THE VRATA'S OTHER THAN AHIMSA–AS PROPOUNDED IN JAINISM

Ahimsā or non-violence is the fundamental Vrata, according to the Jainas.

The next Vrata which is essential to a moral life is the vow of truthfulness or Satya. Its opposite i.e., speaking falsely is the Anṛta, which is defined as telling something which is not factual. It should be noted that the Pramatta-yoga or wicked intention, which lies at the root of violence and which gives it the character of violence, forms the basis of Anṛta or lying also. Nothing is a falsehood unless it is a deliberate lie and nothing is true, if an improper motive prompts its utterance. It is accordingly said that even if a statement is true but made with the deliberate intention of hurting the hearer's feeling, the statement is deprived of its character of truth. On the contrary, a false statement made for the purpose of doing some good to the hearer, cannot be condemned as a downright lie.

The character of a phenomena is determined with reference to its nature (Dravya), time (Kāla), place (Kṣītra) and modality (Bhāva). A particular cup, for instance, exists only as a thing made of (say) silver, during (say) winter, at a particular place (say) Calcutta and as (say) a round article; and you cannot think of it as constituted of 'an absolute substance', persisting through all 'eternity', existing simultaneously at 'all places' and possessed of 'a universal shape'. A true statement presents a thing or phenomenon, as it is in respect of its own 'nature', 'time', 'place', and 'modality'. So, when a thing actually exists with reference to its own particular nature, modification, time and location and one says that it does not exist,—this is one form of lying; to say that a thing exists, whereas as a matter of fact it does not exist, is the second manner of lying; to speak about a thing as something which is really different from it, is the third kind of falsehood; the fourth form of lying includes the three following manners of stating a fact, viz.,—(1) The Garthita or the condemnable. A true statement may be so made with scornful laughter as to give pain to the hearer; it may be clothed in harsh and angry words; its tone may be incivil and its words, unconnected with each other; it may be so delivered as to give rise to mistaken ideas in the hearer; the words used may be ambiguous or meaningless or they may suggest something which contradicts the eternal verities as disclosed by the competent masters. All such statements, though embodying true facts, are nevertheless Garthita or condemned. (2) The Sāvadya or faulty. Statements, e.g. about cutting the limbs of an animal, about piercing it, about beating it, about tilling lands, about trading (especially, trafficking in living animals), about stealing etc. etc.,—all bad to or are connected with injury to animals. Such statements may not contain any falsehoods, they may even be connected with truths but are nevertheless faulty and as such, are to be avoided. (3) The Apriya or pain-giving. Words which create unpleasant feelings, envy and grief and exhaust one's patience, which give rise to fear, feelings of enmity, sorrow and quarrelsome-ness, are akin to falsehood, even though they may contain a truth in them. In connection with the
three forms of the fourth mode of lying, it is, however, to be noted that although harsh and cruel statements are here generally condemned, a teacher or a well-disposed man, when using unpleasant expressions to one whom he wants to reform, is not to be considered as a liar. It is the Pramatta-yoga or the evil passions which make one’s expressions false,—so that a teacher or a well-intending person, speaking harshly just to mind the manners of the person talked to and having the good of the person in his heart, cannot be accused of telling a lie in any of its forms.

The Jaina teachers fully recognise the fact that a house-holder or an ordinary man of the world has to support himself, earn his livelihood any how and cannot do without collecting some articles to meet his necessities and that consequently, it is impossible for him to avoid lying absolutely. Accordingly they lay down that a man should try to limit his false statements as much as possible. The form of lying which has been described above as the Sāvadya may be unavoidable for him; but there is no reason why he should not give up the other kinds of false-speaking and why, in the case of the Sāvadya, he should go beyond what is barely necessary for his living.

As in the case of the Ahimsā, the Jaina teachers prescribe five Bhāvanā’s or meditations for stabilising and strengthening the vow of Satya. These consist in the Pratyākhya or giving up of Krodha or anger, Lobha or avarice, Bhūrūtā or cowardice, Hāsya or frivolity and in the Anuvicel-bhāṣa or talking in accordance with the scriptural injunctions. The negative aspects of the vow of truthfulness are the avoidance of its transgressions in the forms of Mithyopadeśa or teaching false doctrines; the Rahovoākhya or giving publicity to secret actions of persons; the Kūta-Ilkha-kiṛyā or forgery; the Nyāsāpahāra or breach of trust by taking advantage of one’s forgetfulness;—[This is illustrated as follows: A deposits Rs. 500/- with B. Subsequently, A forgetting the amount of his deposit asks for the return of Rs. 400/- only, B takes advantage of A’s forgetfulness and gives him the amount, demanded; thereby B misappropriates Rs. 100/-]; the Sākara-mantra-Chīda, or the divulgence of what one supposes to be a fact, from his observation of the manners of some persons who hold consultations in private.

Astiya or non-stealing is the third great Vrata or vow laid down in the Jaina religious books. Stealing has been defined as “appropriating what was not given”. All appropriations, however, are not theft; misappropriations which are deliberate or wilful i.e., actuated by the Pramatta-yoga are cares of theft. A question may be raised whether a righteous man inviting the Karma-pudgala within him, can be accused of theft. The Jaina moralists answer the question in the negative. In the first place, a Muni introducing in himself the Karma is not actuated by any Pramatta-yoga or intention to have it. Secondly, it is pointed out that Karma is a subtle form of matter which belongs to no body, so that its inflow in a Muni does not mean any appropriation of a thing which is not given; in legal phraseology, the inflow of Karma does not involve any ‘wrongful gain’ or ‘wrongful loss’ to any body. Another point that is raised is whether such acts of a person as taking water from another man’s well amount to stealing on his part, in as much as the water was not given to him by the owner of the well. The Jainas affirm that all appropriations of things which have not been expressly given are essentially cases of thefts and in the case under consideration i.e., in the case of water being taken without the express permission of the owner of the well, the taking of water is technically, a case of stealing. They, however, point out that such technical stealing is unavoidable by
ordinary people of the world and recommend that all misappropriations which are not unavoidable in this way, should be given up.

The five Bhāvanā’s or meditations, rather acts,—which fix or stabilise one’s practice of non-stealing are:—Śūnyāgāra or living in a solitary place; Vimocitāvās or living in a place, deserted by all people; Paraparodhākaraṇa or living in a place where one is not likely to be obstructed by others nor where one is likely to obstruct others; Bhaikṣya-śuddhi or looking to the purity of what is given to one as alms; and Saddharmāvismavāda or not entering into disputations with one’s brothers in faith, in respect of one another’s belongings.

The vow of non-stealing is transgressed, even when one instead of himself stealing, abets it (Citana-prayoga); or receives stolen property (Tāḍāhṛtādāṇa); or sells things at iniquitous prices i.e., practises black-marketing (Viruddha-rājyāti Krama); or uses false weights and measures (Hinādhika-mānonmāna); or adulterates things (Prati-rūpaka-vyavahāra).

The Vrata of Brahma or sex-abstinence is opposed to Abrahma, which consists in the act of Maithuna or sexual contact. The Pramatta-yoga or deliberate inclination i.e., sex-hunger is the primal source of all sex-activities. It is needless to point out that sex-urge arouses the intensest of feelings in a person and as such, it is responsible for his bad and undesirable states, both here and hereafter. Complete sex-purity is possible only in homeless saints and sages; a house-holder cannot act up to that ideal of sex-abstinence and he needs the need of a companion for the satisfaction of his sex-hunger; this explains the validity of the custom of marriage in human society. The Jaina moralists maintain that sex-indulgence is always bad from a moral point of view; even a person who has his sex-satisfaction exclusively through his wife cannot be looked upon as high-placed in the scale of moral progress. Such a person is called the Kuśīla-Tyāgi. Although such a person stands lower in moral rank than the Muni, he is certainly better than a person wallowing in uncontrolled sex-endurances. At any rate the Jaina moralists recognise that living without a wife may be impracticable in most cases of ordinary run but they emphatically urge that there is no reason why one should go after a woman who is not his legally married wife.

As regards the Aticāra’s or indirect transgressions of the vow of Brahmacaryā, they are indicated as,—the Para-vivāha-karaṇa or causing marriage between persons who belong to mutually prohibited families; the Itvabikā-parigrabhitāgamana or co-habitation with a married woman of immoral disposition; the Itvabikā- aparigrabhitāgamana or co-habitation with an unmarried woman of immoral disposition; the Anangi-krīḍā or unnatural intercourse; the KāmaT-Ibrābhinirvīṣa or surrender to strong sexual urge.

The following five Bhāvanā’s, on the other hand stabilise one’s vow against sexual unchastity viz.,—the Tyāga or refraining from hearing all talks which excite passions for women (the śṛṇi-rāga-Kattā-Śravaṇa); from looking at the attractive limbs of a woman,—the Tanmano-harāṅga-nirikṣaṇa; from drinking liquids which excite sexual urge,—(the Vṣyleta-rasa); and from making one’s own body clean and attractive, (the Sva-śarira-saṁskāra).

The last but not the least of the Vrata’s is the Aparigraha or non-attachment to worldly affairs. It is opposed to Farigraha which consists in Mūrcchā or taking interest in the living or the non-living objects of the world, through Pramatta-yoga or passionate inclination. It is clear that if there is in any one’s mind, even a trace of having or the apprehension of the sort ‘this
is mine’, he has Parigraha or attachment, even though he may live in a forest, naked and destitute of all gross things. On the other hand, if one’s mind is devoid of all feelings of ‘mine-ness’, he has Aparigraha, even though he is surrounded by and lives in the midst of a number of possessions, moveable and immovable.

The absolute non-attachment to worldly things is obviously impossible for a house-holder and the Jaina thinkers recommend accordingly that the range of worldliness should be progressively shortened. The five Bhāvanā’s strengthening the practice of the vow of non-attachment consist in withdrawing one’s liking to the pleasant objects of the five senses and his dislike for the unpleasant objects of these five senses. The Aparigraha-vrata is transgressed even when a person confining his possessions within a certain number, changes their proportions without actually changing their number. Thus suppose, a person takes the vow to be content with four pieces of cloth and four utensils; his vow would be transgressed if he takes to the possession of three pieces of cloth and five utensils. The transgressions of the vow of non-attachment in this manner of interchanging are likely to be committed in respect of the following five pairs of possession viz.,—lands and houses; silver and gold; cattle and corn; male servants and female servants; and things for putting on and utensils.

The above with Ahimsā are the five Vrata’s or cardinal virtues for practice, according to the Jainas. Besides these primary vows, the Jaina moralists speak of Śīla’s, which are sub-vows, supplementing the practice of the Vrata’s. The Śīla’s are seven in number, divided into two broad classes of the Guṇa-vrata’s and the Śīkṣā-vrata’s. The former enhance the value of the Vrata’s and are three in number. There are four forms of the Śīkṣā-vrata’s. The Śīkṣā-vrata’s are so called, because they make the practice of the vows, perfectly disciplined.

The first of the three Guṇa-vrata’s is the Dig-vrata. It consists in one’s taking a vow to limit his activities throughout his life within fixed bounds in all the ten directions. This sub-vow of the Dig-vrata may be transgressed in five different ways viz.,—(1) When negligently or deliberately one rises higher than his limit in the upward direction (hrdha-vyatikrama); (2) When in the same manner he goes lower than his downward limit (Adhah-vyatikrama); (3) When in the same manner, he crosses his limits in the eight other directions (Tiryak-vyatikrama); (4) When in a fit of passion or negligence, he increases his limit in one direction, even though decreasing it in another direction (Kṣītra-vṛddhī); (5) When he forgets the limits, even though he does not cross them (Smṛtyantarādhaṇā).

The Diśa-vrata is the second mode of the Guṇa-vrata and consists in one’s taking a vow to still more limit his activities, already limited by the Dig-vrata vow, for a period of time. The Diśa-vrata is violated,—1. if the vower sends for something from beyond the limited limit (Ānayaṇa); 2. if he sends a person beyond the limited limit (Prīṣya-prayoga); 3. if he sends his voice (e.g. by telephone) beyond the limited limit (Śabdāṇupata); 4. if he communicates with persons beyond the limited limit by making signs to them (Rūpāṇupāta); 5. if he throws material things beyond the limited limit (Pudgala-kṣīpa).

The third mode of the Guṇa-vrata is the Anartha-daṇḍa-vrata which means a vow not to commit any aimless sin. There are five forms of the Anartha-daṇḍa-vrata which consist in avoiding respectively the Apadhyāṇa or thinking ill of others, the Papadīśa or preaching sinful matter to others, the Pramāṇa-cāritra or thoughtless mischievous acts, such as breaking the
branches of trees aimlessly, the Himśūdāna or distribution of offensive weapons among people, and the Duḥṣruti or reading or hearing the reading of the bad books. The Anartha-daṇḍa-vrata is transgressed even when the vower makes fun of or with other (Kandarpa); when he throws mischievous and practical jokes at others (Kaut-kucca); when he becomes garrulous (Mankharya); when he overdues a thing (Asamlkṣyādhihikaraṇa); when he keeps himself supplied with enjoyable things which are more than what are necessary for him (Upabhoga-paribhogānarthakya).

The disciplinary or the Śīkṣā-vrata's have, as said before, four forms. The first is the Sāmāyika which consists in self-contemplation at stated times e.g. sunrise, noon or sun-set everyday for a stated period every time. The Sāmāyika is transgressed by misdirection of mind (Manodusprāṇidhānam), by misdirection of body (Kāya-dusprāṇidhānam), by misdirection of speech (Vāk-dusprāṇidhānam), by decreasing the interest in the Sāmāyika (Anādara), by forgetting the formalities connected with the Sāmāyika (Smṛtyanupasthānam).

The Poṣadhopavāsa is the second Śīkṣā-vrata and means a vow to fast on four days in a month viz. on the two eighth and the two fourteenth days in the two lunar fortnights in every month, by abstaining from food and drink and by making religious study etc. in those days of fasting. The vow of fasting is violated by excercating in a place without inspecting and sweeping it before hand (Apratyāvāṣṭārāmārjaṅgita), by taking up a thing from or laying it down in a place, without first inspecting and sweeping it (Apratyāvāṣṭārāmārjita), by arranging for sitting in a place within first inspecting and sweeping it (Apratyāvāṣṭārāmārjita—Sam-staropakramana), by giving up interest in fasting (Anādara) and by forgetting the prescribed formalities for fasting (Smṛtyanupasthānam).

The Bhogopabhoga-parimāna is a vow, limiting one's enjoyment of both exhaustible (Upabhoga) and un-exhaustible (bhoga) things. It is the third of the disciplinary sub-vows and is transgressed when the vower takes to eating living things even such as green vegetables (Sacittāhāra); when he uses for his own purpose, a thing which is connected with a living thing e.g. when he uses a green leaf as a plate (Sacitta-Sambandhāhārata); when he consumes a mixture of living and non-living things e.g. hot and cold water together (Sacitta-Sammishāḥāra); when he eats exciting or particularly invigorating food (Abhiṣavāhāra); or, when takes an ill-cooked food (Duḥpakvāhāra).

The fourth sub-vow under the Śīkṣā-vrata is the Atithi-samvībhāga, which means taking a vow to take one's meals only after giving a part of them to deserving guest,—preferable, a man living the austere moral life of an ascetic, having right faith and right conduct; or, failing him, a house-holder having right conduct only; or, failing him, a person with right faith but without any observance of the vows. These are called the Supātra's or worthy donees. Not so good a donee would be one whose outward conduct is good but who is devoid of right faith, he is a Kupātra. A person, however, whose conduct is not good but who is not possessed of right faith is an Apātra or unworthy donee. The Jaina's lay down principles which determine the nature of the things to be given; (e.g. the things given should be helpful to study etc.); the manners in which they are to be given (e.g. by welcoming the guest etc. etc.); and the attitude, both of the giver and of the taker, at the time when the gifts are made (e.g. in all humility etc.). The Jaina's, however, assert that the matter of Karuṇā-dāna or charities, no distinction is to be made as regards the persons who are to receive the gifts; so that food
medicine, knowledge and removal of fears should be freely extended to all needy persons, Jaina or non-Jaina, human or sub-human. This vow of 'giving to guests' is violated if one places food on a living thing e.g. on a green leaf (Sacittanikṣipa); if one covers food with a living thing (Sacitapidhāna); if one delegates his duties as a host, to another (Para-vyapadiṣa); if his charitable conduct is vitiated by disrespectfulness or by envious competition with another donor (Mātsarya); or, if his charity is not made at the proper time (Kālātikrama).

This finishes our survey of the Vrata's or the vows essential to moral progress. The five Vrata's are vows of non-violence, sexual purity, non-attachment, non-stealing and truthfulness. The The homeless saints practise the vows in their perfection; the practice of those vows by the house-holders must necessarily be imperfect; and hence, the Vrata's as performed by the house-holders have been called the Aṇu-vrata's,—the difference between the Vrata's and the Aṇu-vrata's being not one of kind but one of degree in successful observance. The seven Śīla's including the three Guṇa-vrata's and the four Śikṣā-vrata's supplement the observance of the Aṇu-vrata's and are generally meant for the house-holders. The observance of the Śīla's paves the way of the house-holder for the five cardinal virtues and makes his conduct well-controlled. The Jaina's further maintain that the well ordered life which is the effect of the Śīla-practice should be crowned with a well-ordered death. Such a death is called the Sallīkhanā by them and consists in a perfectly unattached and dispassionate attitude towards the world, during last moments of life. This Sallīkhanā or contemplative death is marked by total abstinence from food, drink, medicine and all things worldly and unperturbed fixation of the dying man upon his self. It is recommended for practice, not merely to a man observing the Śīla's (Na Śrāvakasyaiva dig-viratyādi-Śīlavataḥ) but also to one who has brought himself under self-control (Samyatasāyapi). The Sallīkhanā is not a form of suicide. It is recommended only where the body is completely disabled by extreme old age or by endurable diseases or when it is rendered hopelessly helpless by the distraction or enfeeblement of the senses and such other causes and the man becomes conscious of the impending unavoidable death and of the necessity of concentrating himself upon his pure self. Akalanka nicely illustrates the practice of Sallīkhanā by pointing out firstly how the traders in valuable articles never want the distraction of their store-house; that when causes arise to destroy the house, they try to remove these causes to the best of their ability and resources; that when they find that those destructive causes are irremovable, they do no longer care the house and concentrate their efforts upon the preservation of the valuable articles of the store-house; that it is in the same manner that a good man never wants to put an end to his body; that he tries to save his body when disease and other ailments threaten to destroy it; but that when all attempts to save the body prove to be finally unavailing, he dissociates himself from it and establishes himself exclusively upon his essential self. This is Sallīkhanā or peaceful contemplative death, which is essentially different from any form of suicide. It is clear that the calm and faultless character of the Sallīkhanā is destroyed and its practice becomes condemnable, if there is in the dying man Jīvitāśamsā or a desire to live; Maraṇāsāsā or a desire to hasten death; Mitrānurāgā or attachment for his friends; Sukhānubandha or a lingering fond remembrance of the occasions of fast enjoyments, or, Nidāna or an expectant desire for enjoyments in the next world.