or answering⁶ them without one's appointment by the assembly and rebuking anybody for his offence without the permission of the person concerned⁷ were unlawful.

The recitation of the *Pātimokkha* was one of the special features of the *uposatha*. In normal circumstances, it was recited in its full extent. But in case of trouble (*antarāya*) either from a king or a thief or the like, it could be recited abridged.⁸ So also, it was recited normally by a senior monk (*therādhikam pātimokkham*). In case all the *theras* of an assembly were incapable to do so, then even a junior member could be entrusted with the job.⁹ Moreover, it should not be recited in an assembly where there was a nun (*bhikkhuni*), a nun under training (*sikkhamānā*), a novice (*sāmaṇera*), a female novice (*sāmaṇeri*), a renegade (*sikkhāpacakkhātaka*), a person guilty of an extreme offence (*antimavattam ajjhāpanaka*), a eunuch (*paṇḍaka*) or the like or in an assembly otherwise impure.¹⁰ Of the four types of *uposathakamma*, namely, a service held unlawfully by an incomplete chapter, held unlawfully by a complete chapter, held lawfully by an incomplete chapter and held lawfully by a complete chapter, only the fourth type was deemed legal.¹¹

In the beginning, the *Pātimokkha* was recited by the monks on behalf of the nuns in the *uposatha* meetings convened by the nuns. In due course, on account of the scandalous remarks of the people they were taught to recite it themselves.¹² But the nuns, even then, could

1. *MV*, 2. 2. 3, p. 106.
2. *CV*, 2. 2. 10, p. 72.
3. *Ibid*, 2. 3. 14, p. 75.
4. *MV*, 2. 11. 19, p. 115.
5. *Ibid*, 2. 12. 20, p. 115.
6. *Ibid*, 2. 13. 21, pp. 115-16.
7. *Ibid*, 2. 14. 22, p. 116.
8. *Ibid*, 2. 11. 19, p. 114.
9. *Ibid*, 2. 16. 24, pp. 117-18.
10. *Ibid*, 2. 38. 52, pp. 141-42.
11. *Ibid*, 2. 10. 18, pp. 115-16.
12. *CV*, 10.5.6, pp. 379-80.

not get rid of the subjugation of monks as they had to ask two or three days beforehand on what day the *uposatha* would be.¹

If during or after the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* by an incomplete assembly being conscious or unconscious of its incompetency to hold *uposatha*, there arrived monks belonging to the same residence whose number was greater than those holding the *uposatha*, then the *Pātimokkha* must be recited again. If on the other hand their number was either equal to or less than those holding the *uposatha*, then it was not to be recited anew.²

Anybody guilty of an offence was not allowed to perform *uposatha*. A person doubtful of his offence was, however, permitted to attend it provided that he was ready to atone for his offence as soon as his doubt was removed. Neither a common confession of an offence nor a common acceptance of such confession was regarded lawful. On the *uposatha* day, if all the resident monks were guilty of a common offence, then one of them had to confess his guilt before a monk of a nearby *avāsa* and the rest before him after his return. If even this much was not possible, then they had to atone for it even after the solemnisation of the ceremony.³

It was essential for all to attend the *uposatha* personally, if not so, then at least by proxy. Absence from the ceremony was allowed under circumstances beyond control only. No laxity in this respect was permissible on the plea of personal purity, how much great it might be. The virtuous members, on the contrary, were considered more responsible than ordinary monks or nuns. Buddha's admonition to Mahākappin, an *arahata*, when he was hesitating to attend the ceremony may be cited as an instance in point:

"If you Brahmanas do not honour, do not regard, do not revere, do not pay reverence to the *uposatha*, who will then honour, regard, revere, pay reverence to the *uposatha*? Go to the *uposatha*, O Brahmanas, do not neglect to go, go to the functions of the Order, do not neglect to go."⁴

So also on the *uposatha* day, the monks were debarred from leaving a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks for a residence or non-residence without monks; or a residence or non-residence

1. CV, 10 2.2.3, p. 375; PM (*Bhikkhuni*), 4, 59.

2. MV, 2.28.41, pp. 129-31; 2.29.42, p. 132; 2.30.43, pp. 132-33; 2.31.44, pp. 133-34; 2.32.45, pp. 134-37.

3. *Ibid*, 2. 27. 40, pp. 127-29.

4. *Ibid*, 2. 3. 6, p. 108.

inhabited by monks belonging to different districts (*stīma*), except with a Saṅgha (i. e., with a number of monks sufficient for holding *uposatha*) or in case of danger.¹ But they were allowed to leave on *uposatha* day a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks for a residence or non-residence inhabited by monks belonging to the same districts provided that they could reach the place in due time.²

Out of the three types of *uposatha* referred to in the *Mahāvagga*, the *uposatha* just discussed is the *saṅgha-uposatha*, the other two being the *pārisuddhi* and the *adhīṭṭhāna*. The *uposatha* held by four or more than four monks or nuns is called *saṅgha-uposatha* as the minimum quorum for performing an Ecclesiastical Act is four. The recitation of the *Pātimokkha* is one of the essential features of *saṅgha-uposatha*. The declaration of *pārisuddhi* in order of seniority with the usual formality, if there be less than four monks in an *āvāsa* on the *uposatha* day, is called *pārisuddhi-uposatha* and the concentration of one's mind on the thought—'Today is my *uposatha* day', if there be only one monk in an *āvāsa* on that day, is designated *adhīṭṭhāna-uposatha*.³ The concluding passage of the *Uposathakkhandhaka*⁴ refers to a special type of *uposatha* held on any other day than the *uposatha* days for the sake of reconciliation of the Order which was known as *saṅghasāmaggi-uposatha*.

Besides these, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* gives three types of *uposatha* known as *gopālaka*, *nigaṭṭha* and *ariya*. The first two types make a reference to the *uposatha* performed by the Jaina laity in which they, on the *uposatha* day indulge in merriments⁵, and copy temporarily⁶ the life of an ascetic by renouncing family ties and household duties respectively. The third type is the *uposatha* observed by the Buddhists themselves.

(c) Jaina :

In Jainism the expression '*posaha*' or '*posadha*' stands for *uposatha*. The Jaina Sanskrit rendering of the term is *pauṣadha*⁷ or sometimes *prauṣadha*.⁸ Umāsvāti gives the word *parva* as the synonym of *pauṣadha* and includes *aṣṭamī*, *caturdaśī* and *pañcadasi* or any other day (*tithi*)

1. *MV*, 2. 37, 51, p. 141.

2. *Ibid*, 2. 36. 50, pp. 140-41.

3. *Ibid*, 2. 24. 37, pp. 125-26.

4. *na ca, bhikkhave, anuposathe uposatho kātabbo, aññātra, saṅgha-sāmaggiyā ti.*—*Ibid*, 2. 38. 52, p. 142.

5. Cf. *Bhag*, 12, 1, p. 553a.

6. Cf. *Ibid*, 12. 1, p. 555a.

7. *Tattva*, auto commentary, 7.16.

8. *Sarva*, 7.21.

of the month as suitable for *pausa*. The comentator Siddhasenagaṇi explains this statement of Umāsvāti as implying that on *aṣṭamī*, *caturdaśī* and *pañcadasī*, the *pausa* is to be necessarily observed, while any other day is to be selected according to the convenience of the person concerned. The *pausa* in Jainism is meant exclusively for the laity. In the Jaina Scripture, we find references to *posahasāla*, that is a place or hall set apart for performance of the *pausa*.¹ A Jaina *upāsaka* was required to fast on the day and live in *posahasāla* like a monk abstaining from bath, powder, garlands and ornaments. He was also required to desist from all kinds of sinful activities and sit and sleep on *kuśa*-grass-mats or wooden planks procured for the purpose. He was also expected to practise various meditational postures and remain awake as far as possible meditating on religious principles and the nature of self. Generally the *pausa* was observed for one day. But one could be allowed to continue it for more than one day also.

In the *Bhagavatisūtra*² we find reference to a kind of *pausa* (*paṅkhiya-pasaha*) when people went out and prepared food and drink and passed the day in merriments. But this type of *pausa* was not considered religious. It was called *pausa* perhaps because it was associated with the *parva* days, such as *aṣṭamī* or *caturdaśī*. It appears that the ceremonies, secular or religious, which were performed on *pausa* or *parva* days were indiscriminately called *pausahas*. And this explains the *Anguttara* reference to *gopālaka-uposatha*.³

In Jainism two kinds of *tapah* (austerity) is recognised, namely internal and external, each of which is of six kinds.⁴ Among the six kinds of internal austerities, the first is called *prāyaścitta* which has ten varieties, the second of which is called *pratikramaṇa*⁵ meaning recoil from the sins committed. The second internal austerity is called *vinaya*⁶ which has five varieties, the fifth being called *tapovinaya*. This *tapovinaya*⁷ includes six obligatory acts (*āvāṣyaka*), namely *sāmāyika* (the practice of the equanimous mood of mind), *caturviṃsatistava* (hymns in praise of the twenty-four Tirthaṅkaras), *vandana* (showing respects to the superiors), *pratikramaṇa* (condemnation of the transgressions committed by the monk), *pratyākhyāna* (determination to give up all sinful and unmonkly activities) and *kāyotsarga* (suspension of physical movements accompanied by mindfulness). Our main concern

1. *Uva*, 1.79, p. 18.

3. *Vide Infra*, p. 193.

5. *Ibid*, 7.33ff.

2. *Bhag*, 12.1, p. 553a

4. *Anag*, 7.4.

6. *Ibid*, 7.60ff.

7. *Ibid*, 7.75.

here is the nature and the content of *pratīkramaṇa*. In the *pratīkramaṇa*, the monk condemns himself for the sins and transgressions of the monastic rules committed by him. He makes confession of the transgressions before his preceptor. In other words, in the *pratīkramaṇa* the monk is required to remember all the vows and rules of monastic life undertaken by him for lifelong observance. He exerts himself to examine the shortcomings of monastic life and make atonement for them.

To be exact the whole process beginning from *sāmayika* and ending in *kāyotsarga* is the Jaina equivalent of the *uposatha* of the Buddhists. In the *Pātimokkha*, the punishments for the crimes committed are also mentioned. But in the Jaina *Pratīkramaṇa* the specific punishments are not mentioned, though, of course, monks are required to recoil from their sinful deeds; condemn himself privately (*nindā*) and publicly (*garhā*), and ultimately beg pardon of their respective preceptors by means of confession of their crimes *ālocanā*.¹ Unlike the Buddhist *uposatha*, the *pratīkramaṇa* is done daily—in the morning for the transgressions done at night, and in the evening for the same committed during the day. There is also the provision of *pratīkramaṇa* after a journey or similar act involving inadvertent commission of crime. Besides these, there are prescribed the fortnightly, four-monthly and yearly *pratīkramaṇas*, in addition to the *uttamārtha-pratīkramaṇa* done for the attainment of the supreme goal of life, namely, *mokṣa*.²

It is thus found that there are essential points of agreement between the Buddhist *uposatha* and the Jaina *pratīkramaṇa*, rather the complete obligatory monastic act beginning from *sāmayika* and ending in *kāyotsarga*.

In this connection the problem why in Jainism the *puṣadha* was exclusively meant for the householders, while in Buddhism it was exclusively prescribed for the monks deserves consideration. The Jaina monks performed *pratīkramaṇa* on the last day of every fortnight in which they recited all possible omissions and commissions, and transgressions and expressed their purity. The *pratīkramaṇa* was obviously performed on the *parva* days. The contents of the Buddhist *Pātimokkha* is very similar to the contents of the Jaina *pratīkramaṇa* and it appears that the Buddhists introduced the *Pātimokkha* for a purpose

1. *Anag*, 8. 62.

2. *alocanaṃ divasiyaṃ raiyaṃ iriyavahaṃ ca boddhavvaṃ / pakkhaya cadummasiya samvaccharamuttamattham ca //* *Icīd*.

similar to that of the Jainas. The *Patimokkha* was recited on the *uposatha* day and was in due course identified with the latter, though the identification was never complete inasmuch as we find *uposathas* performed on other days and for other purposes as well, as mentioned above. As regards Jainism there was no occasion for identifying *pratikramaṇa* with *paṣadha* which was left exclusively for the laymen.

It has already been stated that *upavasatha* stood for a fast-day and the fasting was observed on the *pūrṇimā* and *amāvāsyā*. It appears that *pūrṇimā* and *amāvāsyā* were in due course recognised as *upavasatha* or fasting days, and thus there was a kind of necessary association between *upavāsa* and the *pūrṇimā* and the *amāvāsyā* days. Consequently *pūrṇimā* and *amāvāsyā* came to be designated as *upavasatha* days. Various religious sects accepted the *uposatha* day as specially suited date for religious observances, fasting being one of their essential features. This is perhaps the reason why we find the word *upavāsa* necessarily associated with *paṣadha*. The Buddhists were not in favour of such fasting and so we find Pāli *uposatha* never associated with *upavāsa*.

(d) Conclusion :

It is almost certain that the *uposatha* owes, in some form or other, a pre-Śramaṇic origin. Pt. Shri Sukhalalji Sanghavi also holds the same opinion which is manifest in his following words :

“There is no material before us for determining how one tradition influenced another a thousand years ago. Nevertheless we may venture to observe that the *upavasatha* (fasting) in the Vedic tradition was considered to be the means of acquisition of a pleasant condition (heaven ?). In the Śramaṇic tradition on the other hand *uposatha*¹ or *posaha* was regarded as the instrument of the good (salvation). Viewed from the course of evolution it is found that the conception of the good (blessed condition) has come about among mankind after that of the pleasant. If this be true the custom of *upavāsa* (fast) or *posaha* in the Śramaṇic tradition however ancient it may be, must be held to bear the impress of the fasting ceremony of the Vedic cult of sacrifice.”²

One point more which may be gathered from this study is that the Buddhists were the last to adopt this practice, firstly, because they

1. The *uposatha* ceremony in the Buddhist tradition did not include fasting though it might be the original content of it.
2. Translated into English, cf. *DC*, II, p. 107.

admit frankly enough that the ceremony was already in vogue among the *tithiyas*, and secondly, the Jaina *posaha*, like the Vedic *upavasatha*, was a sole concern of the householders rather than of the mendicants as we find in the case of the Buddhist. This adherence of the Jainas to the original form takes the Jaina *posaha* to greater antiquity than the *uposatha* of the Buddhists who wrought a change in the original form (i.e. from social to monastic), in all probability, to claim a greater antiquity and novelty.

Abbreviations

Anag—Anagāradharmāmṛta.

BD—Book of Discipline (English Translation of Vinaya Piṭaka by I.B. Horner).

Bhag—Bhagavatisūtra (Agamodaya Samiti Bombay).

GV—Cullavagga (Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series).

DC—Darshana Aur Chintana (Pt. Sukhalalji Sanghavi).

EBJ—Early Buddhist Jurisprudence (Miss Bhagwat).

Kaṅkha—Kaṅkhavitarani, Edited by D.M. Stede.

MV—Mahāvagga (Nalanda-Devanagari-Pali-Series).

PM—Pātimokkha, Edited by Dr. P. L. Vaidya.

SED—Sanskrit-English-Dictionary (M.M. Williams).

Tattva—Tattvārthādhigama sūtra.

Uva—Uvāsagadasao, Edited by Dr. P. L. Vaidya.

SEMINAR OF SCHOLARS

A Seminar of Scholars is held every year at the Institute on Mahāvīra's birthday. The first such Seminar was held in 1963 when Shri J. C. Mathur, I. C. S., Commissioner of Tirhut Division, took the initiative in proposing it, and since then it is being held regularly. In the pages that follow, some of the papers read and lectures delivered on the occasion are being published. Unrecorded lectures or speeches delivered extempore could not be included in the Bulletin.

The first Seminar was held in two sittings on April, 6, 1963. Scholars came from the sister Institutes in the State. Shri J. C. Mathur welcomed the scholars. Dr. Yogendra Mishra, Principal Shri Bhagwan Prasad Sinha of L. N. College, Bhagwanpur, and others participated in the deliberations of the first sitting. Principal Shri Mahendra Pratap of L. S. College, Muzaffarpur, presided over the second sitting at which the Director read a paper on *Gṛhastha Dharma* (householder's duties) according to Mahāvīra, Buddha, Manu and Gandhiji, which was discussed at length by the scholars present. Besides the staff and students of the Institute, the local people took a keen interest in the Seminar. The first sitting of the second Seminar was held on April 24, 1964, in the presence of Muni Shri Dhanrajji Maharaj, a senior disciple of Acharya-Shri Tulsi. Shri Mahesh Prasad Sinha, a Cabinet Minister in the Government of Bihar, presided over the sitting, the subject of discussion being *The Jaina view of Good and Evil*. Shri J. S. Bali, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars and Principal Krishneshwar Jha, Pandit Rupnath Jha, Pandit Kanhaiya Sharma, Pandit Sobhakant Jha and others took part in the discussions. Dr. D. N. Sharma and Shri R. P. Poddar also read papers on the subject. The third Seminar was held on April 14, 1965, and was presided over by the Governor of Bihar, Shri M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar. Shri Satyendra Narayan Sinha, Education Minister of Bihar, sent a good will message expressing his desire that the Seminar should be a permanent feature of the Institute. Shri J. S. Bali and Shri M. P. N. Sharma, Deputy Education Secretary, took keen interest in organizing the Seminar. Among the participants in the deliberations were Shri S. V. Sohoni, I.C.S., Shri J.C. Mathur, I.C.S., Dr. P. L. Srivastava, Vice-Chancellor, Bihar University, Professor D. Malvania, Dr. B. P. Sinha, Professor A.L. Thakur, Pandit

Darbarilal Kothia, Pandit Sobhakant Jha, Principal Mahendra Pratap and Shri N. C. Jain. The Director read a paper on *Materialism versus Spiritualism* and also on *Anekānta and Madhyamā Pratipad*. Dr. B. P. Sinha spoke on the Cultural Heritage of Vaishali Prof. D. Malvania gave a talk on the contribution of the Jainas to Indian Philosophy. At the fourth Seminar which was held on April 3, 1966, the subject of discussion was *Religion and Secularism*. Shri Satyendra Narayan Sinha, Education Minister, presided. Shri J. C. Mathur, Dr. Sukumar Sen, Dr. G. C. Chaudhary, Pandit Kanhaiya Sharma, Professor A. L. Thakur and others participated. *Religion and Politics (Dharmanīti aur Rājanīti)* was the topic of discussion at the fifth Seminar which was held on April 22, 1967. Shri Nageshwar Prasad Sinha, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars and Shri Karpuri Thakur, Deputy Chief Minister of Bihar, presided. Shri J. C. Mathur, Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Pandit Ram Padarath Sharma, Shri L. C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi and Vice-Chancellor Shri B. M. K. Sinha of Bihar University participated in the discussions. *Rāṣṭriya Ekatā* (National Unity) was the subject of discussion at the sixth Seminar held on April 11, 1968. Sādhvī Kasturāji, a learned nun under Acharya-Shri Tulsī, who graced the Seminar by her presence, emphasized the role of language as an ingredient of national integration. Shri Krishna Kant Singh, Minister, was the Chief Guest, and Pandit Vidyadhara Shastri of Bikaner presided over the Seminar. Dr. P. S. Muhar, Vice-Chancellor, Bihar University, Shri L. C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi and others participated in the discussions. The seventh Seminar, presided over by Dr. A. N. Upadhye, was held on April 1, 1969. The subject of discussion was the connotation of the words *Ārya* and *Anārya*. Dr. N. C. Shastri, Principal Ram Karan Sharma and others participated.

A two-day Seminar was held on April 18-19, 1970, which was inaugurated by Professor Dr. N. K. Deoraj, Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University. The subject discussed at the Seminar was *Foundation of world peace : Ahimsā and Anekānta*. Shri Daroga Prasad Rai, Chief Minister of Bihar, presided over the second session of the Seminar held on April 19, Shri S. K. Ghose, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division, welcomed the scholars. Professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee read a learned paper on the subject and was followed by Principal Ram Karan Sharma. Shri L. C. Jain and others. Shri Nitishwar Prasad Sinha, State Education Minister, also spoke. The ninth Seminar, which was held on April 8, 1971, was presided over by Shri D. K. Barooah, Rajyapal

of Bihar, who gave an illuminating talk on the subject of *Dharma ke Mūl: Anubhūti Evaṃ Tarka* with which our publication of the papers read at the Seminars begins. Shri K. K. Srivastava, I. A. S., Commissioner, Tirhut Division took keen interest in organizing the Seminar. Shri J. C. Mathur, Shri L. C. Jain, Shri L. P. Sahi, Dr. Yogendra Mishra, Dr. Jayamant Mishra, Pandit Ram Karan Sharma and Dr. Darbarilal Kothia participated in the deliberations of the Seminar.

धर्म के मूल : अनुभूति एवं तर्क*

देवकान्त बरूआ

पण्डितगण और बन्धुगण,

मैं आपसे माफी माँगना चाहता हूँ कि मेरी जो हिन्दी होगी, वह चलती हिन्दी होगी। वह संस्कृत पण्डितों की हिन्दी नहीं होगी। लेकिन मेरा ख्याल है, मेरी चलती हिन्दी आप लोग समझ लेंगे। हिन्दी 'प्राकृत' भाषा है। प्राकृत का अर्थ ही है प्रकृति या स्वभाविकता से सम्बद्ध। इसलिए प्राकृत भाषा का अर्थ हुआ जनगण द्वारा व्यग्रहृत ऐसी स्वभाविक भाषा, जो साधारण जनता के लिए कथ्य और बोधगम्य—दोनों हो। प्राकृत भाषा के तात्पर्य को व्यक्त करने वाली यह उक्ति प्रसिद्ध है—“प्रकृत्या स्वभावेन सिद्धमिति प्राकृतम्” अथवा “प्राकृतजनानां भाषा प्राकृतम्”। रुद्रट की काव्यालंकारसूत्र-वृत्ति में नमिसाधु ने यही मत व्यक्त किया है। यों वैयाकरणों और अलंकारिकों ने 'प्रकृति' और 'प्राकृत' से कई खींचतान वाले आशय निकाले हैं। जैसे, 'सिद्धहेमचन्द्र' में कहा गया है—“प्रकृतिः संस्कृतम् तत्र भवम् तत आगतम् वा प्राकृतम्” और मार्कण्डेय के 'प्राकृत सर्वस्व' में कहा गया है—“प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत्र भवम् प्राकृतमुच्यते”। किन्तु वैयाकरणों और अलंकारिकों द्वारा कही गई ये बातें ऐतिहासिक और भाषा वैज्ञानिक दृष्टि से ग्राह्य नहीं हैं। ऐतिहासिक दृष्टि से तो प्राकृत प्रकाश के लेखक बरहृषि की ही व्याख्या ग्राह्य है, जिसके मुताबिक संस्कृत का विकृत रूप ही प्राकृत है। इसलिए संस्कृत का जो नियम है, उसका प्राकृत में लागू होना अनुचित है, क्योंकि संस्कृत से जो अशुद्ध हुआ, वही रूप प्राकृत है। प्राकृत भाषा में जो लोग व्याकरण लगते हैं, वे मेरे ख्याल में जबर्दस्ती करते हैं। त्रिविक्रम^३ ने भी अपने व्याकरण में देश्य भाषाओं को व्याकरण के बाहर ही रखा था।

* विद्वद्गोष्ठी, ८ अप्रैल १९७१, में माननीय श्री बरूआ, राज्यपाल, बिहार द्वारा दिया गया अध्यक्षीय भाषण।

१. वैयाकरणों द्वारा प्रस्तुत की गई व्याख्याओं के कुछ उदाहरण इस प्रकार हैं—

- (क) 'प्रकृतेः संस्कृताद् आगतम् प्राकृतम् ।'—सिद्धदेवगण, वाग्मटालंकार की टीका।
- (ख) 'संस्कृतरूपायाः प्रकृतेः उत्पन्नत्वात् प्राकृतम् ।'—रामचन्द्र तर्कवाचीश कृत काव्यादर्श-टीका।
- (ग) 'प्रकृतेरागतं प्राकृतम् । प्रकृतिः संस्कृतम् ।'—धनिक, दशरूप की टीका।
- (घ) 'प्रकृतिः संस्कृतम् । तत्र भवत्वाद् प्राकृतं स्मृतम् ।'—प्राकृतचन्द्रिका (फोटोसंन की तीसरी रिपोर्ट में उद्धृत)।

२. प्राकृत-प्रकाश प्राकृत भाषा का पुराना ग्रन्थ है। इस पर मामह, वसन्तराज, सदानन्द इत्यादि की कई प्रसिद्ध टीकाएँ मिलती हैं।

३. त्रिविक्रम आदित्यवर्मन के पौत्र और मल्लिनाथ के पुत्र थे। इन्होंने हेमचन्द्र को आधार मानकर प्राकृत व्याकरण की टीका लिखी।

पहले, आज से सौ साल पहले हमारे बंगाल और आसाम में पण्डित लोग संस्कृत तो शुद्ध लिखते थे और पीछे इन पण्डित लोगों ने जब अंग्रेजी सीखी, तो ये अंग्रेजी भी शुद्ध लिखते थे। लेकिन देशी भाषा लिखने में, प्राकृत लिखने में ये गलती कर देते थे और कुछ परवाह नहीं करते थे। मगर ईश्वरचन्द्र विद्यासागर ने वर्ण-परिचय लिखकर बांगला भाषा में संस्कृत नियम लागू कर दिया। तबसे देशी भाषा को—प्राकृत भाषा को भी व्याकरण-संगत बनाने का प्रयास चल रहा है और उसका नतीजा यह हुआ कि आजकल पण्डितों के समाज में जो हिन्दी चल रही है, वह गाँव में किसी को समझ में नहीं आती।

आज इस बात की चर्चा हुई कि धर्म की बुनियाद क्या है? अनुभूति या तर्क? आजकल हिन्दी भाषा में तर्क का माने कुछ हल्का हो गया है। हम अक्सर बहस करने वाले को तार्किक कह देते हैं यानी आजकल 'तार्किक'। शिकायत का शब्द हो गया है। किन्तु, संस्कृत में तर्क के लिए दूसरा शब्द है 'युक्ति'। यानी युक्तिवादी को ही तार्किक कहा जाता है। इस तरह संस्कृत में 'तर्क' शब्द का जो अर्थ था, उसके मुताबिक युक्ति से चिन्ता करके या युक्ति की बुनियाद पर निर्णय करने वाले को तार्किक कहा जाता था। मुजफ्फरपुर का जो यह वैशाली है, वह पुराने समय में तार्किकों का पीठस्थान था। इसलिए उसका असर अभी भी वैशाली पर है जो अच्छा है, बुरा नहीं। फलस्वरूप, स्वाधीन चिन्तन की शक्ति अभी भी वैशाली में प्रवहमान है। वैशाली की जो खूबी है, इसका जो गौरव है, वह केवल इसलिए नहीं कि यह महावीर तीर्थकर का जन्मस्थान है या भगवान् बुद्ध ने यहाँ अपने धर्म का प्रचार किया था। निश्चय ही वैशाली के गौरव के कई कारणों में ये बातें भी शामिल हैं। लेकिन वैशाली के गौरव का सबसे बड़ा कारण यह है कि इसी जगह पर भारतवर्ष में मस्तिष्क की प्रथम मुक्ति हुई थी। मगध, कोसांबी, कोशल—सब जगह की चिन्ताधारा संकीर्ण थी, लेकिन वैशाली का जो चिन्ता-प्रवाह था, वह उन्मुक्त था, स्वतंत्र था। और उसका विकास भारतवर्ष में ही नहीं, सारी दुनियाँ में हुआ।

एशिया में मैं काफी घूम चुका हूँ। मैं जब चीन गया तो वहाँ तुनह्वांग उत्तरी चीन में मैंने एक मूर्ति देखी। उसकी तसवीर मेरे पास रखी हुई है। वहाँ लिखा हुआ है अप्सरा—फलाङ्ग देव। जहाँ धर्मकीर्ति का मन्दिर है, मैं वहाँ भी गया। जापान जाकर मैंने वहाँ का सागरोत्सव (सौ सेरेमगी) भी देखा। वहाँ लगभग सब कुछ बौद्ध धर्म से आया हुआ है। उनकी जो चिन्तय है, बैठने-बैठाने का ढंग है, वह बौद्ध धर्म से आया हुआ है। उनका जो सौन्दर्य-बोध है, बाग-बगीचा वगैरह लगाने का सजीका है, वह भी बौद्धधर्म से ही आया हुआ है। इतना ही नहीं, मैं थाइलैंड गया, अंकोरवाट गया, कम्बोडिया और कंबोज गया। मैं एशिया में जहाँ भी गया, वहाँ मैंने वैशाली में विकसित हुई चिन्ता-धारा का 'इम्पैक्ट', जिसे हिन्दी में प्रभाव कहते हैं, स्पष्ट देखा। चूँकि समूचे एशिया पर मैंने यह प्रभाव देखा, इसलिए मैं कहता हूँ कि वैशाली मेरे लिए श्रद्धा का स्थान है—तीर्थस्थान है। यह इसलिए भी तीर्थ-स्थान है कि यहीं पर पहली बार युक्तिवादियों ने, जैसा कि मैं पहले भी कह चुका हूँ, हमारे मस्तिष्क को—पूरे भारतवर्ष के मस्तिष्क को मुक्ति प्रदान की।

आपलोगों ने इस बात की भी चर्चा की कि धर्म क्या है? धर्म की अनेक व्याख्याएँ हैं। उसके तो बहुत मतलब हैं। सनातनपंथी जो कहते हैं, वह भी धर्म है। वर्णाश्रम को

भी हमलोग धर्म ही कहते हैं। लेकिन वर्णाश्रम को जो नहीं मानते, वे भी एक प्रकार के धर्म के ही आचरण का दावा करते हैं। भगवान् बुद्ध का जो धर्म है, उसका नाम तो सद्धर्म है अच्छा धर्म। कभी भी भगवान् बुद्ध ने बौद्धधर्म नहीं कहा सद्धर्म कहा। इसी तरह अनेक भिन्नताओं या विशेषताओं के रहने पर भी महावीर तीर्थंकर द्वारा चलाया मत भी धर्म ही है। इतना ही नहीं, जो मत भगवाद् को बिल्कुल नहीं मानता, वह भी धर्म कहलाया। इस तरह धर्म की व्याख्या और रूप अनेक है, एक नहीं।

विद्वद्गोष्ठी में बहुत लोगों ने श्लोक को प्रमाण मानकर कई बातें कहीं। लेकिन किसी एक श्लोक को प्रमाण माना जाय, तो कैसे? संस्कृत में अनेक परस्पर-विरोधी श्लोक मिलते हैं। संस्कृत वाङ्मय तो समुद्र जैसा है। उसमें हांगर (मगर) भी है, जो मछली खाता है और मुक्ता—मोती भी है। जैसे समुद्र में ऐसे जानवर भी होते हैं, जो दूसरे समुद्री जानवर को खा जाते हैं, वैसे ती संस्कृत में ऐसे श्लोक हैं, जो दूसरे संस्कृत श्लोक को हज़म कर जाते हैं। धर्मकीर्ति^१ के श्लोक का आशय मैं आपको सुना देता हूँ, जो इसी वैशाली की सृष्टि है। उसका कहना है कि अष्टबुद्धि के पाँच लक्षण होते हैं। पहला लक्षण है 'वेद-प्रामाण्य', अर्थात् वेद को प्रमाण मानना। दूसरा लक्षण है 'कस्यचित् कर्तृवादः', यानि यह मानना कि ईश्वर ने दुनिया को बनाया है। तीसरा लक्षण है 'स्नाने धर्मेच्छा',—यह विश्वास करना कि नहाने से धर्म होता है। चौथा लक्षण है 'जातिवादावलेपः'—जाति-व्यवस्था या वर्णाश्रम को मानना। और, पाँचवां लक्षण है 'संतापारम्भ पापहानायचेति'—अर्थात् शरीर को कष्ट देकर धर्म-लाभ मानना। इस तरह जो अष्टबुद्धि है, जिसका दिमाग बिल्कुल खराब हो गया है, उसकी सूर्यता के वे (उपर्युक्त) पाँच लक्षण हैं—'ध्वस्तप्रज्ञाने पञ्चलिंगानि जाड्ये'। तो, यह भी संस्कृत में लिखा हुआ है और धर्मकीर्ति जैसे बड़े ब्राह्मणों का लिखा हुआ है। अब इनका श्लोक मानूँ या वेदवादियों ग्रथवा आस्तिकों का श्लोक मानूँ। बताइये।

भगवान् बुद्ध ने जिसे धर्म कहा है, उसके बारे में मैं थोड़ा जानता हूँ। जिसको आप धर्म कहते हैं, उसके प्रसंग में अक्सर यह विचार किया जाता है कि ईश्वर है या नहीं, सृष्टि किसने की या सृष्टि स्वयं हो गई, वगैरह। मगर भगवान् बुद्ध ने इनके बारे में कुछ कहा ही नहीं। भगवान् बुद्ध ने धर्म का जो माने लगाया था, वह था आचरण—विनय। उनका धर्म तो था आर्य अष्टांगिक मार्ग, जिसमें है सम्यग् दृष्टि, सम्यक् संकल्प, सम्यग् वाचा, सम्यक् कर्म, सम्यग् अजीव, सम्यक् प्रयत्न, सम्यक् स्मृति और सम्यक् समाधि। यानि भले-बुरे का ठीक ज्ञान होना चाहिए, हर मनुष्य का संकल्प ठीक होना चाहिए, उसका वचन ही नहीं कर्म भी ठीक होना चाहिए, उसे अच्छी तरह से जीवन-निर्वाह करना चाहिए, इत्यादि। सचमुच, आचरण ही सबसे बढ़कर महत्वपूर्ण है। आप चोरी करके सद्धर्म का पालन नहीं कर सकते हैं। इसलिए भगवान् बुद्ध का जो धर्म है, वह आचरण का धर्म है। इसमें है पुरुषकार। मेरी समझ से बौद्ध धर्म और जैन धर्म का जो सबसे बड़ा गुण है, वह है पुरुषकार में विश्वास। आप में अच्छा काम करने की जो क्षमता है, उसके द्वारा आप अपने मविष्य का निर्माण कर सकते हैं। यह निश्चित है कि आप जो करेंगे, उसीसे आपका मविष्य निर्मित

१. प्रमाणवार्तिक स्ववृत्ति, १, ३४२।

अथना निर्णीत होगा, किसी और कुछ से नहीं। यहाँ ठीक काम करने के साथ ठीक-ठीक बोलना भी शामिल है। तभी तो भगवान् बुद्ध ने कहा है—‘सम्यग् वाचा’। आज अपने कई तरह की बातें सुनीं : सौन्दर्य की आराधना करनी चाहिए, साहस से बोलना चाहिए, बढ़ियाँ और सार्थक काम करना चाहिए। लेकिन भगवान् बुद्ध ने इससे भी आगे बढ़कर कहा कि माई, केवल सत्य वाक् बोलने से नहीं होगा, सत्य क्रिया भी करनी होगी। क्रिया में—काम में ही तुम्हारा सत्य प्रतिफलित होगा, खाली बात में नहीं। इसलिए सत्य वाचा ही नहीं, सत्य क्रिया भी होनी चाहिए। सत्य क्रिया पर बुद्ध ने शायद इसलिए भी जोर दिया कि भगवान् में प्रगाढ़ विश्वास—अन्धविश्वास रखने के बावजूद व्यक्ति अच्छे आचरण से दूर रह सकता है। बहुत से लोग ऐसे हैं, जो धर्म में काफी विश्वास करते हैं, लेकिन कर्म—काम कुछ नहीं करते। ऐसे अनेक भक्तिवादी हमें मिलते हैं। यों भक्ति में भी दो पक्ष हैं। एक तो यह है कि भक्ति में कर्म और विश्वास दोनों का समन्वय होना चाहिए। लेकिन एक दूसरा पक्ष भी है, जिसमें कहा गया है कि भगवान् में विश्वास करने के अलावा तुमको कुछ करना-धरना ही नहीं है :

अजगर करे न चाकरी, पंछी करे न काम ।

दास मलूका कह गए, सबके दाता राम ॥

भागवत¹ में भी अजामिल का उपाख्यान है। अजामिल एक ब्राह्मण था। उसने जीवन भर पाप ही किया। मरने के वक्त उसको एकड़ने के लिये यमदूत आया। अजामिल के लड़के का नाम था नारायण। सो उसने पुकारा ‘आईसो पुत्र नारायण’। उस पुकार को सुनते ही विष्णुदूत को शंका हुई कि यह व्यक्ति तों नारायण का, विष्णु भगवान् का भक्त है। फिर क्या था। विष्णुदूत ने अजामिल को यमदूत से छीन लिया—उसे मृत्यु के मुँह से बचा लिया। समूची जिन्दगी भर जिसने पाप किया, मरने के समय गलती से उसके मुँह में नारायण आ गया, तो उसकी मुक्ति हो गई। अचरज है कि सम्यग् आचरण के बिना ऐसा भी होता है। केवल भक्तिवादियों में ही नहीं, निरीश्वरवादियों या नास्तिकों में भी कई लोग मानते हैं कि कुछ करने-धरने की जरूरत नहीं है। ऐसे लोगों में सबसे बड़ा था मकहालि गोशाल²। वे सब कुछ मानते थे—दुनिया को मानते थे और पुनर्जन्म भी

१. अत्रियमाणो हरेर्नाम गृणन् पुत्रोपचारितम् ।

अजामिलोऽप्यगाढाम कि पुनः श्रद्धया गृणन् ॥

—भागवत पुराण, ६. २. ४६ ।

२. नत्थि, महाराज, हेतु, नत्थि पच्चयो सत्तानं सङ्किलेसाय । अहेतू अपच्चया सत्ता सङ्किलिस्सन्ति । नत्थि हेतु, नत्थि पच्चयो सत्तानं विसुद्धिया । अहेतू अपच्चया सत्ता विसुद्धन्ति । नत्थि अत्तकारे, नत्थि पुरिसकारे, नत्थि बलं, नत्थि विरियं, नत्थि पुरिसथामो, नत्थि पुरिसपरक्कमो । सब्बे सत्ता सब्बे पाणा सब्बे भूता सब्बे जीवा अवसा अबला अवरिया नियतिसंगतिभावपरिणता, छस्सेवाभिजातीसु सुखदुक्खं पटिसंवेदेन्ति ।

—दीघनिकाय, नालन्दा-देवानागरी-पालि-ग्रन्थमाला, १९६६, पृ० ४७ ।

मानते थे। लेकिन वे कहते थे कि करने-धरने से कुछ नहीं होता है। यदि तुम किसी का गला काटोगे, तो उससे पाप नहीं होगा और यदि तुम गरीबों में रुपया बाँट दोगे, तो उससे पुण्य भी नहीं होगा। यानी तुम्हारे करने-धरने का कोई असर तुम्हारे पुनर्जन्म पर नहीं होगा। किसी भी जीव के लिए सबसे बड़ी चीज है भाग्यचक्र। जीव तो अपने भाग्यचक्र के अनुसार चौरासी लाख योनियों में गुजरने के बाद अपने आप अर्हंत हो जायगा। वे ईश्वर में विश्वास नहीं करते थे, पुनर्जन्म में विश्वास करते थे, लेकिन अक्रियावादी थे। किन्तु, भगवान् बुद्ध ने ऐसी धारणा को स्वीकार नहीं किया। उन्होंने स्पष्ट कहा कि जिस धर्म में पुरुषकार नहीं है, वह धर्म जनता के लिए मंगलदायक नहीं हो सकता। इसीलिए भगवान् बुद्ध ने धर्म का उद्देश्य बताया—'बहुजनहिताय च'। जिस धर्म में पुरुषकार को स्थान नहीं है, वह धर्म 'बहुजनहिताय च' नहीं हो सकता। इस तरह धर्म का जो सबसे बड़ा शोथ है, वह है, आचरण और आचरण की बुनियाद है, जैसाकि मैं समझा हूँ, युक्ति।

इस प्रसंग में मैं आप लोगों को बौद्धधर्म का एक वाकिया बतलाना चाहता हूँ। आप जानते ही होंगे कि कुछ संन्यासी एकदम कपड़ा पहनते ही नहीं। कुछ संन्यासी पहनते भी हैं तो एक या दो कपड़े पहनते हैं। किन्तु, भगवान् बुद्ध ने बौद्ध भिक्षुओं के लिए तीन कपड़े पहनने का नियम कर दिया। उन्होंने क्यों ऐसा कर दिया? उन्होंने प्रयोग कर देखा कि कितना कपड़ा पहनना चाहिए। हेमन्त ऋतु में—शीतकाल में उन्होंने महसूस किया कि बहुत ठंडा पड़ता है। उसमें उन्होंने स्वयं अपने पर प्रयोग कर देखा, एक कपड़ा लिया, दूसरा कपड़ा लिया, तीसरा कपड़ा लिया। उन्होंने पाया कि तीन कपड़े में आराम तो नहीं होता, लेकिन कष्ट-निवारण होता है। भगवान् बुद्ध तो मध्यमथी थे, मध्यमा प्रतिपदा को मानने वाले। इसलिए उन्होंने भिक्षुओं से कहा कि तीन कपड़े लिया करो। इस तरह भगवान् बुद्ध का या बौद्ध धर्म का जो 'त्रिनय' हैं, उसकी बुनियाद युक्ति है। इस प्रसंग में एक दूसरा उदाहरण लीजिए। भगवान् बुद्ध ने खड़ाऊँ पहनना बन्द कर दिया, क्योंकि खड़ाऊँ से बहुत आवाज होती है और उस आवाज से ध्यान तथा एकाग्र-चिन्ता में व्याघात होता है। इसलिए उन्होंने तय कर दिया कि भिक्षुगण खड़ाऊँ नहीं पहनेंगे। लेकिन बिना खड़ाऊँ के पैदल चलने-फिरने में जब तकलीफ महसूस हुई, तो उन्होंने कहा कि एक परत की चर्मपादुका^३ पहन सकते हैं। हाँ, विशेष परिस्थिति में कोई कठिनाई उपस्थित होने पर

१. भगवा सीतासु हेमन्तिकसु रत्तीसु अन्तरठुकासु हिमपातसयये रत्ति अज्भोकासे एक-चीवरो निसीदि । न भगवन्तं अहोसि । निक्खान्ते पठमे यामे सीतं भगवन्तं अहोसि । दुतियं भगवा चीवरं पारुपि । न भगवन्तं सीतं अहोसि । निक्खान्ते मज्झिमे यामे सीतं भगवन्तं अहोसि । ततियं भगवा चीवरं पारुपि । न भगवन्तं सीतं अहोसि... 'ये पिहो ते कुलपुत्ता इमस्मिं धम्मविनये सीतालुका सीतभीरुका तेपि सबकोन्ति तिचीवरेन यापेतुं' । महावग्ग, ८. १५. २१ (पृष्ठ ३०४) ।

२. महावग्ग— ५. ७. १५ (पृष्ठ-२०८) ।

३. एक परतवाली चर्मपादुका को पालि में एकपलासिक कहा गया है ।

महावग्ग, ५. ३. ७ (पृष्ठ २०४) ।

एकाधिक परतवाली^१ या मोटे चमड़े की पादुका भी पहनी जा सकती है। इस तरह भगवान् बुद्ध ने तर्क से—युक्ति से सोच-विचार कर आचरण और व्यापार के सभी नियमों को बनाया।

वैशाली में जो गणतंत्र था, उसके निर्णय की भी तो यही प्रक्रिया थी। जिस समय अजातशत्रु वैशाली पर आक्रमण करना चाहता था, उस समय भगवान् बुद्ध ने एक दफे कहा था कि जबतक लिच्छवी लोग अपने सन्ध्यागार में नियमपूर्वक जाते रहेंगे, तबतक अजातशत्रु उनको नहीं जीत सकेगा।^२ लिच्छवीगण अपने सन्ध्यागार में जाकर तर्क-युक्ति से आपस में आलोचना करके ही कोई निर्णय करते थे। इस तरह धर्म-आचरण के धर्म की बुनियाद है युक्ति। मैं आध्यात्मिक धर्म के बारे में नहीं जानता हूँ; क्योंकि वह मेरे वश के बाहर की बात है। इस आचरण-धर्म की चर्चा उपनिषद्में भी मिलती है। श्री-अमो माथुर साहब टी० एस० इलियट की चर्चा कर रहे थे। टी० एस० इलियट की सर्वोत्तम कविता वेस्टलैंड का अन्तिम खण्ड है, 'What the thunder said'^३ इसमें उन्होंने बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् के ही एक सूत्र के आधार पर आचरण-धर्म का काव्यात्मक संकेत किया है। नर, असुर, और देव ने एक-एक कर प्रजापति से पूछा कि हमारे लिए धर्म क्या होगा, हमारा अनुशासन क्या होगा? प्रजापति ने कहा—द, द, द—दत्त, दयध्वम् और दाम्यत। चूँकि आदमी परिश्रमी होता है, इसलिए प्रजापति ने आदमी से कहा कि दान करो। असुर कुछ क्रूर होते थे, इसलिए प्रजापति ने उनसे कहा कि दया करो और देवता चूँकि इन्द्रिय-सुखों में डूबे रहते थे, इसलिए प्रजापति ने उनको कहा कि भाई थोड़ा दमन करो—आत्म नियंत्रण करो। इस तरह उपनिषद् में भी आचरण का ही उपदेश है कि हमें क्या करना चाहिए, मनुष्य-जीवन का क्या कर्तव्य होना चाहिए। मतलब यह कि आचरण का निर्णय करना धर्म का सबसे बड़ा

१. एक से अधिक परतवाली चर्मपादुका को गणगण उपाहन कहा गया है:

महावग्ग, ५. ५ १२ (पृष्ठ २०६)।

२. वज्जी अमिण्हं सन्निपाता सन्निपातबहुला.....वज्जी समग्गा सन्निपतन्ति समग्गा बृहहस्ति समग्गा वज्जिकरणीयानि करोन्ति.....वज्जी अपञ्जत्तं न पञ्जापेन्ति पञ्जत्तं न समुच्छिन्दन्ति, यथापञ्जते धोराणे वज्जिधम्ममे समदाय वस्तन्ति... एकमेकेन पि भो गोतम, अपरिहानियेन धम्ममेन समन्नागतानं वज्जीनं बुद्धियेव पाटि-कंहां, नो परिहानि, को पन वादो सत्तहि अपरिहानियेहि धम्महि ॥

दीघनिकाय—२. ३. १. ४-५ (पृष्ठ ५६-६१)।

३. The Waste Land and Other Poems. T. S. Eliot, Faber and Faber, London. 1968, pages 42-43.

४. तदेतदेवैषा देवी वागनुवदति स्तनयित्नुर्दं द द इति दाम्यत दत्त दयध्वमिति । तदेतत् त्रयं शिशोर् दमं दानं दयामिति । बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, ५. २. ३. Eliot ने इसे Deussen द्वारा किये गये जर्मन अनुवाद Sechzig Upanishads des Veda से ग्रहण किया था।

काम है। कुछ लोग पूजा-पाठ करते हैं, लेकिन गरीब के ऊपर अत्याचार भी करते हैं। मेरी समझ में यह धर्म नहीं हुआ। धर्म तो मनुष्य के प्रति, एक दूसरे के प्रति हमारे व्यवहार में निहित है और इस धर्म की बुनियाद 'युक्ति' है। जिस धर्म से हमारे रोज़ दिन के जीवन का कोई मतलब नहीं है, उस धर्म की बुनियाद युक्ति के अलावा कुछ और हो सकती है, जिसके बारे में न मेरी जानकारी है और न जिस पर कुछ कहने का मैं अधिकारी हूँ। मेरी निश्चित राय है कि जिस धर्म से हम जीवन-यापन करते हैं, जो धर्म हम सबको एक सूत्र में मूँच करके रखता है और जो पूरे समाज का धारण-पोषण करता है, उस धर्म की बुनियाद युक्ति पर ही कायम है। आखिर धर्म है क्या? जो धारण करता है, वही तो धर्म है। सचमुच, जो इस दुनिया का धारण-पोषण करता है, जो इसको ठीक रास्ते पर अच्छी तरह से चलाता है, वही धर्म है। जिन महापुरुषों ने धर्म के बारे में कोई महत्त्वपूर्ण बात कही या धर्म सम्बन्धी धारणाओं में कुछ परिवर्तन किया, उसका आधार 'युक्ति' ही है। क्या उचित है और क्या अनुचित है—इसके बारे में चिन्तन करके उन्होंने तय किया कि यह नियम होना चाहिए और यह नहीं होना चाहिए। फिर जो नियम ही, उसे बल की लकीर नहीं बनाना चाहिए। उसमें भी जरूरत के मुताबिक समय-समय पर युक्ति के द्वारा परिवर्तन की गुंजाइश रहनी चाहिए। भगवान् बुद्ध द्वारा चलाये नियमों की यही खूबी है। भगवान् बुद्ध ने कहीं कठोर नियंत्रण किया, तो कहीं कुछ घटा भी दिया। स्नान के बारे में कहा गया है—'स्नाने धर्मच्छा'। हमारे देश में अनेक ऐसे आदमी थे और अभी भी हैं, जो बिना नहाये चाय-पान भी नहीं करते; तीन-दफे—सुबह, दोपहर, शाम नहाते हैं। इतना ही नहीं, बहुत लोग खाना भी भीगे कपड़े में ही खाते हैं। लेकिन भगवान् बुद्ध ने भिक्षुओं से कहा—पन्द्रह दिनों में एक दफे नहाओ।^१ ऐसा क्यों कर दिया उन्होंने? इसलिए कि स्नान करने में ही आदमी लगा रहेगा, तो दूसरे आवश्यक काम कब करेगा। हमारे सनातनी हिन्दू धर्म में लोग समझते थे और अभी भी कुछ लोग समझते हैं कि हम जितना ही नहायेंगे उतना ही पुण्य होगा। हमें ऐसी धार्मिक धारणाओं में सामाजिक अवस्था और सामाजिक समस्याओं को देखते हुए परिवर्तन करना है। यह परिवर्तन कैसे किया जायगा? अनुभूति से या युक्ति से? मेरे विचार में इसे युक्ति से होना चाहिए। ऐसा मैं इसलिए कहता हूँ कि जो धर्म मनुष्य के सामाजिक जीवन से कोई ताल्लुक नहीं रखाता है, उसकी बुनियाद अनुभूति हो सकती है, लेकिन जो धर्म मनुष्य-जीवन के निकट सम्पर्क में है, जो धर्म मनुष्य जीवन को संयमित करके एकता, अहिंसा, मैत्री और साम्य के रास्ते पर ले जाना चाहता है, उस धर्म की बुनियाद 'युक्ति' पर ही कायम रहेगी और 'युक्ति' ही उस धर्म के प्रारम्भ और परिवर्तन का आधार बनी रहेगी।

वैशाली में आज जो चर्चा हुई, वह बहुत अच्छी हुई। मैं समझता हूँ, इससे भी बेसी चर्चा होनी चाहिए थी। धर्म-समन्वय की बात भर कह देने से समन्वय नहीं होता

१ कथं हि नाम ते, भिक्षुवे, मोघपुरिसा राजानं पि वस्सित्वा न मत्तं जानित्वा नहायिस्सन्ति। नेतं, भिक्षुवे, अपसन्नानं वा पसादाय...पे० एवं च पन, भिक्षुवे इमं भिक्षुपापदं उद्दिसेय्याथ—यो पन भिक्षु ओरेनद्धमासं नहायेय्य, पाचित्तियं।

है। और, वैशाली का यह रास्ता था भी नहीं। यहाँ का तो रास्ता था कि हमारा जो प्रतिपाद्य विषय है, उसके सम्बन्ध में हम वाद-विवाद करेंगे—विचार के स्तर पर लड़ेंगे, सब मिलकर आलोचना-प्रत्यालोचना करेंगे, तब एक समन्वय निकलेगा—एक तत्त्व-बोध पैदा होगा। वही समन्वय सच्चा समन्वय होगा और वही वैशाली की परम्परा के लायक समन्वय होगा। केवल यह कह देना कि हम सब एक हैं, समन्वय नहीं है और ऐसा समन्वय कभी वैशाली में हुआ नहीं। वैशाली तो गणतंत्र का जन्म-स्थान है—हाली राजनीतिक गणतंत्र का ही नहीं। यहाँ सबको स्वतंत्र चिन्तन करने का अधिकार था और सभी इस अधिकार का प्रयोग करते थे—इसे व्यवहार में लाते थे। यह वैशाली चिन्तनशील लोगों की जगह थी। इसमें शक नहीं कि वैशाली शौकीन लोगों की भी जगह थी। गरीबी दूर हो जाने पर लोग शौकीन हो ही जाते हैं। जब भगवान् बुद्ध यहाँ आये और लिच्छवी लोग उनसे मिलने गये, तब भगवान् ने देखा कि यहाँ के लोग कितने शौकीन हैं : जिसका घोड़ा लाल रंग का है, उसका कपड़ा भी लाल है और जिसका कपड़ा नीला है, उसका घोड़ा भी नीला है। तब भगवान् बुद्ध ने प्रसन्न होकर मिश्रुओं से कहा था कि तुम लोगों ने देवता तो नहीं देखा है। देखा लो, इन लिच्छवियों को। देवता की शकल-सूरत ऐसी ही होती।^१

मैं आप लोगों से मिलकर बड़ा प्रसन्न हुआ। बड़ी बाँछा थी कि वैशाली को देखा आऊँ, जिसके बारे में मैंने इतना पढ़ा है। वह बाँछा आज पूरी हुई। मेरे विचार से वैशाली में ऐसा अनुष्ठान बराबर करना चाहिए, जिससे स्वाधीन चिन्ताधारा विकसित हो। चिन्ता और अनुभूति अलग-अलग नहीं हैं। आदमी की अनुभूति उसके सामाजिक परिपार्श्व में उसकी चिन्ताधारा से बनती है। अच्छे आदमी की अनुभूति अच्छी होती है, दुष्ट की दुष्ट। जिसकी चिन्ताधारा दुष्ट है, उसकी अनुभूति का शुद्ध होना नामुमकिन है और जिसकी चिन्ताधारा शुद्ध है, उसको अनुभूति शुद्ध होगी ही। अगर आप दार्शनिक तत्त्व-निरूपण में जाइए, तो आप पाएँगे कि अनुभूति और युक्ति में कोई मौलिक पार्थक्य नहीं है। दोनों में प्रणाली-भेद है, लेकिन दोनों का जन्म तो मनुष्य से ही होता है। चिन्ता और अनुभूति दोनों ही मनुष्य के अन्दर हैं, बाहर नहीं। यानी जिसकी चिन्ता सत् होगी, उसकी अनुभूति भी सत् होगी। इसलिए आप चिन्तामुक्ति का प्रबन्ध कीजिए, स्वाधीन और सत्चिन्ता का प्रबन्ध कीजिए। देखिए आपकी अनुभूति शुद्ध होगी। नमस्कार।

१—महावग्ग, ६. १८. ३० (पृष्ठ २४७)।

THE ROOT OF RELIGION : INTUITION AND REASONING.¹

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

The subject of the present seminar has a perennial interest both for the believer and the sceptic. The sceptic must be thankful to the pious believer for providing him with the staple for his criticism. After all his attitude is primarily, if not mainly, negative. He wants to demolish the very foundation of the belief of the follower of a religion. He can succeed in his task by showing that the faith and practice of a religious man are based on hoax invented by the intellectuals of a country for thriving at the expense of credulous fools. The professional custodians of religion do prescribe certain ceremonies and ways of worship which can be performed with valued materials such as food, cloth, aromatics. These things are covetable to men of all walks of life and consequently grateful to the Deity. The Deity of course does not consume them but leaves them intact for the use of priests and their family. The sceptics are mostly intellectual people who have carried on their crusade against religion as social institution with formidable arguments in all ages and countries which focus on the utilitarian value of the Votive offerings. India produced a class of intellectuals who prided themselves on their freedom from superstitions and independent thinking. Scepticism is almost as old as religion. The Buddha had a contemporary called Ajita Kesakambali who preached the materialistic doctrine that there is no life after death, the soul dies with the body and consciousness is only a byproduct of the physical elements—earth, water, air and fire. It is on a par with the heat of the body. The Buddha believed in life after death, heaven and hell and transmigration. His chief concern was the promulgation of a way of discipline which would ultimately lead to emancipation from the cycle of birth and death. He had to fight these materialists and prove their tenets as false heresy. The purpose of my mention of this historical fact is to show that faith and scepticism have run *pari passu* without being able to extinguish each other. It is not an unprecedented novel phenomenon. The present day communist creed of dialectical materialism sponsored by Karl Marx is only a revival of old materialism and scepticism with ingenious trappings. We shall give our evaluation of this respectable philosophical doctrine in due course.

1. Read on April 8, 1971, at Seminar of Scholars.

I now propose to examine the thesis that religion owes its inception to the deliberate fraud of a class of intellectuals who adopted the priestly profession as a source of livelihood. But these priests are themselves believers in efficacy of religion and the religious practices. They also practise these ceremonies with all these paraphernalia. They invoke the services of other priests and make a gift of the offerings to them. It may be argued that these people are the victims of past impostors. But the question arises with regard to these alleged professional cheats. They also were sincere believers.¹ It may be contended that the series of impostors in generation after generation are responsible for the emergence of an institutional religion. The so-called prophets are also victims of pious fraud. But we cannot light upon any historical individual who may have been the first impostor. If the whole series of religious persons are supposed to have been the victims of deception, the theory of deception will not hold water. If religion were outcome of fraud and deception on the part of a person or a community it must have been discovered long ago and the culprits brought to book. But religion is not an institution of a particular age, a country or a nation but is found to be present wherever men live, as modern anthropologists have shown. So the hypothesis of fraud cannot be seriously entertained. If, on the other hand, it is supposed to owe its origin to error or false belief, it ought to have been corrected by discovery of the opposite truth just as all errors are found to be cancelled by the opposite finding. Even if it is supposed to be based on a mistaken notion and a pipedream, the mistake must be enormously powerful to hold all the diverse races of mankind from time immemorial under its sway. So neither the hypothesis of deception nor error will be acceptable as a satisfactory explanation of the origin of religion. It must again be recognized that in spite of the preachings of the prophets of scepticism, religion continues to be a powerful force with mankind in general. This faith in religion is not confined to ignorant uneducated people but has adherence among the best intellects of every generation. The great prophets and apostles of religion, to name a few, Śrīkṛṣṇa, Buddha, the Jain Tīrthaṅkaras, Jesus Christ, cannot be dubbed as men of weak intellect. Even the greatest men of science in modern age Newton, Einstein, Eddington and others were believers in God. The line of defence may however be regarded as an *argumentum ad hominem*. But this is mentioned by us as a matter worthy of serious consideration by the materialist philosopher and we expect an explanation from him.

1. See Nyāyakusumāñjali, Chap. I.

We now propose to approach this subject from two different angles of vision, namely, religion as a matter of personal intuition and religion as a social institution. We find in the *Rgveda* and also in other Vedic Samhitās that man offers sacrifices which consist in the oblation of clarified butter and other food-grains into fire. Fire was not a mere natural phenomenon but was animated by an exalted spirit called God. Fire-God carries this oblation to the deities and the sacrificer's desires and wants are fulfilled. The ancient Aryans were a virile people and were constantly engaged in their war against the aborigines who resisted them as interlopers. Victory in the battle was fondly desiderated. Sons were sincerely wanted to maintain their possessions and fight the enemies who wanted to rob them. Broadly speaking the gods were to be gratified for the grant of fulfilment of their various wants. A good harvest, cattle, horses, good health, a large number of progeny were necessary for their communal life. Religion was thus regarded as the means securing the good things of this world and also of heavenly life after death. The Āryans believed that their personal prowess was not alone sufficient; they wanted to reinforce it with the superior power of gods. Fulfilment of personal desires and wants was the *vis a tergo* of religious performance. In course of time men and women came to form a community which with progressive growth developed into nation-hood. The good and the prosperity of the whole community was sought to be realized by big sacrifices attended with prayers and utterances of spells. Consciousness of the limitations of human prowess and efforts inspired them to seek the alliance of God for the fulfilment of their personal and national wants. We may safely draw the conclusion that consciousness of helplessness or frustration due to limitations of finitude is the source of religion as a cult. Divine discontent with finite achievement drives man to the attainment of infinite perfection. The irrepressible urge for transcending the limitations of finite knowledge, finite power and finite happiness is the genesis of religion. It finds expression in science and philosophy and will cease to operate till the realization of the goal. The finite man must become infinite God. The intuition of the infinite, articulate or inarticulate, is present in every man and this is the beginning of religion, the pursuit of spirituality.

Not only in India but also among the Hebrews of Palestine, we find the same realization of the necessity of the help of superior power. So also in Greece. The worship of many gods was ultimately superseded by the conception of one God to whom prayers are addressed with devotion and faith for the satisfaction of temporal wants. With the development of philosophical speculation the conception

of God was more and more spiritualized. Fear of punishment was tempered with feelings of love, confidence and personal intimacy. With the establishment of prosperity and growth of power for self-defence and national security, satisfaction of temporal wants and achievement of worldly success were regarded as things of inferior value. The philosophers and wise men wanted the fulfilment of higher values. They wanted to transcend their spiritual limitations. And contemplation of the divine mystery was resorted to as the means to higher realization. Man's ambition was not satisfied with the acquisition of temporal prosperity which only satisfies the animal needs. It came to be realized that eternal good and absolute freedom from all limitations were to be achieved. For this a life of contemplation and meditation on the inner mysteries of the spirit was adopted by aspiring men and women. The flesh is after all subject to decay and death and the superiority of spirit over the flesh was realized. No finite power or glory could satisfy the spiritual aspirant. All finite achievements are fraught with misery. These men wanted to be immortal and free from all limitations. The physical passions and weaknesses were to be subdued as the preliminary step to higher life.

The quest of the infinite came to be the ruling passion. All temporal goods, plenty of food, drink, youthful vigour, physical strength were found to be inadequate. These aspiring souls forsook worldly life. The comforts of family, the security of national power and possession of abundant material prosperity were weighed in the balance and found to be wanting in their power to secure the highest value which was not subject to decay and death, wax and wane. Worldly prosperity, powers of arms and ammunition, military superiority are not eternal values and cannot give permanent satisfaction. They are subject to growth and decay. The paths of glory lead but to the grave. Life that is immortal, full in every dimension beyond the ravages of time, perfect security, serenity and plenum of bliss—that is the summum bonum, than which nothing can be greater or higher. This state of infinite perfection is called *Mokṣa*, emancipation from all bonds and limits. The *Nirvāṇa* is only another name of this highest state. We do not want to enter into the controversy whether this highest condition is positive life or mere negation of suffering. Fits of swoon, epileptic fits and the coma induced by narcotic drugs are free from the visitation of pain. If *Nirvāṇa* or *Mokṣa* were an eternal sleep and a never ending coma, it would not be a covetable state. Buddhagosa in his *Visuddhimagga* quotes passages from the Pali canon to show that *Nirvāṇa* is a positive state of bliss in

which all wants are satisfied and pain and suffering are totally extinguished.

It has been argued that this state of perfection is only a bunkum, a figment of the imagination or a deliberate fraud devised to afford solace to the exploited proletariat who are deprived of all the good things of the world. This fantastic dream is held out before the working men and women in order to blunt the edge of their resistance. The apostles of spiritual life are allies of the capitalists and their mission is to keep the down-trodden, persecuted, exploited labouring class in perpetual subjection. The salvation of the working men and women lies in their struggle against the privileged class. The bourgeoisie and the capitalists must be annihilated and the rule of the proletariat established. From reports of newspapers we are given to understand that this has been achieved in Russia and China and the other communist countries. This is an unending temptation for the poor people of all countries. Communism is defined as vesting of property in the community, each member working according to his capacity and receiving according to his wants. This is no doubt the utopia which is to be realized as the ultimate goal and socialism is the penultimate stage.

This is a respectable philosophy and is a covetable price for the sections of people which are lagging behind in the struggle for existence. Let us suppose that conditions of society are so adjusted that none will be deprived of the legitimate share of the food, drink and housing accommodation, in fact all things that are necessary for comfortable and healthy life. When this state of society is reached, there would be no class struggle, all men being placed on an equal footing. Whether all men and women can be made equal partners of life so far as the material advantages are concerned is a moot question. Again it is problematic whether all men can be intellectually and morally made perfectly equal. In the existing state of affairs we find blatant inequalities in intelligence, capacity for physical and intellectual labour and moral dispositions. Let us suppose that these inequalities will be obliterated by means of social adjustment and reforms in the education system. Let us also suppose that all poverty, deformity and drawbacks, physical and intellectual, will be made good by progress of science and people will cease to have any worry regarding the necessities of physical existence. Suppose this utopia is realized. But will all men be content with the good things of the earth? As we have observed before nothing finite can satisfy a man. The higher and higher a man rises in the scale of civilization and culture his wants

become more and more refined. We have seen that man's aspiration is infinite. He wants to rise superior to his intellectual, moral and spiritual values. The Buddha sacrificed his life of luxury and plenty in which the satisfaction of all the passions and desires of humdrum life were available beyond measure. He embraced the life of the beggar not out of frustration. He was not a jilted lover or subjected to any physical malady. On all accounts he was a very handsome youngman and had a loyal wife of exceeding beauty bubbling over with youthful grace and also a new born baby. Yet he gave up the pleasure of the palace and went out as homeless ascetic in quest of infinite consummation which was beyond the control of time. Men come to be fed up as much with prosperity as with poverty. Is there such a thing as spiritual poverty and spiritual wealth? If these be not fantasy of morbid imagination, it will not cease to have its attraction for some rare souls. This has been the historical testimony of India's spiritual life. That this state of perfection and freedom is not a stupid fantasy is proved by the powerful philosophy that both preceded and followed it. We cannot dismiss it as an idle dream or the fraud of wicked gangster. That will be doing less than justice to these exceptional persons whose influence is still working among large sections of men and women.

But a problem stares us in the face. One cannot be such a churlish boor as to challenge the credentials of prophets and founders of religion in the past. But if all these super-excellent persons were directly acquainted with the ultimate truth, why should there be such pronounced divergence of views among them. The difference of the Buddha from the Upaniṣadic seers and from other prophets such as Mahāvīra and prophets of other countries is unambiguous. Kumārila, the most powerful advocate of Vedic religion, put this poser—"If the Buddha was omniscient, why should Kapila be not, when they openly profess their superior wisdom? If both are omniscient why should there be difference of opinion between them"¹.

This is a challenge. I have discussed this problem in a paper entitled "The Omniscient as a founder of Religion" (See Research Volume III, Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra). It may suffice to say that barring the differences in liturgy and rituals which are mainly influenced by environment and social conditions, there is fundamental unanimity in respect of the essentials of religion. The different forms

1. sugato yadi sarvajñāḥ kapilo ne'ti kā pramā /
ubhau yadi ca sarvajñau matabhedastayoh katham //

and ceremonies are rather the external vesture and in spite of their bearing on spiritual life, they cannot be allowed to arrogate equal or superior status over the moral and religious thought and disposition. It is high time that these external differences of the physical aspect of religion were sized up and given their due place. As regards the so-called atheistic creeds such as Buddhism and Jainism which have no place for personal God as creator and sustainer of the world order, we must face the question whether they can be given the status of religion. The question can be answered by definition we put upon religion. Popular religion Christianity, Islam are theistic. They posit a personal God with varying attributes. Buddhism and Jainism however do not affirm the existence of God as creator. The Semitic creeds assert that God created not only the world order but also the souls of men. Even popular Hinduism holds that souls are eternal verities coeval with God. So the conception of God as creator is not entirely the same or similar. Buddhism and Jainism are rather interested in the accomplishment of individual perfection. According to the Jainas the soul is a nascent and potential God and when emancipated from the bonds of the heritage of karma, the soul manifests infinite knowledge, infinite power and infinite bliss. The Buddhist does not believe in personal soul and maintains ultimate dissolution of the individuality in infinite impersonal state called *Nirvāṇa*. However they may differ from theistic believers, they believe in after-life, transmigration and ultimate achievement of spiritual perfection. The followers of these creeds, at least their best exponents do not worship a personal God for winning His favour and grace. They entirely depend on their unaided efforts for reaching the highest consummation. If we make due allowance for personal-equations, we may find essential identity or similarity in the conception of ultimate reality. The Vedāntist believes in both personal and impersonal Godhead.

The next question which demands our attention is the issue whether morality can be a substitute for religion. Though our ideas of morality as embodied in concrete acts differ from nation to nation, country to country, followers of one religion from those of others, morality must be traced to the necessity of subordinating lower passions to higher values. Ultimately morality finds its higher expressions in the sacrifice of personal interest for the good of the majority of mankind leading to spiritual elevation. I use the word spiritual in contradistinction to the pleasures of the body. The intellectual pleasure that is found in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, cultivation of science and philosophy, literature and arts, is certainly higher

than the pleasure accruing from the satisfaction of the demands of physical senses. Spirituality rather consists in the cultivation of super-personal values, goodness, beauty and truth. Love of truth is one of its exponents. Now morality cannot entirely account for this spiritual life. Morality is concerned with struggle of good and evil and the ultimate triumph of the good over evil is the aim of religion. Swāmi Vivekānanda has defined religion as consisting in drawing out the spiritual majesty of the soul. This definition fits in with the theistic and the so called atheistic religions both.

If this evolution of spirituality be the essence and purpose of religion there is no cause for antagonism and hostility to it. But in its external manifestation religion takes the form of ceremonies and rituals which differ from one another. The average man attaches supreme importance to these external factors and thinks that a person who follows different observances and liturgies is mistaken. Herein lies the conflict and clash of one religion with another. To crown all, religious communities have their relative political and economic interests which are not all reconcilable. To identify religion with politics becomes a natural transition. In the medieval age religions were fought with fanatical zeal between the Moslims and the Christians and the result had been huge bloodshed and forcible conversion. This has been unhappy consequence of formalistic and institutional religion which must be deplored by every cultured man. Fortunately India has saved herself from the pursuit of this calamitous aberration, and this has been possible because of her philosophy.

India's philosophical culture is characterized by a sincerity of purpose and seriousness of outlook which cannot fail to extort the unstinted admiration of all but cynic. Another characteristic of Indian speculation is the unfettered freedom of thought which was unknown in other climes. There was no state persecution for philosophical opinions, and censorship of thought was unknown, provided it did not instigate the subversion of the moral order. The same was true of religions. India has been the land of freedom of religion, which is however a recent growth in the west. This was made possible in India for the reason that Indians did not seek to make political and economical capital out of their religious persuasion. They never confounded things of *Caesar* with things of God. Another reason seems to be the perfect agreement and unanimity on the necessity of moral discipline. Indian thought was agreed on the moral condition that the animal in man was to be supplanted by the divine. There may be some truth in the contention that

India's tolerance of other faiths has resulted in the weakening of her political power. Indians are not even today intolerant of other creeds; but the political consequences are to be set down to the account of the proselytizing zeal of alien faiths which seek to strengthen their political interests by multiplication of converts. India in the past has effected the solution of religious differences by pinning them down in their respective spheres of influence as spiritual forces and I am convinced that the solution of her present-day problems can be achieved if political labels cease to be put on the difference of faith — religious, philosophical and intellectual. Nowadays politics has turned out to be the most dominating influence in India. I wish that same spirit of toleration should also prevail in the arena of active politics. The philosophy of murder and violence which is regarded as a legitimate weapon of defence and offence by the Naxalites must be quashed and no quarter should be shown to the perpetrators of these orgies of violence. As we have said the religion is a living spiritual force. It is a prerogative of a man which distinguishes him from brutes. If one forswears religion he will revert to the level of brutes.¹ If politics and religion be kept apart and not allowed to overstep their respective jurisdiction, religion will have no reason to be persecuted. It is intriguing that churches are now functioning in communist Russia. The impulse to worship is an ineradicable instinct. Buddhism and Jainism have no place for personal God and therefore rationally speaking cannot lend countenance to ritualistic worship. But the prophets of the Jaina religion are worshiped by laymen as gods. In the Buddhist church the Buddha and Bodhisatvas are receiving worship with a vengeance. Poets have sung the glory of sexual love and the sufferings and sacrifices undergone by lovers. But the self-inflicted torments and ascetic self-mortification cast the sufferings of human love into the shade. It is the source of strength and inspiration for the common man and woman and the more drastic are the measures employed for its suppression, it returns and recoils with far greater intensity and redoubled vigour. Religion is a formative principle in man's character and carries him to the apex of perfection. A true religion does not encourage obscurantism and the quest of truth is its key-note, its alpha and omega. Science and philosophy are bound to be its allies and not opponents as misguided people are prone to think.

1. dharmo hi teṣāṃ adhiko viśeṣo
dharmeṇa hīnāḥ paśubhiḥ samānāḥ.

धर्म के मूल-अनुभूति एवं तर्क

नथमल टाटिया

गत वर्ष इस विद्वद्गोष्ठी का विषय था—विश्वशान्ति के भूलाधार : अहिंसा और अनेकान्त । इस वर्ष अहिंसा, सत्य आदि जैसे धर्मतत्त्वों के आधारभूत प्रमाणों पर हम विचारविमर्श कर रहे हैं । हमारे ज्ञान के साधन मुख्यतया तीन हैं—प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान एवं आगम । प्रत्यक्ष का अर्थ है साक्षात् अनुभूति । अनुमान में तर्क का समावेश होता है । आप्त पुरुषों की अनुभूति जिस माध्यम से हमें प्राप्त होती है, उसे आगम या श्रुति कहा गया है । अतः यह आगम मूलतः अनुभूति ही है । इस प्रकार ज्ञान के साधन वस्तुतः दो ही रह जाते हैं—अनुभूति एवं तर्क । अनुभूति की यथार्थता या अग्रयथार्थता निर्भर है अनुभव करनेवाले व्यक्ति की योग्यता पर । अनासक्त तत्त्वान्वेषी ऋषि ही सत्य का दर्शन कर सकते हैं । एवं अपने पूर्वज ऋषियों द्वारा अनुभूत सत्त्वों का, जो आगम या श्रुति में लिपिबद्ध हैं, संवाद भी उन्हीं द्वारा संभव है । निजी अनुभूति के दृढीकरण में भी आगमों से सहायता मिलती है । इसी बात को भर्तृहरि अपने वाक्यपदीय (१.३०) में इस प्रकार कहते हैं—ऋषीणामपि यत्र ज्ञानं तदप्यागहेतुकम्, अर्थात् ऋषियों की भी जो अनुभूति है वह आगम पर ही निर्भर है । भर्तृहरि के अनुसार इस अर्थ अनुभूति का खण्डन तर्क द्वारा नहीं किया जा सकता है । वे कहते हैं (वाक्यपदीय, १.३८)—

अतीन्द्रियानसवेद्यात् पश्यन्त्यार्षेण चक्षुषा ।

ये भावान् वचनं तेषां नानुमानेन बाध्यते ॥

अर्थात्, आर्ष चक्षुद्वारा अतीन्द्रिय एवं दूसरे उपायों से अगम्य तत्त्वों को देखने वाले पुरुषों के वचन अनुमान द्वारा बाधित नहीं किये जा सकते ।

महर्षि मनुने भी धर्मज्ञान में आगम को ही मुख्य प्रमाण माना है । मनुस्मृति (३.१३) में कहा गया है—

अर्थ कामेष्वसक्तानां धर्मज्ञानं विधीयते ।

धर्मं जिज्ञासमानानां प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः ॥

अर्थात्, अर्थ और काम में अनासक्त व्यक्तियों के हृदय में ही धर्मज्ञान व्यवस्थित होता है । धर्म जिज्ञासुओं के लिए श्रुति अर्थात् आगम ही श्रेष्ठ प्रमाण है । धर्मज्ञान के मौलिक आधारों की चर्चा के प्रसंग में मनुस्मृति (२.६ एवं १२) में आगम के अलावा परम्परागत स्मृति, सदाचार एवं आचमनुष्ठि का भी उल्लेख किया गया है । आगम एवं स्मृति को तर्क द्वारा खण्डन करना मनु (२.११) पसन्द नहीं करते । समाज के सामूहिक हित एवं लोक-कल्याण को ध्यान में रख कर ही उन्होंने ऐसी व्यवस्था की है ।

पुण्य और पाप की पहिचान कोई व्यक्ति आसानी से अपने हृदय में कर सकता है । इसके लिए शास्त्र की आवश्यकता नहीं है । भर्तृहरि स्पष्ट कहते हैं (वाक्यपदीय, १.४०)—

१. ८ अप्रैल १९७१ को विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पठित निबन्ध ।

इदं पुण्यमिदं पापमित्येतस्मिन् पदद्वये ।

आचण्डालं मनुष्याणामल्पं शास्त्रप्रयोजनम् ॥

अर्थात्, यह पुण्य है, यह पाप है—इन दो पदों के बोध के लिए अधम से अधम व्यक्ति को भी शास्त्रज्ञान की कोई आवश्यकता नहीं है। तात्पर्य यह है कि पाप-पुण्य का बोध प्रत्येक व्यक्ति के अन्तःकरण में स्वतः सिद्ध है। इसके लिए किसी आगम या तर्क का प्रयोजन महसूस नहीं होता। हाँ कभी-कभी कर्तव्याकर्तव्य के ज्ञान में जटिलता अवश्य आ जाती है, एवं वैसी परिस्थिति में पाप-पुण्य विवेक में भ्रम की संभावना है, जिसके निराकरण में तर्क सहायक बनता है। तर्क द्वारा अनुभूति का स्पष्टीकरण एवं परिष्करण होता है, निर्माण नहीं।

मगवान् बुद्ध ने भी अनुभूति को ही धर्मज्ञान का मूलभूत साधन माना है। अहिंसा, अदत्तादान आदि जैसे व्रत, एवं ज्योतिष, अग्निहोम आदि जैसी विद्याओं को उन्होंने नैतिक तथा आध्यात्मिक विकास के अकाट्य परिचायक के रूप में स्वीकार नहीं किया। बुद्ध ने घर्मों का स्वरूप गम्भीर, दुर्दश, दुरनुबोध, वस्तुभूत, श्रेष्ठ, अतर्कगोचर, सूक्ष्म, एवं पण्डितवेदनीय माना है (ब्रह्मजालसुत्त) एवं कहा है कि जैसे घर्मों का दर्शन उसी चित्त में हो सकता है जो पूर्णरूपेण समाहित, परिशुद्ध, पर्यवदात, निष्कम्प, बलेशरहित, मृदुभूत, कर्म योग्य एवं स्थिर है (सामञ्जससुत्त)। प्रज्ञा के विकास के बिना शील एवं व्रत सफल नहीं होते। गीता (२.५६) में भी आत्मदर्शन के अभाव में सिर्फ इन्द्रियनिग्रह को भवतृष्णा के निवारण में असमर्थ माना गया है। इस प्रकार धर्मज्ञान में स्वानुभूति को एक मात्र साधन मानते हुए भी बुद्ध ने अपने शिष्यों को यह स्पष्ट रूप से कह दिया है कि स्वयं बिना समझे-बूझे किसी भी धर्म को स्वीकार नहीं करना चाहिए। वे कहते हैं (अंगुत्तरनिकाय, ३-६५३)—यदा तुम्हे कालामा अत्तना व जानेय्याथ—इमे धम्मा कुसला इमे धम्मा अनवज्जा इमे धम्मा विञ्जुपसत्था इमे धम्मा समत्ता समादिन्ता हिताय सुखाय संवत्तन्तीति, अथ तुम्हे कालामा उपसंमपज्ज विहरेय्याथा ति ।

हे कालामगण, जब तुम यह जान लो कि ये धर्म कुशल हैं, ये धर्म अनिन्दित हैं, ये धर्म विज्ञों द्वारा प्रशंसित हैं, ये धर्म गृहीत एवं अनुपालित होने पर तुम्हारे लिए हितकर एवं सुखकर सिद्ध होंगे, तभी तुम उन्हें जीवन में उतार कर विहार करना। मगवान् बुद्ध की यह उन्मुक्त दृष्टि ज्ञानसारसमुच्चय (३१) में इस प्रकार प्रकट की गई है—

तापाच्छेदाच्च निकषात् सुवर्णमिव पण्डितैः ।

परीक्ष्य मिखावो ग्राह्यं मद्दत्तो न तु गौरवात् ॥

जिस प्रकार सुवर्ण को तपा कर, काट कर एवं कसीटी पर कस कर ग्रहण किया जाता है, उसी प्रकार, हे मिश्रुओं, मेरे वचन की परीक्षा के बाद ही स्वीकार करो, मेरे प्रति गौरव बुद्धि से नहीं। किसी दूसरे के अनुभव को सत्य मानने से पूर्व उसे अपनी युक्ति से समझना एवं अपने अनुभव में उतारना आवश्यक माना गया है।

जैन आचार्यों ने भी अनुभव एवं तर्क—इन दोनों को धर्मज्ञान में प्रमाण माना है। आस पुरुष के लक्षण के प्रसंग में आचार्य समन्तभद्र (आप्तमीमांसा, ६) कहते हैं—

स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो॥ युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् ।
अविरोधो यदिष्टं ते प्रसिद्धेन न बाध्यते ॥

अर्थात्, वह निर्दोष (सर्वज्ञ) आप ही हैं, कारण आपके वचन युक्ति एवं शास्त्र के विरोधी नहीं हैं । (आप के वचनों में) अविरोध इसलिये है क्योंकि आप द्वारा प्रतिपादित तत्त्व सर्वमान्य प्रमाणों से बाधित नहीं हैं । आचार्य सिद्धसेन दिवाकर ने आगम एवं हेतुवाद के प्रवृत्ति क्षेत्र का विभाजन करके उनमें सामंजस्य स्थापित किया है । (सन्मतितर्क, ३.४३-५) । कुछ पदार्थ ऐसे हैं, जिन्हें आगम अर्थात् आप्तपुरुष के अनुभव के आधार पर ही जाना जा सकता है, एवं हेतुवाद के विषयभूत पदार्थ भी नियत हैं । आचार्य हरिभद्र ने अपने लोक-तत्त्वनिर्णय (श्लोक ३८) में तर्क की उपादेयता इस प्रकार सिद्ध की है—

पक्षपातो न मे बीरे न द्वेषः कपिलादिषु ।

युक्तिमद्वचनं यस्य तस्य कार्यः परिग्रहः ॥

अर्थात्, मेरे मन में न महावीर के प्रति अनुराग है न कपिल के प्रति द्वेष है । जिसके वचन युक्तिपूर्ण हों उसे ही स्वीकार करना चाहिए । न्यायविशारद उपाध्याय श्रीमद् यशोविजय ने अपने अध्यात्मोपनिषत् (१,६) में अनुभूति एवं तर्क के सम्बन्ध के प्रसंग में जैनदर्शन का हृदय स्पष्ट रूप से हमारे सामने निम्नोक्त प्रकार रखा है—

मनोवत्सो युक्तिगवी मध्यस्थस्यानुधावति ।

तामाकर्षति पुच्छेन तुच्छाग्रहमनः कपिः ॥

मध्यस्थ पुरुषका मनरूपी बछड़ा युक्तिरूपी (अपनी) गोमाता का अनुधावन करता है । (पर) दुराग्रही पुरुष का मनरूपी बन्दर उस युक्तिरूपी गाय को उसकी पूछ पकड़ कर अपनी तरफ खींचता है । तात्पर्य यह है कि जब कोई व्यक्ति अनासक्त होकर सत्य अन्वेषण करता है तो उसकी बुद्धि सही युक्ति के सहारे आगे बढ़ती है । वह व्यक्ति आरम्भ से ही तत्त्व-पक्षपाती होता है एवं उसकी बुद्धि तर्कप्रसूत होने के कारण आसानी से युक्ति का अनुसरण सकलतापूर्वक कर सकती है । दुराग्रही का मन शुरू से ही कुतर्क के वशीभूत होने के कारण अपने पूर्वाग्रहों के समर्थन में ही तर्क का प्रयोग करता है ।

निष्कर्ष यह है कि ब्राह्मण, बौद्ध एवं जैन परम्परायें नैतिक एवं आध्यात्मिक तत्त्वों के आविष्कार में अनुभूति एवं तर्क—इन दोनों को महत्त्व देती हैं, पर उनमें अनुभूति को प्राथमिकता इसलिए दी जाती है क्योंकि वह धर्मज्ञान का प्रारम्भिक बिन्दु है । वैसे तो कोई भी अनुभूति युक्तिरहित नहीं है । पर युक्ति या तर्क प्रारम्भ में उसे स्वयं अव्यक्त रह कर प्रभावित करता है, एवं अपनी सूक्ष्मता के कारण बुद्धिमत् नहीं होता ।

धर्मज्ञान के साधनों के बारे में भारतीय दर्शनों का ऐकमत्य हमने देखा । अब विचारणीय हैं धर्म के स्वरूप के बारे में इन दर्शनों की मान्यताएँ । धर्म शब्द का प्रयोग यहाँ अत्यन्त व्यापक अर्थ में किया गया है । सामाजिक व्यवस्था एवं वैयक्तिक हित के लिए जितने प्रकार के विधि-निषेध किये गये हैं, वे सभी धर्म के अन्तर्गत हैं । जाति, देश, काल, आदि की विभिन्नता के कारण धर्म की विभिन्नता को समुचित मान्यता हमारे दार्शनिकों ने निःसंकोच दी है । परस्पर विरोधी आचार-व्यवहारों को भी विभिन्न परिस्थितियों में विभिन्न

सामाजिक गुटों के लिए धर्म में समावेश कर दिया गया है। इस प्रसंग में जैन आचार्य हरिमद्र के विचार माननीय हैं। वे कहते हैं कि जो कार्य लोकसंजन के लिए किया जाता है एवं जिससे अन्तःकरण की मलिनता दूर नहीं होती, उसे लोकपंक्ति की संज्ञा दी जाती है। यह लोकपंक्ति भी परम्परया धर्म ही है। (योगबिन्दु ९०)। लोक कल्याण के लिए जो भी किया जाय वह सब धर्म है। धर्म-देशनाओं की विविधता का आधार शिष्यों की योग्यतायें हैं। आचार्य हरिमद्र कहते हैं (योगदृष्टिसमुच्चय, १३२) —

चित्रा तु देशनैषां स्याद्विनेयानुगुण्यतः ।

यस्मादेते महात्मानो भवव्याधिनिष्वराः ॥

अर्थात्, शिष्यों की योग्यताओं के अनुसार ऋषिओं की देशनाओं में विविधता आ जाती है, क्योंकि ये ऋषि भवव्याधि के बंध हैं एवं रूग्ण व्यक्ति की आवश्यकताओं के अनुरूप ऋषियों का विधान करते हैं। इन विशेष विशेष धर्मों के अतिरिक्त एक एक सर्वजनसाधारण धर्म की कल्पना भी भारतीय चिन्तकों ने की है, जो निम्नोक्त उद्गार में व्यक्त होती है—

श्रूयतां धर्मसर्वस्वं श्रुत्वा चैवावधारयताम् ।

आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत् ॥

धर्म के नीचोड़ को सुनो एवं सुनकर अवधारित करो। जो आचरण अपने लिए प्रतिकूल प्रतीत हो वैसे आचरण दूसरे के प्रति नहीं करना चाहिए।

ईश्वर तत्त्व की मान्यता के बारे में भी भारतीय धर्मों में विविधता देखी जाती है। सभी भारतीय धर्म ईश्वरवादी नहीं हैं। भक्त अपने भगवान् को अपनी कल्पना के अनुरूप बना लेता है। पर पुनर्जन्म, मोक्ष, पाप, पुण्य जैसे तत्त्व हमारे सभी धर्मों को मान्य हैं। अपनी निगूढतम अनुभूति में ऋषि एक अद्वितीय तत्त्व का दर्शन करते हैं—एकं सद्भिप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति। इसी प्रकार शिव, ब्रह्मा, बुद्ध, ईश्वर, अहंत्, कर्म एवं विष्णु जैसे तत्त्वों में भारतीय दार्शनिक कोई निम्नता नहीं देखते। वे स्पष्ट कहते हैं—

यं शैवाः समुपासते शिव इति ब्रह्मेति वेदान्तिनो,

बौद्धा बुद्ध इति प्रमाणपटवः कर्त्तेति नैयायिकाः ।

अर्हन्निव्यथ जैनशासनरताः कर्मेति मीमांसका,

सोऽयं वो विदधातु वाञ्छितफलं त्रैलोक्यनाथो हरिः ॥

जिसकी शैव लोग शिव के रूप में उपासना करते हैं, जिसे वेदान्ती ब्रह्मतत्त्व कहते हैं जिसे बौद्ध बुद्ध की संज्ञा देते हैं, प्रमाण-शास्त्र में निष्णात नैयायिक जिसे जगत्कर्ता ईश्वर के रूप में देखते हैं, जैन शासन के अनुरागी जिसे अर्हत् कहते हैं, कर्मकाण्डी मीमांसक जिसे कर्म कहते हैं, वह तीन लोकों के प्रभु भगवान् हरि आपको वाञ्छित फल प्रदान करें। जिस तरह एक विष्णु-भक्त ने अपने उपास्य हरि के रूप को ही दूसरे धर्मों के उपास्य देवों में देखा, उसी तरह माता भारती का भक्त सभी देवियों में अपनी उपास्य देवी को ही देखता है। वह कहता है—

तारा त्वं सुगमताममे भगवती गौरीति शैवागमे

वज्रा कौलिकशासने जिनमते पद्मावती विश्रुता ।

गायत्री श्रुतशालिनां प्रकृतिरित्युक्तसि सांख्यायने
मातभारति किं प्रभूतमणितैर्व्याप्तं समस्तं स्वया ॥

हे मातः भारत, तुम ही बौद्ध आगमों में तारा हो, शैव आगमों में गौरी हो, कौलिक धर्म में ब्रह्मा हो, जैन शासन में पद्मावती के नाम से विख्यात हो, वेदानुरागियों की मायत्री हो, सांख्य दर्शन में तुम्हें प्रकृति कहा जाता है, अधिक कहने का क्या प्रयोजन, समस्त (चराचर जगत्) तुम्हारे द्वारा व्याप्त है ।

इसी प्रकार मुक्ति, मोक्ष या निर्वाण तत्त्व के बारे में भी भारतीय चिन्तकों में एक-वाक्यता देखी जाती है । किसी साधक की साधनालब्ध अनुभूति का अपलाप करना महान् अपराध है । जैन आचार्य हरिमद्र अपने योगदृष्टिसमुच्चय (१३९) में कहते हैं—

न युज्यते प्रतिक्षेपः सामान्यस्यापि तत्सत्ताम् ।

आर्यापवादस्तु पुनर्जिह्वाच्छेदाधिको मतः ॥

हमारे जैसे (चर्मचक्षुवालों) के लिए सामान्य जन का भी तिरस्कार करना उचित नहीं है तो फिर आर्यजनों का अपवाद फैलाना जिह्वाच्छेद से भी अधिक (दण्डयोग्य अपराध) क्यों नहीं माना जायगा ? यदि निर्वाण एक साधनालब्ध अनुभूति है एवं वह वस्तुभूत है तो वैसे सभी अनुभूतियाँ अवश्य एक रूप होंगी । हरिमद्र इस प्रश्न पर विचार करते हुए अपने (योगदृष्टिसमुच्चय, १२७-२८) में कहते हैं—

संसारतीततत्त्वं तु परं निर्वाणसंज्ञितम् ।

तद्व्यक्रमेव नियमाच्छेदभेदैऽपि तत्त्वतः ॥

सदाशिवः परब्रह्मा सिद्धात्मा तथेतित च ।

शब्दैस्तदुच्यतेऽन्वर्थैरेकमेवैवमादिभिः ॥

संसार से परे जो परम तत्त्व है उसे ही निर्वाण की संज्ञा दी जाती है । वह नियमतः एवं तात्त्विक रूप से एक ही है यद्यपि भिन्न-भिन्न साधक उसका वर्णन भिन्न-भिन्न शब्दों में करते हैं । वह एक ही तत्त्व सदाशिव, पर-ब्रह्म, सिद्ध आत्मा तथा तथता आदि शब्दों से वर्णित होता है, जो उसके स्वरूप के परिचायक होने के कारण अन्वर्थ हैं ।

इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि भारतीय साधक एवं चिन्तक विभिन्न उपाय देवों एवं साधनालब्ध अनुभूतियों में एकरूपता देखते हैं । इस बात की पुष्टि के लिए और भी उद्धरण दिये जा सकते हैं, पर प्रस्तुत प्रसंग में उनकी आवश्यकता नहीं है । भिन्न-भिन्न सम्प्रदाय के तार्किक युक्तियों द्वारा अपनी अपनी परम्पराओं की पुष्टि करते रहे पर साथ साथ ऐसे भी चिन्तक हुए जिन्होंने उन विभिन्न परम्पराओं में भी सामंजस्य करने का प्रयत्न किया । वैसे प्रयत्नों के फलस्वरूप जैन दार्शनिकों का नयवाद परिपुष्ट हुआ, जो भारतीय चिन्तन धारा को उनकी एक अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण देन है । कोई भी वाद मिथ्या नहीं है, यदि वह अपने प्रतिद्वन्द्वी दूसरे वादों का निराकरण नहीं करके अपनी ही सिद्धि में संलग्न रहता है । सत्यान्वेषण ही तर्कशास्त्र का एकमात्र उद्देश्य होना चाहिए—यही नयवाद का निष्कर्ष है ।

हमने प्रस्तुत विषय के कुछ ही मुद्दों पर अपने विचार आपके सामने रखे । गोष्ठी में भाग लेने वाले विद्वान् विषय के विभिन्न पहलुओं पर अपने-अपने विचार आपके समक्ष रखेंगे ।

विश्वशान्ति के मूलाधार—अहिंसा एवं अनेकान्त*

एन० के० देवराज

माननीय अध्यक्ष, डा० टाटिया और मित्रों,

मैं इस शोध-संस्थान के अधिकारियों के प्रति, जिन्होंने मुझे आमन्त्रित करके इस उत्सव में सम्मिलित होने का अवसर दिया, हृदय से आभार प्रकट करता हूँ।

हमारा देश और उसकी संस्कृति बड़ी प्राचीन है। शुरू से इस संस्कृति में दो धाराओं का सम्मिश्रण रहा है। एक वैदिक आर्य संस्कृति की धारा और दूसरी श्रमण संस्कृति की धारा। श्रमण संस्कृति में बौद्ध और जैन परम्पराओं का अन्तर्भाव होता है। इसमें अहिंसा के प्रचार का सबसे अधिक श्रेय जैन संस्कृति और परम्परा को है। जैन परम्परा की दूसरी महत्वपूर्ण देन अनेकान्तवाद का सिद्धान्त है। उक्त संस्कृति के ये दोनों तत्त्व विश्वशान्ति को अग्रसर करने वाले हैं।

वैदिक आर्य मांस भक्षण से परहेज नहीं करते थे। मनुभूति के उत्तर रामचरित के चौथे अंक में आपस्तम्बधर्मसूत्र के एक उद्धरण के साथ यह उल्लेख किया गया है कि विशिष्ट मुनि के सत्कार के लिये दो वर्ष की बछिया का हनन किया गया। उन दिनों भी मांस का उपभोग विशिष्ट अतिथियों के लिये किया जाता था। संस्कृत में अतिथि का नाम गोघ्न भी है—अर्थात् वह जिसके लिये गी का वध किया जाय। मांसाहार का पूर्ण परित्याग जैन धर्म की विशेष शिक्षा है। थाइलैण्ड आदि के बौद्ध लोग मांस भक्षण से परहेज नहीं करते, बुद्धजी के मांस-भक्षण के भी उल्लेख मिलते हैं।

लेकिन अहिंसा का अर्थ केवल जीवों के वध और मांस-भक्षण से परहेज नहीं है। हमारे यहाँ अहिंसा को धर्म का मूल कहा गया है, महाभारत में अहिंसा का स्थान सत्य से भी ऊपर बताया गया है। कहा गया है : 'अहिंसार्थं हि भूतानां धर्म-प्रवचनं कृतम्,' अर्थात् धर्म का उपदेश हिंसा के निवारण के लिये है। चतुःशतक के टीकाकार चन्द्रकीर्ति ने एक उद्धरण दिया है जिसके अनुसार तथागत लोग धर्म को अहिंसा प्रधान मानते हैं। योगदर्शन के प्रणेता पतंजलि ने धर्मों में अहिंसा को पहला स्थान दिया है। धर्मों में अपरिग्रह का भी समावेश है। हमारे अपने युग में गांधीजी ने अपरिग्रह पर विशेष जोर दिया है। वस्तुतः अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह में घना सम्बन्ध है। प्रश्न है, हम हिंसा क्यों करते हैं? उत्तर है, अपने व्यक्तित्व के पोषण के लिए, अपने और अपनी की स्वार्थपूर्ति के लिए। हमारे सब तरह के गलत आचरण के मूल में आत्मप्रेम, आत्मकेन्द्रित होने की वृत्ति होती है। जबतक हम पूर्णतया निस्वार्थ न बन जायें—गांधी जी के शब्दों में जब तक हम पूरे-पूरे अपरिग्रही न बन जायें—तबतक हम हिंसा से पूर्णतया विरत नहीं हो सकते। इससे जाहिर है कि अहिंसा का पूरा-पूरा पालन बहुत कठिन है। केवल जीवों के वध से विरत होना

* विद्वद्गोष्ठी, अप्रैल १८, १९७० में दिया गया उद्धृष्टान्त माषण।

अहिंसा का बाह्य रूप है, असली अहिंसा स्वार्थभावना का पूर्ण उच्छेद है। ऐसी अहिंसा का पालन आध्यात्मिक साधक ही कर सकते हैं।

अहिंसा का सामाजिक न्यूनतम रूप यह है कि हम अपने और दूसरों के हितों के बीच न्याय भावना का पालन करते हुए सामंजस्य रखें। अपने लिए, अपने सम्बन्धियों और जाति के लिए, अन्याय करना एक प्रकार की हिंसा है—क्योंकि उससे दूसरों के हित की हानि होती है। अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय क्षेत्र में जब एक देश दूसरे को दबाकर उसका शोषण करना चाहता है तो शोषक देश का व्यवहार हिंसा पूर्ण बन जाता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय शान्ति के लिए अहिंसामूलक न्याय का पालन नितान्त जरूरी है।

जैन धर्म और दर्शन की दूसरी महत्वपूर्ण देन अनेकान्तवाद का सिद्धान्त है। ज्ञान मीमांसा में जैन दर्शन वस्तुवादी है, हिन्दुओं का न्याय दर्शन भी वस्तुवादी है। वस्तुवादी से तात्पर्य इस मान्यता से है कि ज्ञेय पदार्थ ज्ञान और ज्ञाता का निरपेक्ष होता है। विज्ञानवादी बौद्ध कहते हैं कि नील और नील बुद्धि एक ही है, क्योंकि उनका ग्रहण साथ-साथ होता है; इस तर्क को सहोपलम्भ नियम कहते हैं। वस्तुवादी ज्ञान और अर्थ में भेद मानते हैं, और यह भी मानते हैं कि अर्थ के अनुरूप ही ज्ञान होता है। अनेकान्तवाद के अनुसार प्रत्येक वस्तु में अनन्त धर्म होते हैं। उनमें से कुछ परस्पर-विरोधी भी हो सकते हैं। अपने प्रयोजन के अनुसार, या अपने दृष्टिकोण के अनुसार, द्रष्टा वस्तु में एक या दूसरे धर्म को देखता और उसका उल्लेख करता है। एक दृष्टि से जो है, दूसरी दृष्टि से उसका अभाव भी कहा जा सकता है। जैन तर्कशास्त्र सप्तमंगी की वचन शैली को मानता है। जैनियों के अनुसार प्रत्येक सत्पदार्थ उत्पाद, व्यय एवं ध्रुवता से संयुक्त होता है। किसी वस्तु का द्रव्य नहीं बदलता, जिससे उसमें 'वही है' की भावना होती है; किन्तु उसके पर्याय बदलते रहते हैं। इसलिए एक ही वस्तु ध्रुव या नित्य भी है और पर्यायों की दृष्टि से अनित्य भी। स्याद्वाद-मञ्जरी के अनुसार वस्तु में नाना धर्मों का स्वीकार ही अनेकान्तवाद है, कथनों के रूप में इस सिद्धान्त को प्रकट करना ही स्याद्वाद है।

हमारे देश में प्रायः प्राचीन शिक्षाओं को असमीक्षित रूप में मानकर चलने की प्रथा है। लेकिन इस तरह की स्वीकृति से विशेष लाभ नहीं होता। पुरानी शिक्षाओं को इस ढंग से देखना और आँकना चाहिए कि वे हमारी जीवन्त चेतना का अंग बन जायँ। हमारे अपने युग में, हर क्षेत्र में, नये प्रश्न उठ रहे और उठाये जा रहे हैं। ऐसी स्थिति में हमारे लिए वही प्राचीन शिक्षायें उपयोगी हो सकती हैं जो आज की समस्याओं को हल करने में मदद दे सकती हैं। प्राचीन जैन चिन्तकों ने अनेकान्तवाद का प्रयोग उस समय के दार्शनिक विवादों का हल खोजने में किया था। उदाहरण के लिए न्याय-वैशेषिक के अनुसार सामान्यों का अलग अस्तित्व है जिसके कारण हमें समान वस्तुओं में अनुवृत्ति का आभास होता है। इसके विपरीत बौद्ध विचारक सामान्य को अपोह रूप में कथित करते हैं। इस विवाद का, और ऐसे दूसरे विवादों का अनेकान्तवाद ने अपना समाधान प्रस्तुत किया। आज के दर्शन-क्षेत्र में दूसरे प्रश्न और विवाद चल रहे हैं। हमारा विचार है कि अनेकान्त का सिद्धान्त उन विवादों के लिए आज भी महत्व रखता है और उसका उपयोग आज के विवादों को सुलझाने

में किया जा सकता है। चिन्तन के इतिहास में हमेशा ही ऐकान्तिक दृष्टियों का प्रतिपादन होता आया है, अतएव हमेशाही अनेकान्त पर गौरव देने की जरूरत होती है। उदाहरण के लिए तर्कनिष्ठ अनुभववादियों (Logical Empiricists or positivists) ने अर्थवान् कथनों की एक परिभाषा दी, यह परिभाषा विज्ञान के कथनों को देखकर बनायी गयी थी। इस परिभाषा के अनुसार अर्थवान् कथन वह है जिसका इन्द्रियअनुभव के जरिए परीक्षण हो सके—जिसे सही मानने का अर्थ गोचर जगत में किसी तथ्य की प्रत्याशा करना है। अर्थवक्ताकी कसौटी का प्रयोग करते हुए उन्होंने कहा—रत्नमीमांसा के कथन प्रायः गोचर, अनुभव द्वारा परीक्षणीय नहीं होते, इसलिए वे निरर्थक होते हैं। इस दृष्टि से “ईश्वर है” और “ईश्वर नहीं है” ये दोनों कथन निरर्थक हैं। गलत नहीं निरर्थक। यहाँ प्रश्न उठता है—यह क्यों माना जाय कि सब तरह के अर्थवान् कथन एकही कोटि के होते हैं? उदाहरण के लिए तर्कनिष्ठ भाववादियों का यह कथन कि “अर्थवान् कथन परीक्षणीय होते हैं” स्वयं इन्द्रिय-अनुभव द्वारा परीक्षणीय नहीं हैं। अनेकान्तवाद के अनुसार प्रत्येक कथन किसी अपेक्षा या प्रयोजन से नियन्त्रित और उसी के अनुरूप सत्य होता है। मतलब यह कि विभिन्न कथनों की सत्यता भिन्न कोटियों की होती है, वह विभिन्न दृष्टियों और प्रयोजनों की सापेक्ष होती है।

इस मत की पुष्टि में हम ऐतिहासिक घटनाओं की व्याख्या में संकेतित किये जाने वाले कारणों का उल्लेख कर सकते हैं। ऐतिहासिक घटनाओं और स्थितियों की व्याख्या के अनेक स्तर या धरातल होते हैं। एक धरातल पर हम कहते हैं कि हमारे देश को गांधीजी ने स्वतंत्र किया। व्याख्या के दूसरे स्तर पर कहा जायगा कि गांधी का व्यक्तित्व और उनकी सत्याग्रह की पद्धति वे उपकरण थे जिनके द्वारा भारतीय जनता को भय की स्थिति से निकाल कर संगठित किया गया। अन्ततः स्वतंत्रता का कारण इस संगठित जनता का दबाव था जो ब्रिटिश सरकार पर पड़ा। यह भी संभव था कि गांधीजी के बदले कोई दूसरा नेता जनता को दूसरे ढंग से संगठित करता। तात्पर्य यह कि यदि गांधी का जन्म न हुआ होता, तो भी भारत स्वतंत्र होता, लेकिन दूसरे तरीके से और शायद पन्द्रह अगस्त १९४७ के बदले किसी और वर्ष में और किसी दूसरी तिथि में। इतिहास की व्याख्या करते हुए हम कब किस हेतु को कितना महत्व देंगे, यह हमारे यानी इतिहासकार के, प्रश्न के स्वरूप और व्याख्याता के प्रयोजन पर निर्भर करता है। हमारे कथन दृष्टि-सापेक्ष या प्रयोजन-सापेक्ष होते हैं, यह अनेकान्तवाद का मूल तात्पर्य है। इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि उक्त सिद्धान्त की आज भी उपयोगिता है। यदि किसी प्राचीन मान्यता में बल है तो वह आज भी उपयोगी होगी नहीं तो श्रद्धापूर्वक उस मान्यता को दुहराते रहने से कोई लाभ नहीं है।

में इस वक्तव्य के साथ आपकी संगोष्ठी की सफलता के लिए शुभ कामना करता हूँ।



FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE : AHIMŚĀ AND ANEKĀNTA¹

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

I must observe at the outset even at the risk of being misunderstood and charged with patriotic bias that it is India's distinctive prerogative to have preached, promulgated and practised the cult of ahimsā i. e. non-injury to life. All religious sects of Orthodox Vedic religion and the protestant creeds that emerged in India's soil have accepted this doctrine as the cardinal basis of spiritual life. The protestant creeds have arraigned Vedic religion on the charge of approval of violence and injury which is inevitable in sacrifices. There is no doubt that animal sacrifice is a necessary part of the cult of Vedic sacrifice. But even the uncompromising advocates of orthodoxy could not plead for the cult of *himsā*, and had to plump for non-violence and non-injury as integral part of religion (*mā himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ*). But sacrifices were placed in separate category and it is maintained that the injury to animal in sacrifice is not inspired by personal greed or malice, and hence its semblance to *himsā* is a deceptive appearance. I shall have occasion to discuss the question of motive and intention in so far as they bear upon the essential character of ahimsā.

Sāṅkhya philosophy is uncompromising in its advocacy of ahimsā and does not make exception or concession even for Vedic sacrifices. One has to suffer the unwelcome consequences of *himsā* involved in Vedic sacrifices, notwithstanding the purity of the motive. One may attain heaven as the reward of Vedic sacrifice but has to suffer the punishment of committing *himsā*. So it is not absolutely pure (Cf. *dr̥ṣṭavadānuśravikaḥ sa hyaviśuddhi-kṣayātīśayayuktaḥ—Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 2). Sāṅkhya is an orthodox system and this vehement advocacy of ahimsā on its part shows that even orthodox Brāhmanical faith was unyielding in its insistence on this fundamental ethical issue.

The uncompromising, unhesitating and unambiguous advocacy of ahimsā not only as a religious tenet but as the very foundational principle of religious life is the line of demarcation between Indian religions and those of the Semitic origin. This question of injury to

1. Read at the Seminar of Scholars on April 19, 1970.

life did not cause trouble to the Hebrew prophets, the Christian apostles, and Islam. Christianity has advocated friendship and love so far as it concerns human relationship. But the love and compassion do not reach down to the animal level. So far as Manu and the Jaina prophets are concerned, they have scruples even regarding vegetable life. It is the special characteristic of the Jaina community that they abstained from animal food since the inception of Jaina religion, which cannot be definitely assigned a historical date.

I shall now be concerned with the difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina ethical attitudes so far as the moral value of ahimsā is considered.

Physical violence *per se* has little moral value. Its moral value stems from a consideration of motive underlying it. Brutes and animals are therefore neither condemned nor excused for committing violence as they are incapable of cherishing ill will or malice. In point of fact violence is the rule of life in the animal kingdom; the stronger animal preys upon the weaker for its very subsistence. It is only among humans that the question has got any relevance. One of the reasons seems to be the possibility of finding substitutes for animal food. The well known verse of the *Pañcatantra* gives the clue: "When a man can fill his stomach with vegetables spontaneously growing in wilderness, why should he commit the sin of killing another fellow creature".

svacchanda-vanajātena śākenāpi prapūryate /
asya dagdhodarasyārthe kaṣṭh kuryāt pātakam mahat //

The Upāli episode recorded in the *Majjhima Nikāya* of the Pali canon may or may not be a correct appraisal of the Jaina position on ahimsā. But whether it be a fake or a genuine historical incident it lays stress on an important ethical issue. The Buddha insists that the psychological motive is more important than the outward act. Death of millions of living animalculae is taking place every minute. An earthquake, an avalanche, a tornado and the like calamities take toll of hundreds of men and animals. We are not in a position to condemn anybody for these cruelties. If a man accidentally treads on a worm in spite of the best precaution he cannot be held responsible for the loss of life entailed. But when a man kills another out of malice or greed or by way of retaliation he is held guilty both by law court and the ethical philosopher. It appears from the Pali version that the psychological attitude which is the spring of the action was not taken into account in the early Jaina canon. But we find

it definitely recorded in the definition of *hiṃsā* as propounded by Umāsvāti viz. 'the deprivation of life caused by vanity or anger or malice (*pramāda*) is deemed *hiṃsā*'. In current Jaina ethics we find a revealing consciousness of the part played by the psychological motive in the distinction between unmotivated violence (*dravyahiṃsā*) and motivated violence (*bhāvahiṃsā*).

The Buddha, if we are to believe in the Pali version, did not abstain from animal diet, and so also his followers. The uproar of the Jainas against Buddha's partaking of meat in the feast given by the Licchavi general, Siṃhasenāpati, may be a historical fact. The Buddha exculpated himself and his followers on the ground that animal food by itself is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, though it is the result of violence. If the animal is not slaughtered by a person for his own delectation or by another at his instigation or encouraged by his approval, the person partaking of the animal food is not to be blamed. Furthermore the difference between Buddha and Devadatta on the question of the permissibility of animal diet brought about a schism in the Buddhist church. But the Buddha did not yield for the sake of gaining popular applause. One must purify his mind and remove the debasing passions, ill will, malice, greed, vanity, self-aggrandisement and not be tempted or provoked to kill a living being.

The present-day malaise of the nations stems from fear of aggression of the powerful nations on weaker ones. The weaker nations are for all practical purposes thought to be the proper objects of exploitation, if not extirpation. It is undesirable that any average man with undeveloped moral sense wants to enrich himself at the cost of his fellows. He does not believe in the principle of live and let live. Violence begets violence and there is no end of hostility as it is said in the *Dhammapāda* :

na hi vereṇa verāṇi sammantidha kuḍācana /
 avereṇa tu sammanti esa dhammo sanantano ti //

"Hostility cannot be contained by hostility, but only by cessation from and forbearance of the hostility. Buddhism says that it is the perennial law of ethics." We have no reason to doubt the truth of this law in the relationship between different persons, though its validity is called in question in international affairs.

Nowadays violence seems to be the basal law of political conduct. The cult of communism is founded on the cult of *hiṃsā* involved in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the capitalists. When the capitalist exploits human labour for his profit, he must be

contained by law, if moral persuasion fails. But if the rich man employs his wealth for the amelioration of the poorer sections one should have nothing but admiration for him. After all everybody cannot gain money or save a capital. America is rich because she has been able to exploit the available resources and bring advanced scientific knowledge to bear upon it. Nature has favoured her and she has developed the capacity for turning it to account. Let each nation do its best and solve the problem of poverty. This will alleviate the distress of the common herd and take the wind out of the sails of the modern apostles of violence. Curiously enough this cult of violence of inevitable class-struggle has received the imprimatur of powerful nations. But unless there is a change in the human character and the aptitude for judicious use of one's income is developed, the prospect of the betterment of the lot of general mankind by division of wealth executed by force or law will recede farther. The ethics of the Jains and other Indian schools of thought has therefore laid stress on the necessity of setting limits to one's possessions (*parigraha*). It will be no solution if the tables are turned on the capitalists. The enrichment of the proletariat at the impoverishment of the capitalists will only bring about the same problem in another form. The state and the individual must not lack in their exertion to bring about a state of affairs in which every man who is capable of work does his duty without grumble and has enough of creature comforts.

We have alluded to this economic problem because it has serious repercussions on the moral field. Our concept of *ahimsā* must not be negative, but fulfil itself in rendering necessary help to those who want it. Our charity must not encourage idleness, but end in helping others to stand on their own feet. The rich man must shed his love of wealth for its own sake or for the satisfaction of vanity. But economic betterment is not the be-all and the end-all. Only if it serves as the scaffolding to intellectual, moral and spiritual elevation, it will serve a real need. Different men are born with different capacities and it is necessary that each man should have a suitable field for the development of his powers. Each one of us has to be taught the salutary lesson that the individual and the community are integrally connected and each must help the other. The individual must not be sacrificed at the altar of supposed communal well-being, nor should the interests of the community be ignored or frustrated in the pursuit of individual uplift. What is more important than distribution of wealth is the growth and development of charitable disposition. The intellectually superiors must help those who are intellectually backward. The morally degraded sections should be won over by the

gospel of love and friendship i.e. *maitrī* and *karuṇā*. If we make definite beginning we shall start on the right track and ultimately succeed in eliminating the causes of jealousy, malice and international feud. Moral education combined with the knowledge of science and technology will go a long way in the achievement of the goal. Let us not dismiss the ideal of ahimsā as a fantastic figment of a man living in ivory tower. It is not as impracticable as it appears and we shall have to find out the *modus vivendi* to avoid the catastrophe threatened by nuclear warfare.

Now let us discuss the logic and psychology of *anekānta* i. e. non-extremism. The Jaina does not believe in the extremist *a priori* logic of the Absolutist. Leaving the metaphysical question apart, and pragmatically considered this logical attitude breeds dogmatism and if carried one step further engenders fanaticism, the worst and vilest passion of the human heart. The dogmatist concludes that his view is the only correct one and whoever differs from his standpoint must be condemned of heresy. But truth has many facets at least in the field of experience. If we see only one side of the coin and refuse to see the other side our assessment will suffer from imperfection. A is A and never B—this monolithic conception of reality refuses to entertain other interpretations. But things that we encounter in experience are seen to vary from time to time. The chair or the table fresh from the factory is seen to lose its charm after use. This change is integral to the real. To dismiss change as deceptive appearance on the ground of its failure to fit in with the Procrustean conception of uniformity fails to do justice to our experience.

In philosophy the interpretation of the laws of thought viz the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle have received different interpretations inspired by different logical attitude and the result has been the deployment of philosophers in antagonistic groups. Change and identity are held to be irreconcilable opposites. Change necessarily entails the idea of identity in the midst of the emergence of different attributes. A man is seen to be angry on one occasion and pleased on another and also simultaneously in relation to different persons. Now the question is raised whether an identical entity, as the person is supposed to be, can have two incompatible predicates viz. anger and pleasure. If the attributes are identical with the subject, the subject is to be deemed to vary with the change of attributes and thus be reduced to different atomic units. This is the position of the Buddhist fluxist (*kṣaṇabhāṅgavādi*). It is the result of the law of contradiction which asserts that a thing cannot be both A

and not-A, which is implied by the occurrence of anger and pleasure which is the negation of the former. If both the predicates have to be true one has to admit that A is and is not. A is susceptible to anger and also to the negation of it in having pleasure. The two are contradictorily opposed being derived as they are from the basic contradiction of being and non-being.

The Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntist are on the other hand not willing to surrender the unity of self-consciousness and in failing to reconcile identity with change they assert that the occurrence of contradictory attributes is to be predicated of the mind-stuff which is identified with the self (*ātman*) by the fiat of transcendent illusion. But this shifting of the contradiction to the mind from self places the former in the same uncomfortable predicament. The mind cannot be real since it is found to be fraught with self-contradiction. The Vedāntist accepts the consequence and unhesitatingly declares that not only the mind but also the rest of the phenomenal entities are only appearance. The phenomenal order is governed by the law of causation. But causation is logically indefensible. The cause cannot be identical with the effect since the latter must be different numerically and qualitatively, from the former. Nor can the cause and effect be absolutely different since that would render the affiliation of the effect to the cause meaningless. They are both identical and different to all appearances. This is held to be impossible by the Vedāntist and the Negativists (*Śūnyavādī*). The objective world is dismissed as a metaphysical impossibility by both of them. But whereas the Negativist refuses to believe in the duality of the mind and the self, for which there is no evidence in experience and thus declares the psychical subject as also appearance, the Vedāntist, on the other hand, is adamant on the reality of the self. The self is held to be a transcendent unity which refuses to accommodate the different mental events as its attributes.

The Sāṅkhya on the other hand does not subscribe to the theory of illusion. The objective world from the mind to gross elements is real on its own account though it embodies the different attributes. There is difference and also identity running in and through the varying attributes. The entity which changes is one and changing attributes are different and the two together form one integral whole. In other words, the difference and identity are not absolute and mutually exclusive. The Jaina philosopher agrees with the Sāṅkhya philosopher in his assessment of the objective real. But he differs from him in respect of the subjective plane. The contention of the Buddhist Negativist that

the subject is also liable to the same charge of combining identity and difference as its traits is accepted as the correct appraisal by the Jaina philosopher. But he differs from the Negativist when the latter dismisses both the subject and the object as irrational appearance. The contention of the Jaina is that the criterion of reality or otherwise is to be discovered in experience. And when experience endorses the co-occurrence and co-existence of both we must conclude that reality is capable of accommodating these variations. This also holds good of causation. The effect is both identical with and different from the cause and there is not incompatibility in this combination. This is called the law of *anekānta*.

I am not holding brief for either a Buddhist or a Jaina philosopher. But whether one is prepared to accept the Jaina's solution or not he must have the candour to admit that the Jaina philosopher has succeeded in justifying the existence of both the subject and the object and their relationship whereas the Vedāntist sacrifices the objective world and the negativist makes holocaust of both at the altar of *a priori* logic. The law of *anekānta* saves both.

In religion, the extremist *a priori* attitude has produced terrible consequences in the past. The proselytizing creeds are responsible for huge bloodshed. If one believes that his mode of worship is the only correct way to win the love of God and all others are false heresies, one cannot have friendly feeling towards the other. Nowadays religion is shoved into the background in the so-called communist countries, but the fanaticism of the neo-gospel is equally adamant. It will not listen to logic or the opposite opinion. Like Christianity or Islam it seeks to convert the whole world to its creed and declare *jehad* against the recalcitrants. The adherents of different political parties are equally intolerant of their rivals. An ordinary layman fails to understand the subtle nuances of difference between the diverse forms of socialism now preached in India. But the differences, small or great, subtle or obtuse, are inflaming the worst passions of hatred and intolerance. In the present day, politics is by and large supplanting religion, but it inherits the same spirit of intolerance as religions showed in the mediaeval times. The study of philosophy may produce one salutary effect. Philosophers differ from one another or criticize their opponents with vehemence. But fortunately their quarrels are confined to words or thoughts and do not culminate in physical fights. The *argumentum ad baculum* is not considered in academic circles as the decisive instrument. So also we should cultivate this attitude in our day to day life and in politics. In politics the conflict

of economic interests combined with the ideological dogmatism has made the confusion worse confounded. Jawaharlal Nehru evolved the formula of co-existence as the guiding principle of international politics. But unfortunately his doctrine of Pañcaśīla did not cut ice with the other nations. This spirit of mutual concession and accommodation can have a chance of playing an effective role if the superpowers, Russia, America and China see their way to accept it as the guiding policy.

It may be thought that we are uttering a platitude or expressing a pious wish. It is a counsel of perfection which has no chance of being translated into actual practice. But with due deference to this assessment of practical politicians we may observe that we cannot lower our ideal. The ideal always outstrips the actual. But if it is uppermost in the mind of lead and light it lets loose a power to raise the level of communal morality. What was thought to be an impracticable phantasy has been realized in concrete experience. Nobody could think in the past of the latest inventions in science and technology such as aeroplanes, rockets and atom bombs, etc., as practical propositions. So also in the morality of international politics have occurred momentous changes. The bombing of civil population shocks our conscience and this exercises a restraining influence on the conduct of wanton warfare. In the present-day world situation, ideology plays not an inconsiderable part in the framing of policies of nations. There is a tug of war between socialism and democracy. Thus conflict derives its sanction from the economic conditions of nations. To the poor man, the unemployed educated youth, and persons suffering from frustration due to relegation of merit in the interest of party politics, the word 'socialism' has an irresistible appeal. It is believed that socialism will usher in the millennium. Democracy also professes to afford equality of opportunity to all. Democracy favours freedom of speech and criticism whereas socialism tends to culminate in dictatorship which will not hesitate to use individuals as tools in the promotion of the welfare of the state. In communist countries violence is regarded as the legitimate means of achieving the goal. India is a poor country and is thus subject to all the evils that poverty brings in its train. What is matter of great concern is that the leaders of socialistic movements in India are in their speech and practice inciting the underprivileged people particularly agricultural labourers and workers in factories and mills to resort to violence. Democracy on the other hand is slow in its resolves and cautious in its policy. The so-called communist is noted for his fanaticism and his faith in the sacrosanct infallibility of the Marxist philosophy both in the national and international politics.

The conflict between socialism and democracy has assumed an alarming dimension. Communism is determined to bring about a revolution in every country and convert the peoples of the world to its creed. It manifests all the characteristics of fanaticism which marked the expansion of Islam in its political conquest. The catastrophe, the third world war, can be averted if the powers standing for different socio-political organizations realize the futility of extremist policies. Let each nation follow its ideology and seek to achieve complete success within its frontiers. Let them accept the principle of live and let live if not as a creed at least as a practical policy. The problem of poverty and unemployment and the wastage of national energy must be solved by each nation. If a government fails to tackle this problem with sincerity of purpose it runs the risk of being supplanted by another promising better results. In the achievement of this task the attitude of *Anekanta* if properly and judiciously cultivated will play a momentous role. The doctrine of *anekanta* which counsels avoidance of extremes, need not be confined to speculative thought. Its application to the practical conduct of human affairs in the individual's field of activity or in the national plane is imperative.

It may be argued that the spirit of moderation fostered by *anekanta* philosophy may breed self-complacency and latitudinarianism. If the possibility of the opposite ideology be conceded one may develop lukewarm attitude and not be enthusiastic and lack in zeal in the cause of his own accepted creed. It will undermine the robust faith necessary for the unwavering pursuit of the task enjoined upon him. Laxity in conviction will make a man liable to change his faith over to another under temptation or provocation.

But this unwelcome upshot is not necessarily entailed by the psychology of *anekanta*. One may be unyielding in one's faith and yet not intolerant of other creeds. An orthodox Hindu, firm in his conviction and strictly observant of the discipline enjoined by his religion, may have the charity to believe in the sincerity of a Christian or a Muslim. This is the secret of the unmolested co-existence of different faiths in India, though mutually antagonistic to all appearances. Unfortunately this spirit of accommodation is not appreciated by followers of creeds imported from foreign lands. We may however plead for the cultivation of this accommodative attitude not only in the field of religion but also in politics and pursuit of economic policies. None should develop a one-track mind and refuse to take into account the interests of the other party. In

economics the interests of labour should not be sacrificed nor should labour develop a hostile attitude to the capitalist. Labour cannot have scope of action if there is no capital to open new avenues of work. The interests of both can be adjusted. The unprivileged underdog must be lifted out of the morass of degradation and trained to develop his skill and efficiency to achieve a better and higher standard of life. In the political sphere tyranny and persecution have been seen to have had ephemeral success in the past. Let the apostles of communism lay to heart the lesson of history. The impending threat of aggression by stronger nations may serve a purpose if it spurs the weaker nations to energetic activity in self-defence. The spirit of *anekānta* does not put premium on idleness and self-complacency. That will be rather a travesty of *anekānta*. True *anekānta* fosters firmness consistent with tolerance. The cultivation of this attitude will ensure peace between individuals and nations.

To sum up, let each man adhere to his ancestral faith or political conviction with as much tenacity as he is capable of. But for God's sake let him not fight with his neighbour if he pursues a different line. There have been two world wars before and the third is impending. Violence has not succeeded in stemming violence. War has not outlawed war. The third world war will be conducted with nuclear arms and nobody can forecast the future shape of things. It can be avoided only by the development of *anekānta* attitude which is the psychological counterpart of non-violence.

FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE: AHIMŚĀ AND ANEKĀNTA¹

NAND KISHORE PRASAD

The definition of real given in the *Tatvārthādhigamasūtra* unfolds the dynamic nature of entities. A real is that which embodies origination (*utpāda*), cessation (*vyaya*) and continuity (*dhrauya*): utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat (op. cit., 5. 30). A real is always changing and change means the origination of a novel attribute preceded by the cessation of the previous attribute and the underlying reality running through them incorporates both. The relation of quality and substance is also identity in difference. The quality of A is not different from the underlying substance and yet is not entirely the same. There is difference between A and its quality, but it is not as different as the quality of B. In this process the dilemma of Bradley posed in the proposition confronts us: 'If you predicate something which does not belong to the subject, it is false. If you predicate what is not different from the subject, you predicate nothing'. But in a proposition there must be a subject and a predicate. As a matter of fact all our statements are instances of subject-predicate relation. But if the Bradlean dilemma be a true appraisal we must cease from making any statement at all. This is tantamount to putting a gag in our mouth. The Jaina along with the philosophers of *Bhedābheda* schools solved the problem by asserting that the relation of the predicate to the subject is neither one of absolute identity nor of absolute difference but both. Identity and difference can co-exist. If the real is to forfeit difference as one of its constituents, it will be a blank of which nothing can be affirmed or defined.

This is called the law of *anekānta*. It strikes a balance between two supposed opposites by steering a middle course between them. In the Jaina thought this law of *anekānta* is confined to philosophy and logic. It was however applied in ethics by the Buddha in his formula of *Majjhimā Paṭipadā* (*Madhyamā Pratipad*). Buddha finds contradiction between extreme asceticism and extreme self-indulgence. The former enfeebles a person and the latter degenerates him. The two extremes can be avoided by following the middle path of moderation.

1. Read at Seminar of Scholars on April 19, 1970.

In the, *Bhagavadgītā* Sri Krishna counsels balanced diet, balanced recreation, balanced activity and balanced rest:

yuktāhāravihārasya yuktaceṣṭasya karmasu

yuktasvapnāvabodhasya yogo bhavati duḥkhaḥ (op. cit., VI 17).

Extremes must be avoided. Extremism means *ekānta* attitude, i. e. adherence to one extreme (*anta*) to the exclusion of the other.

The doctrine of *anekānta* was applied to the ethical conduct of a person aspiring for higher values. But unfortunately its application to day to day life of an individual and the mutual behaviour of nations has not been advocated with emphasis by any thinker, so far as our knowledge goes. The subject of our present discourse has been proposed by our Director, Dr. N. Tatia. He envisages this scope of the application of this principle in the political sphere and is persuaded that this *anekānta* attitude together with non-violence will serve as the foundation of world peace.

The Jaina logician believes in relativity and non-absolutism and makes assessment of the truth of a proposition in sevenfold predication. We may take the following paradigm for illustration of the *anekānta* standpoint. There are so many divergent theories regarding causation. In answer to the question—‘is the effect pre-existent in the cause?’ different answers have been given by different philosophers either in the affirmative or in the negative or in both, or in a non-committal manner. The Jaina answers this in the following manner: (1) it is (*syād asti*), (2) it is not (*syād nāsti*), (3) it is and is not (*syād asti ca nāsti ca*) (4) it is indefinable (*syād avaktavya*), (5) it is and is indefinable (*syād asti ca avaktavya*), (6) it is not and is indefinable (*syād nāsti ca avaktavya*) and (7) it is, is not and indefinable (*syād asti ca nāsti ca avaktavya*). The first endorses the Sāṅkhya position called *satkāryavāda*, subject to a qualification. It is pre-existent so far as it is identical with the cause but not as a full-fledged effect. The second proposition endorses the Nyāya position called *asatkāryavāda*. The effect is not pre-existent as it is found to be after its emergence. So the acceptance is not unqualified. Without further elaboration we may assert that a thing is true in its own character, taken by itself, in its own place and in its own time. I now propose to apply it to the examination of a political question.

Is democracy the true universal form of government or socialism with perfect state control? Is there a *via media*? Consistent with the law of *anekānta*, the Jaina philosopher would say, ‘nothing can be universally true for all the time’. It holds true under a specified set

of circumstances and ceases to be valid when those circumstances disappear. Democracy believes in individual freedom of speech, freedom of action and also in his capacity of forming true judgement. It will be a misfit in a country where the majority of people are illiterate, politically unconscious, have no civic sense, that is to say, have not any conception of the welfare of the entire nation and are concerned wholly with the satisfaction of their immediate biological needs. In such a country democracy formed on the basis of popular votes proves to be a travesty. So it is good for a people which is politically educated and has clear notion of the ultimate good. Democracy is good for it. Is monarchy good? Yes, subject to a qualification. If the king is educated politically, morally and is not self-centred, open to conviction and devotes himself to the promotion of the well-being of the people of all classes, it will be an ideal form of government. As a matter of fact all political thinkers of India in the past from the authors of the Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, down to Kauṭilya and his successors and also Plato and Aristotle have all shown their preference for constitutional monarchy. But if the king develops into a despot and is entirely negligent of the interest of the people, is intemperate and addicted to pleasures of the senses monarchy will prove to be a curse. Democracy again is apt to degenerate into tyranny of the majority and when this majority is composed of needy, greedy and indolent people this will also prove to be a cause of misery. The intellectually advanced sections, the well-to-do merchants and industrialists, the morally sensitive people will suffer. So there must be checks and balancing factors. So no definite qualified answer can be given to the question whether a particular form of government is better than the other.

The general mass of a nation have no idea of higher values and as such have a natural animus against the advanced section. They will be easily duped by interested party politicians. Their policy will be directed to the effacement of classes and equalization by the achievement of universal poverty. But there will be a handful of clever men who as the leaders of people will live in luxury hold out hopes of higher standard of life. This is unfortunately found to be the situation in our country in the present day. The remedy may be found if the leaders are self-sacrificing and find delight in promoting the well-being of all sections of people. But the general amelioration can be affected by true education of the entire nation. People must be taught to place the interest of the nation above individual prosperity, which will have no stability if the majority are sunk in abject poverty. Abject poverty and unutilisable surplus of wealth are two extremes and must be adjusted by the law of *anekānta*.

In the international sphere the rivalry of nations can be tempered by restraint of ambition. A powerful nation which has a superior military organization equipped with superior arms naturally feels tempted to aggrandize itself at the cost of weaker nations. This leads to war which inflicts untold suffering on the victims of aggression. And the aggressor too suffers in loss of man and materials if the resistance is sustained. The fate of Hitler's Germany should bring the lesson home to the aggressor that war is not as profitable as he thinks. There are so many risks and so many miscalculations inevitable in the prosecution of war. This shows the working of the law of *anekānta* below the surface. Too much of power is almost as bad as too much of weakness. The two extremes are equally detestable. The weaker nations must be stronger to foil the ambitious designs of the power-intoxicated aggressor. There must be sobering down of the pride of power on the one hand and the uplift of the weaker nations from the slough of despondency and degradation on the other. This is the significance of *anekānta* which denounces extremism of either.

Intellectual and moral persuasion is better than physical violence. One may be cowed down by the bully but cannot be expected to entertain feelings of loyalty. It is by love, friendship and provision of succour that a powerful individual or an organisation can hope to win the love of poor and weak people.

But this traffic in benevolence cannot be one-track affair. The beneficiary must appreciate the mental charity of the benefactor and free himself from moral degradation by cherishing feeling of gratitude. The present-day conflict of labour and capital is not entirely an economic problem. Without investment of capital there can be no development which means opening out new avenues of activity. The industrial enterprise is a cooperative concern. It can flourish only if the capitalist is not over ambitious and the labour is not avaricious. There must be sincerity of purpose on both sides. It is extreme avarice on either side that is at the bottom of the trouble, which is as much a question of psychology as of economics. This malady can be redressed if there is appreciation of inter-dependence on the part of both, capital and labour.

The advocacy of non-violence need not be dismissed as the fad of a dreamer. Violence may be effective for the time being, but unless it is re-inforced by non-violence its success will not be enduring. Non-violence on the part of the stronger man and nation will inspire admiration for the former's forbearance. The father's admonition is

effective because it is backed by love. Let the stronger and richer nations befriend the downtrodden and thus establish hegemony of love. We appeal to the ruling powers to make an experiment with love and friendship as moral weapons and keep the destructive nuclear weapons in cold storage. This was the ideal which moved Mahatma Gandhi. This ideal can produce tangible results if the powerful nations are induced to give a trial to this principle. The weaker nations too must not be misled to have recourse to violence as the means of self-amelioration. This pursuit of non-violence will play an effective role in national and international spheres if there is consciousness of the futility of extreme measures which is the objective of *anekanta* attitude of mind.

आर्य बनाम अनार्य

नथमल टाटिया

[१] मनुस्मृति (२।२२) में आर्यावर्त की सीमा का निर्देश करते हुए कहा गया है—पूर्व समुद्र तथा पश्चिम समुद्र और हिमाचल एवं विन्ध्याचल पर्वत के मध्यस्थित देश को बुधजन आर्यावर्त कहते हैं। विन्ध्य के दक्षिण में आर्यों के विस्तार का उल्लेख मनु ने नहीं किया है। बल्कि, उन्होंने तो आर्यावर्त के ही अन्तर्गत मल्ल, लिच्छवी आदि जातियों को ब्राह्मण क्षत्रियों से उत्पन्न माना है (मनु० १०।२२) जो अन्नत अर्थात् यज्ञोपवीतहीन एवं सावित्री से परिभ्रष्ट होते थे। आर्यलोगों के विरोधी के रूप में दस्युओं तथा दासों के उल्लेख ऋग्वेद (५।३४।६, ३।३४।६ आदि) में आते हैं और यह बात यहाँ निःसन्देह कही जा सकती है कि उत्तर भारत की वह प्रजा जो पश्चिम से पूर्व की ओर अपना विस्तार करती गयी, अपने को आर्य कहती थी तथा पहले से बसी हुई एक भिन्न संस्कृति वाली प्रजा को दस्यु कहकर उसे अन्नत या अन्यन्नत मानती थी। इस दस्यु प्रजा के विभिन्न घटकों को आर्यतर होने के कारण हम अनार्य कह सकते हैं। अनार्य शब्द का अर्थ असभ्य भी होता है, किन्तु, प्रस्तुत प्रसंग में वह अभिप्रेत नहीं है। यहाँ अनार्य शब्द से हमारा तात्पर्य आर्यतर प्रजा से है, जो कालक्रम से आर्यों में घुल-मिल गयी। सच्चाई तो यह है कि आर्यों की प्राचीन संस्कृति क्रमशः बदलती गयी और कालान्तर में उसने एक नयी संस्कृति का रूप धारण कर लिया। आर्य-अनार्य का जाति-भेद सर्वथा समाप्त होकर एक नई जाति में परिणत हुआ, जिसे आज हम हिन्दू-जाति कहते हैं। लौकिक संस्कृत में आर्य शब्द एक विशेषण पद मात्र बनकर रह गया। आर्य शब्द के मूलभूत ऋ धातु (ऋ गति-प्रापणयोः ६६१) से उत्पन्न आर्य शब्द का अर्थ पाणिनि ने (अष्टाध्यायी ३।१।१०३ में) स्वामी एवं वैश्य किया है। पश्चात्तर में, आर्य शब्द का यौगिक अर्थ प्राप्तव्य होता है जिससे श्रेष्ठ, पूज्य आदि औपचारिक अर्थ निकल आते हैं। अतः सज्जन, सभ्य, साधु आदि रूढ़ अर्थों में इस शब्द का बहुधा प्रयोग देखा जाता है। श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता (२।२) के 'अनार्यजुष्ट' शब्द में धर्म शब्द का अर्थ श्रेष्ठ पुरुष है। कालिदास ने अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तलम् के 'यदार्यमस्थामभिलाषि मे मनः' (प्रथम अंक) में आर्य शब्द का प्रयोग साधु अर्थ में किया है। अमरकोष (ब्रह्मवर्ग ५) में महाकुल, कुलीन, आर्य, सभ्य, सज्जन एवं साधु शब्द समानार्थक माने गये हैं। किसी प्रजा-विशेष के लिए आर्य शब्द का प्रयोग पाणिनि काल के पूर्व ही लुप्त हो गया सा प्रतीत होता है। परवर्ती काल में यह शब्द अपने यौगिक और रूढ़ अर्थों में ही सिमट कर रह गया, ऐसा कहा जा सकता है।

[२] जैन आगम (पण्यवर्ण ९७-१३८) में कर्मभूमि के मनुष्यों को आरिय (संस्कृत-आर्य) एवं मिलेच्छ या मिलक्खु (संस्कृत-म्लेच्छ)—इन दो भागों में बाँट दिया है। अग्रेल १, १९६९, को विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पढ़ा गया।

गया है। म्लेच्छ जातियों की एक लम्बी सूची दी गई है, जिसमें सग, जवण, चिलाय, सबर आदि गिनाये गये हैं। आर्यों पर कई दृष्टियों से विचार वहाँ किया गया है। ऋद्धि-प्राप्त आर्यों में अर्हत्, चक्रवर्ती, बलदेव, वासुदेव, चारण एवं विद्याधरों का समावेश किया गया है। शेष आर्यों का वर्णन निम्नोक्त नौ [९] शीर्षकों में पाया जाता है— १. क्षेत्र-आर्य, २. जाति-आर्य, ३. कुल-आर्य, ४. कर्म-आर्य, ५. शिल्प-आर्य, ६. भाषा-आर्य, ७. ज्ञान-आर्य, ८. दर्शन-आर्य और ९. चारित्र-आर्य। क्षेत्र-आर्य के प्रसंग में निम्नोक्त देशों का उल्लेख है—मगध, अंग, वंग, कलिग, काशी, कोशल, कुरु, कुसुट्ट, पंचाल, जंगल, सौराष्ट्र, विदेह, वत्स, संडिल्ल, मलय (मलद), मत्स्य, अच्छ, दसण्ण, चेदी, सिंधुसोवीर, शूरसेन, भंगी, वट्ट, कुणाल, लाह एवं केकयार्थ। मनुस्मृति में निर्दिष्ट आर्यावर्त की तुलना, देशों की इस सूची से की जा सकती है। जाति-आर्यों के अन्तर्गत इन छः जातियों का उल्लेख है—अंबट्ठ, कलिद, विदेह, वेदग, हरिय और चुंचुण। अंबट्ट एवं वेदह की व्याख्या मनुस्मृति (१०।८ तथा १०।११) में उपलब्ध है। कुल-आर्यों में—उग, भोग, राहल (संस्कृत-राज्य), इक्खाम (इक्खाकु), णाय, (जातृ) एवं कीरव्व—ये छः कुल गिनाये गये हैं। कर्म-आर्य नाना प्रकार के होते हैं, जिनमें—दोसिय (दौष्यिक, वस्त्र का व्यापारी), सोलिय (सौत्रिक, सूते का व्यापारी), कोलालिय (कौलालिक, मिट्टी का पात्र बनाने वाला) आदि पेशेवरों का समावेश किया गया है। शिल्प-आर्यों में तुण्णग (रफू करने वाला), तंतुवाय (जुलहा), छत्तार (छाता बनाने वाला), पोत्थार (पोथी लिखने वाला), चित्तार (चित्र बनाने वाला), आदि शिल्पियों का उल्लेख किया गया है। भाषा-आर्यों के अन्तर्गत अर्धमागधी भाषा तथा ब्राह्मीलिपि का उपयोग करने वाले गिनाये गये हैं। ज्ञान-आर्य, दर्शन-आर्य एवं चारित्र-आर्य की व्याख्या जैनदर्शन के माक्ष-मार्ग की अपेक्षा से की गयी है। वस्तुतः मोक्ष-मार्ग ही आर्यत्व का निष्कर्ष है। क्षेत्र, जाति, कुल आदि उपाधिमात्र हैं। परम्परा से मान्य आर्य-म्लेच्छ विभाग को जैनों ने औपचारिक मान्यता तो अवश्य दी, किन्तु, उसके आधारभूत जातिवाद के सिद्धान्त को अस्वीकृत कर दिया तथा व्यापक दृष्टि से संस्कृति के मूलभूत तत्त्वों को ध्यान में रखकर आर्यत्व का पुनर्मूल्यांकन प्रस्तुत किया। व्याकरण-महाभाष्य में उद्धृत "न म्लेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै" द्वारा अक्षुप्त उच्चारण करने वालों पर जो प्रतिबन्ध लगाया गया था, उसका निराकरण भाषा-आर्य की व्याख्या में जैनों द्वारा कर दिया गया। यहाँ जैनदर्शन की समन्वयात्मक दृष्टि अत्यन्त स्पष्ट रूप में निखर आधी है।

[३] भगवान् बुद्ध ने तो आर्य शब्द की किसी प्रजा या जाति-विशेष के अर्थ में लिया ही नहीं। उन्होंने बोध प्राप्त कर जिन सत्त्वों का प्रचार किया उन्हें आर्य-सत्त्व (पाली-अरिय सच्च) यानि 'सत्यदृष्टियों द्वारा अनुभूत सत्य' की संज्ञा दी। अर्थात् उनकी दृष्टि में सत्य का साक्षात्कार कर लेने पर ही मनुष्य आर्य बनता है। यह दृष्टि जैनदर्शन के मोक्षमार्गनामी आर्य की दृष्टि के समान ही कही जा सकती है। बौद्ध ग्रन्थों में इस पारिभाषिक आर्य पद की व्याख्या विस्तार से मिलती है। आर्य शब्द का विपरीतार्थ बोधक शब्द पृथग्जन है, जो अज्ञान रूपी अन्धकार में निमग्न रहने की अवस्था का बोधक है। अनार्य शब्द का प्रयोग बौद्ध ग्रन्थों में हीन या असभ्य अर्थ में आता है। असत्पुरुष, दुःशील,

गणधर्मा आदि अर्थों में भी इस पद के प्रयोग पालि ग्रन्थों में देखे जाते हैं। आर्य शब्द की व्याख्या में जिस व्यापक दृष्टि का आश्रय जैन विचारकों ने लिया वैसा बौद्ध विचारकों ने नहीं। वस्तुतः भगवान् बुद्ध आचार में समन्वय के पक्षपाती थे, किन्तु, विचार के क्षेत्र में वे किसी प्रकार के समझौते में विश्वास नहीं रखते थे। इसके विपरीत, भगवान् महावीर आचार में तनिक भी शिथिलता को स्वीकार नहीं करते हुए विचार के क्षेत्र में मध्यमार्ग अर्थात् अनेकान्त को प्रश्रय देते थे। इसी कारण आर्य पद के विभिन्न पहलुओं पर महावीर के अनुयायियों ने विचार किया तथा उसकी व्याख्या में विकासशील सामाजिक तथा दार्शनिक तत्त्वों के समावेश में वे सावधान रहे। किन्तु, ठीक इसके विपरीत, दूसरी तरफ, बौद्ध चिन्तकों ने आर्य शब्द के व्यावहारिक पहलुओं की सर्वथा उपेक्षा कर, मात्र उसके पार-मार्थिक तत्त्व की ओर ही ध्यान रखा।

[४] आर्य शब्द के उपर्युक्त विवेचनों से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि ब्राह्मणपरम्परा में यह शब्द अपनी प्राचीन विशेष्य-वाचकता को सुरक्षित रखता हुआ विशेषण-वाचकता की ओर अग्रसर हुआ, पर भूल से सर्वथा पृथक् नहीं होकर अपनी व्यावहारिकता को मौलिकता के साथ बनाये रखा। जैन मनीषियों ने तो सामाजिक विकास को ध्यान में रख कर व्यावहारिक एवं पारमार्थिक दोनों ही दृष्टियों का समन्वय करते हुए इस शब्द की एक विस्तृत व्याख्या प्रस्तुत की। किन्तु, बौद्ध चिन्तकों ने केवल पारमार्थिक निष्कर्ष के आधार पर ही इसका उपयोग किया। इस कारण बौद्ध परम्परा में यह शब्द एक अर्थ-विशेष का वाचक बन कर ही रह गया।

इस प्रकार आर्य शब्द का अर्थगत विकास भारतीय संस्कृति के अन्तर्गत हिन्दू, जैन तथा बौद्ध इन तीनों दृष्टिकोणों का युगपत् प्रतिनिधित्व करता है।



राष्ट्रीय एकता

नथमल टाटिया

१. राष्ट्रीय एकता का अर्थ है राष्ट्रवासियों की वह एकता जो राष्ट्र के योगक्षेम के लिए आवश्यक है। एकता का अर्थ है अविवाद या अभेद। पारस्परिक विवाद या भेद (जिसमें वैषम्य भी समाविष्ट है) ही राष्ट्र की अशांति एवं अघोमति का कारण होता है। ये विवाद आर्थिक, वैयक्तिक, वर्णगत, दलीय, जातिगत, साम्प्रदायिक, क्षेत्रीय, नीतिगत तथा अन्य विविध प्रकार के हो सकते हैं। पर इन सभी विवादों के मूल में दो तत्त्व मुख्यतया क्रियाशील रहते हैं—(१) अर्थ एवं काम की वासना, तथा (२) दृष्टिभेद, अर्थात् आदर्शगत भेद। अर्थ-वासना के अन्तर्गत वित्तप्राप्ति, प्रभुत्वप्राप्ति आदि की गणना की जा सकती है तथा आदर्शगत भेद में आधुनिक समाजवाद, साम्यवाद, लोकतन्त्रवाद आदि राजनीतियों का तथा वर्णगत, क्षेत्रीय, साम्प्रदायिक तथा अन्य सभी प्रकार के भेदों का समावेश किया जा सकता है।

२. इस प्रसंग में बौद्ध दार्शनिक आचार्य वसुबन्धु की एक अभिव्यक्ति विशेष माननीय है। इस चराचर जगत् के घटक तत्त्वों के रूप में बौद्ध दर्शन में ये पांच स्कन्ध (धर्मों के पुंज) माने गये हैं—रूप, वेदना, संज्ञा, संस्कार एवं विज्ञान। उस पर यह प्रश्न उठता है कि जब जड़ जगत् की व्याख्या एक रूप-स्कन्ध से ही हो जाती है तथा चेतन जगत् की व्याख्या के लिए विज्ञान-स्कन्ध (जो सामान्य मानसिक वृत्तियों का बोधक है), संस्कार-स्कन्ध (जिसमें अन्य सभी विशिष्ट मनोवृत्तियों का समावेश हो जाता है) ही पर्याप्त हैं तो फिर स्वतंत्ररूप से वेदना-स्कन्ध [सुख-दुःख आदि वेदना में] एवं संज्ञा-स्कन्ध (दार्शनिक कल्पनायें) को मानने की आवश्यकता ही क्या है ? इस प्रश्न का उत्तर आचार्य वसुबन्धु ने निम्नांकित श्लोक (अभि-धर्मकोश १.२१) में दिया है—

विवादमूलसंसारहेतुस्वाक्रमकारणात् ।

चैतेभ्यो वेदनासंज्ञे पृथक् स्कन्धो निवेशितो ॥

स्वरचित भाष्य में इसकी व्याख्या उन्होंने इस प्रकार की है—

विवादमूले-कामाध्यवसानं दृष्ट्यध्यवसानं च । तयोर्वेदनासंज्ञे यथाक्रमं प्रधानहेतु । संसारस्मापि ते प्रधानहेतु । वेदनास्वादगृहो हि विपर्यस्तसंज्ञः संसरति ।

इस भाष्य की व्याख्या करते हुए आचार्य यशोमित्र ने कहा है—

वेदनास्वादवशाद्धि कामानभिष्वजन्ते गृहिणः । विपरीत संज्ञावशाच्च दृष्टीरभिष्वजन्ते प्रायेण प्रव्रजिताः ।

भाषार्थ यह है कि वेदना और संज्ञा...ये दो स्कन्ध सारे विवादमूलों के और सांसारिक जीवन के हेतुमूल हैं। स्कन्धों की क्रमव्यवस्था जो शास्त्र में की गई है वह भी स्कन्धों की

१. ११ अप्रिल, १९६८, को विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पढ़ा गया।

संख्या पांच मान कर ही की गई है (जिसका विवेचन प्रस्तुत प्रसंग में अनावश्यक है) । चित्त के साथ उत्पन्न धर्मों को चैत कहा जाना है । इन चैतों के तीन भेद किये गये हैं— वेदना-स्कंध, संज्ञा-स्कंध एवं संस्कार-स्कंध । संस्कार-स्कंध के अन्तर्गत सभी प्रकार के चैतों— उदाहरणार्थ स्मृति, मनस्कार, लोभ, द्वेष, मोह, अलोभ, अद्वेष, अमोह, क्रोध, ईर्ष्या, आदि आदि—का समावेश किया गया है । किन्तु जैसा कि ऊपर कहा गया है, वेदना-स्कंध एवं संज्ञा-स्कंध-यद्यपि ये चैत ही हैं तथा इनका भी समावेश संस्कारों में किया जा सकता था—अलग से इसलिए गिनाये गये कि ये दो ही सभी विवादमूलों के तथा संसार के हेतुभूत हैं । विवादों के मूल में प्रधानतया दो प्रकार की आसक्तियाँ विद्यमान रहती हैं—काम भोगों के प्रति आसक्ति तथा अपनी-अपनी दृष्टियाँ अर्थात् सिद्धान्तों के प्रति आसक्ति । पहली आसक्ति का प्रधान हेतु है वेदना जो गृही जीवन में बहुधा देखी जाती है, और दूसरी आसक्ति का प्रधान हेतु है संज्ञा जो प्रायः संन्यासियों में पाई जाती है । यदि इन दो आसक्तियों को समन्वित रूप में दे देखा जाय तो यों भी कहा जा सकता है कि सुख दुःखादि वेदनाओं से प्रभावित होकर व्यक्ति मिथ्या दृष्टियों में फँस जाता है और एक अविच्छिन्न दुःखप्रवाह में भटकता रहता है ।

आधुनिक युग की समस्यायें बाहरी रूप में भिन्न दिखाई देने पर भी तत्त्वतः वे ही हैं । आर्थिक प्रतिस्पर्धा तथा सैद्धान्तिक मतभेदों के कारण ही सभी समस्यायें उठ खड़ी होती हैं, और साथ-साथ दलीय, साम्प्रदायिक तथा अन्य विवाद भी उपस्थित होते हैं, जो राष्ट्रीय एकता के लिये घातक सिद्ध होते हैं ।

सभी भारतीय दर्शन संसार को दुःखमय मानते हैं तथा सभी विवादों के मूल में लोभ, द्वेष एवं मोह का प्रभाव बताते हैं । इन वृत्तियों से छुटकारा बिना पाये किसी प्रश्न का संतोषप्रद समाधान होना इन दर्शनों में असम्भव माना गया है ।

३. राष्ट्रीय एकता के प्रश्न पर महाभारत में अधिक व्यावहारिक ढंग से विचार किया गया है । गणराज्यों के नाश की चर्चा करते हुए भीष्म युधिष्ठिर को कहते हैं (शांतिपर्व, १०७, १४) :—

भेदे गणा विनेशुहि सिन्नास्तु सुजयाः परैः ।

तस्मात्संघातयोगेन प्रयतेरन् गणाः सदा ॥

अर्थात् आपस में फूट होने से ही संघ या गणराज्य नष्ट हुए हैं । फूट होने पर शत्रु उन्हें अनायास ही जीत लेते हैं । अतः गणों को चाहिये कि वे सदा संघबद्ध होकर ही विजय के लिए प्रयत्न करें । भीष्म संघीय एकता की प्रशंसा करते हुए कहते हैं (१०७, १४) :—

अर्थाश्चैवाधिगम्यन्ते संघातबलपौरुषैः ।

बाह्याश्च मैत्री कुर्वन्ति तेषु संघातवृत्तिषु ॥

अर्थात् जो सामूहिक बल और पुरुषार्थ से सम्पन्न हैं, उन्हें अनायास ही सब प्रकार के अभीष्ट पदार्थों की प्राप्ति ही जाती है । संघबद्ध होकर जीवन-निर्वाह करने वाले लोगों के साथ संघ से बाहर के लोग भी मैत्री स्थापित करते हैं ।

भेद ही संघविनाश का मूल कारण है। संघनायक ही संघ के योगक्षेम का आधार-भूत स्तम्भ हैं। नारद वासुदेव को कहते हैं (शांतिपर्व, ८१.२५) :—

भेदाद्विनाशः संघानां संघमुख्योऽसि केशव ।
यथा त्वां प्राप्य नौत्सीदेवयं संघस्तथा कुरु ॥

हे केशव ! आप इस यादव संघ के नायक हैं। भेद के कारण ही संघों का विनाश होता है। अतः आप ऐसा करें जिससे आपको पाकर इस संघ का—इस यादव गणतंत्र राज्य का—मूलोच्छेदन न हो जाय।

संघनायक के आवश्यक गुणों का वर्णन नारद इस प्रकार करते हैं (वही, श्लोक २६)—

नान्यत्र बुद्धिक्षांतिभ्यां नान्यत्रेन्द्रियनिग्रहात् ।
नान्यत्र धन-संत्यागाद्गणः प्राप्तेऽवतिष्ठते ॥

बुद्धि, क्षमा और इन्द्रियनिग्रह के बिना तथा धन के बिना तथा धन के त्याग किये बिना कोई गण अथवा संघ किसी बुद्धिमान् पुरुष की आज्ञा के अधीन नहीं रहता है।

वासुदेव जैसे महापुरुष ही विवदमान संघ की एकता को अधुण्ण रख सकते हैं। इस प्रसंग में नारद कहते हैं (वही, श्लोक २३) :—

नामहापुरुषः कश्चिन्नानात्मा नासहायवान् ।
महतीं धुरमाधत्ते तामुद्यभ्योरसा वह ॥

जो महापुरुष नहीं है, जिसने अपने आत्मा को बश में नहीं किया है तथा जो सहायकों से सम्पन्न नहीं है, वह कोई भारी भार नहीं उठा सकता। अतः आप ही इस गुस्तर भार को हृदय से उठाकर बहन करें।

महामारत के ये उल्लेख राष्ट्रीय एकता तथा इस एकता के आधारभूत राष्ट्रनायक के गुणों पर महत्वपूर्ण प्रकाश डालते हैं।

४. राष्ट्रीय एकता के अभाव में समय-समय पर देशों में महान् संकट आये हैं। मौर्यकाल में राष्ट्रीय एकता की स्थापना हुई जो अशोक के काल तक विकास की पराकाष्ठा तक पहुँची। पर इस एकता के नष्ट होते ही फिर संकट आया था। गुप्तकाल में फिर से एकता आई और देश समृद्धि के शिखर पर पहुँचा, पर एकता कमो स्थिर नहीं रही।

आधुनिक युग में गांधीजी ने राष्ट्रीय एकता के लिए प्राण दिये, अमरिकी राष्ट्रपति अब्राहम लिंकन ने ईसवी सन् १८५८ में कहा था—

“A house divided against itself cannot stand’. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free”,

उन्होंने एकता के लिए प्राणाहुति दी जिसकी पुनरावृत्ति राष्ट्रपति केनेडी ने की। इसी राष्ट्रीय एकता को संकटग्रस्त पाकर हाल ही में पहली अप्रैल को राष्ट्रपति जानसन ने घोषणा की—

“It is true that a house divided against itself—by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race—is a house that cannot stand.”

“Whatever the trials and tests ahead, the ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in powerful weapons, or infinite resources or boundless wealth—but in the unity of our people.”

राष्ट्रीय एकता की सुरक्षा एक अत्यन्त दुष्कर कार्य है। हाल ही में अहिंसावादी नीग्रो नेता मार्टिन लूथर किंग की निर्भम हत्या के फलस्वरूप अमेरिका के विभिन्न शहरों में गोरों और अश्वेतों के बीच भयंकर जातीय दंगे शुरू हुए हैं। इस घटना से यह स्पष्ट है कि अमेरिकी राष्ट्रीय एकता जिस संकट में आज से करीब सौ वर्ष पूर्व—अब्राहम लिंकन के समय में थी, उसी संकट में आज भी है। शत्रुओं से परिवेष्टित भारतवर्ष की स्थिति भी आज वैसी ही है। राष्ट्रीय एकता का प्रश्न चिरंतन है और इस पर ऊहापोह करना तथा राष्ट्रीय एकता को जीवित रखने के उपायों को ढूँढ़ निकालना हमारा पावन कर्तव्य है।

—: ० :—

धर्मनीति और राजनीति

नथमल टाटिया

१. 'धर्म' शब्द का प्रयोग कई अर्थों में हुआ है, पर प्रस्तुत प्रसंग में साक्षात् रूप से निःश्रेयस एवं आनुषंगिक रूप से अम्युदय के साधन को ही 'धर्म' मान कर हम उस पर विवेचन करेंगे। 'नीति' शब्द से हमारा अभिप्राय है नय अर्थात् आधारभूत दृष्टि एवं उस दृष्टि के पोषक उपायभूत नियम-उपनियमों से। महाभारत के शांतिपर्व में नीतिशास्त्र के विषयों के बारे में कहा गया है—

यैर्यैस्पायैर्लोकस्तु न चलेदायंवरमनः।

तत्सर्वं राजघातुंल नीतिशास्त्रेऽभिवर्णितम् ॥ (५९.७४)

अर्थात् जिन जिन उपायों द्वारा यह जगत् सन्मार्ग से विचलित न हो उन सबका नीतिशास्त्र में प्रतिपादन किया जाता है। 'राजनीति' शब्द के पर्याय के रूप में हमारे प्राचीन साहित्य में 'दण्डनीति' शब्द का प्रयोग आता है जिसे अर्थशास्त्र भी कहा गया है। 'दण्डनीति' शब्द की व्याख्या महाभारत में इस प्रकार की गई है—

दण्डेन नीयते चैवं दण्डं नयति वा पुनः।

दण्डनीतिरिति स्थाता त्रीन् लोकानभिवर्तते ॥ (शांतिपर्व, ५९.७५)

अर्थात् जिस नीतिशास्त्र के अनुसार दण्ड द्वारा जगत् का सन्मार्ग पर स्थापन किया जाता है अथवा राजा जिसके अनुसार प्रजावर्ग में दण्ड की स्थापना करता है, वह दण्डनीति के नाम से विख्यात है, जिसका प्रभाव तीनों लोकों में व्याप्त है। यद्यपि राजनीति का साक्षात् फल है अम्युदय अर्थात् लौकिक उन्नति, पर परम्परया शांति एवं समृद्धि की स्थापना द्वारा वह निःश्रेयसका भी साधक बनता है।

निष्कर्ष यह है कि साक्षात् रूप से आध्यात्मिक तथा आनुषंगिक रूप से लौकिक उत्कर्ष के साधनभूत नीतियों का समावेश धर्मनीति में है, एवं उन नीतियों को कार्यान्वित करना तथा उनकी मर्यादाओं को सुरक्षित रखकर लौकिक उन्नति का साधन दण्डनीति का उद्देश्य है। विचारालयों की दण्डव्यवस्था दण्डनीति का ही एक क्षुद्र अंग है। दण्डनीति शास्त्र में साम, दान, भेद, दण्ड आदि उपायों का पूर्णतः समावेश होता है और भिन्न-भिन्न राष्ट्रों का पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध एवं एक ही राष्ट्र के अन्तर्गत अंगीभूत राज्यों की नियंत्रण-व्यवस्था भी इसी शास्त्र का विषय है। राजा-प्रजा का सम्बन्ध, राष्ट्रहितकर कार्य, प्रजाओं का पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध आदि विषय भी दण्डनीति के ही अन्तर्गत हैं। पर इन विषयों की चर्चा प्रसंगप्राप्त नहीं है, हमें तो केवल धर्मनीति और दण्डनीति के पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध पर विवेचन करना है।

१. अप्रिल २२, १९६७, की विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पढ़ा गया।

२. प्रस्तुत विषय को समझने के लिए महाभारत तथा कौटिल्य अर्थशास्त्र में वर्णित चार मूलभूत विद्याओं पर दृष्टि डालना आवश्यक है। ब्रह्मा द्वारा रचित नीतिशास्त्र में वर्णित विद्याओं के उल्लेख के प्रसंग में महाभारत कहता है—

त्रयी चान्वीक्षिकी चैव वार्ता च भरतर्षभ ।

दण्डनीतिश्च विपुला विद्यास्तत्र निदर्शिताः ॥ (वही ५९-३३) ।

कौटिल्य अर्थशास्त्र के विद्योद्देश प्रकरण में भी इन चार विद्याओं का उल्लेख है। कौटिल्य के अभिप्राय का स्पष्टीकरण महामहोपाध्याय डा० योगेन्द्रनाथ वाग्ची ने अपने “प्राचीन भारत की दण्डनीति” (पृष्ठ ४६-४७) में किया है। न्यायभाष्यकार वात्स्यायन ने भिन्न-भिन्न विद्याओं के ज्ञान और फलों का विवेक करते हुए कहा है—तद्विदं तत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसाधिगमश्च यथाविद्यं वेदितव्यम् । इसी भाष्य की व्याख्या में वार्तिककार उदद्योतकर ने कहा है कि प्रत्येक विद्या में ही तत्त्वज्ञान है और निःश्रेयस प्राप्ति भी है। त्रयी विद्या का तत्त्वज्ञान है अग्निहोत्रादि कर्मों के क्रमिक अंग आदि का परिज्ञान एवं किस प्रकार कर्म करने पर कर्म सफल होगा आदि ध्यौरों की जानकारी। एवं स्वर्ग प्राप्ति है इस विद्या का निःश्रेयसाधिगम। आन्वीक्षिकी विद्या में आत्मा आदि पदार्थों का परिज्ञान ही तत्त्वज्ञान, एवं मोक्षप्राप्ति निःश्रेयसाधिगम है। वार्ता विद्या में कृषि, वाणिज्य, पशुपालन आदि का ज्ञान तत्त्वज्ञान है एवं इन साधनों द्वारा धनलाभ ही इसका निःश्रेयसाधिगम है। दण्डनीति विद्या में साम, दान, भेद, दण्ड आदि उपायों का ज्ञान तत्त्वज्ञान एवं राज्यलाभ निःश्रेयसाधिगम है।

इन विद्याओं के पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध के बारे में मतभेद है। कौटिल्य अर्थशास्त्र के विद्योद्देश प्रकरण में कहा गया है कि मनु के शिष्यवर्गों ने त्रयी, वार्ता और दण्डनीति ये तीन ही विधाएँ मानी हैं, आन्वीक्षिकी को त्रयी के अन्तर्गत माना है। वृहस्पति के अनुयायियों ने वार्ता और दण्डनीति दो ही को विद्या कहा है। शुक्राचार्य की शिष्यपरम्परा में दण्डनीति ही एकमात्र विद्या कही गयी है। किन्तु कौटिल्य ने चार विद्याएँ मानी हैं। (देखो—प्राचीन भारत की दण्डनीति, पृष्ठ ४६-४७)

प्रस्तुत प्रसंग में हमें त्रयी और आन्वीक्षिकी को धर्मनीति के अन्तर्गत एवं वार्ता और दण्डनीति को राजनीति के अन्तर्गत मानकर, धर्मनीति और राजनीति के पारस्परिक सम्बन्धों पर विचार करना है। वार्ताविद्या अब राजनीति का ही अंग मानी जाती है, इसलिए यदि हम ‘राजनीति’ या प्राचीन ‘अर्थशास्त्र’ शब्द का प्रयोग सामूहिक रूप में वार्ता और दण्डनीति के अर्थ में करें तो वह प्रयोग असंगत नहीं होगा।

३. धर्मनीति का विधान धर्मशास्त्रों में किया गया है तथा राजनीति का अर्थशास्त्रों में। ये दोनों शास्त्र अपने अपने विषय में स्वतंत्र हैं। मत्स्य तो यह है कि अर्थशास्त्र धर्मशास्त्र का परिपालक है। अर्थशास्त्र या दण्डनीति के नाश से अन्य सब धर्म नष्ट हो जाते हैं। महाभारत कहता है—

मज्जेत् त्रयी दण्डनीती हतायां सर्वे धर्माः प्रक्षयेयुष्विवृद्धाः ।

सर्वे धर्मविद्याश्रमाणां हताः स्युः क्षात्रे व्यक्ते राजधर्मे पुराणे ॥

सर्वे त्यागा राजमेषु दृष्टाः सर्वा दीक्षा राजधर्मेषु चोक्ताः ।

सर्वा विद्या राजधर्मेषु युक्ताः सर्वे लोका राजधर्मं प्रविष्टाः ।

(शांतिपर्व, ६३. २६-९)

अर्थात्, यदि दण्डनीति नष्ट हो जाय तो तीनों वेद रसातल में चले जायें और समाज में प्रचलित सारे धर्मों का नाश हो जाय, पुरातन राजधर्म, जिसे क्षात्रधर्म भी कहते हैं, यदि लुप्त हो जाय तो आश्रमों के सम्पूर्ण धर्मों का ही लोप हो जायगा । राजा के धर्मों में सारे त्यागों का दर्शन होता है, राजधर्मों में सारी दीक्षाओं का प्रतिपादन हो जाता है, राजधर्म में सम्पूर्ण विद्याओं का संयोग सुलभ है, तथा राजधर्म में सम्पूर्ण लोकों का समावेश हो जाता है ।

भारतीय प्राचीन शास्त्रकारों का धर्मशास्त्र और अर्थशास्त्र के पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध निर्धारण करने वाला यह दृष्टिकोण परवर्ती काल में बदल गया, जब मिताक्षराकार विज्ञानेश्वर महाशय जैसे विद्वान् राजधर्म को अर्थशास्त्र की कोटि में रखकर धर्मशास्त्र के साथ अर्थशास्त्र का विरोध होने पर अर्थशास्त्र को दुर्बल और हीन मानने लगे । याज्ञवल्क्य स्मृति के व्यवहार—अध्याय की—अर्थशास्त्रात्तु बलवद्धर्मशास्त्रमिति स्थितिः—इस उक्ति के आधार पर यह मत पनपा । इस मत की असंगति पर “प्राचीन भारत की दण्डनीति” में सूक्ष्म विवेचन प्रस्तुत किया गया है, जिसे ध्यानपूर्वक अवश्य देखना चाहिये । जैन, बौद्ध, जैसे धर्मधर्मों की मौलिक वैराग्य प्रधान भावनाओं का इस मत के उद्भव में प्रभाव रहा है । यद्यपि सोमदेव सूरि जैसे जैन चिन्तक अपने नीतिवाक्यामृत में स्पष्ट कहते हैं—अथ धर्मार्थ-फलाय राज्याय नमः—पर यह उक्ति प्राचीन वैदिक परम्परा की प्रतिध्वनि मात्र प्रतीत होती है । बौद्ध परम्परा की स्थिति भी इस विषय में जैन परम्परा जैसी ही है । इस प्रश्न पर महाभारत की व्याख्या अत्यन्त स्पष्ट एवं विवेकपूर्ण है । ऐसी व्याख्या अत्यन्त दुर्लभ है । धर्मशास्त्र में वर्णित मोक्ष और अर्थशास्त्र में वर्णित दण्ड के अंगीभूत विषयों के प्रसंग में महाभारत कहता है—

मोक्षस्यास्ति त्रिवर्गोऽन्यः प्रोक्तः सत्त्वं रजस्तमः ।

स्थानं वृद्धिः क्षयश्चैव त्रिवर्गश्चैव दण्डजः ॥

(शांति, ५९.३१)

अर्थात् मोक्ष का त्रिवर्ग दूसरा बताया गया है जिसमें सत्त्व, रजस् और तमस् की गणना है । दण्डजनित त्रिवर्ग उससे भिन्न है । स्थान, वृद्धि, और क्षय—ये ही उसके भेद हैं (अर्थात् दण्ड से धनियों की स्थिति, धर्मात्माओं की वृद्धि और दुष्टों का विनाश होता है ।

४. धर्मनीति और राजनीति के पारस्परिक सम्बन्धों के बारे में प्राचीन भारत के दृष्टिकोण को हमने देखा, इन दोनों नीतियों को स्वतंत्र मानकर विषय और फल की अपेक्षा से उनमें अविरोध की स्थापना करना हमारे प्राचीन चिन्तकों को दृष्ट था । मध्ययुग में मिताक्षराकार जैसे विद्वानों ने इसके विपरीत धर्मनीति को ही प्राधान्य देकर राजनीति को हीन बताया । राजनीति में भाग लेने के कारण जैनों ने आचार्य हेमचन्द्र जैसे महापुरुष की मर्त्या की, आधुनिक युग में महात्मा गांधी ने इन नीतियों में घनिष्ठ सम्बन्ध स्थापन की

दिशा में चिन्तन तथा प्रयोग किया। धर्मरहित राजनीति को उन्होंने अस्वीकार किया, तथा ऐसे धर्म को भी उन्होंने निरर्थक माना जिसका उपयोग राजनीति में नहीं हो सके, वह राजनीति कैसी, जिसमें अहिंसा और सत्य जैसे धर्मों को स्थान न हो। एवं वह धर्म ही कैसा, जो सामाजिक, आर्थिक तथा अन्य राष्ट्रीय हितों के साधन में समर्थ न हो, धर्म सभी परिस्थितियों में धर्म ही है, एवं अधर्म सदैव अधर्म ही है। अहिंसा सदैव धर्म है, चाहे अहिंसा पालन में वह अहिंसक व्यक्ति हिंसा का पात्र बन जाय, अहिंसा की स्थापना के लिए की गई हिंसा भी हिंसा ही है। साध्य और साधन में वैषम्य गांधीजी ने स्वीकार नहीं किया, व्यावहारिक जीवन में गांधीजी के इस दर्शन का सफल प्रयोग शायद अभी तक सिद्ध नहीं हुआ है। पर हिंसा शक्ति की निरर्थकता की अनुभूति ही इस दर्शन के मूल में है, इस सत्य को मानने में शायद कोई कठिनाई नहीं होगी।

RELIGION AND SECULARISM¹

NATHMAL TATIA

Religion is generally associated with belief in God. But there are religions, such as Jainism and Buddhism as also some branches of Hinduism, which do not believe in God, but are satisfied with postulation of individual selves as intelligent substances or series of moments capable of infinite perfection and exaltation. And consequently religion *quā* the path of perfection finds expression as worship of God, called *bhaktimārga* or pursuit of a moral code, called *karma-mārga*. But a more fundamental principle of Indian mind is the consistency between thought and action and the basic attitude which determines the thought itself and is called *samyag-darśana* in all branches of Indian thought. This *samyag-darśana* is the starting point of religious and spiritual life. We find many wandering teachers in the time of Mahāvīra and Buddha who were in search of the basic ideal which should determine spiritual life. The orthodox society wedded to Vedic ritualism was in the background. There were free thinkers who did not believe in ritualism, but were anxious to find a way out of the sufferings of worldly life. Vedic ritualism holding out future prospects was *dharma* for the orthodox people while the way out of worldly sufferings was the *dharma* for the new society that was struggling to emerge. The term *dharma* thus had two different connotations which were the two different ends of human life, technically known as *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*. Eventually, there emerged an integrated conception of *dharma* which was the cause of worldly prosperity as well as spiritual elevation. It is in the context of this concept of religion as *dharma* that we have to discuss the subject of religion and secularism.

Secularism is a belief that the state, morals, education, etc., should be independent of religion. But here religion has a very narrow connotation. The Indian concept of religion, which is identical with *dharma*, however, includes all activities of social welfare, statecraft, state polity, education, moral training, etc. Even the intellectual pursuits such as Logic and Metaphysics are considered *dharma*. *Dharma* thus stands for the basic principle that is the condition and also the justification of how one thinks and acts. Consequently, secularism, in order to be significant in this context, must have a special meaning.

1. Read at the Seminar of Scholars or April 3, 1966,

It should be conceived as a detergent against anti-social and anti-human elements that might surreptitiously adulterate the *dharma*.

Secularism is vitally significant and relevant to a society which has gathered prejudices and superstitions as part and parcel of religion. There are countries with a declared state religion, other religions being relegated to creeds of minorities. Conflicts are liable to arise in such situations, specially when sectarian ideals are sought to be injected in the public life of a composite people. Secularism is a vital force against anti-social tendencies in such circumstances. Religion in its essential character is a purifying force. But it fails to serve its purpose or rather disserves the society, when mixed up with idols and idiosyncrasies.

There were periods of religious conflicts in the course of our history. But an understanding of the essential unity of all religions gradually emerged and reached its climax in Bhagavān Ramkrishna Paramahansa and Swāmī Vivekānanda and found its concrete fulfilment in the life and activities of Mahātmā Gandhi who considered society without religion as body without soul. It is the Indian concept of *dharma* as the determining principle of all human activities, that was responsible for the manifestation of such unique personalities who brought about radical change in our concept of religion and its bearing on social and political life. The relation between religion and secularism should be considered in the light of the contributions of these great leaders of thought and action, who symbolized the best values of religion in harmony with the best demands of secularism.

Secularism functions as a safeguard against imposition of a personal belief on public life, or exaltation of sectarian customs to the status of a universal code of conduct. The Pak representative at the XIth International Congress of the History of Religions at Claremont, California, which I attended last September, tried to justify the necessity of a separate state for the followers of Islam for cultivation of the values of Islamic culture in public life. But the Indian concept of cultural values is radically different. A religious tenet, such as *ahimsā* (nonviolence) or *samyama*, (self-restraint) is a universal principle of conduct, irrespective of caste, creed or sect. Secularism is necessary for a society imbued with sectarian outlook, but such necessity is transcended by cultivation of impersonal values which clean the society and elevate the individual.

MATERIALISM VERSUS SPIRITUALISM¹

NATHMAL TATIA,

The two dogmas of materialism are—(1) the sole reality of matter and (2) the reign of law. In the field of ethics, pleasure and the fulfilment of desires is the only end. Of course, sometimes intellectual pleasures are considered higher than the sensuous. It is further recognized that one cannot be happy unless one is just, wise and noble, as also that only a cheerful person can be just, noble and wise. The materialist morality is—enjoy your life and help others to enjoy it, without harming any one. This is what can be considered as materialism in its most commendable perspective of modern times.

In ancient Indian thought, materialism is associated with Br̥haspati, the preceptor of gods, and Cārvāka, both of whom are perhaps mythical figures. They are not mentioned either in the Jaina Āgamas or the Buddhist piṭakas. The Mahābhārata, however, mentions Cārvāka Rākṣasa by name, and in the Rāmāyaṇa we find reference to Jābāli who propounds hedonism. The Jaina Āgamas refer to a doctrine which rejected the existence of soul and explained consciousness as a temporary effect of the mixture of material elements. This doctrine and others which accepted God and soul but did not agree to the Jaina doctrine are denounced as heresies in the second Āgama of the Jainas. In the Pali *Samaññaphalasutta*, we find mention of Ajitakeśakambali as a protagonist of nihilism (*ucchedovāda*). He did not believe in good and bad deeds and their results. Nor did he accept the authority of any person who has experienced the life hereafter. The human personality according to him is a combination of four material elements and nothing remains of it after death. Charity and benevolence are futile actions. But in spite of all these doctrines assigned to him, the fact remains that Ajitakeśakambali was a recluse and had a moral code of his own. He was, therefore, a materialist in the modern acceptation of the term defined above, allowance being made to the modes of life and thinking of those times. It appears that anyone not believing in the established moral code was called a heretic, irrespective of his ontological convictions. The school of thought which believed in determinism (*niyatīvāda*) or naturalism (*svabhāvavāda*) was also looked at with contempt. The Buddha denounced determinism as the worst type of heresy which deserved unqualified condemnation. The opposition, therefore, was not between materialism and spiritua-

1. Read at the Seminars of Scholars on April 14, 1965.

lism, but between the established moral life and the subversion of it, materialism being only one of the forms of such subversion. The problem of materialism versus spiritualism, therefore, in order to be significant, should be narrowed to the ethical problem of good and bad ways of life and their justification, logical and metaphysical.

In this connection, it will not be irrelevant to refer to the Buddha's insistence that the distinction between good and bad deeds must be accepted for living a civilized life. *Ākaravati Śraddhā*, that is, faith backed by reason is the minimum condition of social life, without which life itself will be meaningless. There were very many schools of thought propounding different moral codes and conceptions of spiritual emancipation (*mokṣa*). The Buddha did not like to enter into controversies about these concepts. He was satisfied if a man recognized the distinction between *sucarita* and *duṣcarita* and was true to his conviction. This was what he considered as the essential requirement of spiritual life. It is difficult to understand the opposition of materialism in the context of this simplified concept of spiritualism, except it is interpreted as a doctrine that denounced the established moral code of conduct.

In later Indian thought, many criticisms of materialism were advanced by schoolmen, both orthodox and non-orthodox. But these criticisms centered round epistemological and ontological problems, only cursorily touching the social and moral outlook of materialism. It appears that they were fighting with a phantom. It is not denied that there were free thinkers who approached the problems with open mind. But it is difficult to accept that these thinkers were as perverse as they were represented to be.

Materialism, as defined above, upholds the validity of only the two ends of life, viz. *artha* and *kāma* that is, worldly possessions and fulfilment of desires. The other two accredited ends of life viz. *dharma* and *mokṣa*, that is, moral principles and spiritual freedom, are not accepted as necessary truths by materialism. Spiritualism on the other hand believes in all these four ends. Of course, the materialist has also a moral code. But his moral code has no solid foundation. The maximum good of the maximum number may be accepted as the criterion of conduct. But that does not fully satisfy our reason which demands a universal criterion free from exigencies of place and time. We love freedom and greatmen defended it even at the cost of their lives. The reason is not known, but every one of us aspires to preserve his freedom. This implies life before and after. Of course the materialist also is as much enthusiastic about his

freedom as a spiritualist. But his enthusiasm is inconsistent with his presuppositions. It proves his implicit faith in immortality. The logical and also the metaphysical justification of self-sacrifice for the cause of freedom must be sought for in the immortality of soul and the conservation of human efforts culminating in what is called *mokṣa* or infinite freedom. Materialism at its best tends to obliterate the boundary of spiritualism and merge in it.

Materialism believes in the reign of law, which is another name of causation. But what is the law determining the effects of good and bad thinking and behaviour of human beings? If strategy and success are the only things that count—and this is the implication of materialism—all unselfish strivings in the sphere of arts and sciences will pass for vain activities. One can deny teleology by denying cosmological purpose, but one cannot deny good and bad acts and their fruits. One can and should deny determinism (*niyativāda*) which envisages strivings determined by the future result (*phalānukūlapravṛtti*), but it is dangerous to deny *puṣākāra* which asserts that the future is determined by the conscious effort of persons (*pravṛtṭyanukūla-phala*). The materialist's reign of law will be nothing but a form of determinism if the existence of free conscious agents is denied, and that will be an unacceptable dogma.

The ancient doctrines of individual freedom unconcerned with the freedom of others is not acceptable to the modern mind. But the Mahāyāna conception of freedom as a joint endeavour is a welcome doctrine. Freedom, in order to be freedom, must be freedom of all. Freedom of some is no freedom. It must be universal and full and for all. This is the Mahāyāna concept at its highest.

Whether it be materialism or spiritualism, the ultimate principle must be one unitary fact. Is it not then more reasonable to admit it as free spirit in order to explain our innate love for freedom, unselfish strivings, unsatiated thirst for knowledge and the possibility of infinite unfolding of the qualities of the head and heart? God is not essential to spiritualism. Only soul and reincarnation are considered necessary to it. The Buddhists deny even the soul which they substitute by stream of consciousness, and there are others who deny even reincarnation in the Indian sense, and yet they are believers in spiritualism. Belief in independent conscious principle, as opposed to matter, was the minimum requirement of spiritualism. But spiritualism in modern times has a wider connotation in that whatever is appreciative of freedom and dignity of the individual is accepted as spiritualism.

ANEKĀNTA AND MADHYAMĀ-PRA TIPAD¹

NATHMAL TATIA

Vardhamāna Mahāvīra started with implicit faith in *ahimsā* and austerities, while Gautama Buddha was impressed by the practice of meditation. The supreme problem of Mahāvīra was the conflict of ontological doctrines of his time, which led him and his followers to formulate the doctrine of *anekānta*. The Buddha was troubled about the psycho-ethical discipline, specially the final end of meditation and the rational adjustment of various codes of life, hedonistic and ascetic, which he characterized as *madhyamā-Pratīpad* (middle course).

The ontological pursuits of Mahāvīra and his followers led to the discovery of the conflict in the nature of things, and the resolution of such conflict in their theory of *anekānta*. A real must change and this change is impossible without a mode that has originated, a mode that has passed, and also an aspect that continues to exist in order to make origination and passing possible. In other words, a real must have a persistent feature in order to appropriate change, that is, a real must be a substance capable of assuming modes. This is *anekānta*, that is the doctrine which accepts many-sidedness of a real which is necessarily continuity and change rolled into one.

The Buddha singled out the moral aspect of life and discovered the causal doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) which traced the final source of life and death in *avidyā* (ignorance and false notions). This causal law determined the ontological speculation of the Buddha and his followers. Substance, according to this law, was a myth raised up by imagination. The modes alone were real without any underlying unity. One mode replaces another in unbroken succession determined by causal nexus. The unity is replaced by an infinite chain of self-charged moments in this doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* which literally means 'origination depending on relevant causes and conditions'. Nothing is independent and self-sufficient in this view. The real is also *śūnya*, that is, devoid of a character which is self-explanatory without any reference beyond itself. The concept of unity is a composite act of imagination, called *upādāya-prajñāpti*, that is, a concept (*prajñāpti*) depending upon (*upādāya*) other constituent concepts. Nāgārjuna, a Mādhyamika Buddhist, equates *madhyamā-pratīpad* with these three aspects of the real when he says :—

यः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्ष्महे ।

सा प्रज्ञप्तिरुपादाय प्रतिपत्सैव मध्यमा ॥

That is, what is known as *pratītyasamutpāda* is also called by us *śūnyata*. The same is also named *upādāya-prajñāpti* which is identical with *madhyamā-pratīpad*.

Another aspect of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *madhyamā-pratīpad* is the non-acceptance of any of a set of two extreme concepts or views. Nāgārjuna pays homage to the Buddha as the promulgator of the negation of all sets of conflicting concepts in the following verse—

अनुसोधमनुत्पादमनुच्छेदमशाश्वत—
मनेकार्थमनानार्थमनागतमनिर्गमम् ।
यः प्रतित्यसमुत्पादं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शिवं
देशयामास संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे वदतां वरम् ॥

I offer my homage to the foremost among the speakers, the enlightened one, who promulgated the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* which is identical with the quietening of worldly life and the supreme good, which is free from beginning and end, permanence and impermanence, unity and plurality, coming and going.

The Yogācāra Buddhist also eulogizes the Buddha's doctrine as the negation of the cognized (*grāhya*) and the cognizer *grāhaka*.

Thus, the *madhyamā-pratīpad*, originally a doctrine of life came to be interpreted by later Buddhist thinkers as a doctrine of reality, from the ontological as well as the epistemological point to view.

Anekānta, on the other hand, was an ontological doctrine from the beginning. It was an attempt to explain causation and also a doctrine of relation. A substance can have different modes and yet preserve its unity and identity with those modes. The criterion of unity is inseparability. There can be distinction without difference. Modes are different among themselves and *disinct* from the substance, but they are not *different* from the latter. The relation between substance and modes is identity-cum-distinction. The Buddhist does not agree with the Jaina and consequently fails to find any unity in the knowing, feeling and willing of the same person, which leads him to the denial of the entitative character of personality. Knowing, feeling and willing also are finally rejected by the Mādhyamika Buddhist as unreal. Thus, while the theory of *anekānta* was an attempt at the synthesis of the conflict apparent in experience and reason, the *madhyamā-pratīpad*, as interpreted by later Buddhist thinkers, accentuated the conflict and denounced both the extremes as untenable and unacceptable. If *anekānta* gives an impression of eclecticism, the *madhyamā-pratīpad* was made to play a role which it was perhaps originally not intended to do.

THE JAINA VIEW OF GOOD AND EVIL¹

NATHMAL TATIA

The problem of good and evil has exercised the mind of philosophers at all times. The difficulty arises when one endeavours to define absolute good and absolute evil. Good and evil, being relative, appear intermingled. What is good in one set of circumstances becomes evil in another and as such their nature remains elusive. Besides, there are thinkers, and the vast majority at that, who think every good mixed up with even greater evil. The Jaina philosopher is a protagonist of such thinking, and we propose here to give a succinct account of an import and facet of his theory of good and evil.

The Jaina thinker finds good and evil connected with the purity and impurity of the soul. Absolute purity is absolute good which is achieved in final salvation in the supramundane disembodied state of existence. At the mundane stage, absolute good is impossible. Of course, the Jaina believes in embodied beings who are perfect, but such beings, according to him, are not absolutely free because their bodily organism is regarded as a hindrance to perfect freedom. A problem pertinent to this aspect of the Jaina theory is the issue of bondage. Our good and evil acts induce association with matter, and such association is called bondage. The good or evil nature of the bondage is determined by the corresponding nature of the act which produced it. If the act is good, the bondage is good; and if the act is evil, the bondage is evil. But what is good and what is evil? Let us define them in terms of bondage.

The Jaina philosopher defines good (*śubha*) and evil (*aśubha*) bondage as follows : whatever varies directly with the passions (*kaṣāya*) is evil, and whatever varies inversely to the latter is good. This relation of variation is to be understood in the context of the intensity (*anubhāga*) and duration (*sthiti*) of the bondage. Ultimately the good is what we take to be good, and the bad is what we take to be bad, and the philosopher sets himself to define them only to give voice to the concepts peculiar to himself.

The Jaina thinker links bondage to passions in the main, and good and evil bondage is conceived accordingly. Bondage of all

1. Read at the Seminar of scholars on April 24, 1964.

types is to be got rid of because of its relation to passions. Of course, even the soul which is free from passions is liable to bondage so long as it has not suspended all activity. But his bondage is momentary and got rid of automatically in the next moment. Such bondage is set down to the soul's coloration (*leśyā*) which is an aftermath of passions. The Jaina philosopher regards activity (*yoga*)—physical, vocal and mental—as the preliminary condition of bondage which however derives its duration from the passions that accompany the activity. The coloration, being a mere aftermath of passion (and not passion itself), can condition only a momentary bondage devoid of any duration or, to be exact, possessed of only an apology for duration. To return to the point, the passions determine the intensity and duration of bondage. Now as the passions are evil in nature, their effects, viz. intensity and duration, should also be regarded as evil. But here the Jaina theory makes certain departures from the normal standard of the causal law. In the case of good bondage, both the intensity and duration are generally taken to vary inversely to the passions. But there are also cases of good bondage where the duration varies directly with the passions, e.g., all cases of good bondage except the human, heavenly and animal *āyus* (longevity). Similarly, though the duration of bondage is generally taken to increase only with the increase of passions and regarded evil¹, in the case of heavenly *āyus* (longevity), the duration of bondage increases with the diminution of passions, and is also regarded good.

The relation between bondage and passions being thus determined, we come to the important problem of precise determination of the conditions of good and bad bondage. That the evil bondage is due to passions is not a matter of opinion. But as regards the conditions of good bondage the commentators of Umāsvāti regard it as a by-product of spiritual exertions, such as penance and self-mortification, but Ācārya Kundakunda considers such bondage as the effect of the spiritual efforts *hindered by the rise of passions*. Ācārya Kundakunda's position appears more precise and regardful of the demands of the causal law. The inverse ratio of variation between good bondage and passions compels further thinking on the issue. It might be plausible to establish a causal relation between the measure of soul's purity induced by spiritual exertion and the measure of good bondage consequent upon the activity (*yoga*) of the soul. But whatever be the solution, the fact remains that the good bondage has no direct relation

1. *Vide Karmagrantha V*, p. 51, lines 10-11.

with the so-called good acts at the mundane level of existence. And this is more or less true of very many schools of Indian thought.

This trend of thought in Indian philosophy, particularly in Jainism and early Buddhism, has led the thinkers like Dr. Schweitzer and others dub our thought and culture as pessimistic in outlook. But in this crisis of thought and challenge of the modern scientific age, we could fruitfully look back to the maxim of the *Bhagvaadgītā* :

संन्यासः कर्मयोगश्च निःश्रेयसकरावुभौ ।
तयोस्तु कर्मसंन्यासात्कर्मयोगो विशिष्यते ॥

Which exhorts us to eschew the fruits of *karman* rather than the *karman* itself and thus saves our thought from the otherwise inductable trend of pessimism.

गृहस्थ-धर्म^१

नथमल टाटिया

(महावीर, बुद्ध, मनु और गांधी द्वारा प्रतिपादित)

१. वर्धमान महावीर का श्रावक धर्म :

जैन धर्म निवृत्ति-प्रधान धर्म है। वर्धमान महावीर द्वारा प्रतिपादित गृहस्थ-धर्म का स्वरूप उनके साधु-धर्म का ही एक स्थूल रूप है। साधुओं के लिए अमर्यादित अहिंसा, सत्य, अस्तेय, ब्रह्मचर्य और अपरिग्रह व्रतों का विधान किया गया है, और गृहस्थों के लिए उन्हीं व्रतों का सीमित रूप में विधान किया गया है। साधुओं के लिए मानसिक, वाचिक और कायिक हिंसा, असत्य आदि निषिद्ध हैं तथा ऐसे कर्म स्वयं करना, दूसरे से कराना, तथा करते हुए का अनुमोदन करना भी उनके लिए निषिद्ध है। गृहस्थों के लिए सांसारिक सभी कर्मों से इस प्रकार निवृत्ति संभव नहीं, अतएव ऐसे कर्मों की सीमा निर्धारित करने का उन्हें उपदेश दिया गया है। इस दृष्टि से गृहस्थों के लिए और भी कई व्रतों का विधान किया गया है। उपासकवशा नामक सप्तम अर्थभागधी आगम के प्रथम अध्यायन में गृहस्थों के लिए निम्नांकित द्वादशविध गृहधर्म विहित है—पाँच अणुव्रत और सात शिक्षाव्रत।

पाँच अणुव्रत इस प्रकार हैं—(१) स्थूल प्राणातिपात (हिंसा) से विरति अर्थात् यावज्जीवन मन, वचन और कार्य से न स्वयं ऐसी हिंसा करना, न दूसरे से करवाना। जीवन धारण के लिए अनिवार्य हिंसा (आरम्भजा एवं विरोधजा^२) से बचना गृहस्थ के लिए संभव नहीं, अतएव यथाशक्ति संकल्प-मूलक हिंसक प्रवृत्ति से विरत रहना ही विहित है। किसी प्राणी का बन्धन, वध, या उस पर अतिभार-आरोपण आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार माने गये हैं। (२) स्थूल मृषावाद से विरति। गुप्त बातों को कह देना, मिथ्या उपदेश, कूटनेत्र आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार माने गये हैं। (३) स्थूल अदत्तादान से विरति। चुराई हुई वस्तु का लेना, आयात-निर्यात के नियमों का उल्लंघन करना आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार हैं। (४) स्वदारसंतोषिक व्रत। अपरिगृहीता-गमन आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार हैं। (५) इच्छापरिमाण व्रत अर्थात् परिग्रह-मर्यादा। मर्यादित परिमाण से अधिक क्षेत्र, वास्तु, धन-धान्य आदि का संग्रह करना इस व्रत का अतिचार माना गया है।

सात शिक्षाव्रत निम्नांकित हैं—(१) दिग्भ्रत अर्थात् पूर्व, पश्चिम आदि दिशाओं में अपने कार्य-क्षेत्र को सीमित करना। इस प्रकार मर्यादित सीमा के बाहर किसी

१. अप्रिल ६, १९६३, की विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पढ़ा गया।

२. जीवन-धारण के लिए अनिवार्य हिंसा आरम्भजा, एवं समाज, राष्ट्र आदि की सुरक्षा के लिए अनिवार्य हिंसा विरोधजा कहलाती है।

प्रकार की पाप क्रिया में प्रवृत्त होना इस व्रत का भंग करना है। (२) उपभोगपरिभोगव्रत अर्थात् सचित्त आहार और श्रौषण एवं हिसक व्यवसाय-वाणिज्य से विरति। मांसादि का भक्षण एवं अंगारकर्म, वनकर्म, दन्तवाणिज्य आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार गिनाये गये हैं। (३) अनर्थदण्ड से विरति अर्थात् निरर्थक पाप प्रवृत्ति से विरत रहना। असभ्य भाषण, मुखरता, शारीरिक कुचेष्टा, आवश्यकता से अधिक वस्तुओं का संग्रह आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार हैं। (४) सामायिकव्रत अर्थात् अभिगृहीत समय तक पापाचरण से निवृत्त रहना। सब प्रकार की सावद्य प्रवृत्तियों से निवृत्त होकर आत्मचिन्तन का अभ्यास ही सामायिक व्रत है। एकाग्रता का विक्षेप इस व्रत का अतिचार माना जाता है। (५) देशावकाशिकव्रत अर्थात् किसी स्थान-विशेष में अवस्थित रहने का व्रत। नियत स्थान में रह कर भी अन्य किसी व्यक्ति द्वारा या शब्दप्रयोग या संकेत द्वारा भयादित स्थान से बाहर की किसी वस्तु को मँगवा लेना या कोई काम करवा लेना इस व्रत का अतिचार माना गया है। (६) पौसघोषवास व्रत अर्थात् अष्टमी, चतुर्दशी, पूर्णिमा आदि तिथि में उपवास धारण कर उपाश्रय आदि में रह कर धर्मोपासना करना। सर्व प्रकार के सावद्य कर्मों से विरत होकर निर्धारित समय के लिए साधु जीवन का पालन इस व्रत में किया जाता है। साधु जीवन के प्रतिकूल किसी प्रकार की क्रिया करना इस व्रत का अतिचार गिना गया है। (७) यथासंविभागव्रत अर्थात् कल्प्य वस्तुओं का योग्य पात्रों को दान करने का व्रत। नहीं देने के अभिप्राय से वस्तु को अकल्प्य बना देना या मात्सर्यवश दान देना, आदि इस व्रत के अतिचार हैं।

गृहस्थों के निमित्त विहित ये बारह व्रत स्पष्टतः निवृत्ति-प्रधान हैं। सांसारिक प्रवृत्तियों से यथाशक्ति निवृत्त होने का इनमें उपदेश है। आदर्शभूत साधु जीवन के ही अनुरूप श्रावकधर्म की कल्पना की गई है। ये व्रत सामाजिक जीवन को सरल उज्ज्वल और सन्तुलित करने में सहायक होते हैं। पर सामाजिक जीवन के पारस्परिक व्यवहारों पर ये प्रकाश नहीं डालते।

नये पाप कर्मों से आत्मा को संवृत रखने के निमित्त गुप्ति, समिति, धर्म (क्षमा, मार्दव, आर्जव, आदि), अनुप्रेक्ष, परीषहजय एवं चारित्र तथा संवित कर्मों के क्षय के लिए तपश्चरण का विधान किया गया है। गृहस्थों के लिए ये विशेष रूप से विहित नहीं किये गये हैं। अतएव इनकी चर्चा यहाँ प्रासंगिक नहीं है।

२. गौतम बुद्ध का श्रावक धर्म :

अब हम गौतम बुद्ध द्वारा प्रतिपादित गृहविनय पर दृष्टि डालें। पालि पिटक के अन्तर्गत दीघनिकाय के सिंगालोवाद-सुत्तन्त में गृहधर्म प्रतिपादित किया गया है। इसे गृहविनय सुत्तन्त भी कहा जाता है। बुद्धश्लेष कहते हैं—इमस्मिं च पन सुत्ते यं गिहीहि कत्तब्ब-कम्मं नाम तं अकथितं नत्थि, अर्थात् गृहस्थों का ऐसा कोई कर्तव्य कर्म नहीं है जो इस सुत्तन्त में नहीं कहा गया हो। एक समय भगवान् बुद्ध राजगृह के वेणुवन में विहार रहे थे। उस समय सिंगाल नामक एक गृहपति-पुत्र को बुद्ध ने इस गृहविनय का

उपदेश दिया । आर्यश्रावक (गृहस्थ) को इन चार कर्मक्लेशों से दूर रहना चाहिये—
 (१) प्राणातिपात, (२) अदत्तादान, (३) कामेसु मिथ्याचार (अर्थात् अन्नह्लाचर्य) और
 (४) मृषावाद । इन चार कारणों के वश होकर पापकर्म में प्रवृत्त नहीं होना चाहिए—
 (१) राग, (२) द्वेष, (३) मोह और (४) भय । ये छः भोगों के अपायमुख (विनाश
 के कारण) हैं—(१) नशीली वस्तुओं का सेवन, घनहानि, कलह, रोग, अकीर्ति आदि
 इसके दुष्परिणाम हैं । (२) अकाल में रास्तों में घूमना । अपनी अरक्षा, स्त्रीपुत्र की
 अरक्षा, सम्पत्ति की अरक्षा, दूसरों की शंका का पात्र बनना, आदि इसके दुष्परिणाम हैं ।
 (३) नृत्य-गीत आदि का सेवन । नृत्य-गीत आदि में आसक्त व्यक्ति इन्हीं के अन्वेषण
 में परेशान रहता है । (४) जुआ और प्रमाद-कारक वस्तुओं का सेवन । शत्रुता, शोक,
 घनहानि आदि इसके दुष्परिणाम हैं । (५) पापमित्रों की संगति । ऐसी संगति के
 परिणाम स्वरूप धूर्त, शराबी, बंचक, आदि दुष्ट व्यक्तियों का समागम सुलभ हो जाता
 है । (६) आलस्य में पड़ना । अतिशीत, अतिउष्ण, अति प्रातः, अति सायं, अति
 क्षुधा, आदि का वहाना लेकर कर्तव्य कर्मों का नहीं करना इसका दुष्परिणाम है ।

अब हम बुद्ध द्वारा उपदिष्ट सामाजिक सम्बन्धों के नियमों पर दृष्टि डालें ।
 माता-पिता, आचार्य, स्त्री, पुत्र, मित्र और साथी, दास-कर्मकर एवं श्रमणब्राह्मण के
 प्रति गृहस्थ के कर्तव्य और गृहस्थ के प्रति उनकी अनुकम्पा (प्रत्युपकार) का वर्णन
 सिंगालोवाद सुतन्त्र में इस प्रकार किया गया है :—

(१) माता-पिता के प्रति पुत्र के पाँच कर्तव्य—उनका भरण-पोषण करना,
 उनका काम करना, कुल-वंश कायम रखना, दायित्व प्रतिपादन करना, प्रेतों के निमित्त
 आद-दान देना ।

इस प्रकार सेवित माता-पिता पुत्र पर पाँच प्रकार से अनुकम्पा करते हैं—
 पाप से बचाते हैं, कल्याण में स्थापित करते हैं, शिल्प सिखलाते हैं, योग्य स्त्री से
 सम्बन्ध कराते हैं तथा यथासमय दायित्व देते हैं ।

(२) आचार्य के प्रति अन्तेवासी के पाँच कर्तव्य—उत्थान (आसन से उठकर
 प्रत्युद्गमन करना), उपस्थान (सेवा), शुश्रूषा, परिचर्या, और सरकारपूर्वक शिल्पग्रहण ।

इस प्रकार सेवित होकर आचार्य अन्तेवासी पर पाँच प्रकार से अनुकम्पा करते
 हैं—सुविनय से युक्त करते हैं, अच्छी तरह से विद्यार्थे सिखाते हैं, सभी प्रकार के शिल्प
 तथा विद्याओं का निःशेष उपदेश देते हैं—मित्र और साथियों का सुप्रतिपादन करते
 हैं तथा सभी दिशाओं में सुरक्षित रखते हैं ।

(३) भार्या के प्रति स्वामी के पाँच कर्तव्य—सम्मान पूर्वक सम्बोधन, अपमान
 न करना, परस्त्री गमन न करना, ऐश्वर्य (कर्तृत्व) प्रदान करना तथा आभूषण आदि
 प्रदान करना ।

इस प्रकार पूजित होकर भार्या निम्नोक्त प्रत्युपकार करती है—वह घर का
 काम भली-भाँति से करती है, नौकर चाकर को वश में रखती है, अननिचारिणी होती
 है, अजित धन की रक्षा करती है तथा दक्षतापूर्वक गृहकार्य में सदैव तत्पर रहती है ।

(४) मित्र और साथियों के प्रति आर्यश्रावक के पाँच कर्तव्य—दान, प्रियवचन, अर्थचर्या, (इष्टानुष्ठान), समानात्मता, अप्रत्याख्यान अर्थात् माँगने पर किसी भी वस्तु के सम्बन्ध में ना नहीं कहना ।

इस प्रकार अनुगृहीत मित्र निम्नोक्त प्रकार से आर्य श्रावक के सहायक बनते हैं— प्रमादग्रस्त होने पर उसकी रक्षा करते हैं, प्रमादग्रस्त होने पर उसके धनकी रक्षा करते हैं, भय उत्पन्न होने पर उसे शरण देते हैं, आपदाओं में उसे छोड़ते नहीं, तथा दूसरे भी ऐसे श्रावक का सत्कार करते हैं ।

(५) दास-कर्मकरों के प्रति स्वामी के पाँच कर्तव्य—योग्यता के अनुसार कर्तव्यों का संविभाग, यथासमय भोजन एवं वेतन प्रदान, रक्षण होने पर उनकी सेवा, उत्तम रसों वाले पदार्थों का प्रदान तथा समय पर अवकाश देना ।

स्वामी के ऐसे आचरण करने पर वे निम्नोक्त प्रकार से उसका प्रत्युत्कार करते हैं—स्वामी के जगने के पहले जग जाते हैं, पीछे सोते हैं, चोरी नहीं करते, कर्तव्यों का अच्छी तरह पालन करते हैं तथा स्वामी का यश और कीर्ति फैलाते हैं ।

(६) श्रमणब्राह्मणों के प्रति आर्यश्रावक के पाँच कर्तव्य—मैत्रीपूर्ण कायिक कर्म, मैत्रीपूर्ण वाचिक कर्म, मैत्रीपूर्ण मानसिक कर्म, अनावृत्तद्वारता अर्थात् उनके लिये द्वार सदैव खुला रखना, तथा आहारदान ।

इस प्रकार पूजित होकर वे आर्यश्रावक को निम्नोक्त प्रकार से अनुकम्पित करते हैं—पाप कर्मों से निवारित करते हैं, कल्याण कर्मों में नियोजित करते हैं, कल्याण-भावना से अनुकम्पित करते हैं, श्रुतपूर्व उपदेश सुनाते हैं, श्रुत उपदेश को दृढ़ करते हैं, तथा सुगति का मार्ग प्रदर्शन करते हैं ।

बुद्ध प्रतिपादित उक्त गृहधर्म में पाप कर्मों से निवृत्त होने का तथा कल्याणकारक कर्मों में प्रवृत्त होने का विधान किया गया है । अर्थात् ये नियम निवृत्ति तथा प्रवृत्ति दोनों का सन्तुलित विधान करते हैं । बुद्ध कहते हैं—उक्त चौदह प्रकार के पाप कर्मों से निवृत्त होने वाला तथा छः कल्याण कर्मों का अनुष्ठान करने वाला आर्यश्रावक दोनों लोकों का विजय करता है, वह इहलोक तथा परलोक दोनों की आराधना करता है तथा मर कर सुगति—स्वर्ग लोक को प्राप्त होता है । बुद्ध का यह विधान उनके मध्यमा प्रतिपत् (मध्यम मार्ग) सिद्धान्त के अनुरूप ही है ।

जैन परम्परा में विहित श्रावक धर्म का आधार निवृत्त्यात्मक अहिंसा है । बौद्ध परम्परा में श्रावकधर्म का आधार अलोभ, अद्वेष, एवं अमोह—ये तीन कुशलमूल हैं, जो विधिप्रधान हैं । अलोभ का अर्थ है त्याग, अद्वेष का अर्थ है मैत्री एवं अमोह का अर्थ है पारमाथिक ज्ञान । इस आधार भूमिगत भेद को ध्यान में रखने पर इन दो धर्मों का मौलिक भेद स्पष्ट रूप से समझा जा सकता है । कुशलमूलों की विविध प्रधानता बुद्ध-प्रतिपादित गृहस्थ धर्म के उक्त विवेचन से भी प्रतिफलित होती है ।

३. मनु प्रतिपादित गृहस्थ धर्म :

जैन एवं बौद्ध धर्म का आदर्श संन्यास है । मनु भी संन्यास को यथोचित महत्त्व

देते हैं। और क्रमशः ब्रह्मचर्य, गार्हस्थ्य, वानप्रस्थ, तथा संन्यास—इन चार आश्रमों के विधिवत् अनुष्ठान से परम गति की प्राप्ति स्वीकार करते हैं (मनु० ६, ८७-८८), पर गृहस्थ-आश्रम को वे सर्वश्रेष्ठ मानते हैं। जिस प्रकार सभी नदियाँ और नद समुद्र में आश्रय लेते हैं, उसी प्रकार सभी आश्रम वाले गृहस्थ में ही संस्थित होते हैं (मनु० ६, ९०)। जैसे वायु के सहारे सब जीव जीते हैं, उसी प्रकार गृहस्थ के सहारे सब आश्रम जीवित रहते हैं (मनु० ३, ७७)।

मनुस्मृति में वर्णभेद तथा देश, काल आदि के भेद से गृहस्थ धर्म की विभिन्नता मानी गई है। व्यक्ति की रुचि के अनुसार धर्म की व्यवस्था की गई है। उदाहरणार्थ कोई पंच यज्ञों का अनुष्ठान करते हैं तो कोई इन्द्रियनिग्रह तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानानुशीलन मात्र से ही गृहस्थ धर्म को चरितार्थ समझते हैं (मनु० ४.२१-२४)। गृहस्थ जीवन की विविध परिस्थितियों को ध्यान में रख कर ही मनुस्मृति में विविध नियमों का विधान किया गया है। पर इन नियमों का आधारभूत मौलिक तत्त्व भी स्पष्ट रूप से वहीं निर्दिष्ट है।

महावीर और बुद्ध की तरह मनु यह स्वीकार करते हैं कि कामात्मता न प्रशस्ता (मनु० २.२) अर्थात् कर्मफल की इच्छा प्रशस्त नहीं है, पर साथ-साथ यह भी कहते हैं—न चैवेहास्यकामता (मनु० २, २) अर्थात् संसार में शुद्ध अकामता संभव नहीं। कामता के बिना किसी प्रकार की क्रिया संभव नहीं। अतएव व्रत और यमधर्म का पालन करता हुआ मनुष्य धर्म, अर्थ, काम तथा मोक्ष—इन चारों पुरुषार्थ की सिद्धि करता है।

गृहस्थ को अनिवार्य रूप से कुछ पापकर्म करने पड़ते हैं। उसके लिए चूल्हा, चक्की, झाड़ू, ओखली और जल का घट—ये पाँच पाप के स्थान हैं। इन अनिवार्य पापों से मुक्त होने के निमित्त गृहस्थ के लिए ब्रह्मयज्ञ (अध्यापन), पितृयज्ञ (तर्पण), देवयज्ञ (हवन करना), भूतयज्ञ (वलिवैश्वदेव) तथा नृयज्ञ (अतिथियों को भोजन) का मनुने विधान किया है। (मनु० ३. ६८-७१)। स्वार्थत्याग का अभ्यास ही इन यज्ञों का लक्ष्य है। हिंसा-मुक्त जीवन ही आदर्श जीवन है। जीवत यात्रा के लिए यदि हिंसा का आश्रय लेना पड़े तो कम से कम हिंसा करने का प्रयत्न करना चाहिए। मनु कहते हैं—जीवों को बिना पीड़ित किये अथवा यथासंभव स्वल्प पीड़ित कर जो वृत्ति संभव हो, उसका आश्रय कर विभ्र अपनी जीवन-यात्रा का निर्वाह करे (मनु० ४.२)।

महावीर और बुद्ध की तरह मनु भी गृहस्थों के लिए यम और नियम का विधान करते हैं। मनु यम को अधिक मौलिक मानते हैं। वे कहते हैं—विद्वान् यमों का सर्वदा सेवन करे। नियमों का नित्य न सेवन करे, यमों का सेवन नहीं करता हुआ केवल नियमों का ही सेवन करने वाला पतित होता है (मनु० ४. २०४)। महर्षि पतंजलि के अनुसार अहिंसा, सत्य, अस्तेय, ब्रह्मचर्य और अपरिग्रह ये पाँच यम, तथा शौच, संतोष, तप, स्वाध्याय एवं ईश्वरप्रणिधान ये पाँच नियम हैं। याज्ञवल्क्य स्मृति (३. ३१२-१३) आदि ग्रन्थों में यम एवं नियम के भेद अन्य प्रकार से गिनाये गये हैं। भगवान् महावीर तथा बुद्ध द्वारा प्रतिपादित सदाचार के सभी नियमों का समावेश इनमें किया गया है।

माता, पिता तथा आचार्य के प्रति गृहस्थ के कर्तव्य के बारे में मनु कहते हैं—जब तक ये तीनों जीवित रहें तब तक अन्य धर्म का अनुष्ठान न करके निरय इन्हीं की

सेवा में लगे रहना चाहिए (मनु० २.२३५)। भार्या के प्रति कर्तव्य के प्रसङ्ग में मनुस्मृति में कहा गया है—घर की दीप्ति स्वरूप स्त्रियाँ सन्तानोत्पादनार्थं सम्मान के योग्य हैं, घर में विराजमान लक्ष्मी और स्त्री में कोई अन्तर नहीं है (मनु० ६.२६)। मनु ने मित्र की अनिवार्यता पर जोर देते हुए उनके ये लक्षण बताये हैं—ध्रुव, वर्धनशील, धर्मज्ञ, कृतज्ञ, संतोषी, अनुरक्त एवं स्थिर-पराक्रम (मनु० ७.२०८-२०९)। मनु ने दासवर्ग से विवाद करने का निषेध किया है (मनु० ४.१८१) तथा उन्हें अपनी छाया समझ कर उनके अधिक्षेपों का भी सहन करना उचित माना है (मनु० ४.१८५)।

मनुस्मृति में निवृत्ति और प्रवृत्ति पर सूक्ष्मता से विचार किया गया है। इह-लोक या पर-लोक के सम्बन्ध में किसी कामना वश जो कोई कर्म किया जाय उसे प्रवृत्ति कर्म और ज्ञानपूर्वक निष्काम भाव में जो कर्म किया जाय उसे निवृत्त कर्म कहते हैं। प्रवृत्त कर्मों का भली-भाँति अनुष्ठान करके मनुष्य देवताओं के समान हो जाते हैं। निवृत्त कर्म करने से मनुष्य पाँच महाभूतों का भी अतिक्रम कर सकता है—अर्थात् मोक्ष प्राप्त कर लेता है। आत्मयाजी पुरुष सब प्राणियों को अपने में और अपने को सब प्राणियों में व्याप्त देखता हुआ ब्रह्मत्व लाभ करता है (मनु० १२.८६-६१)। इस प्रकार मनु ने निवृत्ति और प्रवृत्ति में समन्वय करने का प्रयत्न किया है।

४. गांधीजी की दृष्टि में गृहस्थ धर्म :

गांधीजी का जीवन जैन साधक श्रीमद्राजचन्द्र, टालस्टाय तथा रस्किन से प्रभावित था और भगवान् महावीर, बुद्ध, मनुस्मृति एवं गीता का धर्म तो उन्हें परम्परा से प्राप्त था ही। मनुस्मृति तथा गीता की भाँति उन्होंने भी निवृत्ति और प्रवृत्ति में समन्वय किया। धर्म और अर्थ को दो विरोधी वस्तु वे नहीं मानते थे। आसक्तियोग की प्रस्तावना में वे लिखते हैं—“व्यापार इत्यादि लौकिक व्यवहार में धर्म नहीं बचाया जा सकता, धर्म को जगह नहीं हो सकती, धर्म का उपयोग केवल मोक्ष के लिए किया जा सकता है। धर्म की जगह धर्म शोभा देता है और अर्थ की जगह अर्थ।’ बहुतों से ऐसा कहते हम सुनते हैं। गीताकार ने इस भ्रम को दूर किया है। उसने मोक्ष और व्यवहार के बीच ऐसा भेद नहीं रखा है, वरन् व्यवहार में धर्म को उतारा है। जो धर्म व्यवहार में न लाया जा सके वह धर्म नहीं है, मेरी समझ से यह बात गीता में है। मतलब, गीता के मतानुसार जो कर्म ऐसे हैं कि आसक्ति के बिना ही न सकें वे सभी त्याज्य हैं। ऐसा सुवर्ण-नियम मनुष्य को अनेक धर्म संकटों में से बचाता है। इस मत के अनुसार खून, झूठ व्यभिचार इत्यादि कर्म अपने आप त्याज्य हो जाते हैं। मानव-जीवन सरल बन जाता है। और सरलता में से शांति उत्पन्न होती है।” आसक्ति के बिना कर्म करने का एकमात्र उपाय है कर्मफलत्याग। आत्मार्थी के लिए आत्मदर्शन का एक अद्वितीय उपाय भी वही है। इस प्रसंग में गांधीजी ने उक्त प्रस्तावना में लिखा है—“मनुष्य को ईश्वररूप हुए बिना चैन नहीं पड़ता, शांति नहीं मिलती। ईश्वररूप होने के प्रयत्न का नाम सत्त्वा और एकमात्र पुरुषार्थ है और यही आत्मदर्शन है। यह आत्मदर्शन सब धर्मग्रन्थों का विषय है, वैसे ही गीता का भी है। पर गीताकार ने इस विषय का प्रतिपादन करने के लिए गीता नहीं रची, वरन्

आत्मार्या को आत्मदर्शन का एक अद्वितीय उपाय बतलाना गीता का आशय है। जो चीज हिन्दू धर्मग्रन्थों में छिटफुट दिखाई देती है, उसे गीता ने अनेक रूपों, अनेक शब्दों में, पुनरुक्ति का दोष स्वीकार करके भी, अच्छी तरह स्थापित किया है। वह अद्वितीय उपाय है कर्मफलत्याग।” कर्ममात्र में कुछ दोष तो है ही, तब कर्मबन्धन में से अर्थात् दोषस्पर्श में से मुक्ति कैसे? इसके उत्तर में गांधीजी उसी प्रस्तावना में लिखते हैं—

“इसका जवाब गीताजी ने निश्चयात्मक शब्दों में दिया है—‘निष्काम कर्म से, यज्ञार्थ काम करके, कर्मफलत्याग करके सब कर्मों को कृष्णार्पण करके, अर्थात् मन, वचन और काया को ईश्वर में होम करके।’” निष्कामता और कर्मफलत्याग ज्ञान एवं भक्ति से उत्पन्न होते हैं। भक्ति अन्धश्रद्धा नहीं है। स्थितप्रज्ञ ही भक्त हो सकता है। ज्ञान प्राप्त करना, भक्त होता ही आत्मदर्शन है। आत्मदर्शन उससे भिन्न वस्तु नहीं है। इस प्रसंग में उक्त प्रस्तावना में गांधीजी लिखते हैं—“जैसे रुपये के बदले में जहर खरीदा जा सकता है और अमृत भी लाया जा सकता है, वैसे ज्ञान या भक्ति के बदले बन्धन भी लाया जा सके और मोक्ष भी, यह संभव नहीं है। यहाँ तो साधन और साध्य, बिल्कुल एक नहीं तो लगभग एक ही वस्तु है, साधन की पराकाष्ठा जो है वही मोक्ष है और गीता के मोक्ष का अर्थ परमशांति है।” कर्मफलत्याग का अर्थ कर्मत्याग नहीं है। शुष्क ज्ञानी और बाह्याचारी भक्त होना गांधीजी को इष्ट नहीं। हाथ से लोटा तक उठाना भी शुष्क ज्ञानी के लिए कर्मबन्धन है। बाह्याचारी भक्त खाने-पीने आदि भोग भोगने के समय ही माला को हाथ से छोड़ता है, चक्की चलाने या रोगी की सेवा शुश्रूषा करने के लिए कभी नहीं छोड़ता। गांधीजी के अनुसार ऐसे ज्ञानी और भक्तों को लक्ष्य कर गीताकार ने साफ तौर से कह दिया है—“कर्म बिना किसी ने सिद्धि नहीं पाई। जनकादि भी कर्म द्वारा ज्ञानी हुए। यदि मैं भी आलस्यरहित होकर कर्म न करता रहूँ तो इन लोगों का नाश हो जाय।” कर्ममात्र बंधन रूप है, यह निर्विवाद है। तब कर्म करते हुए भी मनुष्य बन्धनमुक्त कैसे रहे? इस पर गांधीजी लिखते हैं—“जहाँ तक मुझे मालूम है, इस समस्या को गीता ने जिस तरह हल किया है वैसे दूसरे किसी भी धर्मग्रन्थ ने नहीं किया है, गीता का कहना है, ‘फलासक्ति छोड़ो और कर्म करो’। ‘आशा रहित होकर कर्म करो,’ ‘निष्काम होकर कर्म करो’, यह गीता की वह ध्वनि है जो भुलाई नहीं जा सकती। जो कर्म छोड़ता है वह गिरता है। कर्म करते हुए भी जो उसका फल छोड़ता है वह चढ़ता है। फलत्याग का अर्थ यह नहीं है कि परिणाम के सम्बन्ध में लापरवाही रहे। परिणाम और साधन का विचार और उसका ज्ञान अत्यावश्यक है। इतना होने के बाद जो मनुष्य परिणाम की इच्छा किये बिना साधन में तन्मय रहता है वह फलत्यागी है।” कर्मानुरूप फल अवश्य मिलता है। उस फल में आसक्ति नहीं रखना ही फलत्याग है। फलत्याग में अपरिमित श्रद्धा की परीक्षा है। जो मनुष्य परिणाम का ध्यान करता रहता है वह बहुत बार कर्तव्यभ्रष्ट हो जाता है। संपूर्ण कर्मफलत्यागी द्वारा भौतिक युद्ध हो सकता है या नहीं, इस प्रश्न के बारे में गांधीजी उक्त प्रस्तावना में लिखते हैं—“गीता की शिक्षा को पूर्णरूप से अमल में लाने का ४० वर्ष तक सतत प्रयत्न करने पर मुझे तो नम्रता-पूर्वक ऐसा ज्ञान पड़ा है कि सत्य और अहिंसा का पूर्णरूप से पालन किये बिना सम्पूर्ण कर्मफलत्याग मनुष्य के लिए अतंभव है।” कर्म करने में जो अनिवार्य हिंसा होती

है, वह अहिंसा के पूर्ण पालन में बाधक है या नहीं? इस प्रकार का जवाब गांधीजी सम्पूर्णफलत्याग के आधार पर देते हैं। यदि साध्य भी अहिंसा है और साधन भी अहिंसा तो अनिवार्य हिंसा साधन के कोटि में आकर अहिंसा ही बन जाती है। हिंसा से अहिंसा की सिद्धि गांधीजी स्वीकार नहीं करते। अनिवार्य हिंसा की सीमारेखा देश, काल और व्यक्ति के अनुसार बदलती है। विधि निषेध की सीमा निर्धारित करना सम्भव नहीं। उक्त प्रस्तावना में गांधीजी लिखते हैं—“गीता विधিনিषेध बतलाने वाली भी नहीं है। एक के लिए जो विहित होता है, वही दूसरे के लिए निषिद्ध हो सकता है, एक काल या एक देश में जो विहित होता है, वह दूसरे काल में, दूसरे देश में निषिद्ध हो सकता है। निषिद्ध केवल फलासक्ति है, विहित है अनासक्ति।”

गांधीजी के जीवन-दर्शन का मूल आधार अहिंसा है इस बारे में वे जैनदर्शन से प्रभावित हैं। भगवान् बुद्ध के मध्यम मार्ग को भी वे स्वीकार करते हैं। तथा मनु एवं गीता प्रतिपादित निष्काम प्रवृत्ति की कल्पना भी उन्हें मान्य है। उनके जीवन का परम ध्येय आत्मदर्शन, अहिंसा द्वारा अहिंसा की सिद्धि है। सत्य ही उनका ईश्वर है (हरिजन, दिनांक ६-७-४०)। सत्य और अहिंसा आत्मदर्शन के उपाय हैं। ब्रह्मचर्य को श्रेष्ठ मानते हुए भी गांधीजी गृहस्थ जीवन को अत्यन्त हेय नहीं मानते। सम्भोग का विवेक करते हुए वे कहते हैं—“सन्तानोत्पत्ति के ही अर्थ किया हुआ संभोग ब्रह्मचर्य का विरोधी नहीं है, कामाग्नि तृप्ति के कारण किया गया संभोग त्याज्य है” (ब्रह्मचर्य, पहला भाग, पृ० ८५-८७)। मनु० (६.१०७) को अनुसरण करते हुए वे एक ही सन्तति को ‘धर्मज’ मानते हैं, यद्यपि वे पुत्र और पुत्री के बीच भेद नहीं करते (वही)। गांधीजी विवाहित को अविवाहित सा होने का उपदेश देते हैं। कामप्रेरित आकर्षण को वे स्वाभाविक नहीं मानते। स्त्री-पुरुष के बीच का सहज आकर्षण यह है जो भाई और बहिन, माँ और बेटे बाप और बेटी के बीच होता है। संसार इसी स्वाभाविक आकर्षण पर टिका है (गांधीजी अनौत्ति की राह पर, पृ० ७०-१)। एक बार महात्मा गांधी से पूछा गया—“क्या आप विवाह के विरुद्ध हैं?” उन्होंने उत्तर दिया—“मनुष्य जीवन का सार्थक्य मोक्ष है। हिन्दू के तौर पर मैं मानता हूँ कि मोक्ष का अर्थ जीवन-मरण की घट-माल से मुक्ति—ईश्वर साक्षात्कार। मोक्ष के लिए शरीर के बन्धन टूटने चाहिए। शरीर के बन्धन तोड़ने वाली हर एक वस्तु पथ्य और दूसरी अपथ्य है। विवाह बन्धन तोड़ने के बदले उसे उलटा अधिक जकड़ लेता है। ब्रह्मचर्य ही ऐसी वस्तु है जो कि मनुष्य के बन्धन मर्यादित कर ईश्वरार्पित जीवन बिताने में उसे शक्तिमान करता है। विवाह में तो सामान्य रूप से विषय-वासना की तृप्ति का ही हेतु रहा हुआ है। इसका परिणाम शुभ नहीं। ब्रह्मचर्य के परिणाम सुन्दर हैं।” विकार की सम्भावनाओं के आधार पर गांधीजी ने विवाहित जीवन को हेय माना है। मोक्ष या आत्मसाक्षात्कार के अन्तिम आदर्श के साथ लोकसंग्राहक प्रवृत्तियों का मेल बैठाने के प्रयत्नों में ऐसे विरोध सर्वत्र हो जाते हैं, जिनका बौद्धिक समन्वय एक जटिल दार्शनिक प्रश्न है जिसके समाधान की कोशिश सभी दार्शनिक अपने अपने ढंग से करते आये हैं।

कर्मफलत्याग को मध्यविन्दु बनाकर ब्रह्मचर्य आदि चारों आश्रमों का समन्वय

‘कर्मयोग’ के रूप में गांधीजी करते हैं। उनका जीवन इसी समन्वय का प्रतीक है। सदाचार के सभी नियमों का समावेश इसमें अपने आप ही हो जाता है। अहिंसा सत्य और ब्रह्मचर्य का उल्लेख हम कर चुके हैं। रसास्वाद-संयम पर गांधीजी काफी जोर देते हैं। निर्भयता अहिंसा का एक मुख्य अंग है। अस्तेय और अपरिग्रह भी अहिंसा से भी फलित होते हैं। मनुष्य जीविकामात्र का अधिकारी है। स्वामित्व भाव से उससे अधिक रखना चोरी है। जीवन के सभी क्षेत्रों में अन्याय का सांमना करने के लिए सत्याग्रह गांधीजी का एक नया आविष्कार है। प्राचीन भारत के सारे आध्यात्मिक तथा नैतिक मूल्यों का समन्वय हम गांधीजी के दर्शन में पाते हैं। जैन, बौद्ध एवं ब्राह्मण परम्पराओं के नैतिक मूल्य गांधीजी के जीवन में एक रूप लेते हैं तथा प्रवृत्ति एवं निवृत्ति की प्राचीन भेदरेखा संसार एवं निर्वाण को जोड़ने वाली कड़ी बन जाती है।

धर्म और तत्त्व^१

सुखलालजी संघवी

मित्रो,

अवस्था भी हुई और स्वास्थ्य भी ठीक नहीं है; अतः सामान्य रूप से तत्त्वज्ञान के विषय में जो विचार आते हैं उन्हींको आप के समक्ष उपस्थित करके सन्तोष मानता हूँ, और साथ-ही-साथ आप सबका आभार भी मान लेता हूँ।

भारतीय तत्त्वज्ञान अनेक सम्प्रदायों और उनकी शाखा-प्रशाखाओं में विभक्त है। इसका इतिहास एवं विकास-क्रम अत्यन्त दीर्घ है। मैं यहाँ सर्वप्रथम कुछ ऐसे सिद्धान्तों के विषय में कहना चाहता हूँ जो कि प्रत्येक सम्प्रदाय को मान्य है और एक अथवा दूसरे रूप में उन सिद्धान्तों के आधार पर ही उन-उन दर्शनों एवं उपदर्शनों ने औरों से अलग पड़ने वाली अपनी मान्यताओं का समर्थन किया है। वे सिद्धान्त संक्षेप में अधोलिखित हैं।

(१) कार्यकारणभाव, (२) लक्ष्यलक्षणभाव, (३) अनुमानप्रकार अथवा न्याय-वाक्य, (४) परीक्षापद्धति, (५) ज्ञान एवं विचारोत्पत्ति का क्रम, (६) वचन-प्रामाण्य का मूल बीज, और (७) प्रामाण्य-अप्रामाण्य की समीक्षा।

पिछले दो-ढाई सहस्र वर्षों में पूर्वप्रचलित और नव-विकसित कोई भारतीय दर्शन ऐसा नहीं है जिसने उपर्युक्त मूल सिद्धान्तों का प्रश्रय लिये बिना अपने मन्तव्यों की स्थापना की हो अथवा इतर मन्तव्यों का खण्डन किया हो। इन सिद्धान्तों के महत्त्व को सबने मान्य रखा है और इसीलिए प्रत्येक दर्शन एवं उसकी शाखाओं ने अपने मन्तव्यों की उपपत्ति के लिए इन मूल सिद्धान्तों का सहारा तो लिया ही है, साथ ही इन सिद्धान्तों को, अपनी-अपनी मान्यता का समर्थन करने की दृष्टि से, घटाया है और विकसित भी किया है।

इन मूल सिद्धान्तों का दार्शनिक विचार वर्तुल में जिस कालक्रम से और जिस परम्परा के मुख्य आश्रय से स्पष्ट निरूपण हुआ है तथा जिन परम्पराओं ने इनके विकास में सबसे पहले और सबसे अधिक महत्त्व का योगदान दिया है उनको भूलकर यदि हम किसी भी एक दर्शन का अध्ययन-चिन्तन करें तो उस अध्ययन-चिन्तन में उपयोगी हो सके वैसे कड़ी या कुंजी ही हमारे हाथ में से सरक जायगी। हम भले ही किसी एक अभिप्रेत दर्शन का अथवा उसकी शाखा-प्रशाखा का प्रामाणिक एवं सही ज्ञान प्राप्त करने का प्रयत्न करें, परन्तु हमें उक्त मूल सिद्धान्तों का, उनके

१. १४-१५ अक्टूबर, १९६१ को अखिल भारतीय प्राच्यविद्या परिषद् (२१वाँ अधिवेशन, श्रीनगर) के "धर्म और तत्त्वज्ञान" के विभागाध्यक्ष का अभिभाषण।

विकास क्रम के अनुसार ही, ज्ञान प्राप्त करने का प्रयत्न करना चाहिए और उसी के अनुरूप अध्ययन-अध्यापन की प्रणाली नियत करनी चाहिए। आज तो प्राचीन और अर्वाचीन दोनों प्रकार की दार्शनिक अध्ययन की परिपाटी में ऐसा क्रम शायद ही देखा जाता है। फलतः प्राचीन पाठशालाओं में तथा अर्वाचीन विद्यालयों, महा-विद्यालयों और विश्वविद्यालयों में—जहाँ कहीं दार्शनिक अध्ययन-अध्यापन चलता है वहाँ—प्रायः सर्वत्र उक्त मूल सिद्धान्तों के स्पष्ट एवं परिपक्व ज्ञान की कमी ही देखी जाती है।

अब हम देखें कि उक्त सिद्धान्तों का सर्वाधिक प्राचीन और व्यवस्थित निरूपण किन-किन दर्शनसूत्रों में लभ्य है तथा किस दर्शन ने उनके विकास में विशेष योग दिया है। जैसा मैं समझा हूँ, दार्शनिक सूत्रों में उक्त सिद्धान्तों का वैसा निरूपण कणादसूत्रों और अक्षपादसूत्रों में ही पाया जाता है। न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन के चिन्तकों ने ही इन सिद्धान्तों को, दूसरे किसी भी दर्शन के चिन्तकों की अपेक्षा, अधिक गहराई से चर्चा की है और उनमें विचार की सूक्ष्मता दिखलाई है। इसीलिए हम देखते हैं कि सांख्ययोग, जैन-बौद्ध एवं पूर्व-उत्तरमीमांसा के सूत्रकारों ने तथा उन सूत्रों पर व्याख्या, अनुव्याख्या अथवा उपानुव्याख्या लिखनेवालों ने न्याय-वैशेषिक परम्परा द्वारा प्रस्तुत की गई उक्त सिद्धान्तों की विचारसमृद्धि और परिभाषाओं का ही अधिकांशतः उपयोग किया है और उसमें अपनी मान्यता के अनुरूप आवश्यक परिवर्तन या रूपान्तर भी किया है। इस बात को कतिपय छद्मदर्शनों के द्वारा स्पष्ट करें।

कणाद एवं अक्षपाद के पूर्वज चिन्तकों ने और स्वयं कणाद तथा अक्षपाद ने अपने-अपने सूत्रों में जो विचारणा उपस्थित की है वैसी विचारणा कणाद और अक्षपाद के सूत्रों से पहले किसी भी ग्रन्थ में उपलब्ध नहीं होती। कणाद ने अपने दर्शन की नींव साक्षात् इन्द्रियावलोकन तथा तदाश्रित मनोज्ञान के ऊपर रखी है। इस अवलोकन तथा तदाश्रित चिन्तन के आधार पर ही उसने अपने प्रमेय-निरूपण में कार्यकारणभाव का सिद्धान्त स्पष्ट किया है। यह प्रमेयनिरूपण इतर दर्शनों को मान्य है या नहीं यह अलग प्रश्न है, परन्तु उसने कार्यकारणभाव का स्वरूप इतना अधिक स्पष्ट किया है कि दूसरे दार्शनिकों को उसी का कार्यकारणभाव का सिद्धान्त और उसके साथ संकलित अन्योन्य बातें जैसी की तैसी लेनी पड़ी हैं। अन्वय और व्यतिरेक ये दो कार्यकारणभाव के नियामक तत्त्व हैं। इसी विचार में आगे जाकर प्रतिबन्ध, प्रतिबन्धकभाव एवं उत्तेज्य-उत्तेजकभाव की चर्चा का समावेश हुआ, अन्यथासिद्धि एवं अनन्यथासिद्धि के विचार की चर्चना हुई, उपादान अथवा समवायी और निमित्तकारण के रूप में कारणों के वैविधा का निरूपण हुआ, स्वरूपकारणता तथा फलोपधायककारणता जैसे मुद्दे भी चर्चा में प्रविष्ट हुए तथा सामग्रीकारणत्ववाद भी स्पष्ट हुआ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणभाव की विस्तृत चर्चा का, जो कि दार्शनिक युग का एक विशिष्ट स्वरूप है, व्यवस्थित आधार कणाद के सूत्रों में ही सर्वप्रथम उपलब्ध होता है, और इसीलिए सदोष-निर्दोष लक्षण की जैसी और जितनी सूक्ष्म चर्चा न्याय-वैशेषिक साहित्य में हम देखते हैं वैसी और उतनी इतर दर्शनों के वाङ्मय में उपलब्ध नहीं होती और

यदि कहीं उपलब्ध होनी भी है तो वह न्याय-वैशेषिक की परम्परा के आधार पर ही विकसित हुई है। लक्ष्यलक्षणभाव के विचार में अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति, असम्भव जैसे दोषों का स्पष्ट निरूपण और तद्विषयक ग्रन्थों की रचना भी न्याय-वैशेषिक साहित्य की एक दूसरी विशेषता है।

यद्यपि कणाद सूत्रों में अनुभाव की चर्चा है, परन्तु इस विषय में मौलिक और अपनी कही जा सके वैसी विशेषता तो न्यायसूत्रों की ही है। स्वार्थ एवं परार्थानुमान—न्यायवाक्य, उसका साद्गुण्य-वैगुण्य अथवा सद्देतु-हेत्वाभास, छल, जाति, निग्रहस्थान आदि की विशद और मौलिक चर्चा भी न्यायसूत्रों की ही विशेषता है।

इसी प्रकार परीक्षापद्धति से लेकर प्रापाण्य-अप्रमाण्य की समीक्षा तक के अवशिष्ट चार मुद्दे भी जिस स्पष्टता के साथ न्यायसूत्रों में निरूपित हैं उस स्पष्टता के साथ दूसरे किसी दर्शनसूत्र में सर्वप्रथम उपलब्ध नहीं होते। इस प्रकार न्याय-वैशेषिक दोनों दर्शनों ने अलग-अलग और संयुक्त रूप से जिन उक्त दार्शनिक सिद्धान्तों की चर्चा की है और इन दोनों दर्शनों के व्याख्याकारों ने अठारहवीं-उन्नीसवीं शती तक जिनका विकास अपने-अपने ग्रन्थों में किया है, उन्हीं का उपयोग दूसरे दार्शनिक अपने-अपने ढंग से करते रहे हैं। सांख्य एवं योगदर्शन के अभ्यासी को यदि इन सिद्धान्तों का प्रामाणिक और पूर्ण ज्ञान प्राप्त करना हो तो वह न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन के प्रामाणिक अभ्यास के बिना कभी भी प्राप्त नहीं कर सकता। इसी प्रकार बौद्ध और जैन दर्शनों में जबसे तर्क और न्याय की नींव पड़ी और आगे जाकर उन दर्शनों में उसका जो विकास हुआ उसमें से यदि न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन के द्वारा किए गये इन सिद्धान्तों के चिन्तक को कम कर दें तो उनका तार्किक आधार समझ में ही नहीं आ सकता। बौद्धोंने भले ही क्षणिकत्व, वाह्यार्थसून्यत्व और सून्यवाद जैसे मन्तव्यों को स्पष्ट करने तथा उनका विकास साधने के लिए कार्यकारणभाव आदि सिद्धान्तों की चर्चा में अपनी ओर से भी सूक्ष्म विचार का योग दिया हो और इसी प्रकार भले ही जैन तार्किकों ने परिणामिनित्यत्व एवं अनेकान्तर्दृष्टि को स्पष्ट करने की तथा उनका विकास करने की दृष्टि से इन सिद्धान्तों की विशद चर्चा की हो और उसमें अपना भी योग प्रदान किया हो (और वस्तुतः इन दोनों दर्शनों ने ऐसा प्रदान विशेष रूप से किया भी है), तो भी उनका मूल आधार तो न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन की विचार पद्धति ही है।

पूर्वमीमांसा के सूत्रकार जैमिनि और उत्तरमीमांसा के सूत्रकार बादरायण का विचारक्षेत्र मुख्यतया अनुक्रम से यज्ञकर्म और ब्रह्मस्वरूप का निरूपण है। स्वाभाविक रूप से ही उनको अपने-अपने मन्तव्य उपस्थित करने में कार्यकारणभाव आदि सिद्धान्तों का प्रश्रय लेना पड़ा है, परन्तु उन्होंने इन सिद्धान्तों के विषय में अपने सूत्रों में कोई विशेष चर्चा नहीं की है। अब, जो व्यक्ति इन दोनों मीमांसाओं का ज्ञान प्राप्त करना चाहता हो और वह भी यथार्थ रूप से, उसे उक्त सात सिद्धान्तों का यथावत् परिचय अनिवार्य रूप से करना ही चाहिए। इन सूत्रों के भाष्यकारों को तथा उस-उस भाष्य के उत्तरवर्ती व्याख्याकारों को दर्शनान्तरों के वादों का प्रतिवाद करने में तथा अपने वाद

को स्पष्ट रूप से स्थापित करने में जब कभी कार्यकारणभाव आदि सिद्धान्तों के विकल्पित ज्ञान की आवश्यकता हुई है, तब उन्होंने न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन की इस विचारसमृद्धि की ओर ही नजर घुमाई है। कुमारिल, प्रभाकर और वाचस्पति मिश्र जैसे विद्वान् अपनी-अपनी मीमांसा पद की व्याख्याओं में अपने मन्तव्य सबल रूप से उपस्थित कर सके हैं इसका भी आधार यही है। श्रीहर्ष ने खण्डनखण्डकाव्य में अथवा मधुसूदन ने अद्वैतसिद्धि आदि में जो केवलाद्वैत की स्थापना की है और उस स्थापना में जो बल देखा जाता है वह बल उन्होंने पाया कहाँ से ? इसी प्रकार रामानुज ने अथवा उनके अनुयायियों ने विशिष्टाद्वैत की जो सबल स्थापना की है उसका बल उनकी कहाँ से मिला है ? उपाध्याय यशोविजयजी ने जैन तर्क और अनेकान्त दृष्टि की स्थापना में जो कौशल दिखलाया है वह किसके आधार पर ? इन और इनके जैसे दूसरे प्रश्नों का उत्तर एक ही है और वह यह कि उन सबने न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन के मूल ग्रन्थ और उन पर की उत्तरोत्तर अधिकाधिक सूक्ष्म और सूक्ष्मतर व्याख्याओं का गम्भीर अध्ययन जितने परिमाण में किया उतने परिमाण में उनके निरूपण उस-उस समय में प्रतिष्ठित हुए।

मेरी यह विचारसरणी यदि ठीक हो तो ऐसा सूचित करना आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है कि इस समय दार्शनिक अध्ययन-अध्यापन की जो प्रणाली ढीली-ढाली नींव पर चल रही है और जिस प्रणाली का अवलम्बन लेकर प्रतिवर्ष तत्तद् दर्शन के अनेक विद्यार्थी उपाधि प्राप्त करते हैं, और फिर भी चिन्तन-मनन की दृष्टि से कोई ठोस एवं मौलिक कार्य नहीं देखता, उसमें आमूलचूल परिवर्तन की अनिवार्य आवश्यकता है। यह परिवर्तन मेरी दृष्टि से जैसा होना चाहिये उसकी भी संक्षिप्त रूपरेखा यहाँ सूचित करूँ तो यह अनुचित नहीं समझी जायगी।

भारतीय दर्शनों में से किसी भी एक दर्शन का मुख्य रूप से अध्ययन करना हो तो सबसे पहले जिस प्रकार संस्कृत भाषा एवं साहित्य का पर्याप्त ज्ञान आवश्यक है उसी प्रकार न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन के मूल एवं महत्वपूर्ण ग्रन्थों का अथवा उस दर्शन के सर्वसंग्राही किसी एक ग्रन्थ का तलस्पर्शी अध्ययन अनिवार्य रूप से आवश्यक है। वह एक ग्रन्थ भी ऐसा होना चाहिए जिसमें उक्त सात मुद्दों के बारे में विशद चर्चा आती हो तथा न्याय-वैशेषिक की सभी परिभाषाएँ असन्दिग्ध भाव से समझ में आ जायँ उस प्रकार जिसमें उनकी चर्चा हो। इतनी चीज तैयार होने के उपरान्त अभिप्रेत एक दर्शन का अभ्यासी भले ही उस दर्शन का क्रमिक अभ्यास शुरू करे, परन्तु वह अभ्यास किसी भी प्रकार से एकांगी न रहे इसके लिए यह आवश्यक है कि वह अभ्यासी साथ ही साथ अपने मुख्य विषय से भिन्न इतर भारतीय दर्शनों का प्रामाणिक ज्ञान प्राप्त करने के लिए उस-उस दर्शन के परिचायक एवं मौलिक ऐसे कम से कम एक-एक ग्रन्थ का तलस्पर्शी ज्ञान प्राप्त करे, क्योंकि भारत में दार्शनिक चिन्तन इस प्रकार उत्तरोत्तर आगे बढ़ा है कि उसमें किसी एक दर्शन की परम्परा की इतर दर्शन की परम्परा से अलग किया ही नहीं जा सकता। अतएव अपने अभिप्रेत दर्शन का अर्थ समझने के लिए तथा उसमें किये गये इतर दर्शनों के मन्तव्यों के प्रतिवाद का मूल्यांकन करने के लिये यह आवश्यक है कि मुख्य विषय के रूप में स्वीकृत दर्शन के अतिरिक्त इतर दर्शनों का ज्ञान भी उन्हीं के ग्रन्थों के

द्वारा प्राप्त करना चाहिये। ऐसा न होने से बहुत बार दर्शन का अभ्यासी इतर दर्शनों का यथावत् एवं तटस्थ मूल्यांकन करने के बदले एकांगी दृष्टि का शिकार हो जाता है और अपने अभिप्रेत मुख्य दर्शन के मन्तव्यों से भिन्न मन्तव्यों की पूरी समझ के बिना ही, अवगणना करना है फलतः वैसे अभ्यासी के भीतर वादकथा के स्थान में अल्प एवं विलक्षण का प्रवेश, अज्ञात रूप से भी हो जाता है।

यहाँ तककी चर्चा अब हमको 'तत्त्वज्ञान' पदका अर्थ समझने के लिए प्रेरित करती है। दर्शनों में 'तत्त्वज्ञान' पदका सामान्य अर्थ ऐसा रूढ़ हो गया है कि जिसके कारण दर्शन का अभ्यासी या चिन्तक अपने-अपने दर्शन में प्रतिपादित तत्त्व ही यथावत् एवं परिपूर्ण हैं ऐसा मानने लगता है। उदाहरणार्थ, न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शनका अभ्यासी छः या सात पदार्थ अथवा सोलह पदार्थ जो अनुक्रम से वैशेषिक और न्यायसूत्र में निरूपित हैं और उन तत्त्वों का जिस रूप में एवं जिस प्रकार से निरूपण हुआ है उसी को परिपूर्ण मानकर और उन्हीं के ज्ञान को पारमार्थिक समझकर उनका सम्बन्ध अभ्युदय एवं निःश्रेयस् के साथ जोड़ता है। वह ऐसा मानने लगता है कि इन तत्त्वों का यथावत् ज्ञान हो जाय तो निःश्रेयस् सिद्ध होगा ही, इसी प्रकार सांख्य-योग, जैन-बौद्ध और मीमांसाद्वय के बारे में भी कहा जा सकता है। प्रत्येक दर्शन का सूत्रपात मोक्ष के ध्येय से हुआ है और इस ध्येय की सिद्धि के अनन्य उपाय के तौर पर तत्तद् दर्शन के ही प्रमेयों का यथावत् ज्ञान पर्याप्त समझा जाता है। एक ही ध्येय की सिद्धि के उपाय रूप उस-उस दर्शन के मन्तव्यों अथवा प्रमेयों का एकमात्र यथावत् ज्ञान ही यदि उस ध्येय को सिद्ध करने में पर्याप्त हो तो इस परसे ऐसा फलित होगा कि एक दर्शन का तत्त्वज्ञान यथावत् होने से पूर्ण है और इतर दर्शनों के तत्त्वों का ज्ञान या तो भ्रान्त है या फिर सर्वथा नगण्य है। यह फलितार्थ 'तत्त्वज्ञान' पद के रूढ़ अर्थ की समझमें से स्वतः उत्पन्न होता है। इसीलिए हम दार्शनिक अभ्यास एवं चिन्तन को पन्थ अथवा चौके की संकुचित सीमा में आबद्ध देखते हैं। दार्शनिक अभ्यास से जिस उज्ज्वल एवं उदार प्रकाश की आशा रखी जाती है और जो सम्भवतः निःश्रेयस् की दिशा का एक प्राथमिक सोपान बनने की क्षमता रखता है, वही अभ्यास और चिन्तन अभ्यासी को संकुचित कठघरे में बन्द करके तमिस्र के गर्भ की ओर ले जाता है। अतः 'तत्त्व' पद के तात्पर्य का हमें विचार करना चाहिए।

मेरी समझ में 'तत्त्व' पद का अर्थ इतना ही होना चाहिए कि तत्तद् दर्शनके मूल चिन्तक अथवा प्रवर्तक ने जिन प्रमेयों का जिस रूप में ज्ञान प्राप्त किया था उन प्रमेयों को उसने उसी रूप में निरूपित करने का प्रयत्न किया। वह निरूपण उस चिन्तक अथवा प्रवर्तक की विचारसीमा तक तो यथावत् है, परन्तु उसमें विचार के दूसरे प्रवाहों अथवा दृष्टिविन्दुओं का समावेश न होने से वह, उतनी हद तक, एक देशीय है; और वैसे एक-देशीय ज्ञान को तत्त्वज्ञान कहने का अर्थ इतना ही है कि उस-उस चिन्तक अथवा प्रवर्तक ने जो कुछ जाना-सोचा उसका प्रामाणिक रूपसे निरूपण किया और निरूपण में कोई विप्र-तारण अथवा विप्रलम्भ की दृष्टि थी ही नहीं। जो कुछ समझ में आया उसीको, और वह भी निःस्वार्थभाव से, अन्य जिज्ञासुओं के बोध के लिए ग्रथित किया तथा उसका सम्बन्ध अभ्युदय एवं निःश्रेयस् के साथ जोड़ा।

जिस समय जिस समाज में जिस ध्येय की मुख्य प्रतिष्ठा होती है उस समय उस समाज में मुख्य चिन्तक और प्रवर्तक उस ध्येय के साथ अपने उपदेश का सम्बन्ध जोड़ दे यह स्वाभाविक है। इसीलिए स्वर्ग एवं मोक्ष के ध्येय की प्रतिष्ठा होने के कारण प्रत्येक दर्शन ने अपना सम्बन्ध उस ध्येय के साथ जोड़ दिया, परन्तु अधिकांशतः अभ्यासी और साम्प्रदायिक व्यक्ति यह बात सोचना प्रायः भूल गये कि यदि किसी दर्शन का तत्त्वज्ञान मोक्षसाधक हो तो उसके विरोधी प्रतीत होने वाले तत्त्वज्ञान क्या मोक्ष-साधक नहीं ?

इससे 'तत्त्वज्ञान' पद का जो अर्थ मैंने ऊपर सूचित किया है उस अर्थ को लेकर यदि हम विचार करें तो हमें ज्ञात होगा कि प्रत्येक प्रामाणिक चिन्तक एवं प्रवर्तक का तत्त्वज्ञान उसकी विचारसीमामें यथावत् है और सब मिलकर के एक दूसरे के पूरक भी हैं। ये सब विशाल तत्त्वज्ञान के अंश-रूप होने से अज्ञाननिवारक हैं तथा सत्य ज्ञान की दिशा में ले आते हैं। इस दृष्टि से वे निःश्रेयस्सिद्धि के उपाय भी हो सकते हैं।

इस प्रकार विचार करने पर ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि दर्शन के सच्चे अभ्यासी को अपने अभ्यास में तुलना एवं इतिहास का दृष्टिविन्दु रख करके ही आगे बढ़ना चाहिए। ऐतिहासिक दृष्टिविन्दु इसलिए आवश्यक है कि एक-एक दर्शन का विकास जिस क्रम से हुआ हो वह समक्ष में आ सके तथा इतर दर्शनों के साथका सम्बन्ध भी अवगत हो सके। तुलना दृष्टि इसलिए आवश्यक है कि उससे दूसरे को गलत समझने के भ्रम से बचा जा सकता है। दूसरे के द्वारा किये गये प्रतिवाधों का मूल्यांकन करने में भी तुलना एवं इतिहास की दृष्टि उपकारक होती है। इसलिये मेरी तो ऐसी पक्की धारणा है कि प्रत्येक शास्त्र के अभ्यासीकी भाँति दर्शनशास्त्र के अभ्यासी को भी अभ्यास के केन्द्र में तुलना और इतिहास की दृष्टि अवश्य रखनी चाहिये।

पाठशालाओं में प्राचीन प्रणालिका के अनुसार तथा कालेज-विद्यालयों में नवीन प्रणालिका के अनुसार अध्ययन करने वाले अभ्यासी आगे जाकर दार्शनिक प्रश्नों के ऊपर संशोधन करने के लिए प्रेरित होते हैं। अधिकांशतः वैसे संशोधन बहुत छिछले और मात्र वर्णनात्मक अथवा संग्रहात्मक देखे जाते हैं। इस कमी का एक कारण, मेरे अभिप्राय के अनुसार, यह भी है कि संशोधनकर्ता योग्य रूप से अध्ययन-वाचन नहीं करते और एकांगी बन जाते हैं। मौलिकता से शून्य संशोधन प्रायः निरर्थक और पुनरुक्ति रूप ही होते हैं। भारतीय दर्शनों की किसी भी एक शाखा अथवा किसी भी एक दर्शन के किसी एक मुद्दे पर मौलिक संशोधन करना हो तो, मेरी दृष्टि से, कम से कम निम्नांकित तैयारी का होना आवश्यक है :—

१. प्रत्येक दर्शन के, विशेषतया उद्दिष्ट दर्शन के, ग्रन्थों का मूल से लेकर ही पठन-मनन होना चाहिए; यहाँ तक कि उसके प्राचीनतम उपलब्ध मूल से लेकर उसके भाष्य, व्याख्या आदि उत्तरकालीन सब प्रमुख ग्रन्थों का मनन और धीरे-धीरे अवलोकन करना चाहिए।

२. संशोधन का मुख्य विषय चाहे जिस दर्शन का हो, परन्तु इतर दर्शनों के महत्वपूर्ण और संशोधन के साथ सम्बद्ध साहित्य का, हो सके वहाँ तक मूल ग्रन्थों के

आधार पर ही, परिशीलन करना आवश्यक है। इसके बिना विचारणीय प्रश्न में उत्पन्न होने वाली उलझनों सुलझ नहीं सकतीं।

३. ऐसा अवलोकन और चिन्तन करते समय तथा ग्रन्थों के नोट्स बनाते समय जिस प्रकार तुलना और इतिहास की दृष्टि आवश्यक है उसी प्रकार उस अवलोकन-चिन्तन आदि में पन्थगत संकुचित पूर्वाग्रहों से मुक्ति भी अनिवार्य रूप से आवश्यक है।

यदि कम से कम इतनी तैयारी के साथ दार्शनिक संशोधन हो तो भारतीय दर्शनों की उपलब्ध सामग्री इतनी अधिक विशाल और अर्थपूर्ण है कि उसके आधार पर किया गया संशोधन आज की नयी दुनिया के नवजिज्ञासुओं को भी पर्याप्त मात्रा में सन्तुष्ट कर सकता है और साथ ही भारतीय चिन्तकों की गम्भीर तपश्चर्या के प्रति चाहे जिस व्यक्ति का बहुमान उत्पन्न कर सकता है, ऐसा मेरा पूर्ण और पक्का विश्वास है।

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दार्शनिकों के विचार-चिन्तन के लिए तत्त्वज्ञान से सम्बद्ध एकाध मुद्दे की भी मैं यहाँ चर्चा करना चाहता हूँ। वह मुद्दा ज्ञान-प्रक्रिया के बारे में है।

भारतीय परम्पराओं में लौकिक-लोकोत्तर, व्यवहार-निश्चय, संवृति-परमार्थ, माया-परमार्थ, परिकल्पित-परिनिष्पन्न जैसे शब्दयुगल प्रसिद्ध हैं। इन सब युगलों में एक भाव समान है और वह है स्थूल से सूक्ष्म की ओर विचार प्रगति। जैन परिभाषा में करें तो द्रव्य से भाव की ओर प्रगति। यह प्रगति विचार और आचार दोनों क्षेत्रों में मानसिक एवं आध्यात्मिक विकासक्रम के आधार पर और उसी के अनुपात में हुई है।

जो वस्तु सामान्यतः सर्वसाधारणगम्य हो अथवा सर्वसाधारणगम्य हो सके वह लौकिक प्रदेश में आती है। इससे उल्टा, जो वस्तु सर्वसाधारणगम्य न हो और फिर भी विशिष्ट अधिकारी व्यक्ति को अथवा व्यक्तियों को ही गम्य हो वह लोकोत्तर कहलाती है। यही भाव, एक अथवा दूसरे रूप में, इतर शब्दयुगलों में निरूपित है। मानवजीवन का विकास देखने पर ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि सर्वप्रथम लौकिक भूमिका की रचना होती है और उसमें प्रगति होने पर बाद में लोकोत्तर भूमिका की स्थापना होती है इसीलिए भाषा में भी हम देखते हैं कि जो शब्द लौकिक विचार-आचार में सर्वविदित होते हैं उनमें से बहुत से कालक्रम से लोकोत्तर विचार-आचार के बोधक भी बन जाते हैं। यज्ञ, प्रत्यक्ष जैसे शब्द, जो व्यवहारभूमि में प्रचलित थे और हैं, वे ही कालक्रम से ज्ञान-यज्ञ, ध्यानयज्ञ, परमप्रत्यक्ष, योगप्रत्यक्ष जैसे लोकोत्तर अर्थ में भी रुढ़ हुए हैं।

लौकिक और व्यावहारिक भूमिका की अपेक्षा लोकोत्तर और पारमार्थिक भूमिका की प्रतिष्ठा अत्यन्त उच्च कक्षा की मानी गई है। लौकिक में से लोकोत्तर में क्रमिक संक्रमण तो प्रसिद्ध है, परन्तु कभी-कभी लोकोत्तर और पारमार्थिक भूमिका की प्रतिष्ठा रखने वाले शब्द भी, उस प्रतिष्ठा के साथ ही, लौकिक और व्यावहारिक भूमिका में

प्रविष्ट हो जाते हैं और वैसे प्रवेश के साथ ही तत्त्वचिन्तन एक नया मोड़ लेता है। यह कैसे होता है इसका एक दृष्टान्त प्रस्तुत मुद्दे के द्वारा उपस्थित करने का मैं यहाँ प्रयत्न करूँगा।

न्याय-बैशेषिक, सांख्य-योग, जैन और पूर्वमीमांसक जैसे दर्शन जड़-चेतन उभय की वास्तविकता में मानते हैं। इनका ज्ञान लौकिक भूमिका वाले को भले ही अस्पष्ट, अपूर्ण और एकांगी हो, परन्तु लोकोत्तर भूमिकावाले को इन्हीं जड़-चेतन उभय पदार्थों का स्पष्ट, पूर्ण और सर्वांगीण ज्ञान होता है। ज्ञान में तारतम्य है, परन्तु उससे इन दोनों तत्त्वों के अस्तित्व में कोई तारतम्य नहीं है। जड़ एवं चेतन दोनों तत्त्वों का अस्तित्व अपने-अपने स्वरूप की दृष्टि से त्रिकालाबाधित माना जाता है। परन्तु इससे उल्टा बौद्ध एवं वेदान्त परम्पराओं की कुछ शाखाओं में माना जाता है। योगाचार और शून्यवाद तथा केवलाद्वैत ये तीनों परम्पराएँ तो इस विषय में इतनी प्रसिद्ध हैं कि उनका संकेतभर करना पर्याप्त होगा।

योगाचार और शून्यवाद इन महायानी शाखाओं के मन्तव्य से सर्वथा भिन्न मन्तव्य रखनेवाली बौद्ध परम्परा की ही धेरवाद, सर्वास्तित्वाद् और सौत्रान्तिक जैसी शाखाएँ हैं। इसी प्रकार विशिष्टाद्वैत, शुद्धाद्वैत जैसी वेदान्त परम्पराएँ केवलाद्वैती परम्परा से सर्वथा भिन्न मन्तव्य रखती हैं। मन्तव्य का यह भेद बाह्यार्थ का अस्तित्व वास्तविक मानना अथवा अज्ञानकल्पित इस पर आधारित है। योगाचार, शून्यवाद और केवलाद्वैत इन तीनों के मन्तव्यों में दूसरा चाहे जो और चाहे जितना मतभेद हो, परन्तु इन तीनों का एक बात में समान मन्तव्य है और वह है : बाह्यार्थ का अस्तित्व वास्तविक नहीं, किन्तु अज्ञानकल्पित है। इस मन्तव्य का अस्पष्ट बीज तो कतिपय प्राचीन उपनिषदों के अमुक वाक्यों में तथा बौद्ध पिटक के उपलब्ध कुछ शब्दों में है, परन्तु इस मन्तव्य का स्पष्ट विचार-विस्तार तो इस समय हमें उपलब्ध साहित्य में से योगाचार और शून्यवाद के साहित्य में ही मिलता है। लंकावतार जैसे प्राचीन सूत्र, प्रज्ञापारमिता जैसे प्राचीन ग्रन्थ और मध्यमककारिका जैसे दार्शनिक ग्रन्थों के देखने पर यह बात स्पष्ट होती है कि उन ग्रन्थों के रचयिताओं ने बाह्य, इन्द्रियगम्य एवं भेदप्रधान विश्व को अविद्यामूलक और मनोविकल्पप्रसूत माना है। जब अविद्या और मनोविकल्प नष्ट हो जाते हैं तब इस विश्व का कोई अस्तित्व ही नहीं रहता। सच्चा अस्तित्व मनोविकल्प और वाक्प्रपंच से परे होने के कारण निर्विकल्प और निष्प्रपंच है। योगाचार और शून्यवाद ने जो स्थापना की वही स्थापना वेदान्त परम्परा के ब्रह्मतत्त्व के निरूपण में अवतीर्ण हुई। इसीलिए केवलाद्वैत परम्परा में भी ब्रह्मतत्त्व का निर्विकल्प और निष्प्रपंच के रूप में वर्णन हुआ है।

बाह्य और आन्तरिक अथवा जड़ और चेतन इन दोनों तत्त्वों के वास्तविक अस्तित्व के मन्तव्य में से एक ही आन्तरिक ज्ञान अथवा चेतनातत्त्व के वास्तविक अस्तित्व का जो मन्तव्य भिन्न-भिन्न दर्शन परम्पराओं में स्थापित एवं चर्चित हुआ उसका प्रेरक बल कौन सा है, यह भी एक प्रश्न है। इसका उत्तर भारतीय परम्पराओं की प्राचीन सम्पत्ति-जैसी योगप्रणाली में से उपलब्ध होता है। सांख्य-योग, जैन और बौद्ध इन तीनों परम्पराओं में योग-विषयक उच्च भूमिका की अमुक मान्यताएँ

और उनकी परिभाषाएँ आज तक समान रूप से सुरक्षित रही हैं। पातंजल योगसूत्र में सवितर्क, निवितर्क, सविचार और निविचार ये चार समापत्तियाँ प्रसिद्ध हैं। बौद्ध परम्परा में सवितर्क-निविचारपीतिसुखएकगता आदि चार अथवा पाँच ध्यान, नवभेद से, उपलब्ध होते हैं। जैन परम्परा में भी पृथक्त्ववितर्कसविचार, एकरवितर्क-अविचार, सूक्ष्मक्रिय-अप्रतिपाती तथा समुच्छिन्नक्रिय-अप्रतिपाती ये चार ध्यान पहले से ही प्रचलित हैं। इनमें से निवितर्क एवं निविचारसमापत्ति को योगसूत्र और उस पर के भाष्य में निविकल्पक और इन्हीं समापत्तिकालीन दर्शन को परमदर्शन एवं ऋतम्भरा प्रज्ञा कहा है बौद्ध परम्परामें भी वितर्क एवं विचार की उपशान्ति होने पर जो ज्ञान होता है उसी को निविकल्पक कहा है। जैन परम्परा की भी ऐसी ही माम्यता है। ध्यान की ऐसी उच्च कक्षा में प्रकट होनेवाले ज्ञान को ही प्रत्येक परम्परा परम प्रमाण मानती है। परन्तु योगाचार महायानियों ने योग की निविकल्प-भूमि को ही अन्तिम और परमार्थ मानकर और तत्कालीन निविकल्प ज्ञान के अनुसार विश्व का निविकल्प एवं निष्प्रपंच रूप ही वास्तविक है तथा उसके अतिरिक्त सब कुछ मनःकल्पित और अविद्यामूलक है ऐसा कहकर विज्ञानचित्त के अतिरिक्त सभी लौकिक और बाह्य पदार्थों का निषेध किया है। शून्यवादी और केवलाद्धृती भी इसी मार्ग पर गये हैं।

इस प्रतिपादन का परिणाम ज्ञानप्रक्रिया में यह आया कि जो ज्ञान निविकल्पक और निष्प्रपंच वही परमार्थसत्य और जिस ज्ञान में शब्दविकल्प अथवा मन का अनुबेध हो वह भ्रान्त या सांबुत।

ध्यान की अमुक भूमिका के आधार पर विश्व के स्वरूप का वर्णन तो विज्ञानवादियों ने किया, परन्तु उसके आगे अपने ही सगे भाइयों का बड़ा भारी मोर्चा था। उन्होंने कहा कि बुद्ध के उपदेशों में जो स्कन्ध, आयतन, लोकधातु, इन्द्रिय आदि बाह्य पदार्थों का निरूपण आता है उसका क्या होगा? विज्ञानवादी और शून्यवादी ने कहा कि पिटकों में जो वैसा उपदेश है वह तो बुद्ध ने स्थूल अधिकारियों में बुद्धिभेद न हो और कालक्रम से वे भी समझने लगेंगे ऐसा मानकर लौकिक दृष्टि से किया है। बुद्ध की पारमार्थिक दृष्टि तो हम जो कहते हैं वही थी, इत्यादि।

विज्ञानवादी, शून्यवादी और केवलाद्धृती को दो-दो मोर्चों पर लड़ना पड़ता था। अपनी-अपनी परम्परा में जो बाह्यार्थ का अस्तित्व मानते उनके साथ अपने पुराने ग्रन्थों का तात्पर्य अपने ढंग से स्पष्ट करके चर्चा करनी पड़ती, तो इतर बाह्यार्थवादी परम्पराओं की दलीलों का जबाब भी युक्ति-प्रयुक्ति द्वारा देना पड़ता। इस चर्चा और विवाद की प्रक्रिया का निर्देशक साहित्य विपुल परिणाम में उपलब्ध है।

विज्ञानवादी एकमात्र ध्यानात्मक लोकोत्तर भूमि में होने वाले निविकल्पक ज्ञान को ही मुख्य और पारमार्थिक प्रमाण मानकर बाह्यार्थ के स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व का खण्डन करते थे और लौकिक भूमिका में होने वाले सविकल्पक, अनुमान एवं आगम जैसे ज्ञानों को पारमार्थिक नहीं मानते थे। अतः स्वाभाविक रूप से ही बाह्यार्थवादी न्याय-वैशेषिक,

सांख्य-योग, पूर्वमीमांसक एवं जैन जैसी परम्पराओं ने तो विज्ञानवादी को ललकारा; इतना ही नहीं, बौद्ध परम्परा की स्थविरवादी, सर्वास्तित्वादी और सौत्रांत्रिक जैसी बाह्यार्थ का अपने ढंग से भी वास्तविक अस्तित्व माननेवाली शाखाओं ने भी विज्ञानवाद के मन्तव्य का प्रतिवाद किया। अब विज्ञानवाद के लिए नया रास्ता निकाले बिना कोई चारा नहीं था। इसलिए ध्यानावस्थ निर्विकल्प ज्ञान की उसके यहाँ जो प्रामाण्य-प्रतिष्ठा थी उसके आधार पर उसने लौकिक भूमिका के ज्ञानक्रम में प्रामाण्य का विचार व्यवस्थित किया। उसने अपनी मूल मान्यता को सुरक्षित रखकर कहा कि ज्ञान तो निर्विकल्प ही प्रमाण है; लौकिक भूमिकाएँ जो इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य सर्वप्रथम ज्ञान होता है वह भी कल्पनापोढ होने से निर्विकल्प है और इसलिए वह भी प्रमाण है। परन्तु उसके पश्चात् होनेवाले सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान या आगम ज्ञान सविकल्पक होने से साक्षात् प्रामाण्यवाले नहीं हैं। उनमें जहाँ कहीं प्रामाण्य माना जाता है और लोकव्यवहार चलता है यहाँ उनका प्रामाण्य परम्परागत अथवा कहे कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान के आधार पर ही मानना चाहिये।

विज्ञानवाद ने यह उत्तर तो दिया, परन्तु उसके समक्ष प्रश्न तो यह था कि बाह्यार्थ के वास्तविक अस्तित्व के बिना इन्द्रियों का सन्निकर्ष किसके साथ होगा? इस पर उसने सौत्रान्तिक दृष्टि का अधलम्बन लिया। उस दृष्टि के अनुसार माने जाने वाले क्षणिक एवं निरंश बाह्य पदार्थ का अस्तित्व मानकर और उसके साथ इन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षको घटाकर उसने निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान की प्रामाण्य-प्रतिष्ठा लौकिक ज्ञान में भी की, परन्तु उसने सविकल्पक ज्ञानों का निर्विकल्पक जैसा साक्षात् प्रामाण्य तो माना ही नहीं। इस प्रकार विज्ञानवाद ने अपने सबन्धु बौद्धों को तो एक प्रकार से सन्तुष्ट किया और मात्र निर्विकल्प को ही मुख्य प्रमाण मानने की अपनी स्थिति भी सुरक्षित रखी। परन्तु इतने से इतर दार्शनिकवादियों को सन्तोष नहीं हो सकता था। क्योंकि बाह्यार्थवादी सभी दर्शन सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान एवं आगम जैसे सविकल्पक ज्ञानों का मुख्य प्रामाण्य मानते थे। यह मतभेद और इसमें से फलित होनेवाली विवादप्रधान-चर्चा भिन्न-भिन्न दार्शनिकों के द्वारा भिन्न-भिन्न दृष्टि बिन्दु से प्रवृत्त हुई है।

सर्वप्रथम हम न्याय-वैशेषिक परम्परा का दृष्टिबिन्दु लेकर विचार करें। उसने कहा कि जिसका हम स्वरूपालोचनमात्र अथवा अव्यपदेश के नाम से व्यवहार करते हैं वह ज्ञान इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष से सर्वप्रथम अवश्य उत्पन्न होता है और उसमें विशेषण-विशेष्य भाव का अवगाहन न होने से उसे निर्विकल्प कहने में भी हमें कोई ख़ास हर्ज नहीं है, परन्तु यह प्राथमिक निर्विकल्प ज्ञान ही विषय स्वरूप की दृष्टि से प्रमाण है और उसके पश्चात् होनेवाला विशिष्ट ज्ञान अथवा सविकल्पक ज्ञान मुख्य प्रमाण नहीं है—ऐसा विज्ञानवादी का मन्तव्य यथार्थ नहीं है। इसी प्रकार अनुमान और आगम ज्ञानों का मुख्य प्रामाण्य भी हम प्रत्यक्ष के जितना ही मानते हैं। इस दृष्टिबिन्दुको न्याय-वैशेषिक परम्परा अन्त तक मानती रही है। उसने विज्ञानवाद के मन्तव्य को अनेक युक्ति-प्रयुक्तियों से बांधित सिद्ध किया है।

सांख्य-योग परम्परा ने भी प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान एवं आगम ज्ञान की प्रक्रिया एक तरह से न्याय-वैशेषिक जैसी ही मानी है। फलतः उसने भी विज्ञानवाद के मन्तव्य का प्रतिवाद किया है। अलबत्ता, सांख्य-योग परम्परा अन्तःकरणवृत्ति को लेकर अपनी ज्ञान-प्रक्रिया घटाती है।

कुमारिल आदि मीमांसकों ने भी कहा है कि इन्द्रियजन्य सर्वप्रथम आलोचनाज्ञान अथवा निर्विकल्पज्ञान अवश्य इष्ट है, परन्तु सन्निकर्षपरम्परा में से उत्पन्न होने वाले सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान और आगम आदि सविकल्पक ज्ञानों के मुख्य प्रामाण्य का निषेध किया ही नहीं जा सकता। ऐसा कहकर इन ज्ञानों का मुख्य प्रामाण्य उन्होंने अनेक युक्ति-प्रयुक्तियों से स्थापित किया है।

जैन परम्परा ने भी विज्ञानवाद का विरोध करके कहा कि तुम जिसे निर्विकल्पक कहते हो वैसा प्राथमिक ज्ञान व्यंजनावग्रह, अर्थावग्रह अथवा दर्शन के रूप में हमें मान्य है, परन्तु सभी सविकल्पक ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य तुम जो नहीं मानते वह हमें किसी प्रकार युक्ति-संगत प्रतीत नहीं होता।

भर्तृहरि जैसे शब्ददर्शन के अनुगामियों ने तो विज्ञानवादी जैसे निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान पर अत्यन्त भार देने वालों को सुना दिया कि ज्ञानमात्र शब्द-सम्बद्ध होने से सविकल्पक ही है। यह शाब्दिक दर्शन का पक्ष एक प्रकार से विज्ञानवाद का सर्वथा विरोधी पक्ष कहा जा सकता है। यद्यपि शाब्दिक दर्शन अपनी रीति से सब ज्ञानों को शब्दानुबद्ध मानता है, फिर भी उसकी परा, पश्यन्ति आदि वाक् की चतुर्विध प्रक्रिया विशेष रूप से विचारणीय तो है ही। विज्ञानवाद लोकोत्तरभूमि में सर्वथा शब्दसंसर्ग से रहित ज्ञान का अस्तित्व तो मानता है, तो शाब्दिक दर्शन लौकिक और लोकोत्तर किसी भी भूमिका में शब्दसम्पर्क से विरहित ज्ञान का अस्तित्व मानता ही नहीं। ये ही इन दोनों परम्पराओं के सर्वथा भिन्न दृष्टिबिन्दु हैं।

विज्ञानवादने सौत्रान्तिक दृष्टि का अवलम्बन लेकर और क्षणिक, निरंश एवं वर्तमान वस्तुमात्र के साथ इन्द्रियसंसर्ग को मान कर तज्जन्य निर्विकल्पक ज्ञानकी जब मुख्य प्रमाण के रूप में स्थापना की, तब उसके पीछे उसकी दृष्टि यह रही कि निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान जाति-गुण-क्रिया की किसी भी कल्पना का स्पर्श किये बिना ही अलण्ड, क्षणिक और वर्तमान वस्तुमात्र का अवगाहन करता है; उसमें किसी धर्म-धर्मों का भेद भासित नहीं होता और न उसमें किसी भी प्रकार की कल्पना का प्रवेश होता है। इस प्रकार उसने लोकोत्तर भूमि के निर्विकल्पक को, अपने ढंग से, लौकिक भूमिका में घटा कर निर्विकल्पक-मात्रके मुख्य प्रामाण्य और पारमार्थिकत्व की प्रतिष्ठा के लिए येन केन प्रकारेण असाधारण प्रयत्न किया। इस प्रयत्न का प्रतिषेध करनेवाले इतर वादियों ने भी उतने ही बल तथा उतनी ही सबल एवं सूक्ष्म युक्तियों से उत्तर दिया। इस प्रकार निर्विकल्प और सविकल्प की चर्चा केवल प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान तक ही मर्यादित न रही; उस चर्चा में अनुमान, आगम आदि ज्ञानों में तथा ईश्वरीय प्रत्यक्ष, सर्वज्ञप्रत्यक्ष और योगिप्रत्यक्ष जैसे अलौकिक ज्ञानों में भी प्रवेश किया है।

परन्तु अब प्रश्न यह है कि केवलाद्वैती वेदान्तियों की इस बारे में क्या मानता है ? यह तो सर्वस्वीकृत बात है कि केवलाद्वैती शुद्ध ब्रह्मचैतन्य के अतिरिक्त दूसरी किसी भी वस्तु का वास्तविक अस्तित्व नहीं मानते । यदि ऐसा है तो उनके मत से ज्ञान-व्यवस्था कैसी है ? इसका उत्तर संक्षेप में इतना ही है कि मूल केवलाद्वैती चिन्तकों ने अखण्ड ब्रह्म-विषयक निर्विकल्पक ज्ञानको ही मुख्य और पारमार्थिक प्रमाण माना है । ऐसा होने पर भी उनकी स्थिति विज्ञानवाद और शून्यवाद की अपेक्षा भिन्न है, क्योंकि केवलाद्वैती परम्परा का मुख्य आधार उपनिषद् हैं । आगम रूप से उनका समावेश तो शब्दप्रमाण में ही होगा, और जहाँ शब्द प्रमाण होगा वहाँ सविकल्पक ज्ञान तो आ ही जायगा । अतएव केवलाद्वैती परम्परा यदि ब्रह्मात्म-विषयक निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान को, विज्ञानवाद की भाँति, पारमार्थिक प्रमाण माने, तो फिर 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादि आगमजन्य सविकल्पक ज्ञान का क्या हो ? विज्ञानवादी तो अनुमान और बुद्धवचन जैसे आगमों को भी साबुत कह देते थे, परन्तु केवलाद्वैती के लिए वहाँ तक आना, अनेक कारणों से, शक्य था ही नहीं । इससे उन्होंने दूसरा मार्ग अपनाया और कहा कि ज्ञान शब्दजन्य होने से ही सविकल्पक नहीं हो जाता । शब्दजन्य होने पर भी उपनिषद ज्ञान संसर्गनिवर्तनकारी होने के कारण निर्विकल्पक ही है और इसीलिए वह मुख्य प्रमाण है । इस प्रकार केवलाद्वैतवादियों ने अपने निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान की व्याख्या की ।

ऐसा लगता है कि केवलाद्वैती परम्परायें निर्विकल्पक-सविकल्पक विषयक चर्चा का और उनकी व्याख्याओं का जो प्रवेश हुआ है वह चाहे जितना प्राचीन हो, परन्तु वह प्रवेश विज्ञानवाद और शून्यवाद के बढ़े हुए तथा बढ़ते जाते प्रभाव के बाद का ही है । इसीलिए केवलाद्वैती परम्परायें इस प्रकार की चर्चा करने वाले प्राचीन ग्रन्थ नहीं हैं और यदि हैं भी तो ये आगमशास्त्र से प्राचीन नहीं हैं । इस प्रकार देखने से ज्ञात होता है कि ज्ञान की प्रक्रियामें लोकोत्तरभूमिका का आश्रय लेकर विज्ञानवाद और शून्यवाद ने जो नवप्रस्थान किया उसने इतर सभी दार्शनिकों को अपना-अपना पक्ष स्थापित करने के लिए बाध्य किया, और उन पक्षों ने भी विज्ञानवादी आदि को ऐसा तो परेशान किया कि अन्त में उनको भी लोकोत्तरभूमि की मादकता में से मुक्त होकर और लौकिक भूमिका में आकर ज्ञान की प्रक्रिया का विचार सुव्यवस्थित करने के लिए बाध्य होना पड़ा । इस प्रकार देखें तो भारतीय दार्शनिक और तार्किक वाङ्मय में इस चर्चा का बहुत बड़ा और रसदायी भाग है । यह चर्चा उस-उस दर्शन के चिन्तक और स्यापकों का सूक्ष्मातिसूक्ष्म बुद्धिबल और दृढ़ मनोयोग सूचित करती है ।

यहाँ एक बात का उल्लेख करना आवश्यक है कि जिस प्रकार विज्ञानवाद और शून्यवाद बौद्ध परम्परा की सर्वास्तित्वादि और सौत्रान्तिक शाखाओं के बाद के ही क्रमिक विकास हैं और इसीलिए उनको अपनी पूर्वभूमिका जैसी उन शाखाओं का आश्रय लेकर ही शास्त्रीय चर्चा में उतरना पड़ा है, उसी प्रकार मेरी दृष्टि से, मात्र केवलाद्वैती ही नहीं, परन्तु रामानुज, वल्लभ आदि परम्पराएँ भी सांख्य तत्त्वज्ञान की पीठिका के ऊपर ही विकसित हुई हैं । इसीलिए उन्हें जब कभी परिभाषाओं तथा अन्य बहुत-सी बातों की आवश्यकता पड़ी तब उन्होंने सीधे तीर पर अथवा कुछ रूपान्तर करके सांख्य परम्परा

का आश्रय लिया है। इसका एक उदाहरण प्रस्तुत निर्विकल्प-सविकल्पकी चर्चा है। केवलाह्वृती परम्परा के उत्तरवर्ती ग्रन्थों में जब प्रमाणनिरूपण की आवश्यकता उपस्थित हुई तब उन्होंने सांख्यसम्मत अन्तःकरण, उसकी वृत्ति और उस अन्तःकरण का विषयदेश में निर्गमन इत्यादि बातों को स्वीकार करके अपना कथन पूरा किया है।

धर्म और उसके तीन पहलू

भारतीय भाषाओं में जो कतिपय शब्द सविशेष विख्यात हैं और जिनके अर्थ का विकास एवं विस्तार भी जोरों से वटवृक्ष की भाँति हुआ है तथा जो शब्द प्रायः प्रत्येक भारतवासी को श्रवण-परिचित हैं वे शब्द हैं : ब्रह्म, व्रत, ऋत, जीव, आत्मा, यज्ञ, कर्म, पुनर्जन्म आदि। इनमें 'धर्म' शब्द का भी निर्देश करना चाहिये। दूसरे शब्दों की अपेक्षा 'धर्म' शब्द का परिचय-क्षेत्र तथा विविध अर्थों में उसका उपयोग विशेष ध्यान आकर्षित करता है। 'धर्म' शब्द केवल आचार अथवा कर्तव्य के अर्थ में ही विकसित नहीं हुआ, उसने तो भक्ति एवं ज्ञान के सभी स्तरों और सभी सम्प्रदायों को अपने में समेट लिया है। इसीलिए श्रमण-ब्राह्मण सभी परम्पराओं के साहित्य में तत्त्वज्ञान, भक्ति और आचारप्रधान ग्रन्थ 'धर्म' पद के साथ संकलित उपलब्ध होते हैं। इस दृष्टि से देखने पर धर्म का वर्णन करने वाले को उसकी प्रत्येक शाखा में जो अर्थविकास हुआ है उसका आकण्ठ आकलन-संकलन करना चाहिए। मैं इस कार्य को अपनी मर्यादा से बाहर का समझ कर उसके केवल तीन पहलुओं का स्पर्श करके यहाँ पर कुछ विचार करना चाहता हूँ। इनमें से प्रत्येक पहलू का किस प्रकार और किस क्रम से विकास, मेरी दृष्टि के अनुसार, हुआ है तथा इन पहलुओं का पारम्परिक सम्बन्ध कैसा है, यह संक्षेप में दिखलाने का मैं प्रयत्न करूँगा।

जीवनमात्र अखण्ड है। उसे समझने के लिए बुद्धि से उसको कुछ भागों में बाँटकर मनुष्य उसके विषय में जानकारी प्राप्त करने का प्रयास करता है, परन्तु जीवन के—अन्तः-बाह्य जीवन के—वे विभाग न तो एक दूसरे से सर्वथा भिन्न हैं और न एक-दूसरे के प्रभाव से नितान्त विमुक्त। वैसे विभागों में दो विभाग ऐसे हैं जो सर्वविदित हैं और जिनका कार्य प्रत्येक व्यक्ति सरलता से समझ भी सकता है। वे दो विभाग अथवा अंश हैं श्रद्धा और बुद्धि। प्राणिमात्र का जीवन इन दो मुख्य तटों के बीच प्रवाहित और विकसित होता है। यह विकास ही धर्म है, क्योंकि यही जीवन को धारण करता है।

परन्तु हम इस समय जिस कक्षा के धर्म के विषय में विचार करने वाले हैं वह कक्षा तो मानव जाति के आरम्भ काल से शुरू होती है और इतर प्राणियों की जीवन-कक्षा से प्रायः भिन्न ही है।

आदिम मानव से लेकर आज तक के विकसित एवं संस्कृत मानव में जिस धर्म का विकास हुआ है उसकी नीव यद्यपि श्रद्धा एवं बुद्धि ही है, तथापि उस विकास के मुख्य तीन पहलू हैं। पहला पहलू भक्ति, उपासना, पूजा अथवा प्रार्थना का है,

जिसकी आधारशिला श्रद्धा है और जिसमें से क्रमशः साम्प्रदायिक एवं पन्थधर्म का विकास होता है तथा जो भिन्न-भिन्न चीकों में रूपान्तरित होता है। दूसरे पहलू का विकास मुख्य रूप से बुद्धि अथवा विशेष प्रकार की समझ में से होता है। यह समाजलक्षी है; अर्थात् ऐतिहासिक बलों के परिवर्तन के साथ ही इस पहलू का सम्बन्ध उत्तरोत्तर विशाल मानव-समाज के साथ बढ़ता जाता है। इसी को हम समाज-धर्म के नाम से पहचानते हैं। तीसरा पहलू व्यक्तिगत अन्तर्लक्षी निगूढ़ अनुभव के आधार पर विकसित होता है, जिसे हम अध्यात्मधर्म कह सकते हैं।

आदिमानव पत्थर, वृक्ष अथवा प्राणी की पूजा करता था। इसके अवशेष आज भी अनेक रूप में विद्यमान हैं। इसके अनन्तर वह प्रकृति के सूर्य, चन्द्र, समुद्र, पर्वत, नदी आदि स्वरूपों का पूजन-सत्कार करने लगा। इस पूजा उपासना का प्रेरक तत्त्व किसी अगम्य एवं अलौकिक शक्ति-विषयक उसकी श्रद्धा ही रहा है। धीरे-धीरे यह श्रद्धा किसी एक सर्वशक्तिमान, सर्वज्ञ और सृष्टि-संहारकर्ता दिव्य एवं अलौकिक तत्त्व के विषय में स्थिर होती गई। यही श्रद्धा अद्वैत ब्रह्म तथा सब में आत्मीयत्व की भावना का परिपोषण करके भी पूजा-उपासना के विविध स्वरूपों में परिणत हुई है। इस प्रकार हम देखें तो मानवजाति के सांस्कृतिक समुत्थान में श्रद्धा की वृत्ति अगम्य एवं अलौकिक शक्ति के प्रति, भिन्न-भिन्न प्रयोजन के अनुसार, मनुष्य को विनम्र, भक्त तथा उपासनाशील बनाने की ही रही है। भूमण्डल पर इस समय जितने मुख्य पन्थ विद्यमान हैं और उनका जो इतिहास ज्ञात हुआ है उस पर से ऐसा कहा जा सकता है कि प्रायः सभी धर्म-पन्थ, कमोवेश अंशमें, श्रद्धा की परिवर्तिष्णु एवं विकासशील वृत्ति में से होकर गुजरे हैं।

धर्म की प्रारम्भिक भूमिकामें श्रद्धा ही, फिर वह चाहे जिस कारण से उत्पन्न हुई हो, मुख्य होती है; परन्तु जब उस श्रद्धा में कोई स्फोटक तत्त्व समाविष्ट होता है, अर्थात् कोई व्यक्ति उस प्रचलित श्रद्धा को शिथिल बनाकर उसमें कुछ संशोधन करता है और उस पुरानी श्रद्धा के बारे में मन को, बुद्धिबल के सहारे, साशंक बनाता है, तब उस पुरुष के आसपास भी एक समुदाय इकट्ठा हो जाता है। यही समुदाय आगे जाकर उस धर्म का एक सम्प्रदाय अथवा उपपन्थ बन जाता है। इस प्रकार बुद्धि और ज्ञान-विज्ञान का जैसे-जैसे विकास होता गया, लोगों में समझदारी अधिकाधिक बढ़ी गई, पहले दूर-दूर रहने वाले मानव-समुदाय एवं समाज अधिक समीप आते गये और एक-दूसरे के जीवन में प्रोत्प्रोत होते गये, वैसे-वैसे प्राचीन श्रद्धा, पूजाविधि और उपासना के स्वरूपों में अवश्य परिवर्तन होता गया। कभी-कभी मनुष्य बुद्धि एवं ज्ञान के प्रकाश में चौंधियाकर श्रद्धा का कार्य, जो कि अन्तिम आशवासन प्रदान करता है उसको, भूल भी गया; फिर भी श्रद्धा तो सामुदायिक जीवन में अपना निर्धारित कार्य करती ही रही, क्योंकि मानव का व्यक्तिगत मन समष्टि-मन के साथ इस प्रकार जुड़ा हुआ है कि वह प्रयत्न करे तो भी समष्टि-मन से अलग होकर शान्ति का अनुभव कभी कर ही नहीं सकता; और समष्टि-मन तो सामुदायिक जीवन के पूजा-उपासना आदि धार्मिक पहलुओं में भी व्यक्त होता है। इसीलिए हम देखते हैं कि भिन्न-भिन्न जातियों, टोलियों तथा देशों में बसनेवाले

सभी मनुष्य किसी-न-किसी धर्म-पन्थ का अवलम्बन लेकर गहरा सन्तोष अनुभव करते हैं।

ये धर्म-पन्थ एक-दूसरे की मान्यता एवं पूजाप्रणालिका की भिन्नता के कारण बहुत बार लड़े-झगड़े भी हैं, परन्तु अनिवार्य रूप से सहजीवन बिताने का अवसर उपस्थित होने पर पुनः एक-दूसरे के साथ तटस्थ रहना तथा सहिष्णु बनना भी सीखे हैं। इस समय जानने योग्य बड़े और मुख्य धर्म-पन्थ लगभग तेरह हैं, यद्यपि इसके अवान्तर भेद-प्रभेद तो असंख्य हैं। धर्म के इस पहलू का स्वरूप इस प्रकार कहा जा सकता है :

१. इसका आधार मुख्यतया श्रद्धा है। वह श्रद्धा भी किसी अगम्य एवं अलौकिक दिव्य शक्ति के प्रति होती है फिर भले ही इसके प्रतीक दृश्य और गम्य प्रकार के हों।

२. श्रद्धाजीवी धर्म-पन्थों का एक लक्षण यह भी है कि वे अन्य पन्थों के साथ जो महत्त्व का साम्य है उसकी ओर ध्यान न देकर उनसे अपना भेद दिखलाने वाले स्वरूप पर ही ध्यान केन्द्रित करते हैं। इसके परिणामस्वरूप भेद का ही पोषण होता रहता है।

३. कोई भी धर्म-पन्थ अपने आसपास समुदाय जमा करके ही पनप सकता है। इसलिए उस-उस धर्म-पन्थ के अनुयायी व्यक्ति के मन में सर्वदा ऐसा ही विचार और उत्साह रममाण रहता है कि किसी भी प्रकार से दूसरे पन्थ के अनुयायियों को अपने पन्थ की ओर मोड़ना चाहिए। इतना ही नहीं, यदि कोई व्यक्ति उसके पन्थ का त्याग करता हो तो वह उसके प्रति घृणाभाव रखता है अथवा उदासीनता धारण करता है।

४. धर्म के पान्थिक अथवा साम्प्रदायिक पहलू के साथ अनेक तत्त्व संकलित होते हैं। उनमें से पूजा-उपासना के अमुक विशेष प्रकार, इनके लिए गुरु एवं पुरोहितवर्ग का अस्तित्व तथा उसके निर्वाह के लिए कुछ व्यवस्था, मन्दिर और तीर्थ जैसे धर्मस्थान, धर्मप्रधान ग्रन्थ, ग्रन्थों की प्रारम्भ से ही पवित्र मानी जानेवाली कोई एक भाषा, पन्थ के अनुयायियों का क्रियाकाण्ड एवं उत्सवप्रधान सामुदायिक जीवन, अपने-अपने पन्थ के अनुयायियों में पारस्परिक एकत्व की भावना इत्यादि लक्षण प्रत्येक पन्थ में दीये जैसे स्पष्ट दिखाई पड़ते हैं।

इस श्रद्धाप्रधान सम्प्रदाय का अस्तित्व मानववर्ग के साथ, उसके जीवन की भाँति अविभाज्य रूप से जुड़ा हुआ है। इसका एक और अनन्य कहा जा सके वैसे लाभ यह है कि मनुष्य केवल इन्द्रियगम्य दृश्य लोक में ही आवद्ध न रहकर दृष्टिमर्यादा से बाहर के ऊर्ध्वलोक की ओर भी दृष्टिक्षेप करने लगता है, उसको ध्यान में रखकर जीवन में ऊर्ध्वगामिता के पोषण के लिए यथाशक्ति पुरुषार्थ करता है और उसमें एक प्रकार की आन्तरिक तृप्ति का भी अनुभव करता है, जिसके बिना उसका जीवन नीरस और शुष्क हो जाने की अधिक सम्भावना रहती। इस ऊर्ध्वगामी जीवन की दिशा में प्रयाण करने पर बीच में अनेक वहम और संकुचितता के भयस्थान बाधा उपस्थित करते हैं, परन्तु अन्त में बुद्धि एवं पुरुषार्थ सहायता करके उसका उद्धार भी करते

हैं। इसी कारण धर्म का साम्प्रदायिक पहलू सर्वदा कुछ न कुछ सिद्धि दिखलाता ही रहा है।

धर्म का दूसरा पहलू सामाजिक है। समाज एक से कद का और एक ही प्रकार का सर्वदा नहीं रहा है हजारों वर्षों में वह परिवर्तन और विकास की अनेक भूमिकाओं में से व्यतीत होकर आज की स्थिति पर पहुँचा है।

मनुष्य गुहावासी था तब उसका समाज बहुत छोटा और इधर उधर विलरा हुआ था। इसके पश्चात् जब वह अपने पशुओं के साथ भिन्न-भिन्न स्थानों में खानाबदोश स्थिति में भटकने लगा उस समय यद्यपि उसके सामाजिक स्वरूप में कुछ परिवर्तन तो हुआ, किन्तु उसके समाज का कद तो छोटा ही रहा। खाना-बदोश स्थिति में से जब वह खेती पर आया तब वह कुछ स्थिर हुआ और उसके छोटे-बड़े मूथ बनने लगे। इसीमेंसे आगे जाकर छोटे-बड़े गाँवों का विकास हुआ। इस प्रकार परिवर्तित होते-होते मानव समाज आज की स्थिति पर पहुँचा है। आज तो भिन्न-भिन्न महाद्वीपों, देशों और उनके प्रदेशों में रहने पर भी, विकसित यांत्रिक वाहन-व्यवहार के कारण, मानो एक ही बड़े नगर में सब बसते हों ऐसा प्रतीत होता है।

आदिम मानव-कुटुम्बों से लेकर आज के विशाल समाज की स्थिति में मनुष्य पहुँचा है तो सही, परन्तु यह सर्वथा सीधे मार्ग से—उलभन, संघर्ष और मारकाट के बबण्डरों की थपेड़े खाये बिना नहीं पहुँचा। अनेक बार भिन्न-भिन्न समाज और दल, छोटे-बड़े कारणों से रणक्षेत्र में उतरे हैं और विरोधी दल का नामो-निशान न रहे इस प्रकार का उनका एक-दूसरे के साथ व्यवहार रहा है, फिर भी मानवसमाज तो उत्तरोत्तर सम्पन्न ही होता गया है और दिन-प्रतिदिन विस्तृत होने वाले आपसी सम्बन्धों के कारण उनमें निकटता भी अधिकाधिक आती गई है।

अनेकविध आसुरी संघर्षों के होने पर भी भिन्न-भिन्न छोटे-बड़े मानव समुदायों के बीच संवाद का जो तत्त्व ऊपर उठता रहा है उसके मूल में क्या है—ऐसा प्रश्न सहजभाव से ही सकता है। इसका उत्तर सामाजिक धर्म में से प्राप्त होता है। इतर प्राणियों की अपेक्षा मनुष्य में प्रेम, आत्मौपम्य और अहिंसा का बीज अत्यधिक मात्रा में सन्निहित रहता है। यह बीज चाहे जैसे विसंवादों को भी अन्त में शान्त करके अपना काम करता ही रहता है। जिस प्रकार एक कुटुम्ब में अथवा एक देहात में बहुत बार विकट संघर्ष पैदा होने पर भी अन्त में एक दूसरे से मिले बिना चैन नहीं पड़ता, उसी प्रकार छोटे-बड़े सभी मानव समुदायों का है। मनुष्य जैसे अपने आपको अत्यन्त चाहता है, वैसे ही वह औरों को भी उसी परिमाण में चाहकर सन्तोष का अनुभव करता है। यह चाह प्रेमशक्ति का बाह्य रूप है। प्रेम या अहिंसा जैसे-जैसे, समझदारी के साथ अथवा लाचारी से, जीवन में विकसित होती है, वैसे-वैसे विरोधी समाजों के बीच संवाद स्थापित होता जाता है। यह मूलगत प्रेमशक्ति ही समाजधर्म की आन्तरिक और ठोस नींव है। जिन्होंने इस आधारभूत तत्त्व को जीवन में उतारा था और जो इसके लिए विशेष प्रयत्न करते रहे उन प्रजाशील एवं विवेकी सन्तों ने मानववर्ग को मुख्य धर्म के इस सामाजिक पहलू की

और मोड़ा। इसके फलस्वरूप मानवजाति परलोकलक्षी एवं श्रद्धाजीवी साम्प्रदायिक धर्म की भूमिकामेंसे आगे बढ़कर प्रत्यक्षगम्य एवं इहलोकलक्षी सामाजिक धर्म की भूमिका को सविशेष समझने के लिए प्रेरित हुई।

समाजधर्म के बाह्यनियम देश एवं कालभेद से बदलते रहते हैं, परन्तु उन नियमों का जीवानुभूत तत्त्व तो प्रेम अथवा अहिंसा का बीज ही है। इस बीज का पोषण श्रद्धा से ही होता है, परन्तु उसमें माता की-सी सँभाल रखने वाले विवेकरूपी पोषक तत्त्व की विशेष अपेक्षा रहती है। इस समय सब देशों में जैसे समाजलक्षी नियम हैं वैसे ही पहले समय में भी थे। भारत में वैसे नियमों का दिग्दर्शक विशाल साहित्य उपलब्ध भी है। गौतम धर्मसूत्र और मनुस्मृति जैसे स्मृतिग्रन्थ इसके निदर्शन हैं।

चार वर्ण और चार आश्रम के ढाँचे में उन ग्रन्थों में उस समय तक के विकसित मानव धर्म का निरूपण किया है। उनमें जैसे जीवनव्यवसाय की भिन्न-भिन्न प्रवृत्तियों को सुसंवादी बनाने के नियम हैं, वैसे ही व्यक्तिगत जीवन को आद्यन्त सुसंवादी बनाने के भी विधान हैं। इजिप्त, यूनान तथा अन्य प्राचीन सभ्यता वाले देशों में भी इसी से मिलती-जुलती समाजधर्म की व्यवस्था थी। आज जैसे-जैसे विश्व समीप आता गया, वैसे-वैसे मानवसमाज के लिए शान्तिपूर्वक जीने के नये नियम भी बनते गये और वे मान्य भी होते रहे। यह एक सामाजिक धर्म का आशीर्वाद रूप बाह्य—देखा जा सके वैसे—पहलू है, परन्तु वास्तव में उसका मूल तो मानव के चित्त में अविभाज्य एवं सहज-सिद्ध है।

जब मनु अनेकविध वर्ण और आश्रम-विषयक व्यावहारिक नियमों का वर्णन करते हैं तब वे उस आन्तरिक मूलगत धर्म के स्वरूप को तनिक भी नहीं भूलते। इसीलिए वे मनुस्मृति में अहिंसा, सत्य आदि दस प्रकार के धर्म के रूप में अथवा सत्पुरुष के विवेक के रूप में उस आन्तरिक धर्म का भी सूचन करते हैं।

जैन, बौद्ध आदि अनेक श्रमणधर्म भी अस्तित्व में आते गये और उनका विकास होता गया। उन्होंने यद्यपि समाज के सभी स्तरों को लक्ष में रखकर मनु आदि स्मृतिकारों की भाँति सामाजिक धर्मों का वर्णन तो नहीं किया, परन्तु उन धर्मों के अन्तःप्राणतुल्य अवैर अथवा प्रेम धर्म का निरूपण करने और उसका विकास करने में उनका अपेक्षाकृत अधिक योगदान रहा है।

धर्म के पहले पहलू के रूप में निरूपित उपासना अथवा पन्थधर्म के तथा दूसरे पहलू इस सामाजिक धर्म के बीच जो अन्तर है वह खास उल्लेखनीय और ज्ञातव्य है। पहला पन्थधर्म मुख्यतया परलोकलक्षी एवं अनीन्द्रिय तत्त्व की किसी-न-किसी प्रकार की श्रद्धा पर स्थापित होता है और टिकता है, जबकि इस सामाजिक धर्म की रचना मुख्यतया दृश्य इहलोक को लक्ष में रखकर हुई है। उपासना और पन्थधर्म तो उस-उस धर्म के अनुयायी तक ही मर्यादित होते हैं, जबकि सामाजिक धर्म विभिन्न जातियों और लोगों को भी एक-सा मान्य होता है। उपासना और पन्थधर्म में बुद्धि एवं ज्ञानशक्ति अवश्य सहायता करती है, परन्तु उसका मूल आधार श्रद्धा है, जब कि

सामाजिक धर्म में मूल आधार बुद्धि, समझदारी और विवेक का है; धलबत्ता, इस आधार को दृढ़ बनाने में श्रद्धा का बल काम तो करता ही है। उपासना और पन्थधर्मका यदि बहुत विकास हो भी तो वह केवल दूसरे पन्थ के प्रति सहिष्णुता अथवा तटस्थता धारण करने की सीमा तक ही होता है, परन्तु सामाजिक धर्म जब अपने सही अर्थ में विकसित होता है तब वह पंथ, जाति, देश और वर्ण के भेदों को भी मिटा डालता है।

जिस प्रकार उपासना और पन्थधर्म मानवजीवन का एक उज्ज्वल पहलू है उसी प्रकार सामाजिक धर्म भी उसका दूसरा उज्ज्वल पहलू है। इन दोनों पहलुओं के आधार ही सामुदायिक जीवन तृप्ति का अनुभव करता है। सामाजिक धर्म की जो मूल नींव है वह उपासना अथवा पंथधर्म की विरोधी नहीं है; उल्टा, वह उसके उज्ज्वल अंग को अधिक समुज्ज्वल बनाती है।

धर्म का तीसरा पहलू आध्यात्मिक है। आध्यात्मिक धर्म का उद्गम जीव में जब अपने सत्य स्वरूप की जिज्ञासा और उसकी अभीप्सा जगती है तब होता है। जब ऐसा उद्गम होता है तब वह जीव परमात्मा अथवा वीतराग जैसे अत्यन्त विशुद्ध आदर्श की ओर अभिमुख होता है। यह अभिमुखता ही उसे अपने आपका अन्तर्निरीक्षण करने के लिए सतत प्रेरणा देती रहती है, जिसके कारण यह आध्यात्मिक जीव अपने किसी भी दोष अथवा मल को सहन नहीं कर सकता और उसके निवारण की दिशा में निरन्तर प्रयत्नशील रहता है।

आध्यात्मिक धर्म की इस यात्रा का प्रेरक बल है श्रद्धा और विवेकबुद्धि अर्थात् प्रज्ञा का समत्व। इस यात्रा में श्रद्धा जीव को उन्मार्ग पर टिकाये रखती है और प्रज्ञा उसे उन्मार्ग में जाने से रोकती है। यह स्थिति ही श्रद्धा और प्रज्ञा की भूमिका है।

जैसे-जैसे श्रद्धा और प्रज्ञा की भूमिका विकसित होती जाती है, वैसे-वैसे जीव के मूलगत शुद्ध स्वरूप का अधिकाधिक आविर्भाव होता जाता है। तब ऐसे आध्यात्मिक धर्म में सत्य, अहिंसा आदि सद्गुणों का स्वतः विकास होने लगता है।

आध्यात्मिक धर्म साम्प्रदायिक अथवा सामाजिक धर्म की भाँति सामुदायिक नहीं है। वह है तो व्यक्तिगत, परन्तु यह साम्प्रदायिक और सामाजिक दोनों धर्मों को उज्ज्वल करता है। एक प्रकार से देखें तो आध्यात्मिक धर्म का इन दोनों धर्मों के साथ कोई विरोध नहीं है, तो दूसरी ओर उसका इन धर्मों के साथ कभी-कभी विरोध भी पैदा होता है। परन्तु आध्यात्मिक धर्म की विशेषता यह है कि जैसे विरोध को कालक्रम से दूर करके यह उससे मानवजाति के लिए एक नया ही रसायन पैदा करता है और साम्प्रदायिक धर्म के छोटे-बड़े चौकों को भेदकर सामाजिक धर्म की संकुचित सीमाओं को विशाल बनाता है। इसीलिए हम देखते हैं कि मूलतः व्यक्तिगत होने पर भी यह आध्यात्मिक धर्म मानवजाति के लिये सदा आशीर्वाद रूप ही रहा है।

इस प्रकार धर्म के इन तीन पहलुओं के द्वारा मानवधर्म की समग्र आकृति अंकित हुई है।

भारतीय तथा विश्व के इतर धर्मों के बारे में अंग्रेजी आदि भाषाओं में अनेक पुस्तकें पठनीय हैं। कई भारतीय भाषाओं में भी इस विषय की पुस्तकें उपलब्ध हैं, तथापि मैं यहाँ तो दो पुस्तकों का निर्देश करना योग्य समझता हूँ, जो इस विषय के जिज्ञासुओं के लिए खास पठनीय हैं। पहली पुस्तक है श्री जे० ए० मॅक्यूलोश-लिखित *Religion : Its Origin and Forms (The Temple Primers, London, 1904)*. दूसरी पुस्तक गुजराती में जिसका नाम है 'धर्मवर्णन' (प्रकाशक : प्राच्यविद्या मंदिर, बड़ौदा)। इसके लेखक सुप्रसिद्ध विद्वान् स्वर्गीय डॉ० आनन्दशंकर बापूभाई ध्रुव हैं। निस्सन्देह डॉ० ध्रुव की यह पुस्तक इतनी अधिक प्रामाणिक और उपयोगी है कि कम से कम सभी जिज्ञासु भारतवासियों के लिए यह पठनीय है।

धर्म एवं बदलते हुए मूल्य'

नथमल टाटिया

(१) जो वस्तु हमें इष्ट है वही हमारे लिए मूल्य है। उस इष्ट वस्तु की प्राप्ति के साधन भी मूल्य ही हैं। उदाहरणार्थ—पुत्र, वित्त एवं स्वर्गादि लोक मूल्य हैं, एवं उनकी प्राप्ति के साधन रूप से इष्ट याग-यज्ञ, व्रत, तपस्या आदि भी मूल्य हैं। इष्ट मूल्यों को हम साध्य-मूल्य कह सकते हैं एवं उनकी प्राप्ति के उपायों को हम साधन-मूल्य की संज्ञा दे सकते हैं। बुद्ध ने अविद्या एवं तृष्णा को सांसारिक जीवन का हेतु माना। भगवान् महावीर ने इसी बात को मोहनीय कर्म मानकर स्पष्ट किया। योग-दर्शन में तृष्णा को राम कहा गया है। योग-भाष्य (१.७) में राम की व्याख्या इस प्रकार है—

सुखाभिज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वः सुखे तत्साधने वा यो गर्वः, तृष्णा, लोभः, स रामः ।

अर्थात्, जिस व्यक्ति ने अतीत में सुख का अनुभव किया है, उस व्यक्ति के मन में, उस अतीत अनुभव के स्मरण के कारण, जो सुख एवं सुख के साधनों के प्रति आसक्ति, तृष्णा एवं लोभ है, वही राम है। चूंकि भारतीय सभी दर्शन संसार को अनादि मानते हैं, अतः यह तृष्णा भी अनादि है एवं कोई भी व्यक्ति इसके प्रभाव से मुक्त नहीं है। आधुनिक युग में फ्रायड ने इस तत्त्व को कामतृष्णा (libido) की संज्ञा दी है, जिसे वे अनादि एवं अनन्त मानते हैं, जबकि भारतीय दर्शन उसके प्रात्यन्तिक उन्मूलन के साधनों में भी विश्वास रखते हैं। यह तृष्णा सभी सांसारिक मूल्यों का बीज है। इसके विपरीत दूसरे नैतिक एवं ध्यात्मिक मूल्य भी माने गये हैं, जो मनुष्य को एक उच्च स्तर पर ले जाते हैं। इन दो प्रकार के मूल्यों के बारे में वैदिक दार्शनिकों में मौलिक विवाद रहा है, जिसकी एक मनोरंजक चर्चा हम सांख्य ग्रन्थ युक्तिबीपिका (पृष्ठ १६-१७, दिल्ली, १९६७) में पाते हैं। प्राचीन वैदिक धर्म में त्रिविध एषणाओं को योग्य स्थान प्राप्त था। पर उपनिषद् काल में संन्यास को प्रधानता मिली, जिसकी पराकाष्ठा हम सांख्य-दर्शन में देखते हैं। मीमांसक दर्शन सदैव प्राचीन वैदिक धर्म का समर्थक रहा, यद्यपि उपनिषदों का प्रभाव उत्तरोत्तर बढ़ता ही गया एवं शांकर वेदान्त में उसका पर्यवसान हुआ। युक्तिबीपिका में ये दो पक्ष, अत्याग-पक्ष एवं संन्यास-पक्ष के रूप में उभर आये हैं। सांख्य दार्शनिक भी वेद का प्रामाण्य अस्वीकार नहीं करते हैं (वही, पृष्ठ १६), पर वे अपना सिद्धान्त वेदों के उन अंशों से फलित करते हैं, जिनमें संन्यास का उपदेश दिया गया है। अपने पक्ष में बृहदारण्यक (४. ४. २२) का निम्नोक्त वाक्य उद्धृत करते हैं :—

१. जैन युवक संघ, बम्बई, के तत्त्वावधान में भारतीय विद्या भवन में १८ अगस्त, १९७१ को दिया गया भाषण ।

एतमेव विदित्वा मुनिर्भवति, एतमेव प्रजाजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रजजन्ति ।
एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वं विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते, किं प्रजया करिष्यामो
येषां मोऽयमात्माऽयं लोक इति, ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च
व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ।

अर्थात्, इस ब्रह्म को ही जान कर मुनि होता है, इसी ब्रह्मलोक की इच्छा से
संन्यासी लोग संन्यास ग्रहण करते हैं। यही कारण है कि पहले के ऋषि सन्तति की
कामना नहीं करते थे—हमें सन्तति से क्या प्रयोजन? हमारे लिए, यह ब्रह्म ही आत्मा
है, लोक है। ऐसे ऋषि पुत्र-कामना, वित्त-कामना एवं लोक-कामना से परे होकर
भिक्षाटन से जीवन यापन करते हैं।

इसके विपरीत मीमांसक अपने अत्याग सिद्धान्त के पक्ष में निम्नोक्त वाक्य उद्धृत
करते हैं :—

(क) जरामयंमतेत् सत्रं यदग्निहोत्रदर्शपीर्णमासौ, जरया ह एतस्मात् सत्राद्विमुच्यते,
मृत्युना च (शाबर-भाष्य २.४.४)। अर्थात् ये अग्निहोत्र एवं दर्शपीर्णमास शाश्वत यज्ञ हैं।
जरा या मृत्यु आने पर ही इन कर्त्तव्यों से पुरुष मुक्त हो सकता है।

(ख) कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविशेच्छतं समाः (ईशावास्योपनिषत्, २)। अर्थात्
विहित कर्मों का अनुष्ठान करता हुआ सौ वर्ष तक जीने की कामना करे।

इन उद्धरणों से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि दोनों पक्ष अपने-अपने ध्येय की प्राप्ति
के लिए दो भिन्न मार्ग अपनाते रहे। मीमांसक स्वर्ग को ही उत्तम ध्येय मानते हैं यद्यपि
परवर्ती काल में उनका स्वर्ग मोक्ष जैसा ही बन गया। साध्य-भूत-मूल्य बदल गया, पर
साधन-भूत-मूल्य के बारे में नये मत के साथ प्राचीन मत का सामंजस्य स्थापित नहीं हो
पाया। जैन एवं बौद्ध धर्म, जो मोक्षवादी हैं, यज्ञ एवं ब्राह्मण शब्दों की नवीन व्याख्या
प्रस्तुत करते हैं। उत्तराध्ययन-सूत्र के हरिकेशीयाध्ययन (४३-४६) एवं यज्ञीयाध्ययन
(१६-३३) इस प्रसंग में दृष्टव्य हैं। पालि पिटक के सुतनिघात के ब्राह्मण-धम्मिक सुत्त
(१६-२६) में पशु-यज्ञों की उत्पत्ति के कारण बताये गये हैं तथा वहीं (१२) चावल,
घृत आदि से किये जाने वाले प्राचीन यज्ञों का भी उल्लेख है। यज्ञ की नवीन व्याख्या
हम माघसुत्त में देखते हैं। धम्मपव के ब्राह्मणवग्ग में ब्राह्मण का स्वरूप बताया गया है।

संक्षेप में ऐसा कहा जा सकता है कि प्रधानतया साधनभूत मूल्यों के प्रश्न पर
हमारे दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय इन दो विभागों में बंट गये—(१) कर्मकाण्डी सम्प्रदाय एवं
(२) संन्यासी सम्प्रदाय।

कर्मकाण्डी सम्प्रदाय के उदाहरणार्थ हम बुगसिप्तशती में भक्त द्वारा देवी को
संबोधित निम्नोक्त प्रार्थना को ले सकते हैं :—

देहि सौभाग्यमारोग्यं देहि में परमं सुखम् ।

रूपं देहि जयं देहि यज्ञो देहि द्विषो जहि ॥

अर्थात्, युझे सौभाग्य दो, आरोग्य दो, उत्कृष्ट सुख दो, जय दो, यज्ञ दो, मेरे
घात्रुओं का नाश करो।

दूसरी ओर, निवृत्ति-मार्गी जैन आचार्य समन्तमद् स्वामी की निम्नोद्धृत स्तुति को हम देख सकते हैं, जिसमें उपर्युक्त प्रवृत्ति मार्ग को त्याज्य बताया गया है (स्वयम्भू-स्तोत्र, ४६) :—

अपत्यवित्तोत्तरलोकतृष्णया तपस्विनः केचन कर्म कुर्वन्ते ।

भवान्पुनर्जन्म-जरा-जिहासया त्रयीं प्रवृत्तिं समधीरवारुणत् ॥

अर्थात्, कितने ही तपस्वी जन संतान, धन तथा परलोक की तृष्णा के बशीभूत होकर कर्मकाण्ड में रत रहते हैं। परन्तु आप समभावी हैं एवं आपने पुनर्जन्म एवं जरा को दूर करने की इच्छा से मन, वचन तथा काय—इन तीनों की प्रवृत्ति को रोका है।

हमने ऊपर कुछ सांसारिक मूल्यों की चर्चा की। इन मूल्यों का वर्गीकरण अर्थ और काम के रूप में भी किया जाता है। धर्म, अर्थ काम एवं मोक्ष ये चार पुरुषार्थ हैं। इनमें मोक्ष परम पुरुषार्थ है, तथा धर्म उस परम पुरुषार्थ तक पहुँचने का मार्ग है। ऐसे तो अर्थ एवं काम का आधार भी धर्म ही है, क्योंकि धर्म रहित अर्थ एवं काम अन्त में अहितकर ही सिद्ध होते हैं। धर्म भी अर्थ एवं काम के बिना पनप नहीं सकता। इस अर्थ में धर्म-पुरुषार्थ अर्थ एवं काम का मूल भी है और फल भी। श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता उपर्युक्त चारों पुरुषार्थों में सामंजस्य स्थापन करने का प्रयत्न करती है। जैन एवं स्थविरवादी बौद्ध मोक्ष-पुरुषार्थ को ही प्रधानता देते हैं एवं निवृत्तिप्रधान धर्म को ही एकमात्र मोक्षमार्ग मानते हैं। महायानी बौद्धों का मत इस विषय में करीब-करीब गीता जैसा ही है। मोक्ष केवल एक व्यक्तिकृत प्रश्न नहीं है, उसका सम्बन्ध समाज के सभी अंगों से है जो अविभाज्य रूप से जुड़े हुए हैं।

आध्यात्मिक मूल्यों के अन्तर्गत अहिंसा, अपरिग्रह आदि गिनाये जायेंगे, जिनका परम साध्य मोक्ष है, यद्यपि सांसारिक हित की प्राप्ति के लिए भी वे परमावश्यक हैं।

(२) मूल्यों की इस सामान्य चर्चा के बाद अब धर्म के बारे में कुछ विचार करना आवश्यक है। कुछ धर्म ईश्वरवादी हैं, जो ईश्वर को ही विश्व-व्यवस्था के मूल नियन्ता के रूप में मानते हैं। इन धर्मों से भिन्न कुछ ऐसे धर्म भी हैं, जो अपने कर्म-सिद्धान्तों के आधार पर ही विश्वव्यवस्था की व्याख्या करते हैं। इनके मत में कर्मतत्त्व ही चराचर जगत् का नियन्ता है। कुछ ऐसे धर्म भी हैं जो ऐसा एक अद्वैत तत्त्व मानते हैं, जो स्वयं ही उपादान एवं निमित्त कारण के रूप में चराचर जगत् के मूल में विद्यमान है। आधुनिक चिन्तन इस अन्तिम विचार-धारा के अनुकूल है। ईश्वरवादी धर्म उपास्य सर्वशक्तिमान् ईश्वर के बिना धर्म की कल्पना ही नहीं कर सकते। उसी तरह निरीश्वरवादी, जैसे जैन एवं बौद्ध धर्म, यह समझने में असमर्थ हैं कि ईश्वर कैसे इस विषमता पूर्ण जगत् के कर्ता हो सकते हैं। जड़ जगत् के वैज्ञानिक नियम एवं मनोजगत् के कुछ रहस्यों का आधुनिक सफल विश्लेषण हमें तीसरी विचार-धारा की ओर स्वतः आकृष्ट करते हैं। कुछ भी हो, पर समाज-व्यवस्था के लिए भौतिक उत्पत्ति, जिसका समावेश अर्थ एवं काम पुरुषार्थ में किया जा सकता

है, के साथ ग्रहणा, अपरिग्रह, आदि नैतिक एवं आध्यात्मिक मूल्यों की आवश्यकता अनिवार्य है। हम अपना यह अध्ययन, सहूलियत की दृष्टि से, भारतीय धर्मों तक ही सीमित रखेंगे, ताकि इन धर्मों में विवेचित मूल्यों के इतिहास पर हम विशेष रूप से प्रकाश डाल सकें।

(३) मूल्यों के विवेचन के प्रसङ्ग में हमने ऊपर कुछ मूल्यों का उल्लेख किया है, जैसे याग-यज्ञ, व्रत, तपस्या, मोक्ष आदि। अब हम देखें कि किस तरह मूल्य बदलते हैं।

एक ही नाम से प्रसिद्ध मूल्य का स्वरूप भिन्न-भिन्न धर्मों में भिन्न-भिन्न प्रकार का हो सकता है। उदाहरणार्थ मोक्ष को लीजिए। जैन, बौद्ध, वेदान्त आदि दर्शनों में मोक्ष के स्वरूप भिन्न भिन्न हैं, यद्यपि उन सबों के लिए मुक्ति, मोक्ष, निर्वाण जैसे शब्द निर्विवाद रूप से व्यवहृत होते थे। इस प्रकार के भेद को हम तिर्यक् भेद कह सकते हैं, जो एक ही शब्द के समकालीन विभिन्न अर्थों का स्रोतक है। समकालीन धर्मों में विभिन्न अर्थवाची यज्ञ शब्द भी इस तिर्यक् भेद का दृष्टान्त है।

इसी तरह यह भी देखा जाता है कि एक ही शब्द एक ही धर्म-सम्प्रदाय में भिन्न-भिन्न काल में भिन्न-भिन्न अर्थ धारण करता हुआ गुजरता है। उदाहरणार्थ यज्ञ शब्द को लीजिये। श्रीमद्भगवद्गीता में सर्वगत ब्रह्म ही यज्ञ में सदा अधिष्ठित माना गया है—तस्मात् सर्वगतं ब्रह्म नित्यं यज्ञे प्रतिष्ठितम् (३.१५)। अनासक्त कर्म ही वैदिक यज्ञ का तात्पर्य है (३.१६)। गीता (४.२४) स्पष्टरूपेण कहती है—अर्पण अर्थात् हवन करने की क्रिया ब्रह्म है, हविः अर्थात् अर्पण करने का द्रव्य ब्रह्म है, ब्रह्माग्नि में ब्रह्म ने हवन किया है—इस प्रकार जिसकी बुद्धि में सभी कर्म ब्रह्ममय हैं, उसको ब्रह्म ही मिलता है :

ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविर्ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतम् ।

ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना ॥

अपने समय तक विकसित विभिन्न यज्ञों की सूची गीता (४.२८) में इस प्रकार प्रस्तुत की गई है :

द्रव्ययज्ञास्तपोयज्ञा योगयज्ञास्तथापरे ।

स्वाध्याय-ज्ञानयज्ञाश्च यतयः संशितव्रताः ॥

अर्थात्, तीक्ष्ण व्रत का आचरण करने वाले यत्ति कोई द्रव्य रूप, कोई तप रूप, कोई योग रूप, कोई स्वाध्याय रूप और कोई ज्ञान रूप यज्ञ किया करते हैं। इसी प्रसंग में आखिर (४.३२-३) में कहा गया है :

एवं बहुविधा यज्ञा वितता ब्रह्मणो मुखे ।

कर्मजान् विद्धि तान्सर्वानिर्बन्धात्वा विमोक्ष्यसे ॥

श्रेयान् द्रव्यभयाद्यज्ञाज्ज्ञानयज्ञः परन्तप ।

सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते ॥

अर्थात्, “इस प्रकार भाँति-भाँति के यज्ञ ब्रह्म के ही मुख में अर्पित हैं। यह जानो कि वे सब कर्म से निष्पन्न होते हैं। यह ज्ञान हो जाने से तू मुक्त हो जायगा। हे परन्तप ! द्रव्यमय यज्ञ की अपेक्षा ज्ञानमय यज्ञ श्रेष्ठ है, क्योंकि हे पार्थ ! सब प्रकार के समस्त कर्मों का पर्यवसान ज्ञान में होता है।” भक्तिभागियों के लिए गीताकार जपयज्ञ का विधान इस प्रकार करते हैं (१०.२५)—अज्ञानां जपयज्ञोऽस्मि; अर्थात्, यज्ञों में मैं स्वयं जपयज्ञ हूँ। मनुस्मृति (३.७०-१) के पाँच महायज्ञ भी इस प्रसंग में मननीय हैं। यज्ञ शब्द का पूरा इतिहास इस तरह स्पष्ट हो जाता है। इस प्रकार के कालिक भेद को हम ऊर्ध्वगामी परिवर्तन कह सकते हैं।

उक्त ऊर्ध्वगामी परिवर्तन के दृष्टान्त के रूप में योग शब्द को भी लिया जा सकता है। योग शब्द का प्राचीन अर्थ था चित्तवृत्तियों का निरोध (योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः—योगसूत्र, १.२)। परन्तु गीता (२.४८) के अनुसार योग का अर्थ है कार्य की सिद्धि या असिद्धि जो भी हो, उसमें समभाव रखना। कर्म करने की कुशलता को भी गीता में योग कहा गया है: योगः कर्मसु कौशलम् (२.५०)।

यहाँ योग शब्द का अर्थ है कर्मयोग। भीर्मासकों के कर्मकाण्ड के स्थान पर कर्मयोग की स्थापना करते हुए गीताकार ने संन्यासमार्ग का भी पुनर्मूल्यांकन किया जो इस प्रकार है (गीता, ५.२) :

संन्यासः कर्मयोगश्च निःश्रेयसकरावुभौ ।
तयोस्तु कर्मसंन्यासात्कर्मयोगो विशिष्यते ॥

अर्थात्, कर्मसंन्यास एवं कर्मयोग—ये दोनों मार्ग मोक्ष प्राप्त करा देने वाले हैं, परन्तु इन दोनों में कर्मसंन्यास की अपेक्षा कर्मयोग की योग्यता विशेष है। इस तरह हम देखते हैं कि योग शब्द जो मूल में चित्तसमाधि के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त था एवं मात्र व्यक्तिगत मुक्ति का साधन था, वह उत्तरवर्ती काल में व्यक्ति एवं समाज के हित साधन की दृष्टि से किये गये सभी प्रकार के कर्तव्यों का वाचक बन गया। आधुनिक युग में लोकमान्य तिलक (गीता रहस्य, प्रकरण ११) एवं महात्मा गांधी के हाथों में तो यह कर्मयोग और भी व्यापक बन गया। गीता के कर्मयोग पर गांधीजी लिखते हैं—“कर्म करते हुए भी मनुष्य बंधन मुक्त कैसे रहे? जहाँ तक मुझे मालूम है, इस समस्या को गीता ने जिस तरह हल किया है वैसे किसी भी धर्मग्रन्थ ने नहीं किया है। गीता का कहना है, फलासक्ति छोड़ो और कर्म करो, आचारहित होकर कर्म करो, निष्काम होकर कर्म करो। यह गीता की वह ध्वनि है जो भुलाई नहीं जा सकती। जो कर्म छोड़ता है वह गिरता है। कर्म करते हुए भी जो उसका फल छोड़ता है वह चढ़ता है। फल त्याग का यह अर्थ नहीं है कि परिणाम के सम्बन्ध में लापरवाही रहे। परिणाम और साधन का विचार और उसका ज्ञान अत्यावश्यक है। इतना होने के बाद जो मनुष्य परिणाम की इच्छा किये बिना साधन में तन्मय रहता है वह फलत्यागी है” (अनासक्तियोग, प्रस्तावना)। गांधी जी प्रागे लिखते हैं—“साधारणतः तो यह माना जाता है कि धर्म और अर्थ विरोधी वस्तु हैं, व्यापार इत्यादि लौकिक व्यवहार में धर्म नहीं बचाया जा सकता, धर्म को जगह नहीं हो सकती, धर्म का उपयोग केवल मोक्ष के लिए किया जा सकता है। धर्म की जगह धर्म

शोभा देता है और अर्थ की जगह अर्थ। बहुतें से ऐसा कहते हम सुनते हैं। गीताकार ने इस भ्रम को दूर किया है। उसने मोक्ष और व्यवहार के बीच ऐसा भेद नहीं रखा है, वरन् व्यवहार में धर्म को उतारा है। जो धर्म व्यवहार में न लाया जा सके वह धर्म नहीं है, मेरी समझ से यह बात गीता में है।” योग शब्द की यह आधुनिक व्याख्या समयानुकूल मूल्यों के उत्क्रमण का एक स्पष्ट उदाहरण है।

मूल्यों के ऊर्ध्वगामी परिवर्तन के प्रसंग में ब्रह्मचर्य, अपरिग्रह, अहिंसा एवं मोक्ष तत्त्व के पुनर्मूल्यांकन पर भी विचार किया जा सकता है।

जननेन्द्रिय के विकारों पर अंकुश रखना ही ब्रह्मचर्य का पालन है—ऐसा माना गया था। पर गांधीजी ने इस परिभाषा को व्यापकता प्रदान की, और उसे जीवन में उतारने के प्रयत्न किये। वे कहते हैं—“सारे विषयों पर अंकुश रखना ही ब्रह्मचर्य है। जो दूसरी इन्द्रियों को जहाँ तहाँ भटकने देता है और एक ही इन्द्रिय को रोकने की कोशिश करता है, वह निष्फल प्रयत्न करता है, इसमें क्या शंका है” (संयम और संतति-नियमन, नवजीवन प्रकाशन मंदिर, अहमदाबाद, १९६२, पृष्ठ ११३)। अपने जीवन में ब्रह्मचर्य व्रत उतारने के प्रसंग में गांधीजी कहते हैं:—“ब्रह्मचर्य के सम्पूर्ण पालन का अर्थ है ब्रह्मदर्शन। यह ज्ञान मुझे शास्त्र द्वारा नहीं हुआ। यह अर्थ मेरे सामने क्रम-क्रम से अनुभवसिद्ध होता गया। उससे सम्बन्ध रखनेवाले शास्त्र-वाक्य मैंने बाद में पढ़े। अब ब्रह्मचर्य को एक घोर तपश्चर्या के रूप में रहने देने के बदले उसे रसमय बनाना था, उसी के सहारे निभाना या इसलिये अब उसकी विशेषताओं के मुझे नित-नये दर्शन होने लगे। इस प्रकार यद्यपि मैं इस व्रत में से रस छूट रहा था, तो भी कोई यह न माने कि मैं उसकी कठिनाई का अनुभव नहीं करता था आज मुझे ५६ वर्ष पूरे हो चुके हैं, फिर भी इसकी कठिनता का अनुभव तो मुझे होता ही है। यह एक असिंधारा व्रत है, इसे मैं अधिकाधिक समझ रहा हूँ। और निरन्तर जागृति की आवश्यकता का अनुभव कर रहा हूँ” (वही, पृ० १००)। गांधीजी के ब्रह्मचर्य विषयक इस पुनर्मूल्यांकन की दिशा वही है जो उनके द्वारा किये गये कर्मयोग सम्बन्धी विकास की है।

अपरिग्रह शब्द का अर्थ है परिग्रह नहीं रखना। इस व्रत के पूर्ण पालन के लिए संन्यासी लोग वस्त्र तक का त्याग कर देते हैं, क्योंकि वस्त्र भी तो आस्त्रि में परिग्रह ही है। यहाँ तक तो ठीक है। पर यदि कोई ऐसा समझ ले कि जीवन-यात्रार्थ अपनी न्यूनतम आवश्यकता की पूर्ति के लिए जो वस्त्र, पात्र आदि उपकरण रखता है वह संन्यासी ही नहीं है, तो परिस्थिति अव्यावहारिक बन जाती है। इस प्रश्न को लेकर ही शायद जैन संघ श्वेताम्बर एवं दिगम्बर—इन दो भागों में बँट गया। जैनाचार्य वाचक उमास्वाति ने इस प्रश्न का समाधान—मूर्च्छा परिग्रहः (मूर्च्छा अर्थात् आसक्ति ही परिग्रह है, तत्त्वार्थसूत्र ७.१२) ऐसा कह कर किया। इस विषय में गांधीजी कहते हैं—“वास्तव में परिग्रह मानसिक वस्तु है। मेरे पास घड़ी है, रस्सी है और कच्छ (लंगोटी) है। इनके अभाव में यदि मुझे क्लेश होता है तो मैं परिग्रही हूँ। यदि किसी को बड़े कम्बल की जरूरत है तो वह उसे रखे, पर खो जाने पर क्लेश न करे तो वह अपरिग्रही है” (नोति: धर्म: वर्णन, गाँधी-साहित्य-प्रकाशन, इलाहाबाद, १९६८, पृ० २७)।

अहिंसा व्रत का अर्थ है हिंसा से विरति। हिंसा का स्थूल अर्थ है प्राणि-वध। इस प्राणि-वध से बचने के लिए जैन धर्म में कई नियम किये गये हैं, जिनका पालन असंभव नहीं तो अत्यन्त दुष्कर तो है ही। भारतीय धर्मों के इतिहास में अहिंसा-सिद्धान्त अत्यन्त घनिष्ट रूप से जैन धर्म से सम्बद्ध है। द्रव्य-हिंसा और भाव-हिंसा का विश्लेषण जैन दर्शन का एक महत्त्वपूर्ण विषय है। अहिंसा पर जैन धर्म ने इतना अधिक भार दिया कि जैन सम्प्रदाय निवृत्तिमार्ग की पराकाष्ठा पर पहुँच गया एवं अव्यावहारिक-सा प्रतीत होने लगा। फलस्वरूप जैनेतर चिन्तक जैन धर्म को अति दुःसाध्य समझने लगे। दूसरी ओर बौद्ध धर्म में अहिंसा को इतना शिथिल कर दिया गया कि बौद्ध धर्म की लोग कटु आलोचना करने लगे। परन्तु परवर्ती काल में वाचक उमास्वाति ने हिंसा का जो लक्षण किया वह भारतीय दर्शन को जैन दर्शन की एक अमूल्य देन कही जा सकती है। पातंजल-योग-भाष्य (२.३०) में अहिंसा का लक्षण निम्नांकित प्रकार किया गया था—

अहिंसा सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वभूतानामनभिद्रोहः।

अर्थात्, किसी प्रकार से किसी जीव का पीड़न नहीं करना ही अहिंसा है। आचार्य वसुबन्धु अपने अभिधर्मकोश (४:७३) में प्राणातिपात (= हिंसा) की व्याख्या इस प्रकार करते हैं :—

प्राणातिपातः संचिन्त्य परस्याभ्रान्तिमारणम्।

अर्थात्, मारने की इच्छा से दूसरे प्राणी का भ्रान्तिरहित (अचूक) हनन करना ही प्राणातिपात है। उपर्युक्त दोनों लक्षणों में पीड़ित या हनन क्रिया को ही महत्त्व दिया गया है। परन्तु वाचक उमास्वाति ने हिंसा के लक्षण में प्रमत्त योग का ही प्राधान्य दिया है। वे कहते हैं (तत्त्वार्थसूत्र, ७.८)—

प्रमत्तयोगात् प्राणव्यपरोपणं हिंसा।

अर्थात्, प्रमत्तयोग से होने वाला प्राणवध हिंसा है। इस सूत्र का स्पष्टीकरण पंडित श्री सुखलालजी ने इस प्रकार किया है—“हिंसा की व्याख्या दो अंशों द्वारा पूरी की गई है। पहला अंश है—प्रमत्तयोग अर्थात् रागद्वेषयुक्त अथवा असावधान प्रशुक्ति, और दूसरा है—प्राणवध। पहला अंश कारण रूप में और दूसरा कार्य रूप में है। इसका फलित अर्थ यह है कि जो प्राणवध प्रमत्तयोग से हो वह हिंसा है।” उपर्युक्त चर्चा से यह फलित होता है कि जैन दर्शन में हिंसा-अहिंसा के प्रश्न को जैसा महत्त्व दिया गया है वैसा जैनेतर दर्शनों में परिलक्षित नहीं होता। गांधीजी ने अपने अनासक्तियोग में अहिंसा के स्वरूप को और अधिक विकसित किया। गीता का तात्पर्य फलत्याग तथा अहिंसा में है, न कि भौतिक युद्ध में। गीता में पशुहिंसा का समर्थन नहीं किया गया है। गीता की गहराई से नये-नये अर्थ निकाले जा सकते हैं, क्योंकि वह एक महाकाव्य है। अपने समय तक में विकसित नैतिक तथा आध्यात्मिक मूल्यों का नवीकरण गीता ने किया एवं युग-युग में होने वाले परिवर्तनों को द्योतित करने की शक्ति भी उसके महाशब्दों में विद्यमान है। अनासक्तियोग

की शिक्षा गांधीजी ने गीता से प्राप्त की एवं उसके तात्पर्य को पर्याप्त मात्रा में विस्तृत भी किया। गांधीजी के निम्नोक्त कथन से यह बात स्पष्ट हो जाती है। वे कहते हैं—“गीता सूत्रग्रन्थ नहीं है। गीता एक महान् धर्मकाव्य है। उसमें जितने गहरे उतरिये उतने ही उसमें से नये और सुन्दर अर्थ लीजिये। गीता जनसमाज के लिए है, उसने एक ही बात को अनेक प्रकार से कहा है। अतः गीता में आये हुए महाशब्दों का अर्थ युग-युग में बदलता और विस्तृत होता रहेगा। गीता का मूलमंत्र कभी नहीं बदल सकता। वह मंत्र जिस रीति से सिद्ध किया जा सके उस रीति से जिज्ञासु चाहे जो अर्थ कर सकता है। गीता विधিনিषेध बतलाने वाली भी नहीं है। एक के लिए जो विहित होता है, वही दूसरे के लिए निषिद्ध हो सकता है। एक काल या एक देश में जो विहित होता है, वह दूसरे काल में, दूसरे देश में निषिद्ध हो सकता है। निषिद्ध केवल फलासक्ति है, विहित है अनासक्ति” (अनासक्तियोग, प्रस्तावना)। युग, परिस्थिति एवं वैज्ञानिक प्रकाश के अनुकूल धर्म में या धार्मिक मूल्यों में परिवर्तन होना स्वाभाविक है। यह गीता का निष्कर्ष है। गांधीजी के जीवन में हम सभी भारतीय धर्मों का सूरतिमान् समन्वय पाते हैं, एवं यदि यह कहा जाय कि गांधीजी ही एकमात्र ऐसे महापुरुष हैं जिनके जीवन में हिन्दू, बौद्ध एवं जैन धर्म के उच्च आदर्श पूर्णरूपेण प्रतिफलित हुए हैं तो अत्युक्ति नहीं होगी। गांधीजी अति-कर्मी होते हुए भी अति-अकर्मी थे। प्रवृत्ति एवं निवृत्ति का पारस्परिक विरोध, जो ब्राह्मण एवं श्रमण परम्पराओं के दृष्टिबिन्दुओं में निहित था, गांधीजी के जीवन में शान्त हो गया। जैन अहिंसा की सच्ची व्याख्या तो वर्तमान युग में गांधीजी के जीवन में ही दृष्टिगोचर होती है। युद्ध और शान्ति के क्षेत्र में गांधीजी ने अहिंसा के प्रयोग किए एवं फलस्वरूप सरयाग्रह की कल्पना आई। नरसंहारी युद्ध का कोई प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विकल्प हो सकता है तो वह सत्याग्रह ही है।

अब हम मोक्ष तत्त्व के विकास पर दृष्टि डालें। मोक्ष की कल्पना स्वर्ग की कल्पना के बाद ही आई होगी। हो सकता है दोनों कल्पनायें स्वतंत्र रूप से उत्पन्न हुई हों। कुछ भी हो, पर मोक्षवाद क्रमशः प्रबल होता गया एवं स्वर्गवाद संकुचित होता गया। प्रायः सभी मोक्षवादी संसार को दुःखमय मानते हैं। सांख्यकारिका (कारिका १) का निम्नोक्त कथन सामान्यतः प्रायः सभी मोक्षवादी धर्मों को मान्य है—

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताजिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।

अर्थात्, आध्यात्मिक, आधिभौतिक एवं आधिदैविक— इन त्रिविध दुःखों से पीड़ित होने के कारण, उन दुःखों को नाश करने वाले हेतु को जानने की इच्छा उत्पन्न होती है। दुःख से सदा के लिए मुक्ति पाना इन सभी धर्मों का ध्येय है, फिर भले ही मोक्ष या निर्वाण को सच्चिदानन्द रूप माना जाय, या शुद्ध चेतना रूप माना जाय, या ज्ञान, अज्ञान, सुख, दुःख आदि विशेष गुणों से रहित आत्मा की शुद्ध स्थिति रूप ही माना जाय। भले बुरे सभी प्रकार के कर्मों से छुटकारा पाना ही मोक्ष है। संसार में रहकर सांसारिक दुःखों को दूर करने तथा सुव्यवस्थित समाज निर्माणार्थ प्रयत्न करने की दिशा में भी ये धर्म प्रवृत्त रहे। पर, चूंकि निवृत्ति-प्रधान साधना द्वारा व्यक्तिगत मोक्ष प्राप्त करना ही इन धर्मों का मुख्य उद्देश्य था, वह सामाजिक प्रवृत्ति आध्यात्मिक धर्म का

अनिवार्य एवं अविभाज्य अंग नहीं बन सकी। परन्तु महायानी बौद्धों ने ऐसी प्रवृत्ति को धर्म का अन्तरंग माना। हीनयानी बौद्धों ने क्लेशावरण अर्थात् लोभ, द्वेष एवं मोह से युक्त होने को ही निर्वाण माना, जिसे महायानी बौद्धों ने स्वीकार नहीं किया। विश्व के सर्वांगीण हितसाधन को ही उन्होंने धर्म का एकमात्र उद्देश्य माना एवं उसी उद्देश्य से प्रेरित होकर बोधिचित्त की कल्पना की। बोधिचर्यावितार (३.७-१०) में बोधिचित्तगत संकल्प का वर्णन इस प्रकार किया गया है—

रत्नानानामस्मि भैषज्यं भवेयं वैद्य एव च ।
तदुपश्यायकश्चैव यावद्रोगापुनर्भवः ॥
क्षुत्पिपासाव्यथां हन्यामन्नपानप्रवर्धयैः ।
दुर्भिक्षान्तरकल्पेषु भवेयं पानभोजनम् ॥
दरिद्राणां च सत्त्वानां निधिः स्यामहमक्षयः ।
नानोपकरणाकारैरुपतिष्ठेयमग्रतः ॥
आत्मभावांस्तथा भोगान् सर्वत्रयन्वगतं शुभम् ।
निरपेक्षस्त्यजाम्येष सत्त्वासर्वैर्धसिद्धये ॥

अर्थात्, “व्याधि पीड़ितों के लिए मैं औषध बनूँ एवं उनकी रोग निवृत्ति तक मैं उनका वैद्य एवं परिचारक बना रहूँ। मैं प्राणियों की क्षुधा एवं पिपासा की व्यथा को सतत अन्न-पान आदि के सम्पादन द्वारा दूर करना चाहता हूँ। दुर्भिक्षग्रस्त अन्तरकल्पों में मैं पान तथा भोजन के रूप में परिणत होना चाहता हूँ। दरिद्र प्राणियों के लिए मैं अक्षय धनराशि बनना, तथा विविध उपकरण बनकर उनके सामने उपस्थित होना चाहता हूँ। मैं निष्काम भाव से, अपने शरीरों का, भोगों का एवं अतीत, अनागत तथा वर्तमान तीनों कालों में अर्जित पुण्य फलों का त्याग सब प्राणियों के अभ्युदय एवं निश्चयस की सिद्धि के निमित्त करता हूँ।” बोधिसत्त्व तब तक मोक्ष प्राप्त करना नहीं चाहता जबतक एक भी प्राणी संसार में किसी प्रकार का दुःख भोग करता हो। मोक्ष की यह उदात्त कल्पना बौद्ध धर्म की एक अपूर्व देन है। इस कल्पना के मूल में है दुःखार्त प्राणियों के प्रति सतत सक्रिय असीम करुणा एवं अनन्त प्रज्ञा। भगवान् बुद्ध के सद्धर्म का विकास उत्तरोत्तर होता गया, जिसमें इस कल्पना को एक अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण स्थान प्राप्त हुआ।

बदलते हुए मूल्यों के इस विवेचन के प्रसंग में पर्युषण पर्व की चर्चा करना भी असंगत नहीं होगा। पर्युषण का अर्थ है नियत स्थान में वास करना वर्षावासार्थ उपयुक्त स्थान का चुनाव भाद्र शुक्ला पंचमी तक कर लेना आवश्यक माना गया था। अरुः इस तिथि को अस्त में या आदि में रख कर उसके ८ दिन पूर्व या १० दिन पश्चात् तक पर्युषण या दशलक्षणी पर्व मनाने की प्रथा चल पड़ी। हिन्दू, जैन एवं बौद्ध ग्रन्थों से वर्षावास की चर्चाओं के तुलनात्मक अध्ययन से पर्युषण पर्व के क्रमविकास पर काफी प्रकाश डाला जा सकता है। तात्पर्य यह है कि हमारे धार्मिक पर्व के स्वरूप भी युग-युग में प्रयोजनानुसार बदलते रहे हैं।

(४) अब धर्म एवं मूल्यों के पारस्परिक सम्बन्ध पर कुछ विशेष विचार करना आवश्यक है। जिन धर्मों में विश्व के स्रष्टा एवं नियन्ता के रूप में ईश्वर या प्रजापति की कल्पना की जाती है, उन धर्मों में सांसारिक, नैतिक एवं आध्यात्मिक सभी मूल्यों का आधार ईश्वर ही हैं। गीता (३.१०-१२) के निम्नोक्त श्लोकों से यह बात स्पष्ट हो जाती है :—

सहयज्ञाः प्रजाः सृष्ट्वा पुरोवाच प्रजापतिः ।
अनेन प्रसविष्यध्वमेष वोऽस्तिवष्टकामधुक् ॥
देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।
परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥
इष्टान्भोगान्हि वो देवा दास्यन्ति यज्ञभाविताः ।
तेर्दानप्रदायैभ्यो यो भुङ्क्ते स्तेन एव सः ॥

अर्थात्, “प्रारम्भ में यज्ञसहित प्रजा की सृष्टि करते हुए ब्रह्मा ने उनसे कहा— इस (यज्ञ) के द्वारा तुम्हारी वृद्धि हो—यह तुम्हारी कामधेनु बने। तुम इससे देवताओं को सन्तुष्ट करते रहो, और वे देवता तुम्हें संतुष्ट करते रहें। इस प्रकार परस्पर एक दूसरे को संतुष्ट करते हुए परम श्रेयः प्राप्त कर लो। यज्ञ से संतुष्ट होकर देवता लोग तुम्हारे इच्छित भोग तुम्हें देंगे। उन्हीं का दिया हुआ उन्हें वापिस न देकर जो केवल स्वयं उपभोग करता है वह सचमुच चोर है।” देव, मनुष्य, पशु एवं वनस्पति सहित सारे चराचर जगत् को ईश्वर संचालित करते हैं एवं उनके कर्मानुसार उन्हें फल देते हैं। आत्मा, पुनर्जन्म एवं कर्म इन ईश्वरवादी धर्मों को भी मान्य हैं। अनीश्वरवादी जैन, बौद्ध आदि धर्मों में आत्मा या विज्ञान तत्त्व को ही ईश्वर के सारे अधिकार दे दिये गये हैं। आत्मा स्वतंत्र है। कर्मों का कर्ता एवं भोक्ता वह स्वयं है। आत्मा सर्वशक्तिमान् है। सर्वज्ञ बनने की योग्यता भी उसमें है। गीता के उपर्युक्त प्रजापति के स्थान पर जैन धर्म ने अपने आदि तीर्थङ्कर भगवान् ऋषभदेव को अभिषिक्त किया, जो अपने ही प्रयत्नों से सर्वज्ञत्व प्राप्त कर जगत् के प्रथम धर्मप्रवर्तक बने। उनकी स्तुति करते हुए जैनाचार्य स्वामी समन्तभद्र कहते हैं :— (स्वयम्भूस्तोत्र, १, २, ५) :—

स्वयम्भुवा भूतहितेन भूतले समंजस-ज्ञान-विभूति-चक्षुषा ।
विराजितं येन विधुन्वता तमः क्षपाकरेणैव गुणोत्करैः करैः ॥१॥
प्रजापतिर्यः प्रथमं जिजीविषूः शशास कृष्यादिषु कर्मसु प्रजाः ।
प्रबुद्धतत्त्वः पुनरद्भुतोदयो ममत्वतो निर्विविदे विदांवरः ॥२॥

(पुनानु चेतो मम नाभिनन्दनः पंक्ति ३, श्लोक ५)

अर्थात्, “(वह नाभिनन्दन श्री ऋषभदेव मेरे अन्तःकरण को पवित्र करें), जो स्वयम्भू थे (अर्थात् जो बिना किसी दूसरे के उपदेश के आत्म-विकास को प्राप्त हुए थे), जो प्राणियों के हित के लिए भूमण्डल पर सम्यक् ज्ञान की विभूति रूप नेत्र के धारक थे और अपने गुणसमूह रूप किरणों से अज्ञानांधकार को दूर करते हुए पृथ्वीतल पर ऐसे शोभायमान थे जैसे कि अपनी प्रकाशकत्वादिगुणविशिष्ट किरणों से रात्रि के अन्धकार को दूर

करता हुआ पूर्ण चन्द्रमा सुशोभित होता है; जिन्होंने प्रथम प्रजापति के रूप में (देश, काल और प्रजा-परिस्थिति के) तत्त्वों को अच्छी तरह से जानकर जीवनोपाय को जानने की इच्छा रखनेवाले प्रजाजनों को सबसे पहले कृषि आदि कर्मों में शिक्षित किया, और फिर हेयोपादेय तत्त्व का विशेष ज्ञान प्राप्त करके आश्चर्यकारी प्रकाश को प्राप्त होते हुए जो ममत्व से ही विरक्त हो गये, एवं इस तरह जो तत्त्ववेत्ताओं में श्रेष्ठ हुए।” अतः यह स्पष्ट है कि जैन धर्म के अनुसार भी मूल्यों का उद्भव धर्म-प्रवर्तकों से ही होता है। प्राचीन बौद्ध धर्म की भी इस विषय में यही स्थिति रही। महायान बौद्ध धर्म में अवश्य इसमें आमूल परिवर्तन हुआ। बोधिसत्त्व स्वयं उन मूल्यों के रूप में सत्। अवतरित होना चाहता है, जैसा कि हमने ऊपर बोधिचर्यावतार ग्रन्थ के उद्धरण में देखा वेदान्त दर्शन में भी ऐसे विकास की संभावना रही, पर शायद वह साकार नहीं हो पाई।

धर्मों के साथ मूल्य अभिन्न रूपेण संश्लिष्ट हैं। हमने यह देखा। हम यह भी कह सकते हैं कि धर्म मूल्यगर्भित हैं। पर जो धर्म में विश्वास नहीं करते तथा आत्मा, पुनर्जन्म एवं कर्म में भी श्रद्धा नहीं रखते, उनके लिए मूल्यों का क्या स्थान है? इस प्रश्न पर भी विचार कर लेना आवश्यक है। मूल्यों का लक्ष्य एवं नियन्ता कोई सर्व-शक्तिमान् पुरुष ही हो सकता है। इस दृष्टि से नास्तिकता-वादियों के लिए राष्ट्र के अधिनायक या जन-प्रतिनिधियों को ही ईश्वर या कर्म का स्थान प्राप्त होना चाहिए। वस्तुस्थिति भी यही है। ये राष्ट्रनायक या जन-प्रतिनिधि विभिन्न धर्मों में स्वीकृत लोकसंग्राहक सिद्धान्तों से प्रेरणा भले ही लें, पर आखिरी निर्णायक तो वे स्वयं ही हैं। धर्मनिरपेक्ष मूल्यों को मानने में भी कोई कठिनाई नहीं होनी चाहिये, यदि वे मूल्य बहुजन-हिताय बहुजन-सुखाय हों। वास्तव में धर्मप्रसूत मूल्यों का आधार भी वही बहुजन-हित एवं बहुजन-सुख है।

(५) हमने मूल्यों पर विचार किया, एवं धर्म पर भी विचार किया। अर्थ एवं काम जैसे सांसारिक मूल्यों का बीज तृष्णा है। पर अहिंसा, अपरिग्रह, जैसे नैतिक, एवं मोक्ष जैसे आध्यात्मिक मूल्य तृष्णारहित होने के कारण एकान्ततः लोकहितकर होते हैं। इन लोकहितकर तत्त्वों के उर्वर्गामी परिवर्तन तथा विकास की चर्चा हमने ऊपर की है। अब देखना है कि इन तत्त्वों को क्रम से सजाया जा सकता है या नहीं। इस प्रसंग में बौद्ध ग्रन्थों में वर्णित छः पारमिताओं पर दृष्टि डाल लेना आवश्यक है। ये पारमितार्ये हैं—दान, शील क्षान्ति, वीर्यं, ध्यान एवं प्रज्ञा। इनमें से प्रथम तीन से अभ्युदय प्राप्त होता है, तथा शेष तीन से निःश्रेयस। ये सब चित्त की अवस्थायें हैं। लोक-हितार्थ फलसहित सर्वस्व त्याग करने की भावना जब पराकाष्ठा को पहुँच जाती है एवं चित्त जब मात्सर्यरहित एवं अनासक्त बन जाता है, तब चित्त की उस अवस्था को ज्ञानपारमिता की संज्ञा दी जाती है। प्राणतिपातादि सर्व प्रकार की सावध प्रवृत्तियों से विरति की भावना जब अपनी पराकाष्ठा को पहुँचती है तो मन की उस स्थिति को शील-पारमिता कहते हैं। क्रोधादि से निवृत्ति के अन्यास का चरम उत्कर्ष ही क्षान्तिपारमिता कहलाती है। कुशल कर्मों में निरन्तर समुद्यम ही वीर्यं है। इस समुद्यम की पराकाष्ठा ही वीर्यपारमिता है। कुशल प्रवृत्ति में सतत संलग्न

रहने के फलस्वरूप चित्त में जो स्थिरता आती है, उसका चरम उत्कर्ष को पहुँचना ही ध्यानपारमिता है। उक्त पाँचों पारमितायें प्रज्ञापारमिता के लिए परिकर का काम करती हैं। प्रज्ञा शब्द का अर्थ है यथावस्थित वस्तुतत्त्व की प्रविवेक। इस प्रविवेक का परम प्रकर्ष ही प्रज्ञापारमिता है। इस प्रज्ञापारमिता का गणना यद्यपि सबसे अन्त में की गई है, पर यह जान लेना आवश्यक है कि इसके बिना दान, शील, आदि कुछ भी पराकाष्ठा तक नहीं पहुँच सकते। क्रम तो वास्तव में यह है कि प्रज्ञा के बिना ध्यान नहीं, ध्यान के बिना वीर्य नहीं, वीर्य के बिना क्षान्ति नहीं, क्षान्ति के बिना शील नहीं, एवं शील के बिना दान नहीं। प्राणातिपात्तादि से विरमण रूप शील का अभ्यास बिना किये कोई निष्काम दानी नहीं बन सकता। इसी तरह, क्षान्ति का अभ्यास बिना किये शीलवान् बनना संभव नहीं, कारण क्षमावान् बिना हुए शील का पालन दुष्कर है। क्षमा वीरस्य भूषणम्—यह कथन सर्वजनस्वीकृत है। अतः वीर्य के बिना क्षान्ति की पराकाष्ठा को कोई कैसे पहुँच सकता है? इसी तरह ध्यान के बिना वीर्य भी संभव नहीं क्योंकि समुद्यमी होने के लिए एकाग्रता-जन्म सोमनस्य एवं प्रसन्नता की परम आवश्यकता है। पुनः, चूँकि ध्यान की विशुद्धि प्रज्ञा के बिना संभव नहीं, अतः प्रज्ञा का विकास ध्यान के लिए अनिवार्य माना जाता है। इन पारमिताओं के अभ्यास से चित्त-शुद्धि प्राप्त होती है, जो मनुष्य को सही रास्ते पर ले जाने में सहायक होती है। भौतिक, नैतिक तथा आध्यात्मिक सभी प्रकार की उन्नति के लिए चित्तशुद्धि का होना अति आवश्यक है। सच्चे विकास की आधारशीला चित्तविशुद्धि ही है।

अब हम अहिंसा, सत्य, अस्तेय, ब्रह्मचर्य एवं अपरिग्रह पर विचार करें। उपर्युक्त दानपारमिता का समावेश अस्तेय एवं अपरिग्रह व्रतों में हो जाता है। शील-पारमिता का समावेश ब्रह्मचर्य व्रत में, एवं क्षान्तिपारमिता का समावेश अहिंसा व्रत में किया जा सकता है। प्रज्ञापारमिता का अन्तर्भाव सहज ही सत्य व्रत में हो जाता है। इस दृष्टि से हम अहिंसा आदि व्रतों को निम्नोक्त क्रम में सजा सकते हैं—अस्तेय, अपरिग्रह, ब्रह्मचर्य, अहिंसा एवं सत्य। इस क्रम में सत्य ही सभी व्रतों का नियामक तत्त्व बन जाता है। जैन आगमों की निम्नोक्त सूक्तियाँ भी इसमें चरितार्थ हो जाती हैं—

(१) सच्चं लोगम्मि सारभूदं (सत्य ही लोक में सारभूत है)।

(२) पढमं णाणं तन्नो दया (पहले ज्ञान, बाद में दया)।

गान्धी दर्शन में भी सत्य का स्थान पहला ही है। आचरण की दृष्टि से प्राचीन शास्त्रों में अहिंसा की गणना प्रथम स्थान में की जाती है, पर वास्तव में सत्य ही सर्वोपरि है।

(६) अब हमें धर्म एवं मूल्यों की शाश्वतता एवं परिवर्तनशीलता पर विचार करना है। सभी धर्मों के अनुयायी अपने-अपने धर्म को शाश्वत मानते हैं, क्योंकि वे साधारणतया परिवर्तन पसन्द नहीं करते, यद्यपि परिवर्तन अनिवार्य रूप से आ ही जाते हैं। कभी-कभी तो ऐसा भी देखा जाता है कि साम्प्रदायिक मनोवृत्तियाँ अपने को पुराने ही धर्म के अनुपालक समझते हैं, जब कि उनके धर्म में काफी परिवर्तन अज्ञात रूप से परिस्थितिवश आ गया होता है। उदाहरणार्थ हम वैदिक धर्म को मानने वालों को ले सकते हैं। प्राचीन याग-यज्ञ जब प्रायः समाप्त हो रहे थे, उस समय भी सांख्य, बौद्धात्म

जैसे दर्शनों के प्रचारक अपने को प्राचीन वैदिक धर्म के अनुयायी ही मानते थे। इसके विपरीत कभी-कभी ऐसा भी देखा जाता है कि एक ही सम्प्रदाय के अनुगामी अपने नवीकृत धर्म को पहचानने में भी असमर्थ रहते हैं। जैनों के २३ वें तीर्थंकर पार्श्वनाथ के शिष्य अपने को भगवान् महावीर के शिष्यों से अलग मानने लगे। प्राचीन चातुर्ग्राम एवं सचेलक धर्म के स्थान पर जब महावीर ने पंचशिक्षिक एवं अचेलक धर्म का प्रचार किया तो निर्ग्रन्थ पन्थ के अनुगामियों को अपने ही धर्म में संशय उत्पन्न होने लगा जिसका समाधान केशी गौतमीय अध्यायन (उत्तराध्यायनसूत्र, २३) में किया गया है। मूल्यों की परिस्थिति भी ऐसी ही है। मूल्य बदल जाते हैं, पर उनका यह बदलना शाब्दिक साम्य के पीछे प्रच्छन्न रहता है। चूंकि भगवान् बुद्ध ने सभी पदार्थों को अनित्य माना, अतः बौद्ध धर्म के अनुयायी हमारे इस विश्लेषण को सहर्त स्वीकार करेंगे। शांकर वेदान्त अनुगामी भी इसमें अपनी सहमति प्रकट करेंगे क्योंकि उनके दर्शन में ब्रह्म ही एकमात्र मूल्य है, जिसकी प्रभा से दूसरे मूल्य, जो सभी मायिक हैं, प्रभास्वर होते हैं। पर दूसरे प्रायः सभी दर्शन धर्म तथा मूल्य दोनों को शाश्वत एवं परिवर्तनशील उभयरूप मानेंगे। ऐकान्तिक रूप से न धर्म बदलता है, न मूल्य। ध्रुवता एवं अध्रुवता दोनों परस्पर जुड़ी हुई हैं। न धर्म अपने मौलिक स्वरूप को कभी छोड़ सकता है, और न मूल्य ही। जबतक मानवजाति रहेगी तब तक मानव धर्म तथा मानव मूल्य भी रहेंगे। यदि मानव अमानव नहीं बन सकते तो मानव धर्म एवं मूल्य का भी आमूल परिवर्तन कैसे हो सकता? इस प्रश्न का समाधान केवल अनेकान्त-दृष्टि से ही हो सकता है। एक ही वस्तु किस तरह नित्य भी हो सकती है और अनित्य भी, इस समस्या के समाधानार्थ स्वयम्भूस्तोत्र का ४३वां श्लोक उद्धृत करता हुआ मैं अपना विवेचन समाप्त करता हूँ।

नित्यं तदेवेदमिति प्रतीते-र्न नित्यमन्यप्रतिपत्तिमिदं ।

न तद्विरुद्धं बहिरन्तरंग-निमित्त-नैमित्तिक-योगतस्ते ॥

अर्थात्, 'यह वही है'— इस प्रकार की प्रतीति होने के कारण वस्तुतत्त्व नित्य है। पुनः 'यह वह नहीं है'— इस प्रकार की प्रतीति होने के कारण वस्तुतत्त्व अनित्य भी है। हे भगवन् ! आपके शासन में वस्तुतत्त्व का नित्य और अनित्य उभयरूप होना विरुद्ध नहीं है, क्योंकि वह बहिरंग निमित्त (अर्थात् सहकारी कारण) अन्तरंग निमित्त (उपादान कारण) एवं नैमित्तिक (निमित्तों से उत्पन्न होने वाले कार्य के सम्बन्ध) को अपने में एक साथ समाविष्ट किये हुए हैं।

धर्मज्ञान के मूल : अनुभूति एवं तर्क^१

देवनारायण शर्मा

वस्तुतः सच्चे धर्म के ज्ञान कराने वाले क्या तर्क एवं अनुभूति दोनों हैं ? अथवा केवल तर्क या केवल अनुभूति—यह प्रश्न अत्यन्त गम्भीर है। हम धर्म की व्याख्या “आचारप्रभवोधर्मः^२” मानें अथवा “धारणाद्धर्ममित्याहुः^३” इसे स्वीकार करें अथवा मीमांसकों के अनुसार “चोदना लक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः^४” कहें, किन्तु, धर्म-संशय की स्थिति में इनके द्वारा किसी निर्णय पर पहुँचना सर्वथा कठिन है। क्योंकि इन व्याख्यानों में से किसी के द्वारा भी धर्म-जिज्ञासु किसी स्पष्ट निश्चित दिशा को नहीं प्राप्त कर सकता। उसकी जिज्ञासा ज्यों के त्यों बनी रह जाती है। क्योंकि ये आचरण, धारणाएँ और प्रेरणाएँ एक नहीं अनेक प्रकार की हैं और परस्पर विरोधी भी हैं।

महाभारत के अन्तर्गत ठीक ऐसा ही प्रश्न यक्ष के द्वारा धर्मराज युधिष्ठिर के सम्मुख उपस्थापित हम पाते हैं और इस पर धर्मराज का उत्तर इस प्रकार प्राप्त होता है—

तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः श्रुतयो विभिन्नानैको ऋषिर्यस्य वचः प्रमाणम् ।

धर्मस्य तत्त्वं निहितं गुहायां महाजनो येनगतः स पन्थाः ॥

[म० भा० वनपर्व ३१३, ११७]

अर्थात् यदि तर्क को देखें तो यह चंचल है, तात्पर्य यह कि जिसकी बुद्धि जैसी तीव्र होती है, वैसे ही अनेक प्रकार के अनेक अनुमान तर्क के द्वारा निष्पन्न होते हैं। श्रुति अर्थात् वेदाज्ञा देखी जाय, तो वह भी भिन्न-भिन्न है। और यदि स्मृतिशास्त्र को देखें तो ऐसा एक भी ऋषि नहीं है, जिसका वचन अन्य ऋषियों की अपेक्षा अधिक प्रमाणभूत समझा जाय। और यदि धर्म का मूलतत्त्व देखा जाय तो वह अत्यन्त सूक्ष्म रहस्यमय होने के कारण साधारण लोगों की समझ में आ नहीं सकता। इस कारण महापुरुषों के द्वारा अपनाया गया मार्ग ही धर्मज्ञान का सच्चा मार्ग है।

यद्यपि ऊपर की यह युक्ति सामान्य लोगों के लिए अपेक्षाकृत सरल प्रतीत होती है, तब भी सभी बातों में इसका निर्वाह संभव नहीं। क्यों कि

१. ८ अप्रैल १९७१ को विद्वद्गोष्ठी में पठित निबन्ध।

२. म० भा० अनु० १०४, १५६ (सम्पादक प० रामचन्द्र शास्त्री, चित्रशाला प्रेस, पूना से प्रकाशित)।

३. म० भा० कर्ण० ६९, ५८.

४. मी० सूत्र० १, १, २.

इन महापुरुषों के आचरण में भी तो कोई एकता नहीं, परस्पर भिन्नता है। और इन आचरणों को भी तो पूर्ण स्वच्छ एवं निष्कलंक नहीं कहा जा सकता।

इस प्रसंग में महाभारत के अन्तर्गत श्येन और राजा शिबि का प्रसंग भी ध्यान देने योग्य है, इससे धर्मज्ञान का एक दूसरा पक्ष प्रकाश में आता है—

धर्म यो बाधते धर्मो न स धर्मः कुवर्त्मतत् ।
 अविरोधात्तु यो धर्मः सधर्मः सत्यविक्रम ॥
 विरोधिषु महीपाल निश्चित्य गुरुलाघवम् ।
 न बाधा विद्यते यत्र तं धर्मं समुपाचरेत् ॥
 [म० भा० वन० १३१]

अर्थात् जिस धर्म से धर्म का नाश हो, वह धर्म नहीं, कुमार्ग है। अविरोधी धर्म ही धर्म कहलाने योग्य है। परस्पर विरुद्ध धर्मों का तारतम्य अथवा लघुता और गुरुता देखकर ही प्रत्येक मीके पर अपनी बुद्धि के द्वारा सच्चे धर्म अथवा कर्म का निर्णय करना चाहिए। पर, इसे भी हम धर्मज्ञान का स्पष्ट आधार नहीं कह सकते। क्योंकि ऐसा व्यवहार में देखा जाता है कि अनेक विद्वान् अपनी-अपनी बुद्धि के अनुसार धर्माधर्म का विचार भिन्न-भिन्न प्रकार से किया करते हैं। और वस्तुतः “तर्कोऽप्रतिष्ठः” इस वचन का रहस्य भी यही है। वस्तुतः इन्हीं कारणों से शास्त्रकारों ने बुद्धिवाद को चौथा स्थान दिया है। अर्थात् धर्म के निर्णय में प्रथम स्थान श्रुति को दूसरा स्मृति को, तीसरा सदाचार को और चौथा अपनी प्रियता^१ तात्पर्य अपनी बुद्धि की अनुकूलता को। इस कारण श्रुति, स्मृति, अथवा सदाचार से विरुद्ध यदि बुद्धि की अनुकूलता हो, तो वह कदापि माननीय नहीं हो सकती। यहाँ यह प्रश्न उठ सकता है कि बुद्धिवाद को छोड़ कर आखिर धर्म-अधर्म का निर्णय होगा कैसे? श्रुति, स्मृति आदि का समझना भी तो बुद्धि पर ही अवलम्बित है। बुद्धि श्रुति, स्मृति का आशय जैसा समझेगी, वैसा ही तो मार्ग निश्चय करेगी। इसीलिए तो श्रुति, स्मृति मानने वालों के भी तो सैंकड़ों अवान्तर भेद बन गये, क्योंकि किसी की बुद्धि ने श्रुति-स्मृति का आशय कुछ समझा तो किसी ने कुछ। तब यदि अन्त में जाकर भी बुद्धि पर ही ठहरना पड़ता है तो पहले से ही सीधा बुद्धिवाद ही क्यों न मान लिया जाय? विचार करने पर यह तर्क सत्य से दूर दृष्टिगत होगा। श्रुति-स्मृति का आशय बुद्धि से समझ कर उसके आधार पर धर्माधर्म का निर्णय करना और बात है और केवल उच्छृङ्खल बुद्धि को निर्णय का आधार मान लेना और बात है। यों तो मूर्ख, बालक, पशु आदि जो कोई भी कुछ करता है, उसमें बुद्धि का आधार तो रहता ही है। बिना बुद्धि की प्रेरणा के कोई क्रिया हो ही नहीं सकती। जैसी कि दार्शनिकों की मान्यता है—“ज्ञानजन्या भवेदिच्छा

इच्छाजन्या कृतिर्भवेत् । कृतिजन्यं भवेत् कर्म ।" अर्थात् पहले किसी वस्तु का ज्ञान होता है फिर ज्ञान से इच्छा पैदा होती है, इच्छा से आत्मा में प्रयत्न होता है, फिर प्रयत्न से शरीरादि में क्रिया होती है । ज्ञान बुद्धि की वृत्ति का ही नाम है अथवा ज्ञान ही बुद्धि है । तब बिना बुद्धि के किसी से भी कोई काम नहीं हो सकता । किन्तु, जड़, बालक, पशु आदि बुद्धिवाद पर स्थिर हैं, ऐसा कोई नहीं कह सकता, क्योंकि वह बुद्धि स्वयं उत्पन्न नहीं होती, दूसरे के द्वारा उत्पन्न करायी जाती है । ठीक इसी तरह शास्त्र द्वारा जो बुद्धि उत्पन्न करायी जायेगी, वह इस बुद्धिवाद की सीमा में नहीं आ सकती । अब रही शास्त्र का आशय भिन्न-भिन्न समझने की बात सो हमारे शास्त्र में किस शब्द का क्या आशय समझना—इसके नियम भी बहुत स्पष्ट और विस्तृत रूप में बने हुए हैं, जिन्हें हम मीमांसाशास्त्र कहते हैं । उसका आधार ले लेने पर बुद्धि की उच्छृङ्खलता पूर्णतः रुक जाती है । अब कोई उन नियमों को न मानकर अपनी धींग-धींगी करता रहे, तब तो यह बात ही दूसरी है । वस्तुतः जिस सत्य का हमने अनुभव नहीं किया, साक्षात्कार नहीं किया, क्या, उस सत्य की सरिता अनुभव की ऊँचाई से प्रवाहित हो सकती है ? कवि की कल्पनाओं को काव्य की भाषा में दुहराने से हमारा काम कुछ चल सकता है, पर, आध्यात्मिक सत्यों को केवल तर्क की भाषा में दुहराने से काम नहीं चल सकता । जब-जब तर्क की दुहाई बढ़ती है और अनुभूति घटती है, तब-तब धर्म निस्तेज हो जाता है । अतः धर्म को तेजस्वी बनाने के लिए अनुभूति को प्रोत्साहन देना होगा । वस्तुतः अनुभूति में ज्ञेय और ज्ञाता, दृश्य और द्रष्टा का सीधा सम्पर्क होता है, किसी माध्यम के द्वारा नहीं । किन्तु, तर्क का क्षेत्र तो परोक्ष अनुभूति अथवा दूसरे माध्यम से होने वाला ज्ञान है ।

वस्तुतः तर्क और पांडित्य से धर्म का निर्णय हो भी नहीं सकता, ठीक वैसे ही जैसे तर्क और पांडित्य से ईश्वर को सत्ता सिद्ध नहीं की जा सकती । वस्तुतः धर्मज्ञान का मूलधार तर्क नहीं सीधी अनुभूति है । धर्म पंडितों की नहीं, संतों और द्रष्टाओं की सृष्टि है । हमारे दार्शनिक सत्य सोचे और समझे नहीं गये थे, प्रत्युत ऋषियों ने आत्मचक्षु से उनका दर्शन किया था । वाद-विवाद, तर्क और पांडित्य से धर्म की सिद्धि नहीं होती । धर्म अनुभूति की वस्तु है और धर्मात्मा हम उन्हीं को मानते आये भी हैं, जिन्होंने धर्म के महासत्यों को केवल जाना ही नहीं, उनका अनुभव और साक्षात्कार किया है । धर्म के रहस्य केवल बुद्धि से उद्घाटित नहीं होते । इसके लिए एक अद्भुत शक्ति अपेक्षित होती है, जो पंडितों में नहीं संतों में पायी जाती है । अनुभूति तर्क से अधिक शक्तिशालिनी वस्तु है । रामकृष्ण परमहंस ने अपने जीवन से यह बता दिया कि धार्मिक सत्य केवल बौद्धिक अनुमान की वस्तु नहीं, प्रत्यक्ष अनुभव के विषय हैं । जब आस्तिक और नास्तिक, हिन्दू, ईसाई और मुसलमान आपस में इस प्रश्न पर लड़ रहे थे कि किसका धर्म ठीक है

और किसका नहीं, तब परमहंस रामकृष्ण ने सभी धर्मों के मूलतत्त्व को अपने जीवन में साकार करके मानों सारे विश्व को यह संदेश दिया कि धर्म को शास्त्रार्थ का विषय मत बनाओ। हो सके तो उसकी सीधी अनुभूति के लिए प्रयास करो। उन्होंने हिन्दुत्व के सभी मार्गों की साधना की। यही नहीं, वे कुछ दिन सच्चे मुसलमान बनकर इस्लाम की भी साधना करते रहे और कुछ कालतक उन्होंने ईसाइयत का भी अभ्यास किया था। भारत की धार्मिक समस्या का जो समाधान रामकृष्ण ने दिया उससे अधिक वास्तविक समाधान और कोई हो नहीं सकता। क्रम-क्रम से वैष्णव, शैव, शाक्त, तांत्रिक, अद्वैतवादी, मुसलमान और ईसाई बनकर परमहंस ने यह सिद्धकर दिखाया कि धर्मों के बाहरी रूप तो केवल बाहरी रूप हैं, उनके मूलतत्त्व में कोई अन्तर नहीं आता। किन्तु, इसकी प्राप्ति अनुभूति से होती है, तर्क अथवा वाद-विवाद से नहीं।

वस्तुतः धर्म के दो रूप हमारे सामने आते हैं। एक तो नित्य व्यवहार में “धर्म” शब्द का प्रयोग केवल “पारलौकिक सुख का मार्ग” इसी अर्थ में किया जाता है। उदाहरणार्थ जब हम किसी से प्रश्न करते हैं, तेरा कौन सा धर्म है? तब उससे हमारे पूछने का यही हेतु होता है कि तू अपने पारलौकिक कल्याण के लिए वैदिक, बौद्ध, जैन अथवा ईसाई किस मार्ग से चलते हो और वह हमारे प्रश्न के अनुसार ही उत्तर देता है। इसी तरह स्वर्ग प्राप्ति के लिए साधनभूत यज्ञ-याग आदि वैदिक विषयों की भीमांसा करते समय “अथातो धर्म जिज्ञासा” आदि धर्म सूत्रों में भी धर्म शब्द का यही अर्थ लिया गया है। परन्तु, धर्म शब्द का एकमात्र यही अर्थ नहीं दूसरा अर्थ, भी है। राजधर्म, प्रजाधर्म, देशधर्म, कुलधर्म आदि सांसारिक नीति-बन्धन भी तो धर्म ही हैं। चतुर्विध पुरुषार्थों की गणना करते समय हम धर्म, अर्थ काम और मोक्ष कहा करते हैं। यहाँ धर्म और मोक्ष को स्पष्टतः पृथक् पृथक् कर दिया गया है। यहाँ धर्म से तात्पर्य कर्तव्य, कर्म, सदाचार आदि है। भगवद्गीता में भी जब भगवान् अर्जुन से यह कह कर लड़ने के लिए कहते हैं कि “स्वधर्ममपि चावेक्ष्य” तब और इसके बाद “स्वधर्मं निधनं श्रेयः परधर्मो भयावहः” इस स्थान पर भी धर्म शब्द चातुर्वर्ण्य धर्म के ही अर्थ में प्रयुक्त हुआ है।

महाभारत, गीता आदि श्राव्यग्रन्थों में तथा आधुनिक नीति-ग्रन्थों में भी व्यावहारिक कर्तव्य अथवा नियम के अर्थ में “धर्म” शब्द का सदा प्रयोग हुआ है। कुलधर्म और कुलाचार दोनों शब्द समानार्थक समझे जाते हैं। कर्ण के साथ अर्जुन के युद्ध प्रसंग में कर्ण के द्वारा यह कहे जाने पर कि

१. गी० २, ३१.

२. गी ३, ३५.

“निःशस्त्र शत्रु को मारना धर्म युद्ध नहीं” भगवान् कृष्ण ने उसे कई पिछली बातों का स्मरण दिलाते हुए, प्रत्येक प्रसंग में यह प्रश्न किया है कि हे कर्ण ! “ववते धर्मस्तदागतः^३” अर्थात् उस समय तुम्हारा धर्म कहाँ गया था ? इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि ‘धर्म’ शब्द का प्रयोग उन सब नीति-नियमों के बारे में किया गया है जो समाजधारणा के लिए शिष्ट जनों के द्वारा बनाये गये हैं। इस दृष्टि से विचार करने पर नीति के नियमों अथवा शिष्टाचार को धर्म का मूल कह सकते हैं। अर्थात् समाजधारणा के लिए मानव के उच्छृङ्खल आचरण का प्रतिबन्ध करना ही धर्म है।

उपर्युक्त प्रकार धर्म के दो स्वरूप पारमार्थिक और भौतिक, इनको दृष्टि में रख कर ही धर्मज्ञान के मूल क्रमशः अनुभूति एवं तर्क बताये गये हैं। यद्यपि सूक्ष्मदृष्टि से देखने पर जैसे उपर्युक्त धर्म के स्वरूपों में भी वास्तविक भेद नहीं है, ठीक उसी प्रकार उनके ज्ञान के मूल साधन अनुभूति एवं तर्क में भी नहीं। किन्तु, व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से ये विभाजन किये गये हैं। वस्तुतः हेतु से अगम्य सूक्ष्म धर्म का समर्थन श्रुति-अनुभूति से और हेतुगम्य का समर्थन तर्क से करना चाहिए। किन्तु, जो अहेतुगम्य सूक्ष्म धर्म के लिए तर्क का प्रयोग करते हैं और हेतुगम्य के लिए श्रुति-अनुभूति का वे सही अर्थ में धर्म के तत्त्व को नहीं जान सकते।

श्रीसिद्धसेनदिवाकरविरचितः

न्यायावतारः

श्रीवेदभद्रसूरिकृतटिप्पनसंवलितश्रीसिद्धाभिगणिकृतटीकासहितः ।

अवियुतसामान्यविशेषदेशिनं वर्धमानमानस्य ।
न्यायावतारविवृतिः स्मृतिवीजविवृद्धये क्रियते ॥१॥

नत्वा श्रीवरनेकान्तध्वान्तविध्वंसभास्करम् ।
वृत्तो न्यायावतारस्य स्मृत्यं किमपि टिप्यते ॥१॥

इहाभीष्टदेवतानमस्कारपुरःसरमनुष्ठीयानं समस्तमपि प्रायः प्रयोजनं निविघ्नानां सिद्धिमध्यास्त इति मन्यमानो व्याख्यातेति प्रसिद्धः सिद्धः पूर्वार्धेन भगवतो वर्धमान-स्वामिनो नमस्कारं तथाभिवेद्यादिप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण क्वचिदपि प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिर्नोपपद्यत इत्युत्तरार्धेनाभिवेद्यप्रयोजने च प्रतिपादयन्नाह—अवियुतेत्यादि । संबन्धस्तुपायोपेयलक्षणः सामर्थ्यादवसेयः । तत्र समुदायार्थस्य पातनिकयैव व्याख्यातत्वादवयवार्थोऽभिधीयते । यु मिश्रणे, विशेषेणैकान्तेन युतो मिश्रीभूतो वियुतो, न तथा एवंविधो सामान्यविशेषो दिशतीत्येवंशीलस्तम् । अनेन सामान्यादवयवान्ताभिन्नविशेषवादिनां सांख्यानानां तथा विशेषेभ्योऽस्यन्ताभिन्नसामान्याभिधायिनां सौगतानां च निरासः, कथंचिदभिन्नयोरेव सामान्य विशेषयोर्विक्तयुक्त्या पुरः प्रतिपादयिष्यमाणत्वात् । तथा केचिद् धातुपारायण-कृतो यु अमिश्रणे इति पठन्ति, तथा च अयुतसिद्धानामाधार्याधारभूतानां यः संबन्ध इहप्रत्ययहेतुः स समवायः इति वैशेषिकीयसूत्रे अयुतसिद्धानामपृथक्सिद्धानामिति व्याख्यातम् । तथा लोकेऽपि भेदाभिधायी युतशब्दः प्रयुज्यमानो दृश्यते । यथा 'द्वावपि भ्रातरावेतो युतो जातो' इत्यादि । ततो विशेषेणैकान्तेन युतो पृथग्भूतो, न वियुतो कथंचिद्विघ्ननाविद्यर्थः । अस्मिन् च व्याख्याने नैयायिकवैशेषिकयोरेत्यन्तभिन्नसामान्यविशेष-वादिनोः प्रतिक्षेपः । एवं समस्ताद्वैतवादिनामध्यनेन विशेषणेन निरासोऽवसेयः तदेकत्वाभ्युपगमस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्युपलभ्यमानाभ्यां सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां बाधितत्वात् । वर्ध-छेदनपूरणयोः, चौरादिकत्वादिनि वर्धयते छिद्यतेऽसाविति स्वरान्तत्वात्कर्मण्यलू, ततो वर्धच्छिन्नो मानोऽहंकारो येन स तथा तम् । निपुर्वादिणः सर्वे गत्यर्था ज्ञानार्था इति न्यायतो ज्ञानार्थाद् नितरामीयन्ते यथास्थितस्वरूपेण परिच्छिद्यन्ते जीवाजीवादयो भावा अनेनेति "परिन्योर्नीणोर्दूताभ्रेषयोः" (पा० ३-३-३७) इत्यनेन घञि न्यायः प्रमाणमार्गः । अवतरन्ति प्राणिनोऽनेनास्मिन्निति वा "अवे तुस्त्रोर्धङ्" (पा० ३-३-१२०) अवतारयतीति वा कर्तर्यञि अवतारस्तीर्थं, न्यायस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी, ततो न्यायस्यावतारो न्यायावतार इति षष्ठीतत्पुरुषः । अयमभिप्रायः । यथा तीर्थापरनाम्नावतारेण नद्यादिहृत्तीर्यन्ते, एव-मनेनाप्यवतारकल्पेन शास्त्रेण न्यायाम्भोधिहृत्तीर्यन्ते इति । तस्य विवृतिः विवरणं क्रियते

तस्य चेदमादिवाक्यम्

प्रमाणव्युत्पादनार्थमिदमारभ्यते ।

प्रमाणेत्यादि । अनेन च तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्धविकलतया ध्वनेर्बहिरर्थं प्रति प्रामाण्यायोगादभिधेयादिसूचनद्वारोत्पन्नार्थसंशयमुखेन श्रोतारः श्रवणं प्रति प्रोत्साह्यन्ते इति धर्मोत्तरो मन्यते । तदयुक्तम् । यदि हि शब्दस्यार्थप्रकाशनं प्रति सामर्थ्यं न समस्ति, तत् कथमसावभिधेयादिसूचने पटिष्ठः स्यात् । न च तस्या-प्रामाण्ये एतच्छ्रवणादर्थसंशयं कुर्वन्ति प्रेक्षावन्तः, तद्वत्ताहानेः मिथ्याज्ञानादपि प्रवृत्त्यविरामप्रसङ्गाच्च । अर्चटस्त्वाह—न श्रावकोत्साहकमेतत्, प्रामाण्याभावात्, तेषां चाप्रामाण्यादप्रवृत्तेः, अन्यथा प्रेक्षावत्ताक्षतेः, किं तर्हि प्रकरणार्थकथनाव-सरोपस्थितपरोपन्यस्तहेत्वसिद्धतोद्भावनार्थम् । तथा हि—संभवत्येवंवादी—नारब्धव्यमिदम्, अभिधेयादिशून्यत्वात्, काकदन्तपरीक्षादिवदिति, तदनेनास्य

इति संबन्धः । स्मृतेर्बीजं—संस्कारः स्मरणाङ्कुरोत्पादकत्वेन बीजमिव बीजमिति लक्षणया बीजशब्देन संस्काराभिधानात्, तस्य विवर्धनाय । अन्यत्र किल क्षेत्रादौ बीजस्य विशेषतो वृद्धये विशिष्टा वृत्तिरावरणं विधीयत इति प्रतीयमानमर्थान्तरम् ॥ निरतिशय-देवतास्तवस्याभिप्रेतार्थसाधकत्वाभावादवियुतसामान्यविशेषदेशिनमित्यनेन भगवतो वचनाति-शयमाह । वचनातिशयश्च ज्ञानातिशयमन्तरेण नोपपद्यत इति ज्ञानातिशयोऽप्यभिहितो द्रष्टव्यः । वर्धमानमित्यनेन तु अपायापगमातिशयः सूचितः, सर्वानर्थहेतोरहंकारस्य भगवता निर्मूलकाशं कथितत्वात् । एवमतिशयत्रयान्यथानुपपत्त्या पूजातिशयोऽप्यर्थाक्षिप्त एव । यद्वा वर्धते अशोकाद्यष्टमहाप्रातिहार्यसंपदा वृद्धिमान् भवतीति वर्धमानः । अस्यां च व्युत्पत्तावनेनापि विशेषणोऽपि प्रजातिशयः प्रादुरभावि ॥

अनेन चेत्यादि । न तावच्छब्दार्थयोस्तादात्म्यलक्षणः संबन्धः, तथा प्रतीतेरभावात् । यदि चाप्रतीयमानमपि तयोस्तादात्म्यं कल्प्येत, तदाग्निमोदकादिष्वनिध्वननानन्तरं वदन-दहनपूरणादयः स्युः, न च दृश्यन्ते, तन्न तयोस्तादात्म्यम् । नापि तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणः सम्बन्धो विचारभारसहः, यतः शब्देनार्थोऽर्थेन वा शब्दो जन्यते इति विकल्पद्वयम् । तत्र न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, यतः शब्दादर्थोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमे न कश्चिदप्यसंपूर्णकामः स्यात्, सुवर्ण-कोटिर्मे भूयादित्यादिष्वन्तितोऽत्यन्तदारिद्र्योपद्रुनस्यापि पुंसः सुवर्णकोट्यादिलाभप्रसङ्गात् । नाप्यर्थेन शब्दो जन्यते इति द्वितीयः पक्षः, अकृतसंकेतस्यापि पुंसः प्रथमपत्तसदर्शने तच्छब्दो-त्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्, तथा अङ्गुल्यग्ने करिणतमित्यादिष्वनीनामर्थाभावेऽप्युत्पत्तेश्च । किं च । अर्थाद् ध्वनीनामुत्पादे अर्थेषु यथास्वं पुरुषबुद्धिनिरपेक्षणा शब्दानां ध्वनं स्यात् । न चार्थमात्रात् पुरुषबुद्धिनिरपेक्षाद् ध्वनयः समुत्पद्यमाना विलोक्यन्ते घटन्ते वा । तथा हि—प्रथममर्थ-दर्शनम्, ततस्तत्प्रतिपादनाभिप्रायः, ततो विवक्षा, ततः स्थानकरणाभिघातः, ततः शब्द-निष्पत्तिः; तत्र शब्दानामर्थजन्यता । इत्थं संबन्धद्वयवैकल्यतो बहिरर्थं शब्दानां प्रामाण्या-भावः । अभिधेयादिसूचनेति । यदाह धर्मकीर्तिविनिश्चये—वक्तुरभिप्रेतं तु सूचयेयुः शब्दा इति । अर्थसंशयमुखेन इति च वदन अर्थसंशयोऽपि हि प्रवृत्त्यङ्गमिति दर्शयन् अनर्थसंशयस्य प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतां निषेधयति ।

तद्वत्ताप्रकाशकेन वचसा तद्वेतुनामसिद्धतोद्भाव्यत इति । तदयुक्ततरम्, यतो यदीदमप्रमाणमिति नाभिधेयादीनि साक्षाल्लक्षयत् प्रवर्तयति, ततः परोपन्यस्त-हेत्वसिद्धतां कथयतीति युक्तिरिक्तं पश्यामः, अप्रमाणस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात्, अन्यथा प्रमाणविचारणमानर्थक्यमशुचीत । तस्मादिदं प्रमाणभूतं सदभिधेयादीनि प्रतिपादयत् प्रेक्षावतः प्रवर्तयतीति प्रकरणादावुपन्यस्तम् ।

संबन्धशून्यत्वादस्य कथमर्थे प्रमाणतेति चेत्, प्रत्यक्षेऽपि कथं तर्हि सेति वाच्यम् । ग्राह्यग्राहकभावसंबन्धबलादिति चेत्, अत्रापि वाच्यवाचकभावादिति ब्रूमः । स एव कथमिति चेत्, अध्यक्षेऽपि वेद्यवेदकभावः कथमिति वाच्यम् । तदुत्पत्तिताकारताभ्यामिति चेत्, केयं तदुत्पत्तिनिमित्तम् । तज्जन्यतेति चेत् । प्रतिक्षणं भङ्गुरत्वे सैव दुरुपपादेत्याचक्ष्महे । तथा हि क्षणनश्वरोऽर्थः स्वक्षणे—पूर्वं पश्चाद् वा कार्यं कुर्यादिति त्रयी गतिः । तत्र न तावदाद्यः पक्षः कक्षीकरणीयः, समकालभाविनिध्यापाराभावात्, इतरथैकक्षणवर्तिनां समस्तार्थक्षणाणामितरेतरं कार्यकारणभावः प्रसज्येत, तथा च तत्प्रयुक्तो ग्राह्यग्राहकभावश्चेत्यसमञ्जस-मापनीपद्येत । अथ स्वक्षणात्पूर्वम्, अचारु एतदपि, स्वयमसतो भविष्यच्छब्द-चक्रवत्यदिरिव पूर्वकालवर्तिनि कार्ये व्यापाराभावात् । अथ स्वक्षणादूर्ध्वं कार्यं विधत्त इति मन्येथाः, एतदप्यसाधीयः, विनष्टस्य कार्यकरणाक्षमत्वात्, अन्यथा मृतस्य शिखिनः केकायितं स्यात् ॥ तदाकारतापि किमर्थीकारसंक्रान्त्या, अथ तत्सदृशतयोत्पत्तेर्ज्ञानस्येति । यद्याद्यः कल्पः, तदयुक्तम्, ज्ञाने स्वाकारार्पणादर्थस्य निराकारतानुषङ्गात्, स्वदेहे पृथुतरार्थदर्शनप्रसङ्गात्, शिरःस्फोटनप्लावनाद्यनर्थ-प्रसक्तेश्च । अथ द्वितीयः, तथा सति सादृश्यवशादर्थव्यवस्थेत्यायातम् । न च

अभिधेयाविसूचने इति । आस्तामभिधेयादीनां प्रतिपादने । एवंवादीति । एवं वक्ष्यमाणप्रकारेण वादवान् एवं वदनशीलो वा । तदिति तस्मादर्थे अन्ययम् । अनेनादि-वाक्येनास्य शास्त्रस्य तद्वत्ता अभिधेयादिमत्ता ॥ संबन्धशून्यत्वादित्यादि । इह यद्यपि परमार्थतो ज्ञानानां कथञ्चित्तादात्म्यलक्षणः शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धः । यदाह भगवान् भद्रबाहुस्वामी—

अभिधानं अभिहेयात् होइ भिन्नं अभिन्नं च ।
 खुरमगिमोयगुच्चारणमि जम्हा उ वयणसवणाणं ॥१॥
 विच्छेदो न वि दाहो न पूरणं तेण भिन्नं तु ।
 जम्हा य मोयगुच्चारणमि तस्थेव पच्चमो होइ ॥२॥
 न य होइ स अन्नस्थे तेण अभिन्नं तदत्थागो ॥ इति ॥

[अभिधानमभिधेयाद् भवति भिन्नमभिन्नं च ।
 खुरागिमोदकोच्चारणे यस्मात्तु वदनश्रवणयोः ॥१॥
 विच्छेदो नापि दाहो न पूरणं तेन भिन्नं तु ।
 यस्माद् मोदकोच्चारणे तत्रैव प्रत्ययो भवति ॥२॥
 न च भवति स अन्यार्थे तेनाभिन्नं तदर्थत्वं । (छाया)]

सादृश्यं भवतां दर्शने तात्त्विकमस्ति, विविक्तक्षणक्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणस्वलक्षणानां पारमार्थिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अनादिकालालीनवासनाप्रबोधसंपादितसत्ताकनिर्विकल्पकविविक्तदर्शनोत्तरकालभावविकल्पव्यवस्थापितसादृश्यवशादर्थग्रहणनियमे सत्येकनीलस्वलक्षणे क्षणे सकलकालकलापव्यापिकाककुवलययादिगतनीलताया व्यवस्थितरविशेषेणानुषज्येत, तथा च प्रतिनियतो ग्राह्यग्राहकभावो न घटामटाद्येत । अङ्गुल्यग्रनिर्दिश्यमानपुरोवर्तिनीलस्वलक्षणदर्शनबलयातत्वात् नैल्यविकल्पस्य तदेवाध्यवस्यति न भूतं भाविकाककुवलययादिगतं वा इति चेत्, तर्हि विकल्पः स्वलक्षणनिष्ठः प्राप्तः, नियतदेशदशावच्छिन्नार्थक्रियासमर्थार्थग्रहणात् । तथा हि— तदध्यवसायः किं तद्विकल्पनं उत तद्ग्रहणम् न तावत् तद्विकल्पनम् विकल्पानां भवदभिप्रायेण स्वलक्षणान्तःप्रवेशाभावात् । तदुक्तम्—

तेनान्यापोहविषयाः प्रोक्ताः सामान्यगोचराः ।

शब्दाश्च बुद्ध्यश्चैव वस्तुन्येषामसंभवात् ॥१॥ इति ।

अथ ब्रूयात्—यद्यपि विकल्पाः सामान्यं गोचरयन्ति तत्त्वतः, तथापि प्रत्यक्षविकल्पयोर्योगपद्येन प्रवृत्तेर्विमूढः प्रतिपत्ता विकल्पस्यापि स्वलक्षणनिष्ठतां व्यवस्यति । तथा चोक्तम्—

मनसोर्युगपद्वृत्तेः सविकल्पाविकल्पयोः ।

विमूढो लघुवृत्तेर्वा तयोरैक्यं व्यवस्यति ॥१॥ इति ।

तथापि शठः शाठ्येन निर्लोठनीय इत्यभिप्रायवान् आचार्यस्तत्प्रसिद्धप्रत्यक्षद्वारेण शब्देऽपि प्रासाध्यमाह— प्रत्यक्षेऽपीत्यादि । त्रयीति । त्रयोऽवयवा रूपाणि यस्यां गती । गतिरिति प्रकारः । असाधीय इति । एतदनयोः प्रकर्षेणासाधु, गुणाङ्गाद्वेष्टेयसु (सि०हे० ७-३-६) ।

विविक्तंति । विविक्ताः परस्परमत्यन्तभिन्नाः, न पुनरवयवव्यादिरूपेण कथञ्चिदेकरूपाः । अनादीत्यादि । अनादिकालालीना संबद्धा या वासना तस्याः प्रबोधस्तेन संपादिता सत्ता यस्य स चासौ, निर्विकल्पकं व्यवसायशून्यं विविक्तं स्फुटं यद्दर्शनं प्रत्यक्षं तदुत्तरकालं भवनशीलो विकल्पश्च तेन व्यवस्थापितं यत्सादृश्यं तस्य वशः सामर्थ्यम्; यदुक्तं— प्रायसत्तायामायत्ते प्रभुत्वे च वशं विदुः । तस्मात् ।

तेनेत्यादि । यत एवं वस्तुनि शब्दार्थे दोषस्तेन कारणेन, अन्यापोहविषया विकल्पबुद्धिप्रतिभासविषयाः शब्दा बुद्ध्यश्च प्रोक्ता आचार्यदिग्नागेन । किंभूता बुद्ध्यः ? सामान्यगोचराः सविकल्पिकाः न सर्वाः, निर्विकल्पाध्यक्षबुद्धीनां वस्तुविषयाभ्युपगमात् । बुद्धीनामेवैतद् विशेषणं न शब्दानाम्, तेषां सामान्यविषयत्वान्यभिचारात्; किं कारणं, वस्तुन्येषां शब्दानां विकल्पानां चासंभवादिति । एतदर्थश्च विस्तरार्थिना प्रमाणवार्तिके कल्याणचन्द्रकृतटीकातोऽवसेयः ।

तत् किमिदं शपथैः प्रत्येयं यदुत मोहाद् विकल्पेन स्वलक्षणमध्यवस्यति न पुनर्विशदनिभसिन्न साक्षात्करोति । एवं चाध्यक्षमपि सकलार्थव्यक्तीर्गोचरयति, विकल्पमोहात्तु संनिहितविषयं लक्ष्यते इति परोऽनुषञ्जयन् दुर्निवारः स्यात् । उत तद्ग्रहणमध्यवसायः, तदा स्वलक्षणनिष्ठता विकल्पस्य स्ववाचा भवद्भिः प्रतिपन्ना स्यात् । एवं च विकल्पयुगलेऽप्यर्थक्रियासमर्थार्थपर्यवसितसत्ताकता विकल्पस्याढौकते । यदा च विकल्पः स्वलक्षणसौधमध्यमध्यास्त इति अभिदध्याः, तथा सति ध्वनेरपि तदन्तःप्रवेशो दुर्निवारः स्यात्, तत्सहचरत्वात् । यदाह भवदाचार्यः—एव शब्दानां विषयो यो विकल्पानामिति । न च विकल्पं व्यतिरिच्य सादृश्यव्यवस्थापकमन्यदस्ति, प्रत्यक्षस्य सकलजगद्विलक्षणस्वलक्षणग्रहणप्रवणत्वात् । तद् यदि तत्सदृशतयोत्पत्तिस्तदाकारता, तदा प्रतिपादितन्यायाद् विकल्पस्य संनिहितार्थगोचरतीररीकर्तव्या, तथा च ध्वनिरपि तद्विषयः सिध्यतीति सिद्धं नः समीहितम् । अन्यथा तदाकारता न समस्ति, गत्यन्तराभावात् । तन्न तदुत्पत्तितदाकारते ग्राह्यग्राहकभावहेतु संस्तः । संस्तां वा, तथापि विकल्पतः पर्यनुयोज्यो भवान् । किमेते ग्रहणकारणं प्रार्थक्येन उत सामस्त्येन । तद् यद्याद्यः पक्षः, कपालक्षणो घटान्त्यक्षणस्य ग्राहकः प्राप्नोति तज्जन्यत्वात्, जलचन्द्रो वा नभश्चन्द्रस्य ग्राहकः स्यात् तदाकारत्वात् । अथ द्वितीयः, तथा सति घटोत्तरक्षणः पूर्णक्षणस्य ग्राहकः प्रसजति, तदुत्पत्तेस्तदाकारत्वाच्च । जडत्वादर्थस्य न ग्राहकत्वमपि तु ज्ञानस्य तदुत्पत्तितदाकारतयोः सत्योरिति चेत्, इदमिदानीं विदितमस्माभिः, एतदपि समानार्थग्राहिप्राचीनसंवेदनक्षणलक्षणमनस्कारोत्पाद्यज्ञाने ग्राहक लक्षणं व्यभिचरति, उत्पादकप्राक्तनक्षणवर्तिमनस्काराग्राहकत्वात् । तदध्यवसाय साहित्येन तदुत्पत्तितदाकारतयोर्ग्रहणकारणत्वं संपूर्ण मनस्कारे तन्नास्तीति चेत्, किमिदं भिन्नगोचरेण सह

मनसोरित्यादि । मन्यते ज्ञायते वस्तु आभ्यामिति सर्वधातुभ्योऽमुन् (पा० उणादि) इति अमुनि मनसी ज्ञाने तयोः सविकल्पाविकल्पयोरेकत्वं विकल्पयति आन्तः प्रमातेति संबन्धः । कुत इत्याह, युगपद्वृत्तेः गन्नादिस्वलक्षणविषयनिविकल्पाध्यक्षानन्तरं पुनर्निविकल्पकेन स्वलक्षणस्य तत्समकालमेव विकल्पेन गकारादिवर्णानां च ग्रहणात् । यद् बोद्धालङ्कारः—कथं तर्हि क्रमेण ग्रहणं न भवति, युगपद्विषयसंनिधानात्, न हि वर्णविकल्पकाले प्रत्यक्षप्रत्ययार्थो न संनिहित इति । लघुवृत्तेर्बन्ति । यथा भवतो लघुवृत्तेः शाखाचन्द्रादिविषयसंनिधौ न क्रमेण ग्रहणाध्यवसायस्तथा ममापि निविकल्पकसमन्तरं ऋगित्येव विकल्पोत्पादात् तयोरैक्यव्यवसायः, न पुनस्तत्त्वतस्तयोरैक्यम् । विशेषतस्त्वेतत्कारिकार्थो बोद्धालङ्कारादेरवसेयः ॥

तदन्त इति । तस्य स्वलक्षणस्यान्तर्मध्यं तत्र प्रवेशस्तद्विषयतेति यावत् ।

जलचन्द्रो वेति । यद्यपि कथंचिन्नभश्चन्द्रेण नभश्चन्द्रस्य जन्यमानत्वात्तदुत्पत्तिरप्यत्र विद्यते, तथापि तदाकारतैव प्राधान्येन विवक्षिता । तदध्यवसायेति । तस्योत्पादकस्या-

साहित्यम् । तथा हि—अध्यवसायो वासनाप्रबोधवशादुत्पन्नः सामान्यमनर्थरूपं विकल्पयति । प्रत्यक्षं बहिरर्थाल्लब्धात्मलाभं तदाकारं तमेव साक्षात्करोति— इति भवतां दर्शनम्, तन्न विकल्पसाहित्यं प्रत्यक्षस्य कंचन विशेषं पुष्पाति । तदिदं ग्राह्यग्राहकभावकारणं प्रत्यक्षेऽपि यद् भवद्भिरभ्यधायि, तद् यथा यथा विचार्यते तथा तथा विशीर्यत इत्यनपेक्षणीयम् । तद् यथाकथंचित् प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रतिपादितग्राह्यग्राहकभावलक्षणवैकल्येऽपि ग्राहकत्वम् अर्थस्य ग्राह्यत्वम्, तथा दृष्टत्वात्, अन्यथा निखिलव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् भवद्भिरपि प्रत्यपादि । तथा शब्दस्य वाचकत्वमर्थस्य वाच्यत्वं प्रतिपद्यध्वं यूयम्, अत्रापि दृष्टहानेः व्यवहारोच्छेदस्य समानत्वात् । अथ इत्थमाचक्षीथाः, यथा—नद्यास्तीरे गुडशकटं पर्यस्तं, धावत धावत डिम्भकाः— इत्यादिविप्रतारकपुरुषवचनश्रवणात् प्रवर्तमाना विप्रलम्भताभाजो जायन्ते, अतः सकलवचनेष्वनाश्वास इति । एवं तर्हि चिकिचिकायमानमरुमरीचिकाचक्रुम्बि यज्जलोत्लेखि विशददर्शनमुदयपदवीं समासादयति तदलीकमवलोकितमिति, सकलाध्यक्षेष्वनाश्वास इत्यभिदध्महे । पाश्चात्यविपरीतार्थोपस्थापकप्रमाणवाचितत्वाद् मरीचिकासु जलज्ञानमप्रमाणं न शेषसत्यस्तम्भादिज्ञानानि, बाधारहितत्वादिति चेत्; तर्हि ध्वनावप्ययं न्यायः किं कार्कभक्षितः । न हि वयं सर्वशब्दानां प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्येमहि, किं तर्हि सुनिश्चिताप्तप्रसूतृकाणामेव । तन्न प्रामाण्यं प्रति प्रत्यक्षशब्दयोर्विशेषमुपलभामहे । एष तु विशेषः स्यात्, प्रत्यक्षं चक्षुरादिसामग्रीविशेषजन्यत्वात् संनिहितनियतार्थग्राहि स्पष्टप्रतिभासम्, शाब्दं तु तथाविधकारणविकलत्वाद् नियतानियतार्थग्राहि अस्पष्टप्रतिभासम् । न च एष विशेषः प्रामाण्यक्षतिकारी, इतरथानुमानस्याप्यप्रामाण्यमासज्येत, तस्याप्यविशदानियतार्थग्राहित्वात् । परमार्थतस्तु त्रिकालव्यापिनः सर्वार्थग्रहणस्वभावत्वेऽपि आवरणतिरस्कृतस्य जीवद्रव्यस्य चक्षुरादिसामग्रीसापेक्षावरणक्षयोपशमवशात् संनिहितस्पष्टार्थग्रहणपरिणामः प्रत्यक्षमित्युच्यते । शब्दसापेक्षक्षयोपशमात् नियतानियताविशदार्थग्रहणपरिणामस्तु शाब्दमिति । तन्न तदुत्पत्तितदाकारते प्रत्यक्षे शाब्देऽन्यस्मिन् वा ज्ञाने वास्तव्यौ स्तः । तस्मात्पारमार्थिकाभिधेयप्रयोजनसंबन्धप्रतिपादकमेतदादिवाक्यमिति स्थितम् ॥

तत्राभिधेयं वाच्यं, तच्चेह प्रमाणम्, तस्यैव प्रकरणेन प्रतिपाद्यत्वात्, तत्प्रमाण इत्यवयवेन लक्षयति । प्रयोजनं द्विधा, श्रोतुः कर्तुश्च । पुनरपि द्विविधं

अध्यवसायो विकल्पनम् । चिकिचिकायमानेति । चिकिचिकाशब्दो देदिप्यमानार्थः; स चानुकरणे पटपटाशब्दवद् डाजन्तः तद्वदाचरति । वास्तव्याविति । वस्तुशब्दात् वस्तुनि परमार्थे “भवे” (सि० हे० ६-३-१२३) इति भवार्थाण्प्रत्ययास्तादीप्रत्ययः । पारमार्थिक्यावित्वर्थः । वास्तव्यशब्दात् स्त्रियामाप्रत्यये वास्तव्ये इति स्यात् ।

तत्रेत्यादि । तत्रेति सप्तम्यर्थे वर्तमानो निर्धारणे वर्तते, तच्च अभिधेयत्वगुणेन ।
द्वयमर्थः—तेषामभिधेयादीन मध्येऽभिधेयं किमुच्यते । ग्राह—वाक्यमिति । अभिधेयशब्दस्य

अनन्तरं व्यवहितं च । तत्र श्रोतुरनन्तरप्रयोजनं प्रमाणविषया व्युत्पत्तिः, कर्तुर्व्युत्पद्यमानस्य प्राज्ञत्वात् शिष्यस्य व्युत्पादनम् । तत्रात्मप्रयोजनं दर्शयन्नारभ्यते इति अस्य मयेतिपदसव्यपेक्षत्वात् । शिष्यप्रयोजनं तु व्युत्पदित्यनेनोपसर्गधातुसमुदायेनैव तदन्तर्गतं लप्स्यते इत्यभिप्रायवान् कर्ता आत्मव्यापारं णिजन्तेन निर्दिशति—प्रमाणव्युत्पादनार्थमिति । व्यवहितप्रयोजनं द्वेषा, व्यावहारिकं पारमार्थिकं च । व्यावहारिकं हेयोपादेयोपेक्षणीयेष्वर्थेषु हानोपादानोपेक्षालक्षणम् । पारमार्थिकं अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसावाप्तिरिति । एतत् साक्षादनुक्तमप्यनन्तरप्रयोजनफलत्वात् तद्वचनेनैवाक्षिप्तमवगन्तव्यम् । संबन्धस्तूपायोपेयलक्षणः, तत्रोपेयं प्रकरणार्थपरिज्ञानम्, प्रकरणमुपायः, ततस्तदभिलषता प्रकरणमिदमारम्भणीयमिति अनुक्तोऽपि वचनेन संबन्धोऽर्थाद् गम्यते इति तात्पर्यार्थः ।

अधुनाक्षरार्थो विव्रियते — तत्र यद्यपि प्रमाणशब्दस्य सर्वकारकैर्भवेन च व्युत्पत्तेः सुकरत्वात् “कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम्” (पा० ३-३-११३) अन्यत्रापि (पा० ३-३-१३०) इति वचनाद् यथाक्रममी कर्त्र्थ्यादिकारकभावव्युत्पत्त्या प्रमाणशब्दवाच्याः, तद् यथा—आत्मार्थज्ञानार्थक्रियाकारणकलापक्षयोपशमक्रियारूपाः, तथापीह ज्ञानमेवाधिक्रियते, तस्यैव परीक्षाक्षमत्वात्, इतरेषां परीक्षायाः तत्पुरःसरत्वात्, वैयर्थ्याच्च । तथा हि— नार्थस्तावदात्मनः परीक्षया, तस्य भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तज्ञानेषु समानत्वात् । नाप्यर्थस्य, तस्योपेयत्वात्, उपायभूतज्ञानपरीक्षणेनैव गतत्वात् । नार्थक्रियायाः तदवगतौ परीक्षावैयर्थ्यात् । नापि कारणकलापस्य, ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः प्राक् स्वरूपानवगतेः, पश्चात् तत्स्वरूपनिर्णयादेव तत्साद्गुण्यवैगुण्यावगतेर्नैरर्थक्यात् । नापि क्षपोपशमस्य, तस्य ज्ञानोत्पादोन्नीयमानरूपत्वात् । नापि प्रमितिमात्रस्य तस्य प्रमाणसाध्यतया, तच्चारुताद्वारेणैव समीचीनता सिद्धेरिति । तदयमभिप्रायः — यद्यपि अनन्तधर्माध्यासिते वस्तुनि सर्व एव शब्दार्थानिरूपचरिता घटन्ते, तथापि येनार्थं परिच्छिद्यार्थक्रियासमर्थार्थप्रार्थनया प्रवर्तन्ते

वाच्यमिति नाम पर्याय इति यादत् । तत्रैवं स्थिते अभिषेयं वाच्यं—प्रतिपादनीयमिति । आत्मप्रयोजनमित्यादि । आत्मप्रयोजनं दर्शयन् कर्ता, आत्मनो व्यापारं यथाकर्तृचिद् व्युत्पत्स्यन्ते शिष्याः, परं मया व्युत्पाद्यमाना व्युत्पद्यन्तामिति प्रयोजकत्वमिनन्तेन कथयतीति सम्बन्धः । ननु प्रमाणव्युत्पादमिदनाथमारभ्यते इत्युक्ते प्रयोजनमात्रं दर्शितं नात्मन इति चेत्, आह— आरभ्यते इत्यस्य मयेतिपदसव्यपेक्षत्वादिति । ननु तथापि पूर्वं कर्तुः श्रोतुश्च प्रयोजनमभिहितम्, अत्र कर्तुः रेवेति तत्कथमित्याह—अभिप्रायवान् । केनोल्लेखेन योऽभिप्रायः । आह—शिष्यप्रयोजनमित्यादि । तदन्तर्गतमिति । व्युत्पादनान्तर्गतम् । अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसावाप्तिरिति । अभ्युदयोऽपवर्गप्राप्तेरेवाग् देवलोकासुकुललाभादिकं सांसारिकं कल्याणम्, निश्चितं केवलपरमानन्दमयत्वात् श्रेयः कल्याणं समासान्ते अति निःश्रेयसं मुक्तिस्तयोः प्राप्तिः । यद्यपि चेहाभ्युदयसामान्यग्रहणेन तद्विशेषस्वरूपस्य निःश्रेयसस्यापि ग्रहः सिद्धः, तथापि गोबलीवर्दन्यायेनोभयोरभिधानमिति ।

नार्थ इति । न प्रयोजनम् । नाप्यर्थस्येति । अत्राग्निषु च स्थानेषु परीक्षया प्रयोजनमिति संबन्धनीयम् । उन्नीयमानरूपत्वादिति । उत्पूर्वाङ्गिनयतेः कर्मणि यण्,

प्रमातारस्तदेवेह ज्ञानमात्मना सह धर्मिरूपतया तादात्म्येऽपि धर्मरूपतया व्यतिरिक्तं प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । तस्य व्युत्पादनम् परपरिकल्पित-लक्षणादिव्युदासेन स्वाभिप्रेतलक्षणादिस्वरूपप्रकाशनम् । तदर्थ—अर्थशब्दः प्रयोजनपर्यायः इदम् इति अर्थरूपतया स्वचेतसि विवर्तमानप्रकरणशरीरं परामृशति । द्विविधं हि प्रकरणशरीरम्, शब्दोऽर्थश्चेति, बहिः शब्दरूपतया प्रकाशयिष्यमाणत्वेऽप्यन्तस्तत्त्वार्थाकारेण प्रत्यक्षत्वाद् । आरभ्यते इति पदवाक्य-श्लोकादिरचनया प्रक्रियते इति यावत् ।

इह च लक्षणसंख्यागोचरफलेषु प्रमाणं प्रति विप्रतिपद्यन्ते परे । तथा हि लक्षणे तावत्, प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानमिति सौमताः । अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तु प्रमाणमिति मीमांसकाः । अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणमिति नैयायिकादयः ॥ तथा संख्यायां, प्रत्यक्षानुमाने द्वे एव प्रमाणे इति सौमताः । प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दो-पमानार्थापित्यभावाः प्रमाणानीति मीमांसकाः । प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दोपमानानि प्रमाणानीति नैयायिकाः । प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दानि प्रमाणानीति वैशेषिकाः । एतान्येव सांख्याः । प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति चार्वाकाः ॥ तथा गोचरे, परस्पर-

निर्णीयमानत्वादित्यर्थः । प्रकरणशरीरमिति । प्रकरणस्य स्वरूपम् । पदेत्यादि । पदं प्रसिद्धम्, वाक्यं विशिष्टपदसमुदायः । यदाह—

पदानां संहतिर्वाक्यं सापेक्षाणां परस्परम् ।

साख्याताः कल्पनास्तत्र पश्चात्तन्तु यथायथम् ॥

श्लोकश्लेषोमात्रम् । आदिग्रहणात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानप्रकरणादिग्रहः ॥

सौमता इति । सुष्ठु अपुनरावृत्त्या गतं गमनं, सर्वे गत्यर्था ज्ञानार्था इति न्यायात् शोभनं ज्ञानं वा यस्य स तथा, स देवता येषां "सास्य देवता" (पा० ४-२-२४) इति अण्; यद्वा सुगतस्य इमे सौमताः, "तस्येदम्" (पा० ४-३-१२०) इति अण् । मीमांसका इति । मीमांसाशब्दः पूजितविचारवचनस्तां विदन्त्यधीयते वा, क्रमादिभ्यो वुन् (पा० ४-२-६१) इत्यकप्रत्ययः । यद्वा मीमांसयन्ति विचारयन्ति यथावस्थितस्वरूपेण प्रमाणप्रमेयादिवस्तुजातमिति मीमांसकाः कर्तरि वुण् । नैयायिकादय इति । न्यायं विदन्त्यधीयते वा "क्रतूकथादेश्ठण्" इति विश्रान्तसूत्रेण ठण् "ठस्येकः" इतीकादेशः ।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दोपमानार्थापित्यभावाः प्रमाणानीति । यदाहुस्तद्वादिदनः—

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शाब्दं चोपमया सह ।

अर्थापत्तिरभावश्च षट् प्रमाणानि जैमिनेः ॥ इति ॥

प्रमाकरस्य वा अभावप्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षविशेषं वदतः पञ्च प्रमाणानीति । प्रत्यक्षानु-मानशब्दानि प्रमाणानीति वैशेषिका इति । व्योमशिवाभिप्रायेणैतत्प्रमाणान्नित्यमवोचदा-चार्यः । कन्दलीकारस्तु प्रत्यक्षानुमाने द्वे एव प्रमाणे प्राह । नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोऽस्त्या विशेषाः, विशेषा एव वैशेषिकम्; "विनयादेः" (पा० ५-४-३४) इति स्वार्थे ठण्; ततो वैशेषिकं विदन्त्यधीयते वा वैशेषिकाः, "तद्वैशेषिके" (सिद्ध० हे० ६-२-११७) इत्यण् ॥ एतान्येव सांख्या इति । संख्या पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि; यदाहुः सांख्याः—

विनिर्जुठितक्षणक्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणानि स्वलक्षणानि प्रमाणगोचरस्तात्त्विक इति बौद्धाः । सामान्यविशेषात्मकं वस्त्विति मीमांसकाः परस्परविभक्तौ सामान्य-विशेषाविति नैयायिकवैशेषिकाः । त्रैगुण्यरूपं सामान्यमिति सांख्याः । भूतचतुष्टयं प्रमाणभूमीति चार्वाकाः ॥ तथा फलेऽपि विप्रतिपद्यन्ते, अर्थाधिगतिः प्रमाण-फलमिति सौगताः । पूर्वं पूर्वं प्रमाणमुत्तरमुत्तरं तु फलमिति मीमांसकादयः ।

तत्र तावल्लक्षणसंख्याविप्रतिपत्ती निराचिकीर्षुराहः—

प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं, बाधविर्जितम् ।

प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा, मेयविनिश्चयात् ॥ १ ॥

तत्रापि पूर्वार्धेन लक्षणविप्रतिपत्तिमुत्तरार्धेन तु संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराचष्टे । लक्षणं च पररूपेभ्यो व्यावर्तनक्षमोऽसाधारणधर्मः । लक्ष्यते परिच्छिद्यते विजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तं लक्ष्यं येन तल्लक्षणमित्युच्यते । तच्चेह द्वये प्रत्याय्याः स्वदर्शनानुरक्तान्तःकरणास्तीर्थान्तरीयाः विप्रतिपत्ताः, तथा मुग्धबुद्धयो लौकिका अव्युत्पन्नाश्चेति । ततश्च यदादौ विप्रतिपन्नान् प्रति लक्षणं तदेवं लक्ष्यलक्षणभावो द्रष्टव्यः । यदिदं भवतामस्माकं च प्रमाणमिति प्रसिद्धम्, तत्स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविर्जितम् मन्तव्यम्; प्रसिद्धं प्रमाणमनुद्याप्रसिद्धं स्वपराभासित्वादि विधीयते । यदा तु अव्युत्पन्नमतीन् प्रतीदं लक्षणम्, तदा प्रतिप्राणि स्वपर-प्रकाशिनो ज्ञानस्य बाधारहितस्य कस्यचित् सिद्धत्वात्, अन्यथा प्रतिनियत-व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्, एवं ते बोध्यन्ते — यददो भवतां क्वचिन्नियतार्थग्राहि स्वपरप्रकाशकं बाधरहितं ज्ञानं प्रसिद्धं तत् प्रमाणमिति बुध्यन्ताम् । अत्रापि सिद्धस्यानुवादोऽसिद्धस्य विधानं योज्यम् ॥

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र तत्राश्रमे रतः ।

जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥ १ ॥

तां विदन्त्यधीयते वा सांख्याः; पूर्ववदण् । तालव्यादिरपि शाङ्ख्यध्वनिरस्तीति वृद्धाम्नायः । तथाहि — शङ्खनामा कश्चिदाद्यः पुरुषविशेषः; तस्यापत्यं पीत्रादिरिति गर्गादित्वाद्यप्रत्ययः ॥ प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमिति चार्वाका इति । चर्वं अदने चर्वन्ति भक्षयन्ति तत्त्वतो न मन्यन्ते पुष्यपापादिकं परोक्षं वस्तुजातमिति चार्वाकाः; मवाकश्यामाकेत्यादि सिद्धहेमोणादिदण्डकेन (सू० ३७) निपातनात् ॥ प्रमाणसंख्यासंग्रहाय श्लोकश्चात्र—

चार्वाकोऽध्यक्षमेकं, सुगतकणभुजौ सानुमानं, सशाब्दं ।

तद्द्वैतं पारमर्षः, सहितमुपमया तत्त्रयं चाक्षपादः ॥

अर्थापत्या प्रभाकृद् वदति, स निखिलं मन्यते भट्ट एतत् ।

साभावं, द्वे प्रमाणे जिनपतिसमये स्पष्टतोऽस्पष्टश्च ॥

त्रैगुण्यरूपं सामान्यमिति । त्रयो गुणाः सरबरजस्तमांसि, ततः स्वार्थे “ण्योऽनन्तादेः” इति ण्यः, त्रयो लोकास्त्रैलोक्यं षड् गुणाः षाड्गुण्यम्, ततस्त्रैगुण्यं रूपं स्वभावो यस्य सामान्यस्य तद् त्रैगुण्यरूपम् । भूतचतुष्टयमिति । पृथ्व्यप्तेजोवायुलक्षणम् ।

अधुनाक्षरार्थः — तत्र प्रमाणमिति पूर्ववत् । स्व आत्मा स्वरूपं, परोऽर्थः, तावाभासयितुं प्रकाशयितुं शीलमस्य तत्तथा । ज्ञायते निर्णीयते तत्त्वं येन तद् ज्ञानम् । बाध्यतेऽनेनेति बाधः, विपरीतार्थोपस्थापकप्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरिति यावत् । तेन विशेषेण वर्जितं रहितं यज्ज्ञानं तत् प्रमाणमिति संटङ्कः ॥

इह च व्यवच्छेद्यापेक्षया लक्षणो विशेषणप्रवृत्तेः स्वपराभासि इत्यनेन ये स्वाभास्येव ज्ञानं मन्यन्ते ज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धविशेषाः, ये च पराभास्येव मीमांसक-नैयायिकादयस्ते निरस्ताः । ते हि बहिरर्थाभावात् ज्ञानं स्वांशपर्यवसितसत्ताक-मित्याचक्षीरन्, तदयुक्तम्, ज्ञेयार्थाभावे ज्ञानाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अथार्थाभावेऽपि स्वप्नदशायां वनदेवकुलादिनानाप्रतिभासं ज्ञानमवलोकितमिति तथाभूतं सकलं ब्रूषे, तन्न, तस्यापि जाग्रदवस्थाभाविस्द्भूतार्थदर्शनसंपादितात्मसंस्कारमिद्धादिकारण-कलापसंनिधानप्रबोधव्यपेक्षत्वात्, इतरथात्यन्तानुभूतभूतपञ्चकातिरिक्तषष्ठभूत-प्रतिभासः स्यात् । किं च । कथमेकं ज्ञानं सितपीताद्यनेकाकारविवर्तमिति प्रष्टव्यो भवान् । अनाद्यविद्यावासनात् इति चेत्, अत्रापि विकल्पयुगलममलमवतरति, ततो ज्ञानात् सा वासना व्यभैत्सीद् न वा । व्यत्यरैक्षीच्चेद्, एवं सति तद्ग्राहक-प्रमाणमभिधानीयम्, ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तायाः संवेदनाभावात्, तत्संवेदने चार्थस्यापि व्यतिरिक्तस्य संवेदनमिति स दुष्प्रतिषेधः स्यात् । वेद्यवेदकाकारकलुषिताज्ज्ञाना-देव व्यतिरिक्ता तत्कारणभूता ज्ञानरूपैव सानुमीयते इति चेन्न, तथा सह संबन्ध-

केचिदेव तु चार्वाकिकदेशीया आकाशलक्षणं पञ्चमं भूतमभिमन्यमानाः पञ्चभूतात्मकं जगदाचक्षते इति ॥

तीर्थान्तरीयेत्यादि । तीर्थेते भवाब्धिरनेनेति तीर्थं द्वादशाङ्गं तदाधारो वा संघः, तस्मादन्यत्तीर्थान्तरं तत्र भवास्तीर्थान्तरीयाः । लौकिका इति । लोके भवा अघ्यात्मादेरा-कृतिगणत्वात् “अघ्यात्मादेः” इति शैशिकश्रुत् ।

तस्यापीत्यादि । स्वप्नदशाज्ञानस्यापि जाग्रदवस्थायां भवनशीलं यत्सद्भूतार्थदर्शनं तेन संपादितो य आत्मनः संस्कारस्तस्य मिद्धादिकारणकलापसंनिधानेन यः प्रबोधस्तं व्यपेक्षते, “कर्मण्यण्” (पा० ३-२-१) तद्भावस्तस्मात् । मिद्धादीति । मिद्धशब्दो निद्रा-भिधायी नपुंसकः । यद्विनिश्चयटीकायां धर्मोत्तरः—मिद्धं निद्रेति । आदिशब्दाददृष्टं दध्यादिभोजनं सजलादिदेशो निशीथादिकालो वातादिः प्रकृतिर्वातादिदूषितत्वं चेत्यादि गृह्यते । तथा चान्नार्थे आगमः—

अणुहृयदिट्टुचित्तियसुयपयइविचारदेवपाण्था ।

सुमिणस्स निमित्ताहं पुण्यं पावं च नाभावो ॥१॥

(विशे० भा० १७०३)

[अनुभूतदृष्टचिन्तितश्रुतप्रकृतिविकारदेवतानूपाः ।

स्वप्नस्य निमित्तानि पुण्यं पापं च नाभावः ॥१॥]

अत्र ‘अणुयेति’ अनूपः सजलदेशः ॥ वेद्येत्यादि । एवशब्दो भिन्नक्रमे, ततोऽयमर्थः—वेद्यवेदकाकारकलुषितादेव ज्ञानाद् व्यतिरिक्ता न तु ज्ञानमात्रादपीति, अत

ग्रहणाभावात्, दृष्टहान्यदृष्टपरिकल्पनाप्रसङ्गाच्च । किं च । यथा व्यतिरिक्त-
वासनावशादेवमपि ज्ञानं नानाकारम्, तथा जडमपि तद्वशादेव बोधरूपं प्रकाशत
इति विपरीतापत्तेरर्थ एव सिद्धिमास्कन्देद् न ज्ञानम् । अथाव्यतिरिक्ता, हन्त
ज्ञानमेव तन्न वासना तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तत्स्वरूपवदित्यास्तां तावत् । परा-
भास्यपि स्वप्रकाशाभावादिभेदधीरन्, तदप्यसंबद्धम् । स्वप्रकाशाभावे परप्रकाशा-
योगात् । न हि प्रदीपः स्वरूपमनुद्द्योतयन् घटाद्युद्द्योतने व्याप्रियते । स्वयं
चाप्रतीतमपि यद्यर्थं ग्राहयति ज्ञानम्, देवदत्तस्योत्पन्नं (ज्ञानं) यज्ञदत्तं
ग्राहयेत्, विशेषाभावात् । अन्यच्च । परप्रकाशनमात्रेऽपि दूरासन्नादिभेदः प्रथमा-
नानामर्थानां किमपेक्षश्चकास्ति, शरीरापेक्ष इति चेत्, न, तस्यापि प्रकाशयता-
विशेषात्, तस्मादन्तर्मुखाकारस्य बहिरर्थग्रहणे सति अयं घटामाटीकते नान्यथा ।
अथार्थापत्त्यादिना प्रमाणान्तरेण तदन्तर्निविष्टं गृह्यते, ततस्तदपेक्षया योक्ष्यते
दूरासन्नादिभेद इति चेत्, न, तत्रापि विकल्पयुगलकानतिवृत्तेः । तथा हि—
तत्प्रमाणान्तरं स्वप्रकाशमन्यप्रकाशं वा । स्वप्रकाशं चेत्, प्रथमस्य किं क्षूणम् ।
अन्यप्रकाशं चेत्, तत्रापीयमेव वार्ता इत्यनवस्था, तस्मात् स्वरूपमवभासयदेव
ज्ञानमर्थग्रहणाय व्याप्रियते इति स्थितम् ॥

एव आह— तत्कारणभूता वेद्यवेदकाकारकलुषज्ञानस्य हेतुभूता । ज्ञानरूपवेति ।
अयमभिप्रायः—ज्ञानरूपा वासना पूर्वक्षणवर्तिनी वेद्यवेदकाकारकलुषमुत्तरक्षणवति विज्ञानं
जनयतीति । तयेत्यादि । तथा वासनया सह वेद्यवेदकाकारकलुषज्ञानस्य कार्यकारणभाव-
लक्षणसम्बन्धग्रहणाभावात् तदभावश्च भवदभिप्रायेण पूर्वापरक्षणवतिज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्य
ग्राहकस्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वात् । दृष्टहानीत्यादि । घटादिसहितचक्षुरादिसामग्रीतोऽन्वय व्यतिरेकाभ्यां
ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति दृष्टस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृतस्य व्यवहारस्य हानिः, तथा प्रत्यक्षादिभिः प्रमा-
णैरसंवेद्यमानायाः वासनायाः सकाशात् सितपीतादिनानाकारकलितमध्यक्षमुत्पद्यते इत्यदृष्टं
तस्य परिकल्पना तयोः प्रसङ्गात् । जडमपीति । अचिद्रूपमपि ज्ञानम् । नहीति । यदुक्तम्—

दीपवनोपपद्येत बाह्यवस्तुप्रकाशनम् ।

अनात्मवेदने ज्ञाने जगदाध्यं प्रसज्यते ॥१॥

विशेषाभावादिति । देवदत्तोत्पन्नज्ञानस्य देवदत्तयज्ञदत्ताभ्यामसंवेद्यमानत्वेनावि-
शेषात् । प्रथमानानामिति । प्रकाशमानानाम् । अन्तर्मुखेत्यादि । अन्तर्मुखोऽन्तःप्रकाशक
आकारो यस्य ज्ञानस्य तस्यैव बाह्यार्थपरिच्छेदे सति अयं दूरासन्नादिभेदः संगच्छते ।
अर्थापत्त्यादिनेति । यदि ज्ञानं मयि उत्पन्नं न स्यात् तर्हि अर्थप्रकटता मे न स्यात्
तस्मादर्थप्राकट्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या ज्ञानं शरीरान्तर्निविष्टमिति व्यवस्थाप्यते । यदुक्तम्—

नान्यथेहार्थसद्भावो दृष्टः सन्नुपपद्यते ।

ज्ञानं चेन्नेत्यतः पश्चात्प्रमाणमिति कल्प्यते ॥१॥ इति ।

आदिशब्दान्मैयाधिकमताभिप्रायेण प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यते । तथा हि—तेषां मते घटादि-
विषयं प्रत्यक्षं घटमेव परिच्छिनन्ति, यदा च घटप्रत्यक्षविषयं मानसाभिधानं प्रत्यक्षान्तर-
मुत्पद्यते तदा तेन घटादिविषयं प्रत्यक्षं मम उदपद्यतेति निश्चीयेत । तथा येषां
मतेऽनुमानात्पृथगर्थापत्तिर्नश्यते, तन्मतेऽनुमानेन ज्ञानं समोदपादीति व्यवस्थाप्यते इति,

‘ज्ञानम्’ इत्यनेन तु यन्नैयायिकादिभिः पर्यकल्प संनिकर्षः प्रमाणमिति, तस्य प्रामाण्यं निरस्यति । यतः स्नानपानावगाहनाद्यर्थक्रियानिर्वर्तनक्षममर्थं निश्चित्याव्यवधानेन प्रवर्तन्ते प्रमातारस्तदेव ज्ञानं प्रमाणं न संनिकर्षो जडतयास्ति, अव्यवहितनिर्णयाभावादित्याकूतम् । अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुत्वात्तस्य प्रामाण्यमिति चेत्, विशीर्णदानौ प्रमाणेयत्ता, देहादेरपि तत्कारणतया प्रामाण्यापत्तेरित्यास्तां तावत् ।

‘बाधविवर्जितम्’ इत्यमुना तु यत्तिमिरादितिरस्कृतनयनदीधिति-प्रसरादिना नभस्तलावम्बिनिशीथिनीनाथद्वयादिप्रतिभासम्, यच्च कुतर्कभ्रान्त-चेतसां निजदर्शनाकर्णनप्रभवं क्षणक्षयिसामान्यविशेषैकान्तेश्वरादिकृतभुवनप्रति-भासं ज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यनीकार्थप्रत्यायकप्रमाणान्तरोपनिपातप्लावितत्वात् प्रतिक्षिपति । विशेषार्थविशब्दोपादानात् यः खलु बहुलकामलावलेपलुप्तलोचनवलानां धवले जलजे पीतिमानमादधानो बोधः समुल्लसति, स यद्यपि सकलं कालं तद्दोषाव्युपरमे प्रमातुर्निजदर्शनेन बाध्यते, तथापि तज्जलजधवलताग्राहिणा जनान्तरदर्शनेन बाधितत्वान्न प्रमाणमित्युक्तं भवति ।

समस्तलक्षणेन तु यत्परे प्रत्यपीपदन् अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तुं प्रमाणम् अविस्वादकं प्रमाणम्, अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणम् इत्यादि तन्निरास्यत्, तथा हि—अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वं किमभिधीयते ? ज्ञानान्तरेणानधिगतमर्थं यदधिगच्छति तत्प्रमाणमिति चेत्, तर्हि तज्ज्ञानान्तरं परकीयं स्वकीयं वा । तद्यदि परकीयम्, तदयुक्तम्, सर्वज्ञज्ञानस्य सकलार्थगोचरतया सर्वप्राकृतंलोकज्ञानानामधिगतार्थाधि-गन्तृत्वेनाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्, तदर्थग्राहिजनान्तरदर्शनसंभवाच्च । अथ स्वकीयं, तत्रापि सोऽधिगम्योऽर्थः किं द्रव्यमुत पर्यायो वा ? द्रव्यविशिष्टपर्यायः, पर्याय-विशिष्टं वा द्रव्यमिति ? तथा किं सामान्यमुत विशेषः ? आहोस्वित् सामान्य-विशिष्टो विशेषः विशेषविशिष्टं वा सामान्यम् ? इत्यष्टौ पक्षाः । तत्र यद्याद्य-

तदप्यनुमानमत्रादिशब्दाद् गृह्यते । तच्चानुमानं द्वेषा, दष्टं सामान्यतोदष्टं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदाहार्थानुमापकं दष्टम्, यथा धूमो धूमध्वजस्य । स्वरूपविप्रकृष्टार्थं तु सामान्यतोदष्टं, यथा गन्धादिज्ञानं घ्राणादेः । तथा हि—गन्धाद्युपलब्धिः करणकार्या, क्रियात्वात्, या क्रिया सा करणकार्या यथा छिदिक्रिया, क्रिया चैयम्, तस्मात्करणकार्या; तथात्रत्यमप्यनुमानं स्वरूप विप्रकृष्टार्थमिति सामान्यतोदष्टम् । तथा हि—अर्थप्राकृत्यं विशिष्टकारणजन्यम्, विशिष्टकार्यत्वात्, यद् यद् विशिष्टकार्यं तद् तद् विशिष्टकारणजन्यं यथा चित्रादि, विशिष्टकार्यं चेदम्, तस्माद्विशिष्टकारणजन्यम् । ततश्च यद्यपि परप्रकाश्येव ज्ञानं तथापि अर्थापत्यादिना प्रमाणेन ज्ञानं मे समुत्पन्नमिति निश्चीयते ।

अत इति । ज्ञानात् । आकूतम् अभिप्रायः ।

अणुक्षयीत्यादि । क्षणेन क्षयः स यस्य वस्तुनोऽस्ति तच्च सामान्यविशेषयोरेकान्तश्च ईश्वर आदिर्यस्य प्रकृत्यात्मस्वभावादेस्तेन कृतं भुवनं च तेषां प्रतिभासो यत्र ज्ञाने तत्तथा । प्लावितत्वाविति । बाधितत्वात् । जलजे शङ्खे । अथ द्वितीयमिति । उररीकुरुषे इति पाश्चात्य विकल्पसंबद्धं क्रियापदमिहापि संबध्यते, एवमुत्तरविकल्पेष्वपि ।

मुररीकुरुषे, तद्युक्तम्, द्रव्यस्य नित्यत्वैकत्वाभ्यामनधिगतत्वांशाभावात् । अथ द्वितीयम्, तदप्यचार, पर्यायस्य प्राचीनसंवेदनोदयसमयध्वस्तस्य संवेदानान्तरप्रभवकालं यावत्प्रतीक्षणासंभवेन विशेषणानर्थक्यात् । उत तृतीयम्, तदप्यसाधीयः, विकल्पद्वयानतिक्रमात् । स हि द्रव्यविशिष्टः पर्यायः समकालभाविना ज्ञानेनानधिगतोऽतिगम्यते, यद्वा कालान्तर भाविनेति । न तावत्समकालभाविना, तत्संभवाभावेनविशेषणवैफल्यात् । न हि संभवोऽस्त्येकस्य प्रमातुरेककालं द्रव्यत्रोडीकृतैकपर्यायविषयसंवेदनद्वयप्रवृत्तेः तथानुभवाभावात्, परस्परमधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वेनाप्रामाण्य प्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि कालान्तरभाविना, गृह्यमाणपर्यायस्य कालान्तरानास्कन्दनात्, पूर्वोत्तरक्षणत्रुटितवर्तमानक्षणमात्रसंबन्धत्वात्तस्य । एतेन पर्यायविशिष्टद्रव्यपक्षोऽपि प्रतिव्यूढः, समानयोगक्षे मत्वात् । अथ सामान्यं, तदप्यसंबद्धम्, तदेकतया प्रथमज्ञानेन साकल्यग्रहणादुत्तरेषां सामान्यज्ञानानामधिगतार्थगोचरतयाप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । अथ विशेषः, स नित्योऽनित्यो वेति वक्तव्यम् । नित्यश्चेत्, एवं सत्याद्यसंवेदनेनैव तस्य सामस्त्यग्रहणादुत्तरेषां तद्विषयाणामधिगतगोचरत्वेनाप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिः । अनित्यश्चेत्, पर्यायदूषणेन प्रतिक्षिप्तः । अथ सामान्यविशिष्टो विशेषः, कास्य विशिष्टता, किं तादात्म्यमुत तत्संनिधिमात्रम् ? तादात्म्यं चेत्, प्रथमज्ञानेन सामान्यवत्तस्यापि ग्रहणात्, अन्यथा तादात्म्यक्षतेः, तद्विषयान्यज्ञानानामप्रामाण्यं प्रसज्येत । तत्संनिध्यपक्षेऽपि द्वयोरपि परस्परं विशकलितरूपत्वात् पक्षद्वयोदितं दूषणं पश्चालग्नं धावति । विशेषविशिष्टसामान्यपक्षे पुनरेतदेव विपरीतं योज्यम् । तन्न अनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वं ज्ञानस्य कथंचिद् विचारभारगौरवं सहत इत्यलक्षणमिति स्थितम् ॥ अत्रि संवादकत्वमधुना विचार्यते — तत्किं प्रदर्शितार्थप्राप्त्या उत प्राप्तियोग्यार्थोपदर्शकत्वेन आहोस्विदविचलितार्थविषयत्वेन भवान् ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं कथयति ? यदि प्रथमः कल्पः, तदयुक्तम्, जलबुद्बुदादिमुर्षुपदार्थोत्पादितसंवेदनस्याप्रमाणतोत्पत्तेः, प्राप्तिकाले तस्य ध्वस्तत्वात् । अथ द्वितीयः, तदप्यचार, प्राप्त्ययोग्यदेशस्थितग्रहनक्षत्रादिगोचरज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसवतेः, अनुचितदेशावस्थानेनैव प्राप्त्यनर्हत्वात्तेषाम् । अथ तृतीयः पक्षः, तत्राप्यविचलितविषयतां कथमवैषि ? ज्ञानान्तरेण तद्विषयनिराकरणाभावादिति चेत् एतदेवास्माभिरुदितं किं भवतः परुषमाभाति ? न हि स्वपरप्रकाशि ज्ञानं बाधारहितं विमुच्यान्यस्य विषयानिराकरणं ज्ञानान्तरेण प्रेक्षामहे । तत्तदेव न्यायात्प्रमाणां भवद्भिरभ्युपगतमिति । अर्थोपलब्धिहेतुः प्रमाणमित्येतदपि न परीक्षां क्षमते, शरीरादेरपि तत्कारणातया प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । अव्यवहितमर्थोपलम्भकारणं प्रमाणां न देहादिकमिति चेत्, एवं तर्हि ज्ञानमेव स्वपराविभाक्कं

समानयोगक्षेमत्वाविति । अलब्धस्य लाभो योगः, लब्धस्य परिपालनं क्षेमः, तथा समानो द्रव्यविशिष्टपर्यायपक्षेण तुल्यो दूषणलाभलक्षणो योगश्च दूषणस्य दुरुत्तरत्वात् परिपालनरूपः क्षेमश्च यस्य पर्यायविशिष्टद्रव्यपक्षस्य तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । अथ

निर्बाधकं च प्रमाणं न संनिकर्षादि, तत्सद्भावेऽप्यर्थपरिच्छेदाभावात् । तस्मा-
देतदेव चारु प्रमाणलक्षणमिति ॥

अधुना तत्संख्यामाह—प्रत्यक्षं चेत्यादि । तत्र सिद्धान्तप्रसिद्धपारमार्थिक-
प्रत्यक्षापेक्षयाक्षशब्दो जीवपर्यायतया प्रसिद्धः, इह तु व्यावहारिकप्रत्यक्षप्रस्तावा-
दक्षध्वनिरिन्द्रियवचनो गृह्यते ।

ततश्चाक्षं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षम् । यदिन्द्रियमाश्रित्योज्जिहीतेऽर्थसाक्षात्कारि-
ज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः । एतच्च प्रत्यक्षशब्दव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

सामान्यमिति । अनधिगतः सन्नधिगम्योऽर्थोऽभिधीयत इति शेषः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि
सिद्धान्तप्रसिद्धेत्यादि । तथा च भगवान् भद्रबाहुः—

जीवो अक्खो तं पइ जं वट्टइ तं तु होइ पच्चक्खं ।
परओ पुण अक्खस्स वट्टन्तं होइ पारोक्खं ॥१॥
केसिचि इंदियाइ अक्खाइं तदुवलद्धि पच्चक्खं ।
तं तु न जुज्जइ जम्हा अग्गाहगमिदियं विसए ॥२॥
नवि इंदियाइ उवलद्धिमंति विगएसु विसयसंभरणा ।
जह गेहगवक्खाइं जो अणुसरिया स उवलद्धा ॥३॥
धूमनिमित्तं नाणं अग्गिमि लिगियं जहा होइ ।
तह इंदियाइं लिगं तं नाणं लिगियं न कहुं ॥४॥ इति ।

[जीवोऽक्षः तं प्रति यद् वर्तते तत्तु भवति प्रत्यक्षम् ।
परतः पुनरक्षस्य वर्तमानं भवति परोक्षम् ॥१॥
केषांचिदिन्द्रियाणि अक्षाणि तदुपलब्धि प्रत्यक्षम् ।
तत्तु न युज्यते यस्मात् अज्ञाहकमिन्द्रियं विषये ॥२॥
नापीन्द्रियाणि उपलब्धिमन्ति विगतेषु विषयसंस्मरणात् ।
यथा गेहगवाक्षा योऽनुस्पर्ता स उपलब्धा ॥३॥
धूमनिमित्तं ज्ञानमग्नौ लैङ्गिकं यथा भवति ।
तथेन्द्रियाणि लिङ्गं तज्ज्ञानं लैङ्गिकं न कथम् ॥४॥]

लौकिका अप्यक्षशब्देन जीवमाहुः । यदाह गौडः—

ज्ञानात्मचक्रशकटे पाशकव्यवहारयोः ।
तुषे कर्षे पुमानक्षं तुच्छे सौवर्चलेन्द्रिये ॥
विभीतकधूतचक्रनाभिगतावयवेष्वपि । पुंसि—इति ।

इदमिह सिद्धान्तरहस्यम्—

एगन्तेण परोक्खं लिगियमोहाइयं च पच्चक्खं ।
इंदियमणोभवं जं तं संववहारपच्चक्खं ॥१॥ (विश्वे० भा० ६५)

[एकान्तेन परोक्षं लैङ्गिकमवध्यादि च प्रत्यक्षम् ।
इन्द्रियमनोभवं यत् तत् संव्यवहारप्रत्यक्षम् ॥]
अत्र 'ओहाइयं' इति अवधिमनःपर्यवकैवलरूपं ज्ञानत्रयम् ।

स ह्येवं व्युत्पादितोऽपि साक्षाद् ग्राह्यग्राहकं ज्ञानविशेषं लक्षयति, तत्रैव रूढत्वात्, यथा गमनक्रियायां व्युत्पादितोऽपि गोशब्दः ककुदादिमन्तं पिण्डविशेषं गच्छन्तम-गच्छन्तं वा गोचरयति, तत्रैव तस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात्, न गमन क्रियायुक्तमपि पुरुषादिकं विपर्ययादिति । ततश्च सर्वज्ञज्ञानानां यत्स्वरूपसंवेदनं तदपि प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तं भवति । तत्रापि स्वरूपस्य ग्राह्यस्य साक्षात्करणसद्भावादिति । अक्षेभ्यः परतो वर्तते इति परोक्षम्, अक्षव्यापारनिरपेक्षमव्यापारेणासाक्षादर्थपरिच्छेदकं यज्ज्ञानं तत्परोक्षमिति भावः । चशब्दौ प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षयोस्तुल्यकक्षतां लक्षयतः । तेन यत्परे प्राहुः प्रत्यक्षं सकलप्रमाणज्येष्ठमित्यादि तदपास्तं भवति, द्वयोरपि प्रामाण्यं प्रत्यविशेषात्, विशदाविशदप्रतिभासविशेषस्य सतोऽपि ज्येष्ठतां प्रत्यनङ्गत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षस्य पुरःसरत्वात्परोक्षस्य कनिष्ठतेति चेत्, नायमेकान्तः, सर्वत्रान्यथानुप-पन्नतावधारितोच्छ्वासनिःश्वासादिजीवलिङ्गसद्भावासद्भावाभ्यां जीवसाक्षात्का-रिप्रत्यक्षक्षूणोऽपि जीवनमृत्प्रतीतिदर्शनात्, अन्यथा लोकव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गात् । क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षगृहीतसंबन्धवलात्परोक्षं प्रवर्तते इति प्रत्यक्षस्य ज्येष्ठत्रकल्पने पश्य मृगो धावतीत्यादिशब्दवलात्कृकाटिकामोटनद्वारेण मृगविषयं, तथा स्मरणात्संकेतग्रहणाद्वा अपूर्वापूर्वार्थदर्शनकुतूहलादिना वनदेवकुलादिगोचरं परोक्षपूर्वं प्रत्यक्षं दृष्टमिति परोक्षस्य ज्येष्ठतासज्येत ।

द्विधेति । सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणं प्रवर्तते इति न्यायात्, अन्यथानियतार्था प्रदर्शकत्वेन तदुच्चारणवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्, त्रिपरीताकारनिराकरणचातुर्यायोगेन निरा काङ्क्षं प्रवृत्त्यसिद्धेः द्विधैव इत्यवधारणेन परपरिकल्पितविपरीतसंख्यान्तरं

अक्षं प्रतिगतं प्रत्यक्षमिति । अक्षशब्दस्य नपुंसकत्वात् तत्पुरुषस्य चोत्तरपदप्रधान-त्वात् नपुंसकत्वमेव प्राप्तमिति न वाच्यम्, परलिङ्गोद्वन्द्व—इत्यधिकारे अंशीति सिद्धहेमलिङ्गानुशासनसूत्रेण अश्येव तत्पुरुष उत्तरपदलिङ्गभाक्, यथा—अर्धं पिप्पल्या अर्धपिप्पलीयम् अर्धो जरत्या अर्धजरतीयम् । तेनान्यत्र वाच्यलिङ्ग एव तत्पुरुषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षो बोधः प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिः प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानम् ॥ उज्जिहीते उत्पद्यते । विपर्ययात् पुरुषादौ गोशब्दस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात् । तथा स्मरणादित्यादि । अपूर्वापूर्वार्थदर्शनविषये कुतूहलेन आदिशब्दात्प्रयोजनादिना कृत्वा हेतुना वा वनविषयं देवकुलादिविषयं वा परोक्षपूर्व-मध्यक्षमीक्षितम्, कुतूहलाद्यपि कुत इत्याह—स्मरणात्, अनुभूतमर्थं हि स्मृतवोत्पन्नकुतूहलः पुमान् प्रवर्तते इति । तथा संकेतग्रहणात्, गृहीतसंकेतो हि संकेतिते स्थाने जातदिरक्षो द्रष्टुं प्रवर्तते ॥

द्विधेति । सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणमित्यादि । अत्र केचिदाहुः—यथा अत्र द्विधेत्युक्ते द्विधैव न त्वेकधा त्रिधा वेत्येवमन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः, तथा चैत्रो धनुर्धर इत्यादिष्वपि चैत्रस्य धनुर्धरत्वमेव स्यात् न शीवोदार्यधैर्यादयः । तदयुक्तम्, यतः सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणमिति न्यायेऽप्याशङ्कितस्यैव व्यवच्छेदः । परार्थं वाक्यमभिधीयते, यदेव च परेण व्यामोहा-दाशङ्कितं तस्यैव व्यवच्छेदः, चैत्रो धनुर्धर इत्यादौ चैत्रस्य धनुर्धरत्वायोग एव परैराशङ्कित इति तस्यैव व्यवच्छेदो नान्यधर्मस्य । इह तु चावार्कनैयायिकादय एकधमनेकधा च

तिरस्कुरुते, तस्य युक्तिबोधितत्वात् । तथा हि—प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यसत्, परोक्षाभावे तस्यैव प्रामाण्यायोगात् । स हि काश्चित्प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीरर्थक्रिया-समर्थार्थप्रापकत्वेनाव्यभिचारिणीरूपलभ्यान्यास्तद्विपरीततया व्यभिचारिणीश्च, ततः कालान्तरे पुनरपि तादृशेतराणां प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां प्रमाणतेतरते समाचक्षीत । न च पूर्वापरपरामर्शशून्यं पुरोवर्त्यर्थग्रहणपर्यवसितसत्ताकं प्रत्यक्षं पूर्वापरकाल-भाविनीनां प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां सादृश्यनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यमुपलक्षयितुं क्षमते । न चायं स्वप्रतीतिगोचराणामपि प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्यं परं प्रतिपादयितुमीशः । तस्मादवश्यंतया यथादृष्टप्रत्यक्षव्यक्तिसाधर्म्यद्वारेणाधुनातनप्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनां प्रामाण्यप्रत्यायकं परप्रतिपादकं च परोक्षान्तर्गतमनुमानरूपं प्रमाणान्तरमुररी-कर्तव्यम् । परावबोधार्थं च प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणं नान्यदस्तीत्युल्लपन् उन्मत्ततामात्मनो लक्षयति । प्रत्यक्षेण परचेतोवृत्तिसाक्षात्करणाभावाद् व्यापारव्याहारचेष्टा-

प्रमाणमाहुः अतो नियतद्वैविध्यप्रदर्शनेन एकत्वबहुत्वे प्रमाणस्य प्रतिक्षिपति । एवं चायमेवकारस्त्रिधा, अयोगान्ययोगात्यन्तयोगव्यवच्छेदकारित्वात् । यद् विनिश्चयः—

अयोगं योगमपरैरत्यन्तायोगमेव च ।

व्यवच्छिन्नमिति धर्मस्य निपातो व्यतिरेचकः ॥१॥ इति ।

निपात एवकारः, व्यतिरेचको निवर्तकः ।

विशेषणविशेष्याभ्यां क्रियया च सहोदितः ।

विवक्षातोऽप्रयोगेऽपि तस्यार्थोऽयं प्रतीयते ॥२॥

व्यवच्छेदफलं वाक्यं यत्तच्चैत्रो धनुर्धरः ।

पार्थो धनुर्धरो नीलं सरोजमिति वा यथा ॥३॥ इति ।

स हीत्यादि । स प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादी चार्वाकः । तादृशेतराणामिति । तादृश्यश्चेत-राश्चेति द्वन्द्वे पुंवद्भावाभावात् कथमिदमिति न वाच्यम्, सामान्यविशेषभावेन संबन्धात्, यथा—भूतमियं ब्राह्मणीति । तथा च माधः—

तद्वितथमवादीर्यन्मम त्वं प्रियेति

प्रियतमपरिभुक्तं यददुकूलं दधानः ।

मदधिवसतिमागाः कामिनां मण्डनश्री-

व्रंजति हि सफलत्वं वल्लभालोकेनेन ॥इति॥

(शिशु० ११-३३)

अत्र हि सफलस्य भावः सफलत्वम्, ततः किं सफलत्वं याति इत्याकाङ्क्षायां मण्डनश्रीरिति संबन्धः । तथात्रापि समाचक्षीत चार्वाकः—के प्रमाणेतरते । केषां तादृशेतराणाम् । इति जिज्ञासायामभिधीयते—प्रत्यक्षव्यक्तीनाम् । क्वचित्तादृशीतराणामित्यपि पाठो दृश्यते । अयम् चार्वाकः ।

परावबोधार्थं चेत्यादि । प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणं नान्यदस्तीत्येतत् प्रतिपाद्याव-बोधार्थमुल्लपन् उन्मत्ततामात्मनो लक्षयतीति संबन्धः । कुत इति । एतस्माद् न्यायात् ।

विशेषदर्शनाद् बोधविशेषावगतौ परोक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं बलादापततीति न्यायात् । स्वर्गादृष्टदेवतादिप्रतिषेधं न प्रत्यक्षेण कर्तुमर्हति, तस्य संनिहितमात्रविषयत्वात् । न चायं तदप्रतिषेधेन खरखरकचावकितामाप्नोति, प्रमाणान्तरं च तत्प्रतिषेधार्थं च नेच्छतीति विषममेतत्कथं कुर्यादिति सविस्मयं नश्चेतः । किं च । प्रत्यक्षमपि कथं प्रमाणतां स्वीकरोतीति वक्तव्यम्, गृह्यमाणपदार्थान्वयव्यतिरेकानुकरणात् । तथा हि—तत्समग्रसामग्रीकपदार्थवलेनोन्मज्जति, तदभावे विस्फारितेक्षणयुगलस्यापि प्रमातुर्नोदीयते इति ब्रूष, परोक्षेऽपि तर्हि समानमेवैतत्, तदपि बहिरर्थसामर्थ्यादेवोल्लसति, तत्संबद्धलिङ्गशब्दद्वारेण तस्योत्पत्तेः, अन्यथा परोक्षाभासताप्रसङ्गात् । तस्य चालीकत्वे पारमार्थिकपरोक्षप्रामाण्यक्षतेरयोगात्, अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षमपि गगनतलावलम्बिशशधरयुगलावलोकनचतुरमलीकमवलोकितमिति । सकलविशददर्शनानि सत्यताभिमतान्यप्यलीकतामशुवीरन् । तन्न प्रमाणभूतं परोक्षं कदाचन गृह्यमाणपदार्थसत्तां विहायोत्पत्तुमुत्सहेत, इति प्रत्यक्षवत्प्रमाण कोटिमारोहति बलादिति स्थितम् ॥ तथा यदपि परैरुक्तद्वयातिरिक्तं प्रमाणसंख्यानान्तरं प्रत्यज्ञायि, तत्रापि यत्पर्यालोच्यमानमुपमानार्थापत्तिवत्प्रमाणतामात्मसाक्षात्करोति, तदनयोरेव प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षयोरन्तर्भावनीयम् । यत्पुनर्विचार्यमाणं मीमांसक परिकल्पिताभाववत्प्रामाण्यमेव नास्कन्दति, न तेन बहिर्भूतेन वा किञ्चिन्नः प्रयोजनम् अबस्तुत्वादित्यपकर्णनीयम् । अथ कथमुपमानस्य प्रामाण्यमिति ब्रूषे । तदुच्यते । प्रथमं हि विशददर्शनाधिगतोपिण्डविशेषस्य 'यथा गौस्तथा गवयः' इति वाक्याकर्णनाहितात्मसंस्कारस्य पुंसोऽटव्यां पर्यटतो गवयपिण्डविशेषविषयविविक्तदर्शनपुरःसरं यत्पूर्वापरगोगवयपिण्डगोचरदर्शनव्यापारसंपादितजन्मकम् 'अयं तेन सदृशोऽनयोर्वा सादृश्यमिति' सादृश्यविशिष्ट

एनमेव च न्यायमाह—प्रत्यक्षेणोत्पत्तिः । अव्यक्षेण प्रतिपाद्यचेतोवृत्तेः प्रत्यक्षीकरणाभावात् गोबलीवदन्वयायेन व्यापारशब्देन चेष्टाविशेषादन्यैव क्रिया गृह्यते, अन्यथा चेष्टाविशेष इति पुनरुक्तं स्यात् । व्याहारशब्दः चेष्टाविशेषोऽक्षिपक्षमसंकोचादिविशिष्टकायिको व्यापारः, तेषां दर्शनात् । बोधविशेषस्य प्रतिपाद्याभिप्रायस्यावगतावभ्युपगम्यमानायां हठात्परोक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमागच्छति । अयमभिप्रायः—प्रतिपाद्यस्यावबोधो भवतु, एतदर्थं चार्वाको वचनमुच्चारयति; परस्य च सचेतनतया स्तम्भाम्भोरुहादिभ्यो वैलक्षण्यमिदं च बोद्धुमभिप्रेतमिति नाव्यक्षेण लक्षयितुं क्षमते, व्यापारादिदर्शनात् प्रतिपाद्यस्य चैतन्याभिप्रायविशेषयो-रवगतावङ्गीक्रियमाणायां परोक्षस्य प्रामाण्यं बलादायातीति । अदृष्टेति । पुण्यपापे । उन्मज्जति उत्पद्यते । उदीयते । ईङ् गतौ देवादिकः उदेतीत्यर्थः । तत्संबद्धेति । अनुमेय-वाच्यरूपेण बाह्यार्थेन संबद्धी लिङ्गशब्दौ ।

यथा गौरित्यादि । यदुक्तम्—

कीदृग्गवय इत्येवं पृष्टो नागरकैर्यदा ।

ब्रवीत्यारण्यको वाच्यं यथा गौर्गवयस्तथा । इति ॥

(श्लोकवार्तिके ४३३ पृष्ठे)

पिण्डं पिण्डविशिष्टं सादृश्यं गोचरयत्संवेदनमुदीयते तदुपमानमिति । यदा-
हस्तद्वादिनः—

तस्माद्यदृश्यते^१ तत्स्यात् सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।

प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ॥१॥ इति ।

(श्लोकवार्तिके ४४४ पृष्ठे)

ततश्च पूर्वापरदर्शनयोः पुरोवर्तिगोगवयपिण्डग्रहणपर्यवसितसत्ताकत्वात्
पूर्वापरपरामर्शशून्यत्वाद् विशदनिर्भासितया शब्दोल्लेखरहितत्वात् तदधिकम-
व्यभिचरितं व्यवहारकारि सादृश्यमवस्यदुपमानं स्वपरप्रकाशितया निर्बाधकत्वान्च
प्रमाणम् । पूर्वापरपिण्डातिरिक्तमपरं सादृश्यं नोपलभ्यते इति चेत्, कोऽयमुपालम्भो
यदि प्रत्यक्षं तत् । यदि प्रत्यक्षे सादृश्यमुपमानगोचरत्वान्न प्रतिभाति,
कोऽस्यापराधः । न हि ज्ञानान्तरे तद्गोचरो न प्रतिभातीति निर्गोचरं तदिति
वक्तुं शक्यम्, इतरथोपमानेऽपि प्रत्यक्षनिर्ग्राह्या व्यक्तिर्न भातीति निर्गोचर-
मध्यक्षमनुष्येत । तद् यथा स्वविषयेऽध्यक्षं प्रमाणं तथोपमानमपि । न हि द्वयोः
प्रथमानयोरेकं प्रति विशेषाभावे पक्षपातः कर्तुं युक्तः । एतेन प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञान-
स्मृत्यूहादीनामविसंवादनानां परोक्षविशेषाणां प्रामाण्यं व्याख्यातमवगन्तव्यम्,
समानन्यायानुपातित्वात् । तथा हि—प्रथममर्थदर्शनमात्मनि संस्कारमाधत्ते,
तादृशदर्शनादसौ संस्कारः प्रबुध्यते, प्रबुद्धः पूर्वार्थविषयं स एवायं तज्जातीयो
वेत्युल्लेखेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानमुत्थापयति, तस्योर्ध्वतिरश्चीनभेदसामान्यव्यवस्थापकत्वाद्
असंजातपूर्वार्थगोचरदर्शनस्य तदुदयाभावात्, तथा स एव संस्कारस्तादृशार्थं दर्शने-
नाभोगादिना वा प्रबुद्धोऽनुभूतविषया संप्रमोषलक्षणं स्मरणमुपजनयति, अदृष्टार्थस्य

पिण्डमिति । पिण्डशब्दः शरीरवृत्तिः पुंनपुंसकः । यदुक्तम्—‘मधुपिण्डी सुरा-
तन्वोरिति’ । यदिति । गवयपिण्डम् । दृश्यते इति । अटव्यममटता पुंसेति शेषः । सादृश्यं
चेति । गोगवयगतम् । तदन्वितमिति । गोगवयपिण्डसंबद्धम् । तदधिकं गोगवयप्रत्यक्षग्रा-
ह्यादुत्कलितम् । अवस्यत् निश्चिन्वत् । ज्ञानान्तर इति । प्रत्यक्षे । तद्गोचरः उपमान-
विषयः । ददिति । उपमानम् । व्यक्तिः स्वलक्षणम् । तत् तस्मात् । एतेनेति । उपमान-
प्रामाण्यव्यवस्थापनेन । तस्येत्यादि । ननु किमिति संस्कारः स एवायं तज्जातीयो वेति द्वैधं
प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानं जनयति ? आह—तस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानस्य परापरविवर्तव्यापि द्रव्यमूर्ध्वसामान्यं
मृद्वि स्थानकोशादिषु सट्टपरिणामः, तिरश्चीनसामान्यं खण्डमुण्डादिषु भोक्त्वत्, तयोर्द्वयो-
रपि निर्णयिकत्वात् । यदि पुनर्द्वैधं प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानं नोज्जृम्भते, तदोर्ध्वतिरश्चीनभेदभिन्न-
सामान्यव्यवस्था न स्यादिति । अथ पूर्वमर्थदर्शनम्, ततः संस्कारः, ततस्तस्य प्रबोधः, तदनु
प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानमिति परंपराश्रयणनिबन्धनाभावात् प्रथमाक्षरनिपाते एव प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानं किं
नोत्पद्यते इत्याह—न संजातं पूर्वार्थगोचरं दर्शनं यस्य तस्य पुंसः प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानोदया-
भावात्, प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानं हि तादृशदर्शनतः संस्कारप्रबोधे, स च सति संस्कारे, संस्कारश्च
पूर्वमर्थदर्शने एवेति । आभोगादीत्यादि । आभोगः प्रणिधानमवधानमिति यावत्, आदिशब्दा-

[१ मुद्रितपुस्तके “स्मर्यते” इति पठ्यते ।]

पुंसः स्मरणानुपपत्तेरिति । ऊहोऽपि प्रत्यक्षानुमानासंवेद्यसाध्यार्थान्यथानुप-
पन्नत्वलक्षणलिङ्गसंबन्धग्रहणप्रवणः प्रमाणान्तरमिति कथयिष्यते । अर्थापत्तिस्तु
प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरीकृते स्फोटोद्विपदार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्या दहनशक्त्यादिकं पावका
देरर्थान्तरं पूर्वदर्शनगोचरात् समधिकमव्यभिचरितं परिकल्पयतीति प्रमाणां स्वीक-
रोत्येव तल्लक्षणयोगात् । एवमन्यदपि प्रत्यक्षगोचराधिक्यसंपादकं निराकाङ्क्षतया
व्यवहारकारि यत्संवेदनं तत्तत्प्रमाणमिति समर्थनीयम्, स्वपरप्रकाशिनिर्बाधत्वात्,
पूर्वापरसोपानपद्धतिदर्शनोत्तरकालभावि तत्संख्यासंवेदनवत् । सर्वेषां चैतेषां परोक्षे-
ऽन्तर्भावः, अन्यथानुपपन्नार्थान्तरदर्शनद्वारेण प्रस्तुतार्थसंवेदनचतुरत्वादिति । किञ्चिद्-
विशेषात् प्रमाणान्तरपरिकल्पने प्रमाणयत्ता विशीर्यते, आनन्त्यप्राप्तेः, आवरण-
क्षयोपशमविचित्रतया ज्ञानप्रवृत्तेर्विचित्रत्वादिति । ननु चैवं सति यत्परोक्षस्य
द्वैविध्यं वक्ष्यमाणमनुमानशाब्दभेदेन तदपि कथमुपपत्स्यते, तत्रापि ह्याप्तप्रणीत-
वचनप्रभवज्ञानस्यार्थान्यथानुपपन्नत्वेनानुमानान्तर्भावो न दुष्पपादः । ततश्चानुमान-
मेवैकमवशिष्यते तदेव परोक्षशब्देन यद्युच्येत युक्तमास्ते, विदुषामभिधानं
प्रत्यनादरात्; सत्यमेतत्, एवं तु मन्यते तद् यद्यपि कयाचित्प्रक्रिययानुमानान्त-
र्भावयितुं शक्यं शाब्दम्, तथापि तत्प्रति विप्रतिपद्यन्ते परे । अतस्तस्याहृत्य
प्रामाण्यं समर्थनीयम् । न चापृथग्भूतस्य तद्विविक्तं वक्तुं शक्यम्, अतः
पार्थक्येनोपन्यासः । अनेन चैतदुपलक्षयति—अन्येषामपि परोक्षविशेषाणाम-

दभ्यासादिपरिग्रहः । तथा च न्यायशास्त्रम्—प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रया-
श्रितसंबन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्याविरोधातिशयप्राप्तव्यवधानमुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषक्रियाधित्वराग-
धमधर्मनिमित्तेभ्य (गी० ३-२-४३) इति । एतद्व्याख्या च तत एव न्यायशास्त्रादवगन्तव्या,
इह तु नोच्यते, सुगमत्वात् ग्रन्थगौरवभयाच्च । अनुभूतो विषयो येन तदनुभूतविषयं ज्ञानं
तस्यासंप्रमोषोऽभ्रंशो ज्ञानानुवृत्तिरिति यावत्, स एव लक्षणं यस्य तत्तथा । ऊहोपीत्यादि ।
प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामसंवेद्यः साध्यार्थान्यथानुपपन्नत्वस्वरूपो यो लिङ्गस्य साध्येन सार्धं
संबन्धस्तस्यादाने सज्जस्तत्पर इति यावत् । तल्लक्षणयोगादिति । प्रमाणलक्षणोपपत्तेः ।
सर्वेषामित्यादि । एतेषामुपमानादीनाम् । तथा हि—एवमुपमानेऽन्यथानुपपन्नार्थान्तरदर्शन-
द्वारेण प्रस्तुतार्थवेदनचतुरत्वं स्मर्यमाणदृश्यमानयोगोर्गवयपिण्डयोरविलक्षणविषाणाद्यव-
यवयोगित्वमन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यदि तयोः किञ्चित्सारूप्यं न स्यात् । एवं प्रत्यभिज्ञाने
इदानीं दृश्यमानः पर्यायोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यदि पूर्वानुभूतः परंपरया एतस्य कारणभूतो
द्रव्यरूपतयैतदात्मा पर्यायो न स्यात् तथा स्मरणेऽपि संस्कारोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यदि पूर्वानु-
भवो न भवति । संस्कारप्रबोधश्च पूर्वानुभवस्मारकः क्वचित्तादृशदर्शनेन, क्वचिच्चाभोगा-
दिभिरिति प्रागेवाभिहितम् । एवमूहेऽपि कतिपयधूमधूमध्वजव्यक्तीनामव्यभिचरितं साहचर्यं
प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यमानमन्यथा न जायतीति, यदि सर्वत्र धूमाग्निव्यक्तयोरन्यथानुपपन्नत्वलक्षणः
संबन्धो न स्यात् । अर्थापत्तौ तु बहिसंयोगात्करतलगतं स्फोटलक्षणं कार्यं प्रत्यक्षेणोप-
लक्ष्यमाणमन्यथा नोपपद्यते, यदि वह्नेः काचिद्दाहिका शक्तिर्न स्यात् । पूर्वापरसोपान-
पद्धतिदर्शनोत्तरकालभाविशतादिसंख्यासंवेदने तु पर्यन्तसोपानानुभवः पूर्वानुभूत-
नवनवत्यादिसोपानसंस्मरणसंबलितोऽन्यथा न संगच्छते, यदि शतादिसंख्या सोपानानां न

नुमानान्तर्भविसंभवेऽपि यं यं प्रति परेषां विप्रतिपत्तिस्तं तं परोक्षान्निष्कृष्य विविक्तयुक्त्युपन्यासेन तस्य तस्य प्रामाण्यमावेदनीयम् । तथा च शास्त्रान्तरे यद्ग्राहीनां लक्षणं अकारि आचार्यैस्तद् युक्तमेवेत्युक्तम् भवति । कथं तर्हि मीमांसकपरिकल्पितोऽभावो न प्रमाणम् ? निर्गोचरत्वादिति ब्रूमः । तथा हि—प्रत्यक्षमेवान्वयव्यतिरेकद्वारेण भूतलमेवेदं घटादिर्नास्तीति वस्तुपरिच्छेदप्रावीण्यमाभिभ्रानं तदधिकग्राह्यार्थाभावात् प्रमाणान्तरं परिकल्प्यमानं निरस्यतीति किं नश्चिन्तया ? तस्य सदसद्रूपवस्तुग्राहिणः प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्धत्वात् । अथ कदाचिदभिदध्यात्, अघ्यक्षं भावांशमेवाकलयति, इन्द्रियद्वारेणोत्पत्तेः, तस्य च भावांशे एव व्यापारात्, नास्तितान्नानं तु वस्तुग्रहणोत्तरकालं प्रतियोगिस्मरणसद्भावे मानसमक्षव्यापारनिरपेक्षमुन्मज्जति ।

तदुक्तम्—

न तावदिन्द्रियेणैषा^१ नास्तीत्युत्पाद्यते मतिः ।

भावांशेनैव संयोगो योग्यत्वादिन्द्रियस्य हि ॥१॥

(श्लो० वा०, पृ० ४७६)

गृहीत्वा वस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्वा च प्रतियोगिनम् ।

मानसं नास्तितान्नानं जायतेऽक्षानपेक्षया ॥१॥ इति

(श्लो० वा०, पृ० ४८२)

स्यादिति । एवं यथाबुद्धिसंप्रदायमुपमानादिष्वन्यथानुपपन्नार्थान्तरदर्शनद्वारेण प्रस्तुतार्थवेदन-
चतुरत्वं भावितम्, अन्यथापि कुशलरैभ्युह्यमिति । आहृत्येति । पूर्वपक्षादिभिर्निष्कृष्य ।

ऊहादीनां लक्षणमकारीति । यथा—उपालम्भानुपलम्भनिमित्तं व्याप्तिज्ञानमूहः, यथेदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवति असति न भवत्येवेति च । आदिशब्दात्संस्कारोद्धोषनिबन्धना तदित्याकारा स्मृतिः, यथा स देवदत्त इति । दर्शनस्मरणकारणकं संकलनं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्, यथा तदेवेदमिति । मीमांसककल्पित इत्यादि । ते ह्येवमाहुः—प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणपञ्चक-
ग्राह्याद् भावाद् भिन्नत्वादभावस्य ग्राहकं पृथगेवाभावप्रमाणम् । न चाभावस्यावस्तुत्वेन तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणाभावः, अभावस्यावस्तुत्वे प्रागभावादिभेदानुपपत्तेः, यदवस्तु न तस्य भेदः, यथा स्वपुष्पादेः, अस्तित्वाभावस्य भेदः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽन्योन्याभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति । किं च अभावस्यावस्तुत्वेऽर्थानामसंकर्यं न स्यात्, असंकर्यहेतोः प्रागभावादेरवस्तुतया-
सत्त्वात्, तथा च प्रतिनियतव्यवहाराभावः ।

तदुक्तम्—

न चावस्तुन एते स्युर्भेदास्तेनास्य वस्तुना ।

कार्यादीनामभावः को भावोः कारणादिनः ॥१॥

(श्लो० वा० पृ०, ४७४)

१. मुद्रित पुस्तके “इन्द्रियैरेषा” इति पठ्यते ।

अत्रोच्यते । भावांशादभावांशस्तर्हि अभिन्नो भिन्नो वा ? अभिन्नश्चेत्, कथमग्रहणम्, भावांशादव्यतिरिक्तत्वादेव, तस्वरूपवत् । भिन्नश्चेत्, घटाद्यभाव-
विनिर्लुठितं भूतलमाद्यदर्शनेन गृह्यते इति घटादयो गृह्यन्ते इति प्राप्तम्,
तदभावाग्रहणस्य तद्भावग्रहणानान्तरीयकत्वात् । तथा च अभावेऽपि पश्चात्-
प्रवर्तमानस्तानुत्सारयितुमपटिष्ठः स्यात्, अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षमसंकीर्णस्य संकीर्णता-
ग्रहणात् भ्रान्तमापनीषद्येत । किं च । प्रमाणाभावादर्थभावोऽभावप्रमाणेन
साध्यते इति भवतोऽभिप्रायः—

प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।

वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणात् ॥१॥

(श्लो० वा० पृ० ४७३)

इति वचनात् । तद्युक्तम् । यतः प्रमाणाभावः कथं ग्राह्यः ? तद् ग्राहक-
प्रमाणान्तराभावादिति चेत्, तस्याप्यभावग्रहणे तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणान्तराभावो ग्राह्य
इत्यनवस्था । अथ अर्थाभावात्प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणाभावाच्चार्थस्याभावः प्रतिपद्यत
इति मन्येथाः, तदेतदितरेतराश्रयं दुर्बटमापद्येत । न यावदर्थभावो गृहीतः
तावत्प्रमाणाभावः सिध्यति, अर्थाभावः प्रमाणाभावात्सेत्स्यतीत्यावर्तनात् । अथे-
न्द्रियवत् स्वयमविज्ञातोऽपि प्रमाणाभावोऽर्थाभावं ज्ञापयिष्यतीत्यभिदधीथाः,
तद्युक्तम्, तस्य तुच्छतया सकलशक्तिविरहलक्षणत्वात्, इन्द्रियस्य तु तद्विपर्यस्त-
तया ज्ञानोत्पादनक्षमत्वात् । तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षमेव भूतलादिप्रतिनियतवस्तुग्राहितां

वस्त्वसंकरसिद्धिश्च तत्प्रामाण्यसमाश्रिता ।

क्षीरे दध्यादि यन्नास्ति प्रागभावः स उच्यते ॥२॥

नास्तितया पयसो दधिन प्रध्वंसाभावलक्षणम् ।

गवि योऽश्ववाद्यभावस्तु सोऽन्योन्याभाव उच्यते ॥३॥

शिरसोऽवयवा निम्ना वृद्धिकाठिन्यवर्जिताः ।

शशशृङ्गादिरूपेण सोऽत्यन्ताभाव उच्यते ॥४॥

क्षीरे दधि भवेदेवं दधिन क्षीरं घटे पटः ।

शशशृङ्गं पृथिव्यादी वैतन्धं मूर्तिरात्मनि ॥५॥

अप्सु गंधो रसश्चाग्नी वायी रूपेण ती सह ।

व्योम्नि संस्पर्शिता ते च न चेदस्य प्रमाणात् ॥६॥

(श्लो० वा० पृ० ४७३-४७४)

ततोऽभावस्य वस्तुत्वे तद्ग्राहकं षष्ठं प्रमाणमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । विनिर्लुठितम्
रहितम् । तद्भावेत्यादि । घटाभावपरिच्छेदस्य घटसद्भावज्ञानपरतन्त्रत्वात् । तान्
घटादीन् । असंकीर्णस्य केवलभूतस्य । संकीर्णता घटादिसाहित्यम् । प्रमाणपञ्चकमित्यादि ।
वस्तुनो भावरूपस्य सत्तावबोधार्थं प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुमात्रे नोत्पद्यते, तत्र घटादि-
विषयेऽभावस्य प्रामाण्यम् । क्वचिद् 'वस्त्वसत्तेति' पाठः, सत्वभावप्रमाणतेत्यनेन संबन्धनीयः ।

बिभति । यदि तद्विपरीतघटादिप्रतियोगिवस्त्वन्तरवैविक्यं तस्याकलयति नान्यथा, विजातीयव्यवच्छेदाभावे तस्यैव प्रतिनियतत्वासिद्धेः, सकलसंकीर्णतया ग्रहण-प्रसङ्गात्, अतोऽधिकग्राह्याभावान्निविषयतयाभावाख्यं प्रमाणं यत् परैः पर्यकल्पितदप्रमाणमिति स्थितम् ।

द्विधेत्यस्मिन् सत्यपि 'प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च' इति नियतद्वैविध्यप्रदर्शनेन सौगतपरिकल्पितं 'प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं चेति' द्वैविध्यमपक्षिपति, तदाकूतेन तस्यायोगात् । प्रत्यक्षातिरिक्तं हि तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्धोपलक्षितकार्यस्वभावानुपलब्धि-रूपलिङ्गत्रयसंपादितजन्मकमनुमानमेव प्रमाणं न शब्दोहादिकम्, संबन्धविकलत्वा-दिति तदाकूतम् । अयुक्तं चेत्, प्रत्यक्षानुमानातिरिक्तप्रमाणान्तराभावग्रहणो-पायाभावात् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षात् प्रमाणान्तराभावगतिः, तस्य स्वलक्षणविषय-त्वेनाभावग्राहिताविरोधात् । नापि स्वभावकार्यानुमानाभ्याम्, तयोर्वस्तुसाधन-त्वात् । नाप्यनुपलब्धेः, तस्या अप्यत्यन्ताभावसाधनविरोधात् । सा हि चतुर्विधा वर्ण्यते मूलभेदापेक्षया, तद् यथा—विरुद्धोपलब्धिविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धिः कारणानुप-लब्धिः स्वभावानुपलब्धिश्चेति । न तावद्विरुद्धोपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरस्यात्यन्ता-भावः । दृश्यात्मनो विरुद्धस्य विधानेन इतराभावसाधनात्, संनिहितदेश एव प्रतियोग्यभावसिद्धेः । एतेन विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धिरपि व्याख्याता, तस्या अपि प्रतिषेध्यविरोधिसंनिधापनद्वारेणाभावसाधकत्वात् । कार्यानुपलब्धिरपि तद्देश-शङ्कितकार्यस्यैवाभावं साधयति न सर्वत्र, स्वयमसिद्धत्वात् । स्वभावानुपलब्धि-रप्येकज्ञानसंसर्गिपदार्थोपलम्भरूपा तद्देश एव प्रतिद्वन्द्व्यभावं गमयति । अतः प्रमाणान्तरस्यापि क्वचिन्निषेधः स्यात् न सर्वत्र । तन्न प्रमाणान्तरबाधकं समस्ति । प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोश्च प्रामाण्यं कुत इति चिन्त्यम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षात्, तस्य निविकल्पकतया सतोऽप्यसत्कल्पत्वात् । तत्पृष्ठभावी विकल्पस्तु न स्वलक्षणाम्भोधिमध्यमवगाहते, तत्कथं तत्राप्रविष्टस्तत्स्वरूपं निश्चिनुयात् । अत्रप्रमाणभूताच्च तस्मात्प्रामाण्यनिर्णय इति निविडजडिमाविष्करणं भवताम् । अनुमानात्प्रामाण्यनिर्णय इति चेत्, न तस्यापि स्वलक्षणाद् बहिः प्लवनात् । अप्रामाण्यव्यवच्छेदस्तेन साध्यते इति चेत्, न, व्यवच्छेदस्य व्यवच्छिन्नाव्यतिरेकात्,

तदिति । प्रमाणस्य । तस्यापि प्रमाणान्तरस्य । एवमिति । अनुमाना यदित्यादिना वक्ष्यमाणप्रकारेण तद्विपरीतेति । ततो भूतलादिलक्षणम् । वैविक्यं राहित्यम् । तस्य भूतलस्य ।

तद् यथेत्यादि । विरुद्धोपलब्धिर्यथा—नात्र शीतस्पर्शः, अग्नेरिति १ । विरुद्धकार्यो-पलब्धिर्यथा—नात्र शीतस्पर्शः, धूमादिति २ । कारणानुपलब्धिर्यथा—नात्र धूमः, अग्न्यभावादिति ३ । स्वाभावानुपलब्धिर्यथा—नात्र धूमः, उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धे-रिति ४ । शेषास्तु सप्तादि अनुपलब्धयो धर्मविन्दुप्रभृतिशास्त्रप्रतिपादिता एष्वेव चतुर्षु भेदेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति, इति प्रतिभेदरूपत्वान्न न पृथगभिहिताः । दृश्यात्मन इति । दृश्यस्वरूपस्य विरुद्धस्य बह्वयादेः ।

इतरथान्धकारनतैनकल्पमनुमानमासञ्चयेत निर्विषयत्वात् । किं च । तत्प्रामाण्यनिर्णायकमनुमानं प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वा । न तावदप्रमाणम्, ततः प्रामाण्यासिद्धेः । नापि प्रमाणम्, तत्प्रामाण्यसाधकाभावात् । न हि प्रत्यक्षात् तत्सिद्धिः, विकल्पशून्यतया किञ्चित्करत्वात्, इत्युक्तम् । अनुमानात् तत्साधने विकल्पयुगलं तदवस्थमेवावतिष्ठते तत्प्रामाण्यसाधनेऽप्यनुमानकल्पना इत्यनवस्था । किं च । गृहीतसंबन्धस्यानुमानं प्रवर्तते, संबन्धस्त्रिकालगोचरो ग्राह्यः, न च प्रत्यक्षं तं लक्षयितुं क्षमते, पूर्वापरक्षणवृत्तिरूपवार्तमानिकक्षणतदुत्तरकालभाविनो विकल्पस्यापि व्यावहारिकाभिप्रायेण तन्निष्ठताभ्युपगमात् । अनुमानाद् ग्रहीष्यति इति चेत्, ननु तदपि संबन्धपूर्वकं, प्रवर्तते, तद्ग्रहणेऽपीयं वार्ता इति अनवस्था । तस्मादनुमानमभिलषता गत्यन्तराभावात् तत्संबन्धग्रहणप्रवणस्त्रिकालगोचरोऽव्यभिचारी वितर्कोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तथा च प्रस्तुतद्वैविध्यस्य विघटितत्वात्, अन्यदपि यदेवंविधमविसंवादि ज्ञानं तत्प्रामाण्यमस्तु इत्यलं शुष्काभिमानेनेति । यदि पुनः साध्यार्थान्यथानुपपन्नहेतुसंपादितमनुमानमिष्येत, तदा प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं चेत्यपि द्वैविध्यं घटामटेदेव; प्रत्यक्षव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानस्य सामस्त्येनानुमानेऽन्तर्भावसंभवात्, अन्यथानुपपन्नार्थान्तरमस्तरेण परोक्षार्थविषयप्रतीतेरभावादिति ॥

सांप्रतमन्यथा सूत्रावयवेनैव प्रकृतनियमकारणमाह—मेयविनिश्चयादिति । द्विधैवेति च काकाक्षिगोलकन्यायेनात्रापि संबन्धनीयम् । ततश्चायमर्थः— द्वाभ्यामेव प्रकाराभ्यां मेयस्य ग्राह्यार्थस्य निश्चयात् स्वरूपनिर्णयात्, द्वे एव प्रमाणे न न्यूनमधिकं चेति । अयमत्राभिप्रायः—स्वसंवेदनं प्रति निखिलज्ञानानामेकरूपतया साक्षात्करणचतुरत्वात् नास्त्येव भेदः, बहिरर्थं पुनरपेक्ष्य कश्चिच्चक्षुरादिसामग्रीवल्लब्धसत्ताकः स्वावयवव्यापिनं कालान्तरसंचरिष्णुं स्थगितक्षणविवर्तमलक्षितपरमाणुपारिमाण्डल्यं संनिहितं विशदनिर्भासं सामान्यमाकारं साक्षात्कुर्वाणः प्रकाशः प्रथते, तत्र प्रत्यक्षव्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । यः पुनर्लिङ्गशब्दादि-

इतरेति । प्रतिषेधस्य शीतादेः । स्वाभावानुपलब्धिरिति दृश्यानुपलब्धिः । एकेत्यादि । एकस्य चक्षुरादिज्ञानस्य ग्राह्यं चक्षुरादिप्रणिधानाभिमुखं भूवटादिवस्तुद्वयमन्योन्यापेक्षमेकज्ञानसंसर्गि कथ्यते, तयोर्हि सतोर्नैकनियता प्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्, परिच्छेदयोग्यताया द्वयोरप्यविशेषात् । ज्ञाने वस्तुद्वयसंसर्गश्च तदाकारयोरेकस्मिन् ज्ञाने संसर्गाद् वस्तुनोरप्युपचारेण संसर्गव्यपदेशात् । तत एकस्मिन् ज्ञाने संसर्गः संबन्धो विद्यते यस्य भूतलादेर्घटादिनेति प्रकरणात् स्वयमूह्यम्, स चासी पदार्थश्च तस्योपलम्भपरिच्छेदो रूपं यस्याः स्वाभावानुपलब्धेः सा तथाः केवलभूतलोपलम्भरूप इति यावत् । तद्दृश एवेति । भूतलदेश एव । प्रतिद्वन्द्विनो घटादेः । स्वलक्षणाम्भोधीति । स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने, ते एव विकल्पस्य सामान्यविषयत्वेनाविषयत्वाद् ग्रम्भोधिः । तत्स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षानुमानस्वरूपम् । त्विति । तयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः । तत्प्रामाण्येति । तस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानप्रामाण्यनिर्णायकानुमानस्य । तत्साधन इति । प्रामाण्यनिर्णायकानुमानप्रामाण्यसाधने । तदवस्थमिति । तदप्यनुमानं प्रमाणमप्रमाणं चेति । पारिमाण्डल्यमिति ।

द्वारेण नियतानियतसामान्याकारावलोकी परिस्फुटतारहितः खल्वात्मनोऽर्थ-
ग्रहणपरिणामः समुल्लसति स परोक्षतां स्वीकरोति । न चेतौ प्रकारौ विहाय
प्रकारान्तरेण ज्ञानप्रवृत्तिं पश्यामः, न चापश्यन्तः प्रमाणान्तरपरिकल्पनं क्षमामहे,
न च द्वयोः प्रथमानयोरेकं निहन्तुवानमुपेक्षामहे, विशेषाभावात्; तस्मादेतदेव
द्वैविध्यमुररीकर्तव्यमिति स्थितम् ॥१॥

सांप्रतं यदस्माभिः प्राग् विवृण्वद्भिर्व्युदपादि, यदुत विप्रतिपन्नाव्युत्पन्न-
व्यामोहापोहसहमिहेदं प्रमाणलक्षणमिति तत्सूत्रदर्शनादेव विमलबुद्धयोऽवगच्छेयुः ।
मन्दमतयस्तु तावता न भोत्स्यन्त इति तद्धितविधित्सया व्यक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणा-
भिधानफलं प्रतिपिपादयिषुरपि सपूर्वपक्षं निराकाङ्क्ष लक्षयेयुस्ते इति तावत्
पूर्वपक्षमुत्थापयन्नाह—

प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि व्यवहारश्च तत्कृतः ।

प्रमाणलक्षणस्योक्तौ ज्ञायते न प्रयोजनम् ॥२॥

इह वचनमुच्चारयता विमृश्यभाषिणा प्रत्यवमृश्यम्—किमिदं मामकं
वचनं श्रोतृसंस्काराधायकमुत नेति । इतरथा पर्यालोचितकारितास्य हीयते ।
श्रोतृसंस्काराधायकं चेत्, उच्चारयति अन्यथा विपर्यय इति । एतत्तु प्रमाण-
लक्षणवाक्यं सकलजनानादिप्ररूढार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादश्रोतृसंस्काराधायकम् । अत
आह—प्रसिद्धानि प्ररूढानि, नाधुना साध्यानीत्यर्थः । प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि,
परोक्षगतभेदापेक्षया बहुवचनं व्यक्तिभेदे सामान्यमपि कथञ्चिद् भिद्यते इति
दर्शनार्थम् । तथा हि । तदविवक्षितव्यक्तिकमेकरूपतां विभक्तिं प्रमाणमिति;
व्यक्त्यवच्छेदेन पुनरवच्छिद्यमानं नानाकारतामादत्ते प्रत्यक्षानुमानशाब्दानि
प्रमाणानीति, व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्तरूपत्वात्तस्य । तथा हि—शब्दाच्चक्षु-
रादेर्वा दूराद् वृक्ष इति प्रत्यये धवखदिरपलाशादिविशेषानपेक्षया साधारणं
वृक्षत्वमेव चकास्ति, तस्मात् तेभ्यो भिन्नं तद्, व्यतिरेकिणाकारेण ज्ञाने
प्रतिभासनाद् घटादिवत् । परिस्फुटद्वखदिरपलाशादिविशेषावलोकनवेलायां
तु न तदतिरेकिणा रूपेण प्रकाशते इत्यभिन्नम्, तदव्यतिरिक्तस्य संवेदनात्,
तत्स्वरूपवत् । विशेषाभिन्नमेव रूपं तात्त्विकं सामान्यस्य, तस्यैव दाहपाकाद्यर्थ-
क्रियाक्षमत्वात् । भिन्नं पुनः कल्पनाबुद्धिविठपितत्वादवस्तरूपमिति चेत्, न,
द्वयोः प्रकाशमानयोरेकस्य निह्नोतुमशक्यत्वात् । अन्यथा भिन्नमेव रूपं
स्वभाविकमितरत्तु कल्पनाबुद्धिदशितमित्यपि वदतां न वदनभङ्गः स्यात् ।

परिमण्डलाः परमाणवः, तेषां भावः, यणि अनुशक्तिकादित्वाद् उभयपदबुद्धौ पारि-
माण्डल्यं वतुलत्वम्, न्यायकुमुदचन्द्रे प्रभाचन्द्रेणाप्येवं व्याख्यातत्वात् । अन्ये तु पारि-
माण्डल्यं परमाणुपरिमाणमेव इत्याहुः । नियतानियतेत्यादि । विजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्त-
त्वात् नियतः, सजातीयेभ्यश्चाव्यावृत्तत्वात् सर्वं एवानियतः, ततो नियतानियतपञ्चासौ
सामान्याकारश्चेति विग्रहः । एतौ प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षरूपौ । १॥

अर्थक्रियाकारिताविशेषस्तु भिन्नेऽपि रूपे न दुरूपपादः, तस्यापि ज्ञानसाधारण-
व्यवहारकरणदक्षत्वात् । न चार्थक्रिया वस्तुलक्षणमिति निवेदयिष्यामः, तस्मात्
सर्वत्र भिन्नाभिन्नौ सामान्यविशेषाविति दर्शनार्थो बहुवचननिर्देशः । आसतां
तावत्प्रमाणानि, व्यवहारश्च तत्कृतः प्रसिद्ध इति संबन्धः । चशब्दोऽपि-
शब्दार्थः । तेनायमर्थः—यदर्थं प्रमाणपरीक्षणमसावपि जलपानशीतत्राणादिव्य-
वहारोऽनादिरूढः, तन्निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानमित्यभिप्रायवानपि परः
परुषतापरिजिहीर्षयात्मनोऽन्यथा प्राह—प्रमाणलक्षणस्योक्तौ पररूपव्यावर्तन-
क्षमासाधारणप्रमाणधर्मकथनरूपायां ज्ञायते निर्णीयतेऽस्माभिर्न प्रयोजनं तत्फलम्,
अतिसूक्ष्मत्वात्तावकाभिसंधेरिति काक्वा प्रश्नयत्युल्लुण्ठयति चेति । किं च
प्रमाणलक्षणमनिश्चितं वाभिधीयते, निश्चितं वा स्वरूपेणेति पक्षद्वयम् । न
तावदनिश्चितम्, अनिश्चितस्य लक्षणत्वायोगात्, उन्मत्तकविस्तवत् । अथ
निश्चितम्, तत्किमप्रमाणात्प्रमाणाद्वा । न तावदप्रमाणात्, अप्रमाणस्य
निश्चायकत्वायोगात् । यदि पुनरप्रमाणमपि निश्चायकमिति संगीर्येत, तदा
प्रमाणपर्येषणं विशीर्येत, नैरर्थक्यापत्तेः, अप्रमाणादपि निश्चायकत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।
अथ प्रमाणात्, तत्किमलक्षणम्, लक्षणोपेतं वा । अलक्षणं चेन्निश्चायकं प्रमाणम्,
तर्हि सर्वप्रमाणानां लक्षणाभिधानमनर्थकम्, तद्व्यतिरेकेणाप्यर्थनिश्चयसिद्धेः,
भवदभिप्रेतलक्षणनिश्चायकप्रमाणवत् । अथ लक्षणोपेतम्, तत्रापि विकल्पयुगल-
मनिवारितप्रसरमनुधावति, तल्लक्षणं निश्चितमनिश्चितं वा । न तावदनिश्चितं
लक्षणं लक्ष्यं लक्षयति । निश्चयोऽपि प्रमाणादप्रमाणाद्वा । अप्रमाणांनिश्चया-
सिद्धेः प्रमाणादिति वक्तव्यम् । तदप्यलक्षणं सलक्षणं वा । अलक्षणत्वे पूर्वस्यार्थ-
ग्रहणे किं क्षूणम् । सलक्षणत्वे त्वेतल्लक्षणं निर्णीतमनिर्णीतं चेति तदेवावर्तते ।
तन्न प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानोपायोऽस्ति, तस्मात्प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि इत्यङ्गी-
कर्तव्यमिति ॥२॥

अधुना चार्यागृहीतस्तावकीनोऽभिप्रायोऽस्माभिरिति परं प्रत्याययंस्तन्मत-
मनुद्राव्य तदेवानुमन्यमानस्तथापि लक्षणोक्तेः साफल्यमावेदयन्नाह—

प्रसिद्धानां प्रमाणानां लक्षणोक्तौ प्रयोजनम् ।
तद्व्यामोहनवृत्तिः स्याद्द्वयामूढमनसामिह ॥३॥

विठपित्वादिति । उपाजने विपूर्वः ष् सौत्रो धातुः । तस्यापीत्यादि । तस्य
विशेषभिन्नसामान्यस्य ज्ञानं च साधारणव्यवहारश्च तयोर्विधाने कुशलत्वात्, तथा हि—
सामान्यं दूराद् धवलवाक्त्रेयादिविशेषाप्रतिभासेऽपि सामान्येन गौर्गौरिति ज्ञानं जनयति,
तथा अयं गौरयं गौरिति साधारणव्यवहारं चेति । यदि पुनर्विशेषेभ्यो भिन्नं नाभ्युपगम्येत
सामान्यम्, तदा तन्नबन्धनं ज्ञानं सादृश्यव्यवहारश्च प्रलयं यायादिति ॥२॥

तन्मतमनुद्राव्येति । शु सु द्रु ह् ऋच्छ गम् सृ प् गतो अनुद्रवत्यनुगच्छति तन्मतम्
सिद्धान्ती प्रयुङ्क्ते, हेतो इति क्त्वाप्रत्यये अनुगम्येति शब्दार्थः; तन्मतस्य चानुगमन-
मुवाचमन्तरेण न संभवतीत्यनूद्येति तात्पर्यम् । यद्वा उत्प्राबल्येन द्रावणं स्फोटनं पूर्वमुद्राव्य

एतदभ्यधायि भवता यथा—प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि, ततस्तेषां लक्षणोक्तौ असाधारणधर्मकथनविषये प्रयोजनं फलं, किमिति शेषः । तदेतदयुक्तम् । यतो यद्यपि प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि, अन्यथा तत्कृतनिखिलव्यवहारोच्छेद-प्रसङ्गात्, तदुच्छेदे च दृष्टहान्याद्यापत्तेः, तथापि केचिद् विततमोहावष्टब्धान्तः करणास्तत्स्वरूपमनुभवस्तोऽपि न लक्षयन्ति ततस्तानवलोकयतामस्माकं तद्विषये कृपापरीतचेतसां यथावस्थितप्रमाणलक्षणाविर्भावनद्वारेण व्यामोहमेतेषामपसारयाम इति प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानं प्रति प्रवर्तते चेतः । तदिदं प्रयोजनम्—तद्व्यामोह-निवृत्तिः स्याद्इति तस्मिन् प्रमाणलक्षणे व्यामोहो विसरीताभ्युपगमवतां विपर्ययसलक्षणस्तीर्थ्यानां प्रमाणाप्रमाणविवेकविकलानाम्, अनध्यवसायात्मकस्तु मुग्धबुद्धीनां लौकिकानाम्, तस्य निवृत्तिरविपरीतलक्षणावगमादपगम इत्यर्थः । सा स्याद् भवेत् । केषामित्याह—व्यामूढं विपरीतग्रहस्तं विचिन्ततां गतं मनोऽन्तःकरणं येषां ते तथा तेषाम् । इहेति लोके । तदयं तात्पर्यार्थः—यद्यनादिप्रसिद्ध प्रमाणलक्षणं प्रति केचिदपि न व्यामोहोयुस्तदा यद् भवद्भिः प्रागुदग्राहि निरर्थकं प्रमाणलक्षणाभिधानमिति, तत् युक्तमेव स्यात् । न चैत-देवम्, तत्र व्यामूढानां दर्शनात् । एतेन यददायि दूषणं प्रमाणलक्षणमनिश्चितं निश्चितं वा अभिधीयेत इत्यादितदपि सिद्धसाध्यतामध्यप्रतिबद्धत्वाच्च बाधाविधायि अस्माकमिति मन्तव्यम् । व्यामूढमनसोऽपि प्रति प्रमाणलक्षणप्रकाशने तल्लग-तीति चेत्, न स्वसंवेदनसिद्धस्य वचनेन प्रकाशनात्, तस्य व्यामोहापोह एव व्यापारात् । यथा विविक्तभूतलावलोकनेऽपि अध्यक्षाद् यो घटादिवैविक्यं न प्रतिपद्यते, कुदर्शनव्यामोहात्, तं प्रत्युच्येत नास्त्यत्र घटः, उपलम्भकारण समग्रतायामप्यनुपलम्भात् । वैविक्यं हि तत्राध्यक्षसिद्धम्, वचनाद् व्यामोहो निवर्त्येत; तथेहापि विद्वद्भिर्द्रष्टव्यम् । निर्णीतं तल्लक्षणमध्यक्षेण, तस्य व्यवसाय-रूपत्वात्; वचनं पुनर्विपरीतारोपनिराकरणे व्याप्रियत इति स्थितम् । तदेवं प्रमाणलक्षणं सामान्येन प्रतिपाद्य तद्गतकुचोद्यं पर्यहार्याचार्येण ॥३॥

अधुना तद्विषयामेव संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराचिकीर्षता ये प्रत्यक्षपरोक्ष-लक्षणे प्रमाणव्यक्ती प्राक् प्रकान्ते, तयोरपि लक्षणं प्रति विप्रतिपद्यन्तेऽपरे । अतस्तल्लक्षणमपि वक्तव्यम्, इति तावत् प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमभिधातुकाम आह—

ततो नव्योगादि, निराकृत्येत्यर्थं । तीर्थ्यानामिति । यद्यपि सम्यक् संसारसागरोत्तरणो-पायभूतत्वात् तीर्थं जिनशासनमेवोच्यते, तथापि तीर्थमिव तीर्थम्, तत्र साधवः तीर्थ्याः, साध्वर्थे यः । एतेनेति । व्यामूढमनसः प्रतिलक्षणाभिधानेन ।

सिद्धसाध्यतामध्यप्रतिबद्धत्वादिति । अयमभिप्रायः—यदि न प्रमाणलक्षणमभिधीयते-ऽस्माभिस्तदा यदुक्तं—प्रमाणलक्षणमनिश्चितं विधानं वा अभिधीयेत इत्यादि तत्समस्तमपि दूषणमस्माकं लभेदपि, यदा तु स्वतः सतो व्यवसायरूपत्वात् स्वसंवेदनेन निर्णीतस्य च प्रमाणलक्षणस्य व्यामूढान् प्रति प्रकाशः, कस्तदा दोषावकाशः ? एतच्च व्यामूढमनसोऽपि प्रतीत्यादि पूर्वपक्षमुत्थाप्य स्वत एवातिस्पष्टमाचार्योऽभिधास्यति, ततः सिद्धमेतत् न बाधा-दिष्यतीति ॥३॥

अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमीदृशम् ।
प्रत्यक्षमितरज्ज्ञेयं परोक्षं ग्रहणक्षया ॥४॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षमिति लक्ष्य निर्देशः, अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानमिति लक्षणनिर्देशः परोक्षोऽक्षगोचरातीतः, ततोऽन्योऽपरोक्षस्तद्भावस्तत्ता तथा, साक्षात्-कृततयेति यावत् । अर्थत इत्यर्थः अवगम्यते इति हृदयम् । अर्थत इत्यर्थो वा, दाहपाकाद्यर्थक्रियाथिभिरभिलष्यते इति यावत् । तस्य ग्राहकं व्यवसायात्मक-तया साक्षात् परिच्छेदकं ज्ञानं तदीदृशमिति, ईदृगेव प्रत्यक्षमिति संटङ्कः । तत्र ज्ञानग्रहणेन यत् सांख्याः प्राहुः—श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिःप्रत्यक्षमिति, तत् तिरस्करोति । श्रोत्रादीनां प्रकृतिविकारतया तद्वृत्तेर्व्यापारलक्षणाया जडतया प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात्, अर्थपरिच्छित्तिहेतुतया प्रत्यक्षत्वे आलोकादिजडकारणकलाप-व्यापारस्यापि प्रत्यक्षतापद्येत, विशेषाभावादिति । अर्थस्य ग्राहकमित्यस्य ग्रहणक्षया इति वक्ष्यमाणपदसापेक्षत्वात् । अमुना बहिरपि येष्वर्थकलाकलनविकलं सकलमपि ज्ञानं प्रलपन्ति तान्निरस्यति । स्वांशग्रहणे ह्यन्तःसंवेदनं व्याप्रियते यथा तथा बहिरपि, इतरथा अर्थवज्ज्ञानसंतानान्तराण्यपि विशीर्येरन्, स्वप्न-दृष्टान्तेन तदनुमानस्योपप्लवमात्रतापत्तेः, स्वविज्ञानस्यैव तथा तथा विजृम्भणात् । तथा च प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकार्यकारणभावादयः प्रलीयेरन्, आत्मव्य-तिरेकेणात्मीयपूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोरपि ज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिनिरोधापत्तेः । अद्वयविज्ञान-

श्रोत्रादीति । श्रोत्रं त्वक् चक्षुषी जिह्वा नासिका चेति पञ्चमी—इति श्रोत्रादी-नीन्द्रियाणि तेषां वृत्तिवर्तनं परिणाम इति यावत् । इन्द्रियाण्येव विषयाकारपरिणतानि प्रत्यक्षमिति हि तेषां सिद्धान्तः । अर्थस्य ग्राहकमित्यादि । ग्रहणक्षयेत्यनेन बाह्यार्थपेक्षया यद् ग्राहकं तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति दर्शयति । न चार्थस्य ग्राहकमित्येतावतैवैतत् सिद्धमिति वाच्यम्, यत आत्मस्वरूपस्यार्थस्य ग्राहकमित्येतावताप्यर्थस्य ग्राहकं भवत्येव । न चैवं केवलस्वांश-ग्राहिणः स्वसंवेदनस्य प्रत्यक्षाव्यवच्छेदः, बहिरर्थनिराकरणपरान् योगाचारादीनधिकृत्यैव ग्रहणक्षयेति वक्ष्यमाणपदस्यायोजनात् । बहिरपीति । न केवलमन्तर्मुखाकारेण ज्ञानमर्थ-ग्रहणसून्यम्, चिद्रूपस्यैव तथा प्रतिभासनात्, अपि तु बहिर्मुखाकारेणापि । ये इति । योगाचारादयः । इतरथेत्यादि । संतानो ज्ञानप्रवाहः, तस्मात् विवक्षितादन्ये संतानान्तराणि । तदनुमानस्य संतानान्तरसाधकानुमानस्य, तथा हि—विवक्षितदेवदत्तादेरन्यत्र यज्जदत्तादौ व्यापारव्याहारो बुद्धिपूर्वकौ, व्यापारव्याहारत्वात्, संप्रतिपन्नव्यापारव्याहारवद्, इति संतानान्तरसाधकानुमानम् । तस्मिन् व्यापारव्याहारयोजनकार्यत्वेन प्रतिबन्धनिश्चयात् । एतस्य चानुमानस्य स्वप्नदृष्टान्तेनोपप्लवो भ्रान्तस्वम् । तथा हि—यथा सर्वे प्रत्यया निरालम्बमानाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्, स्वप्नप्रत्ययवदिति भवदभिप्रायेण बहिरर्थसाधनस्य निरालम्बनतया बाह्यार्थाभावः, तथा संतानान्तरसाधनस्यापि निरालम्बनतया संतानान्तरा-भावः । व्यवहारेति । व्यवहारोऽबलाबालगोपालहालिकादिप्रसिद्धः । न चार्थं भ्रान्तः, क्रिया-विरोधप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि—भ्रमाद् बहलामोदमोदकादनमिव सीगतानामुपलक्षकलभक्षणं सुगतपदद्वयाराधनवद्वा खरोष्ट्रासीपदपर्युपास्तित्वं प्रसजति; न चैतद् युगान्तेऽपि दृश्यते, तन्नार्थं भ्रान्तः । तद्धेतुविति । तस्य घटादेरर्थस्य ये हेतवो मृदादयस्तेभ्योऽन्यानि यानि तास्वा-

तत्त्वसाधनेनानुकूलमाचरसीति चेत्, स्यादेतत्, यदि भवतः प्रमाणपरिदृष्टसकल-
व्यवहारोच्छेदनकुदर्शनवासनाहितादृष्टाद्वयतत्त्वपरिकल्पनात्, प्रतिकूलं न स्यात् ।
तन्नार्थविरहेण वहिः प्रमाणभूतज्ञानोलासोऽस्ति, निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गादिति । ग्राहक-
मिति च निर्णायकं द्रष्टव्यम्, निर्णयाभावेऽर्थग्रहणायोगात् । तेन यत् ताथागतैः
प्रत्यपादि ।

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तम् [न्या० वि० ४] इति

तदपास्तं भवति, तस्य युक्तिरिक्तत्वात् । तथा हि—ते निर्विकल्पकत्वेऽध्यक्षस्यायुक्तीः
खेटयन्ति—किलेदमर्थसामर्थ्येनोदीयते, संनिहितार्थक्रियासमर्थ्यांग्राहकत्वात्, न
चार्थे ध्वनयः सन्ति, तद्धेतुविलक्षणकारणान्तरजन्यत्वात्, ततश्चासावुपनिपत्य
स्वगोचरसंवेदनमुत्थापयन् स्वाकारमनुकारयति । तन्न तद्ग्राहिणि विज्ञाने
शब्दसंश्लेषो युक्तः । किं च यद्युत्पादकार्थोपयोगेऽपि तं तावन्न गृह्णीयात्,
संवेदनमपि तु स्मरणसंघादितं तदमिधायकध्वनिसंयोजनं प्रतीक्ष्यमाणं तावदासीत्,
तर्हि दत्तो जलाञ्जलिरर्थग्रहणस्य । तथाहि—तमर्थमपश्यंस्तस्मिन् गृहीतसंकेतं
तदमिधायकं ध्वनिं नानुस्मरति, उपायाभावाद्, अननुस्मरंश्च पुरोवर्तिन्यर्थेन न
योजयति, स्मृत्युपस्थापनव्यतिरेकेण तद्योजनाशक्तेः अयोजयंश्च भवदभिप्रायेण
न पश्यतीति धान्ध्यादान्ध्यमापद्येत । यदि चेन्द्रियजमपि ज्ञानं विकल्पकलुषित-
मिष्येत, तदा तदपि मनोराज्यादिविकल्पवद् विकल्पान्तराभिभवे सति निवर्तेत;
नचैतदस्ति, संनिहितगोपिण्डगोचरस्य चक्षुर्जसंवेदनस्याश्वादिविषयविकल्पो-
दयेष्यनिवर्तनात्, संहृतसकलविकल्पस्यापि च परिस्फुटसंनिहितार्थविषयदर्शन-
सिद्धेः । तन्नाक्षजं ज्ञानं शब्दसंपर्कमनुभवति । अत्र प्रतिविधीयते—यत्तावदुक्तम्,
अशब्दकार्थसामर्थ्योद्भवत्वाद् ध्वनिरहितमध्यक्षमिति, तदयुक्तम्, न हि शब्दा-
संपृक्तार्थजमित्येतावतैवाभिलाषविनाकृतमिति वक्तुं शक्यम्, अन्यथा जडार्थजनित-
मिति जडमपि तत् स्यात् । अथ बोधरूपमनस्कारसाहित्याद् न जडमिति
ब्रूषे, तथा सत्यभिलाषसंसृष्टमनस्कारसंनियोगात् साभिलाषमपि स्यात् ।
किं च विविक्ताः परमाणवः स्वाकारार्षणद्वारेण स्वगोचरं ज्ञानमुत्पाद-
यन्तः कथमसन्तमात्मनि स्वावयवव्यापिनं कालान्तरसंचरिष्णुमाकारं तत्र

दीनि कारणानि तज्जन्यत्वाद् असावित्यर्थः । उपनिपत्येति । निकटीभूय । स्वाकारम्
अर्थाकारम् । तद्ग्राहिणि अर्थग्राहिणि । तमिति अर्थम् । धान्ध्यादिति । धन्ध्यो जडः तस्य
भावो धान्ध्यं जाड्यम् । विनिश्चयटीकायाम्—धन्ध्यो जड इति । क्वचित् धान्ध्यादिति
पाठस्तदैवं व्याख्या—धियो बुद्धेरान्ध्यं ध्यानं जाड्यम्, परं नायं पौराणिकः ।
संहृतैत्यपि । संहृतविकल्पावस्थायां संनिहितार्थविषयविशददर्शनाभिधानेनेन्द्रियजबोधस्य
विकल्परूपतां निरस्यति, तथा हि—इन्द्रियजो घटादिबोधो विकल्परूपो न भवति,
संहृतसकलविकल्पस्यापि पुंसो जायमानत्वात्, यः पुनर्विकल्परूपो नासीत् संहृतसकल-
विकल्पस्य जायते, यथा मनोराज्यादिविकल्पः, न चायं संहृतसकलविकल्पस्य न जायते,
तस्माद् विकल्परूपो न भवतीत्यत्रानुमानम् । विकल्परूपताभ्युपगमे संहृतसकलविकल्पस्य

प्रथयन्ति । विभ्रमादिति चेन्न इदानीमर्थे यदस्ति तदेव प्रतिभाति, तत्रासतोऽपि स्थूराकारस्य प्रतिभासनात् । तथा शब्दोऽपि यद्यविद्यमानोऽर्थे तद्ग्राहिसि ज्ञाने प्रतिभासेत, किं क्षूयेत ? यच्चोक्तं—स्मरणजनितशब्दसंयोजनं प्रतीक्षमाणमर्थो-पयोगेऽपि यद्यासीतेत्यादि यावदान्ध्यमापद्येत तत् तावकपक्षेऽपि समानम् । तथाहि—स्वलक्षणाविषयेन्द्रियजनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानसद्भावेऽपि न तावदिदंतयानिदं-तया वार्थव्यवस्थितिः, यावद्विधिप्रतिषेधद्वारेण विकल्पयुगलकं पाश्चात्यं नोदयते, यत्रैवांशे विकल्पं जनयति, तत्रैवास्य प्रमाणता—इति वचनात् । निर्विकल्पकस्य सतोऽपि व्यवहारं प्रत्यसत्कल्पत्वात् । स च विकल्पः संकेतकाल-भावितमभिलापसामान्यमनुस्मरत एवोत्पत्तुमर्हति, अभिलापसामान्यस्मरणबीजं च कुतः प्रबुध्येत ? तादृशदर्शनादिति चेत्, ननु तदपि दर्शनं निर्विकल्पकत्वादर्थं नातिशेते, तत्कथं सामान्यविषयविकल्पबीजं प्रबोधयेत् ? अर्थः पुनः सामान्य-व्यवसायात्मिकां बुद्धिं न जनयेदिति भवतां कदाग्रहः । तदर्थवत् तद्विषयं दर्शनं व्यवसायशून्यत्वात् नाभिलापसामान्यगोचरस्मरणबीजं प्रबोधयति, तदप्रबुद्धं न स्मरणं जनयति, अजातं स्मरणं न शब्दं योजयति, अयोजितः शब्दो नार्थं निश्चाययति, अनिश्चितोऽर्थो न व्यवहारमवतरति, अनवतीर्णो नादृष्टाद्विशिष्यते, अविशिष्टः प्रमातुरान्ध्यं लक्षयतीति । तस्माद्यथाकथंचिन्निर्णयाभावात् स्वयम-प्रतीतमपि निर्विकल्पकदर्शनं वासनाप्रबोधद्वारेण विकल्पमुत्थाप्यात्मव्यापारम-भिलापयति कतिचिदंशविषयम्, तथार्थोऽपि यदि चक्षुरादिसामान्यन्तः पातिस्वेना-प्रतीत एव स्वयम्, तथास्वभावत्वात् संकेतकालभाविताभिलापसामान्य-विषयात्मसंस्कारप्रबोधद्वारेणात्मविषयमभिलापसंसृष्टं संवेदनमुल्लासयेत् नात्यन्त-मयुक्तं पश्यामः । न चायं सविकल्पको बोधो मनोराज्यादिविकल्पकल्पः । चक्षुरादिसामग्रीसंपाद्यत्वात् । इतरस्य तु मनोमात्रप्रभवत्वात् । अतः कथं तद्वद्वि-

न प्रादुःष्यादिति बाधकम् । तत्रेति ज्ञाने । तत्रासतोऽपीति । परमाणुलक्षणेऽर्थेऽविद्यमानस्यापि प्रतिभासनात्, ज्ञाने इति शेषः । तावकपक्षेऽपीति । अयमत्राभिप्रायः—

यश्चोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।

नैकः पर्यनुयोज्यः स्यात् ताद्यर्थविचारस्ये ॥१॥ इति ।

[श्लो० वा० पृ० ३४१]

नोदयते इति । अयं वयेत्यादिदण्डकषातुः, नोदयतीति पाठे तु अट पट इट क्कट कट इ गतौ इत्यस्य प्रयोगः । स्मरणबीजमिति । स्मृतेः कारणत्वाद् बीजमिव बीजं संस्कारः । तस्मात् यथा कथंचिदिति । तस्मादिति हेतो पञ्चमी, यथेति दृष्टान्तोपदर्शनार्थः; कथंचित् केनचित् प्रकारेणेति । अयमिति । इन्द्रियजः । विकल्पकल्पः विकल्पसदृशः, कल्पशब्दस्य उपमार्थत्वात् । यदाह—

सामर्थ्यवर्णनायां च छेदने करणे तथा ।

ग्रीपम्ये नाधिवासे च कल्पशब्दं विदुर्बुधाः ॥१॥

१ मुद्रितपुस्तके “तस्माद्यत्रोभयोर्दोषः”, “पर्यनुयोज्यः” इति पठ्यते ।

कल्पान्तराविर्भावे निवर्तेत ? मानसविकल्पस्यैव विकल्पान्तरेण निवर्तनात्, अस्य तु कारणसामर्थ्येन बलात् प्रवृत्तेः । एतेन संहृतसकलविकल्पावस्थायां नैष प्रादुःष्यादित्येतदपि प्रतिक्षिप्तम्, अस्य प्रमातुरिच्छया संहर्तुमशक्यत्वात्, मानस-विकल्पसंहरण एव तत्सामर्थ्योपपत्तेरिति । एतच्च शब्दसंपृक्तप्रत्यक्षपक्षादपि एकान्तनिर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षपक्षस्य पापीयस्तां दर्शयद्भिरस्माभिरुदग्राहि । परमार्थतः पुनः प्रत्यक्षे साक्षाच्छब्दोल्लेखो नेष्यते, विशदव्यवसायेनार्थसाक्षात्करणचतुर-त्वात्तस्य । केवलं तदपि संनिहितं परिस्फुटं स्वावयवव्यापिनं कालान्तर-संचरिष्णुं स्थगितक्षणविवर्तं अलक्षितपरमाणुपारिमाण्डल्यं पदार्थान्तरैः सह समानासमानाकारं स्वपरमाणूनां सामान्याकारं स्तम्भादिकं पदार्थं गोचरयतीति सविकल्पमित्युच्यते, परपरिकल्पितक्षणक्षयिविविक्तपरमाणुलक्षणस्वलक्षणग्रहण-प्रवर्णनिर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्षप्रतिषेधार्थं कथंचिदभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यगोचरतादर्शनार्थं वा । एवं च प्रत्यक्षगोचरीकृतेऽर्थे संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धग्रहणादयस्तद्विषयाः शाब्दव्यवहाराः सर्वे एव निरुपचरिता घटन्ते इत्युक्तं भवति । यदि पुनः शब्दसंसर्गयोग्यप्रति-भासमध्यक्षं न स्यात्, ततः को दोषः इति चेद्, विकल्पानुत्थानेन सविकल्प-व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । तथा हि—निर्व्यवसायं दर्शनमित्यतः पाटवोपेतमपि स्मृतिबीजाधानं तदुत्तरकालभावि वा तादृशार्थदर्शनं तत्प्रबोधनमभ्यासवासनापाट-वेऽपि न विधातुमलम्, यतः सामान्यविकल्पोत्पत्त्या व्यवहारः प्रवर्तेत, क्षणिकत्वादिषु सकलकालं निर्विकल्पकाध्यक्षदृष्टतयाम्युपगतेष्वपि तददर्शनात् । तस्मात् यत्र कुत्रचिदर्थशि पाश्चात्यव्यवहारप्रवृत्तिस्तत्र प्राचीनं संवेदनं निर्णायकमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, अन्यथा क्षणिकत्वाद्यंशवत् सर्वांशेषु व्यवहारः प्रलीयेत । तन्न कदाचन कल्पनापोढत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमातुरपि प्रतीतिगोचरचारितामनुभवति । अप्रतीतं चास्तीति श्रद्धातुं दुःशकम्, अतिप्रसङ्गादित्यलक्षणम् । अभ्रान्तत्वमपि न जाघटीति, भवदभिप्रायेण स्थिरस्थूरार्थग्राहिणः संवेदनस्य विपर्यस्तरूपत्वात्, तद्विपरीतस्य तु स्वप्नकालेऽप्यप्रकाशमानत्वात् । तद्यदि यथावस्थितार्थग्राहित्वम-

चक्षुरादीति । आदिशब्दाद् रूपावलोकनस्कारादयो गृह्यन्ते । इतरस्येति । मनोराज्या-दिविकल्पस्य । तद्वत् मनोराज्यादिविकल्पवत् । एष इन्द्रियजो विकल्पः । पापीयस्तामिति । पापं पातकं तद्योगात् पक्षोऽपि पापः । ततोऽयमनयोरतिशयेन पापः, गुणाङ्गाद्वेष्टेयसू (सिद्ध० ७-३-९) इतीयस् । उदग्राहीति । उपन्यस्तम्, उत्पूर्वं इनन्तोग्रहिरुपन्यासे वर्तते । यदजयः—

उदग्राहितमुपन्यस्ते बद्धान्याहितयोरपि—इति ।

समानासमानाकारमिति । सजातीयैः सह समानाकारं विजातीयैः पुनरसमानाकारम् । संबन्ध-ग्रहणादय इति । आदिग्रहणाद् विशेषणविशेष्यभावग्रह । तथाहीत्यादि । अभ्यासवासनापाट-वेऽपि अभ्यासाद्वासना अभ्यासवासना । वासनेति पूर्वज्ञानजनितामुत्तरज्ञाने शक्तिमाहूस्तद-विदः । तस्याः पाटवं तस्मिन्नपि सति, अलम् समर्थम्, निर्व्यवसायेति च विशेषणद्वारेण हेतुक्तः, निर्विकल्पत्वादाद्योत्तरदर्शने कर्तुंशीति संस्कारतदबोधनं यथाक्रमं कर्तुं न पारयत इत्युक्तं भवति । यत इति । स्मृतिबीजाधानतत्प्रतिबोधनाभ्याम् । तददर्शनादिति । व्यव-हारादर्शनात् ।

भ्रान्तत्वम्, तन्न संभवत्येव, विविक्तक्षणक्षयिपरमाणूनां कदाचिदप्यप्रतिभासात्, तेषां च पारमार्थिकत्वात् । अथ व्यावहारिकाभिप्रायेण यदिदं घटादिकं स्वलक्षणमर्थत्रियाक्षमम्, तत्र यन्न भ्राम्यति तदभ्रान्तमित्यभिप्रेतम्, तर्हि कल्पनापोढपदमुत्सारणीयम्, इदानीमनेन सहावस्थानाभावात् । व्यवहारावतारिणो घटादिस्वलक्षणस्य निर्णयेनैव ग्रहणात्, अन्यथा व्यवहाराप्रवृत्तेः, दृष्टस्याप्यदृष्टानतिशयिनात् । तस्मात् व्यवसायात्मकमध्यक्षमित्येतदेव चाविति स्थितम् ॥ अपरोक्षतया—इत्यनेन तु परोक्षलक्षणसंकीर्णतामध्यक्षस्य परिहरति, तस्य साक्षात्कारितया अर्थग्रहणरूपत्वादिति । ईदृशम्—इत्यमुना तु पूर्वोक्तन्यायात् सावधारणेन विशेषणकदम्बकसचिवज्ञानोपदर्शनात् परपरिकल्पितलक्षणयुक्तस्य प्रत्यक्षतां प्रतिक्षिपति । एवं च यदाहुः—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम्, तथा, सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम् इत्यादि, तदयुक्तमित्युक्तं भवति, अपूर्वप्रादुर्भावस्य प्रमाणवाधितत्वात्, अत्यन्तासतां शशविषाणादीनामप्युत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मादिदमात्मरूपतया विद्यमानमेव विशेषकृद्धेतुकलापसंनिधानात् साक्षादर्थग्रहणपरिणामरूपतया विवर्तेत, तथा चोत्पन्नजन्मादिविशेषणं न संभवेत् । अर्थविविधार्थसूचकमेवैतद्—इत्याचक्षीथाः, तथा सत्यविगानमेवेत्यास्तां तावत् । अधुना परोक्षलक्षणं दर्शयति—इतरदित्यादि । अपरोक्षतयार्थस्य ग्राहकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तम्, तस्मादितरदसाक्षादर्थग्राहकं ज्ञानं परोक्षमिति ज्ञेयमवगन्तव्यम् । एतदपि स्वसंवेदनापेक्षया प्रत्यक्षमेव, बहिरर्थपेक्षया तु परोक्षव्यपदेशमशुत इति दर्शयन्नाह—ग्रहणेक्षया इति, इह ग्रहणं प्रक्रमाद् बहिः प्रवर्तनमुच्यते, अन्यथा विशेषणवैयर्थ्यं स्यात्, तस्येक्षा अपेक्षा तया, बहिःप्रवृत्तिपर्यालोचनयेति यावत् । तदयमर्थः—यद्यपि स्वयं प्रत्यक्षम्, तथापि लिङ्गशब्दादिद्वारेण बहिर्विषयग्रहणेऽसाक्षात्कारितया व्याप्रियते इति परोक्षमित्युच्यते । एतच्च बुभुत्सितार्थान्यथानुपपन्नार्थान्तरप्रतीतिवशादुभयधर्मकमिति । सामान्यलक्षणसद्भावादेकाकारमपि विप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणार्थं द्विधा भिद्यते । तद्यथा अनुमानं शाब्दं चेति । यतोऽद्यापि शब्दस्यार्थान्यथानुपपन्नमेव परे न प्रतिपद्यन्ते, न चापृथक्कृतस्य तद्विविक्तं वक्तुं शक्यम्, अतो भेदेनोपन्यासः ॥४॥

अन्यथेत्यादि । निर्णयेन ग्रहणाभावे व्यवहाराप्रवृत्तेः, दृष्टस्यापि क्षणिकस्वलक्षणस्य अदृष्टादनतिशायनं अविशेषः अदृष्टादनतिशायनं तस्मात् । घञ्युपसर्गस्य बहुलम् (सिद्ध० ३-२-५६) इति बहुलग्रहणात् क्वचिदुत्तरपदस्य वा दीर्घत्वेन नरकनारकादिवदतिशयनमतिशायनं वेत्ति संभवति । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेत्यादि । अत्र सूत्रे यत इत्यध्याहार्यम्, ततोऽयमर्थः—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोत्पन्नत्वादिविशेषणं ज्ञानं यत इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षदिर्भवति तत्प्रत्यक्षम्; ज्ञानं तु प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणफलम्, हानोपादानादिबुद्धधरपेक्षया तु तदपि ज्ञानं प्रमाणमेव । अव्यपदेश्यं व्यवसायात्मकमिति पदद्वयेन निर्विकल्पसविकल्पकभेदेन प्रत्यक्षस्य द्वैविध्यमाह, शेषाणि तु ज्ञानविशेषणानि । सत्संप्रयोगेत्यादि । सता विद्यमानेन वस्तुना इन्द्रियाणां संप्रयोगे संबन्धे सति पुरुषस्य यो ज्ञानोत्पादस्तत्प्रत्यक्षम् आदिशब्दात् साक्षात्कारिप्रभासाधनं प्रत्यक्षमित्यादि गृह्यते ॥४॥

तत्र तावदनुमानलक्षणमभिधित्सुराह—

साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात्साध्यनिश्चायकं स्मृतम् ।

अनुमानं तदभ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात्समक्षवत् ॥५॥

साध्याविनेत्यादि । इहाप्यनुमानमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, तस्याप्रसिद्धतया अनूद्यत्वात् । साध्याविनाभुनो लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकमिति लक्षणनिर्देशः, तस्याप्रसिद्धतया विधेयत्वादिति । अत्राप्यनुमानशब्दस्य कर्त्रादिकारकव्युत्पत्तिक्रमेणार्थकथनं प्रमाणशब्दवद् द्रष्टव्यम् । ततश्चेहापि लिङ्गग्रहणसाध्याविनाभावित्वलक्षणलिङ्गसंबन्धस्मरणकालात् अनु पश्चान्मीयते परिच्छिद्यतेऽर्थोऽनुमेयपावकादियेन ज्ञानेन तदनुमानमिति । तत् किभूतमित्याह—साध्यनिश्चायकमिति । साधनमर्हति साधयितुं वा शक्य इति साध्योऽनुमेय इत्यर्थः, तस्य निश्चायकं तत्स्वरूपनिर्णायकमिति यावत् । तत्कुत इत्याह—लिङ्गात्, लिङ्गद्यते गम्यतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति लिङ्गं हेतुः तस्मात् । किभूतादित्याह साध्याविनाभुन इति । विना भवतीति विनाभु, ततोऽन्यदविनाभु, साध्येनाविनाभु साध्याविनाभु, साध्यं विमुच्य यन्न भवतीत्यर्थः, तस्मात् साध्यनिश्चायकं ज्ञानं तदनुमानं स्मृतम् अमिप्रेतं नीतिविद्भिरिति संबन्धः । तत्र लिङ्गात् साध्यनिश्चायकमित्यनेनानुमानस्य प्रत्यक्षशाब्दलक्षणसंकीर्णतां वारयति । साध्याविनाभुन इत्यनेन परप्रणीतलिङ्गलक्षणव्युदासमाचष्टे । ततश्च यत्परे प्रोचुः—पक्षधर्मत्वान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणरूपत्रयोपलक्षितानि त्रीष्वेव लिङ्गानि अनुपलब्धिः स्वभावः कार्यं चेति । तदुक्तम्—

अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तित्तासति ।

निश्चितानुपलम्भात्मकार्याख्या हेतवस्त्रयः ॥ इति ।

तथान्ये अस्येदं कार्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि चेति लैङ्गिकम्— इति, तथा, पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टमित्यादि । तद्वालप्रलपितप्रायमित्यव-

अनूद्यत्वादिति । ननु वदेरनुपूर्वस्य नाम्नो वदः क्यप् च (सि० हे० ५-१-३५) इति क्यप् प्रथयो न प्राप्नोति, अनुपसर्गादित्यधिकारानुवृत्तेः, ततो व्यञ्जनान्तत्वाद् व्यणि अनुवाद्यत्वादित्येव स्यात् । सत्यम् अनुवदनमनूत्, संपदादित्वात् भावे क्यप्, ततोऽनूदि अनुवादविषये साधु इति साध्वर्थे येऽनूद्यत्वादिति । पक्षधर्मत्वान्वयेत्यादि । परे बोद्धाः । तदुक्तमिति । दिग्नागेनेति शेषः । अनुमेयेत्यादि । अनुमेयः पक्षः, तत्र सद्भावः प्रत्यक्षतो-नुमानतो वा हेतोर्दर्शनम्; तत्र प्रत्यक्षतः कस्मिंश्चित् प्रदेशे धूमस्य, अनुमानतः शब्दे कृतकत्वस्य । तथा तत्तुल्ये साध्यसद्भावाद् अनुमेयसमे सपक्षे इत्यर्थः; असति विपक्षे नास्तित्ता निश्चितता तृतीयं रूपम् । निश्चित इति लिङ्गविपरिणामेन पूर्वयोरपि रूपयोर्योज्यम् । यद्विनिश्चये—अन्ते वचनान्निश्चितत्वं त्रिष्वपि रूपेषु द्रष्टव्यम् इति, एतल्लक्षणा अनुपलब्धि-स्वभावकार्याख्यास्तयो हेतवः । यथा क्वचिद्देशे न घटः उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेः । वृक्षोऽप्यम्, शिषापात्वात् । अग्निरत्र, धूमात् । अन्य इति वैशेषिकाः । अस्येपदम् कार्यं कारणं संयोगि समवायि विरोधि चेति । लैङ्गिकमिति । लिङ्गाज्जातं लैङ्गिकम्, लिङ्गदर्शनाद्

गन्तव्यम्, सर्वत्र साध्याविनाभावित्वस्यैव गमकत्वात् तद्रहितस्य तु त्रैलक्षण्य-
लक्षितस्याप्यगमकत्वात्, इतरथा तत्पुत्रत्वादीनामपि गमकत्वप्रसङ्गात्,
नियमवत् । त्रैलक्षण्यं लक्षणं न यत्किञ्चित्, तेनायमप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न, नियमेन
साध्याविनाभावित्वस्यैवोद्दीपनात्, तच्चेदस्ति किं त्रैलक्षण्यावैश्या, तस्यैव

यदव्यभिचारित्वादिविशेषणं ज्ञानं तद् यतः परामर्शज्ञानोपलक्षितात् कारकसमूहाद् भवति
तल्लौकिकमिति यावत् । तथा हि—कार्यं कारणपूर्वकत्वेनोपलम्भादुपलभ्यमानं कारणस्य
गमकम् । यथा—विशिष्टनदीपूरोपलम्भादुपरि वृष्टो मेघ इति । तथा हि—प्रचुरतरफल-
फेनपर्णकाष्ठादिवहनविशिष्टस्य नदीपूरस्य वृष्टिकार्यत्वेन पूर्वमुपलम्भात् तदुपलम्भे सति
युक्तमनुमानम् अयं नदीपूरो वृष्टिकार्यः, विशिष्टनदीपूरत्वात्, पूर्वोपलब्धविशिष्टनदीपूर-
वत्, पूरउभयतटव्यापकादकसंयोगः । कारणमपि कार्यजनकत्वेन पूर्वमुपलब्धेहपलभ्यमानं
कार्यस्य लिङ्गम् । यथा विशिष्टमेघोन्नतिर्वर्षकर्मण इति । अथ कारणस्यावश्यं कार्यजन-
कत्वेनानुपलम्भात्, कार्याणां चानियतात् कारणादुत्पत्तेर्व्यभिचारः । तथा हि—मेघोन्नतिसद-
भावेऽप्येकदा वृष्टिर्न दृष्टा, कार्यं चानियतात् कारणादुत्पद्यमानं दृष्टम् । यथा वृश्चिकाद्
वृश्चिको जायते गोमयात् सर्वाच्चेति, तत्कथं कार्यात् कारणविशेषप्रतिपत्तिः कारणाच्च
कार्यविशेषस्येति ? नैतदेवम्, कारणविशेषस्य कार्यविशेषगमकत्वम्, कार्यविशेषस्य
तु कारणविशेषगमकत्वमित्यभ्युपगमात् । यस्तु विद्यमानमपि विशेषं नावबुध्यते, तत्र
तस्यापराधो नानुमानस्येति । तथा धूमाम्नेः संयोगी । अथ संयोगस्योभयनिष्ठत्वाविशेषे
कथमेकं नियमेन हेतुरपरं च साध्यमिति व्यवस्था ? सत्यमिदम्, अविनाभावेऽपि
समानमुत्पश्यामः । तथा हि—अविनाभावस्योभयनिष्ठत्वात् कथमेषा व्यवस्थेति ।
अथ यस्योपलम्भादानुमेये प्रवृत्तिस्तदेव साधनं नान्यदिति चेत्, संयोगित्वेऽपि समान-
मेतत् । समवायी चोष्णस्पर्शो वारिस्थं तेजो गमयतीति । विरोधी च यथा—अहि-
विस्फूर्जनविशिष्टो नकुलादेर्लिङ्गम्, बह्निर्वा शीताभावस्येति । नैयायिकाभ्राहुः—पूर्वं
वच्छेषवत्सामान्यतोऽदृष्टमित्यनेन सूत्रावयवेन तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामा-
न्यतोऽदृष्टं चेति सकलं सूत्रं लक्षयति । तत्पूर्वकं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकं त्रिविधमिति; अन्वयी
व्यतिरेकी अन्वयव्यतिरेकी चेति । अथवा सूत्रावयवेनैव प्रकारान्तरेण त्रिविधं पदं व्याचष्टे.
पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोऽदृष्टमिति । पूर्वं साध्यं तद्व्याप्त्या यस्यास्ति तत्पूर्ववत् ।
साध्यसजातीयं च शेषः, तद् यस्यास्ति तच्छेषवत् । सामान्यतश्च विपक्षेऽदृष्टम्, चक्षुब्दात्
प्रत्यक्षागमाविरुद्धं असत्प्रतिपक्षं चेति । एवं च पञ्चरूपम्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोरन्यतररूपा-
भावे च तत्तद्रूपमनुमानमिति । अथवा पूर्ववन्नाम यत्र कारणेन कार्यमनुमीयते,
यथामेघोन्नत्या भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति । प्रयोगस्तु—अमी मेघा वृष्टिमन्तः, गम्भीरगजित-
त्वेऽन्विरप्रभावत्वे च सत्युन्नतत्वात्, ये एवं ते वृष्टिमन्तः; यथा वृष्टिमत्पूर्वमेघाः, तथा
चामी, तस्मात्तथा । शेषवन्नाम यत्र कार्येण कारणमनुमीयते, यथा नदीपूरदर्शनाद् वृष्टिः ।
प्रयोगस्तु उपरिवृष्टिमद्देशसंबन्धिनी नदी, शीघ्रतरस्त्रोतस्त्वे फलफेनकाष्ठादिवहनत्वे च सति
पूर्णत्वात्, तदन्यतदीवत् । सामान्यतोऽदृष्टं नाम अकार्यकारणभूतेन यत्राविनाभाविना
विशेषणेन विशेष्यमाणो धर्मो गम्यते, यथा—बलाकया सलिलमिति । प्रयोगोऽयम् बला-
काजहृद्दृत्तिप्रदेशो जलवान्, बलाकावत्त्वात्, संप्रतिपन्नप्रदेशवदिति । तत्पुत्रादीनामिति ।

गमकत्वात् । तथा हि—जलचन्द्रान्नभ्रन्दम्, कृत्तिकोदयाच्छकटोदयम् । पुष्पितै-
कचूतात्पुष्पिताशेषचूतान् चन्द्रोदयात्कुमुदाकरप्रबोधम्, वृक्षाच्छायामित्यादि पक्ष-
धर्मत्वविरहेऽप्यनुमिमीमहे । कालादिकस्तत्र धर्मी समस्त्येव, तत्र पक्षधर्मता
लिङ्गस्य गृह्यते इति चेन्न, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । एवं हि शब्दस्यानित्यत्वे साध्ये
काककाष्ण्यादेरपि गमकत्वप्रसक्तेः; तत्रापि लोकादेशमिणः कल्पयितुं शक्य-
त्वात् । तथा अन्वयविकलेऽपि अनित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात्, इत्ययं सम्यग्हेतुतया
समर्थयितुं शक्य इति । नान्वयोऽपि हेतोरलक्षणम् । तथा हि—तावकाकूतेनैव
सकलं सत्त्वमनित्यतया क्रोडीकृतम्, इति भावधर्मः श्रावणत्वं कथमनित्यतां
विहाय विपक्षे वर्तितुमुत्सहेत, तद्विकल्पस्य निःस्वभावतापत्तेः, अनित्यताविनि-
र्मुक्तस्य सत्त्वस्यासंभवात् । एतेन सात्मकं जीवच्छरीरम्, प्राणादिमत्त्वात्,
निरात्मकत्वे तद्वैकल्यप्रसङ्गात्, घटादिवद्, इत्ययमपि गमको व्याख्यातः,
साध्यार्थान्यथानुपपन्नत्वस्यात्रापि सद्भावात् । पक्षधर्मत्वान्वययोस्त्वलक्षणतया
प्रतिपादनात् । तथा कार्यस्वाभावानुपलब्धिरूपलिङ्गत्रयनियमोऽपि किल
तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिलक्षणसंबन्धास्तित्वमेतेष्वेवेति यः क्रियते, सोऽप्ययुक्तः, प्रकृत-
संबन्धद्वयविकलस्यापि रूपादे रसादिगमकत्वदर्शनात् । मा भूत्तस्य तादात्म्य-
तदुत्पत्तिभ्यां गमकत्वम्, समवायाद्भ्रविष्यति; तथापि नान्यथानुपपन्नत्वमेव
हेतोरलक्षणमिति यदि वैशेषिको मन्येत, सोऽन्यथा निर्लोठनीयः । स हि विकल्पतः
पर्यनुयोज्यः, समवायिभ्यः समवायोऽभिन्नो भिन्नो वा । यद्यभिन्नः, समवायिन
एव तर्हि, न समवायः; तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्, तत्स्वरूपवत् । भिन्नश्चेत्, स
कथं तेषु वर्तेत सामस्त्येन आहोस्विदेकदेशेन । तद्यदि सामस्त्येन, तदयुक्तम्,
समवायबहुत्वप्रसङ्गात्, प्रतिसमवायि तस्य परिसमाप्ततावाप्तेः । अथैकदेशेन,
तदप्यचार, सांशताप्रसङ्गेन निरवयवत्वक्षतेः, स्वांशवर्तनेऽपि सामस्त्यैकदेशोच्चा-
वताराच्च । तत्रापि सामस्त्यपक्षे बहुत्वं तदवस्थमेव । एकदेशपक्षे त्वंशान्तर-
प्रसङ्गेनानवस्था । तन्न समवायवलाद् गमकतां प्रत्याशा विधेया, तस्यैव तत्र
दुःस्थितत्वात् । एतेन संयोगिनाऽपि गमकता प्रत्युक्ता, समानदूषणत्वात् ।
विरोधिनोऽपि विरुद्धाभावगमकत्वमन्यथानुपपन्नत्वमेव सूचयति, तदभावे गमकत्वा-
योगात् । एवं परपरिकल्पितमन्यदपि लिङ्गलक्षणं यद्गमकताङ्गं तदन्यथानुप-
पन्नत्वं न व्यभिचरति, साध्यं विनाप्युपपद्यमानस्य गमकतावैकल्यादिति, अत्रैव
व्यापके लिङ्गलक्षणे अन्तर्भावनीयम्, विपरीतं तु निरसनीयमिति स्थितम् । तदेव-

स इयामः, तत्पुत्रत्वात्, परिदृश्यमानपुत्रवदिति । आदीति । आदिशब्दात् निरुपाधिसंबन्ध-
बोधसमुत्थसाध्यप्रमासाधनमनुमानमित्यादिग्रहः । आदिशब्दात् पक्वान्येतानि आम्रफलानि,
एकशाखाप्रभवत्वात्, उपभुज्यमानाम्रफलवदित्यादिपरिग्रहः ।

विरोधिन इत्यादि । विरोधी वह्निः स्वविरुद्धस्य शीतस्य असत्त्वं बोधयति । विरुद्धा-
भावगमकरवमित्युपलक्षणम्, विरुद्धसद्भावगमकत्वस्यापि दर्शनात् । अत एव पूर्वमहिर्विस्फू-
जितविशिष्टो नकुलादिलिङ्गमित्युक्तम्, तस्य च सामान्यस्य तद्रूपतया च तेन तस्याध्य-
वसायादिति, स्वलक्षणरूपतया चानुमानेन सामान्यस्य विकल्पनात् । अतस्मिन् अस्वलक्षणे

मनुमानलक्षणं प्रतिपाद्याधुना यच्छौद्धोदनिशिष्यैर्व्यगादि—यदुत भ्रान्तमनुमानम्, सामान्यप्रतिभासित्वात् । तस्य च बहिः स्वलक्षणे व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकविकल्पाभ्यामपाक्रियमाणतया अयोगात्, तद्रूपतया च तेन तस्याध्यवसायाद् अतस्मिस्तद्ग्रहणस्य च भ्रान्तिलक्षणत्वात् । प्रामाण्यं पुनः प्रणालिकया बहिः स्वलक्षणवलायः तत्त्वादनुमानस्य । तथा हि—नार्थं विना तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिरूपसंबन्धप्रतिबद्धलिङ्गसद्भावः न तद्विना तद्विषयं ज्ञानम्, न तज्ज्ञानमन्तरेण प्रागवधारितसंबन्धस्मरणम्, तदस्मरणे नानुमानमिति, अर्थाव्यभिचारित्वाद् भ्रान्तमपि प्रमाणमिति संगीर्यते । तदुक्तम्—

अतस्मिस्तद्ग्रहो भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमा । इति ।

तदपाकर्तुमाह—तदभ्रान्तमित्यादि । तदनुमानं भ्राम्यति स्वगोचरे विपर्यस्यतीति भ्रान्तम्, ततोऽन्यदभ्रान्तम्, अविपरीतार्थग्राहीति यावत्, इयं च प्रतिज्ञा; प्रमीयते यथावस्थितोऽर्थः परिच्छिद्यतेऽनेनेति प्रमाणम्, तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात्, अयं तु हेतुः; संगतमक्षाणामिति समक्षम्, तदिव समक्षवदिति दृष्टान्तः तदिदमनुमानस्य भ्रान्ततानिराकारकं संपूर्णावयम्, उपनयनिगमनयोरवयवत्रयप्रतिपादनेनैवाक्षिप्तत्वात् प्रमाणं सूचितम् । प्रयोगस्त्वेवं द्रष्टव्यः—अभ्रान्तमनुमानम्, प्रमाणत्वात्, इह यत् यत् प्रमाणं तत्तदभ्रान्तं यथा समक्षम्, तथा च प्रमाणं भवद्भिरभ्युपगम्यते अनुमानम्, तस्मात्प्रमाणत्वादभ्रान्तमिति प्रतिपद्यन्तामिति । तत्रार्थवादी तावत्समक्षलक्षणे दृष्टान्ते साध्यविकलतामाविर्भावयितुं न पारयति, स्वयमेव समक्षस्थाभ्रान्ततयाम्युपगमात् । शून्यवादिनः समस्तापलापित्वात् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारं प्रत्ययोग्यतैवेति न तमधिकृत्य स्वसाधनदोषाः परिहर्तव्याः, स्ववचनबाधितप्रतिज्ञत्वेन तद्वादोत्थानाभावात् । तथा हि—सर्वाभावप्रतिपादकं वचोऽस्ति, नास्ति वा । यद्यस्ति तर्हि प्रतिज्ञाहानिः । अथ नास्ति, सकलभावसिद्धिः, प्रतिषेधकाभावात् ॥५॥

ज्ञानवादी पुनर्वैद्यवेदकाकारविकलं सकलविकल्पगोचरातीतं निविकल्पकं विविक्तपारमार्थिकस्वसंवेदनवेद्यं संवेदनमागूर्यानादिकालालीनवासनावलप्रभावितं ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारकलुषितं बहिःप्रथमानं निखिलमपि ज्ञानं विपर्यस्ततया प्रतिजानानः समक्षलक्षणस्य प्रकृतदृष्टान्तस्य साध्यशून्यतामभिदध्यात् अतस्तन्मतविकुट्टनार्थमाह—

तद्ग्रहस्य स्वलक्षणतया परिच्छेदस्य भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमेति । अमुमेवार्थं दृष्टान्तपूर्वकं विनिश्चये धर्मकीर्तिरकीर्तयत् । यथा—

मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।

निच्याजानाविशोवेऽपि विशोषोऽर्थेऽक्रियां प्रति ॥१॥

यथा तथा यथार्थत्वेऽप्यनुमानतदाभयोः ।

अर्थेऽक्रियानुरोधेन प्रमाणत्वं व्यवस्थितम् ॥२॥ इति ॥५॥

न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयात् ।

भ्रान्तं प्रमाणमित्येतद्विरुद्धं वचनं यतः ॥६॥

यद्भवतश्चेतसि विवर्तते, यदुक्तं न केवलमनुमानं भ्रान्तम्, किं तर्हि यद्भवद्भिर्दृष्टान्ततयोपात्तं प्रत्यक्षं तदपि भ्रान्तमेव, सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तमिति वचनात् । तदेतन्न, कुत इत्याह—प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयादिति । प्रमाणभावनिर्णयादित्यर्थः । ननु च प्रमाणतामभ्रान्ततान्यथानुपपन्नां यदि परः प्रतिपद्येत, ततस्तामभ्युपगच्छन् कथं भ्रान्तताविप्रतिपत्तिं विदध्यादिति पार्श्वस्थितवचनावकाशमाशङ्क्य, भ्रान्तताप्रमाणतयोर्विरोधसाधनेन ततः प्रमाणतां व्यावर्त्यानिन्यशरणतया प्रतिज्ञाताभ्रान्तताक्रान्तां तां दर्शयन्नाह—भ्रान्तमित्यादि । भ्रान्तं विपर्यस्तं अथ च प्रमाणां ग्राह्यपरिच्छेदहेतुरित्येतद्वचनमेवंविधार्थप्रत्यायको ध्वनिर्विरुद्धं, पूर्वापरव्याहृतार्थगर्भकत्वात् । ननु च नैवास्य विरुद्धता, तथा हि—अविदितपरमार्थव्यावहारिकाभिप्रायेण लोकसंवृतिं धटयन्तो वयं दृढतरवासनाप्रबोधसंपादितसत्ताकयोः प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः प्रमाणतामाचक्ष्महे, तदभिप्रायेण दर्शितार्थप्रापकत्वेन तयोरविसंवादकत्वात्, शिथिलवासनौमुख्यनिर्मितजन्मकयोः पुनरप्रमाणताम्, तदाकूतेनैव दर्शितेऽर्थे विप्रलम्भनादिति, भ्रान्ततां पुनस्तत्त्वचिन्तकाभिप्रायेण सकलस्य बहिरुपप्लवमानस्य ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारकालुष्यदूषितस्य प्रतिभासस्य पारमार्थिकाद्वयसंवेदनविपर्यस्तरूपत्वादभिदध्महे, बहिः प्रतिभासस्य तद्ग्राह्यार्थविचारक्षमतयोपप्लुतरूपत्वात् । तथा हि—अर्थोऽवयविरूपः अवयवरूपो वा स्यात्, गत्यन्तराभावात् । न तावदवयविरूपो विचारं क्षमते, अवयवविरहे अवयवित्वायोगात्, तेषु च तद्वृत्तिविकल्पानुपपत्तेः । तथा हि—तेषु असावेकदेशेन वर्तते, सामस्त्येन वा । न तावदेकदेशेन, तस्य स्वयं निरवयवत्वात् । अवयववृत्तिनिमित्तमंशान्तरकल्पने तद्वृत्तावप्यंशान्तरकल्पनप्रसङ्गः, तथा चानवस्था । नापि सामस्त्येन, प्रत्यवयवं परिसमाप्तरूपतयावयविवबहुत्वप्रसङ्गात् । भेदपक्षे दोषोऽयम्, अभेदपक्षे नास्तीति चेत्, न, तत्राप्यवयवमात्रम् अवयवविमात्रं वा स्यात्, इतरेतराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्, इतरेतरस्वरूपवत् । किं च समस्तावयवव्यापिनोऽवयविनोऽभ्युपगमे षटादेरेकदेशरागकम्पदर्शनादिषु सकलरागकम्पदर्शनादीनि दुर्निवारानि स्युः, एकस्य रागारागादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासायोगादिति । नाप्यवयवरूपोऽर्थो विचारगोचरचारी, करचरणशिरोग्रीवादीनामवयवानां स्वावयवापेक्षया अवयविरूपतया तद्दूषणेनैवापास्तत्वात् । परमाणुनां निरंशतया अवयवत्वमुपपद्यत इति चेत्, न, तेषामपि दिक्षट्कसंबन्धेन षडंशतापत्तेः, अन्यथावस्थानाभावात्, ततश्चार्थविरहान्तदुन्मुखो ग्राह्याकारोऽस्तीकः,

आगुर्येति प्रतिज्ञाय । ततो भ्रान्ततायाम् । तां प्रमाणताम् । संवृतिमिति कल्पनाम् ।

यदाहुः—

अनिरूपिततत्त्वार्था प्रतीतिः संवृतिर्मता ।

औन्मुख्यमिति आभिमुख्यम् । त्वाकूतेन व्यावहारिकाभिप्रायेण । विक्षट्केत्यादि ।

तदलीकतायां ग्राहकाकारोऽपि नावस्थानमावधनाति, ग्राह्याभावे ग्राहकायोगात्, तदपेक्षयैव तत्स्वरूपस्थितिः, ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारविलये च बोधाकारोऽवशिष्यते, तस्य सर्वत्राव्यभिचरितरूपत्वात्, तस्मात् स एव पारमार्थिक इति । अत्र प्रति-
विधीयते—यदवादि संवेदनमद्वयं पारमार्थिकम्, ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारप्रवृत्तं पुनर-
तात्त्विकमिति, तदयुक्तम्, प्रमाणाभावात् । तथा हि—वहिरन्तश्चानेकाकारतया
हर्षविषादादिभिः स्थिरस्थूरताद्यनेकधर्मपरिकरितार्थग्रहणपरिणामैश्च विवर्तमानं
संवेदनमुपलभ्यते, न पुनर्वैद्यवेदकाकारविविक्तं यादृग् भवद्भिरुपवर्ण्यते
ज्ञानं तादृशं कस्यचित् कदाचन प्रतीतिगोचरचारितामनुभवति, अद्वयप्रतिभासस्य
स्वप्नदशायामप्यननुभूतेः । न च तत्त्वचिन्तका अपि प्रमाणान्तरेण स्वाकृतं
प्रतिष्ठापयन्तः प्रेक्षावतामवधेयवचना भवन्ति, अन्यथैकमचेतनमव्ययमपि ब्रह्मानेकं
चेतनं क्षणभंगुरताक्रान्तमविद्यातः प्रथत इति ब्रुवाणोऽनिराकार्यः स्यात् । यदपि
वहिरर्थनि राकरणधिया अवयव्यवयवद्वारेण दूषणमदायि, तदपि वहिरन्तः प्रथमान-
सकलामुमत्प्रतीतप्रतिभासमुग्दरनिर्दलितशरीरतया भक्तमध्यनिष्ठयूतदर्शिनः पुरतो
विप्रतारणप्रवणकुट्टिनीशपथप्रायमिति न विद्वज्जनमनांसि रञ्जयति, प्रत्यक्षप्रति-
भासापह्नवे तन्मूलकत्वात्, कुयुक्तिविकल्पानामुत्थानाभावात् । किं च संवेदन-
स्यापि सितासिताद्यनेकाकारेष्वेकस्य वर्तने भेदाभेदसामस्त्यैकदेशादिचोद्यं
समानमेवेति न दूषणम् । अनेकाकारविवर्तस्थालीकत्वान्न तेन सह संवेदनस्य
पारमार्थिकस्य भेदाभेदादिचिन्तेति चेत्, ननु एवमितरेतराश्रयं दुस्तरमाढीकते ।
तथा हि—तदीकत्वसिद्धावद्वयसंवेदनसिद्धिः, तत्सिद्धौ च तलदीकत्वमिति
न्यायात् । अन्यच्च अद्वयमप्येकक्षणवर्ति संवेदनं यथा पूर्वोत्तरक्षणाभ्यां
संबन्धमनुभवति, तथा निरंशा अपि यदि परमाणवो दिगंशैः परमाण्वन्तरैर्वा
संश्लेषमागच्छेयुः किमयुक्तं स्यात् । न चावयव्यवयवयोरेकान्तव्यतिरेकपक्षे
यद्दूषणं तदस्मत्पक्षबाधाकरम्, परस्पराविनिर्लुठितरूपयोर्विवक्षया संदर्शनीय-
भेदयोस्तयोरभ्युपगमात्, वहिरन्तश्च तथैव प्रकाशमानतया तयोर्निह्नोतुमशक्य-
त्वात् । एतेन रागारागकम्पाकम्पादिविरोधोद्भावनमपि प्रतिव्यूढम्, प्रमाण-
प्रसिद्धेऽर्थे विरोधाभावात्, प्रमाणबाधितस्यैव विरुद्धत्वात्, कुयुक्तिविकल्पानां
च प्रत्यक्षापह्नवे निर्मूलतया बाधकत्वायोगात्, तदुद्दलितत्वेनोत्थानाभावात्,
भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वाच्च सर्वधर्माणां तद्विपर्ययसंपाद्यो विरोधो दूरापास्त एव ।
किं च, स्वयमेव संवेदनं परमार्थसंव्यवहारापेक्षया प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षसविकल्पका-
विकल्पकभ्रान्ताभ्रान्तादिरूपमभ्युपयतो वहिरर्थे विरुद्धधर्माध्यासप्रतिषेधबुद्धिः

यद्दिकसंबन्धान्यथानुपपत्त्या परमाणूनां सावयतेत्यभिप्रायः । अवधेयवचना आदियवचनः ।
ब्रह्म तत्स्वरूपम् । संवेदनस्यापीत्यादि । एकस्येति । चित्रज्ञानस्य, ज्ञाने ह्येकस्मिन्नेव नील-
पीतादयो बहव आकाराः प्रतिभान्ति, ततस्तेषु नीलपीताद्याकारेषु कथमेकं ज्ञानं वर्तते इति
विचारः प्रवर्तते एव । तदुद्दलितत्वेनेति । प्रत्यक्षापह्नवेन कुयुक्तिविकल्पानां निर्दलितत्वादुत्था-
नाभावः, प्रत्यक्षाभावेहि क्वचित् कस्याप्यदर्शने कथं कुयुक्तिविकल्पानां संभवः ? भिन्नप्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तत्वादिति । पर्यायरूपतया हि एकत्वपरिणामरूपस्यावयविनः तन्तुभ्यो भेदः, द्रव्यरूप-

केवलं जाड्यं सूचयति । तन्न प्रमाणं कथंचिद् भ्रान्तं समस्ति, स्वरूपप्रच्यवप्रसङ्गादिति स्थितम् । ननु च तद्दर्शितार्थालीकतया ज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तता, न स्वरूपेण, न च तदुदयसमये कस्यचिदिदमलीकार्थम्, इदं त्वनलीकार्थमिति विवेकेनावधारणं समस्ति; भ्रान्तताभ्रान्तताभिमतयोस्तदेकरूपतया प्रकाशनात् । यदा च विशददर्शनपथचारिणोऽपि शशधरयुगलादयोऽलीकतामाविशन्तो दृश्यन्ते, तदा सकलसत्यार्थताभिमतप्रतिभासेष्वप्यलीकार्थताशङ्कानिवृत्तेरनाश्वास एव । न च तदर्थप्राप्त्यादिकमारेकानिराकरणकारणं कल्पनीयम्, स्वप्नावस्थायां तत्सद्भावेऽप्यलीकार्थतासिद्धेः । बाधकप्रत्ययोपनिपातात् तस्यासत्यार्थतेति चेत्, न, तस्य स्वगोचरपर्यवसितत्वेन बाधकत्वायोगात् । अन्यथा नीलमाददाना देवदत्तबुद्धिः प्राक्प्रवृत्तपीतबुद्धेर्बाधिकापद्येत्, सर्वप्रतिभासस्य बाधकाभावसिद्धेश्च समानता । तस्माद् भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तज्ञानभ्रान्तिरियं भवताम्, विवेकाभावेन सर्वस्थालीकार्थत्वादिति ॥६॥

अत्राह—

सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।

प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्चायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥७॥

एवं मन्यते—योऽपि समस्तसंवेदनस्य भ्रान्ततां प्रतिजानीते, तेनापि तत्साधकस्याभ्रान्तताभ्युपगन्तव्या, तद्भ्रान्तत्वे तत्प्रतिपादितार्थालीकत्वेन सकलज्ञानाभ्रान्तताप्रसङ्गात्, अन्यथा तद्भ्रान्तत्वायोगात् । एवं च तज्जातीयमन्यदप्यभ्रान्तं स्यात्, ततश्च सकलप्रतिभासस्य समस्तसंवेदनस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितो विपर्यस्तत्वानिष्पत्तेः यत् स्फुटं स्वान्यनिश्चायि सुनिश्चिततया स्वपर-

तयाऽभेदः, एवमुत्पादादिधर्माणामपि विरोधाभावो बोद्धव्यः, उत्तरपर्यायस्य ह्युदयः पूर्वपर्यायस्य व्ययः द्रव्यस्य त्वनुयायिनो ध्रुव्यमिति । परमार्थेत्यादि । परमार्थसंबन्धव्यवहारापेक्षयेति एतद् यथासंभवं योज्यं न यथाक्रमम्, तेन परमार्थापेक्षया संवेदनं प्रत्यक्षम् स्वसंवेदनरूपत्वात्; संबन्धवहारापेक्षया त्वप्रत्यक्षम्, अर्थाभावेऽप्यर्थपरिच्छेदात्मकत्वेन लोकैरध्यवसायात्, तथा परमार्थापेक्षया विकल्परहितम्, सर्वविकल्पानां स्वात्मनि निर्विकल्पत्वात्; संबन्धवहारापेक्षया तु विकल्पकलुषितम्, असतो बहिरर्थस्य तेन विकल्पनात्, तथा परमार्थापेक्षया अभ्रान्तम्, ज्ञानमात्रस्य वास्तवत्वात्; संबन्धवहारापेक्षया च भ्रान्तम्, अविद्यमानबाह्यवस्तुनि बहीरूपतयार्थस्य ग्राहकत्वात् । आदिग्रहणात् परमार्थापेक्षया प्रमाणम् संबन्धवहारापेक्षयत्त्वप्रमाणमित्याद्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् । बहिरर्थे बाह्यवस्तुनि भेदाभेदादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासने कृत्वा हेतुना वा प्रतिषेधबुद्धिः केवलं मन्दतां प्रकटयति । त्वर्थप्राप्त्यादिकमिति । तस्य प्रतिभासमानस्य जलादेरर्थस्य प्राप्तिः, आदिशब्दात् पानावगाहनाद्यर्थक्रियापरिग्रहः । तस्येति । स्वप्नज्ञानस्य । तस्य बाधकप्रत्ययस्य । समानतेति । न कश्चित्प्रतिभासो बाध्यो नापि च बाधकः । विवेकाभावेनेति । विवेको भ्रान्तात् स्वप्नज्ञानादेरभ्रान्तस्य पार्थक्येन व्यवस्थापनम् ॥६॥

योऽपीति । योगाचारादिः । भ्रान्ततामिति । सर्वमालम्बने भ्रान्तम् इति वचनात्

प्रकाशकं तत्प्रमाणमिति संबन्धः । तच्च द्वयसिद्धौ स्वरूपार्थलक्षणयुग्मनिष्पत्तौ प्रसिद्धयति निष्पद्यते, अन्यथा प्रमेयाभावे प्रमाणाभावात् । तस्मात् प्रमाण-
मुररीकुर्वाणेनार्थोऽप्यभ्युपगन्तव्य इत्यभिप्राय इति ॥७॥

तदेवं स्वार्थानुमानलक्षणं प्रतिपाद्य तद्वतां भ्रान्तताविप्रतिपत्तिं च
निराकृत्याधुनाप्रतिपादितपरार्थानुमानलक्षण एवाल्पवक्तव्यत्वात्, तावच्छाब्द-
लक्षणमाह—

दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद्वाक्यात्परमार्थाभिधायिनः ।

तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नं मानं शब्दं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥८॥

अत्रापि शाब्दम् इति लक्ष्यम्, अनुद्यत्वात् । दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद् इत्यादि
लक्षणम्, विधेयत्वात् । दृष्टेन प्रमाणालोकितेन इष्टः प्रति(वि?)पादयिष-
तोऽव्याहतो अनिराकृतः सामर्थ्यादर्थो यस्मिन् वाक्ये तत्तथा, प्रमाणनिश्चितार्था-
वाधितमिति यावत्, तस्मात् । परमोऽकृत्रिमः पुरुषोपयोगी शक्यानुष्ठानो वार्थो
वाच्यस्तमभिधातुं शीलं यस्य तत् परमार्थाभिधायि, विशिष्टार्थदर्शकमित्यर्थः ।
ततः तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नम् प्रकृतवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यार्थादानशीलतया लब्धात्मसत्ताकं
यन्मानं तच्छाब्दमिति प्रकीर्तितम् उपवर्णितं पूर्वाचार्यैरिति संबन्धः । तत्र
दृष्टेष्टाव्याहताद् इत्यनेन कुतीथिकवचसां लौकिकविप्रतारकोक्तीनां च शाब्दतां
निरस्यति, प्रमाणवाधितत्वात् । वाक्यात् इत्यमुना तु वाक्यस्यैव नियतार्थदर्शक-
त्वात्, परमार्थाभिधायितेति दर्शयन् पदाच्छाब्दाभावमाह । परमार्थाभिधायिनः
इत्यनेन ज्वरहरतक्षकचूडारत्नालंकारोपदेशादिवचनप्रभवज्ञानस्य निष्फलतया
प्रामाण्यं निराचष्टे । तत्त्वग्राहितयोत्पन्नम् इत्यमुना त्वेवंभूतादपि वाक्यात्
श्रोतृदोषाद् विपरीताद्यर्थग्रहणचतुरतया प्रादुर्भूतस्य शाब्दत्वं वारयति । मानम्
इत्यनेन अन्तर्भावितप्रोपसर्गार्थेन शाब्दे परस्याप्रामाण्यबुद्धिं तिरस्कुरुते, तदप्रामाण्ये
परार्थानुमानप्रलयप्रसङ्गात्, तस्य वचनरूपत्वात् । श्रवणवहेतुसूचकत्वेनोपचार-
तस्तस्य प्रामाण्यं न तत्त्वत इति चेत्, न, अप्रामाण्यस्य सूचकत्वायोगात् । ननु
हेतुप्रतिपादने यदि तत् प्रमाणम्, ततो हेतुसमर्थकप्रमाणान्तरप्रतीक्षणं न विशीर्येत,

तत्साधकस्य समस्तसंबेदनभ्रान्ततासाधकस्य, निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः, प्रत्ययत्वात्,
स्वप्नप्रत्ययवत्, इत्यनुमानस्य । तद्भ्रान्तत्वे निरालम्बनतासाधकानुमानालीकत्वे ॥७॥

दृष्टेनेत्यादि । अयं भिन्नाधिकरणस्त्रिपदो बहुव्रीहिः, यदि वा इष्टोऽव्याहतोऽर्थोऽत्र
तदिष्टाव्याहतं वाक्यम्, तदनु दृष्टेन प्रमाणनिर्णीतेन इष्टाव्याहतमिति तत्पुरुषः । परमो-
ऽकृत्रिमः पुरुषोपयोगी शक्यानुष्ठानो वेति । वाशब्दः समुच्चये, ततोऽयमर्थः—पुरुषोपयोगी
शक्यानुष्ठानश्च योऽर्थः स परमोऽकृत्रिम इत्युच्यते, तत्र पुरुषोपयोगी इत्यनेन शक्यानुष्ठाना-
नामपि शक्यशरीरोद्धर्तनादीनां पुरुषानुपयोगीनां निरासः, शक्यानुष्ठान इत्यनेन तु पुरुषो-
पयोगिनामपि ज्वरहरशेषशिखारत्नालंकारादीनां प्रतिक्षेपः । विकल्पार्थो वाशब्दः, तदय-
मर्थः—पुरुषोपयोगी शक्यानुष्ठानो वा अर्थोऽकृत्रिम इत्युच्यते । अशक्यानुष्ठानस्य तक्षका-
लंकारादेः परमार्थतः पुरुषानुपयोगित्वात्; पुरुषानुपयोगिनश्च मृतकोद्धर्तनादेस्तत्त्वः पुरुष-
धर्मवद्भिर्विधातुमशक्यत्वादिति । पदाच्छाब्दाभावमाहेति । प्रवृत्तिविषयव्यवस्थापकं हि

तेनैव निर्णीतस्वरूपत्वात्तस्य, प्रमाणसिद्धे पुनः प्रमाणान्तरवैयर्थ्यात् । नैतदस्ति, भवत्परिकल्पिताध्यक्षस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्, तद्दर्शितेऽर्थे विकल्पप्रतीक्षणात्तस्यैव प्रामाण्यमासज्येत । तद्गृहीतमेवार्थमसावभिलाषयतीति चेत्, शब्दप्रतिपादितं हेतुं प्रमाणान्तरं समर्थयते इति समानो न्यायः ॥८॥

शाब्दं च द्विधा भवति—लौकिकं शास्त्रजं चेति । तत्रेदं द्वयोरपि साधारणं लक्षणं प्रतिपादितम्, समर्थनं पुनरविप्रतारकवचनप्रभवस्थेहादिवाक्यप्रस्ताव एव लौकिकस्य विहितम्, शास्त्रजस्य तु विघातव्यमिति यादृशः शास्त्रात्तज्जातं प्रमाणतामनुभवति तद्दर्शयति—

आप्तोपज्ञमनुल्लङ्घ्यमदृष्टेष्टविरोधकम् ।

तत्त्वोपदेशकृत्सारं शास्त्रं कापथघट्टनम् ॥९॥

शास्ति शिक्षयति जीवाजीवादि तत्त्वं ग्राहयति, शिष्यतेऽनेनेति वा शास्त्रम् । तत् किंभूतमिति तद्विशेषणान्याह—आप्तः प्रक्षीणाशेषरागादिदोषगणः, तेन उपज्ञम् आदावुपलब्धम् । अनेनापौरुषेयापोहमाह, तस्य प्रमाणवाधितत्वात् ; पुरुषव्यापाराभावे वचनानुपलब्धेः, उपलम्भेऽपि तदर्थानवगमात्, तदर्थनिश्चयार्थं पुरुषाश्रयणे गजस्तानन्यायप्रसङ्गात्, तस्य रागादिकलुषितत्वेन वितथार्थकथन-प्रवृत्तेः, तदनुष्ठानादपि स्वकार्यसिद्धौ प्रणयनार्थमपि पुरुषः किं नेष्यते ? विशेषा-भावात् । तन्न क्षीणदोषवचनं व्यतिरिच्यान्यतः प्रेक्षावतां परलोकादावदृष्टेऽर्थे प्रवृत्तिर्युक्ता, तत् तदेवशास्त्रं, निरुपचरितशब्दार्थोपपत्तैरित्यास्तां तावत् । अत एव उल्लङ्घ्यते प्राबल्येन गम्यते अभिभूयते अन्यैरित्युल्लङ्घ्यम्, ततोन्वद् अनुल्लङ्घ्यम् सर्ववचनातिशयीति यावत् । अत एव दृष्टेन प्रमाणनिर्णीते-नेष्टस्य तद्वाच्यस्य विरोधो यस्मिस्तत् तथा तदेव, यदि वा, दृष्टः प्रमाणेन,

प्रमाणम्, न च पदेभ्यो यः पदार्थप्रत्ययस्तेन नियतो विषय उपस्थाप्यते, येन घटार्थी कुतश्चि-न्निवृत्त्य क्वचित् प्रवर्तते; नियतदेशे हि वस्तुनि पुमान् प्रवर्तते, न च केनचिद्देशेन विशिष्टो घटो घटशब्देनोपदिशितः, तन्न पदप्रभवप्रत्ययस्य शाब्दप्रमाणत्वम् । तदिति शाब्दम् । तेन शब्देन । तस्य हेतोः ॥८॥

आप्त इत्यादि । उपज्ञायते आदौ उपलभ्यते स्म इत्युपज्ञा, आतश्चोपसर्गे (पा० ३-१-१३१) इति कर्मण्यङ्, तत् आप्तस्योपज्ञा आप्तोपज्ञमिति, तत्पुरुषाधिकारे उपज्ञाप-क्रमे (पा० २-४-२१) इति सूत्रेण उपज्ञान्तस्य नपुंसकत्वम्, तेनोपज्ञमिति तु नावबुध्यते; वाक्ये नपुंसकत्वविधानाभावात् । गजस्तानन्यायेत्यादि । यथा—गजोभ्रसा रजोवियुक्तमात्मानं विधाय पुनरेव रजोभिरात्मानं मलिनयति, तथा त्वमपि रागद्वेषोपहतपुरुषप्रणयनसमुत्थं वेदानां कालुष्यमपौरुषेयत्वाभ्युपगमेन निराकृत्य व्याख्यानार्थं पुनरपि तथाभूतं पुरुषमभ्युप-गच्छन् तदेवांगीकुरुषे इति । तदनुष्ठानादिति । अनुष्ठानं व्याख्यातुर्वाख्यानलक्षणो व्यापारतस्मात् । स्वकार्यस्य परलोकादावदृष्टेऽर्थे प्रवृत्तिरूपस्य सिद्धाविति अम्युपगम्यमाना-यामिति शेषः । दृष्टेनेत्यादि इदमर्थकथनयात्रम्, समासविग्रहस्त्वयम्—इष्टस्य विरोधः, दृष्टेन इष्टविरोधः न विद्यते दृष्टेष्टविरोधो यत्र तत्तथा । तद्वाच्यस्येति शास्त्राभिधेयस्य ।

इष्टो वचनान्तरेण, तयोर्विरोधकम्, तद्विरुद्धार्थाभिधानात्, ततोऽन्यददृष्टेष्ट-
विरोधकम्, अबाधार्थाभिधायित्यर्थः । तदियता शास्त्रस्य स्वार्थसंपदुक्ता,
अधुना तत्त्वोपदेशादीनां परार्थत्वात् परार्थसंपदमाह—तत्त्वं जीवादयः पदार्थाः,
प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितत्वात्, तेषामुपदेशः स्वरूपप्रकाशनम्, तद्रक्षणादिविधानं वा,
तं करोति तत्त्वोपदेशकृत्, अत एव सार्व सर्वस्मै हितम्, प्राणिरक्षणोपायोपदेश-
परमपददायितया विश्वजनीनत्वात् । एतेन परार्थसंपादकत्वमुक्तम् । अधुना
परेषामेवानर्थपरिधातित्वमाह—कृतिसताः पन्थानः कापथाः तीर्थान्तराणि, तेषां
घट्टनं विचालकं निराकारकम्, सर्वजनापकारिकुमतविध्वंसकमित्यर्थः । ईदृशादेव
शास्त्राज्जातं शाब्दं प्रमाणम्, नान्येभ्यः, विप्रलम्भकत्वात्तेषामिति ॥६॥

अधुना परार्थानुमानलक्षणं वक्तव्यम्, तच्च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि पश्यन् एकयोगक्षेम-
त्वात् सामान्येनाह—

स्वनिश्चयवदन्येषां निश्चयोत्पादनं बुधैः ।

परार्थं मानमाख्यातं वाक्यं तदुपचारतः ॥१०॥

अत्र परार्थं मानमिति लक्ष्यम्, स्वनिश्चयवदित्यादि लक्षणम्, स्व आत्मा
तस्य निश्चयः प्रमेयाधिगमः, तद्वदन्येषां प्रतिपाद्यानां निश्चयोत्पादनं प्रमेय-
परिच्छेदज्ञानप्रादुर्भावनम्, यथा आत्मनोऽर्थनिर्णयस्तथा परेषां निर्णयजननमित्यर्थः ।
बुधैर्विद्वद्भिः । परस्मै अर्थः प्रयोजनं येन तत् परार्थम्, मीयतेऽनेनेति मानम्,
आख्यातं कथितम् । ननु च यदि निश्चयोत्पादनं परार्थमानम्, तथा ज्ञानमपि
परप्रत्यायनाय व्याप्रियमाणं परार्थं प्राप्नोतीत्याह—वाक्यं परार्थं, न ज्ञानम्,
तस्यैवानन्तर्येण व्यापारात्, परप्रयोजनमात्रत्वाच्च, इतरस्य तु व्यवहितत्वात्,
स्वपरोपकारित्वाच्च । कथं वचनमज्ञानरूपं प्रमाणमित्याह—तदुपचारतः तस्य
ज्ञानस्थोपचारोऽतद्रूपस्यापि तदङ्गतया तद्रूपत्वेन ग्रहणम् । तत इदमुक्तं भवति—
प्रतिपाद्यगतमुत्पश्यमानं यज्ज्ञानं तदव्यवहितकारणत्वाद् वचनमप्युपचारेण
प्रमाणमित्युच्यते । तत्रानुमानस्य पारार्थ्यं परैरभ्युपगतमेव प्रत्यक्षस्य न प्रतिपद्यन्ते
किलेदं शब्दप्रवेशशून्यं स्वलक्षणग्राहीति नैतद्गोचरः परेभ्यः प्रतिपादयितुं पार्यते ।
न च शब्दात् परस्य स्वलक्षणग्रहणदक्षं प्रत्यक्षमुन्मङ्क्ष्यति, शब्दस्य विकल्पो-
त्पादितत्वेन परस्यापि विकल्पोत्पादकत्वात् ।

सर्वस्मै हितमिति । अस्मिन् वाक्ये सर्वाणो वा (सि० हे० ७-१-४३) इति हितेऽर्थे
एप्रत्ययः । विश्वजनीनत्वादिति विश्वे च ते जनाश्च विश्वजनास्तेभ्यो हितं विश्वजनीनम्
पञ्चसर्वविशवाज्जनात्कर्मधारये (सि० हे० ७-१-४१) इति खः, तस्य इनादेशे चरूपम् ।
कापया इति । कुशब्दस्य पथि शब्दे 'पथ्यक्षोषदर्थे' इत्याकारः । ॥ ६ ॥

परप्रयोजनमात्रत्वादिति । परस्य प्रयोजनं परप्रयोजनम्, तदेव परप्रयोजनमात्रम्,
मात्रं कास्त्वेऽवधारणे इति वचनात्, अवधारणार्थोऽत्र मात्रध्वनिः । यद्यपि कस्यचित्तथा-
विद्याभ्यासाद् वचनमुपचारयतः स्वयमप्यर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्वाक्यस्य प्रयोजनत्वम्, तथाप्यल्पत्वान्नेह
विवक्षितमिति । व्यवहितत्वादिति । ज्ञानान्तरं हि विवक्षा, स्थानकरणाभिधातादिना

तदुक्तम्—

विकल्पयोनयः शब्दा विकल्पाः शब्दयोनयः ।

कार्यकारणता तेषां नार्थं शब्दाः स्पृशन्त्यपि ॥१॥ इति ॥

निविकल्पकं च प्रत्यक्षम्, अतो न शब्दजन्यमित्यतोऽनुमानं दृष्टान्तीकृत्य प्रत्यक्षस्यापि परार्थतां साधयितुमाह—

प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् ।

परस्य तदुपायत्वात्परार्थत्वं द्वयोरपि ॥११॥

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्यनुमानेनेव प्रसिद्धार्थप्रकाशनात् स्वप्रतीतप्रमेयप्रत्यायकत्वात् परार्थत्वं प्रतिपाद्यप्रयोजनत्वं द्वयोरपि प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोः, तुल्यकारणत्वात्, नानुमानस्यैवैकस्येत्यभिप्रायः । इह चाश्रूयमाणत्वात् तदर्थगमनाच्च अपीवशब्दौ लुप्तनिर्दिष्टौ द्रष्टव्यौ । प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतार्थप्रत्यायनं च प्रतिजानानस्यायमभिप्रायः— यत् परो मन्यते, नैतद् गोचरं परेभ्यः प्रतिपादयितुं पार्यत इति । तदयुक्तम्, निविकल्पकाध्यक्षापोहेन व्यससारूपस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रागेव साधितत्वात्, तद्गोचरस्य कथंचिद् विकल्पगम्यत्वेन शब्दप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । तद्यथा अनुमान-प्रतीतोऽर्थः परस्मै प्रतिपाद्यमानो वचनरूपापन्नः परार्थमनुमानम्, तथा प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतोऽपि परार्थं प्रत्यक्षम्, परप्रत्यायनस्य तुल्यत्वाद्, वचनव्यापारस्यैव भेदात् । तथा हि—अनुमानप्रतीतं प्रत्याययन्नैवं वचनयति—अग्निरत्र, धूमात्, यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निः, यथा महानसादौ, वैधर्म्येण वा, अग्न्यभावे न वचिद्धूमः, यथा जलाशयादौ, तथा धूमोऽयम्, तस्माद् धूमादग्निरत्रेति । अव्युत्पन्नविस्मृत-संबन्धयोस्तथैव प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यत्वात्, स्मर्यमाणे संबन्धे पुनरेवम्—अग्निरत्र धूमोपपत्तेः । वैधर्म्येण—अग्निरत्र, अन्यथा धूमानुपपत्तेः । प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतं पुनर्दर्शयन्नेतावद्वक्ति—पश्य राजा गच्छति, ततश्च वचनाद्विविधादपि समग्रसामग्री-कस्य प्रतिपाद्यस्यानुमेयप्रत्यक्षार्थविषया यतः प्रतीतिरुल्लसति, अतो द्वयोरपि परार्थतित्याह—परस्य तदुपायत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतीतिं प्रति प्रतिपादकस्थ-प्रत्यक्षानुमाननिर्णीतार्थप्रकाशनकारणत्वादित्यर्थः । एतेन पूर्वकारिकोक्तोपचार-कारणं च लक्षयति । यच्चोक्तम्—न शब्दात् परस्य प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः, तस्य विकल्प-जनकत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षस्थ स्वलक्षणविषयत्वेन निविकल्पकत्वात् । तदयुक्तम्, सामान्यविशेषात्मकार्थविषयस्य निर्णयरूपस्य तस्य कथंचिदेकविषयता शब्दो-त्पाद्यत्वाविरोधात्, एवंविधस्य च प्रागेव समर्थनात् । चक्षुरादिसामग्रीतस्तदुपपद्यते न शब्दादिति चेत् । अनुमानमपि प्रत्यक्षादिनिश्चिताद् हेतोरविस्मृतसंबन्धस्य

शब्दोत्पत्ती परसंताने ज्ञानोत्पादादिति । विकल्पयोनय इति । विकल्पो योनिः कारणं तेषां तथा ॥१०॥

प्रतिपादकस्थेत्यादि । प्रतिपादकस्थं प्रत्यक्षानुमाननिर्णीतार्थस्य प्रकाश्यतेऽर्थः परे-भ्योनेनेति प्रकाशनं वचनं कारणं यस्य परस्य, तस्य भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । एतेनेति । परप्रतीतिं प्रति वचनस्योपायताप्रदर्शनेन पूर्वकारिकोक्तेति वाक्यं तदुपचारतः इति ।

प्रमातुरुल्लसति, न शब्दात्, अतस्तस्यापि परार्थता विशीर्येत । समर्थहेतुकथनात् तत्र वचनस्य परार्थतिति चेत्, अत्रापि दर्शनयोग्यार्थप्रतिपादनादिति ब्रूमः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षयोः पारार्थ्यं प्रति विशेषोपलब्धिरिति मुच्यतां पक्षपातः ॥ ११ ॥

तदेवं द्वयोरपि परार्थतां प्रतिपाद्य तत्स्वरूपमाह—

प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि च यद्वचः ।

प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात्तदुच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

यद्वचः प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नार्थप्रतिपादि साक्षात्कारिज्ञानगोचरकथनचतुरं तत् प्रत्यक्षमुच्यत इति संबन्धः । तच्च प्रत्यक्षरूपमेवोच्यमानं प्रत्यक्षं, विप्रतिपन्नं प्रति पुनरनुमानद्वारेणोच्यमानमनुमानमेवेति । चशब्देनानेकार्थत्वाद् दर्शयति—वचनं कुतः प्रत्यक्षम् इत्याह—प्रतिभासस्य निमित्तत्वात् प्रतिपाद्यप्रत्यक्षप्रकाशहेतुत्वाद् उपचारेणोच्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ १२ ॥

अनुमानमाह—

साध्याविनाभुवो हेतोर्वचो यत्प्रतिपादकम् ।

परार्थमनुमानं तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् ॥ १३ ॥

हिनोति गमयति अर्थमिति हेतुः, तस्य साध्याविनाभुवः प्राङ्ग्निरूपितस्य यद्वचः प्रतिपादकं संदर्शकं तद् अनुमानप्रकाशहेतुत्वात् परार्थमनुमानम् । तत् कीदृशमित्याह—पक्षो वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणः स आदिर्येषां हेतुदृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनादीनां तानि तथा, तेषां वचनानि प्रतिपादका ध्वनयः, तान्येवात्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकम् । ननु च हेतुप्रतिपादकं वचः परार्थमनुमानमित्यभिधाय तत् पक्षादिवचनात्मकमिति वदतः पूर्वापरव्याहृता वाचोयुक्तिः, नैतदस्ति, एवं मन्यते नैकः प्रकारः परार्थानुमानस्य, किं तर्हि यथा परस्य सुखेन प्रमेयप्रतीतिर्भवति तथा यत्नतः प्रत्यायनीयः । तत्र दशावयवं साधनं प्रतिपादनोपायः । तद्यथा—पक्षादयः पञ्च, तच्छ्रद्धयश्च । तत्र यदा प्रतिपाद्यप्रक्रमादेव निर्णीत-पक्षोऽविस्मृतदृष्टान्तः स्मार्यप्रतिबन्धग्राहकप्रमाणो व्युत्पन्नमतित्वात् शेषावयवाभ्यूहनसमर्थश्च भवति, यद्वा अत्यन्ताभ्यासेन परिकमितमतित्वात् तावतैव प्रस्तुतप्रमेयमवबुध्यते, तदा हेतुप्रतिपादनमेव क्रियते, शेषाभिधानस्य श्रोतृसंस्कारा-

तस्येति । प्रत्यक्षस्य । एकविषयतयेति । शब्देन सहेति शेषः, अयमभिप्रायः—सामान्य-विशेषात्मकं वस्तु शब्दानां गोचरः, प्रत्यक्षमपि कश्चित् सामान्यविशेषात्मकवस्तुविषयम्, ततः सामान्यविशेषात्मकोऽर्थः प्रत्यक्षप्रतिपन्नः परस्मै प्रतिपाद्यमानः परार्थप्रत्यक्षं भवति ॥ ११ ॥

तच्चेति । वचः प्रत्यक्षरूपमिति । पश्य मृगो याति इति प्रत्यक्षरूपतया प्रतिपाद-कत्वाद्द्वचोऽपि यथोच्यते ॥ १२ ॥

वाचोयुक्तिरिति । पश्यद्वाग्दिशो हरयुक्तिदण्डे (सि० हे० ३-२-३२) इति षष्ठ्या अलुक्समासः । अविस्मृतेत्यादि । दृष्टान्तेन स्मार्यः स चासौ प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्तिश्च तस्य ग्राहकम्, तच्च तद्व्युत्पन्नं च, ततो न विस्मृतं तद् यस्य स तथा । परिकमितमतित्वाविति ।

कारितया नैरर्थक्यादित्यादौ हेतुप्रतिपादनं सूत्रकृता परार्थमनुमानमुक्तम् । यदा तु प्रतिपाद्यस्य नाद्यापि पक्षनिर्णयः, तदा अकाण्ड एव हेतूपन्यासोऽदृष्टमुद्गारपातायमानः स्यादिति पक्षोऽपि निर्दिश्यते । तथास्मर्यमाणे प्रतिबन्धग्राहिणि प्रमाणे दृष्टान्तोऽपि वर्धेत, अन्यथा हेतोः सामर्थ्यान्वगतेः । स्मृतेऽपि प्रमाणे दाष्टान्तिके योजयितुमजानानस्योपनयो दर्शयते; तथापि साकाङ्क्षस्य निगमनमुच्यते, अन्यथा निराकुलप्रस्तुतार्थासिद्धेः । तथा यत्र पक्षादौ स्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिस्तत्र तच्छुद्धिः प्रमाणेन कर्तव्या, इतरथा तेषां स्वसाध्यासाधनात् । सर्वेषां चामीषां साधनावयवत्वम्, प्रतिपाद्यप्रतीत्युपायत्वात् । ननु च स्वनिश्चयवत् परनिश्चयोत्पादनं परार्थमनुमानमुक्तम्, न च स्वार्थानुमानकाले क्रमोऽयमनुभूयते संवन्धवेदिनो हेतुदर्शनमात्रात् साध्यप्रतीतिसिद्धेः, न हि प्रतिपत्ता पक्षं कृत्वा ततो हेतुं निभालयति, नापि दृष्टान्तिकं विरचयति, तथा प्रतीतेरभावात्, किं चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां हेतोरेव सामर्थ्यमुन्नीयते, न पक्षादीनाम्, तद्व्यतिरेकेणापि साध्यसिद्धेः तथापि तेषां साधनांशत्वकल्पनेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च तत्सामर्थ्यं स्यात्, तदा पक्षोपन्यासमात्रादेव साध्यावगतेः हेतुरानर्थक्यमश्नुवीत्, उत्तरावयवाश्च; एवं हि तत्सामर्थ्यं सिद्ध्येन्नान्यथा । तस्माच्च एव परनिरपेक्षं साध्यं बोधयति स एव हेतुः साधनम्, न पक्षादय इति । अत्रोच्यते—स्वनिश्चयवत् परनिश्चयोत्पादनं परार्थमनुमानमुक्तमित्यादि यदुक्तं तदयुक्तम्, केवलं तदर्थं न जानीषे, निश्चयापेक्षयैव वतिना तुल्यताविधानात्, न पुनः सर्वसामान्यमभिप्रेतम्, अन्यथा ध्वनिमनुच्चारयन् स्वार्थानुमाने साध्यमवबुध्यते इति, तदनुच्चारणेन परनिश्चयोत्पादनं प्रसज्येत, न चैतदस्ति, शब्दानुच्चारणे परप्रतिपादनासंभवात्, तदर्थं शब्दाङ्गीकरणे येन विना परप्रतिपादनासंभवः तत्तदुररीकर्तव्यम्, समानन्यायात्, न च पक्षादिविरहे प्रतिपाद्यविशेषः प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यः हेतुगोचरादितत्साध्यार्थप्रतीतिविकलतया तस्य साकाङ्क्षत्वात्, तथा च बुभुत्सितार्थबोधाभावादप्रत्यायित एव तिष्ठेत्, अतस्तद्बोधनार्थं पक्षादयो दर्शनीयाः, इति तेऽपि साधनांशाः स्युः । यच्चोक्तम्—अन्वयव्यतिरेकानुकरणाभावान्न साधनम्, हेतुमात्रादपि साध्यसिद्धेः, तदयुक्तम्, अविप्रतारकतानिश्रितपुरुषवचनमात्रादपि अग्निरत्र इत्यादिरूपात् क्वचित्प्रमेयोऽर्थः सिध्यतीति हेतोरेष्यसाधनताप्रसङ्गात्, तद्विरहेणापि साध्यसिद्धेः, युक्तं चैतत्, अविप्रतारकवचनस्य प्रागेव प्रामाण्यप्रसाधनात् । यच्चोक्तम्—यद्यमीषां सामर्थ्यं स्यात्, तदा पक्षमात्रादेव साध्यप्रतीतेर्हेतोर्वैयर्थ्यं स्यादिति, तदयुक्ततरम्, भवत्पक्षेऽपि समानत्वात्, तत्रापि समर्थहेतूपन्यासादेव साध्यावगतेः, अन्यथा समर्थतायोगात् । पश्चात्तस्यैव प्रमाणेन समर्थानं सर्वत्र गृहीत व्याप्तिकस्य च पुनः पक्षधमिण्यु-

परिकर्म संजातमस्या इति, तारकादेराकृतिगणत्वादितच्प्रत्ययः, ततः परिकमिता मतियं स्येति विग्रहः । अकाण्डे अग्रस्तावे । तत्सामर्थ्यमिति । पक्षादीनां सामर्थ्यम् । तत्साध्येत्यादि । तेषां पक्षादीनां साध्यः प्रतिपाद्यो योऽर्थस्तस्य प्रतीतिविकलता, तथा कृत्वा हेतुभूतया वा तस्य

पसंहरणमनर्थकतां प्राप्नुवत्, केन निवार्येत । तदभावे हेतोः सामर्थ्यं नावगम्यते तेन सार्थकमिति चेत्, पक्षादीनपि विरह्य प्रतिपाद्यविशेषः प्रतिपादयितुं न पार्यते इति तेषामपि सार्थकता न दुरूपपादेति मुच्यतामाग्रहः । तस्माद्धेतुवत् पक्षादयोऽपि साधनम्, हेतोरपि क्वचित् प्रतिपाद्ये तदपेक्षतया तन्निरपेक्षताऽ-सिद्धेरिति, तदिदं सकलमाकलयोक्तं तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकमिति ॥१३॥

तदेवमर्थतः पक्षादीन् प्रस्तुत्य तावत् पक्षलक्षणमाह—

साध्याभ्युपगमः पक्षः प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृतः ।

तत्प्रयोगोऽत्र कर्तव्यो हेतुर्गोचरदीपकः ॥१४॥

पच्यत इति पक्षः, व्यक्तीक्रियते इति भावः । किभूत इत्याह—साध्यस्य अनुमेयस्य अभ्युपगमोऽङ्गीकरणम्, प्राश्निकादीनां पुरतः प्रतिज्ञास्वीकार इत्यर्थः । किमभ्युपगममात्रम् ? नेत्याह—प्रत्यक्षाद्यनिराकृतः इति । प्रत्यक्षां साक्षात्कारि संवेदनम्, आदिशब्दादनुमानस्ववचनलोका गृह्यन्ते, तैरनिराकृतोऽबाधितः पक्ष इति संबन्धः । तद्यथा—सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकम्, अस्ति सर्वज्ञः इत्यादि वा, अयं च केवलमेष्टव्यो न पुनः परार्थानुमानकाले वचनेनाभिधातव्यः इति यो मन्येत तं प्रत्याह—तस्य पक्षस्य प्रयोगोऽभिधानमत्र परार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे कर्तव्यो विधेयः । कुत इत्याह—हेतोः प्राङ्ग्निरूपितस्य गोचरदीपक इति, निमित्तकारणहेतुषु सर्वासां प्रायो दर्शनम् इति वचनात्, भावप्रधानत्वाच्च निर्देशस्य, विषयसंदर्शकत्वादित्यर्थः । अयमत्राभिप्रायः—न हि सर्वत्र प्रतिवादिनः प्रक्रमादेव निर्णीतपक्षस्य कूर्चशोभापुरःसरं हेतुरूपन्यस्यते, अपि तु क्वचित् कथंचित् ॥ १४ ॥

ततो यदाद्यापि प्रतिपाद्यः पक्षार्थं न जानीते, तदा अकाण्डे एव हेतावुच्यमाने विषयव्यामोहाद् भ्रान्तिलक्षणो दोषः स्यादित्याह—

अन्यथा वाद्यभिप्रेतहेतुर्गोचरमोहिनः ।

प्रत्याध्यस्य भवेद्धेतुर्विरुद्धारेकितो, यथा ॥ १५ ॥

प्रतिपाद्यस्य साकाङ्क्षत्वात् । पश्चात्तस्यैव प्रमाणेन समर्थनमिति । यत् सत् तत्सर्वं क्षणिकमिति व्याप्त्यालिङ्गितहेतूपन्यासानन्तरं अक्षणिके क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधादिति बाधकप्रमाणेन सत्त्वाख्यहेतोः समर्थनम् । पुनः पक्षधर्मिण्युपसंहरणमिति । कुतकश्च शब्ध इत्यादिरूपम् । तदपेक्षतया पक्षाद्यपेक्षतया ॥१३॥

तहीत्यादि । अयमभिप्रायः—क्वापि निर्णीतपक्षे प्रतिवादिनि हेतुः प्रयुज्यते, क्वाप्य-निर्णीतपक्षे । तत्र यदा निर्णीतपक्षे प्रतिवादिनि हेतुः प्रयुज्यते, यदा निरर्थकत्वात् पक्षोपन्यासोऽस्मान्निर्णय क्रियते एव । द्वितीये तु पक्षे विषयदर्शकत्वेन सफलत्वादवश्यं कार्यं एव । कूर्च-शोभायाः पुरःसरं प्रथमम्, यस्मिन् हेतावुपन्यस्ते कूर्चशोभा संपद्यते, तत्त्वतो वैलक्ष्याभावः, सावष्टम्भता भवतीति यावत्, अथवा कूर्चशोभा पुरःसरं यत्रेति, अस्मिन् पक्षे अयमभि-प्रायः—यदा सम्यग्भूतं किंचिद् द्वित्रिवादिर्कं प्रतिपादयितुमारभ्यते तदा तत्प्रतिपादनादवधि-गपि कूर्चशोभा सावष्टम्भता, समश्रुपरामर्शनं वा भवतीति ॥१४॥

अन्यथा इति उक्तविपरीताश्रयणे पक्षप्रयोगाकरणे इत्यर्थः । वादिनो हेतूपन्यासकर्तुरभिप्रेतोऽभिमतः स चासौ हेतुगोचरश्च बाध्यभिप्रेतहेतुगोचरः, तत्र मुह्यति दोलायते तच्छीलश्च यः, तस्य प्रत्याय्यस्य प्रतिवादिनो हेतुः विरुद्धारेकितो भवेद् विरोधशङ्काकलङ्कितः स्यादित्यर्थः । ततश्च सम्यग्हेतावपि विपक्षे एवायं वर्तते इति व्यामोहाद् विरुद्धदूषणमभिदधीत, पक्षोपन्यासात्तु निर्णीतहेतुगोचरस्य नैव दोषः स्यादित्यभिप्रायः । अमुमेवार्थं स्पष्टदृष्टान्तेनाह यथा इति । तदुपन्यासार्थः ॥ १५ ॥

धानुष्कगुणसंप्रेक्षिजनस्य परिविध्यतः ।

धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिर्देशेन गुणेतरो ॥१६॥

यथा लक्ष्यनिर्देशं विना धानुष्कस्येषुं प्रक्षिपतो यौ गुणदोषौ तौ तद्दक्षिजनस्य विपर्यस्तावपि प्रतिभातः, गुणोऽपि दोषतया दोषोऽपि वा गुणतया, तथा पक्षनिर्देशं विना हेतुमुपन्यस्यतो वादिनो यौ स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यसाधनसमर्थत्वासमर्थत्वलक्षणौ गुणदोषौ तौ प्राश्निकप्रतिवाद्यादीनां विपरीतावपि प्रतिभात इति भावार्थः । अक्षरार्थस्तु धनुषा चरति धानुष्कस्तस्य गुणो लक्ष्यवेधप्रावीण्यलक्षणस्तत्र प्रेक्षकाणां कुतूहलमिति तस्यैवोपादानम्, अन्यथा दोषोऽपि दृष्टव्यः, तत्संप्रेक्षिजनस्य तत्संप्रेक्षणशीललोकस्य परिविध्यतो यथाकथंचिद् वाणं मुञ्चत इत्यर्थः, धानुष्कस्य विना लक्ष्यनिर्देशेन चापधरस्य वेध्यनिष्टङ्कनमृते यौ गुणेतरो गुणदोषौ तौ यथा विरुद्धारेकितौ भवतः, तथा वादिनोऽपीत्यर्थः । तस्मादविज्ञाततदर्थे प्रतिवादिनि वादिधानुष्केण पक्षलक्ष्यं निर्देश्यैव हेतुशरः प्रयोक्तव्य इति स्थितम् ॥ १६ ॥

सांप्रतं हेतोलक्षणावसरः, तच्च स्वार्थानुमानवद् निर्विशेषं द्रष्टव्यम्, प्रयोगस्तु तत्र न दर्शितः, स्वार्थानुमानस्य बोधरूपत्वात्, इह तु दर्शनीयः, परार्थानुमानस्य वचनरूपत्वात्, अतस्तं दर्शयति—

हेतोस्तथोपपत्त्या वा स्यात्प्रयोगोऽन्यथापि वा ।

द्विविधोऽन्यतरेणापि साध्यसिद्धिर्भवेदिति ॥१७॥

स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे हि परप्रणीतलक्षणान्तरव्यपोहेन साध्यव्यतिरेकात् सामस्त्येन हेतोर्व्यावृत्तिरेवैकं लक्षणमिति निर्णीतम्, परार्थानुमानेऽपि तदेव प्रकाशनीयम्, वचनरचना तु क्वचित् कथंचित् प्रवर्तत इत्यभिप्रायवास्तद्वैविध्यमाह—हेतोर्द्विविधः प्रयोगः स्यादिति संबन्धः । कथमित्याह—तथैव साध्यसद्भावे

विरुद्धदूषणमभिदधीतेति । यद् कृतकं तदनित्यम्, यथा घटः, कृतकश्च शब्द इत्युक्ते हि यद्यपि नित्यत्वे साध्ये कृतकत्वमत्र हेतूकृतम्, कृतकत्वानिरव्यात्वयोश्च व्याप्तिर्दर्शितेत्येवं विरुद्धतामभिदध्यादिति भावः ॥१५॥

धनुषा चरतीति । अस्मिन् वाक्ये तेन इति सूत्रेण चरत्यर्थे ठक् । इत्कु इक् इति बाधनार्थं को शश्चात्तद्दोरिसुसः इत्यनेन कादेशः । अविज्ञाततदर्थं इति । अविदितपञ्चार्थं ॥१६॥

एवोपपत्तिविद्यमानता, तथा तथोपपत्त्या, यथा—अग्निरत्र, धूमस्य तथैवोपपत्ते-
रिति । अन्यथापि वा इत्यनेन अवयवे समुदायोपचारादन्यथानुपपत्ति लक्षयति ।
अन्यथा साध्यव्यतिरेके अनुपपत्तिरविद्यमानतैव तथा वा अन्यथानुपपत्त्या हेतोः
प्रयोगः स्यात्, यथा—अग्निरत्र, धूमस्यान्यथानुपपत्तेरिति । एते च द्वे अप्ये-
कस्मिन् साध्ये प्रयोक्तव्ये इति यो मन्येत, तच्छिष्यणार्थमाह—अन्यतरैणापि
तथोपपत्तिप्रयोगेण अन्यथानुपपत्तिप्रयोगेण वा साध्यस्य साध्यप्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थ-
स्य सिद्धिनिष्पत्तिः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतीतावारोहणं भवेद्, इति यस्मात्, तस्मान्न द्वे
अपि प्रयोक्तव्ये, प्रयोगद्वयेऽपि यस्माद् वचनरचना भिद्यते नार्थः, प्रयोगस्य च
साध्यसाधनफलम्, तच्चेदेकेनैव सिध्यति, द्वितीयप्रयोगः केवलं वक्तुरकौशलमाच-
क्षीत, नैरर्थक्यादित्यभिप्रायः ॥१७॥

अधुना दृष्टान्तलक्षणानुसरः । स च द्वेषा साधर्म्येण च । तत्र साधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्तमधिकृत्याह—

साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्यत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् ।

साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः संबन्धस्मरणान्तः ॥१८॥

दृष्टयोरवलोकितयोः सामर्थ्यात् साध्यसाधनयोः अन्तःपरिनिष्ठितिः
अन्वयाद् व्यतिरेकाद्वा साध्यसाधनभावव्यवस्थितिनिबन्धना यस्मिन्निति दृष्टान्तः,
समानो धर्मोऽस्येति सधर्मा तद्भावः साधर्म्यं तेन साधर्म्येण । स किंविधो
भवतीत्याह—साध्यं जिज्ञासितार्थात्मकम्, साधनं तद्गमको हेतुः, तयोः साध्य-
साधनयोर्व्याप्तिः, इदमनेन विना न भवति इत्येवंरूपा, यत्र क्वचिन्निश्चीयतेतरां
अतिशयेन निर्णीयते स साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा—अग्निरत्र, धूमस्य तथैवोपपत्तेः
महानसादिवद् इति । अयं चाविस्मृतप्रतिबन्धे प्रतिवादिनि न प्रयोक्तव्य
इत्याह—संबन्धस्मरणात् इति । यबलोपे पञ्चमी, प्राग्गृहीतविस्मृतसंबन्ध-
स्मरणमधिकृत्य यतोऽभिप्रेतोऽयं नीतिविदाम्, नान्यथा । यदा हि प्रतिपाद्योऽ-
द्यापि संबन्धं साध्याविनाभावित्वलक्षणं नावबुध्यते; तदा प्रमाणेन संबन्धो
ग्राहणीयः, न दृष्टान्तमात्रेण, न हि सहदर्शनादेव क्वचित्सर्वत्रेदममुना विना न
भवतीति सिध्यति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । गृहीते च प्रतिबन्धे स्मर्यमाणे केवलं
हेतुर्दर्शनीयः, तावतैव बुभुत्सितार्थसिद्धेर्दृष्टान्तो न वाच्यः, वैयर्थ्यात् । यदा
तु गृहीतोऽपि विस्मृतः कथंचित् संबन्धः, तदा तस्मरणार्थं दृष्टान्तः कथ्यते ।
ननु च कथं त्रिकालसमस्तदेशव्यापिसंबन्धावगतिः ? न तावन्निर्णयात्मकमपि
प्रत्यक्षं देशकालान्तरसंचरिष्णुनोः साध्यसाधनयोः संबन्धं निरीक्षितुं क्षमते,
संनिहीतेऽर्थे विशदाध्यवसायेन प्रवृत्तेः । नापि शब्दात्तन्निर्णयः तस्य परोपदेश-
रूपतया स्वार्थानुमानाभावप्रसङ्गात्, तत्र परोपदेशाभावात्, तदभावे संबन्धासिद्धेः,

क्वचिदिति । प्रतिपाद्यविशेषे ॥१७॥

साध्यसाधनयोरित्यादि । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण वा साध्यसाधनभावस्य इदमस्य साध्य-
मिदमस्य साधनमिति संबन्धस्य व्यवस्था निबन्धनं यस्याः परिनिष्ठितेः सा तथोक्ता ।

तदसिद्धावनुमानानुत्थानादिति । अनुमानात्संबन्धग्रहणे निरवधिरनवस्थानुषज्येत, संबन्धग्राहिणोऽप्यनुमानस्य पुनः संबन्धान्तरग्रहणसव्यपेक्षत्वादिति । अत्रोच्यते—प्रत्यक्षानुमाने द्वे एव प्रमाणे इति येषां मिथ्याभिनिवेशः, तेषामेष दोषो नास्माकम्, अन्वयव्यतिरेकग्राहिप्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भोत्तरकालभाविनोऽव्यभिचरितत्रिकालव्याधिगोचरस्य मतिनिबन्धनस्योहसंज्ञितस्य प्रमाणान्तरस्य संबन्धग्राहित्येष्टत्वात्, तदनिष्टौ दृष्टव्यवहारविलोपप्रसङ्गात्, तद्विलोपे च विचारानर्थक्यप्राप्तेरिति । अत्र प्रकरणे पुनरनुमानात् पार्थक्येनोहो न दर्शितः, संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहप्रवृत्तत्वादस्य, शाब्दं तु पृथक् समर्थितम्; तस्यात्रैव परार्थानुमानोपयोगित्वादि-त्यास्तां तावत् ॥१८॥

इदानीं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तमुपदर्शनन्नाह—

साध्ये निवर्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसंभवः ।

ख्याप्यते यत्र दृष्टान्ते वैधर्म्येणेति स स्मृतः ॥ १९ ॥

विसदृशो धर्मोऽप्येति विधर्मा, तद्भावो वैधर्म्यम्, तेन वैधर्म्येण दृष्टान्तः । कीदृश इत्याह—साध्ये गम्ये निवर्तमाने असंभवति, तुशब्दोऽवधारणार्थो भिन्न-क्रमः, स च साधनस्यासंभव एवेत्यत्र द्रष्टव्यः । ख्याप्यते प्रतिपाद्यते यत्र क्वचित् दृष्टान्ते स वैधर्म्येण भवति, इतिशब्देन संबन्धस्मरणादिति ॥१९॥

इदमत्रापि संबधनाति—अस्यापि स्मर्यमाणे संबन्धे प्रयोगायोगादिति किमर्थं विस्मृतसंबन्धे एव प्रतिवादिनि दृष्टान्तः प्रयुज्यते नान्यदा, इति परवचनावकाश-माशङ्क्याह—

अन्तर्व्याप्त्यैव साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्बहिरुदाहृतिः ।

व्यर्था स्यात्तदसद्भावेऽप्येवं न्यायविदो विदुः ॥२०॥

अन्यदा हि स्मर्यमाणे वा संबन्धे प्रयुज्येत, अगृहीते वा । यद्यद्यः पक्षः, सोऽप्युक्तः, यदा सर्वत्र साध्याविनाभाविनं हेतुं स्मरति प्रतिपाद्यः, तदा पक्षेऽपि तमवबुध्य कथं साध्यं न प्रतिपद्येत ? ततश्चान्तः पक्षमध्ये व्याप्तिः साधनस्य साध्याक्रान्तत्वमन्तर्व्याप्तिः, तयैव साध्यस्य गम्यस्य सिद्धेः प्रतीतेः वर्हिर्विवक्षित-धमिणोऽप्यत्र दृष्टान्तधमिण्युदाहृतिः व्याप्तिदर्शनरूपा व्यर्था निष्प्रयोजना, तत्र-त्याय्यार्थाभावादिति । द्वितीयपक्षस्यापि निर्दोषतां निरस्यन्नाह—तदसद्भावेऽप्येवम् संबन्धग्रहणादन्तर्व्याप्त्यभावेऽप्येवमिति व्यर्थं बहिरुदाहृतिः, न हि सहदर्शनात् क्वचित् सर्वत्र तद्रूपता सिध्यति, व्यभिचारदर्शनात् । तस्मादगृहीतसंबन्धे प्रति-पाद्ये प्रमाणेन प्रतिबन्धः साध्यः, तत्सिद्धौ तत एव साध्यसिद्धेरकिञ्चित्करी

सधर्मेति । धर्मादिव केवलात् इति बहुव्रीही धर्मशब्दादन् समासान्तः । तन्निर्यायः संबन्ध-निर्यायः । तस्येत्यादि । शब्दस्य परोपदेशरूपतया कृत्वा शब्दजन्यज्ञानस्य स्वार्थानुमानार्थं भवतीत्याह—तत्रेत्यादि । तत्र स्वार्थानुमाने ॥१८॥

विधर्मेति । पूर्ववदन् ॥१९॥

अन्यदा हीति । संबन्धविस्मरणभावे ॥२०॥

दृष्टान्तोदाहृतिरिति न्यायविद्वांसो विदुरबबुध्यन्त इति । इह च प्रकरणे शेषाव-
यवानामुपनयनिगमनशुद्धिपञ्चकलक्षणानां संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहपरत्वादस्य यद्यपि
साक्षाल्लक्षणं नोक्तम्, तथाप्यत एव प्रतिपादितावयवत्रयाद् बुद्धिमद्भिर्हृन्नेयम्;
यतोऽवयवापेक्षया जघन्यमध्यमोत्कृष्टास्तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति । तत्र हेतुप्रतिपादन-
मात्रं जघन्या । द्वयाद्यवयवनिवेदनं मध्यमा । संपूर्णदशावयवकथनमुत्कृष्टा । तत्रेह
मध्यमायाः साक्षात् कथनेन जघन्योत्कृष्टे अर्थतः सूचयति, तत्सद्भावस्य प्रमाण-
सिद्धत्वादिति ॥२०॥

एवं पक्षादिलक्षणं प्रतिपाद्येदानीं हेयज्ञाने सत्युपादेयं विविक्ततरं वेद्यते इति
तद्बुधुदस्ताः पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ताभासा वक्तव्याः । तत्र तावत् पक्षलक्षणव्युदस्तान्
पक्षाभासानाह—

प्रतिपाद्यस्य यः सिद्धः पक्षाभासोऽस्ति लिङ्गतः ।

लोकस्ववचनाभ्यां च बाधितोऽनेकधा मतः ॥२१॥

पक्षस्थानोपन्यस्तत्वात् तत्कार्याकरणत्वाच्च पक्षवदाभासत इति पक्षभासः ।
असावनेकधा अनेकप्रकारो मत इति संबन्धः । कथमित्याह—प्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रति-
वादिनो यः कश्चित् सिद्धः प्रतीतावारूढ एव स पक्षाभासः, साध्यस्यैव पक्षत्वात्,
सिद्धस्य साधनानर्हत्वाद्, अतिप्रसक्तेः । तथा अक्षलिङ्गतोऽध्यक्षहेतुभ्यां लोकस्व-
वचनाभ्यां च बाधितस्तिरस्कृतो यः स पक्षाभासः । तत्र प्रतिपाद्यसिद्धो यथा—
पौद्गलिको घटः, सौगतं वा प्रति सर्वं क्षणिकमित्यादि । प्रत्यक्षबाधितो यथा—
निरंशानि स्वलक्षणानि, परस्परविविक्तौ वा सामान्यविक्षेषाविति । अनुमान-
बाधितो यथा—नास्ति सर्वज्ञ इति । लोकबाधितो यथा—गम्या माता इति ।
स्ववचनबाधितो यथा—न सन्ति सर्वे भावा इति ॥२१॥

सांप्रतं हेतुलक्षणं स्मारयन् तदपास्तान् हेत्वाभासानाह—

अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वं हेतोर्लक्षणमीरितम् ।

तदप्रतीतिसंदेहविपर्ययैस्तदाभता ॥२२॥

हेतोर्लक्षणमसाधारणधर्मरूपं यदीरितं गमितम्, अनेकार्थत्वाद् धातोः प्रति-
पादितं, स्वार्थानुमानप्रस्तावे यदुतान्यथानुपपन्नत्वमिति, तस्याप्रतीतिरनध्यवसायः,

तद्बुधुदस्ता इति । पक्षादिलक्षणरहिताः । अध्यक्षहेतुभ्यामिति । हेतुलिङ्गं, कारणे
कार्योपचारात्; तत्प्रभवं ज्ञानमपि हेतुरनुमानमित्यर्थः । अनुमानबाधित इति । तच्च क्वचिद-
सर्वज्ञे सर्वज्ञशब्दो मुख्यसर्वज्ञापेक्षः, गौणत्वात्, माणवकेऽग्निशब्दवत्, यद्वा ज्ञानतारतम्यं
क्वचिद्विश्रान्तम्, तारतम्यत्वात्, आकाशपरिमाणतारतम्यवत् यत्रैतद्विश्रान्तं स सर्वज्ञः ।
तथा सदसद्वर्गः कस्यचिदेकज्ञानालम्बनः अनेकत्वात्, पञ्चाङ्गुलवत् । तथा कश्चिदात्मा
सर्वार्थेनाक्षात्कारी, तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्, यथा अगगततिमिरा-
दिप्रतिबन्धं चक्षुर्ज्ञानं रूपसाक्षात्कारि । एवं ज्ञानं क्वचिदात्मनि प्रकर्षवत्, स्वावरणहान्यु-
त्कर्षे सति प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्, चक्षुर्दीपादिवत्, स्वावरणहान्युत्कर्षस्तु आवरणहानिः क्वचि-
ज्जीवे परमकाष्ठा प्राप्ता, प्रकर्षत्वात्, परिमाणवदित्यनुमानात् ॥२१॥

संदेहो दोलायमानता, विपर्यासो वैपरीत्यनिर्णयः, अप्रतीतिश्च संदेहश्च विपर्यासश्चेति द्वन्द्वः, पश्चात् तदा सह तत्पुरुषः तैस्तदप्रतीतिसंदेहविपर्यासैः, तदाभता आभानमाभा तस्येव सम्यग्हेतोरिवाभा अस्येति तदाभस्तद्भावः तत्ता, हेत्वाभासता भवतीत्यर्थः ॥२२॥

अधुना येन लक्षणेन यन्नामा हेत्वाभासो भवति तद्दर्शयति—

असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो यो योऽन्यथैवोपपद्यते ।

विरुद्धो योऽन्यथाप्यत्र युक्तोऽनैकान्तिकः स तु ॥२३॥

यः कश्चिदप्रतीतः प्रतीत्या अगोचरीकृतोऽनिश्चितः सोऽसिद्धनामा हेत्वाभासः । तुशब्दः त्रयस्यापि भेदोद्घोतकः । यस्त्वन्यथैव साध्यं विनैव, विपक्ष एवेति यावत्, उपपद्यते संभवति स विरुद्धाभिधानः । यः पुनरन्यथाऽपि साध्य-विपर्ययेणापि युक्तो घटमानकः, अपिशब्दात् साध्येनापि, सोऽत्र व्यतिकरे अनैकान्तिकसंज्ञो ज्ञातव्य इति । तत्र प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धप्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितानेकान्त-विरुद्धबुद्धिभिः कणभक्षाक्षपादबुद्धादिशिष्यकैरुपन्यस्यमानाः सर्वे एव हेतवः, तद्यथा—एकान्तेन अनित्यः शब्दो नित्यो वा, सत्त्वात्, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्, कृतकत्वात्, प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात्—इत्यादयो विवक्षयासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकतां स्वीकुर्वन्ति इत्यवगन्तव्यम् । तथा हि—अनित्यैकान्ते तावदसिद्धाः सर्वे एव हेतवः, चाक्षुषत्ववत् तेषां ध्वनावविद्यमानत्वात्, असदादिव्यवच्छेदेनालीकसंवृति विकल्पितत्वात्, पारमार्थिकत्वे त्वेकस्यानेकरूपापत्यानेकान्तवादापत्तेः, कल्पनारचितसत्ताकानां च सर्वशक्तिविरुहूपतया निःस्वभावत्वात्, तथापि तेषां साधनत्वे साध्यमपि निःस्वभावमिति खरविषाणं शशविषाणस्य साधनमापद्यत इति शोभनः साध्य-साधनव्यवहारः । सर्वे एवायमनुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्धचारुद्धेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन न वहिः सदसत्त्वमपेक्षते, तेनायमदोष इति चेत्, एवं तर्हि चाक्षुषत्वमपि शब्दे

तस्येत्यादि । तस्यान्यथानुपपन्नत्वस्य । इहायं भावार्थः—विद्यमाने हेतोर्वन्यथानु-पन्नत्वस्य संदेहे अनैकान्तिकता, विपर्यासे विरुद्धता, तस्मात् पारिषेध्यात् अत्र हेतोरसत्तायां संदेहे वान्यथानुपपन्नत्वस्याप्रतीतिः । तथा चासिद्धत्वलक्षणमन्यत्र—असत्सत्तानिश्चयोऽप्रसिद्ध इति असन्तो सत्तानिश्चयो यस्मेति विग्रहः, अत एवाग्नेतनकारिकायां सूत्रकारोऽपि वक्ष्यति—असिद्धस्त्वप्रतीतो य इति । दोलायमानतेति । दोलोऽदोलकः, उभयपक्षगामित्वेन तद्वाचरन् संदेहोऽपि दोलायमानस्तस्य भावः तत्ता ॥२२॥

व्यतिकरे इति । प्रस्तावे । कणभक्षेत्यादि । कणभक्षकः कणादापरनामा वैशेषिकः, अक्षपादो नैयायिकानामाद्याचार्यवर्यः, बुद्धः सुगतः, आदिशब्दात् सांख्यादिपरिग्रहः, तेषां कुत्सिता अल्पा वा शिष्याः शिष्यकाः प्रशस्तपादोद्घोतकरधर्मकीर्तिश्वरकृष्णादयस्ते । सत्त्वादित्यादि । यथासंभवं नित्यानित्यत्वयोरमी हेतवो योज्याः । तथा हि—सत्त्वं स्वाभि-प्रायेणानित्यत्वे च साध्ये हेतुः, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं कृतकत्वं चानित्यत्वे एव, प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वं तु नित्यत्वे एवेति । असत्त्वादीति । आदिशब्दादानुत्पन्नत्वादिपरिग्रहः । अनिरूपिततत्त्वार्था प्रतीतिः संवृतिर्भता । सा च यद्यपि सर्वापि अलीकैव, तथापि अलीकेति स्वरूपविशेषणम् ।

बुद्ध्याध्यारोप्य हेतुतयोच्यमानं नासिद्धतयोद्भावनीयम्, विशेषाभावात् । अचाक्षुष-
त्वव्यच्छेदेन चाक्षुषत्वं बुद्ध्याध्यारोपयितुं पार्यते, न यथा कथञ्चित्, न चासौ
शब्देऽस्ति, अचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वात् तस्य, तेनायमदोष इति चेत्, कोऽयमचाक्षुषत्व-
व्यवच्छेदो नाम, व्यवच्छेदमात्रं नीरूपं व्यवच्छिन्नं वा स्वलक्षणं, व्यवच्छेदिका वा
बुद्धिः स्वांशमग्नापि बहिर्वस्तुग्रहणरूपतया प्लवमाना, नापरो वस्तुधर्मा यत्र
भेदाभेदविकल्पद्वारेण दूषणं दित्सुर्भवानिति चेत्, तर्हि स शब्दे नास्ति इति केषा
भाषा, एवं हि नभःपुण्डरीकं तत्र नास्तीति सत्त्वादिकमपि कल्पयितुं न शक्य-
मिति प्रसज्येत । किं च । ते साधनधर्मा धर्मिणि भवन्तोऽपि न भवद्दर्शने
प्रतीतिमारोहन्ति, प्रत्यक्षस्य विकल्पविकलतया धर्मनिर्णयशून्यत्वात्, तदुत्तरकाल-
भाविन्या वासनावोधजन्याया विकल्पबुद्धेः स्वांशग्रहणपर्यवसितशरीरत्वेन बहिः
स्वलक्षणे प्रवेशाभावात्, ततश्चाप्रतीतत्वात् सर्वस्यासिद्धत्वम् । नित्यैकान्तेऽपि
धर्मिणोऽत्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तानामपारमार्थिकानां वा स्वसाधनधर्माणां प्रमाणेनाप्रतीत-
त्वादसिद्धता द्रष्टव्या, धर्मिणोऽविनिर्लुठितरूपाणां पारमार्थिकानां सकलधर्मिणां
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणप्रसिद्धत्वेन निह्नोतुमशक्यत्वादिति । तथा विरुद्धतापि पक्षद्वयेऽपि
सर्वसाधनधर्माणामुन्नेया, अनेकान्तप्रतिबद्धस्वभावत्वेन तत्साधनप्रवणत्वात् ।
एतच्चोत्तरे वक्ष्यामः । एवं पक्षद्वयेऽपि निर्दिश्यमानाः सर्व एव हेतवोऽनैकान्तिक-
तामात्मसात्कुर्वन्ति, परस्परविरुद्धाव्यभिचारितत्वात्, समानयुक्त्युपन्यासेन विपक्षेऽपि
दर्शयितुं शक्यत्वात् । तथा हि—अनित्यवादी नित्यवादिनं प्रति प्रमाणयति—सर्व
क्षणिकम्, सत्त्वात्, अक्षणिके क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरोधात्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्व-
स्य च भावलक्षणत्वात्, ततोऽर्थक्रिया व्यावर्तमाना स्वक्रोडीकृतां सत्तां व्यावर्तयेदिति-
क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिः । न हि नित्योऽर्थोऽर्थक्रियायां क्रमेण प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहते, पूर्वार्थक्रिया-
करणस्वभावोपमर्दद्वारेणोत्तरक्रियायां प्रवृत्तेः, अन्यथा पूर्वार्थक्रियाकारणाविराम-
प्रसङ्गात्, तत्स्वभावप्रच्यवे च नित्यता अपयाति, अतादवस्थस्यानित्यलक्षण-
त्वात् । नित्योऽपि क्रमवर्तितं सहकारिकारणमर्थमुदीक्षमाणस्तावदासीत्, पश्चात्

यथः—एकान्तमुखदा मुक्तिरिति । असाविति अचाक्षुषत्वव्यवच्छेदः । व्यवच्छेदमात्रमित्यादि ।
अमुना विकल्पत्रयेण चेच्छब्दपर्यन्तेन जैन एव बौद्धाभिप्रायमाशङ्कते । नीरूपं तुच्छम् ।
स्वलक्षणं घटादि । अयं घटादिरचाक्षुषो न भवति, इति घटादिकमचाक्षुषेभ्यो व्यवच्छेदयन्ती
विकल्पिका बुद्धिः स्वांशमग्नापि सर्वचित्तचैतानामात्मसंवेदनमिति स्वज्ञानाद्वा ग्राहिकापि
वस्तुनो वस्तुनि विकल्पानामसंभवः, तथापि अनुभवादिजन्यत्वेन बहिरर्थग्राहकतया स्वलक्षण-
जलस्थोपरि तरन्ती । स इति । त्रिविधोऽपि अचाक्षुषत्वव्यवच्छेदः । केषा भाषेति । किम
ग्राक्षेत्कत्वात् अकिञ्चित्कारीत्यर्थः । अकिञ्चित्करत्वमेवातिप्रसङ्गद्वारेण व्यनक्ति—एवं
हीत्यादि । यथा गगनेन्दोवरं शब्दे नास्तीति सत्त्वादिकमपि तत्र भा भूदिति न किञ्चित् ।
एवं तुच्छं व्यवच्छेदमात्रं सर्वथा भिन्नं स्व लक्षणं वस्त्ववसर्पशिनी विकल्पबुद्धिश्च शब्दे नास्तीति
चाक्षुषत्वमपि तत्र न इत्यप्यसारमेवेति भावः । नित्यैकान्त इत्यादि । धर्मिणोऽत्यन्तव्यतिरिक्ता-
नामिति नैयायिकवैशेषिकाभिप्रायेण । अपारमार्थिकानां वेति अर्द्धतवाद्यभिप्रायेण । ततोऽर्थ-
क्रिया व्यावर्तमानेत्यादि । अक्षणिकाक्रमयोगपद्यनिवृत्त्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं वर्तमानं सत्स्वव्याप्तं

तमासाद्य क्रमेण कार्यं कुर्यादिति चेत्, न, सहकारिकारणस्य नित्येऽकिञ्चित्करत्वात्, अकिञ्चित्करस्यापि प्रतीक्षणेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । नापि यौगपद्येन नित्योऽर्थोऽर्थक्रियां कुरुते, अग्रध्यक्षविरोधात् । न ह्येककालं सकलाः क्रियाः प्रारभमाणः कश्चिदुपलभ्यते, करोतु वा, तथाप्याद्यक्षणे एव सकलक्रियापरिसमाप्तेर्द्वितीयादिक्षणेऽवकुर्वाणस्यानित्यता बलादाढौकते, करणाकरणयोरेकस्मिन् विरुद्धत्वादिति । नित्यवादी पुनरेवं प्रमाणयति—सर्वं नित्यम्, सत्त्वात्, क्षणिके सदसत्कालयोरर्थक्रियाविरोधात्, तल्लक्षणं सत्त्वं नावस्थां वध्नातीति ततो निवर्तमानमनन्यशरणतया नित्यत्वं साधयति । तथा हि—क्षणिकोऽर्थः सद् वा कार्यं कुर्यात्, असद् वा, गतन्तराभावात् । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, समसमयवर्तिनि व्यापारायोगात्, सकलभावानां परस्परं कार्यकरणभावप्राप्त्यातिप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि द्वितीयः पक्षः क्षोदं क्षमते, असतः कार्यकरणशक्तिविकलत्वात्, अन्यथा शशविषाणादयोऽपि कार्यकरणायोत्सहेरन, विशेषाभावादिति । तदेवमेकान्तद्वयेऽपि ये हेतवस्ते ते युक्तेः समानतया विरुद्धं न व्यभिचरन्ति, अविचारितरमणीयतया मुग्धजनध्यान्ध्यं चोत्पादयन्तीति विरुद्धा व्यभिचारिणोऽनेकान्तिकाः, सर्ववस्तुधर्माणां वस्तुतोऽनेकान्तप्रतिवद्धत्वादिति । तस्मादमी सर्व एव हेतवः सन्तोऽनेकान्तमन्तरेण नोपपद्यन्ते, इति तमेव प्रतिपादयितुमीशते । विमूढबुद्धिभिः पुनः विपक्षसाधनार्थमुपन्यस्यमाना विवक्षयासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकतामाविभ्रतीति स्थितम् ॥२३॥

तदेवं हेत्वाभासान् प्रतिपाद्य दृष्टान्तलक्षणव्युदस्तान् दृष्टान्ताभासानाह—

साधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।

अपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः साध्यादिविकलादयः ॥२४॥

साधनं साध्याक्रान्तमुपदर्शयितुमभिप्रेतं यस्मिंस्तत् साधर्म्यं तेन, अत्र व्यतिकरे, दूष्यन्त इति दोषाः, दृष्टान्ता एव दोषाः दृष्टान्तदोषाः, दृष्टान्ताभासा इत्यर्थः, न्यायविदीरिता विद्वद्भिर्गदिताः । साध्यं गम्यम्, आदिशब्दात् साधनोभयपरिग्रहः, तद्विकलास्तच्छून्याः, आदिशब्दात् संदिग्धसाध्यसाधनोभयधर्मा गृह्यन्ते । किंभूता एते इत्याह—अपगतं लक्षणं येभ्यस्ते तथा च ते हेतवश्च तेभ्य उत्थानं येषां तेऽपलक्षणहेतूत्थाः । इदं च प्रायिकं विशेषणम्, सम्यग्हेतावपि वक्तृदोषवशात् दृष्टान्ताभासतोपपत्तेः । यथा—नित्यानित्यः शब्दः, श्रावणत्वात् घटवदित्यादि । तत्र साध्यविकलो यथा—भ्रान्तमनुमानम्, प्रमाणत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षवत् । प्रत्यक्षस्य

सत्त्वं निवर्तयति । ननु चार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यमेव सत्त्वं नान्यत्, तथा च ज्ञानश्रीः—“यदि नाम प्रतिदर्शनं सत्त्वभेदस्तथाऽपीहार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यमेव सत्त्वमभिप्रेतमिति,” ततश्चार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यत्वयोर्घटकुम्भयोरिव व्यावृत्तिकृतस्य भेदस्याभावात् कथं व्याप्यव्यापकभावः । उच्यते, कारणस्य कार्यत्वाभावित्वस्यार्थक्रियासामर्थ्यं भवनधर्मकत्वमात्रं तु सत्त्वमिति व्यक्तो व्यावृत्तिकृतो भेदः । यत्तूक्तम्—अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यमेव सत्त्वमिति, तदर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यव्यभिचारित्वात् सत्त्वस्येति ॥२३॥

संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मेति । संदिग्धज्ञासौ साध्यश्च संदिग्धसाध्यः संदिग्धसाध्यो धर्मो

भ्रान्तताविकलत्वात्, तद्भ्रान्तत्वे सकलव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्, तदुच्छेदे च प्रमाणप्रमेयाभावात् न किञ्चित् केनचित् साध्यत इति भ्रान्तवादिनो मूकतामापद्येत । साधन विकलो यथा—जाग्रत्संवेदनं भ्रान्तम्, प्रमाणत्वात् स्वप्नसंवेदनवत् । स्वप्नसंवेदनस्य प्रमाणतावैकल्यात् तत्प्रत्यनीकजाग्रत्प्रत्ययोपनिपातबाधितत्वादिति । उभयविकलो यथा—नास्ति सर्वज्ञः, प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुपलब्धत्वात्, घटवत् । घटस्य सत्त्वात् प्रत्यक्षादिभिरुपलब्धत्वाच्च । संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मो यथा—वीतरागोऽयम्, मरणधर्मत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषवत् । रथ्यापुरुषे वीतरागत्वस्य संदिग्धत्वात्, विशिष्टचेतोधर्माणां विशिष्टव्याहारादिलिङ्गगम्यत्वात् रथ्यापुरुषे तन्निर्णयस्थाप्यभावादिति । संदिग्धसाधनधर्मो यथा—मरणधर्मायं पुरुषः, रागादिमत्त्वात्, रथ्यापुरुषवत् । रथ्यापुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वस्य संदिग्धत्वात्, वीतरागस्यापि तथा संभवादिति । संदिग्धोभयधर्मो यथा—असर्वज्ञोऽयम्, रागादिमत्त्वात्, रथ्यापुरुषवत् । रथ्यापुरुषे प्रदर्शितन्यायेनोभयस्यापि संदिग्धत्वादिति । ननु च परैरन्यदपि दृष्टान्ताभासत्रयमुक्तम्, तद्यथा—अनन्वयोऽ-प्रदर्शितान्वयो विपरीतान्वयश्चेति । तत्रानन्वयो यथा—रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषः, वक्तृत्वाद्, इष्टपुरुषवदिति । यद्यपि किलेष्टपुरुषे रागादिमत्त्वं वक्तृत्वं च साध्यसाधनधर्मौ दृष्टौ, तथापि यो यो वक्ता स स रागादिमानिति व्याप्त्यसिद्धे-रनन्वयोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । तथा अप्रदर्शितान्वयो यथा—अनित्यः शब्दः, कृतकत्वात्, घटवदिति । अत्र यद्यपि वास्तवोऽन्वयोऽस्ति, तथापि वादिना वचनेन न प्रकाशित इत्यप्रदर्शितान्वयो दृष्टान्तः । विपरीतान्वयो यथा—अनित्यः शब्दः, कृतकत्वादिति हेतुमभिधाय यदनित्यं तत् कृतकं घटवदिति । विपरीतव्याप्तदर्शनात् विपरीतान्वयः । साधर्म्यप्रयोगे हि साधनं साध्याक्रान्तमुपदर्शनीयम्, इह तु विपर्यासदर्शनाद्विपरीतता । तदेतद् भवद्भिः कस्मान्नोक्तमिति अत्रोच्यते, परेषां न सुपर्यालोचितमेतद् दृष्टान्ताभासत्रयाभिधानमिति ज्ञापनार्थम् । तथा हि—न तावदनन्वयो दृष्टान्ताभासो भवितुमर्हति । यदि हि दृष्टान्तबलेन व्याप्तिः साध्यसाधनयोः प्रतिपाद्येत, ततः स्यादनन्वयो दृष्टान्ताभासः, स्वकार्याकरणात्, यदा तु पूर्वप्रवृत्तसंबन्धग्राहिप्रमाणगोचरस्मरणसंपादनार्थं दृष्टान्तोदाहृतिरिति स्थितम्, तदानन्वयलक्षणो न दृष्टान्तस्य दोषः, किं तर्हि हेतोरेव, प्रतिबन्धस्याद्यापि प्रमाणेनाप्रतिष्ठितत्वात्, प्रतिबन्धाभावे चान्वयासिद्धेः । न च हेतुदोषोऽपि दृष्टान्ते वाच्यः, अतिप्रसङ्गादिति । तथा अप्रदर्शितान्वयविपरीतान्यावपि न दृष्टान्ताभासतां स्वीकृत्वा, अन्वयाप्रदर्शनस्य विपर्यस्तान्वयप्रदर्शनस्य च वक्तृदोषत्वात्, तद्दोषद्वारेणापि दृष्टान्ताभासप्रतिपादने तदियत्ता विशीर्येत, वक्तृदोषाणामानन्त्यात् । वक्तृदोषत्वेऽपि परार्थानुमाने तत्कौशलमपेक्षते इति । एवं चोपन्यासे न

यस्येति बहुव्रीहिः, न पुनः संदिग्धः साध्यो धर्मो यस्येति संदिग्धः साध्यधर्मो यस्येति वा, धर्मादन् वा केवलात् इत्यनेन केवलात्पदात्परयो यः केवलो धर्मशब्दः तस्मादनो विधानात् । एवं संदिग्धसाधनधर्मादिष्वपि वाच्यम् । व्याहारादीति । आदिशब्दाच्चेष्टाकारपरिग्रहः । तन्निर्णयस्येति । विशिष्टव्यापारादिलिङ्गनिश्चयस्येत्यर्थः ॥२४॥

बुभुत्सितार्थसाधकौ अतो दृष्टान्ताभासावेताविति चेत्, एवं तर्हि करणापाट-
वादयोऽपि दृष्टान्ताभासा वाच्याः । तथा हि—करणपाटव्यतिरेकेणापि न
परप्रत्यायनं समस्ति, विस्पष्टवर्णग्रहणे व्यक्ततया तदर्थावगमाभावादित्यास्तां
तावत् ॥२४॥

तदेवं साधर्म्येण दृष्टान्ताभासान् प्रतिपाद्य वैधर्म्येणाह—

वैधर्म्येणात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिताः ।

साध्यसाधनयुग्मानामनिवृत्तेश्च संशयात् ॥२५॥

साध्याभावः साधनाभावव्याप्तौ दर्शयितुमभिप्रेतो यस्मिन् तद् वैधर्म्यम्,
तेनात्र दृष्टान्तदोषा न्यायविदीरिता इति दत्तार्थम् । साध्यसाधनयुग्मानां गम्य-
गमकोभयानां अनिवृत्तेरनिवर्तनात्, च शब्दस्य व्यवहितप्रयोगत्वात् संशयाच्च,
निवृत्तिसंदेहाच्चेत्यर्थः । तदनेन षड्दृष्टान्ताभासाः सूचिताः । तद्यथा—१,
साध्याव्यतिरेकी; २, साधनाव्यतिरेकी; ३, साध्यसाधनाव्यतिरेकी; तथा ४,
संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः; ५, संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः; ६, संदिग्धसाध्यसाधन-
व्यतिरेकश्चेति । तत्र साध्यव्यतिरेकी यथा—भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वाद् इति ।
अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यत् पुनर्भ्रान्तं न भवति न तत् प्रमाणम्, तद्यथा—स्वप्न-
ज्ञानमिति, स्वप्नज्ञानाद् भ्रान्ततानिवृत्तेः साध्याव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । साधना-
व्यतिरेकी यथा—निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—
यत् पुनः सविकल्पकं न तत् प्रमाणम्, तद्यथानुमानम्, अनुमानात् प्रमाणता-
निवृत्तेः साधनाव्यतिरेकित्वम् । उभयाव्यतिरेकी यथा—नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वा-
दिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यः पुनर्न नित्यानित्यः स न सन्, तद्यथा घटः,
घटादुभयस्याप्यव्यावृत्तेरुभयाव्यतिरेकित्वमिति । तथा संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकी
यथा—असर्वज्ञा अनाप्ता वा कपिलादयः आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयाप्रतिपादकत्वादिति ।
अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यः पुनः सर्वज्ञ आप्तो वा असावार्थसत्यचतुष्टयं
प्रत्यपीपदत्, तद्यथा शौद्धीदनिरिति । अयं च साध्याव्यतिरेकी वा, आर्यसत्य-
चतुष्टयस्य दुःखसमुदयमार्ग-निरोधलक्षणस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वेन तद्भाष-
कस्यासर्वज्ञतानाप्ततोपपत्तेः, केवलं तन्निराकारकप्रमाणसामर्थ्यपर्यालोचन-

आर्यसत्यचतुष्टयमिति । आराद् दूरं यान्ति पापादित्यार्याः, निरुक्तलक्षणं, तेषां
सतां साधूनां पदानां वा यथासंभवं मुक्तिप्रापकत्वेन यथावस्थितवस्तुस्वरूपचिन्तनेन च
हितानि सत्याति तत्त्वानीत्यर्थः, तेषां चतुष्टयम् । दुःखेत्यादि । दुःखं फलभूताः पञ्चोपादान-
स्कन्धाः—रूप वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारो विज्ञानमेव चेति; ते एव तृष्णासहाया हेतुभूताः समु-
दयः, समुदेति स्कन्धपञ्चकलक्षणं दुःखमस्मादिति व्युत्पत्तितः । निरोधहेतुर्निरात्म्याद्याकार-
चित्तविशेषो मार्गः, 'मार्गं अन्वेषणे', मार्ग्यतेऽन्वेष्यते याच्यते निरोधाधिभिरिति कुरादी-
नन्तत्वेन स्वरान्तत्वाद्दलप्रत्ययः । निष्कलेशावस्था चित्तस्य निरोधः, निरुध्यते रागद्वेषोपहत-
चित्तलक्षणः संसारोज्जेनेति करणे षभि मुक्तिरित्यर्थः । एतच्च दुःखादिरूपं, विस्ताराधिना
प्रमाणविनिश्चयटीकादेर्निष्ठङ्कनीयम् । प्रमाणबाधितत्वेनेति । दुःखादीनां हि मूलमात्मा,

विकलानां संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकतया प्रतिभाति इति तथोपन्यस्तः । तथा हि—यद्यप्यार्यसत्यचतुष्टयं शौद्धोदनिः प्रतिपादितवान्, तथापि सर्वज्ञताप्तते तस्य न सिध्यति; ताभ्यां सहाय्यसत्यचतुष्टयप्रतिपादनस्यान्यथानुपपत्त्यसिद्धेः, असर्वज्ञानाप्तेनापि परप्रतारणाभिप्रायप्रवृत्तनिपुणबुद्धिशठपुरुषेण तथाविधप्रतिपादनस्य कर्तुं शक्यत्वात् । तस्मात् शौद्धोदनेः सकाशादसर्वज्ञतानाप्तता-लक्षणस्य साध्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः संदिग्धेति संदिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकत्वमिति । संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा—अनादेयवाक्यः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषः रागादिमत्त्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यः पुनरादेयवाक्यो न स रागादिमान्, तद्यथा सुगत इति । यद्यपि तद्दर्शनानुरक्तान्तःकरणानां सुगतस्यादेयवचनता सिद्धिसौधमध्यारूढा, तथापि रागादिमत्त्वाभावस्तत्प्रतिपादकप्रमाणवैधुर्यात् संदेहगोचरचारितामनुभवति, अतः सुगताद् रागादिमत्त्वाव्यावृत्तिसंशयात् संदिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकत्वमिति । संदिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेको यथा—न वीतरागाः कपिलादयः करुणास्पदेष्वप्यकरुणापरीतचित्ततयादत्तनिजकमांसशकलत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—ये पुनर्वीतरागास्ते करुणापरीतचित्ततया दत्तनिजमांसशकलाः, तद्यथा बोधिसत्त्वा इति । अत्र साध्यसाधनधर्मयोर्बोधिसत्त्वेभ्यो व्यावृत्तिः संदिग्धा, तत्प्रतिपादितप्रमाणवैकल्याद् न ज्ञायते किं ते रागादिमन्तः उत वीतरागाः, तथानुकम्प्येषु किं स्वपिशितखण्डानि दत्तवन्तो नेति वा, अतः संदिग्धसाध्यसाधनव्यतिरेकत्वमिति । परैरपरेऽपि दृष्टान्ताभासास्त्रयोऽविमृश्यभाषितया दर्शिताः । तद्यथा—अव्यतिरेकः, अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकः, विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्चेति, तेऽस्माभिरयुक्तत्वान्न दर्शयितव्याः । तथा हि—अव्यतिरेकस्तैर्दर्शितः, यथा—अवीतरागः कश्चिद् विवक्षितः पुरुषः, वक्तृत्वादिति, अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यः पुनर्वीतरागो न स वक्ता, यथोपलखण्ड इति । यद्यपि किलोपलखण्डादुभयं व्यावृत्तम्, तथापि व्याप्त्या व्यतिरेकासिद्धेरव्यतिरेकत्वमिति । अयुक्तश्चायं वक्तुम्, अव्यतिरेकिताया हेतुदोषत्वात् । यदि हि दृष्टान्तबलेनैव व्यतिरेकः प्रतिपाद्येत, तदा तथाविधसामर्थ्यविकलस्य तदाभासता युज्येत, न चैतदस्ति, प्राक्प्रवृत्तसंबन्धग्रहणप्रवणप्रमाणगोचरस्मरणसंपादनार्थं दृष्टान्तोपादानात्; न ह्येकत्र यो यदभावे न दृष्टः स तदभावे न भवतीति प्रतिबन्धग्राहिप्रमाणव्यतिरेकेण सिध्यति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्; तस्मादसिद्धप्रतिबन्धस्य हेतोरैवायं दोषो न दृष्टान्तस्येति । तथाप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकविपरीतव्यतिरेकावपि वक्तुमयुक्तौ, तयोर्वक्तृदोषत्वात् । तथा हि—अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकस्तैरुक्तः, यथा—नित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादाकाशवत्—इति । अत्र विद्यमानोऽपि व्यतिरेको वादिना वचनेन नोद्भा-

तदभावे कथं तेषां संभवः । तथा हि—दुःखं नाम देहधर्मविलक्षणोऽन्तःसंवेद्यो धर्मः, धर्माश्च धर्मिणमन्तरेण न भवन्ति, रूपादय इव घटम्, नास्ति च बौद्धादीनां दुःखादिधर्मानुगुणो जीवः, मुख्यदुःखाभावे च दुःखहेतुत्वात् दुःखं संसारिणः स्कन्धा अपि न स्युः तदभावे च न हेतुः । एवं मार्गनिरोधयोरपि प्रमाणवाधित्वमपि भावनीयमिति । उपलखण्ड इति । खण्ड-
व्यनिः पुंनपुंसकः ॥२५॥

वित इति दुष्टता । विपरीत व्यतिरेकः पुनरभिहितः, यथा—अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादिति । अत्र वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः—यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं भवति, यथा आकाशमिति, अत्र विपर्यस्तव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनाद्विपरीतव्यतिरेकत्वम्, वैधर्म्यप्रयोगे हि साध्याभावः साधनाभावाक्रान्तोदर्शनीयः, न चैवमत्र, साधनाभावस्य साध्याभावव्याप्ततयाभिधानादिति । व्यतिरेकाप्रदर्शनं विपरीतव्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनं च न वस्तुनो दोषः, किं तर्हि वचनकुशलताविकलस्याभिधायकस्य । किं च येषां भवतामदो दर्शनम्—यदुत स्वार्थानुमानकाले स्वयं हेतुदर्शनमात्रात् साध्यप्रतीतेः परार्थानुमानावसरेऽपि हेतुप्रतिपादनमेवकर्तव्यम्, “विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव हि केवलः”—इति वचनात्, तेषां कृतकत्वाद् इतीयता हेतूपन्यासेनैव सिसाध्यषितसाध्यसिद्धेः समस्तदृष्टान्ताभासवर्णनमपि पूर्वापरव्याहृतवचनरचनाचातुर्यमाविर्भावयति । आसातां तावदेतौ, दृष्टान्तस्य साधनावयवत्वेनानभ्युपगमात् । अथेत्थमाचक्षीथाः—अन्वयव्यतिरेकापरिज्ञाने प्रतिपाद्यस्य न दृष्टान्तमन्तरेणैतौ दर्शयितुं शक्यौ, अतोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनार्थं दृष्टान्तोऽभिधातव्यः, ततश्च तत्कार्याकारिणां तदाभासतेति चेत्, गले गृहीतस्यायमुल्लापः तथाप्यप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकविपरीतव्यतिरेकौ दृष्टान्ताभासौ न वास्तवौ, किं तर्हि वक्तृदोषसमुत्थौ, अतो नाभिधातुं युक्तौ, तथाविधस्य विद्यमानवस्तुप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरहितस्य निबिडजडिमावष्टब्धस्य पुंसो वादानधिकारित्वाद्, मातृकापाठशालायोग्यतया विदुषां वादयितुमयुक्तत्वादिति ॥२५॥

तदेवं परार्थानुमानं व्याचक्षणेन यदुक्तम्—यदुत तत्पक्षादिवचनात्मकमिति तत्पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तानां साभासानां प्रतिपादनात् प्रायः पर्यन्तितम्, केवलं तत्परोक्षदूषणोद्धारादेव समीचीनतामाविर्भति, इत्यमुना प्रस्तावेन दूषणं साभासमभिधातुकाम आह—

वाद्युक्ते साधने प्रोक्तदोषाणामुद्भावनम् ।

दूषणं निरवद्ये तु दूषणाभासनामकम् ॥२६॥

वदनशीलो वादी प्रत्यायकस्तेनोक्ते उपन्यस्ते, कस्मिन् ? साधने, साध्यते प्रतिपाद्यप्रतीतावारोप्यतेऽनुमेयं येन तत्साधनम् । तच्चानेकरूपं प्राक् प्रत्यपादि । तद्यथा क्वचिद्धेतुरेवैकः, क्वचित्पक्षहेतू, क्वचित् पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्ताः, क्वचित्ते एव सोपनयाः, क्वचित् सनिगमनाः, क्वचिदेकैकतच्छ्रद्धिवृद्धयेति, प्रतिपाद्यस्य क्वचित् कथंचित् प्रत्याययितुं शक्यत्वात्, तत्प्रत्यायनोपायस्य च साधनत्वादिति, तत्रेह सम्यक्साधनस्य दूषयितुमशक्यत्वात् साधनाभास एव तत्सामर्थ्यापपत्तेः । साधनाभासमेव दूषणोपनिपातात् प्रागवस्थायांमनिर्जातं सामान्येन साधनध्वनिनोक्तम्, तत्र प्रोक्तदोषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिनिराकृतपक्षासिद्धादिहेतुसाध्यादिविकलदृष्टान्ताद्युपन्यासलक्षणांतामुद्भावनं प्राश्निकानां पुरतः प्रकाशनं यत् तद् दूष्यते—

वदनशीलो वादीति, वदतीति ग्रहादिणिन् इति णिन् अवश्यं वदतीति आवश्यकार्थे वा आवश्यकाधर्मण्योणिन् इति णिन् । वदनं वादः सोऽस्यास्तीति वा वादी; शीलार्थे तूपपदा-

स्वाभिप्रेतसाध्यप्रत्यायनवैकल्यलक्षणं विकृतिं नीयते साधनमनेनेति दूषणमिति ज्ञेयम् । अधुना तदाभासमाह—निर्गतं सम्यक्प्रयुक्तत्वादवद्यं पापं पक्षादिदोषलक्षणं दौष्टद्यमस्मादिति निरवद्यम्, तस्मिन् साधने वादिनोक्ते इति वर्तते, तथापि मत्सरितया प्रमृद्योदरं यदविद्यमानानां दोषाणामुद्भावनं तद्दूषणस्थानोपन्यस्तत्वात् तत्कार्याकरणात् सम्यक्साधने दोषोद्भावनस्य प्रलापायमानत्वात् दूषणवदाभासते इति दूषणाभासमिति, तदेव नाम संज्ञा यस्य तत्तथा, समर्थसाधनोपन्यस्तत्वात् साधिते साध्ये सतामप्यपशब्दालंकारादिदोषाणां यदुद्भावनं तदपि दूषणाभासनामकमिति । तु शब्देन विशेषणार्थेन दर्शयति—वस्तुसिद्धयर्थं वादप्रवृत्तेः, तस्य सिद्धत्वात्, अपशब्दादीनामप्रस्तुततया तद्द्वारेण दोषप्रकाशनस्यासंबद्धप्रलापरूपत्वात्, इतरथा तावन्मात्रेणैव परापाकरणसिद्धेः समर्थसाधनान्वेषणप्रयत्नो-
विशीर्येत, प्रयोजनाभावादिति ॥२६॥

तदेवं व्यावहारिकप्रमाणस्य प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षस्वार्थपरार्थादिभेदभिन्नस्य लक्षणं प्रतिपाद्याधुना यैः पारमार्थिकं समस्तावरणविच्छेदलभ्यमशेषार्थगोचरं केवलज्ञानं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तन्मतोद्दलनार्थं तल्लक्षणमभिधित्सुराह—

सकलावरणमुक्तात्म केवलं यत्प्रकाशते ।

प्रत्यक्षं सकलार्थात्मसततप्रतिभासनम् ॥२७॥

सकलं समस्तमावृणोत्याव्रियते वा अनेनेत्यावरणम्, तत्स्वरूपप्रच्छादनं कर्मेत्यर्थः, सकलं च तदावरणं च सकलावरणं तेन मुक्तो रहितः आत्मा स्वरूपं यस्य तत्तथा, अत एव केवलमसहायं आवरणक्षयोपशमविचित्रतयैव बोधस्य नानाकारतया प्रवृत्तेः, सामस्त्येन पुनरावरणनिर्दलने विवन्धककारणवैकल्यादेकाकार-
तयैव तस्य विवर्तनात्, अतो ज्ञानान्तरनिरपेक्षं यत् प्रकाशते प्रथते निरुपाधिकं द्योतते इत्यर्थः, तत्परमार्थतः प्रत्यक्षम् । तदिदं सकलावरणमुक्तात्म इति हेतुद्वारेण तथा केवलं यत् प्रकाशते इति स्वरूपतो निरूप्याधुना कार्यद्वारेण निरूपयन्नाह—
सकलार्थात्मनां समस्तवस्तुरूपाणां सततप्रतिभासनम्—अनवरतप्रकाशनं सकलार्था-
त्मसततप्रतिभासनमिति, प्रतिभास्यतेऽनेनेति प्रतिभासनं, आत्मनो धर्मरूपतया भेदवद्विवक्षितं ज्ञानमिति यावत् । अस्य च पारमार्थिकत्वम्, निरुपचरितशब्दार्थो-
पपत्तेः । तथा हि—अक्षशब्दो जीवपर्यायस्ततश्चाक्षं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रत्यक्षम्, यत्रात्मनः साक्षाद् व्यापारः, व्यावहारिकं पुनरिन्द्रियव्यवहितात्मव्यापारसंपाद्य-
त्वात् परमार्थतः परोक्षमेव, धूमादग्निज्ञानवत्, तिरोधानाविशेषात् । ननु च प्रसिद्धं लक्ष्यमनूद्याप्रसिद्धं लक्षणं विधीयते, सर्वत्रायं न्यायः, अप्रसिद्धे पुनर्लक्ष्ये लक्षणमभिधीयमानमस्वरारत्रिन्दिनीकुसुमलक्षणवन्निर्गोचरतां यायात्, तदिदं स्वरूपतोऽप्रसाध्य लक्षणमभिधानस्य कोऽभिप्रायः इति । अत्रोच्यते—ये ये

भावेन णिन्प्रत्ययस्यातंभवादर्थकथनमात्रमेतत् । तावन्मात्रेणैवेति । अपशब्दालंकारादि-
दोषोद्भावनमात्रेणैव । प्रयोजनाभावादिति । समर्थसाधनस्य हि परनिराकरणं प्रयोजनम्, तच्चेदपशब्दादिदोषोद्भावनार्थाः चक्रे तदा कृतं वादिदूषणार्थं प्रतिवादिनः समर्थसाधनोप-
न्यासप्रयासेनेति ॥२६॥

मिथ्यावलेपाध्मातान्तःकरणाः प्रमाणप्रसिद्धमप्यदः प्रति विप्रतिपद्यन्ते, तेषां धान्ध्यीकृतबुद्धित्वादवधारणीयतामनेन दर्शयति । किमस्य प्रतिपादकं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, एते ब्रूमः—समस्ति समस्तवस्तुविचारगोचरं विशददर्शनम्, तद्गोचरानुमान-प्रवृत्तेः । इह यद्यद् गोचरमनुमानं प्रवर्तते, तस्य तस्य ग्राहकं किञ्चित् प्रत्यक्षमुद्य-पदवीं समासादयति, यथा चित्रभानोः । प्रवर्तते च सकलार्थविषयमनुमानम्, अतस्तदवलोकिना विशददर्शनेनापि भाव्यमिति । सर्वार्थविषयकं किमनुमानं प्रवर्तते इति चेत् । इदमपि ब्रूमः—इह यद्यदस्ति तत् सर्वं स्थित्युदयापवर्गसंसर्ग-मनुभवति, वस्तुत्वात्, यद्यद्वस्तु तत्तत् स्थेमजन्मप्रलयैः क्रोडीकृतम् । तद्यथा—अङ्गुलिरङ्गुलित्ववक्रत्वजुत्वापेक्षयेति, वस्तु च यदस्ति, अतः प्रस्तुतत्रयक्रान्तं तदवगन्तव्यम् । इदमेव निखिलार्थगोचरमनेकान्तानुमानं ज्ञानक्रियाभ्यासाति-शयान्निखिलावरणविच्छेदे विवन्धककारणाभावाद् विशददर्शनीभवति । न चानुमानप्रवृत्तावप्यनर्थित्वादिना प्रमातुरप्रवृत्तौ अनुमेयगोचरप्रत्यक्षासंभवेन व्यभिचारश्चोदनीयः, संभवस्य साध्यतयाभिप्रेतत्वात् । न च संभवमात्रेऽस्ति व्यभिचारः, सर्वानुमेयानां-संभवत्प्रत्यक्षतया व्याप्तत्वादिति । अथवान्यथानुमान-यामः—संभवत्समस्तशुद्धिक आत्मा, विद्यमान शुद्धशुभायत्वात्, इह यो यो विद्यमानशुद्धशुभायः स स संभवत्समस्तशुद्धिकः, यथा विद्यमानक्षारमृत्पुट-पाकादिशुद्धशुभायो रत्नविशेषः, तथा च विद्यमानज्ञानाभ्यासशुद्धशुभाय आत्मा, अतः संभवत्समस्तशुद्धिक इति । सामस्त्यशुद्धश्चात्मा ज्ञानज्ञानिनोः कथंचिद-भेदात् केवलमभिधीयते इति । ज्ञानाद्यभ्यासः कथं विशुद्धिकारणमिति चेत्, आवरणमलप्रतिपक्षरूपत्वादिति ब्रूमः । प्रतिपक्षरूपता कथमवधारिता इति चेत्, तत्रैव दर्शनात् । तथा हि—दृश्यते ज्ञानाद्यभ्यासतः प्रतिक्षणभावरणविलयः, विशिष्टविशिष्टतरतकार्यबोधाद्यनुभवात्, तदतिशये पुनः सामस्त्योच्छेदः स्यादित्य-भिदध्महे । एतेन यत्परे प्रोचुः यथा—प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणपञ्चकगोचरातिक्रान्तत्वात् सर्वार्थसंवेदनमभावाख्यषष्ठप्रमाणगोचरतां प्रतिपद्यते तदयुक्तम्, तत्संभवस्यानु-मानेन प्रतिपादनात्, प्रमाणपञ्चकप्रवर्तनाभावासिद्धेः किं च । प्रमाणपञ्चकं तद्गोचरं न प्रवर्तते इति कथं भवतो निर्णयः किं नियतदेशकालव्याप्त्या, यद्वा समस्तदेशकालास्कन्दनेनेति ? यद्याद्यः पक्षः, ततो यथा घटादेः क्वचित् प्रमाण-पञ्चकं तद्गोचरं निवर्तमानमभावं साधयति, एवं समस्तवस्तुसंवेदनगोचरमपि तन्निवर्तमानं नियतदेशदशावच्छिन्नमभावं साधयेत्, न सर्वत्र, ततश्च घटादिवत्, तद्दुर्निवारं स्यात् । अथ द्वितीयः पक्षः, असौ असंभव्येव, समस्तदेशकालवर्ति-पुरुषपरिषत्संवेदनसाक्षात्कारिणो ह्येवं वक्तुं युक्तम्—यदुत न क्वचित् समस्तार्थ-

मिथ्यावलेपाध्मातान्तःकरणा इति । अलोकाभिमानापूरितमनसः । चित्रभानोरिति बहूनेः । स्थेमेति । स्थिरस्य भावः, पृथ्यादित्वादिमनि स्थादेशे ध्रौव्यमित्यर्थः । ज्ञानाद्य-भ्यासत इति । ज्ञानाभ्यासात् ज्ञानावरणविलये ज्ञानावरणविलयकार्यो ज्ञानविशेषो दृश्यते । आदिशब्दात् दर्शनाभ्यासात् दर्शनावरणविलये दर्शनावरणविलयकार्यो दर्शनविशेषानुभवो गृह्यते । एवं चारित्र्याभ्यासेऽपि । तदतिशये ज्ञानाद्यभ्यासातिशये ॥२७॥

संवेदनमस्ति इति, न भवतः, तथाविधपुरुषसंभवानभ्युपगमात्, इतरथा य एव कश्चिन्निश्चित्यैवमभिदध्यात्, स एव समस्तवस्तुविस्तारव्यापिज्ञानालोकः इति समस्तार्थगोचरसंवेदनसिद्धिरित्यास्तां तावत् ॥२७॥

तदेवं प्रमाणविषये लक्षणसंख्याविप्रतिपत्ती निराकृत्याधुना क्रमप्राप्तां गोचरविप्रतिपत्तिं बहुवक्तव्यत्वादनिराकृत्य तावत् फलविप्रतिपत्तिं निराचि-
कीर्षुराह—

प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।

केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः ॥२८॥

द्विविधं हि प्रमाणस्य फलम्—साक्षादसाक्षाच्च, अनन्तरं व्यवहितं चेत्यर्थः । तत्र साक्षादज्ञानमनध्यवसायः प्रमेयापरिच्छित्तिस्तस्य विनिवर्तनं विशेषेण प्रलया-
पादनं प्रमाणस्य फलम्, अज्ञानोद्दलनद्वारेण तस्य प्रवृत्तेः, तस्य च सर्वानर्थमूल-
तया प्रमात्रपकारित्वात् तन्निवर्तनस्य प्रयोजनता युक्तैव, एतच्चानन्तरप्रयोजनं
सर्वज्ञानानामेकरूपत्वात् सामान्येनोक्तम् । व्यवहितप्रयोजनं पुनर्विभागेनाह—
केवलस्य सर्वज्ञानस्य सुखं वैषयिकसुखातीतपरमाह्लादानुभवः, उपेक्षा साक्षात्
समस्तार्थानुभवेऽपि हानोपादानेच्छाभावान्मध्यस्थवृत्तिता, ते सुखोपेक्षे फल-
मित्यर्थः । शेषस्य तद्व्यतिरिक्तप्राकृतलोकप्रमाणस्यादानं ग्रहणं हानं परित्याग-
स्तयोरादानहानयोर्धीर्बुद्धिरादानहानधीः सा फलं इति यावत् । ततश्चादेयानां
सम्प्यदर्शनादि-स्त्रक्चन्दनादीनां यादित्सा, तथा हेयानां मिथ्यादर्शनादिविषकण्ट-
कादीनां या जिहासा प्रमाणसाध्या, अप्रमाणात् तदसिद्धेः, प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिणां ततः
प्रवृत्त्ययोगादित्युक्तं भवति ॥२८॥

अधुना गोचरविप्रतिपत्तिं निराचष्टे—

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।

एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥२९॥

अनेके बहुवोऽन्ता अंशा धर्मा वा आत्मानः स्वरूपाणि यस्य तदनेकान्तात्म-
कम् । किं तत् ? वस्तु बहिरन्तश्च, गोचरो विषयः सर्वसंविदां समस्तसंवितीनाम् ।
अनेकानेकान्तमन्तरेण संवेदनप्रसरव्यवच्छेदं दर्शयति, भ्रान्तसंवेदानामप्यने-
कान्तोद्योतनपटिष्ठतया प्रवृत्तेः, केवलं केषुचिदंशेषु विसंवादकत्वादप्रमाणानि
तानि संगीर्यन्ते । तदयमभिप्रायः—यदा संवेदनसामान्यमप्यनेकान्तविरहेण न

अज्ञानोद्दलनद्वारेणोति । अज्ञानमुद्दलयदेव प्रमाणं प्रवर्तते इति । किमुक्तं भवति ?
न प्रमाणात् फलमेकान्तेन भिन्नमभिन्नं वा, भेदाभेदरूपतयैवान्तरारंपरभेदस्य प्रतिभा-
सनात् । तथा हि—यस्यैवात्मनः फलरूपतयापि तस्यैव सः, य एव प्रमिमीते स एव निवृ-
त्ताज्ञानो जहात्याददाति उपेक्षते चेति प्रतीतः । एष चैकप्रमात्रपेक्षया प्रमाणफलयोरभेदः,
करणक्रियापरिणामभेदाच्च भेदः उक्तं च—

पारंपर्येण साक्षाच्च फलं द्वेषाभ्यधाय यत् ।

जिनैर्भिन्नमभिन्नं च प्रमाणात्तदिहोदितम् ॥२९॥

प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहते, तदा तद्विशेषणभूतं प्रमाणं एकान्ते प्रवर्तयिष्यते इति दूरापास्तावकाशा एवैषा वार्ता, तथाप्यनादिमिथ्याभिनिवेशवासितान्तःकरणाः कुदर्शनविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो बहवोऽत्र विप्रतिपद्यन्ते इति सर्वं प्रमाणानामनेकान्तगोचरत्वसाधकं प्रमाणमभिधीयते । इह यत्प्रमाणं तत्परस्पराविनिर्लुठितानेकधर्मपरिकरितवस्तुनो ग्राहकम्, तस्यैव तत्र प्रतिभासमानत्वात्, इह यद्यत्र प्रतिभाति, तदेव तद्गोचरतयाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तद्यथा—निरादीनवनयनप्रभवदर्शने प्रतिभासमानं पाटलतया जपाकुसुमं तथैव तद्गोचरतयाभ्युपगम्यते, परस्पराविभक्तानेकस्वभावाक्रान्तमूर्तिकं च बहिरन्तश्च वस्तु सर्वप्रमाणेषु प्रथते इति, अतस्तदेव तेषां गोचरः । न चेतरेतर-विशकलितधर्मिधर्मभाववादिभिः कणभक्षाक्षपादशिष्यकैस्तावदस्य हेतोरसिद्धतादि-दोषः प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यः, तदभ्युपगमन्तरेण स्वाभिप्रेतवस्तुनोऽवस्थानाभावात् । तथा हि—एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि बहवो धर्मास्ततो भिन्नतनवः कथं वर्तेरन् ? भेदा-विशेषेण सर्वत्र तद्वृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तत्रैव तेषां समवायान्नान्यत्र वर्तन्ते इति चेत्, ननु सोऽपि समवायो यद्युपकार्योपकारकभावव्यतिरेकेणापि भवति, ततः सर्वत्रा-विशेषेण प्रसज्येत, तदभावाविशेषात् अस्त्येवोपकार्योपकारकभाव इति चेत्, हन्त हतोऽसि अनेकोपकारकस्यानेकस्वभावताप्राप्तेः, तद्विरहेऽनेकोपकारकत्वा-भावात् । न हि येन स्वभावेनैकस्योपकरोति तेनैव द्वितीयस्य, तस्य तत्रै-वोपयुक्तात्वात्, द्वितीयोपकारक स्वभावस्य तदुपमर्दनद्वारेणोत्पत्तेः, इतर-थैकमेवोपकुर्वन्तिष्ठेत्, तदेकस्वभावत्वात् । भिन्नाभिः शक्तिभिरुपकरोति न भिन्नैः स्वभावैः, तेन नानेकान्त इति चेत्, तास्ताहि कथं वर्तन्ते इति वाच्यम् । समवायाद् इत्युत्तरेऽसावप्युपकार्योपकारकभावमन्तरेण कथं न सर्वत्र इति प्राचीनं चोद्यं पश्चाल्लग्नमनुधावति । उपकार्योपकारक भावाभ्युपगमे पुनरप्यनेकस्वभावतां प्रदर्शितयुक्तेः पुनः शक्त्युपकारकभिन्नशक्तिपरिकल्पनेऽप्यने-कान्तान्मोक्षः इति वरमादावेव मत्सरितां विहायानेकधर्मोऽध्यासितं वस्त्वभ्युपगतं किं भेदकल्पनयास्थान एवात्मना परिक्लेशितेन इति । किं चानेकान्तभ्युपगमे सत्येषु गुणः—परस्परविभक्तेषु संयोगिसंयोगसमवायिसमवायगुणगुणावयवावयवि-व्यक्तिसामान्यादिषु संयोगिसमवायगुण्यवयवविासामान्यादीनां संयोगिसमवायिगुणा-वयविशेषादिषु वर्तनचिन्तायां यद्दूषणजालमुपनिपतति, तदपि परिहृतं भवति, एकान्तभेद एव तदुपपत्तेः, अनेकान्ते तदुत्थानाभावात् । तथा हि—भिन्नाः खलु संयोगादयः संयोग्यादिभ्यो विकल्पयितुं पार्यन्ते—यदुत कथमेत एतेषु वर्तन्ते इति । किमेकदेशेन यद्वा सामस्त्येन । यद्येकदेशेन, तदयुक्तम्, तेषां निरवयवत्वाभ्युप-गमात्, सावयवत्वेषुपि तेभ्योऽवयवभ्यो यद्यभिन्नाः, ततोऽनेकान्ताः पत्तिः, एकस्था-

निरादीनवेति । आदीनवो दोषः । इतरेतरेत्यादि । विविधानि शकलानि येषां तानि विशकलानि, तानि करोतीति इति विशकल्यन्ते पृथक्क्रियन्ते स्मेति कर्मणि क्तः, विविधानि शकलानि संजातानि येषामिति तारकादेराकृतिगणत्वात् इतच्चप्रत्ययो वा, तत् इतरेतरं विश-कलिताविति विशेषणसमासे तेषां धर्मधर्मिभावं वदन्तीत्येवंशीलास्तैः । परस्परविभक्तेषु संयोगिसंयोगसमवायिसमवायगुणगुणावयवावयवव्यक्तिसामान्यादिष्विति अत्र गुणग्रहणे-

नेकावयवत्वप्राप्तेः । अथ भिन्नास्तेष्वपि ते कथं वर्तन्ते इति वाच्यम्, एकदेशेन सामस्त्येन वा । एकदेश पक्षे तदेवावर्तते इत्यनवस्था । अथ सामस्त्येनतदप्य-साधीयः, प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्ततया संयोगादिवहुत्वप्रसङ्गात्तदभिन्नाः पुन संयोगादयो न विकलभाजो भवन्ति । अभेदपक्षेऽपि संयोगादिमात्रं संयोगादिमात्रं वा स्यादिति चेन्न, तस्याप्येकान्तेनानभ्युपगमात्, किं तर्हि अन्यान्याविश्लिष्ट-स्वरूपा विवक्षया संदर्शनीयभेदाः सर्वे एवैतेऽभ्युपगम्यन्ते, तथाविधानां कुयुक्ति-विकल्पोत्थापितदूषणसमूहनिराकरणक्षमत्वात्, अवाधितप्रतिभासेषु सर्वत्र तेषां तथैव प्रतिभासनात्, अन्यथा प्रतिभासमानानामन्यथा परिकल्पने दृष्टहान्यदृष्ट-परिकल्पनाद्वारेणासमञ्जसप्राप्तेः, तथा च ब्रह्माद्वैतशून्यवादादयः सिद्धिमशुवीरन्, विशेषाभावादिति ॥

एतेनास्य हेतोः कापिला अप्यसिद्धतादिदोषमभिधित्सवो मौक्यमानीताः । तथा हि—अन्तरेकं संवेदनमपरापरहर्षविषादाद्यनन्तधर्मविवर्तिकांस्तरूपं वहिश्च घटादिकमर्थं नवपुराणादिवर्तुलपार्थिवत्वाद्यनेकस्वभावावष्टब्धशरीरं साक्षाल्ल-क्षयन्तः कथं तद्विपरीतकथने प्रवर्तेरन् ? प्रकृतिपुरुषात्मकं द्रव्यमेवैकं तात्त्विकम्, पर्यायध्रान्तिजनकः पुनर्विवर्तोऽपारमार्थिक इति चेन्न, द्वयोरपि सर्वप्रमाणेषु प्रकाशमानयोरवाधितयोः सर्वव्यवहारनिबन्धनयोः पक्षपातमन्तरेणैकस्य निह्नोतु-मशक्यत्वात् । तथा सति विवर्त एव तात्त्विकः, द्रव्यं पुनरलीकमिति पर्यायपक्षपाती प्रसञ्जयन् दुर्निषेधः स्यादिति । अथेत्यमभिदधीथाः—द्रव्यं सर्वत्राव्यभिचारितरूप-त्वात् सत्यम्, पर्यायाः पुनर्व्यभिचारिण इत्यसत्याः । तदयुक्तम्, यदि नाम द्रव्यमभेद-रूपत्वात् सर्वत्रानुवर्तते, पर्यायास्तु भेदरूपत्वात् व्यवच्छिद्यन्ते, तथापि तत्सत्यम् इतरेऽलीका इति वक्तुं न पार्यते, न हि नीलं पीतरूपतां न विभक्ति इत्येतावता तदसत्यम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात्, सर्वस्य पररूपपरिहारावस्थायितयालीकत्वप्राप्तेः । अथ द्रव्यमेव पर्यायास्तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तत्स्वरूपवत्, न सन्ति वा द्रव्यव्यतिरेकिणः पर्यायाः निःस्वभावत्वात् खपुष्पवत् इति प्रमाणयसि, तथा सति पर्याया एव द्रव्यं, तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् तत्स्वरूपवत्, नास्ति वा पर्यायव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यम् निष्पर्यायत्वात् आकाशकुसुमवदिति इतरोऽपि प्रमाणयन् केन वार्यते । तन्न पक्षद्वयेऽपि काचि-द्विशेषोपलब्धिरिति । यथैवानन्तसहक्रमवर्तिपर्यायाध्यासितं वस्तु सर्वप्रमाणेषु प्रकाशते तथैवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, तथा चान्यस्याभावात् तदेव तद्गोचर इति स्थितम् ॥

तथा सुगतमतानुसारिणामपि मध्ये सौत्रान्तिकस्तावदस्य हेतोरसिद्धतामा-विर्भावयितुं नोत्सहते, तदभ्युपगतिव्यतिरेकेण निजदर्शनव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः । तथा

नैव संयोगे लब्धे गोबलीवर्दन्यायेनात्यन्तप्रसिद्धत्वात् गुणेश्चो निष्कृष्य पृथक् संयोगस्थो-पादानम्, गुणास्तु रूपादयो द्रष्टव्याः, आदिशब्दाद् द्रव्ये कम्पादिकर्मणो वृत्तौ दूषणपरिश्रहः । तेषां संयोगादीनाम् । दृष्टेत्यादि । संयोगादिभ्यः कथंचिद्ब्रह्माः संयोगादय इति दृष्टम्, घटपटादिवदेकान्तभेदिनः संयोगादय इति स्वप्नेऽप्यदृष्टम्, तयोर्हानिपरिकल्पने त एव द्वारं तेन ॥ सौत्रान्तिक इति । 'सूत्र अबमोचने' चुरादावदन्तः, ततः सूत्र्यते निर्णयिते तत्त्वमने-नेति स्वरान्तत्वादिति सूत्रमागमः तस्यायं सौत्रः, अन्तः परिनिष्ठा; यदाहुस्तद्वादिनः—

हि—बहिस्तावदेकं कारणमपरापरसामग्र्यन्तःपातितयानेककार्यकार्यविवक्षते, यथा-
रूपं स्वोत्तरक्षणं स्वावगाहिज्ञानादिकं च युगपज्जनयति । यदि चैकक्षणवर्तितः
सामग्रीभेदेन भेदमनुभवत एव भिन्नदेशनानाकार्यकारिता, तथा सति नित्यपक्षोदितं
दूषणं स्वमस्तकोपनिपाति स्यात्, तस्यापि तथैव भिन्नकालकार्यनिवर्तनेऽपि भेदा-
भावप्रसङ्गात् । तथा प्रतिभासभेदेन क्षणक्षयिरूपादिस्वलक्षणत्वाभ्युपगमश्चैवं
निनिवन्धनः स्यात्, कौटस्थ्यमाविभ्रतोऽपि द्रव्यस्यापरापरकारणकलापान्तर्मत-
तयानवपुराणादिपर्यायरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शावभासलक्षणकार्यसंपादनाविरोधप्रसक्तेः ।
किं चायमेकं स्वाव्यवव्यापिनं कालान्तरसंचरिष्णुमाकारं साक्षाल्लक्षणं क्षण-
क्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणानि स्वलक्षणानि व्याचक्षीत नान्यथा, यथाकृतं तदवभासस्य
स्वप्नान्तरेऽप्यनुपलक्षणात्, लक्षितस्य चालक्षितव्यतिरेकनिराकरणतस्तादात्म्यं
कथयन् स्वगिरानेकान्तावभासं समर्थयते । तथा हि—अलक्षितपरमाणुपारि-
माण्डल्यप्रतिक्षणविवर्तमपि स्वलक्षणं स्थिरस्थूराद्यात्मना दर्शयति स्वरूपम्,
अन्यथा सुषुप्तं जगदासज्येत, तदप्रकाशने प्रमाणान्तरस्याप्यत्यन्तविलक्षणस्व-
लक्षणावेदकस्याप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । तथान्तःसंवेदनमर्थस्वरूपापेक्षया बहिर्मुखान्त-
मुखसविकल्पाविकल्पभ्रान्ताभ्रान्तादिप्रतिभासमेकमभ्युपयतः कथमनेकान्ताव-
भासोऽसिद्धः स्यात् ? तथा नानादेशस्थितार्थसार्थसमपिताकारोपरक्तमेकमाकार-
भेदेऽप्यन्यथा युगपत्प्रकाशमानसितासिताद्यर्थव्यवस्थित्यनुपपत्तेः संवेदनमनुमन्य-
मानः कथं भिन्नसमयमाविर्हर्षविषादाद्यनेकविवर्तवशात् तरभेदमात्यन्तिकमभि-
दधीत, अभिन्नयोगक्षेमत्वात् । युगपद्भाविनां संविदन्तनिविष्टाकाराणामेकत्वं
न हर्षादीनाम्, तद्विपर्ययादिति चेन्न, तत्सामर्थ्यव्यवस्थाप्याथभिदप्रसङ्गात्, तदेक-

प्रतिक्षणं विशरारवो रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरमाणुबो ज्ञानं चेत्येव तत्त्वम् इति, ततः सौत्रश्चासौ
अन्तश्च सौत्रान्तः, स विद्यते यस्य अतोऽनेकस्वरात् (सि० हे० ७-२-६) इति इकः । यद्वा
सूत्रान्तः प्रयोजनं प्रवर्तकं यस्य इति प्रयोजनम् (सि० हे० ५-४-११७) इतीकण् । स्वोत्तरे-
त्यादि । स्व आत्मीयः स चासौ उत्तरक्षणश्च, यद्वा स्वस्मादुत्तरः स्वोत्तरः स चासौ क्षणश्चेति,
स्वस्योत्तरक्षणः स्वोत्तरक्षण इति वा । स्वमात्मानमवगाहते विषयीकरोतीत्येवंशीलं स्वाव-
गाहि, तच्च तत् ज्ञानं चेति । आदिशब्दात् सहकारिकारणभावेन रसालोकादिकार्यजनन-
ग्रहः । नित्यपक्षोदितमिति । एकस्य भिन्नकालानेककार्यजनकस्वभावत्वे विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादने-
कत्वमिति । तथैवेति । यथैककालमेकमेकदेशं नानाकार्यं कुर्वदप्येकमेव, तथा अभिन्नकाला-
नेककार्यवर्तनेऽप्येकमेवेति स्थायित्वसिद्धिः । अलक्षितेत्यादि । परिमाण्डलाः परमाणवः तेषां
भावः पारिमाण्डल्यं वर्तुलत्वं परमाणुपरिमाणमेव वा, अनुशक्तिकादित्वाद् उभयपदबुद्धिः ।
प्रतिक्षणं प्रतिसमयं विवर्तः परिणमनं स तथा, परमाणूनां पारिमाण्डल्यप्रतिक्षणविवर्तौ,
तथा न लक्षितौ परमाणुपारिमाण्डल्यप्रतिक्षणविवर्तौ यस्य स्वलक्षणस्य तत् । स्थिरस्थूरादीति ।
आदिशब्दात् पृथुबुद्धोदराद्याकारो गृह्यते । तदप्रकाशने स्थिरस्थूराद्यात्मकवस्त्वप्रकाशने ।
बहिर्मुखेति । बहिर्वाह्यवस्तुविषये मुखमारम्भः प्रकाशनप्रवृत्तिस्य तत्तथा बाह्यवस्त्वभि-
मुखमित्यर्थः । एवमन्तर्मुखेत्यप्युक्तानुसारतो व्याख्येयम्, आदिशब्दात् प्रमाणाप्रमाणादिपरि-
ग्रहः । नानादेशेत्यादि । उपरक्तं विशेषितं एकं संवेदनमिति संबन्धः । अन्यथेति । नानाकारो-

तया सितपीतादिषु ज्ञानस्य बोधरूपेणैवाविशिष्टत्वात् । तदेवं बहिरन्तश्चैकानेकरूपत्वे प्रमाणतः स्थिते स्वलक्षणस्यान्यथा स्वाभ्युपेतदर्शन व्यवस्थायोगाद् नार्थवाद्यनेकान्तप्रकाशं प्रतिक्षेप्तुमर्हति ॥

तथोररोक्तयोगाचारमतमपि बलादनेकान्तप्रकाशरञ्जुरावेष्टयति, एकस्यापि ज्ञानस्यानेकवेद्यवेदकाकारतया प्रथनोपगतेः । एक योगक्षेमत्वात् तदैक्यमिति चेन्न, युगपद्बुद्धयप्रलयवतां सहवेदिनां सकलसंतानानामेकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । संवृति-दक्षितत्वादानेकत्वस्य न तेन स्वसंवेदनसाक्षात्कृतपारमार्थिकैवत्वक्षतिरिति चेन्न, ब्रह्मवादिमताप्रतिषेधप्रसक्तेः । यतोऽनाद्यविद्याबलादेकमक्रमं सचेतनं स्वसंवेदनसाक्षात्कृतमपि ब्रह्मानेकं क्रमवत् चेतनाचेतनं परोक्षापरोक्षं लक्ष्यते, भवत्परिकल्पितग्राह्यग्राहकाकारविविक्तसंवेदनवदिति तेनापि न दुरुपपादम् । अस्तु चायमनेकान्तावभासो भ्रान्तस्तथापि संवेदनस्याद्वयता न लक्ष्यते, तल्लक्षणे सकलासुमतामधुनैव मुक्तावाप्तेः, लक्ष्यते च तत्कथंचित्, इतरथा सुषुप्तदशावत् सर्वव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गान्, इत्येकस्यापि संवेदनस्य लक्षितालक्षितत्वेनानेकान्तप्रतिभासो दुःशकोऽपह्नोतुमिति ज्ञानवाद्यप्यस्य हेतोरसिद्धताविर्भावनं प्रति तूष्णीमासीत् ॥

शून्यवादिनः समस्ताभावादसिद्धोऽनेकान्तप्रकाश इति चेन्न, तस्यापि

परक्तभावे । अभिन्नयोगक्षेमत्वादिति । प्राग्बद्धावनीयम् । तद्विपर्ययादिति । भिन्नकाल-भावितात् । तत्सामर्थ्यादित्यादि । तेषां संविदन्तनिविष्टाकारणां सितपीतादीनां सामर्थ्यम्, तेन व्यवस्थाप्यो योऽर्थस्तस्यैक्यप्रसङ्गात् । तदेकतया आकारस्यामेकतया, सितपीतादिवस्तु-विषयिणो ज्ञानस्य बोधरूपेणैव वा विशिष्टत्वात्, बोधस्वरूपतैव ज्ञानस्योद्धारिता, न पुनः सितपीताद्यो बहिरर्थव्यवस्थापकाः केचिदाकाराः । क्वापि बोधरूपेणैवाविशिष्टत्वात् इति पाठः, तदैवं व्याख्या—यथा बहुष्वपि सितपीतादिषु वस्तुषु ज्ञानस्य बोधरूपेणाविशिष्टत्वं समानत्वम्, तथा सितपीताद्याकारणामेकतयापीत्यर्थः । अयमभिप्रायः—यदैकज्ञानान्तर्वर्तिनां नानादेशव्यवस्थितार्थप्रभवानां बहूनामप्याकारणामेकत्वम्, तदा तदेकाकारज्ञानव्यवस्थाप्यस्य बहिर्वस्तुस्तोमस्याप्येकत्वं स्यात्; एकनीलाकारज्ञानव्यवस्थाप्यबहिर्नीलस्वलक्षण एकत्ववत् । बहिरन्तश्चेत्यादि । प्रमाणत एकानेकरूपत्वे स्वलक्षणस्य व्यवस्थे इति संबन्धः । यथा च वृक्षादिवस्तुनां संनिहितानसंनिहितार्थां स्पष्टास्पष्टप्रतिभासजनकत्वेन स्वलक्षणत्वम्, यस्यार्थस्य संनिधानासंनिधानार्थां ज्ञानप्रतिभासभेदः तत् स्वलक्षणमिति तल्लक्षणात्, तथातः-संवेदनस्यापि । तथा हि—स्मर्यमाणसंवेदनमसंनिहितत्वादस्फुटं प्रतिभाति, अनुभूयमानं तु संनिहितत्वात् स्फुटम्; यदा परसंतानवति संवेदनमसंनिहितत्वादस्फुटम्, स्वसंतानवति तु संनिहितत्वात् स्फुटम्, तस्मादन्तःसंवेदनस्यापि तल्लक्षणलक्षितत्वात् स्वलक्षणत्वमिति । योगाचारेति योजनं योगः, ज्ञानाकारयोः संबन्धः, तमाचरन्ति व्यवहरन्ति इति कर्मण्यण् इति ऋण् साकारज्ञानमात्रवादिन इत्यर्थः, योगः समाधिः साकारज्ञानमात्रैकाग्रता, तमाचरन्ति इति वा, पूर्ववत् ऋण् । ब्रह्मेति ज्ञानाद्वैतमिति । न तेनापि दुरुपपादमिति । एतत् कर्मता-पन्नं तेनापि ब्रह्मवादिना न दुःखेनोपपाद्यते, किंतु सूत्रपादं—सुखेनैव घटयितुं शक्यमित्यर्थः । मुक्तावाप्तेरिति तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिमुक्तिः इति मुक्तिलक्षणाभिधानात्, तत्त्वं च ज्ञानाद्वैतमेवेति

प्रमाणप्रमेयाभावेन सर्वाभावावेदनं समस्ति, अन्यथाप्रमाणकं सर्वं सर्वत्र विद्यते इति परस्यापि वदतो न वदनभङ्गः स्यात्, तदभ्युपगमेऽभ्युपगमक्षतिः । तयोश्च दर्शितवदनेकान्तप्रकाश इति नासिद्धो हेतुः । महमरीचिकानिचयचुम्बिनि संवेदने जलोल्लेखेऽपि तद्गोचरत्वाभ्युपगमाभावादनैकान्तिकोऽयमिति मा शङ्किष्ठाः, तस्य भ्रान्तत्वात्, अभ्रान्तः प्रकाशो हि तदभ्युपगतिहेतुः । अथायमपि इतरेतर-विनिर्लुठितपरमाणुक्षणक्षयिवोधेन वाध्यमानत्वात् भ्रान्त इत्याचक्षीथाः, तदयुक्तम्, यतस्तद्वोधः किमुपलब्धिमात्रम् यद्वा निर्णयो वा । यद्याद्यः कल्पः, तदानुमानं विशीर्येत, निर्गोचरत्वात्, प्राथमकल्पिकेनैव निर्विकल्पकविविक्तदर्शनेन विरोध-भीरुतया सर्वथा वस्तुग्रहणाभ्युपगमात्, प्रमाणकलिते च मानान्तरवैयर्थ्यादन-वस्थाप्राप्तेः । अथ द्वितीयः, तथा सति सर्वं निर्विकल्पकमप्रमाणतामश्नुवीत । न च निर्णयोऽनेकान्तप्रकाशं वाधते, अपि तु समर्थयते, बहिरन्तश्च तथैव तद्विजृम्भणात् । अथ सर्वथा वस्तुग्रहणेऽपि निर्विकल्पकं यत्रांशे पाश्चात्यं व्यवहारकारिव्यवसायमुपजनयति, तत्रैव प्रमाणतामास्कन्दति नान्यत्रेति मन्येथाः, तथा सति यदनन्तरमर्थक्रियासमर्थार्थप्रार्थनया पुरुषः प्रवर्तते स एव निर्णयः प्रामाण्यं स्वीकुर्यान्न निर्विकल्पकम्, तज्जनकत्वेऽपि संनिकर्षादिवदित्यासज्येत । निर्विकल्पकमनधिगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वात् प्रमाणं न व्यवसितिः तद्विकल्पत्वादिति चेन्न, अनुमितेरपि तद्वदप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । न च विपरोताकारनिराकरणचतुरतयानु-मितिर्विशेषवती, निर्णयितेरपि तदपनोददक्षत्वादसमारोपविषयेऽप्रवृत्तेः । त्रिरूप-

तेषामभिप्रायः । तस्यापीति सूत्रवादिनः परस्यापि सांख्यस्य । तदभ्युपगमे प्रमाणप्रमेययो-रङ्गीकारे । तदभ्युपगतिहेतुरिति । प्रतिभासमानार्थगोचरत्वाङ्गीकारणमनुमानमिति क्षणिक-कत्वसाधकम् । प्राथमकल्पिकेनैवेति । कल्पः पक्षः, प्रथमपक्षासी कल्पश्च, तत्र भवः प्राथम-कल्पिकः तेन, प्रथमपक्षाभिहितेनेत्यर्थः, ग्रध्यात्मादेः इति ठञ् । विरोधभीरुतयेति । न ह्यकस्य वस्तुनो नीलत्वादि गृह्यते । न पुनः क्षणिकत्वादीति भावः । अप्रमाणतामिति । सदृशापरापरविप्रलम्भेन दृश्यविकल्पयोरैक्याध्यवसायाद्विकल्पाः क्षणिकतां न गृह्णन्तीति तद्विषयं वस्तुब्रजप्रभवं निर्विकल्पमिति भवता पर्यंकल्पि । यदि चाधुना निर्णयेन क्षणक्षयिणः परमाणवो गृह्यन्ते इत्यभ्युपगमः, ततो न किञ्चिन्निर्विकल्पिकेनेति भावः । समर्थयते इति । ‘अर्थ उपयाञ्चाम्’ चुरादावात्मनेपदी, यदि तु बहुषु पुस्तकेषु समर्थयतीति पाठः, तदैवं गमनिका—समर्थनं समर्थः तं करोति इत्, अनेकान्तप्रकाशस्य समर्थनां करोतीत्यर्थः । अथवा चर्च कचि एजू आजू दीप्ती इत्यात्मनेपदिषु पठित्वा पुनः आजद् भ्रासद् भ्रासु दीप्ती इति आत्मनेपदिषु आजं पठन् अन्येषामात्मनेपदिनां धातूनामात्मनेपदं शिष्ट-प्रयोगानुसारेण वचिचरतीति दर्शयति, तेन लभति लभते, सेवति सेवते, समर्थयति समर्थयते । श्रोतारमुपलभति न प्रशंसितारम् । स्वाधीने विभवेऽप्यहो नरपति सेवन्ति कि मानिनः । इत्यादयः साधव इति स्थितम् । अथेत्यादिना प्राच्यविकल्पमेवाङ्गीकुर्वन्नाह— तज्जनकत्वे इति । निर्णयजनकत्वे संनिकर्षादिवद् इति । यथा प्रमाणभूतज्ञानजनकोऽपि संनिकर्षो न प्रमाणम्, देहादिभिरतिप्रसङ्गात्, तथा निर्विकल्पकमपीत्यर्थः । असमारोप-विषयेऽप्रवृत्तेरिति । यत्रैव किञ्चिद्विपरीतमारोपितं भवति, तत्रैव तदपनोदद्वारेण निर्णय-

लिङ्गजतया विशेषोऽनुमितेर्मानतासाधक इति चेत्, साक्षादनुभवादुत्पादस्तर्हि निर्णीतेर्महापराध इति भवतो बालतामीक्षामहे । किं च, यथा निर्विकल्पकमलक्षितं सकलव्यावृत्तस्वलक्षणग्रहणप्रवणमपि कतिचिदंशविषयं विकल्पमुत्थापयति, तथार्थ एवेन्द्रियालोकादिसंनिवृष्टतया कतिचिन्निजांशविषयं साक्षाद् विशदविकल्पं जनयेदिति किमजागलस्तनकल्पनिर्विकल्पकल्पनया ? तावन्तोऽशा बहिरर्थे विरुध्यन्ते इति चेत्, पाटवापाटवादयो दर्शनेऽप्येकस्मिन् न विरुध्यन्ते इति किं राज्ञामाज्ञा ? तस्मान्न क्षणक्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणस्वलक्षणलक्षकं क्वचित् कदाचिद्दर्शनं लक्षयन्ति, भवन्तोऽपि केवलं स्वदर्शनानुरक्तान्तःकरणतया न तदसत्तां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । स्वांशव्यापिनं कालान्तरानुयायिनमेकं बहिरन्तश्चार्थं बोधं च प्रकाशयन् प्रथमानो निर्णयः न पुनर्निमूलकैः कुयुक्तिविकल्पैर्वाध्यते इति न भ्रान्तः । किं चास्य भ्रान्ततां कथयन् सर्वप्राणप्रमेयव्यवस्थामुन्मूलयति । तथा हि—यत्सत्त्वबोधरूपत्वसुखत्वादिषु प्रमाणं तदेव क्षणक्षयित्वस्वर्गप्रापणशक्तियुक्तत्वादिषु अप्रमाणम्, तथा यद्वस्तु नीलचतुरस्रोर्ध्वतादिरूपतया प्रमेयं तदेव मध्यभागक्षणविवर्तादिनाप्रमेयम्, तथा यद् बहिरर्थापेक्षया सविकल्पकं स्वप्नादिदर्शनं वा भ्रान्तं तदेवस्वरूपापेक्षया भ्रान्तम्, तथा यन्निशीथिनीनाथद्वयादिकं द्वित्वेऽलीकं तदपि धवलतानियतदेश-चारितादावनलीकमिति निर्णयः । यदि तु विरोधाद् विभ्यद्भिर्भवद्भिरयमपहनूयते, किमपरमैकान्तिकं प्रमाणं प्रमेयं चोररीकृत्य स्वाकूतं प्रतिष्ठापयेयुरिति सकौतुकं नश्चेतः । अथ ज्ञानवादी अद्वैतप्रकाशमलक्षितमभ्युपेत्य तेन बाहुविध्यं दधानो बोधो बाध्यमानत्वात् भ्रान्त इत्यभिदद्यात्, तदयुक्तम्, दृष्टहान्यदृष्टपरिकल्पना-

स्यापि प्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः । तथा चागमे—किमयं स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति ईहानन्तरमेव पुरुष एवायमित्यप्रायाभिधानः । अत एव क्षमाश्रमणोऽपि—अब्रमस्थेऽवाश्रो चिचय कस्थइ लखिज्जइ इमो पुरिसो इति पूर्वंपक्षयित्वा—

उपपलदससयवेहो व्व दुव्विभावत्तणेण पडिहाइ ।

समयं व सुक्कसक्कुलिडसणे विसयाणमुदलद्धो ॥

(विशे० भा० २९८-२९९)

इति परिहृतवान् । कतिचिदंशविषयमिति । नीलादिविषयम्, क्षणिकादिविषयम् । तावन्तोऽशा इति । नीलत्वाक्षणिकत्वचतुरस्रत्वोर्ध्वत्वादयो विरुध्यन्ते इति निरंशैकस्वभावत्वाद् वस्तुनः । पाटवापाटवादय इत्यादि । समाधानार्थस्तु तर्हि निर्विकल्पदर्शनस्यापि नीलादिविकल्पं जनयतो नीलादिविकल्पजनने पाटवम्, क्षणिकत्वादिविकल्पं चाजनयतस्तत्रापाटवम् । आदिशब्दात्तु बोधरूपत्वनिर्विकल्पत्वाभ्रान्तत्वादयो धर्मा गृह्यन्ते । ते च पाटवादयः परस्परविरुद्धाः, नैकत्रदर्शने संभवन्ति इति दर्शनस्यापि न विकल्पजनकत्वमित्यभिप्रायः । यदिति संवेदनम् । सत्त्वबोधरूपत्वसुखत्वादिषु प्रमाणमिति । यथासंभवमन्तर्बहिर्गतानां सत्त्वादीनां तस्यैव संवेदनस्य विकल्पोत्थापनद्वारेण व्यवस्थापकत्वात्, यद्यस्य व्यवस्थापने हेतुस्तत्र प्रमाणमिति हि प्रमाणस्थितिः । आदिशब्दान्नीलत्वादिग्रहः । अप्रमाणमिति । क्षण-क्षयित्वादिविषये विकल्पोत्थापनाभावात् । तथा च तत्सिद्धान्तः—यत्रैव जनयेदेनां तत्रैवास्य प्रमाणाता इति ।

प्रसङ्गात्, अलक्षितनिर्विकल्पदर्शनस्य च प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तत्वात् । अथ युक्तिबोधस्य वैविध्यं बाधेत, तथा हि—भ्रान्ताभ्रान्तसंवेदनविवेकस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्, संविन्मात्रस्य तु सर्वत्राव्यभिचारित्वाद् अद्वयं संवेदनं विविक्तयुक्त्या प्रकाशमानमनादिकालालीनवासनासमुपजनितसंवृतिदर्शितसत्ताकं सितासितादिविविधप्रतिभासं निराकुरुते । अत्र प्रतिविदधमहे—किमयमनेकाकारो बोधोऽद्वयसंवेदनाद् व्यत्यरैक्षीद् वा न वा, किं चातो यदि व्यभैत्सीत्, कथमदृष्टतत्कार्यत्वे व्यतिरिक्तोऽयं तदद्वयसंवेदनमनुमापयेत् । अव्यतिरेकपक्षे पुनरनेकः सन् एकसंवेदनतादात्म्येन प्रथमानः कथमद्वैतं नोद्दलयेत् । अथ संवृतिदर्शितत्वादलीकतया अस्य सितासिताद्याकारबहिर्मुखकालुष्यस्य बोधेन तात्त्विकेन सह भेदाभेदविकल्पानुपपत्तिरिति ब्रूषे; तथा सति परो बोधस्यापारमार्थिकत्वं अविद्यादर्शितत्वात्, अर्थसत्तायाः पुनस्तत्त्वरूपता, सर्वत्राव्यभिचारादिति ब्रुवाणो दुर्निवारः स्यात् । जडस्य प्रकाशयोगात् संवित्तिः सत्या, नार्थ इति चेत्, एकस्यानेकतावभासाभावादानेकान्तः सत्यः, नाद्वैतमिति प्रतिजानीमहे । संवृत्याद्वयस्यापि नानाप्रतिभासोऽविद्वद् इति चेत्, अनाद्यविद्यावलाज्जडस्यापि चेतनतया प्रकाशो न विरुद्ध इति परस्यापि शठोत्तरं नातिदुर्लभं भवेत् । किं च नानाकारकलुषितचैतन्यसामान्यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिसामर्थ्यतस्तस्य सिद्धत्वादद्वयसंवेदनमसिद्धं साधयेदयम्, अन्यथा निर्बन्धनतया साधनस्याप्रवृत्तेः, तथा च स्थिरस्थूराद्युपलक्षितार्थाश्वशाद् विशकलितपरमाणुक्षणक्षयिपर्यायतादात्म्यं साधयन्तमनेकान्तवादिनं न प्रतिक्षेप्तुमर्हति, युक्तेरुभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् । किं च, योऽयं सितपीताद्यनेकाकारनिर्णयोऽसावपि स्वसंवेदनापेक्षयाद्वयरूप इति भवदभिप्रायः, यथा चानवस्थाभीस्तया सर्वं ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमभ्युपेतम्, तथा सर्वो निश्चयः स्वनिश्चाय-

स्थप्नादीति । आदिशब्दात् जाग्रदेशभाविनो मरीचिकादौ जलादिज्ञानस्य परिग्रहः । अयमिति अनेकान्तप्रकाशः । कथमदृष्टेत्यादि । तस्याद्वयसंवेदनस्य कार्यं तत्कार्यम्, तस्वभावः तत्कार्यत्वम्, न दृष्टं तत्कार्यत्वं यस्य स तथा, अयमनेकाकारो बोधः । अयमभिप्रायः—भवदाशयेनायमनेकाकारो बोधः, एकस्यानेकधर्मत्वायोगाद् बाधित एव; परमसौ बाधितोऽयनेकाकारो बोधोऽद्वयं न भवति । अद्वयमनुमापयेद् यद्यद्वयस्य कार्यं स्यात् । अद्वैतमिति । द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यामितं स्थितं द्वौ वा प्रकारावितं प्राप्तं द्वीतम्; ततः प्रजादेराकृतिगणत्वात् अणु, यदि वा द्वयोर्भावो द्विता ततः पूर्ववत् स्वार्थे अणि 'प्रकृतेलिङ्गवचने बाधन्ते स्वाधिकाः क्वचित्'—इति वचनाद् नपुंसकत्वं, ततो नञ्समाप्तः । अस्येति । अनेकाकारबोधस्य । सितासिताद्याकारबहिर्मुखकालुष्यस्येति । सितासितादय आकारा यस्य तत्तथा, सितासिताद्याकारबहिर्मुखं कालुष्यं मालिन्यं यस्य तस्य । नानाकारकलुषितेत्यादि । अयं ज्ञानाद्वैतवादी नानाकारकलुषितचैतन्यसामान्यस्याद्वयसंवेदानान्यथानुपत्तिसामर्थ्यतोऽप्रसिद्धं सदद्वयसंवेदनं साधयेत्, न चाद्वयज्ञानवादिनो नानाकारकलुषितस्य चैतन्यसामान्यस्य हेतुतयाभिधीयमानस्याद्वैत्वेन तदसिद्धम्, यदसिद्धेन साध्यते इति दोषः, यत आह तस्य सिद्धत्वादिति । यद्यपि नानाकारा अलीकास्तथापि नीलपीतादिज्ञानेष्वनुगतं चैतन्यमात्रं सिद्धमेव, आकारालीकत्वादेव च न नानाकारकलुषितमित्युक्तम् । अन्यथेति । तदा नानाकारकलुषितं चैतन्यसामान्यं सिद्धं नाभ्युपगम्यते, तदा निर्हेतुकतया द्वयविज्ञानसाधकमनुमानं

कोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, अन्यथा तत्राप्यनवस्थादोषोऽनुषज्येत, निश्चयाश्च सर्वथा स्वरूपं निश्चिन्नुयुः, नैकदेशेन, यतो निश्चयैर्यत्र निश्चीयते रूपं तत्तेषां विषयः कथमिति स्वयमेव स्ववधाय प्रलपितम्, तथा चाद्वयस्य क्षणक्षयिरूपस्य तैर्ग्रहणे विपरीतारोपाभावादादित एव अनुत्थानं संसारस्येति युक्तिरिक्त एवामुक्ताभिमानः स्यात् । न चैवम्, भवभावस्य प्रतिप्राणिप्रसिद्धत्वात् । तत्रायमितरेतराविर्निर्लुठितद्रव्यपर्यायप्रकाशो भ्रान्तः, तद्विपरीतार्थोपस्थापकप्रमाणान्तराभावादिति स्थितम् । यदा तु शून्यवादी निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः प्रत्ययत्वात् स्वप्नप्रत्ययवदिति पराभिप्रायप्रवृत्तानुमानवलाद् भ्रान्ततामस्य कथयेत्, तदा तं प्रति सालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्ययाः प्रत्ययत्वात् जाग्रद्दशाप्रत्ययवदिति विपरीतानुमानमुपढौकनीयम् । स यदि दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यविकलतामुद्भावयेत्, तदा तद्दृष्टान्तेऽपि सा दर्शनीया । यदि पुनरसौ स्वप्नप्रत्ययस्य निरालम्बनत्वं भवद्विरभिप्रेतमिति विलपन्नासितुं न दद्यात्, तदा स विकल्पतः पर्यनुयोज्यः—अस्मदभ्युपगमः प्रमाणं भवतोऽप्रमाणं वा; प्रमाणं चेत्, यथा तद्बलाद् दृष्टान्तसमर्थनं तथा जाग्रत्प्रत्ययगोचरार्थसमर्थनमपि किं न कुरुषे, कोऽयमर्धजरतीयन्यायः । अथाप्रमाणम्, एवं सति स्वप्नप्रत्ययनिरालम्बनतासाधकं प्रमाणान्तरं मृगणीयम्, किमनेन कुशकाशावलम्बनेन । तत्रापि प्रमाणान्तरे विकल्पयुगलममलमवतरति, तत् किं निरालम्बनम्, सालम्बनं वा; निरालम्बनं चेत्, नान्यप्रत्ययस्य निरालम्बनतां गदितुं पटिष्ठं निर्गोचरत्वात् । अथ सालम्बनम्, हन्त हतोऽसि, निरालम्बनाः सर्वे प्रत्यया इति प्रतिज्ञातक्षतेः, अनेनैव व्यभिचारादिति शठः प्रतिशठाचरणेन निर्लोठनीयः । तन्नास्यानैकान्तिकत्वम् । विरुद्धताशङ्का पुनर्दूरापास्तप्रसरैव, प्रमाणप्रकाशितेऽर्थे सर्ववादिनां तथाभ्युपगमाविगानादिति । अनेन संशयविरोधानवस्थावैयधिकरण्यासंभवादिदूषणानि निर्मूलकमिथ्याविकल्पोत्थापितानि प्रतिभासमुद्गरनिपातनिर्दलितमस्तकत्वान्न जीवितुमुत्सहन्ते इति । तस्मादसिद्धतादिदोषादिना कृतोऽयं तथाप्रतिभासलक्षणो हेतुरनेकान्तगोचरतां प्रमाणस्य परानभ्युपगमयति, इत्यत्र विस्तरेण । तस्मात्तस्यैव तत्र प्रतिभासनात् सर्वसंविदामनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचर इति स्थितम् ।

प्रवर्तेत । किं चेत्यादि । अयमभिप्रायः किल—सितपीताद्यनेकाकारनिर्णयः स्वसंवेदनापेक्षया भवदभिप्रायेणाद्वयरूपः, अनवस्थाभयाच्च स्वयं निर्णयेन स्वरूपं निर्णेतव्यम् तदपि सर्वथा, अन्यथा सितपीतादिनिर्णयेन यत् सितपीतादिनिर्णयरूपं स्वरूपं न निर्णीयते, अद्वयात्मकमपि तदात्मना तत् स्वरूपं तस्य निर्णयस्य विषयः कथम् ? नैव स्यादित्यर्थः । एवं चाद्वये गृहीते अनेकाकारारोपाभावादानुत्थानं संसारस्येति । पराभिप्रायेति । परोभ्युपगतानुमानो जैनादिः । अनेनेति । प्रमाणनिर्णयिऽविस्वादेन । संशयविरोधानवस्थावैयधिकरण्यासंभवादिति । नित्यानित्याद्यनेकधर्मकत्वे वस्तुनोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नित्यवस्तुनोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने नित्यमिदं वस्त्वनित्यं चेत्येकस्यावधारणद्वारेण निर्णीतेरभावात् संशयः । तथा यदेव वस्तु नित्यं तदेवानित्यमिति विरोधः, नित्यानित्ययोः परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात् । यदि पुनर्नित्यमनिश्चयात्मना, अनित्यं नित्यरूपतया व्यवस्थितं स्यात्; तदा नित्यानित्यत्वयोरविशेषात् प्रतिनियतव्यवहारोच्छेदः । तथा येनांशेन नित्यं तेनांशेन किं नित्यमेव, आहोस्वित् तेनाप्यंशेन नित्यमनित्यं वेति । तत्राद्य-

अयं च यथावस्थितप्रमाणव्यापारपर्यालोचकप्रमात्रभिप्रायेण प्रमाणगोचरो दर्शितः । नयस्तर्हि किंभूतं मन्यते इति वचनावकाशे सत्याह—'एक' इत्यादि । अनन्तधर्माध्यासितं वस्तु स्वाभिप्रेतैकधर्मविशिष्टं नयति प्रापयति संवेदन-मारोहयतीति नयः, प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकालभावी परामर्श इत्यर्थः । तस्य विषयो गोचरोऽभिमतः अभिप्रेतैकदेशेनानित्यत्वादिधर्मलक्षणो विशिष्टः पररूपेभ्यो व्यवच्छिन्न इत्यर्थः । अर्थः प्रमेयरूपः, प्रमाणमेवंविधमेवार्थं गृह्णाति—इति स्वाकूतेन तेन व्यवस्थापनादिति । अथ चाप्रमाणविषयां लक्षणसंख्यागोचरफल-रूपां चतुर्विधां विप्रतिपत्तिं निराकृत्य अत्रैव नयगोचरं निरूपयन्नाह—एकेत्यादि । ननु चादिवाक्यतः प्रमाणव्युत्पादनमात्रं प्रतिज्ञातं तत् किमयमप्रस्तुतोऽत्र नयगोचरः प्रतिपाद्यते इति । सत्यम्, एवं मन्यते—न नयः प्रमाणादत्यन्तं दूरयायी, किं तर्हि तदंशभूत एव, नयसमुदायसंपाद्यत्वात् प्रमाणस्य, अतस्तद्व्युत्पादन-प्रतिज्ञातेऽसावपि तन्मध्यपतितस्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते इति न्यायाद् गृहीत एव, तन्नायमप्रस्तुत इति । अत्रापि पदार्थस्त्वेक एव, केवलं वाक्यार्थभेदः । तथा हि—इहैवं घटना । नयस्य विषय एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो भवति नीतिविदामिति । ननु च यदि नयस्य प्रमाणात्तःपातित्वेऽपि पृथग् गोचरः प्रतिपाद्यते, ततः प्रमाणवदेतद्-विषया लक्षणादिविप्रतिपत्तिरपि निराकर्तव्या । सत्यम्, किं तु न परेषां नयव्यवहारः प्रसिद्धः, अतो धर्मिणोऽभावात् तद्गोचरा विप्रतिपत्तिरस्त्येव । न च ते तेन तत्त्वं प्रतिपादनीयाः, तत्त्वप्रतिपादने प्रमाणस्यैव व्यापारात्, नयस्य पुनरेकदेश-निष्ठत्वेन तत्प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्यविकलत्वात्, अत एवाचार्यस्य न तल्लक्षणादि-

पक्षे घनेकान्तक्षतिः । द्वितीयपक्षे पुनरपि येनांशेन नित्यं तेनांशेन किं नित्यमेव, आहोस्वित् तेनापि नित्यमनित्यं वेति अनवस्था । एवमनित्यपक्षेऽपि सर्वमेतद् भावनीयम् । तथा भिन्न-प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तयोः शब्दयोरेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यम् । यथा नीलोत्पलमित्यत्र एकस्मिन् उत्पलद्रव्ये नीलशुणं निमित्तीकृत्य नीलशब्दः प्रवर्तते, उत्पलत्वजार्ति चाश्वित्योत्प-लशब्दः, ततो भवति नीलोत्पलशब्दयोर्भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तयोरेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तत्वात् सामानाधि-करण्यम् । अत्र तु नित्यत्वानित्यत्वादिधर्माणां द्रव्यादभेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने यदेव नीलधर्मात्मकं वस्तु नीलशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तदेव सदृशपरिणामलक्षणोत्पलत्वजात्यात्मकत्वमुत्पलशब्दस्यापि प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । तन्नानेकान्ताभ्युपगमेऽभिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यलक्षणं घटते, तदभावाच्च वैयधिकरण्यमिति । तथासंभवोऽपि, संशयविरोधाद्युक्तयुक्तेः, एकस्य वस्तुनो नित्यानित्याद्यनेकधर्मालिङ्गितत्वाभावात्, अतो न नित्यमनित्यं च तदेव वस्तु भवति इति । आदिशब्दात् प्रत्यक्षादिबाधापरिग्रहः ।

प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेरुत्तरकालभावीति । प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन यथावस्थितवस्तुस्वरूपग्रहणाद-नन्तरमिदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमित्यादिस्वाशयेन वस्त्वंशपरामर्श इत्यर्थः । एवंविधमेवेत्यादि । नयदुर्नययोः किञ्चित् साम्यादिभेदेनैव लक्षणाभिधानादेवमाह । यद्वा 'गृह्णात्येव' इत्यत्र एवशब्दो द्रष्टव्यः । केवलं वाक्यार्थभेद इति । तथा हि—पूर्वस्मिन् वाक्यार्थे नयस्य कर्तृभू-तस्यैकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो विषयो भवति, अस्मिन्स्तु वाक्यार्थे नयस्य संबन्धी विषयो नीतिविदां कर्तृभूतानामेवविधोऽभिप्रेत इति स्पष्टो वाक्यार्थभेदः ।

स्वरूपकथनेऽपि महानादरः । गोचरं पुनर्हेयपक्षे काक्वा प्रक्षिपन् साक्षात् प्रति-
पादयति—मा भूत् स्वदर्शनान्तःपातिनां मन्दबुद्धीनां प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नेऽप्यनेकान्तात्मके
वस्तुन्येकदेशसमर्थनाभिनिवेशलक्षणः कदाग्रह इति । अथवा स्वदर्शनान्तःपातिनः
प्रति अनेनैव गोचरकथनेनोपलक्षणत्वाल्लक्षणादीन्यपि लक्षयति । तत्र
प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नार्थकदेशपरामर्शो नय इति लक्षणम्, सर्वनयविशेषानुधायित्वात्पर-
रूपव्यावर्तनक्षमत्वाच्चास्य । संख्यया पुनरनन्ता इति, अनन्तधर्मत्वाद्वावस्तुनः,
तदेकदेशधर्मपर्यायावसिताभिप्रायाणां च नयत्वात्, तथापि चिरंतनाचार्यैः सर्व-
संग्राहिसत्ताभिप्रायपरिकल्पनाद्वारेण सप्त नयाः प्रतिपादिताः । तद्यथा—नैगम-
संग्रहव्यवहारजुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवंभूता नयाः इति । अतोऽस्माभिरपि ते एव
वर्ण्यन्ते । कथमेते सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहकाः इति चेत्, उच्यते । अभिप्रायस्ताव-
दर्थद्वारेण शब्दद्वारेण वा प्रवर्तते, गत्यन्तराभावात्, अर्थश्च सामान्यरूपो
विशेषरूपो वा, शब्दोऽपि रूढितो व्युत्पत्तितश्च, व्युत्पत्तिरपि सामान्यनिमित्त
प्रयुक्ता तत्कालभाविनिमित्तप्रयुक्ता वा स्यात् । तत्र ये केचनार्थनिरूपणप्रवणाः
प्रमात्रभिप्रायास्ते सर्वेऽप्याद्ये नयचतुष्टयेऽन्तर्भवन्ति, तत्रापि ये परस्परविश-
कलितौ सामान्यविशेषाविच्छन्ति तत्समुदायरूपो नैगमः । ये पुनः केवलं
सामान्यं वाञ्छन्ति तत्समूहसंपाद्यः संग्रहः । ये पुनरनपेक्षितशास्त्रोपसामान्य-
विशेषं लोकव्यवहारमवतरन्तं घटादिकं पदार्थमभिप्रेयन्ति तन्नियजन्यो व्यव-
हारः । ये सौगतास्तु क्षणक्षयिणः परमाणुलक्षणा विशेषाः सत्या इति मन्यन्ते,
तत्संघातघटित ऋजुसूत्र इति । तथा ये मीमांसकाः रूढितः शब्दानां प्रवृत्ति
वाञ्छन्ति तन्नियवहसाध्यः शब्द इति । ये तु व्युत्पत्तितो ध्वनीनां प्रवृत्ति
वाञ्छन्ति नान्यथा, तद्द्वारजन्यः समभिरूढ इति । ये तु वर्तमानकालभाविव्यु-
त्पत्तिनिमित्तमधिकृत्य शब्दाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथेति मन्यन्ते, तत्संघटितः खल्वेवंभूत
इति । तदेवं न स कश्चन विकल्पोऽस्ति वस्तुगोचरो योऽत्र नयसप्तके नान्तर्यातीति
सर्वाभिप्रायसंग्राहका एते इति स्थितम् ।

सांप्रतमेधामेव प्रत्येकं मतमुपवर्णयामः—तत्र गमनं गमः परिच्छेद इत्यर्थः,
निश्चितो गमः निगमः विविक्तवस्तुग्रहणं, स एव प्रज्ञादेराकृतिगणतया स्वधिकान्-
प्रत्ययविधानाद् नैगमः । यदि वा, निगम्यन्ते नियतं परिच्छिद्यन्ते इति निगमाः
अर्थास्तेषु भवोऽभिप्रायो नियत परिच्छेदरूपः स नैगम इति । अयं हि सत्तालक्षणं
महासामान्यमवान्तरसामान्यानि च द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनि, तथान्त्यान्
विशेषान् सकलासाधारणरूपलक्षणानवान्तरविशेषांश्चापेक्षया पररूपव्यावर्तन-

तत्समुदायरूपो नैगम इति । पूर्वं हि ये परस्परविशकलितौ सामान्यविशेषाविच्छन्ति
इति बहुवचनेन निर्देशे नैगमे इत्येकवचनान्तत्वात् नात्र सुश्लिष्टो वाक्यार्थः स्यादिति
तत्समुदायरूप इत्युक्तम् । एवं तत्समूहादिशब्देऽपि भावनीयम् ।

तथा ग्रन्थान् विशेषानिति । उत्पादविनाशयोरन्ते व्यवस्थितत्वाद् अन्तानि नित्य-
द्रव्याणि तत्र भवास्तात् । अयमर्थः—तुल्यरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शेषु परमाणुषु नित्यत्वात्पूर्तत्त्वसर्व-

क्षमान् सामान्यादत्यन्तविनिर्लुठितस्वरूपानभिप्रैति । तथा हि किल—संविनिष्ठाः पदार्थव्यवस्थितयः, न च सामान्यग्राहिणि विज्ञाने विशेषावभासोऽस्ति, अनुवर्तमानैकाकारपरामर्शेन तद्ग्रहणाद्, अन्यथा सामान्यग्राहकत्वायोगात्, नापि विशेषग्रहणादक्षे संवेदने सामान्यं चकास्ति, विशिष्टदेशदशावच्छिन्नपदार्थग्राहितया तत्प्रवृत्तेः, अन्यथा विशेषसंवेदनत्वायोगात् । न चेतौ परस्परविभिन्नावपि प्रतिभासमानौ सामान्यविशेषौ कथंचिन्मिश्रयितुं युक्तौ, अतिप्रसङ्गात्, विभिन्नप्रतिभासिनामपि निखिलार्थात्मनामैक्यप्राप्तेः । एवं च प्रमाणयति—परस्परविशिष्टौ सामान्यविशेषौ, पार्थक्येनोपलब्धेः, इह यद्यत् पार्थक्येनोपलभ्यते तत्तत् परस्परविशिष्टं द्रव्यम्, तद्यथा—देवदत्तयज्ञदत्ताविति, पार्थक्येन चोपलभ्येते सामान्यविशेषौ, अतः परस्परविभिन्नाविति । न सामान्यात् पृथग्विशेषोपलम्भ इति चेत्, कथं तर्हि तस्योपलम्भ इति वाच्यम्, सामान्यव्याप्तस्येति चेत्, न तर्हि स विशेषोपलम्भः, सामान्यस्यापि तेन ग्रहणात्, ततश्च तेन बोधेन विविक्तविशेषग्रहणाभावात् तद्वाचकं ध्वनिं तत्साध्यं च व्यवहारं न प्रवर्तयेत् प्रमाता, न चैतदस्ति, विशेषाभिधानव्यवहारयोः प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्, तस्माद्विशेषमभिलषता तत्र च व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयता तद्ग्राहको बोधो विविक्तोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । तथा सामान्यमपि विविक्तकारतया स्वग्राहिणि ज्ञाने यदि न प्रकाशेत, तदा तद्गोचराभिमतसंवेदनेन विशेषस्याप्याकलनात् सामान्याभिधानव्यवहारयोः प्रवृत्तेरुच्छेदस्तथैव वक्तव्यः, विविक्तसामान्यग्राहिबोधमूलकत्वात्तयोः, तदनिष्टौ तयोरप्यभावापत्तेः । न च सामान्यं विशेषं वा तिरस्कृत्य केवलस्य विशेषस्य सामान्यस्य वाभ्युपगमः कर्तुं युक्तः, द्वयोरपि स्वग्राहिज्ञाने प्रतिभासमानतया विशेषाभावात् । तस्मादेतौ द्वावपीतरेतरविशकलितावङ्गीकरणार्हाविति नैगमः ॥

अधुना संग्रहाभिप्रायो वर्ण्यते । तत्र संगृह्णाति अशेषविशेषतिरोधानद्वारेण सामान्यरूपतया जगदादत्ते इति संग्रहः । अयं हि मन्यते—भावलक्षणसामान्याद् व्यतिरिच्यमानमूर्तयो वा विशेषाः परिकल्प्येरन्, अव्यतिरिच्यमानमूर्तयो वा, गत्यन्तराभावात् । तत्र यद्याद्यः पक्षः, तदा निःस्वभावतां ते स्वीकुर्युः, भावव्यतिरेकित्वात्, गगनकुमुमादिवत् । अथ द्वितीयः कल्पः, तर्हि भावमात्रमापद्यन्ते । तथा

गतत्वादिभिस्तुल्येषु सर्वात्मसु चायमम्माद्विलक्षण इति यतो योगिनां प्रत्ययः स प्रतिपरमाणु प्रत्यात्म च विशेष इति ।

तयोरिति उभयत्रापि सामान्याभिधानव्यवहारयोः । तदनिष्टाविति । केवलसामान्यग्राहिबोधानिष्टौ । अत्र नैगमाभिप्रायसंग्रहश्लोकः—

अन्यदेव हि सामान्यमभिन्नज्ञानकारणम् ।

विशेषोऽप्यन्य एवेति मन्यते नैगमो नयः ॥

सामान्यरूपतया जगदादत्ते इति । सर्वमेकम्, सदविशेषादिति हि तत्सिद्धान्तः । प्रत्यक्षं हीति । यदाहुस्तद्वादिनः—

आहुविधात् प्रत्यक्षं न निषेद्धु विपश्चितः ।

नैकत्व आगमस्तेन प्रत्यक्षेण प्रबाध्यते ॥

हि—भावमात्रं विशेषाः । तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वाद्, इह यद्यतोऽव्यतिरिक्तं तत्तदेव भवति, तद्यथा भावस्यैव स्वरूपम्, अव्यतिरेकिणश्च विशेषाः, अतस्तद्रूपा एव । ननु च यदि भावमात्रमेव तत्त्वं तदा तस्य सर्वत्राविशेषाद् य एते प्रतिप्राणि प्रसिद्धाः स्तम्भेभकुम्भाम्भोरुहादिविशिष्टवस्तुसाध्या व्यवहारिणस्ते सर्वेऽपि प्रलयमापद्येरन्, अतो विशेषा अपि विविक्तव्यवहारहेतवोऽभ्युपगन्तव्याः । नैतदस्ति, व्यवहारस्याप्यनाद्यविद्याबलप्रवर्तितत्वात्, तेन पारमार्थिकप्रमाण-प्रतिष्ठितत्वप्रतिबन्धाभावात् । किं च विशेषाग्रहो विशेषेण त्याज्यः, विशेष-व्यवस्थापकप्रमाणाभावात् । तथा हि—भेदरूपा विशेषाः, न च किञ्चित्प्रमाणं भेदमवगाहते, प्रत्यक्षं हि तावद्भावसंपादितसत्ताकं तमेव साक्षात्कर्तुं युक्तं नाभावम्, तस्य सकलशक्तिविरहरूपतया तदुत्पादने व्यापाराभावात्, अनुत्पादकस्य च साक्षात्करणो सर्वसाक्षात्करणप्रसङ्गात्, तथा च विशेषाभावात् सर्वो द्रष्टा सर्वदर्शी स्यात्, अनिष्टं चैतद् भवताम्, तस्माद् भावग्राहकमेव तदेष्टव्यम् । स च भावः सर्वत्राविशिष्ट इति तथैव तेन ग्राह्यः, तदुत्तरकालभावी पुनर्विकल्पो 'घटोऽयं पटादिर्न भवति' इत्येवमाकारो व्यवहारं रचयन् अविद्यामूलत्वान्न प्रमाणम्, तन्न प्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषावगतिः । नाध्यनुमानादेः, प्रत्यक्षमूलकत्वाच्छेषप्रमाण-वर्गस्य, तस्मात् सामान्यमेव परमार्थो न विशेषा इति संग्रहः ॥

सांप्रतं व्यवहारमतमुच्यते—तत्र व्यवहरणं व्यवह्रियते वानेन लौकिकैर-भिप्रायेणेति व्यवहारः । अयं तु मन्यते—यथालोकग्राहमेव वस्त्वस्तु, किमनया-दृष्टाव्यवह्रियमाणवस्तुपरिकल्पनकष्टपिष्टिकया ? यदेव च लोकव्यवहारपथ-मवतरति तस्यानुग्राहकं प्रमाणमुपलभ्यते, नेतरस्य, न हि सामान्यमनादिनिधनमेकं संग्रहाभिमतं प्रमाणभूमिः, तथानुभवाभावात्, सर्वस्य सर्वदर्शित्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि विशेषाः परमाणलक्षणाः क्षणक्षयिणः प्रमाणगोचरः, तथा प्रवृत्तेरभावात् । तस्मादिदमेव निखिललोकावाधितं प्रमाणप्रसिद्धं कियत्कालभाविस्थूरतामा-विभ्राणमुदकाहरणाद्यर्थक्रियानिर्वर्तनक्षमं घटादिकं च वस्तुरूपं पारमार्थिकमस्तु, पूर्वोत्तरकालभावित्पर्यायपर्यालोचना पुनरज्यायसी, तत्र प्रमाणप्रसराभावात्, प्रमाणमन्तरेण च विचारस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्, अवस्तुत्वाच्च तेषां किं तद्गोचर-पर्यानोचनेन ? तथा हि—पूर्वोत्तरकालभाविनो द्रव्यविवर्ताः क्षणक्षयिपरमाणु-लक्षणा वा विशेषा न कंचन लोकव्यवहारमुपरचयन्ति, तन्न ते वस्तुरूपाः, लोक-व्यवहारोपयोगिनामेव वस्तुत्वात् इति व्यवहारः ॥

सांप्रतं ऋजुसूत्राभिप्रायः कथ्यते—तत्र ऋजुप्रगुणमकुटिलमतीतानागतवक्र-परित्यागाद्धर्तमानक्षणविवर्ति वस्तुनो रूपं सूत्रयति निष्टिङ्कितं दर्शयतीति

संग्रहश्लोकः—

सद्रूपतानतिक्रान्तस्वस्वभावमिदं जगत् ।

सत्तारूपतया सर्वं संगृह्णन् संग्रहो मतः ॥

यथालोकग्राहमिति । ग्राहयतीति ग्राहोऽभिप्रायः, पचाद्यच्, लोकाभिप्रायविशेषः, तस्यानतिक्रमेणेति ।

ऋजुसूत्रः । तथा हि—अस्याभिप्रायः । अतीतस्य विनष्टत्वात् अनागतस्यालब्धात्म-
लाभत्वात् खरविषाणादिभ्योऽविशिष्यमाणतया सकलशक्तिविरह रूपत्वान्नार्थ-
क्रियानिर्वर्तनक्षमत्वम्, अर्थक्रियाक्षमं च वस्तु, तदभावान्न तयोर्वस्तुत्वमिति,
वर्तमानक्षणालिङ्गितं च पुनर्वस्तुरूपं समस्तार्थक्रियासु व्याप्रियते इति तदेव
पारमार्थिकम् । तदपि च निरंशमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, अंशव्याप्टेर्युक्तिरिक्तत्वाद्,
एकस्यानेकस्वभावतामन्तरेणानेकस्वावयवव्यापनायोगात् । अनेकस्वभावतैवा-
स्त्विति चेन्न विरोधाघ्रातत्वात् । तथा हि—यद्येकः स्वभावः कथमनेकः अनेक-
श्चेत् कथमेकः ? एकानेकयोः परस्परपरिहारेणावस्थानात्, तस्मात् स्वरूप-
निमग्नाः परमाणव एव परस्पररोपसर्पणद्वारेण कथंचिन्नचयरूपतामापन्ना निखिल-
कार्येषु व्यापारभाज इति ते एव स्वलक्षणम्, न स्थूरतां धारयत्पारमार्थिकमिति ।
किं च प्रमाणतोऽर्थव्यवस्था, न च प्रमाणं देशकालव्याप्तिग्रहणे किञ्चन प्रवर्तते,
सर्वप्रमाणानां वर्तमानप्रकाशरूपत्वात् । तथा हि—प्रत्यक्षं तावद्रूपालोकमनस्कार-
चक्षुर्लक्षणकारणचतुष्टयाल्लब्धसत्ताकं वर्तमानक्षणे एव प्रकाशते, अतीतवत्स्य-
लक्षणयोरसंनिहितत्वात्, ततश्च तत् तत्कालसंबद्धमेव वस्तुनो रूपं साक्षात्कर्तुं
क्षमते न पूर्वमपरं वा, असंनिधानादेव । यदि पुनर्विनष्टमपि पूर्वक्षणवर्तिरूप-

संग्रहश्लोकः--

व्यवहारस्तु तामेव प्रतिवस्तुव्यस्थिताम् ।

तथैव दृश्यमानत्वाद् व्यवहारयति देहिनः ॥

तामिति सत्तारूपताम् । शेषं सुगमम् ।

देशकालव्याप्तीति । एकस्यानेकावयवव्याप्तिर्देशव्याप्तिः, एतावता स्थूरत्वमुक्तम्,
एकस्यानेकक्षणव्याप्तिः कालव्याप्तिः, अनेन तु स्थिरत्वमभिहितम् । तत्र कालव्याप्टे-
रन्तरत्वेन संनिहितत्वाद् यथाकथंचिदर्थप्रकाशस्य वा विवक्षितत्वात् । सर्वप्रमाणाना-
मित्यादिना तावत् कालव्याप्तिं दूषयितुमारभते—वर्तमानप्रकाशरूपत्वादिति । वर्तमानः
पूर्वापरसमयविविक्तः, प्रकाशः परिच्छेदो रूपं येषां प्रमाणानां तेषां प्रमाणानां तेषां
भावस्तस्त्वं तस्मात् । इदमत्र हृदयम्—परिच्छेदकं हि प्रमाणमेकक्षणवर्त्येव, ततस्तेन
परिच्छिद्यमानोऽर्थोपि स्वैकक्षणवर्त्येव परिच्छेत्तव्यः, न पूर्वान्तरक्षणवर्ती, तस्य परिच्छेदक-
प्रमाणकालेऽभावात्, तत्काले च परिच्छेदकप्रमाणस्यासत्त्वादिति ।

तदिति प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्कालसंबद्धं वर्तमानकालसंगतम् । वर्तमानकालपरिगतवस्तु-
ग्राहित्वं चाध्यक्षस्य वैभाषिकाभिप्रायेण, क्षणक्षयाद्यवस्थितत्वलक्षणत्वाद्द्वस्तुनः, अन्यथा
चक्षुरिन्द्रियसंनिष्ठादर्थानुपपन्नमानस्य द्वितीयक्षणभाविनो ज्ञानस्य न प्राक्क्षणवर्तिरूप-
ग्राहकत्वेन वर्तमानवस्तुग्राहकत्वं स्यात् । सौत्रान्तिकाभिप्रायेण वस्तुजन्यज्ञानगतग्राह्याकार-
लक्षणमेव वस्तुनो रूपं साक्षात्कर्तुं क्षमते इति व्याख्या । 'वस्त्वाहितमात्मगतमाकारं
प्रत्यक्षं परिच्छिनति'—इति हि सौत्रान्तिकानां सिद्धान्तः । यदाहुस्तद्वादिनः—

अर्थो ज्ञानसमन्वितो मतिमता वैभाषिकेणोच्यते

प्रत्यक्षो न हि बाह्यवस्तुविसरः सौत्रान्तिकैराश्रितः ।

योगाचारमतानुशैरभिहिता साकारबुद्धिः परा

मन्यन्ते वत मध्यमाः कुतधियः स्वच्छां परं संविदम् ॥इति॥

माकलयेत्, तदा विनष्टत्वाविशेषान्निवधिः क्षरणपरंपरा तत्र प्रतीयेत, तथा च सति संकलिकया अनादिजन्मपरंपराग्राहि प्रत्यक्षमनुपज्येत, एवमनागतक्षण-ग्रहणेऽपि योज्यम्, अनिष्टं चैतत्, तस्मात् तद्वार्तमानिकक्षणग्रहणदक्षमेवेत्यभ्यु-पगन्तव्यम् । ननु न यदि क्षणभङ्गुरतामर्थात्मनामध्यक्षमेव लोकयति, तदानीलतेव प्रतिभासमाना सा विप्रतिपत्तिगोचरं न यायादिति तद्विषयो लौकिकानां व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते, न चैतदस्ति, स्थिरताद्वारेण व्यवहारप्रवृत्तेरिति । अत्र प्रति-विधीयते—साक्षात्कुर्वाणा अपि क्षणविनश्वरतां सदृशापरापरोत्पत्तिविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो मन्दा नाध्यवस्यन्ति, अनादिकालप्ररूढवासनाप्रबोधसमुपजनितमिथ्याविकल्प-सामर्थ्याच्च विपर्यस्तस्थिरताव्यवहारं प्रवर्तयन्ति, तन्नायमध्यक्षस्यापराधः, अपि तु प्रमातृणामेव । तथा हि—घनाकारोऽपि प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविमिथ्या-विकल्पसंदर्शित एव, विविक्तदर्शने तत्प्रतिभासायोगात्, करचरणशिरोग्रीवा-दयो ह्यवयवाः परस्परविभक्ता एव तत्र प्रतिभान्ति, न व्याप्याकारः, न च तेऽपि स्वांशव्यापिनः प्रतिभान्ति, तदवयवानामपीतरेतरविशकलितरूपाणां प्रतिभासता तावत् यावत्परमाणव एव प्रथन्ते, व्यापिरूपस्य विचाराक्षमत्वा-दित्युक्तप्रायम् । नाप्यनुमानात्स्थिरस्थूरवस्तुसिद्धिः, प्रत्यक्षपरिगृहीतं हि संबन्ध-मासाद्यानुमानं प्रवर्तते, यदा च तत्क्षणाभङ्गुरविकृतांशग्रहणचातुर्यमाबिभ्रद् दर्शितं तदानुमानमपि तत्प्रतिबन्धमूलकं तद्गोचरमेव पारंपर्येण प्रतिष्ठापयति, स्वप्रतिभासिनो रूपस्यालीकतया तत्प्रतिष्ठापनद्वारेणैव तस्य प्रामाण्यात् । ननु च स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानादीनि स्थिरस्थूरवस्तुव्यतिरेकेण नोपपद्यन्ते, पूर्वमदृष्टे तदभावात्, पुरुषाद्यवयविनां स्मरणात्प्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च । नैतदस्ति, तेषामलीक-वासनाप्रबोधोत्थापितत्वेन प्रामाण्यायोगात् । किं च, तान्यपि स्वयं वर्तमानक्षणे एव प्रकाशन्ते, विप्लववशात् स्वरूपमेव वासनासंपादितातीतार्थरूपतया व्यवस्यन्ति, घनाकारं च तस्यासन्तमध्यारोपयन्ति, तत्र तेभ्योऽपि व्यापिवस्तुसिद्धिः । तस्माद्

तत्र सौत्रान्तिकयोगाचारशब्दौ पूर्वमेव दत्ताथौ । वैभाषिकमध्यमशब्दौ स्वेवं सौत्रान्तिकाद्यपेक्षया विरुद्धं भाषणं चतुःक्षणिकं वस्त्वादि विभाषा, गुरोश्च निष्ठायां सेट् इति अप्रत्ययः, स प्रयोजनं प्रवर्तकं वैभाषिकध्वनिनिमित्तं यस्य स वैभाषिकः । प्रयोजनम् (पा० ५-१-१०६)—इति ठञ् । प्रभाचन्द्रस्तु न्यायकुमुदचन्द्रे—'विभाषा सद्भ्रमप्रतिपादको ग्रन्थविशेषस्तां विदन्ति अधीयते वा वैभाषिकाः' इत्युवाच । तथा मध्ये भ्रमो मध्यमः मध्यान्मरणं वा इति विश्रान्तसूत्रेण मप्रत्ययः । पूर्वोत्तरक्षणासंस्पर्शी निराकारो ज्ञानक्षणस्त-त्ममर्थनप्रवणा वादिनांऽपि मध्यमाः । माध्यमिकध्वनिस्तु इत्थम्—मध्यमेन, क्षणेन चरन्ति चरत्यर्थे इकण् । यद्वा मध्यमं द्वाद्यपुरुषविशेषस्तस्य दर्शनं मध्यमम् तत्प्रयोजनं येषाम्, पूर्ववत् ठञ्, अस्त्यर्थे वा ठञ् । द्वाद्यस्वरवोतोऽस्य प्राय (?) इति पाठः ।

घनाकारोऽपीत्यादिना देशव्याप्तिं दूषयितुमुपक्रमते । स्वप्रतिभासिनः सामान्यस्य । तत्प्रतिष्ठापनद्वारेण ग्रन्थवसायवशात्स्वलक्षणव्यवस्थापनद्वारेण । तस्य अनुमानस्य । स्मरण-प्रत्यभिज्ञाविति । आदिशब्दात् संकलनाज्ञानादिग्रहः । तान्यपि स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानादीनि । विप्लव इति । सदृशापरापरोत्पत्तिदर्शनकृतो विभ्रमः । स्वरूपमिति । स्मरणानुगतं बोध-

व्यापिनि रूपे प्रमाणानवतारात् परस्परविश्लिष्टाः परमाणव एव परमार्थत इति ऋजुसूत्रः ॥

तदिदमर्थस्वरूपनिरूपणनिपुणानां नयानां मतमुपवर्णितम्, अधुना शब्द-विचारचतुराणामुपवर्णयते—तत्र त्रयाणामपि शब्दादीनामिदं साधारणाकृतम्, यदुत शब्द एव परमार्थो नार्थः, तस्य तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । पार्थक्येन वस्तुत्वसिद्धेः कथमव्यतिरेक इति चेत्, प्रमाणादिति ब्रूमः । तथा हि—न व्यतिरिक्तोऽर्थः शब्दात्, तत्प्रतीतौ तस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात्, इह यत्प्रतीतौ यत्प्रतीयते तत् ततोऽव्यतिरिक्तं भवति, तद्यथा शब्दे प्रतीयमाने तस्यैव स्वरूपम्, प्रतीयते च शब्दे प्रतीयमानेऽर्थः, अतोऽसौ ततोऽव्यतिरिक्त इति । अथ अगृहीतसंकेतस्य घटशब्द-श्रवणेऽपि घटप्रतीतेरभावाद् व्यतिरिक्त इति चेत्, एवं तर्हि विषय्य मारणात्मकत्वं तदज्ञस्य न प्रतिभातीति तत्ततो व्यतिरिक्तमापद्येत, न चैतदस्ति, तदव्यतिरेका-विशेषेण गुडखण्डवद्विषयाप्यमारकत्वापत्तेः, संबन्धस्य च व्यतिरिक्तेन सह प्रागेवापास्तत्वात्, तन्न अबुधप्रमातृदोषेण वस्तुनोऽन्यथात्वम्, अन्यथान्धो रूपं नेक्षते इति तदभावोऽपि प्रतिपत्तव्य इति । ये निरभिधाना वर्तन्तेऽर्थस्तेषां शब्दात्पार्थक्येन वस्तुत्वसिद्धिरिति चेन्न, निरभिधानार्थाभावात्, केवलं केचित् विशेषशब्दैः संकीर्त्यन्ते, केचित् सामान्यध्वनिभिरित्येतावान् विशेषः स्यात् । यदि वा सकलार्थवाचका विशेषध्वनयो न सन्तीति नास्त्यत्र प्रमाणम् । ततश्च सर्वेऽर्था विद्यमानस्ववाचकाः, अर्थत्वात्, घटार्थवदिति प्रमाणात्; सर्वेषां स्ववाचकत्वेन पूर्वोक्तयुक्तेः शब्दादपार्थक्यसिद्धिः । तस्मान्न परमार्थतोऽर्थः शब्दा-दव्यतिरिक्तोऽस्ति, उपचारतः पुनर्लौकिकैरपर्यालोचितपरमार्थैर्व्यवहियते । असा-वप्यौपचारिकः शब्दात्मको वार्थः प्रतिक्षणभङ्गुरः स्वीकर्तव्यः, वर्णानां क्षण-ध्वंसिताप्रतीतेः, ऋजुसूत्रप्रतिपादितयुक्तिकलापाच्च ॥

सांप्रतमेतेषामेव प्रत्येकमभिप्रायः कथ्यते—तत्र शब्दो रूढितो यावन्तो ध्वनयः कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे प्रवर्तन्ते, यथा इन्द्रशक्रपुरन्दरादयः, तेषां सर्वेषामप्येकमर्थ-मभिप्रेति किल प्रतीतिवशात् यथा शब्दाव्यतिरेकोऽर्थस्य प्रतिपाद्यते तथैव तस्यै-कत्वं वा नैकत्वं वा प्रतिपादनीयम्, न चेन्द्रशक्रपुरन्दरादयः पर्यायशब्दा विभि-न्नार्थवाचितया कदाचन प्रतीयन्ते, तेभ्यः सर्वदैवैकाकारपरामर्शोत्पत्तेः, अस्खल-

रूपम् । वासनेति । पूर्वज्ञानजनितामुत्तरज्ञाने शक्तिमाहुः । तथा संपादितमतीतार्थरूप-माकारो येषां स्मरणादीनां तेषां भावस्तथा, अतीतार्थाकारवन्ति वयं स्म इति स्मरणा-दीनि विकल्पयन्ति । तस्येति । स्वरूपस्य । संग्रहश्लोकः :-

तत्रर्जुसूत्रनीतिः स्यात् शुद्धपर्यायसंश्रिता ।

नश्वरस्यैव भावस्य भावात् स्थितिवियोगतः ॥

एक एवेत्यादि । यथा शब्दनयः पर्यायशब्दानामेकमर्थमभिप्रेति तथा तदस्तटीतट-मिति विरुद्धलिङ्गलक्षणधर्माभिसंबन्धाद् वस्तुनो भेदं चाभिधत्ते । न हि विरुद्धधर्मकृतं भेदमनुभवतो वस्तुनो विरुद्धधर्मयोगो युक्तः, एवं संख्याकालकारकपुरुषादिभेदादपि भेदोऽवगन्तव्यः । संग्रहश्लोकः :-

दृत्तितया तथैव व्यवहारदर्शनात् । तस्मादेक एव पर्यायशब्दानामर्थ इति शब्दः । शब्दते आहूयतेऽनेनाभिप्रायेणार्थ इति निरुक्तादेकार्थप्रतिपादकताभिप्रायेणैव पर्यायध्वनीनां प्रायोगादिति ।

सांप्रतं समभिरूढमतमुपवर्ष्यते—तत्र सम् एकीभावेनाभिरोहति व्युत्पत्ति-निमित्तमास्कन्दति शब्दप्रवृत्तौ योऽभिप्रायः सः समभिरूढः । अयं हि पर्यायशब्दानां प्रतिविभक्तमेवार्थमभिमन्यन्ते, तद्यथा—इन्दनादिन्द्रः, परमैश्वर्यमिन्द्रशब्दवाच्यं परमार्थतः, तद्वत्यर्थे पुनरूपचारतो प्रवर्तते, न वा कश्चित् तद्वान् सर्वशब्दानां परस्परप्रविभक्तार्थप्रतिपादकतया आश्रयाश्रयिभावेन प्रवृत्त्यसिद्धेः । एवं शकना-च्छक्रः, पूर्दारणात् पुरन्दर इत्यादि भिन्नार्थत्वं सर्वशब्दानां दर्शयति, प्रमाणयति च—पर्यायशब्दा विभिन्नार्थाः, प्रतिविभक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तकत्वात्, इह ये ये प्रतिविभक्तव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तकास्ते ते भिन्नार्थाः, यथा इन्द्रघटपुरुषादिशब्दाः, विभिन्न व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तकाश्च पर्यायशब्दा अपि, अतो भिन्नार्था इति । यत्पुनरवि-चारितप्रतीतिवलादेकार्थाभिधायकत्वं प्रतिपाद्यते तदयुक्तम्, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि—यदि युक्तिरिक्ता प्रतीतिरेव शरणीक्रियते, तदा तदा मन्दमन्दप्रकाशे दवीयसि देशे संनिविष्टशरीरविभिन्ना अपि निम्बकदम्बाश्वत्थकपित्थादय एकतर्वाकारतामाभिभ्रानाः प्रतीयन्ते इति एकतयैवाभ्युपगन्तव्याः । न चैतदस्ति, विक्षिततत्स्वरूपग्राहिप्रत्यनीकप्रत्ययोपनिपातवाधितत्वेन पूर्वप्रतीतेः विविक्तानामेव तेषामभ्युपगमात्, तन्नैकार्थवाचिनो ध्वनयः सन्ति, रूढिः पुनरविचारिततदर्थाना-मिति समभिरूढः ॥

सांप्रतमेवंभूताभिप्रायः प्रतिपाद्यते—तत्रैवंशब्दः प्रकारवचनः, ततश्चैवं यथा व्युत्पादितः तं प्रकारं भूतः प्राप्तो यः शब्दः स एवंभूतः, तत्समर्थनप्रधाना-भिप्रायोऽप्येवंभूतः, तद्विषयत्वात्, विषयशब्देन च विषयिणोऽभिधानात् । अयं

विरोधे लिङ्गसंख्यादिभेदाद् भिन्नस्वभावताम् ।

तस्यैव मन्थमानोऽयं शब्दः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥

एकीभावेनेति प्रत्येकम् । अयमभिप्रायः—यथा विरुद्धलिङ्गाद् भिद्यते वस्तु, तथा संज्ञाभेदादपि; ततो यावन्तोऽर्थस्य स्वाभिधायका ध्वनयस्तावन्तोऽर्थभेदाः, प्रत्यर्थं शब्द-निवासादिति । तद्वतीति । परमैश्वर्ययुक्ते उपचारस्य च निमित्तम्, तत्रैश्वर्यस्यावस्थानम्, न वा कश्चित् तद्वान् शब्दानामभिवेद्य इति शेषः । दवीयसीति दूरतरे । अविचारित-तदर्थानामिति । तेषां शब्दानामर्थस्तदर्थः, न विचारितस्तदर्थो यैस्ते तथा तेषाम् । संग्रहश्लोकः—

तथाविधस्य तस्यापि वस्तुनः क्षणवृत्तिनः ।

ब्रूते समभिरूढस्तु संज्ञाभेदेन भिन्नताम् ॥

तथाविधस्येति विरुद्धलिङ्गादियोगभेदिनः ॥

तद्विषयत्वाविति । स एवंभूतः शब्दो विषयो यस्याभिप्रायस्य तद्भावस्तत्त्वं तस्मात् । विषयिण इति । अभिप्रायस्य । यद्वा यत्किंवाविशिष्टं शब्देनोच्यते स च क्रियां कुर्वद् वस्तु

हि यस्मिन्नर्थे शब्दो व्युत्पाद्यते स व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तमर्थो यदेव विवर्तते तदेव तं शब्दं प्रवर्तमानमभिप्रैति, न सामान्येन । यथा उदकाद्याहरणवेलायां योषिदादि-मस्तकारूढो विशिष्टचेष्टावानेव घटोऽभिधीयते, न शेषः, घटशब्दव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्त-शून्यत्वात्, पटादिवदिति । अतीतां भाविनीं वा चेष्टामधिकृत्य सामान्येनैवोच्यते इति चेन्न, तयोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नतया शशविषाणकल्पत्वात् । तथापि तद्द्वारेण शब्दः प्रवर्तते, सर्वत्र प्रवर्तयितव्यः, विशेषाभावात् । किं च यद्यतीतवत्स्य-च्चेष्टापेक्षया घटशब्दोऽचेष्टावत्यपि प्रयुज्येत, कपालमृत्पिण्डादावपि तत्प्रवर्तनं दुर्निवारं स्यात् विशेषाभावात्, तस्माद् यत्र क्षणे व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तविकलमस्ति । तस्मिन्नेव सोऽर्थस्तच्छब्देन वाच्य इत्येवंभूतः ।

तदेवमनेकधर्मपरीतार्थप्राहिका बुद्धिः प्रमाणम्, तद्द्वारायातः पुनरेक-धर्मनिष्ठार्थसमर्थेनप्रवणः परामर्शः शेषधर्मस्वीकारतिरस्कारपरिहारद्वारेण वर्त-मानो नयः । स च धर्माणामानन्त्यादनन्तभेदः, तथापि सर्वसंप्राहृकाभिप्रायपरि-कल्पनमुखेनैव सप्तभेदो दर्शितः । अयमेव च स्वाभिप्रेतधर्मविधारणात्मकतया शेष-धर्मतिरस्कारद्वारेण प्रवर्तमानः परामर्शो दुर्नयसंज्ञामश्नुते । तद्वलप्रभावितसत्ताका हि खल्वेते परप्रवादाः । तथा हि—नैगमनयदर्शनानुसारिणौ नैयायिकवैशेषिकौ । संग्रहाभिप्रायप्रवृत्ताः सर्वेऽप्यद्वैतवादाः, सांख्यदर्शनं च । व्यवहारनयानुपाति प्रायश्चार्वाकदर्शनम् । ऋजुसूत्राकृतप्रवृत्तबुद्धयस्ताथागताः । शब्दादिनयमताव-लम्बिनो वैयाकरणादय इति । अथेत्थमभिदधीथाः यथा—कथमेतेऽवधारणद्वारेण स्वकमर्थं समर्थयन्तस्तद्विपरीतं निराकुर्वाणा दुर्नयतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति, अत्रोच्यते— एवं प्रवृत्तौ निर्गोचरत्वात्, निर्गोचरस्य नयत्वायोगात् । तथा हि—नयति केनचिद-शेन विशिष्टमर्थं प्रापयति योऽभिप्रायः स नयः, स्वाभिप्रेतधर्मात् शेषधर्मप्रतिक्षेप-द्वारेण तु प्रवृत्तौ न किञ्चन नयति, एकधर्मालिङ्गितस्य वस्तुनोऽसंभवात्, बहिरन्त-श्चानेकधर्मपरिकरितस्वभावस्य तस्य प्रतिभासात्, तदपह्नवकारिणां कदभि-प्रायाणां प्रतिभासबाधितत्वेनालीकत्वात् । तथा हि—यः तावन्नैगमनयः परस्पर विश्लिष्टौ सामान्यविशेषौ प्रत्यपीपदत्, तदयुक्तम्, तयोस्तथा कदाचन प्रतिभासा-भावात् । यच्चोक्तम्—अनुवर्तमानैकाकारपरामर्शग्राह्यं सामान्यं यत्र न तत्र

एवंभूत उच्यते तत्प्रतिपादनपरो नयोऽप्येवंभूतः । तथा एवं यः शब्देनोच्यते चेष्टादिकः प्रकारः तमेवंभूतः प्राप्तोऽभिप्रायः, तद्विशिष्टस्यैव वस्तुनोऽभ्युपगमनान् । अस्मिन्पक्षे निरुपचारोऽप्येवंभूतध्वनिरभिधीयत इति । यस्त्वचेष्टावत्यपि पृथुबुध्नोहराद्याकारे घटशब्द-प्रयोगः स मिथ्या, निर्निमित्तत्वात् । शशविषाणकल्पत्वादिति । ईषदपरिसमाप्ते शशविषाणे शशविषाणकल्पे, तयोर्भावः तत्त्वं तस्मात् । सर्वत्रेति चेष्टादावपीत्यर्थः । यद्यतीतेत्यादिना शशविषाणकल्पत्वाभावेऽपि दूषणान्तरमभिदधाति । संग्रहश्लोकः—

एकस्यापि ध्वनेर्वर्च्यं सदा तन्नोपपद्यते ।

क्रियाभेदेन भिन्नत्वादेवंभूतोऽभिमन्यते ॥

मदेति । प्रवृत्ति निमित्तकालादन्यदापि । तदिति वस्तु ॥

वैयाकरणादय इति । आदिशब्दादभिधर्मकोशकर्तारो गृह्यन्ते ।

विशेषप्रतिभासः, यत्र च विशिष्टदेशदशावच्छिन्नबोधनिर्ग्राह्यो विशेषो न तत्र सामान्यावगतिः, तद्वचनमात्रमेव, धवखदिरपलाशादिसमस्तविशेषापसरणे वृक्षत्वादिसामान्यप्रतिभासाभावात् । दूराद्विशेषाग्रहणेऽपि केवलं तच्चकास्तीति चेत्, तत्राप्यभ्यन्तरीभूतविशेषप्रतिभासात्, तद्विरहे शशविषाणरूपत्वात् । एवं विशेषा अपि न सामान्यादत्यन्तव्यतिरेकिणः प्रतिभान्ति, तन्निमग्नानामेव तेषां ग्रहणात्, इतरथा सत्तातोऽतिरिच्यमाना भावा निःस्वभावतामात्मसात्कुर्वन्ति । तथा वृक्षत्वादिसामान्येभ्योऽपि भेदिनो वृक्षादयो न स्युः, तदभेदिनबन्धनत्वात्, तत्-स्वरूपस्थितेः, तस्मात्तदेव संवेदनमुपसर्जनीकृतवैषम्यं प्रधानीकृतैकाकारं सामान्यं गृह्णाति इत्युच्यते, न्यक्कृतसमत्वमुत्कलितनानात्वं पुनर्विशेषग्राहीति, समत्वनानात्वयोः कथंचिद् भेदाभेदिनोः परस्परं सर्वार्थेषु भावात्, तदभावे तथाविधप्रतिभासानुपपत्तेः । एतेन यदवादि 'न चैतौ विभिन्नावपि प्रतिभासमानौ सामान्यविशेषौ कथंचिद् मिश्रयितुं युक्तावित्यादि' तदवास्तंमवगन्तव्यम्, विभिन्नयोः प्रतिभासाभावात्, व्यवहारोऽपि सर्वप्रधानोपसर्जनद्वारेण कथंचिदितरेतराविनिर्लुठितसामान्यविशेषसाध्य एव । न हि सामान्यं दोहवाहादिक्रियायामुपयुज्यते, विशेषाणामेव तत्रोपयोगात्; नापि विशेषा एव तत्कारिणः, गोत्वशून्यानां तेषां वृक्षाद्यविशिष्टतया तत्करणसामर्थ्याभावात् । किं च अत्यन्तव्यतिरेके सामान्यविशेषयोः 'वृक्षं छिन्द्व' इति चोदितः किमिति तद्विशेषे पलाशादौ छेदं विधत्ते ? तत्र तस्य समवायादिति चेन्न । समवायग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्, भावेऽपि विशिष्टयोरभेदबुद्ध्युत्पादनाक्षमत्वात्, तस्यापि व्यतिरिक्ततया पदार्थान्तराविशेषात् नित्यत्वैकत्वसर्वगतत्वादिभिश्च सर्वत्र तत्करणप्रसङ्गात् । यत्पुनरवादीः 'यदुत यदि सामान्यं विशेषनिष्ठम्, विशेषो वा सामान्यव्याप्तः समुपलभ्येत, ततो विविक्तयोस्तयोः क्वचिदनुपलम्भात् योऽयं विविक्तः सामान्यविशेषेषु चाभिधानार्थक्रियालक्षणो व्यवहारः स समस्तः प्रलयं यायाद्, लोलीभावेन तद्विवेकस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्', तदप्यसमीचीनम् । यतो यद्यपि परस्पराविविक्तयोः सामान्यविशेषयोः सर्वत्रोपलम्भः, तथापि यत्रैव प्रमातुरर्थित्वं तदेव सामान्यम्, विशेषान्वा प्रधानीकृत्य तद्गोचरं ध्वनिमर्थक्रियां वा प्रवर्तयति, इतरस्याप्युपसर्जनभावेन तत्र व्यापारात्, तद्विकलस्येतरस्यापि शशविषाणायमानतया क्वचिदनुपयोगात् । किं च अत्यन्तव्यतिरेकिणि विशेषेभ्यः सामान्ये वृत्तिविकल्पोपलम्भनूतनविशेषसंबन्धाद्विद्वारेण दूषणमुद्गरकदम्बकं मूर्धनि पतद् दुविषहं स्यात् । तथा हि— तत्तेषु कथं वर्तेत सामस्त्येन एकदेशेन वा ? सामस्त्यपक्षे प्रतिविशेषं परिसमाप्ततया सामान्यवहुत्वप्रसङ्गः, अनिष्टं चैतद्, एकत्वाभ्युपगमक्षतेः । एकदेशेन

तद्विरहे विशेषाणामभावे । शशविषाणरूपत्वादिति । यदुक्तम्—

निविशेषं न सामान्यं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् ।

विशेषोऽपि च नैवास्ति सामान्येन विनाकृतः ॥ इति ।

उपसर्जनीत्यादि । उपसर्जनीकृतं गोणीकृतं वैषम्यं विशेषरूपता येन तत्तथा न्यक्कृतसमत्वमिति । तिरस्कृतसामान्यम् ।

पुनर्यावन्तो विशेषास्तावन्तस्तदंशाः प्रसजन्ति, न चैतदस्ति सामान्यस्य निरवयवत्वात्, सावयवत्वेऽपि पुनस्ते भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा । यद्यभिन्ना विशेषाः, तर्ह्यभेदिनः किं नेष्यन्ते, विशेषाभावात् । भेदपक्षे पुनस्तेष्वपि तत्कथं वर्तेत—सामस्त्येन एकदेशेन वेति ? तदेव चोद्यमलब्धपरिनिष्ठमवतरति, तन्नात्यन्तभेदिनो वृत्तिः संभवति । किं च यद्येकं सामान्यं भेदवत् समस्तविशेषेषु वर्तेत, तदैकविशेषोपलम्भकाले तदुपलभ्यते न वा ? यद्यद्यः पक्षः, तस्यैकतया सर्वत्रोपलम्भात्, व्याप्यग्रहणाभावे व्यापकग्रहणासिद्धेः निखिलतद्व्याप्यविशेषग्रहणमासज्येत, न चैतदस्ति, पुरोवर्तिविशेषस्यैव साक्षात्करणात्, शेषविशेषाणामसंनिधानात्, संनिहितविशेषनिष्ठमेव तदुपलभ्यते, तस्यैव तद्व्यञ्जकत्वात् । इतरेषां तदभावादिति चेन्न, एकस्वभावस्य खण्डशो व्यञ्जनायोगात्, संनिहितविशेषव्यञ्जितमेव तत्सर्वत्र स्वभावान्तराभावात् सर्वविशेषगतं च तद्रूपमतस्तद्दर्शनं केन वार्येत । अथ द्वितीयः कल्पः, तथा सति यथा एकविशेषोपलम्भसमये नोपलभ्यते, तथा विशेषोपलम्भकालेऽपि नोपलभ्येत, विशेषाभावात्, अतस्तदभाव एवोक्तः स्यात्, केवलस्योपलम्भाभावात्, उपलम्भेऽपि स्वस्वभावस्थितेविशेषरूपतापत्तिः, तथा चिरंतनविशेषव्यवस्थितसत्ताकं तन्नूतनविशेषोत्पादे सति कथं तेन सह संबन्धमनुभवेत् ? न तावद्विशेषान्तरेभ्यस्तदुत्पत्सु विशेषदेशं गन्तुमर्हति, निष्क्रियत्वात्, नापि तत्रैवाभवत्, विशेषोत्पादात्प्राक् तद्देशे तदुपलम्भाभावात्, नापि विशेषेण सहोत्पद्यते, नित्यत्वात्, नित्यस्य चोत्पत्तिनिरोधाभावात् । अथ एतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया तत्सक्रियक्रमभिधीयते, तथापि पूर्वव्यक्तित्यागेन वा नूतनविशेषदेशमाक्रामेत् तदभावेन वा ? न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, चिरंतनव्यक्तीनां सामान्यविकलतया तत्संबन्धसाध्यबुद्धिध्वनिविरहप्रसङ्गात्, न चैतदस्ति, अपरापरविशेषोत्पादेऽपि प्राचीनव्यक्तिषु तद्दर्शनात् । अथ द्वितीयः कल्पः, तदप्यसंबद्धम्, निरवयवस्य पूर्वव्यक्तित्यागवैकल्येन समुत्पत्सुव्यक्तिप्रतिगमनाभावात्, सावयवपक्षस्य पुनः प्रागेवापास्तत्वात्, नैतदभ्युपगमद्वारेण परिहारः श्रेयान् । अन्यच्च व्यतिरिक्तसामान्यसंबन्धाद् यदि भावाः समानाः, न स्वरूपेण, तदा सत्त्वसंबन्धात्प्राग् भावाः सन्तोऽसन्तो वा । सन्तश्चेदपार्थक्यः सत्तासंबन्धः, अन्यथानवस्था प्रसज्येत, पुनः सत्तान्तरसंबन्धानिवारणात् । असन्तश्चेदत्यन्तासतामपि गगनारविन्दादीनां सत्तासंबन्धात् भावरूपतापद्येत । एवं द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वगोत्वादिसामान्येष्वपि समस्तमेतद्वाच्यम्, एकयोगक्षेमत्वात्, तन्न परस्परमत्यन्तव्यतिरेकिणौ सामान्यविशेषौ कथंचन घटामाटीकेते । अत एव तत्समर्थनप्रवणस्तत्तादात्म्यप्रतिक्षेपकोऽभिप्रायो निरालम्बनत्वान्नैगमदुर्नयस्य व्यपदेशमास्कन्दति, तादात्म्यापेक्षयैव सामान्यविशेषव्यतिरेकसमर्थकस्य नैगमनयत्वात्, व्यतिरेकिणोरपि तयोर्वस्तूनि कथंचिद् भावात्, इतरथा विवक्षयापि तथा दर्शयितुमशक्यत्वात्,

तद्दर्शनमिति । सर्वव्यक्तीनां प्रत्यक्षता ।

नूतनविशेषसंबन्धादीत्यादिशब्दसूचितं दूषणमभिधातुकाम ग्राह अन्यच्चेत्यादि । सत्त्वसंबन्धादिति । सत्त्वं सामान्यं भावः सत्ता जातिरिति पर्यायाः ।

प्रधानोपसर्जनभावस्य द्वयनिष्ठत्वात्, अत्यन्ततादात्म्येन तत्कारिण्या विवक्षाया अपि निर्गोचरताप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्कथंचिद् भेदाभेदिनावेवैतो, तदन्यतरसमर्थकः पुनः निरालम्बनत्वात् दुर्नयतां स्वीकरोतीति स्थितम् ।

तथा संग्रहोऽप्यशेषविशेषप्रतिक्षेपमुखेन सामान्यमेकं समर्थयमानो दुर्नयः, तदुपेक्षाद्वारेणैव तस्य नयत्वात्, विशेषविकलस्य सामान्यस्यासंभवात् तथा हि— यत्तावदुक्तम्—यदुत विशेषाः सामान्याद् व्यतिरेकिणोऽव्यतिरेकिणो वा । व्यतिरेकपक्षे निःस्वभावत्वम्, तिःसत्ताकत्वात् । अव्यतिरेकपक्षे भावमात्रम्, तदव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्, तत्स्वरूपवत् । तदयुक्तम्, विशेषवादिनोऽप्येवंविधविकल्पसंभवात् । तथा हि—विशेषेभ्यः सामान्यं व्यतिरिक्तमव्यतिरिक्तं वा । व्यतिरिक्तं चेन्न तर्हि सामान्यम्, स्वस्वरूपव्यवस्थिततया विशेषरूपत्वात् । अव्यतिरिक्तं चेत्, तथापि न सामान्यम्, विशेषाव्यतिरिक्तत्वादेव, तत्स्वरूपवत् । यदप्यवादि—अनाद्यविद्याबलप्रवृत्तो विशेषव्यवहारः, तात्त्विकं सामान्यम्, तदपि च वचनमात्रमेव, युक्तिरिक्तत्वात्, सामान्यमेवानाद्यविद्यार्शितम्, विशेषाः पुनः पारमाथिका इति विशेषवादिनोऽपि वदतो वक्त्रभङ्गाभावात् । यत्पुनर्विशेषग्राहकप्रमाणाभावं प्रतिपादयता अभ्यधायि—यदुत प्रत्यक्षं भावसंपादितसत्ताकं तमेव साक्षात्करोति नाभावं तस्थानुत्पादकत्वादित्यादि, तदयुक्ततरम्, यतः केनेदं भवतोऽत्यन्तमुहूदा निवेदितं भाव एव केवलः प्रत्यक्षमुपस्थापयति, न पुनरभावोऽपि । अभावव्यापाराभावप्रतिपादकयुक्तिकलापेनेति चेत्, मुग्ध विप्रतारितोऽसि, तद्व्यापाराभावासिद्धेः, सदसद्रूपवस्तुनः समस्तक्रियासु व्यापारात् । भावतादात्म्येन व्यवस्थितस्याभावस्य व्यापारविरोधा भावात् । कथं भावाभावयोस्तादात्म्यम् ? विरोधादिति चेत्, न, प्रमाणप्रसिद्धे विरोधाभावात् । तथा हि—घटादिकः पदार्थात्मा स्वरूपेण सन्, न पटादिरूपेणापि इति भावाभावात्मकः, यदि पुनः कथंचिन्नाभावात्मकः स्यात्, तदा पटादिरूपेणापि भावात् सर्वात्मकः प्राप्नोति, युक्तमेतत्, अत एव भेदप्रपञ्चत्रिलयसिद्धिरिति चेत्, स्यादेतत्, यदि पटाद्यभावाकान्ताच्छून्यवादिनो मनोरथपूरणं न स्यात् । तथा हि—पटादित्रिविक्तो घटोऽनुभूयते, न च पटाद्यभावो भावेन सह तादात्म्यमनुभवति, तस्मादभावात्मक एवायम्, एवं पटादयोऽपीतरतरापेक्षयेति शून्यत्वापत्तिः, तस्मात् स्वरूपमाविभ्राणं पररूपेभ्यो व्यावृत्तमेव वस्तु सर्वक्रियासु व्याप्रियते इति भावाभावात्मकस्यैव व्यापारः स्वरूपधारणस्य स्वभावत्वात्, पररूपव्यावर्तनस्याभावत्वादिति । एवं स्वगोचरप्रत्यक्षोत्पादनेऽपि व्याप्रियते, ततश्च तद्रूपमेव तत्साक्षात्कुर्यादिति स्वरूपनियते पररूपेभ्यो व्यावृत्ते एव वस्तुनि प्रत्यक्षं प्रवर्तते, तज्जन्यत्वात्, न भावमात्रे,

इतरथेति । यदि कथंचिद् व्यतिरेकिणावपि सामान्यविशेषो न स्याताम् । तथेति । व्यतिरेकेण । तत्कारिण्या भेदविधाधिन्या ।

युक्तिकलापेनेति । भावांशेनैव संयोगो योग्यत्वादिन्द्रियस्य हि । इत्यादिना व्याप्रियते इति भावाभावात्मकं वस्त्विति शेषः । तद्रूपमिति । भावाभावात्मकवस्तुरूपम् ।

तस्य केवलस्य स्वरूपाव्यवस्थितेरुपादकत्वायोगात् । न च जनकत्वादर्थो ग्राह्यो जन्मत्वाद्वा ज्ञानं ग्राहकमतिप्रसङ्गादित्युक्तम्, किं तर्हि आवरणविच्छेदादेर्लब्ध-सत्ताकं ग्रहणपरिणामात् ज्ञानं गृह्णाति, अर्थस्तु संनिधानादेर्गृह्यते, स चानुवर्त-मानव्यावर्तमानरूप एव प्रतीयते इति तथाभूतोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः, न केवलं सामान्य-रूप इति । सदसदंशयोः कथमेकत्रावस्थानमिति चेत्, तादात्म्येनेति ब्रूमः । ननु तादात्म्यं भावमात्रमभावमात्रं वापद्येत, इतरेतराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्, इतरेतरस्वरूप-वत्, तन्नोभयरूपवस्तुसिद्धिः । नैतदस्ति, तादात्म्यस्य संबन्धत्वात्, संबन्धस्य च द्वयनिष्ठत्वात्, तदभावे कस्य केन संबन्धः निर्गोचरत्वात् । तस्मादेतौ सदसदंशौ धर्मिरूपतया अभेदिनौ, वस्तुनः सदसद्रूपस्यैकत्वाद्, धर्मरूपतया पुनर्विवक्षितौ भेदमनुभवतः, स्वरूपेण भावात्, पररूपेण त्वभावादिति । तदेवं प्रत्यक्षे विविक्तवस्तुग्राहिणि सकलप्रमाणप्रष्टे प्रसाधिते शेषप्रमाणान्यपि तदनुसारितया विविक्तमेव स्वगोचरं स्थापयन्तीति, तदपलापी केवलसामान्यप्रतिष्ठापकः कदभि-प्रायः संग्रहदुर्नयव्यपदेशं स्वीकुरुते, विशेषापेक्षयैव सामान्यस्थापकस्य संग्रहनय-त्वादिति ॥

तथा व्यवहारोऽपि प्रमाणप्रसिद्धं वस्तुस्वरूपं निहनुवानो युक्तिरिक्तमवि-चारितरमणीयं लोकव्यवहारमार्गानुसारि समर्थयमानो दुर्नयतामात्मनि निधत्ते, लोकव्यवहारप्रसाधकस्यापीतरानिष्टी व्यवस्थानाभावात् । तथा हि—यदीदं कियत्कालभावि स्थूरतामात्रिभ्रानं लोकव्यवहारकारि घटादिकं भवतस्तात्त्विक-मभिप्रेतं तन्नाकस्मिकम्, किं तर्हि नित्यपरमाणुघटितम्, इतरथा निष्कारणत्वेन सर्वदा भावाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न ते परमाणवस्तथा प्रतिभातीति चेत्, न, अत एव तेषा-मनुमानतः सिद्धिः, यदि पुनर्यदेव साक्षान्न विशददर्शने चकास्ति तत्सकलमपलप्येत हन्त वह्निदानीमपलपनीयम्, घटादिवस्तुनोऽप्यर्वागभागवर्तित्वङ्मात्रप्रतिभासात्, मध्यपरभागादीनामपलापप्रसङ्गात्, तथा च लोकव्यवहारकारितापि विशीर्येत, तावता तदसिद्धेः । अथात्रानुमानबलेन व्यवहारक्षमसंपूर्णवस्तुनः साधनम्, एवं तर्हि भूतभाविपर्यायपरमाणुसाधनमपि क्रियताम्, विशेषाभावात् । तथा हि—

तदिति । प्रत्यक्षम् । अतिप्रसङ्गाविति । चक्षुषा जन्ममानस्यापि ज्ञानस्य चक्षुरग्राहकत्वात् । आवरणविच्छेदादेरिति । विच्छेदः क्षयः, आदिशब्दात् क्षयोपशमः तद्धेतवश्च कारणत्वेन द्रव्यक्षेत्रकालालोकादयः गृह्यन्ते, तर्हि ज्ञानावरणकर्मणः क्षयोपशमे कृते तदनन्तरमव्यवधा-नेन ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति । प्रष्टे इति । विशदप्रतिभासरूपत्वेन सकलप्रमाणमुख्ये ।

अनुमानतः सिद्धिरिति । द्व्यणुकादि स्कन्धो भेदः, मूर्तत्वे सति सावयवत्वात्, कुम्भ-वत् । सावयवैराकाशादिभिर्व्यभिचारपरिहारार्थं मूर्तत्वे सतीति विशेषणम् । ये च द्व्यणुकादि-भेदादनन्तरंशासमुत्पद्यन्ते अवयवास्ते परमाणवः । अथवान्यथानुमानयामः—अणुपरि-माणतारतम्यं वच्चिद् विश्रान्तम्, परिमाणतारतम्यत्वात्, आकाशपरिमाणतारतम्यवत् । यत्र अणुपरिमाणतारतम्यं विश्रान्तं त एव परमाणवः । अथानुमानबलेनेति । तथा हि—अर्वागभागः सांशः, अर्वागभागत्वात्, संप्रतिपन्नार्वागभागवत् । न च वाक्यं यद्यर्वागभा-गदर्शनेनावयवो साध्यन्ते, तर्हि घटशकलमात्रस्यापि सांशत्वसिद्धिः प्राप्नोति, यतो घटशकलं

यथा बाह्यत्वङ्मात्रप्रतिभासेऽपि सर्ववस्तुनां तावता व्यवहाराभावाद् मध्यभागादि-
साधनेन संपूर्णानि तत्समर्थानि तानि साध्यन्ते, तथैव कियत्कालभाविधनाकार-
दर्शनेऽप्यनाद्यनन्तपरमाणुतादात्म्यव्यवस्थितशरीराणि तानि साध्यन्ताम्, तद-
भावेऽपि तेषामनुपपत्तेः । तथा हि—व्यवहारावतारिणो दर्शनयोग्यस्याह्वपर्यायस्य
तावदतीतपर्यायानभ्युपगमे निर्हेतुकत्वम्, तत्र चोक्तो दोषः, तदुत्पादकादन्तर-
पर्यायिष्ठौ पुनस्तज्जनकपर्यायोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य इति अनादिपर्यायपरंपरासिद्धि-
मध्यासीत्, तथा व्यवहारावतारिवस्तुपर्यन्तपर्यायस्य पर्यायान्तरानुत्पादकत्वे
बलादवस्तुत्वमाढौकते, भवन्तीतेरेवार्थक्रियाकरणवैकल्यात्, तदुत्पादकत्वे पुनरसा-
व्यपरपर्यायोत्पादकत्वे इत्यनन्तपर्यायमालोपपद्यते । तथा घनाकारोऽपि विशद-
दर्शनेन साक्षात्क्रियमाणो निष्प्रदेशपर्यन्तावयवव्यतिरेकेण नोपपद्यते, करचरण-
शिरोस्त्रीवाद्यवयवानां खण्डशो भिद्यमानतयावयविरूपत्वात्, तदवयवानामप्यव-
यवान्तरघटितत्वात् । परमाणव एव पर्यन्तावयवाः परमार्थतो घनाकारहेतवः,
तदभावे पुनराकस्मिकोऽसौ सर्वत्रोपलभ्येत, न वा क्वचित्, विशेषाभावात् ।
एतेन यदवादि—लोकव्यवहारावतारिणः प्रमाणमनुग्राहकमस्ति वस्तुनो नेतरस्ये-
त्यादि तदपि प्रतिक्षिप्तमवगन्तव्यम्, दृश्यमानार्थान्यथानुपपत्त्यैव तत्साधनात् ।
यत् पुनरुक्तम्—किं तेषामतीतानागतपर्यायपरमाष्वादीनां पर्यालोचनेन लोक-
व्यवहारानुपयोगितया (अ) वस्तुत्वादित्यादि, तदयुक्तम्, उपेक्षया वार्तमानिकवस्तु-
नोऽनुपयोगित्वेनावस्तुत्वप्राप्तेः, सर्वस्य सर्वलोकानुपयोगित्वात् । कस्यचिदुपयोगि-
तया वस्तुत्वे तेषामपि सा समस्त्यैव, सर्वज्ञानादिगोचरत्वाद् इत्यास्तां तावत् ।
तदेवं प्रमाणप्रसिद्धार्थपलापित्वाद् व्यवहारो दुर्नयः, तदुपेक्षया व्यवहारानुपाति-
वस्तुसमर्थकस्य व्यवहारनयत्वादिति ।

अथ ऋजुसूत्रोऽपि दृष्टापलापेनादृष्टमेव क्षणक्षयिपरमाणुलक्षणं वस्तु-
स्वरूपं परमार्थतया मन्यमानो दुर्नयतामास्कन्दति, दृश्यमानस्थिरास्थूरार्थपल्लवे
निर्मूलतया स्वाभिप्रेतवस्तुसमर्थकपरामर्शस्योत्थानाभावात् । तथा हि—स्वा-
वयवव्यापिनं कालान्तरसंचरिष्णुमाकारं साक्षाल्लक्षयन् पश्चात् कुयुक्ति-
विकल्पेन विवेचयेत्, यदुतैष स्थिरस्थूरो दृश्यमानः खल्वाकारो न घटामिर्यति,
विचाराक्षमत्वादित्यादिना च दृष्टमदृष्टसंदर्शकैः कुयुक्तिविकल्पैर्बाधितुं शक्यम्,
सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् । अथाभिदधीथाः—मन्दमन्दप्रकाशे प्रदेशे रज्जौ
विषधरभ्रान्तिः प्राक्तनी यथोदीचीनेन तस्मिण्यकारिणा विकल्पेन बाध्यते, तथेद-
मपि स्थिरस्थूरदर्शनं क्षणक्षयिपरमाणुप्रसाधकपरामर्शेन, किमत्रायुक्तम्, नैतदस्ति,
रज्जुप्रतिभासस्यैव प्राक्प्रवृत्तविषधरभ्रान्त्यपनोददक्षत्वात्, तदभावे च विकल्प-
शतैरपि निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात् । अत्राप्यतीतवत्स्यंतोर्विनष्टानुत्पन्नतयाऽऽनिहि-

भागमात्रं न स्वर्वांशभाग इति कथं तेन व्यभिचारः ? तानीति । वस्तूनि । आद्यपर्यायस्येति ।
वार्तमानिकस्य, तत्र चोक्तो दोष इति ।

नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं बाहेतोरग्यानपेक्षणात् ।

अपेक्षतो हि भावानां कादाचित्कत्वसंभवः ॥ इति ।

तत्वात्, स्थूरावयवानां च स्वावयवेषु भेदाभेदद्वारेण पर्यालोच्यमानानामवस्थानाभावात्, क्षणक्षयिपरमाणव एव प्रतिभ्रान्ति, ततश्च प्रतिभास एव स्थिरस्थूरदर्शनस्य बाधक इति चेत् । एवं तर्हि प्रतिभासस्योपदेशगम्यतानुपपत्तेः तथैव व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । पाश्चात्यमिथ्याविकल्पविप्लवाच्च प्रवर्तते इति चेत्, न, अन्यत्राप्यस्योत्तरस्य विप्लवहेतुत्वात् । तथा हि—ध्वले जलजादौ प्रतिभातेऽपि 'नीलोऽयम्' अर्धक्षेणावलोकितः पाश्चात्यमिथ्याविकल्पविप्लवाद् धवलः प्रतिभातीति भवन्न्यायेन शठः प्रतिजानानः केन वार्येत । तन्न दृष्टापलापः कर्तुं शक्य इति स्थिरस्थूरवस्तुसिद्धिः, तस्यैव दर्शनात्, इतरस्य ददर्शनद्वारेण साध्यमानस्यानुभेदत्वात्, तदनिष्टौ तस्याप्यसिद्धेः । एतेन स्थिरस्थूरवस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियाविरहप्रतिपादनमपि प्रतिव्यूढम्, तथाविधस्यैव सर्वक्रियासु व्यापारदर्शनात्, क्षणक्षयिणोऽर्थक्रियानिषेधाच्च । यथोक्तं प्राक्—क्षणभङ्गुरो ह्यर्थात्मा स्वक्षणे पूर्वं पश्चाद्वा कार्यं कुर्यादित्यादि । किं च सत्त्वपुरुषत्वचैतन्यादिभिर्बालकुमारयुवस्थविरत्वहर्षविषादादिभिश्चानुवर्तमानव्यावर्तमानरूपस्य सर्वस्य वस्तुनः प्रतीतेर्द्रव्यपर्यायात्मकत्वम्, अभेदस्य द्रव्यत्वात्, भेदस्य पर्यायरूपत्वादिति । ततश्च भूतभाविक्षणयोरसंनिधानद्वारेण वार्तमानिकक्षणस्यैवार्थक्रियाकारित्वप्रतिपादनं नास्मद्वाधाकरम्, पर्यायाणां क्रमभावितया वर्तमानपर्यायालिङ्गतस्यैव द्रव्यस्यार्थक्रियाकरणचतुरत्वात्, केवलं तत्त्वकालव्यापि द्रष्टापि द्रव्यरूपतया यथाभूत एव, ततश्च क्षणिकपर्यायतिरोधानद्वारेण तद्रूपसंकलनात्, स्थिरमेवेदं समस्तक्रियासु व्याप्रियते इति प्रतीतिवीथीमवतरति, स्थैर्यस्यापि तात्त्विकत्वात्, क्षणिकपर्यायाणां विद्यमानानामप्यग्रहणात्, प्राकृतलोकज्ञानस्यावरणक्षयोपशमापेक्षितया कतिचिदंशविषयत्वात् । यदि पुनर्द्रव्यबुद्धिः पर्यायपरंपरादर्शनबलायातत्वादतात्त्विकी कल्प्येत, तदा पूर्वंपर्यायस्योत्तरपर्यायोत्पादने सान्त्वयत्वं निरन्वयत्वं वा वस्तुव्ययम्, गत्यन्तराभावात् । सान्त्वयत्वे द्रव्यं पर्यायान्तराभिहितं स्यात्, निरन्वयत्वाच्च पुनर्निर्हेतुतयोत्तरपर्यायानुत्पादप्रसङ्गः । तन्नोभयरूपवस्तुव्यतिरेकेणार्थक्रियासिद्धिः । न चार्थक्रिया वस्तुलक्षणम्, शब्दविद्युत्प्रदीपादिचरमक्षणानां क्षणान्तराम्भक्तत्वेनावस्तुत्वप्राप्तेः, तदवस्तुत्वे पुनरुपान्त्यक्षणस्यापि वस्तुनि व्यापाराभावात्, एवं यावत्सर्वक्षणानां संकलिकयावस्तुत्वम् । अथ क्षणान्तरानारम्भेऽपि स्वगोचरज्ञानजनकत्वमर्थक्रिया परिकल्प्येत, तथा सति अतीतभावपर्यायपरंपरापि योगिज्ञानगोचरतां यातीति वस्तुत्वं स्वीकुर्यात्, तन्नार्थक्रियावस्तुलक्षणम्, अपि तु उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तता, प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितत्वात् । उत्पादव्ययौ ध्रौव्येण सह विरुद्धाविति चेत्, कुतोऽयं विरोधः, प्रमाणादप्रमाणाद्

इतरस्य क्षणक्षयिपरमाणुत्वस्य । तद्दर्शनेति । स्थिरस्थूरवस्तुदर्शनद्वारेण ।

वीथीं मार्गम् । पर्यायान्तरेण नामान्तरेण । न चार्थक्रिया वस्तुलक्षणमिति । यदाह रागान्धावस्थायामपि धर्मकीर्तिः—

नरुद्धतु क्वापि ते स्वान्तः कान्ते कार्यं स्वयैव च ।

यदेवार्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् ॥ इति ।

वा । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, सर्वप्रमाणानां बहिरन्तस्तथाविधवस्तुद्योतनपटिष्ठतया प्रसाधितत्वात् । नापि द्वितीयः, अप्रमाणस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । एतेन स्थूरतादूषणमपि प्रतिक्षिप्तम्, प्रतिभासहतत्वात्, तदपह्नवे विरोधोद्भावे तस्य निर्मूलतया प्रलापमात्रत्वात् । यत्पुनर्वर्तमानप्रकाशरूपतया तत्संबन्धवस्तुग्राहित्वं सर्वप्रमाणानामुदग्राहि तदयुक्तम्, तेषामेकान्तेन वार्तमानिकत्वासिद्धेः, कथंचिदात्माव्यतिरेकत्वात्, तस्य च कालत्रयव्यापकत्वात्, तद्रूपतया तेषामप्यवस्थानात्, ततश्चात्मनोऽर्थग्रहणपरिणामरूपत्वात् । सर्वप्रमाणानां परिणामिन्येव वस्तुनि व्यापारो न क्षणिके । न चातीतानागतक्षणवतिवस्तुग्रहणेप्यनाद्यनन्तजन्मपरंपराग्रहणप्रसङ्गः, आवरणविच्छेदसापेक्षत्वात् तस्यैव परमार्थतः संवेदनाविर्भावान्तरकारणत्वात्, ग्राह्यादेर्बहिरङ्गत्वात् । सामस्त्येन पुनरावरणविलये सति समस्तवस्तुविस्तारानाद्यनन्तक्षणपरंपराग्रहणप्रसङ्गो ना(तो)नावाधाकारी, इष्टत्वात् । तदेकदेशक्षयोपशमे पुनस्तदनुसारिणी बोधप्रवृत्तिरिति कियत्कालं भाविनि स्थूरे वस्तुनि प्राकृतलोकज्ञानानि प्रवर्तन्ते न संपूर्णं । न च तान्यलीकानि, तद्ग्राह्यांशस्यापि वस्तुनि भावात् तावतैव व्यवहारसिद्धेरिति । यच्चोक्तम्—क्षणिकतां गृह्णन्तोऽपि सदृशापरापरोत्पत्तिविप्रलम्बत्वाद् मन्दा नाध्यवस्यन्ति, मिथ्याविकल्पवशात् स्थिरताव्यवहारं च प्रवर्तयन्ति, तदयुक्तम्, भवदाकूतेन सादृश्याभावात्, तदभावे तदुत्पाद्याभिमतभ्रान्तेर्निर्वीजतयोत्पत्तेरसंभवात् । तथा स्थिरतारोपोऽपि क्वचिद् गृहीतस्थिरत्वस्यैव युक्तो नान्यथा, यथा दृष्टविषयस्य मन्दप्रकाशे रज्जुदर्शने विषयतारोपः, न च भवतां कदाचन स्थिरता प्रतीतिगोचरचारितामनुभवति, तत्कथं प्रतिक्षणमुदयापवर्गसंसर्गिणि सकले वस्तुनि प्रत्यक्षेणावलोकितेऽपि तदारोप इति तस्मात्तिरोहितक्षणविवर्तमलक्षितपरमाणुवैविकत्यं वस्तु सांव्यवहारिकप्रमाणैर्गोचरीक्रियते । तत्तिरस्कारद्वारेण अदृष्टक्षणक्षयिपरमाणुप्रतिष्ठापकोऽभिप्राय ऋजुसूत्रो दुर्नयसंज्ञामश्नुते, तदुपेक्षयैव दर्शकस्य नयत्वात् । इति ॥

तथा शब्दादयोऽपि सर्वथा शब्दाव्यतिरेकमर्थस्य समर्थयन्तो दुर्नयाः, तत्समर्थनार्थमुपन्यस्तस्य तत्प्रतीतौ प्रतीयमानत्वलक्षणस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकत्वात् । तथा हि—नायमेकान्तो यत्प्रतीतौ यत्प्रतीयते तत्ततोऽव्यतिरिक्तमेव, व्यतिरिक्तस्यापि पावकादेरन्यथानुपपन्नत्वलक्षणसंबन्धबलाद् घूमादिप्रतीतौ प्रतीयमानत्वात् । एवं शब्दोऽपि व्यतिरिक्तमप्यर्थं वाचकत्वात् प्रत्याययिष्यति, अव्यतिरेकस्य प्रत्यक्षादिबाधितत्वात्, शब्दाद्विवेकेनैवानुभूयमानत्वात्, अस्मिंश्च हेतावनैकान्तिके स्थिते सर्वार्थानां स्ववाचकत्वसाधनद्वारेण शब्दाव्यतिरेकसाधनमपि

उपात्त्येति । अन्तस्य समीपमुपान्तं तत्र भवमुपान्त्यम् दिगादिदेहांशाद् यः (ति० हे० ६-३-१२४) इति यः ।

सर्वथेति । एवं वदन् इदमाह—कथंचित् शब्दादव्यतिरेकोऽर्थस्याभ्युपगम्यते एव जैनेः । अयं चार्थः अभिहाणं अभिहेयाउ होइ भिन्नं अभिन्नं च इत्यादिना प्राग्दशित

दूरापास्तमेव । न चात्रापि प्रतिबन्धग्राहि प्रमाणम्—यो योऽर्थस्तेन तेन सवाचकेन भवितव्यम्, घटादिदृष्टान्तमात्रात्तदसिद्धेः, क्षणिकालक्षयद्रव्यविवर्तानां संकेतग्रहणोपायाभावेनाभिलषितुमशक्यतया अनभिलाष्यत्वसिद्धेश्च क्षणभङ्गुरता-प्रतिज्ञानं पुनरमीषामपि ऋजुसूत्रवन्निरसितव्यम् । तथा प्रत्येकमतापेक्षयापि स्वाभिप्रेतं प्रतिष्ठापयन्तस्तद्विपरीतं शब्दार्थं तिरस्कुर्वाणा दुर्नयतामात्म-सात्कुर्वन्ति । एतावद्धि प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितम्, यदुत विधिमुखेन शब्दोऽर्थस्य वाचक इति, न पुनरर्थं नियमो यथायमस्यैव वाचको नान्यस्य, देशकालपुरुष-संकेतादिविचित्रया सर्वशब्दानामपरापरार्थाभिधायकत्वोपपत्तेः । अर्थानामप्य-नन्तर्धर्मत्वादेवापरापरशब्दवाच्यत्वाविरोधात्, तथैवाविगानेन व्यवहारदर्शनात्, तदनिष्टौ तल्लोपप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात् सर्वध्वनयो योग्यतया सर्वार्थवाचकाः, देश-क्षयोपशमाद्यपेक्षया तु क्वचित् कथंचित् प्रतीतिं जनयन्ति । ततश्च क्वचिदनपेक्षित-व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्ता रूढितः प्रवर्तन्ते, क्वचित् सामान्यव्युत्पत्तिसापेक्षाः, क्वचि-त्तत्कालवर्तिव्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तापेक्षयेति न तत्र प्रामाणिकेन नियतार्थाग्रहो विधेयः । अतोऽमी शब्दादयो यदा इतरेतराभिमतशब्दार्थोपेक्षया स्वाभिमत-शब्दार्थं दर्शयन्ति, तदा नयाः, तस्यापि तत्र भावात् । परस्परबाधया प्रवर्त-मानाः पुनर्दुर्नयरूपतां भजन्ति, निरालम्बनत्वादिति । ननु च यद्येकैकधर्म-समर्थनपरायणाः शेषधर्मतिरस्कारकारिणोऽभिप्राया दुर्नयतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते, तदा वचनमप्येकधर्मकथनद्वारेण प्रवर्तमानं सावधारणत्वाच्च शेषधर्मप्रतिक्षेपकारि अतीकमापद्यते, ततश्चानन्तधर्माध्यासितवस्तुसंदर्शकमेव वचनं यथावस्थितार्थ-

एवेति । अस्मिंश्च हेताविति । शब्दप्रतीतावर्थस्य प्रतीयमानत्वाद् इत्येवंरूपे । अलक्षयद्रव्य-विवर्तानामिति । बालानामपि अतिप्रतीतत्वात् अलक्ष्ये इत्युक्तम्, यावता स्फुटमनुभूयमाना अपि केचन वस्तुनां पर्याया अनभिलाष्या एव । यदुक्तम्—

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तरं महत् ।

तथापि न तदाख्यातुं सरस्वत्यापि शक्यते ॥

सिद्धान्तरहस्यं चात्र—

पन्नवणिज्जा भावा अणन्तभागो उ अणुभिलष्याणं ।

पन्नवणिज्जाणां पुण अणन्तभागो सुयतिबद्धो ॥

(विशे० भा०, १४१)

[प्रज्ञापनीया भावा अणन्तभागश्चानभिलाष्यानाम् ।

प्रज्ञापनीयानां पुनरनन्तभागः श्रुतिबद्धः ॥]

देशकालेति । देशकालपुरुषेषु संकेत आदिर्वेषां प्रस्तावादीनां ते तथा, तेषां विचित्रता, तथा । यथा हि—कर्कटीशब्दो मालवकादौ फलविशेषे रूढः, गुर्जरादौ तु योन्यामिति । एवं कालादावपि द्रष्टव्यम् । अधिगानेनेति । विगानं वचनीयता विप्रतिपत्तिरिति यावत् । तदनिष्टाविति । तस्य शब्दानामपरापरार्थाभिधायकत्वस्य, अर्थानां स्वपरापरशब्दाभिधेय-त्वस्य । तल्लोपः व्यवहारलोपः । सावधारणत्वाच्चेति । ‘सर्वं वाक्यं सावधारणम्’—

प्रतिपादकत्वात्सत्यम्, न चैवं वचनप्रवृत्तिः, षटोऽयं शुक्लो मूर्त इत्याद्येकैक-
धर्मप्रतिपादननिष्ठतया व्यवहारे शब्दप्रयोगदर्शनात्, सर्वधर्माणां यौगपद्येन
वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्, तदभिधायकानामप्यानन्त्यात् । न चैकैकधर्मसंदर्शकत्वेऽप्य-
मूनि वचनान्यलीकानि वक्तुं पार्यन्ते, समस्तशब्दव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्,
तदलीकत्वे ततः प्रवृत्त्यसिद्धेरिति । अत्रोच्यते, इह तावद् द्वये वस्तुप्रतिपादकाः,
लौकिकास्तत्त्वचिन्तकाश्च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षादिप्रसिद्धमर्थमर्थित्ववशात्लौकिकास्ता-
वद् मध्यस्थभावेन व्यवहारकाले व्यपदिशन्ति—यदुत नीलमुत्पलं सुगन्धि कोमल-
मिति, न तु तद्धर्मिगतधर्मान्तरग्रहणनिराकरणयोराद्रियन्ते, अनर्थित्वात्, तावतैव
विवक्षितव्यवहारपरिसमाप्तेः । न च तद्वचनानामलीकता, शेषधर्मान्तरप्रतिक्षेपा-
भावात्, तत्प्रतिक्षेपकारिणामेवालीकत्वात् । परः सर्वं वचनं सावधारणमिति
न्यायात् तेषामपि शेषधर्मतिरस्कारित्वसिद्धेर्भवन्तीत्यालीकतापद्यते इति चेत्,
न, अवधारणस्य तदसंभवमात्रव्यवच्छेदे व्यापारात् । अनेकपुरुषसंपूर्णं सदसि
द्वारादौ स्थितस्य किमत्र देवदत्तः समस्ति नास्तीति वा दोलायमानबुद्धेः केनचिद-
भिधीयते—यथा देवदत्तोऽस्तीति । अत्र यद्यप्युपन्यस्तपदद्वयस्य सावधारणता
गम्यते, अन्यथा तदुच्चारणवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्, तथाप्यवधारणं तदसंभवमात्रं
व्यवच्छिनत्ति, न शेषपुरुषान्तराणि । नापि पररूपेण नास्तित्वम्, तद्व्यवच्छेदाभिप्रा-
येण प्रस्तुतवाक्यप्रयोगात्, प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायादिसापेक्षतयैव ध्वनेः स्वार्थप्रतिपादनसा-
मर्थ्यात् । न च वाच्यवाचकभावलक्षणसंबन्धानर्थक्यम्, तदभावे प्रयोक्त्रभिप्रायादि-
मात्रेण रूपस्यैव नियोक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न च समस्तधर्मयुक्तमेव वस्तु प्रतिपादयद्वचनं
सत्यमित्यभिदधमहे, येनैकैकधर्मालिङ्गितवस्तुसंदर्शकानामलीकता स्यात्, किं तर्हि
संभवदर्थप्रतिपादकं सत्यमिति, संभवन्ति च शेषधर्माप्रतिक्षेपे वचनगोचरापन्ना
धर्माः, तस्मात् तत्प्रतिपादकं सत्यमेव । यदा दुर्नयमताभिनिविष्टबुद्धिभिस्तीर्थान्-
न्तरीयैस्तद्धर्मिगतधर्मान्तरनिराकरणाभिप्रायेणैव सावधारणं तत् प्रयुज्यते, यथा
नित्यमेव वस्तु अनित्यमेव वेत्यादि, तदा निरालम्बनत्वादलीकतां प्राप्नुवत्केन
वार्येत ? तत्त्वचिन्तकाः पुनः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धमनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु दर्शयन्तो द्वेषा
दर्शयेयुः, तद्यथा—विकलादेशेन सकलादेशेन वा । तत्र विकलादेशो नयाधीनः,
सकलादेशः प्रमाणायत्तः । तथा हि—यदा मध्यस्थभावेनाधित्ववशात् किंचिद्धर्मं
प्रतिपिपादयिष्वः शेषधर्मस्वीकरणनिराकरणविमुखया धिया वाचं प्रयुञ्जते तदा
तत्त्वचिन्तका अपि लौकिकवत् संमुग्धाकारतयाचक्षते—यदुत जीवोऽस्ति कर्ता
प्रमाता भोक्तृत्यादि, अतः संपूर्णवस्तुप्रतिपादनाभावाद् विकलादेशोऽभिधीयते,
नयमतेन संभवद्धर्माणां दर्शनमात्रमित्यर्थः । यदा तु प्रमाणव्यापारमविकलं परामृश्य

इति न्यायात् । तद्व्यवच्छेदाभिप्रायेणेति । तस्य देवदत्तादेरसंभवमात्रस्य व्यवच्छेदाभि-
प्रायेण, देवदत्तोऽस्तीति वाक्यस्योच्चारणात् । 'अप्रयोगाद्' इति तु पाठे किमित्यवधारणम् ।
शेषपुरुषान्तराणि पररूपेण नास्तित्वं च न व्यवच्छिनत्ति इत्याह तदिति । तेषां
शेषपुरुषान्तराणां पररूपेण नास्तित्वस्य व्यवच्छेदाभिप्रायेण प्रस्तुतवाक्यानभिधानात् ।
प्रयोक्त्रभिप्रायादिति । आदिशब्दात् संकेतादिग्रहः । अङ्गीकृतेत्यादि । अङ्गीकृता गुण-

प्रतिपादयितुमभिप्रयन्ति, तदाङ्गीकृतगुणप्रधानभावा अशेषधर्मसूचककथंचित्पर्या-
यस्याच्छब्दभूषितया सावसाधारणया वाचा दर्शयन्ति स्यादस्त्येव जीवः इत्यादि-
कया, अतोऽयं स्याच्छब्दसंसूचिताभ्यन्तरीभूतानन्तधर्मकस्य साक्षादुपन्यस्तजीव-
शब्दक्रियाभ्यां प्रधानीकृतात्मभावस्यावधारणव्यवच्छिन्नतदसंभवस्य वस्तुनः संदर्श-
कत्वात् सकलादेश इत्युच्यते, प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नसंपूर्णार्थिकथनमिति यावत् ।
तदुक्तम्—

सा ज्ञेयविशेषगतिर्नयप्रमाणात्मिका भवेत्तत्र ।
सकलग्राहि तु मानं विकलग्राही नयो ज्ञेयः ॥

तदिदमुक्तं भवति—नयप्रमाणाभिज्ञः स्याद्वादी सकलविकलादेशावधिकृत्य
वस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपिपादयिषया यद्यद् भूते तत्तत् सत्यम्, संभवदर्थगोचरत्वात् ।
दुर्नयमतावलम्बिनः पुनरेकान्तवादिनो यद्यदाचक्षते तत्तदलीकम्, असंभवदर्थ-
विषयत्वादिति ॥२९॥

सांप्रतममुमेवार्थं द्रढयन् सिद्धान्तेऽप्येकैकनयमतप्रवृत्तानि सूत्राणि न
संपूर्णार्थाभिधायकानीति, अपि तु तत्समुदायाभिप्रायप्रवृत्तमविकलवस्तुनिवेदक-
मिति दर्शयन्नाह—

नयानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तेः श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।
संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वाद्भूतमुच्यते ॥३०॥

इह त्रिविधं श्रुतम्, तद्यथा—मिथ्याश्रुतम्, नयश्रुतम्, स्याद्वादश्रुतम् ।
तत्र श्रूयते इति श्रुतमागमः, मिथ्या अलीकं श्रुतं मिथ्याश्रुतम्, तच्च दुर्नयाभिप्राय-
प्रवृत्ततीर्थिकसंबन्धि, निर्गोचरत्वात् । तथा नयैर्हेतुभूतैः श्रुतं नयश्रुतम्,
एतच्चार्यदागमान्तर्गतमेव, एकनयाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धं, यथा—‘पडुप्पन्ने नेरइए
विणस्सइ’ इत्यादि, ऋजुसूत्रनयाभिप्रायेण क्षणिकत्वस्यापि तत्र संभवात् । तथा
निर्दिश्यमानधर्मव्यतिरिक्तशेषधर्मान्तरसंसूचकेन स्याता युक्तो वादोऽभिप्रेतधर्म-
वचनं स्याद्वादः, तदात्मकं श्रुतं स्याद्वादश्रुतम् । तत्, किंभूतमुच्यते इत्याह—
संपूर्णोऽविकलः स चासावर्थश्च तद्विनिश्चायि तन्निर्णयहेतुत्वादेवमभिधीयते,

प्रधानभावाभ्यामशेषाश्च ते धर्माश्च तेषां सूचकः कथंचिच्छब्दः पर्यायो नामान्तरं यस्य
स कथंचित्पर्यायः, स चासौ स्याच्छब्दश्च तेनालंकृतया ॥२९॥

पडुप्पन्नेति सांप्रतमुत्पन्नस्तत्कालोत्पन्न इत्यर्थः । निरयो दुर्गतिस्तत्र भवो नैरयिको
नारकिकः स नश्यति । अथ कथं तत्क्षणोत्पन्नस्य तस्य विनाशः नारकिकारणं जघन्यतोऽपि
दशवर्षसहस्रस्थायित्वस्यागमेऽभिधानात् इत्याह ऋजुसूत्रेत्यादि । अयमभिप्रायः—यावन्तो
नयास्तावत्समुदायरूपोऽर्हदागमः, ‘सर्वनयमयं जिणमयं’ इति वचनात् । यतो यथा यत्स-
मयविशिष्टः संपूर्णस्वस्थितिधर्मा च प्रथमसमये नैरयिक आसीत्, न तथा द्वितीयसमये इति
ऋजुसूत्राभिप्रायेण स्पष्टेव क्षणिकतेति । स्यातेति । अस्तेर्यात्प्रत्ययान्तस्य प्रतिरूपकोऽने-

परमार्थतः पुनः समस्तवस्तुस्वरूपप्रतिपादीत्यर्थः, शब्दात्मकत्वात्, निश्चयस्य बोधरूपत्वादिति । नयश्रुतं तर्हि संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि कस्मान्न भवति इत्याह—
नयानां नैगमादीनामेकनिष्ठानामेकधर्मग्रहणपर्यवसितानां श्रुतवर्तमानि आगममार्गे प्रवृत्तेः प्रवर्तनात् न तदेकैकाभिप्रायप्रतिबद्धं संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि, तत्समुदायस्यैव संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायकत्वादित्याकूतम् ॥३०॥

तदेवं नयप्रमाणस्वरूपं प्रतिपाद्याधुना शेषनयप्रमाणव्यापकं तेषां तत्र तादात्म्येनावस्थानात् प्रमातारमभिधातुकाम आह—

प्रमाता स्वान्यनिर्भासी कर्ता भोक्ता विवृत्तिमान् ।

स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धो जीवः क्षित्याद्यनात्मकः ॥३१॥

तत्र त्रिकालजीवनाज्जीवः, प्राणधारक आत्मेत्यर्थः, स प्रमिणोतीति प्रमाता प्रमेयपरिच्छेदकः । किं भूतः सन्नित्याह—स्वान्यौ आत्मपरो निर्भासयितुं उद्घो-
तयितुं शीलमस्येति स्वान्यनिर्भासी, स्वस्वरूपार्थयोः प्रकाशक इति यावत् ।
तथा करोतीति कर्ता, भुङ्क्ते इति भोक्ता । विवर्तनमपरापरपययिषु गमनं
विवृत्तिः परिणामः, सा विद्यते यस्येति विवृत्तिमान् । स्व आत्मा संवेद्यतेजे-
नेति स्वसंवेदनं तेन सम्यक् सिद्धः प्रतिष्ठितः प्रतीतो वा स्वसंवेदनसंसिद्धः ।
क्षितिः पृथिव्यादिर्येषां तानि क्षित्यादीनि, आदिशब्दादम्बुतेजोवाय्वाकाशानि
गृह्यन्ते । न विद्यते आत्मा स्वरूपमस्येत्यनात्मकः, किं स्वरूपरूपापेक्षया ?
न, क्षित्यादीनामनात्मकः क्षित्याद्यनात्मकः क्षित्यादिस्वरूपो न भवतीत्यर्थः ।
तत्र 'जीवः प्रमाता' इत्यनेन ये पारमार्थिकं प्रमातारं नाम्युपगच्छन्ति अपि
तु विज्ञानक्षणपरंपरानुभवबलप्रबोधितानादिप्ररूढवासनासंपादितसत्ताकं मिथ्या-
विकल्पपरिकल्पितमपारमार्थिकं तं मन्यन्ते प्रतिक्षणविलयवादिनः तान्नि-
राचष्टे, क्षणविलयस्य प्रागेव प्रतिषिद्धत्वात्, बहिरन्तश्च परिणामिवस्तुनः
प्रसाधनात् । ननु च घटादयस्तावद्विनाशमाविशन्तो दृश्यन्ते, तेषां च विनाशो
लकुटादिकारणकलापेन अविनश्वरस्वभावानां वा क्रियेत विनश्वरस्वभावानां वा ।
यद्याद्यः कल्पः, तदयुक्तम्, स्वभावस्य प्रच्यावयितुमशक्यत्वात्, तस्य नियतरूप-
त्वात्, अन्यथा स्वभावत्वायोगात् । अथैवंभूत एव तस्य स्वभावः स्वकारणबला-
यातो यदुत विनाशकारणमासाद्य विनङ्क्ष्यति इति ब्रूषे, तथापि तद्विनाशकारणसंनि-

कान्तार्थवृत्तिः स्याच्छब्दोऽव्ययः, अत्र तु सविभक्तिकनिर्देशः शब्दरूपापेक्षया; तेन स्याता,
स्यादित्यनेन शब्देन युक्तो वाद् इत्यर्थः ॥३०॥

त्रिकालजीवनादिति । जीवनं पञ्चेन्द्रियमनोवाक्कायोच्छ्वासनिःश्वासायुर्लक्षणदश-
विधप्राणधारणम्, तच्च यद्यपि मुक्तानां न संभवति, तथापि नाव्यापकम्, यतो मुक्तात्मानो
मुक्तेर्वाग् यथासंभवं दशविधानपि प्राणान् धारितवन्तः, इत्युपचाराद् मुक्तावस्थायाम-
जीवितवन्तोऽपि जीवन्त इत्युच्यन्ते । यद्वा क्षायिकज्ञानदर्शनलक्षणं द्विविधभावप्राणधारणं
जीवनम्, अस्मिन् च पक्षे त्रिकालप्राणधारणं निरुपचारं मुक्तजीवानां विस्पष्टमेव । तस्व-
भावेति विनाशस्वभावसंपाद्यम् । तत्संनिधापकहेतूनामिति । तस्य विनाश कारणमुद्गरादे-

जानं किं यादृच्छिकम्, उत तत्स्वभावसंपाद्यमेव । यदाद्यः कल्पः, तदा संनिहितस्यापि तत्प्रत्यनीकप्रत्ययोपनिपातेन निवर्तनात् तत्संनिधापकहेतूनामपि स्वसंनिधापककारण-कलापसापेक्षत्वात्, संनिहितानामपि प्रतिद्वन्द्विना निवर्तनात्, यादृच्छिकत्वाच्च नावश्यंभावि तत्संनिधानम्, ततश्चासंनिहितस्वविनाशकारणकदम्बकः कश्चित्घटादिर्न विनश्येदपि, अनिष्टं चैतत्, सर्वकृतकानां विनाशाविगानात् । अथ द्वितीयः पक्षः, तथा सति पश्चादपि तद्वलाद्विनाशहेतवः संनिधास्यन्ति इति प्रथमक्षणे एव संनिदधतु, तथापि क्षणिकतैवार्थस्य । स्वहेतोरेव नियतकालात् परतोऽयं स्वविनाशहेतुं संनिधापयिष्यतीति एवंरूपो जात इति चेत्, न, एवमपि क्षणभंगुरतायात् । तथा हि—स्वहेतुना किलासौ वर्षात्परतः स्वविनाश-हेतुसंनिधापनक्षमस्वभावो व्यधायि, स च तस्योत्पादक्षणात्, द्वितीयक्षणे स्वभावोऽस्ति न वा ? अस्ति चेत्, तथा सति पुनर्वर्षे तेन स्थातव्यम्, एवं यावद्दुर्घोपान्त्यक्षरोऽपि यदि तत्स्वभाव एवासौ तदापरमपि वर्षान्तरं स्थितिरापद्येत, तदा चानन्तकल्पस्थायी भावः स्यात्, अप्रच्युतवर्षस्थायिस्वभावत्वादिति । अथ द्वितीयक्षणे नास्ति स स्वभाव इति ब्रूषे, हन्त क्षणिकत्वमेवाढीकते, अतादवस्थस्य तल्लक्षणत्वात् । किं च । विनाशहेतुभावस्य विनाशं व्यतिरिक्तमव्यतिरिक्तं वा कुर्यात्, व्यतिरिक्तकरणे न किञ्चित् कृतं स्यात्, ततश्च भावस्तादवस्थमनु-भवेत् । तत्संबन्धः क्रियते इति चेत्, संबन्धस्य तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिव्यतिरिक्तस्य प्रतिषेधात् । न चानयोरन्यतरः संबन्धोऽत्र समस्ति, व्यतिरेकिणा सार्धं तादात्म्या-योगात्, अन्यहेतुकस्य पश्चादुत्पन्नस्य तदुत्पत्तिवैकल्यात् । तन्न व्यतिरिक्तो विनाशः कर्तुं युक्तः । अव्यतिरिक्तकरणे पुनस्तमेव भावं विनाशहेतुः करोतीति प्राप्तम्, अव्यतिरेकस्य तद्रूपतालक्षणात्वात् । न चासौ कर्तव्यः, स्वहेतोरेव निष्पन्नत्वात्, तत्करणे च तस्यावस्थानमेव स्यान्न प्रलयः । तन्न अवि-नश्वरस्वभावानां पश्चात्, कथंचिदपि विनाशः कर्तुं शक्यः, विनश्वरस्व-भावानां पुनः स्वहेतवलायातत्वात् प्रागपि प्रतिक्षणभावी न कारणान्तरा-पेक्षः, स्वभावस्य नियतरूपत्वात्, तस्मात् प्राणिति अद्यापि प्रतिक्षण-विलय इति । अत्रोच्यते—सत्यमेतत्, किं तु यथा विनाशकारणायोगात्

रूपसंगहेतवः पाण्यादयः । ननु यदृच्छा स्वेच्छावृत्तिरुच्यते, तत्कथमिह हेतुपेक्षा युज्यते ? सत्यम्, विनाशस्वभावात् यादृच्छिकत्वमिह विवक्षितं न निर्हेतुकत्वम्, निर्हेतुकत्वमपि चाधि-कृत्याभिधास्यति यादृच्छिकेस्यादि ।

कल्पस्थायीति । युगं द्वादशसाहस्रं कल्पं विद्धि चतुर्युगम्—इति लौकिकाः कल्प-माहुः । अत्रेति । भावविनाशयोः । अन्येत्यादि । मुद्गरहेतुकस्य विनाशयोत्तरकालभावितो विनाशस्य घटादेविनाश्यादुत्पत्त्यभावात् । तथेवेति ! स्थित्युत्पत्त्योः प्रतिक्षणभावित्वं बोद्ध-स्याभीष्टमेव, परं तथैव निर्हेतुकत्वेनैवेत्यत्र साध्यम् ।

ननु चेत्यादि । पूर्वं हि बोद्धेन विनाशस्य निर्हेतुकत्वेऽभिहिते परोपन्यस्ते युक्ति-कलापेनैव मत्पक्षः सेत्स्यतीति मन्यमानेनाचार्येणोत्पादस्थिती अपि निर्हेतुके प्रत्यपादिघातात्, तदस्थः पुनः सर्वत्रापि सहेतुकत्वं पश्यन्नेवं पूर्वंपक्षयति । समाधानाभिप्रायस्तु सकलमपि

प्रतिक्षणभावीति नाशो भवद्भिः प्रतिपद्यते, तथैव स्थित्युत्पत्ती प्रतिक्षणभाविन्यौ किं न प्रतिपद्यते, तद्वेतूनामपि विचार्यमाणानामयोगात् । तथा हि—स्थितिहेतुना तावत्स्वयमस्थिरस्वभावा भावाः स्थाप्येरन् स्थिरस्वभावा वा । न तावत्प्रथमः पक्षः क्षोदं क्षमते, स्वभावस्यान्यथा कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्, तस्य प्रतिनियतरूपत्वात्, चेतनाचेतनस्वभाववत्, अन्यथा स्वभावताहानेः । द्वितीयपक्षे पुनः स्वयं स्थिरस्वभावानां किं स्थितिहेतुना ? परः स्थितिर्नेध्यते एव, तेनानभ्युपगतोपालम्भ एवायमिति चेत्, हन्त हतोऽसि, एवं हि भावाः क्षणमात्रमपि न तिष्ठेयुः । क्षणभाविनीष्यते एवेति चेत्, सा तर्हि अस्थितिस्वभावानां हेतुशतैरपि कर्तुं न पार्यते इति ब्रूमः । तत्स्वभावत्वे पुनर्हेतुव्यापारनैरर्थक्यात् । अहेतुका सती सकलकालं भवतीति दत्तो जलाञ्जलिः प्रतिक्षणविलयस्य । तथोत्पादहेतुरपि तत्स्वभावस्योत्पत्तिं विदध्यात् अतस्वभावस्य वा । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः कक्षीकर्तुं युक्तः, स्वयमुत्पादकस्योत्पादने व्याप्रियमाणो हि हेतुः पिष्टं पिनष्टि, शङ्खं धवलयतीति, तदभावेऽपि स्वयोग्यतयोत्पत्तेः । नापि द्वितीयः कल्पोऽङ्गीकरणार्हः, स्वयमनुत्पत्तिधर्मकस्योत्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात्, अन्यथा शशविषाणादयोऽप्युत्पाद्य-कोटिमध्यासीरन्, विशेषाभावात्, ततश्च न कश्चिदत्यन्ताभावः स्यात् । तद्यथा—निर्हेतुकत्वात् नाशः प्रतिक्षणभावी, तथैव दशितयुक्तेः स्थित्युत्पत्ती अपीति त्रयाकान्तं सकलवस्तुजातमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, तथा सति जीवोऽपि जीवत्वचैतन्य-द्रव्यत्वादिभिः स्थेमानमाविभ्राण एव हर्षविषादादिभिरपरापरार्थग्रहणपरिणामैश्चोत्पादव्ययधर्मकः पारमाथिकः प्रमातेति वलात् सिद्धिमध्यास्ते । ननु च यद्युत्पादव्यवस्थितानां निर्हेतुकत्वात् सकलकालभाविता भवद्भिः साध्यते, तदान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणप्रसिद्धः खल्वयं तत्कारणकलापव्यापारः कथं नेयः ? न चायमपह्लोतुं शक्यः । तथा हि—कुलालादिकारणव्रातव्यापारे घटादयः समुपलभ्यन्ते, तदभावे च नोपलभ्यन्ते इति तज्जन्या इत्युच्यन्ते, स्थितिरपि विनाशकारणसंनिधानात् प्राक् तद्वलादेव, तथा नाशोऽपि मुद्गरादि-संनिधानासंनिधानाभ्यां सदसत्तामनुभवतस्तत्कृतः प्रतीयते नाहेतुकः, तत्कथमेत दिति । अत्रोच्यते न वयं सर्वथा हेतूतां व्यापारं वारयामः, किं तर्हि स्वयमुत्पाद-व्ययस्थित्यात्मना विवर्तमानस्य द्रव्यस्य हेतवस्तद्विशेषकरणे व्यापारमनुभवन्ति, तेनैव सार्धं तेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकानुकरणदर्शनात्, दृष्टस्य चापह्लवेऽस्माकमप्रवृत्त-त्वात्, प्रतीतियुक्तिलक्षणद्वयपक्षपातित्वात्, केवलं प्रतीतिविकलां युक्तिं युक्ति-विनाकृतां वा प्रतीतिं नाङ्गीकुर्महे, असंभवदर्थगोचरतया निरालम्बनत्वात्तस्या इत्यास्तां तावत् । 'स्वान्यनिर्भासि' इत्यनेन प्रागुक्तस्वपराभासि प्रमाणविशेषण-वन्मीमांसकान् परोक्षबुद्धिवादिनो योगाचारांश्च ज्ञानमात्रवादिनः प्रतिक्षिपति । कथम् ? ज्ञानज्ञानिनोः कथंचिदभेदेन तदुक्तन्यायाविशेषादिति । 'कर्ता भोक्ता' इति विशेषणद्वयेन सांख्यमतं विकुट्टयति, कर्ता सन् भोक्तापि इति काववोपन्या-

त्रिलोकीगतं मृदादिद्रव्यमात्मनैव प्रतिक्षणमुदयव्ययधौव्यात्मकम्, कुलाललगुडादयस्तु घट-घटीकपालादिविशेषकरणे एव व्याप्रियन्ते इति । अकर्तुरिति । यदाहुः सांख्याः—प्रकृतिः

सात्, अक्तुर्भोगानुपपत्तेः, भुजिक्रियानिर्वर्तनसमर्थस्यैव भोक्तृत्वात् । जपा-
कुसुमादिसंनिधानवशात् स्फटिके रक्तत्वादिव्यपदेशवदकर्तुरपि प्रकृत्युपधान-
वशात् सुखदुःखादिभोगव्यपदेशो युक्तः । तथा हि—‘प्रकृतिविकारदर्पणाकार-
बुद्धिसंक्रान्तानां सुखदुःखात्मकानामर्थानां पुरुषः संनिधानमात्रेण भोजको
व्यपदिश्यते, बुद्ध्यध्यवसितमर्थं पुरुषश्चेतयते’—इति वचनादिति चेत्, न, कथंचित्
सक्रियाकताव्यतिरेकेण प्रकृत्युपधानेऽप्यन्यथात्वानुपपत्तेः, अप्रच्युतप्राचीनरूपस्य
व्यपदेशानर्हत्वात्, तत्प्रच्यवे च प्राक्तनरूपत्यागेनोत्तररूपाध्यासिततया सक्रियत्व
मापततीति न्यायात् । स्फटिकदृष्टान्तेऽपि जपाकुसुमादिसंनिधानादन्धोपलादौ
रक्ततानाविर्भवन्ती तस्य तथाविधं परिणामं लक्षयति, अन्यथान्धोपलवत्तत्रापि
न प्रादुःष्यात्, तत्राक्रियस्य भोक्तृतोपपद्यते इति । ‘विवृत्तिमान्’ इत्यमुनात्वे-
कान्तनित्यमपरिणामिनं नैयायिकवैशेषिकादिप्रकल्पितं प्रमातारं निरस्यति, सर्वथा
अविचलितरूपस्यार्थग्रहणपरिणामानुपपत्तेः । व्यतिरिक्तज्ञानसमवायादेकान्त-
नित्योऽपि प्रमिणोतीति चेत्, न, समवायस्य प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तत्वात्, संबन्धात्-
रस्य च व्यतिरेकिणा साकमनुपपत्तेः, अन्यत्र अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वात् । न च
व्यतिरेकिणि ज्ञाने समस्ति, तद्ग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्, अव्यतिरेकानुभवस्य च
तद्बाधकत्वात् । किं च यदि समवायबलादात्मनि ज्ञानं समवैति, तदा
आत्मनां समवायस्य च विभुत्वादेकरूपत्वाच्च सर्वात्मसु किं न समवैति ?
विशेषाभावात्, तथा च देवदत्तज्ञानेन यज्ञदत्तादयोऽप्यर्थतत्त्वं बुद्धयेरन् ।
अन्यच्च विज्ञानोदयसमयेऽपि यादृशः प्रागवस्थायां तादृश एव संतिष्ठ-
मानः प्रागप्रमाता पश्चात् प्रमातेति ब्रूवाणः खलून्मत्ततामात्मनि आवि-
र्भावयति, नापरमित्यास्तां तावत् । पश्चार्धेन पुनर्भूतव्यतिरेकिणं स्वसं-
वेदनप्रत्यक्षनिर्ग्राह्यं जीवं दर्शयच्चार्वाकदर्शनं तिरस्कुस्ते, जडात्मकभूताव्य-
तिरेकेहि तद्धितलक्षणबोधरूपहर्षविषादादिविवर्तानुभवाभावप्रसङ्गात् । ननु

करोति पुरुष उपभुङ्क्ते—इति । प्रकृतिविकारेत्यादि । सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः,
तस्या विकारो वैषम्यम्, स चासौ निर्मलत्वेन प्रतिबिम्बोत्पत्तियोग्यत्वात् दर्पणाकारा
चासौ बुद्धिश्च तत्र प्रतिबिम्बितानां सुखदुःखादिरूपाणामर्थानामात्मा प्रकृतिसंनिधानात्
भोक्ताभिधीयते । अयमभिप्रायः—अर्थास्तावत् प्रकृत्यात्मके बुद्धिदर्पणे पूर्वं प्रतिबिम्ब्यन्ते,
प्रकृत्यभिन्नत्वभावार्थप्रतिबिम्बवती बुद्धिः, आत्मनीत्येष प्रतिबिम्बलक्षणो भोगः ।
वादमहाराणोऽप्यस्मिन् दर्शने स्थितः प्राह—बुद्धिदर्पणसंक्रान्तसमर्थप्रतिबिम्बकं द्वितीयदर्पण-
कल्पे पुंस्यध्यारोहति, तदेवं भोक्तृत्वमस्य, न तु विकारापत्तिः—इति । तथा
चाहुरासुरिप्रभृतयः—

विविक्तेद्वपरिणतो बुद्धी भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते ।

प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छे यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्बसि ॥

अस्यार्थः—विविक्ता स्पष्टा ईदृग् विषयाकारपरिणतेन्द्रियाकारा परिणतियस्या
बुद्धेः सा तथा, तस्यां सत्यामस्यात्मनो भोगः कथ्यते । किं स्वरूपः ? प्रतिबिम्बोदयः, न
वास्तवः । प्रतिबिम्बमात्रे दृष्टान्तमाह—यथा चन्द्रमसो निर्मले जले प्रतिबिम्बनम्, एवं

च कायाकारपरिणतानि भूतान्येवात्मव्यतिरेकिणीं चेतनामुत्कालयन्ति, सा च तथाविधपरिणामपरिणतेषु तेषु संतिष्ठते तदभावे पुनस्तेष्वेव निलीयते इति तद्व्यतिरेकानुभवेऽपि न परलोकयायिजीवसिद्धिः, इयतेव दृष्टव्यवहारोपपत्तेः । नैतदस्ति, द्वयं हि तावदेतत् संयोगमनुभवदुपलभ्यते—पञ्चभूतात्मकं शरीरं चेतना च । तत्रापि शरीरं बहिर्मुखाकारेण बोधनार्थरूपतया जडमनुभूयते, चेतना पुनरन्तर्मुखाकारेण स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेण साक्षात्क्रियते, अत एवाव्यतिरेकः पक्षः प्रतिभासनिराकृतत्वात्तद्विद्धितः । व्यतिरेकिणोः पुनः प्रकाशमानयोः यदि भूतान्येव चेतनामुत्कालयन्तीति भवद्भिः परिकल्प्यते, तदा चेतनैव भवान्तरादुत्पत्तिस्थानमायाता पञ्चभूतभ्रान्तिजनकं शरीरं निर्वर्तयेत्, पुनर्भवान्तर यातुकामा मुञ्चेत्, तत्तयाधिष्ठितं गमनादिचेष्टां कुर्यात्, तद्विद्युक्तं पुनः काष्ठवत्तिष्ठेदिति जीवसंपाद्यमेव शरीरम्, न पुनरसौ तत्संपाद्य इति । एतत्परिकल्पनं युक्ततरं पश्यामः, जीवस्य चेतनावतः सकर्मकतयापरापरभवभ्रमणपरापरशरीरनिर्वर्तनयोरुपपद्यमानत्वात् । भवान्तरादागच्छन्नुत्पत्तिस्थानं जीवोऽध्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते इति चेत्, भूतान्यपि तर्हि कायाकारधारणद्वारेण चेतनामुत्कालयन्तीति प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलक्ष्यन्ते इति समानो न्यायः । अथ कायाकारपरिणतेष्वेव भूतेषु चेतनोपलभ्यते नान्यदा इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिवशात् तज्जन्येति परिकल्प्यते, एवं तर्हि मृतावस्थायां कायाकारमाविभ्रान्तेष्वपि नोपलब्धा, कायाकारपरिणामो वा कादाचित्कया हेत्वन्तरापेक्षी इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तिवशादेव तन्निर्वर्तनक्षमा चेतना भवान्तरागतचेतना जीवसंबन्धिनीति प्रतिपद्यामहे । किं च, जीवस्तावत् कर्मचैतन्यसंबन्धाच्छरीरनिर्वर्तनार्थं प्रवर्तत इति युक्तमेवैतत्, भूतानि पुनः किंभूतानि चेतनाकरणे प्रवर्तेरन् सचेतनानि निश्चेतनानि वा ? यद्याद्यः कल्पः, ततो विकल्पयुगलमवतरति तच्चैतन्यं तेभ्यो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा ? यदि भिन्नं तदा पुरुषशरीरवत् तत्रापि भूतैः सह वर्तमानमपि भूतविलक्षणमात्मकारणमनु-

विशिष्टाकारपरिणतया बुद्धेरात्मनीति । विभक्तेत्यादिपाठान्तरेण व्याख्यानान्तरं तु हरिभद्रसूरिकृतं नेह प्रकाशयते, बहुव्याख्याने व्यामोहप्रसङ्गात् । अन्ये तु विन्ध्यवासिप्रभृतयः—

पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम् ।

मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधिः स्फटिकं यथा ॥

इति भोगमाचक्षते । व्याख्या—यथोपाधिर्जपापुष्पपद्मरागादिरत्नद्रूपमपि स्फटिकं स्वकारां रक्तादिच्छायां करोति, एवमयमात्मा स्वरूपादप्रच्यवमानः चैतन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वं वचनमिति वचनादचेतनमपि मनो बुद्धिलक्षणमन्तःकरणं स्वनिर्भासं चेतनमिव करोति सांनिध्यात्, न पुनर्वस्तुतो मनसश्चैतन्यम्, विकारित्वात् । तथा हि—मनोऽचेतनम्, विकारित्वात् घटवदिति । अन्धेति । अन्धोपलः प्रतिबिम्बोत्पादनानर्हः खलटः पाषाणः । तद्विति अन्यथानुपपन्नत्वम् । तद्बाधकत्वात् व्यतिरेकबाधकत्वात् । उत्कालयन्तीति । कल-पिल-डिप क्षेपे चुरादावदन्तः, अधिकीकुर्वन्तीत्यर्थः तज्जन्येति । कायाकारपरिणामजन्या । तन्निर्वर्तनेति कायाकारपरिणामोत्पादनसमर्था । पुरुषशरीरेत्यादि । यथा पुरुषशरीरे यच्चैतन्यं तत् स्वोत्पत्तये

मापयतीति तदवस्थैव जीवसिद्धिः । अथाभिन्नम्, तथा सति समस्तभूतानामैक्यं प्रसजति, एकचैतन्याव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्, तस्वरूपवत् । निजनिजचैतन्याव्यतिरेकीणि भूतानि तेनायमदोष इति चेन्न, तत्संपाद्यपुरुषशरीरेऽपि तज्जन्यपञ्चचैतन्यप्रसङ्गात् । पञ्चापि संभूय बृहत्पुरुषचैतन्यं बहवस्तिला इव तैलघटं जनयन्तीति चेत्, तत्तर्हि पुरुषचैतन्यं किं तेषामेव संयोगो यद्वा तदुत्पाद्यमन्यदेव ? यद्याद्यः कल्पः, तदयुक्तम्, चैतन्यानां परस्परं मिश्रणाभावेन संयोगविरोधात्, इतरथा बहुपुरुषचैतन्यानि संभूय बृहत्तमचैतन्यान्तरमारभेरन् । अथ द्वितीयः पक्षः, तत्रापि तेषां किमन्योऽस्ति नास्ति वा ? यद्यस्ति, तदयुक्तम्, प्राग्ब्रह्मज्जन्यचैतन्यपञ्चरूपतापत्तेः । अथ नास्ति, तदप्यचारु, निरन्वयोत्पादस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात्, तन्न सचेतनानि भूतानि चेतनाकरणे व्यापारभाञ्जि भवितुमर्हन्ति । नापि निश्चेतनानि, तेषामत्यन्तविलक्षणतया चैतन्योत्पादविरोधात्, इतरथा सिकतादयस्तैलादिकरणे व्याप्रियेरन् । किं च तत्समुदायमात्रसाध्यं वा चैतन्यं स्यात्, विशिष्टतत्परिणामसाध्यं वा ? न तावदाद्या क्लृप्तिः, इलाजलानलानिलनभस्तलमोलनेऽपि चेतनानुपलब्धेः । द्वितीयविकल्पौ पुनः किं वैशिष्ट्यमिति वाच्यम् । कायाकारपरिणाम इति चेत्, स तर्हि सर्वदा कस्मान्न भवति ? कुतश्चिद्वेत्तरापेक्षणादिति चेत्, तत्तर्हि हेत्वन्तरं भवान्तरायातजीवचैतन्यमित्यनुमिमीमहे, तस्यैव कायाकारपरिणामसाध्यचैतन्यानु रूपोपादानकारणत्वात्, तद्विरहे कायाकारपरिणामसद्भावेऽपि मृतावस्थायां तदभावात्, गमनादिचेष्टानुपलब्धेः, तन्न कायाकारपरिणामजन्यचैतन्यम्, अपि तु स एव तज्जन्य इति युक्तं पश्यामः । न प्रत्यक्षादन्यत् प्रमाण-

शरीरजनकेषु भूतेषु चैतन्यं कल्पयति । तथा तत्रापि । तेष्वपि भूतेषु तैर्भूतैः सह वर्तते यच्चैतन्यं तदपि स्वजनकेषु भूतेषु तेभ्यो भूतेभ्यो भिन्नमात्महेतुमपरं चैतन्यं गमयतीति । तदवस्थेति । अनवच्छिन्नचैतन्यसंतानस्य जीवरूपत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । निरन्वयोत्पादस्य प्रमाणबाधित्वादिति । अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तवस्तुग्रहणपरिणामः प्रत्यक्षं, यथा च तेन मृत्पिण्डादुत्पद्यमानं घटादि मृद्द्रव्यात्मनानुगतम्, घटघटीशरावोदञ्चनाद्यपि पर्यायपेक्षया व्यावृत्तं वीक्ष्यते, ते च भेदाविशेषेऽपि घटापटाष्विव स्थासकोष्ठादिषु विलक्षणैव प्रतिपत्तिः, तथा चैतन्यमपि पूर्वचैतन्यादुत्पद्यमानं चिद्रूपतयानुवृत्तं सितपीतादिवोधरूपतया तु व्यावृत्तं स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षेणैव व्यवस्थाप्यते इति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धान्वयः, तेन च निरन्वयोत्पादैकान्तो बाधितः । तथा हि—पूर्वो ज्ञानक्षण उत्पद्यमानक्षणात् कथंचिदभेदी, उपादानत्वे सति कारणत्वात्, यः पुनः कथंचिदभेदी न भवति नासवुपादानत्वे सति कारणम्, यथा आलोकः, न चायमुपादानत्वे सति न कारणम्, तस्मान् कथंचिदभेदीति । उपादानत्वं हि कार्ये कथंचित् स्वकर्मारोपकत्वेन व्याप्तम्, तच्च सहकारिणामपि प्रसङ्गादेकान्तभेदे नोपपद्यते । ततो भेदतन्निवर्तमानं स्वव्याप्यमुपादानत्वमपि निवर्तयतीति व्याप्तिसिद्धिः । ततः स्थितमेतत् प्रमाणबाधितत्वादिति । अत्यन्तविलक्षणतया चैतन्योत्पादविरोधादिति । अयमभिप्रायः—भूतैश्चैतन्यं जन्यते इति भूतान्येव चैतन्यरूपतया परिणमन्ते इति परिणाम एवोत्पादाद्यर्थो भवतामभिप्रेतः, न चैकान्तवैलक्षण्ये परिणामो घटामियति, एतच्च प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेव, तथापि दृढत्वाद् विप्रतिपत्तेरनुमानमध्यभिधीयते—चैतन्यं विजातीयपरिणामो न भवति, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्, यदुत्पत्ति

मस्ति, न च तेन परलोकगमनागमनादिकं चैतन्यस्योपलक्ष्यते, तेन दृष्टान्येव भूतानि तत्कारणतया कल्पनीयानीति चेत्, न, केवलप्रत्यक्षप्रतिक्षेपेण प्रमाणान्तराणां प्रागेव प्रसाधितत्वात्, तथा च भूयांस्यनुमानानि परलोकानुयायिजीवसाधकानि प्रवर्तेरन् । तद्यथा—तदहर्जातबालकस्य आद्यस्तनाभिलाषः पूर्वाभिलाषपूर्वकः, अभिलाषत्वात्, द्वितीयदिवसादिस्तनाभिलाषवत् । तदिदमनुमानमाद्यस्तनाभिलाषस्याभिलाषान्तरपूर्वकत्वमनुमापयदथापित्या परलोकयायिजीवमाक्षिपति, तज्जन्मन्यभिलाषान्तराभावात्, एवमन्यदप्युदाहार्यमित्यास्तां तावत् । तदयं स्वपरप्रकाशः कर्ता भोक्ता नित्यानित्यात्मको भूतबिलक्षणः साक्षात्-कृतकतिचिन्नजपर्यायानुमितानाद्यनन्तकालभाविनिजानन्तपर्यायविवर्तः प्रमाणप्रतिष्ठितः पारमार्थिको जीवः सकलनयप्रमाणव्यापकः प्रमातेति स्थितम् ॥३१॥

सांप्रतं पर्यन्तश्लोकेन प्रकरणार्थमुपसंहरन्नाह—

मत् न तद्विजातीयपरिणामः, यथा मृदात्मनः सजातीयस्य मृत्पिण्डस्य परिणामो घटः, उत्पत्तिमच्चैतन्यम्, तस्मात् न विजातीयपरिणामः उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं सजातीयपरिणामत्वेन व्याप्तम्, तद्विरुद्धं च विजातीयपरिणामत्वम् । तत् उत्पत्तिमत्त्वं स्वव्यापकाविरुद्धाद् विजातीयपरिणामत्वाद् विनिवृत्तं सत् सजातीयपरिणामत्वेऽवतिष्ठते इति विरुद्धव्यापकोपलब्धिः । सजातीयपरिणामत्वं वा साध्यम् । चैतन्यं सजातीयकारणपरिणामम्, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा मृत्परिणामो घटः, तथा चेदम् सजातीयपरिणामम् । तन्न निश्चेतनानि भूतानि चेतनाकरणे प्रवृत्तिभाञ्जि भवितुमर्हन्तीति स्थितम् । अर्थापत्येति । यथा करतलाग्निसंयोगात् स्फोटः प्रत्यक्षेणोपलक्ष्यमाणो वह्नेर्दाहिकां शक्तिमुपकल्पयतीति, एवमेतदनुमानादनुमीयमानोजन्माद्यस्तनाभिलाषात् प्राचीनोऽभिलाषचेतनावन्तमन्तरेणोपपद्यते, स्तम्भकुम्भाम्भोरुहादेरपि प्रसङ्गात् । यश्चेतनावान् स परलोकयायी जीव इति । एवमन्यदप्युदाहार्यमिति । सात्मकं जीवच्छरीरम्, प्राणादिमत्त्वात्, यत् पुनर्निरात्मकं न तत् प्राणादिमत् यथा कुम्भः, प्राणादिमच्च जीवच्छरीरम्, तस्मात् सात्मकमिति । साक्षादित्यादि । स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षीकृतैः सत्त्वप्रमेयत्वद्रव्यत्वचिद्रूपत्वादिभिः कतिपर्यैः स्वपर्यायैरनुमितोऽनाद्यनन्तकालभाविनामात्मीयानन्तपर्यायाणां व्यावृत्तः परिणामो यस्य जीवस्य स तथा । तथा हि—वर्तमानात्मपर्यायास्तदात्मपर्यायान्तरपूर्वकाः, तान् विना तदनुपपत्तेः, यद्विना यन्नोपपद्यते तत् तत्पूर्वकम् यथा बीजमन्तरेणानुत्पद्यमानोऽङ्कुरो बीजपूर्वः, नोत्पद्यन्ते च पूर्वपर्यायान्तररेण वर्तमानपर्यायाः, अतस्तेऽपि तत्पूर्वकाः । निर्हेतुकत्वप्रसङ्गो विपर्यये बाधकं प्रमाणम् । एवं वर्तमानाः पर्यायाः पर्यायान्तरजनकाः, वस्तुत्वात्, यद् वस्तु तत् पर्यायान्तरस्य जनकम्, यथा घटः कपालानाम्, वस्तूनि च विवादाध्यासिताः, तस्मात् पर्यायान्तरजनकाः । अत्राप्यवस्तुत्वप्रसङ्गो विपर्यये बाधकः, पर्यायाणां च पर्यायिणोऽभिन्नत्वात् वस्तु वस्तवन्तरस्य जन्मं जनकं चेत्युक्तं भवति । सकलनयप्रमाणव्यापक इति । ज्ञातुराशयात्मानो (नीयमाना) नयाः, प्रमाणानि प्रागभिहितस्वरूपाणि, ततः सकलशब्देन विशेषणसमासे तेषां व्यापकः वृक्षत्वमिष शिशपात्वस्य । अयमभिप्रायः—आत्मा हि ज्ञानरूपो नयप्रमाणे तु ज्ञानविशेषरूपे, ततो यथा वृक्षत्वविशेषः शिशपात्वं वृक्षत्वसामान्येन व्याप्यते, एवं ज्ञानविशेषात्मके नयप्रमाणे सामान्यज्ञानरूपेणात्माना व्याप्येते इति ॥३१॥

प्रमाणादिव्यवस्थेयमनादिनिधनात्मिका ।

सर्वसंख्यवहर्तृणां प्रसिद्धापि प्रकीर्तिता ॥३२॥

प्रमाणानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि, आदिशब्दात् नयपरिग्रहस्तेषां व्यवस्था प्रति-
नियतलक्षणादिरूपा मर्यादा सेयमनन्तरोक्तस्थित्या प्रकीर्तितेति संसर्गः । कि-
भूता ? आह—आदिः प्रभवः, निधनं पर्यन्तः, न विद्यते आदिनिधने यस्यासौ
तथाविध आत्मा स्वरूपमस्याः सा अनादिनिधनात्मिका सर्वसंख्यवहर्तृणां
लौकिकतीर्थिकादिभेदभिन्नसमस्तव्यवहारवतां प्रसिद्धापि रूढापि, तदप्रसिद्धौ
निखिलव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्, तदुच्छेदे च विचारानुत्थानेन कस्यचित्तत्त्वस्य-
न प्रतिष्ठितिः, प्रकीर्तिता संशब्दिता, अव्युत्पन्नविप्रतिपन्नव्यामोहापोहायेति
गम्यते, प्रमाणप्रसिद्धेऽप्यर्थे प्रवलावरणकुदर्शनवासनादितः केषांचिदनध्यवसाय-
विपर्यासरूपव्यामोहसद्भावात्, तदपनोदार्थं च सति सामर्थ्यं करुणावतां
प्रवृत्तेरिति ॥३२॥

स्याद्वाद्भ्रुकेशरिसुभोषणनादभोतेरुत्त्रस्तलोलनयनान् प्रपलायमान् ।

हेतुर्नयाश्रितकुतीर्थिमृगाननन्यत्राणान् विहाय जितमेति तमाश्रयध्वम् ॥१॥

भक्तिर्मया भगवति प्रकटीकृत्यं तच्छासनांशकथनान्न मतिः स्वकीया ।

मोहादतो यदिह किंचिदभूदसाधु तत्साधवः कृतकृपा मयिशोधयन्तु ॥२॥

लौकिकतीर्थिकादीति । लौकिका हलधरादयः, तीर्थिका नैयायिकादयः, आदिशब्दात्
शेषपाल्लण्डपरिग्रहः । शासनाविति इति । आदिशब्दात् विप्रतारकवचनादिग्रहः ॥३२॥

साम्प्रतं शास्त्रपरिसमाप्ती शास्त्रकृत् सिद्धः परममङ्गलपदे भगवति जिने स्वयम-
त्यन्तानुरागादतिवस्तलतया परेषामपि तदा तदाधानाय तावदुपदेशमाह स्याद्वादेत्यादि ।
स्याच्छब्दो अस्तेर्यात्प्रत्ययान्तस्य प्रतिरूपकोऽव्ययः, स च यद्यपि विधिविचारणास्तित्व-
विवादानेकान्तसंशयाद्यर्थवृत्तिः, तथाऽप्यनेकान्तवृत्तिरिह गृह्यते, एकान्तप्रतिक्षेपस्यैवात्र
प्रस्तुतत्वात्, तेनोपलक्षितो वादो स्याद्वादः, स एव केशरिसिंहः, किं कित ज्ञाने—इत्यस्य
श्रीणादिके दन्त्यादौ सरप्रत्यये केशरः सटा, तथा च शृङ्गारप्रकाशेऽपि—के मस्तके
सरतीति केशर इत्यल्लण्डयत् । स चार्थं केशरशब्द पुंनपुंसकः, मत्वर्थीयेनप्रत्ययान्तश्च सिंहे
वर्तते, तस्यातिभैरवः परप्रवादिमृगपूगभयंकरत्वाद् नादो वादकालभावी बाम्बिलासस्त-
स्मात् भीतिस्तस्याः । अयमत्र समुदायार्थः—शरणविकलपुरुष इव हेतुः सत्त्वादिः कमपि
शरणाय शरण्यं मार्ग्यमाणः स्याद्वादसिंहनादभयात् स्वयमपि पलायमानान् कुतीर्थिमृगान्
परित्यज्यानन्याशरणतयायं जिनमाश्रयति । अन्यत्र क्वचित् कथंचित् हेत्वाभासतोपपत्त्या
अत्रैव स्वरूपं लभते, तमेव जितं यूयमपि भव्याः भजध्वम् । युक्तं चैतत् पक्षपातरहितानां
सर्वहेतुपुरःसरमेव मतेर्निवेशादिति । यथैकान्तक्षणिकत्वे नित्यत्वे वा न कश्चिद् हेतुरपपद्यते,
तथा प्रागेव स्वयमेव वृत्तिकृता प्रपञ्चितमिति । अधुना श्रीद्वैत्यमात्मनः परिहरन् मुलभत्वात्
क्षयस्थानां मोहस्य शास्त्रशोधने, ततः प्रार्थयन्नाह भक्तिरित्यादि । तच्छासनांशेति । तस्य
भगवतो जिनस्य शासनमागमः, तस्यांशो लवस्तदभिधानात् । अत इति । यतो भक्तिर्व्यक्त-
कृता, न तु गर्वोदुरकंवरतया स्वमनीषिका प्रकाशितेति ॥ साम्प्रतं वैदग्ध्यभिचीनं दर्शयन्

न्यायावतारविवृति विविधां विधित्सोः सिद्धः शुभो य इह पुण्यत्रयस्ततो मे ।
नित्यः परार्थकरणोद्यतमा भवान्ताद् भूयाज्जिनेन्द्रमतलम्पटमेव चेत ॥३॥

इति न्यायावतारविवृतिः समाप्ता ॥

कृतिरियमाचार्यसिद्धव्याख्यानिकस्य । ग्रन्थाग्रम् २०७३॥

ग्रन्थकारः परमपदप्राप्ती बीजभूतां प्रार्थनामाह न्यायेत्यादि । सिद्ध इति । निष्पन्नः । अथ च
व्याजेन ग्रन्थकर्ता स्वनामाभिधानद्वारेण सिद्धव्याख्याता प्रकरणमिदमकरोदिति प्रकाशितम् ।
जिनेन्द्रमतलम्पट इति । ननु च लाम्पट्यं सर्वनिर्हेतुत्वेन न प्रेक्षावतां प्रार्थनाविषयः, तत्कथं
तद् भूयादित्याशास्यते ? सत्यम्, विषयाद्यभिष्वङ्गरूपमेव लाम्पट्यमनर्थपरंपराहेतुत्वेन न
प्रेक्षावङ्किराकाङ्क्षयते । श्रवणमननध्यानादिरूपतया तु भगवद्वचनविषयं तत्परस्व लाम्पट्य-
मपि परंपरया परमपदप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेन दक्षं प्रेक्षावतामाकाङ्क्षमाणं परमाभ्युदय हेतुरेव ॥

प्रक्षामधाम्नोऽभयशेखरैर्भानोरिवोज्ज्वलितभव्यपश्चात् ।

प्रभूततो हर्षपुरीयगच्छे श्रीहेमचन्द्रप्रभुरंशुराशिः ॥१॥

जीयात्सुणीकृतजगत्त्रितयो महिम्ना श्रीहेमसूरिरिति शिष्यमणिस्तदीयः ।

क्षीरोदविभ्रमयशःपटलेन येन शुभ्रीकृता दश दिक्षो मलधारिणापि ॥२॥

शैशवेऽभ्यस्यता तर्कं रतिं तत्रैव वाञ्छता ।

तस्य शिष्यलवेनेदं चक्रे किमपि टिप्पनम् ॥३॥

न्यायावतारविवृतौ विषयं विभज्य किञ्चिन्मया यदिह पुण्यमवापि शुद्धम् ।

संस्थज्य मोहमखिलं भुवि शश्वदेव भद्रैकभूमिरमुना तु समस्तलोकः ॥४॥

इति न्यायावतारटिप्पनकं समाप्तम् ॥ग्रन्थाग्रं १०५३॥

