



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

UC-NRLF



B 3 021 331

REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Received *June*, 188*8*

Accessions No. *36854* Shelf No. *685*

M946

v. 31

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London
HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXI

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1887

[*All rights reserved*]

39

THE ZEND-AVESTA

PART III

THE YASNA, VISPARAD, ÂFRÎNAGÂN,
GÂHS, AND
MISCELLANEOUS FRAGMENTS

TRANSLATED BY

L. H. MILLS



Orford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1887

[*All rights reserved*]

3654

CONTENTS.

PREFACE	PAGE ix-xvi
INTRODUCTION	xvii-xlvii
ABBREVIATIONS	xlviii

TRANSLATIONS.

THE GÂTHAS (YASNA XXVIII-XXXIV, XLIII-LI, LIII)	1-194
YASNA I-XXVII, XXXV-XLII, LII, LIV-LXXII .	195-332
VISPARAD I-XXIII	333-364
ÂFRÎNAGÂN I-III	365-375
GÂHS I-V	377-388
MISCELLANEOUS FRAGMENTS	389-393
INDEX	395-400

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East .	401-404
---	---------



PREFACE.

IT would savour of affectation for me to say very much by way of meeting the necessary disadvantages under which I labour as in any sense a successor of Professor Darmesteter. It is sufficient to state that I believe myself to be fully aware of them, and that I trust that those who study my work will accord me the more sympathy under the circumstances. Professor Darmesteter, having extended his labours in his University, found his entire time so occupied that he was obliged to decline further labour on this Series for the present. My work on the Gáthas had been for some time in his hands¹, and he requested me, as a friend, to write the still needed volume of the translation of the Avesta. Although deeply appreciating the undesirableness of following one whose scholarship is only surpassed by his genius, I found myself unable to refuse.

As to my general treatment, experts will not need to be informed that I have laboured under no common difficulties. On the one hand, it would be extremely imprudent for any scholar not placed arbitrarily beyond the reach of criticism, to venture to produce a translation of the Yasna, Visparad, Áfrinagân, and Gâhs, without defensive notes. The smallest freedom would be hypercriticised by interested parties, and after them condemned by their followers. On the other hand, even with the imperfect commentary which accompanies the Gáthas here, the generous courtesy of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press has been too abundantly drawn upon. One does not expect detailed commentaries in this Series. My efforts have therefore been chiefly confined to forestalling the possible assaults of unfair or forgetful critics, and so to spare myself, in so far as it may be possible, the necessity for painful rejoinder.

¹ See the *Revue Critique*, Nov. 26, 1883.

To print a commentary on the Yasna, &c., which would be clear to non-specialists, and at the same time interesting, would occupy many times more space than could be here allowed. In treating the Gāthas however, even at the risk of too great extension, I have endeavoured to atone for the necessary obscurity of notes by ample summaries, and a translation supported by paraphrase, as such matter has more prospect of being generally instructive than a commentary which must necessarily have remained obscure. These summaries should also be read with the more indulgence, as they are the first of their kind yet attempted, Haug's having been different in their scope. With regard to all matters of mere form, I expect from all sides a similar concession. It will, I trust, be regarded as a sufficient result if a translation, which has been built up upon the strictest critical principles, can be made at all readable. For while any student may transcribe from the works of others what might be called a translation of the Yasna, to render that part of it, termed the Gāthas, has been declared by a respected authority, 'the severest task in Aryan philology¹.' And certainly, if the extent of preparatory studies alone is to be the gauge, the statement cited would not seem to be an exaggeration. On mathematical estimates the amount of labour which will have to be gone through to become an independent investigator, seems to be much greater than that which presents itself before specialists in more favoured departments. No one should think of writing with originality on the Gāthas, or the rest of the Avesta, who had not long studied the Vedic Sanskrit, and no one should think of pronouncing ultimate opinions on the Gāthas, who has not to a respectable degree mastered the Pahlavi commentaries. But while the Vedic, thanks to the labours of editor and lexicographers, has long been open to

¹ 'Es bilden diese fünf Gāthās, die insgesamt metrisch abgefasst sind, den sprachlich wichtigsten, aber auch den weitaus schwierigsten teil des ganzen Avesta, ja man kann sagen, ohne dass man fürchten muss der übertreibung geziehen zu werden, sie bilden den schwierigsten teil der ganzen indogermanischen philologie.' Altiranisches Verbum; von C. Bartholomae; Einleitung, s. 3.

hopeful study, the Pahlavi commentaries have never been thoroughly made out, and writer after writer advances with an open avowal to that effect; while the explanation, if attempted, involves questions of actual decipherment, and Persian studies in addition to those of the Sanskrit and Zend; and the language of the Gâthas requires also the study of a severe comparative philology, and that to an unusual, if not unequalled, extent.

The keen observer will at once see that a department of science so circumstanced may cause especial embarrassment. On the one hand, it is exposed to the impositions of dilettanti, and the hard working specialist must be content to see those who have advanced with studies one half, or less than one half completed, consulted as masters by a public which is only ignorant as regards the innermost laws of the science; and, on the other hand, the deficiencies of even the most laborious of specialists must leave chasms of imperfection out of which the war of the methods must continually re-arise. In handling the Gâthas especially, I have resorted to the plan of giving a translation which is inclusively literal¹, but filled out and rounded as to form by the free use of additions. As the serious student should read with a strong negative criticism, he may notice that I strive occasionally after a more pleasing effect; but, as we lose the metrical flow of the original entirely, such an effort to put the rendering somewhat on a level with the original in this respect, becomes a real necessity. I have, however, in order to guard against misleading the reader, generally, but not always, indicated the added words by parenthetical curves. That these will be considered unsightly and awkward, I am well aware. I consider them such myself, but I have not felt at liberty to refrain from using them. As the Gâthas are disputed word for word, I could not venture to resort to free omissions; and what a translation would be without either additions or omissions, may be

¹ That is approximately so; absolute literalness, even when treated as I propose, would be unmanageably awkward. In another work, I give a word for word rendering of the Gâthas.

seen from the occasional word for word renderings given. Beyond the Gāthas, I have omitted the curves oftener. I have in the Gāthas, as elsewhere, also endeavoured to impart a rhythmical character to the translation, for the reason above given, and foreign readers should especially note the fact, as well as my effort to preserve the colour of original expressions, otherwise they will inevitably inquire why I do not spare words. To preserve the colour and warmth, and at the same time to include a literal rendering, it is impossible to spare words and syllables, and it is unwise to attempt it. Non-specialists may dislike the frequency of alternative renderings as leaving the impression of indecision, while, at the same time, a decision is always expressed by the adoption of a preferred rendering. The alternatives were added with the object of showing how nearly balanced probabilities may be, and also how unimportant to the general sense the questions among specialists often are.

In transliterating, I have followed the plan used in the preceding volumes to avoid confusion, but since the first volume was published, great progress has been made in this particular, and in a separate work I should have adopted a different arrangement¹. As to other unimportant variations from the preceding volumes in matters of usage and fashion, I trust that no one will dwell on them for a moment². As regards the usual and inevitable differences of opinion on more serious questions, see the remarks in the Introduction³. I would also state that I have often avoided rendering identical passages in identical language, as irksome both to reader and writer. I have also not invariably cited the obviously preferable variations of text which have been adopted, and which are so familiar to the

¹ Chiefly as to 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; but I write 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

² As in Āramaiti, Vohu Manah, &c. I also write Neryosangh, and in a few places Gātha(ā), Ahunavaiti(ī), &c. I regret not to have written Mazdāh everywhere.

³ Where I differ from Professor Darmesteter, I desire to be considered as merely proposing alternative renderings. I have therefore omitted a mass of references to the previous volumes as unnecessary.

eye in Westergaard, Spiegel, and Geldner. The texts of Westergaard have been followed necessarily as to extent of matter, as this work is printed before the completion of Geldner's text. The oft-recurring formulas and prayers at the ends of chapters and sections have been left unrendered, and finally for the most part unnoticed, by striking out the useless notes. Citations of the Pahlavi and Sanskrit translations have been given occasionally in full, in order to meet the extraordinary statements which sometimes appear to the effect that they have not been vital to the interpretation of the Gâthas. But by giving these extracts and by frequently citing the Pahlavi, Neryosangh, and the Persian, I have perhaps exposed myself to the misconception that I am an extreme advocate of the so-called tradition¹, whereas all conscientious critics will acknowledge that I follow the indications of these works with more reserve than any writer who professes to have studied them; in fact I may well apprehend censure from 'traditionalists' in this particular. These Asiatic renderings are cited by me the more fully when those who neglect them agree with their indications; and they are therefore cited to show that, whereas those most opposed to them are nevertheless forgetfully indebted to them in nearly every line, therefore in all cases of great difficulty they should be studied as an absolute necessity before rash conjectures are adopted. For it is exactly where we are all most in doubt, that their indications become of most worth, when rationally considered. These translations should be examined for the relics of the truth, the hints, and traces of original explanations, which may most abound where they are themselves most faulty as translations. I therefore never search them for exact reproductions. But the citations which I give

¹ The relics of a 'tradition' direct from the fountain-head are present in the Asiatic commentaries, and also the relics of a tradition from later, and, as it were, modern scholarship; and, lastly, there are also present the direct results of an ancient scholarship; but to speak of the Pahlavi translations as 'tradition,' is merely to use a convenient phrase. I know of no scholar who supposes these commentaries to be in a simple sense 'tradition' from the earliest Zend writers.

here constitute only a very small fraction of those needed. An argument should be built up on the fullest statements of the circumstances, elucidated with scientific completeness. This alone would have any prospect of obliging investigators to acknowledge the truth; for not only inertia and prejudice are arrayed on the other side, but even interest. This much is said of the Pahlavi translations; for Ner. is properly cited only as a translation of a translation, and, as such, of the highest authority¹; so of the Persian.

Zendists will observe that I by no means abandon explanations merely because they are old, a practice which seems almost the fashion. I, however, fully approve of testing and assailing again and again all suggestions whether old or new. I would simply assert that, while the tasks before us remain still so very extensive, it would be better for scholars to exercise their sagacity upon passages which call loudly for wise conjecture, leaving those which are clear as they stand, for later assaults. It will be seen that I myself by no means approve of refraining from conjecture², but I would only in all humility insist that we should not abandon ourselves to unprepared conjecture. As is known³, I have attempted the present rendering after more than ten years of close labour, and after a full trans-

¹ It is to be hoped that our occupations are sufficiently serious to allow us to pass over the imperfections of Neryosangh's Sanskrit style. He was especially cramped in his mode of expressing himself by a supposed necessity to attempt to follow his original (which was not the Gāthic but the Pahlavi) word for word. His services were most eminently scholarly, and, considering his disadvantages, some of the greatest which have been rendered. Prof. R. v. Roth and Dr. Aurel Stein have kindly transcribed for me valuable variations.

² It will be regarded, however, as especially desirable that, in a report from a specialist to the learned public in general, the texts should on no account be violated by conjectural improvements where they are at all translatable; alternatives are therefore added. As has been remarked by a recent reviewer on the new version of the Scriptures, there is scarcely a line of very ancient writings which scholars are not tempted to amend; but such emendations are seldom agreed to among specialists. A first translation should always be attempted with the texts as they stand.

³ See the *Athenæum*, April 12, 1884; and the *Academy*, Sept. 13, 1884. On the entire subject in its connection with the Gnostic and modern philosophies, my special labours have included a much longer period of time than that mentioned.

lation of the Pahlavi and Sanskrit translations, together with an edition of the Zend, Pahlavi, Sanskrit, and Persian texts of the Gâthas. It is proper to add that for the purpose of keeping the judgment free from prejudice, and open to honest conviction from the influence of the *Rîg-veda*, I have followed the practice for a number of years of transcribing the Hymns of the Veda into English in word for word written studies, having already so treated by far the greater part of them; some of these are in curtailed statement, others needlessly full. I have also, on the other hand, turned a large portion of the Gâthas into Vedic Sanskrit. (This, however, is practically a universal custom, as all words are compared with the Vedic, so far as analogies exist between the Gâthas and the *Rîks*.) If therefore the opposed schools regard me as erring in too implicit a reliance on the hints of the Asiatics on the one side, or in too decided a tendency to read the Gâthic as Vedic on the other, they may be assured that I have not erred from interest or prejudice. That my results will please both parties it is folly to expect, in fact perfection in the rendering of the Gâthas (as of some other ancient works) is for ever unattainable, and not to be looked for; moreover, it would not be recognised, if attained; for no writer, whosoever he may be, can produce a rendering of the Gâthas without meeting the assaults of ignorance or design. However imperfect my results may be supposed to be, it is to be hoped that they will contribute some little toward establishing a convention among scholars as to what the Gâthic and Zend writings mean; meanwhile it is confidently expected that they will fulfil the requirements of the science of comparative theology. Whatever may be the ultimate truth as to questions of close detail, the Yasna, as well as the rest of the Avesta, is clear as to its creed.

My list of obligations is a long one, in fact so long that I fear I can express but little compliment in naming advisers, as I have made it a practice to consult all available persons, as well as books. Making one exception, I will therefore reserve to myself the pleasure of recalling them to a future occasion.

It is sufficient to say here that while I follow a new departure in the treatment of the Asiatic commentaries, yet the most prominent writers of the opposing schools have courteously favoured me with their advice. Availing myself of the exception named, I would take the liberty to express my gratitude, here especially, to Dr. E. W. West, our first authority on Pahlavi, for placing at my disposal various readings of the Pahlavi text of the Yasna, of which we have hitherto only possessed a single MS. in the Pahlavi character, that contained in the oldest Zend writing, the Codex numbered five, in the Library of Copenhagen. The variations referred to were transcribed by Dr. West from the venerable MS., the hereditary property of Dastur Dr. Gâmâspgi Minozihargi Asana of Bombay, and written only nineteen (or twenty-two) days later than that numbered five in the Library of Copenhagen. By this generous loan I have been enabled to print elsewhere the first text of the Pahlavi of the Gâthas yet edited with comparison of MSS., likewise also for the first time translated, in its entirety, into a European language. For this Dr. West, during an extended correspondence, has furnished me with information on the Pahlavi not obtainable elsewhere, together with corrections and revisions. There is another eminent friend whose sacrifices of time and labour on my behalf have been exceptional, but I will defer the mention of Zend scholars.

I take this opportunity to express my acknowledgments to Professor Dr. von Halm of the Hof- und Staatsbibliothek, in Munich, for allowing me the free use of Codex 12^b, of Haug's Collection, both at Stuttgart and Hanover; also to Professor Dr. Wilmanns of Göttingen; Geheimrath Dr. Förstemann of Leipsic; and Herr Rath Bodemann of Hanover, for the loan of a large number of valuable works from their respective public libraries, often, with great liberality, renewed.

L. H. MILLS.

HANOVER, February, 1886.



INTRODUCTION.

MANY readers, for whom the Zend-Avesta possesses only collateral interest, may not understand why any introductory remarks are called for to those portions of it which are treated in this volume. The extent of the matter does not appear at first sight a sufficient reason for adding a word to the masterly work which introduces the first two volumes, and, in fact, save as regards questions which bear upon the Gâthas, I avoid for the most part, for the present, all discussion of details which chiefly concern either the sections treated in the first two volumes, or the extended parts of the later Avesta treated here. But the Gâthas are of such a nature, and differ so widely from other parts of the Avesta, that some words of separate discussion seem quite indispensable, and such a discussion was recommended by the author of the other volumes. A second reason why a word of introduction is necessary, when the translation of the successive parts of the Avesta passes from one hand to another, is a reason which bears upon the subject with exceptional force.

It is this: the Avesta, while clearly made out, so far as the requirements of comparative theology are concerned, yet presents difficulties as to minute detail so great, that as yet no two independent scholars can entirely agree as to their solution. Master and pupil, friend and friend, must differ, and sometimes on questions of no trivial moment.

The preliminary studies requisite to the formation of ultimate opinions are so varied, and of such a nature, involving the rendering of matter as yet totally unrendered with any scientific exactness in either India or Europe, that no person can claim to have satisfied himself in these respects. Scholars are therefore obliged to advance biassed by the fact that they are preponderatingly Iranists, or preponder-

atingly Vedists, and therefore certain at the outset that they must differ to a certain degree from each other, and to a certain degree also from the truth. It was also, as might well be understood without statement, with a full knowledge of the fact that I was inclined to allow especial weight to a comparison with the Veda, and that I modified the evidence of tradition somewhat more than he did, that Professor Darmesteter urged me to accept this task. But while I am constrained to say something by way of a preparatory treatise here, a sense of the fitness of things induces me to be as brief as possible, and I must therefore ask indulgence of the reader if my mode of expressing myself seems either rough or abrupt.

As to what the Gâthas are in their detail, enough has been said in the summaries and notes. From those representations, necessarily somewhat scattered, it appears that they ✓ comprise seventeen sections of poetical matter, equal in extent to about twenty-five to thirty hymns of the *Rig-veda*, composed in ancient Aryan metres, ascribing supreme (beneficent) power to the Deity Ahura Mazda, who is yet opposed co-ordinately by an evil Deity called Aka Manah, or Angra Mainyu. In all respects, save in the one particular that He is not the Creator of this evil Deity, and does not possess the power to destroy him or his realm, this Ahura Mazda is one of the purest conceptions which had yet been produced. He has six personified attributes (so one might state it), later, but not in the Gâthas, described as Archangels, while in the Gâthas they are at once the abstract attributes of God, > or of God's faithful adherents upon earth, and at the same time conceived of as persons, all efforts to separate the instances in which they are spoken of as the mere dispositions of the divine or saintly mind, and those in which they are spoken of as personal beings, having been in vain.

We have therefore a profound scheme, perhaps not consciously invented, but being a growth through centuries; and this system is the unity of God in His faithful creatures. It is not a polytheism properly so-called, as Ahura forms with his Immortals a Heptade, reminding one of the Sabellian Trinity. It is not a Pantheism, for it is especially

arrested by the domain of the evil Deity. It might be called, if we stretch the indications, a Hagio-theism, a delineation of God in the holy creation. Outside of the Heptade is Sraosha, the personified Obedience (and possibly Vayu, as once mentioned); and, as the emblem of the pious, is the Kine's soul, while the Fire is a poetically personified symbol of the divine purity and power. As opposed to the good God, we have the Evil Mind, or the Angry (?) Spirit, not yet provided with full personified attributes to correspond to the Bountiful Immortals. He has, however, a servant, Aêshma, the impersonation of invasion and rapine, the chief scourge of the Zarathustrians; and an evil angel, the Drug, personified deceit, while the Daêvas (Devas) of their more southern neighbours (some of whose tribes had remained, as servile castes, among the Zarathustrians) constitute perhaps the general representatives of Aka Manah, Aêshma, the Drug, &c. The two original spirits unite in the creation of the good and evil in existence both actually in the present, and in principles which have their issue in the future in rewards and punishments. The importance of this creed, so far stated, as the dualistical creation, and, as an attempted solution, of the hardest problem of speculation, should be obvious to every enlightened eye. If there existed a supreme God whose power could undo the very laws of life, no evil could have been known; but the doctrine denies that there is any such being. The good and the evil in existence limit each other. There can be no happiness undefined by sorrow, and no goodness which does not resist sin. Accordingly the evil principle is recognised as so necessary that it is represented by an evil God. His very name, however, is a thought, or a passion; while the good Deity is not responsible for the wickedness and grief which prevail. His power itself could not have prevented their occurrence. And He alone has an especially objective name, and one which could only be applied to a person. These suggestions, whether true or false, are certainly some of the most serious that have ever been made¹, and we find them originally here.

¹ Haug long since called attention to the likeness of Hegelianism to the

As to the nature of religious rewards and punishments, we have suggestions scarcely less important in the eye of scientific theology, and, as a matter of fact, very much more extensively spread. To say that the future rewards held out in the Gâthas were largely, if not chiefly, spiritual, and in the man himself, would be almost a slur upon the truth. The truth is, that the mental heaven and hell with which we are now familiar as the only future states recognised by intelligent people, and thoughts which, in spite of their familiarity, can never lose their importance, are not only used and expressed in the Gâthas, but expressed there, so far as we are aware, for the first time. While mankind were delivered up to the childish terrors of a future replete with horrors visited upon them from without, the early Iranian sage announced the eternal truth that the rewards of Heaven, and the punishments of Hell, can only be from within. He gave us, we may fairly say, through the systems which he has influenced, that great doctrine of subjective recompense, which must work an essential change in the mental habits of every one who receives it. After the creation of souls, and the establishment of the laws which should govern them, Âramaiti gives a body, and men and angels begin their careers. A Mâthra is inspired for the guidance of the well-disposed. The faithful learn the vows of the holy system under the teaching of the Immortals, while the infidel and reprobate portion of mankind accept the seductions of the Worst Mind, and unite with the Daêvas in the capital sin of warfare from wanton cruelty, or for dishonest acquisition. The consequence of this latter alliance is soon apparent. The Kine, as the representative of the holy people, laments under the miseries which make Iranian life a load. The efforts to draw a livelihood from honest labour are opposed, but not frustrated, by the Daêva-worshipping tribes who still struggle with the Zarathustrians for the control of the territory. The Kine therefore lifts

chief ideas in the Zarathustrian philosophy as centring in its dualism. And I think that it is quite evident, and I believe conceded by experts, that the Hegelian sublated dualism is a descendant from the Zarathustrian through the Gnostics and Jacob Boehme.

her wail to Ahura, and His Righteous Order, Asha, who respond by the appointment of Zarathustra, as the individual entrusted with her redemption; and he, accepting his commission, begins his prophetic labours. From this on we have a series of lamentations, prayers, praises, and exhortations, addressed by Zarathustra and his immediate associates to Ahura and the people, which delineate the public and personal sorrows in detail, utter individual supplications and thanksgivings, and exhort the masses assembled in special or periodical meetings.

Here, it must be noted, that the population among whom these hymns were composed were chiefly agriculturists and herdsmen. Circumstances which affected their interests as such were of course paramount with them, and as their land and cattle represented their most valuable property, whatever threatened them was the most of all things to be dreaded. Accordingly rapine, and the raid, whether coming from Turanians or Daêva-worshippers, were regarded as the most terrible of visitations. But their moral earnestness in their determination to avoid rapine on their part, even when tempted by a desire for retaliation, is especially to be noted¹. It was as awful when regarded as a sin as it was when suffered as an affliction; and their animus in this particular was most exceptional. While the above facts explain to us, on the one hand, the principal deities, and the peculiar hopes and fears which inspired their worship, they lead us also, on the other hand, to wonder the more that so subtle a theology as we have found expressed in the documents, should have arisen amid so simple a community.

In the course of the recitations we have also special intimations of an organised struggle of the Daêva-party to overwhelm the Zarathustrians. At times they seem very nearly to have accomplished their object. A distinct reference to a battle in the lines occurs, while sanguinary violence is alluded to more than once as in

¹ They pray against Aêshma without qualification. They might practise desolating havoc in time of war; but the raid, as in times of nominal peace, seems to have been foreign to them.

the line, or in skirmish. We conclude from the prevalence of a thankful tone that the Zarathustrians gained the upper hand during the Gâthic period, but although the result may have been assured, the struggle at the time of the last Gâtha was by no means over. In the latest Gâtha, as in the earliest, we have signs of fierce and bloody conflict. The same type of existence prevailed greatly later, in the time of the Yasts, but the scene seems very different, and Zarathustra's human characteristics are wholly lost in the mythical attributes with which time and superstition had abundantly provided him. By way, then, of summarising the chief characteristics of his original system, we may say that he and his companions were struggling to establish a kingdom under the Sovereign Power of God, whose first care was to relieve suffering, and shelter the honest and industrious poor¹. This kingdom was to be conducted according to His holy Order, or plan of salvation, to be permeated by living Piety, and with the ultimate object of bestowing both Weal and Immortality. This high ideal was also not left as an abstract principle to work its way. Society was far too rudimental, then as ever, for the efficient survival of unsupported principles. A compact hierarchical system seems to have existed, the sacramental object being the fire, before which a priesthood officiated with unwavering zeal; but the traces of this are very restricted in the Gâthas, and, according to all probability, it was greatly less elaborated at their period than later.

Such, in very brief outline, is the system which meets us as Zarathustrianism in that period of Mazda-worship when Zarathustra lived and composed the Gâthic hymns.

As to the further question, 'Who was Zarathustra, and when and where did he live?' diversity of opinion still pre-

¹ The practical operation of this prime principle seems to have been at times beneficial to a remarkable, if not unparalleled, extent. Under the Sasanids the lower classes enjoyed great protection. See the remarks of Professor Rawlinson, *The Seventh Oriental Monarchy*, page 440 ff. Also recall the extraordinary treatment of the poor during the drought and famine under Perozes. The account is, however, exaggerated. See Tabari II, p. 130, cited by Professor Rawlinson, p. 314.

vails, so much so that as regards it I differ slightly even from my eminent friend and predecessor. As such differences on the subject of the Avesta are however matters of course, I freely state my impressions. Who was then the person, if any person, corresponding to the name Zarathustra in the Gâthas? Did he exist, and was he really the author of these ancient hymns? That he existed as an historical person I have already affirmed; and as to the hymns ascribed to him and his immediate associates, I have also no hesitation. Parts of these productions may have been interpolated, but the Gâthas, as a whole, show great unity, and the interpolations are made in the spirit of the original. And that Zarathustra was the name of the individual in which this unity centres, we have no sufficient reason to dispute. The name is mentioned in the most sacred connections, as well as in those which depict the reality of the prophet's sufferings; and there is no reason at all why it should have come down endeared to humanity, unless it belonged to one, who, in the presence of a Sovereign and a kingdom, could impress his personality with greatly more defined distinctness upon his contemporaries than either that Sovereign or any of his adherents¹. That any forgery is present in the Gâthas, any desire to palm off doctrines upon the sacred community in the name of the great prophet, as in the Vendîdâd and later Yasna, is quite out of the question. The Gâthas are genuine in their mass, as I believe no scholar anywhere now questions.

For the characteristics of this great teacher, I refer to the hymns themselves, which stand alone, of their kind, in literature. Nowhere, at their period, had there been a human voice, so far as we have any evidence, which uttered thoughts like these. They are now, some of them, the great commonplaces of philosophical religion; but till then they were unheard (*agustâ*).

And yet we must say of Zarathustra, as of all our first announcers, that while he antedates all whose records have come down to us, he was probably only the last visible link

¹ See especially the remarks preceding Y. I.

in a far extended chain. His system, like those of his predecessors and successors, was a growth. His main conceptions had been surmised, although not spoken before. His world was ripe for them, and when he appeared, he had only to utter and develop them. I would not call him a reformer; he does not repudiate his predecessors. The old Aryan Gods retire before the spiritual Ahura; but I do not think that he especially intended to discredit them. One of the inferior ones is mentioned for a moment, but the great Benevolence, Order, and Power, together with their results in the human subject, Ahura's Piety incarnate in men, and their Weal and Immortality as a consequence, crowd out all other thoughts. His mental insight is as evident from his system as his deep moral inspiration. As to his secondary characteristics, his manner of thought and expression, we find them peculiar to the last degree. He has given us writings in which every syllable seems loaded with thought, sometimes much repeated, and to us of the present day, very familiar; but then, when he wrote, one would suppose that he intended to 'utter his dark speech.' Succinctness is carried to an unexampled extreme¹, while the wonderful idea that God's attributes are His messengers sent out into the human soul to ennoble and redeem, makes him at times so subtle that the latest scholars cannot tell whether he means Asha and Vohu Manah personified as Archangels, or as the thoughts and beneficent intentions of the Deity reproduced in men. I can recall no passage whatsoever in which Vohu Manah, Asha, Khshathra, &c., are not strongly felt to mean exactly what they signify as words, while at the same time they are prayed to, and besought to come, as Gods or angels. Either the personification is purely poetical, which would make it, as found in the Gâthas, considering their age and place, a very remarkable phenomenon, or else, having dogmatically personified the divine attributes, Zarathustra never forgets to express a respect which is higher than 'a respect for persons,' that is,

¹ I regard it as most unfortunate that Zendists should search for easy and natural expression in the Gâthas, and the expression of commonplace detail. It is only in passionate utterance that their style becomes simple.

a respect for the principles which they represent. In making every laudatory statement, however, I take for granted, what I fear is nevertheless far from uniformly granted, and that is, that the reader will weigh well what makes all the difference, namely, the very remote period at which we are obliged to place the Gáthas, and the comparatively rude civilisation amid which we must suppose them to have been composed. We must set the ideas which lie before us in this framework of time and place. If we fail to do so, as a matter of course the thoughts and their expression will contain for us nothing whatever new; but as viewed in the light of relation, after long weighing the matter, I cannot refer to them in any other terms than those which I use, without becoming aware that I am recoiling through fear of exaggeration from stating what I believe to be the truth.


As to the personal sentiment of Zarathustra, we can only say that it was devoted. His word *zarazdáiti* gives the keynote to his purposes. We are certain that he was a man of courage; but that he was not scrupulous at shedding blood is also evident. He was not reticent under misfortune, while yet endowed with rare persistence to overcome it.

His sphere was not restricted. The objects which concern him are provinces as well as villages, armies as well as individuals. His circle was the reigning prince and prominent chieftains, a few gifted men deeply imbued with religious veneration for the sacred compositions which had come down to them from primeval antiquity in ancient metres; and these, together with a priesthood exceptionally pure, leading on a sobered population, were also his public. But three orders appear in it, the king, the people, and the peers. That the times were disturbed is involved in what has already been said. One feature alone needs mention, it is that the agitations involved the tenure of the throne. Vistáspa had no easy seat, and the prospect of revolution in the sense of supersedure was continually before him. As to the family life of Zarathustra, we can only say that he commanded respect; nothing whatever is further known.

It will be seen from the above sketch that I make the widest distinction between the Gáthic period and that of the

later Avesta. I do so, not influenced very greatly by the fact that the Gâthas are cited in the later Avesta. Most of these citations are indeed genuine and valid as proofs of priority, while others are mere displacements of the Gâthas made for liturgical purposes, as Genesis is read in churches sometimes after portions of later matter. But a book may be cited by another when it is merely prior to it, and not much older. Nor do I lay too much stress upon the difference between the Gâthic dialect and the so-called Zend; but I do lay very great stress upon the totally dissimilar atmospheres of the two portions. In the Gâthas all is sober and real. The Kine's soul is indeed poetically described as wailing aloud, and the Deity with His Immortals is reported as speaking, hearing, and seeing; but with these rhetorical exceptions, everything which occupies the attention is practical in the extreme. *Grehma* and *Bendva*, the *Karpans*, the *Kavis*, and the *Usigs(-ks)*, are no mythical monsters. No dragon threatens the settlements, and no fabulous beings defend them. *Zarathustra*, *Gâmâspa*, *Frashaostra*, and *Maidhyômâh*; the *Spitâmas*, *Hvôgvas*, the *Haêkataspas*, are as real, and are alluded to with a simplicity as unconscious, as any characters in history. Except inspiration, there are also no miracles. All the action is made up of the exertions and passions of living and suffering men. Let the Zendist study the Gâthas well, and then let him turn to the *Yasts* or the *Vendîdâd*; he will go from the land of reality to the land of fable. He leaves in the one a toiling prophet, to meet in the other a phantastic demi-god. However ancient the fundamental ideas in the myths of the *Yasts* and *Vendîdâd* may be (and some of them were certainly older than the Gâthas or the oldest *Rîks*) in the forms in which they now stand, they are greatly later.

As we enter into further and necessary detail, this seems to be the place for a word as to the relative ages of the several sections which make up these hymns. We see struggle and suffering, fear and anger in some of them, and we naturally group these together as having been composed at a particular stage in *Zarathustra's* career. We read expressions of happy confidence, and we refer them to a



period of repose, as we do those sections where meditation, speculation, or dogmatic statement, are prominent; but nothing is certain except that Y. LIII must have been written after Zarathustra had attained to a sufficient age to have a marriageable daughter. An ancient leader may have reached a position of influence from doctrinal productions, and afterwards expressed the vicissitudes of an active political career. One circumstance must, however, be held in view; and that is, that neither the Gâthas, nor any other ancient pieces, which were hardly at first committed to writing, have been preserved in the form in which they were delivered for the first time. The poet himself would file them into better (?) order at each subsequent delivery, and verses which referred originally to one period of time would, if especially striking, be reproduced in subsequent effusions. And pieces which the composer may have left in one shape, his early successors would be likely to modify by interpolations, excerpitions, or inversions. I believe that the Gâthas show the presence of less foreign matter than is usual, and that the interpolations which are present in them, are themselves of great antiquity, or even practically synchronous with the original. Certainly few of them show anything like an ingenious attempt at imitation. If there exist any interpolations, and we may say *à priori* that all existing compositions of their antiquity are, and must have been, interpolated, the additions were the work of the author's earliest disciples who composed fully in his spirit, while the position of sections in this or that Gâtha has little or nothing to do with the question of their relative age, the metres being all ancient, and the Ustavaiti, *Spenta-mainyu*, &c., showing as decided evidence of originality as any parts of the Ahunavaiti. (See remarks on the Gâtha Ustavaiti, p. 91 ff.)

As we proceed from the question of the relative age of the particular sections as compared with each other to that of their age considered as a whole, we are first met by the question as to place. Were the Gâthas first sung in the East or the West of Iran? I would here say that I regard this point as especially open, as I am even inclined to differ in one particular from my eminent friend

Professor Darmesteter, but let it be understood, only or chiefly, as to the place of origin of the Gâthas. I think that the scene of the Gâthic and original Zarathustrianism was the North-east of Iran, and that the later Avesta was composed during the hundreds of years during which the Zarathustrian tribes were migrating westward in Media.

One certain fact is the occurrence of geographical names in Vendidad I, which are obviously intended to describe the earliest homes of the Iranian races whose lore was the Avesta. The present forms of those names, as they appear in the Avesta, are indeed not the most ancient, but they occur in passages which plainly repeat very ancient myths. These names describe a region from the middle of the North of Iran to the East of it, including ancient Bactria, but extending as far West as Ragha ; and, as the Gâthas are unanimously acknowledged to be the oldest portion of the Avesta, dealing as they do with Zarathustra as an historical person, we naturally look for the scene of his life in the oldest seats. The Zarathustrian Ragha, much further West than the other places mentioned, seems to have a special claim to be regarded as his birthplace, as it possesses so firm a hold upon his name, but the epithet Zarathustrian, together with the special eminence of the governor of Ragha as needing no 'Zarathustra' over him, that is, no imperial chief (see Y. XIX, 19), may both be attributed to successors of Zarathustra. From some reason, probably the migration of Zarathustrian influence toward the West, Ragha became a stronghold of his descendants ; or his name, entirely apart from all family connection, may have become a title for leading politico-ecclesiastical officials (compare the Zarathustrôtema). There is no mention of a foreign origin of Zarathustra in the Gâthas, nor is there any expression from which we might infer it. His family seems as settled as himself. The Spitâmas are mentioned with the same familiarity as the Hvôgvas, and the persons named are, some of them, related to him. He was no isolated figure among the people whom he influenced. Unless then we can place Vîstâspa and Gâmâspa, Frashaostra, and Maidhyômâh, in Ragha, we cannot well place Zarathustra there,

for he is to be placed beside them. Tradition of a late and dubious character places Vîstâspa in Bactria; but it is better to leave the exact region undecided, as certainty can never be reached.

The other circumstances which are imperative with many for a decision for the East as the region where Zarathustra laboured, have been stated with perhaps the greatest power and beauty by Darmesteter¹, who still inclines to the West. These are the strong analogies existing between the Zend language and the Vedic Sanskrit on the one side, and between the gods, heroes, and myths of the Avesta, and those of Veda, on the other.

As bearing, however, in favour of a western origin of the Gâthîc, as well as of the later Avesta, we must confess that the West Iranian of the Cuneiform Inscriptions possesses the same analogies with the Vedic which the language of the Avesta possesses with it; and no reader should need to be reminded that the West Iranian as well as the East Iranian was in no sense derived from the Vedic. The old Aryan from which all descended was once spread without distinction over both West and East, while, on the other hand, the mythological features of the Avesta, kindred as they are to those of the Eastern Veda, are yet reproduced for us, some of them, in the poetry of the mediæval West as drawn from the Avesta; and the name of Mazda, unknown (?) to the *Rîks*², appears cut in the rocks of Persepolis and Behistun, while all the sacred books of the Zarthustrians, including the Gâthas as well as the later Avesta, together with their interpretations, have come down to us from the West, where the Greeks also found their system from the time of Herodotus down.

Added to which we must acknowledge that the differences in dialect between the Avesta and Veda make a wide separation as to place far from startling, while myths as well as religions migrate as by a law.

We must therefore consider well before we venture to differ from those who decide for the West as the scene of Zarathustra's life.

¹ See the Introduction to the first two volumes, and also Ormuzd and Ahriman.

² But cp. *Rv.* VIII, 20, 17, *divô—ásurasya vedhásaś (medhasaś (?)*).

But as we mention the Inscriptions, we must make a very careful distinction. Is their theology that of Zarathustra? If it is, this would certainly constitute a point in conjunction with the descriptions of the Greeks, in favour of a still more extensive prevalence of Zarathustrianism in the West at the dates which the Inscriptions cover.

As to this disputed point, I would answer that their theology may be the Zarathustrian in a sense as yet too little applied to the term, for it may be Gâthic Zarathustrianism, or at least a Mazda-worship at a stage of development corresponding to the stage of Mazda-worship in which it stood when Zarathustra left it; but that it was the later and fully developed Zarathustrianism, provided with all the regulations of the Vendidad, seems out of the question.

In the first place there is no certain mention of Angra Mainyu, or of the Amesha Spenta, in the Inscriptions; and this silence must be accounted for¹ in any case².

The ready and just suggestion is made that the documents are exceedingly limited; that many deities would not be named on so narrow a space, while the statements of Herodotus and his successors make it probable that the entire system of Zarathustra was known in the near neighbourhood, and must have been very familiar to the persons who ordered the Inscriptions to be cut. To this the necessary rejoinder might be made, that the familiarity of Darius with the later, or indeed with the original, Zarathustrianism, if he was familiar with it, renders the absence of the name of Angra Mainyu at least all the more striking.

What more imperative call could there be for the use of that name than in denouncing the opponents whose overthrow forms the theme of the mighty writings?

As the 'grace of Auramazda' is mentioned on the one

¹ Some relief is given by a mention of the Draogha, but the bagâhya are probably Mithra and Anâhita (see the Inscription of Artaxerxes Mnemon, 4) rather than the Amesha Spenta. As we notice the name of Mithra, however, we must remark that, as the Mithra worship undoubtedly existed previously to the Gâthic period, and fell into neglect at the Gâthic period, it might be said that the greatly later Inscriptions represent Mazda-worship as it existed among the ancestors of the Zarathustrians in a pre-Gâthic age or even Vedic age.

² Angra Mainyu and the Amesha are also prominent in the Gâthas.

side, one naturally expects to see some reference to the 'opposition' of His chief adversary on the other, and one also expects to trace some certain recognition of the Bountiful Immortals. I think that both were omitted because their names retained less weight, as we cannot suppose that they were unknown, or, if once known, then forgotten. But allowing that it is not quite fair to reason from such scanty texts, we are met by the positive fact that an important Inscription is written on a tomb¹; and, as the burial of the dead was one of the most flagrant violations of the Zarathustrian ceremonial law, it is not conceivable that Darius could have been a Zarathustrian according to the later Faith. He was either a heretical schismatic departing from a sacred precept, or he was following the creed of his fathers, a Mazda-worshipper, but not 'of Zarathustra's order,' or, if a Zarathustrian, then a partial inheritor of Zarathustra's religion at an undeveloped stage, while burial was not as yet forbidden by it; and at the same time he neglected also prominent doctrines of the Gâthas.

It is not possible that he could have been an isolated schismatic as to such a particular. If he composed the Inscriptions as a monarch of another religion than that of the later Avesta, it would seem to prove either that he was an adherent to a cruder, or half effaced, form of Gâthic Zarathustrianism, which had found its way during the long periods of its existence westward before the later Zarathustrianism arose in the western settlements, or else that it, the religion of the Inscriptions, simply originated where we find it, from an original and wide-spread Mazda-worship which had not yet forbidden the burial of the dead².

¹ And all are the Inscriptions of buried men. See also the statements of Professor de Harlez on the subject.

² And perhaps it had also not forbidden cremation. Geiger (see 'The Civilisation of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times;,' English translation by Dârâb Dastur Peshotan Saâgânâ, B. A., p. 90) conjectures that the dakhma were originally places for cremation. If this is a correct surmise, both burial and cremation may have been permitted at the Gâthic period, being forbidden long after. At least the original Mazda-worship did not recoil from cremation, otherwise the story of the attempt to burn the Lydian Cræsus could not have arisen. The earlier Persians had no abhorrence of either burial or burning. Only the developed Zarathustrian Magism of the Medes obeyed the Vendîdâd.

That such a Mazda-worship once existed in primeval Iran seems certain, and that it was greatly earlier than Zarathustrianism¹. It is also very probable that some form of it survived unadulterated by Zarathustrianism. And this is as probable *à priori* when we reflect on what might have happened, as it is when we seek for an explanation of the burial of a Mazda-worshipper in a tomb.

As the Asura (Ahura) worship extended into India with the Indians as they migrated from Iran, a form of Asura worship arose in Iran which added the name of Mazda to the original term for God. In the East it began to acquire additional peculiarities out of which, when Zarathustra arose, he developed his original system, while in other parts of Iran, and with great probability in Persia, it retained its original simplicity. At subsequent periods only, the Zarathustrian form spread, first at the Gāthic stage, and later a second time, and from a centre further West, as the Zarathustrianism of the later Avesta which is reported by the Greeks. Either then Darius was a Mazda-worshipper, like his fathers, following an original and independent type of Mazda-worship, or he was following a mutilated Gāthic Zarathustrianism, which may not yet have forbidden burial², he and his chieftains adhering to this ancient form, while the masses yielded to the novelties, as the patrician Jews held to Sadduceeism after the masses had become Pharisees, and as the patrician Romans clung to Paganism after Rome had become Catholic. In either case it seems to me that the Mazda-worship of the Inscriptions might be severed from the later Zarathustrianism; and that it must be so severed on some theory or other, all with one voice seem to agree.

In deciding for the North-east³ as the scene of Zarathustra's personal labours, and for the Gāthic dialect as its more particular form of speech, I am not, I trust, solely

¹ Compare even the Scythic name Thamimasadas, cited by Professor Rawlinson (Herod. 3rd edit. iii, p. 195). Were branches of the Scyths themselves in a sense Mazda-worshippers, or could the name have been borrowed?

² And which insisted less upon the personality of Satan.

³ The name Bactrian cannot be considered as more than a convenient expression.

or unduly influenced by the occurrence of the eastern names in the first chapter of the Vendîdâd, for those names may indicate primeval homes from which the ancestors of Zarathustra migrated toward the west centuries before his appearance. I merely say that the occurrence of the names shows that the ancestors of the Zarathustrian Mazda-worshippers once lived in East Iran; and if that is the case, their descendants may have still lived there when Zarathustra developed his system, and it is also possible that masses of Zarathustrians may long have remained behind in the East Iranian mountains after the Zarathustrians of the later Avesta had gone west. The descendant may have arisen in the home of his ancestors, and in fact, other things being equal, there is a stronger probability that he arose there. I do not think that the appearance of a later Zarathustrianism in the west, is a sufficient reason for doubting that the founder of the system laboured nearer the land of the Vedas, where a Vistâspa once ruled (?), where a Daêva-worship long lingered, and where the common names of the Irano-indian gods were heard as household words, and which, we may add, was precisely the place where we should suppose the Indo-aryans to have left the Irano-aryans, as they descended into the Puñgâb.

Having formed an opinion as to the place where Zarathustra laboured, and proceeding to the question as to when he lived and wrote the Gâthas, we find ourselves under the necessity to form our estimate first as to the age of the later parts of the Avesta. While interpolated passages, or indeed whole Yasts, may be very late, I cannot place the later Avesta in its bulk later than the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Darius, for the fact that the Inscriptions preserve either a pre-Zarathustrian Mazdaism, or the Zarathustrianism of the Gâthas long previous as it was in its origin to that of the Vendîdâd, has nothing whatever to do with the relative age of the Inscriptions themselves. The later Avesta, with its forbiddal of burial and cremation, must have existed for a long time side by side with that religion which has left sepulchral monuments, and

whose adherents could contemplate the burning of captives; and analogous facts are universal.

But aside from the seeming difference in the type of Mazda-worship, which simply severs the religion of the Inscriptions from that of the more developed Zarathustrianism, and which has, as we have seen, nothing whatever to do with the question of the relative ages of the Inscriptions and the later Avesta, I think that we have some signs of a later age in the language of the Inscriptions apart from their contents. As, however, Darmesteter is inclined to regard the West Iranian, or Cuneiform, as better preserved than the Zend of the later Avesta, I make my few remarks only with great hesitation.

The termination **𐬨𐬀𐬨𐬀**, which would otherwise be justly considered as an evidence of degeneration in the Zend, I regard as merely a wrong writing for -ahya = Gāthic ahyā. The letter **𐬨** is a relic of the time when the Avesta stood in the Pahlavi character; I think that it is here merely a lengthened **𐬨** = ya¹. Terminations also seem much mutilated in the Cuneiform, and the name Auramazda written as one word, does not seem to me so original.

We must indeed remember that a later generation, owing to an isolated position, often preserves an older dialect, as it may an older form of religion, whereas an earlier generation, if its predecessors have lived in a compact society in smaller districts, varies the ancient forms, as the old Indian developed into Sanskrit and Prākrit. Still we have little reason to be certain that the civilisation of Media and

¹ Also **𐬨𐬀** is simply ayam, and should be so transliterated; so also in a throng of other words. Salemann has noticed the origin of **𐬨** = ê, but gives no other indication in the present sense. I think that **𐬨** and also **𐬨𐬀**, where they equal Aryan ya, should be corrected everywhere, like all other instances of miswriting. Unless indeed we can regard the **𐬨**, for which **𐬨𐬀** were often clearly miswritten, as itself of double significance, as in Pahlavi. **𐬨** might then regularly and properly equal both ê and ya; so **𐬨𐬀** may equal long ê or yâ (ayâ). Other instances of miswriting in Zend would be dat. dual -bya. The Aryan -âm was first written as the nasal vowel -â, and still further carelessly reduced to -a, but never so spoken. On the contrary, in the acc. fem. &c., the nasalisation was over-written, too much expressed. The final nasal caused the scribes to write the preceding letter as if nasalised, 'â,' but it was never nasalised in speech.

Persia was either more or less condensed and social than that of Bactria and the East. But beside a priority to the Inscriptions, we are obliged to consider the time needed for developments. The Greeks of the time of Herodotus probably, and those later certainly, found a form of Zarathustrianism in full development in Media; but if the contemporaries of Herodotus heard familiarly of a Zarathustrianism there, a long period of time must be allowed for its development if it originated in Media, and a still longer period if it found its way there from the East. If, then, the bulk of the later Avesta existed at the time of Herodotus and at that of Darius, how long previously must it have been composed; for such systems do not bloom in a day?

We have the evidence of historical tradition that the Magi¹ were influential even at the time of Cyrus, not dwelling upon the possibility of their existence at the earliest mention of Medes as the conquerors and rulers of Babylon.

Can we then, considering the recognised stagnation of ancient Eastern intelligence, ascribe to the development of the Median Zarathustrianism a shorter period than from one to three centuries? If, then, the bulk of the later Avesta must be placed so long before the Inscriptions of Darius, where shall we place the earlier Avesta with its most important remaining fragments, the Gâthas²?

After studying the Gâthas carefully in detail, and becoming also familiar with them as a whole by frequent perusal, we must measure the time needed for the change from their tone to that of the later Avesta. Could it have been less than a century, or centuries? Was not as much time needed for the Zarathustra of the Gâthas to become the Zarathustra of the later Avesta, as was afterwards consumed by the migration of the creed from the North-east, if it really originated there? As there is undoubtedly a

¹ I regard the Magi as representing the Zarathustrianism of the Vendîdâd. This the false Bardiya endeavoured to introduce, demolishing the temples which the old Mazda-worship permitted in Persia. See the Cuneiform Inscription of Behistun II; Darius 61.

² All in the Gâthic dialect is old.

difference of several centuries between the dates of the newest and oldest parts of the later Avesta, so we must think of a considerable interval between the oldest parts of the later Avesta and the latest parts of the older Avesta, for there is the other consideration which imperatively constrains us to avoid concluding for short periods in the stages of development. The Vedic Hymns, sung in metres closely similar to those in both the Gâthas and the later Avesta, and naming gods, demons, and heroes so closely related, not to speak of myths, challenge us to say whether they are, the oldest of them, older or later than the oldest parts of the Avesta, and, if there exists any difference as to the ages of these ancient productions, how great that difference is. The oldest *Rîks* have now an established antiquity of about 4000 ; were the hymns sung on the other side of the mountains as old ? The metres of these latter are as old as those of the *Rîg-veda*, if not older, and their grammatical forms and word structure are often positively nearer the original Aryan from which both proceeded. If it were not for two circumstances, we should be forced to ask very seriously which were the older, and to abandon altogether our mention of later dates. Those circumstances are the absence of the Aryan gods from the Gâthas ; and, secondly, their abstract conceptions. These latter are so little offset with expected puerilities that it is often hard to believe that the Gâthas are old at all. Their antiquity is placed beyond dispute by the historic mention of Zarathustra. But, if Zarathustra were not indisputably a living man in the Gâthas, their depth and refinement, together with the absence of Mithra, Haoma, &c., would, in themselves considered, force us to place them rather late. As it is, the absence of Mithra and his colleagues, who reappear in the later Avesta, permits us to place the Gâthas considerably later than the oldest *Rîks*. For no sudden and intentional dismissal of the ancient gods is to be accepted with Haug, nor any religious schism as the cause (!) of the migration of the Indians toward the south. The process was of course the reverse.

The migrating tribes, in consequence of their separation

from their brethren in Iran, soon became estranged from them, and their most favoured Gods fell slowly into neglect, if not disfavour.

We need time to account for this change, and no short interval of time. We can therefore place the Gâthas long after the oldest *Rîks*. While, therefore, in view of the established age of the *Rîg-veda*, the Gâthas may possibly have been composed as early as about 1500 B.C., it is also possible to place them as late as (say) 900–1200 B.C., while the fragments in the Gâthic dialect must be considered somewhat later. The dates of the composition of the several parts of the later Avesta, on the other hand, must be supposed to extend over many centuries, as the various sections in the Zend dialect are so much more numerous than those in the Gâthic, the Gâthas themselves representing practically but one date. Placing then the oldest portions of the later Avesta somewhat earlier than Darius, we are obliged to extend the period during which its several parts were composed so far as perhaps to the third or fourth century before Christ, the half-spurious matter contained in them being regarded as indefinitely later.

It seems necessary to state here for the information of non-specialists, and as bearing very seriously upon all the questions involved, that a very unusually severe controversy prevails upon the exegesis of the Avesta, and that it centres in the question as to the value of the Asiatic translations of it. A similar debate was once held on the *Rîg-veda*, but that is now silenced, all agreeing that the traditional renderings are neither to be slavishly followed, nor blindly ignored. Very different has been the fate of Zend philology, and in one important particular the studies are poles apart; for whereas the commentaries on the *Rîks* are written in Sanskrit, which is clear to experts, those on the Zend-Avesta are written in a language upon which the lexicography is most incomplete, and the elucidation of these explanations themselves remains by far the most

difficult task now before us. Professor von Spiegel has accomplished much toward breaking the rough road of science in this direction, and scholars of the first order have followed his leading, while all with one accord express to him their acknowledgments. But Professor von Spiegel has not intended his editions and citations to represent full translations. He has, as a matter of course, taken it for granted that those who oppose him, as well as those who follow him, have studied his Pahlavi editions, not paying him the undesired compliment of making his commentaries the sole source of their knowledge of tradition. Moreover in no branch of science does scholarship make more rapid strides than in Pahlavi, several important works having appeared since Spiegel's commentaries.

In the attempt to master the Pahlavi translations of the Avesta we must consider many and difficult problems.

In the first place, and as a matter of course, they cannot be at all reasonably attempted without a full knowledge of the Gâthic and Avesta texts so far as they have been as yet otherwise and approximately elucidated. The two problems hang together like the arches of a circular building, and they should be studied together word for word; for the Pahlavi used is not fully that of the books. It is often turned quite out of its course, as Pahlavi, by an effort to follow the more highly inflected Zend literally. Then, again, a question of the utmost importance meets us in estimating the glosses, which are often, but not always, from a later hand. A translation of the Pahlavi must of course first be considered as in the light of the glosses, for the language is so indefinite as to many of its grammatical forms, that such an indication as a gloss, if it be proved to have been written by the same person who composed the text, would be decisive in determining the rendering; but a final translation should be made more strictly in the light of the Gâthic, so far as it affords on its side positive indications, and the glosses, where they do not correspond, should be set apart as from a later hand. Then, once more, and on the contrary, where the gloss is obviously right, and the text erroneous, the former should be appro-

priated unencumbered by the latter ¹. We must recognise the traces of former accurate scholarship whether we see them in text or gloss, and, from the accumulation of the correct surmises, we should construct an argument for the probability of the correctness of the hints of the Pahlavi in cases of great difficulty. In rendering the Pahlavi as a necessary prelude to rendering the Avesta, all possible help should of course be sought from the Asiatic translations of the Pahlavi, from those of Neryosangh in Sanskrit, and from the still later ones in Parsi and Persian. Here, again, those who read the Pahlavi only as rendered by Neryosangh need great caution. If Neryosangh is simply read like the classical Sanskrit, great errors will be committed. He needs a glossary of his own, and should be read solely in the light of the Pahlavi which was chiefly his original. So of the Parsi Persian translations, they must be read with especial attention to their originals. After these original translations have been fully mastered, and compared with an improved rendering of the Gâthic, likewise also studied in the full light of the Veda, the patient scholar will be surprised at the result. He will find that to a certain extensive degree, the two sources of information coincide when reasonably estimated, and, moreover, that where the Pahlavi gives us an indication differing from that derived from the Vedic, the surmise of the Pahlavi is the more often correct. I say 'reasonably estimated,' for not only is the Pahlavi, as a less highly inflected language, incapable of rendering the Avesta literally, but its authors do not uniformly make the attempt to do so; nor do they always follow the order of the Gâthic or Zend. Their translations generally run word for word as to their outward forms, for the ancient interpreters probably regarded such a following as essential to a complete rendering, but they found them-

¹ I would here state to the distinguished scholars who have done me the honour to study my work on the Gâthas, that the Pahlavi translations contained in it are those made in the light of the glosses. Here and there final ones will be added in a later volume, as from the Pahlavi texts sometimes considered apart from the Pahlavi glosses, and in consequence often much nearer the Gâthic than those from both text and gloss.

selves compelled to resort to the most important exceptions. And, lastly, the rejection, or total neglect of the Pahlavi translations and their successors, on the ground that they contain errors, is a policy which seems to me defective, and to the last degree. What absurdities can Sāyana be capable of, and yet who would utter final opinions upon the *Rig-veda* without either the ability, or the attempt, to read Sāyana¹?

It is hardly necessary to mention that the restoration of texts goes hand in hand with translation. For how are we to interpret a passage before we know that it exists? And of what inestimable worth are the Pahlavi translations as evidence to texts! Who does not see that where the ancient scribe is most free or erroneous as to form, or root, his rendering often shows plainly which of two words stood before him in his manuscripts. Our oldest MS. (that of Copenhagen, numbered 5) dates from the year 1323 A.D.; and what were the dates of the ancient documents before the eyes of the Pahlavi translator who writes in it?

We must now ask whether our present Pahlavi translations are improvements upon their predecessors, or the reverse. That they are improvements in some few instances is undeniable, for, as we have seen, some of the glosses to them from later hands give the truth where the text is wide. But the glosses which show a later origin are, for the most part, inferior in richness to the texts. Here and there a talented, or fortunate, Parsi threw new light on the subject, but the general tendency was one of deterioration; that is, before the revival of Parsi-learning under Neryosangh (400–500 years ago). This deterioration would naturally decrease as we approach successive periods in going back to the time when MSS. of the Gāthas existed according to positive evidence, that is, to the time when, according to the *Arđā Virāf*, Alexander's servants found skins at Persepolis on which the Avesta had been traced in

¹ Well has Geldner mentioned the 'epoch-making' *Études Iraniennes* of Darmesteter (KZ. vol. xxviii, p. 186). It is to be hoped that these brilliant pieces will stimulate the study of the relation between the Zend and the New Persian through the Ancient Persian and the Pahlavi.

gilded letters (for it is not positively proved that the informants of Herodotus heard the Magian priests singing their 'theogonies' from written books). At each of these periods scholarship is proved to have been competent by the results which it accomplished. The first of them we must place in the sixth century when, on Spiegel's estimate¹, the Zend characters were modified into their present lucid form from the Pahlavi, and distinct short vowels took the place of the unknown signs which existed previously. Then all MSS. which were to be found must have been collected and copied, and, so to speak, re-edited; and here we must accordingly place a period when the Pahlavi translations were more valuable than those of any later date. As we go further back we come upon another period, when, under Shapur II, Âdarbad Mahraspend brought the surviving portions of the Zend-Avesta together (about A.D. 330). Still earlier the servants of Artaxerxes, the Sasanian, collected yet more abundant writings, when Zarathustrianism was instituted as the state religion. Then, under the Arsacids (possibly under Vologeses the first), those most competent in the realm were directed to gather the then extant documents.


While, if we hold that the entire Avesta was written originally in some character different from the Pahlavi, we must finally infer the existence of an early epoch, when the entire Avesta was brought over in its bulk from the earlier East (or West?) Iranian character in which it was first inscribed. If this character differed radically from the Pahlavi, this transliteration must be regarded as one of the most remarkable of literary events. Notwithstanding all the now rapidly corrected errors, the texts have been handed down with the minutest distinctions of dialect preserved², and this proves the existence of competent interpreters at a period practically contemporaneous with the composition of the later portions of the later Avesta. What commentaries must then have existed, not free from

¹ *Eranisches Alterthumskunde* III, s. 767.

² See Hübschmann, *KZ.* bd. 24, s. 326.

error, as we see from the Zand of the Avesta, but, as to language and general sense, how close ! Even if the degree of linguistic knowledge increases only gradually or steadily in going back, without any epochs from the time of Neryosangh to the inferable date of the latest Zend writings, and if the character in which the Avesta was first recorded (after a lengthy life as an orally extended lore) differed only as to mode and fashion, and not radically, from the Pahlavi (which, so far as the later Avesta is concerned, is most probable), we have yet the transliteration of the Gâthas to account for, which perhaps were brought over (after long oral life) from the so-called Aryan character, while the existence of a gradual tradition of a scholarship does not refute the fact that this scholarship must have been at times of the highest character ; it makes high scholarship more probable.

What translations, we again remark, may have existed among these early sages ! And, if they could once make translations fresh from the exegesis of the latest Zend writers themselves, is it not practically certain, considering the tenacity of life manifested by Zoroastrianism, that their explanations still lurk in the commentaries which have come down to us. And if these inferences be at all correct, how should we labour to discover from our present translations what these predecessors were ; and what scholar cannot perceive that gems of evidence as to texts and sense may yet linger in those of our present Pahlavi translations which may yet be otherwise most filled with phantastic error ? And shall we not therefore conclude that their expected inaccuracies, whether small or great, cannot destroy their inherent value ? What, then, are we to think of it, when the New Persian, a quasi-daughter of the Pahlavi, is superficially referred to for linguistic analogies, when even the Armenian is also scanned, while the Pahlavi is left unmastered ? Is a quasi-mother language of the New Persian any the less likely to afford linguistic analogies because an actual translation of the Avesta has been attempted in it, and because the Avesta once stood in its characters, while it may also present claims to be considered to a certain limit a daughter language to both the Gâthic and Zend ?



And should the acknowledged difficulty of the character continue to be a reason for avoiding all efforts to make it out?¹

In the endeavour to divide our Avesta texts into originals and gloss, we are greatly aided by the metre. Interpolated words and phrases are often obvious at a glance, and we should never suspend our efforts to discover all the traces of metre which exist in the Avesta, as a necessary step to the restoration of the documents to their first form; but we should avoid exaggeration, and a carelessly dogmatic procedure in insisting upon reducing lines to an exact, or to a supposed exact, number of syllables². I regard it as unwise to suppose that the metrical lines of the Avesta, or indeed of any very ancient poetical matter, have been composed with every line filed into exact proportions. The ancient poets would have brought out the measures in many a place by accent and a sandhi which are no longer known to us. The Vedic Hymns may, to a great extent, form an exception, but who would not say that where uniform evenness is at hand, an effort to improve the metre has often corrupted the text. Priests or reciters of intelligence would here and there round off an awkward strophe, as year after year they felt the unevenness of numbers. Metre must inevitably bring a perfecting corruption at times, as a deficiency in the metre must also prove a marring corruption. Cases should be carefully discriminated. The expression of passionate feeling, for instance, would be likely to cause

¹ One of the most powerful tributes ever paid to the Pahlavi translators was Haug's conversion to them. Before studying them he lost no opportunity to stigmatise their deficiencies; later, however, he followed them in many an important place, and sometimes with little reserve.

As writers of the opposed extremes seem honestly convinced of the radical error of each other's views, it is obvious that association and interest have much to do with decisions. A scholar should put himself fully under the influence first of one school and then of the other. The necessity for well-balanced studies is extremely great.

² It is only lately that the variation from eleven to twelve syllables in the lines of Trishup has been applied to the Gâthic metres, nor has the possibility of a shifting caesura been acceded to till lately.

unevenness in lines. The language would be vigorous and idiomatic, and of unusual value as a fragment of ancient phrase, but the metre would have suffered.

Then as to conjectured texts; after texts have been improved from all available relics of ancient tradition, or scholarship, as afforded by the Pahlavi translations, and from the evidence of metre, we are at times still left with readings before us which could not have been original. The composers have indeed here and there constructed sentences which they either could not, or would not, make easy, but as a general thing we may say, that where the text, as it stands, gives no satisfactory sense to us, after we have exhausted the resources of previous Asiatic scholarship, or direct analogy, in our efforts to explain it, it is in that case not the text as the composer delivered it. We are then reduced to conjecture, for how are we to translate a text before we are certain that it is integral? Our first efforts should be directed to the detection of losses; for a text may still be of great value when considered as a mass of broken sentences, for, if we are certain that such is its character, we can often fill out the missing members with much probability. But whether we insert supplementary conjectures, or merely bracket later interpolations, we must by all means in cases of real necessity make the effort to amend the text (as also in the Veda).

Even if we fail in our attempted improvements, we are often little worse off than before, for whereas it is possible, or even probable, that the composers wrote what we suggest, it is sometimes not possible that they wrote exactly what stands in our texts. We should even suggest alternative readings where our present ones are only less probable (for the suggestion of an alternative is not the wholesale destruction of a sentence), while even when we declare their outcoming meaning totally unsatisfactory, the MSS. still remain to other writers to begin on afresh. And in estimating what would be reasonable meanings, we should guard carefully against both extremes, and we should especially exercise a strong negative criticism against the recognition of

too much meaning, or too subtle a meaning. Profound and subtle conceptions placed where we are obliged to place the Gâthas, and other ancient portions of the Avesta, are indeed precious relics, as such conceptions at any age show a higher mental power, but we must doubt them only so much the more, and doubt, if we would be scientific and conscientious, till doubt becomes no longer possible. Beyond that we should turn our suspicions against our doubts themselves, which is the proper course if we would exhaust the meanings of the Gâthas. Unless these are a fortuitous concourse of syllables, religiously profound modes of thought are manifest throughout. It is therefore strictly unscientific to force parts of them to express shallow details, and it is above all deplorable to change the text itself in order to produce out of it less enlarged meanings¹. I say to force parts of them, for the great mass of them confessedly defies all attempts to reduce them to the statements of simple commonplace.

They can never possess the rich colour of the *Rîks*; it is therefore the more to be deplored if we fail to see their deep, but awkwardly expressed, and oft-repeated thought. I must express my regret that until lately, when the enclitics have been more carefully considered, the form of sentences in the Gâthas does not seem to have been noticed, writers conjecturing infinitives and simple accusatives at the ends of sentences. Both may, of course, fall there, but when we wish to reconstruct a word, we should not change it to a form which is not placed according to prevailing analogies. Infinitives and accusatives generally, both in the Gâthas and the *Rîg-veda*, avoid the end of the sentence. The accusative, when it falls there, is generally preceded by qualifying words often in apposition or agreement with it. Also in the conception of translations, authors seem to sup-

¹ Non-specialists must not suppose that our texts are more apparently uncertain than (say) many portions of the Old Testament. Large portions of them are also as clear, at least, as the *Rîg-veda*; and the emendations referred to need very seldom affect the doctrines. Let the learned public, however, insist on scholars making honest attempts to render the texts as they stand before their emendations, and greater harmony would result.

pose it impossible that the lines can contain anything but lengthened prosaic sentences (too often with an accusative, or infinitive, pushed awkwardly out to the end). To me the Gâthic sentence is often very short, and so better adapted to poetic expression.

It has been already implied, and it has been taken for granted throughout¹, that the Avesta should be closely compared with the Veda, but let it never be forgotten, in the name of science, that the force and meaning of analogous words in the Gâthic and the Vedic cannot be expected to be uniformly identical, considering the extent of territory, and the length of time, by which those who spoke the two languages were separated. The meanings of the Vedic words could not hold their own even in India, developing into the Sanskrit and Prâkrit which differ widely, how truly misguided is it therefore to attribute necessarily the same shades of meaning to the terms of the two sister tongues. If even the Gâthic hymns stood in the Indian forms, and had been discovered in India, having also reference to Indian history, no thoughtful writer would have rendered them in complete analogy with the *Rig-veda*. The Gâthic usages would have been added in our dictionaries to those of the Vedic, just as the Sanskrit definitions are added.

An additional word seems called for as to the results of Zarathustrian theology. Besides its connection with the modern philosophy through Gnosticism which has been already noticed², a relation between it and the Jewish theology since the Captivity has long been mentioned. The hagiology, the demonology, the temptation, the parables, the eschatology, have all been supposed to show traces of the time when Persian power was dominant in Jerusalem, and with it, Persian literature; but the discussion of such questions requires separate treatises.

As to the general benefit which has resulted from Zarathustrianism in the past, few reflections need to be added. If the mental illumination and spiritual elevation of many millions of mankind, throughout long periods of time, are of

¹ See remarks in the Preface, p. xv.

² See note on p. xix.

any importance, it would require strong proof to deny that Zarathustrianism has had an influence of very positive power in determining the gravest results. That men should be taught to look within rather than without, to believe that suffering and sin do not originate from the capricious power of a Deity still called 'good,' that the 'good thought, word, and deed' should be recognised as essential to all sanctity, even in the presence of a superstitious ceremonial, that a judgment should have been expected according to the deeds done in the body, and the soul consigned to a Heaven of virtue or to a Hell of vice, its recompense being pronounced by the happy or stricken conscience, these can never be regarded by serious historians as matters of little moment, and if, on the contrary, they are allowed to be matters of great moment, the Zend-Avesta should be revered and studied by all who value the records of the human race.

ABBREVIATIONS.

Barth. = Bartholomae.

B.V. S. = Vendidad Sade, von Dr. Hermann Brockhaus. Leipzig, 1850.

D. = dastur.

De inf. = De infinitivi linguarum sanskritae bactricae persicae graecae oscae umbricae latinae gotticae forma et usu, scripsit Eugenius Wilhelmus, phil. doctor. 1872.

G. = Gâmâspgi.

H. = Hübschmann.

Inf. = Geschichte des Infinitivs im Indogermanischen, von Dr. Julius Jolly. 1873.

K. = Kopenhagen MSS.

K. Z. = Kuhnische Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung.

M. † K. = Mainyô-† Khard. Ed. West. 1871.

Ner. = Neryosangh.

P. = Paris MSS.

Rv. = *Rig-veda*.

Sp. = Spiegel.

Trlr. = translator.

V. S. = Ein Kapitel vergleichender Syntax, von Dr. Julius Jolly. 1872.

Wg. = Westergaard.

Z. D. M. G. = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

An asterisk denotes irregularities.

THE GÂTHAS.

THE five Gâthas of Zarathustra and his immediate followers are placed here before the other parts of the Yasna on account of their higher antiquity. There existed no other Yasna for years or centuries beside them.

The more remarkable circumstances connected with them have been already discussed in the Introduction.

If it is necessary to recall any of them here, the most prominent would be that they are undoubtedly the productions of a small group of influential men who are referred to in them for the most part by name; that Zarathustra, everywhere else nearly or quite a demi-god, is here a struggling and suffering man. He is a prophet, or a divinely appointed instructor, but thoroughly human and real, so far as his situations become apparent.

Secondly, their historical tone may be emphasised. Their doctrines and exhortations concern an actual religious movement taking place contemporaneously with their composition; and that movement was exceptionally pure and most earnest. Their tone is therefore everywhere serious. Nearly all myths are dropped, and likewise, as perhaps their most striking peculiarity, even the old Aryan gods, who reappear in the later Yasna, Vendîdâd, and Yasts, are, save one, wholly absent.

The movement in its reformatory character seems to have thrown them out, not perhaps with definite intention, but because the minds of the devout enthusiasts excluded them as having inferior interest, in view of the results immediately before them.

So far as a claim to a high position among the curiosities of ancient moral lore is concerned, the reader may trust himself freely to the impression that he has before him an anthology which was probably composed with as fervent a desire to benefit the spiritual and moral natures of those to

whom it was addressed as any which the world had yet seen. Nay, he may provisionally accept the opinion that nowhere else are such traces of intelligent religious earnestness to be found as existing at the period of the Gâthas or before them, save in the Semitic scriptures.

As to their speculative depth; wherever theosophical speculation is put into words, the evidence of their grasp and subjectivity becomes positive. As the extent of documents necessarily produces a certain impression upon the mind of an investigator, it must not be forgotten that the Gâthas were in all probability many times more voluminous than the fragments which now remain to us. The historian may argue from what has survived to what once existed, and the inevitable conclusion is imposing.

For additional details see the Introduction, and the summaries at the head of each Gâtha and chapter.

THE GÂTHA(Â) AHUNAVAITI(Î).

This Gâtha, consisting of seven chapters of the Yasna (XXVIII-XXXIV), takes its name from the similarity of its metre to that of the Ahuna-vairya formula which also occurs before it in the Yasna. It is composed of homogeneous material, but as its material is also homogeneous with that of the other Gâthas, it probably owes its existence as a group of sections to its metrical form. Its lines were intended to number sixteen syllables, and they are put together in stanzas of three. It is all very ancient and probably nearly all original with Zarathustra himself, though parts seem to be put into the mouths of his immediate associates and disciples. Whether any persons existed in the immediate circle of the sage capable of composing hymns like these unaided, is of course a question; but that some were able to put poetical matter together under his guidance or inspiration seems certain.

An analysis and general summary is placed before each chapter as more convenient than massing them all together. The reader is reminded that the rhythm of the original, so far as it could be reasonably conjectured, is somewhat imitated in parts of the translations.

THE GÂTHAS.

YASNA XXIX.

THE WAIL OF THE KINE. THE CALL OF ZARATHUSTRA. HIS PRAYER FOR AID.

This chapter, the second in the manuscripts of the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, is placed here as in a more natural order. It may be regarded as containing the terminus a quo of the divine revelation. The Soul of the Kine, as representing the herds of the holy Iranian people, their only means of honourable livelihood, raises its voice, and expressing the profoundest needs of an afflicted people, addresses Ahura and His Divine Order, Asha, in bitterness.

1. Recalling another and a later 'groan of the creation,' she demands wherefore and for whom she was made, since afflictions encompass her; and as her comfort, if not her existence, was threatened as much by the unsettled habits induced by constant alarms as by the actual incursions of her predatory neighbours, she beseeches the Bountiful Immortals to instruct her as to the benefits of civilised agriculture, and confirm her protectors in its practice, as her only remedy against the evils of which she complains.

2. Ahura answers by a question to Asha, the personified Righteous Order, as to what guardian he had appointed in order to smite back the fury which assails her, intimating that some chief ought to have been set over her originally who would have averted her miseries, training her people in steady tillage and bucolic skill, and repelling the destructive raids.

3. Asha answers that her sufferings were inevitable, that no chief could be appointed who could prevent them since none was himself without his share of injustice and of passionate resentment. He could not answer why this was the case. The question, involving the insolvable problem of the origin of evil, lay at the foundation of those influences which move the stars of destiny; that the religious revelation afforded by the Ratu (as in

chapter XXX) was intended to meet these problems so far as they could be answered¹, and that therefore all who were entering upon active enterprises were in the act of approaching, not him Asha, the subordinate archangel, but Mazda himself, who was the greatest of beings, and alone able to answer their prayers and questions.

4. Zarathustra², poetically conceived to be present, here intervenes to reaffirm the homage just paid by Asha. He declares Ahura Mazda to be himself the most mindful of all the previously revealed assertions and directions uttered by himself, and fulfilled in the actions of both the Demon-gods of their enemies, and of good or evil men. He is also said to be fully cognisant of what they will do in the future, and to discriminate between what is good and evil as an infallible judge, allotting to us all our destiny in future sufferings or rewards. 5. Addressing Ahura and Asha, and uniting with the Kine's Soul in her supplication, he questions Mazda in his doubt, not in peaceful confidence, as later in the impressive hymn, each verse of which begins with the words, 'This ask I Thee, aright, Ahura! tell me!' but deprecating from himself, and constructively from the Kine, the impending destruction which he sees will justly fall upon the wicked as visited by the discriminating vengeance acknowledged to be Ahura's attribute (see verse 4). 6. At last Ahura, showing the intention of His questions, answers them himself; no regulating lord in full sympathy with the Righteous Order had as yet been discovered or discoverable, but He himself will make a selection. He therefore declares himself as solemnly appointing Zarathustra to that office.

And Zarathustra, inspired by His Good Mind, and guided by His righteousness, will accomplish more than has as yet been done to rally the thrifty community, and settle their virtuous polity upon its desired basis of training and defence. 7. As Zarathustra is a listener in the colloquy between the Deity, the Kine's Soul, and Asha, the Righteous Order, so the other Immortals beside Asha³, here join in, as if the appointment just made had not been heard, or was incredible (see below). Mazda is indeed declared to have revealed the sacred Word-of-reason in harmony with the consenting Righteousness, and to have provided food for the Kine and

¹ Something like this is implied.

² If verses 4, 5, 6, were originally connected.

³ Or possibly a company of the religious chiefs poetically conceived to be present.

the needy consumers, but who was there adequately endowed with the Good Mind, who could promulgate that Māthra with its revealed directions as to sustenance of both body and mind?

8. Ahura repeats his announcement of Zarathustra, as if to silence the objections.

As Zarathustra alone had heard the doctrines from the voice of inspiration, so he desired to declare them, and had authority to do so, together with a settled position of such a character as to make his statements felt.

9. But an unexpected difficulty arises. The Kine's Soul is by no means impressed by the personality of the individual selected as her guardian. So far from being the demi-god of the other parts of the Avesta, Zarathustra's declarations are characterised by her as 'the voice of a pusillanimous man,' while she, on the contrary, expected one truly kingly in his rank and characteristics, and able to bring his desires to effect, while the Bountiful Immortals (or the attending chieftains), as if they had meant their question in verse 7 to be a question uttered in mere perplexity or contempt, join in with chorus, asking when indeed an effective helper will be provided.

10. Zarathustra, undismayed by the coldness of his reception, enters at once upon his office as priest and prophet, praying Ahura for the people; and recognising the names of the 'Immortals,' Khshathra, Asha, and Vohu Manah, in their original sense, asks Ahura to grant to the people in their straits, a Sovereign Authority established in the Divine Order, and bestowing the needed quiet and happiness for which the suffering provinces, as represented by the Kine's Soul in her wail, had expressed their desire.

And as he prays, he avows his own steadfast confidence in Ahura rather than in the Daêvas, as the prime possessor and bestower of blessings.

11. Then, as if eager to receive full equipment upon the spot, he not only beseeches for the Righteous Order, the Kingly Power of God, and His Good Mind for the masses as represented by the Kine, but asks when they are coming to him, and hastening; and he entreats Ahura to bestow His help at once for the great cause, and to a very abundant degree, upon himself and his associates. (It is singular that the name of Âramaiti does not occur in this section.)

Translation.

(Homage to you, O Sacred Gâthas!)

1. Unto you (O Ahura and Asha!) the Soul of the Kine (our sacred herds and folk) cried aloud: For whom did ye create me, and by¹ whom did ye fashion me? On me comes the assault of wrath, and of violent power, the blow² of desolation, audacious insolence, and (thievish)³ might. None other pasture-giver⁴ have I than you, therefore do ye teach me good (tillage) for the fields (my only hope of welfare⁵)!

Ahura speaks.

2. Upon this the Creator⁶ of the Kine (the holy

¹ *Kz mâ tasha/* can only mean this here. The Pahlavi translator probably read *kahmâi*. He has *val mûn li tukhshîd (?) hômanam*.

² One might think of 'inertia' as a rendering for *remô*, (if read), but the afflictions complained of seem rather to imply active violence.

³ Or read *tâyusâ* (robbery?) with the Pahlavi translation; 'yu' and 'vi' would be written much alike in a manuscript.

⁴ *Vastâ* has been found, as I understand, in some manuscripts. The Persian manuscript of Haug has a curious *vâstîrîdâr* (*vâstârîdâr*?) in the Pahlavi text, which seems to confirm *vastâ* in the sense given.

⁵ As there are very many non-specialists to whom it is important to weigh this present subject as closely as it may be possible, and as everything here is a matter of the keenest questioning among experts, I add occasionally a word-for-word rendering, although necessarily very uncouth: To you the Kine's soul cried-complaining: For whom me did ye fashion? Who me made? Against me assaulting-rapine, violence-and, desolations-[blow], daring-insolence-and, (thievish) might-and (possibly change the text). Not for me a pasture-giver than-you other; therefore to-me teach-ye good (things) for-the-pasture (adj. acc. pl. neut.).

⁶ I fear that I cannot follow Haug in his later view, where he follows tradition in rather an extreme manner, rendering 'the cutter (wounder) of the Ox.' Neither Spiegel nor Justi would confide to a later myth to this degree (see Y. XXXI, 9 and XLVI, 9). This is

herds) asked of Righteousness¹: How (was) thy guardian for the Kine (appointed) by thee when, as having power (over all her fate), ye made her? (In what manner did ye secure) for her, together with pasture, a cattle-chief who was both skilled and likewise energetic? Whom did ye select² as her (life's) master who might hurl back the fury of the wicked³?

Asha answers.

3. To Him the (Divine Righteousness) answered with⁴ his sanctity. (Great was our perplexity); a chieftain who was capable of smiting⁵ back (their fury), and who was himself without hate (was not to be obtained by us); among such things as these, those things are not to be known (by beings such as we) which are the influences which approach⁶ (and move) the lofty fires⁷ (revealing the favour and the will of God⁸).

Of beings He is the mightiest to whom those⁹

mentioned, however, not as complaining of an error, but solely to guard the reader against the mistake of an eminent authority. (See also Roth, Z. D. M. G., Bd. 25, s. 9.)

¹ Observe the personification of righteousness.

² Or, 'what salvation-lord,' governed by *dâtâ* from the preceding line; so also the Pahlavi translator *mûn avô pavan nadûkîh khûdâi*. *Ustâ* occurs only here as a verbal form. Supply *angha*/in b.

³ The Pahlavi *aêshmô anâêr zanisnô*.

⁴ Or read *ashem*. The Pahlavi has *ashavahistô pasukhvô gûft*. I am not at all inclined to accept vocatives for nominatives in the *Gâthas*.

⁵ *Sar-gan*, compare *Verethragan*. The Pahlavi indicates this by *tanû sardârîh*. ⁶ Possibly, 'by which he approaches.'

⁷ The Pahlavi *rôshanô î râstô*.

⁸ Cp. Y. XXX, 1 : *yâ raoêbîs daresatâ urvâzâ*.

⁹ The Pahlavi indicates a third person; and *keredushâ* is far the most simply explained as a nom. pl. Recall *mâ mashâ* and *man* (?) *mathâ*. Otherwise, 'to whom I will come with activity and invoking.'

who have performed their actions approach with invocations. (He has no need to ask!)

Zarathustra intervenes ¹.

4. The Great Creator ² (is himself) most mindful of the uttered indications which have been fulfilled beforehand hitherto in the deeds of ³ demon-gods ⁴ and (good or evil) men, and of those which shall be fulfilled by them ⁵ hereafter. He Ahura is the discerning arbiter; so shall it be to us ⁶ as He shall will ⁷!

5. Therefore it is that we both, my soul ⁸ and (the soul) of the mother ⁹ Kine, (are) making our supplica-

¹ A verse or verses may here have fallen out.

² I cannot persuade myself to accept the nearly universally accepted comparison of Mazdau and medhâ. See note on p. 104.

³ Or, 'He has done by Daêvas?' If thus, absolute and not qualified sovereignty would be indicated. See the last line.

⁴ Observe that while 'by Daêva-worshippers' would be an admirable rendering for Daêvâis, because more commonplace and therefore safer, it is here impossible on account of mashyâisââ. We are closely confined to the acceptance of a large idea. Ahura was mindful of what transpired in the deeds of Daêva-gods, and not in those of Daêva-worshippers alone. The inst. must be modified.

⁵ As varshaitê is elsewhere used in an active sense, it is possible, but not probable, that a special predestination may be indicated. 'He shall do by means of Daêvas and men.'

⁶ 'To us men,' not to us Ameshôspends, of course!

⁷ Verbatim. Mazda the-words most-mindful which for have-been-fulfilled before by-means-of- (the actions of) Daêvas-and men-and what-and (shall)-be-done after, He the discriminating lord; so to-us shall-it-be as He shall-choose.

⁸ This seems to prove positively that a human being speaks here and in the previous verse; 'the soul of Righteousness' is of course impossible.

⁹ Some have referred the word to the root zan obscurely present in it; otherwise a drivable cow; one mature and fit for use. The term used in the Vendîdâd in a common meaning as merely

tions for the two worlds to Ahura, and with hands stretched out in entreaty, when (we pray to the Great Creator¹ with questions in our doubt²; (and He will answer).

Not for the righteous liver, not for the thrifty (tiller of the earth), shall there be destruction³ together with the wicked!

Ahura.

6. Upon this the Lord, the Great Creator, He who understands the mysterious grace⁴ by His insight⁵, spake thus: Not in this manner⁶ is a spiritual master found for us, nor a chieftain moved by Righteousness and appointed (in its spirit); therefore Thee⁷ have I named⁸ (as such a head) to the diligent tiller of the ground⁹!

designating a cow at a certain age, may be the familiar use of an adjective here applied in the ancient Gâtha in a sacred sense.

¹ This passage is one of the strongest for the comparison of Mazda and medhâ. The sense 'asking wisdom in our doubt,' is admirable. I cannot however accept the comparison.

² Pavan gômânîkih hampûrsânî; root dî.

³ The Pahlavi awasînisnîh*, but in other connections fragyâitis might well mean 'continued life;' 'life long endured with the wicked.'

⁴ The Pahlavi has vishûpisnô, which here affords a better meaning; see however Y. XLVIII, 9. We might read as alternative here, 'knowing the calamity to be averted.'

⁵ Uncertain. The Pahlavi however indicates 'discernment.'

⁶ One is strongly tempted to read aêvô, 'not a single chief,' but the ancient writing read by the Pahlavi translator had aêvâ ahû.

⁷ This indicates that Zarathustra had been the speaker in the previous verses.

⁸ Appointed.

⁹ Verbatim. Thereupon spake Ahura Mazda knowing the wonderful (thing) through-insight (?) not thus a master found, nor a ruler righteous-order-from-even from, therefore for thee to-the-thrifty-and to-the-husbandman-and (I) as-a-creator I-have-made.

The Ameshôspends¹.

7. Mazda has created the inspired Word-of-reason which is a Māthra of fatness (for the offering), the (Divine) Righteousness consenting with Him in his deed. Food he has prepared for the Kine and for the eaters², He the one bountiful with his (saving) doctrine; but whom hast Thou, endowed with the Good Mind, who may give forth those (doctrines) by word of mouth to mortals³?

Ahura.

8. This man is found for me here who alone⁴ has

¹ Or a company of the saints conceived to be present.

² So some writers, accepting an irregular reading *hvarushaēibyô* after the indication of the Pahlavi translation. Otherwise compare 'rush' (?), *uru*=*ru*, and render 'to the estranged.' We have often to stretch the meaning more than this. Converting instructions are elsewhere suggested for 'all mankind.'

³ The translation of Neryosangh is added here not merely because it is of interest, but because it is, together with the Pahlavi translation, of the last importance in forming correct conclusions. It may be rendered as follows; and the reader may regard it as a specimen, but by no means a particularly favourable one. At the words *âzûtôis* and *maretaēibyô* different texts were before him and the Pahlavi translator as well. Those words are elsewhere rendered by the latter *karpîh* and *ansûtâân*: This greatest magnitude (sic) of the Māthra, the Lord produced together with righteousness as his fellow-worker []. The Great Wise One discloses the herds to the eaters; and he discloses also the great matter to the well-taught scholars. Who is thine, who endowed with the best mind, gives the two things, with the mouth to those who are prosecuting studies (sic)? To expect an ancient rendering to be closer would be unreasonable. The errors (as to root) are not errors, but the certain signs of differing MSS. This constantly occurs; and it is hardly necessary to add that sometimes from such supposed mistakes we get the only possible means of recovering the original text.

⁴ Repeating the announcement in verse 6. The *aêvâ* in 6 would incline one to read *aêvâ* (*ye ne aêvâ*), but the manuscript before the Pahlavi translator read *aêvô*=*khadûk*. It is quite out of the question to suppose his *aêtûnô* and *khadûk* to be accidental. A sharp distinction is made.



hearkened to our enunciations, Zarathustra Spitama! Our mighty and completed acts of grace he desires to enounce for us, for (Me), the Great Creator and for Righteousness; wherefore I will give him the good abode¹ (and authoritative place) of such an one as speaks²!

The *Gæus Urvan*.

9. Upon this the Soul of the Kine lamented (: Woe is unto me) since (I have obtained for myself) in my wounding a lord who is powerless to effect (his) wish, the (mere) voice of a feeble and pusillanimous man, whereas I desire one who is lord over his will (and able as one of royal state to bring what he desires to effect³).

The Ameshôspends⁴.

((Aye,) when shall he ever appear who may bring to her⁴ help strong-handed⁵?)

¹ So the Pahlavi translator, giving the only critical etymology in his *hûdemûnfh*, the gloss aside.

² The Pahlavi text corrected by the Persian MS. may be rendered as follows: This gift I obtained []. For this one is he who was listening to that which is our teaching, Zartôst, the Spitâmân. For us, Aûharmazd, and for Aharâyih is his desire, [that is, that perfectly performed duty, and good works are desired by him]. He recites also a remedy-making (free or erroneous), [that is, he declares a remedy-making against the Drûg who is in the world]; on account of which saying for his word of piety which he utters, they give him a good abode []. (The glosses are often from a later hand and erroneous. Sometimes, however, they contain the truth while the text is futile. I drop them in the present citations when they are of no importance.)

³ Observe that Zarathustra, like other prophets, met at times little honour from his fellow-countrymen who are here well represented by the voice of the Kine's Soul. (See Y. XLVI, 1.)

⁴ Or could not *hôi* be taken in a reflective sense, and referred to the first person like the possessive *sve*; see the connection.

⁵ Verbatim. Thereupon-and the Kine's Soul wept: (I) who

Zarathustra¹.

10. Do ye, O Ahura and thou, O Righteousness! grant gladness unto these (our disciples), and the sovereign Kingdom (of the Deity) such as (is established) in (His) Good Mind by which one bestows upon them the peaceful amenities of home and quiet happiness (as against the fearful ravages which they suffer²), for of these, O Great Creator! I ever thought Thee first possessor³!

11. And when shall the (Divine) Righteousness, the Good Mind (of the Lord, and His) Sovereign Power (come) hastening⁴ to me (to give me strength for my task and mission), O Great Creator, the Living Lord! (For without his I cannot advance

(lament) one-not-able-to-effect-his-wish in-wounding as-a-master (or, I established?) [], whom as-against I-wish one wish-controlling-and-effecting-as-a-sovereign. When ever he may-(shall)-be who to her (possibly to-me-myself?) shall-give effected-by-the-hand help.

¹ Zarathustra, having accepted his call to be the Ratu or his substitute, at once interposes with a prayer for his suffering charge.

² See verse 1, to which reference is continually made as the chief expression of the sufferings to be remedied.

³ The Pahlavi without glosses may be rendered as follows: Give ye assistance to these, O Aûharmazd, Ashavahist and Khshatraver! So also Vohûman, who gives him a pleasing habitation, and also joy. I also think that the first gain and obtaining of this is from thee. (With the gloss slightly different; but valman should be rendered according to ahyâ.)

The text literally is as follows: (Do) ye to these, O Ahura! happiness (? possibly strength; see the Pahlavi) grant, O Asha! Khshathra-and (=the Kingdom) such (kingdom as) by Vohu Manah by-which amenities peaceful-joy-and (one) may give-or-establish; I-even of this, O Mazda! Thee I thought foremost possessor.

⁴ So the Pahlavi translation indicates; compare gimâ and frâ man (?) mathâ; otherwise mâmashâ = I hasten (to fulfil my mission).

or undertake my toil.) Do ye now therefore assign unto us your aid and in abundance¹ for our great cause. May we be (partakers) of the bountiful grace of these your equals² (your counsellors and servants)³!

¹ The Pahlavi has *kabed*. For the fundamental idea compare *prāksh* + suffix.

² The Ameshōspends just mentioned, together with whom Ahura governs and blesses His people. Ahmâ (so conjecturing with Barth.), is also quite sufficiently indicated by the *lanman* of the Pahlavi. Whether an instrumental *zhmâ* can be accepted is doubtful. The form should be altered.

If *zhmâ* stands, *istem* must be understood, or the instrumental taken in a possessive sense.

Ahmâ has no authority from MSS., but is better than *anghâmâ*, as being nearer the MSS.

³ As an impartial specimen I render Ner. thus: Whence will that gift come to me, (the gift which is) *Asavahista*, *Gvahmana*, and *Saharevara*, [that is, sanctity, the highest (best) mind, and the sovereignty, where is the place of the reward which will thus come to me?]. (Here the translation falls into confusion from an error which is most interesting and instructive, because it is corrected by Ner. in an alternative rendering in the gloss. As has been seldom noticed his original was the Pahlavi word *pâdâdahisnfnêd*, rather than the Gâthic *paitî-zânatâ*. This Pahlavi form he could not at first believe to be a second plural. Indeed the Pahlavi glossist may have taken it as a third sg. Neryosangh therefore abortively renders word-for-word as follows: You, O Great Wise One! it offers or presents more excellently through the 'greatest exaltation' (the holy cause). But he recovers himself in the gloss by reading the Pahlavi *pâdâdahisnō vâdûnyên* as an imperative: [Provide a reward through that spotless exaltation (the irreproachable cause)] continuing: Here, O Lord! is the gift (which is) ours, and (which comes) to us from Thee.)

YASNA XXVIII.

PRAYERS CHIEFLY FOR GRACE AND FOR THE
WORDS OF REVELATION.

2. Zarathustra, having entered upon the duties of his office (XXIX, 11), composes a liturgy for the use of some of his more eminent colleagues, possibly, but not at all probably, for the original mover in the entire religious effort (see the expressions 'to Zarathustra and to us,' 'to Vîstâspâ and to me,' 'to Frashaostra and to me'). This reciter, whoever he may have been intended to be, is represented as standing in the appropriate place as a priest, with hands stretched toward Ahura, or His Fire, and praying for the possession of spiritual graces from an unselfish motive, and in order that he might appease the grief of the Kine's Soul, for whose relief Zarathustra had just been appointed (see XXIX, 1, 6, 8).

3. He approaches Ahura Mazda, spiritually inspired by the Good Mind as he declares, and asking for attainments and boons for both the bodily and spiritual lives, derived from Righteousness, whereby that personified Righteousness might establish the elect in a beatified state.

4. The personality of the Ameshôspends comes again strongly forward, as it does so often in worship, in addresses in which Righteousness (Asha), the Good Mind (Vohu Manah), Khshathra (the active Power of the Divine Sovereignty), and Âramaiti (practical piety in the souls of believers), are besought to come, as the Vedic Gods so often are, to the appeals of the suppliant, and to his help in the act of worship itself, which is recognised to be the one efficient means for furthering the cause of redemption which is ever held in view.

5. As one who offered his soul to heaven, and would know by actual experience the blessed rewards bestowed by the holy ceremonial and moral actions prescribed by Ahura Mazda, the reciter declares that he will teach on in the effort to propagate the holy Religious Order, and possessed by the one desire for its increase, while power shall last.

6. With a piety as fervent as it is profound, and speaking with great earnestness, he asks Righteousness, as a person, when he shall see him, becoming fully acquainted with the Good Mind of God, the way which leads to Him, and above all with Obedience. But although he addresses these lofty abstractions as persons, it is utterly

out of the question to suppose that he did not speak in the deepest meaning of the words as expressing states of mind, and qualities of character : O thou Divine Righteous Order ! (Thus he seems to have meant), O thou divine Righteous Order ! when shall I see Thee as if present in my own soul and in those of the people whom Ahura has committed to my charge ? When shall I know the Divine Benevolence as made one with the disposition of my congregation ? When shall I possess by knowledge that only way to our most bountiful Ahura which is, not a mythical angel Sraosha only, but that angel interpreted 'Obedience to Ahura' (observe the dative). One cannot well exaggerate the religious depth or subjectivity. Then, with a bathos which shows how then as ever superstition could hold its own side by side with the truest piety, he exclaims (if the third line was really so composed by him as it has come down to us); 'By such a prayer as a Māthra spell we can with the greatest vigour repel the unclean beasts and creatures which defile our sanctity, or endanger our lives.'

7. Alluding immediately to this revelation, he beseeches Ahura once more to 'come with His Good Mind,' and to grant, not booty, nor even wealth, but 'Asha-gifts,' and (as a bestower of righteousness) long life and powerful spiritual grace to the leading agent Zarathustra (in all probability the composer of the section), and to himself, the officiating priest with his helpers, in order that, not with carnal weapons, but by his 'lofty' and holy 'words,' they all combined may overcome the torments of the ravagers who had made havoc of the settlements, and who were still liable to overwhelm the faithful with their raids and rapine (see XLIV, 20).

8. With an intentional and interesting alliteration he prays to Asha for an *ashi* ; that is, a blessing, even the strenuously attained-to gifts of the great Benevolence. *Āramaiti* likewise becomes the object of his petition together with Ahura ; and this time for the benefit of Vistāspa the monarch, and for himself that they might hear the gracious Māthras, which is indeed the burden of the entire piece.

9. Once more he affords an early (or the earliest (?)) instance of the rhetorical trick, and fills one line with three 'vahistas,' praying Ahura, as being of one mind with Asha (here, for the first time in the Avesta, called 'the best'), to grant the same blessing ; and this time again with an intentional change, 'to himself and to Frashaostra ;' and not for this world, but for 'all the duration of the Good Mind,' using the expression in its concrete sense as heaven ; for heaven to him consisted in an inward state. (So also elsewhere in the Avesta,

even where the palate and the olfactory nerve are the media of felicity or of torture, there also conciliating language on the one side, or 'vile speech' pointed with finest irony on the other, is equally prominent. It is the mind which chiefly enjoys or suffers.)

10. Deeply sensible of the spiritual benefits for which he is asking, he seems touched with gratitude. Accordingly he adds one more petition, which is, that he and his coadjutors, the three just mentioned, may never anger the indulgent mercy which had granted them their request; and that they may persevere, as they have begun, in the strenuous service of Ahura, Asha, and Vohu Manah. For they are, as he declares, easy to be entreated, and beings who desire to bestow spiritual blessings upon mortals, rather than to exercise merely capricious favour or cruelty, and who also possess the power to bring their benevolence to effect.

11. As if unwilling to trust his own perception as to his real spiritual needs, he prays Ahura 'to fill up his desire,' not with what he, the reciter, may in particular request, but with what He, Ahura, knows to be the gifts of Righteousness and the divine Benevolence. And these gifts are again mainly the holy revelation, for he knows, so he earnestly declares, the words of those mighty three to be never void, and to be a sustenance able indeed to fill up his wishes, giving him more than he has of himself either the intelligence or the grace to ask.

12. Having added, in verse after verse, some particular to heighten the fervour of his request, he sums up all in a final expression, as remarkable for its earnestness as for its depth, and begs Ahura, as one set for ever for the defence of the Righteous Order and the Good Mind (whose hallowed influences he accurately foresaw were destined to endure for ages), to tell him, with His very 'voice of spirit,' in order that he may declare them to the waiting masses, the laws which pervade the moral universe, and according to which it arose. For according to these holy principles and so alone, could he promulgate a system which might reclaim society from its imperfections and the Iranian saint from his sufferings. } Ahura who, be it remarked, is alone addressed in this culminating verse, hears and answers by a revelation of these eternal principles, and this answer is contained in chapter XXX. By a thorough comprehension of that most important document, I hold that we may see how it met its purpose as indicated by the capacities and needs of those to whom it was addressed, and how by discriminating truth from falsehood it helped on the defence of Asha, and the founding of the true Benevolence.

Translation.

1. (A strengthening blessing¹ is the thought, a blessing is the word, a blessing is the deed of the righteous Zarathustra. May the Bountiful Immortals² accept and help on³ the chants. Homage to you, O sacred Gâthas⁴!)

2. With venerating (desire) for this (gift) of gracious help, O Mazda⁵, and stretching forth my hands (to Thee) I pray for the first (blessing) of (Thy) bountiful Spirit; (that is, I beseech of Thee that my) actions

¹ Yânim cannot well mean 'revealed,' except by the most far-fetched conception. The Indian yâna, as in devayâna, should give the fundamental idea, easily reconcilable as it is with the ancient rendering of the Pahlavi translator.

² Notice that the Amesbôspends are mentioned in this early heading. In the Gâthas themselves the name, 'Bountiful Immortals,' does not occur.

³ Possibly, 'take up and continue on the Gâthas.' Literally, 'seize forth.'

⁴ It is hardly necessary to say that this is no part of the Gâthas. It is, however, in the Gâthic dialect, and as it needs not, or perhaps cannot, be considered an intentional imitation, it must be very old.

⁵ Vocative with the Vendîdâd Sâdah, otherwise the accumulation of genitives would be suspicious. Ahura is, however, beyond any question elsewhere spoken of as 'the most bounteous Spirit.' The usage is like that of the Semitic scriptures; the Holy Spirit is both God and 'of God.' As to the rendering 'bounteous,' I fear that 'holiest' (so many) is too bold. Ashavan occurs side by side with spenta as applied to Ahura, and ashavan cannot mean 'righteous' there, but must mean 'holy.' The Pahlavi renders etymologically afzûnîk. Comp. svânta. The sole etymological bases for the meaning 'holy' are presented by the Lithuanian and Ecclesiastical Slavonic; but, as Justi has well remarked, in the conceptions of the Avesta that which increases the kingdom of Ahura is equivalent to what is holy. 'Bountiful' must therefore be understood in a particular sense, only to be rendered by the words, 'gracious, sacred, and august.'

(toward) all (may be performed) in (the Divine) Righteousness; and with this I implore from Thee the understanding of Thy Benevolent Mind, in order that I may propitiate the Soul of the Kine¹ (our herds and folk, which cries so bitterly to Thee).

3. And therefore, O Great Creator, the Living Lord! (inspired) by Thy Benevolent Mind, I approach You², (and beseech of Thee³) to grant me (as a bountiful gift) for both the worlds, the corporeal and (for that) of mind, those attainments which are to be derived from the (Divine) Righteousness, and by means of which (that personified Righteousness⁴ within us) may introduce those who are its recipients into beatitude and glory⁵!

4. O (thou Divine) Righteousness, and thou Be-

¹ See Y. XXIX, 1.

² The plural of majesty, or the literal plural, referring to the Bountiful Immortals as together.

³ Plural and singular interchange throughout.

⁴ Possibly, 'one may introduce.'

⁵ See Y. L, 5. *Hvâthrâ* and its allied forms are so often associated with *raoḥah* and the like, that I do not hesitate to accept an Iranian *hvan*=to shine (with *Justi*). As there is an Indian svar which means 'to roar,' and another 'to shine,' and again a *svan*=to sound, so in Iranian there is a *hvan*=to sound, and another=to shine, as in *asmanem hvanvantem*. The 'comfortable stone heaven' is difficult. Comfortable, or even 'delectable mountains' (so we should have to say elsewhere), are not very likely to have been recognised or appreciated in the Avesta. 'Glorious beatitude' is a better rendering here. If *hvâthrâ* always means 'comfort,' how comes it that *hvarəno* is said to be *hvâthrava*? 'Comfortable glory' is hardly probable. Compare also the ancient *subha*. When it is the fashion to accept a separate Iranian root at every difficulty, small and great, I see no reason for stopping here, where the pressure is considerable. The Pahlavi also may be read to favour my view. (Comp. *hveng*=*hvan*.)

nevolent Mind (of Deity)! I will worship you, and Ahura Mazda the first¹, for all of whom the Pious ready mind (within us) is² causing the imperishable Kingdom to advance. (And while I thus utter my supplications to You), come Ye to my calls to help³!

5. (Yea, I will approach You with my supplications, I) who am delivering up (my)⁴ mind and soul to that (heavenly) Mount (whither all the redeemed at last must pass⁵), knowing (full well) the holy characteristics and rewards⁶ of the (ceremonial and moral) actions (prescribed) by Ahura Mazda. (And)

¹ Or, 'having no first' (Roth, reading *apourvim*).

² I am very far from a positive rejection of the forms suggested by the Pahlavi translator, although he should never be pressed on such a point, being often free. As alternative read 'may Piety who bestows increase (fem. participle) come to my calls to give grace.'

³ The Pahlavi translator, unable to credit 'ye as=I who' (so also modern authority sometimes with regard to other occurrences of *ye* in this chapter), renders as follows: When I shall be your own (thus for 'worship,' and possibly deceived by the form of the words, *ufyânî* and *nafsman* being nearly alike in the Pahlavi character), O Ashavahist and Vohûman! the first [], Aûharmazd's also [his own I shall be], through whose unweakened acquisition his rule over them exists [], and [hers also I shall be], Spendarmad's, the giver of increase. She comes to me with joy when I invoke her [when I shall call upon you, come ye on toward me with joy]. (A plain and noticeable instance of an alternative rendering in the gloss. The verb was first thought of as a 3rd sing. middle subjunctive, afterwards as an imperative and plural.)

⁴ *Meñ* = *m* + the nasal vowel, and may represent *man*, or I think also *mãm*, adverbially for *mênâ*; or 'mân' = 'demânê.'

⁵ Mount Alborg, where the *Kînvaf* Bridge extends; so also important authority; but we might read *mêngairê* = *mângairê* (*Garôdman*).

⁶ *Ashi*, a blessing given in reward; so elsewhere.

so long as I am able and may have the power, so long will I teach¹ (Your people concerning these holy deeds to be done by them with faith toward God, and) in the desire (for the coming) of the (Divine) Righteousness (within their souls)².

6. And, thou Righteousness! when shall I see³ thee, knowing the Good Mind (of God), and (above all the personified) Obedience⁴ (of our lives which constitutes) the way⁵ to the most beneficent Ahura Mazda. (Asking this, I thus beseech thee, for) with this holy word of supplication we most hold off⁶ with tongue the flesh-devouring fiends, (the very sign and power of all spiritual foulness)⁷!

¹ I think it is better to hold by the parallel passage and the sense of 'teach' here. The Pahlavi has an irregular form which probably means 'I teach,' but might be intended for 'I am taught.'

After the words 'so long as I have the power,' 'I will teach' is rather more natural than 'I will learn.' Haug's rendering of this word has never been accepted. Those most opposed to tradition follow it here. Perhaps, 'I will teach to desire R.'

² The Pahlavi translation corrected by MSS. may be rendered thus: He who gives up his soul within Garôdmân does so by the aid of Vohûman [], and is also intelligent concerning the veneration which belongs to the doers of good works [] in that which is Aûtharmazd's [religion]; as long as I am a suppliant and have the power, so long do I inculcate the desire of Righteousness [which is, duty and good works].

³ Kadâ *mriîkâm* sumânâ abhî khyam (Rv. VII, 86, 2).

⁴ Obedience, throughout the Avesta and Parsi literature, guides the soul to heaven.

⁵ Or, 'knowing the throne of Ahura' (so the Pahlavi, most scholars following); but the construction would be awkward. 'Finding the way' occurs in the *Rîks*, and *gâtu* need not always mean 'place' in the Gâthic, because it has that sense most frequently in the Zend.

⁶ Possibly, 'we may teach the foul polluted men.' Or, 'confess the greatest One with Khrafstra(-slaying) tongue.' Perhaps the text is to be amended; yet see XXXIV, 5, 9.

⁷ The Pahlavi translation may be rendered thus: O Ashavahist! when do (shall) I see thee? I know this one by means

7. And do Thou, O Lord, the Great Creator! come to me with Thy Good Mind; and do Thou, who bestowest gifts through Thy Righteousness, bestow alike long-lasting life on us. And (that this life may be spent aright, do) Thou by means of Thy lofty words (bestow) the (needed) powerful spiritual help upon Zarathustra and upon us¹, whereby we may overcome² the torments of the tormentor.

8. (And) do thou, O (Divine) Righteousness, bestow (upon me) that sacred blessing which is constituted by the attainments of the Good Mind (within my soul)³; and do thou also, O Piety! grant unto

of a good mind's instruction [that is, I see thee in that time when every man is intelligent because he is pious; but when shall it be?]. And the place of Aðharmazd, when do (shall) I see it, I who am a suppliant for a benefit? That place is known through Srôsh [], that greatest of Māthras is to be taught, given forth with tongue to him whose understanding is confused.

¹ It certainly involves a question how the words 'to Zarathustra and to us' can be compatible with Zarathustra's authorship. Vîstâspa and Frashaostra (verses 8, 9) are equally excluded. Who is then the individual who thus refers to himself with others? And is this verse an interpolation, and with it 8 and 9? This last seems to me a very feeble suggestion. Was this piece, together with the rest (for they all are connected), the work of some unnamed man of influence, the true author of Zarathustrianism? I think that there is also little gained by this supposition. There is no particular reason why Zarathustra's name should have come down to us as the chief figure, while that of the prime mover failed to reach us. I should say that the piece was composed by Zarathustra and put into the mouth of a leading priest, or that it was composed with many others under his inspiration. Or, can there have been a school, or family, of Zarathustrians, religious poets, similar to the Vedic seers? (See chap. LIII, 2 Zarathustris Spitâmô.)

² This mention of 'overcoming an enemy,' strengthens the probability of my view of vâvarôimaidî (vâurôimaidî).

³ The Good Mind is now, as we should say, 'the Spirit of God' in the mind of God, and again His Spirit in the human soul.

Vistâspa and to me our wish ; (yea) may'st Thou grant (us), O Mazda, ruler¹ (as Thou art ! that grace) whereby we may hear² (with understanding) Thy benignant words.

9. That best (of gifts therefore) do I beseech (of Thee), O Thou best (of beings) Ahura ! who art one in will with (Thy Divine) Righteousness (within us, likewise), the best³ (of spirits), desiring it (as I now do) for the (heroic) man Frashaostra, and for me⁴, upon whom also may'st Thou bestow it (not for time alone), but for all the ages of Thy Good Mind (that reign of Thy Benevolence which shall be to us as Heaven⁵) !

¹ The Pahlavi correctly renders pâdakhshâ.

² Probably originally heard, inspired words. Compare Manyus haâ Thwâ æunghâ, verse 12. So often. Oral communications are figuratively alluded to everywhere. No literal articulation or sound (!) is of course intended. (Or 'srayaêmâ=proclaim.')

Neryosangh may be rendered as follows : Grant, O Sanctity ! this devotion which (results) from the priority (an error from misreading the characters of the Pahlavi, chiefly his original) of the Good Mind [that is, make me so religious that prosperity may result to me from my good conduct]. Grant thou to the perfect mind [in, or to, the earth (so the Parsis understood Âramaiti)] the wish that proceeds from Gustâspa and from my people []. Grant praisers, O great wise One ! kings, who may be announcers of your word, and bestowers of arrangements (for the service) ; [that is, who may teach thy word, and render it progressive].

³ The earliest occurrence of Asha Vahista. The Pahlavi : 'Since the best thing that Thou hast [Thy Religion] is better than all other things, the best through Righteousness.'

⁴ See verses 7 and 8.

⁵ In the millennial (sic) renovation as well as in heaven. See chap. XXX, 4, where Vahista Manah is equivalent to heaven. The Pahlavi gloss has : Aigh Frashôstar va hâvistân î Frashôstar, vad tanû î pasîno hamâi nadûkîh padar vâdûn ; that is, for Frashôstar and the disciples of Frashôstar for ever, until the final body provide a benefit thereby.

10. And (impressed and moved) by these gifts of strengthening grace¹ (which Thou may'st give in answer to these prayers) may we never anger You, O Ahura Mazda! (nor Thy) Righteousness (within us), nor yet Thy Kindly Mind (toward us), since we have most earnestly made effort (helping to advance Your cause) in the (chanted)² offering of Your praisers, for most easy to be invoked (are Ye). (Yours are verily both) the desire for (spiritual) blessings (for us), and the (Divine) Possession (of their power)³.

11. And therefore do Thou, O Lord, the Great Creator! fill up and satisfy (my⁴) desire with these attainments (of the grace) of Thy Good Mind, which Thou dost know to be derived from Righteousness, (and) which (are verily) sublime⁵, for I have known⁶

¹ Possibly, 'may we not anger you with our prayers for these blessings.' *Kīm me havyám áhrinâno gusheta.*

² That *dasemê* may now better be referred to a similar root with *dasvare*, I regard the more probable because the Pahlavi also freely renders as if it so understood. Its author knew the meaning of *dasema*=*dasama*. One is reminded of course of the *dâra-gva*.

³ The Pahlavi with its peculiar view of *anâis* (not to be rejected too confidently; see note at another occurrence of it) is interesting (as corrected by the Persian MS.): On account of a not-coming to you, O Aûharmazd! This I would not do []. Ashavahist also I will not pain for the sake of a blessing; [that is, I do not desire a single blessing which appears displeasing to Ashavahist (this turn of the sense is followed by some who have hitherto opposed tradition, but I cannot follow it, although I value every hint of the ancient writers). Also Vohûman, the excellent [I do not harass him].

⁴ Or, 'to those whom thou seest as creatures (?) of V. fill up the desire with attainments.'

⁵ Possibly, 'the righteous,' *erethweng*; cp. *ritâvânas* (?). Pahl. trans. 'î frârnô.' ⁶ Possibly, 'I obtain.'

Thine instructions to be never void¹ of their effect (in the struggles) for our (daily) food², and therefore worthy objects of desire³.

12. (Yea, I approach Thee with my prayers, I) who by these (great gifts of grace) will⁴ protect (Thy) Divine Righteousness, and (Thy) Good Mind (within us) for ever. And do Thou therefore, O Ahura Mazda! teach me from Thyself, yea, from Thine own mouth of spirit, that I may declare it forth to (these Thy waiting people) by what (powers and according to what laws⁵) the primeval world arose⁶!

¹ Ner. has analaso(-aḥ) for asūnâ more correctly than the Pahlavi asūdak.

² Or, 'well reaching their aim;' but the Pahlavi translator gives his evidence for the meaning 'food' = khûrisnō. Recall the constant prayers for nourishment in the *Rîks*. And as favouring the ancient translation, see XXIX, 7, where 'food for the eaters' is declared to be the gift of God, who is at the same time 'bounteous with his doctrine.'

³ Neryosangh: *Evam ye dharmasya vettâraḥ* * *uttamasyaḥ dâter manasaḥ* [] *ekahelayâ* * *Mahâgñânin Svâmin!* *tebhyaḥ* * *pûrnam pariṇohi* * *kâmam*; [kila, [] *subham tebhyaḥ kuru*]. *Evamka igisneḥ* * *analaso labhatâm khâdyâni vastrâṇika vadanena*.

⁴ One is tempted to read *nipauṅghé* as an infinitive, but the Pahlavi translation anticipates us all with its more critical *barâ netrûnam*.

⁵ This question is answered in Y. XXX.

⁶ Ner. improving upon the Pahlavi has as follows: *Yadi sunirîk-shanatayâ dharmam pâlayâmi manaskâ* * *uttamam sadâpravṛttaye*; [kila, *ket satyasya sadvyâpârasyaḥ rakshâm karomi*]. *Tvam tat* * *Mahâgñânin Svâmin!* *prakṛisham me śikshâpaya* * [] *vâti*. *Adṛiṣya Tvatto mukhena [sphuṣaya] antar bhuvane pûrvaṁ babhûva* [tâm *srishîm me brûhi*].

A translation truly remarkable considering the circumstances under which it was made.

YASNA XXX.

THE DOCTRINE OF DUALISM.

1. Accustomed to instruct the masses who throng him on public occasions seeking light, the composer constructs this hymn for similar opportunities. He may be regarded as continuing the thoughts in the close of Y. XXVIII, where he besought Ahura to inform him concerning the origin of the world. He says that he will declare the counsels of God, by which, as we see, he means the great doctrines concerning the origin of good and evil. With these he will declare also the praises, the laudatory portions of the Māthra, and the sacrifices. And he prays that propitious results may be discerned in the heavenly bodies.

2. He further introduces what he has to say by telling the throngs before him that a decisive moment is upon them. They are to choose their religion, and not by acclamation with the foolish decision of a mob, but man by man, each individually for himself. They should therefore arouse themselves and hear with all attention, and gaze at the holy Fire with a good and receptive disposition of mind.

3. He then delivers the earliest statement of dualism which has come down to us. There were two original spirits, and they are called, be it well noted, not two persons, or at least not only two persons, but a better thing, or principle, and a worse one. (The qualifying words are all in the neuter¹.)

At the next sentence they are personified as a pair, each independent in his thoughts, declarations, and actions. Such is the short Theodicy, followed at once by an admonition to those before him to choose the better.

4. These two spirits came together as by natural combination, to make the opposing phenomena of life and its absence, of Heaven and of Hell.

And Hell is described not as a scene of cruelty inflicted on the innocent and the ignorant, but as 'the worst life,' and Heaven as equally remote from a superstitious paradise; that is, as the 'best mental state.'

¹ It is also noticeable that the name Angra Mainyu does not occur in this section.

This is the proper Zarathustrian creation. It is undeniably 'abstract,' very, and just in proportion as it lacks colour and myth are its depths visible. The account of it is also very limited. But it must never be forgotten that its existence is the probable proof that very much more of the kind existed beside it. Instead of there being one hymn sung like this, Y. XXX, there were probably many. The two original forces or beings, although separate clearly, come together; but they do not lose their distinction. Their difference remains as clear as their union. 5. They do not blend unrecognisably; for having created the two principles, they choose each his own particular realm. Ahura chooses the righteous order of religion, and with it the pious of all ages. The evil spirit chooses the wicked.

The point and meaning of the entire doctrine is that a good God cannot be responsible for permanent evil; that imperfection and suffering are original, and inherent in the nature of things, and permanently so. The swallowing up of sin and sorrow in ultimate happiness belongs to a later period. It is not Gāthic Zarathustrianism. Evil was the work of an independent being.

The great thinker saw his point; and it was that the Deity Himself could not prevent the evolution of base and revolting moral qualities with their consequent miseries in both victim and aggressor. An evil God was therefore their author.

6. But the blood-feuds of War, not to speak of the theological animosity, were too much for his philosophy. The sage could not regard all men and their circumstances with broad and equable impartiality.

The hated Daêva-worshippers, who were doubtless equally conscientious with the Zarathustrians, are said to have failed of correct discernment.

As they were deliberating, so he recalls, the Worst Mind, a very real although 'abstract' Satan, came upon them, to induce them to choose him and his evil realm. They acceded, becoming furious in their intention to injure human life. This may be regarded as a dramatic, but at the same time, in a moral sense, a philosophical statement of a temptation and fall. (For a later one, with more colour and less truth, see the temptation proper of Zarathustra himself¹, recalling as it does so vividly the temptation in the Gospels.)

7. If we can accept the words *ahmâikâ* to mean merely 'upon

¹ Comp. Vd. XIX, 1-10. Consider how much time would be required for the name of Zarathrustra to become so involved in myth.

this,' we may hold that the statements proceed without a break. Even a gap of lost verses does not interrupt the sense. The clothing of souls with bodies seems indicated. If so, the doctrine of the Fravashis, otherwise foreign to the Gâthas, may have its origin by inference here, and directly in verse 4. After the creation and first activity of the souls of the Archangels on the one hand, and of the Daêvas on the other, together with their respective human adherents, the one choosing good and the other evil, the remaining Ameshôspends unite with Âramaiti in bestowing a body upon the newly created soul. (So we must conclude from the language.) And the prophet breaks in with the prayer that in the future, and possibly at the Frashakar², the completion of progress, these created souls might possess such advantages as they had when Ahura came at first with his acts of creation; that is, that they might be restored again to a state of sinless happiness, provided with bodies by Âramaiti as at the first. (See Yast XIX, 89.)

8. But, as he implies, and perhaps expresses in a lost verse, vengeance shall come upon the wretched beings who choose the Evil Mind as their master. And it shall come, not in the abstract merely by any means, but as executed by a numerous, if not once predominant party, 'the offspring of the Evil Mind.' And when this shall have been completed (and XXXI, 18 shows us that the weapons to be used to bring it about were not to be those of verbal argument alone) then, as he declares with enthusiasm, 'to God shall be the Kingdom,' a Kingdom established in the Divine Benevolence, which will pervade its organic life, and which will likewise, as the personified 'Immortal,' utter encouragements and commands to its loyal citizens. And these citizens will then not only defeat the Lie-demon, who is the life of the Daêva-party, but they will deliver her up as a captive to the great Genius of Truth, the personified Righteousness. 9. And, as he ardently hoped for the coming of the Kingdom into the hands of Ahura, he as ardently beseeches that he and his coadjutors, the princes already named, may be honoured as the immediate agents in bringing on this 'millennial' completion; nay, he even prays that they may be as Ahuras¹ in merciful services, declaring that all their thoughts were centred in that scene where religious light dwelt as personified in her home.

10. Once more he announces the certain defeat and chastisement of the incarnate falsehood and her adherents, which enables

¹ As the Ahuras of Mazda, the Ameshôspends.

him only the more impressively to describe the rapid reunion of the righteous amid the home-happiness of Heaven.

11. Having delivered his brief but weighty communication, he commends his hearers for learning the holy vows of the Religion on account of the duration of the announced rewards and punishments. They shall be long indeed; and upon their complete inauguration full salvation shall be realised for those who shall have learned and heeded the invaluable truths.

Translation.

1. And now I will proclaim, O ye who are drawing near and seeking¹ to be taught! those animadversions² which appertain to Him who knows (all things) whatsoever; the praises which are for Ahura, and the sacrifices (which spring) from the Good Mind, and likewise the benignant meditations inspired by Righteousness. And I pray³ that propitious results may be seen in the lights.

¹ As 'ish' means approaching with desire, the Pahlavi translator has, freely, khvahîsnō.

² Read māzdathâ.

³ So with long ê; but yaêkâ (P¹¹ supported by the Pahl.) may be the lost dual neuter of the pronoun, referring to the two principles discussed below. Yê*kâ=I pray for, although the most natural rendering grammatically, does not seem so well adapted here, as a prayer for the success of his communication does not harmonise with the otherwise dogmatic statements of the composer. The urvâtâ (vrata) founded upon the doctrine of dualism bring about salvation. They may therefore be touched upon in this introductory verse. And that the heavenly bodies contained indications bearing directly or indirectly upon human destiny seems to have been early an accepted doctrine. (Compare also chap. XXIX, 3, where 'the lofty fires' seem alluded to as moved by the Deity, and this in immediate connection with the discussion of the most important problems concerning the fate of the holy community.) It is, however, not impossible that the lights of the altar may have been meant. (See sûtâ in the second verse.) The Pahlavi translation

2. Hear ye then with your ears; see ye the bright flames¹ with the (eyes of the) Better Mind. It is for a decision as to religions, man and man, each individually for himself. Before the great effort of the cause, awake ye² (all) to our³ teaching!

3. Thus are the primeval spirits who as a pair⁴ (combining their opposite strivings), and (yet each) independent in his action, have been famed (of old). (They are) a better thing, they two, and a worse⁵, as to thought, as to word, and as to deed. And between these two let the wisely acting choose aright. (Choose ye⁶) not (as) the evil-doers⁷!

has dên rôshanô pavan vênisnô hû-ravâkh-manîh. As to yê*¹â or yaê²â, the Pahlavi does not favour a verbal form. But if the pronoun is accepted, even then change is needed; yaê²â yâ=yé³ka yéna is hardly possible. We should be obliged to render: And which two things (were those?) whereby (adverbially) propitious results have been seen in the stars. Others have experienced difficulty, and even ashayaê⁴â(?) has been conjecturally suggested for this place and chap. LI, 2. Neither Sp. nor Westg. report a long ê.

¹ Gôshânô srûd nyôkhshisnîh [aighas gôsh barâ varammûnd]—Zak î rôshanô. Otherwise 'with the eye;' but see yâ raoêbîs daresatâ urvâzâ. The altar-flame would not unnaturally be mentioned after the heavenly lights.

² Literally, '(be ye) wakeful.'

³ Hardly, 'to teach us.' Possibly, 'to teach this, each one.'

⁴ Pahl. transcribes. Notice that paouruyê (pourviyê) is neut.* as are vahyô and akemâ, which is not lightly to be passed over.

⁵ The Pahlavi freely: Benaſsman—[aighânô vinâs va kirkak benaſsman barâ yemalelûnd]. They announced themselves as sin and good works. Ner. yau punyam pâpamka svayam avokatâm.

⁶ Barâ vigîd. Ner. vibhaktavân*. If a third plural subjunctive, still the force is as if imperative. Possibly it is preterit.

⁷ On this important verse I cite Neryosangh. He may be rendered as follows: Thus the two spirits [Hormigda and Âharmana] who uttered first in the world each his own (principle); [that is, who each uttered, one his own good (deed), and the other his own sin], these were a pair, in thought, word, and deed, a highest

* Adverb (?).

4. (Yea) when the two spirits came together at the first to make¹ life, and life's absence², and to determine how the world at the last shall be (ordered), for the wicked (Hell) the worst life, for the holy (Heaven) the Best Mental State³,

5. (Then when they had finished each his part in the deeds of creation, they chose distinctly each his separate realm.) He who was the evil of them both (chose the evil), thereby working⁴ the worst of possible results, but the more bounteous spirit⁵ chose the

and a degraded one. And of these two, the one endowed with good intelligence [] was the distinguisher of the true, and not the one endowed with evil intelligence []. (Both he and the Pahlavi fail to credit a plural form in *eres vîshyâtâ* with Spiegel and Hübschmann.)

The Gâthic verbatim. Yea (=thereupon) the-two the-two-spirits the-two-first-things which-two two-twins two-self-acting-ones were-heard-of in-thought in-word-and in-deed these-two a-better an-evil-and. Of-which-two-and the wisely-acting (ones) aright may discern, not the evil-acting ones.

¹ The Pahlavi read as an infinitive, *dazdê=avô zak dahîsnô*. (So also an important authority recently.) Otherwise it has the place of a third dual perfect; 'they two made.' The place of an infinitive is not generally at the end of a sentence in Gâthic. Can it be simply a third singular? '(Each) makes' (*kamasâ karôti*).

² Pavan *zendakîh*—*va mûnik azendakîh*. Ner. *gîvitenakâ agîvitenakâ*. Observe the singular abstract *agyâitîmkâ*, which is not lightly to be passed over. Why not a more ordinary expression? Have we not here an unusual antithesis? The danger is great that by aiming to reduce all to commonplace for the sake of safety, we may demolish many an interesting conception of antiquity.

³ Observe the subjectivity. These verses settle the question as to the depth of the Zarathustrian hymns. Grammar forces us to see that the composer had large ideas. The entire cast of reflection in the Gâthas tends to be abstract as well as subjective. Not so their invective and partisan exhortations.

⁴ *Verezyô* is a nom. sing. masc., as would seem natural from its position in the sentence. Compare *mâthraîs verezyâis*.

⁵ Observe that Ahura is undoubtedly called *spenista mainyu*. Elsewhere we must sometimes render, 'His bountiful spirit.'

(Divine) Righteousness; (yea, He so chose) who clothes upon Himself the firm¹ stones of heaven (as His robe). And He chose likewise them who content Ahura with actions, which (are performed) really in accordance with the faith².

6. And between these two spirits the Demon-gods (and they who give them worship) can make no righteous choice³, since we have beguiled⁴ them. As they were questioning and debating in their council⁵ the (personified⁶) Worst Mind approached them that he might be chosen. (They made their

¹ Zak † sakht sag nihūftō āsmāniš. Ner. Gādhātaram * ākāsam dadau.

² 'Who with actions really good piously content Ahura.' Let it be noticed that fraore/ is not independently translated by the Pahlavi. It is freely included in avō Aūharmazd; and yet this is supposed by some to be a word-for-word rendering! Ner. prakatāišta karmabhiš.

Verbatim. Of-these-two spirits he-chose-to-himself (he)-who (was) the evil (the one) the worst (deeds) working*. The-Righteous-Order (accusative) (chose) the spirit most-bountiful (he)-who the most-firm stones clothes-on-himself, (those) who-and will-content Ahura with real actions believingly Mazda.

(Properly a verbatim rendering is only possible in an inflected language.)

³ Lā rāstō vigīnēnd. They suffer judicial blindness; a common idea in the Gāthas; compare, 'who holds them from the sight of the truth,' &c.

⁴ The root is indicated by va mūniš valmansān frift. I can see no escape from the above rather adventurous rendering. See also dafshnyā hentū in chap. LIII, 8. Perhaps the idea of injury here preponderates over that of deceit; 'since we have impaired their power.' The choice between a preterit or an improper subjunctive is also difficult. Possibly, 'so that we may fatally deceive them.' Poss. nom. 'deception came upon them, even A. M.'

⁵ This recalls Vendīdād XIX, 45, where the demons assemble in council to consider the advent of Zarathustra.

⁶ Compare verse 4, where Vahistem Manō equals heaven. The

fatal decision.) And thereupon they rushed together unto the Demon of Fury, that they might pollute¹ the lives of mortals².

7. Upon this³ Âramaiti (the personified Piety of the saints) approached, and with her came the Sovereign Power, the Good Mind, and the Righteous Order. And (to the spiritual creations of good and of evil) Âramaiti gave a body, she the abiding and ever strenuous⁴. And for these (Thy people) so let⁵ (that

word is the subject of 'gasat,' and has the proper place of a nominative in the sentence; cp. Vedic usage.

¹ That they might disease (so literally) the lives of those who had not yet been tempted or fallen.

The Pahlavi: *Vīmārīnīdō ahvân ī marđūmân [aigh, levatman aēshm anrūtâân ahûkînēnd]*.

Ner. : *Ye nigaghnur bhuvanam manushyânâm*.

Hübschmann: 'um durch ihn Plagen über das Leben des Menschen zu bringen.'

² Verbatim. Of these two spirits not aright may choose the Daêvas, since these we have beguiled (or have injured). To the-questioning ones upon came-he in-order-that he might-be-chosen (subjunctive middle) he-the worst mind. Thereupon to-furious-rapine they rushed-together in-order-that (yena) they might disease (or ruin) the-life of-man.

³ Or, 'to him;' some unnamed benefactor; hardly 'to us.' The Pahlavi has, *avō valman*, but Ner. has only *tatraka*. Observe *ahmâi* in chap. XLIII, 1, and in chap. XLVII.

⁴ Root *ān*=in. The Pahlavi freely, *pavan astūbīh*. He seems to have thought of *nam* + a priv.

Kehrpem is feminine. *Ānmâ* may be a neuter in apposition.

Otherwise we must accept *-mâ* as a suffix. Or can *kehrpem* (corpus) be a neuter here? The clothing of the spirits with corporeal natures enabled them to advance in the development of moral qualities by self-restraint and pursuit. As has been observed in the summary, no *Fravashis* appear in the *Gāthas*. Have we here possibly an indication of the pre-existence of souls? If *Âramaiti* gave a body, it may be inferred that a period elapsed between the acts of the two spirits and this.

⁵ That bodies are to be given to the saints as at the first is to

body) be (at the last), O Mazda! as it was when Thou camest first with creations¹!

8. And (when the great struggle shall have been fought out which began when the Daêvas first seized the Demon of Wrath as their ally²), and when the (just) vengeance shall have come upon these wretches, then, O Mazda! the Kingdom shall have been gained for Thee by (Thy) Good Mind (within Thy folk). For to those, O living Lord! does (that Good Mind³) utter his command, who will deliver the Demon of the Lie into the two hands⁴ of the Righteous Order (as a captive to a destroyer).

9. And may we be such as those who bring on

be inferred from Yast XIX, 89. (Which see in part ii of the translations of the Zend-Avesta.)

¹ Verbatim. To-this (to us?)-and with-Khshathra came, with-Manah Vohu, with Asha-and (Âramaiti) thereupon a-body the-continuing gave Âr(a)maiti the strenuous (Âramaiti, or the body, a vigorous and strenuous thing).

Of these thine (or to thee) to let-it (the body)-be as thou-camest in-creations the-first.

² See verse 6.

³ What else can be the subject of *sastî*?

⁴ Observe the pronounced personification of Righteousness. As a matter of course the ultimate sense is more commonplace, as is the case with all poetical matter. 'Into the hands of Asha,' is the same as to say, 'into the power of the servant of God.'

But would this be a proper mode of rendering a line of real though rudely primitive poetry? Such renderings are commentary rather than translation. The Pahlavi may be rendered as follows: Thus also in that creation [in the final body] hatred comes to these haters and sinners; [that is, the avengers shall execute chastisement upon them]. And, therefore, O Aûharmazd! what to thee is the sovereignty, by that (so possibly) shall Vohûman give a reward. Through these, O Aûharmazd! [through the religion of Aûharmazd], when one is instructed in Righteousness, [that is, as to the interests of the pious] then the Drûg is given into one's hand, [the Drûg who is Aharmôk].

this great renovation, and make this world progressive, (till its perfection shall have been reached). (As) the Ahuras of Mazda¹ (even) may we be; (yea, like Thyself), in helpful readiness to meet² (Thy people), presenting (benefits³) in union with the Righteous Order. For there⁴ will our thoughts be (tending) where true wisdom shall abide in her home⁵.

10. (And when perfection shall have been attained) then shall the blow of destruction fall upon the Demon of Falsehood, (and her adherents shall perish with her), but swiftest in the happy abode of the Good Mind and of Ahura the righteous saints

¹ Otherwise, 'the Ahura-Mazdas,' or, 'O Mazda and the Ahuras!' I think that the most natural rendering according to the grammar should first be given, notwithstanding something uncommon about it. 'All the Ahura-Mazdas,' has been seen by Roth in chapter XXXI, 4.

² The Pahlavi has the gloss [aighsân hamîshakō hangaman madam tanû î pasîñō kûnîsnō], needlessly enlarged of course, but showing the proper root, which is mi; (so Spiegel.)

³ Or possibly sustaining (the feeble). The Pahlavi reads simply dedrûnîsnō.

⁴ The Pahlavi renders hathrâ in the Indian sense as asâr*, endlessly; so others elsewhere. Hathrâ and yathrâ are of course distinctly in antithesis.

⁵ The Pahlavi mihânō, Persian makân. That maêthâ is an adverbial instrumental meaning, 'in one's home,' seems the more probable from the two hathrâ, yathrâ, adverbs of place. Compare, for instance, athrâ-yathrâ in XLVI, 16, where shaêitî follows. Hübschmann, 'Dort mögen (unsre) Sinne sein, wo die Weisheit thront;' see also husitôis in the next verse.

The Parsi-persian MS. has—Aedûnō (sic) ham mâ kih ân i tû hastam (sic); [kû ân i tû 'hwêr hastam] îñ—rastâ'hiz kardan andar gihân.

(c) Kih—minîsn bêd [kû minîsn pah—dârad] as ângâ dâñât hast [kû, â'hîr i kîz pah nêkî bih dânad] andar makân.

shall gather, they who proceed in their walk (on earth) in good repute¹ (and honour)².

11. Wherefore, O ye men! ye are learning³ (thus) these religious incitations which Ahura gave in (our) happiness⁴ and (our) sorrow⁵. (And ye are also learning) what is the long wounding for the wicked, and the blessings which are in store for the righteous. And when these (shall have begun their course), salvation shall be (your portion⁶)!

¹ Pahlavi, 'mûn vâdûnd zak î sapîr nâmîkîh = they are creating a good repute,' as if *zazentê* were understood in the sense of produce. See the sense 'bear' as given for *hâ*, Rig-veda 843, 2 (X, 17). The analogy is, however, not strong.

² The Pahlavi translation may here be rendered as follows: Thus in that dispensation [in the later body] the Drûg [who is Gan-râk Mînavad] will be overthrown [] when (his) host is scattered. Thus they move keenly on [to seize the reward], which is attained through the good citizenship of Vohûman [when they shall have dwelt in piety]. They who are creating a good renown are thus moving on toward Aûharmazd and Ashavahist [that is, the person who is of good repute goes forward to seize the reward].

³ Once more the anomalous form *âmûkhtisnô* meets us in the Pahlavi. May this not be intended to express 'learning,' whereas *âmûzisnô* would express 'teaching?' I hardly think so.

⁴ The Pahlavi translation is only remotely if at all responsible for *hvîtiâ* as = sua sponte. This would require *hvîti* as = **hvâti* with difficulty comparing 'yim' and 'yem'(?). It is generally considered now as = hu + iti; but the letter *h* = *h* seems doubtful.

⁵ Read *aniti* = 'with impeded progress.' 'In prosperity or adversity.' But these are conjectures.

⁶ The Pahlavi: *Aêtûnô akhar valmansân aîtô nadûkîh*. I do not think that we ought to regard the words of the original as expressing universal restoration. But they may well have given the first indication toward this later view. Literally, they state it, but not when correctly understood.

(SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. The Pahlavi word *yômâi* which transcribes *yesnâ* in verse 4 cannot mean 'by day.' Its imperfect form induced the translators to translate *rûzhâ* and *bhûmandale*, but these scholars, as in many other instances, hinted at a correction.)

YASNA XXXI.

THE PROGRESS AND STRUGGLES OF THE CAUSE.

This composition differs from that in XXX as descending from the more general to the particular, and from the doctrinal to the practical. One might even trace an immediate connection, *urvâtâ* occurring in the last verse of the one and in the first of the other. It is, of course, very possible that the verses before us are only a remnant of those which originally constituted the piece, and here and there one may have been interpolated from other scriptures.

Some writers prefer to assume a loss of the original text or an addition to it at the smallest change of tone, and to assume also a change of subject with it. I do not regard it as very useful to lay too much stress upon these occurrences.

Whether caused by gaps or interpolations, they do not at all affect the fact that the subject-matter is homogeneous and contemporaneous; and, probably, like many more modern compositions, the verses gain in rhetorical effect by being weeded of repetitions.

We might divide as follows 1, 2, an address to the congregation to be connected with XXX as its concluding words; 3-5, an address to Ahura; 6, an address to the faithful; 7-17, to Ahura; 18, to the congregation; 19, to Ahura; 20, 21, to the congregation; 22, an addition.

Treating the section then as containing homogeneous matter which combines well into a unit, I proceed as follows. The sage chants his hymn in the presence of the multitude as before.

1. He declares that while he is reciting things unwillingly heard by the hostile party, those same truths are valued as the best of existing things by those who are sincerely devoted to Mazda, their good disposition quickening their perception.

2. He then declares that if the truths of the holy Religion are not yet clearly seen by the instrumentalities provided, he will approach them still more effectively in accordance with the especial regulation of the spiritual chieftainship, which Ahura Mazda had prepared in response to the lament of the soul of the Kine; i.e. of the Iranian herds and people possibly as representing the entire holy, or clean, creation upon earth. And he further asserts that this regulation concerns the struggle of the two parties, and will bring the cause of the Righteous Order to a successful issue.

3. Changing his address to Ahura, he proceeds to pray at once

for that satisfying decision which would be the natural result of the regulation just promised, and which could be given by the instrumentality of the Sacred Fire and holy ritual, affording mental keenness to the two contending parties. And he declares that this is the doctrine which should be proclaimed for the conversion of mankind. Here we observe that the Zarathustrian Mazda-worship was aggressive and missionary in its spirit, and in a proselyting sense by no means indifferent to the final destiny of the Gentile world. (The later and traditional system announced indeed the restoration and so the conversion of all men, and that not as an object proposed to the efforts of charity, but as a necessary result (so by inference; see *Bundahis* (West), pp. 126, 129). I can find no trace of this in the *Gâthas*.

Here we have only the effort to convert.)

4. Addressing all the Bountiful Immortals, and with the striking title of the Ahuras of Mazda, he prays for the establishment of the 'mighty kingdom' by means of which he might overcome the personified and aggressive falsehood of the opposing and persecuting *Daêva*-worshippers.

5. In order to enable himself to fulfil his mission, he asks for prophetic and judicial knowledge as to what ought to be done, or as to what is about to happen in the immediate future.

6. He lauds the *Mâthra* which we may suppose him to recognise as delivered to him afresh in answer to his prayer for prophetic light, and he praises co-ordinately with the Word of God that Sovereign Authority of Ahura, which was to be established in a kingdom where goodness would increase, and be prosperous, if not predominant.

7. He takes the heavenly bodies as evidence of the wisdom of Him who created the Sacred Order personified as the 'Immortal' *Asha*, and also the Good Mind, his equal. And he ascribes the support and extension of their hallowing influence to Ahura, because He never changes.

8. He reiterates, in expressions which form the basis for another hymn, his conception of Mazda as the supreme object of devotion, as the father of the Good Mind personified as His child, as the creator of the Righteous Order, and as both the controller and the judge of human actions. Therefore the Good Mind and Righteousness are to be worshipped as standing in the closest possible relation to him.

9. He ascribes the 'Immortal' Piety to Him as well. She is His own, and elsewhere His own daughter. He is declared, as in

chapter XXIX, to be the Creator of the Kine, and of Understanding, (His own intelligence), to guide Him in the disposition of the destiny of the holy Iranian people. And according to it He makes the path for the Kine, which as a matter of course has no meaning as applied to bucolics, but is full of meaning when read in view of the wail of the Kine's Soul in chapter XXIX, and of the intervention of the Deity in her behalf, for He actually appointed Zarathustra to meet her necessities. He adds, however, that her free choice is not abolished by the construction 'of this path.' It is elsewhere called the 'religion of the Saviour-prophets,' and she is free to proceed in it, guided by the first prophet, the ideal husbandman, or she can follow the profaner nomad.

10. But he thankfully exclaims that she does not pause in indecision, nor does she choose perversely. She selects the guardian appointed by Ahura, the diligent and pious husbandman, elsewhere identified with Zarathustra himself. He is rich with the spiritual wealth of the Good Mind; and she rejects in his favour the idle and free-booting nomad, excluding him from all share in the sacred religious system.

11. The composer then delineates the struggle which inevitably follows this establishment of the needed means of deliverance. When Mazda has completed the inspiration of doctrines, teaching whither the one endowed with free volition (like the Kine [verse 9]) should direct his choice in action (12), there upon the spot, as it were, the ignorant Daêva-worshipper makes himself heard beside God's spokesman. But the prophet is consoled by the reflection that the pious mind will not question the evil Spirit, or the good Spirit superficially. It searches both the Spirits, questioning them, as it were, in their very home. (Hence it is that Ahura speaks so fully concerning Angra Mainyu, delineating his opposition to Him in extended detail. See XLV, 2.)

13. The composer is still more reanimated by the certainty that Ahura is gazing into the depths of all questions, trivial and profound; which is to say that he observes most closely the men who are discussing them. And he declares that he also sees the cruel injustice of the punishments which the tyrants visit upon the smallest offences, as well as the more flagrant wickedness of those who persecute his adherents without even a pretence of justice.

14. As he recalls the divine forecasting omniscience, he asks Ahura once more concerning the future which was close at hand with its portentous events. And he inquires as to the nature of the veritable and not iniquitous confessions, which were properly due to

be made by the righteous believer in order to avert the impending calamities, and secure the upper hand in the struggle for the throne. And he inquires also as to the proper expiatory prayers which were to be offered by the believer. He does not however fail to inquire analogously concerning the wicked, nor to ask how they, as well as the righteous, shall be situated in the final consummation.

15. Particularising as to the latter, he asks what shall be the punishment for those who succeed in installing an evil monarch, one of the Daêva-party, a prince who cannot exist without the ruthless persecution of the pious husbandman, who repudiates the Lie-demon presiding over the counsels and efforts of the opposing religion.

16. He further asks how and by what actions the wise man may become like Ahura, or his faithful adherent, the expressions used implying deep religious feeling.

17. Striving to arouse the perceptions of his hearers, he inquires as to which one of the two parties holds to the greater or more important religion, the disciple of Asha, the personified Righteous Order Ahura's immediate creature (see above), or the opponent. And he prays that no blind guide may deceive him, or those who belong to him, 'but that the enlightened, yea, even Ahura Himself, may speak to him, and become the indicator and demonstrator of the truth.'

18. Closing this address to the Deity, he turns to the congregation, vehemently forbidding them to listen to the doctrines of his opponents, warning them against the ruin and death which would ensue, and fiercely appealing to the sword.

19. Once more addressing Ahura, he prays that they may on the contrary listen to Him who has power to vindicate the conscientious Zarathustrian, inculcating veracity upon him, and encouraging him in its practice; and this by means of the holy sacrifice, or ordeal of the Fire.

20. He solemnly warns those who would seduce the righteous of their ultimate fate, and adds that their sorrows will be self-induced, if they persevere in their hostility. Their own consciences (as we see from Yast XXII) would not only bring on their ruin, but would form a part of their punishment.

21. On the other hand, happiness and immortality will be the lot of the faithful. And these 'eternal two' will be given to them, accompanied by the fulness of Righteousness, and the exuberant vigour of the Good and Kindly Mind within them and bestowing its blessings upon them.

22. In conclusion he apostrophises the manifest certainty of the truths which he declares, and, addressing Ahura, animates the faithful not merely with the hope of the objective recompense, but with the prospect of being efficient as servants of God.

Translation.

1. These doctrines (therefore) we are earnestly declaring to You as we recite them forth from memory, words (till now) unheard¹ (with faith) by those who by means of the doctrinal vows² of the harmful Lie are delivering the settlements of Righteousness to death, but words which are of the best unto those who are heartily devoted to Ahura³.

2. And if by this means the indubitable truths⁴ are not seen in the soul⁵, then as better (than these words) I will come to you all (in my person) with

¹ Roth, 'wollen wir Worte künden—ungern gehört von denen, welche nach des Unholds Geboten,' &c. Hübschmann preferring 'wir sprechen Worte nicht anhörbar für diejenigen' (Casuslehre, s. 223). A dative of the pronoun is certainly more natural than the ablative as inst. But on the whole *agushtâ* seems better in its ordinary sense, although in so rendering we are obliged to supply a word.

² *Valmansân mûn pavan âfrîngânîh î Drûg zak î Aharâyîh gêhân barâ marenkînênd.*

³ The Pahlavi may be rendered as follows: Both these benedictions, which I (we) recite as yours [the Avesta and Zand], we are teaching by word to him who is no hearer, [to the destroyer of sanctity (the heretical persecutor) []]. Those who utterly slay the world of righteousness through the benedictions of the Drûg [], even those might be an excellent thing, if they would cause progress in what belongs to Aûharmazd.

⁴ Read perhaps *advayâo*; see the Pahlavi. Otherwise 'the way' *advâo* as *panthâs*; but the participle * does not agree. Compare for meaning *kavîm âdvayantam, sâkhâ âdvayâs*.*

⁵ The Pahlavi renders 'in the soul' freely by 'believes:' *Pavan nikîrîsnô lâ hêmnunêdô as pavan zak î agûmânîkîh.* The general indications are to be observed.

* Is it a loc.?

that power, and in that way according to which Ahura Mazda knows and appoints His ruler¹, that ruler over both the two (struggling) bands², in order that we (in obedience to him), may live according to Righteousness³.

3. And that keenness, that deciding satisfaction, which Thou hast given by (Thy) Spirit⁴, and (Thy) Fire, and by Thy Righteousness (itself) to the two battling⁵ (sides), do Thou declare unto us, O Ahura! that vow which is for the seeing⁶ (as those endowed with mental light). Yea, do Thou declare this that we may know it, O Mazda! With the tongue of Thy mouth do Thou speak it (that as I preach its mighty truths⁷) I may make all the living believers⁸!

¹ Comp. chap. XXIX, 2, where the Ratu is discussed; here the word might be the abstract.

² Roth, 'dieser beiden Parteien (Yasna XXXI).'

³ He repels and condemns the evil, and he hallows and helps the good.

⁴ Most striking is the use of mainyu. It is 'the Spirit' = God. It is 'His Spirit.' It is also used of man's spirit.

⁵ Or, 'from the two arəi;' but see āsayāo in verse 2. The Pahlavi translator has avō patkârdârânō shnâkhtârîh; so uniformly. In Y. XLIII, 12, K₅ and most MSS., except K₄, and likewise excepting the printed B.V.S., read ranôibyô which excludes the dual form; also the fire is not mentioned there. It is however far from impossible that the present Pahlavi translation may be a growth beyond an earlier one more in accordance with arəi. The strivers, or fighters, might describe the two rubbing-sticks (?).

⁶ Aîmar (sic), vigârdâr. This meaning suits the connection admirably. The word is otherwise difficult, and this general sense is followed by some who do not so often cite the Pahlavi translator.

⁷ See verse 1.

⁸ Roth, 'wie ich alle lebenden bekehren soll.' So also the general indication of the Pahlavi translator. Pavan hûzvânô ī Lak—zîvandakân harvist-gûn hêmnund. Observe that the religious system contemplated universal proselytism.

4. And when the Divine Righteousness shall be inclined to my appeal¹, and with him all those (remaining ones who are as) Mazda's² (own) Ahuras then with the blessedness (of the reward), with (my) Piety and with Thy Best Mind (active within me), I will pray³ for that mighty Kingdom by whose force⁴ we may smite the Lie-demon⁵.

5. Aye, do Thou tell me that I may discern it, since through (Thy) Righteous Order the better (lot) is⁶ given; tell me this that I may know it with (Thy) Good Mind (as it speaks within me), and that I may ponder⁷ that to which these my truths⁸ belong (and

¹ The general indications *karitūtntâr* and *bavîhūnam* point to the proper sense.

² Or, with Roth, 'wenn wirklich sich rufen lassen die Ahura-Mazdas.' Otherwise, 'O Mazda and the Ahuras.' Hübschmann also maintained that *Mazdau* was here a plural; (see his Y. XXX, 10.)

³ Roth, rendering *ishasâ* in accordance with the Pahlavi, 'erbitte ich.'

⁴ *Mûn pavan zak î valman gûrdîh—khûshîdō Drûgō aē* sufficiently indicates the proper sense. Roth, 'kraft deren wir den Unhold bemeistern mögen.'

⁵ The Pahlavi may be rendered thus: Since in that dispensation [in the final body], I shall be an invoker of Ashavahist, and of Aîharmazd also []; and of her who is veneration 'Spendar-mad' [], I desire [that best of things which is the reward] of Vohûman. Let also that authority which belongs to my people [] be from the strong one [] by whose fortitude [] the Drûg is overcome [].

⁶ Literally, 'Ye gave.'

⁷ I am far from sure that the indication of the Pahlavi is not correct here. According to it, when properly understood, we have here an accusative with the infinitive; 'that I should establish.' Its own translation is however *avō li yehabûnâi*. *Men*=man or *mām*; *en(g)*=ā the nasal vowel. The Pahl. translator recognises *men* elsewhere as=*mînisnō*. It was from no ignorance (!) of the particular word that he wrote 'li' here.

⁸ Or 'my prophet;' comp. *rîshi*; that is, 'that with which my prophet is concerned.'

of which my prophet speaks ; yea), tell me those things, O Mazda Ahura ! which may not be, and which may be¹.

6². And that verily shall be the best of all words to Him which the All-(wise one) will³ declare to me in very deed, that word which is the Māthra of Welfare and of Immortality (for it proclaims His beneficent power). And to the Great Creator (shall there be) a Realm such as that (whose strength I asked for victory⁴), and which (at the last) shall flourish⁵ in its holiness to His (glory⁶) !

7. (For He has sovereign control.) He who conceived of these (truths of the Māthra) as their first (inspirer), (and as He thought their existence they

¹ Or, possibly, 'which shall not be, or which shall be.' Is the subjunctive here used to express obligation ? Roth has 'was nicht sein soll oder was sein soll.' Ner. may be rendered as follows : Tell it to me distinctly [], that which is the highest gift, and which is given to me through sanctity ; [that is, because duty and righteousness are fulfilled by me, the best gift of thy reward (is gained) by this means ; but how is it possible to make it (actually) one's own ?]. Grant me the knowledge through the best mind ; [that is, declare that intelligence to me which comes through good conduct], and by which also safety is (secured) to me []. And declare either that which is not, or that which is, O Great Wise One, the Lord ! [].

² An interval of silence seems here to intervene, or lost verses leave an unexplained transition. The sage turns again to the people.

³ *Vaokâ* K 4 (Barth.).

⁴ See verse 4.

⁵ The Pahlavi has *Aûharmazd având* (sic) *khûdâiyih* *kand* *dên valman vakhshêd* *Vohûmanô*.

⁶ The Parsi-persian MS. is as follows : *Û hast buland, kih ân man âgahîhâ* (sic) *gû-î âskârah* [] *mânsar i tamâm raftanî* ; [*kû, tamâm pēdâim pah rāh i mânsar bâz ân 'hwêš i Hôrmuzd rasêd*], *kih pah Šawâb dârad—bî-marg raftanî azar* []. *Hôrmuzd—'hudâi kand andar û afzayêd Bahman* [*Kûs pādîsâhî pah tan i mard—kandî (?) Hôrmuzd pah tan mihmân*].

(all) as (His)glorious¹ (conceptions first) clothed themselves in the stars²), He is through His understanding the Creator³ of the Righteous Order. And thus likewise He supports His Beneficent Mind (in His saints). And these (holy creatures) may'st Thou cause to prosper by Thy Spirit (since they are Thine own), O Ahura Mazda! Thou who art for every hour the same⁴!

8. Therefore⁵, as the first⁶ did I conceive of Thee, O Ahura Mazda! as the one to be adored with the mind in the creation, as the Father of the Good Mind within us, when I beheld Thee⁷ with my (enlightened) eyes as the veritable maker of our Righteousness, as the Lord of the actions of life⁸!

9. Thine, O Ahura! was Piety; yea, Thine, O Creator of the Kine! was understanding and the

¹ *Mūnas avō rōshanīh gūmīkhtō khvārīh.* *Hvāthrā* and *khvārīh* can hardly mean 'comfortable' here. 'Ease' is the later sense.

² *Raokebīs* certainly means, with illuminating objects, stars or shining lights.

³ Hübschmann, 'der Schöpfer des Asha.'—Casuslehre, s. 190.

⁴ *Pavan mīnavadīkīh vakhshīnēd* [] *mūn kevaniš ham khūdāi.*

⁵ Compare the frequent expression '*spēntem at Thwā menhī*,' in chap. XLIII.

⁶ Roth, 'vornehmsten.'

⁷ When I seized Thee (took Thee in) with my eye. The Pahlavi: *Amatam* [] *pavan hamkashmīh avō ham vakhdūnd hōmanih.*

⁸ *Dēn ahvānō pavan kūnīsnō khūdāi hōmanih.*

Ner. may be rendered as follows: Thus thou wert thought at the first by me, O Great Wise One, the Lord! when thou wert engaged in the production of *Gvahmana* []. In which (production) they apprehend the father of the Best Mind when they observe him with a full-faced look []. (And thou art the father) of that creation which is manifestly righteous; [that is, thou makest the purer creation good in conduct]. Thou art a King in the world as to action; [that is, where it is fitting to confer a benefit, and also where it is fitting to inflict a punishment, in each of these thou art capable].

Spirit¹, when Thou didst order a path for her (guiding). From the earth's tiller (aided²) she goeth³ (in that allotted way), or from him who was never tiller. (Thy path hath given her choice⁴.)

10. (But she did not pause in temptation.) Of the two she chose⁵ the husbandman, the thrifty toiler in the fields⁶, as a holy master endowed with the Good Mind's wealth⁷. Never, Mazda! shall

¹ His *spenta mainyu*; otherwise 'spiritual (understanding),' but *mainyu* is used elsewhere (verse 3 and 7) alone, and certainly not as an adjective even with a substantive understood. The rendering 'spirit' as 'Thy spirit' is suspiciously significant; but what is the help? We are forced by grammar so to translate.

² The ablative has this force as in *Ashâ/ haâ*.

³ I can hardly accede to an infinitive here: *-tê* is a rare infinitive termination in Gâthic. Also the infinitive seldom falls to the end of the sentence. The Pahlavi has *yâtûnêz*, a present; but the Pahlavi should never be positively cited for the forms, as it is free.

⁴ Observe that we are forced by every dictate of logic and common sense to avoid the commonplace rendering here. Cattle do not have 'paths' made for them, nor do they cry aloud for an overseer, or complain at the appointment of one who does not appear to them promising; nor is it one main effort of religion 'to content the soul of cattle.' Cattle, as the chief article of wealth, are taken to signify all civic life. The 'path' is the path for the people to walk in, securing safety for soul and life and herds. The *adhvan* is 'the way' which 'is the religious characteristics and teachings of the prophets' (XXXIV, 13).

⁵ Observe that this cow (some would say 'ox') chooses her master, unlike other cattle. But observe also, what is more interesting, that she seems reconciled to the guardian appointed by Ahura. In Y. XXIX, 9, she actually 'wept' at the naming of the pusillanimous Zarathustra, desiring a kingly potentate. Now, however, we see that she must have dried her tears, as she is satisfied with the simple workman whom he represents notwithstanding high rank.

⁶ In the later Avesta this first *vâstrya fruyant* is declared to be Zarathustra.

⁷ *Mûn fruih pavan Vohûmanô*.

the thieving¹ nomad share the good creed². (For the Kine's choice would bestow it³!)

11. (And this doctrine was the first of rules to regulate our actions. Yet the opposer speaks beside Thee.) For when first, O Ahura Mazda! Thou didst create the (holy) settlements, and didst reveal the religious laws⁴; and when Thou gavest (us) understanding from Thine own mind, and madest our (full) bodily life⁵, and (didst thus determine) actions (by Thy power), and didst moreover deliver to us (nearer) injunctions whereby (as by a rule) the wisher may place his choices⁶,

12. (There strife at once arose, and still is raging.) There (beside Thy prophet) the truthful or liar, the enlightened or unenlightened, lifts his voice (to utter

¹ Pahlavi *davāsahak*; Ner. *pratārayitre*.

² *Khûpō-hōshmûrīsnih*. 'Judicial blindness' is everywhere indicated. (The wicked are kept from the sight of the truth.) Hübschm., *Casuslehre*, 'der frohen Botschaft.'

³ This seems implied.

⁴ Or, 'madest the worlds and the souls (?)'.

⁵ Geldner admirably 'flesh.' The Pahlavi: *tanû-hōmandânō gân yehabûnd*. Notice that 'bodily life or flesh' is mentioned after 'understanding.' Compare Y. XXX, 7, where Âramaiti gives 'a body' after previous creations.

⁶ The Pahlavi has the following interesting gloss: [That is, even the actions and teachings of the pious are given forth by thee; and this was also given in this wisdom of thy mind]. And when there is a person in whom there is a desire for the other world, that desire is granted to him by thee; [that is, what is necessary when he is arriving in the other world, this which is thus required (or desired) by him at that time, is given by thee—through that which is thy mind and wisdom]. Although not able to follow the indications of the Pahlavi fully, I think that there is no question but that we have an important statement in the last line. It does not seem to me possible to render less profoundly than 'where the wisher may place his choices,' his religious preferences and beliefs, including all moral volition.

his faith), and with devoted mind and heart¹. (But without hindrance from this striving, or pausing with feeble search², our) Piety steadily³ questions the two spirits⁴ (not here on earth) but (there in the spirit-world) where (they dwell as) in their home⁵.

13. (Yea, my Piety questions searchingly, for Thou, O Maker! hast Thy view on all; we cannot question lightly.) What questions are asked which are open⁶ (permitted to our thoughts), or what questions (are asked) which are furtive⁷ (hiding themselves from the light), or (what decision soever we may make, and the man) who for the smallest sin binds on the heaviest penance, on all⁸ with Thy glittering eye(s) as a righteous guard Thou art gazing⁹!

¹ Avô zak libbemman.

² See verse 13.

³ Pavan hagisnô î: the Persian MS. (Haug XII, b) transliterates khêzirnô: Ner. has mano-utthânena (sic). Or, 'immediately.'

⁴ The evil as well as the good spirit is questioned. The two spirits of Y. XXX, 3-6 were here inspiring the conflict.

⁵ The Pahlavi unvaryingly in the sense of mihânô [-as gâs tamman yehevûnêdô]; Ner. paralokanivâsân. See Y. XXX, 9; XXXIII, 9; XXXIV, 6. A questioning which was lightly made would indicate a willingness to tamper with error. The Persian MS. following the Pahlavi has: Ânga bâng i buland ân i durûgê guftâr [Ganâ Mînû] wa ân ham i râst guftâr [Hôrmuzd], &c. But Neryosangh is more accurate or literal: Atra bumbâm* karoti [antar gagati], mithyâvaktâ vâ satyavaktâ vâ, &c.

⁶ Pavan zak î âshkârakô.

⁷ Nihânfk.

⁸ Thou seest even the questions and decisions of our thoughts as to matters which are simple or difficult, permitted or occult.

⁹ I have not followed what may yet possibly be a valuable and correct hint of tradition. I render Neryosangh: He who asks through what is open [through righteousness], or he who asks through what is secret [through sin]; or he (also) who through, or on account of, a little sin which has been committed, commits the great one to secure a purification; [that is, who for the sake of purification necessary on account of a little sin which has been committed, commits a greater one, in order that the first may not

14. This then I will ask Thee, O Ahura Mazda! (as I seek Thy counsel once again¹). What events are coming now, and what events shall come in the future²; and what prayers with debt-confessions³ are offered with⁴ the offerings of the holy? And what (are the awards) for the wicked? And how shall they be in the (final) state⁵ of completion⁶?

15. And I would ask Thee this, O Mazda! (concerning the coadjutor of the wicked): What is the award⁷ for him who prepares the throne⁸ for the evil, for the evil-doer⁹, O Ahura! for him who cannot else reclaim¹⁰ his life, not else save¹¹ with lawless

become known], upon these two, each of them, look with thy two eyes. [Over sins and righteous actions thou art in one way, everywhere and again, the Lord.] The concretes here may give the right indication.

¹ See verse 5.

² *Mûn madō, mûniš yāmtûnêdō*, 'What has come? And what is coming?'

³ *Mûn âvâm*.

⁴ *Hačâ* in the Indian sense.

⁵ *Angarōkîh*, the judgment; but *Ner. vipâkatâ*, consummation.

⁶ *Neryosangh* has as follows: *Tad dvitayam tvattaḥ* prikkhâmi, Svâmin! yad âgatam, âyâtika, yo* rinam dadate dânebhyah* punyâtmane* [*Hormigdâya yathâ yugyate dâtum*], *yeṭa, Mahâgñânin! durgatimadbhyaḥ; katham teshâm asti vipâkatâ* evam* [*kila, yaḥ tat kurute, tasmai nidâne prasâdadânam kim bhavati, yaska tat kurute, tasmaiṭa kim bhavati 'ti; me brûhi!*] This seems to me very close, far more so than we have any right to expect as a general rule from a Parsi living in India, and only five or six centuries ago, too late for 'tradition,' and too early for close criticism.

⁷ *Roth*, 'Ich frage—was die Strafe ist?'

⁸ The head of a party seems to have been plotting to introduce a hostile sovereign.

⁹ *Î dūs-kûnîsnō*.

¹⁰ The Pahlavi translator, *nîvidînêdō*, (otherwise *nivêkînêd*, which I much suspect has become confused with *nîvidînêdō* through a clerical blunder); *Ner. labhate*. They both refer *vīnastī* to *vid* (so *Justi*) followed by *most*. *Roth* (*Yasna XXXI*, p. 11), 'der sein Brot nicht findet ohne Gewalthat an der Heerde.'

¹¹ The Pahlavi translator sees the root *han* in the sense of

harm to the tiller's herd, to the pious husbandman's flock, who speaks no word with lying, (who abjures the Lie-demon's faith¹)?

16. Yea, I would ask Thee such a thing as this : How such an one as he who, with wise action, has striven to promote (Thy holy) Rule² over house, and region, and province, in the Righteous Order and in truth, how he may become like Thee³, O Great Creator, Living Lord? And when he may so become, (this also I would ask), and in what actions living he may so be⁴?

17. And which of the (religions) is the greater (and the more prevailing⁵ as to these questions which thus concern the soul?) Is it that which the

acquisition, and not from ignorance of the sense given above. In another place, he renders *vigîd min*; (see XLVII, 5.)

¹ Neryosangh may be rendered as follows: Thus I ask thee: What is for him who seizes upon destruction, and who provides the sovereignty for the wicked [], and commits that evil action, O Lord! from which he does not acquire life even through a bribe* (so meaning), [] and who is a calamity to the man who acts for herds and men removing calamities from them []?

² Roth, 'der die Herrschaft über Hof Gau und Land um das rechte zu fördern hat.'

³ Pahlavi, *Lak hâvand*; Neryosangh, *tvattulyo*; Roth, 'deiner werth.'

⁴ I render the Sanskrit of Neryosangh thus (it improves on the Pahlavi): I ask (thee) thus: How [dost thou bestow] the sovereignty upon one when he is beneficently wise? [] (in the body) of him who, through the increase of sanctity, is no opposer (of prosperity) in provinces or villages; [that is, with him who is discharging his duty and performing acts of sanctity. He is this teacher's teacher, he does not contend]. Thine equal, O Great Wise One, the Lord! thus is he verily, who (is such) in action, [who is thus Thine equal through activity].

⁵ Possibly *mazyô* has the sense of *mazista* in chap. L, 1. There 'the most prevailing' seems to be the proper rendering.

righteous believes, or the wicked¹? (Let then our questionings cease.) Let the enlightened (alone) speak to the enlightened. Let not the ignorant (further) deceive us, (high though he may lift his voice²). Do Thou thyself, O Ahura Mazda! declare³ to us (the truth) as Thy Good Mind's full revealer.

18. (And you, ye assembled throngs!) let not a man of you lend a hearing to Māthra, or to command of that sinner⁴ (ignorant⁵ as he is), for home, village, region, and province he would deliver to ruin⁶ and death. But (fly ye to arms without hearing), and hew ye them all with the halberd⁷!

¹ Literally, 'Which of the two (creeds as) the greater does the righteous (the believing saint) or the wicked (opponent) believe?'

² See verse 12.

³ Or with others 'be Thou'; but the gloss of the Pahlavi translation contains an explanation which may well afford the true solution as in so many instances in which he is both consciously and inadvertently followed. It reads [aīghmānō barā khavītūnīnō—]. May we not see an *az=ah* in the form, or at least a separate Iranian root, as also in *azdā* (L, 1), where the Pahlavi translator gives the same explanation admirably suited to the context.

Neryosangh: Which is it, the pure of soul, or the wicked who teaches as the great one? [] The intelligent speaks to the intelligent []. Be not thou ignorant after this; because (ignorance is) from the deceiver. Instruct us, O Great Wise One, the Lord! [] Furnish us with a sign through the Best Mind; [that is, make me steadfast in good conduct through the recognition of the *dīn*]. Such renderings may suffice to show that an examination of these ancient translations in our search for hints is imperative. Yet the practice prevails of omitting a knowledge of the Pahlavi language, on which not only the oldest translation of the Avesta, but also the irregular Sanskrit of Neryosangh, closely depends.

⁴ Jolly, 'Keiner von euch höre auf die Lieder und Gebote des Lügners.' Roth, 'Rath und Befehle.'

⁵ Compare *evīdvāo* in verse 17.

⁶ *Dūs-rūbismīh*.

⁷ *Sazēd sanēh*, 'prepare the sabre.' It was however a two-handed weapon; see Y. LVI, 12, (4 Sp.).

The Parsi-persian MS.: *Wa ma kas aēdūn az sumâ kih ū*

19. Let them hear Him who conceived of the Righteous Order for the worlds, the (all)-wise One, O Ahura! For truthful speech He rules with absolute sway over words, and ever free of tongue (to guide us in our way¹). By Thy shining flame² (He doth guide us³, Thine altar's flame with its signs of decision and of grace) sent forth for the good of the strivers⁴.

20. (But, O ye listening men!) he who renders

darwand mânsar sunawad wa âmû'htisn (sic); [kû az Âsmôkân (?) Awestâ wa Zand ma sunawad], kih andar—mañall sahar wa deh dehad bad-raftisn wa marg ân i Âsmôgh; aêdûn (sic) ôrân Âsmôghân râ sâzad silâh. (Again very close.)

¹ So conjecturally.

² Compare chap. XXX, 2. 'Behold ye the flames with the better mind;' possibly, also chap. XXX, 1, 'the signs in the lights seen friendly.'

³ According to the grammatical forms the agent here must be a divine being, as *ye mantâ ashem ahûbis* (see verse 7) is characteristic of the Deity. The vocative, strange as it may seem, does not necessarily exclude Ahura, as the subject referred to in *ye*. Several analogous cases occur. The Deity may here however represent His prophet, as the Daêvas do their worshippers in the later Avesta. Some writers force the language into a reference to the human subject for the sake of the greatly to be desired simplicity.

One places Ahurâ in the instrumental, a case in which the Almighty seldom appears. The above translation needs no alternative, as the language would be the same whoever *ye* refers to.

⁴ See note on verse 3, and read as alternative 'from the two aramî.' As an inferior rendering of tradition I cite Neryosangh here: The matter should be heard (taking *gûstâ* as a third singular in a subjunctive sense); [that is, a study should be made of it by him] who is even (in any degree) acquainted with the righteous design of Hormigda for both the worlds. He is independent in the literal truth of his words, in his freedom of speech, [and his fear has no existence]. Thy brilliant fire gives the explanation to the contenders. [It makes purity and impurity evident.]

the saint deceived¹, for him shall be later destruction². Long life shall be his lot in the darkness; foul shall be his food; his speech shall be of the lowest³. And this, which is such a life⁴ as your own, O ye vile! your (perverted) conscience through your own deeds will bring⁵ you⁶!

21. But Ahura Mazda will give both Universal Weal and Immortality⁷ in the fulness of His Righteous Order, and from himself⁸ as the head⁹ of Dominion (within His saints). And He will likewise give the Good Mind's vigorous might¹⁰ to him who in spirit and deeds is His friend¹¹, (and with faith fulfils his vows¹²).

¹ I follow the admirable lead of the Pahlavi here, as the previous verse mentions veracity. Its indication is pavan frīsnō, freely.

² I differ with diffidence from the hint of the Pahlavi here (as elsewhere). It has shīvan=tears, which however is free for 'calamity' and 'sorrow.' Nom. sing.; see its position.

³ Anāk rūbīsnīh yemalelūnêžō. This, placed together with such passages as XLVI, 11, XLIX, 11, and LI, 13, formed the basis for the more complete Yast XXII.

⁴ Others prefer 'place,' but see âyû in line b.

⁵ 'Has led on'?

⁶ I cite Ner.: He who betrays the pure through his fraud, may (deceit) be (also his portion) at the last; [that is, let it be so afterwards; it is in his soul]. Long is his journey, and his arrival is in darkness; and evil food and increasing lawlessness is his []. Darkness is your world, O ye wicked! your in-bred deeds, and your dīn, are leading you on.

⁷ That Ameretatā means more than long life is clear from amesha.

⁸ Afar nafsman patīh. The Gāthic would be more literally perhaps 'from His own Dominion.'

⁹ Sardârīh.

¹⁰ Vazdvarīh; Ner. pīvaratvam.

¹¹ One naturally thinks of urvatha (vratha), as having something of the sense of vratyā. But usage compels also the sense of friendship. Hübschmann, Casuslehre, s. 259, 'der durch Gesinnung und Thaten sich ihm als freund erweist.'

¹² Ner.: Mahāgrānī dadau Svāmī* avirdādāt* amirdādāt sampūr-

22. And to the wise are these things clear as to the one discerning with his mind (not blinded by the perverter¹). With Thy Good Mind and Thy (holy) Kingdom he follows the Righteous Order both in his words and his actions. And to Thee, O Ahura Mazda ! such a man shall be the most helpful and vigorous being² (for he serves with every power³)!

natvam *punyatmane* [] *nigam* *prabhutvam* *râgne* * *âdhipatyena* []
uttamena *pîvaratvam* *manasâ* [-*tasmâi* *dadate*], *yo nigasya adris-*
yamûrte *karmanâ* *mitram*.

¹ So according to frequent indications.

² *Tanû aîthô*. *Ner.*: *Sa te—mitram asti niveditanuñ*.

³ See chap. XXXIII, 14. The Pahlavi translator renders freely as follows: Manifest things (so possibly; otherwise 'manifestly') (are) these to (so a MS. not yet elsewhere compared) the wise when according to his understanding he disposes and reflects, [that is, he who meditates with thought upon that which his lord and dastur declares to him]. Good is the King for whom they would effect righteousness in word and deed, the man whose body is a bearer of Thee, O Aûharmazd!

YASNA XXXII.

THE STRUGGLE IS CONTINUED IN THE MIDST OF
REVERSES.

1. The same author may well be supposed to continue. The first stanzas have been lost, but we observe that the subject of the section is still face to face with the Daêva party. He seems to see them arrayed and engaged in hostile devotions. But he is not intimidated. The friendship of Ahura is before his mind, and he expresses his desire that he and his colleagues may become, or continue, His apostles, notwithstanding the temporal sorrows which, according to XLIII, 11, we see that he clearly anticipated as the portion of those who would propagate the holy faith.

2. Mazda answers him, and through him his followers, as established in His spiritual sovereignty, accepting the devotion of their piety with commendations and implied encouragements. He whom they would serve is supreme; they need not fear.

3. After reporting this response of Ahura, the composer turns with vehemence toward the Daêvas, poetically conceived to be present as if before their adherents, who also, according to verse 1, are supposed to be in sight (or are dramatically so conceived) celebrating their profane devotions; and he addresses them as the 'very seed' of Satan. Their worshippers belong to the religious falsehood and perversity. And they have persistently propagated their evil creed, which is in consequence spreading.

4. They have, so he acknowledges with grief, perverted men's minds, making them spokesmen for themselves, and in consequence deserters from the great Kindly Disposition of Ahura Mazda, and outcasts, fallen from His understanding.

5. They have destroyed the hopes of mankind for a happy life upon earth, and for Immortality in heaven. And in this they are not only the seed of the Evil Mind personified, but his servants rallying at his word.

6. Their leader is striving energetically, so he mournfully bewails, to effect his evil ends; but it is time that he should recall the counteracting measures of Ahura. His holy doctrines are to be announced, and their authority established by the divine Khshathra, His Sovereign Power personified.

7. The composer then contemplates with religious irony the infatuated security of the wretched delinquents whom he is apostrophising. Not a man of them knows the destruction which awaits him, and which, as he intimates, is close at hand, but Ahura, he significantly exclaims, is aware of it. And it will be proportionably severe. The blindness of sinners to danger seems as definite a judgment upon them in his estimate as their blindness to the truth.

8. To point his anger with an instance he names the apostate Yima, whom he supposes to have erred in first introducing the consumption of the flesh of cattle. He disavows community with him as with them all, declaring himself separate from them in Ahura's sight.

9. He acknowledges that their leader has to a certain degree defeated his teachings, and impaired the just estimates of life which he had striven to form within the people, (or that he will do this if not checked), declaring also that he had made inroads upon his property, which was sacred to the holy cause. And he cries aloud to Ahura and to Asha with the words of his very soul.

10. He repeats that their leader threatens to invalidate his teachings, blaspheming the supreme object of nature, the Sun, together with the sacred Kine, injuring the productive land, and carrying murder among the saints.

11. He utters his bitter wail in view of attempted slaughter, and actual spiritual opposition. He points out the plots among the powerful and their illegal confiscation of inheritances, as well those of women as those of men. And he declares that his opponents are endeavouring to injure his adherents, as if repelled by the best spiritual qualities which an individual could possess.

12. He announces the solemn judgment of God upon it all, especially reprobating those who deal treacherously against the mystical Kine; that is, the holy herds and people, and apostrophising those who prefer the *Grēhma* above the saving and sanctifying Asha, and the Kingdom of the Lie-demon above the Divine *Khshathra*.

13. He declares that *Grēhma*, an opposing chief, desired that evil kingdom in the abode of the personified Hell. And he cannot refrain from adding that he also enviously desires to share in the holy apostleship. But, as he severely rejoins, the messenger of God will hold him afar from the sight of the (Divine) Righteousness. He can have no share in the Faith.

(Here it may be noticed that we have some data for presenting

the main features of the struggle. In several instances, centring perhaps in the actual description of a battle in XLIV, 15, 16, we see traces of the closeness of the controversy. In XLIV, 15, the two hosts seem to be closing in regular lines for the 'holy vows themselves.' Here, on the other hand, we read of willing complaint or 'regretful desire,' while judicial blindness is referred to over and over again under various phrases. One might suppose that the Daêva-party were very near the Zarathustrians in many of their religious peculiarities, but that they could not accede to, or understand, the dualism. After the manner of Pagans they implicated the Gods in their sins. (Compare the drunken Indra.) At all events a bitter and violent war of doctrines was waging with both speech and weapons. I think it looks like the struggle 'of two parties' who each claimed to be the proper representative of some similar form of faith, similar, of course I mean, outwardly.)

14. Deploring the establishment of the Kavis who approach with stratagems and false teachings to aid the opposing party, the composer declares that they say that the Kine herself is to be injured instead of blessed by the very fire-priest who kindles¹ the altar-flame.

15. He supports himself however with the hope of ultimate success, and with the prospect of his reward, when he and his fellow-labourers should be gloriously borne to heaven by Weal and Immortality, the 'eternal two,' who not only, as we see, bear saints to bliss, but also constitute the beatitude of heaven itself.

16. He confides all at last to Ahura, who is able to control all events, and to solve all doubts, and who will support his servants in bringing the wicked to vengeance by means of verbal instructions and commands.

Translation.

(That rival-monarch (thus we may supply the sense of lost verses) for whom some are plotting to secure the sovereignty, and who, once in power, would deliver over home, village, town, and province to ruin and to death², is active in his efforts, and offer-

¹ See, however, the notes.

² Compare XXXI, 15, 18.

ing the devotions of his false religion to accomplish his ends.) 1. His¹ lord-kinsman will pray² (as I Zarathustra prayed), and his labouring villagers, with his (trusted) peers, and his (fellow) Daêva-worshippers³. But in my mind is the friendship⁴ of Ahura Mazda, the Great Creator, the living Lord; and Thine heralds, O Ahura! may we be; may we hold back⁵ those who hate and who offend You!

2. To these (for whom the prophet spake) Ahura Mazda answered, ruling⁶ as He does through His Good Mind (within their souls), He replied from His Sovereign Power, our good friend (as he is) through His surpassing⁷ Righteousness: We have accepted

¹ Some prominent teacher, representing the entire Daêva-party, is alluded to; see verses 6, 7, 9, 10.

² Compare *yâsâ* in XXVIII, 2.

³ Or, 'his are the Daêvas;' but the verb *yâsa* perhaps affords a sufficient expression for Daêvâ; *yâsen* or *hentî* may be understood. We may also understand the Daêvas here, as the embodied Daêvas, in the manner in which the pious worshipper is called *Vohu Manah*. That Daêva should however be used quite simply for Daêva-worshipper in this early composition is not probable. In the later Avesta it is frequent usage.

⁴ Or, 'the friend;' I recoil as much as possible from abstracts, but the Pahlavi has *hû-ravâkh-manîh*, and Geldner admirably proposed *brahman*.

⁵ *Aighrân min Lekûm lakhvâr yakhšenunêm*; so the Pahlavi translation, first venturing on the meaning 'holding back from;' *dar* in the sense of *pâ*, which latter in Iranian can mean hold back from advantages as well as from misfortunes. High modern authority coincides with the most ancient authority on this latter point. It is apt to be a subject of scepticism with some who neglect the evidence of tradition.

⁶ 'Pavan sardârîh î Vohûman;' *Ner. svâmîtâyâm* *. It seems difficult to apply the meaning 'being as a refuge' here; see the following 'from His Kingdom.'

⁷ Lit. 'glorious.' This casts light upon the expression *hvanvaitis verezô*.

your good and bountiful Piety, and we have chosen her ; ours shall she be¹ !

3. But you, O ye Daêvas ! are all a seed from the Evil Mind². He who offers sacrifice³ to You the most⁴ is of the Lie-demon, and (he is a child) of perversion⁵. In advance⁶ (are your) deceits whereby ye are famed in the sevenfold⁷ earth !

4. For ye (are) confusing our thoughts⁸, whereby men, giving forth the worst deeds, will speak⁹, as of

¹ Aîgh Spendarmad Lekûm râi sapîr dôshêm [bûndak mînir-nîh] zak î lanman aîto [aîghmânô pavan tanû mâhmân yehevûnâd].

Neryosangh : To these the Great Wise (One), the Lord, answered in the lordship of the highest (best) mind ; [that is, if, or since, Gvahmana had arrived, as a guest, within (their) body] ; from Saharevara he answered [] through (their) righteousness, from the well-inclined, and through good conduct, [if truly good conduct had arrived as a guest within (their) body]. And he said : I befriend your Earth (so Âramaiti was later understood), the perfect-minded one, and your highest one ; she is mine [].

² Compare Yasna XXX, 6. Where the Daêvas are approached by the worst mind as they are consulting.

³ As those who offer sacrifice to these Daêvas are mentioned separately, we are forced to concede a large idea to the composer. He addresses the Daêvas as poetically conceived to be present, and not merely their worshippers as in verse 1. And this must have its weight in the exegesis of other passages.

⁴ The Pahlavi translator has kabed. Or mas for mashyô (?).

⁵ Or possibly arrogance, avarmînistar ; Ner. apamanastaras/ka.

⁶ Sâtûnînêd freely, but indicating the root. The word is a locative.

⁷ The seven karshvars, or quarters of the earth, were already known.

⁸ I correct frô me (=man) mathâ (adj. nom. pl. ; compare yimâ keredushâ and mâ mashâ). I do so after the admirable reading of the Pahlavi translator, as frâz mînîsnô varðînêd [aîghas barâ frîfêd, afas mînîsnô barâ avô vinâs kardânô varðînêd]. Ner. prakrîsh/am mana/—mathnâti. Notice that aîstâ is awkward as a masc., although I have so rendered as more personal.

⁹ Vakhshyentê stood in the ancient writing used by the Pahlavi translator, as also now in some of our surviving MSS. ; otherwise

the Demon-gods beloved, forsaken by the Good Mind¹, (far) astray from the understanding of the Great Creator, the Living Lord, and (far astray) from His Righteousness!

5. Therefore ye would² beguile mankind of happy life³ (upon earth) and of Immortality (beyond it), since the Evil Spirit (has ruled) you with his evil mind. Yea, he has ruled⁴ you, (ye) who are of the Demon-gods, and with an evil word unto action, as his ruler⁵ (governs) the wicked⁶!

reading *vakhshentê* with Justi and most others, and *mîmathâ* with Bartholomae: 'Ye have caused that men who produce the worst results are flourishing, loved of the *Daévas* (as they are).' But in the *Casuslehre*, Hübschmann preferred 'sie sprechen was den *Devas* angenehm ist,' also reading *vakhshentê* (?) (page 240).

¹ So the Pahlavi also indicates *arân Vohûman sîzd*; *Ner. Gvahmana* * *dûre* * *âste*.

² Improper subjunctive; otherwise ye (have) beguiled.

³ The Pahlavi also freely *frîfêd anrûtâân pavan hû-zîvisnîh*.

⁴ *Frâkinas* far from necessarily means 'gave'; 'assigned,' 'indicated' renders it more closely. The Pahlavi has here correctly, but freely, *âshêd*.

⁵ The Pahlavi has here *salitâh* for *khshayô*, and in XXVIII, 8 it has *pâdakhshâ* for *khshayâ*. I do not think that the word is an accusative there. A simple accusative does not so naturally fall to the end of the sentence in Gâthic; it is generally in apposition when so situated. The nominatives tend toward the end of the sentence.

⁶ *Ner.*: It is through both of these that he is deceiving (sic, unable to follow the Pahlavi which probably renders as a second plural; see *mûn lekûm*) mankind in regard to prosperity and immortality, [(saying) if it is possible to live, immortality lies in our path]. Since he is yours, O ye base-minded! O ye base *Devas*! he is inculcating the lowest actions [] of the miscreants; he says that sovereignty [is from *Âharmana*; (that is, the sovereignty) of certain ones (meaning over every one)].

The Gâthic verbatim is as follows: Therefore ye beguiled (would beguile) man of-happy-life, of-immortality-and since you with-evil mind (you) who-(are)-and *Daévas*' (worshippers) the evil-and spirit with an-evil (-word as concerning) action with-word (rules), by

6. Full of crime (your leader) has desired to destroy¹ us, wherefore he is famed, (and his doctrine is declared); but if this be so of these, then in the same manner, O Ahura! Thou possessest² (because Thou knowest) the true (teachings) in Thy memory³. And in Thy kingdom and Thy Righteous Order I will establish Thy precepts (in Thy name)⁴.

7. Among these wretched beings⁵ (this their leader⁶) knows not that those things⁷ which are de-

which (same) means (has-)commanded the wicked (his) ruler (nom. sing. masc.; see Y. XXVIII, 8). The nom., as in Vedic, at the end.

¹ Or, Full of crime ye have striven to attain your ends (?) by those things which are reported. (If verse 5 originally preceded) *ənakhstā* would naturally be regarded as a singular as *paouru-aēnō* is an impossible plural masculine. It might, however, be a singular used collectively. In that case we could put the verb in the plural with verse 5 in view. As to concrete or abstract, the first is obviously correct, and is also so rendered by the Pahlavi translation.

² Vid (with the perf. *vaēdā*) seems to occur in the Gāthas in this sense. Or, 'Thou knowest with the Best Mind.'

³ Or 'in the memorised recital;' Ner. *praka/am kalayati*.

⁴ Parsi-persian MS.: *Bisyâr kīnah-varzandah kīnah 'hwâhad, [kûs wanâh-kârân pâdafrâh kûnêd], kih, guft + srûd istêd [kih guft istêd]; kû, kih ôrân bî-sumâr [kû, pâdafrâh pah ân zamân tamâm bih kunand, kih ruwân bâz ân tan dehad]. Zâhir sumâr-kunandah Hôrmuzd [kû pah wanâh wa kirfah sumâr-kunand]; wân i buland âgâh pah Bahman [muzd dânad; kû ân kih bâyard dâdan]. Pah ân i Tû i Sumâ, Hôrmuzd! 'hudâ, ân i Şawâb âmû'than bih dânêstuwân (sic vid); [kih Sumâ padirâhî tamâm bih bêd + ya'hni + bârad, har kas pah nêkî âgâh bih bârad].*

⁵ The Pahlavi has *kinîkânō*.

⁶ The *hvaētu* of the first verse, the *dursasti* of the ninth, &c.

⁷ The Pahlavi curiously errs with his *rôshanō*=clear; Ner. *parishphuātaraḥ*. It would be straining a point to call him free in interpreting what is 'collected' and so 'obvious' as 'clear.' We must, however, never forget that the supposed error of the Pahlavi is sometimes the reflex of our own (often necessary) ignorance. *Vīdvau* must refer back to the same subject as *ahyâ* in the first verse, or possibly to *Aka Manah*, going a step further back.

clared as victorious¹ (by his allies) are bound together for the smiting; yea, those things by which he was famed (as victorious) by his (blade of) glittering iron². But the utter destruction³ of those things Thou, O Ahura Mazda! knowest⁴, most surely⁵!

8. Of these wretched beings⁶ Yima Vtvanghusha was famed to be; he who, desiring to content⁷ our men, was eating kine's flesh in its pieces. But from⁸ (such as) these, O Ahura Mazda! in Thy discerning discrimination, am I (to be seen as distinct⁹).

¹ Possibly, 'which are by Thee announced as destined and proper to be smitten.' The Pahlavi has *mûn zanisnô âmûkhtênd* (sic). *Jôyâ=jâyâ* to jan, as *âkâyâ* is to kan.

² Compare other allusions to weapons, *snaithirâ*, and possibly *dakhshtem*.

³ So also the Pahlavi, *ristak* and *pâdâfrâs*.

⁴ *Naêhîr vidvau* and *vaêdistô ahî* are in antithesis and emphatic.

⁵ A literal rendering of this difficult verse would be as follows: Of these wretches, nothing knowing (is he that) for the smiting (dat. *jâ, jan*; cp. form Sk. *jâ, jan*) (are) the-collected-things, which things (as) victorious (read *jâyâ*) are declared forth, by which (things) he has been heard (of) through glittering iron, of which things Thou, O-Ahura! the ruin, O-Mazda! most knowing art. Others take *senghaitê* in the sense of 'cut' (?) and render very differently.

⁶ The Pahlavi has *shedâân*; Ner. *tân dveshinah*.

⁷ Or 'teaching,' so the Pahlavi; Ner. *samâsvâdayati*.

⁸ The Pahlavi translator hits the true rendering here: 'from among these I am chosen out by Thee.' Otherwise we have a question: Am I of these? The allusion is to the fall of Yima. As to the first eating of the flesh of beasts, recall Genesis ix. 3. Some have rendered: With regard to these I am of Thine opinion, O Mazda (?).

⁹ The Pahlavi may be rendered as follows: Among (of) these demons Yima of the *Vivanzhânas* is famed to have been a wicked scourge. It was he who taught men thus: Eat ye our flesh in pieces [wide as the breast, long as the arm—(or better with West, 'in lapfuls and armfuls')]. From among these [] I am chosen out by Thee, O *Atharmazd*! hereafter; [that is, even by Thee I am considered as good].

9. An evil teacher (as that leader is), he will¹ destroy (our) doctrines, and by his teachings he will pervert the (true) understanding of life, seizing away² (from me) my riches³, the choice and real wealth of (Thy) Good Mind. To You and to Asha, O Ahura Mazda! am I therefore crying with the voice of my spirit's⁴ (need)!

10. Aye, this man will destroy my doctrines (indeed, for he blasphemes the highest of creatures that live or are made). He declares that the (sacred) Kine⁵ and the Sun are the worst of things which eye can see; and he will offer the gifts of the wicked (as priest to their Demon-gods). And at the last he will parch⁶ our meadows with drought, and will hurl his mace at Thy saint (who may fall before his arms⁷).

¹ An improper subjunctive. Otherwise: He (has) destroyed (not irretrievably, of course; the case was not decided, and finally issued favourably).

² Apô—yantâ; otherwise 'they would take'; Ner. apaharati.

³ Zak î li îshî avôrtô [—khvâstak î pavan dastôbar].

⁴ Pavan valmansân milayâ î minavadhâ; Ner. vâgbhih mâ-nasavrîtyâ aham—âkrandaye (not following our present Pahlavi text, the gloss however). Observe that in reading Ner. we by no means ipso facto read the Pahlavi, either in correct translation, or as following our texts. Compare XLVI, 2.

⁵ One thinks somewhat of the familiar foes of the Vedic kine; but there can be of course no connection. The Iranian sacred Cow did not represent the rain cloud, at least not at all directly.

⁶ Read viyâpa/ as a demon. without sign: 'v' was miswritten for 'y' as often 'y' for 'v.' The Pahlavi language, not to speak of the Pahlavi translation, suggests it. How are we to account for the word viyâvânînd? We should not arrest our philology at the Zend and Sanskrit. The long vowel is most awkward for a comparison with the Indian vap=shear. And I think that 'destroying the means of irrigation' gives as good a meaning as 'shearing the land.' Notice that elsewhere a more correct form appears, viâpôtēmē (Vd. III, 15, (51 Sp.))=viyâpôtēmē.

⁷ Literally, 'he will discharge his club at the righteous.'

11. Yea, these will destroy my life, for they consult with the great¹ of the wicked (enlightening themselves by their words²). And they are seizing away³ the gifts of inherited treasures⁴ from both household-lord and from house-wife⁵; (wretched men that they are), and those who will fiercely wound (my folk, repelled and in no way kindly moved) by the better mind of the holy⁶.

12. (But Ahura will speak His rebuke, for) as to those doctrines which (such) men may be (basely) delivering⁷ (repelled) by the holiest action, (and galled⁸ by its sacred truth) God hath said: Evil (are they! Yea, unto these He hath said it) who have slain the Kine's life by a blessing (and have cursed her while they offered to help her⁹), men by whom Gr̥hmas are loved above Righteousness, and the Karpans,

¹ The Pahlavi translator erroneous, or free, as to *nikōiteres*, indicates the proper sense of *mazibīs* by *pavan masâf* [—*pavan pêshpâyih va pâspâyih*—]; but Neryosangh, *mahattayâ-purâh-saratayâ*.

² Comp. XXXI, 12, 'there high his voice lifts the truthful or liar.'

³ Literally, 'he takes.'

⁴ *Riknah vindisnō*.

⁵ *Kadâk-khûdâi gabrâ nêrman*.

⁶ *Reshînênd*; see V, 10. The ablative of the cause, comp. *ashâ/haâ*; otherwise with *Hübschm.*, 'Sie die Schaden nehmen mögen durch den besten heiligen Geist, O Mazda!' (*Casuslehre*, s. 241.)

⁷ The Pahlavi translator had probably before him a text reading *rashayen*; he renders freely *rêsh srâyênd*. With such a text which is far preferable to the one afforded by the MSS. we may read: Whereby (*yéna*) men will be opposing and retarding (literally wounding) the doctrines which (are derived) from the best (moral and ceremonial) action; but to these men Mazda declared: Evil (are ye). See the previous verse.

⁸ See the previous verse.

⁹ The Pahlavi has *hû-ravâkh-manih yemalelûnd*.

and the Throne of those who have wished¹ for the Demon of lies (as their deity and friend²).

13. And the Grēhma will seek³ for these things by means of his (evil) kingdom⁴ in the abode of (Hell which is⁵) the Worst Mind (who both are together) the destroyers of life, and who, O Mazda! will bewail⁶ with glad but (envious) wish the message of Thy prophet. (But he will not abate with his vengeance), he will hold them afar from the sight⁷ of the truth!

14. His is Grēhma⁸; aye, his! And to (oppose) Thee⁹ he will establish the Kavis and (their) scheming

¹ So also indicated by the Pahlavi *bavîhûnd*.

² There is elsewhere evidence enough of a desire to encroach upon the truth.

³ So also indicated by *bavîhûnêd*.

⁴ Or, 'which kingdoms, sovereign power.'

⁵ Comp. XXX 6.

⁶ Or, 'they gladly complain;' so also the Pahlavi: *Mûn—garzîsnô kâmak*. The singular *gîgereza* is difficult with *yaêkâ*. Many would alter the text at once, and the temptation is great.

⁷ Hübschm., 'ye îs pâ/daresâ/ashahyâ der sie abhalte vom Schauen des Asha' (Casus. 241). So of XLVI, 4. So also indicated by *pâdênd mîn nikêzîsnô î Aharâyîh*; evidence of a struggle, or at least of a desire on the part of a rival party to possess themselves of some religious privilege or precedence. See the previous verse; also XXXI, 10: Never, O Mazda! never shall the thriftless and thieving one share the good doctrine. See still further XLIV, 15, where the two hosts meet in hostility 'on account of the doctrinal vows.'

⁸ Grēhma appertains to, but is not the particular evil teacher referred to throughout. The Pahlavi translator indicates bribery as the meaning of the word. Possibly some impious chieftain is meant whose procedure was of that nature. The word occurs in the plural.

⁹ *Â hôi*; *Thwôî* is difficult. Or (see Y. XLIV, 14), 'Thine understanding has subdued the Kavis.' The Pahlavi translator renders *masîh*, as if he had read *ahuthwôî*, offering an important alternative.

plans. Their deeds¹ of power are but deceits since they have come as an aid to the wicked², and since he has been (falsely) said (to be set) to conquer the Kine³, he who shall kindle that (very) help of grace which removes our death afar, (and lightens Thy saving flame).

15. And therefore will I drive from hence⁴ the Karpans' and Kavis' disciples. And after these (have thus been driven hence and away) then these (my princely aiding saints) whom they (now) render no longer rulers at will over life, (and deprive of their absolute power), these shall be borne (at

Read: In his dominion he has established the Kavis and their intended plans. Reading *hōithōi*, 'his G. is to be bound.'

¹ The predecessors of the Pahlavi translator seem to have understood the word *var(e)kau* as conveying the idea of power rather than that of brilliancy. He renders freely *pavan zak ī varzânân avârûnō dânakânō*. Supposing the text to stand, and not supplying a formation from *var(e)z*, we may hold that there existed a *var(e)k* beside *var(e)z*, as there undoubtedly was a *har(e)k* (see *harek*) beside *har(e)z*. This casts light on the Vedic *várkas*.

² *Amatiḱ paḍīrēnd valman darvandân aīyyārīh [] amatiḱ avō Tōra zanisnō gūftō*. The sufferings of the sacred Kine form the central thought of much that occurs.

³ Can *gāus* be a genitive here? But if a nominative, must not *ye* refer to it? How then could the Kine 'kindle' the aid of grace? A genitive looks difficult. It is, however, accepted by Spiegel, although he renders differently from my translation. The Pahlavi may give us invaluable relief here by restoring the text. The ancient translator read *vaokaya*. Reading with him, we might render: When the Kine which (*yâ*?) caused a death-removing help to be declared, was said to be meet for subjection (or slaying, reading an infinitive from *gan*). This rendering is more probable than that from *saoḱaya*. The Kine distinctly caused this help to be declared. See XXIX. But I make it a matter of principle to follow the MSS. in a first translation, where that is at all possible.

⁴ The Pahlavi translator differs greatly here, having taken *anâis* with adverbial force, and as possessing the *a priv.* (they being

last) by the (immortal¹) two to the home of (Thy) Good Mind (in Heaven)²!

16. (And) this entire³ (reward of the righteous) is from that Best One who teaches⁴ in the wide (mental) light of the pious⁵, ruling (as supreme), O Mazda Ahura⁶! whose are my woes and my doubt-

not inclined). He also read somewhat as follows: *anâis avaênî*(?) as *ye*=from his non-inclination he was blind who (belongs to the Karpan and to the Kavi). Whether a truer text is indicated by him here is doubtful on account of XLIV, 13, and its *nâshâmâ*; but the unvarying explanation of the Kavis as blind probably derives its origin from some such reading here, or elsewhere in lost documents.

Certainly if *âis* can be used as a particle, *anâis* is not altogether impossible in some such sense. Moreover, the Pahlavi translation here and elsewhere has afforded us such a multitude of valuable concretes, that we shall do well to think twice before we reject its most startling suggestions. Lit. trl. 'what (things are) of the K.'

¹ The Pahlavi translation gives a fine suggestion in the concrete sense here; seeing the dual *âyâ*, it explains it as referring to *Haurvatât* and *Ameretatât*, which is very probably correct. So Spiegel also renders. It is very difficult to decide in which sense *yeng daintî nôit jyâteuŕ khshayamaneng vasô* is to be taken. If in an evil sense (as *vase-khshayan*t is sometimes elsewhere taken) one might think of such a rendering as this: I have driven the Karpans' and Kavis' disciples hence to those (evil rulers) whom they (my servants) render no longer wanton tyrants over life. But these (my champion saints) shall be borne by the two to the home of Thy Good Mind. But strict grammar demands of us that *tôit* should refer back to *yeng*. Accordingly I suggest as above first.

² Observe that *Vohu Manah* equals heaven. Recall XXX, 4, 'but for the holy *Vahista Manah*; that is heaven.'

³ The Pahlavi has *ham*; *Neryosangh* has *sarvam*.

⁴ Reading *sâk(a)yâskîŕ* (P¹¹, *skyaskîŕ*; Pahlavi, *âmûkhtisnô* (sic); *Ner.*, *sikhâpanam*). Otherwise *syaskîŕ*, which may well mean 'lying, reposing' in the wide (mental) light of the pious (or of the offering). Geldner lately admirably suggests a 2nd sg.

⁵ *Pavan farâkhû hûshîh*.

⁶ If this 'best one' is the *Ratu* of XXXIII, 1, all is grammatically clear; but the expressions are rather strong in view of

ings¹ (yea, they lie in His power to heal), when I shall make (my prophets) men to be sought² for the harm of the wicked. And this I shall do by the word of my mouth (to defend and avenge my saints)!

XLVIII, 9, where similar language is certainly applied to Ahura. If Ahura is here meant, we have only one instance more to add to the many in which Ahura is spoken of in the third person, with an address to Him thrown in. See the differing views of XLV, 11. Possibly the 'Best One' was Ahura's *Spenta Mainyu*.

¹ *Zak î pavan gûmânîkîh*. As to *âiithi*, *âiithivant* seems to prove that its meaning must be calamity also in this place. Otherwise one is strongly tempted to heed the vigorous indication of the Pahlavi translator. Here and in XLVIII, 9, he renders 'manifest,' 'what is clear in the midst of my doubt.' The etymology would be far simpler. Alternatively *dvaêthâ*=terror (*bî*).

² *Valman î pûmman khvâstâr*. The Pahlavi sees 'to be desired' in *ishyeng*. Otherwise one might render: I will cause (verbal) missiles (comp. *zastâ-istâis*) to be cast forth from the mouth for the harm of the wicked.

(SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 'Parch with drought' in verse 10 may be regarded as having figurative application. The destruction of the means of irrigation, so often resorted to in the same regions later, would point also to a literal sense, but 'waste our meadows like drought' is a safer expression. See further *vîvâpa*, and *vîvâpem*=*viyâpa*, *viyâpem*.)

YASNA XXXIII.

PRAYERS, HOPES, AND SELF-CONSECRATION.

Brighter times seem to have arrived. The vengeance so confidently promised in the close of XXXII is described as near at hand. In fact the first three verses seem to belong as much to XXXII as to the present chapter. They remind one of the choruses of attending saints, or 'Immortals,' in XXIX, perfectly germane to the connection, but referring in the third person to a speaker who closes the last chapter with a first, and who begins again with a first in verse 4. The propriety of a division of chapters here rests upon the fact that the thought comes to a climax at XXXII, 16, beginning afresh at XXXIII, 4. Whether Zarathustra, or the chief composer, whatever his name may have been, composed these three verses relating, as they do, to himself, and put them into the mouth of another, or whether their grammatical form indicates another author, is difficult to determine. I doubt very greatly whether either the expressions 'I approach,' 'I offer,' &c., or the words 'he will act,' 'let him be in Asha's pastures,' are at all meant to express more than some modern hymns which use 'I' and 'he.' Both are in constant employment in anthology with no change in the person indicated. 'I' and 'Thy servant' are merely verbal variations. Here, however, the change is somewhat marked by the allusion to the chastisement of the wicked just previously mentioned in XXXII, 16. 1. It is to be noticed that the strictest canon with the original, as indeed with the later, Zarathustrians of the Avesta was the 'primeval law.' Unquestionably the precepts understood as following from the dualistic principle were intended; that is to say, no trifling with any form of evil, least of all with a foreign creed, was to be tolerated. Ahura has no share in the evolution of anything corrupt. We may even add that He had no power to prevent either sin or sorrow, although He possessed all conceivable power to oppose them. According to these fundamental laws, then, the Ratu is said to act, as sternly severe upon the evil as he is beneficent to the saint. 2. The fierce hostilities hitherto pursued are more than justified. The injury of the wicked by denouncing, planning, or by physical violence, is on a par with advising the good. They who pursue the enemies of Ahura are actually operating in love to God, and sacrificing to religion itself.

3. And accordingly the reciter is made to pray in this immediate connection for a sincere and useful friend (a vahista) to the believer, to whichever class he may belong, whether chief, allied peer, or villager, a friend spiritually enlightened (*vidās*), and, according to Ahura's prescript (XXIX, 2), keen, persevering, and brave in the cultivation of cattle (*thwakhshanghâ gavôî*). 'Let such an one as this, so asked for by the Lord himself, so needed by the Kine, let him,' he prays, 'be supported in his holy toil for us. Let him till and tend, not in the pastures of our valleys only, but in the spiritual pastures of the Divine Benevolence where the mystic kine is grazing.'
4. Taking up the peculiar 'I who' of XXVIII, the composer returns to the first person, continuing in that form with little exception until the last verse, which, naming Zarathustra in the third person, implies (if it is not an addition, which, however, it may be) that Zarathustra had been the speaker throughout. As it is highly probable that the author who uses this 'I who' is the same who uses it in XXVIII, and if we may take verse 14 as fair evidence that Zarathustra is the speaker here, we acquire some additional grounds for believing that the person who wrote (if we can apply such an expression to the author) the words 'to Zarathustra and to us,' as well as 'to Vistâspa and to me,' and 'to Frashaostra and to me,' was universally recognised to be Zarathustra himself composing a piece to be recited by another. As if in response to the expression in verse 3, recalling that although a vahista (a best one) to some of each class (verse 1) he was no contentor of the wicked (XLIII, 15), he begins a prayer which is only completed by its *izyâ* in verse 6, and which gathers force by each preceding profession of fidelity. And true to a practical dualism, he first abjures the leading sin of disobedience to God, and of arrogance, discontent, and dishonesty toward man, accompanied (as it seems to have been) with neglect of the all-important duties to the cattle who shared the sanctity of 'the soul' of their representative. And perhaps it is this practical severity of dualism as opposed to the more facile 'lying' of the opposed religion, which was the cause of that high reputation of the Persians for veracity, which was grouped with avoiding debt by Herodotus among the virtues of the race.
5. I, he goes on to say, or to imply, I who not only abjure disobedience, insolence, complaint, and lying, but especially invoke the great genius who is Obedience himself, Obedience toward God, (Thee), endeavouring as I do by this abjuration and prayer to attain, not to a 'hundred autumns' of booty and glory, but to a long life in the kingdom which was established in the spirit of

the Divine Benevolence, and to paths not only for the war-cart, or for commerce, but to those rigidly straight paths of moral purity in which Ahura dwells, 6. I, he adds once more, who am thus Thine actually invoking (zbayâ) invoker, 'straight' like the paths (erezus), I am seeking with longing (kayâ) to know from that Best Spirit (Thy *Spenta Mainyu*?) animated once more by that best mind, to know-what? Shall we regard it as a bathos when we read that he thus with cumulative urgency prays to know what the Best Spirit thought should be done for the recovery and perfection of the fields? If we turn back to XXIX, 1, we shall see that the identical word (vâstryâ) describes the original want of the kine's soul. It was vohû vâstryâ which she implored as her salvation; and it was the sacred agriculturist who alone could afford it, and who as the 'diligent tiller of the earth' always remained the typical saint. And as his useful deeds in reclaiming, irrigating, and cultivating land, were justly ranked among the first services of a human being, and as the last preparation of the gathered grain was perhaps humorously, but yet pungently, said to make the *Daêvas* start, and shriek, and fly (see *Vendîdâd* III, 32, Sp. 165), and as further, a life from the fruits of the earth to this day constitutes the main difference between those who live by murderous theft and those who live honestly in nearly the same regions, I think we may not only see no bathos here, but on the contrary admire the robust sense of this early religion¹, and say that a knowledge as to a true policy in the department of agriculture was one of the wisest possible desires, and the most of all things worthy of a 'sight of Mazda and of consultation with Him.' How the fields had better be worked, and how the people could best be kept from bloody freebooting as aggressors or as victims, this involved Ahura's Righteous Order, Benevolence, Power, and Piety, the four energising Immortals all at once. And this only could secure the other two rewarding personifications, Welfare and Immortality.

7. Having prayed for that which is the first virtue of civilised existence, work (*verezyêidyâi*), he proceeds to further petitions. 'Come Ye,' he beseeches in Vedic fashion. Come Ye, O Ahura, Asha, and Vohu Manah! and behold the attentive monarch, the leading Magavan, as he listens to my instructions with the other

¹ In this particular. As to ceremonies it had at a later period more than its share of absurdities; but as to honest work as against 'foraging on the enemy' there is a great difference between the Gâthas, and some other ancient hymns, for instance the *Rîks* of the Veda. In fact these latter may be regarded as representing the opposite extreme.

chiefs, and the thronging masses. And let too the sacrificial gifts pour in for offering and worship.

8. He rests at no bare morality for the simple multitude. He knows too well the human foible, therefore he asks with vigour for sacrifice and hymn.

9. Encouraging the two pious chiefs whose souls go hand in hand, he prays that an influence like that of the 'eternal two' might bear their 'spirit' (sic) to the shining home of Paradise, it having attained to perfection by the help of the Best Mind of God within it. (For mainyu in this sense compare XLIV, 11.)

10. Asking of Mazda to grant in His love (or 'by His will') all the happy phases of life which have been, or which shall ever be experienced, he prays that their bodies, that is, their persons, as separate accountable individuals (compare *nareṃ nareṃ hvahyâi tanuyê*) might flourish in the graces of the Good Mind, the Holy Sovereignty, and the Sacred Order, till they were blessed with the *ustâ*, the *summum bonum*.

11. He here prays all the grand abstractions, Piety, the Righteous Order (which alone can 'push on' the settlements), the Good Mind of God within His people, and His kingdom, to turn their mental ears and listen, and listening to pardon.

12. And specifying the one central object of desire, the Thrift-law, the Avesta of the Ratu, or Saoshyant, he asks Ahura to arise to his help and give him spiritual strength by sustaining him through the inspiring Righteousness and the Good Mind, in an effective invocation.

13. With a spirituality still deeper than his Semitic colleague, he asks, not to see the person of God, but His nature, and especially to be able to comprehend and bring home to his mind what the Sovereignty of God implies with its 'blessed rewards.' And he asks of Piety as first acquired, practised, and then speaking within him, to reveal the Gnosis, the Insight, that is, the Religion.

14. After the fervent language of the previous verses we may accept verse 14 as a legitimate continuation. Its 'Zarathustra' may mean 'I' just as 'David' is used by the Psalmist for 'me.' And the language can mean nothing but a dedication of all that he is and has to God, his flesh, his body, his religious eminence, the obedience which he offers in word and deed, inspired by Righteousness, and the Kingdom which he has succeeded in saving and blessing. (I do not think that I have at all exaggerated the grasp and fervour of this section. Less could not be said, if the words are to be allowed their natural weight.)

Translation.

1. As by the laws of the primeval world, so will our spiritual chieftain act (that chief besought-for by the Kine¹, and named as Zarathustra² by the Lord). Deeds most just he will do toward the wicked, as toward the righteous, and toward him whose deeds of fraud³ and righteous deeds combine (in equal measure).

2. Yea, (he will act with justice but with vengeance, for) he who does evil to the wicked by word, or with thought (and plan), and (who therein does not dally, but toils labouring as) with both the hands, or he (again) who admonishes one for his good⁴, such as these are offering (a gift) to their religious⁵ faith in the love (and with the approving view) of Ahura Mazda⁶; (they are offering to conscience.)

¹ See XXIX, 1.

² See XXIX, 6, 8.

³ So the Pahl.; and so also Roth (Z. D. M. G., vol. xxxvii, 5, 223) taking *mithahyâ* as a nom. pl. (comp. *vañahya*). But I am strongly inclined to a former view of my own. *Yêhyâ-mithahyâ* look irresistibly like two genitives. I would render as an emphatic alternative 'what fraud he may lay hold of (*hemyâsaitê* with the gen.), reach (of the one), and what (seem) to him the righteous deeds (of the other).' But if Roth and the Pahlavi are right, we have here the origin of the later *hamêstagâ*, the souls in the intermediate place between Heaven and Hell, whose sins and good works have been equal (West, Gloss. to M. i K.). The Persian manuscript of Haug 12 b. has: *Kih iê* (pro ham) *û i ân ham rasîd êstêd ân i durûgâ, kih iê* (ham) *û ân i 'hâlis* [kû, *hamêstân*].

⁴ So the Pahlavi also indicates: *Val valman î sapîr---kâshisn. Ner. uttamasya vâ âsvâdayanti dehinañ.*

⁵ Literally, 'they are offering a gift to their own choice' (*var*=*varena*; comp. *yâvarenâ*).

⁶ They are holding fast by the holy cause, and their vehemence in vengeance does not negative the fact that they are toiling in the love of Ahura. Pahlavi: *Pavan zak î lak dôshisnô, Aûharmazd î*

3. (And so may it be), O Ahura ! Let the man who is the best toward the righteous saint, whether lord's kinsman¹, or as village labourer, with the allied² peer (of the master), having light, and endowed with energy for the cattle (a Ratu such as Ahura sought to satisfy their wail), let such an one be (for us)³ in the work-field of the Righteous Order, in the pastures of Thy Good Mind⁴.

4. (And I beseech for Thine instruction), I who will abjure⁵ all disobedience (toward Thee, praying that others likewise may withhold it) from Thee ; I who abjure the Evil Mind as well, the lordly kinsman's arrogance⁶, and that lying sin which is (alas !) the next thing to the people⁷ (their most familiar fault), and the blaming ally's falsehood, and from the Kine the worst care of her meadows⁸ (the crime of stint in labour⁹),

¹ Literally, 'with, or as, the kinsman.'

² 'With the true ally.'

³ See XXIX, 2 : 'Let that pasture-giver whom ye would appoint for us, teaching by example and precept *vohû vâstryâ*, let him be on our sacred pastures, and on our side.'

⁴ The Pahlavi may be rendered as follows : He who affords increase to the righteous on account of the relationship [that is, something is given to him ?] does so also on account of the labourer's duty, or class [that is, the labourer is to be considered as his own]. Through the loyalty ; that is, the loyal class, that which adheres to Aûharmazd, he has a thorough understanding as to what is (true) energy toward the herds. Thus Vohûman (a good mind) is a workman with him to whom Righteousness also belongs.

⁵ Hübschm. Casuslehre, 'der ich von dir den Ungehorsam und schlechten Sinn durch Gebet abwenden will' (s. 180).

⁶ Observe that *hvaêtu* certainly designates an upper class. Why else arrogance ?

⁷ Possibly this severity was the cause of the later high reputation of the Zarathustrians for veracity.

⁸ Literally, 'from the pasture of the Kine.'

⁹ The Pahlavi may be rendered : Him who will not listen to

5. I, who (abjuring these sins), call earnestly on Thine Obedience of all (assisting guardians) the greatest one for our help¹, gaining (thereby²) long life in the Realm of (Thy) Good Mind (incarnate in our tribes), and paths that are straight from their Righteous Order, wherein Ahura Mazda dwells³,

6. (Yea), I who, as this Thy faithful priest, invoke Thee through (my) Righteousness, (now) seek⁴ with longing from (Thy) Best Spirit, and with that⁵ (best) intention of mind, (to know) what⁶ he himself thought of the working of (our) fields⁷. Therefore (because I abjure the Evil Mind, and all disobedience,

Thee, O Aûharmazd! will I abjure, and Akôman also, for by him there is the despising of relations, and the deception of the labouring men who live close at hand [that is, of neighbours]. And he is ever bringing censure upon the clients. And he holds to the lowest measure of duty toward the Herd.

¹ Avanghâ *ne*, or avanghânê, an infinitive (see Wilhelm, de Infin. p. 16). The Pahlavi has avô aîyyârîh.

² Sraosha (= listening obedience) is the greatest for help, because by a Mâthra which appeals to him the way to Ahura is found out (XXVIII, 6) and the Demon defeated. If *apânô* is read, so strictly. The Pahlavi translator seems to have understood *apâ ne*; *barâm ayâfinâi pavan dêr-zîvisnîh, zak î pavan khûdâyîh î Vohûman*.

Ner.: *Avâpaya dîrghe gîvitatve*. This may well restore for us the proper text. Reading *apâ ne* we should render 'obtain for us.'

³ Ahura Mazda dwells as in His abode amid the paths where His saints walk (see XLVI, 16).

⁴ So also indicated by *bavihûnêd*. *Kayâ* properly refers to *ye*.

⁵ The Pahlavi translator seems to have seen an imperative in *avâ*, rendering it freely *aîyyârînêdô*.

⁶ *Yâ* may be an instr. sing. or an acc. pl. neut. 'I ask what he thought meet to be done;' *yâ* does not necessarily equal *yéna* in every instance.

⁷ I need hardly remind the reader that agriculture was the great question of orderly and religious life with the Zarathustrians. Without it there was of course no resource but wandering and plunder for them.

arrogance, falsehood), O Mazda ! would I beseech of Thee for a sight of Thee, and for consultation with Thee ! (What is Thy will and mind ?)

7. Come Ye, then, to my best (regulations. Come to my men, and my laws¹), my very own, O Mazda ! and let them see through the Righteous Order and (Thy) Good Mind (which Thou wilt bestow in Thy drawing near) how I am heard before the rich giver² (in the assembly of Thy worshippers). Yea, (come Ye) ; and let the manifold offerings of worship be manifest among us³. (Arouse Ye, and help our zeal⁴ !)

¹ So I render from the context. Otherwise see *tâ tôi izyâ* in the previous verse.

² I was formerly inclined to understand Ahura here, Indian usage permitting. (Indra and other Gods are *maghavan*.) But modern authority, aided by the ancient Pahlavi translator, brings me to a better mind. The Pahlavi has *pavan fravôn magîh*. It is better to refer the word to the disciple. The more prominent members of the congregation are meant.

³ Ner. renders the last line thus : And may these offerings be manifest in the midst of us, and accompanied with (sincerest) worship.

⁴ There are certain cases where allowance for an ancient scholar working under great disadvantages becomes a critical necessity. Here the Pahlavi translator was clearly the victim of a manuscript. The word '*âidûm*' (sic) stood, as similar words so often stand, in his MS. as '*âi. dûm*.' Deeply imbued with a superstitious regard for every letter, and with a public equally scrupulous, he saw no course before him but to translate each as best he could. He chose to render '*âi*' by an infinitive, preserving the root, and could only think of a form of '*dâ*' for *dûm* (so also moderns in another case). Many writers, seeing such a step, cast away his paper, regarding themselves as absolved by such a 'blunder' from mastering his translations. But a little honest labour will always bring one back to sounder exegesis. In the next following verse we have identically the same form in another word, which he renders awkwardly but correctly, using *dâ* again, but as a proper auxiliary.

8. (Come Ye) and show me the worthy aims of our faith, so that I may approach and fulfil them with (Thy) Good Mind, the offering, O Mazda! of the One like You¹, or the words of praises offered with Righteousness. And give Ye as Your offering² (of grace to me) the abiding gifts of Your Immortality and Welfare!

9. And let (one like those³), O Mazda! bear on to Thee the spirit of the two leaders who cause the holy ritual Truth to flourish; let him⁴ bear them to (Thy) brilliant home⁵ with⁶ preternatural insight, and with the Better Mind. Yea, let him bear that spirit on as a fellow-help⁷ in (furthering) the readi-

¹ To approach the offering of a praiser seems certainly an unnatural expression. I think that we are obliged to regard *khshâmâvatô* as another way of saying Yourself rather than 'of Yours'; and if it equals 'Yourself' here, it may elsewhere; see XXXIV, 2, *khshâmâvatô vahmê*, also XLIV, 1, *neme khshâmâvatô*. All acknowledge *mavaitê* to mean 'to me.' Hübschmann, *Casuslehre*, s. 200: 'dass ich mit frommem sinne an eure Verehrung, Mazda, gehen kann.'

² It is curious that *draonô* seems to be in apposition here. The word is used merely in the sense of offering in the later Avesta. It might possibly mean 'possessions' here.

³ See XXXII, 15. There helping princes are spoken of 'as borne by the two (*Haurvatâ* and *Ameretatâ*).' Here in immediate connection with the same two it is said: Let one bear the spirit of the two united chiefs. By the term 'spirit,' which sounds so suspiciously modern, we must nevertheless understand very nearly what the word would mean in a modern phrase. By these two leaders we may understand either *Gâmâspa* and *Vistâspa* (XLIX, 9) or *Gâmâspa* and *Frashaostra*. (Compare *yâvarenâ Frashaostrâ Gâmâspâ*.)

⁴ 'Let one bear them.'

⁵ *Khvârîh mânînisnô*.

⁶ The Pahlavi gives its evidence for an instrumental and for a less pronounced meaning than the one above.

⁷ *Hamkarzârîh*. If the second *kar* is the root, the sense is figurative.

ness¹ of those (in their holy work) whose souls go hand in hand².

10. (And not for these alone do I pray, but for us³ as well.) All prosperous states⁴ in being which have been enjoyed in the past, which men are now enjoying, and which shall be known in the future, do Thou grant (me) these in Thy love⁵. (Yea), cause (our) bodily and personal life to be blest with salvation⁶ through (Thy) Good Mind, (Thy) Sovereign Power, and (Thy) Sanctity⁷.

11. And, O Thou who art the most beneficent Ahura Mazda! and thou who art Âramaiti (our piety), and also the Righteous Order who dost further on the settlements; and Thou, the Good Mind, and the Sovereign Power! hear ye me all, and have mercy⁸ for every deed which I do whatsoever⁹!

¹ Bûndakô.

² Pavan akvîñô rûbânô.

³ So more probably. See the first person in verses 8 and 11.

⁴ So the Pahlavi also, hû-zivîsnih.

⁵ So the Pahlavi also : Pavan hanâ î lak dôshîsnô. 'In Thy will' is here very weak.

⁶ Nadûkîhiê î avô tanû [am yehabûn] ; Ner. subham tanau.

⁷ Neryosangh : Let them continue to live well, and be prosperous in all things [] those females (yâh most curiously) who are born thus [that is, come from elsewhere (and not from us)], and who are [gained over by myself]. Those, O Great Wise One! who shall exist [(or) come in the future], let them render these persons thine own through friendship to thee. Cause thou the Best Mind to increase within me, O Lord! [that is, make my mind ever the more piously zealous]. And in view of my righteousness grant me a benefit in my body, or person [].

⁸ So the Pahlavi also : Am barâ âmûrzêd.

⁹ Observe that all the Ameshôspends, except the two mentioned in verse 8, are here bidden as persons to listen and be merciful. These recurring instances (recall the two hands of Asha &c.) necessitate the view that the idea of personality is never lost in that

12. And Thou, O Ahura! do Thou (Thyself) arise¹ to me! Through Âramaiti give me power, O most bountiful Spirit Mazda! through (my) faithful appeals and offerings²; and for (my) Righteousness grant me mighty strength, and (Thy) thrift-law³ through (Thy) Good Mind⁴.

13. (Arise to give me power), and then for grace in a wide perception⁵ (that I may view its depth and extent), do Thou reveal to me Thy⁶ nature (?), O Ahura! (the power of Thine attributes), and those of Thy (holy) kingdom, and by these, the blessed gifts⁷ of (Thy) Good Mind! And do Thou, O bountiful Piety⁸ show forth the religious truths through (Thy) Righteous Order.

of the abstract quality; and vice versâ; (the latter especially in the Gâthas where the names always retain much, if not all of their original force). As to âdâi; see vanghuyâ (sic) zavô-âdâ in the next verse.

¹ We seem obliged to suppose that Ahura was poetically conceived of as sitting (like Vohûman in Vendidad XIX, 31 (Wg.)) upon an ornamented throne, or we may take the expression as pure metaphor equalling 'exert Thy power.' Âramaiti may be a voc.

² See âdâi in verse 11.

³ Pavan zak î Vohûman sardârîh. The 'thrift-law' is the regulation established by the Ratu demanded in Y. XXIX for the redemption of the Kine. It expresses the entire polity and theology of the Zarathustrian people as summed up in the original Avesta.

⁴ Neryosangh: Up! O Lord! purify me [that is, make me pure, or free, from the influence of that tormentor, the Evil Mind]; and grant me perfect spirituality and zeal. For we are recipients of Gvahmana, O more mighty spirit [that is, let him be as a guest, arrived within my body]! And let sanctity have power over the murderer (?) [], and through the lordship of the Best Mind.

⁵ The Pahlavi has here pavan kâmak kâshismô, on which see Darmesteter, *Études Iranienues*, vol. ii, as per index.

⁶ Literally, 'Your.'

⁷ Ashi has this meaning in the later Avesta. It also means 'sacred regularity,' 'exactness' in religious duties.

⁸ So the Pahlavi also: As pavan Aharâyîh dînô frâz dakh-

14. Thus, as an offering, Zarathustra gives the life¹ of his very body. And he offers, likewise, O Mazda! the priority of the Good Mind, (his eminence gained) by his holiness (with Thy folk); and he offers (above all his) Obedience (to Thee) in deed and in speech, and with these (Thine established) Sovereign Power²!

shakîñö; Ner.: *Punyena dinim prañihñaya*. Possibly, 'give light to our consciences through Asha' would be better.

¹ The tissues; the word seems contrasted with bones elsewhere. The Pahlavi has *khayâ*, and Ner. *givam* (sic).

² The Pahlavi translation may be rendered as follows: Thus, as a gift of generosity, I who am Zartûst (so freely, and with no error from ignorance (!)) give the life of my own body, as the advance [as the chieftainship] to Vohûman and to Aûharmazd, and to Ashavahist, in actions [that is, I would do the deeds which Aharâyih desires], and would give obedient attention to the word (literally the hearing of the word) to (i. e. of) Khshatraver.

YASNA XXXIV.

1. A tone of thankfulness continues. As if in gratitude for better fortunes, the prophet declares that he will bestow upon Ahura with the foremost, according to the measure of the gifts which he has received. Those gifts were the secured Immortality (not mere temporal 'deathlessness'), the Righteous Order, and the Sovereign Power established in holiness and bestowing the Universal Weal.

2. The kind of gifts which are proposed for offerings are not sacrificial beasts or fruits, but the actions of the truly pious citizen whose soul is intimately united with Righteousness, the homage of prayer, and the songs of praise. As no piety could exist without strict ecclesiastical regularity, so no ceremonial punctuality was conceived of apart from honour and charity (see verse 5 and Yast XXII).

3. Accordingly the meat-offering, the mention of which immediately follows, is spoken of as offered with homage to the Righteous Order and to the Divine Sovereignty for the benefit of all the sacred settlements, in order to equip the wise man fully, and as a helpful blessing among the Immortals themselves and their adherents.

4. And the Fire is likewise mentioned, which was worshipped not so much like Agni as the friendly god of the hearth and the altar, but more and chiefly like Agni as the priest of the church.

Not unlike Agni, it is called upon both for inward spiritual strength and for temporal blessings in various forms, together with vengeance hurled very much as if in the form of a thunderbolt (*zastâ-istâis derestâ-aênanghem*). 5. To explain what he means by his supplications for the coming of the Kingdom, and for holy actions (that is, to make it certain that he does not mean punctilious ritualism apart from the noblest charity), he rhetorically asks: 'And what is Your Kingdom, that which Zarathustra establishes and offers to You? (XXXIII, 14). What is the kind of prayer (comp. XLVIII, 8, and LIII, 1) which I must use, so that I may become Yours (Your property) in my actions, not to load Your priesthood with sacrifices, nor to fatten Your princes with booty (as too often in the *Riks*), nor yet to secure a heavy gift to the poet, but to 'nourish Your poor?' This was the essence of the desired Sanctity and the Sovereign Authority. The Kingdom of God, exalted

and personified as a separate intelligence, is positively said to be something more than a gaudy pageant of material display, even Tavâ Khshathrem yâ erezigyôî dâhî drigavê vahyô (LIII, 9). (See also even Vendîdâd II [part i], where moral duties are lauded.)

And the composer himself seems to be so conscious of the sharply defined difference between such a kingdom and that of the rival religion, that he immediately adds an interdict: 'Such is Your Kingdom, caring for the righteous poor, and therefore we declare You irreconcilably distinct from the Daêvas and their polluted followers. Ye are beyond them and before in the spirit of Your Reign!'

6. He then utters an impressive doubt, which only deepens our admiration at his expressions of faith: 'If it be really true,' he continues (see XLIV, 6), 'that Ye are thus with the Righteous Order and the Good Mind, the God who looks upon the goodness of the heart and the activity of the hands, then give me a sign of it, that I may persevere and increase in the depth of my homage while life shall last.' 7. For the struggle, though not without signs of a favourable issue, was far from over yet. (Hence his misgivings.)

He then asks with some wistfulness after the 'ar(e)drâ,' the men that could help, who from the experience of the grace of God, could turn sorrow into blessing by establishing the holy religious system firmly, but with enlarged and not narrowed understanding. And, still a little dispirited, he declares, as so often: 'None have I other than You; therefore I can wait for the ar(e)drâ. Do ye save us alone by Your already offered means of grace.'

8. 'For Ye have given me already, as it were, a sign. The enemy are checked, and for the moment cowed, if they are not repelled. They among whom there was death for so many when they had the upper hand, and when their ruler persecuted the holy vows, are not only struck with terror by the action which we take, but their chief retribution is, as we hold it, spiritual, and therefore, in the eye of truth the more severe. They will not encourage righteous Order and righteous intentions, and accordingly, the personified Good Intention, grieved, will depart from them.'

9. 'Yea,' he reiterates, amplifying, 'the unfortunate sinners who depart from Thy kindly and sacred Piety in this ignorance of all experience of Thy Good Mind, will suffer an equal desertion. The characteristics of righteousness will, in their turn, avoid them as the unclean creatures flee from us.' 10. 'And this is,' thus he continues, 'a sign or result which the All-wise declares to me to steady my soul as I waver.' 'And these are indeed the cheering proofs of Thy favour,' he adds, addressing Ahura, 'which terrify our enemies

and advance us, giving us a righteous eminence (XXXIII, 14) in Thy Kingdom.'

11. 'Therefore that kindly Piety whom these desert in their judicial ignorance, will increase for us both the all-comprehensive blessings; spiritual Deathlessness begun in anticipation here, and its necessary condition, Welfare. And they shall be increased as food (sic) for Mazda's straitened people, or better, to His glory as their monarch. And by their means Ahura may defend Himself efficiently from the persecuting and idolatrous foe.' 12. Taking into consideration all that depends on a correct understanding as to religious and political duties, he fervently prays to be guided aright in the establishment of a ceremonial and of praises, beseeching Mazda to speak, declaring the kind of worship which may secure the *ashis* (which are the blessed rewards). And he asks to be taught those religious paths about which no error was possible, the paths which are the Good Mind's own.

13. After a fashion already known to us (as in XXIX), he answers his question himself. That way which Ahura had already revealed as the Good Mind's own, was made up of the revealed precepts of the *Saoshyants*. There, as in the paths where Ahura dwells (XXXIII, 5; XLVI, 16), the well-doer may prosper from his devotion to the religious truths, and gain a reward immediately from the hand of God. 14. As if never forgetting the original calamity, the woes of the Kine, he further declares that way to be the one of all to be chosen for this earthly life, as the vestibule to the heavenly one. And he asserts that they who toil for the Kine (who represents here, as generally, the holy settlements as well as their chief source of riches and support) are striving to further and demonstrate the wisdom of that way by every righteous contrivance.

Nay, he declares that the deeds of Piety are themselves the highest wisdom, just as the words and righteous actions of the *Saoshyants* not only declare and make, but constitute, 'the way.'

15. Again, concluding with a climacteric and synoptical prayer, he beseeches Ahura to speak and reveal to him all the most available statements, ceremonies, and praises. And never forgetting that all ceremonies, hymns, and sacrifices, sacred as they are, are only means to a greater end; he prays the Deity that He may exert that Sovereign Power which is alone supremely efficient in relieving actual distress (LIII, 9), for by its holy laws and spiritual arms it can alone bring on the *Frashakarz*, and produce that condition in society in which all human progress shall have become complete.

Translation.

1. As to those (three gifts of blessings), Immortality, the Righteous Order, and the (established) Kingdom of Welfare, which Thou, O Mazda! hast given through (holy) deeds, words, and the sacrifice unto these (Thy servants here in my sight¹), gifts (shall) be offered² by us in return to Thee, O Ahura! and with the foremost of them all.

2. Yea, and all those gifts of the Good Spirit³ have been given (back in gratitude) to Thee by the mind and the deed of the bountiful man, whose soul goes hand in hand⁴ with the Righteous Order in the settlement, in homage toward the One like You⁵,

¹ The hymns seem to be all composed for public declamation, as is evident from various passages. Similar indications often occur in the Veda. I formerly connected *aêshâm* with *Ameretatâ*, &c., 'a thank-offering for these (gifts).'

² I am very sorry to oppose progress on such a subject as *dastê*, but I do not think that it is an infinitive, nor that *âitê* or *mrûtê* are such. -*Tê*, or what it represents, I regard as seldom or never a Gâthic suffix, and especially not, as here, where *dastê* falls to the end of the sentence. Too little attention has been paid to the Gâthic sentence. The infinitive seldom falls to the end of it; *vidvanô* *vaoâ*; *ta* *môi* *viđidyâi* *vaoâ*; *viduyê* (*vidvê*) *vohû* *mananghâ*; *menkâ* *daidyâi* *yêhyâ* *mâ* *rishis*; *ashâ* *fradathâi* *aspezeratâ*; *âgôi* (?) *hâdrôyâ*; *ye* *akistem* *vaênanghê* *aogedâ*; but *zbayâ* *avanghânê* (?) *yâ* *verezyêidyâi* *mantâ* *vâstryâ*; *srûidyâi* *Mazdâ* *frâvaoâ*; *kahmâi* *vîviduyê* (-*vê*) *vashî*; *ta* *verezyêidyâi* *hya* *môi* *mraotâ* *vahistem*; *arethâ* *vôizhdyâi* *kâmahyâ* *tem* *môi* *dâtâ*; *dazdyâi* *hâkerenâ*; but *vasmî* *anyâkâ* *viduyê* (-*vê*); *men-dâidyâi* *yâ* *Tôi* *Mazdâ* *âdistis*, &c. The Pahlavi renders here with admirable freedom as a first person, *yehabûnem*.

³ Observe this expression. It is the *spenta mainyu* which, like the 'Holy Spirit of God,' is sometimes identical with Him.

⁴ Souls are elsewhere said to go hand in hand; see Y. XXXIII, 9.

⁵ I suppose that it is possible that *khshmvatô*, here and elsewhere, may refer to the human subject, 'to the praise of your wor-

O Mazda ! and with the chants of the (thankful) praisers¹.

3. And unto Thee, O Ahura ! will we offer the (thankful) meat-offering with self-humbling praise, and to Thy Righteousness (like Thee a person), and for all the settlements in Thy kingdom which are guarded² by Thy Good Mind. For in the perfect preparation of the justly acting (has that offering its power), O Mazda ! together with all (others of its kind). Among those like You and worthy of Yourselves, it is a blessing³.

4. And we pray likewise for Thy Fire, O Ahura ! strong through Righteousness (as it is), most swift, (most) powerful, to the house with joy receiving it, in many wonderful ways our help, but to the hater, O Mazda ! it is a steadfast⁴ harm as if with weapons hurled from the hands⁵.

shipper,' but it does not sound at all natural. I think that *khshmvatō* is merely another way of saying 'of you,' as *mavant*=me. So the Pahlavi also seems to render here: *Avō zak ī lekūm va nīyāyisnō*. Ner. also: *Samāgātāhāmi yushmākam namaskrītaye, Mahāgānān*.

¹ This recalls the *dasemē-stūtām* of Y. XXVIII, 10.

The Pahlavi renders freely and not uncritically, regarding the *spenta nar* as Zarathustra himself: *Aftānō dēn Garōdmānō stāyem*. Ner. : *Garothmāne staumi te*.

² So also the translations: *Aīghas parvarisn va min frarūnīh*. Ner. : *Uttamena pratipālyā manasā*. Compare Y. XXXII, 2 : *sāremanō khshathrāt*. The singular verb is difficult.

³ Or, 'for as those justly acting, and in preparation will we offer it as a blessing together with all who are among "Your own." ' Here *khshmvant* equals 'Your own'; rather than 'Yourselves.'

⁴ Or 'visible' as fire, but this seems too feeble a conception for the place. The Pahlavi translator read *derestā* as a participle from *dar(e)z*, which is quite as possible as that it should be from *dar(e)s*. He renders *yakhšenunēd kīnō* ; Ner., *vidadhāti nigraham*. That he so translated because he was not aware that *derestā* could be also a participle from *dar(e)s*, is no longer tenable.

⁵ As by no means a partially selected specimen, let the reader

5. What is¹ then Your Kingdom, O Mazda? What are Your riches? that I may become² Your own in my actions, with the Righteous Order, and (Thy) Good Mind, to care for Your poor (in their suffering³). Apart from all would we declare You, yea, apart from Daêvas⁴, and Khrafstra-polluted mortals!

consider the following from the Pahlavi: Thus, O Aûharmazd! this which is Thy Fire, which is so powerful, is a satisfaction to him whose is Aharâyih [-when my chieftain (the glossist seeming to have a text with a first pronoun; otherwise the first translator who never saw? us(e)mahî) becomes one by whom duty and charity are fulfilled], for it is quick and powerful [the Fire], and remains continually in friendship with him, and makes joy manifest to him. And therefore, O Aûharmazd! on him who is the tormentor it takes revenge as if with a mighty wish.

¹ Kaŕ is often a mere interrogative particle, so modern interrogatives are also often merely formal.

² Bartholomae admirably follows K₄ here with its hakhmî; it gives a more common explanation of vâo, which I am obliged to take in a possessive sense beside nē. The manuscript used by the Pahlavi writer had, however, ahmî, as many others now extant.

³ Note the recurrence of this care for the poor, showing what the frequent mention of righteousness, the good mind, &c. meant.

⁴ Observe that daêvâis must mean the Demon-gods and not their worshippers here; parē vâo indicates this, and also mashyâis = men, who are separately mentioned. The Pahlavi translator is finely critical here, giving us our first hint as to the meaning: Pêsh Lekûm min harvisp-gûnō levînō gûft hōmanêd [aigh tûbân-kardar hōmanêd, &c.]. So with antare-mrtyê (-vê), he was the pioneer also. I render with impartiality: Which (of what kind) is your sovereignty? [that is, what thing can I do, whereby your sovereignty may be increased through my instrumentality?] And which is your wealth? [that is, what thing shall I do whereby riches may be kept in your possession by my means?] How thus in the actions of Aûharmazd shall I become yours? [That is, I (?) shall do that thing through which, by my means, your sovereignty is extended; and also wealth is kept in your possession by me.] For whenever I (?) shall do righteous deeds, [that is, when I (?) shall do duty and good works], Vohûman gives nourishment to our poor. Before all of every kind, even before them ye are

6. If thus Ye are in verity, O Mazda! with the Righteous Order and Thy Good Mind, then grant Ye me a sign¹ of this in this world's entire abiding² (while I live amid its scenes), how offering sacrifice and praising³ You the more devoutly⁴, I may approach You (in my worship)!

7. Where⁵ are Thine offerers, O Mazda! Thy helpers, who as the enlightened of the Good Mind are producing the doctrines with wide mental light as inherited treasures, (delivering them as Thy word) in misfortune and in woe⁶? I know none other than You; then do Ye save us through Your righteousness!

8. Through these our deeds (of sacrifice and zeal⁷), they are terrified⁸ among whom there was (once) destruction, and for many (at the time) when the

declared; [that is, ye are more capable] than the demons, for their (?) intellect is perverted, (and ye are also before) men.

¹ So also the Pahlavi *dakhsrak*.

² So indicated by *ketrûnânî*. I have no doubt whatever that *maêthâ* should have this sense. See also Y. XXX, 9.

³ So also the Pahlavi: *Pavan âfrînağânô dahisnô va stâyisnô sâtûnam madam*.

⁴ *Urvâidyâo*, if in its original form, looks like a comparative. One naturally thinks of a **vrâd* (?) equivalent to '*vrîdh*.'

⁵ Rhetorically interrogative as often in English, or indeed a mere particle. (Compare XLVI, 9.)

⁶ So also the Pahlavi indicates with its *âmûkhtisnô* (sic) *î hû-varisnô* [*î avô kâr va kîrfak*], *mûniê pavan âsânîh va mûniê pavan tangîh vâdûnyên frâkh-hushîh*. Ner.: *Sikshâm satyâya yaî samâdhânatve, samka/atve* * '*pi kurute vipulakaitanyaî* [*kila, yaî kâryam punyam yat samriddhatayâ kurute*] *taêka yat samka/atayâ* '*pi kurute, tasya vigñânakaitanyam tasmâd bhavati*.

⁷ Nao being taken in a possessive sense.

⁸ But the Pahlavi has: '*Min zak î valmansân maman kûnismô lanman bîm*'; possibly 'by these actions they terrify us'; the middle in the sense of the active.

oppressor of Thy holy vows was as the stronger oppressing the weaker¹. They who have not thought (in consonance) with Thy Righteous Order, from these Thy Good Mind² abideth afar.

9. Aye, they who desert Thy bountiful Piety, O Mazda! that one desired of Thee³, O Thou omniscient! and who thus abandon her by reason of the evil-doer, and in their ignorance of (Thy) Good Mind, from such as these (Āramaiti) with her holiness utterly departs⁴ as the red Khrafstras (who destroy and pollute all life, flee) from us⁵ (Thy faithful servants).

10. Through the action of this (His) Good Mind (as he works his grace within us) the benevolently wise⁶ One declared a result as its fruit, He knowing the bountiful Piety, the creatrix of righteous beings⁷. These all, O Mazda Ahura! in Thy Kingdom (are

¹ It is a mistake to suppose that the Pahlavi translator and his followers, Ner. and the Persian MS. (of Haug's Collection), refer *nāidyauṅghem* and *nadentō* to the same Sanskrit word. They translate them as if referring the first to *nādh*, and the last to *nid*.

² *Min valmansân barâ rakhîk âtō Vohûman*. *Asmanô* seems an impossible reading, and cannot be reconciled with *Vohû*.

³ The hint of the Pahlavi points, as usual, to the general sense, leaving us the task of discovering the grammatical structure.

Here I do not follow the indication of *sedkûnyên*; Ner. *parikshipyanti*. The voc. 'O Thou' is free.

⁴ So also in general the Pahlavi: *Min valmansân kabad Aharâyîh segdak*; Ner. *tebhyaḥ** *prabhuto dharmaḥ** *prabhrasyati*.

⁵ So if *ahma* is read, but the MS. before the Pahlavi translator read *ahmât*; Ner. *etebhyaḥ* (freely). A simpler rendering results; 'as from him flee away.'

⁶ Observe the evidence of the Zend to the prevalent meaning of 'khratu.'

⁷ Or reading *hithām*, and in the sense of 'bond,' we coincide with Ner. *sukhanivâsam*. *Haithām*=the true; *hâtām* ?=of beings. Lit. 'the true creatrix of Asha (the holy).'

‘helps to our progress’) for they smite (our tyrants) with fear¹.

11. And for Thee hath Âramaiti (who is Our Piety) increased both the Universal Weal and (its continuance in) Immortality, and (with them as ever united) the Righteous (ritual and moral) Order (established and made firm) in the Kingdom of (Thy Good Mind). Those powerful lasting two (hath she increased) to (give us the needful) food². And through these, O Mazda! art Thou with Thy perfect expellers of hate³. (Thou removest Thy foes afar⁴!)

12. What then are Thy regulations⁵? And what wilt Thou? What of praise, or of (fuller) offering? Speak forth that we hear it, O Mazda! what will establish the blessed rewards of Thine ordinance⁶!

¹ The word *voyathrâ* is difficult to place; the Pahlavi translator divided, reading *âvo-yathrâ* (possibly *âvoi athrâ*), and rendered *frôd kûshî-ait*=is smitten down; the Persian better: *Frôd zadar*, is smiting down. We may well hesitate before rejecting this indication, which may point to a better text. Like *vafus*, it may indicate the severity of the influences of the righteous system, in the midst of genial allusion. The *tâ vîspâ* might refer quite naturally to *dus-skayasthanâ* in the previous verse. The form *voyathrâ* (corrected) may represent some derivative from the root *bî*=to fear. Compare *byantê* in verse 8.

² So likewise the Pahlavi with its *khûrisnô*; otherwise ‘for glory;’ *hvar*=*svar*. Lit. ‘To Thee (are) both Weal and Immortality.’

³ *Gavîd bêsh min lak hômanih*; Ner. *vîtakash/as tvam asi*.

⁴ Ner.: Thus both are (to be derived) from thee, *Avirdâda*’s food, and that of *Amirdâda* also, [the (food) of the Lord-of-water, and of the Lord-of-wood* (so the later Avesta and Parsism)], and in the kingdom of the best mind, righteousness is making a revelation together with the perfect mind. Do thou also bestow zeal and power upon this one, O Great Wise One, the Lord! From torment art thou exempt.

⁵ So also *vîrâyisnô*.

⁶ Pahlavi *ârâyisnô*.

* Otherwise simply ‘water and tree.’

Teach Thou us the paths through Righteousness, those verily trod by (Thy) Good Mind¹ as he lives within Thy saints².

13. (Do I ask what is that path?) That way which Thou declarest to me as the path of the Good Mind, O Ahura! (is made³ in its parts by) the religious precepts and laws of the Saviours, wherein the well-doer thrives⁴ from (his) Righteousness⁵. And it marks for the good a reward of which Thou art Thyself the bestower.

14. For that (reward), O Mazda! ye have given as the one to be chosen for (our) bodily⁶ life through

¹ The Pahlavi has the gloss: Teach us the way of the original religion.

² Neryosangh: *Kim te sammârganam* [kila, kâryam, te kim mahânyâyitaram?] *Kah kâmah?* *Kâka yushmâkam stutiñ?* *Kâka yushmâkam igisniñ?* *Srinomi, Mahâgñânin! prakrîshîtam brûhi! yat ðetsi** *dharmasya sammârganam*, [aho vireshena parya! tasmât mahânyâyitarât kuru!] *Sikshâpaya** *asmâkam dharmasya mârgam uttamena svâdhînam manasâ.* [*Mârgam yam pûrvanyâyavantam asmabhyam brûhi.*]

³ Observe the certainty of a subtle meaning, 'the way *is* the consciences or laws.'

⁴ Geldner has admirably suggested a comparison with *vrag* on account of the connection 'way.' But as this necessitates two *urvâz*=*vrâz*, and as Ahura is spoken of as 'dwelling' in 'paths,' I do not think that 'thriving in paths' is very difficult. The prominent thought is not the going, but the 'right going.' That path indicates a reward (so also the Pahlavi *kâshîdô*, *Ner. âsvâdayah*). But we must be thankful for the keen and vigorous discussion. Compare *urvâkshshanguha gâya gighaêsa*. The Pahlavi has *hûravâkh-manîh* and in Y. XLIV, 8. If *vrag* is compared, the idea must be happy progress; but *varh* (Justi) seems the more obvious correspondent.

⁵ Asha, very often personified, is a stronger expression than 'correctly.'

⁶ Of course our life on earth, merely in the bodily state. Comp. Y. XXVIII, 3. There *astavatasâ* evidently means 'of earth,' *mananghô*, 'of heaven' (—of corporeal—of mind, without body).

the deeds of Thy Good Mind (in us). They who work in the toil of the mother¹ Kine, these further² Your merciful care through the understanding's action³, and (taught) by Thine Order's (word)⁴.

15. Yea, (show me, O Mazda ! that path and its reward); tell me the best (of truths); reveal the best words and best actions, and the confessing⁵ prayer of the praiser through Thy Good Mind (living within us); and through the Righteous Order, O Ahura ! And by Your Sovereign Power and grace may'st Thou make life really progressive⁶ (till perfection shall have been reached) !

¹ Or the 'mature,' 'drivable' (?) cow. She 'goes on her path' of toil.

² So frâz yehabûnd.

³ Observe that verezenâ cannot well mean 'stall' in this line. The Pahlavi likewise sees varzî-aît in it ; Ner. vidhîyate, both free as to form.

⁴ Neryosangh : Sa yato, Mahâgñânin ! kâmo'smâkam yat tanumate gîvamate dîyate [âkâryâya], uttamena karmaze manasâ [khshatriyâya], yasta gavâ* âkârayitre* Aginâmnyâ, [ku'tumbine], yo yushmâkam sunirvânagñânatayâ, Svâmin ! buddhyâka, punya-pradattayâ vidhîyate [dînih].

⁵ I concede this shade of meaning to the constant and unvarying evidence of the Pahlavi translator. He translates uniformly by avâm yehabûnêd or its equivalents.

⁶ Bring on 'millennial' perfection when progress shall have been completed.

The Pahlavi translation is as follows : Pavan zak î lekûm khûdâyih-Aôharmazd ! frashakarðo pavan kâmakô âshkârakô dén ahvânô yehabûni-aît.

Ner. : Yushmâkam râgyena, Svâmin ! akhshayatvam svekkhayâ parisphu'tam dâsyate bhuvane.

THE GÂTHA(Â) USTAVAITI(Î).

This Gâtha, consisting of Yasna XLIII–XLVI, is named from the word which begins it, like the three last collections. The fact that the word *ustâ* possesses special significance may have influenced the minds of the Parsis of a later age, inducing them to associate this first chapter with happy anticipations, but it was of course not owing to any such circumstance that the name was given to the Gâtha. The Gâtha, like its fellows, has its existence as a unit from the nature of its metre.

It has lines generally of eleven syllables, arranged in stanzas of five. It seemed convenient to chant all the hymns of one particular metre together. This hymn, from some unknown reason, or from pure accident, having stood first in the collection in this metre, the Gâtha was named from its first word.

The question naturally arises at this place whether this Gâtha, in its parts or as a whole, is older than the Ahunavaiti and the others. For supplementary statements on this subject, see the Introduction, page xxvii, also elsewhere. It is sufficient to recall here that the procedure of the Ahunavaiti, and the sequence of the other Gâthas in the MSS. of the Yasna, have little importance in determining the question of relative age. If originally grouped in the order of their age, they might easily become transposed for the purpose of liturgical recitation. (See the inserted Haptanghâiti, and Y. LII.) As to the metres present, they afford no indications as to relative age. The metre of the Ustavaiti, approaching as it does the Trishûp, may be as old as, or older than, that of the Ahunavaiti. The oldest *Rîshis* sang in Trishûp. The sole remaining test of the relative age of pieces, is their contents. Do those of the Ahunavaiti show a priority to those in the Ustavaiti as regards the particular circumstances of which they treat? So far as I am able to

judge, no part of the Ahunavaiti is older than Y. XLVI. There we have the man before us at a period in his life before he had attained to his supreme position. He not only laments the unfavourable prospects of his cause, but he is full of vehement animosity, urging on his adherents to the overthrow of some powerful opposing leader, and anticipating an armed struggle so formidable that its partisans are elsewhere alluded to (in Y. XLIV) as 'hosts.' We see him also exhorting the various chiefs of his party as they are evidently standing before him in some large assembly, possibly as the army on the eve of an important encounter.

He refers intimately to the monarch, to his own family, the Spitâmas, and to the Hvôgvas, as represented by Frashaostra. He offers the rewards of Ahura, as he pronounces His threats and condemnations. Every feature bears the strongest evidence of originality. But have we not the same in the Gâthas Ahunavaiti, Spentâ-mainyu, and the others? Beyond a question. Those passages which express grief, fear, and passionate resentment, we should naturally refer to Zarathustra personally, and to the earlier portion of his career; and we can make no distinction between such passages when they occur in the Ahunavaiti, Ustavaiti, or elsewhere. As to chapter XXIX with its logical commencement, as expressing the sufferings to be remedied in the entire effort, together with the call of Zarathustra in immediate connection, and chapter XXX with its theosophical statements, we should say that they were composed later, during a period of success and reflection. But this would be a mere surmise. The time of the sage need not necessarily have been consumed in struggles even during the early years of his career.

Chapter LIII seems to belong to a period of mature age, but not necessarily to a period of advanced age. It celebrates the marriage of Zarathustra's daughter, but maidens were married early. With the exception of Y. LIII, I would say that the occurrence of a piece in this or that Gâtha has little, if anything, to do with determining the question of its relative age.

YASNA XLIII.

SALVATION IS ANNOUNCED AS UNIVERSAL FOR BELIEVERS. REFLECTIONS OF ZARATHUSTRA UPON THE SUBLIMITY AND BOUNTIFULNESS OF AHURA.

As, in every instance, it is probable that verses have fallen out here and there in this important piece, and some may have been inserted, not necessarily from another composer, but from other compositions. After certain limits, however, marked signs of at least external connection are present. After the first three verses, which are quite apart, then from the fourth and fifth on, every alternate verse has the formula *Spentem a/ thwâ Mazdâ menhî Ahurâ*. It would indeed present no difficulty for a successor to add these words to stanzas otherwise also imitated, but whether from the leading sage or not, whether from him in one strain, or from him as collected from different fragments, the course of thought does not so fail in logical sequence as that it is either impossible, or displeasing, as a whole in a poetical composition.

Verses 1-3 are admirable as preliminary. Verses 4-6, with their lofty descriptions of power and benevolence in the Deity, prepare the way well, with their allusions to the final judgment, for the closer reflections in verses 7-15 upon the prophet's call, uttered at the instigation of Sraosha (his obedient will). Verse 16 is a closing strophe looking much like an addition from another hand, not at all because Zarathustra is mentioned in the third person, but from its general cast. It possesses, however, very great interest from these circumstances. If a later addition, it enables us to see how the principal features of the system were viewed at a period not identical with the earliest, but closely following it.

1. If we can accept the deeply interesting suggestion of the Pahlavi translator, which is, 'Salvation to him to whom there is salvation for every man,' we need then suppose no necessary loss of verses. Otherwise we are obliged to consider the loss of some laudatory verse, or verses, containing such matter as perhaps Y. XXXIV, 14, 'This princely priest has devoted all to Thee, therefore, salvation to him, whosoever he may be.' Whatever may be the actual truth, the main stress of the thoughts is clear and appropriate. Using the word *vase-khshayās* in a good sense,

the composer beseeches Ahura to grant those two 'mighty and eternal ones,' which logically form the complement to each other, universal wholeness, welfare of soul and body, without which beatitude was inconceivable, and then the unlimited duration of that condition; for it is quite impossible that 'long life' alone was here meant by a term, the equivalent of which soon after designated the Bountiful Immortals. We have here again ample data for affirming the richness and depth of the religious conceptions.

The 'powerful and continuous two' are sought together with splendour as rewards, not for the gratification of any selfish sentiment, but in order to maintain Asha, the religious Order, on which the sacred polity, and the tribal, as well as the national wealth depended, but more than any general blessings, the individual sanctity of life. 2. And this is signalised as the highest good; and to this a prayer is added for the 'māya,' which recalls the supernatural wisdom of the Indian Hercules, about which much phantastic and highly coloured myth is grouped; but here, with the ever-recurring contrast, the māya is the mysterious wisdom of the Divine Benevolence, colourless and abstract indeed, but yet possessing how great religious depth!

3. The highest blessing, in another and more than once repeated phrase, is again besought, as 'the better than the good,' even the attainment of the one who guides to the 'straight paths,' which are the 'way, even the conceptions and revelations of the Saviours' (Y. XXXIV, 13; LIII, 2), in which the believer prospers, and Ahura dwells, as he dwells in his kingdom, and his 'chosen home' itself (Y. XLVI, 16). Whether 'this man who shows the paths' of 'the bodily and mental world' is the same as he who prays for the *âyaptâ ahvau astvatasâ hya/kâ mananghō* (the boons of the two worlds) in Y. XXVIII, 3, here referred to in the third person, there speaking in the first, and whether he is Zarathustra himself, are questions. It is only necessary to say that, if any relief is gained by the supposition, then beyond a doubt Zarathustra may have been the composer of both pieces or fragments, here, as in Y. XXVIII, 7, referring to himself as in the third person, there, in Y. XXVIII, also further representing another who prays, referring by name to him as in the third.

But was Zarathustra the only sacred singer, or was he the centre of a group only, of which he was the life? (Compare *Yathrâ ve afsmâinî* (?) *senghânî*—*Gâmâspâ Hvôgvâ*; Y. XLVI, 17; see also the Introduction.)

4. Proceeding as if the first three verses were absent from his

mind (as indeed they may have been only later brought together with what now follows), the composer begins his ascriptions of praise. He will regard Ahura as all-bountiful and mighty, since He has carefully nurtured, as with His very hand, the aids of grace which He will bestow, as gifts of forbearance on those now wicked, in the hope of penitence, and in the merciful threat of punishment, and to the devout disciple, whose piety is never ceremonial only. And these means of grace, although abounding in the inculcation of moral sanctity in thought, and word, and deed (see Vendîdâd VIII, 100 (Sp. 283)¹, where 'thought' clearly refers to intention in the strongest sense of the term), are yet profane, aside from the flame of that holy Fire which rallied the masses to a national worship, and which was strong for the holy order, as well as by means of it. For these reasons he adores their giver, but for still another. It was because the might of the Good Mind of Ahura approached him within them, and gave him strength for all that was before him. 5. Like the Semitic prophet, he poetically conceives himself as having beheld Ahura, as the chief of the two spirits, and as sovereign over all other powers when the world was born. And he regards Him as having also then established rewards and punishments by his holiness, so separate in its dualistic distinction from all complicity with evil either by infiction or permission. And these rewards and punishments were to have their issue not in time alone, but in 'the last turning of the creation' in its course.

6. And for Ahura's coming in this last changing he fervently beseeches, as well as for the appearance of the Sacred Kingdom, established and guarded by the divine Benevolence. And this consummation, he implies, will take place when the settlements shall be furthered in the Righteous Order, and by means of it, the end of progress having been attained; for then the piety of men's souls will itself be their instructor, delivering the regulations which shall silence the controversy of the two sides (Y. XXXI, 3). And these regulations are as the wisdom of Ahura's understanding (Y. XXVIII, 2), so penetrating that all thoughts lie bare to it (Y. XXXI, 13).

7. He now declares the principles on which he accepted the divine call. Sraosha (verse 12), he says, drew near to question him. As he is called by Ahura, Obedience, the same who constitutes the way to Ahura (or finds His throne (Y. XXVIII, 6)), now draws near

¹ Anaêshem manô, anaêshem vaêô, anaêshem skyaothnem prove that the thought, word, and deed referred to were not limited to a ritual meaning.

him, (I say Sraosha (i. e. Obedience), for if he is not so described as drawing near in this verse, he assuredly is so described in a verse nearly following (the twelfth)). Beyond a question, the fine subjectivity here expressed was intended. As the seer cried: O Righteousness! when shall I see thee (in myself and within my people), so now he means that his obedient spirit listens to the call of God. 8. And as his personified conscience questions him as to his origin, and the principles on which he would proceed, it represents the obedient people, as well as the obedient sage (for the sense of Sraosha, while originally applied to the personal will, is not restricted to it). 'Loyalty' questions him, that 'loyalty' may report his answers. He therefore responds, speaking in his name as Zarathustra (or else one thoroughly in unison with him, here speaks in his name). And this is his statement as to the indications which shall determine his personality. His course will be without a compromise. The unbelieving opposers, as he declares, shall meet no favour at his hands, but detestation, while to the devout disciple he will be as powerful an aid. And this because his mind and thought are (as if blinded to the present) fixed upon the ideal Kingdom, while for the present he never ceases to toil on, making preparations for the Frashakarê, and constructing hymn after hymn to set up the needed machinery of lore.

9. Again, his conscience and obedient will, as the angel of the Deity, questions him; and this time offers him that chief of wished for objects to him, religious knowledge. He mentions the holy Fire, with its proper offering, as the theme of his first inquiry.

10. And he beseeches Ahura to answer and to favour him, since he invokes such a complete endowment, going hand in hand with true Piety, and with no selfish interest in his prayer. He then, with a depth which I confess seems suspicious, asks of Mazda to put his petitions for him, recalling Y. XXVIII, 11, where he beseeches Ahura to fill up his desire with what not he, the speaker, but with what He, Ahura, knows to be the Good Mind's gifts. Or, with a conjectural improvement (?) of the text, he asks of Ahura to question him that he may be questioned indeed, saying as it were, 'search me, and know me.' But the other reading being retained as having superior point, and needing no conjectured text, we may see his further thought: 'Ask Thou our questions for us, and then we shall never fail; then we shall be no desireless (anaêsha) men, spurned by the wailing kine as flinching champions (Y. XXIX, 9), but we shall be indeed Thy rulers, "speaking our mighty wish."

Like the isha-khshathra, whom she sought (Y. XXIX, 9), our wish shall work our will; it will accord with the will of God.'

11. He is, however, not blind to all that lies before him in accepting this call. He worships the bounty and majesty of Ahura while he is impressing his soul with the import of this conference, and that notwithstanding, and none the less, because His will, when obeyed in actions, will bring on earthly sufferings.

12. But notwithstanding all that may be in store for him, he hopes to make those doctrines treasures (Y. XXXIV, 7), that is, a spiritual wealth (compare also Ahura's *īsti*). One only qualification would he add: 'Wait only before Thou givest the word that I should go forth with Thy new truths (which bring such suffering to him who first pronounces them), wait till my obedient will, listening fully to all which Thou shalt say, shall come to me, and then shall that obedient reverence in me and my beloved, help on our effort, that we may spread abroad the tidings of Thy promised recompense to win the living to Thee (Y. XXXI, 3).' 13. 'And that I may know and make known (so he continues) the true aims and objects of desire to those to whom I am at Thy word to go, grant me for this long life within Thy Realm, although that life be full of bitterness (verse 11; and Y. XXXII, 10, 11; XLVI, 1), for those who propagate Thy cause.' 14. 'Yea, as a friend, both wise and powerful, gives to a friend, send to me not only Sraosha, an obedient listening will, but *raṣ(e)nô frâkhshnenem*, abundant grace. Then, and then only, shall I be flanked with a proper ally. Then with Thy Sovereign Power, like my Obedient will, as an angel sent forth from Thee, and inspired by Thy righteous Order in law and ritual, in thought, and word, and deed, then I will go out to arouse and head the chiefs, gathering into spiritual hosts the many believing priests who even now would bear in mind and celebrate Thy mysteries.'

15. And as he began with fearless severity, so he would end without a compromise. 'My patient suffering (so he implies as he proceeds (Y. XLVI, 1)) reveals its lesson to me. My mind is long-enduring, but that patience, although it may seem to some the cowardice of a pusillanimous protector (Y. XXIX, 9), yet it is not such in truth, for it declares within me, and forces me to say: Let no man please the wicked; this is our only prospect of success.'

16. And casting back his thoughts he (or another in his name) sums all up well: 'Thus doth Zarathustra choose the spirit, that spirit which animates the faithful in their chiefs (Y. XXXIII, 9),

and by his side every true believer utters his sympathising prayer : Let the Order of life and of the ritual become incarnate in our tribes, and strong because it has the valiant power of faithful men to obey and to defend it. And let Piety prevail till it covers our land blest with the favours of the sacred sun, and as she lives in the lives of true adherents, may she in sympathy with the Good Mind, thus grant rewards for all our deeds !'

Translation.

1. Salvation to this man¹, salvation to him who-soever (he may be²)! Let the absolutely ruling Great Creator grant (us, He) the living Lord, the two eternal powers. Yea, verily³, I ask it of Thee (O Ahura) for the maintaining⁴ Righteousness. And may'st Thou also give it to me, (O inspiring) Piety! splendour⁵ (as it is), holy blessings, the Good Mind's life⁶.

2. Yea, to this one⁷ may the man endowed with

¹ Ahmâi as=to us, does not seem to be good grammar here, as it necessitates a forced separation between it and *yahmâi-kahmâikî*. Cp. *ahmâi yahmâi-kahmâikî* in Y. XLIV, 16.

² I turn from the fine rendering of the Pahlavi with the greatest reluctance: *Nadûk valman mûn zak î valman nadûkîh kaðârzâi* [aîgh *kaðârzâi* *ansutâ min nadûkîh î valman nadûkîh*], happy is he whose benefit is for every one; [that is, for every man there is happiness from his benefit]; Ner. follows.

³ There is a question whether the particle *ga* (gha?) may not have originated from *gât*. Barth. here follows the Pahlavi, reading *gatô* (?) = *pavan yâmtûnisnô*. Lak may have been added, as often, to serve as an alternative rendering.

⁴ Or 'I will,' so Prof. Jolly (infinitive for imper.).

⁵ So also the Pahl. *rayê-hômand*, not as a rendering merely, but as a philological analagon. Otherwise 'riches.'

⁶ Gaêm recalls *sraêsta gaya g(i)vainti*.

⁷ As *ahmâi* would more naturally mean 'to this one' in the previous verse, it is desirable to render it in the same way here.

glory¹ give that best of all things, the (spiritual) glory. And do Thou likewise (Thyself) reveal² Thine own³ (gifts) through Thy most bountiful spirit, O Mazda! (And do Thou teach us) Thy wonderful thoughts of wisdom⁴, those of Thy Good Mind, which Thou hast revealed (to us) by Thy Righteousness (within us) with the happy increase of (our joy⁵), and on a long life's every day⁶.

3. And may that (holy man) approach toward that which is the better than the good⁷, he who will show to us the straight paths of (spiritual) profit, (the blessings) of this corporeal life, and of that the mental⁸, in those veritably real (eternal⁹) worlds, where dwells Ahura; (that holy man) an offerer of Thine¹⁰, O Mazda! a faithful citizen¹¹, and bountiful of (mind).

¹ It is to the last degree improbable that *hvâthrôyâ* (*hvâthravâ*; 'y' miswritten for 'v') indicates a condition of ease and comfort here. The 'easy man' is the farthest possible from the thoughts of the composer. The 'best of all things' makes a word kindred to *hvang* (*hvan*) appropriate here.

² *Kîkî* (?), if an imperative (?), may mean guard over; but the Pahlavi translator gives us the better view; he has *lak pēdākînō*; *Ner. tvam prakâsaya*. Geldner's *kîkîthwâ* is important.

³ *Thwâ*=thy properties. ⁴ The Pahl. has merely *padmânō*.

⁵ This shade of meaning is expressed by the Pahlavi.

⁶ *Ayâre*, acc. pl.

⁷ This expression seems to equal the summum bonum; so also 'worse than the evil' is the ultimate of woe.

⁸ Cp. Y. XXVIII, 3.

⁹ Does *haithyeng* mean 'eternal,' with every passage in which it occurs considered?

¹⁰ *Thwâvant* may, however, like *mavant*, simply express the personal pronoun here. The position of *aredrô*, &c. is awkward if *thwâvant*=thy: 'Where dwells Ahura, Thyself, O Mazda! beneficent, wise, and bountiful.' But *aredra* is almost a special term for a zealous partisan.

¹¹ The Pahl. has *khûp-dânâkîh*, indicating a meaning which would

4. Yea, I will ¹ regard Thee as mighty and likewise bountiful, O Ahura Mazda! when (I behold) those aids of grace (approach me), aids which Thou dost guard and nurture ² as (Thy) just awards to the wicked (to hold him far from us), as well as to the righteous (for our help), Thy Fire's flame therewith so strong through the Holy Order ³, and when to me the Good Mind's power comes ⁴⁺⁵.

5. (For) so I conceived of Thee as bountiful, O Great Giver, Mazda! when I beheld Thee as supreme ⁶ in the generation of life, when, as rewarding ⁷ deeds and words, Thou didst establish evil for the evil, and happy blessings for the good, by Thy (great) virtue ⁸ (to be adjudged to each) in the creation's final change.

6. In which (last) changing Thou shalt come, and with Thy bounteous spirit, and Thy sovereign power,

better apply to Ahura than the one given, which cannot be applied to Him.

¹ Subjunctive (see Prof. Jolly, V. S. p. 28).

² 'By Thy hand.'

³ The holy Fire of the altar.

⁴ *Gimaŕ* may be regarded as an improper subjunctive here.

⁵ The Pahlavi: 'and that too which renders justice to the wicked and also to the righteous. And this Thy Fire is burning, since by it the strength of him who lives in Righteousness is (maintained) when that violence which approaches with a good intention comes to me.'

⁶ See Y. XXXI, 8, where the word is also rendered as = *vornehmster*.

⁷ Literally, 'When Thou didst render deeds provided with rewards.' We are forced to put the action in the past on account of *zāthōi*, but the influences originally set in motion were to have their issue in the end of the world.

⁸ I render *hunarâ* literally, and bring its Pahlavi translation to the same sense as necessarily. Otherwise *hunar* would generally mean 'skill.' *Ner.* has *tava guzeshu*. The Pahlavi would here be recognised by all reasonable scholars as striking in its closeness.

O Ahura Mazda ! by deeds of whom the settlements are furthered through the Righteous Order. And saving regulations ¹ likewise unto these shall Âramaiti utter, (she, our Piety within us), yea, (laws) of Thine understanding which no man may deceive ².

7. Yea, I conceived of Thee as bountiful, O Great Giver Mazda ! when he (Thy messenger, Obedience) drew near me, and asked me thus : Who ³ art thou ? And whose is thine allegiance ? And how to-day shall I show the signs that give the light on this (our) question, (signs) as to the lands (from whence thou camest) and in thyself ?

8. Then to him I, Zarathustra, as my first answer, said : To the wicked (would that I could be) in very truth a strong ⁴ tormentor and avenger, but to the

¹ The word *ratûs* reminds one of the work of the Ratu for the afflicted kine. In the last changing, which shall complete the *Fra-shakarâ*, he, or his representatives, will appear as the last *Saoshyant*, introducing 'millennial' blessedness.

² I render the Pahlavi here as in evidence: 'Through Thee, O (?) bountiful Spirit! the changing comes [(later (?) gloss) from wickedness to goodness]. And it comes likewise through *Aûhar-mazd*'s supremacy within a good mind, through whose action the progress of *Aharâyih*'s settlements is furthered, those which the master is instructing with a perfect mind [], and in which this Thy wisdom shall in no wise be deceived thereby.'

³ As the kine thought little of her deliverer (see Y. XXIX, 9), so *Sraosha*, the obedient host, is here represented as inquiring as to the antecedents of the newly-appointed prophet. But he asks more properly concerning the settlements from which he comes than the lands. *Gaêtha* is not *dahv(h)yu*. An origin external to that of other chieftains is not at all necessarily indicated by the question.

⁴ The Pahlavi sees a denominative in *isôvâ* (*isôvâ*; y for v); it is denom. in the *Altiranisches Verbum*. It differs, however, as to root. I offer an alternative in its sense. An open tormentor; [that is, I openly torment the wicked] even as much as I desire, do I torment (them) [(later (?) gloss) *Ganrâk minavad*].

righteous may I be a mighty help and joy¹, since to preparations² for Thy Kingdom, and in desire (for its approach), I would devote myself so long as to Thee, O Mazda ! I may praise, and weave my song.

9. Yea, I conceived of Thee as bountiful, O Ahura Mazda ! when (Thine herald) with Thy Good Mind near approached me, and asked me thus : For what dost thou desire that thou may'st gain, and that thou may'st know it ? Then for Thy Fire an offering of praise and holiness (I desired. And on that offering for myself)³ as long as I have the power, will I meditate⁴, (and for its holy power among Thy people will I plan⁵).

10. And may'st Thou likewise grant⁶ me (Thy) Righteousness (within me), since I earnestly invoke that perfect readiness (of mind), joining in my prayer with Âramaiti (our Piety toward Thee. Yea, pray Thou Thyself within me through these holy powers). Ask Thou (Thyself) our questions, those which shall be asked by us⁷ of Thee ; for a question asked by

¹ We must be cautious in accepting the statement that the Pahlavi translations attempt to be literal. Here is one which is free and far from erroneous: Aētūnō avō aharūbō min valman ī aōg-hōmand aītō ; [aīghas, rāmīnam].

² The Pahlavi here shows only the correct root. ³ Mā=smā ?

⁴ 'So long as I can, will I be of this mind,' seems hardly expressed here. Observe the nearly parallel construction in verse 8.

⁵ The Pahlavi, Sanskrit, and Persian translations would here be regarded once more as extremely close even by opponents, if reasonable in their estimates. Manayâi seems to me hardly an infinitive, as it is comparatively seldom that an infinitive falls to the end of a sentence either in Gâthic or Vedic. I prefer the indication of the Pahlavi with Justi and Bartholomae (in the *Altiranisches Verbum*).

⁶ Read perhaps daidhīs (later shortened to suit the metre).

⁷ Or, 'ask us that we may be questioned by Thee.'



Thee (as its inspirer), is as the question of the mighty, whene'er Thy (?) ruler speaks his potent wish.

11. Yea, I conceived of Thee as bountiful, O Ahura Mazda! when (Thy messenger) with Thy Good Mind near approached me, and with your words I¹ first impressed (my soul). Woes then 'midst men Thy heart-devoted one² declared³ (to be) my (portion); but that will I⁴ do⁴ which Thou did'st⁵ say was best.

12. And since Thou, coming thus, Thy legal Righteousness in fulness⁶ spakest, then declare not to me words as yet unheard (with faith or knowledge; command me not) to go forth (with these upon my task) before Thy Sraosha⁷ (Obedience) comes to me, to go on hand in hand with me with holy recompense and mighty splendour⁸, whereby to

¹ The Pahlavi translation bears evidence to a less subtle, and therefore more probable sense here, but at the same time to a rarer grammatical form. It renders *dīdāinhē* as a third person, indicating an instance of a third person in *ē*, and not in the perfect. It also recognises a reduplicated form by its *pavan nikēzīsnō nikēzēdō*.

² The Pahlavi translator with a curious error, or still more curious freedom, has *rūbāk-dahisnīh* here and elsewhere. Possibly the Gāthic text before the last compiler differed from ours.

³ I still prefer Professor Bartholomae's earlier rendering, after the Pahlavi, as more in harmony with *mraotā* and *mraos*.

⁴ Professor Jolly has the important rendering 'das will ich thun,' the infinitive in a future or imperative sense.

⁵ 'Ye said.'

⁶ The Pahlavi unvaryingly *kabed*.

⁷ Here we probably have the missing subject in the other verses.

⁸ Reading *māzā rayā*. (*Rayā* cannot well mean 'riches' here.) The Pahlavi also indicates the division by its free or erroneous *mas ratū* (*rad*). *Sraosha*, an obedient will personified, guides the soul as in the later Parsism. Cp. the *Arđā Virāf*.

give the contending¹ throngs(?), as a blessing², (Your) spiritual gifts (of certainty and peace).

13. Thus I conceived of Thee as bounteous, O Ahura Mazda! when with Thy Good Mind (Sraosha, Obedience) approached me. (And I would therefore pray thus of Thee, that bounteous one.) In order that I may make known to men the true and sacred aims of their desires (in the rite or daily toil), grant Ye me long life³ for this, (that blessing⁴) which none with daring may extort⁵ from You, even this (gift) of that desired⁶ place which has been declared to be within Thy Realm.

14. Yea, as the man enlightened⁷ (in Thy law), and who has possessions, gives to his friend, (so give Ye) me, O Great Creator⁸! Thy rejoicing and

¹ Here we have the important reading *rânôibyô* as against the dual of *K₄*, &c. (see Geldner). No mention of the fire occurs; and as the form does not agree with *arazi*, we may well doubt that comparison in view of *āsayau* in Y. XXXI, 2, and the unvarying and uniform *patkarâdârânô* of the Pahlavi. The rendering 'with the sticks' is, however, admirably adapted, and must be considered as an emphatic alternative.

² The Pahlavi supports the reading *vi* for *ve*; it has *barâ*. *Ashî* might also mean merely 'holy,' as adjective.

³ In Y. XXVIII, 7, he asks for it that he may crush the malice of the foe.

⁴ Justi admirably suggested *yânem* understood.

⁵ The Pahlavi divides *dârstaitê*, and, as I hold, mistakes the root as was inevitable. The ancient scribe feared to restore the severed fragments, which appeared, as so often, in the MSS. before him. I would read *darsaitê* with Spiegel's *c(?)* (so Bartholomae, later, however, recurring to a division, with Geldner after the Pahlavi, for the sake of bringing out an infinitive).

⁶ *Vairyau* contracted from *vairyayau* by a corrupting improvement to regulate the metre.

⁷ So the Pahlavi indicates, Bartholomae following as against the rendering 'possessing.'

⁸ With regard to *Mazdau* and *medhâ*, I should perhaps long

abounding grace, when through Thy sovereign Power, and from (the motives of Thy cause of) Righteous Order, I stand forth ¹ to go out to ², or to arouse, the chiefs ³ of Thy (pure) proclamation, with all those (others) who recite Thy well-remembered ⁴ Māthra word.

15. Yea, I conceived of Thee as bounteous, O Ahura Mazda! when with the Good Mind's grace Thy Sraosha (Obedience) approached me, (and said): Let the quiet and long-enduring better mind with understanding teach (thee); let not a foremost ⁵ man

since have stated that I object to the comparison, not only because *medhā* is a feminine, and, as Grassmann has supposed, possibly represented by the Zend *madh*, Greek *math*, but because 'wisdom' is an abstract (while *su-medhās*, as a compound, does not apply so directly). I hold, however, that *mazdā*, the fem. noun in Y, XL, 1 = *medhā*. It is also not impossible that this word may be represented (with differing shades of meaning) by both *madh* and *mazdām* (fem.) in Zend.

¹ Read, perhaps, *frākhstā*; or *frāstā*, 'with Thine advancing kingdom I (am) to go forth to'; (*frā* + *as*, participle.)

² Prof. Jolly has the important rendering, 'Ich will mich erheben'; the infinitive in a future or imperative sense.

³ Chieftainships. Compare (not with exactness, however) *sārdhāmsi*.

⁴ The idea of reciting from memory seems to be included in *marentē*.

⁵ The rendering *pourūs* (?) as = pl. of *pūrūs* is attractive, but *dregvatō* hardly needs, and seldom has, a substantive. The wicked = wicked men; and, on the other hand, *nā* constantly claims an accompanying word; (*nā ismanō*; *nā vaêdemnō*; *hvō nā-erethwō*; *nā spentō*, *ye-nā*, *ke vā-nā*, &c.) Also it is improbable that the words *nā* and *pourūs*, as = *pūrāvas*, should come together; 'let not a man men evil ingratiate (?).' Compare for sense here *purviās* in one or more of its applications. Possibly the meaning is, 'let not a man be foremost in conciliating the wicked.' The Pahlavi likewise has *kabed* (freely). Ner. has: *Mā naraḥ* prakuram durgatinām bhūyāt* yathā kathamkit satkartā*. An important rendering is that of Professor

conciliate the wicked (as sycophant desiring aid), for with that (quiet mind of faith), Thy saints have brought full many a sinner unto Thee (as convert, and in penitence¹).

16. Thus, O Ahura Mazda ! this Zarathustra loves² the Spirit³, and every man most bounteous prays⁴ (beside him) : Be Righteousness life-strong, and clothed with body. In that (holy) Realm which shines (with splendour) as the sun, let Piety be present ; and may she through the indwelling of Thy Good Mind give us blessings in reward for deeds⁵ !

Jolly, V.S. s. 47, 'möchte es wenige Verehrer des Lügners geben.' Cp. Y. XLVI, 1, where the composer speaks of the chiefs as on their side, 'not contenting' him.

¹ Or, with the Pahl. : *Mûn aêtûnô lak harvisp-gûnô aharûbânô pavan anâk yakhsenund*, for they consider all Thy saints as wicked. The rendering above is less natural as conveying the idea of a conversion (comp., however, *yâ g(i)vantô vîspeng vaurayâ*), but it renders the grammatical forms more simply. It is bad policy to force a text to express what we happen to believe to be a more natural idea. Using the hint of the Pahlavi here in an understanding manner, we might then render 'for they hold all sinners as holy.'

² I had long since compared *verentê* with *vrinîte* (-devânâm ávas) ; and am now sustained by Bartholomae's view.

³ Possibly the Spenista mainyu of Ahura. (See also Y. XLIV, 2.)

⁴ The Pahlavi, on the contrary, bears evidence to the meaning 'comes,' which I cannot accept as 'tradition' in view of the following precatives.

⁵ Ner. : 'The kingdom becomes established (in a manner completely manifest) in sun-publicity through mental perfection [] ; and upon the workers of righteousness the Good Mind bestows it.'

YASNA XLIV.

QUESTIONS ASKED OF AHURA WITH THANKFULNESS
AND DEVOTION.

Many verses may here have fallen out, or, on the other hand, the piece having been made up of homogeneous, but not originally connected fragments, has been left with some abrupt transitions. These, however, occasion very little difficulty in exegetical treatment, and are also not displeasing. The formula, 'This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright' seems to have been suggested by Y. XXXI, 14. We might therefore look upon this piece as composed later than Y. XXXI, but not necessarily in a later generation, or even from another hand. In fact the style is thoroughly homogeneous in certain places with that of pieces which we ascribe without a doubt to Zarathustra, and the signs of struggle point to the earliest period. It is possible that the words in Y. XXXI, and the formula here were of common origin, neither having any extended priority to the other, or the words may be original here, and derived in Y. XXXI.

Whether Zarathustra, or another of the narrow circle of religious leaders, was the composer throughout depends upon the further questions already more than once broached, as to how far a corresponding intellectual cultivation was extended at the period in the community, and as to what is the probability of the existence of more than one man in the small group, endowed with the peculiar qualities everywhere manifested in these hymns (see remarks in the Introduction and elsewhere). It is safest to say that Zarathustra composed most of the matter here before us, and that the supplementary fragments were composed under his dominating, if not immediate, influence.

Verses 1 and 2 seem an introduction, but hardly give added emphasis to the fact that the following questions were expressions of devotion, and only in a few instances appeals for knowledge. Verses 3-5 are certainly questions intended to express veneration while naming particular objects of devout inquiry. Verse 6 stands somewhat apart. Verses 7-11 enter into details touching the moral and religious improvement of the people, 12-14 are polemical, 15 and 16 are prophetic, &c.

1. More closely; the composer beseeches Ahura to speak to him, and in a manner characteristic of Himself as in distinction from the falsifying utterance of the opposing religion, which was so familiarly described as the religion of 'Falsehood.' He is entreated to reveal, as is His wont, 'the holy truth.' And the first question propounded to Him by the composer, as comprehensive of all others, is how he may offer homage, the homage of God Himself or of His bountiful spirit; (see *mainyû* in verse 2). And he further asks that Ahura may speak to him, showing him by what ceremonial he may conciliate him, and by what helps of grace that spirit, or Ahura Himself, may be inclined to draw near to him in accordance with his frequent prayer.

2. Once more he asks how he may serve that Spirit as the foremost one of Heaven (compare Y. XXXI, 8, and the Parsi *vahist*) who seeks for this addition of praise to praise, for as the supreme claim to our veneration, He had, as a guardian (Y. XXXI, 13) like Ahura in yet another place, held off destruction from all believing saints and from all repentant men (Y. XXXI, 3), and that although as 'the chief of Heaven,' yet also as a benignant friend.

3. From these introductory petitions, inserted perhaps before many lost verses, he proceeds in another tone, although he may still be said to say what is homogeneous to the foregoing: 'Yea, I ask how I may serve Him, O Mazda! for He is indeed Thyself, and therefore, to show my fervent homage, I ask: Who was, not the first establisher alone, but the first father, of our holy Order as the personified Immortal, and that not by creation, but by generation, as the parent generates the child? Who fixed for stars and sun that "way," the undeviating path through space, long noticed and studied by our fathers, as no random course, or unknown progress save Thee?'

4. The laws of gravitation then become the theme of his praise still expressed in the form of questions, also the atmospheric phenomena, especially the clouds driven by winds, not like the Maruts beyond the mountains perhaps, but still terrible as winds can be. But he cannot leave even the sublime objects of nature without thinking once more of that spiritual power, the strength of righteous character, which was justly more impressive, although still more familiar, and which he designates, as ever, by the 'Good Mind.' Here this great Immortal is left an immortal thought, and is spoken of as 'created,' not 'born' like Asha (in verse third). 5. Beyond a doubt, recognising the satisfactions of energetic life as well as the solaces of slumber, and as forming by their contrast the necessary

change which builds up happiness, he alludes to the supreme arranger as 'well-skilled,' and asks : Who so wisely relieved the day by night ? But, again, he cannot close without reverting to the course of moral duty. 6. Seized with a doubt which again only heightens the fervour of his assurance, he asks whether indeed the facts which he proclaims are really what they seem. Whether piety, although aided by the Good Mind, implanted through Ahura's grace within us, will indeed at last, or soon, assign the purified Realm to the servants of Ahura, who were there among the masses before his eyes (taēibyō), or to Ahura Himself as their sovereign controller (taibyō?). And, as including all rural riches in herself, he asks for whom He had made the kine, not now wailing in her grief (Y. XXIX, 9), but 'delight-affording,' on account of the influence of Piety and Benevolence embodied in the Kingdom, inferring that God had made her for these same (the faithful masses). 7. And going yet further back ; he asks who made that paternal and filial Piety itself, together with the Realm which it should leaven ? Answering his own inquiries by an inference, he adds : I am pressing Thee with fulness in these questions, O Thou bountiful Spirit (compare mainyus, or mainyû in verse 2), the maker of all (sun, stars, and holy qualities). 8. Turning now to verbal revelations, he asks by what means his soul may prosper in moral goodness, praying that it may indeed thus advance as the expected answer would declare. 9. He prays that he may know how he may still further sanctify that Religion which the King of the Holy Realm (compare anghêus vahistahyâ pourvîm), the one like Ahura (see Khshamâvatô and thwâvâs, verse 1) would teach, dwelling in the same abode (in which Ahura is also elsewhere said to dwell) with the holy Order, and the Good Mind (see Y. XLVI, 16).

10. Expressing all in a single word, he asks Ahura to reveal to him the Daēna, the Insight, the substance of that Religion which was 'of all things best,' and which alone could 'advance the settlements' with the holy ritual and moral Order as its ally, which would also render all their moral and ceremonial actions, and moral principles just by means of the divine Piety, which was their realisation in practice ; and he closes with the exclamation that the wishes and desires of his soul, when most imbued with wisdom, will seek for God.

11. Following out the influence of Âramaiti (that personified Piety), he asks to know by what practical means she may approach, and be realised as the characteristic of those to whom the holy Insight should be preached, avowing that God knows how prominent

he is in his devotion to the matter, and with what hatred seated 'in his spirit,' he views the opposing Gods. 12. Then casting a searching glance over the masses, and perhaps eyeing their several groups, each headed by its 'chieftainship' (*sardenau sēnghahyā*), he cries, addressing Ahura formally, but the people really (so also elsewhere frequently), and says: 'Who is the righteous believer as regards these my questions asked of God to express my belief in Him, and who is the sceptic? Which man does the Angra Mainyu govern; or which is as evil as that chief himself?' And, recalling the galling fact that some are tolerated who not only do not assist but oppose his efforts, and perhaps having some half-convinced sections in full sight, he cries with bitterness: 'Why is this sinner, that chief who opposes me as Angra Mainyu opposed Ahura (compare *paiti-eretē* with *âat moi paiti-eretē* in *Vendîdād I*), why is he not believed to be what in very truth he is? Why is he still countenanced?' 13. And then with a fierceness which reminds us of *sâzdûm snaithishâ* (*Y. XXXI, 18*), but which is deeper because proposing a less material remedy, he asks: 'Why must we abide the sight of these opposers, representing their Lie-demon as their Goddess? How can I drive her hence to Hell beneath, not to those who hesitate like these, pausing before they condemn the evil party, but to those who are already filled with their disobedience, and who, having no communion at all with us, receive no light, like these, from the reflected glory of the truth, and who have moreover neither sought nor shared like these, the counsels of Thy Good Mind. Yea, how,' he reiterates, 'can I deliver up that Lying Goddess, in the persons of her adherents, to the Holy Order, in the persons of the saints, into their hands, to slay her, not with the *snaithis* only, but to destroy her as a falsehood by the *Māthras* of Thy doctrine, not barely to withstand these wicked corrupters, as we now do, enduring the silence of these masses at their deeds (verse 12), their fear of them, or their connivance with their creeds, but to spread slaughter among them to their total overthrow?'

15. He then presses on the coming collision, and prays to know to which of the hosts (compare *âsayau*, *Y. XXXI, 2*) that claim the *urvâtâ*, Ahura will give the prize. 16. And who, he further asks, shall be the champion who shall lead the victors, the *verethrem-gan* (compare *sargâ*, *Y. XXIX, 3*) who will thus take up the *snaithis* and the *Māthra* (verse 14), and so at once contend for 'both the worlds.' And he wishes him not alone pointed out, but approached, as Zarathustra was approached (*Y. XLIII*), by an obedient will, and moved to his holy work by the inspiring Good

Mind of Ahura, be that champion Ratu whosoever the Lord might wish. Salvation in the shape of success in his great attempt should be his portion (Y. XLIII, 1). 17. Half intimating that he himself may be the coming man, he begs to know when he can have that conference in which, as in the desired *həmparsti* and *darsti* of Y. XXXIII, 6, he may communicate more closely with Ahura, and through the revelation which might be vouchsafed, may become a protecting leader to secure the ever-named 'abiding two,' 'Weal' and 'Immortality,' which were the 'better than the good,' the 'vahista' of the saints.

18. A preliminary wish arising, he asks that he may receive the honorary gift of mated mares and a camel, as material for sacrifice before a battle (?), the highest interests of the people even, their lasting Welfare, demanding that he should receive this help. 19. For the monarch, or leading chief, who may withhold this justly deserved and needed help, or honour, he declares by the terms of his following question, that some instant judgment will be forthcoming, for the threats of the future condemnation seem for the moment only trite.

20. As a peroration, he appeals to the reason of the wavering groups, among the masses who still delay to call evil evil (verse 12), and he asks whether the *Daêvas*, as represented by their adherents, had ever been good rulers, when they had the power. Were not robbery and violence then the law with them as now? And did not the Kine, as representing the sacred herds and people, lift up her wailing voice?

(The piece from verse 12 seems to constitute a religious war-song. These verses seem not to have been originally connected with the calm and thankful contemplations in verses 1-10, but later united with them. Verses 12-20 stand in the closest connection with Y. XLVI, which has, however, preserved more of the elements of sorrow and discouragement which influenced the leader and his followers at times. See also XLIII, 11.)

Translation.

1. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; when praise is to be offered, how (shall I complete) the praise of the One like You ¹, O Mazda? Let

¹ Some who seldom cite the Pahlavi follow it here; *nîyâysnô zak mûn aêtânô nîyâysnô î Lekûm [dînô]*. Otherwise one might

the One like Thee declare it earnestly to the friend who is such as I, thus through Thy Righteousness (within us) to offer friendly help¹ to us, so that the One like Thee² may draw near³ us through Thy Good Mind (within the soul).

2. This I ask Thee, O Ahura ! tell me aright, how, in pleasing Him, may we serve the supreme one of (Heaven) the better world⁴; yea, how to serve that chief who may grant us those (blessings of His grace, and) who will seek for (grateful requitals at our hands); for He, bountiful (as He is) through the Righteous Order, (will hold off) ruin⁵ from (us) all, guardian (as He is) for both the worlds, O Spirit⁶ Mazda ! and a friend.

read *nemê* with B.V.S. (variation) in Y. LVIII, 3, and render, 'how shall I bow myself in your worship?'

¹ The Pahl. *hamkarðâr* is likewise followed. The alteration to *hâkôrenâ* is very interesting, but, I think, hardly necessary.

² Observe the great difficulty in referring *Khshmvâtô* to a human subject. Here we have 'the homage of the One like You (of Yours(?))' some would say); in Y. XXXIII, 8 we have *Yasnem Mazdâ* (Ahurâ) *Khshmvâtô*; in Y. XXXIV, 2 *Khshmvâtô vahmê*; in Y. XLIX, 6 *Tâm daênâm yâ Khshmvâtô Ahurâ*. *Khshmvâtô* is sometimes merely a way of saying 'of Thyself,' as *mavaitê*=to me.

³ Observe also the emphasis on his 'drawing near'; otherwise 'let Your one declare it to my friend'(?).

⁴ See Roth, Y. XXXI, 8. See, however, also de Harlez's suggestion, perhaps after the hint of the Pahlavi: 'qu'elle a été l'origine?' Here we have another instance where an entire verse seems to allude to Ahura in the third person with an address to Him thrown in, or at the close. In connection with *anghêus vahistahyâ* Ahura must be the *pourvya*, as in Y. XXXI, 8, where Roth renders *vornehmster*. The guardian is also Ahura (see Y. XXXI, 13).

⁵ I cannot fully accept the hint of the Pahlavi here as others do who seldom heed it. I do not think that 'sin' is so much indicated as 'destruction.'

⁶ *Mainyû* is suspiciously expressive as a vocative; perhaps 'by spiritual power' would be safer.

3. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright: Who by generation¹ was the first father of the Righteous Order (within the world)? Who gave the (recurring) sun and stars² their (undeviating) way? Who established that whereby the moon waxes, and whereby she wanes³, save Thee⁴? These things, O Great Creator! would I know⁵, and others likewise still.

4. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright, who from beneath hath sustained the earth and the clouds⁶ above that they do not fall? Who made the waters and the plants? Who to the wind has yoked on the storm-clouds, the swift and fleetest two⁷? Who, O Great Creator! is the inspirer of the good thoughts (within our souls)?

¹ 'As a generator (?)'

² Bartholomae follows the Pahlavi here as rendered by Ner. putting *hveng* and *starem* (-ām) in the genitive, which is in itself far better than to regard *dât* as governing two accusatives. One would, however, rather expect *hveng* *starām* *adhvânem* *dât*.

³ All follow the Pahlavi here, which renders with allowable freedom. *Nerefsaitî* (=Pahl. *nerefsêd*; Ner. *nimflati*; Persian *kâhad*) might possibly be explained as a nasalised form of an Aryan correspondent to *arbha*, as *nas*=*as*.

⁴ Possibly from thine influence (?)

⁵ The infinitive *viduyê* (= *vidvê*) lies here in an unusual place, at the end of the sentence. It is because the word has no stress upon it. The emphasis rests on the objects which he desires to know about; the entire connection deals with 'knowing'; it has no prominence.

⁶ This rendering is not supported by the Pahlavi, which seems to report a rendering from some text with an a privative, and a form of *dar*. The 'unsupported' object might mean the 'air-space.' See the suggestion of Bartholomae 'the earth and the air-space,' comparing the later Sanskrit.

⁷ Or 'for velocity,' adverbially. Velocity, however, in the abstract as the object yoked-on, is rather too finely drawn. I should prefer

5. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; who, as a skilful artisan, hath made the lights and the darkness¹? Who, as thus skilful, hath made sleep and the zest (of waking hours)? Who (spread) the Auroras, the noontides and midnight, monitors to discerning (man), duty's true (guides)²?

6. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright these things which I shall speak forth, if they are truly thus. Doth the Piety (which we cherish) in reality increase³ the sacred orderliness within our actions? To these Thy true saints hath she given the Realm through the Good Mind. For whom hast Thou made the Mother-kine, the producer of joy⁴?

7. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; who fashioned Âramaiti (our piety) the beloved, together with Thy Sovereign Power? Who, through his guiding wisdom⁵, hath made the son revering the father? (Who made him beloved⁶?) With (ques-

the fleet ones, the lightnings. My rendering follows the indication of another, as a dual, but not as to full exegesis. One naturally supposes the yoking together of the winds and dark clouds to be meant.

¹ Recall svār yād āsman adhipā u āndho.—Rv. VII, 88, 2.

² Ner.: 'Who gave us the lights with his keen discrimination? And who the darkness? Who, in his keen discrimination, gave (us our) sleep and waking; [that is, our diligence and activity?] Who is he who gave us the time of husaina, and the time of rapithvana [], and the method and calculation of him who discerns by means of the just rule []?'

³ So also the Pahlavi indicates by 'stavar.'

⁴ So I prefer; but the indication of the Pahlavi deserves an alternative 'giver of bounty'; skar=kar.

'Geus azyau' was later a common expression for a mature animal, but possibly vulgarised from its older special use here.

⁵ Root nî (?).

⁶ I thus add as the Pahlavi translator indicates such an element in uzemem.

tions such as) these, so abundant ¹, O Mazda! I press Thee, O bountiful Spirit, (Thou) maker of all!

8. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright, that I may ponder ² these which are Thy revelations, O Mazda! and the words which were asked (of Thee) by Thy Good Mind (within us), and that whereby we may attain ³, through Thine Order, to this life's perfection. Yea, how may my soul with joyfulness ⁴ increase in goodness? Let it thus ⁵ be ⁶.

9. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright, how to myself shall I hallow ⁷ the Faith of Thy people,

¹ Frakhshnî=in abundance (Pahl. kabad; Ner. prakuram; Persian MS. bisyar). The thought refers back to anyâkâ vîduyê [-vê].

² Haug sagaciously renders as if *mendâidyâi* were a miswriting for *pendâidyâi*, which is in itself very possible, as an 'm' looks much like an inverted 'e' in MSS. So the Pahlavi records the irregularity also, from which Haug derived his idea. But Haug explains the word as an allusion to the five prayer-hours of the day. I doubt very greatly whether the five prayer-hours existed at the date of the composition of this passage. Such regulations grew up much later. The Pahlavi translator indicates elsewhere an accusative (*meng*=*mām*) with an infinitive 'that I should give forth,' which is in itself far from impossible. He was aware (!) that *meng* could also equal *man*; see Y. LIII, 5.

³ *Vaēdyâi* is infinitively used for *vōizdyâi*.

⁴ I do think that it is necessary on the whole to postulate two similar words here (although Geldner's suggestion is most keen and interesting). *Urvākhsanguha* and *urvākhsukhti* do not favour a comparison with *vrag* here. The Pahlavi is indifferent: *Kīgûn denman ī li rūbânō zak ī sapīr hū-ravākh-manīh*? So Ner. *uttam-ānandaž*. Barth. *beglückend*.

⁵ *Kâ-tâ*=*kēna-tēna*.

⁶ Or, 'let those things happen to me;' *gam* means 'come' more frequently than 'go,' here. Lit. 'let it thus advance.'

⁷ *Kīgûn denman ī li dīnō yōs-dâsar ī avēgak yōs-dâsaryōm*? Ner.: *Katham idam aham yat* dīnim pavitratarām pavitrayāmi*; [*kila, dīnim katham pravartamānām karomi*]? As Zarathustra is

which the beneficent kingdom's lord hath taught me, even the admonitions which He called Thine equal, hath taught me through His lofty (and most righteous Sovereignty and) Power, as He dwells in like abode¹ with Thine Order and Thy Good Mind?

10. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright that holy Faith which is of all things best, and which, going on hand in hand with Thy people, shall further my lands in Asha, Thine order, and, through the words of Âramaiti (our piety), shall render actions just. The prayers of mine understanding will seek² for Thee, O Ahura!

11. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; how to these your (worshippers) may (that Piety once again and evermore) approach, to them to whom O Lord, Thy Faith is uttered? Yea, I beseech of Thee to tell me this, I who am known to Thee as Thy foremost³ of (servants); all other (Gods, with their

represented as sanctifying the Fire (in Y. IX, 1), so here he would doubly sanctify the Faith itself. He would 'hallow its name' and meaning.

¹ Pavanas-hamdemûnih-ketrûnêš [pavan hamkhadûkîh].

² I cannot regard the caesura in this verse as possessing ordinary importance, the *maḥvyau* (mahyau) *ñistôis* is especially dependent on the following words. The Pahlavi translator hints at an important solution, which is, that a pause should be made before *usen*; 'the wish of mine understanding wishes, and I wish (am wishing); *Khûrsand hômanam*=I am content. If we can accept a break (a possibility far too little recognised), the *usen* as representing a nom. sing. would refer back to the meaning in *maḥvyau* (mahyau). But reading *ñstîs* (as irregular for *ñstayô* on account of the metre) we might regard *usen* as a third pl. Or shall we take it as a quasi-third singular, *usen* being *usâm* (*en*=the nasal vowel; comp. *ûšâm* as a third sing. imper. after Barth.)? Let 'the wish (*ñstîs*) of my enlightened understanding wish for Thee.'

³ Compare 'aêšhâm tôi, Ahura! *ehmâ* pourutemâis dastê.'

polluted worshippers), I look upon with (my) spirit's¹ hate².

12. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; who is the righteous one in that regard in which³ I ask Thee my question? And who is evil? For which is the wicked? Or which is himself the (foremost) wicked one? And the vile man who stands against me (in this gain of) Thy blessing, wherefore⁴ is he not held and believed to be the sinner that he is?

13. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright, how shall I banish this Demon-of-the-Lie from us hence to those beneath who are filled⁵ with rebellion? The friends of Righteousness (as it lives in Thy saints) gain no light (from their teachings), nor have they loved the questions which Thy Good Mind (asks in the soul⁶)!

Auserkoren is a fine but a bold rendering. Election is, however, included in all divine prescience.

¹ I have no doubt whatever, but that *mainyaur* and *dvaêshanghâ* belong together.

² The Pahlavi translation is as follows: 'That which I ask of Thee, tell me aright, O Aûharmazd! when shall the perfect mind come to those persons [that is, when does the mind of my disciples become perfect]? When shall it come to those who declare this Thy Religion, O Aûharmazd? Grant to me before these the proclamation of the truth. Against every other spirit which is malevolent I keep my guard.'

³ *Yâis* adverbially, or possibly, 'with whom I question.'

⁴ *Kyanghat* is, I think, simply the equivalent for *kî* (?) *anghat* = *quî* fit, how does it happen that? 'Stands' free for 'comes.'

⁵ The Pahlavi on the contrary takes *perenaunghô* in the sense of combating, *pavan anyôkhshîdârih patkârênd* = '(who) are opposing you through disobedience.' It is far from certain that he does not indicate some improvement in text, or rendering.

⁶ Or, 'the counsels of holy men.'

14. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; how shall I deliver that Demon-of-the-Lie into the two hands of Thine Order¹ (as he lives in our hosts) to cast her down to death through Thy Māthras of doctrine, and to send mighty destruction² among her evil believers, to keep those deceitful and harsh oppressors from reaching their (fell) aims³?

15. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright. If through Thy Righteousness (within our souls) Thou hast the power over this for my⁴ protection, when the two hosts shall meet in hate⁵ (as they strive) for those vows which Thou dost desire to maintain, how, O Mazda! and to which of both wilt Thou give⁶ the day⁶?

16. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright,

¹ Ashâi with Geldner.

² The Pahlavi anticipates us in the correct general sense here. It has nas,hônisnō. The Persian MS. renders the Pahlavi, hamâ-vandî nîst dehand î darwand.

³ Anâshê seems regarded as an infinitive by the Pahlavi translator, anayâtûnisnō. 'For the destruction of those deceivers' is an obvious alternative to the rendering above (â nâshê?).

⁴ Geldner and Roth render ma/=Sanskrit mad; otherwise 'with complete protection.' Or is ma/ablative for genitive: If thou rulest over me to afford me protection? The Pahlavi affords no indication.

⁵ The Pahlavi translator erred widely in his attempt to render the word anaoṅghâ. As it is certain that his MSS. differed from ours often, they probably did so here. The verse alludes beyond a question to some expected battle in a religious war, and perhaps in a religious civil war. It is the most positive allusion to the 'strife of the two parties' (Y. XXXI, 2) which has come down to us. It was a struggle concerning the religious vows, or doctrines; avâis urvâtâis yâ tû Mazdâ didereghzô.

⁶ The Pahlavi renders vananām by 'good thing,' explaining 'the sovereign power.'

who smites with victory¹ in the protection (of all) who exist, and for the sake of, and by means of Thy doctrine? Yea, clearly reveal a lord having power² (to save us) for both lives. Then let (our) Obedience³ with Thy Good Mind draw near to that (leader), O Mazda! yea, to him to whomsoever⁴ Thou (shalt) wish that he should come.

17. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; how, O Mazda! shall I proceed to that (great) conference⁵ with You, to that consummation of Your own, when my spoken wish⁶ shall be (effected) unto me, (the desire) to be in the chieftainship⁷ (and supported) by (the hope of) Weal and Immortality (those saving powers of Thy grace), and by that (holy) Māthra (Thy word of thought) which fully guides our way through Righteousness (within).

¹ Verethrem-gâ thwâ, following the Pahlavi with Westergaard, Geldner, and Bartholomae.

² Compare Y. XXIX, 2 and Y. XXVIII, 3; or it may mean 'promise to establish' (Barth.). *Kiždî*, however, hardly seems to need an infinitive with it; it may mean 'appoint.' Compare *dāmsu* (patnī) for a better sense than 'house-lord,' also for *deng* patōis.

³ This casts additional light on the 'one that should come' in Y. XLIII, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15.

⁴ This recalls *ahmâi yahmâi ustâ kahmâikî*.

⁵ The comparison with *gar* has long circulated among Zendists. Many adopt it. It agrees admirably with the Pahlavi as to sense: *Aîmat, Aûharmazd! damânō kardārîh ī Lekûm*, when is Your appointment of the time?

⁶ The Pahlavi *va mûniš zak ī li gōbisnō hōmand khvâstar*.

⁷ *Va sardâr yehevûnisnîh madam Haurvadađ va Amerôdâd; Ner. Svâmino bhavishyanti upari Avirdâde Amirdâde; comp. also Y. XLIX, 8 fraēstaunghô aunghâmâ. Professor Jolly compares būzdyâi with φύεσθαι (Inf. s. 194). The long since circulated comparison with bhug seems to me hardly so probable. It may, however, deserve an alternative; 'to enjoy Weal and Immortality'; but accusatives*

18. (And, having gained Thine audience and Thine Order's sacred chieftainship), then I ask of Thee, O Ahura! and tell me aright, how shall I acquire that Thy Righteous Order's prize, ten (costly) mares male-mated, and with them the camel¹ (those signs of honour and blessing for Thy chief. I ask Thee for these gifts for sacrifice). For it was told me for the sake of our Welfare (in our salvation), and of our Immortality, in what manner Thou² shalt give³ to these (Thy conquering hosts) both of these Thy (gifts⁴ of grace).

19. This I ask Thee, O Ahura! tell me aright; (in the case of the recreant, of him) who does not give this (honoured) gift to him who hath earned it; yea, who does not give it to this (veracious tiller of the earth, to him who in no respect shows favour to the Demon-of-the-Lie, even to the) correct speaker⁵ (of Thy sacrificial word), what shall be his sentence at

do not fall so naturally to the end of the sentence in Gāthic or Vedic, without preceding related or qualifying words.

¹ Those suspected of no partisanship for the Pahlavi translation follow it here as against Haug, who translated the words *ustremâ* by *et amplius*! It means a camel; so the Pahlavi translator rendered many centuries ago before Europeans even knew what the Indian *úsh/ra* meant, which simple analogy Neryosangh first drew. Horses were material for sacrifice among the Persians according to Herodotus. The reasons for the prayer are not fully expressed.

² So better than as a first person aorist subjunctive, if *taîbyô* is to be read. The Pahlavi, however, read *taibyô*, which is not lightly to be passed over.

³ The rendering 'take' has long circulated. I do not, however, prefer it here.

⁴ Weal and Immortality, but *hî* might refer to the two objects, 'the mares' and the 'camel.'

⁵ The ideal Zarathustrian; comp. Y. XXXI, 15; XLIX, 9.

the first (now at this time, and because of this false dealing? I ask it), knowing well his doom at last¹.

20. (And how as to our deluded foes?) Have Daêva-(worshippers) e'er reigned as worthy kings? (This verily I ask of Thee, the Daêva-worshippers) who fight² for these (who act amiss? Have they well reigned) by whom the Karpan and the Usig(k) gave the (sacred) Kine to Rapine³, whence, too, the Kavian in persistent strength⁴ has flourished? (And these have also never given us tribal wealth nor blessings), nor for the Kine have they brought waters to the fields for the sake of the Righteous Order (in our hosts), to further on their growth (and welfare)!

¹ So also the Pahlavi followed by all. *Kađâr valman pavan zak vinâsînô aîtô fratûm*; [*aigas pavan-vinâskârîh pâđafrâs fratûm maman*]? *Âkâs hômanam zak mûn valman aîtô afdûm* [*mamanas darvandîh*]? Ner. (with regard to him) who does not give the reward which has come for the one fitted for, or deserving of, it [to Garathustra's equal], (the reward) which the truthful man; [that is, the good man] is giving to him, what is the first thing which happens through this sin of his? [that is, what is his first chastisement in consequence of this fault?] (For) I am aware of what his punishment shall be in the end [].

² The Pahlavi translator either had a text with some form of *pâ*, or was otherwise misled. He renders *mûn netrûnd*, but gives the word the adverse sense of 'hindering' in the gloss. Ner., however, has *pratiskhalanti* which points to *peshyêntî*, and also tends to show that other MSS. of the Pahlavi (and among them the one used by Ner.) read differently from our three, K₅, D. J., and the Persian transliteration. *Kâm*=Ved. *kâm* with dat.

³ See Y. XXIX, 1.

⁴ Professor Wilhelm 'vigour' (De Infin. p. 14).

YASNA XLV.

THE DOCTRINE OF DUALISM. HOMAGE TO AHURA.

This hymn bears fewer traces of a fragmentary condition than others. It recalls Y. XXX, and, like it, appears to belong to a period, or to an interval, of political repose and theological activity. It is smoother and more artificial than is usual, and it goes straight on its way from beginning to end. A powerful adversary had just been crushed. It was the dussasti of Y. XXXII, 9. This may well have been the result of the conflict alluded to in Y. XLIV, 15, 16, and possibly in Y. LI, 9, 10, also urged on by the fierce Y. XXXI, 18 probably often repeated in lost hymns.

An assembly is addressed as in Y. XXX, 1, but this time as coming 'from near and from far.' It may very possibly have been the winning side in a late struggle. The first verse sounds like a congratulation.

It might be said to be intended to be sung, if not shouted, to a multitude whose outskirts were by no means within easy reach with the voice. At all events attention is summoned with three differing expressions. 'Awake your ears to the sound,' literally 'sound ye,' in a receptive sense; ('let the sound peal in your ears'), then 'listen' (sraotâ); and then 'ponder' (māzdaunghôdâtṃ). 'The Antizarathustra, the evil teacher par eminence, has been defeated,' he declares, 'and he will never again destroy the peace of our lives (Y. XXXII, 9, 11). His evil creed has been silenced, and his tongue can no longer shout out its periods of persuasion or invective (Y. XXXI, 12) beside our preachers.'

2. He then reiterates the chief doctrine for which the parties had been at war, and which they should now see clearly in the light of their victory. 'The foul evils of society do not lie within the control of the holy Ahura in such a manner as that he either originates, or tolerates them. They are, on the contrary, the product of the personified Anger of the Daêvas, the Mainyu in its evil sense, the Angra (angry?) Spirit. Between this being, or personified abstraction, and Ahura, there is a gulf fixed. (Never do we see any aspersions upon Ahura's name, or a suspicion of His purity as shown by complicity with cruelty, or the toleration of evil passions.) It is also to be noted that the defeated dussasti may have possibly been a Daêva-worshipper chiefly as being a heretic from this Faith

of Ahura, believing Him to be implicated in the creation, or permission of sin and suffering, or, if the burial or burning of the dead was forbidden at this time, then possibly a heretic on these questions also. But yet, as a recreant Mazda-worshipper he may have claimed a rightful allegiance to the urvâtâ, and the future blessings, as well as temporal advantages, involved in a correct discipleship; and so he may have used the name of the sacred tenets of the Religion itself to help on a nefarious warfare. In fact he may have been a self-styled Mazda-worshipper, but not of 'Zarathustra's order,' not owned at all in any degree by the genuine adherents, and met as a real, if not an open, Daêva-worshipper.

The ardent prophet therefore declares the utter severance between the good and the evil, the God and the Demon. It is a popular corollary to Y. XXX, 3-6. The two spirits came together indeed at first to make life, and its negation, and they co-operate, if such a term can be applied to an irreconcilable antagonism out of whose antitheses and friction sentient existence alone becomes possible. Their union consists in opposition, for if they blend, they each cease to be what they are. They are, while upholders of existence, yet separate for ever, and that as to every attribute and interest.

3. And the sage goes on to assert that in this he is proclaiming the first Mâthra of this life which the all-wise Mazda had revealed to him. And, whether sure of the victorious masses before him, or whether on the contrary perfectly aware that many a group among them had been more convinced by the snaith's than by reason, he presses at once upon them that one terrible doctrine which seems unfortunately too needful for all successful and sudden propagandism, and he declares that they who do not act in a manner accordant with what he speaks, and even thinks, (having formerly announced it), to such delinquents this life should end in woe.

4. Proceeding in a happier vein, he then dwells upon the fatherhood of God. He will declare this world's best being who is Mazda Himself. He is the father of the Good Mind within His people, when that Good Mind is active in good works. So our piety, when it is practical, is His daughter, for no pretended good intention can claim relationship with Him, nor can any idle sentiment. He needs the 'ready mind' within His servant, and He is not to be deceived (compare Y. XLIII, 6).

5. Returning once more to the Mâthra, and this time to hold out rewards rather than to utter threats, he declares that Happiness and Immortality would be the portion of those who listened to, and

pondered his revelation, and that Ahura Himself would likewise approach them with the rewarding actions of His Good Mind, for Ahura was also in all good actions on the one hand, just as His Immortal Archangels on the other had their objective existence likewise in the believer's soul.

6. Turning from admonition to worship, he announces, not what he terms the 'first' (verse 3), nor the 'best' (verses 4 and 5), but the 'greatest,' element of all, implying that praise, which he now expresses, includes both prayer and doctrinal confessions, and he calls on Ahura both to listen and to teach. 7. It is the 'greatest' element indeed, for it concerns those spiritual blessings which not only the offerers who are now living will seek after, but those also who shall live in future; nay, even the spirits of the just desire them in the eternal Immortality. And these blessings are, according to a well-remembered law, woe to the wicked, and that, not only from outward discipline, but from inward grief. And Ahura had established, so he adds, the beneficent, but, as regards the wicked, still solemn regulations by the exercise of His Sovereign Power as the controller of all (Y. XXIX, 4). 8. Zarathustra (or his substitute) then professes his eagerness to serve the Lord with these words which he had called the 'greatest,' and because he had seen Him with his very eyes, which he explains as meaning that he had known Him through the Righteous Order in his soul, and therefore he prays and hopes to pronounce these greatest praises, not in the assembly (Y. LI, 3) alone, but in the 'Home of sublimity or song' (Y. I, 4).

9. And he desires all the more fervently to do homage to Ahura, because He approaches him with the Power of His divine Authority in weal or woe, blessing both men and herds so long as they multiplied under the influences of Piety. 10. As the praises were the 'greatest,' so he seeks to 'magnify' the Lord in the Yasnas of Âramaiti, Ahura being renowned by His unchanging purpose, for He will bestow the 'eternal two' in His holy Kingdom, when it shall have been made firm! 11. Yea, he would seek to magnify Him who contemns the Daêvas and their party as much as they, in their turn, profess to make little of Him and His religious Kingdom, contrasted as they were with Ahura's prophet, who honoured Him in the holy Insight, the Daêna of the Saoshyant. And this Saoshyant is declared to be the controlling master of every faithful worshipper, and he, or the faithful venerator of the reviled Ahura, is also as our friend, brother, nay, like Ahura Himself (verse 4), our very Father in the Faith.

Translation.

1. Yea, I will speak forth ; hear ye ; now listen, ye who from near, and ye who from afar have come seeking¹ (the knowledge). Now ponder² ye clearly all³ (that concerns) him⁴. Not for a second time shall the false teacher slay our life (of the mind, or the body). The wicked is hemmed in with his faith and his tongue!⁵

2. Yea, I will declare the world's two first⁶ spirits, of whom the more bountiful thus spake to the harmful⁷: Neither our thoughts, nor commands, nor our

¹ Ish means 'to come seeking.' The bavihûnêd/ of the Pahlavi, followed by many, is by no means incorrect.

² The reading mâzdaunghôdûm was suggested to me by Dr. Aurel Stein previously (as I believe) to its announcement elsewhere. Before this the indication of the Pahlavi (which always hesitates to change a MS. regarded at the time as sacred) had been followed by all with its necessary error.

³ The 'e' in kithre must represent a nasalised vowel, as in mehmaidî.

⁴ Îm may be merely a particle.

⁵ I would here strongly insist upon an alternative rendering in the sense of the Pahlavi. The rendering above is given on principle. A text should never be changed, if it is possible to render it as it is. Read, 'the wicked confessing (varetô, active sense) evil beliefs with his tongue.' The Pahlavi has zakas sarîtar kâmakô va zakas darvandîh pavan hûzvânô hêmnunêd/. Many, with this view, would at once read varetâ without MSS.

⁶ Observe the peculiar pouruyê (pourviyê, if not a locative), the two first things, principles, forces; so in Y. XXX, 3.

⁷ Notice that vahyô akemtâ (in Y. XXX, 3) necessarily apply to the mainyû, and not only because, as nominatives, the words fall to the end of the sentence. Here we have analogous adjectives applied unmistakably to the two. The neuters correspond with vahistem manô and akistem manô, and are of capital importance as

understandings, nor our beliefs, nor our deeds, nor our consciences, nor our souls, are at one¹.

3. Thus I will declare this world's first² (teaching), that which the all-wise Mazda Ahura hath told me. And they among you who will not so fulfil and obey this Māthra, as I now shall conceive and declare it, to these shall the end of life (issue) in woe.

4. Thus I will declare forth this world's best (being). From (the insight of His) Righteousness Mazda, who hath appointed these (things)³, hath known (what He utters to be true; yea, I will declare) Him the father of the toiling Good Mind (within us). So is His

expressing that abstract conception which renders the Gāthas so much more impressive as the earliest documents of their kind.

¹ The Pahlavi thus glosses: I do not think what thou thinkest, [for I think what is pious, and thou thinkest what is impious]; nor our teachings, [for I teach what is pious, and thou, what is impious] —nor our religions, for mine is the Gāthic, and thine that of the sorcerer; nor our souls, [for he who takes his stand on my religion, and he who takes his stand on thy religion, are apart; their souls do not occupy the same position]. Ner.: *naṭa dīniḥ* [yato me dīniḥ gāthabhavā teṭa rākshasī*].

² The 'first teaching' was a prominent idea with the Zarathustrians. Z. is called in the later Avesta the *paoiryō/kaēsha* (sic). He hardly plays the rôle of a reformer in the Avesta. He is mentioned after others chronologically, not as repudiating them. He might better be termed reviver. *Yām* is difficult; perhaps *daēnām* is to be understood, or *yem* (māthrem) read; see verse 4, *anghaus ahyā vahistem*. Neither *pourvīm* nor *vahistem* are adverbs.

³ Some change the text here to another which corresponds to some of the terms better. It should, however, first be rendered as it stands; the obscurities may well be owing to idiosyncrasy in the composer; possibly also to an affectation of obscurity (or 'dark speech'). How can Mazda be said to 'know Himself?' or how could any but Ahura be spoken of as 'the Father of Vohu Manah and Âramaiti?' He recognised Himself as having generated V. M. and Â. He was conscious of the completed relation.

daughter through good deeds (our) Piety. Not to be deceived is the all-viewing¹ Lord.

5. Yea, thus I will declare that which the most bountiful One told me, that word which is the best to be heeded by mortals. They who therein grant me obedient² attention, upon them cometh Weal to bless, and the Immortal being, and in the deeds of His Good Mind cometh the Lord.

6. Aye, thus I will declare forth Him who is³ of all the greatest, praising through my Righteousness, I who do aright, those who (dispose of all as well aright). Let Ahura Mazda hear with His bounteous spirit, in whose homage (what I asked) was asked⁴ with the Good Mind. Aye, let Him exhort me through His wisdom (which is ever) the best.

7. (Yea, I will declare Him) whose blessings the offerers will seek for, those who are living now, as well as those who have lived (aforetime), as will they

¹ Hishas looks irresistibly like a nom. sing., but may it not be a nom. actoris from the redup. root? Compare *hīshasa* (although the Pahlavi renders with a different cast of meaning). What Indian word to compare here is hard to say. I prefer Bartholomae's earlier view (as to the meaning) with the Pahlavi *harvispō nīkīrīdār*. By dropping the later glosses, the sense of the Pahlavi comes out as usual, much closer to the Gātha.

² Observe the vigour possessed by 'Sraosha.' It designates the angel of Obedience; and at the same time it is the only word which can here bring out the sense when it is understood in its actual meaning; so continually with the words *Vohu Manah*, *Asha*, &c.

³ Lit. 'Him who I, doing aright, (praising Him with His immortals) who (all likewise) are (beneficent).' Or it may be 'that which.'

⁴ So with many who hold the least to the hints of the Pahlavi. Otherwise I would render 'there is furtherance,' comparing *afrašt-mantō*.

also who are coming¹ (hereafter. Yea, even) the soul(s) of the righteous (will desire) them in the eternal² Immortality. (Those things they will desire which are blessings to the righteous) but woes to the wicked. And these hath Ahura Mazda (established) through His kingdom, He, the creator (of all).

8. Him in our hymns of homage and of praise would I faithfully serve, for now with (mine) eye, I see Him clearly, Lord of the good spirit³, of word, and action, I knowing through my Righteousness Him who is Ahura Mazda. And to Him (not here alone, but) in His home of song⁴, His praise we⁵ shall bear.

9. Yea, Him with our better Mind we seek to honour, who desiring (good), shall come to us (to bless) in weal and sorrow⁶. May He, Ahura Mazda, make us⁷ vigorous through Khshathra's royal power,

¹ *Bvaititiâ* (sic) seems, as elsewhere, to express 'those who are becoming.'

² The Pahlavi uniformly errs, or is strangely free, with this word. The sense 'continuous' is here admirably adapted.

³ This word seems evidently used almost in a modern sense of 'character,' 'disposition.' Elsewhere we are in doubt whether to refer it to the *Spēnista Mainyu* of Ahura, or to Ahura Himself.

⁴ Paradise; possibly 'home of sublimity.'

⁵ The change from singular to plural is frequent. *Ner.* varies from the Pahlavi in the last verse, improving upon it: *Evam tasmai prazāmam antar Garothmāne nidadāmahe*. This was probably an intentional improvement, as the Persian MS. follows our Pahlavi text. His MS. of the Pahlavi probably read *barâ yehabûnd*.

⁶ Or, 'who has created weal and sorrow for us with good intention, (and as our discipline);' but this is hardly probable. Ahura did not originate evil. *Spēntâ*, *aspenkâ* are used adverbially (see Y. XXXIV, 7).

⁷ I hardly agree to reading *verezenyau* (sic) here in the sense of 'homes.' The meaning is 'endow us with efficiency' in the pursuit of the objects mentioned in the context. Or 'the propitiation and

our flocks and men in thrift to further, from the good support and bearing¹ of His Good Mind, (itself born in us) by His Righteousness.

10. Him in the Yasnas of our Piety we seek to praise with homage, who in His persistent energy² was famed to be (in truth) the Lord Ahura Mazda, for He hath appointed in His kingdom, through His holy Order and His Good Mind, both Weal and Immortality, to grant³ the eternal mighty pair to this our land (and the creation).

11. (Him would we magnify and praise) who hath despised the Daêva-gods and alien men, them who before held Him in their derision. Far different are (these) from him who gave Him honour. This latter one is through the Saoshyant's bounteous Faith, who likewise is the Lord of saving power⁴,

reverential honour' may have been more directly in the composer's mind; 'may He endow our (worship) with efficiency that it may accomplish its desired result.' See the positions of the words.

The Pahlavi translation also bears witness to the rendering above, with its erroneous or free *varzîdâr avô lanman*.

¹ As it is impossible for those who have studied the subject to believe that the Pahlavi translator did not know the meaning of *amavandîh* in Zend, we must suppose him to have had some form like *hazah* before him instead of *huzâ(thwâ/)*.

² The Pahlavi translator, rendering this word in the two other places by *pavan astûbîh*, had evidently some reason for seeing a form of *nâman* here. The natural conclusion is that his MS. read differently in this place. Ner. renders him appropriately.

³ *Dân* looks like an accusative infinitive here (Bartholomae); otherwise the two verbs must be regarded as having indefinite pronouns understood, 'one assigns,' and 'they grant.'

⁴ I cannot see the applicability of Agni's title 'house-lord' here; compare *dâmsupatni* as 'adj. referring to pāti.

a friend, brother, or a father to us, Mazda Lord¹!

YASNA XLVI.

PERSONAL SUFFERINGS, HOPES, AND APPEALS.

In treating this most valuable section, we can as usual presuppose that the several verses were not originally composed in the order in which they now appear. Verses 1-3 seem like a cry 'from the depths.' In verse 4 animosity appears; and an appeal to the energy of some of his warlike adherents seems to prove that, with verses 5 and 6, the composer addressed it to an assembly; 7-10 are questions and appeals to Ahura, but, as a matter of course, they are none the less really intended to impress the hearers, as well as to animate the mind of the reciter. Verses 11 and 12 were again intended to be delivered to adherents.

Verse 13 is addressed to them in terms. Verse 14 would be regarded by some as little suited to the connection, and the rest seem spoken to an assembly of chiefs. However different they may be as to the particular time or circumstances of their origin, they are in general so homogeneous even as to pitch of intensity, that, with a little exercise of the mind, we can as usual see the reasons why they were put together, or were consecutively composed; and in poetic diction sudden changes neither displease nor surprise us. 1. Beyond a doubt the leading prophet is the figure in the first and second verses; and those verses are so free from imagery that we hold them as describing beyond any reasonable

¹ He who despised the Daêvas, they returning the contempt is probably the same person expressed by the two hōi in the previous verse. It is therefore Ahura, but the words which mean friend, brother, father, are grammatically connected with ye—mainyâtâ, the one who revered Ahura. The expression 'father' gives a strong impression that Ahura is referred to, notwithstanding the vocative. Particularly as we have father in verse 4. The word 'brother,' however, inclines one to the more closely grammatical view.

question, together with many other passages in the Gâthas, the afflictions and discouragements of Zarathustra himself. He knows not whither to turn, although he speaks as a public person and in command of forces which are scanty indeed (verse 2), but yet still able to take the field (Y. XLIV, 15, 16); and his movements also concern large districts ('lands'). He is not driven from his house, but from his country. It is superfluous to say that religion, although blended with a natural ambition, is his leading motive. How he shall satisfy Ahura is the one problem which he aims to solve; but his case at this particular juncture shows every discouragement.

2. Not supposing that his *yâ=yéna* is merely lost in the meaning 'that,' we see that in relieving his burdened mind he exclaims, not that he knows that he is poor in means and troops, but that he knows why it is thus. It is the *dregvant's* work, whom we may also well understand as the *drugvant*, the accursed enemy, who holds back (verse 4) the bearers of the Holy Order from all success in their efforts to gain a righteous livelihood from the favoured cattle culture (Y. XXIX, 2), and who, as he with grief long since foresaw, should he attain to power, would deliver up home, village, district, and province to ruin and death (Y. XXXI, 18). He therefore cries to Ahura in common with the Kine herself (Y. XXIX, 9), and his 'behold' is only a changed expression for her exclamations (Y. XXIX, 1).

As a friend, he would have the good Mazda to regard him as seeking an especial form of grace; and he would beseech Him to fill up his need (Y. XXVIII, 11) in his extremity, teaching him, not the value of flocks and followers alone, but of that *îsti* which lay deeper than the material wealth which he yet lamented, even the blessings of the Holy Order in every home. 3. And therefore he continues: Teach me and tell me of those great thoughts, the *kh ratavô*, the salvation-schemes of the Saviours, elsewhere also spoken of as the *kh ratu* of life (Y. XXXII, 9); for these saving helpers would, through a severe conflict and after many a reverse, at last bring on 'Completed Progress.'

4. But he must arouse himself from the relief and indulgence of his grief, he therefore springs to action, and with a cry which we hear elsewhere (Y. LIII, 9), and which was in all probability often uttered in hymns now lost to us, he urges the reward for the chief, who at the head of his retainers, shall expel the world-destroyer, the *dussasti* (Y. XLV, 1), from power and from life. And what is that reward? It seems to be merely the recognition and confirmation of merit among the faithful. The man who shall

expel, or destroy, the heretical tyrant shall be eminent in the recognition of his services in the support of the people and their sacred agricultural civilisation.

That was to be reward enough, and even that prestige (*pourvâtêṃ*) was to be given back to God in offering for still further service (Y. XXXIII, 14).

5. And every righteous official is urged to repeat the proclamation as a warning to every polluted Daêva-worshipper whom he can discover, or to whom his voice can reach, as well as to those secret adherents who would seem to need encouragement. The charged official is to assail the destructive opponent (Y. XXXII, 6-8), only after careful discrimination. He is to approach the evil chief, the hostile *hvaêtu* (of the blood), as distinct from the inferior noble, or the peasant clansman, and he is to tell him fully of the price set on his head. 6. 'And the superintendent who has the power, and does not thus carry out these instructions, shall himself be delivered over to the bonds of that Lie-demon whom the evil "kinsman" serves. For there is no compromise in the dualistic moral creed. The man who favours the evil is as the evil, and the friend of the good is as the good himself; so had the Lord ordained.'

7. Then, as so often elsewhere, he turns his thoughts to the outward emblem as the sign of inward grace, the sacramental Fire without which the masses would have had no help to fix the eye, or draw prostrations, and he asks with the question of profound devotion: Whom have they (Thy Saoshyants, verse 3) set me, as strengthener in these storms, save Thee and Thy symbolic flames? Yet even here he names the Good Mind with them, and the Order.

8. 'But,' he continues, 'may he who would destroy my settlement find every influence and power combined to form his ruin; may all things keep him back from prosperity, and may nothing keep him back from harm.'

9. He calls, then, for a leading helper who may help him magnify Ahura, not merely in religious celebrations, but in that universal advance of the sacred 'cause,' which follows Ahura's 'conciliation' (verse 1).

10. As if to hinder the discouragement of those who hear his own unburdenings of grief, he declares that he will never leave the faithful few who follow him; he will go with them to the 'dread assize' itself, as if to help them pass the last of tests.

11. But the 'wicked,' open or concealed, should not share these hopes; their conscience, ever the remorseless executioner, shall curse them, as they try to pass the Judgment Bridge; and hurled

from that narrow path (it becomes narrow to the faithless), they shall fall to 'eternal' Hell.

12. Their destruction is not, however, yet decided; there is not only hope for the tribesmen of Ahura, but for the pagan, and not for the 'alien' only, but for the Turanian enemy, whose very name had been a synonym for suffering. If these even shall repent, they may be blest; and some had already turned. The converted tribe Fryána offered many pious proselytes. These would help on the righteous order together with the holy people, and God would dwell with them as well.

13. Rhetorically referring to himself as in the third person, or else representing some second speaker who names his name, he can still offer his reward to any prince who will yet come up with his retainers to his cause, not kept back by the many refusals which he had met (verse 1), nor discouraged by the scant numbers of his bands; and that reward is one which might yet be efficacious to induce self-sacrificing succour, for in addition to what had been said (see verse 4) he could declare spiritual life from Ahura to be the portion of every faithful follower, and with it future temporal wealth. And he should declare this true recruit the 'good mate' in the service, the first helper (verse 9) of the tribes.

14. Here we have what seems a question conceived as uttered by some one in the throng, or else simply rhetorically thrown in: 'Who is that friend, that powerful coadjutor who is thus offered this reward, and for such a service?' Zarathustra names the king. But he diverts the minds of hearers from a pernicious trust in individuals.

He would appeal, so he implies, not to one man only, although that one be Vistâspa, the heroic, but to all whom Ahura would recognise in His assembly, through the inspired suffrage of the mass.

15. And first he addresses the group made up chiefly of his family, the Spitâmas; they were, as he implied, enlightened in the sacred lore, and among the foremost therefore of the Ar(e)dra.

16. He then calls on Frashaostra, with the Hvôgvas, exhorting all to continue in their righteous course, in harmony with those whom they wish for as Saviours for the land, assuring them that they will reach at last that sacred scene where the 'Immortals' dwell with God. 17. 'That scene,' he further adds, 'where the faithful sing their praises in perfection, using the true metres' (as sacred as the Vedic). And he declares that Ahura, who discerns the truth infallibly, will heed and answer; for the praises sung there will be those of obedient men who offer to the cause. 18. He once

more holds out his spiritual rewards as the best gifts of the inspired revelation, threatening as usual commensurate visitation upon the oppressing clans, while both promises and threats are in harmony with Ahura's will, for that alone has been his guide in every statement. 19. After all complaints, and threats, and stern injunctions, he closes with the once more repeated word 'reward,' and that for every man who shall aid in 'his great affair' (Y. XXX, 2), and he appeals to God Himself, asserting His inspiration for all that he has said.

Translation.

1. To what land to turn¹; aye, whither turning shall I go? On the part of² a kinsman (prince), or allied peer, none, to conciliate, give³ (offerings) to me (to help my cause), nor yet the throngs of labour, (not) even such as these⁴, nor yet (still less) the evil

¹ The Pahlavi translator sees the usual meaning in *nemôi* and *nemô*. He also accepts *kām zām* adverbially after the constant Greek usage. 'In what land shall I establish my religion (as it is here rejected); whither with my praises (of the true God) shall I go?' The rendering is so much richer that I turn from it with great reluctance.

² It is to be regretted that able scholars should so hastily change the Gāthic text here without first trying to render it as it is. This is all the more necessary, as each independent writer disputes emendations. *Pairi* I think ought to stand. The *hvaētu*, *airyaman*, and *vereznem* are also elsewhere alluded to, as appertaining to the hostile party sometimes, and therefore not among those from among whom (*parâ?*) the prophet would be expelled.

³ *Dadaiti* as a third plural has long been suggested with the eagerness of discovery. Its subjects would then be *khshnâus*, and that implied in *yâ vereznâ*. But the construction is difficult thus, and it may be greatly doubted whether we had not better alter our discovery back into the singular with the Pahlavi. I am greatly confirmed in my view of the grammatical form of *khshnâus* by Bartholomae's decision for a nominal form. Otherwise it would be a third singular, with loss of the final dental.

⁴ *Hekâ* seems to be an irregular form (see Y. LVIII, 4). I can



tyrants of the province. How then (establish well the Faith, and thus) conciliate Thy (grace), O Lord?

2. This know I, Mazda! wherefore I am thus unable to attain my wish¹, and why my flocks are so reduced in number, and why my following is likewise scant. Therefore I cry to Thee; behold it, Lord! desiring helpful grace for me, as friend bestows on friend. (Therefore to meet my spirit's need, and this as well) declare and teach² to me the Good Mind's wealth.

3. When come, Great Giver! they who are the day's enlighteners³, to hold the Righteous Order of the world upright, and forward pressing? When are

only make an exclamatory isque=talisque of it. The Pahlavi renders freely as if some form of hi=to bind were before him (recall hôis?), or perhaps he read hakâ, rendering as=these all together, hamsâyakîk; Ner. ye svasrenayo.

¹ So the Kine complained of him in Y. XXIX, 9 as anaêsha; so also the Pahlavi, explaining akhvâstar [aîgham denman atû-bânîkîh maman râi khavîûnam]. He proceeds li amat kam ramak va amatiê kam-gabrâ hômanam, explaining anaêshô as not being an ishâ-khshathra. Mâ=smâ notwithstanding position (?).

² 'Nim wahr' has long since circulated as a rendering for âkhsô; and with îstîm in the sense of 'prayer,' it has afforded the admirable sense 'observe, take heed of the desire of the pious.' But we have a positive proof of the meaning 'teach,' 'declare' for khsa; see Y. LXV, 9 (Wg.). So also in Y. XXVIII, 5. That Ahura possessed an îsti is clear from Y. XXXIV, 5. And if the sage could ask, 'What is your îsti (wealth)? what is your kingdom (power over possessions)?' it is certainly not strained to suppose that he could say here; 'tell me concerning your wealth,' especially as he bewails his poverty. Îsti is in antithesis to the idea expressed in kamnafshvâ and kamnânâ. So also the Pahlavi as translated by the Persian 'hezânah.

³ Ukshâno would seem to be an ancient error for ushâno, as the Pahlavi translator renders as if reading ushâ in Y. L, 10, and

the schemes of the saviour Saoshyants with (their) lofty revelations (to appear)? To whom for help does he (their chief) approach, who has Thy Good Mind (as his fellow-worker¹)? Thee, for mine exhorter and commander, Living Lord! I choose.

4. (But e'er these helpers come to me, all rests as yet in gloom.) The evil man is holding back² those who are the bearers of the Righteous Order from progress³ with the Kine, (from progress with the sacred cause) within the region, or the province⁴, he, the evil governor, endowed with evil might⁵, consuming⁶ life with evil deeds. Wherefore, whoever hurls him from his power, O Mazda! or from life, stores for the Kine in sacred wisdom shall he make⁷.

not ukhshâ. Otherwise 'increasers of the days' is a fine expression, but suspicious in view of the Pahlavi rendering in Y. L., 10. Ner.'s *vikâsayitryo (sic) is striking, but I cannot claim for it all that it seems to offer, as Ner. elsewhere renders forms of vakhsh by those of kas. The Persian follows the Pahlavi.

¹ Comp. Y. XLIV, 1.

² Pâ in the sense of 'keeping back from welfare' as well as in that of 'protection,' a sense first taught us by the Pahlavi writers, is now at last generally acknowledged. It now, like many other suggestions of the Pahlavi, actually casts light in the rendering of the analogous Vedic word.

³ So the mass of MSS. with the Pahl. min fravâmisnô; Persian az raftan. The expression might refer to the 'going of the kine,' as representing the people in her 'path.'

⁴ Comp. Y. XXXI, 18.

⁵ Pahl. zak î pavan dûs-stahamak; Ner. dush/o balât-kâri. The elements seem to be duz + hazô + bâo(=vâo).

⁶ Ush in Iranian seems to have the sense of destruction combined with it sometimes; hence aoshah, aoshisnô.

⁷ Kar can well mean 'attain to.' Pathmeng as=paths (so I formerly rendered) gives a far feeblar sense than that indicated by the first Zendist, the Pahlavi writer. The 'wisdom' of preparing stores for the kine, even if we suppose an animal only to be meant,

5. (Yea), he who, as ruler, treats no coming applicant with injury¹, as a good citizen (or nobly wise) in sacred vow and duty, and living righteously in every covenant, who, as an uncorrupted judge, discerns the wicked (that leader who, rejecting me, would keep back those who propagate the Faith), let him, (this righteous judge,) declare (the vengeance) to that (hostile²) lord, (my) kinsman. Yea, let him crush him when he sallies forth³ (to approach us for our harm)!

6. (And he who leaves him in his guilty error has my curse.) Yea, he who has the power⁴, and will not thus (with stern reproof⁵) approach him, shall go to

is obvious. The Iranian winter was something very different from that in India. But the kine is not alluded to without a certain figurative meaning: she represents the people, and as such she cried aloud; and Zarathustra received the commission to relieve her sufferings as such. That the word *hučistōis* stands in the genitive should not disturb us. The 'care for the kine' was a matter of national importance, and 'wisdom' could not better be exercised than in this direction.

¹ Or we may render 'he who as ruler does not bestow favours upon him who approaches with injury.' The hint of the Pahlavi favours this.

² *Hvaêtavê* is here, as in Y. XXXIII, 4; Y. XXXII, 1, and the first verse of this chapter, the hostile chieftain called 'kinsman' in an aristocratic sense by Zarathustra and his group.

³ I compare *uzûithyazuska* which is used of the breaking forth of water. The Pahlavi translator seems to have had some such idea 'mûn lâla hengîdô', but with him the entire line, which divides all writers, favours the sense 'in saving him from his impiety.' *Khrûnyâz* is a verbal form (with Bartholomae).

⁴ The Pahlavi translator sees the root *is*=to wish in *ismanô*, 'who does not willingly approach him;' or 'who does not approach desiring (and seeking?) him.'

⁵ I am gratified to see that another takes nearly this view of this line. He has 'verfolgt.'

the abode of the Lie, (and) the enchainer¹. For he is evil who is the best one to the evil, and he is holy who is friendly to the righteous, as Thou didst fix the moral laws², O Lord!

7. Whom, then, as guard, O Mazda! hast Thou³ set me⁴ then when that wicked one still held⁵ me for his hate? Whom (had I) then but Thee, Thy Fire and Mind, Ahura! by deeds performed in which Thy Righteous rule is saved and nurtured? Therefore that spiritual power⁶ (vouchsafing me) for the (holy) Faith (its truths) declare.

8. And as to him who (now by evil power) delivers up my settlements to harm, let not his burning (wrath) in deeds attain⁷ me. But bearing back⁸ the (evil will and evil influence of such), let these things come (back) to him in anger. Let that to his body come which holds from⁹ welfare; but let no (help)

¹ Haêthahyâ, as a masculine, is awkward, as would be baêthahyâ, so the Pahl. (of the terrifier). A loc. of haithya may be correct, taking dâmân also as a loc. Otherwise 'to the creatures of the Lie, and the enchainer (or terrifier).'

² Or, 'as Thou didst make the souls at first.'

³ So with K6, K9 (Barth.).

⁴ Some render 'me' here, who seem elsewhere loath to translate thwâvazt as=like thee, thee. Khshmvâtô, thwâvâs, and mavaitê, in Y. XLIV, 1, may be rendered, 'of you,' 'thou,' and 'to me.'

⁵ So the Pahlavi indicates. I have, however, elsewhere, as against tradition, rendered as if the root were dar(e)s; 'has set his eye on me for vengeance.'

⁶ One might be tempted to read ta/ môi dâs tvəm; 'that granting me, do Thou speak forth for the faith.'

⁷ The Pahlavi translator indicates the root sâ by his rêsh; so read as alternative, 'let him not wound us.'

⁸ The meaning 'but contrariwise' has been ventured on. The indication of the Pahlavi is 'in opposing'; pavan pađrak yâm-tûnisnô.

⁹ The Pahlavi here misses the point, and taking pâyâs in its usual

at all (approach him, which may) keep him back from misery. (And let this happen as I speak) from (vengeful) hate, O Lord!

9. But who is the freely helping one who will teach me foremost ¹ how we may adore Thee, Thou the well to be invoked ² as in Thy deeds, the holy³, bountiful Ahura? What (words) the Kine's creator ⁴ spake for Thee by aid of, and to aid, the Righteous ritual Order, these words of Thine, (Thy people coming) with Thy Good Mind, are seeking ⁵ now (to gain and learn from) me ⁶, O Mazda Lord!

sense, falls into confusion. The ancient scholars, like some of their successors, could not always believe that pâ could mean 'to hold back from good' as well as from evil. They recognised it sometimes, giving us our instruction on the subject, but not here.

¹ Did the composer appeal to some powerful coadjutor here, or does he rhetorically express his perplexity?

² Zevîstîm must equal forms of hû; but from the constant evidence of the Pahlavi to the meaning 'endearing,' one is much inclined to suggest a reading as if from zush.

³ Ashavanem is applied to Ahura, and cannot so well mean 'righteous' here. 'Holy' is the more proper term in this connection, while *spentem* is necessarily excluded from that meaning by its occurrence with *ashavanem* in immediate connection.

⁴ Notice that the word *tashâ* occurs here with no mention of wounding in the connection (see note 6 on page 6).

⁵ I am here recalled to the Pahlavi by some who rarely name it. I had rendered, 'these words are inciting me (in duty) through Thy Good Mind;' so *ish* often in the Veda. The Pahlavi translator, like his successors, scandalised at the difficult forms, also anticipated his successors (as elsewhere often) in getting free from the difficulty. He did what is exactly equivalent to what is now practised by scholars (sometimes too often). He rendered the text as if changed from what he could not understand to what he could understand, adhering to the right roots however, which I now follow. He knew that *ishentî mâ* did not mean, 'I am seeking,' but he could not credit the words before him.

⁶ We have now a suggestion which must often have presented itself to those who read the *Rig-veda* constantly, and that is (so

10. Whoever, man or woman, shall give to me those (gifts) of life which Thou hast known¹ as best, O Mazda! and as a holy blessing through (Thy) Righteous Order, a throne (established) with (Thy) Good Mind, (with these I shall go forth; yea, those) whom I shall (accompany and so) incite², to the homage of such as You³ (on earth), forth to the Judge's Bridge (itself) with all of them shall I lead on⁴ (at last).

11. (And they and I have every need for help, for now) the Karpan and the Kavi will join in governments⁵ to slay the life of man with evil deeds, they whom their own souls and their own conscience will betray⁶. And when they approach there where the Judge's Bridge (extends, unlike the believing ones of God, who go so firmly forth with me as guide and helper, these shall miss their path and fall⁷), and

Bartholomae) that mâ may equal smâ here and often elsewhere. It is well possible, as the 's' often disappears.

¹ Notice once more the expression, 'Thou hast known;' so in Y. XXVIII, 11, the composer confides the very direction of his petitions to the discrimination of the Deity. We gain from this the true sense of *peresâ nau yâ tôi zhmâ parstâ*; Ahura's question and prayer are mighty when repeated by us, because He has known what is best, and what are the true *dâtheng* for which we should ask.

² This sense corresponds admirably with the connection; *Ner. uthâpayâmi*.

³ Such as you = you as in the plural of majesty, or as referring to Ahura and His Bountiful Immortals (so often).

⁴ 'Go forth.'

⁵ Or, 'with kings;' but the Pahlavi has, *avô khudâyih ayûgênd mûn Kik va Karapô*.

⁶ So the Pahlavi indicates. Otherwise 'will harden,' or, if *khrao-dat* is read, 'will rage (against).'

⁷ Inserted to shed light on the last line; so the later Parsism.

in the Lie's abode for ever shall their habitation¹ be.

12. (But for the penitent there is yet hope ; for all our former foes shall not thus fall, as from the *K'invat* Bridge to woe, for) when from among the tribes and kith of the Turanian, even among the more powerful ones of the Fryâna, those shall arise² who further on the settlements of Piety with energy and zeal, with these shall Ahura dwell together through His Good Mind (in them), and to them for joyful grace deliver His commands³.

13. Yea, he who will propitiate Zarathustra Spitâma⁴ with gifts midst men, this man is fitted for the proclamation, and to him Ahura Mazda will give the (prospered) life. And he will likewise cause the settlements to thrive in mental goodness. We think⁵ him, therefore, Your good companion to (further and maintain) Your Righteousness (and meet for Your approach).

¹ I am again brought back to the Pahlavi, having formerly rendered 'bodies,' which I would now put in the second place.

² The Pahlavi, although as usual free or erroneous as to forms, gives us the valuable hint of *hengî-ait* for *uzgen* (sic=*gayen*).

³ Here we have the clear evidence of the conversion of a border tribe. The Zarathustrians had saved some Turanian clan from plunder or annihilation, and so secured their friendship. These became known as the 'friendly people.' That true Zarathustrian piety may have arisen among them is of course possible.

⁴ It need hardly be said that this reference to Z. in the third person, does not prove that the composer was not Z. himself. One might even say that his authorship was even not less probable on this account.

⁵ Let it be noted that the Pahlavi translator gives us our first critical knowledge as to the true writing and meaning of *mehmaidî* ; or will scholars object that he renders in the singular? Valman pavan zak î Lekûm Aharâyîh hamîshak minâm khûp hamkhâk ; Ner. dhyâyâmi suddha-sakhâyam.

(A voice from among the Chiefs.)

14. (But where is such an one ?) Whom hast thou Zarathustra¹ ! thus a holy friend for the great (effort of the) cause ? Who is it who thus desires to speak it forth ? (Zarathustra answers. Aye, such an one I have.) It is our Kavi Vistâspa², the heroic ; (and not he alone, but all) whom thou shalt (as in Thy prophet) meet³ in the assembly, O Ahura Mazda ! these likewise will I call (to my attempt), and with Thy Good Mind's words.

15. O ye Haêkat-aspas, Spitâmas ! to you will I now address my words, since ye discern the things unlawful, and the lawful, for these your actions to establish⁴ (firmly on its base) for you the Righteous Order through those which are the Lord's primeval laws.

16. (And to the Hvôgvas would I likewise speak.) Thou Frashaostra Hvôgva (whom I see)⁵; go thou

¹ Shall we regard this verse as misplaced because the subject is in the second person ? It is probable (as of very many verses) that it was often recited by the composer, or others, in a different connection, and perhaps originally so ; but it was a happy thought for the effect to introduce it here. Let it be supposed that this and the previous verse were arranged to be spoken by another voice during the public recital. We see that the interest is much increased by the intruding strophe.

² This passage may be regarded as recording the call of Vistâspa to the holy work. Zu=hû need not always express the invocation of the gods.

³ Others, 'unite.'

⁴ Or, 'ye take to you the righteous character to yourselves,' as the infinitive is difficult ; but in that case Khshmaibyâ becomes awkward. The translation of dâ as 'take' has long been familiar.

⁵ Obviously composed for an occasion when the several parties would be present.

(forth) with the generous helpers¹, with those whom we are praying for as for salvation to the land. Go thou where Piety joins hand in hand with the Righteous Order, where are the wished-for Realms of Good Mind, where Mazda in His most honoured² home abides,

17. Where in your measured verse³ I will declare aloud (the praises), not in unmeasured lines, *Gâmâspa Hvôgva!* but songs of homage (will I weave) with ever gained Obedience in offering. (And unto Mazda) will I chant them, yea, to Him who will discern aright what things are lawful (or) unlawful⁴ (which I thus do, or utter), and with His wonder-working thoughts⁵ of Righteousness (attend).

18. (For) whosoever (offers) sanctity⁶ to me, to him shall be the best gifts whatsoever. Yea, of my

¹ Ar(e)dra seems to be especially applied, and might be left un-rendered.

² I see no impossibility whatever in such a rendering, literally in 'his choice-abode'; so also the Pahlavi indicates: *tamman afgh Aôharmazd pavan kâmak dên demânô ketrônêd*. The question is of 'going' and 'dwelling,' and the meaning 'abode' is quite in point. As to *var*, see *îstâ khshathrâ*; and compare *mazdâvarâ*. Aside from this, *vardmām*=in blessing.

³ The Pahlavi again, with its followers, gives us our first hint at the general meaning here. What else can his *padmân* and *apadmânîk* mean, but the regularity, that is, the rhythm and cadence of the words?

⁴ *Dâthemkâ adâthemkâ* would be 'the truth and the heresy' in general.

⁵ If *mantû* is taken as an instrumental, (can it be an act. imper.?) *vistâ* might occupy the place of a preterit, but it looks far more like a participle, and might be regarded as forming a compositum with *vahmeng*. Supply the dat. (?) pers. pron. understood before *ya*.

⁶ The alteration to *yaur*, considered as an aorist, has long circulated, but seems now, like so many of the bolder conceptions, to be given up. *Yaos* is the sister word of the Vedic *yós*, and

(spirit's) wealth will I bestow on him through Thy Good Mind (which I give), but oppressions will I send on him who as oppressor will deliver us to anguish, O Mazda! desiring, as I do, to satisfy Your choice by righteous (vengeance). This is the decision of mine understanding and my will.

19. (Yea, this I earnestly announce.) He who from Righteousness (in mind and life) shall verily perform for me, for Zarathustra, that which is thus most helpful (for my cause) according to my earnest wish (and through my words of urgent zeal) on him shall they bestow reward(s) beyond this earth, with all the mental¹ blessings gained through the sacred mother-kine². And these things (all) did'st Thou (Thyself) command to me, O Mazda, Thou most wise³!

shows us that some shade of sanctity may inhere in that word. The Pahlavi renders more indefinitely by 'yân' = a helpful blessing.

¹ The Pahlavi translator, however, saw *menâ*, rendering *avô li*. His text may well have justified him.

² Bearing; or is it 'fit to drive?'

³ The Pahlavi here reports another text.

(SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. *Askî*, in verse 18, may equal 'verily indeed.' *Vahistâ*, &c. = 'the best things of my wealth will I assign to him through the Good Mind.' The meaning 'wealth' seems much called for here, and if here, then in verse 2. *Vasnâ* in verse 19 may mean 'through grace'.)

THE GĀTHA(Ā) SPENTĀ MAINYŪ (SPENTĀMAINYU(Ū)).

This Gātha, consisting of Yasna XLVII-L, takes its name from its commencing words. Like the other Gāthas it owes its existence as a collection to the nature of its metre, as its matter is homogeneous with that of the others. Its metre may be said to be Trishŭp, as its lines have each eleven syllables, and are arranged in stanzas of four.

A general view precedes each chapter. The grouping of hymns in this Gātha has, as usual, little or nothing to do with the question of their relative age.

YASNA XLVII.

THE BOUNTIFULNESS OF AHURA.

As in every instance, we may have here only the fragments of a more extended piece; but also, as ever, the circumstance does not diminish the value of what remains. Although some signs of authorship apart from Zarathustra are present, the later verses are not at all remote, so far as the period of time which they indicate is concerned, from the Zarathustrian verses, and are therefore of nearly equal interest, possessing the advantage moreover of affording data for estimating the progress of change.

1. The *Spentā mainyū* here is not identical with Ahura, but is, as so often, His spirit. It is more than possible that the memorable application of the word *spenta* to the seven, giving us the Ameshōspends, the Amshasponds of literature, derives its origin from the first verse here before us, or from lost verses of a similar character. All the seven seem purposely and artificially grouped here, although 'His Spirit' is of course not one of them. The commencing word *spenta* further attracted attention in so far as to form the theme for a sort of play upon words in the later epilogue of Visparad XIX. By means of this His indwelling Spirit (which idea, or expression, has probably no direct connection with the 'Holy Spirit' of the Old and New Testaments, but which, as giving the designation 'spirit' to the Ameshōspends, may well have been the original of the 'seven spirits which are before the throne of God'), by means of this

blessed spirit, that is, in accordance with his inmost thoughts, Ahura bestows a gift upon the ideal saint (verses 4, 5), upon him who works the best results for Zarathustra (Y. XLVI, 19), the Ratu, and the prophet (Y. XXIX, 6, 8). And this gift is declared to be the inseparable two, Happiness in every particular, and then both the prospect and realisation of the continuance of that Happiness in Immortality. And these He bestows, not through His immediate action, which no human intellect, or susceptibility, could take in unaided, but by His especially revealed Benevolence, His Best Mind, as His representative, in accordance with His plan of Order and Purity, pervading every moral as well as every spiritual regulation, and by the exercise of His Royal Power, sent forth as the 'archangel' Khshathra, and embodied in the polity of the sacred Zarathustrian state, and this as influenced in all its relations, public and domestic, by practical piety called Âramaiti, Ahura's daughter (the ready mind). Such a revelation of the component parts of the mind and will of the Deity, the simplest labouring class could understand for the moment, and for some decades; but all was, as a matter of course, soon to be overgrown with the old weeds of superstition and of myth.

2. Falling into detail and varying expressions, the composer prays that Ahura may carry out His holy scheme into action by the busy hands and fingers of domestic piety, and by the preached and recited words of the Good Mind from the mouth and tongue of faithful priests. So, and so only, would He become the Father of Asha, the divine Order, and of moral and ritual regularity among men.

3. From discourse concerning God, he arises, as so often, to an address to Him. That Spirit (referred to in the verses 1, 2) is Ahura's own, for He is the One who makes it bounteous; He is the bountiful One who has created the sacred symbolic Kine, the emblem and the substance of 'joy,' representing at once the possessions of the holy people, and those people themselves. And He it is who, in answer to her wail (Y. XXIX, 1, 9), has spread for her the meadows 'of Piety' as arranged in the consultations (Y. XXXIII, 6) made on her behalf.

4. And this 'Spirit,' as might be expected, does not confine its attention to the inspiration of Piety alone. The justice of Mazda is vindicated. The wicked are afflicted under its influence with a long wounding (Y. XXX, 11) for their sins, and for their cynical preference for prosperous men of bad and dishonest character as well as of heretical faith.

5. But he expresses his confidence that Ahura Mazda will, in the end, set all aright. He will, unlike the persons just mentioned, give unto the ashavan, not kasu alone, but paru, (not a meagre share, but fulness) of whatever is the best, while the dregvant and the aka (verse 4), the faithless and the wicked, although they may be isvanô, prosperous, will only taste the enjoyment of their wealth aside from God, and therefore marred. So long as they pursue their usual course, they live in actions inspired not by the bountiful spirit, but by the Evil Mind, a mind as aka as the person alluded to in the words paraos (kâthê) akô dregvaitê in the previous verse.

6. But, as ever, the moral appeals, and ascriptions of praise, lofty as they are, are not left without the support and service of the ritual. God will give these gifts, and all which are the best, but in connection with His Fire imparted to these struggling sides (Y. XXXI, 2), the believing and the faithless (verses 4, 5), through the increase of His Piety and Order; for that piety, as ever the instructress, will convert all those who come to her, and seek her light (Y. XXX, 1; Y. XLV, 1). Nay, she will cause all the living to choose and believe in God (Y. XXXI, 3).

(If the first two verses here are more like the work of a disciple, the last four show again the original tone. It must never be forgotten, however, that later and even interpolated portions are, in their sense, also original, and differ but slightly in their great age from pieces more directly from the first composer.)

Translation.

1. And to this¹ (man, His chosen saint), Ahura Mazda will give² both the two (greatest gifts, His)

¹ Or, 'to us;' but in that case it would be the Kine who 'took counsel' as mentioned in the third verse. This is, however, far from impossible, as she is mentioned as uttering her wail, and being answered by her maker in Y. XXIX, 1, 2. So understanding, 'to us' becomes an admirable rendering for verse 1; but in verse 3, it is strained, as the Kine for whom (Y. XXIX, 9) Zarathustra was appointed, could not so readily be declared to be the one which was given to 'us,' she representing 'us' in that place to a great extent. There is a certain plausibility about the rendering 'to us,' but I think ahmâi refers to ashaonê understood (see verses 4 and 5). The Pahlavi, moreover, is against a first person.

² Dān (Geldn.) seems to be a 3rd plural aorist subjunctive; the

Universal Weal and Immortality, by means of His bountiful Spirit, and with His Best Mind, from (the desire to maintain His) Righteous moral Order in word and deed, and by the (strength and wisdom) of His Sovereign Power, (established) in Piety (among His folk).

2. Aye, (that blessedness, which is the) best¹ (creation) of this most bounteous spirit, Ahura Mazda will bring forth in action with words from the mouth and tongue of His Good Mind (within His seers), and by the two hands² of Âramaiti (His Piety as she lives within the soul). And by such³ wise (beneficence is) He the father of the righteous Order (within our worship and our lives).

3. And Thou art therein, O Ahura Mazda! the bountiful One who appertains to, and who possesses, that (most bounteous) spirit in that Thou art He who for this⁴ (man, in whom this spirit works) hath made the joy-creating Kine. (And as to her), for her, as

plural being owing to the fact that Ahura gives with the other Ameshôspends. Dã might also be the relic of the proper word which represents the participle; comp. dās (sic).

¹ The idea of the summum bonum seems to have early developed itself, and from this constant use of this word in the neut. singular and plural, and also with anghu.

² Notice once more the pronounced personification of both Vohu Manah and Âramaiti; see Y. XXX, 8, and Y. XLIV, 14, &c. The Pahlavi translation notices the dual form pavan kolâ II yadman.

³ The Pahlavi seems to lead those who regard ôyâ as=a form of ava; it has zak î.

⁴ This is the ahmâi of the first verse, (but always possibly='to us,' if the verses are not to be brought into any kind of connection.) Otherwise it obviously refers to ashâunê* in 4 and 5; so the Pahlavi throughout. See ahmâi and hoi in LI, 6.

joyful meadows¹ of her peace, wilt Thou bestow (Thine) Âramaiti (who is our Piety as earth considered), since he² (for her) hath taken counsel with Thy Good Mind, Lord !

4. (But this Thy bounteous spirit doth not alone bestow rewards and blessings on the good.) The wicked (foemen of the Faith) are harmed, and from (the motives which move) that bounteous spirit (of Thine own), O Mazda³ ! but not thus the saints. (And yet the ruler's pride would ever slight the righteous.) The feeble man alone stands free to give in kindly obligation⁴ to Thy saint, but having wealth and ruling power, the evil (man) is (at the service) of the wicked, and for much⁵.

¹ Many would say that we have here an instance in which the identity of Âramaiti with the earth is recognised in the Gâthas. I would say, on the contrary, that here we have an instance in which a poetical conception gave rise to a later error or fantastical association. Piety, with frugal virtue, induced a thorough husbandry ; and secured the hushiti, peaceful home-life. She gave meadows to the Kine ; at the next step she poetically represents the meadows, and then the earth. If vâstrâi, it would be for 'nurture.'

² Or 'she,' as she once bewailed in a colloquy. Otherwise the person who was appointed to care for her interests is meant. Compare Y. XXXIII, 6, where the righteous Zaoatar speaks as desiring counsels (həmparstôis) in the interest of the pastures, and the laws of the sacred agriculture. Cp. also the later reproduction of the idea in an extended form in the Vendidad. The zaoatar of Y. XXXIII, 6, may have been the ashavan of verses 4 and 5.

³ Voc. with K₅ (Barth.).

⁴ The Pahlavi gives us, as usual, our first surmise as to the meaning of 'kâthê ;' I follow Geldner with regard to it as against Haug. The expressions here are not literal.

⁵ Isvâkîi connects only indirectly with kasəuski, as kâthê intervenes. I regard paraos akô dregvâitê as presenting the true antithesis to kasəuski/nâ ashâunê. The isvâ may have kîi merely from the influence of jingle, being at the head of the line like kasəus ; isvâ means

5. But Thou wilt give these gifts, and through Thy (most blessed and most) bounteous spirit, O Ahura Mazda! to this¹ Thy holy saint, for they are whatsoever is the best; but far² from Thy love the wicked has his portion, abiding in the actions of the Evil Mind.

6. Aye, these things wilt Thou give (to him), O Thou Ahura Mazda! and through Thy bounteous spirit, (and) by Thy Fire as in a good bestowal to

of itself 'possessing means.' Paraos may depend on kâthê understood, as kasêus depends on it expressed. Moreover, hās in all the instances in which it is used ends the sense, and here is separated by the caesura from paraos, which, however, is of no great importance. The discourse is of the wicked; the holy are incidentally mentioned, and here their ill-treatment is signalised. Akô cannot well mean 'hostile' here; see also akâ/ in the following verse. Isvâkî/, if understood with nâ, alters nothing. 'A man was desirous of little for the service of the saint, but even when he himself was rich, (in the desire) of much was the evil for the evil.' Or, taking kasêuskî/ as governed by isvâkî/ understood with kâthê as before understood in the last line: 'Only a man (men) (possessed) of little was at the service of the righteous, while an evil man (men) possessed of much (was at the service) of the wicked.' The other translation is: 'Even a man of little means stands to the willing service of the saint, but a man even of large means is hostile (?) to the wicked.' This is very glib and so attractive, but I cannot accept it in view of the context. Gâthic expression is often unfortunately far from glib; but cramped, awkward, and apt to contain more thought than could be conveniently expressed within the counted number of syllables. The glib rendering needs other language than that in the MSS. See the following verse, which directly contrasts the treatment of the good and evil by Ahura Himself.

¹ See ahmâi in verse 1, and ashaunê in verse 4. Ahura treats the saint in a manner the reverse from that practised by the nâ kasêus* and akô, not giving sparingly to the good, nor much to the wicked.

² The Pahlavi gives us our first surmise here, as usual, by gavið min hanâ î lak dôshisnih.

the two striving¹ (throngs) through the prosperous increase of our Piety, and of the Righteous ritual and moral Truth; for that (Piety of ours instructing) doth teach² the many coming ones who seek her (face)!

YASNA XLVIII.

ANTICIPATED STRUGGLES AND PRAYERS FOR CHAMPIONS AND DEFENDERS.

This chapter divides itself quite naturally into sections. 1-4 belong together, then 5 and 6, 7 seems less closely connected; then follows 8-12.

1. A struggle is evidently at hand, whether the same as that to which allusion is more than once made, by incitation, as in Y. XXXI, 18; with anxious expectation, as in Y. XLIV, 15, 16; or as if in a sense of victory, as in Y. XLV, 1; or of defeat, as in Y. XLIX, is difficult, or rather impossible to determine. But with the verses 10, 11, 12 in view, together with the dispirited, Y. XLIX, 1, we shall say at once that, if this verse was intended to connect with them, an armed struggle had been expected, whether the decisive one or not, we need not say.

The saint, that is, the pious adherent to the Holy Order, whatever may be the result of the preliminary struggles, is encouraged by a view of the end. 2. But the burdened worshipper craves still further reassurance before the storms of battle came once more upon him. 3. For little as the assurances of Ahura are valued

¹ Or, 'by the two aráni; ' but compare the āsayau in Y. XXXI, 2 just preceding ranôibyâ; so here the ashavan and dregvant are mentioned in a preceding verse. The Pahlavi is unvarying with patkardârânô. I will not positively decide as to this point; generally, however, the preferred rendering is in the text, while on very many questions there is nearly an even balance of probabilities.

² Or, 'chooses to herself; ' but a causative sense may be expressed by an intensive form; the Pahlavi also here bears evidence in the same sense to a causative by hēmnunêd, itself, however, meaning only the object caused; namely, the belief.

by the heretic, to the man who understands the true relations, what Ahura declares by means of His inspired prophets, the secret-announcers, this is, of all things, best; (he need not ask as elsewhere, Y. XXXI, 17). 4. And whoever would hope for spiritual growth and purity must turn his mind to that word of the Deity, and pursue its teachings faithfully, and so at last his fears will vanish, for his doubts will disappear. He will understand as the Lord has taught.

5. This verse seems a prayer to Âramaiti; when the long struggles shall have found their issues, and the one party or the other wins the day, let not that party be the evil alliance with its monarch. For, if the government is set up, and carried on with all the prescribed ceremonial and moral exactness of the wise Kisti; if men who toil for the sacred Kine, and with the virtue of those who cultivate her, hold the reins of power, and can so suppress the predatory raids on defenceless, as well as unoffending victims, then no gift of Ahura, since the tribes became a nation, could be looked upon as a greater, or as so great a blessing, as the correct Authority, and the Order of the Faith.

6. For that sacred Kine, as so often already implied or stated, was all in all to the pious worshipper. It was she, representing, as she did, all wealth in herds, who alone could sustain the home-life of happy industry. And this is the reason why Ahura had originally caused the herbage to grow for her support.

7. Urging the overthrow of the spirit of Rapine in accordance with the Kine's complaint, he exhorts the armed masses to energetic and offensive valour.

8. He then vehemently, although only rhetorically, asks how he may use the proper prayers to rally the needed coadjutors among the chiefs (Y. XLVI, 9) to carry on the struggle. 9. Again he utters a cry for relief in his suspense, and of entreaty for light as to the rewards, which did not concern this life for its own sake (verse 1) merely or chiefly; but which were spiritual blessings received here in preparation for the spiritual world.

10. 'When,' he repeats as one among similar questions four times repeated, 'when shall the ideal men appear whose thoughtful plans (Y. XLVI, 3) shall drive hence the polluted schemes of the false priests and of the tyrants (Y. XLVI, 1)?' 11. And when shall Âramaiti, the kindly piety of home, appear, she who, like the earth, spreads pastures for the peaceful kine, when shall she appear with holy Khshathra (later well called an angel, or archangel) the personified Authority of God over home and state, without which

an anarchy as bad as that of the Evil Authority (verse 5) might continue or recur; and who was the champion-chief who would give them peace through blood (Y. XLVI, 4; LIII, 9)? In a word, to whom, as to the coadjutors of such a leader, would the light of reason, and the true faith come to inspire and to guide them? 12. There is but one only class of human combatants whom he would thus match against that Demon of furious Rapine (v. 6), toward whom the evil on their part at their first creation rushed as to their leader (Y. XXX, 6), and these are the saving Saoshyānts, the vicegerents of the Immortals upon earth, the religious princes Vistāspa, Gāmāspa, Frashaostra, and with them, as the greatest among all, he who was, with much probability, the speaker in the passage, that is, the Ratu appointed by Ahura for the kine and for men, Zarathustra Spitāma elsewhere and later called, with hyperbole, the first tiller, warrior, and priest.

Translation.

1. If through his action ¹ in the offering of gifts in accordance with the Righteous Order, (Thy saint ²) shall smite the Demon-of-the-Lie (the inspiring spirit of our foes), when that in very truth shall come ³, which has been (and is still yet) proclaimed as a deceit ⁴, (when it shall come) in the Immortal life, regarding (as it does both) men (to bless), and Daēvas ⁵ (to afflict them), then shall (Thy faithful worshipper) increase thereby the celebration of Thy praise, O Lord! and with it blessings ⁶ (for Thy folk).

2. Tell me then, Lord! (the end), for Thou dost

¹ The Pahlavi has also pavan zak dahisnō; but a false gloss gives an erroneous concrete [pavan tanū ī pasinō]. Recall âdâi paitî.

² See ashaônō, ashâunê (sic) (Y. XLVII, 4, 5).

³ Read 'as âshûtâ' = has been pushed on, enacted. I correct here as seems so evidently necessary; but the Pahlavi anticipates with its amat zak yâmtûnê.

⁴ Pavan friftârih.

⁵ See Y. XXIX, 4.

⁶ See Y. XXX, 11, savaṭâ ashavabyô.

know it. (Tell me to grant me strength and courage) before those conflicts come which shall encounter me ¹ (as leader of Thy tribes); shall the champion of Thy holy Order, O Ahura! smite (at last) the evil heretic, and when? (I ask Thee this); for this if it be gained (is known) to be the (one) good consummation ² of (our) life.

3. (Yea, tell me then this), for to the enlightened ³ man is that the best of teachings which the beneficent Ahura doth proclaim, and through (the revelations of) His holy Order, bounteous as he and wise with His intelligence, as well as they ⁴ who declare to us (still other) secret sayings (in His name). The one like Thee (their chieftain ⁵) is, O Mazda! endowed with Thy Good Mind's understanding thoughts.

¹ *Meng*=mām or man; -eng is the nasalised vowel. Man is suspiciously significant here; 'mental battles' is rather advanced for the circumstances. It is, however, not impossible. The Pahlavi favours mām(?) here; it has avō li. We might even read menā on its evidence. The Pahlavi indicates the meaning 'crises' under the figure of the 'Bridge,' which was the last great crisis to every man in the eye of the earlier, as well as of the later, Faith; so also in Y. LI, 12. The 'straits of life' would be an admirable meaning; I differ with hesitation.

² Pahlavi *karḍārīh*.

³ See Y. XLIII, 14.

⁴ *Yaêkī/ gūzrā-senghaunghô*. Or, 'knowing also those who are the teachers of secret doctrines.'

⁵ We may, with some effort, connect *thwāvās* with *vaêdemnāi*. *Spentō vīdvau*, however, must refer to the immediately foregoing Ahurō, especially in view of the *tvem vīdvau*, Ahurā, of verse 2. 'The one like Thee' might even, as in other cases, be only an oblique way of rendering 'Thyself;' but the expression 'with the understanding of Vohu Manah' induces me to refer the word *Thwāvās* to the servant of Ahura; in this case, however, this last line must of course be drawn to verse 4, although not mechanically separated from verse 3.

4. (Yea, tell me the secret of the future struggle¹; for that enlightened man) must² follow close³ the holy Faith (for which that struggle had its toil and effort). Yea, O Mazda! he who would bend his mind (till it attains to) that which is the better and more holy, must pursue the Daëna close in word and action. His will and wish must be consistent with his chosen creed and fealty, and in Thine Understanding (which discerneth all) shall he in many ways⁴ be (versed) at last!

5.

5. (But while I as yet know not the issue, I can yet hope and pray.) Let the good kings obtain the rule. Let not the evil monarchs govern us⁵, (but let the righteous gain the day and rule us), with deeds done in a good discernment, O thou pious wisdom, Âramaiti! sanctifying to men's minds the best of blessings for (their) offspring⁷. Yea, for the Kine, (O Âramaiti⁶!)

¹ See verse 2.

² Present for imperative, as sometimes in modern languages in giving directions.

³ The words are anticipated from the third line.

⁴ I follow the Indian sense here with great reluctance. Nanâ may well be, in Iranian, equivalent to 'each several one,' and in fact may not impossibly teach us the origin of the word ('man, man: comp. nareṃ, * nareṃ*). The Pahl. trlr. is so decided for a personal sense, that he renders gabrâ nêrman=man and woman. Did he suppose 'woman' to be literally (!) expressed in the text?

⁵ Âramaiti is addressed, unless indeed an instrumental is read without MSS. An instrumental is of course preferable.

⁶ The Pahlavi has, with admirable freedom, zakatō hû-khûzâi pâdakhshâyinîm, va al lanman zak î dûs-khûzâi salitâ yehavûnâdō. I read hukhshathrâ khshayentām, mâ ne dûs-khshathrâ, to bring the metre somewhat into order, as some gross irregularity is present; the caesura only, not the sense, is affected by the change.

⁷ Or, 'from the birth-hour on; so the Pahlavi. Its gloss reads [akhar min zerkhûnisnō avinâsîh pâhlûm].

let (Thy) toil be given ¹, and may'st Thou cause her to prosper for our life.

6. For she will grant us pleasing homes², and, (while we live) in this Thy Good Mind's longing³ prayer (to gain her welfare), she grants us likewise lasting strength (for every deed which that Thy Good Mind moves us to perform), and therefore hath Mazda caused the plants⁴ to flourish for her (nurture), He, Ahura, in the generation of primeval life.

7. (Then in our coming strife⁵ let both her mortal foes be slain.) Let the Wrath-demon of rapine be cast down. Smite ye against the envy (which would plot against our Throne⁶), O ye who, abiding by the Good Mind, and in accordance with our holy Order, desire to hold that refuge⁷ fast, to whose sacred bond the bounteous man belongs. And therefore,

¹ So Bartholomae, who now holds to a third singular here, leaving the text undisturbed, and explaining as an optative.

² The Pahlavi seems to render 'comfort' here, using *khvârîh* in that sense.

³ So the Pahlavi correctly indicates by its *arzûk*; *Ner. priyataram*.

⁴ Compare Y. LI, 7. Are the plants here mentioned as in connection with *Âramaiti* in her figurative association with the earth?

⁵ See verses 1, 2.

⁶ Or, 'against the blow,' Y. XXIX, 1. The Pahlavi translator here renders *padîrak* † *arêshak*, while in Y. XXIX, 1 he renders † *rêshkûn*. The variations are probably not real; the renderings referring to some forgotten differences of text; or, as often, he may have anticipated modern freedom, and 'changed his text;' that is, rendered it as if changed to a seemingly more intelligible form; so in a throng of similar cases. This is the only rational explanation of some of his errors. (He was able to render, and has rendered, most grammatical forms in different places.)

⁷ The Pahlavi has, however, *navîdîh*. Did he read *vidhyām*, in itself a very possible text?

O Ahura ! (to save Thy struggling saint who toils with changing lot) will I place (that refuge) for him in Thy world.

8. (And how shall I beseech Thee for this victory and gift ?) What is the (potent ¹) prayer to bring on that Thy holy Reign ²? What for Thy sacred reward and blessing for my (soul) ? How shall I seek the open helpers for (the spread and maintenance of) Thy (great) Order ³, while I myself live ⁴ on in Thy Good Spirit's deeds ?

9. (Aye, when shall faith be changed to sight ⁵); and when shall I in verity discern if Ye indeed have power over aught, O Lord ! and through Thy Righteous Order (guarding here on earth), O Thou within whose (power lie) my griefs ⁶ and doubts? Let then Thy saving prophet find and gain aright (for) my delight ⁷ Thy Good Mind's wonder-

¹ Compare *emavantem aêshem*, also *peresâ nau yâ tôi zhmâ parstâ*. Observe that the Pahlavi translator distinguishes the two senses of *îsti*. In Y. XLVI, 2 he transcribes the Gâthic word, the Persian rendering *hezânah*; Ner. *puṇyalakshmîm*; here, however, he has: *Kaḏâr lak*, *Aûharmazd*, *zak î sapîr khvahîsn î khûdâiyh*.

² Compare verse 5.

³ *Ashâ* might certainly equal *âkâ* here (so Bartholomae) if the constant and intentional repetition of the name and idea of *Asha*, = the personified Order, would not have caused confusion.

⁴ The Pahlavi translator renders a word which occupied the place of *gavarô* by *yakhsenunîdârîh*; Ner. following as to root (freely as to form). As he, however, renders related forms elsewhere by 'living,' 'live,' our only safe conclusion is that he had a different word from *gavarô* (*givarô*) before him in his MS.

⁵ Compare Y. XXVIII, 6.

⁶ I am very far from certain that we do not seriously blunder in not following the indication of the Pahlavi here. See remarks Y. XXXII, 16.

⁷ Or, 'let me enjoy as my own;' but *môi* is difficult. *Ûām* might otherwise be a first personal form in the sense of the Vedic *uā*.

working grace¹; yea, let Thy Saoshyant see how gifts of recompense may be his own.

10. When, Mazda! shall the men of mind's perfection come²? And when shall they drive³ from hence, the soil of this (polluted) drunken joy⁴, whereby the Karpans with (their) angry zeal would crush us⁵, and by whose inspiration the tyrants of the provinces (hold on) their evil rule⁶?

11. Yea, when shall our perfected Piety appear

Bartholomae's third sing. imper. is also of course well possible; but were not the originally abnormal third singulars in -âm, duhâm sayâm, vidâm, taken over from third pl. subj. '-âm' really equalling the nasal vowel merely*? Comp. also Indian ádr̥śram, ábudhram, ásr̥igram, Zend vavazirem, -am=an. 'Tradition' has, Pahl. zivisn̥h; Ner. g̥ivitam; Pers. zīstan, for ūkām, as if rendering 'enjoyment,' 'experience of life.' * (âm=tâm is more difficult.)

¹ Comparing vápus; otherwise, with the Pahlavi, 'knowing the destruction (of the evil) which Vohūman works;' see Y. XXIX, 6, where the rendering of the Pahlavi is supported by the previous verse.

² Comp. Y. XLVI, 3. Kadâ Mazdâ fr̥arentê*—saoshyantâm khratavô?

³ Compare Y. XXXII, 15.

⁴ Is Soma-intoxication here referred to? And was the Haoma-worship in abeyance at the time? The Pahlavi seems to have understood 'magic' here, and in the evil sense, that is, judging from the perhaps later gloss. Aside from the gloss, however, the Pahlavi may well have been, nay, more probably was, intended to be read madih as=madahyâ.

⁵ As to this word, we cannot do better than follow Justi (although his work is now a score of years old). The Indian vârpas, in the sense of deceit, has also been compared. The last Pahlavi translator was probably confused by finding this word, as so often, divided in his MS. He rendered as best he could, or rather he handed down the shattered documents, or oral teachings, of his predecessors with his own too often lame additions, the whole mass being rich in the relics of the truth.

⁶ See verse 5.



together with ¹ Thy Righteousness. When shall she come, as having the amenities of home for us, and provided (like our land) with pastures ² (for the kine)? And who shall give us quiet ³ from the cruel (men) of evil life and faith? To whom shall Thy Good Mind's sacred wisdom come (to guide them in their toil to rescue and avenge us)?

12. (To whom? The answer lieth near.) Such shall be the Saviours of the Provinces, and they who, through Thy Good Mind's grace, shall go on hand in hand with mental keenness ⁴ (as it spreads among Thy saints) by the doing every deed of Thy commandment, O Ahura! through the help of, and in accordance with, Thy Holy Order; for such as these are set (for us), as steadfast foes of hate!

YASNA XLIX.

REVERSES AND HOPES. HONOUR TO FRASHAOSTRA AND OTHER CHIEFS.

The chapter divides itself naturally into sections 1-5, 6-11. Verse 12 belongs with chapter L. One of the struggles in the holy cause seems to have gone against the party of Asha. I say 'one

¹ Ma/ following Ashâ shows that we may also have the preposition in pôi ma/.

² As Âramaiti is here spoken of as 'having pasture,' that is, as inspiring the thrifty husbandmen who cultivate the meadows by irrigation, or drainage, she became associated herself with those meadows, and so later with the earth; see Y. XLVII, 2.

³ The Pahlavi sees in râmâm enforced quiet not 'from' but 'to' the wicked; 'who shall deal the finishing blow to the wicked?'

⁴ So also the Pahlavi, shnâsinîdârîh.

of the struggles,' for from the account of a reverse which we have here, and from that of a success which meets us in chapter XLV, 1, and again from reverses in XLVI, 1, 2, &c., we naturally conclude that 'the cause' saw many vicissitudes, in which the last Gātha still leaves us. Whether Y. XLV, 1 records a victory which was subsequent to the reverse before us, referring to a battle alluded to in Y. XLIV, 14, 15, also possibly anticipated in Y. XXXI, can never be decided; the order of the statements in the sequence of our present MSS. has little or nothing to do with the possible order of the events.

1. A border chief, *Bendva* by name, had proved himself too formidable (*mazistō*) for the moment, and the holy Faith knows how to beg for vengeance on the armed *Drūg*-worshipper. The weapons of Ahura were not spiritual only, any more than those of Israel were, or those of Mohammed. The death of an armed religious enemy was devoutly to be desired for every moral and political, as well as for every personal reason. 2. For judicial as well as priestly decisions hung on the issue. And this *Bendva* had his functionaries and a system, and they were in full and active operation. And this was, beyond a doubt, a rival and settled system, and not merely an upstart and insurrectionary one. It had caused the true prophet many an hour of thought as well as anger. Its functionaries gave him pause (*mānayēiti*). Falsity in religion was as ever his opportunity; and invective follows. 'The priestly judge himself who served the *Drūg*-worshippers was a cheat.' 'The holy Order was his foe, and not his helper.' And he did not contribute at all to the spread of Piety as the Zarathustrians conceived of it, nor indeed really in another sense for the reason that he even repudiated the source of pious wisdom, which is holy counsel. 3. But, however, the evil functionaries might resort to subterfuge and strategy, the opposing powers themselves, the Righteous Order on the one side, and the power of the Lie-demon on the other, were planted in the opposing systems with dualistic clearness, to benefit or injure. There was no compromise, as doubtless the *Drūg*-party may have wished.

And so the poet cries once more for the divine Benevolence to be his guardian; or perhaps he may have intended a particular chief who represented the Good Mind, while at the same time he swept the entire throng and company who adhered to the Lie-demon, with his interdict, away from his consideration. 4. He declares them closely allied to the *Daēva*-worshippers, or else he puts their worship of the *Daēvas* in the place of climax as their

highest offence, not failing to point out what should conciliate sympathy with him always ; that is, that those who brought the Daêvas, and opposed Asha, were the devotees of Rapine (aêshmem vareden); for murderous rapine seems to have been, apart from Asha, the universal sin. By this these Daêva-worshippers gained a stolen livelihood, and spent their ill-gotten means in idle waste (fshuyasû afshuyantô). 5. But he who defended the holy Daêna was as meat and drink to the people, wise and faithful, as a settled citizen, and trained in the habits of the holy State.

6. He therefore prays once more for right discernment as to how he may propagate the Faith. 7. And he calls on the steady citizen to listen, beseeching God Himself to give an ear, and to tell him who the faithful prince, or peer, or villager, may be, who may take the lead (see sarē) in giving forth (see srāvayaēmā) that holy Daêna, with its frasasti, to the masses who await it. 8. But he asks the question as if only to give emphasis to his naming a chief and venerated friend. Frashaostra is the man. He is the one fitted for the hearing, apt to proclaim the truth (frasrûidyâi erethwô). And he begs that they both (compare Y. XXVIII, 9) may be lastingly prominent in that holy Realm which was to counteract the depraved polity whose chief had for the moment gained the upper hand (verses 1, 2). 9. But the case is in so far uncertain and undecided, that he cries for help once more to the ideal citizen himself, fearing that he may yet be induced to share the power with the heretic, and still declares that men's souls may reach the reward of priority only through the holy System of Ahura, and under the rulers of His choice.

10. He therefore confides the result to Ahura, and with it, his dependents, those living and those dead. And his thoughts, being turned to heaven (11), they also revert as if by antithesis (the key-note of the Daêna) to future retribution. Those who may be wavering, half-inclined to adhere to the opposing party (verse 9), are warned in words of peculiar meaning. Those that choose the evil sovereign, a dussasti, as in Y. XXXII, 9, or as the sastars of Y. XLVI, 1, will not go forward with the saints to the *Kinva* (Y. XLVI, 10), nor will they be met by their consciences under pleasing images, and later by the souls of saints who had gone before, but the wicked dead shall meet them in the home of Lies, with poisoned food, and sneering words. And this shall be a self-inflicted vengeance.

Translation.

1. *Bendva*¹ has ever fought with me; (yea, since he first appeared at hand to threaten, and alas to his advantage in the strife). He is the most powerful (in brutal might), and (in his predominance) would crush my strength as I seek to win back the disaffected (in my host) through Righteous² (zeal), O Mazda! Come then with gifts of (vengeful³) good to (meet) my sorrow⁴. Through (Thine inspiring) Good Mind obtain (for me⁵) that (*Bendva's*) death⁶!

2. (Aye, he is indeed the greatest⁷), for that

¹ If this word does not simply mean 'a band,' one might suspect a relation of root with *bānayan*. The Pahlavi has expressively and freely *badtūm* here, and *vīmarīh* in the next verse, with a like word in Y. XXX, 6. This enemy may have been roughly dubbed 'the polluted,' or even 'diseased one;' analogous occurrences are not wanting.

² I cannot agree to rendering *ashâ* 'really,' when applied in an evil sense. The sacred word may mean 'really' when applied to the righteous, but then, in that case, the reality indicated has an element of sanctity in it, and that of no low order. I am also not aware that *riténa* is applied in an evil sense in the *Rig-veda*. The use of *Asha*, like that of *Vohu Manah* and *Khshathra*, &c., is obvious in the *Gâtha*; the six sacred words were, like the theme of a symphony, brought in at every opportunity, with all shades of meaning from those of proper names to those of adverbs. With slight change of text to a nom., we might render, 'He who seeks to please the evil-minded, O Thou A.!'

³ Comp. Y. XXXIII, 2.

⁴ I cannot agree that *arapâ* should be read *rapâ* for the sake of a syllable in the metre. The line has more than eleven syllables here, as the Vedic *Trishūp* often has. Moreover the ancient writing before the Pahlavi translator read likewise *arapâ*, and the sense demands it.

⁵ Or, 'may I obtain.'

⁶ See Y. LIII, 9.

⁷ See the first verse.

Bendva's evil judge doth cause me to hesitate and ponder (in my earnest course of propagation and reform), a deceiver as he is, (estranged) from the Righteous Order, and receiving¹ from it (not happiness) but many a wound. The bountiful and perfect Piety he has not maintained nor strengthened for this² land, nor questions with Thy Good Mind hath he asked³ (to gain him light), O Lord!

3. But (all is not yet lost!); for this religious choice⁴ (our holy creed, for which our last lost⁵ battle has been fought), O Mazda! Thy blessed Order (our guardian help) has yet been set to save and bless us. (But) for (that evil) Judge, the Demon-of-the-Lie, (is set) to deal (for him) her wounds⁶. Therefore do I pray (the more) for the sheltering leadership of Thy Good Mind (within our folk and our commanders). And all the allies of the wicked I abjure⁷.

4. They who with evil scheme and will shall cherish and help on the Wrath of Rapine, and with her Râma⁸, and (not by silent favour, but) with their

¹ I would gladly accede to a subjunctive 2nd singular intensive here in a causative sense, but a 3rd singular precedes, and a 3rd singular follows. I cannot therefore recognise a subjunctive in a precativ, or imperative, sense here. I think the word is a nominative, as its position in the verse corresponds well to that form. It may mean 'delivering against us many a wound.'

² Possibly 'for us in (this) land.'

³ Comp. Y. XLIV, 13.

⁴ Comp. Y. XXX, 2.

⁵ See *mazistô* in the first verse.

⁶ The Pahlavi *mûn rêshînêd pavan Drûg*.

⁷ The Pahlavi translator gave as our first rendering here: *Andarg harvišp-gûnô darvandânô min hamkhâkih andarg yemale-lûnam*; [aigh, min dôstih î levatman valmansân gavidâk yehevûnam].

⁸ The Pahlavi has *arêshkô* = envy.

very tongues, whose will and wish ¹ (run) not with good but evil deeds. These settle and support the Daêvas (in their power, not the Lord). It is ² the wicked's Faith and Insight (so to do. Their faith is the perverted).

5. But he, O Mazda! is our abundance and our fatness³, who (will yet dare these unbelieving foes) and guard the Faith (against that envious Wrath⁴), and with the Good Mind's power. For every man of Piety is a wise citizen⁵ in accordance with the holy Order, and so are all who are (in truth) within Thy Realm, O Lord!

6. And now, will I beseech of You, O Mazda, and Righteousness (within Thy Māthra) speaks⁶ (to tell me) what lies within Your will's intention, that (having discerned Your Insight as the enlightened

¹ The Pahlavi gave us our first surmise as to the general meaning of vās; it renders kāmāk.

² Or, 'by that which is the evil's Faith.'

³ The Pahlavi translator gave us our first general indication here as elsewhere; he has shîrînîh and karpîh. Reading 'Mazdau,' we have 'Mazda (is our source of) abundance and refreshment.'

⁴ See the fourth verse.

⁵ The Pahlavi has, however, khûp shinâsakîh. I differ with hesitation; possibly views may be harmonised.

⁶ Compare Y. XXIX, 3, where Asha answers. I cannot well accept mrûitê as an infinitive. Geldner has keenly pointed out that fraêshyâ is inclined to unite with an infinitive, but so are other forms of ish and vas. Moreover the infinitive does not so naturally fall to the end of the sentence in Gāthic or Vedic. (See above, note on Y. XXXIV, 1.) If an infinitive is insisted upon (so long since) let us at least bring the word into more usual shape, using the Pahlavi translator, as in one of his most valuable offices, as an indirect evidence, where his translation is at fault as a rendering. He has: Frázō avō zak î Lekûm farmâyēm, Aûharmazd, va Ashavahistōkê râî yemalelûnam. He had 'mrûvê' before him, which might be an infinitive.

ever must), I may as well discern aright how we can herald forth those (truths), and that pure Daëna (with them) which is the Faith of Him who is Thyself¹, O Lord.

7. And (as we speak it forth as taught by Asha) then let the (zealous² citizen) give heed, and with Thy Good Mind, O Ahura Mazda! Yea, let him give ear in accordance with (the dictate of) the Holy Order, and do Thou hear alike as well³. Who shall be the ally; and who the kinsman-lord himself, who, with his gifts and (legal rules), shall institute and settle for the serving mass a worthy praise (for God⁴)?

8. (And I do not ask in vain, for such an one is found for us, and near at hand.) To Frashaostra hast Thou given that most favouring guardian power, the headship⁵ of the Holy Order (for us), O

¹ I think that *khshmvâtô* equals simply 'yourself' here, as often (so *mavant*=me); otherwise 'of your disciple,' which would be feeble. Professor Jolly has, V. S., s. 97, 'damit wir ihn verkündigen möchten den Glauben, welcher der eure ist, o Ahura.'

² See the ninth verse.

³ Ahura is elsewhere addressed in close connection with human beings; here the human subject is half lost in Vohûman and Asha. I hardly think that it is wise to change the text without MSS. A lost verse may have relieved all difficulty.

⁴ Others 'the good doctrine,' or again 'the good repute;' but as to the latter, *frasasti* is coupled so constantly in the later Avesta with *yasna*, and *vahma*, &c., that I do not feel at liberty to depart from that sense. The Pahlavi has also *vâfrîgânih*, quite in harmony with the connection.

⁵ This verse is clearly an answer to the questions contained in verse 7. It is a half answer, even if we render *dau* (*dâo*) as a subjunctive. As the question in verse 7 certainly concerns a chief of some kind, I cannot see how we can avoid rendering *sarəm* analogously. We need one who gives a refuge rather than one who receives it. Compare the Pahlavi, and also the Persian, *sar*. The Pahlavi

Ahura! This therefore would I pray of Thee (to confirm to him that gracious gift), and for myself likewise, would I now seek as well that sheltering headship which is within Thy Realm; yea, most blest and foremost¹ may we both for ever be within it.

9. Aye, let the zealous and thrifty husbandman, so formed for giving help and blessings², give heed and listen when I call, (O Mazda!) Let not the truthful (tiller, he who hears and speaks Thy word³), be he who takes⁴ that sheltering chieftainship together with the wicked. Let the believing natures (only) join in that best recompense. And thus in the course of the holy Order are in the fact so joined those two, Gāmâspa and the 'hero'⁵.

10. (And since these champions thus join in that reward), then therefore will I place as well in Thy

translation gives its evidence without intermission for this meaning, a fact largely overlooked.

¹ I think that the connection fairly proves this meaning; and it has likewise the powerful support of the Pahlavi translation: *Hamâi vad avō vîspō farmânpatō hōmanânî* [aîgh, Frashostar [] vad tanû î pasîno hamâi salîtâih yehabûn].

² It is not to be forgotten that *su* is the root of *Saoshyant*.

³ Comp. Y. XXXI, 15.

⁴ Or 'gives;' compare *peresâ avas yâ mainis ye dregvâitê khshathrem hunâitî*. Professor Jolly, V. S., s. 36: 'Nicht soll wer das Rechte redet, die Herrschaft dem Lügner überlassen.'

⁵ *Yâhî* remains a singular, whereas we should expect a dual; (can it be such, the form being altered, as so often by later reciters, to accommodate the metre?) For *Gāmâspâ* and *yukhtâ* as duals compare *utayûitî tevîshî*. *Yâhî* probably refers to *Vîstâspa* (Y. XLVI, 14). Was it an especial epithet for the kings? The later Persian kings took prominent places in battle. If the duals are not admitted, my rendering would be, 'the souls are united with the reward through the (influence and example of the) valiant *Gāmâspa*.' Perhaps *Gāmâspô* is to be read.

protection (Thy) Good Mind¹ (in the living) and the spirits (of the dead. Yea, I confide our very) self-humbling praises, (which we offer, unto Thee), by which (Thine) Âramaiti (who is our Piety, exists), and likewise sacrificing zeal. And this would we do to further Thy great Sovereign Power (among Thy folk), and with undying² (?) strength.

11. (But as to faithless reprobates); the souls (of the evil dead) shall meet those evil men who serve their evil rulers, who speak with evil words, and harbour evil consciences, these souls (in Hell) shall come with evil food³ (to welcome them), and in the Lie's abode their dwelling⁴ verily shall be⁵!

YASNA XLIX, 12 — L.

The most striking circumstance here, after the rhetorical and moral-religious peculiarities have been observed, is the sixth verse; and as to the question of Zarathustrian authorship, it is the most striking in the Gâthas or the Avesta. In that verse we have Zarathustra, not named alone, which might easily be harmonised

¹ This is probably the foundation for the later identification of Vohû Manah and the faithful disciple.

² Here all is conjectural. The Pahlavi reports an adjective from a form of man (or a participle). They who think upon the throne (to seize it) do so with dying power. Wilder conjectures have been made; but the Pahlavi translators seldom wilfully guessed. They took the shattered results of their predecessors, and worked them feebly over; hence their great value, and the unimportance of their errors. They used what intelligence they possessed in re-delivering what they heard and read. Vazdanghâ cannot well be taken in an evil sense, as it is used in a good sense elsewhere. The connection mǎzâ with râ has long circulated; mǎzâ avêmî râ (?). As the souls of the departed are thought of, perhaps 'undying' is the meaning; compare avêmîra (for form) with the Zend avimithris.

³ See Yast XXII by Darmesteter, as supplemented.

⁴ So the Pahlavi; otherwise 'their bodies shall so lie.'

⁵ Verse 12 belongs to the next chapter.

with his personal authorship, nor have we only such expressions as 'to Zarathustra and to us' (Y. XXVIII, 7), but we have Zarathustra named as 'mahyâ râzeng sâhîr,' 'may he declare my regulations, which could only be said, without figure of speech, by some superior, if not by the prime mover himself. Were these verses then written by the prime mover? And was he other than Zarathustra? If so, the entire mass of the Gâthas was of course written by him, or else their style and character may be regarded as of such a character that they could have been composed by four or five closely connected individuals. But while verses here and there are doubtless the productions of secondary persons, the mass of the Gâthas cannot be regarded as the work of several different composers. They are one man's work, directly or indirectly. If then the present section, which is especially original in its tone, was not from Zarathustra, the man whose heart and soul, and, we may add, whose power were in Zarathustrianism, was not Zarathustra, but some unnamed individual far more important. (See note on Y. XXVIII, 7.) The prominence of the name of Zarathustra was in that case solely owing to the personal activity of Zarathustra supported by the social rank of the Spitâmas. Zarathustra was a princely disciple, on the hypothesis mentioned, and nothing more. The real author of Zarathustrianism was, in that case, in no sense Zarathustra; compare 'to Zarathustra and to us:' nor yet Vîstâspa; compare 'to Vîstâspa and to me:' nor Frashaostra; compare 'to Frashaostra and to us;' and, we may also say, not Gâmâspa, for he is addressed in the vocative. He was mentally and personally the superior of all of them. In fact he was the power behind both throne and home, and yet without a name! But, in that case, what becomes of Y. XXIX, 6, 8? Is it probable that the founder of a religion (or of a new departure in a religion) would describe another as the chosen of God, if he were not in fact supposed to be thus eminent? Or, if a popular and sincerely enthusiastic religious composer were about to chant a hymn at a meeting of the religious masses, would he be likely to name a person to the animated throngs, whom they themselves did not feel to be the life of their religious faith? especially, if that person were not prominent from the arbitrary circumstance that he was the reigning prince? I do not think that this is at all probable. But if Zarathustra had, as described, the leading name, and composed a portion of the hymns with their lost companions, is it probable that he possessed no decided prominence in this matter above Vîstâspa, Frashaostra, and Gâmâspa? Was there no central poet, who

composed the mass of the metrical lore, dominating by his influence those who added portions here and there, or was there a quaternion of seers, four Zarathustras, as one might say? As we have said, the hymns decide it. One man's soul is in them, as a composer's feelings are in his compositions, or a master's feelings are in the lines of his disciples. But if there was one central figure instead of four, and he is mentioned as Zarathustra, and as the spokesman in many portions of the Gâthas, being likewise known by inference to be the composer of nearly all of them, how can we account for the words, 'let him, Zarathustra, teach or proclaim my regulations?' Can the verse be regarded as put into the mouth of Ahura, as elsewhere? Hardly, for Ahura is addressed in it. I can therefore only repeat of this verse, as of the others which present analogous questions in Y. XXVIII (with which this chapter L stands in the closest connection), that this thoroughly original piece was composed by Zarathustra as by far the most prominent individual in the religious struggle, dominating his party essentially and positively, and that these verses (6-11) were simply rhetorically put into the mouth of the monarch from the exigency of the style of composition. And I conclude that Vistâspa was supposed to speak them, because in the presence of Zarathustra, it is extremely improbable that any one but the titular head of the State should have been represented as saying of Zarathustra, 'mahyâ râzeng sâhî!'

1. The piece from Y. XLIX, 12 to Y. L, 1-5 joins well on with Y. XLIX, although the tone is brighter. As he begins with questions in Y. XLVIII, 8-11, after the prospective prayers of Y. XLVIII, 1-7, in which he looks forward to a crisis in the armed struggle, so now after the hostile chief has got the upper hand, he cries out once more with interrogatives, uttering the questions, not of curiosity, but of mournful devotion.

'The storm has broken over us,' so he would seem to say, 'and I have prayed for grace to know how we may administer (Y. XLIV, 9) the all-powerful means of help, the Daëna, in which Thy Righteous Order is set (Y. XLIX, 3). I have cried to Thee for chief and peer (verse 7), naming Frashaostra, Gâmâspa, and the Yâhin, and now, while I invoke you, praying for what in your selection is the best (Y. XXVIII, 11; Y. XLIV, 10), I would more than ever declare that I have none other help than Thee and Thy saving Order.'

2. And he asks once more to know how he who seeks to further the sacred herds, as the emblem of the moral thrift of the provinces, should proceed in his allotted work. 3. Answering his own question, he says that it is by advance upon the enemy; he declares

that the heroic settler who pushes the holy system to the utmost verge of the sacred territory or still further, was the man 'to gain the Kine' for the seeking prophet. 4. But in the midst of struggles, he anticipates Garôdman with its praises. 5. For they were all prepared for both worship and work, since God had approached to aid His prophet, encouraging His discouraged spirit. 6. Here Vîstâspa is represented as intervening; and he addresses Ahura literally, but Zarathustra really, exhorting him indirectly to continue on in his work of propagation, undismayed by present circumstances. 7. And with Zarathustra, he would re-engage the other powerful helpers, whom he would yoke on as steeds to gain God's praise in Heaven by passing over every bridge of trial safely. 8. Having heard from Zarathustra his metric words, he will approach with them to pray, and, as in Y. XXVIII, 2, 3, 'with hands stretched out' with homage, and with vigour. 9. And he looks to attain the object of his prayers by religious self-control, and faithful action. 10. His efforts vie with the heavenly bodies in their praise of God. 11. Therefore he will persevere, and as a praiser-king (so the Pahlavi in one place); and he beseeches that Ahura, the life-giver, may help on the all-engrossing cause.

Translation.

Y. XLIX, 12¹. What aids of grace hast Thou for Thine invoking Zarathustra, (O Ahura Mazda!) to grant him through Thy Righteous Order? Yea, what (aids of² grace hast thou for me as) through Thy Good Mind given (within my soul), for me who will (still) pray to Thee with praises, O Great Creator! beseeching what in accordance with Your wished-for aim is best?

Y. L, 1. Aye, doth my soul indeed obtain assisting

¹ This verse is placed here as obviously more closely related to chapter L than to chapter XLIX. Lost verses may, however, have intervened between it and Y. L, 1.

² Another rendering, regarding *ka* as a purely interrogative participle, would be, 'Are they (tôî) helpful to the invoking Zarathustra?' But *ka* tôî is a familiar form; see Y. XXXIV, 12, where it must mean *quid tibi*.

grace, and which of Thy blessings is that gift to me, O Lord? What saving champion is found to save both flocks and herds? And who for myself other than Thy Righteous Order, and Thyself, Ahura? Tell me¹, O (ye) invoked ones! Or what of grace is there for me save Thy Best Mind (itself)?

2. (And if Thy guardian is verily to save our wealth) how shall he (obtain, and by what means shall he) seek after² that joy-creating Kine (who is the living symbol of our peace³)? (How shall that man obtain his wish) who shall desire to see her provided with pastures for (the welfare of) this land? (That only way is righteousness.) Do Thou then grant me lands (so would I ask of Thee) which live in justice in the many⁴ splendours of the sun, and lands which openly⁵ thus live, and which are to be

¹ I should be far from denying that *azdâ* may equal *addhâ*, but a strengthening adverb seems to me of no particular force here. I formerly rested at the simple explanation *az + dâ = dhâ* = desire-exciting, much desired one. But the Pahlavi translator affords an explanation which may surpass that of his successors. He sees the meaning: 'When I shall call upon You,' (that is, freely, 'being invoked,') 'cause Thou (sic) me to understand fully.' This is the remnant of some predecessor's work, who rendered 'tell ye me;' *az* = *ah*, otherwise lost in Zend. The plural follows the singular too often to excite much doubt; *azdâ* = tell ye; so *zdf* is from *az*, as *syôdûm* is from *as* (recall the well-known Indian analogies). See also the explanation of the Pahlavi at Y. XXXI, 17. If a plural cannot be admitted, then consider a form extended by *d*.

² The Pahlavi translates freely, *bavîhûnam*.

³ The Kine must represent the people as well as their live-stock. The raids concerned the owners more than their cattle. In answer to the cry of the Kine, Zarathustra was sent to the people.

⁴ I can hardly agree to the rendering 'among people who see the sun' without a needless reconstruction of the text. The Pahlavi likewise has *pavan khvârîh*; for general meaning, compare *Khshathrôî hueng daresôî*, not as equivalent however.

⁵ *Âskârag stî*.

sought and gained by me (as conquests for the cause).
Give Thou this gift!

3. (Yea, let that joy-creating one) be his possession through the Righteous Order (which he helps to bring, that living sign) which (the most valiant citizen) may give to him (at once reward and charge), and in accordance with Thy Sovereign Authority. (May that heroic settler grant him this gift) he who may make the (last imperilled) farm to flourish in the vigour of Thy blest prosperity, the tract which lies the nearest (to the fields) which our foeman holds as his¹.

4. (And therefore both in thankfulness and hope) will I give sacrifice to You with praises, O Ahura Mazda! together with Thine Order and Thy Best Mind (in Thy saints), and in accordance with Thy sacred Sovereign Power, by whose help the wisher (heaven-bound) may stand upon the (certain) pathway², and in Thine Home-of-song shall I (by means of these my Yasnas offered here) there hear the praises of Thine offering saints who see Thy face³.

5. And we⁴ are in readiness as well (to fulfil Your praises and declare your words), O Ahura Mazda! through Your (grace, and) in accordance with Your Holy Order, since Ye advance with friendliness⁵ to cheer the speaker of Your Māthra-word with open acts of visible relief, as if with hand sent forth,

¹ The Pahlavi translation, as usual, not literally exact, still furnishes the correct clue, *Zak ī nazdistō (?) gēhānō min valman ī darvand bakhshēd* [*aīgar zak dēn dārisn barā yansegūnyēn*].

² *Frō tāis vispāis Kīnvatō frā peretūm*.

³ *Ākau* (compare the Indian *ākē*); 'who approach, and are therefore evident (*āshkarak*) to God, and seeing Him.' Comp. *ākau* in Y. LI, 13, which has been thought a loc.

⁴ See *nau*.

⁵ To *vrag*.

whereby that Māthra-speaker of Your truth may bring us on, and settle us, in weal and bliss ¹.

6. (Therefore will I incite him to his task the more. Let him indeed proclaim the righteous way ²) he who already lifts his voice in Māthras, O Ahura Mazda! he, Zarathustra ³, the faithful friend in accordance with the Holy Order, and with self-abasing worship, giver of understanding for this land, voice-guider (of the way to glory ⁴), let him indeed proclaim and teach my regulations, and in accordance with Thy Good Mind (as his law).

7. (And together with that chief speaker of your word I would engage yet others in the cause). Your well-incited ⁵ and swift ⁶ (servants), O Ahura! would I yoke ⁷ on (as steeds to take their holy course toward heaven), gaining ⁷ thereby (at last) the Bridges ⁸ where

¹ See the previous verse, where the wisher stands on the path, seeking to reach Garōdman. It seems therefore probable that *hvâthrê* refers to *demânê garô*.

² Compare Y. LIII, 2, *daunghô erezûs pathô*.

³ As remarked, this entire piece recalls Y. XXVIII. Here the monarch is represented as speaking precisely as spokesmen are introduced in any other composition. We have no reason to suppose the piece to be the composition of some leading person other than Zarathustra, because of the words 'let Zarathustra speak forth my regulations.' (See page 169.)

⁴ *Īshô staunghaŕ â paithî*.

⁵ Consider a suffix *ishfi*.

⁶ Here the Pahlavi translator gives us both text and translation, *aurvatô=arvand*.

⁷ Or, 'yoke Thou, may'st Thou gain.'

⁸ The *Kinvaŕ* Bridge, either literally or figuratively. Compare 'the bridge of the earth' (Y. LI, 12). The crises of effort, or temptation, are meant, as the *Kinvaŕ* Bridge was the last crisis before salvation or perdition. The souls of the good and of the evil were met by their own consciences on the Bridge, and encouraged or reviled.

'When the soul of the pious passes over that Bridge, the width of

Your adoration (rules and is complete). Yea, I (?) yoke on your mighty ones, and with Thy Holy Order, and Thy Good Mind. And with these may Ye drive on; aye, be Ye for my help!

8. (And as I yoke on Your Māthra-speakers for their course, then) would I (myself) approach You in the (highest) deed of worship¹, and with these sacred metric feet (of Zarathustra and his peers²), those which are heard and famed afar, as the metric feet of zealous worship, and with my hands stretched³ out (in supplicating prayer). Yea, You (would I approach), O Mazda! in union with Your sacred ritual Truth, and with the homage of a freely-giving helper⁴, and with the good virtue of (Your) Good Mind (in my soul).

9. Yea, with these Yasnas of Your sacrifice would I approach You, praising back to You (in answer to Your mercies), O Ahura! and Thou, O Righteousness! in (the holy) actions of Your Good Mind, (as he moves within us), so long indeed as I shall have the power, commanding at my will o'er this my sacred (privilege) and gift. (And doing as) the wise man (thus), may I (like him) become a suppliant who gains⁵ his ends.

10. (Mine every wish and prayer is this), then therefore whatsoever I shall do, and whatsoever deeds

that Bridge becomes about one league' (West, *Mainyô-î Khard*,* p. 134). Possibly the extension of the Bridge for the pious arose from the plural use here.

¹ Compare Y. XXVIII, 3.

² See Y. XXVIII, 9.

³ See Y. XXVIII, 2.

⁴ See Y. XLVI, 9.

⁵ The Pahlavi translator accepts a sense of acquisition here as well as of desire: *Aêtûnō zak î valman î avō hû-dânâk pavan khvahîsnō griftâr hōmanânî* [mozd]. I accede to its indication, holding that *gardh* certainly has such an element in its meaning.

(of ritual and truth I shall yet further do) on account of, (and to make full¹) these (prior deeds of worship), yea, whatsoever (holy works) shine bright² as having worth in (all) men's eyes through Thy Good Mind (whose character they share; these as) the stars, suns, and the Aurora which brings on the light³ of days, are all, through their Righteous Order, (the speakers) of Thy⁴ praise, O Thou Great Giver, Lord!

11. Your praiser then (by eminence) would I be named, and (more), would be it, so long as by (Thine inspiring) Righteousness I am thus able and may have the power. And may the maker of the world give help through (His implanted) Good Mind (in my fellow-servants). And may that (all) be done⁵ (to further us) which through His veritable grace is most promotive (for the cause)!

¹ I can here only follow the words as they are written; the meaning is clear enough although rather advanced. Reconstructions on a large scale are seldom of value.

² Judging from the context, we may render *argat* thus.

³ The Pahlavi translator here renders as if he read *ushâ*. In Y. XLVI, 3 he translates *ukhshânô*. Professor Wilhelm, preferring as above, still recalls the Homeric usage favouring 'increaser.' The Pahlavi has *vakhshînîdâr* in Y. XLVI, 3. Here *hôsh zak î arûs dên bâm I*. Ner. alone understood *arûs*.

⁴ 'Your.'

⁵ An imperative has long been recognised in *varstām*; or read: 'Let him cause that which is the most furthering of deeds to grow influential through veritable grace.' So perhaps better.

THE GÂTHA(Â) VOHÛ KSHATHREM (VOHUKHSHATHRA(Â)).

This Gâtha consists of the single chapter Y. LI. It has lines of fourteen syllables with caesura in the middle.

YASNA LI.

INSTRUCTIONS AND APPEALS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FAITHFUL.

It is hardly possible that we have here a continuous whole. The thoughts, however, harmonise well enough, and the changes give little trouble. 1. As so often the Sovereign Authority of Ahura, His reign over the hearts and in the minds of His faithful worshippers, is the leading theme. That sovereign Power, when it is established, will produce every good thing with it, and repress every evil, and the composer prays that he may never pause at any moment in his efforts to bring that kingdom on. 2. Accordingly, as the foremost of objects, he beseeches for both its blessings and its protection, and names Âramaiti as the especial representative of Ahura in this case to grant the Kingdom as a Realm established in spiritual wealth, and whose first effect should be the glory of God through the agency of holy dispositions in men.

3. The spirit of the Daêna is public and prophetic rather than occult and mysterious. The people therefore gather to hear Gâthas recited, and religious harangues delivered as on political occasions, and all the more because the Mâthras are declared to be the results of direct inspiration from Ahura. 4. The present recitations are invocations calling for the four energising Immortals, the guiding Order, the active Piety, the inspiring Benevolence, and the Power-wielding Kingdom, and, in using these names, the multitude are also beseeching, by the voice of their spokesman, for the Ratu, the Saoshyant cried for by the Kine, looked for by Asha himself, and promised by Ahura.

5. And the men who press this prayer are, each of them, for the moment (*nûîr*), as the Ratu himself. Wise in his homage, he seeks to gain the kine, like the ideal husbandman, both as property and as emblem, and he desires to establish the Ratu, understood as a person, or as the law, which may judge between the two sides (Y. XXXI, 2), and, by the expulsion of the evil, give quiet to the land (Y. XLVI, 4; Y. LIII, 9). 6. Declaring Ahura to be the awarder of the highest good and deepest evil, (7) he calls on Him to grant the 'eternal two,' the rewarding Immortals (not named in the former verse), but only by means of the inspired teachings. 8. And as these inculcations are effective for himself, he will declare forth their threats and promises to others, being repaid for his zealous fidelity in the very act. 9. Recalling the hopes of vengeance, he beseeches Ahura to give forth a sign, or instrument, from the holy Fire, which may settle the disputes by the forged blade of justice. 10. For he declares that the man who murderously assaults his adherents in the opposing interest (see Y. XXXII, 10, &c.) is inherently and originally perverted in his motives, a very son of the Lie, and of the seed of Akôman.

11. While in terms he addresses Ahura, he in reality challenges the devotion of the chieftains, as he calls aloud to the Deity.

12. Here a temptation of Zarathustra is narrated, as in the Vendîdâd, here dwelling on his youth, there on his maturer manhood. But the verse shows marked signs of later age.

13. And the soul of the righteous is encouraged by the recorded example; he shall come off the conqueror, as Zarathustra did.

14. But the Karpans (priestly chiefs?) of the opposing party, following the typical destroyer (as in Y. XXXII), would bring the world to ruin, and the creatures to Hell.

15. The true disciples will however infallibly receive the promised recompense.

16. And as for that *Kîsti*, conceived by Mazda to give the saving knowledge in the sacred verse, the King of the Realm had acquired it. It will be stored in the memory of faithful priests under his care and rule; and he will give his subjects a good worship (Y. XLIX, 7) in accordance with it. 17. A female saint, also illustrious in rank, is celebrated with honourable mention; she is, as it were, the *Kîsti* in her person, as she is named in this connection.

18. Another devoted friend arrests the speaker's eye, as he stands in the assembly; (19) and still another. 20. Then, as if taking in all with his view, and with an expression which shows

his identification with the people, he declares that the 'Archangels' are of one mind with Mazda in bestowing spiritual blessings, the chief of which are inspired words, the source of their discipline, and the guide of their hopes.

21. And with assurances as to the greatness of the spiritual blessings implied in all that he has said, he prays Ahura all the more earnestly to grant them to His elect. 22. And he declares that Ahura knows and observes the man who fulfils every command that he has uttered, as well as believes every doctrine which he has divulged, and that, knowing Him, He also marks Him as the object of His grace. And he ends by expressing once more his desire to approach the Bountiful Immortals, not as naming them alone, but naming them, as we may well suppose, with a full appreciation of all that is meant by the sacred words which belong to them as names.

Translation.

1. The good Government (of Ahura¹) is to be chosen (among all wished-for things²) as that lot which most of all brings on (our happiness). Actions that oppress us it opposes³, through the holy Order (which pervades it), and with the pious zeal (of its true servants). Therefore, O Great Creator! let me

¹ It is far better to take *Khshathra* in its usual and often necessary sense. And it is especially desirable not to confound it with *shôithra*=*kshétra*.

² The choice one.

³ One is somewhat inclined to regard *vidushemnâis* as a monstrous form of *vid*, which has crept into the text under the influence of the two words *vidushê* in verse 8, and owing to an attempt to fill out the metre, the original word having been *videm-nâis*. The Pahlavi gives no indication except for a form of *dû*=to give. Leaving the MSS. intact, I compare *dush*+*vi*.

I render as above on the principle that the text in the MSS. should not be violated where it is possible to translate it at all. Reading *videmnâis* we might render, 'that kingdom's privileges are shared (it is entered and penetrated) by men who act (by actions) in a manner to further its security, (by actions gaining it).'

produce, and help bring on (that Sovereign Power) which is the best for us at every present hour.

2. And first I will ask for¹ these two blessings of Your own, O Thou Great Creator, and thou His Righteous Order! and I also ask of thee, Our Piety (personified, as well); and grant me this Your Sovereign Rule over our desired wealth (to give and to preserve it; and likewise) those spiritual blessings which are advantageous for our worship (of Ahura) through (the inspiration of His) Good Mind (within the soul).

3. (And it is not I alone who thus appeal to You; I speak for all) who are guarded in the (ceremonial and moral) actions of Your (law), and by those (inspired) words (which proceed) from the tongue of Thy Good Mind (as he speaks within Thy Māthra). Yea, these are all assembling (each) to hear You, of whom Thou, O Ahura Mazda! art the foremost guide² and light.

4. (And they cry aloud to Thee, O Mazda! I speaking with them, and in their name): Where is the (promised³) lord of our thrift (the embodied law, saving us from the most dreaded dangers that we fear⁴, the thrift-lord) of (our) ready zeal? Where

¹ I have rather reluctantly read *yêkâ* with long ê. Having in mind Y. XXX, 1, where Sp.'s B. reads *yaêkâ*, and reading *yaêkâ* here, we might regain the lost dual neuter of the pronoun here as in Y. XXX, 1, and so render, 'and which two things belong to thee, the possession (rule) of wealth and the blessings.'

Roth, cited by Geldner, changes to *ashayaêkâ* here and in Y. XXX, 1; and it is certainly striking that *ashâ yêkâ* should occur twice. I render as above, first, as nearer our MSS., and as affording a good sense.

² See Y. XXXI, 17.

³ See verse 5.

⁴ See Y. XXIX, 1; Y. XXXII.

does he stand to (show us) mercy? Whither are (Thy) Righteousness and the Bountiful Âramaiti (our Piety) approaching? From what direction comes Thy Best Mind (to inspire and to guide)? And whence (again), O Great Creator! Thy Sovereign Power (to be our ruler and defence¹)?

5. And it is the tiller of the earth who asks this of Thee, O Ahura! (Thy chosen saint himself); he has asked this all of Thee, striving to discover how he may gain to himself the sacred Kine (and with all wealth in herds beside. And he would seek this) moved by the motives which flow from Thy Righteous Order (and Thy cause), upright as he is in actions, and wise in his self-humbling worship (of that² One) who, as a righteous ruler, has appointed a just controlling guide for those whom He has made.

6. (And in partial answer to his question, and to solve his doubt, I now declare the truth): He who gives to this (good citizen) that which is better than the good³; yea, He who bestows on him in accordance with his religious choice is (our) Ahura Mazda (and not

¹ It is hardly necessary to call attention to the fact that these abstracts are personified here, as in so many other places in the Gâthas. We may indeed doubt whether the idea of personification was ever wholly absent, the original meaning being likewise never lost. Professor Wilhelm prefers taking Ashem as an accusative, 'how does one (do they) come to Asha?' This is admirable; but I am, on the whole, inclined to regard Ashem as a nominative with *fseratus*, *Âr(a)maitis*, &c., taking the plurals *yasô hyen* (*hyen*) as irregularly extending to the other subjects.

² So Wilhelm (by letter), taking a form of the pronoun as understood. It is difficult to suppose that the *vâstrya* could be referred to as appointing the Ratu through the influence of his devotion and pious supplications; as Wilhelm justly says, the third line must apply to Ahura.

³ See Y. XLIII, 3; notice *ahmâi* as referring to *hôi*.



a false god of the Daêvas¹). And this will He bestow through His divine Authority (established in preparation here), while on the withholder of the sacrifice, who offers nothing to His (cause), He will send worse than the evil (and that not here alone, but) in the last turning of the creation in its course !

7. (And as Thou wilt bestow thus graciously on him), so grant me also, O Thou most bountiful Spirit Mazda, Thou who hast made both the Kine and the waters and the plants² (for her support) ! both Immortality and Welfare, those two eternal powers, and through Thy Good Mind in the doctrine (which is revealed through his inspired words³).

8. (Yea, grant me these two inseparable gifts, for having them in store) I will speak for Thee, O Mazda ! because to the man of understanding⁴ one should declare for Thee that which is woe to the wicked, but salvation to him who has maintained the holy Order (in Thy folk and in his soul). For he is (repaid in his deed, and) rejoiced by the Māthra who declares it to the wise.

9. (And when I shall speak, I will declare for You that mental) keenness (which reaches the decision), and which Thou hast bestowed upon the two striving sides⁵, (in Thy satisfying word). And this

¹ See Y. XXXI, 17 where the faith of the dregvant is sufficiently recognised to form the basis for a question, rhetorical indeed, but still a question.

² From this and similar occurrences of the 'water and the plants' beside 'Immortality and Welfare' probably arose the later peculiar identification of those names with water and plants.

³ Compare perhaps verse 20.

⁴ Otherwise ; 'I will speak for Thee, O Lord ! for the (all)-wise one should speak.'

⁵ Or, 'from the two arami;' see notes on Y. XXXI, 3 and Y. XLIII, 12.

I will announce by means of Thy flaming Fire; yea, I will declare it for the bestowal of that sword of justice which is forged from steel¹, and wrought for both the worlds². And for the wounding of the wicked (with its blade) may'st Thou³, O Ahura Mazda! bless and prosper Thine (avenging) saint⁴!

10. (Yea, let Thy believer wound the wicked to the quick), for he, who totally estranged from this (our holy rule⁵), O Mazda! seeks to destroy my life, is a son⁶ of the Lie's creation, and belongs to the miscreants; (but as for me), I call on Asha (Thy Righteous Order to be my help); and may he come with Thy good blessing.

11. (And ye who throng the great assembly⁷, it is of you I speak while, with my lips, I now address the Lord): Who, O Ahura! is a loyal friend to the Spitâma⁸, to Zarathustra? Who has asked his question of the divine Righteousness, (as he approached⁹)?

¹ Compare Y. XXXII, 7, *hvaênâ ayanghâ* (lit. iron).

Others see the ordeal of fire here, and the bath of melted metal from which the righteous suffers nothing, but in which the sinner is consumed, but *râshayanghê* seems to point to injury produced otherwise than by dipping, and *dakhshta* certainly designates a metallic instrument elsewhere; 'sign' is, however, the original meaning.

² So several times; comp. Y. XXVIII, 3, where the depth is unmistakable; see also Y. XXXI, 18 with *ahûbîs* in the next verse.

³ The Pahlavi while not strictly correct, affords the indication of a causative, *sûdînêd*.

⁴ From this verse probably arose the later association of *khshathra-vairya* and metal founding and forging.

⁵ As invoking Asha is in the antithesis, I regard *ashâ* as understood here. *Gât* seems a particle, but also not impossible = *gât*. As it is twice followed by *tê* (*tôi*), the interesting change is suggested to *gatê*, *infin*.

⁶ Or a proper name.

⁸ See Y. XLVI, 9, 14.

⁷ See the third verse.

⁹ See the fourth verse.

By whom is the bounteous Piety (received and cherished)? Or who has been regarded as upright and fitted for the great cause of Thy Good Mind?

12. ('Who is worthy?' would I ask, for Zarathustra was ever such, and from earliest days. He was no polluted wretch.) Paederast never gained his ear, nor Kavi-follower on this (temptation-)bridge of earth, when his body was (maturely) grown, when they both hasten(ed) to him with the bosom's¹ impure power².

13. (And he will be likewise victorious on the veritable Judgment Bridge, for) the righteous man's conscience will truly³ crush the wicked man's (spirit) while his soul rages⁴ fiercely on the open *Kinvaŕ* Bridge⁵, as he strives by his actions, and his tongue's

¹ Some other portion of the human body, suggested by the context, may be meant by *aodares*. The word looks like a verbal form, 3rd pl., but see the preceding dual.

² I render the Pahlavi of this most difficult verse as follows: Far from satisfying me is the *Kik*, the paederast, in regard to both of the two particulars [food and clothing] on the path of winter; (far from satisfying me) who am *Zartûsht*, the *Spîtâman*, with whom he is; that is, (or 'where') he incites me with his incitation in my bodily (?) (sensations; reading *astak* (?)); [that is, a person comes, and thus also they, or he, would do it to me]; and this one who (is doing) [that to us] is also leading us on, even in our progress in the cold [of a winter] of accustomed sin, (or in the cold iniquitous winter). This verse seems a very ancient interpolation.

³ *Haithîm* is an adverb; its position also does not so much favour an accusative substantive.

⁴ So our texts; but the Pahlavi translator saw *khraozhdaitf* (see Y. XLVI, 11) in his MSS., rendering *khŕûsirnô yehabûnd*=utter cries: 'while his soul cries fiercely.'

⁵ The occurrence of *peretau(âo)* in this verse sheds light upon the *peretô* in the previous one. *Âkzu(âo)* seems to be an attracted form for a loc. as elsewhere. Perhaps it is miswritten.

(cursing speech) to reach¹ (and to pollute) Asha's paths (where the faithful souls come).

14. (And as are those lost spirits, so are our foes.) No friends to the creatures² are the Karpans, (not granting) complete (harvests) from the fields with complete (pasture) for the Kine (chief objects for our prayer), bringing woe³ by their deeds and their teachings. And they⁴ will deliver these (beings⁵ whom they lead) at the last (?) by their doctrine(s) in the Home of the Lie.

15. But this is the reward which Zarathustra declared before (to his friends who counsel with Asha), and are fitted for the cause⁶; Ahura Mazda will come the first⁷ into His Song Home, Garôdman,

¹ Nāsvau(áo) would naturally mean 'reaching'; but the word is also elsewhere used in an evil sense, 'reaching to harm.' Y. LIII, 7. The Pahlavi, however, indicates the reading nasvau by its nasînênd. Does the Avesta show an original evil sense to nas=to reach? May the two nas possibly have some original connection? That *hwâis skyaothnâis* means here 'by means of' rather than 'because of' is the more probable from the same words in the next verse, and this notwithstanding Y. XXXI, 20.

² So general a term as 'creatures' should be avoided where possible; but see *ye dâthaëibyô eres ratûm khshayâs ashavau kistâ* (verse 5).

³ As to the grammatical structure, all depends on *sendâ*. Shall we bring down *nôit* from the verse above; or shall we regard *sendâ* as in an evil sense from *sad* as in *sadrâ*? The Pahlavi favours the former, as also in Y. XXXVIII, 5 (Sp. 15). The general result is not, however, affected. Read as alternative: No friends to the creatures are the Karpans as to perfect (harvests) from the fields, (not) blessing us in the matter of perfect (care and fodder) for the cattle, &c.; (*sad* in the sense of blessing with *nôit*).

⁴ Free.

⁵ Or, 'doctrines.'

⁶ See the eleventh verse.

⁷ Alternatives would be, 'Ahura will meet these engagements (?) made when the reward was promised;' or, 'the reward which Zarathustra promised before Ahura came into Garôdman.' Ac-

and then these gifts will be given you by the Good Mind (within you), and with blessings for the cause of the Righteous Order (in His hosts).

16. (And one of you, the greatest, has indeed attained to that wisdom which is thus blessed with a promise), Kavi Vîstâspa has reached it in the Realm of our great cause (of devotion ¹), and moved in his toil by the chants of the Good Mind (who speaks in the Mâthra ²); yea, he hath attained to that wisdom which the bountiful Ahura conceived in accordance with Asha, thus to teach us salvation.

17. (And not alone amidst our princes hath sanctity been marked), Frashaostra, the Hvôgva, hath presented a blest and an endeared form (his child ³); and may Ahura Mazda, who has the Sovereign Power, grant her (to us), who is so much to be beloved. And for the (progress of the) good Religion ⁴ do ye, O ye people! receive her with desire ⁵, and for the gaining of Asha; (she will help the great cause).

18. Yea, that (holy) wisdom, O Gâmâspa the Hvôgva ⁶! these (pious throngs) are choosing through

cordova to the general form of the Gâthic sentence, *lôist parâ* go more naturally together than if the force of the *parâ* was extended to *gasa*. The coming of Ahura is elsewhere mentioned; here He enters His audience-chamber before His approaching saints.

¹ Maga may have some such cast of meaning. I have, moreover, more than once suspected that the origin of 'magian' may, notwithstanding the *môghu* of the later Avesta, be simply this *maga* so often used in the Gâthas to designate 'the cause.'

² See verse 20.

³ So also the Pahlavi translator in his gloss; *aîgham bartman pavan nêrmanîh barâ yehabûnêzô*.

⁴ So also of Zarathustra's daughter, Y. LIII, 4.

⁵ Or, 'cry ye for the gaining of Asha,' as in Y. XXIX, 1.

⁶ Or, reading a nominative, 'Gâmâspa is choosing,' which is itself

their Righteousness as the (true) splendours of riches (these pious men who are) gaining the kingdom where the Good Mind (doth govern). And grant me also, O Mazda! that which these with glad wishes¹ receive from Thy grace².

19. (And this prayer is already and beforehand heard.) This established Sovereign Power the heroic (Kavi Vîstâspa has given), O Maidhyô-mâh the Spitâma. He who is wise through the Religion, and who seeks (the true) life, he is granting it to us³; yea, he has pronounced the laws of Ahura our Maker, and declared that which is for (our) life's actions (beyond all other things) best.

20. And, that gift of blessedness for you, all (the Bountiful Immortals) with one consent in sympathy to help us (are disposed⁴) to grant; (and may they likewise make) the Holy Order (firm) for us through the Good Mind (in our folk); and may they reveal to us the words with which Piety likewise (speaks her truths). And receiving sacrifice with homage (from our praises), may they seek⁵ for us Ahura Mazda's grace.

21. (Yea, this Kavi Vîstâspa) the man of Âramaiti is bounteous, and with understanding in his words and his actions. (And as a reward) may Ahura give

well possible, as *var* is also conjugated with *n*; but *rapæn* seems a plural, and *vidô* likewise.

¹ I concede this shade of meaning to the indications of the Pahlavi.

² The Pahlavi gives us our first indication here.

³ If *Gâmâspô* (nom.) is read in verse 18, *ahmâi* might here refer to him; 'to this one.'

⁴ Or, 'let them grant;' infinitive as imperative.

⁵ Seeking; a dual is here disapproved by the source from which the suggestion originated.

him that Righteousness which is blest, (but) with the Religion (alone), and that Sovereign Power which is established through the Good Mind (in His folk). And this same blessing would I pray from His grace¹.

22. For Ahura Mazda knoweth the man whose best gift for the sacrifice is given unto me, and from the motive of Righteousness; (and in thankfulness for all, and in prayer for yet still further grace), I will worship (the eternal ones); yea, I will worship those who have ever lived, and who still live, and by their own (holy) names, and to their (thrones²) will I draw near with my praise!

THE GÂTHA(Â) VAHISTÂ ÎSTIS (VAHIS- TÔISTI(Î)).

This Gâtha, named from its first words, consists of chapter LIIL of the Yasna. While its matter is homogeneous with that of the other Gâthas, it bears some evidence of having been composed in the latter portion of Zarathustra's life. It is, as usual, separated from the other Gâthas by its metre, which shows four lines with two half lines. The first two have eleven or twelve syllables; the third seems to have fourteen plus a half line with five, so also the last. Irregularities seem frequent. The composition has for its substance a marriage song, but one of a politically religious character.

The piece â-airyemâ-ishyô, Y. LIV, 1, has been considered by some as susceptible of a similar metrical arrangement, and it certainly looks as if it originally belonged to Y. LIIL. It is, however,

¹ I refer tem to Ahura, supposing it to stand; reading tām, I would refer it to ashi.

² Compare Vend. XIX, 31.

otherwise divided by Bartholomae (see *Arische Forschungen*, 2^{ter} heft, s. 23). From the past form of *srâvi*, some have thought that Zarathustra was no longer living when this hymn was composed, but the word may only mean '(his prayer) has been, or is heard.' If we must, however, render 'was heard,' this does not determine the certainty of Zarathustra's death. The expression *Zarathustris Spitâmô* also gives the impression that some heir to Zarathustra's office and prestige existed, but even this is not decisive, for a future successor may be for a time a contemporary, while, on the contrary, the nuptials of Zarathustra's daughter, with the mention of his name, and the reference to her 'father' as the one from whom her bridegroom obtained her, indicate that Zarathustra may well have been still living. The later forms *Zarathustrahê* and *fedhrô* remain as the indications of a later origin than the actual period of Zarathustra's lifetime; but these circumstances may be owing to accidental causes.

The style has freshness and vigour throughout, and would indicate Zarathustrian influence, if not authorship. That Zarathustra does not speak in the first person, has no importance whatever in the question. The piece is not of course a whole; but it may well be a whole out of which parts have fallen. That the subject passes on to the old polemical vehemence in the last verses, is far from unnatural. The marriage festival of Zarathustra's child must have been, if without intention, a semi-political occasion, and the bard would express himself, as naturally, with regard to the struggle which was still going on. This latter fact also shows an early date; the passages referring to the struggle are strongly kindred with some in Y. XLVI, and elsewhere.

Verses 1 and 2 form an admirable introduction; the transition to the marriage occasion was, however, contained in lost verses. Verses 3, 4, and 5 hang well together; and 6 and 7 are not at all remote from them; the warlike close, although far from surprising us, must have been introduced by one or more now missing stanzas.

1. As the object of the 'great cause,' next to the preservation of its adherents, was the extension of its influence, first over hesitating parties (Y. XLIV, 12), and then over all the living (Y. XXXI, 3), it is not surprising that the central prayer of Zarathustra should have culminated in a desire for the conversion of opponents. Even Turanians had been known to come over to the holy creed, and help prosper the settlements which their kith had so often plundered (Y. XLVI, 12); he had therefore prayed that those who

had heretofore injured the holy Daëna might become its disciples by a genuine conversion. 2. Having observed the fidelity of converts and original disciples, the king and his chief nobles would celebrate their devotion by hymns, ceremonies, and sacrifices, as the symbols of every moral virtue, laying down for the people the moral law of the Saviour. 3. As it would be pushing rather far to suppose the Saoshyant to be referred to in *tamkâ*, and as moreover, according to Geldner's admirable suggestion, that title may here well refer to Zarathustra, it is better to accept a loss of verses, and to suppose a person alluded to as the bridegroom, who, if not one so eminent as to merit the imposing name of Saoshyant, was still at least one of his more prominent satellites, for the ancient poet goes on to address a daughter of Zarathustra as a bride. She is the youngest, and her name is as pious as that of a maid of ancient Israel, for she is called 'full of the religious knowledge.' Her husband is to be a support in holiness, and she is to take counsel with piety. 4. Her response is appropriate; she will vie with her husband in every sacred affection, as well as in every domestic virtue. 5. The priestly thaliarch then addresses the bridesmaids and the pair with suitable admonitions to piety and affection. 6. Turning now to the assembly, possibly after the recital of some stanzas long since vanished, he proceeds with warnings and encouragements. He will exorcise the Demon who was especially the slave of the Daëvas; but he warns all men and women against the evil Vayu, the spirit of the air. 7. Charitably concluding that they would come forth as conquerors from the trials which still awaited them, he next warns them against all solicitations to vice. 8. Having named profane Demons, his polemical zeal becomes fully inflamed. Anticipating with fierce delight the sufferings of the wicked, he calls vehemently for the champion, who may, in alliance with neighbouring potentates, deliver up the murderous false-leader, giving peace to the masses; and he entreats that all haste may be used. 9. To arouse the great chiefs to their duty, he recalls (as in Y. XXXII) the successes of the foe; and he calls for the prince who may overthrow and expel him, but, as if well aware that the human arm could not alone bring salvation, he attributes to Ahura the Sovereign Power, which alone can guard helpless innocence against lawless plunder and oppression.

Translation.

1. That best prayer has been answered¹, the prayer of Zarathustra Spitâma, that Ahura Mazda might² grant him those boons, (the most wished-for) which flow from the good Order, even a life that is prospered³ for eternal duration, and also those who deceived⁴ him (may He likewise thus grant him) as the good Faith's disciples in word and in deed⁵.

2. And may Kavi Vîstâspa, and the Zarathustrian Spitâma⁶, and Frashaostra too with them, offer propitiation to Mazda in thought, word, and deed, and

¹ Some lay stress upon the literal form 'was heard,' and regard the expression as indicating the fact that Zarathustra was no longer living (see the remarks in the summary).

² Free.

³ I follow the Pahlavi with all; it has *hû-âhûînâd*.

⁴ I follow the *friftâr* of the Pahlavi, as the conversion of those formerly hostile is suggested by *vaurayâ* and *Fryâna*, not to speak of the primary rendering of *duserethrîs êikhshnushâ*. The Pahlavi also has, 'even he who is the deceiver is to be instructed in the word and deed of the good religion.' The MSS. should not hastily be abandoned.

⁵ That more than a ritualistic sanctity is meant is certain (see Y. XXX, 3); but that no sanctity could be recognised apart from worship is equally undeniable.

⁶ Who was the Zarathustrian Spitâma? Some change the text after the Pahlavi translator, reading Zarathustra Spitâma; but I would not follow this evil example in a first translation of a translatable text. Why should a Spitâma, who was not Zarathustra, be called Zarathustrian? Were some of the Spitâmas not in sympathy with their great kinsman, Spitâmas who were Mazda-yasnians, but not 'of Zarathustra's order?' One would however suppose that some one of Zarathustra's family was meant who occupied the position of his especial representative and natural successor.

Yasna confessions¹ as they render Him praise, making straight paths² (for our going), even that Faith of the Saoshyant which Ahura will found³.

(The master of the feast.)

3⁴. And him will they give Thee, O Pouruêista, Haêkat-aspid and Spitâmi! young⁵ (as thou art) of the daughters of Zarathustra, him will they⁶ give thee as a help in the Good Mind's true service, of Asha's and Mazda's, as a chief and a guardian⁷. Counsel well then (together⁸), with the mind of Ârmaiti, most bounteous and pious; and act with just action.

(She answers.)

4. I will love⁹ and vie with him, since from (my) father¹⁰ he gained (me). For the master and toilers, and for the lord-kinsman (be) the Good Mind's bright

¹ Free.

² Recall the 'path made for the Kine,' and 'the way' which 'Thou declarest to be that of the Good Mind.'

³ That is, will permanently found, establish.

⁴ Verses have here fallen out, as some allusion must have been made to the bridegroom.

⁵ So more according to the hint of the Pahlavi and the statement of the Bundahis; West, XXXII, 5. So Geldner, K. Z. 28, 195.

⁶ Or, 'will he, the Saoshyant, the bride's father.'

⁷ A chieftain, a protecting head.

⁸ It is, perhaps, safer to refer this 'questioning' to the pair; but forms of ham with pares are also used of consultations with the Deity (see Y. XXXIII, 6). Y. XLIV, 13 nearly necessitates the wider and less concrete view here.

⁹ Varânî looks somewhat like a gloss, but the metre seems to demand it.

¹⁰ Her father's sanction was a reason for devotion to the man to whom he had given her.

blessing¹, the pure for the pure ones, and to me (be²) the insight (which I gain from his counsel³). Mazda grant it, Ahura for good conscience for ever.

(The priestly master of the feast.)

5. Monitions for the marrying I speak to (you) maidens, to you, I who know them; and heed ye my (sayings): By these⁴ laws of the Faith which I utter obtain ye the life of the Good Mind (on earth and in heaven). (And to you, bride and bridegroom⁵), let each one the other in Righteousness cherish; thus alone unto each shall the home-life be happy.

6. [Thus real are these things, ye men and ye women⁶!] from the Lie-demon protecting, I guard o'er my (faithful), and so (I) grant progress (in weal and in goodness). And the hate of the Lie (with the hate of her) bondsmen (?) I pray from the body, (and so would expel it⁷). For to those who bear Vayu⁸, (and bring him to power), his shame⁹ mars the glory. To these evil truth-harmers by these means he reaches. Ye thus slay the life mental (if ye follow his courses¹⁰).

¹ The Pahlavi translator has *sīrīh* here.

² *Be* = *bád* lies certainly nearer than *bee* = *bava*!

³ See the previous verse. ⁴ Or, 'being zealous.'

⁵ These words do not seem adapted to the bridesmaids.

⁶ *Gaini* is elsewhere used in an evil sense.

⁷ I can only render thus literally: From the *Drûg* as a generous guide (I) who (compare *ye* in Y. XXVIII) (for) mine, (*mê*) a watching guardian (I guide as a *râthema*; nom. sing. with verbal force) increasing prosperity, i.e. progress, of the *Drûg* I pray (forth*; I exorcise) of the bond(?) (of the *Drûg*) the malicious injuries* from the body or person. * *yêšê-parâ*. * to 3rd *pî*.

⁸ 'If ye bear, or promote, the interests of Vayu.'

⁹ Or, 'evil food.'

¹⁰ Some line here is gloss; the first thought would be to eliminate

7. But yours be the recompense, (O ye righteous women!) of this great cause. For while lustful desire heart-inflamed from the body¹ there beyond goeth down where the spirit of evil reaches (to ruin, still) ye bring forth the champion² to help on the cause, (and thus conquer temptation). So your last word is 'Vayu'; (ye cry it in triumph³).

8. And thus let the sinners by these means be foiled⁴; and consumed⁵ be they likewise. Let them shriek in their anger. With good kings let (our champion⁶) deliver⁷ the smiter⁸ (as a captive in

the difficult second line; but the third line might be an effort (by the poet himself, or an associate, see the metrical form) to explain, or relieve, the awkward second line. Reading *yemâ* and *râthemâ*, and taking *genayô* as in an evil sense, with *spasuthâ* as a second plural, we might render as a question: 'Do ye, O ye twain, ye helpers of the *Drûg*; do ye regard promotion (as thus to be gained)?' But in that case verses 6 and 7 should be regarded as separated by many lost verses from the fifth verse. But is not the first line the gloss? It is merely an address.

¹ Free.

² Lit. 'the greatness.'

³ The difficulty here lies in the first line which seems to declare a reward in a good sense. *Mîzdem* is hardly used of retribution. It must therefore be taken in a good sense. The following evil results must be supposed to have been avoided; and 'Vayu' to be uttered in triumph. Vayu is used in an evil sense in verse 6.

If *mîzdem* could be supposed to express retribution, then evil men and women would be threatened, and Vayu would be a cry uttered in woe. As to Vayu with his two natures, see part ii as per index.

⁴ The foiling of the evil here recalls *âdebaomâ*.

⁵ The Pahlavi translator seems to me too free in rendering *zahvyâkâ* (*zahyâkâ*), *zanisn-hômand*. It also makes a curious imitation of letters in *gêh va mar* for *genarâm*. It is of course far from certain that he had our present text.

⁶ See verse 9; also Y. XLVI, 4.

⁷ Recall the delivering of the evil into the two hands of Asha (Y. XXX, 8, and Y. XLIV, 14).

⁸ *Khrûnerâmâ* must be a gloss.

battle), giving peace to our dwellings, and peace to our hamlets. Let him charge¹ those deceivers, chaining death as the strongest²; and swift be (the issue).

9. Through false believers the tormentor makes Thy helpers³ refusers⁴; (those who once helped our heroes shall no longer give succour). The estranged thus desires, and the reprobate⁵ wills it, with the will that he harbours to conquer our honour⁶. Where is then the Lord righteous who will smite them from life⁷, and (beguile) them of license? Mazda! Thine is that power, (which will banish and conquer). And Thine is the Kingdom⁸; and by it Thou bestowest the highest (of blessings) on the right-living poor⁹!

¹ 'Let him "rout" or "stir" them.'

² Comp. *mazista*=the strongest in Y. XLIX, 1, 'the prevailer.' Lit. 'with the chaining of death the greatest.'

³ For *narps* I can only suggest the suspiciously simple *nar*=hero (comp. the frequent *nâ*) and *pî*=nourish, support. The Pahlavi translator seems likewise to have had some such rendering in mind, for he translates *dastôbar*.

⁴ As to *rigîs*, the Pahlavi translation, which is here more than usually difficult, hints in the direction above followed, by a word which I would restore as *rêgînênd*.

⁵ The Pahlavi translator erroneously sees 'bridge' in *peshô*, or is free with his *tanâpûharkânô hômand*. See Geldner, *Stud.* 3.

⁶ See Geldner, *Stud.* 54.

⁷ See Y. XLVI, 4.

⁸ Comp. the *Ahuna-vairya* which takes its last line from this place, and Y. XXXIV, 5. *Vahyô* is a variation for *vanghêus vahyô*.

⁹ Here I have endeavoured to imitate the swing of the rhythm by breaking up the sentences, especially in the second line. Literally it would be, 'with the desire, with the virtue-conquering (desire) of the reprobate.' Such freedom as the above is often a critical necessity in the attempts to reproduce the warmth of the original.

THE YASNA.

IT is now hardly necessary to say that the Yasna is the chief liturgy of the Zarathustrians, in which confession, invocation, prayer, exhortation, and praise are all combined as in other liturgies. Like other compositions of the kind, it is made up of more or less mutually adapted fragments of different ages, and modes of composition. The Gâthas are sung in the middle of it, and in the Vendîdâd Sâdah, the Visparad is interpolated within it for the most part at the ends of chapters.

We have no reason to suppose that the Yasna existed in its present form in the earlier periods of Zarathustrianism, but we have also no reason to doubt that its present arrangement is, as regards us, very ancient. The word Yasna means worship including sacrifice. Introductory excerpts occur in several MSS., and are now printed by Geldner. They are to be found in Y. I, 23; Y. III, 25; Y. XI, 17, 18; Y. XXII, 23-27; Y. XXVII, 13, 14; Ny. I, 2.

YASNA I.

THE SACRIFICE COMMENCES.

1. I announce¹ and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to Ahura Mazda, the Creator, the radiant and glorious, the greatest and the best, the most beautiful (?) (to our conceptions), the most firm, the wisest, and the one of all whose body² is the most perfect, who

¹ Or, 'I invite;' but the word seems equal to âvaêdhayêma; compare the Vedic vid + ni. Comp. also nî tê vaêdhayêmi and nî vô vaêdhayêmi in Y. I, 21, 22. The Pahlavi favours 'I invite.'

² Not that Ahura was conceived of as having a body proper. The stars are elsewhere poetically described as his body, as other

attains His ends the most infallibly, because of His Righteous Order, to Him who disposes our minds aright¹, who sends His joy-creating grace afar; who made us, and has fashioned us, and who has nourished and protected us², who is the most bounteous Spirit³!

2. I announce and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Good Mind, and to Righteousness the Best, and to the Sovereignty which is to be desired, and to Piety the Bountiful, and to the two, the Universal Weal and Immortality, to the body of the Kine, and to the Kine's Soul, and to the Fire of Ahura Mazda, that one who more than ⁴ (all) the Bountiful Immortals has made most effort (for our succour)!

3. And I announce and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Asnya, the day-lords of the ritual order, to Hâvani the holy, the lord ⁵ of the ritual order; and I celebrate, and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to Sâvanghi and to Vîsya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order. And I announce and (will) complete (my Yasna) to Mithra of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, and of the myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken ⁶ name, and to Râman *Hvâstra*.

divinities are said to be tanu-mâthra, having the Mâthra as their body; that is, incarnate in the Mâthra.

¹ 'Disposing aright as to mind.'

² Pahlavi parvard.

³ Elsewhere the Spenta Mainyu is spoken of as His possession.

⁴ The Fire seems almost spoken of as one of the Amesha Spenta.

⁵ Lords of the ritual because ruling as chief at the time of their mention, and in this sense regarded as genii protecting all ritual seasons and times of their class. Vîsya presides over the Vîs; Sâvanghi, over cattle.

⁶ Having an especial Yast.

4. I announce and (will) complete (my Yasna) to Rapithwina, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Frâdatfshu, and to Zantuma, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order; and I celebrate and complete (my Yasna) to Righteousness¹ the Best, and to Ahura Mazda's Fire¹.

5. I announce and complete (my Yasna) to Uzayêirina the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Frâdat-vîtra and to Dahvyuma², the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and to that lofty Ahura Napât-apâm (the son of waters), and to the waters which Ahura Mazda³ made.

6. I announce and complete (my Yasna) to Aiwisrûthrima (and) Aibigaya⁴, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and to Zarathustrôtema, and to him who possesses and who gives that prosperity in life which furthers all. And I celebrate and complete (my Yasna) to the Fravashis of the saints, and to those of the women who have many sons⁵, and to a prosperous home-life which continues without reverse throughout the year, and to that Might which is well-shaped and stately⁶, which strikes victoriously, Ahura-made, and to that Victorious Ascendency (which it secures).

7. I announce and I complete (my Yasna) to Ushahina, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Beregya (and) Nmânya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and to Sraosha (who is Obedience) the blessed, endowed with blessed recompense (as a thing com-

¹ Constantly associated together in the later Avesta.

² *hv*=h before y.

³ As opposed to those which might belong to Angra Mainyu.

⁴ Or, 'who furthers life.' ⁵ 'Men and herds?'

⁶ 'Well-grown.'

pleted¹), who smites with victory, and furthers the settlements, and to Rashnu², the most just, and to Arstât³, who advances the settlements, and causes them to increase.

8. And I announce and I complete (my Yasna) to the Mâhya, the monthly festivals, lords of the ritual order, to the new and the later⁴ moon, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the full moon which scatters night.

9. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the Yâirya, yearly feasts, the holy lords of the ritual order. I celebrate and complete (my Yasna) to Maidyô-zaremya⁵, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Maidyô-shema, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Paitishahya, and to Ayâthrima the advancer, and the spender of the strength of males⁶, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Maidhyâirya, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Hamaspathmaêdhaya, the holy lord of the ritual order; yea, I celebrate and complete my Yasna to the seasons, lords of the ritual order.

10. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to all those who are the thirty and three⁷ lords of the ritual order, which, coming the nearest, are around about Hâvani, and which (as in their festivals) were

¹ I should say that the suffix has this force here as in close connection with ashyô.

² Genius of rectitude.

³ Rectitude in another form.

⁴ Literally, 'to the moon within,' showing little light.

⁵ See the Âfrinagân.

⁶ The rutting season.

⁷ Haug first called attention to the striking coincidence with the Indian. In the Aitareya and Satapatha Brâhmanas, in the Atharvaveda, and in the Râmâyana, the gods are brought up to the number thirty-three. The names differ somewhat however. (See Essays, ed. West, 2nd edition, p. 276; see also Rv. 240, 9; 250, 2.)

inculcated by Ahura Mazda, and were promulgated by Zarathustra, as the lords of Asha Vahista, who is Righteousness the Best.

11. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the two, to Ahura¹ and to Mithra, the lofty, and the everlasting, and the holy, and to all the stars which are Spenta Mainyu's creatures, and to the star Tistrya, the resplendent and glorious, and to the Moon which contains the seed of the Kine, and to the resplendent Sun, him of the rapid steeds, the eye² of Ahura Mazda, and to Mithra the province-ruler. And I celebrate and complete my Yasna to Ahura Mazda (once again, and as to him who rules the month³), the radiant, the glorious, and to the Fravashis⁴ of the saints.

12. And I announce and complete my Yasna to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! together with all the fires, and to the good waters, even to all the waters made by Mazda, and to all the plants which Mazda made.

13. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the Bounteous Māthra, the holy and effective, the revelation given against the Daêvas⁵; the Zarathus-

¹ The star Jupiter has been called Ormuzd by the Persians and Armenians, and it may be intended here, as stars are next mentioned, but who can fail to be struck with the resemblance to the Mitra-Varuna of the *Rîg-veda*. Possibly both ideas were present to the composer.

² Recall *Kakshur Mitrasya Varunasya Agneḥ*.

³ The first day of the month is called Ahura Mazda.

⁴ The first month is called Fravashi. These are put for the particular day of celebration.

⁵ This was the Vendidad, the name being a contraction of *vidaêvâ-dâta*. It will not be forgotten that the Vendidad, although later put together, contains old Aryan myths which antedate

trian revelation, and to the long descent ¹ of the good Mazdayasnian Faith.

14. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the mountain Ushi-darena ², the Mazda-made, with its sacred brilliance, and to all the mountains glorious with sanctity ³, with their abundant Glory Mazda-made, and to that majestic Glory Mazda-made, the unconsumed ⁴ Glory which Mazda made. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to Ashi the good, the blessedness (of the reward), and to Kisti, the good religious Knowledge, to the good Erethe (Rectitude ⁵?), and to the good Rasāstāt (persisting zeal ⁶?), and to the Glory and the Benefit which are Mazda-made.

15. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the pious and good Blessing of the religious man ⁷, the holy, and to the curse of wisdom, the swift and redoubted Yazad of potency (to blight).

16. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to these places and these lands, and to these pastures, and these abodes with their springs of water (?) ⁸, and

Zarathustra, although in its present greatly later form, Zarathustra is a demi-god in it, and his name is involved in myth.

¹ 'The long tradition;' so Spiegel.

² From this mountain the Iranian kings were later supposed to have descended; hence the mention of the 'glory.'

³ Observe the impossibility of the meaning 'comfort,' or mere 'well-being' here.

⁴ Or possibly 'the unseized,' the Pahlavi agrift(?); Ner. *agrīhītām*; *hvar*, to eat, may have meant 'seize' originally.

⁵ Erethe (*riti*?) seems without inflection.

⁶ The state of activity (?).

⁷ Shall we say, 'of the departed saint' here?

⁸ The Pahlavi with its afkhvâr points here perhaps to a better text. Recall awzhdâtemka, awzhdaunghô, awrem.

to the waters, land, and plants, and to this earth and to yon heaven, and to the holy wind, and to the stars, moon, and sun, and to the eternal stars without beginning¹, and self-disposing², and to all the holy creatures of Spenta-Mainyu, male and female, the regulators of the ritual order.

17. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to that lofty lord who is the ritual Righteousness³ (itself), and to the lords of the days in their duration, and of the days during daylight, to the moons, the years, and the seasons which are lords of the ritual order at the time of Hâvani⁴.

18. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the Fravashis of the saints, the redoubted, which overwhelm (the evil), to those of the saints of the ancient lore, to those of the next of kin, and to the Fravashi of (mine) own⁵ soul!

19. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to all the lords of the ritual order, and to all the Yazads, the beneficent, who dispose (of all) aright, to those both heavenly and earthly, who are (meet) for our sacrifice and homage because of Asha Vahista, (of the ritual Order which is 'the best').

20. O (thou) Hâvani, holy lord of the ritual order, and Sâvanghi, Rapithwina, and Uzayêrina, and Aiwisrûthrima, (and) Aibigaya, (thou that aidest

¹ Meaning 'without beginning to their course,' and so 'fixed' (?).

² Self-determining, not satellites, having the laws of their own motion in themselves.

³ The divine Order par eminence, expressed in the ritual and the faith.

⁴ Not 'to the chief of Hâvani,' possibly 'in the lordship,' the time when it is especially the object of worship. Thus each object of worship becomes in its turn a 'lord or chief' of 'the ritual order.'

⁵ The soul of the celebrant or his client is intended.

life !) if I have offended you, and thou, O Ushahina, holy lord of the ritual order !

21. If I have offended thee¹, whether by thought, or word, or deed, whether by act of will, or without intent or wish, I earnestly make up the deficiency of this in praise to thee. If I have caused decrease² in that which is Thy Yasna, and Thy homage, I announce (and celebrate³) to thee (the more for this) !

22. Yea, all ye lords, the greatest ones, holy lords of the ritual order, if I have offended you by thought, or word, or deed, whether with my will, or without intending error⁴, I praise you (now the more) for this. I announce to you (the more) if I have caused decrease in this which is your Yasna, and your praise.

23. I would confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, of Zarathustra's order, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for Hâvani, the holy lord of the ritual order, for (his) sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, for Sâvanghi, and for Vîsya, the holy lord of the ritual order, for (his) sacrifice, homage, propitiation and praise, and for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation and praise of the lords of the days in their duration, and of the days during daylight, for

¹ Compare *Rv.* VII, 86, 3-6.

² Practised, or induced neglect, or omitted portions of it.

³ 'I invite for Thee' (?).

⁴ That the thought, word, and deed here were more than the mere semi-mechanical use of faculties in reciting the liturgy, is clear. At the same time all morality was supposed to be represented in the liturgy. The evil man would offend in thought, word, and deed, if he recited it carelessly, or with bad conscience, and as guilty of any known and unrepented sins. The moral and ceremonial laws went hand in hand.

those of the monthly festivals, and for those of the yearly ones, and for those of the seasons!

YASNA II.

THE SACRIFICE CONTINUES.

1. I desire to approach¹ the Zaothras² with my worship. I desire to approach the Baresman with my worship. I desire to approach the Zaothra conjointly with the Baresman in my worship, and the Baresman conjointly with the Zaothra. Yea, I desire to approach this Zaothra (here), and with this (present) Baresman, and I desire to approach this Baresman conjoined with this Zaothra with my praise³; and I desire to approach this Baresman with praise provided with its Zaothra with its girdle, and spread with sanctity.

2. And in this Zaothra³ and the Baresman I desire to approach Ahura Mazda with my praise, the holy

¹ Referring yâs to its more original sense. Or read, 'I desire the approach of' the various objects of worship, which may be correct, as we understand the genius of each several object to be invoked. Aside from this, a desire 'to approach' seems quite necessary to fill out the sense here. Many of the objects referred to were already present, although some, like 'the mountains,' needed to be spiritually approached, or indeed invoked.

² Zaothra seems to me hardly a vocative here. If declined as other nouns, it would seem to be exceptionally a masculine; compare ahmya zaothrê below. I should feel constrained to regard it here as a masc. plural accusative (comp. haoma).

³ If zaothrê is not a loc. masc. it may be used with the loc. masc. pronoun irregularly. It would then equal Zaothraya. The letter **yo** is often simply the Pahlavi **yo** a little lengthened and equivalent to ya (aya). **yo** does not merely stand for ya (aya), but it is sometimes the correct writing for those letters. (Useless repetitions are curtailed.)

lord of the ritual order, and the Bountiful Immortals, (all) those who rule aright, and who dispose of all aright, these also I desire to approach and with my praise.

3. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Asnya with my praise. I desire to approach the Hâvani with my praise, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Sâvanghi and Vtsya, the holy lords of the ritual order. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach Mithra with my praise, of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, and of the myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name, and Râman *Hvâstra* with him, the holy lord of the ritual order.

4. And in this Zaothra and with the Baresman I desire to approach Rapithwina with my praise, the holy lord of the ritual order; and Frâdat-fshu and Zantuma, the holy lords of the ritual order; and in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach toward Righteousness the Best with my praise, and with him the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son.

5. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach Uzayêirina with my praise, and Frâdat-vira and Da^hvyuma¹, the holy lords of the ritual order; and with them that lofty lord, the kingly and brilliant Apâm-napât², of the fleet horses, and likewise the water Mazda-made and holy,

6. And Aiwisrûthrima, (and) Aibigaya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and Frâdat-vîspâm-hugâiti, and Zarathustrôtema, the holy lord, and the good, heroic, and bountiful Fravashis of the saints, and the women who have many sons, and a peaceful and prosperous home-life that continues without reverse throughout the year, and Force well-shaped and

¹ *hv*=h before y.

² Sometimes Napât-apâm.

stately, and the Victorious-blow Ahura-given, and the Victorious Ascendency (which it secures), and (7) Ushahina, the holy lord of the ritual order, Beregya and Nmánya, the holy lords of the ritual order, and Sraosha, Obedience, the blessed and the stately, who smites with the blow of victory, furthering the settlements, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Rashnu, the most just, and Arstâz, who furthers the settlements, and causes them to increase.

8. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Mâhya, the monthly festivals with my praise, the new moon and the waning moon (the moon within), the holy lords of the ritual order, and the full moon which scatters night, (9) and the Yearly festivals, Maidhyô-zaremaya, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Maidhyô-shema, and Paitishahya, and Ayâthrima, the promoter, who spends the strength of males, and Maidhyâirya and Hamaspathmaêdhaya, and the seasons, the holy lords of the ritual order.

10. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach all the lords of the ritual order with my praise, the three and thirty who come the nearest round about our Hâvanis, who are those lords (and seasons) of Righteousness the Best, which were inculcated by Mazda, and spoken forth by Zarathustra.

11. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach Ahura and Mithra with my praise, the lofty, eternal, and the holy two; and I desire to approach the stars, moon, and sun with the Baresman plants, and with my praise, and with them Mithra the governor of all the provinces, and Ahura Mazda the radiant and glorious, and the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, (12) and thee, the Fire,

Ahura Mazda's son, the holy lord of the ritual order, with all the fires! And I desire to approach the good waters in this Zaothra with this Baresman with my praise, all best waters, Mazda-made and holy, and all the plants which are Mazda-made and holy.

13. And I desire to approach the bounteous Māthra in this Zaothra with this Baresman, and with my praise, the most glorious as it is, and with it the law instituted against the Daêvas; yea, I desire to approach the Zarathustrian law with my praise, and (with it) its long descent, and the good Mazdayasnian Religion (as complete).

14. And I desire to approach Mount Ushi-darena in this Zaothra, with this Baresman with my praise, Mazda-made, and glorious with sanctity, the Yazad-(mount). And I desire to approach all the mountains with my praise, glorious with sanctity as they are, and with abundant glory, Mazda-made, and holy lords of the ritual order; and I desire to approach the mighty kingly Glory Mazda-made and unconsumed; yea, (even) the mighty unconsumed Glory Mazda-made. And I desire to approach Ashi Vanguhi (the good blessedness) in my praise, the brilliant, lofty, powerful, and stately, saving by inherent power. Yea, I desire to approach the Glory Mazda-made with my praise; and I desire to approach the Benefit conferred by Mazda.

15. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Blessing, pious and good, and the pious and holy man who utters it, and the mighty and redoubted Curse of the wise, the Yazad.

16. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach these waters with my praise, and these lands and plants, and these places, districts,

and pastures, and these dwellings with their springs of water ¹, and this land-ruler, who is Ahura Mazda.

17. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach all the greatest lords with my praise, the day-lords, and the month-lords, those of the years, and of the seasons, and the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints.

18. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach all the holy Yazads with my praise; yea, even all the lords of the ritual order, Hâvani at his time, and Sâvanghi at his time, and all the greatest lords of the ritual at their proper times.

YASNA III.

THE YASNA ADVANCES TO THE NAMING OF THE OBJECTS OF PROPITIATION.

1. With a Baresman brought to its appointed place accompanied with the Zaothra at the time of Hâvani, I desire to approach the Myazda-offering with my praise, as it is consumed, and likewise Ameretâtâ ² (as the guardian of plants and wood) and Haurvatât (who guards the water), with the (fresh) meat ³, for the propitiation of Ahura Mazda, and of the Bountiful

¹ See note on Y. I, 16.

² Spiegel has observed with truth that Ameretâtâ and Haurvatât may represent severally all the fruits and the liquids offered.

³ The modern Parsis, Haug following, render 'butter'; but Spiegel is inclined to discredit this later tradition, holding that 'flesh' was originally intended; but on its becoming disused in India, milk was substituted, hence the error.

Gaus hudhæu, in its primary sense, meant of course 'the Kine of blessed endowment.' (Repetitions are again curtailed.)

Immortals, and for the propitiation of Sraosha (who is Obedience) the blessed, who is endowed with sanctity, and who smites with the blow of victory, and causes the settlements to advance.

2. And I desire to approach Haoma and Parahaoma¹ with my praise for the propitiation of the Fravashi of Spitâma Zarathustra, the saint. And I desire to approach the (sacred) wood with my praise, with the perfume, for the propitiation of thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son!

3. And I desire to approach the Haomas with my praise for the propitiation of the good waters which Mazda created; and I desire to approach the Haomawater, and the fresh milk² with my praise, and the plant Hadhânaêpata, offered with sanctity for the propitiation of the waters which are Mazda-made.

4. And I desire to approach this Baresman with the Zaothra with my praise, with its binding³ and spread with sanctity for the propitiation of the Bountiful Immortals. And I desire with (?) my voice the thoughts well thought, and the words well spoken, and the deeds well done, and the recital of the Gâthas as they are heard. And I desire to approach the well-said Mâthras with my praise, and this (higher) lordship with this sanctity, and this exact regulation⁴ (of the Ratu), and the reverential prayer for blessings (spoken at the fitting hour); and I desire to approach them for the contentment and propitiation

¹ The Haoma-juice.

² So better than 'fresh meat.' Fluids are the chief objects of attention here.

³ With its girdle.

⁴ Anghuyãm—rathwãm stand related as ahû and ratu; so also the Pahlavi ahûôih and radîh, and Ner. svâmitâmkâ gurutâmkâ.



of the holy Yazads, heavenly and earthly, and for the contentment of each man's soul.

5. And I desire to approach the Asnya with my praise, the lords of the ritual order, and the Hâvani and Sâvanghi and Vîsya, the holy lords of the ritual order. And I desire to approach with the Yast¹ of Mithra of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, of the myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name, and with him Râman *Hvâstra*.

6. And I desire to approach Rapithwina with my praise, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Frâdat-fshu and Zantuma, and Righteousness the Best, and Ahura Mazda's Fire.

7. And I desire to approach Uzayêrina, and Frâdat-vîra and Daivyuma* with my praise, with that lofty Ahura Napât-apâm, and the waters Mazda-made,

8. And Aiwisrûthrima, and Aibigaya, and Frâdat-vîspâm-hugaiti, and Zarathustrôtema with the Yast of the Fravashis of the saints², and of the women who have many sons, and the year long unchanged prosperity, and of Might, the well-shaped and stately, smiting victoriously, Ahura-made and of the Victorious Ascendency (which it secures).

9. And I desire to approach Ushahina, Beregya, and Nmânya with the Yast of Sraosha (Obedience) the sacred, the holy, who smites with the blow of victory, and makes the settlements advance, and with that of Rashnu, the most just, and Arstât

¹ Yestî seems used of an especial Yast here, and subsequently, as genitives intrude among datives, the form possibly taking the place of the words 'for the propitiation of'; here Yast X may be referred to.

² Yast XIII.

who furthers the settlements, and causes them to increase.

10. And I desire to approach the monthly festivals, the lords of the ritual order, and the new moon and the waning moon, and the full moon which scatters night,

11. And the yearly festivals, Maidhyô-zaremaya, Maidhyô-shema, Paitishahya, and Ayâthrima the breeder who spends the strength of males, and Maidhyâirya, and Hamaspathmaêdhaya, and the seasons, lords of the ritual order, (12) and all those lords who are the three and thirty, who approach the nearest at the time of Hâvani, who are the Lords of Asha called Vahishta (and whose services were) inculcated by Mazda, and pronounced by Zarathustra, as the feasts of Righteousness, the Best.

13. And I desire to approach Ahura and Mithra, the lofty and imperishable two, the holy, and with the Yast of those stars which are the creatures of Spenta Mainyu, and with the Yast of the star Tistrya, the radiant, the glorious, and with that of the moon which contains the seed of cattle, and with that of the resplendent sun, the eye of Ahura Mazda, and of Mithra, province-lord of the provinces, and with that of Ahura Mazda (as He rules this day) the radiant, the glorious, and with that of the Fravashis of the saints, (who rule this month),

14. And with thy Yast, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son! with all the fires, and to the good waters with the Yast of all the waters which are Mazda-made, and with that of all the plants which Mazda made.

15. And I desire to approach with the Yast of the

Māthra Spenta, the holy, the effective, the law composed against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian, and with that of the long descent of the Religion which Mazda gave.

16. And I desire to approach with the Yast of Mount Ushi-darena, Mazda-made, and of all, glorious with sanctity, and abundant in brilliance, and with that of the Kingly Glory, Mazda-made; yea, with that of the unconsumed glory which Mazda made, and with that of Ashi Vanguhi, and Kisti Vanguhi, and with that of the good Erethê, and the good Rasāstāt, and the good Glory, and of the Benefit which Mazda gave.

17. And I desire to approach with the Yast of the good and pious Blessing of the pious man and of the saint, and with that of the awful and swift Curse of the wise, the Yazad-curse, (18) and to these places, regions, pastures, and abodes, with their water-springs, and with that of the waters, and the lands, and the plants, and with that of this earth and yon heaven, and with that of the holy wind and of the stars, moon, and sun, and with that of the stars without beginning, self-determined and self-moved, and with that of all the holy creatures which are those of Spenta Mainyu, male and female, regulators of the ritual order, (19) and with that of the lofty lord who is Righteousness (himself, the essence of the ritual), and with that of the days in their duration, and of the days during daylight, and with that of the monthly festivals, and the yearly festivals, and with those of the several seasons which are lords of the ritual at the time of Hâvani.

20. And I desire to approach the meat-offering with a Yast, and Haurvatāt (who guards the water), and Ameretatāt (who guards the plants and wood), with

the Yast of the sacred flesh for the propitiation of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the mighty, whose body is the Māthra, of him of the daring spear, the lordly, the Yazad of the spoken name.

21. And I desire to approach both Haoma and the Haoma-juice with a Yast for the propitiation of the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitāma, the saint, the Yazad of the spoken name. And I desire to approach the wood-billets with a Yast, with the perfume for the propitiation of thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! the Yazad of the spoken name.

22. And I desire to approach with a Yast for the mighty Fravashis of the saints, the overwhelming, the Fravashis of those who held to the ancient lore, and of those of the next of kin.

23. And I desire to approach toward all the lords of the ritual order with a Yast, toward all the good Yazads, heavenly and earthly, who are (set) for worship and for praise because of Asha Vahista (of Righteousness the Best).

24. I will confess myself a Mazdayasnian, of Zarathustra's order, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord for Hâvani, the holy lord of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise, and for Sâvanghi and Vîsya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise of the day-lords of the days in their duration, and of the days during daylight, and for the month-regulators, and the year-regulators, and for those of the (several) seasons, for their sacrifice, and homage, their propitiation, and their praise.

(The Zaothar speaks¹): As the Ahû to be

¹ So at least the rubric. One would think that the sentence was intended to be dictated to the Ratu to be repeated; that is, if the

(revered and) chosen, let the priest speak¹ forth to me.

- (The Ratu responds): As the Ahû to be (revered and) chosen, let him who is the Zaoatar speak¹ forth to me.

(The Zaoatar again): So let the Ratu from his Righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth!

YASNA IV.

THE OFFERING TAKES PLACE.

1. These good thoughts, good words, and good deeds², these Haomas, meat-offerings, and Zaothras, this Baresman spread with sanctity, this flesh, and the two, Haurvatât (who guards the water) and Ameretatât (who guards the plants and wood), even the flesh, the Haoma and Haoma-juice, the wood-billets, and their perfume, this sacred lordship³ and chieftainship³, and the timely prayer with blessing, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, and the well-said Mâthras, these all we offer, and make known with celebrations (here).

2. Yea, these do we announce with celebrations, and we present them to Ahura Mazda, and to Sraosha

rubric is correct. The sentence as uttered by the priest seems difficult.

¹ Present, or infin. for imperative (?).

² The fact that somewhat of a more technical *sumatî*, *sûktâ*, *sukrîtâ* adheres to these expressions in this place must not for a moment induce us to suppose that their deeper meaning was lost. All good thoughts, words, and deeds culminated in the ritual, as in an enlightened high ecclesiasticism. They were nourished by it, and not lost in it. (Expressions are here varied.)

³ The prominence and supremacy of each deity, or genius, while he is especially the object of worship in the ritual order, the expressions being taken from the Ahuna-vairya.

(Obedience) the blessed, and to the Bountiful Immortals, and to the Fravashis of the saints, and to their souls, and to the Fire of Ahura Mazda, the lofty lord of the entire creation of the holy, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise.

3. Yea, further, we present (them to the Bountiful Immortals with an especial gift) these thoughts well thought, these words well spoken, these deeds well done, these Haomas, Myazdas, Zaothras, and this Baresman spread with sanctity, the flesh, and Haurvatât (who guards the water), and Ameretatât (who guards the plants and wood), even the flesh, Haoma and Parahaoma, the wood-billets, the perfume, and this their lordship and their sanctity, and this chieftainship, this prayer for blessing, the heard recital of the Gâthas, and the well-said Mâthras.

4. We offer with our celebrations, and we announce them (of a verity) to the Bountiful Immortals, those who exercise their rule aright, and who dispose (of all) aright, the ever-living, ever-helpful, the male divinities among their number who dwell with the Good Mind¹, [and the female² ones as well].

5. And we announce them in our celebrations as more propitious for this house³, and for the furtherance of this house, of its herds, and of its men, of those now born, and of those yet to be born, the holy, yea, for the furtherance of that house of which these (men) are thus.

6. And we present these offerings to the good

¹ Vohu Manah, Asha, and Khshathra.

² Âramaiti, Haurvatât, and Ameretatât.

³ It would seem that the Yasna must have been at the time celebrated in the houses of the worshippers. Hence perhaps some of the priests were pairigathans.

Fravashis of the saints who are mighty and overwhelming for the succour of the saints.

7. Yea, we present these hereby to the Creator Ahura Mazda, the radiant, the glorious, and the heavenly spirit, for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise of the Bountiful Immortals (all).

8. And we present these hereby to the Day-lords of the ritual order, to Hâvani, to Sâvanghi, and to Vîsya, the holy lords of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise, and to Mithra of the wide pastures, and the thousand ears, and the myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name,

9. And to Rapithwina, Frâdat-fshu, and Zantuma, the holy lords of the ritual order, and to Righteousness the Best, and to Ahura Mazda's Fire,

10. And to Uzayêirina, Frâdat-vîra, and Dahv-yuma¹, the holy lords of the ritual order, and to that lofty lord Napât-apâm, and to the water Mazda-made,

11. And to Aiwisrûthrima, the life-furtherer², and to Frâdat-vîspâm-hugyâiti and Zarathustrôtema, the holy lords of the ritual order, and to the Fravashis of the saints, and to the women who bring forth many sons, and to the Prosperous home-life which endures without reverse throughout the year, and to Force, well-shaped and stately, and to the Blow of victory which Mazda gives, and to the Victorious Ascendency which it secures, for their sacrifice, homage, their propitiation, and their praise,

12. And to Ushahina, with Beregya and Nmânya, and Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, smiting with the blow of victory and furthering the settlements, and to Rashnu, the most just, and to Arstât, furthering the settlements, and causing them to increase.

¹ Dahyuma.

² Aibigaya.

13. And these we announce and we present hereby to the Month-lords of the ritual order, to the new moon and the waning moon (the moon within), and to the full moon which scatters night, the holy lord of the ritual order, for (their) sacrifice, homage, their propitiation, and their praise.

14. And these we announce hereby and we present to the Yearly festivals, to Maidhyô-zaremaya, Maidhyô-shema, Patishahya, and to Ayâthrima, to Maidhyâirya, Hamaspathmaêdhaya, and to the Seasons as holy lords of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise.

15. And these we announce and we present hereby to all those lords who are the three and thirty lords of the ritual order, who approach the nearest around about our Hâvani, and which are the festivals of Righteousness the Best, inculcated by Mazda, and uttered forth by Zarathustra for their sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise.

16. And these we announce and we present to Ahura and to Mithra, the lofty, and imperishable, and holy two, to the stars, the creatures of Spenta Mainyu, and to the star Tistrya, the radiant, the glorious, and to the Moon which contains the seed of cattle, and to the resplendent Sun, of the swift horses, Ahura Mazda's eye, and to Mithra, the lord of provinces, for their sacrifice, homage, their propitiation and their praise; yea, these we present hereby to Ahura Mazda (as he rules this day) and to the Fravashis of the saints (as they rule this month), for their sacrifice, homage, their propitiation and their praise.

17. And these we announce hereby to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! with all the fires for

thy sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and to the good waters for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise of all the waters Mazda-made, and to all the plants which Mazda made,

18. And to the Māthra Spenta, the holy, the effective, the law against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian statute, and to the long descent of the good Mazdayasnian religion.

19. And these we announce and we present hereby to Mount Ushi-darena, Mazda-made, brilliant with sanctity, and to all the mountains shining with their holiness, abundantly luminous, and Mazda-made, and to the Kingly glory, the unconsumed¹ glory Mazda-made, and to the good Blessedness, and the good Religious-knowledge, and the good Rectitude, and to the good Rasāstāt, and to the Glory and the Benefit which Mazda created.)

20. And these we offer and present to the pious and good Blessing of the pious, and to the swift and dreadful Yazad, the Curse of wisdom.

21. And to these places, pastures, and dwellings with their springs of water, their rivers, to the lands and to the plants, to this earth and yon heaven, to the holy wind, to the stars, moon, and sun, to the stars without beginning, self-disposed, and to all the holy creatures of the Spenta Mainyu, male and female (the rulers as they are of the ritual order).

22. And these we announce and we present hereby to that lofty lord who is Asha, the ritual righteousness itself, to the Day-lords, and the Month-lords, the Year-lords, and the Seasons who are the lords of the ritual at the time of Hāvani, and for

¹ Unseized (?).

their sacrifice, homage, their propitiation and their praise.

23. Yea, these we announce and we present to Sraosha, the blessed and mighty, whose body is the Māthra, him of the daring spear, the lordly one, and to the holy Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitāma, the saint.

And these we announce and we present to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! for thy sacrifice, homage, thy propitiation, and thy praise.

24. And these we announce and we present to the Fravashis of the saints, the mighty and overwhelming, of the saints of the ancient lore, and of the next of kin.

25. And these we announce and we present hereby to all the good Yazads, earthly and heavenly, who are (meet) for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise, because of Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best).

We worship the Bountiful Immortals who rule aright, and who dispose of all aright.

26. And that one of beings (do we worship) whose superior (service) in the sacrifice Ahura Mazda knows, and from his righteousness (which he maintains, and those of all female beings do we worship) whose (higher service is thus likewise known; yea, all male and female beings do we worship (who are such))¹!

YASNA V.

This chapter is identical with Yasna XXXVII.

¹ Elsewhere with slight verbal change.

YASNA VI¹.

THE SACRIFICE CONTINUES WITH FULLER EXPRESSION.

1. We worship the Creator Ahura Mazda with our sacrifice, and the Bountiful Immortals who rule aright, and who dispose of all aright.

2. And we worship the Asnya with our sacrifice, and Hâvani, Sâvanghi and Vîsya, the holy lords of the ritual order, and Mithra of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, and myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name, and we worship Râman *Hvâstra*.

3. And we worship Rapithwina with our sacrifice, and Frâdat-fshu, and the Zantuma, and Righteousness the Best, and the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, holy lords of the ritual order.

4. And we worship Uzayêirina, and Frâdat-vîtra, and *Dahvyuma**, the holy lord of the ritual order, and that kingly Ahura, the radiant Napât-apâm, of the fleet horses, and the water holy, and Mazda-made.

5. And we worship Aiwisrûthrima and Aibigaya in our sacrifice, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Frâdat-vîspâm-hugyâiti and the Zarathustrôtema, the holy lord of the ritual order, and the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, and the women who bring forth many sons, and the Prosperous home-life which endures without reverse throughout the year, and Force which is well-shaped and stately, and the Blow which brings the victory, which is Ahura-given, and the Victorious Ascendency (which it secures).

6. And we worship Ushahina with our sacrifice, and

¹ This chapter differs from Y. II only in having yazamaidê instead of the formula ahmya zaotrê baresmanaêka—âyêê yêsti. Expressions for the same Zend words are purposely varied.

Beregya, and Nmânya, and Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately who smites with victory, and makes the settlements advance, and Rashnu, the most just, and Arstât who makes the settlements advance and causes them to increase, the holy lords of the ritual order.

7. And we worship the Mâhya in our sacrifice, the new moon and the waning moon (the moon within) and the full moon which scatters night, the holy lord of the ritual order.

8. And we worship the Yearly festivals in our sacrifice, Maidhyô-zaremaya, Maidhyô-shema, Paitishahya, and Ayâthrima, the furtherer (or breeder), the spender of virile strength, and Maidhyâirya, the holy lord of the ritual order, and Hamaspathmaêdhaya, and the Seasons (in which they are).

9. And we worship with our sacrifice all the lords of the ritual order, who are the thirty and three who approach the nearest around about us at Hâvani, who are the lords of Righteousness the Best, and whose observances were inculcated by Ahura Mazda, and uttered forth by Zarathustra.

10. And we worship Ahura and Mithra with our sacrifice, the lofty, and imperishable, and holy two, and the stars, moon, and sun, among the plants of the Baresman, and Mithra, the province-lord of all the provinces, even Ahura Mazda, the radiant, the glorious, and the good, valiant, and bountiful Fravashis of the saints.

11. And we worship thee, the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, together with all the fires, and the good waters, the best and Mazda-made, and holy, even all the waters which are Mazda-made and holy, and all the plants which Mazda made.

12. And we worship the Māthra Spenta with our sacrifice, the glorious and of a truth, the law revealed against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian law, and we worship with our sacrifice its long descent, and the good Mazdayasnian Religion.

13. And we worship Mount Ushi-darena, the Mazda-made, the glorious Yazad, shining with holiness, and all the mountains that shine with holiness, with abundant brilliance, Mazda-made, the holy lords of the ritual order. And we worship the mighty Kingly glory Mazda-made, the mighty glory, unconsumed and Mazda-made, and the good Sanctity, the brilliant, the lofty, the powerful and the stately, delivering (men) with its inherent power. Yea, we worship the Glory, and the Benefit which are Mazda-made.

14. And we worship the pious and good Blessing with our sacrifice, and the pious man, the saint, and that Yazad, the mighty Curse of wisdom.

15. And we worship these waters, lands, and plants, these places, districts, pastures, and abodes with their springs of water, and we worship this lord of the district with our sacrifice, who is Ahura Mazda (Himself).

16. And we worship all the greatest lords, the Day-lords in the day's duration, and the Day-lords during daylight, and the Month-lords, and the Year-lords.

17. And we worship Haurvatât (who guards the water) and Ameretatât (who guards the plants and the wood), and Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately, who smites with the blow of victory, and makes the settlements advance, the holy lord of the ritual order.

18. And we worship Haoma with our sacrifice

and the Haoma-juice. And we worship the sacred Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma the saint.

And we worship the wood-billets, and the perfume and thee, the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, the holy lord of the ritual order.

19. And we worship the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints.

20. And we worship all the holy Yazads, and all the lords of the ritual order at the time of Hâvani, and Sâvanghi, and all the greatest lords at their (proper) time. (The Yênhê hâtâm follows.)

21. The Ratu. As an Ahû (revered and) to be chosen, the priest speaks forth to me.

The Zaoatar. So let the Ratu from his Righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth!

YASNA VII.

PRESENTATION OF OFFERINGS BY THE PRIEST WITH THE OBJECT OF PROPITIATION NAMED.

1. With a complete and sacred offering¹ I offer and I give this meat-offering, and (with it) Haurvatât (who guards the water), and Ameretatât (who guards the plants and the wood), and the flesh of the Kine of blessed gift, for the propitiation of Ahura Mazda, and of the Bountiful Immortals (all, and) for the propitiation of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, endowed with sanctity, who smites with the blow of victory, and who causes the settlements to advance.

¹ With Ashi; possibly 'for a blessing,' as Ashi often has the sense of 'reward,' but scrupulous sanctity and completeness seem to be the sense here. (Expressions here are as usual varied.)

2. And I offer the Haoma and Haoma-juice with a complete and sacred offering for the propitiation of the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma the saint, and I offer the wood-billets with the perfume for Thy propitiation, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son!

3. And I offer the Haomas with a complete and sacred offering for propitiation [to the good waters] for the good waters Mazda-made. And I offer this Haoma-water with scrupulous exactness and with sanctity, and this fresh milk, and the plant Hadhânaêpata uplifted with a complete and sacred offering for the propitiation of the waters which are Mazda-made.

4. And I offer this Baresman with its Zaothra (and with its binding) for a girdle spread with complete sanctity and order for the propitiation of the Bountiful Immortals, and I offer with my voice the thoughts well-thought, the words well-spoken, and the deeds well-done, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, the Mâthras well-composed and well-delivered, and this Lordship, and this Sanctity, and this ritual mastership, and the timely Prayer for blessings, with a complete and sacred offering for the propitiation of the holy Yazads, heavenly and earthly, and for the contentment of the individual soul!

5. And I offer to the Asnya with a complete and sacred offering, as lords of the ritual order, and to Hâvani, and to Sâvanghi and Vîsya, holy lords of the ritual order, and to Mithra of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, and myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name, and to Râman Hvâstra.

6. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Rapithwina, the holy lord of the ritual order; and I offer to Frâdat-fshu and to the Zantuma, and to

Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best) and to Ahura Mazda's Fire.

7. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Uzayêirina, Frâdať-vîra, and to the *Dahvyuma**, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to that lofty Ahura Napât-apâm, and to the waters which Mazda created.

8. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Aiwisrûthrima, the life-furtherer, and to Frâdať-vîspâm-hugyâiti, and to the Zarathustrôtema, and to the Fravashis of the saints, and to the women who have many sons, and to the Prosperous home-life which endures (without reverse) throughout the year, and to Force, the well-shaped and stately, and to the Blow which smites with victory Ahura-given, and to the Victorious Ascendency (which it secures).

9. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Ushahina, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Beregya, and Nmânya, and to Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, endowed with sanctity, who smites with the blow of victory, and makes the settlements advance, and to Rashnu the most just, and to Arstât who furthers the settlements and causes them to increase.

10. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to the Mâhya, lords of the ritual order, to the new and the waning moon (the moon within), and to the full moon which scatters night, holy lords of the ritual order.

11. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to the Yearly festivals, the lords of the ritual order, to Maidhyô-zaremaya, and Maidhyô-shema, to Paitishahya, and to Ayâthrima the furtherer (the breeder), the spender of the strength of males, and

to Maidhyâirya and Hamaspathmaêdhaya, holy lords of the ritual order, and I offer with sanctity to the several seasons, the lords of the ritual order.

12. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to all those lords who are the thirty and three, who approach the nearest round about our Hâvani, and who are the lords of Asha (the ritual by-eminence), of Righteousness who is (the Best), whose observances are inculcated as precepts by Mazda, and uttered forth by Zarathustra.

13. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Ahura and Mithra, the lofty and imperishable, and holy two, and to the stars which are the creatures of Spenta Mainyu, and to the star Tistrya, the radiant, the glorious, and to the Moon which contains the seed of cattle in its beams, and to the resplendent Sun of the fleet horses, the eye of Ahura Mazda, and to Mithra, the lord of the provinces. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, (who rules this day), and to the Fravashis of the saints (who name the month).

14. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! together with all the fires, and to the good waters, even to the waters which are Mazda-made, and to all the plants which Mazda made.

15. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to the Mâthra Spenta, the holy, the effective, revealed against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian law, and to the long descent of the good Religion, of the Mazdayasnian faith.

16. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Mount Ushi-darena, the Mazda-made, brilliant

with holiness, and to all the mountains shining with holiness, of abundant brightness, and which Mazda made, and to the Royal glory unconsumed and Mazda-made. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to Ashi Vanguhi, and to Kisti Vanguhi, and to Erethe, and to Rasāstāt, and to the Glory (and the) Benefit which Mazda made.

17. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to the good and pious Prayer for blessings of the pious man, and to that Yazad, the swift and dreadful Curse of the wise.

18. And I offer with a complete and sacred blessing to these places, districts, pastures, and abodes with their springs of water, and to the waters and the lands, and the plants, and to this earth and yon heaven, and to the holy wind, and to the stars, and the moon, even to the stars without beginning (to their course), the self-appointed, and to all the holy creatures of Spenta Mainyu, be they male or female, regulators (as they are) of the ritual order.

19. And I offer with a complete and sacred blessing to that lofty lord who is Righteousness (the Best), and the Day-lords, the lords of the days during their duration, and to those of the days during daylight, and to the Month-lords, and the Year-lords, and to those of the seasons, the lords who are lords of the ritual, and at the time of Hâvani.

20. And I offer the Myazda meat-offering with a complete and sacred offering, and Haurvatât (who guards the water), and Ameretatât (who guards the wood), and the flesh of the Kine of blessed gift, for the propitiation of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, whose body is the Māthra, him of the

daring spear, the lordly, the Yazad of the spoken name.

21. And I offer the Haoma and the Haoma-juice for the propitiation of the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma the saint, the Yazad of the spoken name.

And I offer the wood-billets with the perfume for Thy propitiation, the Fire's, Ahura Mazda's son, the Yazad of the spoken name.

22. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to the Fravashis of the saints, the mighty and overwhelming, to those of the saints of the ancient lore, and to those of the next of kin.

23. And I offer with a complete and sacred offering to all the lords of the ritual order, and to all the good Yazads heavenly and earthly who are (meet) for sacrifice and homage because of Asha who is Vahista (of Righteousness who is the Best).

24. May that approach to us, and with a sacred blessing (O Lord!) whose benefits the offerers are seeking for. Thy praisers and Māthra-speakers, O Ahura Mazda! may we be named; we desire it, and such may we be. What reward, O Ahura Mazda! adapted to myself Thou hast appointed unto souls,

25. Of this do Thou Thyself bestow upon us for this world and for that of mind; (yea, do Thou bestow) so much of this as that we may attain to Thy ruling protection and to that of Righteousness for ever.

26. We sacrifice to the Ahuna-vairya, and to the veracious word correctly uttered, and to the good and pious prayer for blessings, and to the dreadful curse of the wise, the Yazad, and to Haurvatâ/ and Ameretatâ/, and to the flesh of the Kine of blessed gift, and to the Haoma and Haoma-juice, and to the wood-billets, and the perfume, for the praise of the pious and good prayer for blessings.

The Yênhê hâtâm.

27. (To that one) of beings do we sacrifice whose superior (fidelity) in the sacrifice Ahura Mazda knows through his Righteousness (within him, yea, even to those female saints do we sacrifice) whose (superior sanctity is thus known. We sacrifice to all) both males and females whose (superiority is such). (The Ratu speaks.) As an Ahû (revered and) to be chosen, he who is the Zaoatar speaks forth to me.

(The Zaoatar.) So let the Ratu from his Righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth!

YASNA VIII.

OFFERING OF THE MEAT-OFFERING IN PARTICULAR.
THE FAITHFUL PARTAKE.

I. A blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best.

It is weal ; it is weal to this (man),

When toward Righteousness Best there is right.

I offer the Myazda (of the) meat-offering with a complete and sacred offering ; and I offer Haurvatatâ (who guards the water), and Ameretatâ (who guards the plants and the wood), and the flesh of the blessed Kine ; and I offer the Haoma and the Haoma-juice, the wood-billets and the perfume for the praise of Ahura Mazda, and of the Ahuna-vairya, the veracious word, and for that of the pious and beneficent Prayer for blessings, and for the redoubted Curse of the wise, and for the praise of the Haoma, and of the Mâthra of the holy Zarathustra ; and may it come to us with sacred fulness (to accept and to recompense our gift).

2. (The Ratu speaks.) Eat, O ye men, of this Myzda, the meat-offering, ye who have deserved it by your righteousness and correctness!

3. O ye Bountiful Immortals, and thou, the Mazdayasnian law, ye just men and just women, and ye Zaothrás, whoever among these Mazdayasnians would call himself a Mazdayasnian desiring to live in the practice of the liberality of Righteousness [for by sorcery the settlements of Righteousness are ruined], do ye cause (such an one) to be (still further) taught, (ye), who are the waters, the plants, and the Zaothras !

4. And whoever of these Mazdayasnians, adults, when he invokes with earnestness, does not adhere to these words, and (so) speaks, he approaches to that (word) of the magician ; (but, as against that magician's word) 'a blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best.'

5. May'st Thou, O Ahura Mazda ! reign at Thy will, and with a saving rule over Thine own creatures, and render Ye the holy (man) also a sovereign at his will over waters, and over plants, and over all the clean and sacred (creatures) which contain the seed of Righteousness. Strip ye the wicked of all power !

6. Absolute in power may the holy be, bereft of all free choice the wicked ! Gone (may he be), met as foe, carried out from the creatures of Spenta Mainyu, hemmed in¹ without power over any wish !

7. I will incite, even I who am Zarathustra², the

¹ Or 'shut out,' which would seem better adapted.

² This piece is a reproduction, or close imitation, of some earlier fragment. It sounds like an exhortation delivered while the Faith was still new.

heads of the houses, villages, *Zantus*, and provinces, to the careful following of this Religion which is that of Ahura, and according to Zarathustra, in their thoughts, their words, and their deeds.

8. I pray for the freedom and glory of the entire existence of the holy (man) while I bless it, and I pray for the repression and shame¹ of the entire existence² of the wicked.

9. Propitiation to Haoma who brings righteousness (to us) for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise. (The Zaothar ?) As the Ahû to be (revered and) chosen, the Zaothar speaks forth to me. (The Ratu.) As an Ahû to be (revered and) chosen, the Zaothar speaks forth to me. (The Zaothar.) So let the Ratu from his Righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth !

YASNA IX.

THE HÔM YAST.

The Haoma-yast has claims to antiquity (owing to its subject, but not to its dialect), next after the *Srôš-yast*. H(a)oma=Soma, as a deity, flourished not only before the *Gâthas*, but before the *Rîks* of the Veda, in Aryan ages before Iranian and Indian became two peoples.

The astonishing circumstance has been elsewhere noted that a hymn, which is a reproduction of an Aryan original, should, notwithstanding its earlier characteristics, be necessarily assigned to

¹ The Pahlavi translator, as I think, had a text before him which read *duszhvâthrem* ; I so correct. Against the keen and most interesting suggestion of *dusz + âthrem*, I am compelled to note *ahvâthrê*, showing a compositum *a + hvâthra*, which seems not probable if = *a + hu + âthra*. *Duszâthra*, not *ahvâthrê*, would have been written. Cp. *hveng*=*hvan* for root.

² Possibly 'house.'

a date much later than the Gâthas in which H(a)oma worship is not mentioned.

Probably on account of bitter animosities prevailing between their more southern neighbours and themselves, and the use of Soma by the Indians as a stimulant before battle, the Iranians of the Gâthic period had become lukewarm in their own H(a)oma worship. But that it should have revived, as we see it in this Yast, after having nearly or quite disappeared, is most interesting and remarkable. Was it definitively and purposely repudiated by Zarathustra, afterwards reviving as by a relapse? I do not think that it is well to hold to such deliberate and conscious antagonisms, and to a definite policy and action based upon them. The Soma-worship, like the sacramental acts of other religions which have become less practised after exaggerated attention, had simply fallen into neglect, increased by an aversion to practices outwardly similar to those of 'Daêva-worshippers.' The Yast is, of course, made up of fragments, which I have endeavoured to separate by lines. In the translation I have given a rhythmical rendering, necessarily somewhat free. It was difficult to import sufficient vivacity to the piece, while using a uselessly awkward literalness. The freedom, as elsewhere, often consists in adding words to point the sense, or round the rhythm. (Expressions for identical Zend words have been here, as elsewhere, purposely varied.)

1. At the hour of Hâvani¹. H(a)oma came to Zarathustra, as he served the (sacred) Fire, and sanctified (its flame), while he sang aloud the Gâthas.

And Zarathustra asked him: Who art thou, O man! who art of all the incarnate world the most beautiful in Thine own body² of those whom I have seen, (thou) glorious [immortal]?

2. Thereupon gave H(a)oma answer³, the holy one who driveth death afar: I am, O Zarathustra

¹ In the morning from six to ten.

² Or, 'beautiful of life.'

³ 'Me,' omitted as interrupting rhythm, seems to be merely dramatic; or did it indicate that there was an original Zarathustrian Haoma Gâtha from which this is an extension?

H(a)oma, the holy and driving death afar ; pray to me, O Spitâma, prepare me for the taste. Praise toward me in (Thy) praises as the other [Saosh-yants] praise.

3. Thereupon spake Zarathustra : Unto H(a)oma be the praise¹. What man, O H(a)oma ! first prepared thee for the corporeal world ? What blessedness was offered him ? what gain did he acquire ?

4. Thereupon did H(a)oma answer me, he the holy one, and driving death afar : Vivanghvant² was the first of men who prepared me for the incarnate world. This blessedness was offered him ; this gain did he acquire, that to him was born a son who was Yima, called the brilliant, (he of the many flocks, the most glorious of those yet born, the sunlike-one of men³), that he made from his authority both herds and people free from dying, both plants and waters free from drought, and men could eat imperishable food.

5. In the reign of Yima swift of motion was there neither cold nor heat, there was neither age nor death, nor envy⁴ demon-made. Like fifteen-yearlings⁵ walked the two forth, son and father, in their stature and their form, so long as Yima, son of Vivanghvant ruled, he of the many herds !

6. Who was the second man, O H(a)oma ! who

¹ Might not the entire sixteenth verse be placed here ?

² The fifth from Gaya Maretan the Iranian Adam, but his counterpart, the Indian Vivasvat, appears not only as the father of Yama, but of Manu, and even of the gods, (as promoted mortals ?).

³ Compare svar-dṛśas pávamânâs.

⁴ So the Pahlavi.

⁵ Males, like females, seem to have been considered as developed at fifteen years of age.

prepared thee for the corporeal world? What sanctity was offered him? what gain did he acquire?

7. Thereupon gave H(a)oma answer, he the holy one, and driving death afar: Âthwya¹ was the second who prepared me for the corporeal world. This blessedness was given him, this gain did he acquire, that to him a son was born, Thraêtaona² of the heroic tribe,

8. Who smote the dragon Dahâka³, three-jawed and triple-headed, six-eyed, with thousand powers, and of mighty strength, a lie-demon of⁴ the Daêvas, evil for our settlements, and wicked, whom the evil spirit Angra Mainyu made as the most mighty Drug(k) [against the corporeal world], and for the murder of (our) settlements, and to slay the (homes) of Asha!

9. Who was the third man, O H(a)oma! who prepared thee for the corporeal world? What blessedness was given him? what gain did he acquire?

10. Thereupon gave H(a)oma answer, the holy one, and driving death afar: Thrîta⁵, [the most helpful of the Sâmas⁶], was the third man who prepared me for the corporeal world. This blessedness was given

¹ Comp. Tritá âptîá.

² Comp. the Indian Traitâná connected with Tritá.

³ Let it be remembered that Tritá smote the Ahi before Indra, Indra seeming only to re-enact the more original victory which the Avesta notices. Concerning Azhi Dahâka, see Windischmann's *Zendstudien*, s. 136.

⁴ Free.

⁵ In the *Rîg-veda* âptyá seems only an epithet added to the name Tritá*; and the two serpents of the Avesta are suspicious. Two names seem to have become two persons, or has the Avesta the more correct representation?

⁶ Have we the Semites here? They certainly penetrated as conquerors far into Media, and it seems uncritical to deny their leaving traces. The gloss may be very old.

* And to that of other gods.

him, this gain did he acquire, that to him two sons were born, Urvâkhshaya and Keresâspa, the one a judge confirming order, the other a youth of great ascendant, ringlet-headed¹, bludgeon-bearing.

11. He who smote the horny dragon swallowing men, and swallowing horses, poisonous, and green of colour, over which, as thick as thumbs are, greenish poison flowed aside, on whose back once Keresâspa cooked his meat in iron caldron at the noon-day meal; and the deadly, scorched, upstarted², and springing off, dashed out the water as it boiled. Headlong fled affrighted manly-minded³ Keresâspa.

12. Who was the fourth man who prepared thee,

¹ Comp. Kapardînam.

² I abandon reluctantly the admirable comparison of hvîs with the Indian svîd (Geldner), also when explained as an inchoative (Barth.), but the resulting meaning is far from natural either here or in Vend. III, 32 (Sp. 105). That the dragon should begin to sweat (!) under the fire which was kindled upon his back, and which caused him to spring away, seems difficult. The process was not so deliberate. He was scorched, started, and then sprang. Also in Vend. III, 32 when the barley is produced the demons hardly 'sweat (with mental misery).' The idea is too advanced for the document. Burnouf's and Haug's 'hiss' was much better in both places. But I prefer the hint of the Pahlavi lââ vazîrînd. In Vend. III, 32 (Sp. 105), khîst-hômand. Ner. taptastka sa nrisam-sah kukshubhe [dvîpâdo * babhûva]. Whether hvîsatka=hîsatka (?) has anything to do with hiz or khiz=Pahlavi âkhîzîdanô †, N. P. 'hîzîdan, is a question. I follow tradition without etymological help; perhaps we might as well write the word like the better known form as a conjecture.

³ The Pahlavi translator makes the attempt to account for the epithet 'manly-minded' as applied to Keresâspa while yet he fled affrighted; he says: Hômand marðmînisnih hanâ yehevînd, aîghas libbem-man pavan gâsdârt; Ner. asya paurushamânasatvam * idam babhûva yad asau kaitanyam sthâne dadhau, 'his manly-mindedness was this, that he kept his wits on the occasion.' See the same story treated somewhat differently in the Yasts by Darmesteter (p. 295, note 2).

† Or, âkhîzîdanô.

O H(a)oma ! for the corporeal world ? What blessedness was given him ? what gain did he acquire ?

13. Thereupon gave H(a)oma answer, he the holy, and driving death afar : Pourushaspa¹ was the fourth man who prepared me for the corporeal world. This blessedness was given him, this gain did he acquire, that thou, O Zarathustra ! wast born to him, the just, in Pourushaspa's house, the D(a)êva's foe, the friend of Mazda's lore, (14) famed in Airyêna Vaêgah ; and thou, O Zarathustra ! didst recite the first the Ahuna-vairya², four times intoning it, and with verses kept apart [(Pâzand) each time with louder and still louder voice].

15. And thou didst cause, O Zarathustra ! all the demon-gods to vanish in the ground who aforetime flew about this earth in human shape (and power. This hast thou done), thou who hast been the strongest, and the staunchest, the most active, and the swiftest, and (in every deed) the most victorious in the two spirits'³ world.

16. Thereupon spake Zarathustra : Praise to H(a)oma. Good is H(a)oma, and the well-endowed, exact and righteous in its nature, and good inherently, and healing, beautiful of form, and good in deed, and most successful in its working⁴, golden-hued, with bending sprouts. As it is the best for drinking, so (through its sacred stimulus) is it the most nutritious⁵ for the soul.

17. I make my claim on thee, O yellow one ! for

¹ Son of Pâtîrasp or Spêtârasp ; Bundahis XXXII, 1, 2, &c.

² The Ahuna-vairya is in the Gâthic dialect, and in the Ahuna-vaiti metre ; it may have been composed by Z. It named the Gâtha.

³ Comp. Y. XXX, 6 ?

⁴ Free.

⁵ Comp. pathmæng gavôî.

inspiration¹. I make my claim on thee for strength ; I make my claim on thee for victory ; I make my claim on thee for health and healing (when healing is my need) ; I make my claim on thee for progress and increased prosperity, and vigour of the entire frame, and for understanding², of each adorning kind, and for this, that I may have free course among our settlements, having power where I will, overwhelming angry malice, and a conqueror of lies.

18. Yea, I make my claim on thee that I may overwhelm the angry hate of haters, of the D(a)êvas and of mortals, of the sorcerers and sirens³, of the tyrants⁴, and the Kavis, of the Karpans, murderous bipeds, of the sanctity-destroyers, the profane apostate bipeds, of the wolves four-footed monsters, of the invading host, wide-fronted, which with strata-gems⁵ advance.

19. This first blessing I beseech of thee, O H(a)oma, thou that drivest death afar ! I beseech of thee for (heaven), the best life of the saints, the radiant, all-glorious⁶.

This second blessing I beseech of thee, O H(a)oma, thou that drivest death afar ! this body's health (before that blest life is attained).

This third blessing I beseech of thee, O H(a)oma, thou that drivest death afar ! the long vitality of life.

¹ Or, is madhem related to medhá as well as mazdâ (fem.) ?

² Pahl. farzânakîh.

³ Hardly 'witches,' outwardly attractive, but evil female beings.

⁴ Pahl. sâstârânô.

⁵ Pahl. pavan frîfârîh ; Ner. pratâranatayâ.

⁶ Vispô-hvâthrem does not mean 'comfortable' here. *Hvan* is the root ; comp. *hveng*=sun.

20. This fourth blessing I beseech of thee, O H(a)oma, thou that drivest death afar! that I may stand forth on this earth with desires gained¹, and powerful, receiving satisfaction, overwhelming the assaults of hate, and conquering the lie.

This fifth blessing, O H(a)oma, I beseech of thee, thou that drivest death afar! that I may stand victorious on earth, conquering in battles², overwhelming the assaults of hate, and conquering the lie.

21. This sixth blessing I ask of thee, O H(a)oma, thou that drivest death afar! that we may get good warning of the thief, good warning of the murderer, see first the bludgeon-bearer, get first sight of the wolf. May no one whichsoever get first the sight of us. In the strife with each may we be they who get the first alarm!

22. H(a)oma grants to racers³ who would run a course with span both speed and bottom (in their horses). H(a)oma grants to women come to bed with child a brilliant offspring and a righteous line.

H(a)oma grants to those (how many!) who have long sat searching books, more knowledge and more wisdom.

23. H(a)oma grants to those long maidens, who sit at home unwed, good husbands, and that as soon as asked, he H(a)oma, the well-minded.

24. H(a)oma lowered Keresâni⁴, dethroned him from his throne, for he grew so fond of power, that

¹ Pahl. min hvâstâr.

² Pahl. vâniđâr pavan kûshânô.

³ Arvantô=aurvantô; so the Pahl. arvand.

⁴ Comp. the Vedic Kṛiśānu, archer and demi-god who guarded the Soma. Ner. seems to notice that the name recalls that of the Christians.

he treacherously said: No priest behind ¹ (and watching) shall walk the lands for me, as a counsellor to prosper them, he would rob everything of progress, he would crush the growth of all !

25. Hail to thee, O H(a)oma, who hast power as thou wilt, and by thine inborn strength ! Hail to thee, thou art well-versed in many sayings, and true and holy words. Hail to thee for thou dost ask no wily questions, but questionest direct.

26. Forth hath Mazda borne to thee, the star-bespangled girdle ², the spirit-made, the ancient one, the Mazdayasnian Faith.

So with this thou art begirt on the summits of the mountains, for the spreading of the precepts, and the headings ³ of the Māthra, (and to help the Māthra's teacher),

27. O H(a)oma, thou house-lord, and thou clan-lord, thou tribe-lord, and chieftain of the land, and thou successful learned teacher, for aggressive strength I speak to thee, for that which smites with victory, and for my body's saving, and for manifold delight !

28. Bear off from us the torment and the malice of the hateful. Divert the angry foe's intent !

What man soever in this house is violent and wicked, what man soever in this village, or this tribe, or province, seize thou away the fleetness from

¹ So the Pahlavi, before others, read apās ; comp. frās.

² Haug's keen-sighted suggestion, pourvanfm=paurva=the Pleiades + nfm=leading the P., looks doubtful, and seems refuted by Yast XXIV, 29, where Darmesteter renders a word probably akin, as 'the many.' I would here render 'the former.'

³ The 'grasp,' the 'summary of them.'

his feet; throw thou a veil of darkness o'er his mind; make thou his intellect (at once) a wreck!

29. Let not the man who harms us, mind or body, have power to go forth on both his legs, or hold with both his hands, or see with both his eyes, not the land (beneath his feet), or the herd before his face.

30. At the aroused and fearful¹ Dragon, green, and belching forth his poison, for the righteous saint that perishes, yellow H(a)oma, hurl thy mace²!

At the (murderous) bludgeon-bearer, committing deeds unheard of³, blood-thirsty, (drunk) with fury, yellow H(a)oma, hurl thy mace!

31. Against the wicked human tyrant, hurling weapons at the head, for the righteous saint that perishes, yellow H(a)oma, hurl thy mace!

Against the righteousness-disturber, the unholy life-destroyer, thoughts and words of our⁴ religion well-delivering, yet in actions never reaching, for the righteous saint that perishes, yellow H(a)oma, hurl thy mace!

32. Against the body of the harlot, with her magic minds o'erthrowing with (intoxicating) pleasures⁵, to the lusts her person offering, whose⁶ mind as vapour wavers as it flies before the wind, for the righteous saint that perishes, yellow H(a)oma, hurl thy mace!

¹ Pahl. sakhmakan; Ner. bhayamkare.

² Or, 'strike thy club.'

³ 'Deeds apart,' 'evil deeds.'

⁴ Free.

⁵ Or, 'holding.'

⁶ Yênhê must be an error; otherwise 'offering the person to him whose mind as vapour wavers.'

YASNA X.

1. Let the Demon-gods and Goddesses fly far away¹ from hence, and let the good Sraosha make here his home! [And may the good Blessedness here likewise dwell], and may she here spread delight and peace within this house, Ahura's, which is sanctified by H(a)oma, bringing righteousness (to all).

2. At the first force of thy pressure, O intelligent! I praise thee with my voice, while I grasp at first thy shoots. At thy next pressure, O intelligent! I praise thee with my voice, when as with full force of a man I crush thee down.

3. I praise the cloud that waters thee, and the rains which make thee grow on the summits of the mountains; and I praise thy lofty mountains where the H(a)oma branches spread².

4. This wide earth do I praise, expanded far (with paths), the productive, the full bearing, thy mother, holy plant! Yea, I praise the lands where thou dost grow, sweet-scented, swiftly spreading, the good growth of the Lord. O H(a)oma, thou growest on the mountains, apart on many paths³, and there still may'st thou flourish. The springs of Righteousness most verily thou art, (and the fountains of the ritual find their source in thee)!

¹ The Pahlavi as corrected by the MS. of Dastur Hoshanggi Gâmâspgi has *barâ akhar min latamman padênd barâ shêdâ-*; Ner. *Rîte pasêât asmât prapatanti, rîte devâh rîte devasahâyâh devyâh, uttamañ Sroso nivasati.*

² Or, 'where, O Haoma! thou hast grown,' reading—*isa* with Barth. as 2nd sing. perf. pret. middle.

³ Or, 'on the pathways of the birds.'

5. Grow (then) because I pray to thee on all thy stems and branches, in all thy shoots (and tendrils) increase thou through my word!

6. H(a)oma grows while he is praised, and the man who praises him is therewith more victorious. The lightest pressure of thee, H(a)oma, thy feeblest praise, the slightest tasting of thy juice, avails to the thousand-smiting of the D(a)êvas.

7. Wasting doth vanish from that house, and with it foulness, whither in verity they bear thee, and where thy praise in truth is sung, the drink of H(a)oma, famed, health-bringing (as thou art). [(Pâzand) to his village and abode they bear him.]

8. All other toxicants go hand in hand with Rapine of the bloody spear, but H(a)oma's stirring power goes hand in hand with friendship. [Light is the drunkenness of H(a)oma (Pâzand).]

Who as a tender son caresses H(a)oma, forth to the bodies of such persons H(a)oma comes to heal.

9. Of all the healing virtues, H(a)oma, whereby thou art a healer, grant me some. Of all the victorious powers, whereby thou art a victor, grant me some. A faithful praiser will I be to thee, O H(a)oma, and a faithful praiser (is) a better (thing) than Righteousness the Best; so hath the Lord, declaring (it), decreed.

10. Swift¹ and wise hath the well-skilled² Deity created thee; swift and wise on high Haraiti did He, the well-skilled, plant thee.

11. And taught (by implanted instinct) on every

¹ Having immediate effect, and giving wisdom.

² Comp. Y. XLIV, 5.

side, the bounteous¹ birds have carried thee to the Peaks-above-the-eagles², to the mount's extremest summit, to the gorges and abysses, to the heights of many pathways³, to the snow-peaks ever whitened.

12. There, H(a)oma, on the ranges dost thou grow of many kinds. Now thou growest of milky whiteness, and now thou growest golden; and forth thine healing liquors flow for the inspiring of the pious. So terrify away from me the (death's) aim of the curser. So terrify and crush his thought who stands as my maligner.

13. Praise be to thee, O H(a)oma, (for he makes the poor man's thoughts as great as any of the richest whomsoever.) Praise be to H(a)oma, (for he makes the poor man's thoughts as great as when mind reacheth culmination.) With manifold retainers dost thou, O H(a)oma, endow the man who drinks thee mixed with milk; yea, more prosperous thou makest him, and more endowed with mind.

14. Do not vanish from me suddenly like milk-drops in the rain; let thine exhilarations go forth ever vigorous and fresh; and let them come to me with strong effect. Before thee, holy H(a)oma, thou bearer of the ritual truth, and around thee would I cast this body, a body which (as all) may see (is fit for gift and) grown⁴.

15. I renounce with vehemence the murderous woman's⁵ emptiness, the *Gaini's*, hers, with intellect

¹ Possibly 'the birds taught by the bounteous one;' the 'God-taught birds.'

² Elsewhere and here also possibly a proper name.

³ Or the 'pathways of the birds;' so Haug, following Spiegel and Justi. Gugrati, as above.

⁴ Which is seen as mine well-grown.

⁵ *Gaini* seems always used in an evil sense in the later Avesta.

dethroned¹. She vainly thinks to foil us, and would beguile both Fire-priest and H(a)oma ; but she herself, deceived therein, shall perish. And when she sits at home², and wrongly eats of H(a)oma's offering, priest's mother will that never make her, nor give her holy³ sons !

16. ⁴To five do I belong, to five others do I not ; of the good thought am I, of the evil am I not ; of the good word am I, of the evil am I not ; of the good deed am I, and of the evil, not.

To Obedience am I given, and to deaf disobedience, not ; to the saint do I belong, and to the wicked, not ; and so from this on till the ending shall be the spirits' parting. (The two shall here divide.)

17. Thereupon spake Zarathustra : Praise to H(a)oma, Mazda-made. Good is H(a)oma, Mazda-made. All the plants of H(a)oma praise I, on the heights of lofty mountains, in the gorges of the valleys, in the clefts (of sundered hill-sides) cut for the bundles bound by women. From the silver cup I pour Thee to the golden chalice over⁵. Let me not thy (sacred) liquor spill to earth, of precious cost.

18. These are thy Gâthas⁶, holy H(a)oma, these

¹ I would correct to a form of *kh ratu*.

² Compare the avoiding the service mentioned by the Pahlavi translator on Y. LIII, 5.

³ Or, more safely, 'many sons.'

⁴ Haoma speaks.

⁵ Here the priest evidently manipulates the cups containing the Haoma-juice.

⁶ The application of this term here seems to point to a high antiquity for the Haoma Yast ; if not in the present piece, which is not so old as the Gâthas, then in previous hymns to Haoma of which this Yast is an improvement, or extension.

thy songs, and these thy teachings¹, and these thy truthful ritual words, health²-imparting, victory-giving, from harmful hatred healing giving.

19. These and thou art mine, and forth let thine exhilarations flow; bright and sparkling let them hold on their (steadfast) way; for light are thine exhilaration(s), and flying lightly come they here. Victory-giving smiteth H(a)oma, victory-giving is it worshipped; with this Gâthic word we praise it.

20. Praise to the Kine; praise and victory (be) spoken to her! Food for the Kine, and pasture! 'For the Kine let thrift use toil; yield thou us food³.'

21. We worship the yellow lofty one; we worship H(a)oma who causes progress, who makes the settlements advance; we worship H(a)oma who drives death afar; yea, we worship all the H(a)oma plants. And we worship (their) blessedness, and the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint⁴.

YASNA XI.

PRELUDE TO THE H(A)OMA-OFFERING⁵.

1. Three clean creatures (full of blessings) curse betimes while yet invoking, the cow, the horse, and then H(a)oma. The cow cries to her driver⁶ thus:

¹ Ner. possibly figuratively *yâh kas̥it asvâdanâh̥*.

² Ner. *saundaryam*.

³ See Y. XLVIII, 5.

⁴ The *Yênê hâtâm* follows.

⁵ This characteristic fragment is repeated and extended in the later literature of the Parsis. The curse of the cow, horse, and of Haoma (scilicet the priest) when they are stinted, was extended to all domestic animals. It has been difficult to avoid the full metrical rhythm of the original with its jingling cadence. A full freedom is also not avoided.

⁶ Not 'to the priest;' Ner. *gr̥ihîtâram*.

Childless be thou, shorn of offspring, evil-famed, and slander-followed, who foddered¹ fairly dost not use me, but fattenest me for wife or children, and for thy niggard selfish meal.

2. The horse cries to his rider thus : Be not spanner² of the racers ; stretch no coursers to full-speed ; do not stride across the fleetest, thou, who dost not pray me swiftness in the meeting thick with numbers, in the circuit thronged with men.

3. H(a)oma speaks his drinker thus : Childless be thou, shorn of offspring, evil-famed, and slander-followed, who holdest me from full outpouring, as a robber, skulls in-crushing. No head-smiter³ am I ever, holy H(a)oma, far from death⁴.

4. Forth my father gave an offering, tongue and left eye chose Ahura, set apart for H(a)oma's meal.

5. Who this offering would deny me, eats himself, or prays it from me, this which Mazda gave to bless me, tongue with left eye (as my portion).

6. In his house is born no fire-priest, warrior ne'er in chariot standing, never more the thrifty tiller. In his home be born Dahâkas, Mûrakas of evil practice, doing deeds of double nature.

7. Quick, cut off then H(a)oma's portion, gift of flesh for doughty H(a)oma ! Heed lest H(a)oma

¹ 'Who dost not give me cooked (food)' seems improbable. If *hvâstām* means fodder, why is it fem., especially here with a feminine correlative? I think that 'having good food' is the meaning of the word, as an adjective, and agreeing with *gām* understood. Possibly, 'who dost not bestow upon me as the one well-foddered.'

² Dialectically used.

³ 'Light is the intoxication of Haoma ;' (other toxicants smite the head).

⁴ 'Having death afar.'

bind thee fettered, as he bound the fell Turanian Frangrasyan¹ (the murderous robber) fast in iron close-surrounded in the mid-third² of this earth! 8. Thereupon spake Zarathustra³: Praise to H(a)oma made by Mazda, good is H(a)oma Mazda-made.

9. ⁴Who to us is one hereupon to thee (becomes) two, to be made to three, for the five⁵-making of the four, for the seven-making of the sixth, who are your nine in the decade (?), who serve you and with zeal⁶.

10. ⁷To thee, O holy H(a)oma! bearer of the ritual sanctity, I offer this my person which is seen (by all to be) mature, (and fit for gift); to H(a)oma the effective do I offer it, and to the sacred exhilaration which he bestows; and do thou grant to me (for this), O holy H(a)oma! thou that drivest death afar, (Heaven) the best world of the saints, shining, all brilliant.

¹ A Turanian king.

² Observe the threefold division of the earth; see it also in Vend. II.

³ A poetical reproduction. Z. had been long among the ancient dead.

⁴ The Raspi at present hands the Haoma-cup to the priest at this point; the efficacy of the liquor is supposed to be multiplied.

⁵ *Peṛdaidyâi* is to be read as of course; the letter *o*, not unlike *e* in a MS. when turned, was probably half inverted.

⁶ This seems rendered by the Pahlavi as an interlude between the Ratu and the Zaoṭar; comp. Y. XXVIII, 11. Several broken sentences from other parts of the Avesta are here doubtfully recalled, perhaps as having especial sanctity.

⁷ The Raspi brings the Haoma-vessel to the Baresman at this point; and touching its stand, the Mâh-rû, lays a cloth on the right hand of the Zaoṭar, who, looking at the vessel, proceeds to recite as follows in verse 10.

11. (The Ashem Vohû, &c.)

12-15. May'st Thou rule at Thy will, O Lord¹!

16. I confess myself a Mazdayasnian of Zarathustra's order².

17. ³I celebrate my praises for good thoughts, good words, and good deeds for my thoughts, my speeches, and (my) actions. With chanting praises I present all good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, and with rejection I repudiate all evil thoughts, and words, and deeds. 18. Here I give to you, O ye Bountiful Immortals! sacrifice and homage with the mind, with words, deeds, and my entire person; yea, (I offer) to you the flesh of my very body (as your own). And I praise Righteousness. A blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best, &c.

YASNA XII (SP. XIII).

THE MAZDAYASNIAN CONFESSION⁴.

1. I drive⁵ the Daêvas hence; I confess as a Mazda-worshipper of the order of Zarathustra, estranged from the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of

¹ See Y. VIII, 5-8.

² See Y. III, 24, 25.

³ This piece is in the Gâthic dialect, and therefore an especially fitting prelude to the Confession of faith in Y. XII.

⁴ This piece in the Gâthic dialect has claims to higher antiquity next after the Haptanghâiti. Its retrospective cast shows that it is later than the original period. Verse 7 savours of a later date with its reference to the plants and waters. That Zarathustra, Kavi Vîstâspa, Frashaostra, and Gâmâspa are named by no means proves that they were still living. Still, they are not mentioned with any fanciful or superstitious exaggeration; they are not yet demi-gods.

⁵ As a partial explanation of nâismî* from nas, compare the aorist nesat. Possibly also from nad, 'I curse the demons.'

the Lord, a praiser¹ of the Bountiful Immortals; and to Ahura Mazda, the good and endowed with good possessions, I attribute all things good, to the holy One, the resplendent, to the glorious, whose are all things whatsoever which are good; whose is the Kine, whose is Asha (the righteous order pervading all things pure), whose are the stars, in whose lights the glorious beings and objects are clothed².

2. And I choose Piety, the bounteous and the good, mine may she be³. And therefore I loudly deprecate all robbery⁴ and violence against the (sacred) Kine, and all drought⁵ to the wasting of the Mazdayasnian villages.

3. Away from (?) their thoughts do I wish to lead (the thought of) wandering at will, (away the thought of) free nomadic pitching of the tent, for I wish to remove(?) all wandering from⁶ (their) Kine which abide in steadfastness upon this land; and bowing down in worship to Righteousness I dedicate my offerings with praise so far as that. Never may I stand as a source of wasting, never as a source of withering to the Mazdayasnian villages, not for the love⁷ of body or of life.

4. Away do I abjure the shelter and headship of the

¹ And sacrificer.

² A genuine citation from the Gâthas (see Y. XXXI, 7).

³ A genuine allusion to the Gâthas (Y. XXXII, 2).

⁴ This preserves the proper reading of *tâyuska* (so the Pahlavi) in Y. XXIX, 1.

⁵ *Viyâpa* as beyond a doubt; so *viyâpem* in verse 3.

⁶ *Frâ* has the same force as in *fra perenaoti* (?), to fill forth, to empty. Otherwise, 'forth to their thoughts I offer in my prayer free ranging at their choice, and a lodging where they will, together with their cattle which dwell upon this land.'

⁷ Comp. *nâiri-kinanghô*, *khra^tu-kinanghô*, and *shaêtô-kinanghô*.

Daêvas, evil as they are ; aye, utterly bereft of good, and void of virtue, deceitful in their wickedness, of (all) beings those most like the Demon-of-the-Lie, the most loathsome of existing things, and the ones the most of all bereft of good.

5. Off, off, do I abjure the Daêvas and all possessed by them, the sorcerers and all that hold to their devices, and every existing being of the sort ; their thoughts do I abjure, their words and actions, and their seed (that propagate their sin); away do I abjure their shelter and their headship, and the iniquitous of every kind who act as Rakhshas act!

Thus and so in very deed might Ahura Mazda have indicated¹ to Zarathustra in every question which Zarathustra asked, and in all the consultations in the which they two conversed together. 6. Thus and so might Zarathustra have abjured the shelter and the headship of the Daêvas in all the questions, and in all the consultations with which they two conversed together, Zarathustra and the Lord.

And so I myself, in whatsoever circumstances I may be placed, as a worshipper of Mazda, and of Zarathustra's order, would so abjure the Daêvas and their shelter, as he who² was the holy Zarathustra abjured them (once of old).

7. To that religious sanctity³ to which the waters appertain, do I belong, to that sanctity to which the plants, to that sanctity to which the Kine of blessed gift⁴, to that religious sanctity to which Ahura Mazda, who made both Kine and holy men, belongs,

¹ Reading adakhshayaêtâ ; otherwise khshayaêtâ, commanded.

² The Pahlavi structure 'he who' foreshadowed, as often.

³ Not in the sense of recompense here.

⁴ Observe this original meaning ; 'butter' is here impossible.

to that sanctity do I. Of that creed which Zarathustra held, which Kavi Vistâspa, and those two, Frashaostra and Gâmâspa; yea, of that religious faith which every Saoshyant who shall (yet come to) save (us), the holy ones who do the deeds of real significance, of that creed, and of that lore, am I.

8. A Mazda-worshipper I am, of Zarathustra's order; (so) do I confess, as a praiser and confessor, and I therefore praise aloud the well-thought thought, the word well spoken, and the deed well done;

9. Yea, I praise at once the Faith of Mazda, the Faith which has no faltering utterance¹, the Faith that wields the felling halbert², the Faith of kindred marriage, the holy (Creed), which is the most imposing, best, and most beautiful of all religions which exist, and of all that shall in future come to knowledge, Ahura's Faith, the Zarathustrian creed. Yea, to Ahura Mazda do I ascribe all good, and such shall be the worship of the Mazdayasnian belief!

YASNA XIII (SP. XIV).

INVOCATIONS AND DEDICATIONS.

1. I address (my invocation to) Ahura Mazda. And I invoke (among guardian beings) the chief³ of

¹ Fraspâvaokhedhrâm; 'y' miswritten for 'v.' Fra seems to be prohibitive 'speech without falling, or hesitation;' better as adj.

² Comp. Y. XXXI, 18.

³ This Ratu is the description and representation of the Nmânô-paiti as occupying the attention of the worshippers chiefly at the time of his mention in the course of the ritual. (I vary the expression 'chief' with that of 'lord' here for the sake of change.) Once established as a Ratu in the ritual, he became a guardian genius Nmânya; so of the others. (Y. XIII is in the Gâthic dialect.)

the house-lord, and the chief of the *Vis*-lord¹, and the chief of the *Zantu*-lord². And I invoke the chief of the province-lord³. And the chief of women I invoke, the Mazdayasnian Faith, the blessed and good *Parendi*⁴, her who is the holy one of human-kind⁵. And I invoke this (holy) earth which bears us.

2. And I invoke the friendly and most helpful person's⁶ lord, the Fire of Ahura Mazda, and also the most energetic lords of holy men, those who are most strenuous⁷ in their care of cattle and the fields, and the chief of the thrifty tiller of the earth. And I invoke the steady settler⁸ of sanctity, (and) the chief of the charioteer.

3. And I invoke the chief of the fire-priest by means of the most imposing sciences of the Mazdayasnian Faith. And I invoke the chief of the *Ātharvan*, and his pupils I invoke; yea, the lords of each of them. I invoke these lords, and I summon the Bountiful Immortals here, and the Prophets who shall serve us, the wisest as they are, the most scru-

¹ *Visya*.

² *Zantuma*.

³ *Dahvyuma* = *Dahyuma*.

⁴ The goddess of riches.

⁵ Lit. biped; see elsewhere where quadruped means merely beast.

⁶ Or, 'households.'

⁷ *Ashethwôzgemā* (several manuscripts have *ashe*) finds its explanation from the Pahlavi of Dastur Hoshanggi *Gâmâspgî*'s MS. It may be read *kabed rang rasisntûm* instead of *kabed yôm rasisntûm*. The ancient error of *yôm* arose from the fact that the copyist had before him a form which might be read either *rôg* or *rang*, the characters being identical for either word. He could not reconcile himself to *rang* in the sense of effort, and so decided for *rôg*; but in order to guide his successors aright, he changed it for its synonym *yôm*, which, as Spiegel well remarks, affords but little sense. But the word is *rang*, as I believe, and this is at once corroborated by *Ner.*'s *bahuklesa*. Read *as + thwakhsa + gatemā* = *kabed + rang + rasisntûm*, the most progressing with painful energy.

⁸ Or, 'steadiest forces.'

pulous in their exactness (as) they utter words (of doctrine and of service), the most devoted (to their duties likewise), and the most glorious in their thoughts(?)¹. And I invoke the most imposing forces of the Mazdayasnian Faith, and the fire-priests I invoke, and the charioteers, the warriors, and the thrifty tillers of the soil.

4. And to You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals! Ye who rule aright, and dispose (of all) aright, I offer the flesh of my very frame, and all the blessings of my life.

Thus² the two spirits³ thought, thus they spoke, and thus they did;

5. And therefore as Thou, O Ahura Mazda! didst think, speak, dispose, and do all things good (for us), so to Thee would we give, so would we assign to Thee our homage; so would we worship Thee with our sacrifices. So would we bow before Thee with these gifts, and so direct our prayers to Thee with confessions of our debt.

6. By the kinship of the good kindred⁴, by that of Righteousness the good (Thy righteous servant's nature) would we approach Thee, and by that of the good thrift-law, and of Piety the good.

7. And we would worship the Fravashi of the Kine of blessed gift⁵, and that of the holy Gaya Maretan, and we would worship the holy Fravashi⁶

¹ I should think that the reference was here to *khṛatavō*, Y. XLVI, 3. See Y. XXXII, 14, as alternatively rendered.

² A portion of the text has here fallen out.

³ The recognition of a strong dualism here is imperative. Ahura alone is praised.

⁴ Or, 'of the good kinsman, the lord(?)'.

⁵ Elsewhere meaning 'meat,' just as *Ameretatâ* and *Haurvatâ* mean wood and water.

⁶ Or, 'sanctity and the Fravashi.'

of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint. Yea, that one of beings do we worship whose better (service) in the sacrifice Ahura Mazda knows; (even those women do we worship) whose¹ (better service thus is known). Yea, both (holy) men and women (do we worship whom Ahura Mazda knows²). As the Ahû is excelling, so is our Ratu, one who rules from the Righteous Order, a creator of mental goodness, and of life's actions done for Mazda; and the Kingdom is to Ahura which to the poor (may offer) nurture³.

A blessing is the Right called the best, there is weal, there is weal to this (man), when toward Righteousness Best (he does) right⁴.

8. We worship the Ahuna-vairya; and we worship Asha Vahista the best(?), the bountiful Immortal. And we sacrifice to the Hâ fraoreti, even to the confession and laudation of the Mazdayasnian Faith!

YASNA XIV (SP. XV).

DEDICATIONS.

1. I will come to You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals! as a praiser and a priest, and an invoker and sacrificer, as a memorising reciter and a chanter, for Your sacrifice and homage, which are to be offered to You, the Bountiful Immortals, and for our dedication and sanctification; (yea, for ours) who are the holy prophets (destined to benefit the saints).

2. And to You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals²! would I dedicate the flesh of my very body³, and all the blessings of a prospered life⁴.

3. In this Zaothra with this Baresman, I desire to

¹ Feminine.

² Elsewhere with verbal difference.

³ See Y. XXXIII, 14.

⁴ Verses 1, 2 are Gâthic.

approach the holy Yazads with my praise¹, and all the holy lords of the ritual order at their times, Hâvani at his time, and Sâvanghi and Visya at their times. 4. I confess myself a Mazdayasnian, and of Zarathustra's order².

5. The Zaoatar speaks : As an Ahû (revered and) chosen, the Zaoatar (?) speaks forth to me (?).

The Ratu speaks: As an Ahû (revered and) to be chosen, the Zaoatar speaks forth to me.

The Zaoatar : So let the Ratu from his Righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth !

YASNA XV (SP. XVI).

THE SACRIFICE CONTINUES.

1. With precept, praise, and with delight produced by grace³, I call upon the Bountiful Immortals the good, and also therewith the beautiful by name⁴; and I sacrifice to them with the blessing of the good ritual, with the earnest blessings of the good Mazdayasnian Faith.

2. Whose best gift from his Righteousness is mine in the offering Ahura this knoweth ; who have lived, and live ever, by their names these I worship, while I draw near with praises⁵. The Good Kingdom is to be chosen, that lot which most of all bears on (our blessings⁶).

3. Let Sraosha (Obedience) be here present for

¹ See Y. II, 18.

² See Y. III, 24, 25.

³ Root rap=rabh, a reception of grace, or being received by grace.

⁴ Namān may be meant for a locative ; 'with the beautiful things in their name (?)'.

⁵ See Y. LI, 22.

⁶ See Y. LI, 1.

the sacrifice of Ahura Mazda, the most beneficent, the holy, who is so dear to us as at the first, so at the last ; yea, let him be present here ¹.

4. As the Ahû (revered and) to be chosen, the Âtarevakhsha thus speaks forth to me.

(Response) : So let the Ratu from his righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth !

YASNA XVI (Sp. XVII).

THE SACRIFICE CONTINUES WITH INCREASED FULNESS OF EXPRESSION.

1. We worship Ahura Mazda, the holy lord of the ritual order, who disposes (all) aright, the greatest Yazad, who is also the most beneficent, and the one who causes the settlements to advance, the creator of good creatures ; yea, we worship Him with these offered Zaothras, and with truthfully and scrupulously delivered words ; and we worship every holy Yazad of the heaven (as well) !

2. And we worship Zarathustra Spitâma in our sacrifice, the holy lord of the ritual order with these Zaothras and with faithfully delivered words ; and we worship every holy earthly Yazad as we worship him ; and we worship also the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint. And we worship the utterances of Zarathustra and his religion, his faith and his lore.

3. And we worship the former religions of the world ² devoted to Righteousness which were insti-

¹ This fragment in the Gâthic dialect might more properly be placed before the Srôsh Yast.

² So the Pahlavi translator, probably reading angheus ; otherwise

tuted at the creation, the holy religions of the Creator Ahura Mazda, the resplendent and glorious. And we worship Vohu Manah (the Good Mind), and Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and Khshathra-vairya, the Kingdom to be desired, and the good and bountiful Âramaiti (true piety in the believers), and Haurvatât and Ameretatât (our Weal and Immortality).

4. Yea, we worship the Creator Ahura Mazda and the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, and the good waters which are Mazda-made and holy, and the resplendent sun of the swift horses, and the moon with the seed of cattle (in his beams¹); and we worship the star Tistrya, the lustrous and glorious; and we worship the soul of the Kine of blessed endowment, (5) and its Creator Ahura Mazda; and we worship Mithra of the wide pastures, and Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, and Rashnu the most just, and the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, and the Blow-of-victory Ahura-given (as it is). And we worship Râman Hvâstra, and the bounteous Wind of blessed gift, (6) and (its) Creator Ahura Mazda, and the good Mazdayasnian Religion, and the good Blessedness and Arstât.

And we worship the heaven and the earth of blessed gift, and the bounteous Mâthra, and the stars without beginning (to their course), self-disposing as they are.

7. And we worship the glorious works of Righteousness in which the souls of the dead find satisfaction and delight [(Pâzand) which are the Fravashis

'of the conscience that loves the right.' In Yast XIII, 118 the word is a proper name through an error.

¹ Possibly in allusion to the menses. The moon is masc.

of the saints], and we worship (Heaven) the best world of the saints, shining, all glorious.

8. And we worship the two, the milk-offering and the libation, the two which cause the waters to flow forth¹, and the plants to flourish, the two foes who meet the Dragon¹ demon-made; and who are set to meet, to defeat, and to put to flight, that cheat², the Pairika, and to contradict the insulting malice of the Ashemaogha (the persecuting heretic) and that of the unholy tyrant full of death³.

9. And we worship all waters and all plants, and all good men and all good women. And we worship all these Yazads, heavenly and earthly⁴, who are beneficent and holy.

10. And we worship thee (our) dwelling-place who art the (earth, our) bounteous Āramaiti⁵, and Thee, O Ahura Mazda, O holy Lord of this abode⁶! which is the home of healthy herds and healthy men, and of those who are both endowed with health and lover(s) of the ritual right.

(Response of the individual worshipper(?).) Wherefore whichever of persons, or whatever of bodily influences, is most helpful and preserving in that abode (thus owned by Mazda) let this meet me in mine abode, and there may it abide for summer and for winter. (Or⁷ let that one meet me in all my house,

¹ We cannot mistake a connection here with *yó áhim gaghāna—avāsrīgat sártave saptá síndhūn*.

² Or is it possible that a plague of mice is meant, *mūs* being here indeclinable?

³ Ordering the execution of many of his subjects.

⁴ *Gaēthyāta* with J 3, K 11.

⁵ Later association of *Ā.* and the earth.

⁶ Originally recited in private houses.

⁷ Alternative.

in whom are what of influences are the most mighty power for the body and the person's life ; yea, let that one meet me there, and there abide for summer and for winter (for my help) !)

YASNA XVII.

TO THE FIRES, WATERS, PLANTS, &C.

1-10¹, 11. We worship thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son ! We worship the fire Berezi-savangha (of the lofty use²), and the fire Vohu-fryâna (the good and friendly³), and the fire Urvâzista (the most beneficial and most helpful⁴), and the fire Vâzista (the most supporting⁵), and the fire Spênista (the most bountiful⁶), and Nairya-sangha the Yazad of the royal lineage⁷, and that fire which is the house-lord of all houses and Mazda-made, even the son of Ahura Mazda, the holy lord of the ritual order, with all the fires.

12. And we worship the good and best waters Mazda-made, holy, all the waters Mazda-made and holy, and all the plants which Mazda made, and which are holy.

¹ See chapter VI, which is nearly identical with XVII, 1-10.

² This fire is that before Ahura Mazda and the kings.

³ This fire dwells in the bodies of men and beasts (animal heat).

⁴ This is in trees and plants.

⁵ This in the clouds (lightning).

⁶ This is the fire which is applied in the world (Bundahis, West, page 61).

⁷ That N. is here referred to as connected with the fire, seems certain ; this fire corresponds with that of Vâhrâm in places of worship.

13. And we worship the Māthra-spenta (the bounteous word-of-reason), the Zarathustrian law against the Daêvas, and its long descent.

14. And we worship Mount Ushi-darena which is Mazda-made and shining with its holiness, and all the mountains shining with holiness, and of abundant glory, and which Mazda made —.

15. And we worship the good and pious prayer for blessings, (16) and these waters and (these lands), (17) and all the greatest chieftains, lords of the ritual order¹;

18. And I praise, invoke, and glorify the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, those of the house, the Vts, the Zantuma, the Da^hvyuma², and the Zarathustrôtema, and all the holy Yazads³!

YASNA XVIII⁴.

1. Grant me, Thou who art maker of the Kine, plants and waters, Immortality, Mazda! Grant, too, Weal, Spirit bounteous —.

YASNA XIX.

ZAND OR COMMENTARY ON THE AHUNA-VAIRYA FORMULAS⁵.

(As the Ahû is excellent, so (is) the Ratu (one who rules) from the righteous Order, a creator of mental goodness and of life's actions done for Mazda; and

¹ 1-17 occur also in MSS. as Y. LIX, 1-17.

² Dahyuma.

³ The Yênhê hâtâm follows.

⁴ See Y. LI, 7, and Y. XLVII.

⁵ The obvious errors contained in this ancient comment cannot

the Kingdom (is) for Ahura which to the poor shall offer a nurturer.)

1. Zarathustra asked of Ahura Mazda: O Ahura Mazda, Thou most bounteous Spirit! maker¹ of the corporeal worlds, the holy One! which was that word which Thou did'st declare to me, (2) which was before the sky, and before the water, before the earth, and before the cattle, before the plants, and before the fire, and before the holy man, and the Demon-gods (the Daêvas), before the Khrafstra-men², and before all the incarnate world; even before all the good creatures made by Mazda, and which contain (and are) the seed of righteousness?

3. Thereupon Ahura Mazda said: It was this piece³, the Ahuna-vairya, O Spitama Zarathustra! which I pronounced as thine (4) before the sky, and before the waters, before the land, and before the cattle and the plants, and before the fire, Ahura Mazda's son, before the holy man⁴, and before the Daêvas, and Khrafstra-men, and before the entire corporeal world, even before the good creatures made by Mazda, which contain (and are) the seed of righteousness.

5. It was these part(s) of the Ahuna-vairya, O Spi-

destroy its great interest as a specimen of early exegesis. Where I hold it to be erroneous may be seen from my rendering of the Ahuna without further observations. The Ahuna-vairya is in the Gâthic dialect, and the Ahunavaiti metre. This Zand is in the Zend (sic). Ahû gives better sense as a nom.

¹ See *daunghôiz* para below.

² May not *khrafstra* be a degeneration from *kehrp-astar*? While the term may be applied to wild beasts, one is strongly inclined to hold that foul insects are chiefly referred to.

³ This part of the Ahuna (?), meaning its several parts.

⁴ Tradition naturally specifies Gaya Maretan.

tama Zarathustra! which especially belongs to me, and when each is intoned aloud without the (needless) repetition¹ of verses and of words, and without their omission, it is worth a hundred of their other stanzas, even although they are prominent in the ritual, and likewise equally as well recited without additions or omissions; nay, further, when it is intoned imperfectly but added to, and with omissions, it is even then in effect equivalent (not to a hundred indeed, but) to ten other (stanzas) that are prominent.

×6. And whoever in this world of mine which is corporeal shall mentally recall, O Spitâma* Zarathustra! a portion of the Ahuna-vairya, and having thus recalled it, shall undertone it, or beginning to recite it with the undertone, shall then utter it aloud, or chanting it with intoning voice, shall worship thus, then with even threefold (safety and with speed²) I will bring his soul over the Bridge of Kînvat, I who am Ahura Mazda (I will help him to pass over it) to Heaven (the best life), and to Righteousness the Best, and to the lights of heaven³.

7. And whoever, O Spitama Zarathustra! while undertoning the part(s) of the Ahuna-vairya (or this piece the Ahuna-vairya), takes ought therefrom, whether the half, or the third, or the fourth, or the fifth, I who am Ahura Mazda will draw his soul off

¹ I do not think that mispronunciation is here intended; the Pahlavi has abarâ shûtakîh; aîghas barâ lâ khelmûnêd; Ner. na sete. I am strongly inclined to read anapashûta for anapishûta.

² Three times seems to me to lack meaning, but it may have given rise to a foolish belief that the soul went three times before death to heaven.

³ Vahistaëibyô retaining this sense here.

from the better world ; yea, so far off will I withdraw it as the earth is large and wide ; [and this ¹ earth is as long as it is broad ²].

8. And I pronounced this saying which contains its Ahû and its Ratu ³ before the creation of this heaven, before the making of the waters, and the plants, and the four-footed kine, before the birth of the holy biped man, before this sun with its body made for the acquisition of the creation of the Bountiful Immortals ⁴.

9. ⁵And the more bountiful ⁶ of the two Spirits (Ahura) declared to me ⁷ (Zarathustra) the entire creation of the pure, that which exists at present, that which is in the course of emerging into existence ⁸, and that which shall be, with reference to the performance and realisation 'of the actions of a life devoted to Mazda ⁹.'

10. And this word is the most emphatic of the words which have ever been pronounced, or which are ¹⁰ now spoken, or which shall be spoken in future; for (the eminence of) this utterance is a thing of such a nature, that if all the corporeal and living world

¹ Īm here equals iyám.

^{*} Pâzand.

³ So, referring to the wording of the Ahuna.

⁴ Enabling us to receive the blessings which they bestow through the influence of the sun. 'The sun-shaped matter' would give us a materialism. The Pahlavi has 'levîno min zak khurkhshêdô brîno (?) kerpô tanô ĩ khûrkshêd pavan barâ ayâpakîh ĩ ameshô-spendânô yehabûnd.'

⁵ I hold that Ahura speaks no further here.

⁶ See Y. XLV, 1.

⁷ Of course fictitious, as Z. had long been among the dead.

⁸ Does bavaintîka mean 'past'?

⁹ Through the state of action ; skyaothananâm anghêus Mazdâi.

¹⁰ Can mruyê(-vê) be a third singular like ghnê, isê?

should learn it, and learning should hold fast by it, they would be redeemed from their mortality!

11. And this our word I have proclaimed as a symbol to be learned ¹, and to be recited, as it were, to every one of the beings under the influence of and for the sake of Righteousness the Best.

12. And 'as' (the worshipper has) here spoken it forth, when he has thus 'appointed' the 'Lord and regulator ²,' so (by thus reciting these authoritative words), he acknowledges Ahura Mazda (as prior to, and supreme) over, those creatures who have 'the mind' ³ as their first. 'As' he acknowledges Him as the greatest of them all, 'so' he assigns the creatures to Him (as to their originator).

13. As he undertones the third sentence, he thereby announces that 'all the amenities of life appertain to the 'good' Mazda ⁴, (and come) from Him. As he recites 'dazda mananghō,' 'the creator of mind,' he acknowledges Him as superior and prior to mind; and as he makes Him the one who indicates (the truth) to mind, (saying) 'mananghō of mind,' which means that by this much he makes Him (its director), and then he makes Him 'the lord of actions ⁵.'

14. And when he acknowledges Him for the creatures thus, 'O Mazda ⁶!' he acknowledges Him (as

¹ Or, 'it has been declared to us, the learner, and the one in charge of the ritual.'

² In the words *yathâ ahû vairyô, athâ ratus*.

³ See *dazda mananghō*, coming 'before' *skyaothananām angheus*, *khshathrem*, and *vâstârem*.

⁴ Can the Ahuna have lost words, and is *Mazdau hugtîs vangheus* a citation? At all events, the Zandist errs in separating *vangheus* from *mananghō*. He attributes mystical meaning to every word.

⁵ Comp. *ahû-skyaothananām*.

⁶ Reading *Mazda* (?).

their ruler) when he assigns the creatures to Him thus. He then assigns the Kingdom to Ahura¹, saying: 'Thine, O Mazda! is the Kingdom.' And he assigns a nourisher and protector to the poor, saying: Yim drigubyô dadať vâstârem; that is, as a friend to Spitama². This is the fifth sentence, (and it concludes) the entire recital and word, (even) the whole of this word of Ahura Mazda³.

15. He who is the best (of all) Ahura Mazda, pronounced the Ahuna-vairya, and as He pronounced it as the best, so He caused it to have its effect⁴, (He, ever) the same, (as He is).

The evil one at once⁵ arose (to oppose Him), but He (Ahura) repelled that wicked one with His interdict, and with this repelling renunciation: Neither our minds are in harmony, nor our precepts, nor our comprehensions, nor our beliefs, nor our words, nor our actions, nor our consciences, nor our souls⁶!

CATECHETICAL ZAND⁷.

16. And this saying, uttered by Mazda, has three stages, or measures⁸, and belongs to four classes (of men as its supporters), and to five chiefs (in the political world, without whom its efficiency is

¹ Khshathremâ Ahurâi â.

² As having the interest of the poor at heart.

³ Supposing Ahura (?) to be meant by Ahû and Ratu; see Mazdâi Ahurâi. The Zandist may have rendered: As Ahura is the (first) to be chosen, so He is our Ratu from His righteousness, the creator of Vohûman (including all good creatures), &c.

⁴ 'Praised' (?).

⁵ Reading haithwať; Pahlavi tîz; possibly 'being present.'

⁶ See Y. XLV, 2.

⁷ This Zand differs, as to the application of Ahû and Ratu, from the former.

⁸ Afsman elsewhere applies to metre.

marred), and it has a conclusion ending with a gift. (Question.) How are its measures (constituted)? (Answer.) The good thought, the good word, and the good deed. 17. (Question.) With what classes of men? (Answer.) The priest, the charioteer (as the chief of warriors), the systematic tiller¹ of the ground, and the artisan². These classes therefore accompany the religious man throughout his entire duty³ with the correct thought, the truthful word, and the righteous action. These are the classes and states in life which give attention to the rulers⁴, and fulfil the (laws) of religion; (yea, they are the guides and companions of that religious man) through whose actions the settlements are furthered in righteousness.

18. (Question.) How are the chiefs (constituted)? (Answer.) They are the house-chief, the village-chief, and the tribe-chief, the chief of the province, and the Zarathustra⁵ as the fifth. That is, so far as those provinces are concerned which are different from, and outside of the Zarathustrian regency, or domain. [Ragha⁶ which has four chiefs (only) is the Zarathustrian (district)]. (Question.) How are the chiefs of this one constituted? (Answer.) They (are) the house-chief, the village-chief, the tribe-chief, and the Zarathustra as the fourth. 19. (Question.) What is the thought well thought? (Answer.) (It is that which the holy man thinks), the one who holds the holy thought to be before all other things⁷. (Question.)

¹ These are 'the poor,' but not mendicants.

² A class not in the Gâthas; observe the rise of a caste system.

³ Or, 'experience.'

⁴ Or, 'the ritual.'

⁵ The title of a governor.

⁶ It did not need the fifth. It was a centre of rule.

⁷ Ashavan manas paoiryô.

What is the word well spoken? (Answer.) It is the Māthra Spenta¹, the bounteous word of reason. (Question.) What is the deed well done? (Answer.) It is that done with praises², and by the creatures who regard Righteousness as before all other things. 20. (Question.) Mazda made a proclamation, whom did He announce? (Answer.) Some one who was holy, and yet both heavenly and mundane³. (Question.) What was His character, He who made this sacred enunciation? (Answer.) He who is the best (of all), the ruling one. (Question.) Of what character (did He proclaim him the coming one)? (Answer.) As holy and the best, a ruler who exercises no wanton or despotic power⁴.

21. We sacrifice to the (several) part(s) of the Ahuna-vairya. We sacrifice to the memorised recital of the Ahuna-vairya, and its regular chanting and its use in the full Yasna.

YASNA XX.

ZAND, OR COMMENTARY, ON THE ASHEM VOHŪ.

1. A blessing is Righteousness (called) the best; there is weal, there is weal to this man when the Right (helps) the Righteousness best, (when the pious man serves it in truth⁵). Ahura Mazda spake forth: Ashem vohŭ vahistem asti. To this Asha, the holy ritual sanctity, one attributes the

¹ Probably the Gāthas with their lost portions, also the Vendîdād.

² Ritual strictness based upon practical piety.

³ The Saoshyant.

⁴ The latter part of this Zand shows that the Ratu was recognised as a human ruler in it.

⁵ Elsewhere verbally different; 'when Asha is for A.V.'

qualities of 'good' and 'best,' as one attributes property to an owner; thus this sentence *vohû vahistem asti* is substantiated (at once ¹).

2. *Ustâ asti ustâ ahmâi*; by this attribution of blessedness (the praiser) assigns every person (or thing) of a sacred nature to every holy person, and as one usually (?) and regularly (?) ² assigns every person or thing (?) ³ that is holy to every holy man.

3. *Yyať ashâi vahistai* ⁴; by these words the worshipper ascribes the entire *Māthra* (to *Asha Vahista*), and ascribes all to the *Māthra*, as one ascribes the kingdom to Righteousness, and as one ascribes righteousness to the invoking saint; yea, as one ascribes righteousness to us who are the prophets (who shall help and bless the people). The three maxims of the sentences (are thus fulfilled). And every word (in its detail), and the entire utterance in its proclamation, is the word of *Ahura Mazda*.

CATECHETICAL ADDITION ⁵.

4. *Mazda* has made a proclamation. (Question.) Whom did He announce? (Answer.) That holy one who is both heavenly and earthly. (Question.) Of what character is He who has thus announced Him? (Answer.) He is the best, and the one who is exercising sovereign power. (Question.) Of what character is the man whom He announced? (Answer.)

¹ It is carried into effect; possibly 'rendered fit for praising' (?).

² The Pahlavi indicates *nâ stâitya* (?).

³ *Ashavanem* here and in Y. XIX, 19 might be a neuter from a transition, or addition.

⁴ 'Ashem.'

⁵ This Catechetical addition is identical with that in Y. XIX. The wording alone is slightly altered in the translation to relieve the sameness.

The holy and the best, the one who rules with no capricious tyranny.

We sacrifice to the (several) part(s) of the Asha Vahista (prayer). We sacrifice to the heard-recital of the Asha Vahista, to its memorising, its chanting, and its sacrificial use ¹!

YASNA XXI.

CATECHETICAL ZAND, OR COMMENTARY UPON THE YÊNHÊ HÂTÂM ².

(The Yênhê. (To that one) of beings do we offer, whose superior (fidelity) in the sacrifice Ahura Mazda recognises by reason of the sanctity (within him; yea, even to those female saints also do we sacrifice) whose (superior fidelity is thus likewise known; thus) we sacrifice to (all, to both) the males and females (of the saints) !)

¹ The Yênhê hâtâm follows.

² The expressions in this prayer were suggested by Y. LI, 22; but the Zand does not consistently follow the thoughts in the Gâtha. Təm understood should be supplied as an object for yazamaidē in connection with yênhê, as well as tauskâ for yaung-hâm. In Y. LI, 22, it is, however, by no means certain that yazâi applies to a təm yêhyâ. Holding the twenty-first verse in mind, I am obliged to refer yêhyâ to nâ spentô. Here, however, men and women are worshipped, as it is improbable that the 'Immortals' whose names are in the feminine are meant. The prayer is in the Gâthic dialect, and ancient metre would hardly contain so artificial a formation. It can only be defended from the *teng yazâi hvâis nâmenis* of Y. LI, 22.

Or did the composer of the prayer correctly render Y. LI, 22, and boldly write his succinct words as being clear to his hearers from explanations which are now lost? Such explanations (oral or written) as a matter of course existed from the first. No composer fails to discuss his productions.

1. A word for the Yasna by Zarathustra, the saint. Yênhê, &c. Here the worshipper indicates and offers the Yasna (which is the sacrificial worship) of Mazda as by the command (or as the institution) of Ahura¹. Hâtâm. Here the worshipper offers the sacrificial worship as if with the beings who are among those who are destined to live². 2. Yâunghâm. Here he indicates and offers the sacrificial worship of those holy females who have Âramaiti at their head³, as homage to the Immortals. These are the three sentences which comprehend all the Yasnian speech. (Question.) To whom is this Yasna addressed? (Answer.) To the Bountiful Immortals (in the course of the Yasna). 3. Thereupon spake Mazda: Salvation to this one, whosoever he may be! May the absolute ruler Ahura grant it. (Question.) 4. Whom did He answer with this answer? (Answer.) He answered: The state of salvation; and with this answer, 'the state of salvation,' he answered every saint who exists, every one who is coming into existence, and every one who shall exist in the future. (Question. Who answered thus? Answer.) The best One. (Question. What did He answer?) (Answer.) The best thing. (That is,) the best One, Mazda, answered the best and the holy (answer) for the better and the holy man. 5. We sacrifice to this piece, the Yênhê hâtâm, the prominent and holy Yast.

¹ Referring yênhê to Ahura (?).

² Fit to live, clean.

³ The Ameshôspends whose names are in the feminine; so the Zandist erroneously.

YASNA XXII.

THE SACRIFICE CONTINUES.

1. With the Baresman brought hither together with the Zaothra, for the worship of the Creator Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, and for that of the Bountiful Immortals, I desire to approach this Haoma with my praise, offered (as it is) with punctilious sanctity (or, for a blessing), and this fresh milk, and this plant Hadhânaêpata. 2. And, as an act of worship to the beneficent waters, I desire to approach these Zaothras with (my) praise offered (as they are) with punctilious sanctity, having the Haoma with them, and the flesh, with the Hadhânaêpata. And I desire to approach the Haoma-water with my praise for the beneficent waters; and I desire to approach the stone mortar and the iron mortar with my praise. 3. And I desire to approach this plant for the Baresman with my praise, and the well-timed prayer for blessings, that which has approached (to accept our homage), and the memorised recital and the fulfilment of the good Mazdayasnian Faith, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, and⁴ the well-timed and successful prayer for blessings, that of the holy lord of the ritual order. And I desire to approach these wood-billets and their perfume with my praise,—thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son! Yea, I desire to approach all good things with my praise, those which Mazda made, and which have the seed of sanctity (within them), (4) for the propitiation of Ahura Mazda and of the Bountiful

Immortals, and of Sraosha the blessed, and of Ahura Mazda's Fire, the lofty ritual lord¹!

20. And I desire to approach this Haoma with (my) praise, that which is thus lifted up with sanctity, and this milk (fresh as it is, and as if) living and lifted up with sanctity, and this plant the Hadhânaê-pata lifted up with sanctity. 21. And I desire to approach these Zaothras with (my) praise for the beneficial waters, these Zaothras which have the H(a)oma with them and the milk with them, and the Hadhânaê-pata, and which are lifted up with sanctity. And I desire to approach the Haoma-water with (my) praise for the beneficial waters, and the two mortars, the stone one and the iron one, (22) and I desire to approach this branch for the Baresman with my praise, and the memorised recital and fulfilment of the Mazdayasnian law, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, and the well-timed and persistent prayer for blessings (uttered) by the holy lord² of the ritual order, and this wood and perfume, even thine, O Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, and all good objects Mazda-made (23) for the propitiation of Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, and of the Bountiful Immortals, and of Mithra of the wide pastures, and of Râman Hvâstra³, (24) and of the resplendent sun, immortal, radiant, of the fleet horses, and of Vayu, (of predominant influence and) working on high, set over the other beings in the creation [(Pâzand); that is for thee thus (O Vayu) when thine influence is that which apper-

¹ 5-19=Y. III, 5-19; 20-23=1-4 from imem.

² The priest? (Repetitions are, as everywhere, curtailed and varied.)

³ For closer rendering of details, see verses 2, 3, 4, which differ chiefly in the final dedication.

tains to Spenta Mainyu¹], and for the propitiation of the most just knowledge Mazda-given, and of the holy and good Religion, the Mazdayasnian Faith; (25) for the propitiation of the Māthra Spenta, (the bounteous) and holy, and the effective, instituted against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian law, and of the long descent of the good Mazdayasnian Faith² [the holding in mind and devotion to the Māthra Spenta, and knowledge of the Mazdayasnian Religion] for the propitiation of the understanding which is innate and Mazda-made, and of that which is heard by the ear; (26) and for thy propitiation, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son! [(Pāzand); (yea) thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son] with all the fires, and for the propitiation of Mount Ushi-darena, the Mazda-made, radiant with sanctity; (27) and of all the holy Yazads, spiritual and earthly, and of the holy Fravashis, the redoubted and overwhelming, those of the ancient lore, and those of the next of kin and of the Yazad of the spoken name!

YASNA XXIII.

THE FRAVASHIS OF THE SAINTS; PRAYERS FOR THEIR APPROACH³.

1. I desire to approach with my praise⁴ those Fravashis which have existed from of old, the Fravashis of the houses, and of the villages, of the communities, and of the provinces, which hold the

¹ And not the evil Vayu, which appertains to Angra Mainyu.

² Insert, 'and of the good Zarathustrian devotion.'

³ This chapter is said to be reserved for funeral occasions.

⁴ Or, 'I pray for the approach.' See Y. XXVI.

heaven in its place apart, and the water, land, and cattle, which hold the children in the wombs safely enclosed apart so that they do not miscarry. 2. And I desire to approach toward the Fravashi¹ of Ahura Mazda, and with my praise, and for those of the Bountiful Immortals, with all the holy Fravashis which are those of the heavenly Yazads. And I desire to approach the Fravashi of Gaya Maretan (the life-man) in my worship with my praise, and for that of Zarathustra Spitâma, and for those of Kavi Vistâspa, and of Isat-vâstra², the Zarathustrian, with all the holy Fravashis of the other ancient counsellors as well. 3. And I desire in my worship to approach toward every holy Fravashi whosoever it may be, and wheresoever dead upon this earth (its possessor may have lain), the pious woman, or the girl of tender years, the maiden diligent (among the cattle) in the field (who) may have dwelt (here; yea, all) which are now worshipped from this house³, which are attentive to, and which attain to (our) good Yasnas and (our) homage. 4. Yea, I desire to approach the Fravashis of the saints with my praise, redoubted (as they are) and overwhelming, the Fravashis of those who held to the ancient lore, and the Fravashis of the next-of-kin; and I desire to approach toward the Fravashi of mine own⁴ soul in my worship with my praise; and I desire therewith to approach toward all the lords of the ritual, and with

¹ Fravashi seems a dative; comp. ūtī.

² Zarathustra's eldest son by his wife Padokhshah; he was the chief of priests according to tradition.

³ This Yasna was recited from house to house.

⁴ The 'own' soul; notice the seeming distinction between Fravashi and soul.

praise ; and I desire to approach all the good Yazads with my praise, the heavenly and the earthly, who are meet, for sacrifice and homage, because of Righteousness the Best !

YASNA XXIV.

PRESENTATIONS.

1. (And having approached these Haomas with our worship), we present them to Ahura Mazda ; (yea, we present) these Haomas, Myazdas, Zaothras, and the Baresman spread with punctilious sanctity, and the flesh, and the milk, fresh as if living, and lifted up with punctilious sanctity, and this branch the Hadhânaêpata likewise lifted up with sanctity.

2. (And having approached these Zaothras in our worship), we present them to the good waters having the Haoma with them, and the milk, and the Hadhânaêpata, and lifted up with scrupulous sanctity ; and (with them) we present the Haoma-water to the good waters, and both the stone and the iron mortar.

3. And we present this plant of the Baresman, and the timely prayer for blessings, which has approached in the due course of the ritual, and the recollection and practice¹ of the good Mazdayasnian Religion, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, and the timely prayer for blessings which has approached as the prayer of the holy lord of the ritual order ; and these wood-billets, and the perfume, (even) thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son ! and all good objects Mazda-made, which have the seed of righteousness, we offer and present. 4. And these we present hereby to Ahura Mazda, and to Sraosha (Obedience) the

¹ Or the memorised recital and performance of its rites.

blessed (and Righteous), and to the Bountiful Immortals; and to the Fravashis of the saints, even to the souls of the saints, and to the Fire of Ahura Mazda, the lofty lord of entire holy creation, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise.

5. And these we present hereby to the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint, for sacrifice, propitiation, and for praise, and to that of the people¹ who love Righteousness, with all the holy Fravashis of the saints who are dead and who are living, and to those of men who are as yet unborn, and to those of the prophets who will serve us, and will labour to complete the progress and renovation of the world².

6. And we present these Haomas, Myazdas, Zaothras, and the Baresman spread with sanctity, and the flesh, and the milk (fresh as if) living, and lifted up with sanctity, and the Hadhânaêpata branch.

7. And we present these Zaothras to the beneficial waters having the Haoma with them, and the flesh, and the Hadhânaêpata lifted up with sanctity, and the Haoma-water, to the good waters, with the stone and iron mortars, (8) and this plant of the Baresman, (and) the timely Prayer and the recollection and practice of the good Mazdayasnian Faith³, and these wood-billets, and the perfume, thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son! and all objects which are Mazda-made, and which have, and are, the seed of Righteousness, these we offer and present.

9. (Yea,) we present these hereby to the Bountiful Immortals who rule aright, and who dispose of all

¹ Elsewhere perhaps, erroneously, as a proper name: or read *anghus*.

² Pahlavi *frashakarð karðârân*.

³ 'And the heard recital of the Gâthas.'

aright, the ever-living, ever-helpful, who abide with the Good Mind (of the Lord and of His folk¹) !

YASNA XXV.

1. And we worship the Bountiful Immortals with our sacrifice, who rule aright, and who dispose of all aright ; and we worship this Haoma, this flesh and branch, (2) and these Zaothras for the good waters, having the Haoma with them, and the flesh with them, and Hadhânaêpata, and lifted up with sanctity, and we worship the Haoma-water for the beneficial waters ; and we worship the two, the stone mortar and the iron mortar ; (3) and we worship this plant for the Baresman and the well-timed prayer for blessings which has approached (in its proper place within the ritual course), and also both the remembrance and the practice² of the good Mazdayasnian Religion, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, and the well-timed prayer for blessings of the holy lord of the ritual order which has approached, and these wood-billets with the perfume, (even) thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son ! and we worship all good objects which are Mazda-made, and which contain (and are) the seed of Righteousness.

4. And we worship Ahura Mazda with our sacrifice, the resplendent, the glorious, and the Bountiful Immortals who rule aright, and who dispose (of all) aright, and Mithra of the wide pastures and Râman *Hvâstra* ; and we worship the shining sun, the resplendent, the immortal, of the fleet horses.

¹ See Y. IV, 4-25, which is repeated here. Expressions are curtailed.

² Or the memorised recital and fulfilment.

5. And we worship the holy wind which works on high, placed higher than the other creatures in the creation; and we worship this which is thine, O Vayu! and which appertains to the Spenta Mainyu within thee; and we worship the most true religious Knowledge, Mazda-made and holy, and the good Mazdayasnian law.

6. And we worship the Māthra Spenta verily glorious (as it is), even the law pronounced against the Daêvas, the Zarathustrian law, and its long descent¹; yea, we worship the good Mazdayasnian Religion, and the Māthra which is heart-devoted and bounteous (imparting heart's devotion to the saint); yea, we worship the Mazdayasnian Religion maintained in the understanding² of the saint; and we honour that science which is the Māthra Spenta, and the innate understanding Mazda-made, and the derived understanding, heard with ear, and Mazda-made.

7. Yea, we worship thee, the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son! the holy lord of the ritual order; and we worship all the Fires, and Mount Ushi-darena (which holds the light³) Mazda-made and holy, the Yazad mount, brilliant with sanctity. 8. And we worship every holy spiritual⁴ Yazad; and every holy earthly Yazad (who exists)!

¹ Its long tradition.

² Or maintaining the understanding.

³ A sunrise or sunset mountain; see the word applied intellectually just previously, also previous notes on it.

⁴ That is, heavenly.

YASNA XXVI.

THE FRAVASHIS; SACRIFICE AND PRAISE TO THEM.

1. I praise, invoke, and weave my hymn to the good, heroic, and bountiful Fravashis of the saints; (and having invoked these, then) we worship the Nmânyas, and the Vtśyas, and the Zantumas, and the Dahvyumas¹, and the Zarathustrôtemas.

2. And of all these prior Fravashis, we worship here the Fravashi of Ahura Mazda, which is the greatest and the best, the most beautiful and the firmest, the most wise and the best in form, and the one that attains the most its ends because of Righteousness. 3. And (having invoked them) hither, we worship the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the holy ones, those of the Bountiful Immortals, the brilliant, of effective glance, the lofty, the devoted, the swift ones of the creatures of Ahura who are imperishable and holy.

4. And (having invoked them) hither, we worship the spirit and conscience, the intelligence and soul and Fravashi of those holy men and women who early heard the lore and commands (of God²), and loved and strove after Righteousness, the ritual truth; and we worship the soul of the Kine of blessed gift. 5. And (having invoked it) hither, we worship the Fravashi of Gaya Maretan the holy, and the sanctity and Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma the saint; and we worship the Fravashi of Kavi Vîstâspa the holy, and that of Isať-vâstra the Zarathustrian, the saint.

¹ Dahyumas.

² 'Of the early religion.'

6. And (having invoked them) hither, we worship the life, conscience, intelligence, soul and Fravashi of the next of kin, of the saints male and female who have striven after the ritual truth, which are those of the dead and living saints, and which are those also of men as yet unborn, of the future prophets who will help on the renovation, and complete the human progress, with them all.

7. And (having invoked them) hither, we worship the souls of the dead [(Pâzand) which are the Fravashis of the saints ¹]; and of all the next of kin who have passed away in this house, of the Aêthrapaitis (the teachers) and of the disciples; yea, of all holy men and women; (8) and we worship the Fravashis of all the holy teachers and disciples; and of all the saints both male and female.

9. (And having invoked them) hither we worship the Fravashis of all the holy children who fulfil the deeds of piety; and we worship the Fravashis of the saints within the province; and those of the saints without the province. 10. We worship the Fravashis of (those) holy men and holy women; we worship all the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints from Gaya Maretan (the first created) to the Saoshyant, the victorious ².

11. Yea, we worship all the Fravashis of the saints, and we worship the souls of the dead [(Pâzand) which are the Fravashis of the saints]!

¹ Whether a real distinction existed in the minds of these early writers, between a Fravashi and a departed soul, is hard to say. That a Fravashi was worshipped as existing before the person to whom it appertained was born, may be owing to a poetical, and not a dogmatic, anticipation.

² From the Iranian Adam to the Christ of the resurrection; see Yast XIX, 89, 91.

YASNA XXVII.

PRELUDE TO THE CHIEF RECITAL OF THE
AHUNA-VAIRYA.

1. This is to render¹ Him who is of all the greatest, our lord² and master³ (even) Ahura Mazda. And this to smite⁴ the wicked Angra Mainyu, and to smite Aêshma of the bloody spear, and the Mazainya Daêvas, and to smite all the wicked Varenya Daêvas.

2. And this is to further Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, to further the Bountiful Immortals, and the influences of the star Tistrya, the resplendent, the glorious, (and) to the furtherance of the holy man, and of all the (bountiful and) holy creatures of the Bounteous Spirit.

3-5⁵. 6. The Haomas are crushed, O Mazda, Khshathra, and Asha, O ye Lords! Good is Sraosha who accompanies the sacrifice with the great glory⁶, and may he be present affording strenuous help.

7. We are offering saving acts of wisdom and of worship with the sacred gift of the Ahuna-vairya intoned with sanctity, and of the two mortars here

¹ Dazdyâi would be an infin. for an imperative; but it here refers to the Ahuna. We might say, 'Let this render,' &c.

² See Y. XXXIV, 5.

³ Referring to the Ahû and Ratu of the Ahuna, but with erroneous application.

⁴ Comp. Vend. XIX, 9 (Wg.).

⁵ The Ahuna appears here in the MS. with Y. XXXIV, 5, the â airymâ, and the Ashem Vohû.

⁶ Mâzâ rayâ; otherwise mâzarayâ, with greatness (see Y. XLIII, 12).

brought forward¹ with holy act, and with that of the correctly uttered words likewise ; and therefore may they be to us the more saving in their wise significance.

8-12². 13. As the Ahû is excellent, so is the Ratu (one who rules) from (his) sanctity, a creator of mental goodness, and of life's actions done for Mazda ; and the Kingdom (is) for Ahura, which to the poor may offer a nurturer. 14. (What is Your Kingdom, Your riches ; how may I be Your own in my actions, to nourish Your poor, O Mazda ? Beyond ; yea, beyond all we declare You, far from Daêvas and Khrafstra-accursed mortals³!)

15. We worship the Ahuna-vairya. We worship Asha Vahista, the most beautiful⁴, the Bountiful Immortal⁵.

YASNA XXXV.

YASNA HAPTANGHÂITI.

With the Yasna of the 'Seven Chapters' which ranks next in antiquity after the Gâthas, we already pass into an atmosphere distinct from theirs. The dialect still lingers, but the spirit is changed. We have advanced personification of the Bountiful Immortals ; that is, their personification seems more prominent, while the ideas of which they are the personification already, and to a proportionate degree, have grown dim. The name Amesha Spenta occurs: the Fravashis appear ; the Fire is worshipped, the Earth, and the Grass.

To the waters, to the Soul of the Kine, and to all holy or clean

¹ Here the Parsi priests now manipulate the mortars.

² See Y. XXXIII, 11-14 ; and Y. I, 23, and Y. XII.

³ See Y. XXXIV, 15. The Ashem follows.

⁴ Or, 'the best.'

⁵ The Yênhê hâtâm follows. For Y. XXVIII-XXXIV, see the Gâtha Ahunavaiti above, pp. 2-194.

beings, the very word yazamaidê is applied for the first time. On the other hand, many later objects of worship are totally absent, the six seasons of the creation, the five divisions of the day, the five Gâthas, Zarathustra, the Baresman, the Haoma, &c. A considerable period of time must have elapsed since the Gâthas had been composed, and a lengthy period must also be supposed to have passed before the Avesta of the later type began to be sung and recited. The chapter numbered XLII in the Vendîdâd Sâdah of Brockhaus (1850), and in the edition of Westergaard (1852), and numbered XLI, 18-35 in Spiegel's edition, seems a later addition; but it cannot be very much later, as it preserves the dialect and general features. An intentional imitation is not probable. Spiegel has included it with chapter XLI to preserve the number 'seven;' and if the entire section is to be called 'the Yasnas of the Seven Chapters,' it should most certainly not be numbered XLII! I so number merely to follow Westergaard, as do the first two parts of these translations from the Avesta. This portion should neither be incorporated with chapter XLI, nor numbered as a separate one; it should be noted as a supplement. The name 'Seven Chapters' was of course given to the pieces long after their composition.

PRAISE TO AHURA AND THE IMMORTALS; PRAYER FOR THE PRACTICE AND DIFFUSION OF THE FAITH.

1. We sacrifice to Ahura Mazda, the holy Lord of the ritual order, and to the Bountiful Immortals, who rule aright, who dispose of all aright; and we sacrifice to the entire creation of the clean, the spiritual and the mundane, with the longing blessing of the beneficent ritual, with the longing blessing of the benignant Religion, the Mazdayasnian Faith.

2. We are praisers of good thoughts, of good words, and of good actions, of those now and those hereafter¹ [(Pâzand) of those being done, and of those

¹ The Pahlavi translator, as so often, first saw the proper explanation here.

completed]. We implant ¹(?) them (with our homage, and we do this) the more, and yet the more since we are (praisers) of the good (from whom they spring).

3. That, therefore, would we choose, O Ahura Mazda! and thou, O Righteousness the beautiful! that we should think, and speak, and do those thoughts, and words, and deeds, among actual good ² thoughts, and words, and actions, which are the best for both the worlds; (4) and together with these gifts (?) and actions which are thus the best, we would pray for the Kine (which represents the pure creation), that she may have comfort and have fodder from the famed, and from the humble, from the potent and the weak.

5. To the best of good rulers (is) verily the Kingdom, because we render and ascribe it to Him, and make it thoroughly His own (?), to Mazda Ahura do we ascribe it, and to Righteousness the Best.

6. As thus both man or woman knows (the duty), both thoroughly and truly, so let him, or her, declare it and fulfil it, and inculcate it upon those who may perform it as it is. 7. We would be deeply mindful of Your sacrifice and homage, Yours, O Ahura Mazda! and the best, (and we would be mindful) of the nurture of the Kine. And that let us inculcate and perform for You according as we may, and (for) such (praisers as we are).

8. Under the shelter ³ of the ritual Order let us do so in the active fulfilment ³ of its (precepts) toward every one of the (clean) and better creatures which

¹ Or, we are 'purifiers,' or 'adorners.' Tradition 'spreading from man to man,' so thoroughly implanting themselves; comp. perhaps *nîd*.

² *Hâtâm* in this sense.

³ Or, 'in the house and stall.'

are fit to live¹, with a gift for both the worlds.
 9. Yea, those words and sayings, O Ahura Mazda! we would proclaim as Righteousness, and as of the better mind (?); and we would make Thee the one who both supports (us in our proclamation) of them, and who throws still further light upon them (as they are),

10. And by reason of Thy Righteous Order, Thy Good Mind, and Thy Sovereign Power, and through the instrumentality of our praises of Thee, O Ahura Mazda! and for the purpose of (still further) praises, by Thy spoken words, and for (still further) spoken words, through Thy Yasna, and for (still further) Yasnas (would we thus proclaim them, and make Thee the bestower of our light).

YASNA XXXVI.

TO AHURA AND THE FIRE.

1. We would approach You two, O (Ye) primeval ones in the house² of this Thy holy Fire, O Ahura Mazda, Thou most bounteous Spirit! Who brings pollutions to this (Thy flame) him wilt Thou cover with pollutions (in his turn). 2. But as the most friendly do Thou give us zeal, O Fire of the Lord! and approach us³, and with the loving blessing of the most friendly, with the praise of the

¹ Or, 'live-stock.'

² Or, 'in the service of the Fire;' so the Pahlavi: consider also the occurrence of forms of var(e)z in the other sense in the close proximity. Fire temples did not exist; some shelter, however, must have been afforded. Also the dual pouruyê(-ve) may refer to Ahura and the Fire. Comp. Y. XXX, 3. Or, is it 'at first?'

³ Possibly, 'but most favoured is he whom (yem).'

most adored. Yea, may'st thou approach to aid us in this our greatest (undertaking) among the efforts of our zeal.

3. The Fire of Ahura Mazda art thou verily¹; yea, the most bounteous one of His Spirit, wherefore Thine is the most potent of all names (for grace), O Fire of the Lord! 4. And therefore we would approach Thee, (O Ahura!) with the help of Thy Good Mind (which Thou dost implant within us), with Thy (good) Righteousness, and with the actions and the words inculcated by Thy good wisdom!

5. We therefore bow before Thee, and we direct our prayers to Thee with confessions of our guilt, O Ahura Mazda! with all the good thoughts (which Thou dost inspire), with all the words well said, and the deeds well done, with these would we approach Thee. 6. And to Thy most beauteous body² do we make our deep acknowledgments, O Ahura Mazda! to those stars (which are Thy body); and to that one, the highest of the high, [such as the sun was called]!

YASNA XXXVII.

TO AHURA, THE HOLY CREATION, THE FRAVASHIS
OF THE JUST, AND THE BOUNTIFUL IMMORTALS.

1. Thus therefore do we worship Ahura Mazda, who made the Kine (the living creation), and the (embodied) Righteousness (which is incarnate in the clean), and the waters, and the wholesome plants, the stars, and the earth, and all (existing) objects

¹ Vôi looks as if it represented vâf here.

² See Y. I, 1.

that are good. 2. Yea, we worship Him for His Sovereign Power and His greatness, beneficent (as they are), and with priority among the Yazads¹ who abide beside the Kine (and care for her protection and support).

3. And we worship Him under His name as Lord, to Mazda dear, the most beneficent (of names). We worship him with our bones, and with our flesh, (with our bodies and our life). And we worship the² Fravashis of the saints, of holy men, and holy women; (4) and Righteousness the Best do we worship, the most beauteous, the Bountiful Immortal and that which is endowed with light in all things good.

5. And we worship the Good Mind (of the Lord), and His Sovereign Power, and the Good Faith, the good law of our thrift, and Piety the ready mind (within Thy folk)!

YASNA XXXVIII.

TO THE EARTH AND THE SACRED WATERS.

1. And now we worship this earth which bears us, together with Thy wives³, O Ahura Mazda! yea, those Thy wives do we worship which are so desired from their sanctity. 2. We sacrifice to their zealous wishes, and their capabilities, their inquiries (as to duty), and their wise acts of pious reverence,

¹ Or, 'with the priority in the Yasnas, (we who are they) who abide.'

² Tem is interpolated; or shall we render: 'We worship Him' as in the F. with adverbial use as in the Greek, and often here?

³ Compare the Indian gnás. The waters are wives, as is the earth; below they are mothers.

and with these their blessedness, their full vigour and good portions, their good fame and ample wealth. 3. O ye waters! now we worship you, you that are showered down, and you that stand in pools and vats, and you that bear forth (our loaded vessels?) ye female Ahuras of Ahura, you that serve us (all) in helpful ways, well forded and full-flowing, and effective for the bathings, we will seek you and for both the worlds! 4. Therefore did Ahura Mazda give you names, O ye beneficent¹ ones! when He who made the good bestowed you. And by these names we worship you, and by them we would ingratiate ourselves with you, and with them would we bow before you, and direct our prayers to you with free confessions of our debt. O waters, ye who are productive², and ye maternal ones, ye with heat³ that suckles the (frail and) needy (before birth), ye waters (that have once been) rulers of (us) all, we will now address you as the best, and the most beautiful; those (are) yours, those good (objects) of our offerings, ye long of arm to reach our sickness, or misfortune⁴, ye mothers of our life!

YASNA XXXIX.

TO THE SOUL OF THE KINE, &c.

1. And now we sacrifice to the Kine's soul, and to her created body, and we sacrifice to the souls

¹ Vanguhís with K₄, &c.

² Compare azi as applied to the Kine.

³ Compare agnáyas, reading agnayô. Or is it agnivau with a suffix va?

⁴ Or, 'our sicknesses and welfare.'

of cattle who are fit to live¹ (for us), and whose (we ?) are, such as are the same to them.

2. And we worship the souls of those beasts which are tame and broken in, and of wild herds, and the souls of the saints wherever they were born, both of men and of women, whose good consciences are conquering in the strife against the Daévas, or will conquer, or have conquered.

3. And now we worship the Bountiful Immortals (all) the good, and both those male², and those female³ (by their names). The males among them do we worship, ever living, and ever helpful, who dwell beside the pious, and the females thus the same. 4. As Thou, O Ahura Mazda! hast thought and spoken, as thou hast determined, and hast done these things (effecting) what is good, therefore do we offer to Thee, therefore do we ascribe to Thee our praises, and worship Thee, and bow ourselves before Thee; and therefore would we direct our prayers to Thee, Ahura! with confessions of our sin.

5. And we thus draw near to Thee together with the good kinship of our kindred, with that of Righteousness the blessed, and the good law of thrift and energy and the good Piety, the ready mind (within Thy folk)!

YASNA XL.

PRAYERS FOR HELPERS.

1. And now in these Thy dispensations, O Ahura Mazda! do Thou wisely⁴ act for us, and with abun-

¹ Live-stock.

² Yôî.

³ Yaustâ.

⁴ A fem. noun mazdâ = medhá.

dance with Thy bounty and Thy tenderness¹ as touching us; and grant that reward which Thou hast appointed to our souls, O Ahura Mazda! 2. Of this do Thou Thyself bestow upon us for this world and the spiritual; and now as part thereof (do Thou grant) that we may attain to fellowship with Thee, and Thy Righteousness for all duration.

3. And do Thou grant us, O Ahura! men who are righteous, and both lovers and producers of the Right as well. And give us trained beasts for the pastures, broken in for riding², and for bearing, (that they may be) in 'helpful³ companionship with us, and as a source of long enduring vigour, and a means of rejoicing grace to us for this⁴.

4. So let there be a kinsman lord for us, with the labourers of the village, and so likewise let there be the clients (or the peers⁵). And by the help of those may we arise.

So may we be to You, O Mazda Ahura! holy and true⁶, and with free giving of our gifts.

YASNA XLI.

A PRAYER TO AHURA AS THE KING, THE LIFE, AND THE REWARDER.

1. Praises, and songs, and adorations do we offer to Ahura Mazda, and to Righteousness the Best; yea, we offer and we ascribe them, and proclaim them.

2. And to Thy good Kingdom, O Ahura Mazda!

¹ Otherwise, 'understanding which protects' (?).

² So the Pahlavi and Ner. ³ Bezvaitê. ⁴ May we be rejoicing(?).

⁵ Hakhmā (= -a) replacing the airyaman of the Gāthas, and throwing light upon its meaning. The form is irregular.

⁶ Or, 'holy rishis' (ereshayō?).

may we attain for ever, and a good King be Thou over us ; and let each man of us, and so each woman, thus abide, O Thou most beneficent of beings, and for both the worlds ! 3. Thus do we render Thee, the helpful Yazad, endowed with good devices, the friend of them (who worship Thee) with (well-adjusted) ritual ; so may'st Thou be to us our life, and our body's vigour, O Thou most beneficent of beings, and that for both the worlds !

4. Aye, let us win and conquer (?) long life, O Ahura Mazda ! in Thy grace, and through Thy will may we be powerful. May'st Thou lay hold on us to help, and long, and with salvation, O Thou most beneficent of beings !

5. Thy praisers and Māthra-speakers may we be called ¹, O Ahura Mazda ! so do we wish, and to this may we attain ². What reward most meet for our deserving Thou hast appointed for the souls, O Ahura Mazda ! (6) of that do Thou bestow on us for this life, and for that of mind ³. Of that reward (do Thou Thyself grant this advantage), that we may come under Thy protecting guardianship, and that of Righteousness for ever. We sacrifice to that brave Yasna, the Yasna Haptanghâiti ⁴, the holy, the ritual chief !

YASNA XLII.

A SUPPLEMENT TO THE HAPTANGHÂITI ⁵.

1. We worship You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals ! with the entire collection of this Yasna, Haptanghâiti

¹ See Y. L, 11.

² Or, 'abide.'

³ See Y. XXVIII, 3.

⁴ Here the Haptanghâiti once ended.

⁵ Of not greatly later origin.

(as we sum up all). And we sacrifice to the fountains of the waters, and to the fordings of the rivers, to the forkings of the highways, and to the meetings of the roads.

2. And we sacrifice to the hills that run with torrents, and the lakes that brim with waters, and to the corn that fills the corn-fields; and we sacrifice to both the protector and the Creator, to both Zarathustra and the Lord.

3. And we sacrifice to both earth and heaven, and to the stormy wind that Mazda made, and to the peak of high Haraiti, and to the land, and all things good.

4. And we worship the Good Mind (in the living) and the spirits of the saints. And we sacrifice to the fish of fifty-fins¹, and to that sacred beast the Unicorn² (?) which stands in Vouru-kasha, and we sacrifice to that sea of Vouru-kasha where he stands, (5) and to the Haoma, golden-flowered, growing on the heights; yea, to the Haoma that restores us, and aids this world's advance. We sacrifice to Haoma that driveth death afar, (6) and to the flood-streams of the waters, and to the great flights of the birds, and to the approaches of the Fire-priests, as they approach us from afar³, and seek to gain the provinces, and spread the ritual lore. And we sacrifice to the Bountiful Immortals all⁴!

¹ See, however, Bundahis (West), p. 66.

² See Bundahis, chap. XIX, also Darmesteter, Ormuzd and Ahriman (pp. 148-150).

³ Yôî yêyâ dûrâ points to a migration of Zoroastrianism, coming West(?).

⁴ For Yasna XLIII-LI, see above, pp. 98-187.

YASNA LII (SP. LI).

A PRAYER FOR SANCTITY AND ITS BENEFITS.

1. I pray with benedictions for a benefit, and for the good, even for the entire creation of the holy (and the clean); I beseech for them for the (generation which is) now alive, for that which is just coming into life ¹, and for that which shall be hereafter. And (I pray for that) sanctity which leads to prosperity, and which has long afforded shelter ², which goes on hand in hand with it ³, which joins it in its walk, and of itself becoming its close companion as it delivers forth its precepts, (2) bearing every form of healing virtue which comes to us in waters ⁴, appertains to cattle, or is found in plants, and overwhelming all the harmful malice of the Daêvas, (and their servants) who might harm this dwelling ⁵ and its lord, (3) bringing good gifts, and better blessings, given very early, and later (gifts), leading to successes, and for a long time giving shelter ⁶. And so the greatest, and the best, and most beautiful benefits of sanctity fall likewise to our lot (4) for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and the praise of the Bountiful Immortals, for the bringing prosperity to this abode, and for the prosperity of the entire creation of the holy,

¹ Or, 'for that which is past?' bavâithyâika.

² Dareghô-vârethmanem is treated as a feminine; see also dareghô-vârethmanô in verse 3.

³ Have we hvô-aiwishâkîm, as representing some more regular form?

⁴ Medicinal springs.

⁵ This Yasna was celebrated from house to house.

⁶ Vârethmanô.

and the clean, (and as for this, so) for the opposition of the entire evil creation. (And I pray for this) as I praise through Righteousness, I who am beneficent, those who are (likewise of a better mind) ¹. 5-8. (See Y. VIII, 5-8.) (For Y. LIII, see Gâthas, pp. 190-194.)

YASNA LIV ² (SP. LIII).

THE AIRYEMÂ-ISHYÔ.

1. Let the Airyaman, the desired friend and peersman, draw near for grace to the men and to the women who are taught of Zarathustra, for the joyful grace of the Good Mind, whereby the conscience may attain its wished-for recompense. I pray for the sacred reward of the ritual order which is (likewise so much) to be desired; and may Ahura Mazda grant ³ it, (or cause it to increase).

2. We sacrifice to the Airyemâ-ishyô, the powerful, the victoriously smiting, the opponent of assauling malice, the greatest of the sentences of the holy ritual order. And we sacrifice to the bounteous Gâthas that rule supreme in the ritual, the holy (and august). And we sacrifice to the Praises of the Yasna which were the productions of the world of old ⁴.

¹ Citation from the Gâthas (Y. XLV, 6).

² This piece in the Gâthic dialect, and in a metre supposed by some to be identical with that of the Vahistôisti, is very old, and ranks with the Ahuna-vairya and Ashem Vohû in importance.

³ Or, can masatâ (sic) equal 'with his liberality, or majesty,' leaving *yantu* to be understood with Ahurô?

⁴ The later Avesta notes the antiquity of the older.

YASNA LV (Sp. LIV).

THE WORSHIP OF THE GÂTHAS AS CONCLUDED, AND
THAT OF THE STAOTA YÊSNYA¹ AS BEGINNING.

1. We present hereby and we make known, as our offering to the bountiful Gâthas which rule (as the leading chants) within (the appointed times and seasons of) the Ritual, all our landed riches, and our persons, together with our very bones and tissues, our forms and forces, our consciousness, our soul, and Fravashi.

2. That which Gâthas (may) be to us, which are our guardians and defenders, and our spiritual food, yea, which (may) be to our souls both food and clothing, such are these Gâthas to us, guardians, and defenders, and (spiritual) food, even such they are, both food and clothing to the soul.

And (may) they be to us (for this our offering) abundant givers of rewards, and just and righteous ones, for the world beyond the present, after the parting of our consciousness and body. 3. And may these (Praises of the Offering) come forth, and appear for us with power and victorious assault, with health and healing, with progress, and with growth, with preparation and protection, with beneficence and sanctity, and abounding with gifts² toward him who can understand; yea, let them appear (with free liberality to the enlightened), let them appear as

¹ Staota Yêsnya seems to designate that part of the Yasna which begins with the Srôsh Yast.

² Frârâiti; or possibly 'to the freely giving,' (the term. '-ti' as a dative).

Mazda, the most beneficent, has produced them, He the one who is victorious when He smites, and who helps the settlements advance, for the protection, and the guarding of the religious order of the settlements which are now being furthered, and of those which shall bring salvation to us, and for the protection of the entire creation of the holy (and the clean).

4. And may'st thou, (O Asha ! who abidest within the Gâthas¹), give to every holy man who comes with this prayer for a blessing, and endeavouring to help himself², according to his good thoughts, and words, and deeds.

5. We are therefore worshipping both the (divine) Righteousness and the Good Mind, and the bountiful Gâthas, that rule as the leading chants within (the times and the seasons of) the holy ritual order.

6. And we worship the Praises of the Yasna which were the production of the ancient world, those which are (now) recollected and put in use³, those which are now learned and taught, those which are being held (in mind, and so) repeated, those remembered and recited, and those worshipped, and thus the ones which further the world through grace in its advance.

And we worship the part(s)⁴ of the Praises of the Yasna, and their recitation as it is heard, even their memorised recital, and their chanting, and their offering (as complete).

¹ Conjectural; see Ashem below. ² Pahlavi avô nafsman.

³ Recited from memory, and used in the ceremonial.

⁴ The part, 'each part.'

YASNA LVI (SP. LV).

INTRODUCTION TO THE SRÔSH YAST.

1. Let Sraosha (the listening Obedience) be present here for the worship of Ahura Mazda, the most beneficent, and holy, of him) who is desired by us as at the first, so at the last; and so again may attentive Obedience be present here for the worship of Ahura Mazda, the most beneficent and the holy who (is so) desired by us.

2. (Yea), let Sraosha (the attentive Obedience) be present here for the worship of the good waters, and for the Fravashis of the saints which are so desired by us, [and for (their¹) souls], as at the first, so at the last.

And thus again may Sraosha (the listening Obedience) be present here for the worship of the good waters, and for the Fravashis of the saints, which are so desired by us, [(and) for (their) souls].

3. Let Sraosha (the listening Obedience) be present here for the worship of the good waters; yea, let the good Obedience be here for the worship of the good and bountiful Immortals who rule aright, and dispose (of all) aright, the good, and for the worship of the good Sanctity, or Blessedness, who is closely knit with the Righteous Order, to perfect us, and to incite us. May Sraosha (Obedience) be here present for the worship of the good waters, he the good and the holy², as at the first, so at the last.

¹ One might be inclined to render 'who are so desired by us for our souls.' But I think that the words are Pâzand to the preceding.

² Or, 'endowed with recompense.'

4. And so again may Sraosha, (Obedience) the good, be present here for the worship of the good waters, and of the good¹ and bountiful Immortals, and of Blessedness the good who is closely knit with the Righteous Order to perfect and to incite us². Yea, we worship Sraosha the blessed and the stately, who smites with victory, and who furthers the settlements in their advance, the holy lord of the ritual order³.

YASNA LVII (SP. LVI).

THE SRÔSH YAST⁴.

1. A blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best, &c.

Propitiation be to Sraosha, Obedience the blessed, the mighty, the incarnate word of reason, whose body is the Māthra, him of the daring spear, devoted to the Lord, for (his) sacrificial worship, homage, propitiation, and praise.

¹ Of the female (feminine) names.

² Or, 'give to us.' The Ahuna and Ashem Vohû follow here.

³ The Yênhê hâtâm, &c. follows.

⁴ As Sraosha is the only divinity of the later groups mentioned in the first four Gâthas, this Yast would seem to have claims to antiquity next after the pieces in the Gâthic dialect. The name Sraosha does not appear to have lost its meaning as an abstract quality, notwithstanding the materialistic imagery. With Y. XXVIII, 6 in view, where Sraosha 'finds the way' to Ahura, or 'finds His throne,' we may understand that the worshippers, who first heard this Yast, praised listening obedience, or repentance, as they did nearly all the remaining abstract qualities, together with their principal prayers, and hymns themselves. The rhythm of the original has been somewhat imitated in the rendering given, as it is difficult to avoid doing so, and to avoid other objectionable features at the same time.

I.

2. We worship Sraosha, (Obedience) the blessed, the stately, him who smites with the blow of victory, and who furthers the settlements, the holy, (ruling) as the ritual lord. Him do we worship, who in ¹ the creation of Mazda the first adored Ahura, with the Baresman spread, who worshipped the Bountiful Immortals ² (first), who worshipped both the protector and the Creator, who are ³ (both) creating all things in the creation.

3. For his splendour and his glory, for his might, and the blow which smites with victory, I will worship him with the Yasna of the Yazads, with a Yasna loud intoned, him Obedience the blessed, with the consecrated waters, and the good Blessedness, the lofty, and Nairya-sangha, the stately; and may he draw near to us to aid us, he who smites with victory, Obedience the blessed!

4. We worship Sraosha, Obedience the blessed, and that lofty Lord who is Ahura Mazda Himself, Him who has attained the most to this our ritual, Him who has approached the nearest to us in our celebrations. And we worship all the words of Zarathustra, and all the deeds well done (for him), both those that have been done (in times gone by),

¹ So 'tradition.'

² Sraosha was not reckoned as one of the Ameshôspends at the time of the composition of this verse.

³ Comp. Y. XXX, 4; but Ahura and some one of the Immortals, or possibly Zarathustra (see Y. XLII, 2), must be meant here. Angra Mainyu could not have been worshipped as either protector or creator. Observe the present tense.

and those which are yet to be done (for him in times to come).

II.

5. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately, him who smites with the blow of victory, who prospers the settlements, the holy ritual lord, (6) who first spread forth the Baresman, and the three bundles, and the five bundles, and the seven bundles, and the nine, till it was heaped for us knee-high, and to the middle of the thighs¹, for the Bountiful Immortals, for their worship, and their homage, and their propitiation, and their praise.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might, and the blow which smites with victory, I will worship him with the Yasna of the Yazads, with a Yasna loud intoned, him Obedience the blessed, with the consecrated waters.

III.

7. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, the stately, who smites with the blow of victory, who furthers the settlements, the holy ritual chief.

8. Who first chanted the Gâthas, the five² Gâthas of Zarathustra, the Spitâma, the holy (with the fashion) of their metres³, and after the well-constructed order of their words, together with the Zand which they contain, and the questions⁴ which they

¹ Le Barsom est de cinq branches dans les Darouns ordinaires. Il est de sept branches pour le Daroun No naber, pour le Freoueschi, et pour le Gâhânâbâr. Il est de neuf branches pour le Daroun des Rois, et pour celui du Mobed des Mobeds (Anquetil).

² This proves that the Gâthas were greatly older than this Yast. That the Gâthas were originally five seems improbable; yet they had become reduced to that number at this time.

³ Nom. sing.?

⁴ Comp. *ta' thwâ peresâ*, &c.; 'questions back and forth.'

utter, and the answers which they give, for the Bountiful Immortals, for their sacrifice and homage, their propitiation, and their praise.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

IV.

9. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately, who smites with the blow of victory, and who furthers the settlements, the holy ritual chief, (10) who for the poor among (our) men and women built a mighty house¹, who after sunset, and with his levelled battle-axe, smites Aêshema bloody wounds, and having struck the head, casts him lightly (?)² (to the earth), as the stronger (smites) the weaker.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

V.

11. We worship Sraosha, Obedience the blessed and the stately, him who smites with the blow of victory, who furthers the settlements, the holy ritual chief, as the energetic, and the swift, the strong, the daring (and redoubted) hero, (12) who comes back from all his battles (and comes from them) a conqueror, who amid the Bountiful Immortals sits as companion at their meeting³.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

¹ One of the earliest notices of the kind.

² Hu + angh, or can sas = to be inactive, indicate a change?

³ This is possibly the origin of a later view which established Sraosha as one of the Immortals, to fill up the number seven without including Ahura. The original 'seven spirits' included Ahura.

VI.

13. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, who is the strongest and most persistent of the youths, the most energetic, and the swiftest, who of all the youths strikes most with terror¹ from afar (?). [Be ye desirous, O ye Mazdayasnians! of the Yasna of Obedience the blessed².]

14. Far from this house, this village, and this tribe, and from this country, the evil and destructive terrors (shall) depart. In the dwelling of that man in whose abode Obedience the blessed, who smites victoriously, is satisfied and welcomed, there is that holy man who thus contents him (most) forward in the thinking better thoughts, in the speaking truthful (ritual) words, and in the doing holy deeds³.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might . . .

VII.

15. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately, who is the conqueror of the Kayadha, and the Kâidhya, who was the smiter of the Lie-demon of the Daêvas, the one veritably powerful, the destroyer of the world, who is the guardian and watchman over all the migrations (?) of the tribes.

16. Who sleeplessly and vigilant guards the creatures of Ahura, who sleeplessly and with vigilance

¹ =kat-tarestemem, comp. for form katpayãm.

² Possibly an ancient interpolation. Repetitions are curtailed.

³ This verse 14 may be an ancient extension of the Yast; it may of course be taken for granted that within a certain period at a very remote time, the Yast was altered and improved.

Verse 16 may have originally formed two sections; the formula 'we worship,' &c. having been omitted.

saves them, who with halberd raised on high guards all the corporeal world after setting of the sun, (17) who has never slept in quiet since the two Spirits made the worlds, [the bounteous and the evil one¹], who guards the homes of Asha, who battles all (?) the days long and the nights with all the Daêvas [(Pâzand) the Mâzanian], (18) nor terror-stricken does he turn in affright before (their power); but before him all the Daêvas turn in affright against their will, and rush to darkness in their fear.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

VIII.

19. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, whom Haoma worshipped on the highest height of high Haraiti, he Haoma, the reviver², and the healer, the beautiful, the kingly³, of the golden eye, (20) of the gracious words⁴, of the warning and the guarding words, who intones our hymns on every side⁵, who possesses understanding and of every brilliant form, which abounds in many an explanation⁶ and revelation of the word, who has the first place in the Mâthra.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

IX.

21. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed,

¹ This seems a gloss; its import is correct.

² The renovator, as completing the progress which makes things fresh, *frashôkereti*.

³ Possibly compare *soma râgan*; but see the following adjective, and read as alternative 'brilliant.'

⁴ Possibly 'who excites to much speech.'

⁵ Comp. *pairi gaêthê*, Y. XXXIV, 2.

⁶ Having much Zand.

whose house stands with its thousand pillars, as victorious, on the highest height of high Haraiti, self-lighted from within, star-studded from without, (22) to whom the Ahuna-vairyā has come, the axe of victory¹, and the Haptanghâiti, and the Fshûshô-mâthra which smites with victory, and all the Yasna sections.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might . . .

X.

23. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, by whose might and victorious power, and wise conduct, and (full) knowledge, the Bountiful Immortals² descend upon this earth of seven quarters.

24. Who as teacher of the law will stride forth upon this earth with its dwellers in the body, and ruling as he will.

And in this Religion, Ahura Mazda has been confessed³ with faith, and the Good Mind likewise with Him, and Righteousness the Best, and Khshathra-vairyā, and Piety the Bounteous, and the Universal Weal and Immortality; and the question to the Lord is asked, and Mazda's lore (is written).

25. O Sraosha (Obedience), thou blessed one, and stately! protect us for the lives; yea, for both, (for that) of this world which is corporeal, and for the world of mind, against unhappy⁴ death, and the remorseless Wrath of rapine, against the hosts with ill-intent, who lift their bloody spears⁵ against us;

¹ Comp. Vend. XIX, 10.

² They listen to Obedience, and so descend.

³ The meaning 'doth confess,' if correct, would show a very great degeneration from the lore of the Gâthic period.

⁴ Lit. 'evil.'

⁵ Bannered spears; spears with streamers.

yea, against their assaults whom¹ the Wrath-demon will set on, and Vîdhâtu, demon-made. 26. Therefore may'st thou, O Sraosha, the blessed and the stately! grant swiftness to our teams, soundness to our bodies, and abundant observation² of our foes, and their smiting (as we mark them), and their sudden death.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

XI.

27. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, whom four racers draw in harness, white and shining, beautiful, and powerful³, quick to learn, and fleet⁴, obeying before speech, heeding orders from the mind, with their hoofs of horn gold-covered, (28) fleeter than (our) horses, swifter than the winds, more rapid than the rain(-drops as they fall); yea, fleeter than the clouds, or well-winged birds, or the well-shot arrow as it flies⁵, (29) which overtake these swift ones all, as they fly after⁶ them pursuing, but which are never overtaken when they flee, which plunge away from both the weapons (hurled on this side and on that) and draw Sraosha with them, the good Sraosha and the blessed; which from both the weapons (those on this side and on that) bear the good Obedience the blessed, plunging forward in their zeal, when he takes his course from India on the East, and when he lights down in the West.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might

¹ The hosts. ² So the Pahlavi and Ner. See also Y. IX, 21.

³ *Spenta* can hardly mean 'holy' here.

⁴ *Âsava* for *asaya*(?); 'y' miswritten for 'v.' Comp. *gâtava* (form).

⁵ Reading *anghamanayau* for *anhê manayau*; otherwise, 'swifter than one's thought'(?).

⁶ Lit. 'not those after overtake.' Possibly 'these who all overtake those who fly with turned backs, who are not overtaken from behind.'

XII.

30. We worship Obedience the blessed and the stately, who though lofty and so high, yea, even to the girdle, yet stoops to Mazda's creatures, (31) who thrice within the day, and three times of a night, will drive on to that Karshvar *Hvaniratha*, called the luminous, as he holds in both the hands¹ and poizes his knife-like battle-axe, which flies as of itself, and to cleave the Daêvas' skulls, (32) to hew down Angra Mainyu, the wicked, and to hew down Rapine of the bloody spear, to hew down the Daêvas of Mazendran², and every Demon-god.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might . . .

XIII.

33. We worship Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed and the stately, him who smites with victory, both here and not here, and on this entire earth. And we worship all the (gifts) of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, the mighty, and the strong, whose body is the Mâthra.

Yea, we worship (all the martial gifts) of Sraosha (Obedience) the mighty, both armed with shielding armour, and a warrior strong of hand, skull-cleaver of the Daêvas, conquering the endowments³ of the conqueror, the holy conqueror of the conqueror, and (his) victorious powers, and the Ascendency which it bestows, and we worship

¹ Snaithis must designate a two-handed weapon.

² Observe how far West the word Daêva is applied; also, if Hindvô is not in a gloss in verse 29, the fact proves that a vast geographical extent was familiar to the writers of the Avesta.

³ Vanaitis, fem. as *vispau* refers to attributes celebrated in the Yart.

this Ascendency of Sraosha's (the same which conquers theirs); and that of Arsti do we praise as well. 34. And every house by Sraosha guarded do we worship, wherein the blessed friendly Sraosha is befriended and made welcome, where the holy man is far advanced (?) in holy thoughts, and righteous words and deeds.

For his splendour and his glory, for his might, which smites with victory, I will worship him with the Yasna of the Yazads, with a Yasna loud-intoned, him Obedience the blessed, with the consecrated waters, and the good Blessedness, the lofty, and Nairyasangha, the stately, and may he come to us to aid us, he who smites with victory, Obedience the blessed!

YASNA LVIII (Sp. LVII).

THE FSHŪSHÔ-MĀTHRA ¹.

1. (Introduction.) (To the increase of our homage and praise of God) we offer this service² which, as our defence³, may shield us, which is worship⁴ with its beneficent results; and Blessedness is with it of a verity⁵, and Piety as well. [(Pâzand) and of this worship the results here mentioned are the well-thought thought, the word well spoken, and the deed well done]; and let this our worship shelter us from the Daêva and from the evil-minded man. 2. And to this worship do we confide⁶ our settle-

¹ This piece in the Gâthic dialect has claims to an antiquity as high as Y. XII. It recalls the Gâthas in many ways. The increaser of cattle is identical with the thrifty tiller, and is the typical saint.

² The Pahlavi has *sûd* a partial transcription, but the word is obscure.

³ See *nipâtû*.

⁴ *Nem* with *KIR*.

⁵ *Hâ + ge*; comp. Indian *sa + gha*; or possibly from *ha*.

⁶ 'Make mention of.'

ments and persons for protection and care, for guarding, and for oversight; (3) and in this worship will we abide, O Ahura Mazda! and with joy.

In this worship do we exercise our choices; and to it will we approach, and to it will we belong; yea, to revering worship will we confide our settlements and persons for protection, and for care, for guarding, and for oversight, to such worship as is the praise of such as You¹.

MĀTHRA.

4. The owner of herds is the righteous (one), and he is victorious when he strikes, and thus he is the best; [(Pâzand) we therefore offer (this) service (for herd-owners²)] for the herd-owner is the father of the Kine by the help of him who follows the ritual order; and he is the father of the holy man as well, and of the sanctified creation³. He is in verity the bestower of blessings, and to him⁴, O Ye Bountiful Immortals⁵! we render, (and his do we make) Your greatness, Your goodness, and Your (spiritual) beauty, and let this man, the cattle-owner, approach to guard over us; and may he be our watchman together with the Righteous Order, and with store for our nourishment and full generous liberality, together with sharing of the goods⁶, with gentleness⁷, and with Ahura Mazda's sacred Fire!

¹ Khshmvâtô is often Gâthic for 'You.'

² Pâzand, as fshûshê is a plural, and not Gâthic. Or, 'we make men cattle-owners (we invite them to be such).'

³ The creation is mentioned in connection with the Kine. The typical saint stands at the head of the clean creation.

⁴ Whose?

⁵ See below.

⁶ Root vi + dâ (dhishâ); so also the Pahl. 'barâ dahisnîh.'

⁷ Akîñh va âtashiê î Aûharmazd-dâd. The word is difficult.

5. O Ye Bountiful Immortals! as Ye have made us, so do Ye save us, holy men, and saintly women (as we are, and steadfast in the faith)¹. Save us, O Ye Bountiful Immortals! Ye who rule aright, and who dispose (of all) aright, for none other do I know, save You; then with Your Righteousness² do Ye save us.

6. And we offer hereby our thoughts, and words, and actions, our herds, and men, to the Bountiful Spirit. And may the creative stars of Ahura Mazda, the Creator, shine down on us, and round about us³ with full herds and healthy settlements, with healthy herds and healthy men, and with all in vigour, and endowed with the blessing of the Lord. 7. Praise to Thee, O Fire of Ahura Mazda! may'st thou come to (us in) the greatest one of the engrossing interests⁴ for the help of the great (effort), for the joy-producing grace of the great (interest of our cause); grant us both Weal and Deathlessness!

8. We sacrifice to the entire collection of the Praises of the Yasna, with the careful structure of their language which has reached the most its object. And we offer (our homage) in our celebrations to Thy body, O Ahura Mazda! the most beautiful of forms, these stars, and to that one, the highest of the high [(Pâzand) such as the sun was called]. Yea, we worship the Praises of the Yasna which were the production of the world of old.

¹ Or, 'male and female holy ones, (the Amesha).'

² Y. XXXIV, 7.

³ Lit. 'may we be closely beheld by the creative lights,' &c.

⁴ Allusion to *maze-yaunghô*.

YASNA LIX (SP. LVIII).

MUTUAL BLESSINGS.

1-17. (See Y. XVII, 1-17.) 18-27. (See Y. XXVI, 1-10.) 28. We worship Verethraghna, the Ahura-made, the victorious blow; and we worship the Saoshyant, who smites with victory; and we sacrifice to this Baresman with its Zaothra and its girdle (which is its band) and which is spread with sanctity. And we sacrifice to (our) own soul(s), and to (our) own Fravashi(s). 29. (See Y. XVII, 19.) 30. (The Ratu speaks): O thou good (servant of the Lord)! may that be thine which is better than the good; may'st thou acquire that which is (thine) own¹ in the Zaothra; may'st thou attain to that reward which the Zaothar has been obtaining², who is far advanced in his good thoughts, and words, and deeds.

31. (The Zaothar speaks): May that happen to you (likewise) which is better than the good, and may that not happen which is worse than the evil, and may that likewise not be my lot. 32. As (our) Ahû (is) excellent, so (is our) Ratu (one who rules) from his Righteousness, a creator of mental goodness, and of life's actions done for Mazda, and the Kingdom (is) to Ahura which to the poor will offer a nurturer. A blessing is Asha called the Best, &c. We sacrifice to the Ahuna-vairya; we sacrifice to Asha Vahista³ the most beautiful, the Bountiful

¹ Avô nafsman.

² Hanayamnô zungha, a periphrastic perfect.

³ Asha Vahista occurs as immediately suggested by the Ashem

Immortal. And we sacrifice to the Fshûshô-māthra, the by-spoken¹. And we sacrifice to the entire collection of the Praises of the Yasna; (yea), to the Yasna Praises which were instituted in the world of yore.

YASNA LX (SP. LIX).

PRAYERS FOR THE DWELLING OF THE SACRIFICER².

1. Thus that better than the good may he approach, who shows to us straight paths of profit appertaining to this bodily life and to the mental likewise, in the eternal (?) realms where dwells Ahura; yea, may he approach it, who is Thy worthy servant, and good citizen, O Great giver Lord³!

2. May these blessings approach this house, which are the wise perceptions of the saints, the sacred blessings bestowed through the ritual, their guileless characteristics, together with their recognition of what is due; and may the Righteous Order appear for this village, and the Divine Sovereign Power, together with the benefit and glorious welfare (which ensues),

3. And with these the long enduring prominence of this Religion of Ahura's, the Zārazhustrian Faith. And may the Kine⁴ be now with greatest speed within (the farm-yard of) this house, most speedily

Vohû formula, Asha Vahista seems therefore a proper name, both here and in the formula, if one place explains the other (?).

¹ The ever-spoken (?). The Yēnhê and Ahuna follow.

² Said on the visitation of farm-houses by the travelling priest.

³ See Y. XLIII, 3.

⁴ Gaus seems feminine here, and used collectively, and *hata* has the Indian sense of *sata*.

may the rewarded sanctity and the strength of the holy man be here, most speedily as well Ahura's lore. 4. And may the good and heroic and bountiful Fravashis of the saints come here, and may they go hand in hand with us with the healing virtues of (their) blessed gifts as wide-spread as the earth, as far-spread as the rivers, as high-reaching¹ as the sun, for the furtherance² of the better men, for the hindrance of the hostile, and for the abundant growth of riches and of glory.

5. May Sraosha (Obedience) conquer disobedience³ within this house, and may peace triumph over discord here, and generous giving over avarice, reverence³ over contempt, speech with truthful words over lying utterance. May the Righteous Order gain the victory over the Demon of the Lie⁴.

6. As in this (house) the Bountiful Immortals seek for good Yasnas and good praises from the blessed Sraosha (who governs here), and as they seek for (one) good sacrifice and act of homage (more especially their own) which is a good offering⁵ (to them) for (our) salvation, and a good offering in praise, together with a long continued offering of the entire self⁶, (7) let not then (their) brilliant glory⁷ ever desert this house, nor the bright abundance, nor an illustrious⁸ offspring legitimately⁹ born, nor that long continued companionship which is the

¹ Earth-wide, stream-long, sun-high. ² Isti seems a dative.

³ The name Sraosha had not lost its original meaning; so of Âr(a)maiti.

⁴ Asha-Drugem?

⁵ Possibly, 'good support.'

⁶ Pahl. benafsman.

⁷ Hvâthrava/ hvarenô determines the sense. ⁸ See 'hvâthrava.'

⁹ The Pahl. does not necessarily render 'heavenly;' the word elsewhere means 'original.'

furtherance of that good blessedness which teaches concerning glory¹. 8-10 (= Y. VIII, 5-7).

11. In order that our minds may be² delighted, and our souls the best, let our bodies be glorified as well, and let them, O Mazda! go likewise openly (unto Heaven) as the best world³ of the saints as devoted to Ahura, (12) and accompanied by Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and the most beautiful! And may we see Thee, and may we, approaching, come around about Thee, and attain to entire companionship with Thee! And we sacrifice to the Righteous Order, the best, the most beautiful, the bounteous Immortal!

YASNA LXI (SP. LX).

1. Let us peal⁴ forth the Ahuna-vairya in our liturgy between the heaven and earth, and let us send forth the Asha Vahista in our prayer the same, and the Yênhê hâtâm. And let us send forth in our liturgies between the heaven and earth the pious and good prayer of the pious man for blessings, (2) for the encounter with, and for the displacement of Angra Mainyu with his creatures which are likewise evil as he is, for he is filled with death (for those whom he has made). Aye, let us send that petition forth for the encounter with, and for the dislodgment of the *Kahvaredhas* and of the individual *Kahvaredha*⁵ the male, and the female

¹ Or, 'welfare.'

² *Aunghân*.

³ The nom. is difficult. The Ashem Vohû and Ahuna follow.

⁴ De Harlez, 'faisons retentir.'

⁵ The Pahlavi perhaps 'diminishers;' Darmesteter, 'causing to pine.'

(to the last individual of each), (3) and for the encounter with, and the dislodgment of the Kayadhas, and of the individual Kayadhians, male and female¹, and of the thieves and robbers, of the Zandas², and the sorcerers, of the covenant breakers, and of those who tamper with the covenants. 4. Yea, we send it forth for the encounter with, and for the overthrow of the murderers of the saints, and of those who hate and torment us for our Faith, and of those who persecute the ritual, and the tyrant full of death. Yea, let us peal them forth for the encounter with, and the overthrow of the wicked, O Zarathustra Spitama! whoever they may be, whose thoughts, and words, and works are not congenial to the holy ritual laws.

5. And how shall we drive the Demon of the Lie from hence from us³? Aye, how shall we, the prophets who are yet to serve and save (thy people), drive the Drug from hence, so that we, having power over her as being utterly without power, may drive her hence with blow from the seven Karshvars, for the encounter with, and for the dislodgment of the entire evil world⁴?

YASNA LXII (Sp. LXI).

TO THE FIRE.

1. I offer my sacrifice and homage to thee, the Fire, as a good offering, and an offering with our hail

¹ 'Cannibals' has been suggested as the meaning here.

² The later Zendiks are of course not meant, unless we have an interpolation.

³ Citation from the Gáthas, Y. XLV, 6.

⁴ Citations follow.

of salvation, even as an offering of praise with benedictions, to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son ! Meet for sacrifice art thou, and worthy of (our) homage. And as meet for sacrifice, and thus worthy of our homage, may'st thou be in the houses of men (who worship Mazda). Salvation be to this man who worships thee in verity and truth, with wood in hand, and Baresman ready, with flesh in hand, and holding too the mortar. 2. And may'st thou be (ever) fed with wood as the prescription orders. Yea, may'st thou have thy perfume justly, and thy sacred butter without fail, and thine andirons regularly placed. Be of full-age as to thy nourishment, of the canon's age as to the measure of thy food, O Fire, Ahura Mazda's son ! 3. Be now aflame¹ within this house ; be ever without fail in flame ; be all ashine within this house ; be on thy growth² within this house ; for long time be thou thus to the furtherance of the heroic (renovation), to the completion of (all) progress, yea, even till the good heroic (millennial) time when that renovation shall have become complete. 4. Give me, O Fire, Ahura Mazda's son ! a speedy glory, speedy nourishment, and speedy booty, and abundant glory, abundant nourishment, abundant booty, an expanded mind, and nimbleness of tongue for soul and understanding, even an understanding continually growing in its largeness, and that never wanders³, and long enduring virile power, (5) an offspring sure of foot, that never sleeps on watch [not for a third part of the day, or night], and that rises quick from bed⁴, and

¹ Or, 'for giving light.'

² Or, 'to give light' ? comp. ukhshânô and ukhshâ.

³ Read apairyâthem.

⁴ Or, 'has the quickest place.'

likewise a wakeful offspring, helpful to culture, or reclaim, legitimate, keeping order in men's meetings, (yea,) drawing men to assemblies through their influence and word, grown to power, skilful, redeeming others from oppression, served by many followers, which may advance my line (in prosperity and fame), and (my) Vîs, and my Zantû, and (my) province, (yea, an offspring) which may deliver orders to the Province as (firm and righteous rulers). 6. And may'st thou grant me, O Fire, Ahura Mazda's Son! that whereby instructors may be (given) me, now and for evermore, (giving light to me of Heaven) the best life of the saints, brilliant, all glorious. And may I have experience ¹ of the good reward, and the good renown, and of the long forecasting preparation of the soul. 7. The Fire of Ahura Mazda addresses this admonition to all for whom he cooks the night and morning (meal). From all these, O Spitama! he wishes ² to secure good care, and healthful care (as guarding for salvation), the care of a true praiser. 8. At both the hands of all who come by me, I, the Fire, keenly look: What brings the mate to his mate (thus I say to him), the one who walks at large, to him who sits at home? [We worship the bounteous Fire, the swift-driving charioteer ³.]

9. And if this man who passes brings him wood brought (with good measure that is) with sacred care, or if he brings the Baresman spread with sanctity, or

¹ Bartholomae follows tradition boldly here, rendering 'aushalten, festhalten an; giriftar yehvînâni(î).'

² Or, 'is worshipped for.'

³ This curious gloss seems thrown in as a solace to the Fire for the expression preceding. It savours of the *Rîk*.

the Hadhânaêpata plant, then afterwards Ahura Mazda's Fire will bless him, contented, not offended, and in (its) satisfaction (saying thus). 10. May a herd of kine be with thee, and a multitude of men, may an active mind go with thee, and an active soul as well. As a blest soul may'st thou live through thy life, the nights which thou shall live. This is the blessing of the Fire for him who brings it wood (well) dried, sought out for flaming, purified with the earnest blessing of the sacred ritual truth¹. 11. We strive after the flowing on of the good waters, and their ebb² as well, and the sounding of their waves, desiring their propitiation; I desire to approach them with my praise³. 12 = Y. III, 24, 25.

YASNA LXIII⁴ (SP. LXII).

(See Y. XV, 2; Y. LXVI, 2; Y. XXXVIII, 3.)

YASNA LXIV (SP. LXIII).

(See Y. XLVI, 3; Y. L, 6-11.)

YASNA LXV (SP. LXIV).

TO ARDVI SÛRA ANÂHITA, AND THE WATERS.

1. I will praise the water Ardvi Sûra Anâhita, the wide-flowing (as it is) and healing in its influence,

¹ The Ashem Vohû occurs here.

² Or, 'falling.'

³ See as alternative Darmesteter's masterly rendering of the Âtas Nyâyis, 7-18.

⁴ This chapter is composed of short passages from other portions of the Yasna collected together possibly for the purpose of filling out the number of sections to some figure no longer known.

efficacious against the Daêvas, devoted to Ahura's lore, and to be worshipped with sacrifice within the corporeal world, furthering all living things¹(?) and holy, helping on the increase and improvement of our herds and settlements, holy, and increasing our wealth, holy, and helping on the progress of the Province, holy (as she is)? 2. (Ardvi Sûra Anâhita) who purifies the seed of all male beings, who sanctifies the wombs of all women to the birth, who makes all women fortunate in labour, who brings all women a regular and timely flow of milk, (3) (Ardvi Sûra Anâhita) with a volume sounding from afar², which is alone equal in its bulk to all the waters which flow forth upon earth, which flows down with mighty volume from high Hukairya to the sea Vouru-kasha. 4. And all the gulfs³ in Vouru-kasha are stirred (when it falls down), all the middle doth well up when Ardvi Sûra Anâhita rushes in, when she plunges foaming into them, she, whose are a thousand tributaries, and a thousand outlets, and each as it flows in, or rushes out, is a forty days' ride in length to a rider mounted well.

5. And the (chief) outlet to this one water (Ardvi Sûra Anâhita) goes apart, dividing to all the seven Karshvars. And this outlet to my river, Ardvi Sûra Anâhita, bears off its waters always in summer and in winter. This my river purifies the seed of men, and wombs of women, and women's milk⁴.

6. Let the saints' Fravashis now draw near, those of the saints who live, or have lived, of those born, or yet to be born; yea, let them come near which

¹ The Pahlavi has *gân*, or *gûy*, in which latter case the meaning 'springs' would be better.

² Or, 'famed from afar.'

³ Lit. 'sides.'

⁴ See Darmesteter's *Âbân Yast*, I-V.

have borne these waters up stream from the nearest ones (that lie below as the outlet pours away ¹).

7. Let not our waters be for the man of ill intent, of evil speech, or deeds, or conscience ; let them not be for the offender of a friend, not for an insulter of a Magian ², nor for one who harms the workmen, nor for one who hates his kindred. And let not our good waters (which are not only good, but) best, and Mazda-made, help on the man who strives to mar our settlements which are not to be corrupted, nor him who would mar our bodies, (our) uncorrupted (selves), (8) nor the thief, or bludgeon-bearing ruffian who would slaughter the disciples, nor a sorcerer, nor a burier of dead bodies, nor the jealous, nor the niggard, nor the godless heretic who slays disciples, nor the evil tyrant among men. Against these may our waters come as torments. As destructive may these come (?), may they come to him who has done those first (foul evils), as to him who does the last ³.

9. O waters ! rest ⁴ still within your places while the invoking priest shall offer.

Shall not the invoker make offering to these good waters, and with the inculcated words ? (And how shall this be done ?) Shall he not be tongue-fettered, if he offers else than with the ritual ? Shall (not) the words be so delivered as the Aêthrapaiti teaches ? Where shall the blessings be (inserted) ? Where the supplications with confessions ? Where the gifts of those that offer ? 10 ⁵. (It shall be only thus) as Ahura Mazda showed before to Zarathustra, and as Zara-

¹ Or, 'drawn up in vapours for the supply of the waters by the rain.'

² So the indication of the Pahlavi.

³ î-dî.

⁴ Or, 'rejoice ye.'

⁵ Response.

thustra taught the corporeal worlds (thé men on earth)! Thou shalt pray the first petition to the waters, O Zarathustra, and after that thou shalt offer the Zaothras to the waters, sanctified, and sought out with pious care; and thou shalt pronounce these words (as follows, thus): (11) O ye waters, I beseech of you this favour; and grant ye me this great one in whose bestowal ye flow down to me for the bettering (of my state), with a never-failing truth. O ye waters, I beseech of you for wealth of many kinds (which gives) power (to its holder ¹), and for an offspring self-dependent whom multitudes will bless, and for whose wasting, or defeat, or death, or vengeful punishment, or overtaking, no one prays.

12. And this do I beseech of you, O waters, this, O ye lands, and this, ye plants! This wealth and offspring I beseech of You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals, who rule aright, who dispose (of all) aright, O Ye good beings, male and female ², givers of good things; and this I beseech of you, O ye beneficent, mighty, and overwhelming Fravashis of the saints, and this (of thee), O Mithra of the wide pastures, and this of thee, O blest and stately Sraosha; and of thee, O Rashnu the most just, and of thee, O Fire, Ahura Mazda's son; and of thee, O lofty lord, the royal Apām-napât, of the fleet horses; aye, of You all, ye Yazads, bestowers of the better gifts and holy.

13. And this do ye therefore grant me, O ye holy waters, and ye lands ³!

14. And grant me likewise what is still greater than this all, and still better than this all, and more

¹ Powerful.

² Some of the names are in the feminine.

³ Here repeat as above from 'O ye plants' to 'givers of the better thing and holy.'

beautiful, and more exceeding precious (and that is, Immortality and Welfare ¹), O Ye Yazads, holy and ruling mightily, and powerful at once, and grant it speedily according to this Gâthic (?) word: (Yea), by veritable grace let that be done ² (?) for us which is most promotive of our weal. 15. And according to this further word again: Grant me, Thou who art maker of the Kine, the plants, and the waters, Immortality and likewise Weal, O Ahura Mazda, Thou most bounteous Spirit. And grant me these two eternal gifts through Thy Good Mind in the doctrine ³.

16-18. (See Y. XV, 2; Y. LVI, 3-4 ⁴.)

YASNA LXVI (Sp. LXV).

TO THE AHURIAN ONE ⁵.

1. I am now offering this Zaothra here with sanctity ⁶, together with the Haoma and the flesh, and the Hadhânaêpata lifted up with sacred regularity as to thee, O Ahurian One, for the propitiation of Ahura Mazda, of the Bountiful Immortals, of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, and of the Fire of Ahura Mazda, the ritual's lofty lord. 2. Y. VII, 5-19. 3. Y. XXII, XXVIII, 24-27.

YASNA LXVII (Sp. LXVI).

1-4. (See Y. XXIII, 1-4, replacing 'I desire to approach with sanctity' by 'I offer with sanctity'; see also Y. VII, 24.) 5-7. (See Y. XXXVIII, 3-5.)

¹ See below.

² See Y. L, 11.

³ See Y. LI, 7.

⁴ The Ahuna and Ashem Vohû follow.

⁵ I should say Ardvî Sûra Anâhita; see Y. LXVIII, 10, where the good waters are addressed as Ahurian Ones of Ahura.

⁶ Or, 'for a blessing.'

YASNA LXVIII (SP. LXVII).

TO THE AHURIAN ONE, AND THE WATERS.

1. We offer this to thee, O Ahurian (daughter) of Ahura! as a help¹(?) for life. If we have offended thee, let this Zaothra then attain to thee (for satisfaction), for it is thine with its Haoma, and its milk, and its Hadhânaêpata. 2. And may'st thou approach to me for milk and for libation, O Zaothra! as health, for healing, and for progress, for growth and in preparation for ceremonial merit, for good renown, for equanimity², and for that victory which makes the settlements advance.

3. Yea, we worship thee with sacrifice, O thou Ahurian (daughter) of Ahura with the Zaothras of the good thought; and we worship, O Ahura, one with the Zaothras of the good word and deed (4) for the enlightenment of the thoughts, and words, and actions, for preparation for the soul, for the settlement's advance, and to prepare the saints endowed with ritual merit.

5. And grant me, O thou Ahurian One! Heaven, and to have an offspring manly and legitimate, who may promote my house, my village, my tribe and province, and the authority thereof.

6. We sacrifice to thee, O thou Ahurian one! And we sacrifice to the sea Vouru-kasha, and to all waters upon earth, whether standing, or running, or waters of the well, or spring-waters which peren-

¹ The Pahlavi translator saw the root av in this sense here with K4, 11; P6, but the form is strange.

² So the Pahlavi indicates with no impossible suggestion.

nially flow, or the drippings of the rains, or the irrigations of canals. 7. With this hymn from the (spirit of) the Yasna do we worship thee, and with the homage which it offers as it is the most legitimate¹ Yasna, and homage of them (all) because of Righteousness the Best. We sacrifice to the good waters, and to the best, which Mazda created. 8. And we sacrifice to the two, to the milk and to the libation, which make the waters flow, and the plants sprout forth, opposing therein the Dragon Daêva-made, for the arrest of that cheat the Pairika, and to contradict the insulting malice of the Ashemaogha (the disturber and destroyer of our Faith), and of the unholy tyrant full of death, and of the human Daêva (worshipper) of hateful malice (and intent).

9. And may'st thou hear our sacrificial chants, O thou Ahurian (daughter) of Ahura! Yea, be propitiated by our Yasna, O Ahurian one! and so may'st thou be present² at our Yasna; may'st thou come to us to help, as we chant our full-offered Yast, with the full offering of Zaothras.

10. If any man shall sacrifice to you, O ye good waters, the Ahurian ones of Ahura! with the best and most fitting Zaothras offered piously, (11) to that man ye give both splendour and glory, with health and vigour of the body and prominence of form; yea, to him ye give possessions which entail abundant glory, and a legitimate scion, and a long enduring life, and (Heaven at the last), the best life of the saints, shining, all glorious. 12. And to me also do ye now give it, to me who am offering this Yasna as a priest³.

¹ Or 'virtuous,' with Darmesteter.

² May'st thou sit.

³ Zôto ũ yastar hômanam.

(Response¹.) And to us Mazdayasnians who are likewise offering sacrifice, do ye grant (both the desire and knowledge of the path that is correct²), to us colleagues, and disciples, Aêthrapaitis and Aêthryas, men and women as well as children, and maidens of the field, (13) who think good only, for the overwhelming of oppression and of malice in the raids of the invader, and in face of foes who hate. Grant to us both the desire³ of, and the knowledge of that straightest path, the straightest because of Righteousness, and of (Heaven) the best life of the Saints, shining, all glorious. As the Ahû is excellent, so is the Ratu (one who rules) from the Righteous Order, a creator of mental goodness and of life's actions done for Mazda. And the kingdom (is) for Ahura, which to the poor may offer nurture. 14. (The Zaothar speaks): I beseech with my benediction for a safe abode, for a joyful and a long abode for the dwellers in this village from whence these Zaothras (which I offer come). And I pray in my benediction for a safe abode, and a quiet and a joyful one, and a long abiding to every Mazdayasnian village, and for a succour even with my wants, for a succour with salutations of salvation, and for one with praises, O Fire⁴! and for thee, O Ahurian one of Ahura! do I ask the fullest Yast.

15. And I pray for (?) Râman *Hvâstra* for this Province, and for healthfulness and healing. And I pray for it with my blessing for you pious men, for all. And I pray for him who is saintly with (true) goodness, whosoever he may be, between heaven

¹ Or, 'the priest continues speaking for the people.' ² See below.

³ Or, 'this desire, the knowledge.' ⁴ Or, 'of the Fire.'

and the earth, for a thousand healing remedies, and for ten thousand of the same.

16-19. (See Y. VIII, 5-8.) 20. Thus may it happen as I pray. 21. And by this may I gain¹ (that) blessing, the good Blessedness (our sanctity rewarded). And we address, and we invoke religious zeal and capability, and the waters with our Yasna² thus: O ye good waters! since (they are) yours, do ye, as you are asked, grant splendour and grant glory, ye who are well able so to give; and do ye, O ye waters! grant (once more) that helpful blessing which was gained from you of old!

22. Praise (be) to Ahura Mazda, and to the Bountiful Immortals. Praise (be) to Mithra of the wide pastures. Praise to the fleet-horsed sun. Praise to (the star which so we name, and with this sun) Ahura Mazda's eyes. Praise to the Kine³ (the herds of blessed gift). Praise to Gaya (Maretan) and to the Fravashi of Zarathustra (first of) saints; yea, praise to the entire creation of the holy (and the clean), to those now living, and to those just passing into life, and to those of days to come. 23. And do Thou then Ahura, as in answer to these our prayers and songs of praise, cause us to prosper to salvation through Thy Good Mind, the Sovereign Power, and Thy Righteous Order (in Thy ritual and law⁴)!

¹ Or, 'the good wisdom' from the second dâ (good adjustment).

² Passages follow from Y. XXXVIII, 2-5.

³ The Gâthic Kine.

⁴ See Y. XXXIII, 10. Citations follow from Y. XXXVI, 6; Y. XLIII, 6, also the Ashem and Y. III, 24, 25; then Y. XLVII, 1-7. Then the words 'we worship the chapter Spentâ-mainyu from the beginning,' then the Yênhê hâtâm.

YASNA LXIX (SP. LXVIII).

This chapter is composed of fragments: see Y. XV, 2; and Y. LI, 1 and 22.

YASNA LXX (SP. LXIX).

TO THE BOUNTIFUL IMMORTALS, AND THE
INSTITUTIONS OF RELIGION.

1. I would worship these (the Bountiful Immortals) with my sacrifice, those who rule aright, and who dispose (of all) aright, and this one (especially) I would approach with my praise, (Ahura Mazda). He is thus hymned (in our praise-songs). Yea, we worship in our sacrifice that deity and lord, who is Ahura Mazda, the Creator, the gracious helper, the maker¹ of all good things; and we worship in our sacrifice Zarathustra Spitâma, that chieftain (of the rite).

2. And we would declare those institutions established for us, exact (and undeviating as they are). And I would declare forth those of Ahura Mazda, those of the Good Mind, and of Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and those of Khshatra-vairya (the Realm to be desired), and those of the Bountiful Âramaiti (the Piety within us), and those of Weal and Immortality, and those which appertain to the body² of the Kine, and to the Kine's soul, and those which appertain to Ahura Mazda's Fire, (3) and those of Sraosha (Obe-

¹ Reading tashvæunghem(?) (comp. dadhvæunghem), according to the indication of the Pahlavi.

² Tashan with change of accent. So the Pahlavi indicates.

dience) the blessed, and of Rashnu the most just, and those of Mithra of the wide pastures, and of (the good and) holy Wind, and of the good Mazdayasnian Religion, and of the good and pious Prayer for blessings, and those of the good and pious Prayer which frees one from belying, and the good and pious Prayer for blessing against unbelieving words¹. 4. (And these we would declare) in order that we may attain unto that speech which is uttered with (true) religious zeal, or that we may be as prophets of the provinces, that we may succour him² who lifts his voice (for Mazda³), that we may be as prophets who smite with victory, the befriended of Ahura Mazda, and persons the most useful to Him⁴, holy men (indeed) who think good thoughts, and speak good words, and do good deeds. 5. That he may approach us with the Good Mind⁵, and that (our souls) may advance in good, let it thus come; yea, 'how may my soul advance in good? let it thus advance⁶.'

6. We praise the flood and ebb of the good waters, and their roar, and that high Ahura, the royal Apām-napât, the glittering one, of the fleet horses; and this for the sacrifice, and homage, and propitiation, and praise of the entire holy creation; and may Sraosha (Obedience) be here (to aid us). 7. (Yea), we sacrifice to Sraosha, Obedience the blessed⁷.

¹ Read the gloss to the Pahlavi in Visp. IX, 3, anêranîhâ.

² Or, barentû, 'let them lift.'

³ Y. XXXI, 12.

⁴ See Y. XXXI, 22.

⁵ Y. XLIV, 1.

⁶ Y. XLIV, 8.

⁷ The Yênhê hâtâm.

YASNA LXXI (Sp. LXX).

THE YASNA CONCLUDING.

1. Frashaostra, the holy, asked the saintly Zarathustra: Answer me, O thou most eminent Zarathustra, what is (in very truth) the memorised recital of the rites?

What is the completed delivery of the Gâthas¹?
 2. Upon this Zarathustra said: (It is as follows.) We worship Ahura Mazda with our sacrifice (as) the holy lord of the ritual order; and we sacrifice to Zarathustra likewise as to a holy lord of the ritual order; and we sacrifice also to the Fravashi of Zarathustra, the saint. And we sacrifice to the Bountiful Immortals, (the guardians²) of the saints. 3. And we sacrifice to (all) the good heroic and bounteous Fravashis of the saints, of the bodily (world on earth), and of the mental (those in Heaven). And we worship that one of ritual lords who attains the most his ends; and we sacrifice to that one of the Yazads, lords of the ritual order, who is the most strenuous, who gains the most, who reaches most to what he seeks, even that well-timed Prayer which is the prayer of that holy ritual lord, and which has approached the nearest (to us for our help).

4. We sacrifice to Ahura Mazda, the holy lord of

¹ This, while very ancient as regards us, is of course not genuine in its present shape. It was doubtless composed long after Frashaostra and Zarathustra had ceased to live. It may be, however, an expansion of an earlier document.

² 'The Amesha Spenta of the holy ones.'

the ritual order, and we worship His entire body¹, and we worship the Bountiful Immortals all; and we worship all the ritual lords. And we sacrifice to the entire Mazdayasnian Faith. And we worship all the sacred metres.

5. And we worship the entire bounteous Māthra, even the entire system of the Faith set up against the Daêvas; and we worship its complete and long descent. And we sacrifice to all the holy Yazads, heavenly and earthly; and we worship all the good, heroic, and bountiful Fravashis of the saints.

6. And we worship all the holy creatures which Mazda created, and which possess the holy institutions², which were established holy in their nature³, which possess the holy lore, and the holy sacrifice, which are holy, and for the holy, and to be worshipped by the holy. And we worship all the five⁴ Gāthas, the holy ones, and the entire Yasna [its flow and its ebb⁵, and the sounding (of its chants)]. 7. And we sacrifice to all the Praises of the Yasna, and to all the words which Mazda spake, which are the most fatal to evil thoughts, and words, and deeds; (8) and which designate⁶ the evil thought, and word, and deed, and which then cut down and fell every evil thought, and word, and deed. [(Pâzand.) One would think of it as

¹ The heavenly bodies are thus termed elsewhere, and the sun is called his eye. { written for it.

² Possibly, 'were created pure.'

³ 'Shaped holy.'

⁴ Or, 'are worshipped as holy,' vahmyāta, or yēsnyāta.

⁵ This figure is too advanced to be probable. The text has been disturbed. The words describe the waters elsewhere.

⁶ So with the Pahlavi, referring the word to the third kar, the root of khratu, passive (?) form, with active sense. It also, however, not impossibly might mean 'cut around,' preparatory to felling.

when the fire cuts, sucks out, and consumes the dry wood which has been sanctified and carefully selected (for its flame).] And we sacrifice to the strength, the victory, the glory, and the speed of all these words (as they go forth for their work). 9. And we sacrifice to all the springs of water, and to the water-streams as well, and to growing plants, and forest-trees¹, and to the entire land and heaven, and to all the stars, and to the moon and sun, even to all the lights without beginning (to their course)². And we sacrifice to all cattle, and to the aquatic beasts, and to the beasts that live on land, and to all that strike the wing, and to the beasts that roam the plains, and to those of cloven hoof. 10. And to all Thy good and holy female (creatures) in the creation do we sacrifice, (O Thou who art) Ahura Mazda³ the skilful maker ! on account of which Thou hast made many things and good things (in Thy world). And we sacrifice to those male creatures in the creation which are Thine and which are meet for sacrifice because of Asha Vahista (of Righteousness the Best). And we sacrifice to all the mountains brilliant with holiness, and to all the lakes which Mazda created, and to all fires. And we sacrifice to all the truthful and correctly spoken words, (11) even those which have both rewards and Piety within them. Yea, we worship (you) for protection and shielding, for guarding and watching; and may ye be to me for preparation.

I call upon the Gâthas here, the bountiful holy ones,

¹ Elsewhere rendered 'stems.'

² Not determined like the course of a planet.

³ We should expect the vocative after 'Thy.'

ruling in the ritual order ; yea, we sacrifice to you, (O ye Gâthas !) for protection and shielding, for guarding and watching. Mine may ye be as a preparation. For me, for (mine) own soul I call on (you) ¹, and we would worship (you) for protection and for shielding, for guarding and for watching. 12. And we sacrifice to Weal, the complete welfare, holy and ruling in its course in the ritual order ; and we sacrifice to Deathlessness (the immortal being of the good), holy, and ruling in the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the question of the Lord, and to His lore, the holy chiefs, and to the heroic Haptanghâiti, the holy lord of the ritual order. 13. (Frasha.) Let the holy Zarathustra himself seek out a friend and a protector. And I say² to thee (O Zarathustra !) to make to thee a friend holy beyond the holy, and truer than the true, for that is the better thing ; for he is evil who is the best to the evil, and he is holy to whom the holy is a friend³, (14) for these are the best of words, those which Ahura Mazda spoke to Zarathustra.

And⁴ do thou, O Zarathustra ! pronounce these words at the last ending of (thy) life. 15. For if, O Zarathustra ! thou shalt pronounce these words at the last ending of (thy) life I, Ahura Mazda, will keep your soul away from Hell. Yea, so far away shall I hold it as is the breadth and extension of the earth [(Pâzand) and the earth is as wide as it is long].

16. As thou dost desire, O holy (one) ! so shalt thou be, holy shalt thou cause (thy) soul to pass over

¹ Or, 'I would invoke (mine) own soul ;' see verse 18.

² Possibly the rejoinder of Frashaostra, or these are 'the best words' referred to in verse 14 ; but the section is a dialogue.

³ Y. XLVI, 6.

⁴ Ahura speaks.

the *Kinvaŋ* Bridge; holy shalt thou come into Heaven. Thou shalt intone the *Gâtha Ustavaiti*, reciting the salvation hail ¹.

17. We sacrifice to the active man, and to the man of good intent, for the hindrance of darkness, of wasting of the strength and life, and of distraction. And we sacrifice to health and healing, to progress and to growth, for the hindrance of impurity, and of the diseases of the skin ².

18. And we sacrifice to the (*Yasna's*) ending words, to those which end the *Gâthas*. And we sacrifice to the bounteous Hymns themselves which rule in the ritual course, the holy ones.

And we sacrifice to the Praise-songs of the *Yasna* which were the products of the world of yore; yea, we sacrifice to all the *Staota-Yêsnya* hymns. And we sacrifice to (our) own soul and to (our) *Fravashi*. 19-21. (See *Y. VI*, 14-16.) 22. I praise, invoke, and I weave my song to the good, heroic, bountiful *Fravashis* of the saints, to those of the house, and of the village, the district and the province, and to those of the *Zarathustrôtemas*. 23. And we sacrifice to the Fire, *Ahura Mazda's* son, the holy ritual chief.

And we sacrifice to this *Baresman* having the *Zaotra* with it, and its girdle with it, and spread with sanctity, the holy ritual chief. And we sacrifice to *Apãm-napât*, and to *Nairya-sangha*, and to that *Yazad*, the wise man's swift Curse.

And we sacrifice to the souls of the dead, [which are the *Fravashis* of the saints]. 24. And we sacrifice to that lofty Lord who is *Ahura Mazda* Himself.

¹ *Y. XLIII*, 1 follows.

² Diseases arising from filth.

25. And we pray (again) for the Kine (once more) with these gifts and (ceremonial) actions which are the best¹. 26-28. (See Y. VIII, 5-7.) 29-31. (See Y. LX, 11-13.)

YASNA LXXII. (See Y. LXI.)

¹ See Y. XXXV, 4; Y. XLVIII, 6.

VISPARAD.

VISPARAD I¹.

1. I announce ², and (will) complete (my Yasna) to the lords ³ of the spiritual creatures, and to the lords of the earthly creatures, to the lords ³ of those which live under the waters, and to the lords of those which live upon land, to the lords of those which strike the wing, and to the lords of those which roam (wild) upon the plains, to the lords of those of (home-beasts) of the cloven hoof, holy lords of the ritual order.

2. I announce, and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Yearly festivals, the lords of the ritual order, to Maidhyô-zaremaya, the milk-giver, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Maidhyô-shema, the pasture-giver, and to Paitishahya, the corn-giver, and to Ayâthrima, the furtherer or breeder, the spender of the seed of males, and to Maidhyâiryas the cold ⁴, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Hamaspath-maêdhaya, the especial time for ritual deeds ⁵, holy lords of the ritual order.

¹ This Visparad consists of additions to various portions of the Yasna; and its several chapters generally follow the corresponding portions of the Yasna in the Vendidad Sâdah. The word Visparad means 'all the chiefs,' referring to the 'lords of the ritual.' Chapter I should be read immediately after Yasna I, 9.

² Or, 'I invite.'

³ Lords because ruling as chief objects of attention during their mention in the course of the sacrifice, also, as in this case, genii guarding over all of their class.

⁴ So De Harlez, admirably following the Pahl. sardîk (sic).

⁵ Pavan yazisn kardarih.

3. I announce, and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to the settlements of the future one, when the future ¹ shall produce them as it were anew, and I celebrate and will complete (my Yasna) to the Praises of the Yasna ² collected, completed, and much-offered, and to the Myazdas of the saints of the ritual, male and female.

4. And I announce, and will complete (my Yasna) to the Seasons, the lords of the ritual order, and to the heard recital of the Ahuna-vairya, and to Righteousness the Best, to him who has (?) our praise, and to the Yênhê hâtâm, the frequent chant of sacrifice ³, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order.

5. And I announce and complete (my Yasna) to the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, the holy, ruling in the ritual order, and to those women who bring forth many sons of many talents, Mazda-given, and holy lords of the ritual order, and to that (chant) which has its Ahû and its Ratu ⁴ (before it in the Yasna).

And I celebrate, and will complete (my sacrifice) to the Yasna Haptanghâiti ⁵, holy, and ruling in the ritual order, [and to the water Ardvi Anâhita ⁶].

6. And I announce, and I (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Gâtha Ustavaiti, the holy, ruling in the ritual order, and to the mountains which shine

¹ *Aunghairyô*, a collective, or *zîzanen*, a participle.

² Here is praise to a part of the Yasna itself, although not yet recited in the V. S.

³ Its chief word is *yazamaidê*, it is 'the well-sacrificed,' the word often occurring.

⁴ Or, 'to him who is devoted to the Ahuna, with its Ahû and Ratu (?).'

⁵ Observe the priority of the Haptanghâiti; it should be read first.

⁶ Interpolated.

with holiness, the abundantly brilliant¹ and Mazda-made, the holy lords of the ritual order.

And I announce, and (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu, the holy, ruling in the ritual order; and I celebrate and will complete (my Yasna) to Verethraghna (the blow of victory²) Ahura-given, the holy lord of the ritual order.

7. And I announce, and (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra, holy, ruling in the ritual order, and to Mithra of the wide pastures, and to Râman Hvâstra, the holy lords of the ritual order. And I celebrate and will complete my Yasna to the Gâtha Vahistôisti, the holy, ruling in the ritual order. And I celebrate and will complete my Yasna to the good and pious Prayer for blessings, the benediction of the pious³, and to that Yazad, the redoubted and swift Curse of the wise, the holy lord of the ritual order.

8. And I announce, and (will) complete (my Yasna) to the Airyemâ-ishyô, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the Fshûshô-mâthra, and to that lofty lord Hadhaokhdha⁴, the holy lord of the ritual order.

9. And I announce, and (will) complete (my Yasna) to the questions asked of Ahura, and to the lore of Ahura, to the Ahurian Dahvyuma (Dahyuma), and to the Ahurian Zarathustrôtema, holy lords of the ritual order, and to the farm-house with its pastures

¹ This sense is most obvious.

² The 'fiend-smiting' is the common meaning of *vritrahâ*; but verethra is clearly 'victory' in Zend; *vritrá* also equals defensive valour.

³ Can *dahmahêta* mean 'the departed saint' here?

⁴ A lost part of the Avesta, two fragments of which only survive.

which give pasture to the Kine of blessed gift, and to the holy cattle-breeding man¹.

VISPARAD II².

1. In this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the lords of (the ritual) which are spiritual with my praise; and I desire to approach the earthly lords (as well). And I desire to approach the lords of the water with my praise, and the lords of the land; and I desire to approach with my praise those chiefs which strike the wing, and those which wander wild at large, and those of the cloven hoof, who are chiefs of the ritual (in their turn).

2. In this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the holy Yearly festivals with my praise, the lords of the ritual order, Maidhyô-zaremaya, the milk-giver, and Maidhyô-shema, the pasture-giver, and Paitishahya, the corn-giver, and Ayâthrima the breeder, the spender of the seed of males, Maidhy-âirya, the cold, Hamaspathmaêdhaya, the especial time for ritual duties, the holy lords of the ritual order.

3. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the future one of the settlements with my praise, the holy lord of the ritual order, when the future one shall produce (them as it were anew).

And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach all these chieftains of the ritual with my praise whom Ahura Mazda mentioned to Zarathustra

¹ Comp. Y. XXIX, 2. Y. I, 10-23 follows.

² Visparad II should be read after Yasna II, 8, of which it is an extension.

for sacrifice and homage because of Asha Vahista (of Righteousness the Best).

4. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach Thee¹, the lord, with my praise, Thou who art Ahura Mazda, the spiritual lord and regulator² of the spiritual creatures [the lord and regulator of the spiritual creation].

And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach thee, Zarathustra Spitâma, with my praise, the terrestrial (lord and regulator) of the terrestrial creation, [the lord and regulator of the terrestrial creation].

5. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the man who recites the ritual rites with my praise, who is maintaining thus the thought well thought, and the word well spoken, and the deed well done, and Piety the bountiful, even him³ who maintains the Mâthra of the Saoshyant, by whose actions the settlements are advanced in the righteous order.

6. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the (yearly) Seasons with my praise, the holy lords of the ritual order, and the Ahuna-vairya as it is recited, and Asha Vahista when he is lauded⁴, and the Yênhê hâtâm, the frequent chant of sacrifice.

7. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Gâtha Ahunavaiti with my praise.

¹ It is certainly not impossible that the idea of 'invoking the approach of Ahura' was meant, but 'approaching him' is more natural.

² Ahûmka ratûmka, applied to the same person, the usage arising from an erroneous rendering of the Ahuna-vairya; see Y. XIX, 12.

³ Yô, with K7b, K11, daretem, passive form; or, 'who (has) the Mâthra held.' The text must, however, be in disorder.

⁴ In the Ashem Vohû.

And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to worship those women with my praise who are well-portioned¹, and of good parentage, and who are stately in their growth; yea, I desire to approach that chant in my praise which has the Ahû and the Ratu, [for He is verily the one who has the Ahû and the Ratu, that is, Ahura Mazda²].

And I desire to approach the heroic Yasna Haptanghâiti in my praise, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order; and Ardvi Sûra Anâhita, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order.

8. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Gâtha Ustavaiti with my praise, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order; and I desire to approach those mountains³ with my praise which shine with holiness, abundantly glorious, Mazda-made, the holy lords of the ritual order, and the Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu, and Verethraghna, the blow of victory, Mazda-given, the holy lord of the ritual order, and the Victorious Ascendency (which it bestows).

9. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra with my praise, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order, and Mithra of the wide pastures, and Râman Hvâstra, and the Gâtha Vahistôisti, and the pious and good prayer for blessings, and the pious and holy man, and that Yazad, the redoubted and swift curse of the wise.

10. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the Airyemâ-ishyô with my

¹ So the Pahlavi.

² Erroneous Pâzand.

³ This sentence affords support to my rendering of âyêsê, as expressing a desire to approach, rather than one for the approach of (the Genius of) the Mountain; at the same time the latter idea may very possibly be the correct one. (Expressions are curtailed.)



praise, and the Fshûshô-māthra, and that lofty lord, the Hadhaokhdha, holy lord(s) of the ritual order.

11. And in this Zaothra with this Baresman I desire to approach the question asked of Ahura, and the lore of the Lord (which he reveals in answer), and the farm-house of the man possessed of pastures, and the pasture produced for the Kine of blessed gift, and the holy cattle-breeding man¹.

VISPARAD III.

BEGINNING OF THE HAOMA OFFERING; ROLL-CALL OF THE PRIEST².

1. (The Zaotar speaks.) (I call for) the Hâvanan³, and would have him here.

(The Ratu answers.) I will come (and fulfil his duties).

(The Zaotar speaks.) I would have the Âtarevakhsha⁴ here.

(The Ratu answers.) I will come (and fulfil the services which fall to his charge).

(The Zaotar.) I would have the Frabaretar⁵.

(The Ratu.) I will come (and fulfil the services which fall to his charge).

(The Zaotar.) I would have the Âberet⁶ present.

(The Ratu.) I will come (for him).

¹ Y. II, 10 follows Visparad II, 11.

² This chapter 1-5 follows Y. XI, 1-8 in the Vendîdâd Sâdah; so, appropriately.

³ The Ratu answers for all according to the rubric printed by Westergaard, but of later origin than the text. It arose from the fact that the several offices were later united in that of the Ratu. Originally the corresponding official answered to his title. The Hâvanan was the Mobad who pounded the Haoma in the mortar.

⁴ The Mobad who fed the Fire.

⁵ The Mobad who aided the presentations. ⁶ The water carrier.

(The Zaoatar.) I would have the Âsnatar ¹.

(The Ratu.) I will come (and do the duties which he serves).

(The Zaoatar.) I would have the Raêthwiskar ² to be here.

(The Ratu.) I will come (for him).

(The Zaoatar.) I would have the Sraoshâvareza ³ present, the wisest one, the most correct and veracious in his speech.

(The Ratu.) I will come. 2. (The Zaoatar.) I would have the Fire-priest to be here, and the warrior, and the thrifty tiller ⁴ of the earth, and the house-lord, and the lords of the Vts and the Zantu.

3. And I summon the youth of holy thoughts, words and works, and of good conscience ; (yea), the youth of good speech, given (in marriage) to his kin ⁵. And I summon the province-ranger, and the itinerant of many arts, and the house-mistress.

4. And I summon the woman advanced in her holy thoughts, and words, and deeds, and well subordinated, whose ruler is her lord ⁶, the holy one, who is (as) the bounteous Âramaiti ; (yea), I summon even Thy wives, O Ahura ! And I summon likewise the holy man advanced in his good thoughts, and words, and deeds, who is learned in pious lore, and innocent of the Kayadha, and by whose deeds the settlements are furthered in the righteous order.

¹ The washer.

² The mixer (?), or the Mobad who attended to disinfections.

³ The Mobad who attended to penance.

⁴ The typical layman.

⁵ This important custom was fully treated in the lost Nask, No. 16 (or No. 18; by another reckoning).

⁶ So the most, but ratukhshathra means elsewhere 'ruling in the ritual as supreme.'

5. Yea, we summon you, whoever you may be, if only chiefs of the Mazdayasnians; and we summon the Bounteous Immortals, and the pious Saoshyants (the prophets for our help), the most correct and truthful in their speech, the most zealous, the most glorious in their thoughts, the greatest ones, and the powerful; and we summon the Fire-priests, and the warriors, and the diligent husbandman of the Mazdayasnian Faith.

6¹. (The Zaotar.) As an Ahû to be (revered and) chosen, the Âtarevakhsha (announcing) speaks forth ² to me.

(The Ratu[?].) So let the Ratu from his righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth.

(The Ratu.) As an Ahû to be (revered and) chosen, the Zaotar (announcing) speaks forth ² to me.

(The Zaotar.) So let the Ratu from (his) righteousness, holy and learned, speak forth.

(The Ratu.) Thou art the announcer for us, O Fire-priest! [(Pâzand.) It is the ³ Zaotar (who is meant).]

(The Zaotar.) I will come as this Zaotar, and recite the Staota Yêsnaya with memorised intoning, chanting, and praise.

VISPARAD IV (SP. V)⁴.

I. (Yea,) we sacrifice to the thoughts of the mind, and to the good wisdom, and to the good and blessed

¹ This section follows Y. XI, 9-15 in the V. S., preceding a section described as Y. XI, 59, 60, in the B. V. S.

² Probably in an imperative sense, or, with some, an infinitive.

³ Read Zaotasti which contains sandhi. It seems a gloss to explain the Âthraom (sic). It is zaotâ asti.

⁴ This section, preceding Y. XI, closed in the B. V. S., seems to me

sanctity, and to the good religious knowledge, and to good health (of soul and body). [At their (several) seasons, and with the presence of seasonable circumstances, they are hymned¹.] 2. Confession is to be made for the Kine; we, Zarathustrian Mazda-yasnians, celebrate at the sacrificial time for the Myazda-offering, at the time for the Ratufriti, the prayer for blessings, for the sacrificial worship, homage, propitiation, and praise of the entire creation of the holy (and the clean).

VISPARAD V (SP. VI)².

1. I come to You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals! as a praiser priest, and invoker, as a memoriser, reciting (Your ritual), and as a chanter for Your sacrifice and homage, Your propitiation, and Your praise; (yea, for Yours) the Bountiful Immortals, and for our preparation, (O ye holy Saoshyants!) and for your well-timed prayer for blessings, and your sanctification, and for our victorious smiting of our foes, beneficial (as it is) for our souls, for ours, the Saoshyants, (with you), and holy. 2. And I make my offering to You, O Ye Bountiful Immortals, who rule aright, and who dispose (of all) aright! (Yea), I offer You the flesh of my very body, and all the blessings of my life as well.

3. And I confess my belief in Thee, O Ahura

to belong properly after Yasna VIII, and the Myazda offering with the Ratufriti.

¹ Pâzand.

² This piece should be read after Yasna XIV, with which it is nearly identical. The language of the translation is slightly varied to relieve the effect of sameness.

Mazda! and as a Mazdayasnian of the order of Zarathustra, and in accordance with his Faith.

VISPARAD VI (SP. VII) ¹.

In accordance with the precept, with praise, and with the joyful reception of grace, with Zaothras intelligently offered, with sacrificial words correctly spoken, I call the good Amesha Spenta by their names of beauty; yea, I worship the Bountiful Immortals by their beautiful names, with the blessing of the ritual Order, with the longing blessing of Righteousness the good.

VISPARAD VII (SP. VIII) ².

1. We worship the (sacrificial) words correctly uttered, and Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, and the good Ashi, (the blest order of our rites), and Nairya-sangha. And we worship the victorious Peace as the unprostrated and unmoved. And we sacrifice to the Fravashis of the saints, and to the *Kinvaŋ* Bridge, and to the Garô Nmâna of Ahura, even Heaven, the best world of the saints, the shining and all glorious!

2. And we sacrifice to that better path ³ that leads to that Best World (as well). And we worship Arstât (Justice) the good, which helps the settlements to advance and flourish, benefiting them thereby, that Arstât which is the Mazdayasnian Faith; and (with her) we worship Rashnu the most just, and

¹ Nearly identical with Yasna XV.

² This chapter should be read after Yasna XVII, which it appropriately follows in the Vendîdâd Sâdah.

³ Possibly 'the best (better) course of that best world.'

Mithra of the wide pastures. And we worship Pareñdi the wealthy, wealthy with a wealth of thoughts, with a throng of words, and with a breadth of actions, [for she makes our persons agile (for good thoughts and words and actions)]. 3. And we worship that virile defensive¹ Heroism which possesses men who think beforehand, and heroic men, which is fleeter² than the fleet, stronger than the strong, which comes to him who is endowed by God, which, when especially made theirs by men, produces one who is a freer of the body. And we worship Sleep³, the Mazda-made, the gladdener of the herd and men. 4. And we worship those things in the creation of the holy which are the ancient institutions, those formed before the sky, the water, the land, the plants, and the Kine of blessed gift. And we worship the sea Vouru-kasha, and the stormy wind which is made by Mazda, and the shining heaven, of old created, the first-made earthly object of (all) the earthly world.

5. And we worship thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son! the holy lord of the ritual order, and this Baresman, having the Zaothra with it, and the girdle with it, spread out with sanctity, the holy ritual chief, and we worship Apām-napāt (the son of waters).

¹ One might consider, 'virile power which has men and heroes in the mind beforehand;' but vareti=gôrdîh.

² Âsyayau (sic) and takhmôtâsyayau (sic) agree with feminines; possibly because of the male qualities referred to. They might be said to be in apposition rather than in agreement with the feminine.

³ Sleep is elsewhere an evil; a Demon, Bûshyâsta, rules it; but this is untimely sleep; see, on the other hand, Y. XLIV, 5.

VISPARAD VIII (SP. IX).

1. With this word be Thou approached ¹, with the proper word be Thou present here, Thou who art Ahura Mazda, the holy, together with the good Yazads who are the Bountiful Immortals, who rule aright, and dispose (of all) aright, together with fifty, and a hundred, and a thousand, and ten thousand, and millions, and yet more.

2. And to Him who rules the best let the Kingdom be ²!

VISPARAD IX (SP. X) ³.

1. (I desire to offer my homage and my praise ⁴) to the offered Haomas and Zaothras, and to those also which shall yet be offered, which smite victoriously, and are foes of hatred, and following in company (as they do) with the healing virtues of sanctity, following also in company with those of *Kisti* (religious knowledge), and with the remedies of Mazda, and with those of Zarathustra and the Zarathustrôtema, (2) and to the offered Haomas and Zaothras which accompany those remedies which belong to the holy disciple well versed in good devices ⁵, and accompanying those of the itinerant also versed in good devices ⁵, and accompanying those likewise of the good Mazdayasnian Faith, and those of the pious and beneficent Prayer for blessings, and of the pious and good veracity, and

¹ 'Mediated' (?), or 'known,' madhayangha (-uha).

² See Y. XXXV, 5.

³ This section should be read before Y. XXII.

⁴ Supplied necessarily from Visp. X, 2; see its genitive.

⁵ Or, 'sciences' (in some cases medical).

of the pious word against unbelief, (3) for information and explanation, for preparation (?) and devotion, for the libation and complete offering, for the complete recital of the liturgy memorised as well; and to those Haomas which are pungent, bounteous, holy, and offered with sanctity (and for a blessing), to those which are yet to be offered with sanctity, and which are now being celebrated, and which are likewise in the future to be celebrated, to those which are being pressed with sanctity, and to those which are yet to be pressed, (to these I desire to approach, and to express my homage and my praise). 4. And I desire to express my homage and my praise to the strength of the strong, and to the victorious blow of the mighty, to the powerful Rectitude and Blessedness, to *Kisti* and the Priority for the powerful Ascendency, and to these powerful Yazads which are the Bountiful Immortals, who rule aright, and dispose of all aright, ever-living, ever-helpful, who, male and female, dwell together with the Good Mind, (to these I desire in my homage and my praises to approach); (5) (yea, I desire to approach for homage and praises toward) our Universal Weal and Immortality, to the body of the Kine, and to the Kine's Soul. (And I desire to approach) the Fire of the spoken name¹, and toward that farm-house which is sanctified and which has fields and comfort², and mercy (for the poor); (6) as a praiser with praise for the sacrifice, homage, which is this praise of Ahura Mazda, of the Bountiful Immortals, and of the holy and lofty Lord, for the sacrifice, and homage of the Lord that most attains his ends, and which is this praise of that blessedness

¹ Having a Yast.

² Here is an instance where *hvâthra* may mean 'comfort.'

which has approached us, and of that well-timed prayer for blessings offered in the ritual, (7) which is likewise the praise of the *Māthra Spenta* (the bounteous word of reason), and of the *Mazdayasnian Religion*, and the Praises of the *Yasnas*¹, which is also that of all the lords of the ritual, and of all the well-timed prayers for blessings, for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and glorification of the entire creation of the holy (and the clean).

VISPARAD X (SP. XI)².

1. I desire to approach the *Arezahis* with my praise, and the *Savahis*, and *Fradadhafshu*, and *Vīdadhafshu*, and *Vouru-baresti*, and *Vouru-garesti*, and this *Karsh-var* which is *Hvaniratha*. 2. And I desire to approach the stone mortar with my praise, and the iron mortar, and the cup that holds the *Zaothra*, and the hair (which stays the spilling³), and *Thy Baresman* spread with sanctity. And I desire to approach the *Ahuna-vairya* with my praise, and the ritual prayers beside *Ahuna*, and the standing offices of the *Mazdayasnian Faith*.

VISPARAD XI (SP. XII).

1. To *Ahura Mazda* would we present⁴ our offered *Haomas* and that which is lifted up, as the most

¹ Perhaps 'the *Yasts* in the *Yasna*,' otherwise the latter portion of the *Yasna*.

² This section follows *Y. XXII*.

³ The *varesa* consists (as used at present) of three, five, or seven hairs from the tail of a white bull, which are tied to a gold, silver, copper, or brass ring. This can be used as long as the bull lives, but as often as it is used it must be reconsecrated. (Haug.)

⁴ The wording is purposely varied in the renderings to avoid sameness.

beneficial to Verethraghna (the blow of victory) which furthers the settlements; and that which is offered to the good and holy king, and that which is offered to the holy ruler which rules according to, or in the ritual, and we make known our Haomas to the Bountiful Immortals, and to the good waters; and we present our Haomas each to (our) own soul¹; and we announce our Haomas in our celebration to the entire creation of the holy (and the clean).

2. Yea, we present these Haomas and Haoma-implements, and these spread mats, and these Myazdas, these stones, the first in the creation, the stone mortar brought here with the yellow² Haoma in it, and the iron mortar brought here with the yellow Haoma in it, this Haoma-water, and this Baresman spread with sanctity, (3) these bodies, and (their) forces, these striving Zaothras (that seek to find Thy grace), this holy Haoma, and the flesh, and the holy man, and the saint's innate thoughts, even the Saoshyants' innate thoughts.

And we present this fresh milk as an offering, now lifted up with sanctity, and this Hadhânaêpata plant, lifted up with sanctity; (4) and we offer, and present these Zaothras with our celebration, having the Haoma with them, and the milk, and the Hadhânaêpata, to the good waters and offered up with piety. And we present the Haoma-water in our celebrations to the good waters, and both the stone and the iron mortar, (5) and this branch for the Baresman, and the prayer for blessings uttered at the fitting moment which has approached (for our help in its order with the prayers), and the recollec-

¹ To the soul of the person who may be reciting.

² Zâiri with K₄.

tion and practice of the good Mazdayasnian law, and the heard recital of the Gâthas, the well-timed prayer for blessings as it comes uttered by the saint (and for our help), and ruling (while it is spoken) as a ritual lord, and these wood-billets, and the perfume even Thine, the Fire's, O Ahura Mazda's son! and all good objects (which are ours), and Mazda-made, and which have the seed of sanctity (or are that seed).

6. Yea, these we make known and we announce in this our celebration to Ahura Mazda (as our gift), and to Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, and to Ashi (who is the recompense), and to Rashnu the most just, and to Mithra of the wide pastures, and to the Bountiful Immortals, and the Fravashis of the saints, and to their souls, and to the Fire of Ahura Mazda, the lord, and to the lofty lord (the Apām-napât?), and to the Myazda, the lord, and to the well-timed prayer for blessings as it rules in the order of our prayers, for the sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and adoration of the entire creation of the holy (and the clean).

7. Yea, these we make known in this our celebration hereby for the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint, for its sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and to the (Fravashi) of Anghuyu (?)¹ who hath loved righteousness, together with all the holy Fravashis of the saints, of those now dead, and of those of the living, and of those of men unborn, of the prophets that shall serve us, bringing on the renovation of the completed world. 8-11, see verses 2-5.

12. Yea, we would make these known hereby in our celebrations to the Bountiful Immortals, who rule

¹ Here, erroneously, a proper name as in Yast XIII. Possibly of that Zarathustrian world (period) which loved righteousness; the word occurs after the name of Z. I think, that 'y' should be 'v.'

aright, and who dispose (of all) aright, the ever-living, ever-helpful, who are good (?), and bestowers of the good, who dwell with the Good Mind [(Pâzand) for they who are the Bountiful Immortals abide with the Good Mind, they who rule aright, and dispose (of all) aright, for thence they are regulated, and thence they arose, (namely,) from the Good Mind ¹].

13. And we make known these our celebrations as the more promotive for this ² house, for the furtherance of this house, and as benefits for this house, because of the increase of this household, as overcoming the restrictions which impede this household, and as overcoming the harmful malice which may mar this house, to bless its herds, and its retainers, born, and yet to be born, for the saints of the house as it was aforetime, of it as it ³ stands here now, and to which we likewise now belong as the Saoshyants of the provinces, (14) [which (is that we are Saoshyants) for the saints who do good deeds, and of the female saints who do good deeds, and of the saints who do the deeds conspicuously good, and of the females likewise thus, of the saints who do good deeds upon good deeds, and of the females thus the same].

15. And we make these known in our celebrations to the good Fravashis of the saints which are formidable and overwhelming in their aid. 16. And we make these known in our celebrations hereby to Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, and to the good

¹ Vohu Manah certainly appears the most prominent here. They arose from the 'good thought' of Ahura.

² This office was celebrated in private houses by itinerant priests.

³ Yênhê aêm might be a citation from some lost prayer. The singular aêm may, however, be taken collectively, as families are spoken of.

Blessedness, and to Nairya-sangha, and to the victorious Peace, and to Ahura Mazda's Fire, and to the lofty lord, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise, to the entire creation of the holy and the clean. 17, 18 = Visp. X, 1, 2.

19. (Sp. XIII.) Yea, we make that known which is lifted up in offering, and which is the Avesta¹ as the holy Ahura Mazda directed that it should be said, and as Zarathustra, the holy, directed, and as I, the priest, who am acquainted with their sacrifice and homage, am now letting it be known. I who understand the lawful and legitimate Avesta², and the ritual prescripts (20) for Your sacrifice, homage, and propitiation, O Ye who are the Bountiful Immortals, and for our preparation (?), and for the success of our well-uttered prayer for blessings, for victory, sanctification, and the well-being of our souls, (of ours), for (we are) the holy Saoshyants.

21. Yea, we make these known in our celebrations here, and we offer them to Him who is Ahura Mazda, of all the greatest, the master and the Lord.

VISPARAD XII (Sp. XIV)³.

1. For the offered Haomas which have been offered in libation to that lofty Lord Ahura Mazda and to the holy Zarathustra Spitama (produce) abundance in cattle and in men; and this⁴ abundance is (as) the good Sraosha, who accompanies (us) with the great

¹ Âvista probably = Avesta; compare Veda. The moral and ceremonial laws.

² Avestic.

³ Follows Y. XXVII.

⁴ Hâ seems to have a certain conjunctive force like sa in composition, 'And thereto the good Sraosha;' or is it an interjection?

splendour of sanctity, and may he¹ be here with energetic effort (to aid us in our worship).

2. We offer the wise offerings of the Ahuna-vairya intoned with sanctity and yet to be intoned, possessing their many teachings of religious wisdom (as they do), and those of the two mortars which pour the Haomas out, and which are pushed forward with precision², and are now in the course of being thus advanced once more³. 3. (And so we teach as well the many teachings of the religious wisdom) contained in the words correctly spoken, in the Zarathustrian utterances⁴, and in the ceremonies correctly practised, and the Baresmans spread exactly, and the Haomas pressed correctly, and the praise, Yasnas, and the doctrines of the Mazdayasnian Religion with their recitations, and their movements. 4. For thus they may become to us more full of devices and of wisdom, and so we offer these wise ritual deeds in the creation, so we impart them with their many points of meaning while we (ourselves) still ponder them as those which Ahura Mazda, the holy One, delivered, which have (as if) their nourishment from Vohu Manah⁵ and their growth from the Righteous Order, which are the greatest of all beings, the best, and the most beautiful; for thus shall these be to us the more full of wisest meaning, and more full of incitation⁶, and may we be among those (who are) of Spənta Mainyu's world in that we are imparting (to the chosen) these

¹ Recall *hetâ* of Y. XLVI, 1.

² With punctilious sanctity.

³ The Parsi priests at present make appropriate manipulations here.

⁴ In the now ancient *Gâthas*, &c.

⁵ Compare *gaêthau vispau yau vohû thraostâ mananghâ*.

⁶ Or, 'may we be more zealous than any who are in the creation of the bounteous spirit.'

precepts of the wisest meaning and these incitations which are contained therein. 5. And full of wisest meaning be ye two to us, O (thou) stone mortar, and (thou) the iron one, as ye are now turned, and as ye are now being advanced¹, ye two mortars of the house, [and of the village, of the tribe, and of the province, and ye who are in this house (itself), this village, tribe, and province]; yea, in those which are ours, Mazdayasnians, who are steadfast in our worship, who appear with our wood-billets and our perfumes, and with our supplicated blessings [(Pâ-zand) for so may they be to us, the more full of wisest teaching].

VISPARAD XIII (SP. XV)².

1. According to the ritual we worship Ahura Mazda; according to the ritual we worship the Bountiful Immortals; and we sacrifice to the sacrificial word correctly spoken, and to every Mâthra (as to a sacred word of reason). And we sacrifice to Zarathustra, him who is especially the possessor of the Mâthra³; and we sacrifice to the 'blessings for the saints'⁴; and we worship the 'hail'⁵ addressed to the Bountiful Immortals.

2. Also we worship the three principal (chapters) uttered (in the Yasna) without addition or omission⁶;

¹ Referring to manipulations.

² This fragment follows Y. XXX in the Vendîdâd Sâdah, and was written in allusion to Y. XXVIII, Y. XXIX, and Y. XXX.

³ Referring to mâtthra srevaêmâ in Yasna XXVIII, 8.

⁴ Referring to the words savaââ ashavabyô in Yasna XXX, 11.

⁵ Referring to the word ustâ in Yasna XXX, 11.

⁶ The three first chapters XXVIII-XXX; the text has bad grammar, or broken connection.

and we worship the three principal ones without addition or omission; we worship the three commencing ones entire without addition or omission¹. And we worship the entirety² of the three principal ones without addition or omission; and their Hâs, their metrical lines, their words, and their word-structure [and their recital, memorising, chanting, and their steadfast offering].

VISPARAD XIV (SP. XVI)³.

1. (We worship Ahura Mazda, the holy Lord of the ritual order⁴; and we sacrifice to the Gâtha Ahunavaiti) with its measures, and word-structure, and its Zand, with its questions and counter-questions, with its words and its metric feet. And we sacrifice to these as well-recited, and now in the course of being recited, as well-worshipped, and now in the course of being used in worship⁵. 2. (Yea, we sacrifice to it) in

¹ It is difficult to see how *anapishûtâ* can mean 'without retrenchment,' but the context seems to require it, and the Pahlavi translation bears evidence to it. Perhaps read *anapashûtâ*.

² 'The whole three first.' Some suppose the three prayers to be intended (the Ahuna-vairya, the Ashem Vohû, and the Yênhê hâtâm). I think that the three chapters XXVIII-XXX are meant. As the piece follows those three chapters in the Vendîdâd Sâdah, so its expressions indicate a reference to them. This might tend to show that the Ahunavaiti was at one time, if not originally, divided at this place.

³ This fragment was written in evident allusion to the entire Ahunavaiti, which it follows in the Vendîdâd Sâdah. It expresses the veneration acquired by the first Gâtha long after its composition.

⁴ From the Vendîdâd Sâdah.

⁵ *Frâyazentâm* may be a metaplasm; otherwise 'of the sacrificers.'

its own 'wisdom'¹, in its own 'clearness'², in its own 'loving intention'², in its sovereignty, and its own ritual order, and its 'acquired boon'², which is also that given by Ahura Mazda for the promotion of piety, for that thought which originates from the 'heart-devoted self'².

3. (Sp. Chapter XVII.) Also we worship the Ahuna-vairya, the holy lord of the ritual order, the holy lord with its Ahû and its Ratu [(Pâzand); for He is the one with the title Ahû and Ratu, who is Ahura Mazda³]. 4. And we sacrifice to the constituent parts of the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, to its chapters, and its metrical lines, its words, and word-structure, [and to its heard-recital, and memorised recital, its continuous and its steadfast offering].

VISPARAD XV (Sp. XVIII)⁴.

1. Hold your feet in readiness, and your two hands, and your understandings⁵, O ye Zarathustrian Mazdayasniâns! for the well-doing of lawful deeds in accordance with the sacred Order, and for the avoidance of the unlawful and evil deeds which are contrary to the ritual. Let the good deeds for the furtherance of husbandry be done⁶ here. Render ye the needy rich⁷. 2. Let Sraosha (Obedience) be present here for the worship of Ahura Mazda,

¹ Dâmi with K4. Possibly in their own house (dâmi=dani).

² These words probably allude severally, say, to dâmi in Y. XXXI, 7, kithrâ in Y. XXXI, 22, zaoshê in Y. XXXIII, 2, 10, âyaptâ in Y. XXVIII, 8, to zarzdau in Y. XXXI, 1.

³ Erroneous.

⁴ This piece is a later composed prelude to the Haptanghâiti, which it precedes in the Vendîdâd Sâdah.

⁵ Sursum corda! ⁶ Comp. gavôî verezyâtâm, Y. XLVIII, 5.

⁷ 'Place the needy with those without need.'

the most helpful, and the holy, who is so desired by us in the pronunciation, and for the service, and the pondering¹ of the Yasna Haptanghâiti, for the heart's devotion to it, for its memorisation, and its victorious and holy recital (or for the victorious saint), without addition or omission, (3) which has been intoned, and which shall yet be uttered as great, powerful, smiting with victory, separate from harmful malice, for the pronunciation of victorious words for Ahura Mazda's Fire. (4, 5 are identical with Visp. IX, 6, 7.)

VISPARAD XVI (SP. XIX)².

1. And we worship the Fire here, Ahura Mazda's son, and the Yazads having the seed of fire in them, and the Rashnus having the seed of fire³ in them; and we worship the Fravashis of the saints. And we worship Sraosha who smites with victory, and the holy man, and the entire creation of the holy (and the clean). 2. And we worship the Blessedness and the Fravashi of Zarathustra Spitâma, the saint. And we worship the saints and their blessed Fravashis (as of one). And we worship all their Fravashis (as considered each apart), and those of the saints within the Province, and those of the saints without the Province; yea, we worship the Fravashis of holy men and holy women (wherever they may be, those devoted to the Order of the Faith). And we sacrifice to those whose (service)

¹ Possibly mǎzdâtaê/a.

² This piece follows the Haptanghâiti in the Vendîdâd Sâdah; it was intended as a sequel to it.

³ Having the power to propagate its worship, maintaining it unextinguished. De Harlez makes the admirable suggestion, 'bright as flame'; but the Pahlavi renders tokhmak.

for us in the Yasna Ahura Mazda, the holy, has known as the better¹, and of these Zarathustra is the living chief² and master. And we sacrifice to the fields and the waters, the lands and the plants, and to the constituent parts of the Yasna Haptanghâiti, its chapters, its metred lines, its words, and word-structure.

VISPARAD XVII (SP. XX)³.

And we strive after the good thoughts, words, and deeds inculcated in the Yasna Haptanghâiti. A blessing is the Right (called) the Best, (there is) weal; (there is) weal for this (man) when toward Righteousness Best (there is) right.

VISPARAD XVIII (SP. XXI)⁴.

1. We worship Ahura Mazda with the usta⁵. And we worship the Amesha Spenta with the usta, and the holy man, the saint. And we worship the prior world of the holy (and of the clean) with an usta, and the state of weal and salvation for the holy man (the saint).
2. And we worship that life-long state of blessedness (for the holy) which is the evil man's calamity⁶; yea, we worship his eternal⁷ salvation, and with the salvation prayer. And we sacrifice to every saint who

¹ Comp. Y. LI, 22.

² Anghuska ratuska here referred to the same person; comp. ahû.

³ An addition to chapter XVI.

⁴ This piece having reference to various expressions in the Gâtha Ustavaiti, follows it in the Vendidad Sâdah.

⁵ Referring to ustâ in Y. XLIII, 1.

⁶ See Y. XLV, 7.

⁷ Akaranem=the eternal thing; otherwise an adjective of two terminations; or, finally, read -âm.

exists, who is now coming into existence, and who shall exist in future.

VISPARAD XIX (Sp. XXII)¹.

1. We worship Ahura Mazda the bountiful; and we worship the Bountiful Immortals (saying the *Spenta*). And we sacrifice to the bountiful saint, and to the bountiful anticipative understanding². Also we sacrifice to the good and bountiful *Âramaiti* (the ready mind). And we worship her together with³ the bountiful creatures in the creation of the pure. And we sacrifice to the holy creatures who have intelligence as their first⁴, (to those foremost in their mind). And we worship the omniscient understanding, and Him who is Ahura Mazda (Himself). 2. And we sacrifice to the shining sun, which is the highest of the high; yea, we worship the sun together with the Bountiful Immortals, and the *Māthras* with their good ceremonies⁵. Also we sacrifice to the glorious achievements, and to this glory (which we have gained). And we sacrifice to the herds which have the Fire and its blessings⁶. Also we worship the holy benefit which is so widely

¹ The word *spenta* throughout alludes to the *Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu*, but it is of course not without grammatical application.

² In the *Bundahis* especially referred to Ahura.

³ Or, 'together with the bountiful creatures we worship the holy creatures.'

⁴ This expression may have been accidentally determined by the position of the word *manô* in the Ahuna-vairya formula; see Y. XIX. 12.

⁵ Or, 'the well-fulfilled.'

⁶ 'Fire-made' is unintelligible; 'fire gifts-having' may refer to the flocks and herds, as expressing the source of that prosperity which is represented by the holy Fire.

diffused¹, and that wisdom which is the bounteous Âramaiti, whose are the laws² of the Righteous Order, and of those holy creatures who have Righteousness as their first.

VISPARAD XX (Sp. XXIII)³.

1. (Homage to the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra⁴! We sacrifice to the Vohu-khshathra), (the good kingdom) even the Khshathra-vairya, the kingdom to be desired; and we sacrifice to the iron-founding⁵, and to the (sacrificial) words⁶ correctly spoken which smite (the foe) with victory, and which hold the Daêvas subject.

And we worship that reward and that health, that healing and that progress, that growth and that victorious smiting⁷ (2) which are between the Vohu-khshathra and the Vahistôisti⁸, (and which are acquired by us) by the memorised recital of the good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, for the withstanding of evil thoughts, and words, and deeds; yea, for the undoing of all treacherous thoughts (directed) against me, and of all false words, and unfair deeds. 3. [And we sacrifice to the later Yasna, the heroic Haptanghâiti⁹, (and which as it recurs becomes) the holy ritual chief.]

¹ Pahl. fravaft sûd.

² Dâthra with K₄.

³ This piece from the later Avesta follows Y. LI, in the Vendîdâd Sâdah.

⁴ From the Vendîdâd Sâdah.

⁵ Associated with this Gâtha from Y. LI, 9.

⁶ Compare Y. LI, 3. ⁷ Y. LI, 9; also perhaps Y. LIII, 8, 9.

⁸ Between; that is, described in the space between the Vohu-khshathra and the Vahistôisti, i.e. in Y. LII. See hamistê in Y. LII, 4, and paitistâtê in Visp. XX, 2.

⁹ This would seem misplaced; perhaps Y. XLII is meant, which follows the Haptanghâiti.

VISPARAD XXI (SP. XXIV).

1. We strive earnestly, and we take up our Yasna and our homage to the good waters, and to the fertile fruit-trees (which bear as of themselves), and to the Fravashis of the saints ; yea, we take up our Yasna, and our homage earnestly to those beings which are (so) good, the waters, and the trees, and the Fravashis of the saints, (2) and to the Kine, and to Gaya (Maretan), and to the Māthra Spenta (the bounteous word-of-reason), the holy, which works (within and for us with effect), to these we take up our Yasnas and our homage with earnest zeal, and to Thee, O Ahura Mazda ! and to thee, O Zarathustra, we do the same ; and to thee, O lofty lord (the Apām-napât), and to the Bountiful Immortals. 3. And we sacrifice to the listening (that hears our prayers) and to that mercy, and to the hearing of (our spoken) homage, and to that mercy which is (shown in response to our offered) praise. And we sacrifice to the frâ râiti vîdushê, which is contained in the piece hvâdaênâis ashaonts ; and we sacrifice to 'the good praise which is without hypocrisy, and which has no malice (as its end)' ; and we sacrifice to the later Yasna and to its offering ; and we sacrifice to the chapters of the later Yasna, and to its metrical lines, its words, and word-structure.

VISPARAD XXII (SP. XXV).

With this chant (fully) chanted, and which is for the Bountiful Immortals and the holy Saoshyants (who are the prophets who shall serve us), and by means of these (ceremonial) actions, which are (of all)

the best, we desire to utter our supplications for the Kine. It is that chant which the saint has recognised as good and fruitful of blessed gifts, and which the sinner does not know¹. May we never reach that (ill-luck that the sinner) may outstrip us (in our chanting), not in the matter of a plan (thought out), or of words (delivered), or ceremonies (done²), nor yet in any offering whatever when he (?) approaches (us for harm).

VISPARAD XXIII (SP. XXVI)³.

1. We worship Ahura Mazda as the best⁴ (worship to be offered in our gifts). We worship the Amesha Spenta (once more, and as) the best. We worship Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best). And we sacrifice to those (prayers) which are evident as the best; that is, the Praises of the Yasnas.

Also we sacrifice to that best wish, which is that of Asha Vahista, and we worship Heaven, which is the best world of the saints, bright and all-glorious; and we sacrifice likewise to that best approach which leads to⁵ it. 2. And we sacrifice to that reward,

¹ The parties are divided by knowledge and ignorance (compare the Gnosis). See Y. XXXI, 12

² Not in thought, word, or deed may we reach (his) priority in progress.

³ This piece from the later Avesta follows Y. LIII, in the Vendidad Sâdah, and has reference to its expressions.

⁴ It is an important suggestion which holds vahistem as equal to 'saying vahistem,' in allusion to the Vahistâ frstis; but as the word is inflected further on (see vahistahê), and as it moreover once applies to Asha, as Asha Vahista, it is better to render it as having adjective application throughout, being none the less, of course, an intentional echo of the first word of Y. LIII, 1.

⁵ Or, 'of it.'

health, healing, furtherance, and increase, and to that victory which is within¹ the two, the Ahunavairya and the Airyemâ-ishyô, through the memorised recital of the good thoughts, words, and deeds (which they enjoin).

¹ Possibly 'between them,' meaning the Gâthas which are so placed.

ÂFRÎNAGÂN.

ÂFRÎNAGÂN.

AS to the present use of these blessings, says Haug (ed. West): 'Âfrînagân are blessings which are to be recited over a meal consisting of wine, milk, and fruits, to which an angel, or the spirit of a deceased person, is invited, and in whose honour the meal is prepared. After the consecration (which only a priest can perform) is over, the meal is eaten by those who are present. The performance of these Âfrînagân is required of every Parsi at certain fixed seasons of the year. These are the six Gahanbârs, each lasting five days (at the six original seasons of the year) for which the Âfrînagân Gahanbâr is intended, the five Gâtha-days (the five last days of the year), during which the Âfrînagân Gâtha must be used; and, lastly, the third day (Ardibahist) of the first month (Fravardin) in the year, at which the performance of Âfrînagân Rapithwin, devoted to the spirit presiding over the southern quarter (who is the guardian of the way to paradise), is enjoined to every Parsi whose soul wants to pass the *Kinvað* after death.' (Essays, 2nd edition, page 224.)

I. ÂFRÎN[-AGÂN] GAHANBÂR¹.

1. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, and of Zarathustra's order, a foe of the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for the holy Hâvani¹, the regulator of the ritual order (and its lord in its turn), for its sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise; (and I confess myself) for Sâvanghi and for Vîsya, the holy lords of the ritual order, for their sacrifice, homage,

¹ The Âfrîn for the morning hours from 6 to 10.

propitiation, and praise, and for that of the Asnya, the day-lords of the days during daylight, and of the days in their length, for the Mâhya, month-lords, and the Yâirya, year-lords, and for those of the especial seasons, and for the worship, homage, propitiation, and praise of that lofty lord who is the Ritual Righteousness (itself); yea, for the worship, homage, propitiation, and praise of the lords of the days, months, years, and seasons—for those lords of the ritual order who are of all the greatest, who are the regulators of the ritual at the time of Hâvani.

2. To Maidhyô-zaremya ¹, the lord [or to Maidhyô-shema ¹, the lord, or to Paitishahya ¹, the lord, or to Ayâthrima ¹, Maidhyâirya ¹, or Hamaspathmaêdhaya], be propitiation, homage, and praise.

3. O ye Mazdayasnians who are here present! offer ye² this ritual service, and present ye the Myazda which is that of the Maidhyô-zaremya, taking a piece of sound flesh from a choice beast, with a full flow of milk.

4. If ye are able to do this, (well); if ye are unable to do it, ye may take then (a portion) of some liquor of equal value, it matters not which it is, and have it consumed as it is proper; and so be ye discreet from your obedience, most correctly faithful in your speech, most saintly from your sanctity, best ordered in your exercise of power, least straitened by oppressions, heart-easy with rejoicings, most merciful of givers, most helpful to the poor, fulfilling most the ritual, the blest and longed-for Asha, (coy?) riches woman-minded(?) bringing (as reward). If ye can do this

¹ The name of the season at the time present, when the text is recited, is to be used.

² Bring ye, O these Mazdayasnians!

and with vigour, (well); (5) if not, bring wood to the Ratu's house. It matters not what [kind, so it be well cut, and very dry, and in loads of fitting size. If that is possible, (well); if not, then let a man bring wood to the Ratu's dwelling, and heap it up as high as the ear, or to reach the fore-shoulder, or with the fore-arm measure, (or at least as high as the end of the hanging hand). If that is possible, (well); (6) but if it has not been possible, then let the worshipper (with the mind's offering) ascribe the power to him who rules the best, Ahura, (saying¹): Wherefore for this cause verily we offer and ascribe the Sovereign Power to Ahura Mazda, who rules the best, and to Righteousness (the ritual and moral Order), and we complete our sacrifice to them. Thus is the Myazda offered with the well-timed prayer for blessings.

7. In case that a man does not give of the first Myazda which is that of the Maidhyô-zaremaya, O Spitama Zarathustra! the Ratu that has the right to that Myazda, and who has this person under his guidance, expels² that (false) disciple who has not his Myazda with him, as a man that does not worship, from the midst of the Mazda-worshippers. 8. In the case that a man does not give of the second Myazda, O Spitama Zarathustra! which is that of the Maidhyô-shema, then let² the Ratu to whom the Myazda should come, and who has the person under his guidance, expel that disciple, since he comes without his Myazda, as he would a man who refuses to recite his vows, from among the number of the Mazda-

¹ Or, 'because we offer.'

² Not 'renders him (detected) among the Mazdayasnians;' compare for form *ahtarê-mrôyê*; see also *fra-dasti* and *fra-perenaoti*; also the present may be used for the imperative.

worshippers. 9. In the case that a man does not give of the third Myazda, O Spitama Zarathustra! which is that of Paitishahya, then let the Ratu who ought to receive that Myazda, and who has had the person under his guidance, expel that disciple which brings no Myazda, as a detected¹ reprobate, from among the number of the Mazdayasnians. 10. In case that a man does not offer of the fourth Myazda, O Spitama Zarathustra! which is that of the Ayâthrima, let the Ratu who ought to receive that Myazda, and who has the person under his guidance, expel that disciple, since he brings no Myazda, as a refuse² beast from among the number of the Mazdayasnians. 11. In the case that a man does not give of the fifth Myazda, which is that of the Maidhyâirya, then let the Ratu to whom that Myazda belongs as a perquisite, and who has that person under his guidance, expel him, since he brings no Myazda, as an alien³, from among the number of the Mazdayasnians. 12. In case that a man does not give of the sixth Myazda, which is that of the Hamaspathmaêdhaya, O Spitama Zarathustra! let the Ratu to whom that Myazda belongs as a perquisite, and who has this person under his discipline to learn him the lore of Ahura, expel him, (as ignorant) since he brings no Myazda, from among the number of the Mazdayasnians. 13. And let him decry him afterwards without hesitation⁴, and drive⁵ him out; and let that Ratu lay upon him after-

¹ Possibly 'having a breast burnt by the ordeal,' and so 'detected;' or 'hot-breasted, vehement' (?); comp. úras.

² It may be '(his) excluded beast,' or 'his stray beast' (?).

³ Or, possibly, 'he is rejected when offering himself as arrived from the settlements' (?).

⁴ 'Without recoiling.'

⁵ Syazdayôiz.

wards the expiating deeds without reserve; and in accordance with these rules, let the disciple treat the Ratu. (Let him beware of failure to bring his Myazda, or if he fails let the disciple bear, as is befitting, what is due.) A blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best, it is weal, it is weal for this (man) when toward Righteousness Best there is right.

14. I bless with my prayer the royal Province-chiefs (who are faithful worshippers) of Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, (beseeching) for superior strength for them, and for more important victory, and more influential rule, and desiring for them further authoritative power, and helpful support, and long duration to their reign, and the prolonged vitality of their frames, and health. 15. And I pray in my benediction for strength well-shaped and stately of growth, and which smites victoriously, Ahura-made, and crushing, and for an ascendancy abundantly subduing all who are filled with furious hate, assaulting the evil-minded enemies, and destroying, as if at once, the deadly, godless¹ foes.

16. And I pray in my blessing that he (the province-governor) may conquer in victorious battles every malicious foe, and each malignant, profane in thoughts, and words, and actions, (17) that he may indeed be constantly victorious in his own religious thoughts, and words, and deeds, and unvarying in the smiting of every foe, and of every Daêva-worshipper, and that he may, as he proceeds², be well rewarded, and of good repute, possessing a far-foreseeing preparation of the soul. 18. And I pray with blessings thus: Live thou long and blessed be

¹ Unfriendly and untrue; ‘* avratyá.’

² Recall yôî zazentê vanghâu sravahî.

thou, 'hail' to thee; live for the aid of holy men, and for the crushing of the evil; and I pray for Heaven (for thee) the best world of the saints, shining, all glorious. And thus may it happen as I pray—¹. 19. And I bless in my prayer the sacrifice, and homage, and the strength, and swiftness of the day-lords during daylight, and of the lords of the days in their length, of the month-lords, and the year-lords, and of the lords of the seasons² (in their course), and for the worship, homage, propitiation, and praise of the lofty lord who is the Righteous Ritual itself, and of those lords of the ritual who are of all the greatest, and who are the lords of the ritual at the time of Hâvani, for Maidhyô-zaremaya the lord, [(or) for Maidhyô-shema the lord, (or) for Paitishahya² the lord, or for Ayâthrima, Maidhyâirya, or Hamaspathmaêdhaya²⁺³].

II. ÂFRÎN[-AGÂN]⁴ GÂTHA⁴.

1. As the Ahû is (revered and) to be chosen, so (is) the Ratu (one who rules) from the Righteous Order, a creator of mental goodness, and of life's actions done for Ahura, and the Kingdom (is) to Mazda, which to the poor may offer a nurturer.

I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper—for the praise of Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, and of the Bountiful Immortals, for the bountiful and

¹ See Y. XXXV, 2. The Ahuna follows.

² The name varies with the season in which the sacrifice is made.

³ As in 18.

⁴ Recited during the days called after the Gâthas, the last five of the year. A long period of time must have elapsed since the Gâthas were composed, as they probably were not originally 'five,' and yet seem to have been only remembered as such.

holy Gâthas which rule in the ritual order. (Propitiation and praise be) to the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, and to the Gâtha Ustavaiti, to the Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu, and to the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra, and to the Gâtha Vahistôisti. 2. Propitiation to the Fravashis of the saints, the mighty, overwhelming, even to those of the saints of yore, who held the primeval faith (the Gâthic faith), and to those of the next of kin.

3. We sacrifice to Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious; and we sacrifice to the Amesha Spenta who rule aright, and who dispose (of all aright). And we sacrifice to the bounteous and holy Gâthas, which rule (as the first) in the ritual order.

We sacrifice to the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, the holy, as it rules in the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the Gâtha Ustavaiti, the holy, as it rules in the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu, the holy, as it rules in the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra, the holy, as it rules in the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the Gâtha Vahistôisti, the holy, as it rules in the ritual order. 4 = Yt. XIII, 49-52¹.

III. ÂFRÎN[-AGÂN]² RAPITHVIN³.

1. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, of Zarathustra's order, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for Rapithwina, the holy lord of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and for Frâdat-fshu³ and Zantuma⁴,

¹ Verses 5, 6 = Â. I, 14-18; for verse 6, see verses 1, 2; also see Â. I, 19.

² To be recited on the third day (Ardibahist) of the first month (Fravardin). ³ A genius who furthered cattle.

⁴ The genius of the Zantu, presiding over this Gâh Rapithvin.

the holy lord(s) of the ritual order. 2. And to Ahura Mazda, the resplendent, the glorious, and to the Bountiful Immortals, be propitiation, and to Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and to the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, and to all the holy Yazads, heavenly and earthly, and to the Fravashis of the saints, the mighty and overwhelming—.

3. For thus did Ahura Mazda speak to Spitama Zarathustra the word which was spoken for the ritual time of the Rapithwina, (saying): Ask us, O holy Zarathustra ¹, what are Thy questions to be asked of us ², for Thy question is as that mighty one when Thy ruler speaks his mighty wish ¹. 4. Then Zarathustra asked Ahura Mazda: O Ahura Mazda, most bountiful ³ creator of the material worlds and holy! what does that man acquire, what does he merit, what reward shall there be for that man (5) who shall recite the Rapithwina office with the Rapithwina prayer for blessing, and who shall sacrifice with ⁴ the Rapithwina office with hands (well) washed, and with (well) washed mortars, with the Baresman spread, and with Haoma high uplifted, and with fire brightly flaming, with Ahuna-vairya loud intoned, with Haoma-moistened tongue, and with a body Māthra-bound? 6. And Ahura Mazda answered him: As the wind from the southern quarter, O Spitama! causes the entire material world to advance and to increase, and as it will bless it ⁵, rejoice it, and cause it to progress ⁶, such a like reward does such a man receive, (7) who

¹ Erroneous.

² Ahmâi; see Y. XLIII, 10 with *ahmâ*.

³ Insert 'spirit.'

⁴ Or, 'to.'

⁵ Saoshyati^{ka}; or can saoshyanti be a locative absolute, preserving a fuller form?

⁶ Or, 'causes it to enter into helpful joy' (?).

recites the Rapithwina-ratu with the Rapithwina blessing, and sacrifices with¹ it with (well) washed hands, and mortars, with Baresman spread, and Haoma lifted, with fire brightly flaming, and with Ahuna-vairya loud intoned, and with Haoma-moistened tongue, and a body Māthra-bound! 8. Thus hath Ahura Mazda declared to Spitama Zarathustra the word which (should be) spoken at the Rapithwina time. 9, 10. (See Â. I, 14-19.)

¹ Or, 'to.'

THE GÂHS.

THE GÂHS.

THE Gâhs are the five divisions of the day. The Hâvani from 6 to 10 A.M., the Rapithwina from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M., the Uzayêirina from 3 to 6 P.M., the Aiwisrûthrima from 6 to 12 P.M., the Ushahina from 12 P.M. to 6 A.M. The Gâhs here following are prayers which must be recited at the Gâhs of the day; hence their name¹.

I. THE GÂH HÂVAN².

Unto Ahura Mazda be propitiation. A blessing is Righteousness (called) the Best—.

1. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, of Zarathustra's order, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for the holy Hâvani, regulator of the ritual order, for its sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and for Sâvanghi and Visya, the righteous regulator(s) of the ritual order, for their homage, sacrifice, propitiation, and praise, and for those of the Asnya, the day-lords during daylight, and the Ayara, lords of the days in their length, and for the Mâhya, the month-lords, and the Yâirya, year-lords, and for those of the especial seasons.

2. And to Mithra of the wide pastures, of the thousand ears, of the myriad eyes, the Yazad of the spoken name³, be sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and to Râman *Hvâstra*.

3, 4. And we sacrifice to Ahura Mazda the holy

¹ The term Gâh, itself, may have arisen from the practice of chanting the Gâthas at different fixed times in the day.

² To be recited every day at the time of Hâvani.

³ Having a special Yast.

lord of the ritual Order, and to Zarathustra, and to the Fravashi of Zarathustra, the saint. And we sacrifice to the Bounteous Immortals, (the guardians) of the saints, and to the good, heroic, and bounteous Fravashis of the saints (of the living and of the dead), of the bodily, and of those in heaven. And we sacrifice to the highest of the lords, the one that most attains its ends; and we sacrifice to the most strenuous of the Yazads, the most satisfying of the lords of the ritual order, the one who reaches (what he seeks), the most infallibly of those who have as yet approached the nearest in the ritual, even to the timely prayer of the saint who rules in the ritual order. 5. And we sacrifice to the Hāvani, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the Universal Weal, the holy, ruling in the ritual order, and to Deathlessness, the holy, ruling in the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the question and lore of the holy lord of the ritual. And we sacrifice to that heroic mighty Yasna, the Haptanghâiti, the lord of the ritual order. 6. And we sacrifice to Sâvanghi and Vîsya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the Airyemâ-ishyô¹, the holy lord of the ritual order, the powerful, victoriously smiting, that which no hate can reach, which overwhelms all torments, and which passes over all torments with victory, which is the uppermost, and the middle, and the foremost, for the effective invocation of that surpassing Māthra, the five Gāthas.

7, 8. And we sacrifice to Mithra of the wide pastures—, and to Râman Hvâstra, for the worship and exaltation of Vîsya, the chief. And we sacrifice to

¹ The personified prayer; see Y. LIV.

Viśya, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to Mithra, and to Râman *Hvâstra* —.

9-11. And we sacrifice to thee, the Fire, O Ahura Mazda's son, the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to this Baresman which has the Zaothra with it, and the girdle with it, and which is spread with exact sanctity, itself the holy lord. And we sacrifice to the Apām-napât, and to Nairya-sangha, and to that Yazad, the swift curse of the wise. And we sacrifice to the souls of the dead, [which are the Fravashis of the saints]. And we worship that exalted Lord who is Ahura Mazda, the highest object of the ritual order, who is the one who has attained the most to homage in the ritual. And we sacrifice to all the words which Zarathustra spake, and to all the deeds well done, and to those which shall yet be done in days to come. (And) we sacrifice to that male one of beings whose (gift) in the offering Ahura doth know to be better, and of female saints, the same. As the Ahû is to be (revered and) chosen, so (is) the Ratu, one who rules from the Righteous Order, a creator of mental goodness, and of life's actions done for Mazda, and the Kingdom (is) to Ahura, which to the poor shall offer a nurturer—.

II. GÂH RAPITHVIN¹.

1. Propitiation to Ahura Mazda. A blessing is Asha Vahista. I confess as a Mazda-worshipper, and of Zarathustra's order—for Rapithwina, the holy lord of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and for praise, and for Frâdat-fshu and Zantuma, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage,

¹ Recited every day at the hour of Rapithwina.

propitiation, and for praise. 2. And propitiation be to Asha Vahista, and to Ahura Mazda's Fire, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise¹. 3. 4. (See Y. LXXI, 2, 3.)

5. And we sacrifice to the Rapithwina, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the Gâtha Ahunavaiti, the holy, and ruling in the ritual order ; and to the Gâtha Ustavaiti, and to the Gâtha Spentâ-mainyu, and to the Gâtha Vohu-khshathra, and to the Gâtha Vahistôisti, holy, and ruling in the ritual order. 6. And we sacrifice to Frâdat-fshu, and to Zantuma, and to the Fshûshô-mâthra, even to the word correctly spoken, and we sacrifice to the (many) words correctly spoken, even to the victorious ones which slay the Demon-gods (the Daêvas²). And we sacrifice to the waters and the lands, and to the plants, and to the heavenly Yazads who are givers of the holy and the good. And we sacrifice to the Bountiful Immortals, (the guardians) of the saints.

7. And we sacrifice to the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, and to the heights of Asha (called) Vahista, and to the greatest Mâthras as moving us to action, the greatest as teaching faithfulness to holy vows, the greatest as referring to actions which are evidently just, and the greatest for the acquisition of the Mazdayasnian Faith. 8. And we sacrifice to that assembly and reunion which the Bountiful Immortals hold when they gather (?) on the heights of Heaven, for the sacrifice and homage of Zantuma, the lord.

And we (therefore) sacrifice to Zantuma (as) the holy lord of the ritual order. 9. And we sacrifice

¹ The Ahuna follows.

² Zarathustra conquered the Demon with the Ahuna-vairya.

to Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and to the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son —. 10. Yea, we sacrifice to Thee, the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son, the holy ritual lord —.

I bless the sacrifice, homage, strength, and swiftness of Asha Vahista, and of the Fire, of Ahura Mazda —. And to this one be the glory!

III. GÂH UZIREN¹.

1. Propitiation to Ahura Mazda! A blessing is Asha Vahista—. I confess myself a Mazdayasnian of the order of Zarathustra, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for the Uzayêirina, the holy lord of the ritual order, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and for Frâdat-vîra and Da^hvyuma, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, for their sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise. 2. And to that lofty Ahura, Apâ^m-napât, and to the waters which Mazda created be sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise²! 3, 4. (G. I, 3, 4.) 5. We sacrifice to the Uzayêirina, the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the Zao^tar, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the Hâvanan, and to the Âtarevakhsha, and to the Frabaretar, and to the Âberet, and to the Âsnatar, and the Raêthwiskar, and to the Sraoshâvareza, holy lords of the ritual order. 6. And we sacrifice to Frâdat-vîra and Da^hvyuma, the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the stars, the moon, and the sun, and to the constellations (?), and we sacrifice to the stars without beginning (to their course ?), and to the glory of the doctrinal proclama-

¹ Recited every day at the hour of Uzayêirina.

² The Ahunâ follows.

tions which are the evil man's distress¹. 7. And we sacrifice to the manifest performer of the truth (the correct maintainer of the rites), the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the later lore; yea, we sacrifice to the manifest fulfiller of the truth, and to the (entire) creation of the holy (and the clean) by day and by night with Zaothras together with offered prayers, for the sacrifice and homage of *Dahvyuma*, the lord. And we sacrifice to *Dahvyuma*, the holy lord of the ritual order. 8. And we sacrifice to that lofty and royal lord, the brilliant *Apām-napât* of the fleet horses; and we sacrifice to the water which is Mazda-made and holy. 9, 10. And we sacrifice to thee, the Fire, Ahura Mazda's son². 11³. And I bless the sacrifice, homage, strength, and swiftness of that lofty Ahura *Napât-apām*, and of the water which Mazda created⁴.

IV. GÂH AIWISRÛTHRIMA⁵.

1. Propitiation be to Ahura Mazda. A blessing is Asha Vahista—. I confess myself a Mazdayasnian, and of Zarathustra's order, a foe to the *Daêvas*, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for *Aiwisrûthrima*, and *Aibigaya*⁶, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, for their sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and for *Frâdat-vîspām-hugyâiti*⁷ and *Zarathustrôtema*⁸, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, for their sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise. 2. And to the

¹ See Y. XLV, 7.

² The *Yēnhê hâtām* here follows.

³ The *Ahuna* follows.

⁴ The *Ashem* follows.

⁵ Recited every day at the hour of *Aiwisrûthrima*.

⁶ Or, 'that furthers life.'

⁷ The genius presiding over all that furthers happiness.

⁸ The genius presiding over the highest office in a province.

Fravashis of the saints, and to the women who have many sons, and to that prosperity of home which lasts without reverse throughout the year, and to Strength, well-shaped and stately, and to the victorious Blow Ahura-given, and for the crushing Ascendency which it bestows, (to all) be propitiation—. 3, 4. (See Gāh I, 3, 4.) 5. And we sacrifice to Aiwisrûthrima (and) Aibigaya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order, and to thee, O Ahura Mazda's Fire ! And we sacrifice to the stone-mortar, and to the iron-mortar, and to this Baresman spread with sanctity, with the Zaothra, and with its girdle, holy lords of the ritual order. Also we sacrifice to the sacred two, to the waters and the plants, and to the sacred vows for the soul, (as) holy lord(s) of the ritual order. 6. Also we sacrifice to Frâdat-vîspām-hugyâiti (as) ruling in the ritual order ; and we sacrifice to Zarathustra, the holy lord of the ritual ; also we sacrifice to the Māthra Spenta, (the bounteous word of reason¹), and to the soul of the Kine, and to the Zarathustrôtema². 7. Also we sacrifice to the Fire-priest, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the charioteer (the warrior), the holy lord of the ritual order. Also we sacrifice to the thrifty tiller of the earth, the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to the house-lord, and to the village-chief, and to the Zantu-chief, and to the province-chief of the province, the holy lord of the ritual order. 8. And we sacrifice to the youth of the good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, even to the youth of good conscience, the holy lord of the ritual order ; yea, we

¹ The Gāthas and Vendidad ; the first verse of the Gāthas mentions the Kine's soul.

² ' And to Zarathustra.'

sacrifice to the youth of the spoken word (who spoke the words which we hold so dear¹), the holy lord of the ritual order. Yea, we sacrifice to the youth who is given to his kin (and married to his blood), the holy lord of the ritual order. And we sacrifice to him who ranges through the province², and to the itinerant with his many arts³, the holy ritual lords. And we sacrifice to the house-mistress, holy, and ruling in the ritual order. 9. And we sacrifice to the holy woman forward⁴ in good thoughts, and words, and deeds, receiving her instructions well, having her husband as her lord, the holy, and such as Âramaiti, the bounteous, is, and such as are thy wives, O Mazda, Lord!

And we sacrifice to the holy man most forward in good thoughts, and words, and works, wise as to piety, simple as to sin, by whose deeds the settlements advance in the holy order, for the worship and homage of the Zarathustrôtema, the lord. And we sacrifice to the Zarathustrôtema, the holy lord of the ritual order. 10. And we sacrifice to the good, heroic, bountiful Fravashis of the saints, and to the women who have many sons, and to that Prosperity which endures throughout the year, and to the well-shaped and stately Strength. And we sacrifice to the Blow of Victory, Ahura-given, and to the crushing Ascendency which it secures. 11, 12. (See Gâh I, 9, 10.) 13. (The Ahuna-vairya, &c.)

¹ See Yast XXII.

² It is very probable that the Yasna was at that period celebrated from house to house.

³ Medical?

⁴ Is it possibly, 'favouring good thoughts,' &c.?

V. GĀH USHAHIN¹.

1. Propitiation to Ahura Mazda. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, of the order of Zarathustra, a foe to the Daêvas, devoted to the lore of the Lord, for the Ushahina, for sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise, and to Beregya and Nmânya, the holy lord(s) of the ritual order. 2. Propitiation be to Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, endowed with recompense, smiting with the blow of victory, and causing the settlements to advance and to increase.

3, 4. (See Gâh I, 3, 4.) 5. We sacrifice to Ushahina, the holy lord of the ritual order; and we sacrifice to the beautiful Aurora, and to the dawn of morning; yea, we sacrifice to the morning, the shining², of the glittering horses, having the men of forethought (as its servants), yea, having men of forethought and heroes (awake and at their work), to the morning which gives light within the house³. And we sacrifice to the lights of dawn which are radiant with their light and fleetest horses which sweep over (?) the seven-fold earth. And we sacrifice to Ahura Mazda, the holy lord of the ritual order, and to the Good Mind, and to Asha Vahista (who is Righteousness the Best), and to Khshathra-vairya, and to Âramaiti, the bounteous and the good.

6. And we sacrifice to Beregya, even the holy lord of the ritual order, even to Nmânya with the longing desire for the good Asha, and with the longing desire for the good Mazdayasnian law, for the worship

¹ Recited every day at the hour of Ushahina.

² So, better than 'royal,' which is, however, possible.

³ Or, 'while it abides.'

and homage of Nmânya, the lord. 7. And we sacrifice to Sraosha, and to Rashnu, the most just, and to Arstât, who causes the settlements to advance and to increase. 8, 9. (See Gâh I, 9, 10.) 10. And I bless the sacrifice, homage, strength, and swiftness of Sraosha (Obedience) the blessed, endowed with sanctity, smiting with the blow of victory, and who causes the settlements to advance; and I bless the sacrifice of Rashnu, the most just, and that of Arstât, who causes the settlements to advance and to increase¹.

¹ The Ashem and the Ahmâi raêška.

MISCELLANEOUS FRAGMENTS.

I.

1. (An incitation to the priest or worshipper.) As thou keepest company with the Good Mind, and with Righteousness the Best, and with Khshathra-vairya (the Kingdom to be desired), speak to the male and female disciples of Zarathustra Spitama the saint, (and declare) the praise which is to be spoken, that of the Yasna, even the words against which no anger¹ shall prevail.

2. And do thou, O Zarathustra²! declare our words for sacrifice and worship, ours, the Bountiful Immortals', that the waters may (thus) be sacrificed to by thee, and the plants, the Fravashis of the saints, and the created Yazads, heavenly and earthly, which are holy and beneficent.

II.

1. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper—for the praise of Thraêtaona, the Âthwyan. Let them declare it—. Propitiation be to the Fravashi of Thraêtaona, the Âthwyan, the saint. 2. We sacrifice to Thraêtaona, the Âthwyan, the holy lord of the ritual order; and may we be free from the dog Kuro³, and the Tarewani³, and the Karpan, (we who are) of⁴ those who sacrifice in order. 3. (The Ahuna

¹ Others 'the unrestricted words.'

² Perhaps 'Zarathustra' is here merely the equivalent of 'priest.'

³ Obscure.

⁴ Awkward formations.

follows.) Sacrifice, homage, strength, and swiftness be to the Fravashi of Thraêtaona, the saint. (The Ahem and Ahmâi raêška follow.)

III.

1. All good thoughts, and all good words, and all good deeds are thought, and spoken, and done with intelligence; and all evil thoughts, and words, and deeds are thought, and spoken, and done with folly.
2. And let (the men who think, and speak, and do) all good thoughts, and words, and deeds inhabit¹ Heaven (as their home). And let those who think, and speak, and do evil thoughts, and words, and deeds abide in Hell. For to all who think good thoughts, speak good words, and do good deeds, Heaven, the best world, belongs. And this is evident, and as of course (?) (or, 'and therewith their seed').

IV.

1. I proclaim the Airyemâ-ishyô as the greatest of all authoritative prayers, O Spitama! as the most influential and helpful for progress; and may the Saoshyants (who would further us) use it and revere it.

2. I am speaking in accordance with it, O Spitama! and therefore I shall rule as sovereign over creatures which are mine, I who am Ahura Mazda. Let no one rule as Angra Mainyu² over realms that are his own, O Zarathustra Spitama! 3. Let Angra Mainyu be hid beneath the earth³. Let the Daêvas likewise

¹ Ashaêta = â + shaêta used subjunctively.

² Insert 'of the evil faith.'

³ In Y. IX, 14, 15, it is the Ahuna-vairya which drives the Daêvas beneath the earth.

disappear. Let the dead arise (unhindered by these foes), and let bodily life be sustained in these now lifeless bodies.

V.

1. To Ahura Mazda, the radiant, the glorious, to the Bountiful Immortals, to Force well-shaped and stately, to the Blow of Victory, Ahura-given, to the Victorious Ascendency (which it secures), to the path of pleasantness, to the good Zarenumant¹, to the 'Glowing' Mountain made by Mazda, and to all the Yazads! 2. We sacrifice to Ahura Mazda, the radiant, the glorious, and to the Bountiful Immortals who rule aright, who dispose (of all) aright, and to Force well-shaped and stately, and to the Blow of Victory, and to the Ascendency of Victory, and to the path of pleasantness, and to Zarenumant, the good, which Mazda created, and to the 'Glowing' Mount, and to every saint.

VI².

Propitiation be to the created body of the Kine of blessed endowment, and to the Kine's soul (so, if there is one cow presented³). Propitiation be to the body and soul of you two (so, if there are two³). —To your body and soul (if there are three, or the entire herd³). (The Ahuna follows.)

¹ According to the Bundahis, the name of a lake.

² This fragment was spoken when the milk was drawn from the cow, or cows, for the offering, and when the water was received with which the udder of the cow was to be washed. (Sp. transl. vol. iii, p. 254.)

³ These words are in Persian introduced as rubric.

VII¹.

1. To the good waters, and to all the waters which Mazda created, and to that lofty lord, Apām-napāt, and to thee, O Ahurian One of Ahura, that water which Mazda created! be sacrifice, homage, propitiation, and praise. (The Ahuna follows.) 2. We utter our praises forth to thee, O Ahurian One of Ahura! and we complete good sacrifices, and deeds of adoration, with good gifts of offering, and gifts with praise, which are appropriate to thee among the holy Yazads. I will seek to render thee content. I will pour thee out. [Let them now recite the lofty Gâthas which belong to the ritual.]

VIII².

1. The moons* of the season will wane. Let the Mazdayasnian (pray) for a smiter who may destroy quickly (the demon who causes their decrease). And quickly indeed may the malignant one die off—. For no one of her adherents can maintain this Drug(k) by prayers.

2. Smiting fiercely³ with her weapon, she, the Drug(k), goes on, and most mighty she has been. And she wanders on, O Zarathustra! as mindful of her might, and strong⁴ in proportion as she advances

¹ This was to be spoken when the vessel containing the Zaothras was taken in hand (Sp.).

² This fragment is very much broken in its connections, and most corrupt in its grammatical forms. The translation is entirely conjectural. Section IX has also irregularities.

³ Some form of dva may be conjectured.

⁴ 'With her weapon.'

as the sinful Drug(k). But may Khshathra¹ be with me—, so that . . . the deadly one may die away, for thereupon the blow of destruction shall come upon the Drug(k)².

IX.

1. The Ahuna-vairya is a prayer to be (revered and) chosen as the choice one of Mazda. The Khshathra-vairya is likewise such, and the Yâ daêna³. They (it) will gain the reward. Yathâ ahû vairyo. It is the word of Mazda. They are the words in season. It is the Māthra-spenta word, the unsubdued, the undeceived, the victorious, the opponent of malice, the healing and victorious word of Mazda, which, as it is pronounced⁴, gives most the victory to him who utters it. 2. I have declared the hymn which is most helpful and victorious against the words of Aêshma, which is health-giving and healing, and conducive to progress, the multiplier, and the furtherer of growth. And let the worshipper present it with a liberal offering . . . with its pleasing words. Let that be done through veritable grace which helps us on the most⁵. The Kingdom (is) to Ahura, which to the poor may grant a nurturer⁶.

¹ Khshathra~~ta~~ ?

² See Y. XXX, 10.

³ So I conjecture as the commencing words of some piece.

⁴ 'For healing.'

⁵ Y. L, 11.

⁶ Last line of the Ahuna.

INDEX.

- Aêshma, page xix, xxi, 161, 280, 393.
 Aêthrapaiti, 279, 318, 323.
 Aêthrya, 323.
 Age of the Gâthas, &c., xxviii-xxxvii;
 age as compared with one an-
 other, xxvii, 92.
 Agni, 80, 129.
 Ahî, 233.
 Ahuna-vairya, 2, 194, 227, 228, 254,
 260, 261, 264, 293, 303, 309,
 312, 336, 349, 354, 356, 357,
 360, 364, 372, 374, 375, 384,
 386, 391, 392, 393.
 Ahunavaiti(î), xxvii, 2, 3, 91, 92,
 336, 339, 373, 382.
 Aburian, 287, 320, 321, 322, 323,
 337, 392.
 Ahû, 228, 230, 255, 259, 262, 281,
 309, 323, 336, 357, 372, 381.
 Aibigaya, 197, 201, 204, 209, 215,
 219, 384, 385.
 Airyemâ-ishyô, 293, 337, 340, 364,
 380, 390.
 Airyêna Vaêgah, 235.
 Aiwisrûthrima, 197, 201, 204, 209,
 215, 219, 224, 379, 384, 385.
 Aka Manah, xviii, xix, 60.
 Alborg, 19.
 Alexander, xl.
 Ameretatât, 66, 76, 207, 211, 213,
 226, 227, 228, 252, 256.
 Amesha Spenta, xxx, 281, 327, 345,
 351, 363.
 Ameshôspends, 11, 13, 14, 27, 145,
 148, 269; (bidden to approach,
 77).
 Anâhita, xxx.
 Angra Mainyu, xxx, 25, 110, 233,
 272, 298, 312, 390.
 Apâm-napât, 197, 204, 209, 215, 219,
 224, 319, 326, 331, 346, 351,
 362, 381, 383, 384, 392.
 Arani, 41.
 Archangels, xxiv, 27, 124, 178.
 Ardâ Virâf, xl.
 Ardibahîst, 367.
 Ardvi Sûra Anâhita, 316, 336, 340.
 Arezahi, 349.
 Armenian, xlii.
 Arsacids, xli.
 Arstâr, 198, 205, 209, 215, 220, 224,
 256, 345, 388.
 Arsti, 306.
 Artaxerxes Mnemon, xxx.
 Artaxerxes, the Sasanian, xli.
 Aryan, x, xviii, xxiv, xlii, 1.
 Asha, xxiv, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16,
 33, 39, 44, 68, 77, 89, 94, 127,
 157, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165,
 168, 176, 182, 191, 225, 248,
 295, 302, 311, 368, 387.
 Asha Vahista, 2, 201, 218, 267, 268,
 281, 309, 312, 325, 329, 339,
 363, 374, 382, 383, 384.
 Ashem Vohû, 293, 356.
 Ashi, 200, 345.
 Ashi Vanguhi, 206, 211.
 Asiatic Commentaries, xxxvii-xliii.
 Asnya, 196, 219, 223, 368, 379.
 Aurora, 114, 175, 387.
 Authorship of the Gâthas, xxiii, 2,
 167-169, 173.
 Avesta, xxix, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxv,
 xxxix, xli, xlii, xlvi, xlvii, 15, 17,
 40, 51, 68, 71, 78, 88, 126, 167,
 184, 185, 282, 293, 337, 353,
 361.
 Ayara, 379.
 Ayâthrima, 198, 205, 210, 216, 220,
 224, 335, 338, 368, 370, 372.
 Azhi Dahâka, 233.
 Âberer, 341, 383.
 Âdarbad Mahraspand, xli.
 Âfrînagân, ix, 367.
 Âramaiti(î), xii, 14, 15, 27, 32, 33,
 46, 58, 77, 87, 88, 101, 109, 124,
 126, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152,
 155, 156, 159, 167, 176, 180,

- 186, 191, 256, 257, 269, 311,
325, 342, 360, 361, 386.
Asnatar, 342, 383.
Ātarevakhsha, 255, 341, 343, 383.
Ātharvan, 251.
Āthwya, 233, 389.
- Babylon, xxxv.
Bactria, xxviii, xxix, xxxii, xxxv.
Bagāhya, xxx.
Bardiya, xxxv.
Baresman, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
208, 213, 246, 253, 270, 299,
309, 314, 315, 331, 338, 339,
340, 341, 346, 349, 350, 354,
374, 381.
Battle, 39, 50, 110, 118, 154, 162,
189.
Behistun, xxix, xxxv.
Bendva, xxvi, 160, 162, 163.
Beregya, perhaps better as adj.,
197, 205, 209, 215, 220, 224,
387.
Bridge, 140, 154, 183, 194, 261.
Bundahis, 37, 360, 391.
Burial, xxxi.
Būshyāsta, 346.
- Captivity, xlii.
Conversion of all men, 41.
Cow, 45, 391.
Creation, 108, 196.
Cremation, xxxi.
Croesus, xxxi.
Cuneiform Ins., xxix, xxxiv.
Cyrus, xxxv.
- Daēna, 124, 126, 155, 161, 165, 169,
189.
Daēva, xix, xx, xxi, 8, 26, 27, 39, 51,
54, 57, 58, 59, 70, 85, 110, 111,
121, 122, 129, 132, 153, 160,
161, 164, 189, 199, 202, 211,
212, 231, 235, 236, 241, 247,
249, 260, 272, 280, 281, 292,
301, 302, 305, 306, 317, 322,
366, 371, 379, 387, 390.
Dahāka, 233, 245.
Dabvyuma (Dahyuma), 197, 204,
209, 215, 219, 224, 251, 259,
278, 337, 384.
Dakhma, xxxi.
Darius, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxv,
xxxvii.
Daughter, 37, 92, 123, 146.
- Demi-gods, 4, 85, 240, 260.
Dog, 389.
Dragon, xxvi, 233, 234, 239, 322.
Draogha, xxx.
Drūg (Drug), xix, 33, 35, 40, 160,
163, 192, 233, 313, 392, 393.
Dualism, xix, 25, 26, 123.
- Erethe, 226.
- Fire, 41, 80, 84, 95, 96, 100, 102,
116, 132, 138, 147, 150, 177,
182, 196, 199, 204, 206, 208,
209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216,
219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225,
227, 258, 260, 270, 271, 272,
274, 275, 276, 277, 281, 284,
285, 314, 315, 316, 319, 320,
323, 325, 331, 346, 348, 351,
353, 358, 360, 374, 375, 381,
383, 384, 385.
Fire priest, 243.
— Berezi-savangha, 258.
— Spenista, 258.
— Urvāzista, 258.
— Vāzista, 258.
— Vohu-fryāna, 258.
Frabaretar, 341, 383.
Frangrasyan, 246.
Frashakard, 27, 82, 96, 101.
Frashaostra, xxvi, xxviii, 14, 15, 22,
69, 76, 92, 133, 142, 153, 161,
165, 168, 169, 185, 190, 247,
250, 327, 330.
Fravashi, 27, 32, 197, 199, 201, 204,
205, 207, 208, 209, 212, 214,
215, 216, 218, 219, 223, 224,
227, 244, 255, 256, 259, 272,
273, 275, 278, 279, 281, 286,
294, 296, 309, 311, 317, 319,
324, 327, 328, 331, 345, 351,
352, 358, 362, 374, 381, 382,
385, 386.
Frādat-fshu, 197, 204, 209, 215, 219,
223, 373, 381, 382.
Frādat-vīra, 197, 204, 209, 215, 219,
224, 383.
Frādat-vīspām-hugyāiti, 204, 209,
215, 219, 224, 384, 385.
Fryāna, 133, 141, 190.
Fshūshō-māthra, 303, 306, 310, 337,
341, 382.
- Gahanbār, 367.
Ganrāk Mīnavad, 35.

- Garôdman, 19, 109, 170, 173, 184, 345.
 Gaya Maretan, 252, 260, 324, 362.
 Gâh, ix, 373, 379.
 Gâtha(â), ix-xxvii, 1-194, 195, 208, 213, 214, 230, 231, 243, 270, 281, 282, 293, 295, 299, 329, 330, 331, 336, 337, 339, 340, 351, 356, 372, 373, 392.
Gen Urvan, 11.
 Gnostic, xiv, xx, xlvi, 71.
 Grehma, xxvi, 63, 64.
 Gaini, 192, 242.
 Gâmâspa, xxvi, xxviii, 76, 94, 143, 153, 166, 168, 169, 185, 247, 250.
 Hadhaokhdha, 337, 341.
 Hadhânaêpata, 208, 270, 316, 320, 321, 350.
 Haêkar-aspa, xxvi, 142, 191.
 Hamaspathmaêdhaya, 198, 205, 210, 216, 220, 225, 335, 338, 370, 372.
 Hamêstagâ, 72.
 Haoma, 158, 208, 213, 214, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235-246, 271, 302, 321, 347, 349, 350, 353, 354, 374, 375.
 Haoma-water, 208, 227, 228, 270, 271.
 Haptanghâiti(i), 91, 247, 281, 303, 330, 336, 340, 380.
 Haraiti, 241, 302, 303.
 Haurvadad, 119.
 Haurvatât, 66, 76, 207, 211, 213, 226, 228, 252, 256.
 Hâvan, 379.
 Hâvanan, 341, 383.
 Hâvani, 196, 198, 201, 202, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 219, 222, 223, 226, 231, 254, 367, 368, 372, 379, 380.
 Heaven, a spiritual state, xx, xlvii, 25, 30.
 Hegelianism, xix.
 Hell, a spiritual state, xx, xlvii, 25, 30.
 Heptade, xviii.
 Herodotus, xxix, xxx, xxxv, 69, 120.
 Historical character of the Gâthas, xxvi, 1.
 Hoshangî G., 240, 251.
 Hôrn Yast, 230.
 Hukairya, 317.
 Hvaniratha, 305, 349.
 Hvôgva, xxvi, xxviii, 92, 94, 133, 142, 185.
 Immortality, 94.
 India, xxxii, 137.
 Indo-aryans, xxxiii.
 Inscriptions, xxx, xxxiv.
 Iran, xxxvii, 137.
 Irano-aryans, xxxiii.
 Isha-khshathra, 97.
 Israel, 160.
 Isti, 97, 135.
 Kabvaredhas, 312.
 Karpans, xxvi, 63, 65, 66, 121, 140, 158, 177, 184, 236, 389.
 Karshvar, 58, 305, 313, 317, 349.
 Kavis, xxvi, 56, 64, 65, 66, 121, 140, 142, 183, 185, 186, 190, 236, 247, 250, 273.
 Kayadha, 301, 313, 342.
 Kâidhya, 301.
 Keresâni, 237.
 Keresâspa, 234.
 Khrafstra, 20, 85, 87, 260, 281.
 Khshathra, xxiv, 12, 14, 33, 55, 128, 146, 152, 162, 178.
 Khshathra-vairya, 182, 256, 325, 361, 387, 389.
 Kine, xix, xx, cp. xxix, 14, 36, 38, 44, 46, 55, 56, 62, 63, 65, 69, 72, 73, 82, 90, 111, 114, 121, 131, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 171, 176, 177, 180, 184, 196, 226, 227, 244, 248, 249, 259, 262, 283, 286, 307, 310, 320, 325, 332, 346, 348, 363, 385, 391.
 Kuro, 389.
 Kinvar Bridge, 141, 161, 173, 183, 331, 345, 367.
 Kisti, 152, 177, 200, 211, 226, 347.
 Last judgment, 95, 100.
 Magavan, 70.
 Maghavan, 75.
 Magi, xxxv.
 Magian, xxxi, 185, 318.
 Magic, 239.
 Maidhyâirya, 198, 205, 210, 216, 220, 225, 335, 338, 368, 370, 372.
 Maidhyô-mâh, xxvi, xxviii, 186.

- Maidhyô-shema, 198, 205, 210, 216,
 220, 224, 335, 338, 368, 369,
 372.
 Maidhyô-zaremayâ, 198, 205, 210,
 216, 220, 224, 335, 338, 368,
 369, 372.
 Marriage song, 187.
 Maruts, 108.
 Mazainya, 280.
 Mazdaism, xxix seq.
 Mazdayasnian, 206, 217, 225, 229,
 238, 247, 253, 256, 270, 272,
 277, 282, 323, 328, 343, 344,
 345, 347, 349, 351, 354, 355,
 357, 368, 369, 370, 382, 383,
 387.
 Mazendran, 305.
 Mâh-rû, 246.
 Mâhya, 198, 205, 220, 224, 368, 379.
 Mâzanian, 302.
 Mâthra, xx, 10, 15, 21, 25, 37, 74, 105,
 110, 119, 123, 126, 172, 173,
 174, 176, 179, 181, 185, 199,
 206, 208, 213, 214, 217, 218,
 227, 228, 238, 256, 259, 266,
 267, 272, 277, 290, 297, 302,
 305, 306, 307, 310, 328, 339,
 341, 349, 355, 360, 362, 374,
 375, 380, 382, 385, 393.
 Medes, xxxi.
 Medhâ, 8, 9, 104.
 Media, xxxiv, xxxv.
 Metres, xviii, xlii, 133.
 Mithra, xxx, 196, 199, 204, 205, 209,
 210, 216, 219, 220, 223, 225,
 256, 271, 319, 326, 337, 346,
 351, 379, 380, 381.
 Mobad, 341, 342.
 Mohammed, 160.
 Moon, 113.
 Mortar, 270, 350, 354, 355, 374, 385.
 Mount Alborg, 19.
 Môghu, 185.
 Mûrakas, 245.
 Myazdas, 207, 214, 226, 228, 229,
 350, 368, 369, 370, 371.
 Nairya-sangha, 258, 298, 331, 345,
 353, 381.
 Neryosangh, xii, xiv, xxxix.
 Nmânya, 197, 205, 209, 215, 220,
 224, 387, 388.
 Omniscience of Ahura, 47, 101.
 Origin of evil, xix, 25, 29, 30, 31.
 Originality of the Gâthas, xx.
 Padokhshah, 273.
 Paederast, 183.
 Pairika, 257.
 Paitishahya, 198, 205, 210, 216,
 220, 224, 335, 338, 368, 370,
 372.
 Pantheism, xviii.
 Paradise, 71, 143, 261.
 Parahaoma, 208, 214.
 Pareñdi, 251, 346.
 Parsi, xxxix, xl, 48, 108.
 Pâtirasp, 235.
 Perozes, xxii.
 Persepolis, xxix, xl.
 Persian, xi, xxxi, xxxix, xl, xlii, xlv,
 6, 34, 69.
 Personification of Ameshôspends,
 xxiv.
 Place of Origin of the Gâthas, xxviii-
 xxxiii.
 Pleiades, 238.
 Pourukâsta, 191.
 Pourushaspa, 235.
 Puçgâb, xxxiii.
 Raêthwîkar, 342, 383.
 Ragha, xxviii, xxix.
 Rakshas, 249.
 Rapithwîna, 197, 201, 204, 209, 215,
 219, 223, 367, 373, 374, 379,
 381, 382.
 Rasâstâr, 200, 211, 217, 226.
 Rashnu, 198, 205, 209, 215, 220, 224,
 256, 319, 326, 345, 351, 358,
 388.
 Raspi, 246.
 Ratu, 3, 12, 41, 66, 71, 73, 78, 101,
 146, 163, 176, 177, 180, 208,
 213, 228, 230, 246, 250, 253,
 254, 259, 262, 309, 323, 336,
 340, 343, 357, 369, 370, 371,
 372.
 Ratufriti, 344.
 Râma, 163.
 Râman Hvâstra, 196, 204, 209, 256,
 271, 323, 337, 340, 379, 380.
 Recompense to the good and evil,
 34, 35, 52, 100, 161, 167.
 Renovation of the world, 33, 82, 90,
 131.
 Resurrection, 391.
 Rîg-veda, xxxvi, xxxvii, xl, xlv, 35,
 114, 139, 162, 199, 233.
 Rîks, xv, xxxvi, xxxviii, xlv, 20, 24,
 70, 80, 315.
 Rishl, 91.

- Sadduceeism, xxxii.
 Saoshyant, 71, 82, 101, 124, 129, 131, 132, 136, 153, 158, 176, 189, 191, 232, 250, 266, 309, 339, 343, 344, 350, 352, 362, 390.
 Sasanids, xxii.
 Satan, 26, 54.
 Savahis, 349.
 Saviours, 89, 94, 131, 133, 189.
 Sâmas, 233.
 Sâvanghi, 196, 201, 202, 204, 207, 209, 212, 215, 219, 222, 223, 254, 367, 379, 380.
 Sâyana, xl.
 Scyths, xxxii.
 Shapur II, xli.
 Snaithis, 110, 123, 305.
 Soma, 158, 231.
 Sovereignty of Ahura, 8.
 Spenista fire, 258.
 Spenta mainyu, 45, 67, 70, 83, 106, 145, 199, 201, 210, 211, 216, 217, 225, 226, 229, 272, 277.
 Spentâ-mainyu Gâtha, xxvii, 92, 145, 307, 337, 340, 360, 373, 381, 382.
 Spitami, 191.
 Spitâma (Spitama), xxvi, xxviii, 92, 133, 141, 182, 186, 188, 190, 212, 218, 227, 255, 264, 299, 313, 315, 325, 339, 351, 353, 370, 374, 375, 389, 390.
 Sraosha (transl. Obedience), 15, 20, 74, 93, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 105, 127, 197, 205, 208, 209, 212, 215, 218, 221, 222, 224, 254, 256, 271, 274, 280, 296, 297-306, 311, 319, 320, 325, 326, 352, 353, 357, 358, 388.
 Sraoshâvareza, 342, 383.
 Srôsh Yast, 296, 297.
 Staota Yēsnya, 294, 331.
 Texts, xlv.
 Thraëtaona, 233, 389, 390.
 Thritha, 233.
 Tistrya, 199, 210, 216, 225, 256, 280.
 Tradition, xii.
 Traitana, 233.
 Trishrup, xliii, 91, 145, 162.
 Turanian, xxi, 133, 141, 188, 246.
 Unicorn (?), 291.
 Urvâkhshaya, 234.
 Urvâzista, 258.
 Ushahina, 197, 202, 205, 209, 215, 219, 224, 379, 387.
 Ushi-darena, 200, 206, 211, 225, 259, 277.
 Usig(k), xxvi, 121.
 Urtavaiti(i), xxvii, 91, 92, 331, 336, 340, 359, 373, 382.
 Urtâ, 7, 91.
 Uzayêirina, 197, 201, 204, 209, 215, 219, 224, 379, 383.
 Vahista Manah, 31, 66.
 Vahistôisti(i), 293, 337, 340, 361, 373, 382.
 Varenya, 280.
 Varesa, 349.
 Vayu, xix, 189, 192, 193, 271, 272.
 Veda, xxix, xxxix, xlii, 14, 32, 102, 136, 143, 164.
 Vedic, x, xv, xxix, xxxvi, xliii, xlv, 14, 32, 102, 136, 143, 164.
 Vendidad, xxiii, xxvi, xxx, xxxiii, 1, 78, 81, 95, 110, 149.
 Vendidad Sâdah, 17, 195, 335, 355, 356, 358, 359, 361, 363.
 Verethraghna, 337, 340, 350.
 Visparad, ix, 332, &c.
 Vivasvat, 232.
 Vidadhafshu, 349.
 Vidhâtu, 304.
 Vis, 259, 315, 342.
 Vistâspa, xxv, xxviii, xxix, xxxiii, 14, 15, 22, 69, 76, 133, 142, 153, 166, 168, 169, 170, 185, 186, 190, 247, 250.
 Visya, 196, 202, 204, 209, 212, 215, 219, 223, 251, 367, 379, 380.
 Vivanghusha, 61.
 Vivanghvant, 232.
 Vohu-fryâna, 258.
 Vohu-khshathra, 337, 340, 361, 373, 382.
 Vohu Manah, xii, xxiv, 5, 12, 16, 33, 66, 127, 148, 154, 162, 256, 352, 354.
 Vologeses I, xli.
 Vouru-kasha, 317, 321, 346.
 Waters, 286, 316, 392.
 Yama, 232.
 Yasna, ix, 1, 91, 195.
 Yast, 1.
 Yazad, 207, 209, 212, 218, 227, 255, 258, 259, 272, 306, 320, 327,

- 328, 331, 337, 347, 348, 374,
380, 389, 391, 392.
Yâirya, 198, 368, 379.
Yênê hâtâm, 228, 268, 281, 336.
Yima, 61, 232.
- Zand, 40, 356.
Zandas, 313.
Zantu, 230, 251, 315, 342, 373, 385.
Zantuma, 197, 204, 209, 215, 219,
223, 259, 373, 381, 382.
Zaotar, 149, 213, 228, 230, 246, 254,
342, 343, 383.
- Zaothra, 203, 204, 206, 207, 213,
214, 255, 309, 321, 323, 338,
339, 340, 341, 350, 384, 385.
Zarathustra, personal history, xxiii,
xxiv; call, 9; unfavourable re-
ception, 5, 11, 101, 103; conse-
cration to Ahura, 79, 108; suf-
fering, 93, 134; trust in Ahura, 81.
Zarathustrôtema, 197, 204, 209, 215,
224, 259, 331, 337, 347, 384,
385, 386.
Zarenumant, 391.
Zendiks, 313.

In addition to the occurrences cited above, the words *aêshma*, aka *manah*, *ameretatâr*, *amesha spenta*, *asha*, *ashi vanguhi*, *asnya*, *âramaiti*, *âtharvan*, *drûg*, *frashakarâ*, *ganrâk* *mînavad*, *haurvatâr*, *îsti*, *khshathra*, *kinvar*, *kisti*, *mazdayasnian*, *mâhya*, *mâthra*, *ratu*, *spenta mainyu*, *sraosha*, *vahista manah*, *verethraghna*, *vîsya*, *vohu manah*, *zaotar* occur as translated.

With regard to the subject indexed as the originality of the Gâthas, it is not intended to deny that the original migrations of the entire Aryan race may have been from the North-west.

On page 198 read *Maidhyô-shema*, *Maidhyô-zaremaya*; p. 204, -*gyâiti*; p. 209, -*gyâitê*.

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.		III Class.								
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	क	𐬕	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	k	
2 " aspirata	kh	ख	𐬖	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	kh	
3 Media	g	ग	𐬔	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓		
4 " aspirata	gh	घ	𐬕	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔		
5 Gutturo-labialis	q								
6 Nasalis	ñ (ng)	ङ	{ 𐬕 (ng) }						
7 Spiritus asper	h	ह	𐬖 (h)	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,								
9 " asper faucalis	ʔh								
10 " lenis faucalis	ʔh								
11 " asper fricatus		'h	. . .								
12 " lenis fricatus		'h	. . .								
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis		k	. . .	च	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	k	
14 " aspirata		kh	. . .	छ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	kh	
15 Media		g	. . .	ज	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔		
16 " aspirata		gh	. . .	झ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕		
17 " Nasalis		ñ	. . .	ञ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕		



CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬚	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	י	y
19 Spiritus asper										
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		(y)								
22 " lenis assibilatus		s		श	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑		z
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th			थ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	ת	th
25 " assibilata										
26 Media	d		TH	द	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌		
27 " aspirata	dh			ध	𐬍	𐬍	𐬍	𐬍		
28 " assibilata			DH							
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	𐬥	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l								
32 " mollis 2			L							
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	ס	s
34 " asper 2			S (S)							
35 " lenis	z			ज	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1			z (z)							
37 " asperimus 2			z (z)							

Dentales modificatae
(linguales, &c.)

38	Tennis
39	" aspirata
40	Media
41	" aspirata
42	Nasalis
43	Semivocalis	r
44	" fricata	f
45	" diacritica
46	Spiritus asper	sh
47	" lenis	zh

Labiales.

48	Tennis	p
49	" aspirata	ph
50	Media	b
51	" aspirata	bh
52	Tennisima
53	Nasalis	m
54	Semivocalis	w
55	" aspirata	hw
56	Spiritus asper	f
57	" lenis	v
58	Anusvāra
59	Visarga

[illegible]

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0		
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ə		
3 " labialis	ɔ		
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	𐬀	𐬀	𐬀	ا	א	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	𐬁	𐬁	𐬁	آ	א	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	𐬂	𐬂	𐬂	ي	י	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	𐬃	𐬃	𐬃	יי	י	...
8 Dentalis brevis	ɛ			ए
9 " longa	ē			ऐ
10 Lingualis brevis	ɪ			ऋ
11 " longa	ī			ॠ
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए
15 " longa	é(āi)	(e)	
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)	
17 " "	ei(ēi)		
18 " "	oi(ōu)		
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o		
20 " longa	ō(au)	(o)	
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)	
22 " "	eu(ēu)		
23 " "	ou(ōu)		
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä		
25 Palatalis fracta	ī		
26 Labialis fracta	ū		
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō		

**HOME USE
CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
MAIN LIBRARY**

This book is due on the last date stamped below.
1-month loans may be renewed by calling 642-3405.
6-month loans may be recharged by bringing books
to Circulation Desk.

Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior
to due date.

**ALL BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO RECALL 7 DAYS
AFTER DATE CHECKED OUT.**

DEC 22 1974 17

REC'D CIRC DEPT

NOV 22 '74

MAY 06 1990

AUTO DISC

MAY 01 1990

LD21—A-40m-5,'74
(R8191L)

General Library
University of California
Berkeley

YC 54595

U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



0022674806







This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

UC-NRLF



B 3 021 332


REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Class

685

M246

v. 32



THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London
HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST


TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXII



Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1891

[*All rights reserved*]

Oxford

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

BY MORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

VEDIC HYMNS

TRANSLATED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

PART I

HYMNS TO THE MARUTS, RUDRA,
VÂYU, AND VÂTA

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1891

[*All rights reserved*]

Handwritten text: *Handwritten* *Handwritten*

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION	xxix
HYMNS, TRANSLATION AND NOTES:—	
Mandala X, 121, The Unknown God	I →
I, 6, Indra and the Maruts	14
„ 19, Agni and the Maruts	53 ↗
„ 37, The Maruts	63 ↖
„ 38, „	81—
„ 39, „	97—
„ 64, „	106—
„ 85, „	126
„ 86, „	154
„ 87, „	159
„ 88, „	169
„ 165, The Maruts and Indra	179
„ 166, The Maruts	209
„ 167, „	272 ↗
„ 168, „	279
„ 170, Dialogue between Indra and Agastya	286
„ 171, The Maruts	289
„ 172, „	293
II, 34, „	295
V, 52, „	312
„ 53, „	319
„ 54, „	325
„ 55, „	333
„ 56, „	337
„ 57, „	340
„ 58, „	343
„ 59, „	347

	PAGE
Mandala V, 60, Agni and the Maruts	352
„ 61, The Maruts	356
„ 87, „	363
VI, 66, „	368
VII, 56, „	373
„ 57, „	379
„ 58, „	382
„ 59, The Maruts and Rudra	386
VIII, 7, The Maruts	390
„ 20, „	400
„ 94, „	408
X, 77, „	412
„ 78, „	416
I, 43, Rudra	419
„ 114, „	422
II, 33, Rudra, the Father of the Maruts	426
VI, 74, Soma and Rudra	434
VII, 46, Rudra	436
→ I, 2, Vāyu	440
„ 134, „	444
X, 168, Vāta	449
„ 186, „	451
APPENDICES :—	
I. Index of Words	455
II. List of the more important Passages quoted in the Preface and in the Notes	530
III. A Bibliographical List of the more important Publications on the Rig-veda	540
Corrigenda	551

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East	553
---	-----

INTRODUCTION.

I finished the Preface to the first volume of my translation of the Hymns to the Maruts with the following words :

‘ The second volume, which I am now preparing for Press, will contain the remaining hymns addressed to the Maruts. The notes will necessarily have to be reduced to smaller dimensions, but they must always constitute the more important part in a translation or, more truly, in a deciphering of Vedic hymns.’

This was written more than twenty years ago, but though since that time Vedic scholarship has advanced with giant steps, I still hold exactly the same opinion which I held then with regard to the principles that ought to be followed by the first translators of the Veda. I hold that they ought to be decipherers, and that they are bound to justify every word of their translation in exactly the same manner in which the decipherers of hieroglyphic or cuneiform inscriptions justify every step they take. I therefore called my translation the first *traduction raisonnée*. I took as an example which I tried to follow, though well aware of my inability to reach its excellence, the *Commentaire sur le Yasna* by my friend and teacher, Eugène Burnouf. Burnouf considered a commentary of 940 pages quarto as by no means excessive for a thorough interpretation of the first chapter of the Zoroastrian Veda, and only those unacquainted with the real difficulties of the Rig-veda would venture to say that its ancient words and thoughts required a less painstaking elucidation than those of the Avesta. In spite of all that has been said and written to the contrary, and with every wish to learn from those who think that the difficulties of a translation of Vedic hymns have been unduly exaggerated by me, I cannot in the least

modify what I said twenty, or rather forty years ago, that a mere translation of the Veda, however accurate, intelligible, poetical, and even beautiful, is of absolutely no value for the advancement of Vedic scholarship, unless it is followed by pièces justificatives, that is, unless the translator gives his reasons why he has translated every word about which there can be any doubt, in his own way, and not in any other.

It is well known that Professor von Roth, one of our most eminent Vedic scholars, holds the very opposite opinion. He declares that a metrical translation is the best commentary, and that if he could ever think of a translation of the Rig-veda, he would throw the chief weight, not on the notes, but on the translation of the text. 'A translation,' he writes, 'must speak for itself. As a rule, it only requires a commentary where it is not directly convincing, and where the translator does not feel secure.'

Between opinions so diametrically opposed, no compromise seems possible, and yet I feel convinced that when we come to discuss any controverted passage, Professor von Roth will have to adopt exactly the same principles of translation which I have followed.

On one point, however, I am quite willing to agree with my adversaries, namely, that a metrical rendering would convey a truer idea of the hymns of the Vedic *R̥shis* than a prose rendering. When I had to translate Vedic hymns into German, I have generally, if not always, endeavoured to clothe them in a metrical form. In English I feel unable to do so, but I have no doubt that future scholars will find it possible to add rhythm and even rhyme, after the true meaning of the ancient verses has once been determined. But even with regard to my German metrical translations, I feel in honesty bound to confess that a metrical translation is often an excuse only for an inaccurate translation. If we could make sure of a translator like Rückert, even the impossible might become possible. But as there are few, if any, who, like him, are great alike as scholars and poets, the mere scholar seems to me to be doing his duty better when he produces a correct translation, though in

prose, than if he has to make any concessions, however small, on the side of faithfulness in favour of rhythm and rhyme.

If a metrical, an intelligible, and, generally speaking, a beautiful translation were all we wanted, why should so many scholars clamour for a new translation, when they have that by Grassmann? It rests on Böhlingk and Roth's Dictionary, or represents, as we are told, even a more advanced stage of Vedic scholarship. Yet after the well-known contributors of certain critical Journals had repeated ever so many times all that could possibly be said in praise of Grassmann's, and in dispraise of Ludwig's translation, what is the result? Grassmann's metrical translation, the merits of which, considering the time when it was published, I have never been loth to acknowledge, is hardly ever appealed to, while Ludwig's prose rendering, with all its drawbacks, is universally considered as the only scholarlike translation of the Rig-veda now in existence. Time tries the troth in everything.

There is another point also on which I am quite willing to admit that my adversaries are right. 'No one who knows anything about the Veda,' they say, 'would think of attempting a translation of it at present. A translation of the Rig-veda is a task for the next century.' No one feels this more strongly than I do; no one has been more unwilling to make even a beginning in this arduous undertaking. Yet a beginning has to be made. We have to advance step by step, nay, inch by inch, if we ever hope to make a breach in that apparently impregnable fortress. If by translation we mean a complete, satisfactory, and final translation of the whole of the Rig-veda, I should feel inclined to go even further than Professor von Roth. Not only shall we have to wait till the next century for such a work, but I doubt whether we shall ever obtain it. In some cases the text is so corrupt that no conjectural criticism will restore, no power of divination interpret it. In other cases, verses and phrases seem to have been jumbled together by later writers in the most thoughtless manner. My principle therefore has always been, Let us translate what we can, and thus reduce the untranslatable

portion to narrower and narrower limits. But in doing this we ought not to be too proud to take our friends, and even our adversaries, into our confidence. A translation on the *sic volo sic jubeo* principle does far more harm than good. It may be true that a judge, if he is wise, will deliver his judgment, but never propound his reasons. But a scholar is a pleader rather than a judge, and he is in duty bound to propound his reasons.

In order to make the difference between Professor von Roth's translations and my own quite clear, I readily accept the text which he has himself chosen. He took one of the hymns which I had translated with notes (the 165th hymn of the first *Mandala*), and translated it himself metrically, in order to show us what, according to him, a really perfect translation ought to be*. Let us then compare the results.

On many points Professor von Roth adopts the same renderings which I had adopted, only that he gives no reasons, while I do so, at least for all debatable passages. First of all, I had tried to prove that the two verses in the beginning, which the *Anukramanî* ascribes to Indra, should be ascribed to the poet. Professor von Roth takes the same view, but for the rest of the hymn adopts, like myself, that distribution of the verses among the singer, the Maruts, and Indra which the *Anukramanî* suggests. I mention this because Ludwig has defended the view of the author of the *Anukramanî* with very strong arguments. He quotes from the *Taitt. Br.* II, 7, 11, and from the *Tândya Br.* XXI, 14, 5, the old legend that Agastya made offerings to the Maruts, that, with or without Agastya's consent, Indra seized them, and that the Maruts then tried to frighten Indra away with lightning. Agastya and Indra, however, pacified the Maruts with this very hymn.

Verse 1.

The first verse von Roth translates as follows :

‘Auf welcher Fahrt sind insgemein begriffen
Die altersgleichen mitgebornen Marut?
Was wollen sie? woher des Wegs? Das Pfeifen
Der Männer klingt: sie haben ein Begehren.’

* Z. D. M. G., 1870, XXIV, p. 301.

Von Roth here translates *subh* by *Fahrt*, journey. But does *subh* ever possess that meaning? Von Roth himself in the Dictionary translates *subh* by *Schönheit*, *Schmuck*, *Bereitschaft*. Grassmann, otherwise a strict adherent of von Roth, does not venture even to give *Bereitschaft*, but only endorses *Glanz* and *Pracht*. Ludwig, a higher authority than Grassmann, translates *subh* by *Glanz*. I say then that to translate *subh* by *Fahrt*, journey, may be poetical, but it is not scholarlike. On the meanings of *subh* I have treated I, 87, 3, note 2. See also Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 163.

But there comes another consideration. That *mimikshire* is used in the sense of being joined with splendour, &c. we see from such passages as I, 87, 6, *bhānū-bhiḥ sám mimikshire*, i. e. 'they were joined with splendour,' and this is said, as in our passage, of the *Maruts*. Prof. von Roth brings forward no passage where *mimikshire* is used in the sense in which he uses it here, and therefore I say again, his rendering may be poetical, but it is not scholarlike.

To translate *arḥanti śuśhmam* by 'das Pfeifen klingt,' is, to say the least, very free. *Sushma* comes, no doubt, from *svas*, to breathe, and the transition of meaning from breath to strength is intelligible enough. In the Psalms we read (xviii. 15), 'At the blast of the breath of thy nostrils the channels of waters were seen, and the foundations of the earth were discovered.' Again (Job iv. 9), 'By the blast of God they perish, and by the breath of his nostrils are they consumed;' Isaiah xi. 4, 'And with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.' Wrestlers know why breath or wind means strength, and even in the expression 'une œuvre de longue haleine,' the original intention of breath is still perceived. In most passages therefore in the *Rig-veda* where *sushma* occurs, and where it means strength, prowess, vigour, we may, if we like, translate it by breath, though it is clear that the poet himself was not always aware of the etymological meaning of the word. Where the sound of *sushma* is mentioned (IX, 50, 1; X, 3, 6, &c.), it means clearly breath. But when, as in VI, 19, 8, *sushma* has the adjectives *dhanaspr̥t*, *sudáksha*, we can hardly translate it by anything but strength. When, therefore,

von Roth translates *sushma* by whistling, and *arkanti* by sounding, I must demur. Whistling is different from breathing, nor do I know of any passage where *ark* with *sushma* or with any similar word for sound means simply to sound a whistle. Why not translate, they sing their strength, i.e. the Maruts, by their breathing or howling, proclaim themselves their strength? We find a similar idea in I, 87, 3, 'the Maruts have themselves glorified their greatness.' Neither Grassmann nor Ludwig venture to take *sushma* in the sense of whistle, or *arkanti* in the sense of sounding. Bergaigne seems to take *vrishanaḥ* as a genitive, referring to Indra, 'ils chantent la force à Indra,' which may have been the original meaning, but seems hardly appropriate when the verse is placed in the mouth of Indra himself (Journ. Asiat. 1884, p. 199). *Sushma* never occurs as an adjective. The passages in which von Roth admits *sushma* as an adjective are not adequate. Does *mitgeboren* in German convey the meaning of *sániḥ*, 'of the same nest?'

Verse 2.

The second verse contains few difficulties, and is well rendered by von Roth :

'An wessen Sprüchen freuen sich die Jungen?
Wer lenkt die Marut her zu seinem Opfer?
Gleich Falken streichend durch den Raum der Lüfte—
Wie bringt man sie mit Wunscheskraft zum Stehen?'

Verse 3.

The third verse is rendered by von Roth :

'Wie kommt es, Indra, dass du sonst so munter,
Heut' ganz alleine fährst, sag an Gebieter!
Du pflegtest auf der Fahrt mit uns zu plaudern;
Was hast du wider uns, sprich, Rosselenker!'

Von Roth takes *kútaḥ* in a causal sense, why? I believe that *kútaḥ* never occurs in that sense in the Rig-veda. If it does, passages should be produced to prove it.

Māhinaḥ can never be translated by 'sonst so munter.' This imparts a modern idea which is not in the original.

Subhāna*h* does not mean auf der Fahrt, and plaudern, adopted from Grassmann, instead of sám prikkhase, introduces again quite a modern idea. Ludwig calls such an idea 'abgeschmackt,' insipid, which is rather strong, but not far wrong.

Verse 4.

Von Roth :

'Ich liebe Sprüche, Wünsche und die Tränke,
Der Duft steigt auf, die Presse ist gerüstet;
Sie flehen, locken mich mit ihrem Anruf,
Und meine Füchse führen mich zum Mahle.'

It is curious how quickly all difficulties which beset the first line seem to vanish in a metrical translation, but the scholar should face the difficulties, though the poet may evade them.

To translate súshma*h* iyarti by 'der Duft steigt auf,' the flavour of the sacrifices rises up, is more than even Grassmann ventures on. It is simply impossible. Benfey (Entstehung der mit r anlautenden Personalendungen, p. 34) translates: 'My thunderbolt, when hurled by me, moves mightily.'

Again, prábhrita*h* me ádri*h* does not mean die Presse ist gerüstet. Where does Indra ever speak of the stones used for pressing the Soma as my stone, and where does prábhrita*h* ever mean gerüstet?

Verse 5.

Von Roth :

'So werden wir und mit uns unsre Freunde (Nachbarn),
Die freien Männer, unsre Rüstung nehmen,
Und lustig unsre Schecken alsbald schirren.
Du kommst uns eben ganz nach Wunsch, o Indra.'

The first lines are unnecessarily free, and the last decidedly wrong. How can svadhām ánu hí na*h* babhútha mean 'Du kommst uns eben ganz nach Wunsch?' Svadhâ does not mean wish, but nature, custom, wont (see I, 6, 4, note 2; and Bergaigne, Journ. Asiat. 1884, p. 207). Babhútha means 'thou hast become,' not 'thou comest.'

Verse 6.

Von Roth :

‘Da war’s auch nicht so ganz nach Wunsch, o Maruts,
Als ihr allein mich gegen Ahi schicktet!

Ich aber kräftig, tapfer, unerschrocken,

Ich traf die Gegner alle mit Geschossen.’

The only doubtful line is the last. Von Roth’s former translation of *nam*, to bend away from, to escape from (cf. *φεύγω* and *bhug*), seems to me still the right one. He now translates ‘I directed my arrow on every enemy,’ when the genitive, as ruled by *ánamam*, requires confirmation. As to *sam ádhatta* I certainly think von Roth’s last interpretation better than his first. In the Dictionary he explained *samdhâ* in our passage by to implicate. Grassmann translated it by to leave or to desert, Ludwig by to employ. I took it formerly in the usual sense of joining, so that *yát mām ékam samádhatta* should be the explanation of *svadhâ*, the old custom that you should join me when I am alone. But the construction is against this, and I have therefore altered my translation, so that the sense is, Where was that old custom you speak of, when you made me to be alone, i. e. when you left me alone, in the fight with Ahi? The *udâtta* of *ánamam* is not irregular, because it is preceded by *hi*.

Verse 7.

Von Roth :

‘Gewaltiges hast du gethan im Bunde

Mit uns, o Held, wir mit vereinter Stärke,

Gewaltiges vermögen wir, du mächtiger

Indra, wenn es uns Ernst ist, ihr Gesellen.’

By this translation, the contrast between ‘thou hast done great things with us,’ and ‘Now let us do great things once more,’ is lost. *Kṛinávâma* expresses an exhortation, not a simple fact, and on this point Grassmann’s metrical translation is decidedly preferable.

Verse 8.

Von Roth :

‘*Vṛitra* schlug ich mit eigener Kraft, ihr Marut,

Und meine Wuth war’s, die so kühn mich machte,

Ich war's, der—in der Faust den Blitz—dem Menschen
Den Zugang bahnte zu den blinkenden Gewässern.'

This is a very good translation, except that there are some syllables too much in the last line. What I miss is the accent on the I. Perhaps this might become stronger by translating :

'Ich schlug mit eigner Kraft den *Vṛitra* nieder,
Ich, Maruts, stark durch meinen Zorn geworden ;
Ich war's, der blitzbewaffnet für den Menschen
Dem lichten Wasser freie Bahn geschaffen.'

Verse 9.

Von Roth :

'Gewiss, nichts ist was je dir widerstünde,
Und so wie du gibts keinen zweiten Gott mehr,
Nicht jetzt, noch künftig, der was du vermöchte :
Thu' denn begeistert was zu thun dich lüset.'

Here I doubt about begeistert being a true rendering of *pravṛiddha*, grown strong. As to *karishyāh* instead of *karishyā*, the reading of the MSS., Roth is inclined to adopt my conjecture, as supported by the analogous passage in IV, 30, 23. The form which Ludwig quotes as analogous to *karishyam*, namely, *pravatsyam*, I cannot find, unless it is meant for *Āpast. Srauta S. VI, 27, 2, namo vo-stu prāvātsyam iti Bahvrikāh*, where however *prāvātsyam* is probably meant for *prāvātsam*.

Grassmann has understood *devātā* rightly, while Roth's translation leaves it doubtful.

Verse 10.

Von Roth :

'So soll der Stärke Vorrang mir allein sein :
Was ich gewagt, vollführ' ich mit Verständniss.
Man kennt mich als den Starken wohl, ihr Marut,
An was ich rühre, Indra der bemeistert's.'

Von Roth has adopted the translation of the second line, which I suggested in a note ; Ludwig prefers the more abrupt construction which I preferred in the translation. It is difficult to decide.

Verse 11.

Von Roth :

‘Entzückt hat euer Rühmen mich, ihr Marut,
Das lobenswerthe Wort, das ihr gesprochen,
Für mich—den Indra—für den freud’gen Helden,
Als Freunde für den Freund, für mich—von selbst ihr.’

The last words für mich—von selbst ihr are not very clear, but the same may be said of the original *tanvê tanûbhih*. I still adhere to my remark that *tanu*, self, must refer to the same person, though I see that all other translators take an opposite view. Non liquet.

Verse 12.

Von Roth :

‘Gefallen find ich, wie sie sind, an ihnen,
In Raschheit und in Frische unvergleichlich.
So oft ich euch, Marut, im Schmuck erblickte,
Erfreut’ ich mich und freue jetzt an euch mich.’

This is again one of those verses which it is far easier to translate than to construe. *Ākkhānta* me may mean, they pleased me, but then what is the meaning of *kṛadāyātha kṛa nūnām*, ‘may you please me now,’ instead of what we should expect, ‘you do please me now.’ In order to avoid this, I took the more frequent meaning of *kṛad*, to appear, and translated, ‘you have appeared formerly, appear to me now.’

To translate *ānedyāḥ srāvaḥ ā śhaḥ dādhanāḥ*, by ‘in Raschheit und in Frische unvergleichlich,’ is poetical, but how does it benefit the scholar? I take *ā dhā* in the sense of bringing or giving, as it is often used; cf. II, 38, 5. This is more compatible with *śhaḥ*, food, vigour. I am not certain that *ānēdyāḥ* can mean blameless. Roth s. v. derives *ānedyā* from *a-nedya*, and *nedya* from *nid*. But how we get from *nid* to *nedya*, he does not say. He suggests *anedyāḥ* or *anedyasravaḥ* as emendations. I suggested *anedyam*. But I suspect there is something else behind all this. *Anedīyaḥ* may have been intended for ‘having nothing coming nearer,’ and like *an-uttama*, might express excellence. Or *anedyāḥ* may have been an adverb, not nearly.

These are mere guesses, and they are rather contradicted by *anedyāḥ*, used in the plural, with *anavadyāḥ*. Still it is better to point out difficulties than to slur them over by translating 'in Raschheit und in Frische unvergleichlich.' It is possible that both Roth and *Sāyana* thought that *anedyāḥ* was connected with *nediyāḥ*; but what scholars want to know is the exact construction of a sentence.

Verse 13.

Von Roth :

'Ist irgendwo ein Fest für euch bereitet,
So fahrt doch her zu unsrer Schaar, ihr Schaaren!
Der Andacht Regungen in uns belebend,
Und werdet Zeugen unserer frommen Werke.'

In this verse there is no difficulty, except the exact meaning of *apivâtáyantaḥ*, on which I have spoken in note 1.

Verse 14.

Von Roth :

'Wo dankbar huldigend der Dichter lobsingt,
Hier wo uns *Mānya's* Kunst zusammenführte,
Da kehret ein, ihr Marut, bei den Frommen,
Euch gelten ja des Beters heil'ge Sprüche.'

Prof. von Roth admits that this is a difficult verse. He translates it, but again he does not help us to construe it. Grassmann also gives us a metrical translation, but it differs widely from von Roth's :

'Wenn wie zur Spende euch der Dichter herlockt,
Und der Gesang des Weisen uns herbeizog,' &c. ;
and so does Geldner's version, unless we are to consider this as an improved rendering from von Roth's own pen :

'Wenn uns des *Mānya* Kunst zur Feier herzieht,
Wie Dichter ja zu Festen gerne rufen,' &c.

Here Geldner conjectures *duvasyā* for *duvasyāt*, and takes *duváse* as an infinitive.

Verse 15.

Von Roth :

'Geweih't ist euch der Preis, Marut, die Lieder,
Des *Mānya*, des *Mandârasohns*, des Dichters,
Mit Labung kommt herbei, mir selbst zur Stärkung
[Geb't Labung uns und wasserreiche Fluren].'

How *tanvê vayām* is to mean 'mir selbst zur Stärkung' has not been explained by von Roth. No doubt *tanvê* may mean *mir selbst*, and *vayām* zur Stärkung; but though this may satisfy a poet, scholars want to know how to construe. It seems to me that Roth and Lanman (Noun-inflection, p. 552) have made the same mistake which I made in taking *ishām* for an accusative of *ish*, which ought to be *ísham*, and in admitting the masculine gender for *vrigána* in the sense of *Flur*.

I still take *yásishṭa* for the 3 p. sing. of the precative *Ātmanepada*, like *ganishishṭa* and *vanishishṭa*. With the preposition *áva*, *yásishṭhāh* in IV, 1, 4, means to turn away. With the preposition *á* therefore *yásishṭa* may well mean to turn towards, to bring. If we took *yásishṭa* as a 2 p. plur. in the sense of come, we could not account for the long *î*, nor for the accusative *vayām*. We thus get the meaning, 'May this your hymn of praise bring *vayām*,' i. e. a branch, an offshoot or offspring, *tanvê*, for ourselves, *ishá*, together with food. We then begin a new sentence: 'May we find an invigorating autumn with quickening rain.' It is true that *ishá*, as a name of an autumn month, does not occur again in the Rig-veda, but it is found in the *Satapatha-bráhmaṇa*. *Vrigána*, possibly in the sense of people or enemies, we have in VII, 32, 27, *ágñâtāh vrigánāh*, where Roth reads wrongly *ágñâtā vrigánā*; V, 44, 1 (?); VI, 35, 5. *Gírádānu* also would be an appropriate epithet to *ishá*.

Professor Oldenberg has sent me the following notes on this difficult hymn. He thinks it is what he calls an *Ākhyāna*-hymn, consisting of verses which originally formed part of a story in prose. He has treated of this class of hymns in the *Zeitschrift der D. M. G.* XXXIX, 60 seq. He would prefer to ascribe verses 1 and 2 to Indra, who addresses the Maruts when he meets them as they return from a sacrifice. In this case, however, we should have to accept *rīramāma* as a pluralis majestaticus, and I doubt whether Indra ever speaks of himself in the plural, except it may be in using the pronoun *naḥ*.

In verse 4 Professor Oldenberg prefers to take *prá-*

bhr̥ito me ádrih̥ in the sense of 'the stone for pressing the Soma has been brought forth,' and he adds that *me* need not mean 'my stone,' but 'brought forward for me.' He would prefer to read *śúshma m iyarti*, as in IV, 17, 12; X, 75, 3, though he does not consider this alteration of the text necessary.

Professor Oldenberg would ascribe vv. 13 and 14 to Indra. The 14th verse would then mean, 'After Mānya has brought us (the gods) hither, turn, O Maruts, towards the sage.' Of this interpretation I should like to adopt at all events the last sentence, taking *varta* for *vart-ta*, the 2 p. plur. imperat. of *vr̥it*, after the Ad class.

The text of the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā*, lately published by Dr. L. von Schröder, yields a few interesting various readings: v. 5, *ekam* instead of *etāñ*; v. 12, *śravā* instead of *śrava*; and v. 15, *vayāmsi* as a variant for *vayām*, which looks like a conjectural emendation.

A comparison like the one we have here instituted between two translations of the same hymn, will serve to show how useless any rendering, whether in prose or poetry, would be without notes to justify the meanings of every doubtful word and sentence. It will, no doubt, disclose at the same time the unsettled state of Vedic scholarship, but the more fully this fact is acknowledged, the better, I believe, it will be for the progress of our studies. They have suffered more than from anything else from that baneful positivism which has done so much harm in hieroglyphic and cuneiform researches. That the same words and names should be interpreted differently from year to year, is perfectly intelligible to every one who is familiar with the nature of these decipherments. What has seriously injured the credit of these studies is that the latest decipherments have always been represented as final and unchangeable. Vedic hymns may seem more easy to decipher than Babylonian and Egyptian inscriptions, and in one sense they are. But when we come to really difficult passages, the Vedic hymns often require a far greater effort of divination than the hymns addressed to Egyptian or Babylonian deities. And there is this additional difficulty that when we deal with

inscriptions, we have at all events the text as it was engraved from the first, and we are safe against later modifications and interpolations, while in the case of the Veda, even though the text as presupposed by the Prâtisākhya may be considered as authoritative for the fifth century B.C., how do we know what changes it may have undergone before that time? Nor can I help giving expression once more to misgivings I have so often expressed, whether the date of the Prâtisākhya is really beyond the reach of doubt, and whether, if it is, there is no other way of escaping from the conclusion that the whole collection of the hymns of the Rig-veda, including even the Vāḷakhilya hymns, existed at that early time^a. The more I study the hymns, the more I feel staggered at the conclusion at which all Sanskrit scholars seem to have arrived, touching their age. That many of them are old, older than anything else in Sanskrit, their grammar, if nothing else, proclaims in the clearest way. But that some of them are modern imitations is a conviction that forces itself even on the least sceptical minds. Here too we must guard against positivism, and suspend our judgment, and accept correction with a teachable spirit. No one would be more grateful for a way out of the maze of Vedic chronology than I should be, if a more modern date could be assigned to some of the Vedic hymns than the period of the rise of Buddhism. But how can we account for Buddhism without Vedic hymns? In the oldest Buddhist Suttas the hymns of three Vedas are constantly referred to, and warnings are uttered even against the fourth Veda, the Āthabbana^b. The Upanishads also, the latest productions of the Brāhmaṇa period, must have been known to the founders of Buddhism. From all this there seems to be no escape, and yet I must confess that my conscience quivers in assigning such compositions as the Vāḷakhilya hymns to a period preceding the rise of Buddhism in India.

^a See Preface to the first edition, p. xxxii.

^b Tuvaśakasutta, ver. 927; Sacred Books of the East, vol. x, p. 176; Introduction, p. xiii.

I have often been asked why I began my translation of the Rig-veda with the hymns addressed to the Maruts or the Storm-gods, which are certainly not the most attractive of Vedic hymns. I had several reasons, though, as often happens, I could hardly say which of them determined my choice.

First of all, they are the most difficult hymns, and therefore they had a peculiar attraction in my eyes.

Secondly, as even when translated they required a considerable effort before they could be fully understood, I hoped they would prove attractive to serious students only, and frighten away the casual reader who has done so much harm by meddling with Vedic antiquities. Our grapes, I am glad to say, are still sour, and ought to remain so for some time longer.

Thirdly, there are few hymns which place the original character of the so-called deities to whom they are addressed in so clear a light as the hymns addressed to the Maruts or Storm-gods. There can be no doubt about the meaning of the name, whatever difference of opinion there may be about its etymology. Marut and maruta in ordinary Sanskrit mean wind, and more particularly a strong wind, differing by its violent character from *vāyu* or *vāta* ^a. Nor do the hymns themselves leave us in any doubt as to the natural phenomena with which the Maruts are identified. Storms which root up the trees of the forest, lightning, thunder, and showers of rain, are the background from which the Maruts in their personal and dramatic character rise before our eyes. In one verse the Maruts are the very phenomena of nature as convulsed by a thunderstorm; in the next, with the slightest change of expression, they are young men, driving on chariots, hurling the thunderbolt, and crushing the clouds in order to win the rain. Now they are the sons of Rudra and *Prisni*, the friends and brothers of Indra, now they quarrel with Indra and claim their own rightful share of praise and sacrifice. Nay, after a time the storm-gods in India, like the storm-gods in other countries,

^a The *Vāyus* are mentioned by the side of the Maruts, Rv. II, 11, 14.

obtain a kind of supremacy, and are invoked by themselves, as if there were no other gods beside them. In most of the later native dictionaries, in the *Medinî*, *Viśva*, *Hemaṅdra*, *Amara*, and *Anekārthadhvanimañgarî*, Marut is given as a synonym of *deva*, or god in general^a, and so is Maru in Pāli.

But while the hymns addressed to the Maruts enable us to watch the successive stages in the development of so-called deities more clearly than any other hymns, there is no doubt one drawback, namely, the uncertainty of the etymology of Marut. The etymology of the name is and always must be the best key to the original intention of a deity. Whatever Zeus became afterwards, he was originally conceived as Dyaus, the bright sky. Whatever changes came over Ceres in later times, her first name and her first conception was Sarad, harvest. With regard to Marut I have myself no doubt whatever that Mar-ut comes from the root *MṚ*, in the sense of grinding, crushing, pounding (Sk. *mṛināti*, *himsāyām*, part. *mūrṇa*, crushed, like *mṛidita*; *āmúr* and *āmúri*, destroyer). There is no objection to this etymology, either on the ground of phonetic rules, or on account of the meaning of Marut^b. Professor Kuhn's idea that the name of the Maruts was derived from the root *MṚ*, to die, and that the Maruts were originally conceived as the souls of the departed, and afterwards as ghosts, spirits, winds, and lastly as storms, derives no support from the Veda. Another etymology, proposed in Böhtlingk's Dictionary, which derives Marut from a root *MṚ*, to shine, labours under two disadvantages; first, that there is no such root in Sanskrit^c; secondly, that the lurid splendour of the lighting is but a subordinate feature in the character of the Maruts. No better etymology having been proposed, I still maintain that the derivation of Marut from *MṚ*, to pound, to smash, is free from any objection, and that the original conception of the Maruts was that of the crushing, smashing, striking, tearing, destroying storms.

^a Anundoram Borooah, *Sanskrit Grammar*, vol. iii, p. 323.

^b See *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii, p. 357 seq.

^c *Marúti* is a word of very doubtful origin.

It is true that we have only two words in Sanskrit formed by the suffix *ut*, *marút* and *garút* in *garút-mat*, but there are other suffixes which are equally restricted to one or two nouns only. This *ut* represents an old suffix *vat*, just as *us* presupposes *vas*, in *vidus* (*vidushî*, *vidush-tara*) for *vid-vas*, nom. *vid-vân*, acc. *vidvâmsam*. In a similar way we find side by side *párus*, knot, *párvan*, knot, and *párvata*, stone, cloud, presupposing such forms as **parvat* and *parut*. If then by the side of **parut*, we find Latin *pars*, *partis*, why should we object to Mars, *Martis* as a parallel form of *Marut*? I do not say the two words are identical, I only maintain that the root is the same, and the two suffixes are mere variants. No doubt *Marut* might have appeared in Latin as *Marut*, like the neuter *cap-ut*, *capitis* (cf. *prae-ceps*, *prae-cipis*, and *prae-cipitis*); but Mars, *Martis* is as good a derivation from *MĀ* as *Fors*, *Fortis* is from *GHĀ**. Dr. von Bradke (*Zeitschrift der D.M.G.*, vol. xl, p. 349), though identifying *Marut* with Mars, proposes a new derivation of *Marut*, as being originally **Mavrit*, which would correspond well with *Mavors*. But **Mavrit* has no meaning in Sanskrit, and seems grammatically an impossible formation.

If there could be any doubt as to the original identity of *Marut* and Mars, it is dispelled by the Umbrian name *çerfo Martio*, which, as Grassmann^b has shown, corresponds exactly to the expression *sárdha-s māruta-s*, the host of the *Maruts*. Such minute coincidences can hardly be accidental, though, as I have myself often remarked, the chapter of accidents in language is certainly larger than we suppose. Thus, in our case, I pointed out that we can observe the transition of the gods of storms into the gods of destruction and war, not only in the Veda, but likewise in the mythology of the Polynesians; and yet the similarity in the Polynesian name of *Maru* can only be accidental^c.

* Biographies of Words, p. 12.

^b Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xvi, p. 190; and note to *Rv.* I, 37, 1, p. 70.

^c *M. M.*, Science of Religion, p. 255.

And I may add that in Estonian also we find storm-gods called Marutu uled or maro, plural marud^a.

Fourthly, the hymns addressed to the Maruts seemed to me to possess an interest of their own, because, as it is difficult to doubt the identity of the two names, Marut and Mars, they offered an excellent opportunity for watching the peculiar changes which the same deity would undergo when transferred to India on one side and to Europe on the other. Whether the Greek Ares also was an offshoot of the same root must seem more doubtful, and I contented myself with giving the principal reasons for and against this theory^b.

Though these inducements which led me to select the hymns to the Maruts as the first instalment of a translation of the Rig-veda could hardly prevail with me now, yet I was obliged to place them once more in the foreground, because the volume containing the translation of these hymns with very full notes has been used for many years as a text book by those who were beginning the study of the Rig-veda, and was out of print. In order to meet the demand for a book which could serve as an easy introduction to Vedic studies, I decided to reprint the translation of the hymns to the Maruts, and most of the notes, though here and there somewhat abbreviated, and then to continue the same hymns, followed by others addressed to Rudra, Vāyu, and Vāta. My task would, of course, have been much easier, if I had been satisfied with making a selection, and translating those hymns, or those verses only, which afford no very great difficulties. As it is, I have grappled with every hymn and every verse addressed to the Maruts, so that my readers will find in this volume all that the Vedic poets had to say about the Storm-gods.

In order to show, however, that Vedic hymns, though they begin with a description of the most striking phenomena of nature, are by no means confined to that

^a Bertram, *Ilmatar*, Dorpat, 1871, p. 98.

^b *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii, p. 357.

narrow sphere, but rise in the end to the most sublime conception of a supreme Deity, I have placed one hymn, that addressed to the Unknown God, at the head of my collection. This will clear me, I hope, of the very unfair suspicion that, by beginning my translation of the Rig-veda with hymns celebrating the wild forces of nature only, I had wished to represent the Vedic religion as nature-worship and nothing else. It will give the thoughtful reader a foretaste of what he may expect in the end, and show how vast a sphere of religious thought is filled by what we call by a very promiscuous name, the Veda.

The MS. of this volume was ready, and the printing of it was actually begun in 1885. A succession of new calls on my time, which admitted of no refusal, have delayed the actual publication till now. This delay, however, has been compensated by one very great advantage. Beginning with hymn 167 of the first *Mandala*, Professor Oldenberg has, in the most generous spirit, lent me his help in the final revision of my translation and notes. It is chiefly due to him that the results of the latest attempts at the interpretation of the Veda, which are scattered about in learned articles and monographs, have been utilised for this volume. His suggestions, I need hardly say, have proved most valuable; and though he should not be held responsible for any mistakes that may be discovered, whether in the translation or in the notes, my readers may at all events take it for granted that, where my translation seems unsatisfactory, Professor Oldenberg also had nothing better to suggest.

Considering my advancing years, I thought I should act in the true interest of Vedic scholarship, if for the future also I divided my work with him. While for this volume the chief responsibility rests with me, the second volume will contain the hymns to Agni, as translated and annotated by him, and revised by me. In places where we really differ, we shall say so. For the rest, we are willing to share both blame and praise. Our chief object is to help forward a critical study of the Veda, and we are well

aware that much of what has been done and can be done in the present state of Vedic scholarship, is only a kind of reconnaissance, if not a forlorn hope, to be followed hereafter by a patient siege of the hitherto impregnable fortress of ancient Vedic literature.

F. MAX MÜLLER.

OXFORD :
6th Dec. 1891.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

WHEN some twenty years ago I decided on undertaking the first edition of the two texts and the commentary of the Rig-veda, I little expected that it would fall to my lot

What a translation of the Rig-veda ought to be.

to publish also what may, without presumption, be called the first translation of the ancient sacred hymns of the Brahmans. Such is the charm of deciphering step by step the dark and helpless utterances of the early poets of India, and discovering from time to time behind words that for years seemed unintelligible, the simple though strange expressions of primitive thought and primitive faith, that it required no small amount of self-denial to decide in favour of devoting a life to the publishing of the materials rather than to the drawing of the results which those materials supply to the student of ancient language and ancient religion. Even five and twenty years ago, and without waiting for the publication of Sâyaṇa's commentary, much might have been achieved in the interpretation of the hymns of the Rig-veda. With the MSS. then accessible in the principal libraries of Europe, a tolerably correct text of the *Samhitâ* might have been published, and these ancient relics of a primitive religion might have been at least partially deciphered and translated in the same way in which ancient inscriptions are deciphered and translated, viz. by a careful collection of all grammatical forms, and by a complete intercomparison of all passages in which the same words and the same phrases occur. When I resolved to devote my leisure to a critical edition of the text and commentary of the Rig-veda rather than to an independent study of that text, it was chiefly from a conviction that the traditional interpretation of the Rig-veda, as embodied in the commentary of Sâyaṇa and other works of a similar

character, could not be neglected with impunity, and that sooner or later a complete edition of these works would be recognised as a necessity. It was better therefore to begin with the beginning, though it seemed hard sometimes to spend forty years in the wilderness instead of rushing straight into the promised land.

It is well known to those who have followed my literary publications that I never entertained any exaggerated opinion as to the value of the traditional interpretation of the Veda, handed down in the theological schools of India, and preserved to us in the great commentary of Sâyaṇa. More than twenty years ago, when it required more courage to speak out than now, I expressed my opinion on that subject in no ambiguous language, and was blamed for it by some of those who now speak of Sâyaṇa as a mere drag in the progress of Vedic scholarship. Even a drag, however, is sometimes more conducive to the safe advancement of learning than a whip; and those who recollect the history of Vedic scholarship during the last five and twenty years, know best that, with all its faults and weaknesses, Sâyaṇa's commentary was a *sine quâ non* for a scholarlike study of the Rig-veda. I do not wonder that others who have more recently entered on that study are inclined to speak disparagingly of the scholastic interpretations of Sâyaṇa. They hardly know how much we all owe to his guidance in effecting our first entrance into this fortress of Vedic language and Vedic religion, and how much even they, without being aware of it, are indebted to that Indian Eustathius. I do not withdraw an opinion which I expressed many years ago, and for which I was much blamed at the time, that Sâyaṇa in many cases teaches us how the Veda ought not to be, rather than how it ought to be understood. But for all that, who does not know how much assistance may be derived from a first translation, even though it is imperfect, nay, how often the very mistakes of our predecessors help us in finding the right track? If now we can walk without Sâyaṇa, we ought to bear in mind that five and twenty years ago we could not have made even our first steps, we could never, at least, have gained a firm

footing without his leading strings. If therefore we can now see further than he could, let us not forget that we are standing on his shoulders.

I do not regret in the least the time which I have devoted to the somewhat tedious work of editing the commentary of Sāyana, and editing it according to the strictest rules of critical scholarship. The Veda, I feel convinced, will occupy scholars for centuries to come, and will take and maintain for ever its position as the most ancient of books in the library of mankind. Such a book, and the commentary of such a book, should be edited once for all; and unless some unexpected discovery is made of more ancient MSS., I do not anticipate that any future Bekker or Dindorf will find much to glean for a new edition of Sāyana, or that the text, as restored by me from a collation of the best MSS. accessible in Europe, will ever be materially shaken*. It has taken a long time, I know; but those who find fault with me for the delay, should remember that few

* Since the publication of the first volume of the Rig-veda, many new MSS. have come before me, partly copied for me, partly lent to me for a time by scholars in India, but every one of them belonged clearly to one of the three families which I have described in my introduction to the first volume of the Rig-veda. In the beginning of the first Ashṭaka, and occasionally at the beginning of other Ashṭakas, likewise in the commentary on hymns which were studied by native scholars with particular interest, various readings occur in some MSS., which seem at first to betoken an independent source, but which are in reality mere marginal notes, due to more or less learned students of these MSS. Thus after verse 3 of the introduction one MS. reads: *sa prāha nṛpatiṃ, rājan, sāyanāryo mamānugaḥ, sarvaṃ vetty esha vedānāṃ vyākhyātrītena, yugyatām*. The same MS., after verse 4, adds: *ityukto mādhavāryeṇa vīrabukkamahāpatiḥ, anvarāt sāyanātārāyaṃ vedārthasya prakāśane*.

I had for a time some hope that MSS. written in Grantha or other South-Indian alphabets might have preserved an independent text of Sāyana, but from some specimens of a Grantha MS. collated for me by Mr. Eggeling, I do not think that even this hope is meant to be realised. The MS. in question contains a few independent various readings, such as are found in all MSS., and owe their origin clearly to the jottings of individual students. When at the end of verse 6, I found the independent reading, *vyutpannas tāvatā sarvā riko vyākhyātum arhati*, I expected that other various readings of the same character might follow. But after a few additions in the beginning, and those clearly taken from other parts of Sāyana's commentary, nothing of real importance could be gleaned from that MS. I may mention as more important specimens of marginal notes that, before the first *punaḥ kīdrīsam*, on page 44, line 24 (1st ed.), this MS. reads: *athavā yagñasya devam iti sambandhaḥ, yagñasya prakāśakam ityārthaḥ, purohitam iti prithagvīśhanam*. And again, page 44, line 26,

scholars, if any, have worked for others more than I have done in copying and editing Sanskrit texts, and that after all one cannot give up the whole of one's life to the collation of Oriental MSS. and the correction of proof-sheets. The two concluding volumes have long been ready for Press, and as soon as I can find leisure, they too shall be printed and published *.

In now venturing to publish the first volume of my translation of the Rig-veda, I am fully aware that the fate which awaits it will be very different from that of my edition of the text and commentary. It is a mere contribution towards a better understanding of the Vedic hymns, and though I hope it may give in the main a right rendering of the sense of the Vedic poets, I feel convinced that on many points my translation is liable to correction, and will sooner or later be replaced by a more satisfactory one. It is difficult to explain to those who have not themselves worked at the Veda, how it is that, though we may understand almost every word, yet we find it so difficult to lay hold of a whole chain of connected thought, and to discover expressions that will not throw a wrong shade on the original features of the ancient words of the Veda. We have, on the one hand, to avoid giving to our translations too modern a character, or paraphrasing instead of translating; while, on the other, we cannot retain expressions which, if literally rendered in English or any modern tongue, would have an air of quaintness or absurdity totally foreign to the intention of the ancient poets. There are, as all Vedic scholars know, whole verses which, as yet, yield no sense whatever. There are words the meaning of

before *punaḥ kīdrīṣam*, this MS. adds: *athavā rītvigam rītvigvid (vad) yagñā-nirvāhakam hotāraṁ devānām āhvātāraṁ*; *tathā ratnadhātāmaṁ*. In the same line, after *ratnānām*, we read *ramanīyadhanānām vā*, taken from page 46, line 2. Various readings like these, however, occur on the first sheets only, soon after the MS. follows the usual and recognised text. [This opinion has been considerably modified after a complete collation of this MS., made for me by Dr. Winternitz.] For the later *Ashśakas*, where all the MSS. are very deficient, and where an independent authority would be of real use, no *Gantha* MS. has as yet been discovered.

* They have since been printed, but the translation has in consequence been delayed.

which we can only guess. Here, no doubt, a continued study will remove some of our difficulties, and many a passage that is now dark, will receive light hereafter from a happy combination. Much has already been achieved by the efforts of European scholars, but much more remains to be done; and our only chance of seeing any rapid progress made lies, I believe, in communicating freely what every one has found out by himself, and not minding if others point out to us that we have overlooked the very passage that would at once have solved our difficulties, that our conjectures were unnecessary, and our emendations wrong. True and honest scholars whose conscience tells them that they have done their best, and who care for the subject on which they are engaged far more than for the praise of benevolent or the blame of malignant critics, ought not to take any notice of merely frivolous censure. There are mistakes, no doubt, of which we ought to be ashamed, and for which the only *amende honorable* we can make is to openly confess and retract them. But there are others, particularly in a subject like Vedic interpretation, which we should forgive, as we wish to be forgiven. This can be done without lowering the standard of true scholarship or vitiating the healthy tone of scientific morality. Kindness and gentleness are not incompatible with earnestness,—far from it!—and where these elements are wanting, not only is the joy embittered which is the inherent reward of all *bonâ fide* work, but selfishness, malignity, aye, even untruthfulness, gain the upper hand, and the healthy growth of science is stunted. While in my translation of the Veda and in the remarks that I have to make in the course of my commentary, I shall frequently differ from other scholars, I hope I shall never say an unkind word of men who have done their best, and who have done what they have done in a truly scholarlike, that is, in a humble spirit. It would be unpleasant, even were it possible within the limits assigned, to criticise every opinion that has been put forward on the meaning of certain words or on the construction of certain verses of the Veda. I prefer, as much as possible, to vindicate my own translation, instead of

examining the translations of other scholars, whether Indian or European. Sâyana's translation, as rendered into English by Professor Wilson, is before the world. Let those who take an interest in these matters compare it with the translation here proposed. In order to give readers who do not possess that translation, an opportunity of comparing it with my own, I have for a few hymns printed that as well as the translations of Langlois and Benfey* on the same page with my own. Everybody will thus be enabled to judge of the peculiar character of each of these translations. That of Sâyana represents the tradition of India; that of Langlois is the ingenious, but thoroughly uncritical, guess-work of a man of taste; that of Benfey is the rendering of a scholar, who has carefully worked out the history of some words, but who assigns to other words either the traditional meaning recorded by Sâyana, or a conjectural meaning which, however, would not always stand the test of an inter-comparison of all passages in which these words occur. I may say, in general, that Sâyana's translation was of great use to me in the beginning, though it seldom afforded help for the really difficult passages. Langlois' translation has hardly ever yielded real assistance, while I sincerely regret that Benfey's rendering does not extend beyond the first *Mandala*.

It may sound self-contradictory, if, after confessing the help which I derived from these translations, I venture to call my own the first translation of the Rig-veda. The word translation, however, has many meanings. I mean by translation, not a mere rendering of the hymns of the Rig-veda into English, French, or German, but a full account of the reasons which justify the translator in assigning such a power to such a word, and such a meaning to such a sentence. I mean by translation a real deciphering, a work like that which Burnouf performed in his first attempts at a translation of the Avesta,—a *traduction raisonnée*, if such an expression may be used. Without such a process,

* In the new edition, Langlois' translation has been omitted, and those of Ludwig and Grassmann have been inserted occasionally only.

without a running commentary, a mere translation of the ancient hymns of the Brahmans will never lead to any solid results. Even if the translator has discovered the right meaning of a word or of a whole sentence, his mere translation does not help us much, unless he shows us the process by which he has arrived at it, unless he places before us the *pièces justificatives* of his final judgment. The Veda teems with words that require a justification ; not so much the words which occur but once or twice, though many of these are difficult enough, but rather the common words and particles, which occur again and again, which we understand to a certain point, and can render in a vague way, but which must be defined before they can be translated, and before they can convey to us any real and tangible meaning. It was out of the question in a translation of this character to attempt either an imitation of the original rhythm or metre, or to introduce the totally foreign element of rhyming. Such translations may follow by and by : at present a metrical translation would only be an excuse for an inaccurate translation.

While engaged in collecting the evidence on which the meaning of every word and every sentence must be founded, I have derived the most important assistance from the Sanskrit Dictionary of Professors Böhtlingk and Roth, which has been in course of publication during the last sixteen years. The Vedic portion of that Dictionary may, I believe, be taken as the almost exclusive work of Professor Roth, and as such, for the sake of brevity, I shall treat it in my notes. It would be ungrateful were I not to acknowledge most fully the real benefit which this publication has conferred on every student of Sanskrit, and my only regret is that its publication has not proceeded more rapidly, so that even now years will elapse before we can hope to see it finished. But my sincere admiration for the work performed by the compilers of that Dictionary does not prevent me from differing, in many cases, from the explanations of Vedic words given by Professor Roth. If I do not always criticise Professor Roth's explanations when I differ from him, the reason is obvious. A dictionary without a full

translation of each passage, or without a justification of the meanings assigned to each word, is only a preliminary step to a translation. It represents a first classification of the meanings of the same word in different passages, but it gives us no means of judging how, according to the opinion of the compiler, the meaning of each single word should be made to fit the general sense of a whole sentence. I do not say this in disparagement, for, in a dictionary, it can hardly be otherwise ; I only refer to it in order to explain the difficulty I felt whenever I differed from Professor Roth, and was yet unable to tell how the meaning assigned by him to certain words would be justified by the author of the Dictionary himself. On this ground I have throughout preferred to explain every step by which I arrived at my own renderings, rather than to write a running criticism of Professor Roth's Dictionary. My obligations to him I like to express thus once for all, by stating that whenever I found that I agreed with him, I felt greatly assured as to the soundness of my own rendering, while whenever I differed from him, I never did so without careful consideration.

The works, however, which I have hitherto mentioned, though the most important, are by no means the only ones that have been of use to me in preparing my translation of the Rig-veda. The numerous articles on certain hymns, verses, or single words occurring in the Rig-veda, published by Vedic scholars in Europe and India during the last thirty years, were read by me at the time of their publication, and have helped me to overcome difficulties, the very existence of which is now forgotten. If I go back still further, I feel that in grappling with the first and the greatest of difficulties in the study of the Veda, I and many others are more deeply indebted than it is possible to say, to one whose early loss has been one of the greatest misfortunes to Sanskrit scholarship. It was in Burnouf's lectures that we first learnt what the Veda was, and how it should form the foundation of all our studies. Not only did he most liberally communicate to his pupils his valuable MSS., and teach us how to use these tools, but the results

of his own experience were freely placed at our service, we were warned against researches which he knew to be useless, we were encouraged in undertakings which he knew to be full of promise. His minute analysis of long passages of Sāyana, his independent interpretations of the text of the hymns, his comparisons between the words and grammatical forms, the thoughts and legends of the Veda and Avesta, his brilliant divination checked by an inexorable sense of truth, and his dry logical method enlivened by sallies of humour and sparks of imaginative genius, though not easily forgotten, and always remembered with gratitude, are now beyond the reach of praise or blame. Were I to criticise what he or other scholars have said and written many years ago, they might justly complain of such criticism. It is no longer necessary to prove that Nābhānedishṭha cannot mean 'new relatives,' or that there never was a race of Etendhras, or that the angels of the Bible are in no way connected with the Aṅgiras of the Vedic hymns; and it would, on the other hand, be a mere waste of time, were I to attempt to find out who first discovered that in the Veda deva does not always mean divine, but sometimes means brilliant. In fact, it could not be done.

In a new subject like that of the interpretation of the Veda, there are certain things which everybody discovers who has eyes to see. Their discovery requires so little research that it seems almost an insult to say that they were discovered by this or that scholar. Take, for instance, the peculiar pronunciation of certain words, rendered necessary by the requirements of Vedic metres. I believe that my learned friend Professor Kuhn was one of the first to call general attention to the fact that semivowels must frequently be changed into their corresponding vowels, and that long vowels must sometimes be pronounced as two syllables. It is clear, however, from Rosen's notes to the first Ashṭaka (I, 1, 8), that he, too, was perfectly aware of this fact, and that he recognised the prevalence of this rule, not only with regard to semivowels (see his note to RV. I, 2, 9) and long vowels which are the result of Sandhi, but likewise with regard to others that occur in the body of a

word. 'Animadvertē,' he writes, 'tres syllabas postremas vocis adhvarānām dipodiae iambicae munus sustinentes, penultima syllaba praeter iambi prioris arsin, thesin quoque sequentis pedis ferente. Satis frequentia sunt, in hac praesertim dipodiae iambicae sede, exempla syllabae naturae longae in tres moras productae. De qua re nihil quidem memoratum invenio apud Pingalam aliosque qui de arte metrica scripserunt: sed numeros ita, ut modo dictum est, computandos esse, taciti agnoscere videntur, quum versus una syllaba mancus non eos offendat.'

Now this is exactly the case. The ancient grammarians, as we shall see, teach distinctly that where two vowels have coalesced into one according to the rules of Sandhi, they may be pronounced as two syllables; and though they do not teach the same with regard to semivowels and long vowels occurring in the body of the word, yet they tacitly recognise that rule, by frequently taking its effects for granted. Thus in Sūtra 950 of the Prātisākhya, verse IX, 111, 1, is called an Atyashī, and the first pāda is said to consist of twelve syllables. In order to get this number, the author must have read,

āyā rūkā hāṛīnyā pūñānāh.

Immediately after, verse IV, 1, 3, is called a Dhr̥iti, and the first pāda must again have twelve syllables. Here therefore the author takes it for granted that we should read,

śākhē śākhāyām ābh̥y ā vāvṛt̥svā*.

No one, in fact, with any ear for rhythm, whether Saunaka and Pingala, or Rosen and Kuhn, could have helped observing these rules when reading the Veda. But it is quite a different case when we come to the question as to which words admit of such protracted pronunciation, and which do not. Here one scholar may differ from another according to the view he takes of the character of Vedic metres, and here one has to take careful account of the minute and

* See also Sūtra 937 seq. I cannot find any authority for the statement of Professor Kuhn (Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 114) that, according to the Rik-prātisākhya, it is the first semivowel that must be dissolved, unless he referred to the remarks of the commentator to Sūtra 973.

ingenious observations contained in numerous articles by Professors Kuhn, Bollensen, Grassmann, and others.

With regard to the interpretation of certain words and sentences too, it may happen that explanations which have taxed the ingenuity of some scholars to the utmost, seem to others so self-evident that they would hardly think of quoting anybody's name in support of them, to say nothing of the endless and useless work it would entail, were we obliged always to find out who was the first to propose this or that interpretation. It is impossible here to lay down general rules:—each scholar must be guided by his own sense of justice to others and by self-respect. Let us take one instance. From the first time that I read the fourth hymn of the Rig-veda, I translated the fifth and sixth verses :

utá bruvantu naḥ nīdaḥ nīḥ anyātaḥ kīti ārata,
 dādhanāḥ indre it dūvaḥ,
 utá naḥ su-bhāgān arīḥ vokēyuh dasma kṛishṭāyaḥ,
 syāma it indrasya sārmani.

1. Whether our enemies say, 'Move away elsewhere, you who offer worship to Indra only,'—

2. Or whether, O mighty one, all people call us blessed : may we always remain in the keeping of Indra.

About the general sense of this passage I imagined there could be no doubt, although one word in it, viz. *arīḥ*, required an explanation. Yet the variety of interpretations proposed by different scholars is extraordinary. First, if we look to Sāyana, he translates :

1. May our priests praise Indra ! O enemies, go away from this place, and also from another place ! Our priests (may praise Indra), they who are always performing worship for Indra.

2. O destroyer of enemies ! may the enemy call us possessed of wealth ; how much more, friendly people ! May we be in the happiness of Indra !

Professor Wilson did not follow Sāyana closely, but translated :

1. Let our ministers, earnestly performing his worship,

exclaim: Depart, ye revilers, from hence and every other place (where he is adored).

2. Destroyer of foes, let our enemies say we are prosperous: let men (congratulate us). May we ever abide in the felicity (derived from the favour) of Indra.

Langlois translated:

1. Que (ces amis), en fêtant Indra, puissent dire: Vous, qui êtes nos adversaires, retirez-vous loin d'ici.

2. Que nos ennemis nous appellent des hommes fortunés, placés que nous sommes sous la protection d'Indra.

Stevenson translated:

1. Let all men again join in praising Indra. Avaunt ye profane scoffers, remove from hence, and from every other place, while we perform the rites of Indra.

2. O foe-destroyer, (through thy favour) even our enemies speak peaceably to us, the possessors of wealth; what wonder then if other men do so. Let us ever enjoy the happiness which springs from Indra's blessing.

Professor Benfey translated:

1. And let the scoffers say, They are rejected by every one else, therefore they celebrate Indra alone.

2. And may the enemy and the country proclaim us as happy, O destroyer, if we are only in Indra's keeping*.

Professor Roth, s.v. anyáta^h, took this word rightly in the sense of 'to a different place,' and must therefore have taken that sentence 'move away elsewhere' in the same sense in which I take it. Later, however, s.v. ar, he corrected himself, and proposed to translate the same words by 'you neglect something else.'

Professor Bollensen (Orient und Occident, vol. ii, p. 462),

* I add Grassmann's and Ludwig's renderings:

Grassmann: Mag spottend sagen unser Feind:

'Kein Andrer kümmert sich um sie;

Drum feiern Indra sie allein.'

Und glücklich mögen, Mächtiger!

Die Freundesstämme nennen uns,

Nur wenn wir sind in Indra's Schutz.

Ludwig: Mögen unsere tadler sagen: sogar noch anderes entgeht euch (dabei), wenn ihr dienst dem Indra tut.

Oder möge uns glückselige nennen der fromme, so nennen, o wundertäter, die (fünf) völker, in Indra's schutze mögen wir sein.

adopting to a certain extent the second rendering of Professor Roth in preference to that of Professor Benfey, endeavoured to show that the 'something else which is neglected,' is not something indefinite, but the worship of all the other gods, except Indra.

It might, no doubt, be said that every one of these translations contains something that is right, though mixed up with a great deal that is wrong; but to attempt for every verse of the Veda to quote and to criticise every previous translation, would be an invidious and useless task. In the case just quoted, it might seem right to state that Professor Bollensen was the first to see that *arīh* should be joined with *krishṭāyāh*, and that he therefore proposed to alter it to *arīh*, as a nom. plur. But on referring to Rosen, I find that, to a certain extent, he had anticipated Professor Bollensen's remark, for though, in his cautious way, he abstained from altering the text, yet he remarked: *Possitne arih pluralis esse, contracta terminatione, pro arāyāh?*

After these preliminary remarks I have to say a few

Plan of the words on the general plan of my translation.
work.

I do not attempt as yet a translation of the whole of the Rig-veda, and I therefore considered myself at liberty to group the hymns according to the deities to which they are addressed. By this process, I believe, a great advantage is gained. We see at one glance all that has been said of a certain god, and we gain a more complete insight into his nature and character. Something of the same kind had been attempted by the original collectors of the ten books, for it can hardly be by accident that each of them begins with hymns addressed to Agni, and that these are followed by hymns addressed to Indra. The only exception to this rule is the eighth *Mandala*, for the ninth being devoted to one deity, to Soma, can hardly be accounted an exception. But if we take the Rig-veda as a whole, we find hymns, addressed to the same deities, not only scattered about in different books, but not even grouped together when they occur in one and the same book. Here, as we lose nothing by giving up the old arrangement, we

are surely at liberty, for our own purposes, to put together such hymns as have a common object, and to place before the reader as much material as possible for an exhaustive study of each individual deity.

I give for each hymn the Sanskrit original * in what is known as the Pada text, i.e. the text in which all words (pada) stand by themselves, as they do in Greek or Latin, without being joined together according to the rules of Sandhi. The text in which the words are thus joined, as they are in all other Sanskrit texts, is called the Samhitâ text. Whether the Pada or the Samhitâ text be the more ancient, may seem difficult to settle. As far as I can judge, they seem to me, in their present form, the product of the same period of Vedic scholarship. The Prâtisâkhyas, it is true, start from the Pada text, take it, as it were, for granted, and devote their rules to the explanation of those changes which that text undergoes in being changed into the Samhitâ text. But, on the other hand, the Pada text in some cases clearly presupposes the Samhitâ text. It leaves out passages which are repeated more than once, while the Samhitâ text always repeats these passages; it abstains from dividing the termination of the locative plural su, whenever in the Samhitâ text, i.e. according to the rules of Sandhi, it becomes shu; hence nadishu, agishu, but ap-su; and it gives short vowels instead of the long ones of the Samhitâ, even in cases where the long vowels are justified by the rules of the Vedic language. It is certain, in fact, that neither the Pada nor the Samhitâ text, as we now possess them, represents the original text of the Veda. Both show clear traces of scholastic influences. But if we try to restore the original form of the Vedic hymns, we shall certainly arrive at some kind of Pada text rather than at a Samhitâ text; nay, even in their present form, the original metre and rhythm of the ancient hymns of the Rîshis are far more perceptible when the words are divided, than when we join them together throughout according to the rules of Sandhi. Lastly, for practical purposes, the Pada text is far superior to the Samhitâ text in which the final

* This is left out in the second edition.

and initial letters, that is, the most important letters of words, are constantly disguised, and liable therefore to different interpretations. Although in some passages we may differ from the interpretation adopted by the Pada text, and although certain Vedic words have, no doubt, been wrongly analysed and divided by Sākalya, yet such cases are comparatively few, and where they occur, they are interesting as carrying us back to the earliest attempts of Vedic scholarship. In the vast majority of cases the divided text, with a few such rules as we have to observe in reading Latin, nay, even in reading Pāli verses, brings us certainly much nearer to the original utterance of the ancient *Rishis* than the amalgamated text.

The critical principles by which I have been guided in editing for the first time the text of the Rig-veda, require a few words of explanation, as they have lately been challenged on grounds which, I think, rest on a complete misapprehension of my previous statements on this subject.

As far as we are able to judge at present, we can hardly speak of various readings in the Vedic hymns, in the usual sense of that word. Various readings to be gathered from a collation of different MSS., now accessible to us, there are none. After collating a considerable number of MSS., I have succeeded, I believe, in fixing on three representative MSS., as described in the preface to the first volume of my edition of the Rig-veda. Even these MSS. are not free from blunders,—for what MS. is?—but these blunders have no claim to the title of various readings. They are lapsus calami, and no more; and, what is important, they have not become traditional *.

* Thus X, 101, 2, one of the Pada MSS. (P 2) reads distinctly *yagñām prā kriṇuta sakhāyaś*, but all the other MSS. have *ayata*, and there can be little doubt that it was the frequent repetition of the verb *kri* in this verse which led the writer to substitute *kriṇuta* for *ayata*. No other MS., as far as I am aware, repeats this blunder. In IX, 86, 34, the writer of the same MS. puts *ragasi* instead of *dhāvasi*, because his eye was caught by *rāgā* in the preceding line. X, 16, 5, the same MS. reads *sām gakkhasva* instead of *gakkhatām*, which is supported by S 1, S 2, P 1, while S 3 has a peculiar and more important reading, *gakkhatāt*. X, 67, 6, the same MS. P 2 has *vī ākartha* instead of *vī ākarta*.

A number of various readings which have been gleaned from Pandit Tārā-

The text, as deduced from the best MSS. of the *Samhitâ* text, can be controlled by four independent checks. The first is, of course, a collation of the best MSS. of the *Samhitâ* text.

The second check to be applied to the *Samhitâ* text is a comparison with the Pada text, of which, again, I possessed at least one excellent MS., and several more modern copies.

The third check was a comparison of this text with *Sâyana's* commentary, or rather with the text which is presupposed by that commentary. In the few cases where the Pada text seemed to differ from the *Samhitâ* text, a note was added to that effect, in the various readings of my edition; and the same was done, at least in all important cases, where *Sâyana* clearly followed a text at variance with our own.

The fourth check was a comparison of any doubtful passage with the numerous passages quoted in the *Prâtisâkhya*.

These were the principles by which I was guided in the critical restoration of the text of the *Rig-veda*, and I believe I may say that the text as printed by me is more correct than any MS. now accessible, more trustworthy than the text followed by *Sâyana*, and in all important points identically the same with that text which the authors of the

nâtha's Tûlâdânâdipaddhati (see Trübner's *American and Oriental Literary Record*, July 31, 1868) belong to the same class. They may be due either to the copyists of the MSS. which Pandit *Târânâtha* used while compiling his work, or they may by accident have crept into his own MS. Anyhow, not one of them is supported either by the best MSS. accessible in Europe, or by any passage in the *Prâtisâkhya*.

RV. IX, 11, 2, read devayu		instead of devayuh ^b .	
IX, 11, 4,	„ arkata	„	arkate ^b .
IX, 14, 2,	„ yadî sabandhavaḥ	„	yaddîptabandhavaḥ ^b .
IX, 16, 3,	„ anaptam	„	anuplam ^b .
IX, 17, 2,	„ suvânâsa	„	stuvânâsa ^b .
IX, 21, 2,	„ pravrinvento	„	pravrinvato ^b .
IX, 48, 2,	„ samvrikta	„	samyukta ^b .
IX, 49, 1,	„ no *pâm	„	no yâm ^b .
IX, 54, 3,	„ sûryaḥ	„	sûryam ^b .
IX, 59, 3,	„ sîda ni	„	sîdati ^b .

^b As printed by Pandit *Târânâtha*.

Prâtisâkhya followed in their critical researches in the fifth or sixth century before our era. I believe that starting from that date our text of the Veda is better authenticated, and supported by a more perfect apparatus criticus, than the text of any Greek or Latin author, and I do not think that diplomatic criticism can ever go beyond what has been achieved in the constitution of the text of the Vedic hymns.

Far be it from me to say that the editio princeps of the text thus constituted was printed without mistakes.

Aufrecht's
Romanised Re-
print of the
Rig-veda.

But most of these mistakes are mistakes which no attentive reader could fail to detect. Cases like II, 35, 1, where *gôgishat* instead of *gôshishat* was printed three times, so as to perplex even Professor Roth, or II, 12, 14, where *sasamânâm* occurs three times instead of *sasamânâm*, are, I believe, of rare occurrence. Nor do I think that, unless some quite unexpected discoveries are made, there ever will be a new critical edition, or, as we call it in Germany, a new recension of the hymns of the Rig-veda. If by collating new MSS., or by a careful study of the Prâtisâkhya, or by conjectural emendations, a more correct text could have been produced, we may be certain that a critical scholar like Professor Aufrecht would have given us such a text. But after carefully collating several MSS. of Professor Wilson's collection, and after enjoying the advantage of Professor Weber's assistance in collating the MSS. of the Royal Library at Berlin, and after a minute study of the Prâtisâkhya, he frankly states that in the text of the Rig-veda, transcribed in Roman letters, which he printed at Berlin, he followed my edition, and that he had to correct but a small number of misprints. For the two *Mandalas* which I had not yet published, I lent him the very MSS. on which my edition is founded; and there will be accordingly but few passages in these two concluding *Mandalas*, which I have still to publish, where the text will materially differ from that of his Romanised transcript.

No one, I should think, who is at all acquainted with the rules of diplomatic criticism, would easily bring himself to

touch a text resting on such authorities as the text of the Rîg-veda. What would a Greek scholar give, if he could say of Homer that his text was in every word, in every syllable, in every vowel, in every accent, the same as the text used by Peisistratos in the sixth century B.C. ! A text thus preserved in its integrity for so many centuries, must remain for ever the authoritative text of the Veda.

To remove, for instance, the eleven hymns 49-59 in the eighth *Māṇḍala* from their proper place, or count them by themselves as *Vāḷakhilya* * hymns, seems to me, though no doubt perfectly harmless, little short of a critical sacrilege. Why *Sāyana* does not explain these hymns, I confess I do not know ^b ; but whatever the reason was, it was not because they did not exist at his time, or because he thought them spurious. They are regularly counted in *Kātyāyana*'s *Sarvānukrama*, though here the same accident has happened. One commentator, *Shadgurusishya*, the one most commonly used, does not explain them ; but another commentator, *Gagannātha*, does explain them, exactly as they occur in the *Sarvānukrama*, only leaving out hymn 58. That these hymns had something peculiar in the eyes of native scholars, is clear enough. They may for a time have formed a separate collection, they

* The earliest interpretation of the name *Vāḷakhilya* is found in the *Taittirīya-āraṇyaka*, I, 23. We are told that *Pragāpati* created the world, and in the process of creation the following interlude occurs :

sa tapo = tapyata. sa tapas taptvā sarīram adhūnuta. tasya yan māṁsam āsīt tato = runāḥ ketavo vātarasanā rīshaya udatish/haṇ. ye nakhāḥ, te vaikhānasāḥ. ye bālāḥ, te bālakhilyāḥ.

He burned with emotion. Having burnt with emotion, he shook his body. From what was his flesh, the *Rīshis*, called *Arunas*, *Ketus*, and *Vātarasanas*, sprang forth. His nails became the *Vaikhānasas*, his hairs the *Bālakhilyas*.

The author of this allegory therefore took *bāla* or *vāla* in *vāḷakhilya*, not in the sense of child, but identified it with *bāla*, hair.

The commentator remarks with regard to *tapas* : *nātra tapa upavāsādirūpam, kimtu srashāvyaṁ vastu kīdrīram iti paryālokanārūpam.*

^b A similar omission was pointed out by Professor Roth. Verses 21-24 of the 53rd hymn of the third *Māṇḍala*, which contain imprecations against *Vasishtha*, are left out by the writer of a *Pada MS.*, and by a copyist of *Sāyana*'s commentary, probably because they both belonged to the family of *Vasishtha*. See my first edition of the *Rîg-veda*, vol. ii, p. lvi, Notes.

may have been considered of more modern origin *. I shall go even further than those who remove these hymns from the place which they have occupied for more than two thousand years. I admit they disturb the regularity both of the *Mandala* and the *Ashṭaka* divisions, and I have pointed out myself that they are not counted in the ancient *Anukramanīs* ascribed to Saunaka ; (History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 220.) But, on the other hand, verses taken from these hymns occur in all the other Vedas^b; they are mentioned by name in the *Brāhmanas* (Ait. Br. V, 15 ; VI, 24), the *Āraṇyakas* (Ait. Ār. V, 10, p. 445), and the *Sūtras* (*Āsv. Srauta Sūtras*, VIII, 2, 3), while they are never included in the manuscripts of *Parisishṭas* or *Khilas* or apocryphal hymns, nor mentioned by *Kātyāyana* as mere *Khilas* in his *Sarvānukrama*. Eight^c of them are mentioned in the *Bṛihaddevatā*, without any allusion to their apocryphal character :

Parāṇy aṣṭau tu sūktāny *riṣhīnām* tigmategasām,
 Aindrāṇy atra tu *shadvimsaḥ* pragātho bahudaivataḥ.
Rig antyāgner *akety* agniḥ sūryam antyapado gagau.
 Praskanvas *ka* *prishadhras* *ka* *prādād* yad vastu *kimkāna*
 Bhūrid iti tu sūktābhyām akhilam parikīrtitam.
 Aindrāṇy ubhayam ity atra *sha* āgneyāt parāṇi tu.

‘The next eight hymns belong to *Riṣhis* of keen intellect^d; they are addressed to *Indra*, but the 26th *Pragātha*

* *Sāyana* (RV. X, 88, 18) quotes these hymns as *Vālakhilya-saṃhitā*. In the *Mahābhārata* XII, 59 ; 110 seq. the *Vālakhilyas* are called the ministers of King *Vainya*, whose astrologer was *Garga*, and his domestic priest *Sukra* ; see Kern, *Bṛihat-saṃhitā*, transl. p. 11.

^b This is a criterion of some importance, and it might have been mentioned, for instance, by Professor *Bollensen* in his interesting article on the *Dvīpadā Virāg* hymns ascribed to *Parāśara* (I, 65-70) that not a single verse of them occurs in any of the other Vedas.

^c *Sāyana* in his commentary (RV. X, 27, 15) speaks of eight, while in the Ait. Ār. V, 10, the first six are quoted (containing fifty-six verses, comm.), as being used together for certain sacrificial purposes.

^d Lest *Saunaka* be suspected of having applied this epithet, *tigmategas*, to the *Vālakhilyas* in order to fill the verse (*pādapūranārtham*), I may point out that the same epithet is applied to the *Vālakhilyas* in the *Maitry-upanishad* 2, 3. The nom. plur. which occurs there is *tigmategasāḥ*, and the commentator remarks: *tigmategasas tīvrategaso=tyūrgitaprabhāvāḥ* ; *tegasā ityevamvidha etakāḥkākāḥsāṅketapāḥ* *kāṇḍasaḥ* *sarvatra*. See also *Maitr. Up.* VI, 29.

(VIII, 54, 3-4, which verses form the 26th couplet, if counting from VIII, 49, 1) is addressed to many gods. The last verse (of these eight hymns), VIII, 56, 5, beginning with the words *akety agniḥ*, is addressed to Agni, and the last foot celebrates Sūrya. Whatsoever Praskanva and Prishadhra gave (or, if we read *prishadhrāya*, whatever Praskanva gave to Prishadhra), all that is celebrated in the two hymns beginning with *bhūrīt*. After the hymn addressed to Agni (VIII, 60), there follow six hymns addressed to Indra, beginning with *ubhayam*.'

But the most important point of all is this, that these hymns, which exist both in the Pada and Samhitā texts, are quoted by the Prātisākhya, not only for general purposes, but for special passages occurring in them, and nowhere else. Thus in Sūtra 154, *hetāyaḥ* is quoted as one of the few words which do not require the elision of a following short a. In order to appreciate what is implied by this special quotation, it is necessary to have a clear insight into the mechanism of the Prātisākhya. Its chief object is to bring under general categories the changes which the separate words of the Pada text undergo when joined together in the Ārshī Samhitā, and to do this with the utmost brevity possible. Now the Sandhi rules, as observed in the Samhitā of the Rig-veda, are by no means so uniform and regular as they are in later Sanskrit, and hence it is sometimes extremely difficult to bring all the exceptional cases under more or less general rules. In our passage the author of the Prātisākhya endeavours to comprehend all the passages where an initial a in the Veda is not elided after a final e or o. In ordinary Sanskrit it would be always elided, in the Samhitā it is sometimes elided, and sometimes not. Thus the Prātisākhya begins in Sūtra 138 by stating that if the short a stands at the beginning of a pāda or foot, it is always elided. Why it should be always elided in the very place where the metre most strongly requires that it should be pronounced, does not concern the author of the Prātisākhya. He is a statistician, not a grammarian, and he therefore simply adds in Sūtra 153 the only three exceptional passages where the a, under these very circumstances,

happens to be not elided. He then proceeds in Sûtra 139 to state that a is elided even in the middle of a pāda, provided it be light, followed by y or v, and these, y or v, again followed by a light vowel. Hence the Samhitā writes te •vādan, so •yām, but not śikshanto •vratam, for here the a of avratam is heavy; nor mitramaho •vadyât, for here the a following the v is heavy

Then follows again an extension of this rule, viz. in the case of words ending in āvo. After these, a short a, even if followed by other consonants besides y or v, may be elided, but the other conditions must be fulfilled, i. e. the short a must be light, and the vowel of the next syllable must again be light. Thus the Samhitā writes indeed gāvo •bhītaḥ, but not gāvo •gman, because here the a is heavy, being followed by two consonants.

After this, a more general rule is given, or, more correctly, a more comprehensive observation is made, viz. that under all circumstances initial a is elided, if the preceding word ends in aye, ayaḥ, ave, or avaḥ. As might be expected, however, so large a class must have numerous exceptions, and these can only be collected by quoting every word ending in these syllables, or every passage in which the exceptions occur. Before these exceptions are enumerated, some other more or less general observations are made, providing for the elision of initial a. Initial a, according to Sûtra 142, is to be elided if the preceding word is vaḥ, and if this vaḥ is preceded by â, na, pra, kva, kītraḥ, savitâ, eva, or kaḥ. There is, of course, no intelligible reason why, if these words precede vaḥ, the next a should be elided. It is a mere statement of facts, and, generally speaking, these statements are minutely accurate. There is probably no verse in the whole of the Rig-veda where an initial a after vaḥ is elided, unless these very words precede, or unless some other observation has been made to provide for the elision of the a. For instance, in V, 25, 1, we find vaḥ preceded by akkīa, which is not among the words just mentioned, and here the Samhitā does not elide the a of agnim, which follows after vaḥ. After all these more or less general observations as to the elision of

an initial a are thus exhausted, the author of the *Prātisākhya* descends into particulars, and gives lists, first, of words the initial a of which is always elided; secondly, of words which, if preceding, require under all circumstances the elision of the initial a of the next word, whatever may have been said to the contrary in the preceding *Sūtras*. Afterwards, he gives a number of passages which defy all rules, and must be given on their own merits, and as they stand in the *Samhitā*. Lastly, follow special exceptions to the more or less general rules given before. And here, among these special exceptions, we see that the author of the *Prātisākhya* finds it necessary to quote a passage from a *Vāḷakhilya* hymn in which *hetáyaḥ* occurs, i.e. a word ending in *ayaḥ*, and where, in defiance of *Sūtra* 141, which required the elision of a following initial a under all circumstances (*sarvathā*), the initial a of *asya* is not elided; VIII, 50, 2, *Samhitā*, *satánikā hetáyo asya*. It might be objected that the *Prātisākhya* only quotes *hetáyaḥ* as an exceptional word, and does not refer directly to the verse in the *Vāḷakhilya* hymn. But fortunately *hetáyaḥ* occurs but twice in the whole of the *Rig-veda*; and in the other passage where it occurs, I, 190, 4, neither the rule nor the exception as to the elision of an initial a, could apply. The author of the *Prātisākhya* therefore makes no distinction between the *Vāḷakhilya* and any other hymns of the *Rig-veda*, and he would have considered his phonetic statistics equally at fault, if it had been possible to quote one single passage from the hymns VIII, 49 to 59, as contravening his observations, as if such passages had been alleged from the hymns of *Vasishtha* or *Viśvāmitra*.

It would lead me too far, were I to enter here into similar cases in support of the fact that the *Prātisākhya* makes no distinction between the *Vāḷakhilya* and any other hymns of the *Rig-veda-samhitā* *. But I doubt whether the bearing of this fact has ever been fully realised. Here we see that the absence of the elision of a short a which follows after a word ending in *ayaḥ*, was considered of sufficient importance

* The *Prātisākhya* takes into account both the *Sākala* and *Bāṣkala* *sākhās*, as may be seen from *Sūtra* 1057.

to be recorded in a special rule, because in most cases the *Samhitā* elides an initial a, if preceded by a word ending in *ayaḥ*. What does this prove? It proves, unless all our views on the chronology of Vedic literature are wrong, that in the fifth century B.C. at least, or previously rather to the time when the *Prātisākhya* was composed, both the *Pada* and the *Samhitā* texts were so firmly settled that it was impossible, for the sake of uniformity or regularity, to omit one single short a; and it proves *à fortiori*, that the hymn in which that irregular short a occurs, formed at that time part of the Vedic canon. I confess I feel sometimes frightened by the stringency of this argument, and I should like to see a possibility by which we could explain the addition, not of the *Vālakhilya* hymns only, but of other much more modern sounding hymns, at a later time than the period of the *Prātisākhyas*. But until that possibility is shown, we must abide by our own conclusions; and then I ask, who is the critic who would dare to tamper with a canon of scripture of which every iota was settled before the time of Cyrus, and which we possess in exactly that form in which it is described to us by the authors of the *Prātisākhyas*? I say again, that I am not free from misgivings on the subject, and my critical conscience would be far better satisfied if we could ascribe the *Prātisākhya* and all it presupposes to a much later date. But until that is done, the fact remains that the two divergent texts, the *Pada* and *Samhitā*, which we now possess, existed, as we now possess them, previous to the time of the *Prātisākhya*. They have not diverged nor varied since, and the vertex to which they point, starting from the distance of the two texts as measured by the *Prātisākhya*, carries us back far beyond the time of Saunaka, if we wish to determine the date of the first authorised collection of the hymns, both in their *Pada* and in their *Samhitā* form.

Instances abound, if we compare the *Pada* and *Samhitā* texts, where, if uniformity between the two texts had been the object of the scholars of the ancient *Parishads*, the lengthening or shortening of a vowel would at once have removed the apparent discordance between the two tradi-

tional texts. Nor should it be supposed that such minute discordances between the two, as the length or shortness of a vowel, were always rendered necessary by the requirements of the metre, and that for that reason the ancient students or the later copyists of the Veda abstained from altering the peculiar spelling of words, which seemed required by the exigencies of the metre in the *Samhitā* text, but not in the *Pada* text. Though this may be true in some cases, it is not so in all. There are short vowels in the *Samhitā* where, according to grammar, we expect long vowels, and where, according to metre, there was no necessity for shortening them. Yet in these very places all the MSS. of the *Samhitā* text give the irregular short, and all the MSS. of the *Pada* text the regular long vowel, and the authors of the *Prātisākhya*s bear witness that the same minute difference existed at their own time, nay, previous to their own time. In VII, 60, 12, the *Samhitā* text gives :

iyām deva purōhitir yuvābhyām yagnēshu mitrāvarunāv akāri.

This primacy, O (two) gods, was made for you two, O Mitra and Varuna, at the sacrifices !

Here it is quite clear that *deva* is meant for a dual, and ought to have been *devā* or *devau*. The metre does not require a short syllable, and yet all the *Samhitā* MSS. read *devā*, and all the *Pada* MSS. read *devā* ; and what is more important, the authors of the *Prātisākhyā* had to register this small divergence of the two texts, which existed in their time as it exists in our own *.

Nor let it be supposed, that the writers of our MSS. were so careful and so conscientious that they would, when copying MSS., regulate every consonant or vowel according to the rules of the *Prātisākhyā*. This is by no means the case. The writers of Vedic MSS. are on the whole more accurate than the writers of other MSS., but their learning does not seem to extend to a knowledge of the minute rules of the *Prātisākhyā*, and they will commit

* See *Prātisākhyā*, *Sūtra* 309 seqq., where several more instances of the same kind are given. I should prefer to take *devapurohiti* as one word, but that was not the intention of the authors of the *Samhitā* and *Pada* texts.

occasionally the very mistakes against which they are warned by the *Prātisākhya*. Thus the *Prātisākhya* (Sūtra 799) warns the students against a common mistake of changing *vaiyasva* into *vayyasva*, i. e. by changing *ai* to *a*, and doubling the semivowel *y*. But this very mistake occurs in S 2, and another MS. gives *vaiyyasva*. See p. lvi.

If these arguments are sound, and if nothing can be said against the critical principles by which I have been guided

Aufrecht's
mistakes.

in editing the text of the *Rig-veda*, if the fourfold check, described above, fulfils every requirement that could be made for restoring that text which was known to *Sāyana*, and which was known, probably 2000 years earlier, to the authors of the *Prātisākhyas*, what can be the motives, it may fairly be asked, of those who clamour for a new and more critical edition, and who imagine that the *editio princeps* of the *Rig-veda* will share the fate of most of the *editiones principes* of the Greek and Roman classics, and be supplanted by new editions founded on the collation of other MSS.? No one could have rejoiced more sincerely than I did at the publication of the Romanised transliteration of the *Rig-veda*, carried out with so much patience and accuracy by Professor Aufrecht. It showed that there was a growing interest in this, the only true Veda; it showed that even those who could not read Sanskrit in the original *Devanāgarī*, wished to have access to the original text of these ancient hymns; it showed that the study of the Veda had a future before it like no other book of Sanskrit literature. My learned friend Professor Aufrecht has been most unfairly charged with having printed this Romanised text *me insciente vel invito*. My edition is *publici juris*, like any edition of Homer or Plato, and anybody might, with proper acknowledgment, have reprinted it, either in Roman or *Devanāgarī* letters. But far from keeping me in ignorance of his plan, Professor Aufrecht applied to me for the loan of the MSS. of the two *Mandalas* which I had not yet published, and I lent them to him most gladly, because, by seeing them printed at once, I felt far less

guilty in delaying the publication of the last volumes of my edition of the text and commentary. Nor could anything have been more honourable than the way in which Professor Aufrecht speaks of the true relation of his Romanised text to my edition. That there are misprints, and I, speaking for myself, ought to say mistakes also, in my edition of the Rig-veda, I know but too well; and if Professor Aufrecht, after carefully transcribing every word, could honestly say that their number is small, I doubt whether other scholars will be able to prove that their number is large. I believe I may with the same honesty return Professor Aufrecht's compliment, and considering the great difficulty of avoiding misprints in Romanised transcripts, I have always thought and I have always said that his reprint of the hymns of the Veda is remarkably correct and accurate. What, however, I must protest against, and what, I feel sure, Professor Aufrecht himself would equally protest against, is the supposition, and more than supposition of certain scholars, that wherever this later Latin transcript differs from my own Devanâgarî text, Professor Aufrecht is right, and I am wrong; that his various readings rest on the authority of new MSS., and constitute in fact a new recension of the Vedic hymns. Against this supposition I must protest most strongly, not for my own sake, but for the sake of the old book, and, still more, for the sake of the truth. No doubt it is natural to suppose that where a later edition differs from a former edition, it does so intentionally; and I do not complain of those who, without being able to have recourse to MSS. in order to test the authority of various readings, concluded that wherever the new text differed from the old, it was because the old text was at fault. In order to satisfy my own conscience on this point, I have collated a number of passages where Professor Aufrecht's text differs from my own, and I feel satisfied that in the vast majority of cases, I am right and he is wrong, and that his variations do not rest on the authority of MSS. I must not shrink from the duty of making good this assertion, and I therefore proceed to an examination of such passages as have occurred to me on

occasionally referring to his text, pointing out the readings both where he is right, and where he is wrong. The differences between the two texts may appear trifling, but I shall not avail myself of that plea. On the contrary, I quite agree with those scholars who hold that in truly critical scholarship there is nothing trifling. Besides, it is in the nature of the case that what may, by a stretch of the word, be called various readings in the Veda, must be confined to single letters or accents, and can but seldom extend to whole words, and never to whole sentences. I must therefore beg my readers to have patience while I endeavour to show that the text of the Rig-veda, as first published by me, though by no means faultless, was nevertheless not edited in so perfunctory a manner as some learned critics seem to suppose, and that it will not be easy to supplant it either by a collation of new MSS., such as are accessible at present, or by occasional references to the *Prâtisākhya*.

I begin with some mistakes of my own, mistakes which I might have avoided, if I had always consulted the *Prâtisākhya*, where single words or whole passages of the Veda are quoted. Some of these mistakes have been removed by Professor Aufrecht, others, however, appear in his transcript as they appear in my own edition.

I need hardly point out passages where palpable misprints in my edition have been repeated in Professor Aufrecht's text. I mean by palpable misprints, cases where a glance at the Pada text or at the *Samhitā* text or a reference to *Sāyana*'s commentary would show at once what was intended. Thus, for instance, in VI, 15, 3, *vṛidhē*, as I had printed in the *Samhitā*, was clearly a misprint for *vṛidhó*, as may be seen from the Pada, which gives *vṛidhák*, and from *Sāyana*. Here, though Professor Aufrecht repeats *vṛidhē*, I think it hardly necessary to show that the authority of the best MSS. (*S* 2 alone contains a correction of *vṛidhó* to *vṛidhē*) is in favour of *vṛidhák*, whatever we may think of the relative value of these two readings. One must be careful, however, in a text like that of the Vedic hymns, where the presence or absence of a single letter or accent begins to become

the object of the most learned and painstaking discussions, not to claim too large an indulgence for misprints. A misprint in the *Samhitā*, if repeated in the Pada, or if admitted even in the commentary of *Sāyana*, though it need not be put down to the editor's deplorable ignorance, becomes yet a serious matter, and I willingly take all the blame which is justly due for occasional accidents of this character. Such are, for instance, II, 12, 14, *sasamānām* instead of *sasamānām*; I, 124, 4, *sudhyúvaḥ*, in the Pada, instead of *sundhyúvaḥ*; and the substitution in several places of a short u instead of a long ū in such forms as *sūśávāma*, when occurring in the Pada; cf. I, 166, 14; 167, 9.

It is clear from the *Prātisākhya*, *Sūtra* 819 and 163, 5, that the words *ūtī́ndra* in IV, 29, 1, should not be joined together, but that the hiatus should remain. Hence *ūtī́ndra*, as printed in my edition and repeated in Professor Aufrecht's, should be corrected, and the hiatus be preserved, as it is in the fourth verse of the same hymn, *ūtī́ itthá*. MSS. S 1, S 3 are right; in S 2 the words are joined.

It follows from *Sūtra* 799 that to double the y in *vaiyasva* is a mistake, but a mistake which had to be pointed out and guarded against as early as the time of the *Prātisākhya*. In VIII, 26, 11, therefore, *vaiyyasváya*, as printed in my edition and repeated in Professor Aufrecht's, should be changed to *vaiyasváya*. MSS. S 1, S 3 are right, likewise P 1, P 2; but S 2 has the double mistake *vayyasváya*, as described in the *Prātisākhya*; another MS. of Wilson's has *vaiyy*. The same applies to VIII, 23, 24, and VIII, 24, 23. P 1 admits the mistaken spelling *vaiyasva*.

Some corrections that ought to be made in the Pada-*pāṭha* only, as printed in my edition, are pointed out in a note to *Sūtra* 738 of the *Prātisākhya*. Thus, according to *Sūtra* 583, 6, *srūyáḥ* in the Pada text of II, 10, 2, should be changed to *sruyáḥ*. MSS. P 1, P 2 have the short u.

In V, 7, 8, I had printed *súkiḥ* *shma*, leaving the a of

shma short in accordance with the *Prâtisâkhyâ*, Sûtra 514, where a string of words is given before which sma must not be lengthened, and where under No. 11 we find yâsmai. Professor Aufrecht has altered this, and gives the â as long, which is wrong. The MSS. S 1, S 2, S 3 have the short a.

Another word before which sma ought not to be lengthened is māvate. Hence, according to Sûtra 514, 14, I ought not to have printed in VI, 65, 4, shmâ māvate, but shma māvate. Here Professor Aufrecht has retained the long â, which is wrong. MSS. S 1, S 2, S 3 have the short a.

It follows from Sûtra 499 that in I, 138, 4, we should not lengthen the vowel of sú. Hence, instead of asyâ û shû na úpa sâtâye, as printed in my edition and repeated by Professor Aufrecht, we should read asyâ û shú na úpa sâtâye. S 1, S 2, S 3 have short u*.

In VII, 31, 4, I had by mistake printed viddhî instead of viddhî. The same reading is adopted by Professor Aufrecht (II, p. 24), but the authority of the *Prâtisâkhyâ*, Sûtra 445, can hardly be overruled. S 1, S 2, S 3 have viddhî.

While in cases like these, the *Prâtisâkhyâ* is an authority which, as far as I can judge, ought to overrule the authority of every MS., however ancient, we must in other cases depend either on the testimony of the best MSS. or be guided, in fixing on the right reading, by *Sâyana* and the rules of grammar. I shall therefore, in cases where I cannot consider Professor Aufrecht's readings as authoritative improvements, have to give my reasons why I adhere to the readings which I had originally adopted.

In V, 9, 4, I had printed by mistake purú yó instead of purî yó. I had, however, corrected this misprint in my edition of the *Prâtisâkhyâ*, 393, 532. Professor Aufrecht decides in favour of purú with a short u, but against the authority of the MSS., S 1, S 2, S 3, which have purî.

* In the same verse, I, 138, 4, the shu in ó shú tvâ should not be lengthened, for there is no rule, as far as I can see, in the *Prâtisâkhyâ* that would require the lengthening of sú before tvâ. See *Prâtisâkhyâ*, 491.

It was certainly a great mistake of mine, though it may seem more excusable in a Romanised transcript, that I did not follow the writers of the best MSS. in their use of the Avagraha, or, I should rather say, of that sign which, as far as the Veda is concerned, is very wrongly designated by the name of Avagraha. Avagraha, according to the Prâtisâkhya, never occurs in the Samhitâ text, but is the name given to that halt, stoppage, or pause which in the Pada text separates the component parts of compound words. That pause has the length of one short vowel, i.e. one mâtrâ. Of course, nothing is said by the Prâtisâkhya as to how the pause should be represented graphically, but it is several times alluded to as of importance in the recitation and accentuation of the Veda. What we have been in the habit of calling Avagraha is by the writers of certain MSS. of the Samhitâ text used as the sign of the Vivṛtti or hiatus. This hiatus, however, is very different from the Avagraha, for while the Avagraha has the length of one mâtrâ, the Vivṛtti or hiatus has the length of $\frac{1}{4}$ mâtrâ, if the two vowels are short; of $\frac{1}{2}$ mâtrâ, if either vowel is long; of $\frac{3}{4}$ mâtrâ, if both vowels are long. Now I have several times called attention to the fact that though this hiatus is marked in certain MSS. by the sign \ast , I have in my edition omitted it, because I thought that the hiatus spoke for itself and did not require a sign to attract the attention of European readers; while, on the contrary, I have inserted that sign where MSS. hardly ever use it, viz. when a short initial a is elided after a final e or o; (see my remarks on pp. 36, 39, of my edition of the Prâtisâkhya.) Although I thought, and still think, that this use of the sign \ast is more useful for practical purposes, yet I regret that, in this one particular, I should have deviated from the authority of the best MSS., and caused some misunderstandings on the part of those who have made use of my edition. If, for instance, I had placed the sign of the Vivṛtti, the \ast , in its proper place, or if, at least, I had not inserted it where, as we say, the initial a has been elided after e or o, Professor Bollensen would have seen at once that the authors of the Prâtisâkhyas fully agree with him in looking on this change, not as an

elision, but as a contraction. If, as sometimes happens, final o or e remain unchanged before initial short a, this is called the *Pañkâla* and *Prākya padavṛtti* (Sûtra 137). If, on the contrary, final o or e become one (*ekibhavati*) with the initial short a, this is called the *Abhinihita sandhi* (Sûtra 138). While the former, the hiatus of the *Pañkâla* and Eastern schools, is marked by the writers of several MSS. by the sign *, the *Abhinihita sandhi*, being a sandhi, is not marked by any sign *.

I, 3, 12. *râgati* (Aufr. p. 2) instead of *râgati* (M. M. vol. i, p. 75) is wrong.

I, 7, 9. *ya ékaḥ* (Aufr. p. 5) should be *yá ékaḥ* (M. M. vol. i, p. 110), because the relative pronoun is never without an accent. The relative particle *yathâ* may be without an accent, if it stands at the end of a *pâda*; and though there are exceptions to this rule, yet in VIII, 21, 5, where Professor Aufrecht gives *yáthâ*, the MSS. are unanimous in favour of *yathâ* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 480). See *Phit-sûtra*, ed. Kielhorn, p. 54.

I, 10, 11. *â tú* (Aufr. p. 7) should be *á tú* (M. M. vol. i, p. 139), because *â* is never without the accent.

I, 10, 12. *gúshṭâḥ*, which Professor Aufrecht specially mentions as having no final Visarga in the Pada, has the Visarga in all the MSS., (Aufr. p. 7, M. M. vol. i, p. 140.)

I, 11, 4. *kávir* (Aufr. p. 7) should be *kavír* (M. M. vol. i, p. 143).

I, 22, 8, read *râdhâmsi*.

I, 40, 1 and 6. There is no excuse for the accent either on *tvémahe* or on *vókema*, while *sákāñ* in I, 51, 11, ought to have the accent on the first syllable.

I, 49, 3. Rosen was right in not eliding the a in *divó ántebhyaḥ*. S 1, S 2, S 3 preserve the initial a, nor does the *Prâtisākhya* anywhere provide for its suppression.

I, 54, 8. *kshátram* (Aufr. p. 46) is a mere misprint for *kshatrám*.

* As to the system or want of system, according to which the *Abhinihita sandhi* takes place in the *Saṃhitâ*, see p. xlviii seq.

I, 55, 7. vandanasrúd (Aufr. p. 47) instead of vandanasrud (M. M. vol. i, p. 514) is wrong.

I, 57, 2. samásita instead of samásita had been corrected in my reprint of the first *Mandala*, published at Leipzig. See Bollensen, *Zeitschrift der D. M. G.*, vol. xxii, p. 626.

I, 61, 7, read *vishnuh* ; I, 64, 2, read *súkayah* ; I, 64, 5, read *dhūtayah*.

I, 61, 16. Rosen had rightly printed *hāriyoganā* with a long *ā* both in the *Samhitā* and *Pada* texts, and I ought not to have given the short *a* instead. All the MSS., S 1, S 2, S 3, P 1, and P 2, give the long *ā*. Professor Aufrecht gives the short *a* in the *Pada*, which is wrong.

I, 67, 2 (4). *vidántim* (M. M. vol. i, p. 595) is perfectly right, as far as the authority of the MSS. and of *Sāyana* is concerned, and should not have been altered to *vindántim* (Aufr. p. 57).

I, 72, 2, read *vatsám* ; I, 72, 6, read *parśñ* ; I, 76, 3, read *dhákshy* ; I, 82, 1, read *yadá*.

I, 83, 3. Rosen was right in giving *ásamyattah*. I gave *ásamyatah* on the authority of P 1, but all the other MSS. have *tt*.

I, 84, 1. *indra* (Aufr. p. 68) cannot have the accent on the first syllable, because it does not stand at the beginning of a *pāda* (M. M. vol. i, p. 677). The same applies to *indra*, VI, 41, 4, (Aufr. p. 429) instead of *indra* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 734) ; to *ágne*, I, 140, 12, (Aufr. p. 130) instead of *agne* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 133). In III, 36, 3, on the contrary, *indra*, being at the head of a *pāda*, ought to have the accent on the first syllable, *indra* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 855), not *indra* (Aufr. p. 249). The same mistake occurs again, III, 36, 10 (Aufr. p. 250) ; IV, 32, 7, (Aufr. p. 305) ; IV, 32, 12, (Aufr. p. 305) ; VIII, 3, 12, (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 86). In V, 61, 1, *narah* should have no accent ; whereas in VII, 91, 3, it should have the accent on the first syllable. In VIII, 8, 19, *vipanyû* should have no accent, and Professor Aufrecht gives it correctly in the notes, where he has likewise very properly removed the *Avagraha* which I had inserted.

I, 88, 1, read *yâta* (M. M. vol. i, p. 708), not *yâtha* (Aufr. p. 72).

I, 90, 1, read *rigunítĩ*; I, 94, 11, read *yavasádo* (M. M. vol. i, p. 766), not *yayasádo* (Aufr. p. 80).

I, 118, 9. *abhibhūtim* (Aufr. p. 105) instead of *abhíbhūtim* (M. M. vol. i, p. 957) cannot be right, considering that in all other passages *abhíbhūti* has the accent on the second syllable. S 1, S 2, S 3 have the accent on the i.

I, 128, 4. *ghrītasrīr* (Aufr. p. 117) instead of *ghrītasrīr* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 52) is wrong.

I, 144, 2, read *pārivritāh* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 155) instead of *parīvritāh* (Aufr. p. 133).

I, 145, 5. Professor Aufrecht (p. 134) gives *upamasyām*, both in the *Saṃhitā* and *Pada* texts, as having the accent on the last syllable. I had placed the accent on the penultimate, (*Pada*, *upa-māsyām*, vol. ii, p. 161,) and whatever may be the reading of other MSS., this is the only possible accentuation. S 1, S 2, S 3 have the right accent.

I, 148, 4. *pūrūni* (Aufr. p. 136) instead of *purūni* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 170) does not rest, as far as I know, on the authority of any MSS. S 1, S 2, S 3 have *purūni*.

I, 151, 7. *gakkhatho* (Aufr. p. 137) should be *gákkhatho* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 181).

I, 161, 12. All the *Pada* MSS. read *prá ábravīt*, separating the two words and accentuating each. Though the accent is irregular, yet, considering the peculiar construction of the verse, in which *prá* and *pró* are used as adverbs rather than as prepositions, I should not venture with Professor Aufrecht (p. 144) to write *prá abravīt*. The MSS. likewise have *á ágagan*, I, 161, 4; and *prá ágáh*, VIII, 48, 2, not *prá agáh*, as Aufrecht gives in his second edition.

I, 163, 11. *dhrágīman* (Aufr. p. 147) instead of *dhrágīmān* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 245) is wrong.

I, 163, 13. *gamyā* (Aufr. p. 148) instead of *gamyā* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 246) is wrong.

I, 164, 17, read *párena* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 259) instead of *paréna* (Aufr. p. 149).

I, 164, 38. The first *kikyúh* ought to have the accent, and has it in all the MSS., (Aufr. p. 151, M. M. vol. ii, p. 278.)

I, 165, 5. A mere change of accent may seem a small

matter, yet it is frequently of the highest importance in the interpretation of the Veda. Thus in I, 165, 5, I had, in accordance with the MSS. S 1, S 2, S 3, printed *étân* (vol. ii, p. 293) with the accent on the first syllable. Professor Aufrecht alters this into *etân* (p. 153), which, no doubt, would be the right form, if it were intended for the accusative plural of the pronoun, but not if it is meant, as it is here, for the accusative plural of *éta*, the speckled deer of the Maruts.

I, 165, 15. *yâsishṭa* (Aufr. p. 154) instead of *yâsishṭa* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 298) is not supported by any MS.

I, 169, 7, instead of *patayânta* (Aufr. p. 158), read *patáyanta* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 322).

I, 174, 7. *kúyâvâkam* (Aufr. p. 162) should be *kúyavâkam* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 340).

I, 177, 1. *yuktá*, which I had adopted from MS. S 3 (*prima manu*), is not supported by other MSS., though P 2 reads *yuttká*. Professor Aufrecht, who had retained *yuktá* in the text, has afterwards corrected it to *yuktvá*, and in this he was right. In I, 177, 2, *gâhi* for *yâhi* is wrong.

I, 188, 4. *astrinan* (Aufr. p. 171) instead of *astrinan* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 395) can only be a misprint.

II, 29, 6. *kártâd* (Aufr. p. 203) instead of *kartâd* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 560) is wrong.

II, 40, 4. *ḥakra* (Aufr. p. 214) instead of *ḥakrá* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 614) is wrong.

III, 7, 7. *guh* (Aufr. p. 226) instead of *gúh* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 666) is wrong; likewise III, 30, 10, *gáh* (Aufr. p. 241) instead of *gáh* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 792).

III, 17, 1. *igyate* (Aufr. p. 232) instead of *agyate* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 722) is impossible.

III, 47, 1. Professor Aufrecht (p. 256) puts the nominative *índro* instead of the vocative *indra*, which I had given (vol. ii, p. 902). I doubt whether any MSS. support that change (S 1, S 2, S 3 have *indra*), but it is clear that *Sâyana* takes *indra* as a vocative, and likewise the *Nirukta*.

III, 50, 2. Professor Aufrecht (p. 258) gives *asya*, both in the *Samhitâ* and *Pada*, without the accent on the last syllable. But all the MSS. that I know (S 1, S 2, S 3, P 1,

P 2) give it with the accent on the last syllable (M. M. vol. ii, p. 912), and this no doubt is right. The same mistake occurs again in III, 51, 10, (Aufr. p. 259); IV, 5, 11, (Aufr. p. 281); IV, 36, 2, (Aufr. p. 309); V, 12, 3, (Aufr. p. 337); while in VIII, 103, 9, (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 195) the MSS. consistently give *asya* as unaccented, whereas Professor Aufrecht, in this very passage, places the accent on the last syllable. On the same page (p. 259) *amandan*, in the Pada, is a misprint for *ámandan*.

III, 53, 18. *asi* (Aufr. p. 262) instead of *ási* (M. M. vol. ii, p. 934) is wrong, because *hí* requires that the accent should remain on *ási*. S 1, S 2, S 3, P 1, P 2 have *ási*.

IV, 4, 7. *svá áyushe* (Aufr. p. 279) instead of *svá áyushi* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 37) is not supported by any good MSS., nor required by the sense of the passage. S 1, S 2, S 3, P 1, P 2 have *áyushi*.

IV, 5, 7. *árupitam*, in the Pada, (Aufr. p. 280) instead of *árupitam* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 45) is right, as had been shown in the *Prātisākhya Sūtra* 179, though by a misprint the long *ā* of the *Samhitā* had been put in the place of the short *a* of the Pada.

IV, 5, 9. read *gaúh* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 46) instead of *góh* (Aufr. p. 281).

IV, 15, 2. *yāti*, with the accent on the first syllable, is supported by all MSS. against *yāti* (Aufr. p. 287). The same applies to *yāti* in IV, 29, 2, and to *várante* in IV, 31, 9.

IV, 18, 11. *amī*, without any accent (Aufr. p. 293), instead of *amī* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 105) is wrong, because *amī* is never unaccented.

IV, 21, 9. *no*, without an accent (Aufr. p. 296), instead of *nó* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 120) is wrong.

IV, 26, 3. *átithigvam* (Aufr. p. 300) instead of *atithigvám* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 140) and VI, 47, 22, *átithigvasya* (Aufr. p. 437) instead of *atithigváśya* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 776) are wrong, for *atithigvá* never occurs again except with the accent on the last syllable. The MSS. do not vary. Nor do they vary in the accentuation of *kútsa*: hence *kútsam* (Aufr. p. 300) should be *kútsam* (M. M. vol. iii. p. 139).

IV, 36, 6. Professor Aufrecht (p. 309) has altered the accent of *āvishuḥ* into *āvishúḥ*, but the MSS. are unanimous in favour of *āvishuḥ* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 181).

Again in IV, 41, 9, the MSS. support the accentuation of *ágman* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 200), while Professor Aufrecht (p. 313) has altered it to *agman*.

IV, 42, 9. *ádâsat*, being preceded by *hí*, ought to have the accent; (Aufrecht, p. 314, has *adâsat* without the accent.) For the same reason, V, 29, 3, *ávindat* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 342) ought not to have been altered to *avindat* (Aufr. p. 344).

IV, 50, 4. *vyóman* is a misprint for *vyòman*.

V, 15, 5. Professor Aufrecht (p. 338) writes *dirghám* instead of *dógham* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 314). This, no doubt, was done intentionally, and not by accident, as we see from the change of accent. But *dógham*, though it occurs but once, is supported in this place by all the best MSS., and has been accepted by Professor Roth in his Dictionary.

V, 34, 4. *práyato* (Aufr. p. 351) instead of *práyatâ* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 371) is wrong.

V, 42, 9. *visármānam* (Aufr. p. 358) instead of *visarmānam* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 402) is wrong.

V, 44, 4. *parvané* (Aufr. p. 360) instead of *pravané* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 415) is wrong.

V, 83, 4. *vānti* (Aufr. p. 389) instead of *vānti* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 554) is supported by no MSS.

V, 85, 6. *āsiñkāntih* (Aufr. p. 391) instead of *āsiñkāntih* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 560) is not supported either by MSS. or by grammar, as *siñk* belongs to the *Tud*-class. On the same grounds *isháyantaḥ*, VI, 16, 27 (M. M. vol. iii, p. 638), ought not to have been changed to *ishayántaḥ* (Aufr. p. 408), nor VI, 24, 7, *avakarsáyanti* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 687) into *avakársayanti* (Aufr. p. 418).

VI, 46, 10, read *girvanas* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 763) instead of *gírvanas* (Aufr. p. 435).

VI, 60, 10. *krinoti* (Aufr. p. 450) instead of *krinóti* (M. M. vol. iii, p. 839) is wrong.

VII, 40, 4. *aryamá āpah* (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 35), in the Pada, instead of *aryamá āpaḥ* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 81) is wrong.

VII, 51, 1. âdityânām (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 40) instead of adityânām (M. M. vol. iv, p. 103) is wrong.

VII, 64, 2. iām (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 50) instead of iām (M. M. vol. iv, p. 146) is wrong. In the same verse gopāk in the Pada should be changed in my edition to gopā.

VII, 66, 5. yó (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 51) instead of yé (M. M. vol. iv, p. 151) is indeed supported by S 3, but evidently untenable on account of atipíprati.

VII, 72, 3. In abudhran Professor Aufrecht has properly altered the wrong spelling abudhnan; and, as far as the authority of the best MSS. is concerned (S 1, S 2, S 3), he is also right in putting a final ñ, although Professor Bollensen prefers the dental n; (Zeitschrift der D. M. G., vol. xxii, p. 599.) The fact is that Vedic MSS. use the Anusvâra dot for final nasals before all class-letters, and leave it to us to interpret that dot according to the letter which follows. Before I felt quite certain on this point, I have in several cases retained the dot, as given by the MSS., instead of changing it, as I ought to have done according to my system of writing Devanâgarî, into the corresponding nasal, provided it represents an original n. In I, 71, 1, S 2, S 3 have the dot in agushran, but S 1 has dental n. In IX, 87, 5, asrigran has the dot; i. e. S 1 has the dot, and nkh, dental n joined to kh; S 2 has nkh without the dot before the n; S 3 has the dot, and then kh. In IV, 24, 6, the spelling of the Samhitâ âvivenam tám would leave it doubtful whether we ought to read âvivenan tám or âvivenam tám; S 1 and S 3 read âvivenam tám, but S 2 has âvivenan tám; P 2 has âvi-venan tám, and P 1 had the same originally, though a later hand changed it to âvi-venam tám. In IV, 25, 3, on the contrary, S 1 and S 3 write âvivenam; S 2, âvivenam; P 1 and P 2, âvi-venam. What is intended is clear enough, viz. âvi-venan in IV, 24, 6; âvi-venam in IV, 25, 3. [In the new edition âvivenam has been left in both passages.]

VII, 73, 1. arvinâ (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 56) instead of arvinâ (M. M. vol. iv, p. 176) is wrong. On the same page, dhîshnye, VII, 72, 3, should have the accent on the first syllable.

VII, 77, 1. In this verse, which has been so often dis-

cussed (see Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 472 ; Böhlingk and Roth, Dictionary, vol. ii, p. 968 ; Bollensen, Orient und Occident, vol. ii, p. 463), all the MSS. which I know, read *karāyai*, and not either *karāthai* nor *garāyai*.

VIII, 2, 29. *kirīnam* (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 84) instead of *kārīnam* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 308) does not rest on the authority of any MSS., nor is it supported by *Sāyana*.

VIII, 9, 9. Professor Aufrecht has altered the very important form *ākukyuvimāhi* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 389) to *ākukyavimāhi* (vol. ii, p. 98). The question is whether this was done intentionally and on the authority of any MSS. My own MSS. support the form *ākukyuvimāhi*, and I see that Professor Roth accepts this form.

VIII, 32, 14. *āyāntāram* (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 129) instead of *āyantāram* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 567) is wrong.

VIII, 47, 15. *dushvāpnyam* (Aufr. vol. ii, p. 151) is not so correct as *duśshvāpnyam* (M. M. vol. iv, p. 660), or, better, *dushshvāpnyam* (Prātisākhya, Sūtras 255 and 364), though it is perfectly true that the MSS. write *dushvāpnyam*.

[I ought to state that all these errata have been corrected by Professor Aufrecht in his second edition.]

In the ninth and tenth *Mandalas* I have not to defend myself, and I need not therefore give a list of the passages where I think that Professor Aufrecht's text is not supported by the best MSS. My own edition of these *Mandalas* will soon be published, and I need hardly say that where it differs from Professor Aufrecht's text, I am prepared to show that I had the best authorities on my side.

Professor Aufrecht writes in the second edition of his Romanised text of the *Rig-veda* (p. iv): 'Um den Herren, die diese Druckfehler in majorem gloriam suam mit so grosser Schonung hervor gehoben haben, einen Gegendienst zu erweisen, bemerke ich einige derselben.' Dieser Gegendienst, so gut er gemeint war, ist leider nicht sehr bedeutend ausgefallen, auch nicht immer in majorem gloriam Catonis.

In I, 161, 2, Professor Aufrecht objects to *katuras krinotana*. I felt doubtful about it, and in the commentary I printed *katurah krinotana*. In IV, 33, 5, the reading

ātus kara is sanctioned by the authority of the *Prātisākhya*, Sūtra 281, 4.

In I, 181, 5, Aufrecht prefers *mathrā*; *Sāyana*, Böhtlingk and Roth, and I prefer *mathnā*.

In II, 11, 10, he has discovered that *gûrvît* was meant for *gûrvât*. Whitney still quotes *gûrvît*.

In III, 9, 4, he has discovered that *apsu* should be *-psu*; but this had been already corrected.

In III, 25, 2, the final *a* of *vaha* ought to be long in the *Samhitā*.

In IV, 19, 4, instead of *drilhā ni* read *drilhāni*.

In VII, 33, 2, instead of *avrinītā* read *-vrinītā*.

In VII, 35, 13, the Visarga in *devagopāh* should be deleted.

In VII, 42, 2, the *Anusvāra* in *yumkshvā* should be deleted.

In VIII, 2, 30, the *anudāttatara* should be shifted from the ultimate to the penultimate, *dadhīré*, not *dadhīre*.

In VIII, 51, 3, *avishyanta* was meant for *arishyantam*.

In VIII, 55, 5, for *na* read *ā*. The MSS. vary in both cases.

In IX, 108, 7, in *vanakraksha*, the *kra* was printed as *ri*. Professor Aufrecht might have seen it correctly printed in the index. *Sāyana* read *vanarīksha*.

In X, 28, 11, Professor Aufrecht thinks that the Pada should have *godhāh* instead of *godhā*. I think *godhā* is right, in spite of Professor Aufrecht's appeal to the silence of the *Prātisākhya*. The fact is that *godhāh* never occurs, while *godhā* occurs in the preceding verse, and again VIII, 69, 9.

After such a flourish of trumpets, we expected more from Professor Aufrecht; still we must learn to be grateful even for small mercies.

Having said so much in vindication of the text of the *Rig-veda* as published by me, and in defence of my principles of criticism which seem to me so self-evident as hardly to deserve the name of *canones critici*, I feel bound at the same time both to acknowledge some inaccuracies that have occurred in the index at the end of each volume, and to defend some entries in that index which have been challenged without sufficient cause.

It has been supposed that in the index at the end of my fourth volume, the seventeenth verse of the 34th hymn in the seventh *Mandala* has been wrongly assigned to Ahi Budhnya, and that one half only of that verse should have been reserved for that deity. I do not deny that we should be justified in deriving that sense from the words of the *Anukramanikâ*, but I cannot admit that my own interpretation is untenable. As *Sâyana* does not speak authoritatively on the subject, I followed the authority of *Shadgurusishya*. This commentator of the *Anukramanikâ* says: atra *ka* abgâm ukthair ahim *grinisha* ity ardharko • bganâmno * devasya stutiḥ; mâ no • hir budhnya ity ardharko • hribudhnyanâmno devasya ^b. Another commentator says: abgâm ukthair ardharko • hiḥ; uttaro mâ no • hir ity ahir budhnyah. From this we learn that both commentators looked upon the *Dvipadâs* as *ardharkas* or half-verses, and ascribed the whole of verse 16 to Ahir abgâh, the whole of verse 17 to Ahir budhnyah. It will be seen from an accurate examination of *Sâyana*'s commentary on verse 17, that in the second interpretation of the second half of verse 17, he labours to show that in this portion, too, Ahir budhnyah may be considered as the deity.

It is perfectly right to say that the words of the *Anukramanikâ*, abgâm aheh, signify that the verse beginning with abgâm, belongs to Ahi. But there was no misprint in my index. It will be seen that *Shadgurusishya* goes even beyond me, and calls that deity simply Abga, leaving out Ahi altogether, as understood. I was anxious to show the distinction between Abgâ Ahiḥ and Ahir Budhnyah, as the deities of the two successive verses, and I did not expect that any reader could possibly misinterpret my entry ^c.

With regard to hymns 91 and 92 of the seventh *Mandala*, it is true, that in the index I did not mention that certain verses in which two deities are mentioned (91, 2 ;

* I find that Mr. Macdonell in his edition of the *Sarvânukramanî* reads ardharko • hinâmno. If this is right, part of my argument would fall.

^b MS. Wilson 379 has, ardharko nâmano daivatasya, and in the margin • hi. Ahirbudhnya seems to have been taken as one word.

^c The editor of the Bombay edition of the text of the *Rig-veda* assigns verse 16 to Ahi, verse 17 to Ahirbudhnya.

4-7; 92, 2), must be considered as addressed not to Vāyu alone, but to Vāyu and Indra. It will be seen from Sāyana's introduction to hymn 90, that he, too, wrongly limits the sentence of the Anukramanikā, *aindryas ka yā dvivaduktāḥ*, to the fifth and following verses of hymn 90, and that he never alludes to this proviso again in his introductory remarks to hymn 91 and 92, though, of course, he explains the verses, in which a dual occurs, as addressed to two deities, viz. Indra and Vāyu. The same omission, whether intentional or unintentional, occurs in Shadgurusishya's commentary. The other commentary, however, assigns the verses of the three hymns rightly. The subject has evidently been one that excited attention in very early days, for in the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, V, 20, we actually find that the word *vām* which occurs in hymn 90, 1, and which might be taken as a dual, though Sāyana explains it as a singular, is changed into *te* *.

In hymn VII, 104, *rakshohavau* might certainly be added as an epithet of Indrā-Somau, and Shadgurusishya clearly takes it in that sense. The Anukramanikā says: *indrāsomā paññādhikaindrāsomam rākshoghnām śāpābhisāpaprayam*.

In hymn VIII, 67, it has been supposed that the readings *Samada* and *Sāmada* instead of *Sammada* and *Sāmmada* were due to a misprint. This is not the case. That I was aware of the other spelling of this name, viz. *Sammada* and *Sāmmada*, I had shown in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature (2nd ed.), p. 39, where I had translated the passage of the Sāṅkhāyana-sūtras in which Matsya Sāmmada occurs, and had also called attention to the Āsvalāyana-sūtras X, 7, and the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa XIII, 3, 1, 1,

* The interpunction of Dr. Haug's edition (p. 128) should be after *te*. Shadgurusishya says: *ata eva brāhmaṇasūtrayoḥ praūge vāyavyatvāya prāvīraya sukāyo dadrire^b vām iti dvivātanasthāne ta ity ekavātanapāḥ/kaḥ kṛitah, vām ity uktam^b ked aindratvam ka syād iti*. Possibly the same change should be made in Āsvalāyana's Śrauta Sūtras, VIII, 11, and it has been made by Rāma Nārāyaṇa Vidyāratna. The remark of the commentator, however, *dadrire ta iti prayogapāḥ/kaḥ*, looks as if *vām* might have been retained in the text. The MSS. I have collated are in favour of *te*.

^b Mr. Macdonell (Sarvānukramanī, p. 133) inserts *ta iti* after *dadrire*.

where the same passage is found. I there spelt the name Sâmmada, because the majority of the MSS. were in favour of that spelling. In the edition of the *Āsvalāyana-sūtras*, which has since been published by Rāma Nārāyaṇa Vidyāranya, the name is spelt Sāmada. My own opinion is that Sâmmada is the right spelling, but that does not prove that Sāyana thought so; and unless I deviated from the principles which I had adopted for a critical restoration of Sāyana's text, I could not but write Sāmada in our passage. B 1 and B 4 omit sāmada, but both give samadākhyasya; Ca. gives likewise samadākhyasya, and A. semadākhyasya. This, I believe, was meant by the writer for sammadākhyasya, for in the passage from the *Anukramanī* both A. and Ca. give sâmmado. I then consulted the commentary of Shadgurusishya, and there again the same MS. gave twice sâmmada, once sāmada, which is explained by samadākhyamahāmīnarāgaputra. A better MS. of Shadgurusishya, MS. Wilson 379, gives the readings sâmmado, sâmmada, and sammadākhyasya. The other commentary gives distinctly sāmāda. [I have adopted sammada in the new edition.]

In IX, 68, Professor Aufrecht adopts what he considers the bold reading Vatsapri; I prefer to be timid and allow Sāyana his own reading Vatsapri; see *Sarvānukramanī*, ed. Macdonell, pp. 34, 146.

It will be seen from these remarks that many things have to be considered before one can form an independent judgment as to the exact view adopted by Sāyana in places where he differs from other authorities, or as to the exact words in which he clothed his meaning. Such cases occur again and again. Thus in IX, 86, I find that Professor Aufrecht ascribes the first ten verses to the *Akrishṭas*, whereas Sāyana calls them *Ākrishṭas*. It is perfectly true that the best MSS. of the *Anukramanīkā* have *Akrishṭa*, it is equally true that the name of these *Akrishṭas* is spelt with a short a in the *Harivamśa*, 11,533, but an editor of Sāyana's work is not to alter the occasional mistakes of that learned commentator, and Sāyana certainly called these poets *Ākrishṭas*.

Verses 21-30 of the same hymn are ascribed by Professor Aufrecht to the *Prisniyah*. Here, again, several MSS. support that reading; and in Shadgurusishya's commentary, the correction of *prisniyah* into *prisinayah* is made by a later hand. But Sâyana clearly took *prisinayah* for a nominative plural of *prisni*, and in this case he certainly was right. The Dictionary of Böhtlingk and Roth quotes the Mahâbhârata, VII, 8728, in support of the peculiar reading of *prisniyah*, but the published text gives *prisinayah*. Professor Benfey, in his list of poets (Ind. Stud. vol. iii, p. 223), gives *prisniyoga* as one word, not *prisniyogâ*, as stated in the Dictionary of Böhtlingk and Roth, but this is evidently meant for two words, viz. *prisinayo* + *gâh*. However, whether *prisniyah* or *prisinayah* be the real name of these poets, an editor of Sâyana is bound to give that reading of the name which Sâyana believed to be the right one, i. e. *prisinayah*.*

Again, in the same hymn, Professor Aufrecht ascribes verses 31-40 to the Atris. We should then have to read *tritiye* + *trayah*. But Sâyana read *tritiye trayah*, and ascribes verses 31-40 to the three companies together of the *Rishis* mentioned before. On this point the MSS. admit of no doubt, for we read: *katurthasya ka dasarkasya âkrishâtâ mâshâ ityâdiddvinâmânas trayo ganâ drashâtârah*. I do not say that the other explanation is wrong; I only say that, whether right or wrong, Sâyana certainly read *trayah*, not *atrayah*; and an editor of Sâyana has no more right to correct the text, supported by the best MSS., in the first and second, than in the third of these passages, all taken from one and the same hymn.

But though I insist so strongly on a strict observance of the rules of diplomatic criticism with regard to the text of the Rig-veda, nay, even of Sâyana, I insist equally strongly on the right of independent criticism, which ought to begin where diplo-

* Professor Aufrecht in his new edition of the text (1877) adopts the more timid reading *prisinayah*. See also *Bṛhat-Samhitâ*, transl. by Kern, p. 2: *Sikâtââ prisinayo gargâ vâ lakhilyâ marîtipââ bhrîgavo ângirasaḥ kaiva sūksmâs kânye maharshayah*.

matic criticism ends. Considering the startling antiquity which we can claim for every letter and accent of our MSS., so far as they are authenticated by the *Prâtisâkhya*, to say nothing of the passages of many hymns which are quoted verbatim in the *Brâhmanas*, the *Kalpa-sûtras*, the *Nirukta*, the *Bṛihaddevatâ*, and the *Anukramanis*, I should deem it reckless to alter one single letter or one single accent in an edition of the hymns of the *Rig-veda*. As the text has been handed down to us, so it should remain; and whatever alterations and corrections we, the critical *Mlekkhas* of the nineteenth century, have to propose, should be kept distinct from that time-hallowed inheritance. Unlikely as it may sound, it is true nevertheless that we, the scholars of the nineteenth century, are able to point out mistakes in the text of the *Rig-veda* which escaped the attention of the most learned among the native scholars of the sixth century B.C. No doubt, these scholars, even if they had perceived such mistakes, would hardly have ventured to correct the text of their sacred writings. The authors of the *Prâtisâkhya* had before their eyes or ears a text ready made, of which they registered every peculiarity, nay, in which they would note and preserve every single irregularity, even though it stood alone amidst hundreds of analogous cases. With us the case is different. Where we see a rule observed in 99 cases, we feel strongly tempted and sometimes justified in altering the 100th case in accordance with what we consider to be a general rule. Yet even then I feel convinced we ought not to do more than place our conjectural readings below the *textus receptus* of the *Veda*,—a text so ancient and venerable that no scholar of any historical tact or critical taste would venture to foist into it a conjectural reading, however plausible, nay, however undeniable.

There can be no clearer case of corruption in the traditional text of the *Rig-veda* than, for instance, in I, 70, 4, where the *Pada* text reads :

vârdhân yâm pûrvîḥ kshapâḥ ví-rûpâḥ sthâtúḥ ka rátham rítâ-pravitam.

All scholars who have touched on this verse, Professors Benfey, Bollensen, Roth, and others, have pointed out that

instead of *ka rátham*, the original poet must have said *karátham*. The phrase *sthátúh karátham*, what stands and moves, occurs several times. It is evidently an ancient phrase, and hence we can account for the preservation in it of the old termination of the nom. sing. of neuters in *ri*, which here, as in the Greek *μάρ-τυρ* or *μάρ-τυς*, masc., appears as *ur* or *us*, while in the ordinary Sanskrit we find *ri* only. This nom. sing. neut. in *us*, explains also the common genitives and ablatives, *pituh*, *mātuḥ*, &c., which stand for *pitur-s*, *mátur-s*. This phrase *sthátúh karátham* occurs :

I, 58, 5. *sthátúh karátham bhayate patatrínah*.

What stands and what moves is afraid of Agni.

I, 68, 1. *sthátúh karátham aktún ví ūrnot*.

He lighted up what stands and what moves during every night.

I, 72, 6. *pasún ka sthâtrñ karátham ka páhi*.

Protect the cattle, and what stands and moves !

Here it has been proposed to read *sthátúh* instead of *sthâtrñ*, and I confess that this emendation is very plausible. One does not see how *pasú*, cattle, could be called immobilia or fixtures, unless the poet wished to make a distinction between cattle that are kept fastened in stables, and cattle that are allowed to roam about freely in the homestead. This distinction is alluded to, for instance, in the *Satapatha-brâhmaṇa*, XI, 8, 3, 2. *saurya evaisha pasuḥ syâd iti, tasmâd etasminn astamite paravo badhyante ; badhnanty ekân yathâgoshtam, eka upasamâyanti*.

I, 70, 2. *gârbhaḥ ka sthâtām gârbhaḥ karátham*, (read *sthâtrām*, and see Bollensen, *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 462.)

He who is within all that stands and all that moves.

The word *karátha*, if it occurs by itself, means flock, movable property :

III, 31, 15. *ât ít sâkhi-bhyaḥ karátham sám airat*.

He brought together, for his friends, the flocks.

VIII, 33, 8. *puru-trâ karátham dadhe*.

He bestowed flocks on many people.

X, 92, 13. *prâ naḥ pûshâ karátham—avatu*.

May Pûshan protect our flock !

Another idiomatic phrase in which *sthâtúh* occurs is *sthâtúh gágatah*, and here *sthâtúh* is really a genitive :

IV, 53, 6. *gágatah sthâtúh ubháyasya yáh vaś*.

He who is lord of both, of what is movable and what is immovable.

VI, 50, 7. *vísvasya sthâtúh gágatah gánitríh*.

They who created all that stands and moves.

VII, 60, 2. *vísvasya sthâtúh gágatah ka gopáh*.

The guardians of all that stands and moves. Cf. X, 63, 8.

I, 159, 3. *sthâtúh ka satyám gágatah ka dhármani pu-trásya páthah padám ádvayávinah*.

Truly while you uphold all that stands and moves, you protect the home of the guileless son. Cf. II, 31, 5.

But although I have no doubt that in I, 70, 4, the original poet said *sthâtúh karátham*, I should be loath to suppress the evidence of the mistake and alter the Pada text from *ka rátham* to *karátham*. The very mistake is instructive, as showing us the kind of misapprehension to which the collectors of the Vedic text were liable, and enabling us to judge how far the limits of conjectural criticism may safely be extended.

A still more extraordinary case of misunderstanding on the part of the original compilers of the Vedic texts, and likewise of the authors of the *Prātisākhya*s, the *Niruktas*, and other Vedic treatises, has been pointed out by Professor Kuhn. In an article of his, 'Zur ältesten Geschichte der Indogermanischen Völker' (*Indische Studien*, vol. i, p. 351), he made the following observation: 'The Lithuanian *laukas*, Lett. *lauks*, Pruss. *laukas*, all meaning field, agree exactly with the Sk. *lokas*, world, Lat. *locus*, Low Germ. (in East-Frisia and Oldenburg) *louch*, *lôch*, village. All these words are to be traced back to the Sk. *uru*, Gr. *εὐρύς*, broad, wide. The initial *u* is lost, as in Goth. *rûms*, O. H. G. *rûmi*, *rûmin* (Low Germ. *rûme*, an open uncultivated field in a forest), and the *r* changed into *l*. In support of this derivation it should be observed that in the Veda *loka* is frequently preceded by the particle *u*, which probably was only separated from it by the *Diaskeuastæ*, and that the meaning is

that of open space.' Although this derivation has met with little favour, I confess that I look upon this remark, excepting only the Latin *locus**, i. e. *stlocus*, as one of the most ingenious of this eminent scholar. The fact is that this particle *u* before *loka* is one of the most puzzling occurrences in the Veda. Professor Bollensen says that *loka* never occurs without a preceding *u* in the first eight *Mandalas*, and this is perfectly true with the exception of one passage which he has overlooked, VIII, 100, 12, *dyaúh dehí lokám vágrāya vi-skábhe*, *Dyu!* give room for the lightning to step forth! Professor Bollensen (l. c. p. 603) reads *vritráya* instead of *vágrāya*, without authority. He objects to *dyaúh* as a vocative, which should be *dyaŭh*; but *dyaúh* may be *dyóh*, a genitive belonging to *vágrāya*, in which case we should translate, Make room for the lightning of *Dyu* to step forth!

But what is even more important is the fact that the occurrence of this unaccented *u* at the beginning of a *pāda* is against the very rules, or, at least, runs counter to the very observations which the authors of the *Prātisākhya* have made on the inadmissibility of an unaccented word in such a place, so that they had to insert a special provision, *Prāt.* 978, exempting the unaccented *u* from this observation: *anudāttam tu pādādaṁ novargam vidyate padam*, 'no unaccented word is found at the beginning of a *pāda* except *u*!' Although I have frequently insisted on the fact that such statements of the *Prātisākhya* are not to be considered as rules, but simply as more or less general statistical accumulations of facts actually occurring in the Veda, I have also pointed out that we are at liberty to found on these collected facts inductive observations which may assume the character of real rules. Thus, in our case, we can well understand why there should be none, or, at least, very few instances, where an unaccented word begins a *pāda*. We should not begin a verse with an enclitic particle in any other language either; and as in Sanskrit a verb at the

* On *locus*, see Corssen, *Krit. Beitr.* p. 463, and *Aussprache*, 2nd ed., p. 810. Corssen does not derive it from a root *stā* or *sthā*, but identifies it with Goth. *striks*, Engl. *stroke*, *strecke*.

beginning of a pāda receives ipso facto the accent, and as the same applies to vocatives, no chance is left for an unaccented word in that place, except it be a particle. But the one particle that offends against this general observation is *u*, and the very word before which this *u* causes this metrical offence, is *loka*. Can any argument be more tempting in favour of admitting an old form *uloka* instead of *u loka*? *Lokám* is preceded by *u* in I, 93, 6; II, 30, 6; (*asmín bhayá-sthe kṛinutam u lokám*, make room for us, grant an escape to us, in this danger!) IV, 17, 17; VI, 23, 3; 7 (with *urúm*); 47, 8 (*urúm naḥ lokám*, or *ulokám* ?); 73, 2; VII, 20, 2; 33, 5 (with *urúm*); 60, 9 (with *urúm*); 84, 2 (with *urúm*); 99, 4 (with *urúm*); IX, 92, 5; X, 13, 2; 16, 4 (*sukṛtām u lokám*); 30, 7; 104, 10; 180, 3 (with *urúm*). *Loké* is preceded by *u* in III, 29, 8; V, 1, 6; *loka-kṛt*, IX, 86, 21; X, 133, 1. In all remaining passages *u loká* is found at the beginning of a pāda: *lokáḥ*, III, 37, 11; *lokám*, III, 2, 9 (*u lokám u dvé (īti) úpa gāmīm iyatuḥ*); V, 4, 11; *loka-kṛtnúm*, VIII, 15, 4; IX, 2, 8. The only passages in which *loka* occurs without being preceded by *u*, are *lokám*, VI, 47, 8 (see above); VIII, 100, 12; X, 14, 9; 85, 20 (*amṛtasya*); *lokáḥ*, IX, 113, 9; *lokán*, X, 90, 14; *loké*, IX, 113, 7²; X, 85, 24.

It should be remembered that in the Gāthās the *u* of words beginning with *urv*^o does not count metrically (Hübschmann, Ein Zoroastrisches Lied, p. 37), and that in Pāli also *uru* must be treated as monosyllabic, in such passages as *Mahāv*, p. 2, line 5. The same applies to passages in the Rīg-veda, such as I, 138, 3; VII, 39, 3, where the metre requires *uru* to be treated as one syllable. In IX, 96, 15, the original reading may have been *urur iva*, instead of *uru-iva*.

Considering all this, I feel as convinced as it is possible to be in such matters, that in all the passages where *u loká* occurs and where it means space, *carrière ouverte*, freedom, we ought to read *uloká*; but in spite of this I could never bring myself to insert this word, of which neither the authors of the Brāhmaṇas nor the writers of the Prātisākhya or even later grammarians had any idea, into the text. On

the contrary, I should here, too, consider it most useful to leave the traditional reading, and to add the corrections in the margin, in order that, if these conjectural emendations are in time considered as beyond the reach of doubt, they may be used as evidence in support of conjectures which, without such evidence, might seem intolerable in the eyes of timid critics.

There remains one difficulty about this hypothetical word uloká, which it is but fair to mention. If it is derived from uru, or, as Professor Bollensen suggests, from urvaḥ or urvak, the change of va into o would require further support. Neither maghon for maghavan, nor durona for dura-vaṇa are strictly analogous cases, because in each we have an a preceding the va or u. Strictly speaking, uroka presupposes uravaka, as slóka presupposes sravaka, or óka, house, avaka (from av, not from uḥ). It should also be mentioned that a compound such as RV. X, 128, 2, urúlokam (scil. antáriksham) is strange, and shows how completely the origin of loka was forgotten at the time when the hymns of the tenth *Mandala* were composed. But all this does not persuade us to accept Ascoli's conjecture (*Lezioni di Fonologia Comparata*, p. 235), that as uloga (but not uloka) is a regular Tamil form of loka, uloka in the Veda might be due to a reaction of the aboriginal dialects on the Vedic Sanskrit. We want far more evidence before admitting such a reaction during the Vedic period.

The most powerful instrument that has hitherto been applied to the emendation of Vedic texts, is the metre.

Metrical criticism. Metre means measure, and uniform measure, and hence its importance for critical purposes, as second only to that of grammar. If our knowledge of the metrical system of the Vedic poets rests on a sound basis, any deviations from the general rule are rightly objected to; and if by a slight alteration they can be removed, and the metre be restored, we naturally feel inclined to adopt such emendations. Two safeguards, however, are needed in this kind of conjectural criticism. We ought to be quite certain that the anomaly is impossible, and we ought to be able to explain to a certain extent

how the deviation from the original correct text could have occurred. As this subject has of late years received considerable attention, and as emendations of the Vedic texts, supported by metrical arguments, have been carried on on a very large scale, it becomes absolutely necessary to re-examine the grounds on which these emendations are supposed to rest. There are, in fact, but few hymns in which some verses or some words have not been challenged for metrical reasons, and I feel bound, therefore, at the very beginning of my translation of the Rîg-veda, to express my own opinion on this subject, and to give my reasons why in so many cases I allow metrical anomalies to remain which by some of the most learned and ingenious among Vedic scholars would be pronounced intolerable.

Even if the theory of the ancient metres had not been so carefully worked out by the authors of the *Prâtisākhya*s and the *Anukramanī*s, an independent study of the Veda would have enabled us to discover the general rules by which the Vedic poets were guided in the composition of their works. Nor would it have been difficult to show how constantly these general principles are violated by the introduction of phonetic changes which in the later Sanskrit are called the euphonic changes of Sandhi, and according to which final vowels must be joined with initial vowels, and final consonants adapted to initial consonants, until at last each sentence becomes a continuous chain of closely linked syllables.

It is far easier, as I remarked before, to discover the original and natural rhythm of the Vedic hymns by reading them in the Pada than in the *Samhitā* text, and after some practice our ear becomes sufficiently schooled to tell us at once how each line ought to be pronounced. We find, on the one hand, that the rules of Sandhi, instead of being generally binding, were treated by the Vedic poets as poetical licences only; and, on the other, that a greater freedom of pronunciation was allowed even in the body of words than would be tolerated in the later Sanskrit. If a syllable was wanted to complete the metre, a semivowel might be pronounced as a vowel, many a long vowel might

be protracted so as to count for two syllables, and short vowels might be inserted between certain consonants, of which no trace exists in the ordinary Sanskrit. If, on the contrary, there were too many syllables, then the rules of Sandhi were observed, or two short syllables contracted by rapid pronunciation into one ; nay, in a few cases, a final m or s, it seems, was omitted. It would be a mistake to suppose that the authors of the *Prâtisākhya*s were not aware of this freedom allowed or required in the pronunciation of the Vedic hymns. Though they abstained from introducing into the text changes of pronunciation which even we ourselves would never tolerate, if inserted in the texts of Homer and Plautus, in the Pāli verses of Buddha, or even in modern English poetry, the authors of the *Prâtisākhyā* were clearly aware that in many places one syllable had to be pronounced as two, or two as one. They were clearly aware that certain vowels, generally considered as long, had to be pronounced as short, and that in order to satisfy the demands of the metre, certain changes of pronunciation were indispensable. They knew all this, but they did not change the text. And this shows that the text, as they describe it, enjoyed even in their time a high authority, that they did not make it, but that, such as it is, with all its incongruities, it had been made before their time. In many cases, no doubt, certain syllables in the hymns of the Veda had been actually lengthened or shortened in the *Samhitā* text in accordance with the metre in which they are composed. But this was done by the poets themselves, or, at all events, it was not done by the authors of the *Prâtisākhyā*. They simply register such changes, but they do not enjoin them, and in this we, too, should follow their example. It is, therefore, a point of some importance in the critical restoration and proper pronunciation of Vedic texts, that in the rules which we have to follow in order to satisfy the demands of the metre, we should carefully distinguish between what is sanctioned by ancient authority, and what is the result of our own observations. This I shall now proceed to do.

First, then, the authors of the *Prâtisākhyā* distinctly admit

that, in order to uphold the rules they have themselves laid down, certain syllables are to be pronounced as two syllables.

We read in Sûtra 527: 'In a deficient pāda the right number is to be provided for by protraction of semivowels (which were originally vowels), and of contracted vowels (which were originally two independent vowels).' It is only by this process that the short syllable which has been lengthened in the *Samhitā*, viz. the sixth, or the eighth, or the tenth, can be shown to have occupied and to occupy that place where alone, according to a former rule, a short syllable is liable to be lengthened. Thus we read :

I, 161, 11. *ūd̐vātsvasmā ākr̥iṇōtānā trīnam.*

This would seem to be a verse of eleven syllables, in which the ninth syllable *na* has been lengthened. This, however, is against the system of the *Prātisākhya*. But if we protract the semivowel *v* in *udvatsv*, and change it back into *u*, which it was originally, then we gain one syllable, the whole verse has twelve syllables, *na* occupies the tenth place, and it now belongs to that class of cases which is included in a former Sûtra, 523.

The same applies to X, 103, 13, where we read :

pretā gāyātā nārāḥ.

This is a verse of seven syllables, in which the fifth syllable is lengthened, without any authority. Let us protract *pretā* by bringing it back to its original component elements *pra itā*, and we get a verse of eight syllables, the sixth syllable now falls under the general observation, and is lengthened in the *Samhitā* accordingly.

The same rules are repeated in a later portion of the *Prātisākhya*. Here rules had been given as to the number of syllables of which certain metres consist, and it is added (Sûtras 972, 973) that where that number is deficient, it should be completed by protracting contracted vowels, and by separating consonantal groups in which semivowels (originally vowels) occur, by means of their corresponding vowel.

The rules in both places are given in almost identically

the same words, and the only difference between the two passages is this, that, according to the former, semivowels are simply changed back into their vowels, while, according to the latter, the semivowel remains, but is separated from the preceding consonant by its corresponding vowel.

These rules therefore show clearly that the authors of the *Prātisākhya*, though they would have shrunk from altering one single letter of the authorised *Samhitā*, recognised the fact that where two vowels had been contracted into one, they might yet be pronounced as two; and where a vowel before another vowel had been changed into a semivowel, it might either be pronounced as a vowel, or as a semivowel preceded by its corresponding vowel. More than these two modifications, however, the *Prātisākhya* does not allow, or, at least, does not distinctly sanction. The commentator indeed tries to show that by the wording of the *Sūtras* in both places, a third modification is sanctioned, viz. the vocalisation, in the body of a word, of semivowels which do not owe their origin to an original vowel. But in both places this interpretation is purely artificial. Some such rule ought to have been given, but it was not given by the authors of the *Prātisākhya*. It ought to have been given, for it is only by observing such a rule that in I, 61, 12, *gōr nā pārvā vī rādā tīrāskā*, we get a verse of eleven syllables, and thus secure for *dā* in *radā* the eighth place, where alone the short *a* could be lengthened. Yet we look in vain for a rule sanctioning the change of semivowels into vowels, except where the semivowels can rightly be called *kshaipra-varṇa* (*Sūtra* 974), i.e. semivowels that were originally vowels. The independent (*svābhāvika*) semivowels, as e.g. the *v* in *parva*, are not included; and to suppose that in *Sūtra* 527 these semivowels were indicated by *varṇa* is impossible, particularly if we compare the similar wording of *Sūtra* 974*.

* It will be seen from my edition of the *Prātisākhya*, particularly from the extracts from *Uvaṣa*, given after *Sūtra* 974, that the idea of making two syllables out of *goḥ*, never entered *Uvaṣa*'s mind. M. Regnier was right, Professor Kuhn (*Beiträge*, vol. iv, p. 187) was wrong. *Uvaṣa*, no doubt, wishes to show that original (*svābhāvika*) semivowels are liable to *vyūha*, or at least

We look in vain, too, in the *Prâtisâkhya* for another rule according to which long vowels, even if they do not owe their origin to the coalescence of two vowels, are liable to be protracted. However, this rule, too, though never distinctly sanctioned, is observed in the *Prâtisâkhya*, for unless its author observed it, he could not have obtained in the verses quoted by the *Prâtisâkhya* the number of syllables which he ascribes to them. According to *Sûtra* 937, the verse, RV. X, 134, 1, is a *Mahâpañkti*, and consists of six *pâdas*, of eight syllables each. In order to obtain that number, we must read :

sāmragāṃ kārshāṇām.

We may therefore say that, without allowing any actual change in the received text of the *Samhitā*, the *Prâtisâkhya* distinctly allows a lengthened pronunciation of certain syllables, which in the *Pada* text form two syllables; and we may add that, by implication, it allows the same even in cases where the *Pada* text also gives but one instead of two syllables. Having this authority in our favour, I do not think that we use too much liberty if we extend this modified pronunciation, recognised in so many cases by the ancient scholars of India themselves, to other cases where it seems to us required as well, in order to satisfy the metrical rules of the *Veda*.

Secondly, I believe it can be proved that, if not the authors of the *Prâtisâkhya*, those at least who constituted
 Shortening of the Vedic text which was current in the
 long vowels. ancient schools and which we now have before us, were fully aware that certain long vowels and diphthongs could be used as short. The authors of the *Prâtisâkhya* remark that certain changes which can take place before a short syllable only, take place likewise before the word *no*, although the vowel of this 'no' is by them supposed to be long. After having stated in *Sûtra* 523 that the eighth syllable of hendecasyllabics and dodecasyllabics, if short, is lengthened, provided a short syllable

to *vyavâya*; but though this is true in fact, *Uvaṭa* does not succeed in his attempt to prove that the rules of the *Prâtisâkhya* sanction it.

follows, they remark that for this purpose *naḥ* or *no* is treated as a short syllable :

X, 59, 4. *dyū-bhīḥ hītaḥ gāṛimā sū naḥ āstū*, (*Samh.* *sū nō āstū*.)

Again, in stating that the tenth syllable of hendecasyllabics and dodecasyllabics, if short, is lengthened, provided a short syllable follows, the same exception is understood to be made in favour of *naḥ* or *no*, as a short syllable :

VII, 48, 4. *nū devāsāḥ vāṛivāḥ kārtaṇā nāḥ*, (*Samh.* *kartāṇā no, bhūta no, &c.*)

With regard to *e* being shortened before a short *a* where, according to rule, the *a* should be elided, we actually find that the *Samhitā* gives *a* instead of *e* in RV. VIII, 72, 5. *vēti stótave ambyām*, *Samh.* *vēti stótava ambyām*. (*Prātis.* 177, 5.)

I do not ascribe very much weight to the authority which we may derive from these observations with regard to our own treatment of the diphthongs *e* and *o* as either long or short in the Veda, yet in answer to those who are incredulous as to the fact that the vowels *e* and *o* could ever be short in Sanskrit, an appeal to the authority of those who constituted our text, and in constituting it clearly treated *o* as a short vowel, may not be without weight. We may also appeal to the fact that in Pāli and Prākṛit every final *o* and *e* can be treated as either long or short*. Starting from this we may certainly extend this observation, as it has been extended by Professor Kuhn, but we must not extend it too far. It is quite clear that in the same verse *e* and *o* can be used both as long and short. I give the *Samhitā* text :

I, 84, 17. *ka īshate | tugyate kō bibhāyā*
ko mamsate | santam indrām kō āntī,
kas tokāya | ka ibhāyotā rāyē
adhi bravat | tanve kō gānāyā.

* See Lassen, *Inst. Linguae Præcriticæ*, pp. 145, 147, 151; Cowell, *Vararuchi*, Introduction, p. xvii. Kedārabhaṭṭa says: Pāṇinir bhagavān prākṛitalakṣhaṇam api vakti samskrīṭād anyat, dīrghākṣhaṇam ka kutraṭid ekām mātrām upaitīti. Secundum d'Alwisium commentator docet sermonem esse de litteris Sanscriticis *e* et *o*. Cf. Pischel, *De Grammaticis prakriticis*, 1874.

But although there can be no doubt that e and o, when final, or at the end of the first member of a compound, may be treated in the Veda as anceps, there is no evidence, I believe, to show that the same licence applies to a medial or initial e or o. In IV, 45, 5, we must scan

usrāḥ garante prati vastōḥ āsvinā,

ending the verse with an epitritus tertius instead of the usual dijambus^a.

Thirdly, the fact that the initial short a, if following upon a word ending in o or e, is frequently not to be elided, is clearly recognised by the authors of the Prātisākhya (see p. xlviii). Nay, that they wished it to be pronounced even in passages where, in accordance with the requirements of the Prātisākhya, it had to disappear in the Saṃhitā text, we may conclude from Sūtra 978. It is there stated that no pāda should ever begin with a word that has no accent. The exceptions to this rule are few, and they are discussed in Sūtras 978-987. But if the initial a were not pronounced in I, 1, 9, sāḥ naḥ pitā-iva sūnāve āgne su-upāyanāḥ bhava, the second pāda would begin with āgne, a word which, after the elision of the initial a, would be a word without an accent^b.

Fourthly, the fact that other long vowels, besides e and o, may under certain circumstances be used as short in the Veda, is not merely a modern theory, but rests on no less an authority than Pāṇini himself.

^a See Professor Weber's pertinent remarks in Kuhn's Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 394. I do not think that in the verses adduced by Professor Kuhn, in which final o is considered by him as an iambus or trochee, this scanning is inevitable. Thus we may scan the Saṃhitā text:

I, 88, 2. rūkmō na śītraḥ svadhītīvān.

I, 141, 8. rāthō na yātaḥ śikvabhiḥ krīto.

I, 174, 3. sīmho na damē apāmsi vastōḥ.

VI, 24, 3. aksho na śakryoḥ sūra brīhan

X, 3, 1. inō rāgann aratiḥ samiddho.

This leaves but one of Professor Kuhn's examples (Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 192) unexplained: I, 191, 1. kaṅkato na kaṅkato, where iva for na would remove the difficulty.

^b This subject, the shortness of e and o in the Veda, has been admirably treated by Mr. Maurice Bloomfield, 'Final as before Sonants,' Baltimore, 1882. Reprinted from the American Journal of Philology, vol. iii, No. 1.

Pāṇini says, VI, 1, 127, that i, u, *ri* (see RV. Bh. IV, 1, 12) at the end of a pada (but not in a compound*) may remain unchanged, if a different vowel follows, and that, if long, they may be shortened. He ascribes this rule, or, more correctly, the first portion of it only, to Śākalya, Prāṭisākhya 155 seq.^b Thus *ḥakri atra* may become *ḥakri atra* or *ḥakry atra*. *Madhū atra* may become *madhū atra* or *madhv atra*. In VI, 1, 128, Pāṇini adds that a, i, u, *ri* may remain unchanged before *ri*, and, if long, may be shortened, and this again according to the teaching of Śākalya, i. e. Prāṭisākhya 136°. Hence *brahmā rishih* becomes *brahmā rishih* or *brahmarshih*; *kumārī risyah* becomes *kumārī risyah* or *kumāry risyah*. This rule enables us to explain a number of passages in which the Samhitā text either changes the final long vowel into a semivowel, or leaves it unchanged, when the vowel is a *pragṛhya* vowel. To the first class belong such passages as I, 163, 12; IV, 38, 10, *vāgī árvā*, Samh. *vāgyárvā*; VI, 7, 3, *vāgī agne*, Samh. *vāgyāgne*; VI, 20, 13, *pakthī arkaḥ*, Samh. *pakthyārkaḥ*; IV, 22, 4, *sushmī ā góh*, Samh. *sushmyā góh*. In these passages *i* is the termination of a nom. masc. of a stem ending in *in*. Secondly, IV, 24, 8, *pātnī ákkha*, Samh. *pātnyákkha*; IV, 34, 1, *devī áhnām*, Samh. *devyáhnām*; V, 75, 4, *vānikī ā-hitā*, Samh. *vānikyāhitā*; VI, 61, 4, *avitrī avatu*, Samh. *avitryāvatu*. In these passages the *i* is the termination of feminines. In X, 15, 4, *ūtī arvāk*, Samh. *ūtyārvāk*, the final *i* of the instrumental *ūtī* ought not to have been changed into a semivowel, for, though not followed by *iti*, it is to be treated as *pragṛhya*; (Prātis. 163, 5.) It is, however,

* There are certain compounds in which, according to Professor Kuhn, two vowels have been contracted into one short vowel. This is certainly the opinion of Hindu grammarians, also of the compiler of the Pada text. But most of them would admit of another explanation. Thus *dhānu-arnasaḥ*, which is divided into *dhānu-arnasaḥ*, may be *dhānu-arnasaḥ* (RV. V, 45, 2). *Dhānarṇam*, divided into *dhāna-arnam*, may have been *dhāna-riṇam* (RV. X, 46, 5). *Satārṇasam* (RV. VII, 100, 3) may be taken as *satā-riṇasam* instead of *satā-arnasam*.

^b In the Prāṭisākhya the rule which allows vowel before vowel to remain unchanged, is restricted to special passages, and in some of them the two vowels are *savarṇa*; cf. Sūtra 163.

^c Cf. Vāgasan. Prāṭisākhya, IV, 48; Indische Studien, vol. ix, 309; vol. x, 406.

mentioned as an exception in Sûtra 174, 9. The same applies to II, 3, 4, védî iti asyām, *Samh.* védyasyām. The *pragr̥hya* î ought not to have been changed into a semivowel, but the fact that it had been changed irregularly, was again duly registered in Sûtra 174, 5. These two *pragr̥hya* î therefore, which have really to be pronounced short, were irregularly changed in the *Samhitā* into the semivowel; and as this semivowel, like all semivowels, may take *vyavāya*, the same object was attained as if it had been written by a short vowel. With regard to *pragr̥hya* û, no such indication is given by the *Samhitā* text; but in such passages as I, 46, 13, *sambhû* iti *sam-bhû ā gatam*, *Samh.* *sambhû ā gatam*; V, 43, 4, *bāhû* iti *ādrim*, *Samh.* *bāhû ādrim*, the *pragr̥hya* û of the dual can be used as short, like the û of *madhû atra*, given as an example by the commentators of Pāṇini.

To Professor Kuhn, I believe, belongs the merit of having extended this rule to final ā. That the ā of the dual may become short, was mentioned in the *Prātisākhya*, Sûtra 309, though in none of the passages there mentioned is there any metrical necessity for this shortening (see p. lii). This being the case, it is impossible to deny that where this ā is followed by a vowel, and where Sandhi between the two vowels is impossible, the final ā may be treated as short. Whether it must be so treated, depends on the view which we take of the Vedic metres, and will have to be discussed hereafter. I agree with Professor Kuhn when he scans:

VI, 63, 1. *kṵā tyā vālgū pūru-hūtā ādyā*, (*Samh.* *purūhūtādyā*); and not *kṵā tyā vālgū pūruhūtādyā*, although we might quote other verses as ending with an epitritus primus.

IV, 3, 13. *mā vēsasyā prā-minātāḥ mā āpēḥ*, (*Samh.* *māpēḥ*), although the dispondeus is possible.

I, 77, 1. *kāthā dāsemā āgnāyē kâ āsmai*, (*Samh.* *kāsmāi*.)

VI, 24, 5. *āryāḥ vāsasya pāri-ētā asti*.

Even in a compound like *tvā-ūta*, I should shorten the first vowel, e. g.

X, 148, 1. *tmanā tanā sānūyāmā tvā-ūtāḥ*, although the passage is not mentioned by the *Prātisākhya*

among those where a short final vowel in the eighth place is not lengthened when a short syllable follows*.

But when we come to the second pāda of a Gāyatrī, and find there a long ā, and that long ā not followed by a vowel, I cannot agree with Professor Kuhn, that the long ā, even under such circumstances, ought to be shortened. We may scan :

V, 5, 7. vātāsyā patmān īlītā dāivyā hotārā mānūshāḥ.

The same choriambic ending occurs even in the last pāda of a Gāyatrī, and is perfectly free from objection at the end of the other pādas.

So, again, we may admit the shortening of au to o in sāno avye and sāno avyaye, as quoted in the Prātisākhya, 174 and 177, but this would not justify the shortening of au to av in Anuśtubh verses, such as

V, 86, 5. mārtaṃyā devāu ādabhā,
āmsā-ivā devāu ārvātē,

while, with regard to the Trishṭubh and Gagatī verses, our views on these metres must naturally depend on the difficulties we meet with in carrying them out systematically.

There is no reason for shortening ā in

V, 5, 10. devānām guhyā nāmānī.

It is the second pāda of a Gāyatrī here; and we shall see that, even in the third pāda, four long syllables occur again and again.

For the same reason I cannot follow Dr. Kuhn in a number of other passages where, for the sake of the metre, he proposes to change a long ā into a short one. Such passages are in the Pada text :

VI, 46, 11. dīdyāvāḥ tigma-mūrdhānāḥ, not mūrdhānāḥ.

I, 15, 6. rītunā yagñām āsāthe, not āsāthe.

V, 66, 2. sāmyak āsūryam āsāte, not āsāte.

V, 67, 1. vārshishām kshatram āsāthe, not āsāthe. See Beitrage, vol. iii, p. 122.

I, 46, 6. tām āsmē rāsāthām īshām, not rāsāthām īshām.

* I see that Professor Kuhn, vol. iv, p. 186, has anticipated this observation in esh/au, to be read ā-ish/au.

IV, 32, 23. bābhrū yāmeshū sōbhetē, not sōbhetē.

IV, 45, 3. ūtā priyām mādhunē yūṅgāthām rāthām, not yūṅgāthām rāthām.

V, 74, 3. kām ākkhā yūṅgāthē rāthām, not yūṅgāthē rāthām.

IV, 55, 1. dyāvābhūmī (iti) āditē trāsīthām nāh, not trāsīthām nāh.

V, 41, 1. r̥tasyā vā sādasi trāsīthām nāh, not trāsīthām nāh.

I must enter the same protest against shortening other long vowels in the following verses which Professor Kuhn proposes to make metrically correct by this remedy :

I, 42, 6. hīranyāvāsīmāt-tāmā, not vāsīmāt-tāmā.

Here the short syllable of *ganasrī-bhih* in V, 60, 8, cannot be quoted as a precedent, for the *i* in *ganasrī*, walking in companies, was never long, and could therefore not be shortened. Still less can we quote *nāri-bhyaḥ* as an instance of a long *i* being shortened, for *nāri-bhyaḥ* is derived from *nārih*, not from *nāri*, and occurs with a short *i* even when the metre requires a long syllable; I, 43, 6. *nri-bhyaḥ nāri-bhyaḥ gāvē*. The fact is, that in the Rig-veda the forms *nārishu* and *nāri-bhyaḥ* never occur, but always *nārishu*, *nāri-bhyaḥ*; while from *vāsī* we never find any forms with short *i*, but always *vāsishu*, *vāsī-bhih*.

Nor is there any justification for change in I, 25, 16. *gāvāh nā gavyūtiḥ ānu*, the second pāda of a Gâyatrī. Nor in V, 56, 3. *rīkshāh nā vāh mārūtaḥ śimī-vān āmāh*. In most of the passages mentioned by Professor Kuhn on p. 122, this peculiarity may be observed, that the eighth syllable is short, or, at all events, may be short, when the ninth is long :

VI, 44, 21. *vr̥ishnē tē indūh vr̥ishabhā' pīpāyā*.

I, 73, 1. *syōnā-sīh ātithīh nā' prīnānāh*.

VII, 13, 1. *bharē haviḥ nā barhishī' prīnānāh*.

II, 28, 7. *ēnāh kr̥invāntām āsurā bhr̥ināntī*.

Before, however, we can settle the question whether in

these and other places certain vowels should be pronounced as either long or short, we must settle the more general

Metre and question, what authority we have for requiring a long or a short syllable in certain places of the Vedic metres.

If we declare ourselves free from all authority, either grammatical or metrical, we may either sacrifice all grammar to metre, or all metre to grammar. We may introduce the strictest rules of metre, determining the length or shortness of every syllable, and then ignore all rules of grammar and quantity, treat short syllables as long, or long ones as short, and thus secure the triumph of metre. Or, we may allow great latitude in Vedic metres, particularly in certain pādas, and thus retain all the rules of grammar which determine the quantity of syllables. It may be said even that the result would really be the same in either case, and that the policy of 'thorough' might perhaps prove most useful in the end. It may be so hereafter, but in the present state of Vedic scholarship it seems more expedient to be guided by native tradition, and to study the compromise which the ancient students of the Veda have tried to effect between grammar on one side and metre on the other.

Now it has generally been supposed that the Prātisākhya teaches that there must be a long syllable in the eighth or tenth place of Traishubha and Gāgata, and in the sixth place of Ānushubha pādas. This is not the case. The Prātisākhya, no doubt, says, that a short final vowel, but not any short syllable, occupying the eighth or tenth place in a Traishubha and Gāgata pāda, or the sixth place in a Gāyatra pāda, is lengthened, but it never says that it must be lengthened; on the contrary, it gives a number of cases where it is not so lengthened. But, what is even more important, the Prātisākhya distinctly adds a proviso which shows that the ancient critics of the Veda did not consider the trochee as the only possible foot for the sixth and seventh syllables of Gāyatra, or for the eighth and ninth, or tenth and eleventh syllables of Traishubha and Gāgata pādas. They distinctly admit that the seventh and the

ninth and the eleventh syllables in such pādas may be long, and that in that case the preceding short vowel is not lengthened. We thus get the iambus in the very place which is generally occupied by the trochee. According to the Prātisākhya, the general scheme for the Gāyatra would be, not only

$$+ + + + | + \overset{6}{-} \overset{7}{\cup} +,$$

but also

$$+ + + + | + \overset{6}{\cup} \overset{7}{-} +;$$

and for the Traishṭubha and Gāgata, not only

$$+ + + + | + + + \overset{8}{-} \overset{9}{\cup} + + (+),$$

but also

$$+ + + + | + + + \overset{8}{\cup} \overset{9}{-} + + (+).$$

And again, for the same pādas, not only

$$+ + + + | + + + + | \overset{10}{+} \overset{11}{-} \cup (+),$$

but also

$$+ + + + | + + + + | \overset{10}{+} \overset{11}{\cup} - (+).$$

Before appealing, however, to the Prātisākhya for the establishment of such a rule as that the sixth syllable of Ānushṭubha and the eighth or tenth syllable of Traishṭubha and Gāgata pādas must be lengthened, provided a short syllable follows, it is indispensable that we should have a clear appreciation of the real character of the Prātisākhya. If we carefully follow the thread which runs through these books, we shall soon perceive that, even with the proviso that a short syllable follows, the Prātisākhya never teaches that certain final vowels must be lengthened. The object of the Prātisākhya, as I pointed out on a former occasion, is to register all the facts which possess a phonetic interest. In doing this, all kinds of plans are adopted in order to bring as large a number of cases as possible under general categories. These categories are purely technical and external, and they never assume, with the authors of the Prātisākhya, the character of general rules. Let us now, after these preliminary remarks, return to the Sūtras 523 to 535, which we discussed before. The Prātisākhya simply says that certain syllables which are short in the

Pada, if occupying a certain place in a verse, are lengthened in the *Samhitā*, provided a short syllable follows. This looks, no doubt, like a general rule which should be carried out under all circumstances. But this idea never entered the minds of the authors of the *Prātisākhya*. They only give this rule as the most convenient way of registering the lengthening of certain syllables which have actually been lengthened in the text of the *Samhitā*, while they remain short in the Pada; and after having done this, they proceed to give a number of verses where the same rule might be supposed to apply, but where in the text of the *Samhitā* the short syllable has not been lengthened. After having given a long string of words which are short in the Pada and long in the *Samhitā*, and where no intelligible reason of their lengthening can be given, at least not by the authors of the *Prātisākhya*, the *Prātisākhya* adds in *Sūtra* 523, 'The final vowel of the eighth syllable is lengthened in pādas of eleven and twelve syllables, provided a syllable follows which is short in the *Samhitā*.' As instances the commentator gives (*Samhitā* text):

I, 32, 4. *tādītñā sātṛum nā kīlā vivītse.*

I, 94, 1. *āgnē sākhyē mā rishāmā vāyām tāvā.*

Then follows another rule (*Sūtra* 525) that 'The final vowel of the tenth syllable in pādas of eleven and twelve syllables is lengthened, provided a syllable follows which is short in the *Samhitā*.' As instances the commentator gives:

III, 54, 22. *āhā vīsvā sumānā dīdihī nāh.*

II, 34, 9. *āva rudrā asāsō hantānā vādhaḥ.*

Lastly, a rule is given (*Sūtra* 526) that 'The final vowel of the sixth syllable is lengthened in a pāda of eight syllables, provided a syllable follows which is short:'

I, 5, 10. *īśānō yāvāyā vādham.*

If the seventh syllable is long no change takes place:

IX, 67, 30. *ā pāvāsvā devā sōmā.*

While we ourselves should look upon these rules as

founded in the very nature of the metre, which, no doubt, to a certain extent they are, the authors of the *Prātisākhya* use them simply as convenient nets for catching as many cases as possible of lengthened syllables actually occurring in the text of the *Samhitā*. For this purpose, and in order to avoid giving a number of special rules, they add in this place an observation, very important to us as throwing light on the real pronunciation of the Vedic hymns at the time when our *Samhitā* text was finally settled, but with them again a mere expedient for enlarging the preceding rules, and thus catching more cases of lengthening at one haul. They say in *Sūtra* 527, that in order to get the right number of syllables in such verses, we must pronounce sometimes one syllable as two. Thus only can the lengthened syllable be got into one of the places required by the preceding *Sūtra*, viz. the sixth, the eighth, or the tenth place, and thus only can a large number of lengthened syllables be comprehended under the same general rule of the *Prātisākhya*. In all this we ourselves can easily recognise a principle which guided the compilers of the *Samhitā* text, or the very authors of the hymns, in lengthening syllables which in the *Pada* text are short, and which were liable to be lengthened because they occupied certain places on which the stress of the metre would naturally fall. We also see quite clearly that these compilers, or those whose pronunciation they tried to perpetuate, must have pronounced certain syllables as two syllables, and we naturally consider that we have a right to try the same expedient in other cases where to us, though not to them, the metre seems deficient, and where it could be rendered perfect by pronouncing one syllable as two. Such thoughts, however, never entered the minds of the authors of the *Prātisākhyas*, who are satisfied with explaining what is, according to the authority of the *Samhitā*, and who never attempt to say what ought to be, even against the authority of the *Samhitā*. While in some cases they have ears to hear and to appreciate the natural flow of the poetical language of the *Rishis*, they seem at other times as deaf as the adder to the voice of the charmer.

A general rule, therefore, in our sense of the word, that the eighth syllable in hendecasyllabics and dodecasyllabics, the tenth syllable in hendecasyllabics and dodecasyllabics, and the sixth syllable in octosyllabics should be lengthened, rests in no sense on the authority of ancient grammarians. Even as a mere observation, they restrict it by the condition that the next syllable must be short, in order to provoke the lengthening of the preceding syllable, thereby sanctioning, of course, many exceptions; and they then proceed to quote a number of cases where, in spite of all, the short syllable remains short*. In some of these quotations they are no doubt wrong, but in most of them their statement cannot be disputed.

As to the eighth syllable being short in hendecasyllabics and dodecasyllabics, they quote such verses as,

VI, 66, 4. āntār (īti) śāntāḥ āvādyānī pūnānāḥ.

Thus we see that in VI, 44, 9, vārshīyāḥ vāyāḥ krīṇūhī śakībhīḥ, hi remains short; while in VI, 25, 3, gāhī vrīṣṇyānī krīṇūhī pārākāḥ, it is lengthened in the Samhitā, the only difference being that in the second passage the accent is on hī.

As to the tenth syllable being short in a dodecasyllabic, they quote

II, 27, 14. āditē mītrā vārūṇā ūtā mrīḷā.

As to the tenth syllable being short in a hendecasyllabic, they quote

II, 20, 1. vāyām tē vāyāḥ īndrā viddhī sū nāḥ.

As to the sixth syllable being short in an octosyllabic, they quote

VIII, 23, 26. māhāḥ vīśvān ābhī sātāḥ.

A large number of similar exceptions are collected from

* 'Wo die achtsilbigen Reihen mit herbeigezogen sind, ist es in der Regel bei solchen Liedern geschehen, die im Ganzen von der regelmässigen Form weniger abweichen, und für solche Fälle, wo auch das Prātisākhya die Längung der sechsten Silbe in achtsilbigen Reihen vorschreibt, nämlich wo die siebente von Natur kurz ist. Die achtsilbigen Reihen bedürfen einer erneuten Durchforschung, da es mehrfach schwer fällt, den Samhitāttext mit der Vorschrift der Prātisākhya in Übereinstimmung zu bringen.' Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 450; and still more strongly, p. 458.

528, 3 to 534, 94, and this does not include any cases where the ninth, the eleventh, or the seventh syllable is long, instead of being short, while it does include cases where the eighth syllable is long, though the ninth is not short, or, at least, is not short according to the views of the collectors of these passages. See *Sûtra* 522, 6.

Besides the cases mentioned by the *Prâtisākhya* itself, where a short syllable, though occupying a place which would seem to require lengthening, remains short, there are many others which the *Prâtisākhya* does not mention, because, from its point of view, there was no necessity for doing so. The *Prâtisākhya* has been blamed^a for omitting such cases as I, 93, 6, *urum yagñāya kakrathūr u lokam*; or I, 96, 1, *devā agnim dhārayan drāvinodām*. But though occupying the eighth place, and though followed by a short syllable, these syllables could never fall under the general observation of the *Prâtisākhya*, because that general observation refers to final vowels only, but not to short syllables in general. Similar cases are I, 107, 1^a; 122, 9; 130, 10; 152, 6; 154, 1; 158, 5^a; 163, 2; 167, 10^a; 171, 4; 173, 6; 179, 1^a; 182, 8^a; 186, 6, &c.

If, therefore, we say that, happen what may, these metrical rules must be observed, and the text of the Veda altered in order to satisfy the requirements of these rules, we ought to know at all events that we do this on our own responsibility, and that we cannot shield ourselves behind the authority of Saunaka or Kātyāyana. Now it is well known that Professor Kuhn^b has laid down the rule that the *Traishṭubha* pādas must end in a bacchius or amphibrachys $\cup - \cup$, and the *Gāgata* pādas in a dijambus or pæon secundus $\cup - \cup \cup$. With regard to *Ānushṭubha* pādas, he requires the dijambus or pæon secundus $\cup - \cup \cup$ at the end of a whole verse only, allowing greater freedom in the formation of the preceding pādas. In a later article,

^a 'Dazu kommt, dass der uns vorliegende *Samhitāt*ext vielfältig gar nicht mit Saunaka's allgemeiner Regel übereinstimmt, indem die Verlängerung kurzer Silben nicht unter den Bedingungen eingetreten ist, die er vorschreibt.' Kuhn, *Beiträge*, vol. iii, p. 459.

^b *Beiträge zur Vergleichenden Sprachforschung*, vol. iii, p. 118.

however, the final pāda, too, in Ânushṭubha metre is allowed greater freedom, and the rule, as above given, is strictly maintained with regard to the Traishṭubha and Gāgata pādas only.

This subject is so important, and affects so large a number of passages in the Veda, that it requires the most careful examination. The Vedic metres, though at first sight very perplexing, are very simple, if reduced to their primary elements. The authors of the Prātisākhya have elaborated a most complicated system. Counting the syllables in the most mechanical manner, they have assigned nearly a hundred names to every variety which they discovered in the hymns of the Rig-veda^a. But they also observed that the constituent elements of all these metres were really but four, (Sûtras 988, 989):

1. The Gâyatra pāda, of eight syllables, ending in ॐ -.
2. The Vairāga pāda, of ten syllables, ending in --.
3. The Traishṭubha pāda, of eleven syllables, ending in --.
4. The Gāgata pāda, of twelve syllables, ending in ॐ -.

Then follows an important rule, Sûtra 990: 'The penultimate syllable,' he says, 'in a Gâyatra and Gāgata pāda is light (laghu), in a Vairāga and Traishṭubha pāda heavy (guru).' This is called their *vr̥tta*.

This word *vr̥tta*, which is generally translated by metre, had evidently originally a more special meaning. It meant the final rhythm, or if we take it literally, the turn of a line, for it is derived from *vr̥t*, to turn. Hence *vr̥tta* is the same word as the Latin *versus*, verse; but I do not wish to decide whether the connection between the two words is historical, or simply etymological. In Latin, *versus* is always supposed to have meant originally a furrow, then a line, then a verse. In Sanskrit the metaphor that led to the formation of *vr̥tta*, in the sense of final rhythm, has nothing to do with ploughing. If, as I have tried to prove (Chips from a German Workshop,

^a See Appendix to my edition of the Prātisākhya, p. cccvi.

vol. i, p. 84), the names assigned to metres and metrical language were derived from words originally referring to choregic movements, *vr̥tta* must have meant the turn, i. e. the last step of any given movement; and this turn, as determining the general character of the whole movement, would naturally be regulated by more severe rules, while greater freedom would be allowed for the rest.

Having touched on this subject, I may add another fact in support of my view. The words *Trishṭubh* and *Anushṭubh*, names for the most common metres, are generally derived from a root *stubh*, to praise. I believe they should be derived from a root *stubh*, which is preserved in Greek, not only in *στυφελός*, hard, *στυφελίζω*, to strike hard, but in the root *στεμφ*, from which *στέμφυλον*, stamped or pressed olives or grapes, and *ἀστεμφής*, untrodden (grapes), then unshaken; and in *στέμβω*, to shake, to ram, *στοβέω*, to scold, &c. In Sanskrit this root is mentioned in the *Dhātupāṭha* X, 34, *shtubhu stambhe*, and it exists in a parallel form as *stambh*, lit. to stamp down, then to fix, to make firm, with which Bopp has compared the German *stampfen*, to stamp; (Glossarium, s. v. *stambh*.) I therefore look upon *Trishṭubh* as meaning originally tripudium, (supposing this word to be derived from *tri* and *pes*, according to the expression in Horace, *pepulisse ter pede terram*, Hor. Od. iii. 18,) and I explain its name ‘Three-step,’ by the fact that the three last syllables *ṭubh*, which form the characteristic feature of that metre, and may be called its real *vr̥tta* or turn, were audibly stamped at the end of each turn or strophe. I explain *Anushṭubh*, which consists of four equal *pādas*, each of eight syllables, as the ‘After-step,’ because each line was stamped regularly after the other, possibly by two choruses, each side taking its turn. There is one passage in the Veda where *Anushṭubh* seems to have preserved this meaning:

X, 124, 9. *anu-stúbham ánu karkûryámānam índram ní kikyuh kaváyah manishá.*

Poets by their wisdom discovered Indra dancing to an *Anushṭubh*.

In V, 52, 12, *khandah-stúbhah kubhanyávaḥ útsam á*

kīrīṇaḥ nṛītuḥ, in measured steps (i.e. stepping the metre) and wildly shouting the gleemen have danced toward the spring.

Other names of metres which point to a similar origin, i.e. to their original connection with dances, are Pada-paṅkti, 'Step-row;' Nyāṅku-sāriṇī, 'Roe-step;' Abhisāriṇī, 'Contre-danse,' &c.

If now we return to the statement of the Prātisākhya in reference to the *vṛittas*, we should observe how careful its author is in his language. He does not say that the penultimate is long or short, but he simply states, that, from a metrical point of view, it must be considered as light or heavy, which need not mean more than that it must be pronounced with or without stress. The fact that the author of the Prātisākhya uses these terms, *laghu* and *guru*, instead of *hrasva*, short, and *dīrgha*, long, shows in fact that he was aware that the penultimate in these *pādas* is not invariably long or short, though, from a metrical point of view, it is always heavy or light.

It is perfectly true that if we keep to these four *pādas*, (to which one more *pāda*, viz. the half *Vairāga*, consisting of five syllables, might be added,) we can reduce nearly all the hymns of the *Rig-veda* to their simple elements which the ancient poets combined together, in general in a very simple way, but occasionally with greater freedom. The most important strophes, formed out of these *pādas*, are,

1. Three *Gāyatra* *pādas*=the *Gāyatrī*, (24 syllables.)
2. Four *Gāyatra* *pādas*=the *Anuṣṭubh*, (32 syllables.)
3. Four *Vairāga* *pādas*=the *Virāg*, (40 syllables.)
4. Four *Traishṭubha* *pādas*=the *Trishṭubh*, (44 syllables.)
5. Four *Gāgata* *pādas*=the *Gagatī*, (48 syllables.)

Between the *Gāyatrī* and *Anuṣṭubh* strophes, another strophe may be formed, by mixture of *Gāyatra* and *Gāgata* *pādas*, consisting of 28 syllables, and commonly called *Uṣṇih*; likewise between the *Anuṣṭubh* and the *Virāg*, a strophe may be formed, consisting of 36 syllables, and commonly called *Bṛīhatī*.

In a collection of hymns, however, like that of the *Rig-veda*, where poems of different ages, different places, and

different families have been put together, we must be prepared for exceptions to many rules. Thus, although the final turn of the hendecasyllabic Traishṭubha is, as a rule, the bacchius, ◡ — —, yet if we take, for instance, the 77th hymn of the tenth *Maṇḍala*, we clearly perceive another hendecasyllabic pāda of a totally different structure, and worked up into one of the most beautiful strophes by an ancient poet. Each line is divided into two halves, the first consisting of seven syllables, being an exact counterpart of the first member of a Saturnian verse (fate Romae Metelli); the second a dijambus, answering boldly to the broken rhythm of the first member*. We have, in fact, a Trishṭubh where the turn or the three-step, ◡ — —, instead of being at the end, stands in the middle of the line.

X, 77, 1-5, in the Pada text :

1. ābhṛā-prūṣhāḥ nā vākā' prūṣhā vāsū,
hāvishmāntāḥ nā yāgñāḥ' vī-gānūṣhāḥ | &c.

Another strophe, the nature of which has been totally misapprehended by native metricians, occurs in IV, 10. It is there called Padapañkti and Mahāpadapañkti; nay, attempts have been made to treat it even as an Ushnih, or as a kind of Gāyatrī. The real character of that strophe is so palpable that it is difficult to understand how it could have been mistaken. It consists of two lines, the first embracing three or four feet of five syllables each, having the ictus on the first and the fourth syllables, and resembling the last line of a Sapphic verse. The second line is simply

* Professor Kuhn (vol. iii, p. 450) is inclined to admit the same metre as varying in certain hymns with ordinary Traishṭubha pādas, but the evidence he brings forward is hardly sufficient. Even if we object to the endings ◡ — ◡ — and — — ◡ —, V, 33, 4, may be a Gāgata, with vyūha of dāsa, the remark quoted from the Prātisākhya being of no consequence on such points; and the same remedy would apply to V, 41, 5, with vyūha of eshe. In VI, 47, 31, vyūha of arvaparnaiḥ; in I, 33, 9, vyūha of indra and rodasī; in II, 24, 5, vyūha of mād̥bhiḥ would produce the same effect; while in I, 121, 8, we must either admit the Traishṭubha vṛtta — ◡ — or scan dhukshān. In III, 58, 6, I should admit vyūha for narā; in IV, 26, 6, for māṇḍram; in I, 100, 8, for gṛyotīḥ, always supposing that we consider the ending — — ◡ — incompatible with a Trishṭubh verse.

a Trishūbh. It is what we should call an asynartete strophe, and the contrast of the rhythm in the first and second lines is very effective. I am not certain whether Professor Bollensen, who has touched on this metre in an article just published (*Zeitschrift der D. M. G.*, vol. xxii, p. 572), shares this opinion. He has clearly seen that the division of the lines, as given in the MSS. of the *Samhitā* text, is wrong; but he seems inclined to admit the same rhythm throughout, and to treat the strophe as consisting of four lines of five syllables each, and one of six syllables, which last line is to submit to the prevailing rhythm of the preceding lines. If we differ, however, as to the internal architecture of this strophe, we agree in condemning the interpretation proposed by the *Prātisākhya*; and I should, in connection with this, like to call attention to two important facts: first, that the *Samhitā* text, in not changing, for instance, the final t of *martāt*, betrays itself as clearly later than the elaboration of the ancient theory of metres, later than the invention of such a metre as the *Padapañkti*; and secondly, that the accentuation, too, of the *Samhitā* is thus proved to be posterior to the establishment of these fanciful metrical divisions, and hence cannot throughout claim so irrefragable an authority as certainly belongs to it in many cases. I give the *Samhitā* text:

1. Āgnē tam ādyā | āsvām nā stōmāiḥ | krātūm nā bhādrām,
hrīdisprīṣām rīdhīyāmā tā ōhaiḥ.
2. Ādhā hy āgnē | krātōr bhādrāsyā | dākshāsyā sādhoḥ,
rāthīr rītāsyā brīhātō bābhūtha, &c.

Now it is perfectly true that, as a general rule, the syllables composing the *vṛtta* or turn of the different metres, and described by the *Prātisākhya* as heavy or light, are in reality long or short. The question, however, is this, have we a right, or are we obliged, in cases where that syllable is not either long or short, as it ought to be, so to alter the text, or so to change the rules of pronunciation, that the penultimate may again be what we wish it to be?

If we begin with the *Gāyatra pāda*, we have not to read

long before we find that it would be hopeless to try to crush the Gāyatrī verses of the Vedic *R̥ṣhis* on this Procrustean bed. Even Professor Kuhn very soon perceived that this was impossible. He had to admit that in the Gāyatrī the two first pādas, at all events, were free from this rule, and though he tried to retain it for the third or final pāda, he was obliged after a time to give it up even there. Again, it is perfectly true, that in the third pāda of the Gāyatrī, and in the second and fourth pādas of the Anushūbh strophe, greater care is taken by the poets to secure a short syllable for the penultimate, but here, too, exceptions cannot be entirely removed. We have only to take such a single hymn as I, 27, and we shall see that it would be impossible to reduce it to the uniform standard of Gāyatrī pādas, all ending in a dijambus.

But what confirms me even more in my view that such strict uniformity must not be looked for in the ancient hymns of the *R̥ṣhis*, is the fact that in many cases it would be so very easy to replace the irregular by a regular dipodia. Supposing that the original poets had restricted themselves to the dijambus, who could have put in the place of that regular dijambus an irregular dipodia? Certainly not the authors of the *Prātisākhya*, for their ears had clearly discovered the general rhythm of the ancient metres; nor their predecessors, for they had in many instances preserved the tradition of syllables lengthened in accordance with the requirements of the metre. I do not mean to insist too strongly on this argument, or to represent those who handed down the tradition of the Veda as endowed with anything like *apaurusheyatva*. Strange accidents have happened in the text of the Veda, but they have generally happened when the sense of the hymns had ceased to be understood; and if anything helped to preserve the Veda from greater accidents, it was due, I believe, to the very fact that the metre continued to be understood, and that oral tradition, however much it might fail in other respects, had at all events to satisfy the ears of the hearers. I should

have been much less surprised if all irregularities in the metre had been smoothed down by the flux and reflux of oral tradition, a fact which is so apparent in the text of Homer, where the gaps occasioned by the loss of the digamma, were made good by the insertion of unmeaning particles; but I find it difficult to imagine by what class of men, who must have lived between the original poets and the age of the Prātisākhyas, the simple rhythm of the Vedic metres should have been disregarded, and the sense of rhythm, which ancient people possess in a far higher degree than we ourselves, been violated through crude and purposeless alterations. I shall give a few specimens only. What but a regard for real antiquity could have induced people in VIII, 2, 8, to preserve the defective foot of a Gāyatrī verse, *śāmānē ādhī bhārmān*? Any one acquainted with Sanskrit would naturally read *śāmānē ādhī bhārmānī*. But who would have changed *bhārmāni*, if that had been there originally, to *bhārmān*? I believe we must scan *śāmānē ādhī bhārmān*, or *śāmānē ādhī bhārmān*, the pæon tertius being a perfectly legitimate foot at the end of a Gāyatrī verse. In X, 158, 1, we can understand how an accident happened. The original poet may have said : *Śūryō nō dīvas pātu pātu vātō āntārikshāt, āgnīr nāḥ pārthivēbhyaḥ*. Here one of the two *pātu* was lost. But if in the same hymn we find in the second verse two feet of nine instead of eight syllables each, I should not venture to alter this except in pronunciation, because no reason can be imagined why any one should have put these irregular lines in the place of regular ones.

In V, 41, 10, *grīṇīte āgnīr ētarī nā sūshaiḥ, sōḥīshkēso nī rīṇātī vanā*, every modern Pandit would naturally read *vanāni* instead of *vanā*, in order to get the regular Trishubh metre. But this being the case, how can we imagine that even the most ignorant member of an ancient Parishad should wilfully have altered *vanāni* into *vanā*? What surprises one is, that *vanā* should have been spared, in spite of every temptation to change it into *vanāni*, for I cannot doubt for one moment that *vanā* is the right reading, only

that the ancient poets pronounced it *vāṇā*. Wherever we alter the text of the Rig-veda by conjecture, we ought to be able, if possible, to give some explanation how the mistake which we wish to remove came to be committed. If a passage is obscure, difficult to construe, if it contains words which occur in no other place, then we can understand how, during a long process of oral tradition, accidents may have happened. But when everything is smooth and easy, when the intention of the poet is not to be mistaken, when the same phrase has occurred many times before, then to suppose that a simple and perspicuous sentence was changed into a complicated and obscure string of words, is more difficult to understand. I know there are passages where we cannot as yet account for the manner in which an evidently faulty reading found its way into both the Pada and Samhitā texts, but in those very passages we cannot be too circumspect. If we read VIII, 40, 9, *pūrvīṣh ṛā īndrō-pamātāyāh pūrvīr ūtā prāsastāyāh*, nothing seems more tempting than to omit *indra*, and to read *pūrvīṣh ṛā ūpamātāyāh*. Nor would it be difficult to account for the insertion of *indra*; for though one would hardly venture to call it a marginal gloss that crept into the text—a case which, as far as I can see, has never happened in the hymns of the Rig-veda—it might be taken for an explanation given by an Ātārya to his pupils, in order to inform them that the ninth verse, different from the eighth, was addressed to *Indra*. But however plausible this may sound, the question remains whether the traditional reading could not be maintained, by admitting synizesis of *opa*, and reading *pūrvīṣh ṛā īndropamātāyāh*. For a similar synizesis of — *u*, see III, 6, 10. *prākī adhvarēva tasthātūh*, unless we read *prākya adhvarēva*.

Another and more difficult case of synizesis occurs in

VII, 86, 4. *āvā tvānēnā nāmāsā tura(h) iyām*.

It would be easy to conjecture *tvareyām* instead of *tura iyām*, but *tvareyām*, in the sense of 'let me hasten,' is not Vedic. The choriambic ending, however, of a Trishubh

can be proved to be legitimate, and if that is the case, then even the synizesis of *tura*, though hard, ought not to be regarded as impossible.

In II, 18, 5, *ā vimsatyā trimsatā yāh̄y ārvān̄,*
ā k̄atvārim̄satā haribh̄ir yūgān̄aḥ,
ā pāṇk̄asatā sūrathebh̄ir īndrā,
ā shash̄tyā sap̄tatyā sōmap̄eyām,

Professor Kuhn proposes to omit the *ā* at the beginning of the second line, in order to have eleven instead of twelve syllables. By doing so he loses the uniformity of the four *pādas*, which all begin with *ā*, while by admitting synizesis of *haribhiḥ* all necessity for conjectural emendation disappears.

If the poets of the Veda had objected to a *pæon quartus* (— — — —) at the end of a *Gâyatrī*, what could have been easier than to change IV, 52, 1, *divo adarsī duh̄itā*, into *adarsī duh̄itā divāḥ*? or X, 118, 6, *ādābhyām gr̄ih̄apātīm*, into *gr̄ih̄apātīm ādābhyām*?

If an *epitritus secundus* (— — —) had been objectionable in the same place, why not say VI, 61, 10, *stōmyā bhūt sārāsvatī*, instead of *sārāsvatī stōmyā bhūt*? Why not VIII, 2, 11, *rēvantām hī sr̄inōmī tvā*, instead of *rēvantām hī tvā sr̄inōmī*?

If an *ionicus a minore* (— — —) had been excluded from that place, why not say I, 30, 10, *gar̄itr̄ibhyaḥ sakh̄e vāso*, instead of *sakh̄e vāso gar̄itr̄ibhyaḥ*? or I, 41, 7, *vārun̄asyā mah̄i psārāḥ*, instead of *mah̄i psārō vārun̄asyā*?

If a *dispondeus* (— — —) was to be avoided, then V, 68, 3, *māh̄i vām kshātrām devēshū*, might easily have been replaced by *deveshu vām kshātrām māh̄i*, and VIII, 2, 10, *sukrā āsirām yāḥantē*, by *sukrā yāḥantā āsirām*.

If no *epitritus primus* (— — —) was allowed, why not say VI, 61, 11, *nīdās pātū sārāsvatī*, instead of *sārāsvatī nīdās pātū*, or VIII, 79, 4, *dvēshō yāvīr āghāsyā k̄it*, instead of *yāvīr āghāsyā k̄id dvēshāḥ*?

Even the epitritus tertius (— — —) might easily have been avoided by dropping the augment of apām in X, 119, 1-13, kuvit somasyāpām itī. It is, in fact, a variety of less frequent occurrence than the rest, and might possibly be eliminated with some chance of success.

Lastly, the choriambus (— — —) could have been removed in III, 24, 5, śīśīhī nāh sūnūmātāh, by reading sūnūmātāh śīśīhī nāh, and in VIII, 2, 31, sānād āmrīktō dayātē, by reading āmrīktō dayātē sānāt.

But I am afraid the idea that regularity is better than irregularity, and that in the Veda, where there is a possibility, the regular metre is to be restored by means of conjectural emendations, has been so ably advocated by some of the most eminent scholars, that a merely general argument would now be of no avail. I must therefore give as much evidence as I can bring together in support of the contrary opinion; and though the process is a tedious one, the importance of the consequences with regard to Vedic criticism leaves me no alternative. With regard, then, to

Seven the final dipodia of Gāyatrī verses, I still Gāyatra Vṛttas. hold and maintain, that, although the dijambus is by far the most general metre, the following seven varieties have to be recognised in the poetry of the Veda*:

1. — — —, 2. — — —, 3. — — —, 4. — — —, 5. — — —,
6. — — —, 7. — — —, 8. — — —.

I do not pretend to give every passage in which these varieties occur, but I hope I shall give a sufficient number in support of every one of them. I have confined myself almost entirely to the final dipodia of Gāyatrī verses, as the Ānushṭubha verses would have swelled the lists too much.

§ 2. — — — —.

I, 12, 9. tasmai pāvakaṁ mṛīṣyā. (Instead of mṛīlaya, it has been proposed to read mardaya.)

I, 18, 9. divo na sadmāmākṣāṣām.

I, 42, 4; 46, 2; 97, 1-8; III, 11, 3; 27, 10; IV, 15, 7;

* See some important remarks on these varieties in Mr. J. Boxwell's article 'On the Triśṭubh Metre,' Journal Asiat. Soc. Beng., 1885, p. 79.

32, 4; 52, 1; V, 5, 9; 7, 4; 7, 5; 7, 7; 9, 4; 53, 12; 61, 3;
61, 11; 64, 5; 65, 4; 82, 9; VI, 16, 17; 16, 18; 16, 45;
45, 17; 61, 4; VII, 15, 14; 66, 2; VIII, 6, 35; 6, 42;
32, 10; 44, 28; 45, 31; 72, 6; 72, 13; 80, 1; 83, 3; 93,
27; IX, 61, 5; 64, 1; X, 118, 6.

§ 3. — ∪ — —.

I, 22, 11. *akkhinnapatrāḥ sākāntām*.

I, 30, 13. *kshumanto yābhīr mādēmā*.

I, 41, 8; 90, 1; 90, 4; 120, 1; V, 19, 1; 70, 3; VI, 61,
10; VIII, 2, 2; 2, 4; 2, 5; 2, 11; 2, 12; 2, 13; 2, 14;
2, 15; 2, 16; 2, 17; 2, 29; 2, 30; 2, 32; 2, 33; 2, 36;
2, 37; 7, 30; 7, 33; 11, 2; 11, 3; 11, 4; 16, 3; 16, 4;
16, 5; 16, 7; 46, 2; 71, 2; 81, 1; 81, 3; 81, 4; 81, 7;
81, 9; 94, 2; IX, 62, 5; X, 20, 4; 20, 7.

§ 4. ∪ ∪ — —.

I, 3, 8. *usrā iva svāsārāṇī*.

I, 27, 4. *agne deveshū prā vōkāḥ*.

I, 30, 10; 30, 15; 38, 7; 38, 8; 41, 7; 43, 7; II, 6, 2;
III, 27, 3; V, 82, 7; VI, 16, 25; 16, 26; 61, 12; VIII, 2,
1; 2, 3; 2, 8; 2, 18; 2, 19; 2, 21; 2, 22; 2, 23; 2, 26;
2, 35; 16, 2; 16, 6; 16, 8; 71, 9; 79, 3; IX, 21, 5; 62, 6;
66, 21; X, 20, 5; 185, 1; 185, 2; 185, 3.

§ 5. — — — —.

I, 2, 7. *dhiyam ghrītākīm sādhanā*.

I, 3, 4. *anvibhis tanā pūtāsāḥ*.

I, 27, 3; 90, 2; II, 6, 4; III, 41, 8; V, 68, 3; 68, 4;
VIII, 2, 10; 2, 24; 16, 1; 16, 12; 79, 2; IX, 66, 17; X,
20, 6; 20, 8.

§ 6. ∪ — — —.

I, 15, 6. *ritunā yagnām āsāthē*.

I, 38, 2. *kva vo gāvo nā rānyānti* (see note to I, 38, 2).

I, 38, 9; 86, 9; III, 27, 2; 41, 3; IV, 32, 23; V, 68, 5;
70, 2; VI, 61, 11; VIII, 2, 20; 2, 25; 7, 32; 26, 19; 79, 4;
79, 5; 81, 6; X, 158, 4.

§ 7. — — — —.

I, 10, 8. *sām gā āsmābhyām dhūnuhī*.

I, 12, 5. *āgnē tvām rakshasvināh*.

I, 37, 15; 43, 8; 46, 6; III, 62, 7; IV, 30, 21; V, 86, 5; VIII, 5, 32; 5, 35; X, 119, 1-13; 144, 4.

§ 8. — — — —.

I, 2, 9. *daksham dadhātē āpāsām* (or § 2).

I, 6, 10. *indram maho vā rāgasāh*.

I, 27, 6; 30, 21; 41, 9; 90, 5; III, 24, 5; V, 19, 2; 70, 1; 70, 4; 82, 8; VIII, 2, 27; 2, 31; 16, 9; 55, 4; 67, 19; 81, 5; 81, 8; IX, 47, 2.

But although with regard to the Gāyatra, and I may add, the Ānushūbha pādas, the evidence as to the variety Traishūbha and of their *vr̥ttas* is such that it can hardly be Gāyata Pādas.

resisted, a much more determined stand has been made in defence of the *vr̥tta* of the Traishūbha and Gāyata pādas. Here Professor Kuhn and those who follow him maintain that the rule is absolute, that the former must end in — —, the latter in — — —, and that the eighth syllable, immediately preceding these syllables, ought, if possible, to be long. Nor can I deny that Professor Kuhn has brought forward powerful arguments in support of his theory, and that his emendations of the Vedic text recommend themselves by their great ingenuity and simplicity. If his theory could be carried out, I should readily admit that we should gain something. We should have throughout the Veda a perfectly uniform metre, and wherever we found any violation of it, we should be justified in resorting to conjectural criticism.

The only question is at what price this strict uniformity can be obtained. If, for instance, in order to have the regular *vr̥ttas* at the end of Traishūbha and Gāyata lines, we were obliged to repeal all rules of prosody, to allow almost every short vowel to be used as long, and every long vowel to be used as short, whether long by nature or by position, we should have gained very little, we

should have robbed Peter to pay Paul, we should have removed no difficulty, but only ignored the causes which created it. Now, if we examine the process by which Professor Kuhn establishes the regularity of the *vr̥ittas* or final syllables of *Traishṭubha* and *Gāgata* pādas, we find, in addition to the rules laid down before, and in which he is supported, as we saw, to a great extent by the *Prātisākhya* and *Pāṇini*, viz. the anceps nature of *e* and *o*, and of a long final vowel before a vowel, the following exceptions or metrical licences, without which that metrical uniformity at which he aims, could not be obtained :

Prosodial
Licences. 1. The vowel *o* in the body of a word is to be treated as optionally short :

II, 39, 3. *prāṭi vāstor ūsrā* (see *Trishṭ.* § 5).

Here the *o* of *vasto* is supposed to be short, although it is the *Guṇa* of *u*, and therefore very different from the final *e* of *sarve* or *āste*, or the final *o* of *sarvo* for *sarvas* or *mano* for *manas* *. It should be remarked that in Greek, too, the final diphthongs corresponding to the *e* of *sarve* and *āste* are treated as short, as far as the accent is concerned. Hence *ἀποικοι*, *τύπτεται*, and even *γνώμαι*, nom. plur. In Latin, too, the old terminations of the nom. sing. *o* and *u*, instead of the later *us*, are short. (*Neue, Formenlehre*, § 23 seq.)

VI, 51, 15. *gopā āmā*.

Here the *o* of *gopā* is treated as short, in order to get *o—o—* instead of *—o—*, which is perfectly legitimate at the end of an *Ushnih*.

2. The long *ī* and *ū* are treated as short, not only before vowels, which is legitimate, but also before consonants.

VII, 62, 4. *dyāvābhūmī ādīte trāsīthām nāh* (see *Trishṭ.* § 5).

The forms *īsiyā* and *rāsiyā* in VII, 32, 18, occur at the end of octosyllabic or *Gāyatra* pādas, and are therefore

* A very strong divergence of opinion is expressed on this point by Professor Bollensen. He says: 'O und E erst später in die Schrifttafel aufgenommen, bewahren ihre Länge durch das ganze indische Schriftenthum bis ins Apabhramsa hinab. Selbstverständlich kann kurz o und e im Veda erst recht nicht zugelassen werden.' *Zeitschrift der D. M. G.*, vol. xxii, p. 574.

perfectly legitimate, yet Professor Kuhn would change them too, into *īṣiṃyā* and *rāṣiṃyā*. In VII, 28, 4, even *māyī* is treated as *māyī* (see Trishṭ. § 5); and in VII, 68, 1, *vītām* as *vītām*. If, in explanation of this shortening of *vītām*, *vīhi* is quoted, which is identified with *vīhi*, this can hardly be considered as an argument, for *vīhi* occurs where no short syllable is required, IV, 48, 1; II, 26, 2; and where, therefore, the shortening of the vowel cannot be attributed to metrical reasons.

3. Final *m* followed by an initial consonant is allowed to make no position, and even in the middle of a word a nasal followed by a liquid is supposed to make *positio debilis*. Several of the instances, however, given in support, are from *Gāyatra pādas*, where Professor Kuhn, in some of his later articles, has himself allowed greater latitude; others admit of different scanning, as for instance,

I, 117, 8. *māhāh kshōṃasyā āsvinā kāṇvāyā*.

Here, even if we considered the dispondeus as illegitimate, we might scan *kāṇvāyā*, for this scanning occurs in other places, while to treat the first *a* as short before *nv* seems tantamount to surrendering all rules of prosody.

4. Final *n* before semivowels, mutes, and double *n* before vowels make no position^a. Ex. III, 49, 1. *yāsmiṃ vīṣvā* (Trishṭ. § 5); I, 174, 5. *yāsmiṃ kākān*; I, 186, 4. *sāsmiṃ(n) ūdhan*^b.

5. Final Visarga before sibilants makes no position^c. Ex. IV, 21, 10. *sātyāh sāmṛāt* (Trishṭ. § 5). Even in I, 63, 4.

^a Professor Kuhn has afterwards (Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 207) modified this view, and instead of allowing a final nasal vowel followed by a mute to make *positio debilis*, he thinks that the nasal should in most cases be omitted altogether.

^b Here a distinction should be made, I think, between an *n* before a consonant, and a final *n* following a short vowel, which, according to the rules of Sandhi, is doubled, if a vowel follows. In the latter case, the vowel before the *n* remains, no doubt, short in many cases, or, more correctly, the doubling of the *n* does not take place, e.g. I, 63, 4; 186, 4. In other places, the doubling seems preferable, e.g. I, 33, 11, though Professor Kuhn would remove it altogether. Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 125.

^c Here, too, according to later researches, Professor Kuhn would rather omit the final sibilant altogether, loc. cit. vol. iv, p. 207.

kōdīh sakhā (probably a *Gāgata*), and V, 82, 4. *sāvīh* sāubhāgam (a *Gāy.* § 7), the long *i* is treated as short, and the short *a* of *sakhā* is lengthened, because an aspirate follows.

6. *S* before mutes makes no position. Ex. VI, 66, 11. *ūgrā āspridhran* (*Trishṭ.* § 3).

7. *S* before *k* makes no position. Ex. *vīsvāskāndrāh*, &c.

8. Mutes before *s* make no position. Ex. *rākshās*, according to Professor Kuhn, in the seventh *Mandala* only, but see I, 12, 5; *kūtsa*, &c.

9. Mutes before *r* or *v* make no position. Ex. *sūṣiprā*, *dīrghāsrūt*.

10. Sibilants before *y* make no position. Ex. *dāsyūn*.

11. *R* followed by mutes or sibilants makes no position. Ex. *āyūr gīvase*, *kārdīh*, *vārshishthām*.

12. Words like *smāddishān*, &c. retain their vowel short before two following consonants.

We now proceed to consider a number of prosodial rules which Professor Kuhn proposes to repeal in order to have a long syllable where the MSS. supply a short :

1. The vowel *ri* is to be pronounced as long, or rather as *ar*. Ex. I, 12, 9. *tāsmāi pāvākā mrīḷyā* is to be read *mārdāyā*; V, 33, 10. *sāmvāranāsyā rishēh* is to be read *arsheh*. But why not *sāmvāranāsyā rishēh* (i. e. *siarsheh*)?

2. The *a* privativum may be lengthened. Ex. *āgārāh*, *āmritāh*.

3. Short vowels before liquids may be long. Ex. *nārah*, *tārutā*, *tāratī*, *mārutām*, *hāriṣāh*, *ārushi*, *dadhur iha*, *sūvitā* (p. 471).

4. Short vowels before nasals may be lengthened. Ex. *ganān*, *sanitar*, *tānūh*, *ūpā nāh*.

5. Short vowels before the *ma* of the superlative may be lengthened. Ex. *nrītama*.

6. The short *a* in the roots *sam* and *yam*, and in *am* (the termination of the accusative) may be lengthened.

7. The group $\check{a}v\check{a}$ is to be pronounced $\bar{a}u\bar{a}$. Ex. $\check{a}v\check{a}s\bar{e}$ becomes $\bar{a}u\bar{a}s\bar{e}$; $\check{s}a\check{v}i\check{t}\bar{a}$ becomes $\bar{s}a\bar{u}i\bar{t}\bar{a}$; $\check{n}a\check{v}\bar{a}$ becomes $\bar{n}a\bar{u}\bar{a}$.

8. The group $\check{a}y\check{a}$ is to be changed into $\bar{a}i\bar{a}$ or $\bar{e}\bar{a}$. Ex. $\check{n}a\check{y}\check{a}s\bar{i}$ becomes $\bar{n}a\bar{i}\bar{a}s\bar{i}$.

9. The group $v\check{a}$ is to be changed into ua , and this ua to be treated as a kind of diphthong and therefore long. Ex. $\check{k}a\check{r}v\check{a}t\bar{a}m\check{a}h$ becomes $\bar{k}a\bar{u}\bar{a}t\bar{a}m\check{a}h$; $\check{v}\bar{a}r\check{u}\check{n}\bar{a}h$ becomes $\bar{u}\bar{a}r\check{u}\bar{n}\bar{a}h$.

10. The short vowel in the reduplicated syllable of perfects is to be lengthened. Ex. $\check{t}\bar{a}t\bar{a}\check{n}\bar{a}h$, $\check{d}\bar{a}d\check{h}i\bar{r}\bar{e}$.

11. Short vowels before all aspirates may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{r}\bar{a}th\bar{a}h$ becomes $\bar{r}\bar{a}th\bar{a}h$; $\check{s}\bar{a}kh\bar{a}$ becomes $\bar{s}\bar{a}kh\bar{a}$.

12. Short vowels before h and all sibilants may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{m}\bar{a}h\check{n}i$ becomes $\bar{m}\bar{a}h\check{n}i$; $\check{u}\check{s}\check{g}\bar{a}m$ becomes $\bar{u}\bar{s}\check{g}\bar{a}m$; $\check{r}i\check{s}h\bar{a}t\bar{e}$ becomes $\bar{r}i\check{s}h\bar{a}t\bar{e}$; $\check{d}\bar{a}s\bar{a}t$ becomes $\bar{d}\bar{a}s\bar{a}t$.

13. The short vowel before t may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{v}\bar{a}g\check{a}v\bar{a}t\bar{a}h$ becomes $\bar{v}\bar{a}g\bar{a}v\bar{a}t\bar{a}h$; $\check{a}t\check{ith}i\check{h}$ becomes $\bar{a}t\check{ith}i\check{h}$.

14. The short vowel before d may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{u}d\bar{a}r\bar{a}m$ becomes $\bar{u}d\bar{a}r\bar{a}m$; $\check{u}d\bar{a}v\bar{a}$ becomes $\bar{u}d\bar{a}v\bar{a}$.

15. The short vowel before p may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{a}p\bar{a}m$ becomes $\bar{a}p\bar{a}m$; $\check{t}\bar{a}p\check{u}shim$ becomes $\bar{t}\bar{a}p\check{u}shim$; $\check{g}r\check{i}h\bar{a}p\bar{a}tim$ becomes $\bar{g}r\check{i}h\bar{a}p\bar{a}tim$.

16. The short vowel before g and g may be lengthened. Ex. $\check{s}\bar{a}n\check{u}sh\bar{a}g\bar{a}sat$ becomes $\bar{s}\bar{a}n\check{u}sh\bar{a}g\bar{a}sat$; $\check{y}u\check{n}\bar{a}g\bar{a}n$ becomes $\bar{y}u\check{n}\bar{a}g\bar{a}n$.

Let us now turn back for one moment to look at the slaughter which has been committed! Is there one single rule of prosody that has been spared? Is there one single short syllable that must always remain short, or a long syllable that must always remain long? If all restrictions of prosody are thus removed, our metres, no doubt, become perfectly regular. But it should be remembered that these metrical rules, for which all this carnage has been committed, are not founded upon any a priori principles, but deduced by ancient or modern metricians from those very hymns which seem so constantly to violate

them. Neither ancient nor modern metricians had, as far as we know, any evidence to go upon besides the hymns of the Rig-veda ; and the philosophical speculations as to the origin of metres in which some of them indulge, and from which they would fain derive some of their unbending rules, are, as need hardly be said, of no consequence whatever. I cannot understand what definite idea even modern writers connect with such statements as that, for instance, the Trishṭubh metre sprang from the Gāgati metre, that the eleven syllables of the former are an abbreviation of the twelve syllables of the latter. Surely, metres are not made artificially, and by addition or subtraction. Metres have a natural origin in the rhythmic sentiment of different people, and they become artificial and arithmetical in the same way as language with its innate principles of law and analogy becomes in course of time grammatical and artificial. To derive one metre from another is like deriving a genitive from a nominative, which we may do indeed for grammatical purposes, but which no one would venture to do who is at all acquainted with the natural and independent production of grammatical forms. Were we to arrange the Trishṭubh and Gāgati metres in chronological order, I should decidedly place the Trishṭubh first, for we see, as it were before our eyes, how sometimes one foot, sometimes two and three feet in a Trishṭubh verse admit an additional syllable at the end, particularly in set phrases which would not submit to a Trishṭubh ending. The phrase *sam no bhava dvipade sam katushpade* is evidently a solemn phrase, and we see it brought in without hesitation, even though every other line of the same strophe or hymn is Trishṭubh, i.e. hendecasyllabic, not dodecasyllabic. See, for instance, VI, 74, 1; VII, 54, 1; X, 85, 44; 165, 1. However, I maintain by no means that this was the actual origin of Gāgati metres; I only refer to it in order to show the groundlessness of metrical theories which represent the component elements, a foot of one or two or four syllables as given first, and as afterwards compounded into systems of two, three or four such feet, and who therefore would wish us to look upon the hendecasyllabic Trishṭubh as originally a dodecasyllabic Gāgati, only

deprived of its tail. If my explanation of the name of Trishṭubh, i. e. Three-step, is right, its origin must be ascribed to a far more natural process than that of artificial amputation. It was to accompany a choros, i. e. a dance, which after advancing freely for eight steps in one direction, turned back (*vṛtta*) with three steps, the second of which was strongly marked, and would therefore, whether in song or recitation, be naturally accompanied by a long syllable. It certainly is so in the vast majority of Trishṭubhs which have been handed down to us. But if among these verses we find a small number in which this simple and palpable rhythm is violated, and which nevertheless were preserved from the first in that imperfect form, although the temptation to set them right must have been as great to the ancient as it has proved to be to the modern students of the Veda, are we to say that nearly all, if not all, the rules that determine the length and shortness of syllables, and which alone give character to every verse, are to be suspended? Or, ought we not rather to consider, whether the ancient choregic poets may not have indulged occasionally in an irregular movement? We see that this was so with regard to Gâyatrî verses. We see the greater freedom of the first and second pādas occasionally extend to the third; and it will be impossible, without intolerable violence, to remove all the varieties of the last pāda of a Gâyatrî of which I have given examples above, pages civ seqq.

It is, of course, impossible to give here all the evidence that might be brought forward in support of similar freedom Traishṭubha
Vṛtta. in Trishṭubh verses, and I admit that the number of real varieties with them is smaller than with the Gâyatrîs. In order to make the evidence which I have to bring forward in support of these varieties as unassailable as possible, I have excluded nearly every pāda that occurs only in the first, second, or third line of a strophe, and have restricted myself, with few exceptions, and those chiefly referring to pādas that had been quoted by other scholars in support of their own theories, to the final pādas of Trishṭubh verses. Yet even with this limited evidence, I think I shall be able to establish at least three

varieties of Trishṭubh. Preserving the same classification which I adopted before for the Gāyatrī, so as to include the important eighth syllable of the Trishṭubh, which does not properly belong to the *vṛtta*, I maintain that class 4. ॐ — —, class 5. — — —, and class 8. — ॐ — must be recognised as legitimate endings in the hymns of the Veda, and that by recognising them we are relieved from nearly all, if not all, the more violent prosodial licences which Professor Kuhn felt himself obliged to admit in his theory of Vedic metres.

§ 4. ॐ ॐ — —.

The verses which fall under § 4 are so numerous that after those of the first *Mandala*, mentioned above, they need not be given here in full. They are simply cases where the eighth syllable is not lengthened, and they cannot be supposed to run counter to any rule of the *Prātisākhya*, for the simple reason that the *Prātisākhya* never gave such a rule as that the eighth syllable must be lengthened, if the ninth is short. Examples will be found in the final pāda of Trishṭubhs: II, 30, 6; III, 36, 4; 53, 15; 54, 12; IV, 1, 16; 2, 7; 9; 11; 4, 12; 6, 1; 2; 4; 7, 7; 11, 5; 17, 3; 23, 6; 24, 2; 27, 1; 28, 5; 55, 5; 57, 2; V, 1, 2; VI, 17, 10; 21, 8; 23, 7; 25, 5; 29, 6; 33, 1; 62, 1; 63, 7; VII, 21, 5; 28, 3; 42, 4; 56, 15; 60, 10; 84, 2; 92, 4; VIII, 1, 33; 96, 9; IX, 92, 5; X, 61, 12; 13; 74, 3; 117, 7.

In support of § 5. — — —, the number of cases is smaller, but it should be remembered that it might be considerably increased if I had not restricted myself to the final pāda of each Trishṭubh, while the first, second, and third pādas would have yielded a much larger harvest:

§ 5. — — — —.

I, 89, 9. mā no madhyā rīrīshatāyūr gāntōh.

I, 92, 6. supratikā saumanasāyāgīgāh.

I, 114, 5; 117, 2; 122, 1; 122, 8; 186, 3; II, 4, 2; III, 49, 2; IV, 3, 9; 26, 6; V, 41, 14; VI, 25, 2; 66, 11; VII, 8, 6; 28, 4; 68, 1; 71, 2; 78, 1; 93, 7^b; IX, 90, 4; X, 11, 8.

I do not wish to deny that in several of these lines it would be possible to remove the long syllable from the ninth place by conjectural emendation. Instead of áyur in I, 89, 9, we might read áyu; in I, 92, 6, we might drop the augment of agár; in II, 4, 2, we might admit synizesis in áratir, and then read gírā-āsvāh, as in I, 141, 12. In VI, 25, 2, after eliding the a of ava, we might read dāsīh. But even if, in addition to all this, we were to admit the possible suppression of final m in asmabhyam, mahyam, and in the accusative singular, or the suppression of s in the nominative singular, both of which would be extreme measures, we should still have a number of cases which could not be righted without even more violent remedies. Why then should we not rather admit the occasional appearance of a metrical variation which certainly has a powerful precedent in the dispondeus of Gāyatrī? I am not now acquainted with the last results of metrical criticism in Virgil, but, unless some new theories now prevail, I well recollect that spondaic hexameters, though small in number, much smaller than in the Veda, were recognised by the best scholars, and no emendations attempted to remove them. If then in Virgil we read,

‘Cum patribus populoque, penatibusque et magnis dis,’
why not follow the authority of the best MSS. and the tradition of the Prātisākhyas and admit a dispondeus at the end of a Trishūbh rather than suspend, in order to meet this single difficulty, some of the most fundamental rules of prosody?

I now proceed to give a more numerous list of Traishūbha pādas ending in a choriambus, — ∪ ∪ —, again confining myself, with few exceptions, to final pādas:

§ 8. — ∪ ∪ —.

I, 62, 3. sam usriyābhir vāvasāntā nārāh.

I, 103, 4. yad dha sūnuh sravase nāmā dādhe.

I, 121, 9; 122, 10^b; 173, 8; 186, 2; II, 4, 3; 19, 1; 33, 14; IV, 1, 19^a; 25, 4; 39, 2; V, 30, 12; 41, 4; 41, 15;

* ‘Nur eine Stelle habe ich mir angemerkt, wo das Metrum āam verlangt.’

VI, 4, 7; 10, 5; 11, 4; 13, 1^b; 13, 1^d; 20, 1^b; 20, 1^d; 29, 4; 33, 3; 33, 5; 44, 11; 49, 12; 68, 5; 68, 7; VII, 19, 10; 62, 4; IX, 97, 26; X, 55, 8; 99, 9; 108, 6; 169, 1.

It is perfectly true that this sudden change in the rhythm of Trishūbh verses, making their ending iambic instead of trochaic, grates on our ears. But, I believe, that if we admit a short stop after the seventh syllable, the intended rhythm of these verses will become intelligible. We remarked a similar break in the verses of hymn X, 77, where the sudden transition to an iambic metre was used with great effect, and the choriambic ending, though less effective, is by no means offensive. It should be remarked also, that in many, though not in all cases, a cæsura takes place after the seventh syllable, and this is, no doubt, a great help towards a better delivery of these choriambic Trishūbhs.

While, however, I contend for the recognition of these three varieties of the normal Trishūbh metre, I am quite willing to admit that other variations besides these, which occur from time to time in the Veda, form a legitimate subject of critical discussion.

§ 2. ∪ ∪ ∪ —.

Trishūbh verses, the final pāda of which ends in ∪ ∪ ∪ —, I should generally prefer to treat as ending in a Gāgata pāda, in which this ending is more legitimate. Thus I should propose to scan:

I, 122, 11. prāsastāyē māhinā[~] rāthāvātē.

III, 20, 5. vāsūn rūdrāñ ādityāñ[~] ihā hūvē.

V, 2, 1. pūrā[~] pāsyānti nīhitām[~] (tām) āratāu.

VI, 13, 5. vāyō vrīkāyārayē[~] gāsūrayē.

§ 1. ∪ — ∪ —.

I should propose the same medela for some final pādas of Trishūbhs apparently ending in ∪ — ∪ —. We might indeed, as has been suggested, treat these verses as single instances of that peculiar metre which we saw carried out in the whole of hymn X, 77, but at the end of a verse the ad-

Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 180; Bollensen, Zeitschrift der D. M. G., vol. xxii, p. 587.

mission of an occasional Gāgata pāda is more in accordance with the habit of the Vedic poets. Thus I should scan :

V, 33, 4. *vṛṣhā sāmat̥sū dāsāsyā nāmā kīt̥**.

V, 41, 5^b. *rāyā ēshe vāse dādhitā dhīh*.

After what I have said before on the real character of the teaching of the Prātisākhya, I need not show again that the fact of Uvata's counting ta of dadhīta as the tenth syllable is of no importance in determining the real nature of these hymns, though it is of importance, as Professor Kuhn remarks (Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 451), in showing that Uvata considered himself at perfect liberty in counting or not counting, for his own purposes, the elided syllable of avase.

VII, 4, 6. *māpsavāh pari shādāmā mādūvāh*.

§ 6. ∪ — — —.

Final pādas of Trishṭubhs ending in ∪ — — — are very scarce. In VI, 1, 4,

bhadrāyām te ranayantā samdrīshṭau,

it would be very easy to read *bhadrāyām te samdrīshṭau rānāyāntā*; and in X, 74, 2,

dṵaur nā vārebhīh krīṇavāntā svāih,

we may either recognise a Gāgata pāda, or read

dṵaur nā vārebhīh krīṇavāntā svāih,

which would agree with the metre of hymn X, 77.

§ 7. — — ∪ —.

Pādas ending in — — ∪ — do not occur as final in any Traishṭubha hymn, but as many Gāgata pādas occur in the body of Traishṭubha hymns, we have to scan them as dodecasyllabic :

I, 63, 4^a. *tṵām hā tyād īndrā kōdīh sakhā.*

IV, 26, 6^b. *pārāvātāh sakunō māndram mādām.*

The adjective pāvaka which frequently occurs at the end of final and internal pādas of Trishṭubh hymns has always

* Professor Kuhn has finally adopted the same scanning, Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 184.

to be scanned *ṣāvākā*. Cf. IV, 51, 2; VI, 5, 2; 10, 4; 51, 3; VII, 3, 1; 9; 9, 1^b; 56, 12; X, 46, 7^b.

I must reserve what I have to say about other metres of the Veda for another opportunity, but I cannot leave this subject without referring once more to a Omission of final m and s. metrical licence which has been strongly advocated by Professor Kuhn and others, and by the admission of which there is no doubt that many difficulties might be removed, I mean the occasional omission of a final m and s, and the subsequent contraction of the final and initial vowels. The arguments that have been brought forward in support of this are very powerful. There is the general argument that final s and m are liable to be dropt in other Aryan languages, and particularly for metrical purposes. There is the stronger argument that in some cases final s and m in Sanskrit may or may not be omitted, even apart from any metrical stress. In Sanskrit we find that the demonstrative pronoun *sa* appears most frequently as *sa* (*sa dadāti*), and if followed by liquid vowels, it may coalesce with them even in later Sanskrit. Thus we see *saisha* for *sa esha*, *sendraḥ* for *sa indraḥ* sanctioned for metrical purposes even by Pāṇini, VI, 1, 134. We might refer also to feminines which have s in the nominative singular after bases in ū, but drop it after bases in ī. We find in the *Samhitā* text, V, 7, 8, *svādhitiva*, instead of *svādhitīḥ-iva* in the *Pada* text, sanctioned by the *Prātisākhya* 259; likewise IX, 61, 10, *Samhitā*, *bhūmy ā dade*, instead of *Pada*, *bhūmiḥ ā dade*. But before we draw any general conclusions from such instances, we should consider whether they do not admit of a grammatical instead of a metrical explanation. The nominative singular of the demonstrative pronoun was *sa* before it was *sas*; by the side of *bhūmiḥ* we have a secondary form *bhūmī*; and we may conclude from *svādhitī-vān*, I, 88, 2, that the Vedic poets knew of a form *svādhitī*, by the side of *svādhitīḥ*.

As to the suppression of final m, however, we see it admitted by the best authorities, or we see at least alternate forms with or without m, in *túbhya*, which occurs

frequently instead of *túbhyam*^a, and twice, at least, without apparently any metrical reason^b. We find *asmáka* instead of *asmákam* (I, 173, 10), *yushmáka* instead of *yushmákam* (VII, 59, 9-10), *yágadhva* instead of *yágadvam* (VIII, 2, 37) sanctioned both by the *Samhitâ* and *Pada* texts^c.

If then we have such precedents, it may well be asked why we should hesitate to adopt the same expedient, the omission of final *m* and *s*, whenever the Vedic metres seem to require it. Professor Bollensen's remark, that Vedic verses cannot be treated to all the licences of Latin scanning^d, is hardly a sufficient answer; and he himself, though under a slightly different form, would admit as much, if not more, than has been admitted on this point by Professors Kuhn and Roth. On *a priori* grounds I should by no means feel opposed to the admission of a possible elision of final *s* or *m*, or even *n*; and my only doubt is whether it is really necessary for the proper scanning of Vedic metres.

My own opinion has always been, that if we admit on a larger scale what in single words can hardly be doubted

by anybody, viz. the pronunciation of two syllables as one, we need not fall back on

the elision of final consonants in order to arrive at a proper scanning of Vedic metres. On this point I shall have to say a few words in conclusion, because I shall frequently avail myself of this licence, for the purpose of righting apparently corrupt verses in the hymns of the *Rig-veda*; and I feel bound to explain, once for all, why I avail myself of it in preference to other emendations which have been proposed by scholars such as Professors Benfey, Kuhn, Roth, Bollensen, and others.

The merit of having first pointed out some cases where

^a I, 54, 9; 135, 2; III, 42, 8; V, 11, 5; VII, 22, 7; VIII, 51, 9; 76, 8; 82, 5; IX, 62, 27; 86, 30; X, 167, 1.

^b II, 11, 3; V, 30, 6.

^c See Bollensen, *Orient und Occident*, vol. iii, p. 459; Kuhn, *Beiträge*, vol. iv, p. 199.

^d *Orient und Occident*, vol. iv, p. 449.

two syllables must be treated as one, belongs, I believe, to Professor Bollensen in his article, 'Zur Herstellung des Veda,' published in Benfey's *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 461. He proposed, for instance, to write *hyāná* instead of *hiyāná*, IX, 13, 6; *dhyānó* instead of *dhiyānó*, VIII, 49, 5; *sáhyase* instead of *sáhiyase*, I, 71, 4; *yānó* instead of *iyānó*, VIII, 50, 5, &c. The actual alteration of these words seems to me unnecessary; nor should we think of resorting to such violent measures in Greek where, as far as metrical purposes are concerned, two vowels have not unfrequently to be treated as one.

That *iva* counts in many passages as one syllable is admitted by everybody. The only point on which I differ is that I do not see why *iva*, when monosyllabic, should be changed to *va*, instead of being pronounced quickly, or, to adopt the terminology of Greek grammarians, by *synizesis*^a. *Synizesis* is well explained by Greek scholars as a quick pronunciation of two vowels so that neither should be lost, and as different thereby from *synalœphe*, which means the contraction of two vowels into one^b. This *synizesis* is by no means restricted to *iva* and a few other words, but seems to me a very frequent expedient resorted to by the ancient *Rishis*.

Originally it may have arisen from the fact that language allows in many cases alternate forms of one or two syllables. As in Greek we have double forms like *ἀλγεινός* and *ἀλγεινός*, *γαλακτοφάγος* and *γλακτοφάγος*, *πηγνός* and *πηγνός*, *πυκνός* and *πυκνός*^c, and as in Latin we have the shortening

^a *Synizesis* in Greek applies only to the quick pronunciation of two vowels, if in immediate contact; and not, if separated by consonants. *Samprasāraṇa* might seem a more appropriate term, but though the grammatical process designated in Sanskrit by *Samprasāraṇa* offers some analogies, it could only by a new definition be applied to the metrical process here intended.

^b A. B. p. 835, 30. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς μέτροις καὶ ἡ καλουμένη συνεκφώνησις ἢ καὶ συνίησις λέγεται. Ὅταν γὰρ φωνηέντων ἐπ' ἀλλήλους γένηται ἡ προφορά, τότε γίνεται ἡ συνίησις εἰς μίαν συλλαβὴν. Διαφέρει δὲ συναλοιφῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραμμάτων ἐστὶ κλοπή, ἡ δὲ χρόνων· καὶ ἡ μὲν συναλοιφή, ὡς λέγεται, φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ οὐ. Mehlhorn, *Griechische Grammatik*, § 101. Thus in *Ἄσπετόλεμος* we have *synizesis*, in *Ἄσπετόλεμος* *synæresis*.

^c Cf. Mehlhorn, *Griechische Grammatik*, § 57.

or suppression of vowels carried out on the largest scale*, we find in Sanskrit, too, such double forms as *pr̥ithvi* or *pr̥ithivī*, *adhi* and *dhi*, *api* and *pi*, *ava* and *va*. The occurrence of such forms which have nothing to do with metrical considerations, but are perfectly legitimate from a grammatical point of view, would encourage a tendency to treat two syllables—and particularly two short syllables—as one, whenever an occasion arose. There are, besides, in the Vedic Sanskrit a number of forms where, as we saw, a long syllable has to be pronounced as two. In some of these cases this pronunciation is legitimate, i.e. it preserves an original dissyllabic form which in course of time had become monosyllabic. In other cases the same process takes place through a mistaken sense of analogy, where we cannot prove that an original dissyllabic form had any existence even in a prehistoric state of language. The occurrence of a number of such alternate forms would naturally leave a general impression in the minds of poets that two short syllables and one long syllable were under certain circumstances interchangeable. So considerable a number of words in which a long syllable has to be pronounced as two syllables has been collected by Professors Kuhn, Bollensen, and others, that no doubt can remain on this subject. Vedic poets, being allowed to change a semivowel into a vowel, were free to say *nāsātyā* and *nāsātṡyā*, VIII, 5, 32; *pr̥ithivyās* and *pr̥ithivṡyāḥ*; *pitrōḥ* and *pitrōḥ*, I, 31, 4. They could separate compound words, and pronounce *ghr̥itānnāḥ* or *ghr̥itā-ānnāḥ*, VII, 3, 1. They could insert a kind of shewa or svarabhakti in words like *sāmne* or *sāmṡne*, VIII, 6, 47; *dhāmne* or *dhāmṡne*, VIII, 92, 25; *ārāvnāḥ* and *ārāvṡnāḥ*, IX, 63, 5. They might vary between *pānti* and *pānti*, I, 41, 2; *yāthana* and *yāthana*, I, 39, 3; *nidhātōḥ* and *nidhātōḥ*, I, 41, 9; *tredhā* and *tredhā*, I, 34, 8; *dēvāḥ* and *dēvāḥ* (besides *devāsaḥ*), I, 23, 24; *rōdasī* and *rōdasī*, I, 33, 9; 59, 4; 64, 9; and *rōdāsyōḥ*, I, 33, 5; 59, 2; 117, 10;

* See the important chapters on 'Kürzung der Vokale' and 'Tilgung der Vokale' in Corssen's 'Ausprache des Lateinischen,' and more especially his remarks on the so-called irrational vowels in Plantus, *ibid.* vol. ii, p. 70.

VI, 24, 3; VII, 6, 2; X, 74, 1^a. Need we wonder then if we find that, on the other hand, they allowed themselves to pronounce *pr̥thivī* as *pr̥thivī*, I, 191, 6; VII, 34, 7; 99, 3; *dhr̥ishṇāvā* as *dhr̥ishṇāva*, V, 52, 14; *śuvānā* as *śuvānā*? There is no reason why we should change the spelling of *śuvānā* into *svānā*. The metre itself tells us at once where *śuvānā* is to be pronounced as two or as three syllables. Nor is it possible to believe that those who first handed down and afterwards wrote down the text of the Vedic hymns, should have been ignorant of that freedom of pronunciation. Why, there is not one single passage in the whole of the ninth *Māṇḍala*, where, as far as I know, *śuvānā* should not be pronounced as dissyllabic, i.e. as *śuvānā*; and to suppose that the scholars of India did not know how that superfluous syllable should be removed, is really taking too low an estimate of men like *Vyāḍi* or *Saunaka*.

But if we once admit that in these cases two syllables separated by a single consonant were pronounced as one and were metrically counted as one, we can hardly resist the evidence in favour of a similar pronunciation in a large number of other words, and we shall find that by the admission of this rapid pronunciation, or of what in *Plautus* we should call irrational vowels, many verses assume at once their regular form without the necessity of admitting the suppression of final *s*, *m*, *n*, or the introduction of other prosodial licences. To my mind the most convincing passages are those where, as in the *Atyashī* and similar hymns, a poet repeats the same phrase twice, altering only one or two words, but without endeavouring to avoid an excess of syllables which, to our mind, unless we resort to synizesis, would completely destroy the uniformity of the metre. Thus we read:

I, 133, 6. *āpūr̥ṣhāghno* • *pratītā sūrā sātvaḥhī*,
trīsāptaiḥ sūrā sātvaḥhī.

* Professor Bollensen in some of these passages proposes to read *rodasios*. In I, 96, 4, no change is necessary if we read *vīrām*. *Zeitschrift der D. M. G.*, vol. xxii, p. 587.

Here no *pra must be pronounced with one ictus only, in order to get a complete agreement between the two iambic diameters.

I, 134, 5. ūgrā īṣhānāntā bhurvāni,
āpām īshāntā bhurvāni.

As ishanta never occurs again, I suspect that the original reading was ishānanta in both lines, and that in the second line ishānanta, pronounced rapidly, was mistaken for ishanta. Is not bhurvāni a locative, corresponding to the datives in vāne which are so frequently used in the sense of infinitives? See note to I, 6, 8, page 47 seq. In I, 138, 3, we must read :

āheṭāmānā ūrusāmsā sārī bhāvā,
vāge-vāge sārī bhāvā.

In I, 129, 11,

ādḥā hī tvā gānitā gīganād vāsō,
rākshōhanām tvā gīganād vāsō,

we might try to remove the difficulty by omitting vāsō at the end of the refrain, but this would be against the general character of these hymns. We want the last word vāsō, if possible, at the end of both lines. But, if so, we must admit two cases of synizesis, or, if this seems too clumsy, we must omit tvā.

I shall now proceed to give a number of other examples in which the same consonantal synizesis seems necessary in order to make the rhythm of the verses perceptible to our ears as it was to the ears of the ancient Rishis.

The preposition anu takes synizesis in

I, 127, 1. ghrītasyā vibhrāshñm ānu vāshñ sōkīshā. Cf. X, 14, 1.

The preposition abhi :

I, 91, 23. rāyō bhāgam sāhasāvān abhi yūdhyā.

Here Professor Kuhn changes sahasāvan into sahasvaḥ, which, no doubt, is a very simple and very plausible emendation. But in altering the text of the Veda many things have to be considered, and in our case it might be objected that sahasvaḥ never occurs again as an epithet of Soma.

As an invocation *sahasvaḥ* refers to no deity but Agni, and even in its other cases it is applied to Agni and Indra only. However, I do not by any means maintain that *sahasvaḥ* could not be applied to Soma, for nearly the same arguments could be used against *sahasāvan*, if conjecturally put in the place of *sahasvaḥ*; I only wish to point out how everything ought to be tried first, before we resort in the Veda to conjectural emendations. Therefore, if in our passage there should be any objection to admitting the synizesis in *abhi*, I should much rather propose synizesis of *sahasāvan*, than change it into *sahasvaḥ*. There is synizesis in *maha*, e.g. I, 133, 6. *āvār māha īndrā dādrīḥi sṛdhī nāḥ*. Although this verse is quoted by the *Prātisākhya*, *Sūtra* 522, as one in which the lengthened syllable *dhī* of *sṛdhī* does not occupy the tenth place, and which therefore required special mention, the original poet evidently thought otherwise, and lengthened the syllable, being a syllable liable to be lengthened, because it really occupied the tenth place, and therefore received a peculiar stress.

The preposition *pari*:

VI, 52, 14. *mā vō vākāmsi parīkākshyāni vōkām*,
sūmneshv īd vō āntāmā mādēmā.

Here Professor Kuhn (*Beiträge*, vol. iv, p. 197) begins the last *pāda* with *vōkām*, but this is impossible, unless we change the accent of *vōkām*, though even then the separation of the verb from *mā* and the accumulation of two verbs in the last line would be objectionable.

Hārī is pronounced as *hārī*:

VII, 32, 12. *yā īndrō harivān nā dābhānti tām ripāḥ*.

II, 18, 5. *ā kātvarīmsatā haribhīr yugānāḥ*.

Hence I propose to scan the difficult verse I, 167, 1, as follows:

sāhasrām tā īndrā-ūtāyō nāḥ,
*sāhasrām īshō harivō gūrtātāmāḥ**,

* As to the scanning of the second line see p. cxiv.

sāhāsraṁ rāyo mādayādhyai,
sāhāsriṇā ūpā nō yāntu vāgāk.

That the final o instead of as is treated as a short syllable we saw before, and in I, 133, 6, we observed that it was liable to synizesis. We see the same in

I, 175, 6. māyā ivāpō na trīshyātē bābhūthā.

V, 61, 16. ā yāgñiyāso vavṛittānā.

The pragrīhya ī of the dual is known in the Veda to be liable in certain cases to Sandhi. If we extend this licence beyond the limits recognised by the Prātisākhya, we might scan

VI, 52, 14. ūbhē rōdāsy āpām nāpāk kā mānmā, or we might shorten the ī before the a, and admitting synizesis, scan :

ubhē rōdāsī āpām nāpāk kā mānmā.

In III, 6, 10, we must either admit Sandhi between prākī and adhvaréva, or contract the first two syllables of adhvaréva.

The o and e of vocatives before vowels, when changed into av or a(y), are liable to synizesis :

IV, 48, 1. vāyav ā kandrēnā rāthēnā (Anushubh, c.)

IV, 1, 2. sā bhrātārām varuṇām āgna ā vāvṛitsvā.

The termination avaḥ also, before vowels, seems to count as one syllable in V, 52, 14, divō vā dhrīshnāvā ōgasā, which would render Professor Bollensen's correction (Orient und Occident, vol. ii, p. 480), dhrīshnúogasā, unnecessary.

Like ava and iva, we find aya and iya, too, in several words liable to be contracted in pronunciation ; e.g. vayam, VI, 23, 5 ; ayam, I, 177, 4 ; iyam, VII, 66, 8² ; I, 186, 11 (unless we read vo+sme) ; X, 129, 6. Professor Bollensen's proposal to change iyam to im, and ayam to am (Orient und Occident, vol. ii, p. 461), would only cause obscurity, without any adequate gain, while other words would by a similar suppression of vowels or consonants become simply irrecongnisable. In I, 169, 6, for instance, ádha has to be

pronounced with one ictus; in VI, 26, 7, *sādhāvīrā* is trisyllabic. In VI, 10, 1, we must admit synizesis in *adhvaré*; in I, 161, 8, either in *udakām* or in *abravītana*; I, 110, 9, in *ṛibhumān*; VIII, 79, 4, in *diváh*; V, 4, 6, in *nṛitama* (unless we read *so-gne*); I, 164, 17, in *paráh*; VI, 15, 14, in *pāvaka*; I, 191, 6; VII, 34, 7; 99, 3, in *prithivī*; II, 20, 8, in *púraḥ*; VI, 10, 1, in *prayatí*; VI, 17, 7, in *brīhát*; IX, 19, 6, in *bhiyásam*; I, 133, 6, in *maháh*; II, 28, 6; IV, 1, 2; VI, 75, 18, in *varuna*; III, 30, 21, in *vṛishabha*; VII, 41, 6, in *vágínah*; II, 43, 2, in *sísumatíḥ*; VI, 51, 2, in *sanutár*; VI, 18, 12, in *sthávirasya*, &c.

These remarks will, I hope, suffice in order to justify the principles by which I have been guided in my treatment of the text and in my translation of the *Rig-veda*. I know I shall seem to some to have been too timid in retaining whatever can possibly be retained in the traditional text of these ancient hymns, while others will look upon the emendations which I have suggested as unpardonable temerity. Let everything be weighed in the just scales of argument. Those who argue for victory, and not for truth, can have no hearing in our court. There is too much serious work to be done to allow time for wrangling or abuse. Any dictionary will supply strong words to those who condescend to such warfare, but strong arguments require honest labour, sound judgment, and, above all, a genuine love of truth.

The second volume, which I am now preparing for Press, will contain the remaining hymns addressed to the Maruts. The notes will necessarily have to be reduced to smaller dimensions, but they must always constitute the more important part in a translation or, more truly, in a deciphering of Vedic hymns.

F. MAX MÜLLER.

PARKS END, OXFORD:
March, 1869.

VEDIC HYMNS.



VEDIC HYMNS.

MANDALA X, HYMN 121.

ASHTAKA VIII, ADHYĀYA 7, VARGA 3-4.

TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.

1. In the beginning there arose the Golden Child (Hiranya-garbha¹); as soon as born, he alone was the lord of all that is. He established the earth and this heaven:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

2. He who gives breath, he who gives strength, whose¹ command all the bright gods revere, whose shadow² is immortality, whose shadow is death:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

3. He who through his might became the sole king of the breathing and twinkling¹ world, who governs all this, man and beast:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

4. He through whose might¹ these snowy mountains are, and the sea, they say, with the distant river (the Rasâ²), he of whom these regions are indeed the two arms:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

5. He through whom the awful heaven and the earth were made fast¹, he through whom the ether was established, and the firmament; he who measured the air in the sky²:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

6. He to whom heaven and earth¹, standing firm by his will, look up, trembling in their mind; he over whom the risen sun shines forth:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

7. When the great waters¹ went everywhere, holding the germ (Hiranya-garbha), and generating light, then there arose from them the (sole²) breath of the gods:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

8. He who by his might looked even over the waters which held power (the germ) and generated the sacrifice (light¹), he who alone is God above all gods²:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

9. May he not hurt us, he who is the begetter of the earth, or he, the righteous, who begat the heaven; he who also begat the bright and mighty waters:—Who is the God to whom we shall offer sacrifice?

[10¹. Pragâpati, no other than thou embraces all these created things. May that be ours which we desire when sacrificing to thee: may we be lords of wealth!]

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to *Hiranyagarbha Prāgāpatya*, and is supposed to be addressed to Ka, Who, i.e. the Unknown God.

First translated in my *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, 1859, p. 569; see also *Hibbert Lectures*, 1882, p. 301; *Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts*, IV, p. 15.

Verse 1=VS. XIII, 4; XXIII, 1; XXV, 10; TS. IV, 1, 8, 3; 2, 8, 2; AV. IV, 2, 7.

Verse 2=VS. XXV, 13; TS. IV, 1, 8, 4; VII, 5, 17, 1; AV. IV, 2, 1; XIII, 3, 24.

Verse 3=VS. XXIII, 3; XXV, 11; TS. IV, 1, 8, 4; VII, 5, 16, 1; AV. IV, 2, 2.

Verse 4=VS. XXV, 12; TS. IV, 1, 8, 4; AV. IV, 2, 5.

Verse 5=VS. XXXII, 6; TS. IV, 1, 8, 5; AV. IV, 2, 4.

Verse 6=VS. XXXII, 7; TS. IV, 1, 8, 5; AV. IV, 2, 3.

Verse 7=VS. XXVII, 25; XXXII, 7; TS. II, 2, 12, 1; IV, 1, 8, 5; TA. I, 23, 8; AV. IV, 2, 6.

Verse 8=VS. XXVII, 26; XXXII, 7; TS. IV, 1, 8, 6.

Verse 9=VS. XII, 102; TS. IV, 2, 7, 1.

Verse 10=VS. X, 20; XXIII, 65; TS. I, 8, 14, 2; III, 2, 5, 6; TB. II, 8, 1, 2; III, 5, 7, 1; AV. VII, 79, 4; 80, 3.

This is one of the hymns which has always been suspected as modern by European interpreters. The reason is clear. To us the conception of one God, which pervades the whole of this hymn, seems later than the conception of many individual gods, as recognised in various aspects of nature, such as the gods of the sky, the sun, the storms, or the fire. And in a certain sense we may be right, and language also confirms our sentiment. In our hymn there are several words which do not occur again in the *Rig-veda*, or which occur in places only which have likewise been suspected to be of more modern date. *Hiranyagarbhā*

itself is an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. *Sám avartata* is found only in the last *Mandāla*, X, 90, 14; 129, 4. *Bhûtá* also, in the sense of what is, occurs in the tenth *Mandāla* only. It is used three times (X, 55, 2; 58, 12; 90, 2) as opposed to *bhávya*, i. e. what is and what will be; and once more in the sense of all that is (X, 85, 17). *Ātmadāh*, in the sense of giving life, is another ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. *Prasísh* is restricted to *Mandālas* I (I, 145, 1), IX (IX, 66, 6; 86, 32), and our passage. *Himávat*, ἀπαξ λεγόμενον. The repetition of the relative pronoun in verses 2 and 4 is unusual. In the tenth verse the compound *yát-kāmaḥ* is modern, and the insertion of *etāni* between *tvát* and *anyáḥ* is at all events exceptional. The passage V, 31, 2 is not parallel, because in *tvát indra vásyah anyát*, the ablative *tvát* is governed by *vásyah*. In VI, 21, 10, *ná tvāvān anyáḥ amṛita tvát asti*, *anyáḥ* is separated from *tvát* by a vocative only, as in VIII, 24, 11.

But when we say that a certain hymn is modern, we must carefully consider what we mean. Our hymn, for instance, must have existed not only previous to the *Brāhmaṇa* period, for many *Brāhmaṇas* presuppose it, but previous to the *Mantra* period also. It is true that no verse of it occurs in the *Sāma-veda*, but in the *Sāma-veda-brāhmaṇa* IX, 9, 12, verse 1 at least is mentioned^a. Most of its verses, however, occur in the *Vāgasaneyi-samhitā*, in the *Taittirīya-samhitā*, and in the *Atharva-veda-samhitā*, nay, the last verse, to my mind the most suspicious of all, occurs most frequently in the other *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*.

But though most of the verses of our hymn occur in other *Samhitās*, they do not always occur in the same order.

In the *Vāg. Samh.* we have the first verse in XIII, 4, but no other verse of our hymn follows. We have the first verse again in XXIII, 1, but not followed by verse 2, but by verse 3 (XXIII, 3)^b. Then we have verse 1 once more

^a The last line is here, *tasmai ta indo havishā vidhema*, let us sacrifice to him with thy oblation, O Soma!

^b Var. lect. *nimeshatāḥ*.

in XXV, 10, followed by verse 3 (XXV, 11), by verse 4 (XXV, 12), and then by verse 2 (XXV, 13).

We have verses 5, 6, 7, 8 in VS. XXXII, 6 and 7, and verses 7 and 8 in VS. XXVII, 25 and 26, while verse 9 is found in XII, 102 only^a, and the last verse in X, 20^b, and XXIII, 65.

In the Taitt. *Samhitā* the verses follow more regularly, still never quite in the same order as in the Rig-veda. In TS. IV, 1, 8, 3^c, we have verses 1 to 8, but verse 3 before verse 2, and verse 6 before verse 5, while verse 9 follows in IV, 2, 7, 1.

In TS. v. 3 stands before v. 2, in VII, 5, 16, 1, and VII, 5, 17, 1.

In TS. II, 2, 12, the pratikas of verses 1, 7, 10 are quoted in succession.

Verse 7 occurs with important various readings in TA. I, 23, 8, *āpo ha yād brīhatīr gārbham āyan dāksham dādhanā ganāyantiḥ svayambhūm, tāta imé-dhyāsrigyaṇta sargāḥ*.

Lastly in the AV. we find verses 1 to 7 from IV, 2, 1, to IV, 2, 7, but arranged in a different order, viz. as 2, 3, 6, 5, 4, 7, 1, and with important various readings.

Verse 2, *yó 3 syése dvipádo yás kátushpadaḥ*, as third páda; also in XIII, 3, 24.

Verse 3, *ekó rāgā; yásya khāyāmrītam yásya mrityúḥ*, as third páda.

Verse 4, *yásya vísrve; samudré yásya rasām id āhúḥ; imās ka*.

Verse 5, *yásya dyaúr urvī prīthivī ka mahī yasyādá urvá-1 ntáriksham, yasyāsaú sūro vítato mahitvā*.

Verse 6, *ávatas kaskabhāné bhiyāsāne ródasī áhvayethām (sic), yasyāsaú panthā rāgaso vimānaḥ*.

Verse 7, *āpo ágre vísvam áván gārbham dādhanā amrītā ritaḡñāḥ, yāsu devīshv ádhi devā ásit*.

Verse 10, *vísvā rūpāni paribhūr gagāna*, see VII, 79, 4, and 80, 3.

We are justified, therefore, in looking upon the verses, composing this hymn, as existing before the

^a Var. lect. *mā mā, satyádharma vyānaḥ, prathamó* for *brīhatīḥ*.

^b Var. lect. *rūpāni* for *bhūtāni*.

^c Var. lect., ver. 5, *dridhé*, dual for *drīhā*; ver. 6, *úditau vyéti* for *údito vibhāti*; ver. 8, *agnīm* for *yagnām*.

final arrangement of the four *Samhitās*, and if we persist in calling a hymn, dating from that period, a modern hymn, we must make it quite clear that, according to the present state of our knowledge, such a hymn cannot well be more modern than 1000 B.C. Besides the variations in the arrangement of the verses of our hymn, the very considerable various readings which we find in the VS., TS., and AV. are highly instructive, as showing the frequent employment of our hymn for sacrificial purposes. In several cases these various readings are of great importance, as we shall see.

Verse 1.

MUIR: *Hiranyagarbha* arose in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: *Hiranyagarbha* hat zuerst sich gebildet, er ward geboren als einziger herr alles gewordenen, diese erde und diesen himel hält er; Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. *Hiranyagarbha*^a has been translated in different ways, and it would perhaps be best to keep it as a proper name, which it is in later times. It means literally the golden embryo, the golden germ or child, or born of a golden womb, and was no doubt an attempt at naming the sun. Soon, however, that name became mythological. The golden child was supposed to have been so called because it was *Pragâpati*, the lord of creation, when dwelling as yet in the golden egg, and *Hiranyagarbha* became in the end a recognised name of *Pragâpati*, see Sây. on X, 121, 1. All this is fully explained by Sâyana, TS. IV, 1, 8, 3; IV, 2, 8, 2; by Mahîdhara, VS. XIII, 4.

Verse 2.

MUIR: He who gives breath, who gives strength, whose command all, [even] the gods, reverence, whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

^a M. M., India, What can it teach us? pp. 144, 162.

LUDWIG: Geber des lebendigen hauches, geber der kraft, zu des unterweisung alle götter sich einfinden, des glanz die unsterblichkeit, dessen der tod ist, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. In order to account for the repetition of *yasya*, *Sâyana* and *Mahidhara* take *visve* for men, and *devâh* for gods.

Note 2. It is difficult to say what is meant by *khâyâ*, shadow. I take it in the sense of what belongs to the god, as the shadow belongs to a man, what follows him, or is determined by him. In that sense *Sâyana* also takes it, TS. IV, 1, 8, 4, *yasya pragâpates khâyâvat svâdhînam amṛitam, moksharûpam, mṛityuh, prâninâm maranam api, yasya khâyeva svâdhînah*; and, though not quite so clearly, in RV. X, 121, 2. *Mahidhara* on the contrary takes *khâyâ* in the sense of refuge, and says, whose shadow, i.e. whose worship, preceded by knowledge, is *amṛita*, immortality, a means of deliverance^a, while ignorance of him is death, or leads to *samsâra*.

Verse 3.

MUIR: Who by his might became the sole king of the breathing and winking world, who is the lord of this two-footed and four-footed [creation]: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Der des atmenden, augenbewegenden lebendigen durch seine grösze der einzige könig geworden; der verfügt über disz zwei- und vier-füszige, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. It is difficult to say whether *nimishatah* means twinkling or sleeping. It has both meanings as to wink has in English. *Sâyana* (X, 121, 3; TS. IV, 1, 8, 4) and *Mahidhara* (VS. XXIII, 3^b) explain it by winking. This may be right as expressing sensuous perception, in addition to mere breathing. In X, 190, 2, *visvasya mishatô vaś* means, lord of all that winks, i.e.

^a *muktihetu*, not *yuktihetu*, as Weber prints.

^b Is *nimeshâto* in XXIII, 3, a varia lectio, or an *arudha*? In XXV, 13, we read *nimishato*.

lives. The later idea, that the gods do not wink, has nothing to do with our passage.

Verse 4.

MUIR: Whose greatness these snowy mountains, and the sea with the Rasâ (river), declare,—of whom these regions, of whom they are the arms: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Dessen die schneebedeckten (berge, die Hima-vân) vermöge seiner grösze, als des eigentum man ocean und Rasâ nennt, des dise himelsgegenden, des arme sie, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. Muir's translation, which suggests itself very naturally to a European mind, is impossible, because mahitvâ cannot be either mahitvâm (as Sâyana also and Mahîdhara suggest), or mahitvâni; and because âhúh does not mean declare. Otherwise nothing could be better than his rendering: 'Whose greatness these snowy mountains, and the sea with the Rasâ (river), declare.'

Mahitvâ, as Sâyana also rightly perceives, TS. IV, 1, 8, 4, is a very common instrumental (see Lanman, Noun-inflection, pp. 335-6), and the same mahitvâ must be supplied for samudrâm. We might make the whole sentence dependent on âhuh without much change of meaning. The Atharva-veda text supplies a lectio faciliior, but not therefore melior.

Note 2. The Rasâ is a distant river, in some respects like the Greek Okeanos. Dr. Aufrecht takes it as a name of the milky way, Z. D. M. G. XIII, 498: see Muir, S. T. II, p. 373, n. 19.

Verse 5.

MUIR: By whom the sky is fiery, and the earth fixed, by whom the firmament and the heaven were established, who in the atmosphere is the measurer of the aerial space: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Durch den gewaltig der himel und fest die erde, durch den gestützt Svar, und das gewölbe, der die räume im mittelgebiete ausgemessen, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. In this verse I decidedly prefer the reading of the Atharva-veda, *yena dyaus ugrâ prithivî ka drilhe*. It seems not a *lectio faciliior*, and we avoid the statement that the heaven has been made *ugrâ*. *Ugrâ*, as applied to *dyaus*, means awful and grand, as an inherent quality rather, and not simply strong. See Ludwig, Notes, p. 441.

Note 2. *Rágaso vimānaḥ* has been fully discussed by Muir, S. T. IV, p. 71, but it is difficult to find a right translation for it, because the cosmography of the Veda is so different from our own (see I, 6, 9, note 1, and I, 19, 3, note 1). I think we may translate it here by the air, or even by space, particularly the bright air in the sky, the sky (*antariksha* or *nabhas*) being between heaven (*dyu*) and earth (*prithivî*), while *svaḥ* and *nāka* are still higher than the heaven (*dyu*), *svaḥ* being sometimes explained as the abode of the sun, the ether, or empyrean, *nāka*, the firmament, as *svarga* (*Mahīdhara*); or *svaḥ* as *svarga*, and *nāka* as *āditya* (*Sāyana*). *Vimāna* is here simply the measurer, though *vimā*, from meaning to measure, is apt to take the meaning of to make, which is an excuse for *Sāyana*'s rendering, 'who makes the rain in the sky.'

The Atharva-veda rendering is very free, and certainly no improvement.

Verse 6.

MUIR: To whom two contending armies, sustained by his succour, looked up, trembling in mind; over whom the risen sun shines: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Auf den die beiden Schlachtreihen durch (ihre) Begriffe aufgestellt in Ordnung ihren Blick richten, zitternd, im Geiste, wo darüber hin aufgegangen Sûra ausstrahlt, Ka, dem Gotte, möchten wir mit Havis aufwarten.

Note 1. It would be well to read *ródasî* for *krándasî* (which B. R. explain by 'two armies'), and the various reading in AV. IV, 2, 3 decidedly points in that direction. But even if *krándasî* stands, it must be taken in the same sense as *ródasî*. *Uditau vyeti* in TS. IV, 1, 8, 5 is explained by *udayavishaye vividham gakkhati*.

Verse 7.

MUIR: When the great waters pervaded the universe containing an embryo, and generating fire, thence arose the one spirit (asu) of the gods: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Als die groszen waszer kamen, die allen keim in sich faszten, zeugend den Agni, da kam zu stande der götter einziger lebensgeist; Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. The waters here referred to have to be understood as the waters in the beginning of the creation, where, as we read (RV. X, 129, 3), 'everything was like a sea without a light,' or, as the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa (XI, 1, 6, 1) says, 'everything was water and sea.' These waters held the germ^a, and produced the golden light, the sun^b, whence arose the life of all the gods, viz. Pragāpati. The Atharva-veda adds a verse which repeats the same idea more clearly: āpo vatsām ganāyantīr gārbham āgre sāmairayan, tāsytotā gāyamānasyólba āsīd dhiranyāya, 'In the beginning the waters, producing a young, brought forth an embryo, and when it was being born, it had a golden covering.' The sunrise serves here as elsewhere as an image of the creation.

Note 2. Grassmann proposes to omit eka, because it is absent in the Maitráyaṇī Sākhā. The metre shows the same.

Verse 8.

MUIR: He who through his greatness beheld the waters which contained power, and generated sacrifice, who was the one god above the gods: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Der in seiner grösze sogar die waszer über-schaute, wie sie die fähigkeit besitzend erzeugten das opfer, der der einzige gott war über den göttern, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Note 1. In dāksham dādhanā ganāyantīr yagnām, we have a repetition of what was said in the preceding verse,

^a See RV. X, 82, 5-6.

^b See RV. X, 72, 7.

dáksham standing for gárbham, yagnám for agním, which is actually the reading of TS. The Atharva-veda does not contain this verse, which is used as an anyâ vikalpitâ yâgyâ in TS.

Note 2. It is curious that one of the most important sentences in the Rig-veda, *yo deveshv adhi deva eka âsīt*, should have been changed in the Atharva-veda IV, 2, 6 into *yâsu devishv adhi deva âsīt*, 'over which divine waters there was the god.' See Ludwig, Notes, p. 441.

Verse 9.

MUIR: May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who, ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced the great and brilliant waters: to what god shall we offer our oblation?

LUDWIG: Nicht schädige uns, der der erde erzeuger, oder der den himel bereitet mit warhafter satzung, der auch die wasser, die hellen, die mächtigen erzeugt hat, Ka, dem gotte, möchten wir mit havis aufwarten.

Verse 10.

MUIR: Pragâpati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee: may we become masters of riches.

LUDWIG: Pragâpati, kein anderer als du hat umfasst die wesen alle, der wunsch, um deswillen wir dir opfern, der werde uns zu teil, besitzer von reichthümern mögen wir sein.

Note 1. This verse is certainly extremely weak after all that preceded, still, to judge from its frequent occurrence, we cannot well discard it. All we can say is that nowhere, except in the Rig-veda, does it form the final verse of our hymn, and thus spoil its whole character.

That character consists chiefly in the burden of the nine verses, *Kasmai devâya havishâ vidhema*, 'To what god shall we offer sacrifice?' This is clearly meant to express a desire of finding out the true, but unknown god, and to do so, even after all has been said that can be said of a supreme god. To finish such a hymn with a statement

that Pragâpati is the god who deserves our sacrifice, may be very natural theologically, but it is entirely uncalled for poetically. The very phrase *Kasmai devâya havishâ vidhema* must have been a familiar phrase, for we find in a hymn addressed to the wind, X, 168, 4, after all has been said that can be said of him, the concluding line: *ghóshâ/ it asya srinvire ná rûpâm tásmâi vâtâya havishâ vidhema*, 'his sound indeed is heard, but he is not seen—to that Vâta let us offer sacrifice.'

But more than this, on the strength of hymns like our own in which the interrogative pronoun *ka*, 'who,' occurs, the Brâhmanas actually invented a god of the name of *Ka*. I pointed this out many years ago in my *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (1860, p. 433), where I said: 'In accordance with the same system, we find that the authors of the Brâhmanas had so completely broken with the past that, forgetful of the poetical character of the hymns, and the yearning of the poets after the unknown god, they exalted the interrogative pronoun into a deity, and acknowledged a god 'Ka, or Who.' In the *Taittiriya-samhitâ* (I, 7, 6, 6), in the *Kaushîtaki-brâhmana* (XXIV, 4), in the *Tândya-brâhmana* (XV, 10), and in the *Satapatha-brâhmana* ^a, whenever interrogative verses occur, the author states, that *Ka* is Pragâpati, or 'the Lord of Creatures' (*Pragâpatir vai Ka/*). Nor did they stop there. Some of the hymns in which the interrogative pronoun occurred were called *Kadvat*, i.e. having *kad* or *quid*. But soon a new adjective was formed, and not only the hymns, but the sacrifices also, offered to the god, were called *Kâya*, or *who-ish* ^b. This word, which is not to be identified with the Latin *cujus*, *cuja*, *cujum*, but is merely the artificial product of an effete mind, is found in the *Taittiriya-samhitâ* (I, 8, 3, 1), and in the *Vâgasaneyi-samhitâ* (XXIV, 15). At the time of Pânini

^a *Satap. Brâhm.* I, 1, 1, 13; II, 5, 2, 13; IV, 5, 6, 4; also *Aitar. Brâhm.* III, 21.

^b *Ârv. Sr. Sûtra* II, 17, 14; *Kâty. Sr. Sûtra* V, 4, 23; *Vait. Sûtra* VIII, 22, ed. Garbe.

this word had acquired such legitimacy as to call for a separate rule explaining its formation (Pân. IV, 2, 25). The commentator there explains Ka by Brahman. After this we can hardly wonder that in the later Sanskrit literature of the Purâṇas, Ka appears as a recognised god, as the supreme god, with a genealogy of his own, perhaps even with a wife; and that in the Laws of Manu, one of the recognised forms of marriage, generally known by the name of Pragâpati-marriage, occurs under the monstrous title of 'Kâya.' Stranger still, grammarians who know that ka forms the dative kasmai only if it is an interrogative pronoun, consider kasmai in our hymn as irregular, because, as a proper name, Ka ought to form the dative Kâya.

MANDALA I, HYMN 6.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 11-12.

TO INDRA AND THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Those who stand around ² him while he moves on, harness the bright red (steed)¹; the lights in heaven shine forth³.

2. They harness to the chariot on each side his (Indra's)¹ two favourite bays, the brown, the bold, who can carry the hero.

3. Thou who createst light where there was no light, and form, O men¹! where there was no form, hast been born together with the dawns².

4. Thereupon¹ they (the Maruts), according to their wont², assumed again the form of new-born babes³, taking their sacred name.

5. Thou, O Indra, with the swift Maruts¹, who break even through the stronghold², hast found even in their hiding-place the bright ones³ (days or clouds).

6. The pious singers¹ (the Maruts) have, after their own mind², shouted towards the giver of wealth, the great, the glorious (Indra).

7. Mayest thou¹ (host of the Maruts) be verily seen² coming together with Indra, the fearless: you are both happy-making, and of equal splendour.

8. With the beloved hosts of Indra, with the blameless, hasting² (Maruts), the sacrificer¹ cries aloud.

9. From yonder, O traveller (Indra), come hither,
or from the light^a of heaven¹; the singers all yearn
for it;—

10. Or we ask Indra for help from here, or
from heaven, or from above the earth, or from the
great sky.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Kaṇva, the son of Ghora. The metre is Gâyatrî throughout.

Verse 1=SV. II, 818; VS. XXIII, 5; AV. XX, 26, 4; 47, 10; 69, 9; TS. VII, 4, 20, 1; TB. III, 9, 4, 1.

Verse 2=SV. II, 819; VS. XXIII, 6; AV. XX, 26, 5; 47, 11; 69, 10; TS. VII, 4, 20, 1.

Verse 3=SV. II, 820; VS. XXIX, 37; AV. XX, 26, 6; 47, 12; 69, 11; TS. VII, 4, 20, 1; TB. III, 9, 4, 3.

Verse 4=SV. II, 101; AV. XX, 40, 3; 69, 12.

Verse 5=SV. II, 202; AV. XX, 70, 1.

Verse 6=AV. XX, 70, 2.

Verse 7=SV. II, 200; AV. XX, 40, 1; 70, 3.

Verse 8=AV. XX, 40, 2; 70, 4.

Verse 9=AV. XX, 70, 5.

Verse 10=AV. XX, 70, 6.

Verse 1.

WILSON: The circumstationed (inhabitants of the three worlds) associate with (Indra), the mighty (Sun), the indestructive (fire), the moving (wind), and the lights that shine in the sky.

BENFEY: Die rothe Sonne schirr'n sie an, die wandelt um die stehenden, Strahlen strahlen am Himmel auf.

LUDWIG: Sie spannen an den hellen, den roten, den vom feststehenden hinwegwandelnden; heller glanz erstrahlt am Himmel.

Note 1. The poet begins with a somewhat abrupt description of a sunrise. Indra is taken as the god of the bright day, whose steed is the sun, and whose companions the Maruts, or the storm-gods. Arushá, meaning originally red, is used as a proper name of the horse or of the rising sun, though it occurs more frequently as the name of the red horses or flames of Agni, the god of fire, and also of the morning light. In our passage, Arushá, a substantive, meaning the red of the morning, has taken bradhná as an

adjective,—bradhná meaning, as far as can be made out, bright in general, though, as it is especially applied to the Soma-juice, perhaps bright-brown or yellow. Names of colour are difficult to translate from one language into another, for their shades vary, and withdraw themselves from sharp definition. We shall meet with this difficulty again and again in the Veda; see RV. X, 20, 9.

As it has actually been doubted whether bradhná arushá can be meant for the sun, and whether the Vedic poets ever looked upon the sun as a horse, I may quote Vāg. Samh. XXIII, 4, where the same verse occurs and is declared to be addressed to the sun; and Satap. Br. XIII, 2, 6, 1, where we read, *yuñgānti bradhnām arushām karan-tam iti, asau vā ādityo bradhno-rusho-mum evāsmā ādityam yunakti svargasya lokasya samashṭyai*. Ludwig remarks justly that the sun has been conceived as a chariot also, and that bradhná arushá may have been thus understood here. Delbrück translates quite boldly: *Sie schirren die rothe Sonne an*. See also Tait. Br. III, 7, 7, 4; Tāndya Br. XXIII, 3, 5; Sāṅkh. Br. II, 17, 3; Ludwig, Comm. ii. p. 173. M. Bergaigne (Rél. Ved. iii. p. 324) remarks very truly: 'Le soleil est tantôt une roue, tantôt un char, tantôt un cheval, trainant le char, tantôt un héros monté sur le char et dirigeant les chevaux.'

The following passages will illustrate the principal meaning of arushá, and justify the translation here adopted.

ARUSHÁ, AS AN ADJECTIVE.

Arushá is used as an adjective in the sense of red:

VII, 97, 6. *tām sagmāsah arushāsah āsvāh brīhaspátim saha-vāhah vahanti*,—nábhah ná rūpām arushám vásānāh.

Powerful red horses, drawing together draw him, Brīhaspati: horses clothed in red colour, like the sky.

III, 1, 4. *svetām gaghānām arushām mahi-tvā*.

Agni, the white, when born; the red, by growth.

III, 15, 3. *krishnāsu agne arushāh ví bhāhi*.

Shine, O Agni, red among the dark ones.

III, 31, 21; VI, 27, 7.

VII, 75, 6. *prāti dyutânām arushāsah āsvāh kitrāh adri-sran ushāsam vāhantaḥ.*

The red horses, the beautiful, were seen bringing to us the bright dawn.

V, 43, 12; I, 118, 5; IV, 43, 6; V, 73, 5; I, 36, 9; VII, 3, 3; 16, 3; X, 45, 7; I, 141, 8.

II, 2, 8. *sáh idhánáh ushāsah rāmyāh ānu svāh ná dīdet arushéna bhânúnā.*

He (Agni), lit after the lovely dawns, shone like the sky with his red splendour.

III, 29, 6; IV, 58, 7; I, 114, 5; V, 59, 5; 12, 2; 12, 6; VI, 8, 1.

VI, 48, 6. *syāvāsu arusháh vrīshā.*

In the dark (nights) the red hero (Agni). Cf. III, 7, 5.

In one passage *vrīshan* *arushá* is intended for fire in the shape of lightning.

X, 89, 9. *nī amítreshu vadhám indra túmram vrīshan vrīshānam arushám sīsihi.*

Whet, O strong Indra, the heavy strong red weapon, against the enemies.

X, 43, 9. *út gāyatām parasúh gyótishā sahā—vī rokatām arusháh bhânúnā súkīh.*

May the axe (the thunderbolt) appear with the light—may the red one blaze forth, bright with splendour.

X, 1, 6; VI, 3, 6.

X, 20, 9. *krīshnāh svetáh arusháh yāmaḥ asya bradhnáh rigráh utá sōnah.*

His (Agni's) path is black, white, red, bright, reddish, and yellow.

Here it is extremely difficult to keep all the colours distinct.

Arushá is frequently applied to Soma, particularly in the 9th *Māṇḍala*. There we read :

IX, 8, 6. *arusháh hárīh.* IX, 71, 7. *arusháh diváh kavīh vrīshā.* IX, 74, 1. *vāgī arusháh.* IX, 82, 1. *arusháh vrīshā hárīh.* IX, 89, 3. *hárīm arushám.*

IX, 111, 1. *arusháh hárīh.* See also IX, 25, 5; 61, 21. In IX, 72, 1, *arushá* seems used as a substantive in the sense of red-horse.

Professor Spiegel, in his important review of my translation (Heidelberger Jahrbücher, 1870, p. 104), points out that aurusha in Zend means white, so that it would seem as if the original meaning of arusha had been bright, bright like fire, and thus red.

ARUSHÁ, AS AN APPELLATIVE.

Arushá is used as an appellative, and in the following senses :

1. The one red-horse of the Sun, the two or more red-horses of Agni.

I, 6, 1. *yuñgānti bradhnám arushám.*

They yoke the bright red-horse (the Sun).

I, 94, 10. *yát áyuktháh arusháh róhitá ráthe.*

When thou (Agni) hadst yoked the two red-horses and the two ruddy horses to the chariot. I, 146, 2.

II, 10, 2. *srúyáh agníh—hávam me—syávā rátham vaha-táh róhitá vā utá arusháh.*

Mayest thou, Agni, hear my call, whether the two black, or the two ruddy, or the two red-horses carry you.

Here three kinds of colours are clearly distinguished, and an intentional difference is made between róhita and arushá. IV, 2, 3.

IV, 6, 9. *táva tyé agne harítah—róhitásah—arushāsah vríshanaḥ.*

To thee (Agni) belong these bays, these ruddy, these red-horses, the stallions.

Here, again, three kinds of horses are distinguished—Haríts, Róhitas, and Arushás.

VIII, 34, 17. *yé rigráh vāta-ramhasah arushāsah raghu-syádah.*

Here arushá may be the subject, and the rest adjectives ; but it is also possible to take all the words as adjectives, referring them to áśú in the next verse. The fact that *rigrá* likewise expresses a peculiar red colour, is no objection, as may be seen from I, 6, 1 ; 94, 10.

VII, 42, 2. *yuñkshvá—harítah róhitah ka yé vā sádman arusháh.*

Yoke (O Agni) the bays, and the ruddy horses, or the red-horses which are in thy stable. VII, 16, 2.

2. The cloud, represented as one of the horses of the Maruts.

I, 85, 5. *utá arushásya ví syanti dhārāk.*

(When you go to the battle, O Maruts), the streams of the red (horse) flow off.

V, 56, 7. *utá syāh vāgī arushāk.*

This strong red-horse,—meant for one of the horses of the Maruts, but, at the same time, as sending rain.

ARUSHÁ, AS THE PROPER NAME OF A SOLAR DEITY.

Besides the passages in which *arushá* is used either as an adjective, in the sense of red, or as an appellative, meaning some kind of horse, there are others in which, as I pointed out in my Essay on Comparative Mythology^a, *Arushá* occurs as a proper name, as the name of a solar deity, as the bright deity of the morning (*Morgenroth*). My interpretation of some of these passages has been contested, nor shall I deny that in some of them a different interpretation is possible, and that in looking for traces of *Arushá*, as a Vedic deity, representing the morning or the rising sun, and containing, as I endeavoured to show, the first germs of the Greek name of Eros, I may have seen more indications of the presence of that deity in the Veda than others would feel inclined to acknowledge. Yet in going over the same ground again, I think that even verses which for a time I felt inclined to surrender, yield a better sense, if we take the word *arushá*, which occurs in them as a substantive, as the name of a matutinal deity, than if we look upon it as an adjective or a mere appellative. It might be said that wherever this *arushá* occurs, apparently as the name of a deity, we ought to supply Agni or Indra or Sūrya. This is true to a certain extent, for the sun, or the light of the morning, or the bright sky form no doubt the substance and

^a Chips from a German Workshop, 2nd ed., vol. ii, p. 137 seq. Selected Essays, vol. i, p. 444.

subject-matter of this deity. But the same applies to many other names originally intended for these conceptions, but which, nevertheless, in the course of time, became independent names of independent deities. In our passage I, 6, 1, *yuṅgānti bradhnám arushám*, we may retain for *arushá* the appellative power of steed or red-steed, but if we could ask the poet what he meant by this red-steed, or if we ask ourselves what we can possibly understand by it, the answer would be, the morning sun, or the light of the morning. In other passages, however, this meaning of red-steed is really no longer applicable, and we can only translate *Arushá* by the Red, understanding by this name the deity of the morning or of the morning sun, the later *Aruṇa*.

VII, 71, 1. *ápa svásuḥ ushásaḥ nák gihíte rinákti krishnā arushāya pánthām*.

The Night retires from her sister, the Dawn; the Dark one yields the path to the Red one, i. e. the red morning.

Here *Arushá* shares the same half-mythological character as *Ushas*. Where we should speak of dawn and morning as mere periods of time, the Vedic poet speaks of them as living and intelligent beings, half human, half divine, as powers of nature capable of understanding his prayers, and powerful enough to reward his praises. I do not think therefore that we need hesitate to take *Arushá* in this passage as a proper name of the morning, or of the morning sun, to whom the dark goddess, the Night, yields the path when he rises in the East.

VI, 49, 2. *diváh śísum sáhasaḥ sūnúm agním yagñásya ketúm arushám yágadhyai*.

To worship the child of *Dyu*, the son of strength, *Agni*, the light of the sacrifice, the Red one (*Arushá*).

In this verse, where the name of *Agni* actually occurs, it would be easier than in the preceding verse to translate *arushá* as an adjective, referring it either to *Agni*, the god of fire, or to *yagñásya ketúm*, the light of the sacrifice. I had myself yielded* so far to these considerations that I

* Chips from a German Workshop, vol. ii, p. 139.

gave up my former translation, and rendered this verse by 'to worship Agni, the child of the sky, the son of strength, the red light of the sacrifice^a.' But I return to my original translation, and I prefer to see in Arushá an independent name, intended, no doubt, for Agni, as the representative of the rising sun and, at the same time, of the sacrificial fire of the morning, but nevertheless as having in the mind of the poet a personality of his own. He is the child of Dyū, originally the offspring of heaven. He is the son of strength, originally generated by the strong rubbing of the *aravis*, i. e. the wood for kindling fire. He is the light of the sacrifice, whether as reminding man that the time for the morning sacrifice has come, or as himself lighting the sacrifice on the Eastern altar of the sky. He is Arushá, originally as clothed in bright red colour, but gradually changed into the representative of the morning. We see at once, if examining these various expressions, how some of them, like the child of Dyū, are easily carried away into mythology, while others, such as the son of strength, or the light of the sacrifice, resist that unconscious metamorphosis. That Arushá was infected by mythology, that it had approached at least that point where nomina become changed into numina, we see by the verse immediately following:

VI, 49, 3. *arushásya duhitārā vīrūpe (iti vī-rūpe) str/bhiḥ anyā pipisē sūrah anyā.*

There are two different daughters of Arushá; the one is clad in stars, the other belongs to the sun, or is the wife of Svar.

Here Arushá is clearly a mythological being, like Agni or Savitar or Vaisvânara; and if Day and Night are called his daughters, he, too, can hardly have been conceived otherwise than as endowed with human attributes, as the child of Dyū, as the father of Day and Night, and not as a mere period of time, not as a mere cause or effect.

IV, 15, 6. *tām árvantam ná sânasīm arushám ná diváh śsum marmṛigyānte divé-dive.*

^a Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1867, p. 204.

They trim the fire day by day, like a strong horse, like Arushá, the child of Dyu.

Here, too, Arushá, the child of Dyu, has to be taken as a personal character, and, if the ná after arushám is right, a distinction is clearly made between Agni, the sacrificial fire, to whom the hymn is addressed, and Arushá, the child of heaven, the pure and bright morning, here used as a simile for the cleaning or trimming of the fire on the altar.

V, 47, 3. arusháh su-parnáh.

Arushá, the morning sun, with beautiful wings.

THE FEMININE ÁRUSHÎ, AS AN ADJECTIVE.

Árushî, like arushá, is used as an adjective, in the same sense as arushá, i. e. red :

III, 55, 11. syávi ka yát árushî ka svásárau.

As the dark and the red are sisters.

I, 92, 1 and 2. gávah árushîh and árushîh gáh.

The red cows of the dawn.

I, 92, 2. rúrantam bhânúm árushîh asirayuh.

The red dawns obtained bright splendour.

Here ushása^h, the dawns, occur in the same line, so that we may take árushîh either as an adjective, referring to the dawns, or as a substantive, as a name of the dawn or of her cows.

I, 30, 21. ásve ná kître arushi.

Thou beautiful red dawn, thou, like a mare.

Here, too, the vocative arushi is probably to be taken as an adjective, particularly if we consider the next following verse :

IV, 52, 2. ásvá-iva kitrā árushî mātā gávām ritá-vari sákhā abhūt arvíno^h ushā^h.

The dawn, beautiful and red, like a mare, the mother of the cows (days), the never-failing, she became the friend of the Asvins.

X, 5, 5. saptá svásrîh árushîh.

The seven red sisters.

THE FEMININE ÁRUSHÎ, AS A SUBSTANTIVE.

If used as a substantive, árushî seems to mean the dawn. It is likewise used as a name of the horses of Agni, Indra, and Soma ; also as a name for mare in general.

It means dawn in X, 8, 3, though the text points here so clearly to the dawn, and the very name of dawn is mentioned so immediately after, that this one passage seems hardly sufficient to establish the use of árushî as a recognised name of the dawn. Other passages, however, would likewise gain in perspicuity, if we took árushî by itself as a name of the dawn, just as we had to admit in several passages arushá by itself as a name of the morning. Cf. I, 71, 1.

Árushî means the horses of Agni, in I, 14, 12 :

yukshvá hí árushîḥ ráthe harítaḥ deva rohítaḥ.

Yoke, O god (Agni), the red-horses to the chariot, the bays, the ruddy.

I, 72, 10. prá nṛkîḥ agne árushîḥ agānan.

They knew the red-horses, Agni, coming down. VIII, 69, 5.

Soma, as we saw, was frequently spoken of as arusháḥ háriḥ.

In IX, 111, 2, tridhātubhiḥ árushîbhiḥ seems to refer to the same red-horses of Soma, though this is not quite clear.

The passages where árushî means simply a mare, without any reference to colour, are VIII, 68, 18, and VIII, 55, 3.

It is curious that Arushá, which in the Veda means red, should, as pointed out before, in its Zend form aurusha, mean white. That in the Veda it means red, and not white, is shown, for instance, by X, 20, 9, where svetá, the name for white, is mentioned by the side of arushá. Most likely arushá meant originally brilliant, and became fixed with different shades of brilliancy in Sanskrit and Persian. Arushá presupposes a form ar-vas, and is derived from a root ar in the sense of running or rushing. See Chips from a German Workshop, vol. ii, pp. 135, 137.

Having thus explained the different meanings of *arushá* and *árushí* in the *Rig-veda*, I feel it incumbent, at least for once, to explain the reasons why I differ from the classification of Vedic passages as given in the Dictionary published by Boehtlingk and Roth. Here, too, the passages in which *arushá* is used as an adjective are very properly separated from those in which it appears as a substantive. To begin with the first, it is said that '*arushá* means ruddy, the colour of Agni and his horses; he (Agni) himself appears as a red-horse.' In support of this, the following passages are quoted:

III, 1, 4. *ávardhayan su-bhágam saptá yahvī́h svetám gagā́nām arushám mahi-tvā́, ś́srum ná gátám abhí áruh árvā́h.* Here, however, it is only said that Agni was born brilliant-white^a, and grew red, that the horses came to him as they come to a new-born foal. Agni himself is not called a red-horse.

III, 7, 5. Here, again, *vr̥shnah* *arushásya* is no doubt meant for Agni. But *vr̥shan* by itself does not mean horse, though it is added to different names of horses to qualify them as male horses; cf. VII, 69, 1, *ā́ vām ráthah vr̥shabhih yātu árvaih*, may your chariot come near with powerful horses, i. e. with stallions. See note to I, 85, 12. We are therefore not justified in translating *arushá vr̥shan* by red-horse, but only by the red male, or the red hero.

In III, 31, 3, *agníh gagā́e guhvā́ régamānah maháh putrán arushásya pra-yákshe*, I do not venture to say who is meant by the *maháh putrán arushásya*, whether *Ādityas* or *Maruts*, but hardly the sons of Agni, as Agni himself is mentioned as only born. But, even if it were so, the father of these sons (*putra*) could hardly be intended here for a horse.

IV, 6, 9. *táva tyé agne harítah ghríta-snā́h róhitāsah rigu-ā́ñkah su-ā́ñkah, arushāsah vr̥shanah rigu-mushkā́h.* Here, so far from Agni being represented as a red-horse, his different horses, the *Haríts* or bays, the *Róhitas* or

^a See V, 1, 4. *svetáh vā́gī gāyate ágre áhnam.* X, 1, 6. *arusháh gátáh padé ś́lāyā́h.*

ruddy, and the *arushāsaḥ vrīṣhanah*, the red stallions, are distinctly mentioned. Here *vrīṣhan* may be translated by stallion, instead of simply by male, because *arushā* is here a substantive, the name of a horse.

V, 1, 5. *gānishṭa hí gēnyaḥ āgre áhnām hitáh hitēshu arusháh vāneshu*. Here *arusháh* is simply an adjective, red, referring to Agni, who is understood throughout the hymn to be the object of praise. He is said to be kind to those who are kind to him, and to be red in the woods, i. e. brilliant in the wood which he consumes; cf. III, 29, 6. Nothing is said about his equine nature.

In V, 12, 2 and 6, VI, 48, 6, we have again simply *arushā vrīṣhan*, which does not mean the red-horse, but the red male, the red hero, i. e. Agni.

In VI, 49, 2, *diváh śśum sáhasaḥ sūnúm agním yagñásya ketúm arushám yágadhyai*, there is no trace of Agni being conceived as a horse. He is called the child of the sky or of Dyū, the son of strength (who is produced by strong rubbing of wood), the light or the beacon of the sacrifice, and lastly *Arushā*, which, for reasons stated above, I take to be used here as a name.

Next follow the passages in which, according to Professor Roth, *arushā*, as an adjective, is said to be applied to the horses, cows, and other teams of the gods, particularly of the dawn, the *Asvins*, and *Bṛihaspati*.

I, 118, 5. *pári vām ásváh vāpushaḥ patangāḥ váyaḥ vahantu arushāḥ abhīke*. Here we find the *váyah arushāḥ* of the *Asvins*, which it is better to translate by red birds, as immediately before the winged horses are mentioned. In fact, whenever *arushā* is applied to the vehicle of the *Asvins*, it is to be understood of these red birds, IV, 43, 6.

In I, 92, 1 and 2 (not 20), *árushī* occurs three times, referring twice to the cows of the dawn, once to the dawn herself.

In IV, 15, 6, *tám árvantam ná sânasīm arushám ná diváh śśum marmṛigyānte divé-dive*, *arushā* does not refer to the horse or any other animal of Agni. The verse speaks of a horse by way of comparison only, and says that the sacrificers clean or trim Agni, the fire, as people clean a horse. We

cannot join arushám in the next páda with árvantam in the preceding páda, for the second ná would then be without any construction. The construction is certainly not easy, but I think it is safer to translate: they trim him (Agni), day by day, as they clean a strong horse, as they clean Arushá, the child of Dyu. In fact, as far as I know, arushá is never used as the name of the one single horse belonging to Agni, but always of two or more.

In III, 31, 21, antár (íti) *krishnān arushaḥ dhāma bhiḥ gāt, dhāma bhiḥ* is said to mean flames of lightning. But dhāman in the Rig-veda does not mean flames, and it seems better to translate, with thy red companies, scil. the Maruts.

That arushá in one or two passages means the red cloud, is true. But in X, 43, 9, arushá refers to the thunderbolt mentioned in the same verse; and in I, 114, 5, everything refers to Rudra, and not to a red cloud, in the proper sense of the word.

Further on, where the meanings attributable to árushî in the Veda are collected, it is said that árushî means a red mare, also the teams of Agni and Ushas. Now, here, surely, a distinction should have been made between those passages in which árushî means a real horse, and those where it expresses the imaginary steeds of Agni. The former, it should be observed, occur in one *Mandala* only, and in places of somewhat doubtful authority, in VIII, 55, 3, a Váľakhilya hymn, and in VIII, 68, 18, a dānastuti or panegyric. Besides, no passage is given where árushî means the horses of the dawn, and I doubt whether such a passage exists, while the one verse where árushî is really used for the horses of Indra, is not mentioned at all. Lastly, two passages are set apart where árushî is supposed to mean flames. Now, it may be perfectly true that the red-horses of Agni are meant for flames, just as the red-horses of Indra may be the rays of the sun. But, in that case, the red-horses of Agni should always have been thus translated, or rather interpreted, and not in one passage only. In IX, 111, 2, árushî is said to mean flames, but no further light is thrown upon that very difficult passage.

Note 2. *Pári tasthúshaḥ*. I take this form as a nominative plural like *ábibhyushaḥ*, I, 11, 5, *tvām devāḥ ábibhyushaḥ tugyámânâsaḥ ávishuḥ*, 'the gods, stirred up, came to thee, not fearing ;' and like *dadúshaḥ*, I, 54, 8, *yé te indra dadúshaḥ vardháyanti máhi kshatrám*, 'who giving or by their gifts increase thy great power, O Indra.' Here we might possibly take it as a gen. sing. referring to te, but *dadivân* is far more appropriate as an epithet of the sacrificer than of the god. (See Benfey, *Vocativ*, p. 24; and *Hermes*, p. 16.) It is well known among Sanskrit scholars that Professor Whitney, in reviewing my translation, declared that the participial form *tasthushaḥ* had no right to be anything but an accusative plural or a genitive or ablative singular. (See *Chips from a German Workshop*, vol. iv, p. 508.) Dr. Kern, however, in his translation of the *Bṛihat-Samhitâ* had shown long before that nom. plur. such as *vidushaḥ* are by no means rare, even in the *Mahâbhârata* and kindred works. Dr. Lanman (*Journ. Americ. Or. Soc.* X, p. 513) has now entered *abibhyushaḥ* as a nom. plur., but he prefers to take *tasthushaḥ* as an acc. plural, so that we should have to translate *kárantam pári tasthúshaḥ* by 'walking round those who stand.' This may be grammatically possible; but who could be meant by *tasthushaḥ*, standing ones? And, secondly, is it usual in Vedic Sanskrit to say *karati pári tam*, 'he walks round him?' We find *pari tam yâti*, or *tam pari yâti*, but hardly *yâti pari tam*, 'he goes round him,' except when *pari* stands independent of the verb and means 'around,' e.g. IX, 72, 8, *pavasva pári pârthivam rágat*. It is more difficult to decide whether we should adopt Ludwig's interpretation, who takes *pari tasthushaḥ* in the sense of 'away from what is firm.' This is correct grammatically, and *tasthivat*, as opposed to *gágat*, is often used in the sense of what is immovable. But is it ever used in that sense by itself? I doubt it, though I may add in support of it such a passage as I, 191, 9, *út apaptat asaú sūryaḥ . . . âdityáḥ párvatebhyāḥ*, a verse where the expression *visvâdrishṭaḥ adrishṭahā* is analogous to our *ketúm krinván aketáve*. I therefore retain *pari tasthushaḥ* as a nom. plural in the sense of standing around, circumstantes, possibly of *parikara*,

attendants. Parishthāna or sthāna comes to mean an abode, and paritasthivantas would be bystanders, attendants, the people, in fact, who are supposed to harness the horse.

Though I do not assign great weight to interpretations of hymns, as given by the Brāhmanas, I may mention that in the Taitt. Br. III, 9, 4, 1, paritasthushaḥ is explained as a nom. plur., ime vai lokāḥ paritasthushaḥ, while Sāyana in his commentary (Sāma-veda II, 6, 3, 12, 1) has parito-va-sthitā lokatrayavartināḥ prāninaḥ.

Note 3. Rōkante rokāṇā. A similar expression occurs III, 61, 5, where it is said of Ushas, the dawn, that she lighted the lights in the sky, prā rokāṇā ruruke ranvā-sandrīk.

Verse 2.

WILSON: They (the charioteers) harness to his car his two desirable coursers, placed on either hand, bay-coloured, high-spirited, chief-bearing.

BENFEY: Die lieben Falben schirren sie zu beiden Seiten des Wagens an, braune, kühne, held-tragende.

LUDWIG: Sie spannen seine lieblichen falben an den wagen mit auseinandergehenden seiten, die blutroten, mutigen, helden-bringenden.

Note 1. Although no name is given, the pronoun asya clearly refers to Indra, for it is he to whom the two bays belong. The next verse, therefore, must likewise be taken as addressed to Indra, and not to the sun or the morning-red, spoken of as a horse or a chariot in the first verse.

Vipakshasā is well explained by Sāyana, vividhe pakshasā rathasya pārsvau yayos tau vipakshasau, rathasya dvayor pārsvayor yogitāv ity arthaḥ. The only doubt is whether it refers to the two sides of the chariot, or of the principal horse. That horses were sometimes yoked so that one should act as leader, and two should be harnessed on each side, we see in I, 39, 6, note.

Verse 3.

WILSON: Mortals, you owe your (daily) birth (to such an Indra), who, with the rays of the morning, gives sense to the senseless, and to the formless, form.

BENFEY: Licht machend—Männer!—das Dunkele und kenntlich das Unkenntliche, entsprangst du mit dem Morgenroth.

LUDWIG: Sichtbarkeit schaffend dem unsichtbaren, gestalt o schmuckreiche (Marut) dem gestaltlosen, wurdet ihr mit den Ushas zusammen geboren.

Note 1. In the TB. III, 9, 4, several of these mantras are enjoined for the *Asvamedha*. When the banner (*dhvaga*) is fastened, this verse is to be used, because *ketu* was supposed to mean a banner. The vocative *maryâh*, which I have translated by O men, had evidently become a mere exclamation at a very early time. Even in our passage it is clear that the poet does not address any men in particular, for he addresses Indra, nor is *marya* used in the general sense of men. It means males, or male offspring. It sounds more like some kind of asseveration or oath, like the Latin *mehercle*, or like the English O ye powers, and it is therefore quoted as a *nipâta* or particle in the *Vâg. Prâtis.* II, 16. It can hardly be taken here as addressed to the Maruts, though the Maruts are the subject of the next verse. Kluge in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xxv, p. 309, points out that *maryâh* as an interjection does not occur again in the *Rig-veda*. But the *Rig-veda* contains many words which occur once only, and the author of *Vâg. Prâtisâkhya* is no mean authority. See also *Tândya Brâhm.* VII, 6, 5. If Dr. Kluge proposes to read *mâryâi* as a dative (like *λύκῳ*) he knows, of course, that such a form does not only never occur again in the *Rig-veda*, but never in the whole of Sanskrit literature. Grassmann and Lanman (N. I., p. 339) both seem to imagine that the Pada text has *marya*, but it has *maryâh*, and no accent. If *maryâh* had the accent, we might possibly translate, 'the youths, i. e. the Maruts, made,' taking *krinvan* for *akrinvan*, or the more usual *akurvan*; but in that case the transition to *agâyathâh* would be very sudden. See, however, I, 6, 7.

Sāyana explains it *maryāh, manushyāh ! idam āstaryam paryata*. Another explanation of this verse, which evidently troubled the ancient commentators as much as us, is, 'O mortal, i. e. O sun (dying daily), thou hast been born with the dawn.'

Note 2. *Ushādbhih*, an instrumental plural which attracted the attention of the author of the *Vārttika* to *Pān.* VII, 4, 48. It occurs but, once, but the regular form, *ushobhih*, does not occur at all in the *Rig-veda*. The same grammarian mentions *mās*, month, as changing the final *s* of its base into *d* before *bhis*. This, too, is confirmed by *RV.* II, 24, 5, where *mādbhih* occurs. Two other words, *svavas*, offering good protection, and *svatavas*, of independent strength, mentioned together as liable to the same change, do not occur with *bhih* in the *Rig-veda*, but the forms *svavadbhih* and *svatavadbhih* probably occurred in some other Vedic writings. *Svatavadbhyaḥ* has been pointed out by Professor Aufrecht in the *Vāgasan. Samhitā* XXIV, 16, and *svatavobhyaḥ* in *Satap. Br.* II, 5, 1, 14. That the nom. *svavān*, which is always trisyllabic, is not to be divided into *sva-vān*, as proposed by *Sākalya*, but into *su-avān*, is implied by *Vārttika* to *Pān.* VIII, 4, 48, and distinctly stated in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*. That the final *n* of the nom. *su-avān* disappeared before semi-vowels is confirmed by the *Sākala-prātisākhya*, *Sūtra* 287; see also *Vāgasan. Prātis.* III, *Sūtra* 135 (*Weber, Ind. Stud.* vol. iv, p. 206). On the proper division of *su-avas*, see Aufrecht, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. xiii, p. 499.

Verse 4.

WILSON: Thereafter, verily, those who bear names invoked in holy rites (the Maruts), having seen the rain about to be engendered, instigated him to resume his embryo condition (in the clouds).

BENFEY: Sodann von freien Stücken gleich erregen wieder Schwangerschaft die heiligen Namen tragenden.

LUDWIG: Da haben nämlich in ihrer göttlichen weise dise der *Prisni* leibesfrucht gebracht, opfer verdienenden namen erwerbend.

Note 1. *Āt* must here take *vyūha* and be pronounced as an iambus. This is exceptional with *āt*, but there are at least two other passages where the same pronunciation is necessary. I, 148, 4, *āt rokate vāne ā vi-bhā-vā*, though in the line immediately following it is monosyllabic. Also in V, 7, 10, *āt agne āprinatah*.

Note 2. *Svadhā*, literally one's own place, afterwards, one's own nature. It was a great triumph for the science of Comparative Philology that, long before the existence of such a word as *svadhā* in Sanskrit was known, it should have been postulated by Professor Benfey in his *Griechisches Wurzellexicon*, published in 1839, and in the appendix of 1842. *Svadhā* was known, it is true, in the ordinary Sanskrit, but there it only occurred as an exclamation used on presenting an oblation to the manes. It was also explained to mean food offered to deceased ancestors, or to be the name of a personification of *Māyā* or worldly illusion, or of a nymph. But Professor Benfey, with great ingenuity, postulated for Sanskrit a noun *svadhā*, as corresponding to the Greek *ἔθος* and the German *sitte*, O. H. G. *sit-u*, Gothic *sid-u*. The noun *svadhā* has since been discovered in the Veda, where it occurs very frequently; and its true meaning in many passages where native tradition had entirely misunderstood it, has really been restored by means of its etymological identification with the Greek *ἔθος* or *ἦθος*. See Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. ii, p. 134; vol. xii, p. 158.

The expressions *ānu svadhām ānu* and *svadhām ānu* are of frequent occurrence. They mean, according to the nature or character of the persons spoken of, and may be translated by as usual, or according to a person's wont. Thus in our passage we may translate, The Maruts are born again, i. e. as soon as Indra appeared with the dawn, according to their wont; they are always born as soon as Indra appears, for such is their nature.

I, 165, 5. *indra svadhām ānu hī naḥ babhūtha*.

For, Indra, according to thy wont, thou art with us.

VIII, 20, 7. *svadhām ānu srīyam nāraḥ—vāhante*.

According to their wont, the men (the Maruts) carry splendour.

Thou hast grown (Indra) according to thy nature.

IV, 33, 6. ánu svadhā́m rībhávaḥ gāgmukḥ eṭām.

According to their nature, the Rībhus went to her, scil. the cow; or, according to this their nature, they came.

IV, 52, 6; I, 33, 11; I, 88, 6; VII, 56, 13; III, 51, 11.

In all these passages svadhā́ may be rendered by manner, habit, usage, and ánu svadhā́m would seem to correspond to the Greek ἐξ ἑθους. Yet the history of these words in Sanskrit and Greek has not been exactly the same. First of all we observe in Greek a division between ἑθός and ἦθος, and whereas the former comes very near in meaning to the Sanskrit svadhā́, the latter shows in Homer a much more primitive and material sense. It means in Homer, not a person's own nature, but the own place, for instance, of animals, the haunts of horses, lions, fish; in Hesiod, also of men. Hom. Il. XV, 268, μετὰ τ' ἦθεα καὶ νομόν ἱππων, loca consueta et pascua. Svadhā́ in the Veda does not occur in that sense, although etymologically it might take the meaning of one's own place: cf. dhā-man, familia, &c. Whether in Greek ἦθος, from meaning lair, haunt, home, came, like νόμος and νόμος, to mean habit, manner, character, which would be quite possible, or whether ἦθος in that meaning represents a second start from the same point, which in Sanskrit was fixed in svadhā́, is impossible to determine. In Sanskrit svadhā́ clearly shows the meaning of one's own nature, power, disposition. It does not mean power or nature in general, but always the power of some one, the peculiarity, the individuality of a person. This will appear from the following passages:

II, 3, 8. tīsrāḥ devīḥ svadháyā barhīḥ ā́ idám ákṣhidram pántu.

May the three goddesses protect by their power the sacred pile unbroken.

IV, 13, 5. káyā yāti svadháyā.

By what inherent power does he (the Sun) move on?

IV, 26, 4. ā́kṣkráyā svadháyā.

By a power which requires no chariot, i.e. by himself without a chariot.

The same expression occurs again X, 27, 19.

In some places the verb *mad*, to delight, joined with *svadháyâ*, seems to mean to revel in his strength, to be proud of his might.

V, 32, 4. *svadháyâ mādantam*.

Vṛitra who delights in his strength.

VII, 47, 3. *svadháyâ mādantiḥ*.

The waters who delight in their strength. See X, 124, 8.

In other passages, however, as we shall see, the same phrase (and this is rather unusual) requires to be taken in a different sense, so as to mean to rejoice in food.

I, 164, 38; III, 17, 5.

III, 35, 10. *Indra pība svadháyâ kīṭ sutásya agnéḥ vā pāhi gihváyâ yagatra*.

Indra drink of the libation by thyself (by thy own power), or with the tongue of Agni, O worshipful.

To drink with the tongue of Agni is a bold but not unusual expression. V, 51, 2. *agnéḥ pibata gihváyâ*. X, 15, 3.

I, 165, 6. *kvā syā vaḥ marutaḥ svadhā́śīt yát mām ékam sam-ádhatta ahi-hátye*.

Where was that custom of yours, O Maruts, when you left me alone in the killing of Ahi?

VII, 8, 3. *káyâ naḥ agne ví vasaḥ su-vrīktīm kām ūm (īti) svadhām rinavaḥ sasyámānaḥ*.

In what character dost thou light up our work, and what character dost thou assume, when thou art praised?

IV, 58, 4; IV, 45, 6.

I, 64, 4. *sākám gagāire svadháyâ*.

They (the Maruts) were born together, according to their nature; very much like *ánu svadhām*, I, 6, 4. One can hardly render it here by 'they were born by their own strength,' or 'by spontaneous generation.'

In other passages, however, *svadháyâ*, meaning originally by its own power, or nature, comes to mean, by itself, *sponte suâ*.

VII, 78, 4. *ā asthāt rátham svadháyâ yugyámānam*.

She, the dawn, mounted the chariot which was harnessed by itself, by its own power, without requiring the assistance of people to put the horses to.

X, 129, 2. ānīt avātām svadháyā tát ékam.

That only One breathed breathlessly (or freely) by its own strength, i. e. by itself.

In the same sense svadhābhiḥ is used in several passages :

I, 113, 13. amṛitā karati svadhābhiḥ.

The immortal Dawn moves along by her own strength, i. e. by herself.

VIII, 10, 6. yāt vā svadhābhiḥ adhi-tīshṭhathaḥ rátham.

Or whether ye mount your chariot by your own strength, ye Asvins.

I, 164, 30. gíváḥ mṛitásya karati svadhābhiḥ ámartyaḥ mártvena sá-yoniḥ.

The living moves by the powers of the dead, the immortal is the brother of the mortal. III, 26, 8 ; V, 60, 4.

There are doubtful passages, such as I, 180, 6, in which the meaning of svadhābhiḥ, too, is doubtful. In VI, 2, 8, svadhā looks like an adverb, instead of svadháyā, and would then refer to párigmā. The same applies to VIII, 32, 6.

But svadhā means also food, lit. one's own portion, the sacrificial offering due to each god, and lastly, food in general.

I, 108, 12. yāt indrágnī (íti) út-itā sūryasya mádhya diváḥ svadháyā mādáyethe (íti).

Whether you, Indra and Agni, delight in your food at the rising of the sun or at midday.

X, 15, 12. tvám agne īlitāḥ gāta-vedaḥ ávāt havyāni surabhīni kṛitvī, prá adāḥ pitṛi-bhyaḥ svadháyā té akshan addhī tvám deva prá-yatā havīmshi. 13. yé ka ihā pitāraḥ yé ka ná ihā yān ka vidmā yān ūm (íti) ka ná pra-vidmā, tvám vettha yāti té gāta-vedaḥ svadhābhiḥ yagnām sú-kṛitam gushasva. 14. yé agni-dagdhāḥ yé ágni-dagdhāḥ mádhya diváḥ svadháyā mādáyante, tébhiḥ sva-rāt ásunītim etām yathā-vasām tanvām kalpayasva.

12. Thou, O Agni Gātavedas, hast carried, when implored, the offerings which thou hast rendered sweet : thou hast given them to the fathers, they fed on their share. Eat thou, O god, the proffered oblations. 13. Our fathers who are here, and those who are not here, our fathers whom we know and those whom we do not know, thou knowest

how many they are, O Gâtavedas, accept the well-made sacrifice with the sacrificial portions. 14. They who, whether burnt by fire or not burnt by fire, rejoice in their offering in the midst of heaven, give to them, O king, that life, and thy (their) own body, according to thy will.

III, 4, 7. *saptá prikskhāsaḥ svadhāyā madanti.*

The seven horses delight in their food.

X, 14, 7. *ubhā rāgānā svadhāyā mādantā.*

The two kings delighting in their food.

IX, 113, 10. *yātra kāmāḥ ni-kāmāḥ ka, yātra bradhnāsyā vishrāpam, svadhā ka yātra trīptiḥ ka tātra mām amṛitam kridhī.*

Where wishes and desires are, where the cup of the bright Soma is (or, where the highest place of the sun is), where there is food and rejoicing, there make me immortal.

I, 154, 4. *yāsyā trī pūrṇā mādhunā padāni ākshīyamānā svadhāyā mādanti.*

He (Vishnu) whose three places, full of sweet, imperishable, delight or abound in food.

V, 34, 1; II, 35, 7; I, 168, 9; I, 176, 2.

In the tenth book *svadhā* is used very much as it occurs in the later Sanskrit, as the name of a peculiar sacrificial rite.

X, 14, 3. *yān ka devāḥ vavridhūḥ ye ka devān svāhā anye svadhāyā anye madanti.*

Those whom the gods cherish, and those who cherish the gods, the one delight in Svāhā, the others in Svadhā; or, in praise and food.

NOTE 3. The expression *garbha-tvām ā-irire* is matched by that of III, 60, 3, *saudhanvanāsaḥ amṛita-tvām ā-irire*, the Saudhanvanas (the *Ribhus*) obtained immortality, or became immortal. I do not think that *punar erire* can mean, as Ludwig supposes, they pushed away their state of *garbha*. The idea that the Maruts assumed the form of a *garbha*, lit. of an embryo or a new-born child, is only meant to express that they were born, or that the storms burst forth from the womb of the sky as soon as Indra arises to do battle against the demon of darkness. Thus we read, I, 134, 4, *āganayaḥ marūtaḥ vakshānābhyah*, Thou, Vāyu, hast produced the Maruts from the bowels (of the sky).

As assisting Indra in this battle, the Maruts, whose name retained for a long time its purely appellative meaning of storms, attained their rank as deities by the side of Indra, or, as the poet expresses it, they assumed their sacred name. This seems to be the whole meaning of the later legend that the Maruts, like the *R̥ibhus*, were not originally gods, but became deified for their works. See also Kern, Translation of *Bṛihat-saṃhitā*, p. 117, note.

Other explanations are: they made that which was born within the cloud into a garbha or embryo; or, they arose with *Āditya*, proceeded with *Savitar*, and when *Savitar* set, they became again garbhas; see *Sāma-veda* II, 2, 7, 2, comm.

VÁHNI.

Verse 5.

WILSON: Associated with the conveying Maruts, the traversers of places difficult of access, thou, Indra, hast discovered the cows hidden in the cave.

BENFEY: Mit den die Festen brechenden, den Stürmenden fandst, Indra, du die Kühe in der Grotte gar.

LUDWIG: Und mit denen, die das feste sogar anbrechen, selbst im versteck, o Indra, mit den priesterlichen, fandest du die morgenstralen auf.

Note 1. *Sāyana* explains *vāhni* in the sense of *Marúdbhiḥ*, and he tells the oft-repeated story how the cows were carried off by the *Paṇis* from the world of the gods, and thrown into darkness, and how Indra with the Maruts conquered them and brought them back. Everybody seems to have accepted this explanation of *Sāyana*, and I myself do not venture to depart from it. Yet it should be stated that the use of *vāhni* as a name of the Maruts is by no means well established. *Vāhni* is in fact a most difficult word in the Veda. In later Sanskrit it means fire, and is quoted also as a name of *Agni*, the god of fire, but we do not learn why a word which etymologically means carrier, from *vah*, to carry, should have assumed the meaning of fire. It may be that *vah*, which in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin means chiefly to carry, expressed origin-

ally the idea of moving about (the German be-wegen), in which case váh-ni, fire, would have been formed with the same purpose as ag-ní, ig-nis, fire, from Sk. ag, âγ-ω, ag-o. In *Alvis-mal*, V, 94, we read, kalla Vág Vanir, the Wanæs call fire Vág, i.e. wavy. But in Sanskrit Agni is so constantly represented as the carrier of the sacrificial oblation, that something may also be said in favour of the Indian scholastic interpreters who take váhni, as applied to Agni, in the sense of carrier. However that may be, it admits of no doubt that váhni, in the Veda, is distinctly applied to the bright fire or light. In some passages it looks very much like a proper name of Agni, in his various characters of terrestrial and celestial light. It is used for the sacrificial fire :

V, 50, 4. yátra váhniḥ abhí-hitaḥ.

Where the sacrificial fire is placed.

It is applied to Agni :

VII, 7, 5. ásâdi vritáḥ váhniḥ â-gaganvân agniḥ brahmâ.

The chosen light came nigh, and sat down, Agni, the priest.

Here Agni is, as usual, represented as a priest, chosen like a priest, for the performance of the sacrifice. But, for that very reason, váhni may here have the meaning of priest, which, as we shall see, it has in many places, and the translation would then be more natural : He, the chosen minister, came near and sat down, Agni, the priest.

VIII, 23, 3. váhniḥ vindate vásu.

Agni finds wealth (for those who offer sacrifices?).

More frequently váhni is applied to the celestial Agni, or other solar deities, where it is difficult to translate it in English except by an adjective :

III, 5, 1. ápa dvârâ támasaḥ váhniḥ âvar (ity âvaḥ).

Agni opened the two doors of darkness.

I, 160, 3. sáḥ váhniḥ putráḥ pitróḥ pavitra-vân punâti dhîraḥ bhúvanâni mâyáyâ.

That light, the son of the two parents, full of brightness, the wise, brightens the world by his power.

Agni is even called váhni-tama (IV, 1, 4), which hardly means more than the brightest.

II, 17, 4. *āt ródasī (īti) gyótishā váhniḥ ā atanot.*

Then the bright (Indra) stretched out or filled heaven and earth with his light.

II, 38, 1. *út ūm (īti) syáh deváh savitā—váhniḥ asthāt.*

The divine Savitar, the luminous, arose.

Besides this meaning of light or fire, however, there are clearly two other meanings of *váhni* which must be admitted in the Veda, first that of a carrier, vehicle, and, it may be, horse; secondly that of minister or priest.

VI, 57, 3. *agāḥ anyásya váhnayaḥ hárī (īti) anyásya sám-bhrítā.*

The bearers of the one (Pūshan) are goats, the bays are yoked for the other (Indra).

I, 14, 6. *ghritá-prishthāḥ manaḥ-yúgaḥ yé tvā váhanti váhnayaḥ.*

The horses with shining backs, obedient to thy will, which carry thee (Agni).

VIII, 3, 23. *yásmai anyé dása práti dhúram váhanti váhnayaḥ.*

A horse against whom other ten horses carry a weight; i. e. it requires ten horses to carry the weight which this one horse carries. (See X, 11, 7. *vāhamānaḥ āsvaiḥ.*)

II, 37, 3. *médyantu te váhnayaḥ yébhiḥ ŷyase.*

May thy horses be fat on which thou goest. II, 24, 13.

I, 44, 13. *srudhī srut-karna váhni-bhiḥ.*

Agni, who hast ears to hear, hear, on thy horses. Unless *váhni-bhiḥ* is joined with the words that follow, *devaḥ sayāva-bhiḥ*.

III, 6, 2. *vaḥyántām te váhnayaḥ saptá-gihvāḥ^a.*

May thy seven-tongued horses be called. Here *váhna-yaḥ* is clearly meant for the flames of Agni, yet I doubt whether we should be justified in dropping the simile, as the plural of *váhni* is nowhere used in the bald sense of flames.

In one passage *váhni* is supposed to be used as a feminine, or at all events applied to a feminine subject:

VIII, 94, 1. *yuktā váhniḥ ráthânām.*

^a Cf. I, 58, 7. *saptá guhvāḥ.*

She is yoked as the drawer of the chariots. Probably, however, *váhniḥ* should here be changed into *váhni*.

The passages in which *váhni* is applied to Soma in the ninth and tenth *Mandalas* throw little light on the subject. (IX, 9, 6; 20, 5; 6; 36, 2; 64, 19; 89, 1; X, 101, 10.)

Instead of *visām vispátih*, lord of men (VII, 7, 4), we find IX, 108, 10. *visām váhniḥ ná vispátih*. One feels inclined to translate here *váhniḥ* by leader, but it is more likely that *váhni* is here again the common name of Soma, and that it is inserted between *visām ná vispátih*, which is meant to form one phrase.

In IX, 97, 34. *tisráḥ vākaḥ śrayati prá váhniḥ*, we may take *váhni* as the common appellation of Soma. But it may also mean minister or priest, as in the passages which we have now to examine. Cf. X, 11, 6.

For besides these passages in which *váhni* clearly means vector, carrier, drawer, horse, there is a large class of verses in which it can only be translated by minister, i. e. officiating minister, and, as it would seem, chiefly singer or reciter*.

The verb *vah* was used in Sanskrit in the sense of carrying out (*ud-vah*, *ausführen*), or performing a rite, particularly as applied to the reciting of hymns. Hence such compounds as *ukthá-vâhas* or *stóma-vâhas*, offering hymns of praise, and *yagnâ-vâhas*. Thus we read:

V, 79, 4. *abhí yé tvâ vibhâ-vari stómairḥ grínānti váhnayah*.

The ministers who praise thee, splendid Dawn, with hymns.

I, 48, 11. *yé tvâ grínānti váhnayah*.

The ministers who praise thee.

VII, 75, 5. *ushâḥ ukkhati váhni-bhiḥ grínānā*.

The dawn lights up, praised by the ministers.

VI, 39, 1. *mandráśya kavéh divyásya váhneh*.

Of the sweet poet, of the heavenly priest . . .

VII, 82, 4. *yuvām ít yut-sú prítanâsu váhnayah yuvām kshémasya pra-savé mitá-gñavah, śrānā vásvah ubháyasya kârávah* *indrâvarunâ su-hávâ havâmahe*.

* See Taitt. Brâhm. I, 1, 6, 10. *vahnir vâ anadvân, vahnir adhvaryuḥ*.

We, as ministers, invoke you only in fights and battles; we, as suppliants, (invoke) you for the granting of treasure; we, as poets, (invoke) you, the lords of twofold wealth, you, Indra and Varuṇa, who listen to our call.

VI, 32, 3. *sáh váhni-bhiḥ ríkva-bhiḥ góshu sásvat mitá-gñu-bhiḥ puru-krítvā gígāya.*

He (Indra) was victorious often among the cows, always with celebrating and suppliant ministers.

I have placed these two passages together because they seem to me to illustrate each other, and to show that although in the second passage the celebrating and suppliant ministers may be intended for the Maruts, yet no argument could be drawn from this verse in favour of váhni by itself meaning the Maruts. See also VIII, 6, 2; 12, 15; X, 114, 2.

IV, 21, 6. *hótā yáh naḥ mahān sam-várāṇeshu váhniḥ.*

The Hotar who is our great priest in the sanctuaries.

I, 128, 4. *váhniḥ vedhāḥ ágāyata.*

Because the wise priest (Agni) was born.

The same name which in these passages is applied to Agni, is in others, and, as it will be seen, in the same sense, applied to Indra.

II, 21, 2. *tuvi-gráye váhnaye.*

To the strong-voiced priest or leader.

The fact that váhni is followed in several passages by *ukthaḥ* would seem to show that the office of the váhni was chiefly that of recitation or of addressing prayers to the gods.

III, 20, 1. *agním ushásam asvínā dadhi-krām ví-usháishu havate váhniḥ ukthaḥ.*

The priest at the break of day calls with his hymns Agni, Ushas, the Asvins, and Dadhikrá.

I, 184, 1. *tā vām adyá tau aparám huvema ukhāntyām ushási váhniḥ ukthaḥ.*

Let us invoke the two Asvins to-day and to-morrow, the priest with his hymns is there when the dawn appears.

In a similar sense, it would seem, as *váhniḥ ukthaḥ*, the Vedic poets frequently use the words *váhniḥ áśā*. This *áśā* is the instrumental singular of *ás*, mouth, and it is used

in other phrases also of the mouth as the instrument of praise.

VI, 32, 1. *vagrīne sām-tamāni vākāmsi āsā sthāvīrāya taksham.*

I have shaped with my mouth blessed words to the wielder of the thunderbolt, the strong Indra.

X, 115, 3. *āsā vāhniṃ nā sokīśhā vi-rapsīnam.*

He who sings with his flame as the poet with his mouth. See also I, 38, 14. *mimīhī ślókam āsyē*, make a song in thy mouth.

Thus we find *vāhniḥ āsā* in the same place in the sixth and seventh *Mandalas* (VI, 16, 9 ; VII, 16, 9), in the phrase *vāhniḥ āsā vidúh-tarah*, applied to Agni in the sense of the priest wise with his mouth, or taking *vāhniḥ āsā* as it were one word, the wise poet.

I, 129, 5. *vāhniḥ āsā, vāhniḥ nah ākkha.*

Indra, as a priest by his lips, as a priest coming towards us.

From the parallelism of this passage it would seem that Professor Roth concluded the meaning of *āsā** to be near,

* *Ās*, mouth, the Latin *os*, *oris*, has been derived from a root *as*, to breathe, preserved in the Sanskrit *as-u*, spirit, *asu-ra*, endowed with spirit, living, the living god. Though I agree with Curtius in admitting a primitive root *as*, to breathe, from which *as-u*, breath, must have sprung, I have always hesitated about the derivation of *ās* and *āsyā*, mouth, from the same root. I do not think, however, that the lengthening of the vowel in *ās* is so great a difficulty as has been supposed (Kuhn, *Zeitschrift*, vol. xvii, p. 145). Several roots lengthen their vowel *a*, when used as substantives without derivative suffixes. In some cases this lengthening is restricted to the *Āṅga* base, as in *anaḍvāh*; in others to the *Āṅga* and *Pada* base, as in *visvavāh*, *visvavād̥bhiḥ*, &c.; in others again it pervades the whole declension, as in *turāśhāt*: (see Sanskrit Grammar, §§ 210, 208, 175.) Among ordinary words *vāk* offers a clear instance of a lengthened vowel. In the Veda we find *rūtīśhāham*, VI, 14, 4, and *rūtīśhāham* (*Samhitā*), I, 64, 15. In X, 71, 10 the *Samhitā* has *sabhāśahéna*, the *Pada* *sabhāśahéna*. We find *vāh* in *apsu-vāh* (*Sām. Ved.*), *indra-vāh*, *havya-vāh*. *Sah* at the end of compounds, such as *nri-sah*, *prītanā-sah*, *bhūri-sah*, *satrā-sah*, *vibhā-sah*, *sadā-sah*, varies between a long and short *ā*: (see Regnier, *Étude sur l'idiome du*

or coram. In the *Nighantū*, II, 16, the right reading is evidently *âsât*, not *âsâ*; see *Nirukta*, ed. Satyavrata Sâma-srami, vol. i, p. 264. *Âsâ*, however, is an old variant, as may be seen from *Rig-veda-bhâshya* I, 127, 8; X, 115, 3.

I, 76, 4. *pragâ-vatâ vâkasâ vâhniâ âsâ â ka huvé ní ka satsi ihâ devaiâ*.

With words in which my people join, I, the poet, invoke, and thou (Agni) sittest down with the gods.

VI, 11, 2. *pâvakâyâ guhvâ vâhniâ âsâ*.

Thou, a poet with a bright tongue, O Agni!

Grassmann thinks that *vahnir âsâ* can always be translated by 'vor das Angesicht bringend,' but this does not appear to be the case in his translation.

The question now arises in what sense *vâhni* is used when applied without further definition to certain deities. Most deities in the Veda are represented as driving or driven, and many as poets or priests. When the *Asvins* are called *vâhni*, VIII, 8, 12; VII, 73, 4, it may mean riders. But when the *Viśve Devâs* are so called, I, 3, 9, or the *Rîbhus*, the exact meaning is more doubtful. The *Maruts* are certainly riders, and whatever other scholars may say to the contrary, it can be proved that they were supposed to sit astride on horseback, and to have the bridle through the horse's nostrils (V, 61, 2). But if in our verse I, 6, 5, we translate *vâhni* as an epithet, rider, and not only as an epithet, but as a name of the *Maruts*, we cannot support our translation by independent evidence, but must rely partly on the authority of *Sâyana*, partly on the general tenor of the text before us, where the *Maruts* are mentioned in the preceding verse, and, if I am right, in the verse following also. On the other hand, if *vâhni* can thus be used as a name of

Vêdas, p. 111.) At all events no instance has yet been pointed out in Sanskrit, showing the same contraction which we should have to admit if, as has been proposed, we derived *âs* from *av-as*, or from *an-as*. From 'an' we have in the Veda *ânâ*, mouth or face, I, 52, 15. From *as*, to breathe, the Latin omen, originally *os-men*, a whisper, might likewise be derived. See Bopp, *Comp. Gr. par.* 909; Kuhn in *Ind. Stud.* I, 333.

the Maruts, there is at least one other passage which would gain in clearness by the admission of that meaning, viz.

X, 138, 1. *táva tyé indra sakhyéshu váhnayaḥ—ví adar-diruḥ valám.*

In thy friendship, Indra, these Maruts tore asunder the cloud.

Note 2. I have translated *viśú* by stronghold, though it is only an adjective, meaning firm. Dr. Oscar Meyer, in his able essay *Quaestiones Homericae, specimen prius, Bonnae, 1867*, has tried to show that this *viśú* is the original form of *ῥῆϊος*, and he has brought some further evidence to show that the siege and conquest of Troy, as I pointed out in my *Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. ii, p. 470, was originally described in language borrowed from the siege and conquest of the dark night by the powers of light, or from the destruction of the cloud by the weapons of Indra. It ought to be considered, however, that *viśú* in the Veda has not dwindled down as yet to a mere name, and that therefore it may have originally retained its purely appellative power in Greek as well as in Sanskrit, and from meaning a stronghold in general, have come to mean the stronghold of Troy.

Note 3. The bright cows are here the cows of the morning, the dawns, or the days themselves, which are represented as rescued at the end of each night by the power of Indra, or similar solar gods. Indra's companions in that daily rescue are here the Maruts, the storms, the same companions who act even a more prominent part in the battle of Indra against the dark clouds. These two battles are often mixed up together, so that possibly *usríyāḥ* may have been meant for clouds.

Verse 6.

WILSON: The reciters of praises praise the mighty (troop of Maruts), who are celebrated, and conscious of the power of bestowing wealth in like manner as they (glorify) the counsellor (Indra).

BENFEY: Nach ihrer Einsicht verherrlichend besingen Sänger den Schätzeheern, den berühmten, gewaltigen.

LUDWIG : Als fromme heran zum liede haben die sänger ihn, der trefliches findet, berühmten gesungen.

Note 1. The reasons why I take *gírah* as a masculine in the sense of singer or praiser, may be seen in a note to I, 37, 10.

Note 2. *yáthâ matím*, lit. according to their mind, according to their heart's desire. Cf. II, 24, 13.

Verse 7.

WILSON : May you be seen, Maruts, accompanied by the undaunted (Indra); both rejoicing, and of equal splendour.

BENFEY : So lass mit Indra denn vereint, dem furchtlosen, erblicken dich, beide erfreu'nd und glanzesgleich.

LUDWIG : Mit Indra zusammen wirst du gesehn zusammengehend mit dem furchtlosen, mild ihr zwei, von gleichem glanze.

Note 1. The sudden transition from the plural to the singular is strange, but the host of the Maruts is frequently spoken of in the singular, and nothing else can here be intended. It may be true, as Professor Benfey suggests, that the verses here put together stood originally in a different order, or that they were taken from different sources. Yet though the *Sâma-veda* would seem to sanction a small alteration in the order of the verses, the alteration of verses 7, 4, 5, as following each other, would not help us much. The *Atharva-veda* sanctions no change in the order of these verses.

The transition to the dual at the end of the verse is likewise abrupt, not more so, however, than we are prepared for in the *Veda*. The suggestion of the *Nirukta* (IV, 12) that these duals might be taken as instrumentals of the singular, is of no real value.

Note 2. *Dr̥kshase*, a very valuable form, well explained by *dr̥isyethâh*, a second person singular conjunctive of the First Aorist *Âtmanepada*, the termination 'sase' corresponding to Greek *ση*, as the conjunctive takes the personal terminations of the present in both languages. Similar

forms, viz. *prīkshase*, X, 22, 7, *mamsase*, X, 27, 10; Ath. Veda VII, 20, 2-6, and possibly *vīvakshase*, X, 21, 1-8, 24, 1-3, 25, 1-11, will have to be considered hereafter. (Nirukta, ed. Roth, p. 30, Notes.) As Ludwig has pointed out, the *Tāndya-brāhmaṇa* XII, 2, 6, 7, reads *drikshuse*, and explains it by *ime lokā dadṛisire*. *Sāyana*, however, explains *dṛisidhātoḥ karmāṇi madhyamaikavaṭane vyatyayena sepratyaye drikshusa iti rūpam*. See Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, I, p. 111. The story of Indra's being forsaken by all the gods in his battle against *Vṛitra*, but being helped by the Maruts, is often mentioned; see RV. VIII, 96, 7; SV. I, 4, 1, 4, 2; Ait. Br. III, 20.

Verse 8.

WILSON: This rite is performed in adoration of the powerful Indra, along with the irreproachable, heavenward-tending, and amiable bands (of the Maruts).

BENFEY: Durch Indra's liebe Schaaren, die untadligen, himmelstürmenden, strahlet das Opfer mächtiglich.

LUDWIG: Mit den tadellosen, morgens erscheinenden singt der kämpfer sighaft, mit des Indra zu liebenden scharen.

NOTE 1. *Arkati*, which I have here translated by he cries aloud, means literally, he celebrates. I do not know of any passage where *arkati*, when used, as here, without an object, means to shine, as Professor Benfey translates it. The real difficulty, however, lies in *makhá*, which *Sāyana* explains by sacrifice, and which I have ventured to translate by priest or sacrificer. *Makhá*, as an adjective, means, as far as we can judge, strong or vigorous, and is applied to various deities, such as *Pūshan* I, 138, 1, *Savitṛi* VI, 71, 1, *Soma* XI, 20, 7, *Indra* III, 34, 2, the Maruts I, 64, 11; VI, 66, 9. By itself, *makhá* is never used as the name of any deity, and it cannot therefore, as Professor Roth proposes, be used in our passage as a name of Indra, or be referred to Indra as a significant adjective. In I, 119, 3, *makhá* is applied to men or warriors, but it does not follow that *makhá* by itself means warriors, though it may be connected

with the Greek *μαχος* in *σύμμαχος*. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, p. 293 ; Grassmann, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xvi, p. 164.

There are two passages where *makhá* refers to an enemy of the gods, IX, 101, 13 ; X, 171, 2.

Among the remaining passages there is one where *makhá* is used in parallelism with *váhni*, X, 11, 6. *vívakti váhniḥ, su-apasyáte makháḥ*. Here I propose to translate, The poet speaks out, the priest works well. The same meaning seems applicable likewise to the phrase *makhásya dāvane*, to the offering of the priest, though I should prefer to translate 'to share in the sacrifice.'

I, 134, 1. *ā yāhi dāvane, vāyo (iti), makhásya dāvane*.

Come, Vāyu, to the offering, to the offering of the priest.

VIII, 7, 27. *ā naḥ makhásya dāvane—dévāsaḥ úpa gan-tana*.

Come, gods, to the offering of our priest.

Professor Roth proposes to render *makhá* in these passages by 'attestation of joy, celebration, praise,' and he takes *dāvane* as a dative of *dāván*, a *nomen actionis*, meaning, the giving. There are some passages where one feels inclined to admit a noun *dāvāna*, and to take *dāvane* as a locative sing.

VI, 71, 2. *devásya vayám savitúḥ sávīmani*

sréshṭhe syāma vásunaḥ ka dāvane.

May we be in the favour of the god Savitar, and in the best award of his treasure.

In II, 11, 1, and II, 11, 12, the locative would likewise be preferable ; but there is a decided majority of passages in which *dāvane* occurs and where it is to be taken as a dative*, nor is there any other instance in the Veda of a *nomen actionis* being formed by *vana*. It is better, therefore, in VI, 71, 2, to refer *sréshṭhe* to *sávīmani*, and to make allowance in the other passages for the idiomatic use of such phrases as *dāvane vásūnām* or *rāyāḥ dāvane*, whether from *dā* or from *do*. See *De Infinitivi forma et usu*, by E. Wilhelm, 1873, p. 17.

* RV. I, 61, 10 ; 122, 5 ; 134, 2 ; 139, 6 ; II, 1, 10 ; IV, 29, 5 ; 32, 9 ; V, 59, 1 ; 4 ; 65, 3 ; VIII, 25, 20 ; 45, 10 ; (92, 26) ; 46, 25 ; 27 ; 63, 5 ; 69, 17 ; 70, 12 ; IX, 93, 4 ; X, 32, 5 ; 44, 7 ; 50, 7.

The termination *váne* explains, as has been shown by Professor Benfey, Greek infinitives such as *δοῦναι*, i. e. *δοεναί* or *δοφεναι* = Sanskrit *dā-váne*. The termination *mane* in *dā-mane*, for the purpose of giving, explains, as the same scholar has proved, the ancient infinitives in Greek, such as *δό-μεναι*. It may be added that the regular infinitives in Greek, ending in *εναί*, as *λελοιπ-έναι*, are likewise matched by Vedic forms such as IX, 61, 30. *dhūrv-ane*, or VI, 61, 13. *vibhv-áne*, and *turv-áne* (Delbrück in K. Z. XVIII, p. 82 ; Bopp, Accent, §§ 106, 113, 117). It is hardly right to say that *vibhváne* in VI, 61, 13, should be taken as an instrumental, for it does not refer to the chariot, but to *Sarasvatī*. In the termination *ευ*, which stands for *ενι*, like *εις* for *εσι*, we have, on the contrary, not a dative, but a locative of an abstract noun in an, both cases, as we see from their juxta-position in VI, 71, 2, being equally applicable to express the relation which we are accustomed to call infinitive. See RV. I, 134, 5. *ugrāḥ ishananta bhurváni*, *apām ishanta bhurváni*.

Note 2. *Abhidyu* I now translate by hastening, and derive it from *div*, *dīvyati*, in its original meaning of to throw forth, to break forth, to shine. As from this root we have *didyú*, weapon, what is thrown, pl. *didyavaḥ*, and possibly *didyut*, the weapon, particularly Indra's weapon or thunderbolt, *abhidyu* might mean breaking forth, rushing forth towards us, something like *prakṛiḥ/naḥ*, another name of the Maruts. How *abhidyu* could mean conquérant, maître du jour, as M. Bergaigne maintains, I do not see. *Abhidyūn*, I, 33, 11 ; 190, 4, does not differ much from *ānu-dyūn*, i. e. it is used *vipsāyām*.

Verses 9, 10.

WILSON: Therefore circumambient (troop of Maruts), come hither, whether from the region of the sky, or from the solar sphere ; for, in this rite, (the priest) fully recites your praises.

BENFEY: Von hier, oder vom Himmel komm ob dem Æther, Umkreisender ! zu dir streben die Lieder all.

LUDWIG: Von hierher, o Parigman, kom, oder von des himels glanzfirmamente her; zu disem streben unsere lieder auf.

WILSON: We invoke Indra,—whether he come from this earthly region, or from the heaven above, or from the vast firmament,—that he may give (us) wealth.

BENFEY: Von hier, oder vom Himmel ob der Erde begehren Spende wir, oder, Indra! aus weiter Luft.

LUDWIG: Von hier zu empfangen verlangen wir, oder vom himel, oder vom irdischen raume her, oder aus dem grossen luftkreis den Indra.

Note 1. Although the names for earth, sky, and heaven vary in different parts of the Veda, yet the expression *diváh roṇánám* occurs so frequently that we can hardly take it in this place in a sense different from its ordinary meaning. Professor Benfey thinks that *roṇáná* may here mean ether, and he translates 'come from heaven above the ether;' and in the next verse, 'come from heaven above the earth.' At first, every reader would feel inclined to take the two phrases, *diváh vá roṇánāt ádhi*, and *diváh vá páṛthivát ádhi*, as parallel; yet I believe they are not quite so.

The following passages will show that the two words *roṇánám diváh* belong together, and that they signify the light of heaven, or the bright place of heaven.

VIII, 98, 3. *ágakṣhah roṇánám diváh.*

Thou (Indra) wentest to the light of heaven. I, 155, 3.

III, 6, 8. *uraú vá yé antárikṣhe—diváh vá yé roṇané.*

In the wide sky, or in the light of heaven.

VIII, 82, 4. *upamé roṇané diváh.*

In the highest light of heaven.

IX, 86, 27. *trīṣṭhe prishṭhé ádhi roṇané diváh.*

On the third ridge, in the light of heaven. See also I, 105, 5; VIII, 69, 3.

The very phrase which we find in our verse, only with *ṛit* instead of *vá*, occurs again, I, 49, 1; VIII, 8, 7; and the same sense must probably be assigned to VIII, 1, 18, *ádha gṃáh ádha vá diváh brīhatáh roṇánāt ádhi*.

Either from the earth, or from the light of the great heaven, increase, O Indra!

Roṇáná also occurs in the plural:

I, 146, 1. *vísṡá diváh roṇánā*.

All the bright regions of heaven.

Sáyana: 'All the bright palaces of the gods.' See III, 12, 9.

The same word *roṇáná*, and in the same sense, is sometimes joined with *sūrya* and *nāka*.

Thus, I, 14, 9. *sūryasya roṇánāt vísṡān devān—hótā ihá vakshati*.

May the Hotar bring the Visve Devas hither from the light of the sun, or from the bright realm of the sun.

III, 22, 3. *yáh roṇané parástāt sūryasya*.

The waters which are above, in the bright realm of the sun, and those which are below.

I, 19, 6. *yé nākasya ádhi roṇané, diví devāsaḥ āsate*.

They who in the light of the firmament, in heaven, are enthroned as gods.

Here *diví*, in heaven, seems to be the same as the light of the firmament, *nākasya roṇané*.

Thus *roṇáná* occurs also frequently by itself, when it clearly has the meaning of heaven.

It is said of the dawn, I, 49, 4; of the sun, I, 50, 4; and of Indra, III, 44, 4.

vísṡam ā bhāti roṇánám, he lights up the whole sky.

We also read of three *roṇanas*, where, though it is difficult to say what is really meant, we must translate, the three skies. The cosmography of the Veda is, as I said before, somewhat vague and varying. There is, of course, the natural division of the world into heaven and earth (*dyú* and *bhūmí*), and the threefold division into earth, sky, and heaven, where sky is meant for the region intermediate between heaven and earth (*pr̥thivī*, *antáríksha*, *dyú*). There is also a fourfold division, for instance,

VIII, 97, 5. *yát vā ási roṇané diváh
samudrásya ádhi vishṡápi,
yát p̥r̥thive sádane vr̥trahan-tama,
yát antáríkshe ā gahi*.

Whether thou, O greatest killer of *Vṛitra*, art in the light of heaven, or in the basin of the sea, or in the place of the earth, or in the sky, come hither!

V, 52, 7. *yé vavridhánta pārthiváh yé uráu antárikshe ā, vrigāne vā nadīnām sadhá-sthe vā maháh diváh.*

The Maruts who grew, being on the earth, those who are in the wide sky, or in the realm of the rivers, or in the abode of the great heaven.

But very soon these three or more regions are each spoken of as threefold. Thus,

I, 102, 8. *tisráh bhūmih tríni rokanā.*

The three earths, the three skies.

II, 27, 9. *trī rokanā divyā dhārayanta.*

The *Ādityas* support the three heavenly skies.

V, 69, 1. *trī rokanā varuna trīn utá dyūn tríni mitra dhārayathaḥ rágāmsi.*

Mitra and Varuna, you support the three lights, and the three heavens, and the three skies.

Here there seems some confusion, which *Sāyana's* commentary makes even worse confounded. What can *rokanā* mean as distinct from *dyú* and *rágas*? The fourth verse of the same hymn throws no light on the subject, and I should feel inclined to take *divyā-pārthivasya* as one word, though even then the cosmic division here adopted is by no means clear. However, there is a still more complicated division alluded to in IV, 53, 5:

trīh antáriksham savitā mahi-tvanā trī rágāmsi pari-bhūh tríni rokanā, tisráh diváh prithivīh tisráh invati.

Here we have the sky thrice, three welkins, three lights, three heavens, three earths.

A careful consideration of all these passages will show, I think, that in our passage we must take *diváh vā rokanāt ádhi* in its usual sense, and that we cannot separate the two words.

In the next verse, on the contrary, it seems equally clear that *diváh* and *pārthivāt* must be separated. At all events there is no passage in the *Rig-veda* where *pārthiva* is joined as an adjective with *dyú*. *Pārthiva* as an adjective is frequently joined with *rágas*, never with *dyú*. See I, 81,

5; 90, 7; VIII, 88, 5; IX, 72, 8: in the plural, I, 154, 1; V, 81, 3; VI, 31, 2; 49, 3.

Pārthivāni also occurs by itself, when it refers to the earth, as opposed to the sky and heaven.

X, 32, 2. *vī indra yāsi divyāni roṇāṇā vī pārthivāni rāgasā.*

Indra thou goest in the sky between the heavenly lights and the earthly.

VIII, 94, 9. *ā yé vīsvā pārthivāni paprāthan roṇāṇā divāḥ.*

The Maruts who stretched out all the earthly lights, and the lights of heaven.

VI, 61, 11. *ā-paprūshī pārthivāni urú rāgaḥ antáriksham.*

Sarasvatī filling the earthly places, the wide welkin, the sky. This is a doubtful passage.

Lastly, *pārthivāni* by itself seems to signify earth, sky, and heaven, if those are the three regions which Vishṇu measured with his three steps; or east, the zenith, and west, if these were intended as the three steps of that deity. For we read:

I, 155, 4. *yāḥ pārthivāni tri-bhūḥ it vīgāma-bhīḥ urú krá-mishā.*

He (Vishṇu) who strode wide with his three strides across the regions of the earth.

These two concluding verses might also be taken as containing the actual invocation of the sacrificer, which is mentioned in verse 8. In that case the full stop at the end of verse 8 should be removed.

MANDALA I, HYMN 19.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 36-37.

TO AGNI (THE GOD OF FIRE) AND THE MARUTS
(THE STORM-GODS).

1. Thou art called forth to this fair sacrifice for a draught of milk¹; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

2. No god indeed, no mortal, is beyond the might¹ of thee, the mighty one; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

3. They who know of the great sky¹, the Visve Devas² without guile³; with those Maruts come hither, O Agni!

4. The strong ones who sing their song¹, unconquerable by force; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

5. They who are brilliant, of terrible designs, powerful, and devourers of foes; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

6. They who in heaven are enthroned as gods, in the light of the firmament¹; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

7. They who toss the clouds¹ across the surging sea²; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

8. They who shoot with their darts (lightnings) across the sea with might; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

9. I pour out to thee for the early draught¹ the sweet (juice) of Soma; with the Maruts come hither, O Agni!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Medhâtithi, of the family of Kaṇva. Verse I=SV. I, 16.

Verse 1.

WILSON : Earnestly art thou invoked to this perfect rite, to drink the Soma juice ; come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY : Zu diesem schönen Opfer wirst du gerufen, zum Trank der Milch!—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG : Her zu diesem schönen opfer, gerufen wirst zum milchtrank du, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. Gopîthá is explained by Yâska and Sâyana as drinking of Soma. I have kept to the literal signification of the word, a draught of milk. In the last verse of our hymn the libation offered to Agni and the Maruts is said to consist of Soma, but Soma was commonly mixed with milk. The other meaning assigned to gopîthá, protection, would give the sense : 'Thou art called for the sake of protection.' But pîtha has clearly the sense of drinking in soma-pîthá, RV. I, 51, 7, and may therefore be taken in the same sense in gopîthá.

Verse 2.

WILSON : No god nor man has power over a rite (dedicated) to thee, who art mighty : come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY : Denn nicht ein Gott, kein Sterblicher ragt über dein, des Grossen, Macht—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG : Es überragt kein gott, kein sterblicher die einsicht dein des grossen, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. The Sanskrit krátu expresses power both of body and mind. Paraś governs the accusative.

Verse 3.

WILSON : Who all are divine, and devoid of malignity,

and who know (how to cause the descent) of great waters : come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Die guten Götter, welche all bestehen in dem weiten Raum—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die wissen um den grossen raum, alle götter truges bar, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. The sky or welkin (*rāgas*) is the proper abode of the Maruts, and 'they who know of' means simply 'they who dwell' in the great sky. The Vedic poets distinguish commonly between the three worlds, the earth, *pr̥thivī*, f., or *pārthiva*, n.; the sky, *rāgas*; and the heaven, *dyú*: see I, 6, 9, note 1. The phrase *mahāh rāgasah* occurs I, 6, 10; 168, 6, &c. *Sāyana* takes *rāgas* for water or rain: see on this my article in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xii, p. 28. In some passages *rāgas* means 'darkness,' and might be identified with the Greek ἑρεβος; Ath. Veda VIII, 2, 1. *pārāyāmi tvā rāgasa út tvā mr̥tyór apīparam*, 'I bring thee out of darkness, out of death I brought thee.' The identification of *rāgas* with ἑρεβος (Leo Meyer, in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. vi, p. 19) must however remain doubtful, until stronger evidence has been brought forward in support of a Greek β representing a Sanskrit *g*, even in the middle of a word. See my article in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xv, p. 215; Curtius, Grundzüge (fifth edition), p. 480.

Note 2. The appellation *Vīśve devāḥ*, all gods together, or, more properly, host-gods, is often applied to the Maruts; cf. I, 23, 8; 10. Benfey connects this line with the preceding verse, considering *Vīśve devāḥ*, it seems, inappropriate as an epithet of the Maruts.

Note 3. On *adrūh*, without guile or deceit, without hatred, see Kuhn's excellent article, Zeitschrift für die Vergleichende Sprachforschung, vol. i, pp. 179, 193. *Adrūh* is applied to the Maruts again in VIII, 46, 4, though in connection with other gods. It is applied to the *Vīśve Devas*, RV. I, 3, 9; IX, 102, 5: the *Ādityas*, RV. VIII, 19, 34; 67, 13: the *Rudras*, RV. IX, 73, 7: to Heaven and Earth, RV. II, 41, 21; III, 56, 1; IV, 56, 2; VII, 66, 18: to *Mitra* and *Varuna*, RV. V, 68, 4: to *Agni*, RV. VI, 15, 7; VIII, 44, 10. The form *adhrūk* occurs in the sixth *Mandala* only.

Verse 4.

WILSON: Who are fierce, and send down rain, and are unsurpassed in strength: come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Die schrecklich-unbesiegbaren, die mächtiglich Licht angefacht—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die singen, die gewaltigen, ihr lied unange-griffen durch (ihre) kraft, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. Sâyana explains arká by water. Hence Wilson: 'Who are fierce and send down rain.' But arká has only received this meaning of water in the artificial system of interpretation first started by the authors of the Brâhmanas, who had lost all knowledge of the natural sense of the ancient hymns. The passages in which arká is explained as water in the Brâhmanas are quoted by Sâyana, but they require no refutation. On the singing of the Maruts, see note to I, 38, 15; also Bergaigne, Journ. As. 1884, p. 194. The perfect in the Veda, like the perfect in Homer, has frequently to be rendered in English by the present.

Verse 5.

WILSON: Who are brilliant, of terrific forms, who are possessors of great wealth, and are devourers of the malevolent: come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Die glänzend-grau'ngestaltigen, hochherrschend feindvernichtenden — Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die glanzvollen, von schrecklicher gestalt, von grosser herschaft, feindverzerer, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Verse 6.

WILSON: Who are divinities abiding in the radiant heaven above the sun: come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Die Götter die im Himmel sind ob dem Lichtkreis des Göttersitz's—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die ob der himmelswölbung glanz, am himel die götter sitzen, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. Nâka must be translated by firmament, as there

is no other word in English besides heaven, and that is wanted to render dyú. Like the Jewish firmament, the Indian *nāka*, too, is adorned with stars; cf. I, 68, 10. *pipésa nākam str̥bhiḥ*. Dyú, heaven, is supposed to be above the *rāgas*, sky or welkin. Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xii, p. 28.

Sāyana: 'In the radiant heaven above the sun.' See note 1 to I, 6, 9; p. 49.

Verse 7.

WILSON: Who scatter the clouds, and agitate the sea (with waves): come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Welche über das wogende Meer hinjagen die Wolkenschaar—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die die berge wiegend hindurch durchs wogenmeer bewegen, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. That *pārvata* (mountain) is used in the sense of cloud, without any further explanation, is clear from many passages:

I, 57, 6. *tvám tám indra pārvatam mahāṁ urúm vāgreṇa vagrin parva-sāḥ kakartitha*.

Thou, Indra, hast cut this great broad cloud to pieces with thy lightning. Cf. I, 85, 10.

We actually find two similes mixed up together, such as V, 32, 2. *ūdhāḥ pārvatasya*, the udder of the cloud. All we can do is to translate *pārvata* by mountain, but always to remember that mountain means cloud. In the Edda, too, the rocks, said to have been fashioned out of Ymir's bones, are supposed to be intended for clouds. In Old Norse *klakkr* means both cloud and rock; nay, the English word cloud itself has been identified with the Anglo-Saxon *clūd*, rock. See Justi, *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 62. See Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, I³, 398, 424; also Kuhn, *Weisse Frau*, p. 12.

Note 2. Whether the surging sea is to be taken for the sea or for the air, depends on the view which we take of the earliest cosmography of the Vedic *Rishis*. *Sāyana* explains: 'They who make the clouds to go, and stir the

watery sea.' Wilson remarks that the influence of the winds upon the sea, alluded to in this and the following verse, indicates more familiarity with the ocean than we should have expected from the traditional inland position of the early Hindus, and it has therefore been supposed by others that, even in passages like our own, *samudrá* was meant for the sky, the waters above the firmament. But although there are passages in the *Rig-veda* where *samudrá* must be taken to mean the welkin (*RV. I, 95, 3. samudrá ékam diví ékam ap-sú*), this word shows in by far the larger number of passages the clear meaning of ocean. There is one famous passage, *VII, 95, 2*, which proves that the Vedic poets, who were supposed to have known the upper courses only of the rivers of the *Penjáb*, had followed the greatest and most sacred of their rivers, the *Sarasvatî*, as far as the Indian ocean. It is well known that, as early as the composition of the laws of the *Mānavas*, and possibly as early as the composition of the *Sūtras* on which these metrical laws are based, the river *Sarasvatî* had changed its course, and that the place where that river disappeared under ground was called *Vinasana*^a, the loss. This *Vinasana* forms, according to the laws of the *Mānavas*, the western frontier of *Madhyadesa*, the eastern frontier being formed by the confluence of the *Gangā* and *Yamunā*. *Madhyadesa* is a section of *Āryāvarta*, the abode of the *Āryas* in the widest sense. *Āryāvarta* shares with *Madhyadesa* the same frontiers in the north and the south, viz. the *Himālaya* and *Vindhya* mountains, but it extends beyond *Madhyadesa* to the west and east as far as the western and eastern seas. A section of *Madhyadesa*, again, is the country described as that of the *Brahmarshis*, which comprises only *Kurukshetra*, the countries of the *Matsyas*, *Pañkālās* (*Kānyakubga*, according to *Kullūka*), and *Sūrasenas* (*Mathurā*, according to *Kullūka*). The most sacred spot of all, however, is that section of the *Brahmarshi* country which lies between the rivers *Drishadvatî* and *Sarasvatî*, and which in the laws of

^a Mentioned in *Lāṭy. Śrauta Sūtras*, X, 15, 1; *Pañkavimsa Brāhm. XXV, 10, 1*; see *Hist. A. S. L.*, p. 12.

the Mānavas is called Brahmāvarta. In the Sūtras which supplied the material to the authors of the metrical law-books, the Vinasana is mentioned for the first time in the Baudhāyana Sūtras, I, 2, 9, 'Āryāvarta lies to the east of the region where (the Sarasvatī) disappears, to the west of the Black-forest, to the north of the Pāripātra (mountains), to the south of the Himālaya.' The name of the Sarasvatī is not mentioned, but no other river can be understood. What is curious, however, is, that in the Vasishṭha Sūtras where the same frontiers of Āryāvarta are given (I, 8), the MSS. read originally prāḡ ādarsāt, i. e. east of the Ādarsa mountains, which was afterwards changed into prāḡ adarsanāt, and interpreted 'east of the invisibility, or of the disappearance of the Sarasvatī.' Vasishṭha quotes another authority, a Gāthā of the Bhāllavins, which says : 'In the west the boundary river,' i. e. sindhur vidhārāṇī. This sindhur vidhārāṇī is another name of the old Sarasvatī, and in Baudhāyana I, 2, 12, the same verse is quoted, though the reading of vidhārāṇī varies with viṭarāṇī and visarāṇī. See Bühler, l. c. Madhyadesa is mentioned in one of the Parisishṭas (MS. 510, Wilson) as a kind of model country, but it is there described as lying east of Dasārṇa^a, west of Kāmpilya^b, north of Pāriyātra^c, and south of the Himavat, or again, in a more general way, as the Duāb of the Gangā and Yamunā^d.

It is 'very curious that while in the later Sanskrit lite-

^a See Wilson's Vishṇu-purāṇa, ed. Hall, pp. 154, 155, 159, 160.

^b See Wilson's Vishṇu-purāṇa, ed. Hall, p. 161.

^c L. c., pp. 123, 127. Instead of Pāriyātra, other MSS. read Pāripātra; see Bühler, Vasishṭha I, 8.

^d Prāḡ dasārṇāt pratyak kāmpilyād udak pāriyātrād, dakshinena himavataḥ. Gangāyamunayor antaram eke madhyadesam ity ātakshate. Medhātithi says that Madhyadesa, the middle country, was not called so because it was in the middle of the earth, but because it was neither too high nor too low. Albiruny, too, remarks that Madhyadesa was between the sea and the northern mountains, between the hot and the cold countries, equally distant from the eastern and western frontiers. See Reinaud, Mémoire sur l'Inde, p. 46.

rature the disappearance of the Sarasvatî in the desert is a fact familiar to every writer, no mention of it should occur during the whole of the Vedic period, and it is still more curious that in one of the hymns of the Rig-veda we should have a distinct statement that the Sarasvatî fell into the sea :

VII, 95, 1-2. *prá kshódasâ dhāyasâ sasre eshā sárasvatî dharúnam āyasi pūh, pra-bābadhānā rathyā-iva yāti vísvāh apāh mahinā sīndhuh anyāh. ékā aketat sárasvatî nadīnām rúkih yati giri-bhyaḥ ā samudrāt, rāyāh kētantī bhūvanasya bhūreḥ ghrítam páyah duduhe nāhushāya.*

1. 'With her fertilising stream this Sarasvatî comes forth— (she is to us) a stronghold, an iron gate. Moving along as on a chariot, this river surpasses in greatness all other waters. 2. Alone among all rivers Sarasvatî listened, she who goes pure from the mountains as far as the sea. She who knows of the manifold wealth of the world, has poured out to man her fat milk.'

Here we see *samudrá* used clearly in the sense of sea, the Indian sea, and we have at the same time a new indication of the distance which separates the Vedic age from that of the later Sanskrit literature. Though it may not be possible to determine by geological evidence the time of the changes which modified the southern area of the Penjáb and caused the Sarasvatî to disappear in the desert, still the fact remains that the loss of the Sarasvatî is later than the Vedic age, and that at that time the waters of the Sarasvatî reached the sea. Professor Wilson had observed long ago in reference to the rivers of that part of India, that there have been, no doubt, considerable changes here, both in the nomenclature and in the courses of the rivers, and this remark has been fully confirmed by later observations. I believe it can be proved that in the Vedic age the Sarasvatî was a river as large as the Sutlej, that it was the last of the rivers of the Penjáb, and therefore the iron gate, or the real frontier against the rest of India. At present the Sarasvatî is so small a river that the epithets applied to the Sarasvatî in the Veda have become quite inapplicable to it. The Vedic *Rishis*, though acquainted with numerous rivers, including

the Indus and Ganges, call the Sarasvatî the mother of rivers (VII, 36, 6. *sârasvatî saptâthî sîndhu-mâtâ*), the strongest of rivers (VI, 61, 13. *apâsâm apâh-tamâ*), and in our passage, VII, 95, 2, we have, as far as I can judge, conclusive evidence that the old Sarasvatî reached in its course the Indian sea, either by itself, or united with the Indus^a.

But this passage, though important as showing the application of *samudrâ*, i. e. confluviæ, to the Indian sea, and proving the acquaintance of the Vedic *Rishis* with the southern coast of India, is by no means the only one in which *samudrâ* must be translated by sea. Thus we read, VII, 49, 2 :

yâh âpah divyâh utâ vâ srâvanti khanîtrimâh utâ vâ yâh svayam-gâh, samudrâ-arthâh yâh sûtayaâh pâvakâh tâh âpah devîh ihâ mām avantu.

The waters which are from heaven, or those which flow after being dug, or those which spring up by themselves, the bright, pure waters that tend to the sea, may those divine waters protect me here !

I, 71, 7. *agnîm vîsvâh abhî prîkshaâh sakante samudrâm nâ sravâtaâh saptâ yahvîh.*

All kinds of food go to Agni, as the seven rivers go to the sea.

Cf. I, 190, 7. *samudrâm nâ sravâtaâh ródha-kakrâh.*

V, 78, 8. *yâthâ vâtaâh yâthâ vânam yâthâ samudrâh égati.*

As the wind moves, as the forest moves, as the sea moves (or the sky).

In hymn X, 58, the same expression occurs which we have in our hymn, and *samudrâm arnavâm* there as here admits but of one explanation, the surging sea.

Samudrâ in many passages of the *Rig-veda* has to be taken as an adjective, in the sense of watery or flowing :

VI, 58, 3. *yâ te pûshan nâvaâh antâh samudré hiranyâyîh antârikshe kâranti.*

Thy golden ships, O Pûshan, which move within the watery sky.

^a See 'India, what can it teach us?' pp. 170, 171.

VII, 70, 2. *yáh vâm samudrân sarítaḥ píparti.*

He who carries you across the watery rivers.

I, 161, 14. *at-bhíḥ yâti várunaḥ samudraíḥ.*

Varuṇa moves in the flowing waters.

In both these passages *samudrá*, as an adjective, does not conform to the gender of the noun. See Bollensen, *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 467.

II, 16, 3. *ná samudraíḥ párvataiḥ indra te ráthaḥ (ná pari-bhvē).*

Thy chariot, O Indra, is not to be overcome by the watery clouds.

Verse 8.

WILSON: Who spread (through the firmament), along with the rays (of the sun), and, with their strength, agitate the ocean: come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Die mit Blitzen schleudern mächtig über das Meer hinaus—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Die mit stralen ihre richtung nemen mit gewalt durchs mer, mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Verse 9.

WILSON: I pour out the sweet Soma juice for thy drinking, (as) of old: come, Agni, with the Maruts.

BENFEY: Ich giesse zu dem ersten Trank für dich des Soma Honig aus—Mit diesen Marut's, Agni! komm!

LUDWIG: Ich giesze dir zum ersten trunk madhu mit dem soma zu; mit den Marut, Agni, kom.

Note 1. *Pûrvapîti*, the early draught, implies at the same time the priority of the god to whom it is given.

MANDALA I, HYMN 37.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 12-14.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Sing forth, O Kaṁvas, to the sportive host of your Maruts, brilliant on their chariots, and unscathed¹,—

2. They who were born together, self-luminous, with the spotted deer (the clouds)¹, the spears, the daggers, the glittering ornaments².

3. I hear their¹ whips, almost close by, when they crack them in their hands; they gain splendour² on their way³.

4. Sing forth the god-given prayer to the wild¹ host of your Maruts, endowed with terrible vigour² and strength.

5. Celebrate the bull among the cows (the storm among the clouds)¹, for it is the sportive host of the Maruts; he grew as he tasted the rain².

6. Who, O ye men, is the strongest among you here, ye shakers of heaven and earth, when you shake them like the hem of a garment¹?

7. At your approach the son of man holds himself down; the gnarled cloud¹ fled at your fierce anger.

8. They at whose racings¹ the earth, like a hoary king, trembles for fear on their ways,

9. Their birth is strong indeed: there is strength to come forth from their mother, nay, there is vigour twice enough for it¹.

10. And these sons, the singers¹, stretched out the fences in their racings²; the cows had to walk knee-deep.

11. They cause this long and broad unceasing rain¹ to fall on their ways.

12. O Maruts, with such strength as yours, you have caused men to tremble¹, you have caused the mountains to tremble.

13. As the Maruts pass¹ along, they talk together on the way : does any one hear them?

14. Come fast on your quick steeds ! there are worshippers¹ for you among the Kaṇvas : may you well rejoice among them.

15. Truly there is enough for your rejoicing. We always are their servants, that we may live even the whole of life.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to *Kaṇva*, the son of *Ghora*.

Verse 1=TS. IV, 3, 13, 6.

Verse 3=SV. I, 135.

Verse 10=SV. I, 221.

Verse 1.

WILSON: Celebrate, *Kaṇvas*, the aggregate strength of the *Maruts*, sportive, without horses, but shining in their car.

BENFEY: *Kaṇviden*, auf! begrüsst mit Sang, die muntre Heerschaar der *Marut*'s, die rasch'ste, wagenglänzende.

LUDWIG: Eurer spilenden schar, der *Marutschar*, der unangreifbaren, die auf wagen glänzt, der singt, o *Kaṇvās*, zu.

Note 1. Wilson translates *anarvānam* by without horses, though the commentator distinctly explains the word by without an enemy. A *Brāhmaṇa* passage explains: *bhrātrivyo vā arvā, ity śrutyantarāt*. See TS. IV, 3, 13, 6. Wilson considers it doubtful whether *arvan* can ever mean enemy. The fact is, that in the *Rig-veda* *an-arvān* never means without horses, but always without hurt or free from enemies; and the commentator is perfectly right, as far as the sense is concerned, in rendering the word by without an enemy, or unopposed (*apraty-rīta*). *An-arvān* is not formed from *arvat*, horse, racer, but from *arvan*; and this is derived from the same root which yields *arus*, n. a wound, *rīti* (see I, 64, 15, note), &c. The accusative of *anarvat*, without a horse, would be *anarvantam*, not *anarvānam*.

The root *ar*, in the sense of hurting, is distantly connected with the root *mar*: see *Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, p. 323. It exists in the Greek *ἄλλυμι*, corresponding to Sanskrit *rinomi*, i. e. *arnomi*, I hurt, likewise

in *ούλη*, wound, which cannot be derived from *δλη*; in *ούλος*, *ούλιος*, hurtful, and *δλοός*, destructive : see Curtius, *Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie* (fünfte Ausgabe), p. 372. In the Veda *ar* has the sense of offending or injuring, particularly if preceded by *upa*.

X, 164, 3. *yát â-sásâ nih-sásâ abhi-sásâ upa-ârimâ gâ-gratah yát svapántah, agnîh vîsvâni âpa duk-kritâni âgushâtâni âré asmât dadhâtu.*

If we have offended, or whatever fault we have committed, by bidding, blaming, or forbidding, while waking or while sleeping, may Agni remove all wicked misdeeds far from us.

Hence *upârâ*, injury, VII, 86, 6. *âsti gyâyan kântiyasah upa-aré*, the older man is there to injure, to offend, to mislead, the young : (History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, second edition, p. 541.) Roth translates *upârâ* by *Verfehlung*, missing. *Ari*, enemy, too, is best derived from this root, and not from *râ*, to give, with the negative particle, as if meaning originally, as *Sâyana* supposes, a man who does not give. In *ârarivân*, gen. *ârarushah*, hostile, Rosen recognised many years ago a participle of a really reduplicated perfect of *ar*, and he likewise traced *arâru*, enemy, back to the same root : see his note to I, 18, 3.

From this root *ar*, to hurt, *ârvan*, hurting, as well as *ârus*, wound, are derived in the same manner as both *dhânvan* and *dhânu*s, bow, are formed from *dhan*; *yâgvân* and *yâgus* from *yag*, *pârvan* and *pârus* from *par*. See Kuhn, *Zeitschrift*, vol. ii, p. 233.

Anarvân, then, is the same as *ânarus*, Sat. P. *Brâhmaṇa* III, 1, 3, 7; and from meaning originally without a wound or without one who can wound, it takes the more general sense of uninjured, invulnerable, perfect, strong, (cf. integer, intact, and entire.) This meaning is applicable to I, 94, 2; 136, 5; II, 6, 5; V, 49, 4; VII, 20, 3; 97, 5; X, 61, 13; 65, 3. In I, 116, 16, *anarvân* seems to be used as an adverb; in I, 51, 12, as applied to *slôka*, it may have the more general meaning of irresistible, powerful.

There are two passages in which the nom. sing. *ârvân*, and one in which the acc. sing. *ârvânam*, occur, apparently

meaning horse. But in I, 163, 13, and IX, 97, 25, *árvān* stands in the Pada text only, the *Samhitā* has *árvā ákka* and *árvā iva*. In X, 46, 5, the text *hlri-smasrum ná árvānam dhāna-arkam* is too doubtful to allow of any safe induction, particularly as the *Sāma-veda* gives a totally different reading. I do not think, therefore, that *árvat*, horse, admits in the nom. and acc. sing. of any forms but *árvā* and *árvan-tam*^a. *Pāṇini* (VI, 4, 127) allows the forms *arvān* and *arvānam*, but in *anarvan* only, which, as we saw, has nothing in common with *árvat*, horse. Benfey: 'die rascheste (keinen Renner habend, uneinholbar),' the quickest (having no racer, hence not to be reached). M. Bergaigne (*Journ. As.* 1884, p. 188) tries to defend *anarvan* in the sense of *anasva*, without considering the grammatical objections. In VI, 66, 7 (not I, 6, 7) *anasváḥ* does not refer to *yāmah*.

The masculine *anarvānam* after the neuter *sárdhas* is curious; *sárdhas* means might, but it is here used to express a might or an aggregate of strong men or gods, and the nom. plur. *yé*, who, in the next verse, shows the same transition of thought, not only from the singular to the plural, but also from the neuter to the masculine, which must be admitted in *anarvānam*^b. It would be possible, if necessary, to explain away the irregularity of *anarvānam* by admitting a rapid transition from the Maruts to Indra, the eldest among the Maruts (cf. I, 23, 8. *Indra-gyeshthāḥ mārut-ganāḥ*), and it would be easier still to alter *sárdhas* into *sárdham*, as an accusative singular of the masculine noun *sárdha*, which has the same meaning as the neuter *sárdhas*. There is one passage, V, 56, 9, which would seem to give ample countenance to such a conjecture:

tām vaḥ sárdham rathe-rúbham—ā huve.

I call hither this your host, brilliant on chariots.

Again, II, 30, 11, we read:

tām vaḥ sárdham mārutam—girā úpa bruve.

I call with my voice on this your host of Maruts.

^a See Bugge, *K. Z.* XIX, p. 403.

^b Bollensen (*Z. D. M. G.* XXII, 603) calls it a vulgar Donatus; see, however, Lanman, *Noun-Inflection*, pp. 330, 526.

VIII, 93, 16. *srutám vaḥ vrítrahán-tamam prá sárdham*
karshanínām, ā sushe.

I pant for the glorious, victorious, host of the quick Maruts.

From this *sárdha* we have also the genitive *sárdhasya*, VII, 56, 8 (4):

subhráh vaḥ sūshmaḥ krúdhmī mánāmsi dhúniḥ múnī-
iva sárdhasya dhrishnóḥ.

Your prowess is brilliant, your minds furious; the shout of the daring host is like one possessed.

We have likewise the dative *sárdhāya*, the instrumental *sárdhena*, and the acc. plur. *sárdhān*; and in most cases, except in two or three where *sárdha* seems to be used as an adjective, meaning strong, these words are applied to the host of the Maruts.

But the other word *sárdhas* is equally well authenticated, and we find of it, not only the nominative, accusative, and vocative sing. *sárdhas*, but likewise the nom. plur. *sárdhāmsi*.

The nominative singular occurs in our very hymn:

I, 37, 5. *kríám yát sárdhaḥ mǎrutam.*

Which is the sportive host of the Maruts.

I, 127, 6. *sáḥ hí sárdhaḥ ná mǎrutam tuvi-svániḥ.*

For he (Agni) is strong-voiced like the host of the Maruts.

IV, 6, 10. *tuvi-svanásaḥ mǎrutam ná sárdhaḥ.*

Thy flames (Agni) are strong-voiced like the host of the Maruts.

V, 46, 5. *utá tyát naḥ mǎrutam sárdhaḥ ā gamat.*

May also that host of the Maruts come to us.

II, 1, 5. *tvám narām sárdhaḥ asi puru-vásuḥ.*

Thou (Agni), full of riches, art the host of the men.

This host of men seems to me intended again for the Maruts, although it is true that in thus identifying Agni with different gods, the poet repeats himself in the next verse:

II, 1, 6. *tvám sárdhaḥ mǎrutam.*

Thou art the host of the Maruts.

If this repetition seems offensive, the first *narām sárdhas* might be taken for some other company of gods. Thus we find:

VII, 44, 5. *srinótu naḥ daśvyam sárdhaḥ agníḥ srinvántu víśve mahishāḥ ámûrāḥ.*

May the divine host, may Agni, hear us, may the Visve hear us, the strong, the wise.

Or III, 19, 4. *sáḥ ā vaha devá-tātim yavishtha sárdhaḥ yát adyá divyám yágâsi.*

Bring thou hither, O Agni, the gods, that you may sacrifice to-day to the divine host.

Or I, 139, 1. *ā nú tát sárdhaḥ divyám vrinímahe.*

We chose for us now that divine host.

As in these last, so in many other passages, *sárdhas* is used as a neuter in the accusative. For instance,

I, 106, 1; II, 11, 14. *mārutam sárdhaḥ.*

II, 3, 3; VI, 3, 8. *sárdhaḥ marútām.*

The vocative occurs,

V, 46, 2. *ágne índra váruṇa mítra dévāḥ sárdhaḥ prá yanta māruta utá vishṇo (iti).*

Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, gods, host of the Maruts, come forth, and Vishṇu!

We see how throughout all these passages those in which *sárdha* and *sárdhas* are applied to the Maruts, or to some other company of gods, preponderate most decidedly. Yet passages occur in the Rig-veda where both *sárdha* and *sárdhas* are applied to other hosts or companies. Thus V, 53, 10, *sárdha* refers to chariots, while in I, 133, 3, *sárdhas* is applied to evil spirits.

If the passages hitherto examined were all that occur in the Rig-veda, we might still feel startled at the construction of our verse, where *sárdhas* is not only followed by masculine adjectives in the singular, but, in the next verse, by a pronoun in the plural. But if we take the last irregularity first, we find the same construction, viz. *sárdhas* followed by *yé*, in III, 32, 4:

índrasya sárdhaḥ marútaḥ yé āsan.

The host of Indra, that was the Maruts.

As to the change of genders, we find adjectives in the masculine after *sárdhas*, in

V, 52, 8. *sárdhaḥ mārutam út samsa satyá-savasam r/bh-vasam.*

Celebrate the host of the Maruts, the truly vigorous, the brilliant.

Here, too, the poet afterwards continues in the plural, though as he uses the demonstrative, and not, as in our passage, the relative pronoun, we cannot quote this in support of the irregularity which has here to be explained. Anyhow the construction of our verse, though bold and unusual, is not so unusual as to force us to adopt conjectural remedies. In V, 58, 2, we find *yé* after *ganáh*. On the Umbrian *Çerfo Martio*, as possibly the same as *sárdha-s máruta-s*, see Grassman, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xvi, p. 190. The Zend *saredha*, kind, species, is the same word.

Verse 2.

WILSON: Who, borne by spotted deer, were born self-radiant, with weapons, war-cries, and decorations.

BENFEY: Die mit Hirschen und Speeren gleich mit Donnern und mit Blitzen auch—selbststrahlende—geboren sind.

LUDWIG: Die mit vilfarbigen speeren, mit der schwerter glanze, sichtbar wurden mit eigenem leuchten.

Note 1. The spotted deer (*prīshatī*) are the recognised animals of the Maruts, and were originally, as it would seem, intended for the rain-clouds. *Sāyana* is perfectly aware of the original meaning of *prīshatī*, as clouds. The legendary school, he says, takes them for deer with white spots, the etymological school for many-coloured lines of clouds: (RV. BH. I, 64, 8.) This passage shows that although *prīshatī*, as Roth observes, may mean a spotted cow or a spotted horse,—the Maruts, in fact, are called sometimes *prīshat-asvāh*, having piebald horses, or, having *prīshats* for their horses, VII, 40, 3,—yet the later tradition in India had distinctly declared in favour of spotted deer. The Vedic poets, however, admitted both ideas, and they speak in the same hymn, nay, in the same verse, of the fallow deer and of the horses of the Maruts. Thus V, 58, 1, the Maruts are called *āśú-asvāh*, possessed of quick horses; and in V, 58, 6, we read *yát prá áyāsishta prīshatībhiḥ āsvaiḥ—ráthebhiḥ*, where the gender of *prīsha-*

tībhiḥ would hardly allow us to join it with ásvaiḥ, but where we must translate: When you come with the deer, the horses, the chariots, or with your deer, as horses. Ludwig joins prishatībhiḥ with rishābhiḥ, and again in I, 64, 8; see note 1 to I, 87, 4.

Note 2. The spears and daggers of the Maruts are meant for the thunderbolts, and the glittering ornaments for the lightning. Sāyana takes vāśī in this passage for war-cries on the authority of the Nirukta, where vāśī is given among the names of the voice. From other passages, however, it becomes clear that vāśī is a weapon of the Maruts; and Sāyana, too, explains it sometimes in that sense: cf. V, 53, 4; 57, 2. Thus I, 88, 3, the vāśīs are spoken of as being on the bodies of the Maruts. In V, 53, 4, the Maruts are said to shine in their ornaments and their vāśīs. Here Sāyana, too, translates vāśī rightly by weapon; and in his remarks on I, 88, 3, he says that vāśī was a weapon commonly called ārā, which is a shoemaker's awl. See Dhammapada, ver. 401. This reminds one of framea, which at one time was supposed to be connected with the German pfrieme. See, however, Grimm (Deutsche Grammatik, vol. i, p. 128) and Leo Meyer (Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. vi, p. 424). In VIII, 29, 3, the god Tvashṭar is said to carry an iron vāśī in his hand. Grassman (Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xvi, p. 163) translates vāśī by axe. That aṅgī is to be taken in the sense of ornament, and not in the sense of ointment, is shown by passages like VIII, 29, 1, where a golden ornament is mentioned, aṅgī aṅkte hiraṇyāyam. Sākām, together, is used with reference to the birth of the Maruts; see I, 64, 4. It should not be connected with vāśībhiḥ.

Verse 3.

WILSON: I hear the cracking of the whips in their hands, wonderfully inspiring (courage) in the fight.

BENFEY: Schier hier erschallt der Peitsche Knall, wenn sie in ihrer Hand erklingt; leuchtend fahr'n sie im Sturm herab.

LUDWIG: Als wäre es hier, so hört man es, wenn die geisseln in ihren händen knallen; wunderbar strecken sie auf ihrer fart sich nieder.

Note 1. Eshâm should be pronounced as a creticus; also in verses 9, 13, 15. This is a very common vyûha. On the whips as lightning, see Grimm, Donner, p. 27.

Note 2. I should have taken *kitrâm* as an adverb, like Benfey, if *ni riñg* were not usually construed with an accusative. *Riñg* in the 3rd pers. plur. pres. Âtm. is treated like a verb of the Ad-class. The SV. seems to read *yâmam*, and the commentator explains it by *ratham*.

Note 3. The locative *yâman* is frequently used of the path on which the gods move and approach the sacrifice; hence it sometimes means, as in our passage, in the sky. *Yâmam* in BR., s. v. *arg*, is wrong.

We might also translate: 'Here, close by, I hear what the whips in their hands say; they drive forth the beautiful (chariot) on the road.' See SV. I, 2, 1, 5, 1, comm.

Verse 4.

WILSON: Address the god-given prayer to those who are your strength, the destroyers of foes, the powerful, possessed of brilliant reputation.

BENFEY: Singt eurer Schaar, der wühlenden, der strahlenreichen, kräftigen ein gotterfülltes Gebet!

LUDWIG: Eurer kûnen schar, von blendender herlichkeit, der kraftvollen, soll ein von den gôttern eingegebenes brahma gesungen werden.

Note 1. Benfey translates *ghrîshvi* by burrowing, and refers it to the thunderbolt that uproots the earth. He points out that *ghrîshvi* means also, for the same reason, the boar, as proved by Kuhn (Die Herabkunft des Feuers, S. 202). *Ghrîshî* is evidently a common name for boar, the Norse *gríss*, and the god of the wind, *Grimnir* or *Grimr*, is conceived as a boar, shaking the cornfield, in such phrases as 'Der Eber geht ins Korn' (Gentha, l. c. p. 14). I prefer, however, in this place the general sense assigned to the adjective *ghrîshu* and *ghrîshvi*, exuberant, brisk, wild. See Kuhn in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xi, p. 385. Wilson, after Sâyana, translates destroyers of foes. On the representation of the clouds as boars, see Nir. V, 4.

Note 2. *Tveshá-dyumna* is difficult to render. Both

tveshá and dyumná are derived from roots that mean to shine, to be bright, to glow. Derivatives from tvish express the idea of fieriness, fierceness, and fury. In IV, 17, 2, tvish is used correlatively, with manyú, wrath. Derivatives from dyu convey the idea of brightness and briskness. Both qualities are frequently applied to the Maruts.

Verse 5.

WILSON: Praise the sportive and resistless might of the Maruts, who were born amongst kine, and whose strength has been nourished by (the enjoyment of) the milk.

BENFEY: Preist hoch die muntre Marutschaar die unbesiegbar in den Küh'n, im Schlund des Safts wuchs sie heran.

LUDWIG: Preise wie unter kühlen den stier, (so) der Marut spilende schar, beim verschlingen des saftes ist sie grosz geworden.

Note 1. This translation is merely conjectural. I suppose that the wind driving the clouds before him, is here compared to a bull among cows, cf. V, 52, 3:

té syandrāśaḥ ná ukshānaḥ áti skandanti sárvarīḥ.

They, the Maruts, like rushing bulls, mount on the dark cows.

The last sentence states that the wind grows even stronger after it has tasted the rain (I, 85, 2. té ukshitāśaḥ mahimānam ārata).

Note 2. I take *gāmbhe* in the sense of *gāmbhane*. (On the root *gabh* and its derivatives, see Kuhn, Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft, vol. i, p. 123 seq.) It would be better to read *mukhe*, instead of *sukhe*, in the commentary. The Maruts were not born of milk for *Prisni*, as Wilson says in a note, but from the milk of *Prisni*. *Prisni* is called their mother, Rudra their father: (V, 52, 16; 60, 5.)

Benfey takes the cows for clouds in which the lightnings dwell; and the abyss of the sap is by him supposed to be again the clouds.

Verse 6.

WILSON : Which is chief leader among you, agitators of heaven and earth, who shake all around, like the top (of a tree)?

BENFEY : Wer, Helden ! ist der erste euch—ihr Erd- und Himmel-schütterer !—wenn ihr sie schüttelt Wipfeln gleich ?

LUDWIG : Wer ist der grösste bei euch, helden, wenn vom himel und der erde, schütteler, ihr am saume gleichsam rüttelt !

Note 1. *Āntam ná*, literally, like an end, is explained by *Sāyana* as the top of a tree. Wilson, Langlois, and Benfey accept that interpretation. Roth proposes, like the hem of a garment, which I prefer ; for *vastrānta*, the end of a garment, is a common expression in later Sanskrit, while *anta* is never applied to a tree in the sense of the top of a tree. Here *agra* would be more appropriate.

Verse 7.

WILSON : The householder, in dread of your fierce and violent approach, has planted a firm (buttress) ; for the many-ridged mountain is shattered (before you).

BENFEY : Vor eurem Gange beuget sich, vor eurem wilden Zorn der Mann ; der Hügel weicht und der Berg.

LUDWIG : Vor eurem anzug, eurem gewaltigen eifer, niederduckte sich der mensch, wich der festgeknotete [wolken]berg.

Note 1. *Sāyana* translates : 'Man has planted a firm buttress to give stability to his dwelling.' The reading *ná* for *ní*, which Aufrecht adopted, is untenable, as Ludwig shows. It has been altered in the second edition. See also VIII, 7, 5, *ní yemiré*. *Nidadhré* is the perfect *Ātmanepada*, and expresses the holding down of the head or the cowering attitude of man. I have taken *ugrāya manyāve* over to *gṛhīta*, because these words could hardly form an apposition to *yāmāya*. As the Vedic poets speak of the very mountains as shaken by the storms, we might translate *pārvato girīḥ* by the gnarled or rocky mount ;

but there is no authority for translating *gñhita* by it is shattered, and we should have to translate, the mountain yielded or bent before your anger. Cf. V, 57, 3 :

ní vañ vāñā gihate yāmanāñ bhiyāñ.

The forests get out of your way from fear.

V, 60, 2. *vāñā kit ugrāñ gihate ní vañ bhiyāñ prithivī kit regate pārvatañ kit.*

Even the forests, ye fearful Maruts, yield from fear of you ; even the earth trembles, even the mountain.

In I, 166, 5, *yāt tveshā-yāmāñ nadāyanta pārvatāñ*, we may translate 'when they on their fiery course made the parvatas (clouds) to sound or thunder,' but it is more likely that *nādayati* here means to cause to shake or vibrate, and that *parvata* stands for mountain. We ought to remember such poetical expressions as I Kings xix. 11, 'and a great, strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord.'

Verse 8.

WILSON : At whose impetuous approach earth trembles ; like an enfeebled monarch, through dread (of his enemies).

BENFEY : Bei deren Lauf bei deren Sturm die Erde zittert voller Furcht, wie ein altergebeugter Mann.

LUDWIG : Bei deren märschen zitterte wie ein gealtet stammeshaupt die erd vor furcht auf ihren wegen.

Note 1. *Āgma* seems to express the act of racing or running (like *āgi*, race, battle), while *yāma* is the road itself where the racing takes place. A very similar passage occurs in I, 87, 3. The comparison of the earth (fem.) to a king (masc.) would be considered a grave offence in the later Sanskrit literature. In I, 87, 3, *vithurāñ* takes the place of *vispāti*.

Verse 9.

WILSON : Stable is their birthplace, (the sky) ; yet the birds (are able) to issue from (the sphere of) their parent : for your strength is everywhere (divided) between two (regions,—or, heaven and earth).

BENFEY: Kaum geboren sind sie so stark, dass ihrer Mutter sie entfliehn: ist ja doch zwiefach ihre Kraft.

LUDWIG: Denn fest ist ihr geburtsort, vögel (sind sie) von der mutter fortzugehn, nach dem, wie von altersher ihre kraft.

Oder, Denn fest ist ihre kraft geworden von der mutter sich zu trennen, da schon von alters her ihre kraft diss wollte.

Note 1. A very difficult verse. The birth of the Maruts is frequently alluded to, as well as their surpassing strength, as soon as born. Hence the first sentence admits of little doubt. But what follows is very abrupt. Váyas may be the plural of vi, bird, or it may be váyas, the neuter, meaning vital strength: see Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xv, p. 217. The Maruts are frequently compared to birds (cf. I, 87, 2; 88, 1), but it is usual to indicate the comparison by ná or iva. I therefore take váyas as a nom. sing. neut., in the sense of vigour, life. They are called *br̥hadvayasaḥ* in a Nivid; see Ludwig, p. 226. Nir-i is used with particular reference to the birth of a child (cf. V, 78, 7; 9).

Verse 10.

WILSON: They are the generators of speech: they spread out the waters in their courses: they urge the lowing (cattle) to enter (the water), up to their knees, (to drink.)

BENFEY: In ihrem Lauf erheben dann diese Söhne Getös und Fluth, die bis zum Knie den Kühen geht.

LUDWIG: Und dise söne, die sänger, denten auf ihren zügen ihre banen aus, so dass brüllend sie uns ganz nahe kamen.

Note 1. If we could take *sûnávaḥ gíraḥ* in the sense of the sons of voice, i. e. of thunder, which would remove many difficulties, the accent of *gíraḥ* would have to be changed. The commentator takes *sûnu* in the sense of *utpádaka*, producers of sound. *Gíraḥ*, however, occurs at least once more, in the sense of singers or poets, IX, 63, 10, where *gíraḥ* can only be a vocative, O ye singers! In I, 6, 6, the translation of *gíraḥ* by singers, i. e. the Maruts, may be contested, but if we consider that *gíraḥ*, in the sense of

hymns, is feminine, and is followed by the very word which is here used, viz. *devayántaḥ*, as a feminine, viz. *devayántīḥ*, VII, 18, 3, we can hardly doubt that in I, 6, 6, *gṛāḥ* is a masculine and means singers. The same applies to VI, 63, 10. In VI, 52, 9, *úpa naḥ sūnávaḥ gṛāḥ srinvantu amṛtasya yé*, the construction is, of course, quite different.

Note 2. The expression that the Maruts enlarged or extended the fences of their race-course (RV. IV, 58, 7), can only mean that they swept over the whole sky, and drove the clouds away from all the corners. *Kāshṭhā* may mean the wooden enclosures (carceres) or the wooden poles that served as turning and winning-posts (metae). The Sāma-veda has *yagñeshu* instead of *agmeshu*. That the translation of this verse is purely tentative, and far from satisfactory, was known to all Vedic scholars, but I doubt whether they will consider the interpretation which M. Bergaigne proposes with so much assurance, as less tentative and more satisfactory. He translates (Journ. As. 1884, p. 239), 'des fils ont, dans leur marche, allongé leurs chants comme des chemins, pour y marcher à genoux (sur les genoux) en mugissant (en chantant).' I shall content myself with shortly pointing out the misgivings which every Vedic scholar would feel at once in proposing such a rendering. First as to the conception itself. Can a poet say, 'The Maruts have stretched out their songs in order to march on them on their knees?' 'The roads,' as M. Bergaigne shows himself, are only a simile, and no one walks on a simile. Secondly, the idea that these Maruts widened the roads on which they march, is common enough, but that they lengthened their songs, like paths, is never said by the Vedic *Rishis*, nor would they in such a case have left out the particle *na* or *iva*. Lastly, though many things are said of the Maruts, I do not remember that they ever appear on their knees. I do not think, therefore, that M. Bergaigne's infallible method helps us much beyond where we were before. Conjectures are easy, but for that very reason, one does not like to bring them forward. One might propose to read *sūnávaḥ diváḥ*, a very common name of the Maruts. One might go a step further, identify

gih with *bhâratî*, and point out that the Maruts are called the sons of Bharata, II, 36, 2. But all this leaves us in utter uncertainty, and where a scholar feels the ground so uncertain beneath his feet, he hesitates to speak with papal authority. M. Bergaigne's strong point is that *abhigñû* means on their knees, not up to their knees. Here again, I ask, does *abhi* in prepositional compounds ever mean on? If *abhigñû* is used in the same sense in which we use 'on our knees,' it would in Sanskrit mean only 'bowing up to the knees.' Now in I, 72, 5, *abhigñû* seems to express a positive expression of reverence. With regard to the other passages where *abhigñû* occurs, M. Bergaigne has not shown how they ought to be translated so as to give a clear sense. I do not pretend to solve the difficulties, but I think it is better to confess our difficulties than to hide them under the veil of a so-called systematic interpretation. *Abhigñû*, like *mitagñû*, may have expressed a position of the knees, expressive of strength, but on such points very little information is to be gained from Indian commentators.

The last sentence expresses the result of this race, viz. the falling of so much rain that the cows had to walk up to their knees in water. This becomes still clearer from the next verse.

SÂYANA: These, the producers of speech, have spread water in their courses, they cause the cows to walk up to their knees in order to drink the water.

Verse 11.

WILSON: They drive before them, in their course, the long, vast, uninjurable, rain-retaining cloud.

BENFEY: Dann treiben sie im Sturm heran jenen langen und breiten Spross der Wolke unerschöpflichen.

LUDWIG: Sogar diesen langen, breiten, das kind der wolke, den unfeindlichen, schleudern auf ihren zügen sie vorwärts.

Note 1. Rain is called the offspring of the cloud, *mihó nápât*, and is then treated as a masculine; cf. *apâm nápât*, &c.

Verse 12.

WILSON: Maruts, as you have vigour, invigorate mankind: give animation to the clouds.

BENFEY: O Marut's! mit der Kraft, die ihr besitzt, werft ihr Geschöpfe um, die Berge werft ihr um sogar.

LUDWIG: O Marut, so wie eure kraft ist, warft ihr die leute nieder, warft ihr die berge nieder.

Note 1. In VIII, 72, 8, *akūkyavit* is explained by *vyā-dārayat*, he tore open. *Akūkyavitana* is the Vedic form of the 2nd pers. plur. of the reduplicated aorist.

Verse 13.

WILSON: Wherever the Maruts pass, they fill the way with clamour: every one hears their (noise).

BENFEY: Wenn die Marut's des Weges ziehn, dann sprechen mit einander sie und mancher mag sie hören.

LUDWIG: Wenn die Marut wandern, sprechen auf dem weg sie mit einander, es höret sie ein jeder.

Note 1. *Yānti* has to be pronounced as an amphibrachys.

Verse 14.

WILSON: Come quickly, with your swift (vehicles). The offerings of the *Kaṇvas* are prepared. Be pleased with them.

BENFEY: Auf schnellen kommet schnell herbei, bei *Kaṇva*'s Spross sind Feste euch: da wollt euch schön ergötzen.

LUDWIG: Brecht rasch auf mit raschen rossen, bei den *Kaṇva*'s ist euer dienst, dort eben erfreuet euch.

Note 1. Benfey supposes that *dúvaḥ* stands in the singular instead of the plural. But why should the plural have been used, as the singular (*asti*) would have created no kind of difficulty? It is better to take *dúvaḥ* as a nominative plural of a noun *dū*, worshipper, derived from the same root which yielded *dúvaḥ*, worship. We certainly find *á-duvaḥ*, as a nom. plur., in the sense of not-worshipping:

VII, 4, 6. *mā tvā vayām sahasā-van avīrāḥ mā āpsavaḥ
pāri sadāma mā āduvaḥ.*

May we not, O hero, sit round thee like men without strength, without beauty (cf. VIII, 7, 7), without worship.

Here Sâyana explains *āduvaḥ* very well by *parikarāṇa-hīnāḥ*, which seems better than Roth's explanation 'zögernd, ohne Eifer.'

Verse 15.

WILSON : The offering is prepared for your gratification : we are your (worshippers), that we may live all our life.

BENFEY : Gerüstet ist für euren Rausch und wir gehören, traun ! euch an für unser ganzes Lebelang.

LUDWIG : Er ist euch zur trunkesfreude, und wir gleichfalls euer hier, dass unsere ganze dauer wir erleben.

MANDALA I, HYMN 38.

ASHṬAKA I, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 15-17.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. What then now? When¹ will you take (us) as a dear father takes his son by both hands, O ye gods, for whom the sacred grass has been trimmed²?

2. Where now? On what errand of yours are you going, in heaven, not on earth¹? Where are your cows sporting?

3. Where are your newest favours¹, O Maruts? Where the blessings? Where all delights?

4. If you, sons of *Prisni*, were mortals, and your praiser an immortal¹,—

5. Then never¹ should your praiser be unwelcome, like a deer in pasture grass², nor should he go on the path of Yama³.

6. Let not one sin¹ after another, difficult to be conquered, overcome us; may it depart² together with greed.

7. Truly they are terrible and powerful; even to the desert the Rudriyas bring rain that is never dried up¹.

8. The lightning lows like a cow, it follows as a mother follows after her young, when the shower (of the Maruts) has been let loose¹.

9. Even by day the Maruts create darkness with the water-bearing cloud¹, when they drench the earth.

10. Then from the shouting of the Maruts over the whole space of the earth¹, men reeled forward.

11. Maruts on your strong-hoofed never-wearying³

steeds¹ go after those bright ones (the clouds), which are still locked up².

12. May your fellies be strong, the chariots, and their horses, may your reins¹ be well-fashioned.

13. Speak forth for ever with thy voice to praise the Lord of prayer¹, Agni, who is like a friend², the bright one.

14. Fashion a hymn in thy mouth! Expand like the cloud¹! Sing a song of praise.

15. Worship the host of the Maruts, the terrible, the glorious, the musical¹. May they be magnified here among us².

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to *Kaṁva*, the son of *Ghora*. The metre is *Gâyatrî* throughout. Several verses, however, end in a spondee instead of the usual iambus. No attempt should be made to improve such verses by conjecture, for they are clearly meant to end in spondees. Thus in verses 2, 7, 8, and 9, all the three *pâdas* alike have their final spondee. In verse 7, the *ionicus a minore* is with an evident intention repeated thrice. No verse of the hymn occurs in *SV.*, *VS.*, *AV.*; but verse 8 = *TS.* III, 1, 11, 5; verse 9 = *TS.* II, 4, 8, 1.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Kadha-priya* is taken in the *Padapāṭha* as one word, and *Sâyana* explains it by delighted by or delighting in praise, a nominative plural. A similar compound, *kadha-priya*, occurs in I, 30, 20, and there too the vocative sing. fem., *kadhapriye*, is explained by *Sâyana* as fond of praise. In order to obtain this meaning, *kadha* has to be identified with *kathâ*, story, which is simply impossible. There is another compound, *adha-priyâ*, nom. dual, which occurs VIII, 8, 4, and which *Sâyana* explains either as delighted here below, or as a corruption of *kadha-priyâ*.

In *Boehtlingk* and *Roth's Dictionary*, *kadha-priya* and *kadha-prî* are both taken as compounds of *kadha*, an interrogative adverb, and *priya* or *prî*, to love or delight, and they are explained as meaning kind or loving to whom? In the same manner *adha-priya* is explained as kind then and there.

It must be confessed, however, that a compound like *kadha-prî*, kind to whom?, is somewhat strange, and it seems preferable to separate the words, and to write *kâdha priyâ* and *âdha priyâ*.

It should be observed that the compounds *kadha-prî* and *kadha-priya* occur always in sentences where there is another interrogative pronoun. The two interrogatives *kât*—*kâdha*, what—where, and *kâs*—*kâdha*, who—where, occurring in the same sentence, an idiom so common in

Greek, may have puzzled the author of the Pada text, and the compound being once sanctioned by the authority of Sākalya, Sāyana would explain it as best he could. But if we admit the double use of the interrogative in Sanskrit, as in Greek, then, in our passage, *priyāk* would be an adjective belonging to *pitā*, and we might translate: 'What then now? When will you take (us), as a dear father takes his son by both hands, O ye Maruts?' In the same manner we ought to translate I, 30, 20:

kāk te *ushāk* *kādha* *priye* *bhugé* *márta* *amartye*.

Who and where was there a mortal to be loved by thee, O beloved, immortal Dawn?

In VIII, 7, 31, where the same words are repeated as in our passage, it is likewise better to write:

kát ha *nūnám* *kādha* *priyāk* *yát* *índram* *ágahātana*, *kāk* *va* *sakhi-tvé* *ohate*.

What then now? Where is there a friend, now that you have forsaken Indra? Who watches for your friendship?

Why in VIII, 8, 4, *adha* *priyā* should have been joined into one word is more difficult to say, yet here, too, the compound might easily be separated.

Kādha does not occur again, but would be formed in analogy with *ádha*. It occurs in Zend as *kadha*.

Kuhn, *Beiträge* IV, p. 186, has shown that *kūshthak* (RV. V, 74, 1) is a similar monster, and stands for *ku shthak*.

The words *kát* ha *nūnám* commonly introduce an interrogative sentence, literally, What then now? cf. X, 10, 4.

Note 2. *Vrikta*-barhis is generally a name of the priest, so called because he has to trim the sacrificial grass. 'The sacred Kusa grass (*Poa cynosuroides*), after having had the roots cut off, is spread on the Vedi or altar, and upon it the libation of Soma-juice, or oblation of clarified butter, is poured out. In other places, a tuft of it in a similar position is supposed to form a fitting seat for the deity or deities invoked to the sacrifice. According to Mr. Stevenson, it is also strewn over the floor of the chamber in which the worship is performed.'

Cf. VI, 11, 5. *vriṅgé* ha *yát* *námasā* *barhík* *agnau*, *áyāmi* *srúk* *ghritá-vatī* *su-vrīktík*.

When I reverentially trim the truss for Agni, when the well-trimmed ladle, full of butter, is stretched forth.

In our passage, unless we change the accent, it must be taken as an epithet of the Maruts, they for whom the grass-altar has been prepared. They are again invoked by the same name, VIII, 7, 20 :

kvā nūnām su-dānavaḥ mādatha vṛikta-barhishaḥ.

Where do ye rejoice now, you gods for whom the altar is trimmed?

Otherwise, *vṛikta-barhishaḥ* might, with a change of accent, supply an accusative to *dadhidhve*: 'Will you take the worshippers in your arms?' This, though decidedly better, is not absolutely necessary, because to take by the hand may be used as a neuter verb.

WILSON: Maruts, who are fond of praise, and for whom the sacred grass is trimmed, when will you take us by both hands as a father does his son?

BENFEY: Wo weilt ihr gern? was habt ihr jetzt—gleichwie ein Vater seinen Sohn—in Händen, da das Opfer harrt?

Verse 2.

Note 1. The idea of the first verse, that the Maruts should not be detained by other pursuits, is carried on in the second. The poet asks, what they have to do in the sky, instead of coming down to the earth. The last sentence seems to mean 'where tarry your herds?' viz. the clouds. *Sâyana* translates: 'Where do worshippers, like lowing cows, praise you?' Wilson: 'Where do they who worship you cry to you, like cattle?' Benfey: 'Wo jauchzt man euch, gleich wie Stiere? (Ihre Verehrer brüllen vor Freude über ihre Gegenwart, wie Stiere.)' The verb *ranyati*, however, when followed by an accusative, means to love, to accept with pleasure. The gods accept the offerings and the prayers:

V, 18, 1. *visvāni yāḥ āmartyaḥ havyā mārteshu ranyati.*

The immortal who deigns to accept all offerings among mortals.

V, 74, 3. *kāśya brāhmāni ranyathaḥ.*

Whose prayers do ye accept?

Followed by a locative *raṇyati* means to delight in. Both the gods are said to delight in prayers (VIII, 12, 18; 33, 16), and prayers are said to delight in the gods (VIII, 16, 2). I therefore take *raṇyanti* in the sense of tarrying, disporting, and ná, if it is to be retained, in the sense of not; where do they not sport? meaning that they are to be found everywhere, except where the poet desires them to be. We thus get rid of the simile of singing poets and lowing cows, which, though not too bold for Vedic bards, would here come in too abruptly. It would be much better, however, if the negative particle could be omitted altogether. If we retain it, we must read: kvā váh | gāvāh | na rán | yantí | . But the fact is that through the whole of the Rig-veda kvā has always to be pronounced as two syllables, kuva. There is only one passage, V, 61, 2, where, before a vowel, we have to read kva: kuva vo 'svāh, kvābhisavaḥ. In other passages, even before vowels, we always have to read kuva, e.g. I, 161, 4. kuvet=kva it; I, 105, 4. kuvartam=kva rītam. In I, 35, 7, we must read either kuvedānīm sūryaḥ, making sūryaḥ trisyllabic, or kuva idānīm, leaving a hiatus. In I, 168, 6, kvāvaram is kuvāvaram: Sākalya, forgetting this, and wishing to improve the metre, added na, thereby, in reality, destroying both the metre and the sense. Kva occurs as dissyllabic in the Rig-veda at least forty-one times.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The meanings of sumná in the first five *Mandalas* are well explained by Professor Aufrecht in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. iv, p. 274. As to suvitā in the plural, see X, 86, 21, and VIII, 93, 29, where Indra is said to bring all suvitas. It frequently occurs in the singular:

X, 148, 1. ā naḥ bhara suvitām yāsya kākān.

Verse 4.

Note 1. One might translate: 'If you, sons of *Prisni*, were mortals, the immortal would be your worshipper.' But this seems almost too deep and elaborate a compliment for a primitive age. Langlois translates: 'Quand vous ne

seriez pas immortels, (faites toutefois) que votre panégyriste jouisse d'une longue vie.' Wilson's translation is obscure : 'That you, sons of *Prisni*, may become mortals, and your panegyrist become immortal.' Sâyana translates : 'Though you, sons of *Prisni*, were mortal, yet your worshipper would be immortal.' Ludwig has, 'Wenn ihr, o kinder der *Prisni*, sterbliche wäret, der unsterbliche wäre euer sänger dann. Nicht werde euch unlieb der sänger, wie ein wildes tier auf der weide, nicht des Yama Pfad betrete er.' I think it best to connect the fourth and fifth verses, and I feel justified in so doing by other passages where the same or a similar idea is expressed, viz. that if the god were the poet and the poet the god, then the poet would be more liberal to the god than the god is to him. Whether syât should have the udâtta, I cannot tell. Thus I translated a passage, VII, 32, 18, in my History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 545 : 'If I were lord of as much as thou, I should support the sacred bard, thou scatterer of wealth, I should not abandon him to misery. I should award wealth day by day to him who magnifies, I should award it to whosoever it be.' Another parallel passage is pointed out by Mr. J. Muir, (On the Interpretation of the Veda, p. 79 ; see also Sanskrit Texts, V, 303.) VIII, 19, 25 : 'If, Agni, thou wert a mortal, and I were an immortal, I should not abandon thee to malediction or to wretchedness ; my worshipper should not be miserable or distressed.' Still more to the point is another passage, VIII, 44, 23 : 'If I were thou, and thou wert I, then thy wishes should be fulfilled.' See also VIII, 14, 1, 2.

As to the metre it is clear that we ought to read *martāsaḥ syātāna*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Mā*, though it seems to stand for *nā*, retains its prohibitive sense.

Note 2. *Yávasa* is explained by Sâyana as grass, and Wilson's Dictionary, too, gives to it the meaning of meadow or pasture grass, whereas *yava* is barley. The Greek *ζῆα* or *ζεία* is likewise explained as barley or rye, fodder for horses. See I, 91, 13. *gāvaḥ ná yāvaseshu*, like cows in meadows.

Note 3. The path of Yama can only be the path first followed by Yama, or that leads to Yama, as the ruler of the departed.

X, 14, 8. sám gakkhasva pitṛī-bhiḥ sám yaména.

Meet with the fathers, meet with Yama (X, 14, 10; 15, 8).

X, 14, 7. yamám paryâsi várūnam ka devám.

Thou wilt see (there) Yama and the divine Varuna.

X, 165, 4. tásmāi yamāya námaḥ astu mrityáve.

Adoration to that Yama, to Death!

WILSON: Never may your worshipper be indifferent to you, as a deer (is never indifferent) to pasture, so that he may not tread the path of Yama.

BENFEY: Wer euch besingt, der sei euch nicht gleichgültig, wie das Wild im Gras, nicht wandl' er auf des Yama Pfad.

Āgoshya is translated insatiable by Professor Goldstücker.

Verse 6.

Note 1. One of the meanings of *nīrrīti* is sin. It is derived from the same root which yielded *ritá*, in the sense of right. *Nīrrīti* was conceived, it would seem, as going away from the path of right, the German *Vergehen*. *Nīrrīti* was personified as a power of evil and destruction.

VII, 104, 9. áhaye vā tñ pra-dádātu sómaḥ ā vā dadhātu *nīh-riteh* upá-sthe.

May Soma hand them over to Ahi, or place them in the lap of *Nīrrīti*.

I, 117, 5. susupvāmsam ná *nīh-riteh* upá-sthe.

Like one who sleeps in the lap of *Nīrrīti*.

Here Sāyana explains *Nīrrīti* as earth, and he attaches the same meaning to the word in other places which will have to be considered hereafter. Cf. Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series, p. 562.

Wilson treats *Nīrrīti* as a male deity, and translates the last words, 'let him perish with our evil desires.'

Note 2. *Padīshṭá* is formed as an optative of the *Ātmanepada*, but with the additional *s* before the *t*, which, in the ordinary Sanskrit, is restricted to the so-called benedictive (Grammar, § 385; Bopp, *Kritische Grammatik*, ed. 1834,

§ 329, note). Pad means originally to go. Thus RV. IX, 73, 9, átra kartám áva padâti áprabhuḥ, may the impotent go down into the pit. In certain constructions it gradually assumed the meaning of to perish, and native commentators are inclined to explain it by pat, to fall. One can watch the transition of meaning from going into perishing in such phrases as VS. XI, 46, mâ pâdy áyushaḥ purâ, literally, 'may he not go before the time,' but really intended for 'may he not die before the time.' In the Rig-veda padîshṭá is generally qualified by some words to show that it is to be taken in malam partem. Thus in our passage, and in III, 53, 21; VII, 104, 16; 17. In I, 79, 11, however, padîshṭá sáḥ is by itself used in a maledictory sense, pereat, may he perish! In another, VI, 20, 5, pâdi by itself conveys the idea of perishing. This may have some weight in determining the origin of the Latin pestis (Corssen, Kritische Beiträge, p. 396), for it shows that, even without prepositions, such as á or vi, pad may have an ill-omened meaning. In the Aitareya-bráhmaṇa VII, 14 (History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 471), pad, as applied to a child's teeth, means to go, to fall out. With sam, however, pad has always a good meaning, and this shows that originally its meaning was neutral. Another translation, suggested by Ludwig, might be: 'Let not one dreadful Nirṛiti (sin) after another strike us.'

Verse 7.

Note 1. The only difficult word is avâtām. Sâyana explains it, 'without wind.' But it is hardly possible to understand how the Maruts, themselves the gods of the storm, the sons of Rudra, could be said to bring clouds without wind. Langlois, it is true, translates without any misgivings: 'Ces dieux peuvent sur un sol desséché faire tomber la pluie sans l'accompagner de vent.' Wilson: 'They send down rain without wind upon the desert.' Benfey saw the incongruous character of the epithet, and explained it away by saying that the winds bring rain, and after they have brought it, they moderate their violence in order not to drive it away again; hence rain without wind. Yet even

this explanation, though ingenious, and, as I am told, particularly truthful in an eastern climate, is somewhat too artificial. If we changed the accent, *ávâtâm*, unchecked, unconquered, would be better than *avâtām*, windless. But *ávâta*, unconquered, does not occur in the Rig-veda, except as applied to persons. It occurs most frequently in the phrase *vanván ávâtáḥ*, which *Sâyana* explains well by *himsan ahimsitáḥ*, hurting, but not hurt: (VI, 16, 20; 18, 1; IX, 89, 7.) In IX, 96, 8, we read *prít-sú vanván ávâtáḥ*, in battles attacking, but not attacked, which renders the meaning of *ávâta* perfectly clear. In VI, 64, 5, where it is applied to Ushas, it may be translated by unconquerable, intact.

There are several passages, however, where *avâta* occurs with the accent on the last syllable, and where it is accordingly explained as a *Bahuvrihi*, meaning either windless or motionless, from *vâta*, wind, or from *vâta*, going (I, 62, 10). In some of these passages we can hardly doubt that the accent ought to be changed, and that we ought to read *ávâta*. Thus in VI, 64, 4, *avâte* is clearly a vocative applied to Ushas, who is called *ávâtâ*, unconquerable, in the verse immediately following. In I, 52, 4, the Maruts are called *avâtáḥ*, which can only be *ávâtáḥ*, unconquerable; nor can we hesitate in VIII, 79, 7, to change *avâtáḥ* into *ávâtáḥ*, as an epithet applied to Soma, and preceded by *ádriptakratuḥ*, of unimpaired strength, unconquerable.

But even then we find no evidence that *ávâta*, unconquered, could be applied to rain or to a cloud, and I therefore propose another explanation, though equally founded on the supposition that the accent of *avâtâm* in our passage should be on the first syllable.

I take *vâta* as a Vedic form instead of the later *vâna*, the past participle of *vai*, to wither. Similarly we find in the Veda *gîta*, instead of *gîna*, the latter form being sanctioned by *Pāṇini*. *Vâ* means to get dry, to flag, to get exhausted; *ávâta* therefore, as applied to a cloud, would mean not dry, not withered, as applied to rain, not dried up, but remaining on the ground. It is important to remark that in one passage, VI, 67, 7, *Sâyana*, too, explains *ávâta*, as applied to rivers, by *asushka*, not dry; and the same meaning would

be applicable to *avâtām* in I, 62, 10. In this sense of not withered, not dry, *avâtām* in our passage would form a perfectly appropriate epithet of the rain, while neither windless nor unconquered would yield an appropriate sense. In the famous passage, X, 129, 2, *ānīt avâtām svadháyâ tát ékam*, that only One breathed breathless by itself, *avâtām* might be taken, in accordance with its accent, as windless or breathless, and the poet may have wished to give this antithetical point to his verse. But *avâtām*, as an adverb, would here be equally appropriate, and we should then have to translate, 'that only One breathed freely by itself.' Ludwig translates, 'Als treue die blendenden, die stürmenden Rudriya auf öder fläche sogar, als brunnen die wolke schaffen.' This presupposes the conjectural reading *ava-tām*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The peculiar structure of the metre in the seventh and eighth verses should be noted. Though we may scan

-----*u**ú*--- | ---*u*---*ú*--- | *u*-----*u**ú*--- |
 ---*u*---*ú*--- | ---*u*---*ú*--- | *u*-----*u**ú*---

by throwing the accent on the short antepenultimate, yet the movement of the metre becomes far more natural by throwing the accent on the long penultimate, thus reading

---*ú*---*ú**u**ú*--- | ---*ú**u**ú**u**ú*--- | *u**ú*---*ú**u**ú*---
 ---*ú**u**ú*---*u**ú*--- | ---*ú**u**ú*---*u*--- | *u**ú*---*ú**u**ú*---

SÂYANA : Like a cow the lightning roars, (the lightning) attends (on the Maruts) as the mother cow on her calf, because their rain is let loose at the time of lightning and thunder.

WILSON : The lightning roars like a parent cow that bellows for its calf, and hence the rain is set free by the Maruts.

BENFEY : Es blitzt—wie eine Kuh brüllt es—die Mutter folgt dem Kalb gleichsam—wenn ihr Regen losgelassen. (Der Donner folgt dem Blitz, wie eine Kuh ihrem Kalbe.)

Vāsrā as a masculine means a bull, and it is used as a name of the Maruts in some passages, VIII, 7, 3 ; 7. As

a feminine it means a cow, particularly a cow with a calf, a milch cow. Hence also a mother, X, 119, 4. The lowing of the lightning must be intended for the distant thunder, and the idea that the lightning goes near or looks for the rain is not foreign to the Vedic poets. See I, 39, 9: 'Come to us, Maruts, with your entire help, as lightnings (come to, i. e. seek for) the rain!'

Verse 9.

Note 1. That *pargánya* here and in other places means cloud has been well illustrated by Dr. Bühler, *Orient und Occident*, vol. i, p. 221. It is interesting to watch the personifying process which is very palpable in this word, and by which *Parganya* becomes at last a friend and companion of Indra. See now, 'India, what can it teach us?' p. 183 seq.

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Sádma*, as a neuter, means originally a seat, and is frequently used in the sense of altar: IV, 9, 3. *sáh sádma pári niyate hótâ*; VII, 18, 22. *hótâ-iva sádma pári emi rébhan*. It soon, however, assumed the more general meaning of place, as

X, 1, 1. *agnih bhânúnâ rúsatâ vísvâ sádmâni aprâh*.

Agni with brilliant light thou filledst all places.

It is lastly used with special reference to heaven and earth, the two *sádmanî*, I, 185, 6; III, 55, 2. In our passage *sádma pârthivam* is the same as *pârthive sádane* in VIII, 97, 5. Here the earth is mentioned together with heaven, the sea, and the sky. *Sâyana* takes *sádma* as 'dwelling,' so do Wilson and Langlois. Benfey translates 'der Erde Sitz,' and makes it the subject of the sentence, which may be right: 'From the roaring of the Maruts the seat of the earth trembles, and all men tremble.' *Sadman*, with the accent on the last syllable, is also used as a masculine in the *Rig-veda*, I, 173, 1; VI, 51, 12. *sadmānam divyām*.

Verse 11.

Note 1. I have translated *vi/ṇu-pāṇibhiḥ*, as if it were *vi/ṇupāṇibhiḥ*, for this is the right accent of a *Bahuvrīhi*

compound. Thus the first member retains its own accent in *prithú-pāni*, *bhūri-pāni*, *vṛsha-pāni*, &c. It is possible that the accent may have been changed in our passage, because the compound is used, not as an adjective, but as a kind of substantive, as the name of a horse. *Pāni*, hand, means, as applied to horses, hoof :

II, 31, 2. *prithivyāḥ sánau gághananta pāni-bhiḥ*.

When they strike with their hoofs on the summit of the earth.

This meaning appears still more clearly in such compounds as *dravát-pāni* :

VIII, 5, 35. *hiranyáyena ráthena dravátpāni-bhiḥ ásvaiḥ*.

On a golden chariot, on quick-hoofed horses.

The horses of the Maruts, which in our verse are called *vīu-pāni*, strong-hoofed, are called VIII, 7, 27. *híraya-pāni*, golden-hoofed :

ásvaiḥ hírayapāni-bhiḥ dévásaḥ úpa gantana.

On your golden-hoofed horses come hither, O gods.

Those who retain the accent of the MSS. ought to translate, 'Maruts, with your strong hands go after the clouds.'

Note 2. *Ródhasvatī* is explained by *Sâyana* as river. It does not occur again in the *Rig-veda*. *Ródhas* is enclosure or fence, the bank of a river ; but it does not follow that *ródhasvat*, having enclosures or banks, was applicable to rivers only. II, 15, 8, it is said that he emptied or opened the artificial enclosures of Bala, these being the clouds conquered by Indra. Hence I take *ródhasvatī* in the sense of a cloud yet unopened, which is followed or driven on by the Maruts.

Kitrá, bright or many-coloured, is applied to the clouds, V, 63, 3. *kitrébhiḥ abhráḥ*.

Note 3. Roth and Ludwig take *ákhidrayāman* for a name of horse, which seems right. The word does not occur again in the *Rig-veda*.

WILSON: Maruts, with strong hands, come along the beautifully-embanked rivers with unobstructed progress.

BENFEY: Mit euren starken Händen folgt den hehren eingeschlossnen nach in unermüd'tem Gang, Maruts.

Verse 12.

Note 1. Abhîsu, rein, does not mean finger in the Rig-veda, though Sâyana frequently explains it so, misled by Yâska, who gives abhîsu among the names of finger. Wilson: 'May your fingers be well skilled (to hold the reins).'

Verse 13.

Note 1. Agni is frequently invoked together with the Maruts, and is even called marût-sakhâ, the friend of the Maruts, VIII, 92, 14. It seems better, therefore, to refer brâhmanas pátim to Agni, than, with Sâyana, to the host of the Maruts (marúdganam). Brâhmanaspáti and Br̥has-páti are both varieties of Agni, the priest and purohita of gods and men, and as such he is invoked together with the Maruts in other passages, I, 40, 1. Tánâ is an adverb, meaning constantly, always, for ever. Cf. II, 2, 1; VIII, 40, 7.

WILSON: Declare in our presence (priests), with voice attuned to praise Brahmanaspati, Agni, and the beautiful Mitra.

BENFEY: Lass schallen immerfort das Lied zu grüssen Brahmanaspati, Agni, Mitra, den herrlichen.

Note 2. Mitra is never, as far as I know, invoked together with the Maruts, and it is better to take mitráam as friend. Besides ná cannot be left here untranslated. Ludwig translates, 'beautiful like Mitra,' that is, bright like the sun.

Verse 14.

Note 1. The second sentence is obscure. Sâyana translates: 'Let the choir of priests make a hymn of praise, let them utter or expand it, like as a cloud sends forth rain.' Wilson similarly: 'Utter the verse that is in your mouth, spread it out like a cloud spreading rain.' Benfey: 'Ein Preislied schaffe in dem Mund, ertöne dem Parganya gleich.' He takes Parganya for the god of thunder, and supposes the hymn of praise to be compared to it on account of its loudness. Tatanañ can only be the second person singular of the conjunctive of the reduplicated perfect, of which we

have also tatánat, tatánâma, tatánan, and tatánanta. *Tatana* can be addressed either to the host of the Maruts, or to the poet. I take it in the latter sense, for a similar verse occurs VIII, 21, 18. It is said there of a patron that he alone is a king, that all others about the river Sarasvatî are only small kings, and the poet adds: 'May he spread like a cloud with the rain,' giving hundreds and thousands (*par-gányah-iva tatánat hí vṛishṭyā*). Ludwig takes *tan* in the sense of thundering; thunder like *Parganya*!

Verse 15.

Note 1. It is difficult to find an appropriate rendering for *arkín*. It means praising, celebrating, singing, and it is in the last sense only that it is applicable to the Maruts. Wilson translates, 'entitled to adoration'; Benfey, 'flaming.' Boehtlingk and Roth admit the sense of flaming in one passage, but give to *arkín* in this place the meaning of praising. If it simply meant, possessed of *arká*, i. e. songs of praise, it would be a very lame epithet after *panasyú*. But other passages, like I, 19, 4; 52, 15, show that the conception of the Maruts as singers was most familiar to the Vedic *Rishis* (I, 64, 10; Kuhn, *Zeitschrift*, vol. i, p. 521, note); and *arká* is the very name applied to their songs (I, 19, 4). In the Edda, too, 'storm and thunder are represented as a lay, as the wondrous music of the wild hunt. The dwarfs and Elbs sing the so-called *Alb-leich* which carries off everything, trees and mountains.' See Justí in *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 62; Genthe, *Windgottheiten*, p. 4; 11. There is no doubt therefore that *arkín* here means musician, and that the *arká* of the Maruts is the music of the winds.

Note 2. *Vṛiddhá*, literally grown, is used in the Veda as an honorific epithet, with the meaning of mighty, great, or magnified:

III, 32, 7. *yágâma* it námasâ *vṛiddhám* *índram*
bṛihántam *rishvám* *agáram* *yúvânam*.

We worship with praise the mighty Indra, the great, the exalted, the immortal, the vigorous.

Here neither is *vṛiddhá* intended to express old age,

nor yúvan young age, but both are meant as laudatory epithets. See Darmesteter, Ormazd et Ahriman, p. 91 seq.

Asan is the so-called *Let* of as, to be. This *Let* is properly an imperative, which gradually sinks down to a mere subjunctive, and is generally called so. Of as, we find the following *Let* forms: belonging to the present, we have *ásasi*, II, 26, 2; *ásati*, VI, 23, 9; *ásathaḥ*, VI, 63, 1; and *ásatha*, V, 61, 4: belonging to the imperfect, *ásaḥ*, VIII, 100, 2; *ásat*, I, 9, 5; *ásâma*, I, 173, 9; *ásan*, I, 89, 1. *Ásam*, a form quoted by Roth from Rig-veda X, 27, 4, is really *ásam*.

We find, for instance, *ásaḥ*, with an imperative or optative meaning, in

VIII, 100, 2. *ásaḥ ka tvám dakshinatáḥ sákhâ me
ádha vritráṇi gaṅghanâva bhûri.*

And be thou my friend on my right hand, and we shall kill many enemies.

Here we see the transition of meaning from an imperative to the conditional. In English, too, we may say, 'Do this and you shall live,' which means nearly the same as, 'If you do this, you will live.' Thus we may translate this passage: 'And if thou be my friend on my right side, then we shall kill many enemies.'

X, 124, 1. *imám naḥ agne úpa yagñám â ihi—
ásaḥ havya-vât utá naḥ purah-gâḥ.*

Here we have the imperative *ihi* and the *Let* *ásaḥ* used in the same sense.

Far more frequently, however, *ásaḥ* is used in relative sentences, such as,

VI, 36, 5. *ásaḥ yáthâ naḥ sávasâ kakánâḥ.*

That thou mayest be ours, delighting in strength.

VII, 24, 1. *ásaḥ yáthâ naḥ avitâ vridhé ka.*

That thou mayest be our helper and for our increase.

See also X, 44, 4; 85, 26; 36.

WILSON: May they be exalted by this our worship.

BENFEY: Mögen die Hohen hier bei uns sein.

MANDALA I, HYMN 39.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 18-19.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. When you thus from afar cast forwards your measure¹, like a blast of fire, through whose wisdom is it, through whose design²? To whom do you go, to whom, ye shakers (of the earth)?

2. May your weapons be firm to attack, strong also to withstand. May yours be the more glorious power, nor that of the deceitful mortal.

3. When you overthrow what is firm, O ye men, and whirl about what is heavy, you pass¹ through the trees of the earth, through the clefts of the rocks².

4. No real foe of yours is known in heaven, nor on earth, ye devourers of foes! May power be yours, together with your race¹! O Rudras, can it be defied²?

5. They make the rocks tremble, they tear asunder the kings of the forest¹. Come on, Maruts, like madmen, ye gods, with your whole tribe.

6. You have harnessed the spotted deer to your chariots, a red one draws as leader¹; even the earth listened² at your approach, and men were frightened,

7. O Rudras, we quickly desire your help for our race. Come now to us with help, as of yore; thus now for the sake of the frightened *Kaṇva*¹.

8. Whatever fiend, roused by you or roused by men, attacks us, deprive him of power, of strength, and of your favours¹.

9. For you, chasing and wise Maruts, have wholly

protected¹ Kanva. Come to us, Maruts, with your whole favours, as lightnings² (go in quest of) the rain.

10. Bounteous givers, you carry whole strength, whole power, ye shakers (of the world). Send, O Maruts, against the wrathful enemy of the poets an enemy, like an arrow¹.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to *Kaṁva*, the son of *Ghora*. The metre varies between *Bṛihatī* and *Satobṛihatī*, the odd verses being composed in the former, the even verses in the latter metre. Each couple of such verses is called a *Bārḥata Pragātha*. The *Bṛihatī* consists of 8+8+12+8, the *Satobṛihatī* of 12+8+12+8 syllables. No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV.; verse 5=TB. II, 4, 4, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Māna*, which I translate by measure, is explained by *Sāyana* as meaning strength. Wilson: 'When you direct your awful vigour downwards from afar, as light (descends from heaven).' Benfey: 'Wenn ihr aus weiter Ferne so wie Strahlen schleudert euren Stolz (das worauf ihr stolz seid: euren Blitz).' Langlois: 'Lorsque vous lancez votre souffle puissant.' I doubt whether *māna* is ever used in the *Rig-veda* in the sense of pride, which no doubt it has, as a masculine, in later Sanskrit: cf. *Halāyudha*, ed. Aufrecht, iv, 37. *Māna*, as a masculine, means frequently a poet in the *Rig-veda*, viz. a measurer, a thinker or maker; as a neuter it means a measure, or what is measured or made. Thus V, 85, 5, we read:

mānena-iva tasthi-vān antárikṣhe ví yáḥ mamé prithivīm sūryena.

He (*Varuṇa*) who standing in the welkin has measured the earth with the sun, as with a measure.

In this passage, as well as in ours, we must take measure, not in the abstract sense, but as a measuring line, which is cast forward to measure the distance of an object,—a simile, perfectly applicable to the *Maruts*, who seem with their weapons to strike the trees and mountains when they themselves are still far off. Another explanation might be given, if *māna* could be taken in the sense of measure, i. e. shape or form, but this is doubtful.

Note 2. Várpas, which has generally been translated by body or form, is here explained by praise. Benfey puts Werk (i.e. Gesang, Gebet); Langlois, maison. Várpas, which, without much reason, has been compared to Latin corpus, must here be taken in a more general sense. Thus VI, 44, 14, asyá máde purú várpāmsi vidvān, is applied to Indra as knowing many schemes, many thoughts, many things, when he is inspired by the Soma-juice; see I, 19, 5.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Benfey takes ví yāthana in a causative sense, you destroy, you cause the trees to go asunder. But even without assigning to yā a causative meaning, to go through, to pierce, would convey the idea of destruction. In some passages, however, vi-yā is certainly used in the simple sense of passing through, without involving the idea of destruction:

VIII, 73, 13. ráthaḥ viyāti ródasi (iti).

Your chariot which passes through or between heaven and earth.

In other passages the mere passing across implies conquest and destruction:

I, 116, 20. vi-bhindúnā . . . ráthena ví párvatān . . . ayātam.

On your dissevering chariot you went across, or, you rent, the mountains (the clouds).

In other passages, however, a causative meaning seems equally, and even more applicable:

VIII, 7, 23. ví vṛitrám parva-sáḥ yayuḥ ví párvatān.

They passed through Vṛitra piecemeal, they passed through the mountains (the clouds); or, they destroyed Vṛitra, cutting him to pieces, they destroyed the clouds.

Likewise I, 86, 10. ví yāta vīsvam atrīnam.

Walk athwart every evil spirit, or destroy every evil spirit! See before, I, 19, 7; 37, 7.

We must scan ví yāthana vanināḥ prīthivyāḥ.

Note 2. It might seem preferable to translate āsāḥ párvatānām by the spaces of the clouds, for párvata means clouds in many places. Yet here, and still more clearly in verse 5, where párvata occurs again, the object of the poet

is to show the strength of the Maruts. In that case the mere shaking or bursting of the clouds would sound very tame by the side of the shaking and breaking of the forest trees. Vedic poets do not shrink from the conception that the Maruts shake even mountains, and Indra is even said to have cut off the mountain tops : IV, 19, 4. *áva abhinat kakú-bhaḥ párvatânām*. In the later literature, too, the same idea occurs : Mahābh. Vana-parva, ver. 10974, *dyauḥ svit patati kim bhūmir dīryate parvato nu kim*, does the sky fall? is the earth torn asunder, or the mountain?

Verse 4.

Note 1. Sāyana was evidently without an authoritative explanation of *tánā yugā*. He tries to explain it by 'through the union of you may strength to resist be quickly extended.' Wilson : 'May your collective strength be quickly exerted.' Benfey takes *tánā* as adverb and leaves out *yugā* : 'Zu allen Zeiten, O Furchtbare!—sei im Nu zu überwält'gen euch die Macht.' *Yugā*, an instrumental, if used together with another instrumental, becomes in the Veda a mere preposition : cf. VII, 43, 5; 95, 4. *rāyā yugā*; X, 83, 3. *tápasā yugā*; X, 102, 12. *vádhriṇā yugā*; VII, 32, 20. *púram-dhyā yugā*; VI, 56, 2. *sákhyā yugā*; VIII, 68, 9. *tvā yugā*. As to the meaning of *tán*, see B. R. s. v., where *tán* in our passage is explained as continuation. The offspring or race of the Maruts is mentioned again in the next verse.

Note 2. I take *nú kit á-dhr̥she* as an abrupt interrogative sentence, viz. Can it be defied? Can it be resisted? See V, 87, 2 :

tát vaḥ marutaḥ ná á-dhr̥she sávaḥ.

Your strength, O Maruts, is not to be defied.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Large trees of the forest are called the kings or lords of the forest. Instead of *pró ārata*, the Taitt. Br. II, 4, 4, 2, reads *pró varata*, which Sāyana explains by *pro, prakarsheṇa, avārata dhāvata*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Práshñi* is explained by *Sâyana* as a sort of yoke in the middle, when three horses or other animals are harnessed to a car; *róhita* as a kind of red deer. Hence Wilson remarks that the sense may be, 'The red deer yoked between them aids to drag the car.' But he adds that the construction of the original is obscure, and apparently rude and ungrammatical. Benfey translates, 'Sie führt ein flammenrothes Joch,' and remarks against Wilson that *Sâyana*'s definition of *práshñi* as yoke is right, but that of *róhita* as deer, wrong. If *Sâyana*'s authority is to be invoked at all, one might appeal from *Sâyana* in this place to *Sâyana* VIII, 7, 28, where *práshñi* is explained by him either by quick or by *pramukhe yugyamānaḥ*, harnessed in front. The verse is

yát eshām *prishatīḥ* ráthe *práshñīḥ* váhati *róhitaḥ*.

When the red leader draws or leads their spotted deer in the chariot.

VI, 47, 24. *práshñīḥ* is explained as tripada *ādhāraḥ*; *tadvad vahantīti prashñayo=svāḥ*. In I, 100, 17, *práshñibhiḥ*, as applied to men, means friends or supporters, or, as *Sâyana* explains, *pārsvasthair anyair rishibhiḥ*.

Ludwig (IV, ad 25, 8) adds some useful information. He quotes from the comm. on Taitt. S. I, 7, 8; *vāmadakshinayor asvayor madhya ishādvayam prasārya tayor madhye saptyākhyagātivisheshopetam asvam yuñgyāt*. The right horse is said to be the *arvā*, the left *vāgī*, the middle *saptīḥ*. *Lātyāyana* II, 7, 23, calls the two side-horses *prashñi*. According to *Sâyana* (Taitt. S. I, 7, 8, p. 1024) *prashñi* means originally a tripod for holding a pot (see above), and afterwards a chariot with three horses. In that case we should have to translate, the red chariot moves along.

Note 2. Aufrecht derives *asrot* from *sru*, to shake, without necessity, however; see Muir's Sanskrit Texts, IV, p. 494.

Ludwig also remarks that *asrot* might be translated by the earth trembled or vibrated. Similar passages occur RV. I, 127, 3. *vílú kīṭ yásya sám-ritau srúvat vánā-iva yát sthirám*, at whose approach even what is firm and strong

will shake, like the forests. Roth translates, the earth yielded, got out of your way.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Kaṇva, the author of the hymn.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The abhva, fiend, or, as Benfey translates it very happily, Ungethüm, may have been sent by the Maruts themselves, or by some mortal. With reference to yushmé-shita it is said afterwards that the Maruts are to withdraw their help from him. I have adopted Wilson's and Ludwig's interpretation of vi yuyota, with the instrumental.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The verb dadá is the second pers. plur. of the perfect of dá, and is used here in the sense of to keep, to protect, as is well shown by B. and R. s. v. dá 4, base dad. Śāyana did not understand the word, and took it for an irregular imperative; yet he assigned to the verb the proper sense of to keep, instead of to give. Hence Wilson: 'Uphold the sacrificer Kaṇva.' Benfey, less correctly, 'Den Kaṇva gabt ihr,' as if Kaṇva had been the highest gift of the Maruts.

Note 2. The simile, as lightnings go to the rain, is not very telling. It may have been suggested by the idea that the lightnings run about to find the rain, or the tertium comparationis may simply be the quickness of lightning. Wilson: 'As the lightnings bring the rain.' Benfey: '(So schnell) gleichwie der Blitz zum Regen kömmt.' Lightning precedes the rain, and may therefore be represented as looking about for the rain. Ludwig proposes some bold conjectures. He would change káṇvam to raṇvam, and take the words from asāmibhiḥ to ganta as a parenthesis. He translates: 'For nothing imperfect, you highly to be revered Maruts, no, something delightful you gave—(with perfect aids, Maruts, come to us)—as lightnings give rain.'

Verse 10.

Note 1. Wilson: 'Let loose your anger.' Śāyana: 'Let loose a murderer who hates.'

Pari-manyú, which occurs but once in the Rig-veda, corresponds as nearly as possible to the Greek *περίθυμος*. Manyú, like *θυμός*, means courage, spirit, anger; and in the compound parimanyú, as in *περίθυμος*, the preposition pári seems to strengthen the simple notion of the word. That pári is used in that sense in later Sanskrit is well known; for instance, in parilaghu, perlevis, parikshâma, withered away: see Pott, *Etymologische Forschungen*, second edition, vol. i, p. 487. How pári, originally meaning round about, came to mean excessive, is difficult to explain with certainty. It may have been, because what surrounds exceeds, but it may also have been because what is done all around a thing is done thoroughly. See Curtius, *Grundzüge*, fifth edition, p. 274. Thus we find in the Veda, VIII, 75, 9, pári-dveshas, lit. one who hates all around, then a great hater:

mā naḥ . . . pári-dveshasaḥ amhatíḥ, ūrmíḥ ná nāvam ā vadhīt.

May the grasp of the violent hater strike us not, as the wave strikes a ship.

Again, pari-sprídh means literally one who strives round about, then an eager enemy, a rival (fem.):

IX, 53, 1. nudásva yāḥ pari-sprídhah.

Drive away those who are rivals.

Pari-krosá means originally one who shouts at one from every side, who abuses one roundly, then an angry reviler. This word, though not mentioned in B. R.'s Dictionary, occurs in

I, 29, 7. sárvam pari-krosám gahi.

Kill every reviler!

The same idea which is here expressed by pari-krosá, is in other places expressed by pari-ráp, lit. one who shouts round about, who defies on every side, a calumniator, an enemy, one who 'be-rattles.'

II, 23, 3. ā vi-bādhya pari-rápah.

Having struck down the enemies.

II, 23, 14. ví pari-rápah ardaya.

Destroy the enemies.

In the same way as the words meaning to hate, to

oppose, to attack, are strengthened by this preposition, which conveys the idea of round about, we also find words expressive of love strengthened by the same preposition. Thus from *prítāḥ*, loved, we have *pári-prītaḥ*, lit. loved all round, then loved very much: I, 190, 6. *pári-prītaḥ ná mitráḥ*; cf. X, 27, 12. We also find IX, 72, 1. *pari-prīyaḥ*, those who love fully or all around, which may mean great lovers, or surrounding friends.

In all these cases the intensifying power of *pári* arises from representing the action of the verb as taking place on every side, thoroughly, excessively; but in other cases, mentioned by Professor Pott, particularly where this preposition is joined to a noun which implies some definite limit, its magnifying power is no doubt due to the fact that what is around, is outside, and therefore beyond. Thus in Greek *περίμετρος* expresses the same idea as *ὑπέρμετρος* (loc. cit. p. 488), but I doubt whether *pári* ever occurs in that sense in Sanskrit compounds.

MANDALA I, HYMN 64.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 5, VARGA 6-8.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. For the manly host, the joyful, the wise, for the Maruts bring thou, O Nodhas¹, a pure offering². I prepare songs, like as a handy priest³, wise in his mind, prepares the water, mighty at sacrifices.

2. They are born, the tall bulls of Dyū¹ (heaven), the manly youths² of Rudra, the divine, the blameless, pure, and bright like suns; scattering rain-drops, full of terrible designs, like giants³.

3. The youthful Rudras, they who never grow old, the slayers of the demon¹, have grown irresistible like mountains. They throw down with their strength all beings, even the strongest, on earth and in heaven.

4. They deck themselves with glittering ornaments¹ for a marvellous show; on their chests they fastened gold (chains) for beauty²; the spears on their shoulders pound to pieces³; they were born together by themselves⁴, the men of Dyū.

5. They who confer power¹, the roarers², the devourers of foes, they made winds and lightnings by their powers. The shakers milk the heavenly udders (clouds), they sprinkle the earth all round with milk (rain).

6. The bounteous¹ Maruts pour forth² water, mighty at sacrifices, the fat milk (of the clouds). They seem to lead³ about the powerful horse, the cloud, to make it rain; they milk the thundering, unceasing spring⁴.

7. Mighty they are, powerful, of beautiful splendour, strong in themselves¹ like mountains, (yet) swiftly gliding along;—you chew up forests, like wild elephants², when you have assumed your powers among the red flames³.

8. Like lions they roar, the wise Maruts, they are handsome like gazelles¹, the all-knowing. By night² with their spotted deer (rain-clouds) and with their spears (lightnings) they rouse the companions together, they whose ire through strength is like the ire of serpents.

9. You who march in companies, the friends of man, heroes, whose ire through strength is like the ire of serpents¹, salute heaven and earth²! On the seats on your chariots, O Maruts, the lightning stands, visible like light³.

10. All-knowing, surrounded with wealth, endowed with powers, singers¹, men of endless prowess, armed with strong rings², they, the archers, have taken the arrow in their fists.

11. The Maruts who with the golden tires of their wheels increase the rain, stir up the clouds like wanderers on the road. They are brisk, indefatigable¹, they move by themselves; they throw down what is firm, the Maruts with their brilliant spears make (everything) to reel².

12. We invoke with prayer¹ the offspring of Rudra, the brisk, the pure, the worshipful², the active. Cling³ for happiness-sake to the strong company of the Maruts, the chasers of the sky⁴, the powerful, the impetuous⁵.

13. The mortal whom ye, Maruts, protected, he indeed surpasses people in strength through your protection. He carries off booty with his horses,

treasures with his men; he acquires honourable¹ wisdom, and he prospers².

14. Give, O Maruts, to our lords strength glorious, invincible in battle, brilliant, wealth-acquiring, praiseworthy, known to all men¹. Let us foster our kith and kin during a hundred winters.

15. Will¹ you then, O Maruts, grant unto us wealth, durable, rich in men, defying all onslaughts²?—wealth a hundred and a thousand-fold, always increasing?—May he who is rich in prayers³ (the host of the Maruts) come early and soon!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Nodhas, of the family of Gotama. No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV.; but verse 6=TS. III, I, 11, 7.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The first line is addressed by the poet to himself.

Note 2. *Suvṛikṭi* is generally explained by a hymn of praise, and it cannot be denied that in this place, as in most others, that meaning would be quite satisfactory. Etymologically, however, *suvṛikṭi* means the cleaning and trimming of the grass on which, as on a small altar, the oblation is offered: cf. *vṛikṭabarhis*, I, 38, 1, note 2, page 84. Hence, although the same word might be metaphorically applied to a carefully trimmed, pure, and holy hymn of praise, yet wherever in the Veda the primary meaning is applicable, it seems safer to retain it: cf. III, 61, 5; VI, 11, 5.

Prof. Roth, in the *Mélanges Asiatiques*, vii, p. 612, calls the derivation, which he himself discovered, a 'Columbus-Egg.' He derives *suvṛikṭi* from *su* + *vṛikṭi*, and translates it by excellent praise. He supports the insertion of *v*, by the analogy of *su-v-ita*, for *su-ita*. This derivation is certainly very ingenious, but there are some difficulties which have still to be accounted for. That the substantive *vṛikṭi* does not occur by itself would not be fatal, because other words in the Veda occur as *uttarapadas* only. But there is the compound *námovṛikṭi* in X, 131, 2, which shows that *vṛikṭi* existed as a substantive, though it is true that the *Vāgasaneyins* (X, 32) read *namaukti* instead. *Taitt. S. I*, 8, 21; *Taitt. Br. II*, 6, 1, 3; and *Ath. V. XX*, 125, 2, have all *namovṛikṭi*. There is also the compound *svāvṛikṭi* in RV. X, 21, 1. Are these to be separated from *su-vṛikṭi*, and ought we not to take into consideration also the *Zend hvarsta*, as pointed out by M. Darmesteter (*Ormazd*,

p. 10, note), meaning well performed, perfect in a liturgical sense?

Note 3. Apás, with the accent on the last syllable, is the accusative plural of ap, water, and it is so explained by Sáyana. He translates: 'I show forth these hymns of praise, like water, i. e. everywhere, as Parganya sends down rain at once in every place.' Benfey explains: 'I make these hymns smooth like water, i. e. so that they run smooth like water.' He compares ῥυθμός, as derived from ῥέω. Ludwig translates: 'Als ein kunstfertiger das werk im geiste, auch geschickt mit der hand mach ich schön die in der opferversammlungen mächtig wirkenden lieder.' I thought formerly that we ought either to change the accent, and read ápaḥ, or the last vowel, and read apāḥ. In the former case the meaning would be, 'As one wise in mind and clever performs his work, so do I compose these hymns.' In the second case we should translate: 'Like a workman, wise in mind and handy, I put together these hymns.'

Still there is one point which has hitherto been overlooked by all translators, namely, that apāḥ vidátheshu ábhúvaḥ, occurring in the first and sixth verses, ought to be taken in the same sense in both passages. Now apāḥ vidátheshu ábhúvaḥ seems to mean water efficacious at sacrifices. In the sixth verse I now translate: 'The bounteous Maruts pour down water, mighty or efficacious at sacrifices, the fat milk (of the clouds).' Hence in the first verse I should now like to translate: 'I prepare my songs, like as a handy priest, wise in his mind, prepares the water mighty or efficacious at sacrifices.' Roth assigns to vidátha a too exclusively political meaning. Vidátha may be an assembly, a public meeting, a witenagemot, or an ἐκκλησία, but public meetings at that time had always a religious character, so that vidátha must often be translated by sacrifice.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It is difficult to say in passages like this, whether Dyu should be taken as heaven or as a personified deity. When the Maruts are called Rudrásya máryāḥ, the boys of

Rudra (VII, 56, 1), the personification is always preserved. Hence if the same beings are called *Diváh máryáh*, this too, I think, should be translated the boys of Dyu (III, 54, 13; V, 59, 6), not the sons of heaven. The bulls of Dyu is a more primitive and more vigorous expression for what we should call the fertilising winds of heaven.

Note 2. *Márya* is a male, particularly a young male, a young man, a bridegroom (I, 115, 2; III, 33, 10; IV, 20, 5; V, 61, 4, with *vira*).

The Maruts have grown strong like well-grown manly youths. See also V, 59, 3.

V, 59, 5. *máryáh-iva su-vrídhaḥ vavridhuḥ nárah*.

The men have grown strong like well-grown stallions.

In some passages it has simply the meaning of man :

I, 91, 13. *máryáh-iva své okyě*.

Like a man in his own house.

Note 3. The simile, like giants, is not quite clear. *Sátvan* means a strong man, but it seems intended here to convey the idea of supernatural strength. Benfey translates, 'like brave warriors;' Wilson, 'like evil spirits.' *Ghorávarpas* is an adjective belonging to the Maruts rather than to the giants, and may mean of awful aspect, I, 19, 5, or of cruel mind; cf. I, 39, 1, note 2.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Abhog-ghánaḥ*, the slayers of the demon, are the slayers of the clouds, viz. of such clouds as do not yield rain. *Abhog*, not nurturing, seems to be a name of the rainless cloud, like *Námuḥi* (na-muḥ, not delivering rain), the name of another demon, killed by Indra; see Benfey, Glossar, s. v. The cloud which sends rain is called *bhugmán* :

VIII, 50, 2. *girlḥ ná bhugmāḥ maghávāt-su pinvate*.

Like a feeding cloud he showers his gifts on the worshippers.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The ornaments of the Maruts are best described V, 54, 11 :

āmseshu vah rishtāyah pat-sú khādāyah vākshah-su rukmāh.

On your shoulders are the spears, on your feet rings, on your chests gold ornaments. See also I, 166, 10, &c.

Rukmā as a masc. plur. is frequently used for ornaments which are worn on the breast by the Maruts. The Maruts are actually called rukmāvākshasaḥ, gold-breasted (II, 34, 2; V, 55, 1; 57, 5). In the Āsval. Srauta-sūtra IX, 4, rukma is mentioned as an ornament to be given to the Hotri priest; it is said to be round.

Note 2. Vāpushe and subhé, as parallel expressions, occur also VI, 63, 6. Cf. Delbrück, K. Z. xviii, 96.

Note 3. *Ni mimrikshur* does not occur again in the Rig-veda, and Roth has suggested to read *ni mimikshur* instead; see *ni + marg.* He does not, however, give our passage under *myak*, but under *mraksh*, and this seems indeed preferable. No doubt, there is ample analogy for *mimikshuh*, and the meaning would be, their spears stick firm to their shoulders. But as the MSS. give *mimrikshuh*, and as it is possible to find a meaning for this, I do not propose to alter the text. The question is only, what does *mimrikshuh* mean? *Mraksh* means to grind, to rub, and Roth proposes to render our passage by 'the spears rub together on our shoulders.' The objections to this translation are the preposition *ni*, and the active voice of the verb. I take *mraksh* in the sense of grinding, pounding, destroying, which is likewise appropriate to *mraksha-kṛtvān* (VIII, 61, 10), and *tuvi-mrakshā* (VI, 18, 2), and I translate, 'the spears on their shoulders pound to pieces.'

Note 4. The idea that the Maruts owe everything, if not their birth, at least their strength (*svā-tavasaḥ*, *svā-bhānavah*, *sva-sṛtaḥ*), to themselves is of frequent occurrence in these hymns. See verse 7, note 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. They are themselves compared to kings (I, 85, 8), and called *isānā*, lords (I, 87, 4).

Note 2. *Dhūni* is connected with root *dhvan*, to dun or

to *din*. *Sāyana* explains it by bending or shaking, and *Benfey*, too, translates it by *Erschütterer*. *Roth* gives the right meaning.

Verse 6.

Note 1. I translate *sudānavaḥ* by bounteous, or good givers, for, if we have to choose between the two meanings of bounteous or endowed with liquid drops or dew, the former is the more appropriate in most passages. We might, of course, admit two words, one meaning, possessed of good water, the other, bounteous; the former derived from *dānu*, neuter, water, or rain, the other from *dānú*, giving. It cannot be denied, for instance, that whenever the *Maruts* are called *sudānavaḥ*, the meaning, possessed of good rain, would be applicable: I, 40, 1; 44, 14; 64, 6; 85, 10; II, 34, 8; III, 26, 5; V, 52, 5; 53, 6; 57, 5; VIII, 20, 18; X, 78, 5; I, 15, 2; 23, 9; 39, 10. Yet, even in these passages, while *sudānavaḥ* in the sense of possessed of good rain is possible throughout, that of good giver would sometimes be preferable, for instance, I, 15, 2, as compared with I, 15, 3. Though *sudānu*, in the sense of possessed of good water, sounds as strange as would *suvrishṭi* in the sense of possessed of good rain, or *sumegha*, possessed of good clouds, yet it is difficult to separate *sudānavaḥ* and *gīrádānavaḥ*, both epithets of the *Maruts*.

When the same word is applied to *Indra*, VII, 31, 2; X, 23, 6; to *Vishṇu*, VIII, 25, 12; to the *Asvins*, I, 112, 11; to *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, V, 62, 9; to *Indra* and *Varuṇa*, IV, 41, 8, the meaning of giver of good rain might still seem natural. But with *Agni*, VI, 2, 4; the *Ādityas*, V, 67, 4; VIII, 18, 12; 19, 34; 67, 16; the *Vasus*, I, 106, 1; X, 66, 12; the *Viśve*, X, 65, 11, such an epithet would not be appropriate, while *sudānavaḥ*, in the sense of bounteous givers, is applicable to all. The objection that *dānu*, giver, does not occur in the *Veda*, is of no force, for many words occur at the end of compounds only, and we shall see passages where *sudānu* must be translated by good giver. Nor would the accent of *dānú*, giver, be an obstacle, considering that the author of the *Unādi-sūtras* had no Vedic

authority to guide him in the determination of the accent of *dānú*. Several words in *nu* have the accent on the first syllable. But one might go even a step further, and find a more appropriate meaning for *sudānu* by identifying it with the Zend *hudānu*, which means, not a good giver, but a good knower, wise. True, this root *dā*, to know, does not occur in the ordinary Sanskrit; and Hübschmann (*Ein Zoroastrisches Lied*, 1872, p. 48) tries to prove that the root *dā*, to know, does not exist in Zend either. But even thus we might have the derivation in Sanskrit and Zend, while the root was kept alive in Greek only (*δάημι*, *δαίς*). This, however, is only a conjecture; what is certain is this, that apart from the passages where *sudānu* is thus applied to various deities, in the sense of bounteous or wise, it also occurs as applied to the sacrificer, where it can only mean giver. This is clear from the following passages:

I, 47, 8. *su-kr̥te su-dānave*.

To him who acts well and gives well.

VII, 96, 4. *gani-yántaḥ nú ágravaḥ putri-yántaḥ su-dāna-vaḥ, sárasvantam havāmahe*.

We, being unmarried, and wishing for wives and wishing for sons, offering sacrifices, call now upon Sarasvat.

VIII, 103, 7. *su-dānavaḥ deva-yávaḥ*.

Offering sacrifices, and longing for the gods. Cf. X, 172, 2; 3; VI, 16, 8.

IV, 4, 7. *sáḥ ít agne astu su-bhágaḥ su-dānuḥ yáḥ tvā nītyena havíṣhā yáḥ ukthaḥ píprīshati*.

O Agni, let the liberal sacrificer be happy, who wishes to please thee by perpetual offerings and hymns. See also VI, 16, 8; 68, 5; X, 172, 2, 3.

It must be confessed that even the meaning of *dānu* is by no means quite clear. It is clear enough where it means demon, II, 11, 18; 12, 11; IV, 30, 7; X, 120, 6, the seven demons. In I, 32, 9; III, 30, 8, *dānu*, demon, is applied to the mother of *Vṛtra*, the dark cloud. From this *dānu* we have the derivative *dānavá*, meaning again demon. Why the demons, conquered by Indra, were called *dānu*, is not clear, unless they were conceived originally as dark clouds, like *Dānu*, the mother of Indra. *Dānu* might mean wise,

or even powerful, for this meaning also is ascribed to *dānu* by the author of the *Unādi-sūtras*. If the latter meaning is authentic, and not only deduced *ex post* from the name of *Dānu* and *Dānava*, it might throw light on the Celtic *dána*, *fortis*, from which Zeuss derives the name of the Danube.

Sometimes *dānu*, as a neuter, is explained as Soma :

X, 43, 7. *āpaḥ ná sīndhum abhī yāt sam-áksharan sómāsaḥ*
īndram kulyāḥ-iva hradām, vārdhanti víprāḥ máhaḥ asya
sádane yávam ná vṛishṭíḥ divyéna dānunā.

When the Somas run together to Indra, like water to the river, like channels to the lake, then the priests increase his greatness in the sanctuary, as rain the corn, by the heavenly Soma-juice, or by heavenly moisture.

In the next verse *gīrádānu* is explained as the sacrificer whose Soma is always alive, always ready.

In VI, 50, 13, however, *dānu pápriḥ* is doubtful. As an epithet to *Apām nápāt*, it may mean he who wishes for Soma, or he who grants Soma ; but in neither case is there any tangible sense, unless Soma is taken as a name of the fertilising rain or dew. Again, VIII, 25, 5, *Mitra* and *Varuṇa* are called *sriprá-dānū*, which may mean possessed of flowing rain. And in the next verse, *sám yā dānūni yemáthuḥ* may be rendered by *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, who brought together rain.

The fact that *Mitra-Varuṇau* and the *Asvins* are called *dānunaspatī* does not throw much more light on the subject, and the one passage where *dānu* occurs as a feminine, I, 54, 7, *dānuḥ asmai úparā pivate diváḥ*, may be translated by rain pours forth for him, below the sky, but the translation is by no means certain.

Dānuḥitra, applied to the dawn, the water of the clouds, and the three worlds (V, 59, 8 ; 31, 6 ; I, 174, 7), means most likely bright with dew or rain ; and *dānumat vásu*, the treasure conquered by *Indra* from the clouds, can be translated by the treasure of rain. Taking all the evidence together, we can hardly doubt that *dānu* existed in the sense of liquid, rain, dew, and also Soma ; yet it is equally certain that *dānu* existed in the sense of giver, if not of gift, and that from this, in certain passages, at all events,

sudānu must be derived, as a synonym of sudāvan, sudāman, &c.

Spiegel admits two words dānu in the Veda and Avesta, the one meaning enemy, the other river. Darmesteter (Ormazd, p. 220) takes dānu as a cloud, water, or river. Ludwig translates sudānu by possessed of excellent gifts.

Note 2. I thought formerly that pinvanti was here construed with two accusatives, in the sense of 'they fill the water (with) fat milk.'

Cf. VI, 63, 8. dhenúm naḥ ísham pinvatam ásakrām.

You filled our cow (with) constant food.

Similarly duh, to milk, to extract, is construed with two accusatives : Pāṇ. I, 4, 51. gām dogdhi payaḥ, he milks the cow milk.

RV. IX, 107, 5. duhánáḥ ūdhaḥ divyám mádhu priyám.

Milking the heavenly udder (and extracting from it) the precious sweet, i. e. the rain.

But I now prefer to translate pínvanti apáḥ by they pour out water, and I take páyaḥ ghrítavat as a description of the water, namely, the fat milk of the clouds. After that parenthesis, vidátheshu ábhúvaḥ is again an epithet of apáḥ, as it was in the first verse.

Note 3. The leading about of the clouds is intended, like the leading about of horses, to tame them, and make them obedient to the wishes of their riders, the Maruts. Átyaḥ vâgī is a strong horse, possibly a stallion; but this horse is here meant to signify the clouds. Thus we read :

V, 83, 6. diváḥ naḥ vrishṭīm marutaḥ raridhvam prá pinvata vrishnaḥ ásvasya dhārāḥ.

Give us, O Maruts, the rain of heaven, pour forth the streams of the stallion (the cloud).

In the original the simile is quite clear, and no one required to be told that the átyaḥ vâgī was meant for the cloud. Vâgín by itself means a horse, as I, 66, 2; 69, 3. vâgī ná prítáḥ, like a favourite horse; I, 116, 6. paidváḥ vâgī, the horse of Pedu. But being derived from vâga, strength, vâgín retained always something of its etymological meaning, and was therefore easily and naturally transferred to the cloud, the giver of strength, the source

of food. Even without the ná, i. e. as if, the simile would have been understood in Sanskrit, while in English it is hardly intelligible without a commentary. Benfey discovers some additional idea in support of the poet's comparison: 'Ich bin kein Pferdekennner,' he says, 'aber ich glaube bemerkt zu haben, dass man Pferde, welche rasch gelaufen sind, zum Uriniren zu bewegen sucht. So lassen hier die Maruts die durch ihren Sturm rasch fortgetriebenen Wolken Wasser herab strömen.'

Note 4. Útsa, well, is meant again for cloud, though we should hardly be justified in classing it as a name of cloud, because the original meaning of útsa, spring, is really retained, as much as that of avatá, well, in I, 85, 10-11. The adjectives *stanáyantam* and *ákshitam* seem more applicable to cloud, yet they may be applied also to a spring. Yáska derives utsa from ut-sar, to go forth; ut-sad, to go out; ut-syand, to well out; or from ud, to wet. In V, 32, 2, the wells shut up by the seasons are identified with the udder of the cloud.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Svátavas means really having their own independent strength, a strength not derived from the support of others. The yet which I have added in brackets seems to have been in the poet's mind, though it is not expressed. In I, 87, 4, the Maruts are called *sva-srít*, going by themselves, i. e. moving freely, independently, wherever they list. See I, 64, 4, note 4.

Note 2. *Mrigāh* *hastínah*, wild animals with a hand or a trunk, must be meant for elephants, although it has been doubted whether the poets of the Veda were acquainted with that animal. *Hastín* is the received name for elephant in the later Sanskrit, and it is hardly applicable to any other animal. If they are said to eat the forests, this may be understood in the sense of crushing or chewing, as well as of eating.

Note 3. The chief difficulty of the last sentence has been pointed out in B. and R.'s Dictionary, s. v. *āruṇi*. *Āruṇi* does not occur again in the whole of the Rig-veda. If we take it with *Sáyana* as a various reading of *aruṇi*, then the

Arūṇīs could only be the ruddy cows of the dawn or of Indra, with whom the Maruts, in this passage, can have no concern. Nor would it be intelligible why they should be called āruṇī in this one place only. If, as suggested by B. and R., the original text had been yadā aruṇīshu, it would be difficult to understand how so simple a reading could have been corrupted.

Another difficulty is the verb áyugdhvam, which is not found again in the Ríg-veda together with távishī. Távishī, vigour, is construed with dhâ, to take strength, V, 32, 2. adhatthâh; V, 55, 2. dadhidhve; X, 102, 8. adhâtta; also with vas, IV, 16, 14; with pat, X, 113, 5, &c. But it is not likely that to put vigour into the cows could be expressed in Sanskrit by 'you join vigour in the cows.' If távishī must be taken in the sense which it seems always to possess, viz. vigour, it would be least objectionable to translate, 'when you joined vigour, i. e. when you assumed vigour, while being among the Āruṇīs.' The Āruṇīs being the cows of the dawn, āruṇīshu might simply mean in the morning. Considering, however, that the Maruts are said to eat up forests, āruṇī, in this place, is best taken in the sense of red flames, viz. of fire or forest-fire (dāvāgni), so that the sense would be, 'When you, Storms, assume vigour among the flames, you eat up forests, like elephants.' Benfey: 'Wenn mit den rothen eure Kraft ihr angeschirrt. Die rothen sind die Antilopen, das Vehikel der Maruts, wegen der Schnelligkeit derselben.'

Verse 8.

Note 1. As píśā does not occur again in the Ríg-veda, and as Sáyana, without attempting any etymological arguments, simply gives it as a name of deer, it seems best to adopt that sense till something better can be discovered. Supís, too, does not occur again. In VII, 18, 2, píś is explained by gold, &c.; VII, 57, 3, the Maruts are called visvapís.

Note 2. Kshápaḥ can only be the accusative plural, used in a temporal sense. It is so used in the expression kshápaḥ usráḥ ka, by night and by day, lit. nights and days (VII, 15, 8). In VI, 52, 15, we find kshápaḥ usráḥ in the same sense.

IV, 53, 7. *kshapābhiḥ āha-bhiḥ*, by night and by day. I, 44, 8, the loc. plur. *vyúshṭishu*, in the mornings, is followed by *kshāpaḥ*, the acc. plur., by night, and here the genitive *kshapāḥ* would certainly be preferable, in the sense of at the brightening up of the night. The acc. plur. occurs again in I, 116, 4, where *tisráḥ* is used as an accusative (II, 2, 2; VIII, 41, 3). *Kshapāḥ*, with the accent on the last, must be taken as a *genitivus temporalis*, like the German *Nachts* (I, 79, 6). In VIII, 19, 31. *kshapāḥ vástushu* means at the brightening up of the night, i. e. in the morning. Thus, in III, 50, 4, Indra is called *kshapām vastā ganitā sūryasya*, the lighter up of nights, the parent of the sun. In VIII, 26, 3, *āti kshapāḥ*, the genitive may be governed by *āti*. In IV, 16, 19, however, the accusative *kshāpaḥ* would be more natural, nor do I see how a genitive could here be accounted for:

dyāvaḥ ná dyumnāḥ abhi sántaḥ aryāḥ kshapāḥ madema sarādaḥ ka pūrvīḥ.

May we rejoice many years, overcoming our enemies as the days overcome the nights by splendour.

The same applies to I, 70, 4, where *kshapāḥ* occurs with the accent on the last syllable, whereas we expect *kshāpaḥ* as nom. or acc. plural. Here B. and R. in the Sanskrit Dictionary, s. v. *kshap*, rightly, I believe, suppose it to be a nom. plur. in spite of the accent.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Āhimanyu* comes very near to *Angra-mainyu*; cf. Darmesteter, Ormazd, p. 94.

Note 2. *Ródasī*, a dual, though frequently followed by *ubhé* (I, 10, 8; 33, 9; 54, 2), means heaven and earth, excluding the *antáriksha* or the air between the two. Hence, if this is to be included, it has to be added: I, 73, 8. *āpatri-vān ródasī antáriksham*. Cf. V, 85, 3. We must scan *ródasī*. See Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 193. Should *rodasī* stand for *rodasīm*, as elsewhere? She is certainly intended by what follows in the next line.

Note 3. The comparison is not quite distinct. *Amāti* means originally impetus, then power, e. g. V, 69, 1:

vavṛidhānāu amátim kshatríyasya.

Increasing the might of the warrior.

But it is most frequently used of the effulgence of the sun, (III, 38, 8; V, 45, 2; 62, 5; VII, 38, 1; 2; 45, 3.) See also V, 56, 8, where the same companion of the Maruts is called Rodasī. The comparative particle ná is used twice.

Verse 10.

Note 1. See I, 38, 14, p. 95.

Note 2. In *vṛśha-khādi* the meaning of *khādi* is by no means clear. *Sāyana* evidently guesses, and proposes two meanings, weapon or food. In several passages where *khādi* occurs, it seems to be an ornament rather than a weapon, yet if derived from *khad*, to bite, it may originally have signified some kind of weapon. Roth translates it by ring, and it is certain that these *khādis* were to be seen not only on the arms and shoulders, but likewise on the feet of the Maruts. There is a famous weapon in India, the *ṭakra* or quoit, a ring with sharp edges, which is thrown from a great distance with fatal effect. Bollensen (*Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 46) suggests for *vṛśhan* the meaning of hole in the ear, and then translates the compound as having earrings in the hole of the ear. But *vṛśhan* does not mean the hole in the lap of the ear, nor has *vṛśhabhá* that meaning either in the Veda or elsewhere. Wilson gives for *vṛśhabha*, not for *vṛśhan*, the meaning of orifice of the ear, but this is very different from the hole in the lap of the ear. Benfey suggests that the *khādis* were made of the teeth of wild animals, and hence their name of biters. *Vṛśhan* conveys the meaning of strong, though possibly with the implied idea of rain-producing, fertilising. See p. 138. In RV. V, 87, 1, Osthoff translates *sukhādāye* by *jucunde praeibenti*, Benfey by *schönverzehrendem*; Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, IV, 70, has the right rendering. Cf. note to I, 166, 9.

Verse 11.

Note 1. Formerly explained as 'zum Kampfe wandelnd.' See Kuhn, *Zeitschrift*, vol. iv, p. 19.

Note 2. WILSON: Augmenters of rain, they drive, with golden wheels, the clouds asunder; as elephants (in a herd, break down the trees in their way). They are honoured with sacrifices, visitants of the hall of offering, spontaneous assailers (of their foes), subverters of what are stable, immovable themselves, and wearers of shining weapons.

BENFEY: Weghemmnissen gleich schleudern die Fluthmehrer mit den goldnen Felgen das Gewölk empor, die nie müden Kämpfer, frei schreitend-festesstürzenden, die schweres thu'nden, lanzenstrahlenden Maruts.

Verse 12.

Note 1. Havásá, instead of what one should expect, hávasá, occurs but once more in another Marut hymn, VI, 66, 11.

Note 2. Vanín does not occur again as an epithet of the Maruts. It is explained by Sâyana as a possessive adjective derived from vana, water, and Benfey accordingly translates it by fluthversehn. This, however, is not confirmed by any authoritative passages. Vanín, unless it means connected with the forest, a tree, in which sense it occurs frequently, is only applied to the worshippers or priests in the sense of venerating or adoring (cf. venero, venustus, &c.):

III, 40, 7. abhí dyumnāni vanínah índram sakante ákshitā.

The inexhaustible treasures of the worshipper go towards Indra.

VIII, 3, 5. índram vanínah havāmahe.

We, the worshippers, call Indra.

Unless it can be proved by independent evidence that vanín means possessed of water, we must restrict vanín to its two meanings, of which the only one here applicable, though weak, is adoring. The Maruts are frequently represented as singers and priests, yet the epithets here applied to them stand much in need of some definite explanation, as the poet could hardly have meant to string a number of vague and ill-connected epithets together. If one might conjecture, svānínam instead of vanínam would be an improvement. It is a scarce word, and occurs but once more

in the Veda, III, 26, 5, where it is used of the Maruts, in the sense of noisy, turbulent.

Note 3. *Saskata*, which I have here translated literally by to cling, is often used in the sense of following or revering (colere):

II, 1, 13. *tvām rāti-sākaḥ adhvarēshu saskire.*

The gods who are fond of offerings cling to thee, follow thee, at the sacrifices.

The Soma libation is said to reach the god :

II, 22, 1. *sāḥ enam saskat devāḥ devām.* The gods too are said to cling to their worshippers, i. e. to love and protect them : III, 16, 2 ; VII, 18, 25. The horses are said to follow their drivers : VI, 36, 3 ; VII, 90, 3, &c. It is used very much like the Greek *ἀπείλω*.

Note 4. *Ragastūḥ* may mean rousing the dust of the earth, a very appropriate epithet of the Maruts. *Sāyana* explains it thus, and most translators have adopted his explanation. But as the epithets here are not simply descriptive, but laudatory, it seems preferable, in this place, to retain the usual meaning of *rāgas*, sky. When Soma is called *ragastūḥ*, IX, 108, 7, *Sāyana* too explains it by *tegasām prerakam*, and IX, 48, 4, by *udakasya prerakam*.

Note 5. *Rigīshín*, derived from *rigīsha*. *Rigīsha* is what remains of the Soma-plant after it has once been squeezed, and what is used again for the third libation. Now as the Maruts are invoked at the third libation, they were called *rigīshín*, as drinking at their later libation the juice made of the *rigīsha*. This, at least, is the opinion of the Indian commentators. But it is much more likely that the Maruts were invoked at the third libation, because originally they had been called *rigīshín* by the Vedic poets, this *rigīshín* being derived from *rigīsha*, and *rigīsha* from *rig*, to strive, to yearn, like *purīsha* from *prī*, *manīshā* from *man* ; (see *Unādi-sūtras*, p. 273.) This *rig* is the same root which we have in *ῥέγειν*, to reach, *ῥογή*, emotion, and *ῥογία*, furious transports of worshippers. Thus the Maruts from being called *rigīshín*, impetuous, came to be taken for drinkers of *rigīsha*, the fermenting and overflowing Soma, and were assigned accordingly to the third libation at sacrifices.

Rigishín, as an epithet, is not confined to the Maruts; it is given to Indra, with whom it could not have had a purely ceremonial meaning (VIII, 76, 5).

Verse 13.

Note 1. *Âprikkhya*, literally, to be asked for, to be inquired for, to be greeted and honoured. A word of an apparently modern character, but occurring again in the *Rig-veda* as applied to a prince, and to the vessel containing the Soma.

Note 2. *Púshyati* might be joined with *krátu* and taken in a transitive sense, he increases his strength. But *púshyati* is also used as an intransitive, and means he prospers :

I, 83, 3. *ásam-yatah vraté te ksheti púshyati.*

Without let he dwells in thy service and prospers.

Roth reads *asamyattah*, against the authority of the MSS.

Verse 14.

Note 1. The difficulty of this verse arises from the uncertainty whether the epithets *dhanasprítam*, *ukthyām*, and *visvákarshanim* belong to *súshma*, strength, or to *toká*, kith and kin. Roth and Benfey connect them with *toká*. Now *dhanasprít* is applicable to *toká*, yet it never occurs joined with *toká* again, while it is used with *súshma*, VI, 19, 8. *Ukthyā*, literally, to be praised with hymns, is not used again as an epithet of *toká*, though it is quite appropriate to any gift of the gods. Lastly, *visvákarshani* is never applied to *toká*, while it is an epithet used, if not exactly of the strength, *súshma*, given by the gods, yet of the fame given by them :

X, 93, 10. *dhátam víréshu visvá-karshani srávah.*

Give to these men world-wide glory. Cf. III, 2, 15.

The next difficulty is the exact meaning of *visvá-karshani*, and such cognate words as *visvá-krishñi*, *visvá-manusha*. The only intelligible meaning I can suggest for these words is, known to all men; originally, belonging to, reaching to all men; as we say, world-wide or European fame, meaning by it fame extending over the whole of Europe, or over the whole world. If Indra, Agni, and the Maruts are called by

these names, they mean, as far as I can judge, known, worshipped by all men. Benfey translates *allverständig*.

Verse 15.

NOTE 1. *Riti*, the first element of *riti-sāham*, never occurs by itself in the *Rig-veda*. It comes from the root *ar*, to hurt, which was mentioned before (p. 65) in connection with *ār-van*, hurting, *ārus*, wound, and *āri*, enemy. *Sām-riti* occurs I, 32, 6. *Riti* therefore means hurting, and *riti-sāh* means one who can stand an attack. In our passage *rayīm virā-vantam riti-sāham* means really wealth consisting in men who are able to withstand all onslaughts.

The word is used in a similar sense, VI, 14, 4 :

agnih apsam riti-sāham viram dadāti sāt-patim, yasya trāsanti sāvasaḥ sam-kākshi sāt-ravaḥ bhiyā.

Agni gives a strong son who is able to withstand all onslaughts, from fear of whose strength the enemies tremble when they see him.

In other passages *riti-sāh* is applied to Indra :

VIII, 45, 35. *bibhāya hī tvā-vataḥ ugrāt abhi-prabhaṅgī-naḥ dasmāt ahām riti-sāhaḥ.*

For I stand in fear of a powerful man like thee, of one who crushes his enemies, who is strong and withstands all onslaughts.

VIII, 68, 1. *tuvi-kūrmīm riti-sāham indra sāvishtha sāt-pate.*

Thee, O most powerful Indra, of mighty strength, able to withstand all onslaughts.

VIII, 88, 1. *tām vaḥ dasmām riti-sāham—īndram gih-bhīḥ navāmahe.*

We call Indra the strong, the resisting, with our songs.

NOTE 2. The last sentence finishes six of the hymns ascribed to Nodhas. It is more appropriate in a hymn addressed to single deities, such as Agni or Indra, than in a hymn to the Maruts. We must supply *sardha*, in order to get a collective word in the masculine singular.

Nū, as usual, should be scanned *nū*.

NOTE 3. *Dhiyā-vasu*, as an epithet of the gods, means rich in prayers, i. e. invoked by many worshippers. It does

not occur frequently. Besides the hymns of Nodhas, it only occurs independently in I, 3, 10 (Śarasvatī), III, 3, 2, III, 28, 1 (Agni), these hymns being all ascribed to the family of Visvāmitra. In the last verse, which forms the burden of the hymns of Nodhas, it may have been intended to mean, he who is rich through the hymn just recited, or he who rejoices in the hymn, the god to whom it is addressed.

Nodhas, the poet, belongs, according to the Anukramanī, to the family of Gotama, and in the hymns which are ascribed to him, I, 58-64, the Gotamas are mentioned several times :

I, 60, 5. *tām tvā vayām pátim agne rayinām prá samsā-
maḥ matī-bhiḥ gótamāsaḥ.*

We, the Gotamas, praise thee with hymns, Agni, the lord of treasures.

I, 61, 16. *evā te hāri-yogana su-vṛiktī indra brāhmāṇi
gótamāsaḥ akran.*

Truly the Gotamas made holy prayers for thee, O Indra with brilliant horses! See also I, 63, 9.

In one passage Nodhas himself is called Gotama :

I, 62, 13. *sanā-yaté gótamaḥ indra nāvyaṃ
átakshat brāhma hari-yóganāya,
su-nīthāya naḥ savasāna nodhāḥ—
prātāḥ makshú dhiyā-vasuḥ gagamyāt.*

Gotama made a new song for the old (god) with brilliant horses, O Indra! May Nodhas be a good leader to us, O powerful Indra! May he who is rich in prayers (Indra) come early and soon!

I feel justified therefore in following the Anukramanī and taking Nodhas as a proper name. It occurs so again in

I, 61, 14. *sadyāḥ bhuvat vīryāya nodhāḥ.*

May Nodhas quickly attain to power!

In I, 124, 4. *nodhāḥ-iva* may mean like Nodhas, but more likely it has the general meaning of poet.

MANDALA I, HYMN 85.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 9-10.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Those who glance forth like wives and yoke-fellows¹, the powerful sons of Rudra on their way, they, the Maruts, have indeed made heaven and earth to grow²; they, the strong and wild, delight in the sacrifices.

2. When grown up¹, they attained to greatness; the Rudras have established their seat in the sky. While singing their song and increasing their vigour, the sons of *Prisni* have clothed themselves in beauty².

3. When these sons of the cow (*Prisni*)¹ adorn themselves with glittering ornaments, the brilliant² ones put bright weapons on their bodies³. They drive away every adversary⁴; fatness (rain) streams along their paths;—

4. When you¹, the powerful, who shine with your spears, shaking even what is unshakable by strength,—when you, O Maruts, the manly hosts², had yoked the spotted deer, swift as thought, to your chariots;—

5. When you had yoked the spotted deer before your chariots, hurling¹ the stone (thunderbolt) in the fight, then the streams of the red-(horse)² rush forth: like a skin³ with water they water the earth.

6. May the swiftly-gliding, swift-winged horses carry you hither! Come forth with your arms¹! Sit down on the grass-pile; a wide seat has been made for you. Rejoice, O Maruts, in the sweet food².

7. Strong in themselves, they grew¹ with might; they stepped to the firmament, they made their seat wide. When Vishṇu² saved the enrapturing Soma, the Maruts sat down like birds on their beloved altar.

8. Like¹ heroes indeed thirsting for fight they rush about; like combatants eager for glory they have striven in battles. All beings are afraid of the Maruts; they are men terrible to behold, like kings.

9. When the clever Tvashṭar¹ had turned the well-made, golden, thousand-edged thunderbolt, Indra takes it to perform his manly deeds²; he slew Vṛitra, he forced out the stream of water.

10. By their power they pushed the well¹ aloft, they clove asunder the rock (cloud), however strong. Blowing forth their voice² the bounteous Maruts performed, while drunk of Soma, their glorious deeds.

11. They pushed the well (cloud) athwart this way, they poured out the spring to the thirsty Gotama. The Maruts with beautiful splendour approach him with help, they in their own ways satisfied the desire of the sage.

12. The shelters which you have for him who praises you, grant them threefold¹ to the man who gives! Extend the same to us, O Maruts! Give us, ye heroes², wealth with valiant offspring!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Gotama. No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS.; verse 6=AV. XX, 13, 2; verse 7=TS. IV, 1, 11, 3; verse 12=TS. I, 5, 11, 5; TB. II, 8, 5, 6.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The phrase *gánayaḥ ná sáptayaḥ* is obscure. As *gáni* has always the meaning of wife, and *sápti* in the singular, dual, and plural means horse, it might be supposed that *gánayaḥ* could be connected with *sáptayaḥ*, so as to signify mares. But although *gáni* is coupled with *patnī*, I, 62, 10, in the sense of mother-wife, and though *sápti* is most commonly joined with some other name for horse, yet *gánayaḥ sáptayaḥ* never occurs, for the simple reason that it would be too elaborate and almost absurd an expression for *vaḍavāḥ*. We find *sápti* joined with *vāgīn*, I, 162, 1; with *ráthya*, II, 31, 7; *átyam ná sáptim*, III, 22, 1; *sáptī hárī*, III, 35, 2; *ásvā sáptī-iva*, VI, 59, 3.

We might then suppose the thought of the poet to have been this: What appears before us like race-horses, viz. the storms coursing through the sky, that is really the host of the Maruts. But then *gánayaḥ* remains unexplained, and it is impossible to take *gánayaḥ ná sáptayaḥ* as two similes, like unto horses, like unto wives.

I believe, therefore, that we must here take *sápti* in its original etymological sense, which would be *ju-mentum*, a yoked animal, a beast of draught, or rather a follower, a horse that will follow. *Sápti*, therefore, could never be a wild horse, but always a tamed horse, a horse that will go in harness. Cf. IX, 21, 4. *hitāḥ ná sáptayaḥ ráthe*, like horses put to the chariot; or in the singular, IX, 70, 10. *hitāḥ ná sáptiḥ*, like a harnessed horse. The root is *sap*, which in the Veda means to follow, to attend on, to worship. But if *sápti* means originally animals that will go

together, it may in our passage have retained the sense of yoke-fellow (*σύνυγος*), and be intended as an adjective to *gánayaḥ*, wives. There is at least one other passage where this meaning would seem to be more appropriate, viz.

VIII, 20, 23. *yûyám sakhâyaḥ saptayaḥ*.

You (Maruts), friends and followers! or you, friends and comrades!

Here it is hardly possible to assign to *sápti* the sense of horse, for the Maruts, though likened to horses, are never thus barely invoked as *saptayaḥ*!

If then we translate, 'Those who glance forth like wives and yoke-fellows,' i.e. like wives of the same husband, the question still recurs how the simile holds good, and how the Maruts rushing forth together in all their beauty can be compared to wives. In answer to this we have to bear in mind that the idea of many wives belonging to one husband (*sapatnī*) is familiar to the Vedic poet, and that their impetuously rushing into the arms of their husbands, and appearing before them in all their beauty, are frequent images in their poetry. In such phrases as *pátim ná gánayaḥ* and *gánayaḥ ná gárbbham*, the *ganis*, the wives or mothers, are represented as running together after their husbands or children. This impetuous approach the poet may have wished to allude to in our passage also, but though it might have been understood at once by his hearers, it is almost impossible to convey this implied idea in any other language.

Wilson translates: 'The Maruts, who are going forth, decorate themselves like females: they are gliders (through the air), the sons of Rudra, and the doers of good works, by which they promote the welfare of earth and heaven. Heroes, who grind (the solid rocks), they delight in sacrifices.'

Ludwig translates: 'Die ganz besonders sich schmücken wie frauen, die renner, zu ihrem zuge,' &c. This is possible, yet the simile sounds somewhat forced.

Note 2. The meaning of this phrase, which occurs very frequently, was originally that the storms by driving away the dark clouds, made the earth and the sky to appear

larger and wider. It afterwards takes a more general sense of increasing, strengthening, blessing.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Ukshita is here a participle of vaksh or uksh, to grow, to wax; not of uksh, to sprinkle, to anoint, to inaugurate, as explained by Sāyana. Thus it is said of the Maruts, V, 55, 3. sākām gātāh—sākām ukshitāh, born together, and grown up together.

Note 2. The same expression occurs VIII, 28, 5. saptó (iti) ādhi srīyaḥ dhire. See also I, 116, 17; IX, 68, 1.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Gó-mātri, like gó-gāta, a name of the Maruts, who are also called prīṣni-mātaraḥ, sīndhu-mātaraḥ.

Note 2. Subhrā is applied to the Maruts, I, 19, 5. Otherwise, no doubt, it might refer, as Ludwig remarks, to virúk-mataḥ, always supposing that virúkmat is a feminine. Whether tanúshu subhrāḥ can stand for tanúshu subhrāsu is more doubtful.

Note 3. Virúk-mataḥ must be an accusative plural. It occurs I, 127, 3, as an epithet of ógas; VI, 49, 5, as an epithet of the chariot of the Asvins. In our place, however, it must be taken as a substantive, signifying something which the Maruts wear, probably armour or weapons. This follows chiefly from X, 138, 4. sátrūn asrināt virúkmatā, Indra tore his enemies with the bright weapon. In VIII, 20, 11, where rukmā occurs as a masculine plural, ví bhrāgante rukmāsaḥ ādhi bāhúshu, their bright things shine on their arms, it seems likewise to be meant for weapons; according to Sāyana, for chains. In V, 55, 3; X, 78, 3, the Maruts are called vi-rokīnaḥ, bright like the rays of the sun or the tongues of fire.

Note 4. Observe the short syllable in the tenth syllable of this Pāda; Benfey, Védica, p. 124; Lanman, Noun-Inflection, pp. 378, 543.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The sudden transition from the third to the second person is not unusual in the Vedic hymns, the fact

being that where we in a relative sentence should use the same person as that of the principal verb, the Vedic poets frequently use the third.

Note 2. *Vṛsha-vrāta* is untranslatable for reasons stated p. 138 seq.; it means consisting of companies of *vṛśhans*, in whatever sense that word be taken. Wilson in his translation mistakes *ákyutā* for *ákyutāḥ*, and *vrāta* for *vrata*. He translates the former by 'incapable of being overthrown,' the latter by 'entrusted with the duty of sending rain,' both against the authority of *Sāyana*. *Vṛsha-vrāta* occurs twice in the *Rig-veda* as an epithet of *Soma* only, IX, 62, 11; 64, 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. If we take *ádri* for cloud, then *ramh* might have the meaning of stirring up.

V, 32, 2. *tvám útsán rítú-bhiḥ badbadhânñ áramhaḥ*.

Thou madest the springs to run that had been shut up by the seasons.

VIII, 19, 6. *tásya ít árvantaḥ ramhayante áśávaḥ*.

His horses only run quick.

But *ádri* often means stone, in the sense of weapon, or bolt (cf. *adrivaḥ*, voc., wielder of the thunderbolt), and *ramhayati* would then have the meaning of hurling. This is the meaning adopted by Benfey and Ludwig.

Note 2. The red may be the dark red cloud, but *arushá* has almost become a proper name, and its original meaning of redness is forgotten. Nay, it is possible that *arushá*, as applied to the same power of darkness which is best known by the names of *Vṛitra*, *Dasyu*, &c., may never have had the sense of redness, but been formed straight from *ar*, to hurt, from which *arvan*, *arus*, &c. (see p. 65 seq.). It would then mean simply the hurter, the enemy. It is possible also to take *arushá* in the sense of the red horse, the leader between the two *Haris*, when we ought to remember that the *Maruts* pour forth the streams of the stallion, RV. V, 83, 6. *prá pinvata vṛśhnaḥ ásvasya dhāráḥ*, and that they lead about the horse to make it rain, RV. I, 64, 6. *átyam ná mihé ví nayanti vâgínam*.

Note 3. Sāyana explains: 'They moisten the whole earth like a hide,' a hide representing a small surface which is watered without great effort. Wilson: 'They moisten the earth, like a hide, with water.' Langlois: 'Alors les gouttes d'eau, perçant comme la peau de ce (nuage) bien-faisant viennent inonder la terre.' Benfey: 'Dann stürzen reichlich aus der rothen (Gewitterwolke) Tropfen, mit Fluth wie eine Haut die Erde netzend. (Dass die Erde so durchnässt wird, wie durchgeregnetes Leder.)' If the poet had intended to compare the earth, before it is moistened by rain, to a hide, he might have had in his mind the dryness of a tanned skin, or, as Professor Benfey says, of leather. If, on the contrary, the simile refers to the streams of water, then *kārma-iva*, like a skin, might either be taken in the technical acceptation of the skin through which, at the preparation of the Soma, the streams (*dhârâh*) of that beverage are squeezed and distilled, or we may take the word in the more general sense of water-skin. In that case the comparison, though not very pointedly expressed, as it would have been by later Sanskrit poets, would still be complete. The streams of the red-(horse), i. e. of the cloud, rush forth, and they, whether the streams liberated by the Maruts, or the Maruts themselves, moisten the earth with water, like a skin, i. e. like a skin in which water is kept and from which it is poured out. The cloud itself being called a skin by Vedic poets (I, 129, 3) makes the comparison still more natural.

One other explanation might suggest itself, if the singular of *kārma* should be considered objectionable on account of the plural of the verb. Vedic poets speak of the skin of the earth. Thus:

X, 68, 4. *bhūmyâh udnâ-iva ví tvákam bibheda.*

He (*Br̥haspati*) having driven the cows from the cave, cut the skin of the earth, as it were, with water, i. e. saturated it with rain.

The construction, however, if we took *kārma* in the sense of surface, would be very irregular, and we should have to translate: They moisten the earth with water like a skin, i. e. skin-deep.

We ought to scan *kārmēvōdābhīḥ vī ūdāntī bhūmā*, for *kārmēvā ūdābhīḥ vyūdāntī bhūmā* would give an unusual cæsure.

Verse 8.

Note 1. AV. XX, 13, 2. With your arms, i. e. according to Sāyana, with armfuls of gifts. Though this expression does not occur again so baldly, we read I, 166, 10, of the Maruts, that there are many gifts in their strong arms, *bhūrīni bhadraṁ nāryeshu bāhūshu*; nor does *bāhū*, as used in the plural, as far as I am able to judge, ever convey any meaning but that of arms. The idea that the Maruts are carried along by their arms as by wings, does not rest on Vedic authority, otherwise we might join *raghupátvānaḥ* with *bāhūbhiḥ*, come forth swiftly flying on your arms! As it is, and with the accent on the antepenultimate, we must refer *raghupátvānaḥ* to *sáptayaḥ*, horses.

Note 2. The sweet food is Soma.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The initial 'a' of *avardhanta* must be elided, or 'té a' be pronounced as two short syllables equal to one long.

Note 2. Taitt. S. IV, 1, 11, 3. *Vishṇu*, whose character in the hymns of the Veda is very different from that assumed by him in later periods of Hindu religion, must here be taken as the friend and companion of Indra. Like the Maruts, he assisted Indra in his battle against *Vṛitra* and the conquest of the clouds. When Indra was forsaken by all the gods, *Vishṇu* came to his help.

IV, 18, 11. *utā mātā mahishám ānu avenat amī (īti) tvā gahati putra devāḥ*,

ātha abravīt vṛitrām índraḥ hanishyān sákhe vishṇo (īti) vi-tarám ví kramasva.

The mother also called after the bull, these gods forsake thee, O son; then, when going to kill *Vṛitra*, Indra said, Friend, *Vishṇu*, step forward!

This stepping of *Vishṇu* is emblematic of the rising, the culminating, and setting of the sun; and in VIII, 12, 27,

Vishṇu is said to perform it through the power of Indra. In VI, 20, 2, Indra is said to have killed Vṛitra, assisted by Vishṇu (vishṇunā saśānāḥ). Vishṇu is therefore invoked together with Indra, VI, 69, 8; VII, 99; with the Maruts, V, 87; VII, 36, 9. In VII, 93, 8, Indra, Vishṇu, and the Maruts are called upon together. Nay, māruta, belonging to the Maruts, becomes actually an epithet of Vishṇu, V, 46, 2. māruta utā vishṇo (īti); and in I, 156, 4. mārutasya vedhāsaḥ has been pointed out by Roth as an appellation of Vishṇu. The mention of Vishṇu in our hymn is therefore by no means exceptional, but the whole purport of this verse is nevertheless very doubtful, chiefly owing to the fact that several of the words occurring in it lend themselves to different interpretations.

The translations of Wilson, Benfey, and others have not rendered the sense which the poet intends to describe at all clear. Wilson says: 'May they for whom Vishṇu defends (the sacrifice), that bestows all desires and confers delight, come (quickly) like birds, and sit down upon the pleasant and sacred grass.' Benfey: 'Wenn Vishṇu schützt den rauschtriefenden tropfenden (Soma), sitzen wie Vögel sie auf der geliebten Streu.' Langlois: 'Quand Vichnou vient prendre sa part de nos enivrantes libations, eux, comme des oiseaux, arrivent aussi sur le couda qui leur est cher.' Ludwig: 'Als Vishṇu half dem zum rauschtrank eilenden stiere, setzten sie sich wie vögel aufs liebe barhis.'

Whence all these varieties? First, because āvat may mean, he defended or protected, but likewise, it is supposed, he descried, became aware. Secondly, because vṛtshan is one of the most vague and hence most difficult words in the Veda, and may mean Indra, Soma, or the cloud: (see the note on Vṛtshan, p. 138.) Thirdly, because the adjective belonging to vṛtshan, which generally helps us to determine which vṛtshan is meant, is here itself of doubtful import, and certainly applicable to Indra as well as to Soma and the Asvins, possibly even to the cloud. Mada-kyút is readily explained by the commentators as bringing down pride, a meaning which the word might well have in modern Sanskrit, but which it clearly has not in

the Veda. Even where the thunderbolt of Indra is called *madaḥyút*, and where the meaning of 'bringing down pride' would seem most appropriate, we ought to translate 'wildly rushing down.'

VIII, 96, 5. *ā yát vágram bāhvóḥ indra dhátse mada-ḥyútam áhaye hántaváḥ ūm (íti).*

When thou tookest the wildly rushing thunderbolt in thy arms in order to slay Ahi.

When applied to the gods, the meaning of *madaḥyút* is by no means certain. It might mean rushing about fiercely, reeling with delight, this delight being produced by the Soma, but it may also mean sending down delight, i. e. rain or Soma. The root *kyu* is particularly applicable to the sending down of rain; cf. Taitt. Samh. II, 4, 9, 2; 10, 3; III, 3, 4, 1; and Indra and his horses, to whom this epithet is chiefly applied, are frequently asked to send down rain. However, *madaḥyút* is also applied to real horses (I, 126, 4) where givers of rain would be an inappropriate epithet. I should therefore translate *madaḥyút*, when applied to Indra, to his horses, to the *Asvins*, or to horses in general by furiously or wildly moving about, as if 'made or *madena kyavate*,' he moves in a state of delight, or in a state of intoxication, such as was not incompatible with the character of the ancient gods. Here again the difficulty of rendering Vedic thought in English, or any other modern language, becomes apparent, for we have no poetical word to express a high state of mental excitement produced by drinking the intoxicating juice of the Soma or other plants, which has not something opprobrious mixed up with it, while in ancient times that state of excitement was celebrated as a blessing of the gods, as not unworthy of the gods themselves, nay, as a state in which both the warrior and the poet would perform their highest achievements. The German Rausch is the nearest approach to the Sanskrit *mada*.

VIII, 1, 21. *vśveshām tarutāram mada-ḥyútam máde hí sma dádāti naḥ.*

Indra, the conqueror of all, who rushes about in rapture, for in rapture he bestows gifts upon us. Cf. I, 51, 2.

The horses of Indra are called *mada-kyút*, I, 81, 3; VIII, 33, 18; 34, 9. Ordinary horses, I, 126, 4.

It is more surprising to see this epithet applied to the *Asvins*, who are generally represented as moving about with exemplary steadiness. However we read:

VIII, 22, 16. *mánaḥ-gavasā vrishanā mada-kyutā*.

Ye two *Asvins*, quick as thought, powerful, wildly moving; or, as *Sâyana* proposes, liberal givers, humblers of your enemies. See also VIII, 35, 19.

Most frequently *mada-kyút* is applied to *Soma*, X, 30, 9; IX, 32, 1; 53, 4; 79, 2; 108, 11; where particularly the last passage deserves attention, in which *Soma* is called *mada-kyútam saḥśra-dhâram vrishabhâm*.

Lastly, even the wealth itself which the *Maruts* are asked to send down from heaven, most likely rain, is called, VIII, 7, 13, *rayīm mada-kyútam puru-kshúm visvá-dhâyasam*.

In all these passages we must translate *mada-kyút* by bringing delight, showering down delight.

We have thus arrived at the conclusion that *vrishanam mada-kyútam*, as used in our passage I, 85, 7, might be meant either for *Indra* or for *Soma*. If the *Asvins* can be called *vrishanau mada-kyutā*, the same expression would be even more applicable to *Indra*. On the other hand, if *Soma* is called *vrishabhāḥ mada-kyút*, the same *Soma* may legitimately be called *vrishā mada-kyút*. In deciding whether *Indra* or *Soma* be meant, we must now have recourse to other hymns, in which the relations of the *Maruts* with *Vishnu*, *Soma*, and *Indra* are alluded to.

If *Indra* were intended, and if the first words meant 'When *Vishnu* perceived the approach of *Indra*,' we should expect, not that the *Maruts* sat down on the sacrificial pile, but that they rushed to the battle. The idea that the *Maruts* come to the sacrifice, like birds, is common enough:

VIII, 20, 10. *vrishanasvéna marutaḥ vrishā-psunā ráthena vrishā-nābhinā, ā syenāsaḥ ná pakshínāḥ vrithā naraḥ havyā naḥ vítāye gata*.

Come ye *Maruts* together, to eat our offerings, on your

strong-horsed, strong-shaped, strong-naved chariot, like winged hawks!

But when the Maruts thus come to a sacrifice it is to participate in it, and particularly in the Soma that is offered by the sacrificer. This Soma, it is said in other hymns, was prepared by Vishṇu for Indra (II, 22, 1), and Vishṇu is said to have brought the Soma for Indra (X, 113, 2). If we keep these and similar passages in mind, and consider that in the preceding verse the Maruts have been invited to sit down on the sacrificial pile and to rejoice in the sweet food, we shall see that the same train of thought is carried on in our verse, the only new idea being that the saving or, possibly, the descrying of the Soma is ascribed to Vishṇu. See, however, Bergaigne, *Journ. Asiat.* 1884, p. 472.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *na* and *iva* together, see Bollensen, *Orient und Occident*, II, 470.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Tvā́shṭar*, the workman of the gods, frequently also the fashioner and creator.

Note 2. *Nári*, the loc. sing. of *nri*, but, if so, with a wrong accent, occurs only in this phrase as used here, and as repeated in VIII, 96, 19. *nári ápāmsi kártā sáh vṛitra-hā*. Its meaning is not clear. It can hardly mean 'on man,' without some more definite application. If *nri* could be used as a name of *Vṛitra* or any other enemy, it would mean, to do his deeds against the man, on the enemy. *Nri*, however, is ordinarily an honorific term, chiefly applied to Indra, IV, 25, 4. *náre náryāya nri-tamáya nṛinām*, and hence its application to *Vṛitra* would be objectionable. *Sáyana* explains it in the sense of battle. I believe that *nári* stands for *náryá*, the acc. plur. neut. of *nárya*, manly, and the frequent epithet of *ápas*, and I have translated accordingly. Indra is called *nárya-apas*, VIII, 93, 1. See also Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xxv, p. 601.

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Avatá*, a well, here meant for cloud, like *útsa*, I, 64, 6.

Note 2. *Dhámantaḥ vānám* is translated by *Sâyana* as playing on the lyre, by *Benfey* as blowing the flute. Such a rendering, particularly the latter, would be very appropriate, but there is no authority for *vānā* meaning either lyre or flute in the *Veda*. *Vānā* occurs five times only. In one passage, VIII, 20, 8. *góbhiḥ vānāḥ agyate*, it means arrow; the arrow is sent forth from the bow-strings. The same meaning seems applicable to IX, 50, 1. *vānāsya kodaya pavīm*. In another passage, IX, 97, 8. *prá vadanti vānám*, they send forth their voice, is applied to the *Maruts*, as in our passage; in IV, 24, 9, the sense is doubtful, but here too *vānā* clearly does not mean a musical instrument. See III, 30, 10. *Spiegel* compares the *Huzvareh* and *Armenian vāng* (Pers. *bānig*), voice. *M. Senart* (*Journal Asiatique*, 1874, p. 281) is in favour of taking *vāna* for flute.

Verse 12.

Note 1. In the *Taitt. S.* I, 5, 11, we have *sasamānāya*, and in the *Taitt. Br.* II, 8, 5, 6, *samsamānāya*, but *Sâyana* explains *sasamānāya*, *samsanam* kurvate. He explains *tridhâtûni* by *asanam*, *pānam*, *khâdanam*.

Vrīshan.

Note 2. In *vrīshan* we have one of those words which it is almost impossible to translate accurately. It occurs over and over again in the *Vedic hymns*, and if we once know the various ideas which it either expresses or implies, we have little difficulty in understanding its import in a vague and general way, though we look in vain for corresponding terms in any modern language. In the *Veda*, and in ancient languages generally, one and the same word is frequently made to do service for many. Words retain their general meaning, though at the same time they are evidently used with a definite purpose. This is not only a peculiar phase of language, but a peculiar phase of thought, and as to us this phase has become strange and unreal, it is very difficult to transport ourselves back into it, still more to translate the pregnant terms of the *Vedic poets* into the definite languages which we have to use. Let us imagine a state of

thought and speech in which *virtus* still meant manliness, though it might also be applied to the virtue of a woman ; or let us try to speak and think a language which expressed the bright and the divine, the brilliant and the beautiful, the straight and the right, the bull and the hero, the shepherd and the king by the same terms, and we shall see how difficult it would be to translate such terms without losing either the key-note that was still sounding, or the harmonics which were set vibrating by it in the minds of the poets and their listeners.

I. *Vṛiṣhan*, male.

Vṛiṣhan, being derived from a root *vrish*, spargere, meant no doubt originally the male, whether applied to animals or men. In this sense *vrīṣhan* occurs frequently in the Veda, either as determining the sex of the animal which is mentioned, or as standing by itself and meaning the male. In either case, however, it implies the idea of strength and eminence, which we lose whether we translate it by man or male.

Thus *ásva* is horse, but VII, 69, 1, we read :

ā vām ráthak—*vrīṣha*-bhiḥ yātu ásvaiḥ.

May your chariot come near with powerful horses, i. e. with stallions.

The *Háris*, the horses of Indra, are frequently called *vrīṣhanā* :

I, 177, 1. yuktvā hárī (iti) *vrīṣhanā*.

Having yoked the bay stallions.

Vṛishabhá, though itself originally meaning the male animal, had become fixed as the name of the bull, and in this process it had lost so much of its etymological import that the Vedic poet did not hesitate to define *vrīshabhá* itself by the addition of *vrīṣhan*. Thus we find :

VIII, 93, 7. *sák vrīṣhā vrīshabhák* bhuvat.

May he (Indra) be a strong bull.

I, 54, 2. *vrīṣhā vrīṣha*-tvā *vrīshabhák*.

Indra by his strength a strong bull ; but, literally, Indra by his manliness a male bull.

Even *vrīshabhá* loses again its definite meaning ; and as

bull in bull-calf means simply male, or in bull-trout, large, so *vrishabhá* is added to *átya*, horse, to convey the meaning of large or powerful :

I, 177, 2. *yé te vrīṣhanāḥ vrishabhāsaḥ indra—átyāḥ.*

Thy strong and powerful horses ; literally, thy male bull-horses.

When *vrīṣhan* and *vrishabhá* are used as adjectives, for instance with *súshma*, strength, they hardly differ in meaning :

VI, 19, 8. *ā naḥ bhara vrīṣhanam súshmam indra.*

Bring us thy manly strength, O Indra.

And in the next verse :

VI, 19, 9. *ā te súshmaḥ vrishabhāḥ etu.*

May thy manly strength come near.

Vámsaga, too, which is clearly the name for bull, is defined by *vrīṣhan*, I, 7, 8 :

vrīṣhā yúthā-iva vámsagaḥ.

As the strong bull scares the herds.

The same applies to *varāha*, which, though by itself meaning boar, is determined again by *vrīṣhan* :

X, 67, 7. *vrīṣha-bhiḥ varāhaiḥ.*

With strong boars.

In III, 2, 11, we read :

vrīṣhā—nānadat ná simhāḥ.

Like a roaring lion.

If used by itself, *vrīṣhan*, at least in the *Rig-veda*, can hardly be said to be the name of any special animal, though in later Sanskrit it may mean bull or horse. Thus if we read, X, 43, 8, *vrīṣhā ná kruddhāḥ*, we can only translate like an angry male, though, no doubt, like a wild bull, would seem more appropriate.

I, 186, 5. *yéna nāpātam apām guṇāma manāḥ-gúvaḥ vrīṣhanāḥ yám váhanti.*

That we may excite the son of the water (Agni), whom the males, quick as thought, carry along.

Here the males are no doubt the horses or stallions of Agni. But, though this follows from the context, it would be wrong to say that *vrīṣhan* by itself means horse.

If used by itself, *vr̥ṣhan* most frequently means man, and chiefly in his sexual character. Thus :

I, 140, 6. *vr̥ṣhā-iva pátñih abhī eti rōruvat*.

Agni comes roaring like a husband to his wives.

I, 179, 1. *ápi ūm (liti) nú pátñih vr̥ṣhanah gagamyuh*.

Will the husbands now come to their wives?

II, 16, 8. *sakrīt sú te sumatī-bhih—sám pátñibhih ná vr̥ṣhanah nasímahi*.

May we for once cling firmly to thy blessings, as husbands cling to their wives.

V, 47, 6. *upa-prakshé vr̥ṣhanah módamânâh diváh pathā vadhvāh yanti ákkha*.

The exulting men come for the embrace on the path of heaven towards their wives.

In one or two passages *vr̥ṣhan* would seem to have a still more definite meaning, particularly in the formula *sūrah dr̥śike vr̥ṣhanah ka paúmsye*, which occurs IV, 41, 6; X, 92, 7. See also I, 179, 1.

In all the passages which we have hitherto examined *vr̥ṣhan* clearly retained its etymological meaning, though even then it was not always possible to translate it by male.

The same meaning has been retained in other languages in which this word can be traced. Thus, in Zend, *arshan* (the later *gushan*) is used to express the sex of animals in such expressions as *aspahé arshnô*, gen. a male horse; *varāzahe arshnô*, gen. a male boar; *géus arshnô*, gen. a male ox; but likewise in the sense of man or hero, as *arsha husrava*, the hero *Husrava*. In Greek we find *ἀρσην* and *ἀρρῆν* used in the same way to distinguish the sex of animals, as *ἀρσενες ἵπποι*, *βοῦν ἀρσενα*. In Latin the same word may be recognised in the proper name *Varro*, and in *vâro* and *bâro*.

We now come to another class of passages in which *vr̥ṣhan* is clearly intended to express more than merely the masculine gender. In some of them the etymological meaning of *spargere*, to pour forth, seems to come out again, and it is well known that Indian commentators are very fond of explaining *vr̥ṣhan* by giver of rain, giver of

good gifts, bounteous. The first of these meanings may indeed be admitted in certain passages, but in others it is more than doubtful.

II. *Vṛśhan*, fertilising.

I, 181, 8. *vṛśhā vām meghāḥ* may be translated, your raining cloud.

I, 129, 3. *dasmāḥ hī sma vṛśhanam pīnvasi tvākam*.

Thou art strong, thou fillest the rainy skin, i. e. the cloud.

See also IV, 22, 6; and possibly V, 83, 6.

It may be that, when applied to Soma too, *vṛśhan* retained something of its etymological meaning, that it meant gushing forth, poured out, though in many places it is impossible to render *vṛśhan*, as applied to Soma, by anything but strong. All we can admit is that *vṛśhan*, if translated by strong, means also strengthening and invigorating, an idea not entirely absent even in our expression, a strong drink.

III. *Vṛśhan*, strong.

I, 80, 2. *sāḥ tvā amadat vṛśhā madaḥ, sómah—sutāḥ*.

This strong draught inspirited thee, the poured out Soma-juice.

I, 91, 2. *tvām vṛśhā vṛsha-tvébhiḥ*.

Thou, Soma, art strong by strength.

I, 175, 1. *vṛśhā te vṛśhne induh vāgī sahasra-sātamaḥ*.

For thee, the strong one, there is strong drink, powerful, omnipotent.

In the ninth *Mandala*, specially dedicated to the praises of Soma, the inspiriting beverage of gods and men, the repetition of *vṛśhan*, as applied to the juice and to the god who drinks it, is constant. Indo *vṛśhā* or *vṛśhā indo* are incessant invocations, and become at last perfectly meaningless.

IV. *Vṛśhan*, epitheton ornans.

There can be no doubt, in fact, that already in the hymns of the Veda, *vṛśhan* had dwindled away to a mere epitheton ornans, and that in order to understand it correctly, we must, as much as possible, forget its etymological

colouring, and render it by hero or strong. Indra, Agni, the Asvins, Vishnu, the R̥ibhus (IV, 35, 6), all are *vr̥tshan*, which means no longer male, but manly, strong.

In the following passages *vr̥tshan* is thus applied to Indra :

I, 54, 2. *yák dhr̥ishnúnā sávasā ródasí (íti) ubhé (íti) vr̥tshā vr̥tsha-tvā vr̥tshabhāh ni-r̥iṅgáte.*

(Praise Indra) who by his daring strength conquers both heaven and earth, a bull, strong in strength.

I, 100, 1. *sák yák vr̥tshā vr̥tshnye bhih sám-okāh mahāh divāh pr̥ithivyāh ka sam-r̥āt satínā-satvá hávyah bháreshu marútvān nah bhavatu índrah ūtī.*

He who is strong, wedded to strength, who is the king of the great sky and the earth, of mighty might, to be invoked in battles,—may Indra with the Maruts come to our help!

I, 16, 1. *ā tvā vahantu hárayah vr̥tshanam sóma-pítaye, índra tvā sūra-kakshasah.*

May the bays bring thee hither, the strong one, to the Soma-draught, may the sunny-eyed horses (bring) thee, O Indra!

IV, 16, 20. *evā ít índrāya vr̥tshabhāya vr̥tshne bráhma akarma bhr̥t̥gavah ná rátham.*

Thus we have made a hymn for Indra, the strong bull, as the Bhr̥igus make a chariot.

X, 153, 2. *tvām vr̥tshan vr̥tshā ít asi.*

Thou, O hero, art indeed a hero; and not, Thou, O male, art indeed a male; still less, Thou, O bull, art indeed a bull.

I, 101, 1. *avasyávaḥ vr̥tshanam vágra-dakshinam marút-vantam sakhyāya havāmahe.*

Longing for help we call as our friend the hero who wields the thunderbolt, who is accompanied by the Maruts.

VIII, 6, 14. *ní sushne indra dharmasīm vágram gaghantha dásyavi, vr̥tshā hí ugra sr̥invishé.*

Thou, O Indra, hast struck the strong thunderbolt against Sushna, the fiend; for, terrible one, thou art called hero!

VIII, 6, 40. *vavridhánah úpa dyávi vr̥tshā vagrī aroravít vr̥itra-hā soma-pātamah.*

Growing up by day, the hero with the thunderbolt has roared, the *Vṛitra*-killer, the great Soma-drinker.

V, 35, 4. *vṛīshā hí ási rādhase gagñishé vṛīshni te sávak.*

Thou (Indra) art a hero, thou wast born to be bounteous ; in thee, the hero, there is might.

V. *Vārshishtā*, strongest, best, oldest.

It is curious to watch the last stage of the meaning of *vṛīshan* in the comparative and superlative *vārshiyas* and *vārshishtā*. In the Veda, *vārshishtā* still means excellent, but in later Sanskrit it is considered as the superlative of *vṛiddha*, old, so that we see *vṛīshan*, from meaning originally manly, vigorous, young, assuming in the end the meaning of old. (M. M., Sanskrit Grammar, § 252.)

Yet even thus, when *vṛīshan* means simply strong or hero, its sexual sense is not always forgotten, and it breaks out, for instance, in such passages as,

I, 32, 7. *vṛīshnah vādhriḥ prati-mānam búbhūshan puru-trā vṛitrāḥ asayat ví-astak.*

Vṛitra, the eunuch, trying to be like unto a man (like unto Indra), was lying, broken to many pieces.

The next passages show *vṛīshan* as applied to Agni :

III, 27, 15. *vṛīshanam tvā vayám vṛīshan vṛīshanah sám idhimahi.*

O, strong one, let us the strong ones kindle thee, the strong !

V, 1, 12. *ávoḥāma kaváye médhyāya vátak vandāru vṛīshabhāya vṛīshne.*

We have spoken an adoring speech for the worshipful poet, for the strong bull (Agni).

Vishnu is called *vṛīshan*, I, 154, 3 :

prá víshnave sūshám etu mánma giri-kshíte uru-gâyāya vṛīshne.

May this hymn go forth to *Vishnu*, he who dwells in the mountain (cloud), who strides wide, the hero !

Rudra is called *vṛīshan* :

II, 34, 2. *rudráḥ yát vak marutak rukma-vakshasak vṛīshā ágani prīsnýak sukré ūdhani.*

When *Rudra*, the strong man, begat you, O Maruts with

bright ornaments on your chests, in the bright lap of *Prisni*.

That the Maruts, the sons of Rudra, are called *vr̥ṣhan*, we have seen before, and shall see frequently again (I, 165, 1; II, 33, 13; VII, 56, 20; 21; 58, 6). The whole company of the Maruts is called *vr̥ṣhā gaṇāḥ*, the strong or manly host, i. e. the host of the Maruts, without any further qualification.

VI. *Vr̥ṣhan*, name of various deities.

Here lies, indeed, the chief difficulty which is raised by the common use of *vr̥ṣhan* in the Veda, that when it occurs by itself, it often remains doubtful who is meant by it, Indra, or Soma, or the Maruts, or some other deity. We shall examine a few of these passages, and first some where *vr̥ṣhan* refers to Indra :

IV, 30, 10. *āpa ushāḥ ānasaḥ sarat sám-pishāt āha mibhyúshī, ní yāt sīm sīmáthat vr̥ṣhā*.

Ushas went away from her broken chariot, fearing lest the hero should do her violence.

Here *vr̥ṣhan* is clearly meant for Indra, who, as we learn from the preceding verse, was trying to conquer Ushas, as Apollo did Daphne; and it should be observed that the word itself, by which Indra is here designated, is particularly appropriate to the circumstances.

I, 103, 6. *bhūri-karmane vr̥ṣhabhāya vr̥ṣhne satyá-sushmāya sunavāma sómam, yáḥ ā-dr̥ṣtya paripanthī-iva sūrah áyagvanah vi-bhāgan éti védah*.

Let us pour out the Soma for the strong bull, the performer of many exploits, whose strength is true, the hero who, watching like a footpad, comes to us dividing the wealth of the infidel.

Here it is clear again from the context that Indra only can be meant.

But in other passages this is more doubtful :

III, 61, 7. *ritásya budhné ushásām ishanyán vr̥ṣhā mahī (īti) ródasī (īti) ā vivesa*.

The hero in the depth of the heaven, yearning for the dawns, has entered the great sky and the earth.

The hero who yearns for the dawns, is generally Indra; here, however, considering that Agni is mentioned in the preceding verse, it is more likely that this god, as the light of the morning, may have been meant by the poet. That Agni, too, may be called *vr̥ṣhan*, without any other epithet to show that he is meant rather than any other god, is clear from such passages as,

VI, 3, 7. *vr̥ṣhā ruksháh óshadhīshu nūnot.*

He the wild hero shouted among the plants.

In VII, 60, 9, *vr̥ṣhanau*, the dual, is meant for Mitra and Varuna; in the next verse, *vr̥ṣhanah*, the plural, must mean the same gods and their companions.

That Soma is called simply *vr̥ṣhan*, not only in the ninth Mandala, but elsewhere, too, we see from such passages as,

III, 43, 7. *īndra p̥ība vr̥ṣha-dhūtasya vr̥ṣnah (ā yām te syenáh usatē gabhāra), yāsya mādē kyaváyasi prā krishāh yāsya mādē āpa gotrā vavārtha.*

Indra drink of the male (the strong Soma), bruised by the males (the heavy stones), inspirited by whom thou makest the people fall down, inspirited by whom thou hast opened the stables.

Here Sâyana, too, sees rightly that 'the male bruised by the males' is the Soma-plant, which, in order to yield the intoxicating juice, has to be bruised by stones, which stones are again likened to two males. But unless the words, enclosed in brackets, had stood in the text, words which clearly point to Soma, I doubt whether Sâyana would have so readily admitted the definite meaning of *vr̥ṣhan* as Soma.

I, 109, 3. *mā k̥hedma rasmīn iti n̥dhamānāh pitr̥nām saktīh anu-yākkhamānāh, indrāgnī-bhyām kām vr̥ṣhanah madanti tā hī ādrī (īti) dhishānāyāh upā-sthe.*

We pray, let us not break the cords (which, by means of the sacrifices offered by each generation of our forefathers, unite us with the gods); we strive after the powers of our fathers. The Somas rejoice for Indra and Agni; for the two stones are in the lap of the vessel.

First, as to the construction, the fact that participles are thus used as finite verbs, and particularly when the subject changes in the next sentence, is proved by other passages,

such as II, 11, 4. The sense is that the new generation does not break the sacrificial succession, but offers Soma, like their fathers. The Soma-plants are ready, and, when pressed by two stones, their juice flows into the Soma-vessel. There may be a double entendre in *dhishānāyāh upā-sthe*, which Sanskrit scholars will easily perceive.

When *vrīshan* is thus used by itself, we must be chiefly guided by the adjectives or other indications before we determine on the most plausible translation. Thus we read :

I, 55, 4. *sáh ít váne namasyú-bhih vakasyate káru gáneshu pra-bruvānāh indriyām, vrīshā khānduh bhavati haryatāh vrīshā kshémēna dhénām maghá-vā yát ínvati.*

In the first verse the subject may be Indra or Soma : 'He alone is praised by worshippers in the forest (or in the wooden vessel), he who shows forth among men his fair power.' But who is meant to be the subject of the next verse? Even *Sāyana* is doubtful. He translates first : 'The bounteous excites the man who wishes to sacrifice; when the sacrificer, the rich, by the protection of Indra, stirs up his voice.' But he allows an optional translation for the last sentences : 'when the powerful male, Indra, by his enduring mind reaches the praise offered by the sacrificer.'

According to these suggestions, *WILSON* translated : He (Indra) is the granter of their wishes (to those who solicit him); he is the encourager of those who desire to worship (him), when the wealthy offerer of oblations, enjoying his protection, recites his praise.

BENFEY : The bull becomes friendly, the bull becomes desirable, when the sacrificer kindly advances praise.

LANGLOIS : When the noble *Maghavan* receives the homage of our hymns, his heart is flattered, and he responds to the wishes of his servant by his gifts.

As far as I know, the adjective *khāndu* does not occur again, and can therefore give us no hint. But *haryatā*, which is applied to *vrīshan* in our verse, is the standing epithet of Soma. It means delicious, and occurs very frequently in the ninth *Mandala*. It is likewise applied to Agni, *Pūshan*, the *Haris*, the thunderbolt, but wherever

it occurs our first thought is of Soma. Thus, without quoting from the Soma-Mandala, we read, X, 96, 1, haryatám mādām, the delicious draught, i. e. Soma.

X, 96, 9. pítvā mādasya haryatāsyā āndhasaḥ, means having drunk of the draught of the delicious Soma.

VIII, 72, 18. padām haryatāsyā ni-dhānyām, means the place where the delicious Soma resides.

III, 44, 1. haryatāḥ sōmaḥ.

Delicious Soma.

II, 21, 1. bhara īndrāya sōmam yagatāya haryatām.

Bring delicious Soma for the holy Indra.

I, 130, 2. mādāya haryatāya te tuvíḥ-tamāya dhāyase.

That thou mayest drink the delicious and most powerful draught, i. e. the Soma.

If, then, we know that *vr̥ṣhan* by itself is used in the sense of Soma, haryatā *vr̥ṣhan* can hardly be anything else. *Vaḥasyate* also is peculiar to Soma in the sense of murmuring, or as it were talking, and never occurs as a passive. I therefore should prefer to assign the whole verse to Soma, and translate: He indeed, when in the wooden vessel, talks with his worshippers, proclaiming his fair power among men; the strong Soma is pleasing, the strong Soma is delicious, when the sacrificer safely brings the cow, i. e. the milk to be mixed with the Soma.

That Indra was thirsting for Soma had been said in the second verse, and he is again called the Soma-drinker in the seventh verse. A verse dedicated to Soma therefore seems to come in quite naturally, though the *Anukramanī* does not sanction it.

That the Maruts are called *vr̥ṣhan*, without further explanations, will appear from the following passages:

I, 85, 12. rayīm naḥ dhatta *vr̥ṣhanah* su-vīram.

Give us wealth, ye heroes, consisting of good offspring.

VIII, 96, 14. śhyāmi vaḥ *vr̥ṣhanah* yúdhyaata āgaú.

I wish for you, heroes (Maruts), fight in the race!

In all the passages which we have hitherto examined, *vr̥ṣhan* was always applied to living beings, whether animals, men, or gods. But as, in Greek, ἀρσεν means at last simply strong, and is applied, for instance, to the

crash of the sea, *κρύπος ὄρησιν πόντου*, so in the Veda *vr̥ṣhan* is applied to the roaring of the storms and similar objects.

V, 87, 5. *svanáḥ vr̥ṣhā*.

Your powerful sound (O Maruts).

X, 47, 1. *gagrībhṃá te dákshinam indra hástam vasu-yávaḥ vasu-pate vásūnām, vidmá hí tvā gó-patim sūra gónām asmábhyam kītrám vr̥ṣhanam rayīm dāḥ*.

We have taken thy right hand, O Indra, wishing for treasures, treasurer of treasures, for we know thee, O hero, to be the lord of cattle; give us bright and strong wealth.

Should *kītrá* here refer to treasures, and *vr̥ṣhan* to cattle?

X, 89, 9. *nī amítreshu vadhám indra túmram vr̥ṣhan vr̥ṣhānam arushám sīsihi*.

Whet, O hero, the heavy strong red weapon against the enemies.

The long *ā* in *vr̥ṣhānam* is certainly startling, but it occurs once more, IX, 34, 3, where there can be no doubt that it is the accusative of *vr̥ṣhan*. Professor Roth takes *vr̥ṣhan* here in the sense of bull (s. v. *tumra*), but he does not translate the whole passage.

III, 29, 9. *krinóta dhūmám vr̥ṣhanam sakhāyaḥ*.

Make a mighty smoke, O friends!

Strength itself is called *vr̥ṣhan*, if I am right in translating the phrase *vr̥ṣhanam sūshmam* by manly strength. It occurs,

IV, 24, 7. *tásmin dadhat vr̥ṣhanam sūshmam indraḥ*.

Indra may give to him manly strength.

VI, 19, 8. *ā naḥ bhara vr̥ṣhanam sūshmam indra*.

Bring to us, O Indra, manly strength.

VII, 24, 4. *asmé (īti) dádhat vr̥ṣhanam sūshmam indra*.

Giving to us, O Indra, manly strength.

See also VI, 19, 9, *sūshmaḥ vr̥ṣhabháḥ*, used in the same sense.

VII. *Vr̥ṣhan*, general and empty term of praise.

This constant play on the word *vr̥ṣhan*, which we have observed in the passages hitherto examined, and which give by no means a full idea of the real frequency of its

occurrence in the Veda, has evidently had its influence on the Vedic *Rīshis*, who occasionally seem to delight in the most silly and unmeaning repetitions of this word, and its compounds and derivatives. Here no language can supply any adequate translation; for though we may translate words which express thoughts, it is useless to attempt to render mere idle play with words. I shall give a few instances:

I, 177, 3. *ā tishtha rátham vrīshanam vrīshā te sūtāḥ sōmah pári-siktā mádhūni, yuktvá vrīsha-bhyām vrīshabha kshitnām hāri-bhyām yāhi pra-vátā úpa madrik.*

Mount the strong car, the strong Soma is poured out for thee, sweets are sprinkled round; come down towards us, thou bull of men, with the strong bays, having yoked them.

But this is nothing yet compared to other passages, when the poet cannot get enough of *vrīshan* and *vrīshabhā*.

II, 16, 6. *vrīshā te vágrah utá te vrīshā ráthah vrīshanā hārī (iti) vrīshabhāni āyudhā, vrīshnah mādasya vrīshabha tvām isishe índra sómasya vrīshabhásya trīpmuhi.*

Thy thunderbolt is strong, and thy car is strong, strong are the bays, the weapons are powerful, thou, bull, art lord of the strong draught, Indra rejoice in the powerful Soma!

V, 36, 5. *vrīshā tvā vrīshanam vardhatu dyaúh vrīshā vrīsha-bhyām vahase hāri-bhyām, sáh nah vrīshā vrīsha-rathah su-sipra vrīsha-krato (iti) vrīshā vagrin bhāre dhāh.*

May the strong sky increase thee, the strong; a strong one thou art, carried by two strong bays; do thou who art strong, with a strong car, O thou of strong night, strong holder of the thunderbolt, keep us in battle!

V, 40, 2-3. *vrīshā grāvā vrīshā mādah vrīshā sōmah ayám sūtāh, vrīshan indra vrīsha-bhih vritrahan-tama, vrīshā tvā vrīshanam huve.*

The stone is strong, the draught is strong, this Soma that has been poured out is strong, O thou strong Indra, who killest *Vritra* with the strong ones (the Maruts), I, the strong, call thee, the strong.

VIII, 13, 31-33. *vrīshā ayám indra te ráthah utó (iti) te*

vr̥ṣhanā hārī (īti), *vr̥ṣhā tvām sata-krato* (īti) *vr̥ṣhā hāvah*. *vr̥ṣhā grāvā vr̥ṣhā mādah vr̥ṣhā sōmah ayām sutāh*, *vr̥ṣhā yagnāh yām īnvasi vr̥ṣhā hāvah*. *vr̥ṣhā tvā vr̥ṣhanam* huve *vāgrin kītrābhih ūtī-bhih*, *vavānthā hī prāti-stutim vr̥ṣhā hāvah*.

This thy car is strong, O Indra, and thy bays are strong; thou art strong, O omnipotent, our call is strong. The stone is strong, the draught is strong, the Soma is strong, which is here poured out; the sacrifice which thou orderest is strong, our call is strong. I, the strong, call thee, the strong, thou holder of the thunderbolt, with manifold blessings; for thou hast desired our praise; our call is strong.

There are other passages of the same kind, but they are too tedious to be here repeated. The commentator, throughout, gives to each *vr̥ṣhan* its full meaning either of showering down or bounteous, or male or bull; but a word which can thus be used at random has clearly lost its definite power, and cannot call forth any definite ideas in the mind of the listener. It cannot be denied that here and there the original meaning of *vr̥ṣhan* would be appropriate even where the poet is only pouring out a stream of majestic sound, but we are not called upon to impart sense to what are *verba et praeterquam nihil*. When we read, I, 122, 3, *vātah apām vr̥ṣhan-vân*, we are justified, no doubt, in translating, 'the wind who pours forth water;' and X, 93, 5, *apām vr̥ṣhan-vasû* (īti) *sūryāmāsā*, means 'Sun and Moon, givers of water.' But even in some passages where *vr̥ṣhan* is followed by the word *vr̥ṣh*, it is curious to observe that *vr̥ṣh* is not necessarily used in the sense of raining or pouring forth, but rather in the sense of drinking.

VI, 68, 11. *īndrāvarunā mādhumat-tamasya vr̥ṣhnaḥ sōmasya vr̥ṣhanā* * ā *vr̥ṣhethām*.

* The dual *vr̥ṣhanau* occurs only when the next word begins with a vowel. Before an initial a, ā, i, the au is always changed into āv in the *Samhitā* (I, 108, 7-12; 116, 21; 117, 19; 153, 2; 157, 5; 158, 1; 180, 7; VII, 61, 5). Before u the preceding au becomes ā in the *Samhitā*, but the Pada gives au, in order to show that no Sandhi can take place between the two vowels (VII, 60, 9;

Indra and Varuṇa, you strong ones, may you drink of the sweetest strong Soma.

That *â-vrîsh* means to drink or to eat, was known to Sâyana and to the author of the Satapatha-brâhmana, who paraphrases *â vrîshâyadhvam* by *asnîta*, eat.

The same phrase occurs I, 108, 3.

I, 104, 9. *uru-vyâkâḥ gathâre â vrîshasva*.

Thou of vast extent, drink (the Soma) in thy stomach.

The same phrase occurs X, 96, 13.

VIII, 61, 3. *â vrîshasva—sutâsya indra ândhasaḥ*.

Drink, Indra, of the Soma that is poured out.

In conclusion, a few passages may be pointed out in which *vrîshan* seems to be the proper name of a pious worshipper :

I, 36, 10. *yâm tvâ devâsaḥ mânave dadhúḥ ihâ yâgishtham havya-vâhana, yâm kâṇvaḥ médhya-atithiḥ dhana-sprîtam yâm vrîshâ yâm upa-stutâḥ*.

Thee, O Agni, whom the gods placed here for man, the most worthy of worship, O carrier of oblations, thee whom *Kaṇva*, thee whom *Medhyâtithi* placed, as the giver of wealth, thee whom *Vrîshan* placed and *Upastuta*.

Here the commentator takes *Vrîshan* as *Indra*, but this would break the symmetry of the sentence. That *Upa-stutâḥ* is here to be taken as a proper name, as *Upastuta*, the son of *Vrîshṭihavya*, is clear from verse 17 :

agnîḥ pra âvat mitrâ utâ médhya-atithim agnîḥ sâtâ upa-stutâm.

Agni protected also the two friends, *Medhyâtithi* and *Upastuta*, in battle.

The fact is that whenever *upastutâ* has the accent on the last syllable, it is intended as a proper name, while, if used as a participle, in the sense of praised, it has the accent on the first.

X, 66, 7). Before consonants the dual always ends in *â*, both in the *Samhitâ* and *Pada*. But there are a few passages where the final *â* occurs before initial vowels, and where the two vowels are allowed to form one syllable. In four passages this happens before an initial *â* (I, 108, 3 ; VI, 68, 11 ; I, 177, 1 ; II, 16, 5). Once, and once only, it happens before *u*, in VIII, 22, 12.

VIII, 5, 25. yáthā *kit kánvam āvatam priyá-medham* upa-stutám.

As you have protected *Kanva*, *Priyamedha*, *Upastutá*. Cf. I, 112, 15.

VIII, 103, 8. prá mámhishthāya gāyata—úpa-stutāsa*h* agnáye (accent of the vocative).

Sing, O *Upastutás*, to the worthiest, to *Agni* !

X, 115, 9. *Iti tvā agne vrishī-hávyasya putráh* upa-stutāsa*h* *rishayah* avo*kan*.

By these names, O *Agni*, did the sons of *Vrishihavya*, the *Upastutás*, the *Rishis*, speak to you.

Vrishan occurs once more as a proper name in VI, 16, 14 and 15 :

tám ūm (*Iti*) tvā dadhya*ñ* *rishi* putrá*h* idhe átharva*ñ*, *vritra-hánam* puram-darám.

tám ūm (*Iti*) tvā páthya*ñ* *vrishá* sám idhe dasyuhán-tamam, dhanam-gayám ráne-rane.

Thee, O *Agni*, did *Dadhyak* kindle, the *Rishi*, the son of *Atharvan*, thee the killer of *Vritra*, the destroyer of towns ;

Thee, O *Agni*, did *Vrishan* *Páthya* kindle, thee the best killer of enemies, the conqueror of wealth in every battle.

Here the context can leave no doubt that *Dadhyak* and *Vrishan* were both intended as proper names. Yet as early as the composition of the *Satapatha-bráhmaṇa*, this was entirely misunderstood. *Dadhyak*, the son of *Atharvan*, is explained as speech, *Vrishan* *Páthya* as mind (*Sat. Br.* VI, 3, 3, 4). On this *Mahidhara*, in his remarks on *Vāg. Samh.* XI, 34, improves still further. For though he allows his personality to *Dadhyak*, the son of *Atharvan*, he says that *Páthya* comes from *pathin*, path, and means he who moves on the right path ; or it comes from *páthas*, which means sky, and is here used in the sense of the sky of the heart. He then takes *vrishan* as mind, and translates the mind of the heart. Such is a small chapter in the history of the rise and fall of the Indian mind !

MANDALA I, HYMN 86.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 11-12.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. O Maruts, that man in whose dwelling you drink (the Soma), ye mighty (sons) of heaven, he indeed has the best guardians¹.

2. You who are propitiated¹ either by sacrifices or from the prayers of the sage, hear the call, O Maruts!

3. Aye, the powerful man to whom you have granted a sage, he will live in a stable rich in cattle¹.

4. On the altar of this strong man (here)¹ Soma is poured out in daily sacrifices; praise and joy are sung.

5. To him let the mighty¹ Maruts listen, to him who surpasses all men, as the flowing rain-clouds² pass over the sun.

6. For we, O Maruts, have sacrificed at many harvests, through the mercies¹ of the swift gods (the storm-gods).

7. May that mortal be blessed, O chasing Maruts, whose offerings you carry off¹.

8. You take notice either of the sweat of him who praises you, ye men of true strength, or of the desire of the suppliant¹.

9. O ye of true strength, make this manifest with might! strike the fiend¹ with your lightning!

10. Hide the hideous darkness, destroy¹ every tusky² fiend. Make the light which we long for!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Gotama.

Verse 1=VS. VIII, 31; AV. XX, 1, 2; TS. IV, 2, 11, 1.

Verse 2=TS. IV, 2, 11, 2.

Verse 6=TS. IV, 3, 13, 5.

Verse 8=SV. II, 944.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Vímahas* occurs only once more as an epithet of the Maruts, V, 87, 4. Being an adjective derived from *máhas*, strength, it means very strong. The strong ones of heaven is an expression analogous to I, 64, 2. *diváh rish-vāsaḥ ukshánah*; I, 64, 4. *diváh nárah*. The Ait. Brāhmaṇa VI, 10, takes *gopā*, guardian, as Indra.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The construction of this verse is not clear. *Yagnā-vāhas* has two meanings in the Veda. It is applied to the priest who carries or performs the sacrifice:

III, 8, 3, and 24, 1. *várkaḥ dhāḥ yagnā-vāhase*.

Grant splendour to the sacrificer!

But it is also used of the gods who carry off the sacrifice, and in that case it means hardly more than worshipped or propitiated; I, 15, 11 (*Asvinau*); IV, 47, 4 (*Indra and Vāyu*); VIII, 12, 20 (*Indra*). In our verse it is used in the latter sense, and it is properly construed with the instrumental *yagnāḥ*. The difficulty is the gen. plur. *matīnām*, instead of *matībhiḥ*. The sense, however, seems to allow of but one construction, and we may suppose that the genitive depends on the *yagnā* in *yagnāvāhas*, 'accepting the worship of the prayers of the priest.' Benfey refers *yagnāḥ* to the preceding verse, and joins *hávam* to *víprasya matīnām*: 'Durch Opfer—Opferförderer ihr!—oder ihr hört—Maruts—den Ruf der Lieder, die der Priester schuf.'

The *Samhitā* text lengthens the last syllable of *srinutá*, as suggested by the metre.

If the accent allowed *yagñavâhasaḥ* to be taken as a genitive, the translation, as suggested by Ludwig, might be, 'Either for the sake of the sacrifices of the sacrificer, or because of the prayers of the sage, O Maruts, hear the call.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. The genitive *yâsya vâgīnaḥ* depends on *vīpra*. Anu-taksh, like anu-grah, anu-*gñā*, seems to convey the meaning of doing in behalf or for the benefit of a person. *Gántā* might also be translated in a hostile sense, he will go into, he will conquer many a stable full of cows.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Ludwig has pointed out that *asyā* may refer to the present sacrificer.

Verse 5.

Note 1. I have altered *ā bhúvaḥ* into *ābhúvaḥ*, for I do not think that *bhúvaḥ*, the second pers. sing., even if it were *bhúvat*, the third pers., could be joined with the relative pronoun *yáḥ* in the second pada. The phrase *vīsvāḥ yáḥ karshanīḥ abhí* occurs more than once, and is never preceded by the verb *bhuvah* or *bhuvat*. *Ābhúvaḥ*, on the contrary, is applied to the Maruts, I, 64, 6, *vidátheshu ābhúvaḥ*; and as there can be no doubt who are the deities invoked, *ābhúvaḥ*, the strong ones, is as appropriate an epithet as *vīmahas* in the first verse.

Note 2. *Sasrúshiḥ śshaḥ*, as connected with *sūra*, the sun, can only be meant for the flowing waters, the rain-clouds, the givers of *ish* or vigour. They are called *divyāḥ śshaḥ* :

VIII, 5, 21. *utá naḥ divyāḥ śshaḥ utá śndhûn varshathaḥ*.

You rain down on us the heavenly waters and the rivers.

WILSON translates: May the Maruts, victorious over all men, hear (the praises) of this (their worshipper); and may (abundant) food be obtained by him who praises them.

BENFEY: Ihn, der ob allen Menschen ragt, sollen hören die Labungen, und nahn, die irgend Weisen nahn.

LUDWIG: Hören sollen von ihm, der über allen menschen ist, die erden, seine bis zur sonne gelangten kräfte. In his

notes he would prefer: Von ihm sollen sie gegenwärtig hören, von ihm der alle menschen übertrifft (und die in die sonne weggegangen), die darbringungen.

Sroshantu does not occur again; but we find sróshan, I, 68, 5; sróshamāna, III, 8, 10; VII, 51, 1; VII, 7, 6.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The expression ávobhiḥ, with the help, the blessings, the mercies, is generally used with reference to divine assistance; (I, 117, 19; 167, 2; 185, 10; 11; IV, 22, 7; 41, 6; V, 74, 6; VI, 47, 12; VII, 20, 1; 35, 1, &c.) It seems best therefore to take *karshaní* as a name or epithet of the Maruts, although, after the invocation of the Maruts by name, this repetition is somewhat unusual. I should have preferred, 'with the help of our men, of our active and busy companions,' for *karshaní* is used in that sense also. Only ávobhiḥ would not be in its right place then. The same applies to the various reading in TS. IV, 3, 13, 5, where instead of ávobhiḥ we find máhobhiḥ. This too is used with reference to gods, and particularly to the Maruts; see I, 165, 5, note.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Par, with ati, means to carry over (I, 97, 8; 99, 1; 174, 9; III, 15, 3; 20, 4; IV, 39, 1; V, 25, 9; 73, 8; VII, 40, 4; 97, 4; VIII, 26, 5; 67, 2, &c.); with apa, to remove (I, 129, 5); with niḥ, to throw down. Hence, if used by itself, unless it means to overrun, as frequently, it can only have the general sense of carrying, taking, accepting, or accomplishing.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Vidá as second pers. plur. perf. is frequent, generally with the final 'a' long in the Samhitá, I, 156, 3; V, 41, 13; 55, 2.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Observe the long penultimate in rákshaḥ, instead of the usual short syllable. Cf. I, 12, 5, and see Kuhn, Beiträge, vol. iii, p. 456.

Verse 10.

Note 1. See note 1 to I, 39, 3.

Note 2. *Atrín*, which stands for *attrín*, is one of the many names assigned to the powers of darkness and mischief. It is derived from *atrá*, which means tooth or jaw, and therefore meant originally an ogre with large teeth or jaws, a devourer. Besides *atrá*, we also find in the Veda *átra*, with the accent on the first syllable, and meaning what serves for eating, or food :

X, 79, 2. *átrāni asmai paṭ-bhīk sám bharanti.*

They bring together food for him (Agni) with their feet.

With the accent on the last syllable, *atrá* in one passage means an eater or an ogre, like *atrín* :

V, 32, 8. *apādam atrām—mrīdhṛá-vākam.*

Indra killed the footless ogre, the babbler.

It means tooth or jaw :

I, 129, 8. *svayám sã rishayādhyai yã naḥ upa-īshé atrañh.*

May she herself go to destruction who attacks us with her teeth.

It is probably from *atrá* in the sense of tooth (cf. *δδόντες* = *ēdóntes*) that *atrín* is derived, meaning ogre or a devouring devil. In the later Sanskrit, too, the Asuras are represented as having large tusks, *Mahābh. V, 3572, damshīrino bhīmavegās ka.*

Thus we read I, 21, 5, that Indra and Agni destroy the Rakshas, and the poet continues :

āpragāḥ santu atrīnaḥ.

May the ogres be without offspring !

IX, 86, 48. *gahí vísvān rakshásah indo (īti) atrīnaḥ.*

Kill, O Soma, all the tusky Rakshas. Cf. IX, 104, 6; 105, 6.

VI, 51, 14. *gahí ní atrīnam pañim.*

Kill, O Soma, the tusky Pani.

I, 94, 9. *vadhañh duk-sāmsān āpa duk-dhyāñh gahí
dûré vā yé ānti vā ké kīti atrīnaḥ.*

Strike with thy blows, O Agni, the evil-spoken, evil-minded (spirits), the ogres, those who are far or who are near.

See also I, 36, 14; 20; VI, 16, 28; VII, 104, 1; 5; VIII, 12, 1; 19, 15; X, 36, 4; 118, 1.

MANDALA I, HYMN 87.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 6, VARGA 13.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Endowed with exceeding vigour and power, the singers, the never flinching, the immovable, the impetuous, the most beloved and most manly, have decked themselves with their glittering ornaments, a few only¹, like the heavens with the stars.

2. When you have seen your way through the clefts, like birds, O Maruts, on whatever road it be¹, then the casks (clouds) on your chariots trickle everywhere, and you pour out the honey-like fatness (the rain) for him who praises you.

3. At their racings the earth shakes, as if broken¹, when on the (heavenly) paths they harness (their deer) for victory². They the sportive, the roaring, with bright spears, the shakers (of the clouds) have themselves glorified their greatness.

4. That youthful company (of the Maruts), with their spotted horses¹, moves by itself; hence² it exercises lordship, invested with powers. Thou indeed art true, thou searchest out sin³, thou art without blemish. Therefore the manly host will help this prayer.

5. We speak after the kind of our old father, our tongue goes forth at the sight¹ of the Soma: when the singers (the Maruts) had joined Indra in deed², then only they took their holy names;—

6. These Maruts, armed with beautiful rings, obtained splendours for their glory¹, they obtained² rays, and men to celebrate them; nay, armed with daggers, speeding along, and fearless, they found the beloved domain of the Maruts³.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Gotama. No verse in SV., VS., AV.

Verse 2 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 7.

Verse 3 = TS. IV, 3, 13, 7.

Verse 6 = TS. II, 1, 11, 2; IV, 2, 11, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Ké *kit* refers to the Maruts, who are represented as gradually rising or just showing themselves, as yet only few in number, like the first stars in the sky. Ké *kit*, some, is opposed to *sarve*, all. The same expression occurs again, V, 52, 12, where the Maruts are compared to a few thieves. B. and R., and those who follow them, translate *usrāḥ iva strī-bhiḥ* by 'like cows marked with stars on their foreheads.' Such cows no doubt exist, but they can hardly be said to become visible by these frontal stars, as the Maruts by their ornaments. We must take *usrāḥ* here in the same sense as *dyāvāḥ*; II, 34, 2, it is said that the Maruts were perceived *dyāvāḥ ná strī-bhiḥ*, like the heavens with the stars.

I, 166, 11. *dûre-drīsaḥ yé divyāḥ-iva strī-bhiḥ*.

Who are visible far away, like the heavens (or heavenly beings) by the stars.

And the same is said of Agni, II, 2, 5. *dyaúḥ ná strī-bhiḥ kitayat ródasī (īti) ánu*. *Strībhiḥ* occurs I, 68, 5; IV, 7, 3; VI, 49, 3; 12. It always means stars, and the meaning of rays (*strahl*) rests, as yet, on etymological authority only. The evening sky would, no doubt, be more appropriate than *usrāḥ*, which applies chiefly to the dawn. But in the Indian mind, the two dawns, i. e. the dawn and the gloaming, are so closely united and identified, that their names, too, are frequently interchangeable.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I translate *yayī* not by a goer, a traveller, i. e. the

cloud (this is the explanation proposed by Sâyana, and adopted by Professor Benfey), but by path. Sâyana (TS. IV, 3, 13, 7) renders yayim by gatim. Etymologically yayí may mean either, and in some passages I feel doubtful as to which is the more appropriate meaning. But in parallel passages yayí is clearly replaced by yāma. Thus :

VIII, 7, 2. yát—yāmam subhrāḥ ákidhvam.

When you, bright Maruts, have seen your way.

See also VIII, 7, 4. yát yāmam yānti vāyú-bhiḥ.

When they (the Maruts) go on their path with the winds.

VIII, 7, 14. ádhi-iva yát girīnām yāmam subhrāḥ ákidhvam.

When you, bright Maruts, had seen your way, as it were, from above the mountains.

The same phrase occurs, even without yāma or yayí, in

V, 55, 7. ná párvatāḥ ná nadyāḥ varanta vaḥ yātra ákidhvam marutaḥ gákkhata ít u tát.

Not mountains, not rivers, keep you back ; where you have seen (your way), there you go.

Though yayí does not occur frequently in the Rig-veda, the meaning of path seems throughout more applicable than that of traveller.

V, 87, 5. tveshāḥ yayíḥ.

Your path, O Maruts, is blazing.

V, 73, 7. ugrāḥ vām kakuhāḥ yayíḥ.

Fearful is your pass on high.

I, 51, 11. ugrāḥ yayīm níḥ apāḥ srótasā asrigat.

The fearful Indra sent the waters forth on their way streaming.

X, 92, 5. prá—yayínā yanti síndhavaḥ.

The waters go forth on their path.

Ludwig takes kósa as buckets on the chariots of the Maruts, which seems right.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Cf. I, 37, 8, page 75. There is no authority for Sâyana's explanation of vithurā-iva, the earth trembles like a widow. Vithurā occurs several times in the Rig-veda, but never in the sense of widow. Thus :

I, 168, 6. *yát kyaváyatha vithurā-iva sám-hitam.*

When you, Maruts, throw down what is compact, like brittle things.

I, 186, 2 ; VI, 25, 3 ; 46, 6 ; VIII, 96, 2 ; X, 77, 4 (*vi-thuryáti*). The Maruts themselves are called *ávithura* in verse 1. Spiegel compares the Zend *aiwithura*. As to *ágma* and *yāma*, see I, 37, 8, page 75.

Note 2. *Súbh* is one of those words to which it is very difficult always to assign a definite special meaning. Being derived from *subh*, to shine, the commentator has no difficulty in explaining it by splendour, beauty ; sometimes by water. But although *súbh* means originally splendour, and is used in that sense in many passages, yet there are others where so vague a meaning seems very inappropriate. In our verse *Sáyana* proposes two translations, either, 'When the Maruts harness the clouds,' or, 'When the Maruts harness their chariots, for the bright rain-water.' Now the idea that the Maruts harness their chariots in order to make the clouds yield their rain, can hardly be expressed by the simple word *subhé*, i. e. for brightness' sake. As the Maruts are frequently praised for their glittering ornaments, their splendour might be intended in this passage, as it certainly is in others. Thus :

I, 85, 3. *yát subháyante añgī-bhiḥ tanūshu subhrāḥ dadhire virúkmataḥ.*

When the Maruts adorn themselves with glittering ornaments, the brilliant ones put bright weapons on their bodies.

VII, 56, 6. *subhā sóbhishthāḥ, sriyā sám-mislāḥ, ógah-bhiḥ ugrāḥ.*

The most brilliant by their brilliancy, united with beauty, terrible by terrors.

In I, 64, 4, I have translated *vákshaḥ-su rukmān ádhi yetire subhé* by 'they fix gold (chains) on their chests for beauty.' And the same meaning is applicable to I, 117, 5, *subhé rukmám ná darsatám ní-khátam*, and other passages : IV, 51, 6 ; VI, 63, 6.

But in our verse and others which we shall examine, beauty and brilliancy would be very weak renderings for

subhé. 'When they harnessed their chariots or their deer for the sake of beauty,' means nothing, or, at least, very little. I take, therefore, subhé in this and similar phrases in the sense of triumph or glory or victory. 'When they harness their chariots for to conquer,' implies brilliancy, glory, victory, but it conveys at the same time a tangible meaning. Let us now see whether the same meaning is appropriate in other passages :

I, 23, 11. *gáyatām-iva tanyatúḥ marútām eti dhṛishṇu-yā yāt súbham yāthána naráḥ*.

The thundering voice of the Maruts comes fiercely, like that of conquerors, when you go to conquer, O men !

Sāyana : 'When you go to the brilliant place of sacrifice.'

Wilson : 'When you accept the auspicious (offering).'

Benfey : 'Wenn ihr euren Schmuck nehmt.'

V, 57, 2. *yāthana súbham*, you go to conquer. Cf. V, 55, 1.

Sāyana : 'For the sake of water, or, in a chariot.'

V, 52, 8. *sárdhaḥ mārutam út samsa—utá sma té subhé naráḥ prá syandrāḥ yugata tmánā*.

Praise the host of the Maruts, whether they, the men, the quickly moving, have by themselves harnessed (the chariots) for conquest.

Sāyana : 'For the sake of water.' Cf. X, 105, 3.

V, 57, 3. *subhé yāt ugrāḥ prīshatīḥ áyugdhvam*.

When you have harnessed the deer for conquest.

Sāyana : 'For the sake of water.'

III, 26, 4. *subhé—prīshatīḥ ayukshata*.

They had harnessed the deer for victory.

Sāyana : 'They had harnessed in the water the deer together (with the fires).'

V, 63, 5. *rātham yuñgate marútaḥ subhé su-khám sūraḥ ná—gó-ishṛishu*.

The Maruts harness the chariot meet for conquest, like a hero in battles.

Sāyana : 'For the sake of water.'

I, 88, 2. *subhé kám yānti—ásvaiḥ*.

The Maruts go on their horses towards conquest.

Sāyana : 'In order to brighten the worshipper, or, for the sake of water.'

I, 119, 3. sám yát mitháḥ paspridhânāsaḥ ágmata subhé makhāḥ ámitāḥ gāyávaḥ ráne.

When striving with each other they came together, for the sake of glory, the brisk (Maruts), immeasurable (in strength), panting for victory in the fight.

Sâyana : 'For the sake of brilliant wealth.'

VII, 82, 5. marút-bhiḥ ugráḥ súbham anyáḥ íyate.

The other, the fearful (Indra), goes with the Maruts to glory.

Sâyana : 'He takes brilliant decoration.'

I, 167, 6. ā asthāpayanta yuvatīm yúvānaḥ subhé nímislām.

The Maruts, the youths, placed the maid (lightning on their chariot), their companion for victory (subhé nímislām).

Sâyana : 'For the sake of water, or, on the brilliant chariot.' Cf. I, 127, 6; 165, 1.

VI, 62, 4. súbham pr̥ksham ísham ūrgam váhantā.

The Arsvins bringing glory, wealth, drink, and food.

VIII, 26, 13. subhé kákrâte, you bring him to glory.

Subham-yāvan is an epithet of the Maruts, I, 89, 7; V, 61, 13. Cf. subhra-yāvāná, VIII, 26, 19 (Arvinau).

Subham-yā, of the wind, IV, 3, 6.

Subham-yú, of the rays of the dawn, X, 78, 7.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Sâyana : 'With spotted deer for their horses.' See I, 37, 2, note 1, page 70; as Pûshan is called agâsra, having goats for his horses, RV. V, 58, 2.

That the Maruts have not only pr̥ishatī, but horses for their chariots, we have seen before. In I, 88, 1, we have ásvaparnaiḥ ráthebhiḥ.

Note 2. Ayā is a word of very rare occurrence in the Rig-veda. It is the instrum. sing. of the feminine pronominal base ā or ī, and as a pronoun followed by a noun it is frequently to be met with; V, 45, 11. ayā dhiyā, &c. But in our verse it is irregular in form as not entering into Sandhi with íśanáḥ. This irregularity, however, which might have led us to suppose an original ayāḥ, indefatigable, corre-

sponding with the following ási, is vouched for by the Pada text, in such matters a better authority than the Samhitā text, and certainly in this case fully borne out by the Prātisākhya, I, 163, 10. Unless we read ayāh, we must take ayā as an adverb, in the sense of thus or hence; cf. VI, 66, 4. In some passages where ayā seems thus to be used as an adverb, it would be better to supply a noun from the preceding verse. Thus in II, 6, 2, ayā refers to samídham in II, 6, 1. In VI, 17, 15, a similar noun, samídghā or girā, should be supplied. But there are other passages where, unless we suppose that the verse was meant to illustrate a ceremonial act, such as the placing of a samídgh, and that ayā pointed to it, we must take it as a simple adverb, like the Greek τῷ: RV. III, 12, 2; IX, 53, 2; 106, 14. In X, 116, 9, the Pada reads áyāh-iva, not áyā, as given by Roth; in VI, 66, 4, áyā nú, the accent is likewise on the first.

Note 3. *Rina-yāvan* is well explained by B. and R. as going after debt, searching out sin. *Sāyana*, though he explains *rina-yāvan* by removing sin, derives it nevertheless correctly from *rina* and *yā*, and not from *yu*. The same formation is found in *subham-yāvan*, &c.; and as there is *rina-yā* besides *rina-yāvan*, so we find *subham-yā* besides *subham-yāvan*. Ludwig prefers the derivation from *yu*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The Soma-juice inspires the poet with eloquence.

Note 2. *Sāmi* occurs again in II, 31, 6; III, 55, 3; VIII, 45, 27; X, 40, 1. Grassmann has shown that it may be taken as an instrum. of *sāmi*, meaning work, but with special reference to the toil of the battle-field or the sacrifice. It is used in the former sense in

VIII, 45, 27. *vī ānaṣ turvāne sāmi*.

He (Indra) was able to overcome, lit. he reached to, or he arrived at the overcoming or at victory by toil.

But, like other words which have the general meaning of working or toiling, *sāmi* is used both in a general sense, and in the more special sense of sacrifice.

X, 40, 1. *vāstoḥ-vastoḥ váhamānam dhiyā sāmi*.

Your chariot, O Asvins, driven along every morning by thought and deed.

II, 31, 6. *apām nāpāt āsu-hémā dhiyā sāmī.*

Apām nāpāt (Agni) moving quickly by thought and deed.

In these two passages it might be possible, with a slight alteration of the accent, to read *dhiyā-sāmī* as one word. *Dhiyā-sām* would mean the sacrificer who is engaged in prayer; cf. *dhiyā-gūr*, V, 43, 15. Thus we read:

VI, 2, 4. *yāh te su-dānave dhiyā martaḥ saramate.*

The mortal who toils for thee, the liberal god, with prayer.

There is no necessity, however, for such a change, and the authority of the MSS. is against it. See also IX, 74, 7.

In III, 55, 3, *sāmī ākṛha* *ḍidyē pūrvyāni*, Roth takes *sāmī* as an acc. plur. neut., Lanman as an instrum., Grassmann as a locative.

I glance back at the former sacrifices. See B. R. s.v. *dī* and *sāmī*.

In other passages the feminine *sāmī* seems to mean work, sacrificial work, but, as far as we can see, not simply sacrifice. Thus the *R̥ibhus* and others are said to have acquired immortality by their work or works, *sāmī* or *sāmibhiḥ*, I, 20, 2; 110, 4; III, 60, 3; IV, 33, 4. Cf. IV, 22, 8; 17, 18; V, 42, 10; 77, 4; VI, 52, 1; VIII, 75, 14; IX, 74, 7; X, 28, 12. In VI, 3, 2, we read:

igē yagnēbhiḥ saramé sāmibhiḥ.

I have sacrificed with sacrifices, I have worked with pious works.

Here the verb *sam* must be taken in the sense of working, or performing ceremonial worship, while in other places (III, 29, 16; V, 2, 7) it may be perhaps taken in the more special sense of singing songs of praise. The Greek *κᾶμ-νω*, to work, to labour, to tire (Sanskrit *sāmyati*), the Greek *κομιδή* and *κομίζω*, to labour for or take care of a person, and possibly even the Greek *κῶμος*, a song or a festival (not a village song), may all find their explanation in the Sanskrit root *sam*.

The idea that the Maruts did not originally enjoy divine

honours will occur again and again : cf. I, 6, 4 ; 72, 3. A similar expression is used of the *Ribhus*, I, 20, 8, &c. But while originally the expression of obtaining sacred names meant no more than obtaining a sacred or divine character, it was soon taken literally, and a number of names were invented for the Maruts which even in the *Vāgasan. Samhitā* XVII, 80–85 amount to 49, i.e. 7×7 . *Yagnīya*, properly 'worthy of sacrifice,' has the meaning of divine or sacred. The Greek *ἄγιος* has been compared with *yāgya*, *sacrificio colendus*, which is not a Vedic word.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Sriyāse kām* seems to be the same as the more frequent *sriyé kām*. *Sriyāse* only occurs twice more, V, 59, 3. The chief irregularity consists in the absence of *Guna*, which is provided for by *Pāṇini's* *kasēn* (III, 4, 9). Similar infinitives, if they may so be called, are *bhiyāse*, V, 29, 4 ; *vridhāse*, V, 64, 5 ; *dhruvāse*, VII, 70, 1 ; *tugāse*, IV, 23, 7 ; *riñgāse*, VIII, 4, 17 ; *vriñgāse*, VIII, 76, 1 ; *rikāse*, VII, 61, 6. In VI, 39, 5, *rikāse* may be a dat. sing. of the masculine, to the praiser.

Note 2. *Mimikshire* from *myaksh*, to be united with. *Rasmī*, rays, after *bhānū*, splendour, may seem weak. It might be possible to assign to *rasmī* the meaning of reins, and take *rikvabhir* in the sense of sounding or tinkling. In V, 79, 8, *arśī* is used in juxtaposition with *rasmī*.

Note 3. The bearing of this concluding verse is not quite clear, unless we take it as a continuation of the preceding verse. It was there said that the Maruts (the *rikvānah*) obtained their holy names after having joined Indra in his work, which means that they then and there became what they are. Having thus obtained their true character and a place among the gods, they may be said to have won at the same time splendour, and worshippers to sing their praises, and to have established themselves in what became afterwards known as their own domain, their own place among the gods who are invoked at the sacrifice. See VII, 58, 1.

The metre requires that we should read *dhāmanāḥ*.

BENFEY translates : Gedeih'n zu spenden woll'n die schöngeschmücketen mit Lichtern, Strahlen mit Lobsängern regenen ; die brüllenden, furchtlosen, stürmischen, sie sind bekannt als Glieder des geliebten Marutstamms.

WILSON : Combining with the solar rays, they have willingly poured down (rain) for the welfare (of mankind), and, hymned by the priests, have been pleased partakers of the (sacrificial food). Addressed with praises, moving swiftly, and exempt from fear, they have become possessed of a station agreeable and suitable to the Maruts.

LUDWIG : Zu herlichkeit haben dise sich mit liechtglanz versehen, mit sausenden zügeln die schönberingten, schwertbewaffnet die kraftvollen, ohne furcht besitzen sie die freundliche Marutmacht.

MANDALA I, HYMN 88.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 6, VARGA 14.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Come hither, Maruts, on your chariots charged with lightning, resounding with beautiful songs¹, stored with spears, and winged with horses! Fly³ to us like birds, with your best food², you mighty ones!

2. They come gloriously on their red, or, it may be, on their tawny horses which hasten their chariots. He who holds the axe¹ is brilliant like gold;— with the tire² of the chariot they have struck the earth.

3. On your bodies there are daggers for beauty; may they stir up our minds¹ as they stir up the forests. For yourselves, O well-born Maruts, the vigorous (among you) shake² the stone (for distilling Soma).

4. Days went round you and came back¹, O hawks, back to this prayer, and to this sacred rite; the Gotamas making prayer with songs, pushed up the lid of the well (the cloud) for to drink.

5. No such hymn¹ was ever known as this which Gotama sounded for you, O Maruts, when he saw you on golden wheels, wild boars² rushing about with iron tusks.

6. This comforting speech rushes sounding towards you, like the speech of a suppliant: it rushed freely from our hands as our speeches are wont to do.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Gotama, the son of Rahûgana. The metre varies. Verses 1 and 6 are put down as Prastâra-paṅkti, i. e. as 12 + 12 + 8 + 8. By merely counting the syllables, and dissolving semivowels, it is just possible to get twenty-four syllables in the first line of verses 1 and 6. The old metricians must have scanned verse 1 :

ā vīdyunmāt-bhīh mārūtāh sū-ārkaīh
rāthēbhīh yāta-rishmat-bhīh āsvā-pārnaīh.

Again verse 6 : ēshā syā vāh mārūtāh anū-bhārtrī
prātī stobhātī vāghātāh nā vānī.

But the general character of these lines shows that they were intended for hendecasyllabics, each ending in a bacchius, though even then they are not free from irregularities. The first verse would scan :

ā vīdyunmāt-bhīh mārūtāh sū-ārkaīh
rāthēbhīh yāta-rishmat-(bhīh) āsvā-pārnaīh.

And verse 6 : ēshā syā vāh mārūtāh-anū-bhārtrī
prātī stobhātī vāghātāh nā vānī.

Our only difficulty would be the termination bhīh of rishmat-bhīh. I cannot adopt Professor Kuhn's suggestion to drop the Visarga of bhīh and change i into y (Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 198), for this would be a license without any parallel. It is different with sah, originally sa, or with feminines in ih, where parallel forms in ī are intelligible. The simplest correction would be to read rāthēbhīh yāta-rishmat-māntāh-āsvā-pārnaīh. One might urge in support of this reading that in all other passages where rishmat occurs, it refers to the Maruts themselves, and never to their chariots. Yet the difficulty remains, how could so simple a reading have been replaced by a more difficult one?

In the two Gâyatrî pâdas which follow I feel equally reluctant to alter. I therefore scan

ā varshishīthāyā nāḥ īshā vāyāḥ nā pāptatā sū-māyāḥ,
taking the dactyl of paptata as representing a spondee, and admitting the exceptional bacchius instead of the amphimacer at the end of the line.

The last line of verse 6 should be scanned :

āstobhāyāt vrīthāśām ānū svādhām gābhāstyōḥ.

There are two other verses in this hymn where the metre is difficult. In the last pâda of verse 5 we have seven syllables instead of eleven. Again, I say, it would be most easy to insert one of the many tetrasyllabic epithets of the Maruts. But this would have been equally easy for the collectors of the Veda. Now the authors of the Anukramanîs distinctly state that this fifth verse is virāḍrûpâ, i. e. that one of its pâdas consists of eight syllables. How they would have made eight syllables out of vi-dhāvataḥ varāhûn does not appear, but at all events they knew that last pâda to be imperfect. The rhythm does not suffer by this omission, as long as we scan vī-dhāvātāḥ varāhûn.

Lastly, there is the third pâda of the second verse, rukmaḥ na kītraḥ svadhiti-vân. It would not be possible to get eleven syllables out of this, unless we admitted vyūha not only in svādhītivân or svādhītī-vân, but also in kītrāḥ. Kuhn (Beiträge, vol. iv, p. 192) proposes to scan rukmaū na kītarāḥ svadhītivân. Nothing would be easier than to insert eshām after kītraḥ, but the question occurs again, how could eshām be lost, or why, if by some accident it had been lost, was not so obvious a correction made by Saunaka and Kātyāyana?

No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB.

Verse 1

Note 1. Alluding to the music of the Maruts, and not to the splendour of the lightning which is mentioned before. See Wolf, Beiträge zur Deutschen Mythologie, vol. ii, p. 137. 'Das Ross und den Wagen des Gottes begleitet munterer Hörnerschall, entweder stösst er selbst ins Horn,

oder sein Gefolge. Oft vernimmt man auch eine liebliche Musik, der keine auf Erden gleich kommt (Müllenhof, 582). Das wird das Pfeifen und Heulen des Sturmes sein, nur in idealisirter Art.' Ibid. p. 158.

Note 2. *Várshishtā*, which is generally explained as the superlative of *vriddha*, old (*Pân.* VI, 4, 157), has in most passages of the *Rig-veda* the more general meaning of strong or excellent: VI, 47, 9. *īsham ā vakshi īshām vārshishtām*; III, 13, 7 (*vásu*); III, 26, 8 (*rátna*); III, 16, 3 (*raí*); IV, 31, 15; VIII, 46, 24 (*srávaḥ*); IV, 22, 9 (*nṛimná*); V, 67, 1 (*kshatrā*); VI, 45, 31 (*mūrdhán*). In some passages, however, it may be taken in the sense of oldest (I, 37, 6; V, 7, 1), though by no means necessarily. *Várshishtā* is derived in reality from *vr̥shan*, in the sense of strong, excellent. See note to I, 85, 12, page 144.

Note 3. *Paptata*, the second person plural of the imperative of what is commonly, though without much reason, called the aorist of the causative of *pat*. It is curiously like the Greek *πίπτει*, but it has the meaning of flying rather than falling; see Curtius, *Grundzüge*, p. 190. Two other forms formed on the same principle occur in the *Rig-veda*, *paptaḥ* and *paptan*:

II, 31, 1. *prá yát váyaḥ ná páptan*.

That they may fly to us like birds.

VI, 63, 6. *prá vām váyaḥ—ānu paptan*.

May your birds fly after you.

X, 95, 15. *púrûravaḥ mã mr̥itháh mã prá paptaḥ*.

Purûravas, do not die, do not go away!

Verse 2.

Note 1. Though *svadhiti-vân* does not occur again, it can only mean he who holds the axe, or, it may be, the sword or the thunderbolt, the latter particularly, if Indra is here intended. *Svadhiti* signifies axe:

III, 2, 10. *svá-dhitim ná tégase*.

They adorned Agni like an axe to shine or to cut.

The *svádhiti* is used by the butcher, I, 162, 9; 18; 20; and by the wood-cutter or carpenter, III, 8, 6; 11; X, 89, 7, &c. Roth (s.v.) takes *svadhiti* as meaning also a tree,

possibly the oak, and he translates svadhiti^{vān} in our passage by a chariot made of the wood of the Svadhiti tree. In RV. IX, 96, 6, svádhiti^r vānānām may well mean 'the strong axe among woods,' the axe being naturally made of the strongest wood. In V, 32, 10, a devī svádhiti^ḥ is mentioned, possibly the lightning, the companion of Indra and the Maruts.

Note 2. The tire of the chariot of the Maruts is frequently mentioned. It was considered not only as an essential part of their chariot, but likewise as useful for crushing the enemy :

V, 52, 9. utá pavyā^ḥ ráthānām ádrim bhindanti ógasā.

They cut the mountain (cloud) with the tire of their chariots.

I, 166, 10. pavíshu kshurā^ḥ ádhi.

On their tires are sharp edges.

In V, 31, 5, tires are mentioned without horses and chariot, which were turned by Indra against the Dasyus (I, 64, 11). I doubt, however, whether in India or elsewhere the tires or the wheels of chariots were ever used as weapons of attack, as detached from the chariot ; (see M. M., On Pavítrava, in Beiträge zur Vergleichenden Sprachforschung, vol. iii, p. 447.) If we translate the figurative language of the Vedic poets into matter-of-fact terms, the tires of the chariots of the Maruts may be rendered by thunderbolts ; yet by the poets of the Veda, as by the ancient people of Germany, thunder was really supposed to be the noise of the chariot of a god, and it was but a continuation of the same belief that the sharp wheels of that chariot were supposed to cut and crush the clouds ; (see M. M., loc. cit., p. 444.)

Verse 3.

Note 1. That the vāśis are small weapons, knives or daggers, we saw before, p. 71. Sāyana here explains vāśi by a weapon commonly called āra, or an awl. In X, 101, 10, vāśis are mentioned, made of stone, asman-máyī.

The difficulty begins with the second half. Medhā, as here written in the Pada text, could only be a plural of

a neuter medhá, but such a neuter does nowhere exist in the Veda. We only find the masculine médha, sacrifice, which is out of the question here, on account of its accent. Hence the passage III, 58, 2, ūrdhvā^h bhavanti pitārā-iva médhā^h, is of no assistance, unless we alter the accent. The feminine medhā means will, thought, prayer: I, 18, 6; II, 34, 7; IV, 33, 10; V, 27, 4; 42, 13; VII, 104, 6; VIII, 6, 10; 52, 9; IX, 9, 9; 26, 3; 32, 6; 65, 16; 107, 25; X, 91, 8. The construction does not allow us to take medhā as a Vedic instrumental instead of medháyā, nor does such a form occur anywhere else in the Rig-veda. Nothing remains, I believe, but to have recourse to conjecture, and the addition of a single Visarga in the Pada would remove all difficulty. In the next line, if tuvi-dyum-nāsa^h be the subject, it would signify the priests. This, however, is again without any warrant from the Rig-veda, where tuvi-dyumná is always used as an epithet of gods. I therefore take it as referring to the Maruts, as an adjective in the nominative, following the vocatives maruta^h su-gātā^h. The conception that the Maruts stir up the forests is not of unfrequent occurrence in the Rig-veda: cf. I, 171, 3. That ūrdhvā is used of the mind, in the sense of roused, may be seen in I, 119, 2; 134, 1; 144, 1; VII, 64, 4. The idea in the poet's mind seems to have been that the thunderbolts of the Maruts rouse up men to prayer as they stir the tops of the forest trees. Ludwig takes medha, masc., in the sense of lance, comparing it with Icelandic meidhr, but the two words cannot well be the same. Possibly vana may be meant for lances: 'May they raise our minds, like lances;' see note to I, 171, 3.

Note 2. On dhan in the sense of to agitate, see B. and R. s. v. The shaking of the stone may be the shaking of the stone for distilling the heavenly Soma or the rain; but adri may also be meant for the thunderbolt. I now take tuvidyumna for an adjective referring to the Maruts, because it is a divine rather than a human epithet. Still, the passage is doubtful.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The first question is, which is the subject, áhāni

or *gr̥dhrah*? If *gr̥dhrah* were the subject, then we should have to translate it by the eager poets, and take *áhāni* in the sense of *visvā ahāni*. The sense then might be: 'Day by day did the eager poets sing around you this prayer.' There would be several objections, however, to this rendering. First, *gr̥dhrah*, though metaphorically applicable to poets, never occurs again as signifying poets or priests. One passage only could be quoted in support, IX, 97, 57, *kavayah ná gr̥dhrah* (not *gr̥dhrah*), like greedy poets. But even here, if indeed the translation is right, the adjective is explained by *kaví*, and does not stand by itself. Secondly, *áhāni* by itself is never used adverbially in the sense of day after day. The only similar passage that might be quoted is III, 34, 10, and that is very doubtful. To take *áhāni* as a totally different word, viz. as *á+hāni*, without ceasing, without wearying, would be too bold in the present state of Vedic interpretation. If then we take *áhāni* as the subject, *gr̥dhrah* would have to be taken as a vocative, and intended for the Maruts. Now, it is perfectly true, that by itself *gr̥dhra*, hawk, does not occur again as a name of the Maruts, but *syenā*, hawk, and particularly a strong hawk (IX, 96, 6), is not only a common simile applied to the Maruts, but is actually used as one of their names:

VII, 56, 3. *abhí sva-pūbhiḥ mithāḥ vapanta vāta-svanasaḥ syenāḥ aspridhran*.

They plucked each other with their beaks (?), the hawks, rushing like the wind, strove together.

Aguḥ might be the aorist of *gai*, to sing, or of *gā*, to go:

I, 174, 8. *sánā tã te indra návyāḥ ā aguḥ*.

New poets, O Indra, sang these thy old deeds.

III, 56, 2. *gāvaḥ ā aguḥ*.

The cows approached.

If then the sense of the first line is, 'Days went and came back to you,' the next question is whether we are to extend the construction to the next words, *imām dhīyam vārkāryām ka devīm*, or whether these words are to be joined to *krinvántaḥ*, like *bráhma*. The meaning of

vārkāryā is, of course, unknown. Sāyana's interpretation as 'what is to be made by means of water' is merely etymological, and does not help us much. It is true that the object of the hymn, which is addressed to the Maruts, is rain, and that literally vārkāryā might be explained as 'that the effect of which is rain.' But this is far too artificial a word for Vedic poets. Possibly there was some other word that had become unintelligible and which, by a slight change, was turned into vārkāryā, in order to give the meaning of rain-producing. It might have been *kārkārya*, glorious, or the song of a poet called Vārkara, or, as Ludwig suggests, *Vrikāri*. The most likely supposition is that vārkāryā was the name given to some famous hymn, some pæan or song of triumph belonging to the Gotamas, possibly to some verses of the very hymn before us. In this case the epithet devī would be quite appropriate, for it is frequently used for a sacred or sacrificial song: IV, 43, 1. devīm su-stutīm; III, 18, 3. imām dhīyam sata-séyāya devīm. See, however, the note to verse 6.

The purport of the whole line would then be that many days have gone for the Maruts as well as for the famous hymn once addressed to them by Gotama, or, in other words, that the Gotamas have long been devoted to the Maruts, an idea frequently recurring in the hymns of the Veda, and, in our case, carried on in the next verse, where it is said that the present hymn is like one that Gotama composed when he saw the Maruts or spoke of them as wild boars with iron tusks. The pushing up the lid of the well for to drink, means that they obtained rain from the cloud, which is here, as before, represented as a covered well.

See another explanation in Haug, *Über die ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Wortes Brahma*, 1868, p. 5.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Yógaṇa commonly means a chariot:

VI, 62, 6. areṇú-bhiḥ yógaṇebhiḥ bhugántā.

You who possess dustless chariots.

VIII, 72, 6. áśva-vat yógaṇam br̥hāt.

The great chariot with horses.

It then became the name for a distance to be accomplished without unharnessing the horses, just as the Latin *jugum*, a yoke, then a juger of land, 'quod uno jugo boum uno die exarari posset,' Pliny XVIII, 3, 3, 9.

In our passage, however, *yógana* means a hymn, lit. a composition, which is clearly its meaning in

VIII, 90, 3. *bráhma te indra girvanah kriyánte ánatidbhutá, imá gushasva hari-asva yóganá indra yá te ámanmahi.*

Unequalled prayers are made for thee, praiseworthy Indra; accept these hymns which we have devised for thee, O Indra with bright horses!

Note 2. *Varāhu* has here the same meaning as *varāhá*, wild boar (VIII, 77, 10; X, 28, 4). It occurs once more, I, 121, 11, as applied to *Vritra*, who is also called *varāhá*, I, 61, 7; X, 99, 6. In X, 67, 7, *vr̥sha-bhiḥ varāhaiḥ* (with the accent on the penultimate) is intended for the Maruts^a. Except in this passage, *varāha* has the accent on the last syllable. In IX, 97, 7, *varāhá* is applied to Soma.

Verse 6.

This last verse is almost unintelligible to me. I give, however, the various attempts that have been made to explain it.

WILSON: This is that praise, Maruts, which, suited (to your merits), glorifies every one of you. The speech of the priest has now glorified you, without difficulty, with sacred verses, since (you have placed) food in our hands.

BENFEY: Dies Lied—Maruts!—das hinter euch emporstrebt, es klingt zurück gleich eines Beters Stimme. Mühlos schuf solche Lieder er, entsprechend eurer Arme Kraft. (Note: Der zum Himmel schallende Lobgesang findet seinen Widerhall (wirklich, 'bebt zurück') in dem Sturm-

^a See Genthe, *Die Windgottheiten*, 1861, p. 14; Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 689. Grimm mentions *eburðrung* (boar-throng) as a name of Orion, the star that betokens storm.

geheul der Maruts, welches mit dem Geheul des Betenden verglichen wird.)

LUDWIG: Dises lied, o Marut, euch unterstützend (aufnemen) als eines priesters braust euch entgegen, nachbrausen hat es gemacht ohne mühe in (die) der nähe die göttliche weise (ihrer) arme.

My own translation is to a great extent conjectural. It seems to me from verse 3, that the poet offers both a hymn of praise and a libation of Soma. Possibly *vârkâryâ* in verse 4 might be taken in the sense of Soma-juice, and be derived from *valkala*, which in later Sanskrit means the bark of trees. In that case verse 5 would again refer to the hymn of Gotama, and verse 6 to the libation which is to accompany it. *Anu-bhartrî* does not occur again, but it can only mean what supports or refreshes, and therefore would be applicable to a libation of Soma which supports the gods. The verb *stobhati* would well express the rushing sound of the Soma, as in I, 168, 8, it expresses the rushing noise of the waters against the felines of the chariots. The next line adds little beyond stating that this libation of Soma rushes forth freely from the hands, the *gabhastis* being specially mentioned in other passages where the crushing of the Soma-plant is described :

IX, 71, 3. *âdri-bhiḥ sutâḥ pavate gâbhastyoḥ*.

The Soma squeezed by the stones runs from the hands.

The translation would then be : O Maruts, this comforting draught (of Soma) rushes towards you, like the speech of a suppliant ; it rushed freely from our hands, as our draughts (of Soma) are wont to do.

On *svadhâ*, see p. 32.

MANDALA I, HYMN 165.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 24-26.

TO THE MARUTS AND INDRA.

The Prologue.

The sacrificer speaks :

1. To what splendour do the Maruts all equally¹ cling², they who are of the same age, and dwell in the same nest? With what thoughts?—from whence are they come³? Do these heroes sing forth their (own) strength⁴, wishing for wealth?

2. Whose prayers have the youths accepted? Who has turned the Maruts to his own sacrifice? By what strong desire¹ may we arrest them, they who float through the air like hawks?

The Dialogue.

The Maruts speak :

3. From whence¹, O Indra, dost thou come alone, thou who art mighty? O lord of men², what has thus happened to thee? Thou greetest (us)³ when thou comest together with (us), the bright (Maruts)⁴. Tell us then, thou with thy bay horses, what thou hast against us!

Indra speaks :

4. The sacred songs are mine, (mine are) the prayers¹; sweet² are the libations! My strength rises³, my thunderbolt is hurled forth. They call for me, the hymns yearn for me. Here are my horses, they carry me hither.

The Maruts speak :

5. From thence, in company with our strong

friends¹, having adorned our bodies, we now harness our fallow deer² with all our might³;—for, Indra, according to custom, thou hast come to be with us.

Indra speaks :

6. Where, O Maruts, was that custom with you, when you left me alone in the killing of Ahi? I indeed am terrible, powerful, strong,—I escaped from the blows of every enemy¹.

The Maruts speak :

7. Thou hast achieved much with us as companions¹. With equal valour, O hero! let us achieve then many things, O thou most powerful, O Indra! whatever we, O Maruts, wish with our mind².

Indra speaks :

8. I slew *Vṛitra*, O Maruts, with (Indra's) might, having grown powerful through my own vigour; I, who hold the thunderbolt in my arms, have made these all-brilliant waters to flow freely for man¹.

The Maruts speak :

9. Nothing, O mighty lord, is strong¹ before thee; no one is known among the gods² like unto thee. No one who is now born³ comes near, no one who has been born. Do what thou wilt do⁴, thou who art grown so strong.

Indra speaks :

10. Almighty strength be mine alone, whatever I may do, daring in my heart¹; for I indeed, O Maruts, am known as terrible: of all that I threw down, I, Indra, am the lord.

Indra speaks :

11. O Maruts, now your praise has pleased me, the glorious hymn which you have made for me, ye

men!—for me, for Indra, for the joyful hero, as friends for a friend, for your own sake, and by your own efforts¹.

Indra speaks:

12. Truly, there they are, shining towards me, bringing blameless glory, bringing food. O Maruts, wherever I have looked for you, you have appeared to me in bright splendour: appear to me also now!

The Epilogue.

The sacrificer speaks:

13. Who has magnified you here, O Maruts? Come hither, O friends, towards your friends. Ye brilliant Maruts, welcoming¹ these prayers, be mindful² of these my rites.

14. The wisdom of Mânya has brought us hither, that he should help as the poet helps the performer of a sacrifice¹: turn hither quickly²! Maruts, on to the sage! the singer has recited these prayers for you.

15. May this your praise, O Maruts, this song of Mândârya, the son of Mâna¹, the poet, bring offspring² for ourselves with food. May we have an invigorating autumn, with quickening rain³.

NOTES.

A critical examination of Professor von Roth's remarks on this hymn, together with some supplementary notes of my own, will be found in the Preface to this volume.

According to the *Anukramanikâ* this hymn is a dialogue between Agastya, the Maruts, and Indra. A careful consideration of the hymn would probably have led us to a similar conclusion, but I doubt whether it would have led us to adopt the same distribution of the verses among the poet, the Maruts, and Indra, as that adopted by the author of the *Anukramanikâ*. He assigns the first two verses to Indra, the third, fifth, seventh, and ninth to the Maruts, the fourth, sixth, eighth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth to Indra, and the three concluding verses to Agastya. I think that the two verses in the beginning, as well as the three concluding verses, belong certainly to Agastya or to whoever else the real performer of the sacrifice may have been. The two verses in the beginning cannot be ascribed to Indra, who, to judge from his language, would never say: 'By what strong desire may we arrest the Maruts?' It might seem, in fact, as if the three following verses too should be ascribed to the sacrificer, so that the dialogue between Indra and the Maruts would begin only with the sixth verse. The third verse might well be addressed to Indra by the sacrificer, and in the fourth verse we might see a description of all that he had done for Indra. What is against this view, however, is the phrase *prábhṛitaś me ádriś*. If used by the sacrificer, it might seem to mean, 'my stone, i.e. the stone used for squeezing the Soma, has been brought forth.' But though Professor Roth assigns this meaning to *prábhṛita* in our passage, I doubt whether, in connection with *ádri*, or with *vágra*, *prábhṛita* can mean anything but hurled. Thus we read:

I, 61, 12. *asmaí ít ūm (íti) prá bhara—vritrāya vágram.*

Hurl thou, Indra, the thunderbolt against this *Vritra*.

V, 32, 7. *yát im vágrasya prá-bhṛitau dadābha.*

When Indra conquered him in the hurling of the thunderbolt.

I therefore suppose the dialogue to begin with verse 3, and I find that Langlois, though it may be from different reasons, arrived at the same conclusion.

There can be little doubt that the other verses, to verse 12, are rightly apportioned between Indra and the Maruts. Verse 12 might perhaps be attributed again to the worshipper of the Maruts, but as there is no absolute necessity for assigning it to him, it is better to follow the tradition and to take it as the last verse of Indra's speech. It would seem, in fact, as if these ten verses, from 3 to 12, formed an independent poem, which was intended to show the divine power of the Maruts. That their divine power was sometimes denied, and that Indra's occasional contempt of them was well known to the Vedic poets, will become evident from other hymns. This dialogue seems therefore to have been distinctly intended to show that, in spite of occasional misunderstandings between the Maruts and the all-powerful Indra, Indra himself had fully recognised their power and accepted their friendship. If we suppose that this dialogue was repeated at sacrifices in honour of the Maruts, or that possibly it was acted by two parties, one representing Indra, the other the Maruts and their followers, then the two verses in the beginning and the three at the end ought to be placed in the mouth of the actual sacrificer, whoever he was. He begins by asking, Who has attracted the Maruts to his sacrifice, and by what act of praise and worship can they be delighted? Then follows the dialogue in honour of the Maruts, and after it the sacrificer asks again, 'Who has magnified the Maruts, i.e. have not we magnified them?' and he implores them to grant him their friendship in recognition of his acts of worship. If then we suppose that the dialogue was the work of Mândārya Mānya, the fourteenth verse, too, would lose something of its obscurity. Coming from the mouth of the actual sacrificer, it would mean, 'the wisdom, or the poetical power, of Mānya has brought us to this, has induced us to do this, i.e. to perform this dialogue of Mānya, so that he, Mānya, should assist, as a poet assists the priest at a sacrifice.' Of course all this is and can only be guess-work.

We do not know the age of Mānya nor that of Agastya. We do not know whether they were contemporaries or not. But supposing that Mānya was present at the sacrifice, *vīpra* might be meant for Mānya; and in the last words, too, 'the singer has recited these prayers for you,' the singer (*garitā*) might again be Mānya, the powerful poet whose services the sacrificer had engaged, and whose famous dialogue between Indra and the Maruts was considered a safe means of winning their favour. It would be in keeping with all this, if in the last verse the sacrificer once more informed the Maruts that this hymn of praise was the work of the famous poet Māndārya, the son of Māna, and if he then concluded with the usual prayer for safety, food, and progeny.

No verse of this hymn occurs in the *Sāma-veda*; verse 3 = VS. XXXIII, 27; verse 4 = VS. XXXIII, 78; verse 6 = TB. II, 8, 3, 5; verse 8 = TB. II, 8, 3, 6; verse 9 = VS. XXXIII, 79.

Verse 1.

Note 1. As *saṁānī* occurs in the Veda as the feminine of *saṁāna* (cf. IV, 51, 9; X, 191, 3; 4), *saṁānyā* might, no doubt, be taken as an instrumental, belonging to *subhā*. We should then have to translate: 'With what equal splendour are the Maruts endowed?' *Sāyana* adopts the same explanation, while Wilson, who seems to have read *saṁānyāḥ*, translates 'of one dignity.' Professor Roth, s. v. *myaksh*, would seem to take *saṁānyā* as some kind of substantive, and he refers to another passage, I, 167, 4, *sādhāraṇyā-iva marútaḥ mimikshuḥ*, without, however, detailing his interpretation of these passages.

It cannot be said that *Sāyana*'s explanation is objectionable, yet there is something awkward in qualifying by an adjective, however indefinite, what forms the subject of an interrogative sentence, and it would be possible to avoid this, by taking *saṁānyā* as an adverb. It is clearly used as an adverb in III, 54, 7; VIII, 83, 8.

Note 2. *Mimikshuḥ* is the perfect of *myaksh*, in the sense of to be firmly joined with something. It has therefore a more definite meaning than the Latin *miscere* and the Greek *μίσγειν*, which come from the same source, i. e.

from a root mik or mig, in Sanskrit also mis in mis-ra ; (see Curtius, Grundzüge, p. 300.) There may be indeed one or two passages in the Veda where myaksh seems to have the simple meaning of mixing, but it will be seen that they constitute a small minority compared with those where myaksh has the meaning of holding to, sticking to ; I mean

X, 104, 2. mimikshúh yám ádraya^h indra túbhyam.

The Soma which the stones have mixed for thee.

This form cannot be derived from mimiksh, but is the 3rd pers. plur. perf. Parasm. of myaksh. It may, however, be translated, 'This Soma which the stones have grasped or squeezed for thee,' as may be seen from passages quoted hereafter, in which myaksh is construed with an accusative.

II, 3, 11. ghrítám mimikshe.

The butter has been mixed.

This form cannot be derived from mimiksh, but is the 3rd pers. sing. perf. Átm. of myaksh. If the meaning of mixing should be considered inadmissible, we might in this verse also translate, 'The butter has become fixed, solid, or coagulated.'

Leaving out of consideration for the present the forms which are derived from mimiksh, we find the following passages in which myaksh occurs. Its original meaning must have been to be mixed with, to be joined to, and in many passages that original sense is still to be recognised, only with the additional idea of being firmly joined, of sticking to, or, in an active sense, laying hold of, grasping firmly.

1. Without any case :

I, 169, 3. ámyak sã te indra risht^h asmé (Iti).

This thy spear, O Indra, sat firm for us.

This would mean that Indra held his weapon well, as a soldier ought to hold his spear. Ámyak is the 3rd pers. sing. of a second aor. Parasm., ámyaksham, ámyak(sh + t) ; (Sây. prâpnoti.) Cf. VIII, 61, 18.

2. With locative :

X, 44, 2. mimyáksha vágra^h nri-pate gabhásta.

In thy fist, O king, the thunderbolt rests firmly.

I, 167, 3. *mimyaksha yéshu sú-dhitâ—rishth.*

To whom clings the well-grasped spear.

VI, 50, 5. *mimyaksha yéshu rodasî nú devî.*

To whom the goddess Rodasî clings. (Sây. *samgakkhate.*)

VI, 11, 5. *ámyakshi sádma sádane prithivyâh.*

The seat was firmly set on the seat of the earth. (Sây. *gamyate, parigrhyate.*) It is the 3rd pers. sing. aor. pass.

VI, 29, 2. *â yásmin háste náryâh mimikshúh â ráthe hiranyáye rathe-sthâh, â rasmáyah gâbhastyoh sthûráyoh â ádhvan árvâsah vrishanah yugânâh.*

To whose hand men cling, in whose golden chariot the drivers stand firm, in whose strong fists the reins are well held, on whose path the harnessed stallions hold together. (Sây. *âsikyante, âpûryante; or âsiñkanti, pûrayanti.*)

X, 96, 3. *indre ní rûpâ háritâ mimikshire.*

Bright colours stuck or clung or settled on Indra. (Sây. *nishiktâni babhûvu; miheh sanantât karmâni rûpam.*)

3. With instrumental:

I, 165, 1. *kâyâ subhâ marútaḥ sám mimikshuh.*

To what splendour do the Maruts cling; or, what splendour clings to them?

V, 58, 5. *svâyâ matyâ marútaḥ sám mimikshuh.* (See also I, 165, 1.)

The Maruts cling to their own thought or will. (Sây. *vrishyâ samyak siñkanti.*)

I, 167, 4. *yavyâ sâdhâraṇyâ-iva marútaḥ mimikshuh.*

The Maruts cling to the young maid, as if she belonged to all. See I, 173, 12; VIII, 98, 8; or VI, 27, 6.

I, 87, 6. *bhânú-bhiḥ sám mimikshire.*

The Maruts were joined with splendour. (Sây. *medhum ikkhanti.*)

4. With accusative:

VIII, 61, 18. *ní yâ vágram mimikshátuḥ.*

Thy two arms which have firmly grasped the thunderbolt. (Sây. *parigrhñitaḥ.*)

Here I should also prefer to place VII, 20, 4, if we might read *mimikshe* or *mimyaksha*, for it is impossible to take *mimikshan* for anything but a participle of the desiderative of *mih*, which does not yield an appropriate meaning.

ní vágram índraḥ mīmikshan.

Grasping firmly the thunderbolt. (Sây. satrushu prâ-payan.)

VI, 29, 3. sriyê te pâdâ dūvaḥ ā mīmikshuḥ.

Thy servants embrace thy feet for their happiness. (Sây. āsiṅkanti, samarpayanti.)

Like other verbs which mean to join, myaksh, if accompanied by prepositions expressive of separation, means to separate. (Cf. vi-yukta, se-junctus.)

II, 28, 6. āpo (īti) sū myaksha varuṇa bhiyāsam māt.

Remove well from me, O Varuṇa, terror. (Sây. apagamaya.)

Quite distinct from this is the desiderative or inchoative verb mīmiksh, from mih, in the sense of to sprinkle, or to shower, chiefly used with reference to the gods who are asked to sprinkle the sacrifice with rain. Thus we read :

I, 142, 3. mādhvā yagñām mīmikshati.

(Narāsa) sprinkles the sacrifice with rain.

IX, 107, 6. mādhvā yagñām mīmiksha naḥ.

Sprinkle (O Soma) our sacrifice with rain.

I, 34, 3. tríḥ adyā yagñām mādhunā mīmikshatam.

O Asvins, sprinkle the sacrifice with rain thrice to-day!

I, 47, 4. mādhvā yagñām mīmikshatam.

O Asvins, sprinkle the sacrifice with rain!

5. Without mādhu :

I, 22, 13. mahī dyaúḥ prīthivī ka naḥ imām yagñām mīmikshatām.

May the great heaven and earth sprinkle this our sacrifice.

6. With mādhu in the accusative :

VI, 70, 5. mādhu naḥ dyāvāprīthivī (īti) mīmikshatām.

May heaven and earth shower down rain for us.

Very frequently the Asvins are asked to sprinkle the sacrifice with their whip. This whip seems originally, like the whip of the Maruts, to have been intended for the cracking noise of the storm, preceding the rain. Then as whips had possibly some similarity to the instruments used for sprinkling butter on the sacrificial viands, the Asvins are

asked to sprinkle the sacrifice with their whip, i. e. to give rain :

I, 157, 4. mādhu-matyā naḥ kāsayaḥ mimikshatam.

O Asvins, sprinkle us with your rain-giving whip.

I, 22, 3. táyā yagnām mimikshatam.

O Asvins, sprinkle the sacrifice with it (your whip).

7. Lastly, we find such phrases as,

I, 48, 16. sám naḥ râyā—mimikshvá.

Sprinkle us with wealth, i. e. shower wealth down upon us. Here mih is really treated as a Hu-verb in the *Ātmanepada*, though others take it for *mimikshasva*.

As an adjective, *mimikshú* is applied to Indra (III, 50, 3), and *mimikshá* to Soma (VI, 34, 4).

Note 3. I do not see how *étāsaḥ* can here be taken in any sense but that suggested by the Pada, *ā-itāsaḥ*, come near. Professor Roth thinks it not impossible that it may be meant for *étāḥ*, the fallow deer, the usual team of the Maruts. These *Etas* are mentioned in verse 5, but there the Pada gives quite correctly *étān*, not *ā-itān*, and *Sāyana* explains it accordingly by *gantūn*.

Note 4. The idea that the Maruts proclaim their own strength occurred before, I, 87, 3. It is a perfectly natural conception, for the louder the voice of the wind, the greater its strength, and vice versa.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Mānas* here, as elsewhere, is used in the sense of thought preceding speech, desire, or devotion not yet expressed in prayer. See Taitt. *Samh.* V, 1, 3, 3. *yat purusho manasābhigakḥhati tad vākā vadati*, what a man grasps in his mind, that he expresses by speech. Professor Roth suggests an emendation which is ingenious, but not necessary, viz. *mahā nāmasā*, with great adoration, an expression which occurs, if not in VI, 52, 17, at least in VII, 12, 1. We find, however, the phrase *mahā mānasā* in

VI, 40, 4. *ā yāhi sāvata usatā yayātha indra mahā mānasā soma-péyam*,

úpa bráhmāni srinavaḥ imā naḥ átha te yagnāḥ tanvė váyaḥ dhāt.

Come hither, thou hast always come, Indra, to our libation through our yearning great desire. Mayest thou hear these our prayers, and may then the sacrifice put vigour in thy body.

It is curious to observe that throughout the Rig-veda the instrumental singular mahā is always used as an adjective belonging to some term or other for praise and prayer. Besides the passages mentioned, we find :

II, 24, 1. ayā vidhema nāvayā mahā girā.

Let us sacrifice with this new great song.

VI, 52, 17. su-uktēna mahā nāmasā ā vivāse.

I worship with a hymn with great adoration, or I worship with a great hymn in adoration. VIII, 46, 14. gāya girā mahā ví-ketasam. Celebrate the wise Indra with a great song. Otherwise we might translate, Thou hast always come with a great yearning desire.

Verse 3.

Note 1. We ought to scan kūṭāḥ tvām īndrā māhīnāḥ sām, because yāsi, being anudatta, could not begin a new pāda. It would be more natural to translate kūṭāḥ by why? for the Maruts evidently wish to express their surprise at Indra's going to do battle alone and without their assistance. I do not think, however, that in the Rig-veda, even in the latest hymns, kūṭāḥ has as yet a causal meaning, and I have therefore translated it in the same sense in which it occurs before in the poet's address to the Maruts.

Note 2. Sat-pati, lord of men, means lord of real men, of heroes, and should not be translated by good lord. Sat by itself is frequently used in the sense of heroes, of men physically rather than morally good :

II, 1, 3. tvām agne īndraḥ vṛishabhāḥ satām asi.

Thou, Agni, art Indra, the hero among heroes.

I, 173, 7. samāt-su tvā sūra satām urānām.

Thee, O hero, in battles the protector of (good and true) men.

Note 3. The meaning of sām prikkhase is very much the same as that of sām vadasva in I, 170, 5.

Note 4. Subhānā is evidently meant as a name for the

Maruts, who thus speak of themselves in the third person, which is by no means unusual in the Rig-veda.

Mahidhara explains *subhânaiḥ* by *sobhanair vaṭanaiḥ*.

Verse 4.

Indra certainly addresses his old friends, the Maruts, very unceremoniously, but this, though at first startling, was evidently the intention of the poet. He wished to represent a squabble between Indra and the Maruts, such as they were familiar with in their own village life, and this was to be followed by a reconciliation. The boorish rudeness, selfishness, and boastfulness here ascribed to Indra may seem offensive to those who cannot divest themselves of the modern meaning of deities, but looked upon from the right point of view, it is really full of interest.

Note 1. *Bráhmâni* and *matáyaḥ* are here mentioned separately in the same way as a distinction is made between *bráhman*, *stóma*, and *ukthá*, IV, 22, 1; VI, 23, 1; between *bráhmâni* and *gíraḥ*, III, 51, 6; between *bráhma*, *gíraḥ*, and *stómaḥ*, VI, 38, 3; between *bráhma*, *gíraḥ*, *ukthá*, and *mánma*, VI, 38, 4, &c.

Note 2. *Sám*, which I have here translated by sweet, is a difficult word to render. It is used as a substantive, as an adjective, and as an adverb; and in several instances it must remain doubtful whether it was meant for one or the other. The adverbial character is almost always, if not always, applicable, though in English there is no adverb of such general import as *sám*, and we must therefore render it differently, although we are able to perceive that in the mind of the poet it might still have been conceived as an adverb, in the sense of 'well.' I shall arrange the principal passages in which *sám* occurs according to the verbs with which it is construed.

1. With *bhû*:

VIII, 79, 7. *bháva naḥ soma sám hridé*.

Be thou, Soma, well (pleasant) to our heart. Cf. VIII, 82, 3.

VIII, 48, 4. *sám naḥ bhava hridé á pítáḥ indo (íti)*.

Be thou well (sweet) to our heart, when drunk, O Soma !
Cf. X, 9, 4.

I, 90, 9. *sám naḥ bhavatu aryamā*.

May Aryaman be well (kind) to us !

VI, 74, 1. *sám naḥ bhûtam dvi-páde sám kátuk-pade*.

May Soma and Rudra be well (kind) to our men and cattle.

Here *sám* might be rendered as an adverb, or as an adjective, or even as a substantive, in the sense of health or blessing.

Cf. VII, 54, 1; IX, 69, 7. The expression *dvipád* and *kátuk-pad* is curiously like what occurs in the prayers of the Eugubian tables, *Fisovie Sansie, ditu ocre Fisi, tote Jovine, ocrer Fisie, totar Jovinar dupursus, peturpursus fato fito* (Umbrische Sprachdenkmäler, ed. Aufrecht, p. 198); and also in the edicts of Piyadasi, *dupada-katupadesu pakhivâlikalesu*, 'aux bipèdes, aux quadrupèdes, aux volatiles, aux animaux qui se meuvent dans les eaux.' See Burnouf, Lotus, p. 667.

II, 38, 11. *sám yát stotri-bhyaḥ âpáye bhávâti*.

What may be well (a pleasure) for the praisers, for the friend.

X, 37, 10. *sám naḥ bhava kákshasâ*.

Be kind to us with thy light !

2. With as :

VIII, 17, 6. *sómaḥ sám astu te hridé*.

May the Soma be well (agreeable) to thy heart !

I, 5, 7. *sám te santu prá-ketase*.

May the Somas be well (pleasing) to thee, the wise !

V, 11, 5. *túbhyam manîshâ iyám astu sám hridé*.

May this prayer be well (acceptable) to thy heart !

I, 114, 1. *yáthâ sám ásat dvi-páde kátuk-pade*.

That it may be well for our men and cattle. Cf. X, 165, 1 ; 3.

VII, 86, 8. *sám naḥ kshéme sám ûm (íti) yóge naḥ astu*.

May it be well with us in keeping and acquiring !

V, 7, 9. *â yáḥ te—agne sám ásti dhāyase*.

He who is lief to thee to support, i.e. he whom thou likest to support.

V, 74, 9. *sám ûm (íti) sú vâm—asmākam astu karkritih*.

Let there be happiness to you—glory to us !

3. With *as* or *bhû* understood :VI, 45, 22. *sám yát gáve ná sákíne.*

A song which is pleasant to the mighty Indra, as food to an ox.

VIII, 13, 11. *sám ít hí te.*

For it is well for thee.

X, 86, 15. *mantháh te indra sám hridé.*

The mixture is pleasant to thy heart, O Indra !

X, 97, 18. *áram kāmāya, sám hridé.*

Enough for love, pleasant to the heart.

VI, 34, 3. *sám tát asmai.*

That is pleasant to him.

VI, 21, 4. *káh te yagnáh mánase sám várāya.*

What sacrifice seems to thy mind pleasant to select ?

4. With *kar* :I, 43, 6. *sám naḥ karati árvate.*

May he do well to our horse, i.e. may he benefit our horses.

IV, 1, 3. *tokāya tugé—sám kridhi.*

Do good to our children and progeny, or bless us for the procreation of children.

VIII, 18, 8. *sám naḥ karataḥ asvínā.*

May the two Asvins do us good !

5. With *vah* :I, 157, 3. *sám naḥ ā vakshat dvi-páde kátuḥ-pade.*

May he bring blessing to us for man and cattle.

VIII, 5, 20. *téna naḥ—párve tokāya sám gáve, váhatam pīvaríḥ íshah.*

Bring to us rich food, a blessing to cattle, to children, and to the ox.

6. With verbs, such as *pû*, *vâ*, and others, where it is clearly used as an adverb :IX, 11, 3. *sáh naḥ pavasva sám gáve sám gánāya sám árvate, sám rāgan óshadhibhyaḥ.*

Do thou, king Soma, stream upon us, a blessing for the ox, a blessing for man, a blessing for the horse, a blessing for the plants. Cf. IX, 11, 7 ; 60, 4 ; 61, 15 ; 109, 5.

VII, 35, 4. *sám naḥ ishiráh abhí vātu vātah.*

May the brisk wind blow kindly upon us, or blow a blessing upon us!

VII, 35, 6. *sám nah tváshṭā gnābhiḥ ihā sṛinotu.*

May Tvashṭar with the goddesses hear us here well, i. e. auspiciously!

VII, 35, 8. *sám nah sūryah—út etu.*

May the sun rise auspiciously for us!

VIII, 18, 9. *sám nah tapatu sūryah.*

May the sun warm us well!

III, 13, 6. *sám nah soka—ágne.*

Shine well for us, O Agni!

Sám Yóh.

Sám also occurs in a phrase that has puzzled the interpreters of the Veda very much, viz. *sám yóh*. These are two words, and must both be taken as substantives, though originally they may have been adverbs. Their meaning seems to have been much the same, and in English they may safely be rendered by health and wealth, in the old acceptance of these words:

I, 93, 7. *dhattam yágamānáya sám yóh.*

Give, Agni and Soma, to the sacrificer health and wealth.

I, 106, 5. *sám yóh yát te mánuh-hitam tát ímahe.*

Bṛihaspati, we ask for health and wealth which thou gavest to Manu.

I, 114, 2. *yát sám ka yóh ka mánuh á-yegé pitā tát asyāma táva rudra prá-nītishu.*

Rudra, the health and wealth which Manu, the father, obtained, may we reach it under thy guidance.

II, 33, 13. *yāni mánuh ávrinīta pitā nah tā sám ka yóh ka rudráya varmi.*

The medicines which our father Manu chose, those I desire, the health and wealth of *Rudra*.

I, 189, 2. *bháva tokāya tánayāya sám yóh.*

Be to our offspring health and wealth!

IV, 12, 5. *yákkha tokāya tánayāya sám yóh.*

Give to our offspring health and wealth!

V, 69, 3. *īte tokāya tánayāya sám yóh.*

I ask for our offspring health and wealth.

VI, 50, 7. *dhāta tokāya tánayāya sām yóh.*

Give to our offspring health and wealth !

X, 182, 1. *átha karat yágamānáya sām yóh.*

May he then produce for the sacrificer health and wealth.

VII, 69, 5. *téna nah sām yóh—ní arvinā vahatam.*

On that chariot bring to us, Asvins, health and wealth.

III, 17, 3. *átha bhava yágamānáya sām yóh.*

Then, Agni, be health and wealth to the sacrificer.

III, 18, 4. *bṛihát váyah saramānéshu dhehi, revát agne visvāmitreshu sām yóh.*

Give, Agni, much food to those who praise thee, give to the Visvāmitras richly health and wealth.

X, 15, 4. *átha nah sām yóh arapáh dadhāta.*

And give us health and wealth without a flaw! Cf. X, 59, 8.

X, 37, 11. *tát asmé sām yóh arapáh dadhātana.*

And give to us health and wealth without a flaw!

V, 47, 7. *tát astu mitra-varunā tát agne sām yóh asmábhyam idám astu sastám.*

Let this, O Mitra-Varuna, let this, O Agni, be health and wealth to us ; may this be auspicious !

V, 53, 14. *vṛishṭvī sām yóh āpah usrí bhesagám syāma marutáh sahá.*

Let us be together with you, O Maruts, after health, wealth, water, and medicine have been showered down in the morning.

VIII, 39, 4. *sám ka yóh ka máyah dadhe.*

He gave health, wealth, and happiness.

VIII, 71, 15. *agním sām yóh ka dātave.*

We ask Agni to give us health and wealth.

X, 9, 4. *sám yóh abhí sravantu nah.*

May the waters come to us, as health and wealth, or may they run towards us auspiciously.

Note 3. If we retain the reading of the MSS. *súshmaḥ iyarti*, we must take it as an independent phrase, and translate it by 'my strength rises.' For *súshma*, though in this and other places it is frequently explained as an adjective, meaning powerful, is, as far as I can see, always a substantive, and means breath, strength. There may be a few passages in which, as there occur several words for strength, it might

be possible to translate *súshma* by strong. But even there it is better to keep to the general meaning of *súshma*, and translate it as a substantive.

Iyarti means to rise and to raise. It is particularly applied to prayers raised by the poet in honour of the gods, and the similes used in connection with this, show clearly what the action implied by *iyarti* really is. For instance,

I, 116, 1. *stómân iyarmi abhriyâ-iva vâtaḥ*.

I stir up hymns as the wind stirs the clouds.

X, 116, 9. *su-vakasyām iyarmi sīndhau-iva prā īrayam nāvam arkaḥ*.

I stir up sweet praise, as if I rowed a ship on the river with hymns.

In the sense of rising it occurs,

X, 140, 2. *pāvakā-varṇāḥ sukrā-varṇāḥ ānūna-varṇāḥ út iyarshi bhānūnā*.

Thou risest up with splendour, Agni, thou of bright, resplendent, undiminished majesty.

We might therefore safely translate in our verse 'my strength rises,' although it is true that such a phrase does not occur again, and that in other passages where *iyarti* and *súshma* occur together, the former governs the latter in the accusative. Cf. IV, 17, 12; X, 75, 3.

Mahādhara translates, 'my held-up thunderbolt moves on destroying everything,' but he admits another rendering in which *adri* would mean the stone used for pressing the Soma.

Verse 5.

Note 1. If, as we can hardly avoid, we ascribe this verse to the Maruts, we must recognise in it the usual offer of help to Indra on the part of the Maruts. The question then only is, who are the strong friends in whose company they appear? It would be well if one could render *antamébhiḥ* by horses, as Sāyana does, but there is no authority for it. *Svá-kshatra* is an adjective, meaning endowed with independent strength, synonymous with *svá-tavas*, I, 166, 2. It is applied to the mind of Indra, I, 54, 3; V, 35, 4; to the Maruts, V, 48, 1, but never to horses. As it stands, we can only suppose that a distinction is made between the Maruts and their followers,

and that after calling together their followers, and adorning themselves for battle, they proceed to harness their chariots. Cf. I, 107, 2.

Note 2. *Etán*, in all MSS. which I consulted, has here the accent on the first syllable, and Professor Aufrecht ought not to have altered the word into *etán*. If the accent had not been preserved by the tradition of the schools, the later interpreters would certainly have taken *etán* for the demonstrative pronoun. As it is, in spite of accent and termination, *Sâyana* in I, 166, 10, seems to take *étâh* for *eté*. In other passages, however, *Sâyana*, too, has perceived the difference, and in I, 169, 6, he explains the word very fully as *prishadvarnâ gantâro vâ asvâ vâ*. In this passage the *Etas* are clearly the deer of the Maruts, the *Prishatis*:

I, 169, 6. *ádha yát eshâm prithu-budhnâsaḥ étâh*.

In the next verse, however, *éta* seems applied to the Maruts themselves:

I, 169, 7. *práti ghorānām étānām ayāsām marútām srinve â-yatām upabdhī*.

The sound of the terrible, speckled, indefatigable Maruts is heard, as they approach; unless we translate:

The noise of the terrible deer of the indefatigable Maruts is heard, as they approach.

In I, 166, 10, *ámseshu étâh*, I adopt Professor Roth's conjecture, that *étâh* means the skins of the fallow deer, so that we should have to translate: On their shoulders are the deer-skins.

In the other passages where *éta* occurs it is used as a simile only, and therefore throws no light on the relation of the *Etas* to the Maruts. In both passages, however (V, 54, 5; X, 77, 2), the simile refers to the Maruts, though to their speed only, and not to their colour.

Note 3. *Máhaḥ-bhiḥ*, which I have translated 'with all our might,' seems to be used almost as an adverb, mightily or quickly (*makshu*), although the original meaning, with our powers, through our might, is likewise applicable. The original meaning is quite perceptible in passages like

V, 62, 3. *ádhárayatam prithivīm utá dyāṁ mītra-rāgānā varunā máhaḥ-bhiḥ*.

Kings Mitra and Varuna, you have supported heaven and earth by your powers.

VII, 3, 7. *tébhiḥ naḥ agne ámitaiḥ máhaḥ-bhiḥ satám pûrbhiḥ áyasibhiḥ ní páhi.*

With those immeasurable powers, O Agni, protect us, with a hundred iron strongholds.

I, 90, 2. *té—máhaḥ-bhiḥ, vratā rakshante visvāḥ.*

They always protect the laws by their powers.

VII, 71, 1. *tvám naḥ agne máhaḥ-bhiḥ páhi.*

Protect us, Agni, with thy power.

In other passages, however, we see *máhaḥ-bhiḥ* used of the light or of the flames of Agni and of the dawn :

IV, 14, 1. *deváh rókamānaḥ máhaḥ-bhiḥ.*

Agni, the god, brilliant with his powers.

VI, 64, 2. *devi rókamāná máhaḥ-bhiḥ.*

O goddess, brilliant with thy powers.

The powers of the Maruts are referred to by the same name in the following passages :

V, 58, 5. *prá-pra gāyante—máhaḥ-bhiḥ.*

The Maruts are born with their powers.

VII, 58, 2. *prá yé máhaḥ-bhiḥ ógasā utá sánti.*

The Maruts who excel in power and strength. Cf. III, 4, 6.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Indra in this dialogue is evidently represented as claiming everything for himself alone. He affects contempt for the help proffered by the Maruts, and seems to deny that he was at any time beholden to their assistance. By asking, Where was that custom that I should be with you and you with me in battle? he implies that it was not always their custom, and that he can dispense with their succour now. He wants to be alone, as in his former battle with Ahi, and does not wish that they should join him (cf. I, 33, 4). Professor Roth takes *sam-ádhatta* in the sense of implicating, but it can hardly be said that the Maruts ever implicated Indra in his fight against Ahi. Certainly this is not in keeping with the general tenor of this dialogue where, on the contrary, Indra shuns the

company of the Maruts. But while on this point I differ from Professor Roth, I think he has rightly interpreted the meaning of *ánamam*. Out of the four passages in which *badhasnañ* occurs, it is three times joined with *nam*, and every time has the sense of to bend away from, to escape from. See also Sonne, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xii, p. 348.

Verse 7.

Note 1. See VII, 39, 6. *sakshímáhi yúgyebhiñ nú devañ*.

Note 2. The last words leave no doubt as to their meaning, for the phrase is one of frequent occurrence. The only difficulty is the vocative *marutañ*, where we should expect the nominative. It is quite possible, however, that the Maruts should here address themselves, though, no doubt, it would be easy to alter the accent. As to the phrase itself, see

VIII, 61, 4. *táthá ít asat índra krátvá yáthá vásañ*.

May it be so, O Indra, as thou mayest desire by thy mind.

VIII, 66, 4. *vagríñ—ít karat índrañ krátvá yáthá vásat*.

May Indra with the thunderbolt act as he may desire in his mind. Cf. VIII, 20, 17; 28, 4, &c.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Here again Indra claims everything for himself, denying that the Maruts in any way assisted him while performing his great deeds. These deeds are the killing of *Vṛitra*, who withholds the waters, i. e. the rain from the earth, and the consequent liberation of the waters, so that they flow down freely for the benefit of Manu, that is, of man.

When Indra says that he slew *Vṛitra indriyēna*, he evidently chooses that word with a purpose, and we must therefore translate it here, not only by might, but by Indra's peculiar might. *Indriyá*, as derived from *índra*, means originally Indra-hood, then power in general, just as *verethraghna* in Zend means victory in general, though originally it meant the slaying of *Vṛitra*.

On *bádhīm*, see Bollensen, *Z. D. M. G.* XXII, p. 594.

He takes *bádhiṃ* for a contraction of *badhisham*, in analogy with *badhiṣ* and *badhīt*. He refers to *akramiṃ*, X, 166, 5, and *badhiṃ*, X, 28, 7.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Ánutta*, in the sense of 'not shaken,' not shakeable, *inébranlable*, is strange; likewise the genitive, where we expect the instrumental. Still, *nud*, by itself, occurs in similar phrases, e. g. VI, 17, 5, *nutthák ákyutam*, thou shookest what is unshakeable, which might have been expressed by *ákukyavaḥ ánuttam*, and I cannot bring myself to believe that in our passage Aufrecht's conjectural emendation is called for. He (K. Z. XXVI, 611) takes *ánutta* for *ánudatta*, like *pratta* for *pradatta*, &c., and proposes to omit the negative particle, translating the verse: 'Certainly it is conceded to thee, there is none among the gods like unto thee.'

But though I cannot adopt this emendation here, I think that in other passages Aufrecht's rendering of *ánutta* is far more appropriate than to take it for *a-nutta*; for instance, I, 80, 7; III, 31, 13; VII, 34, 11.

There remains one verse in which *anutta* seems to mean not shaken, not overcome, namely, VIII, 90, 5, *tvám vritráni hamsi apratīni ékaḥ ít ánuttá karshani-dhrítá*, thou, being alone, killest the irresistible enemies with the thunderbolt (?). However, *anudá*, in the sense of conceding, yielding, *nachgeben*, is certainly a very familiar idea in Vedic poetry.

II, 12, 10. *yák sárdhate ná anu-dádāti sridhyám*, who does not forgive the hurter his hurt.

I, 53, 8; II, 21, 4; 23, 11; X, 38, 5, *Indra* is called *ananudák*, not yielding, not surrendering.

We must therefore admit two *anuttas*, one *á-nutta*, the other *ánu(da)tta*. In *ánutta-manyu* I prefer the former, 'of irresistible fury,' while Aufrecht prefers the latter, 'of recognised, or universally-admitted fury.'

Note 2. *Devátá* in the ordinary sense of a deity never occurs in the *Rig-veda*. The word, in fact, as a feminine substantive occurs but twice, and in the tenth *Mandala*

only. But even there it does not mean deity. In X, 24, 6, *devāḥ devátayā* means, O gods, by your godhead, i.e. by your divine power. In X, 98, 1, *br̥haspate prāti me devátām ihi*, I take *devátā* in the same sense as *devátāti*, and translate, O *Br̥haspati*, come to my sacrifice.

In all other places where *devátā* occurs in the Rig-veda it is a local adverb, and means among the gods. I shall only quote those passages in which Professor Roth assigns to *devátā* a different meaning :

I, 55, 3. *prā vīryēṇa devátā āti kekite*.

He is pre-eminent among the gods by his strength.

I, 22, 5. *sáḥ kēttā devátā padám*.

He knows the place among the gods.

I, 100, 15. *ná yásya devāḥ devátā ná mártāḥ āpah kánā sávasaḥ ántam āpúḥ*.

He, the end of whose power neither the gods among the gods, nor mortals, nor even the waters have reached.

Here the translation of *devátā* in the sense of 'by their godhead,' would be equally applicable, yet nothing would be gained as, in either case, *devátā* is a weak repetition.

VI, 4, 7. *índram ná tvā sávasā devátā vāyúm prínanti rāḍhasā nṛt-tamāḥ*.

The best among men celebrate thee, O Agni, as like unto Indra in strength among the gods, as like unto Vāyu in liberality. See also *devatāti*, VIII, 74, 3 ; X, 8, 2.

Note 3. The juxta-position of *gāyamānaḥ* and *gātāḥ* would seem to show that, if the latter had a past, the former had a future meaning. To us, 'No one who will be born and no one who has been born,' would certainly sound more natural. The Hindu, however, is familiar with the idea as here expressed, and in order to comprehend all beings, he speaks of those who are born and those who are being born. Thus in a *Padasishṭa* of the *Pāvamānīs* (IX, 67) we read :

yan me garbhe vasataḥ pápam ugram,
yag gāyamānasya ka kimkid anyat,
gātasya ka yak kāpi vardhato me,
tat pávamānibhir aham punāmi.

Note 4. *Karishyā* is written in all the MSS. without a

Visarga, and unless we add the Visarga on our own authority, we should have to take it as an entirely anomalous acc. plur. neut. of a passive participle of the future, *karishyám* standing for *kāryām*, *faciendum*. It is much easier, however, to explain this form if we add the Visarga, and read *karishyāḥ*, which would then be a second person singular of a Vedic conjunctive of the future. This form occurs at least once more in the Veda :

IV, 30, 23. *utá nūnám yát indriyám karishyāḥ indra paúmsyam, adyá nákiḥ tát ā minat.*

O Indra, let no man destroy to-day whatever manly feat thou art now going to achieve.

Verse 10.

Note 1. As I have translated these words, they sound rather abrupt. The meaning, however, would be clear enough, viz. almighty power belongs to me, therefore I can dare and do. If this abrupt expression should offend, it may be avoided, by taking the participle *dadhṛishván* as a finite verb, and translating, Whatever I have been daring, I shall do according to my will.

Verse 11.

Note 1. In this verse Indra, after having declined with no uncertain sound the friendship of the Maruts, seems to repent himself of his unkindness towards his old friends. The words of praise which they addressed to him in verse 9, in spite of the rebuff they had received from Indra, have touched his heart, and we may suppose that, after this, their reconciliation was complete. The words of Indra are clear enough, the only difficulty occurs in the last words; which are so idiomatic that it is impossible to render them in English. In *tanvë tanúbhiḥ*, literally for the body by the bodies, *tanû* is used like the pronoun self. Both must therefore refer to the same subject. We cannot translate 'for myself made by yourselves,' but must take the two words together, so that they should mean, 'the hymn which you have made for your own benefit and by your own exertions.'

Verse 13.

Note 1. Spiegel, in his review, called my attention to the Zend *api-vat*, which Burnouf discussed in his 'Études,' p. 328. Burnouf tries to show that *vat* in Zend has the meaning of knowing, and that it occurs with the preposition *api*, in *apivatahê* and *apivatâiti*. If this is the same word as in Sanskrit, then *apivâtayati* would be a causative, meaning to make known. The meaning of *vat*, however, is doubtful in Zend, and hardly appropriate in the few passages where it occurs in the Veda. Roth, in the Dictionary, explains *vat* by *verstehn*, *begreifen*, the causative by *begreiflich machen*; but in our passage he translates it by *belebend*, Ludwig by *aufspürend*. Till we get more light, I shall feel content to translate *apivat* by to approach, to obtain, and the causative by to make approach, to invite, to welcome.

The following are the passages in which *api-vat* occurs :
VII, 3, 10. *âpi krátum su-kétasam vatemala*.

May we obtain an excellent understanding; not, Awaken in us a good sense.

VII, 60, 6. *âpi krátum su-kétasam vátantaḥ*.

They (Mitra and Varuṇa) obtaining an excellent understanding.

I, 128, 2. *tám yagñā-sādhām âpi vâtayâmasi*.

Him, Agni, the performer of the sacrifice, we make approach, we invite.

X, 20, 1; 25, 1. *bhádram naḥ âpi vâtaya mánah, dáksham utá krátum*.

Bring to us, i. e. give us, a good mind, and a strong understanding.

X, 13, 5. *pitré putrásaḥ âpi avíwatan rítam*.

The sons obtained the right for the father (an obscure verse).

As to *svapivâta*, VII, 46, 3, I should derive it from *van*, in the sense of implored, desired; see, however, Muir, Sanskrit Texts, IV, p. 314, note; Nirukta, ed. Roth, p. 135.

Note 2. On *návedāḥ*, see IV, 23, 4.

Verse 14.

Note 1. This is a verse which, without some conjectural

alterations, it seems impossible to translate. *Sâyana*, of course, has a translation ready for it, so has *M. Langlois*, but both of them offend against the simplest rules of grammar and logic. The first question is, who is meant by *asmān* (which is here used as an *amphimacer*), the sacrificers or the *Maruts*? The verb *ā kakré* would well apply to the *medhā manyāsya*, the hymn of *Mānya*, which is intended to bring the *Maruts* to the sacrifice, this bringing to the sacrifice being the very meaning of *ā kar*. But then we have the vocative *marutaḥ* in the next line, and even if we changed the vocative into the accusative, we should not gain much, as the *Maruts* could hardly call upon anybody to turn them towards the sage.

If, on the contrary, we admit that *asmān* refers to those who offer the sacrifice, then we must make a distinction, which, it is true, is not an unusual one, between those who here speak of themselves in the first person, and who provide the sacrifice, and the poet *Māndārya Mānya*, who was employed by them to compose or to recite this hymn.

But even if we adopt this alternative, many difficulties still remain. First of all, we have to change the accent of *kakré* into *kakre*, which may seem a slight change, but is not the less objectionable when we consider that in our emendations of the Vedic hymns we must think rather of accidents that might happen in oral traditions than of the *lapsus calami* of later scribes. Secondly, we must suppose that the hymn of *Māndārya Mānya* ends with verse 13, and that the last verses were supplied by the sacrificers themselves. Possibly the dialogue only, from verse 3 to verse 12, was the work of *Mānya*, and the rest added at some solemn occasion.

Other difficulties, however, remain. *Duvasyāt* is taken by *Sâyana* as an ablative of *duvasyā*, worthy of *dúvas*, i. e. of worship, of sacrifice. Unfortunately this *duvasyā* does not occur again, though it would be formed quite regularly, like *namasyā*, worthy of worship, from *nāmas*, worship.

If we take *duvasyāt* as the 3rd pers. sing. of the present in the Vedic conjunctive, we must also confess that this conjunctive does not occur again. But the verb *duvasyati*

occurs frequently. It seems to have two meanings. It is derived from *dúvas*, which in the Vedic language means worship or sacrifice, just as *karma*, work, has assumed the special sense of sacrifice. Derived from *dúvas* in this sense, *duvasyati* means to worship. But *dúvas* meant originally any *opus operatum*. The root from which *dúvas* is derived, is lost in Sanskrit, but it exists in other languages. It must have been *du* or *dû* in the sense of acting, or sedulously working. It exists in Zend as *du*, to do, in Gothic as *táujan*, *gataujan*, Old High-German *zawjan*, Modern German *zauen* (Grimm, Gram. i². p. 1041). The Gothic *tavi*, *opus*, Old High-German *zouwi*, Middle High-German *gezöuwe* (Grimm, Gram. iii. p. 499), come from the same source; and it is possible, too, that the Old Norse *taufr*, modern *töfrar*, incantamenta, the Old High-German *zoupar*, Middle High-German *zouber*, both neuter, and the modern *Zauber*, may find their explanation in the Sanskrit *dúvas*. Derived from *dúvas*, in the sense of work, we have *duvasyati* in the sense of helping, providing, the German *schaffen* and *verschaffen*.

In the sense of worshipping, *duvasyati* occurs,

III, 2, 8. *duvasyáta—gâtá-vedasam*.

Worship *Gâtavedas*.

V, 28, 6. *ā guhota duvasyáta agním*.

Invoke, worship Agni. Cf. III, 13, 3; 1, 13.

III, 3, 1. *agníh hí devān—duvasyáti*.

Agni performs the worship of the gods. Cf. VII, 82, 5.

I, 167, 6. *sutá-somaḥ duvasyán*.

He who has poured out Soma and worships.

In many passages *duvasyati* is joined with an instrumental:

V, 42, 11. *námaḥ-bhiḥ devám—duvasya*.

Worship the god with praises.

I, 78, 2. *tám u tvā gótamaḥ girā—duvasyati*.

Gotama worships thee with a song.

V, 49, 2. *su-uktaíḥ devám—duvasya*.

Worship the god with hymns.

VI, 16, 46. *vitṛ yáḥ devám—duvasyét*.

He who worships the god with a feast.

X, 14, 1. yamám—havíśhâ duvasya.

Worship Yama with an oblation.

VI, 15, 6. agnīm-agnim vaḥ samídhâ duvasyata.

Worship Agni with your log of wood. Cf. VIII, 44, 1.

III, 1, 2. samít-bhiḥ agnīm námasâ duvasyan.

They worshipped Agni with logs of wood, with praise.

In the more general and, I suppose, more original sense of caring for, attending, we find duvasyati :

III, 51, 3. anehásaḥ stúbhaḥ índraḥ duvasyati.

Indra provides for the matchless worshippers.

I, 112, 15. kalīm yābhiḥ—duvasyáthaḥ.

By the succours with which you help Kali. Cf. I, 112, 21.

I, 62, 10. duvasyánti svásáraḥ áhrayānam.

The sisters attend the proud (Agni).

I, 119, 10. yuvám pedáve—svetám—duvasyathaḥ.

You provide for Pedu the white horse.

If, then, we take duvasyati in the sense of working for, assisting, it may be with the special sense of assisting at a sacred act, like διακονεῖν; and if we take duvās, as it has the accent on the last syllable, as the performer of a sacrifice, we may venture to translate, 'that he should help, as the singer helps the performer of the sacrifice*.' The singer or the poet may be called the assistant at a sacrifice, for his presence was not necessary at all sacrifices, the songs constituting an ornament rather than an essential part in most sacred acts. But though I think it right to offer this conjectural interpretation, I am far from supposing that it gives us the real sense of this difficult verse. Duvasyāt may be, as Sāyana suggests, an ablative of duvasyá; and duvasyá, like namasyā, if we change the accent, may mean he who is to be worshipped, or worshipping. In this way a different interpretation might suggest itself, though I confess I do not see that any other interpretation as yet suggested is satisfactory. Some happy thought may some day or other clear up this difficulty, when those who have

* Kar in the sense of officiating at a sacrifice is equally construed with a dative, X, 97, 22. yásmai kṛinóti bráhmaṇáh, he for whom a Bráhmaṇa performs a sacrifice.

toiled, but toiled in a wrong direction, will receive scant thanks for the trouble they have taken. See Bollensen, Z. D. M. G. XVIII, p. 606.

Note 2. In the second line, the words *ó sú varta* remind us of similar phrases in the Veda, but we want an accusative, governed by *varta*; whereas *marutaḥ*, to judge from its accent, can only be a vocative. Thus we read :

I, 138, 4. *ó (iti) sú tvā vavṛitmahī stómebhiḥ*.

May we turn thee quickly hither by our praises!

VIII, 7, 33. *ó (iti) sú vṛishnah—vavṛityām*.

May I turn the heroes quickly hither!

Compare also passages like III, 33, 8 :

ó (iti) sú svasārah kārāve sṛinota.

Listen quickly, O sisters, to the poet.

I, 139, 7. *ó (iti) sú nah agne sṛinuhi*.

Hear us quickly, O Agni.

Cf. I, 182, 1; II, 34, 15; VII, 59, 5; VIII, 2, 19; X, 179, 2.

Unless we change the accent, we must translate, 'Bring hither quickly!' and we must take these words as addressed to the *kāru*, the poet, whose hymn is supposed to attract the gods to the sacrifice. By a quick transition, the next words, *marutaḥ vípram ákkha*, would then have to be taken as addressed to the gods, 'Maruts, on to the sage!' and the last words would become intelligible by laying stress on the *vaḥ*, 'for you, and not for Indra or any other god, has the singer recited these hymns.' See, however, Preface, p. xxi.

Verse 15.

Note 1. I translate *Mánya*, the son of *Mána*, because the poet, so called in I, 189, 8, is in all probability the same as our *Mándārya Mánya*. But it may also be *Mánya*, the descendant of *Mandāri*. The *Mānas* are mentioned I, 172, 5; 182, 8.

Note 2. *Vāg. S. XXXIV, 48*. The second line is difficult, owing to the uncertain meaning of *vayām*.

Ā ishā^a yāśishā has been rendered, 'Come hither with

^a There was a misprint in the *Samhitā* text, *eshā* instead of *éshā*, which was afterwards repeated whenever the same verse occurred again.

water or drink or rain,' yâsishṭa being the aorist without the augment and with the intermediate vowel lengthened. The indicative occurs in

V, 58, 6. yât prâ âyâsishṭa prîshatîbhiḥ âsvaiḥ.

When you Maruts came forth with your fallow deer and your horses.

But what is the meaning of vayāṃ? Vayā means a germ, a sprout, an offshoot, a branch, as may be seen from the following passages:

II, 5, 4. vidvān asya vratā dhruvā vayāḥ-iva ānu rohate.

He who knows his eternal laws, springs up like young sprouts. (Better vayā-iva.)

VI, 7, 6. tāsya it ūm (īti) vīsvā bhūvanā ādhi mûrdhāni vayāḥ-iva ruruhuḥ.

From above the head of Vaisvanara all worlds have grown, like young sprouts.

VIII, 13, 6. stotā—vayāḥ-iva ānu rohate. (Better vayā-iva.)

The worshipper grows up like young sprouts.

VIII, 13, 17. īndram kshonīḥ avardhayan vayāḥ-iva.

The people made Indra to grow like young sprouts.

VIII, 19, 33. yāsya te agne anyé agnāyaḥ upa-kshītaḥ vayāḥ-iva.

Agni, of whom the other fires are like parasitical shoots.

I, 59, 1. vayāḥ it agne agnāyaḥ te anyé.

O Agni, the other fires are indeed offshoots of thee.

II, 35, 8. vayāḥ it anyā bhūvanāni asya.

The other worlds are indeed his (the rising sun's) offshoots.

VI, 13, 1. tvât vīsvā—saubhagāni āgne vī yanti vanīnaḥ nā vayāḥ.

From thee, O Agni, spring all happinesses, as the sprouts of a tree.

VI, 24, 3. vrikshāsya nū (nā?) te—vayāḥ vī ūtāyaḥ ruruhuḥ.

Succours sprang from thee, like the branches of a tree.

V, 1, 1. yahvāḥ-iva prâ vayāṃ ut-gîhānāḥ prâ bhānāvaḥ sisrate nākam ākkha.

Like birds(?) flying up to a branch, the flames of Agni went up to heaven; (or like strong men reaching up to.)

VI, 57, 5. *tām pūshnāḥ su-matīm vayām vrikshāsya prā vayām-iva índrasya ka ā rabhāmahe.*

Let us reach this favour of Pūshan and of Indra, as one reaches forth to the branch of a tree.

There remain some doubtful passages in which *vayā* occurs, VII, 40, 5, and X, 92, 3; 134, 6. In the first passage, as in our own, *vayāḥ* is trisyllabic.

If *vayā* can be used in the sense of offshoot or sprout, we may conclude that the same word, used in the singular, might mean offspring, particularly when joined with *tanvē*. 'Give a branch to our body,' would be understood even in languages less metaphorical than that of the Vedas; and as the prayer for 'olive branches' is a constant theme of the Vedic poets, the very absence of that prayer here, might justify us in assigning this sense to *vayām*. In VI, 2, 5, the expression *vayāvantam ksháyam*, a house with branches, means the same as *nṛvántam*, a house with children and men. See M. M., On *Bíos* and *váyas*, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. xv, p. 215. Benfey (*Endungen in íans*, p. 37) takes *vayām* as a genitive plural, referring it to the Maruts, as closely connected with each other, like branches of a tree. This is much the same interpretation as that of Mahīdhara (VS. XXXIV, 48), who translates 'come near for the body, i. e. for the bodily strength of the fellows, the Maruts.' Ludwig takes it as a possible instrumental of *vayam*.

It is preferable, however, to take *yāsishṭa* as a precative *Ātm.*, in order to account for the long *ī*, and to accept it as a third person singular, referring to *stómaḥ*.

Note 3. *Vṛigāna* means an enclosure, a *vomós*, whether it be derived from *vrig*, to ward off, like *arx* from *arcere*, or from *vrig*, in the sense of clearing, as in *vrikta-barhis*, *barhíḥ* *prā vṛiṅge*, I, 116, 1. In either case the meaning remains much the same, viz. a field, cleared for pasture or agriculture,—a clearing, as it is called in America, or a camp,—enclosed with hurdles or walls, so as to be capable of defence against wild animals or against enemies. In this sense, however, *vṛigana* is a neuter, while as a masculine it means powerful, invigorating. See Preface, p. xx.

MANDALA I, HYMN 166.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 1-8.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Let us now proclaim for the robust¹ host, for the herald² of the powerful (Indra), their ancient greatness! O ye strong-voiced Maruts, you heroes, prove your powers on your march, as with a torch, as with a sword³!

2. Like parents bringing a dainty to¹ their own² son, the wild (Maruts) play playfully at the sacrifices. The Rudras reach the worshipper with their protection, strong in themselves, they do not fail the sacrificer.

3. For him to whom the immortal guardians have given fulness of wealth, and who is himself a giver of oblations, the Maruts, who gladden men with the milk (of rain), pour out, like friends, many clouds.

4. You who have stirred¹ up the clouds with might, your horses rushed² forth, self-guided. All beings who dwell in houses³ are afraid of you, your march is brilliant with your spears thrust forth.

5. When they whose march is terrible have caused the rocks to tremble¹, or when the manly Maruts have shaken the back of heaven, then every lord of the forest fears at your racing, each shrub flies out of your way², whirling like chariot-wheels³.

6. You, O terrible Maruts, whose ranks are never broken, favourably¹ fulfil our prayer²! Wherever your gory-toothed³ lightning bites⁴, it crunches⁵ cattle, like a well-aimed bolt⁶.

7. The Maruts whose gifts are firm, whose bounties are never ceasing, who do not revile¹, and who are highly praised at the sacrifices, they sing their song² for to drink the sweet juice: they know the first manly deeds of the hero (Indra).

8. The man whom you have guarded, O Maruts, shield him with hundredfold strongholds from injury¹ and mischief,—the man whom you, O fearful, powerful singers, protect from reproach in the prosperity of his children.

9. On your chariots, O Maruts, there are all good things, strong weapons¹ are piled up clashing against each other. When you are on your journeys, you carry the rings² on your shoulders, and your axle turns the two wheels at once³.

10. In their manly arms there are many good things, on their chests golden chains¹, flaring² ornaments, on their shoulders speckled deer-skins³, on their fellies sharp edges⁴; as birds spread their wings, they spread out splendours behind.

11. They, mighty by might, all-powerful powers¹, visible from afar like the heavens² with the stars, sweet-toned, soft-tongued singers with their mouths³, the Maruts, united with Indra, shout all around.

12. This is your greatness¹, O well-born Maruts!—your bounty³ extends far, as the sway² of Aditi⁴. Not even⁵ Indra in his scorn⁶ can injure that bounty, on whatever man you have bestowed it for his good deeds.

13. This is your kinship (with us), O Maruts, that you, immortals, in former years have often protected the singer¹. Having through this prayer granted a hearing to man, all these heroes together have become well-known by their valiant deeds.

14. That we may long flourish, O Maruts, with your wealth, O ye racers, that our men may spread in the camp, therefore let me achieve the rite with these offerings.

15. May this praise, O Maruts, this song of Mândârya, the son of Mâna, the poet, ask you with food for offspring for ourselves! May we have an invigorating autumn, with quickening rain!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Agastya, the reputed son of Mitrāvaruṇau, and brother of Vasishṭha. The metre in verses 1-13 is Gāgati, in 14, 15 Trishṭubh. No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Rabhasá, an adjective of rábhas, and this again from the root rabh, to rush upon a thing, á-rabh, to begin a thing. From this root rabh we have the Latin robur, in the general sense of strength, while in rabies the original meaning of impetuous motion has been more clearly preserved. The Greek λάβρος, too, as pointed out by Cowell, comes from this root. In the Vedic Sanskrit, derivatives from the root rabh convey the meaning both of quickness and of strength. Quickness in ancient languages frequently implies strength, and strength implies quickness, as we see, for instance, from the German snēl, which, from meaning originally strong, comes to mean in modern German quick, and quick only. The German bald again, meaning soon, comes from the Gothic balþs, the English bold. Thus we read :

I, 145, 3. śśuk ā adatta sám rábhaḥ.

The child (Agni) acquired vigour.

Indra is called rabhaḥ-dāḥ, giver of strength ; and rabhasá, vigorous, is applied not only to the Maruts, who in V, 58, 5, are called rábhishthāḥ, the most vigorous, but also to Agni, II, 10, 4, and to Indra, III, 31, 12.

In the sense of rabid, furious, it occurs in

X, 95, 14. ádha enam vṛkáḥ rabhasāsaḥ adyúḥ.

May rabid wolves eat him !

In the next verse rabhasá, the epithet of the wolves, is replaced by śśiva, which means unlucky, uncanny.

In our hymn rabhasá occurs once more, and is applied there, in verse 10, to the aṅgí or glittering ornaments of the Maruts. Here Sáyana translates it by lovely, and it was most likely intended to convey the idea of lively or brilliant splendour, though it may mean also strong. See also IX, 96, 1.

Note 2. Ketú, derived from an old root *ki*, in Sanskrit *ki*, to perceive, from which also *kitra*, conspicuous, ken-speckled, beautiful, means originally that by which a thing is perceived or known, whether a sign, or a flag, or a herald. It is the Gothic *haidu*, species. It then takes the more general sense of light and splendour. In our passage, herald seems to me the most appropriate rendering, though B. and R. prefer the sense of banner. The Maruts come before Indra, they announce the arrival of Indra, they are the first of his army.

Note 3. The real difficulty of our verse lies in the two comparisons *aidhā-iva* and *yudhā-iva*. Neither of them occurs again in the Rīg-veda. B. and R. explain *aidhā* as an instrumental of *aidh*, flaming, or flame, and derive it from the root *idh*, to kindle, with the preposition *ā*. Professor Bollensen in his excellent article *Zur Herstellung des Veda* (Orient und Occident, vol. iii, p. 473) says: 'The analysis of the text given in the Pada, viz. *aidhā-iva* and *yudhā-iva*, is contrary to all sense. The common predicate is *taviṣhāmi kartana*, exercise your power, you roarers, i. e. blow as if you meant to kindle the fire on the altar, show your power as if you went to battle. We ought therefore to read *aidhé | va* and *yudhé | va*. Both are infinitives, *aidh* is nothing but the root *idh* + *ā*, to kindle, to light.' Now this is certainly a very ingenious explanation, but it rests on a supposition which I cannot consider as proved, viz. that in the Veda, as in Pāli, the comparative particle *iva* may be changed, as shown in the preface to the first edition, to *va*. It must be admitted that the two short syllables of *iva* are occasionally counted in the Veda as one, but *yudhé-iva*, though it might become *yudhá iva*, would never in the Veda become *yudhéva*.

As *yudhā* occurs frequently in the Veda, we may begin by admitting that the parallel form *aidhā* must be explained in analogy to *yudhā*. Now *yúdh* is a verbal noun and means fighting. We have the accusative *yúdham*, I, 53, 7; the genitive *yudháḥ*, VIII, 27, 17; the dative *yudhé*, I, 61, 13; the locative *yudhí*, I, 8, 3; the instrumental *yudhā*, I, 53, 7, &c.; loc. plur. *yut-sú*, I, 91, 21. As long as *yúdh*

retains the general predicative meaning of fighting, some of these cases may be called infinitives. But yúdh soon assumes not only the meaning of battle, battle-ground, but also of instrument of fighting, weapon. In another passage, X, 103, 2, yúdhāḥ may be taken as a vocative plural, meaning fighters. Passages in which yúdh means clearly weapon, are, for instance,

V, 52, 6. ārukmaḥ ā yudhā nārah rishvāḥ rishṭīḥ asrikshata.

With their bright chains, with their weapon, the tall men have stretched forth the spears.

X, 55, 8. pītṛī sómasya divāḥ ā vridhānāḥ sūrah nīḥ yudhā adhamat dāsýūn.

The hero, growing, after drinking the Soma, blew away from the sky the enemies with his weapon. See also X, 103, 4.

I therefore take yúdh in our passage also in the sense of weapon or sword, and, in accordance with this, I assign to aīdh the meaning of torch. Whether aīdh comes from idh with the preposition ā, which, after all, would only give edh, or whether we have in the Sanskrit aīdh the same peculiar strengthening which this very root shows in Greek and Latin*, would be difficult to decide. The torch of the Maruts is the lightning, the weapon the thunderbolt, and by both they manifest their strength; ferro et igne, as Ludwig remarks.

WILSON: We proclaim eagerly, Maruts, your ancient greatness, for (the sake of inducing) your prompt appearance, as the indication of (the approach of) the showerer (of benefits). Loud-roaring and mighty Maruts, you exert your vigorous energies for the advance (to the sacrifice), as if it was to battle.

Verse 2.

NOTE 1. That úpa can be construed with the accusative is clear from many passages:

III, 35, 2. úpa imám yagnám ā vahātaḥ indram.

Bring Indra to this sacrifice!

I, 25, 4. váyah ná vasatīḥ úpa.

As birds (fly) to their nests.

* Schleicher, Compendium, § 36, αἶδω, αἰδέομαι, αἰδοῦναι; and § 49, aides, aidilis aestas.

Note 2. *Nítya*, from *ni + tya**, means originally what is inside, internus, then what is one's own; and is opposed to *níshṭya*, from *nis + tya*, what is outside, strange, or hostile. *Nítya* has been well compared with *nigá*, literally eingeboren, then, like *nítya*, one's own. What is inside, or in a thing or place, is its own, is peculiar to it, does not move or change, and hence the secondary meanings of *nítya*, one's own, unchanging, eternal. Thus we find *nítya* used in the sense of internal or domestic:

I, 73, 4. *tám tvá nárah dāme ā nítyam iddhām āgne sákanta kshitíshu dhruvāsu.*

Our men worshipped thee, O Agni, lighted within the house in safe places.

This I believe to be a more appropriate rendering than if we take *nítya* in the sense of always, continuously lighted, or, as some propose, in the sense of eternal, everlasting.

VII, 1, 2. *dakshāyāh yāh dāme āsa nítyah.*

Agni who is to be pleased within the house, i. e. as belonging to the house, and, in that sense, who is to be pleased always. Cf. I, 140, 7; 141, 2; X, 12, 2, and III, 25, 5, where *nítyah*, however, may have been intended as an adjective belonging to the vocative *sūno*.

Most frequently *nítya* occurs with *sūnú*, I, 66, 1; 185, 2; *tánaya*, III, 15, 2; X, 39, 14; *toká*, II, 2, 11; *āpí*, VII, 88, 6; *páti*, I, 71, 1, and has always the meaning of one's own, very much like the later Sanskrit *nigā*, which never occurs in the Rig-veda, though it makes its appearance in the *Ātharvāna*.

Níshṭya, extraneus, occurs three times in the Rig-veda:

VI, 75, 19. *yāh nah svāh áranah yāh ka níshṭyah gíghāmsati.*

Whoever wishes to hurt us, our own friend or a stranger from without.

X, 133, 5. *yāh nah indra abhi-dāsati sá-nábhih yāh ka níshṭyah.*

He who infests us, O Indra, whether a relative or a stranger.

VIII, 1, 13. *mā bhūma níshṭyāh-iva indra tvád áranāh-iva.*

* *Āpa-tya*; cf. Bopp, Accentuationssystem, § 138, *ἐπι-σσαι*, Nachkommen.

Let us not be like outsiders, O Indra, not like strangers to thee.

WILSON: Ever accepting the sweet (libation), as (they would) a son, they sport playfully at sacrifices, demolishing (all intruders).

LUDWIG: Wie einen nicht absterbenden Sohn das Madhu bringend.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Ávyata, a Vedic second aorist of *vî* (*ag*), to stir up, to excite. From it *pravayana*, a goad, *pra-vetar*, a driver. The Greek *οἶστρος*, *gad-fly*, has been referred to the same root. See Fick, *Wörterbuch*, p. 170.

Roth (Wenzel, *Instrumental*, p. 54) translates: 'While you quickly throw yourselves into the mists;' from a verb *vyâ*.

Note 2. *Adhragan*, from *dhrag*, a root which, by metathesis of aspiration, would assume the form of *dragh* or *dragh*. In Greek, the final medial aspirate being hardened, reacts on the initial media, and changes it to *t*, as *bâhu* becomes *πῆχυς*, *budh* *πυθ*, *bandh* *πενθ*. This would give us *τρεχ*, the Greek root for running, Goth. *thrag-jan*.

Note 3. *Harmyâ* is used here as an adjective of *bhúvana*, and can only mean living in houses. It does not, however, occur again in the same sense, though it occurs several times as a substantive, meaning house. Its original meaning is fire-pit, then hearth, then house, a transition of meaning analogous to that of *aedes*. Most of the ancient nations begin their kitchen with a fire-pit. 'They dig a hole in the ground, take a piece of the animal's raw hide, and press it down with their hands close to the sides of the hole, which thus becomes a sort of pot or basin. This they fill with water, and they make a number of stones red-hot in a fire close by. The meat is put into the water, and the stones dropped in till the meat is boiled. Catlin describes the process as awkward and tedious, and says that since the Assinaboins had learnt from the Mandans to make pottery, and had been supplied with vessels by the traders, they had entirely done away the custom, "excepting at public festivals; where they seem, like all others of the human family, to take pleasure in cherishing and perpetuating

their ancient customs^a.”’ This pit was called *harmyá*^b or *gharmá*, which is the Latin formus. Thus we read :

VII, 56, 16. *té harmye-sthāh śśavaḥ ná subhrāh.*

The Maruts bright like boys standing by the hearth.

From meaning fire-pit, or hearth, *harmyá* afterwards takes the more general sense of house :

VII, 55, 6. *téshām sám hanmaḥ akshāni yáthā idám harmyám táthā.*

We shut their eyes as we shut this house (possibly, this oven).

VII, 76, 2. *pratikī ā agāt ádhi harmyébhyaḥ.*

The dawn comes near, over the house-tops.

X, 46, 3. *gātāḥ ā harmyéshu.*

Agni, born in the houses.

X, 73, 10. *manyóḥ iyáya harmyéshu tasthau.*

He came from Manyu, he remained in the houses.

In some of these passages *harmyá* might be taken in the sense of householder ; but as *harmyá* in VII, 55, 6, has clearly the meaning of a building, it seems better not to assign to it unnecessarily any new significations.

If *harmya* or **harma* meant originally a fire-pit, then a hearth, a house, we see the close connection between *harma* and *gharma*, *harmya* and *gharmya*. Thus by the side of *harmyeshtha* we find *gharmyeshtha* (RV. X, 106, 5). We find *gharma* meaning, not only heat in general, but fire-pit, hearth ; and we find the same word used for what we should call the pit, a place of torture and punishment from which the gods save their worshippers, or into which they throw the evil-doers.

V, 32, 5. *yúyutsantam támasi harmyé dhāh.*

^a Tylor, *Early History of Mankind*, p. 262.

^b Spiegel, who had formerly identified *harmyá* with the Zend *zairimya* in *zairimyaŋura*, has afterwards recalled this identification ; see Spiegel, *Av. Übers.* I, p. 190 ; *Commentar über den Avesta*, I, p. 297 ; Justi, *Handbuch*, p. 119 ; Haug, *Pahlavi Glossary*, p. 22. According to the Parsis, the *Hairimyaŋura*, a *daēva* animal which appears at the rising of the sun, is the turtle, and Darmesteter (*Ormazd et Ahriman*, p. 283) identifies *zair* in *zair-imya* with the Greek *χαλ-ύς*, Sanskrit *har-muḥa*.

When thou, Indra, hadst placed *Sushna*, who was anxious to fight, in the darkness of the pit.

In the next verse we find
asûryé tāmasi, in the ghastly darkness.

VIII, 5, 23. yuvám kárvāya násatyā ápi-riptāya harmyé sásvat ūtíh dasasyathah.

You, *Násatyas*, always grant your aid to *Karva* when thrown into the pit.

This fiery pit into which *Atri* is thrown, and whence he, too, was saved by the *Asvins*, is likewise called *gharmá*, I, 112, 7; 119, 6; VIII, 73, 3; X, 80, 3.

Lastly we find :

X, 114, 10. yadā yamáh bhávati harmyé hitáh.

When *Yama* is seated in the house, or in the nether world.

When the *Pitars*, too, the spirits of the departed, the *Manes*, are called *gharma-sád*, this is probably intended to mean, dwelling on the hearth (X, 15, 9 and 10), and not dwelling in the abode of *Yama*.

Kuhn, *Zeitschrift*, vol. ii, p. 234 : 'Die ihr die Luft erfüllt mit eurer Kraft, hervorstürmt ihr selbst-gelenkten Laufes.'

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Nad* certainly means to sound, and the causative might be translated by 'to make cry or shriek.' If we took *párvata* in the sense of cloud, we might translate, 'When you make the clouds roar;' if we took *párvata* for mountain, we might, with Professor Wilson, render the passage by 'When your brilliant coursers make the mountains echo.' But *nad*, like other roots which afterwards take the meaning of sounding, means originally to vibrate, to shake; and if we compare analogous passages where *nad* occurs, we shall see that in our verse, too, the Vedic poet undoubtedly meant *nad* to be taken in that sense :

VIII, 20, 5. ákyutā kit vah ágman ā nānadati párvatāsaḥ vānaspátih, bhūmih yāmeshu regate.

At your racing even things that are immovable vibrate, the rocks, the lord of the forest; the earth quivers on your ways. (See I, 37, 7, note 1.) Grassmann here translates *nadáyanta* by erschüttern, but in VIII, 20, 5 by erdröhnt.

Note 2. See I, 37, 7, note 1.

Note 3. Rathiyánti-iva does not occur again. Sâyana explains it, like a woman who wishes for a chariot, or who rides in a chariot. I join it with óshadhi, and take it in the sense of upamánád ákâre (Pân. III, 1, 10), i.e. to behave like or to be like a chariot, whether the comparison is meant to express simply the quickness of chariots or the whirling of their wheels. The Pada has rathiyánti, whereas the more regular form is that of the Samhitâ, rathiyántî. Cf. Prâtisâkhya, 587.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Su-*ketúnâ*, the instrumental of su-*ketú*, kindness, good-mindedness, favour. This word occurs in the instrumental only, and always refers to the kindness of the gods; not, like sumatî, to the kindness of the worshipper also :

I, 79, 9. *â nah agne su-*ketúnâ* rayîm visvâyu-poshasam, mârâikâm dhehi gîvâse.*

Give us, O Agni, through thy favour wealth which supports our whole life, give us grace to live.

I, 127, 11. *sâh nah nêdishîkam dâdrisânâh â bhara âgne devêbhih sâ-kanâh su-*ketúnâ* mahâh râyâh su-*ketúnâ*.*

Thou, O Agni, seen close to us, bring to us, in union with the gods, by thy favour, great riches, by thy favour !

I, 159, 5. *asmâbhyam dyâvâprithivî (îti) su-*ketúnâ* rayîm dhattam vâsu-mantam sata-gvînam.*

Give to us, O Dyâvâprithivî, by your favour, wealth, consisting of treasures and many flocks.

V, 51, 11. *svastî dyâvâprithivî (îti) su-*ketúnâ*.*

Give us, O Dyâvâprithivî, happiness through your favour !

V, 64, 2. *tâ bâhâvâ su-*ketúnâ* prá yantam asmai ârkate.*

Stretch out your arms with kindness to this worshipper !

In one passage of the ninth *Mandala* (IX, 65, 30) we meet with su-*ketúnâ*, as an accusative, referring to Soma, the gracious, and this would pre-suppose a substantive *ketúna*, which, however, does not exist.

Note 2. Sumatî has, no doubt, in most passages in the Rig-veda, the meaning of favour, the favour of the gods. 'Let us obtain your favour, let us be in your favour,' are familiar expressions of the Vedic poets. But there are also numerous passages where that meaning is inapplicable, and

where, as in our passage, we must translate *sumatí* by prayer or desire.

In the following passages *sumatí* is clearly used in its original sense of favour, blessing, or even gift :

I, 73, 6 (7). *su-matím bhíkshamānāh*.

Begging for thy favour.

I, 171, 1. *su-ukténa bhikshe su-matím turānām*.

With a hymn I beg for the favour of the quick Maruts.

I, 114, 3. *aryāma te su-matím*.

May we obtain thy favour! Cf. I, 114, 9.

I, 114, 4. *su-matím it vayám asya ā vrinīmahe*.

We choose his favour. Cf. III, 33, 11.

I, 117, 23. *sádā kavī (iti) su-matím ā kake vām*.

I always desire your favour, O ye wise Asvins.

I, 156, 3. *mahāh te vishno (iti) su-matím bhagāmahe*.

May we, O Vishnu, enjoy the favour of thee, the mighty!

Bhiksh, to beg, used above, is an old desiderative form of bhag, and means to wish to enjoy.

III, 4, 1. *su-matím rāsi vásvaḥ*.

Thou grantest the favour of wealth.

VII, 39, 1. *ūrdhvāh agnīh su-matím vásvaḥ asret*.

The lighted fire went up for the favour of wealth. Cf. VII, 60, 11; IX, 97, 26.

III, 57, 6. *vāso (iti) rāsva su-matím visvá-ganyām*.

Grant us, O Vasu, thy favour, which is glorious among men!

VII, 100, 2. *tvām vishno (iti) su-matím visvá-ganyām—dâh*.

Mayest thou, Vishnu, give thy favour, which is glorious among men!

X, 11, 7. *yāh te agne su-matím mārtaḥ ākshat*.

The mortal who obtained thy favour, O Agni.

II, 34, 15. *arvākē sā marutaḥ yā vaḥ ūtlh ó (iti) sú vāsrā-iva su-matīh gigātu*.

Your help, O Maruts, which is to usward, your favour may it come near, like a cow!

VIII, 22, 4. *asmān ākkha su-matīh vām subhaḥ patī (iti) ā dhenúk-iva dhāvatu*.

May your favour, O Asvins, hasten towards us, like a cow!

But this meaning is by no means the invariable meaning of *sumatí*, and it will easily be seen that, in the following

passages, the word must be translated by prayer. Thus when Sarasvatī is called (I, 3, 11) *kétantī su-matīnām*, this can only mean she who knows of the prayers, as before she is called *kodayitrī sūnṛtānām*, she who excites songs of praise :

I, 151, 7. *ákḥha gírah su-matīm gantam asma-yū (īti)*.

Come towards the songs, towards the prayer, you who are longing for us. Cf. X, 20, 10.

II, 43, 3. *tūshnīm āsinah su-matīm kīkiddhi nah*.

Sitting quiet, listen, O Sakuni (bird), to our prayer !

V, 1, 10. *ā bhāndishthasya su-matīm kīkiddhi*.

Take notice of the prayer of thy best praiser ! Cf. V, 33, 1.

VII, 18, 4. *ā nah īndrah su-matīm gantu ákḥha*.

May Indra come to our prayer !

VII, 31, 10. *prá-ketase prá su-matīm kṛinudhvam*.

Make a prayer for the wise god !

IX, 96, 2. *su-matīm yāti ákḥha*.

He (Soma) goes near to the prayer.

X, 148, 3. *r̥shinām víprah su-matīm kakánáh*.

Thou, the wise, desiring the prayer of the *R̥shis*.

VIII, 22, 6. *tā vām adyá sumatī-bhiḥ subhah patī (īti) ásvinā prá stuvīmahi*.

Let us praise to-day the glorious Asvins with our prayers.

IX, 74, 1. *tám ímahe su-matī*.

We implore him with prayer.

In our passage the verb *pipartana*, fill or fulfil, indicates in what sense *sumatī* ought to be taken. *Su-matīm pipartana* is no more than *kāmam pipartana*, fulfil our desire ! See VII, 62, 3. *ā nah kāmam pūpurantu* ; I, 158, 2. *kāmapréna-iva mánasā*. On *sumná*, see Burnouf, *Études*, p. 91, and Aufrecht, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, vol. iv, p. 274.

Note 3. *Kriviḥ-datī* has been a crux to ancient and modern interpreters. It is mentioned as a difficult word in the *Nighantū*, and all that Yāska has to say is that it means possessed of cutting teeth (*Nir. VI, 30. krivirdatī vikartanadantī*). Professor Roth, in his note to this passage, says that *krivi* can never have the meaning of well, which is ascribed to it in the *Nighantū* III, 23, but seems rather to mean an animal, perhaps the wild boar, *κῆρπος*, with metathesis of *v* and *r*. He translates our passage : 'Where

your lightning with boar-teeth tears.' In his Dictionary, however, he only says, 'krivis, perhaps the name of an animal, and dant, tooth.' Sâyana contents himself with explaining krivirdatî by vikshepanasîladantî, having teeth that scatter about.

My own translation is founded on the supposition that krivis, the first portion of krivirdatî, has nothing to do with krivi, but is a dialectic variety of kravîs, raw flesh, the Greek κρέας, Latin caro, cruor. It means what is raw, bloody, or gory. From it the adjective krûra, horrible, cruentus (Curtius, Grundzüge, p. 142; Kuhn, Zeitschrift, vol. ii, p. 235). A name of the goddess Durgâ in later Sanskrit is krûradantî, and with a similar conception the lightning, I believe, is here called krivirdatî, with gory teeth.

Note 4. It should be observed that in râdati the simile of the teeth of the lightning is carried on. For râdati may be supposed to have had in the Veda, too, the original meaning of râdere and rôdere, to scratch, to gnaw. Râda and radana in the later Sanskrit mean tooth. It is curious, however, that there is no other passage in the Rig-veda where rad clearly means to bite. It means to cut, in

I, 61, 12. góh ná párvā ví rada tiraskā.

Cut his joint through, as the joint of an ox.

But in most passages where rad occurs in the Veda, it has the meaning of giving. It is not the same which we have in the Zend râd, to give, and which Justi rightly identifies with the root râdh. But rad, to divide, may, like the German theilen in zutheilen, have taken the meaning of giving. Greek δαίω means to divide, but yields δαίς, portion, meal, just as Sanskrit day, to divide, yields dâyas, share, i. e. inheritance.

This meaning is evident in the following passages :

VII, 79, 4. tâvat ushah râdhaḥ asmâbhyam râsva yâvat stotri-bhyah âradah grinânâ.

Grant us, Ushas, so much wealth as thou hast given to the singers, when praised.

I, 116, 7. kakshîvate aradatam pûram-dhim.

You gave wisdom to Kakshîvat.

I, 169, 8. râda marût-bhiḥ surûdhaḥ gó-agrah.

Give to the Maruts gifts, rich in cattle.

VII, 62, 3. *ví naḥ sahásram surúdhaḥ radantu.*

May they (the gods) give to us a thousand gifts!

I, 117, 11. *vāgam víprāya—rádantā.*

Giving spoil to the sage!

VI, 61, 6. *rāda pūshā-iva naḥ saním.*

Give us, Sarasvatī, wealth, like Pūshan!

IX, 93, 4. *rada índo (íti) rayím.*

Give us, O Indra, wealth!

VII, 32, 18. *rada-vaso (íti).*

Indra, thou who givest wealth!

In many passages, however, this verb *rad* is connected with words meaning way or path, and it then becomes a question whether it simply means to grant a way, or to cut a way open for some one. In Zend, too, the same idiom occurs, and Professor Justi explains it by 'prepare a way.' I subjoin the principal passages:

VI, 30, 3. *yát ābhyaḥ áradaḥ gâtúm indra.*

That thou hast cut a way for them (the rivers). Cf. VII, 74, 4.

IV, 19, 2. *prá vartanīḥ aradaḥ visvá-dhenâḥ.*

Thou (Indra) hast cut open the paths for all the cows.

X, 75, 2. *prá te aradat várunaḥ yátave patháḥ.*

Varuna cut the paths for thee to go.

VII, 87, 1. *rádat patháḥ várunaḥ súryāya.*

Varuna cut paths for Sūrya.

V, 80, 3. *patháḥ rádanti suvitāya devī.*

She, the dawn, cutting open the paths for welfare.

VII, 60, 4. *yásmai ādityāḥ ádhvanaḥ rádanti.*

For whom the Ādityas cut roads.

II, 30, 2. *patháḥ rádantiḥ—dhúnayaḥ yanti ártham.*

Cutting their paths, the rivers go to their goal.

This last verse seems to show that the cutting open of a road is really the idea expressed by *rad* in all these passages. And thus we find the rivers themselves saying that Indra cut them out or delivered them:

III, 33, 6. *indraḥ asmān aradat vágra-bāhuḥ.* Cf. X, 89, 7.

Note 5. *Rināti*, like the preceding expressions *krívdāti* and *rádati*, is not chosen at random, for though it has the

general meaning of crushing or destroying, it is used by the Vedic poets with special reference to the chewing or crunching by means of the teeth. For instance,

I, 148, 4. *purūṇi dasmāḥ nī rināti gāmbhaiḥ.*

Agni crunches many things with his jaws.

I, 127, 4. *sthīrā kit ānnā nī rināti ógasā.*

Even tough morsels he (Agni) crunches fiercely.

In a more general sense we find it used,

V, 41, 10. *sokīḥ-kesaḥ nī rināti vānā.*

Agni with flaming hair swallows or destroys the forests.

IV, 19, 3. *āhim vāgreṇa ví rināḥ.*

Thou destroyedst Ahi with the thunderbolt.

X, 120, 1. *sadyāḥ gagānāḥ nī rināti sátrūn.*

As soon as born he destroys his enemies.

Note 6. *Súdhita-iva barhánā.* I think the explanation of this phrase given by Sāyana may be retained. He explains *súdhitā* by *suhitā*, i. e. *sushīḥ* *preritā*, well thrown, well levelled, and *barhánā* by *hatis*, *tatsādhanā* *hetir vā*, a blow or its instrument, a weapon. Professor Roth takes *barhánā* as an instrumental, used adverbially, in the sense of powerfully, but he does not explain in what sense *súdhitā-iva* ought then to be taken. We cannot well refer it to *didyút*, lightning, on account of the *iva*, which requires something that can form a simile of the lightning. Nor is *su-dhitā* ever used as a substantive so as to take the place of *svádhitīva*. *Sú-dhita* has apparently many meanings, but they all centre in one common conception. *Sú-dhita* means well placed, of a thing which is at rest, well arranged, well ordered, secure; or it means well sent, well thrown, of a thing which has been in motion. Applied to human beings, it means well disposed or kind.

III, 23, 1. *nīḥ-mathitāḥ sú-dhitāḥ ā sadhá-sṭhe.*

Agni produced by rubbing, and well placed in his abode.

VII, 42, 4. *sú-pritāḥ agnīḥ sú-dhitāḥ dāme ā.*

Agni, who is cherished and well placed in the house.

III, 29, 2. *arányoḥ nī-hitāḥ gâtá-vedāḥ gárbhaḥ-iva sú-dhitāḥ garbhínīshu.*

Agni placed in the two fire-sticks, well placed like an embryo in the mothers. Cf. X, 27, 16.

VIII, 60, 4. abhī práyāmsi sú-dhitā ā vaso (īti) gahi.

Come, O Vasu, to these well-placed offerings. Cf. I, 135, 4; VI, 15, 15; X, 53, 2.

X, 70, 8. sú-dhitā havīmshi.

The well-placed offerings.

IV, 2, 10 (adhvarām). VII, 7, 3 (barhī).

As applied to āyus, life, súdhita may be translated by well established, safe :

II, 27, 10. asyāma āyūmshi sú-dhitāni pūrvā.

May we obtain the happy long lives of our forefathers.

IV, 50, 8. sá it ksheti sú-dhitāh ókasi své.

That man dwells secure in his own house.

Applied to a missile weapon, súdhita may mean well placed, as it were, well shouldered, well held, before it is thrown ; or well levelled, well aimed, when it is thrown :

I, 167, 3. mīmáksha yéshu sú-dhitā—rishīh.

To whom the well held spear sticks fast.

VI, 33, 3. tvām tām indra ubháyan amitrān dāsā vritrāni āryā ka sūra, vādhih vānā-iva sú-dhitebhih átkaih.

Thou, Indra, O hero, struckest both enemies, the barbarous and the Aryan fiends, like forests with well-aimed weapons.

Applied to a poem, súdhita means well arranged or perfect :

I, 140, 11. idám agne sú-dhitam dúh-dhitāt ádhi priyāt ūm (īti) kit mánmanaḥ préyah astu te.

May this perfect prayer be more agreeable to thee than an imperfect one, though thou likest it.

VII, 32, 13. mántram ákharvam sú-dhitam.

A poem, not mean, well contrived.

As applied to men, súdhita means very much the same as hitá, well disposed, kind :

IV, 6, 7. ádha mitráh ná sú-dhitāh pávakāh agnīh didāya mánushishu vikshú.

Then, like a kind friend, Agni shone among the children of man.

V, 3, 2. mitráam sú-dhitam.

VI, 15, 2. mitráam ná yám sú-dhitam.

VIII, 23, 8. mitráam ná gāne sú-dhitam ritá-vani.

X, 115, 7. *mitrásaḥ ná yé sú-dhitāḥ*.

At last *sú-dhita*, without reference to human beings, takes the general sense of kind, good:

III, 11, 8. *pári vīsvāni sú-dhitā agnēḥ aryāma mánma-bhiḥ*.

May we obtain through our prayers all the goods of Agni.

Here, however, *práyāmsi* may have to be supplied, and in that case this passage, too, should be classed with those mentioned above, VIII, 60, 4, &c.

If then we consider that *súdhita*, as applied to weapons, means well held or well aimed, we can hardly doubt that *barhánā* is here, as *Sâyana* says, some kind of weapon. I should derive it from *barhayati*, to crush, which we have, for instance,

I, 133, 5. *pisāṅga-bhrishṭim ambhrinām piśāṭim indra sám mrīṇa, sárvaṃ rākshaḥ ní-barhaya*.

Pound together the fearful *Pisāṭi* with his fiery weapons, strike down every *Rakshas*.

II, 23, 8. *br̥haspate deva-nīdaḥ ní-barhaya*.

Bṛihaspati strike down the scoffers of the gods. Cf. VI, 61, 3.

Barhánā would therefore mean a weapon intended to crush an enemy, a block of stone, it may be, or a heavy club, and in that sense *barhánā* occurs at least once more:

VIII, 63, 7. *yát pāñka-ganyayā viśā indre ghóshāḥ ásrī-kshata, ástrināt barhánā vipáḥ*.

When shouts have been sent up to Indra by the people of the five clans, then the club scattered the spears; or, then he scattered the spears with his club.

In other passages Professor Roth is no doubt right when he assigns to *barhánā* an adverbial meaning, but I do not think that this meaning would be appropriate in our verse. Grassmann also translates, 'ein wohlgezielter Pfeil.'

Verse 7.

NOTE 1. *Alátrināsaḥ*, a word which occurs but once more, and which had evidently become unintelligible even at the

time of Yāska. He (Nir. VI, 2) explains it by *alamâtardano meghaḥ*, the cloud which opens easily. This, at least, is the translation given by Professor Roth, though not without hesitation. *Alamâtardanaḥ*, as a compound, is explained by the commentator as *âtardanaparyâptaḥ*, *alam âtardayitum udakam*, i. e. capable of letting off the water. But *Devarāgayagvan* explains it differently. He says: *alam paryâptam âtardanam himsā yasya, bahûdakavāḥkhabalo meghe viśeshyate*, i. e. whose injuring is great; the dark cloud is so called because it contains much water. *Sāyana*, too, attempts several explanations. In III, 30, 10, he seems to derive it from *tr̥h*, to kill, not, like Yāska, from *trid*, and he explains its meaning as the cloud which is exceedingly hurt by reason of its holding so much water. In our passage he explains it either as *anâtrina*, free from injury, or good hurters of enemies, or good givers of rewards.

From all this I am afraid we gain nothing. Let us now see what modern commentators have proposed in order to discover an appropriate meaning in this word. Professor Roth suggests that the word may be derived from *rā*, to give, and the suffix *trina*, and the negative particle, thus meaning, one who does not give or yield anything. But, if so, how is this adjective applicable to the Maruts, who in this very verse are praised for their generosity? Langlois in our passage translates, 'heureux de nos louanges;' in III, 30, 10, 'qui laissait flétrir les plantes.' Wilson in our passage translates, 'devoid of malevolence;' but in III, 30, 10, 'heavy.'

I do not pretend to solve all these difficulties, but I may say this in defence of my own explanation that it fulfils the condition of being applicable both to the Maruts and to the demon Bala. The suffix *trina* is certainly irregular, and I should much prefer to write *alâtrina*, for in that case we might derive *lâtrin* from *lâtra*, and to this *lâtra*, i. e. *râtra*, I should ascribe the sense of barking. The root *rai* or *rā* means to bark, and has been connected by Professor Aufrecht with Latin *rire*, *inrire*, and possibly *inritare*^a,

^a Kuhn, Zeitschrift, vol. ix, p. 233.

thus showing a transition of meaning from barking, to provoking or attacking. The same root *râ* explains also the Latin *lâtrare*, to bark, *allâtrare*, to assail; and, whatever ancient etymologists may say to the contrary, the Latin *latro*, an assailer. The old derivation 'latrones eos antiqui dicebant, qui conducti militabant, ἀπὸ τῆς λατρείας,' seems to me one of those etymologies in which the scholars of Rome, who had learnt a little Greek, delighted as much as scholars who know a little Sanskrit delight in finding some plausible derivation for any Greek or Latin word in Sanskrit. I know that Curtius (Grundzüge, p. 326) and Corssen (Kritische Nachträge, p. 239) take a different view; but a foreign word, derived from *λάτρον*, pay, hire, would never have proved so fertile as *latro* has been in Latin.

If then we could write *alâtrinâśaḥ*, we should have an appropriate epithet of the Maruts, in the sense of not assailing or not reviling, in fact, free from malevolence, as Wilson translated the word, or rather Sâyana's explanation of it, *âtardanarahita*. What gives me some confidence in this explanation is this, that it is equally applicable to the other passage where *alâtrina* occurs, III, 30, 10:

alâtrinâḥ valâḥ indra vragâḥ gôḥ purâ hântoḥ bhâyamânaḥ ví âra.

Without barking did Vala, the keeper of the cow, full of fear, open, before thou struckest him.

If it should be objected that *vragâ* means always stable, and is not used again in the sense of keeper, one might reply that *vragâḥ*, in the nom. sing., occurs in this one single passage only, and that *bhâyamânaḥ*, fearing, clearly implies a personification. Otherwise, one might translate: 'Vala was quiet, O Indra, and the stable of the cow came open, full of fear, before thou struckest.' The meaning of *alâtrinâ* would remain the same, the not-barking being here used as a sign that Indra's enemy was cowed, and no longer inclined to revile or defy the power of Indra. Hom. hymn. in Merc. 145, οὐδὲ κύνας λελάκοντο.

Note 2. See I, 38, 15, note 1, page 95.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Abhi-hruti seems to have the meaning of assault, injury, insult. It occurs but once, but abhi-hrut, a feminine substantive with the same meaning, occurs several times. The verb hru, which is not mentioned in the Dhâtupâtha, but has been identified with hvar, occurs in our hymn, verse 12:

I, 128, 5. *sák nah trâsate duk-itât abhi-hrútaḥ sámsât aghât abhi-hrútaḥ.*

He protects us from evil, from assault, from evil speaking, from assault.

X, 63, 11. *trâyadhvam nah duk-évâyâḥ abhi-hrútaḥ.*

Protect us from mischievous injury!

I, 189, 6. *abhi-hrútâm ási hí deva vishpát.*

For thou, god, art the deliverer from all assaults. Vishpát, deliverer, from vi and spas, to bind.

Ví-hruta, which occurs twice, means evidently what has been injured or spoiled:

VIII, 1, 12. *ishkartâ ví-hrutam púnar (íti).*

He who sets right what has been injured. Cf. VIII, 20, 26.

Ávi-hruta again clearly means uninjured, intact, entire:

V, 66, 2. *tā hí kshatrám ávi-hrutam—āráte.*

For they both have obtained uninjured power.

X, 170, 1. *āyuh dádhat yagnā-patau ávi-hrutam.*

Giving uninjured life to the lord of the sacrifice.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Tavishá certainly means strength, and that it is used in the plural in the sense of acts of strength, we can see from the first verse of our hymn and other passages. But when we read that tavishāṇi are placed on the chariots of the Maruts, just as before bhadrá, good things, food, &c., are mentioned, it is clear that so abstract a meaning as strength or powers would not be applicable here. We might take it in the modern sense of forces, i. e. your armies, your companions are on your chariots, striving with each other; but as the word is a neuter, weapons, as the means

of strength, seemed a preferable rendering. As to *mitha-spridhya*, see I, 119, 3, p. 164.

Note 2. The rendering of this passage must depend on the question whether the *khâdís*, whatever they are, can be carried on the shoulders or not. We saw before (p. 120) that *khâdís* were used both as ornaments and as weapons, and that, when used as weapons, they were most likely rings or quoits with sharp edges. There is at least one other passage where these *khâdís* are said to be worn on the shoulders :

VII, 56, 13. *ámseshu á marutaḥ khādāyaḥ vaḥ vākshah-su rukmāḥ upa-sisriyānāḥ.*

On your shoulders are the quoits, on your chests the golden chains are fastened.

In other places the *khâdís* are said to be in the hands, *hásteshu*, but this would only show that they are there when actually used for fighting. Thus we read :

I, 168, 3. *áeshām ámseshu rambhínī-iva rarabhe, hásteshu khādīḥ ka kritīḥ ka sám dadhe.*

To their shoulders there clings as if a clinging wife, in their hands the quoit is held and the dagger.

In V, 58, 2, the Maruts are called *khâdi-hasta*, holding the quoits in their hands. There is one passage which was mentioned before (p. 112), where the *khâdís* are said to be on the feet of the Maruts, and on the strength of this passage Professor Roth proposes to alter *prá-patheshu* to *prá-padeshu*, and to translate, 'The *khâdís* are on your forefeet.' I do not think this emendation necessary. Though we do not know the exact shape and character of the *khâdí*, we know that it was a weapon, most likely a ring, occasionally used for ornament, and carried along either on the feet or on the shoulders, but in actual battle held in the hand. The weapon which Vishnu holds in one of his right hands, the so-called *kakra*, may be the modern representation of the ancient *khâdí*. What, however, is quite certain is this, that *khâdí* in the Veda never means food, as Sáyana optionally interprets it. This interpretation is accepted by Wilson, who translates, 'At your resting-places on the road refreshments (are ready).' Nay, he

goes on in a note to use this passage as a proof of the advanced civilisation of India at the time of the Vedic *Rishis*. 'The expression,' he says, 'is worthy of note, as indicating the existence of accommodations for the use of travellers: the *prapatha* is the *choltri* of the south of India, the *sarāi* of the Mohammedans, a place by the road-side where the travellers may find shelter and provisions.'

Note 3. This last passage shows that the poet is really representing to himself the *Maruts* as on their journey, and he therefore adds, 'your axle turns the two (IV, 30, 2) wheels together,' which probably means no more than, 'your chariot is going smoothly or quickly.' Though the expression seems to us hardly correct, yet one can well imagine how the axle was supposed to turn the wheels as the horses were drawing the axle, and the axle acted on the wheels. Anyhow, no other translation seems possible. *Samáyā* in the *Veda* means together, at once, and is the Greek *ὁμῆ*, generally *ὁμοῦ* or *ὁμῶς*, the Latin *simul*. Cf. I, 56, 6; 73, 6; 113, 10; 163, 3; VII, 66, 15; IX, 75, 4; 85, 5; 97, 56.

Vṛit means to turn, and is frequently used with reference to the wheels:

VIII, 46, 23. *dāsa syāvāḥ—nemīm ní vavṛituh*.

The ten black horses turn down the felly or the wheel.

IV, 30, 2. *satṛā te ānu kṛishṭāyāḥ vīsvāḥ kakṛā-iva vavṛituh*.

All men turn always round thee, like wheels.

That the *Ātmanepada* of *vṛit* may be used in an active sense we see from

I, 191, 15. *tātaḥ vishám prá vavṛite*.

I turn the poison out from here.

All the words used in this sentence are very old words, and we can with few exceptions turn them into Greek or Latin. In Latin we should have *axis vos(ter) circos simul divertit*. In Greek *ἄξων ὁ(μῶν) κύκλω δμῆ . . .*

Verse 10.

Note 1. See I, 64, 4, note 1, page 111.

Note 2. See I, 166, 1, note 1, page 212.

Note 3. On *éta* in the sense of fallow deer, or, it may be, antelope, see I, 165, 5, note 2, page 196.

Éta originally means variegated, and thus becomes a name of any speckled deer, it being difficult to say what exact species is meant. *Sâyana* in our passage explains *étâh* by *suklavarnâ mâlâh*, many-coloured wreaths or chains, which may be right. Yet the suggestion of Professor Roth that *étâh*, deer, stands here for the skins of fallow deer, is certainly more poetical, and quite in accordance with the Vedic idiom, which uses, for instance, go, cow, not only in the sense of milk,—that is done even in more homely English,—but also for leather, and thong. It is likewise in accordance with what we know of the earliest dress of the Vedic Indians, that deer-skins should here be mentioned. We learn from *Āsvalâyana's Gr̥hya-sûtras*, of which we now possess an excellent edition by Professor Stenzler, and a reprint of the text and commentary by Râma Nârâyana Vidyâratna, in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, that a boy when he was brought to his tutor, i. e. from the eighth to possibly the twenty-fourth year, had to be well combed, and attired in a new dress. A *Brâhmaṇa* should wear the skin of an antelope (*aiṇeya*), the *Kshatriya* the skin of a deer (*raurava*), the *Vaisya* the skin of a goat (*âga*). If they wore dresses, that of the *Brâhmaṇa* should be dark red (*kâshâya*), that of the *Kshatriya* bright red (*mâṅgishtha*), that of the *Vaisya* yellow (*hâridra*). The girdle of the *Brâhmaṇa* should be of *Muṅga* grass, that of the *Kshatriya* a bow-string, that of the *Vaisya* made of sheep's wool. The same regulations occur in other *Sûtras*, as, for instance, the *Dharma-sûtras* of the *Āpastambîyas* and *Gautamas*, though there are certain characteristic differences in each, which may be due either to local or to chronological causes. Thus according to the *Āpastambîya-sûtras*, which have been published by Professor Bühler, the *Brâhmaṇa* may wear the skin of the *harina* deer, or that of the antelope (*aiṇeyam*), but the latter must be from the black antelope (*krishnam*), and, a proviso is added, that if a man wears the black antelope skin, he must never spread it out to sit or sleep on it. As materials for the dress, *Āpastamba*

allows *sana*, hemp*, or *kshumâ*, flax, and he adds that woollen dresses are allowed to all castes, as well as the *kambala* (masc.), which seems to be any cloth made of vegetable substances (*darbhâdinirmitam kîram kambalam*). He then adds a curious remark, which would seem to show

* *Sana* is an old Aryan word, though its meanings differ. Hesychius and Eustathius mention *κάννα* as being synonymous with *ψίαθος*, reed. Pollux gives two forms, *κάννα* and *κάνα*, (Pollux X, 166, *πανάκα δὲ ἐστὶ ψίαθος ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀκατίοις ἦν καὶ κάναν καλοῦσιν*. VII, 176, *κάνναι δὲ τὸ ἐκ κανάβων πλέγμα*.) This is important, because the same difference of spelling occurs also in *κάνναβις* and *κάναβος* or *κάνναβος*, a model, a lay figure, which Lobeck derives from *κάνναι*. In Old Norse we have *hanp-r*, in A. S. *hænep*, hemp, Old High-Germ. *hanaf*.

The occurrence of the word *sana* is of importance as showing at how early a time the Aryans of India were acquainted with the uses and the name of hemp. Our word hemp, the A. S. *hænep*, the Old Norse *hanp-r*, are all borrowed from Latin *cannabis*, which, like other borrowed words, has undergone the regular changes required by Grimm's law in Low-German, and also in High-German, *hanaf*. The Slavonic nations seem to have borrowed their word for hemp (Lith. *kanapė*) from the Goths, the Celtic nations (Ir. *canaib*) from the Romans (cf. Kuhn, *Beiträge*, vol. ii, p. 382). The Latin *cannabis* is borrowed from Greek, and the Greeks, to judge from the account of Herodotus, most likely adopted the word from the Aryan Thracians and Scythians (Her. IV, 74; Pictet, *Les Aryens*, vol. i, p. 314). *Κάνναβις* being a foreign word, it would be useless to attempt an explanation of the final element *bis*, which is added to *sana*, the Sanskrit word for hemp. It may be *visa*, fibre, or it may be anything else. Certain it is that the main element in the name of hemp was the same among the settlers in Northern India, and among the Thracians and Scythians through whom the Greeks first became acquainted with hemp.

The history of the word *κάνναβις* must be kept distinct from that of the Greek *κάννα* or *κάνα*, reed. Both spellings occur, for Pollux, X, 166, writes *πανάκα δὲ ἐστὶ ψίαθος ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀκατίοις ἦν καὶ κάναν καλοῦσιν*, but VII, 176, *κάνναι δὲ τὸ ἐκ κανάβων πλέγμα*. This word *κάννα* may be the same as the Sanskrit *sana*, only with this difference, that it was retained as common property by Greeks and Indians before they separated, and was applied differently in later times by the one and the other.

that the Brâhmanas preferred skins, and the Kshatriyas clothes, for he says that those who wish well to the Brâhmanas should wear agina, skins, and those who wish well to the Kshatriyas should wear vastra, clothes, and those who wish well to both should wear both, but, in that case, the skin should always form the outer garment. The Dharma-sûtras of the Gautamas, which were published in India, prescribe likewise for the Brâhmana the black antelope skin, and allow clothes of hemp or linen (*sânakshaumakîra*) as well as kutapas (woollen cloth) for all. What is new among the Gautamas is, that they add the kârpâsa, the cotton dress, which is important as showing an early knowledge of this manufacture. The kârpâsa dress occurs once more as a present to be given to the Potar priest (*Âsv. Srauta-sûtras IX, 4*), and was evidently considered as a valuable present, taking precedence of the kshaumî or linen dress. It is provided that the cotton dress should not be dyed, for this, I suppose, is the meaning of *avikrîta*. Immediately after, however, it is said, that some authorities say the dress should be dyed red (*kâshâyam apy eke*), the very expression which occurred in *Âpastamba*, and that, in that case, the red for the Brâhmana's dress should be taken from the bark of trees (*vârksha*). Manu, who here, as elsewhere, simply paraphrases the ancient Sûtras, says, II, 41 :

*kârshmarauravabâstâni karmâni brahma-kârîna-
vasîrann ânupûrvyena sânakshaumâvikâni ka.*

‘Let Brahma-kârîns wear (as outer garments) the skins of the black antelope, the deer, the goat, (as under garments) dresses of hemp, flax, and sheep's wool, in the order of the three castes.’

The Sanskrit name for a dressed skin is *agina*, a word which does not occur in the *Rig-veda*, but which, if Bopp is right in deriving it from *agâ*, goat, as *aiyís* from *aîf*, would have meant originally, not skin in general, but a goat-skin. The skins of the *éta*, here ascribed to the Maruts, would be identical with the *aineya*, which *Âsvalâyana* ascribes to the Brâhmana, not, as we should expect, to the Kshatriya, if, as has been supposed, *aineya* is derived from *ena*, which is a secondary form, particularly in the

feminine enī, of eta. There is, however, another word, *eda*, a kind of sheep, which, but for Festus, might be haedus, and by its side *ena*, a kind of antelope. These two forms pre-suppose an earlier *erna* or *arna*, and point therefore in a different direction, though hardly to *āpves*.

Note 4. I translate *kshurā* by sharp edges, but it might have been translated literally by razors, for, strange as it may sound, razors were known, not only during the Vedic period, but even previous to the Aryan separation. The Sanskrit *kshurā* is the Greek *ξυρός* or *ξυρόν*. In the Veda we have clear allusions to shaving :

X, 142, 4. *yadā te vātaḥ anu-vāti sokīḥ, vāptā-iva smāsrū vapasi prā bhūma.*

When the wind blows after thy blast, then thou shavest the earth as a barber shaves the beard. Cf. I, 65, 4.

If, as B. and R. suggest, *vaptar*, barber, is connected with the more modern name for barber in Sanskrit, viz. *nāpita*, we should have to admit a root *svap*, in the sense of tearing or pulling, *vellere*, from which we might derive the Vedic *svapṛ* (VII, 56, 3), beak. Corresponding to this we find in Old High-German *snabul*, beak, (*schnepfe*, snipe,) and in Old Norse *nef*. The Anglo-Saxon *neb* means mouth and nose, while in modern English *neb* or *nib* is used for the bill or beak of a bird*. Another derivation of *nāpita*, proposed by Professor Weber (Kuhn's Beiträge, vol. i, p. 505), who takes *nāpita* as a dialectic form of *snāpitar*, *balneator*, or *lavator*, might be admitted if it could be proved that in India also the barber was at the same time a *balneator*. Burnouf, Lotus, p. 452, translating from the *Sāmañña-phala Sutta*, mentions among the different professions of the people those of 'portier,' 'barbier,' and 'baigneur.'

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Vī-bhūṭayaḥ* is properly a substantive, meaning

* Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, vol. iii, pp. 400, 409. There is not yet sufficient evidence to show that Sanskrit *sv*, German *sn*, and Sanskrit *n* are interchangeable, but there is at least one case that may be analogous. Sanskrit *svaṅg*, to embrace, to twist round a person, German *slango*, *Schlange*, snake, and Sanskrit *nāga*, snake. Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, vol. iii, p. 364.

power, but, like other substantives*, and particularly substantives with prepositions, it can be used as an adjective, and is, in fact, more frequently used as an adjective than as a substantive. In English we may translate it by power. It is a substantive,

I, 8, 9. evá hí te ví-bhûṭayaḥ ūṭayaḥ indra mā-vate sadyáḥ
kit sánti dāsúshe.

For indeed thy powers, O Indra, are at once shelters for a sacrificer, like me.

But it is an adjective,

I, 30, 5. ví-bhûṭiḥ astu sūnṛtā.

May the prayer be powerful.

VI, 17, 4. mahām ánūnam tavásam ví-bhûṭim matsarāsaḥ
garhrishanta pra-sāham.

The sweet draughts of Soma delighted the great, the perfect, the strong, the powerful, the unyielding Indra. Cf. VIII, 49, 6; 50, 6.

Vibhṛvāḥ, with the Svarita on the last syllable, has to be pronounced vibhṛáḥ. In III, 6, 9, we find vi-bhávaḥ.

Note 2. See I, 87, 1, note 1, page 160.

Note 3. See I, 6, 5, note 1, page 41.

Verse 12.

Note 1. Mahi-tvanám, greatness, is formed by the suffix tvaná, which Professor Aufrecht has identified with the Greek σῦνη (συνον); see Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. i, p. 482. The origin of this suffix has been explained by Professor Benfey, *ibid.* vol. vii, p. 120, who traces it back to the suffix tvan, for instance, i-tvan, goer, in prātaḥ-ítvá = prātaḥ-yāvā.

Note 2. Vratá is one of the many words which, though we may perceive their one central idea, and their original purport, we have to translate by various terms in order to make them intelligible in every passage where they occur. Vratá (from *vri*, *vrinoti*), I believe, meant originally what is enclosed, protected, set apart, the Greek νομός :

1. V, 46, 7. yāḥ pārthivāsaḥ yāḥ apām ápi vraté tāḥ naḥ
devīḥ su-havāḥ sárma yakḥhata.

* See Benfey, Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. ii, p. 216.

O ye gracious goddesses, who are on the earth or in the realm of the waters, grant us your protection !

Here *vratá* is used like *vrigána*, see I, 165, 15, note 3, page 208.

X, 114, 2. *tāsām ní kīkyuḥ kaváyaḥ ni-dānam páreshu yāḥ gúhyeshu vratéshu.*

The poets discovered their (the Nirriti's) origin, who are in the far hidden chambers.

I, 163, 3. *ási tritáḥ gúhyena vraténa.*

Thou art Trita within the hidden place, or with the secret work.

Dr. Muir sent me another passage :

III, 54, 5. *dádrisre eshām avamā sádāmsi páreshu yā gúhyeshu vratéshu.*

2. *Vratá* means what is fenced off or forbidden, what is determined, what is settled, and hence, like *dhárman*, law, ordinance. *Várayati* means to prohibit. In this sense *vratá* occurs very frequently :

I, 25, 1. *yát kīṭ hí te vísaḥ yathā prá deva varuṇa vratám, minímási dyávi-dyavi.*

Whatever law of thine we break, O Varuṇa, day by day, men as we are.

II, 8, 3. *yásya vratám ná mīyate.*

Whose law is not broken.

III, 32, 8. *índrasya kárma sú-kritā purūṇi vratāni devāḥ ná minanti víśve.*

The deeds of Indra are well done and many, all the gods do not break his laws, or do not injure his ordinances.

II, 24, 12. *víśvam satyám maghavânā yuvóḥ ít āpaḥ kaná prá minanti vratám vām.*

All that is yours, O powerful gods, is true ; even the waters do not break your law.

II, 38, 7. *nákiḥ asya tāni vratā devásya savitúḥ minanti.*

No one breaks these laws of this god Savitar. Cf. II, 38, 9.

I, 92, 12. *áminatī dáivyāni vratāni.*

Not injuring the divine ordinances. Cf. I, 124, 2.

X, 12, 5. *kát asya áti vratám kakrima.*

Which of his laws have we overstepped ?

VIII, 25, 16. *tásya vratāni ānu vaḥ kārāmasi.*

His ordinances we follow.

X, 33, 9. *nā devānām āti vratām satā-ātmā kṇā gīvati.*

No one lives beyond the statute of the gods, even if he had a hundred lives.

VII, 5, 4. *táva tri-dhātu prithivī utá dyaúḥ vaīsvānara vratām agne saḁanta.*

The earth and the sky followed thy threefold law, O Agni Vaisvānara.

VII, 87, 7. *yáḥ mrīláyāti kakrúshe kit āgah vayám syāma várune ánāgáh, ānu vratāni áditeḥ ridhántaḥ.*

Let us be sinless before Varuna, who is gracious even to him who has committed sin, performing the laws of Aditi!

II, 28, 8. *námaḥ purā te varuṇa utá nūnám utá aparám tuvi-gāta bravāma, tvé hí kam párvate ná sritāni ápra-kyutāni duḥ-dabha vratāni.*

Formerly, and now, and also in future let us give praise to thee, O Varuna; for in thee, O unconquerable, all laws are grounded, immovable as on a rock.

A very frequent expression is *ānu vratām*, according to the command of a god, II, 38, 3; 6; VIII, 40, 8; or simply *ānu vratām*, according to law and order:

I, 136, 5. *tám aryamā abhī rakshati rīgu-yántam ānu vratām.*

Aryaman protects him who acts uprightly according to law.

Cf. III, 61, 1; IV, 13, 2; V, 69, 1.

3. The laws or ordinances or institutions of the gods are sometimes taken for the sacrifices which are supposed to be enjoined by the gods, and the performance of which is, in a certain sense, the performance of the divine will.

I, 93, 8. *yáḥ agnīśhómā havīśhā saparyát devadrīkā mánasā yáḥ ghrítēna, tásya vratām rakshatam pátām ám-hasaḥ.*

He who worships Agni and Soma with oblations, with a godly mind, or with an offering, protect his sacrifice, shield him from evil!

I, 31, 2. *tvám agne prathamáḥ ángirah-tamaḥ kavíḥ devānām pári bhūshasi vratām.*

Agni, the first and wisest of poets, thou performest the sacrifice of the gods.

III, 3, 9. *tāsa vratāni bhūri-poshīṇaḥ vayām ūpa bhūshema dāme ā suvṛiktī-bhiḥ.*

Let us, who possess much wealth, perform with prayers the sacrifices of Agni within our house.

In another acceptation the vratas of the gods are what they perform and establish themselves, their own deeds :

III, 6, 5. *vratā te agne mahatāḥ mahāni tāva krātvā ródasī (īti) ā tatantha.*

The deeds of thee, the great Agni, are great, by thy power thou hast stretched out heaven and earth.

VIII, 42, 1. *āstabhnāt dyām āsuraḥ visvā-vedāḥ āmimīta varimānam prithivyāḥ, ā asīdat visvā bhūvanāni sam-rāṭ visvā īt tāni vārunasya vratāni.*

The wise spirit established the sky, and made the width of the earth, as king he approached all beings,—all these are the works of Varuna.

VI, 14, 3. *tūrvantaḥ dāsyum āyāvaḥ vrataḥ sīkshantaḥ avratām.*

Men fight the fiend, trying to overcome by their deeds him who performs no sacrifices ; or, the lawless enemy.

Lastly; *vratā* comes to mean sway, power, or work, and the expression *vraté tāva* signifies, at thy command, under thy auspices :

I, 24, 15. *ātha vayām āditya vraté tāva ānāgasaḥ āditaye syāma.*

Then, O *Āditya*, under thy auspices may we be guiltless before *Aditi*.

VI, 54, 9. *pūshan tāva vraté vayām ná rishyema kádā kaná.*

O *Pūshan*, may we never fail under thy protection.

X, 36, 13. *yé savitūḥ satyā-savasya visve mitrásya vraté vārunasya devāḥ.*

All the gods who are in the power of *Savitar*, *Mitra*, and *Varuna*.

V, 83, 5. *yāsya vraté prithivī nāmnamīti yāsya vraté saphā-vat gārbhurīti, yāsya vraté óshadhīḥ visvā-rūpāḥ sáhaḥ parganya máhi sárma yakṣha.*

At whose bidding the earth bows down, at whose bidding hoofed animals run about, at whose bidding the plants assume all shapes, mayest thou, O Parganya, yield us great protection!

Note 3. Dâtrá, if derived from dâ, would mean gift, and that meaning is certainly the most applicable in some passages where it occurs:

IX, 97, 55. ási bhágaḥ ási dâtrásya dâtā.

Thou art Bhaga, thou art the giver of the gift.

In other passages, too, particularly in those where the verb dâ or some similar verb occurs in the same verse, it can hardly be doubted that the poet took dâtrá, like dátra or dâttra, in the sense of gift, bounty, largess:

I, 116, 6. yám arvinā dadáthuḥ svetám ásvam—tát vām dâtrám máhi kirtényam bhūt.

The white horse, O Asvins, which you gave, that your gift was great and to be praised.

I, 185, 3. aneháḥ dâtrám áditeḥ anarvám huvé.

I call for the unrivalled, the uninjured bounty of Aditi.

VII, 56, 21. mã vaḥ dâtrāt marutaḥ níḥ arāma.

May we not fall away from your bounty, O Maruts!

III, 54, 16. yuvám hí stháh rayi-daú naḥ rayinām dâtrám rakshethe.

For you, Násatyas, are our givers of riches, you protect the gift.

VI, 20, 7. *rig*svane dâtrám dâsúshe dāḥ.

To *Rigisvan*, the giver, thou givest the gift.

VIII, 43, 33. tát te sahasva ímahe dâtrám yát ná upa-dásyati, tvát agne vāryam vásu.

We ask thee, strong hero, for the gift which does not perish; we ask from thee the precious wealth.

X, 69, 4. dâtrám rakshasva yát idám te asmé (íti).

Protect this gift of thine which thou hast given to us.

VIII, 44, 18. ísishe vāryasya hí dâtrásya agne svāḥ-patíḥ.

For thou, O Agni, lord of heaven, art the master of the precious gift. Cf. IV, 38, 1.

Professor Roth considers that dâtrá is derived rather from dâ, to divide, and that it means share, lot, possession. But there is not a single passage where the meaning of gift or

bounty does not answer all purposes. In VII, 56, 21, *mā vaḥ dātrāt marutaḥ nīḥ arāma*, is surely best translated by, 'let us not fall away from your bounty,' and in our own passage the same meaning should be assigned to *dātrá*. The idea of *dātrá*, bounty, is by no means incompatible with *vratá*, realm, dominion, sway, if we consider that the sphere within which the bounty of a king or a god is exercised and accepted, is in one sense his realm. What the poet therefore says in our passage is simply this, that the bounty of the Maruts extends as far as the realm of Aditi, i. e. is endless, or extends everywhere, Aditi being in its original conception the deity of the unbounded world beyond, the earliest attempt at expressing the Infinite.

As to *dātra* occurring once with the accent on the first syllable in the sense of sickle, see M. M., 'Über eine Stelle in Yaska's Commentar zum Naighantuka,' Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1853, vol. vii, p. 375.

VIII, 78, 10. *táva ít indra ahám ā-sāsá háste dātram kaná ā dade*.

Trusting in thee alone, O Indra, I take the sickle in my hand.

This *dātra*, sickle, is derived from *do*, to cut.

Aditi, the Infinite.

Note 4. Aditi, an ancient god or goddess, is in reality the earliest name invented to express the Infinite; not the Infinite as the result of a long process of abstract reasoning, but the visible Infinite, visible, as it were, to the naked eye, the endless expanse beyond the earth, beyond the clouds, beyond the sky. That was called A-diti, the un-bound, the un-bounded; one might almost say, but for fear of misunderstandings, the Absolute, for it is derived from *diti*, bond, and the negative particle, and meant therefore originally what is free from bonds of any kind, whether of space or time, free from physical weakness, free from moral guilt. Such a conception became of necessity a being, a person, a god. To us such a name and such a conception seem decidedly modern, and to find in the Veda Aditi, the

Infinite, as the mother of the principal gods, is certainly, at first sight, startling. But the fact is that the thoughts of primitive humanity were not only different from our thoughts, but different also from what we think their thoughts ought to have been. The poets of the Veda indulged freely in theogonic speculations, without being frightened by any contradictions. They knew of Indra as the greatest of gods, they knew of Agni as the god of gods, they knew of Varuṇa as the ruler of all, but they were by no means startled at the idea that their Indra had a mother, or that their Agni was born like a babe from the friction of two fire-sticks, or that Varuṇa and his brother Mitra were nursed in the lap of Aditi. Some poet would take hold of the idea of an unbounded power, of Aditi, originally without any reference to other gods. Very soon these ideas met, and, without any misgivings, either the gods were made subordinate to, and represented as the sons of Aditi, or where Indra was to be praised as supreme, Aditi was represented as doing him homage.

VIII, 12, 14. *utā sva-rāge áditiḥ stómam índrāya gīṣanat.*
And Aditi produced a hymn for Indra, the king.

Here Professor Roth takes Aditi as an epithet of Agni, not as the name of the goddess Aditi, while Dr. Muir rightly takes it in the latter sense, and likewise retains *stómam* instead of *sómam*, as printed by Professor Aufrecht. Cf. VII, 38, 4.

The idea of the Infinite, as I have tried to show elsewhere, was most powerfully impressed on the awakening mind, or, as we now say, was revealed, by the East*. 'It is impossible to enter fully into all the thoughts and feelings that passed through the minds of the early poets when they formed names for that far, far East from whence even the early dawn, the sun, the day, their own life, seemed to spring. A new life flashed up every morning before their eyes, and the fresh breezes of the dawn reached them like greetings from the distant lands beyond the mountains, beyond the clouds, beyond the dawn, beyond "the immortal

* Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series, p. 499.

sea which brought us hither." The dawn seemed to them to open golden gates for the sun to pass in triumph, and while those gates were open, their eyes and their mind strove in their childish way to pierce beyond the limits of this finite world. That silent aspect awakened in the human mind the conception of the Infinite, the Immortal, the Divine.' Aditi is a name for that distant East, but Aditi is more than the dawn. Aditi is beyond the dawn, and in one place (I, 113, 19) the dawn is called 'the face of Aditi,' *áditer ánikam*. Thus we read :

V, 62, 8. *híranya-rûpam ushásaḥ ví-ushṭau áyaḥ-sthûnam út-itâ sūryasya, ā rohathaḥ varuṇa mitra gártam átaḥ kakshâthe (iti) áditim dítim ka.*

Mitra and Varuṇa, you mount your chariot, which is golden, when the dawn bursts forth, and has iron poles at the setting of the sun : from thence you see Aditi and Diti, i. e. what is yonder and what is here.

If we keep this original conception of Aditi clearly before our mind, the various forms which Aditi assumes, even in the hymns of the Veda, will not seem incoherent. Aditi is not a prominent deity in the Veda, she is celebrated rather in her sons, the Âdityas, than in her own person. While there are so many hymns addressed to Ushas, the dawn, or Indra, or Agni, or Savitar, there is but one hymn, X, 72, which from our point of view, though not from that of Indian theologians, might be called a hymn to Aditi. Nevertheless Aditi is a familiar name ; a name of the past, whether in time or in thought only, and a name that lives on in the name of the Âdityas, the sons of Aditi, including the principal deities of the Veda.

Aditi and the Âdityas.

Thus we read :

I, 107, 2. *úpa naḥ devāḥ ávasā ā gamantu ángirasām sāma-bhiḥ stûyámānāḥ, indraḥ indriyaḥ marútaḥ marút-bhiḥ ádityaḥ naḥ áditiḥ sárma yamsat.*

May the gods come to us with their help, praised by the songs of the Ângiras,—Indra with his powers, the Maruts with the storms, may Aditi with the Âdityas give us protection !

X, 66, 3. *indraḥ vāsu-bhiḥ pári pátu naḥ gáyam ádityaḥ naḥ áditiḥ sárma yákkhatu, rudráḥ rudrébhiḥ deváh mṛilayāti naḥ tváshṭā naḥ gnābhiḥ suvitāya ginvatu.*

May Indra with the Vasus watch our house, may Aditi with the Ādityas give us protection, may the divine Rudra with the Rudras have mercy upon us, may Tvashṭar with the mothers bring us to happiness!

III, 54, 20. *ádityaḥ naḥ áditiḥ sṛinotu yákkhantu naḥ marútaḥ sárma bhadram.*

May Aditi with the Ādityas hear us, may the Maruts give us good protection!

In another passage Varuna takes the place of Aditi as the leader of the Ādityas:

VII, 35, 6. *sám naḥ indraḥ vāsu-bhiḥ deváh astu sám ádityébhiḥ várunaḥ su-sámsaḥ, sám naḥ rudráḥ rudrébhiḥ gálāshaḥ sám naḥ tváshṭā gnābhiḥ ihá sṛinotu.*

May Indra bless us, the god with the Vasus! May Varuna, the glorious, bless us with the Ādityas! May the relieving Rudra with the Rudras bless us! May Tvashṭar with the mothers kindly hear us here!

Even in passages where the poet seems to profess an exclusive worship of Aditi, as in

V, 69, 3. *prátáḥ devīm áditim gohavími madhyándine út-itá súryasya,*

I invoke the divine Aditi early in the morning, at noon, and at the setting of the sun,

Mitra and Varuna, her principal sons, are mentioned immediately after, and implored, like her, to bestow blessings on their worshipper.

Her exclusive worship appears once, in VIII, 19, 14.

A very frequent expression is that of *ádityāḥ áditiḥ* without any copula, to signify the Ādityas and Aditi:

IV, 25, 3. *káḥ devānām ávaḥ adyá vṛínite káḥ ádityān áditim gyótiḥ itte.*

Who does choose now the protection of the gods? Who asks the Ādityas, Aditi, for their light?

VI, 51, 5. *vísve ádityāḥ adite sa-góshāḥ asmábhyam sárma bahulám ví yanta.*

All ye Âdityas, Aditi together, grant to us your manifold protection!

X, 39, 11. ná tám rāḡānau adite kútaḥ káná ná ámhaḥ asnoti duḥ-itám nákiḥ bhayám.

O ye two kings (the Asvins), Aditi, no evil reaches him from anywhere, no misfortune, no fear (whom you protect). Cf. VII, 66, 6.

X, 63, 5. tās ā vivāsa námasā suvṛiktī-bhiḥ mahāḥ âdityān âditim svastāye.

I cherish them with worship and with hymns, the great Âdityas, Aditi, for happiness' sake.

X, 63, 17. evá platéh sūnúḥ avivṛidhat vaḥ vísve âdityāḥ adite manīṣhī.

The wise son of Plati magnified you, all ye Âdityas, Aditi!

X, 65, 9. pargányāvātā vṛishabhā purīṣhīnā indravāyū (iti) várūnaḥ mitráḥ aryamā, devān âdityān âditim havāmahe ye pāṛthivāsaḥ divyāsaḥ ap-sú yé.

There are Parganya and Vāta, the powerful, the givers of rain, Indra and Vāyu, Varuna, Mitra, Aryaman, we call the divine Âdityas, Aditi, those who dwell on the earth, in heaven, in the waters.

We may not be justified in saying that there ever was a period in the history of the religious thought of India, a period preceding the worship of the Âdityas, when Aditi, the Infinite, was worshipped, though to the sage who first coined this name, it expressed, no doubt, for a time the principal, if not the only object of his faith and worship.

Aditi and Daksha.

Soon, however, the same mental process which led on later speculators from the earth to the elephant, and from the elephant to the tortoise, led the Vedic poets beyond Aditi, the Infinite. There was something beyond that Infinite which for a time they had grasped by the name of Aditi, and this, whether intentionally or by a mere accident of language, they called dāksha, literally power or the powerful. All this, no doubt, sounds strikingly modern, yet, though the passages in which this dāksha is mentioned are few in number, I should not venture to

say that they are necessarily modern, even if by modern we mean only later than 1000 B.C. Nothing can bring the perplexity of the ancient mind, if once drawn into this vortex of speculation, more clearly before us than if we read :

X, 72, 4-5. *áditeh dákshah agâyata dákshât um (iti) áditih pári,—áditih hí áganishtha dáksha yá duhitā táva, tām devāh ánu agâyanta bhadráh amṛta-bandhavaḥ.*

Daksha was born of Aditi, and Aditi from Daksha. For Aditi was born, O Daksha, she who is thy daughter; after her the gods were born, the blessed, who share in immortality.

Or, in more mythological language :

X, 64, 5. *dákshasya vā adite gánmani vraté rāgānā mitrā-várunā ā vivāsasi.*

Or thou, O Aditi, nursest in the birthplace of Daksha the two kings, Mitra and Varuna.

Nay, even this does not suffice. There is something again beyond Aditi and Daksha, and one poet says :

X, 5, 7. *ásat ka sāt ka paramé ví-oman dákshasya gánman áditeh upá-sthe.*

Not-being and Being are in the highest heaven, in the birthplace of Daksha, in the lap of Aditi.

At last something like a theogony, though full of contradictions, was imagined, and in the same hymn from which we have already quoted, the poet says :

X, 72, 1-4. *devānām nú vayám gānā prá voḥāma vipanyáyā, ukthéshu sasyámāneshu yáh (yát?) pásyāt út-tare yugé. 1.*

bráhmaṇah pátiḥ etā sám karmāra-iva adhamat, devānām pûrvyé yugé ásataḥ sāt agâyata. 2.

devānām yugé prathamé ásataḥ sāt agâyata, tát āsāh ánu agâyanta tát uttānā-padaḥ pári. 3.

bhūh gagñe uttānā-padaḥ bhuváh āsāh agâyanta, áditeh dákshah agâyata, dákshât um (iti) áditiḥ pári. 4.

1. Let us now with praise proclaim the births of the gods, that a man may see them in a future age, whenever these hymns are sung.

2. Brahmanaspati * blew them together like a smith (with

* Bráhmaṇaspati, literally the lord of prayer, or the lord of the sacrifice, sometimes a representative of Agni (I, 38, 13, note), but

his bellows); in a former age of the gods, Being was born from Not-being.

3. In the first age of the gods, Being was born from Not-being, after it were born the Regions (space), from them Uttānapada ;

4. From Uttānapad the Earth was born, the Regions were born from the Earth. Daksha was born of Aditi, and Aditi from Daksha.

The ideas of Being and Not-being (τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν) are familiar to the Hindus from a very early time in their intellectual growth, and they can only have been the result of abstract speculation. Therefore dāksha, too, in the sense of power or potentia, may have been a metaphysical conception. But it may also have been suggested by a mere accident of language, a never-failing source of ancient thoughts. The name dāksha-pitaraḥ, an epithet of the gods, has generally been translated by 'those who have Daksha for their father.' But it may have been used originally in a very different sense. Professor Roth has, I think, convincingly proved that this epithet dāksha-pitar, as given to certain gods, does not mean, the gods who have Daksha for their father, but that it had originally the simpler meaning of fathers of strength, or, as he translates it, 'preserving, possessing, granting faculties*.' This is particularly clear in one passage :

III, 27, 9. bhūtānām gārbham ādadhe, dākshasya pitāram.

I place Agni, the source of all beings, the father of strength

by no means identical with him (see VII, 41, 1); sometimes performing the deeds of Indra, but again by no means identical with him (see II, 23, 18. *īndreṇa yugā—nīḥ apām aubgaḥ arnavām*; cf. VIII, 96, 15). In II, 26, 3, he is called father of the gods (*devānām pitāram*); in II, 23, 2, the creator of all beings (*vīśvashām ganiṭā*).

* The accent in this case cannot help us in determining whether dāksha-pitar means having Daksha for their father (*Δακχοπατήρ*), or father of strength. In the first case dāksha would rightly retain its accent (*dāksha-pitar*) as a Bahuvrīhi; in the second, the analogy of such Tatpurusha compounds as *grīhā-pati* (*Pân. VI, 2, 18*) would be sufficient to justify the *pūrvapadaprakṛitisvaratvam*.

After this we can hardly hesitate how to translate the next verse :

VI, 50, 2. *su-gyótishaḥ—dáksha-pitr̥n—devān.*

The resplendent gods, the fathers of strength.

It may seem more doubtful, when we come to gods like Mitra and Varuṇa, whom we are so much accustomed to regard as Ādityas, or sons of Aditi, and who therefore, according to the theogony mentioned before, would have the best claim to the name of sons of Daksha ; yet here, too, the original and simple meaning is preferable ; nay, it is most likely that from passages like this, the later explanation, which makes Mitra and Varuṇa the sons of Daksha, may have sprung.

VII, 66, 2. *yá—su-dákshâ dáksha-pitarā.*

Mitra and Varuṇa, who are of good strength, the fathers of strength.

Lastly, even men may claim this name ; for, unless we change the accent, we must translate :

VIII, 63, 10. *avasyávaḥ yushmābhiḥ dáksha-pitarāḥ.*

We suppliants, being, through your aid, fathers of strength.

But whatever view we take, whether we take *dáksha* in the sense of power, as a personification of a philosophical conception, or as the result of a mythological misunderstanding occasioned by the name of *dáksha-pitar*, the fact remains that in certain hymns of the *Rig-veda* (VIII, 25, 5) *Dáksha*, like *Āditi*, has become a divine person, and has retained his place as one of the *Ādityas* to the very latest time of *Purāṇic* tradition.

Aditi in her Cosmic Character.

But to return to *Aditi*. Let us look upon her as the Infinite personified, and most passages, even those where she is presented as a subordinate deity, will become intelligible.

Aditi, in her cosmic character, is the Beyond, the unbounded realm beyond earth, sky, and heaven, and originally she was distinct from the sky, the earth, and the ocean. *Aditi* is mentioned by the side of heaven and earth, which

shows that, though in more general language she may be identified with heaven and earth in their unlimited character, her original conception was different. This we see in passages where different deities or powers are invoked together, particularly if they are invoked together in the same verse, and where Aditi holds a separate place by the side of heaven and earth :

I, 94, 16 (final). *tát naḥ mitráḥ váruṇaḥ mamahantām áditiḥ síndhuḥ pr̥thivī utá dyaúḥ.*

May Mitra and Varuna grant us this, may Aditi, Sindhu (sea), the Earth, and the Sky!

In other passages, too, where Aditi has assumed a more personal character, she still holds her own by the side of heaven and earth ; cf. IX, 97, 58 (final) :

I, 191, 6. *dyaúḥ vaḥ pitā pr̥thivī mātā sómaḥ bhrātā áditiḥ svásā.*

The Sky is your father, the Earth your mother, Soma your brother, Aditi your sister.

VIII, 101, 15. *mātā rudrāṇām duhitā vásūnām svásā ádityāṇām amṛtasya nābhiḥ, prá nú voḥam kikitúshe gánāya mā gām ánāgām áditim vadhishā.*

The mother of the Rudras, the daughter of the Vasus, the sister of the Ádityas, the source of immortality, I tell it forth to the man of understanding, may he not offend the cow, the guiltless Aditi ! Cf. I, 153, 3 ; IX, 96, 15 ; Vāgasan. Samhitā XIII, 49.

VI, 51, 5. *dyaúḥ pítar (iti) pr̥thivi mātāḥ ádhruk ágne bhrātāḥ vasavaḥ mr̥lāta naḥ, v̥sve ádityāḥ adite sa-góshāḥ asmábhyam sárma bahulám vi yanta.*

Sky, father, Earth, kind mother, Fire, brother, bright gods, have mercy upon us ! All Ádityas (and) Aditi together, grant us your manifold protection !

X, 63, 10. *su-trāmānam pr̥thivīm dyāṁ aneḥásam su-sármānam áditim su-prán̥itim, daivīm nāvam su-aritrām ánāgasam ásravantīm ā ruhema svastāye.*

Let us for welfare step into the divine boat, with good oars, faultless and leakless—the well-protecting Earth, the peerless Sky, the sheltering, well-guiding Aditi !

X, 66, 4. *áditiḥ dyāvâpr̥thivī (iti).*

Aditi, and Heaven and Earth.

Where two or more verses come together, the fact that Aditi is mentioned by the side of Heaven and Earth may seem less convincing, because in these Nivids or long strings of invocations different names or representatives of one and the same power are not unfrequently put together. For instance,

X, 36, 1-3. *ushásânáktâ brihatī (īti) su-pésasâ dyāvâ-kshāmâ várūnah mitráh aryamā, índram huve marútaḥ párvatân apáh ádityān dyāvâprithivī (īti) apáh svār (īti svāh).* 1.

dyaúh ka nah prithivī ka prá-ktasâ ritávarī (īty ritá-vari) rakshatām ámhasah risháh, mā duh-vidátrā nīh-rītiḥ nah ísata tát devānām ávah adyá vrinímahe. 2.

vīsvasmât nah áditiḥ pátu ámhasah mātā mitráśya várūnasya revátaḥ svāh-vat gyótiḥ avrikám nasímahi. 3.

1. There are the grand and beautiful Morning and Night, Heaven and Earth, Varuna, Mitra, Aryaman; I call Indra, the Maruts, the Waters, the Âdityas, Heaven and Earth, the Waters, the Heaven.

2. May Heaven and Earth, the provident, the righteous, preserve us from sin and mischief! May the malevolent Nirrīti not rule over us! This blessing of the gods we ask for to-day.

3. May Aditi protect us from all sin, the, mother of Mitra and of the rich Varuna! May we obtain heavenly light without enemies! This blessing of the gods we ask for to-day.

Here we cannot but admit that Dyāvâkshāmâ, heaven and earth, is meant for the same divine couple as Dyāvâprithivī, heaven and earth, although under slightly differing names they are invoked separately. The waters are invoked twice in the same verse and under the same name; nor is there any indication that, as in other passages, the waters of the sky are meant as distinct from the waters of the sea. Nevertheless even here, Aditi, who in the third verse is called distinctly the mother of Mitra and Varuna, cannot well have been meant for the same deity as Heaven and Earth, mentioned in the second verse; and the author of

these two verses, while asking the same blessing from both, must have been aware of the original independent character of Aditi.

Aditi as Mother.

In this character of a deity of the far East, of an Orient in the true sense of the word, Aditi was naturally thought of as the mother of certain gods, particularly of those that were connected with the daily rising and setting of the sun. If it was asked whence comes the dawn, or the sun, or whence come day and night, or Mitra and Varuna, or any of the bright, solar, eastern deities, the natural answer was that they come from the Orient, that they are the sons of Aditi. Thus we read in

IX, 74, 3. *urvī gávyûtiḥ áditeḥ ritám yaté.*

Wide is the space for him who goes on the right path of Aditi.

In VIII, 25, 3, we are told that Aditi bore Mitra and Varuna, and these in verse 5 are called the sons of Daksha (power), and the grandsons of Savas, which again means might: *nápâtâ sávasaḥ maháḥ sūnū (īti) dákshasya su-krátū (īti)*. In X, 36, 3, Aditi is called the mother of Mitra and Varuna; likewise in X, 132, 6; see also VI, 67, 4. In VIII, 47, 9, Aditi is called the mother of Mitra, Aryaman, Varuna, who in VII, 60, 5 are called her sons. In X, 11, 1, Varuna is called *yahvāḥ áditeḥ*, the son of Aditi (cf. VIII, 19, 12); in VII, 41, 2, Bhaga is mentioned as her son. In X, 72, 8, we hear of eight sons of Aditi, but it is added that she approached the gods with seven sons only, and that the eighth (*mārtāndá*, addled egg) was thrown away: *aṣṭaú putrásaḥ áditeḥ yé gâtāḥ tanvāḥ pári, devān úpa prá ait saptá-bhiḥ parā mārtāndám āsyat.*

In X, 63, 2, the gods in general are represented as born from Aditi, the waters, and the earth: *yé sthā gâtāḥ áditeḥ at-bhyāḥ pári yé prithivyāḥ té me ihá sruta hávam.*

You who are born of Aditi, from the water, you who are born of the earth, hear ye all my call!

The number seven, with regard to the *Ādityas*, occurs also in

IX, 114, 3. *saptá dísaḥ nānā-sūryāḥ saptá hótāraḥ ritvīgaḥ devāḥ ādityāḥ yé saptá tébhiḥ soma abhí raksha naḥ.*

There are seven regions with their different suns, there are seven Hotars as priests, those who are the seven gods, the Ādityas, with them, O Soma, protect us!

The Seven Ādityas.

This number of seven Ādityas requires an explanation. To say that seven is a solemn or sacred number is to say very little, for however solemn or sacred that number may be elsewhere, it is not more sacred than any other number in the Veda. The often-mentioned seven rivers have a real geographical foundation, like the seven hills of Rome. The seven flames or treasures of Agni (V, 1, 5) and of Soma and Rudra (VI, 74, 1), the seven paridhis or logs at certain sacrifices (X, 90, 15), the seven Harits or horses of the sun, the seven Hotar priests (III, 7, 7; 10, 4), the seven cities of the enemy destroyed by Indra (I, 63, 7), and even the seven Rishis (X, 82, 2; 109, 4), all these do not prove that the number of seven was more sacred than the number of one or three or five or ten used in the Veda in a very similar way. With regard to the seven Ādityas, however, we are still able to see that their number of seven or eight had something to do with solar movements. If their number had always been eight, we should feel inclined to trace the number of the Ādityas back to the eight regions, or the eight cardinal points of the heaven. Thus we read :

I, 35, 8. *ashtaú ví akhyat kakúbhaḥ prīthivyāḥ.*

The god Savitar lighted up the eight points of the earth (not the eight hills).

But we have seen already that though the number of Ādityas was originally supposed to have been eight, it was reduced to seven, and this could hardly be said in any sense of the eight points of the compass. Cf. Taitt. Ār. I, 7, 6.

As we cannot think in ancient India of the seven planets, I can only suggest the seven days or tithis of the four parvans of the lunar month as a possible prototype of the

Ādityas. This might even explain the destruction of the eighth Āditya, considering that the eighth day of each parvan, owing to its uncertainty, might be represented as exposed to decay and destruction. This would explain such passages as,

IV, 7, 5. *yágishthaṁ sapta dhāma-bhiḥ.*

Agni, most worthy of sacrifice in the seven stations.

IX, 102, 2. *yagñāsya sapta dhāma-bhiḥ.*

In the seven stations of the sacrifice.

The seven threads of the sacrifice may have the same origin :

II, 5, 2. *ā yāsmiṁ sapta rasmāyaḥ tatāḥ yagñāsya netāri, manushvāt daivyaṁ aśvaṁ.*

In whom, as the leader of the sacrifice, the seven threads are stretched out,—the eighth divine being is manlike (?).

The sacrifice itself is called, X, 124, 1, *saptá-tantu*, having seven threads.

X, 122, 3. *saptá dhāmāni pari-yān āmartyaḥ.*

Agni, the immortal, who goes round the seven stations.

X, 8, 4. *ushāḥ-ushāḥ hí vaso (íti) ágram éshi tvám yamá-yoḥ abhavaḥ vi-bhāva, ritāya sapta dadhishe padāni ganāyan mitrám tanvê svāyai.*

For thou, Vasu (Agni), comest first every morning, thou art the illuminator of the twins (day and night). Thou holdest the seven places for the sacrifice, creating Mitra (the sun) for thy own body.

X, 5, 6. *saptá maryādāḥ kavāyaḥ tatakshuḥ tāsām ékām ít abhí amhuráḥ gāt.*

The sages established the seven divisions, but mischief befell one of them.

I, 22, 16. *átaḥ devāḥ avantu naḥ yátaḥ víshnuḥ vi-śakramé prithivyāḥ sapta dhāma-bhiḥ.*

May the gods protect us from whence Vishnu strode forth, by the seven stations of the earth!

Even the names of the seven or eight Ādityas are not definitely known, at least not from the hymns of the Rig-veda. In II, 27, 1, we have a list of six names: Mitrá, Aryamán, Bhága, Váruna, Dáksha, Ámsaḥ. These with Áditi would give us seven. In VI, 50, 1, we have Áditi,

Várūna, Mitrá, Agní, Aryamán, Savitár, and Bhága. In I, 89, 3, Bhága, Mitrá, Áditi, Dáksha, Aryamán, Várūna, Sóma, Arvínā, and Sárasvatī are invoked together with an old invocation, pūrvayā ni-vídā. In the Taittirīya-āraṇyaka, I, 13, 3, we find the following list: 1. Mitra, 2. Varuna, 3. Dhātār, 4. Aryaman, 5. Amsa, 6. Bhaga, 7. Indra, 8. Vivasvat, but there, too, the eighth son is said to be Mārtānda, or, according to the commentator, Áditya.

The character of Aditi as the mother of certain gods is also indicated by some of her epithets, such as rāga-putrā, having kings for her sons; su-putrā, having good sons; ugrā-putrā, having terrible sons:

II, 27, 7. pīpartu naḥ áditiḥ rāga-putrā áti dvéshāmsi
aryamā su-gébhiḥ, brhāt mitrásya várūnasya sárma úpa
syāma puru-vīrāḥ árishtāḥ.

May Aditi with her royal sons, may Aryaman carry us on easy roads across the hatreds; may we with many sons and without hurt obtain the great protection of Mitra and Varuna!

III, 4, 11. barhiḥ naḥ ástām áditiḥ su-putrā.

May Aditi with her excellent sons sit on our sacred pile!

VIII, 67, 11. pārsi dīné gabhīré ā úgra-putre glghām-
sataḥ, mákiḥ tokásya naḥ rishat.

Protect us, O goddess with terrible sons, from the enemy in shallow or deep water, and no one will hurt our offspring!

Aditi identified with other Deities.

Aditi, however, for the very reason that she was originally intended for the Infinite, for something beyond the visible world, was liable to be identified with a number of finite deities which might all be represented as resting on Aditi, as participating in Aditi, as being Aditi. Thus we read:

I, 89, 10 (final). áditiḥ dyaúḥ áditiḥ antáriksham áditiḥ
mâtā sáḥ pitā sáḥ putráḥ, víśve devāḥ áditiḥ pāñka gánāḥ
áditiḥ gâtām áditiḥ gáni-tvam.

Aditi is the heaven, Aditi the sky, Aditi the mother, the

father, the son. All the gods are Aditi, the five clans, the past is Aditi, Aditi is the future.

But although Aditi may thus be said to be everything, heaven, sky, and all the gods, no passage occurs, in the Rig-veda at least, where the special meaning of heaven or earth is expressed by Aditi. In X, 63, 3, where Aditi seems to mean sky, we shall see that it ought to be taken as a masculine, either in the sense of *Āditya*, or as an epithet, unbounded, immortal. In I, 72, 9, we ought probably to read *prīthvī* and pronounce *prīthuvī*, and translate 'the wide Aditi, the mother with her sons;' and not, as Benfey does, 'the Earth, the eternal mother.'

It is more difficult to determine whether in one passage Aditi has not been used in the sense of life after life, or as the name of the place whither people went after death, or of the deity presiding over that place. In a well-known hymn, supposed to have been uttered by *Sunaḥsepa* when on the point of being sacrificed by his own father, the following verse occurs :

I, 24, 1. *kāḥ naḥ mahyaḥ āditaye pūnaḥ dāt, pitāram ka drīśeyam mātāram ka.*

Who will give us back to the great Aditi, that I may see father and mother?

As the supposed utterer of this hymn is still among the living, Aditi can hardly be taken in the sense of earth, nor would the wish to see father and mother be intelligible in the mouth of one who is going to be sacrificed by his own father. If we discard the story of *Sunaḥsepa*, and take the hymn as uttered by any poet who craves for the protection of the gods in the presence of danger and death, then we may choose between the two meanings of earth or liberty, and translate, either, Who will give us back to the great earth? or, Who will restore us to the great Aditi, the goddess of freedom?

Aditi and Diti.

There is one other passage which might receive light if we could take Aditi in the sense of Hades, but I give this translation as a mere guess :

IV, 2, 11. *râyé ka nah su-apatyāya deva dītim ka rāsva āditim urushya.*

That we may enjoy our wealth and healthy offspring, give us this life on earth, keep off the life to come! Cf. I, 152, 6.

It should be borne in mind that Diti occurs in the Rig-veda thrice only, and in one passage it should, I believe, be changed into Aditi. This passage occurs in VII, 15, 12. *tvām agne vīrá-vat yārah devāh ka savitā bhāgah, dītih ka dāti vāryam.* Here the name of Diti is so unusual, and that of Aditi, on the contrary, so natural, that I have little doubt that the poet had put the name of Aditi; and that later reciters, not aware of the occasional license of putting two short syllables instead of one, changed it into Aditi. If we remove this passage, then Diti, in the Rig-veda at least, occurs twice only, and each time together or in contrast with Aditi; cf. V, 62, 8, page 243. I have no doubt, therefore, that Professor Roth is right when he says that Diti is a being without any definite conception, a mere reflex of Aditi. We can clearly watch her first emergence into existence through what is hardly more than a play of words, whereas in the epic and Purāṇic literature this Diti (like the Suras) has grown into a definite person, one of the daughters of Daksha, the wife of Kasyapa, the mother of the enemies of the gods, the Daityas. Such is the growth of legend, mythology and religion!

Aditi in her Moral Character.

Besides the cosmical character of Aditi, which we have hitherto examined, this goddess has also assumed a very prominent moral character. Aditi, like Varuṇa, delivers from sin. Why this should be so, we can still understand if we watch the transition which led from a purely cosmical to a moral conception of Aditi. Sin in the Veda is frequently conceived as a bond or a chain from which the repentant sinner wishes to be freed:

VII, 86, 5. *āva drugdhāni pītryā sriga nah āva yā vayām kakrīmā tanūbhih, āva rāgan pasu-trīpam nā tāyūm srigā vatsām nā dāmnah vāsishtham.*

Absolve us from the sins of our fathers, and from those

which we have committed with our own bodies. Release Vasishtha, O king, like a thief who has feasted on stolen cattle; release him like a calf from the rope^a.

VIII, 67, 14. té naḥ āsnāḥ vṛkânām ādityāsaḥ mumókata stenām baddhām-iva adite.

O Ādityas, deliver us from the mouth of the wolves, like a bound thief, O Aditi! Cf. VIII, 67, 18.

Sunakṣepa, who, as we saw before, wishes to be restored to the great Aditi, is represented as bound (dita) by ropes, and in V, 2, 7, we read :

sūnakṣēpam kīti nī-ditam saḥsṛāt yūpāt amuñikāḥ āsa-mishṭa hī sāk, evā asmāt agne vī mumugdhi pāsān hōtar (īti) kīkitvaḥ ihā tū nī-sādya.

O Agni, thou hast released the bound Sunakṣepa from the stake, for he had prayed; thus take from us, too, these ropes, O sagacious Hotar, after thou hast settled here.

Expressions like these, words like dāman, bond, nī-dita, bound, naturally suggested ā-diti, the un-bound or un-bounded, as one of those deities who could best remove the bonds of sin or misery. If we once realise this concatenation of thought and language, many passages of the Veda that seemed obscure, will become intelligible.

VII, 51, 1. ādityānām āvasā nūtanena sakṣhīmāhi sārmanā sām-tamena, anāgāḥ-tvé aditi-tvé turāsaḥ imām yagñām dadhatu srōshamānāḥ.

May we obtain the new favour of the Ādityas, their best protection; may the quick Maruts listen and place this sacrifice in guiltlessness and Aditi-hood.

I have translated the last words literally, in order to make their meaning quite clear. Āgas has the same meaning as the Greek *āyos*, guilt, abomination; an-āgās-tvá, therefore, as applied to a sacrifice or to the man who makes it, means guiltlessness, purity. Aditi-tvá, Aditi-hood, has a similar meaning, it means freedom from bonds, from anything that hinders the proper performance of a religious act; it may come to mean perfection or holiness.

^a See M. M., History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 2nd ed., p. 541.

Aditi having once been conceived as granting this adititvá, soon assumed a very definite moral character, and hence the following invocations :

I, 24, 15. út ut-tamám varuṇa pāśam asmát áva adhamám ví madhyamám srathaya, átha vayám áditya vraté táva ánāgasaḥ áditaye syāma.

O Varuṇa, lift the highest rope, draw off the lowest, remove the middle ; then, O Áditya, let us be in thy service free of guilt before Aditi.

V, 82, 6. ánāgasaḥ áditaye devásya savitúḥ savé, vísvā vāmāni dhīmahi.

May we, guiltless before Aditi, and in the keeping of the god Savitar, obtain all goods ! Professor Roth here translates Aditi by freedom or security.

I, 162, 22. anāgāh-tvám naḥ áditiḥ krinotu.

May Aditi give us sinlessness ! Cf. VII, 51, 1.

IV, 12, 4. yát kit hí te puruṣa-trā yavishtha ákitti-bhiḥ kakrimá kát kit āgah, kridhí sú asmān áditeḥ ánāgān ví énāmsi sistrathaḥ víshvak agne.

Whatever, O youthful god, we have committed against thee, men as we are, whatever sin through thoughtlessness, make us guiltless of Aditi, loosen the sins on all sides, O Agni !

VII, 93, 7. sáh agne enā námasá sám-iddhaḥ ákṣha mitráṃ várunam índram voṣeḥ, yát-sím āgah kakrimá tát sú mrīḥ tát aryamā áditiḥ sistrathantu.

O Agni, thou who hast been kindled with this adoration, greet Mitra, Varuṇa, and Indra. Whatever sin we have committed, do thou pardon it ! May Aryaman, Aditi loose it !

Here the plural sistrathantu should be observed, instead of the dual.

VIII, 18, 6-7. áditiḥ naḥ dívā paśúm áditiḥ náktam ádva-yāḥ, áditiḥ pátu amhasaḥ sadā-vridhā.

utá syā naḥ dívā matíḥ áditiḥ ūtyā ā gamat, sá sám-tāti máyaḥ karat āpa srīdhaḥ.

May Aditi by day protect our cattle, may she, who never deceives, protect by night ; may she, with steady increase, protect us from evil !

And may she, the thoughtful Aditi, come with help to

us by day; may she kindly bring happiness to us, and carry away all enemies! Cf. X, 36, 3, page 251.

X, 87, 18. *ā vṛiskyantām āditaye duḥ-ēvāḥ.*

May the evil-doers be cut off from Aditi! or literally, may they be rooted out before Aditi!

II, 27, 14. *ādite mītra vārūna utā mrīḥ yāt vaḥ vayām kakṛimā kāt kīt āgaḥ, urū asyām ābhayam gyōtiḥ indra mā naḥ dīrghāḥ abhī nasan tāmistrāḥ.*

Aditi, Mitra, and also Varuna forgive, if we have committed any sin against you. May I obtain the wide and fearless light, O Indra! May not the long darkness reach us!

VII, 87, 7. *yāḥ mrīḥyāti kakṛúshe kīt āgaḥ vayām syāma vārūne anāgāḥ, ānu vratāni āditeḥ ridhāntaḥ yuyām pāta svastī-bhiḥ sādā naḥ.*

May we be sinless before Varuna, who is gracious even to him who has committed sin, and may we follow the laws of Aditi! Protect us always with your blessings!

Lastly, Aditi, like all other gods, is represented as a giver of worldly goods, and implored to bestow them on her worshippers, or to protect them by her power:

I, 43, 2. *yāthā naḥ āditiḥ kárat páṛve nṛí-bhyaḥ yāthā gáve, yāthā tokāya rudríyam.*

That Aditi may bring Rudra's favour to our cattle, our men, our cow, our offspring.

I, 153, 3. *pípāya dhenúḥ āditiḥ rītāya gánāya mitrávarunā haviḥ-dé.*

Aditi, the cow, gives food to the righteous man, O Mitra and Varuna, who makes offerings to the gods. Cf. VIII, 101, 15.

I, 185, 3. *aneháḥ dātrám āditeḥ anarvám huvé.*

I call for the unrivalled, uninjured gift of Aditi. Here Professor Roth again assigns to Aditi the meaning of freedom or security.

VII, 40, 2. *dīdeshṭu devī āditiḥ réknaḥ.*

May the divine Aditi assign wealth!

X, 100, 1. *ā sarvá-tātim āditim vrinīmahe.*

We implore Aditi for health and wealth.

I, 94, 15. *yásmai tvám su-dravināḥ dáḍasaḥ anāgāḥ-tvám*

adite sarvá-tâtâ, yám bhadréna sávasâ kodáyâsi pragâ-vatâ
râdhasâ té syâma.

To whom thou, possessor of good treasures, grantest guiltlessness, O Aditi, in health and wealth*, whom thou quickenest with precious strength and with riches in progeny, may we be they! Cf. II, 40, 6; IV, 25, 5; X, 11, 2.

The principal epithets of Aditi have been mentioned in the passages quoted above, and they throw no further light on the nature of the goddess. She was called *devî*, goddess, again and again; another frequent epithet is *anarván*, uninjured, unscathed. Being invoked to grant light (VII, 82, 10), she is herself called luminous, *gyótishmatî*, I, 136, 3; and *svârvatî*, heavenly. Being the goddess of the infinite expanse, she, even with greater right than the dawn, is called *úrûkî*, VIII, 67, 12; *uruvyâkas*, V, 46, 6; *uruvragâ*, VIII, 67, 12; and possibly *prithvî* in I, 72, 9. As supporting everything, she is called *dhârayátkshiti*, supporting the earth, I, 136, 3; and *visvâganyâ*, VII, 10, 4. To her sons she owes the names of *râgaputrâ*, II, 27, 7; *suputrâ*, III, 4, 11; and *ugrâputrâ*, VIII, 67, 11: to her wealth that of *sudravinas*, I, 94, 15, though others refer this epithet to Agni. There remains one name *pastyâ*, IV, 55, 3; VIII, 27, 5, meaning housewife, which again indicates her character as mother of the gods.

I have thus given all the evidence that can be collected from the Rig-veda as throwing light on the character of the goddess Aditi, and I have carefully excluded everything that rests only on the authority of the Yagur- or Atharva-vedas, or of the Brâhmanas and Âranyakas, because in all they give beyond the repetitions from the Rig-veda, they seem to me to represent a later phase of thought that ought not to be mixed up with the more primitive conceptions of the Rig-veda. Not that the Rig-veda is free from what seems decidedly modern, or at all events secondary and late. But it is well to keep the great collections, as such,

* On sarvâtâtî, salus, see Benfey's excellent remarks in *Orient und Occident*, vol. ii, p. 519. Professor Roth takes aditi here as an epithet of Agni.

separate, whatever our opinions may be as to the age of their component parts.

In the Atharva-veda Aditi appears more unintelligible, more completely mythological, than in the Rig-veda. We read, for instance, Atharva-veda VII, 6, 1 :

‘Aditi is the sky, Aditi is the welkin, Aditi is mother, is father, is son ; all the gods are Aditi, and the five clans of men ; Aditi is what was, Aditi is what will be.

‘We invoke for our protection the great mother of the well-ruling gods, the wife of *Rita*, the powerful, never-aging, far-spreading, the sheltering, well-guiding Aditi.’

In the Taittirīya-āraṇyaka and similar works the mythological confusion becomes greater still. Much valuable material for an analytical study of Aditi may be found in B. and R.’s Dictionary, and in several of Dr. Muir’s excellent contributions to a knowledge of Vedic theogony and mythology.

Aditi as an Adjective.

But although the foregoing remarks give as complete a description of Aditi as can be gathered from the hymns of the Rig-veda, a few words have to be added on certain passages where the word *áditi* occurs, and where it clearly cannot mean the goddess Aditi, as a feminine, but must be taken either as the name of a corresponding masculine deity, or as an adjective in the sense of unrestrained, independent, free.

V, 59, 8. *mímātu dyaúh áditih vitáye nah.*

May the boundless Dyú (sky) help us to our repast !

Here *áditi* must either be taken in the sense of *Āditya*, or better in its original sense of unbounded, as an adjective belonging to Dyú, the masculine deity of the sky.

Dyú or the sky is called *áditi* or unbounded in another passage, X, 63, 3 :

yébhyaḥ mātā mādhu-mat pínvate páyaḥ pýūṣham dyaúh áditih ádri-barhâh.

The gods to whom their mother yields the sweet milk, and the unbounded sky, as firm as a rock, their food.

IV, 3, 8. *kathā sárdhāya marútām ritāya kathā sūrē brīhatē prikkhyāmānah, prāti bravaḥ áditaye turāya.*

How wilt thou tell it to the host of the Maruts, how to the bright heaven, when thou art asked? How to the quick Aditi?

Here Aditi cannot be the goddess, partly on account of the masculine gender of *turāya*, partly because she is never called quick. Aditi must here be the name of one of the *Ādityas*, or it may refer back to *sûré brīhaté*. It can hardly be joined, as Professor Roth proposes, with *sārdhāya marútām*, owing to the intervening *sûré brīhaté*.

In several passages *áditi*, as an epithet, refers to Agni:

IV, 1, 20 (final). *vīsveshām áditiḥ yagnīyānām vīsveshām átithiḥ mānushānām*.

He, Agni, the Aditi, or the freest, among all the gods; he the guest among all men.

The same play on the words *áditi* and *átithi* occurs again:

VII, 9, 3. *ámūrah kavīḥ áditiḥ vivásvān su-samsát mitráḥ átithiḥ siváḥ nah, kītrá-bhānuḥ ushásām bhāti ágre*.

The wise poet, Aditi, Vivasvat, Mitra with his good company, our welcome guest, he (Agni) with brilliant light came at the head of the dawns.

Here, though I admit that several renderings are possible, Aditi is meant as a name of Agni, to whom the whole hymn is addressed, and who, as usual, is identified with other gods, or, at all events, invoked by their names. We may translate *áditiḥ vivásvān* by 'the brilliant Aditi,' or 'the unchecked, the brilliant,' or by 'the boundless Vivasvat,' but on no account can we take *áditi* here as the female goddess. The same applies to VIII, 19, 14, where Aditi, unless we suppose the goddess brought in in the most abrupt way, must be taken as a name of Agni; while in X, 92, 14, *áditim anarvānam*, to judge from other epithets given in the same verse, has most likely to be taken again as an appellative of Agni. In some passages it would, no doubt, be possible to take Aditi as the name of a female deity, if it were certain that no other meaning could be assigned to this word. But if we once know that Aditi was the name of a male deity also, the structure of these passages becomes far more perfect, if we take Aditi in that sense:

IV, 39, 3. *ánágasam tám áditih kṛinotu sáh mitréna várūnena sa-gósháh.*

May Aditi make him free from sin, he who is allied with Mitra and Varuna.

We have had several passages in which Aditi, the female deity, is represented as *sagósháh* or allied with other *Ádityas*, but if *sáh* is the right reading here, Aditi in this verse can only be the male deity. The pronoun *sá* cannot refer to *tám*.

With regard to other passages, such as IX, 81, 5; VI, 51, 3, and even some of those translated above in which Aditi has been taken as a female goddess, the question must be left open till further evidence can be obtained. There is only one more passage which has been often discussed, and where *ádití* was supposed to have the meaning of earth:

VII, 18, 8. *duh-ádhyāh áditim sreváyantaḥ aketásah ví gagrībhre párushnīm.*

Professor Roth in one of his earliest essays translated this line, 'The evil-disposed wished to dry the earth, the fools split the Parushnī,' and he supposed its meaning to have been that the enemies of Sudás swam across the Parushnī in order to attack Sudás. We might accept this translation, if it could be explained how by throwing themselves into the river, the enemies made the earth dry, though even then there would remain this difficulty that, with the exception of one other doubtful passage, discussed before, *ádití* never means earth. We might possibly translate: 'The evil-disposed, the fools, laid dry and divided the boundless river Parushnī.' This would be a description of a stratagem very common in ancient warfare, viz. diverting the course of a river and laying its original bed dry by digging a new channel, and thus dividing the old river. This is also the sense accepted by *Sâyana*, who does not say that *vīgraha* means dividing the waves of a river, as Professor Roth renders *kūlabheda*, but that it means dividing or cutting through its banks. In the Dictionary Professor Roth assigns to *ádití* in this passage the meaning of endless, inexhaustible.

Kaná.

Note 5. Nothing is more difficult in the interpretation of the Veda than to gain an accurate knowledge of the power of particles and conjunctions. The particle *kaná*, we are told, is used both affirmatively and negatively, a statement which shows better than anything else the uncertainty to which every translation of Vedic hymns is as yet exposed. It is perfectly true that in the text of the Rig-veda, as we now read it, *kaná* means both indeed and no. But this very fact shows that we ought to distinguish where the first collectors of the Vedic hymns have not distinguished, and that while in the former case we read *kaná*, we ought in the latter to read *ka ná*.

I begin with those passages in which *kaná* is used emphatically, though originally it may have been a double negation.

I a. In negative sentences :

I, 18, 7. *yásmât rité ná sídhyati yagñáh vipaḥ-kítaḥ kaná.*

Without whom the sacrifice does not succeed, not even that of the sage.

V, 34, 5. *ná ásunvatá saḥate púshyatá kaná.*

He does not cling to a man who offers no libations, even though he be thriving.

I, 24, 6. *nahí te kshatrám ná sáhaḥ ná manyúm váyaḥ kaná amī (íti) patáyantaḥ ápúḥ.*

For thy power, thy strength, thy anger even these birds which fly up, do not reach. Cf. I, 100, 15.

I, 155, 5. *trítīyam asya nákiḥ ā dadharshati váyaḥ kaná patáyantaḥ patatrīnaḥ.*

This third step no one approaches, not even the winged birds which fly up.

I, 55, 1. *diváh kít asya varimā ví papratha, índram ná mahnā prithivī kaná práti.*

The width of the heavens is stretched out, even the earth in her greatness is no match for Indra.

I b. In positive sentences :

VII, 32, 13. *pûrvīḥ kaná prá-sitayaḥ taranti tám yáh índre kármanā bhúvat.*

Even many snares pass him who is with Indra in his work.
VIII, 2, 14. ukthám *kaná* sasyámānam ágoḥ aríḥ á *kiketa*,
ná gāyatrám gīyámānam.

He (Indra) marks indeed a poor man's prayer that is recited, but not a hymn that is sung. (Doubtful.)

VIII, 78, 10. táva ít indra ahám á-sásá háste dātram *kaná* á dade.

Hoping in thee alone, O Indra, I take even this sickle in my hand.

I, 55, 5. ádha *kaná* srát dadhati tvíshi-mate indráya vāgram ni-ghánighnate vadhám.

Then indeed they believe in Indra, the majestic, when he hurls the bolt to strike.

I, 152, 2. etát *kaná* tvaḥ ví *kiketat* eshám.

Does one of them understand even this?

IV, 18, 9. mámat *kaná* used in the same sense as mámat *kít*.

I, 139, 2. dhíbhíḥ *kaná* mánasá svébhiḥ akshá-bhiḥ.

V, 41, 13. váyah *kaná* su-bhvāḥ á áva yanti.

VII, 18, 9. áśúḥ *kaná* ít abhi-pitvám gagāma.

VIII, 91, 3. á *kaná* tvā *kikitsāmaḥ* ádhi *kaná* tvā ná imasi.

We wish to know thee, indeed, but we cannot understand thee.

X, 49, 5. ahám randhayam mrígayam srutárvane yát má ágihíta vayúnā *kaná* ānu-shák.

VI, 26, 7. ahám *kaná* tát sūrí-bhiḥ ānaryām.

May I also obtain this with the lords.

I c. Frequently *kaná* occurs after interrogative pronouns, to which it imparts an indefinite meaning, and principally in negative sentences :

I, 74, 7. ná yóḥ upabdíḥ ásvyah srinvé ráthasya kát *kaná*, yát agne yāsi dūtyām.

No sound of horses is heard, and no sound of the chariot, when thou, O Agni, goest on thy message.

I, 81, 5. ná tvā-vān indra káḥ *kaná* ná gātáḥ ná gani-shyaté.

No one is like thee, O Indra, no one has been born, no one will be !

I, 84, 20. *mā te rādhāmsi mā te ūtāyaḥ vaso (īti) asmān kádā ṇaná dabhan.*

May thy gifts, may thy help, O Vasu, never fail us!

Many more passages might be given to illustrate the use of *ṇaná* or *kás ṇaná* and its derivatives in negative sentences.

Cf. I, 105, 3; 136, 1; 139, 5; II, 16, 3; 23, 5; 28, 6; III, 36, 4; IV, 31, 9; V, 42, 6; 82, 2; VI, 3, 2; 20, 4; 47, 1; 3; 48, 17; 54, 9; 59, 4; 69, 8; 75, 16; VII, 32, 1; 19; 59, 3; 82, 7; 104, 3; VIII, 19, 6; 23, 15; 24, 15; 28, 4; 47, 7; 64, 2; 66, 13; 68, 19; IX, 61, 27; 69, 6; 114, 4; X, 33, 9; 39, 11; 48, 5; 49, 10; 59, 8; 62, 9; 85, 3; 86, 11; 95, 1; 112, 9; 119, 6; 7; 128, 4; 129, 2; 152, 1; 168, 3; 185, 2.

I d. In a few passages, however, we find the indefinite pronoun *kás ṇaná* used in sentences which are not negative:

III, 30, 1. *títikshante abhí-sastim gānānām indra tvát ā káh ṇaná hí pra-ketáh.*

They bear the scoffing of men; for, Indra, from thee comes every wisdom.

I, 113, 8. *ushāḥ mṛítám kám ṇaná bodháyantí.*

Ushas, who wakes every dead (or one who is as if dead).

I, 191, 7. *ādrishṭáh kím ṇaná ihá vaḥ sārve sákám ní gasyata.*

Invisible ones, whatever you are, vanish all together!

II. We now come to passages in which *ṇaná* stands for *ka ná*, and therefore renders the sentence negative without any further negative particle. It might seem possible to escape from this admission, by taking certain sentences in an interrogative sense. But this would apply to certain sentences only, and would seem forced even there:

II, 16, 2. *yásmāt indrāt bṛihatáh kím ṇaná im rité.*

Beside whom, (beside) the great Indra, there is not anything.

II, 24, 12. *vísvam satyám magha-vâná yuvóḥ it āpah ṇaná prá minanti vratám vām.*

Everything, you mighty ones, belongs indeed to you; even the waters do not transgress your law.

IV, 30, 3. *vīśve kánā ít anā tvā devāsaḥ indra yuyudhuḥ.*
Even all the gods do not ever fight thee, O Indra.

V, 34, 7. *duḥ-gé kánā dhriyate vīśvaḥ ā purú gānaḥ yāḥ*
asya távishīm ákukrudhat.

Even in a stronghold many a man is not often preserved who has excited his anger.

VII, 83, 2. *yásmin āgā bhāvati kīm kánā priyám.*

In which struggle there is nothing good whatsoever.

VII, 86, 6. *svāpnaḥ kánā ít ánrítasya pra-yotā.*

Even sleep does not remove all evil.

In this passage I formerly took *kánā* as affirmative, not as negative, and therefore assigned to *prayotā* the same meaning which *Sāyana* assigns to it, one who brings or mixes, whereas it ought to be, as rightly seen by Roth, one who removes.

VIII, 1, 5. *mahé kánā tvām adri-vaḥ párá sulkāya deyām,*
ná saháśráya ná ayútāya vagri-vaḥ ná satāya sata-magha.

I should not give thee up, wielder of the thunderbolt, even for a great price, not for a thousand, not for ten thousand (?), not for a hundred, O Indra, thou who art possessed of a hundred powers!

VIII, 51, 7. *kadā kánā starīḥ asi.*

Thou art never sterile.

VIII, 52, 7. *kadā kánā prá yukkkhasi.*

Thou art never weary.

VIII, 55, 5. *kákshushā kánā sam-nāse.*

Not to be reached even with eye.

X, 56, 4. *mahimnáḥ eshām pitáraḥ kánā ísire.*

Note 6. Considering the particular circumstances mentioned in this and the preceding hymn, of Indra's forsaking his companions, the Maruts, or even scorning their help, one feels strongly tempted to take *tyágas* in its etymological sense of leaving or forsaking, and to translate, by his forsaking you, or, if he should forsake you. The poet may have meant the word to convey that idea, which no doubt would be most appropriate here; but it must be confessed, at the same time, that in other passages where *tyágas* occurs, that meaning could hardly be ascribed to it. Strange as it may seem, no one who is acquainted with the general

train of thought in the Vedic hymns can fail to see that *tyágas* in most passages means attack, onslaught; it may be even the instrument of an attack, a weapon. How it should come to take this meaning is indeed difficult to explain, and I do not wonder that Professor Roth in his Dictionary simply renders the word by forlornness, need, danger, or by estrangement, unkindness, malignity. But let us look at the passages, and we shall see that these abstract conceptions are quite out of place:

VIII, 47, 7. *ná tám tigmám kaná tyágah ná drásad abhí tám gurú.*

No sharp blow, no heavy one, shall come near him whom you protect.

Here the two adjectives *tigmá*, sharp, and *gurú*, heavy, point to something tangible, and I feel much inclined to take *tyágas* in this passage as a weapon, as something that is let off with violence, rather than in the more abstract sense of onslaught.

I, 169, 1. *maháh kit asi tyágasaḥ varūtā.*

Thou art the shielder from a great attack.

IV, 43, 4. *káh vām maháh kit tyágasaḥ abhīke urushyátam mádhvī dasrá naḥ útī.*

Who is against your great attack? Protect us with your help, O Asvins, ye strong ones.

Here Professor Roth seems to join *maháh kit tyágasaḥ abhīke urushyátam*, but in that case it would be impossible to construe the first words, *káh vām*.

I, 119, 8. *ágakḥhatam kṛpamānam parā-vāti pitúḥ svásya tyágasá ní-bádhitam.*

You went from afar to the suppliant, who had been struck down by the violence of his own father.

According to Professor Roth *tyágas* would here mean forlornness, need, or danger. But *níbádhita* is a strong verb, as we may see in

VIII, 64, 2. *padā pavīn arādhásaḥ ní bādhasva mahān asi.*

Strike the useless *Panis* down with thy foot, for thou art great.

X, 18, 11. *út svañīkasva prīthivi mā ní bādhathāh.*

Open, O earth, do not press on him (i. e. the dead, who is

to be buried ; cf. M. M., Über Todtenbestattung, Zeitschrift der D. M. G., vol. ix, p. xv).

VII, 83, 6. yātra rāga-bhiḥ dasā-bhiḥ nī-bādhitam prā su-dāsam āvatam trītsu-bhiḥ sahā.

Where you protected Sudās with the Trītsus, when he was pressed or set upon by the ten kings.

Another passage in which tyāgas occurs is,

VI, 62, 10. sánutyena tyāgasā mártasya vanushyatām āpi śīrshā vavṛiktam.

By your covert attack turn back the heads of those even who harass the mortal.

Though this passage may seem less decisive, yet it is difficult to see how tyāgasā could here, according to Professor Roth, be rendered by forlornness or danger. Something is required by which enemies can be turned back. Nor can it be doubtful that śīrshā is governed by vavṛiktam, meaning turn back their heads, for the same expression occurs again in I, 33, 5. páraḥ kīti śīrshā vavṛiguh té indra āyagvānaḥ yāgva-bhiḥ spārdhamānāḥ.

Professor Benfey translates this verse by, 'Kopfüber flohn sie alle vor dir;' but it may be rendered more literally, 'These lawless people fighting with the pious turned away their heads.'

X, 144, 6. evā tát índraḥ indunā devéshu kīti dhārayāte máhi tyāgaḥ.

Indeed through this draught Indra can hold out against that great attack even among the gods.

X, 79, 6. kīm devéshu tyāgaḥ énaḥ kakartha.

What insult, what sin hast thou committed among the gods?

In these two passages the meaning of tyāgas as attack or assault is at least as appropriate as that proposed by Professor Roth, estrangement, malignity.

There remains one passage, VI, 3, 1. yám tvám mitréna váranaḥ sa-góshāḥ déva pāsi tyāgasā mártam āmhaḥ.

I confess that the construction of this verse is not clear to me, and I doubt whether it is possible to use tyāgasā as a verbal noun governing an accusative. If this were possible, one might translate, 'The mortal whom thou, O God (Agni),

Varuna, together with Mitra, protectest by pushing back evil.' More probably we should translate, 'Whom thou protectest from evil by thy might.'

If it be asked how *tyágas* can possibly have the meaning which has been assigned to it in all the passages in which it occurs, viz. that of forcibly attacking or pushing away, we can only account for it by supposing that *tyag*, before it came to mean to leave, meant to push off, to drive away with violence (*verstossen* instead of *verlassen*). This meaning may still be perceived occasionally in the use of *tyag*; e. g. *devás tyagantu mām*, may the gods forsake me! i. e. may the gods drive me away! Even in the latest Sanskrit *tyag* is used with regard to an arrow that is let off. 'To expel' is expressed by *nis-tyag*. Those who believe in the production of new roots by the addition of prepositional prefixes might possibly see in *tyag* an original *ati-ag*, to drive off; but, however that may be, there is evidence enough to show that *tyag* expressed originally a more violent act of separation than it does in ordinary Sanskrit, though here, too, passages occur in which *tyag* may be translated by to throw, to fling; for instance, *khe dhûlim yas tyaged ukkair mûrdhnî tasyaiva sâ patet*, he who throws up dust in the air, it will fall on his head. Ind. Spr. 1582.

Muk, too, is used in a similar manner; for instance, *vagram mokshyate te mahendraḥ*, Mahâbh. XIV, 263. Cf. *Dhammapada*, ver. 389.

Verse 13.

Note 1. *Sâmsa*, masc., means a spell, whether for good or for evil, a blessing as well as a curse. It means a curse, or, at all events, a calumny:

I, 18, 3. *mā naḥ sâmsaḥ ārarushaḥ dhûrtiḥ prānak mārtyasya*.

Let not the curse of the enemy, the onslaught of a mortal hurt us,

I, 94, 8. *asmākam sâmsaḥ abhī astu duḥ-dhyāḥ*.

May our curse overcome the wicked!

III, 18, 2. *tāpa sâmsam ārarushaḥ*.

Burn the curse of the enemy!

VII, 25, 2. âré tám *sámsam* *krinuhi* *ninitsóh*.

Take far away the curse of the reviler! Cf. VII, 34, 12.

It means blessing :

II, 31, 6. *utá vah sámsam uslgâm-iva smasi*.

We desire your blessing as a blessing for suppliants.

X, 31, 1. *â nah devânâm úpa vetu sámsah*.

May the blessing of the gods come to us!

X, 7, 1. *urushyá nah urú-bhih deva sámsaih*.

Protect us, god, with thy wide blessings!

II, 23, 10. *mā nah duh-sámsah abhi-dipsúh írata prá su-sámsáh matí-bhih târishîmahî*.

Let not an evil-speaking enemy conquer us; may we, enjoying good report, increase by our prayers!

In some passages, however, as pointed out by Grassmann, *sámsa* may best be rendered by singer, praiser. Grassmann marks one passage only,

II, 26, 1. *rigúh ít sámsah vanavat vanushyatáh*.

May the righteous singer conquer his enemies.

He admits, however, doubtfully, the explanation of B. R., that *rigúh sámsah* may be taken as one word, meaning, 'requiring the right.' This explanation seems surrendered by B. R. in the second edition of their Dictionary, and I doubt whether *sámsah* can mean here anything but singer. That being so, the same meaning seems more appropriate in other verses also, which I formerly translated differently, e. g.

VII, 56, 19. *imé sámsam vanushyatáh ní pânti*.

They, the Maruts, protect the singer from his enemy.

Lastly, *sámsa* means praise, the spell addressed by men to the gods, or prayer :

I, 33, 7. *prá sunvatáh stuvatáh sámsam ávah*.

Thou hast regarded the prayer of him who offers libation and praise.

X, 42, 6. *yásmin vayám dadhimá sámsam índre*.

Indra in whom we place our hope. Cf. *ásams*, Westergaard, *Radices Linguae Sanscritae*, s. v. *sams*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 167.

ASHṬAKA II, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 4-5.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. O Indra, a thousand have been thy helps accorded to us, a thousand, O driver of the bays, have been thy most delightful viands. May thousands of treasures richly to enjoy, may goods¹ come to us a thousandfold.

2. May the Maruts come towards us with their aids, the mighty ones, or with their best aids from the great heaven, now that their furthest steeds have rushed forth on the distant shore of the sea ;

3. There clings¹ to the Maruts one who moves in secret, like a man's wife (the lightning²), and who is like a spear carried behind³, well grasped, resplendent, gold-adorned ; there is also with them Vāk (the voice of thunder), like unto a courtly, eloquent woman.

4. Far away the brilliant, untiring Maruts cling to their young maid, as if she belonged to them all¹; but the terrible ones did not drive away Rodast (the lightning), for they wished her to grow² their friend.

5. When the divine Rodast with dishevelled locks, the manly-minded, wished to follow them, she went, like Sûryâ (the Dawn), to the chariot of her servant, with terrible look, as with the pace of a cloud.

6. As soon as the poet with the libations, O Maruts, had sung his song at the sacrifice, pouring out Soma, the youthful men (the Maruts) placed the young maid (in their chariot) as their companion for victory, mighty in assemblies.

7. I praise what is the praiseworthy true greatness of those Maruts, that the manly-minded, proud, and strong one (Rodasi) drives with them towards the blessed mothers.

8. They protect¹ Mitra and Varuṇa from the unspeakable, and Aryaman also finds out the infamous. Even what is firm and unshakable is being shaken²; but he who dispenses treasures³, O Maruts, has grown (in strength).

9. No people indeed, whether near to us, or from afar, have ever found the end of your strength, O Maruts! The Maruts, strong in daring strength, have, like the sea, boldly¹ surrounded their haters.

10. May we to-day, may we to-morrow in battle be called the most beloved of Indra. We were so formerly, may we truly be so day by day, and may the lord of the Maruts be with us.

11. May this praise, O Maruts, this song of Māndārya, the son of Māna, the poet, ask you with food for offspring for ourselves! May we have an invigorating autumn, with quickening rain!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Agastya, addressed to the Maruts, but the first verse to Indra. Metre Trishṭubh throughout.

No verse of this hymn occurs in the Sâma-veda, nor in the other Samhitâs.

Verse 1.

Note 1. We must keep *vâga*, as a general term, distinct from *asva*, horses, and *go*, cows, for the poets themselves distinguish between *gavyântaḥ*, *asvayântaḥ*, and *vâgayântaḥ*; see IV, 17, 16; VI, 8, 6.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On *mimyaksha*, see before, I, 165, 1, note 2.

Note 2. The spear of the Maruts is meant for the lightning, and we actually find *rishî-vidyutaḥ*, having the lightning for their spear, as an epithet of the Maruts, - I, 168, 5; V, 52, 13.

The rest of this verse is difficult, and has been variously rendered by different scholars. We must remember that the lightning is represented as the wife or the beloved of the Maruts. In that character she is called *Rodasî*, with the accent on the last syllable, and kept distinct from *ródasî*, the dual, with the accent on the antepenultimate, which means heaven and earth.

This *Rodasî* occurs:

V, 56, 8. *á yásmin tastháu su-ránâni bíbhraṭi sákâ marútsu rodasî.*

The chariot on which, carrying pleasant gifts, stands *Rodasî* among the Maruts.

VI, 50, 5. *mimyaksha yéshu rodasî nú devî.*

To whom clings the divine *Rodasî*.

VI, 66, 6. *ádha sma eshu rodasî svá-sokîḥ á ámavatsu tasthau ná rókaḥ.*

When they (the Maruts) had joined the two *Rodas*, i.e. heaven and earth, then the self-brilliant *Rodasî* came among the strong ones.

The name of *Ródasî*, heaven and earth, is so much more frequent in the Rig-veda than that of *Rodasî*, that in

several passages the *iti* which stands after duals, has been wrongly inserted after *Rodasī* in the singular. It is so in our hymn, verse 4, where we must read *rodasīm* instead of *rodasī iti*, and again in X, 92, 11.

Besides the lightning, however, the thunder also may be said to be in the company of the Maruts, to be their friend or their wife, and it is this double relationship which seems to be hinted at in our hymn.

The thunder is called *Vāk*, voice, the voice of heaven, also called by the author of the *Anukramanī*, *Āmbhrinī*. It was natural to identify this *ambhrina* with Greek *ὄβριμος*, terrible, particularly as it is used of the thunder, *ὄβριμον ἐβρόντησε*, Hes. Th. 839, and is applied to Athene as *ὄβριμο-πάτρη*. But there are difficulties pointed out by Curtius, *Grundzüge*, p. 532, which have not yet been removed. This *Vāk* says of herself (X, 125, 12) that she stretched the bow for Rudra, the father of the Maruts, that her birth-place is in the waters (clouds), and that she fills heaven and earth. See also X, 114, 8.

In I, 173, 3. *antāh dūtāh nā rodasī karat vāk*.

The voice (thunder) moved between heaven and earth, like a messenger.

In VIII, 100, 10 and 11, after it has been said that the thunderbolt lies hidden in the water, the poet says: *yāt vāk vādantī avi-keṭanāni rāshtri devānām ni-sasāda mandrā*, when the voice, the queen of the gods, the delightful, uttering incomprehensible sounds, sat down. If, in our verse, we take *Vāk* in the sense of thunder, but as a feminine, it seems to me that the poet, speaking of the lightning and thunder as the two companions of the Maruts, represents the first, *Rodasī*, or the lightning, as the recognised wife, hiding herself in the house, while the other, the loud thunder, is represented as a more public companion of the Maruts, distinctly called *vidatheshu pagrā* (verse 6), a good speaker at assemblies. This contrast, if it is really what the poet intended, throws a curious light on the social character of the Vedic times, as it presupposes two classes of wives, not necessarily simultaneous, however,—a house-wife, who stays at home and is not much seen, and a wife who appears in

public and takes part in the society and conversation of the sabhâ, the assembly-room, and the vidathas, the meetings. The loud voice of the thunder as well as the usual hiding of the lightning might well suggest this comparison. That good manners, such as are required in public, and ready speech, were highly esteemed in Vedic times, we learn from such words as sabhéya and vidathyâ. Sabhéya, from sabhâ, assembly, court, comes to mean courtly, polite; vidathyâ, from vidatha, assembly, experienced, learned.

VIII, 4, 9. *kandráh yâti sabhâm úpa*.

Thy friend, Indra, goes brilliant towards the assembly.

X, 34, 6. *sabhâm eti kitaváh*.

The gambler goes to the assembly.

VI, 28, 6. *brîhât vah váyah ukryate sabhâsu*.

Your great strength is spoken of in the assemblies.

Wealth is described as consisting in sabhâs, houses, IV, 2, 5; and a friend is described as sabhâsaha, strong in the assembly, X, 71, 10.

Sabhéya is used as an epithet of vipra (II, 24, 13), and a son is praised as sabheya, vidathya, and sadanya, i.e. as distinguished in the assemblies.

Vidathyâ, in fact, means much the same as sabheya, namely, good for, distinguished at vidathas, meetings for social, political, or religious purposes, IV, 21, 2; VII, 36, 8, &c.

Note 3. *Úparâ ná rishîh*. I do not see how uparâ can here mean the cloud, if it ever has that meaning. I take úpara as opposed to pûrva, i.e. behind, as opposed to before. In that sense úpara is used, X, 77, 3; X, 15, 2; 44, 7, &c. It would therefore mean the spear on the back, or the spear drawn back before it is hurled forward.

B. R. propose to read *sam-vâk*, colloquium, but they give no explanation. The reference to VS. IX, 2, is wrong.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The fourth verse carries on the same ideas which were hinted at in the third. We must again change *rodasî*, the dual, into *rodasîm*, which is sufficiently indicated by the accent. *Yavyâ* I take as an instrumental of *yavi*, or of

yavyâ. It means the youthful maid, and corresponds to yuvati in verse 6. Yavyâ would be the exact form which Curtius (Grundzüge, p. 589) postulated as the Sanskrit prototype of Hebe^a. Now, if the Maruts correspond to Mars in Latin, and to Ares in Greek, the fact that in the Iliad Hebe bathes and clothes Ares^b, may be of some significance. Sâdhârani is used in the sense of uxor communis, and would show a familiarity with the idea of polyandry recognised in the epic poetry of the Mahâbhârata.

But although the Maruts cling to this maid (the Vâk, or thunder), they do not cast off Rodasî, their lawful wife, the lightning, but wish her to grow for their friendship, i. e. as their friend.

Ayâsah yavyâ must be scanned ˘ ˘ ˘ — ˘ — —. In VI, 66, 5, ayâsah mahnâ must be scanned as ˘ ˘ ˘ — ˘ — — (mahimnâ?).

Note 2. Vṛdham, as the accent shows, is here an infinitive governed by gushanta.

Verse 5.

See von Bradke, Dyaus Asura, p. 76.

Verse 6.

I translate arkâ by poet. The construction would become too cumbersome if we translated, 'as soon as the hymn with the libations was there for you, as soon as the sacrificer sang his song.'

Verse 7.

The meaning of the second line is obscure, unless we adopt Ludwig's ingenious view that Rodasî is here conceived as Eileithyia, the goddess who helps mothers in childbirth. I confess that it is a bold conjecture, and there is nothing in Vedic literature to support it. All I can say is that Eileithyia is in Greek, like Hebe (Yavyâ) and Ares (Marut), a child of Hera, and that lightning as well as dawn might become a symbol of birth. The etymology and the

^a Wir müssen ein vorgriechisches yâvâ oder möglicherweise yâvyâ annehmen.

^b Il. V, 905.

very form of *Ελλείθνια* is doubtful, and so is that of *Rodasī*. It is tempting to connect *rodasī*, in the sense of heaven and earth, with O. S. *radur*, A. S. *rodor* (Grimm, *Myth.* p. 662), but that is impossible. Cf. I, 101, 7.

Verse 8.

Note 1. I do not see how *pānti*, the plural, can refer to *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, nor how these gods could here be introduced as acting the part of the *Maruts*. I therefore refer *pānti* to the *Maruts*, who may be said to protect *Mitra* and *Varuṇa*, day and night, and all that belongs to them, from evil and disgrace. *Aryaman* is then brought in, as being constantly connected with *Mitrā-varuṇau*, and the finding out, the perceiving from a distance, of the infamous enemies, who might injure *Mitrā-varuṇau*, is parenthetically ascribed to him. See Ludwig, *Anmerkungen*, p. 239.

Note 2. *Kyavante* cannot and need not be taken for *kyāvayanti*, though *akyutaḥ* is a common epithet of the *Maruts*. It is quite true that the shaking of the unshakable mountains is the work of the *Maruts*, but that is understood, even though it is not expressed. In V, 60, 3, we read, *pārvataḥ kīṭ māhi vṛiddhāḥ bibhāya*, even the very great mountain feared, i. e. the *Maruts*.

Note 3. *Dāti* in *dātivāra* has been derived by certain Sanskrit scholars from *dā*, to give. It means, no doubt, gift, but it is derived from *dā* (*do*, *dyati*), to share, and means first, a share, and then a gift. *Dātivāra* is applied to the *Maruts*, V, 58, 2; III, 51, 9, and must therefore be applied to them in our passage also, though the construction becomes thereby extremely difficult. It means possessed of a treasure of goods which they distribute. The growing, too, which is here predicated by *vavṛidhe*, leads us to think of the *Maruts*, as in I, 37, 5, or of their friend *Indra*, I, 52, 2; 81, 1; VI, 30, 1. It is never, so far as I know, applied to the sacrificer.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Dhrīṣhatā* is used as an adverb; see I, 71, 5; 174, 4; II, 30, 4, &c. Perhaps *tmanā* may be supplied as in I, 54, 4.

MANDALA I, HYMN 168.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 6-7.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. To every sacrifice¹ you hasten together², you accept prayer after prayer, O quick Maruts! Let me therefore bring you hither by my prayers from heaven and earth, for our welfare, and for our great protection;

2. The shakers who were born to bring food and light¹, self-born and self-supported, like springs², like thousandfold waves of water, aye, visibly like unto excellent bulls³,

3. Those Maruts, like Soma-drops¹, which squeezed from ripe stems dwell, when drunk, in the hearts of the worshipper—see how on their shoulders there clings as if a clinging wife; in their hands the quoit is held and the sword.

4. Lightly they have come down from heaven of their own accord: Immortals, stir yourselves with the whip! The mighty Maruts on dustless paths, armed with brilliant spears, have shaken down even the strong places.

5. O ye Maruts, who are armed with lightning-spears, who stirs you from within by himself, as the jaws are stirred by the tongue¹? You shake the sky², as if on the search for food; you are invoked by many³, like the (solar) horse of the day⁴.

6. Where, O Maruts, is the top, where the bottom of the mighty sky where you came? When you throw down with the thunderbolt what is strong, like brittle things, you fly across the terrible sea!

7. As your conquest is violent, splendid, terrible, full and crushing, so, O Maruts, is your gift delightful, like the largess of a liberal worshipper, wide-spreading, laughing like heavenly lightning.

8. From the tires of their chariot-wheels streams gush forth, when they send out the voice of the clouds; the lightnings smiled upon the earth, when the Maruts shower down fatness (fertile rain).

9. *Prisni*¹ brought forth for the great fight the terrible train of the untiring Maruts: when fed they produced the dark cloud³, and then looked about for invigorating food².

10. May this praise, O Maruts, this song of Mândârya, the son of Mâna, the poet, ask you with food for offspring for ourselves! May we have an invigorating autumn, with quickening rain!

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to Agastya. Verses 1-7, *Gagatī*; 8-10, *Trishāubh*. No verse of this hymn occurs in the SV., VS., TS., AS.

Verse 1.

There can be little doubt that the text of the first line is corrupt. Ludwig admits this, but both he and Grassmann translate the verse.

GRASSMANN: *Durch stetes Opfer möchte ich euch gewinnen recht, Gebet, das zu euch Göttern drengt, empfängt ihr gern.*

LUDWIG: *Bei jedem opfer ist zusammen mit euch der siegreich thätige, in jedem lied hat der fromme an euch gedacht.*

Ludwig proposes to read *ādīdhiye* or *devayād ā dīdhiye*, but even then the construction remains difficult.

Note 1. *Yagñā-yagñā*, an adverbial expression, much the same as *yagñe yagñe* (I, 136, 1); it occurs once more in VI, 48, 1.

Note 2. *Tuturvāniḥ* does occur here only, but is formed like *gugurvāni*, I, 142, 8, and *susukvāni*, VIII, 23, 5. Possibly *tuturvāniḥ* might stand for the host of the Maruts in the singular, 'you hasten together to every sacrifice.' As to *dadhidhve*, used in a similar sense, see IV, 34, 3; 37, 1.

As a conjecture, though no more, I propose to read *evayāḥ u*.

Eva, in the sense of going, quick, is used of the horses of the Maruts, I, 166, 4. More frequently it has the sense of going, moving, than of manner (*mos*), and as an adverb *eva* and *evam* mean in this way (K. Z. II, 235). From this is derived *evayāḥ*, in the sense of quickly moving, an epithet applied to *Vishṇu*, I, 156, 1, and to the Maruts, V, 41, 16: *kathā dāsema nāmasā su-dānūn eva-yā marūtaḥ akkha-ukthaiḥ*, How shall we worship with praise and invocations the liberal quick-moving Maruts? I read, with Roth, *eva-yāḥ*; otherwise we should have to take *evayā* as

an adverbial instrumental, like *âsayâ* from *âsâ*; see Grassmann, s. v. *âsayâ*.

In one hymn (V, 87) *Evayâ-marut*, as one word, has become an invocation, reminding us of *ἦε Φοῖβε*, or *Evoe Bacche*, and similar forms. Possibly *ἦα* may be *viatica*, though the vowels do not correspond regularly (see *yayi*, I, 87, 2, note 1).

From *eva* we have also *eva-yâvan* (fem. *evayâvari*, VI, 48, 12), which Benfey proposed to divide into *evayâ-van*, quick, again an epithet of *Vishnu* and the *Maruts*. If then we read *evayâh* u, without the accent on the last syllable, we should have a proper invocation of the *Maruts*, 'You, quick *Maruts*, accept prayer after prayer.'

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Îsham svâr* are joined again in VII, 66, 9. *sahâ îsham svâh ka dhimahi*. It seems to mean food and light, or water and light, water being considered as invigorating and supporting. *Abhigâyanta* governs the accusative.

Note 2. The meaning of spring was first assigned to *vavra* by Grassmann.

Note 3. Though I cannot find *gâvaḥ* and *ukshânaḥ* again, used in apposition to each other, I have little doubt that Grassmann is right in taking both as one word, like *ταῦρος βοῦς* in Greek.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The first line of this verse is extremely difficult. GRASSMANN translates:

Den Somasäften gleichen sie, den kräftigen,
Die eingeschlürft sich regen, nimmer wirkungslos.

LUDWIG: Die wie Soma, das gepresst aus saftvollen stengel, aufgenommen ins innere freundlich weilen.

It may be that the *Maruts* are likened to *Somas*, because they refresh and strengthen. So we read VIII, 48, 9:

tvám hí naḥ tanvâḥ Soma gopâḥ gâtre-gâtre ni-sasâttha.

For thou, O Soma, has sat down as a guardian in every member of our body.

It is possible, therefore, though I shall say no more, that the poet wished to say that the *Maruts*, bringing rain and

cooling the air, are like Somas in their refreshing and invigorating power, when stirring the hearts of men. In X, 78, 2, the Maruts are once more compared with Somas, *su-sármāṇāḥ ná sómāḥ ritām yaté*. Should there be a dative hidden in *ásate*?

Rambhīṇī I now take with *Sāyana* in the sense of a wife clinging to the shoulders of her husband, though what is meant is the spear, or some other weapon, slung over the shoulders; see I, 167, 3.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Hánvā-iva gihváyā* gives no sense, if we take *hanvā* as an instrum. sing. *Hanu* is generally used in the dual, in the *Rig-veda* always, meaning the two jaws or the two lips. Thus Ait. Br. VII, 11. *hanû sagihve*; AV. X, 2, 7. *hanvor hi gihvām adadhâḥ*, he placed the tongue in the jaws. I should therefore prefer to read *hanû iva*, which would improve the metre also, or take *hanvā* for a dual, as *Sāyana* does.

One might also translate, 'Who amongst you, O Maruts, moves by himself, as the jaws by the tongue,' but the simile would not be so perfect. The meaning is the same as in the preceding verse, viz. that the Maruts are self-born, self-determined, and that they move along without horses and chariots. In X, 78, 2, the Maruts are called *svayug*, like the winds.

Note 2. I feel doubtful about *dhanvaḥkyút*, and feel inclined towards *Sāyana*'s explanation, who takes *dhanvan* for *antariksha*. It would then correspond to *parvata-kyút*, *dhruva-kyút*, &c.

Note 3. *Purupraisha* may also be, You who have the command of many.

Note 4. As to *ahanyâḥ ná étasaḥ*, see V, 1, 4. *svetâḥ vâgī gāyate agre áhnām*.

Verse 6.

Vithura translated before, I, 87, 3, by broken, means also breakable or brittle. *Sāyana* explains it by grass, which may be true, though I see no authority for it. Grassmann translates it by leaves. It is derived from *vyath*.

Verse 7.

Sâtí and râtí are used on purpose, the former meaning the acquisition or conquest of good things, the latter the giving away of them. The onslaught of the Maruts is first described as violent and crushing; their liberality in giving away what they have conquered, chiefly rain, is represented as delightful, like the gifts of a liberal worshipper. Then follows *prithugráyī asuryēva gāṇḡgatī*. Here *asuryā* reminds us of the *asuryā* in the preceding hymn, where it occurred as an epithet of *Rodasī*, the lightning. *Prithugráyī*, wide-spreading, seems to apply best to the rain, that is, the *râtī*, though it might also apply to the lightning. However, the *râtī* is the storm with rain and lightning, and I therefore propose to read *gāḡghatī* for *gāṇḡgatī*. *Gāṇḡ* is a root which occurs here only, and *gaggh* too is a root which is unknown to most students of Sanskrit. Benfey*, to whom we owe so much, was the first to point out that *gaggh*, which Yaska explains by to make a noise and applies to murmuring waters, is a popular form of *gaksh*, to laugh, a reduplicated form of *has*. He shows that *ksh* is changed into *kkh* in *akkhā* for *akshā*, and into *gh* and *ggh*, in Pāli and Prakrit, e.g. *ghā* for *kshā*. The original form *gaksh*, to laugh, occurs I, 33, 7. *tvām etān rudatāh grākshatah ka āyodhayaah*, thou foughest them, the crying and the laughing.

That the lightning is often represented as laughing we see from the very next verse, *āva smayanta vidyūtah*, the lightnings laughed down; and the very fact that this idea occurs in the next verse confirms me in the view that it was in the poet's mind in the preceding one. See also I, 23, 12. *haskārāt vidyūtah pāri ātah gātāh avantu nah marūtah mri-layantu nah*.

In the only other passage where *gāṇḡ* occurs, VIII, 43, 8, *arkīshā gaṇḡganābhāvan*, applied to Agni, admits of the same correction, *gagghanābhāvan*, and of the same translation, 'laughing with splendour.'

Benfey's objection to the spelling of *gaggh* with two

* Gött. Nachr., 1876, No. 13, s. 324.

aspirates is just with regard to pronunciation, but this would hardly justify our changing the style of our MSS., which, in this and in other cases, write the two aspirates, though intending them for non-aspirate and aspirate.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Prisni*, the mother of the Maruts, who are often called *Prisni-mâtaraḥ*, *gô-mâtaraḥ*, and *sîndhu-mâtaraḥ*.

Note 2. As to *svadhâ* in the sense of food, see before, I, 6, 4, note 2, and X, 157, 5.

Note 3. *Abhva* is more than dark clouds, it is the dark gathering of clouds before a storm, ein Unwetter, or, if conceived as a masculine, as in I, 39, 8, ein Ungethüm. Such words are simply untranslatable.

MANDALA I, HYMN 170.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 8-9.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN INDRA AND HIS WORSHIPPER, AGASTYA.

1. Indra : There is no such thing to-day, nor will it be so to-morrow. Who knows what strange thing¹ this is? We must consult the thought of another, for even what we once knew seems to vanish.

2. Agastya : Why dost thou wish to kill us, O Indra? the Maruts are thy brothers; fare kindly with them, and do not strike¹ us in battle.

3. The Maruts : O brother Agastya, why, being a friend, dost thou despise us? We know quite well what thy mind was. Dost thou not wish to give to us?

4. Agastya : Let them prepare the altar, let them light the fire in front! Here we two will spread² for thee the sacrifice, to be seen¹ by the immortal.

5. Agastya : Thou rulest, O lord of treasures; thou, lord of friends, art the most generous. Indra, speak again with the Maruts, and then consume our offerings at the right season.

NOTES.

Although this hymn is not directly addressed to the Maruts, yet as it refers to the before-mentioned rivalry between the Maruts and Indra, and as the author is supposed to be the same, namely Agastya, I give its translation here.

None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., TS., AV.

The Anukramanikâ ascribes verses 1, 3, 4 to Indra, 2 and 5 to Agastya ; Ludwig assigns verses 1 and 3 to the Maruts, 2, 4, and 5 to Agastya ; Grassmann gives verse 1 to Indra, 2 and 3 to the Maruts, and 4 and 5 to Agastya.

The hymn admits of several explanations. There was a sacrifice in which Indra and the Maruts were invoked together, and it is quite possible that our hymn may owe its origin to this. But it is possible also that the sacrifice may be the embodiment of the same ideas which were originally expressed in this and similar hymns, namely, that Indra, however powerful by himself, could not dispense with the assistance of the storm-gods. I prefer to take the latter view, but I do not consider the former so untenable as I did formerly. The idea that a great god like Indra did not like to be praised together with others is an old idea, and we find traces of it in the hymns themselves, e. g. II, 33, 4. *mā dúḥstutî, mā sáhûti*.

It is quite possible, therefore, that our hymn contains the libretto of a little ceremonial drama in which different choruses of priests are introduced as preparing a sacrifice for the Maruts and for Indra, and as trying to appease the great Indra, who is supposed to feel slighted. Possibly Indra and the Maruts too may have been actually represented by some actors, so that here, as elsewhere, the first seeds of the drama would be found in sacrificial performances.

I propose, though this can only be hypothetical, to take the first verse as a vehement complaint of Indra, when asked to share the sacrifice with the Maruts. In the second

verse Agastya is introduced as trying to pacify Indra. The third verse is most likely an appeal of the Maruts to remind Indra that the sacrifice was originally intended for them. Verses 4 and 5 belong to Agastya, who, though frightened into obedience to Indra, still implores him to make his peace with the Maruts.

Verse 1.

Note 1. In the first verse Indra expresses his surprise in disconnected sentences, saying that such a thing has never happened before. I do not take ádbhuta (nie da gewesen) in the sense of future, because that is already contained in svas. The second line expresses that Indra does not remember such a thing, and must ask some one else, whether he remembers anything like it. We ought to take abhisamkárénya as one word, and probably in the sense of to be approached or to be accepted. Abhisamkârin, however, means also changeable.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Vadhî is the augmentless indicative, not subjunctive; see, however, Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. I, pp. 21, 115.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Ketana refers to yagña as in VIII, 13, 8. It means that which attracts the attention of the gods (IV, 7, 2), and might be translated by beacon.

Note 2. The dual tanavāvahai is strange. It may refer, as Grassmann supposes, to Agastya and his wife, Lopamudrá, but even that is very unusual. See Oldenberg, K. Z. XXXIX, 62. Professor Oldenberg (K. Z. XXXIX, 60 seq.) takes this and the next hymn as parts of the same Âkhyâna hymn, and as intimately connected with the Marutvatiya Sâstra of the midday Savana, in the Soma sacrifice.

MANDALA I, HYMN 171.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 11.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. I come to you with this adoration, with a hymn I implore the favour¹ of the quick (Maruts). O Maruts, you have rejoiced² in it clearly³, put down then all anger and unharness your horses!

2. This reverent praise of yours, O Maruts, fashioned in the heart, has been offered by the mind¹, O gods! Come to it, pleased in your mind, for you give increase to (our) worship².

3. May the Maruts when they have been praised be gracious to us, and likewise Maghavat (Indra), the best giver of happiness, when he has been praised. May our trees (our lances)¹ through our valour stand always erect, O Maruts!

4. I am afraid of this powerful one, and trembling in fear of Indra. For you the offerings were prepared,—we have now put them away, forgive us!

5. Thou through whom the Mānas¹ see the mornings, whenever the eternal dawns flash forth with power², O Indra, O strong hero, grant thou glory to us with the Maruts, terrible with the terrible ones, strong and a giver of victory.

6. O Indra, protect thou these bravest of men¹ (the Maruts), let thy anger be turned away² from the Maruts, for thou hast become³ victorious together with those brilliant heroes. May we have an invigorating autumn, with quickening rain!

NOTES.

The Anukramanî assigns verses 1 and 2 to the Maruts, the rest to Indra Marutvat. The poet is again Agastya. The whole hymn corresponds to the situation as described in the preceding hymns, and leads on to a kind of compromise between the Maruts, who seem really the favourite gods of the poet, and Indra, an irresistible and supreme deity whose claims cannot be disregarded.

None of the verses of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., TS., AV.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Sumati here means clearly favour, as in I, 73, 6, 7; while in I, 166, 6 it means equally clearly prayer.

Note 2. Ludwig takes rarânâtâ as referring to sùkténa and námasâ. The accent of rarânâtâ is irregular, and likewise the retaining of the final long â in the Pada text. Otherwise the form is perfectly regular, namely the 2 p. plural of the reduplicated aorist, or the so-called aorist of the causative*. Pânini (VII, 4, 2, 3) gives a number of verbs which form that aorist as √ √ -, and not as √ - √, e.g. asasâsat, not asîsasat; ababâdhat, ayayâkat, &c. Some verbs may take both forms, e.g. abibhragat and ababhrâgat. This option applies to all Kânyâdi verbs, and one of these is ran, which therefore at the time of Kâtyâyana was supposed to have formed its reduplicated aorist both as ârarânat and as ârîranat. Without the augment we expect rîranata or rârânata. The question is why the final a should have been lengthened not only in the Samhitâ, that would be explicable, but in the Pada text also. The conjunctive of the perfect would be rârânata. See also Delbrück, Verbum, p. 111.

Note 3. Vedyâbhis, which Ludwig translates here by um dessentwillen, was ihr erfahren sollt, I have translated by clearly, though tentatively only.

* See Sanskrit Grammar, § 372, note.

Verse 2.

Note 1. The same idea is expressed in X, 47, 7. *hridi-sprīsaḥ mánasā vakyámānāḥ*.

Note 2. *Námasaḥ vridhásāḥ* is intended to convey the idea that the Maruts increase or bless those who worship them.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The second line has given rise to various interpretations.

GRASSMANN :

Uns mögen aufrecht stehn wie schöne Bäume

Nach unsrem Wunsch, O Maruts, alle Tage.

LUDWIG: Hoch mögen sein unsere kämpfenden lanzen,
alle tage, O Marut, sigesstreben.

As *komyā* never occurs again, it must for the present be left unexplained.

There was another difficult passage, I, 88, 3. *medhā vānā nā kṛinavante ūrdhvā*, which I translated, 'May the Maruts stir up our minds as they stir up the forests.' I pointed out there that *ūrdhva* means not only upright, but straight and strong (I, 172, 3; II, 30, 3), and I conjectured that the erect trees might have been used as a symbol of strength and triumph. *Vana*, however, may have been used poetically for anything made of wood, just as cow is used for leather or anything made of leather. In that case *vana* might be meant for the wooden walls of houses, or even for lances (like *δοῦπα* from *δόρυ* = Sk. *dāru*), and the adjective would probably have to determine the true meaning. If connected with *komala* it might have the same meaning as *εὐχεστός*.

Prof. Oldenberg suggests that *vanāni* may be meant for the wooden vessels containing the Soma.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The *Mānas* are the people of *Mānya*, see I, 165, 15, note 1, and there is no necessity for taking *māna*, with Grassmann, as a general name for poet (Kuhn's Zeitschrift, vol. xvi, p. 174).

Note 2. It is doubtful to which word *savasâ* belongs. I take it to be used adverbially with *vyushîshu*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. We might also translate, 'protect men from the stronger one,' as we read I, 120, 4. *pâtâm ka sâhyasâh yuvâm ka râbhyasâh nah*; and still more clearly in IV, 55, 1. *sâhiyasâh varuṇa mitra mâtât*. But I doubt whether *nṛñ* by itself would be used in the sense of our men, while *naraḥ* is a common name of the Maruts, whether as *divâḥ nâraḥ*, I, 64, 4, or as *nâraḥ* by themselves, I, 64, 10; 166, 13, &c.

Note 2. On the meaning of *avayâ* in *âvayâtaheḥâḥ*, see Introduction, p. xx:

Note 3. On *dadhânaḥ*, see VIII, 97, 13, &c.

MANDALA I, HYMN 172.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYÂYA 4, VARGA 12.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. May your march be brilliant, brilliant through your protection, O Maruts, you bounteous givers, shining like snakes !

2. May that straightforward shaft of yours, O Maruts, bounteous givers, be far from us, and far the stone which you hurl !

3. Spare, O bounteous givers, the people of *Trinaskanda*, lift us up that we may live !

NOTES.

The hymn is ascribed to Agastya, the metre is Gâyatrî. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., TS., AV.

Verse 1.

Prof. Oldenberg conjectures *kitrá ûtíh*, and possibly *mahibhânavaḥ* for *ahibhânavaḥ*. See for *yāmaḥ kitráh ûtī* V, 52, 2. *té yāman pānti*; also VI, 48, 9.

MANDALA II, HYMN 34.

ASHṬAKA II, ADHYĀYA 7, VARGA 19-21.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. The Maruts charged with rain¹, endowed with fierce force, terrible like wild beasts², blazing³ in their strength⁴, brilliant like fires, and impetuous⁵, have uncovered the (rain-giving) cows by blowing away the cloud⁶.

2. The (Maruts) with their rings¹ appeared like the heavens with their stars², they shone wide like streams from clouds as soon as Rudra, the strong man, was born for you, O golden-breasted Maruts, in the bright lap of *Prisni*³.

3. They wash¹ their horses like racers in the courses, they hasten with the points of the reed² on their quick steeds. O golden-jawed³ Maruts, violently shaking (your jaws), you go quick⁴ with your spotted deer⁵, being friends of one mind.

4. Those Maruts have grown to feed¹ all these beings, or, it may be, (they have come) hither for the sake of a friend, they who always bring quickening rain. They have spotted horses, their bounties cannot be taken away, they are like headlong charioteers on their ways².

5. O Maruts, wielding your brilliant spears, come hither on smooth¹ roads with your fiery² cows (clouds) whose udders are swelling; (come hither), being of one mind, like swans toward their nests, to enjoy the sweet offering.

6. O one-minded Maruts, come to our prayers, come to our libations like (Indra) praised by men¹ !

Fulfil (our prayer) like the udder of a barren cow², and make the prayer glorious by booty to the singer.

7. Grant us this strong horse for our chariot, a draught¹ that rouses our prayers, from day to day, food to the singers, and to the poet in our homesteads² luck³, wisdom, inviolable and invincible strength.

8. When the gold-breasted Maruts harness the horses to their chariots, bounteous¹ in wealth, then it is as if a cow in the folds poured out² to her calf copious food, to every man who has offered libations.

9. Whatever mortal enemy may have placed us among wolves¹, shield us from hurt, ye Vasus! Turn the wheels with burning heat² against him, and strike down the weapon of the impious fiend, O Rudras!

10. Your march, O Maruts, appears brilliant, whether even friends have milked the udder of *Prisni*, or whether, O sons of Rudra, you mean to blame him who praises you, and to weaken those who are weakening Trita, O unbeguiled heroes¹.

11. We invoke you, the great Maruts, the constant wanderers, at the offering of the rapid *Vishnu*¹; holding ladles (full of libations) and prayerful we ask the golden-coloured and exalted Maruts for glorious wealth.

12. The *Dasagvas* (Maruts?)¹ carried on² the sacrifice first; may they rouse us at the break of dawn. Like the dawn, they uncover the dark nights with the red (rays), the strong ones, with their brilliant light, as with a sea of milk.

13. With the (morning) clouds, as if with glittering red ornaments¹, these Maruts have grown great in the sacred places². Streaming down with rush-

ing splendour³, they have assumed their bright and brilliant colour.

14. Approaching¹ them for their great protection to help us, we invoke them with this worship, they whom Trita may bring near, like the five Hotri priests for victory², descending on their chariot to help.

15. May that grace of yours by which you help the wretched¹ across all anguish, and by which you deliver the worshipper from the reviler, come hither, O Maruts ; may your favour approach us like a cow (going to her calf) !

NOTES.

Hymn ascribed to *Gr̥tsamada*. Metre, 1-14 *Gagatī*, 15 *Trishṭubh*, according to the *paribhāṣhā* in the *Sarvānu-kramanī* 12, 13. See also Ludwig, III, p. 59; Bergaigne, *Recherches sur l'histoire de la liturgie védique*, 1889, pp. 66 seq.; Oldenberg, *Prolegomena*, p. 144. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV. The first verse is found in TB. II, 5, 5, 4, with three various readings, viz. *tavishébhir ūrm̐bhiḥ* instead of *távishībhir ar̥kīnaḥ*, *bhrúmim* instead of *bhr̥mim*, and *rīpa* instead of *ápa*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Dhârāvarāḥ*, a word of doubtful import, possibly meaning wishing for rain, or the suitors of the streams of rain. The Maruts are sometimes represented as *varas* or suitors; cf. V, 60, 4.

Note 2. Cf. II, 33, 11.

Note 3. Bergaigne, II, 381, translates *ar̥kīnaḥ* by *chantres*, *singers*, deriving it, as it would seem, from *arka* which, as he maintains (*Journ. Asiat.* 1884, IV, pp. 194 seq.), means always song in the RV. (*Rel. Véd.* I, 279). This, however, is not the case, as has been well shown by Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* I, pp. 23 seq. Besides, unless we change *ar̥kīnaḥ* into *arkīnaḥ*, we must connect it with *arkī*, light. Thus we read VIII, 41, 8, *ar̥kīnâ padā*.

Note 4. *Tavishébhir ūrm̐bhiḥ*, the reading of the *Taittirīyas*, is explained by *Sāyana* by *balavadbhir gamanaiḥ*. It may have been taken from RV. VI, 61, 2.

Note 5. On *rigishín*, see I, 64, 12^b; I, 87, 1.

Note 6. *Bhr̥mim* seems to me a name of the cloud, driven about by the wind. The *Taittirīyas* read *bhrúmim*, and *Sāyana* explains it by *megham dhamantas k̐layantaḥ*. In most passages, no doubt, *bhr̥mim* means quick, fresh, and is opposed to *radhra*, IV, 32, 2; VII, 56, 20. In I, 31, 16, as applied to *Agni*, it may mean quick. But in our passage that meaning is impossible, and I prefer the traditional

meaning of cloud to that of storm-wind, adopted by Benfey and Roth. The expression 'to blow a storm-wind' is not usual, while *dham* is used in the sense of blowing away clouds and darkness. The cows would then be the waters in the clouds. It is possible, however, that Sâyana's explanation, according to which *bhṛīmi* is a musical instrument, may rest on some traditional authority. In this case it would correspond to *dhāmantaḥ vāṇām*, in I, 85, 10².

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *khâdin*, see I, 166, 9, note 2. On *rukma-vakshas*, I, 64, 4, note 1. Golden-breasted is meant for armed with golden chest-plates. The meaning seems to be that the Maruts with their brilliant *khâdis* appear like the heavens with their brilliant stars. The Maruts are not themselves lightning and rain, but they are seen in them, as Agni is not the fire, but present in the fire, or the god of fire. Thus we read, RV. III, 26, 6. *agnéḥ bhāmam marútām ógaḥ*, 'The splendour of Agni, the strength of the Maruts,' i.e. the lightning. It must be admitted, however, that a conjecture, proposed by Bollensen (Z.D.M.G. XLI, p. 501), would improve the verse. He proposes to read *riśhtayah* instead of *vriśhtayah*. We should then have to translate, 'Their spears shone like lightnings from the clouds.' These *riśhtis* or spears are mentioned by the side of *khâdi* and *rukma* in RV. V, 54, 11, and the compound *riśhtīvidyutah* is applied to the Maruts in I, 168, 5 and V, 52, 13. The difficulty which remains is *abhṛīyâḥ*.

Note 2. On *dyāvō ná strībhiḥ*, see note to I, 87, 1.

Note 3. The second line is full of difficulties. No doubt the Maruts are represented as the sons of Rudra (V, 60, 5; VI, 66, 3), and as the sons of *Prisni*, fem., being called *Prisni-mâtaraḥ*. Their birth is sometimes spoken of as unknown (VII, 56, 2), but hardly as mysterious. Who knows their birth, hardly means more than 'the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh.' *Prisni* as a feminine is the speckled sky, and the cloud may have been conceived

as the udder at the same time that *Prisni* was conceived as a cow (I, 160, 3). Nothing seems therefore more natural than that we should translate, 'When Rudra had begotten you in the bright lap of *Prisni*.' The bright lap, *sukráṁ ūdhaḥ*, is an idiomatic expression (VI, 66, 1; IV, 3, 10), and I see no reason why we should with Roth, K.Z. XXVI, 49, change the *sukré* of the *padapāṭha* into *sukráḥ* and refer it to *vrīshā*.

The real difficulty lies in *ágani*. Can it mean he begot, as Bergaigne (*Religion Védique*, III, 35) interprets it? Wherever *ágani* occurs it means he was born, and I doubt whether it can mean anything else. It is easy to suggest *aganit*, for though the third person of the aorist never occurs in the RV., the other persons, such as *aganishṭa*, *ganishṭāḥ*, are there. But, as the verse now stands, we must translate, 'When Rudra was born for you, he the strong one in the bright udder of *Prisni*.' Could Rudra be here conceived as the son, he who in other passages is represented as the husband of *Prisni*? There is another passage which may yield the same sense, VI, 66, 3. *vidé hí mātá maháḥ mahī sá, sá it prīsnih subhvē gárgham á adhāt*, 'for she, the great, is known as the mother of the great, that very *Prisni* conceived the germ (the Maruts) for the strong one.'

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Ukshánte* is explained by washing, cleaning the horses, before they start for a new race. See V, 59, 1. *ukshánte ásvān*, followed by *tárushante á rágaḥ*; IX, 109, 10. *ásvaḥ ná niktáḥ vāgī dhánāya*; Satap. Br. XI, 5, 5, 13. Pischel (*Ved. Stud.* I, 189) supposes that it always refers to the washing after a race.

Note 2. *Nadáśya kárnaiḥ* is very difficult. *Sâyana*'s explanation, *meghasya madhyapradesaiḥ*, 'through the hollows of the cloud,' presupposes that *nada* by itself can in the RV. be used in the sense of cloud, and that *karna*, ear, may have the meaning of a hole or a passage. To take, as BR. propose, *kárna* in the sense of *karvá*, eared, with long ears, would not help us much. Grassmann's

translation, 'mit der Wolke schnellen Fittigen,' is based on a conjectural reading, *nadasya parnaiḥ*. Ludwig's translation, 'mit des fluszes wellen den raschen eilen sie,' is ingenious, but too bold, for *karna* never means waves, nor *nada* river in the Rig-veda. The Vedārthayātṇa gives: 'they rush with steeds that make the roar,' taking *karnaiḥ* for *karṭṛibhiḥ*, which again is simply impossible. The best explanation is that suggested by Pischel, Ved. Stud., p. 189. He takes *nada* for reed, and points out that whips were made of reeds. The *karna* would be the sharp point of the reed, most useful for a whip. I cannot, however, follow him in taking *āśúbhiḥ* in the sense of accelerating. I think it refers to *asva* in the preceding pāda.

Note 3. *Hīraṇyasiprāḥ*. *Siprā*, in the dual *sipre*, is intended for the jaws, the upper and lower jaws, as in RV. I, 101, 10. *vī syasva sipre*, open the jaws. See Zimmer, Altindisches Leben, p. 249, note. RV. III, 32, 1; V, 36, 2, *sipre* and *hánû*; VIII, 76, 10; X, 96, 9. *sipre hárinî dávidhvataḥ*; X, 105, 5. *siprābhyām siprínivān*. In the plural, however, *siprāḥ*, V, 54, 11 (*siprāḥ śirshásu vítatāḥ hīraṇyáyīḥ*), VIII, 7, 25, is intended for something worn on the head, made of gold or gold threads. As we speak of the ears of a cap, that is, lappets which protect the ears, or of the cheeks of a machine, so in this case the jaws seem to have been intended for what protects the jaws, and not necessarily for the real jaw-bones of an animal, used as an helmet, and afterwards imitated in any kind of metal. As to *siprin* it may mean helmeted or possessed of jaws. To be possessed of jaws is no peculiar distinction, yet in several of the passages where *siprin* occurs, there is a clear reference to eating and drinking; see VI, 44, 14; VIII, 2, 28; 17, 4; 32, 24; 33, 7; 92, 4; see also *sipravān* in VI, 17, 2. It is possible therefore that like *susipra*, *siprin* also was used in the sense of possessed of jaw-bones, i. e. of strong jaw-bones. Even such epithets as *hīraṇya-sipra*, *hári-sipra*, *híri-sipra* may mean possessed of golden, possibly of strong jaws. (M. M., Biographies of Words, p. 263, note.) Roth takes *hārisipra* as yellow-jawed, *hírisipra* as golden-cheeked, or with golden helmet, *hīraṇyasipra*, with golden

helmet. A decision between golden-jawed or golden-helmeted is difficult, yet golden-jawed is applicable in all cases.

In our passage we must be guided by *dávidhvataḥ*, which together with *sípra* occurs again X, 96, 9. *sípre vāgāya hárinī dávidhvataḥ*, shaking the golden jaws, and it seems best to translate: O ye golden-jawed Maruts, shaking (your jaws), you go to feed.

Note 4. If we retain the accent in *prīkshám*, we shall have to take it as an adverb, from *prīkshá*, quick, vigorous, like the German *snél*. This view is supported by Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* I, 96. If, however, we could change the accent into *prīksham*, we might defend Sâyana's interpretation. We should have to take *prīksham* as the accusative of *prīksh*, corresponding to the dative *prīkshé* in the next verse. *Prīksh* is used together with *subh*, *ish*, *ûrg* (VI, 62, 4), and as we have *subham yâ*, we might take *prīksham yâ* in the sense of going for food, in search of food. But it is better to take *prīkshám* as an adverb. In the next verse *prīkshé* is really a kind of infinitive, governing *bhúvanâ*.

Note 5. Tradition explains the *Prishatīs* as spotted deer, but *prishadasva*, as an epithet of the Maruts, need not mean having *Prishatīs* for their horses, but having spotted horses. See Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* II, p. 378, note.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Ludwig translates: Zu narung haben sie alle diese Wesen gebracht; Grassmann: Zur Labung netzten alle diese Wesen sie. Ludwig suggests *kitrāya* for *mitrāya*; Oldenberg, far better, *mitrāyavaḥ*, looking for friends, like *mitrāyúvaḥ*, in I, 173, 10.

Note 2. On *vayúna*, see Pischel in *Vedische Studien*, p. 301. But why does Pischel translate *rigipyá* by bulls, referring to VI, 67, 11?

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Adhvasmábhiḥ* seems to mean unimpeded or smooth. Cf. IX, 91, 3.

Note 2. The meaning of *īndhanvabhiḥ* is very doubtful.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Narām ná sámsah*, the original form of *Narâ-samsah*, I take here as a proper name, *Männerlob* (like *Frauenlob*, the poet) referring to Indra. Bergaigne, I, p. 305, doubts whether *Narâsamsa* can be a proper name in our passage, but on p. 308 he calls it an appellation of Indra.

Note 2. *Āsvām iva*, gives a sense, but one quite inappropriate to the Veda. It would mean, 'fill the cow in her udder like a mare.' I therefore propose to read *asvām iva* (*asuam iva*), from *asû*, a cow that is barren, or a cow that has not yet calved. Thus we read, I, 112, 3. *yābhiḥ dhenúm asvām pínvathah*, 'with the same help with which you nourish a barren cow.' Cf. I, 116, 22. *staryām pipyathuh gām*, 'you have filled the barren cow.' If *asvām iva dhenúm* is a simile, we want an object to which it refers, and this we find in *dhīyam*. Thus we read, V, 71, 2; VII, 94, 2; IX, 19, 2, *pipyatam dhīyah*, to fulfil prayers. I know, of course, that such changes in the sacred text will for the present seem most objectionable to my friends in India, but I doubt not that the time will come when they will see that such emendations are inevitable. I see that in the appendix to the Petersburg Dictionary, s.v. *asû*, the same conjecture has been suggested.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Here again I have taken great liberties. *Āpânám* is explained by *Sâyana* as a participle for *âpnuvantam*. This participle, though quite correct (see Lindner, *Altindische Nominalbildung*, p. 54), does not occur again in the RV., nor does it yield a proper meaning. It could only mean, 'give us a horse to the chariot, an obtaining prayer, rousing the attention (of the gods) day by day.' *Āpâna* may mean a drinking or carousing, and I do not see why we should not take it in that sense. Sacrifices in ancient times were often festivals; VII, 22, 3. *imā bráhma sadhamāde gushasva*, 'accept these prayers at our feast.' If we suppose that *âpâna* refers to the drinking of Soma, then

nothing is more appropriate than to call the drinking *kitáyat*, exciting, *bráhma*, a hymn. Anyhow I can discover no better meaning in this line. Grassmann, who knows that *kitayati* means to excite, yet translates: 'Gebt Gebet, das durchdringt, euch erinnernd Tag für Tag.' Ludwig: 'Das erfolgreiche brahma, das erinnernde tag für tag.' Possibly we should have to change the accent from *ápáná* to *ápána*. *Ápáná* in IX, 10, 5 is equally obscure.

Note 2. On *vrigana*, see I, 165, 15³. For fuller discussions of the various meanings of *vrigana*, see Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* I, 139; Oldenberg, *Göttinger gel. Anzeigen*, 1890, pp. 410 seq.; Ph. Colinet, *Les principes de l'exégèse védique d'après MM. Pischel et Geldner*, p. 28; Ludwig, *Über Methode bei Interpretation des Rigveda*, 1890, pp. 27 seq.

Note 3. *Saní* means acquiring, success, luck, gain, and is often placed in juxtaposition with *medhá*, wisdom. If they are thus placed side by side, *saní* looks almost like an adjective, meaning efficient. RV. I, 18, 6. *saním medhám ayásisham*, 'I had asked for efficient, true, real wisdom,' or, 'I had asked for success and wisdom.' In such passages, however, as V, 27, 4. *dádat riká saním yaté dádat medhám ritáyaté*, it is clear that *saní* was considered as independent and different from *medhá* (*rikáyaté* = *ritáyaté*).

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *sudánavaḥ*, see note to I, 64, 6. It must often be left open whether *sudánu* was understood as bounteous, or as having good rain or good Soma.

Note 2. *Pinvate*, lit. to make swell or abound.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Vrikatáti* is an old locative of *vrikatát*, wolfhood. To place us in wolfhood means to treat us as wolves, or as *vogelfrei*. Others take it to mean treating us as a wolf would treat us.

Note 2. *Tápushâ kakríyâ*. According to Lanman (p. 571) *tápushâ* might be taken as an acc. dual fem. I know,

however, of no strictly analogous cases, and prefer to take *tápūshā* as an instrumental, this being its usual employment.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The second line is obscure. Neither Grassmann nor Ludwig nor Sāyana can extract any intelligible meaning from it. I have translated it, but I am far from satisfied. There may be an antithesis between the friends (the Maruts themselves, see V, 53, 2), milking the udder of *Prisni*, and the Maruts coming to blame their friends for not offering them sacrifices, or for offering them sacrifices in common with Indra. In the first case when they, as friends, milk the cloud, their approach is brilliant and auspicious. In the second case, when they come to blame those who ought to celebrate them, or those who are actually hostile to them by causing the ruin or decay of a friend of the Maruts, such as Trita, their approach is likewise brilliant, but not auspicious. Trita is a friend of the Maruts whom they assist in battle, and it is possible that this legend may be alluded to here. Sometimes Trita seems also connected with the third libation which was offered at sunset, just as *Vishṇu* represented the second libation which was offered at noon*. Thus we read, VIII, 12, 16. *yát sómam indra víshṇavi yát vâ gha trité âptyé yát vâ marútsu mândase*, 'whether you, Indra, enjoy the Soma near *Vishṇu*, or near Trita *Âptya*, or among the Maruts.' *Sâkapûni*, as quoted by Yâska (Nir. XII, 19), explains the three steps of *Vishṇu* as earth, sky, and heaven; *Aurṇavâbha* distinguishes *Samârohana*, *Vishṇupada*, and *Gayasiras*. But all this does not help us to disentangle our verse. It should be added that Bergaigne makes *Tritám* to be governed by *duhúh* (Rel. Véd. II, 327). We should then have to translate, 'or whether they milk Trita in order to blame the singer, to make them old who make

* *Odinn* is styled *Thridi*, by the side of *Hâr* and *Tafnhâr* (the high and the even high) as the Third High. At other times he is *Tveggi* (*secundus*). Grimm's *Teutonic Mythology*, vol. i, p. 162.

others old, or who themselves become old.' This, however, does not help us much. Professor Oldenberg conjectures that possibly *gurátām* might be changed to *gurátā*, and that the dual of the verb might refer to Rudra and *Prisni*; or we might read *gurátā* for *guráta*, if it refers to Rudriyas. *Návamānasya* might also be used in the sense of making a noise (see I, 29, 5), and possibly *návamānasya nidé* might have been intended for shouting and laughing to scorn. But all this leaves the true meaning of the verse as unfathomable as ever.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Vishṇor esháya prabhṛithé* is obscure. At the offering of the rapid *Vishṇu* is supposed to mean, when the rapid *Vishṇu* offers Soma. The same phrase occurs again, VII, 40, 5. In VIII, 20, 3, we can translate, 'we know the strength of the Maruts, and of the hasting *Vishṇu*, the bounteous gods.' In VII, 39, 5, the reading is *vishṇum eshām*. Bergaigne (II, 419) is inclined to take *vishṇu esha* as Soma. We should then translate, 'at the offering of Soma.'

Verse 12.

Note 1. The *Daragvas* are mentioned as an old priestly family, like the *Āngiras*, and they seem also, like the *Āngiras*, to have their prototypes or their ancestors among the divine hosts. Could they here be identified with the *Maruts*? They are said to have been the first to carry on the sacrifice, and they are asked to rouse men at the break of the day. Now the same may be said of the *Maruts*. They are often connected with the dawn, probably because the storms break forth with greater vigour in the morning, or, it may be, because the chasing away of the darkness of the night recalls the struggle between the darkness of the thunderstorm and the brightness of the sun. The matutinal character of the *Maruts* appears, for instance, in V, 53, 14 (*usrí bhesagám*), and their father *Dyaus* is likewise called *vṛishabhák usríyah*, V, 58, 6. In the second line *úrñute*, though in the singular, refers also to the *Maruts* in the plural; see Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*,

Paris, 1886, p. 80. There still remain two difficult words, *maháh* and *gó-arnasá*. The former (see Lanman, p. 501) may be taken as an adjective referring to the Dasagvas or Maruts, unless we take it as an adverb, quickly, like *makshu*. If we could change it into *mahá*, it would form an appropriate adjective to *gyotishá*, as in IV, 50, 4. On *gó-arnasá* all that can be said is that it mostly occurs where something is uncovered or revealed, so I, 112, 18; X, 38, 2.

Note 2. On *yagñam vah*, to carry on the sacrifice like a wagon, see Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* II, 259–260. See also RV. VIII, 26, 15; 58, 1, and *yagña-vâhas*.

Verse 13.

Note 1. In interpreting this obscure verse we must begin with what is clear. The *arunáh aṅgáyah* are the well-known ornaments of the Maruts, mentioned I, 37, 2, note; I, 64, 4, note, &c. The Maruts shine in these ornaments or paints, I, 85, 3; 87, 1; V, 56, 1; X, 78, 7. Though we do not know their special character, we know that, like the daggers, spears, and bracelets of the Maruts, they were supposed to contribute to their beautiful appearance. Again, we know that when the Maruts are said to grow (*vavridhu*), that means that they grow in strength, in spirits, and in splendour, or, in a physical sense, that the storms increase, that the thunder roars, and the lightnings flash, see V, 55, 3; 59, 5. Now if it is said that the Rudras grew with *kshonís*, as if with bright red ornaments, we must have in these *kshonís* the physical prototype of what are metaphorically called their glittering ornaments. And here we can only think either of the bright morning clouds (referring to *usháh ná râmíh arunáh ápa ūrnute* in the preceding verse), or lightnings. These bright clouds of heaven are sometimes conceived as the mothers (III, 9, 2. *apáh mātṛíh*), and more especially the mothers of the Maruts, who are in consequence called *Síndhu-mátarah*, X, 78, 6, a name elsewhere given to Soma, IX, 61, 7, and to the Asvins, I, 46, 2. It is said of a well-known hero, *Purúravas* (originally a solar hero), that as soon as he was born the women (*gnáh*) were there, and immediately after-

wards that the rivers increased or cherished him, X, 95, 7. In other passages too these celestial rivers or waters or clouds are represented as women, whether mothers or wives (X, 124, 7). A number of names are given to these beings, when introduced as the companions of the Apsaras Urvasī, and it is said of them that they came along like *aṅgāyah* *arunāyah*, like bright red ornaments, X, 95, 6. It seems clear therefore that the *arunāḥ aṅgāyah* of the Maruts have to be explained by the bright red clouds of the morning, or in more mythological language, by the Apsaras, who are said to be like *arunāyah aṅgāyah*. Hence, whatever its etymology may have been, *kshonībhiḥ* in our passage must refer to the clouds of heaven, and the verse can only be translated, 'the Rudras grew with the clouds as with their red ornaments,' that is, the clouds were their red ornaments, and as the clouds grew in splendour, the Maruts grew with their splendid ornaments.

Professor Geldner arrived at a similar conclusion. In Bezenberger's *Beiträge*, XI, p. 327, and more recently in *Ved. Stud.*, p. 277, he assigned to *kshonī* the meaning of woman, which is quite possible, and would make it a synonym of the celestial *gnās*. But he translates, 'the Maruts excite themselves with red colours as with women.' These are hardly Vedic thoughts, and the position of *nā* would remain anomalous. Nor should we gain much if we read *te kshonayah arunebhiḥ na aṅgibhiḥ*, 'these Rudras were delighted like wives by bright ornaments.' The bright ornaments have once for all a settled meaning, they are peculiar to the Maruts, and cannot in a Marut hymn be taken in any other sense.

Then comes the question, how is the meaning assigned to *kshonī*, namely cloud, or, as personified, Apsaras, applicable to other passages? In X, 95, 9, it seems most appropriate: 'So long as the mortal (*Purūravas*), longing for the immortal (*Apsaras*), does not come near with strength to those *kshonīs*, i. e. those Apsaras, or morning clouds, they beautified their bodies like ducks' (an excellent image, if one watches ducks cleaning themselves in the water), 'like sporting horses biting each other.' Geldner

translates this verse somewhat differently, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 276.

Having disposed of these two passages where *kshonī* occurs in the plural, we have next to consider those where it stands in the dual. Here *kshonī* always means heaven and earth, like *rodasi*, *dyāvaprithivī*, &c.

VIII, 7, 22. *sám u tyé mahatīh apáh sám kshonī sám u sūryam . . . parvasáh dadhuh*. They, the Maruts, set the great waters (the sky), heaven and earth and the sun piece-meal (or, they put them together piece by piece).

VIII, 52, 10. *sám índrah ráyah bṛihatīh adhūnuta sám kshonī sám u sūryam*. Indra shook the great treasures, heaven and earth, and the sun.

VIII, 99, 6. *ánu te sūshmam turáyantam iyatuḥ kshonī sīsum ná mātárā*. Heaven and earth followed thy rapid strength, like mother-cows their calf.

II, 16, 3. *ná kshonībhyám paribhvē te indriyám*. Thy strength is not to be compassed by heaven and earth.

If after this we look at the passage translated by Professor Geldner, I, 180, 5. *apáh kshonī sakate máhinā vām*, we see at once that *apáh* and *kshonī* cannot be separated, and that we must translate, your *Máhinā* reaches heaven and earth and the sky. *Máhinā*, according to Professor Geldner, means the magnificent woman, namely *Sūryā*, but it is possible that it may have been meant for 'mahimā, your greatness reaches heaven and earth and the sky.' *Apáh*, which Professor Geldner translates 'from the water,' is the acc. plural, meaning the waters between heaven and earth, or the sky. It occurs again in connection with heaven and earth, the sun, heaven, and generally without any copula. Thus, VIII, 7, 22. *apáh, kshonī, sūryam*, i.e. the waters (the sky), heaven and earth, the sun. I, 36, 8. *ródasi apáh*, heaven and earth and the waters; cf. V, 31, 6. Likewise I, 52, 12. *apáh svāh paribhūh eshi á dívam*; V, 14, 4. *ávindat gáh apáh svāh*; VI, 47, 14. *apáh gáh*; cf. VI, 60, 2. VII, 44, 1. *dyāvaprithivī apáh svāh*, cf. X, 36, 1; IX, 90, 4; 91, 6.

There remain five passages where *kshonīh* occurs, and where Professor Geldner's conjecture that it means women

holds good. In I, 54, 1, it may mean real women, or the women of the clouds. In I, 57, 4; 173, 7; VIII, 3, 10; 13, 17; also in X, 22, 9, women seems the most plausible translation.

Note 2. *Rítasya sádanâni* is almost impossible to translate. It may be the places in heaven where the Maruts are supposed to be, or the places where sacrifices are offered to them.

Note 3. *Átyena págasâ* has been explained in different ways. *Sâyana* renders it by always moving power; Grassmann by 'mit schnell erregtem Schimmer;' Ludwig, 'mit eilender kraft,' though he is no longer satisfied with this meaning, and suggests 'net for catching.' Roth has touched several times on this word. In the *Allgemeine Monatsschrift* of 1851, p. 87, he suggested for *págas* the meaning of 'impression of a foot or of a carriage, perhaps also reflection.' In his *Notes on the Nirukta*, p. 78 seq., he is very hard on the Indian commentators who explain the word by strength, but who never go conscientiously through all the passages in which a word occurs. He then still maintained that the word ought to be translated by track.

It seems, however, that the most appropriate meaning in the passages in which *págas* occurs is splendour, though of course a stream of light may be conceived as a bright train or path. In some the meaning of light seems quite inevitable, for instance, III, 15, 1. *ví págasâ prithúnâ sósukânah*. Agni, shining with broad light.

VIII, 46, 25. *á . . . yâhí makhâya págase*. Come hither, Vâyu, for strong light.

III, 14, 1. (*agnih*) *prithivyâm págah asret*. Agni assumed (or spread) splendour on earth.

VII, 10, 1. *usháh ná gârah prithú págah asret*. (Agni,) like the lover of the dawn, assumed (or spread) wide splendour.

III, 61, 5. *úrdhvâm madhudhá diví págah asret*. The dawn assumed rising splendour in the sky.

VII, 3, 4. *ví yâsya te prithivyâm págah áset*. Thou (Agni) whose splendour spread on earth.

IX, 68, 3. *abhivrágan ákshitam págaḥ á dade*. (Soma) approaching assumed imperishable splendour. This splendour of Soma is also mentioned in IX, 109, 21, and the expression that he shakes his splendour (*vr̥thā kar*) occurs IX, 76, 1; 88, 5. (Cf. Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 117.)

In VI, 21, 7. *abhí tvā págaḥ rakshásaḥ ví tasthe*, it would, no doubt, seem preferable to translate, 'the power of the Rakshas came upon thee,' but the *ugrám págaḥ*, the fierce light, is not out of place either, while in most of the passages which we have examined, the meaning of power would be entirely out of place.

In I, 121, 11, heaven and earth seem to be called *pāgasī*, the two splendours. Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 87, translates *átyena págasá* by 'durch das stattliche Ross,' namely the Soma, but *pāgas* seems to be something that belongs to Soma, not Soma himself.

Verse 14.

Note 1. Grassmann suggests *iyánáḥ* instead of *iyánáḥ*.

Note 2. *Abhíshṭaye*, for superiority or victory, rather than for assistance. *Abhíshṭi*, with accent on the last syllable, means conqueror or victorious; see RV. I, 9, 1; III, 34, 4; X, 100, 12; 104, 10.

Verse 15.

Note 1. On *radhra* and its various applications, see Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 124.

MANDALA V, HYMN 52.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 8-10.

TO THE MARUTS (THE-STORM-GODS).

1. O Syāvāsva, sing boldly with¹ the Maruts, the singers who, worthy themselves of sacrifice, rejoice in their guileless glory² according to their nature.

2. They are indeed boldly the friends of strong power; they on their march protect all who by themselves are full of daring¹.

3. Like rushing bulls, these Maruts spring over¹ the dark cows (the clouds)², and then we perceive the might of the Maruts in heaven and on earth.

4. Let us boldly offer praise and sacrifice to your Maruts, to all them who protect the generation of men, who protect the mortal from injury.

5. They who are worthy, bounteous, men of perfect strength, to those heavenly Maruts who are worthy of sacrifice, praise the sacrifice!

6. The tall men¹, coming near with their bright chains, and their weapon, have hurled forth their spears. Behind these Maruts there came by itself the splendour of heaven, like laughing lightnings².

7. Those who have grown up on earth, or in the wide sky, or in the realm of the rivers, or in the abode of the great heaven,

8. Praise that host of the Maruts, endowed with true strength and boldness¹, whether those rushing heroes have by themselves harnessed (their horses) for triumph,

9. Or whether these brilliant Maruts have in the (speckled) cloud clothed themselves in wool¹, or

whether by their strength they cut the mountain asunder with the tire of their chariot;

10. Call them comers, or goers, or enterers, or followers, under all these names, they watch on the straw¹ for my sacrifice.

11. The men (the Maruts) watch, and their steeds watch. Then, so brilliant are their forms to be seen, that people say, Look at the strangers¹!

12. In measured steps¹ and wildly shouting² the gleemen³ have danced toward the well (the cloud). They who appeared one by one like thieves, were helpers to me to see the light⁴.

13. Worship, therefore, O seer, that host of Maruts, and keep and delight them with your voice, they who are themselves wise¹ poets, tall heroes armed with lightning-spears.

14. Approach, O seer, the host of Maruts, as a woman approaches a friend, for a gift¹; and you, Maruts, bold in your strength², hasten hither, even from heaven, when you have been praised by our hymns.

15. If he, after perceiving them, has approached them as gods with an offering, then may he for a gift remain united with the brilliant (Maruts), who by their ornaments are glorious on their march.

16. They, the wise¹ Maruts, the lords, who, when there was inquiry for their kindred, told me of the cow, they told me of *Prisni* as their mother, and of the strong *Rudra* as their father.

17. The seven and seven heroes¹ gave me each a hundred. On the *Yamunâ* I clear off glorious wealth in cows, I clear wealth in horses.

NOTES.

This hymn is ascribed to *Syāvārva* *Ātreya*. Metre, *Anuṣṭubh*, 1-5, 7-15; *Pañkti*, 6, 16, and 17. *Sāyana* seems to take verse 16 as an *Anuṣṭubh*, which of course is a mistake. No verse of this hymn occurs in *SV.*, *VS.*, *TS.*, *TB.*, *MS.*, *AV.*

Verse 1.

Note 1. One expects the dative or accusative after *arkā*. The instrumental leaves us no choice but to translate, 'Sing with the Maruts, who are themselves famous as singers.' Cf. I, 6, 8; V, 60, 8.

Note 2. On *śrāvaḥ mādanti*, see Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 75.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Dhrīśadvīnas* may also refer to the Maruts.

Verse 3.

Note 1. One expects *ádhi* instead of *āti*, see Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 95 seq.

Note 2. See note to I, 37, 5; also, Bartholomae in *Bezenberger's Beiträge*, XV, 211. The whole verse has been discussed by Benfey, *Vedica und Verwandtes*, p. 152 seq.

Verse 6.

Note 1. This verse has been discussed before, I, 168, 7, note. Benfey (*Nachrichten der K. Ges. der Wiss. zu Göttingen*, 1876, 28 Juni; comp. *Vedica und Verwandtes*, p. 141) translated it: 'Heran... haben die Helden, die ehren, ihre Speere geschleudert; ihnen, den Maruts, nach (erheben sich) traun gleichsam lachende Blitze, erhebt sich selbst des Himmels Glanz.' *Rīshvāḥ* seems here, as in verse 13, to refer to the Maruts, as in IV, 19, 1, *rīshvám* refers to Indra, though it can be used of weapons also, see VI, 18, 10. As to the instrumentalis comitativus in *rukmaḥ* and *yudhā*, see Lanman, p. 335.

Note 2. Benfey's explanation of *gāghghatīh* is ingenious, though it leaves some difficulties. The writing of *ghgh* in Devanāgarī may have been meant for *ggh*, as in *akhhkhalī-kṛītya*, VII, 103, 3. But there remains the fact that *gaksh* occurs in the sense of laughing, I, 33, 7, and one does not see why it should have undergone a Prakritic change in our passage, and not there. It might be a mimetic word, to express the sound of rattling and clattering; cf. *gañganābhāvan*, VIII, 43, 8.

Verse 8.

Note 1. As to the adjective in the masculine gender after *sārdhas*, see I, 37, 1, note. The meaning of *rābhvas*, bold, rabid, is doubtful; see Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* II, 408.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Sāyana takes *Parushnī* as the name of one of the rivers of the Punjab, called the *Irāvati*, and at present the *Ravi*. *Parushnī* might mean speckled, muddy, as a synonym of *prīni*. Roth has suggested that *parushnī* might here mean cloud. But what is the meaning of *parushnī* in a similar passage, IV, 22, 2. (*Indrah*) *sriyē pārushnīm ushāmānah ūrnām yāsyāh pārvāni sakhyāya vivyē*? If it means that Indra clothed himself in speckled wool, that wool might be intended for what we call woolly or fleecy clouds. As the Maruts often perform the same acts as Indra, we might read in our verse *utā sma té pārushnis ūrnāh*, and pronounce *utā sma té pārushnia ūrnāh*, though Lanman, p. 395, objects to *ias* for *is* in the acc. plur. See, however, *hetīh ādevīh* in VIII, 61, 16. The instrumental singular is possible, but again unusual with *vas*, *pārushnyā ūrnā*. Possibly the original meaning of *parushnī* may have been forgotten, and if the name of the river *Parushnī* was generally known, it might easily have taken the place of *parushnī*, the cloud. For other explanations see Roth, *Über gewisse Kürzungen*, Wien, 1887; Bartholomae, in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, XXIX, 583; Schmidt, *Die Pluralbildungen der indogermanischen Neutra*, 1889, p. 307.

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Vishṭārāḥ* does not occur again, and Lanman is therefore quite justified in assigning to it the meaning of straw (p. 339). He paraphrases: 'Let their customs carry them where they may, yet when I sacrifice, they wait quietly on the straw, i.e. the altar, for it.' He reads in the Pada text *vi-stāré* for *vi-stārāḥ*. *Vishṭārīn*, which occurs AV. IV, 34, 1, does not throw much light on the exact meaning of *vishṭāra* in this place. If we retain *vishṭārāḥ*, the nominative, we must assign to it the meaning of crowd, and refer it to the Maruts.

Verse 11.

Note 1. *Pārāvata* is a turtle-dove (VS. XXIV, 25), and it is just possible that the Maruts might have been compared to them. But *pārāvata* is used in VIII, 100, 6, as an epithet of *vasu*, wealth, and in VIII, 34, 18, we read of *rātis* (not *rātris*), i.e. gifts of *Pārāvata*. The river *Sarasvatī* is called *pārāvataḡṇī*, killing *Pārāvata*, VI, 61, 2, and in the *Pañkav.* Br. IX, 4, 11, we hear that *Turasravas* and the *Pārāvatas* offered their *Somas* together. I am therefore inclined to take *Pārāvata*, lit. distant people, extranei, strangers, as a name of an Aryan border clan with whom the Vedic Aryas were sometimes at war, sometimes at peace. In that case the frontier-river, the *Sarasvatī*, might be called the destroyer or enemy of the *Pārāvatas*. As their wealth and gifts have been mentioned, to compare the Maruts with the *Pārāvatas* may mean no more than that the Maruts also are rich and generous. Ludwig thinks of the *Παρυῆται*, which seems more doubtful. For a different interpretation see Delbrück, *Syntax*, p. 531.

Verse 12.

Note 1. I take *khandaḥstúbh* in the sense of stepping (according to) a measure, as explained in my Preface (1st ed.), p. cii, though I do not doubt that that meaning was afterwards forgotten, and replaced by the technical meaning of *stubh*, to shout. See Böhtlingk-Roth, s.v. *stubh*, and

stobhagrantha, Sâma-veda, Bibl. Ind., II, p. 519. It can hardly be supposed that such artificial performances of Vedic hymns, as are preserved in the Sâma-veda, could have suggested the first names of the ancient metres.

Note 2. Kubhanyú can only be derived from bhan, to shout.

Note 3. The *kirīṇah* are probably intended here for strolling minstrels who, when they approached the well of a village (here the cloud), might be taken either for friends or foes.

Note 4. *Drīśī* tvishé. Grassmann translates: 'Wie Räuberbanden schienen sie geschart zum Andrang meinem Blick.' Ludwig better: 'Helfer waren sie, glanz zu sehn.' We must either read *drīśé* tvishé, to see the light, or *drīśé* tvishī, to be seen by light. See, however, P. G., Ved. Stud. p. 225.

Verse 13.

Note 1. Vedhas, wise. The different possible meanings of this word have been discussed by Ludwig, Z.D.M.G. XL, p. 716; and by Bartholomae, in Kuhn's Zeitschrift, XXVII, p. 361.

Verse 14.

Note 1. On *dānā*, see Lanman, pp. 533, 335; P. G., Ved. Stud. p. 101.

Note 2. *Dhrishṇavaḥ* ógasā to be read - ॐ - ॐ - ॐ.

Verse 15.

This verse, as Roth says, is very obscure, and the translation is purely tentative. Grassmann derives *vak-shánā* from *vah* in the sense of an offering. It may more easily be derived from *vaksh*, i.e. what gives increase, and be taken as an instrumental. Pischel shows that in many passages *vakshanā* in the plural has the meaning of *yoni*, also of the *yoni* on the altar. But even this meaning does not throw much light on our passage. The first *pāda* may possibly be taken in an interrogative and conditional sense, or we may translate: 'Now, having perceived them, may he, as a refreshing draught goes to the gods, come

together with the Maruts for his reward.' Whatever the verse may mean, *eshâm devân* cannot mean the gods of the Maruts, or prove the existence of idols, as Bollensen (Z. D. M. G. XXII, 587) and even Muir (S. T. V, 454) imagined. The translation of Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 101, *sûr(bhi) aṅgibhi* mit 'Herren, die schmieren, d. h. ordentlich bezahlen,' seems too exclusively German. Could *aṅgin* be an adjective, in the sense of possessed of *aṅgis*?

Verse 16.

Note 1. If *sîkvas* is not to be derived from *sak* (see Hübschmann, *Vocalsystem*, pp. 64, 186), we should have to derive *nis*, night, from a root altogether different from that which yields *nakt*, *nákta*, &c. But how does *sîkvas* come to mean, according to Ludwig, both bunch of flowers, and flaming? Does he connect it with *sikhâ*? Surely, if *siksh* may stand for *sirak-s*, why not *sik-vas* for **sirisak-vas*? 'Bright' leaves it doubtful whether it means clever or flaming.

Verse 17.

Note 1. The seven, seven heroes need not be the Maruts, but some liberal patrons who rewarded *Syâvârva*. See Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* II, 371.

MANDALA V, HYMN 53.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 11-13.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Who knows their birth? or who was of yore in the favour of the Maruts, when they harnessed the spotted deer¹?

2. Who has heard them when they had mounted their chariots, how they went forth? For the sake of what liberal giver (Sudâs) did they run, and their comrades followed¹, (as) streams of rain (filled) with food?

3. They themselves said to me when day by day¹ they came to the feast with their birds²: they (the Maruts) are manly youths and blameless; seeing them, praise them thus;

4. They who shine by themselves in their ornaments¹, their daggers, their garlands, their golden chains, their rings, going² on their chariots and on dry land.

5. O Maruts, givers of quickening rain, I am made to rejoice, following after your chariots, as after days¹ going with rain.

6. The bucket which the bounteous heroes shook down from heaven for their worshipper, that cloud they send¹ along heaven and earth, and showers follow on the dry land.

7. The rivers having pierced¹ the air with a rush of water, went forth like milk-cows; when your spotted deer roll about² like horses that have hasted to the resting-place on their road.

8. Come hither, O Maruts, from heaven, from the sky, even from near¹; do not go far away!

9. Let not the Rasâ, the Anitabhâ, the Kubhâ, the Krumu, let not the Sindhu delay you ! Let not the marshy Sarayu prevent you ! May your favour be with us alone !

10. The showers come forth after the host of your chariots, after the terrible Marut-host of the ever-youthful heroes ¹.

11. Let us then follow with our praises and our prayers each host of yours, each troop, each company ¹.

12. To what well-born generous worshipper have the Maruts gone to-day on that march,

13. On which you bring to kith and kin the never-failing seed of corn ? Give us that for which we ask you, wealth and everlasting happiness !

14. Let us safely pass through our revilers, leaving behind the unspeakable and the enemies. Let us be with you when in the morning ¹ you shower down health, wealth ², water, and medicine, O Maruts !

15. That mortal, O men, O Maruts, whom you protect, may well be always beloved by the gods, and rich in valiant offspring. May we be such !

16. Praise the liberal Maruts, and may they delight on the path of this man here who praises them, like cows in fodder. When they go, call after them as for old friends, praise them who love you, with your song !

NOTES.

Ascribed to *Syāvāsva Ātreya*. Metre, 1, 5, 10, 11, 15 *Kakubh*; 2 *Bṛīhati*; 3 *Anuṣṭubh*; 4 *Pura-ushnih*; 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16 *Satobṛīhati*; 8, 12 *Gāyatrī*. No verse of this hymn occurs in *SV.*, *VS.*, *AV.*; the sixth verse is found in *TS. II*, 4, 8, 1; *MS. II*, 4, 7; *Kāthaka XI*, 9.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Kilāṣi*, as fem. of *kilāsa*, does not occur again. It seems to have meant spotted or marked with pocks, and would be intended for the *prīshatis*. Does *Kailāsa* come from the same source?

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Kāsmāi sasruḥ* is much the same as *kāsmāi adyā sūgātāya ... prā yayuḥ*, in verse 12. We must then begin a new sentence, *ānu āpāyaḥ*, their comrades after, namely *sasruḥ*. Thus we read in verse 10 *tām vaḥ sārđham ... ānu prā yanti vṛishtāyaḥ*, where the streams of rain are represented as the followers of the *Maruts*. We might also translate in our sentence: For what liberal giver did their comrades, the streams of rain with food follow after (the *Maruts*).

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Ūpa dyūbhiḥ* occurs again *VIII*, 40, 8, and seems to mean from day to day.

Note 2. The birds of the *Maruts*, probably of the same character as the birds of the *Asvins*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I translate *aṅgi* by ornament in general, not by paint or ointment, though that may have been its original meaning.

Note 2. On *srāya*, see *Pān. III*, 3, 24. *Dhānvasu* may possibly have been intended as governed by *svābhānavaḥ*, and not by *srāyāḥ*; see, however, *VIII*, 33, 6. *smāsrushu sritāḥ*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *dyāvah*, nom. plur., and *ráthān*, acc. plur., compare Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, p. 88. The text is doubtful, and may be a corruption of *vrishṭīh dyāvah yatīh* iva.

Verse 6.

Note 1. The *Taittirīyas*, TS. II, 4, 8, 1, read *pargányāh*; the *Maitreyas*, *prā pargányah śrigatām* and *yantu*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Tatridāná*, as *trid* occurs in the Veda in the *Parasmaipada* only, may be intended for a passive, bored, dug out, tapped. One would, however, expect in that case an instrumental, *marudbhih*, by whom they were brought forth.

Note 2. The words *ví yád vártanta enyāh* have received various explanations. Wilson translates: 'When the rivers rush in various directions.' *Sāyana* admits also another meaning: 'When the rivers grow.' Ludwig translates: 'Sich verteilend gehn die schimmernden auseinander.' Grassmann, very boldly: 'Wie Hengste träufelnd, wenn vom Wege heimgekehrt, sie zu den bunten Stuten gehn.' *Vi-vrit* seems, however, to have a very special meaning, namely, rolling on the ground, and this the spotted deer are here said to have done, like horses at the end of their journey. We read of the sacrificial horse, Sat. Br. XIII, 5, 1, 16. *sa yady ava vā gighred vi vā varteta, samriddho me yagñā iti ha vidyāt*; cf. XI, 2, 5, 3. In the TS. VII, 1, 19, 3, the commentator explains *vivartanam* by *nirgatya bhūmau viluṭhanam*, the rolling on the ground. The same meaning is applicable to *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, p. 66 (Childers), where the *Bhikkhus* are said to roll on the ground when they hear of Buddha's death; also to *Mahābh. III, 11953* (of a wild boar). The meaning therefore in our passage seems to be, when the deer roll on the ground, as horses are wont to do at the end of a journey.

Verse 8.

Note 1. *Amāt* corresponds here to *prithivī* in other places. Originally it may have meant from the home.

Verse 9.

This verse has often been discussed on account of the names of the rivers which it contains. Syāvārṣva had mentioned the Yamunā in 52, 17, and some interpreters have been inclined to give to parushnī in 52, 9 a geographical meaning, taking it for the river Ravi, instead of translating it by cloud. The geographical names are certainly interesting, but they have been discussed so often that I need not dwell on them here. (See M. M., India, p. 163.)

The Rasā, known to the Zoroastrians as the Razhā, was originally the name of a real river, but when the Āryas moved away from it into the Punjāb, it assumed a mythical character, and became a kind of Okeanos, surrounding the extreme limits of the world.

Anitabhā seems to be the name of a new river or part of a river. It can hardly be taken as an epithet of Rasā, as Ludwig suggests. Anitabhā, whose splendour has not departed (Ludwig), or, amitabhā, of endless splendour, would hardly be Vedic formations. (Chips, I, p. 157; Hibbert Lect., p. 207; India, pp. 166, 173, notes.)

Kubhā is the Κωφῆν or Κωφῆς of the Greeks, the Kabul river. The Krumu I take to be the Kurrum. (India, p. 177, note.)

The Sindhu is the Indus, though it is difficult to say which part of it, while the Sarayu has been supposed to be the Sarayū, the affluent of the Gaṅgā, but may also be a more general name for some more northern river in the Punjāb. (See Zimmer, Altindisches Leben, pp. 17 f., 45; Muir, S. T. II, p. xxv, note.)

Verse 10.

Note 1. Návyasīnām has been a puzzle to all interpreters. Sāyana seems to me to give the right interpretation, namely, nūtanānām. As from aṅgasā, instr. sing., straightway, aṅgasīna was formed, straightforward; from návyasā, instr. sing., anew, návyasīna seems to have been formed in the sense of new. Návyasīnām might then be a somewhat

irregular gen. plur., referring to *gaṇám mārutam*, the Marut-host of the young men; see V, 58, 1. Lanman (p. 515) takes it for a gen. plur. fem., but in that case it could not refer to *rāthānām*. Zimmer translates *endlos*, Bergaigne (II, 400) thinks of new or rejuvenescent mothers.

Verse 11.

Note 1. See III, 26, 6.

Verse 14.

Note 1. *Uśrī*, in the morning. Lanman (p. 427) proposes to read *uśhāri*, but the metre would be better preserved by reading *vṛishṭvī* as trisyllabic. The difficulty is the construction of the gerund *vṛishṭvī*, which refers to the Maruts, and *syāma sahā*, which refers to the sacrificers.

Note 2. On *sām yóh*, see I, 165, 4, note 2.

The metrical structure of this hymn is interesting. If we represent the foot of eight syllables by a, that of twelve by b, we find the following succession:

I {	1 a b a	II {	3 a a a a
	2 a a b a		4 b a a
III {	5 a a a	IV {	8 a a a
	6 b a b a		9 b a b a
	7 b a b a		12 a a a
V {	10 a b a	VI {	13 b a b a
	11 a b a		14 b a b a
		VII {	15 a b a
			16 b a b a

We find that I contains the question, II the answer, III description of rain, IV prayer and invitation, V praise of the companions, VI prayer, VII conclusion. Comp. Oldenberg's *Prolegomena*, p. 106 seq.

MANDALA V, HYMN 54.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 14-16.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. You have fashioned¹ this speech for the brilliant Marut-host which shakes the mountains : celebrate then the great manhood in honour of that host who praises the warm milk (of the sacrifice), and sacrifices on the height of heaven², whose glory is brilliant.

2. O Maruts, your powerful men (came) forth searching for water, invigorating, harnessing their horses, swarming around. When they aim with the lightning, Trita shouts, and the waters murmur, running around on their course.

3. These Maruts are men brilliant with lightning, they shoot with thunderbolts, they blaze with the wind, they shake the mountains, and suddenly, when wishing to give water¹, they whirl the hail ; they have thundering strength, they are robust, they are ever-powerful.

4. When you drive forth¹ the nights, O Rudras, the days, O powerful men, the sky, the mists, ye shakers, the plains, like ships, and the strongholds, O Maruts, you suffer nowhere.

5. That strength of yours, O Maruts, that greatness extended far as the sun extends its daily course, when you, like your deer on their march, went down to the (western) mountain with untouched splendour¹.

6. Your host, O Maruts, shone forth when, O sages, you strip, like a caterpillar, the waving tree¹.

Conduct then, O friends, our service ² to a good end, as the eye conducts the man in walking.

7. That man, O Maruts, is not overpowered, he is not killed, he does not fail, he does not shake, he does not drop, his goods do not perish, nor his protections, if you lead him rightly, whether he be a seer or a king.

8. The men with their steeds, like conquerors of clans, like Aryaman (Mitra and Varuna)¹, the Maruts, carrying waterskins², fill the well; when the strong ones roar, they moisten the earth with the juice of sweetness³.

9. When the Maruts come forth this earth bows, the heaven bows, the paths in the sky bow, and the cloud-mountains with their quickening rain.

10. When you rejoice at sunrise, O Maruts, toiling together¹, men of Svar (sun-light), men of Dyū (heaven), your horses never tire in running, and you quickly reach the end of your journey.

11. On your shoulders are the spears, on your feet rings, on your chests golden chains, O Maruts, on your chariot gems; fiery lightnings in your fists, and golden headbands tied round your heads¹.

12. O Maruts, you shake the red apple¹ from the firmament, whose splendour no enemy² can touch; the hamlets bowed when the Maruts blazed, and the pious people (the Maruts) intoned their far-reaching shout.

13. O wise Maruts, let us carry off¹ the wealth of food which you have bestowed on us; give us², O Maruts, such thousandfold wealth as never fails³, like the star Tishya⁴ from heaven!

14. O Maruts, you protect our wealth of excellent men, and the seer, clever in song; you give to

Bharata (the warrior)¹ a strong horse ², you make the king to be obeyed ³.

15. O you who are quickly ready to help, I implore you for wealth whereby we may overshadow all men, like the sky. O Maruts, be pleased with this word of mine, and let us speed by its speed over a hundred winters !

NOTES.

The same poet, *Syāvārva Ātreya*. Metre, 1-13, 15 *Gagati*; 14 *Trishṭubh*. None of the verses of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Anaga*, explained as a 2nd pers. plur. perf., referring to the same people who are addressed by *arkata*. It may be also the first person of the imperative; see Benfey, *Über die Entstehung der mit r anlautenden Personalendungen*, p. 5, note.

Note 2. Possibly the second line of this verse may refer to ceremonial technicalities. *Gharma* means heat and summer, but also the sacrificial vessel (*formus*) in which the milk is heated, and the warm milk itself. *Yagvan* can only mean sacrificing, and *diváh prishtha* is the back of heaven, the highest roof of heaven; see *triprishtha*. Thus we read, I, 115, 3. *haritah . . . diváh á prishthám asthuh*. See also I, 164, 10; 166, 5; III, 2, 12; IX, 36, 6; 66, 5; 69, 5; 83, 2; 86, 27. It would seem therefore as if the Maruts themselves were here represented as performing sacrificial acts in the highest heaven, praising the milk, that is, the rain, which they pour down from heaven to earth. Possibly the text is corrupt. If *yagyu* could have the same meaning as *prayagyu*, I should like to conjecture, *diváh á prishthám yágyave*. In IX, 61, 12. *índrāya yágyave* seems to mean 'to the chasing Indra.' See also *āyagi* (*erjagend*), obtaining. Might we conjecture *divá á prikshayāvane*? *Prikshayāma* occurs as a name; see also II, 34, 3.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Abdā*, wish to give water, is very doubtful. Both *abda* and *abdi*, in *abdimat*, mean cloud. The text seems corrupt.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The meaning of *vyag* is doubtful. It may simply mean to make visible.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The last words *ánasvadâm yát ní áyâtana girím* are difficult. *Sâyana* has an explanation ready, viz. when you throw down the cloud or the mountain which gives no water or which does not give up the horses carried off by the *Pañis*. Grassmann too is ready with an explanation: 'Als ihr unnahbar glänzend, Hirschen gleich, den Berg auf eurer Fahrt durchranntet, den kein Ross erreicht.' Ludwig: 'Als ihr nider gehn machtet den nicht vergängliches gebenden (d. i. die waszer; oder: die rosse verweigernden?) berg.'

Giri may be the cloud, and nothing could be more appropriate than that the *Maruts* should come down upon the cloud or go over it, in order to make it give up the rain. But *asvadâ* means 'giving horses,' and though rain-clouds may be compared to horses, it does not follow that *asva* by itself could mean rain. *Asvadâ* is used of the dawn, I, 113, 18, possibly as giving horses, that is, wealth, but possibly also, as bringing the horses to the morning sun. These horses start with the dawn or the sun in the morning, and they rest in the evening. The legend that *Agni* hid himself in an *Asvattha* tree (*Sâyana*, RV. I, 65, 1) may owe its origin to *asvattha*, i. e. horse-stable, having been a name of the West (K. Z. I, 467); cf. *tishtadgu*, at sunset. In X, 8, 3, the Dawns are called *ásvabudhnâh*, which may mean that they had their resting-place among the horses. The *Maruts*, more particularly, are said to dwell in the *Asvattha* tree, when *Indra* called them to his help against *Vṛitra*; cf. Sat. Brāhm. IV, 3, 3, 6; Pār. Grīhy. II, 15, 4. Possibly therefore, though I say no more, possibly the Dawn or the East might have been called *asvadâ*, the West *anasvadâ*, and in that case it might be said that the *Maruts* are of unsullied splendour, when they

go down to the western mountain. M. Bergaigne explains, 'La montagne qui ne donne pas, qui retient le cheval, le cheval mythique, soleil ou éclair.' My own impression, however, is that *anasvadâm* is an old mistake, though I cannot accept Ludwig's conjecture *a-nasva-dâm*. Why not *ánu svadhâm*, or *anasva-yâh*, moving without horses? cf. V, 42, 10.

Verse 6.

Note 1. This is, no doubt, a bold simile, but a very true one. In one night caterpillars will eat off the whole foliage of a tree, and in the same way a violent storm in the autumn will strip every leaf. *Arnasám* as an adjective, with the accent on the last syllable, does not occur again, but it can hardly mean anything but waving. If it will stand for the sea, we might translate, 'When you clear the waving sea (or air), as the caterpillar a tree.'

Note 2. *Arámati* seems here to mean service or obedience, not a person who is willing to serve.

Verse 8.

Note 1. To translate *aryamánah* by friends is unsatisfactory. Bergaigne takes it for Aryaman, Mitra, and Varuna, the three Aryamans, as we say the two Mitras, and points out that these three gods do send rain, in I, 79, 3; VII, 40, 4.

Note 2. It ought to be *kavandhína* as much as *kávandha*, V, 85, 3.

Note 3. *Mádhva ándhasá*; Grassmann, 'mit des Honigs Seim.'

Verse 10.

Note 1. *Sabharas* is evidently a recognised epithet of the Maruts, see VS. XVII, 81 and 84, but its meaning is doubtful. We have *visvábharasam*, IV, 1, 19, as an epithet of Agni, which does not help us much. If *bharas* means burden, *sabharas* may mean those who work together, companions, friends.

Verse 11.

Note 1. See Muir, S. T. V, p. 149. On *síprāḥ* &c., see II, 34, 3, note.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The red apple to be shaken from the firmament can only be the lightning. *Vi-dhû* is construed with two accusatives, as in III, 45, 4; V, 57, 3. Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 266.

Note 2. *Aryáḥ* cannot be a vocative, on account of the accent, nor a nominative on account of the context. There remains nothing but to take it as a genitive, and connect it with *agrībhīta*, though such a construction has few parallels, except perhaps in such sentences as *hávyaḥ karshanínám*, VI, 22, 1, &c. Possibly it may be intended as an epithet of the Maruts. Bergaigne (*Journ. As.* 1884, p. 190), 'au profit du pauvre.' Geldner (*Ved. Stud.* I, p. 148) proposes a very bold translation: 'The sacrificial nets are being contracted, when the Maruts rush on. The priests (*ritāyu*) roar their (as catching-net) extended shouting.' The sense is said to be that when the Maruts appear, all priests try to catch them by shouting. See, however, Oldenberg in *Gött. Gel. Anzeigen*, 1890, p. 414.

Verse 13.

Note 1. For *rathyāḥ*, see II, 24, 15. *rāyáḥ syāma rathyāḥ váyasvataḥ*; VI, 48, 9.

Note 2. *Rāranta*, 2nd pers. plur. imp. intens., but *Pada* has *raranta*. Why not *rarāta*?

Note 3. *Yukkkhati* has been compared by Kuhn (*K. Z.* III, 328) with *δύσκει*; but see Brugmann, *Grundriss*, I, pp. 110, 118.

Note 4. *Tishya* must be the name of a star, hardly, as *Sâyana* suggests, of the sun. It ought to be a star which does not set. See Weber, *Über alte iranische Sternnamen*, p. 14. Ludwig quotes from TS. II, 2, 10, 1 seq., an identification of *Tishya* with *Rudra*.

Verse 14.

Note 1. Grassmann marks this verse as late, Ludwig defends it. We must know what is meant by late before we decide. Bharata may mean simply a warrior, or a Bharata ; see Ludwig, III, 175-176 ; Oldenberg, Buddha (1st edition), p. 413.

Note 2. Árvantam vāgam, a horse, his strength. See Bergaigne, Rel. Véd. II, 405 ; Pischel, Ved. Stud. p. 46.

Note 3. Could srushámat here mean obedient ?

MANDALA V, HYMN 55.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 17-18.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. The chasing¹ Maruts with gleaming spears, the golden-breasted, have gained great strength, they move along on quick well-broken horses;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

2. You have yourselves, you know, acquired power; you shine bright and wide, you great ones. They have even measured the sky with their strength;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

3. The strong heroes, born together, and nourished together, have further grown to real beauty. They shine brilliantly like the rays of the sun;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

4. Your greatness, O Maruts, is to be honoured, it is to be yearned for like the sight of the sun. Place us also in immortality;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

5. O Maruts, you raise¹ the rain from the sea, and rain it down, O yeomen²! Your milch-cows, O destroyers³, are never destroyed;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

6. When you have joined the deer as horses¹ to the shafts, and have clothed yourselves in golden garments, then, O Maruts, you scatter all enemies;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

7. Not mountains, not rivers have kept you back, wherever you see, O Maruts, there you go. You

go even round heaven and earth ;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

8. Be it old, O Maruts, or be it new, be it spoken, O Vasus, or be it recited, you take cognisance of it all ;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

9. Have mercy on us, O Maruts, do not strike us, extend to us your manifold protection. Do remember the praise, the friendship ;—when they went in triumph, the chariots followed.

10. Lead us, O Maruts, towards greater wealth, and out of tribulations, when you have been praised. O worshipful Maruts, accept our offering, and let us be lords of treasures !

NOTES.

The same poet, Syāvārva Ātreya. Metre, 1-9 *Gagati*; 10 *Trishubh*. None of the verses occurs in SV., VS., AV. Verse 5 is found in TS. II, 4, 8, 2; MS. II, 4, 7. The refrain probably means that when the Maruts march in triumph, the chariots of their army, or the chariots of other gods, follow. The latter view is taken by Sāyana, TS. II, 4, 8, 2.

Verse 1.

Note 1. *Práyagyu*, generally explained by rushing forward, but in that sense hardly to be derived from *yag*, to sacrifice, may stand for an old Vedic form *prayakshyu*, changed into *prayagyu* by priests who had forgotten the root *yaksh*, and thought of nothing but sacrifices. This root *yaksh* has been identified by Grassmann with OHG. *jagôn* (venari, persequi), originally to rush after, to hunt, to try to injure or kill (cf. *mṛiganyávah*, X, 40, 4). This would explain most derivations from *yaksh*, not excepting the later *Yakshas*, and would yield an excellent sense for *prayakshyu*, as an epithet of the Maruts. See note to VII, 56, 16. Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 98, is satisfied with deriving *prayagyu* and *prishthaprayag* from the root *yag*, to sacrifice, and translates it by sacrificing, but in the sense of causing sacrifices to be offered.

Verse 5.

Note 1. The verb *irayatha* is transitive; see Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 54, and compare AV. IV, 27, 4. *apáh samudrád dívam úd vahanti*.

Note 2. I have translated *purishinaḥ* by yeomen, in the sense of cultivators of the land. I have followed Roth, who shows that *purisha* means soil, and that *purishin* is used for an occupier of the soil, a landlord. See K. Z. XXVI, p. 65.

Note 3. *Dasra*, powerful, a common epithet of the *Asvins*, seems here, when joined with *dasyanti*, to retain something

of its etymological meaning, which comes out clearly in *dâs*, to attack, unless it is derived from *dams*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. I prefer to translate here 'the deer as horses,' not 'the speckled horses.' See, however, II, 34, 4, and Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 226.

MANDALA V, HYMN 56.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 19-20.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. O Agni, on to the strong host (of the Maruts), bedecked with golden chains and ornaments¹. To-day I call the folk of the Maruts down from the light of heaven.

2. As thou (Agni) thinkest in thine heart, to the same object my wishes have gone. Strengthen thou these Maruts, terrible to behold, who have come nearest to thy invocations.

3. Like a bountiful lady¹, the earth comes towards us, staggering, yet rejoicing; for your onslaught, O Maruts, is vigorous, like a bear, and fearful, like a wild bull.

4. They who by their strength disperse wildly¹ like bulls, impatient of the yoke, they by their marches make the heavenly stone, the rocky mountain (cloud)² to shake.

5. Arise, for now I call with my hymns¹ the troop of these Maruts, grown strong together, the manifold, the incomparable, as if calling a drove of bulls.

6. Harness the red mares to the chariot, harness the ruddy horses to the chariots, harness the two bays, ready to drive in the yoke, most vehement to drive in the yoke.

7. And this red stallion too, loudly neighing, has been placed here, beautiful to behold; may it not cause you delay on your marches, O Maruts; spur him forth on your chariots.

8. We call towards us the glorious chariot of the Maruts, whereon there stands also Rodasi¹, carrying delightful gifts, among the Maruts.

9. I call hither this your host, brilliant on chariots, terrible and glorious; among which she, the well-born and fortunate, the bounteous lady, is also magnified among the Maruts.

NOTES.

The same poet and deity, though Agni is invoked in the first, possibly in the second verse also. Metre, 1, 2, 4-6, 8, 9 *Bṛīhatī*; 3, 7 *Satobṛīhatī*. None of the verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., MS.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Here again some interpreters of the Veda take *añgi* in the sense of paint, war-paint. It may be so, but the more general meaning of colours or ornament seems, as yet, safer.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The earth is frequently represented as trembling under the fury of the Maruts. Here she is first called *mīlūśmatī*, a curious compound which, in our verse, may possibly have a more special meaning. As the earth is not only struck down by the storm, but at the same time covered with water and fertilised, she is represented as struck down and staggering, but likewise as rejoicing, possibly, as drunk.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Vṛthā* means pell-mell, confusedly, wildly; see also Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* p. 115.

Note 2. *Āsmā svaryāḥ* seems to mean the thunderbolt like *vāgraḥ svaryāḥ* in I, 32, 2; 61, 6. See also V, 30, 8. In that case we should have to translate, 'they let the heavenly bolt fall down on the rocky mountain.' But *kyāvayati* is never used for the hurling of the thunderbolt, nor is it construed with two accusatives. It always means to shake what is firm, and we have therefore to translate, 'they shake the heavenly stone (the sky), the rocky mountain (the cloud).' *Parvata* and *giri* often occur together, as in I, 37, 7; VIII, 64, 5.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Stómaiḥ* may possibly refer to *sámukshitânām*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *Rodasī*, see before, I, 167, 3.

MANDALA V, HYMN 57.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 21-22.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. O Rudras, joined by Indra, friends on golden chariots, come hither for our welfare! This prayer from us is acceptable to you like the springs of heaven to a thirsty soul longing for water.

2. O you sons of *Prisni*, you are armed with daggers and spears, you are wise, carrying good bows and arrows and quivers, possessed of good horses and chariots. With your good weapons, O Maruts, you go to triumph!

3. You shake¹ the sky and the mountains (clouds) for wealth to the liberal giver; the forests bend down out of your way from fear². O sons of *Prisni*, you rouse the earth when you, O terrible ones, have harnessed the spotted deer for triumph!

4. The Maruts, blazing with the wind, clothed in rain, are as like one another as twins, and well adorned. They have tawny horses, and red horses, they are faultless, endowed with exceeding vigour; they are in greatness wide as the heaven.

5. Rich in rain-drops, well adorned, bounteous, terrible to behold, of inexhaustible wealth, noble by birth, golden-breasted, these singers of the sky¹ have obtained their immortal name².

6. Spears are on your two shoulders, in your arms are placed strength, power, and might. Manly thoughts dwell in your heads, on your chariots are weapons, and every beauty has been laid on your bodies.

7. O Maruts, you have given us wealth of cows, horses, chariots, and heroes, golden wealth! O men of Rudra, bestow on us great praise, and may I enjoy your divine protection!

8. Hark, O heroes, O Maruts! Be gracious to us! You who are of great bounty, immortal, righteous, truly listening to us, poets, young, dwelling on mighty mountains¹, and grown mighty.

NOTES.

The same poet and deity. Metre, 1-6 Gagatī; 7, 8 Trishūbh. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS.; verse 6 in MS. IV, 11, 4.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Dhû is construed with two accusatives, see RV. III, 45, 4; otherwise vâsu might be connected with dârúshe. The third pāda is almost literally repeated soon after, V, 60, 2; see note 1 to I, 37, 7.

Note 2. Yámanah bhiyá may be from fear of your approach.

Verse 5.

Note 1. In diváh arkáh even Bergaigne allows that arká may mean singer, not song.

Note 2. Náma, name, is here as elsewhere what is meant by the name, therefore immortal being or immortality.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Bríhadgirayah cannot well mean with a powerful voice. The Maruts are called girishṭha, VIII, 94, 12, dwelling on mountains, and like bríhaddiva, bríhadgiri seems to have been intended for dwelling on high mountains.

MANDALA V, HYMN 58.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 28.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. I praise¹ now the powerful company of these ever-young Maruts, who drive violently along with quick horses; aye, the sovereigns are lords of *Amṛita* (the immortal).

2. The terrible company, the powerful, adorned with quoits on their hands, given to roaring, potent, dispensing treasures, they who are beneficent, infinite in greatness, praise, O poet, these men of great wealth!

3. May your water-carriers come here to-day, all the Maruts who stir up the rain. That fire which has been lighted for you, O Maruts, accept it, O young singers!

4. O worshipful Maruts, you create for man an active king, fashioned by *Vibhvan*¹; from you comes the man who can fight with his fist, and is quick with his arm, from you the man with good horses and valiant heroes.

5. Like the spokes of a wheel, no one is last, like the days they are born on and on, not deficient in might. The very high sons of *Prisni* are full of fury, the Maruts cling firmly to their own will¹.

6. When you have come forth with your speckled deer as horses¹ on strong-fellied chariots, O Maruts, the waters gush, the forests go asunder²;—let *Dyu*³ (Sky) roar down, the bull of the Dawn.

7. At their approach, even the earth opened wide,

and they placed (sowed) their own¹ strength (the rain), as a husband the germ. Indeed they have harnessed the winds as horses to the yoke, and the men of Rudra have changed their sweat into rain.

8. Hark, O heroes, O Maruts! Be gracious to us! You who are of great bounty, immortal, righteous, truly listening to us, poets, young, dwelling on mighty mountains, and grown mighty.

NOTES.

The same poet and deity. Metre, Trishubh. None of the verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS. Verses 3 and 5 are found in TB. II, 5, 5, 3; II, 8, 5, 7; MS. IV, 11, 2; IV, 4, 18.

Verse 1.

Note 1. On *stushé*, see M. M., Selected Essays, I, p. 162; Wilhelm, De infinitivi forma et usu, p. 10; Bartholomae, in Bezzenberger's Beiträge, XV, p. 219. I take *stushé* as 1 pers. sing. Aor. Átm. (not, as Avery, of the Present) in many places where it has been taken as an infinitive. For instance, II, 31, 5; VI, 49, 1; 51, 3 (with *voke*); 62, 1 (with *huve*); VIII, 5, 4; 7, 32; 74, 1; 84, 1 (here the second *páda* must begin with *stushé*). It may be an indicative or a subjunctive. As to *stushe*, without an accent, its character cannot be doubtful; see I, 122, 8; 159, 1; V, 33, 6; VI, 21, 2; 48, 14; VIII, 21, 9; 23, 2; 23, 7 (*grine*). In II, 20, 4, *tám u stushe índram tám griníshe*, *griníshe* is an aorist with *vikarāṇa*, like *punishé*, I praise that Indra, I laud him. In I, 46, 1, *stushé* may be the infinitive, but not necessarily. It is an infinitive in I, 122, 7. *stushé sâ vâm varuna mitra rátih*, your gift, Varuna and Mitra, is to be praised. Likewise in VIII, 4, 17 (see BR. s. v. *sāman*); 24, 1; 63, 3, though in several of these passages it must remain doubtful whether *stushé* should be taken as an absolute infinitive, or as a finite verb. In VIII, 65, 5, *indra griníshe u stushé*, means, 'Indra, I laud and praise,' as in II, 20, 4.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Vibhva-tashá* is generally explained as made by a master, or by *Vibhvan*, one of the *R̥ibhus*. This may be so, though it seems a bold expression (see Bergaigne, II, 410-411). But may it not be a mere synonym of *sutashā*, and intended for *vibhvane tashā*? see Selected Essays, I, p. 143.

Verse 5.

Note 1. See Taitt. Br. II, 8, 5, 7. As to *mimikshuḥ*, see note to I, 165, 1.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On *prīshatībhiḥ āsvaiḥ*, see II, 34, 4; V, 55, 6. Bergaigne's note (II, p. 378) does not settle the question whether the horses of the Maruts were speckled, or whether they had speckled deer for their horses.

Note 2. On *rizaté vānāni*, see V, 57, 3.

Note 3. Dyaus, the father of the Maruts, the oldest and highest god of heaven, the strong bull, or, it may be, the man of the dawn. See v. Bradke, Dyaus Asura, p. 63; Bergaigne, I, p. 316.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Roth conjectures *svām* for *svām*, taking it as a locative of *sū*, genetrix. This is not without difficulties, nor is it necessary. That we find in the Rig-veda no other locative in *ām* after monosyllabic stems in *ū* is perhaps no serious objection. But the text as it stands can be translated, 'as a husband the germ, they have placed (sown) their own strength.' *Sāvas* is the same as *vrīshnyam* and *vrīshni sāvaḥ* in VIII, 3, 8; 10. *Dhuḥ* is used like *dhā* in *retodhā*.

MANDALA V, HYMN 59.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 24.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. They truly¹ tried to make you grant them welfare. Do thou sing² praises to Heaven (Dyu), I offer sacrifice (*rita*) to the Earth. The Maruts wash their horses and race to the air, they soften their splendour by waving mists.

2. The earth trembles with fear from their onset. She sways like a full ship, that goes rolling¹. The heroes who appear on their marches, visible from afar, strive together within the great (sacrificial) assembly².

3. Your horn is exalted for glory¹, as the horns of cows; your eye is like the sun², when the mist is scattered. Like strong racers, you are beautiful, O heroes, you think of glory, like manly youths³.

4. Who could reach, O Maruts, the great wise thoughts, who the great manly deeds of you, great ones? You shake the earth like a speck of dust, when you are carried forth for granting welfare.

5. These kinsmen¹ (the Maruts) are like red horses, like heroes eager for battle, and they have rushed forward to fight. They are like well-grown manly youths, and the men have grown strong, with streams of rain they dim the eye of the sun.

6. At their outbreak there is none among them who is the eldest, or the youngest, or the middle: they have grown by their own might, these sons of *Prisni*, noble by birth, the boys of Dyaus; come hither to us!

7. Those who like birds flew with strength in rows¹ from the ridge of the mighty heaven to its ends, their horses shook the springs² of the mountain (cloud) so that people on both sides³ knew it.

8. May¹ Dyaus Aditi (the unbounded)² roar for our feast, may the dew-lighted Dawns come striving together; these, the Maruts, O poet, (the sons) of Rudra, have shaken the heavenly bucket (cloud), when they had been praised.

NOTES.

The same poet and deity. Metre, 1-7 Gagati; 8 Tri-shūbh. None of the verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TB., TS., MS.

Verse 1.

Note 1. If we accept the text as it stands, we have to translate, 'The spy called out to you to grant welfare.' The spy is then either Agni (Bergaigne, II, p. 378) or the priest. See also VIII, 61, 15; X, 35, 8. But there are many objections to this. Pra-krand is not used in that sense, and we should expect pra krānt suvitāya. Pra-kar, when it is construed with a dative, means generally to prepare some one for something, to cause some one to do a thing. Thus, I, 186, 10. *pró asvínau ávase krínudhvam*, get the Asvins to protect. VI, 21, 9. *prá útāye várunam mitráṁ índram marútaḥ kríshva ávase naḥ adyá*, make Varuna, Mitra, and Indra to protect, make the Maruts to protect us to-day. X, 64, 7. *prá vaḥ vāyúm—stómaiḥ krínudhvam sakhyāya pūshānam*, make Vāyu by your praises to be your friend. I, 112, 8. *prá andhām sronām kákshase étave krítháḥ*, whereby you make the blind and lame to see and to walk. The poet therefore seems to have said in our verse also, 'They (my men or priests) made you or wished you to give them welfare.' What *spaṭ* can mean in such a sentence, is difficult to say. Till we know better, we must simply accept it as a particle of asseveration, like *baṭ*.

Note 2. *Árkā* may also be the first person.

Verse 2.

Note 1. With regard to *vyáthir yatí*, cf. I, 117, 15. *samudráṁ avyathír gaganván*, and VIII, 45, 19. *vyáthir gaganvámsaḥ*; Bergaigne, Journ. As. 1884, p. 490.

Note 2. *Mahé vidátḥ* must be taken as a locative sing. It occurs again X, 96, 1. We have similar forms in *maḥé ráne*, IX, 66, 13, &c. The locative is governed by *antáḥ*,

as in II, 27, 8. *vidáthe antáh eshám*. The etymology and the meaning of *vidatha* have been often discussed, for the last time by M. Regnaud, *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 1890. Prof. Roth, as M. Regnaud states, explains it by conseil, avis, réunion où l'on délibère, assemblée, troupe, armée. Grassmann takes it generally for réunion, rencontre, combat. Geldner derives it from *vid*, in the sense of art, science. Ludwig derives it likewise from *vid*, but in the sense of Bekanntschaft, then Gesellschaft, and lastly as synonymous with *yagña*, sacrifice, assemblage. M. Regnaud differs from all his predecessors, and derives *vidatha* from *vidh*, to sacrifice. He maintains that **vidhatha* would become *vidatha*, like *adhak* from *dah* or *dhagh*, and *phaliga* for *parigha*. I know nothing about the etymology of *phaliga*, but if it stands for *parigha*, the second aspirate has lost its aspiration and thrown it on the initial. In *adhak*, the final has lost its aspiration, and thus allowed its appearance in the initial. But in *vidatha*, if it stood for *vidhatha*, there would be no phonetic excuse whatever for changing *dh* into *d*, at least in Sanskrit. It is possible that in Sanskrit such a form as *vidhatha* might have been avoided, but there is no phonetic law to prevent the formation of such a word as *vidhatha*, like *ukátha*, *yagatha*, &c. We say *vidhatha* in the 2 pers. plur., as we say *bodhatha*. No Sanskrit grammarian could derive *vidatha* from *vidh*. If therefore *vidatha* signifies sacrifice, this is not because it is derived from *vidh*, to sacrifice. *Vidatha* may have been the name of a sacred act, as *veda* is of sacred knowledge. But the fact remains that it is best translated by assembly, particularly an assembly for sacrificial purposes.

Verse 3.

Note 1. On *sriyáse*, see I, 87, 6.

Note 2. I see no necessity for changing *sûrya* into *sûra*, see Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, p. 94. He would translate, 'they are like the eye of the sun.'

Note 3. *Máryâ* may be bridegrooms, as in V, 60, 4

(*varāh iva*), but there is nothing to indicate that meaning here. The difficulty is to find a word to express *sriyāse*. It means to shine, but at the same time to excel. Possibly it may have even a more definite meaning, such as to shine in battle, or to triumph.

Verse 5.

Note 1. As to *sabandhu*, see VIII, 20, 21.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *srénih*, see Gaedicke, p. 164; Bergaigne, *Mél. Renier*, p. 94.

Note 2. The meaning of *nabhanú*, spring, is doubtful.

Note 3. *Ubháye* refers to many on both sides, and cannot be taken for *ubhe*, heaven and earth. It may mean all, particularly when there are two sides only, as in a battle.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Ludwig seems to have seen the true meaning of this verse, namely that, though *Dyaus* may roar for the feast, and though the Dawns may strive to come near, the *Maruts* alone deserve the sacrifice, because they opened the chest of rain.

Note 2. On *Dyaus Aditi*, see note to I, 166, 12, p. 261, where the translation has to be corrected.

MANDALA V, HYMN 60.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 25.

TO AGNI AND THE MARUTS.

1. I implore¹ Agni, the gracious, with salutations, may he sit down here, and gather what we have made². I offer³ (him sacrifice) as with racing chariots; may I, turning to the right, accomplish this hymn to the Maruts.

2. Those who approached on their glorious deer, on their easy chariots, the Rudras, the Maruts,—through fear of you, ye terrible ones, the forests even bend down, the earth shakes, and also the mountain (cloud).

3. At your shouting, even the mountain (cloud), grown large, fears, and the ridge of heaven trembles. When you play together, O Maruts, armed with spears, you run together like waters.

4. Like rich suitors the Maruts have themselves¹ adorned their bodies with golden ornaments; more glorious for glory², and powerful on their chariots, they have brought together splendours on their bodies.

5. As brothers, no one being the eldest or the youngest, they have grown up together to happiness. Young is their clever father Rudra, flowing with plenty is *Prīṣni* (their mother), always kind to the Maruts.

6. O happy Maruts, whether you are in the highest, or in the middle, or in the lowest heaven, from thence, O Rudras, or thou also, O Agni, take notice of this libation which we offer.

7. When Agni, and you, wealthy Maruts, drive down from the higher heaven over the ridges, give then, if pleased, you roarers, O destroyers of enemies¹, wealth to the sacrificer who prepares (Soma-juice).

8. Agni, be pleased to drink Soma with the brilliant Maruts, the singers, approaching in companies¹, with the men (Āyus²), who brighten and enliven everything; do this, O Vaisvânara (Agni), thou who art always endowed with splendour.

NOTES.

This hymn, by the same poet, is supposed to be addressed either to the Maruts alone, or to the Maruts and Agni. The same might have been said of hymn 56 and others which are used for the Âgnimâruta Sastra. See Bergaigne, *Recherches sur l'histoire de la liturgie védique*, p. 38. Metre, 1-6 Trishubh ; 7, 8 Gagatî. No verse of this hymn occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., except verse 1 in AV. VII, 50, 3 ; TB. II, 7, 12, 4 ; MS. IV, 14, 11 ; verse 3 in TS. III, 1, 11, 5 ; MS. IV, 12, 5 ; verse 6 in TB. II, 7, 12, 4.

Verse 1.

The AV. reads svâvasum, prasaktó, pradakshinám, all of them inferior readings. The TB. agrees with RV., except that it seems to read prasapták (prakarshena samâgatah).

Note 1. That *îd* or *îd* has originally the meaning of imploring, asking, begging, we see from such passages as RV. III, 48, 3. upasthâya mâtâram ánnam aîta, 'he, having approached his mother, asked for food,' unless we prefer to construe *îd* with two accusatives, 'he, having approached, asked his mother for food.' The same verb is also construed with the accusative of the god implored, the dative of the object, and the instrumental of the means by which he is implored. See RV. VIII, 71, 14. agním îishva ávase gáthâbhih, implore Agni with songs for his protection. Whether the root *îd* is distantly connected with either *ish*, to desire (Brugmann, I, 591), or with *ard*, to stir, or with *ar*, to go, is a question which admits of many, or of no answer.

Note 2. *Viki* *krítam* seems to have the settled meaning of gathering in what one has made at play, or in battle ; see X, 42, 9 ; 43, 5 ; IX, 97, 58 ; X, 102, 2. The same meaning is applicable here, though we may also translate, 'Take notice of our *kríta* or our *karma*, i. e. the sacrifice.' A similar thought is expressed in verse 6. Sâyaṇa explains *vigânâtu* and *vikinuyât*.

Note 3. Perhaps *prá bhare* means, 'I am carried forth,' as in V, 59, 4, where it is applied to the Maruts.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See note 2 to I, 6, 4. Instead of *svadhābhiḥ* we have *svayām* in VII, 56, 11.

Note 2. *Sriyé sréyāmsaḥ* is difficult to translate ; cf. II, 33, 3. *sréshthaḥ sriyá asi*. Ludwig translates, zu herlichkeit die herlichen.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *risâdas*, see Aufrecht, Bezenb. Beitr. XIV, p. 32.

Verse 8.

Note 1. On *ganasrî*, see BR. s. v. ; Lanman, 372 ; Benfey, *Vedica und Verwandtes*, p. 108 ; Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* I, 53 seq. Ludwig translates *scharenherlich*, but what does that mean ? 'Shining in their companies' is a possible meaning, but the analogy of *abhisrî* and *adhvarasrî* points in another direction.

Note 2. On the *Âyus* as a proper name, see Bergaigne, *Rel. Véd.* I, 62 ; II, 323.

MANDALA V, HYMN 61.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 26-29.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Who are you, O men, the very best, who have approached one by one, from the furthest distance¹?

2. Where are your horses, where the bridles? How could you, how did you come?—the seat on the back, the rein in the nostrils?

3. Their goad is on the croup¹, the heroes stretched their legs apart². . .

4. Move along, heroes, young men, the sons of an excellent mother¹, so that you may warm yourselves at our fire².

5. (1.) May the woman, if she stretched out her arm¹ as a rest for the hero, praised by Syâvâsva², gain cattle consisting of horses, cows, and a hundred sheep.

6. (2.) Many a woman is even more often kindlier than a godless and miserly man,

7. (3.) A woman who finds out the weak, the thirsty, the needy, and is mindful of the gods.

8. (4.) Even though many an unpraiseworthy miser (Pāṇi) is called a man, she is worth as much in weregild.

9. (5.) Also the young woman joyfully whispered to me, to Syâva, the road,—and the two bays went straight to Purumī/za¹, the wise, the far-famed,

10. (6.) Who gave me a hundred cows, like Vaidadasvi, like Taranta, in magnificence.

11. (1.) The Maruts, who drive on their quick horses, drinking the delightful mead, have gained glory here;

12. (2.) They on whose chariots Rodas¹ glitters in glory², like the golden disk above in heaven ;

13. (3.) That youthful company of the Maruts, with blazing chariots, blameless, triumphant, irresistible.

14. (4.) Who now knows of them where the strikers rejoice, the well-born, the faultless ?

15. (5.) You who are fond of praise, become the leaders of the mortal, listening to his imploring invocations, thus is my thought¹.

16. (6.) Bring then to us delightful and resplendent¹ treasures, ye worshipful Maruts, destroyers of enemies.

17. (1.) O night, like a charioteer, carry away this hymn to Dârbhya, and these songs, O goddess.

18. (2.) And then tell him thus from me, 'When Rathavîti offers Soma, my desire never goes away from me.'

19. (3.) That mighty Rathavîti dwells among people rich in cattle¹, retired among the mountains.

NOTES.

This hymn is of a very composite nature. It is addressed to the Maruts by Syāvâsya. According to the Anukramanî, however, the Maruts are addressed in vv. 1-4, 11-16 only; vv. 5-8 are addressed to Sasîyasî Tarantamahishî, 9 to Purumîlha Vaidadarvi, 10 to Taranta Vaidadarvi, 17-19 to Rathavîti Dârbhya. None of the verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS. Metre, 1-4, 6-8, 10-19 Gâyatri; 5 Anushûbh; 9 Satobṛihatî.

It has been pointed out that in the hymns addressed to the Maruts beginning with V, 52, and ending with V, 60, there is the usual decrease in the number of verses of each successive hymn, viz. 17, 16, 15, 10, 9, 8, 8, 8, 8. Our hymn, however, which is the last in the collection of hymns addressed by Syāvâsya to the Maruts, breaks the rule, and it has been suggested with great plausibility that it contains a number of verses thrown together at random. Possibly the four verses in the beginning formed an independent hymn, addressed to the Maruts, and again 5-10, and 11-16, followed by an appendix, 17-19. These verses refer to a legend which will have to be discussed at verse 5.

Verse 1.

Note 1. As to paramâsyâḥ parāvâtaḥ, see TS. IV, 1, 9, 3, where we also find (IV, 1, 9, 2) pârasyâ âdhi samvâtaḥ.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Gaghâne, like gaghanataḥ, may mean simply behind, as agre and agrataḥ mean before.

Note 2. It is clear that the Maruts are here supposed to sit astride on their horses. This is also shown by prishthé sâdas (v. 2), and by putrakrîthé ná gânyah, they stretched out their legs, ὡς γυναῖκες ἐν τεκνοποιῶν. Zimmer (p. 230) says, 'Zum Reiten wurde das Ross nicht benutzt.' On p. 295 he modifies this by saying, 'Keine einzige klare Stelle des Rigveda ist mir bekannt, wo das Reiten beim Kampfe erwähnt würde; man fährt immer zu Wagen, wie die Griechen in homerischen Zeiten.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. Bhádragānaya^h, generally rendered by 'possessed of beautiful wives,' seems really to mean 'possessed of an excellent mother.' Gāni clearly means mother, when Agni dvimâtā, having two mothers, is called dvigāni^h; for it is never said that he has two wives. Besides, the Maruts are constantly addressed as the sons of their mother, *Prisni*, while their wives are mentioned but rarely. However, the other meaning is not impossible. See also Bergaigne, II, 387 seq.

Note 2. The fire here intended is, I suppose, the sacrificial fire, to which the Maruts are here invited as they had been in former hymns.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Ludwig compares the A. S. expression *healsgebedde*; see also RV. X, 10, 10.

Note 2. I have very little belief in the legends which are told in the *Brāhmaṇas* and in the *Anukramanī* in illustration of certain apparently personal and historical allusions in the hymns of the Veda. It is clear in many cases that they are made up from indications contained in the hymns, as in IX, 58, 3, and it seems best therefore to forget them altogether in interpreting the words of the Vedic hymns.

The story told in the introductory verses, quoted by Sāyana, is this:—'Arkaṇānas Ātreya was chosen by Rathavīti Dārbhya to be his *Ritvig* priest. At the sacrifice Arkaṇānas saw the daughter of Rathavīti and asked her in marriage for his son Syāvāsva. Rathavīti consulted his wife, but she declined on the ground that no daughter of theirs had ever been given to a man who was not a poet (*Rishi*). Thereupon Syāvāsva performed penance, and travelled about collecting alms. He thus came to Saśiyasī, who recommended him, as a *Rishi*, to her husband, king Taranta. King Taranta was very generous to him, and sent him on to his younger brother, Purumīlla. On his way to Purumīlla, Syāvāsva saw the Maruts, and composed a hymn in their praise (vv. 11–16). He had thus become a real poet or *Rishi*, and on returning home, he received from Rathavīti his daughter in marriage.'

Saunaka confirms the same story, see Sâyana's commentary to V, 61, 17. Here therefore we have to deal with two princely brothers, both Vaidadarvis, namely Taranta and Purumilla. They both give presents to Syâvârva, who is a Brâhmana, and he marries the daughter of another prince, Rathavîti Dârbhya.

In the Tândya-Brâhmana, however, XIII, 7, 12, another story is told, which I quoted in my edition of the Rig-veda at IX, 58, 3 (vol. v, p. xxxiii). Here Dhvasra and Purushanti are introduced as wishing to give presents to the two Vaidadarvis, Taranta and Purumilla. These hesitate for a while, because they have no right to accept a present without deserving it or having done something for it. They then compose a hymn in praise of Dhvasra and Purushanti, and after that feel justified in accepting their present.

Here therefore the Vaidadarvis are receivers, not givers of presents, therefore of princely, not, as has been supposed, of priestly rank, and this would agree better with the words of verse 9, purumillâya viprâya. See on all this Oldenberg in Z. D. M. G. XLII, p. 232.

If we accept this story, we have to take sâsiyasî in verse 6 as a proper name.

But sâsiyasî may be a comparative of sas-vat (see B.-R. s.v.), and would then mean, more frequent. We expect, no doubt, an adverb rather like sasvat, but a feminine corresponding to vâsiyasî is perhaps admissible. In that case we should have simply to deal with some woman, tvâ strî, who, as the poet says, is as good as, if not better than, many a man.

Verse 8.

This verse is very obscure. Sâyana translates: 'And the other half (the husband of Sâsiyasî, viz. Taranta) is a man not praised (enough), thus I, the poet, say: and that Taranta is equal or just in the giving of wealth.' Grassmann translates: 'Und dagegen ist mancher nicht lobenswerth geizig, der ein Mann sich nennt, ein solcher ist der Strafe verfallen.' Ludwig: 'Auch mancher halbmensch,

ungepriesen, der "mensch" zwar heisst, doch ein *Pani* ist, der ist auf böse gabe nur bedacht.'

The first light that was thrown on this verse came from Prof. Roth. He showed (Z. D. M. G. XLI, p. 673) that *vairadeya* means *weregild*, the German *wergelt*, the price to be given for a man killed. *Vaira* would here be derived from *vira*, man, the Goth. *waír*, the Latin *vir*, and *vairadeya* would mean what is to be given as the value of a man. Still I doubt whether Prof. Roth has discovered the true meaning of the verse. He translates: 'So ist auch mancher Mann nicht zu loben, mehr ein *Pani* (unfromm, gegen die Götter karg, zugleich Bezeichnung habstüchtiger Dämonen), obschon man ihn einen Menschen nennt—nur am Wergeld steht er den andern gleich.' I confess I do not see much point in this. It is quite clear that the poet praises a charitable woman, and wishes to say that she is sometimes better than a man, if he gives nothing. Now the *weregild*, if we may say so, for women was generally, though not always, less than that for men, and I therefore propose to read *sá vaíradeye ít samá*, and translate: 'Even though many an unpraiseworthy miser (*Pani*) is called man, she is like him in *weregild*, i.e. she is worth as much, even though she is a woman.' On *uta*, see Delbrück, *Syntaktische Forschungen*, V, p. 528.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Purumi/ha* is here clearly the man from whom benefits are expected, and therefore could not be the same as *Purumi/ha Vaidadarvi*, mentioned by the commentator, who accepted gifts from *Dhvasra* and *Purushanti*. Nor can *Taranta Vaidadarvi* in the next verse be taken for a recipient, but only for a giver, and therefore, most likely, a prince. The whole story, however, is by no means clear, and I doubt whether the commentator drew his information from any source except his own brain.

Verse 11.

I agree with Ludwig that a new hymn begins with verse 11.

Verse 12.

Note 1. I have adopted the reading Rodasī vibhrāgate in my translation; cf. VI, 66, 6, where Rodasī is compared with a rōkaḥ.

Note 2. Roth (K. Z. XXVI, 51) takes sriyādhi as sriyās adhi, but such a sandhi has not yet been established in the hymns of the Rig-veda, see Oldenberg, Proleg. p. 459, Anm. 1. Oldenberg himself suggests sriyó-dhi, and would translate, 'They whose charms shine over the two worlds on their chariots.' Pischel (Ved. Stud. p. 54) translates yéshām sriyā by 'for whose sake.'

Verse 15.

Note 1. On itthā dhiyā, see Pischel, Ved. Stud. p. 184.

Verse 16.

Note 1. The Pada ought to have puru-kandrá, as suggested by Grassmann and Ludwig.

Verses 17-19.

These verses are very peculiar, and may refer to historical events, for Dālbhya or Dārbhya and Rathavīti sound like real names. Of course the Indian commentators are never at a loss to tell us what it all refers to, but we can never say how little they knew, and how much they invented. The invocation of Ūrmyā, if it is meant for the Night, and the request that she may convey the hymn to Dārbhya, is different from the usual style of the hymns. See, however, VIII, 24, 28, and Oldenberg, Z. D. M. G. XXXIX, 89.

The following names, occurring in our hymn, have the sanction of the Anukramanī: Sasīyasi Tarantamahishī (V, 61, 5; 8), Purumīḥa Vaidadarvi (V, 61, 9), Taranta Vaidadarvi (V, 61, 10), Rathavīti Dālbhya (V, 61, 17-19). There is another Purumīḥa, a Sauhotra, in IV, 43, and a Purumīḥa Āngirasa in VIII, 71.

Verse 19.

Note 1. See Oldenberg, Z. D. M. G. XXXIX, 89. He corrects gómatīḥ to gómatīm, the name of a river, mentioned in a very similar way in VIII, 24, 30.

MANDALA V, HYMN 87.

ASHTAKA IV, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 33-34.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Let your voice-born¹ prayers go forth to the great Vishṇu, accompanied by the Maruts, Evayāmarut, and to the chasing host, adorned with good rings, the strong, in their jubilant throng, to the shouting power (of the Maruts).

2. O Maruts, you who are born great, and proclaim it yourselves by knowledge, Evayāmarut, that power of yours cannot be approached by wisdom, that (power) of theirs (cannot be approached) by gift or might¹; they are like unapproachable mountains.

3. They who are heard with their voice from the high heaven, the brilliant and strong, Evayāmarut, in whose council no tyrant¹ reigns, the rushing chariots² of these roaring Maruts come forth³, like fires with their own lightning.

4. The wide-striding (Vishṇu)¹ strode forth from the great common seat, Evayāmarut. When he has started by himself from his own place along the ridges, O ye striving, mighty² Maruts, he goes together with the heroes (the Maruts), conferring blessings.

5. Impetuous, like your own shout, the strong one (Vishṇu) made everything tremble, the terrible, the wanderer¹, the mighty, Evayāmarut; strong with him you advanced self-luminous, with firm reins, golden coloured, well-armed², speeding along.

6. Your greatness is infinite, ye Maruts, endowed

with full power, may that terrible power help, Evayâmarut. In your raid¹ you are indeed to be seen as charioteers ; deliver us therefore from the enemy, like shining fires.

7. May then these Rudras, lively like fires and with vigorous shine, help, Evayâmarut. The seat of the earth is stretched out far and wide¹, when the hosts of these faultless Maruts come quickly to the races.

8. Come kindly on your path, O Maruts, listen to the call of him who praises you, Evayâmarut. Confidants of the great Vishṇu, may you together, like charioteers, keep all hateful things far¹, by your wonderful skill.

9. Come zealously¹ to our sacrifice, ye worshipful, hear our guileless call, Evayâmarut. Like the oldest mountains in the sky, O wise guardians, prove yourselves for him irresistible to the enemy.

NOTES.

This hymn is evidently a later addition at the end of the fifth *Mandala*. It is addressed to the Maruts, and is ascribed to Evayāmarut Ātreya. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS., except the first, which is found in SV. I, 462. Metre, Atigagati.

The name of the poet is due to the refrain Evayāmarut which occurs in every verse, and sometimes as an integral portion of the verse. Evayāmarut is a sacrificial shout, much like *Evoî* in Greek, *Evoe* in Latin, though I do not mean to say that the two are identical. Evayāh, as I explained in note to I, 168, 1, is an epithet of Vishṇu, as well as of the Maruts, meaning quickly moving. Evayāmarut, therefore, may mean the 'quick Marut.' This is strange, no doubt, because in the *Rig-veda* the Maruts always occur in the plural, except in some doubtful passages. Still Evayāmarut, the quick Marut, might be a name of Vishṇu. It cannot be taken as a Dvandva, Vishṇu and the Maruts.

This hymn was translated by Benfey in his glossary to the *Sāma-veda*, p. 39. Benfey takes evayā as identical with *εὐοῖ*, and explains it as an adverbial instrumental, like *āśuyā*, in the sense of *stürmisch*. But this would leave evayāvan unexplained.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Giri-gāh may mean 'produced on the mountains,' but it may also mean 'produced in the throat or voice,' and it is so explained elsewhere, for instance in SV. I, 462 (*Bibl. Ind.*, vol. i, p. 922). girau vāki nishpannāh; [also by another commentator, hridaye gâtā, yagñagâtā vā ity uktam]. Oldenberg suggests girige, which would be much better, considering how Vishṇu is called girikshit, girishthā, &c.; see Bergaigne, II, 47. Most of the epithets have occurred before. I take sāvase as a substantive, like sardhas, not as an adjective. As to dhūnivrata, see V, 58, 2; as to prāyagyu, V, 55, 1.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Krátvá, dāná, and mahnā seem to me in this place to belong together. The difficulty lies in the transition from *vaḥ* to *eshām*, but this is not uncommon. On *mahinā*=*mahimnā*, *dāná*, and *mahnā*, see Wenzel, *Instrumentalis*, p. 17; Lanman, p. 533. Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 101, translates, 'Ihre Macht gereicht ihnen zu grosser Gabe.' See also VIII, 20, 14. *Gātāḥ mahinā*, born by greatness, seems to mean born in greatness, or born great. It would be easy to write *mahínāḥ*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The translation of *īri* is purely conjectural.

Note 2. *Syandrāsaḥ*, as suggested by Oldenberg, are probably meant for *rathāḥ*. *Syandana* is a carriage in later Sanskrit. In VIII, 20, 2, we have to supply *rathaiḥ*; in VI, 66, 2, *rathāḥ*.

Note 3. *Prá*, with the verb understood, they come forth; cf. VII, 87, 1. *prá árnāmsi samudrīyā nadīnām*; X, 75, 1. *Dhuni*, like *dhûti*, has become almost a name of the Maruts, see I, 64, 5.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The god here meant seems to be *Vishnu*, mentioned already in verse 1, and probably recalled by the *Evayā* in *Evayāmarut*.

Note 2. We must either take *vīspardhasaḥ* and *vīmahasaḥ* with Benfey as names of the horses, or accept them as vocatives, addressed to the Maruts. *Vimahas* is used as an epithet of the Maruts, see I, 86, 1.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *yayīḥ*, see note to I, 87, 2; but it seems better to take it here as an adjective.

Note 2. On *svâyudha*, see Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 143; Oldenberg, *Gött. Gel. Anzeigen*, 1890, p. 424.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Prásiti* may be, as Ludwig translates it, *fangschnur*, a noose, but it can hardly mean *Noth*, as Grassmann

suggests. I take it here in the sense of shooting forth, onslaught, raid; cf. VII, 46, 4. Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* I, p. 139, takes it for a trap. Lanman, p. 386, is right in considering the locative in *au* before consonants a sure sign of the modern origin of this hymn.

Verse 7.

Note 1. The idea that the earth is stretched out or becomes large during a thunderstorm has been met with before, V, 58, 7. We read I, 37, 8; 87, 3, that at the racings of the Maruts the earth trembled, and that the Maruts enlarged the fences in their races. I therefore translate, though tentatively only, that the earth is opened far and wide, as a race-course for the faultless Maruts, whose hosts *ā*, appear, *āgmeshu*, on the courses, *mahāh*, quickly. If the accent of *paprathe* could be changed, we might translate, 'at whose coursings (*āgmeshu ā*) the seat of the earth is quickly stretched out far and wide,' and then take *sārdhāmsi ādbhutainasām* in apposition to *rudrāsaḥ*. *Adbhutainas*, in whom no fault is seen.

Bergaigne translates, '*faisant du mal mystérieusement*.' See Geldner, in *K. Z.* XXVIII, 199, Anm. 2; Bezzenberger's *Beiträge*, III, 169.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Cf. VI, 48, 10.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Susāmi*, generally explained as a shortened instrumental, for *suramī*=*suramyā*, used in an adverbial sense. *Susāmi* has a short *i* here, because it stands at the end of a *pāda*, otherwise the *i* is long, see VII, 16, 2; X, 28, 12, even before a vowel. The same applies in the *Rig-veda* to *samī*; it has short *i* at the end of a *pāda*, see II, 31, 6; VIII, 45, 27; X, 40, 1. The phrase *dhiyā sāmī*, which has short *i* in II, 31, 6; X, 40, 1, has long *i* in IX, 74, 7. *dhiyā sāmī*. It is shortened, however, before vowels in the middle of a *pāda*, and written *samy*; see I, 87, 5; III, 55, 3.

MANDALA VI, HYMN 66.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 7-8.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. This may well be a marvel, even to an intelligent man, that anything should have taken the same name *dhenu*, cow :—the one is always brimming to give milk among men, but *Prisni* (the cloud, the mother of the Maruts) poured out her bright udder once (only).

2. The Maruts who shone like kindled fires, as they grew stronger twice and thrice,—their golden, dustless (chariots¹) became full of manly courage and strength.

3. They who¹ are the sons of the bounteous Rudra, and whom she indeed was strong enough to bear ; for she, the great, is known as the mother of the great, that very *Prisni* conceived the germ for the strong one (Rudra).

4. They who do not shrink from being born in this way¹, and who within (the womb) clean themselves from all impurity², when they have been brought forth brilliant, according to their pleasure, they sprinkle their bodies with splendour.

5. Among them there is no one who does not strive to be brought forth quickly ; and they assume the defiant name of Maruts. They who are not (unkind¹), never tiring in strength², will the generous sacrificer be able to bring down these fierce ones ?

6. Fierce in strength, followed by daring armies, these Maruts have brought together heaven and earth¹, both firmly established² ; then the self-

shining Rodast stood among the impetuous Maruts, like ³ a light.

7. Even though your carriage, O Maruts, be without your deer ¹, without horses, and not driven by any charioteer, without drag², and without reins, yet, crossing the air³, it passes between heaven and earth, finishing its courses.

8. No one can stop, no one can overcome him whom you, O Maruts, protect in battle. He whom you protect in his kith, his cattle, his kin, and his waters, he breaks the stronghold at the close of the day¹.

9. Offer a beautiful song to the host of the Maruts, the singers, the quick, the strong, who resist violence with violence; O Agni, the earth trembles before the champions.

10. Blazing like the flame of the sacrifices, flickering like the tongues of the fire, shouters, like roaring fighters, the flame-born Maruts are unassailable.

11. I invite with my call this strong and Marut-like son of Rudra¹, armed with flaming spears. Bright thoughts, like wild waters from the mountain², strove to reach the host of heaven.

NOTES.

Hymn ascribed to Bharadvāga Bārhaspatya. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV. Verse 2 in MS. IV, 14, 11. Verse 9 in TS. IV, 1, 11, 3; TB. II, 8, 5, 5; MS. IV, 10, 3. Verse 10 in MS. IV, 14, 11. Metre, Trishṭubh.

Verse 1.

The meaning seems to be that it is strange that two things, namely, a real cow and the cloud, i.e. *Prisni*, the mother of the Maruts, should both be called *dhenu*, cow; that the one should always yield milk to men, while the other has her bright udder milked but once. This may mean that *dhenu*, a cow, yields her milk always, that *dhenu*, a cloud, yields rain but once, or, that *Prisni* gave birth but once to the Maruts. See also VI, 48, 22; Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 19; Delbrück, *Tempuslehre*, p. 102. *Dhenu* must be taken as the neuter form, and as a nominative, as is shown by II, 37, 2. *dadīh yāh nāma pátýate*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It seems necessary to take *arenávaḥ hiranyáśaḥ* for *rathāḥ*, chariots, as in V, 87, 3. *Sáyana* takes the same view, and I do not see how the verse gives sense in any other way. The first *páda* might be referred to the Maruts, or to the chariots.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The relative pronouns may be supposed to carry on the subject, viz. *Marútaḥ*, from the preceding verse, unless we supply *eshām mâtá*. I am doubtful about *mahó mahī*; cf. I, 102, 1; II, 33, 8. Grassmann proposes to read *mahâm*, gen. plur.; Ludwig thinks of *garbha*. It may also be a compound, as in *mahámaha*, *mahámahivrata*, or an adverb, but the construction remains difficult throughout. Oldenberg suggests that the second *páda* may have been *yān ko nú prīsnīḥ dādhrivīḥ bháradhyai*.

Verse 4.

Note 1. A tentative rendering and no more. I take *áyá* for *ayá* as an adverb in the sense of thus, in this way, see I, 87, 4, note 2. Grassmann seems to take it as an instr. fem., dependent on *ganúshaḥ*, which is possible, but without analogy. Lanman, p. 358, takes it for *áyāḥ*, nom. plur. of *aya*, wanderer, and translates, 'as long as the ones now wanderers quit not their birth.' Grassmann: 'Die nicht verleugnen die Geburt aus jener.' But is *gan* with instrumental ever used of a woman giving birth to a child? Ludwig: 'Die sich nicht weigern der geburt.'

Note 2. *Pû* with accusative occurs AV. XIX, 33, 3.

Verse 5.

This verse is again very obscure. It would be more honest to say that it is untranslatable. Possibly the poet may have taken *doháse* in the same sense as *duhré* in verse 4. The Maruts are born as by being milked from the udder of *Prisni*. It would then mean, 'Among whom there is no one not striving to be born quickly.'

Note 1. *Stauna* is an unknown word. *Sâyana* explains it as *stena*, thieves. It probably meant something not favourable, something that must be denied of the Maruts. This is all we can say. It cannot be a corruption of *stavânâḥ*, praised.

Note 2. *Ayás* can hardly refer to *Prisni*, never tiring to suckle the Maruts. In B.-R. *ayás* is explained as *sich nicht anstrengend, behende, leicht, unermüdlich*. See also Windisch, K. Z. XXVII, 170; also Johansson, Bezzenb. Beitr. XV, p. 180.

Verse 6.

Note 1. To join together heaven and earth is, as Bergaigne remarks (II, p. 374, n. 1), the apparent effect of a thunderstorm, when the clouds cover both in impenetrable darkness. We have the same expression in VIII, 20, 4.

Note 2. On *suméke*, see Geldner, K. Z. XXIV, 145; and Windisch, Festgruss an Böhrling, p. 114.

Note 3. The *ná*, placed before *rókaḥ*, is irregular, see Bergaigne, *Mélanges Renier*, p. 79. Oldenberg suggests

narokâh = *nri-okâh*, 'she who is fond of the men,' namely, of the Maruts. The corruption may be due to the writers of our text.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Anenáh* is strange, and might be changed into *anetáh*; it cannot be *anenáh*, without guilt.

Note 2. If *avasa* in *an-avasa* comes from *ava-so*, it may mean the step for descending or ascending, or possibly a drag. Bergaigne explains it by *sine viatico*.

Note 3. *Ragah-tŭh*, according to Ludwig, den Staub aufwirbelnd, which seems too much opposed to *arenu*, dustless. *Ragas + tar* means to pass through the air, and in that sense only conquering the air. Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* p. 123, ignores the various shades of meaning in *tur* at the end of compounds.

Verse 8.

Note 1. *Párye dyóh*, according to Grassmann, 'on the decisive day,' like *párye divi*.

Verse 11.

Note 1. I have translated *Rudrásya sūnúm* by the son of Rudra. It is true that a single Marut, as the son of Rudra, is not mentioned; but on the other hand, one could hardly call the whole company of the Maruts, the *māruta* scil. *gana*, the son of Rudra. In I, 64, 12, we have *Rudrasya sūnu* in one *pāda*, and *māruta gana* in the next. The *R̥ibhus* also are called in the same line *savasaḥ napātaḥ*, and *indrasya sūno*, IV, 37, 4. Here *sūnu* corresponds almost to the English offspring, only it is masculine.

Note 2. *Giráyah* may have been meant for *giryah*, a possible ablative of *giri*; see Lanman, p. 383. *Ugráh* would then refer to *āpah*, unless we break the sentence into two, viz. 'my bright thoughts tend to the host of heaven,' and 'the fierce Maruts strive like waters from the mountain.' If we compare, however, IX, 95, 3. *apām iva íd ūrmáyah tárturánāh prá manishāh írate sómam ákkha*, we see that the whole verse forms one sentence. All would be right if we could change *girayah* into *giribhyah*, but is not this a conjecture *nimis facilis*?

MANDALA VII, HYMN 56.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 23-26.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Who are these resplendent men, dwelling together, the boys of Rudra, also ¹ with good horses?
2. No one indeed knows their births, they alone know each other's birthplace.
3. They plucked each other with their beaks ¹; the hawks, rushing like the wind, strove together.
4. A wise man understands these secrets ¹, that *Prisni*, the great, bore an udder.
5. May that clan be rich in heroes by the Maruts, always victorious, rich in manhood!
6. They are quickest to go, most splendid with splendour, endowed with beauty, strong with strength.
7. Strong is your strength, steadfast your powers, and thus by the Maruts is this clan mighty.
8. Resplendent is your breath, furious are the minds of the wild host, like a shouting maniac ¹.
9. Keep from us entirely your flame, let not your hatred reach us here.
10. I call on the dear names of your swift ones, so that the greedy should be satisfied ¹, O Maruts,
11. The well-armed, the swift, decked with beautiful chains, who themselves adorn their bodies.
12. Bright are the libations for you, the bright ones, O Maruts, a bright sacrifice I prepare for the bright. In proper order came those who truly follow the order, the bright born, the bright, the pure.
13. On your shoulders, O Maruts, are the rings,

on your chests the golden chains are fastened; far-shining like lightnings with showers¹, you wield your weapons, according to your wont.

14. Your hidden¹ splendours come forth; spread out your powers (names), O racers! Accept, O Maruts, this thousandfold, domestic share, as an offering for the house-gods².

15. If you thus listen, O Maruts, to this praise, at the invocation of the powerful sage, give him quickly a share of wealth in plentiful offspring, which no selfish enemy shall be able to hurt.

16. The Maruts, who are fleet like racers, the manly youths, shone like Yakshas¹; they are beautiful like boys standing round the hearth, they play about like calves who are still sucking.

17. May the bounteous Maruts be gracious to us, opening up to us the firm heaven and earth. May that bolt of yours which kills cattle and men, be far from us! Incline to us, O Vasus, with your favours.

18. The Hotri priest calls on you again and again, sitting down and praising your common gift, O Maruts. O strong ones, he who is the guardian of so much wealth, he calls on you with praises, free from guile.

19. These Maruts stop the swift, they bend strength by strength¹, they ward off the curse of the plotter, and turn² their heavy hatred on the enemy.

20. These Maruts stir up even the sluggard¹, even the vagrant², as the gods³ pleased. O strong ones, drive away the darkness, and grant us all our kith and kin.

21. May we not fall away from your bounty, O

Maruts, may we not stay behind, O charioteers, in the distribution of your gifts. Let us share in the brilliant wealth, the well-acquired, that belongs to you, O strong ones.

22. When valiant men fiercely fight together, for rivers, plants, and houses¹, then, O Maruts, sons of Rudra, be in battles our protectors from the enemy.

23. O Maruts, you have valued¹ the praises which our fathers have formerly recited to you ; with the Maruts the victor is terrible in battle, with the Maruts alone the racer wins the prize.

24. O Maruts, may we have a strong son, who is lord among men, a ruler, through whom we may cross the waters to dwell in safety, and then obtain our own home for you¹.

25. May Indra then, Varuna, Mitra, Agni, the waters, the plants, the trees of the forest be pleased with us. Let us be in the keeping, in the lap of the Maruts ; protect us always with your favours.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Vasishṭha. Verse 1 occurs in SV. I, 433; verse 10 in TS. II, 1, 11, 1; MS. IV, 11, 2; verse 12 in TB. II, 8, 5, 5; MS. IV, 14, 18; verse 13 in TB. II, 8, 5, 5; MS. IV, 14, 18; verse 14 in TS. IV, 3, 13, 6; MS. IV, 10, 5; verse 16 in TS. IV, 3, 13, 7; MS. IV, 10, 5; verse 19 in TB. II, 8, 5, 6; MS. IV, 14, 18. Metre, 1-11 Dvipadā Virāg; 12-25 Trishṭubh.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The SV. reads athā for the older adhā. Sanikā in the edition of the Bibl. Ind. is a misprint for sanīā.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Sva-pû is explained by Roth as possibly a broom, raising the dust. Grassmann translates it by light, Ludwig by blowing. I suggest to take it for *vapû, in the sense of beak or claw, from vap, which follows immediately. See note to I, 88, 4. I do not see how the other meanings assigned to svapû give any sense. Oldenberg therefore suggests pavanta, 'Sie strömten hell auf einander zu mit ihren svapûs.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. Sâyana explains etāni ninyā by svetavarṇāni marudātmakāni bhūtāni. He takes ūdhas as a locative.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Geldner translates: 'Der Spielmann des wilden Heeres ist wie ein Muni,' and adds, 'Aber was ist ein Muni im Veda?'

Verse 10.

Note 1. I read tripān for tripāt of the Pada text, and refer vāvasānā to the Maruts. The TS. has tripāt, and the commentary explains it by triptim. The first line is Virāg, the second Trishṭubh, and the Trishṭubh metre is afterwards carried on.

Verse 11.

This verse refers to the Maruts, not, as Ludwig thinks, to the priests. Dr. v. Bradke (Dyaus Asura, p. 65) proposes to join verses 10 and 11 into one Trishúbh, and possibly to insert á before huve. I doubt whether for the present such changes are justified. On the structure of this hymn, see Oldenberg, Prol. 96, Anm. 3; 200, Anm. 5.

Verse 13.

Note 1. TB. II, 8, 5, 6, reads *vyrishābhiḥ* (not *vrishābhiḥ*), and the commentator explains, *vyrishābhir āyudhaviśeshair vyriśtyākhyair, viśeshena rokamānāḥ sthitāḥ*. And again, *riśtaya eva viśiśtatvād vyriśtaya ity ukyante*. Bollensen, Z. D. M. G. XLI, 501, conjectures *riśābhiḥ* for *vrishābhiḥ*, which is very ingenious. See also note 1 to II, 34, 2.

Verse 14.

Note 1. *Budhnyā*, explained by *budhne bhavāni*, and also by *kālapravrittāni*.

Note 2. *Grihamedhiya* may refer to the Maruts as *grihamedhās* or *grihamedhinas*; see RV. VII, 59, 10; VS. XXIV, 16. The *grihamedhiyā ishī* in Sat. Br. XI, 5, 2, 4, is meant for the Maruts.

Verse 16.

Note 1. *Yakshadrīśaḥ* is explained as wishing to see a sacrifice or feast. Ludwig retains this meaning. Grassmann translates, 'wie feurige Blitze funkeln.' *Yaksha* may mean a shooting star or any meteor, literally what shoots or hastens along; see VII, 61, 5. *nā yāsu kītrām dādriśe nā yakshām*; also note to V, 55, 1. But *driś* is not *sadrīś*. If we follow the later Sanskrit, *yaksha* would mean a class of spirits, followers of Kuvera, also ghosts in general. If this is not too modern a conception for the Rig-veda, we might translate *yakshadrīś*, 'appearing as ghosts' (see Kaus. Sūtra 95 in BR.), or, considering the expression *ātyaḥ nā yamsat yakshabhṛt viketāḥ*, I, 190, 4, take it for a name of horses.

Verse 19.

Note 1. Does not *sáhasa á* stand for *sáhasá á*, and not for *sáhasaḥ á*? Comp. Oldenberg, *Prolegomena*, 465 seq.

Note 2. On *dadhanti*, see Hübschmann, *Indogerm. Vocal-system*, p. 12.

Verse 20.

Note 1. On *radhra*, see Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* pp. 124 seq.

Note 2. *Bhrīmi* is doubtful, but as it stands by the side of *radhra*, it seems to have a bad meaning, such as a vagrant, unsteady.

Note 3. The *Vasus* are often mentioned with the *Ādityas* and *Rudras*, see III, 8, 8; X, 66, 12; 128, 9. By themselves they became almost synonymous with the *Devas*. Thus in VII, 11, 4, we read that *Agni* became the master of all sacrifices, *krátum hí asya Vāsavaḥ gushánta átha devāḥ dadhire havyaváham*, 'for the *Vasus* liked his wisdom, therefore the *Devas* made him the carrier of offerings.' See also V, 3, 10. *pitá Vaso yádi tát gosháyāse*. In one passage, VI, 50, 4, *Vasavaḥ* means the *Maruts*. In our passage it seems better to take it in the sense of gods, but we might also refer it to the *Maruts*.

Verse 22.

Note 1. With *pāda b*, compare VII, 70, 3 b.

Verse 23.

Note 1. I have taken *bhūri kakra* in the sense of *magni facere*, though I can find no analogous passages.

Verse 24.

Note 1. This verse has been well explained by Dr. v. Bradke, *Dyaus Asura*, p. 66. *Svám ókaḥ*, our own home, occurs IV, 50, 8; V, 33, 4; VI, 41, 1; VIII, 72, 14. *Abhyas* means generally to obtain what is not our own. See also VII, 48, 2. *Vaḥ*, which I have translated 'for you,' may also mean 'from you.'

Verse 25.

This verse is marked as a *galita* taken from VII, 34, 25, while the last *pāda* is a *galita* taken from VII, 1, 25.

MANDALA VII, HYMN 57.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 27.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. O ye worshipful, your company of Maruts is fond of honey, they who delight in their strength at the sacrifices, the Maruts, who shake even the wide heaven and earth, and fill the well, when they move about, the terrible ones.

2. Truly the Maruts find out the man who praises them, and guide the thoughts of the sacrificer. Sit down then to rejoice to-day, on the altar¹ in our assemblies² well pleased.

3. Others do not shine so much as these Maruts with their golden chains, their weapons, and their own bodies; the all-adorned, adorning heaven and earth, brighten themselves with the same brightness, when starting for triumph.

4. May your shining thunderbolt be far from us, O Maruts, whatever sin we may commit against you, men as we are: O worshipful, let us not fall under¹ its power, let your best favour rest on us.

5. May the Maruts be pleased with whatever little we have done here, they the faultless, the bright, the pure. Protect us, ye worshipful, with your favours, lead us to prosperity through booty.

6. And let the manly Maruts, when they have been praised, under whatever names, enjoy these offerings! Grant that our offspring may not die¹, raise up for us riches², glory, and wealth.

7. O Maruts, when you have thus been praised, come all together with help towards our lords who with their hundredfold wealth freely prosper us;—protect us always with your favours!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Vasishtha. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS. Metre, Trishubh.

Verse 1.

This hymn has been translated by Geldner and Kaegi. The first verse is most difficult. G.-K. avoid all difficulties by translating, 'Beim Fest des süßen Trankes weiss man tüchtig euch zu begeistern, hehre Schaar der Marut.' Ludwig grapples with them by translating: 'An eures madhu kraft, o zu vererende, freut bei den opfern sich der Marut geschlecht.' I doubt, however, whether savas is ever ascribed to madhu, though it is ascribed to Soma. Oldenberg suggests, 'The sweet ones' is your Marut-name, O worshipful, they who rejoice in their strength at the sacrifices.' Here the difficulty would be that Mārutam nāma is the recognised term for the name, i.e. the kin of the Maruts. Still, unless we venture on a conjecture, this would seem to be the best rendering. Could we change mādhvāḥ vaḥ nāma mārutam into madhvād vaḥ nāma mārutam? Madhvād is a Vedic word, though it occurs once only, in I, 164, 22, and as trisyllabic. Its very rarity would help to account for the change. The meaning would then be, 'your Marut kin eats honey, is fond of honey.'

It has been proved that the present mādāti is always neutral, meaning to rejoice, while mand (Par.) is transitive, to make rejoice. Otherwise madhvāḥ might possibly have been taken in the sense of sweet things, as in I, 180, 4; IX, 89, 3, and construed with madanti.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Barhis, which I translate by altar, is the simplest form of an altar, mere turf or kusa-grass, on which the offerings are placed. See note to VII, 46, 4.

Note 2. On vidatha, see my note, V, 59, 2.

Verse 3.

See Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 241; his rendering would be acceptable but for the *â*. Without any verb of motion *â ragas* can hardly mean 'through the air,' nor *â rôdasî* 'through the worlds.'

Verse 4.

Note 1. On *api bhû* and *api as*, see B.-R. s. v.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Amrita* cannot be rendered by immortality in our sense, it simply means not dying.

Note 2. *Gigritâ*, imp. aor. caus. of *gar*. *Râyâk*, acc. plur.

MANDALA VII, HYMN 58.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 28.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Sing to the company (of the Maruts), growing up together, the strong among the divine host¹: they stir heaven and earth by their might, they mount up to the firmament from the abyss of Nirṛiti².

2. Even your birth¹ was with fire and fury, O Maruts! You, terrible, wrathful, never tiring! You who stand forth with might and strength; every one who sees the sun², fears at your coming.

3. Grant mighty strength to our lords, if the Maruts are pleased with our praise. As a trodden path furthers a man, may they further us; help us with your brilliant favours.

4. Favoured by you, O Maruts, a wise man wins a hundred, favoured by you a strong racer wins a thousand, favoured by you a king also kills his enemy: may that gift of yours prevail, O ye shakers.

5. I invite these bounteous sons of Rudra¹, will these Maruts turn again to us? Whatever they hated secretly or openly, that sin we pray the swift ones to forgive.

6. This praise of our lords has been spoken: may the Maruts be pleased with this hymn. Keep far from us, O strong ones, all hatred, protect us always with your favours!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Vasishtha. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS. Metre, Trishubh.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Dhâman is one of the cruces of translators, and it remains so after all that has been written on the subject by Bergaigne, III, 210 seq. There are many words in the Veda which it is simply impossible to translate, because their meaning has not yet been differentiated, and they convey such general or rather vague concepts that it is utterly impossible to match them in our modern languages. Translators are often blamed that they do not always render the same Vedic by the same English word. It would be simply impossible to do so, because, according to the different surroundings in which it occurs, the same word receives different shades of meaning which in English can only be approximately expressed by different words. Bergaigne is, no doubt, right when he says that dhâ-man is derived from dhâ, to set or settle, and that it therefore meant at first what is settled. From this he proceeds to argue that the original meaning of dhâman, from which all others are derived, is law. But law is a very late and very abstract word, and we must never forget that words always progress from the concrete to the abstract, from the material to the spiritual, and but seldom, and at a much later time, in an opposite direction. Now even if we were to admit that dhâman does not occur in the Veda in the sense of settlement, i.e. abode, this is certainly its most general meaning afterwards, and no one would maintain that a settlement, i.e. a household, was called dhâman, because it involved a settlement, i.e. laws. The same applies to vratâ. Bergaigne (III, 213) agrees with me that vrata should be derived from var, to surround, to guard, and not from var, to choose, but he thinks that it meant at once 'garde, protection,'

and not 'lieu clos.' I still hold that like *νομός*, *vrata* must have meant first a real hedge, or *ἔρκος*, and then only an abstract enclosure, i.e. a law, *νόμος*. In this case we can see the actual transition of thought. People would begin by saying, 'there is a fence here against your cattle,' and this would in time assume the meaning 'there is a defence against your cattle straying on my meadow.' But it would be impossible to begin, as Bergaigne (p. 216) does, with the abstract meaning of protection, law, and then return and use the word in such phrases as V, 46, 7. *apām vraté*, 'within the pale of the waters.'

Dhāman, therefore, meant originally, I still believe, what was actually laid down or settled, hence an abode. When, as in the Veda, it means law, I do not say that this was necessarily derived from the meaning of abode. I only maintain that it was a second, if not a secondary, meaning, and that, at all events, the meaning of abode cannot be derived from that of law.

After *dhāman* meant what is settled, it has sometimes to be translated by law, by nature, sometimes by class, or clan, where it comes very near to *nāman*, name, while sometimes it may best be rendered by a general and abstract suffix, or even by a plural. Thus in our passage, *daívyasya dhāmnaḥ* is not very different from *devānām*.

What is peculiar to our passage is the genitive governed by *tuvishmān*. After all the learning which Bergaigne has expended on the analysis of *dhāman*, he does not help us to a translation of our sentence. If we translate 'of the divine law, powerful,' we have words, but no sense. I take *daívyasya dhāmnaḥ* as a genitivus partitivus, such as AV. IV, 37, 5. *óshadhînam vírúdhām víryāvatî*. See Kuhn, *Zeitschrift* XIII, 120; Siecke, *Genitivus*, p. 14. Grassmann: 'Die mächtig walten in der Götter Wohnsitz.' Ludwig: 'Die von göttlicher natur, die starke.' He denies that *tuvishmān* could be followed by the genitive. I do not maintain that I am satisfied on that point. All I say in this as in many other cases is that my translation gives something which we can understand. Let others give us something better.

Note 2. On *Nirriti*, see Hibbert Lectures, p. 245; Lect. Science of Lang., vol. ii, p. 562. *Avamsá*, literally without beams of support, or bottomless.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *ganûs*, see Lanman, p. 571.

Note 2. *Svardrîk*, according to Grassmann, der lichte Himmel; according to Ludwig, jeder der das licht schaut. *Sâyana*, among other meanings, gives that of tree. See VII, 83, 2.

Verse 3.

On the construction of this verse, see Delbrück, Syntax, p. 384, and Bergaigne, Mélanges Renier, p. 82.

Verse 5.

Note 1. With regard to *tán mî/húsha/ rudrásya*, 'these bounteous (sons) of Rudra,' see VIII, 20, 3.

MANDALA VII, HYMN 59.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 29-30.

TO THE MARUTS AND RUDRA.

1. Whom you protect again and again, O gods, and whom you lead, to him, O Agni, Varuṇa, Mitra, Aryaman, and Maruts, yield your protection.

2. He who sacrifices, O gods, overcomes his enemies by your protection on a happy day. He who gives to your delight, spreads forth his dwelling, spreads out much food.

3. This Vasishṭha will not despise even the last among you, O Maruts; drink¹ all of you, to-day, at my libation here, full of desire.

4. Your help does not indeed fail that man in battle to whom you granted it, O men! Your newest favour has turned hither, come quick then, ye who wish to drink.

5. O ye whose gifts are cheering, come to drink the (juice of the Soma) flowers: these are your libations, O Maruts, for I gave them to you, do not go elsewhere!

6. Sit down on our altar and protect¹ us, to give us brilliant riches. O Maruts, who never miss the Soma mead, hail to you here to enjoy yourselves.

7. Having adorned their bodies, the swans with dark blue backs came flying in secret¹—the whole flock sat down all around me, like gay men, delighting in the Soma offering.

8. O Maruts, that hateful man who beyond our thoughts tries to hurt us, O Vasus, may he catch the snares of Druh, kill him with your hottest bolt!

9. O you Maruts, full of heat, here is the libation ;
be pleased to accept it, O you who destroy the
enemies by your help¹.

10. O you who accept the domestic sacrifices¹,
come hither, O Maruts, do not keep away, you who
are bounteous by your help².

11. O Maruts, strong and wise, with sun-bright
skins, I choose the sacrifice for you here and there¹.

12. We sacrifice to Tryambaka¹, the sweet-
scented, wealth-increasing (Rudra). May I be de-
tached from death, like a gourd from its stem, but
not² from the immortal³.

NOTES.

Ascribed to *Vasishtha*. Verse 12 addressed to Rudra.

Verse 3 occurs SV. I, 241; verse 8, AV. VII, 77, 2; TS. IV, 3, 13, 3; MS. IV, 10, 5; verse 9, AV. VII, 77, 1; TS. IV, 3, 13, 3; MS. IV, 10, 5; verse 10, TS. IV, 3, 13, 5; MS. IV, 10, 5; verse 11, TĀ. I, 4, 3; MS. IV, 10, 3; verse 12, VS. III, 60; AV. XIV, 1, 17; TS. I, 8, 6, 2; MS. I, 10, 4; TĀ. X, 56; Sat. Br. II, 6, 2, 12.

Metre, 1, 3, 5 *Bṛīhatī*; 2, 4, 6 *Satobṛīhatī*; 7, 8 *Trishṭubh*; 9, 10, 11 *Gāyatrī*; 12 *Anuṣṭubh*.

Verse 2.

With *pāda* a compare I, 110, 7; with *c* and *d*, VIII, 27, 16.

Verse 3.

Note 1. SV. has *pibantu*, and as a various reading the comment. gives *pivanta*. *Suté sákā* is a standing phrase.

Verse 6.

Note 1. I cannot see how *avitá* can stand for *avishṭa* (Delbrück, Verb, 186; Whitney, Gram. § 908). I translate as if the text gave *ávatá*.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On the secret approach of the Maruts, see I, 88, 5.

Verse 8.

The text in the AV. VII, 77, 2, is bad, *yó no mártō maruto durhrinâyús, práti muñkatām sáh, and tápasā* for *hánmanā*. The TS. IV, 3, 13, 3, has *tiráh satyáni*. It reads besides, *yó no mártō vasavo durhrinâyús tiráh satyáni marutaḥ glghâṁsât druháh pásam, and tápasā*. *Tiráh kītāni* may mean 'beyond all conception,' as Grassmann takes it, or 'unobserved,' as B.-R. suggest. *Tiráh satyáni* might mean 'in spite of all pledges,' but that is probably an emendation. All this shows the unsettled state of Vedic tradition, outside that of the Rig-veda; see Oldenberg, Prolegomena, p. 328.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Ūtī*, taken here as a dative, by Lanman, p. 382.

Verse 10.

Note 1. On the Maruts *gr̥hamedhinaḥ*, see Sat. Br. II, 5, 3, 4. Possibly the Maruts may be called *gr̥hamedhas*, i.e. *gr̥hasthas*, performing the *Gr̥hya* sacrifices. See on these names TS. I, 8, 4, 1; 2.

Note 2. The last pāda in the TS. is *pramuñḥānto no āmhasaḥ*.

Verse 11.

Note 1. On *ihéha*, see Delbrück, Syntax, p. 51. It means 'here and there,' that is, 'again and again.'

Verse 12.

Note 1. Tryambaka is a name of Rudra, but its original meaning is doubtful. Some commentators explain it by 'three-eyed,' but its natural meaning would be 'having three mothers.' The Sat. Br. II, 6, 2, 9, derives it from Stry-ambikā, because Ambikā, Rudra's sister, shares the sacrifice with him.

Note 2. On *mā* with optative, see Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. I, 194; Syntax, 338, 361, Anm. 1.

Note 3. That *amṛitāt* is right, not, as Grassmann suggests, *amṛita*, is clear from the parallel forms, *prétó muñḥāmi nāmútaḥ*, or *itó mukshīya māmútaḥ*. Pischel in Z.D.M.G. XL, 121, demands too much logical accuracy from a poet; see AV. XIV, 1, 17; VS. III, 60.

All scholars seem to agree that this hymn is a composite hymn, and that it breaks the law of decrease in the number of verses. It begins with three Pragâthas, verses 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, which may be in their right place. Then follow two Trishubhs, 7 and 8, which may form a hymn by themselves. The next three Gâyatrîs, which clearly belong together, are a later addition; so is the last verse, which ought to stand in the Atharva rather than in the Rig-veda. The Pada text does not divide this last verse. See on this subject, Oldenberg, Z.D.M.G. XXXVIII, 449 seq., Proleg. 200; 511; Bergaigne, Recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitâ, II, 10.

MANDALA VIII, HYMN 7.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 18-24.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).'

1. When the sage has poured out the threefold¹ draught to you, O Maruts, then you shine forth in the mountains (clouds).

2. Aye, when, O bright Maruts, growing in strength, you have seen your way, then the mountains (clouds) have gone down¹.

3. The sons of *Prisni*, the bulls, have risen together with the winds, they have drawn forth the swelling draught.

4. The Maruts sow the mist, they shake the mountains (clouds), when they go their way with the winds,

5. When the mountain bent down before your march, the rivers before your rule, before your great power (blast).

6. We invoke you by night for our protection, you by day, you while the sacrifice proceeds.

7. And they rise up on their courses, the beautiful, of reddish hue¹, the bulls, above the ridge of the sky.

8. With might they send forth a ray of light, that the sun may have a path to walk¹: they have spread far and wide with their lights.

9. Accept, O Maruts, this my speech, this hymn of praise, O *R̥bhukshans*¹, this my call.

10. The *Prisni*¹ (the clouds) yielded three lakes (from their udders) as mead for the wielder of the thunderbolt (Indra), the well, the water-skin, the watering-pot².

11. O Maruts, whenever we call you from heaven, wishing for your favour, come hither towards us.

12. For you are bounteous¹, in our house, O Rudras, R̥bhukshans: you are attentive, when you enjoy (the libations).

13. O Maruts, bring to us from heaven enrapturing wealth, which nourishes many, which satisfies all.

14. When you have seen your way, brilliant Maruts, as it were from above¹ the mountains, you rejoice in the (Soma) drops which have been pressed out.

15. Let the mortal with his prayers ask the favour of that immense, unconquerable (host)¹ of them,

16. Who like torrents¹ foam along heaven and earth with their streams of rain, drawing the inexhaustible well.

17. These sons of *Prisni* rise up together with rattlings, with chariots, with the winds, and with songs of praise.

18. That (help) with which you helped Turvāsa, Yadu, and Kāṇva when he carried off riches, that we pray for, greatly for our wealth.

19. O bounteous Maruts, may these draughts, swelling like butter, strengthen you, together with the prayers of Kāṇva.

20. Where do you rejoice now, O bounteous Maruts, when an altar has been prepared for you? What priest serves you?

21. For you for whom we have prepared an altar, do not, as it was with you formerly, in return for these praises, gladden the companies of our sacrifice.

22. These Maruts have brought together piece

by piece¹ the great waters, heaven and earth, the sun, and the thunderbolt;

23. And, while performing their manly work, they have trodden *Vṛitra* to pieces, and the dark mountains (clouds).

24. They protected the strength and intelligence of the fighting *Trita*, they protected *Indra* in his struggle with *Vṛitra*.

25. Holding lightnings in their hands, they hasten heavenward, golden helmets¹ are on their head; the brilliant *Maruts* have adorned themselves for beauty.

26. When with *Usanâ*² you have come from afar to *Uksh̥norandhra* (ox-hollow)¹, he roared from fear, like *Dyu* (the sky).

27. O gods, come to us with your golden-hoofed horses, for the offering of the sacrifice¹.

28. When the red leader leads their spotted deer in their chariot, the brilliant *Maruts* approach and let the waters run.

29. The heroes went downwards to *Saryanâvat*, to *Sushoma*, to *Ârgika*, to *Pastyâvat*.

30. When will you come hither, O *Maruts*, to the sage who calls you so, with your consolations to the suppliant?

31. What then now? Where are your friends, now that you have forsaken *Indra*? Who is counted in your friendship?

32. O *Kâṇvas*, I praise *Agni*, together with our *Maruts*, who carry the thunderbolt in their hands, and are armed with golden daggers.

33. Might I succeed in bringing hither the strong hunters, hither with their splendid booty for the newest blessings.

34. The hills even sink low, as if they thought themselves valleys, the mountains even bow themselves down.

35. The crossing (horses) bring them hither, flying through the air; they bestow strength on the man who praises them.

36. The old fire¹ has been born, like the shine² by the splendour of the sun, and the Maruts have spread far and wide with their lights.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Punarvatsa Kāṇva. Verse 8 occurs MS. IV, 12, 5; verse 11 in TS. I, 5, 11, 4; MS. IV, 10, 4; verse 28 in AV. XIII, 1, 21. Metre, Gāyatrī.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Trishṭúbham is an adjective belonging to ísham. The same expression occurs again, VIII, 69, 1, as a galita, and is therefore of little help. In IX, 62, 24, the íshaḥ are called parishṭúbhaḥ, which seems to mean something like paríśrut, i. e. standing round about. I therefore take trishṭubh in our passage simply as threefold, referring probably to the morning, noon, and evening sacrifice. The sacrifice is often called trivṛt, X, 52, 4; 124, 1. Some scholars ascribe to stubh in trishṭubh the meaning of liturgical shouting.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Besides ní ahâsata, we find úd ahâsata, I, 9, 4, and ápa ahâsata, IX, 73, 6. On ñi, see verse 14, and V, 55, 7. It is often impossible to say whether the Vedic Aorist should be translated in English by the perfect or the imperfect. If we take the verse as describing an historical fact, it would be, 'When you saw your way, or, as soon as you had seen your way, the clouds fell.' If it is meant as a repeated event, it would be, 'when, i. e. whenever you have seen your way, the clouds have fallen.' The difficulty lies in English, and though the grammars lay down rules, usage does not conform to them. The difference in the use of tenses in English is so great that in the revised version of the Bible, a number of passages had to be translated differently for the English and for the American public. Thus in Rom. ii. 12, the English edition gives, 'For as many as have sinned without law, shall perish without law.' The American edition changes this into 'As many as sinned without the law.' Gal. iii. 22, English: 'The scripture hath shut up;' American: 'The scripture shut up.' It was on account of this and other changes of

idiom which have sprung up between English and American, that different editions of the revised version had actually to be printed for England and America. No wonder, therefore, that an American critic should in his innocence have charged me with not knowing the difference between the aorist, the imperfect, and the perfect in Vedic Sanskrit!

Verse 7.

Note 1. Arunapsu, perhaps reddish-coloured, an epithet of the dawn, here applied to the Maruts. The Maruts are sometimes called *vrishapsu*, *ahrutapsu*, I, 52, 4; VIII, 20, 7.

Verse 8.

Note 1. The relation between the light cast forth by the Maruts and the path of the sun is not quite clear, except that in other places also the Maruts are connected with the morning. The darkness preceding a thunderstorm may be identified with the darkness of the night, preceding the sunrise. See Bergaigne, II, 379 seq.

Verse 9.

Note 1. The meaning of *ṛibhukshan* is doubtful. It is applied to Indra and the Maruts. See Bergaigne, II, 403; 404 note; 412.

Verse 10.

Note 1. The *Prisni*s in the plural fem. are the clouds, see VIII, 6, 19. Mythologically there is but one *Prisni*, the mother of the Maruts. See also Bergaigne, II, 397.

Note 2. I am doubtful about the three lakes of Madhu, here of rain, poured from their udders by the clouds. The number three is common enough, and Ludwig has pointed out a parallel passage from the AV. X, 10, 10-12, where we read of three *pâtras*, filled with milk and Soma. Many similar passages have been collected by Bergaigne, I, 177, but again without a definite result. The question is whether the three words *utsa*, *kavandha*, and *udrin* are meant as names of the three *pâtras*, in our passage, of the three lakes, or whether they should be taken as an apposition,

the three lakes, namely, the well (of the sky), the skin full of water, and udrin, the watering-pot. Udrin is elsewhere an adjective only, but I think we must here translate, 'the well, the water-skin, the watering-pot.'

Verse 12.

Note 1. On sudánavaḥ as vocative, see Delbrück, Syntax, p. 106.

Verse 14.

Note 1. For adhi with genitive, one expects ati. But Delbrück doubts whether ati can govern the genitive. See Altind. Syntax, p. 440.

Verse 15.

Note 1. As ádábhyaśya can only refer to etávataḥ, I have taken etávāt in the sense of gāṇa, followed by eśhām. But I am not certain that the rendering is right.

Verse 16.

Note 1. I have ventured to translate drapsáḥ by torrents. Neither drops nor sparks nor banners seem to yield an appropriate simile, but I feel very doubtful. See VIII, 96, 13; IX, 73, 1.

Verse 22.

Note 1. I thought at first that by sám parvasáḥ dadhuḥ was meant the mixing or confounding together of heaven and earth; it being impossible, during a storm, to distinguish the two. But there is clearly, as Ludwig points out, an opposition between sám dadhuḥ and ví yayuḥ. I therefore take parvasáḥ in verse 22 in the sense of piece by piece, as in AV. IV, 12, 7. sám dadhat párushā páruḥ, while in verse 23 it means in pieces.

Verse 25.

Note 1. On sipráḥ, see note to II, 34, 3.

Verse 26.

Note 1. Ukshnáḥ rándhram, 'the hollow of the bull,' whatever that may be, is not mentioned again. If it is meant for

the dark cloud which hides the rain, then the roar of the bull would be the thunder of the cloud, stirred by the Maruts. Aukshnorandhra, however, is the technical name of certain Sâmans, so that Ukshnorandhra may have been, like Usanâ (later Usanas), a proper name. See Tândya Br. XIII, 9, 18; 19.

Note 2. If usânâ stands for usanayâ it might mean, 'with desire,' but it seems more likely that it refers to the *Rishi*, who is called Usanâ in the *Rig-veda*, and Usanas in later writings. See Lanman, p. 562, l. 21; Bergaigne, II, 338, n. 3; Schmidt, K. Z. XXVI, 402, n. 1.

Verse 27.

Note 1. On makhâsya dâvâne, see note to I, 6, 8, where I accepted the old explanation, 'Come to the offering of the priest.' But does makha mean priest? In later Sanskrit it means sacrifice, so that makhâsya dâvâne has been translated, 'for the offering of the sacrifice,' that is, 'that we may be able to offer you sacrifice.' If makha means glad and refers to Soma, which is doubtful, the sense would be the same. Possibly dâvâne may here be derived from do, to divide, but this would not help us much.

Verse 28.

The AV. reads yâm tvâ prîshatî râtî prâshîr vâhati rohita, subhâ yâsi rinânn apâh, which yields no help.

Verse 29.

This verse is very difficult. First of all, nîkâkrayâ can hardly mean 'without a chariot' (B.-R.), but seems an adverb, meaning downwards. But the chief difficulty lies in this, that we must decide, once for all, whether words, such as sushoma, saryavât, ârgîka, pastyâvat, &c., are to be interpreted in their natural sense, as expressing localities, well known to the poet, or in their technical sense, as names of sacrificial vessels. That this decision is by no means easy, may be inferred from the fact that two scholars, Roth and Ludwig, differ completely, the former preferring the technical, the latter the geographical meaning. We must

remember that in the hymns to the Maruts the poets speak occasionally of the countries, far and near, visited by the storm-winds. We must also bear in mind that in our very passage the poet asks the Maruts to come to him, and not to tarry with other people. When, therefore, he says, that they went to Saryanâvat, &c., is that likely to be meant for a tank of Soma at his own or any other sacrifice?

Saryanâvat is derived from sarya, this from sara. Sara means reed, arrow; sarya, made of reeds, saryâ, an arrow, but also reeds tied together and used at the sacrifice for carrying Soma-oblations. From it, saryana, which, according to Sâyana, means lands in Kurukshetra (RV. VIII, 6, 39), and from which Saryanâvat is derived, as the name of a lake in that neighbourhood (not a Landstrich, B.-R.). When this saryanâvat occurs in the Rig-veda, the question is, does it mean that lake, evidently a famous lake and a holy place in the early settlements of the Vedic Âryas, or does it mean, as others suppose, a sacrificial vessel made of reeds? It occurs in the Rig-veda seven times.

In I, 84, 14, Indra is said to have found the head of the horse, which had been removed among the mountains (clouds) at Saryanâvat. This seems to me the lake in which the sun sets. In the 8th Mandala saryanâvat occurs three times. In VIII, 6, 39, Indra is invoked to rejoice at Saryanâvat, or, according to others, in a vessel full of Soma. In our passage the Maruts went to Saryanâvat, to Sushoma, Ârgîka, and Pastyâvat, countries, it would seem, not vessels. In VIII, 64, 11, after saying that the Soma had been prepared among the Pûrus, it is added that the Soma is sweetest in Saryanâvat, on the Sushomâ, and in Ârgîkiya. In IX, 65, 22, we read of Somas prepared far and near, and at Saryanâvat, and in the next verse we read of Somas to be found either among the Ârgîkas, among the Pastyâs, or among the Five Tribes. In IX, 113, 1; 2, Indra is asked to drink Soma at Saryanâvat, and the Soma is asked to come from Ârgîka. In X, 35, 2, the aid is implored of heaven and earth, of the rivers and the mountains, and these mountains are called saryanâvatah.

Ârgikiyâ, besides the three passages mentioned already, occurs X, 75, 5, where it is clearly a river as well as Sushomâ, while in IX, 65, 23, the Ârgikas, in the plural, could only be the name of a people.

Taking all this into account, it seems to me that we ought to accept the tradition that Saryanâvat was a lake and the adjoining district in Kurukshetra, that Ârgikâ was the name of a river, Ârgika the name of the adjoining country, Ârgikâh, of the inhabitants, Ârgikiyâ another name of Ârgikâ, the river, and Ârgikiyam another name of the country Ârgika. Sushoma in our passage is probably the name of the country near the Sushomâ, and Pastyâvat, though it might be an adjective meaning filled with hamlets, is probably another geographical name; see, however, IX, 65, 23. Ludwig takes Saryanâvat as a name of the Eastern Sarasvatî; see Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 19; but we should expect Saryanâvatî as the name of a river. See also Bergaigne, I, 206, who, according to his system, takes all these names as 'préparateurs célestes du Soma.'

Verse 31.

See I, 38, 1, note 1.

Verse 36.

Note 1. Sâyana may be right in stating that this verse was intended for an Âgnimâruta sacrifice, and that therefore Agni was praised first, and afterwards the Maruts. In that case pûrvya might mean first.

Note 2. *Khandas* is doubtful; see, however, I, 92, 6.

MANDALA VIII, HYMN 20.

ASHTAKA VI, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 36-40.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Come hither, do not fail, when you march forward! Do not stay away, O united friends, you who can bend even what is firm.

2. O Maruts, *R̥bhukshans*, come hither on your flaming strong fellows¹, O Rudras, come to us to-day with food, you much-desired ones, come to the sacrifice, you friends of the Sobharis².

3. For we know indeed the terrible strength of the sons of Rudra, of the vigorous Maruts, the liberal givers¹ of Soma² (rain).

4. The islands (clouds) were scattered, but the monster remained¹, heaven and earth were joined together. O you who are armed with bright rings, the tracts (of the sky)² expanded, whenever you stir, radiant with your own splendour.

5. Even things that cannot be thrown down resound at your race, the mountains, the lord of the forest,—the earth quivers on your marches.

6. The upper sky makes wide room, to let your violence pass, O Maruts, when these strong-armed heroes display their energies in their own bodies.

7. According to their wont these men, exceeding terrible, impetuous, with strong and unbending forms¹, bring with them beautiful light².

8. The arrow of the Sobharis is shot from the bowstrings at the golden chest on the chariot of the Maruts¹. They, the kindred of the cow (*Prisni*),

the well-born, should enjoy their food, the great ones should help us.

9. Bring forward, O strongly-anointed¹ (priests), your libations to the strong host of the Maruts, the strongly advancing.

10. O Maruts, O heroes, come quickly hither, like winged hawks, on your chariot with strong horses, of strong shape, with strong naves, to enjoy our libations.

11. Their anointing is the same, the golden chains shine on their arms, their spears sparkle.

12. These strong, manly, strong-armed Maruts, do not strive among themselves; firm are the bows, the weapons on your chariot, and on your faces are splendours.

13. They whose terrible name¹, wide-spreading like the ocean, is the one of all that is of use, whose strength is like the vigour of their father,

14. Worship these Maruts, and praise them! Of these shouters, as of moving spokes¹, no one is the last; this is theirs by gift, by greatness² is it theirs.

15. Happy is he who was under your protection, O Maruts, in former mornings, or who may be so even now.

16. Or he, O men, whose libations you went to enjoy; that mighty one, O shakers, will obtain your favours with brilliant riches and booty.

17. As the sons of Rudra, the servants of the divine Dyu¹, will it, O youths, so shall it be.

18. Whatever liberal givers may worship¹ the Maruts, and move about together as generous² benefactors, even from them turn³ towards us with a kinder heart, you youths!

19. O Sobhari, call loud with your newest song

[32]

n d

the young, strong, and pure Maruts, as the plougher calls the cows.

20. Worship the Maruts with a song, they who are strong like a boxer, called in to assist those who call ¹ for him in all fights; (worship them) the most glorious, like bright-shining bulls.

21. Yes, O united friends, kindred, O Maruts, by a common birth, the oxen lick one another's humps ¹.

22. O ye dancers, with golden ornaments on your chests, even a mortal comes (to ask) for your brotherhood ¹; take care of us, ye Maruts, for your friendship lasts for ever.

23. O bounteous Maruts, bring us some of your Marut-medicine, you friends, and (quick, like) steeds.

24. With the favours whereby you favour the Sindhu, whereby you save, whereby you help Krivi ¹, with those propitious favours be our delight, O delightful ones, ye who never hate your followers ².

25. O Maruts, for whom we have prepared good altars, whatever medicine ¹ there is on the Sindhu, on the Asikni, in the seas, on the mountains,

26. Seeing it, you carry it all on your bodies. Bless us with it! Down to the earth, O Maruts ¹, with what hurts our sick one,—straighten what is crooked!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Sobhari Kânva ; metre, Kâkubha pragâtha.
Verse 1 = SV. I, 401 ; verse 21 = SV. I, 404.

Verse 1.

SV. reads sthâta, and *dridhâ kid yamayishnavah*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. It might be better to supply *rathaiḥ*, but the poet may have used *pars pro toto*.

Note 2. The Sobharis, who are mentioned in the 8th *Mandala* only, are clearly a clan of that name, and their hymns form a small collection by itself. See Oldenberg, *Prolegomena*, p. 209 seq.

Verse 3.

Note 1. *Milhvas* is sometimes used by itself in the sense of patron or benefactor, VII, 86, 7 ; 97, 2. Whether it can govern a genitive is doubtful, but see VII, 58, 5, note.

Note 2. Here again, as in II, 34, 11, *Vishnu esha* seems to mean Soma, possibly the food, or even the seed (*retas*) of *Vishnu*. *Sâyana* too takes *Vishnu* as a name of rain. In I, 154, 5, we read that the spring of *madhu* is in the highest place of *Vishnu*. Could it mean the generous sons of *Vishnu* ?

Verse 4.

Note 1. My translation is purely conjectural. I take *dvipa* for isolated or scattered clouds, different from the *dukkhunâ*, which I take for the black mass of storm-clouds, threatening destruction. Grassmann : 'Die Wolkeninseln stoben und das Unheil floh.' Ludwig : 'Empor stiegen gewaltig die waszerinseln, still stand das unglück.'

Note 2. The coming together of heaven and earth and their apparent widening have been ascribed to the Maruts before. It seems hardly possible to translate *dhanvâni* here by bows. I take it for the wide expanse, as if the desert, of the sky.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *psu* in *vṛishapsu*, see note to VIII, 7, 7.

Note 2. Possibly *srīyam vāhante* has to be taken like *subham yā*, see Gaedicke, *Accusativ*, p. 163.

Verse 8.

Note 1. In support of the translation which I proposed in I, 85, 10, note 2, all I can say is that *ag* is a verb used for shooting forth an arrow, see I, 112, 16, and that *vāna* may be used in the sense of *bāna*, reed and arrow, and that *go* is used for bowstring, see B.-R. s.v. The question, however, arises, how does this verse come in here? How does the fact that the Sobharis, who are praising the storm-gods, shoot their arrow at the golden chest on their chariot, agree with what precedes and follows?

Let us look first whether a more natural translation can be found. B.-R. translate: 'The sacrificial music of the Sobharis is furnished and therefore made more attractive by draughts of milk (or animal food).' In order to support such a translation, it should be proved, first, that *vāna* ever means sacrificial music, and that such sacrificial music can be spoken of as *agyate* (it is furnished), *gobhiḥ* (by milk-draughts). Grassmann translates: 'Durch Milchtrank wird der Sobharis Musik belohnt.' Here again it must be proved that *vāna* can mean sacrificial music, and *agyate*, it is rewarded. Ludwig translates: 'Mit der milch wird gesalbt den Sobhari der zapfen am wagen am goldnen korbe.' This is explained to mean that 'the bolt on the chariot of the Maruts is to be greased with milk, so that the milk may stream down on the Sobharis.' I doubt whether *vāna* can mean bolt, and I do not see that the intention of the poet, namely to ask for rain, would be conveyed by such words.

Sâyana interprets: 'Through the cows, i. e. the hymns, of the Sobharis the lyre of the Maruts is made evident;' or, 'by the cows, i. e. the Maruts, the lyre is manifested for the sake of the Sobharis.'

In support of my own translation I can only appeal to a

custom ascribed by Herodotus (IV, 94) to another ancient Aryan tribe, namely the Thracians, who, when there is thunder and lightning, shoot arrows against the sky. Herodotus in trying to find a motive for this says they do it to threaten the god, because they believe in no other god but their own. This may be so; the only question is whether in shooting their arrows against the sky, they hoped to drive the clouds away, or wished them to give up their treasure, namely the rain. I should feel inclined to take the latter view, but in either case we see that what the Thracians did, was exactly what the Sobharis are said to do here, namely to shoot an arrow at the golden chest or treasure on the chariot of the Maruts. This is, of course, no more than a conjecture, and I shall gladly give it up, if a more appropriate meaning can be elicited from this line. What is against it is the frequent occurrence of *aṅg* with *gobhiḥ* in the sense of covering with milk, see IX, 45, 3; V, 3, 2, &c. As to *rátke kóse hiranyáye*, see VIII, 22, 9.

Verse 9.

Note 1. *Vrishad-aṅgayak* for *vrishan-aṅgayak*, see J. Schmidt, K. Z. XXVI, 358. It cannot mean 'raining down ointments,' as Grassmann supposes, because that would be *varshad-aṅgayak*, if it existed at all. Besides, the *aṅgis* are never poured down, nor are they sacrificial viands. The repetition of the word *vrishan* is intentional, and has been discussed before.

Verse 13.

Note 1. *Nāman* is, of course, more than the mere name; but name can be used in much the same sense.

Verse 14.

Note 1. The simile of the aras, as in V, 58, 5, seems to require another negative.

Note 2. See V, 87, 2, on *dānā* and *mahnā*.

Verse 17.

Note 1. On *diváh ásurasya vedhásak*, see von Bradke, *Dyaus Asura*, pp. 44 and 46. It should be remembered,

however, that vedhas and medhas interchange. Thus in RV. IX, 102, 4, we have vedhām, in SV. I, 101, medhām. On medhās, the Zend mazdā, see Darmesteter, Ormazd, p. 29. I take servant in the sense of worshipper, from vidh.

Verse 18.

Note 1. Arhanti, in the sense of arhayanti, to worship, seems better than to be worthy of, or to have a right to.

Note 2. *Mil'kúshaḥ* can be nominative, see Lanman, p. 511; but it may also refer to the Maruts, and then be accusative.

Note 3. Instead of *ā vavridhvam*, which Ludwig translates, *Nemt uns für euch in besitz*, Grassmann translates, *Wendet euch zu uns her*. He read therefore *ā vavridhvam*, and this, the plural corresponding to *ā vavritsya*, seems to be the right reading.

Verse 20.

Note 1. Grassmann proposes to change *pritsú hótṛishu* into *yutsú pritsúshu*. But may not *hótṛishu* be used here in a sense corresponding to that of *hávya*? *Hávya* has almost the technical meaning of an ally who is to be called for assistance. Thus IV, 24, 2. *sáh vrītrahátye hávyah*; VII, 32, 24. *bháre-bhare ka hávyah*, &c. Now a *hávyaḥ*, one who is called, presupposes a *hótṛi*, one who calls for assistance. It is true that *hotṛi*, from *hu*, to pour out, has so completely become a technical name that it seems strange to see it used here, in a new etymological sense, as caller. But the connection with *havya* may justify what may have been meant as a play on the words. Wilson seems to have taken the verse in a similar sense, when he translates: 'and like a boxer who has been challenged over his challengers.' He, like Ludwig, takes *hotṛi* as a challenger. I prefer to take it as calling for aid. I am not satisfied, however, with either translation, nor does Grassmann or Ludwig offer anything useful.

Verse 21.

Note 1. In the SV. *marútaḥ* and *riháte* have the accent

on the second syllable. *Sábandhavaḥ* was used before of the Maruts, V, 59, 5; according to its accent it would here refer to *gávaḥ*. I can see no meaning in this verse except a very naturalistic one, namely that the Maruts, who are described as friends and brothers, as never quarrelling and always of one mind, are here compared to oxen, grazing in the same field, and so far from fighting, actually licking the humps on each other's backs.

Verse 22.

Note 1. Grassmann, 'geht euch an um eure Brüderschaft;' possibly, 'becomes your brother.'

Verse 24.

Note 1. It is, no doubt, very tempting to change *tūrvatha* into *turvāsam*, as Ludwig proposes. The difficulty is to understand how such a change should have come about. *Sindhu* may mean here, not so much the river, as the people living on its shores. *Krivi* is said to be an old name of the *Pañkālas* (Sat. Br. XIII, 5, 4, 7). But, because the *Pañkālas* were called *Krivis*, and because in later times we often hear of *Kuru-Pañkālas*, it does in no way follow that the *Krivis* were identical with the *Kurus*. It proves rather the contrary. *Kuru* may be derived from *kar*, and may have meant active, but it may also have had a very different original meaning. A derivation of *krivi* from *kar* is still more objectionable.

Note 2. *Asaḥadvishaḥ*, which I translate by not hating your followers, is translated by Ludwig: 'ihr, denen kein haszer folgt.' It may also be rendered by 'hating those who do not follow you.'

Verse 25.

Note 1. The medicines are generally brought by *Rudra*, and by his sons, the *Maruts*.

Verse 26.

Note 1. As to *kshamá rápaḥ*, see X, 59, 8-10; AV. VI, 57, 3; as to *íshkarta*, VIII, 1, 12.

MANDALA VIII, HYMN 94.

ASHTAKA VI, ADHYÂYA 6, VARGA 28-29.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. The cow, wishing for glory, the mother of the bounteous Maruts, sends forth her milk; the two horses¹ have been harnessed to the chariots,—

2. She in whose lap¹ all gods observe their duties, sun and moon (also), that they may be seen;

3. Therefore all our friends¹, the singers, invite the Maruts always, to drink (our) Soma.

4. This Soma here has been prepared, the Maruts drink of it, the Asvins also drink of the lord (Soma)¹.

5. Mitra, Aryaman, Varuṇa drink of the Soma which is continually¹ clarified, dwelling in three abodes², procuring offspring.

6. May Indra also rejoice to his satisfaction in this pressed juice, mixed with milk, like a Hotri¹ at the morning-sacrifice.

7. Did the brilliant lords flare up? Endowed with pure strength they rush, like water, through their enemies.

8. Shall I now choose the favour of you, the great gods, who by yourselves shine forth marvellously,

9. The Maruts, who, when going to drink Soma, spread out the whole earth and the lights of heaven.

10. I call now them who are endowed with pure strength, you, O Maruts, from heaven, that you may drink the Soma here;

11. I call now those Maruts who hold heaven and earth asunder, that they may drink the Soma here ;

12. I call now that manly company of the Maruts, dwelling in the mountains, that they may drink the Soma here.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Bindu or Pūṭadakṣha. Metre, Gāyatrī. Verse 1=SV. I, 149; verse 4=SV. I, 174; II, 1135; verse 5=SV. II, 1136; verse 6=SV. II, 1137. The whole hymn can easily be divided into *trikas*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I adopt Ludwig's correction of the Pada, changing *váhniḥ* to *váhni iti*, though it interrupts somewhat the connection between the first and second verses. Still it seems as impossible to change *Prisni*, the mother of the Maruts, into a cart-horse as into a sucking-calf. This we should have to do, if we took *dhayati* in its usual sense of sucking. Still *dhayati* means to suck, not to suckle. The commentary to the SV. explains *vahniḥ* as *vodhrī*, the driver.

Verse 2.

Note 1. I should prefer to take *upásthe* in the sense of proximity, which, as in the case of *vṛikshopasthe*, may be translated by shadow, or protection.

Verse 3.

Note 1. I cannot believe that we can take *aryá ā* in our passage as *aryé ā*, and translate it with Pischel (Z. D. M. G. XL, p. 125) by 'our singers among the Aryas.' With the plural *kārávaḥ* we should expect *aryéshu ā*, not *aryé ā*; see also Bergaigne, III, 287; II, 218. Pāda a and b are *galita*, see VI, 45, 33.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Svarāg* seems to be meant for Soma as lord, not as brilliant.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Tánā* is generally explained by *ūrṇāstukanirmita daśāpavitra*; see also Bergaigne, I, 179.

Note 2. The three abodes are either the morning, noon,

and evening sacrifices, or the three Soma-vessels, the *Dronakalasa*, *Ādhavanīya*, and *Pūtabhrīt*.

Verse 6.

Note 1. I do not see why *hótā-iva* should not mean 'like the priest,' for the priest also rejoices in the libation; see *Arthasaṃgraha*, ed. Thibaut, pp. 10 and 20. Ludwig prefers to take *hótā* for Agni, fire.

Verse 9.

Note 1. See note to I, 6, 9, and 10, note 1.

MANDALA X, HYMN 77.

ASHṬAKA VIII, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 10-11.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Let me with my voice shower¹ wealth like cloud-showers², like sacrifices of a sage, rich in oblations. I have praised the goodly host of the Maruts³, so that they may be worthy of a Brahman⁴, so that they may be glorious.

2. These boys have prepared their ornaments for beauty, the goodly host of the Maruts, through many nights; the sons of Dyu struggled, like harts, they, the Âdityas, grew high, like banners¹.

3. They who by their own might seem to have risen above heaven and earth, like the sun above the cloud, they are glorious, like brilliant heroes, they shine forth like foe-destroying youths.

4. When you move along on the bottom of the waters, the earth seems to break and to melt¹. This perfect sacrifice is meet for you, come hither together, as if enjoying our offerings.

5. You are as drivers¹ on the poles with their reins, and as brilliant with light at daybreak; like hawks, you are famous destroyers of foes; like wells² springing forth, you scatter moisture.

6. When you, O Maruts, come from afar, knowing the great treasure of the hidden place, O Vasus, the treasure which has to be gained, then keep away also from afar all who hate us.

7. The man who, firm in his sacrifice, offers gifts to the Maruts to the end of the ceremony¹, he

gains health and wealth, blessed with offspring ; he shall also be in the keeping of the gods.

8. They are indeed our guardians, to be worshipped at all sacrifices, most blissful by their name of Ādityas ; may they, swiftly driving on their chariots, protect our prayer, quick even on their march, delighting in our sacrifice.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Syûmarasmi Bhârgava. On the metre, see Rig-veda, translation, Introd. p. civ; Benfey, Quantitätsversch. IV, 2; 38-39; Oldenberg, Prolegomena, 92. This hymn and the next belong closely together. They are both so artificial and obscure that a translation of them can only be tentative. None of its verses occurs in SV., VS., AV., TS., TB., MS.

Verse 1.

Note 1. I take prushâ for prushâni.

Note 2. I do not think that abhraprúshaḥ can be meant for the Maruts.

Note 3. The ná in many of the verses seems to be due to a mere trick, and untranslatable.

Note 4. Or, 'I have praised the priestly host, so that they may be worthy of good Marut-hood.'

Verse 2.

Note 1. Akrâḥ, banners, Grassmann; columns, Ludwig. The meaning is utterly unknown.

Verse 4.

Note 1. See Aurel Mayr, Beiträge aus dem Rig-Veda, p. 12. 'The earth melted,' see Ps. xlv. 6.

Verse 5.

Note 1. Prayug seems to mean here a driver; pra-yug is often used of the Maruts as harnessing or driving their horses; see I, 85, 5; V, 52, 8.

Note 2. Prava has been derived from pru, to float. I should prefer to derive it from pra-van, from which we have pra-vana, precipice, possibly the Latin adjective pronus, and, very irregularly, Greek πρηνής. Stems in radical n frequently enter the class of stems in â and a, and pravan would become pravâḥ or pravaḥ, as -gan becomes -gâḥ and -gaḥ; cf. Lanman,

p. 478. Others take vana for a mere suffix like vat. Prava, rushing forward, would have been a good name for a spring. This, of course, is a mere conjecture. Others derive pravâ-s from vâ, to blow. As a substantive pravâ as well as upavâ occurs AV. XII, 1, 51. *vâtasya pravâm upavâm ânu vâty arêh*. But these words mean the blowing before and the blowing after, and not blowers. There are the verbs pravâ and anuvâ in *Tândya Br.* I, 9, 7; TS. III, 5, 2, 3; IV, 4, 1, 1. They are there referred to dawn and night. These passages, however, seem too technical to allow us to fix the original meaning of prava-*h*. Pravâ in RV. I, 34, 8, remains unexplained.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *udrîki*, see Ludwig's note.

MANDALA X, HYMN 78.

ASHTAKA VIII, ADHYĀYA 3, VARGA 12-13.

TO THE MARUTS (THE STORM-GODS).

1. Full of devotion like priests with their prayers, wealthy like pious men, who please the gods with their offerings, beautiful to behold like brilliant kings, without a blemish like the youths of our hamlets—

2. They who are gold-breasted like Agni with his splendour, quick to help like self-harnessed winds, good leaders like the oldest experts, they are to the righteous man like Somas, that yield the best protection.

3. They who are roaring and hasting like winds, brilliant like the tongues of fires, powerful like mailed soldiers, full of blessings like the prayers of our fathers,

4. Who hold together like the spokes of chariot-wheels, who glance forward like victorious heroes, who scatter *ghṛita*¹ like wooing youths, who chant beautifully like singers, intoning a hymn of praise,

5. Who are swift like the best of horses, who are bounteous like lords of chariots on a suit, who are hastening on like water with downward floods, who are like the manifold¹ *Āngiras* with their (numerous) songs.

6. These noble sons of *Sindhu*¹ are like grinding-stones, they are always like *Soma*-stones², tearing everything to pieces; these sons of a good mother are like playful children, they are by their glare like a great troop on its march.

7. Illumining the sacrifice¹ like the rays of the dawn, they shone forth in their ornaments like triumphant warriors; the Maruts with bright spears seem like running rivers, from afar they measure many miles.

8. O gods, make us happy and rich, prospering us, your praisers, O Maruts! Remember our praise and our friendship, for from of old there are always with you gifts of treasures.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Syûmarasmi Bhârgava. None of its verses occurs elsewhere. Metre, 1, 3, 4, 8 Trishtubh; 2, 5-7 Gagatî.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Ghr̥itaprush*, Fett sprühend, Gluth austheilend, according to Grassmann; *gh̥r̥ita*-sprühend, according to Ludwig. Sâyaṇa takes *vareyávaḥ* as wishing to give presents, and explains that such gifts were preceded by a gift of water, so that *gh̥r̥itaprúshaḥ* would mean, giving water or rain. The real meaning is difficult.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Visvarûpa* may have been meant in a more special and mythological sense.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Sîndhu-mâtaraḥ* may be a synonym of *Prisni-mâtaraḥ*, *sindhu* being used as a name of the water in the sky. It may also mean, having the river *Sindhu* for their mother, i. e. coming from the region of the river. Bergaigne translates (II, 397), 'qui ont pour mère la rivière céleste. Cette rivière peut être une des formes de la vache qui passe aussi pour leur mère.'

Note 2. The *grāvānaḥ* and *ádrayaḥ* are probably meant for stones used for pounding corn and squeezing Soma.

Verse 7.

Note 1. On *adhvarasrî*, see Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 53.

MANDALA I, HYMN 43.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYÂYA 3, VARGA 26-27.

TO RUDRA.

1. What could we say to Rudra, the wise, the most liberal, the most powerful, that is most welcome to his heart,—

2. So that Aditi¹ may bring Rudra's healing to the cattle, to men, to cow, and kith,

3. So that Mitra, that Varuna, that Rudra hear us, and all the united Maruts¹.

4. We implore Rudra, the lord of songs, the lord of animal sacrifices¹, the possessor of healing medicines², for health, wealth³, and his favour.

5. He who shines like the bright sun, and like gold, who is the best Vasu among the gods,

6. May he bring health to our horse, welfare to ram and ewe, to men, to women, and to the cow !

7. Bestow on us, O Soma, the happiness of a hundred men, great glory of strong manhood¹;

8. O Soma¹, let not those who harass and injure overthrow us; O Indu, help us to booty !

9. Whatever beings are thine, the immortal, in the highest place of the law, on its summit¹, in its centre, O Soma, cherish them, remember them who honour thee.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Kanva Ghaura, and addressed to Rudra (1, 2, 4-6), to Rudra and Mitrâ-Varunau (3), and to Soma (7-9). Metre, Gâyatrî (1-8); Anushtubh (9). Verse 2 in TS. III, 4, 11, 2; MS. IV, 12, 6.

The hymn may be divided into two, the first from 1-6, the second from 7-9. See, however, Bergaigne, III, 32, n. 1; and Recherches sur l'hist. de la Samhitâ, I, 65. He would prefer to divide the whole into three hymns.

Verse 1.

See TÂ. X, 17, 1; Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. I, 246.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Ludwig takes Aditi here as a name of Rudra; also Hillebrandt, Über die Göttin Aditi, p. 6.

Verse 3.

Note 1. The *visve sagóshasaḥ*, following on Rudra, can hardly be meant for any but the Maruts, who are often called *sagóshasaḥ*. But it may also have been intended for all the gods together.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Gâthápatim and medhápatim are both difficult. We expect gâthápatim and medhápatim. If, as Ludwig maintains, gâtha in Zend is equivalent to *ritu*, season, then gâthapati might be *ritupati*, a name of Agni, X, 2, 1. But this is extremely doubtful. We must derive gâthápati from gâthā, I, 167, 6, and medhápati from medhā, animal sacrifice, till we know more on the subject.

Note 2. Gálâsha-bheshagam, an epithet of Rudra; see VIII, 29, 5, where Rudra is intended. In II, 33, 7, the arm of Rudra is called bheshagáh gálâshaḥ; in VII, 35, 6, Rudra himself is called gálâshaḥ. Gálâsha seems connected with gala, water. Bergaigne, III, 32, translates it by adoucissant.

Note 3. On *samyóḥ*, see note 2 to I, 165, 4.

Verse 7.

Note 1. Tuvi-*nr̥im̐na* would seem more appropriate as a vocative. In verse 8, too, I should prefer to take Soma as a vocative, like Benfey and Grassmann.

Verse 8.

Note 1. I read Soma, paribádhaḥ. See Delbrück, Synt. Forsch. p. 116.

Verse 9.

Note 1. Unless we can take mûrdhá for a locative, attracted by nábhā, I should propose to read mûrdhán nábhā. It can hardly be an adverbial Dvandva, mûrdhá-nábhā, nor do I see how it can be applied as a nominative to Rudra. The whole verse is difficult, possibly a later addition. On *ritásya amṛtasya dhāman*, see IX, 97, 32 ; 110, 4 (dhárman).

MANDALA I, HYMN 114.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 5-6.

TO RUDRA.

1. We offer these prayers¹ to Rudra, the strong, whose hair is braided², who rules over heroes³, that he may be a blessing to man and beast, that everything in this our village may be prosperous and free from disease.

2. Be gracious to us, O Rudra, and give us joy, and we shall honour thee, the ruler of heroes, with worship. What health and wealth father Manu acquired by his sacrifices, may we obtain the same, O Rudra, under thy guidance.

3. O bounteous Rudra, may we by sacrifice obtain the goodwill of thee, the ruler of heroes; come to our clans, well-disposed, and, with unharmed men, we shall offer our libation to thee.

4. We call down for our help the fierce Rudra, who fulfils our sacrifice, the swift, the wise; may he drive far away from us the anger of the gods; we desire his goodwill only.

5. We call down with worship the red boar of the sky, the god with braided hair, the blazing form; may he who carries in his hand the best medicines grant us protection, shield, and shelter!

6. This speech is spoken for the father of the Maruts, sweeter than sweet, a joy¹ to Rudra; grant to us also, O immortal, the food of mortals, be gracious to us and to our kith and kin!

7. Do not slay our great or our small ones, our

growing or our grown ones, our father or our mother, and do not hurt our own¹ bodies, O Rudra!

8. O Rudra, hurt us not in our kith and kin, nor in our own life, not in our cows, nor in our horses! Do not slay our men in thy wrath: carrying libations, we call on thee always.

9. Like a shepherd¹, I have driven these praises near to thee; O father of the Maruts, grant us thy favour! For thy goodwill is auspicious, and most gracious, hence we desire thy protection alone.

10. Let thy cow-slaying and thy man-slaying be far away¹, and let thy favour be with us, O ruler of heroes! Be gracious to us, and bless us, O god, and then give us twofold protection².

11. We have uttered our supplication to him, desiring his help; may Rudra with the Maruts hear our call. May Mitra, Varuna, Aditi, the River, Earth, and the Sky grant us this!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Kutsa Ângirasa. Metre, 1-9 Gagatî; 10, 11 Trishubh. Verse 1=VS. XVI, 48; TS. IV, 5, 10, 1; MS. II, 9, 9 (yáthâ nah sám); verse 2=TS. IV, 5, 10, 2; verse 7=VS. XVI, 15; TS. IV, 5, 10, 2; verse 8=VS. XVI, 16; TS. III, 4, 11, 2; IV, 5, 10, 3; MS. IV, 12, 6 (áyushi; havishmanto námasâ vidhema te); verse 10=TS. IV, 5, 10, 3.

Verse 1.

Note 1. TS. reads imám matím, and yáthâ nah sám.

Note 2. Kapardin is an epithet not only of Rudra, but also of Pûshan (VI, 55, 2; IX, 67, 11), and of a Vedic clan, the Trîtsus (VII, 83, 8) or Vasishthas; see Roth, Zur Literatur und Geschichte des Weda, pp. 94 seq.; Oldenberg, Z.D.M.G. XLII, p. 207. Kaparda is the name of a shell, and the hair twisted together in the form of a shell seems to have suggested the name of kapardin.

Note 3. Kshayád-vîra means 'ruling over heroes,' just as mandád-vîra (VIII, 69, 1) means 'delighting heroes.' This meaning is applicable to all passages where kshayád-vîra occurs, and there is no reason why we should translate it by 'destroyer of heroes,' which can hardly be considered as an epitheton ornans. No doubt, a god who rules and protects can also be conceived as punishing and destroying, and this is particularly the case with Rudra. Hence in certain passages Rudra may well be invoked as nrîhán (IV 3, 6), just as we read of the Maruts (VII, 56, 17): 'May that bolt of yours which kills cattle and men be far from us! Incline to us, O Vasu, with your favours!' See Muir, S.T. IV, p. 301, note.

Verse 2.

TS. reads áyagé and pránîtau. See Ludwig, Notes, p. 265.

Verse 6.

Note 1. On the meaning of vardhana and vridh in Zend, see Darmesteter, Ormazd, pp. 41, 6; 92, 1.

Verse 7.

Note 1. TS. reads *priyá má nas tanúvaḥ rudra rīriṣaḥ*. Priya, dear, used like φίλος, in the sense of our own. See Bergaigne, III, 152.

Verse 8.

See Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. I, p. 141 (ed. 1837); and Svetāsvat. Up. in S. B. E. XV, p. 254, note. Āyushi for āyaú is supported by VS. and TS. I propose to read āyau for āyaú. Bhāmitáḥ is supported by TS. and Svet. Up., while VS. reads bhāmīnaḥ, which Mahidhara refers to virān. The last line is the same in RV. and VS., but the TS. reads havīshmanto námasā vidhema te, while the Svet. Up. reads havishmantaḥ sadasi tvā havāmahe.

Verse 9.

Note 1. As to the simile, see RV. X, 127, 8, and Muir S. T. IV, p. 304, note.

Verse 10.

Note 1. TS. reads *ārāt te, goghná (°é), purushaghné, kshayádvirāya, rákshā* for *mṛiṣā, deva brūhi*.

Note 2. I take *dvibárhāḥ*, which stands for *dvibárhaḥ*, as an adjective to *sárma*, or possibly as an adverb, see Lanman, p. 560. It can hardly refer to Rudra, as Grassmann supposes. See J. Schmidt, Pluralbildungen der Neutra, pp. 132 seq.

MANDALA II, HYMN 33.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 7, VARGA 16-18.

TO RUDRA, THE FATHER OF THE MARUTS
(THE STORM-GODS).

1. O father of the Maruts, let thy favour come near, and do not deprive us of the sight of the sun ; may the hero (Rudra) be gracious to our horse¹, and may we increase in offspring, O Rudra !

2. May I attain to a hundred winters through the most blissful medicines which thou hast given ! Put away far¹ from us all hatred, put away anguish, put away sicknesses in all directions !

3. In beauty thou art the most beautiful of all that exists, O Rudra, the strongest of the strong, thou wielder of the thunderbolt ! Carry us happily to the other shore of our anguish, and ward off all assaults of mischief¹.

4. Let us not incense thee, O Rudra, by our worship, not by bad praise, O hero, and not by divided praise ! Raise up our men by thy medicines, for I hear thou art the best of all physicians.

5. He who is invoked¹ by invocations and libations, may I pay off² that Rudra with my hymns of praise. Let not him who is kind-hearted³, who readily hears our call, the tawny, with beautiful cheeks, deliver us to this wrath !

6. The manly hero with the Maruts has gladdened me, the suppliant, with more vigorous health. May I without mischief find shade, as if from sunshine¹, may I gain the favour of Rudra !

7. O Rudra, where is thy softly stroking hand which cures and relieves¹? Thou, the remover of all heaven-sent mischief, wilt thou, O strong hero, bear with me?

8. I send forth a great, great hymn of praise to the bright tawny bull. Let me reverence¹ the fiery god² with prostrations; we celebrate the flaring name³ of Rudra.

9. He, the fierce god, with strong limbs, assuming many forms, the tawny Rudra, decked himself with brilliant golden ornaments. From Rudra, who is lord of this wide world, divine power¹ will never depart.

10. Worthily thou bearest arrows and bow, worthily, O worshipful¹, the golden, variegated chain; worthily thou cuttest every fiend² here to pieces, for there is nothing indeed stronger than thou, O Rudra.

11. Praise him, the famous, sitting in his chariot¹, the youthful, who is fierce and attacks like a terrible wild beast² (the lion). And when thou hast been praised, O Rudra, be gracious to him who magnifies thee, and let thy armies³ mow down others than us!

12. O Rudra, a boy indeed makes obeisance to his father who comes to greet him¹: I praise the lord of brave men, the giver of many gifts, and thou, when thou hast been praised, wilt give us thy medicines.

13. O Maruts, those pure medicines of yours, the most beneficent and delightful, O heroes, those which Manu¹, our father, chose, those I crave from Rudra, as health and wealth.

14. May the weapon of Rudra avoid us¹, may the great anger of the flaring one pass us by.

Unstring thy strong bows² for the sake of our liberal lords, O bounteous Rudra, be gracious to our kith and kin.

15. Thus, O tawny and manly god, showing thyself¹, so as neither to be angry nor to kill, be mindful of our invocations², and, rich in brave sons, we shall magnify thee in the congregation.

NOTES.

Ascribed to *Gṛītsamada*. Metre, *Trishṭubh*. See Muir, S. T. IV, 309; Geldner and Kaegi, p. 90. Bergaigne, III, 153; Leop. v. Schroeder, *Indiens Literatur und Cultur*, 343. Verse 1=TB. II, 8, 6, 9; verse 2=TB. II, 8, 6, 8; verse 10=TĀ. IV, 5, 7; verse 11=TS. IV, 5, 10, 3; AV. XVIII, 1, 40; verse 14=VS. XVI, 50; TS. IV, 5, 10, 4; verse 15=TB. II, 8, 6, 9.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The words *abhi naḥ vīráḥ árvati kshameta* admit of different interpretation. Grassmann has: 'Der Held sei huldreich unsren schnellen Rossen;' Muir: 'May the hero spare our horses;' Ludwig: 'Unser held möge tüchtig zu Rosse sein.' The passages quoted by Ludwig from the Sat. Br. III, 7, 3, 1, and IV, 3, 4, 14, do not bear out the meaning of tüchtig sein, to be strong, they rather mean, to suffer, to submit to, with a dative. Yet *vīráḥ* by itself may mean son or offspring (III, 4, 9; VII, 1, 21; 56, 24), and if *abhi-ksham* in our passage could mean to be capable and strong, Ludwig's translation would be justified. But if we take *vīrá*, hero, as intended for Rudra, as Indra also is often called simply *vīra*, *abhi kshameta* would lend itself to the translation of 'to be gracious,' or 'to spare,' and I therefore translate: 'May the hero (Rudra) be gracious to our horse.' It should be understood in the same sense in verse 7, at least I see no reason to vary the translation as Geldner does, and also Ludwig, while Muir is right and consistent. Our poet uses the verb *abhiksham* frequently, II, 28, 3; 29, 2 (*abhikshantāraḥ*?). It seems confined to the second *Mandala*.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Vitarám*, wherever it occurs, is always joined with *vī* in the *Rig-veda*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. If *rāpas* is derived from *rap*, to whisper, it would have meant originally what is whispered, that is, slander, accusation, and then only crime. Latin *crimen* also meant originally what is heard, Leumund. *Crimen* is not connected with the Greek *κρίνω*. The *î* in *crimen* has to be accounted for like the *î* in *liber*, from *lubh* (*libh*). The *r* is irregular, unless we find an analogy in *increpare*.

Verse 5.

Note 1. *Hávate*, we expect *húyáte*. Ludwig's explanation has not solved the difficulty, and *suhávaḥ* points back to *yo havate*. Oldenberg suggests an anacoluthon, He who invokes—may I.

Note 2. I formerly took *áva dishīya* in the sense of 'to unloose,' used originally with reference to tethered horses. As horses are unloosed before they can do their work, so the gods are, as it were, unloosed by prayer, or set off, so that they may fulfil what they are asked to do; see RV. I, 25, 3. In the passage quoted by Ludwig from the TS. I, 8, 6, 2, the same meaning seemed quite appropriate: *áva Rudrám adimahi—yáthā naḥ sréyasaḥ kárat*, 'We unloosed Rudra, that he might make us happier.' Ludwig takes it to mean, 'We have bound, tied, or obliged Rudra, so that he make us happy,' but the preposition *ava* is against this interpretation. Muir proposes 'to avert' or 'to propitiate,' the latter being adopted by Geldner.

However, in an article lately published by Roth on Wergeld in the Veda (Z.D.M.G. XLI, 672), *ava-day* has been recognised as an almost technical legal term, meaning 'to pay off, to compound.' Thus, *Tândya* Br. XVI, 1, 12, we read *yâḥ satam vairam tad devân avadayate*, 'He portions off, i.e. he satisfies, or pacifies, the gods who were offended, by giving a hundred cows.' With *niḥ*, we find TB. I, 6, 10, 1. *pragâ rudrân nîr áva dayate*; the same occurs in Maitr. S. I, 10, 20, where we also read, *grîheshv eva Rudram nir ava dayata esha te Rudra bhâgas*. See also Ait. Br. II, 7, 1. There is a verse quoted, *ávâmba Rudrám adimahi*, in TS. I, 8, 6, 2;

and again in MS. I, 10, 4; *Kāth.* IX, 7; Kap. S. VIII, 10; VS. III, 58, and this gives us the right key to our verse, namely, 'May I pay off, may I pacify, Rudra with my songs of praise,' *dishîya* being the optat. of the aorist, *adimahi* the aor. ind.

Note 3. On *ridûdārah*, see Benfey, *Quantitätsversch.* V, 1; p. 25; Geldner, *K.Z.* XXVIII, 201; Ludwig, *Süsses in seinem bauche habend*; Bergaigne, *miséricordieux*. The meaning is doubtful.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Ghrîṇīva*, divided into *ghrîṇi-iva*, is a difficult form. Various attempts have been made to explain it. Grassmann translates: 'Wie Schatten von der Gluth mög unverseht ich des Rudra Huld erreichen,' preferring to write *ghrîner va*. Ludwig, in his notes: 'Bei hitze,' taking *ghrîṇi* as a locative. Muir: 'Shade in the heat.' Geldner: 'Vor Sonnengluth den Schatten,' taking *ghrîṇi* as an instrumental. Lanman (p. 379) takes the same view, though he admits that this would be the only example of an instrumental in the masculine, contracted to *i*. He translates: 'As by the heat unharmed, to shelter bring me.' He adds: 'It may be ablative with elision and crasis,' and this is likewise Roth's view. Weber thinks that we may retain *ghrîṇīva* in the *Samhitā* text, but should divide it into *ghrîṇi-iva*, 'like a man suffering from heat' (*Ind. Stud.* XIII, p. 58). I think we must take into account a parallel passage, VI, 16, 38. *ûpa khâyām iva ghrîṇeh āganma sārma te vayām*, see M.M., Preface to translation of *Rig-veda*, p. cxliii. Probably the apparent irregularity of the metre led to the change of *ghrîner iva* to *ghrîṇīva*, but *ghrîner iva* can be scanned $\cup - \cup$; see M.M., l. c., p. cxlviii.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Gālāsha* by itself occurs but once more as an epithet of Rudra, VII, 35, 6, and twice in composition, *gālāshabheshaga*; see I, 43, 4. The second *pāda* begins with *hāstak*.

Verse 8.

Note 1. Namasyá is difficult, but we can hardly take it for namasyámasi, masi being supplied from *grinimasi*. Nor do we gain by taking namasyá for an instrumental. Perhaps it is best to take it as a 1st pers. of the imperative.

Note 2. The meaning of kalmalikin is unknown.

Note 3. I think it is best to translate náma by name, though, no doubt, it implies more than the mere name. Geldner's 'majestätisch Wesen' is right, but it is only one side of náma. See VIII, 20, 13, note 1.

Verse 9.

Note 1. On vai, see Delbrück, Syntax, p. 483. On asurya, see von Bradke, Dyaus Asura, pp. 29, 34.

Verse 10.

Note 1. I have changed yagatám into yagata.

Note 2. Árhan idám dayase vísvam ábhvam has been rendered in different ways. Grassmann: 'Du theilst alle diese Macht aus.' Ludwig: 'Du besitzest all diese gewalt.' Geldner: 'Du besitzest höchste Macht.' Muir: 'Thou possessest all this vast world.' Dayase is used, no doubt, in the sense of cutting and distributing, but never in the sense of possessing. In several places, however, it has been translated by to cut and to destroy, e.g. X, 80, 2. agn/*h* vrítráni dayate purúni, 'Agni cuts up many enemies.' VI, 22, 9. vísvá/*h* agurya dayase ví máyá/*h*, 'thou destroyest all deceits.' See also IV, 7, 10; VI, 6, 5. As to ábhva in the sense of fiend, we had it before in I, 39, 8. á yá/*h* na/*h* ábhva/*h* íshate, ví tám yuyota. In other places it assumes a more neutral character, meaning monster, or monstrous power; see B.-R. s.v. 'To distribute power' is not a Vedic conception, nor does ábhva ever mean power in the sense of 'ungeheure Macht, or Urkraft' (Delbrück, Chrest. p. 49).

Verse 11.

Note 1. AV. XVIII, 1, 40, has gartasádam gánânám rágânám, and anyám asmát te. Garta-sad, literally, sitting

in the hole, probably the place of the chariot where the king sat, separated from the driver. These divided chariots can be seen in the ancient monuments of Assyria and Babylon. The king seems to stand in a box of his own, fighting, while the charioteer holds the reins, so as not to interfere with the king. See, however, Bergaigne, III, 122 seq.; Z. D. M. G. XL, 681.

Note 2. The *mṛigá bhîmá* is probably meant for the lion, cf. I, 154, 2, and Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, p. 78.

Note 3. As to the *senâs* of Rudra, see TS. IV, 5, 2, 1, *senâni*; AV. XI, 2, 31; Pâr. *Grîhy.* III, 8, 11.

Verse 12.

Note 1. The sense would be better if *vándamānam* could be changed to *vándamānaḥ*.

Verse 13.

Note 1. That father Manu obtained health and wealth from Rudra was mentioned before, I, 114, 2, and it is curious that the Vedic authority of Manu's *Smṛiti* should be based on the well-known sentence, *yat kimka Manur abravīt tad bhesagam*, Taitt. *Saṃh.* II, 2, 10, 2; cf. M. M., *Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit.* p. 89.

Verse 14.

Note 1. The VS. reads *pāri no rudrāsya hetír vrinaktu*, *pāri tveshāsya durmatír aghâyóḥ*. *Vṛigyâh* is the 3rd pers. sing. in s of the aor. opt.

Note 2. Rudra is called *sthiradhanvan*; see also IV, 4, 5; VIII, 19, 20; X, 116, 5; 6; 120, 4; 134, 2; Maitr. S. II, 9, 9.

Verse 15.

Note 1. *Kekitāna*, the vocative of the participle.

Note 2. Muir seems to translate *bodhi*, which *Sâyana* explains by *budhyasva*, by 'think of us now.' The TB. reads *havanasrôḥ*.

MANDALA VI, HYMN 74.

ASHTAKA V, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 18.

TO SOMA AND RUDRA.

1. Soma and Rudra, may you maintain your divine dominion, and may the oblations reach you properly. Bringing the seven treasures to every house, be kind to our children and our cattle.

2. Soma and Rudra, draw far away in every direction¹ the disease² which has entered our house. Drive far away Nirṛiti³, and may auspicious glories belong to us!

3. Soma and Rudra, bestow all these remedies on our bodies. Tear away and remove from us¹ whatever evil we have committed, which clings to our bodies.

4. Soma and Rudra, wielding sharp weapons and sharp bolts, kind friends, be gracious unto us here! Deliver us from the snare of Varuṇa, and guard us, as kind-hearted gods!

NOTES.

Ascribed to Bhâradvâga Bârhaspatya. Verse 2 occurs TS. I, 8, 22, 5; AV. VII, 42, 1; verse 3, TS. I, 8, 22, 5; AV. VII, 42, 2. All the four verses, but in a different order (3, 1, 2, 4), in MS. IV, 11, 2; see also *Kâth.* XI, 12. Metre, Trishûbh.

This is the only hymn addressed to Soma and Rudra. In the *Khândogya* Up. III, 7 and 9, the Rudras are said to have Indra, while the Maruts have Soma at their head.

It is translated by Geldner and Kaegi.

The whole hymn betrays its secondary character; first by violating the law of decrease, secondly by duals in au before consonants, and thirdly by using a very large number of passages from other hymns. Compare verse 1, pâda c, with V, 1, 5, c; verse 2, pâda c, with I, 24, 9, c; verse 2, pâda d, with VI, 1, 12, d. Phrases like verse 1, pâda d, *sâm nañ bhûtam dvipâde sâm kâtuhpade*, occur again and again, with slight modifications; see I, 114, 1; 157, 3; VII, 54, 1; X, 165, 1. Sumanasyâmânâ also is suspicious. It occurs again in the next hymn, the last of the *Mandala*, in VII, 33, 14, likewise a suspected hymn, and in the tenth *Mandala*, X, 51, 5; 7.

Verse 2.

Note 1. On *vîshûkîm*, see II, 33, 2.

Note 2. *Âmivâ* has been identified with *âvîa* by Fick, *Orient und Occident*, III, p. 121. The difficulty is *m=n*.

Note 3. The AV. reads *bâdhethâm dûrâm nîrrîtim*, the AV. and TS. read *parâkalî kritâm kid énah prâ mumuktam asmât*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. AV. reads *asmât* for *asmé*, and *ásat* for *ásti*.

Verse 4.

In the *Maitr. S.* the second half of this verse is, *mumuktâm asmân grastân abhîke prâ yakḥḥatam vrishanâ sântamâni*.

MANDALA VII, HYMN 46.

ASHṬAKA V, ADHYĀYA 4, VARGA 13.

TO RUDRA.

1. Offer ye these songs to Rudra whose bow is strong, whose arrows are swift, the self-dependent¹ god, the unconquered conqueror, the intelligent, whose weapons are sharp—may he hear us !

2. For, being the lord¹, he looks after what is born on earth ; being the universal ruler, he looks after what is born in heaven. Protecting us, come to our protecting doors, be without illness among our people, O Rudra !

3. May that thunderbolt of thine, which, sent from heaven, traverses the earth, pass us by ! A thousand medicines are thine, O thou who art freely accessible¹ ; do not hurt us in our kith and kin !

4. Do not strike us, O Rudra, do not forsake us ! May we not be in thy way when thou rushest forth furiously. Let us have our altar and a good report among men¹—protect us always with your favours !

NOTES.

Ascribed to Vasishṭha. Verse 1 occurs TB. II, 8, 6, 8. Metre, 1-3 Gagatī; 4 Trishṭubh.

Verse 1.

Note 1. The TB. has svadhāmne for svadhāvne, mîdhûshe for vedhâse, and *srinotana* for *srinotu nah*. The commentator explains both svadhāmne = svakīyasthānayuktāya, and svadhāvne = svadhārabdavākyenānnena yuktāya vā. On vedhas, see Bartholomae, K. Z. XXVII, 361; Ludwig, Z. D. M. G. XL, 716.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Geldner translates *kshayena* by 'from his high seat.' The meaning of *kshaya* in this place seems defined by the parallel expression *sāmrāgyena*.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Svapivāta has been variously translated. Grassmann gives Vielbegehrter; Ludwig, des windhauch in schlaf versenkt; Roth, wohl verstehend, denkend; Geldner, freundlicher; Muir, thou who art easy of access, which seems to me the right rendering; cf. *sūpāyana*. It is derived from *api* + *vat*, which occurs six times in the Rîg-veda. As a simple verb it means 'to go near, to attend,' as a causative, the same, or 'to bring near.' Thus, VII, 3, 10. *āpi krātum su-kétasam vatema*, may we obtain wisdom, full of good thoughts. VII, 60, 6. *āpi krātum su-kétasam vātantaḥ*, (the gods) obtaining wisdom, full of good thoughts (for their worshippers). X, 20, 1 (X, 25, 1). *bhadrām nah āpi vātaya mānaḥ*, let us obtain a good mind. I, 128, 2. *tām yagñā-sādham āpi vātayāmasi*, we go near to, or we bring near Agni, the performer of the sacrifice. I, 165, 13. *mān-māni—api-vātáyantaḥ*, bringing the prayers near, or attending to the prayers. X, 13, 5. *pitṛé putrásaḥ āpi avivatan ritām*, the sons brought the sacrifice to the father.

Api-vāta would then mean approach, or in a more

spiritual sense, attention, regard, and *su-apivâta* would mean either of easy approach, opposed to *durdharsha*, or full of kind attention and regard. See Muir, S.T. IV, p. 314, note. Bergaigne, III, 306, does not help us much, though he points out where the difficulty lies.

The following are the Zend passages in which *api-vat* occurs, with some notes sent me by Dr. Stein: *Apivatahê*, Y. 9, 25, 2. p. sg. med. c. Gen. 'Hom, du verstehst dich auf rechte Preissprüche' d.h. 'kannst sie würdigen;' *apivatâtê daênayâo mâzdayaçnois*, V. 9, 2, 47, 'vertraut mit dem Gesetz;' *daênâm zarazca dât apaêca aotât*, yt. 9, 26: 'wer das Gesetz lernt und in dasselbe eindringt;' *verezyôtûca frâcâ vatôyôtû*, Y. 35, 6, 'das richtig erkannte führe er aus und theile es mit;' Y. 44, 18 scheint *apivaiti* 1. p. sg. med. in der Bedeutung: 'in Erfahrung gebracht haben;' die Stelle ist indess sehr dunkel.

Verse 4.

Note 1. *Ā naḥ bhaga barhīshi gīvasamsé* seems a very simple sentence. It has been translated without any misgivings by Grassmann, Ludwig, Geldner and Kaegi and others.

Grassmann translates: 'Lass lange lebend uns die Streu noch schmücken.'

Ludwig: 'Gib uns anteil an dem barhis als verheiszung des lebens.'

Kaegi and Geldner (or Roth): 'Verstatt uns Theil an Opfer und an Herrschaft.'

Bergaigne often points to such translations with scorn, but after he has written several pages on the words in question, here on *gīvasamsa*, he is indeed very positive that it means 'formule qui donne la vie' (I, p. 306), but what such a 'formule' is, and how this meaning fits the whole sentence, he does not tell us.

Let us begin with what is clear. *Ā bhaga naḥ* with locative, means 'appoint us to something,' i.e. 'give us something.' Thus I, 121, 15. *ā naḥ bhaga gōshu*, means 'divide us, distribute us, appoint us to cows,' i.e. 'give us cows as our share.' The same expression is used when

instead of cows or riches, the gods are asked to give long life, glory, or sinlessness. Thus we read, I, 104, 6. *sáh tvám naḥ indra sūrye sáh apsú anâgâstvé á bhaga gīvaramsé*, that is, 'Indra, allow us to share and rejoice in the sun, in water, in sinlessness and praise of men.' X, 45, 10. *á tám bhaga sausravaséshu*, 'give him, let him share in, good renown.'

When we are once familiar with this phraseology, we cannot doubt that in our passage also we have to translate, 'let us have our barhis, our homely altar, and good report among men.'

Another word *narâsamsa* had originally the same meaning as *gīvaramsa*, but it was chiefly used as a name of Agni. He was called *Narâsamsa*, i. e. *Männerlob*, or *dyóh sámśa*, *Himmelslob*, as a German poet was once called *Frauenlob*, not only because he praised women, but because he was praised by women. As we can say, God is my song, the Vedic Rishis might call any god the *samsa*, i. e. the praise or song of men, of the fathers, or of the gods. So far from agreeing with Bergaigne, 'on comprendrait moins bien qu'une locution dont le sens propre aurait été "éloge mortel" eût désigné celui qui est loué par le mortel,' nothing is easier and better confirmed by other languages, while the invocation of 'une formule sacrée' is almost unintelligible. If in a later hymn Indra is called *gyéshtāḥ mántrāḥ*, in X, 50, 4, I should translate, 'thou art the oldest or the best song,' that is, 'the theme of the oldest song,' but not thou art a magic formula. There is no necessity therefore for taking *narâsamsa* as a possessive compound, possessed of the praise of men, nor must we forget that in words which become almost proper names the accent is by no means always a safe guide.

MANDALA I, HYMN 2.

ASHTAKA I, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 3-4.

To VÂYU.

1. Come hither, O Vâyu, thou beautiful one!¹
These Somas are ready, drink of them, hear our call!

2. O Vâyu, the praisers celebrate thee with hymns, they who know the feast-days¹, and have prepared the Soma.

3. O Vâyu, thy satisfying stream¹ goes to the worshipper, wide-reaching, to the Soma-draught.

4. O Indra and Vâyu, these (libations of Soma) are poured out; come hither for the sake of¹ our offerings, for the drops (of Soma) long for you.

5. O Indra and Vâyu, you perceive the libations, you who are rich in booty¹; come then quickly hither!

6. O Vâyu and Indra, come near to the work¹ of the sacrificer, quick, thus is my prayer², O ye men!

7. I call Mitra, endowed with holy strength¹, and Varuṇa, who destroys all enemies; who both fulfil a prayer accompanied by fat offerings².

8. On the right way, O Mitra and Varuṇa, you have obtained great wisdom, you who increase the right and adhere to the right¹;

9. These two sages, Mitra and Varuṇa, the mighty, wide-ruling, give us efficient strength.

NOTES.

Ascribed to Madhukēkandas Vaisvāmītra, and addressed to Vāyu (1-3), Indra and Vāyu (4-6), and to Mitra and Varuṇa (7-9). Metre, Gāyatrī. Verse 4=VS. VII, 8; XXXIII, 56; TS. I, 4, 4, 1; MS. I, 3, 6. Verse 7=SV. II, 197; VS. XXXIII, 57. Verse 8=SV. II, 198. Verse 9=SV. II, 199.

This hymn, with the hymn I, 3, belongs to the Pra-uga ceremony. It consists of three *trikas*.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Darsata, as applied to the wind, may be intended for visible, but its more general meaning is conspicuous, clarus, insignis.

Verse 2.

Note 1. Aharvid, which Benfey translates by tagekundig, Grassmann, die des Tages (Anbruch) kundig, seems to have two meanings. When applied to men, poets or priests, it means those who know (vid) the right days or seasons for every sacrifice, but when it is applied to certain deities, particularly those of the morning, it means finding (vind), bringing back the day, like lucifer. Thus the Asvins are called aharvidā (VIII, 5, 9; 21). The power (daksha) of Viṣṇu is called aharvid, conquering, or bringing, the light of the day (I, 156, 4). The priests, as inviting these gods, might possibly themselves be called aharvid, bringing back the light of day, but this seems doubtful.

Verse 3.

Note 1. This verse, though it seems easy, is really full of difficulties. The meaning of dhenā is very doubtful. It is explained as lips by native authorities, and would in that case be derived from dhe, to suck. But though this meaning is possible in some passages, particularly where dhene occurs in the dual, in other passages dhenā seems clearly to

mean a stream of milk, or of some other liquid, poured out (*visrīṣhta*) from the clouds or at a sacrifice. It often occurs in the dual dhene, and has then been taken as the upper and lower lips (not the nares, as Roth suggests), distinguished from *sipre*, the upper and lower jaws. See note on II, 34, 3. *Sāyana* (Rv. Bh. I, 101, 10) explains it by *gihvopagihvike*. *Durga* adds (*Nirukta Bhāṣya*, VI, 17) *ādhastye damṣhṛe vā gihvopagihvike vā, ity eke, taylor hy annam dhiyate*.

Benfey translates: 'Vāyu, deine vorkostende Lippe schreitet zum Opferer, weit hingestreckt zum Somatrank.' *Prapriṅkatī* can hardly mean vorkostend.

Verse 4.

Note 1. The instrumental *práyobhiḥ* is best translated here by 'for the sake of;' see *Wenzel*, *Instrumental*, p. 104.

Verse 5.

Note 1. On *vāginī* and *vāga*, see 'India, what can it teach us?' pp. 164, 166. The transition of meaning from *vāga*, booty, to *vāga*, wealth in general, finds an analogy in the German *kriegen*, to obtain, also in *Gewinn*, and *A.S. winnan*, to strive, to fight, to obtain. *Vāginīvasū*, in the dual, is a frequent epithet of the *Asvins*, II, 37, 5; V, 74, 6; 7; 75, 3; 78, 3; VIII, 5, 3; 12; 20; 8, 10; 9, 4; 10, 5; 22, 7; 14; 18; 26, 3; 85, 3; 101, 8; of *Indra*, III, 42, 5; X, 96, 8.

It differs little from *vāginīvat*, which is likewise applied to the *Asvins*, I, 120, 10, and comes to mean simply wealthy, liberal; cf. I, 122, 8; VII, 69, 1. *Vāginīvatī* is an epithet of *Ushas*, *Sarasvatī*, and *Sindhu*. A common phrase is *vāgebhiḥ vāginīvatī*, lit. wealthy in wealth, cf. I, 3, 10. *Vāginī* occurs as the feminine of *vāgin*, wealthy, or strong, but never in the sense of mare; cf. III, 61, 1. *úshaḥ vāgena vāginī*, *Ushas* wealthy by wealth or booty; VI, 61, 6. *Sarasvatī vāgeshu vāginī*, *Sarasvatī*, strong in battles; cf. I, 4, 8; 9. Native commentators generally explain *vāginī* by sacrifice, *vāginīvasu*, by dwelling in the sacrifice. I take *vāginī* in compounds like *vāginīvasu* as a collective

substantive, like *padminî*, *ûhinî*, *vâhinî*, *tretinî*, *anikinî*, &c., and in the sense of wealth ; unless we may look upon *vâginîvat* as formed in analogy to such words as *tavishî-mat*, only that in this case *tavishî* exists in the sense of strength. Pischel's explanation, *Ved. Stud.* p. 9, rich in mares, takes for granted the existence of *vâginî* in the sense of mare. I have not found any passage where *vâginî* has necessarily that sense.

Verse 6.

Note 1. *Nishkrîta* can hardly mean here what it means in later Sanskrit, a rendezvous.

Note 2. On *îthâ dhiyâ*, see Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 184.

Verse 7.

Note 1. *Pûtâdaksha*, cf. *pûtâkratu*, VIII, 68, 17.

Note 2. *Ghrîtâkî* seems to be taken here in a technical sense, like *ghritavat*, i.e. with oblations of butter thrown into the fire. In I, 167, 3, I took *ghritâkî* in the more general sense of bright, resplendent, while others ascribed to it the meaning of bringing fatness, i.e. rain. It may also mean accompanied by ghee. See B.-R. s. v.

Verse 8.

Note 1. *Rîtasprîs*, probably not very different from *rîtasâp*.

MANDALA I, HYMN 134.

ASHTAKA II, ADHYĀYA 1, VARGA 23.

TO VĀYU.

1. O Vāyu, may the quick racers bring thee towards the offerings, to the early drink¹ here, to the early drink of Soma! May Sûnṛitâ² (the Dawn) stand erect, approving thy mind! Come near on thy harnessed chariot to share, O Vāyu, to share in the sacrifice³!

2. May the delightful drops of Soma delight thee, the drops made by us, well-made, and heaven-directed, yes, made with milk, and heaven-directed. When his performed aids assume strength for achievement, our prayers implore the assembled steeds for gifts, yes, the prayers implore them.

3. Vāyu yokes the two ruddy, Vāyu yokes the two red horses, Vāyu yokes to the chariot the two swift horses to draw in the yoke, the strongest to draw in the yoke. Awake Purandhi (the Morning)¹ as a lover wakes a sleeping maid, reveal heaven and earth, brighten the dawn, yes, for glory brighten the dawn.

4. For thee the bright dawns spread out in the distance beautiful garments, in their houses¹, in their rays, beautiful in their new rays. To thee the juice-yielding² cow pours out all treasures. Thou hast brought forth the Maruts from the flanks³, yes, from the flanks of heaven.

5. For thee the white, bright, rushing Somas, strong in raptures, have rushed to the whirl, they

have rushed to the whirl of the waters. The tired hunter asks luck of thee in the chase¹; thou shieldest² by thy power from every being, yes, thou shieldest by thy power from powerful spirits³.

6. Thou, O Vâyu, art worthy as the first before all others to drink these our Somas, thou art worthy to drink these poured-out Somas. Among the people also who invoke thee and have turned to thee¹, all the cows pour out the milk, they pour out butter and milk (for the Soma).

NOTES.

Ascribed to Paru~~kk~~hepa Daivodâsi, and addressed to Vâyu. Metre, 1-5 Atyashî; 6 Ashî. No verse occurs in the other Vedas.

Verse 1.

Note 1. Pûrvapîti may here imply that Vâyu receives his libation first, before the other gods, see verse 6.

Note 2. Whatever the etymology of *sûnrîta* may be, in our passage, which describes the morning sacrifice and the arrival of Vâyu as the first of the gods, it can hardly mean anything but dawn. Ūrdhvâ sthâ is an expression applied frequently to the rise of the dawn or the morning, see III, 55, 14; 61, 3; VIII, 45, 12. In the last passage *sûnrîta* is simply the dawn. Ludwig translates, 'deine treflichkeit erhebe sich, günstig aufnemend die absicht.' He, like Bergaigne, III, 295, takes *sûnrîta* as *su-nri-tâ*, virtue. It seems to me that *sûnrîta* may be formed irregularly in analogy to *an-rîta*, and then mean true, good. In other places *sûnrîtam* seems to mean hymn, like *rîtavâka*, IX, 113, 2. In places where it occurs as a name of Ushas, one feels tempted to conjecture *su-nrîtûs*. See also Bartholomae, in Bezenb. Beitr. XV, 24.

Note 3. On *makhâsya dâvâne*, see note to I, 6, 8; but also note to VIII, 7, 27.

Verse 2.

My translation is purely tentative, and I doubt whether the text can be correct. I have taken *krâna* here in the sense of made, but I am quite aware that this meaning becomes incongruous in our very verse, when repeated for the third time. On its other meanings, see Pischel, Ved. Stud. p. 67. For the whole verse, compare VI, 36, 3. Grassmann translates :

Die lust'gen Indu's mögen, Vâyu, dich erfreuen,
Die starken, die wir schön gebraut, die himmlischen,
Die milchgemischten, himmlischen ;
Wenn Tränke tüchtig deinen Sinn

Uns zu gewinnen, bei dir sind,
Dann fordere Lieder die vereinte Rosseschar,
Die Speisen zu empfangen auf.

Ludwig: Erfreuen sollen dich die frohen tropfen, Vāyu, von uns bereitet, die morgendlichen, mit milch bereitet, die morgendlichen, dasz der (opfer) tüchtigkeit zukomen hilfeleistungen zum gelingen, gewärt, die insgesamt herwärts gerichteten gespanne (antworten) zur (mit) beschenkung den liedern, ihn sprechen an die lieder.

These translations may serve to show that certain verses in the Veda are simply hopeless, and that the translators must not be held responsible if they cannot achieve the impossible.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Purandhi may have meant originally doorkeeper or bar-holder (cardo), from *pûh* and *dhi*, being formed like *ishudhí*, *vr̥śhandhi*, *śevadhí*, &c. Purandhrí also may have been *πυλωρός*, janitor, or rather janitrix, then housewife. Grassmann translates it by Segensfülle, Ludwig by Fülle; Bergaigne, III, 476, has a long note on purandhi, as one of the many names of 'la femelle.' Whatever it meant etymologically, in our passage, where she is to be woke by the wind in the morning (cf. *ushásaḥ budhí*, I, 137, 2), it is again a characteristic epithet of the dawn, *πολιοῦχος*, *πολιάς*, *πολαίτης*. See also Pischel, *Vedica*, p. 202; Hillebrandt, *Wiener Zeitschrift*, III, 188; 259.

Verse 4.

Note 1. I have translated *damsu* as a locative; could it be a nom. plur. of *damsu*, *δασυ*, referring to *vastrā*, the terminations being left out? see Lanman, p. 415.

Note 2. Sabardúghā, juice-yielding. Roth explains it as quickly yielding, identifying *sabar* with Greek *ἄφαρ*. But Greek *φ* never represents Sanskrit *b*. *Sabar*, juice, milk, water, would really seem to yield the true source of A. S. *sæp*, O. H. G. *saf*, *sap*, for it is clear that neither *δρός*, nor Lat. *sucus*, would correspond with A. S. *sæp*; see Brugmann, *Grundriss*, vol. i, § 328; also Bartholomae, in *Bezenb. Beitr.* XV, 17.

Note 3. Vakshánābhyaḥ, from the flanks. It would be better if we could refer vākshānābhyaḥ to Dhenu, the cow, the mother of the Maruts, while Dyaus is their father, see V, 52, 16. Here, however, Vāyu is conceived as their father, and dyaus (fem.) as their mother.

Verse 5.

Note 1. I have followed Ludwig in his explanation of tsārī, hunter, watcher, and takvaviya, chase of the takva, whatever animal it may be.

Note 2. Oldenberg suggests prāsi for pāsi, which on many accounts would be excellent.

Note 3. On asuryā, see von Bradke, Dyaus Asura, p. 39, and Bergaigne, Journal Asiatique, 1884, p. 510.

Verse 6.

Note 1. Vihutmat is translated by Roth as not sacrificing. But vihutmat can hardly be separated from vihava and vihavya, and seems to mean therefore invoking, possibly, invoking towards different sides. Hu, to sacrifice, does not take the preposition vi. Vavargushī is doubtful. Without some other words, it can hardly mean 'those who have turned towards the gods,' as we read in X, 120, 3 (tvé krátum ápi vriṅganti víśve); nor is it likely to be the same as vrikta-barhis, 'those who have prepared the barhis.' I have translated it in the former sense. See Geldner, Ved. Stud. p. 144, and Oldenberg, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1890, p. 414.

MANDALA X, HYMN 168.

ASHTAKA VIII, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 26.

TO VĀTA.

1. Now for the greatness of the chariot of Vāta !
Its roar goes crashing and thundering. It moves touching the sky, and creating red sheens ², or it goes scattering the dust of the earth.

2. Afterwards there rise the gusts of Vāta ¹, they go towards him, like women to a feast ². The god goes with them on the same chariot, he, the king of the whole of this world.

3. When he moves on his paths along the sky, he rests not even a single day ¹; the friend of the waters, the first-born, the holy, where was he born, whence did he spring ?

4. The breath of the gods, the germ ¹ of the world, that god moves wherever he listeth ; his roars indeed are heard, not his form—let us offer sacrifice to that Vāta !

NOTES.

Ascribed to Anila Vâtâyana, and addressed to Vâyu, here called Vâta. The metre is Trishṭubh. This hymn does not occur in the other Vedas. See Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, V, p. 145; Geldner and Kaegi, p. 95.

Verse 1.

Note 1. For this use of the accusative, see Pischel, *Ved. Stud.* p. 13.

Note 2. *Arunâni* is explained by Geldner, *Ved. Stud.* p. 274, as the reddish colours of the lightning.

Verse 2.

Note 1. *Vishṭhâ* means kind or variety. Anu seems to refer to ratha, which I take as the subject of the whole of the first verse.

Note 2. 'Sie gehn mit einander zum Tanz,' Geldner and Kaegi.

Verse 3.

Note 1. Geldner and Kaegi propose aha for ahaḥ.

Verse 4.

Note 1. Vâta seems to be called the garbha of the world, in the sense of being its source or life.

MANDALA X, HYMN 186.

ASHTAKA VIII, ADHYĀYA 8, VARGA 44.

TO VĀTA.

1. May Vāta waft medicine, healthful, delightful to our heart; may he prolong our lives!
 2. Thou, O Vāta, art our father, and our brother, and our friend; do thou grant us to live!
 3. O Vāta, from that treasure of the immortal which is placed in thy house yonder, give us to live!
-

NOTES.

Ascribed to Ula Vâtâyana, and addressed to Vāyu, under the name of Vāta. The metre is Gâyatrî. Verse 1 occurs in SV. I, 184; II, 1190; Taitt. Br. II, 4, 1, 8; Taitt. Âr. IV, 42, 8. Verse 3 in SV. II, 1192; Taitt. Br. II, 4, 1, 8; Taitt. Âr. IV, 42, 7.

APPENDICES.

- I. INDEX OF WORDS.
- II. LIST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PASSAGES
QUOTED 'IN THE PREFACE AND IN THE
NOTES.
- III. A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST OF THE MORE IM-
PORTANT PUBLICATIONS ON THE RIG-
VEDA.

THE following Index of Words was commenced by Professor Thibaut, and continued and finished by Dr. Winternitz. I beg to express my gratitude to both of them, more particularly to Dr. Winternitz, who has spared no pains in order to make the Index as complete and as accurate as possible.—F. M. M.

The Index contains all the words of the hymns translated in this volume, and besides, all the words about which something is said in the Notes.

The lists of passages are complete, except when three dots (...) are put after the word (e. g. *ákkba* ...).

Three figures refer to *Mandala*, hymn, and verse, a small figure to a note, e. g. X, 77, 2¹, stands for *Mandala* X, hymn 77, verse 2, note 1 (the word occurs in X, 77, 2, and also in note 1).

If a word occurs in a note only, the passage is put in parentheses, e. g. (V, 61, 4¹) means that the word occurs in note 1 on V, 61, 4, but *not* in V, 61, 4.

In the case of longer notes, it seemed advisable to refer to the page. *One* number refers to the page, e. g. (287) means that the word occurs in a note on page 287.

I. INDEX OF WORDS.

- ámsa**, shoulder:
ámseshu, I, 64, 4; 166, 9; 10;
 168, 3; V, 54, 11; VII, 56, 13;
ámsayob ádhi, V, 57, 6.
- amhatí**, tribulation:
amhatí-bhyab, V, 55, 10.
- ámhas**, anguish:
ámhab, II, 34, 15; 33, 2; *ámhasab*, II, 33, 3.
- ákanishṭha**:
ákanishṭhāsab, among whom none
 is the youngest, V, 59, 6; 60, 5.
- ákava**, not deficient:
ákavāb, V, 58, 5.
- aketú**, without light:
aketāve, I, 6, 3.
- aktú**, night:
aktún, V, 54, 4.
- akrá**, banner (?):
akráb, X, 77, 2¹.
- áksha**, axle:
ákshab, I, 166, 9³.
- ákshita**, unceasing:
ákshitam (bīgam), V, 53, 13;
útsam, the inexhaustible well,
 I, 64, 6¹; VIII, 7, 16.
- akshna-yāvan**, crossing:
akshna-yāvānab, the crossing
 (horses), VIII, 7, 35.
- ákhidrayāman**, never-wearying:
ákhidrayāma-bhiḥ (steeds), I, 38,
 11³.
- akḥkhalikri**:
akḥkhalikrītya, (V, 52, 6²).
- Agastya**:
agastya, I, 170, 3; (287 seq.)
- ágrībhīta-śoṭis**, untouched splendour:
ágrībhīta-śoṭishab, V, 54, 5¹; -am,
 V, 54, 12².
- Agni**, the god:
agne, I, 19, 1-9; VI, 66, 9; VII,
 59, 1; *agne*, V, 56, 1; 60, 6;
 8; *agnib*, V, 60, 7; VII, 56,
 25; *agnib ná*, X, 78, 2; *agnib*
gāni pūrvyāb, VIII, 7, 36; *agnim*,
 I, 38, 13¹; V, 60, 1; VIII,
 7, 32.—Agni and the Maruts,
 (339; 354; V, 59, 1¹).—Agni
 has two mothers, (V, 61, 4¹).—
hótā=Agni, (VIII, 94, 6¹).
agní, fire, light:
agnib, V, 58, 3; *agnim*, X, 121,
 7; I, 170, 4; *agnáyab yathā*,
 V, 87, 7; *agnáyab ná idhānāb*,
 VI, 66, 2; *agnáyab ná suru-*
kānāb, II, 34, 1; *surukvāmsab*
ná agnáyab, V, 87, 6; *agnáyab*
ná svá-vidyutab, V, 87, 3; *ag-*
néb guhvāb, VI, 66, 10; *agni-*
nām gihvāb, X, 78, 3.
agni-táp, warming oneself at the
 fire:
agni-tápab, V, 61, 4².
agní-bhrāgas, fiery:
agní-bhrāgasab, V, 54, 11.
ágra:
ágre, in the beginning, X, 121,
 1.—*agra*, top of a tree, (I, 37,
 6¹).
agratas and agre, before:
 (V, 61, 3¹).
aghá, mischief:
aghát, I, 166, 8.
ághnya, bull:
ághnyam, I, 37, 5¹.
ánga, limb:
ángaiḥ, II, 33, 9.
angá:
té aṅgá, they alone, VII, 56, 2;
yát aṅgá, aye when, VIII, 7, 2.
Āngiras:
āngirasab (visvá-rūpāb), X, 78,
 5¹.—Āngiras and Daragvas, (II,
 34, 12¹).
ákarama:
ákaramāb, no one being last, V,
 58, 5.
ákḥba, prep. c. acc. . . .:
 approach thou, V, 52, 14; 15;
 on to, I, 165, 14.
átyuta, unshakable:
átyutā, I, 85, 4; 167, 8; VIII,
 20, 5.

akṛuta-kyút, shaking the unshakable :
epithet of Indra [not of the
Maruts, correct on p. 278],
(I, 167, 8².)

ag :
ágati, he drives, VI, 66, 7.—*vânáb*
*agya*te, the arrow is shot, VIII,
20, 8¹; (I, 85, 10²).—*ví ágatha*,
you drive forth, V, 54, 4¹.

agá, goat :
(234.)
agá-ava, having goats for his horses :
ep. of Pūshan, (I, 87, 4¹).
agára, never growing old :
agárāb, I, 64, 3.

agina, skin :
(234.)
agirá, ready, swift (horses) :
agirá, I, 134, 3; V, 56, 6.
ágoshya, unwelcome :
*ágoshya**b*, I, 38, 5².
ágma, racing :
ágmeshu, I, 37, 8¹; 10²; 87, 3;
V, 87, 7¹.

ágman, racing :
ágman (Loc.), I, 166, 5; VIII, 20, 5.
agyeshibá :
agyeshibáb, among whom none is
the eldest, V, 59, 6; *agyesh-*
ibásab, V, 60, 5.

ágra, a plain :
ágrān, V, 54, 4.
añk, to bow :
sām akyanta, V, 54, 12.

añg :
añgate (*añgi*), they brighten them-
selves, VII, 57, 3.—*añg*, with
*góbhi**b*, to cover with milk,
(VIII, 20, 8¹; 405).—*prá anaga*,
you have fashioned, V, 54, 1.—
with *ví*, to deck, adorn oneself ;
ví aňgate, I, 64, 4; *ví ānagre*,
I, 87, 1; *ví aňgata*, VIII, 7,
25.—*sām aňge*, I prepare, I,
64, 1.

āñgasā, straightway, and *aňgasīna*,
straightforward :
(V, 53, 10¹.)

aňgi :
aňgi aňgate, they brighten them-
selves with brightness, VII, 57,
3; *samānám aňgi*, their anoint-
ing is the same, VIII, 20, 11.—
pl. the glittering ornaments of
the Maruts, *aňgáyab*, I, 166,
10; *aňgín*, X, 77, 2; *aňgi-bhi**b*,

I, 37, 2²; 64, 4¹; 85, 3; 87, 1;
V, 52, 15¹; 56, 1¹; X, 78, 7;
(*arunébhi**b*) II, 34, 13¹; (307;
308); *aňgi*shu, V, 53, 4¹.—(VIII,
20, 9¹.)

aňgin, possessed of *aňgis* ?
(V, 52, 15¹.)

aňgi-mát, well-adorned :
aňgi-mántab, V, 57, 5.

átas :
átab, from yonder, I, 6, 9; from
thence, I, 165, 5; V, 60, 6;
átab kít, even from them, VIII,
20, 18.

āti :
gánān āti tasthau, I, 64, 13; across,
II, 34, 15.—*āti=ādhi*? V, 52,
3¹; (VIII, 7, 14¹).—*pūrvī**b* *āti*
kshápab, through many nights,
X, 77, 2; *āti kshápab*, Gen., (I,
64, 8².)

*āti*thi, guest :
play on the words *āti*thi and *á*dit*i*,
(262.)

átka, garment :
átkān, V, 55, 6.

átya, rushing, horse, racer :
átyam, I, 64, 6²; *átyām ná sáptim*,
(I, 85, 1¹); *vṛishanab vṛisha-*
bhāsab átyāb, strong and power-
ful horses (140); *átyāb-iva*, V,
59, 3; *átyāsab ná*, VII, 56, 16;
átyān iva āgishu, II, 34, 3.—
átyena págasā, with rushing
splendour, II, 34, 13².

*át*ra :
now, I, 165, 11; here, I, 165, 13;
V, 61, 11; VII, 57, 5.

*át*ra, food :
(I, 86, 10².)
atrā, tooth, jaw, eater, ogre :
(I, 86, 10².)

atrín, tusky fiend :
atrínam, I, 86, 10².

*át*ha, therefore :
I, 87, 4; 114, 9; (VII, 56, 1¹)

adás, yonder :
X, 186, 3.

ádābhya, unbeguiled, unconquerable :
adābhyāb, II, 34, 10; *ádābhyasya*,
VIII, 7, 15¹.

Aditi :
Aditi, (241 seqq.); *ādityāb áditib*,
(244); earth, (255; 263); as
adj. unbound, unbounded, (257);
unrestrained, independent, free,

- (261 seqq.); masc. = *Āditya* (255; 261); ep. of *Agni* (262).
 —*āditiḥ*, I, 43, 2¹; 114, 11;
āditeb-iva, I, 166, 12.—*Dyaūḥ*
Āditiḥ, V, 59, 8².
aditi-tvā, *Aditi-hood*, perfection or
 holiness:
 (257.)
ā-dū, not worshipping:
āduvaḥ, nom. plur., (I, 37, 14¹).
ādeva-tra, godless:
ādeva-trāt, V, 61, 6.
ādbhuta, n., strange thing:
ādbhutam, I, 170, 1¹.
ādbhuta-enas, in whom no fault is
 seen, faultless:
ādbhuta-enasām, V, 87, 7¹.
adyā, to-day ...
ādri, stone:
 thunderbolt, *ādriḥ*, I, 165, 4³;
 p. xv; xxi; (182); *ādrim*, I, 85,
 5¹; *ādrivā*, I, 168, 6.—*Soma*-
 stone, *ādrim*, I, 88, 3; *ādrayaḥ*
nā, X, 78, 6².—mountain, *ādrim*,
 V, 52, 9; *ādrayaḥ*, V, 87, 2.
adriyat, wielding the thunderbolt:
adriyaḥ, voc., (I, 85, 5¹).
adrūḥ, without guile:
adrūhaḥ, I, 19, 3³.
adroghā, guiltless:
adroghām, V, 52, 1.
ādvayāvin, free from guile:
ādvayāvi, VII, 56, 18.
adveshā, kind:
adveshāḥ, V, 87, 8.
ādha, then ...:
ādha, also VII, 56, 1¹.—*ādha yāt*,
 now that, I, 167, 2.—*ādha priyā*,
 for *adha-priyā*, (I, 38, 1¹).
ādhi, over, on, in (c. Loc.), from (c.
 Abl.) ...:
devēshu ādhi, above all gods, X,
 121, 8.—(V, 52, 3¹).—*riyāḥ* *ādhi*,
 not *riyās ādhi*, V, 61, 12².—
ādhi snūnā divāḥ, above the
 ridge of the sky, VIII, 7, 7;
ādhi-iva girīṇām, as it were
 from above the mountains,
 VIII, 7, 14¹.
ādhriṣṭa, unassailable:
ādhriṣṭāsab, V, 87, 2; *ādhriṣṭāḥ*,
 VI, 66, 10.
ādhri-gu, irresistible:
ādhri-gāvaḥ, I, 64, 3.
ādhvan, road, way, journey:
ādhvan ā, I, 37, 13; *ādhvanab*, V,
 53, 7; *asyā ādhvanab*, V, 54, 10;
gatāḥ ādhvā, a trodden path,
 VII, 58, 3.
adhvarā, sacrifice:
adhvarām, I, 19, 1; VII, 56, 12;
adhvaré, I, 165, 2; X, 77, 8;
 VIII, 7, 6; *adhvarāsya-iva*, VI,
 66, 10.
adhvara-rī, illumining the sacrifice:
adhvara-rīyaḥ, X, 78, 7¹; (V, 60, 8¹).
adhvare-sthā, firm in the sacrifice:
adhvare-sthāḥ, X, 77, 7.
adhasmān, smooth:
adhasmā-bhiḥ *pathī-bhiḥ*, on
 smooth roads, II, 34, 5¹.
an, to breathe:
prānatāḥ, of the breathing (world),
 X, 121, 3.
ananudā, not yielding:
ananudāḥ, (I, 165, 9¹).
anantā-rushma, of endless prowess:
anantā-rushmāḥ, I, 64, 10.
anabhīrū, without reins:
anabhīrūḥ, VI, 66, 7.
anamivā, without illness:
anamivāḥ, VII, 46, 2.
ānarus, without wound:
 (66.)
anarvān:
anarvānam, unscathed, I, 37, 1¹;
 (65 seqq.); epithet of *Aditi*,
 (260); *āditiṃ anarvānam* = *Agni*,
 (262).
anavadyā, faultless:
anavadyāḥ, I, 6, 8; *anavadyāsab*,
 VII, 57, 5.
anavabhrā-rādhas, of inexhaustible
 wealth:
anavabhrā-rādhasab, I, 166, 7; II,
 34, 4; V, 57, 5.
anavasā, without drag (?):
anavasāḥ, VI, 66, 7².
anavā, without horses:
anavāḥ, VI, 66, 7; (67).
ānava-dā, the West (?):
ānava-dām, V, 54, 5¹.
anava-yā, moving without horses:
anava-yāḥ (?), (V, 54, 5¹).
an-āgāstvá, guiltlessness, purity:
 (257.)
anāturā, free from disease:
anāturām, I, 114, 1.
ānādhriṣṭa, unconquerable:
ānādhriṣṭāsab, I, 19, 4.
ānānata, never flinching:
ānānatāḥ, I, 87, 1.

Ānitabhā, N. of a river:

V, 53, 9¹.

ānika:

āditer ānikam, the face of Aditi (the dawn), (243).—marūtām ānikam, the train of the Maruts, I, 168, 9.—ānikeshu ādhi, on the faces, VIII, 20, 12.

ānu, prep. . . .:

according to, svadhām ānu, see svadhā; ānu gōsham, according to pleasure, VI, 66, 4.—ānu dyūn, day by day, I, 167, 10; (I, 6, 8²).—ānu ātakshata, I, 86, 3¹; ānu scil. sasrub, V, 53, 2¹.—after, X, 168, 2¹.—synzesis, p. cxxii.

ānutta, not shaken, strong:

ānuttam, I, 165, 9¹.

ānutta-manyu, of irresistible fury:

(I, 165, 9¹.)

ānu-patha, follower:

ānu-pathāb, V, 52, 10.

anu-bhartṛī, comforting:

anu-bhartṛī, I, 88, 6¹; (178.)

anu-stubh:

Anushrubh='After-step,' p. xcvi.

anu-svadhām, according to their nature:

V, 52, 1.

anetā:

anenāb for anetāb? (VI, 66, 7¹.)

ānedyā, blameless:

ānedyāb, I, 87, 4; 165, 12; V, 61, 13; p. xviii seq.

anenā, without deer:

anenāb, VI, 66, 7¹.

anenās, without guilt:

anenāb, (VI, 66, 7¹.)

ānta, end:

āntam, the hem of a garment, I, 37, 6¹.—rāvasab āntam, I, 167, 9.—āntān divāb, V, 59, 7.

āntab-patha, enterer:

āntab-pathāb, V, 52, 10.

antamā, friend:

antamēbbiāb, I, 165, 5¹.

antār:

antāb, from within, I, 168, 5.—c. Loc. within, V, 59, 2².—antāb sāntab, within (the womb), VI, 66, 4.

antāriksha, sky, air:

antāriksham, V, 54, 4; 55, 2; divāb ā antārikshāt, V, 53, 8; urāū antāriksha, V, 52, 7; antāriksha rāgasab, the air in the

sky, X, 121, 5²; antāriksha, through the air, I, 165, 2; X, 168, 3; antārikshena, VIII, 7, 35.—antāriksha, prithivī, and dyū, (50); rōdasi antāriksham, (I, 64, 9².)

antārikshya:

antārikshyāb pathyāb, the paths in the sky, V, 54, 9.

ānti, near:

I, 167, 9.

āndhas, (Soma) juice:

āndhasab (mādhvab), I, 85, 6²;

āndhasā (mādhvab), V, 54, 8³;

āndhāmsi pītāye, to drink the (juice of the Soma) flowers, VII, 59, 5.

anyā, other . . .:

nā tvād anyāb, no other than thou, X, 121, 10.—anyāb, enemy, VII, 56, 15.

anyātas, to a different place:

anyātab, p. xl.

anyātra, elsewhere:

VII, 59, 5.

āp, water:

āpab, V, 54, 2; 58, 6; VII, 56, 25; āpab-iva, V, 60, 3; VIII, 94, 7; girāyab nā āpab ugrāb, VI, 66, 11²; āpab nā, X, 78, 5; āpab brihatīb, the great waters, X, 121, 7¹; 8; 9; mahatīb apāb, VIII, 7, 22; apāb mātṛīb, (307); apāb, I, 165, 8; VIII, 7, 28.—apāb tārema, cross the waters, VII, 56, 24.—apāb, the waters (at sacrifices), I, 64, 1³; 6².—apām arnavām, I, 85, 9; apām nā ūrmāyab, I, 168, 2; apām budhnē, X, 77, 4; bhurvāni apām, I, 134, 5; apām sākḥā, the friend of the waters (Vāta), X, 168, 3.—ap-sū, VI, 66, 8.—apāb, the waters between heaven and earth, the sky, (309).—āpab, Acc. (cf. Lanman, 483), V, 53, 14.

āpatya, 'Nachkommen':

(215, note *.)

apa-bhartṛī, the remover:

apa-bhartṛā (rāpasab), II, 33, 7.

āpas, n., work, deed:

āpab, (I, 64, 1³); āpāmsi (nāri), I, 85, 9.

apās, m., workman:

apāb, (I, 64, 1³); apāsam (dāksham), efficient, I, 2, 9.

- apârá, infinite:
 apâráb, V, 87, 6.
 ápi, adv. :
 even, II, 34, 10; also, X, 77, 7.
 ápi, prep. :
 ápi (bhúma, c. Loc.), under, VII,
 57, 4¹.
 api-vâta, approach, attention, regard :
 (VII, 46, 3¹).
 ápûrva, incomparable :
 ápûrva, V, 56, 5; ápûrva
 prathamâb, as the first before
 all others, I, 134, 6.
 apeśas, without form :
 apeśase, I, 6, 3.
 áprati-skuta, irresistible :
 áprati-skutab, V, 61, 13.
 ápra-jasta, infamous :
 ápra-jastân, I, 167, 8.
 Apsaras :
 (307; 308).
 ábibhîvas, fearless :
 ábibhyushâ, I, 6, 7; ábibhyushab,
 (I, 6, 1²).
 abda, cloud :
 (V, 54, 3¹).
 abdâ, wish to give water (?) :
 abdâ-yâ, wishing to give water, V,
 54, 3¹.
 abdi-mât, with clouds :
 (V, 54, 3¹).
 abhî, prep., to . . . :
 yâb karshanîb abhî (bhûvab ?), who
 surpasses all men, I, 86, 5¹.—
 abhî dyûn=ânu dyûn, (I, 6, 8²).
 —synzesis of abhî, p. cxxii.
 abhî-iti, assault :
 abhî-itîb râpasab, II, 33, 3.
 abhî-gñû, knee-deep :
 I, 37, 10².
 abhîtas, all around :
 abhîtab mâ, VII, 59, 7.
 abhî-dyu, hastening, or, heaven-
 directed. [It is doubtful which
 is the right meaning] :
 abhîdyu-bhîb, hasting, I, 6, 8²;
 abhî-dyavab, hastening heaven-
 ward, or, shining forth, VIII,
 7, 25; I, 134, 2 (bis); X, 77, 3;
 78, 4.
 abhî-mâtin, adversary :
 abhî-mâtinam, I, 85, 3.
 abhî-ñrî :
 cf. gaurî, (V, 60, 8¹).
 abhîshî, victory :
 abhîshraye, II, 34, 14².
 abhîshî, conqueror, victorious :
 (II, 34, 14²).
 abhisam-karénya, to be approached,
 accepted, consulted :
 abhisam-karényam, I, 170, 1¹.
 abhisam-kârin, changeable :
 (I, 170, 1¹).
 abhî-svartî, intoning :
 abhî-svartârab arkâm, intoning a
 hymn of praise, X, 78, 4.
 abhî-hrut, assault, injury :
 (I, 166, 8¹).
 abhî-hruti, injury :
 abhî-hruteb, I, 166, 8¹.
 ábhîru, fearless :
 ábhîravab, I, 87, 6.
 abhîsu, rein, bridle :
 abhîsavab, I, 38, 12¹; V, 61, 2.
 abhok-hân, slayer of the demon :
 abhok-hânab, I, 64, 3¹.
 abhrâ, cloud :
 abhrât ná sūryab, X, 77, 3.
 abhra-prúsh, cloud-shower :
 abhra-prúshab, X, 77, 1².
 abhrîya, belonging to the cloud :
 abhrîyâm vâkam, the voice of the
 clouds, I, 168, 8; abhrîyâb vri-
 shîyâb, streams from clouds,
 II, 34, 2¹.
 ábhva, fiend :
 ábhvab, I, 39, 8¹; vísvam ábhvam,
 II, 33, 10²; ábhvam, the dark
 cloud, I, 168, 9³.
 áma, onslaught :
 áma, V, 56, 3; ámat, V, 59, 2;
 ámaña vab yâtave, VIII, 20,
 6.
 amâti, impetus, power, light :
 amâtîb, I, 64, 9³.
 ámadhyama :
 ámadhyamâsab, among whom none
 is the middle, V, 59, 6.
 ámartya, immortal :
 ámartyâb, I, 168, 4.
 áma-vat, violent, impetuous :
 áma-vatî, I, 168, 7; áma-vat, V,
 58, 1; áma-vân, V, 87, 5; áma-
 vat-su, VI, 66, 6; áma-vantab,
 I, 38, 7; VIII, 20, 7.
 amât, from near :
 V, 53, 8¹.
 ámita, infinite :
 ámitâb, V, 58, 2.
 ámivâ, sickness :
 ámivâb, II, 33, 2; ámivâ, VI, 74,
 2³.

amṛita, immortal, pl. the immortals :
amṛitāb, I, 38, 4 ; *amṛita* (Rudra), I, 114, 6 ; *amṛitasya* (Indra), I, 170, 4 ; (Rudra), I, 43, 9¹.—*amṛitam nāma*, V, 57, 5.—*amṛitāb* (Maruts), I, 166, 3 ; *amṛitāsab*, I, 166, 13 ; *ámṛitāb*, V, 57, 8 ; 58, 8.
amṛita, n., the immortal, immortality, not dying :
amṛitam, X, 121, 2 ; *amṛitasya*, V, 58, 1 ; VII, 57, 6¹ ; X, 186, 3 ; *amṛitāt*, VII, 59, 12².
amṛita-tvā, immortality :
amṛita-tvám ṣṭhīre, they became immortal (I, 6, 4³) ; *amṛita*-tvé dadhātana, V, 55, 4.
ámṛidhra, unceasing :
ámṛidhram (rain), I, 37, 11.
ambhrinā, ὄβριμος ? (275.)
áya, wanderer :
áyāb, (VI, 66, 4¹)
ayā, going :
ayāsab, (I, 64, 11¹)
áyab-damshtra, with iron tusks :
áyab-damshtrān, I, 88, 5.
ayā, adv., hence :
I, 87, 4².—Instrum., *ayā* dhiyā, through this prayer, I, 166, 13.
áyā for *ayā*, VI, 66, 4¹.
ayās, untiring :
ayāb, (I, 87, 4²) ; *ayāsab*, I, 64, 11¹ ; 167, 4¹ ; VI, 66, 5² ; *áyāsab*, VII, 58, 2 ; *ayāsām*, I, 168, 9.—*ayāb*, not striving (?), VI, 66, 5².
ar, to hurt :
(65 seq. ; I, 64, 15¹ ; 85, 5²) ; *upa-ārimā*, we have offended, (66.)
ará, spoke :
aráb-iva, like the spokes of a wheel, V, 58, 5 ; *rāthānām ná arāb*, X, 78, 4 ; *aránām ná karamāb*, as of moving spokes no one is the last, VIII, 20, 14¹.
arakshás, guileless :
araksháb, V, 87, 9.
árathi, not a charioteer :
árathib, VI, 66, 7.
arapás, without mischief :
arapáb, II, 33, 6.
áram, properly :
VI, 74, 1 ; *áram* *krinvantu*, let them prepare, I, 170, 4 ; *áram*-*kritāb*, ready, I, 2, 1.
arámati, service :
arámatim, V, 54, 6².

árarivas, hostile :
áarushe, on the enemy, VII, 56, 19 ; (66.)
aráru, enemy :
(66.)
arágin, dark :
arágināb (párvatân), VIII, 7, 23.
árāti, enemy :
árátib, V, 53, 14 ; *árátayab*, I, 43, 8.
arádhás, miserly :
arádhāsab, V, 61, 6.
árāvan, selfish :
árāvā, VII, 56, 15.
ári, friend :
vísve arýāb, VIII, 94, 3¹.
ári, enemy :
arýāb, Gen., V, 54, 12² ; Abl., VII, 56, 22.—(66) ; (I, 64, 15¹)—*arib* = *arib* = *arayab*, pp. xxxix ; xli.
árishta, inviolable :
árishtam (sáhab), II, 34, 7.
árishta-grāma, whose ranks are never broken :
árishta-grāmāb, I, 166, 6.
árishta-vīra, with unharmed men :
árishta-vīrāb, I, 114, 3.
arunā, red :
arunébhiḥ *aṅg*-*bhiḥ*, II, 34, 13¹ ; *arunāib*, with the red (rays), II, 34, 12.—Red (horses), *arunébhiḥ*, I, 88, 2 ; *arunā*, I, 134, 3.—*arunāni*, red sheens, X, 168, 1².
arunā-arva, having red horses :
arunā-arvāb, V, 57, 4.
arunā-psu, reddish-coloured :
arunā-psavāb (Maruts), VIII, 7, 7¹.
arunī, red :
arunī, the ruddy cows, (I, 64, 7²).—*aṅg* *arunāyab*, bright red ornaments, (308.)
arushā, red ; m. f., red horse :
arushām (horse), I, 6, 1¹ ; *arushā*-*sya*, I, 85, 5² ; *arushib*, red mares, V, 56, 6 ; *arusháb* *vāgī*, V, 56, 7 ; *arushāsab* *ávāb*, V, 59, 5 ; *arushām* *varāhām*, I, 114, 5.—(See 17 seqq.) Adj. red, (17-19) ; white, bright, (19, 24) ; *vṛishan* *arushā*, fire in the shape of lightning, (18) ; the red hero, (18, 25) ; the red horses of the Sun and of Agni, (19 seq.) ; the cloud as one of the horses of the Maruts, (20.)

- N. pr. of a deity, the Morning Sun, (20–23, 26, 27); the red cloud, (27.)—*ārushī*, fem. adj. or subst. (23); fem. subst. dawn, &c. (24); flames? (27.)
- ārus*, n., a wound: (65; 66); (I, 64, 15¹.)
- arenū*, dustless:
- arenāvab*, I, 168, 4; VI, 66, 2¹.
- arepās*, blameless:
- arepāsab*, I, 64, 2; V, 53, 3; 57, 4; 61, 14; X, 78, 1.
- arkā*, song:
- the music of the Maruts, (I, 38, 15¹; II, 34, 1³); *arkām* (*rik*), I, 19, 4¹; 85, 2; 166, 7².—Song of praise, hymn, *arkām*, VI, 66, 9; X, 78, 4; *arkaib*, I, 88, 4.
- arkā*, singer:
- arkāb*, I, 167, 6¹; *divāb* *arkāb*, V, 57, 5¹; (II, 34, 1³.)
- arkin*, musical:
- arkīnam*, I, 38, 15¹; *arkīnab*, (II, 34, 1³.)
- ark*, see *rik*.
- arkātri*, shouter:
- arkātrayab*, VI, 66, 10.
- Arkanānas* *Ātreya* : (V, 61, 5¹.)
- arkī*, light: (I, 87, 6²; II, 34, 1³.)
- arkīm*, blazing:
- arkīnab*, II, 34, 1³.
- arkīs*, splendour:
- arkīshā sūrab*, VIII, 7, 36.
- arnavā*, wave, waving:
- samudrām arnavām*, the surging sea, I, 19, 7²; *apām arnavām*, the stream of water, I, 85, 9; *tveshām arnavām*, the terrible sea, I, 168, 6; *arnavaib*, by waving mists, V, 59, 1.
- arnas*, the sea:
- ārnab*, I, 167, 9; VIII, 20, 13.
- arnasā*, waving:
- arnasām*, V, 54, 6¹.
- ārtha*, n., errand:
- ārtham*, I, 38, 2.
- arbhakā*, small:
- mahāntam utā arbhakām*, I, 114, 7.
- aryā*:
- aryē ā*, among the Aryas, (Pischel, VIII, 94, 3¹.)
- Aryamān*:
- aryamō*, I, 167, 8¹; *āryaman*, VII, 59, 1; *aryamā*, VIII, 94, 5.—
- aryamānab* (the three Aryamans, i.e. Aryaman, Mitra, and Varuṇa), V, 54, 8¹.
- ārvat*, horse, racer:
- ārvā*, VII, 56, 23; 58, 4; *ārvat-bhiḥ*, I, 64, 13; *ārvantam vāgam*, a strong horse, V, 54, 14²; *ārvate*, I, 43, 6; *ārvati*, II, 33, 1¹.—(65; 67.)—*ārvā*, the right horse, (I, 39, 6¹.)
- ārvan*, horse, racer, (66 seq.)
- ārvan*, hurting:
- (65; 66); (I, 64, 15¹.)
- arvāṇā*:
- arvāṇab vab ā vavṛityām*, let me bring you hither, I, 168, 1; *arvāṇī sū—ūtīb*, may that grace come hither, II, 34, 15; *arvāḥ* (*ayām yagñāb*), it is meet for you, X, 77, 4.
- arh*, to be worthy:
- arhāse*, X, 77, 1⁴; *arhasi* (*pītim*), I, 134, 6 (bis); *ārhan*, II, 33, 10 (tris); *ārhanṭab*, V, 52, 5.—*ārhanṭi*, they worship, VIII, 20, 18¹.
- alamātardana*, explanation of *alātrinā*, (227.)
- alātrinā*, not reviling:
- alātrināsab*, I, 166, 7¹.
- av*, to protect, to save, to help:
- avatha*, V, 54, 14; *āvatha*, VIII, 20, 24; VI, 66, 8; *avatu*, V, 87, 6; *avantu*, V, 87, 7; X, 77, 8; *āvata* (conj. for *avitā*), VII, 59, 6¹; *āvat*, I, 85, 7²; (134); *āvata*, I, 64, 13; 166, 8; 13; *āvā*, VIII, 7, 18; *āvan āvantīb*, VII, 46, 2.—*āvya*, having granted, I, 166, 13.—*ānu āvan*, VIII, 7, 24.—*prā avata*, VII, 57, 5; *prā-avitā* (with Gen.), I, 87, 4.
- āva*, adv., down:
- I, 168, 4; 8.
- avamsā*, abyss:
- avamsāt*, VII, 58, 1².
- avatā*, well:
- avatām*, I, 85, 10¹; 11.—(I, 64, 6¹.)
- avadyā*, unspeakable:
- avadyāt*, I, 167, 8; *avadyām*, V, 53, 14.—*avadyāni*, impurity, VI, 66, 4.
- avāni*, course:
- avānā*, V, 54, 2.
- avamā*, lowest:
- avamē*, in the lowest (heaven), V, 60, 6.

āvayāta-he/as :

āvayāta-he/āb bhāva, let thy anger be turned away from (Instr.), I, 171, 6².

āvara :

āvaram, the bottom, I, 168, 6 ;
āvarān, descending, II, 34, 14.

āvas, help, protection :

āvab, I, 39, 7 ; VIII, 94, 8 ; I, 114, 9 ; āvasā, I, 39, 7 ; 85, 11 ; 166, 2 ; VII, 59, 2 ; āvase, I, 168, 1 ; II, 34, 14 ; I, 114, 4 ; āvasab, V, 57, 7 ; āvab-bhiḥ, I, 86, 6¹ ; 167, 2.—āvasā, by (his) will, X, 121, 6.

avasā, drag (?) :

(VI, 66, 7².)

avasyā, desiring help :

avasyāvab, I, 114, 11.

āvāta, unconquered, (90.)

avātā (or āvāta), never dried up :

avātām, I, 38, 7¹.

avikrīta, not dyed :

(234.)

āvithura, immovable :

āvithurāb, I, 87, 1 ; (I, 87, 3¹.)

āvi-hruta, uninjured, intact :

(I, 166, 8¹.)

as, to eat :

prā asāna, I, 170, 5.

as, to reach, to attain to :

ārata, I, 85, 2 ; 87, 5 ; ārāthe, I, 2, 8 ; asnutha, V, 54, 10 ; asyāma, I, 114, 2 ; 3 ; ariya, II, 33, 2 ; 6.—abhi asyām, I, 166, 14.—ūt asnavat, V, 59, 4.—prā asnavantu, VI, 74, 1.

asās, impious fiend :

asāsab, II, 34, 9.

āsiva, unlucky, uncanny :

(I, 166, 1¹.)

āsma-didyu, shooting with thunderbolts :

āsma-didyavab, V, 54, 3.

āsman, stone :

āsmā, I, 172, 2.—āsmānam sva-ryām, the heavenly stone (the sky), V, 56, 4².

asman-māya, made of stone :

asman-māyī (vāśī), (I, 88, 3¹.)

āsva, horse :

āsvāb-iva, V, 53, 7 ; 59, 5 ; āsvā-sab nā gyēshibāsab, X, 78, 5 ; āsvā sāptī-iva, (I, 85, 1¹) ; gōshu, āveshu, I, 114, 8 ; vṛishabhiḥ āsvaiḥ, stallions, (I 39) ; asva and vāga, (I, 167, 1¹).—For āsvām-

iva, read asvām-iva, II, 34, 6².—

The horses of the Maruts, āsvā-sab, I, 38, 12 ; V, 59, 7 ; āsvāb, V, 54, 10 ; 61, 2 ; āsvān, I, 171, 1 ; II, 34, 3 ; 8 ; V, 55, 6¹ ; 58, 7 ; 59, 1 ; āsvaiḥ, I, 88, 2 ; V, 55, 1 ; VIII, 7, 27 ; prīshatibhiḥ āsvaiḥ, V, 58, 6¹ ; (I, 37, 2¹.)

asvatthā, horse-stable, i.e. West :

(V, 54, 5¹.)

arva-dā, giving horses, the dawn, the East (?) :

(V, 54, 5¹.)

ārva-parva, winged with horses :

ārva-parvaiḥ, (I, 87, 4¹) ; I, 88, 1.

ārva-budhna, having their resting-place among the horses :

ārva-budhnāb, the Dawns (V, 54, 5¹.)

arva-yāt, wishing horses :

arvayāntab, (I, 167, 1¹.)

arva-yūg, harnessing horses :

arva-yūgab, V, 54, 2.

ārva-vat :

ārva-vat rādhāb, wealth of horses, V, 57, 7.

Asvīn :

asvīnā, the Asvins, VIII, 94, 4.

āsrya, consisting of horses :

āsryam (rādhāb), V, 52, 17 ; āsryam parūm, V, 61, 5.

āshālba, unconquered :

āshāl/bāya, VII, 46, 1.

as, to throw :

āsyaṭha, you hurl, I, 172, 2 ; as-yatu āre asmāt, may he drive far away from us, I, 114, 4 ; āsyan, scattering, X, 168, 1.—prā āsyatha, you cast forwards, I, 39, 1.—vī asyatha, you scatter, V, 55, 6.

as, to be . . . :

naḥ astu, may it be ours, X, 121, 10 ; yushmākam astu, may yours be, I, 39, 2 ; 4.—vab santu, I, 38, 12 ; 39, 2 ; smāsi eshām, we are their servants, I, 37, 15 ; me astu, I, 165, 10 ; vab sānti, you have for (dat.), I, 85, 12.—sānti, there are, I, 37, 14 ; āsti (with dat.), there is enough for, I, 37, 15 ; nā āsti, there is no such thing, I, 170, 1.—yāt syātana, syāt, I, 38, 4¹ ; syāma té, may we be such, V, 53, 15.—asan, may they be, I, 38, 15² ;

- (96); *asati*, V, 53, 15; *yáthā ása*tha, V, 61, 4; *ása yáb vā ása*ti, who was or who may be so, VIII, 20, 15; *táthā* it *asat*, so shall it be, VIII, 20, 17; *astu*, though it be, VI, 66, 7.—*syāma sahā*, V, 53, 14¹; *sam-dṛīsi sthāna*, V, 87, 6; *úrdhvā santu*, I, 171, 3; *sám* with *as*, (191 seq.)—*ānu syāt nab*, may he be with us, I, 167, 10.—*antáb sántab*, VI, 66, 4.—*abhi syāma*, may we obtain, VII, 56, 24¹.—*prá sánti*, they stand forth, VII, 58, 2; *prá astu*, may it prevail, VII, 58, 4.
- ásamyatab* (not *asamyattab*): (I, 64, 13².)
- asaka*-dvish, not hating the followers:
asaka-dvishab, VIII, 20, 24².
- ásāmi*, whole:
ásāmi-bhiḥ, I, 39, 9; *ásāmi*, whole, I, 39, 10 (bis).—adv., wholly, I, 39, 9.
- ásāmi*-jvas, of perfect strength:
ásāmi-jvasab, V, 52, 5.
- Ásiknī*, N. of a river:
ásiknyām, VIII, 20, 25.
- ásu*, breath:
ásuḥ, X, 121, 7.
- ásura*, divine:
ásurāb, I, 64, 2; *diváb ásurasya*, VIII, 20, 17¹.—*ásurab*, lord, VII, 56, 24.
- asuryā*, divine; n., divine power:
asuryā, I, 167, 5; *asuryā*-iva, like heavenly lightning, I, 168, 7¹.—*asuryām*, II, 33, 9¹; VI, 74, 1; *asuryāt*, I, 134, 5².
- asú*, barren:
asvām-iva (conjecture for *ásvām*-iva) *dhenūm*, like a barren cow, II, 34, 6².
- ástuta*, unpraiseworthy:
ástutab, V, 61, 8.
- ástri*, archer:
ástārab, I, 64, 10.
- asmad*...:
iyām asmát matlb, this prayer from us, V, 57, 1; *asmān*, I, 165, 14¹; (203.)—*asmé tanūshu*, on our bodies, VI, 74, 3.—*nab* (*útāyab*), accorded to us, I, 167, 1.—*asmāka* for *asmākam*, p. cxviii.—no (*nab*), short, p. lxxxii seq.
- ah*, to say:
āhub, X, 121, 4; V, 53, 3.
- āha*, indeed:
V, 52, 6; VIII, 20, 20; (X, 168, 3¹).—*āt āha*, thereupon, I, 6, 4.—*nā āha*, nowhere, never, V, 54, 4; 10.
- ahab*-víd, (1) knowing the days, (2) finding, bringing back the day, lucifer:
ahab-vídab, knowing the feast-days, I, 2, 2¹.
- āhan*, day:
āhāni, I, 88, 4¹; V, 54, 4; *āhāni vīsvā*, always, I, 171, 3; *āhā*-iva, V, 58, 5; *āhani priyé*, on a happy day, VII, 59, 2; *kata-māt kanā āhab*, not even a single day, X, 168, 3; *kshapābhiḥ āha*-bhiḥ, by night and by day, (I, 64, 8².)
- ahanyā*, of the day:
ahanyāb, I, 168, 5⁴.
- aham*-yú, proud:
aham-yúb, I, 167, 7.
- āhi*-bhānu, shining like snakes:
āhi-bhānavab, I, 172, 1¹.
- āhi*-manyu, whose ire is like the ire of serpents:
āhi-manyavab, I, 64, 8; 9¹.
- ahi*-hátya, the killing of Ahi:
ahi-hátye, I, 165, 6.
- āhruta*-psu, with unbending forms:
āhruta-psavab, VIII, 20, 7; (VIII, 7, 7¹.)
- ā*, prep. . . .:
with Loc., on, in, *ādhvan ā*, I, 37, 13; *dhānvan ā*ti *ā*, I, 38, 7; *āgmeshu ā*, on the courses, V, 87, 7¹.—with Acc., over, I, 38, 10; towards, V, 52, 12; I, 167, 2; on to, V, 56, 1; *gōsham ā*, to his satisfaction, VIII, 94, 6; *ā rāgas*, through the air (?), (VII, 57, 3¹).—with Abl., *diváb ā*, from heaven, V, 53, 8; 54, 1²; *asmát ā*, towards us, V, 56, 3.—*pāri ā vab ā agub*, I, 88, 4; *ā te*, before thee, I, 165, 9.—*ā*, 6, I, 165, 14²; VII, 59, 5; VIII, 7, 33.—adv., here, I, 37, 6; hither, II, 34, 4; *mūhub ā*, V, 54, 3.

- â, pronominal base, see *ayā*.
 āgas, āyos, guilt, sin:
 āgab, VII, 57, 4; (257.)
 Āngirasa:
 Purumīlba Āngirasa, (362.)
 āga, skin of a goat:
 (232.)
 āgī, race, course:
 āgīshu, II, 34, 3; (I, 37, 8¹)
 āt, then:
 āt āha, thereupon, I, 6, 4¹; āt it,
 then only, I, 87, 5; 168, 9.
 ātura, sick:
 āturasya, VIII, 20, 26.
 ātma-dā, he who gives breath:
 ātma-dāb, X, 121, 2; (4.)
 ātmán, breath:
 ātmā devānām, the breath of the
 gods (Vāta), X, 168, 4.
 Ātreya:
 Arkānāsa Ātreya, (V, 61, 5²).
 â-dardirā, tearing to pieces:
 â-dardirāsab (ādrayab), X, 78, 6.
 Ādityā, the Ādityas:
 ādityāsab, X, 77, 2; ādityéna nām-
 nā, X, 77, 8.—ādityā = nāka,
 (X, 121, 5²).—Vasus, Ādityas,
 Rudras, (VII, 56, 20²).—(See
 243 seqq.); ādityāb āditib, (244);
 eight Ā., (251 seqq.); seven Ā.,
 (252 seqq.); six Ā., (253.)
 ādhavanīya, a Soma-vessel:
 (VIII, 94, 5²).
 ā-dhita, known:
 ā-dhītam, what we once knew, I,
 170, 1.
 â-dhrish, see *dhrish*.
 âp, to find:
 âpúb, I, 167, 9; âpānām = âpnu-
 vantam, (II, 34, 7¹).
 â-pathi, comer:
 â-pathayab, V, 52, 10.
 â-pathī, wanderer:
 â-pathyāb, I, 64, 11.
 âpānā, a draught:
 âpānām, II, 34, 7¹.
 âpī, friend:
 âpāyab, II, 34, 10; V, 53, 2¹.
 âpi-tvā, friendship:
 âpi-tvām, VIII, 20, 22.
 â-prīkkbya, honourable:
 â-prīkkbyam, I, 64, 13¹.
 â-bhū, mighty:
 â-bhūvab, I, 64, 1³; 6; 86, 5¹.
 â-bhūshénya, to be honoured:
 â-bhūshényam, V, 55, 4.
 âmbhrinī, the voice of the thunder:
 (275.)
 â-yagī, erjagend, obtaining:
 (V, 54, 1²).
 âyu, life:
 âyau (for âyaú), I, 114, 8¹.
 âyú, man:
 âyú-bhiḥ, with the men (Āyus), V,
 60, 8².—âyaú, read âyau, I, 114,
 8¹.
 âyudha, weapon:
 âyudhā, I, 39, 2; V, 57, 6; VIII,
 20, 12; âyudhaiḥ, VII, 56, 13;
 57, 3.
 âyus, life:
 âyub, I, 37, 15; âyushi, (I, 114, 8);
 âyumshi prá târishat, X, 186, 1;
 âyumshi sú-dhitāni, (225.)
 ârā, a shoemaker's awl:
 (I, 37, 2²; 88, 3¹).
 ârāt, far:
 ârāt kit yuyota, VII, 58, 6; X, 77,
 6.
 ârātāt, from afar:
 I, 167, 9.
 ârugatnú, breaking through:
 ârugatnú-bhiḥ (c. Acc.), I, 6, 5.
 âruni, red flame:
 ârunīshu, I, 64, 7².
 âré, far:
 âré kakrima, we have put away, I,
 171, 4; âré, may it be far, I, 172,
 2 (bis); VII, 56, 17; I, 114, 10;
 âré asmāt asyatu, may he drive
 far away from us, I, 114, 4; âré
 bādhethām, VI, 74, 2.
 Ârgikā, N. of a country:
 ârgiké, VIII, 7, 29¹.—A sacrificial
 vessel, (VIII, 7, 29¹).—Ârgikāb,
 N. of the people of Ârgika, (398
 seqq.)
 Ârgikā, N. of a river:
 (399.)
 Ârgikiya, n. = Ârgika, the country:
 (398 seqq.).—Ârgikiyā, f. = Ârgikā,
 the river, (399.)
 âvis, openly:
 âvib (karta), I, 86, 9; VII, 58, 5.
 â-vrita, invested:
 â-vritab, I, 87, 4.
 â-sās, wish:
 â-sāsab, V, 56, 2.
 âsā, cleft:
 âsāb, I, 39, 3².
 â-sīr, milk (for the Soma):
 â-sīram, I, 134, 6 (bis).

ârú, quick, swift :

ârāvab, X, 78, 5.—ârú-bhiḥ, on the quick steeds, I, 37, 14; II, 34, 3^a; V, 55, 1; 61, 11.

ârú-arva, with quick horses :

ârú-arvāb, V, 58, 1; (I, 37, 2¹.)

ās, to sit :

āsate, they are enthroned (as gods), I, 19, 6; āsate, they dwell, I, 168, 3.—upa-āsate, they revere, X, 121, 2.

ās, mouth :

āsā vāndyāsab, visibly like, I, 168, 2.—ās, mouth, as the instrument of praise (41-43); etymology (42, note *); āsā, instr. (42 seq.).

āsān, mouth :

āsā-bhiḥ, I, 166, 11^a.

āsā :

instr. āsayā, (I, 168, 1^a.)

āsāt, coram :

(42 seq.)

āsyā, mouth :

āsyē, I, 38, 14.

i, to go . . . :

iyānāb, approaching for (two Acc.), II, 34, 14¹; yatīb vṛishī, going with rain, V, 53, 5¹; vyāthib yatī (a ship) that goes rolling, V, 59, 2¹; rītām yatē, to the righteous man, X, 78, 2; iyante, they move along, V, 55, 1; iyate, X, 168, 2; iyamānāb, X, 168, 3.—āti iyāma, let us pass, V, 53, 14.—adhi-ithā, you listen (c. Gen.), VII, 56, 15.—ānu yanti, they follow, V, 53, 6.—ā-itāsab, they are come, I, 165, 1^a; ūpa ā ayati, he comes (to ask) for (Acc.), VIII, 20, 22¹.—ūt-itab sūrab, the risen sun, X, 121, 6; ūt-ite sūrye, at sunrise, V, 54, 10.—nīb-etave, to come forth, I, 37, 9¹.—pārā itana, move along, V, 61, 4.—prayāt yantu, go forth, V, 87, 1; prayāt-bhyab, V, 54, 9; pra-yatī adhvarē, while the sacrifice proceeds, VIII, 7, 6; ānu prā yanti, V, 53, 10.—vī yayub parva-rāb, they have trodden to pieces, VIII, 7, 23; (VIII, 7, 22¹.)

lā, food :

lābhiḥ, V, 53, 2.

īt, indeed . . . :

āt it, then only, I, 87, 5; 168, 9;

evā it, I, 165, 12; gha it, II, 34, 14; it u, V, 55, 7; sā sā it, VI, 66, 3; sādām it, I, 114, 8.

itās, from here :

itāb (opp. to ātab), I, 6, 10.

iti :

V, 52, 11; 53, 3; 61, 8; 18.

itī, pace :

ityā (nābhasab), I, 167, 5.

itthā, thus :

I, 39, 1; 7; 165, 3; VII, 56, 15; VIII, 7, 30.—itthā dhiyā, thus is my thought, V, 61, 15¹; I, 2, 6².

itvan, see prātab-Itvan.

idām, this here . . . :

dyām imām, X, 121, 1; iyām prithivī, V, 54, 9.—asyā, X, 121, 3; I, 86, 4¹; 5; asya, his (Indra's), I, 6, 2¹.—eshām, I, 37, 3¹; 9; 13; 15; 38, 8; 12; 165, 13; V, 52, 15¹; 87, 2¹; etāvatab eshām, VIII, 7, 15¹; tāt eshām, this is theirs, VIII, 20, 14 (bis).—imā, here are, I, 165, 4; imē Marūtab (opp. anyē), VII, 57, 3.—idām, here, II, 33, 10.

idām-idam, again and again :

VII, 59, 1.

inā, strong :

ināsab, V, 54, 8.

īndu, (Soma) drop :

īndu-bhiḥ, VIII, 7, 14; īndavab, I, 2, 4; 134, 2.—īndo, O Indu, I, 43, 8.

Indra :

indra, īndra, I, 6, 5; 165, 3; 5; 7; 167, 1; 170, 2; 5; 171, 6; īndrab, I, 85, 9; 165, 10; 166, 12; VII, 56, 25; VIII, 94, 6; vāyo īndrab āa, I, 2, 5; 6; īndram, I, 6, 10; 87, 5; VIII, 7, 24; 31; īndrena, I, 6, 7; īndrāya, I, 165, 11; īndrasya, I, 6, 8; 167, 10; īndrāt, I, 171, 4; īndre, I, 166, 11.—Indra called vīra, (II, 33, 1¹.)

īndra-vat, joined by Indra :

īndra-vantab, V, 57, 1.

īndravāyu, Indra and Vāyu :

īndravāyū, I, 2, 4.

īndriyā, vigour :

īndriyām, I, 85, 2.—īndriyēna, with (Indra's) might, I, 165, 8¹.

īndh, to kindle :

īdhānāb, VI, 66, 2.—sām indhatām (agnīm), let them light (the fire),

I, 170, 4; sám-iddhab, V, 58, 3.
 —(I, 166, 1²).
 fndhanvan, fiery :
 fndhanva-bhiḥ, II, 34, 5².
 iradh :
 irādhyai, for achievement, I, 134, 2.
 frin, tyrant (?) :
 frī, V, 87, 3¹.
 írya, active :
 íryam (rágānam), V, 58, 4.
 iva, like . . . :
 ihā-iva, almost close by, I, 37, 3.—
 iva and ná, I, 85, 8¹.—iva, as one
 syllable, I, 166, 1³; p. cxix.
 ish, to rush :
 ishazanta, ishanta, I, 134, 5; p.
 cxxii.
 fsh, food :
 fsham, I, 168, 2¹; II, 34, 7; 8;
 ishā, I, 88, 1; 165, 15; 166, 15;
 167, 11; 168, 10; p. xx; VIII,
 20, 2; ishē bhugē, VIII, 20, 8;
 fshab (acc. pl.), I, 165, 12; VII,
 59, 2; p. xviii; ishām, I, 168, 5.
 —fshab saśrúshib, waters, rain-
 clouds, I, 86, 5².—fshab, viands,
 I, 167, 1.—fsham, draught, VIII, 7,
 1¹; 3; fshab, draughts, VIII, 7, 19.
 ishā, autumn :
 ishām, I, 165, 15; 166, 15; 167,
 11; 168, 10; 171, 6; p. xx.
 fshazy, to hasten :
 fshazyata, V, 52, 14.
 fshirā, invigorating :
 fshirām, I, 168, 9.
 fshu, arrow :
 fshum, I, 39, 10; 64, 10.
 fshu-mat, carrying good arrows :
 fshu-mantab, V, 57, 2.
 fshkri, see kri.
 fshri, rite, oblation :
 fshrim, I, 166, 14; fshráyab, VI,
 74, 1.
 ishmin, speeding along :
 ishminab, I, 87, 6; V, 87, 5; VII,
 56, 11.—ishminam, strong, V,
 52, 16.
 ihā, here . . . :
 ihā-iva, almost close by, I, 37, 3.—
 —ihā-ihā, here and there, VII,
 59, 11¹.
 î, to ask for (with two Acc.) :
 îmahe, I, 6, 10; V, 53, 13; îmahe,
 I, 43, 4; II, 34, 11.—áva îmahe,

we pray to forgive, VII, 58, 5.—
 See also i.
 î, pronominal base, see ayā, and
 îm.
 îksh :
 abhî afkshetām, they look up to
 (acc.), X, 121, 6.
 îñkh, to toss :
 îñkháyanti, I, 19, 7.
 id, to implore, to ask :
 î/e, V, 60, 1¹; î/e (with double
 Acc.), I, 134, 5.
 îm :
 I, 38, 11; 85, 11; 134, 2; 167, 8
 (bis); V, 54, 4; yāt îm, I, 87, 5;
 167, 5; 7; VII, 56, 21; yē îm,
 V, 61, 11; ké îm, VII, 56, 1; úpa
 îm, I, 171, 2.
 îr :
 â-îrîré, they produced, assumed, I,
 6, 4³.—ut-îráyanti (vātam), they
 send out, I, 168, 8; út îrayatha,
 you raise, V, 55, 5¹; út îrayanta,
 they have risen, VIII, 7, 3; út
 îrate, VIII, 7, 7; 17.—prá îrate,
 they come forth, VII, 56, 14;
 prá airata, they expanded, VIII,
 20, 4; prá îrayāmi, I send forth,
 II, 33, 8; sám prá îrate, they
 rise, X, 168, 2.
 îvat, so much :
 îvatab, VII, 56, 18.
 îr, to rule, to be lord (with Gen.) :
 îre, X, 121, 3; îre, I, 165, 10;
 îrishe, I, 170, 5; îshre, V, 87, 3;
 îsire, V, 58, 1.—îrānāb, I, 87, 4;
 îrānāt, II, 33, 9.
 îrāna-kṛit, conferring powers :
 îrāna-kṛitab, I, 64, 5¹.
 îsh, to shrink :
 îshante, VI, 66, 4.
 u, particle . . . :
 ná vaf u, II, 33, 9.—u before loka,
 p. lxxiv seqq.
 ukthā, praise, hymn :
 ukthām, I, 86, 4; ukthā, I, 165,
 4¹; ukthāni, VII, 56, 23; uk-
 thaib, VII, 56, 18; ukthēbhiḥ, I,
 2, 2.—vāhniḥ ukthaib, the priest
 with his hymns (41).
 ukthā-vāhas, offering hymns of praise :
 (40.)
 ukthyā, praiseworthy :
 ukthyām, I, 64, 14¹.—ukthyām

- (gâyatrām), praising, of praise, I, 38, 14.
- uksh, to sprinkle, to pour out, to wash:
- ukshānti, I, 166, 3; ukshānte, II, 34, 3¹; V, 59, 1; ukshāmānāb, VI, 66, 4.—ā ukshata, I, 87, 2. —(I, 85, 2¹.)
- uksh, to grow:
- see vaksh.
- ukshān, bull:
- ukshānāb, I, 64, 2¹; V, 52, 3; gāvab ukshānāb, excellent bulls, I, 168, 2⁸. — ukshnāb rāndhram, 'the hollow of the bull,' VIII, 7, 26¹.
- Ukshnorandhra, N. pr.: (VIII, 7, 26¹.)
- ugrā, terrible, strong:
- ugrāb, I, 19, 4; VI, 66, 6; VII, 56, 6; 57, 1; I, 134, 5; ugrāsab, VIII, 20, 12; āpab ugrāb, wild waters, VI, 66, 11²; ugrāb, I, 166, 6; 8; V, 57, 3; 60, 2; ugrāb, I, 165, 6; 10; VII, 56, 23; II, 33, 9; ugrāb ugrēbhiḥ, I, 171, 5; ugrān, VI, 66, 5; ugrām, VII, 56, 7; VIII, 20, 3; II, 33, 11; ugrāya manyāve, fierce anger, I, 37, 7. — dyaūb ugrā, the awful heaven, X, 121, 5¹.
- ugrā-putra, having terrible sons:
- ugrā-putrā (Aditi), (254; 260.)
- ugrā-bāhu, strong-armed:
- ugrā-bāhavab, VIII, 20, 12.
- ūt, prep. . . .
- utā, and, also; even . . . : then, after yāt, I, 85, 5.—utā vā, aye, or also, I, 86, 3; V, 60, 6; V, 58, 1; utā sma—utā sma—utā, whether—or whether, V, 52, 8; 9; mā—utā mā, I, 114, 7 (tris).—utā gha, even though, V, 61, 8¹; nūnām utā, even now, VIII, 20, 15.
- ut-rík:
- ut-ríkī yagñé, to the end of the ceremony, X, 77, 7¹.
- utó, also:
- V, 55, 4; VIII, 94, 6; I, 134, 6; X, 168, 1.
- ūt-ogas, ever-powerful:
- ūt-ogasab, V, 54, 3.
- ut-tamá, highest:
- ut-tamām, exalted, V, 59, 3; ut-tamé, in the highest (heaven), V, 60, 6.
- út-tara, higher:
- út-tarāt diváb, V, 60, 7; út-tarā dyaūb, VIII, 20, 6.
- ut-bhíd, breaking out:
- ut-bhídaḥ, V, 59, 6.
- útsa, spring, well (cloud):
- útsam, I, 64, 6⁴; (I, 85, 10¹); I, 85, 11; V, 52, 12⁸; 54, 8; VII, 57, 1; VIII, 7, 10²; 16; diváb útsāb, the springs of heaven, V, 57, 1.
- utsa-dhí, the lid of the well:
- utsa-dhīm, I, 88, 4¹; (176.)
- udán, water:
- udā-bhiḥ, I, 85, 5; nimnāb udā-bhiḥ, X, 78, 5.
- udanyú, longing for water:
- udanyávab, V, 54, 2; udanyáve, V, 57, 1.
- uda-vāhá, water-carrier:
- uda-vāhēna, I, 38, 9; uda-vāhāsab, V, 58, 3.
- udrín, watering-pot:
- udrínam, VIII, 7, 10².
- und, to water, moisten:
- vi-undānti, I, 38, 9; ví undanti, I, 85, 5; V, 54, 8.
- úpa, prep. . . . : with Loc., úpa rátheshu, I, 39, 6; 87, 2.—with Acc., to, I, 166, 2¹; úpa te, near to thee, I, 114, 9.—úpa dyú-bhiḥ, day by day, V, 53, 3¹.
- upa-má, very high:
- upa-māsab, V, 58, 5.
- úpara, carried behind:
- úparā, I, 167, 3⁸.
- upári, above:
- V, 61, 12.
- upavā, the blowing after:
- (X, 77, 5².)
- Upastutā, N. pr., son of Vṛishnihavya: (152 seq.).—See stu.
- upá-stha, lap:
- upá-sthe, VII, 56, 25; VIII, 94, 2¹.
- upa-hatnú, attacking:
- upa-hatnúm, II, 33, 11.
- upa-hvará, cleft:
- upa-hvaréshu, I, 87, 2.
- upará, injury:
- (66.)
- ubg:
- níb aubgat, he forced out, I, 85, 9.
- ubhá, both:
- ubhé, heaven and earth, (V, 59, 7⁸); VI, 66, 6; ubhé ródasí, VIII, 20, 4.

ubhāya :
 ubhāye, people on both sides, V, 59, 7.²
 urú, wide :
 urú, I, 85, 6 ; 7 ; uráu antárikṣhe, V, 52, 7 ; urávab, V, 57, 4 ; urvī, VII, 57, 1.—uru as one syllable, p. lxxvi.
 uru-kramá, wide-striding :
 uru-kramáb (Vishṇu), V, 87, 4.¹
 uru-kshāya, wide-ruling :
 uru-kshāyā, I, 2, 9.
 urú-loka :
 urú-lokam (antáriksham), p. lxxvii.
 uru-vyátas :
 ep. of Aditi, (260.)
 uru-vyáñk, wide-reaching :
 urúñk, ep. of Aditi, (260.)—urúñk, I, 2, 3.
 uru-vraga :
 uru-vragā, ep. of Aditi, (260.)
 urushy, to deliver :
 urushyata, V, 87, 6.
 urúñk, see uru-vyáñk.
 Urvasī :
 (308.)
 urvāruká, gourd :
 urvārukám-iva, VII, 59, 12.
 urviyā, wide :
 V, 55, 2.
 uloka for u loka :
 pp. lxxiv seqq.
 ur, see var.
 Uśanas :
 = Uśanā, (VIII, 7, 26².)
 Uśanā, N. of a Rishi :
 uśanā, with Uśanā, VIII, 7, 26².
 urānā, desire :
 uśanā, with desire, (VIII, 7, 26².)
 ushás, dawn :
 ushásab ví-usháishu, usháb ná, II, 34, 12 ; ushásab, the Dawns, V, 59, 8 ; I, 134, 3 (bis) ; 4 ; ushát-bhiḥ, I, 6, 3² ; ushásām ná ketávab, X, 78, 7.
 usrá :
 kshápab usráb ka, and usráb, by night and by day, (I, 64, 8².)—usráb-iva, the heavens, I, 87, 1.
 —usráb, the mornings, I, 171, 5.
 usri :
 usrí, in the morning, (II, 34, 12¹) ; V, 53, 14.¹
 usríya, bright :
 usríyab, the bright ones (days or clouds), I, 6, 5³ ; usríyab, (II,

34, 12¹.)—usríyab vrishabháb, the bull of the Dawn, V, 58, 6².
 útí, protection, help, favour :
 útí, II, 34, 15 ; VII, 59, 4 ; útí, instr., I, 64, 13 ; 172, 1¹ ; VII, 57, 7 ; 59, 9¹ ; 10 ; útáye, II, 34, 14 ; VIII, 7, 6 ; útáyab, I, 167, 1 ; V, 54, 7 ; I, 134, 2 ; útí-bhiḥ, favours, I, 39, 8 ; 9 ; VII, 58, 3 ; VIII, 20, 24 ; útíshu, VIII, 20, 15.
 ūdhan and ūdhar, udder :
 ūdhab divyāni, the heavenly udders (clouds), I, 64, 5.—ūdhani, II, 34, 2² ; 6.—ūdhab, II, 34, 10 ; VI, 66, 1 ; VII, 56, 4.¹
 ūma, guardian :
 ūmāsab, I, 166, 3 ; ūmāb, V, 52, 12 ; X, 77, 8.
 ūrnā, wool :
 ūrnāb vasata, V, 52, 9¹.
 ūrnu :
 āpa ūrnute, she uncovers, II, 34, 12¹.
 ūrdhvā, erect :
 ūrdhvā kṛinavante, they stir up, I, 88, 3¹ ; ūrdhvām nunudre, they pushed up, I, 85, 10 ; 88, 4 ; ūrdhvā santu, may they stand erect, I, 171, 3¹ ; ūrdhvā nab karta, lift us up, I, 172, 3 ; ūrdhvā tishṭbatu, may (the dawn) stand erect, I, 134, 1².
 ūrml, wave :
 ūrmáyab, I, 168, 2.
 ūrmyā, night :
 ūrmye, V, 61, 17¹.
 ūh, see vah.
 ūh, to watch :
 ohate, V, 52, 10 ; 11 ; ní ohate, V, 52, 11.—ohate (sakhitvé), he is counted (in your friendship), VIII, 7, 31.
 ri, to go :
 lyarti, it rises, I, 165, 4² ; p. xv ; xxi.—arta, it came, V, 52, 6.—ā ūyarta, bring, VIII, 7, 13.—ūt arpaya, raise up, II, 33, 4.—mā náb arāma, may we not fall away, VII, 56, 21.—pró ārata, come on, I, 39, 5¹.—sam-arānāb, coming together, I, 165, 3.
 ri, to hurt, see ar.
 rikti, praise :
 su-rikti (?), (I, 64, 1².)
 ríkvan, singer :
 ríkvānab (Maruts), I, 87, 5 ; ríkva-

- bhiḥ, V, 52, 1; 60, 8.—*ríkva-*
bhiḥ, men to celebrate them,
I, 87, 6².
- ríksha*, bear:
ríkshab ná, V, 56, 3.
- rik*, to sing, praise:
arkati, I, 6, 8¹; *árkanti*, I, 165, 1⁴;
p. xiii; *árka*, V, 59, 1⁴; *árkantab*,
I, 85, 2; *árkate*, I, 87, 2; *án-*
rikúb (*arkám*), I, 19, 4¹; *arkat*,
I, 165, 14.—Inf. *rikáse*, (I, 87,
6¹).—*prá árka*, V, 52, 1¹; 5;
prá arkata, V, 54, 1; VII, 58, 1;
prá árkonti, I, 166, 7².
- rikás*, praiser:
rikáse, (I, 87, 6¹.)
- rigipyá*, headlong:
rigipyásab, II, 34, 4².
- rigishá*, what remains of the Soma-
plant after it has been squeezed:
(I, 64, 12⁶.)
- rigishín*, impetuous:
rigishínám, I, 64, 12⁶; *rigishínab*,
I, 87, 1; II, 34, 1.
- riṅg*, to strive, to yearn:
riṅgáta, you advanced, V, 87, 5;
riṅgati, straightforward, I, 172,
2; Inf. *riṅgáse*, (I, 87, 6¹); *rigi-*
shá from *rig*, (I, 64, 12⁶).—nf
riṅgate, they gain, I, 37, 3².—
sám asmin riṅgate, they yearn
for it, I, 6, 9.
- rina-yá*, going after debt:
(I, 87, 4².)
- rina-yāvan*, searching out sin:
rina-yāvā, I, 87, 4².
- ritá*, right; rite, sacrifice:
riténa, in proper order, VII, 56,
12; on the right way, I, 2, 8;
ritám yaté, to the righteous
man, X, 78, 2.—*ritásya sáda-*
neshu, in the sacred places, II,
34, 13²; *ritásya párasmin dhā-*
man, in the highest place of the
law, I, 43, 9¹.—*ritám*, sacrifice,
V, 59, 1; *ritásya*, VIII, 7, 21;
ritānām, I, 165, 13.—(I, 38,
6¹.)
- ritá-gāta*, well-born:
ritá-gātāb, V, 61, 14.
- rita-gña*, righteous:
rita-gñāb, V, 57, 8; 58, 8.
- rita-yú*, pious:
rita-yāvab, V, 54, 12².
- ritá-van*, holy:
ritá-vā, X, 168, 3.
- rita-váká*, hymn:
(I, 134, 1².)
- rita-vridh*, increasing the right:
rita-vridhau (*mitrávarunau*), I, 2,
8.
- rita-sāp*, following the order:
rita-sāpab, VII, 56, 12; (I, 2, 8¹.)
- rita-spriṣ*, adhering to the right:
rita-spriṣā (*mitrávarunau*), I, 2,
8¹.
- riti*, hurting:
(65); (I, 64, 15¹.)
- riti-sáh*, defying all onslaughts:
riti-sāham, I, 64, 15¹.
- ritu-thā*, at the right season:
I, 170, 5.
- ritupati*, N. of Agni:
(I, 43, 4¹.)
- ridūdára*, kindhearted (?):
ridūdaráb, II, 33, 5².
- ridh*, to accomplish:
ridhyām, V, 60, 1.
- ridhak*, far:
VII, 57, 4.
- Ribhu*, the *Ribhus*:
(V, 58, 4¹; VI, 66, 11¹.)
- ribhukshan* (?):
ribhukshanab, VIII, 7, 9¹; 12;
20, 2.
- ribhukshás*, lord:
ribhukshāb, I, 167, 10.
- ribhvas*, bold, rabid:
ribhvasam, V, 52, 8¹.
- rish*:
tiráb (*srídhab*) *árshanti*, they rush
through, VIII, 94, 7.
- ríshi*, seer:
ríshe, V, 52, 13; 14; *ríshe*, V,
59, 8; *ríshim vā rágānam vā*, V,
54, 7; *ríshim—rágānam*, V, 54,
14.—(V, 61, 5².)
- rishi-dvish*, enemy of the poets:
rishi-dvíshe, I, 39, 10.
- rishí*, spear:
rishírb, I, 167, 3²; *rishíráyab*, I,
64, 4; (II, 34, 2¹); V, 54, 11;
57, 6; VIII, 20, 11; *rishírb*, V,
52, 6; *rishírb-bhiḥ*, I, 37, 2; 64,
8; 85, 4; (VII, 56, 13¹); *rish-*
tíshu, I, 166, 4.
- rishri-mát*, armed with spears:
rishrimát-bhiḥ, I, 88, 1; (170);
rishri-mántab, V, 57, 2; 60, 3.
- rishírb-vidyut*, armed with lightning-
spears:
rishírb-vidyutab, (I, 167, 3²); V, 52,

- 13; *rishri-vidyutab*, I, 168, 5; (II, 34, 2¹).
rishvá, tall:
rishváśab, I, 64, 2; *rishvāb*, V, 52, 6¹; 13.
- éka*, alone:
ékab, X, 121, 1; 3; 7²; 8; I, 165, 3; *ékam*, I, 165, 6; VIII, 20, 13; *ékasya* *kit* me, I, 165, 10.—*ékab-ekab*, one by one, V, 61, 1.
- ékam-eka*:
ékam-ekā śatā, each a hundred, V, 52, 17.
- eg*:
egati, (the earth) trembles, V, 59, 2.—*égatha*, you stir, VIII, 20, 4.
- eda*, a kind of sheep:
(I, 166, 10³; 235.)
- ena*, a kind of antelope:
(I, 166, 10³; 235.)
- éta*, the fallow deer:
étāb, (I, 165, 1³); V, 54, 5; *étān*, I, 165, 5².—*étāb*, speckled deer-skins, I, 166, 10³; (232; 234 seq.)—*étāb ná*, like harts, X, 77, 2.—See *ena*.
- etād*, this . . .:
etāni víśvā gātāni, all these created things, X, 121, 10.—*etān* and *étān*, (I, 165, 5²).—*eté*, there they are, I, 165, 12.—*etāt tyāt*, I, 88, 5; *eshā syā*, I, 88, 6.—*etāni nityā*, these secrets, VII, 56, 4¹.
- étara*, the (solar) horse:
étarab, I, 168, 5⁴.
- etāvat*, so much:
etāvat, VII, 57, 3.—*etāvatab kit* *eshām*, of that immense (host) of them, VIII, 7, 15¹.
- ena*, fem. enī:
enyāb, spotted deer, V, 53, 7².—See *éta*, (234 seq.)
- enad*, this:
enā, instr., II, 34, 14; V, 53, 12; *enān*, V, 52, 6.
- énas*, sin:
énab, VII, 58, 5; VI, 74, 3.
- éman*, march:
éma-bhiḥ, V, 59, 2.
- éva*, horse:
évāśab, I, 166, 4; (I, 168, 1²).
- evá*:
evá it, truly, I, 165, 12; *evá* and *evám*, (I, 168, 1²).—*evá*, thus, II, 33, 15.
- evám*, thus:
adverb of *éva*, (I, 168, 1²).
- evayā*, quickly moving, quick:
eva-yāb, I, 168, 1² (conjecture for *deva-yāb*); (365.)
- evayāmarut*, *Evayāmarut*, a sacrificial shout:
evayāmarut, V, 87, 1 to 9; (365); (I, 168, 1²).
- eva-yāvan*, the constant wanderer:
eva-yāvnab, II, 34, 11.—fem. *eva-yāvarī*, (I, 168, 1²); (365.)
- eshā*, rapid:
eshāsya (*vishṇob*), II, 34, 11¹; VIII, 20, 3².
- aineya*, skin of an antelope:
(232; 234.)
- aídh*, torch:
aidhā-iva, I, 166, 1².
- ó, see ā.
- ókas*, home:
svám ókab, VII, 56, 24¹.
- ógas*, power:
ógab, I, 39, 10; V, 57, 6; VII, 56, 7; I, 165, 10; *ógasā*, I, 19, 4; 8; 39, 8; 85, 4; 10; V, 52, 9; 14²; 55, 2; 56, 4; 59, 7; VII, 58, 2; VIII, 7, 8; *ógab-bhiḥ*, VII, 56, 6.—*ógiyab*, stronger, II, 33, 10.
- óshadhi*, plant:
óshadhīb, I, 166, 5; *óshadhīshu*, VII, 56, 22; *óshadhīb* (nom.), VII, 56, 25.
- aukshṇorandhra*:
(VIII, 7, 26¹).
- Ka*, Who, the Unknown God:
(p. 3.)
- kakúbh*, hump:
kakúbbab rihaté mithāb, they lick one another's humps, VIII, 20, 21¹.
- kakuhā*, exalted:
kakuhān, II, 34, 11.
- Kāṇva*:
kāṇvam, I, 39, 9; VIII, 7, 18;
kāṇvāya, I, 39, 7¹.—*kāṇvāb*, I, 37, 1; *kāṇveshu*, I, 37, 14;
kāṇvāśab, VIII, 7, 32.

- kát**, interrog. part.:
VIII, 94, 7; 8.—See **kím**.
- katamá**:
katamát *kaná áhab*, even a single day, X, 168, 3.
- kathám**, how:
V, 61, 2.
- kathá**, how:
V, 53, 2; 61, 2.
- kadž**, when:
VIII, 7, 30.
- kádha**:
when, I, 38, 1¹; where, VIII, 7, 31.
- kadha-prí**:
kadha-priyab (read *kádha priyáb*), I, 38, 1¹; VIII, 7, 31.
- kan**, see *kanáná*.
- kananā**, a caterpillar:
kananā-iva, V, 54, 6¹.
- kaparda**, a shell, the hair twisted together in the form of a shell:
(I, 114, 1²).
- kapardín**, with braided hair:
kapardíne (rudráya), I, 114, 1²;
kapardínám, I, 114, 5.
- kám**, part.:
I, 39, 7; 87, 6¹; 88, 2; 3 (bis); VII, 57, 3; VIII, 94, 2; hí kam, VII, 59, 5.
- kambala**, m., cloth made of vegetable substance:
(233-)
- kárna**:
kárnaib nadásya, with the points of the reed, II, 34, 3².
- karmalíkin**, fiery (?):
karmalíkinám, II, 33, 8².
- kávandha**, water-skin:
kávandham, VIII, 7, 10²; (V, 54, 8²).
- kavandhín**, carrying water-skins:
kavandhínab, V, 54, 8².
- kaví**, poet; wise:
kaváyab, V, 52, 13; kaváyab, V, 57, 8; 58, 8; wise, VII, 59, 11; kaváyab, V, 58, 3; kavím, wise, I, 114, 4; kaví, I, 2, 9.
- káśā**, whip:
káśāb, I, 37, 3¹; káśayā, I, 168, 4.
- Kānvá**:
kānvásya, VIII, 7, 19.
- kāma**, desire:
kāmam, I, 85, 11; kāmasya, I, 86, 8; kāmab, V, 61, 18.
- kāmín**, loving, desiring:
kāmínab, V, 53, 16; VII, 59, 3.—
kāmínám, the needy, V, 61, 7.
- kāmya**, beloved:
kāmyā, I, 6, 2; V, 61, 16; kām-
yaib, I, 6, 8.
- kārú**, poet, singer:
kārúb, I, 165, 14; kārób, I, 165, 15; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10;
kárave, II, 34, 7; káravab, VIII, 94, 3.
- kārpāsa**, cotton dress:
(234-)
- kāvya**:
kāvya, wise thoughts, V, 59, 4.
- kāshāya**, dark red:
(232, 234-)
- kāshubā**, fence:
kāshubāb, I, 37, 10².
- kím**, interrog. pron. . . .:
kásmai devāya havishā vidhema, X, 121, 1-9; kím te, what has happened to thee? I, 165, 3; káb nú, I, 165, 13; káb nūnám, V, 61, 14; kát ha nūnám, what then now? I, 38, 1¹; VIII, 7, 31; kát ártam, what errand? I, 38, 2; kát votéma, what could we say? I, 43, 1.—kím, why? I, 170, 2; 3.—kím with *kaná*, indef. pron., (265 seq.)—
káb *kit*, any one, I, 37, 13; ké *kit*, a few only, I, 87, 1¹; V, 52, 12; kéna *kit*, whatever, I, 87, 2.
- kirāna**, speck of dust:
kirānam, V, 59, 4.
- kilāś**, spotted deer:
kilāśyāb, V, 53, 1¹.
- kírn**, gleeman:
kírínab, V, 52, 12².
- kutapa**, woollen cloth:
(234-)
- kútas**, whence:
kútab, I, 165, 1; 3¹; X, 168, 3; p. xiv.
- kup**, caus., to rouse:
kopáyatha, V, 57, 3.
- kubhanyú**, wildly shouting:
kubhanyávab, V, 52, 12².
- Kúbhā**, the Kabul river:
kúbhā, V, 53, 9¹.
- kumārā**, boy:
kumārāb, II, 33, 12.
- Kuru**:
(VIII, 20, 24¹)

Kurukshetra :

(398 seq.)

kuvít, interrog. part.:

VII, 58, 5.

kûlabheda, cutting through the banks (of a river) :

(263.)

kûsh**tab**=kú sh**tab** :

(I, 38, 1¹.)

kri, to make . . . :

krinavante ū:dhvā, may they stir up, I, 88, 3; ūrdhvān karta, I, 172, 3; bhūri *āk*artha, thou hast achieved much, I, 165, 7; bhūriṇi *krināvāma*, I, 165, 7; p. xvi; bhūri *āk*akra, you have valued, VII, 56, 23¹.—*krinōti*, he performs a sacrifice for (Dat.), (205, note *); *krinvāntab* brāhma, making prayer, I, 88, 4; *krité* kit, whatever little we have done, VII, 57, 5.—*kārāma āgāb*, VII, 57, 4; *kritām éna**b***, VI, 74, 3. — *yāni karishyā krinuhī*, do what thou wilt do, I, 165, 9⁴; p. xvii; *yā nū krināvai*, I, 165, 10.—*kartana tavishāni*, prove your powers, I, 166, 1.—*ārē āk*rima, we have put away, I, 171, 4.—*mā kirām karat*, may it not cause delay, V, 56, 7.—*kritām*, made (at play, or in battle), V, 60, 1².—*āk*akrire satrā, they have brought together, V, 60, 4.—*krinuté māna**b** deva-trā*, she is mindful of the gods, V, 61, 7.—*āk*akrire *vridhē*, I, 85, 1; *kridhi gīvātave*, X, 186, 2.—*āram krinvantu*, let them prepare, I, 170, 4.—*ā asmān āk*kré, has brought us hither, I, 165, 14¹; (203); *ā akaram ūpa te*, I have driven thee to thee, I, 114, 9.—*āvīb karta*, make manifest, I, 86, 9.—*īshkarta*, straighten, VIII, 20, 26¹.—*prā akran*, they tried to make, V, 59, 1¹.—See *krāná*, *ni**b**-kritā*.

krití, sword :

kritīb, I, 168, 3.

krish, to plough :

*āk*arkrishat, VIII, 20, 19.

k/ṛp :

*tébhi**b** kalpasva sādhu-yā*, fare kindly with them, I, 170, 2.

ketú, light :

ketúm, I, 6, 3¹; *ketúnā*, V, 60, 8; *ketávab* (ushásām), rays, X, 78, 7.—*ketāve*, herald, I, 166, 1².—See *aketú*.

Kailāsa :

from *kilāsa* ? (V, 53, 1¹.)

komyā (?) :

I, 171, 3¹.

kōra, cask, bucket (cloud) :

kōrāb, I, 87, 2¹; *kōram*, V, 53, 6; 59, 8.—*kōre hiraṇyāye*, at the golden chest (on the chariot), VIII, 20, 8¹.

krátu, power of body and mind :

krátvā, wisdom, I, 39, 1; V, 87, 2¹; with our mind, I, 165, 7²; *krátum*, I, 64, 13; 2, 8; VIII, 7, 24; might, I, 19, 2.

krand, to roar :

*āk*radat *bhiyā*, VIII, 7, 26.—*áva krandat*, V, 58, 6.—*prā krand*, to call out, (V, 59, 1¹.)

krāndasī, heaven and earth :

krāndasī, X, 121, 6¹.

kram, to stride :

*āk*rame, V, 87, 4; *ānu krāmema*, let us follow, V, 53, 11; *akra-mīm*, (I, 165, 8¹.)

kravis, raw flesh :

(I, 166, 6³.)

krāná, made (?) :

*krāná**sab***, *krāná**b*** (bis), I, 134, 2¹.

Krivi :

krívim, VIII, 20, 24¹.

krívi**b**-dat, gory-toothed :

*krívi**b**-datí*, I, 166, 6³.

krí**d**, to play :

*krí**l**anti*, I, 166, 2; *krí**l**atha*, V, 60, 3.

krí**l**ā, playful :

*krí**l**ām (sárdhab)*, I, 37, 1; 5; *krí**l**āb*, I, 166, 2.

krí**l**ī, sportive, playful :

*krí**l**āyab*, I, 87, 3; (*sírlí**l**āb*), X, 78, 6.

krudh :

*mā tvā āk*rudhāma, let us not incense thee, II, 33, 4.

krúdhmin, furious :

krúdhmī, VII, 56, 8.

Krúmu, the Kurrum :

*Krúmu**b***, V, 53, 9¹.

krúra, horrible :

(I, 166, 6³.)

Kṛīradantī, N. of Durgā:

(I, 166, 6³.)

kvā, where:

I, 38, 2¹ (bis); 3 (bis, and kvō); I, 165, 6; V, 61, 2 (bis); VIII, 7, 20; II, 33, 7; kvā svit, kvā, I, 168, 6; X, 168, 3.—kvā, pronounced kuva, (86.)

ksháp, night:

kshápab, by night, I, 64, 8²; pūrváb áti kshápab, through many nights, X, 77, 2.

ksham:

abhí kshameta nab árvati, may he be gracious to our horse, II, 33, 1¹; abhí ákshamīthāb mā, wilt thou bear with me? II, 33, 7.

kshám, earth:

kshamá, on earth, V, 52, 3; down to the earth, VIII, 20, 26¹.

kshámya, earthly:

kshámyasya gánmanab, what is born on earth, VII, 46, 2.

ksháya, dwelling:

ksháye, I, 86, 1; ksháyam, VII, 59, 2.

ksháya, lordship:

ksháyena, being the lord, VII, 46, 2¹.

kshayát-víra, ruling over heroes:

kshayát-víráya (rudráya), I, 114, 1²; 2; kshayát-vírasya, I, 114, 3; kshayát-víra, I, 114, 10.

kshar, to flow:

ksharati, (the ship) sways, V, 59, 2.—prá áksharat, he has poured out, VIII, 7, 1.

kshi, to dwell:

ksheti, V, 61, 19.—á ksheti, he acquires, I, 64, 13.

kshiti, hamlet:

kshitinām, X, 78, 1.

kshiprá-ishu, with swift arrows:

kshiprá-ishave (Rudra), VII, 46, 1.

kshud:

kshódante ápab, the waters gush, V, 58, 6; kshodanti, they stir, VII, 58, 1.

kshumá, flax:

(233.)

kshurá, sharp edge:

kshuráb, I, 166, 10⁴.

kshoní:

kshoníbhiḥ, with the (morning) clouds, II, 34, 13¹.—kshoníb, pl., women, (308; 309 seq.); kshoní,

du., heaven and earth, VIII, 7, 22; (309.)

kshódas, rush of water:

kshódasā, V, 53, 7.

kshaumí, linen dress:

(234.)

kshamá, earth:

kshamayā kárati, it traverses the earth, VII, 46, 3.

khād, to chew up:

khádatha, I, 64, 7².

khādí, ring, quoit:

khādíb, I, 168, 3.—khádáyab, I, 166, 9²; V, 54, 11; VII, 56, 13; khádíshu, V, 53, 4.—(I, 64, 10²; II, 34, 2¹.)

khādín, having rings:

khádínab, II, 34, 2¹.

khádi-hasta, adorned with rings on their hands, or, holding the quoits in their hands:

khádi-hastam, V, 58, 2; (I, 166, 9².)

ganá, host, company:

ganáb, I, 87, 4 (bis); V, 61, 13; VII, 56, 7; (VI, 66, 11¹); ganám, I, 38, 15; 64, 12; V, 52, 13; 14, 53, 10; 56, 1; 58, 1; 2; VIII, 94, 12; X, 77, 1⁴; ganám-ganam, V, 53, 11; ganáya, VII, 58, 1.—ganaíb, hosts (of Indra), I, 6, 8.

gana-jrí, marching in companies:

gana-jriyab, I, 64, 9; ganajrí-bhiḥ, V, 60, 8¹; p. lxxxviii.

gábhasti, fist:

gábhastyob, I, 64, 10; V, 54, 11; from our hands, I, 88, 6¹; (178.)

gam, to go . . .:

gántā, he will live in, I, 86, 3¹.—gatáb ádhvā, a trodden path, VII, 58, 3.—á gahi, come hither, I, 6, 9; 19, 1-9.—úpa á gamam, I, 2, 4; á nab úpa gantana, VIII, 7, 11; 27.—práti á gathá, VIII, 20, 16.—sam-gagmānáb, coming together, I, 6, 7.

gám, earth:

gmáb, I, 37, 6.

gáya, house:

gáyam, VI, 74, 2.

gar, see gri.

garút-mat, p. xxv.

garta-sád, sitting in the chariot (hole):

garta-sadam, II, 33, 11¹.

gárbha, germ :

gárbham, X, 121, 7; V, 58, 7; VI, 66, 3; *bhūvanasya gárbhaḥ*, the germ of the world, X, 168, 4¹.

garbha-tvá, the form of new-born babes :

garbha-tvám, I, 6, 4³.

gávya, consisting of cows :

(*rādhā*) *gávyam*, V, 52, 17; *paśúm gávyam*, V, 61, 5.

gavyát, desirous of cows :

gavyántab, (I, 167, 1¹).

gā, to go :

gīgāti, V, 87, 4; I, 2, 3.—*ádhi gātana*, do remember (c. Gen.), V, 55, 9; *ádhi gāta*, VIII, 20, 22; X, 78, 8.—*ā gāt*, she went to, I, 167, 5; *ō gīgātu*, II, 34, 15; *ā gīgātana*, V, 59, 6; *ā gīgāta*, VII, 57, 7.—*ūpa gāt*, I, 38, 5.—*pāri ā vaḥ ā agub*, they went round you and came back to, I, 88, 4¹; *pāri gāt*, may it pass by, II, 33, 14.—*prā gīgāta*, come forth, I, 85, 6; *prā gīgāti*, I, 87, 5.

gātú, path :

gātúm, V, 87, 8.

gāthá, song :

gāthám, I, 167, 6; (I, 43, 4¹).

gāthá-pati, lord of songs :

gāthá-patim (*rudrám*), I, 43, 4¹.

gāyatrá, song :

gāyatrám (*ukthyām*), I, 38, 14.

gír, speech, song :

iyám gírb, I, 165, 15; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; *imám me. gíram*, VIII, 7, 9; *gírā*, I, 38, 13; V, 52, 13; 53, 16; 87, 3; VIII, 20, 19; 20; *gírāb*, I, 64, 1; V, 61, 17; VII, 46, 1; (I, 37, 10¹; 165, 4¹).

gír, singer :

gírāb (the Maruts), I, 6, 6¹; 9; 37, 10¹.

gírí, mountain, cloud :

gírí, VIII, 7, 5; *gírīm*, I, 37, 12; *gírāyab*, I, 64, 7; VIII, 7, 34; *gírīm ānaṣva-dām*, western mountain, V, 54, 5¹; *gírāyab* for *gírāyab* (?), VI, 66, 11²; *ádhi-iva gírínām*, VIII, 7, 14.—*gírí* (*párvatab*), gnarled (cloud), I, 37, 7¹; *párvatam gírím*, V, 56, 4².

gírī-kshít, ep. of Vishṇu :

(V, 87, 1¹).

gírī-gā, voice-born :

gírī-gāb, V, 87, 1¹.

gírī-sthā, dwelling on mountains :

gírī-sthām (*mārutam ganám*), VIII, 94, 12; (V, 57, 8¹; 87, 1¹).

gurú, heavy :

gurú, I, 39, 3; VII, 56, 19; *laghu* and *guru*, light and heavy syllables, p. xcvi.

guh, to hide :

gúhata, I, 86, 10.

gúha, hiding-place :

gúhā, I, 6, 5; *gúhā* (*śárantī*), in secret, I, 167, 3.

gúhya, hideous :

gúhyam, I, 86, 10.

gúrtá-tama, most delightful :

gúrtá-tamāb, I, 167, 1.

gri (*gar*), caus., to raise up :

gigrítā, VII, 57, 6².

grídhra, hawk :

grídhraḥ, I, 88, 4¹.

gríhá, house :

gríhé, X, 186, 3.

gríha-medha, accepting the domestic sacrifices :

gríha-medhāsab, VII, 59, 10¹; (VII, 56, 14²).

gríhamedhin :

marutab gríhamedhinab, (VII, 56, 14²; 59, 10¹).

gríha-medhiya, offering for the house-gods :

gríha-medhíyam, VII, 56, 14².

grí, to praise :

grínímasi, I, 64, 12; II, 33, 8; *grínántam*, VII, 57, 2; *grínaté*, VI, 66, 9; *gríníhi*, V, 53, 16; *gríníshe*, (V, 58, 1¹); II, 33, 12; *grínânāb*, V, 55, 10; 59, 8; *grínânāb*, VII, 56, 18.—*ā grínanti*, they invite, VIII, 94, 3.—*ūpa grínímasi*, II, 34, 14.

gai, to sing :

gāya, I, 38, 14; *gāyat*, I, 167, 6; *agub*, (175.)—*abhí gāya*, VIII, 20, 19.—*prā gāyata*, I, 37, 1; 4.

gó, cow, bull :

gáúb-iva, V, 56, 3; *gāvab ná*, I, 38, 2; V, 53, 16; 56, 4; *gāvab ná ukshānab*, I, 168, 2²; *gāvab*, VIII, 20, 21¹; *gāb-iva*, VIII, 20, 19; *gāvām sárgam-iva*, V, 56, 5; *gāvām-iva*, V, 59, 3.—*gáve*, I, 43, 2; 6; *góshu*, VI, 66, 8; I, 114, 8.—*góshu*, among the cows

(clouds), I, 37, 5¹; *gāb*, the (rain-giving) cows, II, 34, 1.—*gāub*, the cow (*Prisni*), VIII, 94, 1¹; *gām*, V, 52, 16.—*gō*, cow, milk, leather, thong, (232); *gōbhiḥ*, from the bowstrings, VIII, 20, 8¹; milk, I, 134, 2.
gō-arnas, a sea of milk :
gō-arnasā, II, 34, 12¹.
go-ghnā, cow-slaying :
go-ghnām, I, 114, 10.
gō-gāta, name of the Maruts :
(I, 85, 3¹).
Gótama :
gótamāya, I, 85, 11; *gótamāsab*, I, 88, 4¹; *gótamab*, I, 88, 5; (125.)
godhā, not *godhāb* :
p. lxvii.
gopā, guardian :
gopāb, VII, 56, 18; (I, 86, 1¹).
gopāy, to guard :
gopāyātam, VI, 74, 4.
go-pithā, a draught of milk :
go-pithāya, I, 19, 1¹.
go-pithā, keeping :
go-pithē devānām, X, 77, 7.
gō-bandhu, the kindred of the cow (*Prisni*) :
gō-bandhavab, VIII, 20, 8.
gō-mat, rich in cattle :
gō-mati (vragē), I, 86, 3; *gō-matib ānu*, V, 61, 19¹; *gō-mat rādhab*, wealth of cows, V, 57, 7.—*gō-matab*, (*Soma*) mixed with milk, VIII, 94, 6.
gō-mātri, having the cow (*Prisni*) as their mother :
gō-mātaraḥ, I, 85, 3¹; (I, 168, 9¹).
go-hān, killing cattle :
go-hā, VII, 56, 17.
gnā, woman :
gnāb, (307; 308.)
grāma, village :
grāme asmin, I, 114, 1.
grāma-gīt, conqueror of clans :
grāma-gītab, V, 54, 8.
grāvan, grinding-stone :
grāvānab nā, X, 78, 6².
gha, particle :
I, 37, 11; *gha it*, II, 34, 14; *utā gha*, V, 61, 8; *kit gha*, VIII, 20, 21.
gharmā, formus, pit :
(217 seq.); (V, 54, 1²).
gharma-sād, dwelling on the hearth (the *Pitris*) :
(218.)

gharma-stūbh, who praises the warm milk (of the sacrifice) :
gharma-stūbhe, V, 54, 1².
gharmya and *gharmye-sthā* :
see *harmya*, (217.)
ghrīni :
ghrīni-iva, i. e. *ghrīner iva*? as if from sunshine, II, 33, 6¹.
ghritā, fatness :
ghritām, fatness (rain), I, 85, 3; 87, 2; 168, 8.—*ghritām nā*, like butter, VIII, 7, 19; *ghritām āsram*, butter and milk for the *Soma*, I, 134, 6.
ghrita-prūsh, scattering *ghrita* :
ghrita-prūshab, X, 78, 4¹.
ghritā-vat, fat :
ghritā-vat (pāyab), I, 64, 6².
ghritākī :
ghritākī, resplendent, I, 167, 3.—*ghritākīm (dhiyam)*, accompanied by fat offerings, I, 2, 7².
ghrīshu, brisk :
ghrīshum, I, 64, 12.
ghrīshī, boar :
(I, 37, 4¹).
ghrīshvi, wild :
ghrīshvaye, I, 37, 4¹; *ghrīshvayab*, I, 85, 1; 166, 2.
ghrīshvi-rādhas, whose gifts are cheering :
ghrīshvi-rādhasab, VII, 59, 5.
ghorā, terrible :
ghorāb, I, 167, 4.
ghorā-varpas, of terrible designs :
ghorā-varpasab, I, 19, 5; 64, 2³.
ghōsha, shout, roar :
ghōshab, X, 168, 1; *ghōsham*, V, 54, 12; *ghōshāb*, X, 168, 4.
ka, and . . . :
also, I, 165, 12; see *kanā* (264; 266 seq.); *ka-ka*, I, 168, 3; *ko*, VI, 66, 3.
kakānā, delighting in (*Loc.*) :
kakānāb, X, 77, 8.
akrā, wheel :
akrā, I, 166, 9².—*akra*, the weapon, (I, 166, 9²).
akrī, wheel :
akrīyā, the wheels, II, 34, 9²; on their chariot, II, 34, 14.
aksh :
prā akshaya, reveal, I, 134, 3.—*sam-ākshya*, wherever I have looked for you, I, 165, 12.

kákshana, sight :

kákshavam, V, 55, 4.

kákshas, sight :

kákshasā, I, 87, 5.

kákshus, eye :

kákshub, V, 54, 6; 59, 3²; 5.

kāt :

ví kātayasva, put away, II, 33, 2.

kātub-pad, beast :

dvi-pádab kātub-padab, man and beast, X, 121, 3; *sám dvi-páde kātub-pade*, (191); I, 114, 1; VI, 74, 1; p. cxi.

kaná :

kaná, not even, I, 166, 12⁵; X, 168, 3; (264 seqq.); *nahí kaná*, not even, VII, 59, 3.—*kaná*, in negative sentences, (264); in positive sentences, (264 seq.); with interrogative pronouns, (265 seq.); *kaná*, for *ka ná*, (264; 266 seq.)

kánishṭha, best :

kánishṭhā su-matīb, VII, 57, 4.

kandrā, bright :

kandrāb, X, 121, 9; *kandrān*, VIII, 20, 20.

kandrā-vat, golden :

kandrā-vat, V, 57, 7.

kandrā-varna, in bright splendour :

kandrā-varnāb, I, 165, 12.

kar, to move :

kāratī, VII, 46, 3; X, 168, 4; *kārantam*, I, 6, 1; *kārantī*, I, 167, 3; *kārantī*, VIII, 20, 18.—*ā kara*, come, I, 114, 3.—*ūpa kara*, come, VII, 46, 2.

karātha, movable :

sthātúb karātham, what stands and moves, pp. lxxii seq.—*karātha*, flock, movable property, p. lxxiii.

karamá, last :

karamám, VII, 59, 3; *karamáb*, VIII, 20, 14¹.

karkārya, glorious :

(176.)

karkrītya, glorious :

karkrītyam, I, 64, 14.

kārman, skin :

kārma-iva, I, 85, 5².

karshanī, pl., men :

karshanīb, I, 86, 5.—*karshanīnām*, the swift gods (Maruts), I, 86, 6¹.

kāru, beautiful :

kārum (adhvarám), fair, I, 19, 1.—*kāravab*, V, 59, 3.

ki, to gather :

ví kayat krítām, may he gather what we have made, V, 60, 1².

ki, to perceive, to see :

ákidhvam, I, 87, 2; V, 55, 7; VIII, 7, 2¹; 14; *káyate*, I, 167, 8.—*ni-ketārab*, they find out, VII, 57, 2.—*ketú*, from *ki* (I, 166, 1²).

kit, to perceive, &c. :

kitáyante, they see, I, 171, 5.—*kitáyante*, they appear, V, 59, 2; *kitayanta*, they appeared, II, 34, 2; *kekite*, appears, II, 34, 10; *kekitāna*, showing thyself, II, 33, 15¹.—*kétati*, he looks after (Gen.), VII, 46, 2; *ketathab*, you perceive (Gen.), I, 2, 5; *ketatha*, you think of (Dat.), V, 59, 3.—*kikitúshe*, to the intelligent man, VI, 66, 1; *keketa*, he understands, VII, 56, 4; *yáthā kikitati*, that he may hear, I, 43, 3.—*aketi*, it was known, I, 88, 5.—*ā kikitrire*, they have become well known, I, 166, 13.—*kitáyat*, exciting, rousing, II, 34, 7¹.

kit, even . . . :

nú kit, I, 39, 4; VI, 66, 1; 5; VII, 56, 15; *kit gha*, I, 37, 11; VIII, 20, 21; *kit hí*, VII, 59, 7.—*yáb kit*, X, 121, 8; *yáthā kit*, V, 56, 2.—*káb kit*, see *kím*.—*kríté kit*, whatever little we have done, VII, 57, 5.

kitṭá, thought :

kitṭám, I, 170, 1; *tiráb kitṭāni*, VII, 59, 8¹.

kitrá, brilliant, beautiful :

kitráb, I, 88, 2; (171); I, 166, 4; 172, 1 (bis); *kitrá*, II, 34, 10; VI, 66, 9; *kitráb*, I, 165, 13; VIII, 7, 7; X, 78, 1; the bright ones (the clouds), I, 38, 11²; *kitráb*, I, 64, 4; *kitrá*, V, 52, 11; I, 134, 4; *kitráya*, for *mitráya*, Ludwig, (II, 34, 4¹).—*kitrá*, splendour, I, 37, 3².—*kitrá*, from *ki*, (I, 166, 1²).

kitrá-bhānu, of beautiful splendour :

kitrá-bhānavab, I, 64, 7²; 85, 11.

kītrā-vāga, with splendid booty :

kītrā-vāgān, VIII, 7, 33.

kīrām :

mā *kīrām* karat, may it not cause delay, V, 56, 7.

kud, to stir :

kodata, I, 168, 4.—*prā kodata*, spur forth, V, 56, 7.

kētana, to be seen :

kētanam, I, 170, 4¹.

ko, see *ka*.

kōda, goad :

kōdab, V, 61, 3.

kyu, to shake, caus., to throw down :

kyavante, I, 167, 8²; *akutyavitana*, I, 37, 12¹ (bis); *akutyavub*, I, 166, 5; 168, 4; V, 53, 6; *kyāvam*, I, 165, 10; *kyavāyatha*, I, 168, 6.—*kyu*, to send down the rain, (135).—*ā akutyavub*, V, 59, 8.—*prā kyavayanti*, I, 37, 11; 64, 3; V, 56, 4²; *prā kyavāyantab*, I, 85, 4; *prā akutyavub*, V, 59, 7.

kbad, to appear :

ākkbānta, *kbadāyātha*, I, 165, 12; p. xviii.

kbandab-stūbh, stepping according to a measure :

kbandab-stūbhab, V, 52, 12¹; p. xcvi seq.

kbandas, shine :

kbandab, VIII, 7, 36².

kbāndu :

vrīshā kbāndub, (147.)

kbarāls, shelter :

kbarālb, I, 114, 5.

kbāyā, shadow :

kbāyā, X, 121, 2²; *kbāyām*, II, 33, 6.

-*ga*, from -*gan* :

(X, 77, 5²).

gaksh=*gaggb*, to laugh :

(284); (V, 52, 6²).

gāgat, world :

gāgatab, X, 121, 3.—*gāgatab sthātūb*, of what is movable and what is immovable, p. lxxiv.

gāgmi, rushing about :

gāgmayab, I, 85, 8.

gaghāna, croup :

gaghāne, on the croup, or behind, V, 61, 3¹.

gaghanatas, behind :

(V, 61, 3¹).

gaggb, to laugh :

gāggbatī (conjecture for *gāṅgati*), I, 168, 7¹; (V, 52, 6²).

gaggb, to laugh :

gāggbatib, V, 52, 6².

gāṅg, see *gaggb*.

gāṅganā-bhū, to rattle :

gāṅganā-bhāvan, (V, 52, 6²).

gan, to be born, caus., to beget :

agāyathāb, I, 6, 3; *agāyanta*, I, 37, 2; *gagāire*, I, 64, 2; 4; *āgani*, II, 34, 2²; *gāni*, VIII, 7, 36; *gāyamānab gātāb*, who is now born and who has been born, I, 165, 9²; *gātāb*, X, 121, 1; 168, 3; *gātāb*, V, 55, 3; 87, 2¹; *gātāsyā*, of all that exists, II, 33, 3; *gātāni*, X, 121, 10.—*ganāyanti*, X, 121, 7; 8; *ganāyantab*, I, 85, 2; *aganayanta*, I, 168, 9; *ganayatha*, V, 58, 4; *āganayab*, I, 134, 4; *dīvam gāgāna*, X, 121, 9.—*abhi-gāyanta*, they were born to bring (Acc.), I, 168, 2¹.—*prā-pra gāyante*, they are born on and on, V, 58, 5; *prā gāyemahi pra-gābhīb*, may we increase in offspring, II, 33, 1.

-*gan* :

-*gab* and -*gāb*, (X, 77, 5²).

gāna, man :

gānab, I, 86, 1; *gānam*, I, 166, 8; *gānāya*, I, 166, 12; II, 34, 8; V, 58, 4; *gānāsab*, I, 166, 14; *gānāsab jūrāb*, valiant men, VII, 56, 22; *gānān*, I, 37, 12; 64, 13; *gānānām*, VII, 56, 24.

gāni, wife :

gānayab, I, 85, 1¹; V, 61, 3²; *gānīb*, mothers, I, 167, 7¹.

ganitrī, begetter :

ganitā prithivyāb, X, 121, 9.

ganītra, birthplace :

ganītram, VII, 56, 2.

ganús, birth :

ganúshā, V, 57, 5; 59, 6; *ganúshab*, VI, 66, 4¹; *ganúsmhi*, VII, 56, 2; *ganúb*, VII, 58, 2¹.

gantú, a man :

gantúm, VII, 58, 3.

gánman, what is born :

gánmanab, VII, 46, 2; *gánmane*, host, I, 166, 1.—*gánmanā*, after the kind, I, 87, 5.

- gabh :**
 (I, 37, 5²)
gámbha, tasting :
gámbhe, I, 37, 5².
gar, to praise :
garante tvám ákka, I, 2, 2 ;
garāyai, I, 38, 13.
gāra, the weakening :
garāya, II, 34, 10.
garitrī, praiser, singer :
garitā, I, 38, 5 ; 165, 14 ; *garitré*,
 II, 34, 6 ; 33, 11 ; *garitúb*, V,
 87, 8 ; *garitārab*, I, 2, 2.
gālāsha, relieving :
gālāshab, II, 33, 7¹ ; (I, 43, 4²).
gālāsha-bheshaga, the possessor of
 healing medicines (Rudra) :
gālāsha-bheshagam, I, 43, 4² ; (II,
 33, 7¹).
gāsuri, weak :
gāsuri, V, 61, 7.
gā, people :
gāsu nab, among our people, VII,
 46, 2 ; (X, 77, 5²).
gātā, see *gan*.
gāna, birth :
gānam, I, 37, 9 ; V, 53, 1.
gāni, mother :
 (V, 61, 4¹).
gāmi-tvā, kinship :
gāmi-tvām, I, 166, 13.
gārā, lover :
gārāb, I, 134, 3.
gā-vat, procuring offspring :
gā-vatab (Soma), VIII, 94, 5.
gi, to overpower :
giyate, V, 54, 7.
gigatnú, hasting :
gigatnáva, X, 78, 3 ; 5.
gigivās, victorious :
gigivāmsab, X, 78, 4.
gigishā, valour :
gigishā (Instr.), I, 171, 3.
ginv, to rouse, to gladden :
ginvatha, VIII, 7, 21.—*ginvanta*
sām, I, 64, 8.
gihmām, athwart :
 I, 85, 11.
gihvā, tongue :
gihvā, I, 87, 5 ; *gihvāyā*, I, 168, 5¹ ;
agninām ná gihvāb, X, 78, 3 ;
agnéb gihvāyā pāhi, drink with
 the tongue of Agni, (34.)
gīta for *gīna*, (90.)
gīrá-dānu, bringing quickening rain :
gīrá-dānum, I, 165, 15 ; 166, 15 ;
 167, 11 ; 168, 10 ; 171, 6 ; p. xx ;
gīrá-dānavab, (113 ; 115) ; II, 34,
 4 ; V, 54, 9 ; *gīra-dānavab*, V,
 53, 5.
gīv, to live :
gīvāse, I, 37, 15 ; 172, 3 ; X, 186,
 3 ; *gīvātave*, X, 186, 2.
gīva-rāmsā, good report among
 men :
gīva-rāmsé, VII, 46, 4¹.
gu, to stir up :
gunānti, V, 58, 3 ; VII, 56, 20.
gugurvāni :
 (I, 168, 1²).
gur, to weaken :
guratām, II, 34, 10¹ ; *gugurvān*,
 hoary, I, 37, 8.
gush, to be pleased, to accept :
gugushub, I, 165, 2 ; *gushānāb*, I,
 171, 2 ; *gushādhvam*, V, 55, 10 ;
 58, 3 ; VII, 56, 14 ; *yāthā gush-*
ānta, VII, 56, 20 ; *gushanta*, VII,
 56, 25 ; 58, 6 ; *gūgoshan it*, VII,
 58, 3 ; *gugushrana*, VII, 59, 9.
 —*gushānta*, they wished (with
 Infin.), I, 167, 4 ; *gōshat*, I,
 167, 5.
gūshra-tama, most beloved :
gūshra-tamāsab, I, 87, 1.
guhū, tongue :
guhvāb, VI, 66, 10.
gū, see *gu*.
gū, quick :
gūvab, I, 134, 1.
gri, see *gar*.
gōsha, pleasure :
ānu gōsham, VI, 66, 4 ; *gōsham ā*,
 to his satisfaction, VIII, 94,
 6.
gñā, to know :
te mánab ānu gñatī, approving
 thy mind, I, 134, 1 ; (I, 86, 3¹).
 —*vī gñatī*, she finds out, V, 61,
 7 ; see *gigānivas*.
gyéshṭba, oldest, best :
gyéshṭbebbib, I, 167, 2 ; *gyésh-*
tāsab, V, 87, 9 ; X, 78, 5 ;
gyéshṭbāb, X, 78, 2 ; *gyéshṭbab*
māntrab, (439.)
gyótishmat, brilliant :
gyótishmantab, X, 77, 5 ; *gyótish-*
matī, epithet of Aditi, (260.)
gyótis, light :
gyótib, I, 86, 10 ; *gyótishā*, II,
 34, 12.

takva-vīya, chase of the takva (?) :

takva-vīye, I, 134, 5¹.

taksh, to fashion :

tashāb, I, 171, 2; (V, 58, 4¹).—ānu
ātakhshata, you have granted, I,
86, 3¹.

tátas, from that :

tátāb, X, 186, 3.

táttra, there :

I, 170, 4; tátro, among them, I,
37, 14.

táthā, so :

táthā ít asat, so shall it be, VIII,
20, 17.

tád, pron. . . . :

sáb, read sá? V, 61, 8¹; sá sá ít,
that very (*Prisni*), VI, 66, 3;
táyā díā, this way, I, 85, 11;
syāma té, may we be such, V,
53, 15.—tát, therefore, so, then,
I, 166, 14; 167, 10; VII, 56,
25; VIII, 94, 3; yáttra-tát, V,
55, 7; yáthā ít-tát ít, V, 56, 2.
—sa and sas, p. cxvii.

tan, to expand, to spread :

tatanāb, I, 38, 14¹; tanāvāvahi,
I, 170, 4²; tanvate, I, 134, 4;
tanushva, unstring (the bow),
II, 33, 14; tatāna, it extended,
V, 54, 5.—tatānāma nrīn abhí,
we may overshadow all men, V,
54, 15.—ā tanvánti, they shoot,
I, 19, 8; ā tatānan, may they
spread, I, 166, 14.—út atnata,
they stretched out, I, 37, 10.—
ví-tatāb, tied, V, 54, 11; ví-
tatam, far-reaching, V, 54, 12.

tán, race :

tánā, I, 39, 4¹.

tána, race :

tánāya, I, 39, 7.

tánaya, children :

tánayasya, I, 166, 8; tokám tá-
nayam, kith and kin, I, 64, 14;
VII, 56, 20; tokāya tánāyā,
V, 53, 13; I, 114, 6; II, 33, 14;
toké tánaye, VI, 66, 8; I, 114,
8; tokéshu tánayeshu, VII, 46,
3.

tánā, adv., for ever, continually :

I, 38, 13¹; VIII, 94, 5¹.

tanú, body, self :

tanvāb, I, 114, 7; 165, 5; V, 60, 4;
VII, 56, 11; 59, 7; tanúshu, I,
85, 3¹; 88, 3; V, 57, 6; 60, 4;
VIII, 20, 6; 12; 26; VI, 74,

3 (bis); tanvām, VI, 66, 4;
tanúbhiāb, VII, 57, 3.—tanvē, for
ourselves, I, 165, 15; p. xx; I,
166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; tanvē
tanúbhiāb, for your own sake, and
by your own efforts, I, 165, 11¹;
p. xviii.

tápas :

tápasā, (VII, 59, 8¹.)

tápushība, hottest :

tápushībena hánmanā, VII, 59, 8.

tápus, burning heat :

tápushā, II, 34, 9².

támas, darkness :

támāb, I, 38, 9; 86, 10; támāmsi,
VII, 56, 20.

tar, see *tri*.

Tarantá :

tarantáb-iva, like Taranta, V, 61,
10; Saviyasí Tarantamahishí,
Taranta Vaidadarvi, (359 seq.;
362; V, 61, 5²; 9¹.)

táras, speed :

tárasā, V, 54, 15.

tarutrí, he who overcomes :

ná tarutā, VI, 66, 8.

tavás, strong :

tavásam, I, 64, 12; V, 58, 2; ta-
vasāb, I, 166, 8; tavásāb, V, 60, 4;
tavāse, V, 87, 1; I, 114, 1; tavāb-
tamāb tavásām, the strongest of
the strong, II, 33, 3.

tavishá, powerful :

tavishāb, I, 165, 6; 8; V, 87, 5;
asmāt tavishāt, I, 171, 4; tavi-
shāb, V, 54, 2; tavishébhiāb ūrmí-
bhiāb, (298); (II, 34, 1⁴.)

tavishá, power :

tavishāni, I, 166, 1; strong weapons,
I, 166, 9¹.

távishí, power :

távishí, I, 39, 2; 4; távishíbhíāb, I,
64, 5; 10; 87, 4; 166, 4; II,
34, 1; (298); távishíāb, I, 64, 7;
távishím, V, 55, 2.

távishí-mat, powerful :

távishí-mantam, V, 58, 1; (I, 2,
5¹; 443.)

tavishí-yú, growing in strength :

tavishí-yavāb, VIII, 7, 2.

távyas, most powerful :

távyase (rudráya), I, 43, 1.

tâyú, thief :

tâyavāb, V, 52, 12.

tigmā-āyudha, having sharp weapons :

tigmā-āyudhau (Soma and Rudra),

- VI, 74, 4; tigmá-âyudhâya (Rudra), VII, 46, 1.
 tigmá-heti, having sharp bolts :
 tigmá-heti, VI, 74, 4.
 tirás, across :
 tiráb, I, 19, 7; 8; through, V, 53, 14; VIII, 94, 7.—tiráb kittáni, beyond thoughts, VII, 59, 8¹.
 tish/badgu, at sunset :
 (V, 54, 5¹).
 tishyā, N. of a star :
 tishyāb, V, 54, 13⁴.
 tú, part. :
 VIII, 7, 11.
 tug :
 Inf. tugāse, (I, 87, 6¹).
 tuturvāni, hastening :
 tuturvānib, I, 168, 1².
 tur, to hasten :
 turayante, II, 34, 3.
 -tur at the end of compounds :
 (VI, 66, 7³).
 turā, quick :
 turāsab (Maruts), I, 166, 14; turānām, I, 171, 1; VII, 56, 10; 58, 5; turāya, VI, 66, 9; turām, VII, 56, 19.
 turanyū, rushing :
 turanyāvab, I, 134, 5.
 Turasravas :
 (V, 52, 11¹).
 turv, to save :
 tūrvatha, VIII, 20, 24¹.—turvāne, (48.).
 Turvāsa :
 Turvāsam, VIII, 7, 18; (VIII, 20, 24¹).
 tuvi-gâtā, mighty :
 tuvi-gâtāb, I, 168, 4; tuvi-gâtāu, I, 2, 9.
 tuvi-dyumnā, vigorous :
 tuvi-dyumnāsab, I, 88, 3¹, 2; tuvi-dyumnāb, V, 87, 7.
 tuvi-nrīmā, of strong manhood :
 tuvi-nrīmām (śrāvab), I, 43, 7¹.
 túvi-magha, of great bounty :
 túvi-maghāsab, V, 57, 8; 58, 8.
 túvi-manyu, wrathful :
 túvi-manyavab, VII, 58, 2.
 tuvi-mrakshā :
 (I, 64, 4²).
 tuvi-rādhās, of great wealth :
 tuvi-rādhāsab, V, 58, 2.
 tūvishmat, strong :
 tūvishmān, I, 165, 6; VII, 56, 7; 58, 1¹.
 tuvi-svan, strong-voiced :
 tuvi-svanab, I, 166, 1.
 tuvi-svāni, loudly neighing :
 tūvi-svānib, V, 56, 7.
 tūyam, quick :
 VII, 59, 4.
 Trina-skandā :
 trina-skandāsya, I, 172, 3.
 Trītsu :
 Trītsus, or Vasishthas, are called Kapardinab, (I, 114, 1²).
 trid, to pierce :
 tatridānāb, V, 53, 7¹; (227).
 trip, to be satisfied, caus. to satisfy :
 tarpayanta, I, 85, 11; tripán (for tripát, Pada), VII, 56, 10¹.
 triptā-amsu, (squeezed) from ripe stems :
 triptā-amsavab, I, 168, 3.
 trish, to be thirsty :
 trishyantam, V, 61, 7.
 trishu-āyāvas, flickering :
 trishu-āyāvasab, VI, 66, 10.
 trishnāg, thirsty :
 trishnāge, I, 85, 11; V, 57, 1.
 trishnā, greed :
 trishnayā sahā, I, 38, 6.
 trī, to cross :
 tārema apāb, VII, 56, 24; tarati, VII, 59, 2; tārema, let us speed, V, 54, 15; rāgas tar, to pass through the air, (VI, 66, 7³); see tarutri.—tārushante ā, they race, V, 59, 1.—prā tirate, he spreads forth, VII, 59, 2; prā tiradhvam, VII, 56, 14; prā tirata nab, lead us to (Dat.), VII, 57, 5; prā tireta, help us, VII, 58, 3; prā tārishat (āyūm-shi), may he prolong, X, 186, 1.—vī tirāti, it furthers, VII, 58, 3.
 tokā, kith :
 tokāya, I, 43, 2; tokām tánayam, kith and kin, I, 64, 14; VII, 56, 20; tokāya tánayāya, V, 53, 13; I, 114, 6; II, 33, 14; toké tánaye, VI, 66, 8; I, 114, 8; tokéshu tánayeshu, VII, 46, 3.
 tmān, self :
 tmāne tokāya tánayāya, to us and to our kith and kin, I, 114, 6.
 tmānā, by oneself :
 (I, 167, 9¹); I, 168, 4; 5; V, 52, 2; 6; 8; 87, 4; VIII, 94, 8; freely, VII, 57, 7; barhānā

- tmánâ, by their own might, X, 77, 3.
 tyag, to push off, to drive away, then, to leave :
 (270.)
 tyâgas :
 tyâgasâ, in his scorn, I, 166, 12⁶; (267 seqq.); tyâgas, leaving, forsaking, (267); attack, on-slaughter, (268 seqq.); weapon, (268.)
 tyád, pron. . . :
 etát tyát, I, 88, 5; eshá syá, I, 88, 6.
 trâtrí, protector :
 trâtárab, VII, 56, 22.
 tri, three :
 tísráb kshápab, Acc., (I, 64, 8²); trîni sâramsi, three lakes, VIII, 7, 10³.
 trí-ambaka, see tryâmbaka.
 Tritá :
 tritám, II, 34, 10¹; tritáb, II, 34, 14; V, 54, 2; tritâsya, VIII, 7, 24.
 tri-dhātu, threefold :
 tri-dhâtûni, I, 85, 12.
 tri-vrít, threefold :
 of the sacrifice, (VIII, 7, 1¹).
 trís, thrice :
 dvíb tríb, VI, 66, 2.
 tri-sadhashá, dwelling in three abodes (Soma) :
 tri-sadhashâsya, VIII, 94, 5³.
 tri-stúbh, threefold :
 tri-stúbham ísham, the threefold draught, VIII, 7, 1¹.—tri-stubh = 'Three-step,' p. xcvi.
 trai, to protect :
 tráyadhve, V, 53, 15; VII, 59, 1.
 tryâmbaka, N. of Rudra :
 tryâmbakam, VII, 59, 12¹.
 tva, pron. :
 tvâ strí, some woman, V, 61, 6; (360.)
 tvákshas, energy :
 tvákshâmsi, VIII, 20, 6.
 tvákshiyams, more vigorous :
 tvákshiyasâ váyasâ, II, 33, 6.
 tvad, pron. . . :
 kím te, what has happened to thee, yát te asmé, what thou hast against us, I, 165, 3.—túbhya for túbhyam, p. cxvii seq.
 Tvâshtri :
 tvâshhá, I, 85, 9¹.
 tvâ-datta, given by thee :
 tvâ-dattebhih, II, 33, 2.
 tvâ-vat, like unto thee :
 tvâ-vân, I, 165, 9.
 tvish, to blaze, to flare up :
 âtitvishanta, V, 54, 12; atvishanta, VIII, 94, 7.—(I, 37, 4²).
 tvísh, glare :
 tvishâ, X, 78, 6.—*drisí* tvishé, to see the light, V, 52, 12⁴.
 tvíshi-mat, blazing :
 tvíshi-mantab, VI, 66, 10.
 tveshá, terrible, fierce, blazing :
 tvesháb, V, 87, 5; tveshám, I, 38, 15; 168, 6; 9; V, 53, 10; 56, 9; 58, 2; 87, 6; VIII, 20, 13; I, 114, 4; 5; II, 33, 8; tveshâsya, II, 33, 14; tvesháb, I, 38, 7; VIII, 20, 7; tveshâ, I, 168, 7.
 tveshá-dyumna, endowed with terrible vigour :
 tveshá-dyumnáya, I, 37, 4².
 tveshá-pratíka, with terrible look :
 tveshá-pratíkâ, I, 167, 5.
 tveshá-yâma, whose march is terrible :
 tveshá-yâmâb, I, 166, 5.
 tveshá-ratha, with blazing chariots :
 tveshá-rathab, V, 61, 13.
 tveshá-samdriś, terrible to behold :
 tveshá-samdriśab, I, 85, 8; V, 57, 5.
 tveshyâ, fire and fury :
 tveshyēna, VII, 58, 2.
 tsârín, hunter, watcher :
 tsârí, I, 134, 5¹.
 dams :
 dasra from dams ? (V, 55, 5³).
 damsána :
 damsánaib, valiant deeds, I, 166, 13; damsánâ, by wonderful skill, V, 87, 8.
 dámsu, दासु :
 dámsu, Nom. pl. ? (I, 134, 4¹).
 dáksha, power :
 dáksham, X, 121, 8; I, 134, 2; dáksham apásam, I, 2, 9.—Daksha and Aditi, (245 seqq.; 251.)
 dáksha-pitri, father of strength :
 dáksha-pitarab, (247 seq.); dáksha-pitarâ, (248.)
 dákshinâ, largess :
 dákshinâ, I, 168, 7.

dagh :
 mā paśāt daghma, let us not stay
 behind, VII, 56, 21.
 dáttra, or dáttra, gift, bounty:
 (240.)
 Dadhyaś, N. pr.:
 (153.)
 dabh, to hurt:
 ā-dábhat, VII, 56, 15.
 dām, house:
 dām-su, I, 134, 4¹.
 dáma, house:
 dáme, VIII, 7, 12; dáme-dame,
 VI, 74, 1.
 dámya, domestic:
 dámyam, VII, 56, 14.
 day, to divide:
 dayase, thou cuttest, II, 33, 10³.—
 (I, 166, 6⁴).—See dā (do).
 dātrī, breaker:
 dārtā, VI, 66, 8.
 darśatā, visible, conspicuous, beau-
 tiful:
 darśatām, I, 38, 13; darśatāb, V,
 56, 7; darśata, I, 2, 1¹; darśatā,
 I, 64, 9.
 dāśya, to be seen:
 dāśyā, V, 52, 11.
 dávidhvat, violently shaking:
 dávidhvatab, II, 34, 3³.
 Dāra-gva:
 dāra-gvāb (Maruts?), II, 34, 12¹.
 dasasy, to help:
 dasasyātha, VIII, 20, 24; dasas-
 yāntab, bounteous, VII, 56, 17.
 das, to perish:
 ūpa dasyanti, V, 54, 7; 55, 5³.—
 dāsamānab, tired, I, 134, 5.
 dasmā-varśas, shining forth marvel-
 lously:
 dasmā-varśasām, VIII, 94, 8.
 dasra, destroyer:
 dasrāb, V, 55, 5³.
 dā, to give:
 dāta, II, 34, 7; (c. Gen.), VII, 56,
 15; dehi, X, 186, 3; dada, V,
 57, 7; dadub, V, 52, 17; dādat,
 V, 61, 10; dādāta (pra-gāyai
 amṛitasya), VII, 57, 6; dātave,
 VII, 59, 6; dadūshab, (I, 6, 1²);
 ná ditsasi, dost thou not wish
 to give, I, 170, 3.—dadā, you
 have protected, I, 39, 9¹.—
 ānutta=ānu-datta, (I, 165, 9¹).—
 mā pārā dāb, do not forsake, VII,
 46, 4.—See dāvan.

dā (do, dyati), to share, to divide:
 āva dishiya, may I pay off, II, 33,
 5³.—(I, 167, 8³; VIII, 7, 27¹).—
 See day.
 dā, to bind:
 nī-dita, bound, (257.)
 dāti-vāra, dispensing treasures:
 dāti-vārab, I, 167, 8³; dāti-vāram,
 V, 58, 2.
 dātrī, giver:
 dātāram (bhūreb), II, 33, 12.
 dātra, sickle:
 (241.)
 dātrā, bounty:
 dātrām, I, 166, 12³; dātrāt, VII,
 56, 21.
 dādhrīvi, strong:
 dādhrīvi, VI, 66, 3.
 dānā, gift:
 dānā, for a gift, V, 52, 14¹; 15;
 by gift, V, 87, 2¹; VIII, 20, 14.
 dānavā, demon:
 (114 seq.)
 dānu:
 giver or gift, (115).—m., demon,
 (114 seq.)—f., rain (?), (115).—
 n., water, rain, (113; 115);
 Soma, (115.)
 dānū, giving:
 (113 seq.)
 dānu-kiṭra, dew-lighted:
 dānu-kiṭrāb uśhāsab, V, 59, 8; (115.)
 dānunaspāti, ep. of Mitra-Varuṇau
 and the Asvins:
 (115.)
 dānu-mat:
 dānumat vāsu, the treasure of rain,
 (115.)
 dāyas, share, inheritance:
 (I, 166, 6⁴).
 Dārbyā:
 Rathaviti Dārbyā, (V, 61, 5³; 359
 seq.); dārbyāya, V, 61, 17¹.
 Dālbya, see Dārbyā.
 dāvān, giving:
 makhāśya dāvāne, for the offering
 of the sacrifice, VIII, 7, 27¹; I,
 134, 1 (bis); to the offering of
 the priest, (47 seq.)—suvitāya
 dāvāne, to grant welfare, V, 59,
 1¹; 4.—dāvāne, for gifts, I,
 134, 2.
 dā, to give, to sacrifice:
 dāratī, VII, 59, 2; dadārimā, I,
 86, 6; dādārat, X, 77, 7; dā-
 śushe, I, 85, 12; V, 57, 3¹; I,

2, 3; *dadārushe*, I, 166, 3; V, 53, 6.
dāsvās, see *dās*.
dās, to attack :
 (V, 55, 5^a).
Diti and *Aditi* :
 (255 seq.)
didrikshēnya, to be yearned for :
didrikshēnyam, V, 55, 4.
didyú, flame :
didyúm, VII, 56, 9.—weapon, (I, 6, 8²).
didyút, weapon, Indra's weapon or thunderbolt :
didyút, lightning, I, 166, 6; shining thunderbolt, VII, 57, 4; VII, 46, 3; (I, 6, 8²).—*didyút* (*adhvarāsyā*), flame, VI, 66, 10.
didhishú :
didhishāvab ná rathyāb, like lords of chariots on a suit, X, 78, 5.
div (*dīvyati*), to throw forth, to break forth, to shine :
 (I, 6, 8²).
dīv, see *dýú*.
dīvishī, daily sacrifice :
dīvishīshu, I, 86, 4.
divi-sprī, touching the sky :
divi-sprīk, X, 168, 1.
divyā, heavenly :
divyám kōsam, V, 59, 8; *divyāsya gānmanab*, VII, 46, 2; *divyāni*, I, 64, 3; 5.—*divyāb-iva strībhīb*, heavens, I, 166, 11²; (I, 87, 1¹).
dis, to display :
dēdisate, VIII, 20, 6.
dīs, direction :
tāyā dīā, this way, I, 85, 11.
dīrghā, long :
dīrghām, I, 37, 11; 166, 12.—Adv., I, 166, 14; V, 54, 5; *dīrghām prithú*, far and wide, V, 87, 7¹.
dīrghā-yasas, far-famed :
dīrghā-yasase, V, 61, 9.
dub-gā, stronghold :
dub-gāni, V, 54, 4.
dub-dhārtu, irresistible :
dub-dhārtavab, V, 87, 9.
dub-dhūr, impatient of the yoke :
dub-dhūrab, V, 56, 4.
dub-matī, hatred :
dub-matīb, VII, 56, 9; II, 33, 14.
dub-māda, madman :
durmādāb-iva, I, 39, 5.

dúb-stuti, bad praise :
dúb-stuti, II, 33, 4.
dub-hána, difficult to be conquered :
dub-hánā, I, 38, 6.
dub-hrināyú, hateful :
dub-hrināyúb, VII, 59, 8.
dukkbúnā, monster :
dukkbúnā, VIII, 20, 4¹.
dudhrá, wild :
dudhráb (*gaúb*), V, 56, 3.
dudhra-krit, making to reel :
dudhra-kritab, I, 64, 11.
dúr, door :
dúrab, VII, 46, 2.
dúvas, worship :
dúvab, (I, 37, 14¹); worship, sacrifice, work, (204.)
duvās, worshipper :
duvāse, I, 165, 14¹; (205); p. xix;
duvāsab, I, 168, 3.
duvasy, to care for, to attend :
duvasyāt, he should help, I, 165, 14¹; p. xix.—*duvasyān*, sacrificing, I, 167, 6.—(203 seqq.)
duvasyā, worthy of worship :
 (203; 205.)
dustára, invincible :
dustáram, I, 64, 14; II, 34, 7.
duh, to milk :
duhānti, I, 64, 5; 6²; *duhúb*, II, 34, 10; *duduhe* (*údhak*), VI, 66, 1; *duhre*, *duhrate*, I, 134, 6; *dohate*, I, 134, 4; *duduhré*, VIII, 7, 10².—*duhukshānta*, they have drawn forth, VIII, 7, 3; *duhántab útsam*, drawing the well, VIII, 7, 16.—*nīb duhré*, they have been brought forth, VI, 66, 4.—See *dohás*.
dū, worshipper :
dúvab, Nom. pl., I, 37, 14¹.
dūre-drīs, visible from afar :
dūre-drīsab, I, 166, 11; V, 59, 2.
drilbā, strong :
drilbā kit, I, 64, 3; (VIII, 20, 1¹); *drilbāni kit*, I, 168, 4.—*drilbā*, made fast, X, 121, 5¹.
dris, to see :
drīkshase, mayest thou be seen, I, 6, 7²; *drisī tvishé*, to see the light, V, 52, 12⁴; *drisē kām*, that they may be seen, VIII, 94, 2.—Cf. *didrikshēnya*.
-dris, in *yaksha-dris* :
 (VII, 56, 16¹).

drih :

dadrîhânám, strong, I, 85, 10.

dri, see *dârtri*.

devâ, god :

devâya, X, 121, 1-9; *devâb*, X, 121, 2; *yâb devêshu âdhi devâb ékab*, he who alone is God above all gods, X, 121, 8; *devânâmâsub*, X, 121, 7; *âtmâ devânâm*, X, 168, 4; *devânâm go-pithé*, in the keeping of the gods, X, 77, 7; *srêshîbab devânâm vásub*, the best Vasu among the gods (Rudra), I, 43, 5; *Vasus* = *Devas*, (VII, 56, 20³); *nahî devâb ná mârtyab*, I, 19, 2.—*vîsve devâsab*, I, 19, 3²; *devâb vîsve*, VIII, 94, 2.—The Maruts, *devâsab*, I, 19, 6; *devâb*, I, 167, 4; *dévâsab*, I, 39, 5; VIII, 7, 27; VII, 59, 1; *devâb*, I, 171, 2; VII, 59, 2; X, 78, 8; *devân*, V, 52, 15¹; *mahânâm devânâm*, VIII, 94, 8.—*Rudra, deva*, I, 114, 10; II, 33, 15; *devâya*, VII, 46, 1.—*devâb*, *Vâta*, X, 168, 2; 4.—*devâ*, divine, brilliant, p. xxxvii; *devîm (vâr-kâryâm)*, sacred, I, 88, 4¹; (176); *devî*, ep. of *Aditi*, (260); *devi*, O goddess (the night), V, 61, 17.—*deva* for *devâ*, dual, p. lii.

deva-avî, pleasing the gods :

deva-avyâb, X, 78, 1.

devâtâ, among the gods :—

I, 165, 9²; p. xvii.

devâ-tâti :

(I, 165, 9².)

devâtta, god-given :

devâtta, I, 37, 4.

deva-trâ, towards the gods :

V, 61, 7.

deva-yagyâ, sacrifice :

deva-yagyâyâ, I, 114, 3.

deva-yât, pious :

deva-yântab, I, 6, 6.

deva-yâ (?) :

deva-yâb, I, 168, 1, see *eva-yâb*.

deshnâ, gift :

deshnâm, VII, 58, 4.

daivya, divine :

daivyasya, V, 57, 7; VII, 58, 1¹;

râpasab daivyasya, heaven-sent mischief, II, 33, 7; *daivyam*

hê/ab, the anger of the gods, I,

114, 4.

do, see *dâ*.

dôb, arm :

dôb, V, 61, 5¹.

dohâs :

dohâse, to give milk, VI, 66, 1;

dohâse, to be brought forth, VI, 66, 5¹.

dyâvâkshâmâ, heaven and earth :

(250.)

dyâvâprithivî, heaven and earth :

V, 55, 7; (250.)

dyu, to shine :

(I, 37, 4².)

dyû, heaven, sky, *Dyu* :

Dyaus = *Zeus*, p. xxiv; *dyaûb*

âditib, the boundless *Dyu* (sky),

(261); V, 59, 8²; *dyaûb*, *Dyu*

(the bull of the Dawn), V, 58,

6²; *dyaûb ná*, VIII, 7, 26;

prithivî utâ dyaûb, Earth and

Sky, I, 114, 11; *divâb putrâsab*,

the sons of *Dyu*, X, 77, 2;

divâb âsurasya vedhâsab, the

servants of the divine *Dyu*,

VIII, 20, 17; *divab narab*, V,

54, 10; I, 64, 4; *divâb mâryâb*,

V, 59, 6; *divâb ukshânab*, I, 64,

2¹; *divâb*, (sons) of heaven, I,

86, 1; *divâb sârdhâya*, host of

heaven, VI, 66, 11; *divé*, to

heaven (*Dyu*), V, 59, 1; *dyôb*

sâmsab, 'Himmelslob,' (439).—

divâb vakshânâbhyab, from the

flanks of heaven (*Dyu*, f., mother

of the Maruts), I, 134, 4².—

divâb, from heaven, I, 6, 10;

168, 4; V, 52, 14; 53, 6; 8;

54, 13; (*brihatâb*), V, 87, 3;

VIII, 7, 11; 13; 94, 10; VII, 46,

3; *divâb*, of heaven, V, 52, 5; 6;

7; 57, 1; 59, 7; I, 37, 6; 38,

2; *divâb arkâb*, singers of the

sky, V, 57, 5¹; *divâb prishîbâm*,

back of heaven, I, 166, 5; V,

54, 1²; *divâb sânu*, ridge of

heaven, V, 60, 3; (*snûnâ*), VIII,

7, 7; *divâb rokanât*, from the

light of heaven, I, 6, 9¹; V, 56,

1; *rokanâ*, the lights of heaven,

VIII, 94, 9; *rokanâ divî*, I, 6, 1;

divâb varâhâm arushâm, the red

boar of the sky (*Rudra*), I, 114,

5; *divâb prithivîyâb*, X, 77, 3;

divî, I, 19, 6¹; 85, 2; V, 52, 3;

- 61, 12; ádhi dyávi, I, 39, 4; diví(uttamé, madhyamé, avamé), V, 60, 6; diváb út-tarât, V, 60, 7; dyaúb út-tarâ, VIII, 20, 6.—dyâm imâm, X, 121, 1; dyaúb ugrâ, X, 121, 5; dívam gagâna, X, 121, 9; dyâm, V, 57, 3; dyaúb-iva, V, 57, 4; dyaúb, V, 54, 9; dyāvab ná strî-bhib, (I, 87, 1¹); II, 34, 2.—prithivî, râgas, dyû, (I, 19, 3¹); (50; 51.)
- dyû, day :
dyāvab, V, 53, 5¹; dívâ, by day, I, 38, 9; VIII, 7, 6; úpa dyû-bhib, ânu dyûn, day by day, V, 53, 3¹; I, 167, 10; divé-dive, from day to day, II, 34, 7; pârye dyób, at the close of the day, VI, 66, 8¹.
- dyut, to shine :
dávidyutati, they sparkle, VIII, 20, 11; ví dyutayanta, they shone wide, II, 34, 2.
- dyu-mât, brilliant :
dyu-mântam, I, 64, 14.
- dyumnâ, brilliant :
dyumnaíb, VIII, 20, 16; (I, 37, 4².)
- dyumnâ-ravas, of brilliant glory :
dyumnâ-ravase, V, 54, 1.
- drapsâ, torrent (?) :
drapsâb, VIII, 7, 16¹.
- drapsîn, scattering rain-drops :
drapsinab, I, 64, 2.
- dravât-pâni, quick-hoofed :
(I, 38, 11¹.)
- drávina, wealth :
drávinam, V, 54, 15.
- dru :
dravât, quickly, I, 2, 5.
- Drúh :
druháb pârân, the snares of Druh, VII, 59, 8.
- dronakalasa, a Soma-vessel :
(VIII, 94, 5².)
- dvi-gâni, having two mothers (Agni) :
dvi-gâinib, (V, 61, 4¹.)
- dvitâ, twice :
I, 37, 9.
- dvi-pád, man :
dvi-pádab kátub-padab, man and beast, X, 121, 3; dvi-páde kátub-pade, I, 114, 1; VI, 74, 1; (191; 435); p. cxi.
- dvi-bárhas, twofold :
dvi-bârhab (probably dvi-bárhab), I, 114, 10¹.
- dvi-mâtrî, having two mothers (Agni) :
dvi-mâtâ, (V, 61, 4¹.)
- dvish, enemy :
dvisham, I, 39, 10; dvishab, VII, 59, 2.
- dvís, twice :
dvíb trib, twice and thrice, VI, 66, 2.
- dvipâ, island :
dvipâni, islands (clouds), VIII, 20, 4¹.
- dvêshas :
dvêshab, haters, I, 167, 9; X, 77, 6.—dvêshâmsi, hateful things, V, 87, 8; dvêshab, hatred, VII, 56, 19; 58, 6; II, 33, 2.
- dhan, to shake :
dhanayante, I, 88, 3²; dhanâ-yanta, they have rushed forth, I, 167, 2.
- dhána, treasure :
dhânâ, I, 64, 13.
- dhána-arâ :
dhána-arâam, may be dhána-rikam, p. lxxxv^a.
- dhana-sprît, wealth-acquiring :
dhana-sprîtam, I, 64, 14¹; VIII, 7, 18.
- dhânus, bow :
from dhan, (66.)
- dhânva-arnas :
dhânva-arnasab, may be dhânva-arnasab, p. lxxxv^a.
- dhana-kyút, shaking the sky :
dhanva-kyútâb, I, 168, 5².
- dhânvan, bow :
dhânvâni, VIII, 20, 12; dhânva, II, 33, 10; (66); (VIII, 20, 4².)
- dhânvan, desert, dry land :
dhânvan kit â, I, 38, 7; dhânvasu, V, 53, 4²; dhânvanâ, V, 53, 6.—dhânvâni, the tracts (of the sky), VIII, 20, 4².
- dhârman, power :
dhârmanâ, I, 134, 5 (bis).
- dhav, to run :
dhavadhve, V, 60, 3.
- dhâ, to place, to bring, to offer, to bestow, to give (c. Loc. and Dat.); pass., to take, to assume; to gain . . . :

- dadhé** (*vriká-tâti*), II, 34, 9¹;
dhuḥ, V, 58, 7¹; **dadhanti**, VII,
 56, 19².—**dadhidhvê**, will you
 take, I, 38, 1; **dadhidhve**, you
 accept, I, 168, 1²; **dádhanāb**, X,
 121, 7; 8; I, 6, 4; **tāvishīb dhâ**,
 to take strength, (I, 64, 7³);
dadhire (*várnam*), they have
 assumed, II, 34, 13; **dádhanāb**,
 having become, I, 171, 6³;
dadhe mudé, I am made to
 rejoice, V, 53, 5.—**ā dádhanāb**,
 bringing, I, 165, 12; p. xviii;
ā dádhanāb nāma, assuming a
 name, VI, 66, 5; **gārbham ā**
adhât, she conceived the germ,
 VI, 66, 3; **ā-bitâ**, piled up, I,
 166, 9.—**nī dhattâ**, put down, I,
 171, 1; **ādhi nī dhehi asmé**,
 bestow on us, I, 43, 7.—**sam-**
ādhatta mām ékam, you left
 me alone, I, 165, 6¹; p. xvi;
sām dadhe, it is held, I, 168, 3;
sām vi-dyútâ dádhati, they aim
 with the lightning, V, 54, 2;
sām dadhuḥ parva-jāb, they
 have brought together piece by
 piece, VIII, 7, 22¹.—See **dhâtri**,
 and **dhya** for **dhimahi**.
- dhâtri**, bestowing:
dhâtârab, VIII, 7, 35.
- dhānyâ**:
dhānyām bīgam, the seed of corn,
 V, 53, 13.
- dhāman**, abode, law, company:
dhāma-bhiḥ, in their own ways, I,
 85, 11.—**dhāmnāb** (*mārutasya*),
 domain, I, 87, 6³; (*daśvyasya*),
 host, VII, 58, 1¹.—**pārasmin**
dhāman ritāsya, in the highest
 place of the law, I, 43, 9¹.—
 (27; 383 seq.)
- dhārayât-kshiti**, supporting the earth:
 ep. of Aditi, (260.)
- dhārâ**, stream:
dhārâb, I, 85, 5², 3.
- dhârâvarâ**, charged with rain:
dhârâvarâb, II, 34, 1¹.
- dhāv**, to run:
vi-dhāvatab, rushing about, I, 88, 5.
- dhiyâ-vasu**, rich in prayers:
dhiyâ-vasub, I, 64, 15³.
- dhiyâ-jām**, engaged in prayer:
 (166.)
- dhī**, prayer:
dhīyam, I, 88, 4; II, 34, 6²; I, 2,
- 7; **dhīyam-dhiyam**, prayer after
 prayer, I, 168, 1; **dhiyâ**, I, 166,
 13; **dhiyâ-jām**, (V, 87, 9¹); (166);
dhiyâb, I, 134, 2 (bis); **dhiyâb**,
 I, 87, 4; **dhibhīb**, V, 52, 14.—
itthâ dhiyâ, thus is my thought,
 V, 61, 15¹; I, 2, 6².
- dhīti**, prayer:
dhīti-bhiḥ, V, 53, 11.
- dhīra**, wise:
dhīrab, I, 64, 1; VII, 56, 4.
- dhūni**, roaring:
dhūnayab, the roarers (Maruts),
 I, 64, 5²; 87, 3; V, 60, 7; VI,
 66, 10; X, 78, 3; **dhūninām**,
 V, 87, 3³; VIII, 20, 14.—
dhūniḥ, shouting, VII, 56, 8¹.
- dhūni-vrata**, given to roaring:
dhūni-vratam, V, 58, 2; **dhūni-**
vratāya, V, 87, 1.
- dhūr**, shaft, yoke:
dhûb-sû, V, 55, 6; X, 77, 5; **dhuri**,
 V, 56, 6 (bis); 58, 7; I, 134, 3
 (bis).
- dhû**, to shake (with two Acc.):
dhûnuthâ, I, 37, 6; V, 57, 3¹.—
vī dhûnutha, V, 54, 12¹.
- dhûb-sād**, charioteer:
dhûb-sādab, II, 34, 4.
- dhūti**, shaker:
dhūtayab (Maruts), I, 37, 6; 39, 1;
 10; V, 54, 4; VII, 58, 4; VIII,
 20, 16; (V, 87, 3²); **dhūtayab**, I,
 64, 5; 87, 3; 168, 2; V, 61, 14.
- dhūrv**:
dhūrvane, (48.)
- dhri**, to hold:
dadhire, I, 64, 10; 85, 3; (*nā-*
māni), I, 87, 5; **dādhāra**, he
 established, X, 121, 1; **dhārā-**
yante vratâ, they observe their
 duties, VIII, 94, 2; **dhārāye-**
thām, may you maintain, VI, 74,
 1.—**ādhi sriyab** **dadhire**, they
 clothed themselves in beauty,
 I, 85, 2².—**vī ānu dhire**, they
 spread out behind, I, 166, 10.
 —**nī dadhré**, he holds himself
 down (Dat.), I, 37, 7¹.
- dhriśh**, to defy:
ā-dhriśhe, I, 39, 4²; V, 87, 2.—**da-**
dhriśhvān, daring, I, 165, 10¹.
- dhriśhatâ**, adv., boldly:
 I, 167, 9¹.
- dhriśhat-vīn**, full of daring:
dhriśhat-vināb, V, 52, 2¹.

- dhriṣṇú**, bold :
dhriṣṇú, I, 6, 2; *dhriṣṇú*, VI, 66, 5;
dhriṣṇúnā, I, 167, 9; *dhriṣṇa-*
vab, V, 52, 14²; pp. cxxi; cxxiv;
dhriṣṇób, VII, 56, 8.
dhriṣṇú-ogas, endowed with fierce
force :
dhriṣṇú-ogasaḥ, II, 34, 1.
dhriṣṇu-yā, boldly :
V, 52, 1; 2; 4.
dhriṣṇú-sena, followed by daring
armies :
dhriṣṇú-senāḥ, VI, 66, 6.
dhe, to suck :
gaúb dhayati, the cow sends forth
her milk, VIII, 94, 1¹.
dhénā, stream (of milk); du., lips :
dhénā, I, 2, 3¹.
dhenú, milch-cow :
dhenúb, II, 34, 8; I, 134, 4³;
dhenúm, II, 34, 6; *dhenávab*,
V, 53, 7; 55, 5; I, 134, 6; *dhe-*
núnām, V, 61, 10; *dhenú-bhiḥ*,
II, 34, 5.—*dhenú* (neut.), VI,
66, 1¹.
dhéshṭa, most generous :
dhéshṭab, I, 170, 5.
dhmā, to blow :
dhāmantaḥ, I, 85, 10; II, 34, 1⁶.—
dhāmanti ānu, foam along, VIII,
7, 16.
dhyā :
tāsyā dhīmahi, that we pray for,
VIII, 7, 18.
dhraḡ, to float :
dhraḡataḥ, I, 165, 2.—*prā adh-*
raḡan, they rushed forth, I,
166, 4².
dhru :
dhruváse, Inf., (I, 87, 6¹).
dhruvá, firm :
dhruváni, I, 167, 8.
dhruva-kyút, throwing down what is
firm :
dhruva-kyútaḥ, I, 64, 11; (I, 168, 5²).
dhvan, to dun, to din :
(I, 64, 5²).
Dhvasra :
(360); (V, 61, 5²; 9¹).
ná, not . . . :
nahí-ná, I, 19, 2; 39, 4; *ná-nó*, I,
170, 1; *nákib-ná*, I, 165, 9.—
kvā ná, where not, I, 38, 2¹; *ná*,
not, interrog., I, 170, 3.—*ka ná*
and *kaná*, (264; 266 seq.) — *ná*
áha, nowhere, never, V, 54, 4;
10. — *arāṇām ná karamáb* for
arāṇām ná ná karamáb, VIII, 20,
14¹.
ná, like . . . :
ná and *iva*, I, 85, 8¹; *ná rókaḥ*,
VI, 66, 6².—I, 64, 9³; VIII, 20,
14¹; X, 77, 1³.
nákis :
nákib, nothing, I, 165, 9; no one,
VII, 56, 2; not, VIII, 20, 12.
nakt, *nákta*, night :
(V, 52, 16¹).—*náktam*, by night,
VIII, 7, 6.
naksh, to reach :
nákshanti, I, 166, 2; *nákshante*,
VII, 58, 1.
nad, Caus., to cause to tremble :
nadáyanta, I, 166, 5¹; (I, 37, 7¹).
nad, to roar :
nānadati, I, 64, 8.—*ā nānadati*, they
resound, VIII, 20, 5.
nadá, reed :
nadáśya, II, 34, 3².
nadí, river :
nadīnām, V, 52, 7; *nadyāḥ*, V, 55, 7.
nápāt, offspring :
miháb nāpātam, I, 37, 11¹.—*java-*
sab nāpātaḥ, (VI, 66, 11¹).
nabhanú, spring :
nabhanún, V, 59, 7².
nábhas, the sky between heaven and
earth :
(X, 121, 5²).—*nábhasaḥ*, cloud, I,
167, 5.
nam, to bow :
ánamam (vadha-snaḥ), I escaped,
I, 165, 6¹; p. xvi; *namadhvam*,
incline, VII, 56, 17; *kuvít nám-*
sante, will they turn, VII, 58,
5.—*ā namanti*, they bend, VII,
56, 19; *práti nanāma*, he makes
obedience, II, 33, 12.
námab-vrīkti :
(I, 64, 1²).
namayishṇu, able to bend :
namayishṇavaḥ, VIII, 20, 1¹.
námas, worship :
námasā, (I, 165, 2¹); II, 34, 14; I,
114, 2; 5; I, 171, 1; *námasaḥ*
(*vrīdhāsaḥ*), I, 171, 2²; *námab-*
bhiḥ, salutations, V, 60, 1; II,
33, 4; 8; *námab (ávoḥāma)*, sup-
plication, I, 114, 11.
namasy, to worship :
namasyá, V, 52, 13; II, 33, 8¹.

namasyā, worthy of worship :

(203 ; 205.)

nāmasvat, reverent :

nāmasvān, I, 171, 2.

namasvīn, worshipping :

namasvīnam, I, 166, 2.

Nāmuḥi, name of a demon :

(I, 64, 3¹.)

nārāśansa, 'Männerlob' :

Indra, (II, 34, 6¹) ; Agni, (439.)

narokas, fond of men :

narokāb = nri-okāb, Oldenberg for

nā rōkab, (VI, 66, 6².)

nārya, manly :

nāri āpāmsi, I, 85, 9² ; nāryāb, I,

166, 5 ; nāryeshu, I, 166, 10.

nārya-apas, epithet of Indra :

(I, 85, 9².)

nāva, new :

nāvyaṁsi, newest, I, 38, 3 ; nāvyaśe,

VIII, 7, 33 ; nāvīyasi (su-matib),

VII, 59, 4 ; nāvishṭbayā, VIII,

20, 19.

nāvedas, mindful (c. Gen.) :

nāvedāb, I, 165, 13² ; nāvedasab, V,

55, 8.

nāvya, new :

nāvyeshu, I, 134, 4.

nāvyaśina, ever-youthful :

nāvyaśinām, V, 53, 10¹ ; 58, 1.

nar, to come near :

nārate, I, 165, 9.—abhī narat, he

will obtain, VIII, 20, 16.—prā-

nak, let it reach, VII, 56, 9.

nar, to vanish :

vī naryati, I, 170, 1.

nās, du., nostrils :

nasób, V, 61, 2.

nahī, not indeed :

I, 19, 2 ; 39, 4 ; VII, 59, 4 ; nahi nú,

I, 167, 9 ; nahī kaná, not even,

VII, 59, 3 ; nahī sma, VIII, 7, 21.

nāka, the firmament :

nākab, X, 121, 5² ; nākam, I, 85,

7 ; V, 54, 12¹ ; VII, 58, 1 ; nā-

kasya ādhi rokané, I, 19, 6¹.—

nāka, rokaná, sūrya, (50.)

nādh :

nādhāmānam, suppliant, VIII, 7,

30 ; II, 33, 6.

nāpita, barber :

(I, 166, 10⁴.)

nābhi :

nābhā, in the centre, I, 43, 9¹.

nāman, name :

nāma yagñīyam, I, 6, 4 ; nāmāni

yagñīyāni, I, 87, 5 ; amṛitam

nāma, V, 57, 5² ; nāma, VI, 66,

1 ; 5 ; VII, 56, 10 ; VIII, 20, 13¹ ;

II, 33, 8² ; nāma mārutam, com-

pany of the Maruts, VII, 57, 1¹ ;

nāmāni, powers, VII, 56, 14 ;

nāma-bhiḥ, V, 52, 10 ; VII, 57,

6 ; ādityéna nāmā, by their

name of Ādityas, X, 77, 8 ; nā-

man and dhāman, (384.)

nāri, woman :

nri-bhyab nāri-bhyab, to men and

women, I, 43, 6 ; p. lxxxviii.

nīb-riti, sin :

nīb-ritib, I, 38, 6¹.—nīb-riteb, of

Nirriti, VII, 58, 1² ; nīb-ritim,

VI, 74, 2.

nīb-kritā :

nīb-kritām, the work (of the sacri-

ficer), I, 2, 6¹.

nī-kakrayā, adv., downwards :

VIII, 7, 29¹.

ni-keṭri, he who finds out :

ni-keṭārāb, VII, 57, 2.

nigā, 'eingeboren,' one's own :

(I, 166, 2².)

nīnyā, secret :

nīnyā, VII, 56, 4¹.

nītya, one's own :

nītyam, I, 166, 2².

nīd, to blame :

nīdé, II, 34, 10¹.

nīd, reviler, enemy :

nīdāb (Abl.), II, 34, 15 ; V, 87, 6 ;

9 ; nīdāb (Acc. pl.), V, 53, 14.

nī-dhī, treasure :

nī-dhīb, X, 186, 3.

nī-dhruvi, lasting :

āsti nī-dhruvi, it lasts, VIII, 20, 22.

nī-misla, companion :

nī-mislām, I, 167, 6.

nī-mishat, see mish.

nī-méghamāna :

nī-méghamānāb, streaming down,

II, 34, 13.

nīmā, downward :

nīmāb udā-bhiḥ, with downward

floods, X, 78, 5.

nī-yút, steed :

nī-yútāb, I, 167, 2 ; V, 52, 11 ; I,

134, 2.

nīyútvat, with steeds :

nīyútvantāb, V, 54, 8 ; nīyútvatā

(ráthena), I, 134, 1.

nir, night :

(V, 52, 16¹.)

nishanḡn, carrying quivers :

nishanḡnab, V, 57, 2.

nishkā, golden chain :

nishkāṁ, II, 33, 10.

nīshṭya, strange, hostile :

(I, 166, 2².)

nīs, out of, from (c. Abl.):

nīb (nayata), V, 55, 10; nīb (ka-
krame), V, 87, 4.

nī, to lead :

nāyatha, VII, 59, 1.—nayata ākṣba
nīb, lead us towards, and out of,
V, 55, 10.—ānu neshatha, con-
duct, V, 54, 6.—vī nayanti, they
lead about, I, 64, 6⁸.—See pra-
netrī.

nīla-prishṭba :

nīla-prishṭbāb hamsāsab, the swans
with dark blue backs, VII, 59, 7.

nú, indeed ; now . . . :

nākió nú, I, 165, 9; utá vā nú, V,
60, 6; utó nú, VIII, 94, 6; yā
nú, I, 165, 10; yé ka nú, V, 87,
2; yān ko nú, VI, 66, 3.—nú
kit, interrog. part., I, 39, 4²; VI,
66, 1; 5; VII, 56, 15; nú, in-
terrog., I, 64, 15²; II, 33, 7; V,
52, 15¹.

nu, to shout :

anūshata, I, 6, 6; nāvamānasya,
who praises you, II, 34, 10¹.

nud, to push :

nunudre, I, 85, 10; 11; 88, 4;
nutthāb, thou shookest, (I, 165,
9¹).—āpa nudanta, they drove
away, I, 167, 4; parā-núde, to
attack, I, 39, 2.

nūtana, new :

nūtanam, V, 55, 8.

nūnām, now :

I, 39, 7; 165, 12; 170, 1; V, 56,
5; 58, 1; VIII, 20, 15.—kāt ha
nūnām, I, 38, 1; VIII, 7, 31;
kvā nūnām, I, 38, 2; VIII, 7,
20; káb nūnām, V, 61, 14.

nṛí, man ; hero :

nārab ná ranvāh, like gay men, VII,
59, 7; nṛí-bhyaḡ (pāve, gāve,
tokāya), I, 43, 2; nṛí-bhyaḡ
nāri-bhyaḡ, I, 43, 6; jatāsya
nṛinām, I, 43, 7; narām ná sām-
sab (Indra), II, 34, 6¹; nṛí-bhiḡ,
I, 64, 13; nári āpāmsi, see nárya.
—narā (Indra and Vāyu), I, 2,
6; narab, men (Maruts), I, 37,
6; 86, 8; 165, 11; V, 53, 15;

54, 10; 59, 3; 61, 1; VII, 59,
4; VIII, 20, 10; 16; nārab, I,
39, 3; 64, 4; 10; 85, 8; 166,
13; V, 52, 5; 6; 8; 11; 53, 3;
6; 54, 3; 8; 55, 3; 57, 8; 58, 8;
59, 2; 5; 61, 3; VII, 56, 1; 57,
6; VIII, 7, 29; 20, 6; 7; nṛin,
I, 171, 6¹; V, 54, 15; 58, 2; nṛi-
bhiḡ, V, 87, 4; narām ribhukshāb,
I, 167, 10.

nṛi-okas, see narokas.

nṛit, to dance :

nṛitub, V, 52, 12.

nṛí-tama, most manly :

nṛi-tamāsab, I, 87, 1.

nṛitú, dancer :

nṛitavab (the Maruts), VIII, 20, 22.

nṛi-mānas, manly-minded :

nṛi-mánāb, I, 167, 5.

nṛimā, manhood :

nṛimnām, V, 54, 1; VII, 56, 5;
nṛimnā, manly thoughts, V, 57,
6; nṛimnāib, manly courage, VI,
66, 2.

nṛi-vat, with children and men :

(208.)

nṛi-vāhas, who can carry the heroes :

nṛi-vāhasā, I, 6, 2.

nṛi-sāk, friend of man :

nṛi-sākab, I, 64, 9.

nṛi-hán, killing men :

nṛi-hā, VII, 56, 17.—Ep. of Rudra,
(I, 114, 1².)

nédishṭba, nearest :

nédishṭbam, V, 56, 2.

néma, many a :

némab, V, 61, 8.

nemí, felly :

nemāyab, I, 38, 12.

Nódhas :

nódhab, I, 64, 1¹; (124 seq.)

naú, ship :

nāvab, V, 54, 4; naúb, V, 59, 2.

pakshá, wing :

pakshān, I, 166, 10.

pakshín, winged :

syenāsab pakshínab, VIII, 20, 10.

pagrá, mighty :

pagráṁ, I, 167, 6.

pāñkan, five :

pāñka hótrín, II, 34, 14.

Pañkāla :

krivi=Pañkāla? (VIII, 20, 24¹.)

paní, miser :

panīb, V, 61, 8.

pat, to fly :

paptúb, V, 59, 7; pátatab, VIII, 7, 35.—ā paptata, fly to, I, 88, 1³; ā apaptan, VII, 59, 7.—
ví patatha, you fly across, I, 168, 6; ví pápatan, they were scattered, VIII, 20, 4.

pat (patyate) :

pátyamānam, having taken (a name), VI, 66, 1; távishib pat, (I, 64, 7³.)

pāti, lord :

bhūtāśya pátib, X, 121, 1; bráhmanab pátim, I, 38, 13¹; pátayab rayīmām, X, 121, 10; V, 55, 10.

pátnī, wife :

gāni with pátnī, (I, 85, 1¹.)

pathín, path :

pathā (yamāśya), on the path, I, 38, 5³; kēna kit pathā, I, 87, 2; pathi-bhiś, II, 34, 5; X, 168, 3; pánthām sūryāya yāṭave, a path for the sun to walk, VIII, 7, 8¹.

pathyā, path, course :

pathyāb, V, 54, 9; VI, 66, 7.

pad, to go, depart :

padishrá, I, 38, 6³.

pad, foot :

pat-sú, V, 54, 11.

pan, to glorify :

panayanta, I, 87, 3.

panasyú, praiseworthy, glorious :

panasyúm, I, 38, 15; V, 56, 9; panasyāvab, X, 77, 3.

pánīyas, more glorious :

pánīyasī (távishī), I, 39, 2.

payab-dhā, sucking :

payab-dhāb, VII, 56, 16.

payab-vrīdh, increasing the rain :

payab-vrīdhab, I, 64, 11.

páyas, milk (rain) :

páyasā, I, 64, 5; 166, 3; páyab ghrítā-vat, I, 64, 6².

par, see *pri*.

pára, highest :

párasmin dhāman, I, 43, 9; páram, top, I, 168, 6.—páre yugé, in former years, I, 166, 13.

pára-para, one after another :

pára-parā, I, 38, 6.

paramá, further :

paramāb, I, 167, 2; paramāśyāb, V, 61, 1¹.

parás, beyond (c. Acc.) :

paráb, I, 19, 2¹.

párā, prep. . . . :

adv., far away, I, 167, 4.

parākāt, from afar :

X, 77, 6.

parākaś, far away :

ārē parākaś, VI, 74, 2.

parā-vát, far :

parā-vátāb, from afar, I, 39, 1; VIII, 7, 26; X, 78, 7; far, V, 53, 8; paramāśyāb parā-vátāb, from the furthest distance, V, 61, 1¹; parā-vāti, in the distance, I, 134, 4.

pári, prep. . . . :

pári (tasthúshab), round, I, 6, 1²; (aguś), I, 88, 4.—With Abl., from, V, 59, 7; VII, 46, 3.—
pári-, excessive, (104 seq.)—
Synizesis of pári, p. cxxiii.

pari-krośá, reviler :

pari-krośám, (104.)

parikshāma, withered away :

(104.)

pári-gman, traveller :

pári-gman (Indra), I, 6, 9.

pári-grī, running, swarming around :

pári-grayaś, I, 64, 5; V, 54, 2 (bis).

pári-dveshas, a great hater :

pári-dveshasāb, (104.)

pari-prī :

pári-priyāb, great lovers or surrounding friends, (105.)

pári-prīta, loved very much :

pári-prītab, (105.)

pári-prūsh, scattering moisture :

pári-prūshab, X, 77, 5.

pári-bādh, harasser :

pári-bādhāb, I, 43, 8¹.

pári-manyú, wrathful :

pári-manyāve, I, 39, 10¹.

pári-ráp, enemy :

pári-rápab, (104.)

parilaghu, per levis :

(104.)

parishubāna, abode :

(I, 6, 1²); (29.)

pári-stúbh :

pári-stúbhab, shouting all around, I, 166, 11.—pári-stúbhab (ishab), standing round about, (VIII, 7, 1¹.)

pári-sprīdh, rival :

pári-sprīdhāb, (104.)

pári-srut :

pári-stubh = pari-srut, (VIII, 7, 1¹.)

pārīnas, wealth :

pārīnasā, I, 166, 14.

pārushñi, (speckled) cloud :

pārushnyām, V, 52, 9¹; (V, 53, 9¹.)

pārus, knot :

(66); p. xxv.

pargānya, cloud :

pargānyena, I, 38, 9¹; *pargānyab* iva, I, 38, 14¹; *pargānyam*, V, 53, 6¹.

pārvata, mountain (cloud) :

pārvatab, V, 60, 2; 3; *pārvatab* girib, I, 37, 7¹; *pārvatam* girim, V, 56, 4¹; *pārvatam*, I, 85, 10; *pārvatāb*, I, 64, 3; V, 54, 9; 55, 7; VIII, 7, 2; 34; *pārvatāsab*, V, 87, 9; VIII, 20, 5; *pārvatān*, I, 19, 7¹; 39, 5; 64, 11; 166, 5¹; V, 57, 3; VIII, 7, 4; 23; *pārvatasya*, V, 59, 7; *pārvatānām* (ārāb), I, 39, 3²; *pārvateshu*, V, 61, 19; VIII, 7, 1; 20, 25.—p. xxv.

parvata-kyūt, shaking the mountains :

parvata-kyūte, V, 54, 1; *parvata-kyūtab*, V, 54, 3; (I, 168, 5².)

pārvan, knot :

(66); p. xxv.

parva-jās, piece by piece, to pieces :

parva-jāb, VIII, 7, 22¹; 23.

pārāna, valley :

pārānāsab, VIII, 7, 34.

pāvī, tire (of a wheel) :

pāvī-bhīb, I, 64, 11; *pavyā*, I, 88, 2²; V, 52, 9; *pāvishu*, I, 166, 10; *pāvī-bhyab*, I, 168, 8.

par, to see :

pāryan, I, 88, 5; V, 53, 3; *pāry-antab*, VIII, 20, 26.—*pari-āparyat*, he looked over, X, 121, 8; *pāri aparyan*, they looked about for (Acc.), I, 168, 9.

parū, cattle :

parvāb, I, 166, 6; *parūm* (ārvyam), V, 61, 5; *pārvē*, I, 43, 2.

pasupā, shepherd :

pasupāb-iva, I, 114, 9¹.

parśāt, behind :

parśāt dagh, to stay behind, VII, 56, 21.

Pastyā, N. of a people :

(398.)

Pastyā-vat, N. of a country :

pastyā-vati, VIII, 7, 29¹.—Adj., filled with hamlets, (399.)—

Subst., sacrificial vessel, (VIII, 7, 29¹.)

pastyā, housewife, ep. of Aditi :

(260.)

pā, to protect :

pānti, I, 167, 8¹; V, 52, 2; 4; *pāsi*, I, 134, 5² (bis); *pāhi*, I, 171, 6¹; *pāthāna*, I, 166, 8; *yūyām* *pāta*, VII, 56, 25; 57, 7; 58, 6; 47, 4.—*nī pānti*, they ward off, VII, 56, 19.

pā, to drink :

pāthā, I, 86, 1; *pāhi*, I, 2, 1; *pī-tāsab*, I, 168, 3; *pībanti asya*, VIII, 94, 4; 5; *piba*, V, 60, 8; *pibata*, VII, 59, 3¹; *pībantab*, V, 61, 11; *pībadhya*, I, 88, 4.

pāgas, splendour :

pāgasā ātyena, II, 34, 13³.

pāgasvat, brilliant :

pāgasvantab (vīrāb), X, 77, 3.

pāñī, hand, hoof :

(I, 38, 11¹.)

pātra, vessel :

three *pātras*, filled with milk and Soma, (VIII, 7, 10².)

Pāthya :

Vrīshan Pāthya, (153.)

pārā, the other shore :

pārē, I, 167, 2; *pārām* (pārshi nab), II, 33, 3; *pārām*, the end, V, 54, 10.

pārāvata, pl., extranei, strangers :

pārāvātāb, V, 52, 11¹.

pārāvata-hān :

pārāvata-ghnī (Sarasvatī), (V, 52, 11¹.)

pārthiva, earthly; earth :

pārthivam (sādma), I, 38, 10¹; V, 87, 7¹; *pārthivā*, divyāni, I, 64, 3; *pārthivāb*, V, 52, 7.—*pārthivāt ādhi*, from above the earth, I, 6, 10; (51 seq.); *pārthiva*, rāgas, dyū, (I, 19, 3¹); *pārthivāni*, earth, sky, and heaven, (52); *vīsvā pārthivāni*, the whole earth, VIII, 94, 9.

pārya :

pārye dyōb, at the close of the day, VI, 66, 8¹.

pāvakā, pure :

pāvakāsab, I, 64, 2; *pāvakām*, I, 64, 12; *pāvakébhiḥ*, V, 60, 8; *pāvakāb*, VII, 56, 12; 57, 5; *pāvakān*, VIII, 20, 19.—*pāvaka* ◡—◡—, p. cxvi seq.

pāsa, snare :

pāṣān, the snares of (Druh), VII, 59, 8; vārunasya pāṣāt, VI, 74, 4.

pitṛ, father :

pitā, I, 38, 1; X, 186, 2; pitāram, II, 33, 12; pitāram utā mātāram, I, 114, 7; pitūb, I, 87, 5; pitṛi-nām nā sāmsāb, like the prayers of our fathers, X, 78, 3.—mānub pitā, I, 114, 2; II, 33, 13.—pitāb marutām, Rudra, the father of the Maruts, I, 114, 9; II, 33, 1; pitā, V, 60, 5; pitāram, V, 52, 16; pitṛe marutām, I, 114, 6.

pitrya, of the father or fathers :

pitryāni (ukthāni), VII, 56, 23; pitryam (vāyab), VIII, 20, 13.

pinv, to sprinkle, pour out :

pinvanti, I, 64, 5; 6^a; pinvate, II, 34, 8^a; pinvanti utsam, they fill the well, V, 54, 8; VII, 57, 1.

pipishvat, crushing :

pipishvatī, I, 168, 7.

pipishu, wishing to drink :

pipishavab, VII, 59, 4.

pippala, apple :

pippalam rūsat, the red apple (the lightning), V, 54, 12^a.

piś, to adorn :

piṣe, he decked himself, II, 33, 9; piṣe, it has been laid, V, 57, 6; piśrām, bedecked, V, 56, 1.—abhi piṣe, they have adorned, V, 60, 4.—ā piśāñāb, adorning, VII, 57, 3.

pīś, gold :

(I, 64, 8¹.)

piśā, gazelle :

piśāb-iva, I, 64, 8¹.

piśānga, tawny :

piśāngaiś (horses), I, 88, 2.

piśānga-arva, having tawny horses :

piśānga-arvāb, V, 57, 4.

pish, see pipishvat.

pitf, drinking :

pītāye, for to drink, I, 166, 7; VII, 59, 5; asyā sōmasya pītāye, VIII, 94, 10 to 12; pītīm arhasi, thou art worthy to drink, I, 134, 6 (bis).

pūms, man :

pūmsāb, V, 61, 6; pūmān, V, 61, 8.

putrā, son :

putrām, I, 38, 1; putrāb (prīśneb), V, 58, 5; (rudrāsya), VI, 66, 3; divāb putrāsab, X, 77, 2.

putra-krithā :

putra-krithēnā gānayab, ὄς γυναικες ἐν τεκνοποιῇ, V, 61, 3^a.

púnar, again :

I, 6, 4; VII, 58, 5; VIII, 20, 26.

púr, stronghold :

pûb-bhīb, I, 166, 8.

purandhrī, housewife :

(I, 134, 3¹.)

púram-dhi, morning, dawn :

púram-dhim, I, 134, 3¹.

purás, in front :

purāb, I, 170, 4.

purā :

of yore, I, 39, 7; V, 53, 1; formerly, I, 167, 10; VII, 56, 23; VIII, 7, 21.

purisha, soil :

from prī, (I, 64, 12^a; V, 55, 5^a.)

purishín :

purishínā, marshy, V, 53, 9.—purīshināb, cultivators of the land, yeomen, V, 55, 5^a.

purú, many :

purú, I, 166, 3; 13; pūrvībhīb, I, 86, 6; pūrvīb, X, 77, 2.

puru-kshú, nourishing many :

puru-kshúm, VIII, 7, 13.

puru-kandrá, resplendent :

puru-kandrá (for Pada puru-kand-rāb), V, 61, 16¹.

puru-tāma, manifold :

puru-tāmam, V, 56, 5.

puru-drapsá, rich in rain-drops :

puru-drapsāb, V, 57, 5.

puru-praisha, invoked by many :

puru-praishāb, I, 168, 5^a.

Puru-mīlba :

puru-mīlāya, V, 61, 9¹; (V, 61, 5^a); (359 seq.; 362.)

puru-rūpa, assuming many forms :

puru-rūpab, II, 33, 9.

purusha-ghná, man-slaying :

purusha-ghnām, I, 114, 10.

purushātā, men as we are :

VII, 57, 4.

Purushanti :

(360); (V, 61, 5^a; 9¹.)

puru-sprīh, much-desired :

puru-sprīhab, VIII, 20, 2.

Purúravas :

(307.)

push, to prosper :

púshyati, I, 64, 13^a; pushyema, let us foster, I, 64, 14; púshyanti nrimām, rich in manhood, VII,

- 56, 5; *pushrám*, prosperous, I, 114, 1.—See *pushyás*.
pushrī, prosperity:
pushrīshu, I, 166, 8.
pushri-vārdhana, wealth-increasing (Rudra):
pushri-vārdhanam, VII, 59, 12.
pushyás, prosperity:
pushyāse, VII, 57, 5.
pū, to clean:
punishé, (V, 58, 1¹); *punānāb*, who clean themselves from (Acc.), VI, 66, 4²; *pūtāsya*, clarified (Soma), VIII, 94, 5.—*pavanta*, (VII, 56, 3¹).
pūtā-daksha, endowed with holy strength:
pūtā-daksham, I, 2, 7¹.
pūtā-dakshas, endowed with pure strength:
pūtā-dakshasab, VIII, 94, 7; 10.
pūtabhrit, a Soma-vessel:
(VIII, 94, 5²).
Pūru, N. of a people:
(398.).
pūrva, former, old:
pūrvāsu vi-ushrīshu, VIII, 20, 15;
pūrvān-iva sākhn, V, 53, 16;
pūrvam, ancient, I, 166, 1.—
pūrva, before, opposed to *ūpara*, behind, (I, 167, 3²).
pūrvā-pīti, the early draught:
pūrvā-pītaye, I, 19, 9¹; 134, 1¹ (bis).
pūrvyā, old:
pūrvyām, V, 55, 8; *pūrvyāb* (agnīb), old, or, first, VIII, 7, 36¹.
Pūshan:
is *kapardin*, (I, 114, 1²).
priksh, food:
priksham yā, to go in search of food, (II, 34, 3⁴); *prikshé*, to feed, II, 34, 4¹.
prikshām, adv., quick:
II, 34, 3⁴.
Prikshayāma, N. pr.:
(V, 54, 1²).
priksha-yāvan (?) :
priksha-yāvane, (V, 54, 1²).
prik:
pra-priṣṭkatī (dhēnā), satisfying, I, 2, 3¹.—*prikshase*, (I, 6, 7²).
prināt, a liberal worshipper:
prinātāb, I, 168, 7.
prīt, battle, fight:
prīt-sū, I, 64, 14; VIII, 20, 20¹.
prītanā, battle:
prītanāsu, I, 85, 8; VII, 56, 22;
23; 59, 4.
prīthivī, earth:
prīthivī, *antāriksha*, *dyū*, (50);
prīthivī, *rāgas*, *dyū*, (I, 19, 3¹);
prīthivī, X, 121, 5; I, 39, 6;
the earth trembles, I, 37, 8; V,
54, 9; 56, 3¹; 60, 2; VI, 66, 9;
opens wide, V, 58, 7; *prīthivī*
utā dyaūb, I, 114, 11; *prīthivīm*,
X, 121, 1; V, 57, 3; (vi-undānti),
I, 38, 9; V, 54, 8; *prīthivyāb*,
X, 121, 9; I, 38, 2; 39, 3; X,
77, 3; 168, 1; *prīthivya*, V,
59, 1; *prīthivyām*, I, 168, 8.—
prīthivī, i. e. *prīthuvī*, (255);
= *prīthvī*, pp. cxx; cxxi.
prīthū, broad:
prīthūm, I, 37, 11; *dirghām*
prīthū, far and wide, V, 87, 7.—
prīthvī, (255; 260.)
prīthu-grāya, wide-spreading:
prīthu-grāyī, I, 168, 7¹.
prīthū-pāni:
(I, 38, 11¹).
Prīni, *Prīni*, the mother of the
Maruts:
prīnib, I, 168, 9¹; V, 60, 5; VI,
66, 1: 3¹; VII, 56, 4; (V, 61,
4¹; VIII, 94, 1¹); *prīnim*, V,
52, 16; *prīnyāb*, II, 34, 2²;
10; *prīneb putrāb*, V, 58, 5.—
prīnaya, the clouds, VIII, 7,
10¹.
prīni-mātri, pl., sons of *Prīni*:
prīni-mātarab, I, 38, 4; V, 57, 2;
3; *prī*, I, 85, 2; V, 59, 6; VIII,
7, 3; 17.—(I, 85, 3¹; 168, 9¹;
II, 34, 2²; V, 61, 4¹; X, 78,
6¹).
prīshat-arva, with spotted horses:
prīshat-arvāb, I, 87, 4¹; *prīshat-*
arvāsab, II, 34, 4.—(I, 37, 2¹;
II, 34, 3²).
prīshatī, the spotted deer (the
clouds):
prīshatībhiḥ, I, 37, 2¹; 64, 8; II
34, 3²; V, 58, 6¹; *prīshatīb*, I,
39, 6; 85, 4; 5; V, 55, 6¹; 57,
3; VIII, 7, 28; *prīshatīshu*, V,
60, 2.—(I, 87, 4¹; V, 53, 1¹).
prīshbā, back:
prīshbām (*divāb*), I, 166, 5; (V,
54, 1²); *prīshbē* (*sādab*), V, 61,
2; (V, 61, 3²).

prishṭba-prayag :

(V, 55, 1¹.)

prishṭba-yágvān :

diváb ā *prishṭba*-yágvane, who sacrifices on the height of heaven, V, 54, 1².

prī (or *par*), to carry over :

pārshatha, you carry off, I, 86, 7¹ ; *pārshi nab pārám āmhasab*, carry us to the other shore of anguish, II, 33, 3.—*āti pārâyatha*, you help across, II, 34, 15 ; (I, 86, 7¹).—*apa par*, to remove, *nib par*, to throw down, (I, 86, 7¹.)

prī, to fill :

pipartana, fulfil, I, 166, 6² ; (221.) —*pūrṇā* (naúb), full, V, 59, 2.

péras, form :

pérasab, I, 6, 3 ; see *aperás*.

pósha, fulness :

pósham (ráyab), I, 166, 3.

paúmsya, valour :

paúmsyebhiḥ, I, 165, 7 ; VI, 66, 2 ; *paúmsyā*, manly deeds, I, 166, 7 ; V, 59, 4 ; *vriṣhni paúmsyam*, manly work, VIII, 7, 23.

pyai, to fill, to swell :

pipyata, II, 34, 6² ; *pîpāya*, it is brimming, VI, 66, 1 ; *pipyúshim* (isham), swelling, VIII, 7, 3 ; *pipyúshib* (ishab), VIII, 7, 19.

prá, prep. . . . :

prá (*āti tasthaú*), I, 64, 13 ; *prá* (verb understood), V, 54, 2 ; 87, 3² ; *prá rátheshu*, I, 85, 5.

pra-avitri, see *av*.

pra-kri/in, playing about :

pra-kri/inab (the Maruts), (I, 6, 8²) ; VII, 56, 16.

prá-ketas, wise :

pra-ketasab, I, 39, 9 ; V, 87, 9 ; *prá-ketasab*, I, 64, 8 ; attentive, VIII, 7, 12 ; *prá-ketase* (rudráya), I, 43, 1.

prakkb, to ask :

sám prikkbase, thou greetest, I, 165, 3² ; p. xv.—See ā-*prikkbya*.

pra-gá, offspring :

pra-gáyai, VII, 57, 6 ; *pra-gābhiḥ prá gáyemahi*, II, 33, 1.—*pra-gāb*, beings, I, 43, 9.

Pragāpati :

prágāpate, X, 121, 10.

pra-gñātrī, expert :

pra-gñātārāb ná gyéshibāb, X, 78, 2.

pra-tarām, further :

V, 55, 3.

prá-tavas, endowed with exceeding power :

prá-tavasab, I, 87, 1.

prāti, prep. . . . :

to, I, 19, 1 ; 171, 1 ; towards, I, 88, 6 ; 165, 12 ; me *arapat prāti*, V, 61, 9.

prati-skābh, see *skambh*.

pratná, old :

pratnásyā, I, 87, 5.

prá-tvakshas, endowed with exceeding vigour :

prá-tvakshasab, I, 87, 1 ; V, 57, 4.

prath, to spread :

práthishṭba, (the earth) opened wide, V, 58, 7 ; *paprathe*, (the earth) is stretched out, V, 87, 7¹.—*ā papráthan*, they spread out, VIII, 94, 9.

prathamá, first :

prathamáni, I, 166, 7 ; *prathamāb*, II, 34, 12 ; *prathamāb ápúrvyab*, I, 134, 6¹.

prathama-gā, first-born :

prathama-gāb, X, 168, 3.

pra-dakshinít, turning to the right : V, 60, 1.

pra-dív :

pra-dívā, always, V, 60, 8.

pra-dír, region :

pra-dírāb, X, 121, 4.

prá-niti, guidance :

prá-nitishu, I, 114, 2¹.

pra-netrí, leader :

pra-netārāb mártam, V, 61, 15 ; *pra-netārāb* (mánma), they guide, VII, 57, 2.

prá-patha, journey :

prá-patheshu, I, 166, 9².

prá-pada :

prá-padeshu, Roth for *prá-pathe-shu*, (I, 166, 9²).

pra-bhrithá, offering :

pra-bhrithé, II, 34, 11¹.

pra-yagyū, chasing :

pra-yagyavab, I, 39, 9 ; 86, 7 ; VII, 56, 14 ; *prá-yagyavab*, V, 55, 1¹ ; *prá-yagyave*, V, 87, 1 ; *prá-yagyūn*, hunters, VIII, 7, 33.

práyas, offering :

práyāmsi, I, 86, 7 ; *práyab*, I, 134, 1 ; *práyab-bhiḥ*, for the sake of our offerings, I, 2, 4¹.

práyasvat, enjoying the offerings :
 práyasvantab, X, 77, 4.
 pra-yúg, driver :
 pra-yúgab, X, 77, 5¹.
 pra-yúdh, eager for battle :
 pra-yúdhab, V, 59, 5.
 pra-yotrí, one who removes :
 pra-yotā, (267.)
 pravá, spring, well :
 pravásab, X, 77, 5².
 pra-vana, pronus :
 (X, 77, 5²).
 pravátvat, bowing :
 pravátvatī, pravátvatīb, pravát-
 vantab, V, 54, 9.
 pra-van :
 prava=pravan, (X, 77, 5²)
 pravayana, a goad :
 (I, 166, 4¹).
 pravā, the blowing before :
 (X, 77, 5²).
 pra-vetri, driver :
 (I, 166, 4¹).
 prá-jasti, great praise :
 prá-jastim, V, 57, 7.
 pra-sis, command :
 pra-sīsham, X, 121, 2 ; (4.)
 práshri, leader :
 práshrib, I, 39, 6¹ ; VIII, 7, 28.
 prá-sita, springing forth :
 prá-sitāsab (wells), X, 77, 5.
 prá-siti, raid :
 prá-sitau, V, 87, 6¹ ; mā te bhūma
 prá-sitau, may we not be in thy
 way when thou rushest forth,
 VII, 46, 4.
 prá-sthāvan, marching forward :
 prá-sthāvānab, VIII, 20, 1.
 prá :
 prási, for pási, (Oldenberg, I, 134,
 5²).
 pránat, see an.
 prātāb, early :
 I, 64, 15 ; at the morning sacri-
 fice, VIII, 94, 6.
 priyá, beloved :
 priyé, I, 85, 7 ; priyása, I, 87, 6 ;
 kádha priyáb, for kadha-priyab
 (see kadha-pri), I, 38, 1¹ ; VIII,
 7, 31 ; priyā (nāma), VII, 56,
 10 ; áhani priyé, on a happy day,
 VII, 59, 2 ; priyāb tanvāb, our
 own bodies, I, 114, 7¹.
 pri, to please :
 pipriyānāb, well pleased, VII, 57,
 2.

pru, to float :
 (X, 77, 5²).
 prush, to shower down :
 prushnuvānti, I, 168, 8 ; prushā
 (for Pada prusha), let me
 shower, X, 77, 1¹.
 prēshita, most beloved :
 prēshitāb, I, 167, 10.
 phaliga, for parigha (?) :
 (350.)
 bar, particle of asseveration :
 (V, 59, 1¹).
 badh, see vadh.
 bandh, to bind :
 baddhām ásti tanñshu, it clings to
 our bodies, VI, 74, 3.
 bāndhana, stem :
 urvārukām iva bāndhanāt, like a
 gourd from its stem, VII, 59,
 12.
 bandhu-eshá :
 bandhu-eshé, when there was in-
 quiry for their kindred, V, 52,
 16.
 babhrú, tawny :
 babhrúb, II, 33, 5 ; 9 ; babhráve,
 II, 33, 8 ; babhro, II, 33, 15.
 barhánā, weapon, bolt :
 barhánā, I, 166, 6² ; (226.)—bar-
 hánā tmánā, by their own
 might, X, 77, 3.
 barhís, grass-pile, altar :
 barhíb, I, 85, 6 ; VII, 57, 2¹ ; 59,
 6 ; barhíshi, I, 85, 7 ; 86, 4 ;
 VII, 46, 4¹.
 bála, strength :
 bálam, I, 37, 12 ; V, 57, 6.
 bala-dā, giving strength :
 bala-dāb, X, 121, 2.
 bahulá, manifold :
 bahulám, V, 55, 9.
 bānā, reed, arrow :
 (VIII, 20, 8¹).
 bādth, to drive away :
 árē bādthēhām, VI, 74, 2.—bā-
 dhante ápa, I, 85, 3 ; ápa bā-
 dhadhvam, VII, 56, 20.—ní-
 bādhita, struck down, (268 seq.)
 bāhú, arm :
 bāhú (the regions are the two
 arms of Hiranyagarbha), X,
 121, 4 ; bāhú-bhīb, I, 85, 6¹ ;
 bāhúshu, I, 166, 10 ; VIII, 20,
 11 ; bāhrób, V, 57, 6.

bâhú-ogas, strong-armed :

bâhú-ogasab, VIII, 20, 6.

bâhú-gûta, quick with his arm :

bâhú-gûtab, V, 58, 4.

bîga, seed :

bîgam, V, 53, 13.

budh, to awake :

Sâyana, bodhi=budhyasva, (II, 33, 15².)—prâ bodhaya, awake, I, 134, 3.

budhnâ, bottom :

budhné apâm, X, 77, 4.

budhnyâ, hidden :

budhnyâ, VII, 56, 14¹.

brîh :

barhayati, to crush, (226.)—upa-bârbrîhat, she stretched out (dôb, her arm), V, 61, 5¹.—Cf. vrih.

brîhât, great, mighty :

brîhât, V, 55, 1 ; 2 ; 57, 8 ; 58, 8 ; brîhât váyab, VII, 58, 3 ; brîhât gshîte, VIII, 20, 6 ; brîhât vademâ, we shall magnify, II, 33, 15 ; brîhântam krátum, I, 2, 8 ; âpab brîhatîb, X, 121, 7¹ ; 9 ; brîhatâb divâb, V, 59, 7 ; 87, 3.

brîhat-giri, dwelling on mighty mountains :

brîhat-girayab, V, 57, 8¹ ; 58, 8.

brîhât-diva, coming from the great heaven :

brîhât-divaib, I, 167, 2 ; (V, 57, 8¹.)

brîhat-vayas, of great strength :

brîhat-vayasab (the Maruts), (I, 37, 9¹.)

Brîhaspâti, a variety of Agni :

(I, 38, 13¹.)

bradhnâ, bright :

bradhnâm, I, 6, 1¹.

Brâhmanaspâti, lord of prayer :

N. of Agni, (I, 38, 13¹) ; (246, note^a.)

brahmanyât, prayerful :

brahmanyântab, II, 34, 11.

brahmân, m. priest :

brahmâ kâb, VIII, 7, 20 ; brahmânam, X, 77, 1¹.

brâhman, n., prayer, hymn :

brâhma, I, 37, 4 ; 88, 4 ; 165, 11 ; II, 34, 7¹ ; brâhmâni, I, 165, 2 ; 4¹ ; 14 ; II, 34, 6 ; brâhmanâb pátim, lord of prayer, I, 38, 13¹.

brû, to speak :

bruve (pûmân fti), he is called, V, 61, 8.—âdhi brûhi nab, bless

us, I, 114, 10.—ûpa bruvate, they implore, I, 134, 2.—prâ bruvâte, they proclaim, V, 87, 2.—sâm bruvate, they talk together, I, 37, 13.

bhaksh, to enjoy :

bhakshiyâ (c. Gen.), V, 57, 7.

bhâga, luck :

bhâgam, luck, I, 134, 5 ; bhâge â, in wealth, II, 34, 8.

bhag, to obtain :

bhégire, V, 57, 5.—â bhaga nab, appoint us to, give us, help us to (Loc.), I, 43, 8 ; VII, 46, 4¹ ; â bhagatana, VII, 56, 21.—Desider., bhiksh, (220.)

bhadrá, good, auspicious :

bhadrá, good things, I, 166, 9¹ ; 10 ; (sauravasâni), VI, 74, 2 ; (vástrâ), beautiful, I, 134, 4 ; bhadrá (râtîb), I, 168, 7¹ ; (sumatîb), I, 114, 9.

bhâdra-gâni, having an excellent

mother :

bhâdra-gânayab, V, 61, 4¹.

bhan, to shout :

(V, 52, 12¹.)

bhandât-ishî, in jubilant throng :

bhandât-ishraye, V, 87, 1.

bharatâ, Bharata (the warrior) :

bharatâya, V, 54, 14¹.

bharas, burden (?) :

(V, 54, 10¹.)

bhârtî, husband :

bhârtâ-iva, V, 58, 7.

bhâ, to shine :

vi-bhâti, he shines forth, X, 121, 6.

bhâgâ, share :

bhâgâm, VII, 56, 14.

bhânú, splendour :

bhânúb divâb, V, 52, 6 ; bhânúm, V, 59, 1 ; bhânú-bhiîb, I, 87, 6 ; VIII, 7, 8 ; 36.

bhâm, to be in wrath :

bhâmitâb, I, 114, 8¹.

bhâma, vigour :

bhâmena, I, 165, 8.

bhâmîn :

bhâmînaâ, VS. for bhâmitâb, (I, 114, 8¹.)

bhâs, light :

bhâsâ, X, 77, 5.

bhiksh, to beg, to implore :

(220) ; bhikshe, I, 171, 1 ; bhiksheta, VIII, 7, 15.

bhind, to cut asunder :
 bhindanti, V, 52, 9.—bibhidub ví,
 they clove asunder, I, 85, 10.
 bhiyás, fear :
 bhiyásā, V, 59, 2; bhiyáse, (I, 87,
 6¹).
 bhishág, physician :
 bhishák-tamam bhishágām, the
 best of all physicians, II, 33, 4.
 bhī, to fear :
 bhayate, I, 166, 5; VII, 58, 2;
 bhayante, I, 85, 8; 166, 4;
 bibhāya, V, 60, 3; bibhyúshe,
 I, 39, 7; ábibhayanta, I, 39, 6.
 —See ábibhīvas, bhiyás.
 bhī, f., fear :
 bhiyā, I, 37, 8; 171, 4; V, 57,
 3^a; 60, 2; VIII, 7, 26.
 bhīmá, terrible :
 bhīmāb, II, 34, 1; bhīmāsab, VII,
 58, 2; mrigām ná bhīmám, II,
 33, 11^a.
 bhīma-yú, fearful :
 bhīma-yúb, V, 56, 3.
 bhīmá-sandriś, terrible to behold :
 bhīmá-sandriśab, V, 56, 2.
 bhumán, the feeding cloud :
 bhumā, (I, 64, 3¹).
 bhuṅg, to enjoy :
 bhuṅgé (ishé), VIII, 20, 8; ékam
 it bhuṅgé, of use, VIII, 20, 13.
 bhurván, whirl :
 bhurváni (apām), I, 134, 5 (bis);
 p. cxxii.
 bhúvana, being, world :
 víśvā bhúvanāni, bhúvanā, I, 64,
 3; 85, 8; 166, 4; II, 34, 4;
 víśvasmāt bhúvanāt, I, 134, 5.—
 asyá bhúvanasya bhūreḥ, of this
 wide world, II, 33, 9; asyá víś-
 vasya bhúvanasya rāgā (Vāta),
 X, 168, 2; bhúvanasya gārbhaḥ,
 X, 168, 4¹.
 bhū, to be . . . :
 bhúvaḥ, I, 86, 5¹; nab babhútha,
 thou hast come to be with us,
 I, 165, 5; p. xv; babhúvān,
 having grown, I, 165, 8; śam
 nab bhútam, VI, 74, 1; (190 seq.;
 435); bhūvan sákām, they be-
 came full of, VI, 66, 2; bodhi,
 II, 33, 15².—mā ápa bhútana,
 do not keep away, VII, 59, 10.
 —mā ápi bhūma tásyam, let us
 not fall under its power, VII,
 57, 4¹.—kútab ā babhúva,

whence did he spring, X, 168,
 3.—pári babhúva, he embraces,
 X, 121, 10.—vi-bhvāne, (48).—
 bhávya and bhútá, what is and
 what will be, (p. 4); bhútásya
 pátiḥ, the lord of all that is, X,
 121, 1.
 bhūman, earth :
 bhūma, I, 85, 5^a; 88, 2.
 bhūmi, earth :
 bhūmi and dyú, (50); bhūmib, I,
 87, 3; V, 59, 2; VIII, 20, 5;
 bhūmim, I, 64, 5; V, 59, 4;
 bhūmyām, I, 39, 4; bhūmy
 ā dade, p. cxvii.
 bhūri, much :
 bhūri, bhūríni, I, 165, 7; 166, 10;
 bhūri śakra, you have valued,
 VII, 56, 23¹; bhūreḥ, II, 33, 9;
 12.
 bhūri-pāni :
 (I, 38, 11¹).
 bhūsh, to honour :
 ā-bhūshantiḥ, who honour, I, 43,
 9; cf. ā-bhūshénya.
 bhrī, to bear, to carry :
 bibhritha, I, 39, 10; VIII, 20, 26;
 bíbhratí, V, 56, 8; háste bí-
 bhrat, I, 114, 5; bibharshi, II,
 33, 10; bharata, VII, 46, 1;
 bharate, I, 64, 13; bháradhyai,
 VI, 66, 3; gabhára, VII, 56, 4.
 —bíbhratab ūpa, bringing to
 (Acc.), I, 166, 2¹.—prá bhára-
 dhve, you are carried forth, V,
 59, 4; prá bhara, I, 64, 1; prá
 bhare, I offer, V, 59, 1; 60, 1^a;
 prá bharadhvam, VI, 66, 9; prá
 bharāmahe, I, 114, 1; prá-
 bhratab, hurled forth, I, 165, 4;
 (182); pp. xv : xxi.—prāti
 bharadhvam, bring forward,
 VIII, 20, 9.
 bhrími, quick, fresh :
 (II, 34, 1^a).—bhrímim, cloud,
 II, 34, 1^a; vagrant, VII, 56,
 20².
 bhesagá, medicine :
 bhesagám, V, 53, 14; VIII, 20,
 25¹; X, 186, 1; bhesagáb
 gálāshab, II, 33, 7; (I, 43, 4³);
 háste b.bhrat bhesagá, carry-
 ing in his hand medicines
 (Rudra), I, 114, 5; bhesagā,
 II, 33, 12; 13¹; VII, 46, 3;
 bhesagāni, VI, 74, 3; bhesa-

- gásya* (mārutasya), VIII, 20, 23;
bheshagébhiḥ, II, 33, 2; 4.
bhogá, liberal:
bhogán, V, 53, 16.
bhrág, to shine:
bhrágante, VII, 57, 3; *ábhraḡi*,
 V, 54, 6.—*vi bhrágante*, I, 85,
 4; VIII, 20, 11; *vi-bhrágante*
 (for *vi-bhrágante*), V, 61, 12¹.
bhrágat-rishri, with brilliant spears:
bhrágat-rishrayab, I, 64, 11; 87,
 1; 168, 4; II, 34, 5; V, 55, 1;
 X, 78, 7; *bhrágat-rishrim*, VI,
 66, 11.
bhrágat-ganman, flame-born:
bhrágat-ganmānab, VI, 66, 10.
bhrágas, splendour:
bhrágasā, X, 78, 2.
bhrātri, brother:
bhrātarab, I, 170, 2; V, 60, 5; *bhrā-*
tab, I, 170, 3; *bhrātā*, X, 186, 2.
bhrātri-tvá, brotherhood:
bhrātri-tvám, VIII, 20, 22¹.
bhrúmi:
bhrúmim for *bhrímim*, (298); (II,
 34, 1⁶).
manhánā, in magnificence:
 V, 61, 10.
makshú, quickly:
 I, 39, 7; (II, 34, 12¹); VI, 66, 5;
 VII, 56, 15; I, 2, 6; soon, I,
 64, 15.
makhá, adj., strong, brisk:
 (46 seq.); *makhāb*, I, 64, 11;
makhébhyab, champions, VI,
 66, 9.
makhá, sacrifice:
makhásya dāvane, for the offering
 of the sacrifice, VIII, 7, 27¹; I,
 134, 1; (47.)—*makháb*, sacri-
 ficer (?), I, 6, 8¹.
maghá, wealth:
maghāni, VII, 57, 6.
maghá-vat, mighty, lord:
maghá-vā, V, 61, 19; *magha-van*,
 I, 165, 9; *maghāvat-bhyab*, VII,
 58, 3; II, 33, 14; *maghāvat-su*,
 I, 64, 14; *maghónām*, VII, 58,
 6; VIII, 94, 1.—*maghá-vā*, Ma-
 ghavat (Indra), I, 171, 3.
magmán, strength:
magmánā, I, 64, 3.
matí, thought; prayer:
iyám matíb, this prayer, V, 57, 1;
imāb matíb, I, 114, 1¹; *matáyab*,
 I, 165, 4¹; V, 87, 1; *matinām*,
 prayers, I, 86, 2¹.—*yáthā matím*,
 after their own mind, I, 6, 6²;
sváyā matyā, their own will, V,
 58, 5.—*matí*, thoughts, I, 165, 1.
mad, pron. . . .:
 me, they are mine, I, 165, 4; *ahám*,
 I, 171, 1; 4.
mad, to rejoice:
mādanti (c. Loc.), I, 85, 1; V, 61,
 14; (c. Acc.), V, 52, 1²; *mádatha*,
 V, 54, 10; VIII, 7, 20; *mádanti*,
 V, 56, 3¹; *mádantab*, VII, 59, 7;
svadháya mádantam, (34); *mat-*
sati, may he rejoice in (Gen.),
 VIII, 94, 6; *mādayādhvai*, I,
 37, 14; VII, 59, 6; *mādaya-*
dhvam (c. Gen.), I, 85, 6; *mā-*
dayādhvai, I, 167, 1.—*prā ma-*
danti, thy delight, VII, 57, 1¹.—
 See *mand*.
māda, enjoying, rapture, Rausch,
 feast:
mádab, I, 86, 4; *máde*, I, 85,
 10; V, 53, 3; VIII, 7, 12;
mádeshu, I, 134, 5; *mádāya*, I,
 37, 15; II, 34, 5.—(135.)
mada-kyút, enrapturing:
mada-kyútam, I, 85, 7²; (134 seqq.);
 VIII, 7, 13.
madirá, delightful:
madirám (*mádhū*), V, 61, 11; *madi-*
rásya, the sweet juice, I, 166, 7.
mádhū, sweet juice, mead:
mádhū, I, 19, 9; 166, 2; V, 61,
 11; VIII, 7, 10³; *mádhvab*
ándhasab, sweet food, I, 85, 6³;
mádhvab ándhasā, with the juice
 of sweetness, V, 54, 8³; for
mádhvab read *madhvád* (?), VII,
 57, 1¹; *mádhob*, II, 34, 5;
somyé mádhau, VII, 59, 6.
madhu-ád, eating honey, fond of
 honey:
madhu-ád (conjecture for *má-*
dhvab), VII, 57, 1¹.
mádhū-varṇa, honey-like:
mádhū-varṇam, I, 87, 2.
madhyamá, middle:
madhyamé, in the middle (heaven),
 V, 60, 6.
man, to think, to perceive:
manmahe, V, 52, 3; *mānyase*, V,
 56, 2; *manvánáb*, V, 52, 15;
māmsase, (I, 6, 7³); *mānyamā-*
nāb pársānāsab, thinking them-

- selves valleys, VIII, 7, 34.—*āti*
manyase, thou despisest, I, 170,
3.—*pari-mámsate*, he will de-
spise, VII, 59, 3.
manab-gd, swift as thought :
manab-gúvab, I, 85, 4.
mánas, mind :
mánab, I, 170, 3; *mánab krinuté*,
she is mindful, V, 61, 7; *mánab*
ánu gānatī, I, 134, 1; *mánāmsi*,
VII, 56, 8; *mánasā*, X, 121, 6;
I, 64, 1; 171, 2¹ (bis); *mahā*
mánasā, with strong desire, I,
165, 2¹.
manā, wrath :
asyaī manāyai, II, 33, 5.
manishā, thought; prayer :
manishāb, VI, 66, 11; *manishām*,
X, 77, 8; *manishā*, in my heart,
I, 165, 10.—(I, 64, 12⁶).
manishīn, wise :
manishīnab, V, 57, 2.
mānu, man :
mānave, I, 165, 8; 166, 13.—
Mānub pitā, father Manu, I,
114, 2; II, 33, 13¹.
mānus, man :
mānushab (*yōshā*), I, 167, 3.
māntṛa, song :
gyēshṭhab māntṛab, the oldest
song (Indra), (439).
mand, to please, to make rejoice :
(VII, 57, 1¹); *māndantu*, I, 134, 2;
āmandat, I, 165, 11; *mamandū-*
shī, joyful, V, 61, 9; *mandadhve*,
you rejoice, VIII, 7, 14.—*ūt*
mamanda, he has gladdened, II,
33, 6.—See *mad*.
mandāt-vīra, delighting heroes :
(I, 114, 1⁸).
mandasānā, pleased :
mandasānāb, V, 60, 7; *mandasānāb*,
V, 60, 8.
mandīn, delightful :
mandīnab, I, 134, 2.
mandū, happy-making :
mandū, I, 6, 7.
mandrā, sweet-toned :
mandrāb, I, 166, 11.
manman, thought; prayer :
mánma, *bráhma*, *gírab*, and *ukthā*,
(I, 165, 4¹); *mánma*, VII, 57,
2; *mánmāni*, I, 165, 13; *mánma-*
bhiś, VIII, 7, 15; 19; X, 78, 1.
manyú, courage, spirit, anger, wrath :
(I, 37, 4²); (104); *manyáve*, I, 37,
7; *manyú-bhiś*, fiercely, VII,
56, 22.
mayab-bhū, beneficent, delightful :
mayab-bhúvab, I, 166, 3; V, 58, 2;
mayab-bhuvaś, VIII, 20, 24;
mayab-bhū, II, 33, 13; X, 186, 1.
máyas, delight :
máyab nab bhūta, be our delight,
VIII, 20, 24; *nab máyab kridhi*,
I, 114, 2.
mar, distantly connected with ar :
(65.)
Marút . . . :
etymology, p. xxiv seq.; *Marut*
= *Mars*, p. xxv; *marut*, *maruta*,
wind, p. xxiii; *marut*=*deva*,
p. xxiv.
marútvat, with the Maruts :
marútvate (*Vishṇu*), V, 87, 1;
rudrāb marútvān, I, 114, 11;
II, 33, 6.
marút-sakhi, the friend of the Maruts,
(*Agni*) :
marút-sakhā, (I, 38, 13¹).
mārta, mortal :
mártab, I, 64, 13; VIII, 20, 22;
mártam, V, 61, 15; *mártāsab*, I,
38, 4; *márteshu*, VI, 66, 1.
marta-bhógana, food of mortals :
marta-bhóganam, I, 114, 6.
mártya, mortal :
mártyab, I, 19, 2; 86, 7; II, 34,
9; V, 53, 15; VIII, 7, 15;
mártyam, V, 52, 4; *mártyasya*
(*mâyīnab*), I, 39, 2.
mártya-ishita, roused by men :
mártya-ishitab, I, 39, 8.
márya, manly youth :
maryāb, I, 6, 3¹; *máryāb*, I, 64, 2²;
V, 53, 3; 59, 3²; 5; 6; VII,
56, 1; 16; X, 77, 3; 78, 4;
máryāsab, V, 61, 4; X, 77, 2;
máryāb (*kshītnām*), X, 78, 1.
mah :
mamahe, he has magnified, I, 165,
13; *tāt nab mamahantām*, may
they grant us this, I, 114, 11.
máh, fem. *mahī*, great, mighty :
mahā mánasā, I, 165, 2¹; *mahé*,
I, 168, 1; V, 87, 1; VII, 7, 5;
mahāb, Abl., I, 6, 10; *mahāb*,
Gen., I, 19, 2; 3; 168, 6; V, 52,
7; 87, 8; X, 77, 6; *mahāb*, Acc.
pl., II, 34, 11; Nom. pl., II, 34,
12¹; *mahāb mahī*, the great
(mother) of the great, VI, 66,

- 3¹; mahāb mahīm su-stutīm, a great, great hymn of praise, II, 33, 8; mahīm īsham, II, 34, 8; mahāb īshab, VII, 59, 2; mahī, VII, 56, 4; II, 33, 14.
- mahā, great:
mahé vidāthe, V, 59, 2²; mahā-nām devānām, VIII, 94, 8.
- mahāt, great, mighty:
mahāntab, I, 166, 11; VIII, 20, 8; mahāntab, V, 55, 2; mahāntam utā arbhakām, our great or our small ones, I, 114, 7; mahānti mahatām, V, 59, 4; mahatīb apāb, VIII, 7, 22; mahatē rāwāya, I, 168, 9; mahatāb, V, 87, 4.
- mahān, might:
mahnā, I, 166, 11; V, 87, 2¹; VI, 66, 5; VIII, 20, 14.
- māhas, might:
(I, 86, 1¹); māhab, V, 52, 3; māhasā, V, 59, 6; māhāmsi, V, 60, 4; VII, 56, 14; māhab-bhīb, I, 165, 5²; V, 58, 5; VII, 58, 2; (I, 86, 6¹).—mahām, great, I, 6, 6.
- mahās, adv., quickly:
mahāb, (II, 34, 12²); V, 87, 7; X, 77, 8.
- mahā-grāmā, a great troop:
mahā-grāmāb, X, 78, 6.
- mahāmaha, mahāmahivrata:
(VI, 66, 3¹).
- māhi, great; adv., exceedingly:
māhi, n., II, 34, 14; V, 54, 1; I, 43, 7.—Adv., māhi vriddhāb, grown large, V, 60, 3; māhi tve-shāb, exceeding terrible, VIII, 20, 7; truly, I, 167, 10.
- mahi-tvā, greatness, might:
mahi-tvā, Instr., X, 121, 3; 4¹; V, 58, 2; VII, 58, 1; mahi-tvām, I, 87, 3; 166, 1.
- mahi-tvanā, greatness, might:
mahi-tvanā, Instr., I, 85, 7; 86, 9; mahi-tvanām, I, 166, 12¹; V, 54, 5; 55, 4.
- mahinā, greatness, might:
mahinā, X, 121, 8; V, 57, 4; 87, 2¹.—See mahimān.
- mahi-bhānu:
mahi-bhānavab for ahi-bhānavab(?), (I, 172, 1¹).
- mahimān, greatness:
mahimānam, I, 85, 2; mahimā, I, 167, 7; V, 87, 6; mahinā=mahimnā, (V, 87, 2¹).—See mahinā.
- mahishā, mighty:
mahishāsab, I, 64, 7.
- mahī, earth:
mahī, X, 77, 4.
- mahiḥ:
mahiḥyāte, she is magnified, V, 56, 9.
- mahomahī (compound?):
(VI, 66, 3¹).
- mā, not...:
I, 38, 5¹; mó, I, 38, 6; mó sú, VII, 59, 5; mā, with Optative, VII, 59, 12².
- mā, to measure; to fathom:
memire yōganāni, they measure many miles, X, 78, 7; mimihi (ślōkam), fashion, I, 38, 14.—vi mamire (antāriksham), they have measured, V, 55, 2; vi-mānab (antārikshe rāgasab), X, 121, 5².
- mā, to roar:
mimāti, I, 38, 8¹; mīmātu, V, 59, 8.
- mānḡishṭba, bright red:
(232.)
- mātri, mother:
mātā, VI, 66, 3¹; VIII, 94, 1; vatsām nā mātā, I, 38, 8; mātāram, V, 52, 16; pitāram utā mātāram, I, 114, 7; mātúb, I, 37, 9; apāb māttrib, (307.)
- māna, measure:
mānam, I, 39, 1¹.
- Māna:
mānāsab, the Mānas, I, 171, 5¹; (I, 165, 15¹).
- mānusha, adj., of men; m., man:
mānushā yugā, V, 52, 4.—mānushab, I, 37, 7; X, 77, 7; mānushāb, I, 38, 10; 39, 6.
- Māndāryā:
māndāryāsa, I, 165, 15¹; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; (183 seq.)
- Mānyā, the son of Māna (?):
mānyāsa, I, 165, 14¹; 15¹; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; (183 seq.; 203.)
- māyīn, deceitful; powerful:
māyīnab (mātyasya), I, 39, 2.—māyīnab (pl.), powerful, I, 64, 7; māyīnam, V, 58, 2.
- māruta, of the Maruts:
mārutam (jārdhab), I, 37, 1; 5; V, 52, 8; p. xxv; (ganām), I, 38, 15; 64, 12; V, 52, 13; 14; 53, 10; 58, 1; VIII, 94, 12; (rātham), V, 56, 8; mārutam

- (*nāma*), VI, 66, 5; VII, 57, 1¹;
mārutab (*ganāb*), V, 61, 13;
mārutāya (*sārdhāya*), V, 54, 1;
 VIII, 20, 9; *mārutasya dhām-*
nab, I, 87, 6.—*mārutāya*, to the
 host of the Maruts, VI, 66, 9.—
mārutasya bhesagāya, of the
 Marut-medicine, VIII, 20, 23.—
mārutam rudrāya sūnūm, the
 Marutlike son of Rudra, VI, 66,
 11¹; *māruta*, epithet of Vishnu,
 (134.)
mārāṭikā, consolation :
mārāṭikēbbhiḥ, VIII, 7, 30.
mārtāṇḍā, addled egg :
 (251.)
mās, month :
māt-bhiḥ, (I, 6, 3²)
māhina, mighty :
māhinab, I, 165, 3; p. xiv.—*mā-*
hinā = *mahimā*, greatness? (309.)
migh, see *ni-mēghamāna*.
mitrā, friend :
mitrām nā, I, 38, 13²; V, 52, 14;
mitrāya, II, 34, 4; *mitrānām*, I,
 170, 5.
Mitrā :
Aryaman, Mitra, Varuna, (V, 54,
 8¹); *mitrāb*, VII, 56, 25; VIII,
 94, 5; I, 43, 3; 114, 11; *mitra*,
 VII, 59, 1; *mitrām*, I, 2, 7.
mitra-pati, lord of friends :
mitrānām mitra-pate, I, 170, 5.
mitrāyu, looking for friends :
mitrāyāvab, *mitrāyuvab*, (II, 34,
 4¹)
Mitrāvaruna, du., *Mitra and Varuna* :
mitrāvarunau, I, 167, 8¹; **nā*, I, 2,
 9; *mitrāvarunau*, I, 2, 8.
mithās, each other :
mithāb, VII, 56, 2; 3; VIII, 20,
 21.
mithasprīdhya, clashing against each
 other :
mithasprīdhya-iva, I, 166, 9¹.
mimiksh, to sprinkle, to shower :
 (185; 187 seq.).—See *myaksh*.
mimikshā :
mimikshāb sōmab, (188.)
mimikshū :
mimikshūm indram, (188.)
mirā, from *mis* :
 (185.)
mish :
ni-mishatāb, the twinkling (world),
 X, 121, 3¹.
mih :
mimikshvā, sprinkle, (188.)
mih, rain, mist :
mīham, I, 38, 7; VIII, 7, 4; *mihé*,
 I, 64, 6.—*mihāb nāpātam*, rain,
 the offspring of the cloud, I, 37,
 11¹.
mī, to dim :
prā minanti, V, 59, 5.
mī/būb-tama, most liberal :
mī/būb-tamāya (*rudrāya*), I, 43, 1.
mī/būshmat, bountiful :
mī/būshmatī-iva, like a bountiful
 lady, V, 56, 3¹.
mīdbvās, bounteous :
mīdbvab (*rudra*), I, 114, 3; II, 33,
 14; *mī/būshab* (*rudrāya*), VI,
 66, 3; *tān rudrāya mī/būshab*,
 the bounteous sons of Rudra,
 VII, 58, 5¹; *mī/būshab* (*marū-*
tab), VIII, 20, 18²; *mī/būshām*,
 VIII, 20, 3¹; *mī/būshī*, V, 56, 9.
muṭ, to deliver :
muṭātātha, II, 34, 15; *muṭātām*,
 VI, 74, 3; *mukshīya*, VII, 59,
 12².—*prā nab muṭkatam*, VI,
 74, 4.—*prāti āmugdhvam*, you
 have clothed yourselves, V, 55,
 6; *prāti muṭishra pāṇ*, may
 he catch the snares, VII, 59, 8.
 —*vī muṭadhvam*, unharness, I,
 171, 1.—(270.)
mud, to rejoice :
mudé, V, 53, 5.
mūni, maniac :
mūniḥ-iva, VII, 56, 8¹.
mush, to strip :
mōshatha, V, 54, 6¹.
mushri-hān, boxer :
mushri-hā, V, 58, 4; VIII, 20, 20.
mūhus, suddenly :
mūhub, V, 54, 3.
mūrdhān, summit :
mūrdhā nābhā, I, 43, 9¹.
mrigā :
mrigāb iva hastīnab, like wild ele-
 phants, I, 64, 7²; *mrigāb nā*
bhīmāb, terrible like wild beasts,
 II, 34, 1²; *mrigām nā bhīmām*,
 like a terrible wild beast (the
 lion), II, 33, 11².—*mrigāb*, deer,
 I, 38, 5.
mriganyū, hunter :
mriganyāvab, (V, 55, 1¹)
mrig, to clear off :
ūt mrige, *nī mrige*, V, 52, 17.

mrid, to be gracious :

mriḷayantu nab, I, 171, 3; *mriḷāta nab*, I, 171, 4; V, 55, 9; 57, 8; 58, 8; *mriḷantu*, VII, 56, 17; *mriḷā* (*nab*), I, 114, 2; 10; II, 33, 11; *mriḷa*, I, 114, 6; II, 33, 14; *mriḷatam*, VI, 74, 4.

mriḷayāt-tama, most gracious :

mriḷayāt-tamā (*su-matīb*), I, 114, 9.

mriḷayāku, softly stroking :

mriḷayākub (*hāstab*), II, 33, 7.

mriṭyū, death :

mriṭyūb, X, 121, 2; *mriṭyōb*, VII, 59, 12.

mridh, to fail :

mardhanti, I, 166, 2; *mārdhati*, VII, 59, 4.

médha, animal sacrifice :

(I, 88, 3¹; I, 43, 4¹).

medhā-pati, the lord of animal sacrifices :

medhā-patim, I, 43, 4¹.

medhas :

medhās and *vedhās*, (VIII, 20, 17¹).

medhā, wisdom :

medhā, I, 165, 14¹; *medhām*, II, 34, 7².—*medhāb*, minds, I, 88, 3¹.

medhā-pati :

(I, 43, 4¹).

meshā, ram :

meshāya meshyē, to ram and ewe, I, 43, 6.

mō, see *mā*.

myaksh, to cling :

(184 seqq.) : *mimyaksha* (with Loc.), I, 167, 3; *mimikshub*, I, 167, 4.—*sām mimikshub*, I, 165, 1²; p. xiii; V, 58, 5; *sām mimikshire*, they were united with, they obtained, I, 87, 6².

mraکش, to pound to pieces :

nī mimrikshub, I, 64, 4².

mraکشa-kṛtvan :

(I, 64, 4²).

yaksh, jagōn, to hunt :

(V, 55, 1¹).

yaksha, the Yakshas :

(V, 55, 1¹; VII, 56, 16¹).

yaksha-drīś, shining like Yakshas :

yaksha-drīśab, VII, 56, 16¹.

yag, to sacrifice :

yāgāma, V, 60, 6; *yāgāmahe*, VII, 59, 12; *yāgadhva* for *yāgadhvam*,

p. cxviii; *yāgamānāya*, V, 60, 7; *yāgamānasya*, VII, 57, 2; *īgānāb*, VII, 59, 2.—*ā-yegē* he acquired by sacrifices, I, 114, 2¹.

yagatā, worshipful :

yagatām, read *yagata*, II, 33, 10¹.

yāgatra, worshipful :

yagatrāb, V, 55, 10; 58, 4; VII, 57, 1; 4; 5.

yāgus :

from *yag*, (66.)

yagñā, sacrifice :

yagñām, I, 170, 4; X, 121, 8; II, 34, 12² (*vah*); V, 52, 4; 5; 10; 87, 9; VII, 59, 11; VIII, 20, 2; *havishmantab yagñāb*, X, 77, 1; *visvá-psub yagñāb*, X, 77, 4; *ut-rīkī yagñē*, X, 77, 7; *yagñā-yagñā*, to every sacrifice, I, 168, 1¹; *yagñālb*, I, 86, 2; X, 78, 1; *yagñēbhib*, I, 166, 14; *yagñēshu*, VII, 57, 1; X, 77, 8.

yagñā-vāhas, carrying off the sacrifices, worshipped, propitiated :

yagñā-vāhasab, I, 86, 2¹; (40); (II, 34, 12²).

yagñā-sādḥ, fulfilling our sacrifice :

yagñā-sādham (*rudrām*), I, 114, 4.

yagñīya, to be worshipped, worshipful :

yagñīyam nāma, I, 6, 4; *yagñīyāni nāmāni*, I, 87, 5²; (167); *yagñīyāb*, V, 52, 1; *yagñīyāb*, V, 87, 9; *yagñīyāsab*, V, 61, 16; *yagñēshu yagñīyāsab*, X, 77, 8; *yagñīyebhib*, V, 52, 5.

yāgyu = *prayagyū* (?) :

yāgyave, (V, 54, 1²).

yāgvan, sacrificing :

(V, 54, 1²); (66.)

yat, to strive :

yetire, I, 85, 8; V, 59, 2; VIII, 20, 12; X, 77, 2.—*ādhi yetire*, they fastened, I, 64, 4.—*sām yatantām*, may they come striving together, V, 59, 8.

yatā-sruk, holding ladles (full of libations) :

yatā-srukab, II, 34, 11.

yāt-kāma, which we desire :

yāt-kāmāb, X, 121, 10; (4.)

yātra :

yātra, wherever, I, 166, 6; V, 55, 7; *yātra ādhi*, over whom, X, 121, 6; where, V, 61, 14; when, VIII, 20, 6.

yáthâ and yathâ, as, like:

yáthâ purâ, as of yore, I, 39, 7;
yáthâ, like, V, 54, 8; 13; 61,
10; VII, 57, 3; yathâ, V, 53, 7;
54, 4; 87, 7.—yáthâ matim, after
their own mind, I, 6, 6²; te yáthâ
mánab, what thy mind was, I,
170, 3; yáthâ kit mánase, hridâ,
V, 56, 2; yáthâ vidâ, you know,
V, 55, 2; yáthâ gushânta, VII,
56, 20; yáthâ vârantî, VIII, 20,
17.—yáthâ, so that, V, 59, 7;
61, 4; I, 43, 2 (tris); 3 (tris);
114, 1; II, 33, 15.

yathâ-varâm, wherever he listeth:
X, 168, 4.

yâd, rel. pron. . . .:

yâsya, X, 121, 2¹; 4; (p. 4.)—yât ha
vâb bâlam, with such strength
as yours, I, 37, 12; yât ha vâb
purâ, as it was with you for-
merly, VIII, 7, 21; yât ádbhu-
tam, what strange thing, I, 170,
1.—yêna, that, I, 166, 14; yâs-
min, where, I, 168, 6.

yâd, adv., when; that . . .:

yât-tâtâb, X, 121, 7; yât sim, I,
37, 6; 9; yât ha, I, 37, 13; VIII,
7, 11; ádha yât, now that, I,
167, 2; yât ângâ, VIII, 7, 2;
yât-yât vâ, II, 34, 10; V, 60,
6; yât, if, I, 38, 4; yât, that, I,
165, 14; 166, 13; 14; 167, 7;
VII, 56, 4; 10.

yadâ, when:

V, 87, 4.

yâdi:

when, I, 168, 8; if, VII, 56, 15.

Yâdu:

yâdum, VIII, 7, 18.

yam, to hold, to yield, to give:

ârma yakkbata, VII, 59, 1; yakkba,
I, 114, 10; yamsat asmâbhyam,
I, 114, 5; yakkbamânâb âyu-
dhaih, wielding weapons, VII, 56,
13.—yakkbata ádhi, grant, I, 85,
12.—ní yemiré, they bent down
before (Dat.), VIII, 7, 5; 34.—
prâ-yatâs, thrust forth, I, 166,
4.—ví yanta, extend, I, 85, 12;
ví yantana, V, 55, 9; ví yamub,
they stretched (their legs) apart,
V, 61, 3²; ví yematub, they went
straight to (Dat.), V, 61, 9.

yâma, rein:

yâmab, V, 61, 2.

yamá, twin:

yamâb-iva, V, 57, 4.

Yamá:

yamásya pathâ, I, 38, 5².

yamayishnu:

yamayishnavab, SV. for namayi-
shnavab, (VIII, 20, 1¹).

Yamúnâ:

yamúnâyâm, V, 52, 17; (V, 53, 9¹.)

yayí:

yayím, way, I, 87, 2¹.—yayíb, the
wanderer, V, 87, 5¹.—yayiyab
(sindhavab), running, X, 78, 7.

yáva, barley:

(I, 38, 5².)

yávase, pasture grass, fodder:

yávase, I, 38, 5²; V, 53, 16.

yaví, or, yavyâ, young maid:

Instr., yavyâ, I, 167, 4¹.

yahví, river:

yahvíshu, VII, 56, 22.

yâ, to go . . .:

yâtave, I, 37, 10; VIII, 7, 8; 20,
6; yânti, they pass along, I,
37, 13¹; yâmi, I explore, V, 54,
15; súbham yâtâm, going in
triumph, V, 55, 1 to 9; (VIII,
20, 7²); yâthana súbham, V, 57,
2; (I, 87, 4²); yât âyâsub, when
they move about, VII, 57, 1.—
ânu yâtâ, go after, I, 38, 11.—
âva yâsat, will he bring down,
VI, 66, 5.—â yâ, to come . . .: â
yâtam úpa dravât, come quickly
hither, I, 2, 5; â yâsishra, may
it bring, ask for, I, 165, 15²;
166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; p.
xx; â nab yântu ákkba, I, 167,
2; â yâtam úpa nib-kritâm, I,
2, 6.—ní âyâtana, you went
down, V, 54, 5¹.—yâthana pári,
you go round, V, 55, 7.—prâ
yâta, come, I, 37, 14; prâ
yâtana, I, 165, 13; prâ yayub,
V, 53, 12; prâ âyâsishra, V, 58,
6.—ví yâthana, you pass through,
I, 39, 3¹; ví yâta, destroy, I, 86,
10¹; ví yâti, it passes between,
VI, 66, 7.

yâma, way, march:

yâmab, I, 166, 4; 172, 1¹; yâmam,
(I, 87, 2¹); VIII, 7, 2¹; 14;
yâmam yânti, VIII, 7, 4; yâmam
yêshibâb, VII, 56, 6; yâmena,
V, 53, 12; yâmâya, I, 37, 7;
39, 6; VIII, 7, 5; yâme, V, 54,

- 5; *yāmebhiḥ*, VIII, 7, 7; *yāme-shu*, I, 37, 8¹; 87, 3; V, 56, 7; VIII, 20, 5.—*yāmaḥ*, carriage, VI, 66, 7.
- yāman*, way, march:
yāma, II, 34, 10; *yāman*, I, 37, 3²; 85, 1; 166, 1; V, 52, 2; 58, 7; X, 77, 8; 78, 6; VII, 58, 2; *yāmani*, V, 53, 16; on moving, X, 77, 4; *yāmani* (*ishām*), on the search, I, 168, 5; *yāmanab*, out of your way, V, 57, 3²; *yāma-bhiḥ*, I, 37, 11; V, 56, 4.
- yāma-rṛta*, glorious on their march:
yāma-rṛtebhiḥ, V, 52, 15.
- yāma-hūti*, imploring invocation:
yāma-hūtishu, V, 61, 15.
- yu*, to keep off:
 (I, 87, 4³); *yuyōta*, VII, 56, 9; *ārāt yuyota*, VII, 58, 6; X, 77, 6; *yuyodhi*, II, 33, 3; *mā nab yuyothāb*, do not deprive us of (*Abl.*), II, 33, 1; *nā vai yoshat*, it will never depart, II, 33, 9.—*yuyotana āpa*, keep far, V, 87, 8¹.—*vī yuyota*, deprive (*Acc.*) of (*Instr.*), I, 39, 8¹.
- yugā*:
pāre yugé, in former years, I, 166, 13; *mānushā yugā*, generation of men, V, 52, 4.
- yukkb*, to fail:
yūkkbati, V, 54, 13².
- yug*, to join, to yoke, to harness:
yugānti, I, 6, 1; 2; *yugāte*, I, 87, 3; II, 34, 8; *yukkte*, I, 134, 3; *yugdhvam*, V, 56, 6 (*tris*); *yuyugré*, V, 53, 1; *āyugdhvam*, V, 55, 6; 57, 3; *yuktā*, VIII, 94, 1; *āyukta*, he started, V, 87, 4.—*yuganta*, they joined together (heaven and earth), VI, 66, 6¹; VIII, 20, 4²; *āyugdhvam* (*tāvishāb*), you have assumed, I, 64, 7²; *yugānāb*, in company with, I, 165, 5.—*ā āyugdhvam*, you have yoked, I, 85, 4; *ā-yuyugré*, V, 58, 7.—*ūpo ayugdhvam*, I, 39, 6; *ūpa yugmahe*, I, 165, 5.—*prā āyugdhvam*, I, 85, 5; *prā yugata*, V, 52, 8; (X, 77, 5¹).—*vi-yukta*, *sejunctus*, (187.)
- yugā*, together with (*Instr.*):
 I, 39, 4¹.
- yūgya*, companion:
yūgyebhiḥ, I, 165, 7¹.
- yudh*, to fight:
yūdhyataḥ (*tritāsya*), VIII, 7, 24.—*prā yuyudhub*, they have rushed forward to fight, V, 59, 5.
- yūdḥ*, weapon, sword:
yudhā-iva, I, 166, 1²; *yudhā*, V, 52, 6¹; *yutsū*, (*Grassmann*, VIII, 20, 20¹.)
- yūyudhi*, thirsting for fight:
yūyudhayab, I, 85, 8.
- yuvatī*, young woman:
yuvatīb, V, 61, 9; *yuvatīm*, I, 167, 6.
- yūvan*, youthful, youth:
yūvā (*ganāb*), I, 87, 4; V, 61, 13; *yūvā* (*rudrāb*), V, 60, 5; *yūvānam* (*Rudra*), II, 33, 11; *yūvānab*, I, 64, 3; 165, 2; 167, 6; V, 57, 8; 58, 8; *yuvānab*, V, 58, 3; *yūvānab*, VIII, 20, 17; 18; *yūnab*, VIII, 20, 19.
- yushmāt* . . .:
yushmākam, I, 39, 2; 4; *yushmāka*, VII, 59, 9; 10; p. cxviii.—*vaḥ* followed by *eshām*, V, 87, 2¹; *vaḥ*, for you or from you, VII, 56, 24¹.
- yushmā-ishita*, roused by you:
yushmā-ishitab, I, 39, 8¹.
- yushmā-ūta*, favoured by you:
yushmā-ūtab, VII, 58, 4 (*tris*).
- yushmāka*, your:
yushmākābhiḥ, I, 39, 8; *yushmākena*, I, 166, 14.
- yushmā-datta*, bestowed by you:
yushmā-dattasya, V, 54, 13.
- yēshṭba*:
yāmam yēshṭbāb, quickest to go, VII, 56, 6.
- yógana*:
yóganam, hymn, I, 88, 5¹.—*yóganam*, the daily course (of the sun), V, 54, 5.—*yóganāni*, many miles, X, 78, 7.
- yodhā*, soldier:
yodhāb, X, 78, 3.
- yoshānā*, woman:
yoshānā, V, 52, 14.
- yóshā*, woman, wife:
yóshā, I, 167, 3; *yóshāb*, X, 168, 2.
- yós*, wealth:
jām yób, health and wealth, (193 seq.); V, 53, 14²; *jām ka yób ka*, I, 114, 2; II, 33, 13.

- rawh**, to hurl :
ramháyanta, I, 85, 5¹.—*arahânáb*,
 racers, I, 134, 1.
- raksh**, to shield :
rakshata, I, 166, 8; *rákshata*, II,
 34, 9.
- rákshas**, fiend :
rákshab, I, 86, 9¹.
- raghu-pátvan**, swift-winged :
raghu-pátvánab, I, 85, 6¹.
- raghu-syád**, swiftly gliding along :
raghu-syádab, I, 64, 7; 85, 6.
- ragab-túr**, crossing the air :
ragab-túb, VI, 66, 7²; *ragab-túram*,
 chaser of the sky, I, 64, 12⁴.
- rágas**, air :
rágas, dyú, rokaná, (51; 55); *rágas*
 and *pārthiva*, (51 seq.; 55);
rágab, V, 53, 7; 59, 1; á *rágab*,
 through the air (?), (VII, 57,
 3¹); *rágasab* (pl.), X, 121, 5²;
maháb rágasab (Abl.), I, 6, 10;
 (Gen.), I, 19, 3¹; 168, 6.—*rágas*,
 water, rain; darkness, (I, 19,
 3¹); *rágamsi*, clouds, mists, I,
 166, 3; 4; V, 54, 4; *rágasab*
vi-sárgane, when the mist is
 scattered, V, 59, 3.
- ran**, to delight in (Loc.), to be
 pleased, to accept with pleasure
 (Acc.):
 (85; 86); *ránan*, V, 53, 16;
rananta, VII, 57, 5; *rananti*,
 I, 38, 2¹; *rañanātā*, you have
 rejoiced, I, 171, 1².
- rána**, fight :
ránāya, I, 168, 9.
- ránaya**, glorious :
rányāni, I, 85, 10.
- ranvá**, gay :
ranváb, VII, 59, 7.
- rátna**, treasure :
saptá ratná, VI, 74, 1.
- ratna-dhéya**, gift of treasures :
ratna-dhéyāni, X, 78, 8.
- rátha**, chariot :
ráthe, II, 34, 7; *ráthai*-*iva*, V,
 60, 1; *ráthānām ná aráb*, like
 the spokes of chariot-wheels,
 X, 78, 4.—*ráthe*, Indra's chariot,
 I, 6, 2.—*ráthāb*, the chariots of
 the Maruts, I, 38, 12; V, 55, 1
 to 9; (V, 87, 3¹; VI, 66, 2¹);
ráthān, V, 53, 5¹; *ráthebhi*, I,
 88, 1; V, 58, 6; *ráthai*, VIII,
 7, 17; (VIII, 20, 2¹); *ráthānām*,
 V, 52, 9; 53, 10; VIII, 94, 1;
rátheshu, I, 39, 6; 64, 9; 85,
 4; 5; 87, 2; 166, 9; II, 34,
 8; V, 53, 2; 4; 56, 6; 7; 57,
 6; 60, 2; 4; 61, 12; VIII, 20,
 12.—*rátham*, the chariot of the
 Maruts, I, 167, 5; V, 56, 8;
ráthēna, VIII, 20, 10; *ráthasya*,
 I, 88, 2; *ráthe*, V, 54, 11; 56,
 6; VIII, 7, 28; 20, 8¹.—
ráthasya (Vāta's), X, 168, 1.—
ráthēna (Vāyu's), I, 134, 1;
ráthe, I, 134, 3.
- ratha-túr**, hastening the chariots :
rathatúb-bhi, I, 88, 2; *ratha-*
túb, X, 77, 8.
- rátha-vat**, consisting of chariots :
rátha-vat rádhāb, V, 57, 7.
- Rátha-víti Dārbhya** :
 (359 seq.; 362); (V, 61, 5²);
rátha-vítāu, V, 61, 18; *rátha-*
vítib, V, 61, 19.
- rathiyánti** :
rathiyánti-iva, whirling like chariot-
 wheels, I, 166, 5².
- rathī**, charioteer :
rathīb-iva, V, 61, 17; *rathyāb ná*,
 V, 87, 8; *rathyāb*, VII, 56, 21.—
rathyāb (*didhishāvab*), lords of
 chariots, X, 78, 5.—*rathyāb*
syāma, let us carry off, V, 54, 13¹.
- rathiyánti**, see *rathiyánti*.
- rathe-rúbh**, brilliant on chariots :
rathe-rúbham, I, 37, 1; V, 56, 9.
- ráthya** :
ráthyab sáptib, (I, 85, 1¹).
- rad**, to scratch, to bite :
rádati, I, 166, 6⁴; *rad*, to cut, to
 give, (222 seq.).
- rada**, radana, tooth :
 (I, 166, 6⁴).
- radhrá**, wretched, a sluggard :
radhrám, II, 34, 15¹; VII, 56,
 20¹; *radhrá* and *bhrími*, (II,
 34, 1⁶).
- rándhra**, hollow :
ukshnáb rándhram, 'the hollow of
 the bull,' VIII, 7, 26¹.
- rap**, to whisper :
 (II, 33, 3¹).—*me arapat prátī*, V, 61, 9.
- rápas**, mischief :
rápab (*āturasya*), VIII, 20, 26¹;
rápasab, II, 33, 3¹; 7.
- rapát-úddhan**, whose udders are
 swelling :
rapádúddha-bhi, II, 34, 5.

rabh, to cling :

rarabhe, I, 168, 3.—rabh, to rush upon, â-rabh, to begin, (I, 166, 1¹.)

rabhab-dâ, giving strength :

rabhab-dâb (Indra), (I, 166, 1¹.)

râbhas, vigour :

râbhab, (I, 166, 1¹.)

rabhasâ, robust :

rabhasâya, I, 166, 1¹; rabhasâsab (aṅgâya), I, 166, 10²; rabhasâb, V, 54, 3.

râbhishîba, most vigorous :

râbhishîbâb, (I, 166, 1¹); V, 58, 5.

ram, to stop, to arrest :

riramâma, I, 165, 2; p. xx; mǎ ní riramat, V, 53, 9; ramayanti, VII, 56, 19.

ram, to delight :

ramâya, V, 52, 13; raranta (read rarâta?), V, 54, 13².

rambhñ, clinging :

rambhñî-iva, I, 168, 3¹.

rayî, wealth :

rayîm, I, 64, 15; 85, 12; V, 54, 14; VIII, 7, 13; rayî-bhîb, I, 64, 10; pátayab rayîñm, X, 121, 10; V, 55, 10.

ramî, ray :

ramîm, VIII, 7, 8; ramâyab, V, 55, 3; ramîshu, I, 134, 4 (bis); ramî-bhîb, I, 87, 6²; darts (lightnings), I, 19, 8; reins, X, 77, 5.

râsa, rain :

râsasya, I, 37, 5.

Rasâ, the distant river :

rasâ, V, 53, 9¹; rasâyâ, X, 121, 4².

râ, to give :

ârâsata, I, 166, 3; ârâdhvam, I, 166, 12; VII, 59, 4; râsya, I, 114, 6; 9; râsi, II, 33, 12; raré, VII, 59, 5; rarâta (for raranta?), V, 54, 13².

râg, to shine :

vî râgatha, V, 55, 2; VIII, 7, 1.

râgan, king :

râgâ gâgatab, X, 121, 3; vívasya bhúvanasya râgâ, X, 168, 2; rîshim vâ râgânâ vâ, V, 54, 7; râgânâ, V, 54, 14; 58, 4; râgânâb-iva, I, 85, 8; râgânâb ná kîtrâb, X, 78, 1.

râga-putra, having kings for her sons :

râga-putrâ, ep. of Aditi, (254; 260.)

râtâ-havis, who has offered libations :

râtâ-havishe, II, 34, 8.

râtâ-havya, generous worshipper :

râtâ-havyâya, V, 53, 12.

râtî, gift :

râtîb, I, 168, 7¹; (V, 52, 11¹);

râtîm, VII, 56, 18.

râdh, to give :

(I, 166, 6¹); râdhyasya (vâsvab), to be gained, X, 77, 6; mǎ rîradhat, let him not deliver, II, 33, 5.

râdhas, wealth :

râdhab, II, 34, 11; V, 52, 17

(bis); 53, 13; 57, 7.

râmî, dark night :

râmîb, II, 34, 12.

ri :

rîñti, it crunches, I, 166, 6¹.—rînaté, they go asunder, V, 58, 6².—rîñân apáb, they let the waters run, VIII, 7, 28.—ânu rîyate, it streams along, I, 85, 3.—ní rîñânti, they disperse, V, 56, 4.

rît :

prâ rîrîtré, they have risen above (Abl.), X, 77, 3.

ripú, enemy :

ripúb, II, 34, 9.

rîśâdas, devourer of foes :

rîśâdasab, I, 19, 5; 64, 5; X, 77, 3; 5; rîśâdasab, I, 39, 4; V, 60, 7¹; 61, 16; VII, 59, 9; rîśâdasam (várûnam), I, 2, 7.

rîsh, to suffer, to drop :

rîshyatha, V, 54, 4; ná rîshyati, V, 54, 7; mǎ rîrishab, do not hurt, I, 114, 7; 8; VII, 46, 3.

rîsh, hurt :

rîshâb, II, 34, 9; V, 52, 4.

rîshany, to fail :

mǎ rîshanyata, VIII, 20, 1.

rîh, to lick :

rîhaté, VIII, 20, 21¹.

rî, see ri.

rukma, gold, golden chains :

rukma, I, 88, 2; (II, 34, 2¹); ruk-mâb, I, 166, 10; V, 54, 11; VII, 56, 13; rukmâsab, VIII, 20, 11; rukmân, I, 64, 4¹; rukma, V, 52, 6¹; VII, 57, 3; rukmébhi, V, 56, 1; rukméshu, V, 53, 4.—rukma, weapons(?), (I, 85, 3²).—rukma-iva, like the golden disk (in heaven), V, 61, 12.

- rukma-vakshas**, gold-breasted :
rukma-vakshasab (the Maruts), (I, 64, 4¹); II, 34, 8; V, 55, 1; 57, 5; X, 78, 2; **rukma-vakshasab**, II, 34, 2¹; VIII, 20, 22.
- ruk**, to shine :
rókante, I, 6, 1³; **rókate**, I, 43, 5; **rókamânâb**, I, 165, 12.—**vī rukânâb**, far-shining, VII, 56, 13.
- rug**, to crash :
rugán, X, 168, 1.
- Rudrá** :
rudrâb, II, 34, 2; V, 60, 5; I, 43, 3; 114, 11; **rudra**, I, 114, 2 (bis); 3; 7; 8; II, 33, 1 seqq.; VII, 46, 2; 4; **rudrâm**, V, 52, 16; I, 43, 4²; 114, 4; II, 33, 5; **rudrâya**, I, 43, 1; 114, 1², 6; VII, 46, 1; **rudrâsya**, I, 64, 2; 12; 85, 1; V, 59, 8; VI, 66, 3; 11¹; VII, 56, 1; 58, 5¹; VIII, 20, 17; II, 33, 6; 8; 13; 14; **rudrât**, II, 33, 9; **Rudra** brings the medicines, (VIII, 20, 25¹); **Aditi** = **Rudra** (?), (I, 43, 2¹).—**Rudras**, **Vasus**, and **Adityas**, (VII, 56, 20³); **rudrâb**, I, 64, 3; 166, 2; II, 34, 13; V, 60, 2; **rudrâsab**, I, 85, 2; V, 87, 7; **rúdrâb**, I, 39, 7; VIII, 7, 12; **rudrâb**, II, 34, 9; V, 54, 4; 60, 6; **rúdrâsab**, I, 39, 4; **rudrâsab**, V, 57, 1; VIII, 20, 2.
- rudriya**, belonging to **Rudra** :
rudriyâsab, **Maruts**, I, 38, 7; V, 58, 7; **rudriyâb**, II, 34, 10; **rudriyâsab**, V, 57, 7; VII, 56, 22; **rudriyânâm**, VIII, 20, 3.—**rudriyam**, **Rudra's** healing, I, 43, 2.
- rúrat**, red :
rúrat pīppalam, the red apple, V, 54, 12¹.
- rûpá**, form :
rûpâni, V, 52, 11; **tveshâm rûpâm**, the blazing form, I, 114, 5; **ghoshâb jrinvire ná rûpâm**, X, 168, 4.
- reg**, to tremble, to shake :
regate (the earth), I, 37, 8; V, 60, 2; VI, 66, 9; VIII, 20, 5; **regamâne**, X, 121, 6; **regamânâb**, I, 171, 4; **regata**, V, 60, 3; **regatha**, V, 59, 4; **regati**, he stirs, I, 168, 5; **regayat**, he made tremble, V, 87, 5; **regayanti**, VII, 57, 1.—**prá regate**, I, 87, 3; **áreganta prá**, they reeled forward, I, 38, 10.
- renú**, dust :
renúm, X, 168, 1.
- retab-dhâ** :
(V, 58, 7¹).
- revát**, with wealth :
revát váyab, health and wealth, X, 77, 7.
- rai** or **râ**, to bark :
(227 seq.)
- raí**, wealth :
râyâb, V, 54, 13; VII, 56, 15; 57, 6²; **râyâb pōsham**, fulness of wealth, I, 166, 3; **râyé**, VIII, 7, 18; **râyab**, treasures, I, 167, 1; V, 54, 7.
- raivatâ**, rich :
raivatâsab, V, 60, 4.
- róka**, light :
ná rókab, VI, 66, 6²; (V, 61, 12¹).
- rokaná**, light :
rokanâ (diví), I, 6, 1²; (divâb), VIII, 94, 9¹; **rokanât** (divâb), I, 6, 9¹; (49 seqq.); V, 56, 1; **nâkasya ádhi rokané**, I, 19, 6; **rokanâ**, **sūrya**, **nâka**, (50); three **rokanas**, (50 seq.)
- ródasī**, du., heaven and earth :
ródasī, (X, 121, 6¹); I, 64, 9²; 85, 1; (I, 167, 3²); V, 53, 6; VI, 66, 6¹; 7; VII, 56, 17; 57, 1; 3¹; 58, 1; I, 134, 3; VIII, 7, 16; 20, 4; 94, 11; for **ródasī** read **rodasí**, V, 61, 12¹; **ródasyob**, I, 168, 1.
- Rodasī**, f., wife of the **Maruts**, the lightning :
rodasī, (I, 64, 9²; 167, 3²); I, 167, 5; V, 56, 8¹; VI, 66, 6; **rodasī** (for **ródasī** iti), V, 61, 12¹; **rodasīm** (for **rodasī**), I, 167, 4¹; **Rodasī** as **Eileithyia**, (I, 167, 7¹).
- ródhas**, enclosure, fence, bank of a river :
(I, 38, 11²).
- ródhasvat**, still locked up, unopened :
ródhasvatib (clouds), I, 38, 11².
- rohít**, ruddy horse :
rohitab, V, 56, 6.
- róhita**, red (horse) :
rohitab, I, 39, 6¹; VIII, 7, 28; **róhitâ**, V, 61, 9; I, 134, 3.
- raurava**, skin of a deer :
(232.)

laghu, light :

laghu and guru, light and heavy syllables, p. xcvi.

loká, space :

loká and uloká, p. lxxiv seqq.

vámsaga, bull :

(140.)

vákmya, praiseworthy :

vákmyab, I, 167, 7.

vaksh (uksh), to grow, to wax :

vavakshúb, I, 64, 3; vavakshire, II, 34, 4; úkshantam utá ukshitám, I, 114, 7; ukshámânáb, V, 57, 8; 58, 8; ukshitásab, I, 85, 2¹; sákám ukshitáb, V, 55, 3; sám-ukshitânám, V, 56, 5¹.—vívakshase (?), (I, 6, 7².)

vakshánā, flank :

vakshánābhyab diváb ā, I, 134, 4².

vakshánā, offering (?) :

vakshánā, Instr.? V, 52, 15¹.

vákshas, chest :

vákshab-su, I, 64, 4; 166, 10; V, 54, 11; VII, 56, 13.

vañkú, swift :

vañkúm (rudrám), I, 114, 4.

vat, to speak, to tell :

vo^téb, I, 165, 3; vo^tāma, I, 166, 1; vo^temahi, I, 167, 10; vo^tanta, V, 52, 16 (bis); vo^tatāt, V, 61, 18; kát vo^tēma, I, 43, 1; ukyate, I, 114, 6; ávo^tāma námab asmai, I, 114, 11.—ádhi vo^tata, bless us, VIII, 20, 26.—prá vivakmi, I praise, I, 167, 7; prá vo^tanta, they told me of (Acc.), V, 52, 16; prá vā^ti, VII, 58, 6.

vákas, word, speech :

idám vákab, V, 54, 15; I, 114, 6.

vakasy, to murmur :

vakasyate, (of Soma), (148.)

vágra, thunderbolt :

vágram, I, 85, 9; VIII, 7, 22.

vágra-bāhu, holding the thunder-

bolt in his arms :

vágra-bāhub, I, 165, 8; vagra-bāho, II, 33, 3.

vágra-hasta, with the thunderbolt in their hands :

vágra-hastab, VIII, 7, 32.

vágrin, wielder of the thunderbolt :

vágrīne (Indra), VIII, 7, 10.

vat :

api-vātáyantab, welcoming, I, 165, 13¹; p. xix; api-vat, to

go near, to attend, Caus. the same, or, to bring near, (VII, 46, 3¹); api-vat in Zend, (202; 438.)

vatsá, the young :

vatsám, I, 38, 8; vatsásab, calves, VII, 56, 16.

vad, to speak :

vadāmasi, I, 87, 5; brhát vadema, II, 33, 15; udyáte (opp. sas-yáte), V, 55, 8; vādān, they crack (the whips), I, 37, 3.—ák^tba vada, speak forth, I, 38, 13.—ā vadata, salute, I, 64, 9.—sám vadasva, speak with, (I, 165, 3²); I, 170, 5.

vadh, to strike, to slay :

vádhim, I, 165, 8¹; mǎ vadhib, I, 170, 2¹; VII, 46, 4; I, 114, 7; 8; mó vadhit, I, 38, 6; mǎ vadhishvana, V, 55, 9.

vádhar, weapon, bolt :

vádhab, II, 34, 9; VII, 56, 17.

vadha-snā, blow :

vadha-snaib, I, 165, 6¹.

van :

vanata, accept, VIII, 7, 9; see vat and su-apivāta.

vana, water :

(I, 64, 12².)

vāna, forest :

vānā, I, 64, 7; 88, 3¹; V, 57, 3; 60, 2; vānāni, V, 58, 6²; trees (lances), I, 171, 3¹.

vānaspāti, lord of the forest :

vānaspātiab, I, 166, 5; VIII, 20, 5; vānaspátin, I, 39, 5¹.

vanín, tree :

vanínab, I, 39, 3; VII, 56, 25.

vanín, worshipful :

vanínam, I, 64, 12².

vanushy :

vanushyatáb, of the plotter, VII, 56, 19.

vand, to worship :

vāndasva, I, 38, 15; V, 58, 2; VIII, 20, 14; 20; vāndamānam, greeting, II, 33, 12¹.

vanditr, worshipper :

vanditāram, II, 34, 15.

vāndya, excellent :

vāndyāsab, I, 168, 2.

vandhúra, seat (on a chariot) :

vandhúreshu, I, 64, 9.

vap, to pull :

abhí vapanta, they plucked, VII,

- 56, 3¹. — ní vapantu, may they mow down, II, 33, 11.
- vap, to sow :
vápanti marútab mīham, VIII, 7, 4.
- vápus, marvel :
vápúb, VI, 66, 1; vápushe, I, 64, 4².
- váptri, barber :
vápṭa-iva, (I, 166, 10⁴.)
- vayab-vrīdh, invigorating :
vayab-vrīdhāb, V, 54, 2.
- váyas, strength :
váyab, I, 37, 9¹; V, 55, 1; VII, 58, 3; VIII, 7, 35; 20, 13; revát váyab, X, 77, 7; vayasā, II, 33, 6.
- váyasvat, consisting of food :
ráyab váyasvatab, V, 54, 13¹.
- vayā, germ, sprout, offspring :
vayām, I, 165, 15²; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; pp. xx; xxi; (207 seq.)
- vayā-vat, with offspring :
vayāvantam ksháyam, (208.)
- vayúna, way :
vayúneshu, II, 34, 4².
- vará, suitor :
varāb-iva, V, 60, 4; (II, 34, 1¹; V, 59, 3².)
- vára, delight :
várāya, VII, 59, 2.
- váram, adv., or, it may be :
I, 88, 2.
- varāhá, boar :
vrīshabhiḥ varāhaib, (140); (I, 88, 5²).—divāb varāhām arushām, the red boar of the sky (Rudra), I, 114, 5.
- varāhu, wild boar :
varāhūn, I, 88, 5².
- varivasy, to open :
varivasyāntab, VII, 56, 17.
- Váruṇa :
Aryaman, Mitra, and Varuṇa, (V, 54, 8¹); várunab, VII, 56, 25; VIII, 94, 5; I, 43, 3; 114, 11; váruṇa, VII, 59, 1; várunasya páśāt, from the snare of Varuṇa, VI, 74, 4; várunam, I, 2, 7.
- várūtha, protection :
várūtham, II, 34, 14.
- vare-yú, wooing :
vare-yávab (máryāb), X, 78, 4¹.
- várkas, see samāná-varkas.
- várna, colour :
várnām, II, 34, 13.
- vartanī, road :
vartanīm, V, 61, 9.
- vartrī, one who stops :
ná vartā, VI, 66, 8.
- vartman, path :
vartmāni, I, 85, 3.
- várdhana, joy :
rudráya vārdhanam, I, 114, 6¹.
- várpas, design :
várpasā, I, 39, 1².
- várman-vat, mailed :
várman-vantab (yodhāb), X, 78, 3.
- várman, shield :
śarma várma kbardib, I, 114, 5.
- varshá, rain :
varshām, V, 58, 7.
- varshá-nirmig, clothed in rain :
varshá-nirnigab, V, 57, 4.
- várshishṭba, best, strongest :
várshishṭbayā, I, 88, 1²; várshishṭbab, I, 37, 6; vrīshan, várshīyas, várshishṭba, (144.)
- valkala, bark of trees :
(178.)
- vavrá, spring :
vavrásab, I, 168, 2².
- vas, to wish, to long for :
vajmi, II, 33, 13; uśmási, I, 86, 10; várāma, I, 165, 7²; urānti vām, I, 2, 4; yāthā váranti, as they will it, VIII, 20, 17; vāvaśānāb, the greedy, VII, 56, 10¹.
- vas, to clothe :
tāvishib with vas (I, 64, 7²).—ūrñāb vasata, they clothed themselves in wool, V, 52, 9².
- vas, Caus., to brighten :
vāsaya ushásab, I, 134, 3 (bis).
- vas, to dwell :
pravatsyam, prāvātsyam, p. xvii.
- vasavyā, wealth :
vasavyē, VII, 56, 21.
- Vásishṭba :
vásishṭbab, VII, 59, 3; the Vasishṭbas are kapardinab, (I, 114, 1².)
- Vasu :
vasavab, II, 34, 9; V, 55, 8; VII, 56, 17; 20² (gods); 59, 8; X, 77, 6; śréshtbab devānām vásub, the best Vasu among the gods (Rudra), I, 43, 5.
- vásu, kind :
vāsyaśā hridā, VIII, 20, 18; vá-syaśī, V, 61, 6; (360.)
- vásu, wealth, treasure :
vásu, V, 57, 3¹; VII, 59, 6; X, 77, 1; párvatatam vásu, (V, 52, 11¹); vāsuvab, X, 77, 6; vāsūni, V, 61,

- 16; I, 134, 4; *vásūnām*, I, 170, 5; *vāsyab*, greater wealth, V, 55, 10.
- vasu-pati*, lord of treasures:
vasu-pate vásūnām, I, 170, 5.
- vasu-yā*, wishing for wealth:
vasu-yā, I, 165, 1.
- vāstu*, brightening up:
kshapāb vāstushu, at the brightening up of the night, i. e. in the morning, (I, 64, 8²).
- vastrī*, the lighter up:
kshapām vastā (Indra), (I, 64, 8²).
- vāstra*, garment:
bhadrā vāstrā, I, 134, 4.—(234);
vastrānta, the end of a garment, (I, 37, 6¹).
- vāsyas*, see *vāsu*.
- vah*, to draw, to carry, to drive:
vahati, I, 39, 6; VIII, 7, 28; *vāhate*, I, 167, 7; *vāhante*, V, 58, 1; 61, 11; *vāhadhve*, V, 60, 7; *vābave*, V, 56, 6 (bis); I, 134, 3 (bis).—*vāhadhve*, you bring, V, 53, 13; *śrīyam vahante*, VIII, 20, 7².—*yagñām ūhire*, they carried on the sacrifice, II, 34, 12²; (40); (V, 52, 15¹).—*vahatab ākṛba*, they carry hither, I, 165, 4.—*ā vahantu*, I, 85, 6; 134, 1; *ā vahanti*, VIII, 7, 35; *ā vahata*, VIII, 20, 23.—*parā vaha*, carry away, V, 61, 17.—*prā vāhadhve*, you come, X, 77, 6.
- vāhishṭba*, strongest:
vāhishṭbā, V, 56, 6; I, 134, 3.
- vāhni*:
 (37 seqq.)—*vāhni-bhiḥ*, with the swift Maruts, I, 6, 5¹; (37, 41, 43 seq.)—*vāhni* (for Pada *vāhniḥ*), the two horses, VIII, 94, 1¹; (39.)—*vāhni*, bright, luminous, (38 seq.); *vāhni-tama*, brightest, (38); ep. of Soma, (40); ep. of the Asvins and R̥bhus, (43); m., fire, light, Agni, (37 seq.); minister, priest, (38, 39, 40-43)—*vāhni*, fem.? (39 seq.)
- vā*, or . . .:
utā vā, I, 86, 3; V, 60, 6; *vā*, either (the second *vā* being left out), I, 86, 8.—*vā*, even, V, 52, 14.
- vā*, to blow:
ā vātu bheshaḡām, may he waft medicine, X, 186, 1.—*pra-vā*, *anu-vā*, (X, 77, 5²).
- vā*:
ā vivāse, I invite, VI, 66, 11; VII, 58, 5; *ā vivāseyam*, may I gain, II, 33, 6.
- vāghāt*, suppliant:
vāghātāb, I, 88, 6.
- vāṭ*, voice:
imām vāṭam, V, 54, 1; *vāṭā*, X, 77, 1.—*vāṭ*, *Vāṭ* (the voice of the thunder), I, 167, 3²; *vāṭam* (abhrīyām), I, 168, 8.
- vāga*, booty, wealth:
 (I, 2, 5¹); *vāgam*, I, 64, 13; VII, 56, 23; *vāge*, I, 43, 8; *vāgāb*, I, 167, 1¹; *vāgebhiḥ*, VII, 57, 5; (I, 2, 5¹).—*vāge*, fight, I, 85, 5.—*ārvantam vāgam*, a horse, his strength, i. e. a strong horse, V, 54, 14².
- vāga-peṣas*, glorious by booty:
vāga-peṣasam, II, 34, 6.
- vāga-yāt*, racing:
vāgayāt-bhiḥ, racing, V, 60, 1.—*vāgayāntāb*, (I, 167, 1¹).
- vāga-sāti*:
vāga-sātau, in battle, VI, 66, 8.—*vāga-sātibhiḥ*, with riches and booty, VIII, 20, 16.
- vāgin*, powerful; strong horse:
vāginam, I, 64, 6²; *vāginab* (Gen.), I, 86, 3; VII, 56, 15; VIII, 20, 16; f. *vāgīni*, wealthy, strong, (I, 2, 5¹).—*vāgī arushāb*, red stallion, V, 56, 7; with *sāpti*, (I, 85, 1¹); *vāginam*, II, 34, 7; *vāgin*, the left horse, (I, 39, 6¹).
- vāgīni*, mare (?):
 (I, 2, 5¹); see *vāgin*.
- vāgīni-vat*, wealthy, liberal:
vāgebhiḥ vāgīni-vatī, (I, 2, 5¹).
- vāgīni-vasu*:
vāgīni-vasū, rich in booty, I, 2, 5¹.
- vānā*=*bāna*, arrow:
vānāb agyate, the arrow is shot, VIII, 20, 8¹.
- vānā*, voice:
vānām, I, 85, 10²; (II, 34, 1⁶).—*vānāb*, sacrificial music (?), (VIII, 20, 8¹).
- vāñi*, speech:
vāñi, I, 88, 6.
- vāta*, wind:
 (90); p. xxiii; *vātān*, I, 64, 5; V, 58, 7; *vātāsab nā sva-yūgab*,

- like self-harnessed winds, X, 78, 2; 3.—*vātasya*, the god Vāta, X, 168, 1; 2; *vātāya*, X, 168, 4; *vātaś*, X, 186, 1; *vāta*, X, 186, 2; 3.
- vāta*, going;
(90.)
- vāta-tvish*, blazing with the wind:
vāta-tvishab, V, 54, 3; 57, 4.
- vāta-svanas*, rushing like the wind:
vāta-svanasab, VII, 56, 3.
- vāmā*, wealth:
vāmām, V, 60, 7.
- vāyú*, wind:
p. xxiii; *vāyú-bhiś*, VIII, 7, 3; 4;
17.—*vāyúb*, the god Vāyu, I, 134, 3 (tris); *vāyo*, I, 2, 1 seqq.;
134, 1 seqq.
- vârkâryâ* (?) :
vârkâryâm devīm, sacred rite, I, 88, 4¹; (176; 178.)
- vârksha*, from the bark of trees:
(234.)
- vârya*, best:
vâryâni (bheshagâ), I, 114, 5.
- vâr*, to shout:
vâratī, V, 54, 2.
- vâśī*, dagger:
vâśībhiś, I, 37, 2¹; *vâśīb*, I, 88, 3¹;
vâśīshu, V, 53, 4; p. lxxxviii.
- vâśī-mat*, armed with daggers:
vâśī-mantaś, I, 87, 6; V, 57, 2.
- vâśrâ*, bull, f. cow:
vâśrâsab, *vâśrâb*, VIII, 7, 3; 7;
(I, 38, 8¹); *vâśrâb*, f., I, 37, 10; *vâśrâ-iva*, I, 38, 8¹; II, 34, 15.
- vī*, prep. . . .
vī, through, I, 39, 3; across, I, 168, 6; *vī vi-tarām*, II, 33, 2¹.
- vī*, m., bird:
vāyab arushāb, the red birds (of the Arvins), (26); *vāyab*, (I, 37, 9¹); *vāyab nā*, I, 85, 7; 87, 2; 88, 1; 166, 10; V, 59, 7; *vī-bhiś*, (the Maruts) with their birds, V, 53, 3².
- vī-akta*, resplendent:
vī-aktâb, VII, 56, 1.
- vī-ushri*, flashing forth (of the dawn), daybreak:
vī-ushrishu (*śarvatînām*), I, 171, 5; (*ushâsab*), II, 34, 12; (*pûrvâsu*), VIII, 20, 15; X, 77, 5; (I, 64, 8²).
- vi-rishri*, see *vy-rishri*.
- vī-oman*, sky:
vī-omani, V, 87, 9.
- vī-karshani*, active:
vī-karshanim, I, 64, 12.
- vī-ketas*, wise:
vi-ketasab, V, 54, 13.
- vi-gânivas*, sage:
vi-gânúshab, X, 77, 1.
- vinâ*, to tear:
vi vinâkanti, they tear asunder, I, 39, 5.
- vī-tata*, see *tan*.
- vi-tarām*, far away:
II, 33, 2¹.
- vithurâ*, broken:
vithurâ-iva, I, 87, 3¹; (I, 37, 8¹);
vithurâ-iva, like brittle things,
I, 168, 6¹.
- vithury*, to break:
vithuryâti, (the earth) breaks, X, 77, 4.
- vid*, to know (with Acc. and Gen.):
kâb veda, I, 170, 1; V, 53, 1; 61, 14; *vêda*, vidre, VII, 56, 2;
vidûb, I, 19, 3¹; 166, 7; V, 59, 7; *vidâ*, you take notice of (Gen.), I, 86, 8¹; *vittât*, V, 60, 6; *vedab*, remember, I, 43, 9;
vidmâ hī, we know quite well, I, 170, 3; VIII, 20, 3; *yâthâ vidâ*, V, 55, 2; *vidânâsab* (c. Gen.), X, 77, 6; *vididé*, I, 39, 4; *vidânab*, I, 165, 9; 10; *vidé hī*, VI, 66, 3.
- vidât-vasu*, giver of wealth:
vidât-vasum (Indra), I, 6, 6.
- vidâtha*, assembly, sacrificial assembly, sacrifice:
vidâtheshu, I, 64, 1²; 6; 85, 1; 166, 2; 7; 167, 6; VII, 57, 2; (276);
vidâthe, V, 59, 2¹; II, 33, 15.
- vidathyâ*, eloquent:
vidathyâ-iva, I, 167, 3².
- vidmân*, knowledge:
vidmânâ, V, 87, 2.
- vi-dyût*, lightning:
vi-dyût, I, 38, 8¹; 64, 9; *vi-dyûtâ*, I, 86, 9; V, 54, 2; *vi-dyûtâb*, I, 39, 9²; 64, 5; 168, 8; V, 52, 6; 54, 11; VII, 56, 13.
- vidyût-mahas*, brilliant with lightning:
vidyût-mahasab, V, 54, 3.
- vidyût-hasta*, holding lightnings in their hands:
vidyût-hastâb, VIII, 7, 25.

vidyúnmat, charged with lightning :
 vidyúnmat-bhîb, I, 88, 1.
 vidh, to sacrifice :
 vidhema havîshâ, X, 121, 1 to 9 ;
 168, 4 ; nâmasâ vidhema te, I,
 114, 2 ; vidhatâb, of her servant,
 I, 167, 5.—vedhas from vidh,
 (VIII, 20, 17¹) ; vidatha, (350.)
 vi-dhartrî, ruler :
 vi-dhartâ, VII, 56, 24.
 vi-dharman, rule :
 vi-dharmâne, VIII, 7, 5.
 vind, to find :
 âvindab, I, 6, 5 ; vidré, I, 87, 6 ;
 vidyâma, may we have, I, 165,
 15 ; 166, 15 ; 167, 11 ; 168, 10 ;
 171, 6.
 vip, to tremble :
 prâ vepayanti, they make tremble,
 I, 39, 5 ; VIII, 7, 4.
 ví-pakshas, on each side :
 ví-pakshasâ, I, 6, 2¹.
 ví-pathi, goer :
 ví-pathayaab, V, 52, 10.
 vipanyú, fond of praise :
 vipanyavaab, V, 61, 15.
 ví-pâka, full :
 ví-pâkâ, I, 168, 7.
 vipra, sage, poet :
 viprab, VII, 58, 4 ; VIII, 7, 1 ; vipra,
 V, 58, 2 ; vipram, I, 86, 3 ; 165, 14 ;
 VIII, 7, 30 ; viprâya, V, 61, 9 ;
 viprasya, I, 85, 11 ; 86, 2 ; VII,
 56, 15 ; viprásab, priests, X,
 78, 1.
 vi-bhâgâ, distribution :
 vi-bhâgê, VII, 56, 21.
 vi-bhû, almighty :
 vi-bhû, I, 165, 10 ; vi-bhvâb, I,
 166, 11¹.
 ví-bhûti, power :
 ví-bhûtayaab, I, 166, 11¹.
 vibhva-tashrâ, fashioned by Vibhvan :
 vibhva-tashrâm, V, 58, 4¹.
 Vibhvan, one of the Rîbhvas :
 (V, 58, 4¹).
 vi-bhvân, see bhû.
 ví-mahas, mighty :
 vi-mahasab, I, 86, 1¹ ; ví-mahasab,
 V, 87, 4¹.
 vi-mâna, see mâ.
 vi-môkana, resting-place (of horses) :
 vi-môkane, V, 53, 7.
 vi-rapsîn, singer :
 vi-rapsinab, I, 64, 10¹ ; 87, 1 ;
 vi-rapsinab, I, 166, 8.

virúkmat, bright weapon :
 virúkmatâb, I, 85, 3², 3.
 vi-rokín, bright, brilliant :
 vi-rokínab, (I, 85, 3²) ; V, 55, 3 ;
 X, 78, 3.
 vívakshase, see vaksh.
 vivartana = nirgatya bhûmau vilu-
 ntbanam :
 (V, 53, 7²).
 vivâsvat :
 âditiâ vivâsvân, (262.)
 vivâs, see vâ.
 vis, to enter :
 â-vivêra, VI, 74, 2.—ní visate, he
 rests, X, 168, 3.
 vís, clan, tribe, people :
 vít, VII, 56, 5 ; víšâ, I, 39, 5 ;
 vísab, I, 172, 3 ; I, 114, 3 ;
 víšâm, I, 134, 6 ; vikshû, houses,
 VII, 56, 22 ; vísab marútâm,
 the folk of the Maruts, V, 56, 1.
 vispâti, king :
 vispâtiâ, I, 37, 8¹.
 vísva, all . . . :
 vísve devâb, X, 121, 2 ; I, 19, 3² ;
 VIII, 94, 2 ; vísve sa-gôshasab,
 all the united Maruts, I, 43, 3¹ ;
 vísvâ gâtâni, X, 121, 10 ; vísvâ
 bhûvanâni, I, 64, 3 ; 85, 8 ;
 166, 4 ; II, 34, 4 ; vísvâb kar-
 shazîb, I, 86, 5 ; vísvam sâdma
 pârthivam, I, 38, 10 ; vísvâ
 pârthivâni, VIII, 94, 9 ; vísvâ
 âhâni, I, 171, 3 ; vísvam grâme
 asmín, everything in this village,
 I, 114, 1 ; vísvasya tasya, of
 this all, V, 55, 8.
 vísvâ-âyu, everlasting :
 vísvâ-âyu, V, 53, 13.
 vísvâ-krishri, known to all men :
 (I, 64, 14¹).
 vísvak, in all directions :
 víshûkîb, II, 33, 2 ; víshûkîm, VI,
 74, 2.
 vísvâ-kandra, all-brilliant :
 vísvâ-kandrâb, I, 165, 8.
 vísvâ-karshani, known to all men :
 vísvâ-karshanim, I, 64, 14¹.
 vísvâ-ganyâ :
 ep. of Âditi, (260.)
 vísvâ-dhâyas, satisfying all :
 vísvâ-dhâyasam, VIII, 7, 13.
 vísva-pls, all-adorned :
 vísva-plsab, VII, 57, 3 ; (I, 64, 8¹).
 vísva-psu, perfect :
 vísvâ-psub (yagñâb), X, 77, 4.

- visvá-bharas:**
visvá-bharasam, (V, 54, 10¹).
visvam, adv., everywhere:
 X, 121, 7.
visvá-mānusha, known to all men:
 (I, 64, 14¹).
visvam-invā, enlivening everything:
visvam-invébhiḥ, V, 60, 8.
visvá-rūpa, manifold:
visvá-rūpāb (āṅgirasab), X, 78, 5¹;
visvá-rūpam (nishkām), variegated, II, 33, 10.
visvá-vedas:
visvá-vedasab, all-knowing, I, 64, 8; 10.—*visva-vedasab*, wealthy, V, 60, 7.
visvāhā, adv., always:
 X, 78, 6.
Vishnu:
vishnub, I, 85, 7²; (133 seq.; 136 seq.); *vishnave*, V, 87, 1; (V, 87, 4¹); *vishnob*, V, 87, 8; *vishnob* eshāsya, the rapid Vishnu (Soma?), II, 34, 11¹; Soma (rain), VIII, 20, 3².—Vishnu and Trita, Vishnu's three steps, (II, 34, 10¹); Vishnu = Evayāmarut? (365.)
vishpāt, deliverer:
 (I, 166, 8¹).
vi-sārgana, scattering:
vi-sārgane, V, 59, 3.
visita-stuka, with dishevelled locks:
visita-stukā, I, 167, 5.
vi-stārā, straw:
vi-stārāb (read *vi-stāré*), V, 52, 10¹.
vi-sthā, kind, variety:
vi-sthāb, the gusts (of Vāta), X, 168, 2¹.
vi-spardhas, striving:
vi-spardhasab, V, 87, 4².
vihava, vihavya:
 (I, 134, 6¹).
vihūmat, invoking:
vihūmatinām, I, 134, 6¹.
vi-hruta, injured, crooked:
vi-hrutam, VIII, 20, 26; (I, 166, 8¹).
vī, to stir up:
 ā āvyata, I, 166, 4¹.
vī, to go:
 āpa veti, it goes away, V, 61, 18.
vī, to enjoy:
 vyantu, VII, 57, 6.
vīṭu, strong:
vīṭu, I, 39, 2.—*vīṭu*, n., stronghold, I, 6, 5².
vīṭu-pavī, strong-fellied:
vīṭupavī-bhiḥ, V, 58, 6; VIII, 20, 2¹.
vīṭu-pānī, strong-hoofed:
vīṭupānī-bhiḥ, I, 38, 11¹.
vītī, rejoicing, feast:
vītāye, V, 59, 8; VII, 57, 2; VIII, 20, 10; 16.
virā, hero, man:
virāb, I, 85, 1; VI, 66, 10; X, 77, 3; *virāsab*, V, 61, 4; *virānab*, I, 114, 8; II, 33, 4; *virāb* (Rudra), II, 33, 1¹; *virāya*, V, 61, 5; *virāya*, I, 86, 4; (Indra), I, 166, 7.—*virāb*, son, VII, 56, 24.
virā-vat, rich in men:
virā-vantam, I, 64, 15.
viryā, strength:
viryām, V, 54, 5.
vri, to keep back:
varanta, V, 55, 7; *vrata* from *vri*, *vrinoti*, (236); *vārayati*, to prohibit, (237).—*āpa avrinvata*, they have uncovered, II, 34, 1.—See *vartrī*, ā-*vrita*.
vri, to choose, to desire:
vrine, VIII, 94, 8; *vrinīmahe*, I, 114, 9; *āvrinīta*, II, 33, 13.—ā *vrine*, VII, 59, 11; ā *vrinīmahe*, I, 39, 7; 114, 4; ā *vavridhvam* (better ā *vavridhvam*, see *vrīt*), (VIII, 20, 18²).
vrikā-tāti, among wolves:
 II, 34, 9¹.
vriktā-barhis, for whom the sacred grass has been trimmed:
vrikta-barhishab, I, 38, 1²; VIII, 7, 20; 21; (I, 64, 1²; 165, 15²; 134, 6¹).
vrikti, trimming (of the grass):
 (I, 64, 1²).
vrikshā, tree:
vrikshām, V, 54, 6¹.
vrigāna, invigorating:
vrigānam, I, 165, 15²; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; 171, 6; p. xx.
vrigāna, n., enclosure, camp, hamlet:
 (I, 165, 15²); *vrigāne*, I, 166, 14; *vrigāne nadīnām*, in the realm of the rivers, V, 52, 7; *vrigānā*, V, 54, 12; *vrigāneshu*, II, 34, 7²; (237).

vriñg, to turn, to ward off, to clear :
(I, 165, 15³); *vriñgāse*, (I, 87, 6¹);
śirshā vavriḡub, *vavriktam*, to
turn back the heads, (269);
vavargūshinām, I, 134, 6¹.—
pāri vriñkta, spare, I, 172, 3;
pāri vrinaktu, VII, 46, 3; *pāri*
vriḡyāb, may it avoid, II, 33,
14².

vrit, to turn :

vartáyatha, I, 39, 3; *vartáyata*,
II, 34, 9; *ávartayat*, I, 85,
9.—*ānu ráthāb avrísata*, the
chariots followed, V, 55, 1
to 9.—*ā vavarta*, I, 165, 2;
ó vartta, I, 165, 14²; p. xxi;
ā vavridhvam (for *ā vavri-*
dhvam), VIII, 20, 18³; *abhi ā*
avart, VII, 59, 4; *ā vavrityām*,
let me bring hither, I, 168, 1;
VIII, 7, 33; *ā-vavártat*, II, 34,
14; *ā vavritana*, V, 61, 16.—
ví vavrite, it turns, I, 166, 9³;
ví vartante, they roll about, V,
53, 7².—*sám avartata*, there
arose, X, 121, 1; 7; (p. 4.)

vritta=versus:

p. xcv.

vritrá, *Vritra* :

*vritrá*m, I, 85, 9; 165, 8; VIII, 7,
23; *vritrá*m, enemy, VII, 58, 4.
vritra-túrya, struggle with *Vritra* :
vritra-túrye, VIII, 7, 24.

vriṭhā, freely, lightly :

I, 88, 6; 168, 4; wildly, V, 56,
4¹; quickly, VIII, 20, 10;
vriṭhā kri, to shake, (311.)

vriddhā, see *vridh*.

vriddhā-savas, endowed with full
power :

vriddhā-savasab, V, 87, 6.

vridh, to grow :

vavridhe, I, 37, 5; 167, 8³; *avar-*
dhanta, I, 85, 7¹; *vavridhanta*,
V, 52, 7; VI, 66, 2; *vavridhub*,
II, 34, 13¹; V, 59, 5; X, 77,
2; *vridhántam*, strong, VI, 66,
11; *vriddhāb*, grown, V, 60, 3;
vriddhāb, magnified, I, 38, 15²;
*vridh*ha, old, (I, 88, 1²); *vridhē*,
to grow, I, 85, 1⁴; *vridhāse*, (I,
87, 6¹); *vridham*, I, 167, 4²;
vardha, strengthen, V, 56, 2;
vardháyanti, VII, 57, 7; *vár-*
dhān, VIII, 7, 19; *vavridhānāb*
asmān, prospering us, X, 78, 8;

ā vavridhub, V, 55, 3.—*pra-*
*vridh*ha, thou who art grown
strong, I, 165, 9; p. xvii.—*ví*
vavridhub, V, 59, 6.—*sám va-*
vridhub, they have grown up
together, V, 60, 5.—*vridh* in
Zend, (I, 114, 6¹.)

vridhā, increasing :

vridhāsab sthā, I, 171, 2¹.

vriṣh, spargere, to rain down :

vriṣhiví, V, 53, 14¹; *varshayatha*,
V, 55, 5.—(139; 151 seq.)—*ā-*
vriṣh, to drink, (152.)

vriṣha-khādi, armed with strong
rings :

vriṣha-khādayab, I, 64, 10².

vriṣhanarvá, with strong horses :

vriṣhanarvéna, VIII, 20, 10.

vriṣhat - aṅgi, strongly - anointed
(priests) :

vriṣhat-aṅgayab, VIII, 20, 9¹.

vriṣhan, strong, manly :

(138 seqq.); strong, powerful, (139
seq.; 142; 149); (I, 64, 10³);
male, (139 seq.); man, husband,
(141; 144); *vriṣhanab paúmsye*,
(141); giver of rain, bounteous,
(141 seq.); fertilising, (142);
bull, horse, stallion, (25 seq.;
139; 140); *arushāsab vriṣhanab*,
the red stallions, (26); *vriṣhnab*,
bulls, VIII, 20, 20; hero,
epitheton ornans, (142 seqq.;
149 seqq.); applied to deities,
(145 seqq.); *arushāb vriṣhā*,
the red hero (Agni), fire in the
shape of lightning, (18; 25; 26);
name of Soma, (134; 136; 142;
146 seqq.); *vriṣhanam*, I, 85,
7²; *vriṣhānam* with *ā*, (149);
N. pr. of a pious worshipper,
(152 seq.); Mahidhara, 'mind,'
(153); see *vārshishṭba*.—*vriṣha-*
nab, the strong Maruts, I, 165,
1; p. xiv; VIII, 20, 12;
vriṣhanab, I, 85, 12²; VII, 56,
18; 20; 21; 58, 6; II, 33, 13;
vriṣhnab, VIII, 7, 33; 20, 19;
vriṣhā ganāb, the manly host (of
the Maruts), I, 87, 4; *vriṣhne*
sárdhāya, I, 64, 1; VIII, 20, 9¹;
vriṣhanam mārutam ganām, I,
64, 12; VIII, 94, 12.—*vriṣhā*,
Rudra, II, 34, 2; Vishnu, V,
87, 5; *vriṣhne*, Indra, I, 165,
11.

- vr̥isha-nâbhi*, with strong naves :
vr̥isha-nâbhinâ, VIII, 20, 10.
vr̥isha-pâni :
 (I, 38, 11¹).
vr̥isha-prayâvan, strongly advancing:
vr̥isha-prayâvne, VIII, 20, 9.
vr̥isha-psu, with strong forms :
vr̥isha-psavaḥ, VIII, 20, 7; (VIII, 7,
 7¹); *vr̥isha-psunâ*, VIII, 20, 10.
vr̥ishabhâ, bull, manly hero :
 (139; 140); *vr̥ishabhâb* (*usr̥iyab*),
 Dyū, the bull of the Dawn, V,
 58, 6²; Rudra, II, 33, 6; *vr̥isha-*
bha, II, 33, 4; 7; 15; *vr̥isha-*
bhâya, II, 33, 8; *vr̥ishabha*,
 Indra, I, 165, 7; 171, 5; *vr̥isha-*
bhâsya, I, 166, 1.
vr̥isha-manas, manly-minded :
vr̥isha-manâb, I, 167, 7.
vr̥isha-vrata, epithet of Soma :
 (I, 85, 4²).
vr̥isha-vrâta, the manly host :
vr̥isha-vrâtâsab, I, 85, 4².
vr̥ishrî, shower, rain :
vr̥ishrîb, I, 38, 8; *vr̥ishrîm*, I, 39,
 9²; V, 55, 5¹; 58, 3; *vr̥ishrî*, V,
 53, 5¹; *vr̥ishrâyab*, II, 34, 2¹; V,
 53, 2¹; 6; 10; *vr̥ishrî-bhiḥ*, V,
 59, 5; VII, 56, 13¹; VIII, 7, 16.
vr̥ishni, manly :
vr̥ishni paūmsyam, manly work,
 VIII, 7, 23; *vr̥ishni śavab*, (V,
 58, 7¹).
vr̥ishnya :
 (V, 58, 7¹).
vr̥ih, to draw :
vī vr̥ihatam, draw far away, VI, 74,
 2.—Cf. *brih*.
vēdi, altar :
vēdim, I, 170, 4.
vedyā (?) :
vedyābhiḥ, clearly (?), I, 171, 1³.
vedhās, wise :
vedhāse, I, 64, 1; VII, 46, 1¹; *ve-*
dhāsab, V, 52, 13¹; *vedhasab*, V,
 54, 6.
vedhās, servant (worshipper) :
vedhāsab, VIII, 20, 17¹.
ven, to cherish :
venab, I, 43, 9.
vēnat, suppliant :
vēnatab, I, 86, 8.
vaī :
nā vaī u, never, II, 33, 9¹; 10.
vai, to wither :
 part. *vāta* and *vāna*, (90.)
Vaidat-arvi :
valdat-arviḥ yāthâ, like Vaidadarvi,
 V, 61, 10; (V, 61, 5²; 9¹; 360;
 362.)
vaiyavā :
 not *vayyasva*, pp. liii, lvi.
vaīra-deya, weregild :
vaīra-deye, V, 61, 8¹.
Vaīsvânara, N. of Agni :
vaīsvânara, V, 60, 8.
vyath, to shake :
vyathate, V, 54, 7; *vithura* from
vyath, (I, 168, 6¹).
vyāthi, rolling :
vyāthib, V, 59, 2¹.
vyadh, to strike :
vidhyata, I, 86, 9.
vyâ :
 (I, 166, 4¹).
vyūha :
 p. lxxx.
vyr̥ishī (*âyudhavīśeṣa*) :
vyr̥ishībhiḥ, (VII, 56, 13¹).
vragâ, stable :
vragé, I, 86, 3.—*vragâm*, strong-
 hold, VI, 66, 8.—*vragâb*, keeper,
 (228.)
vratâ, sway, &c. :
 (236 seqq.); what is enclosed, pro-
 tected, set apart, (236 seq.; 383
 seq.); *apâm vraté*, within the pale
 of the waters, (384); law, (237
 seq.; 384); *ānu vratām*, accord-
 ing to law, (238); *vratâ* (*dhārâ-*
yante), duties, VIII, 94, 2; sway,
 power, (239); *vratām*, I, 166,
 12²; *vraté tāva*, at thy command,
 under thy auspices, (239); sacri-
 fice, (238 seq.); deeds of the
 gods, (239.)
vrâta, troop :
vrâtam-vrâtam, each troop, V, 53,
 11.
śams, to recite, to praise :
śasyate, I, 86, 4; *śasyāte* (opp.
udyāte), V, 55, 8; *śasyānte*, VII,
 56, 23; *śamsamânâya*, var. l. for
śasamânâya, (I, 85, 12¹).—*â śams*,
 (271.)—*ût śamsa*, V, 52, 8.—*prâ*
śamsa, I, 37, 5.
śamsa, spell, blessing, curse; praise,
 prayer :
 (I, 166, 13¹; 271); *narām śamsab*,
 (Indra) praised by men, Mân-
 nerlob, II, 34, 6¹; (439.)—

- sámsam*, curse, VII, 56, 19;
sámsât, reproach, I, 166, 8.—
sámsâb, prayers, X, 78, 3.
sámsa, singer:
sámsam, I, 166, 13¹; (271.)
sámsya, glorious:
sámsyam, II, 34, 11.
sak, to be able:
sikvas from *sak*, (V, 52, 16¹).—
kathám saka, how could you,
 V, 61, 2.
sakrá, hero:
sakráb, I, 166, 1.
sana, hemp:
 (233.)
satá, hundred:
satám hílmâb, I, 64, 14; V, 54, 15;
 II, 33, 2; *ékam-ekâ satâ*, each
 a hundred, V, 52, 17; *dhenûnâm*
satám, V, 61, 10; *satásya nri-*
nâm sriyam, the happiness of a
 hundred men, I, 43, 7.
satá-arkas:
satá-arkasam, may be *satá-rikasam*,
 p. lxxxv.
satá-avaya, consisting of a hundred
 sheep:
parûm satá-avayam, V, 61, 5.
satâbhugi, hundredfold:
satâbhugi-bhîb, I, 166, 8.
satasvin, winning a hundred:
satasvî, VII, 58, 4.
satín, hundredfold:
satínam, I, 64, 15; *satínab*, with
 hundredfold wealth, VII, 57, 7.
sátru, foe:
sátrub, I, 39, 4; *sátrob*, I, 165, 6.
sam, to work, to perform worship, to
 praise:
 (166); *sasamânâya*, I, 85, 12¹;
sasamânâsya, I, 86, 8.
sám, well, pleasant, sweet; health:
 (190 seqq.); I, 165, 4²; with *bhû*,
 (190 seq.); VI, 74, 1; p. cxi;
 with *as*, (191 seq.); I, 114, 1;
 with *asor bhû* understood, (192);
 with *kar, vah*, (192); I, 43, 6;
 with *pû, vâ*, &c., (192 seq.);
sám yób, health and wealth,
 (193 seq.); V, 53, 14; I, 114,
 2; II, 33, 13.
sámî, deed:
sámî, Loc., I, 87, 5²; *sámî* and *sámî*,
 (V, 87, 9¹).
sám-tama, most welcome, blissful:
sám-tamam (hridé), I, 43, 1; *sám-*
tamebhiḥ (bhesagébhiḥ), II, 33,
 2; *sám-tamâ (bhesagâ)*, II, 33,
 13.
sám-bhavishtâb, most blissful:
sám-bhavishtâb, I, 171, 3; *sám-*
bhavishtâb, X, 77, 8.
sam-bhû, healthful:
sam-bhû, X, 186, 1.
sam-yób, for health and wealth:
 I, 43, 4³.
sara, reed, arrow:
 (398.)
sarâd, harvest:
sarât-bhîb, I, 86, 6.—*Sarad* =
 Ceres, p. xxiv.
sâru, shaft:
sârub, I, 172, 2.
sârdha, host:
sârdhas mârutas = *cerfo Martio*,
 p. xxv; *sârdham*, V, 53, 10; 56,
 9; *sârdham-sârdham*, V, 53,
 11; *sârdhâya*, I, 37, 4; 64, 1;
 V, 54, 1; 87, 1¹; VI, 66, 11;
 VIII, 20, 9; *sârdhasya*, VII,
 56, 8; *sârdhab*, see *sârdhas*;
 (67 seq.; 69).—*sârdhân ritâsya*,
 the companies of our sacrifice,
 VIII, 7, 21.—*sârdha*, strong, (68.)
sârdhas, might, host:
 (67; 68 seqq.); *sârdhab*, I, 37, 1¹;
 5; V, 52, 8¹; 54, 6; VII, 59,
 7; (V, 87, 1¹); *sârdhâmsi*, V,
 87, 7¹.
sârman, shelter, protection:
sârma, I, 85, 12; V, 55, 9; VII,
 59, 1; I, 114, 5; 10; *sârman*,
 VII, 56, 25.
sarya, made of reeds:
saryâ, f., an arrow, also a sacrificial
 vessel, (398.)
saryana, lands in Kurukshetra:
 (398.)
Saryanâ-vat, N. of a lake:
saryanâ-vati, VIII, 7, 29¹.—A
 sacrificial vessel, (VIII, 7, 29¹).
sârvara, dark:
sârvarîb, the dark cows (the
 clouds), V, 52, 3².
sâvas, strength:
sâvab, I, 37, 9; 39, 10; V, 58, 7¹;
 87, 2; 6; *sâvasâ*, I, 39, 8; 64,
 8; 9; 13; 167, 9; 171, 5²; VI,
 66, 6; VII, 57, 1¹; *sâvase*, V,
 87, 1¹; *sâvasab*, I, 167, 9; V,
 52, 2; *sâvâmsi*, VII, 56, 7.—
Savas, (251.)

śavishīṭa, most powerful :

śavishīṭa, I, 165, 7.

Śāṛiyasī :

(V, 61, 5^a) ; (360 ; 362) ; see *śāsvat*.

śāsvat, all :

śāsvataḥ, V, 52, 2 ; *śāsvatām* ékam ft, VIII, 20, 13.—*śāsvatinām*, the eternal dawns, I, 171, 5.—*śāṛiyasī*, compar., more frequent, V, 61, 6 ; (360.)

śākīn, hero :

śākīnab, V, 52, 17¹.

śāṇakshaumakīra, clothes of hemp or linen :

(234.)

śās :

ā *śāsate*, they call for me, I, 165, 4.

śikvas, wise, powerful :

śikvasaḥ, V, 52, 16¹ ; 54, 4.

śiksh for *śaksh* :

(V, 52, 16¹.)

śikhā :

(V, 52, 16¹.)

śipra-vat :

śipravān, (II, 34, 3^a.)

śiprā, helmet ; jaw :

śipre, jaws, (II, 34, 3^a ; I, 2, 3¹).—*śiprāḥ* (*hiraṇyāyib*), headbands, V, 54, 11 ; helmets, VIII, 7, 25.

śiprīn, helmeted or possessed of jaws :

(II, 34, 3^a.)

śimī-vat, vigorous, powerful :

śimī-vān, V, 56, 3 ; *śimī-vatām*, VIII, 20, 3 ; *śimī-vantaḥ*, X, 78, 3.

śivā, propitious :

śivābhib (*ūtī-bhib*), VIII, 20, 24.

śīsu, young one, calf :

śīve, II, 34, 8 ; *śīsavab*, VII, 56, 16.

śīṣṭa, child :

śīṣṭāḥ ná *kṛīśyab*, X, 78, 6.

śībham, adv., fast :

I, 37, 14.

śīrshān, head :

śīrshān, VIII, 7, 25 ; *śīrshā-su*, V, 54, 11 ; 57, 6 ; *śīrshā vavṛiktaṃ*, (269.)

sukrā, bright :

sukrāb-iva *sūryab*, I, 43, 5 ; *sukrām* (*ūdhab*), VI, 66, 1 ; *sukré* (*ūdhani*), II, 34, 2^a ; *sukrásab*,

I, 134, 5 ; *sukrébhib* *hiraṇyab*, II, 33, 9.

suk, to shine :

sūkān, VI, 66, 2 ; *susukvāmsab*, V, 87, 6 ; *susukānāb*, brilliant, II, 34, 1 ; *sukatā*, II, 34, 12.

súki, bright, brilliant :

súkayab, I, 64, 2 ; VI, 66, 4 ; 11 ; VII, 57, 5 ; I, 134, 4 ; 5 ; *súki*, *súkinām*, *súkim*, *súki-bhyab*, *súkayab*, VII, 56, 12 ; *súkini*, pure, II, 33, 13.

súki-ganman, bright born :

súki-ganmānab, VII, 56, 12.

sundhyū, brilliant :

sundhyāvab, V, 52, 9.

subh, see *sumbh*.

śubh, splendour, beauty, glory :

subhā, I, 165, 1 ; p. xiii ; VII, 56, 6 ; *subhé*, I, 64, 4^a ; 88, 2 ; for triumph, I, 87, 3^a ; 167, 6 ; V, 52, 8 ; 57, 3 ; VII, 57, 3 ; *śubham yā*, to go in triumph, V, 55, 1 to 9 ; 57, 2 ; (VIII, 20, 7^a.)—*śubhab*, gems, V, 54, 11.

subham-yā :

(164) ; (I, 87, 4^a.)

subham-yāvan, triumphant :

subham-yāvā, V, 61, 13 ; (164 ; I, 87, 4^a.)

subham-yū, triumphant :

subham-yāvab, X, 78, 7 ; (164.)

subhrā, brilliant :

subhrāb, VII, 56, 8 ; *subhrāb*, I, 19, 5 ; 85, 3^a ; 167, 4 ; VII, 56, 16 ; VIII, 7, 25 ; 28.—*subhrāb*, VIII, 7, 2 ; 14.

subhra-khādi, armed with bright rings :

subhra-khādayab, VIII, 20, 4.

subhra-yāvan :

subhra-yāvānā, (164.)

sumbh, to shine ; to adorn :

subháyanta, VII, 56, 16 ; *sobhāse*, to be glorious, X, 77, 1 ; *subháyante*, they adorn themselves, I, 85, 3 ; *sūmbhamānāb*, I, 165, 5 ; VII, 56, 11 ; 59, 7 ; *subhānāb*, bright, I, 165, 3^a ; p. xv ; *subháyat-bhib*, brilliant, V, 60, 8 ; (162.)—*prā sumbhante*, they glance forth, I, 85, 1.

susukvāni :

(I, 168, 1^a.)

susukvās and *susukānā*, see *suk*.

śúshma, breath, strength :

śúshmaḥ, I, 165, 4³; p. xv; breath, VII, 56, 8; *śúshmam*, I, 64, 14; 165, 1⁴; pp. xiii seq.; xxi; VIII, 7, 24; 20, 3; *śúshmāya*, power (blast), VIII, 7, 5; *śúshma* with *vrīṣhan* and *vrīṣabhā*, (140; 149.)

śushmin, strong :

śushmī, VII, 56, 24; *śushmīne*, I, 37, 4.

śūra, hero :

śūrāb, I, 64, 9; *śūrāb-iva*, I, 85, 8; V, 59, 5; *gānāsab śūrāb*, VII, 56, 22; *gigivāmsab ná śūrāb*, X, 78, 4.

śūśu-vās, always increasing :

śūśu-vāmsam, I, 64, 15; *śūśu-vāmsab*, strong, I, 167, 9.

śrīnga, horn :

śrīngam, V, 59, 3.

śridh, strong :

śārdhantam, V, 56, 1.

śé-vridh, conferring blessings :

śé-vridhab, V, 87, 4.

śo :

nī-śitāni, prepared, I, 171, 4.

śokās, blast of fire :

śokāb, I, 39, 1.

śōna, brown :

śōnā, I, 6, 2.

śobhās, see *jumbh*.

śōbhishīḥ, most splendid :

śōbhishīḥāb, VII, 56, 6.

śkut, to trickle :

śkótanti, I, 87, 2.

Syāvā :

syāvāya, V, 61, 9.

Syāvā-arva :

syāva-arva, V, 52, 1; (V, 61, 5²); (359 seq.)

Syāvārva-stuta, praised by *Syāvārva* :

syāvārva-stutāya, V, 61, 5².

syenā, hawk :

syenāb, VII, 56, 3; *syenāsab ná pakshīṇab*, like winged hawks, VIII, 20, 10; *syenāsab*, X, 77, 5; *syenān-iva*, I, 165, 2; (175.)

srath :

srathayanta, they tire, V, 54, 10. —*srathayante*, they soften, V, 59, 1. —*śrathantu*, may they loose it (plural instead of dual), (258.)

srathary, to melt :

sratharyāti, X, 77, 4¹.

srāvas, glory :

srāvab, I, 165, 12; 171, 5; V, 52, 1²; I, 43, 7; *srāvāmsi*, V, 61, 11; *srāvase*, I, 134, 3.

śravasyū, eager for glory :

śravasyūb, VIII, 94, 1; *śravasyāvab*, I, 85, 8. —*śravasyūm*, glorious, V, 56, 8.

śrāyā, going :

śrāyāb, V, 53, 4².

śrī :

āpa-sritab, retired, V, 61, 19. —*śrī-sriyānāb*, fastened, VII, 56, 13.

śriyāse, see *śrī*.

śrī, splendour, beauty, glory :

śrīb, V, 57, 6; *śriyā*, V, 61, 12²; VI, 66, 4; VII, 56, 6; *śriyā śrēshīḥab*, II, 33, 3; *śriyē*, I, 88, 3; V, 55, 3; VIII, 7, 25; X, 77, 2; *śriyē śrēyāmsab*, V, 60, 4²; *śriyāse*, I, 87, 6¹; V, 59, 3² (bis); *śriyāb*, I, 85, 2²; 166, 10; VIII, 20, 12; *śriyam vāhante*, they bring with them beautiful light, VIII, 20, 7². —*śriyam*, happiness, I, 43, 7; *śriyē*, for happiness sake, I, 64, 12.

śru, to hear :

śrinve, I, 37, 3; *śrinōti*, I, 37, 13; *śrinutā*, I, 86, 2¹; *śrōta*, V, 87, 8; 9; *śrudhī*, I, 2, 1; *śrinōtu*, I, 114, 11; VII, 46, 1¹; *śurāva*, V, 53, 2; *śrinvire*, V, 87, 3; X, 168, 4; *śrinomi* (with two Acc.), I hear thou art —, II, 33, 4. —*ā śrot*, listened, I, 39, 6¹; *śroshantu ā*, I, 86, 5². —See *śrōtri*.

śrutā, glorious :

śrutām, I, 6, 6; V, 52, 17; II, 33, 11; *śrutāsu*, V, 60, 2.

śrūtya, glorious :

śrūtyam, I, 165, 11.

śrushī, a hearing :

śrushīm, I, 166, 13.

śrushī-māt, to be obeyed :

śrushī-mántam, V, 54, 14³.

śréni, row :

śréniḥ, V, 59, 7¹.

śréyas :

śriyē śrēyāmsab, glorious for glory, V, 60, 4².

śrēshīḥ, best :

śrēshīḥab, I, 43, 5. —*śrēshīḥab śriyā*, the most beautiful in beauty, II, 33, 3.

śrēṣṭhā-tama, the very best :

śrēṣṭhā-tamāb, V, 61, 1.

śrōtri, listening to :

śrōtārab (yāma-hūtiṣhu), V, 61, 15.

ślōka, hymn :

ślōkam, I, 38, 14.

śvās, to-morrow :

śvāb, I, 167, 10 ; 170, 1.

svi, to flourish :

śrāvāma, I, 166, 14 ; see *śru-vās*.

svit, to shine :

vī svitan, X, 78, 7.

svityāñk, bright :

svitāñk, II, 33, 8.

sakrīt, once (only) :

VI, 66, 1.

sakthān, leg :

sakthāni, V, 61, 3.

sākhi, friend :

sākhā, I, 170, 3 ; X, 186, 2 ; *apām*

sākhā, X, 168, 3 ; *sākhye*

sākhāyab, I, 165, 11 ; *sākhāyab*,

V, 52, 2 ; *sākhāyab*, VIII, 20, 23 ;

sākhin ākkā sakhāyab, I, 165,

13 ; *sākhin*, V, 53, 16.

sakhi-tvā, friendship :

sakhi-tvé, VIII, 7, 31.

sakhyā, friendship :

sakhyāsa, V, 55, 9 ; X, 78, 8 ;

sakhyāya vrīdham, to grow their

friend, I, 167, 4.

sak, to follow :

sisakti, I, 38, 8 ; *sakādhyai*, I, 167, 5.

—*saketa*, may he remain united,

V, 52, 15. — *sākante dāksham*,

they assume strength, I, 134, 2.

sātā, with :

I, 167, 7 ; *sātā marūt-su*, among

the Maruts, V, 56, 8 ; 9 ; *sutē*

sātā, VII, 59, 3¹.

sa-gātyā, common birth :

sa-gātyēna, VIII, 20, 21.

sa-gūsh, endowed with :

sa-gūb, V, 60, 8.

sa-gōshas, friend :

sa-gōshasab, V, 57, 1 ; I, 43, 3¹ ;

sa-gōshasab, V, 54, 6 ; *sa-gōshāb*,

allied with, (263.)

sāt, hero :

(I, 165, 3².)

sāt-arva, with good horses :

sāt-arvab, V, 58, 4.

sāt-pati, lord of (brave) men :

sat-pate, I, 165, 3² ; *sāt-patim*, II, 33, 12.

satyā, true :

satyāb, I, 87, 4 ; 167, 7 ; *satyām*,

truly, I, 38, 7 ; VII, 56, 12 ;

tirāb satyāni, in spite of all

pledges, (VII, 59, 8¹.)

satyā-dharman, righteous :

satyā-dharmā, X, 121, 9.

satyā-javas, of true strength :

satya-javasab, I, 86, 8 ; 9 ; *satyā-javasam*, V, 52, 8¹.

sātya-srut, truly listening :

sātya-srutab, V, 57, 8 ; 58, 8.

satrā, together :

V, 60, 4.

satrāk, common :

satrākīm, VII, 56, 18 ; *satrākāb*, together, X, 77, 4.

sātvan, giant :

sātvānab, I, 64, 2³.

sad, to sit down :

sīdan, I, 85, 7 ; *sattāb*, VII, 56,

18. — *sīdata ā*, sit down on (Acc.),

I, 85, 6 ; *ā sadata* (barhīb), VII,

57, 2 ; 59, 6. — *nī seda*, VII, 59,

7. — *pra-sattāb*, V, 60, 1.

sādana, seat :

pārthive sādane, (I, 38, 10¹) ; *ritā-sya sādanesu*, sacred places, II,

34, 13².

sadanya, distinguished in the assemblies :

(276.)

sādām, always :

II, 34, 4 ; I, 114, 8.

sādas, seat :

sādab, I, 85, 2 ; 6 ; 7 ; V, 61, 2 ;

(V, 61, 3²) ; *sādasab*, V, 87, 4.

sādā, always :

VII, 56, 25 ; 57, 7 ; 58, 6 ; 46, 4 ;

VIII, 20, 22 ; 94, 3.

sādman, seat, place :

sādma (pārthivam), space (of the earth), I, 38, 10¹ ; seat (of the

earth), V, 87, 7¹ ; *sādma*, altar, (I, 38, 10¹.)

sadmán, m. :

sadmānam divyām, (I, 38, 10¹.)

sadyāb-ūti, quickly ready to help :

sadyab-ūtayab, V, 54, 15 ; *sadyāb-ūtayab*, X, 78, 2.

sadyās, quickly :

sadyāb, V, 54, 10.

sadhā-stha, abode, council :

sadhā-sthe, V, 52, 7 ; 87, 3.

sadhriñinā, assembled :

sadhriñināb, I, 134, 2.

sadhryāk, together :

sadhryākab, V, 60, 3.

san, to gain :

sānat, V, 61, 5 ; sānitā, VII, 56, 23.

sanāt, always :

VII, 56, 5 ; X, 78, 8.

sā-nābhi, holding together :

sā-nābhayab, X, 78, 4.

sanī, luck :

sanīm, II, 34, 7^s.

sā-nī/ā, dwelling in the same nest :

sā-nī/āb, I, 165, 1 ; VII, 56, 1 ; p. xiv.

sanutār, far :

V, 87, 8 ; X, 77, 6.

sānemi, entirely :

VII, 56, 9.

sap, to follow, to attend on, to worship :

(I, 85, 1¹.)

sapatnī :

(129.)

sapary, to serve :

saparyati, VIII, 7, 20.

saptā-gihva, seven-tongued :

saptā-gihvāb (vāhnayab), (39.)

saptā-tantu, having seven threads (the sacrifice) :

(253.)

saptān, seven :

saptā saptā jākīnab, the seven and seven heroes, V, 52, 17¹ ; saptā rātnā, the seven treasures, VI, 74, 1.

sāpti, horse, yoke-fellow :

sāptayab, I, 85, 1¹ ; 6 ; saptayab, VIII, 20, 23 ; sāpti, the middle horse, (I, 39, 6¹.)

sa-prāthas, wide-spreading :

sa-prāthab, VIII, 20, 13.

sapsarā, fed :

sapsarāsab, I, 168, 9.

sabab-dūgha, juice-yielding :

sabab-dūghā, I, 134, 4².

sā-bandhu, kinsman :

sā-bandhavab, V, 59, 5¹ ; VIII, 20, 21¹.

sabar, juice, milk, water :

(I, 134, 4².)

sa-bādh, companion :

sa-bādhab, I, 64, 8.

sā-bharas, toiling together :

sa-bharasab, V, 54, 10¹.

sabhā, assembly, court :

(276.)

sabhā-va¹, courtly :

sabhā-vatī, I, 167, 3².

sabhā-sahā, strong in the assembly : (276.)

sabhéya, courtly, polite :

(276.)

sām, prep., with . . . :

I, 64, 8 ; 167, 3.

samā, like, worth as much :

samāb (read samā?), V, 61, 8¹.

sāmāna, feast :

sāmanam nā yóshāb, X, 168, 2².

samānā, together :

I, 168, 1.

sa-manyú, pl., friends of one mind :

sa-manyavab, II, 34, 3 ; 5 ; 6 ;

VIII, 20, 1 ; 21 ; confidants (of Vishnu), V, 87, 8.

samáyā, at once :

I, 166, 9².

sam-āraṇa, battle :

sam-āraṇe, I, 170, 2.

sam-arāṇā, see *rī*.

sa-maryā, battle :

sa-maryé, I, 167, 10.

samaba, well :

V, 53, 15.

samānā, common, equal :

samānām, VI, 66, 1 ; VII, 57, 3 ;

VIII, 20, 11 ; samānāsmāt, V,

87, 4 ; samānébhiḥ, I, 165, 7 ;

fem. samānī, (I, 165, 1¹.)

samānā-varkas, of equal splendour :

samānā-varkasā, I, 6, 7.

samānyā, all equally :

I, 165, 1¹.

sām-ukshita, see *vaksh*.

samudrá, sea :

samudrām, X, 121, 4 ; (aravām),

I, 19, 7² ; 8 ; samudrāsyā, I, 167,

2 ; samudratāb, V, 55, 5 ; samu-

dréshu, VIII, 20, 25.—samudrá,

welkin, (58) ; confluvies, (61) ;

adj. watery, flowing, (61 seq.)

sām-riti :

(I, 64, 15¹.)

sām-okas, surrounded :

sām-okasab, I, 64, 10.

sam-karénya, see *abhisam-karénya*.

sam-drīś, sight :

sam-drīśi sthāna, you are to be

seen, V, 87, 6 ; sūryasya sam-

drīśab, from the sight of the

sun, II, 33, 1.

sām-mīla, united, endowed with :

sām-mīlāsab (c. Instr.), I, 64, 10 ;

- sām-mislâb (c. Loc.), I, 166, 11 ;
(c. Instr.), VII, 56, 6.
- sam-râg, king :
sam-râṭ, VII, 58, 4.
- sam-vāraṇa, the hidden place :
sam-vāraṇasya, X, 77, 6.
- sam-vâṭ, colloquium :
(I, 167, 3^a).
- sām-hita, strong :
sām-hitam, I, 168, 6.
- sa-yūg, together with :
sa-yūk, X, 168, 2.
- sa-rātham, on the same chariot :
X, 168, 2.
- Sarāyu, the river S. :
sarāyub, V, 53, 9¹.
- sāras, lake :
sārāṃsi trīṇi, VIII, 7, 10².
- Sarasvatī, the river :
(V, 52, 11¹).
- sārga, drove :
sārgam (gāvāṇ), V, 56, 5.
- sārva, whole :
sārvayā (viṣā), I, 39, 5.
- sarvā-tāti, salus :
sarvā-tātā, in health and wealth,
(260.) — sarvā - tātā, together,
VII, 57, 7.
- sāvana, libation :
sāvanāni, II, 34, 6 ; sāvane, in the
Soma offering, VII, 59, 7.
- sā-vayas, of the same age :
sā-vayasab, I, 165, 1.
- sāṭ, to cling :
sāṭata, I, 64, 12³.
- sas, to sleep :
gārāb ā sasatīm-iva, as a lover
(wakes) a sleeping maid, I,
134, 3.
- sasahī, victorious :
sasahīb, I, 171, 6.
- sasrivās, see sri.
- sasvār, in secret :
VII, 59, 7¹.
- sasvartā, secretly :
VII, 58, 5.
- sah, to resist, to conquer :
sāhante (sāhāṃsi sāhasā), VI, 66,
9 ; sāhantī, VII, 56, 5 ; sāha-
mānāya, VII, 46, 1 ; sāhantab,
strong, V, 87, 5.
- sahā, together with :
I, 38, 6 ; V, 53, 2 ; 14¹ ; sahó, VIII,
7, 32.
- sahā, strong :
sahāb, VIII, 20, 20.
- sahab-dā, giver of victory :
sahab-dāb, I, 171, 5.
- sāhas, strength :
sāhab, II, 34, 7 ; V, 57, 6 ; VIII,
20, 13 ; sāhāṃsi sāhasā sāhante,
VI, 66, 9 ; sāhab sāhasā (for
Pada sāhasab) ā namanti, VII,
56, 19¹.
- sahasā-vat :
sahasā-van, p. cxxii seq.
- sahāsra, thousand :
sahāsram, I, 167, 1 (tris) ; VII,
46, 3.
- sahāsra-bhrishri, thousand-edged :
sahāsra-bhrishrim, I, 85, 9.
- sahasrīn, thousandfold :
sahasrīnam, I, 64, 15 ; V, 54, 13 ;
sahasrīnab, I, 167, 1.—sahasrī,
winning a thousand, VII, 58, 4.
- sahasrīya, thousandfold :
sahasrīyāsab, I, 168, 2 ; sahasrīyam,
VII, 56, 14.
- sāhasvat, strong :
sāhasvat, aloud, I, 6, 8.
- sāhiyas, bravest :
sāhiyasab, I, 171, 6¹.
- sāhuri, strong :
sāhurīb, VII, 58, 4.
- sā-hūti, divided praise :
sā-hūti, II, 33, 4.
- sahó, see sahā.
- sākām, together :
I, 37, 2³ ; 64, 4 ; 166, 13 ; V, 55,
3 (bis) ; VI, 66, 2.
- sākam-úkshe, growing up together :
sākam-úkshe, VII, 58, 1.
- sālbri, victor :
sālbā, VII, 56, 23.
- sātī, conquest :
sātīb, I, 168, 7¹.—sātīm, help, I,
6, 10.
- sādh, to finish, to fulfil :
sādhān, VI, 66, 7 ; sādhanatā, I, 2, 7.
- sādhāraṇī, belonging to all :
sādhāraṇyā-iva, I, 167, 4¹.
- sādhu-yā, kindly :
I, 170, 2.
- sānu, ridge :
sānunab pári (diváb), V, 59, 7 ;
diváb sānu, V, 60, 3.
- sāman, song :
sāma-bhiḥ, X, 78, 5.
- sāma-vipra, clever in song :
sāma-vipram, V, 54, 14.
- sām-tapana, full of heat :
sām-tapanāb, VII, 59, 9.

sām-rāgya, the being the universal ruler :

sām-rāgyena, VII, 46, 2¹.

sāyaka, arrow :

sāyakāni, II, 33, 10.

sāsahī, see sasahl.

simhā, lion :

simhāb-iva, I, 64, 8 ; vrīshā simhāb, (140.)

siñk, to pour out :

ásiñkan, I, 85, 11.

sīndhu, stream, river :

sīndhava, I, 168, 8 ; V, 53, 7 ; VIII, 7, 5 ; X, 78, 7 ; (X, 78, 6¹).—sīndhub, the Indus, V, 53, 9¹ ; the river, I, 114, 11 ; sīndhum, VIII, 20, 24¹ ; sīndhau, VIII, 20, 25

sīndhu-mātri, pl., the sons of Sindhu, N. of the Maruts :

sīndhu-mātara, X, 78, 6¹ ; (I, 85, 3¹ ; 168, 9¹) ; (307.)

śim, particle :

I, 37, 6 ; 9.

su, to press out, to pour out (Soma) :

suvāna, dissyllabic, p. cxxi ; suvānaib (indu-bhi), VIII, 7, 14 ; sunvatē, V, 60, 7 ; sunvatāb, I, 2, 6 ; sutāb, I, 86, 4 ; VIII, 94, 4 ; sutāb, I, 2, 4 ; 168, 3 ; sutānām sōmānām, I, 134, 6.—See also sutā.

sú, well :

I, 37, 14 ; 38, 6 ; V, 54, 15 ; VIII, 94, 3 ; X, 77, 4 ; VI, 74, 4 ; quickly, I, 165, 14 ; loud, VIII, 20, 19 ; greatly, VIII, 7, 18 ; ó sú, II, 34, 15 ; VII, 59, 5 ; VIII, 7, 33 ; mó sú, VII, 59, 5 ; sahó sú, VIII, 7, 32.

su-ák, fleet :

su-ákāb, VII, 56, 16.

su-ápas, clever :

su-ápāb, I, 85, 9 ; V, 60, 5.

su-apivāta, implored, desired :

su-apivāta (Rudra), freely accessible, VII, 46, 3¹ ; (I, 165, 13¹) ; see vat.

su-ápnas, wealthy :

su-ápnasab, X, 78, 1.

su-arká, resounding with beautiful songs :

su-arkāb, I, 88, 1¹.

su-ávas, gracious :

su-ávasam, V, 60, 1 ; su-ávān, svavadbhi, (I, 6, 3².)

su-árva, possessed of good horses :

su-árva, V, 57, 2 ; VII, 56, 1.

su-ādhi, full of devotion :

su-ādhyāb, X, 78, 1.

su-áyudhá, with good weapons :

su-áyudhāb, V, 57, 2 ; su-áyudhāsab, V, 87, 5² ; VII, 56, 11.

su-uktá, hymn :

su-ukténa, I, 171, 1 ; su-uktám, VII, 58, 6.

su-upâyana :

(VII, 46, 3¹.)

su-krít, good deeds :

su-kríte, I, 166, 12.

sú-kríta, well-made :

sú-krítam, I, 85, 9 ; sú-krítāb, I, 134, 2.

su-kshatrá, powerful :

su-kshatrāsab, I, 19, 5.

su-kshiti, dwelling in safety :

su-kshitāye, VII, 56, 24.

su-khá, easy :

su-khēshu (rátheshu), V, 60, 2.

su-khādi, armed with beautiful rings :

su-khādāye, (I, 64, 10²) ; V, 87, 1 ; su-khādāyab, I, 87, 6.

su-gá, flowing freely :

su-gāb, I, 165, 8.—su-gám, to a good end, V, 54, 6 ; su-gám, welfare, I, 43, 6.

su-gāndhi, sweet-scented :

sugāndhim, VII, 59, 12.

su-gopátama, having the best guardians :

su-gopátamab, I, 86, 1¹.

su-kandrá, bright :

su-kandrá, II, 34, 13.

su-kētú, kindness :

su-kētúnā, I, 166, 6¹.

su-kētúna, gracious :

su-kētúnam (Soma), (I, 166, 6¹.)

sú-gāta, well-born :

sú-gātāya, V, 53, 12 ; sú-gātā, V, 56, 9 ; su-gātāsab ganúshā, V, 57, 5 ; 59, 6 ; VIII, 20, 8 ; su-gātāb, I, 88, 3 ; 166, 12 ; su-gātām, well-acquired, VII, 56, 21.

su-gihvá, soft-tongued :

su-gihvāb, I, 166, 11.

sutá, the pressed juice (of Soma), libation :

asya sutásya, VIII, 94, 6 ; sutē sákā, VII, 59, 3¹ ; sutāsab, I, 165, 4 ; sutānām, I, 2, 5.

- su-tashṭa :
= vibhva-tashṭa ? (V, 58, 4¹.)
- sutā-soma, pouring out Soma :
sutā-somāb, I, 167, 6 ; sutā-some
rātha-vītau (Loc. abs.), V, 61, 18 ;
sutā-somāb, I, 2, 2.
- su-dāmsas, powerful :
su-dāmsasab, I, 85, 1.
- su-dānu, bounteous giver :
su-dānavab, I, 39, 10 ; 172, 1 ;
2 ; 3 ; VII, 59, 10 ; VIII, 7,
12¹ ; 19 ; 20 ; 20, 23 ; su-
dānavab, I, 64, 6¹ ; (113 seqq.) ;
1, 85, 10 ; II, 34, 8¹ ; V, 52, 5 ;
53, 6 ; 57, 5 ; VIII, 20, 18 ; X,
78, 5 ; su-dānub, generous sacri-
ficer, VI, 66, 5.
- su-dās, liberal giver :
su-dāse, V, 53, 2.
- su-dīna, always kind :
su-dīnā, V, 60, 5.
- su-ditī, flaming :
suditī-bhiḥ, VIII, 20, 2.
- su-dūgha, flowing with plenty :
su-dūghā, V, 60, 5.
- su-devā, beloved by the gods :
su-devāb, V, 53, 15.
- su-dravinas :
ep. of Aditi or Agni, (260.)
- su-dhānvan, carrying good bows :
su-dhānvānab, V, 57, 2.
- sū-dhita :
sūdhitā-iva, well-aimed, I, 166, 6⁶ ;
sū-dhitā, well grasped, I, 167,
3.
- su-nishkā, decked with beautiful
chains :
su-nishkāb, VII, 56, 11.
- su-nitī, good leader :
su-nitāyab, X, 78, 2.
- su-nritā, su-nritū :
(I, 134, 1².)
- su-plī, handsome :
su-plīab, I, 64, 8.
- su-putrā, having good sons :
su-putrā (Aditi), (254 ; 260.)
- su-péras, well-adorned, brilliant :
su-pérasam, II, 34, 13 ; su-pérasab,
V, 57, 4.
- su-praketā, brilliant hero :
su-praketébhiḥ, I, 171, 6.
- su-barhis, for whom we have pre-
pared good altars :
su-barhishab, VIII, 20, 25.
- su-bhāga, blessed, fortunate :
su-bhāgab, I, 86, 7 ; VIII, 20, 15 ;
su-bhāgā, V, 56, 9 ; su-bhagāsab,
V, 60, 6.
- su-bhāgā, blessed, happy :
su-bhāgab, I, 167, 7 ; su-bhāgān,
X, 78, 8.
- su-bhū, strong :
su-bhvāb, V, 55, 3 ; 59, 3 ; 87, 3 ;
su-bhvē, VI, 66, 3.
- sū-makha, joyful, powerful :
sū-makhāya, I, 64, 1 ; 165, 11 ; sū-
makhāsab, I, 85, 4 ; sū-makhāb,
V, 87, 7.
- su-matī, favour, goodwill ; prayer :
su-matīb, II, 34, 15 ; VII, 57, 4 ;
59, 4 ; I, 114, 9 ; (219 seq.) ; su-
matīm, I, 171, 1¹ ; 114, 3 ; 4 ;
sumatī-bhiḥ, VII, 57, 5.—su-ma-
tīm, prayer, I, 166, 6¹² ; (220
seq.)
- su-manasyāmāna, kind-hearted :
su-manasyāmānā, VI, 74, 4 ; (435.)
- su-mātrī, having a good mother :
su-mātārāb, X, 78, 6.
- su-māyā, mighty :
su-māyāb, I, 88, 1 ; su-māyāb, I,
167, 2.
- su-māruta :
su-mārutam gacām, the goodly host
of the Maruts, X, 77, 1⁴ ; 2.
- su-méka, firmly established :
su-méke, VI, 66, 6² ; VII, 56, 17.
- sumnā, favour :
sumnām, V, 53, 9 ; VIII, 7, 15 ; I,
43, 4 ; 114, 9 ; 10 ; II, 33, 1 ; 6 ;
sumnā, I, 38, 3¹ ; VIII, 20, 16 ;
sumnébhiḥ, VII, 56, 17 ; sum-
néshu, V, 53, 1.—(221.)
- sumna-yāt, wishing for favour :
sumna-yāntab, VIII, 7, 11.—sumna-
yān, well-disposed, I, 114, 3.
- su-yāma, well-broken (horses) :
su-yāmebhiḥ, V, 55, 1.
- su-rāna, delightful gift :
su-rānāni, V, 56, 8.
- su-rātna, rich :
su-rātnān, X, 78, 8.
- su-rātha, possessed of good chariots :
su-rāthāb, V, 57, 2.
- su-rātī, full of blessings :
su-rātāyab, X, 78, 3.
- suvitā, welfare, blessing :
suvitāya, I, 168, 1 ; V, 57, 1 ; 59,
1¹ ; 4 ; VIII, 7, 33 ; suvitā, I,
38, 3¹.
- su-vīra, with valiant offspring :
su-vīrab, V, 53, 15 ; 58, 4 ; su-vīram,

- I, 85, 12; V, 57, 7; X, 77, 7;
 su-vîrâ, VII, 56, 5; su-vîrâb, II,
 33, 15.
 su-vîrya, with plentiful offspring:
 su-vîryasya (râyâb), VII, 56, 15.
 su-vrîkti, pure offering, prayer:
 su-vrîktîm, I, 64, 12; suvrîktî-bhiḥ,
 I, 168, 1.
 su-vrîdh, well-grown:
 su-vrîdhab, V, 59, 5.
 su-jâmi, zealously:
 su-jâmi = su-jâmî (surâmyâ), V,
 87, 9¹.
 su-jârman, yielding the best pro-
 tection:
 su-jârmânab, X, 78, 2.
 su-jastî, praise:
 sujastî-bhiḥ, V, 53, 11.
 su-jîpra, with beautiful cheeks:
 su-jîprab (Rudra), II, 33, 5; (II,
 34, 3³).
 su-jûkvan, brilliant:
 su-jûkvânab, V, 87, 3.
 su-jéva, kind friend:
 su-jévau, VI, 74, 4.
 su-jâvab-tama, most glorious:
 su-jâvab-tamân, VIII, 20, 20.
 sú-samskrîta, well-fashioned:
 sú-samskrîtâb, I, 38, 12.
 sú-sadris, like one another:
 sú-sadrisab, V, 57, 4.
 su-sandris, beautiful to behold:
 su-sandrisab, X, 78, 1.
 Su-sôma, N. of a country:
 su-sôme, VIII, 7, 29¹.—su-sôma, a
 sacrificial vessel, (VIII, 7, 29¹).
 Su-somâ, N. of a river:
 (398 seq.).
 sú-stuta, highly praised:
 sú-stutâb, I, 166, 7.
 su-stutî, praise:
 su-stutîb, VII, 58, 6; su-stutîm,
 VII, 58, 3; II, 33, 8.
 su-stúbh, chanting beautifully:
 su-stúbhab, X, 78, 4.
 su-háva, who readily hears our call:
 su-hâvab, II, 33, 5¹.
 su-hástya, handy priest:
 su-hástyab, I, 64, 1.
 sú, to bring forth:
 ásûta, I, 168, 9.
 sū, f., genetrix:
 svâm, Loc., (V, 58, 7¹).
 sūd:
 sūsūdatha, you lead rightly, V,
 54, 7.
 sūnú, son:
 sūnúm, I, 64, 12; 166, 2; VI, 66,
 11¹; sūnávab, I, 37, 10¹; 85, 1;
 VIII, 20, 17.
 sūn-rîta:
 sūn-rîtâ, glory, VII, 57, 6.—sūn-
 rîtâ, dawn, I, 134, 1².
 sūra, sun:
 sūrab út-itab, X, 121, 6; sūrab,
 (V, 59, 3²); sūram, I, 86, 5²;
 see svâr.
 sūri, lord:
 sūrávab, V, 52, 16; VIII, 94, 7;
 X, 78, 6; sūrîm, VII, 57, 7; sūrî-
 bhiḥ, V, 52, 15¹.
 sūrya, sun:
 sūrya, náka, roṭanâ, (50); sūryab
 ná, V, 54, 5; 59, 3²; X, 77, 3;
 I, 43, 5; sūryam, VIII, 7, 22;
 sūryasya-iva, V, 55, 3; 4; sūr-
 yasya lákshub, V, 59, 5; sūr-
 yasya sam-drîsab, II, 33, 1;
 sūryâya, VIII, 7, 8¹; sūrye út-
 ite, V, 54, 10; sūryâb-iva, I,
 64, 2.
 sūrya-tvaḥ, with sun-bright skin:
 sūrya-tvaḥab, VII, 59, 11.
 Sūryâ, Sūryâ (the Dawn):
 sūryâ-iva, I, 167, 5.
 sūryâmâsâ, sun and moon:
 VIII, 94, 2.
 sri, to run, to flow:
 sasrub, V, 53, 2¹; sasrúshîb, I, 86,
 5¹; sísratab, V, 54, 10.—prâ sas-
 rub, they went forth, V, 53, 7.
 srig, to let loose, to send forth:
 srigâmi, I, 19, 9; srigata, I, 39,
 10; sriganti, VIII, 7, 8; asri-
 kshata, V, 52, 6; ásargi, I, 38,
 8.—áva-srishrâ divâb, sent from
 heaven, VII, 46, 3.—vî sriganti,
 V, 53, 6.
 sriprâ-dânu, possessed of flowing
 rain:
 sriprâ-dânû, (115).
 sénâ, army:
 sénâb (of Rudra), II, 33, 11².
 senâ-nî, ep. of Rudra:
 (II, 33, 11²).
 so:
 áva syatam, tear away, VI, 74, 3.
 —See prâ-sita.—vi syanti, they
 rush forth, I, 85, 5.
 Sóbhari:
 (VIII, 20, 2²); sóbharînam, VIII,
 20, 8; sobhare, VIII, 20, 19.

Sobharī-yú, friend of the Sobharis :
 sobharī-yávab, VIII, 20, 2².
 sóma, Soma :
 sómab sutáb, I, 86, 4; VIII, 94, 4¹; soma, I, 43, 7; 8¹; 9 (bis); Soma and Rudra, (435); sómam, V, 60, 8; sómasya, I, 85, 10; 87, 5; 134, 1; asyá sómasya pitáye, VIII, 94, 10 to 12; sómâb, X, 78, 2; I, 2, 1; sómâsab, I, 168, 3¹; sómânâm, I, 134, 6.—See *vrishan*.
 soma-paribâdh :
 soma-paribâdhab, read soma, paribâdhab, I, 43, 8¹.
 sóma-píti, Soma-drinking :
 sóma-pítaye, VIII, 94, 3; 9; I, 2, 3.
 soma-píthâ :
 (I, 19, 1¹).
 somârudrâ, Soma and Rudra :
 somârudrâ, 'au, VI, 74, 1 to 4.
 somyá, of Soma :
 somyám mádhu, I, 19, 9; somyé mádhau, VII, 59, 6.
 saudhanvaná, *Ribhu* :
 saudhanvanásab, (I, 6, 4²).
 saúbhaga, delight, happiness :
 saúbhagam, V, 53, 13; saúbhagâya, V, 60, 5; saúbhagâ, I, 38, 3.
 sauravasá, glory :
 sauravasáni, VI, 74, 2.
 Sauhotra :
 Purumî/ba Sauhotra, (362).
 skand, to spring :
 áti skandanti, they spring over, V, 52, 3¹.
 skambh :
 prati-skâbhe, to withstand, I, 39, 2.
 skambhá-deshña, whose gifts are firm :
 skambhá-deshñâb, I, 166, 7.
 stan, to thunder :
 stanáyantam, I, 64, 6⁴; stanáyan, X, 168, 1.
 stanáyat-ama, having thundering strength :
 stanáyat-amâb, V, 54, 3.
 stabh :
 stabhitám, established, X, 121, 5; tastabhánê, standing firm, X, 121, 6.—vi rôdasî tastabhúb, they hold heaven and earth asunder, VIII, 94, 11.

stu, to praise :
 stushé, V, 58, 1¹; VIII, 7, 32; astoshi, X, 77, 1; stuhi, V, 53, 3; stuhí, V, 53, 16; II, 33, 11; stuvaté, VIII, 7, 35; stuvatáb, V, 53, 16; stávânâb, II, 33, 11; staunáb, not stavânâb, (VI, 66, 5¹); stutáb, I, 171, 3; II, 33, 12; stutásya, VII, 56, 15; stutáb, V, 52, 14; stutásab, I, 171, 3; VII, 57, 6; 7; úpa stuhi, praise, VIII, 20, 14.
 stubh, to rush :
 stobhati (vab prâti), ástobhayat, I, 88, 6¹; (178); to shout, (V, 52, 12¹); to praise, p. xcvi.—prâti stobhanti, (streams) gush forth, I, 168, 8.
 stubh, to stamp :
 in tri-stúbh, (VIII, 7, 1¹); p. xcvi.
 strí, star :
 strí-bhih, I, 87, 1¹; 166, 11; II, 34, 2.
 stená, thief :
 Sâyana, stauná = stena, (VI, 66, 5¹).
 stotri, praiser :
 stotâ, I, 38, 4; stotrín, X, 78, 8; stotribhyañ, II, 34, 7.
 stotrâ, praise :
 stotrásya, V, 55, 9; X, 78, 8.
 stobhagrantha :
 (V, 52, 12¹).
 stóma, praise, hymn :
 stóma, bráhmañ, ukthâ, (I, 165, 4¹); stómab, I, 165, 11; 15; 166, 15; 167, 11; 168, 10; 171, 2; stómam, V, 52, 4; 60, 1; 61, 17; VIII, 7, 9; stómân, I, 114, 9; stómaib, V, 56, 5¹; VIII, 7, 17; stómebhiñ, VIII, 7, 21; II, 33, 5².
 stóma-vâhas, offering hymns of praise :
 (40.)
 stauná, unkind (?) :
 staunáb, VI, 66, 5¹.
 strí, woman :
 tvâ strí, V, 61, 6; (360.)
 stryambikâ :
 derivation of Tryambaka, (VII, 59, 12¹).
 sthávira, strong :
 sthávirañ, I, 171, 5.
 sthâ, to stand :
 tish/bat, VIII, 20, 4; úrdhvañ tish/batu, I, 134, 1²; tasthau,

I, 64, 9; V, 56, 8; VI, 66, 6.—
prā āti tasthāu, he surpasses, I, 64, 13.—*mā āpa sthāta*, do not stay away, VIII, 20, 1¹.—*mā āva sthāta*, do not go away, V, 53, 8.—*ā tasthūb*, they stepped to (Acc.), I, 85, 7; V, 60, 2; *ā rātheshu tasthūshab*, V, 53, 2; *ā asthāpayanta*, they placed, I, 167, 6.—*ūt tishṭha*, arise, V, 56, 5.—*pāri sthūb*, they surrounded, I, 167, 9; *pāri tasthūshab*, standing around, I, 6, 1²; *mā pāri sthāt*, let not prevent, V, 53, 9.—*vi tasthire*, they have spread, VIII, 7, 8; 36.
sthāb-raśman, with firm reins :
sthāb-raśmānab, V, 87, 5.
sthātū :
sthātūb karātham, what stands and moves, pp. lxxii seqq.
sthātri, charioteer :
sthātārab, V, 87, 6.—*sthātṛīn*, for *sthātūb*, p. lxxiii; *sthātūb gāga-tab*, p. lxxiv.
sthirā, strong, firm :
sthirām, I, 37, 9; 39, 3; 64, 15; *sthirā* (Rodasi), I, 167, 7; *sthirā*, I, 39, 2; VIII, 20, 1¹; 12; VII, 56, 7; II, 33, 14²; *sthirāb*, I, 38, 12; *sthirāśya*, V, 52, 2; *sthirébhiḥ*, II, 33, 9.
sthirā-dhanvan, whose bow is strong :
Rudra, (II, 33, 14²); *sthirā-dhan-vane*, VII, 46, 1.
snū, ridge :
snū-bhiḥ, V, 60, 7; 87, 4; *ādhi snūnā divāb*, VIII, 7, 7; cf. *sānu*.
spāt, truly :
V, 59, 1¹.
spāras, help :
spārāse, VIII, 20, 8.
spar, to bind :
(I, 166, 8¹).
spār, spy :
spār, (V, 59, 1¹).
spārḥā, brilliant :
spārḥē, VII, 56, 21; *spārḥābhiḥ*, VII, 58, 3; *spārḥāni*, VII, 59, 6.
spārḥā-vira, of excellent men :
spārḥā-vīram, V, 54, 14.
spri, see *spāras*.
spridh, to strive :
aspridhran (c. Dat.), VI, 66, 11; VII, 56, 3.

spridh, enemy :
spridhab, V, 55, 6.
sma, particle :
hī sma, *smāsi sma*, I, 37, 15; *utā sma*, V, 52, 8; 9; *yushmākam sma*, V, 53, 5; *ādha sma*, V, 54, 6; VI, 66, 6; VII, 56, 22; *ihā sma*, V, 56, 7; *nahi sma*, VIII, 7, 21.
smāt, together :
V, 87, 8; VIII, 20, 18.
smi, to smile :
āva smayanta, they smiled upon (Loc.), I, 168, 8.
syand, to haste :
syannāb, V, 53, 7.
syandana, carriage :
(V, 87, 3²).
syandrá, rushing :
syandrāb, V, 52, 8; *syandrāsab*, V, 52, 3; the rushing chariots, V, 87, 3².
srág, garland :
srakshú, V, 53, 4.
sridh, to fail, to miss :
nā sredhati, V, 54, 7; *ásredhantaḥ*, VII, 59, 6.
srídh, enemy :
srídhāb, VIII, 94, 7.
svá, one's own :
svām, V, 58, 7¹; 59, 1; *svám ókab*, VII, 56, 24¹; *svéna*, I, 165, 8; *svāyā* (matyā), V, 58, 5; *svāt*, from his own place, V, 87, 4.
svāb, see *svār*.
svab-drís, seeing the sun :
svab-drík, VII, 58, 2².
svāb-nri, man of Svar :
svab-narab, V, 54, 10.
svāb-vat, heavenly, splendid :
svāb-vatī, splendid, I, 168, 7; heavenly Aditi, (260.)
svá-kshatra, strong :
svá-kshatrebhiḥ, I, 165, 5¹.
sva-gá, self-born :
sva-gāb, I, 168, 2.
svaṅg, to embrace :
(235, note *.)
svá-tavas, strong in themselves :
svá-tavasab, (I, 64, 4⁴; 165, 5¹); I, 64, 7¹; 85, 7; 166, 2; 168, 2; *sva-tavasab*, VII, 59, 11; *svá-tavase*, VI, 66, 9; *svata-vadbhiḥ*, (I, 6, 3²).

- svadhâ, custom, *ṛθος*, *Sitte* :
(32 seqq.); svadhâ, I, 165, 6;
svadhâm ânu, according to their
wont, I, 6, 4²; 88, 6; 165, 5;
p. xv; VII, 56, 13; VIII, 20, 7;
(V, 54, 5¹).—svadhâyâ, by itself,
sponte suâ, 34 seq.; by them-
selves, I, 64, 4⁴; svadhâbhih,
themselves, V, 60, 4¹.
- svadhâ, food :
(35 seq.); svadhâm, I, 168, 9²;
svadhâ, sacrificial term, (36.)
- svadhâ-van, self-dependent :
svadhâ-vne, VII, 46, 1¹.
- svâdhiti, axe :
(I, 88, 2¹; 166, 6⁶); svâdhitiya, p.
cxvii.
- svâdhiti-vat, holding the axe :
svâdhiti-vân, I, 88, 2¹; (171.)
- svanâ, shouting :
svanâb, V, 87, 5; svanât, I, 38,
10; svanê, V, 60, 3.
- svap, to tear, to pull (?) :
(I, 166, 10⁴).
- svapî, beak :
sva-pûbhih, VII, 56, 3¹; (I, 166,
10⁴).
- svâ-bhânu, self-luminous :
svâ-bhânava, I, 37, 2; V, 53, 4;
VIII, 20, 4; (I, 64, 4⁴); svâ-
bhânave, V, 54, 1.
- svâ-yata, self-guided :
svâ-yatâsab, I, 166, 4.
- svayâm, self :
(V, 60, 4¹); themselves, I, 87, 3;
VII, 56, 11; yourselves, V, 55,
2; 87, 2.
- svâ-yaras, famous :
svâ-yarasab, X, 77, 5.
- svâ-yukta, of one's own accord :
svâ-yuktâb, I, 168, 4.
- sva-yûg, self-harnessed :
sva-yûgab (vâtâsab), X, 78, 2;
(I, 168, 5¹).
- svâr, ether :
svâb, X, 121, 5²; light, I, 168, 2¹;
sky, V, 54, 15; sūrab, of the
sun, VIII, 7, 36.
- sva-râg, sovereign :
sva-râgab, V, 58, 1; sva-râgab,
of the lord (Soma), VIII, 94,
4¹.
- svâritri, singer :
svâritârab, I, 166, 11.
- svâ-rokis, self-luminous :
svâ-rokishab, V, 87, 5.
- svarga, heaven :
(X, 121, 5²).
- svaryâ, heavenly :
ârmânam svaryâm, V, 56, 4².
- svavas, see su-âvas.
- svâ-vidyut, with their own lightning :
svâ-vidyutab, V, 87, 3.
- svâ-vrikti :
(I, 64, 1²).
- svâ-rokis, self-shining :
svâ-rokib (Rodasî), VI, 66, 6.
- svâsara, nest, fold :
svâsarâni, II, 34, 5; svâsareshu,
II, 34, 8.
- sva-srîit, going, moving by them-
selves :
sva-srîit, I, 87, 4; sva-srîtab, (I,
64, 4⁴; 7¹); I, 64, 11.
- svastî, favour :
svastî-bhih, V, 53, 14; VII, 56,
25; 57, 7; 58, 6; 46, 4; svastî,
happily, II, 33, 3.
- svâdû, sweet :
svâdôb svâdiya, sweeter than
sweet, I, 114, 6.
- svânâ, rattling :
svânêbhih, VIII, 7, 17.
- svânin, noisy, turbulent :
svâninam, (I, 64, 12²).
- svâhâ, hail to you !
VII, 59, 6.
- svit :
kvâ svit, I, 168, 6; X, 168, 3.
- svri, to sound, to roar :
svrânti, V, 54, 2; 12; âsvaran,
V, 54, 8; sasvâb, I, 88, 5.
- svêda, sweat :
svêdasya, I, 86, 8; varshâm
svêdam âkrîre, they have
changed their sweat into rain,
V, 58, 7.
- ha, particle :
yât ha, I, 37, 12; 13; 39, 3; 85, 7;
87, 3; 88, 5; VIII, 7, 11; 21;
I, 134, 2; kât ha nûnâm, I, 38,
1; VIII, 7, 31; kâm ha, I, 39, 1;
kâb ha, V, 59, 4; yûyâm ha, V,
59, 4.
- hamsâ, swan :
hamsâsab, II, 34, 5; VII, 59, 7.
- han, to kill, to strike :
hanti, VII, 58, 4; hantana, VII,
59, 8; hamsi, II, 33, 15; âhan,
I, 85, 9; hanyate, V, 54, 7;
gaṅghananta, I, 88, 2; gighâm-

- sasi, I, 170, 2.—abhí gíghāmsati, he tries to hurt us, VII, 59, 8.—
 áva hantana, strike down, II, 34, 9.—út gighnante, they stir up, I, 64, 11.—pārā hathá, you overthrow, I, 39, 3; pārā-hatā, staggering, V, 56, 3.—sám hánanta, they fight together for (Loc.), VII, 56, 22.
- hānu, jaw :**
 hānvā-iva, I, 168, 5¹.
- hānman, bolt :**
 hānmanā, VII, 59, 8¹.
- hayé, hark !**
 V, 57, 8; 58, 8.
- hári, bay :**
 hári, the two bays (of Indra), I, 6, 2; 165, 4; hári vríshanā, the bay stallions, (139); sāpti hári, (I, 85, 1¹); hári (of the Maruts), V, 56, 6.—hári with synzesis, p. cxxiii.
- hari-vat, with bay-horses :**
 hari-vaś, I, 165, 3; 167, 1.
- hári-sipra, golden-jawed (or -helmeted) :**
 (II, 34, 3².)
- harmura :**
 (217, note b.)
- harmyá, fire-pit, hearth, house :**
 (218 seqq.)—harmyá, living in houses, I, 166, 4⁴.
- harmye-sthá :**
 harmye-stháś, standing by the hearth, (217); VII, 56, 16.
- hary, to be pleased with (Acc.) :**
 haryata, V, 54, 15.—práti haryate, it is acceptable, V, 57, 1; práti haryanti, they yearn for me, I, 165, 4.
- haryatá, delicious :**
 (147 seq.)
- háva, call :**
 hávam, I, 86, 2; V, 87, 8; 9; VIII, 7, 9; I, 114, 11; I, 2, 1.
- hávana, invocation :**
 hāvanāni, V, 56, 2.
- havana-śrút, mindful of invocations :**
 havana-śrút, II, 33, 15².
- havás, call, prayer :**
 havásā, I, 64, 12¹; VI, 66, 11.
- haviś-kṛt, sacrificer :**
 haviś-kṛtām, I, 166, 2.
- haviśmat, carrying oblations :**
 haviśmān, I, 167, 6; haviśmantab, X, 77, 1; I, 114, 8.
- havís, sacrifice :**
 haviś, VII, 59, 9; I, 114, 3; haviśhā, X, 121, 1 to 9; I, 166, 3; X, 168, 4; haviśhab, V, 60, 6; haviśshi, I, 170, 5; VII, 57, 6; haviś-bhiś, II, 33, 5.
- hávīman, invocation :**
 hávīman, VII, 56, 15; hávīma-bhiś, II, 33, 5.
- hávya, called to assist :**
 hávyaś, VIII, 20, 20¹.
- havyá, offering, libation :**
 havyá, I, 171, 4; VII, 56, 12; 59, 5; VIII, 20, 9; 10; 16.
- havyá-dāti, offering :**
 havyá-dātim, V, 55, 10.
- has, to laugh :**
 gaśh from has, (284.)
- hásta, hand :**
 hástab (bheshagáb gálāshab), II, 33, 7¹; háste bībhṛat bheshagá, I, 114, 5; hástayab, I, 38, 1; hásteshu, I, 37, 3; 168, 3.
- hastín, elephant :**
 hastínab, I, 64, 7².
- hā, to flee :**
 gñhita, I, 37, 7¹; dyaúb gñhite bríhát, the sky makes wide room, VIII, 20, 6.—ápa ahā-sata, út ahā-sata, (VIII, 7, 2¹).—ní gihate, they bend down, V, 57, 3; 60, 2; VIII, 7, 34; ní ahā-sata, they have gone down, VIII, 7, 2¹.—prá gihite, flies out of your way, I, 166, 5².
- hā, to forsake, to leave behind :**
 ágahātana, VIII, 7, 31; hitvá, V, 53, 14.
- hāridra, yellow :**
 (232.)
- hí, indeed, truly, for . . . :**
 áit hí, VII, 59, 7; hí kam, VII, 59, 5; vidmá hí, I, 170, 3; VIII, 20, 3.
- hi, to prepare :**
 hinomi, VII, 56, 12.
- hims, to hurt :**
 má nab himsít, X, 121, 9.
- hitá, friend :**
 hitáb-iva, I, 166, 3; hitá, kind, = sú-dhita, (225.)
- hinv, to rouse :**
 hinvantu, II, 34, 12.
- himávat, the snowy mountain :**
 himávantaś, X, 121, 4; (p. 4.)
- hímā, winter :**
 satām hímāś, during a hundred

- winters, I, 64, 14; V, 54, 15; II, 33, 2.
- híraṇya*, gold:
- híraṇyam-iva*, I, 43, 5; *híraṇyaib*, with golden ornaments, V, 60, 4; II, 33, 9.
- Hiranya-garbhá*, the Golden Child: *híraṇya-garbháb*, X, 121, 1¹; (p. 3 seq.; 6.)
- híraṇya-akra*, on golden wheels: *híraṇya-akrân*, I, 88, 5.
- híraṇya-nirṇig*, gold-adorned: *híraṇya-nirṇik*, I, 167, 3.
- híraṇya-pāni*, golden-hoofed: *híraṇyapāni-bhiḥ*, VIII, 7, 27; (I, 38, 11¹.)
- híraṇyāya*, golden:
- híraṇyāyebhiḥ*, I, 64, 11; *híraṇyāyam* (*vāgram*), I, 85, 9; *híraṇyāyib*, V, 54, 11; VIII, 7, 25; *híraṇyāyān* (*ātkān*), V, 55, 6; *híraṇyāyāb*, golden-coloured, V, 87, 5; *híraṇyāyāsab*, golden (chariots), VI, 66, 2¹; *híraṇyāye kōse*, VIII, 20, 8¹.
- híraṇya-ratha*, on golden chariots: *híraṇya-rathāb*, V, 57, 1.
- híraṇya-varṇa*, golden-coloured: *híraṇya-varṇān*, II, 34, 11.
- híraṇya-vāsi*, armed with golden daggers: *híraṇya-vāsiḥ*, VIII, 7, 32.
- híraṇya-sipra*, golden-jawed: *híraṇya-siprāb*, II, 34, 3².
- híri-sipra*, golden-jawed (or -helmeted): (II, 34, 3².)
- hīd*, to hate: *gihīriré*, VII, 58, 5; *hīritāsya*, furious, VII, 46, 4.
- hu*, to sacrifice: *guhūmāb* (c. Gen.), X, 121, 10; *guhavāma te haviḥ*, I, 114, 3.
- hri*, to be angry: *yāthā ná hriṇishé*, II, 33, 15.
- hriḍ*, heart:
- hriḍā*, I, 171, 2; V, 56, 2; *vās-yasā hriḍā*, VIII, 20, 18; *hriḍé*, I, 43, 1; X, 186, 1; *hrit-sú*, I, 168, 3.
- hélas*, anger: *hélāb*, I, 171, 1; 114, 4.
- hetí*, weapon: *hetib*, II, 33, 14; *hetáyab*, pp. xlviii; 1.
- hótri*, caller: *hótrishu*, VIII, 20, 20¹.
- hótri*, the *Hotri* priest: *hótā*, VII, 56, 18; VIII, 94, 6¹; *pāṭka hótrín*, II, 34, 14; *hótrishu*, (VIII, 20, 20¹.)
- hrāduni-vrít*, whirling the hail: *hrāduni-vrītab*, V, 54, 3.
- hru*, to injure: *ví hruvāti*, he can injure, I, 166, 12; (I, 166, 8¹.)
- hvri*, or *hvar*, to overthrow: *guhuranta*, I, 43, 8; *hru* and *hvar*, (I, 166, 8¹.)
- hve*, to call, to invoke: *havāmahe*, II, 34, 11; VIII, 7, 6; 11; I, 114, 8; *hvae*, V, 56, 5; *huve*, VIII, 94, 10 to 12; I, 2, 7; *havate*, VII, 56, 18; *hávate*, he is invoked (?), II, 33, 5¹; *vípram hávamānam*, VIII, 7, 30.—*ānu hvaya*, call after, V, 53, 16.—*āva hvaye*, I call down, V, 56, 1.—*ā huvāmahe*, we call towards us, V, 56, 8; *ā huve*, V, 56, 9; VII, 56, 10; *ā gohavití*, he calls again and again, VII, 56, 18.—*ní hvayāmahe*, we call down, I, 114, 4; 5.—*prā hūyase*, thou art called forth, I, 19, 1.

II. LIST OF
THE MORE IMPORTANT PASSAGES
QUOTED
IN THE PREFACE AND IN THE NOTES.

RIG-VEDA.

	PAGE		PAGE
I, 3, 11	221	I, 38, 14	42
4, 5; 6	xxxix seqq.	39, 9	92
5, 7	191	43, 2	259
6, 1	19, 21	43, 6	192
6, 6	76	44, 8	119
7, 8	140	44, 13	39
8, 9	236	46, 1	345
11, 5	28	47, 4	187
14, 6	39	47, 8	114
14, 9	50	48, 11	40
14, 12	24	48, 16	188
16, 1	143	49, 1	49
18, 3	270	49, 4	50
18, 6	304	50, 4	50
18, 7	264	51, 11	161
19, 6	50	51, 12	66
21, 5	158	52, 4	90
22, 3	188	54, 2	139, 143
22, 5	200	54, 7	115
22, 13	187	54, 8	28
22, 16	253	55, 1	264
23, 11	163	55, 3	200
23, 12	284	55, 4	147
24, 1	255	55, 5	265
24, 6	264	57, 6	57
24, 15	239, 258	58, 5	lxxiii
25, 1	237	59, 1	207
25, 4	214	60, 5	125
29, 7	104	61, 12	182, 222
30, 5	236	61, 14	125
30, 20	84	61, 16	125
30, 21	23	62, 10	91, 205
31, 2	238	62, 13	125
31, 16	298	64, 4	34
32, 7	144	65-70	xlvi, note b
33, 5	269	68, 1	lxxiii
33, 7	271, 284	70, 2	lxxiii
34, 3	187	70, 4	lxxii seqq., 119
34, 8	415	71, 7	61
35, 8	252	72, 5	78
36, 10	152	72, 6	lxxiii
36, 17	152	72, 9	255
37, 5	68	72, 10	24

	PAGE
I, 73, 4	215
73, 6 (7)	220
74, 7	265
76, 4	43
78, 2	204
79, 9	219
79, 11	89
80, 2	142
81, 5	265
83, 3	123
84, 14	398
84, 20	266
85, 3	162
85, 5	20
85, 12	148
86, 10	100
87, 6	186
88, 2	163
89, 10	254
90, 2	197
90, 9	191
91, 2	142
91, 13	87, III
92, 1; 2	23, 26
92, 2	23, 26
92, 12	237
93, 7	193
93, 8	238
94, 8	270
94, 9	158
94, 10	19
94, 15	259, 260
94, 16	249
95, 3	58
100, 1	143
100, 15	200
100, 17	102
101, 1	143
101, 10	301
102, 8	51
103, 6	145
104, 6	439
104, 9	152
106, 5	193
107, 2	243
108, 3	152
108, 12	35
109, 3	146
112, 3	303
112, 8	349
112, 15	205
113, 8	266
113, 13	35
113, 18	329
113, 19	243

	PAGE
I, 114, 1	191
114, 2	193
114, 3	220
114, 4	220
114, 5	27
116, 1	195
116, 4	119
116, 6	240
116, 7	222
116, 16	66
116, 20	100
116, 22	303
117, 5	88, 162
117, 11	223
117, 23	220
118, 5	26
119, 3	164
119, 8	268
119, 10	205
121, 11	311
121, 15	438
122, 3	151
122, 7	345
124, 4	125
127, 3	102
127, 4	224
127, 6	68
127, 11	219
128, 2	202, 437
128, 4	41
128, 5	229
129, 3	142
129, 5	42
129, 8	158
129, 11	CXXII
130, 2	148
133, 3	69
133, 5	226
134, 1	47
134, 5	CXXII
136, 5	238
138, 4	206
139, 1	69
139, 2	265
139, 7	206
140, 6	141
140, 11	225
142, 3	187
145, 3	212
146, 1	50
148, 4	224
151, 7	221
152, 2	265
153, 3	259
154, 3	144

	PAGE		PAGE
I, 154, 4	36	I, 191, 6	249
154, 5	403	191, 7	266
155, 4	52	191, 9	28
155, 5	264	191, 15. . . .	231
156, 3	220	II, 1, 3. . . .	189
156, 4	134, 441	1, 5. . . .	68
157, 3	192	1, 6. . . .	68
157, 4	188	1, 13	122
159, 3	lxxiv	2, 8. . . .	18
159, 5	219	3, 8. . . .	33
160, 3	38	3, 11	185
161, 11	lxxx	5, 2. . . .	253
161, 14	62	5, 4. . . .	207
162, 22	258	6, 2. . . .	165
163, 3	237.	8, 3. . . .	237
164, 30	35	10, 2	19
165	xii seqq.	11, 1	47
165, 1	186	11, 4	147
165, 5	32	11, 12	47
165, 6	34	12, 10	199
165, 13	437	15, 8	93
166, 5	75	16, 2	266
166, 10	133, 173, 196	16, 3	62, 309
166, 11	160	16, 6	150
167, 3	186, 225, 443	16, 8	141
167, 4	186	17, 4	39
167, 6	164, 204	18, 5	ciii
168, 3	230	20, 4	345
168, 6	86, 162	21, 1	148
168, 8	178	21, 2	41
169, 1	268	22, 1	122
169, 3	185	23, 3	104
169, 6	196	23, 8	226
169, 7	196	23, 10	271
169, 8	222	23, 14	104
171, 1	220	24, 1	189
173, 3	275	24, 12	237, 266
173, 7	189	26, 1	271
174, 8	175	27, 7	254
175, 1	142	27, 9	51
177, 1	139	27, 10	225
177, 2	140	27, 14	259
177, 3	150	28, 6	187
179, 1	141	28, 8	238
180, 5	309	30, 2	223
180, 6	35	30, 11	67
181, 5	lxvii	31, 1	172
181, 8	142	31, 2	93
184, 1	41	31, 6	166, 271
185, 3	240, 259	33, 4	287
186, 5	140	33, 13	193
186, 10	349	34, 2	144
189, 2	193	34, 15	220
189, 6	229	35, 8	207
190, 6	105	37, 3	39

	PAGE		PAGE
II, 38, 1	39	III, 44, 1	148
38, 7	237	44, 4	50
38, 11	191	48, 3	354
43, 3	221	50, 4	119
III, 1, 2	205	51, 3	205
1, 4	17, 25	54, 5	237
2, 8	204	54, 16. . . .	240
2, 10	172	54, 20. . . .	244
2, 11	140	55, 3	166
3, 1	204	55, 11. . . .	23
3, 9	239	56, 2	175
4, 1	220	57, 6	220
4, 7	36	60, 3	36
4, 11	254	61, 1	442
5, 1	38	61, 5	29, 310
6, 2	39	61, 7	145
6, 5	239	IV, 1, 3	xxxviii, 192
6, 8	49	1, 4	38
7, 5	25	1, 20	262
8, 3	155	2, 11	256
11, 8	226	3, 8	261
13, 6	193	4, 7	114
14, 1	310	6, 7	225
15, 1	310	6, 9	19, 25
15, 3	17	6, 10	68
17, 3	194	7, 5	253
18, 2	270	12, 4	258
18, 4	194	12, 5	193
19, 4	69	13, 5	33
20, 1	41	14, 1	197
22, 3	50	15, 6	22, 26
23, 1	224	16, 19. . . .	119
24, 1	155	16, 20. . . .	143
26, 4	163	18, 9	265
26, 5	122	18, 11. . . .	133
26, 6	299	19, 2	223
27, 9	247	19, 3	224
27, 15. . . .	144	19, 4	101
29, 2	224	21, 6	41
29, 9	149	22, 2	315
29, 16. . . .	166	24, 7	149
30, 1	266	24, 9	138
30, 10. . . .	227, 228	25, 3	244
31, 3	25	26, 4	33
31, 15	lxxiii	30, 2	231
31, 21	27	30, 3	267
32, 4	69	30, 10. . . .	145
32, 7	95	30, 23. . . .	201
32, 8	237	33, 6	33
33, 6	223	37, 4	372
33, 8	206	39, 3	263
35, 2	214	41, 6	141
35, 10. . . .	34	43, 4	268
40, 7	121	43, 6	26
43, 7	146	50, 8	225

	PAGE		PAGE
IV, 51, 6	162	V, 58, 5	186, 197
52, 2	23	58, 6	70, 207
53, 5	51	59, 5	111
53, 6	lxxiv	59, 8	261
V, 1, 1	207	60, 2	75
1, 5	26	60, 3	278
1, 10	221	61, 2	86
1, 12	144	62, 3	196
2, 7	166, 257	62, 8	243
7, 9	191	63, 5	163
11, 5	191	64, 2	219
12, 2; 6	26	66, 2	229
18, 1	85	69, 1	51, 119
27, 4	304	69, 3	193, 244
28, 6	204	71, 2	303
31, 5	173	73, 7	161
32, 2	57, 117, 131	74, 1	84
32, 4	34	74, 3	85
32, 5	217	74, 9	191
32, 7	182	78, 8	61
32, 8	158	79, 4	40
32, 10	173	80, 3	223
34, 5	264	82, 6	258
34, 7	267	83, 5	239
35, 4	144	83, 6	116
36, 5	150	85, 5	99
40, 2-3	150	87, 1	120
41, 10	Cl, 224	87, 2	101
41, 13	265	87, 5	149, 161
41, 16	281	VI, 2, 4	166
42, 11	204	2, 5	208
46, 2	69, 134	2, 8	35
46, 5	68	3, 1	269
46, 7	236, 384	3, 2	166
47, 3	23	3, 7	146
47, 6	141	4, 7	200
47, 7	194	7, 6	207
49, 2	204	11, 2	43
50, 4	38	11, 5	84, 186
51, 11	219	13, 1	207
52, 3	73	14, 3	239
52, 6	214	14, 4	124
52, 7	51	15, 6	205
52, 8	69, 163	16, 9	42
52, 9	173	16, 14; 15	153
52, 12	xcvi seq.	16, 38	431
53, 10	69	16, 46	204
53, 14	194	17, 4	236
54, 11	111	17, 5	199
55, 7	161	17, 15	165
56, 7	20	19, 8	140
56, 8	274	19, 8; 9	149
56, 9	67	19, 9	140
57, 2	163	20, 2	134
57, 3	75, 163	20, 5	89

	PAGE
VI, 20, 7	240
21, 4	192
21, 7	311
21, 9	349
22, 9	432
24, 3	207
26, 7	265
28, 6	276
29, 2	186
29, 3	187
30, 3	223
32, 1	42
32, 3	41
33, 3	225
34, 3	192
36, 5	96
39, 1	40
40, 4	188
44, 14	100
45, 22	192
47, 24	102
48, 6	18, 26
49, 2	21, 26
49, 3	22
50, 2	248
50, 4	378
50, 5	186, 274
50, 7	lxxiv, 194
50, 13	115
51, 5	244, 249
51, 14	158
52, 9	77
52, 17	189
54, 9	239
57, 3	39
57, 5	208
58, 3	61
61, 6	223, 442
61, 11	52
61, 13	48, 61
62, 4	164
62, 6	176
62, 10	269
63, 6	162, 172
63, 8	116
64, 2	197
64, 4	90
64, 5	90
66, 3	300
66, 5	277
66, 6	274
66, 7	67
67, 7	90
68, 11	151
70, 5	187

	PAGE
VI, 71, 2	47, 48
74, 1	191
75, 19	215
VII, 1, 2	215
3, 4	310
3, 7	197
3, 10	202, 437
4, 6	80
5, 4	238
7, 5	38
8, 3	34
9, 3	262
10, 1	310
11, 4	378
15, 12	256
16, 9	42
18, 4	221
18, 8	263
18, 9	265
20, 4	186
22, 3	303
24, 1	96
24, 4	149
25, 2	271
31, 10	221
32, 13	225, 264
32, 18	87, 223
32, 27	xx
34, 7	lxviii
35, 4	192
35, 6	193, 244
35, 8	193
36, 6	61
39, 1	220
40, 2	259
42, 2	19
42, 4	224
44, 5	69
46, 3	202
47, 3	34
49, 2	61
51, 1	257
55, 6	217
56, 3	175
56, 6	162
56, 8 (4)	68
56, 13	230
56, 16	217
56, 19	271
56, 21	240, 241
58, 2	197
60, 2	lxxiv
60, 4	223
60, 6	202, 437
60, 9 seq. . . .	146

	PAGE		PAGE
VII, 60, 12 . . .	lii	VIII, 7, 22 . . .	309
62, 3. . . .	223	7, 23	100
66, 2. . . .	248	7, 27	47, 93
69, 1. . . .	25, 139	7, 28	102
69, 5. . . .	194	7, 31	84
70, 2. . . .	62	7, 33	206
71, 1. . . .	21, 197	8, 4. . . .	84
75, 5. . . .	40	8, 7. . . .	49
75, 6. . . .	18	10, 6. . . .	35
76, 2. . . .	217	12, 14. . . .	242
77, 1. . . .	lxv seq.	12, 16. . . .	305
78, 4. . . .	34	12, 27. . . .	133
79, 4. . . .	222	13, 6. . . .	207
82, 4. . . .	40	13, 11. . . .	192
82, 5. . . .	164	13, 17. . . .	207
83, 2. . . .	267	13, 31-33. . .	150
83, 6. . . .	269	17, 6. . . .	191
86, 5. . . .	256	18, 6-7. . . .	258
86, 6. . . .	66, 267	18, 8. . . .	192
86, 8. . . .	191	18, 9. . . .	193
87, 1. . . .	223	19, 6. . . .	131
87, 7. . . .	238, 259	19, 14. . . .	244, 262
91 and 92 . . .	lxviii seq.	19, 25. . . .	87
93, 7. . . .	258	19, 31. . . .	119
94, 2. . . .	303	19, 33. . . .	207
95, 1-2. . . .	60	20, 3. . . .	306
95, 2. . . .	58, 61	20, 5. . . .	218
96, 4. . . .	114	20, 7. . . .	32
97, 6. . . .	17	20, 8. . . .	138
100, 2. . . .	220	20, 10. . . .	136
104. . . .	lxix	20, 11. . . .	130
104, 9. . . .	88	20, 23. . . .	129
VIII, 1, 5. . . .	267	21, 18. . . .	95
1, 12. . . .	229	22, 4. . . .	220
1, 13. . . .	215	22, 6. . . .	221
1, 18. . . .	49	22, 16. . . .	136
1, 21. . . .	135	23, 3. . . .	38
2, 8. . . .	ci	25, 3; 5. . . .	251
2, 14. . . .	265	25, 5 seq. . . .	115
3, 5. . . .	121	25, 16. . . .	238
3, 23. . . .	39	26, 3. . . .	119
4, 9. . . .	276	26, 13. . . .	164
5, 9. . . .	441	29, 1. . . .	71
5, 20. . . .	192	29, 5. . . .	420
5, 21. . . .	156, 441	32, 6. . . .	35
5, 23. . . .	218	33, 8. . . .	lxxiii
5, 25. . . .	153	34, 17. . . .	19
5, 35. . . .	93	39, 4. . . .	194
6, 14. . . .	143	40, 9. . . .	cii
6, 39. . . .	398	42, 1. . . .	239
6, 40. . . .	143	43, 8. . . .	284
7, 2. . . .	161	43, 33. . . .	240
7, 4. . . .	161	44, 18. . . .	240
7, 14. . . .	161	44, 23. . . .	87
7, 20. . . .	85	45, 27. . . .	165

	PAGE		PAGE
VIII, 45, 35 . . .	124	VIII, 100, 2 . . .	96
46, 14 . . .	189	100, 10; 11 . . .	275
46, 23 . . .	231	100, 12 . . .	lxxv
46, 25 . . .	310	101, 15 . . .	249
47, 7 . . .	268	103, 7 . . .	114
48, 2 . . .	lxi	103, 8 . . .	153
48, 4 . . .	190	IX, 11, 3 . . .	192
48, 9 . . .	282	19, 2 . . .	303
49-59 . . .	xlvi seqq.	21, 4 . . .	128
50, 2 . . .	l, 111	34, 3 . . .	149
51, 3 . . .	lxvii	50, 1 . . .	138
51, 7 . . .	267	53, 1 . . .	104
52, 7 . . .	267	61, 12 . . .	328
52, 10 . . .	309	62, 24 . . .	394
55, 3 . . .	24	63, 10 . . .	76
55, 5 . . .	lxvii, 267	65, 22 . . .	398
60, 4 . . .	225	65, 23 . . .	399
61, 3 . . .	152	68 . . .	lxx
61, 4 . . .	198	68, 3 . . .	311
61, 18 . . .	186	70, 10 . . .	128
63, 7 . . .	226	71, 3 . . .	178
63, 10 . . .	248	72, 1 . . .	18, 105
64, 2 . . .	268	72, 8 . . .	28
64, 11 . . .	398	73, 9 . . .	89
65, 5 . . .	345	74, 1 . . .	221
66, 4 . . .	198	74, 3 . . .	251
67 . . .	lxix seq.	86, 1 . . .	lxx
67, 11 . . .	254	86, 21-30 . . .	lxxi
67, 14 . . .	257	86, 27 . . .	49
68, 1 . . .	124	86, 31-40 . . .	lxxi
68, 18 . . .	24	86, 48 . . .	158
71, 14 . . .	354	93, 4 . . .	223
71, 15 . . .	194	95, 3 . . .	372
72, 6 . . .	176	96, 2 . . .	221
72, 8 . . .	79	96, 6 . . .	173
72, 18 . . .	148	96, 8 . . .	90
73, 13 . . .	100	96, 15 . . .	lxxvi
75, 9 . . .	104	97, 8 . . .	138
78, 10 . . .	241, 265	97, 34 . . .	40
79, 7 . . .	90, 190	97, 55 . . .	240
82, 4 . . .	49	97, 57 . . .	175
84, 1 . . .	345	102, 2 . . .	253
88, 1 . . .	124	107, 5 . . .	116
90, 3 . . .	177	107, 6 . . .	187
90, 5 . . .	199	108, 7 . . .	lxvii
91, 3 . . .	265	108, 10 . . .	40
93, 7 . . .	139	111, 1 . . .	xxxviii
93, 16 . . .	68	111, 2 . . .	24, 27
94, 1 . . .	39	113, 1; 2 . . .	398
94, 9 . . .	52	113, 10 . . .	36
96, 5 . . .	135	114, 3 . . .	252
96, 14 . . .	148	X, 1, 1 . . .	92
97, 5 . . .	50	5, 5 . . .	23
98, 3 . . .	49	5, 6 . . .	253
99, 6 . . .	309	5, 7 . . .	246

	PAGE
X, 7, 1	271
8, 3	24, 329
8, 4	253
9, 4	194
11, 6	47
11, 7	220
12, 5	237
13, 5	202, 437
14, 1	205
14, 3	36
14, 7	36, 88
14, 8	88
15, 4	194
15, 12-14	35
18, 11	268
20, 1	202, 437
20, 9	18
24, 6	200
25, 1	202, 437
27, 19	33
28, 11	lxvii
31, 1	271
32, 2	52
33, 9	238
34, 6	276
35, 2	398
36, 1-3	250
36, 13	239
37, 10	191
37, 11	194
39, 11	245
40, 1	165
42, 6	271
43, 7	115
43, 8	140
43, 9	18, 27
44, 2	185
45, 10	439
46, 3	217
46, 5	67
47, 1	149
47, 7	291
49, 5	265
50, 4	439
55, 8	214
56, 4	267
58	61
63, 2	251
63, 3	255, 261
63, 5	245
63, 10	249
63, 11	229
63, 17	245
64, 5	246
64, 7	349

	PAGE
X, 65, 9	245
66, 3	244
66, 4	249
67, 7	140, 177
68, 4	132
69, 4	240
70, 8	225
72, 1-4	246
72, 4-5	246
72, 7	10 ^b
72, 8	251
73, 10	217
75, 2	223
75, 5	399
78, 2	283
79, 2	158
79, 6	269
80, 2	432
82, 5-6	10 ^a
86, 15	192
87, 18	259
89, 9	18, 149
92, 5	161
92, 7	141
92, 11	275
92, 13	lxxiii
92, 14	262
93, 5	151
93, 10	123
95, 6	308
95, 7	308
95, 9	308
95, 14	212
95, 15	172
96, 1	148
96, 3	186
96, 9	148, 302
96, 13	152
97, 18	192
97, 22	205 ^a
98, 1	200
100, 1	259
103, 2	214
103, 13	lxxx
104, 2	185
114, 2	237
114, 10	218
115, 3	42
115, 9	153
116, 9	195
119, 4	92
120, 1	224
120, 3	448
122, 3	253
124, 1	96, 253

	PAGE		PAGE
X, 124, 7	308	X, 144, 6	269
124, 9	xcvi	148, 3	221
125, 12	275	153, 2	143
129, 2	35, 91	158, 1	ci
129, 3	10	164, 3	66
133, 5	215	165, 4	88
138, 1	44	170, 1	229
138, 4	130	182, 1	194
140, 2	195	190, 2	7
142, 4	235		

ATHARVA-VEDA.

IV, 2, 6	11	VIII, 2, 1	55
37, 5	384	X, 2, 7	283
VII, 6, 1	261	XII, 1, 51	415

VĀGASANEYI-SAMHITĀ.

XI, 34	153	XI, 46	89
----------------	-----	----------------	----

TAITTIRĪYA-SAMHITĀ.

I, 8, 6, 2	430	V, 1, 3, 3	188
IV, 3, 13, 3	388	VII, 1, 19, 3	322

AITAREYA-BRĀHMANA.

V, 20	lxix	VII, 14	89
---------------	------	-----------------	----

SATAPATHA-BRĀHMANA.

II, 6, 2, 9	389	XI, 1, 6, 1	10
III, 7, 3, 1	429	5, 2, 4	377
IV, 3, 4, 14	429	XIII, 5, 1, 16	322
VI, 3, 3, 4	153		

TĀNDYĀ-BRĀHMANA.

XIII, 7, 12	360	XVI, 1, 12	430
---------------------	-----	--------------------	-----

TAITTIRĪYA-ĀRANYAKA.

I, 13, 3	254	I, 23	xlvi, note *
------------------	-----	---------------	--------------

ĀSVALĀYANA SRAUTA-SŪTRA.

VIII, 11	lxix, note *	IX, 4	112
------------------	--------------	---------------	-----

III.

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS ON THE RIG-VEDA.

I have often stated how much I was indebted to the labours of others in all I have endeavoured to do for the Veda. I have to make the same acknowledgment once more. Many indeed of those with whom I once worked side by side have ceased from their labours, but the gaps which death has caused have been filled by many young and equally valiant soldiers. I am almost afraid to mention names, lest I should seem forgetful of some by whose labours I have benefitted. The elaborate publications of M. Bergaigne occupy a prominent place, and seem to me to have hardly received the credit which they deserve. Scholars are too apt to forget that we may differ from the results arrived at by our colleagues, and yet admire their industry, their acumen, their genius. Professor Ludwig has continued his work, undismayed by the unjust and unseemly attacks of his rivals. Professor Oldenberg's contributions, *Das altindische Âkhyâna*, 1883; *Ṛigveda-Saṃhitâ und Sâmavedârcika*, 1884; *Die Adhyâyatheilung des Ṛigveda*, 1887, and lastly, the *Prolegomena* to his *Hymnen des Ṛigveda*, 1888, have opened new and important fields of critical investigation. Different views have been ably represented by Pischel and Geldner in their *Vedische Studien*.

Professor Avery's *Contributions to the History of Verb-Inflection in Sanskrit* (1875), Professor Lanman's *Statistical Account of Noun-inflection in the Veda* (1877), are indispensable helps to every student of the Veda. Professor Delbrück's *Syntaktische Forschungen* (1871-1879) und *Das Altindische Verbum* (1874) marked a decided advance in critical scholar-

ship. Almost every case of the noun in the Veda has found its special investigator, the Dative in Delbrück (1867), the Genitive in Siecke (1869), the Vocative in Benfey (1872), the Instrumental in Wenzel (1879), the Accusative in Gaedicke (1880). The nominal suffixes have been treated by Bruno Lindner in his *Altindische Nominalbildung* (1878); the suffixes of the Infinitive by Professor Ludwig (1871) and Professor Wilhelm (1870 and 1873). Geldner and Professor Kaegi have given a popular and useful account of the results of Vedic studies in *Siebenzig Lieder des Rigveda* (1875), and *Der Rigveda* (1881).

The following is a list of the more important publications on the Rig-veda which have proved useful to myself and will prove useful to others. This list does not pretend to be complete, but even in its incomplete form, I hope that it may be serviceable to students of the Rig-veda.

The following abbreviations have been used :—

Bezz. Beitr. = Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen, herausgegeben von A. Bezzenberger.

Festgruss an Böhtlingk = Festgruss an Otto von Böhtlingk zum Doctor-Jubiläum von seinen Freunden. Stuttgart, 1888.

Journ. Amer. Or. Soc. = Journal of the American Oriental Society.

KZ. = Kuhn's Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung.

Rev. hist. rel. = Revue de l'histoire des religions, publiée by M. Jean Reville. Paris.

ZDMG. = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

ARROWSMITH, R. *The Rigveda*. By Adolf Kaegi. Translation. Boston, 1886.

AUFRECHT, TH. KZ. XXV, 435, 601; XXVI, 610; XXVII, 609.—
Zur Kenntniss des Rgveda: Festgruss an Böhtlingk, 1-3.—
Erklärung vedischer Stellen: Bezz. Beitr. XIV, 29-33.—ZDMG. XLV, 305.

AVERY, JOHN. Contributions to the History of Verb-Inflection in Sanskrit, 1875. (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc., Vol. X, No. 10.)

— The Unaugmented Verb-Forms of the Rig- and Atharva-Vedas (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc., Vol. XI, No. 2, 1885.)

BARTHOLOMAE, CHR. Rv. I, 171, 1: KZ. XXIX, 279.—Arisches: Bezz. Beitr. XV, 1-43, 185-247.—ZDMG. XLIII, 664-668.

— Studien zur indogermanischen Sprachgeschichte. Halle, 1890.
See Pischel in Götting. Gel. Anz., No. 13, 20 Juni 1890, pp. 529 ff.

- BENFEY, THEODOR.** Die Quantitätsverschiedenheiten in den Samhitâ- und Pada-Texten der Veden. 6 Theile. Göttingen, 1874-81.
- Ueber die Entstehung des indogermanischen Vokativs. Göttingen, 1872.
- Veda und Verwandtes. Strassburg, 1879.
- Ueber einige Wörter mit dem Bindevocal *î* im Rigveda. Göttingen, 1879.
- Veda und Linguistica. Strassburg, 1880.
- Behandlung des auslautenden *a* in *na* 'wie' und *na* 'nicht' im Rigveda, mit Bemerkungen über die Aussprache der Wörter im Veda. Göttingen, 1881.
- Uebersetzung des Rigveda (I, 1-118): Orient und Occident, 1862-64.
- Rigveda, X, 10, 7: Bezz. Beitr. I, 47-51.—Uebersetzung des Rigveda (I, 119-130): Bezz. Beitr. VII, 286-309.
- Kleinere Schriften, herausgegeben von A. Bezzenberger, I, 109, 120, 265, 278, 295, 305, 314, 316; II, 172, 177. Berlin, 1890.
- BERGAIGNE, A.** La religion védique d'après les hymnes du Rig-Veda. Vols. I-III. Paris, 1878-83.
- Quelques Observations sur les figures de rhétorique dans le Rig-Veda. (Mémoires de la Société de linguistique, tome IV, 2^e fascicule.) Paris, 1880.
- Recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitâ du Rig-Veda I. La Samhitâ primitive. Paris, 1887. (Journal Asiatique, 1886. Extrait.)
- Nouvelles recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitâ du Rig-Veda II-IV. Supplément au Mémoire sur la Samhitâ primitive; les différents couches d'interprétations; le classement du Mandala VIII. Paris, 1887. (Journal Asiatique, IX, 191-287. Extrait.)
- Deuxième note additionnelle à l'article Recherches sur l'histoire de la Samhitâ du Rig-Veda. (Journal Asiatique, IX, 518 f.)
- La syntaxe des comparaisons védiques: Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, LXXII, pp. 75-101. (Mél. Renier, Paris, 1887.)
- Recherches sur l'histoire de la liturgie védique. La forme métrique des hymns du Rig-Veda. (Ac. des Inscr., C—R, XVI, 1888, Mai-Juin, pp. 232-238.)
- Recherches sur l'histoire de la liturgie védique. (Journal Asiatique, XIII, 2, 121-197. 1889.)
- La division en Adhyâyas du Rig-Veda: Journal Asiatique, X, 3, 488-495. (Extrait. Paris, 1888.)
- et V. HENRY. Manuel pour le Sanscrit Védique. Paris, 1890.

- BLOOMFIELD, M. Final *as* before Sonants in Sanskrit. Baltimore, 1882. (Amer. Journal of Philology, Vol. III, No. 1.)
- On certain Irregular Vedic Subjunctives or Imperatives. Baltimore, 1884. (Amer. Journal of Philology, Vol. V, No. 1.)
- On the Vedic Instrumental *paḍbhfs*. (Proc. Amer. Or. Soc. Oct. 1889, pp. clii-clvi.)
- Contributions to the Interpretation of the Veda. Second Series. Baltimore, 1890.
- BOLLESEN, F. Zur Vedametrik : ZDMG. XXXV, 448-445.—Die Betonungssysteme des R̥g- und Sāmaveda : ZDMG. XXXV, 456-72.—Beiträge zur Kritik des Veda : ZDMG. XLI, 494-507 ; XLV, 204.
- P. VON BRADKE. Beiträge zur altindischen Religions- und Sprachgeschichte : ZDMG. XL, 347 ff., 655 ff.
- Dyâus Asura, Ahura Mazdâ und die Asuras. Halle, 1885.
- BRUNNHOFER, H. Erwähnung der Pfahlbauten im R̥gveda : Fernschau, Jahrb. der Mittelschweiz, Geogr.-Commerz. Ges. in Aarau, II (1888).
- Dialektspuren (Infinitiv) : KZ. XXV, 329.—Ueber Infinitive des Veda und Avesta : Bezz. Beitr. XV, 262-270.
- COLINET, PH. Les principes de l'exégèse védique d'après MM. Pischel et K. Geldner (Muséon, IX, 1890, pp. 250-267 and 372-388).
- Purandhi, the goddess of abundance, in the R̥gveda. (Babyl. and Oriental Record, II, 11 (1888), pp. 245-254.)
- Purandhi is the goddess of abundance in the R̥gveda. (Babyl. and Oriental Record, 1890, IV, 6, pp. 121-130.)
- COLLITZ, H. Ueber eine besondere Art vedischer Composita, Verhandlungen des V^{ten} intern. Or. Congr. zu Berlin, 1881. II, 287-298.
- DELBÜCK, B. De usu dativi in carminibus R̥gvedae. Halle, 1867.
- Syntaktische Forschungen. Halle, 1871-79.—Bd. V, Altindische Syntax. Halle, 1888.
- Das Altindische Verbum. Halle, 1874.
- Vedische Chrestomathie. Halle, 1874.
- EATON, A. J. The Âtmanepada in the R̥gveda. Leipzig, 1884.
- D'ECKSTEIN, BARON. Études sur la Grammaire Védique. (Revue Archéologique.) Paris, 1859.
- EDGREN, A. H. On the Relation in the R̥g-Veda between the Palatal and Labial Vowels and their Corresponding Semivowels, 1878. (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc., Vol. XI, 1880.)

- EHNI, J. Der Vedische Mythos des Yama. Strassburg, 1890.
 — Rv. X, 85, die Vermählung des Soma und der Sûryâ : ZDMG. XXXIII, 166–176.
- GAEDICKE, CARL. Der Accusativ im Veda. Breslau, 1880.
- GARBE, R. Accentuationssystem der altindischen Nominalcomposita : KZ. XXIII, 470.
- GELDNER, K. Conjectanea Vedica (kshonî): Bezz. Beitr. XI, 327–331.
 — Ueber das vedische Wort meni: Festgruss an Böhlingk, 31–33.—Conjectanea Vedica: KZ. XXVII, 215 ff.
- GELDNER, K., u. A. KÆGI. Siebenzig Lieder des Rigveda. Tübingen, 1875.
- GRASSMANN, H. Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda. Leipzig, 1873.
 — Rigveda, übersetzt. 2 Vols. Leipzig, 1876–77.
- GRIFFITH, R. T. H. The Hymns of the Rigveda, translated with a Popular Commentary. Vols. I, II. Benares, 1889–90.
- GURU DATTA, Vidyârthi. The Terminology of the Vedas, Part I. Lahore, New Indian Press, 1888.
- HAPPEL, JULIUS. An Varuṇa, Rigveda I, 25, übersetzt: Zeitschr. f. Missionskunde u. Religionswissenschaft, V, 1, p. 28 f.
- HAUG, M. The Origin of Brahmanism. Poona, 1863.
 — A Contribution towards a Right Understanding of the Rigveda. Bombay, 1863.
 — Brahma und die Brahmanen. München, 1871.
 — On the Interpretation of the Veda: Report of the Proc. of the 2nd intern. Congr. of Or. in London, 1874, pp. 24–27. Cf. Delbrück in Jenaer Literaturzeitung, Jahrgang 1874, Art. 785, and 1875, Art. 137.
 — Ueber das Wesen und den Werth des vedischen Accents. München, 1874.
 — Vedische Räthselsfragen und Räthselsprüche. Uebersetzung und Erklärung des Dīrghatamas-Liedes Rīgv. I, 164. München, 1876.
- HILLEBRANDT, A. Ueber die Göttin Aditi. Breslau, 1876.
 — Varuṇa und Mitra. Breslau, 1877.
 — Das altindische Neu- u. Vollmondsopfer. Jena, 1880.
 — Die beiden arischen Accentsysteme. 1882–85.
 — Veda-Chrestomathie mit Glossar. Berlin, 1885.
 — Zu Rv. V, 2, 1–6: ZDMG. XXXIII, 248–251.—Zu Rv. I, 162: ZDMG. XXXVII, 521–524.—Miscelle aus dem Vedaritual: ZDMG. XL, 708–712.

- HILLEBRANDT, A. Spuren einer älteren Rigvedarecension: Bezz. Beitr. VIII, 195-203.—Uktham madar ka sasyate: Bezz. Beitr. IX, 192.
- Vedaica. Vienna Oriental Journal, III, 188-194, 259-273.
- Nationale Opfer in Altindien: Festgruss an Böhltlingk, 40-43.
- Die Sonnenwendfeste in Altindien: Romanische Forschungen, V, 1889, 299 seqq.
- Vedische Mythologie I. Soma und verwandte Götter. Breslau, 1891.
- HIRZEL, A. Gleichnisse und Metaphern im Rgveda. Leipzig, 1890.
- KAEGI, A. Der Rigveda, die älteste Literatur der Inder. 2^{te} Aufl. Leipzig, 1881. See Arrowsmith.
- Vasta usrâh: Festgruss an Böhltlingk, 48 seq.
- KERBAKER, M. Varuna e gli Aditya, saggio di esegesi vedica, memoria (Atti della R. Acad. di archeol. lettere e belle arti, 1884-86). Napoli, 1887, pp. 105-144.—App. II al Vol. XIII, degli Atti &c. Napoli, 1889.
- KIRSTE, J. Études sur les Prâtisâkhyas. Paris, 1883.
- KOULIKOWSKI, D. Les trois feux sacrés du Rig-Véda: Rev. hist. rel. XX, 2, pp. 151-179.
- KÜHNAU, R. Die Trishṭubh-Jagati-Familie. Göttingen, 1886.
- Rhythmus und indische Metrik. Göttingen, 1887.
- LANGLOIS, M. Rig-Véda, ou Livre des Hymnes, traduit du Sanscrit, 4 tom. Paris, 1848-51.
- LANMAN, CHARLES R. A Statistical Account of Noun-Inflection in the Veda. (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc., Vol. X, No. 11.) New Haven, 1880. Cf. Collitz in Bezz. Beitr. VII, 176-184.
- LIGNANA, GIACOMO. I Navagvâh e i Dâṣagvâh del Rîgveda: Verhandlungen des VII^{ten} internat. Or. Congr. in Wien, 1886. Arische Section, pp. 59-68.
- LINDNER, BRUNO. Altindische Nominalbildung. Jena, 1878.
- LUDWIG, A. Der Infinitiv im Veda. Prag, 1871.
- Ueber die unflectierten Formen auf â des verbum finitum im Rigveda. Prag, 1874. (Sitzungsber. d. Kgl. böhm. Ges. d. Wiss.)
- Die philosophischen und religiösen Anschauungen des Veda. Prag, 1875.
- Der Rigveda, Deutsch mit Commentar und Einleitung, Vols. 1-6. Prag, 1876-88.
- Über die Erwähnung von Sonnenfinsternissen im Rigveda. Sitzungsber. der Kgl. böhm. Ges. der Wiss. Prag, 1885.

- LUDWIG, A. Die Ironie im Mahābhārata und im Ṛgveda: Festgruss an Böhrlingk, 82-87.
- Ueber die Kritik des Ṛgveda Textes. Prag, 1889.
- Ueber Methode bei Interpretationen des Ṛgveda. Prag, 1890.
- dhāman und svadhā: KZ. XXVIII, 240.
- Bedeutungen vedischer Wörter: ZDMG. XL, 715-717.—Drei Ṛgvedastellen: ZDMG. XL, 713.
- MACDONELL, A. A. Kātyāyana's Sarvānukramanī of the *Rigveda*. Oxford, 1886.
- MAX MÜLLER, F. Rig-Veda oder die heiligen Lieder der Brahmanen. I: Text und Uebersetzung des Prātisākhya oder der ältesten Phonetik und Grammatik. Leipzig, 1856.
- Rig-Veda-Saṃhitā. The Sacred Hymns of the Brahmins. Translated and explained. Vol. I. London, 1869.
- MAYR, AUREL. Beiträge aus dem Rg-Veda zur Accentuirung des Verbum finitum. Wien, 1871.
- MEYER, RUDOLF. Ṛgvidhāna. Berlin, 1878.
- MUIR, JOHN. Original Sanskrit Texts, Vols. I-V, London, 1868-1871 (2nd ed.).
- MYRIANTHEUS, L. Die Aśvins oder Arischen Dioskuren. München, 1876.
- NEISSER, W. Zur vedischen Verballehre I: Bezz. Beitr. VII, 211-241.
— Vorvedisches im Veda: Bezz. Beitr. XVII, 244-256.
- NÈVE, M. F. Études sur les hymnes du Rig-Vêda. Paris, 1842.
- Essai sur le Mythe des Ribhavas. Paris, 1847.
- OLDENBERG, H. Das altindische Ākhyāna: ZDMG. XXXVII, 54-86.
- Rigveda-Saṃhitā und Sāmavedārcika: ZDMG. XXXVIII, 439-480.
- Ākhyāna-Hymnen im Ṛgveda: ZDMG. XXXIX, 52-90.
- Die Adhyāyatheilung des Ṛgveda: ZDMG. XLI, 508-515; XLII, 362-365.
- Ueber die Liedverfasser des Ṛgveda. ZDMG. XLII, 199-247.
- Der Abhinihita Sandhi im Ṛgveda, ZDMG. XLIV, 321-338.
- Der Ṛgveda. Band I: Metrische und textgeschichtliche Prolegomena. Berlin, 1888. [Cf. Review by A. Hillebrandt, in Goetting. Gel. Anz., Mai 1889, pp. 387-424.—See Sabbathier.]
- The Interpretation of the Veda, and the Hindu Epic: Open Court (Chicago), 1889, April 11 (Translated from the Deutsche Rundschau).

- PERRY, E. D. Indra in the Rigveda : Journ. Amer. Or. Soc., Vol. XI, pp. 117-208. New Haven, 1882. (See Hillebrandt in E. Kuhns Literatur-Blatt für Orientalische Philologie, II, 1.)
- PERTSCH, W. Upalekha, de Kramapâtha libellus. Berol. 1854.
- PETERSON, P. Hymns from the Rigveda, edited with Sâyana's Commentary, notes and a translation. Bombay, 1888 (B. S. S.).
- Handbook to the Study of the Rigveda. Part I. Bombay, 1890 (B. S. S.).
- PISCHEL, R. Miscellanea : ZDMG. XXXV, 711-724. — Veda : ZDMG. XL, 111-126.
- Zur Lehre vom Dativ : Bezz. Beitr. I, 111-120.
- PISCHEL, R., u. K. F. GELDNER. Vedische Studien I. Stuttgart, 1888. [Cf. Reviews by : V. HENRY : Revue critique (1890), 5, pp. 81-85.—H. OLDENBERG : Götting. Gel. Anz. 1890. 10.—BARTHOLOMAE : Deutsche Litztg. 23 (1890).—VECKENSTEDT : Zeitschr. f. Volkskunde II, 6, pp. 244-248.—See Colinet.]
- REGNAUD, PAUL. Le mot védique *ṛta* : Rev. hist. rel. XVI, 1887, pp. 26-27.
- Le caractère et l'origine des jeux des mots védiques : Rev. hist. rel. XVI, 2, pp. 166-169.
- Un épithète des dieux dans le Rig-Veda (*amûra*) : Rev. hist. rel. XV, 1887, pp. 46-51.
- Etymologies védiques : Rev. hist. rel. XIX, 1, pp. 79-84.
- Le Rig-Veda et les origines de la mythologie indo-européenne : Rev. hist. rel. XIX, 3, pp. 333-352.
- Études védiques. Traduction d'un hymn à l'Aurore (I, 123 du Rig-Véda) : Rev. hist. rel. XXI, 1, pp. 63-96.
- Études védiques. Deux appréciations récentes du Rig-Veda : Rev. hist. rel. XXI, 3, pp. 301-311.
- Études védiques. L'hymne III, 1 du Rig-Véda : Rev. hist. rel. XXII, 302.
- REGNIER, A. Étude sur l'idiome des Védas et les origines de la langue Sanscrite. Paris, 1855.
- Études sur la grammaire védique. Prâtisâkhya du Rig-Véda. Paris, 1857.
- RIG-VEDA. Rigveda Sanhita, liber primus, ed. F. Rosen. London, 1838.
- Rig-Veda-Sanhita, the Sacred Hymns of the Brahmans, together with the Commentary of Sayanacharya. Edited by F. Max Müller. 6 vols. London, 1849-1874. Second Edition, Vols. I, II. London, 1890.

- RIG-VEDA. The Hymns of the Rig-Veda in the Samhitâ Text. Reprinted from the editio princeps, by F. Max Müller. London, 1873.
- The Hymns of the Rig-Veda in the Pada Text. Reprinted from the editio princeps, by F. Max Müller. London, 1873.
- Die Hymnen des Rigveda. Herausgegeben von Th. Aufrecht. 2 Theile. 2^{te} Auflage. Bonn, 1877.
- *Riksamhitâ Sâyanâkârya-virakita-Bhâshya-sahitâ*, Padapâṭṭhayuktâ ka, edited by Râgârâma Sâstri Bodas and Sivarâma Sâstri Gore. 8 vols. Bombay, 1889.
- Rigveda Samhitâ, ed. by Prasanna Kumâra Vidyâratna. Vol. I. Calcutta, 1888-9.
- Rigvedasya Sâyanâkârya-virakitam Mâdhaviya-Vedârtha-Prakâśakhyam Bhâshyam. Edited by Prasanna Kumâra Vidyâratna. Calcutta, 1889.
- Rig-Veda Sanhita, the first and second Adhyâyas of the first Ashtaka, with notes and explanations, and an introductory essay on the study of the Vedas. By K. M. Banerjea. Calcutta, 1875.
- Rig Veda Samhitâ, Vols. I-VII. Bengali Translation, with notes, by R. C. Datta. Calcutta, 1887.
- The Vedârthayatra, Marâthi and English Translation of the Vedas. Parts 1-22. Bombay, 1876-80.
- ROTH, R. Zur Litteratur und Geschichte des Weda. Stuttgart, 1846.
- Ueber gewisse Kürzungen des Wortendes im Veda: Verhandlungen des VII^{ten} intern. Or. Congr. in Wien, 1886. Arische Section, pp. 1-10.
- Ueber den Soma: ZDMG. XXXV, 680-692.—Wo wächst der Soma? ZDMG. XXXVIII, 134-139.—Der Adler mit dem Soma: ZDMG. XXXVI, 353-360.—Lösung eines Räthsels im Veda: ZDMG. XXXVII, 109-112.—Wergeld im Veda: ZDMG. XLI, 672-676.
- Vedische Studien: KZ. XXVI, 45.
- SABBATHIER, R. Une édition critique du Rig-Veda par M. Oldenberg: Rev. hist. rel. XX, 3, pp. 297-331.—Rev. de ling. XXIII, 1, 93-97.
- SCHERMAN, LUCIAN. Philosophische Hymnen aus der Rig- und Atharva-Veda-Samhitâ. Strassburg, 1887.
- SCHMIDT, J. Pluralbildungen der indog. Neutra (Weimar, 1889), p. 127 to Rv. I, 171, 1.—p. 128 seq. on *krânâ*.—p. 307 seq. to Rv. V, 52, 9.—p. 314 to Rv. X, 77, 8.
- L. VON SCHRÖDER. Nominalcomposita: KZ. XXIV, 101.

- SCHWAB, JULIUS. Das altindische Thieropfer. Erlangen, 1886.
- SIECKE, E. De genitivi in lingua Sanscrita imprimis Vedica usu. Berol. 1869.
- SIMON, RICHARD. Beiträge zur Kenntniss der vedischen Schulen. Kiel, 1889.
- THIBAUT, G. Das Jaṭāpātala. Lpzg. 1870.
- TURRINI, GIUSEPPE. All' Auròra innò dī Prāskaṇva Kāṇva recāto di Sāṁskṛito in volgare. Bologna, 1889.
- WALLIS, H. W. The Cosmology of the Ṛigveda. London, 1887.
- WEBER, A. Vedische Hochzeitsprüche: Indische Studien, V, 177-226. — Ueber die Metrik der Inder. Berlin, 1863 (Indische Studien, VIII).
- WENZEL, H. Ueber den Instrumentalis im Rigveda. Tübingen, 1879.
- WHITNEY, W. D. On the History of the Vedic Texts: Journ. Amer. Or. Soc. 1853.
- WILHELM, EUGEN. De infinitivi linguarum Sanscritae, Bactriae, etc. forma et usu. Isenaci, 1873.
- WILSON, H. H. Rig-Veda-Saṁhitā. Translated, completed by E. B. Cowell. London, 1850-66.
- WINDISCH, E. Zwölf Hymnen des Rigveda mit Sāyaṇa's Commentar. Leipzig, 1883.
- Vedisches: Festgruss an Böhrling, 114-118.
- WINDISCHMANN, FR. Ueber den Somacultus der Arier: Abhandlungen der Münchener Ak. der Wiss. IV. B. Abh. 2.
- ZIMMER, HEINRICH. Altindisches Leben. Berlin, 1879.
- ZUBATÝ, JOSEF. Der Quantitätswechsel im Auslaute vedischer Wörter: Vienna Oriental Journal, II, 53-62, 309-318; III, 86-92, 151-162, 281-312; IV, 1-16, 89-112.



CORRIGENDA.

Page 123, line 6 from below, *read* visvá-mânusha *for* visvá-manusha

„ 138, „ 19, *read* samsamânâya *for* samsa°

„ 138, „ 20, *read* samsanam *for* samsanam

„ 173, „ 4 from below, *read* ârâ *for* âra

„ 278, „ 17 seq., *read* of Indra *for* of the Maruts

„ 315, „ 8, *read* gaṅganâ- *for* gaṅganâ-

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.				Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.			III Class.							
	II Class.										
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗
4 " aspirata	gh	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	ङ	{ 𐬚 (ng) }
7 Spiritus asper	h	ह	{ 𐬛 (h) }	h, hs
8 " lenis	'	𐬜	𐬜
9 " asper faucalis	"h	𐬝
10 " lenis faucalis	"h
11 " asper fricatus	'h
12 " lenis fricatus	'h
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis	k	𐬞	𐬞	k
14 " aspirata	kh	𐬟	𐬟	kh
15 Media	g	𐬠	𐬠
16 " aspirata	gh	𐬡	𐬡
17 " Nasalis	h	𐬢	𐬢

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬨	𐬨	ي	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y')								
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		s		श	𐬯	𐬯	س	س		
22 " lenis assibilatus		z								z
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬔	𐬔	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th									th
25 " assibilata			TH							
26 Media	d			द	𐬌	𐬌	د	د	ד	
27 " aspirata	dh									
28 " assibilata			DH							
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬎	𐬎	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬵	𐬵	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l								
32 " mollis 2			L							
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬱	𐬱	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2			s (/)							
35 " lenis	z									z
36 " asperimus 1			z (δ)							
37 " asperimus 2			z (ζ)							

Dentales modificatae (linguales, &c.)		Labiales.	
38 Tenuis	t	38 Tenuis	p
39 " aspirata	tʰ	39 " aspirata	ph
40 Media	d	40 Media	b
41 " aspirata	dʰ	41 " aspirata	bʰ
42 Nasalis	n	42 Tenuissima
43 Semivocalis	r	43 Nasalis	m
44 " fricata	r	44 Semivocalis	w
45 " diacritica	ʀ	45 " aspirata	hw
46 Spiritus asper	sh	46 Spiritus asper	f
47 " lenis	zh	47 " lenis	v
		48 Anusvāra
		49 Visarga

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	o									ə
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē									...
3 " labialis	ō									...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	𐬀	𐬀	𐬀	ا	א	...
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	𐬁	𐬁	𐬁	آ	א	...
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	𐬂	𐬂	𐬂	ي	י	...
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	𐬃	𐬃	𐬃	ی	י	...
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			ए	𐬄	𐬄	𐬄	ه
9 " longa	ē			ऐ	𐬅	𐬅	𐬅	ه
10 Lingualis brevis	ri			रि	𐬆	𐬆	𐬆	ر
11 " longa	rī			री	𐬇	𐬇	𐬇	ر
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	𐬈	𐬈	𐬈	و
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	𐬉	𐬉	𐬉	و
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए	𐬊	𐬊	𐬊	ه
15 " longa	ē (ai)	(e)		ऐ	𐬋	𐬋	𐬋	ه
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		आ	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	آ
17 " "	ei (ēi)			इ	𐬍	𐬍	𐬍	ي
18 " "	oi (ōu)			उ	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	و
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			ओ	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	و
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		औ	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	و
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		आ	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	آ
22 " "	eu (ēu)			इ	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	ي
23 " "	ou (ōu)			उ	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓	و
24 Gutturalis fracta	ā			अ	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	ا
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			इ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	ي
26 Labialis fracta	ū			उ	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	و
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō			ओ	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	و

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

THE RIGHT HON. F. MAX MÜLLER.

This Series is published with the sanction and co-operation of the Secretary of State for India in Council.

REPORT presented to the **ACADÉMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS**, May 11, 1883, by **M. ERNEST RENAN**.

‘M. Renan présente trois nouveaux volumes de la grande collection des “Livres sacrés de l’Orient” (Sacred Books of the East), que dirige à Oxford, avec une si vaste érudition et une critique si sûre, le savant associé de l’Académie des Inscriptions, M. Max Müller. . . La première série de ce beau recueil, composée de 24 volumes, est presque achevée. M. Max Müller se propose d’en publier

une seconde, dont l’intérêt historique et religieux ne sera pas moindre. M. Max Müller a su se procurer la collaboration des savans les plus éminens d’Europe et d’Asie. L’Université d’Oxford, que cette grande publication honore au plus haut degré, doit tenir à continuer dans les plus larges proportions une œuvre aussi philosophiquement conçue que savamment exécutée.’

EXTRACT from the QUARTERLY REVIEW.

‘We rejoice to notice that a second series of these translations has been announced and has actually begun to appear. The stones, at least, out of which a stately edifice may hereafter arise, are here being brought together. Prof. Max Müller has deserved well of scientific history. Not a few minds owe to his enticing words their first attraction to this branch of study. But no work of his, not even the

great edition of the Rig-Veda, can compare in importance or in usefulness with this English translation of the Sacred Books of the East, which has been devised by his foresight, successfully brought so far by his persuasive and organising power, and will, we trust, by the assistance of the distinguished scholars he has gathered round him, be carried in due time to a happy completion.’

Professor H. HARDY, Inaugural Lecture in the University of Freiburg, 1887.

‘Die allgemeine vergleichende Religionswissenschaft datirt von jenem grossartigen, in seiner Art einzig dastehenden Unternehmen, zu welchem auf Anregung Max Müllers im Jahre 1874 auf dem

internationalen Orientalistencongress in London der Grundstein gelegt worden war, die Übersetzung der heiligen Bücher des Ostens’ (*the Sacred Books of the East*).

The Hon. ALBERT S. G. CANNING, ‘Words on Existing Religions.’

‘The recent publication of the “Sacred Books of the East” in English is surely

a great event in the annals of theological literature.’

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
LONDON: HENRY FROWDE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.C.

FIRST SERIES.

VOL. I. The Upanishads.

Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part I. The *Khândogya-upanishad*, The *Talavakâra-upanishad*, The *Aitareya-âraṇyaka*, The *Kaushîtaki-brâhmana-upanishad*, and The *Vâgasaneyi-samhitâ-upanishad*. *Second Edition*. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The Upanishads contain the philosophy of the Veda. They have become the foundation of the later Vedânta doctrines, and indirectly of Buddhism. Schopenhauer, speaking of the Upanishads, says: 'In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death.'

[See also Vol. XV.]

VOL. II. The Sacred Laws of the Âryas,

As taught in the Schools of Âpastamba, Gautama, Vâsishtha, and Baudhâya. Translated by GEORG BÜHLER. Part I. Âpastamba and Gautama. *Second Edition*. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The Sacred Laws of the Âryas contain the original treatises on which the Laws of Manu and other lawgivers were founded.

[See also Vol. XIV.]

VOL. III. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Part I. The *Shû King*, The Religious Portions of the *Shih King*, and The *Hsiâo King*. *Second Edition*. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

Confucius was a collector of ancient traditions, not the founder of a new religion. As he lived in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. his works are of unique interest for the study of Ethology.

[See also Vols. XVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXXIX, and XL.]

VOL. IV. The Zend-Avesta.

Translated by JAMES DARMESTETER. Part I. The *Vendîdâd*. *Second Edition*. 8vo, cloth, 14s.

The Zend-Avesta contains the relics of what was the religion of

Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes. It forms to the present day the sacred book of the Parsis, the so-called fire-worshippers.

[See also Vols. XXIII and XXXL]

VOL. V. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. WEST. Part I. The Bundahis, Bahman Yast, and Shâyast lâ-shâyast. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

The Pahlavi Texts comprise the theological literature of the revival of Zoroaster's religion, beginning with the Sassanian dynasty. They are important for a study of Gnosticism.

[See also Vols. XVIII, XXIV, XXXVII, and XLVII.]

VOLS. VI AND IX. The Qur'ân.

Parts I and II. Translated by E. H. PALMER. *Second Edition.* 8vo, cloth, 21s.

This translation, carried out according to his own peculiar views of the origin of the Qur'ân, was the last great work of E. H. Palmer, before he was murdered in Egypt.

VOL. VII. The Institutes of Vishnu.

Translated by JULIUS JOLLY. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

A collection of legal aphorisms, closely connected with one of the oldest Vedic schools, the Kathas, but considerably added to in later time. Of importance for a critical study of the Laws of Manu.

VOL. VIII. The Bhagavadgîtâ, with The Sanatsugâtîya, and The Anugîtâ.

Translated by KÂSHINÂTH TRIMBAK TELANG. *Second Edition.* 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The earliest philosophical and religious poem of India. It has been paraphrased in Arnold's 'Song Celestial.'

VOL. X. The Dhammapada,

Translated from Pâli by F. MAX MÜLLER; and

The Sutta-Nipâta,

Translated from Pâli by V. FAUSBÖLL; being Canonical Books of the Buddhists. *Second Edition.* 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The Dhammapada contains the quintessence of Buddhist morality. The Sutta-Nipâta gives the authentic teaching of Buddha on some of the fundamental principles of religion.

VOL. XI. Buddhist Suttas.

Translated from Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. 1. The Mahā-parinibbāna Suttanta; 2. The Dhamma-kakka-ppavattana Sutta. 3. The Tevigga Suttanta; 4. The Âkaṅkheyya Sutta; 5. The Ketokhila Sutta; 6. The Mahā-sudassana Suttanta; 7. The Sabbāsava Sutta. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

A collection of the most important religious, moral, and philosophical discourses taken from the sacred canon of the Buddhists.

VOL. XII. The Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, according to the Text of the Mādhyandina School.

Translated by JULIUS EGGELING. Part I. Books I and II. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

A minute account of the sacrificial ceremonies of the Vedic age. It contains the earliest account of the Deluge in India.

[See also Vols. XXVI, XLI, XLIII, and XLIV.]

VOL. XIII. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part I. The Pātimokkha. The Mahāvagga, I-IV. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The Vinaya Texts give for the first time a translation of the moral code of the Buddhist religion as settled in the third century B. C.

[See also Vols. XVII and XX.]

VOL. XIV. The Sacred Laws of the Âryas,

As taught in the Schools of Âpastamba, Gautama, Vāsishṭha, and Baudhāyana. Translated by GEORG BÜHLER. Part II. Vāsishṭha and Baudhāyana. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XV. The Upanishads.

Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part II. The Katha-upanishad, The Mundaka-upanishad, The Taittiriya-upanishad, The Brihadāranyaka-upanishad, The Svetâsvatara-upanishad, The Prasṇa-upanishad, and The Maitrāyana-brāhmaṇa-upanishad. *Second Edition.* 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XVI. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Part II. The Yî King. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

[See also Vols. XXVII, XXVIII.]

VOL. XVII. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part II. The Mahāvagga, V-X. The Kullavagga, I-III. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XVIII. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. WEST. Part II. The Dādīstān-ī Dīnīk and The Epistles of Mānūskīhar. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XIX. The Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king.

A Life of Buddha by Asvaghosha Bodhisattva, translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmaraksha, A.D. 420, and from Chinese into English by SAMUEL BEAL. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

This life of Buddha was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese, A.D. 420. It contains many legends, some of which show a certain similarity to the Evangelium infantiae, &c.

VOL. XX. Vinaya Texts.

Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part III. The Kullavagga, IV–XII. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XXI. The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka ; or, The Lotus of the True Law.

Translated by H. KERN. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

'The Lotus of the True Law,' a canonical book of the Northern Buddhists, translated from Sanskrit. There is a Chinese translation of this book which was finished as early as the year 286 A.D.

VOL. XXII. Gaina-Sūtras.

Translated from Prākṛit by HERMANN JACOBI. Part I. The Ākārāṅga-Sūtra and The Kalpa-Sūtra. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

The religion of the Gainas was founded by a contemporary of Buddha. It still counts numerous adherents in India, while there are no Buddhists left in India proper.

[See Vol. XLV.]

VOL. XXIII. The Zend-Avesta.

Translated by JAMES DARMESTETER. Part II. The Sīrōzahs, Yasts, and Nyāyis. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XXIV. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. WEST. Part III. Dīnā-ī Mainōg-Khirad, Sikand-gūmānīk Vigār, and Sad Dar. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

SECOND SERIES.

VOL. XXV. Manu.

Translated by GEORG BÜHLER. 8vo, cloth, 21s.

This translation is founded on that of Sir William Jones, which has been carefully revised and corrected with the help of seven native Commentaries. An Appendix contains all the quotations from Manu which are found in the Hindu Law-books, translated for the use of the Law Courts in India. Another Appendix gives a synopsis of parallel passages from the six Dharma-sūtras, the other Smritis, the Upanishads, the Mahābhārata, &c.

VOL. XXVI. The Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa.

Translated by JULIUS EGGELING. Part II. Books III and IV. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOLS. XXVII AND XXVIII. The Sacred Books of China.

The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Parts III and IV. The Lî K'î, or Collection of Treatises on the Rules of Propriety, or Ceremonial Usages. 8vo, cloth, 25s.

VOL. XXIX. The Gṛhya-Sūtras, Rules of Vedic Domestic Ceremonies.

Part I. Sāṅkhāyana, Âsvalāyana, Pāraskara, Khādīra. Translated by HERMANN OLDENBERG. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XXX. The Gṛhya-Sūtras, Rules of Vedic Domestic Ceremonies.

Part II. Gobhila, Hiranyakesin, Âpastamba. Translated by HERMANN OLDENBERG. Âpastamba, Yagñā-paribhāṣā-sūtras. Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

These rules of Domestic Ceremonies describe the home life of the ancient Âryas with a completeness and accuracy unmatched in any other literature. Some of these rules have been incorporated in the ancient Law-books.

VOL. XXXI. The Zend-Avesta.

Part III. The Yasna, Visparad, Âfrīnagân, Gâhs, and Miscellaneous Fragments. Translated by L. H. MILLS. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XXXII. Vedic Hymns.

Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part I. 8vo, cloth, 18s. 6d.
[See also Vol. XLVI.]

VOL. XXXIII. The Minor Law-books.

Translated by JULIUS JOLLY. Part I. Nārada, Br̥haspati. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d.

VOL. XXXIV. The Vedânta-Sûtras, with the Commentary by Saṅkarâcârya. Part I.

Translated by G. THIBAUT. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

[See also Vols. XXXVIII and XLVIII.]

VOLS. XXXV AND XXXVI. The Questions of King Milinda.

Translated from the Pâli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. Part I. 8vo, cloth, 10s. 6d. Part II. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XXXVII. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. WEST. Part IV. The Contents of the Nasks, as stated in the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Dinkard. 15s.

VOL. XXXVIII. The Vedânta-Sûtras. Part II. 8vo, cloth, with full Index to both Parts, 12s. 6d.

VOLS. XXXIX AND XL. The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Tâoism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. 8vo, cloth, 21s.

VOL. XLI. The Satapatha - Brâhmana. Part III.

Translated by JULIUS EGGELING. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XLII. Hymns of the Atharva-veda.

Translated by M. BLOOMFIELD. 8vo, cloth, 21s.

VOL. XLIII. The Satapatha-Brâhmana.

Translated by JULIUS EGGELING. Part IV. Books VIII, IX, and X. 12s. 6d.

VOL. XLIV. The Satapatha-Brâhmana.

Translated by JULIUS EGGELING. Part V. Books XI, XII, XIII, and XIV. 18s. 6d.

VOL. XLV. The Gâina-Sûtras.

Translated from Prakṛit, by HERMANN JACOBI. Part II. The Uttarâdhyayana Sûtra, The Sûtrakṛitâṅga Sûtra. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

VOL. XLVI. Vedic Hymns. Part II. 8vo, cloth, 14s.

VOL. XLVII. Pahlavi Texts.

Translated by E. W. WEST. Part V. Marvels of Zoroastrianism. 8s. 6d.

VOL. XLVIII. The Vedânta-Sûtras, Part III, with Râmânuga's Sribhâshya.

Translated by G. THIBAUT. 8vo, cloth, 25s.

VOL. XLIX. Buddhist Mahâyâna Texts. Buddha-karita, translated by E. B. COWELL. Sukhâvatî-vyûha, Vagrakke-dikâ, &c., translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Amitâyur-Dhyâna-Sûtra, translated by J. TAKAKUSU. 8vo, cloth, 12s. 6d.

ANECDOTA OXONIENSIA.

ARYAN SERIES.

Buddhist Texts from Japan. I. Vagrakkhedikâ ; The Diamond-Cutter.

Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A. Small 4to, 3s. 6d.

One of the most famous metaphysical treatises of the Mahâyâna Buddhists.

Buddhist Texts from Japan. II. Sukhâvatî-Vyûha : Description of Sukhâvatî, the Land of Bliss.

Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A., and BUNYIU NANJIO. With two Appendices: (1) Text and Translation of Saṅghavarman's Chinese Version of the Poetical Portions of the Sukhâvatî-Vyûha; (2) Sanskrit Text of the Smaller Sukhâvatî-Vyûha. Small 4to, 7s. 6d.

The *editio princeps* of the Sacred Book of one of the largest and most influential sects of Buddhism, numbering more than ten millions of followers in Japan alone.

Buddhist Texts from Japan. III. The Ancient Palm-Leaves containing the Pragñâ-Pâramitâ-Hridaya-Sûtra and the Ushnîsha-Vigaya-Dhâraṇî.

Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A., and BUNYIU NANJIO, M.A. With an Appendix by G. BÜHLER, C.I.E. With many Plates. Small 4to, 10s.

Contains facsimiles of the oldest Sanskrit MS. at present known.

Dharma-Samgraha, an Ancient Collection of Buddhist Technical Terms.

Prepared for publication by KENJIU KASAWARA, a Buddhist Priest from Japan, and, after his death, edited by F. MAX MÜLLER and H. WENZEL. Small 4to, 7s. 6d.

Kâtyâyana's Sarvânukramanî of the Rigveda.

With Extracts from Shadgurusishya's Commentary entitled Vedârthadîpikâ. Edited by A. A. MACDONELL, M.A., Ph.D. 16s.

The Buddha-Karita of Asvaghosha.

Edited, from three MSS., by E. B. COWELL, M.A. 12s. 6d.

The Mantrapâṭha, or the Prayer Book of the Āpa-stambins.


Edited, together with the Commentary of Haradatta, and translated by M. WINTERNITZ, Ph.D. *First Part.* Introduction, Sanskrit Text, Varietas Lectionis, and Appendices. Small quarto, 10s. 6d.

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

LONDON: HENRY FROWDE

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, AMEN CORNER, E.C.



ht

ss
a:

li
li
li-
na.

ss
ss

m-
a-

A.
ss.

ist

ss
lav

ed
ss.

ss-

nd
ss-
ss.

7 7 SE
PET

YC 54595



1

10



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

UC-NRLF



B 3 021 333

REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Received

May, 1891

Accessions No.


43531

Shelf No.

685

M9146

v. 33



THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London
HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXIII



Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1889

[*All rights reserved*]

THE
MINOR LAW-BOOKS

TRANSLATED BY

JULIUS JOLLY

PART I

NÂRADA. BR/HAŚPATI



Orford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1889

[*All rights reserved*]

43531

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION TO NÂRADA	xi
ABBREVIATIONS	xxiii
NÂRADA	I
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE	I
INTRODUCTION. I. Legal Procedure	5
II. The Complaint	24
III. Courts of Justice	36
FIRST TITLE OF LAW. The Law of Debt	41
1. Payment of a Debt	41
2. Valid and Invalid Transactions	49
3. Property	52
4. Means of Livelihood for a Brahman in Times of Distress	55
5. Modes of Proof	58
6. Lending Money at Interest	65
7. Usurers	68
8. Sureties	70
9. Pledges	72
10. Documents	75
11. Witnesses	79
12. Incompetent Witnesses	82
13. Six Cases where Witnesses are unnecessary	85
14. False Witnesses	86
15. Exhorting the Witnesses	91
16. Valid Evidence	95
17. Invalid Evidence	96
18. What has to be done in default of both Witnesses and Documents	96
19. Proof by Ordeal	100
20. The Ordeal by Balance	102
21. The Ordeal by Fire	108

	PAGE
22. The Ordeal by Water	111
23. The Ordeal by Poison	114
24. The Ordeal by Sacred Libation	116
25. The Rice Ordeal	118
26. The Ordeal of the Hot Piece of Gold	119
SECOND TITLE OF LAW. Deposits	120
THIRD TITLE OF LAW. Partnership	124
FOURTH TITLE OF LAW. Resumption of Gift	128
FIFTH TITLE OF LAW. Breach of a Contract of Service	131
SIXTH TITLE OF LAW. Non-payment of Wages	139
SEVENTH TITLE OF LAW. Sales Effected by Another than the Rightful Owner	144
EIGHTH TITLE OF LAW. Non-delivery of a Sold Chattel	146
NINTH TITLE OF LAW. Rescission of Purchase	149
TENTH TITLE OF LAW. Transgression of a Compact	153
ELEVENTH TITLE OF LAW. Boundary Disputes	155
TWELFTH TITLE OF LAW. The Mutual Duties of Husband and Wife	164
THIRTEENTH TITLE OF LAW. The Law of Inheritance	188
FOURTEENTH TITLE OF LAW. Heinous Offences	202
FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH TITLES OF LAW. Abuse and Assault	207
SEVENTEENTH TITLE OF LAW. Games	212
EIGHTEENTH TITLE OF LAW. Miscellaneous	214
APPENDIX. Theft	223
QUOTATIONS FROM NÂRADA	233
I. Judicial Procedure	233
II. The Plaint	235
III. The Answer	239
IV. Writings and Possession	242
V. Witnesses	244
VI. Ordeals	247
VII. Miscellaneous Laws	263
INTRODUCTION TO THE FRAGMENTS OF BR/HAŚPATI	271
BR/HAŚPATI	277
I. Constitution of a Court of Justice	277
II. General Rules of Procedure	282

	PAGE
III. The Plaint	289
IV. The Answer	292
V. The Trial	294
VI. The Judgment	297
VII. The Witnesses	299
VIII. Documents	304
IX. Possession	309
X. Ordeals	315
XI. The Law of Debt	319
XII. Deposits	332
XIII. Sale without Ownership	334
XIV. Concerns of a Partnership	336
XV. Resumption of Gifts	341
XVI. Master and Servant	343
XVII. Violation of Agreements	346
XVIII. Rescission of Purchase and Sale	350
XIX. Boundary Disputes	351
XX. Defamation	355
XXI. Assault	357
XXII. Robbery and Violence	359
XXIII. Adultery	365
XXIV. Duties of Man and Wife	367
XXV. The Law of Inheritance	369
XXVI. Gambling and Betting	385
XXVII. Miscellaneous	386
ADDENDA	391

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the
 Translations of the Sacred Books of the East . . . 393

INTRODUCTION

TO

NÂRADA.

THE Nârada-smṛiti or Nâradiya Dharmasâstra first attracted attention nearly a century ago by being quoted in the Preface to Sir W. Jones's celebrated translation of the Code of Manu. What caused it to be brought before the notice of the learned world, was its bearing on the origin and history of the authoritative law-book of ancient India. The statements extracted by Sir W. Jones from the opening chapter of Nârada's law-book require some modification at present, as he was not acquainted with the larger and more authentic of the two versions of Nârada's work, which is now translated. It appears from the present work (pp. 1-4) that Nârada, the reputed compiler of the Nâradiya Dharmasâstra, refers to four, instead of three, successive versions of the Code of Manu, in 100,000 slokas or 1,080 chapters, in 12,000, 8,000, and 4,000 slokas. The authorship of these four versions is assigned, respectively, to Manu, Nârada, Mârkaṇḍeya, and Sumati, the son of Bhṛigu, and the Nârada-smṛiti is described as an abridgment, made by Nârada, of the ninth or Vyavahâra (legal) chapter of the original Code in 100,000 slokas. The first part of Nârada's abridgment of the ninth chapter of Manu's Code is designed as a mâtṛikâ or vyavahâra-mâtṛikâ, 'summary of proceedings-at-law' or 'general rules of procedure.'

Though the mythical nature of the Preface to the Nârada-smṛiti is sufficiently apparent, some facts which recently have come to light impart a higher degree of probability to the alleged connexion between Manu and Nârada, than was formerly allowed by myself. Thus the contents of Nârada's Preface to his Smṛiti appear

to have been known to such an early author as Medhâtithi, who quotes it, rather loosely it is true, in his Commentary on the Code of Manu, where he says that 'this work, consisting of one hundred thousand (slokas), was composed by Pragâpati and abridged successively by Manu and the rest¹.' This goes far to prove that the Preface to the Nârada-smṛiti had attained notoriety as early as the ninth century A. D., and must be nearly or quite as old as the remainder of the work. The antiquity of the account given by Nârada of the origin and history of the principal code of ancient India is supported to some extent by the Paurânîk statement regarding four successive remodellings of the original composition of Svâyambhuva (Manu), by Bhrigu, Nârada, Brîhaspati, and Aṅgiras², and by a curious tradition preserved in the Mahâbhârata, to the effect that the original Dharmaśāstra, produced by Brahman in 100,000 chapters, was successively reduced to 10,000, 5,000, 3,000, and 1,000 chapters by Saṃkara, Indra, Brîhaspati, and Kāvya³. What is more, in a colophon of the ancient Nepalese MS. of the Nârada-smṛiti, that work is actually designed as the Mânava Dharmaśāstra in the recension of Nârada (mânave dharmaśāstre nârada-proktâyâm samhitâyâm), just as the Code of Manu in the colophons is usually called the Mânava Dharmaśāstra in the recension of Bhrigu (mânave dharmaśāstre bhriguproktâyâm samhitâyâm, or mânave dharmaśāstre bhriguprokte). Again, the chapter on theft (*kaurapratishedha*), which has come to light in Mr. Bendall's Nepalese Palm-leaf MS. of Nârada, and in a Nepalese paper MS. recently discovered by the same scholar, forms an appendix to the body of the Nârada-smṛiti, exactly in the same way as an analogous chapter on robbery and other criminal offences is tacked on at the close of the eighteen titles of law in the Code of Manu, IX, 252-293. It also deserves to be noted, perhaps, that the Dhamathats of Burma, while professing to be founded

¹ Manuśikāsaṅgraha, p. 39, gloss on Manu I, 58; Bühler, Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxv, p. xv.

² Mandlik's Hindu Law, p. xlvii.

³ Mahâbhârata XII, 59, 22, and 80 foll.; Bühler, *ibid.* p. xcvi.

on the laws of Manu, contain several rules and maxims which may be traced to the *Nārada-smṛiti*, whereas they do not occur in the Code of Manu ¹.

Although, therefore, there appears to be an element of truth in *Nārada's* account of the history of the Code of Manu, and of his own *Smṛiti*, there can be no doubt that the actual position of the two works has been inverted by him. The composition of *Bṛigu*, or of *Sumati*, the son of *Bṛigu*, i.e. the now extant Code of Manu, is not posterior, but decidedly anterior, in date to the *Nārada-smṛiti*, as may be gathered easily from a comparison of both works. Thus e.g. *Nārada* mentions twenty-one modes of acquiring property, fifteen sorts of slaves, fourteen species of impotency, three kinds of women twice married, and four kinds of wanton women, twenty women whom a man must not approach, thirty-two divisions of the law of gift, eleven sorts of witnesses, five or seven ordeals, four or five losers of their suit, two kinds of proof and two kinds of documents, seven advantages resulting from a just decision, eight members of a lawsuit, one hundred and thirty-two divisions of the eighteen principal titles of law. The first germs of some of these theories may be traced to the Code of Manu, and it is interesting to note how these germs have been developed by *Nārada*. As a rule, his judicial theories show an infinitely advanced stage of development as compared to Manu's, and his treatment of the law of procedure, in particular, abounding as it does in technical terms and nice distinctions, and exhibiting a decided preference for documentary evidence and written records over oral testimony and verbal procedure, exhibits manifest signs of recent composition.

An analogous inference may be drawn from the fact that *Nārada* was apparently acquainted with a work either identical with, or closely allied to, the now extant Code of Manu. His analysis of the contents of the original Code composed by Manu in 100,000 slokas corresponds in the main to the topics

¹ Forchhammer, The Jardine Prize Essay, pp. 54-58.

treated in that work as it now stands. He quotes the opening verse of the original gigantic work of Manu, and it is a remarkable coincidence that this verse agrees with Manu I, 5, 6, i.e. with the actual exordium of the Code of Manu, as vv. 1-4 serve as an introduction only, and may be a subsequent addition. Forensic law is alleged to have formed the subject of the ninth chapter of the original composition of Manu. In the Code of Manu, law and judicature are discussed in the eighth and ninth chapters. The twenty-four chapters, divided into one thousand and eighty, i.e. 45×24 sections, of the original Code, seem to represent double the twelve chapters of the Code of Manu. On the other hand, Sumati, the son of Bhrigu, who is alleged to have reduced the original Code of Manu to its present size, and to have produced the law-book now current among mankind, may be identified with Bhrigu, the supposed author of the actual Manu-smṛiti; and the number of 4,000 slokas, which is assigned to his composition, may be taken to be a rough statement of the actual extent of the Manu-smṛiti, which in reality runs up to 2,685 slokas only.

A consideration of these facts leaves but little doubt that the compiler of the Nârada-smṛiti, whoever he was, must have been acquainted with a work closely akin to the now extant Manu-smṛiti. This is so much the more probable because several of his references to the authoritative enunciations of Manu may be actually traced to the Manu-smṛiti¹, and because a number of verses either occurring in the MSS. of the Nârada-smṛiti, or attributed to him by the digest-writers, recur in the Code of Manu.

However, though acquainted with the Code of Manu, the so-called Nârada was far from offering a mere slavish reproduction of its doctrines in his own work. On the contrary, the Nârada-smṛiti must be considered as an independent, and therefore specially valuable, exposition of the whole system of civil and criminal law, as taught in the law schools of the period. It is in fact the only Smṛiti, completely preserved

Discrepancies
between Manu
and Nârada.

¹ See e.g. Appendix 26 (p. 227) and Manu VIII, 320; Appendix 34 (p. 228) and Manu VIII, 334; Appendix 36, 37 (p. 228) and Manu VIII, 124, 125.

in MSS., in which law, properly so-called, is treated by itself, without any reference to rules of penance, diet, and other religious subjects; and it throws a new and an important light on the political and social institutions of ancient India at the time of its composition. Several of the doctrines propounded by Nārada are decidedly opposed to, and cannot be viewed in the light of developments from, the teaching of Manu. Thus e.g. Nārada advocates the practice of Niyoga, or appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased husband; he declares gambling to be a lawful amusement, when carried on in public gaming-houses; he allows the remarriage of widows; he virtually abrogates the right of primogeniture by declaring that even the youngest son may undertake the management of the family property, if specially qualified for the task; he ordains that, in a partition of the family property, the father may reserve two shares for himself, and that, in the case of a partition after his death, the mother shall divide equally with the sons, and an unmarried sister take the same share as a younger son; he lays down a different gradation of fines from those laid down by Manu, &c.¹

It may be argued that Nārada would not have ventured to differ from the Code of Manu on such essential points as these, unless he had found good authority for doing so in other early works or dicta attributed to the primeval legislator of India, and that this fact furnishes another reason for attaching some credit to what Nārada relates of the original Code in 100,000 verses, and of its successive abridgment. Thus much is certain, that a great many floating proverbs and authoritative enunciations of Manu and of *Vṛiddha* or *Brīhan-Manu* must have existed by the side of the Code of Manu in the times of Nārada as well as before and after his period, when they were quoted in the *Mahābhārata*² and in the Com-

¹ See the foot-notes, *passim*.

² See Nārada XII, 80-88, and Manu IX, 65-68; Nārada XVII, 1-8, and Manu IX, 221-228; Nārada XII, 97, and Manu V, 162; Nārada XIII, 5, and Manu IX, 105-109; Nārada XIII, 13, 14, and Manu IX, 104, 131; Nārada, Appendix 30, 31, and Manu VIII, 138.

mentaries and Dharmanibandhas from Medhâtithi's Manu-bhâshya down to Gagannâtha's Digest, translated by Colebrooke. The compiler of the Nârada-smṛiti may have incorporated a number of these dicta in his own composition. At the same time, it is far from improbable that a work on law, called the Code of Manu in the version of Nârada, may have existed by the side of the celebrated Code of Manu in the version of Bhrîgu, and that the unknown compiler of the Nârada-smṛiti may have utilised that work for his own composition, and enhanced the value and authority of the latter by referring to, and arranging in his own way, the reports current with regard to Manu and Nârada. The precise nature of the origin of such a work as the Nârada-smṛiti must needs remain a matter for speculation; but it certainly was an established practice with Sanskrit writers to graft their own compositions on earlier works attributed to fabulous personages of the heroic age of India, and indeed to fabricate an authority of this kind for the productions of their own pen.

The probable date of the Code of Manu may be turned
 Date of the Nârada-smṛiti. to account for determining the date of the Nârada-smṛiti; just as the presumable date of the latter work has been used in its turn for fixing the chronological position of Manu. The composition of the two works is separated, apparently, by a considerable interval of time. If, therefore, the date of Manu has been rightly placed between the second centuries B.C. and A.D. by Professor Bühler¹, it would seem to follow that the Nârada-smṛiti can hardly belong to an earlier period than the fourth or fifth century A.D. The same conclusion may be arrived at by other, and independent considerations.

Thus the Nârada-smṛiti agrees on many important
 Compared with other Smṛitis, points, especially in the law of evidence, with the Dharmaśāstras or Smṛitis of Yāgyavalkya, Viṣṇu, Bṛhaspati, Kātyāyana, and Vyāsa. It may be a little older than the three last-named works,

¹ Loc. cit. p. xcvi.

which belong to the latest productions of the *Smṛiti* epoch of Hindu Law, but its legal rules and judicial theories have a decidedly more advanced character than either Vishnu's or Yāgñavalkya's. The *Smṛiti* of Vishnu cannot belong to an earlier period than the third century A. D.¹, and the Yāgñavalkya *Smṛiti* is not likely to be anterior to it in date².

Again, the judicial trial which is described in the well-known drama *Mṛikkhakaṭikā* corresponds in all essential features to the rules laid down in Nārada's chapter on 'The Plaint'³. If, then, the Nāradiya Dharmaśāstra and the *Mṛikkhakaṭikā* are contemporaneous productions, we have a further reason for assigning the composition of the former work to the fifth or sixth century A. D. It may also be noted that Nārada (XII, 74) regards sexual intercourse with a female ascetic, pravratitā, as a kind of incest. In the earlier Indian dramas likewise, such as Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra* and Sūdraka's *Mṛikkhakaṭikā*, the position of nuns and monks is highly dignified.

Last, not least, the European term *Dīnāra*, i. e. denarius or *δηνάριον*, which is so important for the purposes of Indian chronology, occurs repeatedly in the *Nārada-smṛiti*. In the first passage (Introd. II, 34, p. 32), *Dīnāras* are mentioned among other objects made of gold, and it would seem that a gold coin used as an ornament is meant, such as e. g. the necklaces made of gold mohurs, which are being worn in India at the present day. 'A string of *Dīnāras*' (*dīnāra-mālaya*) used as a necklace occurs in a well-known Jain work, the *Kalpa-sūtra* of Bhadrabāhu⁴. It is, however, possible that the '*Dīnāras* or other golden things' may be gold coins simply, and that Nārada means to refer to forged or otherwise counterfeit coins. The second passage (Appendix v. 60, p. 232) is specially valuable, because it contains an exact

¹ Sacred Books of the East, vol. vii, p. xxxii.

² Tagore Law Lectures, p. 49.

³ See, particularly, p. 27, note on 18.

⁴ See Dr. Jacobi's edition, par. 36 (p. 44), and the same scholar's translation of the *Kalpa-sūtra*, Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxii, p. 232.

statement of the value of a Dīnāra which, it says, is called a Suvarṇa also. The reception of Dīnāras among the ordinary coins of that period shows that their circulation in India must have commenced some time before the Nārada-smṛiti was written. The first importation of gold Dīnāras into India cannot be referred to an earlier period than the time of the Roman emperors, and the gold Dīnāras most numerous found in India belong to the third century A.D.¹

The earliest reference to a work called Nārādiya Dharmaśāstra seems to be contained in a work of the sixth century, Bāṇa's Kādambarī². Whether the compiler of the Pañkatantra was acquainted with the Nārada-smṛiti appears to be doubtful. The Pañkatantra in Kosegarten's edition contains a legal text which is attributed to Nārada, though it is not to be found in the Nārada-smṛiti. The standard Bombay edition of the Pañkatantra has that very text, but the name of Nārada is omitted³. Medhātithi's Manubhāṣhya, which seems to belong to the ninth century, contains several references to the Nārada-smṛiti, and Asahāya, who appears to have preceded Medhātithi, is the reputed author of the ancient Commentary on it, which has largely been used for the present work⁴.

These considerations tend to show that the composition of the Nārada-smṛiti cannot be referred to a more recent period than the fifth century A.D., or the sixth century at the very latest. Nor can it belong to a much earlier age than that. This estimate of its age agrees with the results arrived at, thirteen years ago, from the very scanty data then available.

¹ Bühler, S. B. E., vol. xxv, p. cvii; West and Bühler, p. 48; Max Müller, History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 245; Jolly, Tagore Law Lectures, p. 36; Hömle, Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of Orientalists, p. 134.

² P. 91 in Peterson's edition. See Bühler, Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxv, p. cvii, note 1.

³ See Kosegarten's Pañkatantra III, 94; Bombay ed., III, 2. It is true that the two texts immediately preceding the text in question in the Pañkatantra may be compared with Nārada XI, 2 and I, 5, 79.

⁴ The fact that Asahāya refers to a coin called dramma, i. e. the Greek δραχμή, may be used for fixing the earlier limit of his date.

The present translation, unlike the Institutes of Nārada previously published by myself (London, Trübner & Co., 1876), is based in the main on what may be termed the large version of Nārada, and accords throughout with the editio princeps of the Nārada-smṛiti in the Bibliotheca Indica. The reasons which have induced me to consider the large version as the original and authentic composition of Nārada, and to make it the basis of my edition of the Sanskrit text in the Bibliotheca Indica, have been stated in my volume of Tagore Law Lectures, pp. 54-56. In those parts of the work also where both versions agree, or where the only extant MS. of the large version is deficient and has to be supplied from the MSS. of the minor version, the present translation will be found to differ not inconsiderably from my previous rendering of the 'Institutes of Nārada.' The discovery of five valuable MSS. of the minor version, besides the three used in preparing the 'Institutes of Nārada,' the recovery of Asahāya's ancient and valuable Commentary on the Nārada-smṛiti, and the dies diem docet have united to produce a considerable number of new results. Among the new MSS. discovered, the fifteenth-century Nepalese Palm-leaf MS. of Mr. Bendall is the most important, and has furnished an entire new chapter, the authenticity of which is proved by numerous references in the mediaeval and modern Digests of Law. The chapter in question has been termed an Appendix in the present work (pp. 223-232). It is found, likewise, in a Nepalese paper MS. of the minor version, discovered very recently by Mr. Bendall among the Nepalese MSS. of the British Museum, where it had been labelled wrongly as Kaurapratishtedha.

The Commentary of Asahāya, as far as it goes, has furnished the substance of the foot-notes to the present translation, in which it has been quoted constantly as 'A.' Asahāya was a standard writer in the province of Hindu Law, and his Nāradabhāṣya is a very valuable production indeed. He shares with other early commentators of law-books the peculiarity of indulging every now and then in illustrations

taken from the every-day life of his period, which help to throw some light on the practical working of Indian Law in those times. As an instance of this tendency I would cite his remarks on a rule concerning liability for debts (pp. 43, 44). Of course it would be dangerous to trust his philological skill everywhere, and some of his interpretations are decidedly artificial. What is worse, the Commentary of Asahâya has not been preserved in its original shape, but in a recast due to one Kalyânabhaṭṭa, whose name is entirely unknown to fame. It is just possible that Kalyânabhaṭṭa, instead of confining his activity to supplying deficiencies and correcting mistakes in the copies of Asahâya's Commentary, may have inserted some new verses in the text of the Nârada-smṛiti as well. Such might be conjectured, for example, to be the origin of the four verses, Introd. I, 21-24 (pp. 9-13), which are quoted in none of the authoritative Digests, and objectionable as to grammar and metre. It should be remembered, however, that Kalyânabhaṭṭa declares the original work of Asahâya to have been spoiled by negligent scribes, and so the grammatical blunders may be charged to their account.

The latter half of Asahâya's Commentary being lost, I had to avail myself for the corresponding portion of the Other auxiliary
writings. Nârada-smṛiti, of the glosses of other mediaeval writers, by whom the texts of Nârada have been quoted and discussed a great deal. Their opinions have been adverted to very fully, in the chapter on inheritance especially, both on account of the practical importance of inheritance for the law-courts of modern India, and because each of the various schools of Sanskrit lawyers has been anxious to interpret the sayings of Nârada to its own advantage. For the curious and somewhat obscure disquisition on fourteen kinds of impotency (XII, 11-18, pp. 167-169), I have been able to use the advice of my late lamented friend Dr. Haas, the well-known student of Indian medical science. A somewhat analogous passage in the canonical literature of the Buddhists has been kindly pointed out to me by Mr. Rhys Davids¹.

¹ Kullavagga X, 17, 1. See Sacred Books of the East, vol. xx, p. 349.

The sign of an asterisk (*) has been prefixed to those texts of Nārada which were found to be Nārada's reputed as a legal writer. quoted in one or several of the Sanskrit Commentaries or Digests of Law. The same method has been observed previously in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sanskrit text, but a considerable number of quotations has come to light since then. The repute of Nārada as a legal writer appears to have been so great that upwards of half his work has been embodied in the authoritative compositions of the mediaeval and modern writers in the province of Sanskrit law.

Under the heading of Quotations from Nārada, all those texts have been collected at the close of the present translation which are attributed to Nārada in one or several of the Digests and Commentaries, without being traceable in the MSS. of the Nārada-smṛiti. Between these quotations have been inserted, for the sake of completeness and in order to fill up the gaps between the single texts contained in the quotations, a number of unpublished texts from the MSS. of the minor version, and from the final chapter on Ordeals in the ancient Nepalese MS. of the Nārada-smṛiti¹. A complete edition of that chapter will, I trust, be published by Dr. A. Conrady. The quotations have been taken from all the principal Sanskrit works on law, from Medhātithi's Manubhāshya downwards. For a detailed statement of the particular work and chapter from which each text has been quoted, I may refer to the foot-notes. Most texts being quoted in more than one work at a time, it has not been thought necessary to give complete references to every such work in each particular case, but I have made a point of referring as much as possible to those law-books which exist in English, both for convenience of reference and in order to facilitate a comparison of the present translation with previous renderings of the texts of Nārada. All the unpublished texts have been given in the foot-notes in the original Sanskrit, together with the names of the works from which they have been taken. The MSS.

¹ Regarding that chapter, see Preface to Nārada-smṛiti, pp. 6, 7.

of these works were obtained principally from the India Office and Deccan College libraries; for some of them I was able to use copies of my own. A peculiar source of difficulties lies in the fact that these works differ considerably as to the names of the authors of the single texts. Many texts were no doubt proverbial sayings, and appropriated therefore by several writers. In other cases, the mutually conflicting statements of various writers regarding the authorship of the texts may be attributed to carelessness. Grammatical blunders and faulty readings, as well as the *varietas lectionis*, have been referred to in important cases only. I subjoin a list of the abbreviations used in the foot-notes to the present translation.

ABBREVIATIONS.

Aparârka=Aparârka's Commentary on the *Yâgñavalkya-smṛiti*,
Deccan College MS.

Âpastamba, see Manu.

Baudhâya, see Manu.

Col. Dig.=Colebrooke's Digest of Hindu Law (translation of
Gagannâtha's work).

Dâyabhâga=Colebrooke's translation of the *Dâyabhâga* on Inheri-
tance, or the Sanskrit text of the D., in the Calcutta edition of
1829.

Dâyakramasaṅgraha=Wynch's translation in Stokes's Hindu Law-
Books, or the Calcutta edition.

Gagannâtha=Gagannâtha's *Vivâdabhaṅgârnava* (the work trans-
lated by Colebrooke), Bengali MS. in my possession.

Gautama, see Manu.

{ M. or Mitâksharâ=Mitâksharâ, the Calcutta edition of the *Vya-
vahâradhyâya*, or Colebrooke's version of the *Mitâksharâ* on
Inheritance.

{ M. Macn.=Macnaghten's translation of the *Mitâksharâ* on Ad-
ministration of Justice.

Manu=the Code of Manu, ed. Jolly, London, 1887; or Professor
Bühler's translation of the same. For the principal editions and
translations of Âpastamba, Baudhâya, and the other old law-
books, I may refer to my volume of Tagore Law Lectures.

{ May.=Mandlik's translation of the *Vyavahâra Mayûkha*, in his
Hindu Law, Bombay, 1880.

{ May. (text)=Mandlik's edition of the same, *ibid*.

{ Mayûkha=the same work.

Ninor Nârada=The Institutes of Nârada, transl. by J. Jolly, London,
1876; or the unpublished Sanskrit original of the same work.

Nârada=the present translation.

Nârada-smṛiti=The Institutes of Nârada, edited by J. Jolly, in
the Bibliotheca Indica series.

Nepalese Nârada=Mr. Bendall's Nepalese Palm-leaf MS. of Nârada.

Raghunandana=Raghunandana's *Vyavahâratattva*, the Calcutta
edition.

Ratn.=Vivâda Ratnâkara, in the Bibliotheca Indica.

- Smṛitīk.* = Devanabhaṭṭa's *Smṛitīkandrikā*, India Office MS.
Smṛitīkandrikā = the same, or the chapter on Inheritance, transl. by Iyer.
Tod. or *Todarānanda* = Vyavahārasaukhya in *Todar* Mall's *Todarānanda*, Deccan College MS.
 (Uncertain) = texts quoted as '*Smṛiti*' generally, without the name of the author being given.
Vasishṭha, see Manu.
Vīram. = *Vīramitrodaya*, in Jībānanda Vidyāsāgara's edition.
Vishṇu, see Manu.
Viv. = *Vivādatāntāmaṇi*, translated by Tagore, Calcutta, 1863.
Vivādatāntāmaṇi = the Sanskrit text, Calcutta edition of 1837.
V. T. = *Vivādatāntāmaṇi* by Kamalākara, India Office MS.
Vy. K. = *Vyavahāratāntāmaṇi* by Vāṭaspatimisra, Devanāgarī MS. in my possession.
Yāgyavalkya, see Manu.
-



NÂRADA.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

1. HOLY MANU, in order to promote the welfare of all beings, composed a book here, which was to become the foundation of the established rule of conduct. It was made up of twenty-four sections, on (1) the creation of the world; (2) the various kinds of living beings; (3) the extent of the virtuous

1. Regarding the historical value and bearing of this Preface, see Introduction. The table of contents, which is here given for the original Code of Manu, corresponds in the main to the contents of the now extant version of that work. Thus the creation of the world is treated of, Manu I, 5-57; the various kinds of living beings, I, 34-50; the virtuous countries, II, 17-23; the constitution of a judicial assembly, XII, 108-114; the performance of offerings, III, 69-286; IV, 21-28, &c.; established usage (*Âtâra*), *passim*, all the multifarious rules of private morals and social economy falling under this head; forensic law, chapters VIII and IX; the extirpation of offenders, IX, 252-293; the mode of life of a king, chapter VII; the system of the four castes and four orders, I, 87-101; IX, 325-336, &c.; marriage laws, III, 1-62; the mutual relations between husband and wife, IX, 1-103; the order of succession, IX, 103-220; the performance of obsequies, III, 122-286; rules of purification, V, 57-146; rules of diet, V, 1-56; saleable commodities, and those which may not be sold, X, 85-94; the classification of offences, XI, 55-71; the twenty-one hells, IV, 88-90; penances, XI, 72-266. The Upanishads are frequently referred to, e.g. II, 165; VI, 29. Secret or mysterious doctrines are e.g. those taught in the twelfth chapter of the Code of Manu. A somewhat analogous table of contents of the Code of Manu is given in that work itself, I, 111-118.

country; (4) the constitution of a judicial assembly; (5) the performance of offerings according to the Vedas and Vedāṅgas; (6) established usage; (7) forensic law; (8) the extirpation of offenders; (9) the mode of life of a king; (10, 11) the system of the (four) castes and (four) orders; (12) marriage laws; (13) the mutual relations between husband and wife; (14) the order of succession; (15) the performance of obsequies; (16) the elucidation of difficult points regarding purification; (17) the rule as to what may be eaten and what not; (18, 19) the law regarding vendible commodities, and those which must not be sold; (20) the various kinds of crime; (21) heaven and hell; (22) penances; (23) the Upanishads; (24) secret doctrines.

2. Holy Manu, after having thus (composed) that (book) in a hundred thousand ślokas, and in one thousand and eighty chapters, delivered it to the divine sage Nârada. He having learnt it from him, reflecting that a work of this kind could not be remembered easily by mortals on account of its size, abridged it in twelve thousand (ślokas) and delivered it to the great sage Mârkaṇḍeya.

3. He having learnt it from him, and reflecting on

2. The Manu who is referred to in this place is no doubt Manu Svâyambhuva, or 'Manu sprung from the self-existent Being,' to whom the Code of Manu is said to have been revealed by Brahman; see Manu I, 58. Nârada is one of the seven principal Rîshis. He is also reckoned among the Pragâpatis, 'lords of creatures' or 'creators,' and is viewed as the chief of heavenly musicians. Mârkaṇḍeya is elsewhere called 'the long-lived,' and is celebrated for his austerities. He is the reputed author of a well-known Purâna, called after him the Mârkaṇḍeya Purâna.

3. Bhrîgu, one of the great Rîshis of antiquity, is in the Code of Manu introduced as a son of Manu, and as the compiler of the

the (limited duration and) capacity of human life, reduced it to eight thousand (slokas), and delivered this (abridgment) to Sumati, the son of Bhrigu.

4. Sumati, the son of Bhrigu, after having learnt (this book) from him and considered what human capacity had been brought down to through the (successive) lessening of life (in the four ages of the world), reduced it to four thousand (slokas).

5. It is this (abridgment) which Manes and mortals read, whilst the gods, Gandharvas, and other (exalted beings) read in extenso the (original) code, consisting of one hundred thousand (slokas). There the first sloka runs as follows: 'This universe was wrapped up in darkness, and nothing could be discerned. Then the holy, self-existent Spirit issued forth with his four faces.'

6. After this exordium, chapter follows chapter

present version of the Code of Manu; see Manu I, 35, 59, 60. The fact of his being mentioned here as the father of Sumati, the compiler of the final recension of the Code of Manu, renders it probable that this work may have closely resembled the now extant Code of Manu. However, the latter work has not more than 2684 slokas, instead of the 4000 attributed to the version of Sumati.

4. As for the successive lessening of life, and general deterioration of the world, in the four ages, *Krîta*, *Tretâ*, *Dvâpara*, and *Kali*, see Manu I, 81-86.

5. A. observes expressly that the term 'there' refers to the original Code in 100,000 slokas. The sloka here quoted is nearly identical with Manu I, 5 a, 6 a.

6. The *Mâtrikâ* or 'Introduction' (compare *divyamâtrikâ*, a 'general introduction to the law regarding ordeals,' in the *Mitâksharâ*, p. 139) which is here attributed to Nârada, appears to have formed part of the abridgment in 12,000 slokas, which was originally composed by him. It was composed in the *Sûtra* style, i.e. it was made up of aphorisms. The slokas are frequently designed as *Sûtras* by the commentators of law-books. Supposing this work to have consisted of twelve chapters, like the present Code

continuously. There the ninth chapter is headed, 'Judicial Procedure.' There Nârada, the divine sage, composed an Introduction in the Sûtra style, as follows. It begins with the following sloka.

of Manu, each chapter would have contained about 1000 slokas. The Nârada-smṛiti actually has about 1000 slokas. In the Code of Manu, forensic law is treated in the eighth and ninth chapters. The compiler of the present work declares his composition to be the ninth chapter of Nârada's abridged version of the Code of Manu. In the above enumeration of twenty-four subjects treated in the original Code of Manu, judicial procedure is introduced as the seventh and eighth subject. This coincidence indeed might be accidental.

INTRODUCTION.

I. LEGAL PROCEDURE.

* 1. When mortals were bent on doing their duty alone and habitually veracious, there existed neither lawsuits, nor hatred, nor selfishness.

* 2. The practice of duty having died out among mankind, lawsuits have been introduced; and the king has been appointed to decide lawsuits, because he has authority to punish.

3. Documents and (the testimony of) witnesses are declared to be the two methods for clearing up doubtful matters, where two parties are quarrelling with one another.

* 4. Proceedings at law are of two kinds; attended by a wager, or not attended by a wager. A lawsuit

I, 1. Where the sun shines, there is no shade. Where there is shade, there the sun does not shine. Similarly, where virtue reigns, there are neither lawsuits, nor hatred, nor selfishness. On the other hand, where these three are, there virtue is not to be found. A. The object of this introductory portion is to show how far judicial procedure is connected with Dharma 'Virtue,' or 'Duty,' the principal subject of an Indian law-book. The *Vîramitrodaya* and other compilations attribute a further hemistich to Nârada, in which the happy age here alluded to is referred to the period 'when Manu, the father of mankind, was reigning on earth.'

3. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 22; *Vasishtha* XVI, 10; *Vishnu* VI, 23.

4. 'A lawsuit attended by a wager' is where one of the parties promises in writing to pay a certain sum to the king, over and above the amount in dispute. 'A lawsuit not attended by a wager' is one devoid of a stipulation of this sort. *Vîramitrodaya*. This is apparently the correct explanation. *Asahâya* observes that the amount staked may be much smaller than the amount in dispute.

attended by a wager is where (either of the two parties) stakes in writing a certain sum which has to be paid besides the sum in dispute (in case of defeat).

5. In a lawsuit attended by a wager, he of the two who is cast must pay his stake and a fine when his defeat has been decided.

* 6. The plaint is declared to be the essential part of a proceeding-at-law. If he succumbs with it, the defendant loses the whole suit. If he can prove the charge, he gains the suit.

* 7. Gatherings (*kula*), corporations (*sreni*), assemblies (*gana*), one appointed (by the king), and the king (himself), are invested with the power to decide

Thus, although the sum in dispute be very considerable, one may stake two hundred *Paṇas*, or a hundred *Paṇas*, or fifty *Paṇas* only.

5. According to *Asahāya*, the wager must not be laid till the two first stages of the trial, the charge and the answer, are over. The wager may be laid either by the plaintiff or by the defendant. The plaintiff, whose declaration has been refuted by the defendant, stakes a certain sum on the issue of the case. Or the defendant, after having denied the correctness of the charge, stakes a certain sum on the correctness of his own statements, to be proved by the issue of the case. *Asahāya* does not say to whom the sum staked has to be paid in his opinion. It may be observed that, according to Burmese law, which is an offshoot of the early law of India, ten per cent. of the sum staked should be given to the judge and to the pleaders, and the remainder to the victorious party; see Richardson's *Dhammathat*, p. 73. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 18 (see *Mitâksharâ*).

6. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 8.

7. *Kula* means an assemblage consisting of a few persons. *Sreni* denotes an assemblage of eminent merchants, &c. *Gana* denotes a fellowship, such as e.g. the Brahman caste. A. Other commentators take *kula* to mean a family meeting; *sreni*, a company of artisans; *gana*, an assembly of cohabitants. These three stages of private arbitration may be compared to the modern Panchayats of India.

lawsuits; and of these, each succeeding one is superior to the one preceding him in order.

* 8. Judicial procedure has four feet, four bases, four means, it benefits four, reaches four, and produces four results. This has been declared.

* 9. It has eight members, eighteen topics, a hundred branches, three efficient causes, two modes of plaint, two openings, and two issues.

* 10. Virtue, a judicial proceeding, documentary evidence, and an edict from the king are the four feet of a lawsuit. Each following one is superior to the one previously named.

* 11. There virtue is based on truth ; a judicial proceeding (rests) on the statements of the witnesses ; documentary evidence (rests) on declarations reduced

11. Where both parties adhere strictly to truth in their statements, there is virtue or justice clearly enough, judicial procedure, written proof, and a royal edict being quite unnecessary in that case. Where either of the two parties is suspected to have made a false statement, judicial procedure has to be resorted to, which depends on the evidence given by witnesses. Documentary evidence (*karitra*) is where the statements of witnesses are consulted, written in their own hand, on a leaf, or on birch-bark, or on a strip of rind, or some other writing material. That suit, however, which has been decided by an edict from the king himself, is superior to all the rest, according to the saying, 'What has been decided in a village, goes into the town. What has been decided in the town, goes before the king. What has been decided by the king, though wrongly decided, cannot be tried anew.' A. The term *karitra* has been rendered in conformity with this interpretation, which is confirmed by the remarks of *Kandervara* on this sloka. Other commentators and several MSS. of the *Nārada-smṛiti* read *svīkarāṇe* or *prāśnakarāṇe* for *pustakarāṇe*. These commentators explain the term *karitra* in conformity with a text of *Bṛihaspati*, 'Whatever is practised by a man, proper or improper, in accordance with local usage, is termed *karitra* (custom).'

to writing ; an edict (depends) on the pleasure of the king.

* 12. Because the four means, of conciliation and the rest, are adopted, it is said to have four means. Because it protects the four orders, therefore it is said to benefit four.

* 13. Because it affects criminals, witnesses, the assessors of the court, and the king, to the amount of one quarter each, therefore it is said to reach four.

* 14. Because it produces these four, justice, gain, renown, and esteem among men, therefore it is declared to produce four results.

* 15. Because it consists of these eight, the king,

12. Because a lawsuit is decided by resorting, as the case may be, to any one of the four means of success, viz. conciliation, division, bribery, and force, therefore it is said to have four means. Because it protects or guards the four castes and the four orders, therefore it is said to benefit four. A. The four orders are the four stages in the life of a twice-born man : student, householder, hermit, and ascetic.

13. If unjustly decided, it brings evil on the four persons mentioned in this sloka. If justly decided, it confers good on them. A.

15. The several functions of the eight (or ten) 'members' of a judicial proceeding are thus described in a sloka attributed to *Brhaspati*. 'The chief judge publishes the sentence. The king passes it. The assessors investigate the facts of the case. The law-book dictates the judgment, i.e. the victory of the one party, and the fine imposed on the other party. Gold and silver serve the purpose of administering ordeals. Water is used for relieving thirst or appeasing hunger. The accountant has to compute the sums. The scribe has to record the proceedings. The attendant must compel the defendant and the witnesses to appear in court, and detain both plaintiff and defendant, if they have given no sureties.' According to *Asahâya*, the term 'the king's righteous officer' has to be referred to the king's chief judge, and by 'law-

his dutiful officer, the assessors of the court, the law-book, the accountant and scribe, gold, fire, and water ; therefore it is said to have eight members.

*16. Recovery of a debt, deposits, partnership, resumption of gift, breach of a contract of service,

*17. Non-payment of wages, sales effected by another than the rightful owner, non-delivery of a sold chattel, rescission of purchase,

*18. Transgression of a compact, boundary disputes, the mutual duties of husband and wife, law of inheritance, heinous offences,

*19. Abuse, assault, games, and miscellaneous, these are (the eighteen titles of law) on account of which (judicial procedure) is said to have eighteen topics.

*20. Their branches amount to one hundred and

books' are meant the compositions of Manu, Nārada, Visvarūpa, and others.

16-19. Manu VIII, 4-8.

20-25. The 132 divisions of the eighteen titles of law are stated as follows by Asahāya :—

1. Recovery of a debt.

1. Which debts have to be paid, and which not, &c.; 2. debts (in general); 3. property; 4. means of livelihood of a Brahman in times of distress; 5. modes of proof; 6. lending money at interest; 7. usurers; 8. sureties; 9. pledges; 10. documents; 11. incompetent witnesses; 12. witnesses for the plaintiff; 13. witnesses for the defendant; 14. six cases where witnesses are unnecessary; 15. validity of testimony, how long retained; 16. false witnesses; 17. exhorting the witnesses; 18. valid evidence; 19. invalid evidence; 20. what has to be done, where both witnesses and documents are wanting; 21. ordeal by balance; 22. ordeal by fire; 23. ordeal by water; 24. ordeal by poison; 25. ordeal by sacred libation.

2. Deposits.

1. Nyāsa (common deposits); 2. aupanidhika (sealed deposits);

thirty-two. On account of the multifariousness of human concerns, (a judicial proceeding) is said to have a hundred branches.

21. 'Recovery of a debt' has twenty-five divisions; 'deposits' has six; 'partnership' has three; 'resumption of gift' has four;

3. *yâhitaka* (loans for use); 4. *anvâhitaka* (deposits for delivery); 5. *silpihastagata* (bailments with an artizan); 6. *pogandadhana* (property of a minor).

3. Partnership.

1. The common undertakings of partners in business; 2. sacrifices offered by officiating priests; 3. tolls.

4. Resumption of gift.

1. What may be given; 2. what may not be given; 3. valid gifts; 4. invalid gifts.

5. Breach of a contract of service.

1. Service; 2. impure work; 3. conduct of a student; 4. rules of conduct for an apprentice; 5. rules of conduct for a manager; 6. fifteen sorts of slaves; 7. emancipation from slavery; 8. legal position of a slave; 9. release of a slave by the favour of his master.

6. Non-payment of wages.

1. The wages of servants; 2. cowherds and the rest; 3. fee of a public woman; 4. questions arising in regard to the payment of rent.

7. Sales effected by another than the rightful owner.

1. Sale without ownership; 2. treasure-trove.

8. Non-delivery of a sold chattel.

9. Rescission of purchase.

1. Time; 2. worn clothes; 3. loss on metals (caused by working them); 4. preparing cloth.

10. Transgression of a compact.

11. Boundary disputes.

1. Quarrels regarding a field; 2. quarrels regarding a house; 3. quarrels regarding a garden; 4. quarrels regarding a well; 5.

22. 'Breach of service' consists of nine divisions; 'wages' has four divisions; there are two divisions of 'sales effected by another than the rightful owner;' 'non-delivery of a sold chattel' has a single division only;

23. 'Rescission of purchase' has four divisions; 'transgression of compact' is onefold; 'boundary disputes' is twelvefold; there are twenty divisions in 'mutual duties of husband and wife;'

quarrels regarding a sanctuary; 6. quarrels regarding (the boundary of) a village; 7. prohibition to decorate (to cause nuisance in?) a cross-road, &c.; 8. making a dike; 9. waste land; 10. protection of grain; 11. compensation for grain (destroyed by cattle); 12. the foundation (of a householder's existence).

12. Mutual duties of husband and wife.

1. Examination of a man's virile potency; 2. gift of a maiden in marriage; 3. the offence of insulting an officiating priest; 4. the right time for giving a maiden in marriage; 5. the offence of casting a blemish on an unblemished maiden, or suitor; 6. marriage forms; 7. rule regarding incontinent females and other (unchaste women); 8. what constitutes legitimate issue; 9. illicit intercourse; 10. punishment of adultery; 11. incest; 12. intercourse with cattle, and other crimes of this sort; 13. raising issue where there is no husband; 14. the offspring of adulterous intercourse; 15, 16. authorised and unauthorised intercourse of a woman with one not her husband; 17, 18. rule regarding bad wives and husbands; 19. conduct prescribed for a woman whose husband is absent; 20. definition of a rendezvous.

13. Law of inheritance.

1. Definition of heritage; 2. its distribution; 3. indivisible property; 4. what constitutes strīdhana; 5. descent of strīdhana after the death of the proprietress; 6. rules regarding the property of brothers; 7. division of the property between parents and sons; 8. case of a daughter whose father is unknown, &c.; 9. case of a father unauthorised (to raise issue); 10. share of a son suffering from a chronic or agonising disease, or otherwise (incapable of inheriting); 11. division among the sons of a reunited coparcener;

24. 'Law of inheritance' consists of nineteen divisions; 'heinous offences' of twelve; of both 'abuse' and 'assault' there are three divisions;

25. 'Gambling with dice and betting on animals' has a single division; 'miscellaneous' has six divisions. Thus, adding up all these branches (of the principal titles of law), there are one hundred and thirty-two of them.

12. management of the property of a deceased or absent brother; 13. work done by one to whom the management of the family property has been entrusted, &c.; 14. decision in the case of a contested partition; 15. enumeration of the divers kinds of sons. [There ought to be nineteen subdivisions of the law of inheritance, instead of fifteen. That number might be obtained by counting each reason of exclusion from inheritance as a separate division.]

14. Heinous offences.

1. What constitutes a heinous offence; 2. punishments ordained for heinous offences; 3. robbery; 4. distinction between articles of inferior, middling, and superior value; 5, 6. the two kinds of robbers; 7. seizure of robbers; 8. granting food or shelter (to thieves), &c.; 9. thieves; 10. punishment of heinous offences and larceny; 11. tracing a thief by the foot-marks; 12. confiscation of the property of thieves or others, when the stolen goods have not been recovered.

15, 16. Abuse and assault.

1. Abuse; 2. assault; 3. punishments ordained for both offences.

17. Gambling with dice, and betting on animals.

18. Miscellaneous.

1. Protection of the (four) castes and (four) orders by the king in person; 2. dignity of a king; 3. maintenance of Brahmans by the king; 4. authorisation from the king to bestow one's property (on Brahmans); 5. description of the various modes of subsistence permitted to a Brahman; 6. eight things worthy of reverence.

It should be noted that Asahâya himself, in the sequel of his commentary, does not adhere strictly to this division, and gives

* 26. Because it proceeds from one of these three motives, carnal desire, wrath, and greed; therefore it is said to have three efficient causes. These are the three sources of lawsuits.

* 27. It is said to have two modes of plaint, because a plaint may be either founded on suspicion or on fact. It is founded on suspicion, when the defendant has been seen to move in bad company. It is founded on fact, when the stolen chattels or the like have come to light.

* 28. Because it is based on the statements of the two litigants, therefore it is said to have two openings. There the accusation is called the plaint; the answer is called the declaration of the defendant.

* 29. Because it may be founded either on truth or on error, therefore it is said to have two issues. Truth is what rests on true facts. Error is what rests on mistake of facts.

30. Ordeals even are rendered nugatory by artful men. Therefore let no mistake be committed in regard to place, time, quantity, and so on.

a number of different headings, which will be quoted in the notes to this translation.

27. Supposing that the owner of a lost chattel casts his suspicion on a man who is constantly seen in the company of well-known thieves and other bad characters, or who lives with prostitutes, or is addicted to gambling, if he impeaches that man, it is called a charge founded on suspicion. If a man is impeached, after having been taken with the maner, the stolen goods having been found among his property, it is called a charge founded on fact. In a charge founded on suspicion, the decision must be referred to the gods (i.e. to an ordeal). In a charge founded on fact, the decision rests with the king's judge. A.

29. The issue of a lawsuit, like its beginning, may be twofold. Either a just decision is given, in accordance with fact, or the decision is erroneous. A.

31. There a king who acts justly must neglect error when it is brought forward, and seek truth alone, because prosperity depends on (the practice of) duty.

32. As seven flames rise from fire, even so will seven good things become manifest in a self-restrained king who passes just sentences at trials.

33. Religious merit, gain, fame, esteem among men, reverence on the part of his subjects, conquests, and an everlasting residence in paradise.

34. Therefore let a king, after having seated himself on the judgment seat, be equitable towards all beings, discarding selfish interests and acting the part of (Yama) Vaivasvata, (the judge of the dead).

* 35. Attending to (the dictates of) the law-book and adhering to the opinion of his chief judge, let him try causes in due order, adhibiting great care.

36. The connection (âgama) must be examined

31. 'Brought forward,' i.e. stated by the plaintiff. The king shall neglect it, i.e. not accept it as correct. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 19.

32. The idea that fire is composed of seven rays or flames is derived, no doubt, from the seven rays of the sun-god *Sûrya*, who is represented down to the present day as riding in a chariot drawn by seven horses.

34. 'Discarding selfish motives,' i.e. free from love or wrath (*sine ira et studio*). 'The part of Yama,' the king of righteousness, i.e. the distribution of the rewards and punishments due to good and bad actions. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 1; *Vishnu* III, 92, &c.

35. While consulting the law-book, he should take heed at the same time of whatever is brought forward by the assessors of the court conjointly with the chief judge. He should abide by the opinion delivered by the latter. He should try causes in due order, i.e. so that the four feet of a judicial proceeding follow one another in due succession. A. *Manu* VIII, 1, 8, 9; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 1, &c.

36. *Âgama*, 'the connection,' i.e. the relation of the case in hand to the entire system of law; 'the title of law,' its appertaining to a subdivision of this or that title of law; its 'cure,' i.e. it must

first of all ; then the title of law must be ascertained ; thereupon follows the cure ; and the decision comes at the end. These are the four parts of a trial.

37. Avoiding carefully the violation of either the sacred law or the dictates of prudence, he should conduct the trial attentively and skilfully.

38. As a huntsman traces the vestiges of wounded deer in a thicket by the drops of blood, even so let him trace justice.

* 39. Where the rules of sacred law and the dictates of prudence are at variance, he must discard the dictates of prudence and follow the rules of sacred law.

40. When it is impossible to act up to the precepts of sacred law, it becomes necessary to adopt a method founded on reasoning, because custom decides everything and overrules the sacred law.

41. Divine law has a subtile nature, and is occult

be cured like an illness, by carrying it through the four parts of a judicial proceeding. A.

38. As deer in a thick forest is difficult to catch, even so justice is difficult of attainment. A huntsman traces the game by following up the drops of blood to the spot, though the soil may be covered by thick grass, where the wounded deer is seen by him. Similarly a king, following the course of the lawsuit, traces law to the point where justice shines forth clearly. A. Manu VIII, 44.

39. Yâgñavalkya II, 21.

40. According to A., this verse inculcates the superiority of custom to written law. Thus both the practice of raising offspring to a deceased or disabled brother, and the remarriage of widows (see twelfth title of law) are specially sanctioned in the sacred law-books. Yet these two customs are opposed to established practice. Therefore subtile ratiocination is required. A. quotes a verse to the effect that the immemorial usages of every province, which have been handed down from generation to generation, can never be overruled by a rule of the sacred law. Vasishtha XVI, 4; Gautama XI, 23.

41. 'The visible path' means either ratiocination founded on

and difficult to understand. Therefore (the king) must try causes according to the visible path.

* 42. One who has never committed robbery may be charged with robbery. An actual robber, on the other hand, may be acquitted of the charge of robbery. *Mândavya* was tried and declared to be a robber.

* 43. In the case of a woman, at night, outside of

internal or circumstantial evidence, or it may mean a sound decision. A. Gautama XI, 24.

42. 'Justice has been stated (in 41) to be difficult to attain, because a man may be suspected to be a thief merely on account of stolen chattels being found amongst his property. Thus the great sage *Mândavya* even was reproached with theft by an injudicious king, because, faithful to his vow of silence, he did not make a reply when he was charged with theft. Therefore it is necessary to exhibit great care in discerning righteous men from evil-doers.' A. The history of *Mândavya* is related in the *Mahâ-bhârata* I, 4306 foll. A gang of robbers (*Dasyus*) being pursued by a guard, dropped their booty in the habitation of *Mândavya* the ascetic, and hid themselves in his hermitage. Soon after, their pursuers arrived, and asked *Mândavya* in which direction the robbers had proceeded. The saint made no reply, whereupon the guard took to searching the hermitage, in which they discovered both the robbers and the stolen chattels. The thing looking suspicious, they conducted both the saint and the robbers before the tribunal of the king, who ordered the saint to be tied to a stake. However, though tied to the stake and left without food, the saint remained alive. After some time, the king ordered him to be released, and asked his forgiveness for the ill-usage offered to him.

43. 'In the case of a woman,' i. e. if the lawsuit has been instituted by a wife or daughter; or if it has been decided by a woman. 'At night,' as the night is the proper time for sleeping, and not the proper time for attending to judicial business; for it is obviously impossible to try a cause at night. 'Outside of the village,' means 'in the wood.' A lawsuit, when decided in one of these places (or special circumstances), is not finally decided and settled; the cause has therefore to be tried anew. Such is the meaning of this rule. A.

the village, in the interior of a house, and by enemies ; a sentence passed under any one of these various circumstances may be reversed.

* 44. Owing to the recondite nature of lawsuits, and the weakness of memory, the answer may be delayed at pleasure in lawsuits relating to a debt or other subject, with a view to ascertain the true facts.

* 45. Let him answer at once in charges concerning a cow, landed property, gold, a woman, robbery, abuse, an urgent affair, a heinous offence, or a calumny.

* 46. One who tries to right himself in a quarrel, without having given notice to the king, shall be severely punished and his cause must not be heard.

* 47. A defendant who absconds when the cause is about to be tried, and he who does not take heed of what (the claimant) says, shall be arrested by the plaintiff until the legal summons has been declared.

* 48. Local arrest, temporary arrest, inhibition

44. Owing to the recondite nature of lawsuits, and on account of the weakness of men's memory, which renders them unable to remember distinctly any event that has occurred long ago, the defendant in a lawsuit must be allowed sufficient time to prepare his answer. A. Read *rinādishu* in the text.

45, 46. The first rule constitutes an exception to the preceding one. In the cases here mentioned the answer should be tendered at once. A. Gautama XIII, 40, 41; *Yāgyavalkya* II, 12, 16.

48. Local arrest is in this form : 'If you move from this place, the king will arrest you.' Temporary arrest is in this form : 'You must not leave this house for a certain period.' Inhibition from travelling consists of a prohibition not to undertake a journey on which one has determined. Arrest relating to *karman* is in this form : 'You must not persevere in performing this or that *karman* (religious ceremony).' Thus according to A. and *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 55. When placed under arrest of any one out of these four kinds, the person arrested must not break the arrest. Otherwise he will become guilty of an offence against the king. A.

from travelling, and arrest relating to karman ; these are the four sorts of arrest. One arrested must not break his arrest.

* 49. One arrested while crossing a river, or in a forest (kântâra), or in a bad country, or during a great calamity, or in another such predicament, commits no fault by breaking his arrest.

[50. Those causes which have been tried in the king's court, (or) by friends, connections, or relations, shall be tried anew, after a fine of twice the original amount (of the sum in dispute) has been imposed.]

* 51. If one arrested at a proper time breaks his arrest, he shall be punished. One who arrests improperly is (equally) liable to punishment.

* 52. One about to marry ; one tormented by an illness ; one about to offer a sacrifice ; one afflicted by a calamity ; one accused by another ; one employed in the king's service ;

49. Kântâra, 'a fearful forest,' 'a bad country,' a dangerous place, 'a great calamity,' a public disaster or a heavy affliction and the like. One who breaks an arrest which has been put on him in one of the places or on one of the occasions hitherto mentioned, does not commit a criminal offence by doing so. A.

50. A. observes that this verse, though it ought not to come in here, has been inserted from the original work (of Nârada?). It means, according to him, that both those lawsuits which have been decided by the king in person, and those which have been decided by friends, connections, or relatives, shall be tried anew, in case the double amount of the fine ordained has been paid. Yâgñavalkya II, 305. Perhaps the word '(or)' had better be omitted.

51. 'A proper time' means 'a suitable time,' i.e. any other time besides the various occasions mentioned in paragraph 45. 'One who arrests improperly,' is either one who arrests on one of the prohibited occasions, or one who arrests without sufficient reason. A.

52. Artizans, i.e. manual labourers, while engaged in their work. A.

* 53. Cowherds engaged in tending cattle ; cultivators in the act of cultivation ; artizans, while engaged in their own occupations ; soldiers, during warfare ;

* 54. One who has not yet arrived at years of discretion ; a messenger ; one about to give alms ; one fulfilling a vow ; one harassed by difficulties : a person belonging to any of these categories must not be arrested, nor shall the king summon him (before a court of justice).

* 55. One accused of an offence must not lodge a plaint himself, unless he have refuted the charge raised by the other party. Neither (is he allowed to accuse) one who has already been accused by a different party. It is wrong to strike one again who has already been struck (by another).

56. When he has proffered a charge, he must not

53, 54. 'One who has not yet arrived at years of discretion,' i. e. a boy. 'A messenger,' whether employed in the affairs of the king, or by a private person. 'One about to give alms,' at one of the 'Parvan' days (the days of the four changes of the moon). 'One fulfilling a vow,' performing a special religious observance. 'One harassed by difficulties,' i. e. one who has been befallen, at the time being, by a calamity from the king or from fate. All persons in any such situation must not be arrested. A.

55. The defendant, after having been accused by the plaintiff, must not proffer a counter plaint against the plaintiff, without having previously cleared himself of the charge raised against himself, because two different causes cannot be tried at one and the same time. Neither must a new plaint be lodged against one who has already been impeached by another, because one already hit must not be hit again. If a deer has been first hit by one huntsman, and is again hit by another hunter, the effort of the latter is to no purpose. The first huntsman may justly claim the deer, and not the second. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 9.

56. 'He must not alter the charge,' as e. g. by claiming a larger or a smaller sum afterwards than he had done before. If e. g. after

again alter it. He must not recede from his previous claim. By doing so he will lose his suit.

57. He must not lodge a false plaint. He is a sinner who proffers a false charge (against any one). Whatever fine is declared in a suit of this sort has to be paid by the claimant.

58. If a man delays his answer under false pretences, or if he stands mute at the trial, or if he revokes his own former statements : these are the signs by which a loser of his cause may be known.

59. One who absconds after having received the summons, or who does not make any defence after having arrived in court, shall be punished by the king, because his cause is lost.

60. If a man being questioned does not uphold

having first claimed, as being his due, a sum amounting to 20 Gadyâ-nakas of gold, he says afterwards : This man has to give 50 drammas (drachmas) to my son, it is called 'receding from one's first claim and proffering another claim.' A. Yâgñavalkya II, 9.

58. Delaying one's answer under false pretences is e.g. if a man says, 'I am unwell just now,' or 'I am unclean just now. I make no answer.' Likewise, if a man, after having been asked by the judges, does not speak, or if having made a statement previously he revokes it ; by such signs as these a man may be known to have lost his cause. A.

59. He who, after having been summoned by the king, makes off ; or who, having decamped and having been seized with difficulty by the king's officers, does not make any reply to the questions put to him, shall be fined by the king, because he loses his suit. A. Manu VIII, 55, 56 ; Yâgñavalkya II, 16.

60. If, being questioned by the judges, he does not uphold, i.e. maintain, a statement previously made by himself. A. The commentators of Manu, in commenting on an analogous passage of the Code of Manu (VIII, 54), give the following example. A man has made a certain statement regarding the money in dispute. The judge asks him afterwards, 'Why did you tender or accept the money at night?' The man thereupon does not abide by his own former statement. (See Jolly, translation of the eighth chapter of

a statement duly made by himself (at a former stage of the trial) ; or if he ends by admitting what had been previously negated by himself ;

61. Or if he is unable to produce any witnesses, after having declared that they are in existence and having been asked to produce them : by all such signs as these persons devoid of virtue may be known.

* 62. When a lawsuit has been decided evidence becomes useless, unless a document or witnesses can be produced who or which had not been announced at a former stage of the trial.

* 63. As the (fertilizing) power of rain is thrown away on ripe grain, even so evidence becomes useless when the suit has been decided.

the Code of Manu.) 'He who, after having answered a question in the negative previously, makes an opposite statement afterwards.' The meaning is as follows : He is cast, if, having been interrogated by the judges, 'Can you adduce any witnesses or documents ?' he replies at first by saying 'I have none,' and goes on to say 'I have witnesses and documents.' A. The reading seems faulty. See Manu.

61. If a man says he has documents or witnesses, and the judges, having heard this, say to him, 'If you have witnesses, show them,' i. e. exhibit them ; if thereupon he does not adduce them, he loses his suit. A. Manu VIII, 57.

62. 'This wicked debtor owes me money. He declines to restore it, though I can prove his obligation to pay me by witnesses and documentary evidence. Therefore I must cite him before the tribunal of the king.' If the claimant says so and does not produce evidence at the time when he proffers his claim, but produces it afterwards, it does not make evidence. If, however, a statement of this kind had been previously made, and the claimant, owing to some unfortunate accident, or to forgetfulness, &c., has merely failed to repeat it at the third stage of the trial (i. e. during the judicial inquiry), it may be renewed, and shall be examined by the judges, although the case had already been decided, and sureties been given and taken. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 20.

64. False statements even have to be examined if they have been made in due season. That, on the other hand, which has been passed over in silence through inadvertency, fails to produce any result, even though it be true.

* 65. If a man is of opinion that the suit has been decided and punishment declared in a way contrary to justice, he may have the cause tried once more, provided he should pay twice the amount of the fine inflicted.

* 66. If a verdict contrary to justice has been passed, the assessors of the court must pay that fine; because nobody certainly can act as a judge without incurring the risk of being punished (eventually).

67. When a member of a court of justice, actuated by wrath, ignorance, or covetousness, has passed an

64. *Yâgñavalkya II, 19.*

65. A lawsuit is 'decided' at the time when the judges, after having come to a unanimous agreement about the verdict to be passed on the plaintiff and defendant, give them a written record of their respective victory and defeat. The 'punishment has been declared' when the judges, after passing the verdict, dictate a certain punishment, in accordance with the comparative heaviness or lightness of the offence committed. In both cases, if a man considers himself to have lost his cause through an unjust sentence, he may have the cause tried anew, if he pledges himself to pay twice the amount of the fine to the king's judge. A. *Yâgñavalkya II, 305.*

66. 'Where an unjust sentence has been passed, the blame attaches to the assessors of the court. Therefore they have to pay that fine.' A. *Yâgñavalkya II, 4.*

67. 'Wrath' is when he bears him an old grudge. 'Ignorance' means folly. That is done 'through covetousness' which is done in consideration of a bribe. 'He who passes an unjust sentence,' i.e. who says what is opposed to justice. Such an assessor has to be considered as 'no assessor of the court,' i.e. he is unworthy to sit in the court. A.

unjust sentence, he shall be declared unworthy to be a member of the court, and the king shall punish him for his offence.

* 68. That king, however, who is intent on doing his duty, must be particularly anxious to discover what is right and what is wrong, because there is a variety of dispositions among mankind.

69. There are some who give false evidence from covetousness. There are other villainous wretches who resort to forging documentary evidence.

70. Therefore both (sorts of evidence) must be tested by the king with great care: documents, according to the rules regarding writings; witnesses, according to the law of witnesses.

* 71. Liars may have the appearance of veracious men, and veracious men may resemble liars. There are many different characters. Therefore it is necessary to examine (everything).

* 72. The firmament has the appearance of a flat surface, and the fire-fly looks like fire. Yet there is no surface to the sky, nor fire in the fire-fly.

* 73. Therefore it is proper to investigate a matter, even though it should have happened before one's own eyes. One who does not deliver his opinion till he has investigated the matter will not violate justice.

68. The two following paragraphs show what is meant by 'the diversity of men's minds.' A.

72. As the sky has the appearance of a level plain like the earth, yet there is nothing like earth about it; and as there is no fire in the fire-fly, although it sparks like fire; even so the utterances of men are often untrue, though they may have the appearance of true statements. Therefore it is necessary to examine strictly even what a man professes to have seen with his own eyes. A.

* 74. Thus a king, constantly trying lawsuits with attention, will acquire widespread and brilliant renown in this life and the abode of Indra after his death.

II. THE PLAINT.

1. The claimant, after having produced a pledge the value of which has been well ascertained, shall cause the plaint to be written. (He must have been impelled) to proffer his claim, by the nature of the claim, and must be intent on promoting the victory of his cause.

* 2. The defendant (creditor), immediately after having become acquainted with the tenour of the plaint, shall write down his answer, which must correspond to the tenour of the plaint.

* 3. Or let him (the defendant) deliver his answer on the next day, or three days, or seven days later.

II, 1. The term *sunisṭitabalâdhânas*, which has been taken to mean 'after having produced a pledge the value (or competence) of which has been well ascertained,' is by no means clear, and admits of several different interpretations. Thus it might be rendered, 'after having carefully explored the nature of the wrong offered to him.' A. does not explain this obscure term 'Impelled by the nature of his claim,' not by the king, or by an enemy, but merely by his own cause. 'Intent on promoting the victory of his cause,' i.e. absolutely determined not to embark in any other undertaking, previous to having gained his cause. A.

2. The creditor is called plaintiff. The debtor is called defendant. The defendant, after having heard the tenour of the plaint which has been tendered in writing by the plaintiff, shall write an answer, i.e. make a reply, which corresponds to the tenour of the plaint. A. Read *pratyarthî* in the text.

3. The defendant may tender his written answer on the next day, or three days, or seven days after he has heard the accusation. The plaintiff, on the other hand, is not allowed any time to reply to the statements of the defendant. His victory (or defeat) is

The plaintiff no doubt duly obtains his victory at once, when the trial has reached the third stage (the examination of the evidence).

* 4. An answer is fourfold ; a denial, a confession, a special plea, and that which is based on a plea of former judgment.

* 5. A denial is fourfold (being couched in any one out of the four forms hereafter mentioned). 'This is false,' or 'I do not know anything about it,' or 'I was not present at the transaction,' or 'I was not in existence at the time when this event took place.'

6. A contradiction, the reverse, a retort, and a friendly counsel ; in one out of these four forms should the answer be given, and it should be in conformity with the tenour of the plaint.

* 7. Before the answer to the plaint has been tendered by the defendant, the plaintiff may amend his own statements as much as he desires.

decided at once, by examining the proofs that have been adduced. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 7.

4. A special plea is when the defendant admits a fact, but qualifies or explains it so as not to allow it to be matter of accusation. A plea of former judgment is when the defendant pleads that the very same cause has been previously tried at the tribunal of this or that judge, and that his adversary has been cast. A.

6. This paragraph, says A., occurs in the original work, and has therefore been inserted in this place, though it is difficult of explanation and a mere paraphrase of the preceding paragraph. It has been rendered in accordance with his interpretation. 'The reverse' means confession. 'A retort' means a special plea. 'A friendly counsel' means plea of former judgment. A.

7. The plaintiff may go on altering and improving his written declaration, till the defendant gives in his answer. When, however, the plaint has been answered, he is no longer at liberty to make any further amendments. A.

* 8. These are called the defects of a plaint: (1) if it relates to a different subject; (2) if it is unmeaning; (3) if the amount (of the sum claimed) has not been properly stated; (4) if it is wanting in propriety; (5) if the writing is deficient; (6) or redundant; (7) if it has been damaged.

9. By whomsoever a claim is raised, whatever and from whomsoever it may have been claimed: from that very person must the claimant receive that very thing, and it must not be (claimed) mutually, or (claimed) from a stranger. Thus 'a claim relating to a different subject' may be of three kinds.

10. Thy friend here has thought in his mind, that I am his enemy. On account of this great intolerance I have impeached thee here.

11. If he omits to state the amount of the thing (claimed), and forgets to aim at brevity(?): this fault of a plaint is called omission of the amount (claimed), and it should be avoided.

12. Let him avoid improper statements in the plaint (e.g. an accusation which is raised) by a plurality of persons against one single-handed; or

8. A. does not explain the rather obscure terms occurring in several of the following paragraphs. He confines himself to stating that they contain an accurate definition of the 'seven defects of a plaint,' as enumerated in paragraph 8, to which the defect described in paragraphs 15, 16 has to be added as an eighth.

9. The three kinds of 'a claim relating to a different subject' appear, therefore, to be these: where it proceeds from a different person than the creditor; where the amount of the sum claimed has not been stated correctly; and where the plaint has been addressed to a wrong person.

10. This is an instance of an unmeaning or frivolous accusation. A.

11. The reading of this paragraph is uncertain.

(a cause which) is opposed to (the interests of) the city or kingdom (in which he lives).

13. A plaint in which a mere dot is omitted, or where a word or a syllable has been obliterated, or where too little or too much has been written, or which is absurd; such a plaint should be carefully avoided.

14. He should (equally) avoid a plaint which has been destroyed or damaged (by an accident), or which has been soiled by water, oil, or other (liquids), even though the purport and meaning of the plaint be quite plain.

* 15. A plaint, though otherwise established, is not correct, if it is contrary to established law and usage.

16. A claim which is proffered in this form—'I gave this to him while he was in a state of intoxication with fragrance (through a smell of perfume)'—cannot succeed, because it is contrary to established usage.

* 17. Where different words are (subsequently) inserted (in the plaint), and where the sense becomes different (in consequence), there the judicial investigation becomes confused, and the evidence itself is thrown into confusion.

* 18. When the claimant, in a passion, and actuated

17. A. illustrates this rule by the following example. The claimant has claimed a certain sum. At the time of the trial he names a larger sum than he did before. Thus the judicial investigation becomes confused.

18. If a man actuated by one of the three passions, sexual desire, wrath, and covetousness, mentions some special (important) circumstance at the trial, the scribe shall enter it at once in writing on a board, or leaf, or Bhûrga-bark, or box, or wall. A. This rule seems to relate to incidental statements, which escape one of the parties through inadvertency. Thus in the well-known drama *Mrikkhakaśikā*, the wicked prince *Samsthânaka*, when informing the

by one of the immoral motives, such as partiality, makes some special statement, it shall at once be completely reduced to writing on a board or other (writing material).

19. Other statements than those (taken down at first) regarding the plaintiff on a board or other (writing material) shall be removed, after careful consideration, by persons versed in law, (when reporting on the trial) for the information of the king's judge.

20. Let such persons reduce to writing the statements of each party, and whatever else has been written on the board, together with the names of the

judge that Vasantasenâ has been murdered, adds, 'not by myself.' The judge pounces upon the latter statement, suspicious as it looks, and causes the scribe to put it down in writing on the floor. The prince, perceiving that he has committed himself, effaces the writing with his foot. The custom of writing the statements of the parties on the floor is repeatedly referred to in the Indian dramas. From what Brîhaspati says, it would seem that in the time of this law-writer the statements of the parties had first to be written on a board, and then on a leaf, after all the required corrections had been entered. Nârada seems to refer to the same custom in paragraphs 19 and 20.

According to Dr. Burnell, the boards referred to in the law-books must have been a sort of black wooden boards. See Burnell, *South Indian Palæography*, 2nd ed., p. 87.

20. In translating this paragraph, the obscurity of which is only surpassed by the preceding paragraph, I have deviated from the interpretation proposed by the commentator.

A. takes this paragraph as containing four independent clauses: 1. what has been stated or admitted by both parties; 2. whatever else has been written on the board; 3. the depositions of the witnesses; 4. what each party has conceded to the other. These four things should be reduced to writing by the persons entrusted with the judicial investigation. 'Whatever else has been written on the board,' i. e. whatever the plaintiff amends or adds, while the plaint is being reduced to writing. Such statements, as shown in the next paragraph, are called *Pratyâkalita*.

witnesses, as well as those statements in which both parties concur.

21. Additional statements of the plaintiff (or defendant), which are not contained in the writings of both parties, shall be (subsequently) entered into his (their) declaration. They are called Pratyâkalita ('what is interposed').

* 22. If one deputed by the claimant, or chosen as his representative by the defendant, speaks for his client in court, the victory or defeat concerns the party (himself and not the representative).

* 23. He deserves punishment who speaks in behalf of another, without being either the brother, the father, the son, or the appointed agent; and so does he who contradicts himself at the trial.

* 24. He who forsakes his original claim and produces a new one, loses his suit, because he confounds two complaints with one another.

* 25. A verbal error does not annul the claim in

21. A. infers from the use of the term 'both parties' that a Pratyâkalita statement may proceed from the defendant as well as from the plaintiff, though the plaintiff alone is specially mentioned. A. adds that this rule applies equally to all those kinds of statements, which are mentioned in paragraph 20.

22. This rule applies equally where a party is prevented from appearing before the court by illness, and where the party is not a good speaker, and has appointed an agent or attorney for that reason. A.

23. This prohibition relates to those who, from love, anger, or avarice, meddle with the affairs of strangers, and pretend to act in their behalf at court. A.

24. If a claimant, on finding himself unable to prove his claim at the trial, proffers a different claim, he must be pronounced the losing party, on account of the confusion caused by him. A.

25. An erroneous statement does not necessarily cause the defeat

actions of any kind. So if the case relates to cattle, or to a woman, or to land, or to a debt, he is liable to punishment, but his claim is not annulled.

26. Where the defendant denies the charge, the claimant has to prove his accusation, unless the denial should have been in the form called *Pratyavaskandana*.

* 27. What the claimant has fully declared word for word in the plaint that he must substantiate by adducing evidence at the third stage of the trial.

* 28. Proof is said to be of two kinds, human and divine. Human proof consists of documentary and oral evidence. By divine proof is meant the ordeal by balance and the other (modes of divine test).

29. Where a transaction has taken place by day,

of the plaintiff. This is particularly the case in one of the following important actions: a case relating to a cow, female buffalo, or other cattle; a case relating to a woman; a case relating to landed property, i.e. a house, field, &c.; and a case relating to one of the twenty-five subdivisions of the law of debt. In any case he is not defeated, merely on account of an erroneous statement contained in the suit. He does not lose the suit instituted by him, though he is liable to punishment. A. The *Mitâksharâ* (p. 23) has a long gloss on this rule of Nârada, from which it appears that the 'erroneous statements' here referred to are statements made through inadvertency, and that this rule applies to civil, as opposed to criminal actions. Read *vâkkhale* in the Sanskrit text.

26. An answer in the form called *Pratyavaskandana* is where the defendant admits the facts adduced by the plaintiff, but explains them so as not to be matter of accusation.

27. The claimant must prove, at the judicial investigation, whatever he has committed to writing in the plaint. A.

29. The divers kinds of divine test will be declared below. In the case of all those transactions which take place during day-time eye- and ear-witnesses are present. Documentary evidence, likewise, is generally available in such cases. Therefore, divine proof should not be resorted to. Where a transaction is known to have

in a village or town, or in the presence of witnesses, divine test is not applicable.

* 30. Divine test is applicable (where the transaction has taken place) in a solitary forest, at night, or in the interior of a house, and in cases of violence, or of denial of a deposit.

31. Where the defendant has evaded the plaint by means of a special plea, it becomes incumbent on him to prove his assertion, and he is placed in the position of a claimant.

* 32. One who takes to flight after having received the summons; one who remains silent; one who is convicted (of untruth) by (the deposition of) the witnesses; and one who makes a confession himself: these are the four kinds of Avasannas (losers of their suit).

* 33. One who alters his former statements; one

taken place in the presence of witnesses, divine proof is also not applicable. A.

30. In all the places and occasions mentioned in this paragraph human proof is not applicable, wherefore divine test has to be resorted to. A.

31. Where the defendant has recourse to the mode of defence called Pratyavaskandana, i.e. where he admits the charge, but adduces a special circumstance to exonerate himself, the plaint becomes purposeless. To the defendant, however, belongs the onus probandi in regard to the special circumstance mentioned by him. He is, therefore, reduced to the position of a claimant, in that it is incumbent on him to prove his assertion at the time of the judicial investigation (kriyā). A.

32. One who, though summoned by the king's officers, absconds through fear of the accusation brought against him; one who stands mute in the assembly when he is asked to make his declaration; one who is cast by the depositions of the witnesses; and one who confesses to be in the wrong himself: these four persons are non-suited. A. Yāgñavalkya II, 16; Manu VIII, 55-58.

33. Two out of the four 'losers of their suit,' who are referred

who shuns the judicial investigation ; one who does not make his appearance (before the tribunal); one who makes no reply ; and one who absconds after receiving the summons : these five kinds of persons are called Hîna (cast in their present suit).

34. Precious stones, such as rubies, golden ornaments, such as Dînâras, pearls, coral, shells, and other (jewels and precious metals) shall be returned

to in the preceding paragraph, may be said to have lost their cause for once and all, viz. one who is convicted of untruth by the deposition of the witnesses, and one who confesses his wrong himself. The two others, viz. one who remains silent and one who absconds, are liable to punishment, but they do not entirely lose their suit, as their cause may be tried anew. Similarly, the five persons mentioned in par. 33, though non-suited in the case in hand, may have their cause tried anew. 'One who alters his statements,' i.e. one who, from forgetfulness, says something different from what he had stated before. 'One who shuns the judicial investigation,' i.e. one who, from repugnance against judicial investigation, throws the proceedings into confusion. 'One who does not make his appearance before the tribunal,' i.e. on account of a calamity which has befallen him through the king or through fate, &c. 'One who makes no reply,' i.e. one who does not give in his answer at once, and asks for delay to prepare it. 'One who absconds' from fear of an enemy. A. This interpretation has evidently been called forth by a desire to reconcile par. 33 with the preceding paragraph, as the persons called Hîna are partly identical with those designed as Avasannas. It may be doubted, however, whether par. 32 belongs to the original work of Nârada, as the identical rule is elsewhere attributed to Brîhaspati (see Viram., p. 102), and as it is certainly difficult to reconcile the two paragraphs with one another.

34. If the owner of the articles mentioned in this rule sells them for genuine, and the purchaser, putting belief in his statements, accepts them as such, and pays for them, but finds out afterwards that they are not genuine, the seller must take them back, and must give other articles in exchange for them which are really valuable, or he must make good their value to the purchaser. A. As for the meaning of the term Dînâra, which corresponds to the Latin denarius, see the Introduction.

to their owner, in case they turn out to be imitations only.

35. If a man seizes perfumes, or garlands—other than those which have been given to him—or ornaments, or clothes, or shoes, which belong to the king, he deserves to be corporally punished.

* 36. The price or value of a commodity, wages, a deposit, a fine, what has been abandoned (by one and found by another), what has been idly promised, and what has been won at play; none of these articles yields interest, except under a special agreement to the purpose.

37. Men of the *Sûdra* caste, who proffer a false accusation against a member of a twice-born (*Aryan*) caste, shall have their tongue slit by (the officers of) the king, and he shall cause them to be put on stakes.

38. A royal edict, a (private) document, a written

35. One who, from pride, seizes (or uses) one of the above articles, shall be corporally punished, if they belong to the king. A. The reading of this paragraph is quite uncertain.

36. 'The price of a commodity,' the price paid for a saleable commodity which has been sold. 'A deposit,' a trust. 'A fine,' an amercement which has been inflicted by the king's judges. 'What has been abandoned,' what has been seized after its dereliction (by the original owner). 'What has been idly promised' to bards or other worthless persons.

37. If the *Sûdras*, by whom this crime has been committed, are punished by the king, he becomes free from blame. Otherwise, the blame falls on him, as it is his duty to reward the honest, and to punish evil-doers. A.

38. The divers forms in which a plaint is instituted in each of these several cases (excepting a single case, a transaction of sale) are stated as follows by A. : '1. This man has not taken notice of a certain royal edict. 2. This man has (unduly) availed himself of a certain document relating to its owner. 3. This man, by virtue of a certain written title, has appropriated a slave girl belonging to

title, a grant, a pledge, a (promise reduced to) writing, a sale, or purchase : one who brings a claim in regard to any one of these before the king is known as defendant among those conversant with the rules (of legal pleading).

* 39. Where the deposition of the witnesses has been objected to, it becomes necessary first of all to clear the witnesses from suspicion. When the witnesses themselves have been cleared from suspicion, he may undertake to remove the doubts which have been raised against their deposition.

* 40. When a man has lost his cause through the dishonesty of witnesses or judges, the cause may be tried anew. When, however, a man has been cast through his own conduct, the trial cannot be renewed.

41. One convicted by his own confession, one

myself. 4. This man raises the revenue of a certain village which has been granted to myself. The grant relates to myself only. 5. This property has first been pledged to me by the debtor. How can any one else enjoy it? 6. Why does not this man deliver this chattel to me, which has been promised to me in writing? 7. I have purchased this commodity from him, and paid for it. He does not make the commodity over to me.'—Read *âgñâ*.

39. Where the defendant raises groundless objections against the trustworthiness of the depositions of witnesses, he is liable to punishment, like one who shuns the judicial investigation, and loses his suit in consequence. After the witnesses have been cleared from suspicion, their statements have to be examined in order to remove what looks suspicious in them. A.

40. Those who have lost their cause, either through the statements of their own witnesses, or through the decision of the judges, may have their cause tried anew, according to a rule previously laid down. If, however, a man has been convicted by his own conduct, or if the witnesses adduced by him should turn out to have been corrupted by him, the case cannot again be opened. A.

41. 1. One who pleads guilty; 2. one convicted by his own

cast through his own conduct, and one whom the judicial investigation has proved to be in the wrong : (these three) deserve to have their final defeat declared at the hand of the judges.

42. Whenever the (false) assertions have been removed, the judges shall pass a decree. If they pass a judgment, before the false statements have been removed, they will cause evil in the next world and in this.

43. One condemned by the judges shall be punished by the king according to law. The victorious party shall receive a document recording his victory, and couched in appropriate language.

44. This has been formerly declared by the self-existent Being to be the mouth of a lawsuit. If the mouth of a lawsuit is in order, the whole suit is in order, but not otherwise.

conduct, as e.g. by adducing false witnesses or forged documents ;
3. one convicted by the witnesses : those three shall not be punished till they have been condemned by the judges. A.

42. When the time for passing a decree has arrived, the judges shall carefully remove all mere assertions of either party. Should they omit to do so, they would be in danger of condemning an innocent man, and might produce evil in this world by causing loss of money, and in the next world by barring the way to paradise to themselves, as it is the duty of kings to restrain evil-doers and to protect the righteous. A.

43. According to *Bṛihaspati*, the document of victory which has to be given to the victorious party shall contain an accurate record of the plaint, of the answer, and of the judicial investigation.

44. The general rules regarding judicial proceedings, which have been laid down in the preceding section, are declared to be the mouth of a lawsuit, because they are applicable to the trial of every suit. 'The self-existent Being,' i.e. Brahman. A.

III. COURTS OF JUSTICE.

* 1. One who has not been authorized must not speak on any account at the trial. But authorized persons must deliver their opinion in an unbiassed spirit.

* 2. Whether unauthorized or authorized, one acquainted with the law shall give his opinion. He passes a divine sentence who acts up to the dictates of law.

3. If he delivers a fair opinion, a member of the court will incur neither hatred nor sin. But if he speaks otherwise he at once incurs both.

* 4. Let the king appoint, as members of a court

III, 1. Courts of justice are generally thronged by a large attendance. Some of the persons present are intelligent, others are not, and others are wise in their own estimation only. Such persons, if unrestrained, would disturb the judges by interpreting idle speeches between the legal proceedings, and by quarrelling amongst themselves. Therefore, the first half of this paragraph relates to the punishment ordained for those who speak without authorization. Authorized persons, i.e. the judges who sit on the seat of judgment, shall strive to be just, i.e. they shall deliver a judgment in accordance with justice, and shall not show partiality for either of the parties. A.

2. Where all the assessors of the court pass an unjust sentence, from ignorance of the law, or from interested motives, there a Brahman versed in the sacred law and acquainted with legal proceedings, who happens to be present, shall point out the law to them, and restrain the judges from their sinful course. He shall speak, though he has not been appointed to deliver judgment. Law is called the voice of the deity. A.

3. That is called 'a fair opinion' which is not contrary to written law and to custom. A judge who delivers a sentence of this kind incurs neither enmity nor sin, i.e. he does not become unhappy either in this world or in the next. A.

4. As young bulls are able to carry a heavy burden, even so

of justice, honourable men, of tried integrity, who are able to bear, like good bulls, the burden of the administration of justice.

* 5. The members of a royal court of justice must be acquainted with the sacred law and with rules of prudence, noble, veracious, and impartial towards friend and foe.

6. Justice is said to depend on them, and the king is the fountain head of justice. Therefore the king should try causes properly, attended by good assessors.

7. When lawsuits are decided properly, the members of the court are cleared from guilt. Their purity depends on the justice (of the sentences passed by them). Therefore one must deliver a fair judgment.

8. Where justice is slain by injustice, and truth by falsehood, the members of the court, who look on with indifference, are doomed to destruction themselves.

competent judges are able to discharge the onerous duties of their responsible office. They must be men of ripe wisdom, acquainted with sacred law and with the ways of the world, and the king must have tested their qualifications. A. Vishnu III, 74, &c.

5. The law-books contain many utterances of the sages, which are obscure and difficult to make out. Therefore slow-minded persons, who are unable to understand them, and to refer their contents to each case in hand, must not be appointed. Well-descended persons shall be appointed, because they will avoid partiality from family pride. 'Veracious' persons have a natural abhorrence against untruthfulness. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 2.

6. 'On them,' i.e. on the judges, whose qualities have been previously described. A. Vishnu III, 72; Manu VIII, 1; Yâgñavalkya II, 1, &c.

7. If the king decides lawsuits justly, the assessors obtain their own absolution through the just decision. A.

8. Identical with Manu VIII, 14.

9. Where justice, having been hit by injustice, enters a court of justice, and the members of the court do not extract the dart from the wound, they are hit by it themselves.

10. Either the judicial assembly must not be entered at all, or a fair opinion delivered. That man who either stands mute or delivers an opinion contrary to justice is a sinner.

11. Those members of a court who, after having entered it, sit mute and meditative, and do not speak when the occasion arises, are liars all of them.

* 12. One quarter of the iniquity goes to the offender; one quarter goes to the witness; one quarter goes to all the members of the court; one quarter goes to the king.

13. The king is freed from responsibility, the

9. Virtue is here compared to one wounded with a weapon, who goes to a physician in order to be cured by him. The judges are compared to physicians who, by means of a careful judicial investigation, deliver justice from the attacks of iniquity. If they do not extract the dart of iniquity, they are killed themselves by the dart of iniquity, which has been spared by them. A. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 12.

10. Either the judicial assembly must not be entered at all, not even a single time, or an opinion conformable to justice must be delivered. A judge who remains silent, or who, when asked to pass a sentence, says what is contrary to justice, is criminal, i. e. a great sinner. A. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 13.

11. Those judges who sit mute in the judicial assembly, being apparently engaged in meditating over an altogether different affair than that for which the parties have appeared before the tribunal, and who fail to declare at the proper time the victory of the one party and the defeat of the other, all such persons shall be looked upon by the king as equally criminal with those who pass a false sentence. A.

12, 13. These two paragraphs belong together. If the judges

members of the court obtain their absolution, and the guilt goes to the offender, when the guilty person is punished.

14. He who, having entered the court, delivers a strange opinion, ignoring the true state of the case, resembles a blind man who regardless swallows fish together with the bones.

15. Therefore let every assessor of the court deliver a fair opinion after having entered the court, discarding love and hatred, in order that he may not go to hell.

* 16. As an experienced surgeon extracts a dart by means of surgical instruments, even so the chief

were to acquit the criminal, and unjustly to condemn the innocent party, the iniquity or sinful action committed by the unjust decree would go into four parts, i. e. a quarter of it would go respectively to the shares of the perpetrator of the deed, of the witnesses, of all the assessors of the court, and of the king. If, however, the guilty person alone is condemned, i. e. if the criminal party loses his cause, the king becomes free from guilt, the judges are free from responsibility, and the whole guilt falls on the perpetrator of the iniquitous deed. A. Medhâtithi, in commenting on the identical rule of Manu (VIII, 18), observes that the guilt goes to the king, in case the sentence had been passed by him in person. Otherwise it goes to his chief judge. Identical with Manu VIII, 18, 19, &c.

14. One whose eyesight is unimpaired, does not eat fish without having previously removed the bones, which would injure his mouth, his tongue, and his palate. A blind man, on the contrary, eats fish together with the bones, because he is unable to remove them. The case is similar with the eye of knowledge. A.

15. Considering all this, let a judge, after having entered the court of judicature, reject every kind of bias, and deliver a fair, i. e. an impartial opinion, in order that he may not go to hell burdened with the crime of a guilty person (acquitted by him). A.

16. As a skilful surgeon conversant with the art of extracting a dart, extracts it, though it may be difficult to get at and invisible, by the application of surgical instruments, of spells, and other manifold artful practices, even so a judge shall extract the dart of

judge must extract the dart (of iniquity) from the lawsuit.

* 17. When the whole aggregate of the members of a judicial assembly declare, 'This is right,' the lawsuit loses the dart, otherwise the dart remains in it.

18. That is not a judicial assembly where there are no elders. They are not elders who do not pass a just sentence. That is not a just sentence in which there is no truth. That is not truth which is vitiated by error.

iniquity which has entered a lawsuit, by employing the artful expedients of judicial investigation. A.

17. 'The members of a judicial assembly' are those who have come together for the trial of a cause. A.

18. This paragraph, in the original, is a verse composed in the Trishūbh metre, and has the look of an old versus memorialis. Though the author of the Nârada-smṛiti has incorporated it in his work, its contents do not quite fit in with his own ideas regarding the constitution of a judicial assembly, and the prominent place which he assigns to the chief judge of the king.

FIRST TITLE OF LAW.

THE LAW OF DEBT.

1. Payment of a Debt.

* 1. Which debts must be paid, which other debts must not be paid ; by whom, and in what form (they must be paid) ; and the rules of gift and receipt, (all that) is comprised under the title of 'Recovery of a Debt.'

* 2. The father being dead, it is incumbent on the sons to pay his debt, each according to his share (of the inheritance), in case they are divided in interests. Or, if they are not divided in interests, the debt must

The twenty-five sections into which the law of debt has been divided in this translation correspond in the main, though not throughout, to the headings proposed by Asahâya in different portions of his work. Asahâya, as pointed out before, is not consistent with himself in this respect. It is curious to note that the whole law of evidence, excepting the general rules laid down in the preceding chapters, has been inserted by Nârada between the divers rules of the law of debt. He seems to have followed in this respect, as in other particulars, the example set to him by the earlier legislators, such as Manu and Yâgñavalkya.

I, 1, 2. If a debt contracted by the father has not been repaid during his lifetime, by himself, it must be restored, after his death, by his sons. Should they separate, they shall repay it according to their respective shares. If they remain united, they shall pay it in common, or the manager shall pay it for the rest, no matter whether he may be the senior of the family or a younger member, who, during the absence of the oldest, or on account of his incapacity, has undertaken the management of the family estate. A.

be discharged by that son who becomes manager of the family estate.

* 3. That debt which has been contracted by an undivided paternal uncle, brother, or mother, for the benefit of the household, must be discharged wholly by the heirs.

* 4. If a debt has been legitimately inherited by the sons, and left unpaid by them, such debt of the grandfather must be discharged by his grandsons. The liability for it does not include the fourth in descent.

* 5. Fathers wish to have sons on their own account, thinking in their minds, 'He will release me from all obligations towards superior and inferior beings.'

3. A debt contracted for the household, by an unseparated paternal uncle or brother, or by the mother, must be paid by all the heirs. If they are separate in affairs they must pay for it according to their shares. If they live in union of interests, they must repay it in common. A.

2, 3. Manu VIII, 166; Vishnu VI, 27, 35, 36; Yâgñavalkya II, 45, 50.

4. A. proposes an explanation of this paragraph which is not in accordance with its literal meaning, and decidedly opposed to the principles of a sound method of interpretation. He says that the term 'grandsons' must be taken to relate to the grandsons of the debtor's sons, i.e. to the great-grandsons of the debtor, and that the term 'the fourth descendant' signifies the fourth in descent from the debtor's sons, i.e. the fifth in descent from the debtor himself. This assumption, he says, is necessary in order to reconcile the present rule with the statements of all other legislators, and with Nârada's own rule (par. 6). Vishnu VI, 27, 28; Yâgñavalkya II, 50.

5. A. uses this paragraph in support of his theory that the obligation to pay the debts of an ancestor extends to the fourth in descent. As the great-grandson has to discharge 'the debt to superior beings,' i.e. as he has to offer the customary *Śrâddhas* to his great-grandfather, so he is liable for debts contracted by him, which have not been repaid.

6. Three deceased (ancestors) must be worshipped, three must be revered before the rest. These

6. Three deceased ancestors, i.e. the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, may claim the discharge of their terrestrial and celestial liabilities from the fourth in descent. This rule is illustrated by the history of an action which was brought before a court in Patna. A merchant of the Brahman caste, by the name of Śrīdhara, had lent the whole of his wealth, consisting of 10,000 drammās (drachmas), which he had gained through great labour, to a trader, by the name of Devadhara, on condition that interest amounting to two per cent. per mensem of the principal stock should be paid to him. The interest was duly paid to Śrīdhara at the end of the first month. In the second month, however, Devadhara met his death through an accident. His son died of an attack of cholera. Devadhara's great-grandson alone was left. His name was Mahīdhara. As he was addicted to licentious courses, the management of the estate was undertaken by his sons and maternal uncles. They got into the hands of a cunning Brahman called Smārtadurdhara, who advised them not to pay a single rupee to Śrīdhara, as he was able to prove from the law-books that he had no claim to the money. The uncles of Mahīdhara, much pleased with this piece of advice, promised to give 1,000 drammās to the Brahman if they need not pay the money to Śrīdhara. Thus, when at the close of the second month, the uncles and guardians of Devadhara's great-grandson, Mahīdhara, were asked by Śrīdhara to pay 200 drammās, being the amount of interest due on the sum lent to Devadhara, they refused payment. They said: 'We do not owe you the principal, much less any amount of interest. The Brahman Smārtadurdhara has pointed out to us that the obligation to pay stops with the fourth in descent.' Śrīdhara was struck dumb with grief and terror on hearing this announcement made to him. When he had regained his senses, he repaired to the court of justice, attended by his family, friends, and servants, and impeached Mahīdhara, together with his uncles, for their dishonesty. Both parties took sureties. The uncles of Mahīdhara engaged Smārtadurdhara to plead for them. After pretending his clients to be connected with his family by a friendship of long standing, he went on to refer to a text of Nārada (above, par. 4), as proving that the obligation to pay the debts of ancestors stops with the fourth in descent. All his arguments, however, were refuted, and held out to derision by a learned

three ancestors of a man may claim the discharge of their twofold debt from the fourth in descent.

* 7. If a man fails to pay on demand what had been borrowed or promised by him, that sum (together with the interest) goes on growing till it amounts to a hundred krores (= one milliard).

* 8. A hundred krores having been completed, he is born again, in every successive existence, in his (creditor's) house as his slave, in order to repay the debt (by his labour).

* 9. If an ascetic or an Agnihotrî dies without

Brahman, by the name of Smârtasekhara, who, at the end of his address, charged him openly with having taken a bribe from his clients. The consequence was that Mahîdhara and his uncles lost their cause. A. I have quoted this story in full, because it presents a vivid picture of the way in which judicial proceedings used to be transacted in ancient India. The doctrine which the story is intended to illustrate, viz. that the liability to pay debts contracted by an ancestor extends to the great-grandson, is opposed to the teaching of such an eminent authority as Vignânesvara, who maintains in the Mitâksharâ that the great-grandson is not liable for debts contracted by his great-grandfather, and, conversely, that he does not inherit his property. See the author's Tagore Law Lectures (Calcutta, 1885). The same opinion was apparently held by the author of the Nârada-smṛiti, as may be gathered from par. 4, and by other Smṛiti writers. It appears quite probable that the present paragraph, which is not quoted in any of the standard compilations on civil law, may have been inserted by the author of the commentary, who wanted to make the contents of the Nârada-smṛiti agree with his personal views. The shorter recension and the quotations, instead of the present paragraph, exhibit another paragraph, in which the obligation of the son only to release his father from debt is inculcated.

7. This paragraph has been translated according to the explanation given in Vîramitrodaya, p. 358.

9. The ample heavenly reward due to an Agnihotrî, i.e. one who has kept the three sacred fires from the date of his birth, or who has practised austerities without interruption, shall belong to the creditor, and not to the debtor. A.

having discharged his debt, the whole merit collected by his austerities and by his Agnihotra belongs to his creditors.

* 10. A father must not pay the debt of his son, but a son must pay a debt contracted by his father, excepting those debts which have been contracted from love, anger, for spirituous liquor, games, or bailments.

* 11. Such debts of a son as have been contracted by him by his father's order, or for the maintenance of the family, or in a precarious situation, must be paid by the father.

* 12. What has been spent for the household by a pupil, apprentice, slave, woman, menial, or agent, must be paid by the head of the household.

13. When the debtor is dead, and the expense has been incurred for the benefit of the family, the debt must be repaid by his relations, even though they be separated from him in interests.

10, 11. A debt contracted by one blinded by love, or incensed by wrath against his own son, or in an outrageous state of intoxication, or mad with gambling, or who has become surety for another, must not be paid by the son. If, however, a debt has been contracted, even by the son, for the benefit of the household, or in a dangerous situation, it is binding on the father. A. According to Kātyāyana, a debt contracted from love is a promise made to a dissolute woman, and a debt contracted from anger is a reward promised by an angry man to a ruffian for injuring the person or estate of his enemy. 'A debt contracted in a precarious situation,' i. e. a debt contracted in danger of life. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 45, 46, 47; Vishnu VI, 33, 39.

12. 'A pupil,' one engaged in studying science. 'An apprentice,' a pupil who resides with his preceptor for a certain fixed period. 'A slave,' whether born in the house or purchased. A. Vishnu VI, 39.

13. Where the debtor has gone abroad and met his death through illness, or accident, the debtor may claim his due from his relatives, should they even be separated in interests. A.

* 14. The father, uncle, or eldest brother having gone abroad, the son, (or nephew, or younger brother) is not bound to pay his debt before the lapse of twenty years.

* 15. Every single coparcener is liable for debts contracted by another coparcener, if they were contracted while the coparceners were alive and unseparated. But after their death the son of one is not bound to pay the debt of another.

* 16. The wife must not pay a debt contracted by her husband, nor one contracted by her son, except if it had been promised by her, or contracted in common with her husband.

* 17. A sonless widow, and one who has been enjoined by her dying husband (to pay his debt), must pay it. Or (it must be paid) by him who inherits the

14. Necessary debts, such as those enumerated in paragraph 11, must be paid at once by the other family members. Where, however, the father, uncle, or eldest brother resides abroad, and is known to be alive, the son, &c. need not pay his debt till after the lapse of twenty years. A. Vishnu VI, 27; Yâgñavalkya II, 50.

15. After the death of those who have contracted the debt jointly, the son of one is not bound to pay the debt of another than his father. His liability does not extend beyond his father's share of the debt. A. Vishnu VI, 34; Yâgñavalkya II, 45.

16. A woman need not pay a debt contracted by her son, unless she has promised herself to repay it. Similarly, she is not bound to pay a debt contracted by her husband, unless she should have contracted it jointly with him, or if he should have enjoined her on his deathbed to pay his debts, or if she has inherited his property. A. Vishnu VI, 31, 38; Yâgñavalkya II, 46, 49.

17. A widowed woman who has no son is bound to pay the debt of her husband, if he has commissioned her to do so on his deathbed, or if his property has escheated to her. If she is unfit to take the estate, her husband's debt must be repaid by those who have inherited the estate. The property and the liabilities go together. A. Vishnu VI, 29; Yâgñavalkya II, 51, &c.

estate. (For) the liability for the debts goes together with the right of succession.

* 18. A debt contracted by the wife shall never bind the husband, unless it had been contracted at a time when the husband was in distress. Household expenses are indispensably necessary.

* 19. The wives of washermen, huntsmen, cowherds, and distillers of spirituous liquor are exempt from this rule. The income of these men depends on their wives, and the household expenses have also to be defrayed by the wives.

* 20. If a woman who has a son forsakes her son and goes to live with another man, that man shall take her (separate) property. If she has no property of her own, her son (shall take the property of her husband).

* 21. If, however, a woman repairs to another

18. A debt contracted by the wife, for the purpose of saving from distress her husband, son, daughter, or other family members, must be discharged by the family head. A. Vishnu VI, 32, &c.

19. Yâgñavalkya II, 48; Vishnu VI, 37.

20. If a widow who has a son, blinded by love forsakes her son and betakes herself to another husband, taking her Strîdhana (separate property) with her, the Strîdhana shall belong to her second husband, and not to her sons. If, however, a woman who has no separate property goes to live with another man and takes her first husband's property with her, it shall not belong to the second husband. It shall escheat to her son by the first husband. A. This interpretation has been followed in the text. It is hardly reasonable, however, to explain the term *dravya*, in the first instance, as denoting Strîdhana, and then again, as denoting property inherited from the husband. It would seem that the reading adopted by Asahâya is erroneous. The Viramitrodaya and other compilations read *rinam* for *dravyam*, '(the son) must pay the whole debt, if she has no property of her own.' Vishnu VI, 30; Yâgñavalkya II, 51.

21. If a widow who has a young son takes her deceased hus-

man, carrying her riches and offspring with her, that man must pay the debt contracted by her husband, or he must abandon her.

* 22. He who has intercourse with the wife of a dead man who has neither wealth nor a son, shall have to pay the debt of her husband, because she is considered as his property.

* 23. Among these three, the heir of the wealth, the protector of the widow, and the son, he is liable for the debts who takes the wealth. The son is liable, on failure of a (protector of the) widow and of an heir; the protector of the widow, on failure of an heir and of a son.

* 24. Debts contracted by the husbands of the last

band's property and goes to live with another man, the latter is bound to pay the debts contracted by her first husband. His conduct is unimpeachable, likewise, if he lets her go, she taking the whole of her property with her. A.

23. This rule contains the answer to the question : Who is liable for the debts of a deceased person, whose property has been taken by his heirs, whilst his wife through poverty has acceded to another man, and whilst his son remains both penniless and deprived of the protection of his mother? The decision is as follows. Between those three, the heir of the wealth and no other is liable for the debt. Where, however, there is no heir, owing to the want of assets, there the son is liable, if there is no widow; and the widow's husband, if there is no son. The respective liability of the son and of the taker of the widow depends on the circumstances of the case. If the widow is a young and handsome woman of high origin, her second husband has to discharge the debt of her first husband, according to the maxim that she is considered as his property (see above, paragraph 22). If, however, she is kept like a handmaid and receives a mere livelihood from the man who has taken her, the son is bound to pay the debt. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 51.

24. The term *uttamâ* 'the first,' besides its ordinary meaning, conveys a secondary meaning. It implies that when any of the seven *Svairiṇīs* and *Punarbhūts* happens to be specially handsome or

Svairiṇī and of the first Punarbhū, must be paid by him who lives with them.

25. A wife, a daughter-in-law, a woman entitled to maintenance, and the attendants of the wife : by these have debts to be paid, as also by one who lives on the produce of land (inherited from the debtor).

[If among such brothers as have come to a division and are separate in wives, affairs, and wealth, one should die without leaving issue, his wife inherits his wealth.]

2. Valid and Invalid Transactions.

26. The sages declare that the transactions of a woman have no validity, especially the gift, hypothecation, or sale of a house or field.

27. Such transactions are valid when they are sanctioned by the husband ; or, on failure of the husband, by the son ; or, on failure of husband and son, by the king.

* 28. What has been given to a wife by her loving

gifted, her second husband is bound to pay the debts contracted by the first. A. This, no doubt, is a highly artificial interpretation. A definition of the seven Punarbhūs and Svairiṇīs is given further on, XII, 46-53. A. refers to XII, 48 and 52. However, the meaning of the term 'the first Punarbhū' is defined in XII, 46. The Mitāksharā (p. 77) and Vīramitrodaya (p. 347) explain the term 'the last of the Svairiṇīs' as referring to one who, overwhelmed with distress, delivers herself to another man. See XII, 51, and note.

25 b. This paragraph, which contains a rule relative to the law of inheritance, seems to be a marginal gloss, which has somehow crept into the text by mistake.

28. 'Immovables,' such as houses, fields, and the like. A. This rule is frequently quoted in the mediaeval and modern compilations on the law of inheritance, as indicating the extent of a woman's power over her property.

husband, that she may spend or give away as she likes after his death even, excepting immovables.

* 29. In the same way the transactions of a slave are declared invalid, unless they have been sanctioned by his master. A slave is not his own master.

* 30. If a son has transacted any business without authorization from his father, it is also declared an invalid transaction. A slave and a son are equal in that respect.

* 31. A youth who, though independent, has not yet arrived at years of discretion, is not capable of contracting valid debts. (Real) independence belongs to the eldest son (only); (the right of) seniority is based on both capacity and age.

* 32. Three persons are independent in this world: a king, a spiritual teacher, and in all castes successively a householder in his own household.

* 33. All subjects are dependent; the ruler of the country is independent; a student is pronounced to be dependent; independence belongs to the teacher.

30. A son who has not come to a partition of the family estate with his father, continues dependent on him till the father dies. A.

31. This rule constitutes an exception to the general independence of the son after the death of his father. During the period of his minority, he is unable to contract a valid debt. A. The rule that seniority is based both on capacity and age, is certainly remarkable. It is, however, in accordance with the view enounced further on (XIII, 5) by Nârada, that the management of the family property may be undertaken by the youngest brother even, if capable, because the prosperity of a family depends on ability.

32. The king is independent of his subjects. A teacher is independent of his pupils. The head of a household is independent of his family and attendants. A.

33. 34. These two paragraphs are intended to show the respective dependence and independence of wives, sons, householders, &c. A.

* 34. Wives, sons, slaves and other attendants are dependent. The head of the family, to whom the property has descended by right of inheritance, is independent with regard to it.

* 35. A child is comparable to an embryo up to his eighth year. A youth, who has not yet reached the age of sixteen, is called *Poganda*.

* 36. Afterwards he is no longer a minor and independent, in case his parents are dead. While they are alive he can never acquire independence, even though he may have reached a mature age.

* 37. Of the two (parents), the father has the greater authority, because the seed is superior (to the womb); on failure of the begetter, the mother; on failure of the mother, the eldest son.

* 38. All these persons are independent at all times of those who depend on others. They have

34. Colebrooke (Dig. II, 4, 15) has translated a different reading of paragraph 34, thus, 'A householder is not uncontrolled in regard to what has descended from an ancestor.' See, as to the distinction between inherited and self-acquired wealth, *Yâgñavalkya II*, 121.

35. 'Comparable to an embryo' is one who is not yet allowed to perform purificatory and other rites. From his eighth year onwards a boy may perform purificatory ceremonies and commence sacred study. He is called *Poganda* (a young man), because he is not yet capable of transacting legal business. A. This rule of Nârada has become the foundation of the modern law regarding the duration of minority. A controversy has recently arisen as to whether minority terminates at the end or at the beginning of the sixteenth year. Most, if not all, Indian writers seem to agree in taking the latter view. A. seems to be of the same opinion, though he does not express himself very clearly.

36. He remains dependent during the lifetime of his parents, i.e. if he continues to live in union of interests with them. A.

38. 'Coercion,' i.e. punishment or beating; 'relinquishment,' i.e. renouncing. A.

authority in regard to coercion, the relinquishment and the sale (of property).

* 39. If a boy or one who possesses no independence transacts anything, it is declared an invalid transaction by persons acquainted with the law.

* 40. That also which an independent person does, who has lost the control over his actions, is declared an invalid transaction, on account of his want of (real) independence.

* 41. Those are declared to have lost the control over their actions who are actuated by love or anger, or tormented (by an illness), or oppressed by fear or misfortune, or biassed by friendship or hatred.

42. That is declared a valid transaction which is done by the senior or head of a family and by one who has not lost the control over his actions. That is not valid which has been transacted by one who does not enjoy independence.

3. Property.

43. All transactions depend on wealth. In order to acquire it, exertion is necessary. To preserve it,

39. Both what a minor does, and the transactions of one grown up but dependent on others, as e.g. of a slave, are declared invalid by those conversant with law. A.

40. 'One who has lost the control over his actions,' i.e. one whose natural disposition has been perverted, owing to possession by a demon, or to his addiction to gambling or other vicious propensities. A.

42. Here ends the second section of the law of debt, which treats of valid and invalid transactions. A.

43. 'All transactions,' whether originating in virtue, interest, or love. The rule regarding the acquisition (and enjoyment) of wealth is said to be threefold: protection against bipeds, quadrupeds,

to increase it, and to enjoy it : these are, successively, the three sorts of activity in regard to wealth.

44. Again, wealth is of three kinds : white, spotted, and black. Each of these (three) kinds has seven subdivisions.

* 45. White wealth is (of the following seven sorts) : what is acquired by sacred knowledge, valour in arms, the practice of austerities, with a maiden, through (instructing) a pupil, by sacrificing, and by inheritance. The gain to be derived from exerting oneself to acquire it is of the same description.

* 46. Spotted wealth is (of the following seven sorts) : what is acquired by lending money at interest, tillage, commerce, in the shape of Sulka, by artistic performances, by servile attendance, or as a return for a benefit conferred on some one.

* 47. Black wealth is (of the following seven

&c.; increase, through agriculture, lending at interest, trading, and other modes of acquisition ; enjoyment of terrestrial and celestial pleasures. A.

44-54. Vishṇu, chapter LVIII.

45. 'What is acquired by sacred knowledge,' i.e. the gains of sacred study. What is gained by 'the practice of austerities,' i.e. by one who duly performs greater and minor observances, optional and regular rites, and on whom worthy people bestow alms for that reason. What is received 'with a maiden,' i.e. as her marriage portion. The fruit derived from relinquishing white property is of the same kind, i.e. it is pure likewise. Thus A.

46. 'Commerce,' the sale of merchandise. 'Sulka,' the price obtained for giving a damsel in marriage, whether the transaction be lawful or otherwise. 'Artistic performances,' the art of painting or another art. 'Servile attendance,' waiting upon, and paying homage to, another man. Wealth obtained by one of these seven modes is called spotted, i.e. of a middling kind. A. Others explain the ambiguous term Sulka differently, as denoting tolls, or a fare for crossing a river, &c.

47. 'Gambling,' with dice or otherwise. 'One afflicted with

sorts): what is acquired as a bribe, by gambling, by bearing a message, through one afflicted with pain, by forgery, by robbery, or by fraud.

48. It is in wealth that purchase, sale, gift, receipt, transactions of every kind, and enjoyment, have their source.

49. Of whatever description the property may be, with which a man performs any transaction, of the same description will the fruit be which he derives from it in the next world and in this.

50. Wealth is again declared to be of twelve sorts, according to the caste of the acquirer. Those modes of acquisition, which are common to all castes, are threefold. The others are said to be ninefold.

51. Property obtained by inheritance, gifts made from love, and what has been obtained with a wife (as her dowry), these are the three sorts of pure wealth, for all (castes) without distinction.

52. The pure wealth peculiar to a Brahman is

pain,' one pained by an attack of disease. 'Forging,' falsification, of gold, silver, or other metals. 'Robbery,' such as theft. 'Fraud,' deception. What has been acquired by one of these seven kinds is called 'black wealth,' i.e. wealth of the lowest kind. A.

48. From these three kinds of wealth, with their twenty-one subdivisions, spring all the various kinds of transactions, and all kinds of enjoyment. A.

49. The difference between this and the previous classification of the divers modes of acquisition seems to lie in this, that the one system of classification is solely based on the respective legitimacy or illegitimacy of each mode of acquisition, whereas the diversity of caste represents the principle of classification in the other system. It should be borne in mind that an occupation, according to Indian notions, may be perfectly lawful for one caste, though it is unlawful for all others.

52-54. Manu I, 88-91, X, 74-80; Yâgñavalkya II, 118-120; Vishnu II, 4-14; Âpastamba I, 1, 1, 5-6; Gautama X, 2, 7, 49, 56; Vasishtha II, 13-20; Baudhâyana I, 18, 1-5.

declared to be threefold : what has been obtained as alms, by sacrificing, and through (instructing) a pupil.

53. The pure wealth peculiar to a Kshatriya is of three sorts likewise : what has been obtained in the shape of taxes, by fighting, and by means of the fines declared in lawsuits.

54. The pure wealth peculiar to a Vaisya is also declared to be threefold: (what has been acquired) by tillage, by tending cows, and by commerce. For a Sûdra it consists of what is given to him by the members of the three higher castes.

55. These are the legitimate modes of acquisition of wealth for all the (four) castes severally. If one caste should take to the occupations of another caste, it is a criminal proceeding, except in extreme cases of distress.

4. Means of Livelihood for a Brahman in Times of Distress.

56. In times of distress, a Brahman is allowed to gain his substance in the mode prescribed for the caste next to him in rank ; or he may gain his substance like a Vaisya. But he must never resort to

55. Here ends the section of the divers kinds of wealth in the law of debt. A.

56. 'The class next to him in rank,' i.e. the Kshatriya or warrior caste. If he should find himself unable to support his family by the mode of livelihood of his own caste, he may gain his substance like a Kshatriya. At the time of a drought or famine, he may gain his substance like a Vaisya even. 'The lowest caste,' i.e. the Sûdra caste. A. Manu X, 81, 82 ; Vishnu II, 15 ; Yâgñavalkya III, 35 ; Gautama VII, 6, 7 ; Baudhâyana II, 4, 16, &c.

the mode of livelihood prescribed for a member of the lowest caste.

57. At no time must a Brahman follow the occupations of a man of vile caste, or a vile man the occupations of a Brahman. In either case, expulsion from caste would be the immediate consequence.

* 58. For neither of them are such occupations permitted as are either far above or far below their own rank. Those two occupations are lawful for them which lie between these two extremes; for they are common to all (castes).

59. When a Brahman has lived through the times of distress, with the wealth acquired by following the occupations of a Kshatriya, he must perform a penance and relinquish the occupations of a Kshatriya.

60. When, however, a Brahman takes delight in those occupations and persists in them, he is declared a *Kândaprishta* (professional soldier) and must be expelled from society, because he has swerved from the path of duty.

57. By the term 'a vile man,' a member of the *Sûdra* caste is referred to. The occupations of such a man, i.e. the acceptance of food from everybody and the sale of all sorts of commodities, must never be resorted to by a Brahman, even in times of distress. And so must a *Sûdra* avoid the occupation of a Brahman, such as wearing the sacred thread, study of the Vedas, pronouncing sacred benedictions, offering burnt-oblations, and the rest. A.

58. 'Such occupations as are either far above or far below their own rank,' i.e. the occupations of a Brahman and of a *Sûdra* respectively. 'Those two occupations,' i.e. those peculiar to the Kshatriya and Vaisya. A. *hitvâ* seems a faulty reading (for *hite*).

59. *Yâgñavalkya* III, 35.

60. 'Ejected from society,' i.e. he must not be admitted to obsequial repasts and other religious ceremonies. A.

61. When a Brahman is living by the occupations of a Vaisya, he must never sell milk, sour milk, clarified butter, honey, beeswax, lac, pungent condiments, liquids used for flavouring, spirituous liquor,

62. Meat, boiled rice, sesamum, linen, the juice of the Soma plant, flowers, fruit, precious stones, men, poison, weapons, water, salt, cakes, plants,

63. Garments, silk, skins, bone, blankets made of the hair of the mountain-goat, animals whose foot is not cloven, earthen pots, buttermilk, hair, dregs, vegetables, fresh ginger, and herbs.

64. A Brahman may sell dry wood and (dry) grass, excepting fragrant substances, Erakâ grass, ratan, mulberry, roots, and Kusa grass.

65. (He may sell) twigs of bamboo that have fallen spontaneously, of fruits, the fruits of the jujube tree,

61-66. Manu X, 85-90; Yâgñavalkya III, 36-39; Gautama VII, 8-22; Vasishṭha II, 24-31; Âpastamba I, 7, 20, 11 foll.

61. 'Pungent condiments,' such as sugar. 'Liquids,' such as clarified butter and oil. A.

62. A. explains the term Soma, 'the juice of the Soma plant,' which is offered to the gods at a sacrifice, as denoting sacrificial implements generally; 'men,' i.e. servants; 'plants,' i.e. shrubs, creeping plants, and others. A.

63. 'Blankets,' i.e. what is made of wool. 'Animals whose foot is not cloven,' i.e. whole-hoofed animals, such as horses. 'Dregs,' i.e. the deposit of oil. 'Vegetables,' i.e. fresh pot-herbs. A.

64. 'Fragrant substances,' such as the fragrant root of the plant *Andropogon Muricatus*, Bâlaka, the root of the Musta grass, and others. A. If the reading of a single MS. be followed, the sale of the articles enumerated in pars. 64 and 65 is also prohibited for a Brahman. Several of these articles are included among those substances the sale of which is prohibited by other legislators. See Manu X, 86-89; Yâgñavalkya III, 36-39. However, the reading translated above is distinctly supported by the Commentary of Asahâya, and by the analogous rules of Vasishṭha.

and of the Îṅguda plant, ropes, and thread of cotton, if its shape has not been altered (by working it up).

66. If it is for a medicament used to cure a disease, or for an offering, or if necessity can be shown, he may sell sesamum for a corresponding quantity of grain.

67. A Brahman who swerves from the path of duty by selling prohibited articles, must be reminded of his duty by the king by inflicting a severe chastisement on him.

5. Modes of Proof.

* 68. Those invested with legal authority must pay strict attention to the (various) modes of proof. That even which is provable fails to be proved, if the (prescribed) modes of proof are not attended to.

69. Documents, witnesses, and possession are the traditional three means of proof, by which a creditor endeavouring to recover his loan may obtain what he has lent.

70. If the Creator had not created writing as an

69. The term *pramāṇa*, which has been translated 'means of proof,' is both a philosophical and a law term. A. explains it etymologically, as denoting anything which may be known or discerned accurately. Thus, what is counted or reckoned, may be known by figures. What is capable of measurement, may be known by its measure. Similarly, where a lawsuit is pending, the truth may be known by having recourse to one of the ordinary modes of proof, viz. documents, witnesses, possession, and ordeals. Therefore, these means of proof should be duly applied by holy men, kings, and assessors of the court, and others endowed with legal authority, because that which is doubtful cannot be proved otherwise.

70. The term 'documents' in this section seems to relate principally to the well-known land grants which have been found in many

excellent eye (as it were), the affairs of this whole world would not take their proper course.

71. Writing is an excellent eye (as it were), because it solves all doubts which may have arisen in regard to place, time, profit, matter, quantity, or stipulated period.

72. He who, having received a chattel in a certain place, tries to deny the fact, is liable to be confronted with witnesses and convicted, difficult as it may be to prove his guilt.

73. A document is subject to many blemishes ; witnesses are neither exempt from old age nor from death ; possession, which has been continually held, is the only sure mode of proof, as it is not connected with any material object (liable to decay).

74. Thus have these three modes of proof been declared, by means of which a creditor may recover an outstanding debt, which has not been paid to him and called into doubt (by the debtor).

75. A document is valid at all times ; witnesses (may give valid evidence) as long as they live ; possession acquires legal validity through the lapse of a certain period. This is a legal maxim.

parts of India. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 22 ; *Vishnu* VI, 23 ; *Vasishtha* XVI, 10.

75. Witnesses can give evidence while they live only, whereas a document which has been carefully preserved, remains evidence even after the death of the creditor, debtor, and witnesses, and is capable of substantiating a claim raised by the son, grandson, great-grandson, or more remote descendant of the original owner. On the other hand, even after a lapse of time, i.e. when four or five generations have passed away, and an immeasurable period has elapsed, a creditor may recover his loan by dint of uninterrupted possession. 'This is a legal maxim,' i.e. this is the relative value of the divers kinds of proof. A.

76. Of the three modes of proof here enumerated in order, each previous one is superior to the one named after it; but possession is the most decisive of all.

* 77. Though a document be in existence and witnesses living, that is no (true) property of which possession is not actually held. This is specially true as regards immovables.

* 78. If a man is foolish enough to allow his goods to be enjoyed by strangers in his own eyesight, they shall belong to the possessor, even in the presence and during the lifetime of the rightful owner.

* 79. Whatever the owner looking on quietly suffers to be enjoyed by strangers for ten years,

76. The apparent contradiction between the first and second parts of this paragraph is thus removed by A. : 'Possession of immovables without a title does not create proprietary right, as stated in par. 84. Therefore, the possessor of landed property becomes its lawful owner, if his right or title is established by witnesses, but not otherwise. Thus far possession is more important than witnesses. In the same way documents with a title are superior to witnesses, and possession with a title is superior to witnesses, documents, and ordeals.'

77. This paragraph is intended to show the weakness of proof by witnesses or documents, where it is not accompanied by possession. Generally speaking, any of the three kinds of proof is invalid, where it is not accompanied by one of the other kinds. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 27; *Manu* VIII, 200.

78. If a man suffers his movable or immovable property to be enjoyed by another, the latter will become its lawful owner after the lapse of a long period, no matter whether it has been bestowed on him through affection, or forcibly seized by him, or abandoned by its previous owner. A.

79. Where, however, the owner, though unable to recover his property, owing to special reasons, proffers his claim to it every day, or every month, or every year, it is not lost to him, even after the lapse of a longer period than ten years. A. Identical with *Manu* VIII, 147.

though he is present, that cannot be recovered by him.

* 80. If he is neither an idiot nor a minor, and the enjoyment takes place before his eyes, his right to it is extinct by law, and the possessor is allowed to keep it.

* 81. A pledge; a boundary; the property of a child; an open deposit, an Upanidhi deposit; women; and what belongs to the king or to a learned Brahman, none (of these descriptions of property) is lost (to the owner) by adverse possession.

82. Pledges and the rest, excepting the property of a woman and of the king, are however lost to the owner if they have been enjoyed in his presence for twenty years.

80. 'If he is not an idiot,' nor afflicted by a chronic or agonising disease, nor dumb, blind, or deaf. A. Identical with Manu VIII, 148.

81. 'The property of children' is not lost, though it has been enjoyed for a long time by their guardian. 'An Upanidhi deposit,' i.e. a valuable article which has been delivered under cover to another person. 'A woman,' one who has been delivered to a stranger as a deposit, and enjoyed by him. 'The property of a king,' i.e. land. 'The property of a learned Brahman,' i.e. cows. A. Kullûka, in commenting on the identical verse of Manu, refers the term 'woman' to 'female slaves,' &c. The rules laid down in pars. 79-81, which recur literally in the code of Manu, seem to belong to an older order of ideas than those contained in pars. 84 foll. It may be presumed that the harsh law under which adverse possession of ten years' standing was constituted a source of proprietary right, was mitigated at a subsequent period, and has been inserted here as a sort of historical reminiscence only. According to Brîhaspati, thirty years is the ordinary period of prescription. Identical with Manu VIII, 149; Vasishtha XVI, 18.

82. In this paragraph, as in the preceding one, the term 'a king's property' is referred to landed property by A. The correctness of this interpretation seems questionable.

* 83. The property of a woman and of a king is never lost (to the owner), should it even have been enjoyed for hundreds of years without a title (by strangers).

84. Where there is enjoyment, but no title of any sort, there a title is required in order to produce proprietary right. Possession is not sufficient to create proprietary right in that case.

* 85. A clear title having been produced, possession acquires validity. Possession without a clear title does not make evidence (of ownership).

* 86. He who can only plead possession, without being able to adduce any title, has to be considered as a thief, in consequence of his pleading such illegitimate possession.

* 87. He who enjoys without a title for ever so many hundred years, the ruler of the land should inflict on that sinful man the punishment ordained for a thief.

* 88. If a man holds the property of a stranger without a title, it is not legitimate enjoyment. However, after the death of the occupant, it may be enjoyed legitimately by his descendants.

* 89. In cases falling within the memory of man,

88. While the possessor is alive, the property which he is enjoying without a title cannot become his. The owner may claim it at any time. When, however, the possessor dies, unmolested by the owner, the property continues to be enjoyed by his heirs. Therefore, the owner should not fail to assert his own right. A.

89. The *Mitâksharâ* explains the term 'what falls within the memory of man' as denoting a period of 100 years, in accordance with a text from the Veda, 'The life of men extends over a hundred years.' If this explanation be correct, the present rule agrees in substance with the rule laid down in 89 b and 91, a period of a hundred years being about equal in duration to three lives. It is

possession with a title creates ownership. In cases extending beyond the memory of man, and on failure of documents, the hereditary succession of three ancestors (has the same effect).

* 90. If the occupant is impeached (by the legitimate owner), he cannot escape defeat (without refuting the charge). That possession only can create proprietary right, which has been legitimately inherited from the father.

* 91. When possession has been successively held, even unlawfully, by the three ancestors of the father (of the present possessor), the property cannot be taken away from him, because it has gone through three lives in order.

* 92. What has been deposited with a third person to be delivered ultimately to the owner (*Anvâhita*), stolen goods, ordinary deposits, what is held by force, loans for use, and what is being enjoyed during the absence of the owner, these are six (things possessed) without a title.

true that another legislator, Vyâsa, mentions sixty years as the duration of continued possession extending over three generations.

90. If the owner claims his own property from the possessor, the former has to make good his claim. That enjoyment, however, which has passed from the father to the sons by right of inheritance, constitutes a legal title for them. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 28.

91. If the great-great-grandfather has held possession, be it even without a title, of a certain thing, and if it has been enjoyed, after his death, by the great-grandfather and by the grandfather, it cannot be claimed from the father by any one. *Vishnu* V, 187.

92. The term *Anvâhita* is usually explained, like *Anvâdhi*, as denoting what has been deposited with a third person to be delivered ultimately to the owner. A., however, explains *Anvâhita* as denoting a valuable object received from another in exchange for a worthless article.

* 93. If a litigant dies before a lawsuit (regarding property enjoyed by him) has been decided, the son is required to prove his title. The enjoyment is not legitimate (otherwise).

* 94. After the death of a creditor, witnesses, though available, cannot give valid evidence, except if a statement made by the creditor himself on his deathbed (has been preserved).

95. After the death of the defendant, the deposition of witnesses ceases to make evidence. An attested document retains its validity during his life-time only.

* 96. Where a pious act is announced by a diseased

93. Supposing a man were to have obtained possession of the property of a stranger by one of the previously mentioned illegitimate modes of acquisition, if the rightful owner were to impeach him for it, and if the possessor were to die before the case has been decided, in that case the son would have to substantiate his claim, and would not be allowed to continue his enjoyment of the property without doing so. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 29.

94. A man says after the death of his creditor, 'I have restored this or that cow, female buffalo, bull, or field to my creditor; certain honest men have witnessed the transaction.' Another man says, 'Your father owes me one hundred drachmas; certain persons have witnessed the transaction.' He dies, however, before his claim has been examined. In either of these two cases trustworthy witnesses even are of no avail. If, however, the creditor has stated his claim before witnesses on his deathbed; or if a man has given evidence as witness on his deathbed regarding a certain loan, about which the creditor has asked him; the testimony of the witnesses has to be considered as valid even after his death. A.

95. 'The defendant,' i.e. the debtor. An attested document is valid while he lives only. It loses its validity after his death. A.

96. When a diseased father has stated his intentions regarding a religious endowment or other matters of this kind during the absence of his sons, but in the presence of witnesses, the deposition of the latter will be valid even after his death. Similarly, when a man

man, the testimony of the witnesses retains its validity even after his death. The case is the same with the six (things possessed without a title), viz. an Anvâhita deposit and the rest.

97. In all transactions relative to a debt or to any other (among the eighteen titles of law), the last act is the decisive one. In the case of a gift, a pledge, or a purchase, the prior act settles the matter.

6. Lending Money at Interest.

* 98. A contract of delivery and receipt may be made with a view to the profit arising from Sthâna. It is called Kusîda (lending money at interest), and money-lenders make a living by it.

during an attack of illness, repents of his former act, and declares before witnesses that he has deposited with a friend a worthless object in exchange for a valuable one, and wishes to restore the former; or that he has stolen something and wishes to restore it to the owner; or that he wishes to restore a deposit, which had been delivered to him by the owner; or that he intends to make restoration of what he had obtained by forcible means; or of a loan for use; or of what he had been enjoying in secret: in any one out of these six cases the deposition of the witnesses is valid even after his death. A. See par. 92 and note.

97. In all the eighteen titles of law, beginning with the law of debt, the latest act is considered decisive. The law is different in cases of acceptance, where e.g. a village belongs to him who has been the first to receive it; in the case of a pledge or mortgage, and in the case of a purchase, where the pledge or mortgage, and the article sold belong likewise to the first taker. A. Nearly identical with Yâgñavalkya II, 23.

98. According to A., Sthâna, 'continued abode,' may be three-fold: relating to the matter, as when profit arises from (the continuance of) victuals remaining well kept in a certain place; or relating to one's own abode, as when a dealer derives profit from business transactions in his own country; or relating to a different place, as when a dealer earns money through foreign trade.

* 99. Let a money-lender take, in addition to the principal, the interest fixed by Vasishtha, viz. an eightieth part of a hundred in every month.

* 100. Two, three, four, or five (in the hundred) is the legitimate (rate of interest). Let him take as much in the shape of interest, every month, in the direct order of the (four) castes.

* 101. Or let him take two in the hundred, remembering the practice of the virtuous. By taking two in the hundred, he does not commit the crime of covetousness.

* 102. Interest is declared fourfold in this law-book : periodical interest ; stipulated interest ; kâyikâ interest ; and compound interest.

* 103. That which runs by the month is termed

99. Identical with Manu VIII, 140. This rule, which fixes the rate of interest at $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. by the month, or 15 per cent. per annum, is actually found in the Dharmasûtra of Vasishtha II, 51.

100. Identical with Manu VIII, 142. The meaning is that he shall take 2 per cent. from a Brahman, 3 per cent. from a Kshatriya, 4 per cent. from a Vaisya, and 5 per cent. from a Sûdra. A. It appears, from the commentaries on the code of Manu, that the present rule is applicable in those cases where no security has been given, whereas the preceding paragraph refers to loans secured by a pledge.

101. Identical with Manu VIII, 141. The meaning is that he shall take 2 per cent. only from honest men, to whatever caste they may belong. A. In the code of Manu, the present rule precedes par. 100, instead of following it. The author of the Nârada-smṛiti would seem to have erroneously inverted the original position of the two verses.

102. Manu VIII, 153 ; Gautama XII, 34, 35. See, too, Colebrooke's Digest I, XXXV-XLV.

103, 104. 'Periodical interest' means monthly interest, at the rate of from 2 to 5 per cent., according to the caste of the debtor. 'Stipulated interest' is interest at the rate of more than 10 per cent., which has been promised by the debtor himself in times of great distress. Kâya means principal. If a *Pana*, or quarter of a *Pana*, has to be

periodical interest. That interest is termed stipulated interest which has been promised by the debtor himself.

*104. Interest at the rate of one *Pana* or quarter of a *Pana*, paid regularly without diminishing the principal, is denoted *kâyikâ* interest. Interest upon interest is called compound interest.

*105. This is the general rule for interest to be paid on loans. There are special rules according to the local usages of the country where the loan has been made.

*106. In some countries the loan may grow till twice the amount of the principal has been reached. In other countries it may grow till it becomes three, or four, or eight times as large as the principal.

107. The interest on gold, grain, and clothes may rise till it amounts to two, three, or four times the principal. On liquids, the interest may become octuple; of women and cattle, their offspring (is considered as the interest).

paid every day, without diminishing the principal, i.e. if the whole principal has to be restored, though ever so much interest may have been paid on it, it is called *kâyikâ* interest. Where interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per mensem has been paid for twenty months, it will reach the same amount as the sum originally due, so that the principal is doubled. After twenty months more it becomes quadruple; twenty months later it becomes octuple, and so on. This is called compound interest. A. *Bṛhaspati* and *Vyâsa* derive the term *kâyikâ* from *kâya* 'a body,' and explain that it denotes bodily labour, or the use of a pledged slave.

105. Where local customs obtain, differing from the rules previously given, they have to be followed. A.

106, 107. *Manu* VIII, 151; *Vishnu* VI, 11-17; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 39; *Gautama* XII, 36.

107. Gold borrowed at whatsoever rate of interest shall grow till it becomes double; grain, till it becomes treble; cloth, till it becomes

*108. No interest must ever be raised on loans made from friendship, unless there be an agreement to the purpose. Without an agreement even, interest accrues on such loans after the lapse of half a year.

*109. A loan made from friendship can never yield any interest, without being reclaimed by the creditor. If the debtor refuses to restore it on demand, it shall yield interest at the rate of five per cent.

7. Usurers.

*110. Thus has the rule been declared for the interest to be paid on loans offered through friendship. If, however, interest be demanded on grain, at the rate which has been mentioned, it is termed usury.

*111. A Vaisya is at liberty to get over a period of distress by practising usury. A Brahman must never resort to usury, not even in the extremity of distress.

quadruple; liquids (and condiments), till they become octuple. The offspring of pledged females and cattle shall belong to the creditor. A.

108. The chattels, which have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if lent in amicable intercourse, shall not yield any interest before the expiration of six months, without a special stipulation to that effect. Even without a stipulation to that effect, however, they shall yield interest after the lapse of six months. A.

109. A loan which is not restored, on demand even, shall yield interest at the rate of 5 per cent. from that day forward, even though six months are not yet over. A.

110. The term *karman* is sometimes used as an equivalent for gold. A. This interpretation has not been followed.

111. Agriculture, the tending of cattle, &c., are lawful occupations for a Vaisya. Lending money at interest is also permitted to him. Therefore it is said here that a Vaisya may practise usury in times of distress, whereas a Brahman must not resort to usury even in times of overwhelming distress. A.

*112. If a debt is due to a (dead) Brahman creditor, whose issue is living, (it must be paid to them.) If there be no issue, the king must cause the debt to be paid to his kinsmen; on failure of kinsmen (it must be paid) to his relatives.

*113. Where there are neither kinsmen, nor relatives, nor distant connexions, it shall be paid to (other) Brahmans. On failure of such, he must cast it into the waters.

*114. When a creditor receives payment, he must give a receipt for it to the debtor. If he does not give a receipt, although he has been asked for it, he shall lose the remainder of the sum due to him.

*115. If, though pressed by the debtor, he does not give an acquittance for the sum paid to him by the debtor, that sum shall yield interest to the debtor (henceforth), as (it had done) to the creditor (previously).

112. Sakulya, 'kinsman,' is derived from kulya, 'a bone,' and denotes those who have their bones in common (sic), i.e. a father, a paternal uncle, their sons, and other (agnates). Bandhu, 'a relative,' denotes a mother, a sister, a sister's son, and other (agnates). A.

113. This paragraph is intended to show the pre-eminence of the Brahman caste. A.

114. In Colebrooke's Digest (I, 6, 287) the second half of this paragraph is referred to a refusal on the part of the creditor to restore the money, which the debtor had asked him for, on his refusing to give a receipt. This construction is based on the comment of Gagannâtha, but it is not countenanced by the remarks of Asahâya, and is thoroughly artificial. Yâgñavalkya II, 93; Vishnu VI, 26.

115. If the creditor fails to receipt the sum which has been restored to him, on the back of the document, it shall yield interest to the debtor, in the same way as it had yielded interest to the creditor previously. A.

*116. On payment of the debt, he must restore the bond. On failure of a bond, he must give a written receipt. Thus the creditor and debtor will be quits.

8. Sureties.

*117. The guarantee to be offered to a creditor may be twofold : a surety and a pledge. A document and (the deposition of) witnesses are the two modes of proof on which evidence is founded.

*118. For appearance, for payment, and for honesty, these are the three different purposes for which the three sorts of sureties have been mentioned by the sages.

*119. If the debtors fail to discharge the debt, or

116. Where the bond is no longer in existence, because it has been stolen or destroyed, or met with some calamity, the creditor, instead of it, shall give a written receipt to the debtor. Here ends the sixth section of the law of debt, which treats of lending money at interest and of usurers. A.

117. A surety and a pledge are the two sorts of guarantee for a loan on interest. Documents and witnesses are the two kinds of evidence for each of the four elements, which have to be distinguished in the law of debt, viz. the principal, the interest, the surety, and the pledge. A.

118. A surety for appearance is where the debtor denies the debt, and is asked to prove his denial in a court. In that case, he must produce a man, who becomes surety for the debtor's appearance at the time of the trial. A surety for payment is where the creditor, anxious to obtain a loan, produces one or several sureties, who are either jointly or severally bound. A surety for honesty is where the debtor denies having received a certain sum, or declares that he has restored it to the creditor, and is required thereupon to produce a surety for his veracity. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 53; *Vishnu* VI, 41.

119. This paragraph is intended to show that the surety for appearance and the surety for honesty are equally responsible as the

if they prove dishonest, the surety (for payment and for honesty) must pay the debt; and (so must the surety for appearance), if he fails to produce the debtor.

120. When there is a plurality of sureties, they shall pay each (proportionately), according to agreement. If they were bound severally, the payment shall be made (by any of them), as the creditor pleases.

*121. Twice as much as the surety, harassed by the creditor, has given (to the creditor), shall the debtor pay back to the surety.

122. By the mode consonant with religion, by legal

surety for payment. A. Manu VIII, 158-160; Yâgñavalkya II, 53; Vishnu VI, 41.

120. Where a number of sureties have promised each to pay a certain stipulated share of the debt, in case of the debtor's inability to discharge it himself, the liability of each surety does not extend beyond what has been promised by him. Where, however, all the sureties have declared their joint liability for the whole debt, the creditor may enforce payment from any one among them whom he thinks able to satisfy his demand. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 55; Vishnu VI, 42.

121. When, however, the surety, anxious to obtain twice the amount of the sum for which he has given security, should pay the sum to the creditor of his own accord, without being pressed to do so by the creditor, the debtor shall pay that sum only to him, and not the double sum. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 56; Vishnu VI, 43.

122. Identical with Manu VIII, 49. According to Asahâya, four out of the five modes of recovery of a debt are equivalent to the traditional four means of obtaining success, viz. conciliation, division (bheda), presents, and violence. Thus, 'the mode consonant with religion' means conciliation, i.e. gentle remonstrances. If these should prove of no avail, 'legal proceedings,' or 'division' (bheda), shall be resorted to, i.e. the debtor shall be threatened with a plaint in a court of justice. After that, 'presents' or 'fraud' should be adhibited, i.e. a false hope of fictitious gain shall be held out to the debtor. If this mode also should prove unsuccessful, 'force' or 'violence'

proceedings, by fraud, by the customary mode, and, fifthly, by force, a creditor may recover what he has lent.

*123. A creditor who tries to recover his loan from the debtor must not be checked by the king, both for secular and religious reasons.

9. Pledges.

*124. That to which a title is given (*adhikriyate*) is called a pledge. There are two kinds of it : a

may be used, by fettering the debtor, or confining him, &c. The fifth mode, called the customary mode (*âkṛita*), consists of fasting. If the creditor himself, or his son, or his servant, takes to fasting it is no offence; or he may confine his own son or threaten to kill him, or seize the property of a stranger, as a compensation. The commentators of the Code of Manu explain the five modes of recovery of a debt much in the same way as Asahâya. 'Fraud,' according to them, is when the creditor borrows money from the debtor under false pretences, or retains a deposit belonging to him. *Vyavahâra*, generally interpreted by 'legal proceedings,' means, according to *Medhâtithi*, 'engaging the debtor in agriculture, trade, or other work, and taking the proceeds of his labour.' The 'customary mode' (*âkṛita*) is variously explained as denoting 'fasting,' or 'killing' or 'taking (one's own or the debtor's) family and cattle.' Under the former interpretation, it is identical with the well-known 'sitting in Dharna.' See the translations of Manu, and Jolly, *Ind. Schuldrecht*, § 7. For an interesting parallel to the custom of Dharna from the Brehon Laws of Ancient Ireland, see Sir H. Maine's *Early History of Institutions*, p. 297 foll.

123. A dishonest debtor who applies to the king for protection against a creditor enforcing his demand shall not be abetted by the king. 'For secular reasons,' i.e. in order not to disturb the established order of society. 'For religious reasons,' i.e. in order not to offend against religious law. A. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 50. *Vishṇu* VI, 19; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 40.

124. According to Asahâya, the pledge to be released within a specified time is again twofold. It may be either deposited with a 'keeper of the pledge' (*âdhipâla*), who is to return it on the pledge

pledge which must be redeemed within a certain time, and a pledge which must be retained till the debt has been discharged.

*125. A pledge is again twofold: one to be kept only, and a pledge for enjoyment. It must be preserved precisely in the same condition (as at the time of its delivery); otherwise the pledgee loses interest.

*126. The same thing happens when the pledge has been injured owing to the negligence of the pledgee. If it has been lost, the principal is forfeited, provided that the loss was not caused by fate or the king.

*127. A pledge (for custody) must not be used

being restored at the time agreed on. Or it may be delivered to the creditor on condition of its being returned after the lapse of a certain period, say five or ten years. The usufruct of a 'pledge to be retained till the debt has been liquidated' shall belong to the creditor for ever, till the debt has been discharged.

125. Asahâya gives a house and a field as instances of a pledge for use. By spoiling a pledge of this kind, the pledgee forfeits interest, i.e. he loses the produce of a field, the use of a dwelling-place, &c.

126. 'Negligence,' with regard to a bull or other pledge for use, means that it is used at an unseasonable time, or too much, for drawing a cart or carrying a burden. With regard to a pledge for custody, it means that it is abandoned. 'When it has been injured,' as e.g. when an animal given as a pledge has lost one eye. 'The king' may cause the loss of the pledge, if he confiscates the whole property of a man and the pledge together with it, on account of a slight offence. The loss is caused 'by fate,' if e.g. a pledge is stolen by a thief. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 59; Vishnu VI, 6.

127. Identical with Manu VIII, 144. According to Medhâtithi and Kullûka, the provision that the pledgee must make good the value of the pledge to the owner refers to those cases where the pledge has been injured or spoiled. According to Nârâyana, whose opinion is apparently shared by Asahâya, it means that the pledgee

forcibly. The pledgee who uses it forfeits the interest due to him. Moreover he must make good the value (of the pledge) to the owner. Otherwise he is (considered as) a thief of the pledge.

128. That foolish person who uses a pledge without authorization from the owner, shall lose one half of his interest, as a compensation for such use.

129. If a pledge for enjoyment has been given, (the creditor) must not take interest on the loan. Neither must he give or sell a pledge (of any sort) before the (stipulated) period has elapsed.

* 130. When a pledge, though carefully kept, loses its value after a certain time, (the debtor) must either give another pledge, or discharge the debt to the debtor.

* 131. When a debtor has been disabled by a reverse of fortune (from paying the debt), he shall be made to discharge the debt gradually, according to his means, as he happens to gain property.

* 132. If a wealthy debtor from malice refuses to

must satisfy the owner of the pledge out of the profit derived from the use of the pledge.

128. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 150. See Professor Bühler's note.

129. 'A pledge for enjoyment' means one where the profit derived from the pledge takes the place of interest. Such a pledge must not be given or sold before the term fixed for its delivery. A.

130. Yâgñavalkya II, 60.

131. Where the debtor is unable to give another pledge or to restore the loan, he must be made to restore it successively, as best he can, according to his receipts. A. Manu VIII, 177; IX, 229; Yâgñavalkya II, 43.

132. The king shall take 5 per cent. as a compensation for the assistance rendered by him. A. Manu VIII, 139; Yâgñavalkya II, 42; Vishnu VI, 21.

pay his debt, the king shall compel him to pay it by forcible means, and shall take five in the hundred for himself.

133. If the debtor acknowledges the debt with his own mouth, the king shall take from him ten per cent. (of the debt) as a fine; and twice as much (i. e. twenty per cent.) if he has been convicted (after denial of the debt).

134. If the debtor, owing to a calamity, has not means sufficient to discharge the whole debt, (the claim of the creditor) shall be entered in a legal document, specifying the caste (of the creditor and debtor), their names, and the names of their neighbours.

10. Documents.

*135. Documents should be known to be of two sorts : (the first), in the handwriting of the party him-

133. If the debtor, when impeached by the creditor, acknowledges the debt himself, the king shall take 10 per cent. only. If, however, the debtor had undergone the trouble of proving the correctness of his demand against the creditor, the king shall take from him twice as much, i. e. 20 per cent. A. Manu VIII, 139; Yâgñavalkya II, 42; Vishnu VI, 20, 21.

134. If a debtor, who has been cast in a suit, has not means sufficient to discharge the whole debt, he shall give a written bond. A. The meaning of the obscure terms *gâti*, *samgñâ*, *adhivâsa* may be gathered from a text of *Bṛhaspati*, which is quoted in Nandapandita's *Vaigayantī* (MS.) III, 74. There these three terms occur in an enumeration of ten points which have to be noticed in a written deed concerning landed property. According to Nandapandita, *gâti* denotes the caste, Brahmanical or other, of the plaintiff and defendant; *samgñâ* denotes their names, as e.g. Devadatta; *adhivâsa* refers to the names of their neighbours.

135. A document in the handwriting of the party himself has the advantage of being valid without subscribing witnesses. The cus-

self; (the second), in that of another person, (the former being valid) without subscribing witnesses, the latter requiring to be attested. The validity of both depends on local usage.

* 136. That document is said to be valid which is not adverse to the custom of the country, the contents of which answer to the rules regarding pledges (and other kinds of security), and which is consistent in import and language.

* 137. That document is invalid which has been executed by a person intoxicated, by one charged (with a crime), by a woman, or by a child, and that which has been caused to be written by forcible means, by intimidation, or by deception.

138. A bond ceases to be valid in that case also, if the witnesses, creditor, debtor, and scribe be dead,

tom of the country, i. e. the usages prevailing in each country with regard to the validity of documents, is supreme. A. Vishnu VII, 1-5; Yâgñavalkya II, 84-88.

136. I have translated the reading *vyaktâddividhilakshamam*. That writing is not adverse to the custom of the country which does not record an invalid gift, or a disposition in regard to a minor, &c. If the contents of a document are in accordance with the rules regarding pledges, sureties, &c., and if its import and language is free from obscurity and breaks, it is valid. A. Vishnu VII, 11.

137. What has been written by one intoxicated, or charged with the murder of a Brahman or other heavy crime, or by a woman or child; what has been caused to be written by forcible means, the writer not being concerned in the subject matter; and what has been written by one intimidated, or under a delusion; all such documents are invalid. A. Vishnu VII, 6-10; Yâgñavalkya II, 89.

138. The invalidity of those documents, where the creditor, debtor, witnesses, and writer are all dead, is declared for that reason, because such documents may be suspected of forgery. Even after the actual death of all those persons, however, a document retains its validity, where a pledge is in existence and in the possession of the creditor. A.

unless its validity can be established by the existence of a pledge.

* 139. Pledges are declared to be of two kinds, movable and immovable pledges ; both are valid when there is (actual) enjoyment, and not otherwise.

* 140. If a document has been produced in due time, if (the demand recorded in it) has been (repeatedly) urged, and (publicly) proclaimed, it remains valid for ever, even after the death of the witnesses.

141. A document which is unknown and has never been heard of before does not obtain validity when it is brought forward, even though the witnesses be living.

* 142. When a document has been transferred

139. A pledge which is only mentioned in a document, without being actually enjoyed, has no legal validity. A.

140. A document or bond which the descendants of the creditor have repeatedly shown to the descendants of the debtor whenever interest was due (*prārthitam*), or which they have again and again read out, retains its validity for the respective descendants of the creditor and debtor, even after the death of the witnesses and all other persons concerned. A. I have translated the term *prārthitam* as an independant clause.

141. A document or bond, the contents of which are unknown to the descendants of the debtor, about which they have never heard from their ancestors, and which has been suddenly presented to them only in a business transaction, is not considered valid, even though the witnesses be living. A.

142. This rule is equally applicable to a plaintiff and to a defendant in a lawsuit. 1. If a creditor suing a debtor is unable to produce the bond on demand, the judge shall give him time to search for it. If the bond has been destroyed by fire or by some other accident, the fact of its former existence may be established by the testimony of honest persons, who have acted as scribe or as subscribing witnesses, or who happened to be present while the bond was being executed. The statements of such persons are equally decisive where the marks or part of the writing in a document has been obliterated. 2. A debtor having been asked in

into another country, or burnt, or badly written, or stolen, a delay must be granted, in case it should exist still; if it be no longer in existence, the evidence of those who have seen it decides the matter.

143. If a doubt should subsist, as to whether a certain document be authentic or fabricated, its authenticity has to be established by examining the handwriting (of the party), the tenour of the document, peculiar marks, circumstantial evidence, and the probabilities of the case.

* 144. If a document is signed by a stranger and

court to discharge a certain debt, on the strength of a bond signed by himself, says: 'It is true. I had written that document. However, the money was not handed over to me, and I omitted to cause the document to be torn, because it did not happen to be at hand. A few days later the father of my would-be creditor informed me that he had lost the bond and could not find it anywhere; that, however, he was going to give me a written deed recording its loss. So he actually did, and I have deposited that written deed in a certain box while living in that house.' If the debtor pleads an excuse of this sort, he must be allowed some delay to search for the document in question. If it is no longer in existence, the statements of those who saw it shall decide the matter. A.

143. 'The handwriting,' another specimen of the handwriting of the party. 'The tenour of the document,' the names of the subscribing witnesses. 'Peculiar marks,' flourishes in the handwriting of the scribe. 'Circumstantial evidence,' 'these two facts go together,' or 'they do not go together.' 'The probabilities of the case,' 'how has he got hold of this document?' or 'is he nervous or is his manner of speaking composed and quiet?' By such expedients as these shall doubts regarding the genuineness of a document be removed. A. Vishnu VII, 12; Yâgñavalkya II, 92.

144. If a document has passed by purchase or acceptance from the original owner, who signed it, into the possession of a stranger, who claims the loan recorded in it from the debtor, the judge must examine the document. Kalyāṇabhaṭṭa has composed three verses in explanation of the technical terms āgama, sambandha, and hetu. Sambandha, 'connexion,' according to him, may be founded on descent, caste, marriage, friendship, and social intercourse.

meant for a different purpose, it has to be examined, in case its genuineness should be suspected, by inquiring into the connexion (previously existing between the two parties) and into the (probability of) title, and by resorting to reasonable inference.

145. An (obligation which has been stated in) writing can only be annulled by (another) writing, and an attested bond by witnesses. A writing is superior to witnesses; witnesses are not superior to a writing.

* 146. If a document is split, or torn, or stolen, or effaced, or lost, or badly written, another document has to be executed. This is the rule regarding documents.

11. Witnesses.

* 147. In doubtful cases, when two parties are quarrelling with one another, the truth has to be

Âgama, 'a title,' may be founded on inheritance, purchase, mortgaging, seizure, friendship, and acquisition. Hetu, 'reasonable inference,' may be founded on reasoning and an efficient cause. A. For other explanations of the terms âgama and hetu in an analogous passage of Yâgñavalkya (II, 92), see the Mitâksharâ. The Mayûkha agrees with Kalyânabhaṭṭa.

145. If the debtor states that he has paid the debt, he must be able to produce an acquittance in the creditor's handwriting. In the same way, if the creditor pleads that the bond has been stolen, or lost, or burnt, &c., he must produce a certificate from the debtor stating its loss. Where, however, the bond was attested by subscribing witnesses, the debt has to be discharged in the presence of the same witnesses. A.

146. Where a document has met with any one out of the divers accidents mentioned in this paragraph, the party by whom it was executed may be compelled to give another document instead of it. Yâgñavalkya II, 91. Here ends the chapter on documents, the eighth section of the law of debt. A.

147. When the plaintiff and defendant in a lawsuit quarrel

gathered from (the deposition of) witnesses, whose knowledge is based on what has been seen, heard, or understood by them.

148. He should be considered as a witness who has witnessed a deed with his own ears or eyes; with his ears, if he has heard another man speaking; with his eyes, if he has seen something himself.

*149. Eleven descriptions of witnesses are distinguished in law by the learned. Five of them are termed appointed, and the other six not appointed.

*150. A subscribing witness, one who has been reminded, a casual witness, a secret witness, and an indirect witness, these are the five sorts of appointed witnesses.

about a doubtful affair of any sort, the truth has to be ascertained by examining the statements of the witnesses, who have seen, or heard, or been present at, the transaction. A.

148. Manu VIII, 74; Vishnu VIII, 13.

149. Definitions of the eleven witnesses are given in the following paragraphs. A.

150. 'A subscribing witness,' i.e. one by whom a document is attested. 'A secret witness,' one who concealed in a house or room listens to the discourse of the parties. A. Kâtyâyana defines the technical terms in this paragraph as follows: 'One adduced by the claimant himself, whose name is inserted in the deed, is a subscribing witness. A reminded witness is not entered in a deed. He is called a reminded witness who in order to insure the publicity of a transaction is reminded of it again and again by the claimant. One purposely brought near, and one who happened to be on the spot accidentally, are two witnesses not entered in a deed, by whom a claim may be corroborated. One who standing concealed is caused, for the purpose of establishing the claim, to hear distinctly the statements of the defendant, is termed a secret witness. One who subsequently corroborates the statements of other witnesses, whether from his own knowledge, or from hearsay, is called an indirect witness.'

* 151. The witnesses not appointed by (the party) himself have been declared sixfold : viz. the village, a judge, a king,

* 152. One acquainted with the affairs of the two parties, and one deputed by the claimant. In family quarrels, members of that family shall be witnesses.

153. They shall be of honourable family, straightforward, and unexceptionable as to their descent, their actions, and their fortune. The witnesses shall not be less than three in number, unimpeachable, honest, and pure-minded.

154. They shall be Brahmans, Vaisyas, or Kshatriyas, or irreproachable Sûdras. Each of these shall be (witness) for persons of his own order, or all of them may be (witnesses) for all (orders).

* 155. Among companies (of artizans, or guilds of

151, 152. The village or the co-villagers shall be witnesses in a transaction which has taken place within the village. The testimony of the judge shall be heard in regard to a cause tried in a court of justice. The king shall be witness concerning a transaction which has taken place in his presence. These, and one acquainted with the circumstances of both parties, the agent of the claimant, and members of a family in a lawsuit concerning that family, are the six kinds of witnesses not appointed. A.

153. 'Of honourable family,' belonging to a noble race. 'Straightforward,' habitually veracious. 'Less than three,' viz. one or two persons may be witnesses if both parties consent to it. In a dispute regarding landed property, more than three witnesses are required. 'Honest,' free from avaricé. 'Pure-minded,' imbued with the precepts of religion. A. Manu VIII, 62, 63; Vishnu VIII, 8; Âpastamba II, 11, 29, 7; Gautama XIII, 2; Yâgñavalkya II, 68, 69; Vasishtha XVI, 28.

154. Members of these four castes shall be witnesses for members of their own caste only. Or let members of any caste be witnesses for members of any other caste. A. Manu VIII, 62; Gautama XIII, 3; Yâgñavalkya II, 69; Vasishtha XVI, 29; Baudhâyana I, 19, 13.

155. Companies or guilds are of eighteen kinds. Labourers

merchants, other) artizans or merchants shall be witnesses; and members of an association among other members of the same association; persons living outside among those living outside; and women among women.

* 156. And if in a company (of artizans or guild of merchants) or in any other association any one falls out (with his associates), they must not bear witness against him; for they all are his enemies.

12. Incompetent Witnesses.

* 157. The incompetent witnesses, too, have in this law-book been declared by the learned to be of five sorts: under a text of law, and on account of depravity, of contradiction, of uncalled-for deposition, and of intervening decease.

* 158. Learned Brahmins, devotees, aged persons, and ascetics, are those incapacitated under a text of law; there is no (special) reason given for it.

* 159. Thieves, robbers, dangerous characters,

for hire shall be witnesses for other members of the same association. Outcasts shall be witnesses for other low-caste persons. Women shall be witnesses where two women quarrel with one another. In all these cases, the qualities of the witnesses need not be tested. A. Manu VIII, 68; Vasishṭha XVI, 30.

156. If in a company of traders any one member should contract an enmity towards the other members of it, they are unworthy to bear testimony against or about him, on account of their enmity towards him. Here ends the chapter on witnesses, the tenth section of the law of debt. A.

158. The reason why the persons referred to in this paragraph are excluded seems to lie in their entire renunciation of earthly interests, which renders them unfit to appear in a court of justice. See Manu VIII, 65, where 'one dead to the world' is mentioned among the incompetent witnesses, and other parallel passages.

gamblers, assassins, are incompetent on account of their depravity; there is no truth to be found in them.

160. If the statements of witnesses, who have all been summoned by the king for the decision of the same cause, do not agree, they are rendered incompetent by contradiction.

*161. He who, without having been appointed to be a witness, comes of his own accord to make a deposition, is termed a spy in the law-books; he is unworthy to bear testimony.

*162. Where can (any person) bear testimony if the claimant is no longer in existence, whose claim should have been heard? Such a person is an incompetent witness by reason of intervening decease.

*163. If two persons quarrel with one another,

162. Supposing a man were to claim a certain sum from another and to name a witness, whom he states to have witnessed the transaction. If the *soi-disant* creditor should die, it would be impossible to ascertain whether the statement of the witness is true or false. Therefore such a witness must not be admitted by reason of intervening decease. A.

163. A claimant declares, 'This bull, which you have got, is mine. He was stolen by thieves, who took seven cows along with him. If they are found among your property, they may be known by a red mark on the forehead, or by their white feet, or by other signs. . . . I am able to adduce four witnesses who will declare them to be mine.' The opponent replies, 'Pragâpati (the Creator) has created many two-legged and four-legged beings closely resembling one another. If a superficial likeness is to be considered as evidence, I might take another man's wife into my house, because she has eyebrows, ears, a nose, eyes, a tongue, hand, and feet like my wife. This bull is born and bred in my own house. I am able to adduce four witnesses from the village in which he is being kept; their statements will establish the fact that he belongs to me.' In a dispute of this sort the witnesses of him who was the first to bring the suit into court will decide the suit. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 17; *Vishnu* VIII, 10.

and if both have witnesses, the witnesses of that party shall be heard which was the first to go to law.

* 164. If the claimant should be cast at the trial, his cause proving as the weaker one of the two, it is fit that the witnesses of the defendant should be heard.

* 165. No one should converse in secret with a witness summoned by his adversary, neither should he try to estrange him from the cause of his opponent by other means. A party resorting to such practices as these is cast.

166. If a witness dies or goes abroad after having been appointed, those who have heard his deposition may give evidence; for indirect proof (through a second-hand statement) makes evidence (as well as direct proof).

* 167. Even after a great lapse of time (the deposition of) a subscribing witness retains its validity;

164. Where the plaint is rejected and the defence acknowledged as correct, the witnesses of the defendant have to be examined. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 17; *Vishnu* VIII, 11.

165. That man who holds secret conversations with a witness produced by his opponent, or who tries to intimidate him by threats, abuse, and the like, or to bribe him, loses his suit. A.

166. If a witness dies or goes abroad, indirect witnesses, i.e. those who have heard him speak of the matter, on his deathbed, or when he was about to start, either in answer to questions of the plaintiff, or of his own accord, shall be examined. A. *Vishnu* VIII, 12.

167. What follows here is intended to show how long the statements of each of the five appointed witnesses mentioned in par. 150 retain their validity. A subscribing witness may give valid evidence after the lapse of a very long period even. Such a witness should subscribe his name with his own hand, at the time when the document is being executed, as e.g. 'I, Devadatta, have witnessed this transaction.' If he is unable to write, he should cause another person to write in his own name. The document will make evidence, whenever the occasion arises. A.

if a man can write, he should write (his name) himself; if he cannot (write himself), he should cause it to be written by another man.

*168. (The deposition of) a witness who has been reminded (of the transaction) remains valid in this world up to the eighth year, that of a casual witness remains valid up to the fifth year.

*169. (The deposition of) a secret witness remains valid up to the third year; (the deposition of) an indirect witness is declared to remain valid for one year only.

*170. Or no definite period is fixed for judging a witness; for those acquainted with law have declared that testimony depends upon memory.

*171. A witness whose understanding, memory, and hearing have never been deranged, may give evidence even after a very considerable lapse of time.

13. Six Cases where Witnesses are unnecessary.

*172. However, six different kinds of proceedings have been indicated in which witnesses are not required. (Other) indications of the crime committed are substituted for the evidence of witnesses in these cases by the learned.

*173. It should be known that one carrying a fire-brand in his hand is an incendiary; that one taken with a weapon in his hand is a murderer; and that, where a man and the wife of another man seize one another by the hair, the man must be an adulterer.

*174. One who goes about with a hatchet in his

170, 171. Under this rule, the validity of any testimony is declared independent of length of time, and to depend on the competence of the witness alone. A.

hand and makes his approach may be recognised as a destroyer of bridges (and embankments); one carrying an axe is declared a destroyer of trees.

*175. One whose looks are suspicious is likely to have committed an assault. In all these cases witnesses may be dispensed with; only in the (last-mentioned) case of assault careful investigation is required.

176. Some one might make marks upon his person through hatred, to injure an enemy. In such cases it is necessary to resort to inductive reasoning, (ascertaining) the fact of the matter, and strata gems, in order to get a (reliable) test.

14. False Witnesses.

177. Those must not be examined as witnesses who are interested in the suit, nor friends, nor associates, nor enemies, nor notorious offenders, nor persons tainted (with a heavy sin).

*178. Nor a slave, nor an impostor, nor one not admitted to *Srâddhas*, nor a superannuated man, nor a woman, nor a child, nor an oil-maker, nor one

175. 'Suspicious looks,' as e.g. a sword smeared with blood. *Viramitrodaya*. In an analogous text of *Saṅkha*, as quoted in the *Viramitrodaya*, &c., the possession of stolen goods is mentioned as a further manifest proof of crime.

177-187, 190. *Manu* VIII, 64-67, 71; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 70, 71; *Vishṇu* VIII, 1-5; *Gautama* XIII, 5. *Asahâya* observes that the rules regarding incompetent witnesses do not relate to cases of assault only, but to judicial proceedings of every sort.

177. 'Associates,' i.e. partners in business. 'Notorious offenders,' persons formerly convicted of perjury or other crimes. A. For different interpretations of some of the terms occurring in this section, see the notes to Professor Bühler's *Manu*, and to Burnell-Hopkins's *Manu*, VIII, 64, foll.

178. 'A slave,' one born in the house. 'An impostor,' a

intoxicated, nor a madman, nor a careless man, nor one distressed, nor a gamester, nor one who sacrifices for a whole village.

*179. Nor one engaged in a long journey, nor a merchant who travels into transmarine countries, nor a religious ascetic, nor one sick, nor one deformed, nor one man alone, nor a learned Brahman, nor one who neglects religious customs, nor a eunuch, nor an actor.

*180. Nor an atheist, nor a Vrâtya, nor one who has forsaken his wife or his fire, nor one who makes illicit offerings, nor an associate who eats from the same dish (as oneself), nor an adversary, nor a spy, nor a relation, nor one connected by the same womb.

*181. Nor one who has formerly proved an evil-doer, nor a public dancer, nor one who lives by

fallacious person. 'One not admitted to Srâddhas,' one who is not allowed to partake of obsequial feasts. 'A superannuated man,' weak or decrepit persons. 'One distressed,' by a calamity. A.

179. 'One who neglects religious customs,' one who fails to perform his religious duties. 'A eunuch,' one incapable of begetting offspring. A.

180. 'An atheist,' a heretic. 'A Vrâtya,' one for whom the ceremony of initiation has not been performed. 'His wife,' his legitimate spouse. 'His fire,' the sacred Vaitâna fire. 'One who makes illicit offerings,' one who performs sacrifices for persons of bad fame. 'An associate who eats from the same dish,' one with whom one keeps up commensality. 'A spy,' employed in the service of the king. 'One connected by the same womb,' a uterine brother.

181. 'One who has formerly proved an evil-doer,' one afflicted with an ugly disease, the consequence of wicked acts committed in a previous existence; or one guilty of robbery or other crimes. 'One who lives by poison,' one who buys or sells poison. 'A snake-catcher,' one who catches venomous reptiles. 'A poisoner,' one who, actuated by hatred, gives poison to other people. 'An incendiary,' one who sets fire to houses, &c. Kinâra (a ploughman), 'a Sûdra,' or 'a miser.' A.

poison, nor a snake-catcher, nor a poisoner, nor an incendiary, nor a ploughman, nor the son of a Sūdra woman, nor one who has committed a minor offence.

*182. Nor one oppressed by fatigue, nor a ferocious man, nor one who has relinquished worldly appetites, nor one penniless, nor a member of the lowest castes, nor one leading a bad life, nor a student before his course of study is completed, nor an oilman, nor a seller of roots.

*183. Nor one possessed by a demon, nor an enemy of the king, nor a weather-prophet, nor an astrologer, nor a malicious person, nor one self-sold, nor one who has a limb too little, nor a Bhagavṛitti.

*184. Nor one who has bad nails or black teeth, nor one who betrays his friends, nor a rogue, nor a seller of spirituous liquor, nor a juggler, nor an

182. 'A ferocious man,' one who perpetrates illicit acts of violence. 'One who has relinquished worldly appetites,' an ascetic. 'One penniless,' one who has lost his whole wealth through gambling or other extravagance. 'A member of the lowest castes,' a Kāṇḍāla. 'One leading a bad life,' an infidel. A. The term mūlika denotes 'a seller of roots,' according to A. The Vīramitrodaya interprets it by 'one who practises incantations with roots.'

183. A. explains varshanakshatrastūṭaka as a single term, denoting 'an astrologer.' The Vīramitrodaya, more appropriately, divides it into two terms: 'one who prophesies rain,' i.e. a weather-prophet, and 'an astronomer,' i.e. an astrologer. The term aghasamsin, 'a malicious person,' is in the Vīramitrodaya interpreted by 'one who makes public the failings of other people.' 'One self-sold,' one who has entered the state of slavery for money. 'One who has a limb too little,' i.e. an arm or a foot. 'A Bhagavṛitti,' one who lives by the prostitution of his wife, or one who suffers his mouth to be used like a female part (bhaga). A.

184. 'A cruel man,' a hard-hearted man; or Ugra is used as a proper noun denoting the offspring of a Kshatriya with a Sūdra wife. A.

avaricious or cruel man, nor an enemy of a company (of traders) or of an association (of clansmen).

*185. Nor one who takes animal life, nor a leather manufacturer, nor a cripple, nor an outcast, nor a forger, nor a quack, nor an apostate, nor a robber, nor one of the king's attendants.

*186. Nor a Brahman who sells human beings, cattle, meat, bones, honey, milk, water, or butter, nor a member of a twice-born caste guilty of usury.

*187. Nor one who neglects his duties, nor a Kulika, nor a bard, nor one who serves low people, nor one who quarrels with his father, nor one who causes dissension. These are the incompetent witnesses.

*188. The slaves, impostors, and other incompetent witnesses who have been enumerated above, shall be witnesses nevertheless in suits of a specially grave character.

*189. Whenever a heinous crime, or a robbery, or adultery, or one of the two kinds of insult has been committed, he must not inquire (too strictly) into the (character of the) witnesses.

*190. A child also cannot be (made a witness), nor a woman, nor one man alone, nor a cheat, nor a relative, nor an enemy. These persons might give false evidence.

185. 'One who takes animal life,' a butcher. 'A forger,' one who falsifies documents or coined money. 'A quack,' one who practises incantations and the like with mysterious formulas, medicines, &c. 'An apostate,' one who has left the order of religious mendicants. 'An attendant of the king,' a menial. A.

187. 'A Kulika,' a judge; or the head of a caste or guild. 'One who causes dissension,' one who causes friends or others to fall out with one another. *Vīramitrodaya*.

189. *Manu* VIII, 72; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 72; *Gautama* XIII, 9; *Vishnu* VIII, 6.

* 191. A child would speak falsely from ignorance, a woman from want of veracity, an impostor from habitual depravity, a relative from affection, an enemy from desire of revenge.

* 192. By consent of both parties, one man alone even may become a witness in a suit. He must be examined in public as a witness, though (he has been mentioned as) an incompetent witness.

* 193. One who, weighed down by the consciousness of his guilt looks as if he was ill, is constantly shifting his position, and runs after everybody ;

* 194. Who walks irresolutely and without reason, and draws repeated sighs ; who scratches the ground with his feet, and who shakes his arm and clothes ;

* 195. Whose countenance changes colour, whose forehead sweats, whose lips become dry, and who looks above and about him ;

* 196. Who makes long speeches which are not to the purpose as if he were in a hurry, and without being asked : such a person may be recognised as a false witness, and the king should punish that sinful man.

* 197. He who conceals his knowledge (at the time

192. One agreeable to both parties shall be examined in an assembly of honourable men. A. Manu VIII, 77 ; Yâgñavalkya II, 72 ; Vishnu VIII, 9.

193-196. These rules relate to the trial of a cause by the judge. The time for examining the witnesses having arrived, he should examine their miens and gestures. Incompetent witnesses are not only those previously mentioned, but those here described are equally incompetent. A. Manu VIII, 25, 26 ; Yâgñavalkya II, 13-15 ; Vishnu VIII, 18.

197. One who has made a certain statement in the hearing of others, and makes a different statement at the time of the trial, shall receive specially heavy punishment ; for he is a greater criminal than a false witness. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 82.

of trial), although he has previously related (what he knows) to others, deserves specially heavy punishment, for he is more criminal than a false witness even.

15. Exhorting the Witnesses.

*198. (The judge), after having summoned all the witnesses, and bound them down firmly by an oath, shall examine them separately. (They should be men) of tried integrity and conversant with the circumstances of the case.

199. Let him cause a priest to swear by Truth, a Kshatriya by his riding animal and weapons, a Vaisya by his cows, grain, or gold, a Sûdra by all sorts of crimes.

*200. By ancient sacred texts, extolling the excellence of Truth, and denouncing the sinfulness of Falsehood, let him inspire them with deep awe.

201. He who gives false testimony as a witness will enter his enemy's house, naked, with his head shorn, tormented with hunger and thirst, and deprived of sight, to beg food with a potsherd.

202. Naked, with his head shorn, with a potsherd (for a begging-bowl), standing hungry before the door

198-228. *Manu* VIII, 79-101; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 73-75; *Vishnu* VIII, 19-37; *Gautama* XIII, 12-23; *Âpastamba* II, 11, 29, 7-10; *Baudhâyana* I, 19, 10-12; *Vasishtha* XVI, 32-34. Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche*.

199. Identical with *Manu* VIII, 113. See, too, *Manu* VIII, 88. The commentators of the Code of *Manu* give various explanations of the latter verse. It may mean that a false witness is threatened with the guilt of all offences committed against riding animals, cows, grain, &c.; or with the guilt of stealing riding animals, &c.; or with their loss; or that the judge shall exhort witnesses to touch a cow, &c.

201, 202. *Manu* VIII, 93; *Vasishtha* XVI, 33.

of his adversary, shall he constantly meet his enemies who give false testimony.

203. A perjured witness shall spend his nights in the same manner as a wife who has been superseded (by another), or as a man who has been worsted in playing at dice, or as one whose body is weighed down by a heavy burden.

204. A witness who wavers in giving evidence is sure to be fettered with a thousand bonds from the chain of Varuṇa.

205. After the lapse of a hundred years, the cord is taken off him. When he is free from the cord, the man becomes a woman.

206. Thus is a man liberated from this fixed bondage. *Now I will state, in order, how many kinsmen a false witness kills,

*207. If his evidence concerns, respectively, (small) cattle, cows, horses, human beings, gold, and land. Listen to me, my friend.

203. This sentiment shows that the condition of a superseded wife under Hindu law must have been far from enviable. This is equally shown by the custom of presenting a certain sum to her on her supersession by another wife. See Vishṇu XVII, 18; Yâgñīvalkyā II, 143.

204. The snaky 'bonds of Varuṇa' seem to be an equivalent for dropsy, a disease attributed to the influence of the ancient divinity Varuṇa. See Professor Bühler's note on Manu VIII, 82.

207. 'Kills,' i.e. sends to hell. This interpretation is given by the majority of Manu's commentators. According to others, it means 'causes to fall from heaven and to be reborn in the wombs of animals,' or 'incurs a guilt as great as if he had killed.' See Professor Bühler's note on Manu VIII, 97. The idea that a man, by telling a falsehood, ruins his kinsmen as well as himself, belongs to the remotest antiquity, and recurs in the Zendavesta. See Vendîdād IV, 24 seq.; Jolly, translation of Book VIII of the Code of Manu, note.

207-209. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 97-99, &c.

*208. He kills five by false testimony concerning (small) cattle ; he kills ten by false testimony concerning kine ; he kills a hundred by false testimony concerning horses ; (and he kills) a thousand by false evidence concerning a human being.

*209. He kills the born and the unborn by giving false evidence (in a cause) concerning gold ; he kills everything by giving false evidence concerning land ; beware, then, of giving false evidence with regard to land.

210. Truth is said to be the one unequalled means of purification of the soul. Truth is the ladder by which man ascends to heaven, as a ferry (plies) from one bank of a river to the other.

211. If truth and a thousand horse-sacrifices are balanced against one another (it will be found that) truth weighs more heavily than a thousand horse-sacrifices.

212. A tank is better than a hundred wells, an offering better than a hundred tanks, a son better than a hundred offerings, and truth better than a hundred sons.

213. It is truth which makes the earth bear all beings, truth which makes the sun rise. It is through truth that winds blow, and that the waters flow.

214. Truth is the greatest gift, truth is the most efficacious kind of austerity, truth is the highest duty in the world, thus it has been revealed to us.

215. The gods are truth simply, the human race is falsehood. He whose mind is persistent in truth, obtains a divine state in this world even.

216. Speak truth and discard falsehood. It is through truth that thou shalt attain heaven. By

uttering a falsehood thou wilt precipitate thyself into a most dreadful hellish abode.

*217. And in the hells the merciless attendants of Yama, endowed with great strength, will cut off thy tongue and strike thee with swords, constantly,

*218. And attack and pierce thee with spears, while thou art wailing helpless. When thou art standing, they will fell thee to the ground and fling thee into the flames.

*219. After having sustained thus for a long while the acute tortures of hell, thou shalt enter in this world the horrid bodies of vultures, crows, and other (despicable creatures).

*220. Having discovered these evils with which falsehood is attended, and knowing, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from veracity, thou must speak truth and (thereby) save thyself. Do not ruin thyself wantonly.

221. Neither relatives, nor friends, nor treasures, be they ever so great, are able to protect those who are about to be plunged into the tremendous darkness (of hell).

222. Thy ancestors are in suspense, when thou hast been appointed to give evidence (reflecting in their minds): 'Will he conduct us (into heaven) or will he precipitate us (into hell)?'

223. Truth is the self of man. Everything depends on truth. Therefore thou must be intent on acquiring bliss by thy own effort, by speaking truth.

224. Whatever lies between that night in which thou wast born, and that night in which thou art to die (thy whole life in fact) has been spent in vain by thee, if thou givest false evidence.

225. Those places of abode which are destined

for the murderer of a Brahman, and those which await the murderer of a woman or child, and the regions awaiting an ungrateful man, are reserved for a false witness.

226. There is no higher virtue than veracity, nor heavier crime than falsehood. A man must speak truth therefore, particularly when he has been appointed to give evidence.

* 227. There are two ancient verses (which run as follows): 'If a man is base enough to speak falsely in regard to the affairs of a stranger, what may not such a wretch be expected to do, fearless of hell, where his own welfare is concerned ?

* 228. All affairs are connected with speech, have speech for their root, and depend on speech. He who steals a good speech (by violating truth) is capable of committing any theft (or other crime).'

16. Valid Evidence.

229. Where there is conflicting evidence, the plurality of witnesses decides the matter. If the number of witnesses is equal (on both sides), the testimony of those must be accepted as correct,

228. 'Theft' is a very wide term under the Hindu law. The Code of Manu includes in the denomination of theft, forgery of documents and of coins, unlawful sales, and dishonesty generally. For *hitām* one might read *hi tām*, 'For he who steals speech.' Manu IV, 256.

229. Manu VIII, 73 ; Yāgñavalkya II, 78 ; Vishnu VIII, 39.

229, 230. Where witnesses endowed with a good memory are found on both sides in equal numbers, evidence based on recollection is incapable of influencing the decision of the suit. The witnesses must not be examined, and the above rule comes into force, that the witnesses become incompetent, because they do not agree with one another. A. See par. 161.

whose veracity is not liable to suspicion. If the number of such witnesses is equal (on both sides) (the testimony of these must be accepted), who are possessed of a superior memory.

17. Invalid Evidence.

230. Where, however, an equal number of witnesses possessed of a good memory is found on both sides, the evidence of the witnesses is entirely valueless, on account of the subtle nature of the law of evidence.

231. But wherever a litigant has been abandoned by his own witnesses through the act of fate, the sages have declared that he cannot be absolved by (the performance of) an ordeal even.

* 232. Where, the time for giving testimony having arrived, a witness does not make a consistent statement with reference to the questions under notice, his testimony is as good as ungiven.

* 233. If the witnesses were to disagree with one another as to place, time, age, matter, quantity, shape, and species, such testimony is worthless likewise.

* 234. If the witnesses wrongly name too low or too high a sum, this too must be known to make no evidence. This is the rule of witnesses.

18. What has to be done in default of both Witnesses and Documents.

* 235. When, owing to the negligence of the creditor, both a written contract and witnesses are missing, and the opponent denies his obligation, three different methods may be adopted.

* 236. A timely reminder, argument, and, thirdly, an oath, these are the measures which a plaintiff should adopt against his adversary.

* 237. He who does not refute his (adversary's) statements, though he has been reminded again and again, three, or four, or five times, may be compelled to pay the debt in consequence.

* 238. If the defendant has rejected a demand (to pay), he shall aggress him with arguments relative to place, time, matter, the connexions (existing between the two parties), the amount (of the debt), the contents (of the written contract), and so forth.

* 239. If arguments also are of no avail, let him cause the defendant to undergo one of the ordeals, by fire, water, proof of virtue, and so forth, (which may seem) appropriate to the place, to the season, and to the strength (of the defendant).

236. 'A timely reminder,' timely appeals to the debtor and to the witnesses who have attested the loan. 'Argument,' arguing that the sum in dispute has been previously repaid, or the obligation acknowledged by the debtor. Thirdly, he may attack the defendant with an oath or ordeal, such as e.g. by causing him to swear by his own good actions, or to undergo the ordeal of sacred libation, &c. A. The term 'a reminder' is not correctly explained by Asahâya, as the rule under notice refers to those cases where witnesses are missing.

237. If a debtor has again and again been addressed by his creditor, saying, 'Thou owest me money,' and the debtor does not deny the correctness of the assertion, he shall be bound to pay the debt. Raghunandana's Vyavahâratattva.

238. Asahâya says that the various arguments mentioned in this verse shall be resorted to successively, arguments relative to time having to be proffered when arguments relative to place have failed, and so on.

239. The term *sapatha* denotes both an ordeal and an oath in this place, though some of the commentators deny that *sapatha* may have the former meaning.

240. He whom the waters keep below the surface, and whom blazing fire does not burn, is considered to refute the charge. In the opposite case he is deemed guilty.

* 241. Proof by ordeal takes place (if an offence has been committed) in a solitary forest, at night, in the interior of a house, and in the case of a heinous offence, or denial of a deposit.

* 242. (Ordeals) are equally (applicable) in the case of those women, whose morality has been impeached, in cases of theft and robbery, and in all cases of denial of an obligation.

* 243. Of the gods and *Rishis* even, the taking of oaths is recorded. *Vasishtha* took an oath when he was accused of having assumed the shape of an evil spirit.

240. If a man who is performing the ordeal by water does not rise from water, and if blazing fire, which he is holding in his hand, does not burn him, he is freed from the charge, otherwise he is deemed guilty, i.e. criminal. A. Manu VIII, 115. It does not become quite clear whether the divine tests referred to in this paragraph are identical with the ordeals by water and fire as described further on. See the translations of Manu, and Professor Stenzler's and Dr. E. Schlagintweit's papers on Ordeals in Ancient India.

242. Where the conduct of a woman, i.e. her morals, is called into doubt; where theft or robbery is alleged to have been committed; and where anything has been declared false, for all heavy charges in short, this rule regarding the performance of ordeals has been laid down. A.

243, 244. Manu VIII, 110.

243. The great sage *Vasishtha*, being suspected of being an evil spirit, took an oath, and was cleared of suspicion thus. A. The story, to which allusion is made in this place, is told by the commentators of the code of Manu. *Visvâmitra* accused his rival *Vasishtha* before King *Sudâs* as having eaten up his hundred sons, in the shape of a *Râkshasa* (malignant spirit). *Vasishtha* thereupon exclaimed, 'I will fall dead on the spot if I am a *Râkshasa*.'

*244. The seven *Rishis* resolutely took an oath together with Indra in order to clear themselves mutually of suspicion, when each was suspected (by the rest) of having taken lotus fibres.

245. The perpetrator of a wrong action, or of a crime, shall be let off with one half of the punishment due to his offence, if he admits the charge or if he makes his guilt known of his own accord.

246. If, on the other hand, a criminal has cunningly concealed his crime, and is convicted of it, the members of the court of justice will not be satisfied with his conduct, and the punishment inflicted on him shall be specially heavy.

244. The story here referred to occurs in the *Purāṇas*. The meaning is this: If the great sages even have taken oaths in order to clear themselves from suspicion, how much less should ordinary mortals refrain from taking an oath. A. According to Medhātithi and Govindarāga, the two earliest commentators of Manu, the seven *Rishis* had mutually accused one another of the theft of lotus fibres. Indra took an oath when he was suspected with Ahalyā.

245. One who has committed any wrong or sinful act to the detriment of any one whomsoever, or who has become guilty of robbery or other crimes, shall have to suffer one half only of the punishment ordained for his misconduct, if he acknowledges in a court of law the truth of the charge brought against himself by the injured party. The same rule obtains, if he has denounced himself guilty, though no plaint has been lodged against him. A.

246. If the perpetrator of a wrong act, or of robbery, &c., denies his guilt, on being examined in a court of justice, and is convicted afterwards by means of an ordeal or of another mode of proof, the assessors of the court will be incensed against and a heavy punishment inflicted on him, as e.g. he will have to pay twice as much as in ordinary cases. Here ends that section of the law of debt which consists of 'Rules for those cases where both documents and witnesses are wanting.' A.

19. Proof by Ordeal.

* 247. If no witness is forthcoming for either of the two litigant parties, he must test them through ordeals and oaths of every sort.

* 248. (Let him cause a Brahman to swear by) truth, (a Kshatriya) by his (horse or other) vehicle, and by his weapons, (a Vaisya) by his cows, seeds or gold and so on, (or all) by venerable deities or deified ancestors, by their pious gifts or meritorious deeds.

249. Where a heavy crime has been committed, the ruler shall administer one of the ordeals. In light cases, on the other hand, a virtuous king shall swear a man with (various) oaths.

* 250. Thus have these oaths been proclaimed by Manu for trifling cases. In a suit concerning a heavy crime, divine test should be resorted to.

251. Holy Manu has ordained that five kinds of ordeals should be administered to those involved in a doubtful case (which has become the object of a lawsuit), especially if the matter under dispute is of a recondite nature.

* 252. The balance, fire, water, poison, and, fifthly, consecrated water, are the ordeals ordained for the purgation of high-minded persons.

248. In this rule are indicated the various oaths to be administered according to the caste and individual character of the offender. A. Manu VIII, 114.

249, 250. These two verses are intended to indicate the difference in point of applicability between an ordeal and an oath. A.

251. Holy Manu has said that those against whom a charge of an aggravated nature has been brought, shall have to undergo one out of the five ordeals, in order to clear themselves from suspicion, especially when a secret transgression is concerned. A.

252. In this paragraph the author proceeds to enumerate the five ordeals singly. A. Yâgyavalkya II, 95; Vishnu IX, 11.

* 253. (Those ordeals) have been ordained here by Nārada for the purpose of proving the innocence of criminals who are defendants in a lawsuit, (and) in order that right may be discerned from wrong.

* 254. During the rains let the (ordeal by) fire be administered. In the autumn season the balance is declared to be (the proper kind of ordeal). The (ordeal by) water should be applied in summer, and the (ordeal by) poison in the cold weather.

* 255. The distressed shall not be caused to undergo the (ordeal by) water, nor shall poison be given to the bilious, nor shall the ordeal by fire be administered to persons afflicted with white leprosy, or with blindness, or with bad nails.

* 256. An ordeal should never be administered to persons engaged in performing a vow, to those afflicted with a heavy calamity, to the diseased, to ascetics, or to women, if the dictates of justice are listened to.

257. Where no one declares himself ready to

253. The five ordeals have been proclaimed by the great sage Nārada, for the justification of those impeached on account of their suspicious conduct, by showing where the wrong lies and where not. A.

254. The five ordeals should be administered, each of them, at those very seasons, and not at any other season. A. Vishṇu IX, 25, 28, 30.

255, 256. Vishṇu IX, 23, 25, 27, 29.

255. In the case of the persons here mentioned, the ordeals referred to should be avoided, on grounds of disease and of incapacity to undergo them. A.

256. 'Persons engaged in performing a vow,' those who have performed the ceremony initiatory to a Soma sacrifice. A.

257. An ordeal should not take place, unless there should be a special reason for it, such as an accusation. Therefore an ordeal must not be administered, unless there be a plaintiff who declares himself ready to take the punishment on himself in case of defeat.

undergo punishment, an ordeal cannot take place. An ordeal shall be administered to litigants where there is reason for it, but not otherwise.

258. Therefore an intelligent, virtuous, righteous, and wise (king or chief judge) should abstain carefully from administering any one out of the (five) ordeals, unless both parties consent to it.

* 259. The ordeal by water must not take place in the cold weather, nor the ordeal by fire in the hot season, nor must the (ordeal by) poison be administered to any one during the rains, nor the (ordeal by) balance in stormy weather.

20. The Ordeal by Balance.

* 260. Wise legislators conversant with every law have proclaimed, after mature consideration, the following rules regarding the mode of performing the ordeal by balance, which may be administered in every season.

* 261. The two posts should be dug in every

A. Yāgñavalkya II, 96; Vishṇu IV, 20, 21. The reading *na divyam* (for *na vinâ*?) seems wrong. Or translate, 'but there is no ordeal for plaintiffs.'

258. A king or chief-judge, who is endowed with the qualities here mentioned, should administer an ordeal with the full approval of both parties in a cause, but not otherwise. A.

259. The times or seasons here referred to should be avoided in the case of the ordeal by water and of the other ordeals, because they are illegal. A. Vishṇu IX, 24, 26, 28, 30.

260-284. Vishṇu X; Yāgñavalkya II, 100-102.

260. 'After mature consideration,' after having duly considered that the ordeals by fire, water, and poison are subject to many interruptions or obstacles arising from time, locality, &c., wise men have devised this ordeal by balance, which may be performed during any season. That is the meaning. A.

261. The apparatus for performing the ordeal by balance, which is described in this and the following paragraphs, consists of the

case to the depth of two Hastas below ground. (The whole of) their length is ordained to amount to six Hastas in extent.

* 262. The beam of the balance should be four Hastas in length, and the height of the two posts (above ground) should be the same. The intermediate space between the two posts should measure one and a half Hastas.

* 263. The beam of the balance should be made straight, of Khadira or of Tinduka wood, quadrangular and (provided) with three Sthânas and with hooks (by which the strings supporting the scale are suspended) and with other (contrivances).

* 264. He should cause it to be made of Khadira wood or Simsapa wood, or in default of such, of

following elements: 1. Two wooden posts, supporting a transverse beam. The two posts should be fastened in the ground at a distance of one-and-a-half Hastas (1 Hasta = about 18 inches), facing the west and east. The part above ground should be four Hastas long, and the part below ground two Hastas, the whole length of each post amounting to six Hastas. 2. The beam of the balance, by which the scales have to be suspended. The beam itself, which should measure four Hastas, and should be made of Khadira or other strong wood, should be suspended by means of an iron hook and chain in the middle of the transverse beam. 3. The beam of the balance should be surrounded in the middle and at the two extremities, by three Sthânas (belts?) by which two iron hooks should be fastened. 4. The two scales should be suspended at the two ends of the beam, by the iron hooks, and by four strings each. 5. Each of the two scales should move in a wooden arch (*torana*), which serves the purpose of marking the position of the scales. See Mitâksharâ and Stenzler's paper on Ordeals (vol. ix of the Journal of the German Oriental Society), to which a drawing has been added for the purpose of illustrating the statements of the Smṛiti writers regarding this kind of ordeal.

263. Read *rigvî* in the text.

264. Wood of the Khadira tree is the most eligible sort of wood. Then comes Tinduka wood, and lastly Simsapa wood. A.

Sâla wood, (which must be) without notches and withered portions, and devoid of rents.

* 265. These kinds of timber should be used for preparing the beam of the balance, (which should be erected) either in the midst of a public assembly, or before the gates of the royal palace, or in sight of a temple, or in a cross-road.

266. (The balance) must be dug firmly into the earth, after having been covered with perfumes, garlands, and unguents, and after the performance of purificatory and auspicious ceremonies with sour milk, whole grain, clarified butter, and perfumes.

267. This ordeal should always be administered in the presence of the guardians of the world, who must be invoked to be present for the protection (of virtue and justice), and in sight of everybody (who cares to look on).

* 268. It is ordained that all ordeals should be

265. The various places here mentioned are the favourite abodes of Dharmarâga (the king of justice), when he appears on earth. A. The *Vîramitrodaya* and other compositions quote two verses of Kâtyâyana, to the effect that ordeals should be administered to felons in sight of a temple; to those who have offended against the king, before the gates of his palace; to low-caste persons, in a cross-road; and to other offenders, in the midst of a public assembly, or court of justice.

266. It appears from the statements of other legislators, that the ceremonies to be performed on this occasion are perfectly analogous to those which have to take place on the occasion of preparing a sacrificial stake (*yûpa*).

267. 'In sight of everybody,' not in a solitary spot. A.

268-270. This is a digression relative to certain exceptions to the rule in pars. 257, 258. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 96, 99; *Vishnu* IX, 22.

268. An ordeal is ordained, when the plaintiff declares himself ready to undergo punishment. Where, however, any outrage has been committed against the royal family, an ordeal should be administered even without a declaration of this sort. A.

administered in the forenoon, the person (to be tested) having fasted for a day and a night, taken a bath, and wearing his wet dress.

269. Excepting cases of high treason, an ordeal shall not be administered, unless the plaintiff comes forward and declares himself ready to undergo punishment in case of his being defeated.

270. The king may inflict ordeals on his own servants, even without the one party declaring himself ready to undergo punishment. On the other hand, in the case of other persons accused of a crime, (he should administer ordeals) according to law (only).

* 271. After having well fastened the two scales by the hooks of the beam, he should place the man in the one scale and a stone in the other.

The essential features of the proceedings described in pars. 271-284 may be summarized as follows: 1. The person to be tested by this ordeal should be placed in the one scale, and a basket filled with stones and sand placed in the other scale, as an equivalent. 2. The basket having been made precisely equal in weight to the man with the help of goldsmiths and other persons skilled in the practice of weighing, the position of the beam should be marked on each of the two arches. 3. After that, the man should be allowed to descend from the scale. The judge should admonish him, and he should get into the scale again, after a bill recounting the charge raised against him has been fastened on his head. 4. A Brahman should address the balance with prayers. 5. The man having descended once more from the scale, the result of the second weighing should be compared with the result of the first weighing. If he has risen, i.e. if he has proved lighter than the first time, he shall be acquitted; if the scale has gone down, or if it has remained in the same place as before, he must be pronounced guilty. 6. If any part of the balance has broken during the proceeding, he has to be acquitted.

271. The term 'a stone' seems to denote an equivalent here and in the next paragraph. The sequel shows that the equivalent consists of a basket filled with stones and other objects.

* 272. He should weigh the man on the northern side, and the stone on the southern side. There (in the southern scale) he should (place) a basket and fill it up with bricks, mud, and grains of sand.

273. In the first weighing, the weight (of the man) should be ascertained with the aid of experienced men, and the arch marked at that height which corresponds to the even position of the two scales.

* 274. Goldsmiths, merchants, and skilful braziers experienced in the art of weighing, should inspect the beam of the balance.

* 275. After having first weighed the man, and having made (on the arches) a mark for the beam, in order to show the (even) position of the scales, he should cause him to descend from the balance.

* 276. After having admonished him with solemn imprecations he should cause the man to get into the scale again, after having fastened a writing on

273-275. Goldsmiths, merchants, braziers, and other persons familiar with the art of weighing, should ascertain whether the man and the equivalent are precisely equal in weight, and whether the beam of the balance is quite straight, by pouring some water (on the beam of the balance?). A. According to the *Pitāmaha-smṛiti*, the water shall be poured on the beam of the balance. If it does not trickle down from the beam, the beam may be supposed to be straight. The way in which the position of the scales and of the beam of the balance has to be marked on the two arches, may be gathered from the *Yāgyavalkya-smṛiti*, which ordains that a line shall be drawn (across the arches).

276. He should cause the man to get into the scale once more, after having reminded him of his good actions and of the pre-eminence of truth, having invoked the deities, and having fastened on his head a bill recounting the charge, and containing an imprecation. The whole proceeding must not take place in windy or rainy weather. A. The *Vīramitrodaya* and other compilations quote another text of Nârada, according to which no verdict should be given if the scales have been moved by the wind.

his head. There must be neither wind nor rainfall (at the time when this ordeal is being performed).

277. When he has ascended (the scale), a Brahman, holding the scale in his hand, should recite the following: 'Thou art called *dhaṭa* (a balance), which appellation is synonymous with *dharma* (justice).

* 278. Thou knowest the bad and good actions of all beings. This man, being arraigned in a cause, is weighed upon thee.

279. Thou art superior to gods, demons, and mortals in point of veracity.

[Thou, Balance, hast been created by the gods in time out of mind, as a receptacle of truth.

* 280. Deign to speak truth, therefore, O propitious being, and deliver me from this perplexity. If I am an offender, take me down.

* 281. If thou knowest me to be innocent, take me upwards.] Therefore mayst thou deliver him lawfully from the perplexity in which he is involved.'

282. After having addressed him, (invoking) the guardians of the world and the gods, with these and other such speeches, he should cause the man who has been placed in the scale, to descend once more and should ascertain (the state of the matter).

* 283. If he rises, on being weighed (for the second time), he is undoubtedly innocent. If his

277. This quibble is based on the fact that the two words *Dhaṭa* and *Dharma* commence with the same syllable.

279-281. The words enclosed in brackets cannot be genuine. They appear to be a quotation from the *Yâgñavalkya-smṛiti* (II, 101, 102), which has been added as a marginal gloss by a copyist, and has subsequently crept into the text. *Yâgñavalkya* puts this entire address in the mouth of the defendant himself, whereas all the other *Smṛiti* writers put it in the mouth of a third person.

weight remains the same as before, or if he goes down, he cannot be acquitted.

* 284. Should the scales break, or the beam or the hooks split, or the strings burst, or the transverse beam split, (the judge) shall pronounce a formal declaration of his innocence.

21. The Ordeal by Fire.

* 285. I will propound, next, the excellent law regarding the (ordeal by) fire. The interval between

284. It seems strange that the accidents mentioned in this paragraph should be viewed as proofs of innocence. Vishnu, Kâtyâyana, and Vyâsa rule that the proceeding shall be repeated in every such case. Brîhaspati says that these accidents shall be taken as proofs of guilt. The reading *mûrtitaḥ* may be wrong (for *punaḥ sa?* 'he shall cause the proceeding to be repeated'). See Vyâsa.

285-303. Vishnu XI; Yâgyñavalkya II, 103-107.

The essential features of the ordeal by fire are as follows:

1. Eight concentric circles of equal breadth are marked on a piece of ground.
2. An iron ball is heated repeatedly by a blacksmith.
3. The hands of the defendant are examined, and all existing sores or scars coloured with dots.
4. His hands are wrapped up in leaves, in order to protect them against the hot iron.
5. A prayer addressed to Agni, god of fire, shall be recited and written on a leaf, which is fastened on the head of the defendant.
6. The iron ball is placed in his hands, and he is made to walk slowly through all the circles successively, taking one circle with each step. On reaching the last circle he may throw the ball on the ground.
7. His hands are examined once more. If they are found to contain any fresh sores or wounds, he is guilty; if not, he is innocent.
8. If he lets the ball drop from fear, before having reached the last circle, or if the examination of his hands has yielded no definite result, the whole proceeding has to be repeated.

285. Other legislators state that each circle shall be thirty-two *Āṅgulas* broad together with the space situated between it and the next circle. In par. 299 it is said that the breadth of each circle shall equal the length of the defendant's foot. This rule, according to the commentators, refers to the circle minus the intermediate space between it and the next circle, and means that a

every two circles is ordained to measure thirty-two *Āṅgulas*.

* 286. Thus the space covered by the eight circles will measure two hundred and fifty-six *Āṅgulas*.

* 287. He should place seven leaves of the holy fig-tree in the hands of the defendant, and should fasten the leaves (on his hands) with seven threads.

* 288. A professional blacksmith, who has practice in working with fire, and whose skill has been tested on previous occasions, should be caused to heat the iron in fire.

* 289, 290. An iron ball fifty *Palas* in weight having been repeatedly made fiery, sparkling and red-hot, a pure Brahman who reveres truth, should address it as follows, when it has been heated thrice: 'Listen to the law of Manu, which is superintended by the guardians of the world (themselves).

* 291. Thou, O fire, art the means of purification and the exalted mouth of all the gods. Thou, dwelling in the heart of all beings, knowest this affair.

* 292. Truth and falsehood proceed from thy tongue. Deign not to show thyself unworthy of the character thus attributed to thee in the Vedas and other books.

* 293. This man (the defendant) has been thus addressed by that man (the plaintiff), and has denied

circle shall equal the defendant's foot in breadth, where the foot is longer than sixteen *Āṅgulas*. *Pitāmaha* says that the outlines of the circles shall be marked with cow-dung.

288. 'A professional blacksmith,' not one officiating temporarily in that capacity. A.

289, 290. The *Vīramitrodaya* says that the iron ball shall be put into cold water, after it has been heated for the first and second times.

the charge, (declaring) "I will seize the fire, in order to show that it is all untrue."

* 294. Thus confiding in truth, this man is holding thee. Therefore, O fire, be cool for him, if he speak the truth. If, however, he should tell a lie, as a sinner, I implore thee, to burn his hands.'

* 295. This prayer having been carefully written on a leaf and recited, he should fasten the leaf on his head, and after having done so, should then give him the iron ball.

* 296. Having bathed and stepped into the space covered by the (eight) circles, he should seize the fiery ball, take his stand in one circle, and walk slowly through the seven others.

* 297. (The man) must not put it down again till he has passed through the whole of the measured ground. On reaching the eighth circle, he may drop the fiery ball.

* 298. That man who lets the ball drop from fear, or who cannot be proved to have been burnt, shall take the hot iron once more ; this is a fixed rule.

* 299. Each circle should be made as broad as his foot. He must not go further than the breadth of one circle with one step, nor must he remain behind it.

300. In this way the ordeal by fire should always be performed. It is adapted for every season except summer and very cold weather.

* 301. All sores or scars on his hands should be marked with signs previously, and one should examine the hands again afterwards (and look after) the dots with which (the sores) have been marked.

* 302. If it does not appear whether (either of) the two hands is burnt, he shall take and seven times crush grains of rice in his hand, with all his might.

* 303. The grains having been crushed by him, if the members of the court should declare him to be unburnt, he shall be honourably released as being innocent. If he is burnt, he shall receive due punishment.

22. The Ordeal by Water.

304. I will now proclaim the excellent law regarding the (ordeal by) water, (which may be performed at all seasons) one after the other, excepting the winter and dewy seasons.

* 305. (This ordeal may be performed) in streams

302, 303. The crushing of grains of rice serves the purpose of making visible such wounds as might have been overlooked previously. Here ends the section of the ordeal by fire. A.

305-317. Vishnu XII; Yâgñavalkya II, 108, 109.

The ordeal by water may be briefly described as follows:

1. This ordeal should be either performed in a tank or in a river which has no swift current.
2. Three arrows should be discharged from a bow of middling size.
3. After that, a strong man should enter the water as far as his navel. The defendant should seize him by the thigh and dive under water.
4. A swift runner should be sent after the second arrow. When he has reached the place where it has fallen, another equally swift runner should be sent back with it to the place where the defendant has entered the water.
5. The defendant is declared innocent, if he has remained under water till the arrow has been brought back. He is declared guilty, if any one of his limbs have been seen, or if he were to emerge from the water in a different spot from that where he entered it.
6. During the proceeding, a prayer is addressed to the deity of water, in which it is asserted, that fire arose from water, and that the water ordeal is superior therefore to the ordeal by fire.

305. The winter season comprises the months Agrahâyaṇa and

which have not too swift a course, in oceans, in rivers, in lakes, in ponds dug by the gods, in tanks, and in pools.

* 306. The diving shall take place after three arrows have been discharged from a bow which must not be too strong. Wise men (have declared) what its strength should be.

* 307. A strong bow is declared to be 107 (Āṅgulas) long, a moderate bow 106, and an inferior bow 105 (Āṅgulas). This is declared to be the rule regarding the bow.

* 308. A strong man should be placed like a pillar in water, reaching to his navel. The defendant should seize him by the thigh and dive under water.

Pausha. The dewy or cold season (Sisira) comprises the months Māgha and Phālguna. It appears, therefore, that the ordeal by water must not be performed during the period extending from the middle of November to the middle of March, i. e. during the cold weather. This is no doubt because the low temperature of the water during the cold weather might affect the capacity of the defendant to hold out under water sufficiently long.

306. Devakhāta, 'a pond dug by the gods,' denotes a natural hollow or lake. (Böhtlingk's Dictionary.) Nandapāṇḍita, in his Commentary of the *Vishṇu-smṛiti* (LXIV, 16), gives the well-known lake of Pushkara, near Agmīr, as an instance of a Devakhāta.

307. It seems strange that the difference in length between the bows should not amount to more than one Āṅgula or inch. The commentators take the three numerals in this paragraph to denote 105, 106, and 107 respectively, and I have translated in accordance with this interpretation. It is, however, possible to translate the three numerals by 500, 600, and 700 respectively, and to refer them to the number of Hastas (1 Hasta = 18 inches) traversed by each of the three arrows. According to another text, which is wrongly attributed to Nārada by some commentators, the arrows shall be shot at a target, which has to be placed at a distance of 150 Hastas from the marksman.

* 309. From the place where the arrows have been discharged, a young man endowed with swiftness of limb should walk as quickly as possible to the place where the middlemost arrow has fallen down.

* 310. Another man, who must be an equally swift runner, should seize the middlemost arrow and return with it quickly to the place from which the (first) man has proceeded.

311. If he who took the arrow does not see the defendant in water on arriving, because he is completely under water, the defendant must be acquitted.

* 312. Otherwise he is guilty, though only one limb of his have become visible. (He is pronounced guilty) equally, if he has moved to a different place than that where he was first immersed.

* 313. Women or children must not be subjected to the ordeal by water by persons acquainted with the law; nor sick, superannuated, or feeble men.

* 314. Cowards, those tormented by pain, and persons afflicted by a calamity should also be held exempt from this trial. Such persons perish immediately after diving, because they are declared to have hardly any breath.

* 315. Should they even have appeared before the court on account of a serious crime, he must not cause them to dive under water, nor must he subject them to the ordeal by fire, or give them poison.

* 316. 'Nothing is more capable than water and fire of showing the difference between right and wrong.

316, 317. These two paragraphs contain the prayer by which the deity of water should be addressed. A. Vishnu XII, 8; Yâgñavalkya II, 108.



Because fire has arisen from the waters, therefore suspected persons

* 317. Are subjected to this proof by preference, by persons thoroughly conversant with the law. Therefore deign, O venerable Lord of Waters, to effect acquittal through truth.'

23. The Ordeal by Poison.

* 318. Now I shall proclaim the excellent rule regarding the ordeal by poison : at what time, in what manner, and in what form it should be administered.

* 319. The exact quantity of the poison (to be given) having been fixed by persons conversant with the essence of law, it shall be weighed, and given to the defendant in the autumn season, when winter sets in.

320. A man acquainted with law, must not (administer this ordeal) in the afternoon, nor in the

318-326. The ordeal by poison consists of the swallowing of a mild poison by the defendant. He is innocent if he digests the poison without being affected by it. *Vishnu* XIII; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 110, 111.

319. The autumn season, *Sarad*, comprises the two months of *Ârvina* and *Kârttika*, or from middle of September to middle of November. The winter season comprises the two months of *Aprahâya* and *Pausha*, or from middle of November to middle of January. *Mitramisra*, who quotes this text in the *Vîramitrodaya*, asserts that the term 'the winter season' must be taken in this place to include the dewy season, *Sirâ*, as well, i.e. the time from middle of January to middle of March.

320. Though the season of *Sarad* has been referred to in par. 319, it must be reckoned among the prohibited seasons according to par. 320. A. This observation seems to be just, because the performance of this ordeal in the *Sarad* season is prohibited in par. 324 as well. *Vasanta*, the spring season, extends from middle of March to middle of May. *Grîshma*, the hot season, extends from middle of May to middle of July. *Varshâ*, the season of the rains, extends from middle of July to middle of September.

twilight, nor at noon. It must be avoided, likewise, in the autumn, summer, spring, and rainy seasons.

* 321. Spoiled poison, shaken poison, scented and mixed poison, as well as Kālakūṭa and Alābu poison, should be carefully avoided.

* 322. Poison from the *Sṛīṅga* plant, which grows in the Himālayas, of an excellent quality, having (the required) colour, flavour, and taste, and preserving its natural condition, should be given to members of the Kshatriya, Vaisya, and Sūdra castes.

* 323. Let him give to the defendant one-eighth less than the twentieth part of a sixth part of a Pala of the poison, mixed with clarified butter.

* 324. Six Yavas should be given in the rainy season; five Yavas in the hot season; seven or eight in the winter season; in the autumn season this ordeal must not take place.

* 325. 'Thou, O poison, art the son of Brahman.

321. Spoiled, shaken, scented, and mixed poison should be avoided, because it has been changed from its natural state (into something different). Kālakūṭa and Alābu poison should be avoided, because it is too strong. A. Kālakūṭa is a certain deadly poison contained in a bulbous root or tuber. According to a well-known myth, the Kālakūṭa poison was produced at the churning of the ocean, when it threatened to destroy the whole world, and was therefore swallowed by Siva. Alābu is the bottle-gourd.

323. There are 960 Yavas to a Pala. The fraction, therefore, is as follows:— $960 \cdot \frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{1}{20} \cdot \frac{1}{6} = 7$ Yavas. In par. 324, the author says that seven or eight Yavas of poison should be given in winter, i.e. in that season when this ordeal is ordinarily administered. Viṣṇu lays down generally that seven Yavas of poison should be given.

324. This rule shows that the prohibition which has been levelled in par. 320 against the performance of this ordeal in the rainy and summer seasons, must not be interpreted too strictly.

325. This is the prayer which should be addressed to the poison. A.

Truth and virtue are thy support. Clear this man from guilt. Become (like) Ambrosia to him, through truth.'

* 326. Let the man be kept in a shadowy place without taking food, for the whole remainder of the day. If he remains free from convulsions such as are generally caused by poison, he is declared innocent by Manu.

24. The Ordeal by Sacred Libation.

* 327. Now I shall proclaim the excellent rule regarding the ordeal by sacred libation, as it has been laid down, for all seasons indiscriminately, by learned men.

* 328. The consecrated water shall be given, early in the morning, to a virtuous man, who believes in God. He must have fasted and bathed, and wear his wet clothes.

* 329. The defendant should be made to drink three mouthfuls of water in which (an image of) the deity whom he holds sacred has been bathed and worshipped.

* 330. If he should meet himself with any calamity

326. Here ends the chapter of the ordeal by poison. A.

327-333. Vishnu XIV; Yâgñavalkya II, 112, 113.

327. The ordeal by sacred libation is performed by swallowing three mouthfuls of consecrated water in which an idol has been bathed. The defendant is declared innocent, if no misfortune befalls him within a certain period after this trial.

328. Immoral persons and infidels must not be subjected to this ordeal, because they are already deprived of the assistance of the gods in every case. A. Read pûrvâhne in the text.

330. If any misfortune should happen to him, through the act of the king or through fate, it shall be taken as proof of his guilt. A. Other legislators refer in particular to illness, fire, death

within a week or a fortnight (after having undergone this ordeal), it shall be regarded as proof of his guilt.

* 331. If a great misfortune even should befall him after the lapse of a fortnight, he must not be harassed by any one, because the fixed period has elapsed.

* 332. The drinking of consecrated water should be avoided in the case of great criminals, irreligious or ungrateful men, eunuchs, low rascals, unbelievers, Vrâtyas, and slaves.

333. A righteous king, who administers the five ordeals to persons charged with a crime in the way which has been stated, acquires prosperity both in a future state and in this life.

* 334. The ordeal by water is destined for the hot season. The ordeal by poison (should be administered) in very cold weather. A Brahman should be tested by the balance, fire is reserved for the Kshatriya.

* 335. The ordeal by water should be administered to the Vaisya. Poison should be given to the Sûdra. He must not give poison to the Brahman, nor should a Kshatriya take the (hot) iron.

of a relation, or punishment inflicted by the king. Nor is every sort of disease to be considered as proof of guilt. It is obvious that the inclusion of a punishment inflicted by the king among the proofs of guilt tends to place the defendant at the mercy of the sovereign power.

332. All the various categories of persons that are mentioned here as unfit for the performance of this ordeal are so because they are already deprived of the assistance of the gods in every case. A. Vrâtyas, those who have not been invested with the thread.

333. The term 'persons charged with a crime' may denote both real offenders, whose offence has remained secret, and wrongly accused persons. A.

336. The (five) ordeals, ending with the sacred libation and beginning with the balance, should be administered in the case of heavy charges. One hundred and fifty (Paṇas) should be given (to the defendant) if he has been acquitted. One who has not been acquitted is liable to punishment.

25. The Rice Ordeal.

* 337. Now I will proclaim the rule regarding the grains of rice which have to be chewed (by the defendant). This rice ordeal should be administered in cases of larceny, but on no other occasion whatsoever. That is the law.

* 338. Let the judge, who must have cleansed himself previously, use white grains of rice, but not (the grains) of any other fruit, and let him place them in an earthen vessel in the sight of (an image of the deity of) the sun.

339. After having mixed them with water in which (an image of the sun-god) has been bathed, he shall leave them in that place for a night. At daybreak, after having prepared them three times, a worshipper of the gods shall give them himself

340. (To the defendant), who must be facing the east and must have bathed and fasted, after having proclaimed the charge himself, in order that right may be discerned from wrong.

337-342. The rice ordeal consists of chewing a number of grains of rice in the husk. If the tooth-flesh is hurt and if blood issues forth, or if the man is seen to be trembling during the proceeding, it is viewed as a proof of guilt. Otherwise he is acquitted.

339. Should the reading be *triḥ kr̥tvāḥ*, '(he shall give them) thrice?'

* 341. When the defendant has chewed the grains, he shall cause him to spit them on a leaf. If a leaf of the holy fig-tree be not available, he shall take a leaf of the birch-tree (for that purpose).

* 342. Should blood issue forth, or the tooth-flesh be hurt, or the limbs shake, he must be pronounced guilty.

26. The Ordeal of the Hot Piece of Gold.

343. Now I shall give a description of the ordeal of the hot piece of gold, which has been ordained by Brahman himself for the purpose of distinguishing virtue from vice.

* 344. (The judge), after having cleansed himself, shall quickly pour clarified butter into a golden, silver, iron, or earthen vessel, and shall place the vessel on the fire.

* 345. He shall throw into it a shining coin, made of gold, silver, copper, or iron, after having washed it in water more than once.

* 346. Should (the coin) ever drop into the boiling (mixture), it would be a very dangerous thing to touch him (the fire?). Therefore he must address the clarified butter with the following prayer:

* 347. 'Thou art the best instrument of purification, O clarified butter, and (comparable to) Am-

343-348. The ordeal of the hot piece of gold (*Taptamâsha*) derives its name from the gold coin (*mâsha*) or signet-ring (*mudrikâ*), which those who are tried by this ordeal are required to pick out of a vessel filled with a boiling liquid, with the thumb and forefinger. They are declared innocent, if the hand remains unhurt.

346. The reading of the first half of this paragraph is quite uncertain, and the above rendering conjectural.

brosia at a sacrifice. Burn this man at once if he is criminal, and be as cold as ice to him if he is innocent.'

* 348. If, on touching and examining the forefinger (of the defendant) it is found to be unhurt and to show no boils, he is innocent. Otherwise, he is not (innocent).

SECOND TITLE OF LAW.

DEPOSITS.

* 1. Where a man entrusts any property of his own with another in confidence and without suspicion, it is called by the learned a Deposit, a title of law.

2. A sensible man should make a deposit with one who belongs to a respectable family, and who is virtuous, acquainted with his duties, veracious, influential, wealthy, and honourable.

3. In whatever manner a man may have delivered

348. Some writers refer to two further ordeals, besides the seven kinds mentioned by Nârada. One of them is the ordeal of the red-hot ploughshare, which the defendant is made to lick. The other consists of drawing lots.

II, 1. With one in whom he places no confidence, a man will not deposit a single cowry even, without the guarantee of a written receipt or of witnesses. On the other hand, he will deposit a thousand Suvarṇas even, without a receipt or witnesses, with one in whose honesty he places implicit reliance. A.

2. A prudent man may entrust a deposit to one endowed with the seven qualities here mentioned, because he feels sure that he may recover his property at any time. A. The term mahâpaksha, 'influential,' means literally one who has many friends and relations. Identical with Manu VIII, 179.

3. Thus, e. g. a sealed deposit must be returned with the seal, a deposit made before witnesses must be restored in the presence of the same witnesses. See Jolly, translation of Book VIII of the Code of Manu. Identical with Manu VIII, 180.

any of his effects to another, in the same manner shall that article be restored to him. Delivery and receipt ought to be equal.

4. If the depositary fails to restore the deposit to the depositor as he ought, he shall be compelled to restore it by forcible means, after his guilt has been proved by ordeals or other (modes of proof).

* 5. If one article hidden in another is deposited in another man's house, without stating (what it is), it is termed an Aupanidhika deposit.

* 6. Deposits are again divided into two species, attested and unattested ones. They must be restored precisely in the same condition (as they were in at the time of their delivery). Otherwise an ordeal must take place.

* 7. The wicked man who does not return a deposit, on being asked to do so by the depositor, shall be punished by the king. If the deposit has

4. Where the depositary, actuated by interested motives, refuses to restore the deposit, and is convicted of his guilt in a court of justice, by an ordeal or by other proof, he must restore it and pay twice its value as a fine. A. *Manu* VIII, 190.

5. 'One article hidden in another,' such as e.g. a pearl necklace tied up with a particular sort of knot in a cloth. Such a deposit must be restored in the same condition as before, and tied with those very knots with which it was originally delivered. A. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 65.

6. If a deposit has been handed over to the depositary in the presence of witnesses, it must be restored before witnesses. If no witnesses were present at the time of its delivery, they may be equally dispensed with at the time when it is returned to the depositor. If it is not returned to him, the depositary must perform an ordeal or make an oath, &c. A.

7. The last clause concerns a deposit which has not been returned on demand. In that case, a calamity arising through fate or the king affects the depositary, and not the depositor. A. *Manu* VIII, 191; *Vishnu* V, 169-171.

been lost or destroyed, he shall make good its value.

* 8. If he derives profit from a deposit, by using it without the consent of the depositor, he shall be punished likewise, and shall restore the profit, together with interest, to the depositor.

* 9. If a deposit is lost, together with the property of the depositary, the loss shall be the depositary's. The same rule shall obtain, if the loss has been caused by fate or by the king; unless (the depositary) should have acted fraudulently.

10. The depositor being dead, if the depositary restores the deposit to his next-of-kin, of his own accord, he must not be harassed either by the king or by the relations of the depositor.

11. (The rightful owner) shall try to recover it amicably, without resorting to stratagems. Or he shall explore (the depositary's) mode of living, and cause him to restore it by friendly expostulations.

8. If the depositary without the knowledge of the depositor derives gain from the use of the deposit he shall be punished, and shall make over his gain, together with interest, to the depositor. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 67.

10. If, the depositor being dead, the depositary through honesty restores the deposit to his nearest relative and heir, without having been asked to do so, or without the existence of the deposit being known to the heir, he must not be harassed by the relatives of the depositor asserting, 'He has not restored all,' or by the king. A. Manu VIII, 186.

11. Nârâyana, in commenting on Manu VIII, 187, observes that this rule applies to one who believes a deposit to be with another, but has not made it over himself. He shall try to recover the deposit amicably; or he shall ascertain whether the depositary has made extraordinary expenses, and may therefore be suspected to have embezzled the deposit. Other commentators explain this text in a different manner. See Professor Bühler's note on Manu VIII, 187. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 187.

12. What has been stolen by thieves, carried away by water, or burnt by fire, need not be restored (by the depositary), unless he should have appropriated something out of it.

* 13. He who fails to restore a deposit, and he who demands what he never deposited, shall both be punished like thieves, and shall be made to pay a sum equal (in amount to the value of the deposit).

* 14. The same law applies in the case of Yâkita, Anvâhita, and other such deposits, articles made over to an artist, Nyâsa and Pratinâsa deposits.

* 15. If a man takes charge of a wealthy boy, the law is also the same. These six cases are equal (from a legal point of view).

12. If, however, he is convicted, by the performance of an ordeal, of having derived some profit from the deposit, he shall restore his gains. A. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 189.

13. Either of the two criminals here mentioned must be punished like a thief and pay the value of the deposit as a fine. A. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 191.

14. Yâkita is what has been borrowed for use, especially clothes and ornaments, which have been borrowed on the occasion of a wedding or other festival. Anvâhita is a deposit, which has been delivered by the depositor to a third person, on condition of its being returned afterwards to the owner. 'Articles made over to an artist' are materials to be worked by an artisan, as e.g. gold delivered to a goldsmith to be made into an earring. Nyâsa is a secret deposit, which has been handed over to some one inhabitant of the house, behind the back of the house-owner. Pratinâsa is a mutual bailment, both parties exchanging deposits with one another. Asahâya, Vigñânesvara, Mitramisra, &c. Yâgñavalkya II, 67.

15. If a man takes a wealthy boy who has no guardian into his house, the property of the boy is subject to the above rules regarding deposits. A.

THIRD TITLE OF LAW.

PARTNERSHIP.

* 1. Where traders or others carry on business jointly, it is called Partnership, which is a title of law.

* 2. Where several partners are jointly carrying on business for the purpose of gain, the contribution of funds towards the common stock of the association forms the basis (of their undertakings). Therefore let each contribute his proper share.

* 3. The loss, expenses, and profit of each partner are either equal to those of the other partners, or exceed them, or remain below them, according as his share is equal to theirs, or greater, or less.

* 4. The stores, the food, the charges (for tolls and the like), the loss, the freight, and the expense of keeping valuables must be duly paid for by each of the several partners, in accordance with the terms of their agreements.

* 5. (Each partner) is responsible for what has been

III, 2. Thus, e. g. a principal amounting to 1000 Drammas is invested in their common business by four partners. One contributes one-half of the principal, i. e. 500 Drammas. Another contributes one-fifth, i. e. 200 Drammas. A third contributes 200 Drammas likewise. A fourth contributes 100 Drammas. The percentage of the gain and of the charges will be in accordance with the share contributed by each partner. A.

3. Manu VIII, 211; Yâgñavalkya II, 259.

4. The expense incurred by the purchase of merchandise, for food, &c., has to be defrayed by all the partners in due shares, according to the terms originally agreed on, and the several shares contributed by them. A.

5. He who causes the loss of funds contributed by all the partners must make it good, and so must he who has infringed

lost by his want of care, or in consequence of his acting against the instructions of, or without authorization from, all the other coparceners.

* 6. Where the property of the partnership is in danger through fate, through a gang of robbers, or through the king, the tenth part of the goods shall belong to him who has preserved them through his own exertion.

* 7. Should one partner meet with an accident, his heir shall replace him ; or on failure of an heir, another man, or all (the partners) if they are capable (of becoming his substitute).

* 8. In the same way, where an officiating priest has met with an accident, another (priest) shall officiate for him, and receive from him his part of the fee to the stipulated amount.

* 9. Where an officiating priest forsakes a sacri-

the rules of the society, or who has caused a loss by acting without authorization from his partners. A. *Yâgñavalkya II, 260.*

6. If any one member of the society exerts himself to guard their common property against a fire, or against a gang of robbers, or against an encroaching prince who wants to seize it, he shall receive a tenth part of it, as a reward for his trouble. A. *Yâgñavalkya II, 260.*

7. Should any one among the partners die, his sons or other heirs shall take his share. Failing heirs, it shall belong to any other partner, who is able to officiate for him. Or, if all are able to officiate for him, they all shall take it together. A. *Yâgñavalkya II, 265.*

8. If among several officiating priests one should meet with a calamity, his share of the work shall pass to another, and the stipulated fee shall also belong to his substitute. A. *Manu VIII, 206.*

9. If the case of an officiating priest or sacrificer who has left the other party from anger, avarice, or some other reprehensible motive, and without delinquencies on the part of the other party, be brought before the king, he shall punish him. A. *Manu VIII, 389; Yâgñavalkya II, 237; Vishnu V, 113.*

ficer, who is no offender and free from guilt, or where (a sacrificer) forsakes a faultless priest, they shall both be punished.

* 10. There are three sorts of officiating priests : one honoured by previous generations, one appointed by (the sacrificer) himself, and one who performs the functions of a priest of his own accord through friendship.

* 11. This law applies to hereditary and self-chosen priests. But it is no sin to abandon a priest officiating of his own accord.

* 12. A trader on reaching a toll-house should pay the legal duty. A prudent man must not try to evade it, (because) it is called the (king's) tax.

* 13. If he evades a toll-house, or if he buys or sells at another than the legal hour, or if he does not state the value (of his goods) correctly, he shall be fined eight times the amount which he tried to evade.

11. In the case of those officiating priests who have been employed by the ancestors of the sacrifices, i. e. who are hereditary in his family, and in the case of those who have been chosen by himself the punishment ordained for forsaking a priest should be inflicted. But if the sacrificer abandons one who officiates for him from friendship, and employs in his place one better qualified, or more acceptable to himself, awarding to him the stipulated fee, he is free from blame. A.

12. A duty is the king's due, and traders must not defraud the king of it. A.

13. There are three ways for evading a duty : one, if a merchant avoids a toll-house and thus escapes paying the ordinary toll ; another, if he buys or sells at an unseasonable time a commodity on which he has not paid the customary duty ; a third, if he does not state correctly the amount or value of his goods or chattels. A merchant, who has committed any one out of these offences, shall pay eight times the amount of the duty embezzled by him as a fine. A. Manu VIII, 400 ; Yâgñavalkya II, 262.

14. It is declared that a wise man should always abstain from levying a toll on that property of a learned Brahman which belongs to his household; but not (on that which he uses) for trading purposes.

15. The alms received by Brahmans, the property of stage players, and what is capable of being carried on one's back; on all that he must raise no duty.

* 16. If a travelling merchant who has come into his country should die there, the king shall preserve his goods till the heir comes forward.

* 17. On failure of an heir, he must make them over to his relatives or connexions. On failure of them, he shall keep them well guarded for a period of ten years.

* 18. When such property without an owner, and which is not claimed by an heir, has been preserved for ten years, the king may keep it for himself. Thus the sacred law will not be violated.

14. The term *Srotriya*, 'a learned Brahman,' applies to Brahmans generally in this place. All the chattels of a Brahman, except what belongs to the household furniture, are liable to pay duty. Likewise, if he imports and exports goods in trading, those goods have to pay duty. A. *Manu* VII, 133; *Âpastamba* II, 10, 26, 10; *Vasishtha* XIX, 23; *Vishnu* III, 26.

15. The following three descriptions of property shall be exempt from taxation: alms received by Brahmans, no matter how great their value; the property of actors, singers, and the like persons; and what may be carried on the shoulders by any one. A. *Vasishtha* XIX, 37.

18. Read *adâyâdam* in the text.

FOURTH TITLE OF LAW.

RESUMPTION OF GIFT.

* 1. Where a man wishes to resume what he has given, because it has been unduly given by him, it is called Resumption of Gift, a title of law.

* 2. What may be given and what not, valid gifts and invalid gifts; thus the law of gift is declared fourfold in judicial affairs.

* 3. Again, what may not be given is eightfold; what may be given is of one kind only; of valid gifts there are seven species; and sixteen sorts of invalid gifts.

* 4. An Anvâhita deposit, a Yâkita, a pledge, joint property, a deposit, a son, a wife, the whole property of one who has offspring,

* 5. And what has been promised to another man; these have been declared by the spiritual guides to be inalienable by one in the worst plight even.

* 6. What is left (of the property) after the expense of maintaining the family has been defrayed,

IV, 1. 'Unduly' means in a mode opposed to law. Mitâksharâ, Viramitrodaya, Mayûkha, &c. Manu VIII, 214.

2. 'Valid gifts,' literally 'what is given.' 'Invalid gifts,' literally 'what is not given.'

4. For the meaning of the technical terms, Anvâhita and Yâkita, see II, 14. The prohibition of such gifts as would leave the family destitute appears to relate principally to charitable donations and religious endowments.

4-6. Yâgñavalkya II, 175.

6. That only may be given which is left after the cost of living has been defrayed for those whom the head of the family is bound to support. Any gift, on the other hand, which causes hardship to the family, is reprehensible, and not meritorious. A.

may be given. But by giving away anything besides, a householder will incur censure.

7. He who has, for three years, property sufficient to provide for those whom he is bound to maintain, or who has even more than that, shall drink the Soma juice.

* 8. The price paid for merchandise, wages, (a present offered) for an amusement, (a gift made) from affection, or from gratitude, or for sexual intercourse with a woman, and a respectful gift, are the seven kinds of valid gifts.

* 9. Invalid gifts are the following (sixteen): what

7. This rule applies to those cases where there is more wealth than what suffices to maintain the family. A. Manu XI, 7; Yāgñavalkya I, 124; Vasishṭha VIII, 10; Vishṇu LIX, 8.

8. Those gifts only are valid which have been made in one of the seven modes here mentioned. The sixteen other modes of gift are illegal. A. 'A present offered for an amusement,' i. e. what has been given to bards, eulogists, and the like persons. 'A gift made from affection,' to a daughter or other relative. Vīramitrodaya, &c. Instead of *śrībhakti*, 'sexual intercourse with a woman,' the MSS. of Vulg. and the quotations read *śrīśulka*, 'a nuptial gift presented to the relations of the wife.'

9-11. 1. 'Fear,' as e. g. if an honest man promises one hundred drachmas to a ruffian who addresses him, while he is passing through a forest, with the words, 'If thou givest me one hundred drachmas, thou shalt live. Otherwise, thou shalt die.' 2. 'Anger, or hatred:' if a man, actuated by jealousy, says to a Brahman, to whom his wife has offered a seat, 'All the furniture which you see in this house shall be yours.' 3. 'Sorrow:' if a man, in a heavy affliction, declares, 'I will go into the forest. My house has been given to Brahmans to-day.' 4. 'Pain:' a man distressed by a painful illness, says to a Brahman, 'I have given thee one hundred *Suvarṇas*.' 5. 'A bribe:' a litigant says to an assessor of the court, 'I will give thee one hundred *Paṇas* if my cause is declared victorious by thee.' 6. 'In jest,' what has been laughingly given. 7. 'Under false pretences,' as e. g. under the following circumstances:—A libidinous man is enamoured of a public woman, by the name of *Kūtamaṅgarī* ('Mango Bud'). He is deprived of her

has been given by a man under the influence of fear, anger, hatred, sorrow or pain ; or as a bribe ; or in jest ; or fraudulently, under false pretences ;

* 10. Or by a child ; or by a fool ; or by a person not his own master ; or by one distressed ; or by one intoxicated ; or by one insane ; or in consideration of a reward, thinking ' This man will show me some service ;'

* 11. And so is invalid what was given from ignorance to an unworthy man thought to be worthy, or for a purpose (thought to be) virtuous.

* 12. Both the donee who covets invalid gifts and accepts them from avarice, and the donor of what ought not to be given who yet gives it away, deserve punishment.

by a Thakur, and is bewailing his separation from her. Some one asks him whether he will make him a present of a ring, in case he should bring *Kûtamañgarî* before him. He promises to give the ring and offers a surety for it. Thereupon the other exhibits a Mango bud (*Kûtamañgarî*) to him, instead of the woman *Kûtamañgarî*. 8. What was given by a child. 9. What was given by a fool. 10. What was given by a person not his own master. 11. What was given by one distressed, as e.g. if a man being carried away by a current of water exclaims, ' I will give one hundred *Suvarṇas* to any one who saves my life.' 12. What was given by one inebriated. 13. What was given by one insane or possessed by a demon. 14. What was given through a hope of recompense, in expectation of some service to be performed by the donee. 15. What was given to an unworthy man, from ignorance, as e.g. to a *Sûdra*, whom the donor fancied to be a Brahman, because he saw him girt with the sacred thread. 16. What was given for a purpose (thought to be) virtuous, as e.g. if a devout man has made a religious endowment, and the donee employs it for gambling or libidinous purposes. A. Other jurists construe these texts somewhat differently, in order to obtain the sixteen sorts of void gifts distinguished by Nârada. *Manu* VIII, 212.

FIFTH TITLE OF LAW.

BREACH OF A CONTRACT OF SERVICE.

* 1. If a man has promised to render service and fails to render it, it is termed Breach of a Contract of Service, a title of law.

* 2. The sages have distinguished five sorts of attendants according to law. Among these are four sorts of labourers ; the slaves (are the fifth category, of which there are) fifteen species.

* 3. A student, an apprentice, a hired servant, and fourthly, an official ; these must be regarded as labourers ; slaves are those born in the house and the rest.

* 4. The sages have declared that the state of dependence is common to all these ; but that their respective position and income depends on their particular caste and occupation.

* 5. Know that there are two sorts of occupations ; pure work and impure work. Impure work is that done by slaves. Pure work is that done by labourers.

* 6. Sweeping the gateway, the privy, the road,

V, 1-4. Persons bound to obedience. A.

3. 'A student,' one studying divine science. 'A pupil,' an apprentice. *Vīramitrodaya*, &c.

4. Their respective position depends on their caste, and their income depends on their occupation. A.

5-7. Unclean occupations. A.

6. The term 'sweeping' has to be construed with all four nouns, the gateway and the rest. 'The privy,' i.e. a hole or other receptacle of impure substances. 'The place for rubbish,' i.e. a place where the dust and other sweepings from the house are deposited. *Vīramitrodaya*.

and the place for rubbish ; shampooing the secret parts of the body ; gathering and putting away the leavings of food, ordure, and urine,

* 7. And lastly, rubbing the master's limbs when desired ; this should be regarded as impure work. All other work besides this is pure.

* 8. Till he has mastered science, let a student attend diligently on his teacher. The same conduct has to be observed by him towards his teacher's wife and son.

* 9. Let him preserve chastity and beg alms, lying on a low couch and using no ornaments. Let him go to rest after and rise before all (others who are staying at) his teacher's house.

* 10. Let him never come or stay without his teacher's bidding. His (teacher's) call he must obey without hesitation, when he is able to do so.

11. Let him read at the proper time, when his teacher is not averse to it, sitting on a lower seat than his teacher, by his side, or on a bench, and paying attention (to what he says).

12. Science, like the current of a stream, is constantly advancing towards the plain. Therefore, let one studying science be humble towards his teacher.

* 13. His teacher shall correct him, if he does not

8. He must obey his teacher's wife and son, as much as the teacher himself. A.

8-11. Vishnu XXVIII, and the references in the Notes to that Chapter.

9-15. Rules of conduct for a student. A.

12. 'The current of a stream,' meaning a river, advances into the plain, and so does science. Therefore one engaged in studying it should always be lowly and humble. A.

13-14. Gautama II, 42-44 ; Âpastamba I, 28, 29, 31 ; Manu VIII, 299, 300.

pay obedience to him, scolding him or chastising him with a rope or with a small shoot of cane.

14. (The teacher) must not strike him a heavy blow, nor (must he beat him) on a noble part or on the chest; and he must encourage him, after having chastised him. Otherwise the king shall punish him.

* 15. After having completed his studies, let him give the customary present to his teacher and turn home. The conduct of a pupil has been declared.

* 16. If (a young man) wishes to be initiated into the art of his own craft, with the sanction of his relations, he must go and live with a master, the duration of his apprenticeship having been fixed.

* 17. The master shall teach him at his own house and feed him. He must not employ him in work of a different description, and treat him like a son.

* 18. If one forsakes a master, who instructs him

13. Scolding him, i. e. abusing him. A. The Nepalese MS. has a better reading of this clause: 'Or he shall beat him without hurting him, with' &c.

14. A teacher, though angry, must not strike his pupil severely, nor on a noble part, nor on the chest. After having beaten him, he must again encourage him. If the teacher, actuated by an excess of anger, beats him too severely, the pupil shall announce it to the king, who shall punish the teacher. A.

15. Manu II, 245; Yâgñavalkya I, 51; Âpastamba I, 11, 30, 1; Gautama IX, 1; Vishnu XXVIII, 42.

16-21. Rules for an apprentice. A.

16. The teacher must make an agreement in this form, 'Let this apprentice stay with me so and so long.' Viramitrodaya.

17. The teacher shall cause the pupil to do the work peculiar to his own profession, and no other work, and shall feed him and instruct him at his own house. He shall treat him like a son, and not like a labourer. A.

18. If a pupil forsakes his teacher, though the latter has not committed a mortal sin or other heavy crime, the teacher may compel him by forcible means to remain at his house. A.

and whose character is unexceptionable, he may be compelled by forcible means to remain (at the master's house), and he deserves corporal punishment and confinement.

*19. Though his course of instruction be completed, an apprentice must continue to reside at the house of his master, till the fixed period has expired. The profit of whatever work he may be doing there belongs to his master.

*20. When he has learnt the art of his craft within the (stipulated) period, the apprentice shall reward his master as plentifully as he can, and return home, after having taken leave of him.

21. Or, a certain fee having been agreed upon and the skill of the pupil examined, the apprentice shall take (his fee) and shall not go to live in the house of another man.

*22. Hired servants are of three kinds: highest, middlemost, and lowest. The wages due for their labour are fixed in proportion to their skill and to the value of their services.

*23. Soldiers constitute the highest class, agriculturists the middle class, and porters the lowest class. These are the three classes of hired servants.

19. The whole gain of that work which is done by the apprentice while staying at the house of his master after completing his course of instruction, belongs to the master, and not to the apprentice. A. Yâgñavalkya II, 184.

20. After the lapse of the stipulated period, i.e. when the time fixed for his apprenticeship has expired. A.

21. The apprentice shall receive whatever fee has been agreed upon, after his skill has been examined by the master. A. The only MS. of the earlier recension of the Nârada-smṛiti breaks off at this paragraph. The remainder of the present translation has been done from the more recent recension of the Nârada-smṛiti. See Introduction.

* 24. One appointed to manage the property (of the family) and to superintend the household, must also be regarded as a labourer. He is also termed *Kauṭumbika* (the general family servant).

* 25. Thus have the four classes of servants doing pure work been enumerated. All the others do dirty work and are slaves, of whom there are fifteen kinds.

* 26. One born at (his master's) house ; one pur-

24. 'The property,' meaning fields or ready money, &c. 'One appointed to manage it,' i. e. one deputed to administrate it. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 405.

26-28. 'One born at (his master's) house,' one born of a female slave in the house (of her master). 'One received (by gift),' one obtained by the acceptance of a gift and the like. 'One obtained by inheritance,' a slave of the father or other ancestor. 'One maintained during a general famine,' one whose life has been preserved, during a period of dearth, in order that he might do service (for his preserver). 'One pledged by his rightful owner,' one reduced to the condition of a pledge, for a loan received (by his master). 'One released from a heavy debt,' one enslaved for debt, whose debt has been paid and who has thereby become the slave (of him who paid the debt). 'One made captive in a fight,' one defeated in a combat and enslaved by the victorious party. 'One won through a wager,' one gained through the success of a cause, which was preceded by an agreement in this form, 'If I am defeated in this quarrel, I will be thy slave.' 'One who has come forward declaring, "I am thine,"' one who has promised of his own accord to become the slave of another man. 'An apostate from asceticism,' one who has forsaken the order of religious ascetics. 'One enslaved for a stipulated period,' one obtained through an agreement in this form, 'I will be thy slave for such a space of time.' 'One who has become a slave in order to get a maintenance,' one who has offered himself as a slave, on condition that food shall always be given to him. 'One enslaved on account of his connexion with a female slave : ' by a female slave is meant a female house-slave ; one enslaved for connexion with her is one who has married her through love, and has thus been reduced to the status of a slave. 'One self-sold ' is one who has sold himself.

chased; one received (by gift); one obtained by inheritance; one maintained during a general famine; one pledged by his rightful owner;

*27. One released from a heavy debt; one made captive in a fight; one won through a wager; one who has come forward declaring, 'I am thine;' an apostate from asceticism; one enslaved for a stipulated period;

*28. One who has become a slave in order to get a maintenance; one enslaved on account of his connexion with a female slave; and one self-sold. These are the fifteen classes of slaves as declared in law.

*29. Among these, the four named first cannot be released from bondage, except by the favour of their owners. Their bondage is hereditary.

*30. Should any one out of them (however) save his master's life, when his life is in peril, he shall be released from slavery and shall take a son's share (of his master's wealth).

*31. One maintained during a famine is released from bondage if he gives a pair of oxen. It is not

These are the fifteen species (of slaves). *Mitâksharâ*, p. 268. *Manu VIII*, 415.

30. This rule is applicable to any of the fifteen sorts of slaves. *Mitâksharâ*, p. 269. Other commentators cite an encounter with a tiger as an instance of a perilous situation. The slave, in order to obtain release from slavery, must have risked his own life in rescuing his master.

31. The objection that a slave cannot give a pair of oxen, as he has no property of his own according to Nârada himself (V, 41), may be met by the argument that the dominion of slaves over affectionate gifts and the like is universally acknowledged, just as the right of a woman to dispose of *Strîdhana* given to her as an affectionate present. See the gloss on this text in *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 1, 43.

by labour (alone) that the value of the food consumed during a famine can be repaid.

* 32. One pledged (is released) when his master redeems him by discharging the debt. If, however, he causes (the pledgee) to take him in lieu of payment, he becomes equal to a purchased slave.

* 33. It is by paying his debt with interest, that a debtor is released from slavery. One enslaved for a stipulated period recovers freedom on the expiration of that period.

* 34. One who has come forward declaring, 'I am thine,' one made a prisoner in war, and one won through a wager, these are released on giving a substitute whose capacity for work is equal to theirs.

* 35. An apostate from asceticism shall become the king's slave. He can never be emancipated, nor is there any expiation of his crime.

* 36. One who has become a slave in order to get a maintenance, is released at once on giving up the said subsistence. One enslaved on account of his being connected with a female slave is released on parting with her.

* 37. That wretch who, being independent, sells himself, is the vilest of slaves. He cannot be released from bondage.

* 38. Those who are sold after having been captured by robbers, and those who are enslaved by forcible means, must be emancipated by the king. Their slavery is not legal.

* 39. In the inverse order of the (four) castes,

33. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 182.

35. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 183.

36. The *Mitâksharâ* (p. 270) declares that sexual intercourse with a slave is prohibited. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 182.

38. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 182.

39. As a man of the highest caste may marry a wife of an

slavery is not ordained, except where a man violates the duties peculiar to his caste. Slavery (in that respect) is analogous to the condition of a wife.

*40. If one not his own master offers himself (as a slave), saying, 'I am thine,' he (to whom he has offered himself) may not dispose of him. His former master may recover him when he likes.

*41. Three persons are declared to have no proprietary right: a wife, a slave, and a son. Whatever property they acquire shall be made over to him to whom they belong.

*42. He who pleased in his mind wishes to emancipate his own slave, shall take from his (the slave's) shoulders a jar filled with water and smash it.

*43. He shall sprinkle his head with the water, which must contain whole grain and flowers, and

inferior caste or of his own caste, whereas a woman of the highest caste is forbidden to marry a man of inferior caste, the same rule should be observed with regard to a slave. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 406. An ascetic who violates the duties of his order is liable to become the slave of his inferior in caste even. *Mitâksharâ*, p. 271. *Yâgyavalkya II*, 183; *Manu VIII*, 410-414.

40. If a man, after having promised to become the slave of one man, enters the service of another man afterwards, that other man must relinquish him. 'One not his own master,' i. e. the slave of another man. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 411.

41. According to the standard commentators the purport of this rule is merely to indicate the want of independence of wives, sons, and slaves in the disposal of their property. See Professor Bühler's note on *Manu VIII*, 416. Identical with *Manu VIII*, 416.

42, 43. The breaking of a water-pot which the slave is carrying on his shoulder is said to be indicative of the discontinuance of the former slave's office to carry water. The solemn smashing of a water-jar (*ghaṭa-sphoṭa*) forms the principal part of another ceremony of a totally different character as well, viz. of the ceremony of expulsion from caste.

having declared him a free man three times, he shall dismiss him with his face turned towards the east¹.

SIXTH TITLE OF LAW.

NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES.

* 1. A series of rules will be stated (next) for the payment and non-payment of labourers' wages. It is termed 'Non-payment of Wages,' a title of law.

* 2. A master shall regularly pay wages to the servant hired by him, whether it be at the commencement, at the middle, or at the end of his work, just as he had agreed to do.

* 3. Where the amount of the wages has not been fixed, (the servant of) a trader, a herdsman, and an agricultural servant shall respectively take a tenth part of the profit (derived from the sale of merchandise), of the seed of cows, and of the grain.

* 4. Their implements of work, and whatever else

¹ The Indian MSS. and some quotations insert the following paragraph here, which is omitted in the Nepalese MS. and in other quotations :—

‘* 44. From that time let it be said that this slave is cherished by the favour of his master. His food may be eaten, and presents accepted from him, and he shall be respected (by worthy persons).’

VI, 2. When the amount of the wages has been fixed by an agreement in this form, ‘I will give thee thus much,’ it shall be divided into three parts, and one part be given on three occasions, viz. at the commencement, middle, and end of the labour. This rule is applicable where the amount of the wages has been fixed. The next paragraph states the rule for those cases where the amount of the wages has not been fixed. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 414.

3. The strange term ‘the seed of cows’ denotes cows’ milk according to the commentators. *Yāgyavalkya* II, 194.

4. The phrase ‘whatever may have been entrusted to servants for their business’ is explained as referring to grain and the like

may have been entrusted to them for their business, they shall employ with due care and not neglect them wantonly.

* 5. If one fails to perform such work as he had promised to do, he shall be compelled to perform it, first paying him his wages. If he does not perform it after having taken wages, he must pay back twice the amount of his wages.

* 6. One who abandons merchandise which he had agreed to convey to its destination, shall give a sixth part of the wages. (An employer) who does not pay the wages which he had agreed to give shall forfeit those wages together with interest.

* 7. A merchant who does not take a conveyance

used for agriculture. It appears from the preceding paragraph that business of every sort is intended. *Yâgñavalkya II, 193.*

5. *Manu VIII, 215; Âpastamba II, 11, 28, 2-3; Vishnu V, 153, 154; Yâgñavalkya II, 193.*

6. The *Ratnâkara* refers the second half of this paragraph, like the first half, to the special case of wages or hire promised to the carrier for the transport of goods. See *Colebrooke's Digest, III, 1, 92. Yâgñavalkya II, 198.*

7. 'A conveyance,' a cart or the like. 'Beasts for draught or burden,' horses or others. When a man hires the conveyance, &c. of another for the purpose of transporting merchandise, and does not transport the merchandise afterwards, because he has promised to pay an excessive hire, he shall pay a fourth part of the promised hire to the owner of the conveyance. When, however, he takes the conveyance and leaves it, after having completed one half of the journey, he shall have to pay the whole of the hire. *Vîramitrodaya, p. 420. Yâgñavalkya II, 198.* Of vv. 6, 7, the Nepalese MS. has an entirely different version, as follows: '* 6. One who abandons his work before the expiration of the term, forfeits his wages. If it is through the fault of his employer that he strikes work, he shall be rewarded for as much as has been finished by him. 7. He who leaves on the road that which he had undertaken to transport, shall give a sixth part of the (stipulated) wages. An employer who does not pay (wages) after having set the workman to work, (shall be

or beasts for draught or burden, after having hired them, shall be made to pay a fourth part of the hire; and the whole, if he leaves them half-way.

* 8. And so shall a carrier who fails to transport (the goods entrusted to him) forfeit his wages. He shall be compelled to pay twice the amount of his wages, if he raises difficulties at the time of starting.

* 9. When the merchandise has been damaged by the carrier's fault, he shall have to make good every loss, not including such losses as may have been caused by fate or by the king.

* 10. For (tending) a hundred cows, (a heifer shall be given to the herdsman) as wages every year; for (tending) two hundred (cows), a milch cow (shall be given to him annually), and he shall be allowed to milk (all the cows) every eighth day.

* 11. Those (cows) which a cowherd takes to

compelled to pay) the wages together with interest.' This is probably the true reading, as paragraphs 6 and 7 are quoted in this form in the *Vīramitrodaya* and in *Colebrooke's Digest* respectively.

8. According to the *Mitāksharā* (p. 280), the excessive fine ordained in the second half of this paragraph shall be inflicted when a man raises obstacles on specially important occasions, such as a wedding, or the auspicious time for undertaking a journey. *Yāgyavalkya* II, 197.

9. 'Merchandise,' pearls or other commodities which are to be transported. 'Damaged,' i.e. destroyed. In the terms 'merchandise' and 'carrier,' which are successively used in this paragraph, a bull and a husbandman are included by implication. Thus it is declared in the *Madanaratna*. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 418. What the *Madanaratna* means is this, that the responsibility of a husbandman for a bull used by him for the purposes of agriculture is analogous to the responsibility of a carrier for the goods he has undertaken to transport. *Vishnu* V, 155, 156; *Yāgyavalkya* II, 197.

10. *Manu* VIII, 231.

11. *Manu* VIII, 230; *Yāgyavalkya* II, 164.

pasture every day when the night is over, he shall take back again in the evening, after they have eaten (grass) and drunk (water).

*12. If such a cow meets with an accident, he shall struggle to protect her as best he may. If he is unable (to rescue her) he shall go in haste to announce it to his master.

*13. Should he neither struggle to protect (the cow), nor raise a cry, nor announce it to his master, the herdsman must make good the value of the cow (to the owner), and (must pay) a fine to the king.

*14. But the herdsman alone shall make good (the loss of an animal) which has strayed, or been destroyed by worms, or slain by dogs, or met its death (by tumbling) into a pit, if he did not duly 'exert himself (to prevent such accidents).

*15. So if goats or sheep are surrounded by wolves, and the herdsman does not come (to their assistance), he shall be responsible for any (animal) which a wolf may attack and kill.

12. He shall struggle to protect the cow, and if unable to protect her he shall raise an alarm. Ratnākara. See Colebrooke's Digest, III, 4, 11.

13. The second half of this paragraph is read as follows in the Nepalese MS.: 'The herdsman is to blame in that case, and he shall make good the loss.'

14. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 232. Read *nash/am* in the text. The Nepalese MS. here inserts the following paragraph, which is nearly identical with Manu VIII, 234: 'If cattle die, let him give everything to the owner: the tail, skin, the hindpart, the thigh, the bladder, tendons, and yellow concrete bile, and let him point out their particular marks.'

15. Identical with Manu VIII, 235. The Nepalese MS. adds the following paragraph, which is nearly identical with Manu VIII, 236: 'If they graze together in the forest, without being kept in order, and a wolf, suddenly jumping on one of them, kills it, the herdsman shall be free from blame in that case.'

* 16. But for (an animal) seized by robbers, though he raised a cry, the herdsman shall not be bound to pay, provided he gives notice to his master at the proper place and time.

* 17. It is according to these principles that all disputes arising with herdsmen have to be settled. In case of the (natural) death (of an animal entrusted to his care the herdsman) is free from blame, if he can produce the tail, the horns, and the rest.

* 18. If a public woman declines to receive a man after having received her fee, she shall pay twice the amount (of the fee). The same (fine shall be imposed) on a man who does not pay the (stipulated) fee, after having had connexion with a woman (of this description).

* 19. Should a man unnaturally abuse the person (of a public woman) or cause her to be approached by many, he must pay eight times the amount (of the stipulated fee), and a fine to the same amount.

* 20. If a man has built a house on the ground of a stranger and lives in it, paying rent for it, he may take with him, when he leaves the house, the thatch, the timber, the bricks, and other (building materials).

* 21. But if he has been residing on the ground

16. Identical with Manu VIII, 233.

17. The term 'the rest' may be referred, in accordance with the analogous rule of Manu, to the 'ears, hide, bladder, tendons, the yellow concrete bile, and the special proofs or marks.' Manu VIII, 234.

18. Illness, however, is considered as a legitimate reason for breaking an engagement of this sort. Viramitrodaya, p. 422, and other commentaries.

21. The delivery of the materials, out of which the house has been constructed, to the owner of the ground, has to be regarded as a compensation for the ground having been used without authorisation from the owner.

of a stranger, without paying rent and against that man's wish, he shall by no means take with him, on leaving it, the thatch and the timber.

* 22. Hired commodities shall be restored (by the hirer), when the fixed period has expired. The hirer must make good whatever may have been spoiled or destroyed except in the case of (inevitable) accident.

SEVENTH TITLE OF LAW.

SALES EFFECTED BY ANOTHER THAN THE RIGHTFUL OWNER.

* 1. When property kept as a deposit, or the property of a stranger lost (by him) and found (by another man), or stolen articles, are sold in secret, it has to be considered as a 'Sale Effected by Another than the Rightful Owner.'

* 2. When a chattel, which had been sold by another person than the owner, has been recovered

22. This rule applies in the case of water-jars and the like having been injured or destroyed. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 421. The *Ratnâkara* refers this paragraph to broken carriages and the like. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 1, 104. 'Spoiled,' i. e. partially disfigured. 'Destroyed,' i. e. entirely ruined. 'Accident,' when the things have been knocked against one another. *Vîramitrodaya*, *ibid*.

VII, 1. The term 'property kept as a deposit' includes by implication a *Yâkita* and the other species of bailments. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 374, and the other commentaries. See II. Title of Law, 14, 15.

2. The owner of a chattel, which has been sold by a stranger who has no right to it, may reclaim it from any one who happens to be possessed of it. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 375; *Vishnu* V, 164-166; *Manu* VIII, 201, 202; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 168. In the Nepalese MS. the last clause runs as follows: 'The buyer who buys in secret is guilty of theft.'

by the owner, he may keep it. No blame attaches to a sale effected in public, but a clandestine sale is viewed in the same light as theft according to law.

* 3. If a man buys from a slave who has not been authorized (to sell) by his master, or from a rogue, or in secret, or at a very low price, or at an improper time, he is as guilty as the seller.

* 4. The purchaser must not make a secret of the way in which he came by a chattel (purchased by him). He becomes free from blame if he can point out the way in which the chattel was acquired by him. In any other case he is equally guilty with the vendor, and shall suffer the punishment of a thief.

* 5. The vendor shall restore his property to the rightful owner, and shall pay to the buyer the price for which it was sold to him ; besides that he shall pay a fine to the king. Such is the rule in the case

3. 'One who has not been authorized (to sell) by his master,' one who has received no special permission from him (to sell the chattel). The term 'a slave' has to be interpreted in a pregnant sense, so as to include young sons and other dependent persons. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 375. *Vishnu* V, 166 ; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 168.

4. It appears from the detailed provisions of *Bṛihaspati*, *Kātyāyana*, and other *Smṛiti*-writers on the subject of purchase and sale, that every purchase, in order to be legitimate, had to be concluded in open market, on a market day or hour ; or that, at least, the purchaser was required to produce the vendor, when the purchase had not been made in open market. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 168. The Nepalese MS. inserts the following paragraph here : 'Any purchase or sale which has been effected by another than the rightful owner must be known to be invalid ; this is a rule in lawsuits.' The quotations in the *Vīramitrodaya* and other works prove this verse to be genuine. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 170.

5. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 170.

of a sale effected by another than the rightful owner.

6. If any one finds a treasure, which had been deposited by a stranger, he shall take it to the king. Every treasure, found by members of any caste, belongs to the king, excepting (those treasures which have been found by) members of the Brahman caste.

7. A Brahman even, when he has found a treasure, must at once give notice to the king. If the king gives it to him he may enjoy it. If he does not give notice, he is (viewed as) a thief.

8. Of his own property also, which he had lost and found again afterwards, a man must give notice to the king. If he does so, he may keep it as his lawful property. It is not his lawful property otherwise.

EIGHTH TITLE OF LAW.

NON-DELIVERY OF A SOLD CHATTEL.

* I. When merchandise has been sold for a (certain) price and is not delivered to the purchaser, it is termed Non-delivery of a Sold Chattel, a title of law.

* 2. Property in this world is of two kinds, movable and immovable. All that is termed merchandise in the laws regarding purchase and sale.

* 3. The rule regarding the gift and receipt of

6-8. Gautama X, 36-38, 43-45; Vasishtha III, 13-14; XVI, 19, 20; Manu VIII, 30-39; Vishnu V, 56-64; Yâgyavalkya II, 33-35. The position of the two last paragraphs is inverted in the Nepalese MS.

VIII, 3. 'Gift' means sale. 'Receipt' means purchase. What

merchandise is declared sixfold by the learned : (what is sold) by tale, by weight, by measure, according to work, according to its beauty, and according to its splendour.

* 4. If a man sells property for a certain price, and does not hand it over to the purchaser, he shall have to pay its produce, if it is immovable, and the profits arising on it, if it is movable property.

* 5. If there has been a fall in the market value of the article in question (in the interval, the purchaser) shall receive both the article itself, and together with it the difference (in point of value). This law applies to those who are inhabitants of the same place ; but to those who travel abroad, the

is counted before selling it is said to be sold 'by tale.' Betel-nuts may be mentioned as an instance. 'What is sold by weight,' such as gold or sandal-wood and the like substances, which are weighed on a pair of scales. 'What is sold by measure,' such as rice or the like. 'By work,' such as animals giving milk or used for draught or burden. 'According to its beauty,' something handsome, as e.g. a handsome prostitute. 'According to its splendour,' or lustre, as e.g. rubies. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 437. A similar exposition is delivered in the *Ratnākara*, as quoted in *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 3, 3.

4. 'The profits arising on it,' such as e.g. the milk of a cow. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 437. The *Vivādaśintāmaṇi* (p. 55) and the *Ratnākara*, as quoted in *Colebrooke's Digest* (III, 3, 18), take the term *kriyāphalam* as a *Dvandva* compound, denoting 'the work, such as the carrying of burdens and the like, and the profits, such as milk and the like.' *Vishṇu* V, 127 ; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 254.

5. The previous paragraph contains the rule for those cases where the value of the property has increased after its sale. The present rule refers to those cases where the value of the property has diminished after the sale. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 437. Those who travel abroad, i. e. who are in the habit of visiting other countries (for trading purposes), may claim the profit which might have accrued to them from travelling abroad. *Vivādaśintāmaṇi*, pp. 55, 56. *Vishṇu* V, 129 ; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 254.

profit arising from (dealing in) foreign countries shall be made over (as well).

* 6. If the article (sold) should have been injured, or destroyed by fire, or carried off, the loss shall be charged to the seller, because he did not deliver it after it had been sold by him.

* 7. When a man shows one thing, which is faultless (to the intending purchaser), and (afterwards) delivers another thing to him, which has a blemish, he shall be compelled to pay twice its value (to the purchaser), and an equal amount as a fine.

* 8. So when a man sells something to one person, and (afterwards) delivers it to another person, he shall be compelled to pay twice its value (to the purchaser), and a fine to the king.

* 9. When a purchaser does not accept an article purchased by himself, which is delivered to him (by the vendor), the vendor commits no wrong by selling it to a different person.

* 10. Thus has the rule been declared with regard

6. According to *Gagannâtha*, this rule has reference to those cases only where the purchaser has not formally asked for the delivery of the property purchased by himself. He infers from a text of *Yâgñavalkya* that after a demand the loss shall fall on the vendor, even though the property was injured in one of the modes mentioned by that authority, i.e. by force majeure. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 3, 27. It is quite doubtful, however, whether the compiler of the *Nârada-smṛiti* had this distinction in view. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 256.

8, 9. Both he who shows unblemished goods, and sells blemished goods afterwards, and he who sells property to one man and afterwards sells the same property to another man, though the first sale has not been rescinded by the purchaser, shall pay twice the value of the property sold as a fine. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 440. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 257.

9. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 255.

10. Consequently, where there is no agreement as to the time of

to that merchandise for which the price has been tendered. When the price has not been tendered, there is no offence to be imputed to the vendor, except in the case of a special agreement.

* 11. It is for the sake of gain that merchants are in the habit of buying and selling merchandise of every sort. That gain is, in proportion to the price, either great or the reverse.

* 12. Therefore shall merchants fix a just price for their merchandise, according to the locality and season, and let them refrain from dishonest dealings. Thus (by adhering to these principles) traffic becomes an honest profession.

NINTH TITLE OF LAW.

RESCISSION OF PURCHASE.

* 1. When a purchaser, after having purchased an article for a (certain) price, repents (of the purchase made by himself), it is termed Rescission of Purchase, a title of law.

* 2. When a purchaser, after having purchased an article for a (certain) price, thinks he has made a foolish bargain, he may return it to the vendor on the same day, in an undamaged condition.

delivery, the vendor commits no wrong by retaining a commodity sold, on purpose to obtain payment. Thus according to the gloss in Colebrooke's Digest, III, 3, 20. The *Viramitrodaya* (p. 441) has a slightly different explanation. 'Where the price for a sold chattel has not been paid, and the purchase concluded through a verbal engagement merely, there is no offence whether it be ratified or not, unless there should be an agreement in this form, "This purchase cannot be rescinded."'

*3. When the purchaser returns it on the second day (after the purchase has been made), he shall lose a thirtieth part of the price. (He shall lose) twice as much on the third day. After that time, the purchaser is bound to keep it.

*4. The (intending) purchaser shall first examine an article (before purchasing it), in order to find out its good and bad qualities. That which has been approved by the purchaser after close examination, cannot be returned to the vendor.

*5. Milch cattle may be examined for three days; animals of burden, for five days; and in the case of precious stones, pearls, and coral, the period of examination may extend over seven days.

*6. Bipeds shall be examined within half a month; a female, within twice the same (space of time); all sorts of grain, within ten days; iron and clothes, within a single day.

*7. A worn gown, which is in a ragged condition and soiled with dirt, cannot be returned to the vendor, if it was in that blemished state at the time when the purchase was effected.

*8. Wearing apparel loses the eighth part of its value on being washed for the first time; the fourth

IX, 3. 'He shall lose a thirtieth part,' he shall give one-thirtieth part more than the stipulated price. 'Twice as much,' i.e. a fifteenth. See Colebrooke's Digest, III, 3, 5.

5, 6. 'For three days,' including the day of purchase. The terms 'for five days,' &c., have to be interpreted in the same way. 'Milch cattle,' such as e.g. female buffaloes. 'Animals of burden,' such as e.g. young bulls. 'Bipeds,' males, i.e. male slaves. 'Twice the same space of time,' a month. 'A female,' a female slave. *Vīramitrodaya*, pp. 433, 434. *Manu* VIII, 222; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 177.

8, 9. When apparel has been given to a washerman to be washed by him, he is bound to make good the value of that

part (on being washed) for the second time; the third part (on being washed) for the third time; and one half (on being washed) for the fourth time.

* 9. One half of the original value having been lost, a quarter (of the reduced value) shall be deducted henceforth, till the fringe is tattered and (the cloth) in rags. In the case of tattered cloth, there is no rule regarding the reduction of its value (through being washed).

* 10. There is no other way for preparing metallic apparatus of any sort than by forging it in fire according to the rules (of art). While they are being forged, (the weight of) the metals is diminished by exposure in fire.

* 11. Gold is not injured at all (by such treatment). On silver, the loss amounts to two Palas in the hundred. On tin and lead, the loss is eight Palas in the hundred.

* 12. On copper, as well as on utensils made of it, the loss should be known to be five Palas (in the hundred). As for iron, there is no fixed rule regarding the loss arising on it, because it is different in nature from the other metals.

which has been spoiled by him. If it has been washed a single time, he must make good its original value minus an eighth. If it has been washed twice, he must make good its original value minus a fourth. Thus if it has been washed three times, a third has to be deducted from the original value, and so forth. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 372.

11, 12. The value of gold is not diminished on its being heated in fire. Therefore, as much (gold) as has been delivered to a goldsmith for making a bracelet and the like, thus much shall the goldsmith restore after having weighed it. Otherwise, he shall be compelled to restore the loss, and to pay a fine. When silver, a hundred Palas in weight, is heated in fire, the loss amounts to

13. The loss and gain arising from the preparation of cloth shall be stated (next). On yarns made of cotton or wool, the increase of value amounts to ten in the hundred.

14. (This rule has reference) to large tissue (only). In the case of (tissue of) middle size, five in the hundred (is gained). In the case of very fine tissue, the gain is said to amount to three Palas in the hundred.

15. In the case of cloth made of the hair of an animal, and of embroidered cloth, the loss amounts to one-thirtieth. In the case of silk stuff and of cloth prepared from the inner bark of trees, the gain is the same (as the loss in the preceding case). Nor is there any loss (in these cases).

* 16. A merchant who is acquainted with the qualities of the merchandise (he deals in) must not

two Palas. When a hundred Palas of tin or lead is heated in fire, the loss amounts to eight Palas. In the case of copper, the loss shall be five Palas. Artizans losing more than the above amount shall be punished. *Mitâksharâ*, pp. 264, 265. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 178.

13-15. When a blanket or the like is made of coarse woollen thread, the increase must be considered to amount to ten Palas in the hundred. The same rule applies in the case of cloth and the like made of cotton thread. In the case of cloth and the like of a middling quality, i.e. which is not made of very fine thread, the increase amounts to five Palas. In the case of cloth made of very fine thread, the increase is three Palas in the hundred. All these rules apply in the case of washed cloth only. That is called 'embroidered cloth' (*kârmika* or *karmakṛita*) where a circle, *Svas-tika*, or other (figure) is worked on woven cloth, with coloured yarns. 'Cloth made of the hair (of an animal)' is where hairs are joined so as to form a piece of cloth or the like. *Mitâksharâ*, pp. 265, 266. *Manu* VIII, 397; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 179, 180.

16. 'He must not annul a purchase,' he must not repent of it. 'He must know' before concluding a purchase, the 'loss and gain on merchandise,' such as horses or others, i.e. the diminution of

annul a purchase, after having once made it. He ought to know all about the profit and loss on merchandise, and its origin.

TENTH TITLE OF LAW.

TRANSGRESSION OF A COMPACT.

* 1. The aggregate of the rules settled amongst heretics, followers of the Veda (Naigamas) and others, is called Samaya (compact, or established usage). Thus arises a title of law, termed Transgression of a Compact.

* 2. Among heretics, followers of the Veda (Naigamas), guilds (of merchants), corporations (Pûgas), troops (of soldiers), assemblages (of kinsmen), and other (associations) the king must maintain the usages (settled among them), both in fortified towns and in the open country.

its value in one country, and the increase of its value in another country, and 'its origin,' the country where it comes from. That is the meaning. Viramitrodaya, pp. 434, 435.

X, 1. 'Heretics,' Kshapazakas (Buddhist or Jain mendicants) and others who detract from the authority of the Veda. 'Naigamas,' traders or merchants. According to the Mitâksharâ, the term Naigama refers to Pârupatas and others who uphold the authority of the Veda. The term 'and others' is used to include corporations of learned Brahmins and other (associations). Viramitrodaya, p. 423. The term samaya, literally 'compact,' denotes local or caste usages, the violation of which forms the subject of the tenth title of law.

2. Of the term Naigama, the commentators give the same two different interpretations as in the preceding paragraph. I have referred it to 'followers of the Veda,' because it comes immediately after the term 'heretics.' The term pûga has three interpretations in this place. Some say it means 'companies of traders or others.'

* 3. Whatever be their laws, their (religious) duties, (the rules regarding) their attendance, and the (particular mode of) livelihood prescribed for them, that the king shall approve of.

* 4. The king shall prevent them from undertaking such acts as would be either opposed (to the wishes of the king), or contemptible in their nature, or injurious to his interests.

* 5. Mixed assemblages, unlawful wearing of arms, and mutual attacks between those persons shall not be tolerated by the king.

Others say it denotes 'associations of persons differing in caste, whose mode of subsistence is not fixed.' The *Vīramitrodaya* interprets it as referring to riders on elephants, horses, &c. In explanation of the terms *vrāta*, 'a troop of soldiers,' and *gana*, 'an assemblage of kinsmen,' the commentators quote the following text of *Kātyāyana*: 'A multitude of united men armed with various weapons is called *vrāta*. An assemblage of families is called *gana*.' *Manu* VIII, 41; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 192, &c.

3. 'Their laws,' such as to speak the truth. 'Their (religious) duties,' such as the duty of going about begging alms when the night is over, early in the morning. 'The rules regarding their attendance,' the duty of attending, in a temple or other (public hall), for the affairs of the community, when the sound of a drum or other instrument is heard. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 430. The *Ratnākara* interprets the term *karma*, 'their (religious) duties,' by 'their proper occupation for a livelihood.' The drift of this rule, according to *Gagannāha*, is this, that the king must not act otherwise than is consistent with the usages of castes or other corporations. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 2, 11. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 192, &c.

4. 'Contemptible in their nature,' essentially despicable, such as the eating of betel, which is customary among heretics and others. 'Injurious to his interests,' causing pecuniary loss, &c. 'He shall prevent them from undertaking such acts,' he shall act so that they do not undertake them. *Vīramitrodaya*, pp. 430, 431.

5. 'Mixed assemblages,' meetings or gatherings of persons differing in caste. 'Unlawful wearing of arms,' wearing arms without sufficient motives, such as the apprehension of a danger. See *Ratnākara*, as quoted in *Colebrooke's Digest*, III, 2, 25.

*6. Those who cause dissension among the members of an association, shall undergo punishment of a specially severe kind; because they would prove extremely dangerous, like an (epidemic) disease, if they were allowed to go free.

*7. Whenever a criminal act, opposed to the dictates of morality, has been attempted, a king desirous of prosperity shall redress it.

ELEVENTH TITLE OF LAW.

BOUNDARY DISPUTES.

*1. Whenever (a decision has to be given) in regard to landed property, whether it be a dike (or bridge), a field, a boundary, a tilled piece of ground, or a waste, it is termed a Boundary Dispute.

2. In all quarrels regarding landed property or boundaries, the decision rests with the neighbours, the inhabitants of the same town or village, the

6. 'An association,' a guild of merchants or other corporation. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 430.

7. When an act tainted with the sin of covetousness or another crime, and opposed to the dictates of revealed and traditional law, such as e.g. the prostitution of widows or other (virtuous females) among heretics or other (sinful men), has been attempted, the king must redress it, though it may have been practised for a long time. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 431.

XI, 1. The meaning is as follows: 'A dike,' an embankment for the purposes of irrigation. 'A field,' a cultivated piece of ground (under water). 'A boundary,' a landmark. 'A tilled piece of ground,' cultivated soil. 'A waste,' uncultivated ground. When a decision has to be given in a quarrel with regard to any of these, it is called a lawsuit concerning landed property, or Boundary Dispute. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 451.

2. *Manu VIII*, 259; *Yāgyavalkya II*, 150.

(other) members of the same community, and the senior (inhabitants of the district),

*3. (As also) with those living outside on the outskirts of the village and who live by the tillage of fields situated in those parts, and with herdsmen, bird-catchers, hunters, and other inhabitants of the woods.

4. These men shall determine the boundary, in accordance with the (old) landmarks, (such as) chaff of grain, coal, pot-sherds, wells, sanctuaries, trees,

5. Objects of general notoriety, such as ant-hills, artificial mounds, slopes, hills and the like, and fields, gardens, roads, and old dikes.

6. When a piece of ground has been carried off by a stream, or abandoned (by the owner), or when the boundary marks have been destroyed, (they shall fix the boundary) according to the inference to be drawn from (an inspection of) the spot, and according to the traces of possession (held by the former owner).

*7. Should the neighbours speak falsely, when called upon to decide a question of this sort, they shall all be punished one by one by the king, each having to pay the fine of the (second or) middlemost degree.

*8. The corporation, the senior (inhabitants of

3. The foresters shall only be consulted in default of cultivators whose fields are adjacent to the boundaries of the village. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 456. *Manu* VIII, 260. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 150.

4, 5. *Manu* VIII, 246-251; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 151.

7. *Manu* VIII, 263; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 153. The fine of the second degree consists of 500 *Paṇas*.

8. The lower degree of punishment in the case of the persons here mentioned seems to be due to the fact that they may be supposed to be interested in the suit.

the district) and the rest shall also receive punishment one by one: they shall have to pay the fine of the first degree, if they make false statements.

*9. The boundary should not be fixed by one man single-handed, though he be a reliable person. This business should be entrusted to a plurality of persons, because it is an affair of importance.

*10. Should a single man undertake to fix the boundary, (he must do so) after having kept a fast, in a collected frame of mind, wearing a garland of red flowers and a (red) cloak, having strewed earth on his head.

*11. Should there be no persons conversant (with the true state of the question) and no boundary marks, then the king himself shall fix the boundary between the two estates, as he thinks best.

12. According to this rule let all contests be decided in regard to houses, gardens, reservoirs of water, sanctuaries and the rest, as well as the space intermediate between two villages.

*13. When trees have grown on the boundary (or ridge) separating two contiguous fields, the fruits and blossoms shall be assigned to the owners of the two fields in common.

9. According to the *Viramitrodaya* (p. 458), this prohibition in regard to the determination of the boundary by a single man, has reference to those only who are not acceptable to both parties and unacquainted with the law.

10. *Manu VIII, 256*; *Yāgñavalkya II, 152*.

11. In default of neighbours and other persons conversant with the state of the matter, and of trees and other boundary marks, the king shall fix the boundary of his own accord. He shall distribute the ground intermediate between the two villages, which has become the subject of a contest, between the two litigant parties, and fix landmarks between the two. *Viramitrodaya*, p. 460. *Manu VIII, 265*; *Yāgñavalkya II, 153*.

*14. When the boughs (or offshoots) of trees grown on the field of one man should take root in the field of another man, they must be known to belong by right to the owner (of that field), because they have sprung forth in another field (than the stem of the tree).

*15. A cross-road, the sanctuary of a deity, a street, and a public road must not be obstructed by (a place for) ordure, a terrace, a pit, an aqueduct, the edge of a thatch (syandanikâ), or the like (obstructions).

16. Should any one cause such obstruction through inadvertency or by force, the king shall impose on him a fine of the highest degree.

*17. The (erection of a) dike in the middle of another man's field is not a prohibited act, as it may be productive of considerable advantage, whereas the loss is trifling. That is to be desired as (comparative) gain where there is (a slight) loss (only).

*18. There are two sorts of dikes (or water-courses), one (called kheyâ) which is dug into the ground, and (another called bandhya) which prevents the access of water. A kheyâ dike serves the purpose of irrigation, a bandhya dike serves to keep the water off.

*19. No grain is (ever produced) without water ;

14. This rule seems to be intended principally for banyans and the like trees covering a large area with their offshoots. The Nepalese MS. omits vv. 13, 14, 16.

15. The term syandanikâ is variously explained as denoting either the projecting roof or the eaves of a house.

17. Yâgñavalkya II, 156.

18. Kheyâ means literally 'what is capable of being dug,' and bandhya 'what is capable of being stopped.' What is meant by these two terms may best be seen from the next paragraph.

but too much water tends to spoil the grain. An inundation is as injurious (to growth) as a dearth of water.

* 20. If a man were to put in repair a dike erected long ago, but decayed, without asking the permission of the owner, he shall not have (the use and) profits of it.

* 21. However, after the death of the owner or of another man sprung from the same race (who has succeeded to his property), he may repair the dike, after having been authorized to do so by the king.

* 22. By acting otherwise he will get into trouble, in the same way as the hunter (of the tale). The shafts of him are spent in vain who hits again and again one who has been hit already.

* 23. When the owner of a field is unable (to cultivate it), or dead, or gone no one knows whither, any stranger who undertakes its cultivation unchecked (by the owner or others) shall be allowed to keep the produce.

* 24. When the owner returns while the stranger

20. With the owner's permission, any man may restore a dike, &c., which has fallen into decay. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 468. *Yāgyñavalkya* II, 157. Read *pravṛtita* in the text.

21. The authority of the king is required, because, without it, the profits of the dike would have to be enjoyed by the king himself. See *Yāgyñavalkya* II, 157.

22. The *tertium comparationis* in this simile has to be sought in the vanity of the effort only. *Manu* (IX, 73) applies the same simile to seed, i.e. *semen virile* spent in vain on the field, i.e. wife of a stranger.

23. 'Unable' (to cultivate the field) through want of means. 'A field,' one which has become a desert. *Vivāda-kintāmaṇi*, p. 64.

24. 'The owner,' or his son or other (descendant). 'The whole expense incurred in tilling the waste,' the cost of converting the desert into cultivated ground. *Vīramitrodaya*, pp. 469, 470.

is engaged in cultivating the field, (the owner) shall recover his field, after having paid (to the cultivator) the whole expense incurred in tilling the waste.

25. A deduction of an eighth part (shall be made), till seven years have elapsed. But when the eighth year arrives, (the owner) shall recover the field cultivated (by the other, as his independent property).

* 26. A tract of land (which has not been under cultivation) for a year is called *Ardhakhila* (half-waste). That which has not been (under cultivation) for three years is called *Khila* (waste). That which has not been under cultivation for five years is no better than a forest.

27. A field which has been held by three generations in succession, and a house which has been inherited from an ancestor, cannot be estranged (from its legitimate owner) by force of possession, except when the king wills it so.

* 28. When grain has been destroyed by cows or

25. It appears from an analogous text of *Kātyāyana* that this rule is intended for those cases where the owner is unable to pay for the expense incurred by the cultivator. *Kātyāyana* says, 'If through want of means (the owner) do not repay the expense entailed by the cultivation of the waste, the cultivator shall be allowed to keep the produce minus an eighth part. During eight years he may keep the (annual) produce (minus an eighth). After that period, it shall belong to the proprietor.'

26. These definitions are inserted here, because the previous rules according to the commentators apply to a desert or forest only, the cultivation of which causes considerable difficulty and expense.

28-42. *Nārada's* eleventh title of law, though called 'Boundary Disputes,' is in reality a collection of all legal rules relating to fields. *Manu* and those who follow him treat the subject of damage done by cattle to crops or grass as a section of the chapter on 'Disputes between master and herdsman,' which title of law is wanting in the *Nārada-smṛiti*.

28. *Gautama XII, 20.*

other cattle crossing a fence, the herdsman deserves punishment in that case, unless he should have done his best to keep the cattle off.

* 29. When grain has been destroyed (altogether), with the root, the owner of it may claim a corresponding quantity of grain (as damages); the herdsman shall be corporally punished; and on his master he shall impose a fine.

* 30. A cow within ten days after her calving, a full grown bull, a horse, and an elephant shall be kept off carefully. The owner of any one out of these animals is not liable to punishment (should they do mischief).

* 31. For (mischief done by) a cow he shall inflict a fine of one Mâsha; for (mischief done by) a female buffalo, two Mâshas; in the case of a goat or sheep (trespassing) with its young, the fine shall amount to half a Mâsha.

* 32. The (owners of) elephants and horses shall not have to pay any fine; for they are looked upon as protectors of (the king's) subjects. Impunity is (likewise) granted to (the owner of) a strayed cow,

29. The author of the *Vîramitrodaya* (p. 450) observes expressly that the term *vadha* denotes corporal punishment, and not execution, in this place. The other commentators agree with him. *Manu* VIII, 241; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 161; *Gautama* XII, 26; *Vishnu* V, 146. The Nepalese MS. omits this paragraph.

30. The reason why horses and elephants have to be kept off is given in paragraph 32. Horses and elephants were used for the purposes of war principally. *Manu* VIII, 242; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 163, &c.

31. *Vishnu* V, 140-144; *Gautama* XII, 22-25; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 159.

32, 33. *Manu* VIII, 242; *Vishnu* V, 150; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 163. The Nepalese MS. has 'a pregnant cow' for 'a strayed cow.'

of one that has recently calved, and of one unmanageable.

33. (As also to the owner of) one that has lost her way, or broken down, or stuck (in marshy ground), or (of) a bull marked with the sign of consecration. Four times (the amount of the damage done) is declared (to be the fine) in the case of (a cow) whose nostrils have been pierced and who abides in the field.

* 34. When the cattle lie down in the field (after grazing), the fine to be inflicted shall be double; when they remain (in the field for the night), it shall be four times (the ordinary amount); when they graze in the sight (of the keeper), that man shall be punished even as a thief.

* 35. When cows, straying through the fault of

33. The genuineness of this paragraph appears doubtful, because some of the propositions contained in it are nearly identical with the rules laid down in the paragraphs immediately preceding and following it. Besides, the language of this paragraph is obscure, and it is not given in any commentary nor in the Nepalese MS. The solemn ceremony of setting a bull at liberty and consecrating him to the gods, with a mark on each flank, is described by Vishnu, chapter LXXXVI, and in the *Grihya-sûtras*. Piercing the nostrils of a barren cow is mentioned as an offence by Manu VIII, 325. It does not become clear why damage done by a cow of this sort should be a greater offence than damage done by an ordinary cow.

34. 'When they lie down in the field,' after having eaten their fill. 'When they remain,' when they spend the night in the field, after grazing. *Vivâdaśintâmani*, *Gagannâtha*, &c. 'In the sight of the keeper:' thus according to *Gagannâtha* (Colebrooke's Digest, III, 4, 46). The correctness of his interpretation is confirmed by *Yâgñavalkya* II, 162. According to the *Vivâdaśintâmani* (p. 67), the meaning is this, that the cattle are allowed to graze by the keeper, in the sight of the proprietor of the field, and in spite of the remonstrances of the latter. Vishnu V, 145; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 160, 162.

their keeper, have entered a field, no punishment shall be inflicted on the owner of the cows; the herdsman (alone) is punishable (for the damage done by them).

* 36. When (a herdsman) has been seized by the king or (devoured) by an alligator, or struck by Indra's thunderbolt, or bitten by a serpent, or fallen from a tree,

* 37. Or killed by a tiger or other (ferocious animal), or smitten by a disease of any sort, no offence can be imputed either to the herdsman or to the owner of the cattle.

* 38. When a man claims damages for grain consumed by cattle (grazing in his field), that quantity of grain must be restored to him (by the owner of the cattle), which has been consumed in the field in the estimation of the neighbours.

* 39. The cows shall be given up to their owner, and the grain to the husbandman. In the same way a fine shall be imposed on the herdsman when grain has been trodden down (by cows).

36. 'Seized by the king,' employed in the king's business. See Colebrooke's Digest, III, 4, 52.

37. This paragraph is omitted in the Nepalese MS.

38. Gautama XII, 26; Manu VIII, 241; Yâgñavalkya II, 161. The Nepalese MS. inserts a spurious verse here, the first half of which is identical with Manu IX, 37, and the second half identical with Nârada XI, 22.

39. The meaning of the injunction to give up the cows seems to be this, that the owner of the cows shall not at once recover them, when they have been seized by the proprietor of the field, after doing damage in the field. The Vivâdātintâmani has a different reading of this clause: *gavatram gominâ deyam*. This is explained as meaning that 'blades of corn must be made good by the owner of cattle.' Similar readings are found in other commentaries as well. Âpastamba II, 11, 28, 5.

40. When a field is situate on the borders of a village, or contiguous to a pasture ground, or adjacent to a high road, the herdsman is not reprehensible for the destruction of grain (in that field), if the field is not protected by a fence.

* 41. On (that side of) the field which faces the road a fence shall be made over which a camel cannot look, nor cattle or horses jump, and which a boar cannot break through.

* 42. A householder's house and his field are considered as the two fundaments of his existence. Therefore let not the king upset either of them; for that is the root of householders.

43. When his people are flourishing, the religious merit and the treasure of a king are sure to be in a flourishing state as well. When (the people) cease to prosper, (his merit and his treasure) are sure to abate as well. Therefore he must never lose sight of (that) cause of prosperity.

TWELFTH TITLE OF LAW.

THE MUTUAL DUTIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.

* 1. That title of law in which the legal rules for women and men regarding marriage and the other

40. 'Pasture ground,' a meadow reserved for feeding cows or other cattle. Ratnâkara. See Colebrooke's Digest, III, 4, 27. Manu VIII, 238, 240; Vishnu V, 147, 148; Gautama XII, 21; Yâgyavalkya II, 162.

41. Manu VIII, 239.

42. This maxim shows that the compiler of the Nârada-smṛiti wrote for an essentially agricultural people.

XII, 1. Manu IX, 1.

(mutual relations between them) are laid down is called The Mutual Duties of Husband and Wife.

2. When a woman and man are to unite (as wife and husband), the choice of the bride must take place first of all. The choice of the bride is succeeded by the (ceremony of) joining the bride and bridegroom's hands. Thus the ceremony (of marriage) is twofold.

3. Of these two parts (of the marriage ceremony) the choice of the bride is declared to lose its binding force, when a blemish is (subsequently) discovered (in either of the two parties). The Mantra (prayer), which is recited during the ceremony of joining the bride and bridegroom's hands, is the permanent token of matrimony.

4. When a Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaisya, or Sūdra takes a wife, it is best for him to take her out of his own caste ; and so is a member of her own caste the (most eligible) husband for a woman (of any caste).

5. A Brahman may marry three wives of different caste, in the direct order of the castes ; and so may

2. The Smṛiti-writers, as a rule, do not mention the act of *varana*, 'choice of a bride,' at all. It appears from the next paragraph that Nārada also does not place it on a par with the ceremony of marriage, which is indissoluble for life.

3. The 'choice of the bride,' or betrothal, being dissoluble on the discovery of a blemish (in either party), it follows that the act of joining the bride and bridegroom's hands, i. e. the ceremony of marriage, must be indissoluble. See, too, paragraph 28. The particular Mantras to be recited during the marriage ceremony are given in the *Gr̥hya-sūtras*.

4. Āpastamba II, 6, 13, 1 ; Vasishṭha VIII, 1 ; Gautama IV, 1 ; Manu III, 12 ; Yāgñavalkya I, 55.

5, 6. It is important to note that Nārada belongs to that group of Smṛiti-writers who recognise the legitimacy of marriage unions between Brahmans and Sūdra women. Baudhāyana I, 8, 16, 1-5 ;

a Sûdra woman take a husband of any of the three castes above her own.

6. For a Kshatriya, two wives differing (from him) in caste are permitted; for a Vaisya, a single wife differing (from him) in caste. (On the other hand), a Vaisya woman may take a husband of two different castes; and a Kshatriya woman may take a husband of one different caste.

7. Sagotras and Samânapravaras are ineligible for marriage up to the fifth and seventh degrees of relationship respectively, on the father's and mother's side.

*8. The man must undergo an examination with regard to his virile; when the fact of his virile has been placed beyond doubt, he shall obtain the maiden, (but not otherwise.)

*9. If his collar-bone, his knee, and his bones (in

Vasishtha I, 24, 25; Vishnu XXIV, 1-4; Manu III, 12-14; Yâgñavalkya I, 56, 57.

6. The somewhat laconic terms of the original may be paraphrased as follows: A Kshatriya may marry a Vaisya and a Sûdra woman, besides a wife of his own caste. A Vaisya may marry a Sûdra woman, besides a wife of his own caste. A Vaisya woman may either take a Vaisya husband, or she may wed a Kshatriya or a Brahman. A Kshatriya may either take a Kshatriya husband, or she may marry a Brahman.

7. A Sagotra is a relative bearing the same family name (laukika gotra). A Samânapravara is one descended from the same Rîshi (vaidika gotra). See Professor Bühler's notes on Gautama XVIII, 6; Âpastamba II, 5, 11, 15. Manu III, 5; Âpastamba II, 5, 11, 15-16; Gautama IV, 2-5; Vasishtha VIII, 1, 2; Baudhâyana II, 1, 31-38; Vishnu XXIV, 9, 10; Manu III, 5; Yâgñavalkya I, 53.

8. Yâgñavalkya I, 55. It should be observed, however, that the eligibility of impotent men or eunuchs for marriage is recognised in the Code of Manu (IX, 203), and that such men are very commonly married now-a-days.

9. The curious disquisition on impotency is quoted in such an

general) are strongly made; if his shoulders and his hair are (also) strongly made; if the nape of his neck is stout, and his thigh and his skin delicate; if his gait and his voice is vigorous;

*10. If his semen, when thrown into water, does not swim on the surface; and if his urine is rich and foamy: by these tokens may a potent man be known; and one impotent by the opposite characteristics.

*11. Fourteen species of impotent men are distinguished by the sages, according to the rules of science, including both the curable and incurable. The rules regarding them shall be given in order.

*12. One naturally impotent, one whose testicles have been cut out, a *Pakshashandha*, one who has been deprived of his potency by a curse of his spiritual guide, or by illness, or by the wrath of a deity,

*13. One jealous, a *Sevya*, one whose semen is (evanescent) as air, a *Mukhebhaga*, one who spills

early compilation as *Aparārka's Commentary of the Yāgñavalkya-smṛiti* (twelfth century), which goes far to prove its genuineness. *Aparārka's* gloss on this passage, scanty as it is, has proved useful in elucidating some of the difficult terms occurring in it, and in establishing the correct readings. Besides, I have been able to avail myself of some valuable remarks, kindly communicated to me by the late Dr. Haas, the well-known connoisseur of Indian medicine.

10. An analogous text is quoted from the *Smṛiti* of *Kātyāyana*. 'He is called impotent whose urine froths not and whose faeces sink in water, and whose generative organ is deficient in erection or seminal juices.' See *Colebrooke's Digest*, V, 5, 330.

12. 'One naturally impotent' (*nisargashandha*), one born without the capacity of producing semen. *Aparārka*. This category seems to be synonymous with the *sahaga* of *Susruta*, the standard writer on medicine. *Pakshashandha*, according to *Aparārka*, is one capable of approaching a woman once in every half-month (*Paksha*).

13. The jealous man, *īrshyāshandha*, seems to be identical with the *īrshyaka* of *Susruta*, 'qui nisi alius cujusdam ineuntis feminam

his semen, one whose semen is devoid of strength, one timorous, and one who is potent with another woman (than his wife) only, (these are the fourteen sorts of impotent persons.)

* 14. Among these, the two first are incurable ; the one called Pakshashandha should wait for a month ; the (three) named after him shall have to wait for a year.

* 15. Those four, among whom, in the above enumeration, the one jealous comes first, shall be avoided by their wives just like an outcast, though they may have been enjoyed by them.

* 16. For the wife of one who spills his semen, or whose semen is devoid of strength, though they may have discharged their marital duties, another husband must be procured, after she has waited for half a year.

* 17. If a man is timorous, he fails when he is about

conspectu non potest.' The term *sevyā* is obscure enough. Dr. Haas proposes to read *ka sevyastka* or *ka mevyastka* or *kāsekyastka*, for *ka sevyastka*. The *āsekyā* is a species of impotent person according to Susruta. It may be, however, that the reading *sevyā* is correct, and denotes one with whom sexual intercourse is possible. Mukhebhaga, 'is qui ore prout cunno utitur.' The revolting practice in question is repeatedly referred to e. g. by Nârada himself, VI, 19, according to the commentators, and I, 183. Dr. Haas proposes to read *mushkabhagnaḥ*, 'one deprived of the scrotum.' It may be argued, however, that this category has already been referred to in paragraph 12, and that the reading *mushkabhagna* is objectionable for metrical reasons. According to Aparârka, *âkshipta*, the next term, means 'is cuius semen in coitu retro (aut susum) fluit ;' *moghabāga* means 'is cui semen ad propagationem aptum non est ;' *śālīna* means 'is cuius penis coitu facto collabitur ;' and *anyâpati*, the last term, means 'is qui cum alia femina praeter uxorem potest.'

15. 'Like an outcast (*patita*).' Dr. Haas assigns a different meaning to the term *patita*, viz. 'is cuius penis collabitur ;' and refers to such expressions as *dhvagaḥ patati*, 'penis collabitur,' in the *Bhavaprakāsa*.

to approach his wife ; such a feeble man shall be stirred up by bringing before him other men's wives or young maidens, &c.

* 18. If a man is potent with another woman but impotent with his own wife, his wife shall take another husband. This is a law promulgated by the Creator of the world.

19. Women have been created for the sake of propagation, the wife being the field, and the husband the giver of the seed. The field must be given to him who has seed. He who has no seed is unworthy to possess the field.

20. Let a maiden be given in marriage by her father himself, or by her brother with the father's authority, or by her paternal grandfather, or by her maternal uncle, or by her agnates or cognates.

21. In default of all these, by the mother, in case she is competent (to act as guardian) ; if she be wanting in competence, the distant connexions shall give a maiden in marriage.

22. If no such person be in existence, let the maiden have recourse to the king, and let her, with his permission, betake herself to a bridegroom of her own choice,

20, 21. The object of these rules is to prevent that any marriageable maiden should remain unmarried, which is a great point in the eyes of a Hindu legislator. Vishnu XXIV, 38, 39 ; Manu V, 151 ; Yâgñavalkya I, 63. The Nepalese MS. refers to the maternal instead of the paternal grandfather.

22, 23. This is the custom of Svayamvara, 'self-choice (of a bridegroom),' so well known from the Indian epics. It appears from this paragraph that Nârada does not allow this custom to be practised except with certain restrictions. See, however, the next paragraph. 'Age ;' Manu says (IX, 94) that a man at the age of thirty shall marry a maiden of twelve, and a man aged twenty-four, years a maiden of eight. Gautama XVIII, 20 ; Vasishtha XVII,

23. Who belongs to her own caste, and is a suitable match in point of descent, morality, age, and sacred learning. Let her discharge her religious duties in common with him, and bear children to him.

24. When a bridegroom goes abroad after having espoused a maiden, let the maiden wait till her menses have passed three times, and then choose another bridegroom.

25. Let no maiden suffer the period of maturity to come on without giving notice of it to her relations. Should they omit to give her in marriage, they would be equal to the murderers of an embryo.

26. He who does not give such a maiden in marriage commits the crime of killing an embryo as many times as her period of menstruation passes by without her having a husband.

27. Therefore a father must give his daughter in marriage once (for all), as soon as the signs of maturity become apparent. (By acting) otherwise he would commit a heavy crime. Such is the rule settled among the virtuous.

67, 68; Manu IX, 90-92; Vishnu XXIV, 40; Yâgñavalkya I, 64; Baudhâya IV, 1, 14. Read *anurûpam* in the text.

24. This is the law in the case of a woman recently married, when consummation has not yet taken place. As for the conduct enjoined to one left by her husband, when they have been married for some length of time, see paragraphs 96-101.

25. Maturity, according to a well-known versus memorialis, generally commences after completion of the tenth year. 'One aged eight years is a child; one aged nine years is a maiden; one aged ten years is a virgin; after that time she is a marriageable woman.' See Parâsara VII, 6; Samvarta V, 66; Gautama XVIII, 22; Vasishtha XVII, 69; Vishnu XXIV, 41; Manu IX, 4, 93.

26. Vasishtha XVII, 71; Yâgñavalkya I, 64; Baudhâya IV, 1, 13.

27. It must not be inferred from this rule that Nârada is not

28. Once is the (family) property divided, once is a maiden given in marriage, and once does a man say, 'I will give;' each of these three acts is done a single time only among the virtuous.

29. This rule applies to the five (first) marriage forms only, beginning with the Brâhma (form of marriage). In the three (others), beginning with the Âsura form, the (irrevocable) gift (of a maiden to a particular suitor) depends on the qualities (of the suitor).

30. Should a more respectable suitor, (who appears) eligible in point of religious merit, fortune, and amiability, present himself, when the nuptial gift has already been presented (to the parents by the first

an advocate of infant marriage, like many other Smṛiti-writers. Thus Dakṣa says, 'Let a maiden be given in marriage at the age of eight years; thus justice will not be violated.' Âṅgiras rules that a maiden must be given in marriage in her tenth year by all means. Râgamârtanda, Yama, and Parâsara declare that it is a heavy sin if she continues to reside at her father's house after having reached her twelfth year of age. Vasishṭha, Gautama, Viṣṇu, and Manu (IX, 93) ordain to give a maiden in marriage before she attains the age of puberty.

28. This is the general rule regarding the indissolubility of the marriage tie. Divers important restrictions of this rule are stated in paragraphs 24, 29, 30, 96-101. Identical with Manu IX, 47. The Nepalese MS. inserts two paragraphs here: 'Soma springs into existence when the marks of puberty appear, and enjoys women. Their breast is a Gândharva, and Agni (the god of fire) is said to dwell in their menstrual discharge. Therefore let a father give his daughter in marriage before the marks of puberty have appeared in her, and before the menses and the breasts have been developed, and before she has been enjoyed by Soma and the rest.' The first paragraph occurs in the Pañkatantra as well. See the Petersburg Dictionary, s. v. Gândharva.

29. Other legal consequences of the choice of a particular form of marriage are stated in the law of inheritance. See XIII, 9.

30. Out of the various meanings of the term *sulka*, the meaning

suitor), the verbal engagement (previously made) shall be annulled.

31. Let no man calumniate a faultless maiden, neither must one calumniate a faultless suitor. When, however, there is an actual defect, it is no offence if they dissolve their mutual engagement.

32. When a man, after having made a solemn promise of giving his daughter in marriage to a certain suitor, does not deliver her afterwards, he shall be punished by the king like a thief, in case the suitor be faultless.

33. But when a man gives a maiden in marriage, who has a (secret) blemish without first making (the defect) known, the king shall visit him with punishment of the very gravest kind.

34. When a man, from hatred, declares a certain maiden to have lost her virginity, he shall pay one hundred *Paṇas* as a fine, unless he be able to give proofs of her disgrace.

* 35. When a man, after having plighted his faith to a maiden, abandons her, although she is faultless, he shall be fined and shall marry the maiden, even against his will.

36. Affliction with a chronic or hateful disease,

‘nuptial gift, presented to the parents of the bride by the bridegroom,’ is no doubt the only one which fits in this place, as it appears from the preceding paragraph that this rule is applicable principally to the *Âsura* form of marriage, i. e. marriage by purchase. *Yâgñavalkya* I, 65.

31. *Manu* VIII, 225; IX, 72; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 66; *Vishṇu* V, 47.

32. *Manu* IX, 71; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 65.

33. *Manu* VIII, 224; IX, 73; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 66; *Vishṇu* V, 45.

34. *Vishṇu* V, 47; *Manu* VIII, 225; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 66.

35. *Yâgñavalkya* I, 66.

36. It does not become quite clear how far the last term in this

deformity, the loss of her virginity, a blemish, and proved intercourse with another man: these are declared to be the faults of a maiden.

37. Madness, loss of caste, impotency, misery, to have forsaken his relatives, and the two first faults of a maiden (in the above text): these are the faults of a suitor.

38. Eight nuptial rites have been ordained for the (four) castes, by which wedlock may be entered into. The Brâhma form is the first of these, the Prâgâpatya form is the second.

39. The Ârsha, Daiva, Gândharva, and Âsura forms follow next. The Râkshasa form is no worse than the one preceding it, and the Paisâka is declared to be the eighth.

40. In the Brâhma form, a maiden decked with ornaments is given (to the bridegroom), after he has been invited and honourably received (by the father). When he has been addressed with the words, 'Fulfil your sacred duties together (with her),' it is termed the Prâgâpatya form.

41. When (the father) receives (from the bridegroom) a dress and a bull and a cow, it is termed the Ârsha form. When she is given, before the

enumeration, anyagatabhâvâ, differs in import from the two terms immediately preceding it. Perhaps it denotes one pregnant, or who has had a child with another man.

37. 'To have forsaken his relatives.' It is evident that certain near relatives must be meant, as e.g. Manu says (VIII, 389) that a mother, father, wife, or son must not be forsaken.

38-43. Manu III, 20, 21, 27-34; Yâgñavalkya I, 58-61; Âpastamba II, 5, 11, 17-II, 5, 12, 2; Gautama IV, 6-13; Baudhâyana I, 20, 1-9; Vasishtha I, 28-35; Vishnu XXIV, 17-26.

40. See Professor Bühler's note on Manu III, 30, 27.

altar, to a priest, who officiates at a sacrifice, it is termed the Daiva form.

42. The union of a willing maiden with her lover is the fifth form, termed Gândharva. When a price is (asked for the bride by the father and) taken (by him), it is the form termed Âsura.

43. The Râkshasa form is declared to consist of the forcible abduction of a maiden. Sexual intercourse with a woman during her sleep or while she is unconscious (of the approach of a man) constitutes the eighth form, the basest of all.

44. Of these, the (first) four, beginning with the Brâhma form, are declared to be lawful; the Gândharva form is common (to all castes); the three forms, which come after it, are unlawful.

45. (Besides the lawful wives) seven other sorts of wives are mentioned in order, who have previously been enjoyed by another man. Among these, the Punarbhû (woman twice married) is of three kinds, and the Svairinî (wanton woman) is fourfold.

*46. A maiden not deflowered, but disgraced by the act of joining the bride and bridegroom's hands, is

43. The term *pramatta*, translated by 'unconscious,' may either refer to a temporary or to a permanent derangement of the maiden's intellect.

44. *Manu* III, 23-26; *Âpastamba* II, 5, 12, 3; *Gautama* IV, 14, 15; *Baudhâyana* I, 20, 10-16; *Vishnu* XXIV, 27, 28.

45. The fact that Nârada treats *Punarbhûs*, 'remarried women,' as being only one degree superior to *Svairinîs*, 'wanton women,' and belonging like the latter to the category of women previously enjoyed by another man, indicates the low estimation in which he holds remarried women, though remarriage is a perfectly legitimate proceeding, according to him, in certain cases. *Manu* V, 163; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 67. Read *trividhâ* in the text.

46. 'The act of joining the bride and bridegroom's hands,' the marriage ceremony. *Vasishtha* XVII, 20; *Manu* IX, 176; *Vishnu* XV, 8.

declared to be the first Punarbhû. She is required to have the marriage ceremony performed once more (when she is married for the second time).

*47. One who, after having left the husband of her youth and betaken herself to another man, returns into the house of her husband, is declared the second (Punarbhû).

*48. When a woman, on failure of brothers-in-law, is delivered by her relations to a *Sapinda* of the same caste, she is termed the third (Punarbhû).

*49. When a woman, no matter whether she have children or not, goes to live with another man through love, her husband being alive, she is the first *Svairinî* (wanton woman).

*50. When a woman, after the death of her husband, rejects her brothers-in-law or other (relations) who have come to her, and unites herself with a stranger through love, she is called the second (*Svairinî*).

*51. One who, having come from a (foreign) country, or having been purchased with money, or being oppressed with hunger or thirst, gives herself up to a man, saying, 'I am thine,'—is declared to be the third (*Svairinî*).

*52. When a woman, after having been given in

47. Manu IX, 176; *Vasishtha* XVII, 19; *Vishnu* XV, 9.

48. This is an allusion to the custom of *Niyoga* or *levirate*, as described below, in paragraphs 80–88.

49. *Yâgñavalkya* I, 67.

50. The 'wanton woman' here referred to is apparently one who, after the death of her husband, declines to perform the custom of *Niyoga* with a brother-in-law or other relation, and goes to live with a stranger instead of it.

51. 'I am thine;' this is the formula by which a slave that is to be delivered himself to his future master. See above, V, 27.

52. The term *utpannasâhasâ* has been translated 'by force.'

marriage by her spiritual guides, in a manner corresponding with the usages of her country, (is afterwards married) to another by force, she is called the last Svairinî.

* 53. Thus has the law been declared with regard to Punarbhû and Svairinî wives. Among them, each preceding one is inferior to the next in order, and each following one is superior to the one preceding her.

* 54. The issue of those women who have been purchased for a price belongs to the begetter. But when nothing has been paid for a woman, her offspring belongs to her legitimate husband.

55. When seed is strewn on a field, without the knowledge of the owner, the giver of the seed has no share in it; the fruit belongs absolutely to the owner of the field.

56. When seed, carried off by a torrent of water or by a gust of wind, grows up in the field of a

The Mitâksharâ, p. 77, interprets it by utpannavyabhiârâ, 'through adultery,' which seems to mean that an elopement is referred to, and not a forcible abduction. In that case, however, this species of wanton women would coincide entirely with the species described in paragraph 49. Besides, it appears from what is said in paragraph 53, that the species of wanton women described in paragraph 52 must be less reprehensible than the three species described in the preceding paragraphs.

53. The Nepalese MS. has the following two paragraphs instead of 53. 'Among the four sorts of Svairinî women, the last respectively are preferable to those previously mentioned; the treatment of their offspring is optional, as regards inheritance, funeral oblations of balls of meal and water, and other concerns. To Punarbhû women, the same rule is applicable as to Svairinî women. Among them (also) each preceding one is inferior,' &c.

54. This rule shows that the purchase and sale of women must have been a very common proceeding in the times of Nârada.

56. Manu IX, 54.

stranger, the owner of that field shall obtain the produce ; none of the produce shall belong to the owner of the seed.

57. When a full-grown bull begets calves with the cows of another man, while roaming in his cow-pen, the calves shall belong to him who owns the cows ; in vain has the bull spent his strength.

58. When seed is sown in the field of another with the consent of the owner of that field, the offspring is considered to be the common property of the giver of the seed and the owner of the soil.

*59. Grain cannot be produced without a field, nor can it be produced without seed. Therefore offspring belongs by right to both, the father as well as the mother.

*60. Nor is (legitimate) offspring produced, when a man meets a woman at another house than her own. That is declared adultery by those conversant with (the law on) this subject, unless she have come into (the man's) house of her own accord.

*61. A man is not punishable as an adulterer for having intercourse with the wife of one who has left his wife without her fault, or of one impotent or consumptive, if the woman herself consents to it.

57. Manu IX, 50, &c.

58. Manu IX, 53.

60. When a woman enters the house of her paramour of her own accord to have intercourse with him, there is no offence (on his part). *Vivādaśintāmaṇi*, p. 112. The Nepalese MS. reads this paragraph differently: 'When a man has intercourse with a woman who has a protector living, at another man's house, it is termed adultery by those conversant with the subject, unless,' &c.

61. When a man has connexion with a married woman, forsaken by her husband, or whose husband is impotent or feeble, he is not punishable, in case the woman consents to it, even though he meet her at her own house. *Vivādaśintāmaṇi*, p. 112.

*62. To meet with another man's wife in an unseasonable hour or place, and to sit, converse, or dally with her, these are the three grades of adultery.

*63. When a woman and a man have meetings at the confluence of two rivers, at a Ghât, in a garden, or in a park, it is also termed adultery.

64. By the employment of go-betweens, dispatch of letters and other criminal proceedings of various kinds, adultery may be found out by the knowing.

*65. If one touches a woman in a place (where it is) improper (to touch her) or allows himself to be touched (in such a spot), all such acts, done with mutual consent, are declared to be adultery.

*66. Bestowing attentions (on a woman), sporting (with her), touching her ornaments and clothes, sitting with her on a bed, all such acts are (also) declared to be adulterous.

*67. If a man seizes a woman by the hand, by a braid of hair, or by the border of her gown, or if he calls out, 'Stop, stop,' all such acts are (also) declared to be adulterous.

68. By the sending of clothes, ornaments, garlands of flowers, drinks, food, and fragrant substances, adultery may (also) be discovered by the wise.

62. Manu VIII, 354; Yâgñavalkya II, 284.

63. Manu VIII, 356. The Nepalese MS. omits paragraphs 64, 65, and arranges paragraphs 66-69 differently.

65. Identical with Manu VIII, 358. 'A place (where it is) improper (to touch her).' For a different interpretation of this term, see Professor Bühler's note on Manu VIII, 358.

66. 'Bestowing attentions on a woman,' doing what is agreeable to her. *Vivâdākintâmani*, p. 110. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 357.

67. Such acts, when committed against another woman than one's own wife, constitute the offence of adultery. That is the meaning. *Vivâdākintâmani*, p. 110; Yâgñavalkya II, 284.

*69. When a man, actuated by vanity, folly, or braggartism, declares himself, that he has enjoyed the love of a certain woman, that is also termed an adulterous proceeding.

70. When a man has connexion with a woman of his own caste, a fine of the highest degree (shall be inflicted on him); and the middling fine, when he has connexion with a woman of lower caste; and capital punishment, when he has connexion with a woman of superior caste.

71. (When he has connexion) with a maiden against her will, he shall have two fingers cut off. If the maiden belongs to the highest (or Brahman) caste, death and the confiscation of his entire property (shall be his punishment).

*72. When, however, he has connexion with a willing maiden, it is no offence, but he shall bestow ornaments on her, honour her (with other presents), and (lawfully) espouse her.

*73. A mother, mother's sister, mother-in-law, maternal uncle's wife, father's sister, paternal uncle's (wife), friend's (wife), pupil's wife, sister, sister's friend, daughter-in-law,

*74. Daughter, spiritual teacher's wife, Sagotra relation, one come to him for protection, a queen, a female ascetic, a nurse, an honest woman, and a female of the highest caste :

70. *Manu* VIII, 374-385; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 286; *Vishnu* V, 40, 41; *Gautama* XII, 2, 3; *Baudhâyana* II, 3, 52, &c.

71. *Manu* VIII, 366, 367; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 288.

72. *Manu* VIII, 366; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 288. The Nepalese MS. reads: *'When a man of the same caste has intercourse with a willing maiden.'

73-75. *Manu* XI, 171; *Yâgñavalkya* III, 231-233, &c.

* 75. When a man carnally knows any one out of these (twenty) women, he is said to commit incest. For that crime, no other punishment than excision of the organ is considered (as a sufficient atonement).

* 76. When a man has sexual connexion with (small) cattle, he shall pay one hundred (*Paṇas*) as a fine; (for sexual connexion) with a cow, he shall pay the middling fine; and the same (for sexual connexion) with a low-caste woman.

* 77. Let a punishment be inflicted by the king on him who has intercourse with a woman, with whom it is forbidden to have intercourse, and let such sinners be cleared (of the moral offence committed by them) by performing a penance.

* 78. Intercourse is permitted with a wanton woman, who belongs to another than the Brahman caste, or a prostitute, or a female slave, or a female not restrained by her master (*nishkâsint*), if these women belong to a lower caste than oneself; but with a woman of superior caste, intercourse is prohibited.

75. The fact that female ascetics (*pravragitâ*) are reckoned by Nârada among those females whose violation is incest—literally ‘an offence as heavy as the violation of a spiritual teacher’s bed’—constitutes an important difference between his teaching and Manu’s. Manu ordains the same punishment for the violation of female ascetics as for the violation of the wives of actors and singers and other abandoned women. See Professor Bühler’s note on Manu VIII, 363. All commentators declare that this rule is applicable in the case of guarded women only. The *Vivâdañ-tâmaṇi* says that the term ‘mother’ denotes a stepmother in paragraph 73.

76. Vishnu V, 43, 44; Manu VIII, 385; *Yâgyavalkya* II, 289.

78. The two terms, *svairinî*, ‘a wanton woman,’ and *abrâhmaṇî*, ‘one not belonging to the Brahman caste,’ have to be connected. ‘A wanton woman,’ a self-willed unchaste woman. *Nishkâsint*

* 79. When, however, such a woman is the kept mistress (of another man, intercourse with her) is as criminal as (intercourse) with another man's wife. Such women, though intercourse with them is not (in general) forbidden, must not be approached, because they belong to another man.

* 80. Should the husband of a childless woman die, she must go to her brother-in-law, through desire to obtain a son, after having received the (required) authorization from her Gurus.

81. And he shall have intercourse with her, till a son be born. When a son is born, he must leave her. It would be sinful intercourse otherwise.

82-84. (He shall approach) a woman who has brought forth male issue, and who is praiseworthy, free from passion, and without amorous desire. He must have anointed his limbs with clarified butter, or with oil which has not lost its natural condition, and must turn away his face from hers, and avoid the contact of limb with limb. For this (custom is

means 'one who has left her family' according to the Madanaratna, and 'a female slave not restrained by her master' according to Vigñānesvara, Mādhavākārya, and the rest. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 510. See above, V, 39.

79. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 290. The Nepalese MS. reads 'when they belong to another man.'

80-88. *Manu* IX, 59-64, 143; *Yāgñavalkya* I, 69; *Gautama* XVIII, 4-8; *Āpastamba* II, 10, 27, 2, 3; *Vasishṭha* XVII, 55, 66; *Baudhāyana* II, 4, 9-10. Regarding the history of the Indian levirate, see my 'Outlines of a History of Hindu Law' (*Tagore Law Lectures for 1883*), pp. 153, 154.

80. The Gurus intended are, the teacher, sub-teacher, and officiating priests of the deceased husband. See Professor Bühler's note on *Vasishṭha* XVII, 56. According to *Vasishṭha*, the authority of both the Gurus and relatives is required. The relatives are referred to by Nārada himself, paragraphs 82-84.

practised) when the family threatens to become extinct, for the continuation of the lineage, and not from amorous desire. He must not approach a woman who is with child, or blamable, or unauthorized by her relations. Should a woman procreate a son with her brother-in-law without having been authorized thereto by her relations,

85. He is declared an illegitimate, and incapable of inheriting, by the expounders of the Veda. So when a younger brother has intercourse, without authorization, with the wife of his elder brother,

86. Or an elder brother with the wife of his younger brother, they are both declared to commit incest. After having been authorized by the Gurus, he shall approach the woman and advise her,

* 87. In the manner previously stated, (as if she were) his daughter-in-law. He becomes pure, when the ceremony for the birth of a male child is performed. (Let him approach her) once, or till she has conceived. When she is pregnant, she is even as (his daughter-in-law).

86. According to *Gagannâtha's* reading of these texts, the appointment to raise offspring may be given by the king also, where Gurus and relations are wanting. The same clause is found in the Nepalese MS. 'He shall advise the woman' means, according to *Gagannâtha*, 'he shall teach her the general illegality of receiving the caresses of other men, and the particular legality of an appointment to raise up offspring.' See *Colebrooke's (Gagannâtha's) Digest*, IV, 4, 147.

87. 'His daughter-in-law;' a brother's wife is considered as similar to a daughter-in-law, according to *Gagannâtha*. See loc. cit. The 'ceremony for the birth of a male child' (*Pumsavana*), which has the procreation of a son for its object, is usually performed at the time when the mother perceives the first signs of a living conception. It has to be observed that the reading of this paragraph is uncertain, and its rendering conjectural. The Nepalese MS. agrees with *Gagannâtha*.

* 88. Should the man or woman behave otherwise, impelled by amorous desire, they shall be punished severely by the king. Otherwise justice would be violated.

* 89. Husband and wife must not lodge a plaint against one another with their relations, or the king, when a quarrel has arisen through passion, which has its root in jealousy or scorn.

90. When husband and wife leave one another, from mutual dislike, it is a sin, except when a woman, who is kept under supervision, commits adultery.

* 91. When a married woman commits adultery, her hair shall be shaved, she shall have to lie on a low couch, receive bad food and bad clothing, and the removal of the sweepings shall be assigned to her as her occupation.

* 92. One who wastes the entire property of her husband under the pretence that it is (her own) *Strīdhana*, or who procures abortion, or who makes an

89. The term *sambandha*, literally 'connexion,' has been rendered by 'a quarrel.' It can hardly be referred to friendly connexion (with another man or woman) in this place. The prohibition of lawsuits between wife and husband may be compared to the analogous prohibition, in the case of husband and wife, of suretyship, division of property, contracting of debts, and giving evidence.

91. Mitramisra, in the *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 520, quotes this text as proving that an adulteress even has a claim to maintenance. He interprets it as follows. When a woman has committed adultery through amorous desire, she shall be shaved and compelled to lie on a low couch, bad food and a bad dwelling shall be given to her for her maintenance; and the removal of rubbish shall be assigned to her as her occupation. *Yāgñavalkya* I, 70.

92. As for the constituents of *Strīdhana*, or separate property of a woman, see XIII, 8.

attempt on her husband's life, he shall banish from the town.

* 93. One who always shows malice to him, or who makes unkind speeches, or eats before her husband, he shall quickly expel from his house.

* 94. Let not a husband show love to a barren woman, or to one who gives birth to female children only, or whose conduct is blamable, or who constantly contradicts him; if he does (have conjugal intercourse with her), he becomes liable to censure (himself).

* 95. If a man leaves a wife who is obedient, pleasant-spoken, skilful, virtuous, and the mother of (male) issue, the king shall make him mindful of his duty by (inflicting) severe punishment (on him).

96. When a faultless maiden has been married to a man who has a blemish unknown (before his marriage), and does not repair to another man (after discovering it), she shall be enjoined to do so by her relations. If she has no relations living, she shall go (to live with another man) of her own accord.

97. When her husband is lost or dead, when he

93. 'He shall expel from his house.' This, according to an interpretation mentioned by Gagannâtha, means that he shall banish her from the principal habitation, assigning to her a separate dwelling within his close. See Colebrooke's Digest, IV, 1, 63. This interpretation is hardly correct, though it is interesting as it shows the tendency of the commentators to explain away those laws under which married women were deprived of their claim to maintenance. Manu IX, 80, 81; Yâgñavalkya I, 73, &c.

96. This rule shows that a marriage is dissoluble on the discovery of a blemish, as well as a betrothal. See XII, 3.

97. 'Lost,' i.e. gone no one knows whither. This text, or an identical text of Parâsara, has been frequently appealed to by the

has become a religious ascetic, when he is impotent, and when he has been expelled from caste: these are the five cases of legal necessity, in which a woman may be justified in taking another husband.

98. Eight years shall a Brahman woman wait for the return of her absent husband; or four years, if she has no issue; after that time, she may betake herself to another man.

99. A Kshatriya woman shall wait six years; or three years, if she has no issue; a Vaisya woman shall wait four (years), if she has issue; any other Vaisya woman (i. e. one who has no issue), two years.

100. No such (definite) period is prescribed for a Sûdra woman, whose husband is gone on a journey. Twice the above period is ordained, when the (absent) husband is alive and tidings are received of him.

101. The above series of rules has been laid down by the Creator of the world for those cases where a man has disappeared. No offence is imputed to a woman if she goes to live with another man after (the fixed period has elapsed).

modern advocates of the remarriage of widows in India. Vasishṭha XVII, 74.

98, 99. Vasishṭha XVII, 75-80; Manu IX, 76, 77; Gautama XVIII, 15-17.

100, 101. The Nepalese MS. has three paragraphs instead of these two, as follows:—'100. No such period is ordained for a Sûdra woman, nor is justice violated (in her case). The utmost limit for her is a year, especially if she has no issue. 101. This term has been ordained for the wives of absent husbands who are dead. Twice the same term is ordained, when (the absent husband) is alive and tidings are received of him. 101 a. The (other) term has been ordained for those who have issue (?). Afterwards, no offence is imputed to a woman who goes to live with another man.'

102. This body of laws is applicable to the offspring of unions in the direct order of the castes; the offspring of a marriage union in the inverse order of the castes is said to be (produced by) a confusion of castes.

103. There are Anantara, Ekântara, and Dvyantara sons both in the direct and inverse order of the castes.

104. (Of this description are) the Ugra, Pârasava, and Nishâda, (who are begotten) in the direct order, as well as the Ambashtha, Mâgadha, and Kshattri, who spring from a Kshatriya woman.

105. One of these (latter castes) is begotten in the direct order, of the two (others) it must be known that they are (begotten) in an inverse order. The Kshattri and the rest are begotten in an

102. 'In the direct order of the castes,' i.e. where a man of higher marries a woman of lower caste. 'In the inverse order of the castes,' i.e. where a woman of higher marries a man of lower caste.

103-113. Manu X, 6-41; Gautama IV, 16-28; Vasishtha XVIII; Baudhâyana I, 16, 6-12, 17 passim; Vishnu XVI, 1-7; Yâgyavalkya I, 91-95.

103. An Anantara is the son of a father whose caste is only one degree higher or lower than the caste of the mother. An Ekântara is the son of a father whose caste is two degrees higher or lower than the caste of the mother. A Dvyantara is the son of a father whose caste is three degrees higher or lower than the caste of the mother. The Nepalese MS., throughout superior to the Indian MSS., reads as follows:—' 103. An Ugra, Pârasava, and Nishâda are (begotten) in the direct order, and are declared to be the sons of Sûdra women with husbands of the (three) higher castes. 104. Of a Brahman woman are born a Kândâla, a Sûta, and a Vaidehaka; they are declared to spring in an inverse order, from their union with husbands of different caste. 105. An Ambashtha, Mâgadha, and Kshattri are the sons of a Kshatriya woman. Of these, one is born in the direct, and two are born in the inverse order. 106 a. Of a Vaisya woman, are born an Ambashtha, Yavana, and Âyogava,

inverse order, the (three) mentioned first in the direct order.

106. Sacraments, beginning with the boiling of gruel, three times seven in number (shall be performed) by them. The son (of a Brahman) with a Brahman woman is equal in caste (to his father). The son (of a Brahman) with a Kshatriya woman is an Anantara.

107. An Ambashtha and an Ugra are begotten in the same way by Kshatriya men and on Vaisya women respectively. An Ambashtha is an Ekântara, the son of a Brahman with a Vaisya woman.

108. In the same way, a son called Nishâda

Of these, one is born in the inverse, and two are born in the direct order. 106 b. A Sûta and the other Pratilomas (men born in the inverse order), who are begotten contrary to order, are declared to partake of the series of three times seven sacraments, beginning with the Pâka ceremony (cooking food). 106 c. The son,' &c.

106. The meaning of the first half of this paragraph is somewhat obscure. The term *triḥ sapta*, 'three times seven,' has been connected with *samskârâs*, 'sacraments.' The sacraments are peculiar to those mixed castes, which are procreated in the direct order of castes. See Manu X, 41. The 'boiling of gruel' (*ârupâka*) being mentioned as the first sacrament, it appears that the sacraments here referred to are identical with the *yagñas*, 'sacrifices,' of which there are twenty-one according to the usual theory. See Gautama XVIII, 18-20, and Professor Weber's paper on Vedic Sacrificial Rites, *Indische Studien*, X, p. 320. It is also possible to connect the clause 'three times seven' with 'them.' The number of twenty-one mixed castes procreated in a direct order is received by adding the fifteen castes springing from a further mixture between the mixed castes (Manu X, 31) to the six principal mixed castes procreated in a direct order. For *vai matâḥ*, as I have conjectured, the MSS. read *kosh/kataḥ*, which might be rendered '(The twenty-one sacraments, beginning with the boiling of gruel, have to be performed by them) out of a pot.' However, the correctness of this reading is liable to considerable doubt. The Nepalese MS. reads, *te samskârâśka pakâdyâs teshâm triḥ saptako ganâḥ*. This is perhaps the original reading. See the preceding note.

springs from the union of a Kshatriya with a Sûdra woman. A Sûdra woman obtains from a Brahman a son (called) Pârasava, who is superior (to the Nishâda).

109. Thus have the sons born in the direct order of castes been declared. The two sons called Sûta, and Mâgadha as well as the Âyogava,

110. And the Kshattri and Vaidehaka are begotten in the inverse order of castes. The Sûta is declared to be an Anantara, begotten by a Kshatriya on a Brahman woman.

111. Similarly, the Mâgadha and Âyogava are the sons of Vaisya and Sûdra fathers (and of a Brahman mother). A Brahman woman obtains of a Vaisya father an Ekântara son, the Vaidehaka.

112. A Kshatriya woman (obtains of a Sûdra) an Ekântara son, called Kshattri. A Dvyantara son in the inverse order, the most abject of men, because he is the fruit of sinful intercourse,

113. *Kandâla* by name, is born of a Sûdra, when a Brahman woman forgets herself (with him). Therefore must the king take special care to prevent women from sinful intercourse with men of different caste.

THIRTEENTH TITLE OF LAW.

THE LAW OF INHERITANCE.

*1. Where a partition of the paternal property

113. The Nepalese MS. inserts the following before the clause beginning with the word 'Therefore:—'Because confusion of the castes springs up, where the king keeps no watch over them.'

XIII, 1. The term 'sons' includes by implication grandsons and

is instituted by the sons, it is called by the learned, Partition of Property, a title of law.

* 2. The father being dead, the sons shall divide the estate as they ought; (and so shall) daughters (divide the property) of their mother (when she dies); or, failing daughters, their issue.

* 3. (The distribution of the property shall take place) when the mother has ceased to menstruate and the sisters are married, or when the father's sexual desire is extinguished and he has ceased to care for worldly interests.

* 4. Or let a father distribute his property among his sons himself, when he is stricken in years, either allotting a larger share to the eldest son, or (distributing the property in any other way) following his own inclination.

more remote descendants. The term 'paternal' includes property of the grandfather and more remote ancestors as well. Mandlik's *Mayûkha*, p. 33 (IV, 3, 1, Borrodaile). Analogous remarks are found in most other Commentaries.

2. 'Their issue' (*tadanvayaḥ*). According to the usual explanation, the male issue of the daughters is meant. However, there is nothing in the text to warrant an exclusion of the female issue of daughters. *Manu* IX, 104, 192; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 117; *Gautama* XXVIII, 1; *Baudhâya* II, 3, 8.

3. According to the *Mayûkha*, the clause 'when the sisters are married' has to be construed with both the preceding and following clauses, the marriage of the sisters being required to precede both a division in the father's lifetime and a division in the mother's lifetime. See *Mayûkha*, p. 33 (translation, p. 39). The *Dâyabhâga* has a totally different reading of this text, which is censured in the *Vîramitrodaya*. *Gautama* XXVIII, 1.

4. The *Dâyabhâga* (II, 82, Colebrooke) states correctly that the unequal distribution referred to in the last clause of this text must be different from that sort of unequal distribution under which the eldest son is to receive a larger share than the rest. The *Mîtâksharâ* school, on the other hand, recognises two different modes of

* 5. Or the senior brother shall maintain all (the junior brothers), like a father, if they wish it, or even the youngest brother, if able; the well-being of a family depends on the ability (of its head).

* 6. Property gained by valour, or belonging to a wife, and the gains of science, are three kinds of wealth not subject to partition; and so is a favour conferred by the father (exempt from partition).

* 7. When the mother has bestowed (a portion of) her property on any (of her sons) from affection, the rule is the same in that case also; for the mother is equal to the father (as regards her competence to bestow gifts).

* 8. What (was given) before the (nuptial) fire, what (was given) during the bridal procession, the husband's donation, and what was received from her brother, mother, or father, that is called the six-fold property of a woman (Strīdhana).

distribution only: one equal, and the other with the customary deductions in favour of the eldest son, middlemost son, &c., according to the order of seniority. The writers of this school, therefore, have endeavoured to refute the interpretation of the *Dâyabhāga*. See *Vīramitrodaya*, transl., p. 54.—*Manu* IX, 112 foll.; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 114; *Āpastamba* II, 6, 14; *Gautama* XXVIII, 2; *Vishnu* XVII, 1; *Baudhāyana* II, 3, 9.

5. As the management of the property and government of the family, under this rule, may devolve on the youngest brother even, it follows that the middlemost brother may get it *à fortiori*. This is expressly stated in the *Dâyabhāga* (III, 1, 15, Colebrooke). *Manu* IX, 108.

6. 'What was received at the time of obtaining a wife is here called the "wealth of a wife;" meaning effects obtained on account of marriage.' *Dâyabhāga* (VI, 1, 13, Colebrooke); *Manu* IX, 206; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 119.

8. It may be asked by whom the gifts presented before the nuptial fire and during the bridal procession, i. e. at two different stages of the marriage ceremony, must have been presented in

*9. Such property of a woman shall go to her offspring; if she have no offspring, it is declared to go to her husband (if she was married to him) according to one of the four (praiseworthy) marriage forms, beginning with the Brâhma form; (if she was married) according to one of the other forms, it shall go to her parents.

*10. When one brother maintains the family of another brother, who is engaged in studying science, he shall receive a share of the wealth gained by that study, though he be ignorant (himself).

*11. A learned man is not bound to give a share of his own (acquired) wealth against his will to an unlearned co-heir, unless it have been gained by him using the paternal estate.

*12. Two shares let the father keep for himself

order to be Strîdhana. As all the other gifts classed as Strîdhana are presented by relations, it may be inferred that the nuptial gifts have to come from the same quarter. Kâtyâyana declares expressly that a gift made by a stranger is not Strîdhana. Manu IX, 194; Yâgñavalkya II, 143, 144; Vishnu XVII, 18.

9. See XII, 38 foll. The commentators are of opinion that the Gândharva form of marriage follows the same rule as those four forms which are referred to in the first half of this text. This, however, is an artificial interpretation, which has merely been devised for the purpose of making this text agree with an analogous rule of Manu (IX, 196). Manu IX, 195-197; Yâgñavalkya II, 144, 145; Vishnu XVII, 19-21; Vasishtha XVII, 46; Baudhâyana II, 2, 3, 43. Read *katurshvâhuḥ* in the text.

10. Śrīkrishṇa observes that where the support has been offered by several unlearned co-heirs, they shall all of them be made to participate in the gains of science. See Colebrooke's *Dâyabhâga*, VI, 1, 15, note.

11. 'The word "paternal" intends joint property.' *Dâyabhâga* VI, 1, 17; Manu IX, 206; Yâgñavalkya II, 119; Gautama XXVIII, 30.

12. The rule which assigns two shares to a father distributing

when distributing his property. The mother shall receive the same share as a son (when the sons divide the property) after her husband's death.

* 13. To the eldest son a larger share shall be allotted, and a less share is assigned to the youngest son. The rest shall take equal shares, and so shall an unmarried sister.

* 14. The same rule applies to sons of a wife (Kshetrâgas) lawfully begotten on her. For sons of lower caste, a decrease in the shares according to the order (of their caste) is ordained, in case they are born of women legally married.

* 15. When a father has distributed his property amongst his sons, that is a lawful distribution for them (and cannot be annulled), whether the share of one be less, or greater than, or equal to the shares of the rest; for the father is the lord of all.

his property himself, is referred to the father's self-acquired property in the Mitâksharâ school, and to ancestral property in the Bengal school. This difference of interpretation is connected with the varying views taken in the several schools of law of the extent of the patria potestas in questions of proprietary right and inheritance. See Dânyabhâga II, 35, Colebrooke; Mitâksharâ I, 5, 7, Colebrooke. Yâgñavalkya II, 123; Vishnu XVIII, 34.

13. The share of an unmarried daughter, according to the translation here given, would have to be equal to the shares of the middlemost brothers. According to Gagannâtha, all that is meant by Nârada is this, that the daughter shall receive some portion of the property, the precise amount of it being left undecided. See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 1, 71.—Manu IX, 113–118; Vishnu XVII, 37; XVIII, 35; Baudhâyana II, 3, 9; Gautama XXVIII, 5–13; Vasishtha XVII, 42 foll.; Âpastamba II, 6, 14, 6–10; Yâgñavalkya II, 114, 124.

14. For the rules regarding the procreation of a Kshetrâga son, see XII, 80–88. Gautama XXVIII, 35–39; Vasishtha XVII, 47–50; Vishnu XVIII, 1–31; Baudhâyana II, 3, 10; Yâgñavalkya II, 125; Manu IX, 149–156.

15. The writers of the Bengal school give this text its plain

* 16. A father who is diseased, or angry, or absorbed by (sinful) worldly interests, or who acts illegally, has not the power to distribute his property (as he likes).

* 17. The son of a maiden, a son obtained through a pregnant bride, and one born of a woman (whose transgression was) unknown (at first and is found out subsequently): of these, the mother's husband is regarded as the father, and they are declared to be entitled to shares of his property.

* 18. A maiden's son, whose father is unknown and whose mother is not legally married (to his father), shall give a funeral ball (of rice) to his maternal grandfather and inherit his property.

* 19. Those sons who have been begotten by one or by many on a woman not authorized (to raise issue to her deceased husband), shall all be dis-

meaning, viz. that a father may distribute his property among his sons as he pleases. They add, however, that in doing so he must be guided by lawful motives, such as compassion on an incapable son, partiality for a pious son, and the like. See *Dâyabhâga* II, 74, 75; *Colebrooke's Digest*, V, 1, 32. The *Mayûkha*, on the other hand, declares that this rule of *Nârada* had legal force in the former ages of the world only. See *Mandlik's Mayûkha*, p. 35 (transl. p. 43). *Yâgñavalkya* II, 116.

16. This rule 'relates to the case where the father, through perturbation of mind occasioned by disease or the like, or through irritation against any one of his sons, or through partiality for the child of a favourite wife, makes a distribution not conformable to law.' *Colebrooke's Dâyahâga* II, 83. The *Mitâksharâ* (I, 2, 13, 14), cutting down the privileges of the father everywhere, interprets this rule as a prohibition of any other mode of unequal distribution except that by which the customary deductions are made in favour of the eldest son, &c.

17, 18. *Manu* IX, 170-172; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 129; *Vishnu* XV, 10-17; *Vasishtha* XVII, 21-23.

19. Regarding the rule of *Niyoga*, or appointment of a married

inherited; they are the sons of their (respective) begetters only.

* 20. They shall offer the funeral ball (of rice) to their begetter, in case their mother had been obtained for a price; if no price has been paid for her, they shall give the funeral ball to the husband (of their mother).

* 21. One hostile to his father, or expelled from caste, or impotent, or guilty of a minor offence, shall not even take a share (of the inheritance), if he is a legitimate son; much less so, if he is a (Kshetrage) son of the wife (only).

* 22. Persons afflicted with a chronic or acute disease, or idiotic, or mad, or blind, or lame (are also incapable of inheriting). They shall be maintained by the family; but their sons shall receive their respective shares (of the inheritance).

* 23. The sons of two fathers shall give the funeral

woman or widow to raise offspring to her husband, see XII, 80-88; Manu IX, 143.

20. See XII, 54.

21, 22. Manu IX, 201-203; Âpastamba II, 6, 14, 1, 15; Gautama XXVIII, 23, 40, 43; Vasishtha XVII, 52, 53; Baudhâyana II, 3, 37-40; Vishnu XV, 32-37; Yâgyñavalkya II, 140, 141.

21. The commentators are at variance as to the precise meaning of the term 'hostile to his father.' Thus the Sarasvatîvilâsa declares it to denote one who forgets himself so far as to say, 'He is not my father.' The Dâyakramasaṅgraha says it means one who beats his father. According to Gagannâtha and the Ratnâkara, it means 'one who attempts his father's life or commits other hostile acts against him (māraṇâdikṛit), and who fails to offer the customary funeral oblations to his father after his death.' See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 4, 320.

22. Atrophy or pulmonary consumption is instanced as a chronic, and leprosy as an acute disease, in the Ratnâkara. See Colebrooke's Digest, loc. cit.

23. 'The adoptive father,' literally 'the man who owns the

ball (of rice) and the water oblations to each of the two (fathers) singly, and shall receive one half of the property left by their natural and adoptive fathers.

* 24. That portion (of the property) which belongs to a reunited coparcener is declared to be absolutely his own. So when one of the sharers has no issue it shall go to the rest (after the death) of those who are childless.

* 25. If among several brothers one childless should die or become a religious ascetic, the others shall divide his property, excepting the *Strīdhana*.

mother' (Kshetrika). The 'son of two fathers' is no doubt one procreated by Niyoga on the wife of one impotent, &c. It is not equally clear why he is to obtain one half only of the property left by his two fathers, as he is elsewhere declared to succeed to both. According to the *Ratnākara*, this rule 'relates to the case where the natural father has a son begotten in lawful wedlock, and the husband of the mother also has by some means (*kathamkit*) obtained male issue by himself begotten.' See *Colebrooke's Digest*, V, 4, 242.—*Yāgñavalkya* II, 127; *Manu* IX, 145, 190; *Baudhāyana* II, 3, 18, 19.

24. For several other interpretations of this difficult text, see *Colebrooke's Digest*, V, 8, 433. It has to be observed, however, that the reading translated here differs from the reading translated by *Colebrooke*.

25, 26. The fact that the widow is invested with a claim to maintenance merely under this text, whereas the leading texts of *Yāgñavalkya* and *Vishṇu* constitute her heir to the property of a husband who has died without leaving male issue, has caused some difficulty to the commentators. Thus *Madana* says that this text must be held applicable to the widow of an undivided or reunited coparcener only, who is given a mere claim to maintenance by all writers of the *Mitāksharā* school. The writers of the *Bengal* school, on the other hand, recognise the widow's right of inheritance in the case of undivided coparceners even. It appears, however, from the order of heirs given in 49–51, that *Nārada* does not make the widow an heir in any case.

25. *Manu* IX, 212; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 138; *Vishṇu* XVII, 17; *Gautama* XVIII, 21.

*26. They shall make provision for his women till they die, in case they remain faithful to the bed of their husband. Should the women not (remain chaste), they must cut off that allowance.

*27. If he has left a daughter, her father's share is destined for her maintenance. They shall maintain her up to the time of her marriage; afterwards let her husband keep her.

*28. After the death of her lord, the relations of her husband shall be the guardians of a woman who has no son. They shall have full authority to control her, to regulate her mode of life, and to maintain her.

*29. When the husband's family is extinct, or contains no male, or when it is reduced to poverty, or when no one related to it within the degree of a *Sapinda* is left, the father's relations shall be the guardians of a woman.

*30. It is through independence that women go

26. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 142.

27. 'They shall maintain her,' literally 'they shall give her a share.' See par. 13, where a share is allotted to an unmarried sister. The maintenance of the daughter includes, no doubt, the obligation to defray the expense of her marriage. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 141.

28. All the commentators declare that the right of guardianship goes in the order of proximity. 'Thus, without (her guardian's) consent, she may not give away anything to any person; nor indulge herself in matters of shape, taste, smell, and the like; and if the means of subsistence be wanting he must provide her maintenance.' *Gagannâtha*. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, IV, 1, 13.

29. The Nepalese MS. and the commentaries insert the following text here: *'If both families are extinct, the king is declared to be the protector of a woman; he shall provide for her and punish her when she has swerved from the path of duty.'

30, 31. *Vasishtha* V, 1, 2; *Baudhâya* II, 3, 44, 45; *Gautama*

to ruin, though born in a noble family. Therefore the Lord of creatures has assigned a dependent condition to them.

* 31. The father protects her during her infancy, the husband protects her when she is grown up, and the sons (protect her) in her old age. A woman is unfit to enjoy independence.

* 32. What is left (of the father's property), when the father's obligations have been discharged, and when the father's debts have been paid, shall be divided by the brothers, in order that the father may not continue a debtor.

* 33. For those (brothers), for whom the initiatory ceremonies have not been duly performed by their father, they must be performed by the (other) brothers, (defraying the expense) from the paternal property.

XVIII, 1; Manu IX, 3; V, 148; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 85; *Vishnu* XXV, 12, 13.

30. 'They go to ruin,' i.e. they are guilty of disloyalty and other offences; thus, because they do not know what is legal for those who live exactly according to sacred ordinances, and because they cannot be instructed, they would violate the duties of their class and the like. *Gagannâtha*. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, IV, 1, 4.

32. The term *pitrîdâyebhyo*, 'when the father's obligations have been discharged,' is differently explained by different commentators. Thus *Varadarâga* (*Burnell's Vyavahâranirnaya*, p. 18) says it denotes the father's funeral rites and the like. *Akṣuta*, as quoted in *Colebrooke's Dâya-bhâga* I, 47, note, refers it to sums of which payment has been promised by the father. *Manu* VIII, 166; IX, 104; *Baudhâyana* II, 3, 8; *Gautama* XXVIII, 1; *Yâgñavalkya* II, 117. Read *dattvarnam* in the text.

33. There appears to be some doubt as to what is meant here by the term *samskâra*, 'initiatory or sacramental ceremonies,' some commentators including the ceremony of marriage in that term, and others declaring the initiatory ceremonies to terminate with the investiture with the sacred thread. *Yâgñavalkya* II, 124.

* 34. Or, no paternal wealth being left, the initiatory ceremonies must be invariably performed for their brothers by those previously initiated contributing (the required) funds from their own portions.

* 35. One who, being authorized to look after the affairs of the family, charges himself with the management (of the family property), shall be supported by his brothers with (presents of) food, clothing, and vehicles.

* 36. When the fact of a legal partition should be called into question, the decision of the dispute (which has arisen) among the sharers shall be founded on (the testimony of) kinsmen, the written deed recording the division of the estate, and the separate transaction of business.

* 37. Among unseparated brothers, the performance of religious duties is single. When they have come to a partition, they have to perform their religious duties each for himself.

35. Some commentators explain this text as having reference to one who generously declines to take his share at the time of partition. His share shall be made up afterwards by the other brothers contributing severally a portion of their shares. However, there seems to be more foundation for the opinion of those commentators who interpret this text as ordaining the allotment of a preferential share or the presentation of special gifts to the manager of the family property. See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 2, 108.

36. The commentators observe that the contest here referred to does not turn on the mode but on the fact of partition. See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 6, 381. The business here referred to consists of agriculture and the like acts, according to the Mitâksharâ. Yâgñavalkya II, 149.

37. The term 'religious duties,' according to the Mitâksharâ, relates principally to the five Mahâyagñas, 'great sacrifices' or 'sacraments.' Before division they are performed by one brother, generally the eldest brother, as representative of the rest. Manu IX, 111; Gautama XXVIII, 4.

*38. Giving, receiving, cattle, food, houses, fields, and servants must be regarded as separate among divided brothers, and so must cooking, religious duties, income, and expenditure (be kept separate for each of them).

*39. (The acts of) giving evidence, of becoming a surety, of giving, and of taking, may be mutually performed by divided brothers, but not by unseparated ones.

*40. If (brothers or others) should transact such matters as these publicly with their co-heirs, they may be presumed to be separate in affairs, even though no written record (of the partition) be in existence.

*41. Those brothers who for ten years continue to live separate in point of religious duties and business transactions, should be regarded as separate; that is a settled rule.

*42. When a number of persons, the descendants of one man, are separate in point of (the performance of) religious duties, business transactions, and work-

38. 'Giving and receiving,' without consulting each other. Purchase of 'cattle' and the like. See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 6, 380. The upshot of a long discussion of this text by *Gagannātha* is this, that none of the acts mentioned here may be regarded as conclusive evidence by itself, a great deal of collective evidence of all sorts having to be adduced in each case. See Colebrooke's Digest, V, 6, 387.

39. *Yāgyavalkya* II, 52.

41. The term 'brothers' is here used to denote coparceners generally. *Smṛitīkandrikā* XVI, 14. The *Sarasvatīvilāsa* (§ 812, Foulkes) contests the correctness of this interpretation. The Nepalese MS. does not give this paragraph, and it is elsewhere attributed to *Bṛihaspati*.

42, 43. 'Religious duties,' prescribed observances, such as the five great sacrifices (*Mahāyagñas*). 'Business transactions,' such as

ing utensils, and do not consult each other about their dealings,

*43. They are quite at liberty to perform, according to pleasure, all (such transactions as) the gift or sale of their own shares. They are (in fact) masters of their own wealth.

*44. One born after partition shall receive his father's property exclusively. Or, if other sharers have reunited with the father, they shall come to a division (with the son born after partition). Such is the law.

*45. The legitimate son of the body, the son begotten on a wife (Kshetrâga), the son of an (appointed) daughter, the son of a maiden, the son received with the wife, the son secretly born,

*46. The son of a remarried woman, the son cast off, the adopted son, the son bought, the son made, and the son who has offered himself, are declared to be the twelve sons.

*47. Among these, six are kinsmen and heirs, and six are not heirs (but) kinsmen. Each preceding one is declared to be superior (to the one

trading and the like acts. 'Working utensils,' such as household furniture, the separate possession of which is indicative of partition. The meaning is that, when they are separated thus, each may give, sell, or otherwise dispose of (his share). Mayûkha, p. 51 (transl. p. 76).

44. Manu IX, 216; Yâgñavalkya II, 122; Gautama XXVIII, 29; Vishnu XVII, 3. This text is not found in the Nepalese MS., nor is it commonly quoted in the Digests.

45-47, 49. Manu IX, 158-184; Vishnu XV, 1-29; Vasishtha XVII, 12-39; Baudhâyana II, 2, 3, 14-32; Yâgñavalkya II, 128-132.

45, 46. Regarding the meaning of the technical terms in this text, see the corresponding portion of the Code of Manu, and the notes on them in Professor Bühler's translation.

following next), and each following one inferior (to the preceding one).

[48. Where some doubt arises in regard to a house or field, the possession of which has suffered an interruption, (the doubt) may be removed by consulting a writing, or persons who know all about the enjoyment (of the property in question by its occupant), or witnesses.]

*49. After their father's death, these (sons) shall succeed to his wealth in order. Whenever a superior son is wanting, the one next to him in rank is entitled to succession.

*50. On failure of a son, the daughter (succeeds), because she continues the lineage just like (a son); both a son and a daughter continue the lineage of their father.

*51. On failure of daughters, the Sakulyas (are to succeed) and (after them) the Bāndhavas; next, a member of the same caste. In default of all, that (wealth) goes to the king,

48. This text, which comes in very awkwardly between pars. 47 and 49, is apparently spurious, as has been pointed out long ago by Professor Bühler. It is not given in the Nepalese MS.

50. *Gimūtavāhana* and other writers of the Bengal school restrict the daughter's right of succession, as declared in this text, to those daughters who are neither barren nor widowed. See *Dāyabhāga* IV, 2, 10. However, there is nothing in the words of the original to warrant this restriction. *Āpastamba* II, 6, 14, 4.

51, 52. *Manu* IX, 185-189; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 135, 136; *Vasishṭha* XVII, 81-84; *Vishṇu* XVII, 4-14; *Āpastamba* II, 6, 14, 2-5; *Gautama* XXVIII, 21, 41, 42.

51. The term *Sakulya* is apparently used to denote the agnates, and *Bāndhava* to denote the cognates. Therefore the last term *sagāti* cannot be referred to blood-relationship at all, and must denote connexion by membership of the same caste. It is true that the commentators explain it as denoting descent from the same *Rishi*. See *Colebrooke's Digest*, V, 8, 448.

* 52. Unless it should be the property of a Brahman. A king devoted to duty must allot a maintenance to his women. Thus has the law of inheritance been declared.

FOURTEENTH TITLE OF LAW.

HEINOUS OFFENCES.

* 1. Whatever act is performed by force (sahas) by persons inflamed with (the pride of) strength, is called Sâhasa (a heinous offence); sahas (force) means strength in this world.

* 2. Manslaughter, robbery, an indecent assault on another man's wife, and the two species of insult, such are the four kinds of Heinous Offences.

* 3. It is again declared to be threefold in the law-books, viz. (heinous offences) of the first, middlemost, and highest degree. The definition of each kind shall be given as follows.

* 4. Destroying, reviling, disfiguring or otherwise

52. 'His women,' i. e. the women of the deceased proprietor. Vigñānēśvara, Nilakanṭha, and other commentators declare that the term strī, 'woman,' cannot denote the legitimate wives of a deceased heir, and must therefore mean his concubines. This interpretation has been called forth, no doubt, by the fact that, in the opinion of these commentators, the inheritance of one sonless belongs to the widow in the first instance, and does not go to others, where a legitimate widow is in existence.

XIV, 1. The term Sâhasa, literally 'violence,' is used to denote violent deeds or heinous offences of every sort. Manu VIII, 332; Yâgñavalkya II, 230.

2. This text is omitted in the Nepalese MS.

4. 'Destroying,' i. e. totally annihilating the fruits and other objects mentioned in this text. 'Reviling,' i. e. abusing, using bad

(injuring) fruits, roots, water and the like, or agricultural utensils, is declared to be Sâhasa of the first degree.

* 5. (Injuring) in the same way clothes, cattle, food, drink, or household utensils, is declared to be Sâhasa of the middlemost degree.

* 6. Taking human life through poison, weapons or other (means of destruction), indecent assault on another man's wife, and whatever other (offences) encompassing life (may be imagined), is called Sâhasa of the highest degree.

* 7. The punishment to be inflicted for it must be proportionate to the heaviness of the crime, (so however as) not to be less than a hundred (*Panas*) for Sâhasa of the first degree, whereas for Sâhasa of the middlemost degree the punishment is declared by persons acquainted with the law to be no less than five hundred (*Panas*).

* 8. For Sâhasa of the highest degree, a fine amounting to no less than a thousand (*Panas*) is ordained. (Moreover) corporal punishment, confiscation of the entire property, banishment from the town and branding, as well as amputation of that limb (with which the crime has been committed), is declared to be the punishment for Sâhasa of the highest degree.

* 9. This gradation of punishments is ordained for every (caste) indiscriminately, excepting only corporal punishment in the case of a Brahman. A Brahman must not be subjected to corporal punishment.

language. 'Disfiguring,' injuring so far only as to leave the form intact. *Vīramitrodaya*, p. 499.

8, 9. The ambiguous term *vadha* in these two paragraphs is

* 10. Shaving his head, banishing him from the town, branding him on the forehead with a mark of the crime of which he has been convicted, and parading him on an ass, shall be his punishment.

* 11. Those who have committed Sâhasa of either of the two first degrees are allowed to mix in society, after having been punished, but if a man has committed Sâhasa of the highest degree, no one is allowed to speak to him, even when he has received punishment.

* 12. Theft is a special kind of it. The difference between (Sâhasa and theft) is as follows. Sâhasa is where the criminal act consists of a forcible attack, theft is where it is done by fraud.

* 13. That (theft) is again declared to be three-fold by the wise, according to the (value of the) articles (purloined), whether articles of small, middling, or superior value have been stolen.

* 14. Earthenware, a seat, a couch, bone, wood, leather, grass, and the like, legume, grain, and prepared food, these are termed articles of small value.

* 15. Clothes made of other material than silk, cattle other than cows, and metals other than gold, are (termed) articles of middling value, and so are rice and barley.

explained as denoting corporal punishment, and not execution, by the commentators.

9, 10. Gautama XII, 46, 47; Vishnu V, 2-8; Yâgñavalkya II, 270; Manu VIII, 124, 379-380.

12. 'A criminal act' (âdhi), i.e. injuring another man's property; 'through a forcible attack,' i.e. violently, is called theft equivalent to Sâhasa; a criminal act done 'by fraud' is called ordinary theft. Viramitrodaya, p. 490. Manu VIII, 332.

13. Yâgñavalkya II, 275. 14. Manu VIII, 326-329.

* 16. Gold, precious stones, silk, women, men, cows, elephants, horses, and what belongs to a god, a Brahman, or a king, these are regarded as articles of superior value.

17. Taking away by any means whatsoever the property of persons asleep, or disordered in their intellect, or intoxicated, is declared to be theft by the wise.

18. Where stolen goods are found with a man, he may be presumed to be the thief. (The possession of) stolen goods may be inferred from a luxurious mode of life. Suspicion arises where a man is seen in bad company or indulges in extravagance.

* 19. Those who give food or shelter to thieves seeking refuge with them, or who suffer them (to escape) though able (to arrest them), partake of their crime themselves.

* 20. Those who do not come to offer assistance, when people are crying out (for help) within their hearing, or when property is being taken away, are likewise accomplices in the crime.

* 21. That series of punishments, which has been ordained by the wise for the three kinds of Sâhasa, is equally applicable to theft, according as it concerns one of the three species of articles in their order.

22. When cows or other (animals) have been lost,

16. See the Indian law of prescription, where the property of Brahmans and kings is declared to be exempt from the ordinary rules regarding limitation. Manu VIII, 323.

18. Yâgñavalkya II, 266.

19. Those who give food or any other assistance to a thief, or who suffer a thief to escape though able to seize him, have to be punished like thieves. Vivâdāṁtāmaṇi, p. 93. Manu IX, 278; Yâgñavalkya II, 276.

20. Manu IX, 275. This text is omitted in the Nepalese MS.

or when (other) property has been taken away forcibly, experienced men shall trace it from the place where it has been taken.

23. Wherever the footmarks go to, whether it be a village, pasture ground or deserted spot (the inhabitants or owners of) that place must make good the loss, unless they can prove the footmarks to go out of that place again.

24. When the footmarks are obscured or interrupted, because (they lead to) broken ground or to a spot much frequented by other people, the nearest village or pasture ground shall be made responsible.

25. Where two persons have gone the same road, the offence, as a rule, shall be imputed to him who stood charged with other crimes before, or who associates with suspicious characters.

26. *Kandâlas*, executioners, and other such persons, as well as those who are in the habit of roaming at night, shall institute a search (after the thieves) in the villages; those living outside (of inhabited places) shall search (for them) outside.

27. When the thieves are not caught, the king must make good (the loss) from his own treasury. By showing himself remiss (towards criminals), he would incur sin and would offend both against justice and his own interest.

23. Yâgñavalkya II, 271.

24. Yâgñavalkya II, 272.

26. Manu IX, 267.

FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH TITLES OF LAW.

ABUSE AND ASSAULT.

* 1. Abusive speeches, couched in offensive and violent terms, regarding the native country, caste, family, and so forth (of a man), are termed Abuse, (a title of law.)

* 2. It is divided into three species, called respectively *Nishṭhura*, *Aślīla*, and *Tīvra*. The punishment for each increases in severity according as the insult is of a more (or less) serious nature.

* 3. Abuse combined with reproaches has to be regarded as *Nishṭhura*; abuse couched in insulting language is *Aślīla*; charging one with an offence causing expulsion from caste is called *Tīvra* by the learned.

* 4. Hurting the limbs of another person with a hand, foot, weapon or otherwise, or defiling him

XV, XVI, 1. Thus, e.g. when a man says, 'The Gaudas (Bengalis) are quarrelsome,' he abuses another man's native country. When a man says, 'Brahmans are very avaricious,' he abuses another man's caste. When he says, 'The *Viśvāmitras* are a ferocious race,' he abuses another man's family. The clause 'and so forth' is added, in order to include abusive speeches levelled against learned men, artisans, or the like persons, whose learning or art has been abused. 'Violent terms,' i.e. terms which ought never to be used. *Mitāksharā*, p. 285; *Viramirodaya*, p. 482.

3. 'Abuse combined with reproaches' is when e.g. a man says, 'What a fool,' or 'What a rascal.' 'Abuse couched in insulting language' is when a man says, 'I will visit your sister,' or the like. 'Charging one with a mortal sin causing expulsion from caste,' such as e.g. the drinking of spirituous liquor. See loc. cit.

with ashes or other (impure substances), is termed Assault.

* 5. There are three species of that also, as it may be either light, or of a middling sort, or heavy, according as it consists in the raising (of a hand or weapon for the purpose of striking a blow), or in an unexpected attack, or in striking a wound.

* 6. Stealing articles of small, middling, or superior value, is called the three kinds of Sâhasa ; there the thorny weeds (sinners) should be extirpated.

* 7. In both kinds (of insult) five cases are distinguished, when the respective innocence or guilt of the two parties has to be established.

* 8. When two parties have been guilty of insult, and both have commenced to quarrel at the same time, they shall suffer the same punishment, in case that no difference (in their respective culpability) becomes apparent.

* 9. He who is the first to offer an insult is decidedly criminal ; he who returns the insult is likewise culpable ; but the one who began shall suffer the heavier punishment (of the two).

6. The above translation of this paragraph follows the reading of the MSS. If that reading be correct, this paragraph contains a rule relating to the subject of theft or Sâhasa. The quotations have a different reading, under which this paragraph has to be closely connected with the preceding one, and has to be referred equally to the three degrees of assault.

7. The Nepalese MS. and the commentaries insert the following paragraph here : * ‘When an insult has occurred between two men engaged in a violent quarrel, he who suffers the insult patiently is struck, but the offender is punishable.’

8-10. The one who has first commenced a quarrel shall receive the heavier punishment of the two. That man is liable to punishment who persists in hostility. When it is impossible to ascertain any

*10. When both parties are implicated equally, he of the two shall receive punishment who follows up his attack, whether he was (originally) the aggressor or the defendant.

*11. If a Svapâka, Meda, *Kandâla*, cripple, one who gains his substance by killing (animals), an elephant-driver, one deprived of his caste for non-performance of the ceremony of initiation, a slave, or one who treats a Guru or spiritual teacher with disregard,

*12. Should offend a superior, he shall be punished by whipping him on the spot. Nor do the sages regard bodily injury done to a man of this stamp as (an offence equal to) theft.

*13. Should any such low person, abhorred by men, insult another man (his superior), that man himself shall punish him. The king has nothing to do with the penalty (to be inflicted on him).

*14. For these people are the refuse of human society, and their property is (likewise) impure. The king also is at liberty to whip them, but he must not amerce them with a fine.

15. A Kshatriya who reviles a Brahman must

difference in the culpability of the two parties, their punishment shall be equal. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 472. Read *pûrvam*.

11. Svapâka, literally 'dog-cooking,' is the name of a particular degraded tribe, whose only office is to act as public executioners. Meda is the name of another mixed caste. *Kandâlas* are the lowest caste of all, see XII, 113. The Nepalese MS. and the commentaries read *shandha*, 'a eunuch,' instead of Meda.

12-14. When a Svapâka or the like should have insulted an Ârya or member of the three higher castes, honourable men shall be entitled to punish them in person. When the (honourable men) are unable to do so, the king shall punish them; but he must not confiscate their property. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 472.

15-17. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 267-269.

[33]

P



pay one hundred (*Paṇas*) as a fine. A Vaisya (must pay) one and a half hundred, or two hundred. A Sūdra deserves corporal punishment.

16. A Brahman shall be fined fifty (*Paṇas*) for calumniating a Kshatriya; in the case of a Vaisya, the fine shall be half of fifty (i. e. twenty-five); in the case of a Sūdra, (it shall amount to) twelve (*Paṇas*).

17. When a twice-born man offends against a member of his own caste, (he shall pay) twelve (*Paṇas* as a fine). When he utters calumnies which ought never to be uttered, the fine shall be twice as high.

18. Even he who in accordance with fact (contemptuously) calls another man one-eyed, lame, or the like (names), shall be fined by the king not less than one Kārshāpaa.

19. One must not tax with his offence a man who has done penance according to law, or who has received due punishment from the king. By transgressing this rule one becomes liable to punishment.

20. Two persons, a Brahman and a king, are declared to be exempt from censure and corporal punishment in this world; for these two sustain the visible world.

* 21. One who calls an outcast an outcast, or a thief a thief, is equally criminal with those whom he taxes (with their offence). (If he reproaches them) without reason, he is twice as guilty as they are.

17. According to the commentators of Manu, the term 'calumnies which ought never to be uttered' has to be referred to insinuations against the honour of a man's mother, sisters, or other female relatives. See Professor Bühler's note on Manu VIII, 269.

18. Manu VIII, 274; Yāgyavalkya II, 204.

22. A once-born man (or Sûdra), who insults members of a twice-born caste with gross invectives, shall have his tongue cut out ; for he is of low origin.

23. If he refers to their name or caste in terms indicating contempt, an iron rod, ten Aṅgulas long, shall be thrust red-hot into his mouth.

24. If he is insolent enough to give lessons regarding their duty to Brahmans, the king shall order hot oil to be poured into his mouth and ears.

*25. With whatever limb a man of low caste offends against a Brahman, that very limb of his shall be cut off ; such shall be the atonement for his crime.

26. A low-born man, who tries to place himself on the same seat with his superior in caste, shall be branded on his hip and banished, or (the king) shall cause his backside to be gashed.

27. If through arrogance he spits (on a superior), the king shall cause both his lips to be cut off ; if he makes water (on him), the penis ; if he breaks wind (against him), the buttocks.

28. If he pulls (a superior) by the hair, (the king) shall unhesitatingly cause his hands to be cut off, likewise (if he seizes him) by the feet, beard, neck, or scrotum.

29. If a man breaks the skin (of his equal) or

22. 'He is of low origin,' because the Sûdra caste has been produced from Brahman's feet. Identical with Manu VIII, 270.

23. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 271.

24. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 272.

25. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 279.

26, 27. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 281, 282. In paragraph 27 the Nepalese MS. has 'the nose' instead of 'the beard.'

28. Identical with Manu VIII, 283.

29. According to the majority of the commentators of Manu,

fetches blood (from him), he shall be fined a hundred (*Panas*); if he cuts the flesh, six *Nishkas*; if he breaks a bone, he shall be banished.

* 30. If a man censures a king devoted to the discharge of his duties, he shall have his tongue cut out or his entire property confiscated, as an atonement for such crime.

* 31. When an evil-minded man assails a wicked king even, he shall be (fastened) on a stake and burnt in fire; (for he is) more criminal than one who has committed a hundred times the crime of killing a Brahman.

* 32. A father is not liable to be punished for an offence committed by his son; nor is the owner of a horse, dog, or monkey (responsible for any damage caused by one of these animals), unless he should have set them to do it.

SEVENTEENTH TITLE OF LAW.

GAMES.

* 1. Dishonest gambling with dice, small slices of leather, little staves of ivory, or other (games), and betting on birds, form (the subject of) a title of law called (Gambling with Dice and Betting on Animals).

* 2. The master of the gaming-house shall arrange

this rule has reference to an equal in caste. Nearly identical with *Manu VIII*, 284.

XVII, i. The translation is according to the *Vîramitrodaya*. The subject of bets on animals is treated at great length in the *Dhammathats* of Burma, which are based on the law-codes of India. 'Other games,' such as e.g. *Katuraṅga* (*Shatranj*, the Indian chess). 'Birds,' such as pigeons, also bets on professional wrestlers, rams, &c. *Vîramitrodaya*, p. 718. *Manu IX*, 223.

2. 'He shall pay the stakes which have been won,' i.e. to the

the game and pay the stakes which have been won ; the profit of such a conductor of games shall amount to ten per cent.

3. When the dice on being thrown fall twice in a game at dice, those acquainted with (playing at) dice allot the victory to the adversary and the defeat to the gambler.

4. When a dispute has arisen among gamblers, let (other) gamblers be appealed to ; they shall act both as judges and as witnesses in a dispute of this sort.

5. No gambler shall ever enter into another gaming-house before having paid his debt ; he must not disobey the master of the gaming-house, and must pay of his own accord what he owes to him.

*6. Wicked men who play with false dice shall be driven out of the gaming-house, after a wreath of dice has been hung round their necks ; for that is the punishment ordained for them.

7. If a man gambles with dice, without authorization from the king, he shall not get his stake, and shall have to pay a fine.

*8. Or let the gamblers pay to the king the share

winning party. That portion which has to be paid to the king (see paragraph 8) may also be held to be included in this rule, as *Bṛhaspati* says : ' Let the master of the gaming-house collect the stakes and pay his due to the winning party and to the king.' *Āpastamba* II, 10, 25, 12, 13 ; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 199, 200.

3. The rendering of the first portion of this paragraph is conjectural. It might also be translated as follows : ' When the dice on being thrown fall twice repeated,' i. e. when the number is twice as high as at the preceding throw.

4. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 202.

6. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 202.

7, 8. *Yāgñavalkya* II, 201, 203. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are omitted in the Nepalese MS.

due to him and play in public, thus no wrong will be committed.

EIGHTEENTH TITLE OF LAW.

MISCELLANEOUS.

* 1. Under the head of Miscellaneous (Disputes) are comprised lawsuits depending on the king, (such as) transgression of the king's commandments and obedience towards his injunctions,

* 2. Grants of towns, the division of the constituent elements of a state, the duties and the reverse of heretics, followers of the Veda, corporations (of merchants), and assemblages (of kinsmen).

* 3. Disputes between father and son, neglect of (prescribed) penances, abstraction of gifts (made to worthy persons), the wrath of anchorites,

* 4. Sinful confusion of castes, the rules regarding their means of subsistence, and (in short) whatever

XVIII, 1-4. The meagre contents of this title of law can hardly be said to be in keeping with the somewhat pompous announcement contained in paragraphs 1-4. On the whole, this title of Miscellanies, as defined by Nârada and Brîhaspati, may be described as treating of public law or the law of kings (*râgadharma*), private law being treated in the seventeen other titles of law.

1. 'Obedience towards his injunctions,' thus according to the *Mitâksharâ*, p. 351. The *Vîramitrodaya* refers the term *tatkarmakaramam* to those who, from arrogance, do such acts as are permitted to a king only, such as e. g. placing themselves on the king's throne.

2. 'Grants of towns,' i.e. to Brahmins and others. Nârada seems to be referring to the so-called *Agrahâras*. Regarding the seven constituent parts of a state, see *Manu* VII, 157; IX, 294. Naigama has been translated 'followers of the Veda,' because it comes immediately after *pâshanî*, 'heretics.' See, too, X, 1. It usually denotes citizens or traders.

has been omitted in the preceding (titles of law), are treated under the head of Miscellaneous.

5. The king shall be careful to protect all orders and the constituent elements of his state with the four means indicated by science.

6. When any caste should remain (behind the rest) or exceed the limits (assigned to it, the king), seeing that it has strayed from its path, shall bring it back to the path (of duty).

7. So also, when other wicked acts, opposed to the dictates of the sacred law, have been committed, the king, after having reflected (upon the matter) himself, shall inflict punishment on those who deserve it.

8. What is opposed to revealed and traditional law, or injurious to living beings, must not be practised by the king; and when it is practised (by others), he must check it.

*9. When an act contrary to justice has been undertaken by a former king from folly, he must redress that iniquitous enactment in accordance with the principles of equity.

*10. The weapons of soldiers, the tools of artisans, the ornaments of public women, the various musical or other instruments of professional (musicians, or other artists, &c.),

*11. And any implements by which artificers gain

5. 'The four means' of conciliation, division, bribery, and force. *Manu* VIII, 41.

6. *Yâgñavalkya* I, 360. The Nepalese MS. offers a variation as regards the arrangement of paragraphs 6-11.

7. *Manu* VII, 16 ; VIII, 126 ; *Yâgñavalkya* I, 367 ; *Vasishtha* XIX, 8 ; *Vishnu* III, 37.

10. For 'the tools of artisans' the Nepalese MS., in common with the *Mitâksharâ*, has 'the beasts of burden and the like of carriers of goods.'

their substance, must not be laid hold on by the king, even when he confiscates the entire property (of a man or woman).

12. It is not permitted to either advise or rebuke a king or Brahman, on account of their dignity and sanctity, unless they should swerve from the path (of duty).

13. That wicked man who does not act up to the laws proclaimed by the king, shall be fined and corporally punished, as offending against the king's commandments.

14. If the king were remiss in dictating punishments to (members of) any caste, when they have left the path (of duty), the created beings of this world would perish.

15. Brahmins would leave the sacerdotal caste, and Kshatriyas would forsake the Kshatriya caste. The stronger would eat up the weaker, like fish on a spit.

16. The Vaisyas would abandon their work, and the Sûdras eclipse all (the rest), if the kings did not visit their subjects with punishment (when they have committed an offence).

17. To show favour to the virtuous at all times and to oppress the wicked, that is declared to be the duty of kings; gain (results to them) from the oppression of their foes.

18. As fire is not polluted even though it always burns the creatures of this world, even so a king is not polluted by inflicting punishment on those who deserve it.

19. Intelligence is the glory of rulers; it becomes

14, 15. Manu VII, 20.

16. Manu VII, 21, 24.

19. For 'intelligence' the Nepalese MS. has 'a royal edict.'

manifest in their speeches ; whatever sentence they may pass, whether unjust or just, settles the law between litigant parties.

20. (Law) personified as a king, roams on earth visibly, with a thousand eyes. Mortals cannot live at all if they transgress his commandments.

21. Whatever a king does is right, that is a settled rule ; because the protection of the world is entrusted to him, and on account of his majesty and benignity towards living creatures.

22. As a husband though feeble must be constantly worshipped by his wives, in the same way a ruler though worthless must be (constantly) worshipped by his subjects.

23. In order that mortals, fearing the orders issued by kings, might not swerve from the path of duty, therefore royal orders are declared to arise from lawsuits.

24. It is for the establishment of order that various laws (*karitra*) have been proclaimed by kings. A royal order is declared to overrule such laws even.

25. A ruler has purchased his subjects through (the practice of) austerities ; therefore the king is their lord. For that reason, his bidding must be obeyed ; their livelihood even depends on the king.

26. Kings, endowed with immense power, appear (variously) in the five different forms of Agni, Indra, Soma, Yama, and the God of Riches.

24. *Karitra* seems to mean 'law' or 'custom' in this place. Regarding the comparative authority of *karitra* and *rāgasāsana*, 'a royal order,' see p. 7, note. The Nepalese MS. omits 23, 24.

26. Read *rūpāni* in the text.

27. When a ruler is, either justly or without (sufficient) reason, ardent in wrath and burns (or torments) his subjects, he is called Agni (the god of fire).

28. When, relying on his regal power, the king attacks his foes, desirous of victory and upraising a weapon, he is termed Indra.

29. When, free from ardent wrath, he appears before his subjects with a cheerful countenance, he is denoted Soma (the Moon).

30. When the king having seated himself, full of majesty, on the throne of judgment, deals out punishment, equitable towards all creatures, he is called Vaivasvata (or Yama).

31. When a ruler gladdens with gifts petitioners, persons commanding respect, wise men, servants and others, he is called the God of Riches.

32. Therefore one must not treat him with contempt, and, particularly, not scold at him, and pay obedience to his bidding; to disobey him would bring on (instantaneous) death.

33. His duties are, the protection of his subjects, honouring the aged and wise, the trial of lawsuits, and to make (each caste) abide by the duties assigned to it.

34. Let a king be constantly intent on showing honour to the Brahmans. A field furnished with Brahmans is the root of the prosperity of the world.

35. A Brahman may command respect, and a

27. Manu IX, 310.

28. Manu IX, 304.

29. Manu IX, 309.

30. Manu IX, 307.

33. Manu VII, 35, 38; VIII, 3, &c.

34. Manu VII, 82, 83; Yâgyavalkya I, 314.

35. Manu VII, 37.

distinguished seat at the king's court. The king shall show his face in the morning before the Brahman first of all, and shall salute them all.

36. When nine or seven persons (of different rank) meet, they shall first make room for the Brahman to pass by. (Further privileges assigned to the Brahman caste are) free access to the houses of other people, for the purpose of begging alms,

37. The right to collect fuel, flowers, water, and the like, without its being regarded as theft, and to converse with other men's wives, without being restrained (in such intercourse) by others,

38. And the right to cross rivers without paying any fare, and to be conveyed (to the other bank) before other people. When engaged in trading and using a ferry-boat, they shall have to pay no toll.

36. That privilege of the Brahman caste, which is referred to in the first part of this paragraph, finds its explanation in a well-known rule of the Dharmaśāstra regarding persons for whom way must be made, on meeting them in a road. Thus it is ruled by Gautama (VI, 24) that way must be made for a man seated in a carriage, for one who is in his tenth (decade), for one requiring consideration, for a woman, for a Snātaka, and for a king; but that a king himself must make way for a Srottriya (learned Brahman). This makes in all seven persons for whom way should be made. Manu (II, 138), Yāgñavalkya (I, 117), Baudhāyana (II, 6, 30), and Vishṇu (LXIII, 51) agree in enumerating eight persons of this sort. Vasishṭha (XIV, 57-60) mentions nine. See, too, Âpastamba II, 5, 11, 5-7.

37. Manu VIII, 339; Âpastamba I, 10, 28, 3; Gautama XII, 28; Yāgñavalkya II, 166.

38. Manu VIII, 407; Vishṇu V, 132. The last clause is thus given in the Nepalese MS.: 'They shall have to pay no toll on being carried across a river in a ferry, unless (they should cross it) for trading purposes.'

39. A Brahman engaged in travelling, who is tired and has nothing to eat, commits no wrong by taking himself two canes of sugar or two esculent roots.

40. (No gift must be accepted) from one accused of a crime, an outcast, an enemy, an atheist, one in distress, without necessity, or after inflicting pain on the giver.

41. (Gifts shall be accepted) from industrious people on account of their wealth, and from generous people because it is proper to accept gifts from such; to accept gifts from kings is laudable; (they may be accepted) from all people excepting Brahmans.

42. Between a Brahman and a king, who are both devoted to their duty, there is no difference of any sort, when they protect mankind (acting) in accordance with the sacred law.

43. If a ruler, though severe, is mindful of his duty, correct in his conduct, and (quick to) punish the wicked, in order to protect (the virtuous), his wealth is declared to be pure.

44. When a man accepts a gift from a covetous king, who transgresses the precepts of the sacred books, he shall have to pass through the well-known twenty-one hells in succession.

45. As pure and impure waters become alike on their junction in the ocean, even so (all) property acquired by a king (becomes pure in his hands).

39. Gautama XII, 49, 50; Manu VIII, 341. Or 'five esculent roots,' according to the Nepalese MS.

40. Manu II, 185.

44. For a list of the twenty-one hells, see Manu IV, 88-90; Vishnu XLIII, 1-22. The Nepalese MS. omits this paragraph.

45. A different opinion has been enounced above, XV, 14.

46. As gold, on being thrown into blazing fire, acquires purity, even so all gains become pure in the hands of kings.

47. When any man gives any property of his to Brahmans, the king must give his consent to it; this is an eternal law.

48. Both the other customary receipts of a king and what is called the sixth of the produce of the soil, form the royal revenue, the reward (of a king) for the protection of his subjects.

49. Whatever has been bestowed on others than Brahmans may be resumed; but that which has been given to Brahmans can never be taken back again.

50. To give, to read, and to sacrifice (on his own account) are the three duties of a Brahman. To sacrifice for others, to teach, and, thirdly, to collect alms are his (three) means of subsistence.

51. Let a Brahman be devoted to his duty and take a livelihood from the king, and let him not accept gifts from persons of vile origin, if he is anxious to observe the law.

52. How should a king be inferior to a deity, as it is through his word that an offender may become innocent, and an innocent man an offender in due course?

53. Those who being acquainted with the divine nature of a king, endowed with majestic dignity as he is, accept gifts from him, do not in the least disgrace themselves (by doing so).

54. In this world, there are eight sacred objects :

48. Manu VII, 130-132 ; Gautama X, 24-27 ; Vasishtha XIX, 26, 27 ; Âpastamba II, 10, 26, 9 ; Vishnu III, 22-25 ; Baudhâyana I, 10, 18, 1.

50. Manu I, 88, &c.

a Brahman, a cow, fire, gold, clarified butter, the sun, the waters, and a king as the eighth.

55. These one must always look up to, worship and honour them personally, and turn the right side towards them, in order that one's existence may be prolonged.

APPENDIX.

THEFT¹.

1. Two kinds of robbers who steal the goods of others have to be distinguished, the one kind open, and the other kind concealed. Let a prudent king try to find them out.

*2. Open rogues are those who forge measures and weights, receivers of bribes, robbers, gamblers, public prostitutes,

*3. Those who walk in disguise, those who live by teaching the performance of auspicious ceremonies, these and such like persons are considered open rogues.

*4. Rogues acting in secret are those who roam in the wood, or lie concealed, as well as those who make a profession of stealing. They attack and rob (those who do not beware of them).

5. Those who infest a country, a village, or a house, or disturb a sacrificial act, cut-purses, and

¹ This section is found in the Nepalese MS. only. See Introduction. The reading of several passages is uncertain, and this circumstance, taken together with the want of a Commentary, renders my translation less reliable than could be desired.

Appendix. Theft. 1-4. Manu IX, 256-260. The technical terms have been translated in accordance with the glosses of Manu's commentators, as given in the notes to Professor Bühler's translation. In par. 4, *mushyām* seems to stand for *mushyām*.

other persons of this sort have to be considered as concealed rogues also.

*6. Blameless persons with whom the stolen goods are not found must not be chastised as robbers by the king; but let him quickly punish those robbers as guilty of theft with whom the stolen goods have been found.

*7. Those (rogues) who ravage in their own country, and those who disturb sacrificial acts, he shall strip of their entire wealth and rebuke them severely.

*8. Those on whom the stolen goods have not been seized he must examine, when they have been arrested from suspicion. Their fear having been excited, they will give evidence, through anxiety, in accordance with the facts of the case.

*9. Questions shall be proposed to them antithetically with regard to place, time, region, their caste, their name, their dwelling, and their occupation, in case they happen to be workmen.

*10. When the face changes colour or the voice falters, or the features look suspicious, when they do not give evidence in public, when they make impossible statements as to place and time, when there exists a doubt as to their place of residence,

*11. When they indulge in expense for bad purposes, when they have been previously convicted of larceny, when they keep bad company, or when documents speak against them, (by all such circum-

9. 'Antithetically' (vinigrahe), or 'when they have been arrested.'

10, 11. A somewhat analogous description of the signs by which a false witness may be found out, has been given previously: I, 193-196.

stances) they may be discovered (to be thieves), not by the possession of the stolen goods alone.

*12. When a ruffian or robber becomes suspected, and (the judge) has found out circumstantial evidence (which speaks against him), he shall be caused to make an oath.

*13. Those who give food to thieves, as well as those who supply them with fire or water, or who give shelter, or show the way to them, or make their defence,

*14. Or who buy their goods, or receive (their goods), are held to be equally punishable as they, and so are those who conceal them.

15. Those who in a principality are the governors of that principality, and the neighbours called in (to watch over the safety of life and property) are (reckoned as) equal to thieves, when they stand neutral during the attack (of robbers).

*16. He on whose ground a robbery has been committed, must trace the thieves to the best of his power, or else he must make good what has been stolen, unless the footmarks can be traced from that ground (into another man's ground).

*17. When the footmarks, after leaving that ground, are lost and cannot be traced any further, the neighbours, inspectors of the road, and governors of that region shall be made responsible for the loss.

12. The term *lesa* has been rendered by 'circumstantial evidence,' because it seems to be synonymous with *yuktilesa*, I, 236.

13, 14. *Manu* IX, 271, 278.

15. Nearly identical with *Manu* IX, 272.

16. The term *goḥāra*, translated 'ground,' may denote the landed property or pasture ground of a whole village. See above, XIV, 22, 23.

17. See XIV, 24.

18. When a house has been plundered, the king shall cause the thief-catchers, the guards, and the inhabitants of that kingdom to make good the loss, when the thief is not caught.

19. Or, if he is a wicked man and there exists a doubt as to (whether) the robbery (was actually committed or not), the person (alleged to have been) robbed shall be caused to make an oath regarding the robbery, to clear himself (from suspicion).

20. When another person than the thief has been accused of robbery and has been declared thief, because he is unable to prove his innocence, he shall be paid twice as much (as has been stolen), after the (real) thief has been detected.

21. When a man has obtained property stolen by a thief, he must restore it in its pristine shape ; if it be no longer in existence, he must make good its value, and must be made to pay a fine to the same amount.

*22. For stealing wood, cane, grass and the like, (utensils) made of clay, bamboo, utensils made of bamboo, rattan, bone, leather,

*23. Vegetables, green roots, grass or flowers, cow-milk, molasses, salt, or oil,

*24. Cooked food (and other) prepared food, spirituous liquor, flesh, and every sort of objects of small value—(for stealing any of these) a fine five times the value (of the article stolen should be paid).

*25. (For stealing) any articles sold by weight or measure or tale, the fine shall be eight times their amount, in case they are very valuable.

19. The senseless reading of the MS., *dâpyaka teshâm*, has been conjecturally altered into *doshakartaisha*.

22-24. *Manu VIII, 326-329.*

25. *Manu VIII, 321.*

26. Corporal punishment (or death) shall be inflicted on him who steals more than ten Kumbhas of grain; where the amount is less, he shall be made to pay eleven times as much. Thus Manu has declared.

*27. (For stealing) more than a hundred (Palas' worth) of gold, silver, or other (precious metals), or the finest clothes, or very precious gems, corporal punishment (or death shall be inflicted).

28. He who steals a man shall have to pay the highest fine; he who steals a woman (shall be stripped) of his entire wealth; and he who steals a maiden (shall suffer) corporal punishment.

*29. On him who forcibly seizes large domestic animals, the highest fine shall be inflicted; the middlemost amercement on him who takes cattle of middle size; and the smallest fine on him who steals small cattle.

30. The first (or lowest) fine to be inflicted on a guilty person shall amount to neither more nor less than twenty-four (Panas). The middlemost fine shall consist of not more than four hundred, and not less than two hundred (Panas).

31. The highest fine should be known to consist of not more than a thousand, and not less than five hundred (Panas). This is the threefold gradation of punishment, which has been proposed by the Self-Existent for robberies.

26. Manu VIII, 320.

27, 28. Manu VIII, 321, 323.

29. Manu VIII, 325.

30, 31. The reading of these two paragraphs is quite uncertain. The rules laid down here apparently differ considerably from the analogous rules of Manu (VIII, 158) and other legislators.

*32. (When the offence has been committed) for the first time, cut-purses shall have their (little) finger and thumb cut off. (When it has been committed) for the second time, the first fine shall be levied on them.

*33. For (stealing) cows belonging to a Brahman, for piercing (the nostrils of) a barren cow, and for stealing a female slave, (the thief) shall in every case lose half his feet.

34. With whatever limb a thief acts among men, that very (limb) shall be taken from him, this is a law enacted by Manu.

35. Let him inflict a specially heavy punishment on a specially criminal thief, or (a lighter one) on one whose offence is less heavy. But let him not (punish an habitual thief) in the same way as for the first offence.

36. Manu, the son of the Self-Existent, has declared ten places of punishment, which should be (selected) in (punishing members of the) three (lower) castes ; a Brahman should remain uninjured always.

37. (Those places are) the privy parts, the belly, the tongue, the two hands, and, fifthly, the two feet ; as well as the eye, the nose, the two ears, the property, and the body.

32. Manu IX, 277.

33. The parallel passage of Manu (VIII, 325) shows that *sthû-râyâs khedanam* is the correct reading. For the three different explanations of this term, which have been proposed by the commentators of Manu, see the note to Professor Bühler's translation. The translation follows the interpretation proposed by Kullûka, Govindarâga, and Râghavânanda, which appears to be preferable to the others.

34. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 334.

36, 37. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 124, 125.

38. After carefully considering the (nature of the) offence, the place and time, and after examining the ability (of the offender), and the motive (by which he was actuated), he shall inflict these punishments.

39. Neither for the purpose of gaining a friend (in him), nor for the acquisition of large wealth, must a wicked criminal be suffered to go free by the king. Thus Manu has declared.

40. By pardoning an offender, a king commits the same offence as by punishing an innocent man. Religious merit accrues to him from punishing (the wicked).

41. Let him not on any account kill a Brahman, though convicted of all possible crimes. He may at pleasure cause him to be banished, thus has the law been settled.

42. Let the king take his entire wealth from him or leave him a fourth part of it (only he must not take his life), remembering the law promulgated by the Creator. This is just.

43. For four offences of a Brahman, branding him is ordained (as punishment): for violating the bed of a Guru, for drinking spirituous liquor, for theft, and for hurting another Brahman.

*44. For violating the bed of a Guru, (the brand of) a female part should be made; for drinking

38. Manu VIII, 126.

39. Manu VIII, 347.

40. Nearly identical with Manu IX, 249.

41. Manu VIII, 380.

42. The third Pâda of this paragraph has been conjecturally altered, as it cannot be made out in the MS.

43. Manu IX, 236.

44, 45. Manu IX, 237. The last Pâda in paragraph 44 cannot be made out in the MS.

spirituous liquor, (the brand of) a liquor sign is ordained; for theft, he shall make (the brand of) a dog's foot (on his forehead).

45. The slayer of a Brahman shall have (the brand of) a headless man stamped on his forehead, and it is forbidden to speak to him. This is a law enacted by Manu.

46. A thief must approach the king with flying hair, running, and proclaiming his theft (with the words): 'Thus have I acted. Chastise me.'

47. By so doing he is cleared from guilt, because he has confessed his deed; the king, thereupon, shall touch him (with a club), or dismiss him, if he is innocent.

48. Those men who have received a punishment from the king for an offence committed by them, proceed to heaven, free from sin, as (if they were) virtuous men who had acted well.

49. Whether he be punished or released, the thief is freed from his crime; if, however, the king does not punish him, the crime committed by the thief falls on (the king) himself.

50. Self-possessed men are corrected by their Guru; wicked men are corrected (or punished) by the king; but those who have sinned in secret are corrected by Yama, the son of Vivasvat.

51. The crime of a Sûdra in theft is eightfold (that of a man of the lowest caste); of a Vaisya, sixteenfold; and of a Kshatriya, thirty-twofold.

46. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 314.

48. Identical with Manu VIII, 318.

49. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 316.

51. Nearly identical with Manu VIII, 337.

52. Of a Brahman, sixty-fourfold; thus the son of the Self-Existent has declared. Knowledge makes a difference also. For knowing persons, (the punishment) is specially severe.

*53. Punishment is pronounced to be twofold: corporal punishment and fines. Corporal punishment is again declared to be of ten sorts; fines are (also) of more than one kind.

*54. Fines begin with a *Kākaṇī*, and the highest amount of a fine is one's entire property. Corporal punishment begins with confinement and ends with capital punishment.

*55. 'Fines beginning with a *Kākaṇī*' are declared to amount to no less than one *Māsha*. Those are called 'fines amounting to no less than a *Māsha*' which amount to one *Kārshāpana* at most.

*56. 'Fines beginning with no less than a *Kārshāpana*' are those amounting to no less than four *Kārshāpanas*; or which begin with two, and end with eight (*Kārshāpanas*); or which begin with three, and end with twelve (*Kārshāpanas*).

*57. A *Kārshāpana* is a silver coin in the southern country; in the east, it is an equivalent for (a certain number of) *Panas*, and is equal to twenty *Panas*.

52. Manu VIII, 338.

53. Manu VIII, 129. See too, above, paragraphs 36, 37.

54. *Kākaṇī* or *Kākinī* is the name of a small coin. See par. 58.

53-56. This passage is quoted in the *Smṛitīkandrikā*, with several different readings. One of them, in par. 55, deserves special notice. For *māshāvaraḥ smataḥ* (read *smṛitaḥ*), the *Smṛitīk.* reads *māshaparaḥ smṛitaḥ*, 'are declared to amount to no more than one *Māsha*.' This is probably the correct reading.

57. According to Manu (VIII, 136), the *Kārshāpana* is a copper coin. The reading of the second half of this paragraph is quite uncertain.

* 58. A Mâsha should be known to be the twentieth part of a Kârshâpana. A Kâkanî is the fourth part of a Mâsha or Pala.

59. By that appellation which is in general use in the region of the Punjaub, the value of a Kârshâpana is not circumscribed here.

* 60. A Kârshâpana has to be taken as equal to an *Anāikā*; four of these are a Dhânaka; twelve of the latter are a Suvarṇa, which is called Dînâra otherwise.

61. Let the king practise the duties of his office, and (follow) the rule of inflicting punishment, faithful to the tenets (of the sacred law). Let him destroy accordingly, as governor, the evil-doers, after having traced them by the application of cunning stratagems and arrested them.

59. The term *iha*, 'here,' may be either referred to the place of residence of the author of the *Nârada-smṛiti*, or it may mean 'in this work.'

60. An *Anāikā* is elsewhere reckoned at four Yavas. In the *Vîramitrodaya* and other works, this text is attributed to *Brîhaspati*. The coin called Dînâra is the Roman denarius.

QUOTATIONS FROM NĀRADA.

I. JUDICIAL PROCEDURE.

1, 2. He is called a (Prāḍvivāka or) chief judge who—fully acquainted with the eighteen titles (of law) and with the eight thousand subdivisions thereof, skilled in logic and other branches of science, and thoroughly versed in revealed and traditional lore—investigates the law relative to the case in hand by putting questions (prât) and passing a decision (vivekayati) according to what was heard or understood by him.

3. Let not a king actuated by arrogance or avarice promote litigation among persons not engaged in a controversy.

4. The king shall examine judicial quarrels between two litigant parties in a proper way, acting on principles of equity and discarding both love and hatred.

5. (In disputes) among merchants, artizans, or the like persons, and in (disputes concerning) persons subsisting by agriculture or as dyers, it is impossible for outsiders to pass a sentence; and the passing of

I, 1, 2. Smṛitiḥ. aśvâdarapadâbhiḡñas tadbhedâśvâsahasravit |
ânvikshikyâdikusalaḥ śrutismṛitiparâyanaḥ || vivâdasamsritam dhar-
mam prikkhati prât śrutam matam | vivekayati yas tasmât prâḍvivâkas
tu sa smṛitaḥ ||

3. Vîram. p. 48.

4. Vy. K. râgâ dharmaśahâyas tu dvayor vivadamânayoḥ sam-
yak kâryâny aveksheta râgadveshavivargitaḥ ||

5. Vy. K.; May. p. 6 ('Vyâsa').

the sentence must, therefore, be entrusted to persons acquainted with such matters (in a cause of this sort).

6. A lawsuit cannot be instituted mutually between a teacher and his pupil, or between father and son, or man and wife, or master and servant.

7. A plaint is declared (inadmissible) likewise by the learned in law, when it has been raised by one against many, or by women, or by menials.

8. He shall be admitted as plaintiff whose grievance is the greater, or whose affair is the more important of the two, and not he who was the first to go to law.

9. Half of the (ordinary) punishment is declared for him who either confesses his deed, after having committed an illicit act of violence, or says of his own accord, 'It is true.'

10. When (an assessor of the court) has recognised the royal mind to swerve from the path of duty, he must not pronounce an opinion which is agreeable to the king. (It is only by declaring what is just that) he becomes free from sin.

11. Transgression of (the king's) commands, killing a female, mixture of castes, illicit intercourse with another man's wife, robbery, pregnancy caused by another man than the husband,

6. Vy. K.; Vîram. p. 46 ('Brîhaspati').

7. Vy. K.; Vîram. p. 47.

8. Vîram. p. 60.

9. Smṛitiḥ. *ayuktam sāhasam kṛtvâ pratyâpattim vraget tu yaḥ | brūyât svayam vâ sad iti tasya kârthadamaḥ smṛitaḥ ||*

10. Vîram. p. 15. 'He must not pronounce an opinion which is agreeable to the king,' i. e. he must not endeavour to please him by what he declares, but must deliver an equitable opinion. By acting thus, he becomes free from sin. Vîram.

11, 12. Vîram. p. 50.

12. Abuse, insulting language, assault, and procuring abortion, are the ten (principal) crimes.

13. He who arrests (his adversary) by illegal means, such as by stopping his speech (through gagging the mouth), or by preventing him from breathing, and the like practices, is liable to punishment; but one who breaks (such arrest) is not (punishable). -

14. When a lawsuit has been judged without any previous examination of witnesses (or other evidence), or when it has been decided in an improper manner, or when it has been judged by unauthorized persons, the trial has to be renewed.

15. Whatever property, whether movable or immovable, has been kept (under the care of the judge, after having become the subject of a dispute), must be handed over afterwards to the victorious party together with the interest (accruing on it) and with a document (attesting his victory).

II. THE PLAINT.

1. The defects of a plaint have been declared as follows. (It is defective, if it) relates to the property of a stranger; if it is without an object; if it does not state any quantity; if the mode of acquisition is not referred to in it; if too little or too much is written in it; and if it is unmeaning.

13. May. p. 2. See above, pp. 12-19. This text shows very clearly what is meant by the technical term 'arrest' (âsedha).

14. Vy. *K. asâkshikam tu yad drisham vimârgena ka tîritam | asammata matair drisham punardarsanam arhati ||*

15. *Smṛitīk. madhye yat sthâpitam dravyam kalam vâ yadi vâ sthiram | paskât tat sodayam dâpyam gayine pattrasamyutam ||*

II, 1-8. Vîram. pp. 65, 66.

2. That plaint is declared by the wise to 'relate to the property of a stranger' in which joint property is referred to in a claim raised by one man alone who has no right to it, or without authorization from the other joint proprietors.

3. A plaint is said to be 'without an object' when a man, actuated by hatred or anger, taxes another with the murder of a Brahman (or some other deadly sin) and revokes his own charge afterwards on being required to prove it.

4. That plaint 'does not state any quantity' in which no figure is given with regard to a certain quantity, writing, measure, field, house, or other (object).

5. That plaint 'contains no reference to the mode of acquisition' which does not say whether (the property in dispute) has been acquired by learning, or gained as profit (or interest), or purchased, or obtained by inheritance.

6. 'Too little' is said to be written in that plaint in which the year, month, fortnight, lunar day, and day of the week is not referred to.

7. 'Too much' may be said to be written in that plaint in which (the plaintiff) after having caused the plaint to be written goes on to mention the witnesses at once, without waiting for the answer (of the defendant) to be delivered.

8. That plaint is declared to be 'unmeaning'

2. That plaint is meant in which a stranger or one not authorized by his partners claims the property of a fellowship. *Vîram.*

3. That plaint is said to be without an object which is dropped afterwards by the claimant himself. *Vîram.*

7. 'Witnesses,' or evidence generally. *Vîram.*

8. There is another reading, *ubhayaṃ pûrvam*, under which the

which is rendered unclear by the mode of writing (exhibited in it), though the claimant's previous statements be (duly) entered in it.

9. Let him avoid, as a mere semblance of a declaration, (a plaint the tenour of) which is unnatural, not connected with an injury, senseless, purposeless, incapable of being proved, or at variance (with possibility, or with justice).

10. That suit which is prohibited by the king, or opposed to the interests of the citizens, or of the whole kingdom, or of the constituent elements of the state,

11. As well as (those suits) which are opposed to the interests of a town or village, or of eminent persons: all such suits are declared to be inadmissible.

12. A plaint in which several different subjects are mixed up together can have no effect.

claimant is stated to have proffered both the accusation and the answer. *Vīram*.

9. *Vy. K.*; *M. Macn. I, 4, 10* (uncertain). 'Unnatural,' such as e.g. That person has taken my rabbit's horn and refuses to restore it. 'Not connected with an injury,' as, That man is doing his business in his own house by the light of a lamp which is burning in mine. 'Senseless' (a number of syllables strung together), without any intelligible meaning, as, e.g. *kaṭaṭapam* or *gaḍaḍagavam*. 'Purposeless,' as, This man, *Dedavatta*, is warbling a melodious song before my house. 'Incapable of being proved,' as, *Devadatta* mocks me by a frown. Such an assertion as this is incapable of being proved, because it does not admit of proof. Owing to the transient nature of the act, witnesses are not available, much less can documentary evidence be resorted to; nor would it be proper to perform an ordeal, on account of the trifling nature of the charge. 'At variance' (with possibility), as, A dumb man has cursed me. Or, 'at variance' with the interests of a town or kingdom, *M*.

10, 11. *Vy. K.*; *M. Macn. I, 4, 11* and *May. p. 10* (uncertain).

12. *V. T.*; *M. Macn. I, 4, 12, &c.* (uncertain). Each subject shall

13. That plaint is declared to be inadmissible in which the order (of the words) is inverted, or the arrangement confused, or scattered what belongs together, or which is meaningless, or relative to bygone times, or unapproved.

14. The order (of the words) is said to be inverted in that plaint the meaning of which is rendered unclear by the omission (of certain words) in their proper place, and which is not accepted (in consequence).

15. When the original claim is forsaken and replaced by a different proposition, the plaint is declared to be meaningless, and the previous claim is not carried.

16. When a claim is raised in regard to certain property long after the expiration of the proper time, the plaint is said to relate to bygone times, though evidence be forthcoming.

17. That suit in which the claim relates to one thing, and the judicial investigation to another, is declared to be unapproved, because the trial is inconsistent.

18. When the plaintiff in his written claim con-

be examined in its turn, not all subjects at the same time. A plaint referring to many distinct articles or to several different accusations is not faulty under this rule. M.

13-20. *Vîram*. pp. 67, 68.

13, 14. 'The order is inverted,' i. e. several syllables are inverted in position in the written charge. *Vîram.*, *Smṛitiḥ*.

13. 'The arrangement is confused,' when the natural order of the sentence is interrupted and the sense vitiated in consequence. *Vîram.*, *Smṛitiḥ*.

13. 'Scattered what belongs together,' i. e. the several parts of a proposition are not put together. *Ibid*.

17. 'Because the trial is inconsistent,' because the different parts of the suit do not agree. *Smṛitiḥ*.

founds the charge with the evidence, such a claim also cannot take effect, because the proper order of propositions is violated in it.

19. That plaint should be utterly rejected in which two claims are entered at once, one reasonable, and the other unreasonable.

20. Should a man make mutually conflicting statements in a plaint, his claim cannot succeed because of its being vitiated by inconsistent assertions.

21. When a man though capable (of proving his claim) omits to prove it for twenty or ten years, after the plaint has been lodged by him, his declaration becomes futile (in consequence).

22. (The plaintiff) may amend the plaint while the answer has not been delivered. When the plaint has been answered, the corrections must cease.

III. THE ANSWER.

1. When a plaint of this description has been tendered by the plaintiff, the defendant shall deliver an answer corresponding to such plaint.

2. That is called a (true) answer by those acquainted with the subject, which meets the plaint, and is concise, clear, consistent, and easily intelligible without an explanation.

3. If a man's courage fails him when he is about to make a statement in a lawsuit, a delay must be

21. *Smṛiti*k. *upekshā yatra sādhyasya vimsatim dasa vā samāh* । *saktenāpi kṛte vāde tasya paksho mṛishā bhavet* ॥

22. *Vīram*. p. 20.

III, 1. *Smṛiti*k. ; Raghunandana, pp. 12, 16 ('*Bṛihaspati*').

2. *M. Macn.* I, 5, 3 (uncertain); *V. T.*, &c.

3. *Smṛiti*k. *matir notsahate yasya vivāde vaktum iṅkṛhatah* । *dātavya eva kālāḥ syād arthipratyarthinor api* ॥

granted to him (by the judge), whether he be plaintiff or defendant.

4. When the defendant contradicts the charge, such an answer is termed a denial in a cause.

5. When, the plaint having been reduced to writing by the plaintiff, the defendant admits it but adduces some special circumstance, it is called a (retort in the form) *pratyavaskandana* (special plea).

6. That (answer) is no (true) answer which is dubious, not to the point, too narrow, too extensive, or meeting one part only of the plaint.

7. An answer which treats of a different subject, or which is incomplete, or couched in obscure language, or confused, not intelligible without an explanation, or unreasonable, will never enable (the defendant) to gain his cause.

4. *Raghunandana*, p. 17; *M. Macn.* I, 5, 7, &c. ('*Kâtâyâna*').

5. *M. Macn.* I, 5, 9.

6, 7. *V. T.*; *M. Macn.* I, 5, 11. 'Dubious,' as when (the plaintiff) having declared: This man has received a hundred *Suvarṇas* from me, (the defendant replies): Yes, I have received a hundred *Suvarṇas* or a hundred *Māshas*. 'Not to the point,' as when a debtor being sued for a hundred *Suvarṇas*, replies that he has received a hundred *Paṇas*. 'Too narrow,' as when (a debtor) being sued for a hundred *Suvarṇas*, replies that he has received five. 'Too extensive,' as when (a debtor) being sued for a hundred *Suvarṇas*, replies that he has received two hundred. 'Meeting one part only of the plaint,' as when (a debtor) being sued for gold, clothes, and other objects, replies that he has received gold but nothing else. 'Which treats of a different subject,' as when an action for debt is answered by referring to a different title of law, e.g. when a man being sued for a debt of a hundred *Suvarṇas*, replies, He (the plaintiff) has struck me. 'Incomplete,' not containing any reference to the particulars of country, place, and so on, as when the plaint states a certain field situated in the central country (*Madhyadesa*) near Benares, towards the east of it, to have been seized by the defendant, and the defendant replies merely, 'I

8. In the case of a denial, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff; in the case of a special plea, (it rests) with the defendant.

9. Let (the plaintiff) make an answer which corresponds to (the contents of) the plea. If he does not (make an answer), the king shall cause him to make one, by employing (any of) the (four) methods of conciliation, division, and the rest, till the matter has been cleared up.

10. When, in the case of a denial (on the part of the defendant) the plaintiff himself admits such (denial) as correct, it has to be considered as a confession, and one half of the (ordinary) fine shall be inflicted on the plaintiff.

11. In the case of a denial, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff; in the case of a special plea,

have taken it.' 'Couched in obscure terms,' as when in a suit for a hundred *Suvarṇas* the defendant exclaims, 'Am I the only person indebted to this man?' implying by his speech that the chief judge, or assessors, or plaintiff, is indebted to another man. 'Confused,' inconsistent, as when in an action for a hundred *Suvarṇas* the defendant declares, 'Yes; I have received that sum, but I do not owe it.' 'Not intelligible without an explanation,' owing to the use of wrong inflections, compounds, or constructions, or to the employment of a foreign language. 'Unreasonable,' contrary to common sense, as when the plea runs as follows: The defendant has received a hundred *Suvarṇas* from me, repayable with interest, and has paid the interest only, and not the principal; and the defendant replies: 'Yes; I have paid' the interest, but have not received the principal.' M.

8. M. Macn. I, 5, 14 (uncertain); May. p. 11.

9. *Smṛitiḥ*. *yathārtham uttaram dadyān na ket tad dāpayen nripaḥ* | *sāmbhedādibhir mārgair yāvat so-rthaḥ samuddhṛtaḥ* || Bribery and force are the two remaining methods.

10. *Smṛitiḥ*. *nihnave tu yadā vādī svayam tat pratipadyate* | *gñeyā sampratipattis tu tasyārdho vinayaḥ smṛitaḥ* ||

11. M. Macn. II, 6, 5.

it rests with the defendant ; but in a plea of former judgment, all that is required in the shape of proof is to produce the previous decree.

12. The defendant is at liberty to delay his answer for three days, or for five days even.

IV. WRITINGS AND POSSESSION.

1. A writing (or document) should be signed by witnesses, the (natural) order of ideas and syllables should not be interrupted, local customs and general rules should be observed in it, and it should be complete in every respect.

2. A document signed by the king with his own hand, or sealed with his own seal, is declared to be a royal document, and is (considered as equal to) an attested document in all affairs.

3. A document suspected (to have a blemish) is valid, unless the debtor should have clearly indicated its blemish ; and so (is the validity of) a document which is more than twenty years old (established by mere lapse of time).

4. In the beginning, gift is a cause (of ownership);

12. Vy. *K.* pratyarthî labhate kâlam tryaham pañkâham eva vâ ।
IV, 1. *Smṛitiḥ.* lekhyam tu sâkshimat kâryam aviluptakramâ-
ksharam । desâkârasthitiyutam samagram sarvavastushu ॥

2. *Smṛitiḥ.* ; *Vîram.* p. 195 ('Vasishṭha').

3. *Smṛitiḥ.* ; *Vîram.* p. 200 ('Kâtyâyana'). The validity of a document having been called into doubt, because it either has a blemish or has been vitiated by the lapse of a considerable time, it becomes valid through proof by ordeal. This is the meaning, mere lapse of time being insufficient to produce validity. *Smṛitiḥ.* This interpretation can hardly be correct, as ordeals are not referred to in this text.

4. *M. Macn.* III, 6, 5. In the case of the first man (possessor)

in the middle, possession with a title ; but continued and hereditary possession by itself is also a good cause (of ownership).

5. There are six modes of acquiring wealth : by obtaining (property), what is declared to have been given or earned, (acquisition through) valour, (in the shape of) a marriage portion, and through inheritance from relations or others.

6. Having listened to the answer, (the plaintiff) at the trial shall produce a document as evidence, or he shall prove possession continued for a long time, and corroborated by (the statements of) the neighbours, or by (other) evidence.

7. Supposing a religious student were to perform some vow extending over a period of thirty-six years, or a man (engaged in trade or traffic) were to reside abroad for a long time in the pursuit of wealth :

possession proved by witnesses is superior to, or more decisive than, possession, excepting hereditary possession. Such hereditary possession, again, is superior in the case of the fourth in descent to a title proved by documents. In the case of an intermediate claimant (as e.g. the second or third in descent) a title coupled with possession of short duration even is more decisive than a title entirely destitute of possession. M.

5. *Smṛitīk.* *labdham dānakriyāproktam sauryam vaivāhikam tathā | bāndhavādipragāgātam shadvidhas tu dhanāgamaḥ ||* 'Obtaining,' by birth, paternal or other (inherited) wealth ; or, obtaining property by finding it, as in the case of treasure-trove. *Smṛitīk.*

6. *Smṛitīk.* *srutvottaram kriyāpade lekhyam sādhanam uddiset | sāmantalakshaṇopetā bhuktir vā kīrakālikī.* 'The term *sādhanam* a fortiori denotes witnesses in this place. Therefore the meaning is as follows. In a dispute regarding a house, field, or other (immovable property), the claimant must adduce a document or witnesses, or he must plead possession.' *Smṛitīk.*

7-10. *Smṛitīk.* *brahmacārī kareṭ kimkid vratam shastrimsadāb-dikam | artharthī kānyavishaye dīrghakālam vasen naraḥ || samā-*

8. If, then, the student after having completed his period of studentship (and returned from his preceptor) were to look after his property, possession (by a stranger) continued for fifty years would be capable of depriving him of his property.

9. Twelve years for (the study of) each Veda is the period ordained for those engaged in the pursuit of religious knowledge; for those engaged in the acquisition of mechanical (or manual) skill, the period (of apprenticeship) is declared to last till they have acquired their art.

10. What has been possessed against their wish by their friends or relations, and what has been possessed by persons offending against the king, is not lost by the lapse of (a long) time.

V. WITNESSES.

1. (By false evidence concerning land, a witness kills everything; beware, then, of giving false evidence concerning land.) In the case of (false evidence concerning) water, the consequence is said to be the same as for land, and so it is in the case of carnal connexion with a female, as well as (in the

vratito vratî kuryât svadhanânveshanam tatah | pañcâśadâbdiko bhogas taddhanasyâpahârakah || prativedam dvâdasâbdaḥ kâlo vidyârthinâm smṛitah | silpavidyârthinâm kaiva grahanântaḥ prakîrtitaḥ || suhṛdibhir bandhubhis kaishâm yat syâd bhuktam avasyatâm | nrîpâparâdhikâm kaiva na tat kâlena hiyate || See Manu III, 1.

V, 1-3. Vîram. p. 171. See Nârada I, 17, 209 (above, p. 92), the text immediately preceding these texts in the Vîramitrodaya. 1, 3=Manu VIII, 100, 101. All these texts, up to 10, form part of the exhortation to be addressed to the witnesses by the judge. In 2, I have substituted *tathâśvavat*, the reading of the *Todarâ-nanda*, for *tathâpnuyât*.

case of false evidence) concerning gems produced in water, and everything consisting of stone.

2. In the case of honey or clarified butter (the consequence) is the same as (when false evidence has been given) with regard to small cattle. He incurs the same guilt as in the case of a horse (by giving false evidence) regarding a vehicle. The case of silver, clothes, grain, or the Veda is equal to the case of a cow.

3. Having considered all these evil consequences attending a false declaration, (a witness) must declare openly everything as (he has) heard or seen (it).

4. Kubera, Âditya, Varuna, Sakra (Indra), the son of Vivasvant (Yama), and the (other) guardian deities of the world are constantly looking on with divine eyes.

5. Let (the judge) ask a Brahman for his testimony by saying, 'Speak;' a Kshatriya by saying, 'Speak the truth;' a Vaisya, by referring to his kine, grain, and gold; but a Sûdra (by conjuring him) by all possible wicked deeds.

6. Whatever places (of torment) are assigned (in a future state) to the murderers of Brahmins, or to the slayers of women and children, and to him who betrays a friend, or shows ingratitude, those very places shall be thy home (after death) if thou speakest falsely.

7. All meritorious deeds which thou, O good man, hast done since thy birth, would go to the dogs, if thou shouldst speak falsely.

4. *Smṛitiḥ. kuberâdityavaruṇasakravarivasvatâdayaḥ* । *pasyanti lokapâlâs ka nityam divyena âkshushâ ॥*

5-9. Vy. K. Identical with Manu VIII, 88-92.

8. Although, O virtuous man, thou thinkest of thyself, 'I am alone,' yet that says who sees the evil and the good ever resides in thy heart.

9. If thou art not at variance with the god Yama, the son of Vivasvant, who resides in thy heart, thou needest not go to the Ganges or to (the country of) the Kurus.

10. Perjured witnesses, as well as those who rob others of their property, and wicked kings, shall have to reside (hereafter) in a very dreadful hell for the time of a kalpa.

11. When (a calamity such as) an illness, or fire, or the death of a relative, happens to a witness within seven days after his evidence has been taken, he shall be made to pay the debt and a fine.

12. Learned Brahmans and other such persons (are incompetent witnesses) under a text of law; thieves and the like persons, on account of their notorious perversity; (the deposition of the witnesses is worthless) owing to mutual contradiction when the witnesses make mutually conflicting statements at the trial of a cause.

13. 'One who gives evidence of his own accord' is a witness who comes to make a deposition of his own accord, without being appointed (a witness). Such a man is termed a spy in the law-books, and he is not worthy to become a witness.

10. *Smṛitiḥ. atīvanarake kalpam vaseyuh kṛtasākshinaḥ | paravittaharā ye ka rāgānas kâpyadhârmikâḥ ||* A kalpa is a fabulous period of time, the duration of which is reckoned in various ways.

11. *Tod.* Identical with Manu VIII, 108.

12-14. *Vîram.* p. 151. 12, 13 a, and 14 occur in the Minor Nârada as well (p. 34), where they come immediately after a text which is identical with Nârada I, 12, 157 (above, p. 82).

14. 'One rendered incompetent by intervening decease' is a witness (who comes) after the death of the claimant, unless he should have been instructed (by the claimant) on his deathbed.

VI. ORDEALS.

1. Let (the defendant) touch the heads of his sons, wife, or friends ; or else the (ordeal by) sacred libation (may be performed), whatever the nature of the charge may be.

2. It is on the claimant that the duty of declaring his readiness to take on himself the penalty (to be awarded to the losing party) devolves in every case. Or the ordeal may be performed by either party at pleasure, the other party consenting to give the penalty (to be awarded in case of defeat).

3. To persons suspected by the king, or denounced (as criminals) by (intercourse with) robbers, or intent on their own justification, an ordeal must be administered without binding (an opponent) to give the penalty.

4. (The performance of) an ordeal is ordained in

VI, 1. *Vîram*. p. 226 ; *M. Macn.* X, 1, 5 (uncertain).

2. *Vîram*. p. 228.

3. *V. T.* ; *M. Macn.* X, 1, 5 a (uncertain). The *Mitâksharâ* explains the term *siraś* or *śrisha*, which has been translated by 'penalty' in this paragraph and in the preceding text, as denoting the head, i.e. the fourth or principal division of a lawsuit, which involves defeat or success, and results in the awarding of a punishment or fine to the losing party. It appears more probable, however, that *siras*, 'head,' is an equivalent for 'life,' the accuser having to declare his readiness to risk his life, i.e. a heavy punishment, in case of defeat.

4. *Smṛitiḥ. kārane mahati proktam divyaṃ vādārthinām nrinām | śirovartī yadā na syāt tadā divyaṃ na dīyate ||* This is apparently the

important cases, when people are engaged in a controversy; an ordeal must not be administered when there is no one ready to take the punishment on himself.

5. Justice is based on truth, and litigation (depends) on witnesses. When a case admits of divine test, human evidence (the testimony of witnesses) or documents must not be resorted to.

6. The (ordeal by) sacred libation has been declared by the wise to be applicable to all (castes), and poison (to all castes), excepting the Brahman (caste). (Either the balance is reserved for Brahmins), or the balance may be administered to (members of) every caste.

7. The (ordeal by) sacred libation may be administered in every case. The (ordeal by) balance is admissible in every season.

8. Eunuchs, distressed or feeble persons, the severely afflicted, infants, old men, women, and the blind should be tested by the balance always.

9. (The ordeal by) poison is not destined for

correct reading of the text translated above, Nârada I, 19, 257 (pp. 101, 102).

5. M. Macn. X, 1, 7. In actions for debt and the like, though witnesses possessing the required qualifications (such as veracity, &c.) should have been adduced by the plaintiff, an ordeal may be administered, if the defendant proposes an ordeal and promises to give the fine or other penalty to be inflicted in case of his being defeated, because witnesses are subject to the fault of partiality, whereas an ordeal shows the true state of the case, as no fault can be found with it, and is an emblem of justice. M.

6. Vîram. p. 235. This text comes after Nârada I, 24, 335 (above, p. 117).

7. May. p. 18 (text).

8, 9. Vîram. p. 235. In the third Pâda of 8, I read *bâlavrid-dhâstriyo-ndhâmska* with *Smṛitiḥ*. for *bâlavridhdhâturân stris ka*

women, nor is (the ordeal by) water fit to be administered to them; it is through (the ordeals by) balance, sacred libation, and others that (the judge) must explore the true state of their minds.

10. Let (the judge) test strong men by fire, water, or poison, and let him test infants, old or distressed men by the balance.

11. Let (the judge) avoid (the ordeal by) fire in the case of lepers, (the ordeal by) water in the case of the asthmatic, and (the ordeal by) poison in the case of bilious or phlegmatic persons.

12. In the season of the rains, let the (ordeal by) fire be administered; also in the cold and chilly seasons. In the summer season, the (ordeal by) water is the proper (kind of ordeal). Poison (is destined) for the cold weather.

13. The chilly, cold, and rainy seasons are declared to be (the proper seasons) for the (ordeal by) fire; the autumn and summer seasons, for the (ordeal by) water; the (ordeal by) poison, (is fit) for the cold and chilly seasons.

14. The months of *Kaitra* (March–April), *Mārgaśirsha* (November–December), and *Vaisākha* (April–

(*Vīram.*, *Tod.*), as the term *âtura* occurs twice under the latter reading.

9. *M. Macn.* X, 1, 12 (uncertain); Nepalese *Nārada*.

10, 11. *Minor Nārada* I, 5, 116, 118 (p. 46). For the Sanskrit, see *Nārada-smṛti*, p. 112, note. Nearly identical with a text usually attributed to *Pitāmaha*, *Vīram.* p. 237.

12. *Vīram.* pp. 239, 240. Nearly identical with *Nārada* I, 19, 254 (p. 101) and *Minor Nārada* I, 5, 113, 114 (p. 46).

13, 14 a. *V. T.*; *M. Macn.* X, 1, 10 (uncertain). These two texts are elsewhere attributed to *Pitāmaha*, and it is certainly difficult to reconcile them with 12.

14 b. *Vīram.* p. 240. In the quotations, this text comes after

May) are proper months for all (ordeals), and not adverse to any kind of ordeal. (Ordeals must) never (be administered) in the afternoon, nor in the twilight, nor at noon.

15. Ordeals administered at an improper place, or at an unsuitable time, or performed at a distance from human habitations, constitute a deviation from the proper course of a lawsuit, this is certain.

16. The chief judge must superintend the whole of the proceedings at an ordeal, fasting and obeying the king's instructions in the same way as an Adhvaryu (priest officiates) at a sacrifice.

17. The chief judge, who must be a Brahman, thoroughly versed in the Vedas and Vedāṅgas, instructed in sacred learning and of religious conduct, tranquil-minded, unambitious,

18. Fond of veracity, pure, able, delighting in the welfare of all sentient beings, having kept a fast, clad in his moist garments (after a bath), having cleansed his teeth, should worship all deities according to rule.

19. With red perfumes and garlands, as well as

Nârada I, 19, 259 (above, p. 102). 'The prohibition to administer an ordeal at noon has reference to ordeals other than the ordeal by water.' Vîram.

15. Vîram. p. 241; May. p. 18 (text). I read *bahirvâsakrîṭâni* in the second Pâda (*bahirvâdikrîṭâni*, May.), and *vyabhiṭâram sadartheshu* in the third Pâda (*vyabhiṭâre sadartheshu*, Vîram.). 'At a distance from human habitations,' in solitude. Vîram.

16. M. Macn. X, 1, 8 a; 'Pitâmaha,' elsewhere.

17, 18. Vîram. p. 245; M. Macn. X, 2, 18 ('Pitâmaha'). I read *kuryâd* in 18, as in *Mitâksharâ*, *Vivâdatâṇḍava*, &c. (*krîṭvâ*, Vîram.). These texts, although generally quoted in the section on the ordeal by balance, seem to contain a rule applicable to every ordeal.

19. M. Macn. X, 2, 17, &c. This text is supposed to apply to

with curds, cakes of flour, fried grain and other (offerings), he should first worship the balance, and then show honour to the others.

20. The balance and the other ordeals ordained by the sages should be administered by the king by consent of the claimant, but not otherwise.

21. When they are performed otherwise (the claimant not giving his consent), he incurs the same guilt as a thief.

22. I will state next the excellent rule regarding the (ordeal by) balance, as the king and the chief judge should administer that ordeal to a man (arraigned in a cause).

23. The two posts supporting the beam of the balance should measure four Hastas above ground, their (entire) length should be six Hastas.

24. The king should cause a wooden beam of the balance to be made, which must be four Hastas long,

a judge who is about to administer the ordeal by balance to one arraigned in a cause. The term 'the others' is said to relate to Indra and the other deities.

20, 21. Minor Nārada I, 5, 112, 113 (pp. 45, 46). The second half occurs in the Nepalese Nārada as well, where the chapter on the ordeal by balance commences with it. For the Sanskrit, see Nārada-smṛiti, loc. cit.

22. Minor Nārada I, 5, 119 (p. 46). *atañ param pravakshyāmi dhaṭasya vidhim uttamam | rāgā ka prādvivākas ka yathā tam kārayen naram ||*

23. Nepalese Nārada. *ṣaturhastau tulāpādāv ukṣhrayena prakīrtitau | shaddhastam tu taylor bhavet pramānam parimānatañ ||* The Minor Nārada has the following text instead of this: *dhaṭasya pādāv (pādād) ūrdhvam tu ṣaturhastau prakīrtitau | pañkahastā tulā kāryā dvihastā kārgalā smṛitā ||* Under this reading, the beam of the balance would have to be five Hastas long, whereas the following text (24) states its length at four Hastas.

24-26. Minor Nārada I, 5, 121, 122 (p. 47 and Addenda, pp. xxxii, xxxiii). *kārayeta ṣaturhastām samām lakṣhanalakṣhitām |*

polished, furnished with the required characteristics, and having the two scales suspended by both extremities.

25. After having caused two posts to be erected, on even ground, which must be placed from north to south, and must be arranged both in one line, he shall cause the beam of the balance to be fastened across (the transverse beam which connects) them.

26. With an iron cord let a virtuous man surround the beam in the middle and fasten it in an east-western direction, after having carefully connected it (with the transverse beam).

27. The (appointed) examiners have to take care always that the two perpendiculars of the balance should be equal in length. Water must be poured out on (the beam of) the balance by skilled persons.

28. If the water does not trickle down (from the balance), the balance may be considered as being level.

29. With red perfumes and garlands, as well as with curds, cakes of flour, fried grain and other (offerings, the judge) should first worship the balance, and then show honour to the others.

tulâm kâsh/hamayîm râgâ sikyaprântâvalambinîm || dakshinottara-samsthânâv ubhâv ekatrasamyatau | stambhau krîtvâ same dese tayo/ samsthâpayet tulâm || âyasena tu pâsena madhye samgrîhya dharmavit | yogayet tâm susamyuktâm tulâm prâgaparâyatâm ||

27, 28. May. p. 20 (text); M. Macn. X, 2, 6 (uncertain). These two texts are elsewhere attributed to Pitâmaha, and this is probably the correct view, as the fastening of the two perpendiculars by the two arches in which the balance moves up and down is described in another text of Pitâmaha.

29. M. Macn. X, 2, 17. 'The injunction contained in this text concerns a judge who is about to administer the ordeal by balance to one arraigned in a cause. The others,' i.e. Indra and the other deities. Viram. p. 251. See 19.

30. (The person accused being about to be placed in the scale for the second time, the judge should address the balance as follows): 'Thou, O Balance, hast been created by Brahman, to test the wicked. On account of the syllable dha thou art the image of Dharma (Justice), on account of the syllable ta, thou

31. Being used for balancing (*dhṛita*, in this ordeal) discoverest the vicious. Therefore thou art called dha^{ta} (balance).'

32. If (the person) remains level (*sama*), he is considered to be in a middling position (*samatâ*). If he comes down, he loses his cause. He who goes down is not innocent; he is innocent who goes up.

33. He who remains level is also not acquitted. These are the three possible cases in the (ordeal by) balance. Thus has been declared the never-failing acquittal (obtainable) through the test by balance.

34. When (the scales fixed) at the two extremities of the beam have been moved, when the mark which had been made has come off, when (the balance) is going up and down, being agitated by wind,

35. Or when (the man appointed to hold it) lets it

30, 31. *Vīram.* p. 251; *M. Macn.* X, 2, 23 (uncertain).

32, 33. Nepalese *Nārada*. *samena samatām eti hīyamānas tu hīyate | adhogatir na sudhyeta sudhyetordhvagatis tathā || samo-pi na (hi MS.) visuddhaḥ syād ity eshā trividhā tulā | eshoditā tulākalpe (tulākalpaḥ MS.) suddhir avyabhikārinḥ ||* 32b, 33a are attributed to Vyāsa in the *Vivādatāṇḍava*. The reading *na* for *hi* has been taken from the same compilation. It appears from *Nārada I*, 20, 283 (above, pp. 107, 108) that an equal result of the first and second weighing was not considered as a proof of innocence. According to others, such a result proves the person balanced to be guilty in some degree; or the proceeding has to be repeated.

34, 35. *Vīram.* p. 254; *Smṛtiḥ*; V. T. I read with *Smṛtiḥ*.

go all of a sudden : (in all these cases) the matter in dispute must not be decided either way.

36. Now then I will proclaim the excellent rule regarding the (ordeal by) fire, as it has been declared (by the sages). The intermediate space between two circles is ordained to measure thirty-two *Āṅgulas*.

37. The seven circles are thus declared by persons thoroughly conversant with the art of computation to cover a space of two hundred and twenty-four *Āṅgulas*.

38. Let the peculiar signs be marked which he has on both hands, both visible and invisible ones, whether caused by a scar or not caused by a scar.

39. After having first marked in this way the hands of the person accused, he should offer clarified butter in fire according to rule, as a propitiatory rite, reciting *Mantras* (at the same time).

tulāsirobhyām udbhrāntam vikālam nyastalakṣaṇam । *yadi vāyupranunno vā dhāvaty ūrdhvam adho* । *pi vā* ॥ *nirmuktaḥ sahasā vāpi tadā naikataram vṛget* ॥ 'The mark,' i.e. 'the water or whatever else has been used to mark the even position of the scales' (*Smṛitiḥ*, *Vīram*), or 'the bill recounting the charge which has been fixed on the head of the person balanced' (*V. T.*).

36. *Vīram*. p. 256.

37. Nepalese *Nārada* ; Minor *Nārada* I, 6, 3 (p. 49). I read : *saptabhir maṇḍalair evaṃ āṅgulānām satadvayam* । *śakaturvimsati proktaṃ samkhyātattvārthadarsibhiḥ* ॥ The quotations agree with *Nārada* I, 21, 286 in referring to eight, instead of seven, circles.

38. *Vīram*. p. 259. The marking of the hands serves the purpose of marking the difference between the previously extant sores and those eventually caused by the hot iron ball.

39-45. *Smṛitiḥ*. *kṛitvaivam abhīrastasya prathamam hastalakṣaṇam* । *sāntyartham gūhuyān mantrair ghrītam agnau yathāvidhi* ॥ *tarpiteshv atha deveṣu lokapāleṣu kaiva hi* । *ādityābhīmukho bhūtvā imam mantram udīrayet* ॥ *tvam agne sarvadevānām antas kṛasi pāvakaḥ* । *havyam vahasī devānām antaḥsāntim prayakṣasi* ॥ *prakṣhaṇāni manushyānām pāpāni sukrītāni ka* । *tvam eva*

40. The gods and the guardian deities of the world having been hospitably entertained, let (the person accused) utter the following prayer, facing the sun.

41. 'Thou, O fire, dwellest in the interior of all deities as a flame. Thou conveyest burnt-oblations to the gods, and givest peace of mind.

42. 'Thou, O God, knowest the secret offences and merits of men. Thou, O deity, knowest whatever mortals do not comprehend.

43. 'Arraigned in a cause, I am about to be tested by fire. Therefore deign to deliver me lawfully from the perplexity in which I am involved.'

44. The man (about to be examined) having made this speech, facing the east, with firmness, his joined hands should be covered with seven equal leaves of the holy fig-tree,

45. And both hands should be tied with seven strings of light-coloured thread.

46. (Then the man) should take a smooth ball of red-hot iron, fifty Palas in weight, in both hands, and step gradually across the seven circles.

47. When a man has carefully stepped through

deva gānīshe na vidur yāni mánushāḥ || vyavahārābhisastoyam
vahnau tish/hāmi samsaye | tasmān mām samsayārūḍham dharmatas
trātum arhasi || evam uktavatas tasya prāṇmukhasya tu dhīmataḥ |
pattrair aṅgalim āpūrya asvatthaiḥ saptabhiḥ samaiḥ || veshṭayīta
sitair hastau saptabhiḥ sūtratantubhiḥ || For similar prayers, which
are put in the mouth of the judge however, see Nārada I, 21, 290–
294 (above, pp. 109, 110); Minor Nārada I, 6, 10, 11 (p. 41).

45. M. Macn. X, 3, 2.

46. Minor Nārada I, 6, 6, 7 (p. 49). hutāsataptalohasya
pañkāsātpalikam samam | hastābhyām pindam ādāya mandalāni
sanair vraget ||

47. Nepalese Nārada. tīrtvānena vidhānena mandalāni samāhitaḥ |

the (seven) circles in this way, without having burnt himself in the least, he is acquitted.

48. When he has dropped the ball, his hands should be inspected. If the marks have retained their previous appearance, he should examine (the hands) elsewhere as well.

49. When a bloodshot round stain or any other sore caused by fire is seen, the man has to be considered as guilty, because truth and virtue are not found in him.

50. I will proclaim next the excellent rule regarding the (ordeal by) water. Let a king who is desirous of establishing perfect truth refrain from administering (this ordeal) in winter.

51. With perfumes, garlands, sweet-smelling substances, honey, milk, clarified butter, and the like, let (the judge) perform the worship of Varuṇa (the deity of water) first of all.

52. Let (the judge) cause this ordeal to be per-

adagdhaḥ sarvathâ yas tu sa viruddho bhaven naraḥ || Nearly identical with Minor Nârada I, 6, 7a, 8b.

48, 49. *Tod.*; *Smṛitīk.*; *Vīram.* p. 264 ('Kâlikâpurâṇa'). 48b according to the Nepalese Nârada. tasyaiva muktapindasya kuryât karanirīkshanam | pûrvarûpesu kîhnesu tato =nyatrâpi lakshayet || mandalam raktasamkâsam yaḥ kânyad vâgnisambhavam | so =visuddhas tu vigñeyo =satyadharmavyavasthitaḥ || 'If a boil or other (tumour) caused by fire should be discovered on the palms of his hands, he has to be considered as guilty. If nothing of the kind is discovered, he is innocent.' *Smṛitīk.*, *Vīram.*

50-79. The ordeals by water and poison are omitted in the *Smṛitīkandrikâ*, 'because they are obsolete now-a-days.'

50. Nepalese Nârada. ataḥ param pravakshyâmi toyasya vidhim uttamam | hemante vargayed râgâ ya ikkheḥ kḥuddhim uttamâm ||

51. *M. Macn.* X, 4, 3 (uncertain); *Vīram.* p. 269.

52. Minor Nârada I, 7, 2 (p. 50). svakkhe gale susîtale galaukaḥpaṅkavargite | vipule nâtigâdhe ka kuryâd divyasya nirṇayam ||

formed in transparent and very cool water, which does not contain aquatic animals or mud, and is abundant and not too shallow.

53. Let (a man) go near the bank of the water (in which the accused is to be immersed) and erect an arch as high as the ear (of the person) on the edge (of that water), on level and purified ground.

54. A strong bow should be known to have seven hundred; one not particularly strong, six hundred; a weak bow, five hundred. Thus has the rule regarding the bow been declared.

55. From a bow of a middling quality let a skilful (archer) discharge three arrows, after having made a target one hundred and fifty Hastas distant.

56. (The archer) is blameable if the arrows discharged by him fall short of or go beyond the target. (The person accused) obtains acquittal if his body continues immersed in water after the middling arrow has been (discharged and) brought back.

53. M. Macn. X, 4, 13.

54. Nepalese Nārada. *krūram dhanuḥ saptasatam nātikrūram tu shaśatam | mandam paññasatam gñeyam esha prokto dhanurvidhiḥ ||* Nearly identical with Minor Nārada I, 7, 4 (p. 50); Nārada I, 22, 307 (above, p. 112); Vīram. p. 268, &c. The translation of this text is based on the interpretation given in *Tod*. 'That bow which bends sufficiently to admit of discharging an arrow from it, when a weight of seven hundred Palas is fastened by the string, is said to have seven hundred. The terms "six hundred" and "five hundred" have to be understood in the same way.' See too, above, p. 112, 307 note.

55, 56a. M. Macn. X, 4, 15. The rule regarding the distance of the target, which renders the arrows entirely superfluous, seems to belong to a more recent period than the other rules. See Prof. Stenzler's Essay on Indian Ordeals.

56b. *Tod*. *āñite madhyame vāne magnāṅgaḥ sukitām iyāt |*

57. Among fifty runners, those two who are the quickest runners should be appointed to fetch the arrow.

58. Let a strong man, who may be a Brahman, Kshatriya or Vaisya, and must be free from affection and hatred, be placed in water reaching his navel, (standing erect) like a pillar.

59. (The accused), thoroughly controlled in mind, shall seize the thighs of that man under water, and stand in it composed all the time till the (runner) appointed to fetch (the arrow) has returned.

60. Then let men strictly devoted to veracity and virtue, acquainted with the application of legal rules, and free from affection and hatred, see that everything is fair.

61. An intelligent, pious-minded man should descend into the water and duly address (the deity of water) with the following auspicious texts.

61 b. The sacred prayer (runs as follows). 'Om, adoration to Justice.

62. 'Thou, O lord of waters, who art so pleasantly

57. M. Macn. X, 4, 12.

58. Vîram. p. 269.

59. Nepalese Nârada. *toyam adho manushyasya grîhîtvorî susamyatah | tâvat tish/heta niyato yâvat prâptaḥ samâpakî ||*

60. Minor Nârada I, 7, 8 (p. 51). *dharmasthânâṁ tataḥ kuryuḥ satyadharmaparâyanaḥ | dharmasâstravidhânagñâ râgadveshavivar-gitâḥ ||*

61. Nepalese Nârada. *avatîrya gale vidvân snâtaḥ prayatamâ-nasaḥ | srâvayeta yathânyâyam ebhir mantrapadaibḥ subhaiḥ ||* The correctness of this reading seems doubtful. According to the other authorities, the prayer is to be recited by the judge or by the accused.

61 b. Nepalese Nârada. *dharmamantraḥ | omḥ namo dharmâya |*

62. Nepalese Nârada. *yonis tvam asi (yatas tvam asti MS.) bhûtânâṁ galeṣa sukhasîṭala | trâyasvainam naram pâpât paryasi tvam subhâsubham ||*

cool, art the source of (all) beings. Save this man from guilt, thou knowest both good and evil.

63. 'Thou art the first of the gods and the great comforter of the world. Thou, O water, dwellest in the interior of all beings, like a witness.

64. 'Thou, O deity, alone knowest what mortals do not understand. This man, being arraigned in a cause, is going to dive in thee. Therefore deign to deliver him lawfully from this perplexity.'

65. Then (the accused) should submerge all his limbs in water so as to become invisible.

66. A prudent man should leave the water, after having seen the arrow brought back, and should approach the king and all the assessors of the court, after saluting them reverentially.

67. Though only his ear, eye, mouth or nose should become visible while he is in water, he cannot be acquitted. If he remains invisible, he obtains acquittal.

63a occurs in the Minor Nārada and Nepalese Nārada (Minor Nārada I, 7, 15 a). *ādidevo'si devānām (bhūtānām Nep. Nār.) lokasyāpyāyanam mahat* | After this, the Nepalese Nārada has two texts, which are identical with Nārada I, 22, 316, 317.

63b. Minor Nārada I, 7, 16 a. *tvam ambhaḥ sarvabhūtānām antar karasi sākshivat* | Identical with Vishṇu XII, 7a.

64a, b. Minor Nārada I, 7, 16b, 17a. *tvam eva deva gānīshe na vidur yāni mānavāḥ | vyavahārābhisasto'yam mānushas tvayi maggati* || Nearly identical with Vishṇu XII, 7b, 8a.

64c. Minor Nārada I, 7, 17b. *tad enam samsayād asmād dhar-matas trātum arhasi* | Identical with Vishṇu XII, 8b.

65. Nepalese Nārada. *tato nimagget salile sarvāny āngāny adarsanāt* ||

66. Nepalese Nārada. *prāptam tu sāyakam drishtvā galād uttīrya buddhimān | pranipatya nrīpam gakkhet sarvāms kaiva sabhāsadaḥ* ||

67. Minor Nārada I, 7, 12. *karnākshimukhanāsānām yasya toye vyavasthitam | drisyate na visuddhaḥ syād adriśyaḥ suddhim āpnuyāt* ||

68. Now then I will proclaim the excellent rule regarding the (ordeal by) poison, (stating) how the king should give poison, the best means of purification for a man.

69. Let him give the poison in the presence of (images of) the deities and Brahmans, after having kept a fast and worshipped Mahesvara with incense, offerings, and sacred texts.

70. (The judge) should give the poison with fixed attention, facing the north or the east, in the presence of Brahmans, (while the accused) is facing the south.

71. Let seven Yavas be given, as a test of innocence, without doubt, of poison from the *Sringa* tree or Vatsanâbha (poison) or Himaga poison.

72. In the morning and in a cool place let the poison be given to all persons, after it has been finely ground, and mixed with clarified butter thirty times the quantity.

73. He must not give poison to infants, disabled or superannuated persons, or to those who have committed a very light offence only, or to a madman, to one severely afflicted, to a cripple, or to ascetics.

74. If the person (examined) undergoes no change

68. Minor Nârada I, 8, 1 (p. 52). *atah param pravakshyâmi vishasya vidhim uttamam | yathâ dadyâd visham râgâ rodhanam paramam nrinâm ||*

69. M. Macn. X, 5, 4.

70. M. Macn. X, 5, 6.

71. *Tod.*; Vîram. p. 273 ('Pitâmaha'). Himaga poison is no doubt the poison elsewhere called Haimavata, 'coming from the Himalayas.'

72. Vîram. p. 275; M. Macn. X, 5, 13 ('Kâtâyâna').

73. Nepalese Nârada. na bâlâturavṛddheshu naiva svalpâparâdhishu | nonmattârte tathâ vyânge na ka dadyât tapasvishu ||

74. M. Macn. X, 5, 16.

of appearance during the time occupied by clapping the hands five hundred times, he is acquitted, and should be cured (by giving him antidotes of poison).

75. 'On account of thy poisonous and dangerous nature thou art hard on all persons. Thou art appointed to show the difference between good and evil like a witness.

76. 'Thou, O deity, knowest the sacred ordinances and the conduct of men, both good and evil actions, (in short) whatever men do not comprehend.

77. 'This man being arraigned in a cause, wishes to obtain acquittal. Therefore deign to deliver him lawfully from this perplexity.'

78. This prayer should be pronounced according to rule, while the poison is being swallowed (by the person).

79. The king having known the man to be innocent should honourably dismiss him, and proclaim him (innocent) with a loud voice. Thus has the law been laid down.

80. (Let the ordeal by sacred libation be administered) to one who consents to it and puts faith (in

75. Minor Nārada I, 8, 7. *vishatvād vishamatvâk ka krûram tvam sarvadehinām | subhâsubhavivekârtham niyukto hyasi sâkshivat ||* The first half is identical with Vishnu XIII, 6a.

76. Minor Nārada I, 8, 8. *dharmâni karitam pumsâm asubhâni subhâni ka | tvam eva deva gânishe na vidur yâni mânavâh ||*

76 b is identical with Vishnu XIII, 6 b.

77. Identical with Vishnu XIII, 7.

78. Nepalese Nārada. *iti mantram pathet tatra vidhinâ vishabhakshane* (vibhakshane MS.).

79. *Tod. tam visuddham iti gñâtvâ râgâ satkrîtya mokayet | ukkaiḥ prakâsayek kainam esha dharmo vyavasthitaḥ ||*

80. Vîram. p. 278, where this text is preceded by two texts identical with Nārada I, 24, 327, 328 (above, p. 116).

religion) in the presence of the deities and Brahmanas.

81. Having called near the person accused, (the judge) should place him inside the circle and cause him to swallow three handful of water, after having caused him to face the sun.

82. After having worshipped that deity (to which the accused is devoted, the judge) should wash (the image of that deity) with water, proclaim his crime, and cause him to swallow the three handful of water.

83. When some one drinks consecrated water of his own accord, after having been charged with a crime, and does not confess his guilt, actuated by avarice, such a wicked man will become a leper (in a future birth).

84. When a man tells a lie knowingly and intentionally, after having drunk consecrated water, he is born as a poor, sick, or foolish person in seven (successive) existences.

85. When a man administers the (ordeal by) sacred libation by force to procure some advantage to himself, it will destroy himself, nor will his affairs prosper.

86. When a man has been convicted (by this

81. M. Macn. X, 6, 8 (uncertain); V. T. The circle has to be made with cowdung. M.

82. Vîram. p. 279.

83. Vîram. p. 279; Smṛitiḥ. I read, with the latter work, *yaḥ karkid dūshito naraḥ*, 'after having been charged with a crime,' instead of *na kvaḥid dūshito naraḥ*, 'without having been charged with a crime' (Vîram.).

84, 85. Ibid.

86. Minor Nârada I, 9, 5. *vibhâvitam sa dâpyaḥ syâd dhaninâ tu svayam dhanam | rinâk ka dvigunam dandam râgâ dharmena dâpayet ||*

ordeal) he may be compelled by his creditor himself to repay the debt proved against him, and the king may exact from him with justice a fine amounting to twice as much as the debt.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS LAWS.

1. (Because fathers desire offspring, to be released from debt by their sons), therefore should a son begotten (by his father) give up his own property and assiduously redeem his father from debt, lest he should go to hell.

2. The interest is unlimited on thread, cotton, substances from which spirits may be extracted, tin, lead, weapons of all sorts, skins, copper, iron,

3. And all other articles of this kind, as well as bricks. This has been declared by Manu Praṣāpati.

4. On oil of every sort, on intoxicating drinks, on honey, on butter, on sugar, and on salt, the interest shall cease when it reaches eight times the original amount.

5. The debts of sick, mad, overaged, or long absent persons : such debts should be discharged by their sons even while such persons are alive.

6. A wife, a daughter-in-law, a grandson's wife, and the presents bestowed on a wife (which constitute her separate property) : if a man takes any of these, he shall be made to pay the debts (of such

VII, 1. Viram. p. 340; Minor Nārada I, 3, 5. See Nārada-smṛiti, p. 47, note.

2-4. Minor Nārada I, 4, 34, 35. See Nārada-smṛiti, p. 77, note.

5. Minor Nārada I, 3, 15. See Nārada-smṛiti, p. 50, note.

6, 7. Minor Nārada I, 3, 22, 23. See Nārada-smṛiti, pp. 53, 54, note.

women); and so shall he who lives on the landed property (of a stranger).

7. It is on the wife that the performance of religious acts depends in all (four) castes, one after the other. He who takes the wife of a man, takes his property (and debts) as well.

8. Females are not entitled to bestow gifts, or to sell property. It is only while she is living together (with her family), that a woman may enjoy (the family property).

9. It is by permission (of the owner) only that a female slave, cattle, or an estate may be enjoyed (by a stranger). He who enjoys that which had not been given up to him (by the owner), must pay for the (illegitimate) enjoyment of what he had been enjoying.

10. When a man forcibly enjoys property, such as a house, field, cow or the like, without authorization (from the owner), he deserves the same punishment as a thief.

11. He who uses a bull, or a milch-cow, or a boat, or a female slave, without authorization (from the owner), shall pay four *Panas* (as a fine).

8. Minor Nârada I, 3, 28. See Nârada-smṛiti, p. 56, note.

9-15. Smṛitik. *uddishṭam eva bhoktavyam strī pasur vasudhâpi vâ | anarpitam tu yo bhuñkte bhuktabhogam pradâpayet || anuddishṭam tu yad dravyam vâsakshetragavâdikam | svabaleñaiva bhuñgânas koravad dandam arhati || anadvâham tathâ dhenum nâvam dâsīm tathaiva ka | anuddishṭam tu bhuñgâno dadyât panakatu-shṭayam || dâsī naukâ tathâ dhuryo bandhakam nopabhugyate | upabhoktâ tu tad dravyam panair eva visodhayet || divase dvipanam dâsīm dhenum ashṭapanam tathâ | trayodasam anadvâham aravam bhûmim ka shodasa || naukâm arvam ka dhenum ka lāngalam kârmikasya ka | balâtkâreṇa yo bhuñkte dâpyas kâshṭagunam dine || ulûkhale panârdham tu musalasya panadvayam | sūrpasya ka panârdham tu gaiminir munir abravît ||*

12. A female slave, a boat, a beast of burden, and a pledge is not lost (to the owner) by adverse possession. The possessor is bound to give a compensation in money for his enjoyment of them.

13. (Let him give) two *Panas* a day for the use of a female slave; eight *Panas* for the use of a milch-cow; thirteen for the use of a bull; sixteen for the use of a horse or of an estate.

14. He who forcibly enjoys a boat, a horse, a milch-cow, or the plough of an agriculturist, shall be made to pay eight times (their value) each day.

15. (For the use) of a mortar, half a *Pana*; for the use of a pestle, two *Panas*; for the use of a winnowing basket, half a *Pana*. Thus has the sage Gaimini declared.

16. A deposit which has been entrusted to a friend, is called a deposit based on confidence.

17. Should a man, after entering the order of religious ascetics, violate the duties of his order, the king should cause him to be branded with a dog's foot and banish him quickly (from his realm).

18. These two persons are (as contemptible as) *Kandālas* for their acts, and should be kept entirely apart from the world: one who has forsaken the order of religious ascetics, and one who has entered an order prohibited in law.

19. He is called Guru (a teacher) who instructs his pupil, duly addressing him in *Prākṛit* or *Samskr̥it*, or employing a local or other dialect.

16, 17. *Vīram*. pp. 406, 407.

18. *Smṛitīk*. dvāṁ eva karmatandālau loke dūrabahishkr̥itau | pravragyopanivṛttas ka vr̥thā pravragitas ka yaś ||

19. *Vīram*. p. 72.

20. When a quarrel has arisen between prostitutes and the lovers frequenting their house, the principal prostitutes and the lovers shall decide the dispute in common.

21. If other persons (than the neighbours) should give false evidence in a dispute concerning land, such low persons shall be condemned to pay the first fine each in his turn.

22. A boundary is declared to be of five sorts, as it may be either marked by signs (such as trees), or by water (of a river), or by articles deposited underground, or subject to no quarrel (being determined by consent of both parties), or fixed by royal command.

23. After having traced those (robbers) with the aid of able spies acquainted with their habits, he shall avoid frightening them, and shall cause them to be arrested by officials secretly set upon them.

24. It is not from the air, from the sky, from the sea, or from other (such parts) that robbers will come; therefore one should act thus.

25. (The king) shall endeavour to inveigle (thieves and robbers) through cunning spies who are anxious to catch thieves. Other skilful and reliable persons also, artful talkers and former thieves, shall (be appointed to) detect the thieves.

26. By giving them wealth and valuable presents,

20. Viv. p. 102; Col. Dig. III, 1, 98; Ratn. p. 167.

21. Vîram. p. 459; Ratn. p. 212. 'Other persons,' i. e. hunters, foresters, and so forth. This text comes in between Nârada XI, 7 and 8.

22. Ratn. p. 214; Vîram. p. 452.

23. Ratn. p. 292.

24. Ratn. p. 335. This text should come in immediately after Nârada XIV, 25.

25-29. Ratn. p. 337. Read *kauryâpadesais ka* in 26.

by causing them to attend at public shows and festivals, and by pretending intended robberies, they shall cause (the thieves) to assemble together.

27. Those who fail to make their appearance on such occasions, though skilful spies have been set on them, shall be arrested together with their sons, kinsmen, and relatives.

28. He shall then arrest the thieves after having convicted and enticed them (to make their appearance), and shall inflict capital punishment on them in various ways, after having proclaimed (their deeds) everywhere.

29. Innocent persons also are seen to mingle with thieves (occasionally); let not the king inflict punishments indiscriminately on such.

BR/HASPATI.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

FRAGMENTS OF *BRĪHASPATI*.

THE fragments of *Brīhaspati* are among the most precious relics of the early legal literature of India. Apart from their intrinsic value and interest, as containing a very full exposition of the whole range of the Hindu law, their close connexion with the Code of Manu gives them a special claim to consideration, and renders them a valuable link in the chain of evidence¹ by which the date of the most authoritative code of ancient India has been approximately determined².

The connexion between the Manu and *Brīhaspati Smṛitis* appears first from the way in which *Brīhaspati* refers to, and quotes from, the Code of Manu. In the chapter on Gambling and Betting, *Brīhaspati* says (XXVI, 1), 'Gambling has been prohibited by Manu, because it destroys truth, honesty, and wealth. It has been permitted by others, when conducted so as to allow the king a share (of every stake).' The observation that Manu disagrees with the other legislators as to the permissibility of gambling is perfectly just. See Manu IX, 221-228; *Yāgñavalkya* II, 199-203; *Āpastamba* II, 25, 12, 13; *Nārada* XVII, 1-8; *Kātyāyana* XXV, 1. *Brīhaspati* goes on to say (XXVI, 2) that 'Gambling shall take place under the superintendence of keepers of gaming-houses, for the purpose of discovering thieves.' This rule agrees almost literally with *Yāgñavalkya* II, 203, and the fact that *Brīhaspati* does not refer to *Yāgñavalkya* by name, although he names Manu, can only be accounted for by his very particular veneration for the latter, as the fountain-head of Sacred Law.—On the

¹ Bühler, *The Laws of Manu* (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxv), pp. cviii-cx.

² What follows up to p. 275 has been reprinted, with modifications and additions, from a paper on 'Manu and *Brīhaspati*,' in the first volume of the *Vienna Zeitschrift f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes*, pp. 275-280.

subject of weights or coins, Brīhaspati says (X, 10), 'The quantities beginning with a floating particle of dust and ending with a Kārshāpāna have been declared by Manu.' The statements of Manu which are thus referred to by Brīhaspati may be found, Manu VIII, 132-137.—In speaking of the Niyoga or appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased husband, Brīhaspati says (XXIV, 12), 'The Niyoga has been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same; on account of the successive deterioration of the (four) ages of the world, it must not take place (in the present or Kali age).' This text shows that the conflicting statements of Manu (IX, 57-68) with regard to the Niyoga, which have been the matter of so much comment among European philologists, had already struck his follower Brīhaspati, and were ingeniously explained by him, in accordance with the practice of his own times.—In the chapter on Inheritance (XXV, 33), Brīhaspati observes that out of the thirteen sons declared by Manu, a legitimate son of the body (aurasa) and an appointed daughter (putrikā) are the only ones that represent real issue. It is true that Manu (IX, 158, 180) speaks emphatically of twelve sons only, but the appointed daughter or her son is not among these, and he advocates in strong terms the rights of an appointed daughter's son (IX, 127-140), and cuts down very much the rights of all the other substitutes for a son (IX, 180, 181). This shows that Brīhaspati's rules on this head are perfectly in keeping with the teaching of Manu.—In the chapter on Sale without Ownership (XIII, 1) he refers to Manu (VIII, 197) by the name of Bhrīgu.

Secondly, in a number of other instances, the Code of Manu, though not appealed to by name, is nevertheless distinctly referred to by Brīhaspati. Thus, in the chapter on Inheritance (XXV, 79), he observes that 'those by whom clothes and so forth have been declared impartible have not decided properly.' The well-known *versus memorialis* concerning impartible property, the contents of which are further discussed in the sequel by Brīhaspati, occurs both in the Code of Manu (IX, 219) and

Indirect
references.

in the *Vishnu-smṛiti* ; and it may be presumed either that the authors of these two works are the authorities referred to by *Bṛihaspati*, or that *Manu* is referred to in the pluralis majestatis, as is often the case with teachers. The reason why *Manu* is not referred to by name may be sought in the fact that *Bṛihaspati* does not care to openly avow his dissent from so eminent an authority.—In the chapter on Debts, *Bṛihaspati* remarks (XI, 4) that interest is divided into four species by some, into five by others, and by others again into six sorts. Four sorts of interest are mentioned by *Manu*, VIII, 153.—In the chapter on Inheritance (XXV, 35), he declares that an appointed daughter or her son has been pronounced equal to a legitimate son of the body. The rights of an appointed daughter, as shown before, are laid great stress upon by *Manu*, and he actually states that an (appointed) daughter is equal to a son (IX, 130).

Thirdly, *Bṛihaspati*, even when not expressly referring to *Manu*, presupposes throughout an acquaintance with his Code, and a very large portion of his *Smṛiti* is devoted to the interpretation of technical terms or to the elucidation or amplification of the somewhat laconic enunciations of *Manu*. Thus, for example, in the chapter on Debts (XI, 5–11), he explains, comments on, and amplifies the four sorts of interest mentioned by *Manu* (VIII, 153). In the same chapter (XI, 55–58) he interprets the curious terms used by *Manu* (VIII, 49) to denote the various modes of recovering an outstanding debt. In the chapter on Sale without Ownership (XIII, 2), he explains the technical term *asvâmin*, ‘another person than the owner,’ which had been first used by *Manu*. From the general maxim of *Manu* (VIII, 2, 11) that the allotment of shares among partners in any undertaking shall be arranged in the same way as for a company of officiating priests, *Bṛihaspati* (XIV, 20–32) has developed a series of elaborate rules regarding partnership in tillage, workmanship, trade, musical performances, and robbery. In the same way, the threefold law of breach of promised obedience, non-payment of wages, and disputes between the owner of cattle and his servants has been

developed by *Brīhaspati* (XVI, 1, 2) from Manu's two titles of non-payment of wages and disputes between master and servant. An analogous course of development may be observed in the chapters on Ordeals, Resumption of Gift, and Violation of Agreements, as compared to the scanty provisions of Manu (VIII, 114-116, 212-214, 218-221) on the same subjects. In the chapter on Boundary Disputes, Manu's technical term *maula*, 'an original inhabitant of a place,' is interpreted by *Brīhaspati* (XIX, 12). It would be easy to multiply examples. One more analogy between the Manu and *Brīhaspati Smṛitis* seems to be specially deserving of notice. Both agree in arranging the whole field of legal controversies under eighteen heads, and it appears from the introductory verses to several chapters (XII, 1; XIII, 1; XV, 1; XVI, 1; XVII, 1, &c.) that *Brīhaspati* was anxious to discuss the eighteen titles of law in the same order as Manu. Nevertheless, he applies an interesting new principle of division to the eighteen titles of law by distinguishing fourteen titles relating to civil law, and four titles relating to criminal law (II, 3-9), and introduces a number of subdivisions (II, 2, 10; XVI, 1-3; XXII, 1, 2).

Fourthly, *Brīhaspati* declares emphatically that any *Smṛiti* text opposed to the teaching of Manu has no validity (XXVII, 4).

Under these circumstances the tradition preserved in the *Skanda-purāṇa* that there are four versions of the Code of

Result. Manu, by *Bhrigu*, *Nārada*, *Brīhaspati*, and *Āṅgiras*, acquires a peculiar significance.

Taking the version attributed to *Bhrigu* to be identical with the Code of Manu, the *soi-disant* composition of *Bhrigu*, it is impossible to doubt its connexion with the *Nārada*¹ and *Brīhaspati Smṛitis*. It is but natural to find, therefore, that *Nārada* and *Brīhaspati* agree very closely inter se, as e.g. in adding a title called 'Miscellaneous' to Manu's eighteen titles of law (*Brīhaspati* XXVII, 1), in enumerating and describing three sorts of proof, eleven or twelve kinds of witnesses, eight or ten 'members of a lawsuit,' four parts of a judicial proceeding, four sorts of answer in a suit,

¹ See above, Introduction to *Nārada*.

various 'defects of a plaint,' three kinds of officiating priests, four species of gifts, four divisions of violence (*sâhasa*), five modes of recovery of a debt, &c. Many other analogies between the two works may be gathered from a mere cursory comparison of their contents; they agree particularly in the use of many technical terms. One of these, the designation of a gold coin by the Roman or Greek term *dînâra*, i. e. *denarius* (X, 15), is an important test for the date of both works, and compels us to refer the earlier date of the composition of *Brîhaspati's* law-book to the first century A. D., the period to which belong the earliest Indian coins corresponding in weight to the gold *denarius* of the Romans¹. As regards the lower limit, one might feel inclined to assign an earlier date to *Brîhaspati* than to *Nârada*, on the ground of his being a faithful follower of *Manu* in a far higher degree than is *Nârada*, who differs from *Manu* on such important points as the names and order of several titles of law, the legitimacy of the *Niyoga*, &c.² Nevertheless, the enlightened views of *Brîhaspati* on the subject of women's rights³, and the advanced character of his teaching generally, render it probable that his learned composition belongs to a somewhat more recent period than the *Nârada-smṛiti*.

The fact that *Brîhaspati* was considered an inspired writer by the very earliest commentators of law-books, such as e.g. by *Medhâtithi* (ninth century), proves him to have preceded those commentators by several centuries. An analogous result may be obtained by comparing the laws of *Brîhaspati* with the corresponding portions of the Burmese *Dhammathats*, the Buddhist Indian originals of which, according to Dr. Forchhammer, were composed in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. The coincidences between *Brîhaspati* and the *Dhammathats* are both numerous and striking⁴. It may be added that

¹ West and Bühler, *Digest of the Hindu Law*, I, p. 48; Jolly, *Tagore Lect.* p. 56.

² See above, Introduction to *Nârada*. ³ Jolly, *Tagore Lectures*, pp. 193, 241.

⁴ Several coincidences between *Brîhaspati* and the *Wagaru*, the earliest law-book of Burma, have been collected by Dr. Forchhammer, *Jardine Prize Essay*, pp. 55, 57, 58. For other examples, see Dr. Forchhammer's edition of the *Wagaru*, pp. 12 (gifts), 36 (twelve witnesses), &c.

the judicial proceeding described in the well-known drama *Mṛikkhakatika* corresponds to the rules laid down by *Bṛihaspati*, as has been shown elsewhere. For all these reasons, the composition of the *Bṛihaspati-smṛiti* cannot be referred to a later period than the sixth or seventh century A.D.

Hitherto, those texts of *Bṛihaspati* have been entirely left aside which relate to other parts of the sacred law than Civil and Criminal Law and Procedure. Hemādri's *Katurvarga-kintāmani*, Devāṇḍabhaṭṭa's *Smṛitīkandrikā*, and most other standard Dharmanibandhas contain a number of texts of *Bṛihaspati* on Dāna, Vrata, Prāyaskitta, and all other parts of the religious law. However, an examination of these texts has yielded no definite result, and they are not sufficiently numerous by far to admit of reconstructing the purely religious portion of the ancient *Bṛihaspati-smṛiti* from them. Nor is it at all improbable that the legal texts of *Bṛihaspati* may have formed an independent work from the outset, just like the *Nārada-smṛiti*, or like the Burmese Dhammathats, in which forensic law was treated by itself, without any admixture of religious elements.

The legal texts attributed to *Bṛihaspati* are so numerous as to make up in their entirety a law-book which contains a full exposition of forensic law, hardly inferior in size to the *Nārada-smṛiti*. The principles on which the texts have been collected and arranged are the same as in the case of the Quotations from *Nārada*. The preservation of the introductory texts to several titles of law, and the occurrence of many long series of consecutive texts of *Bṛihaspati* in the Dharmanibandhas, facilitate considerably the task of arrangement, though the original position of many texts in *Bṛihaspati*'s Dharmaśāstra must needs remain doubtful. For the chapter on Inheritance the following other works have been used, besides those consulted for the Quotations from *Nārada*: G. Sarkar's translation of the *Vīramitrodaya* on Inheritance (V.); Dr. Burnell's *Mādhaviya* and *Varadarāga*; Professor Bühler's edition of the *Ugvalā* of Haradatta; Haradatta's *Gautamiyā Mitāksharā* (MS.); Nandapāṇḍita's *Vaigayanti* (MS.).

BRĪHASPATI.

I. CONSTITUTION OF A COURT OF JUSTICE.

1. In former ages men were strictly virtuous and devoid of mischievous propensities. Now that avarice and malice have taken possession of them, judicial proceedings have been established.

2. A judicial assembly is declared to be of four sorts : stationary, not stationary, furnished with (the king's) signet-ring, and directed (by the king). The judges are of as many sorts.

3. A stationary (court meets) in a town or village; one not stationary is called movable ; one furnished with (the king's) signet-ring is superintended by the chief judge ; one directed (by the king) is held in the king's presence.

4. The king, his chosen representative (the chief judge), the judges, the law (*Smṛiti*), the accountant and scribe, gold, fire, water, and the king's own officer are ten members of legal procedure.

5. A court of justice is composed of these ten members ; and a judicial assembly of this sort, in which the king examines causes attentively, is comparable to an act of religion.

I, 1. *Vīram*. p. 5.

2-10. *Smṛitīk*.

2, 3. *Aparārka*. *pratish/hitāpratish/hitā mudritā sāsītā tathā* । *āturvidhā sabhā proktā sabhyās kaiva tathāvidhā* ॥ *pratish/hitā pure grāme kalā nāmāpratish/hitā* । *mudritādhyakshasamyutā rāga-yuktā ka sāsītā* ॥ The *Smṛitīkandrikā* reads *sāstritā*, 'governed by the science of law,' for *sāsītā*, 'directed.'

4-10. *Vīram*. pp. 41, 42.

6. The office of these ten (members) is separately declared for each. The chief judge decides causes; the king inflicts punishments; the judges investigate the merits of the case.

7. The law furnishes the decree, whether victory or defeat; gold and fire serve the purpose of administering ordeals; water is required for persons suffering from thirst or hunger.

8. The accountant should compute the sum (in dispute); the scribe should record the proceedings; the king's own officer should compel the attendance of the defendant, assessors, and witnesses.

9. And he should constantly keep both the plaintiff and defendant in custody, if they have given no sureties. Of these members (of a court of justice) the king is the head; the chief judge is the mouth;

10. The judges are both arms; the law is both hands; the accountant and the scribe are the legs; gold, fire, and water are the eyes and the heart; and the king's own officer is the feet.

11. That judicial assembly is equal (in sanctity) to a sacrificial meeting in which there sit seven or five or three Brahmans, who are acquainted with the world, with (the contents of) the Veda, and with law.

12. In a controversy he examines the (plaint in) question and the answer; he speaks gently at first

11. M. Macn. I, 1, 11.

12. Vîram. p. 37. If the reading be correct, a double etymology of the term *prâdvivâka*, 'a judge,' is propounded in this text: (1) he who asks or examines (*prikkhati*) and afterwards decides (*vadati*); (2) he who speaks gently at first (*prâg vadati*). There is another reading, *pravadati* for *prâg vadati*, under which the former etymology is the only one propounded in this text. It is beyond doubt the true etymology.

(prâg vadati). Therefore he is called Prâdvivâka (judge).

13. Men qualified by the performance of devotional acts, strictly veracious and virtuous, void of wrath and covetousness, and familiar with (legal) lore, should be appointed by the ruler as judges (or assessors of the court).

14. Two persons thoroughly familiar with grammar and vocabulary, skilled in (the art of) computation, honest, and acquainted with various modes of writing, should be appointed by the king as accountant and scribe (respectively).

15. A veracious man, who pays obedience to the judges, should be appointed (by the king) as his own officer, to summon and to keep in custody the witnesses, plaintiff, and defendant.

16. The king should sit facing the east; the judges, facing the north; the accountant, facing the west; and the scribe, facing the south.

17. The king should cause gold, fire, water, and codes of the sacred law to be placed in the midst of them, also (other) holy and auspicious things.

18. In the middle of his fortress, he should build a house, with water and trees adjacent to it, apart (from other buildings), and let him use as court of justice (a room situated) on the eastern side of it, properly constituted and facing the east,

19. Furnished with garlands and with a throne,

13. Aparârka. sâdhukarmakriyâyuktâḥ satyadharmaparâyanâḥ | akrodhalobhâḥ sâstragñâḥ sabhyâḥ kâr्या mahibhugâ ||

14, 15. Vîram. p. 42.

15, 16. May. p. 4 (Mandlik).^c

17. Smṛitiḥ. hiranyam agnim udakam dharmasâstrâni kaiva hi | tanmadhye sthâpayed râgâḥ puṇyâni ka hitâni ka ||

18, 19. Vîram. p. 10. The epithet lakṣhanyâm, 'properly con-

supplied with grain, (decorated) with jewels, adorned with statues, pictures, and images of deities, and (provided) with fire and water.

20. Let the king try causes, attended by three judges, after having entered the excellent judicial assembly, in a sitting or standing posture.

21. The king having risen early in the morning and performed ablutions according to rule, and having shown due honour to Gurus (persons entitled to respect), astronomers, physicians, deities, Brahmans, and domestic priests,

22. And having saluted the Gurus and the rest, should enter the court-room, decorated with flowers, ornaments, and (fine) clothes, with a cheerful countenance.

23. Having entered the judicial assembly in the forenoon, together with the seniors, ministers, and attendants, he should try causes and should listen to (the expositions of) the *Purāṇas*, codes of law, and rules of polity.

24. Let the king or a member of a twice-born caste officiating as chief judge try causes, acting on principles of equity, and abiding by the opinion of the judges, and by the doctrine of the sacred law.

stituted,' means 'constructed according to the rules of architecture.' *Vīram*.

20. *Smṛitiḥ. rāgā kāryāni sampasyet sabhyair eva tribhir vṛitāḥ | sabhām eva pravisyāgryām āsīnaḥ sthita eva vā ||* Nearly identical with *Manu VIII, 10*.

21, 22. *Smṛitiḥ. prātar utthāya nrīpatiḥ sauḥam kr̥tvā vidhānataḥ | gurūṣṇ gyoṭirvido vaidyān devān viprān purohitān || yathāham etān sampūgya sapuṣhpābharanāmbaraḥ | abhivādya ka gurvādīn sumukhaḥ praviset sabhām ||*

23. *May. p. 5.*

24. *Smṛitiḥ. rāgā kāryāni sampasyet prādvivākoṭthavā dvigaḥ | nyāyāṅgāny agrataḥ kr̥tvā sabhyarāstramate sthitaḥ ||*

25. For persons roaming the forest, a court should be held in the forest ; for warriors, in the camp ; and for merchants, in the caravan.

26. Cultivators, artizans (such as carpenters or others), artists, money-lenders, companies (of tradesmen), dancers, persons wearing the token of a religious order (such as Pâsupatas), and robbers should adjust their disputes according to the rules of their own profession.

27. (The king) should cause the disputes of ascetics and of persons versed in sorcery and witchcraft to be settled by persons familiar with the three Vedas only, and not (decide them) himself, for fear of rousing their resentment.

28. Relatives, companies (of artizans), assemblies (of co-habitants) and other persons duly authorized by the king, should decide lawsuits among men, excepting causes concerning violent crimes (sâhasa).

29. (Meetings of) kindred, companies (of artizans), assemblies (of co-habitants), and chief judges, are declared to be resorts for the passing of a sentence, to whom he whose cause has been previously tried may appeal in succession.

30. When a cause has not been (duly) investigated by (meetings of) kindred, it should be decided after due deliberation by companies (of artizans) ; when it has not been (duly) examined by companies (of artizans, it should be decided) by assemblies (of co-habitants) ; and when it has not been (sufficiently) made out by such assemblies, (it should be tried) by appointed (judges).

31. Judges are superior in authority to (meetings of) kindred and the rest ; the chief judge is placed above them ; and the king is superior to all, because he passes just sentences.

32. The insight of princes surpasses by far the understandings (of other persons), in the decision of the highest, lowest, and middling controversies.

33. They who are ignorant of the customs of the country, unbelievers, despisers of the sacred books, insane, irate, avaricious, or troubled (by pain or illness) should not be consulted in the decision of a cause.

34. A Brahman is the root of the tree of justice ; the sovereign prince is its stem and branches ; the ministers are its leaves and blossoms ; just government is its fruit.

35. Renown and wealth are the sap of its fruit ; a dignified station, invincibility, esteem among men, and an eternal residence in paradise is enjoying its fruit.

36. Having recognised these advantages in (the pursuit of) justice, a king should be equitable towards litigants, and should pass a just sentence, discarding avarice and other (evil propensities).

II. GENERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.

1. This legal procedure is declared, however, to be divided into a number of branches. Hear, now,

33. *Smṛitiḥ. darākārānabhiḡñā ye nāstikāḥ sāstravargitāḥ | unmattakruddhalubdhārtā na prashavyā vinirṇaye ||*

34-36. *Vīram. p. 14. Read bhogo+tha grahapūganam in 35 ; vivādinām | tyaktvā lobhādikam rāgā dharmyam in 36.*

II, 1, 2. Vīram. p. 292.

its various divisions which may become the causes of lawsuits.

2. I will proclaim in due order, according to truth, (the titles of law) beginning with the recovery of a debt and ending with (the title of) gambling with dice and betting on animals, as well as the subdivisions of the titles of law.

3. When a master pays wages to the labourers hired by him, for the purpose of doing work, and the labourers do not work, a lawsuit will arise in consequence.

4. When any man injures (another), or when he refuses to give what he ought to give: such are the two principal motives for going to law. Their subdivisions are manifold.

5. Lawsuits are of two kinds, according as they originate in (demands regarding) wealth or in injuries. Lawsuits originating in wealth are (divided again) into fourteen sorts; those originating in injuries are of four sorts.

6. Lending money at interest; deposits (and treasure-trove); (the title) called invalid gifts; concerns of a partnership; non-payment of wages; disobedience; disputes concerning land; sale without ownership;

7. Revocation of sale and purchase; breach of

3, 4. *Smṛitiḥ. prayakṣheḥ kēd bhr̥tīm svāmī bhr̥tyānām karma kurvatām | na kurvanti ka bhr̥tyās ket tatra vādaḥ pravartate || himsām yo kurute kaskid deyam vā na prayakṣhati | dve hi sthāne vivādasya tayoṛ bahutarā gatiḥ ||*

5-9. *Smṛitiḥ. dvipādo vyavahāraḥ syād dhanahimsāsamudbhavaḥ | dvisaptako rthamūlas tu himsāmulas katurvidhaḥ || kusīdanidhyadeyākhyam sambhūyotthānam eva ka | bhr̥tyadānam asurūśā bhūvādo svāmivikrayaḥ || krayavikrayānusrayaḥ samayātikra-*

agreements; the law between wife and husband; theft; the law of inheritance; and gambling with dice.

8. These are the fourteen titles of law that originate in (demands regarding) wealth. There are again various subdivisions of them, owing to the diversity of lawsuits.

9. The two kinds of insult; violence; and criminal connexion with the wife of another man: these have been declared by Bṛhaspati to be the four titles of law originating in injury.

10. Each of them embraces again several different kinds, according as they are of a superior, middling, or of the lowest description. Thus are those four subdivided each in its turn.

11. Those who understand the eighteen titles of law, as proclaimed in the law-books, to be at the root of all lawsuits, are intelligent men indeed.

12. No sentence should be passed merely according to the letter of the law. If a decision is arrived at without considering the circumstances of the case, violation of justice will be the result.

13. The issue of a lawsuit may convert a thief into an honest man, and an honourable man into an

mas tathâ | strîpumsayogaḥ steyam ka dâyabhâgo-kshadevanam ||
evam arthasamutthâni padâni tu katurdasa | punar eva prabhinnâni
kriyâbhedâd anekadhâ || pârushye dve sâhasas ka parastrîsam-
grahas tathâ | himsodbhavapadâny evam kâtvâry âha bṛhaspatiḥ ||

10, 11. Smṛitiḥ. hīnamadhyottamatvena prabhinnâni prīṭhak
prīṭhak | viresha eṣhâm nirdish/as katurṇâm apy anukramât ||
padâny ashvâdaraitâni dharmasâstroditâni tu | mûlam sarvavivâdâ-
nâm ye vidus te parikshakâḥ ||

12-14. Vīram. p. 18. See Nārada I, 1, 42, 71 (above, pp. 16, 23). For the story of Māṇḍavya, who was falsely charged with theft, see *ibid.* p. 16, note.

offender. *Māṇḍavya* acquired the reputation of a thief in consequence of a decision passed without considering the circumstances of the case.

14. Dishonest men may seem honest, and honest men dishonest, so that wrong notions may be easily created; therefore sentences should be passed after due consideration of the circumstances only.

15. By killing an aggressor, a man does not commit sin by any means. He who takes the life of one approaching with intent to murder him is no offender.

16. If one abused returns the abuse, or if one struck strikes again, and kills the assailant, such a man commits no offence.

17. He who refrains from killing an aggressor who abuses him aloud, and is ready to murder him, (because the aggressor) is a virtuous man (otherwise) and practices regularly the recitation of the Veda, obtains the same reward as for performing a horse-sacrifice.

18. The judgment in a doubtful matter is declared to be of four sorts, according as it is based on moral law, or on the issue of the case, or on custom, or on an edict from the king.

19. Each of these has been declared to be twofold by the sages, owing to the diversity of legal affairs.

20. When the matter in dispute has been decided according to equity, after due deliberation, and

15. *Vîram*. p. 24.

16. *Raghunandana*, p. 9.

17. *Vîram*. p. 25.

18. *Vîram*. p. 8. See *Nârada* I, 1, 11 (above, p. 7).

19-24. *Vîram*. pp. 118, 119. I read, with *Smṛiti*, *divyair vâ sodhita* in 21; *pramâṇanishkito* in 22; and *pramâṇarahitâ* in 24.

20, 21. The first kind is when the truth has been duly ascer-

thoroughly examined by means of oaths (or ordeals), it should be known to be a judgment based on moral law.

21. When the defendant admits the accusation, or furnishes clear evidence of his innocence through performing an ordeal, it should be known to be another sort of a decision based on moral law.

22. A sentence founded on an examination of the evidence is termed (a decision based on) the issue of the case. When (the defendant) tells a lie, or makes no answer, it is also termed (a decision based on the issue of the case).

23. When a sentence is passed according to the inference (to be drawn from circumstantial evidence), it is termed (a decision based on) custom. When it is passed according to local usages, it is termed another sort (of a decision based on custom) by the learned in law.

24. A decision based on an edict from the king is ordained, first, for those cases in which no evidence is forthcoming. When the law-books or the judges are at variance with one another, the second sort (of this species of decisions) is said to be applicable.

25. When a sentence is passed exclusively according to the letter of the law, it should be con-

tained and a sentence passed accordingly. The second kind is when no examination of the facts takes place, the question being settled either through a confession on the part of the defendant, or through the performance of an ordeal. *Smṛitīkandrikā*.

22. The evidence here referred to can be human evidence only, i. e. the deposition of witnesses, documents, or possession, divine test being referred to in the two preceding texts. *Smṛitīk*.

23. 'Inference,' such as when a man is caught with a firebrand in his hand. *Smṛitīk*. See *Nārada* I, 18, 172-175 (above, pp. 85, 86).

25-27. *Vīram*. pp. 120, 121.

sidered as (a decision based on) the issue of the case. Moral law is overruled by it.

26. When a decision is passed in accordance with local custom, logic, or the opinion of the traders (living in that town), the issue of the case is overruled by it.

27. Where the king, disregarding established usage, passes a sentence (according to his own inclination), it is (called) an edict from the king, and local custom is overruled by it.

28. The time-honoured institutions of each country, caste, and family should be preserved intact; otherwise the people would rise in rebellion; the subjects would become disaffected towards their rulers; and the army and treasure would be destroyed.

29. The maternal uncle's daughter is taken in marriage among the twice-born inhabitants of the South. In the central country (Madhyadesa), they become labourers or artisans, and eat cows.

30. The inhabitants of the East are fish-eaters, and their women engage in promiscuous intercourse. In the North the women take intoxicating drinks, and in their courses have intercourse with men.

31. The people of Khasa marry the widow of a brother who has died. These men are not subject to the performance of a penance or to punishment on account of any such offence.

32. Thus has legal procedure with its manifold

28-31. *Vīram.* p. 29; *May.* p. 5. I read *pūrve* for *sarve* in 30, with *Mayākhya*, *Kalpataru*, and other compilations. *Baudhāyana* I, 2, 1-7.

32. *Smṛitiḥ evam kānekadhā prokto vyavahāro manishibhiḥ | tasya nirnayakṛid rāgā brāhmaṇas ka bahusrutaḥ ||*

ramifications been represented by the sages. The sentence in a legal controversy has to be passed by the king or by a Brahman thoroughly versed in the Veda.

33. Against whomsoever an accusation has been raised, whether founded on fact or on suspicion, let the king summon that man either through (a letter signed with) his seal or through an attendant.

34. For one timorous, or idiotic, or mad, or over-aged, and for women, boys, and sick persons, a kinsman or appointed agent should proffer the plaint or answer (as their representative).

35. When a man who has a family and relations does not appear before the court through pride after having been summoned, (the king or judge) should inflict on him punishment corresponding to the nature of the accusation.

36. (The plaintiff) is not permitted to put under restraint a person engaged in study; nor one about to marry; nor one sick; nor one afflicted by sorrow; nor one insane; nor an infant; nor one intoxicated; nor a very old man; nor one charged with a crime; nor one engaged in the king's service; nor one performing a vow;

37. Nor a soldier at the time of battle; nor a husbandman at the time of harvest; nor one in a perilous situation; nor a (respectable) woman; nor one not his own master,

38. A king thus obeying the dictates of law in passing sentences, acquires widespread renown in

33. Vīram. p. 52.

35. May. p. 8.

38. Vīram. p. 125.

34. Vīram. p. 53.

36, 37. Vīram. p. 56.

this world and becomes an associate of great Indra (after death).

39. He who effects a perfect cure, by the application of surgical instruments smeared with the ointment of law, of persons blinded by ignorance, and whose eyes are veiled with a mist of doubt,

40. Obtains fame and royal favours in this world and a residence in heaven. Therefore should a decision be passed for those who are blinded by doubt.

41. An officiating priest and one entrusted with the trial of causes are declared to be equal. In a sacrifice, the sacrificer acquires religious merit; in a lawsuit, (the parties obtain) defeat or victory.

42. He who, divesting himself of avarice, hatred, and other (evil propensities), passes sentences according to the dictates of law, obtains the same reward as for the performance of a sacrifice.

III. THE PLAINT.

1. The part called the declaration; the part called the answer; the part called the trial; and the part called the deliberation of the judges regarding the onus probandi: these are the four parts of a judicial proceeding.

2. The plaint is called the (first) part; the answer is the second part; the trial is the third part; and the judgment is the fourth part.

39, 40. Raghunandana, p. 3. I read *svargatim* for *sadgatim*, with *Smṛitiḥ*.

41. Raghunandana, p. 7.

42. *Smṛitiḥ*. *lobhadvēṣhādīkam tyaktvā yaḥ kuryât kâryanirṇayam | jāstrodītena vidhinâ tasya yagñaphalam bhavet ||*

III, 1, 2. Vīram. pp. 59, 60.

3. In the case of a denial, (a judicial proceeding) consists of four parts; likewise, in the case of a special plea; the same rule applies to a plea of former judgment; but in the case of a confession, it has two parts only.

4. When plaintiff and defendant come together, each claiming to be first, their declarations should be received in the order of their castes, or after considering their respective grievances.

5. Those acquainted with (the true nature of) a plaint declare that to be a (proper) plaint, which is free from the defects of a declaration, susceptible of proof, provided with good arguments, precise, and reasonable,

6. Brief in words, rich in contents, unambiguous, free from confusion, devoid of improper arguments, and capable of meeting opposite arguments;

7. When a plaint of this description has been proffered by the plaintiff, the defendant should tender an answer conformable to such plaint.

3. *Vīram*. p. 59.

4. *Vīram*. p. 60. 'When Brahmans and others have entered the judicial assembly simultaneously, the four parts of a judicial proceeding should be instituted in the order of their castes, the Brahman's cause being tried first of all by the king, then the Kshatriya's, and so on, in the order (of their castes). If the comparative importance or heaviness of the respective grievances of each party differs, the order in which the causes are tried is not made to depend either on the relative priority of each declaration, or on the respective caste of the parties. If they are all of equal caste, the relative priority of the declarations is taken into account. If the declarations have been simultaneous, and if the litigants are equal in caste, and their grievances are also equal, the order is made to depend on the choice of the judge and of the assessors of the court.' *Vīram*.

5-7. *Raghunandana*, p. 12.

8. The above and other qualities (of a plaint) having been duly considered, a plaint (containing them) may be regarded as a proper plaint; one not answering this description is a mere semblance of a plaint.

9. That (plaint) which (mentions an act that) has never been done by anybody is called impossible; one referring to a slight offence, or to a trifling sum, is called unmeaning; one in which neither a demand nor a grievance is referred to, should be known to be purposeless.

10. (Or) that plaint is unmeaning which does not concern one of the (fourteen) titles of law relating to the lending of money at interest and so forth; and that plaint is purposeless which does not concern one of the (four) titles of law relating to insult and so forth.

11. (When a claimant declares): This man is bound to give me a bow made of the horn of a hare, the wise declare such a plaint to be unreasonable and unsusceptible of proof.

12. When the interests of a town or kingdom are violated by bringing a certain plaint before a chief judge or before the king, it is termed a plaint contrary (to equity).

13. When a man, (whether) acting as plaintiff (or as defendant), is forsaken by his strength on being about to make a statement in a suit, it is proper

8. *Smṛitiḥ*. *evamādi guṇān samyag ālokya ka suniṣṭitam | pakṣaḥ kṛtaḥ samādeyaḥ pakṣābhāsas tv ato-nyathā ||*

9. *Vīram*. p. 66.

10. *Vīram*. p. 67. Regarding the titles of law, see *Bṛhaspati*, II, 5-9.

11, 12. *Vīram*. p. 67.

13. *Raghunandana*, p. 11.

that a delay should be granted to him, according to circumstances and according to his ability.

14. Let him remove superfluous statements and amplify incomplete ones, and let him write down (everything) on the floor, till the (whole) matter has been definitely stated.

15. The plaintiff is at liberty to alter his declaration, when it is defective or redundant, till the defendant has tendered his answer in the presence of the judges.

16. When the plaintiff through timorousness does not dare to speak, it devolves on the judges to amend his declaration, according to the circumstances of the case.

17. A charge founded on suspicion, (one founded on) fact, a petition regarding the recovery of a debt, and claiming a fresh trial of a cause previously tried : thus a plaint is represented as fourfold.

18. The plaint is fourfold, and so is the answer ; the judgment is declared to be of four kinds also ; by some it is represented as being of eight sorts.

19. Suspicion is explained to mean doubt ; fact is (said to be) an insight into the real nature of a matter ; a petition regarding the recovery of a debt is (plea of) error ; a fresh trial is the repetition of a previous trial.

IV. THE ANSWER.

1. When the plaint has been well defined, a clear exposition given of what is claimed and what not, and the meaning of the plaint fully established, (the

14. Vīram. p. 70.

16-19. Vīram. p. 71.

15. Raghunandana, p. 14.

IV, 1. Vīram. p. 72.

judge) shall then cause the answer to be written (by the defendant).

2. If the defendant does not make an answer fully meeting the contents of the plaint, he shall be compelled to pay by gentle remonstrances, and the other (two) methods (to be indicated directly).

3. Kindly speeches are gentle remonstrances; intimidation is pointing out dangers; force consists of depriving one of his property, or striking, or binding him.

4. When a man makes no answer, though both (mild and harsh methods) have been adopted against him, he is defeated, and liable to punishment after the lapse of a week.

5. When the defendant asks for a delay through (natural) timidity, or terror, or because his memory has been deranged, the delay shall be granted to him.

6. He should be allowed (a delay extending to) one day, or three days, or five days, or seven days, or a fortnight, or a month, or three seasons (equalling six months), or a year, according to his ability.

7. The insane and intoxicated, those abandoned by their relatives or friends, those charged with a heavy crime, idiots, persons cast off from society, and infants, should be considered unable to deliver an answer.

8. One should not cause to be written an answer

2-4. *Vîram*. p. 74.

5, 6. *Vîram*. p. 138.

7. *Tod*. *unmattamattanirdhûtâ mahâpâtakadûshitâh* । *gadâpa-viddhabâlâs ka vigñeyâs te niruttarâh* ॥ Such persons should appoint an agent to deliver the answer in their place. *Tod*.

8. *Smṛitiḥ*. *prastutânyam ka madhyastham nyûnâdhikam asam-gatam* । *avyâpyasâram samdigdham pratipaksham na lekhayet* ॥

which wanders from the subject, or which is not to the point, too confined or too extensive, or not in conformity with the plaint, or not thorough enough, or absurd, or ambiguous.

9. If (the defendant) confesses, he shall state his confession; in the case of a denial, he shall cause (his denial) to be written; and so (should he record) his special plea in an answer by special plea, and his previous victory in an answer by previous victory.

10. A denial called forth by fear (of punishment) is contemptible in the eyes of men familiar with law; a true confession is declared to be meritorious.

11. In a plea by victory in a former trial, a true statement is praised by the virtuous; a false one is sinful and causes the defeat of the defendant.

V. THE TRIAL.

1. When litigants are quarrelling in a court of justice, the judges, after examining the answer, shall adjudge the burden of proof to either of the two parties.

2. The judges having heard both the plaint and the answer, and determined to which party the burden of proof shall be adjudged, that person shall substantiate the whole of his declaration by documents or other proofs.

3. The plaintiff shall prove his declaration, and

9-11. *Tod. tathye tathyam prayuṅgīta mithyâyām kâpi lekhayet | kâranam kâranopete prâggaye tu gayam tathâ || bhayadrish/odbhavâ mithyâ garhitâ sâstravedibhiḥ | satyâ sampratipattis tu dharmyâ sâ parikîrtitâ || prânnyâyakarane tathyam slâghyam sadbhir udâhṛitam | viparītam adharmyam syât pratyarthî hânim âpnuyât ||*

V, 1-3. Vîram. pp. 92, 93.

the defendant his special plea; victory in a previous trial shall be proved by a document recording that victory.

4. When people try to excite fear, or to cause dissension, or terror (among the judges or witnesses), or to throw (other) obstacles in their way, such litigants lose their suit.

5. One who absconds after receiving the summons; one who remains silent; one convicted (of a crime) by the (depositions of) witnesses; and one who admits the correctness of the charge: such are the four losers of their suit.

6. One who absconds loses the suit after three fortnights; one who remains silent, after a week; and one convicted by the witnesses, or confessing his crime, all at once.

7. He who announces witnesses and does not produce them afterwards, within thirty days or three fortnights, suffers defeat in consequence.

8. When a person has promised to appear at a trial or for the performance of an ordeal, and does not make his appearance, it must not be viewed as fraud.

9. If an obstacle caused by fate or the king should intervene during that time, he does not lose his cause through the mere non-observance of the fixed period.

10. Those (litigants) who make a private arrangement with one another, when the plaint and the

4. *Vīram.* p. 99.

5. *Vīram.* p. 102.

6, 7. *Vīram.* p. 102.

8. *Vīram.* p. 103. I read *kr̥itvopasthānanis̥kayam* | with *Smṛitīkandrikā*.

9. *Vīram.* p. 103.

10. *Vīram.* p. 103.

answer have been delivered, and the judgment is about to be given, shall be compelled to pay twice the amount (in dispute) as a fine.

11. When the plaint and the answer have been reduced to writing, and the trial has commenced, the two parties may be welded together like two pieces of red-hot iron.

12. While both parties are in suspense there regarding the (approaching declarations of the) witnesses and judges, those litigants are clever who arrive at a mutual understanding while the uncertainty lasts.

13. When the evidence is equally strong on both sides, and law and custom divided, in such a case a mutual reconciliation between the two parties through royal order is recommended.

14. Gain of religious merit and wealth, and renown accrues to the ruler from an equitable decision; the witnesses and assessors are exempt from censure, and enmity ceases,

15. When an unfavourable or a favourable decree, punishment or praise, renown or infamy has been obtained; whereas (continued) strife among men leads to sin.

16. Therefore should an intelligent (prince) enact that which has been propounded by dutiful and equitable associations, corporations, and chief judges, (in an impartial spirit) devoid of malice and avarice.

11-16. *Vīram*. p. 104. Read *dvayoh samtaptayoh* in 11, with *Smṛtīkandrikā*.

12. The translation follows the gloss of the *Kalpataru*, as quoted in the *Vīramitrodaya*. The *Ratnākara* (*ibid.*) translates the first half as follows: 'When the witnesses and judges are at variance with one another.'

17. Evidence is declared to be twofold, human and divine. Each of these is again divided into a number of branches by sages declaring the essence of things.

18. Human evidence is threefold, as it consists of witnesses, writings, and inference. Witnesses are of twelve sorts; writings are declared to be tenfold; inference is twofold; divine test is ninefold.

19. In the case of an answer of the first or third kinds, divine and human proof should be employed; but in the case of an answer of the fourth kind, an attested document recording the success of either party should be produced.

20. In the cases of a plea of former judgment and of a special plea, the defendant shall prove the contents of his answer; but in the case of a denial, the plaintiff shall prove the contents of the plaint.

VI. THE JUDGMENT.

1. He is said to have gained his cause in this world who has proved his claim, and has been honourably dismissed by the chief judge and the other judges, and received a document recording his victory.

2. Punishment corresponding to the nature of the offence shall be ordained there (in the decree).

17, 18. *Vīram*. p. 110.

19. *Smṛitīk.* *prathame vā tritīye vā pramāṇam daivamānusham | uttare syāt katurthe tu sasākshi gayapattrakam ||* An answer of the first kind is a denial; an answer of the third kind is a confession; an answer of the fourth kind is a plea of former judgment.

20. *Smṛitīk.* *prāñnyāye pratyavaskande pratyarthī sādhayet svakam | uttarārtham pratigñārtham arthī mithyottare punaḥ ||*

VI, 1. *Raghunandana*, p. 60.

2. *Vīram*. p. 124.

3. Whatever has been transacted in a suit, the plaint, answer, and so forth, as well as the gist of the trial, should be noted completely in the document recording the success (of the claimant or defendant).

4. When the king gives the victorious party a document recording the plaint, answer, and trial, and closing with the sentence, it is called a document recording the success (of either party).

5. When a man does not feel satisfied with a decision passed by meetings of kindred or other (resorts for the redress of wrongs), the king should revise the decision declared by them, and institute a fresh trial, if it should prove unjust.

6. After having considered the matter in common with many Brahmans well versed in science, he should punish the wicked men, who were acting as judges in the former trial, together with the victorious party.

7. One appointed by his master to look after his expenses and to superintend (transactions regarding) tillage, loans, and trade, is called a manager.

8. Whatever has been transacted by him is valid, whether relating to receipt, non-receipt, expenses or income, and whether it may have been transacted at home or abroad. The master must not annul such transactions as these.

3, 4. Raghunandana, p. 60. I read *pûrvottarakriyâyuktam* in 4.

5, 6. *Vîram*. p. 123.

7, 8. *Vîram*. p. 127. Read in 7, *krishikusîdavânigye*. These two texts relate to the subject of valid and invalid transactions, which is generally discussed along with the rules of judicial procedure, and with the onus probandi and judgment in particular. They might also have been inserted in the chapter on Master and Servant.

VII. WITNESSES.

1. A subscribing witness, one caused to be written, a secret witness, one who has been reminded, a member of the family, a messenger, a spontaneous witness, an indirect witness, a stranger who has accidentally witnessed the deed,

2. The king, a chief judge, and the (people of the) village : thus have the twelve kinds of witnesses been declared. I am going to declare precisely in order their respective characteristics.

3. He is called a subscribing witness who enters in a deed his own as well as his father's caste, name, and so forth, and his place of residence.

4. He is termed one caused to be written, who has been distinctly entered in the deed, together with the details of the agreement, by the plaintiff when writing a contract of loan or another (contract).

5. He is called a secret witness who is made to listen to the speeches of the debtor, standing concealed behind a wall, (and relates them) just as they were spoken, (when the debtor tries to deny them.)

6. He is called one reminded who, after having been appointed and invited to be present at a transaction concerning a loan, deposit, purchase, or the like, is repeatedly reminded of it.

7. He is designed as a family witness who is appointed by both parties to witness a deed of partition, gift, or sale, being connected and on good

VII, 1, 2a. May. p. 23. 2b-15. Vīram. pp. 144, 145.

3. I read *gātināmādi*, with *Smṛitīkandrikā*.

6. I read *kṛayādike*, with *Smṛitīkandrikā*.

terms with both parties, and acquainted with (the rules of) duty.

8. He is denominated a messenger who is a respectable man, esteemed and appointed by both parties, and has come near to listen to the speeches of the plaintiff and defendant.

9. He is a spontaneous witness who declares that he has witnessed the transaction, after having approached the court of his own accord, while a cause is being heard.

10. That witness who communicates what he has heard to another man, at a time when he is about to go abroad, or lying on his deathbed, should be considered as an indirect witness.

11. He also is called an indirect witness who repeats, from his own hearing or from hearsay, the previous statements of actual witnesses.

12. He is called a secret witness to whom an affair has been entrusted or communicated by both parties, or who happens to witness the transaction.

13. The king in person having heard the speeches of plaintiff and defendant, may act as witness if both should quarrel with one another.

14. If after the decision of a suit a fresh trial should take place, the chief judge, together with the assessors, may act as a witness there, but not in any other case.

15. The (people of the) village may no doubt give testimony, even without a special appointment, as to what has been anywhere spoiled or damaged in the boundary line.

11. The reading *bhāshatām* in the *Vīramitrodaya* is a misprint for *bhāshate*.

16. There should be nine, seven, five, four, or three witnesses; or two only, if they are learned Brahmans, are proper (to be examined); but let him never examine a single witness.

17. Of subscribing and secret witnesses, there should be two (of each sort); of spontaneous, reminded, family witnesses, and indirect witnesses, there should be three, four, or five (of each sort).

18. A single witness even may furnish valid proof, if he is a messenger, an accountant, one who has accidentally witnessed the transaction, or a king, or chief judge.

19. (A witness) should be exhorted by judges acquainted with law, by speeches extolling veracity and denouncing falsehood.

20. Whatever religious merit has been acquired by thee from the time of thy birth to the time of thy death, all that will be lost by thy telling a falsehood.

21. An iniquitous judge, a false witness, and the slayer of a Brahman are pronounced to be criminal in an equal degree; nor is a killer of an embryo or a destroyer of wealth considered as a greater sinner than they are.

22. Knowing this, a witness should give evidence according to truth.

16-18. May. p. 23. The 'accountant' is a species of 'messenger.' *Vīramitrodaya*. Regarding the 'witness who has accidentally witnessed the transaction,' see VII, 12.

19-22. *Tod.* *satyaprasamsāvaśānair anṛitasyāpavādanaiḥ* । *sabhyaiḥ sa bodhanīyas tu dharmasāstrapravedibhiḥ* ॥ *ā ganmatas kāmaraṇāt sukrītam yadupārgitam* । *tat sarvaṃ nāsam āyāti anṛitasyābhisamsanāt* ॥ *kūṭasabhyaiḥ kūṭasākṣī brahmahā ka samāḥ smṛtāḥ* । *bhrūmahā vittahā kaishāṃ nādhikaḥ samudāhṛtaḥ* ॥ *evam vīditvā tat sākṣī yathābhūtam vadet tataḥ* ॥



23. After putting off his shoes and his turban, he should stretch out his right hand, and declare the truth, after taking in his hands gold, cow-dung, or blades of sacred grass.

24. When witnesses summoned (in a suit) are faulty, the opponent may expose them. But a litigant trying to cast a blemish on faultless witnesses is liable to pay a fine to the same amount (as the property in dispute).

25. Whatever faults there may be in a document or in witnesses, they should be exposed at the time of the trial ; those cannot be used as valid objections which are declared afterwards.

26. He whose documents or witnesses are objected to in a suit, cannot gain his cause till he has removed the objections raised against it.

27. I will now state, according to the rules of science, which men may be appointed as witnesses, and which others should be avoided as being low wretches.

28. Those may be witnesses who are in the habit of performing religious ceremonies taught in the Vedas and Smṛitis, free from covetousness and malice, of respectable parentage, irreproachable, and zealous in performing austerities, practising liberality, and exhibiting sympathy (with all living creatures).

29. The mother's father, the father's brother, the

23. Vīram. p. 172.

24. May. p. 25. I read arthî, for arthe, with Vīram.

25. May. p. 26.

26. May. p. 27.

27. Smṛitiḥ. prashavyâḥ sâkshino ye tu varyâs kaiva narâ-dhamah | tân aham kathayishyâmi sâmpratam sâstrakoditân || srautas-mârtakriyâyuktâ lobhadveshavivargitâḥ | kulînâḥ sâkshino nindyâs tapodânadayânvitâḥ ||

29. May. p. 25.

wife's brother and maternal uncle, a brother, a friend, and a son-in-law are inadmissible witnesses in all disputes.

30. Persons addicted to adultery or to drinking, gamblers, those who calumniate everybody, the insane, the suffering, violent persons, and unbelievers cannot act as witnesses.

31. If a witness being summoned does not make his appearance, without being ill, he should be made to pay the debt and a fine, after the lapse of three fortnights.

32. Where the contents of the plaint have been fully corroborated by the witnesses, it is (valid) testimony; in every other case (the plaintiff) will not succeed with his claim.

33. When nothing less (than what has been declared in the plaint) is stated with regard to place, time, age, caste, number, matter, and quantity, the cause should be considered to have been proved.

34. Let him preserve, even by telling a lie, a Brahman who has once sinned through error and is in peril of his life and oppressed by rogues or other (enemies).

35. In a conflict between witnesses, (the testimony of) the majority should be received; when the number is equal (on both sides, the testimony of)

30. *Vīram.* p. 160.

31. *Smṛitīk.* āhūto yas tu nāga~~kk~~het sākshī rogavivargitaḥ | *rinam* *damam* ka dāpyaḥ syāt tripakṣāt paratas tu saḥ ||

32. *Smṛitīk.* yatrāśeṣhāḥ pratig~~ṭh~~ā~~r~~thāḥ sākshibhiḥ prativarnitāḥ | sākshyam syād anyathā tu tam sādhyā~~r~~tham na samāpnuyāt ||

33. *May.* p. 29.

34. *Smṛitīk.* sakṛit pramādāparādhivipram vyāpadi pīḍitam | satā-dibhir vadhyamānam rakshed uktvān~~r~~itāny api ||

35. *Toḍ.* sākshidvaidhe prabhūtās tu grāhyāḥ sāmye gunādhikāḥ | gunidvaidhe kriyāyuktās tatsāmye smṛitimattarāḥ ||

the more virtuous ones; when the virtuous (witnesses) are divided, (the testimony of) those specially eminent for the performance of acts of religion; when they are divided, (the testimony of) those endowed with a superior memory.

VIII. DOCUMENTS.

1. The rule regarding the number of witnesses and their respective characteristics has been thus communicated to you; now I will state in order the laws regarding documents.

2. Within a sixmonth's time even, doubts will arise among men (regarding a transaction). Therefore the letters occurring in a writing were invented of yore by the Creator.

3. Writings are declared to be of three kinds, those written by the king, those written in a particular place, and those written (by a person) with his own hand. Their subdivisions again are numerous.

4. Writings proceeding from (ordinary) people are sevenfold, (viz.) a deed of partition, of gift, of purchase, of mortgage, of agreement, of bondage, of debt, and other (such deeds). The king's edicts are of three sorts.

VIII, 1. Vīram. p. 188.

2. Vīram. p. 188. Hiouen-Thsang (I, 71), the celebrated Chinese pilgrim, reports the Indian tradition that letters were invented by the deity Fan (Brahman). See Führer, *Lehre von den Schriften* in *Brīhaspati's Dharmasāstra*, p. 27; Nārada I, 5, 70 (above, p. 58).

3. May. p. 16. The term 'written in a particular place' seems to relate to documents written by a professional scribe and attested by subscribing witnesses. See Nārada I, 10, 135 (above, p. 75).

4. May. p. 17. The term ādi, 'and other (such deeds)', is explained to denote deeds of purification, or of reconciliation, or regarding a boundary, or the rules of a corporation.

5. Where brothers being divided in interests according to their own wish, make a deed of division among themselves, it is called a partition-deed.

6. When a person having made a grant of landed property, records it in a deed as being enduring as long as the moon and sun are in existence, and which must never be cut down or taken away, it is termed a deed of gift.

7. When a person having purchased a house, field or other (property), causes a document to be executed containing an exact statement of the proper price paid for it, it is called a deed of purchase.

8. When a person having pledged movable or immovable property, executes a deed stating whether (the property pledged) is to be preserved, or used, it is termed a mortgage-deed.

9. When (the people of) a village or province execute a deed of mutual agreement, (the purpose of) which is not opposed to the interests of the king, and in accordance with sacred law, it is designed as a deed of agreement.

10. That document which a person destitute of clothes and food executes in a wilderness stating, 'I will do your work,' is termed a deed of bondage.

11. That contract of debt which a man having borrowed money at interest executes himself or causes to be written (by another), is called a bond of debt by the wise.

12. Having given a tract of land or the like, the

5-11. May. p. 16.

12-18. Vīram. p. 192. For specimens of royal grants precisely corresponding to the rules laid down here, see e.g. Dr. Burnell's *Elements of South Indian Palaeography*, pp. 87 foll.

king should cause a formal grant to be executed on a copper-plate or a piece of cloth, stating the place, the ancestors (of the king), and other particulars,

13. And the names of (the king's) mother and father, and of the king himself, (and containing the statement that) 'This grant has been made by me to-day to N. N., the son of N. N., who belongs to the Vedic school N. N.

14. As being endurable while the moon and sun last, and as descending by right of inheritance to the son, grandson, and more remote descendants, and as a gift which must never be cut down or taken away, and is entirely exempt from diminution (by the allotment of shares to the king's attendants, and so forth),

15. Conveying paradise on the giver and preserver, and hell on the taker, for a period of sixty thousand years, as the recompense for giving and taking (the land).'

16. (Thus the king should declare in the grant), the Secretaries for peace and war signing the grant with the remark, 'I know this.'

17. (The grant) should be provided with (the king's) own seal, and with a precise statement of the year, month and so forth, of the value (of the donation), and of the magistrate. Such a document issued by the king is called a royal edict.

18. When the king, satisfied with the faithful services, valour or other (laudable qualities) of a person, bestows landed or other property on him, it

13. All commentators explain that the name of the particular Veda, such as e. g. the Rig-veda, or the Kāṭhā branch of the Yagur-veda, should be given which the donee is studying.

is (called) a writing containing a mark of royal favour.

19. That which establishes a claim, recording the four parts of a judicial proceeding and bearing the royal seal, is termed a document of success (or decree).

20. Clever forgers acquainted with place and time will make a writing similar (to the original document). Such (writings) should be examined with great care.

21. Women, infants, the suffering, and persons unacquainted with the art of writing, are deceived by their own relations fabricating documents signed with their names. Such (forgery) may be found out by means of internal evidence and legitimate titles.

22. A document executed by a madman, an idiot, an infant, one who has absconded through fear of the king, a bashful person, or one tormented by fear, is not invalidated (by an impossibility to produce its author).

23. (But, as a rule) a document executed by a dying person, an enemy, one oppressed with fear, a suffering person, a woman, one intoxicated, distressed by a calamity, at night, by fraud, or by force, does not hold good,

24. Where even a single witness entered in a deed is infamous and reproached (by the public voice), or where its writer is held in such estimation, it is called a false document.

19. *Smṛitiḥ*, quoted by Burnell, *Elements of South Indian Palaeography*, p. 100.

20, 21. *Vīram*. p. 197.

22. *Vīram*. p. 198. The translation follows the gloss in the *Vīramitrodaya*.

23, 24. *May*. p. 20.

25. A writing being spoiled by fire, or executed a long time ago, or soiled with dirt, or intended for a very short period only, or containing (a number of) mutilated or effaced syllables, is reckoned as a false document.

26. Let a man show (a document) on every occasion to (meetings of) families, associations (of traders), assemblies (of cohabitants), and other (bodies of persons), and read it out to them, and remind them of it, in order to establish its validity.

27. The acquirer (of landed or other property) should establish the written title (under which he is holding it); his son should establish the fact of possession only. If (the father) has been impeached in a court of justice, the son also should be required to prove the written title.

28. When a loan (recorded in a bond) is not expressly claimed from a debtor who has means enough (to discharge it) and is at hand, the bond loses its validity, as the debt is presumed to have been paid (in that case).

29. A writing which has neither been seen nor read out for thirty years, should not be recognised as valid, even though the (subscribing) witnesses be living.

30. When a man does not produce the bond and omits to ask his debtor (to restore the loan), after

25. Aparārka and Smṛitīk., quoted by Führer, No. 29.

26. Vīram. p. 200.

27. Vīram. p. 199.

28-30. Aparārka, quoted by Führer, loc. cit., Nos. 33-35; Smṛitīk. ('Kātyāyana'); *Tod.* In 28, I read *suddharnasaṅkayâ*, for *suddham nâsaṅkayâ*, with *Todarānanda*.

30. The interest on a loan, according to the Indian Law of Debt, ceases on its becoming equal to the principal.

his loan has ceased to yield interest, the bond becomes suspected.

31. A document is certainly not overruled either by witnesses or by an oath (or ordeal), but its validity is diminished by neglect, if it is neither shown nor read.

IX. POSSESSION.

1. This set of rules regarding witnesses and documents has been propounded. The law concerning the acquisition of immovable property and possession will be proclaimed next.

2. Immovable property may be acquired in seven different ways, viz. by learning, by purchase, by mortgaging, by valour, with a wife (as her dowry), by inheritance (from an ancestor), and by succession to the property of a kinsman who has no issue.

3. In the case of property acquired by one of these seven methods, viz. inheritance from a father (or other ancestor), acquisition (in the shape of a dowry), purchase, hypothecation, succession, valour, or learned knowledge, possession coupled with a legitimate title constitutes proprietary right.

4. That possession which is hereditary, or founded on a royal order, or coupled with purchase, hypothecation or a legitimate title : possession of this kind constitutes proprietary right.

31. *Smṛitiś.* and *Aparārka*, quoted by Führer, No. 38.

IX, 1-7. *Vīram.* pp. 203, 204.

1. The *Vīramitrodaya* argues that, although immovable property is principally referred to, the same law applies a fortiori to movable property.

5. Immovable property obtained by a division (of the estate among co-heirs), or by purchase, or inherited from a father (or other ancestor), or presented by the king, is acknowledged as one's lawful property; it is lost by forbearance in the case of adverse possession.

6. He who is holding possession (of an estate) after having merely taken it, occupying it without meeting with resistance, becomes its legitimate owner thus; and it is lost (to the owner) by such forbearance.

7. He whose possession has been continuous from the time of occupation, and has never been interrupted for a period of thirty years, cannot be deprived of such property.

8. That property which is publicly given by co-heirs or others to a stranger who is enjoying it, cannot be recovered afterwards by him (who is its legitimate owner).

9. He who does not raise a protest when a stranger is giving away (his) landed property in his sight, cannot again recover that estate, even though he be possessed of a written title to it.

10. Possession held by three generations produces ownership for strangers, no doubt, when they are related to one another in the degree of a *Sapinda*; it does not stand good in the case of *Sakulyas*.

11. A house, field, commodity or other property having been held by another person than the owner,

5, 6. Col. Dig. V, 6, 384.

8, 9. *Vîram*. p. 209.

10-12. Col. Dig. V, 7, 396.

10-14. *Vîram*. p. 221. *Sapindaship* in this rule includes four generations; the term *Sakulya* is used to denote more remote relations.

is not lost (to the owner) by mere force of possession, if the possessor stands to him in the relation of a friend, relative, or kinsman.

12. Such wealth as is possessed by a son-in-law, a learned Brahman, or by the king or his ministers, does not become legitimate property for them after the lapse of a very long period even.

13. Forcible means must not be resorted to by the present occupant or his son, in maintaining possession of the property of an infant, or of a learned Brahman, or of that which has been legitimately inherited from a father,

14. Nor (in maintaining possession) of cattle, a woman, a slave, or other (property). This is a legal rule.

15. If a doubt should arise in regard to a house or field, of which its occupant has not held possession uninterruptedly, he should undertake to prove (his enjoyment of it) by means of documents, (the depositions of) persons knowing him as possessor, and witnesses.

16. Those are witnesses in a contest of this kind who know the name, the boundary, the title (of acquisition), the quantity, the time, the quarter of the sky, and the reason why possession has been interrupted.

17. By such means should a question regarding occupation and possession be decided in a contest concerning landed property ; but in a cause in which

15-17. Viram. p. 222.

16. Read *nâmâghâ/âgamaṃ*. 'The title,' the cause of ownership, such as gift. 'The quantity,' of land. 'The quarter of the sky,' a description of the region in which a certain estate is situated. 'The time,' at which the estate was acquired. *Todarânaṇḍa*.

no (human) evidence is forthcoming, divine test should be resorted to.

18. When a village, field, or garden is referred to in one and the same grant, they are (considered to be) possessed of all of them, though possession be held of part of them only. (On the other hand) that title has no force which is not accompanied by a slight measure of possession even.

19. Not to possess landed property, not to show a document in the proper time, and not to remind witnesses (of their deposition): this is the way to lose one's property.

20. Therefore evidence should be preserved carefully; if this be done, lawsuits whether relating to immovable or to movable property are sure to succeed.

21. Female slaves can never be acquired by possession, without a written title; nor (does possession create ownership) in the case of property belonging to a king, or to a learned Brahman, or to an idiot, or infant.

22. It is not by mere force of possession that land becomes a man's property; a legitimate title also having been proved, it is converted into property by both (possession and title), but not otherwise.

18. Vîram. pp. 221, 222; Col. Dig. V, 6, 383.

19, 20. *Toḍ. bhūmer abhuktir lekhyasya yathākālam adarsanam | asmāranam sākshinām ka svārthahānikarāṇi ka || tasmād yatnena kartavyam pramāṇaparipālanam | tena kāryāṇi sidhyanti sthāvarāṇi karāṇi ka ||*

21. *Smṛitiḥ. na strīnām upabhogaḥ syād vinā lekhyam katham-kaṇa | rāgasrotriyavitte ka gaḍabāladhane tathā ||*

22. *Smṛitiḥ. bhuktikevalayā naiva bhūmiḥ siddhim avāpnuyāt | āgamenāpi suddhena dvābhyām sidhyati nānyathā ||*

23. Should even the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of a man be alive, land having been possessed by him for thirty years, without intervention of strangers,

24. It should be considered as possession extending over one generation; possession continued for twice that period (is called possession) extending over two generations; possession continued for three times that period (is called possession) extending over three generations. (Possession continued) longer than that even, is (called) possession of long standing.

25. When the present occupant is impeached, a document or witness is (considered as) decisive. When he is no longer in existence, possession alone is decisive for his sons.

26. When possession extending over three generations has descended to the fourth generation, it becomes legitimate possession, and a title must never be inquired for.

27. When possession undisturbed (by others) has been held by three generations (in succession), it is not necessary to produce a title; possession is decisive in that case.

28. In suits regarding immovable property, (pos-

23, 24. *Smṛitiḥ*. pitā pitāmaho yasya gīvek ka prapitāmahaḥ |
trimsat samā yā tu bhuktā bhūmir avyāhatā paraiḥ || bhuktiḥ sâ
paurushî gñeyâ dvigunâ ka dvipaurushî | tripaurushî ka trigunâ
parataḥ syâk kirantanî ||

25. *Smṛitiḥ*. yatrâhartâbhiyuktaḥ syâl lekhyam sâkshî tadâ guruḥ |
tadabhâve tu putrânâṃ bhuktir ekâ garīyasî ||

26. *Smṛitiḥ*. bhuktis tripurushî yâ ka katurthe sampravartitâ |
tad bhogasthiratâm yâti na prikkhed âgamam kvaḥit ||

27. *Smṛitiḥ*. anishedhena yad bhuktam purushais tribhir eva tu |
tatra naivâgamaḥ kâryo bhuktis tatra garīyasî ||

28. *Smṛitiḥ*. sthâvareshu vivâdeshu kramât tripurushî ka yâ |
svatantraiva hi sâ gñeyâ pramânam sâdhyanimaye ||

session) held by three generations in succession, should be considered as valid, and makes evidence in the decision of a cause.

29. He whose possession has passed through three lives, and is duly substantiated by a written title, cannot be deprived of it; such possession is equal to the gift of the Veda.

30. He whose possession has passed through three lives and has been inherited from his ancestors, cannot be deprived of it, unless a previous grant should be in existence (in which the same property has been granted to a different person by the king).

31. That possession is valid in law which is uninterrupted and of long standing; interrupted possession even is (recognised as valid), if it has been substantiated by an ancestor.

32. A witness prevails over inference; a writing prevails over witnesses; undisturbed possession which has passed through three lives prevails over both.

33. When an event (forming the subject of a plaint) has occurred long ago, and no witnesses are forthcoming, he should examine indirect witnesses, or he should administer oaths, or should try artifice.

29. *Smṛitiḥ. yasya tripurushā bhuktiḥ samyag lekhyasamanvitā । evamvidhā brahmadeyā hartum tasya na sakyate ॥* The 'gift of the Veda,' i. e. instruction is mentioned as an instance of an inalienable gift.

30. *Smṛitiḥ. yasya tripurushā bhuktiḥ pâramparyakramâgatâ । na sâ kâlayitum sakyâ pûrvakâk kâsanâd rite ॥*

31. *Smṛitiḥ. bhuktir balavati sâstre py avikkhinnâ kirantanî । vikkhinnâpi hi sâ gñeyâ yâ tu pûrvaprasâdhitâ ॥* 'If it has been substantiated by an ancestor,' i. e. if a previous possessor has adduced a legitimate title.

32. Raghunandana, p. 49.

33. Vîram. p. 223.

X. ORDEALS.

1. A forger of gems, pearl, or coral, one withholding a deposit, a ruffian, and an adulterer, shall be tested by oaths or ordeals in every case.

2. In charges relating to a heavy crime or to the appropriation of a deposit, the king should try the cause by ordeals, even though there be witnesses.

3. When a thing has happened long ago or in secret, or when the witnesses have disappeared long ago, or are perjured all of them, the trial should be conducted by having recourse to an ordeal.

4. The balance, fire, water, poison, and, fifthly, sacred libation ; sixthly, grains of rice ; seventhly, a hot piece of gold, are declared (to be ordeals).

5. The ploughshare is mentioned as the eighth kind, the ordeal by Dharma (and Adharma) as the ninth. All these ordeals have been ordained by the Self-existent (Brahman).

6. Truth, a vehicle, weapons, cows, seeds, and gold, venerable gods or Brahmans, the heads of sons or wives :

7. By these have oaths been ordained, which are easy to perform and proper for trifling occasions.

8. When a quarrel between two litigants has arisen regarding a debt or other charge, that ordeal

X, 1-3. *Vîram.* p. 114.

4. *M. Macn.* X, 1, 2 (uncertain); *Vîram.* p. 225.

5. *Vîram.* p. 225. For a description of the ordeal by Dharma and Adharma, see the laws of *Pitāmaha*.

6, 7. *Vîram.* p. 226. See *Manu* VIII, 114; *Nārada* I, 19, 248 (above, p. 100).

8. *Tod. rinādishu tu kâryeshu visamvâde parasparam | divyam samkhyānvitam deyam purushâpekshayâ tathâ ||*

must be administered which corresponds to the amount (of the sum in dispute) and to the (character or strength of the) individual (to be examined).

9. (The ordeal by) poison should be administered when (property worth) a thousand (*Paṇas*) has been stolen ; (the ordeal by) fire, when a quarter less than that (or 750, has been stolen).

10. When the charge concerns four hundred, the hot piece of gold should be administered. (When it concerns) three hundred, the grains of rice should be given ; and the sacred libation, (when it concerns) half of that.

11. When a hundred has been stolen or falsely denied, purgation by *Dharma* should be administered. Thieves of cows should be subjected by preference to the (ordeal by the) ploughshare by the judges.

12. These figures are applicable in the case of low persons ; for persons of a middling kind, double is ordained ; and for persons of the highest rank, the amount has to be fixed four times as high by persons entrusted with judicial affairs.

13. The quantities (of various coins or weights), beginning with a floating particle of dust and ending with a *Kârshâṇa*, have been declared by *Manu*. They are applicable both to ordeals and to fines.

14. A *Nishka* is four *Suvarṇas*. A *Paṇa* of

9-12. *Vîram*. p. 230. I read, with *Smṛiti*, *katuṣsatâbhiyoge* in 10, and *sabhyaiḥ phâlam prayatnataḥ* in 11.

11. *Dharma*, 'test of right and wrong,' is the ordeal which consists of drawing lots or slips of white and black paper.

12. 'Eminent persons,' through their birth, qualities, or virtue. The same interpretation applies to the two other terms. *Vîram*.

13. *Vîram*. p. 233. See *Manu* VIII, 131-138.

14, 15. *Vîram*. p. 234. I read *kândikâ* for *kândrikâ* in 11, with *Vîramitrodaya*.

copper is a Kârshika (having the weight of one Karsha). A coin made of a Karsha of copper has to be known as a Kârshika Pana.

15. It is also called an *Andikâ*. Four such are a Dhânaka. Twelve of the latter are a *Suvarna*. That is also called a *Dînâra* (denarius).

16. (The testimony of) witnesses is apt to become invalid, whether it be through affection, anger, or avarice. An ordeal properly administered never loses its validity.

17. When a doubt arises with regard to a document or oral evidence, and when ratiocination also fails, purgation through ordeal (is the proper test).

18. Let an ordeal be administered according to the established rule by persons acquainted with the rule of ordeals. If it is administered against the rule, it is ineffective as a means of proving what ought to be proved.

19. If one who has been subjected to the ordeal by balance goes down on being weighed (for the second time), he shall be held guilty. If he remains level, he shall be balanced once more. If he rises, he gains his cause.

20. Should the scale break, or the balance, or beam, or iron hooks split, or the strings burst, or the transverse beam split, he would have to be declared guilty.

15. Nearly identical with Nârada, Appendix, 62 (p. 232).

16. *Vîram*. p. 242.

17. *Smṛiti*. likhite sâkshivâde ka samdeho yatra gâyate | anu-
mâne ka sambhrânte tatra daivam visodhanam ||

18. *Tod*. yathoktavidhinâ deyam divyam divyavisâradaiḥ | yathok-
tapradattam tu na satyam sâdhyasâdhane ||

19. *Vîram*. p. 253.

20. *Vîram*. p. 254.

21. (In the ordeal by water) he should immerse the individual in water and discharge three arrows.

22. He is acquitted (in the ordeal by poison) who has digested poison, which has been given to him according to rule, without the application of spells or antidotes. Otherwise he should be punished and compelled to pay the sum in dispute.

23. To whatsoever deity the accused happens to be devoted, let (the judge) bathe the weapon of that deity in water, and give him to drink three handfuls of it.

24. He to whom no calamity happens, within a week or a fortnight, (either to himself or) to his son, wife or property, is innocent beyond doubt.

25. Let a man chew grains of rice after having kept a fast and purified himself, at a time when the sun is not visible. He is acquitted if what he spits out is pure ; but if it be mixed with blood, he must be (held) guilty.

26. Let (the person) take a hot piece of gold out of (a mixture of) well-heated oil and butter.

27. He whose fingers' ends do not tremble, and who does not become blistered, is acquitted according to law, as has been declared by Pitāmaha.

28. Iron twelve Palas in weight should be formed into what is called a ploughshare. It should be eight Aṅgulas long by four Aṅgulas broad.

21. Vîram. p. 271.

22. Vîram. p. 276.

23. Vîram. p. 280.

24. Vîram. p. 281.

25. Vîram. p. 282. The *Todarānanda* attributes to *Brīhaspati* another text identical with *Nārada* I, 25, 342 (above, p. 119).

26. Vîram. p. 283.

27. Vîram. p. 284. The same text occurs in the Nepalese *Nārada*.

28, 29. Vîram. p. 285. Some texts relating to this kind of

29. (The ploughshare) having been made red-hot in fire, a thief should be made to lick at it once with his tongue. If he is not burnt, he obtains acquittal. Otherwise he loses his cause.

30. (Images of) Dharma and Adharma, one black and the other white, should be painted on two leaves. Then they should be invoked with prayers producing life or others, and with the Gâyatri or other Sâmans,

31. And should be worshipped with perfumes and with white and black flowers, sprinkled with the five products of a cow, and enclosed in balls made of earth afterwards.

32. After having been made equal in size, they should be placed unobserved in a fresh jar. Then the person should take one ball out of the vessel at the bidding (of the judge).

33. If he takes out Dharma, he is acquitted, and should be honoured by the (appointed) examiners.

XI. THE LAW OF DEBT.

1. A creditor should never lend money without having first secured a pledge of adequate value, or a

ordeal are found in the Nepalese Nârada as well, but they are very incorrectly given in the MS. 'The judge, after having placed a ploughshare of the size stated in the text into a fire kindled for that purpose, should perform the whole general rite of ordeals, beginning with the invocation addressed to Dharma and ending with the fixing of a writing on the head of the person. Then, after addressing the fire with the text previously quoted (of Pitâmaha), "Thou, O Agni," &c., and after causing the person to address the fire with the text previously quoted, "Thou, O Agni, (livest) in all beings" (Yâgñavalkya II, 104), he should cause the person to lick (at the ploughshare).' Vîram., *Smṛiti*.

30-33. Vîram. p. 286. 'Prayers producing life,' such as e.g. Rig-veda X, 57, 1; Vîram.

XI, 1. May. p. 102; Col. Dig. I, 1, 11. The commentators agree

deposit, or a trustworthy surety; nor without a bond written (by the debtor himself) or attested (by subscribing witnesses).

2. That (loan) is termed *kusṭḍa* (a loan on interest) which is exacted by persons apprehending no sin (from the act), from a mean (*kutsita*) or wretched (*sīdat*) man, after having been increased to four or eight times the original amount (through the interest accruing on it).

3. An eightieth part (of the principal) accrues as interest on it (every month); and it is certainly doubled by such interest within a third of a year less than seven years (that is to say, within six years and eight months).

4. Interest is declared (by some) to be of four

in explaining the term *ādhi*, 'a pledge,' as denoting a pledge to be used, such as e. g. a cow to be used with her milk, or landed property pledged together with its produce. The term *bandha*, 'a deposit,' is supposed to denote a pledge which must not be used; according to the *Mayūkhā*, however, it means a pledge which is not actually delivered to the creditor, the debtor merely promising not to alienate it. 'A pledge of adequate value' is one corresponding in value to the principal together with the interest. *Vīram*. p. 293. The term *sākshimat*, 'attested,' is referred to a debt contracted orally before witnesses, both by Colebrooke (*Dig.* I, 1, 11) and Mandlik (*May. loc. cit.*). This, however, is opposed to the gloss of the *Vīramitrodaya*.

2. *May.* p. 102; *Col. Dig.* I, 1, 3. It is hardly necessary to point out that the etymology here proposed of the term *kusṭḍa*, 'a loan on interest,' is entirely fanciful. It is really derived from *ku* and *sīda*, and denotes 'that which adheres closely, and cannot easily be got rid of.' The commentators explain the clause 'apprehending no sin' to imply that it is sinful otherwise to accept a gift from an unworthy person.

3. *Smṛtik.*; *Col. Dig.* I, 2, 26. *astibhāgo vardheta lābhe dvigunatām iyāt | prayuktam saptabhir varshais tribhāgonair na sam-sayah ||*

4-8. *Vīram.* pp. 294, 295; *Col. Dig.* I, 2, 35.

sorts ; by others, it is stated to be fivefold ; and by others again, it is said to be of six kinds. Learn their (various) qualities.

5. Kāyikā (bodily interest) ; kâlikâ (periodical interest) ; *kakravṛddhi* (compound interest) ; kâritâ (stipulated interest) ; sikhâvṛddhi (hair-interest) ; and bhogalâbha (interest by enjoyment) : such are the six kinds of interest.

6. Kāyikâ interest is connected with bodily labour ; kâlikâ is due every month ; *kakravṛddhi* is interest on interest ; kâritâ is interest promised by the borrower.

7, 8. When interest is received every day, it is termed sikhâvṛddhi (hair-interest, because it grows every day). Because it grows constantly like hair, and does not cease growing except on the loss of the head, that is to say, on payment of the principal, therefore it is called hair-interest. The use of a (mortgaged) house, or the produce of a field, is termed bhogalâbha (interest by enjoyment).

9. That kâritâ (stipulated) interest has to be paid always, which has been stipulated by the debtor himself, over and above (the ordinary rate of interest), and has been promised in times of distress.

10. When (such special) interest has been stipulated in any other manner, it must not be paid by any means.

11. Hair-interest, bodily interest, and interest by

6. 'Bodily labour,' when the milk of a pledged cow or the strength of a pledged animal for draught or burden is used by the creditor, being, as it were, the interest on his loan. Vîram.

9, 10. Vîram. p. 295 ; Col. Dig. I, 2, 37 ('Kâtyâyana').

10. 'In any other manner,' i.e. by the creditor. Vîram.

11. Vîram. p. 301 ; Col. Dig. I, 2, 35.

[33]

Y

enjoyment shall be taken by the creditor so long as the principal remains unpaid.

12. But the use of a pledge after twice the principal has been realised from it, compound interest, and the exaction of the principal and interest (together as principal) is usury and reprehensible.

13. On gold (and other precious metals), the interest may make (the debt) double; on clothes and base metals (such as tin or lead), treble; on grain, it is allowed to rise to four times the original amount, and so on edible plants (or fruit), beasts of burden, and wool.

14. It is allowed to make (the debt) quintuple, on pot-herbs; sextuple, on seeds and sugar-cane; and it may make (the debt) octuple, on salt, oil, and spirituous liquor.

15. Likewise, on sugar and honey, if the loan be of old standing.

16. On grass, wood, bricks, thread, substances from which spirits may be extracted, leaves, bones, leather, weapons, flowers, and fruits, no interest is ordained.

17. A pledge is termed *bandha*, and is declared to

12. Viv. p. 12; Col. Dig. loc. cit.

13-16. Vīram. pp. 298, 300; Viv. pp. 17, 18; May. p. 104; Col. Dig. I, 2, 63, 67, 69.

13. The Vīramitrodaya reads *ḥarmāsthivarmazām*, 'leather, bones, and armour.'

16. The commentators observe that no interest should be exacted, unless there be a special agreement to the purpose. There is, however, another reading (*vṛiddhis tu na nivartate*), under which the purport of this rule becomes quite different, viz. that there is absolutely no limit regarding the interest on the articles mentioned in it. This version is in harmony with the corresponding regulations of other legislators.

17. Col. Dig. I, 3, 80; May. p. 105; Vīram. p. 305.

be of four sorts ; movable or immovable ; to be kept only or to be used ; to be released at any time, or limited as to time ; stated in writing, or stipulated (orally) before witnesses.

18. Should the creditor, actuated by avarice, use a pledge before interest has ceased to accrue on the loan (on becoming equal to the principal), or before the fixed period has expired, such use shall be stopped.

19. The pledge has to be kept carefully, like a deposit ; interest is forfeited in case of its being damaged.

20. A pledge having been used and rendered worthless (by such use), the principal (itself) is lost ; if a very valuable pledge be spoiled, he must satisfy the pledger.

21. If a pledge be destroyed by a fatal accident or by an act of the king, the debtor shall be caused either to deliver another pledge or to pay the debt.

22. When the debtor restores the principal and asks for his pledge, it must be restored to him ; otherwise the creditor is liable to punishment.

18, 19. Col. Dig. I, 3, 92 ; *Vīram.* p. 306.

20. Col. Dig. I, 3, 86 ; *Vīram.* p. 309 ; *May.* p. 105.

21. Col. Dig. I, 3, 93 ; *May.* p. 105 ; *Vīram.* p. 309. This text has been translated according to the *Vīramitrodaya*. Under the reading of the other compilations, payment of the debt together with interest is enjoined. 'A king,' i.e. a ruler who offends against the dictates of religion. *Vīram.*

22. Col. Dig. I, 3, 103 ; *Vīram.* p. 319. The rule that the principal only needs to be restored concerns a pledge for use. In the case of a pledge for custody, interest has to be paid besides the principal. *Vīram.*

23. When a field or other (immovable property) has been enjoyed, and more than the principal realised by it, then the debtor shall recover his pledge, if the principal and interest has been actually got out of it (by the creditor).

24. (This law applies) when the debtor delivers a field to the creditor, with the following stipulation, 'This (field) shall be enjoyed by you, when interest has ceased (on becoming equal to the principal), that is certain. When the principal has been realised together with the interest, you shall restore (the field) to me.'

25. When the time (for payment) has passed and interest has ceased (on becoming equal to the principal), the creditor shall be owner of the pledge ; but, till ten days have elapsed, the debtor is entitled to redeem it.

26. Notice having been given to the debtor's family, a pledge to be kept (only) may be used, after the principal has been doubled ; and so may a pledge for a fixed period, on the expiration of that term.

27. When the principal has been doubled, or the stipulated period expired in the case of a pledge delivered for a certain time only, the creditor

23. Col. Dig. I, 3, 108 ; May. p. 107.

23, 24. *Vīram.* p. 320. Under a stipulation of this sort, the mortgagee shall recover his pledge, as soon as the creditor has fully realised his demand out of the mortgage, no matter whether he has contributed little or much himself towards its realisation. *Vīram.* The *Ratnākara* (p. 29) inserts the following text after 24, 'This lawful rule has been proclaimed with regard to loans on interest and so forth.'

25. Col. Dig. I, 3, 115 ; *Vīram.* p. 316.

26. *Vīram.* p. 316 ; Col. Dig. I, 3, 119 ('*Smṛiti*').

27, 28. *Vīram.* p. 315. 'During that interval,' i. e. before the ten days have elapsed. *Vīram.* These two texts are elsewhere

becomes owner of the pledge, after having waited for a fortnight.

28. If the debtor should pay the debt during that interval, he may recover his pledge (even then).

29. When the amount of the debt has been doubled (by the interest accruing on it), and the debtor is either dead or no longer present, (the creditor) may take his chattel and sell it before witnesses.

30. Or, its value having been estimated in an assembly, he may keep it for ten days; after which, having realised a sufficient sum to cover his demand, he should relinquish the balance.

31. When a man neither enjoys a pledge, nor obtains it (from the debtor), nor points it out (to others), his written contract (concerning the pledge) is invalid, (just like) a document when the (subscribing) witnesses and debtor are dead.

32. When a house or field has been mortgaged for use and the period (fixed for such use) has not expired, the debtor cannot recover his property, nor can the creditor (recover) his loan.

33. When the (stipulated) period has elapsed, both

attributed to Vyāsa. This is probably the correct view, as it is difficult to reconcile these texts either with the preceding or with the following ones.

29. May. p. 106.

29, 30. *Vīram.* p. 316; *Col. Dig. I, 3, 121.* 'The chattel,' i.e. the pledged commodity. 'A sufficient sum to cover his demand,' i.e. twice as much as the principal. *Vīram.* The balance should be handed over to the relatives of the debtor or to the king. *Colebrooke's Digest* has another text after these two, in which it is stated that the precise amount of the debt should be ascertained by persons skilled in computation.

31. *Col. Dig. I, 3, 126*; *Smṛitiḥ*; *Ratn.* p. 35.

32, 33. *Viv. p. 25*; *Col. Dig. I, 3, 105, 118.* In ordinary case,

parties are at liberty to do so. But, even before (the stipulated period) has elapsed, they may make an arrangement by mutual consent.

34. Where one field has been mortgaged to two creditors at the same time, it shall belong to that mortgagee who was the first to obtain possession of it.

35. If both have possessed it for an equal time, it shall be held in common (or shared equally) by them. The same rule is ordained in the case of a gift or a sale.

36. Which course should be adopted in cases of a competition between three different acts, the identical property having been sold, mortgaged, and given away on one and the same day?

37. The three parties should divide that lawful property of theirs among themselves in proportionate shares, the two first in the ratio of their respective claims, whereas the donee ought to obtain a full third.

38. The pledgee can never be compelled to restore the pledge against his will, before the whole amount due to him has been paid, nor must (the pledge be obtained from him) by deceit or by (the mode called) *Karita*.

the recovery of the loan, attended by the restoration of the pledge to the pledger, takes place after the lapse of the stipulated period. By mutual consent, however, it may take place before that time.

34. The term 'a field' includes by implication any pledge for use. *Vīram*. p. 312. Other commentators add that possession must have been obtained without forcible means. *Col. Dig.* I, 3, 132.

35. *Smṛitiik.*; *Col. Dig.* I, 3, 133; *Ratn.* p. 37.

36, 37. *Vīram*. p. 314 ('*Vasishṭha*'); V. T.

38. *Ratn.* p. 27; *Col. Dig.* I, 3, 102. Regarding the mode called *Karita* or *Âkarita*, see below, XI, 58.

39. For appearance, for confidence, for payment, and for delivering the assets of the debtor : it is for these four different purposes that sureties have been ordained by the sages in the system (of law).

40. The first says, 'I will produce (that man) ;' the second (says), 'He is a respectable man ;' the third (says), 'I will pay the debt ;' the fourth (says), 'I will deliver his assets.'

41. If the debtors fail in their engagements, the two first (sureties themselves, but not their sons) must pay the sum lent at the appointed time ; both the two last (sureties), and in default of them their sons (are liable for the debt), when the debtors break their promise (to pay the debt).

42. The creditor should allow time for the surety to search for a debtor who has absconded ; a fortnight, a month, a month and a half, according to (the distance of) the place (where he is supposed to be hiding himself).

43. (Sureties) must not be excessively harassed ; they should be made to pay the debt by instalments ;

39. Col. Dig. I, 4, 142 ; Vîram. p. 321 ; Viv. p. 27. The author of the last-mentioned work reads *rîne dravyârpane* for *rimidravâyârpane*, which reading he refers to as the traditional one, and defines the fourth kind of surety to be one who vouches for the return of articles lent for use, such as ornaments for a festivity.

40. May. p. 107. The first surety promises to produce a debtor, who is likely to abscond ; the second vouches for the debtor's honesty, declaring that he is a virtuous man, who will not deceive the creditor ; the third promises to pay the debt himself together with the interest, if the debtor should fail to pay it ; the fourth promises to deliver his movable property, such as household furniture, in the same case.

41. May. p. 107.

42, 43. Vîram. pp. 323, 328 ; Col. Dig. I, 4, 148 ; Ratn. p. 45.

they must not be attacked when the debtor is present : such is the law regarding sureties.

44. When (a surety), being harassed, pays a proved debt which he has vouched for, (the debtor) shall pay him twice as much, after the lapse of a month and a half.

45. Should foolish (sureties) in good faith pay the debt, though not required to do so, or on being required to pay a different debt, how and from whom can they recover that sum ?

46. By whom, to whom, and how, should, or should not, be paid a loan which has been received from the hands of another man in the shape of a loan on interest, will now be declared.

47. A loan shall be restored on demand, if no time has been fixed (for its restoration); or on the expiration of the time (if a definite period has been fixed); or when interest ceases (on becoming equal to the principal). If the father is no longer alive, (the debt must be paid) by his sons.

48. The father's debt must be paid first of all, and after that, a man's own debt; but a debt contracted by the paternal grandfather must always be paid before these two even.

49. The father's debt, on being proved, must be paid by the sons as if it were their own; the grandfather's debt must be paid (by his son's sons) without

44. Vîram. p. 328.

45. Ratn. p. 46; Col. Dig. I, 4, 163.

46. Ratn. p. 47; Col. Dig. I, 5, 166.

47. Ratn. p. 47; Col. Dig. I, 5, 166; Viv. p. 32.

48. Ratn. p. 47; Col. Dig. I, 5, 167; May. p. 112.

49. May. p. 112; Col. Dig. I, 5, 167. 'As if it were their own,'
i. e. with interest. Ratn.

interest; but the son of a grandson need not pay it at all.

50. When a debt has been incurred, for the benefit of the household, by an uncle, brother, son, wife, slave, pupil, or dependant, it must be paid by the head of the family.

51. Sons shall not be made to pay (a debt incurred by their father) for spirituous liquor, for losses at play, for idle gifts, for promises made under the influence of love or wrath, or for suretyship, nor the balance of a fine or toll (liquidated in part by their father).

52. The liability for the debts devolves on the successor to the estate, when the son is involved in calamity; or on the taker of the widow, in default of a successor to the estate.

53. Debts contracted by the wives of distillers of spirituous liquor, hunters, washermen, herdsmen, barbers or the like persons, shall be paid by their protector; they were contracted for the affairs of their husbands.

54. When (a debtor) has acknowledged a debt, it may be recovered from him by the expedients of friendly expostulation and the rest, by moral suasion,

50. Ratn. p. 54; Col. Dig. I, 5, 189; Viv. p. 39.

51. Ratn. p. 57; Col. Dig. I, 5, 201; May. p. 113. Regarding promises made under the influence of love or wrath, see *Kātyāyana* X, 53, 54.

52. Ratn. p. 64; Col. Dig. I, 5, 174; May. p. 114; Viv. p. 37.

53. *Vīram*. p. 354 ('*Kātyāyana*'); Col. Dig. I, 5, 217; Ratn. p. 60. 'Protector' means husband. Ratn. 'Barbers,' *nāpita*, are referred to according to the reading of the *Ratnākara*. The *Vīramitrodaya* reads *nāvika*, 'sailors,' which reading is mentioned as a *varia lectio* in the *Ratnākara*. Colebrooke has 'shepherds.'

54. Col. Dig. I, 6, 244; May. p. 109.

by artful management, by compulsion, and by confinement at his house.

55. When a debtor is caused to pay by the advice of friends or kinsmen, by friendly remonstrances, by constant following, or by (the creditor) starving himself to death, it is termed moral suasion.

56. When a creditor, with a crafty design, borrows anything from his debtor, for his own use, or withholds an Anvâhita deposit or the like, and thus enforces payment of the debt, it is termed artful management.

57. When a debtor is fettered and conducted into (the creditor's) own house, where he is compelled to pay the debt by beating or other (forcible) means, it is called compulsion.

58. When a debtor is made to pay by confining his wife, son or cattle, and by watching at his door, it is termed Âkarita (the customary mode).

59. An indigent debtor may be taken to his own house by the creditor and compelled to do work there, such as distilling spirits and the like; but a Brahman must be made to pay gradually.

55. Col. Dig. I, 6, 236; May. p. 109; Ratn. p. 67; Viv. p. 43. The term prâya or prâyopavesana corresponds without doubt to the modern custom of Dharṇa, or 'fasting upon' a debtor, when the creditor places himself before the debtor's house and threatens to starve himself to death, unless the debt be paid. It is true that some commentators interpret prâya by 'importunate demands' (prârthanâbhûlya or prârthanâ).

56. Col. Dig. I, 6, 238; May. p. 109, &c. 'With a crafty design,' as e. g. when valuable ornaments are borrowed from the debtor, on the pretence of using them at a festivity. 'An Anvâhita deposit' is an article deposited for delivery to another person. Vîram. p. 333.

57. Col. Dig. I, 6, 240.

58. Col. Dig. I, 6, 239.

59. Ratn. p. 71; Col. Dig. I, 6, 246.

60. When the time fixed (for payment) has elapsed, and the interest has ceased (on becoming equal to the principal), the debtor may either recover his loan or cause a new bond to be written in the form of compound interest.

61. As compound interest is taken on the doubled principal, so does the use of a pledge (become a new principal), the debt together with the interest being considered as the (new) principal.

62. This rule concerns an acknowledged (debt); but (a debtor) denying (his liability) shall be compelled to pay, on the debt being proved in a (judicial) assembly by a document or by witnesses.

63. (A debtor) claiming judicial investigation in a doubtful case, shall never be put under restraint (by the creditor). He who puts under restraint one not liable to such treatment, shall be fined according to law.

64. A debtor who makes a declaration in this form, 'What may be found to be justly due, that I will pay,' is termed 'one claiming judicial investigation.'

65. When there is a difference of opinion between the two parties regarding the nature (of the loan), or the number or the like, or the (amount of) interest,

60. May. p. 110; Col. Dig. I, 6, 255. The new bond is to be one in which the interest is calculated on the interest added to the principal, i. e. on the doubled principal.

61. Ratn. p. 72; Col. Dig. I, 6, 259. The comparison here proposed relates to the case when a pledge for use has been accidentally destroyed, and a new bond is executed, in which the interest is calculated on the principal together with the lost usufruct.

62. Ratn. p. 75; May. p. 110; Col. Dig. I, 6, 160.

63. May. p. 110; Col. Dig. I, 6, 161.

63-65. Ratn. p. 25. 64. May. p. 110; Col. Dig. I, 6, 162.

65. Col. Dig. I, 6, 163. 'The nature of the loan,' whether it be gold or silver, &c.; 'or the like,' such as the pledge given, &c. Ratn.

or whether the sum be due or not, it is termed a doubtful case.

66. Should a man, after recovering his debt by moral suasion or one of the other modes, fail to receipt it on the bond, or to give a deed of acquittance, it shall yield interest (to the debtor).

XII. DEPOSITS.

1. The Law of Debt, beginning with the delivery of a loan and ending with its recovery, has been declared. Hear, now, the complete set of rules concerning Deposits.

2. When any chattel is deposited in the house of another man, through fear of the king, robbers, or other dangers, or for the purpose of deceiving one's heirs, it is called a Nyâsa deposit.

3. When a chattel enclosed in a cover and marked with a seal (is deposited) without describing its nature or quantity, and without showing it, it is termed an Aupanidhika deposit.

4. Let a man make a deposit, after duly considering the place, house, master of the house, the power, means, qualities, veracity, and kindred (of the depository).

5. (A deposit) is declared to be of two sorts :

66. Ratn. p. 80 ; Col. Dig. I, 6, 288. The term *vṛiddhi*, 'interest,' is interpreted 'forfeiture' by a certain number of commentators. This erroneous interpretation has been adopted by Colebrooke. Sir W. Jones has the correct translation.

XII, 1. Ratn. p. 83 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 1.

2. Ratn. p. 83 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 6 ; Vîram. p. 361.

3. Ratn. p. 83 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 7 (with several different readings).

4. Ratn. p. 85 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 14.

5-8. Ratn. pp. 85, 86 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 19.

attested, or deposited in private ; it must be guarded with the same care as a son ; for it would be destroyed by neglect.

6. The merit of one who preserves a deposit or one who places himself under his protection, is equal to the merit of one who gives (articles made of) gold, or of base metal, or clothes.

7. The sin of those who consume or spoil (by negligence) a bailed chattel is as great as (the sin) of a woman who injures her husband, or of a man who kills his son or his friend.

8. It is the best course not to accept a deposit ; but to destroy it (after having received it) is disgraceful ; after having taken it, a man should keep it carefully and restore it when it has been asked for even once only.

9. A deposit must be returned to the very man who bailed it, in the very manner in which it was bailed ; it must not be delivered to the successor of that man.

10. When a deposit is destroyed, together with the goods of the depositary, by the act of fate or of the king, (the depositary) is not to blame.

11. If the depositary should suffer the deposit to be destroyed by his want of care or indifference, or should refuse to restore it on being asked for it, he shall be made to pay (the value of) it with interest.

6, 9. May. p. 115.

7, 8. Col. Dig. II, 1, 19.

9. Col. Dig. II, 1, 18 ; Viv. p. 51 ; Ratn. p. 87.

10. Ratn. p. 88 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 23 ; Vîram. p. 362 ; May. p. 116.

11. Ratn. p. 90 ; Col. Dig. II, 1, 34 ; May. p. 116 ; Viv. p. 53. The commentators take *bheda*, 'want of care,' to mean separation of the deposit from the depositary's own property, and bestowing less care on it than on the effects of the depositary.

12. Should any (depository) procure advantage for himself by an article deposited (with him), he shall be fined by the king, and compelled to pay its value together with interest.

13. He who, after receiving a deposit, denies the fact, and is convicted by (the evidence of) witnesses or ordeal, shall be compelled to give up the deposit and to pay an equal amount as a fine.

14. When a dispute arises with regard to a deposit privately made, the performance of an ordeal is ordained for both parties, to establish the facts of the case.

15. The same set of rules applies in the case of a bailment for delivery (to a third person), a loan for use, an article delivered to an artist (such as gold delivered to a goldsmith to be worked by him into an earring), a pledge, and a person offering himself for protection.

XIII. SALE WITHOUT OWNERSHIP.

1. Immediately after deposits, sale by another person than the owner has been declared by *Bhrigu*; listen attentively, I will expound that subject thoroughly.

12. Ratn. p. 91; Col. Dig. II, 1, 31. The commentators observe that the use here referred to must have been made without the consent of the owner.

13. Ratn. p. 93; Col. Dig. II, 1, 45.

14. Ratn. p. 95; *Vīram*. p. 366. The term 'both parties' is used in order to imply that the ordeal may be performed either by the alleged depositor or depository. *Vīram*.

15. May. p. 116; Ratn. p. 96; *Viv*. p. 54.

14, 15. Col. Dig. II, 1, 12.

XIII, 1. Ratn. p. 101; Col. Dig. II, 2, 1.

2. An open deposit, a bailment for delivery (Anvâhita), a Nyâsa (sealed) deposit, stolen property, a pledge, or what has been borrowed for use : when any one of these articles has been sold in secret by a man, he is declared a person different from the owner (asvâmin).

3. When the vendor has been produced and has been cast in the suit, (the judge) shall cause him to pay the price and a fine to the buyer and king respectively, and to restore the property to the owner.

4. When the former owner comes forward and makes good his claim to the thing bought, the vendor shall be produced (by the purchaser); by doing so, the purchaser may clear himself.

5. That greedy man who covets another man's property, without having any claim to it, shall be compelled to pay twice the value (of the property claimed) as a fine, if he is unable to prove his claim.

6. When there is no evidence in a suit, the king shall consider the character of the parties and pass a decree himself, according to the equal, greater, or less (credibility of the parties).

7. When a purchase has been made before an assembly of merchants, the king's officers being aware of it (also), but from a vendor whose habitation is unknown; or when the purchaser has deceased :

8. The owner may recover his own property by

2. Ratn. p. 101; Col. Dig. II, 2, 2; Vîram. p. 374.

3. Ratn. p. 102; Col. Dig. II, 2, 30; Viv. p. 57.

4. Ratn. p. 101; Col. Dig. II, 2, 33; Vîram. p. 379.

5. Ratn. p. 106; Col. Dig. II, 2, 46.

6. Ratn. p. 108; Col. Dig. II, 2, 52.

7-9. Ratn. p. 109; Col. Dig. II, 2, 53, 54.

paying half the price (tendered), the custom in that case being that one half of the value is lost to each of the two.

9. A purchase from an unknown (vendor) is one fault (in that case); want of care in keeping it is another; these two faults are viewed by the wise as legitimate grounds of loss to each party.

10. When a man purchases (a commodity) at a fair price, and (the purchase) has been previously announced to the king, there is no wrong about it; but he who makes a fraudulent purchase is a thief.

11. That should be known as a fraudulent purchase which is made at an unreasonably low price, in the interior of a house, outside of the village, at night, in secret, or from a dishonest person.

XIV. CONCERNS OF A PARTNERSHIP.

1. Trade or other occupations should not be carried on by prudent men jointly with incompetent or lazy persons, or with such as are afflicted by an illness, ill-fated, or destitute.

2. A man should carry on business jointly with persons of noble parentage, clever, active, intelligent, familiar with coins, skilled in revenue and expenditure, honest, and enterprising.

3. As an equal, smaller, or larger share (of the

10, 11. Viv. p. 60; Vîram. p. 375; Col. Dig. II, 2, 57. In 10, Colebrooke has 'delivered by the owner in the presence of credible persons.' I have translated the reading of the Vîramitrodāya, 'previously announced to the king.' In 11, the clause 'in secret' is omitted in the Vîramitrodāya.

XIV, 1, 2. Ratn. p. 111; Col. Dig. II, 3, 2; Vîram. pp. 383, 384.

3. Ratn. p. 112; Col. Dig. II, 3, 5.

joint stock) has been contributed by a partner, in the same proportion shall he defray charges, perform labour, and obtain profit.

4. Of those who lend (jointly) gold, grain, liquids and condiments, or the like, the gain shall be equal to their respective shares (of the joint expenditure), whether equal, more, or less.

5. Whatever property one partner may give (or lend), authorized by many, or whatever contract he may cause to be executed, all that is (considered as having been) done by all.

6. They are themselves pronounced to be arbitrators and witnesses for one another in doubtful cases, and when a fraudulent act has been discovered, unless a (previous) feud should exist between them.

7. When any one among them is found out to have practised deceit in a purchase or sale, he must be cleared by an oath (or ordeal); such is the rule in all disputes (of this sort).

8. When a loss or diminution has occurred through fate or the king, it is ordained that it should be borne by all (partners) in proportion to their respective shares.

9. When (a single partner acting) without the assent (of the other partners) or against their express instructions injures (their joint property)

4. Ratn. p. 123; Col. Dig. II, 3, 45.

5-7. Ratn. pp. 123, 113; Col. Dig. II, 3, 45, 9, 10; May. p. 121; Vîram. p. 385.

8. Ratn. p. 113; Col. Dig. II, 3, 11. 'A loss,' destruction of the principal; 'diminution,' loss of profits. Ratn.

9. Ratn. p. 113; Col. Dig. II, 3, 12; Viv. p. 61; Vîram. p. 385.

through his negligence, he must by himself give a compensation to all his partners.

10. That (partner), on the other hand, who by his own efforts preserves (the common stock) from a danger apprehended through fate or the king, shall be allowed a tenth part of it (as a reward), the remainder being distributed among the other (partners), according to their shares (in the stock).

11. Should any such partner in trade happen to die through want of proper care, his goods must be shown (and delivered) to officers appointed by the king.

12. And when any one comes forward claiming that man's property as heir (to the deceased partner), he shall prove his right to it by (the evidence of) other men, and then let him take it.

13. The king shall take a sixth, a ninth, and a twelfth part respectively from the property of a Sūdra, Vaisya, and Kshatriya; and a twentieth from the property of a Brahman.

14. But after the lapse of three years, if no owner should come forward by any means, the king shall take that property; the wealth of a Brahman he shall bestow on (other) Brahmans.

15. So among (several) persons jointly performing a ceremony, if any one should meet with an accident, his (part of) the ceremony shall be performed by a kinsman of his, or by all his associates (in work).

10. Ratn. p. 114; Col. Dig. II, 3, 15; Viv. p. 61; Vīram. p. 386.

11, 12. Ratn. p. 116; Col. Dig. II, 3, 21; Viv. p. 63.

13, 14. Ratn. p. 116; Col. Dig. II, 3, 22; Viv. p. 64.

15. Ratn. p. 117; Col. Dig. II, 3, 29; Viv. p. 65. 'A ceremony,' such as a sacrifice.

16. They (the officiating priests) are pronounced to be threefold: coming (of their own accord), hereditary in the family, and appointed by (the sacrificer) himself; their business should be performed by them accordingly.

17. To a kinsman, relative, or friend one may lend money with a pledge (only); a loan to others must be guaranteed by a surety, or there must be a written contract or witnesses.

18. Gold or silver may be lent according to one's own choice; liquids and condiments, and grain, for a specified period only; it is by local custom that both the loan and its recovery should be regulated.

19. That, however, which has been lent by several persons in common, must be recovered by them jointly; any (such lender) who fails to demand (the loan together with his partners) shall forfeit interest.

20. The law regarding loans has been declared before, (therefore) it is referred to in an abridged form only in the present chapter. Listen to the legal rules regarding cultivators of the soil and other (associates in work), which are declared as follows.

21. Tillage should be undertaken by a sensible

16. Ratn. p. 120; Col. Dig. II, 3, 44. The analogous text of Nārada shows that officiating priests are the persons intended by this rule.

17-26. Ratn. pp. 123, 124; Col. Dig. II, 3, 47-51.

18. In a loan of gold, a definite period for its return need not be specified; but for liquids, &c. the stipulation of a fixed term is necessary. Ratn.

20. 'Declared before,' i. e. in Chapter XI. All the rules declared in that chapter are equally applicable to loans made by an association.

man jointly with those who are his equals in point of cattle, workmen, seeds, and the like, as well as implements of husbandry.

22. They should refrain anxiously from cultivating an enclosed pasture-ground, land adjacent to a town, or to the king's highway, barren soil, and ground infested by mice.

23. That man will enjoy produce who sows fertile land, which has many holes and is wet, capable of irrigation, surrounded by fields on all sides, and cultivated in due season.

24. A sensible cultivator must not admit cattle which is lean, very old, tiny, diseased, apt to run away, blind of one eye, or lame.

25. When by the deficiency of one (partner) as to cattle or seeds a loss happens in (the produce of) the field, it must be made good by him to all the husbandmen.

26. This primeval set of rules has been declared for cultivators of the soil.

27. One able to work up gold, silver, thread, wood, stone, or leather, and acquainted with the articles to be manufactured (with such materials), is called *Silpin* (an artizan or artist) by the wise.

28. When goldsmiths or other (artists) practise their art jointly, they shall share the profits in due proportion, corresponding to the nature of their work.

27, 28. Ratn. p. 124; Col. Dig. II, 3, 52; Viv. p. 70; Vīram. p. 396. Some compilations exhibit the readings *kupya*, 'base metals,' for *rūpya*, 'silver;' *pattra*, 'leaves,' for *sūtra*, 'thread;' *tattatkalābhigñāḥ*, 'acquainted with the minute particles of these materials,' for *ka phalābhigñāḥ*, 'and acquainted with the articles to be manufactured.'

29. The headman among a number of workmen jointly building a house or temple, or digging a pool or making articles of leather, is entitled to a double share (of the remuneration).

30. The same rule has been declared by virtuous men for musicians; he who knows how to beat the time shall take a share and a half, but the singers shall take equal shares.

31. When anything has been brought from a hostile country by freebooters, with the permission of their lord, they shall give a sixth part to the king and share (the remainder) in due proportion.

32. Four shares shall be awarded to their chief; he who is (specially) valiant shall receive three shares; one (particularly) able shall take two; and the remaining associates shall share alike.

XV. RESUMPTION OF GIFTS.

1. The system of rules relative to Concerns of a Partnership has been fully declared thus; the rules regarding what may, or may not, be given, valid, and invalid gifts, will be declared (next).

29. Ratn. p. 125; Col. Dig. II, 3, 54; May. p. 121; Viv. p. 70; Vîram. p. 390. The last two works read *vâpi* for *vâpi*, and under this reading the clause 'or digging a pool' would have to be omitted. The *Mayûkha* reads *dhârmika*, 'sacred articles,' for *kârmika*, 'articles made of leather.'

30. Ratn. p. 125; Col. Dig. II, 3, 55; Viv. p. 71; Vîram. p. 391; May. p. 121.

31, 32. Ratn. p. 125; Col. Dig. II, 3, 56; Viv. p. 71; Vîram. p. 391. 'Their chief,' i. e. one who exerts mind and body. Ratn., Viv.

XV, 1. Ratn. p. 127; Col. Dig. II, 4, 1; Vîram. p. 392.

2. That which may not be given is declared to be of eight sorts, joint property, a son, a wife, a pledge, one's entire wealth, a deposit, what has been borrowed for use, and what has been promised to another.

3. What remains after defraying (the necessary expenses for) the food and clothing of his family, may be given by a man; otherwise (by giving more than that), the religious merit (supposed to be acquired by the giver) though tasting like honey at first, will change into poison in the end.

4. When any field (or house) is given away, belonging to a number of houses or fields acquired in one of the seven modes of (lawful) acquisition, it is ordained to be viewed as a valid gift, whether it have been inherited from the father or acquired by the donor himself.

5. Self-acquired property may be given away at pleasure (by its owner); a pledge may be disposed of according to the rules of mortgage; in the case of property received as a marriage portion, or inherited from an ancestor, the bestowal of the whole is not admitted.

6. When, however, a marriage gift, or inherited property, or what has been obtained by valour, is

2. Ratn. p. 127; Col. Dig. II, 4, 5; Viv. p. 72; Vīram. p. 392.

3. Ratn. p. 129; Viv. p. 75; Col. Dig. II, 4, 18.

4, 5. Viv. p. 76. The seven modes of acquisition are, according to Manu (X, 115), inheritance, finding, purchase, conquest, lending at interest, doing work, and the acceptance of gifts from virtuous men. The prohibition to give away the whole, in 5, relates to property acquired by valour as well, according to the Ratnākara. The clause translated by 'bestowal of the whole' may also mean, 'every gift,' i.e. a gift not sanctioned by the persons referred to in 6.

4-7. Ratn. p. 130; Col. Dig. II, 4, 18.

given with the assent of the wife, kinsmen, or supreme ruler, the gift acquires validity.

7. Co-heirs (or joint-tenants), whether divided in interests or not, have an equal claim to the immovable wealth; a single (parcener) has no power to give, mortgage, or sell the whole (wealth).

8. The following eight sorts of gifts are recognised as valid by persons acquainted with the law of gift, viz. wages, (what was given) for the pleasure (of hearing bards, or the like), the price of merchandise, the fee paid for (or to) a damsel, (and what was given) to a benefactor (as a return for his kindness), through reverence, kindness, or affection.

9. What has been given by one angry, or resenting an injury, or through inadvertence, or by one distressed, by a minor, a madman, one terrified, intoxicated, overaged, cast out from society, idiotic, or afflicted with grief or an illness,

10. Or what is given in jest; all such gifts are declared to be void gifts.

11. When anything has been given through desire of a reward, or to an unworthy man mistaken for a worthy person, or for an immoral purpose, the owner may resume the gift.

XVI. MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. What may not be given and kindred subjects have been declared; the law of servants shall be propounded next. (There) the title of Breach of Promised Obedience is treated first.

8. Ratn. p. 133; Col. Dig. II, 4, 49; Viv. p. 81.

9, 10. Ratn. p. 136; Viv. p. 83; Col. Dig. II, 4, 62.

11. Ratn. p. 136; Viv. p. 83; Col. Dig. II, 4, 62.

XVI, 1, 2. Ratn. p. 139; Col. Dig. III, 1, 1; Viv. p. 84.

2. The titles of non-payment of wages, and then (of disputes) between the owner (of cattle) and his servants are to follow in due order. Such are the three divisions of (the law of) servants.

3. They are pronounced to be of many sorts; according to their particular caste and occupation; and fourfold, according as they serve for science, human knowledge (or skill), love, or gain.

4. Each of these is again divided (into several species), according to the difference of occupation.

5. Science is declared to be a knowledge of (one of) the three Vedas, called Rig-veda, Sâma-veda, and Yagur-veda; for the purpose of acquiring such knowledge, he should pay obedience to a spiritual teacher, as ordained in law.

6. Arts (consisting of) work in gold, base metals, and the like, and the art of dancing and the rest are termed human knowledge; he who studies them should do work at his teacher's house.

7. He who has intercourse with another man's female slave, should be considered as a slave for the sake of his paramour; he must do work for her master, like another hired servant.

8. The servant for gain (or pay) is declared to be of many sorts, another is the servant for a share (of the gain). Of all, a low, a middle, and a high sort is distinguished.

9. A servant engaged for a day, a month, half a month, a sixmonth, two months, or a year, must do

3, 4. Ratn. p. 140; Col. Dig. III, 1, 4; Viv. p. 84.

5. Ratn. p. 140; Col. Dig. III, 1, 8; Viv. p. 86.

6. Ratn. p. 141; Col. Dig. III, 1, 16; Viv. p. 86.

7. Viv. p. 87; Col. Dig. III, 1, 32.

8-11. Ratn. pp. 142, 143; Col. Dig. III, 1, 24.

the work which he promised to do, and receives the stipulated fee.

10. The warrior is the highest of these ; the cultivator of the soil is the middlemost ; the porter is declared to be the lowest, and so is (a servant) employed in household work.

11. A servant for a share of the gain is declared to be twofold, either serving a husbandman or an owner of cattle ; he shall receive, no doubt, a share of the grain produced, or of the milk.

12. A third or a fifth (of the produce) shall be awarded to the cultivator of the soil as his share.

13. Let that cultivator to whom food and clothing is given take a fifth of the crop ; and let him who serves in consideration of the profit (alone) take a third part of the grain produced.

14. Should a hired servant fail in the performance of ever so small a part of his master's work, he forfeits his wages, and may be sued in court for his offence.

15. When a servant does not perform his work after having received his wages, though able (to do work), he shall be compelled to pay twice as much (as his wages) as a fine (to the king), and (shall restore) the wages (to his master).

16. He who has promised (to do work) and does not perform it, shall be compelled to do so by forcible means even ; and if, through obstinacy, such a servant should still not do it as engaged for, he shall be fined

12, 13. Ratn. pp. 157, 158 ; Col. Dig. III, 1, 66, 67.

14, 15. Ratn. p. 159 ; Col. Dig. III, 1, 71.

16. Ratn. p. 160 ; Col. Dig. III, 1, 75. There is another reading, translated by Colebrooke, under which the fine is to amount to two hundred *Paṇas*, instead of eight *Kṛishṇalas*.

eight *Krishnalas*, and his wages shall not be paid to him.

17. When a servant, commissioned by his master, does any improper act (such as theft) for the benefit of his master, the latter shall be held responsible for it.

18. When a master does not pay wages for the labour stipulated after the work has been performed, he shall be compelled by the king to pay it, and a proportionate fine besides.

19. (A man) hired for attendance on milch cows of another shall receive the whole milk every eighth day.

20. (A cowherd) shall save cattle from danger of reptiles, robbers, and tigers, and from caverns or pits; let him try his best to protect them, call out for help, or give notice to his master.

XVII. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS.

1. Thus has been declared the law concerning the mutual relations between master and servant; learn now concisely the performance of agreements.

2. Brahmins imbued with a knowledge of the Veda and of sacred lore, learned divines, and persons keeping a sacrificial fire, (the king) should worship, establish them there (in his kingdom), and provide a maintenance for them.

17. Ratn. p. 162; Col. Dig. III, 1, 84; Viv. p. 100.

18. Ratn. p. 165; Col. Dig. III, 1, 93; Viv. p. 100.

19. Viv. p. 105; Ratn. p. 170; Col. Dig. III, 4, 4.

20. Ratn. p. 172; Viv. p. 106; Col. Dig. III, 4, 10.

XVII, 1-10. Ratn. pp. 177-179; Col. Dig. III, 2, 2, 6.

2-9. Viram. pp. 423-427. The readings given in the Viramītrodaya have been translated everywhere, except in 2, where the Ratnākara has been followed.

3. Let him bestow on them houses and landed property, exempt from taxation, declaring in a written grant that the revenue is remitted.

4. They shall perform for the citizens constant, special, and voluntary rites, as well as expiatory and auspicious ones, and pass a decision in doubtful cases.

5. A compact formed among villagers, companies (of artisans), and associations is (called) an agreement; such (an agreement) must be observed both in times of distress and for acts of piety.

6. When a danger is apprehended from robbers or thieves, it is (considered as) distress common to all; in such a case, (the danger) must be repelled by all, not by one man alone whoever he may be.

7. Mutual confidence having first been established by means of (the ordeal by) sacred libation, by a stipulation in writing, or by umpires, they shall then set about their work.

8. Enemies, dissolute, bashful, indolent, timid, avaricious, overaged or very young persons must not be chosen as intendants of affairs.

9. Honest persons, acquainted with the Vedas and with duty, able, self-controlled, sprung from noble families, and skilled in every business, shall be appointed as heads (of an association).

10. Two, three, or five persons shall be appointed as advisers of the association; their advice shall be taken by the villagers, companies (of artisans), corporations (of cohabitants), and other (fellowships).

11. When a stipulation has been entered in a

11-14. Ratn. p. 181; Col. Dig. III, 2, 14; Vîram. p. 425. For kulāyanam in 13, the Vîramitrodaya reads kulāyandairodhas ka and

document as follows, 'The construction of a house of assembly, of a shed for (accommodating travellers with) water, a temple, a pool, or a garden,

12. Relief to helpless or poor people, the performance of sacrificial acts, a common path, or defence, shall be undertaken by us in proportionate shares : ' that is a lawful agreement.

13. (Such an agreement) must be kept by all. He who fails (in his agreement), though able (to perform it), shall be punished by confiscation of his entire property, and by banishment from the town.

14. And for that man, whoever he may be, who falls out (with his associates), or neglects (his work), a fine is ordained amounting to six Nishkas of four Suvarṇas each.

15. He who injures the joint stock, or insults a Brahman acquainted with the three Vedas, or breaks the mutual agreement, shall be banished from the town.

16. An acrimonious or malicious man, and one who causes dissension or does violent acts, or who is inimically disposed towards that company, association, or the king, shall be banished instantly from the town.

17. The heads of families, companies (of artisans) and associations, whether inhabiting a town or a stronghold, shall censure and reprimand offenders, and forsake them.

interprets it by 'the maintenance of a family, including its preservation in times of distress.'

15. Ratn. p. 183 ; Col. Dig. III, 2, 19.

16. Ratn. p. 184 ; Col. Dig. III, 2, 20 ; Vīram. p. 430.

17. Ratn. p. 184 ; Col. Dig. III, 2, 21 ; Vīram. p. 429 ; Viv. p. 110.

18. Whatever is done by those (heads of an association), whether harsh or kind towards other people, must be approved of by the king as well; for they are declared to be the appointed managers (of affairs).

19. Should they agree, actuated by hatred, on injuring a single member of the fellowship, the king must restrain them; and they shall be punished, if they persist in their conduct.

20. When a dispute arises between the chiefs and the societies, the king shall decide it, and shall bring them back to their duty.

21. Those (companions in trade) who conspire to cheat the king of the share due to him (of their profits), shall be compelled to pay eight times as much, and shall be punished if they take to flight.

22. Whatever is obtained then by a man, shall belong to all in common; whether it have been obtained a sixmonth or a month ago, it shall be divided in due proportion.

23. (Or) it shall be bestowed on the idiotic, the aged, the blind, to women or children, to afflicted or diseased persons, to persons having issue, or the like (worthy persons). This is an eternal law.

24. Whatever is obtained or preserved by the members of a fellowship, or spent on behalf of the

18. Ratn. p. 184; Col. Dig. III, 2, 22; Vīram. p. 429.

19. Ratn. p. 184; Col. Dig. III, 2, 23; Vīram. p. 429.

20. Ratn. p. 184; Col. Dig. III, 2, 24.

21. Ratn. p. 185; Col. Dig. III, 2, 27; Viv. p. 110.

22. Ratn. p. 186; Col. Dig. III, 2, 30; Viv. p. 116. The commentators observe that gifts obtained from a king are meant.

23, 24. Ratn. pp. 186, 187; Col. Dig. III, 2, 31; Vīram. p. 432. For prakalpita in 24, 'what is spent,' the last two words read *rinamkrīta*, 'what is borrowed.'

society, or acquired through the king's favour, is common to all (members of the society).

XVIII. RESCISSION OF PURCHASE AND SALE.

1. This set of rules concerning the law of agreements has been briefly stated; disputes arising from purchase and sale shall be treated next.

2. Two sorts of property are distinguished, immovable and movable; when a purchase is concluded, the term 'vendible property' (*panya*) is applied to both.

3. The purchaser shall examine a chattel himself and show it to others; when, after examining and approving it, he has accepted it, he is not at liberty to return it again.

4. The foolish man who sells an article, though acquainted with its blemish, shall have to pay twice its value (to the vendee), and (a fine of) the same amount (to the king).

5. What has been sold by one intoxicated or insane, or at a very low price, or under the impulse of fear, or by one not his own master, or by an idiot, shall be relinquished (by the purchaser, or it) may be recovered (from the purchaser) by forcible means.

6. Within that period, if a blemish should be

XVIII, 1, 2. Ratn. p. 189; Col. Dig. III, 3, 1.

3. Vivam. p. 433; Col. Dig. III, 3, 11; Ratn. p. 198; Viv. p. 117.

4. Vivam. p. 441; Ratn. p. 192; Col. Dig. III, 3, 31; Viv. p. 114.

5. Vivam. p. 441; Ratn. p. 193; Col. Dig. III, 3, 37. Thus, according to some commentators; others construe the clause 'at a very low price' with each part of the sentence.

6. Viv. p. 116; Col. Dig. III, 3, 14; May. p. 131. 'Within that period,' i. e. the period allowed for examination.

discovered anywhere in the commodity purchased, it shall be returned to the vendor, and the purchaser shall recover the price.

XIX. BOUNDARY DISPUTES.

1. This rule regarding rescission of purchase and sale has been declared. Hear the laws concerning boundaries of villages, fields, houses, and so forth.

2. The determination of boundaries should be settled at the time of foundation, and it should be marked by visible and invisible signs, so as to dispel doubt.

3. Wells, tanks, pools, large trees, gardens, temples, mounds, channels, the course of a river, reeds, shrubs, or piles of stones :

4. By such visible signs as these a boundary line should always be caused to be marked ; also, by other (marks) deposited underground which the earth is not likely to destroy.

5. Dry cowdung, bones, chaff, charcoal, stones, potsherds, sand, bricks, cows' tails, cotton seeds, and ashes :

6. After having placed these substances in vessels, one should deposit them underground at the extremities of the boundary. After that, one should take care to point them out to youths and infants.

7. These (youths and infants) should again show them to their own children, after having grown old ;

XIX, 1. Ratn. p. 201.

2. Ratn. p. 202. 'Invisible signs' are substances deposited underground.

3, 4. Viv. p. 120 ; Ratn. p. 203 ; Vīram. p. 452.

5, 6. Ratn. p. 204 ; May. p. 134 ; Vīram. pp. 452, 453.

7. Ratn. p. 204.

by knowledge thus passing from one generation to the other, doubts regarding boundaries may be obviated.

8. In disputes regarding a house or field, the decision belongs to the neighbours, as well as to the inhabitants of that town or village, or to members of the same society, and to the elders (of that district).

9. (Likewise, to) husbandmen, artizans, servants, cowherds, hunters, gleaners, diggers of roots, fishermen, kinsmen, mischief-makers, and robbers.

10. After having been adjured by imprecations befitting their station, they shall determine the boundary, and shall indicate the marks deposited underground, as evidence. Such is the law.

11. In default of witnesses and signs, even a single man, agreeable to both parties, may fix the boundary, wearing a red garland of flowers and a red cloak, putting earth on his head, adhering to truth, and having kept a fast.

12. Neighbours born in that district, though they be living abroad, are termed natives of the place ; they should be consulted in the decision of a suit.

13. What they should declare in a doubtful case, as honest men and impartial to both parties, shall be held decisive ; thus justice will not be violated.

14. Those are witnesses in a suit of this kind who know the title of acquisition, the size, the duration of the enjoyment, the name, and the characteristics of the land in question.

8, 9. Ratn. p. 209.

10. Ratn. p. 210 ; Vīram. p. 457.

11. Vīram. p. 458 ; Ratn. p. 211 ; Viv. p. 122 ; May. p. 134.

12, 13. Ratn. p. 213.

14. Vīram. p. 453.

15. The same rule holds good in all suits concerning immovable property. If their statements do not agree, they shall be made to pay the highest fine.

16. Supposing a piece of land to have been taken from a village belonging to one man, and given to another man, either by a large river or by the king, what should be decided in that case?

17. The land abandoned by a river or granted by the king belongs to him who receives it. Otherwise, there would be no acquisition through fate or the king among men.

18. Loss and gain and life among men depend on the act of fate and of the king; therefore, in all affairs, what is effected by them must not be rescinded.

19. When a river has been fixed as the boundary line between two villages, it shall never be removed, on account of loss or gain arising (from that river to either village). He who removes it, is liable to punishment.

20. The encroachment (of a river) on one side produces an increase of land elsewhere in banks of rivers; that (increase) must not be taken from him (who gets it).

21. When land is carried away by the swift course

15. *Vīram*. p. 457; *Smṛiti*.

16-23. *Ratn*. pp. 216, 217; *Viv*. pp. 123, 124; *Vīram*. pp. 461, 462. The second half of 19 is read as follows in the *Vīramitrodaya*, '(The river) effects gain or loss, according as people are lucky or unlucky.' This reading may have crept in from 16. For *taulyā*, I read *kālyā*, with *Vīram*.

21. Such a tilled piece of land shall be made over to the previous owner till the harvest is over. When the harvest is over, the previous rule (20) holds good. *Vīram*.

of a river overflowing a tilled piece of ground, the previous owner shall recover it.

22. When land is taken from one man by a king actuated by anger or avarice, or using a fraudulent pretext, and bestowed on a different person as a mark of his favour, such a gift is not considered as valid.

23. When (however) land is taken from a person enjoying it without a legitimate title of ownership, and given to a worthier person, (the latter) must not be deprived of it.

24. A house, pool, shop or the like having been used by a man since the time of its foundation, must not be taken from him, nor diminished or altered.

25. A window, a watercourse, a peg projecting from a wall (used to hang things upon), a shed (erected in a courtyard), a square of four buildings, and a channel for the exit of water (after a rainfall), must not be blocked up, when previously constructed.

26. A privy, a fireplace, a pit, or a receptacle for leavings of food and other (rubbish), must never be made very close to the house of another man.

27. A passage by which men and animals go to and fro unprevented is called *Samsarana*, and must not be obstructed by any one.

28. He who purposely crowds such a place (by carts and the like), or makes a pit, or plants trees, or voids excrements, shall pay a *Mâshaka* as a fine.

23. I read *vai dattâ*, with *Vîram.*, for *vâdeyâ* or *vâdattâ* (*Ratn.*, *Viv.*).

24. *Viv.* p. 124; *Vîram.* p. 463; *Ratn.* p. 219.

25. *Viv.* p. 124; *Vîram.* p. 465; *Ratn.* p. 219.

26. *Viv.* p. 125; *Vîram.* p. 464; *Ratn.* p. 219; *May.* p. 135.

27. *May.* p. 136; *Viv.* p. 125; *Ratn.* p. 220; *Vîram.* p. 464.

28. *Vîram.* p. 465; *May.* p. 136.

29. When a man has leased ground, he shall sow and watch it, and reap the harvest in due season. If he fails to do so, he shall be compelled to make good the average value of the crop to the owner.

XX. DEFAMATION.

1. Injury (pârushya) is declared to be of two kinds, harsh speeches and beating; each of these two kinds is again divided into three species, and the punishment is pronounced to be threefold.

2. Abuse of the first (or lowest) degree means offensive language against, or defamation of, a country, village, family, or the like, without (mentioning) an (individual ignominious) act.

3. Referring (in terms of contempt) to a man's sister or mother, or charging him with a minor sin, is termed abuse of a middling sort by the learned in law.

4. Charging a man with taking forbidden food or drinks, or taxing him with a mortal sin, or maliciously exposing his weakest points, is termed abuse of the highest degree.

5. When two persons abuse each other, their punishment shall be equal, if they are equals in caste; if one is inferior to the other, his punishment shall be double; for a superior, half (of the ordinary punishment) is ordained.

29. Viv. p. 129; Ratn. p. 229.

XX, 1. Ratn. p. 243; Viv. p. 138. The former work reads 'two species.'

2-4. Ratn. pp. 243, 244; Viv. p. 138; May. p. 137; Vîram. p. 483. 'Terms of contempt' in 3 means filthy speeches, such as 'I shall visit your sister or mother.'

5. Ratn. p. 245; Vîram. p. 484.

6. When persons equal in caste and qualities abuse one another, the punishment ordained for them in the system of law is thirteen *Paṇas* and a half.

7. For a Brahman abusing a Kshatriya, the fine shall be half of a hundred (fifty *Paṇas*); for abusing a Vaisya, half of fifty (twenty-five *Paṇas*); for abusing a *Sūdra*, twelve and a half.

8. This punishment has been declared for (abusing) a virtuous *Sūdra* who has committed no wrong; no offence is imputable to a Brahman for abusing (a *Sūdra*) devoid of virtue.

9. A Vaisya shall be fined a hundred (*Paṇas*) for reviling a Kshatriya; a Kshatriya reviling a Vaisya shall have to pay half of that amount as a fine.

10. In the case of a Kshatriya reviling a *Sūdra*, the fine shall be twenty *Paṇas*; in the case of a Vaisya, the double amount is declared to be the proper fine by persons learned in law.

11. A *Sūdra* shall be compelled to pay the first fine for abusing a Vaisya; the middling fine (for abusing) a Kshatriya; and the highest fine (for abusing) a Brahman.

12. (A *Sūdra*) teaching the precepts of religion, or uttering the words of the Veda, or insulting a Brahman, shall be punished by cutting out his tongue.

13. (A man) reviling a sister or other (relation) of

6. Ratn. p. 247; Vīram. p. 483.

7-11. Ratn. pp. 251, 252; Vīram. p. 485.

7. May. p. 138.

12. May. p. 138; Vīram. p. 486; Viv. p. 141; Ratn. p. 252.

13. Ratn. p. 250; Vīram. p. 485. The latter work reads *viprādikam*, 'a Brahman or other person,' for *svasrādikam*, 'a sister or other relative.'

another person shall give a fine amounting to fifty *Panas*.

14. He who reviles a person's native country or other (belongings of his), shall be fined twelve *Panas* and a half. He who through arrogance imputes an offence to him, shall be compelled to pay the first fine.

15. This gradation of fines has been declared by me, subject to modification by the sages, in conformity with the (particular caste or qualities of a) man, so as either to remain as declared, or to be reduced or raised.

XXI. ASSAULT.

1. Injuring (a man) with a hand, stone, club, or (throwing at him) ashes, or mud, or dust, or (attacking him with) a weapon, is termed assault.

2. Throwing ashes or the like (at a man), or striking him with a hand or the like, is (termed) an assault of the first degree ; the fine to be inflicted in that case shall amount to a *Māsha*.

3. This fine is ordained for (an assault on) equals in caste ; (for assaults) on another man's wife or on a superior, it shall be twofold or threefold, according to the sages, according to the rank (of the person injured).

4. He who having been abused returns the abuse, or having been beaten returns the blow, or strikes an offender down, commits no wrong.

14, 15. *Vīram*. p. 488 ; *Ratn*. p. 257.

XXI, 1. *Ratn*. p. 259.

2, 3. *Ratn*. p. 261 ; *Viv*. p. 144.

4. *May*. p. 139 ; *Vīram*. p. 472 ; *Viv*. p. 153 ; *Ratn*. p. 276.

5. When a person throws gravel, stones, or pieces of wood at another, the first (or lowest) fine shall be inflicted on him. When they mutually strike one another with a hand or foot, it shall amount to ten or twenty *Paṇas* respectively.

6. The second fine shall be imposed when two persons in anger use weapons against one another; when a wound has been inflicted, the punishment shall be fixed by experts, corresponding to the severity of the hurt.

7. For injuring (a person) with bricks, stones, or a wooden club, (the fine shall be) two *Māshas*; the double fine shall be inflicted, according to the sages, when blood flows.

8. For tearing the skin, the first (or lowest) fine (shall be inflicted); for tearing the flesh, the second fine; for breaking a bone, the highest fine; for killing, capital punishment.

9. For breaking the ear, nose, or hand (of a person), or injuring his teeth, or feet, the second fine shall be inflicted; and double of that, for entirely cutting off (any of those limbs).

10. He who injures a limb, or divides it, or cuts it off, shall be compelled to pay the expense of curing it; and (he who forcibly took an article in a quarrel, shall restore) his plunder.

11. When a man has been beaten in a solitary place, or when no wound is seen, the offender shall

5. Ratn. p. 263; Viv. p. 145; Vīram. p. 473.

6, 7. Vīram. p. 474; Viv. p. 147; Ratn. p. 264.

8, 9. Viv. p. 148.

10. Viv. p. 153; Ratn. p. 270; Vīram. p. 477.

11, 12. Ratn. p. 273.

be found out by circumstantial evidence or by an oath or ordeal.

12. When he has been struck in the interior of a house, or in a wood, or at night, and blood becomes visible, one shall not examine witnesses.

13. When two persons strike simultaneously, the punishment shall be equal for both; the first aggressor and he who is a habitual mischief-maker shall be compelled to pay a larger fine.

14. When a low person offends a man in high position by harsh words or the like, that man must not be persecuted by the king if he beats his aggressor.

15. Persons begotten in the inverse order of castes, and members of the lowest caste, are called the refuse of society; should they insult a Brahman, they shall be corporally punished, and shall never be amerced in a fine.

16. He who employs at an improper time, for drawing or carrying, tired, or hungry, or thirsty animals, shall be compelled to atone for it in the same way as a cow-killer, or to pay the first fine.

XXII. ROBBERY AND VIOLENCE.

1. Homicide, theft, assault on another man's wife, and the two kinds of injury (abuse and assault) are the four species of violence (Sâhasa).

2. Thieves are declared to be of two kinds, open and concealed. These are subdivided a thousand-

13. Ratn. p. 275.

14. Ratn. p. 276.

15. Ratn. p. 277.

16. Ratn. p. 280.

XXII, 1. May. p. 145.

2-4. Ratn. p. 289; Vîram. p. 491.

fold, according to their skill, ability, and mode of cheating.

3. (Fraudulent) traders, quacks, gamblers, (corruptible) judges, those who accept bribes, cheats, persons (pretending) to know how to interpret evil omens, or to practise propitiatory rites, low artists, forgers,

4. (Hired servants) refusing to do their work, (roguish) umpires, perjured witnesses, and, lastly, jugglers : these are termed open thieves.

5. Housebreakers, highwaymen, robbers of bipeds or quadrupeds, thieves of clothes and the like, and stealers of grain, should be considered secret thieves.

6. (Thieves or robbers) having been found out by the king's attendants by their associating (with thieves) or by marks of their criminality, or by their being possessed of stolen goods, shall be compelled to restore their plunder, and shall be visited with punishments ordained in law.

7. A merchant who conceals the blemish of an article which he is selling, or mixes bad and good articles together, or sells (old articles) after repairing them, shall be compelled to give the double quantity (to the purchaser) and to pay a fine equal (in amount) to the value of the article.

8. A physician who, though unacquainted with drugs and spells, or ignorant of the nature of a disease, yet takes money from the sick, shall be punished like a thief.

9. Gamblers playing with false dice, prostitutes,

5. Ratn. p. 292.

6. Viv. p. 157; Ratn. p. 293.

7-15. Ratn. pp. 297, 306-311, 314; May. p. 142; Vīram. p. 492; Viv. pp. 159-165. The readings of the Ratnākara have been followed throughout, in preference to those found in the other works.

those who appropriate what belongs to the king, and those who cheat an association, are pronounced to be impostors, and punishable as such.

10. Judges passing an unjust sentence, those who live by taking bribes, and those who disappoint confidence (placed in them) : all such persons shall be banished.

11. Those who, without knowing the science of stars, or portents, expound them to the people from avarice, shall be punished by all means.

12. Those who show themselves in public wearing a staff, a skin, and the like (insignia of a religious order), and injure mankind by deceiving them, shall be corporally punished by the king's officers.

13. Those who by artificially getting up articles of small value cause them to appear very valuable, and deceive women or children (by doing so), shall be punished in proportion to their gain.

14. Those who make false gold or factitious gems or coral shall be compelled to restore their price to the purchaser, and to pay the double amount to the king as a fine.

15. Arbitrators who cheat either party from partiality, avarice or some other motive, and witnesses who give false evidence, shall be compelled to pay twice the amount (in dispute) as a fine.

16. Those who procure gain by means of spells or medicines (shall be compelled to give up) their gain; those who practise incantations with roots shall be banished by the ruler of the land.

17. Housebreakers shall be compelled to relinquish their plunder and be impaled on a stake after-

10. Ratn. p. 315.

17. Ratn. p. 317; May. p. 143; Vīram. p. 494; Viv. p. 166.

wards, and highwaymen shall be bound and hanged by the neck from a tree.

18. Those who have kidnapped a man shall be burned by the king with a fire kept up with straw; the stealer of a woman (shall be placed) on a bed of hot iron, or burned with a fire kept up with straw.

19. Stealers of grain shall be compelled to give ten times as much (to the owner), and the double amount as a fine; a cow-stealer shall have his nose cut off, and shall be plunged into water, after having been fettered.

20. When a man takes grass, wood, flowers, or fruit without asking permission to do so, he deserves to have a hand cut off.

21. On him who steals more than ten kumbhas of grain, corporal punishment (or execution) shall be inflicted; (for stealing) less than that, a man shall be fined eleven times the quantity stolen, and shall restore his property to the owner.

22. When a religious man and diligent reader of the Veda has committed theft, he shall be kept in prison for a long time, and shall be caused to perform a penance after having been compelled to restore the stolen goods to the owner.

23. Hear now (the law regarding) theft coupled with violence, which springs from either wrath or avarice.

18. Ratn. p. 317; Viv. p. 166.

19. Ratn. p. 322; Vīram. p. 494; May. p. 143.

20. Ratn. p. 329; Viv. p. 174.

21. Viv. p. 169.

22. Ratn. p. 331; Viv. p. 176. Under the version found in the latter work, the punishment does not take place when the Brahman performs a penance.

23. Vīram. p. 503.

24. It is declared to be threefold, as it may be (theft or violence) of the lowest, second, or highest kind ; the punishment in each case should also be of the lowest, middling, or highest sort, according to the (nature of the) article (stolen or injured).

25. He who destroys or takes implements of husbandry, an embankment, flowers, roots, or fruit, shall be fined a hundred (*Panas*) or more, according (to the nature of his offence).

26. So one injuring or stealing cattle, clothes, food, drinks, or household utensils, shall be compelled to pay a fine of not less than two hundred (*Panas*), like a thief.

27. In the case of women, men, gold, gems, the property of a deity or Brahman, silk, and (other) precious things, the fine shall be equal to the value (of the article stolen).

28. Or the double amount shall be inflicted by the king as a fine ; or the thief shall be executed, to prevent a repetition (of the offence).

29. Violence is declared to be of five sorts, and of these, manslaughter is declared to be the worst ; those who have perpetrated it, shall not be amerced in a fine, they shall be put to death by all means.

30. Both notorious murderers and secret assassins shall be put to death by the king by various modes of execution, after their property has been duly seized.

31. When several persons in a passion beat a single individual (and kill him), the responsibility

24-28. Ratn. p. 350 ; May. p. 147.

29, 30. Ratn. p. 371 ; Viv. p. 192.

30. May. p. 145 ; Vivam. p. 501.

31-33. Ratn. p. 373 ; Viv. p. 194.

for his death shall be charged to him who strikes the fatal blow.

32. He who struck the fatal blow shall have to atone for his offence as directed ; the first aggressor and the associates shall be punished half as much.

33. The decision should be given after carefully ascertaining by signs the less or greater severity of a wound, the seat of vital power, the strength (of the murdered individual), and the repetition (of the blows or cuts).

34. Where the corpse is found, but the murderer cannot be discovered, the king shall trace him by drawing an inference from previous enmities of his.

35. His immediate neighbours, and their neighbours, as well as his friends, enemies, and relatives, shall be questioned by the king's officers, employing towards them the (four) expedients of conciliation and so forth.

36. The (guilty) person may be found out from his keeping bad company, from signs (of the crime committed), and from the possession of stolen property. Thus has been declared the method of discovering murderers and robbers.

37. He who has been arrested on suspicion and does not confess his guilt, shall clear himself (from suspicion) by ordeal ; this rule holds good for causes of every sort.

38. He who has been cleared of guilt by ordeal shall be released ; he who has been convicted shall be put to death. By punishment (of the wicked)

34-36. Ratn. p. 377 ; Viv. p. 197 (the better version).

35. The three other expedients are, bribery, intimidation, and violence.

37, 38. Ratn. pp. 377, 378 ; Viv. p. 198.

and release (of the virtuous), the renown and religious merit of a king is increased.

XXIII. ADULTERY.

1. The two kinds of injury (abuse and assault) and the three kinds of violence have been declared. Learn the threefold (offence of) adultery, which is productive of sin.

2. The two first kinds of it are connected with violence and deception respectively, the third kind springs from sensual desire ; the last is again of three sorts, being of the first, second, or highest degree.

3. When a man has intercourse with a woman in secret against her will, when she is asleep, or disordered in her intellect, or does not notice his approach, it is (termed) forcible enjoyment of a woman.

4. When he conducts her into his house under false pretences, and after giving her intoxicating drugs, has intercourse with her, it is considered fraudulent enjoyment of a woman.

5. When a man exchanges looks with a woman or sends her messages, and has intercourse with her impelled by sensuality, it has to be considered as (adulterous intercourse) springing from sensual désiré.

6. Winking (at a woman), smiling (at her), sending her messengers, and touching her ornaments or clothes, is termed an adulterous act of the first (or lowest) degree.

7. Sending perfumes, garlands, fruit, spirituous liquor, food, or clothes, and conversing with her in

XXIII, 1-5. *Vîram.* pp. 504, 505 ; *Ratn.* pp. 378, 379.

6-8. *Vîram.* p. 505 ; *Ratn.* pp. 379, 380 ; *Viv.* p. 200.

secret, is considered an adulterous act of the second degree.

8. Sitting on the same bed, dallying, and kissing or embracing each other, is defined as an adulterous act of the highest degree by persons acquainted with law.

9. For these three gradations of adultery, the first, middling, and highest fines shall be inflicted respectively; the fine shall be even higher than that, in the case of a very rich man.

10. (The king) shall confiscate the whole wealth of him who violates an unwilling woman, and having caused his penis and scrotum to be cut off, shall cause him to be paraded on an ass.

11. When a man enjoys a woman by fraud, his punishment shall be confiscation of his entire wealth, and he shall afterwards be branded with the mark of a female part and banished from the town.

12. The highest fine (shall be inflicted for connexion) with a woman of equal caste; half of that (for connexion) with a woman of inferior caste; but a man who has connexion with a woman of higher caste than his own, shall be put to death.

13. When a woman has been enjoyed against her

9. Ratn. p. 384; Viram. p. 506; Viv. p. 202; May. p. 149. The Mayūkha as printed reads this text differently, but one MS. of it agrees with the other compilations.

10. Ratn. p. 388; Viv. p. 212; May. p. 148.

11, 12. Ratn. p. 389; Viv. p. 213; May. p. 149. The reading of the Mayūkha seems to be wrong. This rule (12) is declared to apply to those cases where force or deception has not been used. Ratn., Viv.

11. Viram. p. 506.

13, 14. Ratn. p. 400. For the *Krikkhṛa* (Prāgāpatya) and *Parāka* penances, see Manu XI, 212, 216.

will, she shall be kept in the house well guarded, smeared (with ashes), lying on a low couch, and receiving a bare maintenance only.

14. To atone for her sin, she shall be caused to perform the *Krikkhra* or *Parāka* penance, in case she had intercourse with her equal in caste; but if she has been enjoyed by a man of inferior caste, she shall be abandoned and put to death.

15. When a woman comes to a man's house and excites his concupiscence by touching him or the like acts, she shall be punished; half of her punishment shall be inflicted on the man.

16. Her nose, lips, and ears having been cut off, she shall be paraded in the streets and plunged into water; or she shall be torn to pieces by dogs in a public place frequented by many persons.

XXIV. DUTIES OF MAN AND WIFE.

1. The whole set of commandments concerning adultery has thus been stated; listen to me proclaiming the conduct prescribed for man and wife.

2. A woman must be restrained from slight transgressions even by her relations; by night and by day she must be watched by her mother-in-law and other wives belonging to the family.

3. A father who does not give his daughter in

15. *Vīram.* p. 513; *Viv.* p. 217.

16. *Viv.* p. 217.

XXIV, 1. *Ratn.* p. 409; *Col. Dig.* IV, 1, 1.

2. *Ratn.* p. 411; *Col. Dig.* IV, 1, 12.

3. *Ratn.* p. 412; *Col. Dig.* IV, 1, 15; *Viv.* p. 220. Regarding the time favourable for procreation, see *Manu* III, 46.

marriage in proper time (before she has reached maturity), a husband who has not connexion with his wife at the time favourable for procreation, and a son who does not support his mother: all such deserve contempt and shall be punished as ordained in law.

4. Employing (a woman) in the receipt and expenditure (of wealth), in the preparation of food, in the preservation of domestic utensils, in purification, and in the care of the (sacred household) fire, is declared to be the (best) way of guarding women.

5. Let not a woman reside in another man's house, separated from her father, husband, or sons; by (giving way to) malicious propensities, particularly, she is sure to lose her reputation.

6. Rising before (the others), paying reverence to the elders of the family, preparing food and condiments, and using a low seat and bed: thus have the duties of women been declared.

7. Drinking (spirituous liquor), rambling abroad, sleeping by day, and neglect of her daily duties, are faults disgracing a woman.

8. That wife is declared to be devoted to her husband who is afflicted when he is afflicted, pleased when he is happy, squalid and languid when he is absent, and who dies when he dies.

9. While her husband is absent, a woman must avoid decorating herself, as well as dancing, singing,

4. Ratn. p. 416; Col. Dig. IV, 1, 31; Vîram. p. 419.

5. Ratn. p. 427.

6. Ratn. p. 428; Col. Dig. IV, 2, 90.

7. Ratn. p. 431; Col. Dig. IV, 2, 100.

8. Ratn. p. 436; Col. Dig. IV, 2, 107. See 11.

9. Ratn. p. 439; Col. Dig. IV, 2, 118.

looking on at public spectacles or festivals, and using meat or intoxicating drinks.

10. A wife practising religious austerities, fasting and preserving her chastity, self-controlled and liberal always, goes to heaven even though she have no son.

11. A wife is considered half the body (of her husband), equally sharing the result of his good or wicked deeds; whether she ascends the pile after him, or chooses to survive him leading a virtuous life, she promotes the welfare of her husband.

12. The Niyoga (appointment of a widow to raise offspring to her deceased lord) has been declared by Manu, and again prohibited by the same; on account of the successive deterioration of the (four) ages of the world, it must not be practised by mortals (in the present age) according to law.

13. In the ages *Kṛita*, *Tretā*, and *Dvāpara*, men were imbued with devotion and sacred knowledge; in the (present or) *Kali* age, a decrease of its power has been ordained for the human race.

14. The various sons who were appointed by ancient sages cannot be adopted now by men of the present age, as they are destitute of power.

XXV. THE LAW OF INHERITANCE.

1. After the death of both parents, division of the property among brothers has been ordained (to take

10. Ratn. p. 443; Col. Dig. IV, 3, 138.

11. Ratn. p. 442; Col. Dig. IV, 3, 132. It appears from these texts that *Bṛihaspati* advocates the custom of *Satī* (self-immolation of the widow) as an optional rite only, in common with *Vishṇu* and other Indian legislators and jurists.

12-14. Ratn. pp. 449, 450; Col. Dig. V, 4, 279 and IV, 4, 157. See Manu I, 81-86; IX, 56-70.

XXV, 1. Col. Dig. V, 2, 99, 115; D. II, 1; May. p. 39; V. p. 46;

place). It may take place even in their lifetime, if the mother be past child-bearing.

2. Houses and landed property inherited from an ancestor shall be shared equally by the father and sons; but the sons cannot claim a share of their father's own property without the consent of the father.

3. Of property acquired by the grandfather, whether immovable or movable, father and son are declared to be entitled to equal shares.

4. Those (sons) for whom their shares have been arranged by the father, whether equal, less, or greater, must be compelled to abide by such arrangement. Otherwise (if they try to alter the arrangement), they shall be punished.

5. When a partition is made during (the father's) life, the father shall reserve a couple of shares for himself.

6. The worship of the Manes, gods, and Brahmans by those residing (together) and cooking their food (in one house) is single. But when they divide the

Ratn. p. 462. The author of the *Dâyabhâga* and other writers of the Bengal school hold that this rule applies to ancestral wealth only, and that, moreover, the consent of the father is required in every division of his property during his lifetime. In the other schools of law, this text is given its plain meaning.

2. Col. Dig. V, 2, 94 ('Vyâsa'); May. p. 39. The *Mayûkha* deduces from this text the doctrine, generally held by the followers of the *Mitâksharâ*, that partition of property inherited from a grandfather or more remote ancestor may be instituted by sons even against their father's wish.

3. Col. Dig. V, 2, 93; D. II, 50; V. p. 66; May. p. 43.

4. Col. Dig. V, 1, 31; D. II, 75; V. p. 56; Ratn. p. 468.

5. Col. Dig. V, 2, 97; D. II, 46; Ratn. p. 465.

6. V. pp. 53, 257; Ratn. p. 459; Viv. p. 227; Col. Dig. V, 6, 388.

property, (the worship) takes place separately in each house.

7. Partition among coparceners is declared to be of two kinds; one is with attention to priority of birth, the other consists of the allotment of equal shares.

8. All sons of the twice-born, begotten on women equal in caste (to their husbands), shall take equal shares, after giving a preferential share to the eldest.

9. He who is the first by birth, sacred knowledge, or good qualities, shall take a couple of shares out of the partible wealth, and the rest shall take equal shares; but he stands to them in the relation of a father, as it were.

10. When they divide their father's heritage, all the sons shall share *alike*; but he who is distinguished by sacred knowledge and virtue, shall obtain a greater share (than the rest).

11. They are parents in the true sense of the term who have a son whose fame is spread in the world for sacred knowledge, cleverness, valour, wealth, and for knowledge, liberality, and pious acts.

12. In property belonging to the grandfather which had been taken away and has been (afterwards) recovered by the father through his own

7. Col. Dig. V, 1, 30; D. II, 80.

8. Col. Dig. V, 1, 53; D. II, 42.

9. Col. Dig. V, 1, 45; D. II, 42; V. p. 67; Viv. p. 235.

10. Col. Dig. V, 1, 67; V, 3, 116.

11. Col. Dig. V, 3, 116; Ratn. p. 484.

12, 13. Col. Dig. V, 2, 90; D. VI, 2, 34; V. p. 126; May. p. 40; Ratn. p. 461. Some compilations read *bhâgam*, 'withhold it from partition,' for *bhogam*, 'consume it.'

ability, as well as in property acquired by sacred knowledge, valour in arms, &c., the father's ownership has been declared.

13. He may make a gift out of that property, or even consume it, at his will. But in his default, his sons are pronounced to be equal sharers.

14. Whatever has been acquired by all together, in that property they all have equal shares. Their sons, whether unequal or equal (in number), are declared (to be) heirs of the shares of their (respective) fathers.

15. When there are many sons sprung from one father, equal in caste and number, but born of different mothers, a legal division (of the property) may be effected by adjusting the shares according to the mothers.

16. (When there are several brothers) equal in caste, but varying in number (of sons begotten with each wife), a division according to males is ordained.

17. When step-brothers born of different mothers or uterine brothers have come to a division with their father, afterborn brothers shall take their father's share.

18. A son born before (partition) has no claim to the paternal wealth; nor (can) a brother's wealth (be claimed by) one born after partition.

19. Whatever has been acquired, with his own

14. Ratn. p. 481; Aparârka.

15. Col. Dig. V, 1, 62; D. III, 1, 12; May. p. 46; V. p. 76; Ratn. p. 975.

16. Col. Dig. V, 1, 63; May. p. 46; V. p. 76.

17, 18. Col. Dig. V, 2, 100; D. VII, 5; V. p. 93; Ratn. p. 538.

18. M. I, 6, 4; V. p. 219.

19. M. I, 6, 6; Col. Dig. V, 7, 39a.

effort, by a father who has come to a partition with his sons, all that belongs to the son born after partition. Those born before it are declared to have no right.

20. In regard to the property as well as regards debts, gifts, pledges, and purchases, they are independent of each other, excepting impurity (caused by a death) and offerings consisting of water libations.

21. Should there be younger brothers, whose initiation has not been performed, they must be initiated by the other brothers (the expense being defrayed) out of the family property (inherited) from the father.

22. Whether partition has or has not been made, whenever an heir comes forward, he shall receive a share of such wealth as he can prove to be the joint property (of the family).

23. Whether it be a debt, or a document, or house, or field, which has been inherited from the paternal grandfather, he shall take his proper share of it, when he returns after a protracted absence even.

24. When a man has gone abroad, leaving the joint estate of his family, his share must undoubtedly be given to his descendant who has returned from abroad.

25. Whether he be the third or the fifth or even the seventh in descent, he shall receive the share belonging to him by right of succession, his

19, 20. Ratn. p. 539; May. p. 47; D. VII, 6; V. pp. 93, 219.

21. Col. Dig. V, 3, 132; May. p. 48; V. p. 86; Viv. p. 277.

22-26. Col. Dig. V, 7, 394; D. VIII, 1-3; Ratn. p. 540.

24-26. Viv. p. 241.

25. May. p. 46.

birth and family name having been ascertained (first).

26. He whom indigenous inhabitants and neighbours know to be the (legal) owner, to the descendants of that man must the land be surrendered by his kinsmen, when they make their appearance.

27. Let Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sûdras, begotten in order by a Brahman, take four, three, two shares, and one share, in succession.

28. Let those begotten by a Kshatriya (take) three shares, two shares, and one share (respectively). Let those begotten by a Vaisya take two shares and one share.

29. The son by a Kshatriya wife, if elder by birth and endowed with superior qualities, shall take an equal share with the Brahman (son); and so shall a son by a Vaisya wife (share equally) with a Kshatriya son.

30. Land obtained by acceptance of a gift must never be given to the son of a Kshatriya woman or other (wife inferior in caste to her husband). Though their father may have given it to them, the son by a Brahman wife shall take it after the death (of the father).

31. An obedient and excellent son of a man having no other male issue, shall receive a maintenance (though he be born) of a Sûdra woman; let the Sapindas take the remainder.

27. Uggvalâ, p. 79; Varadarâga, p. 19.

28. Varadarâga, p. 19.

29. Col. Dig. V, 3, 156; D. IX, 15; V. p. 98.

30. Col. Dig. V, 3, 161; D. IX, 19; M. I, 4, 36, I, 8, 8; May. p. 46; V. p. 99; Viv. p. 272.

31. Col. Dig. V, 3, 168; D. IX, 28; Viv. p. 274; May. p. 47.

32. A son begotten with a Sûdra woman by a twice-born man is not entitled to a share of the landed property; one begotten with a woman of equal caste shall take all. Thus has the law been settled.

33. Of the thirteen sons mentioned in succession by Manu, the legitimate son of the body (Aurasa) and the appointed daughter (Putrikâ) continue the family.

34. As in default of ghee, oil is admitted by the virtuous as a substitute (at sacrifices), so are the eleven sons (admitted as substitutes), in default of a legitimate son of the body and of an appointed daughter.

35. No one but a legitimate son of the body is declared to be heir of his father's wealth. An appointed daughter is said to be equal to him. All the others are stated to have a claim to maintenance (only).

36. Because a son (Putra) saves his father from the hell called Put by the very sight of his face, therefore should a man be anxious to beget a son.

37. Both a son's son and the son of an appointed daughter cause a man to attain heaven. Both are pronounced to be equal as regards their right of inheritance and the duty of offering funeral balls of meal (Pindas).

32. Col. Dig. V, 3, 164; V. p. 99; Ratn. p. 534. The Ratnâkara after this text inserts two other texts on the right of a Nishâda son, which are elsewhere attributed to Devala.

33, 34. V. p. 120. See Manu IX, 126, 158-160.

35. Col. Dig. V, 4, 215; Viv. p. 285; V. p. 121.

36. Col. Dig. V, 4, 304. punnâmno narakât putraḥ pitaram trâyate yataḥ | mukhasamdarśanênâpi tadutpattau yateta saḥ ||

37. Col. Dig. V, 4, 304; Uggvalâ, p. 80.

38. Gautama has declared that a daughter is appointed after performing a sacrifice to Agni and Pragâpati ; others have said that she is an appointed daughter (Putrikâ) who was merely supposed to be one (before her birth) by a man having no male issue.

39. The other sons, beginning with the son begotten on a wife (Kshetrâga), shall (respectively) take a fifth, a sixth, and a seventh part.

40. The son given, the son cast off, the son bought, the son made (or adopted), the son by a Sûdra wife : these, when pure by caste and irreproachable as to their conduct, are considered sons of middle rank.

41. The son begotten on a wife (Kshetrâga) is despised by the virtuous ; and so are the son begotten on a woman twice married, the son of an unmarried damsel, the son received with the wife, and the son secretly born.

42. Though born of a wife of the same caste, a son destitute of good qualities is unworthy to obtain the paternal wealth ; it shall go to those learned (kinsmen) who offer the funeral ball of meal (Pinda) for the father.

43. A son redeems his father from the highest

38. Col. Dig. V, 4, 225 ; Ratn. p. 562. See Gautama XXVIII, 18.

39. Col. Dig. V, 4, 246 ; Ratn. p. 545 ; V. p. 125. The Vîramitrodaya reads samabhâgînâh for sapta bhâgînâh, 'The other five or six sons beginning with the wife's son are equal sharers.' Regarding the wife's son (Kshetrâga), see Manu IX, 167 ; Brîhaspati XXIV, 12-14.

40, 41. Col. Dig. V, 4, 202 ; V. p. 128 ; Ratn. p. 552.

42, 43. May. p. 101.

42-45. Col. Dig. V, 4, 264 ; V. 319 ; D. V, 4 ; V. p. 256 ; Viv. p. 242.

and lowest debts; consequently there is no use of him who acts otherwise.

44. What can be done with a cow which neither gives milk nor is (ever) pregnant? What is the good of a son being born who is neither learned nor virtuous?

45. A son who is destitute of learning, valour, and wealth, void of devotion and insight, and unobservant of good custom, such a son is declared to be no better than urine and fæces.

46. In the revealed texts (of the Veda), in the traditional law (of the *Smṛitis*), and in popular usage, the wife is declared to be half the body (of her husband), equally sharing the outcome of good and evil acts.

47. Of him whose wife is not dead, half his body survives. How should any one else take the property, while half (his) body lives?

48. Although kinsmen (*Sakulyas*), although his father and mother, although uterine brothers be living, the wife of him who dies without leaving male issue shall succeed to his share.

49. A wife deceased before (her husband) takes away his consecrated fire (*Agnihotra*); but if the husband dies before the wife, she takes his property, if she has been faithful to him. This is an eternal law.

50. After having received all the movable and immovable property, the gold, base metals and grain, liquids and wearing apparel, she shall cause

46. See XXIV, 11.

46-52. Col. Dig. V, 8, 399; V. 8, 416; D. XI, 1, 2; Ratn. p. 589.

46-49. V. pp. 141, 142.

47. M. II, 1, 6.

48-52. Viv. pp. 289, 290.

his monthly, sixmonthly, and annual *Srâddhas* to be performed.

51. Let her propitiate with funeral oblations and pious liberality her husband's paternal uncles, Gurus, daughter's sons, sister's sons, and maternal uncles; also aged or helpless persons, guests, and women (belonging to the family).

52. Should agnates (*Sapindas*) or cognates (*Bândhavas*) or enemies injure the property, let the king inflict on them the punishment destined for a thief.

53. The husband being separated (in interests from his former coparceners), his wife shall take after his death a pledge and whatever else is recognised as property, excepting the immovable wealth.

54. A wife, though preserving her character and though partition have been made, is unworthy to obtain immovable property. Food or a portion of the arable land shall be given to her at will (for her support).

55. The wife is declared to succeed to her husband's property, and in her default, the daughter.

56. A daughter, like a son, springs from each member of a man; how then should any other mortal inherit the father's property while she lives?

57. Equal in caste (to her father) and married to a man of the same caste as her own, virtuous, habitually submissive, she shall inherit her father's property, whether she may have been (expressly) appointed or not.

53, 54. May. p. 77; V. pp. 134, 135, 173.

55, 56. M. II, 2, 2; *Smṛitiḥ*. (K. Iyer's translation) XI, 2, 113.

56-58. Col. Dig. V, 4, 224; D. XI, 2, 8, 17; V. pp. 176, 180, 183; Viv. pp. 292-294.

56, 57. Ratn. p. 591.

58. As her father's wealth becomes her property, though kinsmen be in existence, even so her son becomes the owner of his mother's and maternal grandfather's wealth.

59. In default of them, uterine brothers or brother's sons, agnates (Sakulyas) and cognates (Bāndhavas), pupils, or learned Brahmans are entitled to the inheritance.

60. When a man dies leaving no issue, nor wife, nor brother, nor father, nor mother, all his Sapindas shall divide his property in due shares.

61. Half the entire wealth, however, shall first be set apart for the benefit of the deceased (owner) and carefully assigned for his monthly, sixmonthly, and annual Srâddhas.

62. When there are several relatives, agnates (Sakulyas), and cognates (Bāndhavas), whosoever of them is the nearest shall take the wealth of him who died leaving no issue.

63. When a man dies without leaving either wife or male issue, the mother has to be considered as her son's heiress, or a brother (may succeed) if she consents to it.

64. But on his death the mother shall take a son's share. The mothers shall share equally with the sons, the maidens shall take fourth-part shares.

59. Col. Dig. V, 8, 422; D. XI, 2, 26. 'In default of them,' i.e. of a daughter or daughter's son.

59-62. Col. Dig. V, 8, 437; Ratn. p. 595.

60. V. p. 216.

61. D. XI, 6, 13.

62. V. p. 194; May. p. 81.

63. Col. Dig. V, 8, 423; V. p. 191; Viv. p. 293; D. XI, 3, 2.

64. Col. Dig. V, 2, 85; V. pp. 81, 84, &c. 'On his death,' i.e. on the father's death. For tanayâmsasamâmsinî, 'shall take a son's share,' the Viramitrodya reads tanayâ vâ samâmsinî, 'or the

65, 66. To a father the funeral ball (*Pinda*) and water oblation shall be offered by his son ; in default of a son, the widow (succeeds) ; in her default, a uterine brother ; in default of him, the co-heirs (*dâyādāḥ*) ; afterwards, the property goes to the daughter's son.

67. Should a Kshatriya, Vaisya, or Sūdra die without leaving male issue, or wife, or brother, their property shall be taken (as escheat) by the king, for he is the lord of all.

68. Except in the case of a Brahman ; but a king bent on the practice of virtue must allot a maintenance to his women. Thus has the law of inheritance been declared.

69. For her food (he must assign) a Prastha of rice every afternoon, together with fuel, and one dress purchased for three *Panas* must be given to her every three months.

70. What is left after setting apart property suffi-

daughter shall take an equal share.' Vāṭaspatimisra, Kamalākara, Nandapandita, and other commentators explain the term *mātaraḥ*, 'mothers,' as denoting step-mothers who have no issue, whereas in the first clause the term 'mother' (*ganani*), according to them, denotes a woman who has male issue. It seems more natural, however, to interpret the term 'mother' in the same way in both clauses. Vishnu (XVIII, 34, 35) has the analogous precept that mothers and maiden daughters shall receive shares corresponding to the shares of sons. Vishnu's rule relates to a division of property among sons differing in caste, and the present text of Brīhaspati seems to apply to the same case.

65, 66. Aparārka ; *Smṛiti*. XI, 4, 19 (Iyer). These texts are quoted in some works only, and it is certainly difficult to reconcile them with the other texts of Brīhaspati on inheritance.

67. Col. Dig. V, 8, 446 ; D. XI, 1, 49 ; May. p. 83 ; Viv. p. 298.

68-71. Nandapandita's *Vaigyanī* ; *Ugavalā*, p. 82 ; Gautamīyā *Mitāksharā*. The reading in 71 is uncertain.

cient for the expense of her dress, food, and for the washerman, shall be made over to the co-heirs.

71. (The widow) shall recite the Dhûmâvasânika prayer in the evening, bathe frequently, and pay no regard to dwelling, food, or clothing after her husband's death.

72. He who (having been divided) is again living, through affection, together with his father or brother, or with his uncle even, is said to be reunited with them.

73. When brothers formerly divided are again living together through affection and arrange a second division, the right of primogeniture does not accrue in that case.

74. When any one (brother) should die or anyhow renounce worldly interests, his share is not lost; it is allotted to his uterine brother.

75. If there be a sister, she is entitled to a share of his property. This is the law regarding (the wealth of) one destitute of issue, and who has no wife or father.

76. When two (coparceners) have again established together, they shall mutually inherit their property.

77. If among reunited coparceners any one should acquire property through learning, valour, or other (independent effort of his own), a double share must be given to him; the rest shall take equal shares.

78. Whatever has been given by the paternal

72. Col. Dig. V, 8, 430; M. II, 9, 3; May. p. 84; V. pp. 40, 162, 205; Viv. p. 300; D. XI, 1, 30, XII, 3; Ratn. p. 605.

73-75. Col. Dig. V, 8, 407; Viv. p. 302; V. p. 159.

76. May. p. 88; Viv. p. 305; Ratn. p. 602.

77. Col. Dig. V, 8, 460; V. p. 205; May. p. 85; Viv. p. 302.

78. May. p. 69; *Smr̥itiḥ*. (Iyer) VII, 23.

grandfather, the father, or the mother, (all that shall not be taken from him (who possesses it); (he may keep), likewise, property acquired by valour and the wealth of his wife.

79. Those by whom clothes and the like articles have been declared indivisible have not decided properly. The wealth of the rich depends on clothes and ornaments.

80. (Such wealth) when withheld from partition will yield no profit; but neither can it be allotted to a single (coparcener). Therefore it has to be divided with some skill; or else it would be useless.

81. Clothes and ornaments are divided by (distributing the proceeds after) selling them; a written bond (concerning a debt, is divided) after recovering the sum lent; prepared food (is divided) by an exchange for (an equal amount of) unprepared food.

82. The water of a well or pool shall be drawn and used according to need. A single female (slave) shall be (successively) set to work at their houses (by the several sharers) according to their shares (of the inheritance).

83. If there are many of them, they shall be divided equally. The same rule applies to male slaves as well. Property obtained for a pious purpose shall be divided in equal shares.

84. Fields and embankments shall be divided according to their several shares. A common (road or) pasture-ground shall be always used by the co-heirs in due proportion to their several shares.

79-84. Col. Dig. V, 5, 366; May. pp. 71, 72; *Smṛitiḥ*. (Iyer) VII, 41-43, &c. The arrangement of these texts varies in the several works.

80 b, 82. D. I, 10; V, 3.

85. The clothes, ornaments, bed, and the like, as well as the vehicle and the like, appertaining to the father, shall be given to the person who partakes of his funeral repast, after honouring him with fragrant drugs and flowers.

86. Such property, whether immovable or other, as has been given to women by their father-in-law, can never be taken away from them by the co-heirs.

87. Stridhana goes to the children, and the daughter if not betrothed has a share in it. If she is married, she shall receive an honorary trifle only.

88. The mother's sister, the wife of a maternal uncle, a paternal uncle's wife, a father's sister, a mother-in-law, and an elder brother's wife are declared to be equal to a mother.

89. If they have no legitimate son of the body, nor (other) son, nor daughter's son, nor their son, their sister's son, &c. shall inherit their property.

90. A heinous crime, (a claim regarding) immovable property, a deposit, and a previous partition among co-heirs, have to be ascertained by circumstantial evidence, in default of documents and witnesses.

91. A family feud, mutual malice, or the discovery of stolen goods, may be evidence of a heinous crime; possession of the land may be proof of property; and separate property is an argument of partition.

85. M. I, 4, 17; May. p. 70; V. p. 250.

86. V. p. 174; *Smṛiti*. XI, 1, 44.

87. Col. Dig. V, 9, 487; D. IV, 2, 3; Viv. p. 267; V. p. 229. The two first works read, 'she does not take her mother's wealth' for 'she shall receive an honorary trifle only.'

88, 89. Col. Dig. V, 9, 513; D. VI, 3, 31; May. p. 98; V. p. 243.

90-92. Col. Dig. V, 6, 389; D. XIV, 8.

90, 92. V. p. 261.

92. Those who keep their income, expenditure, and mortgages distinct, and engage in mutual transactions in money-lending and traffic, are undoubtedly separate.

93. Whether kinsmen are united or separate, they are all alike as regards immovable property, as no one of them has power in any case to give, mortgage, or sell it.

94, 95. Whatever share is enjoyed by each, must not be changed from him. If he should subsequently contest a distribution, which was made with his own consent, he shall be compelled by the king to content himself with his share, and shall be punished if he should persist in contention.

96. When the loan or mortgaging of joint property is concealed with a fraudulent purpose, the king shall recover it from the cheat by artifice, but not use violence to extort it from him.

97. Cheats, robbers of wealth, crafty and covetous men, shall be reclaimed by friendly expostulation, by the loss of their own property, or by stratagem.

98. Household utensils, beasts of burden and the like, milch cattle, ornaments, and workmen have to be divided on being discovered. When property is (supposed to be) hidden, proof by sacred libation is ordained.

92. May. p. 75; Viv. p. 313; Ratn. p. 608.

93. M. I, 1, 30; May. p. 76; V. pp. 87, 158; D. II, 27 ('Vyâsa'). For 'kinsmen' some works read 'coparceners' or 'co-heirs' (dâyâdâh). The general meaning remains the same.

94, 95. Col. Dig. V, 6, 378; May. p. 76; V. pp. 258, 259.

96, 97. Col. Dig. V, 6, 379; Ratn. p. 526.

98. Smṛitīk. (Iyer) VI, 11.

99. When there are many uterine brothers sprung from one (father), and a son is born even to one of them only, they all are declared to have male offspring (through that son).

100. The same rule is declared for a plurality of wives of one (husband); if one of them has male issue, that (son) shall present the funeral ball of meal to them all.

101. (For one leaving no male issue), a brother, or brother's son, or a *Sapinda*, or a pupil, should first perform the ceremony of uniting him with the *Sapindas* (to be worshipped at a *Srâddha* offering), and then offer him the funeral ceremonies customary on joyful occasions.

XXVI. GAMBLING AND BETTING.

1. Gambling has been prohibited by Manu, because it destroys truth, honesty, and wealth. It has been permitted by other (legislators) when conducted so as to allow the king a share (of every stake).

2. It shall take place under the superintendence of keepers of gaming-houses, as it serves the purpose of discovering thieves. The same rule has to be observed in bets on prize-fights with animals.

3. When birds, rams, deer or other (animals) are caused to fight against one another, after a wager has been laid, it is called betting on animals (*samâhvaya*).

99, 100. Ratn. p. 583; Varadarâga, p. 27.

101. Ratn. p. 600; Col. Dig. V, 8, 454.

XXVI, 1, 2. Viv. p. 318; Vîram. pp. 721, 722. See Manu IX, 224.

3. Viv. p. 317; Ratn. p. 610.

4. When any one is defeated in a prize-fight between two animals, the wager which has been laid shall be paid by the owner of the (defeated) animal.

5. A wager (or game) shall be made in public; false gamblers shall be banished.

6. When there is a point at issue between the two parties (in a game or wager, other) gamblers shall examine (and decide) the matter; if they are enemies (of either party), the king shall decide the dispute.

7. One defeated in a secret game; or ignorant of the rules; or (defeated) by the use of false dice, or by deceit, though acquainted with the game, shall be released; and one who has lost his entire wealth in a game shall not be compelled to give the whole of it.

8. The keeper of the gaming-house shall receive the stakes and pay the victorious gambler and the king; he shall also act as witness in a dispute, assisted by three other gamblers.

9. Those wicked men who use false dice in a game, or rob the king of his due, or cheat by making false computations, are declared to be gamblers deserving punishment.

XXVII. MISCELLANEOUS (Prakīrṇaka).

1. This (aggregate of rules concerning) lawsuits instituted by litigants has been briefly declared; I will declare (next the law concerning) Miscellaneous Causes instituted by the king (in person).

4, 5. Viv. p. 318; Vīram. p. 720.

6. Vīram. p. 720.

7-9. Ratn. pp. 614-617.

XXVII, 1. Vīram. p. 722; Ratn. p. 621.

2. In the case of a conflict between two *Smritis* (texts of law), equity should be resorted to; when the law-books are inapplicable, that course should be followed which is indicated by a consideration of the circumstances of the case.

3. (However) the first rank (among legislators) belongs to Manu, because he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work; that *Smṛiti* (or text of law) which is opposed to the tenor of the laws of Manu is not approved.

4. When he has discovered a man to be an offender, (the king) should inflict (one of the various sorts of punishment) on him, (gentle) admonition, (harsh) reproof or corporal chastisement, or one of the four gradations of fines.

5. (Let him inflict) a (gentle) admonition, when the offence is very light; (harsh) reproof, for a crime in the first degree; a fine, for a crime in the (second or) middlemost degree; and arrest, in the case of high-treason.

6. Banishment also may be resorted to by (a king) desirous of promoting his own welfare in order to meet opposition, and all (the various) sorts (of punishment) should be united in the case of one who has committed a mortal sin.

7. (The king) should punish elders, domestic priests, and persons commanding respect, with (gentle) admonition only; other litigants he should amerce in a fine, when they are found to be guilty;

2. *Vīram.* p. 119.

3. *Col. Dig. V, 5, 333.* vedārthopanibaddhatvāt prādhānyam tu manoḥ smṛitam | manvarthaviparītā yā na sâ smṛitiḥ prasasyate ||

4-7. *Ratn.* p. 629.

and on the perpetrators of a heavy crime he should inflict corporal punishment.

8. (Gentle) admonition and (harsh) reproof are declared to be the privilege of the Brahman (appointed as chief judge); but both fines and corporal punishment may be inflicted by the king only.

9. Both hands, both feet, the male organ, the eye, the tongue, both ears, the nose, the neck, one half of the feet, the thumb and index, the forehead, the lips, the hindpart, and the hips :

10. These fourteen places of punishment have been indicated. For a Brahman, branding him on the forehead is ordained as the only kind of punishment.

11. A Brahman, though a mortal sinner, shall not suffer capital punishment; the king shall banish him, and cause him to be branded and shaved.

12. That man who deserves capital punishment shall be compelled to pay one hundred *Suvarṇas*; one deserving to have a limb cut off, half as much; and one deserving to have the thumb and index (cut off), half of that.

13. The eighteen titles of law have been explained, together with the particulars of plaint and answer. Learn now (the law regarding) the relative validity of transactions.

14. That transaction which has been prior in time (to another) shall be upheld. If it is departed from, that is (called) an alteration of a transaction.

15. If a creditor or debtor revokes a previous

8. Ratn. p. 630. 9, 10. Ratn. p. 631. 11. Ratn. p. 634.

12. Ratn. p. 656. 13-18. Ratn. pp. 618-620.

agreement and makes another contract of the same description, (in which a) greater or less (amount is stated), it is termed an alteration of a transaction.

16. When (a debtor) having received a loan at the rate of two per cent. (in the month) promises to pay five per cent., that subsequent agreement is valid.

17. Between two successive transactions, the first is (rendered) void (by the second); a subsequent agreement prevails over the one preceding it in time.

18. When a man first makes a deposit and converts it into a pledge afterwards, after receiving money (for it), or sells it, the second transaction prevails over the first.

[19. Forbidden practices are found among the Southerners in the present day, (such as) matches with a maternal uncle's daughter, in spite of the prohibited degree of relationship on the mother's side (causing such unions to be illegal).

20. The highly reprehensible custom of a brother living with his deceased brother's wife, and the delivery of a marriageable damsel to a family is found in other countries.

21. What is more, matches with a mother occur among the Pârasikas. The inhabitants of some countries do not allow the presentation of fresh gifts (of food) at a *Srâddha* offering to those Brahmans who have been fed at a *Srâddha* held on the eleventh

19-24. These texts will be published elsewhere. They have been taken from the *Saṃskāra Kāṇḍa* of the *Smṛitikanḍikā*, where they are quoted from an uncertain author. 20 has been printed, as a text of *Bṛihaspati*, in Professor Bühler's *Ugavalā*, p. 101. The term 'Pârasikas' denotes the Persians, or perhaps the Parsis of India.

day (after the decease of a person) or at some other Śrāddha.

22. Others, after lending grain, take twice as much back in the autumn season and occupy the embanked land, after having received twice the amount lent,

23. Though the principal has been repaid. This is reprehensible also. Such forbidden practices (the king) should check (when they are resorted to) through folly.

24. Such customs as are not opposed to the laws of particular countries and castes or other (corporations), every king should establish in accordance with the sacred law, after consulting the law-books.]

25. Thus let the king every day examine, in common with learned Brahmans, both the suits proffered by litigants and those instituted by the king (himself).

26. When the safety of many may be effected by destroying a single offender, his execution is productive of religious merit (even).

25. Ratn. p. 618.

26. Smṛitiḥ. ekasmin yatra nidhanam prāpīte dush/akārinī | bahūnām bhavati kshemas tasya puṇyaprado vadhaḥ ||

ADDENDA.

P. 231, Appendix v. 56. This difficult text, together with an additional text, is quoted in a somewhat different, but equally faulty form, in the recently published last fasciculus of the Vivâdaratnâkara in the Bibliotheca Indica. I propose to render the two texts as follows: 'Fines beginning with a Kârshâpana may amount to four Kârshâpanas at most (in heavy cases); there are others beginning with two and rising to eight, or beginning with three and rising to twelve Kârshâpanas. All those (fines) which have been declared to begin with one Kârshâpana may be raised to the fourfold amount; the same rule applies to the other fines as well, excepting the highest fine (which consists of 2500 Paras).'

P. 369, *after* v. 14, *add* '15. A wife should be honoured by her husband with (presents of) clothes, ornaments, and food; and at a festival (she should receive similar presents) from her father and brothers, her parents-in-law, and other relations.'

P. 369, *after* note on vv. 12-14, *add* 15. Smṛitîk. bhartrâ patnî samabhyarṅyâ vastrâlamkârabhoganaiḥ | utsave tu pitṛibhrâtrîsva-surâdyais ka bandhubhiḥ ||

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.								
		III Class.								
Gutturales.										
1 Tenuis	k			क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh			ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g			ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	
4 " aspirata	gh			घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	
5 Gutturo-labialis	q				𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	𐬙	
6 Nasalis	h (ng)			ङ	{ 𐬚 (ng) 𐬛 (N) }					
7 Spiritus asper	h			ह	𐬜 (h)	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	𐬜	h, hs
8 " lenis	,									
9 " asper faucalis	'h									
10 " lenis faucalis	'h									
11 " asper fricatus		'h								
12 " lenis fricatus		'h								
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)										
13 Tenuis		k		𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	𐬝	k
14 " aspirata		kh		𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	𐬞	kh
15 Media		g		𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	𐬟	
16 " aspirata		gh		𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	𐬠	
17 " Nasalis	ñ			𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	𐬡	

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬨	𐬨	𐬨	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y)								
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		s		श	𐬯	𐬯	𐬯	ش	ש	z
22 " lenis assibilatus		z								
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th									th
25 " assibilata			TH							
26 Media	d			द	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	د	ד	
27 " aspirata	dh									
28 " assibilata			DH							
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l								
32 " mollis 2			L							
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬱	𐬱	𐬱	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2			S (f)							
35 " lenis	z							ز	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1			z (z)							
37 " asperimus 2			z (z)							

Dentales modificatae
(linguales, &c.)

38 Tenuis	t
39 " aspirata	th
40 Media	d
41 " aspirata	dh
42 Nasalis	n
43 Semivocalis	r
44 " fricata	r
45 " discripta	r
46 Spiritus asper	sh
47 " lenis	sh

Labiales.

48 Tenuis	p
49 " aspirata	ph
50 Media	b
51 " aspirata	bh
52 Tenuissima	p
53 Nasalis	m
54 Semivocalis	w
55 " aspirata	hw
56 Spiritus asper	f
57 " lenis	v
58 Anuvāra	m
59 Visarga	h

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zand.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.		III Class.							
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	o			ā
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ē			ā
3 " labialis	ō			ā
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			i
5 " longa	ā	(a)		i
6 Palatalis brevis	i			ī
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ī
8 Dentalis brevis	ē			
9 " longa	ā			
10 Lingualis brevis	ī			
11 " longa	ī			
12 Labialis brevis	u			u
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ū
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ē
15 " longa	ē(ai)	(e)		ē
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		āi
17 " "	ei(ēi)			ei, ēi
18 " "	oi(ōu)			o
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			āu
20 " longa	ā(au)	(o)		āu
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		āu
22 " "	eu(ēu)			
23 " "	ou(ōu)			
24 Gutturalis fracta	ā			
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			
26 Labialis fracta	ū			ū
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ō			



THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW

AN INITIAL FINE

RETURN
TO →

CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library

LOAN PERIOD 1

HOME USE

4

2

3

5

6

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS

Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date.

Books may be Renewed by calling 642-3405.

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

AUTO DISC CIRC OCT 11 '94

OCT 11 1995

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
BERKELEY, CA 94720

FORM NO. DD6

U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C051331688

YC 54595







This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



32101 076513603

Library of



Princeton University.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London
HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXIV

xford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1890

[*All rights reserved*]

THE
VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

WITH THE COMMENTARY BY

SANĀKARÂKÂRYA

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE THIBAUT

PART I

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1890

[*All rights reserved*]

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SAÑKARÂKÂRYA.

ADHYÂYA I.

Pâda I	3
Pâda II	107
Pâda III	154
Pâda IV	237

ADHYÂYA II.

Pâda I	290
Pâda II	363

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans- lations of the Sacred Books of the East	445
---	-----

1-30-56 *manu. ams. 1*

SREL
5021
798
v.34, pt.1

INTRODUCTION.

TO the sacred literature of the Brahmins, in the strict sense of the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read together with running commentaries such as Sâyaṇa's commentaries on the *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, and the *Bhāṣyas* ascribed to Saṅkara on the chief *Upaniṣads*. But these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they form part ; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling contradictions—which, according to the view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only—is allotted to a separate *sāstra* or body of doctrine which is termed *Mīmāṃsā*, i.e. the investigation or enquiry κατ' ἐξοχήν, viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this *Mīmāṃsā* two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called earlier (*pūrva*) *Mīmāṃsā*, and the later (*uttara*) *Mīmāṃsā*. The former undertakes to systematise the *karmakāṇḍa*, i.e. that entire portion of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and which comprises the *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* exclusive of the *Āraṇyaka* portions ; the latter performs the same

service with regard to the so-called *gñānakāṇḍa*, i.e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the *Āraṇyaka* portions of the *Brāhmaṇas*, and a number of detached treatises called *Upanishads*. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two *sāstras* first assumed a definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute the subject-matter of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* must have arisen at a very early period, and the word *Mīmāṃsā* itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the *Brāhmaṇas* to denote the doubts and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the *Veda*, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want, continually pressing itself on the *adhvaryus* engaged in ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain Vedic *sākhā* or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their own *brāhmaṇa* and *saṃhitā*, without being under any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally conflicting rules implied in the texts of other *sākhās*. It was assumed that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers of one and the same *sākhā*.

The *Uttara Mīmāṃsā-sāstra* may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental attitude of the authors of the *Upanishads*, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through

many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic sâkhâs no doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the assumption of a *vikalpa*, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the *karmakânda* of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the *gñânakânda*, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the *Mîmâṃsâ*. We have, on the one hand, all those works which constitute the *Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ-sâstra*—or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the *Mîmâṃsâ-sâstra*—and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name *Vedânta-sâstra*. At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collections of *Sûtras* (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are *Gaimini* and *Bâdarâyana*. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two

collections of Sūtras was preceded by a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the analogy of other śāstras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sūtras perform their task of systematising the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sūtras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sūtras (of the two Mīmāṃsās as well as of other śāstras) mark the beginning ; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mīmāṃsā-sūtras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of the karmakāṇḍa of the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sūtras on the one hand, and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brāhmaṇas ; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sūtra has to follow, if he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The *gṛhānakāṇḍa* of the Veda, on the other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta-sūtras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sūtras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the karmakāṇḍa, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sūtras, from which all burdensome discussions of

method are excluded ; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedânta-sûtras throughout presuppose the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already established in the latter.

The time at which the two Mîmâmsâ-sûtras were composed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty ; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-called Sûtras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mîmâmsâ-sûtras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mîmâmsâ-sûtras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sûtras aim at conciseness ; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sûtras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sûtra writers is to express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sûtras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mîmâmsâ-sûtras. There scarcely one single Sûtra is

intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sūtra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sūtra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* we therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together with Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras¹ (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Gaimini's *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian Saṅkara or, as he is commonly called, Saṅkarā-kārya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahmanical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Viṣṇu or Śiva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by Saṅkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedānta which diverge from the view represented by Saṅkara nor any of the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedānta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place, Saṅkara's bhāṣhya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be

¹ The Sūtras in which the *gñānakāṇḍa* of the Veda is systematised go by various names, being called either Vedānta-sūtras, or Uttara Mīmāṃsā-sūtras, or Brahma-sūtras, or Sāriraka Mīmāṃsā-sūtras.

taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The Saṅkara-bhāṣhya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedānta-sūtras, and ever since Saṅkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of Saṅkara's work which, as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

But to the European—or, generally, modern—translator of the Vedānta-sūtras with Saṅkara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not Saṅkara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sūtras. To the Indian *Pandit* of Saṅkara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to its being raised, as he looks on Saṅkara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of Saṅkara's comments with the text of Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that Saṅkara's philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Bādarāyaṇa, who himself must necessarily be assumed to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the interpretations given of the Vedānta-sūtras—and the Upanishads—by Saṅkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.

This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if Saṅkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sūtras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered

upon with much hope of success ; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedāntic and based on interpretations of the Sūtras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of Saṅkara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedānta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the Vedānta-sūtras had come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Bādarāyaṇa's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sūtras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Rāmānuga's Vedānta-sāra, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sūtras ; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical—and certainly not feasible in this place—to submit all the existing bhāshyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by Saṅkara, and with the text of the Sūtras themselves.

The bhāshya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaishṇava theologian and philosopher Rāmānuga, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Rāmānuga or, as it is often called, the Śrī-bhāshya appears to be

the oldest commentary extant next to Saṅkara's. It is further to be noted that the sect of the Rāmānugas occupies a pre-eminent position among the Vaiṣṇava sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the *Srī-bhāṣya* moreover is—as every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge—a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of Saṅkara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Rāmānuga's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition.

This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest *bhāṣya* which we possess, i. e. the *Saṅkāra-bhāṣya*, represents an uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between *Bādarāyaṇa*, the reputed author of the *Sūtras*, and Saṅkara; and if, on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern *bhāṣyas* are not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later *bhāṣyas* can help us in making out the true meaning of the *Sūtras*. All we should have to do in that case would be to accept Saṅkara's interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful comparison of Saṅkara's *bhāṣya* with the text of the *Sūtras*, whether the former in all cases faithfully represents the purport of the latter.

In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as to how far we have to accept Saṅkara as a guide to the right understanding of the *Sūtras* (Mr. A. Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that Saṅkara is the generally recognised expositor

of true Vedānta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sūtrakāra, and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedānta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known to us from Saṅkara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of Saṅkara's system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the Sūtras—as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries—with the interpretations given of them by Saṅkara. To both these points we shall revert later on. Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have only Saṅkara's bhāṣhya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the Sūtras—which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part unintelligible—the meaning which Saṅkara ascribes to them; while a reference to other bhāṣhyas may not impossibly change our views at once.—Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of Vedāntic tradition from another point of view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the Sūtras themselves, and the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya, furnish any indications of there having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedāntic systems or lines of Vedāntic speculation.

Beginning with the Sūtras, we find that they supply ample evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedānta-sūtras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedānta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Bādarāyaṇa himself, the reputed author of the

Sûtras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers: Âtreya, Âsmarathya, Audulomi, Kârshnâgini, Kâsakṛîtsna, Gaimini, Bâdari. Among the passages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Audulomi, its only characteristic is thought (*kaitanya*), while Gaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Bâdarâyana declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views.—The second passage occurs in the third pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 7-14), where Gaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Bâdari—whose opinion is endorsed by Saṅkara—teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only.—Finally, the third and most important passage is met with in the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya (Sûtras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage of the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In connexion therewith the Sûtras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to Âsmarathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by Saṅkara and Saṅkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the *bhedâbheda* relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Audulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it; and Kâsakṛîtsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman, which in some way or other presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedânta-sûtras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital

importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities—deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sūtras—denied that doctrine on which the whole system of Saṅkara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedāntins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous: Saṅkara does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once Saṅkara also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sūtras, and in several places Saṅkara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is the *Vṛttikāra* (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two remarks of Saṅkara's at any rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference to Sūtras 7-14 of the third pāda of the fourth adhyāya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sūtras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhānta view, to state merely the pūrvapakṣa;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.—And under I, 3, 19 Saṅkara, after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vādināḥ pāramārthikam eva gaivam rūpam iti manyante asmadyās ka keḥit,' i. e. 'other theorists again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedāntins, and it thus appears that Saṅkara himself

was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who—as in later times the Rāmānugas and others—looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of Mâyâ, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedântins of the school to which Saṅkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedāntic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the Rāmānuga system, which likewise claims to be Vedānta, and to be founded on the Vedānta-sūtras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

It appears that Rāmānuga claims—and by Hindu writers is generally admitted—to follow in his bhāshya the authority of Bodhāyana, who had composed a *vr̥tti* on the Sūtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the Sri-bhāshya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), ‘Bhagavad-bodhāyana-kṛtām vistirṇām brahmasūtra-vr̥ttim pūrvākāryāḥ samkīkshipus tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrāksharāṇi vyākhyāsyante.’ Whether the Bodhāyana to whom that *vr̥tti* is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sūtra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient *vr̥tti* on the Sūtras connected with Bodhāyana’s name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the Sri-bhāshya, and, as we have seen above, Saṅkara’s commentators state that their author’s polemical remarks are directed against the *Vr̥ttikāra*. In addition to Bodhāyana, Rāmānuga appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers—pūrvākāryās—who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedānta and the meaning of the Sūtras. In the Vedārthasaṅgraha—a work composed by Rāmānuga himself—we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhāyana, Taṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharuḍi, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the Vedārthasaṅgraha, as well as the Sri-

bhāshya. The author most frequently quoted is *Dramiḍa*¹, who composed the *Dramiḍa*-bhāshya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhāshyakāra. Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vākyakāra is, I am told², to be identified with the *Taṅka* mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Rāmānuga sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that *Dramiḍāṭkārya* or *Dravidāṭkārya* preceded *Saṅkara* in point of time. In his *ṭikā* on *Saṅkara*'s bhāshya to the *Khândogya* Upanishad III, 10, 4, *Ānandagiri* remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of *Smṛiti* on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the *Dravidāṭkārya*.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedānta-sūtras with which the *Srī*-bhāshya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of Rāmānuga, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of *Saṅkara*. This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Rāmānuga sect stands to earlier sects. What the exact position of Rāmānuga was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally acknowledged that the Rāmānugas are closely connected with the so-called Bhāgavatas or *Pāñḍikarātras*, who are known to have existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators, the last

¹ The name of this writer is sometimes given as *Dramiḍa*, sometimes as *Draviḍa*. In the opinion of *Pandit Rāma Misra Sāstrin* of the Benares College—himself a Rāmānuga and thoroughly conversant with the books and traditions of his sect—the form '*Dramiḍa*' is the correct one.

² Viz. by *Pandit Rāma Misra Sāstrin*. As the *Pandit* intends himself to publish all the traditional information he possesses concerning the history of the Bhāgavatas and Rāmānugas, I limit myself in the text to stating the most relevant results of my study of the *Srī*-bhāshya and the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*.

Sûtras of the second pâda of the second adhyâya (Vedânta-sûtras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhâgavatas—which tenet forms part of the Râmânuga system also—viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyûha) as Vâsudeva, Saṅkarshana, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity (ahaṅkāra). Whether those Sûtras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Râmânuga maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as Saṅkara thinks; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhâgavatas, the direct forerunners of the Râmânugas, are mentioned in the Sûtras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sûtras were composed. And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhâgavatas and the later Râmânugas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedânta-sûtras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Râmânuga interprets the Sûtras, and wherein he differs from Saṅkara. This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the meaning of the Sûtras themselves. A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space which can here be devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the *Śrī-bhāṣya* has been printed, and thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, and—as said before—even urged upon a translator of the Sûtras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bhāṣyakāras, of those Sûtras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedânta system¹. This

¹ Owing to the importance of the Saṅkara-bhāṣya as the fundamental work of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which might be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable. But

will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the *adhikaraṇas* of the Vedānta-sūtras, according to Saṅkara; a review which—apart from the side-glances at Rāmānuga's comments—will be useful as a guide through the Sūtras and the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of Saṅkara as well as of Rāmānuga, which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of Saṅkara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's *System of the Vedānta*, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sūtra-bhāṣhya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads* which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the Saṅkara Vedānta, founded on the Sūtra-bhāṣhya, the Upanishad bhāṣhyas, and some later writers belonging to Saṅkara's school. With regard to Rāmānuga's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Rāmānuga chapter in the *Sarvadarsana-saṃgraha*; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the *Srī-bhāṣhya* itself.

What in Saṅkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.—Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramātman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (*kāitanya*,

the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of ascertaining how far the teaching of Saṅkara agrees with that of Bādarāyana, and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand.—Some other topics, such as a detailed account of Saṅkara's teaching according to the bhāṣhya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by Saṅkara, &c., have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his '*System des Vedānta*.'

gñāna). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance; Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.—But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?—Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called *Mâyā* or *avidyā* to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called 'being' (*sat*), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (*asat*) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings. *Mâyā* thus constitutes the *upādāna*, the material cause of the world; or—if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that *Mâyā* belongs to Brahman as a *sakti*—we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with *Mâyā*. In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called *Īśvara*, the Lord.

Mâyā, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (*bheda*), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all those apparently individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which *Mâyā* has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up—it is broken up, as it were—into a multiplicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called *gīvas* (individual or personal souls). What is real in each

gīva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one *gīva* from another, is the offspring of *Mâyā* and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (*vyavahāra*) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to *Mâyā*. But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond *Mâyā*, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (*upādhi*), the fictitious offspring of *Mâyā*, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (*manas*), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord—as a retributor and dispenser—allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called *kalpas* the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct *Mâyā*, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with *upādhis*, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the

consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless *samsāra*, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The *karmakāṇḍa* indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the *gñānakāṇḍa* of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i. e. of *Īśvara* or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout meditation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a distinct individual soul—although in the enjoyment of great power and knowledge—until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final release.—That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, ‘That art thou,’ have taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i. e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of *Mâyâ*, and asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

Thus Saṅkara.—According to Rāmānuja, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.—There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is

not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'—as Saṅkara maintains,—but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists. While, according to Saṅkara, the only reality is to be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere illusion; Brahman—according to Rāmānuja's view—comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (*aḥit* and *ḥit*) constitute, according to Rāmānuja's terminology, the body of the Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules all things which exist—material or immaterial—as their antaryāmin; the fundamental text for this special Rāmānuja tenet—which in the writings of the sect is quoted again and again—is the so-called antaryāmin brāhmaṇa (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7*) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, [there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls constitute.—Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called modes of him (*prakāra*). They are to be looked upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form. Matter in that state is unevolved (*avyakta*); the

individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation (*saṅkoṣa*). This is the *pralaya* state which recurs at the end of each *kalpa*, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition (*kāraṇāvasthā*). To that state all those scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as something second in addition to Brahman.—When the *pralaya* state comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain expansion (*vikāsa*). The Lord, together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an effect (*kāryāvasthā*). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (*parināma*). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the *samsāra*, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the *gñāna-kānda* of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the *karmakānda* does not lead outside the *samsāra*; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes—and meditates on—him in the way prescribed by the *Upanishads* reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an

everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration. The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.—Both systems teach *advaita*, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas* of the *Sāṅkhyas*, but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the *advaita* taught by *Śaṅkara* is a rigorous, absolute one, *Rāmāṇuga's* doctrine has to be characterised as *viśiṣṭa advaita*, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to *Śaṅkara*, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to *Rāmāṇuga* also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal *Māyā*, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of *Śaṅkara* is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of *Māyā*, so that—strictly speaking—*Śaṅkara's* personal God, his *Īśvara*, is himself something unreal. *Rāmāṇuga's* Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a *param nirguṇam* and an *aparam saguṇam brahma*, between Brahman and *Īśvara*.—*Śaṅkara's* individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal *upādhis* due to *Māyā*. The individual soul of *Rāmāṇuga*, on the other hand, is really individual; it has

indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever.—The release from *samsāra* means, according to Saṅkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Rāmānuga it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.—As Rāmānuga does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only¹.

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedānta-sūtras according to Saṅkara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Rāmānuga disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sūtras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.—In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called *adhikaraṇas*), each of which comprises one or more Sūtras, I shall follow the subdivision into *adhikaraṇas* adopted in the Vyāsādhikaraṇamālā, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sūtras.

¹ The only 'sectarian' feature of the *Srī-bhāṣya* is, that it identifies Brahman with *Viṣṇu* or *Nārāyaṇa*; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sūtras and Upanishads. *Nārāyaṇa* is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.

FIRST ADHYĀYA.

PĀDA I.

The first five *adhikaraṇas* lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1)¹ treats of what the study of the Vedānta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedānta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedānta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent *pradhāna* from which the world springs according to the Sāṅkhyas.

With the next *adhikaraṇa* there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first *adhyāya*. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the *gīva*, the individual soul. Saṅkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sūtras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedānta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of *primā facie* doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first *adhyāya*, appears neither from the wording of the Sūtras nor even from Saṅkara's own treatment of the Vedic

¹ The Roman numerals indicate the number of the *adhikaraṇa*; the figures in parentheses state the Sūtras comprised in each *adhikaraṇa*.

texts referred to in the Sûtras. In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes—of whom the *Khândogya* Upanishad speaks in I, 6, 6—is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. Saṅkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Mâyâ. So that according to Saṅkara himself the alternative lies between the *saguṇa* Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the *saguṇa* Brahman and the *nirguṇa* Brahman.

Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the *ânandamaya*, mentioned in *Taittiriya* Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. Saṅkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on the latter supposition—and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in favour of that interpretation—gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sûtras teach that the *ânandamaya* is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the *ânandamaya*¹.—Râmânuga's interpretation of *Adhikarava* VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of Saṅkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the *ânandamaya* is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while Saṅkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuga separates the *adhikarava* from the subsequent part of the *pâda* and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be

¹ Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators; in the second place, Saṅkara in the passage immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the *adhikarava* '*ânandamayo* = *bhyâsât*' as giving rise to a discussion whether the *param* or the *aparam* brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that part of the *bhâshya* which sets forth the former explanation, but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the latter interpretation.

identified with the *pradhāna* ; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed¹.—Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in *Kh. Up.* I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.—Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to *Kh. Up.* I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.—Adhik. IX (23). The *prāṇa* also mentioned in *Kh. Up.* I, 11, 5 denotes the highest Brahman².—Adhik. X (24–27) teaches that the light spoken of in *Kh. Up.* III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman³.—Adhik. XI (28–31) decides that the *prāṇa* mentioned in *Kau. Up.* III, 2 is Brahman.

PĀDA II.

Adhik. I (1–8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in *Kh. Up.* III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sūtras of this *adhikarṇa* emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence Śaṅkara is obliged to add an explanation—in his comment on Sūtra 6—to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.—The comment of Rāmānuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sūtras; on Sūtra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self

¹ *Evam gīḡhasitasya brahmanas ketanabhogyabhūtagadarūpasattvaragastamomayapradhānād vyāvṛtīr uktā, idānīm karmavaryāt trigunātmakaprakṛtīsam sarganimittanānāvīdhānantadukhasāgaranimagghanenāruddhāt ka pratyagātmano nyan nikhilaheya pratyānīkam niratīsayānandam brahmeti pratipādyate, ānandamayo bhyāsāt.*

² There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra keṭi' in Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Sūtra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by Śaṅkara on other commentators.

³ To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.

from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is ¹.—Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (*Kāṭha* Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.—Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (*Kāṭha* Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul ².—Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in *Kāṭha* Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.—Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaryāmin) described in *Bṛi.* Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sūtra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence Saṅkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.—Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c., mentioned in *Mundaka* Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.—Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the ātman vaisvānara of *Kāṭha* Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

PĀDA III.

Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (*Mund.* Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.—Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhūman referred to in *Kāṭha* Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.—Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to *Bṛi.* Up. III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.—Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to *Prasna* Up. V, 5, is not the

¹ *Gīasya iva parasyāpi brahmaṇaḥ sarīrāntarvartitvam abhyupagataḥ ket tadvad eva sarīrasambandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogaprāptir iti ken na, hetuvaisheshyāt, na hi sarīrāntarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetuḥ api tu puṇyapāparūpakarmaparavasatvaḥ taḥ kṣāpapatāpmanaḥ paramātmāno na sambhavati.*

² The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit text (beginning with *apara āha*) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the *Paīṅgi*-upanishad in Saṅkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that Saṅkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the *Paīṅgi*-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by Saṅkara himself.—That the 'apara' quotes the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* not according to the *Kāṇva* text—to quote from which is Saṅkara's habit—but from the *Mādhyandina* text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an 'apara,' i. e. not Saṅkara.

lower but the higher Brahman.—According to Rāmānuga the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahmā (*gīvasa-maṣīrūpo •ndādhīpatis katurmukhaḥ*).—Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to Saṅkara, Sūtras 14–21)¹ discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 1* is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the *pūrvapakṣhin* pleads the two passages *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 3, 4* and *VIII, 12, 3*, about the serene being (*samprasāda*); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (*viz.* freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in *VIII, 1*, of the small ether within the heart.—But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.—What Rāmānuga understands by the *āvirbhāva* of the soul will appear from the remarks on *IV, 4*.

The two next Sūtras (22, 23) constitute, according to Saṅkara, a new *adhikaraṇa* (VII), proving that he ‘after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted’ (*Kaṭha Up. II, 5, 15*) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.—According to Rāmānuga the two Sūtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sūtras.²

¹ Sūtras 14–21 are divided into two *adhikaraṇas* by the *Adhikaraṇaratnamālā*, but really constitute a simple *adhikaraṇa* only.

² *Itaś caitad evam. Anukṛites tasya ka. Tasya daharākāśasya parabrahmaṇo •nukārād ayam apahatapāpmatvādiguṇako vimuktibandhaḥ pratyagātmā na daharākāśaḥ tadanukāśas tatsāmyaḥ tathā hi pratyagātmano •pi vimuktasya*

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in *Kāṭha* Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

The two next *adhikāraṃ*s are of the nature of a digression. The passage about the *aṅguṣṭhamātra* was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span ; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman : a question finally answered in the affirmative.— This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (*Sūtra* 28). In connexion herewith *Śaṅkara* treats of the nature of words (*śabda*), opposing the opinion of the *Mīmāṃsaka* *Upavarsha*, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called ‘*sphoṭa*,’ which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (*Adhik.* IX ; *Sūtras* 26–33).

Adhik. X (34–38) explains that *Sūtras* are altogether disqualified for *Brahmavidyā*.

Sūtra 39 constitutes, according to *Śaṅkara*, a new *adhikāraṃ* (XI), proving that the *prāṇa* in which everything trembles, according to *Kāṭha* Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.— According to *Rāmāṇuga* the *Sūtra* does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the

parabrahmānukāraḥ sūryate yadā paryāḥ paryate rukmavarnam kartāram isam puruṣam brahmayonim tadā vidvān punyapāpe vidhūya nirāṅganaḥ paramam sāmyam upaitīty ato'nukartā prajāpativākyanirdishṭaḥ anukāryam param brahma na daharākāśaḥ. Api ka smaryate. Samsārino'pi muktāvasthāyām paramasāmyāpattilakṣaṇaḥ parabrahmānukāraḥ smaryate idam jñānam upāśritya, &c.—*Keid* anukṛites tasya kāpi smaryate iti ka sūtradvayam *adhikāraṃ*āntaram tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsa sarvam idam vibhātīty asyāḥ sruṭeḥ parabrahmaparatvanirṇayāya pravṛttam vadanti. Tat tv adṛīyatvādiguṇako dharmokteḥ dyubhāvadyāyatanam svasabdād ity adhi *karana*dvayena tasya prakaraṇasya brahmavishayatvapratipādanāt ghyotiskaraṇābhīdhānāt ity ādīshu parasya brahmano bhārūpatvāvagates ka pūrvapakṣhā-nutthānād ayuktaṃ sūtrākṣharavairūpyāḥ ka.

decision arrived at under Sūtras 24, 25, viz. that the *āṅgushṭhamātra* is Brahman. On this supposition, Sūtras 24–39 form one *adhikarāṇa* in which 26–38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.—The *āṅgushṭhamātra* is referred to twice in the *Kaṭha* Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To determine what is meant by the *āṅgushṭhamātra*, Rāmānuga says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the *āṅgushṭhamātra*, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

The next Sūtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to Saṅkara it constitutes by itself a new *adhikarāṇa* (XII), proving that the 'light' (*gyotis*) mentioned in *Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.—According to Rāmānuga the Sūtra continues the preceding *adhikarāṇa*, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to *Kaṭha Up.* II, 5, 15—a passage intermediate between the two passages about the *āṅgushṭhamātra*—which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sūtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The *āṅgushṭhamātra* is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

The three last Sūtras of the *pāda* are, according to Saṅkara, to be divided into two *adhikarāṇas* (XIII and XIV), Sūtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the *viśvānamaya*, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of *Bṛi. Up.* IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.—According to Rāmānuga the three Sūtras make up one single *adhikarāṇa* discussing whether the *Kāṇḍogya* Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off

all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i. e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)—But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?—(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)—which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which Saṅkara adduces;—and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all *gagadvāpāra* is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

PĀDA IV.

The last pāda of the first adhyāya is specially directed against the Sāṅkhyas.

The first *adhikāraṇa* (1-7) discusses the passage *Kat̥ha* Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped—both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sāṅkhya-sāstra, *avyakta* being a synonym for *pradhāna*.—Saṅkara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the *Kat̥ha* Upanishad that the term *avyakta* has not the special meaning which the Sāṅkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (*sūkshma śarīra*), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Saṅkara, that the tricoloured *agā* spoken of in *Sve. Up.* IV, 5 is not the *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.—What *Rāmā-*

nuga in contradistinction from Saṅkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.

Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the *pañka pañkaganāh* mentioned in *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 17* are not the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas.—Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to Saṅkara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in *Kau. Up. IV, 19*, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.—The subject of the *adhikarāṇa* is essentially the same in Rāmānuga's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the *adhikarāṇa* being polemical against the Sāṅkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the *pradhāna* doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next *adhikarāṇa* (VI; Sūtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Rāmānuga, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sāṅkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sāṅkhya *purusha*.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (*nimitta*) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (*pariṇāma*; Sūtra 25).—Rāmānuga views this *adhikarāṇa* as specially directed against the *Sesvara-sāṅkhyas* who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent *pradhāna* on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sāṅkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.

After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyāya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of Saṅkara and Rāmānuga diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sūtras have been selected and arranged ; and, secondly, if, where Saṅkara and Rāmānuga disagree as to the subdivision of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sūtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sūtras favour either Saṅkara's or Rāmānuga's general views cannot be considered at present.)

The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations—which have occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation—rest on the assumption that the Sūtrakāra in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mīmāṃsā-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mīmāṃsaka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyāya, such as given by Deussen on page 130 ; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sūtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various pramāṇas of the Mīmāṃsā in their due systematic succession.

As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken from the *Khândogya* Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyāya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those *Khândogya* passages of which it

is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sūtrakāra meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the *Khândogya*, and that hence the sixth *adhikarana* which treats of the *ānandamaya* mentioned in the *Taittiriya* Upanishad has, in agreement with Rāmānuga's views, to be separated from the subsequent *adhikaranas*, and to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature. —The remaining *adhikaranas* of the first *pāda* follow the order of passages in the *Khândogya* Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the exception of the last *adhikarana*, which refers to a *Kaushitaki* passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account. —The first *adhikarana* of the second *pāda* returns to the *Khândogya* Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the *Kaṭha* Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the *Srī-bhāṣya*, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sūtra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant¹. —The third *adhikarana* again, whose topic is the 'two entered into the cave' (*Kaṭha* Up. I, 3, 1), appears, as Rāmānuga remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding *adhikarana*; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater,' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same *prakarana*, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter. —The fourth *adhikarana* is again occupied with a *Khândogya* passage. —The fifth *adhikarana*, whose topic is the Ruler within (*antaryāmin*), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Rāmānuga also,

¹ *Yadi paramātmā na bhoktā evaṃ tarhi bhoktṛitayā pratyamāno gīva eva syād ity āsaṅkyāha attā.*

to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding *adhikarana* (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument ¹.—The sixth *adhikarana*, again, which discusses 'that which is not seen' (*adṛśya*; *Mund.* Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the preceding *adhikarana* it had been said that *adrīṣṭa*, &c. denote the highest Self.—The reasons to which the last *adhikarana* of the second *pāda* and the first and third *adhikaranas* of the third *pāda* owe their places are not apparent (the second *adhikarana* of the third *pāda* treats of a *Khândogya* passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the *Prasna Upanishad* treating of the akshara *Omkāra* is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding *adhikarana*.—The fifth and sixth *adhikaranas* investigate *Khândogya* passages.—The two next *Sūtras* (22, 23) are, as remarked above, considered by *Śaṅkara* to constitute a new *adhikarana* treating of the 'being after which everything shines' (*Mund.* Up. II, 2, 10); while *Rāmānuja* looks on them as continuing the sixth *adhikarana*. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that *Rāmānuja*, and not *Śaṅkara*, here hits the intention of the author of the *Sūtras*. The general rule in the first three *pādas* is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the discussion, i. e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form ². From this rule there is in the preceding part of the *adhyāya* only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new *pāda* begins, and it therefore was considered super-

¹ *Sthānādivyapadesāḥ ka ity atra yaḥ śakshushi tishṭhann ity ādinā prati-pādyamānam śakshushi sthitiniyamanādikam paramātmāna eveti siddham kṛtvā akshipurushasya paramātmāmatvam sādhitam idānim tad eva samarthayate antaryāṁ.*

² *Ānandamayaḥ* I, 1, 12; *antaḥ* I, 1, 20; *ākāśaḥ* I, 1, 22; *prāṇaḥ* I, 1, 23; *gyotīḥ* I, 1, 24; *prāṇaḥ* I, 1, 28; *attā* I, 2, 9; *guhāṁ pravishāu* I, 2, 11; *antara* I, 2, 13; *antaryāmi* I, 2, 18; *adrīśyatvādiguṇakaḥ* I, 2, 21; *vaiśvānaraḥ* I, 2, 24; *dyubhāvdyāyatanam* I, 3, 1; *bhūmā* I, 3, 8; *aksharam* I, 3, 10; *saḥ* I, 3, 13; *daharaḥ* I, 3, 14; *pramitāḥ* I, 3, 24; (*gyotīḥ* I, 3, 40;) *ākāśaḥ* I, 3, 41.

fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked above, Sūtra 19 does not in reality begin a new *adhikarāṇa*. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places.—Now neither Sūtra 22 nor Sūtra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Rāmānuga, as continuing the topic of the preceding *adhikarāṇa*.—This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next *adhikarāṇa*, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in *Kaṭha* Up. II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the *alpaśruti* in Sūtra 21, and, if so, the *āṅguṣṭhamātra* properly constitutes the subject of the *adhikarāṇa* immediately following on *Adhik.* V, VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sūtras 22, 23 do not form an independent *adhikarāṇa*.—The two next *adhikarāṇas* are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.—Sūtra 39 forms a new *adhikarāṇa*, according to Saṅkara, but not according to Rāmānuga, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sūtra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sūtra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sūtra given above, according to Rāmānuga's view, that '*gyotih*' need not be taken as a nominative.—The last two *adhikarāṇas* finally refer, according to Rāmānuga, to one *Khândogya* passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sūtra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first *pādas* of the Vedānta-sūtras comprise all the doubtful—or at any rate all the more important doubtful—passages from the *Khândogya* Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain *Khândogya* passage is followed by

a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sûtras into *adhikaraṇas* adopted by Rāmānuga, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.

The fourth pāda of the first adhyāya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sāṅkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also—as is brought out much more clearly in the *Sri-bhāṣya* than by Saṅkara—in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakāra of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyāya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedānta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvā Mimāṃsā-sûtras are throughout *Mimāṃsā*, i. e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a *primâ facie* view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sûtras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sûtras to assume that a whole adhyāya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) *adhikaraṇas*; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining *adhikaraṇas* of the

first adhyāya are occupied. That the Vedānta-sūtras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth *adhyāya* already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the *pradhāna*, and the fourth *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* returns to an express polemic against Sāṅkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first *adhyāya* is due to the wish, on the part of the Sūtrakāra, to guard his own doctrine against Sāṅkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sāṅkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious—and actually attempted—to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages. The Sāṅkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedāntin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the *pradhāna* or some product of the *pradhāna*, or else to the *puruṣa* in the Sāṅkhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedāntin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first *adhyāya* of the Vedānta-sūtras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sūtrakāra; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is—or can possibly be—sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sūtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the *Mīmāṃsā*, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

The first adhyāya has proved that all the Vedānta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedānta, more especially the Sāṅkhya system. The task of the two first pādas of the second adhyāya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedānta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedānta can be satisfactorily established.

PĀDA I.

Adhikaraṇa I refutes the Sāṅkhya objection that the acceptance of the Vedānta system involves the rejection of the Sāṅkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smṛiti, and as such has claims on consideration.—To accept the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, the Vedāntin replies, would compel us to reject other Smṛitis, such as the Manu-smṛiti, which are opposed to the Sāṅkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Smṛitis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, but rather those Smṛitis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smṛiti.

Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes—as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted

and thereby become simple gold again—do not continue to exist in those causes.—Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sāṅkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding *adhikāraṇa* is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sūtra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, according to Saṅkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.—The Śrī-bhāṣya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sūtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Rāmānuja's view, the Sūtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.—The construction which Rāmānuja puts on the Sūtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sūtra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears

from a quotation made by Rāmānuga from the *Dramiḍabhāshyakāra*¹.

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedānta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the *Vaiśeṣikas* according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. —The divergent views of *Sāṅkara* and *Rāmānuga* on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the *Sūtrakāra* remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i. e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture. —The way in which the three *Sūtras* constituting this *adhikaraṇa* are treated by *Sāṅkara* on the one hand and *Rāmānuga* on the other is characteristic. *Rāmānuga* throughout simply follows the words of the *Sūtras*, of which *Sūtra* 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while *Sūtra* 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. *Sāṅkara*, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in *Sūtra* 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create

¹ Lokavat. Yathā loke rāgāsāsanānuvartināṃ ka rāgānugrahanigrahakṛitasukhadukhayoge'pi na sasarīratvamātreṇa śāsake rāgany api śāsanānuvṛittyatvīrittinimittasukhadukhayor bhoktrītvaprasaṅgaḥ. Yathāha Dramiḍabhāshyakāraḥ yathā loke rāgā prakṛadandarūke ghoṛe = nārthasamīkate = pi pradese vartamāno = pi vyaganādyavadhūtadeho doshair na sprīyate abhipretāms ka lokān paripipālayishati bhogāms ka gandhādīn avisvaganopabhogyān dhārayati tathāsau lokasvaro bhramatsvasāmarthyatāmāro doshair na sprīyate rakṣhati ka lokān brahmalokādīms kāvisvaganopabhogyān dhārayatīti.

palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Saṅkara, because the world is unreal; according to Rāmānuga, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

PĀDA II.

The task of the second pāda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedānta view.—The first adhikāraṇa (1-10) is directed against the Sāṅkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.—The second adhikāraṇa (11-17) refutes the

Vaisheshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the *adrishṭa*.—The third and fourth *adhikāraṇas* are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18–27) impugns the view of the so-called *sarvāstivādin*s, or *bāhyārthavādin*s, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28–32) is directed against the *vigñānavādin*s, according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last Sūtra of this *adhikāraṇa* is treated by Rāmānuga as a separate *adhikāraṇa* refuting the view of the Mādhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.—Adhik. V (33–36) is directed against the doctrine of the *Gainas*; Adhik. VI (37–41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last *adhikāraṇa* of the pāda (42–45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas or Pāñjikātrās. But Saṅkara and Rāmānuga totally disagree as to the drift of the Sūtrakāra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.—Sūtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sūtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vāsudeva, there is originated Saṅkarshana, i.e. the *gīva*, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sūtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Saṅkarshana there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the *manas*.—The Sūtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'—This means, according to Saṅkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Saṅkarshana, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sūtra 42 against the Bhāgavata doctrine).'

According to Rāmānuga, on the other hand, the Sūtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is non-contradiction of that (i.e. the Pāñkarātra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Saṅkarshana and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pāñkarātra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.—The form of the Sūtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vā' and of the 'tat,' implied in Rāmānuga's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Saṅkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pāda with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objections—has to be viewed as the true one.

PĀDA III.

The third pāda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikaraṇas treat of the five elementary substances.—Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.—Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.—Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which

the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pāda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the *giva*.—Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.—This Sūtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by Saṅkara on the one hand and Rāmānuja on the other. According to the former, the *giva* is in reality identical—and as such co-eternal—with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.—According to Rāmānuja, the *giva* is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (*prakāra*) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (*vikāsa*), contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (*sa-*

koka) which characterised it during the preceding *pralaya*. But this change is not a change of essential nature (*svārūpānyathābhāva*), and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sūtra declares that the soul is '*gñā*.' This means, according to Saṅkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vaiseshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.—Rāmānuga, on the other hand, explains '*gñā*' by '*gñātri*,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sūtra to be directed not only against the Vaiseshikas, but also against those philosophers who—like the Sāṅkhyas and the Vedāntins of Saṅkara's school—maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure *kaitanya*.—The wording of the Sūtra certainly seems to favour Rāmānuga's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of Saṅkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term *gñā* of which the most obvious interpretation is *gñātri*, not *gñānam*.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is *anu*, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (*sarvagata*, *vyāpin*). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.—In Saṅkara's opinion the Sūtras 19-28 represent the *pūrvapaksha* view, according to which the *gīva* is *anu*, while Sūtra 29 formulates the *siddhānta*, viz. that the *gīva*, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as *anu* in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ—which itself is *anu*—constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the *samsāra*.—According to Rāmānuga, on the other hand, the first Sūtra of the *adhikarana* gives utterance to the *siddhānta* view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sūtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the

Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (*gñâtri*) stands to knowledge (*gñâna*).—In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.—Saṅkara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a *pûrvapaksha* view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere *primâ facie* view is carried ; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate *bonâ fide* attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the *pûrvapaksha* should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with Saṅkara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the *pûrvapaksha* and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Saṅkara's interpretation of the Sûtra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word '*prâgñavat*') the Sûtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality—or qualities—of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This Saṅkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the *samsâra* state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as *anu*.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first '*tat*' by buddhi. And—which is more important—in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Saṅkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi—such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.—can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the *samsâra* state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Saṅkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its

association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Rāmānuga's interpretation of the *adhikaraṇa*. He agrees with Saṅkara in the explanation of Sūtras 19-25, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the *pūrvapaksha*, but the *siddhānta*. Sūtras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Saṅkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term *vigñāna* when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sūtra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sūtra which, according to Saṅkara, is meant to discard the *pūrvapaksha*, serves on Rāmānuga's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sūtras of the *adhikaraṇa* (30-32), 30 explains, according to Saṅkara, that the soul may be called *anu*, since, as long as it exists in the *samsāra* condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Rāmānuga the Sūtra teaches that the soul may be called *vigñāna* because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.—Sūtra 31 intimates, according to Saṅkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sūtra, according to Rāmānuga, teaches that *gñātritva* is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.—In Sūtra 32, finally, Saṅkara sees a statement of the

doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Rāmānuga, the Sūtra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being *gñātri* and *anu*, as it is in reality).—The three Sūtras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the *kartr̥itva* of the *gīva*, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sūtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to Saṅkara's system, this cannot be the final view,—the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upādhis,—he looks upon the next following Sūtra (40) as constituting an *adhikaraṇa* by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.—Rāmānuga, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sūtra 40 from the preceding Sūtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sūtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (*aṃsa*) of Brahman, and the following Sūtras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely

different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Rāmānuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman¹; according to Saṅkara the 'amsa' of the Sūtra must be understood to mean 'amsa iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.—One Sūtra (50) in this *adhikaraṇa* calls for special notice. According to Saṅkara the words 'ābhāsa eva ka' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called *pratibimbavāda*, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sūtra 43 had propounded the so-called *avakṣhedavāda*, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.—According to Rāmānuja the ābhāsa of the Sūtra has to be taken in the

¹ *Gīvasya kartrītvam paramapurushāyattam ity uktam. Idānim kim ayam gīvaḥ paramād atyantabhinnaḥ uta param eva brahma bhrāntam uta brahmaivopādhyavakṣhinnam atha brahmāmsa iti samasyate srutivipratipatteḥ samsayaḥ. Nānu tadananyam ārambhavasadbādibhyaḥ adhikam tu bhedanirdeśād ity atraivāyam artho nirṇītaḥ. Satyam sa eva nānātvaikatvasrutivipratipattyā kshipya gīvasya brahmāmsatvopapādanena viśeṣato nirṇīyate. Yāvad dhi gīvasya brahmāmsatvam na nirṇītam tāvag gīvasya brahmano nanyatvam brahmanas tasmād adhikatvām ka na pratitiśīḥṭati. Kim tāvat prāptam. Atyantam bhinna iti. Kutaḥ. Gṇāgṇau dvāv ityādibhedanirdeśāt. Gṇāgṇayor abhedasrutayas tv agniṇā siñṇed itivād viruddhārthapratipādanād aupāṭhīkyāḥ, Brahmano nso gīva ity api na sādhyāḥ, ekavastvekaśeṣavāśī hy amsasabdaḥ, gīvasya brahmaikadesatve tadgatā doṣā brahmani bhavyeṣu. Na ka brahmakhandō gīva ity amsatvopapattīḥ khandanānarhatvād brahmanaḥ prāgukta-doshaprasaṅgāḥ ka, tasmād atyantabhinnaśya tadamsatvam durupapādam. Yadvā bhrāntam brahmaiva gīvaḥ. Kutaḥ. Tat tvam asi ayam ātmā brahmetyādibrahmātmabbhāvopadesāt, nānātmavādvādyas tu pratyakṣhādisiddhārthānūvāditvād ananyathāsiddhādvaitopadesaparābhīḥ sṛutibhiḥ pratyakṣhādayas ka avidyāntargatāḥ khyāpyante.—Athavā brahmaivānādyupādhyavakṣhinnam gīvaḥ. Kutaḥ. Tata eva brahmātmabbhāvopadesāt. Na kāyam upādhir bhrāntiparikalpita ita vaktum sakyam bandhamokṣhādivyavasthānupapatter. Ity evam prāpte bhiddhīyate. Brahmāmsa iti. Kutaḥ. Nānāvypadesād anyathā kaikatvena vyapadesād ubhayathā hi vyapadeso drīsyate. Nānāvypadesas tāvat sraśtrītvastvigrīyatva — niyantrītvaniyāmyatva — sarvagṇatvā-gṇatva — svādhīnatvaparādhīnatva — suddhatvāsuddhatva — kālyāṇagunākara-tvaviparītatva — patitvaseshatvādibhir drīsyate. Anyathā kābhedenā vyapadeso pi tat tvam asi ayam ātmā brahmetyādibhir drīsyate. Api dāśakita-vāditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma dāśa brahma dāśa brahmeme kitavā ity ātharvaṇikā brahmano dāśakitavāditvam apy adhiyate, tatas ka sarvagīvavyā-pitvena abhedo vyapadiśyate ity arthaḥ. Evam ubhayavyapadesamukhyatva-siddhaye gīvo yam brahmano nso ity abhyupagantavyāḥ.*

sense of hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the Sûtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts¹.

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prânas (by which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmendriyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (anu).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prâna, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the prânas discussed above; and that it is minute (anu).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prânas are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya prâna.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the nâmarûpavyākaraṇa) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

THIRD ADHYÂYA.

PÂDA I.

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an abode to the prânas attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anusaya) of their

¹ Nanu bhrântabrahmagîvavâde * py avidyâkrîtopâdhibhedâd bhogavyavasthâdaya upapadyanta ata āha, ābhâsa eva ēa. Akhaṇḍaikarasaprakāśamâtratvarûpasya svarûpatirodhânapûrvakopâdhibhedopapâdanahetur ābhâsa eva. Prakāśaikasvarûpasya prakāśatirodhânam prakāśanāsa eveti prâg evopapâditam. Ābhâsâ eveti vâ pârâha, tathâ sati hetava ābhâsât.

former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

PĀDA II.

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to Saṅkara the three first Sūtras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sūtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sūtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality. Sūtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikarṇa by Rāmānuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sūtras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sūtras 1 and 2 set forth the pūrvapakṣa. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some sâkhâs declare (the

soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuga remarks, 'mâyâsabdo hy âskaryavâkî ganakasya kule gâtâ devamâyeva nirmittâ ityâdishu tathâ darsanât.' The three remaining Sûtras are exhibited in the Srî-bhâshya in a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to Saṅkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuga. Sûtras 4 and 5 (according to Râmânuga's numeration) are explained by Râmânuga very much in the same way as by Saṅkara; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikaraṇa they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on Saṅkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sûkakaśā hi) Râmânuga sees a deduction from the siddhânta of the adhikaraṇa, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to Saṅkara, taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirviśeṣatva and savīṣeṣatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.—The fact, Sûtra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated

that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and—Sūtra 13 adds—in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.—That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sūtra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedānta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.—That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).—The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in *Smṛiti* (17).—At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).—Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upādhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upādhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).—That the Self is within the upādhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important *adhikaraṇa* the one given in the *Srī-bhāṣya* differs totally. According to *Rāmānuṅga* the *adhikaraṇa* raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as *antaryāmin*. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, *apahatapāpman*, *vigara*, *vimṛityu*, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious

qualities, *satyakâma*, *satyasamkalpa*, &c.) (11).—Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil—according to the *Pragâpativākya* in the *Khândogya*—yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the *antaryâmin* also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the *antaryâmin* (in the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the *gīva* (12).—Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (*dvâ suparnâ sayugâ sakhâyâ*) (13).—Should it be said that, according to the *Khândogya*, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the *samsâra*; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; *pradhâna*) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to ‘*ākāśo ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ*’) (14).—But does not the passage ‘*satyam gñānam anantam brahma*’ teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage ‘*neti neti*’ deny of it all qualities?—As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the *Taittirīya* of their purport, we admit that Brahman’s nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is *satyasamkalpa*, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).—Moreover the *Taittirīya* passage only asserts so much, viz. the *prakāsarûpatâ* of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (16).—And the passage ‘*neti neti*’ will be discussed later on.—The *ubhayalingatva* of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places of *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* (17).—Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).—Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the

sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryāmin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).—Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to Saṅkara, a new *adhikaraṇa* (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (*neti neti*; *Bṛihadâr.*) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upādhis. The last four Sûtras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Rāmānuga, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayalingatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (*prakâra*), so that it can only be called that which is (*sanmâtra*)?—The reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again¹), but merely denies the *prākṛtâtāvattva*, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman.—That Brahman as stated

¹ All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them '*anuvâdena*,' and finally negative them.

above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'—And the intuition (sākshâtkāra) of Brahman ensues only upon its *saṃrādhana*, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and *Smṛiti* declare (24).—That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as *prakāśa*, luminousness, *gñāna*, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (*prapañkavishatā*) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that *prakāśa*, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of *rishis* like Vāmadeva) in the work of *saṃrādhana* mentioned before (25).—For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (*liṅga*) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).—In what relation, then, does the *akīd vastu*, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?—Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (*saṃsthānaviśeṣāḥ*) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).—Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).—Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part—*amsa*—of Brahman (29, 30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Gaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called *apūrva*, but is allotted by the Lord.

PĀDA III.

With the third pāda of the second adhyāya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different sâkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same sâkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular sâkhâ were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other sâkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedānta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one sâkhâ may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other sâkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed

by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pāda.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyās, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyās, or one vidyā only. Śaṅkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyās whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the *saguṇam* brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later *adhikarana*, we may take for an example the so-called *Sāṅdilyavidyā* which is met with in *Kh. Up.* III, 14, again—in an abridged form—in *Bṛi. Up.* V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa* (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, *manomayatva*, *bhârûpatva*), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (*prâṇasarîratva* and *satyasamkalpatva*, for instance, being mentioned in the *Khândogya* Upanishad and *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa*, but not in the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies *sarvavasitva*, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the

other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.—The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyâs of the *Khândogya* Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka* Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities—such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in both identified with prâṇa—yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the *Khândogya* vidyâ is not the whole udgitha but only the sacred syllable Om, while the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka* Upanishad represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sûtra 9 constitutes in Saṅkara's view a new *adhyakaraṇa* (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (*Kh. Up.* I, 1, 1), the *Omkâra* and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that *Omkâra* which,' &c.—According to Râmânuga's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *adhyakaraṇa*.—Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâṇavidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâṇa, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to Saṅkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, men-

tioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.—Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to Saṅkara, aims at proving that the object of *Kaṭha* Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyā only.—Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to Saṅkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sūtrātman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitareyaka meditation.

According to Rāmānuga the Sūtras 11–17 constitute a single adhikaraṇa whose subject is the same as that of Saṅkara's sixth adhikaraṇa. Sūtras 11–13 are, on the whole, explained as by Saṅkara; Sūtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sūtras 14–17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priyasirastva.—If priyasirastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?—'Because,' Sūtra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'—But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)—'Because,' Sūtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (ātmā ānandamaya) is applied to it.'—But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in ātmā prāṇamaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in ātmā ānandamaya it denotes the real Self?—'The term Self,' Sūtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (ātmā vā idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'—But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding

clauses about the *prāṇamaya*, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in *ānandamaya* *ātman*, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?—To this question asked in the former half of 17 (*anvayād iti ket*) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i. e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the *prāṇasaṃvāda*.—The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.—Adhik. XI (20–22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in *Bṛi. Up.* V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate *vidyās*.—Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the *Rānāyaṇīya-khila* have not to be introduced into the corresponding *Khândogya vidyā*, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of *vidyā*.—Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two *vidyās* having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and *brāhmaṇa* passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads—as, for instance, a *brāhmaṇa* about the *mahāvṛata* ceremony at the beginning of the *Aitareya-āranyaka*—do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the *brahmavidyā*, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sūtras 27–30 constitute, according to Saṅkara, two *adhikaraṇas* of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place—not, as

the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world—but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.—The latter *adhikarāṇa* (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the *saguṇam brahma* proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the *nirguṇam brahma* becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

The *Srī-bhāṣya* treats the four *Sūtras* as one *adhikarāṇa* whose two first *Sūtras* are explained as by *Saṅkara*, while *Sūtra* 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods).—To this *Sūtra* 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, '*param ghyotir upasampadya svena rūpe-
nābhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kridān ramamānaḥ sa
svarād bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kāmāṭāro bhavati.*' That subtle body is not due to *karman*, but to the soul's *vidyāmāhātmya*.—That the explanation of the *Srī-bhāṣya* agrees with the text as well as *Saṅkara's*, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is *Saṅkara's* explanation of '*arthavattvam ubhayathā,*' which is said to mean that there is *arthavattva* in one case, and non-*arthavattva* in the other case.

The next *Sūtra* (31) constitutes an *adhikarāṇa* (XVIII)

deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyās which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the *saguṇa*-vidyās of Brahman.—The explanation given in the *Srī-bhāṣhya* (in which *Sūtras* 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman—without any reference to the distinction of *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa*—proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The *Srī-bhāṣhya* reads ‘sarveshām,’ i. e. all worshippers, not ‘sarvāsām,’ all *saguṇa*-vidyās.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.—In the *Srī-bhāṣhya*, where the *Sūtra* follows immediately on *Sūtra* 30, the *adhikarṇa* determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body—there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move—and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyās—such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.—are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.—Adhik. XXI (34) determines that *Kāṭha* Up. III, 1, and *Mu. Up.* III, 1, constitute one vidyā only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to *Rāmānuga* the *Sūtra* contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Sūtra*.—Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, *Bṛi. Up.* III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidyā only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.—Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage *Ait. Ār.* II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.—Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyā of the True contained in *Bṛi. Up.* V, 4, 5, is one only.—According to *Rāmānuga*,

Sûtras 35-38 constitute one *adhikaraṇa* only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to Saṅkara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages *Kh. Up. VIII, 1* and *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22* cannot constitute one *vidyā*, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities.—Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to Saṅkara, of a minor question connected with *Kh. Up. V, 11 ff.*—According to the *Srī-bhāṣya*, Sûtras 39-41 form one *adhikaraṇa* whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion as Saṅkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman—such as *vaśitva*, *satyakāmatva*, &c.—cannot be considered real (*pāramārthika*), since other passages (*sa eṣha neti neti*, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.—To this objection Sûtra 40 replies, ‘(Those qualities) are not to be left out (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passages under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis¹.’—But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as *satyakāma*, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in *Kh. Up. VIII, 2*; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.—To this objection Sûtra 41 replies, ‘Because that (i. e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i. e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;’ (therefore a person desirous of release, may include *satyakāmatva*, &c. in his meditations.)

¹ Rāmānuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: ‘*Na ka mātāpitṛisahasrebhyo ṣ pi vatsalataraṃ śāstram pratārakavad apāramārthikau nirasantyaḥ gunau pramāṇāntarāprati-pannau ādareṇopadiśya saṃsāratākraparivartanena pūrvam eva bambhramya-mānaḥ mumukṣhūn bhūyo ṣ pi bhramayitum alam.*’

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.—Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a *Bri.* Up. passage and a similar *Kh.* Up. passage, Vāyu and Prāṇa are not to be identified, but to be held apart.—Adhik. XXIX (44–52) decides that the fire-altars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agni-rahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to Saṅkara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).—According to the *Srī-bhāshya* the *adhikaraṇa* does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sūtras then have to be translated as follows: ‘Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as *gñātrīva* and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.’—The next Sūtra rejects this view, ‘This is not so, but the separatedness (i. e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be¹ the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).’

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgītha, are, in spite of difference of *svara* in the udgītha, &c., valid, not only for that *sākhā* in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all *sākhās*.—Adhik.

¹ The *Srī-bhāshya* as well as several other commentaries reads *tadbhāva-bhāvitvāt* for Saṅkara's *tadbhāvābhāvitvāt*.

XXXII (57) decides that the Vaisvânara Agni of *Kh. Up. V*, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.—Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the *daharavidyâ*, *Sândilyavidyâ*, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.—Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.—Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the *udgîtha*:

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not *kratvartha*, i. e. subordinate to action, but independent.—Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the *pravrâgins* is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them *vidyâ* only is prescribed, not action.—Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of *vidyâs* are not mere *stutis* (*arthavâdas*), but themselves enjoin the meditation.—The legends recorded in the *Vedânta*-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying—as *arthavâdas*—the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).—For all these reasons the *ûrdhvare-tasaḥ* require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).—Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of *vidyâ* in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).—Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-31).—The *âśramakarmâṇi* are obligatory on him also who does not strive after *mukti* (Adhik. VIII,

32-35).—Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are anāśrama have claims to vidyā (Adhik. IX, 36-39).—An ūrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).—Expiation of the fall of an ūrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).—Exclusion of the fallen ūrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).—Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yagamāna (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).—*Bṛi. Up.* III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to bālya and pāṇḍitya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).—By bālya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sūtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Rāmānuga, the question when the vidyā, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sūtra 51 treats of that vidyā whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmāntara (in which latter case the vidyā arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).—Sūtra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).—Saṅkara, who treats the two Sūtras as two adhikarāṇas, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the saguṇa-vidyās.

FOURTH ADHYĀYA.

PĀDA I.

Adhikarāṇa I (1, 2).—The meditation on the Ātman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3).—The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. III (4).—To the rule laid down in the preceding *adhikarāṇa* the so-called *pratīkopāśanas*, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, *mano brahmety upāśita*) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the *pratīka* as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5).—In the *pratīkopāśanas* the *pratīka* is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the *pratīka*.—Rāmānuja takes Sūtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sūtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new *adhikarāṇa*.

Adhik. V (6).—In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, *ya evāsau tapati tam udgītham upāśita*) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versâ. In the example quoted, for instance, the *udgītha* is to be viewed as *Āditya*, not *Āditya* as the *udgītha*.

Adhik. VI (7-10).—The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.—Saṅkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is *saṃyagdarsana*; but the Sūtra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VII (11).—The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12).—The meditations are to be continued until death.—Saṅkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to *saṃyagdarsana* are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13).—When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the *vidvân* is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14).—Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.—The literal translation of the Sūtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the *vidvân*) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sūtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by Saṅkara from the preceding part of the Sūtra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results *mukti* of

the vidvân, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).’—According to Râmânuga the whole Sûtra simply means, ‘There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvân¹.’

Adhik. XI (15).—The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding *adhikarâṇas* holds good only in the case of *anârabdhakârya* works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the *ârabdhakârya* works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17).—From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (*nitya*): so, for instance, the *agnihotra*, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18).—The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the *upâsanâs* referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19).—The *ârabdhakârya* works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with Brahman.—The ‘*bhoga*’ of the Sûtra is, according to Saṅkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuga a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the *ârabdhakârya* works are exhausted.

PĀDA II.

This and the two remaining *pâdas* of the fourth *adhyâya* describe the fate of the vidvân after death. According to Saṅkara we have to distinguish the vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest

¹ *Nanu vidusho 'pi setikartavyatâkopaśananirvṛttaye vṛśhyannâdiphalânish/âny eva katham tesâṃ virodhâd vinâśa ucyate. Tatrâha pâte tv iti. Sarîrapâte tu tesâṃ vinâśa sarîrapâtâd ūrdhvaṃ tu vidyânuganadrishaphalâni sukrîtâni nasyantîty arthaḥ.*

Brahman, and the vidvân who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sûtras to the former and others to the latter. According to Râmânuga the vidvân is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).—On the death of the vidvân (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to Saṅkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (*prâṇa*), the vital air in the individual soul (*gīva*), the soul in the subtle elements.—According to Râmânuga the combination (*sampatti*) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (*samyoga*), not a merging (*laya*).

Adhik. IV (7).—The vidvân (i.e. according to Saṅkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvân, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the *nâḍīs*.—The vidvân also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidyâ, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (*amṛitatvam hi vidvân abhyasṇute*) is only a relative one.—Râmânuga quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvân :

‘Yadâ sarve pramukhyante kâma ye-sya hr̥di sthitâḥ
atha martyo-mṛito bhavaty atra brahma samasṇute,’
and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvân as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction—mentioned in the preceding pâda—of all the effects of good and evil works, while the ‘reaching of Brahman’ can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-11) raises, according to Saṅkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (*tegalī parasyâm devatâyâm*) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the *samsâra* state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with

Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Rāmānuja the Sūtras 8-11 do not constitute a new *adhikarana*, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares *samsāra*, i. e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (*tasya tāvad eva kīram yāvan na vimokshye atha sampatsye*) (8).—That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority¹ (9).—Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.—According to Saṅkara the Sūtras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the *apara vidyā*) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.—Against this latter implied doctrine Sūtra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the *prāṇas* from the body of the dying sage is denied (*viz.* in *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya prāṇā utkrānti*, of him the *prāṇas* do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "*tasya*" has the sense of the ablative "*tasmāt*," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i. e. from the *gīva* of the dying sage, the *prāṇas* do not depart, but remain with it."—This objection Saṅkara supposes to be disposed of in Sūtra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the *prāṇas* in the case of the

¹ Upalabhyate hi devayānena panthā gakkhato vidushas tam pratibrūyāt satyam brūyād iti kandraṁasā samvādavaśanena sarīrasadbhāvaḥ, ataḥ sūkshma-sarīram anuvartate.

dying sage,' viz. in the passage *Bṛi. Up. III, 2, 11*, where Yâgñavalkya instructs Ârtabhâga that, when this man dies, the *prâṇas* do not depart from it (*asmât*; the context showing that *asmât* means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the *gīva*).—The same view is, moreover, confirmed by *Smṛiti* passages.

According to Rāmānuga the three Sûtras forming Saṅkara's sixth *adhikaraṇa* do not constitute a new *adhikaraṇa* at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the *utkrānti* of the *vidvân*. If, Sûtra 12 says, the *utkrānti* of the *prâṇas* is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5*; the reply is that the sense of the *tasya* there is '*sârîrât*' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the *gīva*, the *prâṇas* do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Mādhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read '*tasya*' but '*tasmât*.'—With reference to the instruction given by Yâgñavalkya to Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the '*ayam puruṣa*' to be the sage who knows Brahman.—And, finally, there are *Smṛiti* passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to Saṅkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his *prâṇas*, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

According to Rāmānuga the two Sûtras continue the teaching about the *prâṇas*, *bhûtas*, &c. of the *vidvân* in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (*samyoga*), but completely¹.

Adhik. IX (17).—Saṅkara here returns to the owner of the *aparâ vidyâ*, while Rāmānuga continues the description of the *utkrānti* of his *vidvân*.—The *gīva* of the dying man

¹ When the *gīva* has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river *Vigārâ*. There it divests itself of the subtle body, and the latter is merged in Brahman.

passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the *nâḍis* ; the *vidvân* by means of the *nâḍi* called *sushumṇâ*, the *avidvân* by means of some other *nâḍi*.

Adhik. X (18, 19).—The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21).—Also that *vidvân* who dies during the *dakṣiṇâyana* reaches Brahman.

PĀDA III.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the *vidvân* up to Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6).—By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on.

The remaining part of the *pāda* is by *Saṅkara* divided into two *adhikaraṇas*. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (*kârya*) or qualified (*saguna*) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in *Sûtras* 7-11 by *Bâdari*, and, finally, accepted by *Saṅkara* in his commentary on *Sûtra* 14. In *Sûtras* 12-14 *Gaimini* defends the opposite view, according to which the soul of the *vidvân* goes to the highest Brahman, not to the *kâryam brahma*. But *Gaimini*'s view, although set forth in the latter part of the *adhikaraṇa*, is, according to *Saṅkara*, a mere *pûrvapaksha*, while *Bâdari*'s opinion represents the *siddhânta*.—The latter of the two *adhikaraṇas* (VI of the whole *pāda* ; 15, 16) records the opinion of *Bâdarâyana* on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a *pratika* form.

According to *Râmânuga*, *Sûtras* 7-16 form one *adhikaraṇa* only, in which the views of *Bâdari* and of *Gaimini* represent two *pûrvapakshas*, while *Bâdarâyana*'s opinion is adopted

as the *siddhānta*. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. *Hiranyagarbha*, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from *Prakṛiti*, and having Brahman for its Self (ye *pratyagātmānam prakṛitivyuktam brahmātmakam upāsate*).—The first view is maintained by *Bādari* in *Sūtra* 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only ;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.—The explanation of *Sūtra* 9 is similar to that of *Śaṅkara* ; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if *Hiranyagarbha* were meant in the passage, '*purusho-mānavaḥ sa etān brahma gamayati*,' the text would read '*sa etān brahmānam gamayati*') that *Hiranyagarbha* is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his *prathamagatva*.—The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in *Śaṅkara* ; so also of 12–14.—The *siddhānta* view is established in *Sūtra* 13, 'It is the opinion of *Bādarāyaṇa* that it, i.e. the *gana* of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is *pratika*, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from *prakṛiti*, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under *pratikas*. For both views—that of *Gaimini* as well as that of *Bādari*—are faulty.' The *kārya* view contradicts such passages as '*asmāḥ kharirāt samutthāya param gyotir upasampadya*,' &c. ; the *para* view, such passages as that in the *pañcākṣi-vidyā*, which declares that *ya ittham viduḥ*, i.e. those who know the *pañcākṣi-vidyā*, are also led up to Brahman.

PĀDA IV.

Adhik. I (1–3) returns, according to *Śaṅkara*, to the owner of the *parā vidyā*, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.—The explanation given by *Rāmānuja* is essentially

the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pāda.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhāga, non-separation. This, on Saṅkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.—According to Rāmānuga the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (*prithagbhūta*) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by such passages as *tat tvam asi* and the like¹.

Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to Saṅkara). According to *Gaimini* the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in *Kh. Up.* VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as *apahatapāpmatva*, *satyasamkalpatva*, &c., *aisvarya*.—According to *Audulomi* the only characteristic of the released soul is *kaitanya*.—According to *Bādarāyana* the two views can be combined (Saṅkara remarking that *satyasamkalpatva*, &c. are ascribed to the released soul *vyavahārāpekshayā*).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to Saṅkara, to the *aparā vidyā*, and discusses the question whether the soul of

¹ Kim *ayam param gyotir upasampannaḥ sarvabandhavinirmuktaḥ pratyagātmā svātmānam paramātmanaḥ prithagbhūtam anubhavati uta tatprakāratayā tadavibhaktam iti visaye so 's nute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā paryaḥ paryate rukmavarṇaḥ kartāram īsaḥ puruṣaḥ brahmayoniḥ tadā vidvān puṇyapāpe vidhūya niraṅgaṇaḥ paramaḥ sāmānyam upaiti idam gñānam upāsritya mama sādharmaḥ āgatāḥ sarve 'pi nopagāyante pralayaṇa vyathanti ketyādīruṣismr̥tibhyo muktasya pareṇa sādharmaḥ sādharmaḥ yāvagamāt prithagbhūtam anubhavatīti prāpte ucyate. Avibhāgeneti. Parasmād brahmaṇaḥ svātmānam avibhāgenānubhavati muktaḥ. Kutaḥ. *Dr̥ṣṭvāt*. *Param brahmapasampadya nivr̥tītāvidyātirodhānasya yāthātathyaṇa svātmano dr̥ṣṭvāt*. *Svātmanaḥ svarūpaḥ* hi *tat tvam asy ayam ātmā brahma aīdadātmyam idam sarvaḥ sarvaḥ khalv idam brahmetyādisāmānādhikaraṇyanirdeśaḥ* ya ātmani tishṭhan ātmano 'ntaro yam ātmā na veda yasyātmā sarīraḥ ya ātmānam antaro yamayati ātmāntaryāmy amṛtāḥ antaḥ pravishṭāḥ sāsṭā gñānānām ityādibhis ka paramātmātmakam takḥharīratayā tatprakārabhūtam iti pratipāditam avasthiter iti kāsakṛtsnety atrāto vibhāgenāham brahmāsmīty evānubhavati.*

the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted.—According to Râmânuga the *adhikarâna* simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding *adhikarâna*. Of the released soul it is said in *Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3* that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere *samkalpa* (it having been shown in the preceding *adhikarâna* that the released soul is, like the Lord, *satyasamkalpa*), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in *Kh. Up. VIII, 2*, ‘By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.’

Adhik. V (10–14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.—Sûtra 12 gives, according to Saṅkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (*svâpyaya* = *sushupti*), or to the fully released soul of the sage (*sampatti* = *kaivalya*).—Râmânuga explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (*sampatti* = *maranam* according to ‘*vân manasi sampadyate*,’ &c.).

Adhik. VII (17–21).—The released *gîvas* participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of Saṅkara as well as Râmânuga, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents—or at any rate more closely approximates to—the true meaning of the Sûtras. That

few of the Sūtras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,—of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sūtras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the *adhikaraṇas* discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sūtras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sūtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of Saṅkara as well as of Rāmānuja are based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of Saṅkara and Rāmānuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sūtras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedānta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sūtras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Rāmānuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sūtra, but where Saṅkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Rāmānuja is able to take the Sūtra as it stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sūtras which in

clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which Saṅkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sūtra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that Saṅkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sūtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.—We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of *adhikaraṇas* and Sūtras concerning whose interpretation Saṅkara and Rāmānuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th *adhikaraṇa* of II, 3, which treats of the size of the *gīva*, and where Rāmānuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to Saṅkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole *adhikaraṇa* and to the wording of the single Sūtras. The *adhikaraṇa* is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedānta is embodied in Bādarāyaṇa's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sūtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedānta-sūtras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of Saṅkara as well as Rāmānuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sūtras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.

The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the Sūtras in any way favour Śaṅkara's doctrine that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The adhyāya first to be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According to Śaṅkara the three latter pādas of that adhyāya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, on the other hand, the three pādas, referring throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into the *samsāra*.

On an *à priori* view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sūtras should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true sanctuary of Vedāntic knowledge, while the fate of the fully initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sūtras. It is, I think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sūtras would—before having allowed himself to be influenced by Śaṅkara's interpretations—imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sūtras conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious *samsāra*,

and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti. And this *à priori* impression—which, although no doubt significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive—is confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which Saṅkara connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sûtras are interpreted by Saṅkara and Rāmānuga has been stated above in the conspectus of contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Rāmānuga more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12–14, we have to note, in the first place, the circumstance—relevant although not decisive in itself—that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, ‘spashṭo hy ekeshâm,’ is more appropriately understood, with Rāmānuga, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than—with Saṅkara—as embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case we should expect not ‘hi’ but ‘tu’). And, in the third place, the ‘eke,’ i.e. ‘some,’ referred to in Sûtra 13 would, on Saṅkara’s interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred, viz. the followers of the Kāṇva-śākhā (the two Vedic passages referred to in 12 and 13 being *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5*, and *III, 2, 11*, according to the Kāṇva recension); while it is the standing practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of the designation ‘eke,’ members of Vedic śākhās, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding Sûtras. With this practice Rāmānuga’s interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the ‘eke’ are the Mādhyandinas, whose reading in *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 5*, viz. ‘tasmât,’ clearly indicates that the ‘tasya’ in the corresponding passage of the Kāṇvas denotes the śārira, i.e. the gīva. I think it is not saying too much that Saṅkara’s explanation, according to which the ‘eke’ would denote the very same Kāṇvas to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred—so that the Kāṇvas would be distinguished from themselves as it were—is altogether impossible.

The result of this closer consideration of the first set of

Sûtras, alleged by Saṅkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust Saṅkara's assertion that another set also—IV, 4, 1-7—has to be detached from the general topic of the fourth adhyâya, and to be understood as depicting the condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the Sûtras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sûtra of the set (7) obliges Saṅkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them 'vyavahârâpekshayâ,' while yet the purport of the whole *adhikarana* is said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no *vyavahâra* exists! Very truly Saṅkara's commentator here remarks, 'atra keśin muhyanti akhandakīnmâtragñânân muktasyâgñânâbhâvât kuta âgñânika-dharmayogah,' and the way in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.

In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyâya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of *aparâ* and *parâ vidyâ*, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of Saṅkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sûtras. The Sûtras 7-16 of the third pâda state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the *vidvân* repairs on death, or—according to *Râmânuga*—the worshippers of which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. *Râmânuga* treats the views of *Bâdari* and *Gaimini* as two *pûrvapakshas*, and the opinion of *Bâdarâyana*—which is stated last—as the *siddhânta*. Saṅkara, on the other hand, detaching the Sûtras in which *Bâdarâyana*'s view is set forth from the preceding part of the *adhikarana* (a proceeding which, although not

plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that Bâdari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhânta, while Gaimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere pûrva-paksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that Saṅkara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if Saṅkara's system itself is already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Râmânuga as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyâya of the Sûtras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sûtras of the fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Saṅkara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyâya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted. And intimately connected with this investigation—in fact, one with it from a certain point of view—is the question whether the Sûtras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Īsvara. That Râmânuga denies the distinction of the two Brahman and the doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-

pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sūtras themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a Sāṅkara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sūtra of the first adhyāya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sūtra meant to define?—That Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sūtra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedānta ; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release ; that Brahman in fact which Sāṅkara calls the highest.—But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later Vedāntic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Māyā or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as *saḥ-kid-ānanda*, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory *ślokas* of the *Pañcadasī* dilating on the *saṃvid* *svayam-prabhā*, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P. D. I, 7). 'That from which the world proceeds' can by a Sāṅkara be accepted only as a definition of *Īśvara*, of Brahman which by its association with Māyā is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sūtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its

various manifestations—a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Rāmānugas—the definition of Brahman given in the second Sūtra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Bādarāyana defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Māyā, is confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sūtras being throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sūtrakāra against the Sāṅkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhāna. The most important Sūtras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pāda of the second adhyāya. Those Sūtras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sūtra of the pāda mentioned replies to the Sāṅkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung.—Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true Sāṅkara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Māyā. Māyā is the upādāna of the material world, and Māyā itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedāntic writers identified with the prakṛiti of the Sāṅkhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sūtra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-

stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Mâyâ, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to Saṅkara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upādâna of the world, i.e. Mâyâ, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Mâyâ, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.—The illustration, again, given in Sûtra 24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, ‘kshîravat dhi,’ ‘as milk (of its own accord turns into curds),’ would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given in the Sûtra next following, ‘as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)’—which refers to the real creation of real things—would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshîravat dhi; devâdivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means¹.

That the Mâyâ doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sûtrakâra, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been

¹ Saṅkara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is—significantly enough—not known to the Sûtras.

the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through *Mâyâ* only, and that the world is unreal; but the *Sûtras* do not contain a single word to that effect. *Sûtra* 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term '*pariṇâmât*;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the *Vedânta* became definitely settled, the term '*pariṇāmavâda*' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of *Saṅkara* are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere *vivarta*, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived to take place in the way taught by *Râmânuga* or in some other manner.—With regard to the last-quoted *Sûtra*, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the *vivartavâda* are in reality reconcilable with it; to *Sûtra* 26, for instance, *Govindânanda* remarks that the term '*pariṇâma*' only denotes an effect in general (*kâryamâtra*), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as *Râmânuga*, are satisfied to take '*pariṇâma*' and similar terms in their generally received sense.

A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to *Saṅkara*'s view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that (Brahman is in itself destitute of all qualities,) and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (*upâdhis*), the offspring of *Mâyâ*. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by *Saṅkara* on the one hand, and *Râmânuga* on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of *Sûtras* widely diverges from that of *Saṅkara*. The wording of the *Sûtras* is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators—if

indeed either—is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ; regarding the sense of some Sūtras Saṅkara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rāmānuga seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Rāmānuga's interpretation of Sūtra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sūtra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term 'prakṛitāitāvat-tvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Rāmānuga's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sūtras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by Saṅkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those—perhaps not few in number—in which both interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.

With special reference to the Māyā doctrine one important Sūtra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'māyā' itself occurs, viz. III, 2, 3. According to Saṅkara the Sūtra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Māyā, i.e. unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Rāmānuga (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term 'māyā,' but in judging of Saṅkara's views we may for the time accept Saṅkara's own interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Māyā, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking soul must not be called Māyā. But that the world perceived by waking men is Māyā, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the Sāṅkara Vedānta ; and the Sūtra therefore proves either that Bādarāyaṇa did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'māyā' in a sense altogether different from that

in which Saṅkara employs it.—If, on the other hand, we, with Rāmānuga, understand the word ‘mâyâ’ to denote a wonderful thing, the Sûtra of course has no bearing whatever on the doctrine of Mâyâ in its later technical sense.

We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sûtras indicate anywhere that their author held Saṅkara’s doctrine, according to which the *gīva* is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to *avidyâ*, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it? This question is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, but yet requires a short separate treatment.

In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sûtras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in Saṅkara’s sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rāmānuga, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pāda of the second adhyāya, which describes the soul as ‘*gñā*,’ is more appropriately understood in the sense assigned to it by Rāmānuga; and, again, that the Sûtras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with Saṅkara’s views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise.—We next have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (*amsa*) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with Saṅkara’s views only if *amsa* is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by ‘*amsa iva*,’ while Rāmānuga is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.—We also have already referred to Sûtra 50, ‘*ābhāsa eva ka*,’ which Saṅkara interprets as setting forth the so-called *pratibimbavāda* according to which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But almost every Sûtra—and Sûtra 50 forms no exception—being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous

aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sūtra 50, if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sūtra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43 contains, as Saṅkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the *avakṛhedavāda*, can itself be accepted only if we interpret *amsa* by *amsa iva*, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that Rāmānuga's interpretation of the Sūtra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sūtras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term *ābhāsa*, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean *hetvābhāsa*, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sūtra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavāda which, in its turn, presupposes the *mâyāvāda*, is the teaching of the Sūtras.

To the conclusion that the Sūtrakāra did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of Saṅkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sūtras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sūtra II, 1, 22, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is *adhika*, i. e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the *sārīra* is not the *antaryāmin*, because the *Mādhyandinas*, as well as the *Kānvas*, speak of him in their texts as different (*bhedena enam adhiyate*), and in 22 the *sārīra* and the *pradhāna* are referred to as the two 'others' (*itarau*) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word '*itara*' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1, 21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in contradistinction from the Lord. The Sāṅkaras indeed maintain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction

due to avidyâ. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sûtras should be thus understood. If we accept the interpretations of the school of Saṅkara, it remains altogether unintelligible why the Sûtrakâra should never hint even at what Saṅkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sûtrakâra was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept Saṅkara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the avowed followers of the Sâṅkara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gauḍapâda down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value.

There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedânta. I mean I, 4, 20-22, which three Sûtras state the views of Āsmārathya, Audulomi, and Kâsakṛitsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The siddhânta view is enounced in Sûtra 22, 'avasthiter iti Kâsakṛitsnaḥ,' i. e. Kâsakṛitsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' Saṅkara understands the Lord's abiding as, i. e. existing as—or in the condition of—the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enuncia-

tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avikṛitah paramesvaro givo nānyaḥ.' Rāmānuga, on the other hand, likewise accepting Kāsakṛitsna's opinion as the siddhānta view, explains 'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as described in the antaryāmin-brāhmaṇa.—We can hardly maintain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by Saṅkara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Rāmānuga's interpretation that in the five other places where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sūtras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something.

If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sūtras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Īśvara in Saṅkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with Saṅkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon Rāmānuga's mode of interpretation—although I accept it without reserve in some important details—I look on the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of criticising Saṅkara's explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of the Sūtras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of Saṅkara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Rāmānuga. If, however, the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of Bādarāyaṇa had greater affinities with that of the Bhāgavatas and Rāmānuga than with the one of which the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya is the classical exponent.

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sūtras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment

as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated by Bādarāyaṇa. The reason of this is that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according to Saṅkara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging to Saṅkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidyā is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidyā are treated very fully in the Vedānta-sūtras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyās (most of which are so-called *saguṇa*, i.e. lower vidyās) is carried in the third adhyāya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyāya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidyā; we certainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what Saṅkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Bādarāyaṇa's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.

The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedānta-sūtras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sūtras by means of the different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sūtras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sūtras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine—of whatever special nature it may be—is hidden in the enigmatical aphorisms of Bādarāyaṇa¹.

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation

¹ Cp. Gough's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 240 ff.

a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sūtras set forth the same doctrine. Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sūtras. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Māyā is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Rāmānuga and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sūtras, denied that the Upanishads teach Māyā, and it is hence by no means impossible that Bādarāyaṇa should have done the same. The *à priori* style of reasoning as to the teaching of the Sūtras is therefore without much force.

But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the Sūtras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upanishads, a question which a translator of the Sūtras and Saṅkara cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the Sūtras and the Saṅkara-bhāṣhya do not agree concerning most important points of Vedāntic doctrine. The Sūtras as well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than systematisations of the Upanishads, and for us a considerable part at least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upanishads has been most adequately systematised, whether by Bādarāyaṇa, or Saṅkara, or Rāmānuga, or some other commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sūtras, and it is by no means impossible that Saṅkara, for instance, should in

the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sûtras.

We must remark here at once that, whatever commentator may be found to deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other, to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contradictions; a system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various points of Vedântic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of *Sruti*, it will certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads—and the impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful investigation—it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole. They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmistakable indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a mere look at the *Kāṇḍogya* Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove. It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine; but in the case of the Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sections of Brahminical society, to different Vedic *sâkhâs*; nay, some of them the tradition makes out to have been *kshattriyas*. And, in the second place, the period, whose

mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of later periods of Indian philosophic development. The later philosophic schools as, for instance, the one of which Saṅkara is the great representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not be changed or added to, but merely systematised and commented upon. Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not indeed mean that the great teachers who appear in the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to their speculations any direction they chose; for nothing can be more certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling; most probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be

spread everywhere, and often issues from the most unexpected sources. Svetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddālaka; the proud Gārgya has to become the pupil of Agātarātru, the king of Kāśi; Bhugyu Sāhyāyāni receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva possessing a maiden; Satyakāma learns what Brahman is from the bull of the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo; and Upakosala is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the expectation of finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine.

And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upanishads amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for instance, of M. Paul Régnaud's *Matériaux pour servir à l'Histoire de la Philosophie de l'Inde*, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt, to different stages of philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for instance, the legend of the ātman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are produced in succession (*Bṛi. Up. I, 1, 4*), can be reconciled with the account given of the creation in the *Kāṇḍogya* Upanishad, where it is said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat,

‘that which is,’ and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations; the latter account is fairly developed Vedānta (although not Vedānta implying the Māyā doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold world from one original being; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as Saṅkara does, that the ātman purushavidha of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* is the so-called Virāg of the latter Vedānta—implying thereby that that section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special form of Īsvara, and not simply the whole process of creation—is the ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing more.

How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more ancient texts which it was impossible to discard when deeper and more advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termination, and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections of such heterogeneous character as the *Khândogya* and *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishads*. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of the texts; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one, i. e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly, there really is no reason to deny.

For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different commentators employ in systematising the contents

of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is meant by the 'impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some few at least of Saṅkara's interpretations, and to render clear the considerations by which he is guided.

We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when discussing the meaning of the Sūtras, viz. the question concerning the ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we have seen, Saṅkara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand, who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman departs from the body by means of the artery called sushumṇā, and following the so-called devayāna, the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which Saṅkara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.

In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new forms of embodiment; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of the gods—on which the sun forms one stage—up to the world of Brahman, from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are *Kh.* Up. V, 10; *Kaush.* Up. I, 2 ff.; *Mund.* Up. I, 2, 9 ff.; *Bri.* Up. VI, 2, 15 ff.; *Prasna* Up. I, 9 ff.—In other passages only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp. *Kh.* Up. IV, 15; VIII, 6, 5; *Taitt.* Up. I, 6; *Bri.* Up. IV, 4, 8, 9; V, 10; *Maitr.* Up. VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.

Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows

I think, beyond any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his knowledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that name.—*Kh. Up.* V, 10 says, 'Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light,' &c.—*Kh. Up.* IV, 15 is manifestly intended to convey the true knowledge of Brahman; Upakosala's teacher himself represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of the sacred fires.—*Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old sloka which says that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the head reaches the Immortal.—*Kaush. Up.* I, 2—which gives the most detailed account of the ascent of the soul—contains no intimation whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature.—*Mund. Up.* I, 2, 9 agrees with the *Khândogya* in saying that 'Those who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion, through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context countenances the assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are there referred to.—*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 8 quotes old slokas clearly referring to the road of the gods ('the small old path'), on which 'sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on as entirely free.—That path was found by Brahman, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman.'—*Bri. Up.* VI, 2, 15 is another version of the *Pañkāgnividyâ*, with the variation, 'Those who know this, and those who in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c.—*Prasna Up.* I, 10 says, 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path *Âditya*, the sun. There is the home of the spirits, the immortal free from danger, the highest. From thence they do not return, for it is the end.'—*Maitr. Up.* VI, 30 quotes

slokas, 'One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to the highest path.'

All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the sushumṇā, and ascends by the path of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some blissful state. But, according to Saṅkara, all these texts are meant to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as *Bṛi. Up. VI, 2, 15*, the 'True,' which the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only *Hiraṇyagarbha*!—And why?—Only because the system so demands it, the system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place. The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is *Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 6, 7*, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires, and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from the old one, accompanied by all the *prāṇas*, there is contrasted the fate of the sage free from all desires. 'But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (*tasya*) do not depart—being Brahman he goes to Brahman.'

We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the important *Sūtras* on whose right interpretation it, in the first place, depends whether or not we must admit the *Sūtrakāra* to have acknowledged the distinction of a *parā* and an *aparā vidyā*. Here the passage interests us as throwing light on the way in which Saṅkara systematises. He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by all *prāṇas* and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand, section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then

and there. This interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather inclined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who does know Brahman (i. e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining section 6 Saṅkara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti,' 'his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does not ascend to the world of Brahman ; while the purport of the clause may simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i. e. do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman. On Saṅkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new difficulty. In the slokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers—as noticed already above—to the path through the veins, primarily the sushumṇā, on which, according to so many other passages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is, according to Saṅkara, followed by him only who has not risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the slokas have manifestly to be connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of the parā vidyā. Hence Saṅkara sees himself driven to explain the slokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor Max Müller's version) as follows :

8. 'The subtle old path (i. e. the path of knowledge on which final release is reached ; which path is subtle, i. e. difficult to know, and old, i. e. to be known from the eternal Veda) has been obtained and fully reached by me. On it the sages who know Brahman reach final release (svargalokasabdaḥ samnihitaprakaraṇāt mokshābhidhāyakaḥ).

9. 'On that path they say that there is white or blue or yellow or green or red (i. e. others maintain that the path to final release is, in accordance with the colour of the arteries, either white or blue, &c. ; but that is false, for the

paths through the arteries lead at the best to the world of Brahman, which itself forms part of the *samsāra*); that path (i.e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true knowledge) is found by Brahman, i.e. by such *Brāhmaṇas* as through true knowledge have become like Brahman,' &c.

A significant instance in truth of the straits to which thorough-going systematisers of the Upanishads see themselves reduced occasionally!

But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests us. Whether Śaṅkara's interpretation of the chapter, and especially of section 6, be right or wrong, so much is certain that we are not entitled to view all those texts which speak of the soul going to the world of Brahman as belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, because a few other passages declare that the sage does not go to Brahman. The text which declares the sage free from desires to become one with Brahman could not, without due discrimination, be used to define and limit the meaning of other passages met with in the same Upanishad even—for as we have remarked above the *Brhadāraṇyaka* contains pieces manifestly belonging to different stages of development;—much less does it entitle us to put arbitrary constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads. Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is easy to understand. The older notion was that the soul of the wise man proceeds along the path of the gods to Brahman's abode. A later—and, if we like, more philosophic—conception is that, as Brahman already is a man's Self, there is no need of any motion on man's part to reach Brahman. We may even apply to those two views the terms *aparā* and *parā*—lower and higher—knowledge. But we must not allow any commentator to induce us to believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks upon as an inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the same light by the authors of the Upanishads.

We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching upon the point considered in what precedes, viz. the second *Brāhmaṇa* of the third *adhyāya* of the *Brhadāraṇyaka*. The discussion there first turns upon the *grahas* and *ati-*

grahas, i. e. the senses and organs and their objects, and Yâgñavalkya thereupon explains that death, by which everything is overcome, is itself overcome by water; for death is fire. The colloquy then turns to what we must consider an altogether new topic, Ârtabhâga asking, 'When this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart from him or not?' and Yâgñavalkya answering, 'No, they are gathered up in him; he swells, he is inflated; inflated the dead (body) is lying.'—Now this is for Saṅkara an important passage, as we have already seen above (p. lxxxix); for he employs it, in his comment on Ved.-sûtra IV, 2, 13, for the purpose of proving that the passage Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present passage also must refer to him who possesses the highest knowledge; hence the 'ayam purusha' must be 'that man,' i. e. the man who possesses the highest knowledge, and the highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding clause which says that death itself may be conquered by water. But, as Râmânuga also remarks, neither does the context favour the assumption that the highest knowledge is referred to, nor do the words of section 11 contain any indication that what is meant is the merging of the Self of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation given by Râmânuga himself, viz. that the prâṇas do not depart from the *gīva* of the dying man, but accompany it into a new body, I can agree as little (although he no doubt rightly explains the 'ayam purusha' by 'man' in general), and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a crude attempt to account for the fact that a dead body appears swollen and inflated.—A little further on (section 13) Ârtabhâga asks what becomes of this man (ayam purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire, his breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much here is clear that we have no right to understand by the 'ayam purusha' of section 13 anybody different from the 'ayam purusha' of the two preceding sections; in spite of this Saṅkara—according to whose system the organs of the true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly

merged in Brahman—explains the ‘*ayam puruṣa*’ of section 13 to be the ‘*asamyagdarsin*,’ i. e. the person who has not risen to the cognition of the highest Brahman. And still a further limiting interpretation is required by the system. The *asamyagdarsin* also—who as such has to remain in the *samsāra*—cannot do without the organs, since his *gīva* when passing out of the old body into a new one is invested with the subtle body; hence section 13 cannot be taken as saying what it clearly does say, viz. that at death the different organs pass into the different elements, but as merely indicating that the organs are abandoned by the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!

The whole third *adhyāya* indeed of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* affords ample proof of the artificial character of Śaṅkara’s attempts to show that the teaching of the Upanishads follows a definite system. The eighth *brāhmaṇa*, for instance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest non-related Brahman, while the preceding *brāhmaṇas* had treated only of *Īsvara* in his various aspects. But, as a matter of fact, *brāhmaṇa* 8, after having, in section 8, represented Brahman as destitute of all qualities, proceeds, in the next section, to describe that very same Brahman as the ruler of the world, ‘By the command of that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart,’ &c.; a clear indication that the author of the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman in Śaṅkara’s sense.—The preceding *brāhmaṇa* (7) treats of the *antaryāmin*, i. e. Brahman viewed as the internal ruler of everything. This, according to Śaṅkara, is the lower form of Brahman called *Īsvara*; but we observe that the *antaryāmin* as well as the so-called highest Brahman described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two sections, characterised by means of the very same terms (7, 23: Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, &c.; and 8, 11: That Brahman is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, &c.).—Nothing can be clearer than that all these sections aim at describing one and the same being, and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed

Vedānta, however valid the latter may be from a purely philosophic point of view.

We may refer to one more similar instance from the *Khândogya Upanishad*. We there meet in III, 14 with one of the most famous vidyās describing the nature of Brahman, called after its reputed author the *Sândilya-vidyā*. This small vidyā is decidedly one of the finest and most characteristic texts; it would be difficult to point out another passage setting forth with greater force and eloquence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt, gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman's nature that *Sândilya's* thought was able to reach, is by *Saṅkara* and his school again declared to form part of the lower vidyā only, because it represents Brahman as possessing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not *gñāna*, i. e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere *upāsana*, a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing certain definite attributes such as having light for its form, having true thoughts, and so on. The *Rāmānujas*, on the other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly describing the nature of their highest, i. e. their one Brahman. We again allow that *Saṅkara* is free to deny that any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies absolute truth; but we also again remark that there is no reason whatever for supposing that *Sândilya*, or whoever may have been the author of that vidyā, looked upon it as anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man.

We return to the question as to the true philosophy of the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commentators.—From what precedes it will appear with sufficient distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philosophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all contradictions and allowing room for all the different statements made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to be systematised simply because they were never meant to

form a system. *Sāṇḍilya*'s views as to the nature of Brahman did not in all details agree with those of *Yāgyñavalkya*, and *Uddālaka* differed from both. In this there is nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests altogether with those who maintain that a large number of detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods, and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole.

The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we take the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophical system,' not in the strict sense in which *Saṅkara* and other commentators are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we receive from commentators, to whatever school they may belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by ourselves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having no particular system to advocate.

The point we will first touch upon is the same from which we started when examining the doctrine of the *Sūtras*, viz. the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher and lower knowledge in *Saṅkara*'s sense, i. e. [a knowledge of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently opposed to *avidyā*, by which latter term we have to understand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic knowledge; and, again, in several places we find the knowledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple-

mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge of the Self; to which latter distinction the *Mundaka Up.* (I, 4) applies the terms *aparā* and *parā vidyā*. But a formal recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes, and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes described as *saguṇa* and sometimes as *nirguṇa* (to use later terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed; hence the circumstance (already exemplified above) that in the same *vidyās* it is spoken of as *saguṇa* as well as *nirguṇa*. When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman, then, is called the Self and life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same entity.

Closely connected with the question as to the double nature of the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question as to their teaching *Mâyā*.—From Colebrooke downwards the majority of European writers have inclined towards the opinion that the doctrine of *Mâyā*, i. e. of the unreal illusory character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was introduced into the system at some later period, whether by *Bādarāyana* or *Śaṅkara* or somebody else. The opposite view, viz. that the doctrine of *Mâyā* forms an integral element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in

more than one place, has in recent times been advocated with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*.

In his *Matériaux*, &c. M. Paul Régnaud remarks that 'the doctrine of *Mâyâ*, although implied in the teaching of the Upanishads, could hardly become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent eternal principles (which became the basis of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy), and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which in the end necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle.'—To the two alternatives here referred to as possible we, however, have to add a third one, viz. that form of the *Vedānta* of which the theory of the *Bhāgavatas* or *Rāmānujas* is the most eminent type, and according to which Brahman carries within its own nature an element from which the material universe originates; an element which indeed is not an independent entity like the *pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*, but which at the same time is not an unreal *Mâyâ* but quite as real as any other part of Brahman's nature. That a doctrine of this character actually developed itself on the basis of the Upanishads, is a circumstance which we clearly must not lose sight of, when attempting to determine what the Upanishads themselves are teaching concerning the character of the world.

In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the *Mâyâ* doctrine or not, we must proceed with the same caution as regards other parts of the system, i. e. we must refrain from using unhesitatingly, and without careful consideration of the merits of each individual case, the teaching—direct or inferred—of any one passage to the end of determining the drift of the teaching of other passages. We may admit that some passages, notably of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, contain at any rate the germ of the later developed *Mâyâ* doctrine¹, and thus render it quite intelligible that a system like *Saṅkara's*

¹ It is well known that, with the exception of the *Svetāsvatara* and *Maitrāyaṇīya*, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits the word '*mâyâ*.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*; but that passage is a quotation from the *R̥ik Saṃhitā* in which *mâyâ* means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Régnaud, *La Mâyâ*, in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, tome xii, No. 3 (1885).

should evolve itself, among others, out of the Upanishads ; but that affords no valid reason for interpreting Mâyâ into other texts which give a very satisfactory sense without that doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant to it. This remark applies in the very first place to all the accounts of the creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the illusional character of the world should have been hinted at, at least, had that theory been held by the authors of those accounts ; but not a word to that effect is met with anywhere. The most important of those accounts—the one given in the sixth chapter of the *Kāndogya* Upanishad—forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to assume that the ‘sending forth’ of the elements from the primitive Sat, which is there described at length, was by the writer of that passage meant to represent a vivarta rather than a parivâma, that the process of the origination of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything else but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the primeval Self. The introductory words, addressed to Svetaketu by Uddâlaka, which are generally appealed to as intimating the unreal character of the evolution about to be described, do not, if viewed impartially, intimate any such thing¹. For what is capable of being proved, and manifestly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of the lump of clay and the nugget of gold, through which there are known all things made of clay and gold ? Merely that this whole world has Brahman for its causal substance, just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot, and gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process through which any causal substance becomes an effect is an unreal one. We—including Uddâlaka—may surely say that all earthen pots are in reality nothing but earth—the earthen pot being merely a special modification (*vikâra*) of clay which has a name of its own—without thereby committing ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form, which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into a pot, is not real but a mere baseless illusion.

In the same light we have to view numerous other passages

¹ As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Rāmānuja.

which set forth the successive emanations proceeding from the first principle. When, for instance, we meet in the *Kātha* Up. I, 3, 10, in the serial enumeration of the forms of existence intervening between the gross material world and the highest Self (the Person), with the 'avyākṛita,' the Undeveloped, immediately below the puruṣa; and when again the *Mundaka* Up. II, 1, 2, speaks of the 'high Imperishable' higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no reason whatever to see in that 'Undeveloped' and that 'high Imperishable' anything but that real element in Brahman from which, as in the Rāmānuga system, the material universe springs by a process of real development. We must of course render it quite clear to ourselves in what sense the terms 'real' and 'unreal' have to be understood. The Upanishads no doubt teach emphatically that the material world does not owe its existence to any principle independent from the Lord like the pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas; the world is nothing but a manifestation of the Lord's wonderful power, and hence is unsubstantial, if we take the term 'substance' in its strict sense. And, again, everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature to the highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated, and which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned constitutes unreality in the sense in which the Mâyā of Saṅkara is unreal. According to the latter the whole world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as the snake, for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen. But this is certainly not the impression left on the mind by a comprehensive review of the Upanishads which dwells on their general scope, and does not confine itself to the undue urging of what may be implied in some detached passages. The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the whole world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge; the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is rather that things have a separate individual existence, and are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects

of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true knowledge sublates this false world, as Saṅkara says, but that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world—the inferior mūrta rūpa of Brahman, to use an expression of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*—and to become one with Brahman in its highest form. ‘We are to see everything in Brahman, and Brahman in everything;’ the natural meaning of this is, ‘we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifestation of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.’ The *māyāvādin* has indeed appropriated the above saying also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense. For him it would be appropriate to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread over it and hiding it from us.

Stress has been laid¹ upon certain passages of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added ‘iva,’ i.e. ‘as it were’ (*yatrānyad iva syāt; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati; ātmā dhyāyati va lelayati va*). Those passages no doubt readily lend themselves to *Māyā* interpretations, and it is by no means impossible that in their author’s mind there was something like an undeveloped *Māyā* doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of the unreality of the world. If *Yâgñavalkya* refers to the latter as that ‘where there is something else as it were, where there is duality as it were,’ he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all things being one in so far as they spring from—and are parts of—Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being unreal in Saṅkara’s sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is only one universal

¹ Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads* pp. 243 ff.

substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is thinking, but the upâdhis, i. e. especially the manas with which the Self is connected. But whether these upâdhis are the mere offspring of Mâyâ, as Saṅkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Râmânuga teaches, is an altogether different question.

I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations, and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva's indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them was darkly labouring with a conception akin to—although much less explicit than—the Mâyâ of Saṅkara. But what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed for introducing the Mâyâ doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it ¹.

The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads we have to touch upon is the relation of the *gīvas*, the individual souls to the highest Self. The special views regarding that point held by Saṅkara and Râmânuga have been stated before. Confronting their theories with the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit without hesitation, that Saṅkara's doctrine faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage—whatever its original relation to Brahman may be—is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before, has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts of the Upanishads describe the soul's going upwards, on the path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells for unnumbered years, i. e. for ever. Those texts, as a type of which we may take the passage Kaushît. Up. I—the fundamental text of the Râmânugas concerning the soul's

JUA

¹ I cannot discuss in this place the Mâyâ passages of the Svetâsvatara and the Maitrâyaṇīya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true unmingled doctrine of the Upanishads.

fate after death—belong to an earlier stage of philosophic development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a continued individual existence. But mixed with texts of this class there are others in which the final absolute identification of the individual Self with the universal Self is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. ‘He who knows Brahman and becomes Brahman;’ ‘he who knows Brahman becomes all this;’ ‘as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes to the divine person.’ And if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep.

It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching of the Upanishads concerning the [original relation] of the individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which the soul is merely *brahma bhrāntam* or *brahma māyopādhikam*, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the elements, described in the *Khândogya* and referred to above, is a real process—of which we saw no reason to doubt—the *gīva ātman* with which the highest Self enters into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or emanation of Brahman itself.

After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief elements of Vedāntic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we may briefly consider Saṅkara’s system and mode of interpretation—with whose details we had frequent opportunities of finding fault—as a whole. It has been said before that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upanishads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that Saṅkara’s system is most probably the best which can be devised.

While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognise a lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This becomes very manifest as soon as we compare Saṅkara's system with that of Rāmānuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman which is, as we should say, a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those passages of the Upanishads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferentenced mass of impersonal intelligence, Rāmānuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has to misinterpret them more or less to make them fall in with his system. The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman; Rāmānuja cannot allow a complete identification but merely an assimilation carried as far as possible. Saṅkara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to find room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where the text speaks of Brahman as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called the All-knowing ruler of the world, the author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And where the legends about the primary being and its way of creating the world become somewhat crude and gross, Hiraṇyagarbha and Virāṅ are summoned forth and charged with the responsibility. Of Virāṅ Mr. Gough remarks (p. 55) that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upanishads for the puruṣa of the ancient *ṛishis*, the divine being out of whom the visible and tangible world proceeded. This is quite true if only we substitute for the 'poets of the Upanishads' the framers of the orthodox Vedānta system—for the Upanishads give no indication whatever

that by their purusha they understand not the simple old purusha but the Virâg occupying a definite position in a highly elaborate system ;—but the mere phrase, ‘providing a place’ intimates with sufficient clearness the nature of the work in which systematisers of the Vedântic doctrine are engaged.

Saṅkara’s method thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical development, to recognise clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of other Vedântic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by Saṅkara between Brahman and Īsvara is known to the Upanishads ; but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirguṇa, and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, Saṅkara is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. The Brahman of the old Upanishads, from which the souls spring to enjoy individual consciousness in their waking state, and into which they sink back temporarily in the state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is certainly not represented adequately by the strictly personal Īsvara of Rāmānuga, who rules the world in wisdom and mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and hence Saṅkara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatized personal Īsvara¹ a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate

¹ The Īsvara who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going systematisers of Vedântic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether.

of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although the Mâyâ doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark. The later growth of the Mâyâ doctrine on the basis of the Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has been no addition to the system from without but only a development from within, no graft but only growth. The lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the full-blown Mâyâ theory may be traced with considerable certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second place, a more thorough following out of the conception that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an erroneous notion, an illusion.—A further circumstance which may not impossibly have co-operated to further the development of the theory of the world's unreality will be referred to later on¹.

¹ That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text

We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of Vedānta is represented by the Vedānta-sūtras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more closely related to the system of Rāmānuga than to that of Saṅkara. If so, the philosophy of Saṅkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sūtras of Bādarāyana. This would indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion—for, judging *à priori*, we should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true doctrine of the Upanishads through Bādarāyana to Saṅkara—but *à priori* considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility of Bādarāyana's Sūtras already setting forth a doctrine that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably had sprung up in altogether different—priestly or non-priestly—communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgītā. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a personal highest being—*Kṛishṇa* or *Vishṇu*—which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhāgavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedānta, i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgītā is quoted in Bādarāyana's Sūtras (at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to *Sruti* only in authority. The Sūtras,

is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.

moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedântic portions of the Mahâbhârata, especially the twelfth book, several of which represent forms of Vedânta distinctly differing from Saṅkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the Bhâgavatas.

Facts of this nature—from entering into the details of which we are prevented by want of space—tend to mitigate the *primâ facie* strangeness of the assumption that the Vedânta-sûtras, which occupy an intermediate position between the Upanishads and Saṅkara, should yet diverge in their teaching from both. The Vedânta of Gauḍapâda and Saṅkara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever since Saṅkara's time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite¹.' The only forms of Vedântic philosophy which are—and can at any time have been—really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread influence are such as the Râmâyan of Tulsidâs, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Mâyâ, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion

¹ Così tra questa
Immensità s'annega il pensier mio,
E il naufrago m'è dolce in questo mare.
LEOPARDI.

to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.

The present translation of the Vedānta-sūtras does not aim at rendering that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows Saṅkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Bādarāyaṇa has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of Saṅkara's commentary with an independent version of the Sūtras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to in the Sūtras and discussed at length by Saṅkara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Müller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible Saṅkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.

I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on the *ṭīkā*s composed by Ānandagiri and Govindānanda (the former of which is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the *Bhāmati*.

My best thanks are due to *Pandits* Rāma Miśra Sāstrin and Gaṅgādhara Sāstrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my obligations to *Pandit* Kesava Sāstrin, of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more than one passage more definite or correct.

VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS

WITH

SAÑKARA BHÂSHYA.

SANĀKARA'S INTRODUCTION.

FIRST ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VĀSUDEVA!

IT is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject¹ whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the Non-Ego²) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose³ upon the subject—whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego—the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versâ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural⁴ procedure—

¹ The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (*ĥit*); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.

² The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the 'thou' (*yushmat*), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (*idam*), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; *ete vayam, ime vayam āsmahe*), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.

³ *Adhyāsa*, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.

⁴ Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech

which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal¹, to make use of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine².'—But what have we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'—The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing³.

Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing⁴. Others, again, define superimposition as the error

and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.

¹ I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.

² 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.'

³ Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of remembrance' is added, the Bhāmatī remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pāṇaliputra again appears before us in Māhishmatī. These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyāsa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.

⁴ The so-called anyathākhyātivādin maintain that in the act of adhyāsa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyāsa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The ātmakhyātivādin maintain that in adhyāsa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ

founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is superimposed¹. Others², again, define it as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the following : 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the Ego³, and the interior Self is well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation⁴. Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects

is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.

¹ This is the definition of the akhyātivādins.

² Some anyathākhyātivādins and the Mādhyamikas according to Ānanda Giri.

³ The pratyagātman is in reality non-object, for it is *svayam-prakāśa*, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of *Ne-science*, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is *gīva*, individual or personal soul. Cp. *Bhāmatī*, pp. 22, 23 : 'kidātmaiva svayamprakāśo'pi buddhyādivishayavikkhuranāt kathamkid āsmatpratyayavishayo'hamkāraspadam gīva iti ka gantur iti ka kshetragñā iti kākhyāyate.'

⁴ Translated according to the *Bhāmatī*. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of *adhyāsa* in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it

can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.

Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.

This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidyā), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidyā). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition¹. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre-supposition on which there base all the practical distinctions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release².—But how can the means of right

may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.—It is known or manifested, the Vedāntin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvāt), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ānanda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: *asmatpratyayāviśayaṭve • py aparokshatvād ekāntenāviśaya-tvābbāvat* *tasminn ahaṅkāradhyāsa ity arthaḥ*. *Aparokshatvam api kaisid ātmano nesham ity āsaṅkyāha pratyagātmeti*.

¹ *Tatraivam sati evambhūtavastutattvādhāraṇe sati*. Bhā. *Tasminn adhyāse uktaṛitā • vidyāvmake sati*. Go. *Yatrātmani buddhyādau vā yasya buddhyāder ātmano vādhyāsaḥ tena buddhyādīnā • tmānā va krītenā • sanayādidosheṇa kaitanyagunena kāmānātmā vā vastuto na svalpenāpi yugyate*. Ānanda Giri.

² Whether they belong to the *karmakāṇḍā*, i.e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the *gñānakāṇḍā*, i.e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.

knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience¹?—Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body²) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed³. Nor can, in the absence of all that⁴, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when

¹ It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.

² The Bhāṣaṇ takes *adhishṭhānam* in the sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.

³ If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.

⁴ I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.

they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also—although distinguished by superior intelligence—proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Vedānta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brāhmaṇa and Kshatriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A Brāhmaṇa is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man

thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versâ the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning—and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one.

With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedânta-texts is begun. That all the Vedânta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called *Sâriraka-mimâmsâ* ¹.

Of this Vedânta-mimâmsâ about to be explained by us the first Sûtra is as follows.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature ². Nor has the word 'then' the sense

¹ The *Mîmâmsâ*, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This *Mîmâmsâ* being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedânta-portions of the Veda, it is also called *Vedânta-mîmâmsâ*.

² *Nâdhikârârtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyârthaḥ, kim ayam aṭhasabdo brahmagñānekkhâyāḥ kim vāntarñitavikāśasya athavekkhāvīśeshanagñānasārambhârthaḥ. Nādyāḥ tasyā mîmāmsāpravartikāyās tadapravartyatvād anārabhyatvāt tasyās kottaratra*

of auspiciousness (or blessing) ; for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution¹.

If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends ; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Pûrvā Mīmāṃsā) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Pûrvā Mīmāṃsā). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedānta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word 'then' to indicate order of succession ; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other

pratyadhikarāṇam apratipādanāt. Na dvitīyo-ṭhasabdenānantar-yoktidvārā viśiṣṭādhikāryasamarpane sādhanakāṭushayāsampan-nānām brahmadhītadvikārayor anarthitvād vikāranārambhān na ka vikāravidhivasād adhikāri kalpyaḥ prārambhasyāpi tulyatvād adhi-kārinas ka vidhyapekshitopādhitvān na trūṭiyaḥ brahmagñānasyā-nandasākshātkāratvenādhikāryatve-ṣpyaprādhānyād aṭhasabdāsam-bandhāt tasmān nārambhārthateti. Ānanda Giri.

¹ Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of ānantarya.

parts of the sacrificial animal¹. (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified²; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man. In the *Brahma-mīmāṃsā*, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),—for it is eternal,—and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be

¹ He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.

² Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayâgas is to the *darsapûṛṇamâsa*-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the *darsapûṛṇamâsa* qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.

stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is proposed.—Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means¹, and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance, *Kṛ. Up. VIII, 1, 6*, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, *Taitt. Up. II, 1*, 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sūtra (*I, 1, 2*); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sūtra the genitive case ('of Brahman;') the literal translation of the Sūtra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (*śeṣa*²); for the desire of knowledge

¹ The 'means' in addition to *sama* and *dama* are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (*uparati*), patience in suffering (*titikṣhā*), attention and concentration of the mind (*samādhāna*), and faith (*śraddhā*).

² According to *Pāṇini II, 3, 50* the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.

demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated.—But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.—This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless procedure.—Not needless; for if we explain the words of the Sûtra to mean ‘the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman’ we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.—This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sûtra. Analogously the sentence ‘there the king is going’ implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sûtra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the passage, ‘That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to know that. That is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this kind the Sûtra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having reference to results¹. Knowledge thus constitutes the

¹ In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said ‘grāmam gakkhati,’ the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.

means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire *Samsāra*. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word 'Brahman,' from the root *br̥h*, 'to be great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman¹. Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokāyatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach

¹ That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the *Brahma-mīmāṃsā*, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.

that that being is enjoying only, not acting ; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, all-powerful Lord¹. Others, finally, (i.e. the Vedāntins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood². If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first Sūtra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedānta-texts, to be carried on with the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude.

So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and the reverend author of the Sūtras therefore propounds the following aphorism.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order

¹ The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools ; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.

² As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food ;' 'the eye, &c. spoke ;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.

of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, Taïtt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which' denote the cause. The full sense of the Sūtra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world—which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes¹, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind,—that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sūtra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yâska² are possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it might—were they referred to in the Sūtra—be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sūtra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent prādhana³, or from atoms, or from non-

¹ So the compound is to be divided according to Ân. Gi. and Go.; the Bhâ. proposes another less plausible division.

² According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhāvavikârah are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.

³ The pradhâna, called also prakṛiti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the Sāṅkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in

being, or from a being subject to transmigration¹; nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously, without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.

(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world², think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without recourse being had to Scripture at all).—But, it might be said, you yourself in the Sûtra under discussion have merely brought forward the same argument!—By no means, we reply. The Sûtras (i.e. literally ‘the strings’) have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedânta-passages. In reality the Vedânta-passages referred to by the Sûtras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedânta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedânta-passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedânta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation; for the passages, *Bri. Up.* II, 4, 5 (‘the Self is to be heard, to be considered’), and *Kh. Up.* VI, 14, 2 (‘as the man, &c., having been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhâra, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge’), declare that human understanding assists Scripture³.

Scriptural text, &c.⁴, are not, in the enquiry into Brahman,

later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term *pradhâna* has been left untranslated. Cp. *Sânkhya Kârikâ* 3.

¹ *Keçit tu hiranyagarbham samsârinam evâgamâg gagaddhetum âtakshate.* Ânanda Giri.

² Viz. the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

³ *Âtmanaḥ sruter ity arthaḥ.* Ânanda Giri.

⁴ Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (*linga*), syntactical

the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in the *Pûrva Mīmāṃsā*), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition¹, &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following: 'At the *atirātra* he takes the *shoḍaśin* cup,' and 'at the *atirātra* he does not take the *shoḍaśin* cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it

connection (*vākya*), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the *Pûrva Mīmāṃsā*.

¹ The so-called *sākshātkāra* of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.

is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.—But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedānta-texts is purposeless.—This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sūtra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedānta-text.—Which, then, is the Vedānta-text which the Sūtra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?—It is the passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhr̥gu Vāruṇi went to his father Varuṇa, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6: 'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sūtrakāra continues as follows:

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.

Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the *Rig-veda* and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, *nyāya*, *purāṇa*, &c.) ; which lamp-like illuminates all things ; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pāṇini possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be ; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the *Rig-veda*, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men ! See what Scripture says about him, 'The *Rig-veda*, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 10*).

Or else we may interpret the Sūtra to mean that Scripture consisting of the *Rig-veda*, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be : through Scripture only as a means of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sūtra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.—But as the preceding Sūtra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sūtra ?—The words of the preceding Sūtra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sūtra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman ? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the *Pūrva Mimāṃsā*

Sûtra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purportless'); the Vedânta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pû. Mî. Sû. I, 2, 7, 'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;)' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the darsapûrnâmsâ-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedânta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedânta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmakânda of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.) that the

Vedānta-texts refer to devout meditation (upāsana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedānta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sūtrakāra replies as follows :

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is connected (with the Vedānta-texts) as their purport.

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the pūrva-paksha (the primâ facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedānta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedānta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (*Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1*); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything' (*Bri. Up. II, 5, 19*); 'That immortal Brahman is before' (*Mu. Up. II, 2, 11*); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, *Bri. Up. II, 4, 13*, 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of

knowledge; for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman. {

Here others raise the following objection :—Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the āhavaniya-fire and other objects not known from the practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain injunctions¹. Why so?

¹ So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and

Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of actions' (Bhâshya on Gaimini Sûtra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages impelling to action' (Bh. on Gaim. Sû. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Gaim. Sû. I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action' (Gaim. Sû. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless' (Gaim. Sû. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others; other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedânta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of immortality.—But—somebody might object—it has been declared that there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the karma-kânda (that part of the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions¹.—We reply that it must not be such because the

makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.'

¹ If the fruits of the two sâstras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two sâstras; if they

Vedānta-texts give information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind, 'Verily the Self is to be seen' (*Bṛi. Up.* II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him as Self' (*Bṛi. Up.* I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his true state' (*Bṛi. Up.* I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the Vedānta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the *sāstra*. If, on the other hand, the Vedānta-texts were considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises seven *dvīpas*,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purposeless, because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be shunned or endeavoured after.—Perhaps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and that so likewise the Vedānta-passages making statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a purpose of their own (without reference to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self being liable to transmigration.—We reply that this might

are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.

be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, *Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing. From all this it results that the *sāstra* can be admitted as a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with injunctions.

To all this, we, the Vedāntins, make the following reply:—The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind, which are known from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*, and are comprised under the name 'religious duty' (*dharma*), is carried on in the *Gaimini Sūtra*, which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the opposite of duty also (*adharma*), such as doing harm, &c., which is defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those qualified to perform

acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results (which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of the sun; *Kh. Up. V, 10, 1*), while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known—from *Sruti*, *Smṛiti*, and reasoning—to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature (*samsāra*). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1*), refers to the *samsāra*-state as described above. From the following passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release' (*moksha*) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said

that the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22); 'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That person is not attached to anything' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 15)¹. All which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal, although changing' (*parināmīnitya*), viz. those, the idea of whose identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who maintain the eternity of the world, or the three *guṇas* in the opinion of the Sāṅkhyas. But this (*moksha*) is eternal in the true sense, i.e. eternal without undergoing any changes (*kūṭasthānitya*), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It² (i.e. *moksha*) is, therefore, the same as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and re-

¹ The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.

² Ānanda Giri omits 'atah.' His comment is: *prithaggrigṛhāsā-vishayatvāḥ ka dharmādyasprishatvam brahmano yuktam ityāha tad iti | atah sabdapāḥ dharmādyasparśa karmaphalavailakshanyam hetūkrītam*.—The above translation follows Govindānanda's first explanation. *Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilakshanatvād ity arthaḥ*.

lease were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two; for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?' (Īs. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage, Bri. Up. I, 4, 10, ('Seeing this the Rishi Vāmadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Kṛ. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumāra showed the other side of darkness' (Kṛ. Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sūtra, supported by arguments, of (Gautama) Ākārya, 'Final release

results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal of the preceding member' (Nyây. Sû. I, 1, 2); and wrong knowledge itself is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of Brahman.

Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere (fanciful) combination¹, as is made use of, for instance, in the following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Visvedevas are endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (*Bri. Up. III, 1, 9*)²; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription (superimposition)³, as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 1; 19, 1*), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind, Âditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber'⁴ (*Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3*); nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c., Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri-

¹ Sampat. Sampan nāmâlpe vastuny âlambane sāmānyena kenākin mahato vastunah sampādanam. Ânanda Giri.

² In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Visvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.

³ Adhyāsaḥ sāstrato tasmims taddhīḥ. Sampadi sampādyamānasya prādhānyenānudhyānam, adhyāse tu âlambanasyeti viśeṣaḥ. Ânanda Giri.

⁴ Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seyam samvargadriṣṭirvâyau prāṇe ka darśāgatam gagad darsayati yathā gīvâtmani brimhanakriyayā brahmadriṣṭir amṛitatvāya phalāya kalpata iti. Bhāmati.

ficial butter¹. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like, violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the following passages, 'That art thou' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* II, 5, 19). And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved' (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.

Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (*Ken. Up.* I, 3); and 'How should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, *Ken. Up.* I, 5, whose first half

¹ The butter used in the *upâmsuyâga* is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as *kartri*—agent—stands in a subordinate *aṅga*-relation to the *karman* of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.

declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the *sāstra* can impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that the aim of the *sāstra* is to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience. The *sāstra*'s purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject (*pratyagâtman*, the inward Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the *sāstra* says, 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (*Ken. Up.* II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge' (*Bri. Up.* III, 4, 2). As thereby (i.e. by the knowledge derived from the *sāstra*) the imagination of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or Release) being something which is to be obtained¹; for as Brahman constitutes a person's Self it is

¹ An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of

not something to be attained by that person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's Self still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (*samskāra*) results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman, which is eternally pure.—But, it might be said, Release might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some action ; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the action of rubbing.—This objection is invalid, we reply, because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be stultified ; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (*dehin*, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per-

obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.

ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I' constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity (*ahamkartri*), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free from qualities' (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Īs. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to any action, excepting knowledge.

But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind. By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the

offering is made on that one let him meditate when about to say vashaṭ' (Ait. Brāhm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhyā.' Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it thus widely differs from meditation and the like.

The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded on *Kṛ. Up.* V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.—But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard about?'—They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such

texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 6*); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the knower?' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*); 'This Self is Brahman' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 5, 19*). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus *Sruti* says, 'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 12*.) And similarly *Smṛiti* declares, 'Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bhārata' (*Bha. Gītā XV, 20*). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (*puruṣa*), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances¹, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that

¹ Viz. things to be originated (for instance, *ghaṭam karoti*), things to be obtained (*grāmaṃ gakkhati*), things to be modified (*suvarṇam kundalam karoti*), and things to be ceremonially purified (*vr̥thiṃ prokshati*).

soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no !' (*Bri. Up. III, 9, 26*) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the *gîvâtman*). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings ; uniform ; one ; eternally unchanging ; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable¹, as there is no cause why it should perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the highest road' (*Ka. Up. I, 3, 11*), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (*Bri. Up. III, 9, 26*), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sâstra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sâstra which consists of

¹ Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.

injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless¹. If, on the other hand, the Veda—in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity—does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).—But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action.—This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (*prayogana*) indeed may be subserviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves.—Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose²? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a

¹ That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.

² I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?

purpose is established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such passages as 'a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport—a consequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word 'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be killed'—which action is naturally established¹—be used as a reason for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere², different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not' is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brāhmaṇa, &c.), just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pragāpati-vow, &c.³ Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be

¹ It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives—not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.

² Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.

³ The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda

considered as referring (not to the Vedānta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvīpas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.'—But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory

is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. Śaṅkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brāhmaṇa is to be formed ;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brāhmaṇa,' viz. some man who is a kṣattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined ; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows ; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.

world?—We reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus Sruti also declares, 'When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1*). If it should be objected that the condition of being free from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de-

merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts¹. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and

¹ The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.

name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the *Sruti* passages concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' *Smṛiti* also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enumerated of one whose mind is steady (*Bha. Gîtâ* II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not

fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the Sāstra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedānta-texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new Sāstra indicated in the first Sūtra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Vedānta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new Sāstra would either not be begun at all, since the Sāstra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sūtra of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man' (Pū. Mīm. Sū. IV, 1, 1). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous Sāstra), it is quite appropriate that a new Sāstra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration:—

'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end¹; how should then the effect² (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sûtras is finished³.)

So far it has been declared that the Vedânta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sâṅkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhâna and the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedânta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedânta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhâna with the souls (purusha). The followers of Kaṇâda again infer from the very same

¹ The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.

² I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

³ The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyāsa)—thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means of proof—proceeds to state as *primâ facie* views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedānta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sāṅkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent *pradhâna* consisting of three constituent elements (*guṇa*) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedānta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the *pradhâna* being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the *pradhâna* in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the *guṇa* of Goodness¹, according to the *Smṛiti* passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gītā XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the *pradhâna*) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (*puruṣa*) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the *pradhâna*, on the other hand, because consisting of the three *guṇas*, comprises also in its *pradhâna* state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedānta-passages therefore in

¹ The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the *pradhâna*.

a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following Sûtra.

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedânta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâṅkhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, *Kh. Up. VI, 2*, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or 'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth *Prāṇa*.' By 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sūtra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sāṅkhyas that the *pradhāna* may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the *guṇa* Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the *pradhāna*-condition the three *guṇas* are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible¹. Nor can we admit the explanation that the *pradhāna* is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the *guṇas*, we term the *pradhāna* all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-

¹ Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.

ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sākshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhāna is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhāna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience¹.—Well then (say those Sāṅkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhāna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.—No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhāna having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sāṅkhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent, cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent.—But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.—Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent

¹ The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.

when we say, 'he burns, he gives light'.—But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.—This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines,' even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,' &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.—What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world?—Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-sāstra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition—as the sun's nature is eternal luminous-

¹ Ānanda Giri comments as follows: paroktānupapattim nirasitum *prikkhati* idam iti. Prakṛtyarthābhāvāt pratyayārthābhāvād vā brahmano sarvagñātetī prasnam eva prakāśayati katham iti. Prathamam pratyāha yasyeti. Uktam vyatirekadvārā vivṛinoti anityatve hīti. Dvītiyam saṅkate gñāneti. Svato nityasyāpi gñānasya tattadarthāvaśāhinnasya kāryatvāt tatra svāntantryam pratyayārtho brahmanāś sidhyatīti āha.—The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'gñānāti' indicating the particularity of the act.

ness—can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (*samsârin*) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. ‘There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.’ ‘Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person’ (*Sv. Up. VI, 8; III, 19*).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for *Sruti* expressly declares that ‘there is no other seer but he; there is no other knower but he’ (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 23*). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?—True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as ‘the hollow (space) of a jar,’ &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like

which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhâna, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pradhâna not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhâna and similar principles, the Sûtrakâra will set forth in the second Adhyâya (II, 1, 4, &c.).

Here the Sâṅkhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non-intelligent pradhâna cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, 'the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the afternoon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhâna also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.—But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word 'thought' and for taking it in a figurative sense?—The observation, the Sâṅkhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, 'That fire thought; that water thought' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4*). We therefrom conclude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there

also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figurative sense¹.

To this argumentation of the Sāṅkhya the next Sūtra replies :

6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).

Your assertion that the term 'Being' denotes the non-intelligent pradhāna, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so? On account of the term 'Self.' For the passage *Kh. Up. VI, 2*, which begins 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth ('it thought,' &c.; 'it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on—denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term 'divinities'—as follows, 'That divinity thought: Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (*gīva ātman*) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhāna is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhāna—as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter—is referred to by the term 'that divinity.' But in that case the divinity would not speak of the *gīva* as 'Self.' For by the term '*Gīva*' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhāna? By 'Self' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent *Gīva* cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhāna. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to

¹ In the second *Khanda* of the sixth *Prapâṭhaka* of the *Kh. Up.* 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.

which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'Self' with reference to the *Giva* is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O Svetaketu' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c.*). Here the clause 'It is the Self' designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word 'Self,' and the concluding clause, 'that art thou, O Svetaketu,' declares the intelligent Svetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense—while the employment of the word 'Self' furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat—the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figurative sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word 'Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense¹.

Here the Sāṅkhya comes forward with a new objection. The word 'Self,' he says, may be applied to the *pradhāna*, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another;' as, for instance, a king applies the word 'Self' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, 'Bhādrasena is my (other) Self.' For the *pradhāna*, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word 'Self' may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses,' are made use of, and as the one word 'light' (*gyotis*) denotes a certain

¹ So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.

sacrifice (the *gyotishṭoma*) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word 'Self' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

To this last argumentation the *Sûtrakâra* replies:

7. (The *pradhâna* cannot be designated by the term 'Self') because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the *Sat*).

The non-intelligent *pradhâna* cannot be the object of the term 'Self' because in the passage *Kṛ. Up. VI, 2 ff.*, where the subtle *Sat* which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, 'That is the Self,' and where the subsequent clause, 'That art thou, O *Svetaketu*,' declares the intelligent *Svetaketu* to have his abode in the Self, a passage subsequent to the two quoted (viz. 'a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent *pradhâna* were denoted by the term 'Sat,' and did comprehend—by means of the phrase 'That art thou'—persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be 'Thou art non-intelligent;' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right knowledge. But to assume that the faultless *sâstra* is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the *sâstra*, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he would—comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail¹—cling to the view of that being the Self,

¹ A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.

and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him; hence he would be debarred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the sâstra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage 'that is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (*Kh. Up. VI, 16*). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage 'that art thou' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only¹, like the knowledge derived from the passage, 'I am the hymn' (*Ait. Ār. II, 1, 2, 6*), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self' can—in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self'—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by perception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i. e. Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word 'Self' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word 'gyotis' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word 'Self' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative

¹ Cp. above, p. 30.

attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also; whence such phrases as 'the Self of the elements,' 'the Self of the senses.' And even if we assume that the word 'Self' primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determinative attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with Svetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word 'Self' here to be something intelligent. The word 'gyotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate example; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of 'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavâda assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sûtra is also possible. The preceding Sûtra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word 'Self' having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sûtra is to be explained as containing an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhâna is not denoted by the word 'Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

8. And (the pradhâna cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the pradhâna which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term 'Being' (Sat), and if the passage 'That is the Self, that art thou, O Svetaketu,' referred to the pradhâna; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the

true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhâna is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered); for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhâna, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying 'that is Arundhati,' although it is really not so; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhâna. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapâṭhaka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).

The word 'and' (in the Sûtra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhâna is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapâṭhaka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the pradhâna, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhâna. Therefore the pradhâna is not denoted by the term 'Sat.'—For this the Sûtrakâra gives a further reason.

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhāna).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat,' Scripture says, 'When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, "he sleeps" (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita).' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 8, 1.*) This passage explains the well-known verb 'to sleep,' with reference to the soul. The word, 'his own,' denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of *api-i*, which means 'to be resolved into.' The individual soul (*gīva*) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind—which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects¹. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind'². When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word '*hrīdaya*' is given by *śruti*, 'That Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the heart (*hrīdi ayam*).' (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 3, 3.*) The words *asanāya* and *udanyā* are similarly etymologised: 'water is carrying away what has been eaten by him;' 'fire carries away what has been drunk by him' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 8, 3; 5.*) Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 'Sat,' by means of the etymology of the word 'sleep.' But the intelligent

¹ So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.

² With reference to *Kṛ. Up. VI, 8, 2.*

Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhâna. If, again, it were said that the pradhâna is denoted by the word 'own,' because belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the same absurd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. 'embraced by the intelligent—prâgñā—Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' *Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 21*) declares that the soul in the condition of dreamless sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word 'Sat,' and not the pradhâna.—A further reason for the pradhâna not being the cause is subjoined.

10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedānta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).

If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedānta-texts also, there were set forth different views concerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhâna doctrine, and others again tending in a different direction; then it might perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in with the pradhâna theory. But the stated condition is absent since all the Vedānta-texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, 'As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prâṇas proceed each towards its place; from the prâṇas the gods, from the gods the worlds' (*Kau. Up. III, 3*). And 'from that Self sprang ether' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*). And 'all this springs from the Self' (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 1*). And 'this prâṇa is born from the Self' (*Pr. Up. III, 3*); all which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self' denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

And that all the Vedānta-texts advocate the same view as to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a uniform character regarding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedānta-texts).'—A further reason for this conclusion is advanced.

11. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the man-tropanishad of the Svetāsvataras (VI, 9) where the word 'he' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent pradhāna or anything else.

In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate arguments, that the Vedānta-texts exhibited under Sūtras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (I, 10), that all Vedānta-texts whatever maintain an intelligent cause. The question might therefore be asked, 'What reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedānta-sūtras?' (as the chief point is settled already.)

To this question we reply as follows: Brahman is apprehended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolutions of name and form (i.e. the multiformity of the created world; in the second place as being the opposite of this, i.e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare

the following passages : *Bri. Up.* IV, 5, 15, 'For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' *Kh. Up.* VII, 24, 1, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the little. The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal;' *Taitt. Ār.* III, 12, 7, 'The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names¹);' *Sv. Up.* VI, 19, 'Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' *Bri. Up.* II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;' *Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8, 'It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long;' and 'defective is one place, perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the like². The different modes of devotion lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction of the different qualities and limiting conditions³. And although the one highest Self only, i.e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man worships him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed

¹ The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as *gīvātman* is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.

² I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.

³ Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities—such as the heart and the like—which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.

this life' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*). *Smṛiti* also makes an analogous statement, 'Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (*Bha. Gitā VIII, 6*).

Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself¹ in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of various dignity and power; compare, for instance (*Ait. Ār. II, 3, 2, 1*), 'He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him²', &c. Similarly *Smṛiti* remarks, 'Whatever being there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory' (*Bha. Gitā, X, 41*); a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i. e. in the *Sūtras*) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on account of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (*Ved. Sū. I, 1, 20*); the same is to be observed with regard to *I, 1, 22* and other *Sūtras*. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous release; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special connexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the

¹ Ānanda Giri reads *āvish/asya* for *āvishkr̥tasya*.

² Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the *sattā*, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.

knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object ; so, for instance, in the case of Sūtra I, 1, 12¹. From all this it appears that the following part of the Sāstra has a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedānta-texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and on the other hand, as being free from the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge. The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from Brahman, which in I, 1, 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of the Vedānta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sūtrakāra, who, while explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says, 'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, 'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the

¹ Ānanda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also : ' na kevalam dvaividhyam brahmanah srutismrityor eva siddham kim tu sūtrakṛto=pi matam ity āha, evam iti, srutismrityor iva prakṛte=pi sāstre dvairūpyam brahmano bhavati ; tatra sopādhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmādhikarānam udāharati ādityeti ; uktanyāyam tulyadeseshu prasārayati evam iti ; sopādhikopadesavan nirupādhikopadesam darsayati evam ityādinā, ātmagñānam nirnetavyam iti sambandhaḥ ; nirṇayaprasaṅgam āha pareti ; anamayādyupādhidhivāroktasya katham paravidyāvishayatvam tatrāha upādhīti ; nirṇayakramam āha vākyeti, uktārtham adhikarānam kvāstīty āsaṅkyoktam yatheti.

Self consisting of food, &c., is different from it.—The pûrvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of Selves, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says 'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former one this one is the embodied Self' (Taît. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self. And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply:—By the Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest Self. So Taît. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is flavour'—which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of the nature of flavour—we read, 'For only after having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether (of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now this is an examination of Bliss;' 'He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss;' and again, II, 9, 'He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing;' and in addition, 'He understood that Bliss is Brahman' (III, 6). And in another scriptural passage also (*Bri. Up.* III, 9, 28), 'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman,' we see the word 'bliss' applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word 'bliss' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote

the secondary Self (the *Samsārin*), because it forms a link in a series of secondary Selves, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The *Sāstra*, wishing to convey information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had been poured; then, again, to another one, always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self¹, which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star *Arundhatī* to another man, at first points to several stars which are not *Arundhatī* as being *Arundhatī*, while only the star pointed out in the end is the real *Arundhatī*; so here also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the innermost (i. e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding, the so-called *vigñānakosa*), and does not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman.

13. If (it be objected that the term *ānandamaya*, consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word denoting a modifica-

¹ After which no other Self is mentioned.

tion (or product); (we declare the objection to be) not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed by the affix *maya*.)

Here the *pûrvapakshin* raises the objection that the word *ânandamaya* (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self.—Why?—Because the word *ânandamaya* is understood to denote something different from the original word (i. e. the word *ânanda* without the derivative affix *maya*), viz. a modification; according to the received sense of the affix *maya*. '*Ânandamaya*' therefore denotes a modification, just as *annamaya* (consisting of food) and similar words do.

This objection is, however, not valid, because '*maya*' is also used in the sense of abundance, i. e. denotes that where there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase '*the sacrifice is annamaya*' means '*the sacrifice is abounding in food*' (not '*is some modification or product of food*'). Thus here Brahman also, as abounding in bliss, is called *ânandamaya*. That Brahman does abound in bliss follows from the passage (*Taitt. Up. II, 8*), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to be absolutely supreme. *Maya* therefore denotes abundance.

14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i. e. of bliss; therefore *maya* is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, '*For he alone causes bliss*' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*). For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, therefore, *maya* may be taken to mean '*abundant*,' the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

15. Moreover (the *ânandamaya* is Brahman be-

cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i. e. proclaimed in the Brāhmaṇa passage as the ānandamaya.)

The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following reason also¹. On the introductory words 'he who knows Brahman attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the qualities of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things, and that, entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all; thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different Selves ('different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, 'different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and the Brāhmaṇa passage belonging to it have the same sense is only proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom); for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome inference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether new subject.

Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self consisting of food, &c.² On the same (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded, 'This same knowledge of Bhrigu and Varuṇa; he understood that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

¹ The previous proofs were founded on līṅga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakaraṇa.

² While, in the case of the Selves consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selves consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.

16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other (i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assumption).

And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i.e. the one which is other than the Lord, i.e. the transmigrating individual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the term 'the one consisting of bliss.' Why? On account of the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is.' Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body, &c., the non-separation of the effects created from the creator, and the creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self different from the highest Self.

17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the *ânandamaya* cannot be the transmigrating soul).

The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly represented as different; *Taitt. Up.* II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive bliss.' For he who perceives cannot be that which is perceived.—But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the following *Sruti*- and *Smṛiti*-passages, 'The Self is to be sought;' 'Nothing higher is known than the attainment of the Self¹?'—This objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything

¹ *Yadi labdhâ na labdhavyaḥ katham tarhi paramâtmano vastuto bhinnena gīvâtmanâ paramâtma labhyata ity arthaḥ. Bhâmât.*

but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth, identified with the Non-Self, i. e. the body and so on; whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like. Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no other seer but he' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 23*), that there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal individual soul; for)¹ the Lord differs from the soul (*vigñānātman*) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope; or as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by its limiting adjunct, (*viz. the jar.*) With reference to this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self, the two last Sūtras have been propounded.

18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the *ānandamaya*) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i. e. to the *pradhāna* inferred by the Sāṅkhyas.)

Since in the passage 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which occurs in the chapter treating of the *ānandamaya* (*Taitt. Up. II, 6*), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred, i. e. the non-intelligent *pradhāna* assumed by the Sāṅkhyas, cannot be regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. Although the opinion that the *pradhāna* is the

¹ *Yathā paramesvarād bhinno gīvātmā drashā na bhavaty evam gīvātmano•pi drash/ur na bhinnā paramesvara iti gīvasyānirvākyatve paramesvaro•py anirvākyāḥ syād ity ata āha paramesvaras tv avidyākalpitād iti. Ānanda Giri.*

cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sūtra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all scriptural passages).

19. And, moreover, it (i. e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i. e. the individual soul) with that, (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).

And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' cannot denote either the *pradhāna* or the individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge is joined, i. e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion, i. e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taġtt. Up. II, 7), 'When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the *pradhāna* or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the true meaning of the word '*ānandamaya*'¹. On what grounds, we ask, can it be maintained that the

¹ The explanation of the *ānandamaya* given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. Ān. to the *vṛttikāra*.

affix 'maya' after having, in the series of compounds beginning with annamaya and ending with vigñānamaya, denoted mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ānandamaya, which belongs to the same series, denote abundance, so that ānandamaya would refer to Brahman? If it should be said that the assumption is made on account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of food, breath, &c., denote Brahman (because the governing influence of the mantra extends to them also).—The advocate of the former interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use of above, viz. as follows: To assume that the Selfs consisting of food, and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the mantra), and taking up a new topic.—But to this we reply that, although unlike the case of the Selfs consisting of food, &c., no inner Self is mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of bliss Scripture declares, 'Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called the tail, the support; while the five involucra, extending from the involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then, can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new topic?—But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i.e. a member of the Self consisting of bliss; analogously to those passages in which a tail and

other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i. e. a subordinate matter) is in reality the chief matter referred to?—From the fact, we reply, of Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter.—But, it will again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is cognised as a mere member of the ânandamaya does not involve a dropping of the subject-matter, since the ânandamaya himself is Brahman.—But, we reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the two alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appropriate to refer to Brahman the clause ‘Brahman is the tail’ which contains the word ‘Brahman,’ and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase, ‘Brahman is the tail, the support,’ goes on, ‘On this there is also the following sloka: He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing.’ As this sloka, without any reference to the Self of bliss, states the advantage and disadvantage connected with the knowledge of the being and non-being of Brahman only, we conclude that the clause, ‘Brahman is the tail, the support,’ represents Brahman as the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy, satisfaction, &c., is well known to every one.—But if Brahman is the principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self of bliss (‘Brahman is the tail, the support’)?—Its being called so, we reply, forms no objection; for the word tail here denotes that which is of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another

scriptural passage declares, 'All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman, we should have to assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities (*savishesha*), because it is said to have joy and the like for its members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage (*II*, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities), 'From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as 'abounding in bliss'¹, we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for the word 'abundance' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage (*Kh. Up.* VII, 24), 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite;' which declares that in the Infinite, i.e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on the other hand, does not differ according to bodies; for the mantra at the beginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge, infinite, and another passage says, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings' (*Sv. Up.* VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word 'ānandamaya;' for merely the radical part of the compound (i.e. the word *ānanda* without the affix *maya*) is repeated in all the following passages; 'It is a flavour, for only after seizing flavour can any one seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessedness;' 'Now this is an examination of bliss;' 'He who

¹ In which sense, as shown above, the word *ānandamaya* must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.

knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing;’ ‘He understood that bliss is Brahman.’ If it were a settled matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, ‘the Self consisting of bliss,’ then we could assume that in the subsequent passages, where merely the word ‘bliss’ is employed, the term ‘consisting of bliss’ is meant to be repeated; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (*Bṛi. Up. III, 9, 28*), the mere word ‘bliss’ denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, ‘If that bliss existed not in the ether,’ the word bliss is used with reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term ‘consisting of bliss.’ The repetition of the full compound, ‘consisting of bliss,’ which occurs in the passage, ‘He reaches that Self consisting of bliss’ (*Taitt. Up. II, 8*), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c., all of which are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be reached.—But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is said to have to be reached, were not Brahman—just as the Selfs consisting of food, &c. are not Brahman—then it would not be declared (in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his reward Brahman.—This objection we invalidate by the remark that the text makes its declaration as to Brahman—which is the tail, the support—being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss; as appears from the passage, ‘On this there is also this sloka, from which all speech returns,’ &c. With reference, again, to the passage, ‘He desired: may I be many, may I grow forth,’ which is found in proximity to the mention of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality connected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is mentioned in the still nearer passage, ‘Brahman is the tail, the support,’ and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted (‘it desired,’ &c.), the later passage

also, 'That is flavour,' &c., has not the Self of bliss for its subject.—But, it may be objected, the (neuter word) Brahman cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word as you maintain is done in the passage, 'He desired,' &c.—In reply to this objection we point to the passage (Taît. Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether,' where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self' can refer to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the knowledge of Bhrîgu and Varuṇa finally ('he knew that bliss is Brahman'), the word 'bliss' is rightly understood to denote Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix 'maya,' nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman; and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the qualified (savishesha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above), which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore must conclude that the affix *maya*, in the word *ānandamaya*, does not denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the words *annamaya* and the subsequent similar compounds.

The Sūtras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the question whether the passage, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' is to be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, 'The Self consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.' That means: Brahman, which in the passage 'the Self consisting of bliss,' &c., is spoken of as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as something subordinate). On account of the repetition; for in the memorial sloka, 'he becomes himself non-existing,' Brahman alone is reiterated. 'If not, on account of the word denoting a modification; not so, on account of abundance.' In this Sūtra the word 'modification' is meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of

the word 'tail,' which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into the passage on account of *prākūrya*¹. *Prākūrya* here means a phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, 'Brahman is the tail, the support ;' the intention being merely to introduce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of 'member,' (an explanation which is impossible) because the preceding Sūtra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the principal matter. 'And because he is declared to be the cause of it.' That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following passage, 'He created all whatever there is' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sūtras also (which refer to the Self of bliss²) are to be considered, as well as they may, as conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the tail.

20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on account of his qualities being declared³.

The following passage is found in Scripture (*Kh. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.*), 'Now that person bright as gold who is seen within

¹ I. e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.

² See I, 1, 15-19.

³ The preceding *adhikarāṇa* had shown that the five Selfs (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities ; while that Brahman

the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye,' &c. Here the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence; or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord?

The pūrvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly transferred to it in the passage, 'The shape of this person is the same as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3, 15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact that a definite abode is mentioned, 'He who is in the sun; he who is in the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides in his own glory, no similar statement can be made; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own glory?' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent, eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited; for the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the devas,' indicates the

itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikāraṇa undertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents the savīśha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.

limitation of the might of the person in the sun ; and the passage, 'He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*), 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded ;' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and the sun cannot be the highest Lord.

To this reasoning the Sūtra replies, 'The one within, on account of his qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is not a transmigrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within the sun is mentioned—'his name is Ut'—and then this name is explained on the ground of that person being free from all evil, 'He has risen above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the person in the eye, in the clause, 'the name of the one is the name of the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the highest Self only ; so, for instance (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 7, 1*), 'The Self which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, 'He is *Rīk*, he is *Sāman*, *Uktha*, *Yagus*, *Brahman*,' which declares the person in the eye to be the Self of the *Rīk*, *Sāman*, and so on ; which is possible only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated in succession *Rīk* and *Sāman* to have earth and fire for their Self with reference to the *Devas*, and, again, speech and breath with reference to the body, continues, '*Rīk* and *Sāman* are his joints,' with reference to the *Devas*, and 'the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with reference to the body. Now this statement

also can be made only with regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage, 'Therefore all who sing to the Vinā sing him, and from him also they obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-gītā (X, 41), 'Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength, know it to be produced from a portion of my energy¹.' To the objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c., cannot refer to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Mâyâ, in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smṛiti also says, 'That thou seest me, O Nārada, is the Mâyâ emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with the qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while passages such as the following one, 'He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 2*), which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own glory only; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be viewed as

¹ So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.

being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally, about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.

21. And there is another one (i. e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration of distinction.

There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following scriptural passage, 'He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 9*). Here the expression, 'He within the sun whom the sun does not know,' clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of the sameness of purport of all Vedânta-texts. It thus remains a settled conclusion that the passage under discussion conveys instruction about the highest Lord.

22. The âkâśa, i. e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic marks (of the latter being mentioned).

In the *Khândogya* (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the origin of this world?' 'Ether,' he replied. 'For all these beings take their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest.'—Here the following doubt arises. Does the word 'ether' denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether?—Whence the doubt?—Because the word is seen to be used in both senses. Its use in the sense of 'elemental ether' is well established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech;

and, on the other hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'If that bliss existed not in the ether;' and *Kh.* Up. VIII, 14, 'That which is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names are¹ that is Brahman.' Hence the doubt.—Which sense is then to be adopted in our case?—The sense of elemental ether, the *pūrvapakshin* replies; because this sense belongs to the word more commonly, and therefore presents itself to the mind more readily. The word 'ether' cannot be taken in both senses equally, because that would involve a (faulty) attribution of several meanings to one and the same word. Hence the term 'ether' applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only; on account of Brahman being in many of its attributes, such as all pervadingness and the like, similar to ether. The rule is, that when the primary sense of a word is possible, the word must not be taken in a secondary sense. And in the passage under discussion only the primary sense of the word 'ether' is admissible. Should it be objected that, if we refer the passage under discussion to the elemental ether, a complementary passage ('for all these beings take their rise from the ether only, &c.') cannot be satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that the elemental ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air, fire, &c. in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up. II, 1), 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, and so on.' The qualities also of being greater and of being a place of rest may be ascribed to the elemental ether, if we consider its relations to all other beings. Therefore we conclude that the word 'ether' here denotes the elemental ether.

To this we reply as follows:—The word ether must here be taken to denote Brahman, on account of characteristic marks of the latter being mentioned. For the sentence,

¹ Or else 'that which is within forms and names.'

'All these beings take their rise from the ether only,' clearly indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedānta-texts agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from the highest Brahman.—But, the opponent may say, we have shown that the elemental ether also may be represented as the cause, viz. of air, fire, and the other elements in due succession.—We admit this. But still there remains the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to apply to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation contained in the word 'only' and the qualification expressed by the word 'all' (in 'all beings') would be out of place. Moreover, the clause, 'They return into the ether,' again points to Brahman, and so likewise the phrase, 'Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;' for absolute superiority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the highest Self only; cp. *Kh. Up.* III, 14, 3, 'Greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.' The quality of being a place of rest likewise agrees best with the highest Brahman, on account of its being the highest cause. This is confirmed by the following scriptural passage: 'Knowledge and bliss is Brahman, it is the rest of him who gives gifts' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 9, 28). Moreover, Gaivali finding fault with the doctrine of Sālāvātya, on account of (his sâman) having an end (*Kh. Up.* I, 8, 8), and wishing to proclaim something that has no end chooses the ether, and then, having identified the ether with the Udgîtha, concludes, 'He is the Udgîtha greater than great; he is without end.' Now this endlessness is a characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that the sense of 'elemental ether' presents itself to the mind more readily, because it is the better established sense of the word *ākāśa*, we reply, that, although it may present itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be accepted, because we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the complementary sentences. That the word *ākāśa* is also used to denote Brahman has been shown already; cp. such passages as, 'Ether is the revealer of all names and forms.' We see, moreover, that various synonyma of *ākāśa* are employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance, *Rik Samh.*

I, 164, 39, 'In which the Vedas are¹, in the Imperishable one (i. e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on which all gods have their seat.' And Taitt. Up. III, 6, 'This is the knowledge of Bhrigu and Varuna, founded on the highest ether (vyoman).' And again, 'Om, ka is Brahman, ether (kha) is Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* IV, 10, 5), and 'the old ether' (*Bri. Up.* V, 1)². And other similar passages. On account of the force of the complementary passage we are justified in deciding that the word 'ether,' although occurring in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman. The case is analogous to that of the sentence, 'Agni (lit. the fire) studies a chapter,' where the word agni, although occurring in the beginning, is at once seen to denote a boy³. It is therefore settled that the word 'ether' denotes Brahman.

23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

Concerning the udgītha it is said (*Kh. Up.* I, 10, 9), 'Prastotri, that deity which belongs to the prastāva, &c.,' and, further on (I, 11, 4 ; 5), 'Which then is that deity? He said: Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to the prastāva.' With reference to this passage doubt and decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated under the preceding Sūtra. For while in some passages—as, for instance, 'For indeed, my son, mind is fastened to prāṇa,' *Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 2 ; and, 'the prāṇa of prāṇa,' *Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 18—the word 'breath' is seen to denote Brahman, its use

¹ Viz. as intimating it. Thus Ân. Gi. and Go. Ân. against the accent of *rikáh*. Sāyana explains *rikáh* as genitive.

² *Omkārasya pratīkatvena vātakatvena lakṣakatvena vā brahmatvam uktam, om iti, kam sukham tasyārthendriyayogagatvam vārayitum kham iti, tasya bhūtākāratvam vyāseddhum purāṇam ity uktam.* Ân. Gi.

³ The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be decided by means of a reference to preceding passages ; where that is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new chapter) complementary, i. e. subsequent passages have to be taken into consideration.

in the sense of a certain modification of air is better established in common as well as in Vedic language. Hence there arises a doubt whether in the passage under discussion the word *prāṇa* denotes Brahman or (ordinary) breath. In favour of which meaning have we then to decide?

Here the *pûrvapakshin* maintains that the word must be held to denote the fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar modification of wind (or air); because, as has been remarked already, that sense of the word *prāṇa* is the better established one.—But no, an objector will say, just as in the case of the preceding *Sûtra*, so here also Brahman is meant, on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also a complementary passage gives us to understand that all beings spring from and merge into *prāṇa*; a process which can take place in connexion with the highest Lord only.—This objection, the *pûrvapakshin* replies, is futile, since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from the principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the following statement (*Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6*), ‘When man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind; when he awakes then they spring again from breath alone.’ What the Veda here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during sleep, while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly, the activity of the sense organs is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time of awaking only. And as the sense organs are the essence of all material beings, the complementary passage which speaks of the merging and emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal vital air also. Moreover, subsequently to *prāṇa* being mentioned as the divinity of the *prastāva* the sun and food are designated as the divinities of the *udgîtha* and the *pratihâra*. Now as they are not Brahman, the *prāṇa* also, by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.

To this argumentation the author of the *Sûtras* replies: For the same reason *prāṇa*—that means: on account of the presence of characteristic marks—which constituted the reason stated in the preceding *Sûtra*—the word *prāṇa* also

must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of *prāṇa* also, that it is connected with marks characteristic of Brahman. The sentence, 'All these beings merge into breath alone, and from breath they arise,' which declares that the origination and retraction of all beings depend on *prāṇa*, clearly shows *prāṇa* to be Brahman. In reply to the assertion that the origination and retraction of all beings can be reconciled equally well with the assumption of *prāṇa* denoting the chief vital air, because origination and retraction take place in the state of waking and of sleep also, we remark that in those two states only the senses are merged into, and emerge from, the chief vital air, while, according to the scriptural passage, 'For all these beings, &c.,' all beings whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And even if the word 'beings' were taken (not in the sense of animated beings, but) in the sense of material elements in general, there would be nothing in the way of interpreting the passage as referring to Brahman.—But, it may be said, that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep, enter into *prāṇa*, and again issue from it at the time of waking, we distinctly learn from another scriptural passage, viz. Kau. Up. III, 3, 'When a man being thus asleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that *prāṇa* alone. Then speech goes to him with all names,' &c.—True, we reply, but there also the word *prāṇa* denotes (not the vital air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks of Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that the word *prāṇa* cannot denote Brahman because it occurs in proximity to the words 'food' and 'sun' (which do not refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless; for proximity is of no avail against the force of the complementary passage which intimates that *prāṇa* is Brahman. That argument, finally, which rests on the fact that the word *prāṇa* commonly denotes the vital air with its five modifications, is to be refuted in the same way as the parallel argument which the *pūrvapakshin* brought forward with reference to the word 'ether.' From all this it follows that the *prāṇa*, which is the deity of the *prastāva*, is Brahman.

Some (commentators)¹ quote under the present Sūtra the following passages, 'the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 4, 18), and 'for to *prāṇa* mind is fastened' (*Kṛ. Up.* VI, 8, 2). But that is wrong since these two passages offer no opportunity for any discussion, the former on account of the separation of the words, the latter on account of the general topic. When we meet with a phrase such as 'the father of the father' we understand at once that the genitive denotes a father different from the father denoted by the nominative. Analogously we infer from the separation of words contained in the phrase, 'the breath of breath,' that the 'breath of breath' is different from the ordinary breath (denoted by the genitive 'of breath'). For one and the same thing cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of—and thus distinguished from—itself. Concerning the second passage we remark that, if the matter constituting the general topic of some chapter is referred to in that chapter under a different name, we yet conclude, from the general topic, that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we meet in the section which treats of the *gyotishṭoma* sacrifice with the passage, 'in every spring he is to offer the *gyotis* sacrifice,' we at once understand that the word *gyotis* denotes the *gyotishṭoma*. If we therefore meet with the clause 'to *prāṇa* mind is fastened' in a section of which the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment suppose that the word *prāṇa* should there denote the ordinary breath which is a mere modification of air. The two passages thus do not offer any matter for discussion, and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the Sūtra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the passage about the *prāṇa*, which is the deity of the *prastāva*, allows room for doubt, *pūrvapaksha* and final decision.

24. The 'light' (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a passage which is connected with the passage about the light).

Scripture says (*Kṛ. Up.* III, 13, 7), 'Now that light which shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than every-

¹ The *vṛitikāra*, the commentators say.

thing, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds that is the same light which is within man.' Here the doubt presents itself whether the word 'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest Self. Under the preceding Sūtras we had shown that some words which ordinarily have different meanings yet in certain passages denote Brahman, since characteristic marks of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has to be discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted, characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes nothing else but the light of the sun and the like, since that is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term. The common use of language, he says, teaches us that the two words 'light' and 'darkness' denote mutually opposite things, darkness being the term for whatever interferes with the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance, the gloom of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the action of the eye is called light. The word 'shines' also, which the text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the sun and similar sources of light; while of Brahman, which is devoid of colour, it cannot be said, in the primary sense of the word, that it 'shines.' Further, the word *gyotis* must here denote light because it is said to be bounded by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'). For while it is impossible to consider the sky as being the boundary of Brahman, which is the Self of all and the source of all things movable or immovable, the sky may be looked upon as forming the boundary of light, which is a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text says, 'the light beyond heaven.'—But light, although a mere product, is perceived everywhere; it would therefore be wrong to declare that it is bounded by the sky!—Well, then, the pūrvapakshin replies, let us assume that the light meant is the first-born (original) light which has not yet become tripartite¹. This explanation again cannot be

¹ I. e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to *Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was

admitted, because the non-tripartite light does not serve any purpose.—But, the *pūrvapakshin* resumes, Why should its purpose not be found therein that it is the object of devout meditation?—That cannot be, we reply; for we see that only such things are represented as objects of devotion as have some other independent use of their own; so, for instance, the sun (which dispels darkness and so on). Moreover the scriptural passage, ‘Let me make each of these three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite,’ does not indicate any difference¹. And even of the non-tripartite light it is not known that the sky constitutes its boundary.—Well, then (the *pūrvapakshin* resumes, dropping the idea of the non-tripartite light), let us assume that the light of which the text speaks is the tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection that light is seen to exist also beneath the sky, viz. in the form of fire and the like, we invalidate by the remark that there is nothing contrary to reason in assigning a special locality to fire, although the latter is observed everywhere; while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the idea of place does not apply at all, would be most unsuitable. Moreover, the clause ‘higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds,’ which indicates a multiplicity of abodes, agrees much better with light, which is a mere product (than with Brahman). There is moreover that other clause also, ‘That is the same light which is within man,’ in which the highest light is identified with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now such identifications can be made only where there is a certain similarity of nature; as is seen, for instance, in the passage, ‘Of that person *Bhūh* is the head, for the head is one and that syllable is one’ (*Bṛi.* Up. V, 5, 3). But that the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly appears from the passage, ‘Of this we have visible and audible proof’ (*Kh.* Up. III, 13, 7 ; 8), which declares that

entirely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the latter.

¹ So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tripartite light exists at all.

the fire is characterised by the noise it makes, and by heat ; and likewise from the following passage, 'Let a man meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.' The same conclusion may be drawn from the passage, 'He who knows this becomes conspicuous and celebrated,' which proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to the devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have to be allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire passage about the light any other characteristic mark of Brahman, while such marks are set forth in the passages (discussed above) which refer to *prāṇa* and the ether. Nor, again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, 'the Gâyatri is everything whatsoever exists,' &c. (III, 12); for that passage makes a statement about the Gâyatri metre only. And even if that section did refer to Brahman, still Brahman would not be recognised in the passage at present under discussion ; for there (in the section referred to) it is declared—in the clause, 'Three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven'—that heaven constitutes the abode ; while in our passage the words 'the light above heaven' declare heaven to be a boundary. For all these reasons the word *gyotis* is here to be taken in its ordinary meaning, viz. light.

To this we make the following reply. The word *gyotis* must be held to denote Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned. In a preceding passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet (quarters). 'Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person (*purusha*). One foot of it are all the beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven.' That which in this passage is said to constitute the three-quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman, which altogether comprises four quarters ; this very same entity we recognise as again referred to in the passage under discussion, because there also it is said to be connected with heaven. If therefore we should set it aside in our interpretation of the passage and assume the latter to refer to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing

a new subject. Brahman, in fact, continues to form the subject-matter, not only of the passage about the light, but likewise of the subsequent section, the so-called *Sândilya-vidyâ* (*Kh. Up.* III, 14). Hence we conclude that in our passage the word 'light' must be held to denote Brahman. The objection (raised above) that from common use the words 'light' and 'to shine' are known to denote effected (physical) light is without force; for as it is known from the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is meant, those two words do not necessarily denote physical light only to the exclusion of Brahman¹, but may also denote Brahman itself, in so far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its effect. Analogously another mantra declares, 'that by which the sun shines kindled with heat' (*Taitt. Br.* III, 12, 9, 7). Or else we may suppose that the word *gyotis* here does not denote at all that light on which the function of the eye depends. For we see that in other passages it has altogether different meanings; so, for instance, *Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 5, 'With speech only as light man sits,' and *Taitt. Sa.* I, 6, 3, 3, 'May the mind, the light, accept,' &c. It thus appears that whatever illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something else may be spoken of as 'light.' Hence to Brahman also, whose nature is intelligence, the term 'light' may be applied; for it gives light to the entire world. Similarly, other scriptural passages say, 'Him the shining one, everything shines after; by his light all this is lighted' (*Kau. Up.* II, 5, 15); and 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as the immortal' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 16). Against the further objection that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that the assignment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to reason because it subserves the purpose of devout meditation. Nor does it avail anything to say that it is impossible to assign any place to Brahman because Brahman is out of connexion with all place. For it is possible to make such

¹ *Brahmano vyavakṣhidya tegaḥsamarpakatvam viśeshakatvam, tadabhāvo=viśeshakatvam. Ân. Gi.*

an assumption, because Brahman is connected with certain limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially connected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the heart. For the same reason it is also possible to attribute to Brahman a multiplicity of abodes, as is done in the clause (quoted above) 'higher than all.' The further objection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which itself is a mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks such as the heat of the body and a certain sound, is equally devoid of force; for the gastric fire may be viewed as the outward appearance (or symbol) of Brahman, just as Brahman's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as seen and heard,' the visibility and audibility (here implicitly ascribed to Brahman) must be considered as rendered possible through the gastric fire being the outward appearance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in the objection that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions an inconsiderable reward only; for there is no reason compelling us to have recourse to Brahman for the purpose of such and such a reward only, and not for the purpose of such and such another reward. Wherever the text represents the highest Brahman—which is free from all connexion with distinguishing attributes—as the universal Self, it is understood that the result of that instruction is one only, viz. final release. Wherever, on the other hand, Brahman is taught to be connected with distinguishing attributes or outward symbols, there, we see, all the various rewards which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for instance, *Bṛi.* Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This is he who eats all food, the giver of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth.' Although in the passage itself which treats of the light no characteristic mark of Brahman is mentioned, yet, as the Sūtra intimates, the mark stated in a preceding passage (viz. the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c.) has to be taken in connexion with the passage about the light as well. The question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being

mentioned in a not distant passage can have the power of divorcing from its natural object and transferring to another object the direct statement about light implied in the word 'light,' may be answered without difficulty. The passage under discussion runs¹, 'which above this heaven, the light.' The relative pronoun with which this clause begins intimates, according to its grammatical force², the same Brahman which was mentioned in the previous passage, and which is here recognised (as being the same which was mentioned before) through its connexion with heaven; hence the word *gyotis* also—which stands in grammatical co-ordination to 'which'—must have Brahman for its object. From all this it follows that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.

25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i. e. by means of the metre) the direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for thus it is seen (in other passages also).

We now address ourselves to the refutation of the assertion (made in the *pûrvapaksha* of the preceding *Sûtra*) that in the previous passage also Brahman is not referred to, because in the sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything whatsoever here exists,' the metre called Gâyatrî is spoken of.—How (we ask the *pûrvapakshin*) can it be maintained that, on account of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not denoted, while yet the mantra 'such is the greatness of it,' &c., clearly sets forth Brahman with its four quarters?—You are mistaken (the *pûrvapakshin* replies). The sentence, 'Gâyatrî is everything,' starts the discussion of Gâyatrî. The same Gâyatrî is thereupon described under the various forms of all beings, earth, body, heart, speech, breath; to which there refers also the verse, 'that Gâyatrî

¹ If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.

² *Svasâmārthyena sarvanāmnaḥ sannihitaparâmarsitvavarena.*

has four feet and is sixfold.' After that we meet with the mantra, 'Such is the greatness of it,' &c. How then, we ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with reference to the Gâyatrî (metre) as described in the preceding clauses, all at once denote Brahman with its four quarters? Since therefore the metre Gâyatrî is the subject-matter of the entire chapter, the term 'Brahman' which occurs in a subsequent passage ('the Brahman which has thus been described') must also denote the metre. This is analogous to a previous passage (*Kh. Up. III, 11, 3*, 'He who thus knows this Brahma-upanishad'), where the word Brahma-upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman, but) to the Gâyatrî metre, Brahman does not constitute the topic of the entire section.

This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our position. 'Because thus direction of the mind is declared,' i. e. because the Brâhmaṇa passage, 'Gâyatrî indeed is all this,' intimates that by means of the metre Gâyatrî the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that metre. Of the metre Gâyatrî, which is nothing but a certain special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be said that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as the cause of the world, is connected with that product also whose name is Gâyatrî, is 'all this;' in accordance with that other passage which directly says, 'All this indeed is Brahman' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 1*). That the effect is in reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on, under Sûtra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects (of Brahman) is seen to be mentioned in other passages also, so, for instance, Ait. Âr. III, 2, 3, 12, 'For the Bahvrikas consider him in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the *Khandogas* in the Mahâvrata ceremony.' Although, therefore, the previous passage speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is meant, and the same Brahman is again referred to in the passage about the light, whose purport it is to enjoin another form of devout meditation.

Another commentator¹ is of opinion that the term Gâyatrî (does not denote Brahman in so far as viewed under the form of Gâyatrî, but) directly denotes Brahman, on account of the equality of number; for just as the Gâyatrî metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so Brahman also has four feet, (i. e. quarters.) Similarly we see that in other passages also the names of metres are used to denote other things which resemble those metres in certain numerical relations; cp. for instance, *Kh. Up.* IV, 3, 8, where it is said at first, 'Now these five and the other five make ten and that is the *Kṛita*,' and after that 'these are again the *Virâg* which eats the food.' If we adopt this interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and the metre is not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is the subject with which the previous passage is concerned.

26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), because (thus only) the declaration as to the beings, &c. being the feet is possible.

That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we must assume for that reason also that the text designates the beings and so on as the feet of Gâyatrî. For the text at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the heart², and then goes on 'that Gâyatrî has four feet and is sixfold.' For of the mere metre, without any reference to Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for the verse, 'Such is the greatness,' &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent the Gâyatrî as the Self of everything as is done in the words, 'One foot of it are all the beings; three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven.' The purusha-sûkta also (*Rik*

¹ The *vṛttikâra* according to Go. Ân. in his *Ākā* on the bhâshya to the next Sûtra.

² Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.

Samh. X, 90) exhibits the verse with sole reference to Brahman. *Smṛiti* likewise ascribes to Brahman a like nature, 'I stand supporting all this world by a single portion of myself' (*Bha. Gītā* X, 42). Our interpretation moreover enables us to take the passage, 'that Brahman indeed which,' &c. (III, 12, 7), in its primary sense, (i. e. to understand the word Brahman to denote nothing but Brahman.) And, moreover, the passage, 'these are the five men of Brahman' (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former passage about the *Gāyatrī* is taken as referring to Brahman (for otherwise the 'Brahman' in 'men of Brahman' would not be connected with the previous topic). Hence Brahman is to be considered as the subject-matter of the previous passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is referred to in the passage about the light where it is recognised (to be the same) from its connexion with heaven, remains unshaken.

27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation, is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition).

The objection that in the former passage ('three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven'), heaven is designated as the abode, while in the latter passage ('that light which shines above this heaven'), heaven is designated as the boundary, and that, on account of this difference of designation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we do by remarking that in either designation nothing is contrary to the recognition. Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

Another (commentator) explains: just as in ordinary language a falcon, although not in contact with the top of a

tree, is not only said to be above the top of the tree but also on the top of the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two passages) said to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it remains therefore a settled conclusion that the word 'light' denotes Brahman.

28. *Prāṇa* (breath) is Brahman, that being understood from a connected consideration (of the passages referring to *prāṇa*).

In the *Kaushitaki-brāhmaṇa-upanishad* there is recorded a legend of Indra and *Pratardana* which begins with the words, 'Pratardana, forsooth, the son of *Divodāsa* came by means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of Indra' (*Kau. Up.* III, 1). In this legend we read: 'He said: I am *prāṇa*, the intelligent Self (*pragñātman*), meditate on me as Life, as Immortality' (III, 2). And later on (III, 3), '*Prāṇa* alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body, makes it rise up.' Then, again (III, 8), 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker.' And in the end (III, 8), 'That breath indeed is the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal.'—Here the doubt presents itself whether the word *prāṇa* denotes merely breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some divinity, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.—But, it will be said at the outset, the *Sūtra* I, 1, 21 already has shown that the word *prāṇa* refers to Brahman, and as here also we meet with characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. the words 'bliss, imperishable, immortal,' what reason is there for again raising the same doubt?—We reply: Because there are observed here characteristic marks of different kinds. For in the legend we meet not only with marks indicating Brahman, but also with marks pointing to other beings. Thus Indra's words, 'Know me only' (III, 1), point to the Self of a divinity; the words, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' point to the breath; the words, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know

the speaker,' point to the individual soul. There is thus room for doubt.

If, now, the pūrvapakshin maintains that the term *prāṇa* here denotes the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert that the word *prāṇa* must be understood to denote Brahman.—For what reason?—On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which treats of the *prāṇa*, we observe that all the single passages can be construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on *prāṇa* is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should *prāṇa* denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, Sve. Up. III, 8, 'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.' Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by theft, not by *bhrūṇahatyā*' (III, 1), has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, *prāṇa* can be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,' 'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages, 'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes

to lead up from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed ;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word *prâna* denotes Brahman.

29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself ; (we reply that this objection is not valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the interior Self.

An objection is raised against the assertion that *prâna* denotes Brahman. The word *prâna*, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am *prâna*, the intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the *prâna*, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, *Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 8*, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on, also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called *prâna* on account of his strength. Scripture says, 'Strength indeed is *prâna*,' and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self

of some deity, the other passages also—as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man—must be interpreted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence *prāṇa* does not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage, ‘As long as *prāṇa* dwells in this body so long surely there is life,’ declares that that *prāṇa* only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the *prāṇas* as founded on the existence of the *prāṇa*, it shows that that *prāṇa* is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs¹.

Of the same tendency is the passage, ‘*Prāṇa*, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;’ and the passage (which occurs in the *passus*, ‘Let no man try to find out what speech is,’ &c.), ‘For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the *prāṇa*. And that *prāṇa* indeed is the Self of *pragñā*, blessed, imperishable, immortal.’ So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, ‘He is my Self, thus let it be known;’ a summing up which is appropriate only if *prāṇa* is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares ‘this Self is Brahman, omniscient²’ (*Bri. Up. II, 5, 19*). We therefore arrive at

¹ The text runs, ‘*astitve ka prāṇānām nihsreyasam*,’ and *Go. Ān.* explains ‘*astitve prāṇasthitau prāṇānām indriyānām sthitir ity arthataḥ śrutim āha*.’ He as well as *Ān. Gi.* quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to ‘*athāto nihsreyasādānam ity ādi*.’ But if instead of ‘*astitve ka*’ we read ‘*asti tv eva*,’ we get the concluding clause of *Kau. Up. III, 2*, as given in Cowell’s edition.

² Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the *Kau. Up.* is Brahman.

the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.—How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained?

30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vāmadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of *rishi*-like intuition¹—the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words ‘Know me only.’

By intuition of the same kind the *rishi* Vāmadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, ‘I was Manu and Sūrya ;’ in accordance with the passage, ‘Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that’ (*Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*). The assertion made above (in the *pūrvapaksha* of the preceding Sūtra) that Indra after saying, ‘Know me only,’ glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of *Tvashtri*’s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of *Tvashtri*’s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage would be, ‘Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me’—but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of *Tvashtri*’s son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, ‘And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.’—(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)—Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: ‘Although I do such cruel deeds,

¹ I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.

yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am *prāṇa*, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage under discussion).

Although we admit, the *pûrvapakshin* resumes, that the chapter about the *prāṇa* does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 'But *prāṇa* alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (*Pra. Up. II, 3*), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then *prāṇa* (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the

passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the body'¹ must give the following explanation, *Prāna* having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other *prānas*, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word *prāna* be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the *prāna* and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is *prāna* that is *pragñā*, what is *pragñā* that is *prāna*;' and, 'For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, *prāna* denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons *prāna* does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the *prāna* really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause 'Know me only,' followed by 'I am *prāna*, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And that *prāna* indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we

¹ *Imam sarīram* instead of *idam sarīram*

therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers)¹ cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, *prāṇa* must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word *prāṇa* is taken in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' preclude the view of *prāṇa* denoting Brahman. For, as the passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (*buddhi*) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. 'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,') which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the

¹ *Pañka* sabdādayaḥ *pañka* prāhivādayaḥ *ka* dasa bhūtamātrāḥ *pañka* buddhīndriyāṇi *pañka* buddhaya iti dasa pragñāmātrāḥ. Yadvā *gñānendriyārthāḥ* *pañka* karmendriyārthāḥ *ka* *pañketi* dasa bhūtamātrāḥ *dvidvidhānīndriyāṇi* *pragñāmātrā* daseti bhāvaḥ. Ān. Gi.

individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of *prāṇa* and *pragñā* (contained in the passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does not agree with that interpretation according to which *prāṇa* is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage '*prāṇa* is *pragñā*.'

The second part of the Sūtra is explained in a different manner also¹, as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of *prāṇa*, under the aspect of *pragñā*, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is *prāṇa*,' and 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as *uktha*,' refer to the *prāṇa* aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that *pragñā*,' and the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by *pragñā* taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the *pragñā* aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, 'These ten

¹ Viz. by the *vṛttikāra*.

objects have reference to *pragñā*, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the *prāṇa*.¹ Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 2*), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is *prāṇa*.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the *prāṇa* chapter¹; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of *prāṇa*, *pragñā*, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

¹ *Ihāpi tad yugate* explaining the '*iha tadyogāt*' of the *Sūtra*.

SECOND PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

IN the first pāda Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else.¹ We therefore begin the second and third pādas in order to settle those doubtful points.

1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (*Kh. Up. III, 14*). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the pūrvapakshin says.—Why?—Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 2*),

'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'—But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?—This objection does not apply, the *pūrvapakshin* rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, *taggalān*, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman¹; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,' &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicative of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute

¹ The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken as a *gunavidhi*, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (*vākyabheda*).

only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul¹, as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.

To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.—Why?—'On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedānta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.—True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

¹ Gīvepi dehādibrimhanāg gyāstvanyâyād vā brahmatety arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed¹, there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the pûrvapakshin asserts

¹ The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in the Sûtra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally 'desired to be expressed.'

cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth, thou art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff ; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (*Sve. Up. IV, 3*), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (*Bha. Gîtâ III, 13*).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind ; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by *manomaya*, &c.).

The preceding *Sûtra* has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman ; the present *Sûtra* states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on ; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (*jâira*) we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body¹, we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only ; for *sruti* declares him to be all-pervading ; compare, 'He is greater than the earth ; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other

¹ Because he is *vyâpin*.

hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 4*), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (*Sat. Brā. X, 6, 3, 2*), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

6. And on account of *Smṛti*.

Smṛiti also declares the difference of the embodied Self

and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gītā XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self, which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sūtras? Śruti passages, as well as Smṛiti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, *Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gītā XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bhārata, to be the kṣhetragña in all kṣhetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned—from the passage, 'That art thou'—that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.

7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that of ether.

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not

the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the pûrva-paksha of Sûtra I, and restated in the pûrva-paksha of the present Sûtra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhyâ although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities—which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a modification of the mind—just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called Sâlagrâm. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other knower but he' (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 23*), and similar passages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence.

This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selves outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, 'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman?—Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sūtrakāra says¹ 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman's part.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the *Katṭhāvallī* (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshatriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and 'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions².

¹ Another interpretation of the later part of Sūtra.

² Cp. *Katṭhā Up.* I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. *Bṛi. Up.* I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (*Mu. Up.* III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the *Mu. Up.*), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedānta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion.

That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to

is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selves (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).

In the same *Kaṭṭavalli* we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the *Trināḥiketa* sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (*buddhi*) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus

been stated, a caviller starts the following objection : neither of the stated views can be maintained.—Why?—On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained ; for drinking (i.e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent—a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as 'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume

that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.

To this we make the following reply:—In the passage under discussion the individual soul (*viġñānātman*) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selves, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance, the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul.—But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave?—Well, we reply, *sruti* as well as *smṛti* speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), 'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;' and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light

and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu,' represents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause, 'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from

the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (*anīṣā*), bewildered ; but when he sees the other Lord (*īśa*) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the *Paīṅgi-rahasya Brāhmaṇa*. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the *sattva* ; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (*gñā*) ; so that the two are the *sattva* and the individual soul (*kshetragñā*). The objection that the word *sattva* might denote the individual soul, and the word *kshetragñā*, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words *sattva* and *kshetragñā* have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the *Paīṅgi-rahasya*), 'The *sattva* is that by means of which man sees dreams ; the embodied one, the seer, is the *kshetragñā* ; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the *pūrvapakṣa* propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying ; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the *saṃsāra* and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is pure intelligence ; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with *śruti* and *smṛiti* passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the individual soul' (*Bha. Gītā XIII, 2*). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the *sattva* and the *kshetragñā* ; to him indeed

who knows this no impurity attaches¹.—But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, ‘One of them eats the sweet fruit?’—The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end² the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here maintained, Scripture (‘For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,’ &c.; *Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15*) declares that the practical assumption of agents, and so on—comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream—holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, ‘But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?’ declares that all that practically postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

¹ Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain ragas by avidyā.

² Tadartham iti, gīvasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yāvat, kaitany-akāyāpannā dhīḥ sukhādinā parivamata iti, tatra puruṣo’pi bhak-trītvam ivānubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyāropayati. Ānanda Giri.

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. (*Kh. Up.* IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the pûrvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitive Self, *viġñānātman*) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the passage (*Bri. Up.* V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand¹, cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye.—Why?—'On account of the agreement.' For the qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as 'That

¹ Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, but in their true sense.

is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of *saṃyadvâma*, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 2*, 'They call him *Samyadvâma*, for all blessings (*vâma*) go towards him (*saṃyanti*). He is also *vâmanî*, for he leads (*nayati*) all blessings (*vâma*). He is also *Bhâmanî*, for he shines (*bhâti*) in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?—To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c. (*Bri. Up. III, 7, 3*). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so on,' which forms part of the Sûtra, intimates that not only locality is assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard' (*Kh. Up. I, 6, 7, 6*), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman

a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary to reason¹; no more than to contemplate Viṣṇu in the sacred sālagrām.

15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i. e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter², viz. in the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way³,' merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started].—How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the passage?—We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude

¹ The Śikās say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sūtra.

² I. e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires give to Upakosala, *Kā. Up.* IV, 10 ff.

³ Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage 'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.

that the name Brahman is here symbolically¹ given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If² in the passage referred to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words—Ka as well as Kha—are joined with the word Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Gārhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding

¹ Āsrayāntarapratyayasyāśrayāntare kshepaḥ pratīkaḥ, yathā brahmasabdaḥ paramātmavishayo nāmādishu kshipyate. Bhā.

² The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.

speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of *Samyadvâma* and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From *śruti* as well as *smṛiti* we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described (*Pra. Up. I, 10*), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not return;' and also (*Bha. Gītā VIII, 24*), 'Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (*Kh. Up. IV, 15, 5*), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-permanency (of the other Selves) and on account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selves).

To the assertion made in the *pûrvapaksha* that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.—No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage ‘That person within the eye’ must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man’s own eye is the object of (that man’s) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, (*viz.* *Kh. Up.* VIII, 9, 1, ‘It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,’) declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.—And, further, ‘on account of impossibility’ (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the cognitional Self, in the second place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be

spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (*adhyāropita*) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz. mortality and fear ; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the *samyadvāma*, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (*aśvarya*).—In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to the scriptural passage, ‘He rests with his rays in him’—still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (*parāgrūpatva*). Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them ; as the mantra declares, ‘From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.’—Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words ‘is seen’ (in the phrase ‘the person that is seen in the eye’), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the *sāstra* which belongs to those who know ; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.

18. The internal ruler over the *devas* and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

In *Bṛi. Up.* III, 7, 1 ff. we read, ‘He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings,’ and later on, ‘He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom

the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryâmin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.—Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar-yâmin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the pûrvapakshin says, we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.—Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antaryâmin—which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)—cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antaryâmin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (*Bṛi. Up. III, 9, 16*), 'He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,' &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so?—Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate

attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.—The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary sense to the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 'He whom the earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.—The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.—If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self¹). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.—For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the *Smṛiti* assumes, (viz. the *pradhâna*), on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

Good so far, a Sāṅkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the *pradhâna* assumed by the Sāṅkhya-*smṛiti*, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their

¹ According to Scripture, *Niraṅkuraṁ sarvaniyantritvaṁ srautam na ka tâdrise sarvaniyantari bhedo na kânumânaṁ srutibhâditam uttishṭhati*. Ānanda Giri. Or else, as Go. Ān. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really different from the individual soul. So also Bhāmatī: *Na kânavasthâ, na hi niyantrantaram tena niyamyate kim tu yo gṛvo niyantâ lokasiddhaḥ sa paramâtmevo-pādhyavaḥkṛtedakalpitaabhedaḥ*.

Smṛiti says, 'Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhâna also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhâna. The pradhâna has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sûtra I, 1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sûtrakâra replies that the word 'internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhâna, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhâna may be spoken of as not being seen, &c., it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sāṅkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 23*) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'—And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhâna.

Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhâna, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is internal (*pratyakṣa*), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 2*), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning the following Sûtra replies.

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both

recensions of the *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka*) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word 'not' (in the Sūtra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sūtra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both *jākhās*, i. e. the *Kāṇvas* as well as the *Mādhyandinas*, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The *Kāṇvas* read (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 22*), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the *Mādhyandinas*, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word 'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'—But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him?—Why—we ask in return—should that be impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under discussion.—May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection.—The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the

Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5 ; 6).—Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhāna, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.

We must, the pūrṇapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhāna because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.'—But, it

may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.—No, the pûrvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads; and so in the case of man also.—While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sûtra, the pradhâna hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhâna, no attribute of a contrary nature being mentioned.—But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), ‘He who knows all and perceives all,’ do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhâna; how, then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhâna?—To this the pûrvapakshin replies: The passage, ‘The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,’ &c., points, by means of the term ‘the Indestructible,’ to the source of all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This same ‘Indestructible’ is again mentioned later on in the passage, ‘It is higher than the high Imperishable.’ Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhâna denoted by the term ‘the Imperishable’ is the source of all beings.—If, however, the word ‘source’ (yonî) be taken in the sense of operative cause, we may by ‘the source of the beings’ understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply.—That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing else.—Whereupon is this conclusion founded?—On the statement of attributes. For the clause, ‘He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,’ clearly states an

attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhāna or the embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all beings—which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'—not to the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, which—in the clause, 'From the Indestructible everything here arises'—is designated as the material cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9), 'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed.—We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility and the like—which formed the subject of the preceding chapter—will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next Sūtra.—Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the *R̥g-veda* and so on, and then the text continues, 'The higher knowledge

is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the *pradhāna*.—Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds only.—Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being implied in the knowledge of one thing—which is contained in the passage (I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?'—is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the Self of all, and not either to the *pradhāna* which comprises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of enjoyment.—The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief subject—which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharvan'—and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the *Rig-veda*, and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightly, such as (I, 2, 7), 'But frail

indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.' After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12), 'Let a Brāhmaṇa after he has examined all these worlds which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'—The remark that, because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be material.—For all these reasons the source of all beings, which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

22. The two others (i. e. the individual soul and the pradhâna) are not (the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive attributes and difference.

The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two others, viz. the pradhâna and the individual soul, on account of the following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul,

which erroneously considers itself to be limited by name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.—In the second place, the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in the text as something different from the *pradhāna*, viz. in the passage, ‘Higher than the high Imperishable.’ Here the term ‘Imperishable’ means that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, ‘Higher than the high Imperishable,’ which expresses a difference then clearly shows that the highest Self is meant here.—We do not on that account assume an independent entity called *pradhāna* and say that the source of all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a *pradhāna* is to be assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted by the terms ‘the Undeveloped’ and so on, we have no objection to such an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement therefrom, i.e. from that *pradhāna*, ‘the source of all beings’ must mean the highest Lord.—A further argument in favour of the same conclusion is supplied by the next Sūtra.

23. And on account of its form being mentioned.

Subsequently to the passage, ‘Higher than the high Imperishable,’ we meet (in the passage, ‘From him is born breath,’ &c.) with a description of the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with a statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of all created beings, ‘Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things.’ This statement of form can refer only to the

highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to the *pradhâna*, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore conclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the other two.—But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?—From the general topic, we reply. The word ‘he’ (in the clause, ‘He is indeed the inner Self of all things’) connects the passage with the general topic. As the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole passage, from ‘From him is born breath,’ up to, ‘He is the inner Self of all beings,’ refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the phrase, ‘Study under him; he knows the Veda and the *Vedângas* thoroughly,’ as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.—But how can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is characterised by invisibility and similar attributes?—The statement as to its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, ‘I am food, I am food, I am the eater of food’ (*Taitt. Up. III, 10, 6*).—Others, however, are of opinion¹ that the statement quoted does not refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers is spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the immediately preceding passage (‘From him is born health, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of all’) speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as something produced, and, on the other

¹ *Vṛittikṛdvyākhyām dūshayati*, Go. Ân. ; *ekadesinam dūshayati*, Ânanda Giri; *tad etat paramatenâkshepasamâdhânâbhyâm vyākhyâya svamatena vyākashṭe*, *punaḥ sabdoḥ pi pūrvasmâd viśesham dyotayann asyeshatâtâm sūkayati*, Bhâmatî.—The statement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean—in agreement with the Bhâmatî—that Sāṅkara is now going to refute the preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. Ân. later on explains ‘*asmin pakṣhe*’ by ‘*svapakṣhe*.’

hand, a passage met with later on ('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation), a statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?—The attribute of being the Self of all beings (which above was said to be mentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is not mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent to that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).—Now, we see that *śruti* as well as *smṛiti* speaks of the birth of *Pragâpati*, whose body is this three-fold world; compare *Rig-veda Samh.* X, 121, 1, 'Hiranyagarbha arose in the beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our oblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in *smṛiti* we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the Person; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the beginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an effect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the Self of breath it abides in the Selves of all beings.—On this latter explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c., does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not be referred to in the Sûtra) the declaration as to the Lord being the 'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the highest Lord, (i. e. as the passage which, according to the Sûtra, proves that the source of all beings is the highest Lord¹.)

¹ The question is to what passage the 'rûpopyâsât' of the Sûtra refers.—According to the opinion set forth first it refers to *Mu. Up.* II, 1, 4 ff.—But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1, 9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i. e. the highest Self, because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of which is not the highest Self but *Pragâpati*, i. e. the *Hiranyagarbha* or *Sûtrâtman* of the later Vedânta, who is himself an

24. Vaisvānara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction qualifying the common terms (Vaisvānara and Self).

(In *Kh. Up. V*, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at present that Vaisvānara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared with reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they are connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to the Vaisvānara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and then finally (*V*, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the Vaisvānara Self as measured by a span, as *abhivimāna*¹, he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves. Of that Vaisvānara Self the head is *Sutegas* (having good light), the eye *Viśvarūpa* (multiform), the breath *Prīthag-vartman* (moving in various courses), the trunk *Bahula* (full), the bladder *Rayi* (wealth), the feet the earth, the chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the *Gārhapatya* fire, the mind the *Anvāhārya* fire, the mouth the *Āhavanīya* fire.'—Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vaisvānara' we have to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity presiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.—But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?—The circumstance, we reply, of 'Vaisvānara' being employed as a common term for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the latter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as to the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is to be accepted and which to be set aside.

Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?—Vaisvānara, the *pūrvapakshin* maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some passages, with the term used in

'effect,' and who is called the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (*prāṇa*) in everything.—Hence the *Sūtra* must be connected with another passage, and that passage is found in *II*, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person (i. e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.

¹ About which term see later on.

that special sense ; so, for instance (*Bṛi. Up. V, 9*), 'Agni Vaisvânara is the fire within man by which the food that is eaten is cooked.'—Or else the term may denote fire in general, as we see it used in that sense also ; so, for instance (*Rig-veda Samh. X, 88, 12*), 'For the whole world the gods have made the Agni Vaisvânara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which the term has that sense are likewise met with ; compare, for instance, *Rig-veda Samh. I, 98, 1*, 'May we be in the favour of Vaisvânara ; for he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace ;' this and similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power and similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding explanations, that, as the word Vaisvânara is used in co-ordination with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'), Vaisvânara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the pûrvapakshin rejoins, let us suppose that Vaisvânara is the embodied Self which, as being an enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vaisvânara fire,¹ (i.e. the fire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the term, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its limiting condition (viz. the body and so on).—In any case it is evident that the term Vaisvânara does not denote the highest Lord.

To this we make the following reply.—The word Vaisvânara denotes the highest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general terms.—Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vaisvânara,' has various meanings—the latter term denoting three beings while the former denotes two—yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude that both terms can here denote the highest Lord only ; viz. in the passage, 'Of that Vaisvânara Self the head is Suteḡas,' &c. For it is clear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is distinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and in so far as

¹ Sâfire lakṣaṇayâ vaisvânaraśabdopapattim āha tasyeti. Ân. Gi.

he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state of being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such the absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of everything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging to its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the members of the highest Self.—Moreover, the result which Scripture declares to abide in all worlds—viz. in the passage, ‘He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selves’—is possible only if we take the term *Vaiśvānara* to denote the highest Self.—The same remark applies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has that knowledge, ‘Thus all his sins are burned,’ &c. (*Kh. Up. V, 24, 3*).—Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words ‘Self’ and ‘Brahman;’ viz. in the passage, ‘What is our Self, what is Brahman?’ Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord only. Hence he only can be meant by the term *Vaiśvānara*.

25. (And) because that which is stated by *Smṛiti* (i. e. the shape of the highest Lord as described by *Smṛiti*) is an inference (i. e. an indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of *Sruti*).

The highest Lord only is *Vaiśvānara*, for that reason also that *Smṛiti* ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his head, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, ‘He whose mouth is fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him the Self of the world.’ The shape described here in *Smṛiti* allows us to infer a *Sruti* passage on which the *Smṛiti* rests, and thus constitutes an inference, i. e. a sign indicatory of the word ‘*Vaiśvānara*’ denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted *Smṛiti* passage contains a glorification¹,

¹ And as such might be said not to require a basis for its statements.

still even a glorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible, unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.—Other Smṛiti passages also may be quoted in connexion with this Sūtra, so, for instance, the following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions, and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'

26. If it be maintained that (Vaisvânara is) not (the highest Lord) on account of the term (viz. Vaisvânara, having a settled different meaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c. being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the Vâgasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vaisvânara) as man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Here the following objection is raised.—Vaisvânara cannot be the highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding within. The term, viz. the term Vaisvânara, cannot be applied to the highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the passage (Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vaisvânara.' The word '&c.' (in the Sūtra) hints at the fiction concerning the three sacred fires, the gârhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on, of the Vaisvânara Self (*Kh. Up. V, 18, 2*¹).—Moreover, the passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place of homa' (*Kh. Up. V, 19, 1*), contains a glorification of (Vaisvânara) being the abode of the oblation to Prâna². For these reasons we have to under-

¹ Na ka gârhapatyâdihridayâditâ brahmanah sambhavinî. Bhâmatî.

² Na ka prâṇâhutyadhikaranatâ • nyatra gatharâgner yugyate. Bhâmatî.

stand by Vaisvânara the gastric fire.—Moreover, Scripture speaks of the Vaisvânara as abiding within, ‘He knows him abiding within man;’ which again applies to the gastric fire only.—With reference to the averment that on account of the specifications contained in the passage, ‘His head is Sutegas,’ &c., Vaisvânara is to be explained as the highest Self, we (the pûrvapakshin) ask: How do you reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only, and not to the gastric fire?—Or else we may assume that the passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we understand from the mantra, ‘He who with his light has extended himself over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere’ (*Rig-veda Samh.* X, 88, 3).—Or else the attribute of having the heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power, be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its body.—Therefore Vaisvânara is not the highest Lord.

To all this we reply as follows.—Your assertions are unfounded, ‘because there is taught the perception in this manner.’ The reasons (adduced in the former part of the Sûtra), viz. the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which Vaisvânara is the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of perception being taught in this manner, i. e. without the gastric fire being set aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the gastric fire, analogously to such passages as ‘Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 18, 1).—Or else they teach that the object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the gastric fire called Vaisvânara for his limiting condition; analogously to such passages as ‘He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light’ (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 2¹). If it were the aim of the passages about the Vais-

¹ According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be looked on as the outward manifestation (*pratîka*) of the highest Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.

vânara to make statements not concerning the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His head is Sutegas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vaisvânara being either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, we shall show under the following Sûtra.—Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vâgasaneyins speak of him—in their sacred text—as man, 'This Agni Vaisvânara is man; he who knows this Agni Vaisvânara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within man.—Those who, in the latter part of the Sûtra, read 'man-like' (puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the following meaning: If Vaisvânara were assumed to be the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as man-like. But the Vâgasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'—The meaning of the term man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the devout worshipper¹).

27. For the same reasons (the Vaisvânara) cannot be the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).

The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the passage 'His head is Sutegas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons

¹ I. e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so on of the devout worshipper.

already stated Vaisvânara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect.—Again, the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of the latter ; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the inapplicability of the term ‘Self.’

28. Gaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on the assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vaisvânara).

Above (Sûtra 26) it has been said that Vaisvânara is the highest Lord, to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or for his limiting condition ; which interpretation was accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as abiding within—and so on.—The teacher Gaimini however is of opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no objection to refer the passage about Vaisvânara to the direct worship of the highest Lord.—But, if you reject the interpretation based on the gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that Vaisvânara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c. (Sû. 26).—To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in opposition to the statement that Vaisvânara abides within. For the passage, ‘He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,’ does not by any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name before.—What then does it refer to?—It refers to that which forms the subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self) which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of the head down to the chin ; the text therefore says, ‘He knows him as man-like,

as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it abides within the tree¹.—Or else we may adopt another interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness (sākshin; i. e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting conditions).—The consideration of the context having thus shown that the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the passage, the term 'Vaisvânara' must denote the highest Self in some way or other. The word 'Visvânara' is to be explained either as 'he who is all and man (i. e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vaisvânara' has the same meaning as 'Visvânara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just as in the case of rākshasa (derived from rakshas), and vāyasa (derived from vayas).—The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we adopt the etymology agni=agranî, i. e. he who leads in front.—As the Gârhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.

But, if it is assumed that Vaisvânara denotes the highest Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?—On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.

29. On account of the manifestation, so Âsmara-thya opines.

The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The highest Lord manifests

¹ Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it forms a part of the tree.—The Vaisvânara Self is identified with the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i. e. form parts of the body.

himself as measured by a span, i. e. he specially manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher Âsmarathya, the scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may refer to the highest Lord.

30. On account of remembrance; so Bâdari opines.

Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for the Sruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.—Or else¹ the Sûtra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an appropriate sense.—Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span may, according to the opinion of the teacher Bâdari, be referred to the highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be called prâdesamâtra), Gaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be considered to rest on imaginative combination.—Why?—Because the passage of the Vâgasaneyi-

¹ Parimânasya hrīdayadvârâropitasya smaryamāne katham âropi vishayavishayitvena bhedād ity âraṅkya vyākhyāntaram āha prâdeseti. Ānanda Giri.

brāhmaṇa which treats of the same topic identifies heaven, earth, and so on—which are the members of Vaisvānara viewed as the Self of the threefold world—with certain parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative identity of Vaisvānara with something whose measure is a span. There we read, ‘The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to identify him (the Vaisvānara) with that whose measure is a span; thus he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what stands above (i. e. the heavenly world) as Vaisvānara (i. e. the head of Vaisvānara ¹). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good light (i. e. the sun) as Vaisvānara (i. e. the eye of V.). Pointing to the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i. e. the air) as Vaisvānara (i. e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether) within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i. e. the ether) as Vaisvānara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is wealth as Vaisvānara (i. e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he said: This is the base as Vaisvānara (i. e. the feet of V.).’—Although in the Vāgasaneyi-brāhmaṇa the heaven is denoted as that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which has the attribute of good light, while in the *Khândogya* the heaven is spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidyā) ², because both texts equally use the term ‘measured by a span,’ and because all sâkhās intimate the same.—The above explanation of the term ‘measured by a span,’ which rests on imaginative identification, the teacher Gaimini considers the most appropriate one.

32. Moreover they (the Gābālas) speak of him

¹ *Atra sarvatra vaisvānarasabdas tadaṅgaparāḥ. Go. Ân.*

² Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the *Sat. Brâ.* for the explanation of the passage from the *Kh. Up.*

(the highest Lord) in that (i. e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is measured by a span).

Moreover the *Gâbâlas* speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved infinite Self abides in the *avimukta* (i. e. the non-released soul). Where does that *avimukta* abide? It abides in the *Varanâ* and the *Nâsî*, in the middle. What is that *Varanâ*, what is that *Nâsî*?' The text thereupon etymologises the term *Varanâ* as that which wards off (*vârayati*) all evil done by the senses, and the term *Nâsî* as that which destroys (*nâsayati*) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what is its place?—The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part of the head) and of the other (i. e. the earthly world represented by the chin).' (*Gâbâla Up. I.*)—Thus it appears that the scriptural statement which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate. That the highest Lord is called *abhivimâna* refers to his being the inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i. e. known by all animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near everywhere—as the inward Self—and who at the same time is measureless' (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it out, i. e. creates it. By all this it is proved that *Vaisvânara* is the highest Lord.

THIRD PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the term 'own,' i.e. Self.

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the Immortal.'—Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the highest Brahman or something else.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is called 'endless, without a further shore' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 12*). Now if the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be supposed to be either the *pradhâna* known from *Smṛiti*, which, as being the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known from *Sruti*, of which it is said (*Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 2*, 'Air is that thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.

Against this view we argue with the sūtrakâra as follows:— 'Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the abode.'—Why?—On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word 'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self.' This term 'Self' is

thoroughly appropriate only if we understand the highest Self and not anything else.—(To propound another interpretation of the phrase ‘*svasabdât*’ employed in the *Sûtra*.) Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in *Sruti* as the general abode by its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for instance (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 4), ‘All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the being¹.’—(Or else we have to explain ‘*svasabdena*’ as follows), In the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion Brahman is glorified with its own names²; cp. *Mu. Up.* II, 1, 10, ‘The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal,’ and II, 2, 11, ‘That immortal Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is to the right and left.’ Here, on account of mention being made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the co-ordination expressed in the passage, ‘Brahman is all’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the text declares (in the passage under discussion), ‘Know him alone as the Self.’ The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, ‘Bring that on which Devadatta sits,’ the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, ‘Know him alone as the Self,’ teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects,

¹ From passages of which nature we may infer that in the passage under discussion also the ‘abode’ is Brahman.

² From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman.

'From death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman' aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world, and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in nature¹; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 13).—For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.—Against the objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay and wood. For as the word *setu* (bridge) is derived from the root *si*, which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something beyond (a further bank).

According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality, the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies². On that account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word 'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

¹ Yat sarvam avidyāropitam tat sarvaṃ paramārthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvaṃ ity arthaḥ. Bhāmatī.

² So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That, viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.'

2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released have to resort.

By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to which the Released have to resort.—The conception that the body and other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self, constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 7). Of the *pradhâna* and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman; cp. *Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise *Brâhmaṇa*, after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'—For that

reason also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.

3. Not (i. e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that which is inferred, (i. e. the *pradhâna*), on account of the terms not denoting it.

While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else. Hence he (the *sûtrakâra*) says that that which is inferred, i. e. the *pradhâna* assumed by the *Sāṅkhya-smṛiti*, is not to be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.—Why?—On account of the terms not denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the non-intelligent *pradhâna*, on the ground of which we might understand the latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as ‘he who perceives all and knows all’ (*Mu. Up. I, 1, 9*) intimate an intelligent being opposed to the *pradhâna* in nature.—For the same reason the air also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

4. (Nor) also the individual soul (*prâṇabhṛit*).

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., for the same reason, i. e. on account of the terms not denoting it.—Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent)¹.—The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused by what follows².—The individual soul is not to be

¹ *Bhogyasya bhoktriśeshatvât tasyâyatanatvam uktam âsaṅkyâha na kēti, gñasyâdrishadvârâ dyubhvâdinimitatve•pi na sâkshât tadâyatanatvam aupâdhikatvenâvibhutvâd ity arthaḥ. Ānanda Giri.*

² It would not have been requisite to introduce a special *Sûtra*

accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.—For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter), as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3), in which the knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. For all this (i. e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is known.—Another reason against the individual soul follows.

7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i. e. mere presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' referring to the eating, i. e. the fruition of the results of works,

for the individual soul—which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sūtra—if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sūtra which applies to the individual soul only.

and the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would contain a statement about something not connected with the general topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.—But, it may be objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord.—Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul. From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer to him merely casually¹.—

¹ If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, &c., the statement regarding Īsvara made in the passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.—I subjoin Ānanda Giri's commentary on the entire passage: *Gīvasyopādhyaikeyenāvivakshitatvāt tadgñāne•pi sarvagñāna-siddhes tasyāyatanatvādyabhāve hetvantaram vākyam ity āśaṅkya sūtreṇa pariharati kutastetyādinā. Tad vyākāśhe dyubhvādīti. Nirdeśam eva darsayati tayor iti. Vibhaktiyartham āha tābhyām keti. Sthitiesvarasyādanāg gīvasamgrāhe•pi katham īsvarasyaiva visvāyatanatvam tadāha yadīti. Īsvarasyāyanatvenāprakṛitatve gīvapri-*

That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, 11. —And if, according to the interpretation given in the *Pañgī-upanishad* (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood to refer to the internal organ (*sattva*) and the individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction (between that interpretation and our present averment that the individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).—How so?—Here (i.e. in the present *Sûtra* and the *Sûtras* immediately preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate bodies—its division being analogous to the division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces within jars and the like—is that which is called the abode of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.—The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is discussed under the *Sûtra* quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which heaven and

thakkathanânupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvârâha anyatheti. Gīvasyāyatanatvenâprakṛitatve tulyânupapattir iti saṅkate nanviti. Tasyaikyârtham lokasiddhasyānuvâdatvân naivam ity âha neti. Gīvasyâpūrvatvâbhāvenâpratipādyatvam eva prakāśayati kṣhetragṛho hīti. Īśvarasyâpi lokavādisiddhatvād apratipādyatety āśaṅkyāha īśvaras tv iti.

earth and the sky are woven.' In the present *adhikarana* the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

8. The *bhûman* (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i. e. the vital air which remains awake even in the state of deep sleep).

We read (*Kh. Up. VII, 23; 24*), 'That which is much (*bhûman*) we must desire to understand.—Sir, I desire to understand it.—Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (*bhûman*). Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the Little.'—Here the doubt arises whether that which is much is the vital air (*prâna*) or the highest Self.—Whence the doubt?—The word '*bhûman*,' taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by *Pânini*, VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (*Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1*), from which we may conclude that the vital air is *bhûman*.—On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage it would appear that the *bhûman* is the highest Self.—Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that the *bhûman* is the vital air,¹ since there is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir, is there something which is more than a name?'—'Speech is more than name.'—'Is there something which is more than speech?'—'Mind is more than speech'); which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital air (such as, 'Is there something

which is more than vital air?'—'Such and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be an *ativâdin*, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an *ativâdin*. He may say I am an *ativâdin*; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But he in reality is an *ativâdin* who declares something beyond by means of the True'¹),—not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an *ativâdin* which is founded on the vital air,—proceeds, by means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the *bhûman*; so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the *bhûman*.—But, if the *bhûman* is interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain the passage in which the *bhûman* is characterised, 'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.—As, the *pûrvapakshin* replies, in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (*Pra. Up. IV, 2; 3*) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The fires of the *prâṇas* are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.—That passage also, which speaks of the bliss of the *bhûman* ('The *bhûman* is bliss,' *Kh. Up. VII, 23*), can be reconciled with our explanation, because *Pra. Up. IV, 6* declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his body').—Again, the statement, 'The *bhûman* is immortality' (*Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1*), may

¹ As might be the *primâ facie* conclusion from the particle 'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.

likewise refer to the vital air ; for another scriptural passage says, 'Prāṇa is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).—But how can the view according to which the bhūman is the vital air be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self overcomes grief,' &c.)?—By the Self there referred to, the pūrvapakshin replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is Brāhmaṇa' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so all this rests in prāṇa,' declares the prāṇa to be the Self of all—by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave of a wheel—the prāṇa may be conceived under the form of bhūman, i.e. plenitude. —Bhūman, therefore, means the vital air.

To this we make the following reply.—Bhūman can mean the highest Self only, not the vital air.—Why?—'On account of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasāda) means the state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased—samprasīdati')—and, secondly, from the fact of samprasāda being mentioned in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* together with the state of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word 'samprasāda' is employed in the Sūtra to denote the vital air ; so that the Sūtra means, 'on account of information being given about the bhūman, subsequently to (the information given about) the vital air.' If the bhūman were the vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make

- statements about the bhūman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has been said about name, a new statement is

made about speech, which is something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhūman also, the statement about which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other than the vital air.—But—it may be objected—we meet here neither with a question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can it be said that the information about the bhūman is given subsequently to the information about the vital air?—Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being an ativâdin, which is exclusively connected with the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement surpassing (the preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no information additional to the information about the vital air.—To this objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an ativâdin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,' states a specification.—But, the objector resumes, this very statement of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativâdin who makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the quality of being an ativâdin depends on speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativâdin must be considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.—This

objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality of being an *ativādin* depends on speaking the truth ; the sense being : An *ativādin* is he who is an *ativādin* by means of the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter (*prakaraṇa*)¹; which would involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of *prakaraṇa* ².—Moreover, the particle but (' But in reality he is,' &c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the *prāṇa* explanation). The following passage also, ' But we must desire to know the True ' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new topic is going to be entered upon.—For these reasons we have to consider the statement about the *ativādin* in the same light as we should consider the remark—made in a conversation which previously had turned on the praise of those who study one Veda—that he who studies the four Vedas is a great *Brāhmaṇa* ; a remark which we should understand to be laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer only ; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion is as follows: *Nārada* at first listens to the instruction which *Sanatkumāra* gives him about various matters, the last of which is *Prāṇa*, and then becomes silent. Thereupon *Sanatkumāra* explains to him spontaneously (without being

¹ It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding part of the chapter.

² And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the *Mīmāṃsā*.

asked) that the quality of being an *ativâdin*, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital air—which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,—is devoid of substance, and that he only is an *ativâdin* who is such by means of the True. By the term ‘the True’ there is meant the highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, and it is called the ‘True’ in another scriptural passage also, viz. *Taitt. Up.* II, 1, ‘The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.’ Nârada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry (‘Might I, Sir, become an *ativâdin* by the True?’) and Sanatkumâra then leads him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge of *bhûman*. We therefrom conclude that the *bhûman* is that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the *bhûman* is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and *bhûman* must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the *pûrvapakshin*), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, ‘There is no other path to go’ (*Svet. Up.* VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at the outset, ‘Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), ‘To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumâra showed the other side of darkness.’ The term ‘darkness’ here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.—Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on something else. But the *brâhmaṇa* (*Kh. Up.* VII, 26, 1) does say, ‘The vital air springs from the Self.’ Nor can it be objected against this last argument that the concluding

part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhûman (mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhûman rest? In its own greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhûman forms the continuous topic up to the end of the chapter.—The quality of being the bhûman—which quality is plenitude—agreës, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhûman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhûman,' gives us to understand that in the bhûman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 5, 15*). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (*Pra. Up. IV, 2*) is said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing the nature of the prāṇa; for the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture says (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 32*), 'This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'—The passage under discussion also ('The bhûman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is little (limited). The bhûman only is bliss') by denying the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhûman, i.e. in its plenitude.—Again, the passage, 'The bhûman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one,

and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 4, 2*).—Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as belonging to the bhûman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to anything else.—By all this it is proved that the bhûman is the highest Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

We read (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 7 ; 8*), 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?—He said: O Gârgî, the Brâhmaṇas call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on.—Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' or 'the highest Lord.'

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samâmnâya, the meaning of 'syllable'; because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om is all this,' *Kṛ. Up. II, 23, 4*) declares a syllable, represented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word 'akshara.'—Why?—Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question, 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then, O Gârgî, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'—Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman. The text (quoted from the *Kṛ. Up.*) says indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement

is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman.—Therefore we take akshara to mean either ‘the Imperishable’ or ‘that which pervades ;’ on the ground of either of which explanations it must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But—our opponent resumes—while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhāna to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the pradhāna) ?—The reply to this is given in the next Sūtra.

11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only.—Why ?—On account of the command.—For the sacred text speaks of a command (‘By the command of that akshara, O Gârgi, sun and moon stand apart!’ III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhāna. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.

12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that whose nature is different (from Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sūtra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sūtra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term ‘akshara,’ from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the

support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gârî, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhâna also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the pradhâna is non-intelligent.—Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions does not exist¹.—It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, 'O Satyakâma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three mât-râs on the highest Person,' &c.—Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt based on the former passage, according to which both are under discussion.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower

¹ A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.

Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principal (*prāna*) may be called 'higher' with reference to the body¹.

To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why?—On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body ; *purusham purisayam*), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition² is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'—But—an objection will be raised—as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c. ; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical?—The two passages, we

¹ *Pindaḥ sthūlo dehaḥ, prānaḥ sūtrātmā.* Ānanda Giri.—The lower Brahman (*hiraṇyagarbha* or *sūtrātmā*) is the vital principle (*prāna*) in all creatures.

² *Samyagdarsana*, i. e. complete seeing or intuition ; the same term which in other places—where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or 'meditating'—is rendered by perfect knowledge.

reply, have in common the terms 'highest' (or 'higher,' *para*), and 'person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term *gīvaghana*¹ refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word *gīvaghana* as 'He whose shape² is characterised by the *gīvas*;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of *gīvas*, i. e. individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word '*gīvaghana*' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence ('by the *Sāman* verses he is led up to the world of Brahman'), and again in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called 'higher,' because it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called *gīvaghana* because all individual souls (*gīva*) with their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (*saṅghāta* = *ghana*) within *Hiranyagarbha*, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the *Brahma*-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that *gīvaghana*, i. e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight, also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, expressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, 'the highest person,' can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, 'Higher than the person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the

¹ Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual soul.'

² *Pāṇini* III, 3, 77, '*mūrttam ghanāḥ*.'

sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman ('the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of meditation), 'As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.'—With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the highest Self by means of the syllable Om, 'as consisting of three mātṛās, obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.

14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent (arguments).

We read (*Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1*), 'There is this city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be understood,' &c.—Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul (*viśvānātman*), or the highest Self. This doubt is caused by the words 'ether' and 'city of Brahman.' For the word 'ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether, i. e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression 'city of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i. e. in consequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to

the nature of the small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the city.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of the word âkāśa. The elemental ether is here called small with reference to its small abode (the heart).—In the passage, 'As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is represented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the outer and the inner ether¹; and it is said that 'heaven and earth are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is space, is one².—Or else, the pûrvapakshin continues, the 'small one' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term, 'the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body as its lord. The lord of the city, i. e. the soul, is represented as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; Sv. Up. V, 8) compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is compared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate its non difference from Brahman.—

¹ So that the interpretation of the pûrvapakshin cannot be objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to itself.

² So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.

Nor does the scriptural passage say that the 'small' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause, 'That which is within that,' &c., it is represented as a mere distinguishing attribute of something else ¹.

To all this we make the following reply :—The small ether can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual soul.—Why?—On account of the subsequent reasons, i. e. on account of the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined as the object of sight, 'If they should say to him,' &c.; thereupon follows an objection, 'What is there that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?' and thereon a final decisive statement, 'Then he should say: As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it.' Here the teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that the ether within the heart is small—which conception is based on the statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i. e. the heart—and thereby precludes the possibility of our understanding by the term 'the small ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language gives to the word 'ether' the sense of elemental ether, here the elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be compared with itself.—But, has it not been stated above, that the ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of an assumed difference between the outer and the inner ether?—That explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted

¹ Viz. of that which is within it. Ānanda Giri proposes two explanations: na *keti*, paravisheshanātvenety atra paro daharākāśa upādānāt tasminn iti saptamyanta-takḥḥabdasyeti seshah. Yadvā parasabdo = ntaḥsthavastuvishayas tadviseshanātvena tasminn iti daharākāśasyokter ity arthah. Takḥḥabdasya samnikṛish/ānvaya-yoge viprakṛish/ānvayasya gaghanyatvād ākāśāntargatam dhieyam iti bhāvaḥ.

the possibility of such a comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural passage declares that he is greater than ether (Sa. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is *primâ facie* established by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sentence¹ would result.—Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the 'small' ether) in the following passage, 'It is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true purposes.'—Although the term 'Self' (occurring in the passage quoted) may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the attribute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being enclosed in the lotus of the heart.—Let it then be assumed—our opponent remarks—that the qualities of all-pervadingness, &c. are ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its non-difference from Brahman.—Well, we reply, if you suppose that the small ether is called all-pervading because it is one with Brahman, our own suppo-

¹ A *vâkyabheda*—split of the sentence—takes place according to the *Mīmāṃsâ* when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different.

sition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.—Concerning the assertion that the term ‘city of Brahman’ can only be understood, on the assumption that the individual soul dwells, like a king, in one particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the term is more properly interpreted to mean ‘the body in so far as it is the city of the highest Brahman ;’ which interpretation enables us to take the term ‘Brahman’ in its primary sense¹. The highest Brahman also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for the perception of Brahman². Other scriptural passages also express the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, ‘He sees the highest person dwelling in the city’ (purusha=purisaya), &c., and Bri. Up. II, 5, 18, ‘This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller within the city (purisaya).’—Or else (taking brahmapura to mean gīvapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as Viṣṇu is near to us in the Śālagrāma-stone.—Moreover, the text (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable (‘as here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,’ &c.), and afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general subject of discussion (‘those who depart from hence after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds’). From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest Self.—We now turn to the statement made by the pūrvapakshin, ‘that the sacred text does not represent the small ether as that

¹ While the explanation of Brahman by gīva would compel us to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual soul.

² Upalabdher adhiṣṭhānam brahmaṇa deha ishyate ।
Tenāsādhāratvena deho brahmapuram bhavet ॥

Bhāmati.

which is to be sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of something else,' and reply as follows: If the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given in the passage ('as large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart'), would be devoid of purport.—But—the opponent might say—that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether); for the text after having raised an objection (in the passage, 'And if they should say to him: Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i.e. the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven, earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction.—Your reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow that heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on, as the subject of discussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven, earth, &c.—by means of the clauses, 'In it all desires are contained,' 'It is the Self free from sin,' &c., and the passage, 'But those who depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires' (in which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the desires to the Self)—declares that the Self as well, which is the abode of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects of knowledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons explained, that ether is the highest Lord.

15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of

N 2

the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i. e. that the individual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture); and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word 'brahmaloka').

It has been declared (in the preceding Sūtra) that the small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth.—For this reason also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In the first place, we read (*Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2*), 'All these creatures, day after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This passage which refers back, by means of the word 'Brahma-world,' to the small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going to it of the creatures, i. e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep sleep, is seen, i. e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. *Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1*, 'He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, 'he has become Brahman,' 'he is gone into the state of Brahman.'—In the second place, the word 'Brahma-world,' which is here applied to the small (ether) under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is Brahman.—But could not the word 'Brahma-world' convey as well the idea of the world of him whose throne is the lotus¹?—It might do so indeed, if we explained the compound 'Brahma-world' as 'the world of Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the co-ordination of both members of the compound—so that

¹ I. e. Brahmā, the lower Brahman.

'Brahma-world' denotes that world which is Brahman—then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.—And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound 'Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordination of its two constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman ; which world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i. e. the world of the True.

16. And on account of the supporting also (attributed to it), (the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him (according to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the highest Lord only.—How?—The text at first introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage, 'In it is that small ether ;' declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that everything is contained in it ; subsequently applies to it the term 'Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of being free from sin, &c. ; and, finally, declares with reference to the same general subject of discussion, 'That Self is a bank, a liminary support (*vidhrîti*), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As 'support' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a liminary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the different castes and âśramas may not be confounded. In accordance with this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject of discussion ; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgî, sun and moon are held apart' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9*). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose referring to the highest

Lord there is no doubt, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a liminary support, so that these worlds may not be confounded' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 22*).—Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small (ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.

17. And on account of the settled meaning.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of 'highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word 'ether' is used in *Kh. Up. VIII, 14*, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names;' and *Kh. Up. I, 9, 1*, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which the word 'ether' is used in the sense of 'individual soul.'—We have already shown that the word cannot, in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be compared to itself, &c. &c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account of a complementary passage, then, the *pūrvapakshin* resumes, we point out that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other one, i.e. to the individual soul: 'Now that serene being (literally: serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4*). For there the word 'serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in

that state, not of anything else. The 'rising from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such passages as, 'The ether is the revealer of forms and names,' because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul. Hence the term 'the small ether' denotes in the passage under discussion the individual soul, 'on account of the reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, 'on account of the impossibility.' In the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the ether. And, in the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in the first Sûtra of the present adhikarana, and is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the pûrvapakshin is not to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next Sûtras (I, 3, 21).

19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become manifest (i. e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The doubt whether, 'on account of the reference to the other,' the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the ground of 'impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom amṛita has been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent chapter which treats of Pragâpati. For there he (Pragâpati)

at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to understand (*Kṛ. Up. VIII, 7, 1*); after that he points out that the seer within the eye, i.e. the individual soul, is the Self ('that person that is seen in the eye is the Self,' *VIII, 7, 3*); refers again and again to the same entity (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you,' *VIII, 9, 3*; *VIII, 10, 4*); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self,' *VIII, 10, 1*; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self,' *VIII, 11, 1*). The clause attached to both these explanations (viz. 'That is the immortal, the fearless; that is Brahman') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that *Pragāpati*, having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of *Indra*, 'In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know these beings,' *VIII, 11, 2*), enters on a further explanation ('I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than this'), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body, to be the highest person. ('Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That is the highest person.')

—From this it appears that there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term, 'the small ether within it,' refers to the individual soul.

This position we counter-argue as follows. 'But in so far as its nature has become manifest.' The particle 'but' (in the *Sūtra*) is meant to set aside the view of the *pūrvapakshin*, so that the sense of the *Sūtra* is, 'Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as its (true) nature has become manifest.' The *Sūtra* uses the expression 'he whose nature has become manifest,'

which qualifies *gîva*, the individual soul, with reference to its previous condition¹.—The meaning is as follows. *Pragâpati* speaks at first of the seer characterised by the eye ('That person which is within the eye,' &c.); shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the waterpan, that he (*viz.* the seer) has not his true Self in the body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you'); and having then spoken of him as subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the individual soul in its real nature, *i.e.* in so far as it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is individual soul ('As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in its own form'). The highest light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman constitutes—as we know from passages such as 'that art thou'—the real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature, *i.e.* that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the individual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of duality—which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man—and does not rise to the knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal Cognition—which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman'—so long it remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body, sense-organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self, whose nature is pure intelligence; then

¹ The masculine '*âvirbhûtasvarûpaḥ*' qualifies the substantive *gîvaḥ* which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the *gîva* whose true nature has become manifest, *i.e.* which has become Brahman, is no longer *gîva*; hence the explanatory statement that the term *gîva* is used with reference to what the *gîva* was before it became Brahman.

knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such scriptural passages as 'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own form.

Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the true nature (svarûpa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then say that 'it appears in its own form (true nature)?' Of gold and similar substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance; so it may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising; otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical existence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising, would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask: Wherein consists that (alleged) rising from the body? Wherein consists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form?

To this we make the following reply.—Before the rise of

discriminative knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of body, senses, mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly—to quote an analogous case from ordinary experience—the true nature of a pure crystal, i.e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue colour; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished its true nature, i.e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected by *Sruti*, on the part of the individual soul which previously is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage under discussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its true nature, i.e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimination, in agreement with the mantra, 'Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (*Ka. Up. I, 2, 22*), and the statement of *Smṛiti* as to the non-difference between embodiedness and non-embodiedness 'Though dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (*Bha. Gī. XIII, 31*). The individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is non-manifest' merely on account of the absence of discriminative knowledge, and it is called 'That whose nature has become manifest' on account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its nature is nothing but its nature (i.e. in reality is always the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with anything.

And wherefrom is all this to be known?—From the instruc-

tion given by Pragâpati who, after having referred to the *giva* ('the person that is seen in the eye,' &c.), continues 'This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fearless, it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is not spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the eye), for that would render Pragâpati obnoxious to the reproach of saying deceitful things.—So also, in the second section, the passage, 'He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory clause, 'I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover¹, a person who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the same person who saw something in the dream.—Thus in the third section also Pragâpati does indeed declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the cognising Self ('In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor all these beings'). The following clause also, 'He is gone to utter annihilation,' is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is no destruction of the knowing of the knower as—according to another scriptural passage (*Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30*)—that is imperishable.—Thus, again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Pragâpati is, 'I shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this;' he thereupon refutes the connexion (of the Self) with the body and other limiting conditions ('Maghavat, this body is mortal,' &c.), shows the individual soul—which is there called 'the serene being'—

¹ To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Pragâpati's instruction refer to the same subject.

in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose characteristics are immortality and fearlessness.

Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII, 1).—Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i. e. the 'this' in 'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i. e. refers to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section. Moreover, if Pragāpati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.—Hence (our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such—which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected with evils of various kinds—is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i. e. into its true state in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.

Others again, and among them some of ours (*asmadyās ka kekī*), are of opinion that the individual soul as such

is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this sârîraka-sâstra has been set forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition¹, and who, by means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other substance of cognition.—If, now, the Sûtrakâra raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he does in this and the preceding Sûtras², he does so for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality—which passages he strengthens by arguments—he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified:—That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real purport of the sâstra's teaching, the Sûtrakâra declares, for instance, in I, 1, 30³. The refutation of the reproach of

¹ I. e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.

² Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.

³ Nanu g'vabrahmazor aikyam na kvâpi sûtrakâro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bheda eva, ato naikyam ish'am tatrâha pratipâdyam tv iti.

futility raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as do not.

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out (by the *pûrvapakshin*) in the passage complementary to the passage about the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under discussion (*viz.* the small ether), and is therefore devoid of meaning.—On that account the *Sûtra* declares that the reference has another meaning, i. e. that the reference to the individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the *naḍis* of the body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest light, i. e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of worship.—In this sense the reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is meant.

21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural

declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant ; we reply that) that has been explained (before).

The pûrvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it having been shown—under I, 2, 7—that a relative smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is—as the Sûtra points out—to be applied here also.—That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart.')

22. On account of the acting after (i. e. the shining after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he shines everything shines ; by the light of him all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (prāgñā ātman).

A luminous substance, the pûrvapakshin maintains.—Why?—Because the passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not

shine is likewise a thing of light. The 'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to some luminous body.

To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.—Why?—On account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage, 'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the *prâgñā* Self, i. e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that *prâgñā* Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts are true' (*Kh. Up. III, 14, 2*). On the other hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body. Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the *pûrvapakshin* asserted) that acting after is observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i. e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.—The clause 'on account of the acting after' (which forms part of the *Sûtra*) points to the shining after (mentioned in the scriptural sloka under discussion); the clause 'and of him' points to the fourth *pâda* of the same sloka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted') intimates the *prâgñā* Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 16*). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c. should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, absurd

as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.—Or else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the sloka; but the meaning (of the last pāda) rather is—as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement ‘all this’—that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.—Moreover, the text shows by means of the word ‘there’ (‘the sun does not shine there,’ &c.) that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, ‘In whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven,’ &c. The same appears from a passage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage under discussion). ‘In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.’ This passage giving rise to the question, ‘How is it the light of lights?’ there is occasion for the reply given in ‘The sun does not shine there,’ &c.—In refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another luminous body—as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is denied only when the sun is shining—we point out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, ‘By the Self alone as his light man sits,’ &c. (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 6), and ‘He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 2, 4).

23. Moreover *Smṛiti* also speaks of him (i. e. of the *prāgñā* Self as being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the *prāgñā* Self is spoken of in *Smṛiti* also, viz. in the *Bhagavad Gītā* (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that ; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'

24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'—The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that on account of the declaration of the person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span ; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. *Smṛiti* also confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and helpless' (*Mahābh.* III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.

To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only

be the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of the term ‘lord of the past and of the future.’ For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the future.—Moreover, the clause ‘this is that’ connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, ‘That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that’ (I, 2, 14).—‘On account of the term,’ i. e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term ‘Lord,’ we understand that the highest Lord is meant¹.—But still the question remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.—The reply to this is given in the next Sūtra.

25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).

The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart ; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term ‘Lord,’ and so on.—But—an objection may be raised—as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration

¹ This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that ‘sabda,’ which the Sūtra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of ‘sentence’ (vākya), and is therefore of less force than līnga, i. e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the aṅguṣṭha/mātrā of the puruṣa, and favours the gīva-interpretation. Sabda, the text remarks, here means śruti, i. e. direct enunciation, and śruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than līnga.

of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.—To this objection the second half of the Sûtra replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the *sâstra*, although propounded without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality entitle men¹ only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the *sâstra*); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the *sâstra*); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on². This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of *adhikâra* (Pûrva Mîm. S. VI, 1).—Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the *sâstra*, the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.—In reply to the *pûrvapakshin's* reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on account of *Smṛiti* we can understand by him who is of the size of a thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that—analogously to such passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'—our passage

¹ I. e. men belonging to the three upper castes.

² The first reason excludes animals, gods, and *rîshis*. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. *Rîshis* cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral *rîshis* of the sacrificer are invoked.—The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the *Sûdras* who are indirectly disqualified for *sâstric* works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ Sûtras VI, 1.

teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedānta-passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it), according to Bādarāyaṇa.

It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to study and act according to the śāstra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.—It is true that the śāstra entitles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Bādarāyaṇa, rather thinks that the śāstra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on.—On what account?—On the account of possibility.—For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavādas, itihāsas, purāṇas, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like Sūdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that

ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Pragâpati' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3*), and 'Bhrîgu Vârûni went to his father Varuṇa, saying, "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (*Taitt. Up. III, 1*).—And the reasons which have been given above against gods and *rishis* being entitled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other *rishis* (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bhrîgu and other *rishis*, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bhrîgu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods' and *rishis*' right to acquire knowledge?—Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted; it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several (forms).

If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of subordinate members (*aṅga*) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person

just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.—Why?—On account of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.—How is that known?—From observation.—For a scriptural passage at first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are 'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 9, 1, 2*); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms.—*Smṛiti* also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays.' If such *Smṛiti* passages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the

while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sūtra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brāhmaṇa, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many actions at the same time; one Brāhmaṇa, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the 'word' (śabda).—How?—The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')¹. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations

¹ The reference is to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).

which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative-ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.—Why? —‘On account of their origin from it.’ For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates.—But—an objection will be raised—in Sūtra I, 1, 2 (‘That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world’) it has been proved that the world originates from Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Âdityas, the Virvedevas, and the Maruts¹ are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Yagñadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)². Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ‘word.’

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species³ does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although

¹ In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.

² Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.

³ Âkrīti, best translated by εἶδος.

the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavâdas, &c. Terms such as 'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.—The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the âkrîtis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word?—'From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Smṛiti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At the word these Pragâpati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the sastra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i. e. the word of the Veda.—*Bri. Up. I, 2, 4*). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.—Smṛiti also delivers itself as follows, 'In the beginning

a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhū, from which all activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be predicated.—Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahesvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pragâpati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Brâ. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhûr he created the earth,' &c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i. e. were created from the words bhûr, &c. which had become manifest in the mind (of Pragâpati).

Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the 'word?'—It is the sphoṭa, the pûrvapakshin says¹. For on the as-

¹ The pûrvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called sphoṭa which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests the sense of the word. The term sphoṭa may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.—The sphoṭa is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called vâṭaka or abhidhâyaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhîhetu).

sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yagñadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption¹; nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception². Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im-

¹ For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.

² In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to

pressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters—which impressions are apprehended from their effects—is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed each other in time.—From all this it follows that the *sphoṭa* is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the *sphoṭa* presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.—And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.—As that *sphoṭa* is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the *sphoṭa* and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.—But—an objection is raised—it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!—That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).—Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.—Nor, again, can it be said

infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.

that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word *cow* is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.—But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of *Devadatta* or *Yagñadatta* reading.—Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable *ga*, when it is pronounced in

the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz. accented with the udātta, the anudātta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal¹? Or else²—and this is the preferable explanation—we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udātta, anudātta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udātta, the anudātta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to assume that the distinctions of udātta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udātta and so on remains without a basis.—Nor should it be urged that from the difference of the udātta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals

¹ 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.

² With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upādhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.

are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself.

The assumption of the *sphoṭa* is further gratuitous, because the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters.—But—our opponent here objects—I do not assume the existence of the *sphoṭa*. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it; for after the *buddhi* has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the *sphoṭa* all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.—You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the *sphoṭa*—i. e. something different from the letters of the given word—then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object.—Our opponent has asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one sense in many letters¹; in the same way as the idea of a

¹ I. e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.

wood, an army, and so on.—But—our opponent may here object—if the word were nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one mental act, such couples of words as *gârâ* and *râgâ* or *pika* and *kapi* would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one couple.—There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order in which they are arranged.

The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists—assisted by a certain order and number—have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the *sphoṭa* is the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the *sphoṭa*, and the *sphoṭa* in its turn is said to manifest the sense.

Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the species.

From all this it follows that the theory according to which the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is unobjectionable.

29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.

As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sûtra.—The present Sûtra now confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates from it.—A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the *rishis*,' *Rig-veda Samh.* X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the *rishis*) was permanent.—On this point Vedavyâsa also speaks as follows: 'Formerly the great *rishis*, being allowed to do so by Svayambhû, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the *itihâsas*, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'

30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the world); as is seen from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*.

If—the *pûrvapakshin* resumes—the individual gods and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical existence including denominations, things denominated and agents denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sûtra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* declare, the whole threefold

world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?

To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'—Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the beginningless *sam-sāra* we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush. Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes one with that *prāṇa* alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the *prāṇas* proceed, each towards its place; from the *prāṇas* the gods, from the gods the worlds.'

Well, the *pūrvapakshin* resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a *mahāpralaya* (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a *mahāpralaya* does cut short the entire current of practical

existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords (Īsvara), such as Hiranyagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former birth ; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is observed—although they all have the common attribute of being animated—so in the ascending series extending from man up to Hiranyagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place ; a circumstance which Śruti and Smṛiti mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as Hiranyagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa ; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, ‘He who first creates Brahman (Hiranyagarbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge’ (Svet. Up. VI, 18). Saunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukramanīs of the Veda) that the ten books (of the *Rig-veda*) were seen by Madhukṛṇḍas and other *rishis*¹. And, similarly, Smṛiti tells us, for every Veda, of men of exalted mental vision (*rishis*) who ‘saw’ the subdivisions of their respective Vedas, such as *kāṇḍas* and so on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the *rishi* and so on, ‘He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he

¹ Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hiranyagarbha, but to many beings.

does not know the *rishi*, the metre, the divinity, and the Brāhmaṇa, runs against a post, falls into a pit¹, &c. &c., therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Ārsheya Brāhmaṇa, first section).—Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Smṛiti also declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed; hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain kind.'—Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahāpralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (*sakti*) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the different conditions based on caste, āsrama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in the beginningless *saṃsāra*, subject to a certain determinateness analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in different creations, so

¹ Viz. *naraka*, the commentaries say.

that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in *Sruti* as well as *Smṛiti*; compare, for instance, *R̥ik. Samh.* X, 190, 3, 'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa. Compare also *Taitt. Brāhm.* III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the *Kṛittikās*.' This passage, which forms part of the injunction of the *ishī* to the *Nakshatras*, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered¹.

Smṛiti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the *rishis* and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the *mahāpralaya*). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the

¹ *Asmin kalpe sarveshām prāṇinām dāhapākaprakāsakāri yo-
yam agnir dr̥isyate so-yam agniḥ pūrvasmin kalpe manushyaḥ
sa devatvapadaprāpakam karmānushāyāsmīn kalpa etag ganma
labdhavān ataḥ pūrvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhāvinīm samgṛhām
āsrityāgnir iti vyapadyate.*—*Sāyana* on the quoted passage.

past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.'

31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidyâ, &c. Gaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidyâ).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Gaimini, considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.—Why?—On account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidyâ, &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidyâ ('the knowledge of the honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas' (*Kh. Up. III, 1, 1*), men are to meditate on the sun (the god Âditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can Âditya meditate upon another Âditya?—Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Âdityas, Maruts, and Sâdhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c. But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain?—We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Âditya is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (*Kh. Up. III, 18, 2*); 'Air is indeed the absorber' (*Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1*); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities them-

selves are not qualified.—So it is likewise impossible that the *rishis* themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with *rishis*, such as expressed in passages like *Bri. Up. II, 2, 4*, ‘These two are the *rishis* Gautama and Bharadvâga; the right Gautama, the left Bharadvâga.’—Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the following Sûtra.

32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the *pûrvapakshin* resumes, which is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms such as *Âditya*, i. e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary passages¹. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes². For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to *Agni* (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is known from the mantras, *arthavâdas*, *itihâsas*, *purâṇas*, and from the conceptions of ordinary life³; but we contest the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the

¹ As, for instance, ‘So long as *Âditya* rises in the east and sets in the west’ (*Kh. Up. III, 6, 4*).

² Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

³ *Yama*, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, *Varuṇa* with a noose, *Indra* with a thunder-bolt, &c. &c.

matter under discussion. Itihāsas and purāṇas again being of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The arthavāda passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of authoritative knowledge for anything¹.—For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

33. Bādarāyaṇa, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyā on the part of the gods); for there are (passages indicative of that).

The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the pūrvapaksha. The teacher, Bādarāyaṇa, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidyā, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.² Nor does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brāhmaṇas, for instance, not for the rāgasūya-sacrifice³.

¹ On the proper function of arthavāda and mantra according to the Mīmāṃsā, cp. Arthasaṃgraha, Introduction.

² See above, p. 197.

³ Which can be offered by kṣattriyas only.

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare, for instance, *Bṛi. Up. I, 4, 10*, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with *rishis*;' *Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 2*, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viroḥana from the Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in *Smṛiti*, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yāgyñavalkya¹.—Against the objection raised in the preceding Sūtra (32) we argue as follows. Words like *āditya*, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selves (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavāda passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavāda passage explaining the words 'ram of Medhātithi,' which form part of the Subrahmanya-formula, that 'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhātithi, the descendant of *Karva*' (*Shadv. Br. I, 1*). And thus *Smṛiti* says that 'Āditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kuntī.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as 'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (*āditya*), &c. also; but—as already remarked—from the use of the words in mantras and

¹ *Srautalingenânūmānabādham darsayitvā smārtēnāpi tadbādham darsayati smārtam iti. Kim atra brahma amṛtam kim svid vedyam anuttamam, kintayet tatra vai gatvā gandharvo mām aprikkhata, Virvāvasus tato rāgan vedātagñānakovida iti mokshadharme ganakayāgyñavalkyasamvādāt prahlādāgarasamvādāt kōk-tānūmānāsiddhir ity arthah.*

arthavādas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pûrvapakshin) that mantras and arthavādas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.—But, the pûrvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavāda, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, ‘(Do) not drink wine,’ one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, ‘drink wine.’—To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavāda, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavāda form a separate group of their own which refers to some accom-

plished thing¹, and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vâyu a white animal.' All the words contained in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavâda passage, 'For Vâyu is the swiftest deity; Vâyu he approaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this arthavâda are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vâyu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavâda) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavâda acts as a mere anuvâda, i. e. a statement referring to something (already known)². When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gunavâda, i. e. a statement of a quality³. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavâda is to be taken as a gunavâda on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthavâda referring to something known (i. e. an anuvâda) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people. —The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because

¹ As opposed to an action to be accomplished.

² Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavâda, 'Fire is a remedy for cold.'

³ Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial post is the sun' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).

without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say *vaushaṣ'* (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1). Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only¹; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavādas.—Moreover, itihāsas and purāṇas also—because based on mantra and arthavāda which possess authoritative power in the manner described—are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the devas. Itihāsa and purāṇa can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smṛiti also declares that Vyāsa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the *rāgasūya-sacrifice*² would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and āśramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious

¹ And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.

² The *rāgasūya-sacrifice* is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.

merit, conversed with the gods face to face. *Smṛiti* also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (*Yoga Sūtra* II, 44). And that Yoga does, as *Smṛiti* declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (*Svet. Up.* II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the *ṛishis* who see the mantras and *brāhmaṇa* passages (i. e. the Veda).—From all this it appears that the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* have an adequate basis.—And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, *arthavādas*, *itihāsas*, *purāṇas*, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation¹ agree with this latter supposition only.

34. Grief of him (i. e. of *Gānasruti*) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (*Raikva* called him *Sūdra*); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by *Raikva*).

(In the preceding *adhikarāṇa*) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present *adhikarāṇa* is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the

¹ In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a *deva*.

claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the Sûdras also possess such a claim.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the Sûdras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, 'Therefore¹ the Sûdra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Samh. VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the Sûdras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the Sûdras; for in the so-called samvarga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Gânasruti Pautrâyana, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of Sûdra 'Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O Sûdra, together with the cows' (Kṛ. Up. IV, 2, 3). Smṛiti moreover speaks of Vidûra and others who were born from Sûdra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.—Hence the Sûdra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the Sûdras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a Sûdra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the Sûdras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.—The Vedic statement, moreover, that the Sûdra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because

¹ The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Samh.

founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also ; for the argumentation is the same in both cases¹.—With reference to the pūrvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word 'Sūdra' being enounced in the samvarga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the Sūdra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced ; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted². Besides, the word 'Sūdra' which occurs in the samvarga-vidyā would establish a claim on the part of the Sūdras to that one vidyā only, not to all vidyās. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavāda, to establish the Sūdras' claim to anything.—The word 'Sūdra' can moreover be made to agree with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When Gānasruti Pautrāyana heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (*suk*) arose in his mind, and to that grief the *rishi* Raikva alludes with the word Sūdra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be accepted because a (real) born Sūdra is not qualified (for the samvarga-vidyā). If it be asked how the grief (*suk*) which had arisen in Gānasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word Sūdra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (*ādravana*) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word Sūdra by dividing it into its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief' (*Sukam abhidudrāva*) or as 'grief rushed on

¹ The Sūdra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyā.

² The *līnga* contained in the word 'Sūdra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavāda-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the *līnga* in the arthavāda-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the Sūdras' qualification for Vedic matters.

him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend ¹.

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of *Gānasruti*) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with *Kaitraratha* (who was a kshattriya himself).

Gānasruti cannot have been a *Sūdra* by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya *Kaitraratha Abhipratârin*. For, later on, i. e. in the passage complementary to the *samvarga-vidyâ*, a kshattriya *Kaitrarathi Abhipratârin* is glorified, 'Once while *Saunaka Kâpeya* and *Abhipratârin Kâkshaseni* were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them' (*Kh. Up. IV, 3, 5*). That this *Abhipratârin* was a *Kaitrarathi* (i. e. a descendant of *Kaitraratha*) we have to infer from his connexion with a *Kâpeya*. For we know (from *Sruti*) about the connexion of *Kaitraratha* himself with the *Kâpeyas* ('the *Kâpeyas* made *Kaitraratha* perform that sacrifice; ' *Tândya Br. XX, 12, 5*), and as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from *Scripture* ('from him a *Kaitrarathi* descended who was a prince ²') that he (*Kaitraratha*) was a prince, we must

¹ *Hamsāvākyād ātmano-nâdaram srutvâ gānasruteh sug utpannety etad eva katham gamyate yenâsau sūdrasabdena sūkyate tatrâha sprîsyate keti. Ānanda Giri.*

² I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of *Saṅkara* consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read *kaitrarathinâmaikaḥ*). *Ānanda Giri* expressly explains *tasmât by kaitrarathâd* *ity arthaḥ*.—The text of the *Tândya Br.* runs: *tasmât kaitrarathinâm ekaḥ kshatrapatir gâyate*, and the commentary explains: *tasmât kâranâd adyâpi kaitravamsotpannânâm madhye eka eva râgâ kshatra-*

understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of *Gânasruti* being praised in the same *vidyâ* with the kshattriya *Abhipratârin* intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals. That *Gânasruti* was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).—Hence the *Sûdras* are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the *Sûdras*).

That the *Sûdras* are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also that in different places of the *vidyâs* such ceremonies as the *upanayana* and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, *Sat. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13*, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' *Kh. Up. VII, 1, 1*, 'Teach me, Sir! thus he approached him;' *Pra. Up. I, 1*, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable *Pippalâda*, thinking that he would teach them all that.'—Thus the following passage also, 'He without having made them undergo the *upanayana* (said) to them' (*Kh. Up. V, 11, 7*), shows that the *upanayana* is a well-established ceremony¹.—With reference to the *Sûdras*, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, *Manu X, 4*, where they are spoken of as 'once born' only ('the *Sûdra* is the fourth caste, once-born'), and *Manu X, 126*, 'In the *Sûdra* there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony.'

patir balâdhipatir bhavati.—Grammar does not authorise the form *kaitraratha* used in the *Sûtra*.

¹ The king *Asvapati* receives some *Brâhmanas* as his pupils without insisting on the *upanayana*. This express statement of the *upanayana* having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.

37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Gâbâla) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i. e. a Sûdra).

The Sûdras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Gâbâla not to be a Sûdra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brâhmaṇa would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth' (*Kh. Up. IV, 4, 5*); which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the Sûdras not being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in *Smṛiti*, of (the Sûdras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

The Sûdras are not qualified for that reason also that *Smṛiti* prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a Sûdra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a Sûdra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the Sûdras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge to the Sûdra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'—From those Sûdras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be with-

held, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit. *Smṛiti*, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*; compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (*Mahābh.*).—It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the *Veda*.

39. (The *prāṇa* is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge—on which we entered as an opportunity offered—being finished we return to our chief topic, i. e. the enquiry into the purport of the *Vedānta*-texts.—We read (*Ka. Up. II, 6, 2*), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the *prāṇa*. It (the *prāṇa*) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal¹.'—This passage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in *prāṇa*, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the *prāṇa* is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

The *pūrvapakshin* maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, *prāṇa* denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms—which is here called *prāṇa*—and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of *Parganya*, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.—Through the knowledge of that air immortality

¹ As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the *pūrvapakshin*), 'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the *prāṇa*, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.'

also can be obtained ; for another scriptural passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.'—We therefore conclude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

To this we make the following reply.—Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of ; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to ? The immediately preceding passage runs as follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity ; and, secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in *prāṇa*,' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word *prāṇa* can denote the highest Self also, appears from such passages as 'the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 4, 18*). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the *prāṇa* and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (*Ka. Up. II, 5, 5*). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and *Vāyu*, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity ; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly

carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i. e. the king's wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'—That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15).—That immortality which the *pûrva-pakshin* asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there (i. e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (*Bri. Up.* III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')—That in the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by *Naïketas* in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to the highest Self.

40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word. For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the nâdis of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' *Kh. Up.* VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply.—The word 'light' can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 12, 1)—and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman—and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person' (VIII, 12, 3).—Against the statement, made by the pûrvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we remark that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.

41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different, &c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, 'He who is called ether (ākāśa) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these

forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 14, 1).

There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the *pûrvapakshin* declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and, secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,' designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (*giva âtman*), and evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 2). But—it may be said—from this very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i. e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms.—True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.—Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing,

In the sixth prapātḥaka of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* there is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the prāṇas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 3, 7*). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

The pūrvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the prāṇas who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (*IV, 4, 22*). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul.—Why?—On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, 'This person embraced by the intelligent (prāṇā) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,' must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i. e.—in his case—all-embracing knowledge.—Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i. e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one' the indi-

vidual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage.—With reference to the pûrvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage ('He among the prâṇas who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving¹,' aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words, 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prâṇas, is the great unborn Self, i. e. the highest Lord.—He, again, who imagines that the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident from the circumstance that on Ganaka's question, which is repeated in every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yāgyavalkya replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by

¹ The stress lies here on the 'as if,' which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.

good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, 'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'—From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

FOURTH PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i. e. the *pradhâna*) ; we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is contained in the simile of the body (i. e. the body itself) ; and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work—as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman—we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, 2) ; we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the *pradhâna* also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedânta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the *pradhâna*, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sâṅkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the *pradhâna* ; for some *sâkhâs* contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the *pradhâna*. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme *rishis* maintain the doctrine of the *pradhâna* being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda.—As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sâṅkhyas refer have a different meaning (i. e. do not allude to the *pradhâna*), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sâṅkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i. e. the *pradhâna*, is perceived in the text of some *sâkhâs*. We read, for instance, they say, in the *Kâtaka* (I, 3, 11), ‘Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped,

beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the pradhāna), and the soul¹. That by the Undeveloped is meant the pradhāna is to be concluded from the common use of Smṛiti and from the etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhāna being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhāna. And this pradhāna vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Smṛiti, and ratiocination.

Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Kāthaka quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti. We do not recognise there the pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas, i. e. an independent general cause consisting of three constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which does not denote any particular determined thing, but may—owing to its etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not manifest'—denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The Sāṅkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the pradhāna; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhāna the fiction of the Sāṅkhyas, 'on account of there being referred

¹ The Great one is the technical Sāṅkhya-term for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhāna or prakṛiti, and puruṣa is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sāṅkhya Kār. 2, 3.

to that which is contained in the simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the circumstance of nothing else remaining.—The immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not well controlled enters into *samsâra*, while he who has them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishnu. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishnu? Whereupon the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishnu. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest Road.' In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses as *grahas*, i. e. graspers, and the objects as *atigrahas*, i. e. superior to the *grahas* (*Bri. Up.* III, 2). The mind (*manas*) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect

(buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great as it is the master.—Or else the phrase 'the great Self' may here denote the intellect of the first-born *Hiranyagarbha* which is the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following *Smṛiti*-passage 'it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance¹,' and likewise with the following scriptural passage, 'He (*Hiranyagarbha*) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (*Svet. Up. VI, 18*). The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its common name *buddhi*, is here mentioned separately, since it may be represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self are identical.—Thus there remains now the body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore con-

¹ *Samkalpavikalparūpamananasaktyâ hairanyagarbhî buddhir manas tasyâh vyashīmanasū samashīṭayâ vyāptim āha mahān iti. Samkalpādisaktitayâ tarhi samdehātmatvam tatrāha matir iti. Mahatvam upapādayati brahmeti. Bhogyagātādhāratvam āha pūr iti. Niskayātmakatvam āha buddhir iti. Kṛtisaktimattvam āha khyātir iti. Niyamanasaktimatvam āha īsvara iti. Loke yat prakṛiṣṭam gñānam tato natīrekam āha pragñeti. Tatphalam api tato nārthāntaravishayam ity āha samvid iti. Kṛitpradhānatvam āha kītir iti. Gñātasarvārthānusamdhānasaktim āha smṛiis keti. Ānanda Giri.*

clude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place, points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. *avyakta*, the only thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through *samsâra* and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul—which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.—are compared to a chariot, and so on.—In accordance with this the subsequent verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vishnu ('the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self.'—That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the *pradhâna* imagined by the Sâṅkhya.

2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term *avyakta*) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sûtra, that the term 'the Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general

subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the *pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*.—But here the following doubt arises: How can the word ‘undeveloped’ appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called *vyakta*, i. e. that which is developed or manifested?

To this doubt the *Sūtra* replies that what the term *avyakta* denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed ‘undeveloped,’ but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase ‘mix the Soma with cows, i. e. milk’ (*R̥g-veda* S. IX, 46, 4). Another scriptural passage also—‘now all this was then undeveloped’ (*Bṛi. Up.* I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i. e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.

3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason.

Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the *pradhāna* is the cause of the world. For we *Sāṅkhyas* understand by the term *pradhāna* nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the

pradhāna doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character¹. This undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term *ākāśa*, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gārgi, the ether is woven like warp and woof' (*Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 11*). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term *akshara*, the Imperishable; so, for instance (*Mu. Up. II, 1, 2*), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of as *Mâyā*, illusion; so, for instance (*Sve. Up. IV, 10*), 'Know then *Prakṛiti* is *Mâyā*, and the great Lord he who is affected with *Mâyā*.' For *Mâyā* is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.—The statement of the *Kāṭhaka* that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the Great

¹ Nanu na *bīgasaktir vidyayā dahyate vastutvād ātmavan nety āha avidyeti. Kekit tu pratigīvam avidyasaktibhedam ikkhanti tan na avyaktāvyākṛitādisabdhāyās tasyā bhedakābhāvād ekatve-pi svasaktiḥ vikītrakāryakaratvād ity āha avyakteti. Na ka tasyā gīvāśrayatvam gīvasabdhavākyasya kalpitatvād avidyārūpatvāt takkha-bdalakshyasya brahmāvyatirekād ity āha paramesvareti. Mâyā-vidyayor bhedād īśvarasya mâyāśrayatvam gīvānām avidyāśrayateti vadantam pratyāha mâyāmayiti. Yathā mâyāvino mâyā paratantrā tathaishāpīty arthaḥ. Pratītau tasyās ketanāpekshām āha mahāsuptir iti. Ānanda Giri.*

one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hiraṇyagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left.—Other interpreters of the two last Sūtras give a somewhat different explanation¹.—There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Sū. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects.—But how—we ask those interpreters—is it possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the

¹ Sūtradvayasya vṛttikṛīḍvākyānam utthāpayati. Go. Ān. Ākāryadesīyamataṁ utthāpayati. Ān. Gi.

passage under discussion)?—If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word *avyakta* which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is *vyakta*, i. e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction—as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for its only subject the highest place of *Vishṇu*, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person.—We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the *Kāṭhaka* passage does not refer to the *pradhāna*.

4. And (the *pradhāna* cannot be meant) because

there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

The Sāṅkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhāna as something to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhāna and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the pradhāna is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers.—Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.—For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradhāna.—Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Viṣṇu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.

5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhāna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.

Here the Sāṅkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sūtra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhāna—which had been referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhāna,

which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhāna is denoted by the term avyakta.

To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the object of perception not the pradhāna but the intelligent, i.e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,' because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sāṅkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhāna, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent Self.—The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedānta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhāna is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.

6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhāna).

To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Kathavallī-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Nakiketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired

about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.'—The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative to the pradhāna, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.

Here the Sāṅkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sūtra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects.—If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhāna in excess of the number of questions asked.

To this we make the following reply.—We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the *Kathavalli-upanishad*. The *Upanishad* starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the *Upanishad*—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and *Naïketas*—carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to *Naïketas*, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon *Naïketas* chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 20), ‘There is that doubt—; this is the third of my boons.’—If we therefore supposed that the passage, ‘That which thou seest as neither this nor that,’ &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire *Upanishad*.—But—the *Sāṅkhya* will perhaps interpose—it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt expressed in the words, ‘There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not.’ Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, ‘This which thou seest as neither this nor that,’ &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the

individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'—which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self—clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedānta tenet.—There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.'—The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Nakiketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Nakiketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignorance, praises Nakiketas, 'I believe Nakiketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question

asked by Naṅiketas, 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Naṅiketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.—Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to *samsāra*. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.—The Sūtra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which

results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the *samsāra*-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.—For these reasons the Sūtra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the *pradhāna* constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the *pradhāna* hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.

7. And (the case of the term *avyakta*) is like that of the term *mahat*.

While the Sāṅkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence¹ (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, 'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'I know that great person' (Sve. Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word *avyakta* also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the *pradhāna*.—The *pradhāna* is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that *agā* means the

¹ The commentators give different explanations of the *Sattā-mātra* of the text.—*Sattāmātre sattvapradhānaprakṛiteṛ ādya-parināme*. Go. Ān.—*Bhogāpavargapurushārthasya mahākkhabditabuddhikāryatvāt purushāpekshitaphalakāraṇam sad ukyate tatra bhāvapratyayo 'pi svarūpārtho na sāmānyavāñi kāryānumeyam mahan na pratyaksham iti mātrasabdaḥ*. Ānanda Giri.

pradhâna) because no special characteristic is stated ; as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhâna comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhâna is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (Sve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one agâ¹, red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one aga who loves her and lies by her ; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'—In this mantra the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhâna. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing property ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light ; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhâna, is denoted by the attributes of its parts, and is therefore called red—white—black. It is further called agâ, i. e. unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the word agâ the settled meaning of she-goat ?—True ; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.—That pradhâna produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prakṛiti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.—On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the

¹ As the meaning of the word agâ is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sûtras and Saṅkara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.—Saṅkara reads—and explains,—in the mantra, sarûpâḥ (not sarûpâm) and bhuktabhogâm, not bhuktabhogyâm.

followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhāna hypothesis.

To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the Sāṅkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms *agā*, &c. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the Sāṅkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 2, 3*). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant—it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup—; so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhāna is meant by the term *agā*, or something else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.'—Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the *agā* of the *Svetāśvatara-upanishad*?—To this question the next *Sūtra* replies.

9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term *agā*); for some read so in their text.

By the term *agā* we have to understand the causal matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises fire, water, and earth.—The word 'but' (in the *Sūtra*) gives emphasis to the assertion.—This *agā* is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three *guṇas* in the Sāṅkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one *sākhā*, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. 'The red colour of burning fire

(agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (tegas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements—fire, water, and earth—we recognise in the Svetâsvatara passage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sâṅkhya guṇas in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the Svetâsvatara—after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'—the text, previous to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prakṛiti is Mâyâ, and the great Lord he who is affected with Mâyâ; 'who being one only rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the mantra treating of the agâ refers to some independent causal matter called pradhâna. We rather assert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.—But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured agâ? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus agâ (i. e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that the word agâ cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced'.¹—To this question the next Sûtra replies.

¹ Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the

10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in *agâ* denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

The word *agâ* neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather expresses an assumption, i. e. it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowledge.—Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of

views of the Sūtra writer and Saṅkara. Govindānanda notes that according to the Bhāṣyakṛit *agâ* means simply *mâyâ*—which interpretation is based on *prakaraṇa*—while, according to the Sūtra-kṛit, who explains *agâ* on the ground of the *Khândogya*-passage treating of the three primary elements, *agâ* denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an *avāntaraprakṛiti*.—On Saṅkara's explanation the term *agâ* presents no difficulties, for *mâyâ* is *agâ*, i. e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sūtra writer, however, *agâ* cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the *rûdhi* signification of *agâ*, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the *avāntara-prakṛiti* be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sūtra replies.

the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.—The words 'like the honey' (in the Sûtra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey (*Kh. Up. III, 1*), and speech as a cow (*Bri. Up. V, 8*), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (*Bri. Up. VI, 2, 9*), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary to reason in the circumstance of the term *agâ* being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the *pradhâna*, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sâṅkhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).

The attempt to base the Sâṅkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the *agâ* having failed, the Sâṅkhya again comes forward and points to another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17*). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories the Sâṅkhya system counts. Cp. Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, 3: 'The fundamental causal substance (i.e. the *pradhâna*) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.'

As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhāna, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

To this reasoning we make the following reply.—It is impossible to base the assertion that the pradhāna, &c. have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, ‘on account of the diversity of the Sāṅkhya categories.’ The Sāṅkhya categories have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for such combination.—Here the Sāṅkhya will perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as the poem says, ‘five years and seven Indra did not rain,’ meaning only that there was no rain for twelve years.—But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to indirect indication¹.—In the second place, the second ‘five’ constitutes a compound with the word ‘people,’ the Brāhmaṇa-accent showing that the two form one word only². To the same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 2, 2, *pañkānām tvā pañkaganānām*, &c.) where the two terms constitute one word, have one accent and one case-

¹ Indication (lakṣhaṇā, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.

² That *pañkaganāh* is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udātta on the last syllable, which udātta becomes anudātta according to the rules laid down in the Bhāṣika Sūtra for the accentuation of the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.

termination. The word thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,' involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another word.—But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound 'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the expression 'five five-bundles' (*pañka pañkapûlyak*) conveys the idea of twenty-five bundles.—The instance is not an analogous one, we reply. The word '*pañkapûli*' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up of five bundles), and hence when the question arises, 'How many such bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating that there are five such bundles. The word *pañkaganâh*, on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against which assumption has already been stated.—For all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhyas.—This is further not possible 'on account of the excess.' For on the Sāṅkhyā interpretation there would be an excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sāṅkhyas which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five categories, the Sāṅkhyā would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same

remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether. —How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sāṅkhya categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that the word *gana* has not the settled meaning of category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the passage.

How, then, the Sāṅkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase ‘the five five-people?’—On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pāṇini II, 1, 50, according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word *pañcakaganâḥ* thus is not meant to convey the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to this question an answer is given by the added numeral ‘five.’ There are certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-*rishis*, where again the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.—Who then are those five-people?—To this question the next Sūtra replies.

12. (The *pañcakaganâḥ* are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

The mantra in which the *pañcakaganâḥ* are mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. ‘They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind¹.’ Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.—But how, the Sāṅkhya asks, can the word ‘people’ be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on?—How, we ask in return, can it be

¹ So in the Mādhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Kāṇva recension has not the clause ‘the food of food.’

applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word 'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the *prânas* in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (*Kh. Up. III, 13, 6*); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (*Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1*). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning¹.—But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning?—That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of *udbhid* and similar words². We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice with the *udbhid*; he cuts the *yûpa*; he makes the *vedi*.' Analogously we conclude that the term *pañkaganâh*, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary passage.—Some commentators explain the word *pañka-*

¹ This in answer to the Sâṅkhya who objects to *gana* when applied to the *prâna*, &c. being interpreted with the help of *lakṣhanâ*; while if referred to the *pradhâna*, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of *yaugika* interpretation (the *pradhâna* being *gana* because it produces, the *mahat* &c. being *gana* because they are produced). The Vedântin points out that the compound *pañkaganâh* has its own *rûdhi*-meaning, just as *asvakarṇa*, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.

² We infer that *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the *yûpa* is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.

ganâ/ to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishâdas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage (*Rig-veda Samh.* VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sûtrakâra), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the Sâṅkhyas, declares that on the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Mādhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Kāṇva-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?—To this question the next Sûtra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Kāṇvas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

The Kāṇva-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'—If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Mādhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Kāṇvas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to that of the Shodasin-cup, which, according to different

passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atirātra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhāna. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by *Smṛiti* or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedānta-passages with regard to the things created, such as ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the Vedānta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhāna.—But now a new objection presents itself.

It is not possible—our opponent says—to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedānta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedānta-texts contradict one another. All the Vedānta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the creation began with fire (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (*Kh.* Up. III, 19, 1). In another place,

again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of that which is not?' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 7).—As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter¹, the Vedānta-passages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of *Smṛiti* and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply.—Although the Vedānta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the creator is described in any one Vedānta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedānta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in *Taitt. Up.* II, 1 ff.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares² that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin-

¹ Option being possible only in the case of things to be accomplished, i.e. actions.

² According to *Go. Ān.* in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (II, 7); according to *Ān. Giri* in the passage, 'He created all' (II, 6).

ning with the gross body ; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again—in the passage, ‘ May I be many, may I grow forth ’—it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-different from the created effects. And—in the passage, ‘ He created all this whatever there is ’—it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance, ‘ Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire ’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 1 ; 3), and ‘ In the beginning all this was Self, one only ; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds ? ’ (*Ait. Âr.* II, 4, 1, 1 ; 2.) The Vedânta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony throughout.—On the other hand, there are found conflicting statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e. Brahman, in which all the Vedânta-texts are seen to agree—for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization ;—and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (*II, 3*) those conflicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way ; nor have we the right to assume such a thing ; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages

setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares; compare *Kh. Up. VI, 8, 4*, 'As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of comparisons such as that of the clay (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4*) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever' (*Gauḍap. Kā. III, 15*).—On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (*Taitt. Up. II, 1*); 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief' (*Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3*); 'A man who knows him passes over death' (*Sve. Up. III, 8*). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (*pratyaksha*), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next *Sūtra*.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the *Upaniṣad* Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.

He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;'; is declared to have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, 'On this there is also this sloka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c. If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (*Kh. Up. III, 19, 1*); for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*), the reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine referred to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is.—The following passage again, 'Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. (*Bri. Up. I, 4, 7*), does not by any means assert that the evolution of

the world took place without a ruler ; as we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails,' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name ; when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also.—We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator ; for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself' (*vyākriyata* ; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).—Or else we may look on the form *vyākriyata* as having reference to a necessarily implied agent ; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or somebody else').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the world.

In the *Kaushîtaki-brâhmana*, in the dialogue of Bâlâki and Agâtasatru, we read, 'O Bâlâki, he who is the maker of

those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word 'prâna' in a complementary passage ('Then he becomes one with that prâna alone'), and that word is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place, prâna is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Bâlâki; for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of prâna we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Prâna and he is Brahman, and they call him That' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 9).—Or else, the pûrvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual soul. For Agâtasatru, in order to instruct Bâlâki about the 'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Bâlâki, by the circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the prâna and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by pushing him with his stick, and so makes Bâlâki comprehend that the being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from the prâna. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with

the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau. Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the *prāṇa*, it may itself be called *prāṇa*.—We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks whatever.

To this we make the following reply.—The Lord only can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part of the section. Bālāki begins his colloquy with Agātasatru with the offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end becomes silent. Agātasatru then sets aside Bālāki's doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman—with the words, 'Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.—and proposes the maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant.—None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely independent.—Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work' denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separately—in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'—and as inferential marks (*viz.* the neuter gender and the singular number of the word *karman*, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there remains no other alternative than to

take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the same world—as that which is made—by the term 'work.'—We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea of limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the world, or rather—to do away with this limitation—he of whom this entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that those persons whom Bālāki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brāhmaṇas¹.' And that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedānta-texts.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that has already been explained.

¹ By the Brāhmaṇas being meant all those Brāhmaṇas who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Lord.—We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the pûrvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation, one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, ‘Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.’—But if this is so, the sense of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of the passage about Pratardana (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present Sûtra?—No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, ‘Or he whose work is this,’ refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.—The word *prāna* occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the passage, ‘The mind settles down on *prāna*’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 2).—The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.

18. But Gaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of

the question and answer ; and thus some also (read in their text).

Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Gaimini, no matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After Agātasatru has taught Bālāki, by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question, 'Bālāki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that *prāṇa* alone ;' and, 'From that Self all *prāṇas* proceed, each towards its place, from the *prāṇas* the gods, from the gods the worlds.'—Now it is the general Vedānta doctrine that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of *prāṇa*, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken ; we understand that the highest Self is meant.—Moreover, the Vāgasaneyisākhā, which likewise contains the colloquy of Bālāki and Agātasatru, clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of cognition' (*viḡñānamaya*), and distinguishes from it the highest Self ('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come back?' *Bṛi. Up. II, 1, 16*) ; and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether' may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in

the passage about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 1, 1). Further on the *Bṛi. Up.* says, 'All the Selves came forth from that Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selves it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause. —The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under discussion refers to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

We read in the *Bṛihadâraṇyaka*, in the *Maitreyî-brâhmaṇa* the following passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyî! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known' (*Bṛi. Up.* IV, 5, 6).—Here the doubt arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest Self.—But whence the doubt?—Because, we reply, the Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to the highest Self.

The *pûrvapakshin* maintains that the passage refers to the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the

individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same individual Self?—A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply.—The passage makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyī has heard from Yāgñavalkya that there is no hope of immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yāgñavalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Smṛiti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the highest Self.—The statement further that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the pūrvapakshin proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that statement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that who-

ever erroneously views this world with its Brahman and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on.—By explaining further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as *Rig-veda*,' &c.) Yāgyavalkya again shows that it is the highest Self.—To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge.—From all this it follows that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the pûrvapakshin that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter, denoted as something dear.

20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so Āsmarathya thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which is denoted as something dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial

statement aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made.—This is the opinion of the teacher Âsmarathya¹.

21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Auḍulomi thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Auḍulomi.—Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3*).—In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, 'As

¹ The comment of the Bhāmāṭi on the Sūtra runs as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also—which are effects of Brahman—are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.—The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Âsmarathya is *bhedābhedavāda*.

the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison ¹.

22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so Kâsakṛtsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Kâsakṛtsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brâhmaṇa-passage, 'Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taît. Âr. III, 12, 7) ².

¹ Bhâmatî: The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pânkarâtrikas: 'Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'—The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Auḍulomi is satyabhedavâda.

² Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, 11.

And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter.—In the opinion of the teacher Kāśakṛtsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Āsmarathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, ‘On account of the fulfilment of the promise’—which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul¹. The opinion of Audulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition². Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by Kāśakṛtsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedānta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ‘That art thou’) aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kāśakṛtsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sūtras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the pūrvapakshin’s arguments, viz. that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage represents as

¹ And not the relation of absolute identity.

² I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.

the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise; so Āsmarathya thinks.' The promise is made in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being¹; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements; thus the teacher Āsmarathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.—'Because the soul when it will depart is such; thus Audulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when—after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on—it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Audulomi's opinion.—'Because it exists in the condition of the soul; thus Kāsakṛtsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Kāsakṛtsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self!—By no means, we reply. The passage means to say

¹ Upapāditam keṭi, sarvasyātmamātratvam iti reshaḥ. Upapādanaprakāram sūṭrayati eketi. Sa yathārdrendhanāgner ityādinai-kaprasavatvam, yathā sarvāsām apām ityādinā ṭaikapralayatvam sarvasyoktam. Ān. Gi.

only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised—in the passage, ‘Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge’—Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, ‘I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-connexion with the *mâtrâs*.’ That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the *mâtrâs*, i. e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that ‘When he has departed there is no more knowledge.’

The third argument also of the *pûrvapakshin*, viz. that the word ‘knower’—which occurs in the concluding passage, ‘How should he know the knower?’—denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of *Kâsakṛtsna*.—Moreover, the text after having enumerated—in the passage, ‘For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,’ &c.—all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares—in the subsequent passage, ‘But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?’—that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, *Yāgñavalkya* goes on, ‘How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?’ As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to conclude that the word ‘knower’ is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i. e. the Self.—That the view of *Kâsakṛtsna* is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedânta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not

real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is all this' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (*Bri. Up.* III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 11).—It is likewise confirmed by *Smṛiti*; compare, for instance, 'Vāsudeva is all this' (*Bha. Gî.* VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bhârata, to be the soul in all bodies' (*Bha. Gî.* XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures' (*Bha. Gî.* XIII, 27).—The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know' (*Bri. Up.* I, 4, 10); 'From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 24).—Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedānta' (*Mu. Up.* III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (*Is. Up.* 7).—And *Smṛiti* also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (*Bha. Gî.* II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selves, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the

highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul)¹. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings.—Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedânta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal². (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retraction of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative

¹ So according to Go. Ân. and Ân. Gi.; although their interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the *ekâm* of the text.—*Kâmâd evaikâm iti gîvasthanâd anyâm ity arthaḥ*. Go. Ân.—*Gîvabhâvena pratibimbâdhârâtiriktâm ity arthaḥ*. Ân. Gi.

² While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.

causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned ; a doubt arises to which of these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3 ; 4 : ' He reflected, he created *prâṇa*.' For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors¹. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.—Further, the effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure ; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of the same nature ; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as ' It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' Sve. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from *Smṛiti*², and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause ; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one,

¹ I. e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.

² Viz. the *Sāṅkhya-smṛiti*.

‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard ; that which is not perceived, perceived ; that which is not known, known ?’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes ; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.—The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (*Kh. Up.* VI, 1, 4), ‘My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ;’ which passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar nature, ‘As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known ; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known.’—Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, ‘What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known ?’ (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, ‘As plants grow on the earth’ (I, 1, 7).—Compare also the promissory statement in *Bṛi. Up.* IV, 5, 6, ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ;’ and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), ‘Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.’—Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedānta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, ‘That from whence (*yataḥ*) these beings are born,’ has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, *Pāṇ.* I, 4, 30.—That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the

world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.—The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sūtra, viz. accordance with the promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.—The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i. e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sūtra supplies a further argument for Brahman's

being the general material cause.—Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether' (*Kh. Up. I, 9, 1*). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.—The word 'directly' (in the *Sûtra*) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.—Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture—in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*)—represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?—Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products.—The word 'itself' in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word '*parinâmât*' (in the *Sûtra*) may also be taken as constituting a separate *Sûtra* by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' (*Taitt. Up. II, 6*).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (*yoni*); compare, for instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the *yoni* of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word *yoni* means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A *yoni*, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (*R̥ik. Samh.* I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source' follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,' &c.—It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedānta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the *pradhāna* is the cause of the world has, in the Sūtras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedānta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The

doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sūtrakāra formally extends, in the above Sūtra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhāna doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhāna doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages. — The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the adhyāya has been reached.

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) *Smṛitis*; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other *Smṛitis*.

It has been shown in the first adhyāya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Vedānta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the *pradhāna*, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.—The purport of the second adhyāya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on *Smṛiti* and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the *pradhāna*, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedānta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on *Smṛiti*.

Your doctrine (the *pûrvapakshin* says) that the omniscient

Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) *Smṛitis*.' Such *Smṛitis* are the one called Tantra which was composed by a *rishi* and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other *Smṛitis* based on it¹; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent *pradhāna* is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a *raison d'être*) for *Smṛitis* like the *Manu-smṛiti*, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction² and comprising the *agnihotra* and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and *āśramas*³. The *Kāpila Smṛiti*, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the *Vedānta*-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the *Smṛitis* mentioned⁴.—But how, somebody may ask the *pūrvapakshin*, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain *Smṛitis* be used as an objection against that sense of *Śruti* which—from various

¹ The *Smṛiti* called Tantra is the *Sāṅkhyasāstra* as taught by Kapila; the *Smṛiti*-writers depending on him are *Āsuri*, *Pañḍasikha*, and others.

² *Mīmāṃsā Sū. I, 1, 2*: *kodanālakṣaṇo-rtho dharmaḥ*. Commentary: *kodanā iti kriyāyāḥ pravartakam vaśanam āhuḥ*.

³ *Purushārtha*; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are *kratvartha*, i. e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.

⁴ It having been decided by the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā* already that *Smṛitis* contradicted by *Śruti* are to be disregarded.

reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.—has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?—Our objection, the *pûrvapakshin* replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of *Sruti*, they naturally rely on *Smṛitis*, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of *Sruti* with their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the *Smṛitis*, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila *Smṛiti* declares to have been *rishi*-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following *Sruti*-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the *rishi*, kapila¹, whom he wishes to look on while he is born' (*Sve. Up. V, 2*). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the *Vedānta*-texts in conformity with the *Smṛitis*.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other *Smṛitis*.'—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain *Smṛitis* purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other *Smṛitis* which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter *Smṛiti*-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks 'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three *guṇas*, O best of *Brāhmaṇas*.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is

¹ On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.—As will be seen later on, Sāṅkara, in this *bhāṣya*, takes the Kapila referred to to be some *rishi*.

dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brâhmana.'—Thus we read also in the Purâṇa, 'Hear thence this short statement: The ancient Nârâyana is all this; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in the Bhagavadgîtâ also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world.' And Âpastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sûtra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Smṛiti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the pûrvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Smṛiti, we reply to him on the ground of Smṛiti only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sûtra. Now it has been shown already that the Sruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Smṛitis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Smṛitis which follow Sruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded; according to the Sûtra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sûtra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is contradiction (between Sruti and Smṛiti) (Smṛiti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Smṛiti is to be recognised) as there is inference (of Smṛiti being founded on Sruti).'—Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without Sruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition. For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction¹; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda)

¹ I. e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.

which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i. e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only. Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the *Smṛitis* contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to *Sruti*.—As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular *Smṛiti*; for if men's inclinations were so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the *Smṛitis*, and the distinction founded on some of them following *Sruti* and others not.—The scriptural passage which the *pūrvapakshin* has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname *Vāsudeva*. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we have a *Sruti*-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu¹, viz. 'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (*Taitt. Samh.* II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything ('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-

¹ After it has been shown that Kapila the *dvaitavādin* is not mentioned in *Sruti*, it is now shown that Manu the *sarvātmavādin* is mentioned there.

luminousness,' i. e. becomes Brahman, *Manu Smṛiti* XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selves, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the *Mahābhārata* also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many persons, O King, according to the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (*Īs. Up.* 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selves also, not only by the assumption of an independent *pradhāna*. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain *Smṛitis*, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.—An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following *Sūtra*.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the

others (i. e. the effects of the pradhāna, according to the Sāṅkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhāna, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sāṅkhya) *Smṛiti* assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in *Smṛiti*; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense—*Smṛiti* is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of *Smṛiti* which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhāna) will be so likewise. This is what the Sūtra means to say.—We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain *Smṛitis* does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sāṅkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (*Smṛiti*) is refuted.

This Sūtra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya-*smṛiti* the Yoga-*smṛiti* also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhāna as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.—But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sūtra does.)—We reply that here an ad-

ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, *Bṛi. Up.* II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon¹.' In the *Svetâsvatara Upanishad*, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body, &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, *Ka. Up.* II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (*Ka. Up.* II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the *Yoga-sâstra* itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the *sâstra* at least (*viz.* the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire *Yoga-smṛiti* will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the *Smṛiti* referring to the *ash/akâs*².—To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the *Sâṅkhya*) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the *Yoga-smṛiti* being authoritative, the disagreement (between *Smṛiti* and *Śruti*) on other topics remains as shown above.—Although³ there are many *Smṛitis* treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the *Sâṅkhya* and *Yoga* because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest

¹ In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (*nidhyâsâ*) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.

² The *ash/akâs* (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons *hemanta* and *śirā*) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the *Pûrvâ Mim.* that *Smṛiti* is authoritative in so far as it is based on *Śruti*.

³ But why—it will be asked—do you apply yourself to the refutation of the *Sâṅkhya* and *Yoga* only, and not also to that of other *Smṛitis* conflicting with the *Vedânta* views?

end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sāṅkhya and Yoga-smṛitis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him ; there is no other path to go' (Sve. Up. III, 8). And the Sāṅkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sāṅkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity¹. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sāṅkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure ; cp. *Bṛi.* Up. IV, 3, 16, 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrāgaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Gābāla Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smṛitis. If it be said that those Smṛitis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain

¹ I. e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.

all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedānta-texts only ; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7) ; 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (*Bṛi. Up.* III, 9, 26) ; and others.

4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world) ; and its being such, (i. e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on *Smṛiti*, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted ; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.—But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled ? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (*dharma*).—(To this the *pûrvapakshin* replies), The analogy between Brahman and *dharma* would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i. e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so *Sruti*, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the latter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than *Sruti* which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge

of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition—*sākshātkāra*—of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like *dharma*)¹. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).'²—The Vedāntic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedāntin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is

¹ The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of *anubhava*; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with *anubhava* than *Sruti* is, we have the right to apply reasoning to *Sruti*.—Ānanda Giri comments on the passage from *anubhavāvasānam* as follows: *brahmasākshātkārasya mokshopāyatayā prādhānyāt tatra sabdād api parokshagoṅarād aparokshārthasādharmyagoṅaras tarko-ntaraṅgam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity arthaḥ. Aitihiyamātreṇa pravādapāramparyamātreṇa parokshatayeti yāvat. Anubhavasya prādhānye tarkasyoktanyāyena tasminn antaraṅgatvād āgamasya ka bahiraṅgatvād antaraṅgabahiraṅgayor antaraṅgam balavad ity nyāyād uktam tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavaprādhānyam tu nādyāpi siddham ity āsaṅkyāhānubhaveti. Nanu Brahmagṛhānam vaidikatvād dharmavad adṛishṭaphalam eshavyam tat kuto-syānubhavāvasānāvidyānivartakatvam tatrāha moksheti. Adhishṭhānasākshātkārasya suktyādigṛhāne tadavidyātat-kāryanivartakatvadṛishṭeḥ, brahmagṛhānasyāpi tarkavasād asambhāvanādinirāsadvārā sākshātkāraśāyinas tadavidyādinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nāḍṛishṭaphalatety arthaḥ.*

gold the material cause of earthen vessels ; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness ; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality ; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).—But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul ; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.—This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c. ; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sâṅkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything¹, and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor² is there anything

¹ Niratisayâḥ, upaganâpâyadharmasūnyatvam niratisayatvam. Ān. Gi.

² A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.

to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature ; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.—Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause ; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification¹. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).—This reasoning—the *pūrvapakshin* replies—if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between

¹ In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; *samaste gagati sato'pi kaitanyasya tatra tatrāntaḥkaraṇaparivāmanūparāgād anupalabdhir aviruddhā. Ān. Gi.*

Brahman and the world, which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent ; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference ; as is declared in the latter part of the Sûtra, ' And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world—which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.—must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause ; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be ' of such a nature,' i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, ' It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ' (Taît. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.—But—somebody might again object—the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. ' The earth spoke ; ' ' The waters spoke ' (Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2 ; 4) ; and, again, ' Fire thought ; ' ' Water thought ' (*Kh.* Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, ' These *prâṇas* when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman ' (*Bṛi.* Up. VI, 1, 7) ; and, again, ' They said to Speech : Do thou sing out for us ' (*Bṛi.* Up. I, 3, 2).—To this objection the *pûrvapakshin* replies in the following Sûtra.

5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.

The word ' but ' discards the doubt raised. We are

not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so? 'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute of the *prāṇas* make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in *prāṇa*' (Kau. Up. II, 14).—And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavādas, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ār. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the *prāṇas* we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Pragâpati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Pragâpati had advised, departing from the body for some time ('They went to their father Pragâpati and said,' &c.; *Kh. Up. V, 1, 7*); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to *prāṇa* (*Bri. Up. VI, 1, 13*), &c.; all of them proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending

deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle.—From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause.

To this objection raised by the *pûrvapakshin* the next *Sûtra* replies.

6. But it is seen.

The word 'but' discards the *pûrvapaksha*.

Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.—But—to state an objection—the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.—Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature—due to the cause passing over into the effect—between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and

cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature ; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (*sattā*), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).—He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known ; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting ; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman ? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the *pūrvapakshin* that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are) ; but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of

perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' (*Rig-v. Samh.* X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (*īśvara*)¹ of extraordinary power and wisdom.

There are also the following *Smṛiti* passages to the same effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable²;' 'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great *ṛishis*. For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great *ṛishis*' (Bha. Gī. X, 2).—And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,

¹ On *īśvara* in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41.

² The line '*prakṛtibhyaḥ param*,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted.

according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c.¹ The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).—He², moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sāṅkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i. e. in our case, the non-intelligent *pradhāna* of the Sāṅkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.—(So much for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

¹ Ānanda Giri on the above passage: *śrutyākāṅkshitam tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udāharati svapnānteti. Svapnagāgaritayor mithovyabhikārad ātmanaḥ svabhāvas tadvattvābhāvād avasthādvayena tasya svato=samprkṛtatvam ato gīvasyāvasthāvatvena nābrahmatvam ity arthaḥ. Tathāpi dehādītādātmyenātmano bhāvān na niḥprapañkabrahmatety āsaṅkyāha samprasāde kṛti. Satā somya tadā sampanno bhavattīti śruteḥ sushupte niḥprapañkasadātmavāgamād ātmanas tathāvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity arthaḥ. Dvaitagrāhipratyakshādvirodhāt katham ātmano=dvītyābrahmatvam ity āsaṅkya taggatvādihetunā brahmātiriktavastvabhāvasiddher adhyakshādīnām atatvavedakaprāmāṇyād avirodhād yuktam ātmano=dvītyābrahmatvam ity āha prapañkasyeti.*

² Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a *vaiśaṅkṣya* of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.

7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i. e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you—the Vedântin—who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.

This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negated. The negation (implied in 'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 6*). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect (as after it).—But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities)!—True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.—This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.

8. On account of such consequences at the time

of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.—If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquires the latter with its properties. As therefore—on your doctrine—the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.—Another objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist).—A third objection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world.—If you finally say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible.—For all these reasons the Vedānta doctrine is objectionable.

To this the next Sūtra replies.

9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances.

There is nothing objectionable in our system.—The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its

cause would inquninate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are parallel instances,' i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquninating with their qualities the causes into which they are re-absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i. e. clay), impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re-absorption. You (i. e. the pûrvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re-absorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And¹ that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.

Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 6); 'The Self is all this' (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is this before' (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 1).

With regard to the case referred to in the *Sruti*-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the

¹ Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâs ken nâvatish/heran na tarhi kâranadharmâ api tish/heyus taylor abhedât tatrâhânanyatye. pîti. Ân. Gi.

effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also.—We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedānta have made the following declaration, ‘When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Māyā awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dreamless non-duality’ (Gauḍap. Kār. I, 16).

So far we have shown that—on our doctrine—there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like.—With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise refer to the ‘existence of parallel instances.’ For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, ‘All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a

wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again' (*Kh. Up.* VI, 9, 2 ; 3). For just as during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge.—Herewith the objection that—according to our doctrine—even the finally released souls would be born again is already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.—The last alternative finally (which the *pûrvapakshin* had represented as open to the *Vedântin*), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the *Vedântins* themselves.—Hence the system founded on the *Upanishads* is in every way unobjectionable.

10. And because the objections (raised by the *Sāṅkhya* against the *Vedānta* doctrine) apply to his view also.

The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.—The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the *pradhāna* being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes that from a *pradhāna* devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the *Sāṅkhya* is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the *Sāṅkhya* also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the *Sāṅkhya* here also is the same as ours.—And, further, if

(as the Sāṅkhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the *pradhāna* ¹.—It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sāṅkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened —by the outcome of the above discussion—in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no-real difficulties ².

11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.

In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn

¹ For if they are effects of the *pradhāna* they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.

² And that the Vedānta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.

by other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Kaṇāda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.

But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only ; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform.—Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the śāstra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right.—He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (*Smṛiti*) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu *Smṛiti* XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments¹. (No fear that because the

¹ The whole style of argumentation of the *Mīmāṃsā* would be

pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be ill-founded too ;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid. —For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.

Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.—Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accomplished actually existing things ; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge ; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known ; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge ?—Nor can it be said that he who maintains the

impossible, if all reasoning were sound ; for then no pûrvapaksha view could be maintained.

pradhāna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sāṅkhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.—Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedānta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradhāna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.—But now some dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedānta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sūtrakāra, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by

either Manu or Vyāsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhāna doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped 'otherwise' (see the preceding Sūtra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.—Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and arthavādas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge¹). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite².—Hence Scripture cannot be acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?' we give you the fol-

¹ The following arthavāda-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning.

² Which are to be known from the Veda only.

lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered into it,' *Taitt. Up.* II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting

adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

14. The non-difference of them (i. e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as 'origin' and the like.

The¹ refutation contained in the preceding Sūtra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause.—How so?—'On account of the scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known; viz. *Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4*, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,' &c.—The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay², there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far

¹ *Parizānavādam avalambyāpātato virodham samādhāya vivartavādam āsritya paramasamādhānam āha. Ān. Gi.*

² *Ānanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramārthato vigñātam iti sambandhaḥ.*

as they are clay they are true.—This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase ‘having its origin in speech’ to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.—Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, ‘Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 4, 1).—Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the ‘and others’ of the Sûtra. Such texts are, ‘In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that’ (*Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 7); ‘This everything, all is that Self’ (*Bri. Up.* II, 4, 6); ‘Brahman alone is all this’ (*Mu. Up.* II, 2, 11); ‘The Self is all this’ (*Kh. Up.* VII, 25, 2); ‘There is in it no diversity’ (*Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 25).—On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert¹)—; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman.—But—it might be objected—Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers

¹ *Drish/eti kadâkîd drish/am punar nash/am anityam iti yâvat.—Drish/agrahanasôkîtam prattikâle=pi sattârâhityam tatraiva hetvan-taram âha svarûpeneti. Ân. Gi.*

and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches ; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam ; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the Veda—which depend on the karmakāṇḍa—may be established in connexion with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.

This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ‘as clay they are true’ asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase ‘having its origin in speech’ declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, ‘In that all this has its Self;’ and, again, ‘That is true;’ whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, ‘That is the Self; thou art that, O Svetaketu!’ teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world—which is based on the individual soul—having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in

addition to the element of unity.—Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' *Bri. Up.* II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (*Kh. VI*, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false-minded¹? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' *Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.—Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true?

Other objections are started.—If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends

¹ In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.

does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?

These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.—But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the Vedānta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing¹.—This objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)

¹ I. e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes.

and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person.—But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal!—These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise.—(We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be considered as refuted¹.—Scripture also (in the passage, ‘If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his work’) declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues ‘if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,’ intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified.—It is, moreover, known from the experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the

¹ Svapnagâgraddehayor vyabhikāre·pi pratyabhigñānāt tadanu-
gatâtmaikyasiddhes kaitanyasya ka dehadharmatve rūpādivat tadanu-
palabdhiprasaṅgād avagates kâbâdhât tadrūpasyâtmano dehadvayâti-
rekasiddher dehamâtrâtmaivâdo na yukta ity arthaḥ. Ân. Gi.

Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction¹. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise ; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (*Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2*), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.

But—it may be said—(that would not be a mere assumption, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman

¹ As long as the 'vyavahāra' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahāra ; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahāra vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.

capable of modification ; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications.—This objection—we reply—is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman, teach it to be absolutely changeless (*kû†astha*). Such passages are, ‘ This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman ’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25*) ; ‘ That Self is to be described by No, no ’ (*Bri. Up. III, 9, 26*) ; ‘ It is neither coarse nor fine ’ (*Bri. Up. III, 8, 8*). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, ‘ Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)? ’ we remark that the qualification, ‘ absolutely changeless ’ (*kû†astha*), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.—Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result ; for in the passage which begins, ‘ That Self is to be described by No, no,’ we read later on, ‘ O *Ganaka*, you have indeed reached fearlessness ’ (*Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4*). We have then¹ to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own—as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this

¹ *Tatreti, srish†yâdisrutinâm svârthe phalavaikalye sat†ti yâvat. Ân. Gi.*

world—is merely to be applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter¹. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications² would be inappropriate, as the state of final release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.

But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.—This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i. e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent *pradhāna* or any other principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.—But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?—Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either

¹ A *Mīmāṃsā* principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.

² According to the *Śruti* 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself.'

as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it¹, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in *Sruti* and *Smṛiti* the illusion (*mâyâ*), power (*śakti*), or nature (*prakṛiti*) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' (*Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1*); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*); 'He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (*Taitt. Ār. III, 12, 7*); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (*Sve. Up. VI, 12*).—Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called *gīvas* (individual souls) or cognitional Selves (*viġñānātman*), which indeed are one with his own Self—just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether—but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i. e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (*Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1*); 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 13*.) In this manner the Vedānta-texts declare that for him who has reached the

¹ *Tattvānyatvābhyām iti, na hīśvaratvena te nirukyete gadāgadāyor abhedāyogāt nāpi tato nyatvena niruktim arhataḥ svātantryena sattāsphūrtyasambhavāt na hi gadām agadānapekshyam sattāsphūr-timad upalakshyate gadātvabhaṅgaprasaṅgāt tasmād avidyātmake nāmarūpe ity arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does not exist. The Bhagavadgītā also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance; hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gī. V, 14; 15) declares that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgītā states; compare *Bri. Up.* IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gī. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arguna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.' The Sūtrakāra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding Sūtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).—The view of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on the qualified (*saguna*) Brahman.

15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.

For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists; for in that case non-difference

does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its effect ¹.—But—it may be objected—even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed only when fire exists.—We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.—Well, then—the objector will say—let us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind ² does not exist unless fire exists.—Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ (buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly ³. And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.—Or else we have to read (in the Sûtra) ‘bhâvât,’ and to translate, ‘and on account of the existence or observation.’ The non-difference of cause and effect results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing called ‘cloth,’ in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre-

¹ So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.

² For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.

³ I. e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.—Tad-bhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam ka kâr-yasya kâraṇânyatve hetur dhûmavîshasya kâgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatve pi na tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam agnibhânasya dhûmabhânâdhînâtât.

gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth, according to *Kṛ. Up. VI, 4*); those, again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world; not to *pradhāna*, &c.), we have already explained.

16. And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.

For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which is' (*Kṛ. Up. VI, 2, 1*); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self, one only' (*Ait. Ār. II, 4, 1, 1*), the effect which is denoted by the word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.

17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because

the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality (merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.

But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In the beginning this was that only which is not' (*Kṛ. Up. III, 19, 1*); and 'Non-existent'¹ indeed this was in the beginning' (*Taitt. Up. II, 7*). Hence Being (*sattvam*) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production.

This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the passage, 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is—in the complementary passage, 'That became existent'—referred to by the word 'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'

The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or posterior time.—Hence with reference to the other passage also, 'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute Non-existence is not meant.—It follows from all this that the designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those things which are distinguished

¹ For simplicity's sake, *asat* will be translated henceforth by non-existing.

by name and form are in ordinary language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation.

18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.

That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural passage.

We at first set forth the argumentation.—Ordinary experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?—Let us then maintain, the *asatkāryavādin* rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (*atisaya*) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.—What, we ask in return, do you understand by that '*atisaya*?' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the *atisaya* a certain power of the cause assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can

determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent ; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect ?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.—Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called *samavāya* connexion ¹.)—If, we reply, you assume the *samavāya* connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the *samavāya* itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by *samavāya*, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to maintain that the *samavāya* is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the *samavāya* relation ².—Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us assume that the *samavāya* connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.—Then, we reply, conjunction (*saṃyoga*) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the *samavāya*

¹ *Samavāya*, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the *Nyāya*, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.

² *Samavāyasya svātantryapakṣaḥ dūṣhayati anabhyupagamyamāne'keti. Samavāyasya samavāyibhiḥ sambandho neshyate kim tu svātantryam evety atrāyavāvayavinor dravyagunādīnāṃ ka viprakarṣaḥ syāt saṃnidhāyakābhāvād ity arthaḥ. Ān. Gi.*

connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion¹.—Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the samavāya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you—who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavāya relation—assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?—If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.—Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts².—In that case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain

¹ A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyāya tenet that *samyoga*, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (*guṇa*) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavāya relation.

² So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.

given parts we should always have to assume further parts¹.—Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.—That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in Srughna and in Pātaliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yagñadatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at Srughna and the other at Pātaliputra.—If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.—That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent², just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic-

¹ Kalpāntaram uthāpayati atheti, tathā ka yathāvayavaiḥ sūtram kusumāni vyāpnuvat katipayakusumagrahaṇe-pi gr̥hyate tathā katipayāvayavagrahaṇe-pi bhavaty avayavino grahaṇam ity arthaḥ. Tatra kim ārambhakāvayavair eva teshv avayavī vartteta kim vā tadatirikṭāvayavair iti vikalpyādyam pratyāha tadāpti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatirikṭāvayavair eva tatra vartamānam dr̥śh/am iti dr̥śh/āntagarbham hetum ākash/e koseti. Dvitiyam dūshayati anavastheti. Kalpitānantāvayavavyavahitatayā prakṛitāvayavino dūraviprakarshāt tantunish/katvam paśya na syād iti bhāvaḥ. Ān. Gi.

² I. e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.

tion. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is originated,' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated¹.' But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.—Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pūrṇavarman,' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal

¹ Every action, Saṅkāra says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.

agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never be.—But, the *asatkâryavâdin* here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its origination.—Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.—Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after

the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.—The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only¹.

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else

¹ Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pāda of this adhyāya.

(viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (*atiraya*) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.

The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra is the one (*Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1*) which refers to that which is. That passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, co-ordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,' proves that the effect exists in—and is non-different from—the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by *samavâya*, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c.

(VI, 1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in—and is not different from—the cause.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object ; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.—Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.

20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air—such as *prāṇa* the ascending vital air, *apāna* the descending vital air, &c.—are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.—Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes, be considered as something else than vital air ; for wind (air) constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.—As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and

non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural passage that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (*Kh. Up. VI, 1, 3*) is fulfilled¹.

21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the passage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O Svetaketu!' (*Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7*).—Or else (if we interpret 'the other' of the Sûtra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the passage, 'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the unmodified Brahman, to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following passage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (*Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2*), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,

¹ Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.

look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' discards the *pûrvapaksha*.—We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural passages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' *Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' *Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1*; 'Then he becomes

united with the True,' *Kh. Up.* VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' *Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.—And if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.—Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such passages as 'that art thou,' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selves; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.

23. And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being

precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandal-wood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragranciness, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.—Further¹ arguments are furnished by the fact of all effects having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).

24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).

Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with?—We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.

This objection is not valid, because causation is possible

¹ Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the 'and' of the Sūtra.

in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn ; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, ' There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge ' (Sve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects ; just as milk is.

25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.

Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary ?

We reply, ' Like gods and others.' As gods, fathers, *ṛishis*, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any

extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power—a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavādas, itihāsas, and purāṇas;—and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be assumed to create the world by itself without extraneous means.

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.—The gods and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent Selves. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being¹; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.—Hence all these illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i. e. means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which

¹ The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva *ketanā*' as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read *ketanaḥ*.

is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.—Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.—The consequence of the Vedânta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, ‘He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint’ (Sve. Up. VI, 19); ‘That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); ‘That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); ‘He is to be described by No, no’ (Bri. Up. III, 9, 26); ‘It is neither coarse nor fine’ (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.—As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.—Another consequence of the Vedântic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive ‘to see’ Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.—And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.—If, on the other hand—in order to escape from these difficulties—we assume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.

Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.—Hence the Vedāntic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

The word 'but' discards the objection.—We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.—That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect ('That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (*Kh. Up.* III, 12, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be admitted.—Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authori-

tative—not the senses, and so on—must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the *Purāṇa* says: ‘Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes¹.’ Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But—our opponent will say—even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions ‘at the *atirātra* he is to take the *shodāsin*-cup,’ and ‘at the *atirātra* he is not to take the *shodāsin*-cup’) any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.

¹ *Prakṛtibhya iti, pratyakshadr̥śh/apadārthasvabhāvebhyo yat param vilakṣaṇam ākāryādyupadesagamyaṁ tad aśintyaṁ ity arthaḥ. Ān. Gī.*

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.—Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words 'O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (*Bṛi. Up. IV, 2, 4*).—Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.

28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods¹, &c.).

Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self

¹ This is the way in which Śaṅkara divides the Sūtra; Âṇ. Gi. remarks to 'loke=po, &c.: ātmani kēti vyākhyāya vīkīrās ka hīti vyākash/e.'

of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (*Bri. Up.* IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the *pradhāna* implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities—viz. the *pradhāna*—is the cause of an effect—viz. the world—which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the *pradhāna* as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.—But—it might be pleaded in favour of the *Sāṅkhyas*—they do not maintain their *pradhāna* to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the *pradhāna* forms a whole containing the three *guṇas* as its parts.—We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts¹. And each *guṇa* by itself assisted merely by the two other *guṇas* constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature².—So that the objection lies against the *Sāṅkhya*

¹ So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else—against the assumption—consist of parts.

² The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three *guṇas* in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.

view likewise.—Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the *pradhâna* rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the *pradhâna* consists of parts.—If you do that, we reply, it follows that the *pradhâna* cannot be eternal, and so on.—Let it then be said that the various powers of the *pradhâna* to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.—Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom¹. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.

30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).

We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.—How then—it may be asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?—He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, ‘because that is seen.’ For various scriptural passages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, ‘He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is

¹ As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.

never surprised' (*Kh. Up.* III, 14, 4); 'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (*Kh. Up.* VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail)' (*Mu. Up.* I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Gârgi, sun and moon stand apart' (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 9); and other similar passages.

31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

Let this be granted.—Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action¹; so, for instance, in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (*Bri. Up.* III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavâdas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?

The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears,' *Sve. Up.* III, 19) declares that Brahman,

¹ The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sûtra 24.

although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.

32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.—The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, 'on account of actions having a purpose.'—We know from ordinary experience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, 'Verily everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear' (*Bṛi. Up. II, 4, 5*). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various contents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also.—Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intelligent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive.—That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.—Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.

33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.

The word 'but' discards the objection raised.—We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no

reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature¹, without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned².—Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says. —Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of

¹ The nature (svabhāva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Mâyā joined with time and karman.

² This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Mâyā the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. Avidyā naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bhā.

Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîlādāv asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva nivṛtter api darsanâd īśvarasyâpi mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm tathâbhâve vinâpi samyagjñānam samsârasamukhittir iti tatrâha na keti. Anirvâkyâ khalv avidyâ parasyesvarasya ka svabhâvo lileti kokyate tatra na prâtīkasvabhāvâyâm anupapattir avataraṭīy arthah.

his regarding (merit and demerit) ; for so (Scripture) declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.—The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy ; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy ; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly ; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, 'because he is bound by regards.' If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame ; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of *Parganya*, the Giver of rain. For as *Parganya* is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings

are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.—And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, ‘For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed’ (Kaush. Up. III, 8)¹; and, ‘A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work’ (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). Smṛiti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, ‘I serve men in the way in which they approach me’ (Bha. Gī. IV, 11).

35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord’s having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

But—an objection is raised—the passage, ‘Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,’ affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of

¹ From this passage we must not—the commentators say—infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Parganya does).

condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen ; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free from inequalities.

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.—The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning ; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.—To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sūtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).

The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence ; and further, as then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions¹. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed ; so that—on the doc-

¹ Rāgadvēṣhamohā rāgādayas te ka puruṣaṁ dukhādibhiḥ klīṣyanti klesās teshāṁ vāsanāḥ karma pravṛtītanugunās tābhir ākṣiptaṁ dharmādīlakṣaṇaṁ karma tadapekṣhāvīdyā. Ān. Gi.

trine of the world having a beginning—we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.—Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, ‘Let me enter with this living Self (*gīva*),’ &c. (*Kh. Up.* VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, ‘the living Self’—a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the *prāṇas*—shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the *prāṇas* would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world’s beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those *prāṇas*? Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the *prāṇas*; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.—Moreover, we have the mantra, ‘As the creator formerly devised (*akalpayat*) sun and moon’ (*Ri. Samh.* X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former *Kalpas*. *Smṛiti* also declares the world to be without a beginning, ‘Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support’ (*Bha. Gi.* XV, 3). And the *Purāṇa* also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future *Kalpas*.

37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which

it was to show why his view should be accepted.—Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present—Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,—on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.

SECOND PÂDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. That which is inferred (by the Sâṅkhyas, viz. the *pradhâna*) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedânta to refute the Sâṅkhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.—There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sâṅkhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu-

ments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the Sāṅkhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sūtras of the first adhyāya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them again?—The task—we reply—which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sāṅkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedānta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedānta-texts.

The Sāṅkhyaś, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.—Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i. e. inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness¹ have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhāna. This pradhāna which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications², in order thus to effect the purposes (i. e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.—The existence of the pradhāna is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like³.

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you Sāṅkhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point

¹ The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (*guṇa*) of the pradhāna. Sā. Kā. 12, 13.

² Viz. the great principle (*mahat*), *ahaṅkāra*, &c. Sā. Kā. 3.

³ The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sā. Kā. 15; Sā. Sūtras I, 129 ff.

out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like—things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and; on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the *pradhâna* is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the *pradhâna* also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c.¹ Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent

¹ If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.

cause exists.—For the reason detailed in the above, i. e. on account of the impossibility of the ‘orderly arrangement’ (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.—The word ‘and’ (in the Sūtra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhāna cannot be inferred, viz. ‘on account of the non-possibility of endowment,’ &c. For it cannot be maintained¹ that all outward and inward effects are ‘endowed’ with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i. e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.² And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on³.—(Turning to the next Sāṅkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhāna from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhāna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several

¹ As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhāna.

² And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.

³ Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sāṅkhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.—‘If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.—And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sāṅkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.’ Bhā.

antecedents¹; for they also are limited².—Further³, it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.—The three *gunas*, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.—Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent *pradhâna* left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots—which are in their own nature non-intelligent—enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the Sâṅkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.—But, the Sâṅkhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel-

¹ *Samsargapûrvakatvaprasaṅga itī gunânām samsrīṣhāṇekavastuprakṛīkatvaprasaktir ity arthaḥ.* Âṇ. Gi.

² For they limit one another.

³ To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).

lignant being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.—Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sāṅkhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedāntin avers)?—We must, the Sāṅkhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The¹ existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.—Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we—the Vedāntins—make the following reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i. e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed

¹ The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.—*Pratyakṣatvābhāve katham ātmasiddhir ity āsāṅkya anumānād ity āha, pravṛtīti. Anumānasiddhasya ketanasya na pravṛtīḥ śrayateti darsayitum evakāraḥ. Katham anumānam ity apekṣhāyām tatprakāram sūkayati kevaleti. Vailakṣṇyam prāṇādimattvam. Ān. Gi.*

to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be raised—your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—If it finally be objected that (on the Vedânta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Mâyâ, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

3. If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

Well, the Sâṅkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as, non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind; so the pradhâna also, although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in

the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' *Bṛi. Up. III, 7, 4*; and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gārgî, some rivers flow to the East,' &c., *Bṛi. Up. III, 8, 9*), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle¹ cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases.—If, finally, our opponent should point to *Sūtra II, 1, 24* as contradicting the present *Sūtra*, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.

4. And because (the *pradhâna*), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

The three *gunas* of the *Sāṅkhyas* when in a state of equipoise form the *pradhâna*. Beyond the *pradhâna* there exists no external principle which could either impel the *pradhâna* to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (*purusha*), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor restrains from—action. As therefore the *pradhâna* stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (*mahat*) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord,

¹ Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence. — *Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatvam sâdhyavati pakshē pravishatvam eva tañ ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyâpy upalakshanam, anupanyâso na vyabhihârabhûmir ity arthañ. Ān. Gi.*

on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being connected with the power of illusion (mâyâ).

5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).

Let this be (the Sâṅkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhâna also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhâna is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply.—The transformation of the pradhâna might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only¹. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by

¹ It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's

applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.—For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the *pradhâna* cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.

6. Even if we admit (the Sāṅkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the *pradhâna*).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sāṅkhya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sūtra, viz. that the *pradhâna* is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous activity of the *pradhâna* has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the *pradhâna* is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the *pradhâna* does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) ¹? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release ².—If release, then the activity of the *pradhâna* would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the

body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.

¹ Anâdheyâtisayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâtisayasûnyasetye arthaḥ. Ân. Gi.

² For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the *pradhâna* aims—ex hypothesi—only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.

state of release ; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.¹—If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhâna to be enjoyed (by the soul)², there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhâna ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhâna nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.—If, finally, you should assume the pradhâna to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhâna) would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhâna does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place³.—It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhâna enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.

7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron) ; thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).

Well then—the Sâṅkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances—let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move ; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhâna.—Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old

¹ I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.

² *Trīṇīye-pi katipayarabdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva muktiḥ syâd iti manvâno dvitīyam pratyâha ubhayârthateti.* Âṇ. Gi.

³ The MSS. of Âṇanda Giri omit *samsârânuḥkṛhedât* ; the Bhāmatī's reading is : *Sargasaktyanuḥkṛhedavad drīksaktyanuḥkṛhedât*

position, according to which the *pradhâna* is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the *pradhâna*? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the *pradhâna* by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and *pradhâna*) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.—The *pradhâna* then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the *pradhâna*, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.—Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sûtra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the *pradhâna*'s part) have to be considered ¹.—The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedântins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in *Mâyâ* and is thus superior (to the soul of the *Sâṅkhyas*).

8. And, again, (the *pradhâna* cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three *guṇas*).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the *pradhâna* is not possible.—The condition of the *pradhâna*

¹ On the theory that the soul is the cause of the *pradhâna*'s activity we again have to ask whether the *pradhâna* acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.

consists in the three *gunas*, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the *gunas* cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the *gunas*, the production of the great principle and the other effects—which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the *gunas*—is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (*pradhâna*) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But—the Sāṅkhya resumes—we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the *gunas* to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the *gunas* from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the *gunas* are admitted to be of an unsteady nature ; hence the *gunas* themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the *pradhâna* being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sāṅkhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedāntic doctrine of Brahman.—Moreover, if the *gunas* were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two

things would happen ; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause ; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it ; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before ¹.

10. And moreover (the Sāṅkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven ². In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only ³. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts *Sruti*, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and *Smṛti*, based on *Sruti*, is well known.—For these reasons also the Sāṅkhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sāṅkhya again brings a countercharge.—The system of the Vedāntins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable ; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering ⁴ are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For

¹ Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyogah. Ân. Gi.

² In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.

³ *Buddhi* in the latter case being the generic name for *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *manas*.

⁴ Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.

those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For—to adduce a parallel case—a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedântin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &c.¹, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light.—That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired² are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

¹ In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.

² 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case ; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and 'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.—The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion ; *anartha*) and the non-desiring person (*anarthin*). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage ; with both one person enters into relation by turns.

On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term 'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedānta teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.—But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning—we, the Vedāntins, reply—is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).—Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only ; how can the

one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?—Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?—That, we reply, is not difficult to see¹. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).—But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.—But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain.—Nor would you (the Sāṅkhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit² a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul³. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the *sattva-guṇa* is that which suffers, and the *guṇa* called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these two⁴. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards⁵ the *sattva-guṇa*, we point out that the employment of the phrase, ‘as it were,’ shows that the soul does not really suffer.

¹ In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedāntin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the *vyavahārika*-state, i. e. the phenomenal world.

² In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.

³ And that would be against the Sāṅkhya dogma of the soul’s essential purity.

⁴ So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.

⁵ *Ātmanas tapte sattve pratibimbitatvād yuktā taptir iti saṅkate sattveti.* An. Gi.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase 'as it were'¹. For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Vedāntic) doctrine also is free from objections².

But perhaps you (the Sāṅkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real³. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more undeniable⁴, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the *pradhāna*) is admitted to be eternal.—And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the *pradhāna*) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two—which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the *pradhāna* by the soul—and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the *guṇa*, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

¹ For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.

² The Sāṅkhya *Pūrvapakshin* had objected to the Vedānta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedāntin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sāṅkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.

³ Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.

⁴ For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sāṅkhya also—release depends.

And as¹ there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular *gunas*, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and *pradhâna* (i. e. non-discrimination); hence the disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the *Sāṅkhyas* cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the *Vedāntin*, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.

Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the *pradhâna* to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.

We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.—The *Vaiseshikas* argue as follows: The qualities which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.—This reasoning the *Sūtrakāra* shows to be fallacious, on the ground of the system of the *Vaiseshikas* themselves.

11. Or (the world may originate from Brahman)

¹ This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and *pradhâna* may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.

as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.

The system of the Vaiseshikas is the following:—The atoms which possess, according to their special kind ¹, the qualities of colour, &c., and which are of spherical form ², subsist during a certain period ³ without producing any effects ⁴. After that, the unseen principle (*adrishṭa*), &c. ⁵, acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause ⁶, they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i. e. of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (*anutva*) and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is

¹ I. e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.

² *Parimandala*, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. *Vais. Sūt.* VII, 1, 20.

³ Viz. during the period of each *pralaya*. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.

⁴ When the time for a new creation has come.

⁵ The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.

⁶ The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the *adrishṭa* and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.

admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (*mahattva*) and length. The same happens¹ when many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary compound combine to produce new effects.

Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything spherical ; or as from binary compounds, which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are big and long, not minute and short ; so this non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which you—the *Vaiśeṣika*—cannot, on your own principles, object.

Here the *Vaiśeṣika* will perhaps come forward with the following argumentation². As effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects. The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.

This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with

¹ I. e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).

² In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental *Vaiśeṣika* principle.

intelligence also ; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves ; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i. e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension¹, and therefore do not originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own ; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes ; as the Sûtras of Kaṇabhūg (Kaṇāda) themselves declare (Vais. Sût. VII, 1, 9, ' Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation ;' VII, 1, 10, ' The contrary of this (the big) is the minute ;' VII, 1, 17, ' Thereby length and shortness are explained² ').—Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not ; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin-

¹ I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.

² The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vaiseshika-sûtras, only the following words, ' Kāraṇabahutvāḥ ka ;' the ka of the Sûtra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and prakāya.—According to the Vaiseshikas the form of extension called anu, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i. e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.—The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i. e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing ; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to prakāya, i. e. accumulation. See the Upaskāra on Vais. Sût. VII, 1, 9 ; 10.

ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelligence¹. Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (*samyoga*) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sûtrakâra adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (Vais. Sût. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1, 6.—Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?)—Because, we reply, there we argued

¹ I.e. if the Vaiseshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.

against the Sāṅkhya, and at present we have to do with the Vaiśeṣika.—But, already once before (II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sāṅkhya are equally valid against the Vaiśeṣika?)—Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examination of the Vaiśeṣika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the *adrīṣṭa* inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co-operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end¹; an effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Kaṇāda's doctrine.—As we observe four elementary substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can-

¹ Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.

not be divided themselves ; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only ; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the *pralaya* (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (*karman*) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle ¹ joins the atom in which it resides to another atom ; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of *Kanāda*.

This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, impossible. For in the *pralaya* state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the

¹ Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.—*Adrish/āpeksham adrish/avatkshetragāsamīyogāpeksham iti yāvat. Ān. Gi.*

causes of the original action (by which the world is produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examination of the Sāṅkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the *adrishya* because at the time of *pralaya* its intelligence has not yet arisen¹. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion², continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle.—Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place; there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (*pradesa*). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.—Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.—If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-

¹ According to the Vaiseshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.

² The soul being all-pervading.

inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion ; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vaiseshika) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence ; but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavâya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.—But—the Vaiseshika is supposed to reply—we are conscious of the so-called samavâya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as

either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion ; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.—Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (*samyoga*) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like *samavāya*, not require another connexion¹. If you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a different thing², we reply that then *samavāya* also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (*guna*), and *samavāya* does not because it is not a quality ; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases³, and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the cause (of another connexion being required)⁴.—For these reasons those who acknowledge *samavāya* to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.

14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either

¹ Which is inadmissible on Vaiseshika principles, because *samyoga* as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by *samavāya*.

² Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.

³ Viz. the absolute difference of *samavāya* and *samyoga* from the terms which they connect.

⁴ Action (*karman*), &c. also standing in the *samavāya* relation to their substrates.

essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither ; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the *adrîshṭa* being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result ; or else the *adrîshṭa* and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable.

15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take place) ; as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vaiseshikas say, all substances composed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts ; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c., and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.

This fundamental assumption of the Vaiseshikas we declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent ; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com-

pared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the Vaiseshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Kaṇāda gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause.—The second reason also which Kaṇāda brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be possible'¹ (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedāntins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.—The third reason also given in the Vais. Sūtras (IV, 1, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sūtra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent². And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sūtra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of (originating) sub-

¹ Our Vaiseshika-sūtras read 'pratishedhabhāvaḥ;' but as all MSS. of Śaṅkara have 'pratishedhābhāvaḥ' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Ānandagiri's explanation: Kāryam anityam iti kārye viśeṣato nityatvanishedho na syād yadi kāraṇe py anityatvam ato nūnāṁ kāraṇānāṁ nityateti sūtrārthaḥ.

² Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called *trasareṇus*, constituting the *minima perceptibilia*.

stances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sûtra IV, 1, 5 would be a useless restatement.—Well, then (the Vaiseshika might say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sûtra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance ; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms¹.—There is no necessity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire².—Thus there would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the opposite of what the Vaiseshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be maintained.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross ; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet ; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or smaller

¹ As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.

² This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyâ by a mere parizâma and might again be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.

number of qualities as the respective elements.—Either assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their solid size (*mūrti*) will be increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations concerning effected material bodies.—If, on the other hand, we assume, in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.—Hence on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unacceptable.

17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

While the theory of the *pradhāna* being the cause of the world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda—as, for instance, *Manu*—with a view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine.—The *Vaiśeṣikas* assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be absolutely different from each other, and to have different characteristics;

just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another. Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative would involve the acceptance of the Sāṅkhya doctrine¹ and the abandonment of the Vaiśeṣika standpoint.—But (the Vaiśeṣika may say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on it.—True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

If you (the Vaiśeṣika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to exist without the other (*ayutasiddhi*²); we point out that things which are

¹ The Sāṅkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the *pradhāna* in various forms.—There is no need of assuming with Govindānanda that by the Sāṅkhya of the text we have to understand the Vedānta.

² *Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avinasyad aparāśritam evāvā-tish/hate tāv ayutasiddhau yathāvayavāvayavināu.*

ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these alternatives agrees with Vaiseshika principles. For the first alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads. So the Vaiseshika-sûtras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being non-separate in place.—If, in the second place, you explain ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha.—And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vaiseshikas make between conjunction (*samyoga*) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (*samavāya*) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect¹ cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. Perhaps the Vaiseshika will say that his definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that *samavāya* is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the Vaiseshika admits that the effect

¹ The connexion of cause and effect is of course *samavāya*.

may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer *ayutasiddha* (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated¹. And² just as conjunction, and not *samavâya*, is the connexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.—although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance—so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not *samavâya*.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, *samavâya* or *saṃyoga*, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be maintained that *saṃyoga* and *samavâya* have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, *Brâhmaṇa*, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence,' which however do not prove

¹ If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer *samavâya* but *saṃyoga*; and that contradicts a fundamental *Vaiśeṣika* principle.

² This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.

themselves to be separate entities.—Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.—Nor, again¹, does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.

Further², conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vaiseshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things—whether contradictory to reason or not—should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vaiseshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

¹ A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.

² It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into *samyoga* with each other, it is shown now that *samyoga* of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that *samyoga* of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (*samslesha*) any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish¹.

Let it then be said (the *Vaisesika* resumes) that the *samavāya* relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode—which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance—is not possible.—That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness can be established. For the *Vedāntins* acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause².—Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space³, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the *Vaisesika* doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the atoms.—If the *Vaisesika* replies that those very parts which are owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible)

¹ *Ekasambandhyākarṣaṇe yatra sambandhyantarākarṣaṇam tatra samsleshaḥ, sa tu sāvayavānām gatukāśaḥ/hādīnām drīṣṭo na tu niravayavaiḥ sāvayavānām, ato dvyanukasya sāvayavyaṣya niravayavena paramānūnā sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyābh.*

² In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.

³ For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.

atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. Earth—which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest thing of all—undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i. e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaiseshika might possibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts¹, we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.

18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the

¹ And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.

Vaiseshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic¹). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, *sarvāstitvavādin*); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, *viġñānavādin*); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, *sūnyavādin*²).—We first controvert those

¹ Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.

² The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the *Saṅkarabhāṣya*, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*.—The Nihilists are the *Mādhyamikas*; the Idealists are the *Yogākāras*; the *Sautrāntikas* and the *Vaiśbhāshikas* together constitute the class of the Realists.—I subjoin the account given of those sects in the *Brahmavidyābharana*.—*Buddhasya hi mādhyamika-yogākāra-sautrāntika-vaiśbhāshikasamgñakāś katvārah sishyāḥ. Tatra buddhena prathamam yān prati sarvam sūnyam ity upadisham te mādhyamikāś te hi gurunā yathoktam tathaiva śraddhayā gr̥hītavanta iti kr̥tvā nāpakr̥ishāḥ punas ka taduktasyārthasya buddhyanusārenākshepasyākṛīatvān notkr̥ishābuddhaya itī mādhyamikāḥ. Anyais tu sishyair gurunā sarvasūnyatva upadish/e gñānātīriktasya sarvasya sūnyatvam astu nāmeti gurūktir yoga itī bauddaiḥ paribhāshitopetāḥ tad upari ka gñānasya tu sūnyatvam na sambhavati tathātve gagadāndhyaprasaṅgāt sūnyasiddher apy asambhavāk keti buddhamate ākārātvena paribhāshita ākshepo pi kr̥ta itī yogākārāḥ, viġñānamātrāstitvavādināḥ. Tadanantaram anyaiḥ sishyaiḥ*

who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (*bhūta*) or elementary (*bhautika*); what is internal is either mind (*kitta*) or mental (*kaitta*). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard; those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.—The inward world consists of the five so-called ‘groups’ (*skandha*), the group of sensation (*rūpaskandha*), the group of knowledge (*viġñānaskandha*), the group of feeling (*vedanāskandha*), the group of verbal knowledge (*samġñāskandha*), and the group of impressions (*samskārankandha*)¹; which

pratīṣiddhasya katham sūnyatvam vaktum sakyam ato gñānavad vāhyārtho•pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so•stu, param tu so •numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathāṅgīkrītyaivam sishyamatim anusrīya kiyatparyantam sūtram bhavishyatīti taiḥ prīṣṭam atas te sautrāntikāḥ. Anye punar yady ayam ghaṭa iti praṭibhālād vāhyo•rtha upeyate tarhi tasyā eva praṭiter aparokṣhatvāt sa katham parokṣo•to vāhyo•rtho na pratyaksha iti bhāṣhā viruddhety ākshipann atas te vaibhāṣhikāḥ.

¹ The *rūpaskandha* comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called *bhautika*, they here re-appear as *kaittika* on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as *kaittika* in so far as they are perceived by the senses.—The *viġñānaskandha* comprises the series of self-cognitions (*ahamaham ity ālayaviġñānapravāhaḥ*), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the *Brahmavidyābhāṣya*, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (*savikalpakam nirvikalpakam ka pravṛtīviġñānasamġnitam*).—The *vedanāskandha* comprises pleasure, pain, &c.—The *samġñāskandha* comprises the cognition of things by their names (*gaur arva ityādisabdasamgalpitapratyayaḥ*, *Ān. Gi.*; *gaur arva ityevam nāmavisishṭasavikalpakaḥ pratyayaḥ*, *Go. Ān.*; *samġñā yagñadattādīpadatadullekhī savikalpapratyayo vā, dvītyapakṣhe viġñānapadena savikalpapratyayo na grāhyaḥ*, *Brahmavidyābh.*). The *samskārankandha* comprises passion, aversion, &c., *dharma* and *adharma*.—Compare also the *Bhāmatī*.—The *viġñānaskandha* is *kitta*, the other *skandhas* *kaitta*.

taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence¹.

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.—Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be established, i. e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (*abhiḡvalana*) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously². And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active³. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i. e. the *ālayavigñāna-pravāha*, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedāntins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms⁴.

¹ It has to be kept in view that the sarvāstitvavādins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.

² Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.

³ In consequence of which no release could take place.

⁴ The *Brahmaṇḍa-sūtra* explains the last clause—from *kṣaṇikatvāt ka*—somewhat differently: *Api ka paramāṇūnām api kṣaṇikatvābhyupagamān melanam na sambhavati, paramāṇūnām melanam paramāṇukriyādhīnam, tathā ka svakriyām prati paramāṇūnām kāraṇatvāt kriyāpūrvakṣaṇe paramāṇubhir bhāvyaṃ, kriyā*

(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)—For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality¹ of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like². All these terms con-

srayatayâ kriyâkshane-pi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam evam melanakshane-pi, nahi melanâsrayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ pravṛttir upapadyate, tathâ ka sthiraparamâṇusâdhyâ melanarûpâ pravṛttiḥ katham teshâm kṣaṇikatve bhavet.—Ānanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.

¹ The *kāramatvât* of Sāṅkara explains the *pratyayatvât* of the Sūtra; *kāryam* *praty ayate ganakatvena gakkhati*.

² The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the comment of the *Brahmavidyābharana*: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.—Impression (affection, *saṃskāra*) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.—Knowledge (*viġñāna*) is the self-consciousness (*aham ity ālayaviġñānasya vṛttilābhaḥ*) springing up in the embryo.—Name and form is the rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The

stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown—when examining the Vaiseshika doctrine—that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in

abode of the six (*shadâyatana*) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.—Touch (*sparsa*) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.—Feeling (*vedanâ*) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.—Desire (*trishnâ*) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.—Activity (*upâdâna*) is the effort resulting from desire.—Birth is the passing out from the uterus.—Species (*gâti*) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.—Decay (*garâ*).—Death (*maranam*) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (*mumûrshâ*).—Grief (*śoka*) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.—Lament (*paridevanam*) the lamentations on that account.—Pain (*duḥkha*) is such pain as caused by the five senses.—Durmanas is mental affliction.—The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

which the *adrishṭa* abides¹; how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i. e. souls), and that which abides in them (the *adrishṭa*).—Let us then assume (the Buddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.—But how—we ask—can they be the cause of that without which—as their abode—they themselves are not capable of existence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal *samsāra* the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.—Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself

¹ Ānanda Giri and Go. Ānanda explain: *Āsrayāśrayibhūteshv iti bhoktrivisheshanam adrishṭāśrayeshv ity arthaḥ*.—The Brahmagovindyaśāstra says: *Nityeshv āsrayāśrayibhūteshv anushv abhyupagamyamāneshu bhoktrishu ka satsv ity anvayaḥ*. *Āsrayāśrayibhūteshv ity asyopakāryopakārakabhāvaprāpteshv ity arthaḥ*.—And with regard to the subsequent *āsrayāśrayisūnyeshu: āsrayāśrayitvasūnyeshu, ayaṁ bhāvaḥ, sthireshu paramānushu yadanvaye paramānūnām samghātāpattiḥ yadvyatiरेके ka na tad upakārakam upakāryāḥ paramānavāḥ yena tatkrīto bhogaḥ prārthyate sa tatra karteti grahītum sakyate, kshanikeshu tu paramānushu anvayavyatiरेकाग्रahasyānekakshanasādhyasyāsambhavān nopakāryopakārakabhāvo nirdhārayitum sakyah*.—Ānanda Giri remarks on the latter: *Adrishṭāśrayakartrirāhityam āhārayeti*. Another reading appears to be *āsrayāśrayasūnyeshu*.

only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.—There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment¹ enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.—Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.—That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).—Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its

¹ *Bauddhânâm kṣhaṇapadena ghaṭḍir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu tadatiriktaḥ kaṣṭit kṣhaṇo nâma hâlo'sti. Brahmâvidyâbh.*

causal energy.—That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.—Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect ; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases¹.—Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and 'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.—In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.—Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.—That too cannot be, we reply ; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception ; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.—Hence

¹ And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?

we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause; while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.—Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.—That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes¹. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.—If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things² are momentary merely.

¹ These four causes are the so-called defining cause (*adhipati-pratyaya*), the auxiliary cause (*śahakāripratyaya*), the immediate cause (*samanantarapratyaya*), and the substantial cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*).—I extract the explanation from the *Brahmaṇḍa-sūtra*: *Adhipatir indriyam tad dhi kakshurādirūpam utpannasya gñānasya rūpādivishayatām niyakkhati niyāmakas ka loke adhipatir ity ukyate. Sahakārī ālokaḥ. Samanantarapratyayaḥ pūrvagñānam, bauddhamate hi kṣaṇikagñānasamtatau pūrvagñānam uttaragñānasya kāranam tad eva ka mana ity ukyate. Ālambanam ghaṭādiḥ. Etān hetūn pratiya prāpya kakshurādiganyam ity ādi.*

² *Samskāra* iti, tanmate pūrvakṣaṇa eva hetubhūtaḥ samskāro vāsaneti ka vyavahriyate kāryam tu tadviśayatayā karmavyutpattyā samskāraḥ, tathā ka kāryakāranātmakam sarvam bhāvarūpam kṣaṇikam iti pratigñārthaḥ. *Brahmaṇḍa-sūtra*.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (*samskrīta*) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,' and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (*abhāvamātra*), devoid of all positive characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded by an act of thought¹; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant destruction of the opposite kind²; by 'space' is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sūtra 24); the two other ones are refuted in the present Sūtra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series.—The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted³.—The latter

¹ As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.

² I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.—*Viparīta iti pratikṣhaṇam ghaṭādīnāṃ yuktyā sādhyamāno-kusalair avagantum asakyaḥ sūkṣhmo vināso-pratisamkhyānirodhaḥ. Brahmāv.*

³ A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really

alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence¹. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interruption.—For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'². As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatisfactory.

exist, since the Bauddhas define the *sattā* of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. *Sarvadaśanasamgraha*). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.

¹ Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.

² The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.

24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-samkhyāvirodha and aprati¹) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, ākāśa).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sūtras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from the Self.'—To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.—Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied—there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies¹.—Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following

¹ What does enable us to declare that there is āvaranābhāva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.

question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation.—Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (*upalabdhrî*) also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, 'I remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state of consciousness does arise.—When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I remember that that other person saw that and that.'—

In the case under discussion, however, the Vaināsika himself—whose state of consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'—knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vaināsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness.—Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. 'this' and 'that'—being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that'

would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only.—Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought ; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that ; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself ; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.—For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.

The system of the Vaināśikas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once,

as then no specification would be required¹. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, ('Entity does) not (spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c.—a thing certainly not actually observed.—If, again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions—just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on—we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.—Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor² does any one

¹ If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.—Cp. on this point the *Sarvādarsana-samgraha*.

² This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.

think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only.—The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition).—Hence as we see on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non-entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from non-existence has to be rejected.—We finally point out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly perplex the mind of every one?

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-active people also.

If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too

lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody.—Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, *vigñāna*) exist.—The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge¹, is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (*buddhi*). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our

¹ According to the *vigñānavādin* the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (*avabhāsa*) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is *māna*, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is *pramātra*, knowing subject.

doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms¹.—In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on².

Moreover, the cognitions—which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness—undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things.—

¹ If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.

² Avayavāvayavirūpo vāhyo rtho nāsti ken mā bhūḍ gātivyaktyādirūpas tu syād ity āraṅkyāha evam iti. Gātyādinām vyaktyādinām kṛtyantabhinnatve svāntaryaprasaṅgād atyantābhinnatve tadvadavāṭadbhāvād bhinnābhinnatvasya viruddhatvād avayavāvayavibhedavag gātivyaktyādibhedo pi nāstīty arthaḥ.

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.—If we be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas¹. In the beginningless *samsāra* ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both (the Vedāntins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions, without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions.—Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.

To all this we (the Vedāntins) make the following reply.—The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists,

¹ Vāsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.

any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?—If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as ‘like something external.’ If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they use the expression ‘like something external?’ No one says, ‘Vishnumitra appears like the son of a barren mother.’ If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external.—But—the Bauddha may reply—we conclude that the object of perception is only like something external because external things are impossible.—This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,

according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of knowledge ; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms?—Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects ; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as external.—For the same reason (i. e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness ; just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one permanent factor (from the two—or more—varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versâ the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar ; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct while the jar is one and the same ; in the same way as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot apprehend—or be apprehended by—each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld ; so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other ; the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c. ; the doctrine of the distinction of individuals and classes ; the

doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence and presence of right knowledge)¹.

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of extraordinary philosophic insight!—It cannot, moreover, be asserted in any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also must be apprehended by something different and so on *ad infinitum*. And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give light to the other.—But both these objections are unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no *regressus ad infinitum*. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witness-

¹ For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.

ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.—Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent).—We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.—The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows.—The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ‘I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the

false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state.—Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Baudhdha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the

variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position.—The same argument, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. ‘the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,’ and ‘mental impressions are not admitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.’—Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the ālayavigñāna, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (ālayavigñāna¹) assumed by you may constitute the abode

¹ The vigñānaskandha comprises vigñānas of two different kinds, the ālayavigñāna and the pravṛttivigñāna. The ālayavigñāna comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the pravṛttivigñāna comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the

of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (*pravṛtti-vigñāna*). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future¹, or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your *ālayavigñāna* to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the *ālayavigñāna* as well as everything else being momentary.—Or (to explain the Sūtra in a different way) as the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence)—for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From

latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.

¹ Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.

whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. —Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused.—So that—and this the Sūtra means to indicate—Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing, (the *Gaina* doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (*Gainas*).

The *Gainas* acknowledge seven categories (*tattvas*), viz. soul (*gīva*), non-soul (*agīva*), the issuing outward (*âsrava*), restraint (*saṃvara*), destruction (*nirgara*), bondage (*bandha*), and release (*moksha*)¹. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two. —They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called

¹ Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; *âsrava* is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects; *saṃvara* is the restraint of the activity of the senses; *nirgara* is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.—For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the *Ârhatta* chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

astikāyas ('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul (*gīva*), body (*pudgala*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), and space (*ākāśa*). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways¹.—To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the *saptabhaṅginaya*: somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity².

This doctrine we meet as follows.—Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tīrthakara (*Gina*) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether

¹ Cp. translation of *Sarvadarsanasamgraha*, p. 59.

² And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.

indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman.—Again, if we apply the *Gaina* reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.—If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination.—As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and vice versâ non-being excluding being—the doctrine of the *Arhat* must be rejected.—The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the *Gainas* as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness, and so on.—The *Gaina* doctrine that

aggregates are formed from the atoms—by them called pudgalas—we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the *Gaina* doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the *Gaina* doctrine an objection resulting from the *syādvāda*, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.—The *Gainas* are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man—which is of the size of the human body—when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age.—But why, the *Gaina* may ask, should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?—Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same place or not?—If you do not admit it, it follows that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of limited dimensions.—If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle only, the extension of all the particles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body

of limited size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

Well then, the *Gaina* may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it enters a small body.—To this hypothesis the next Sūtra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the *Gaina* doctrine of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of works and sunk in the ocean of *samsāra*, rises when its bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is freed from the encumbering clay¹.—Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.—We have further to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it. They cannot spring from the material elements

¹ Cp. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* translation, p. 58.

and re-enter the elements ; for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence of some other, general or special, reservoir of soul-particles.—Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and departing is itself indefinite.—On account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.

The Sûtra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sûtra has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth and so on, are non-permanent.—To this rejoinder our Sûtra replies that if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the *Gaina* view impossible.

36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).

Moreover, the *Gainas* themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be permanent¹, and that hence

¹ The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.

there is no difference between the three sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.—Or else (to explain the Sūtra in a somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the same size—whether minute or infinite—and not of the varying size of its bodies.—For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

The Sūtrakāra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.—But how do you know that that is the purport of the Sūtra (which speaks of the Lord ‘without any qualification’)?—From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Sūtra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sūtrakāra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the present Sūtra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedāntic tenet of the unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedānta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the

pradhāna and of the souls, and that pradhāna, soul, and Lord are of mutually different nature.—The Māhesvaras (Saivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Paśupati (Siva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Paśupati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause.—Similarly, the Vaiśeṣikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sūtra remarks 'the Lord, on account of the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhāna and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyāyikas themselves that 'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action' (Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the

Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with pity).—Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul ; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhâna).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhâna and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be ? It cannot be conjunction (*samyoga*), because the Lord, as well as the pradhâna and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet¹.—How, then, it may be asked, do you—the Vedântins—establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world) ?—There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (*tādâtmya*). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience,

¹ The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the Lord ; for that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a point which the Vedântins do not accept as proved.

may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedântin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.—For all these reasons the Sâṅkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis, for the following reason also.—Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the *pradhâna*, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted; for the *pradhâna*, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the *pradhâna* is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the *pradhâna* in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused

by the pradhāna. If the analogy between the pradhāna and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sūtras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate.—Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation).—This assumption also will not do; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.—They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhāna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhāna, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhāna, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradhāna, souls, and Lord is

defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one¹. From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the *samsāra*, that means their *samsāra* comes to an end, and their subjection to the *samsāra* comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire *samsāra* and the *samsāra* state of all souls. But the *pradhāna* which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by *samsāra*. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the *pradhāna*, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void.—Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the *pradhāna*, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.—But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now

¹ I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.

going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause.—But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that *Smṛiti*, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?—It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedānta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.

The so-called Bhāgavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat) Vāsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (*vyūha*), as Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva denotes the highest Self, Saṅkarṣaṇa the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (*manas*), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (*ahaṅkāra*). Of these four Vāsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects.—The believer after having worshipped Vāsudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (*abhiḡamana*), procuring of things to be offered (*upādāna*), oblation (*īgyā*), recitation of prayers, &c. (*svādhyāya*), and devout meditation (*yoga*), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Nārāyaṇa, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as ‘He is one-fold, he is threefold’ (*Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2*), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhāgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach,

&c. ; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from *Smṛiti* and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that *Saṅkarshana* springs from *Vāsudeva*, *Pradyumna* from *Saṅkarshana*, *Aniruddha* from *Pradyumna*. It is not possible that from *Vāsudeva*, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate *Saṅkarshana*, i.e. the individual soul ; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place ; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.—That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the *Bhāgavata* hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The *Bhāgavata* hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as *Devadatta*, or any other workman. But the *Bhāgavatas* teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed *Saṅkarshana*, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed *Pradyumna*, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the *ahaṅkāra* termed *Aniruddha*. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (*Vāsudeva*, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in *Sūtra* 42).

Let us then—the *Bhāgavatas* may say—understand by *Saṅkarshana*, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.

All these are Vāsudevas free from faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sûtra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.—Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vāsudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?—If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vāsudeva.—Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?—In that case the objection urged in Sûtra 42 remains valid. For Saṅkarshana cannot be produced from Vāsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Saṅkarshana, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause—as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect)—and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pāñkarâtra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vāsudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vāsudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vāsudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhāgavata system, with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and

ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selves, holy Vāsudevas, and so on.—Moreover, we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance, blames the Veda, ‘Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas *Sândilya* studied this *sâstra*.’—For this reason also the Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pahlavi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.									
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
Gutturales.										
1 Tenuis	k	क	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	k
2 " aspirata	kh	ख	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	kh
3 Media	g	ग	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	. . .
4 " aspirata	gh	घ	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	𐬘	. . .
5 Gutturo-labialis	q
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	ङ	{ 𐬙 (ng) } { 𐬚 (n) }
7 Spiritus asper	h	ह	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	h, hs
8 " lenis	,
9 " asper faucalis	'h
10 " lenis faucalis	'h
11 " asper fricatus	'h
12 " lenis fricatus	'h
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)										
13 Tenuis	k	क	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	k
14 " aspirata	kh	ख	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	kh
15 Media	g	ग	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	. . .
16 " aspirata	gh	घ	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	. . .
17 " Nasalis	ñ	ङ	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	𐬛	. . .

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.		II Class.								III Class.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.								
18 Semivocalis	y	य	𐬨 						

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	o									ā
2 Laryngo-palatalis	œ									...
3 " labialis	ø									...
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	𐬀	𐬀	ا	ا	א	ā
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	𐬁	𐬁	آ	آ	א	ā
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	𐬂	𐬂	ی	ی	י	i
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	𐬃	𐬃	ی	ی	י	ī
8 Dentalis brevis	u			उ	𐬄	𐬄	و	و	ו	...
9 " longa	ū			ऊ	𐬅	𐬅	و	و	ו	...
10 Lingualis brevis	ɾi			ऋ	𐬆	𐬆
11 " longa	ɾī			ॠ	𐬇	𐬇
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	𐬄	𐬄	و	و	ו	...
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	𐬅	𐬅	و	و	و	...
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए	𐬈	𐬈
15 " longa	ē (ai)	(e)		ऐ	𐬉	𐬉
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	ai	(ai)		...	𐬊	𐬊
17 " "	ei (ēi)			...	𐬋	𐬋
18 " "	oi (ōu)			...	𐬌	𐬌
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			...	𐬍	𐬍
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		...	𐬎	𐬎
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	au	(au)		...	𐬏	𐬏
22 " "	eu (ēu)			...	𐬐	𐬐
23 " "	ou (ōu)			...	𐬑	𐬑
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			...	𐬒	𐬒
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			...	𐬓	𐬓
26 Labialis fracta	ti			...	𐬔	𐬔

Princeton University Library



32101 076513603

NOT TO BE TAKEN

FROM

SREL

THIS ROOM

5021

798





This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

ANDOVER-HARVARD LIBRARY



AH 659K 0

**HARVARD DEPOSITORY
BRITTLE BOOK**



362
30

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

London
HENRY FROWDE



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

THE
SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

Translation
F. MAX MÜLLER

VOL. XXXV

C.
Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1890

[*All rights reserved*]

1881
Trinity School.

Oxford

PRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

BY HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

○

Milindapañha.
THE QUESTIONS

OF

KING MILINDA

TRANSLATED FROM THE PÂLI

BY

Thomas William
T. W. RHYS DAVIDS

○.
Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1890

[All rights reserved]

BL

1010

.53

v.35

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	xi
The Sinhalese version of the Milinda	xii
Buddhaghosa's four references to it	xiv
MSS. and edition of the text	xvi
King Milinda the same as Menander	xviii
Notices of him in classical writers	xix
His coins	xx
His birthplace, Kalasi, probably=Karisi	xxiii
The author not the same as Nâgârjuna	xxv
Passages in the Pi/akas referred to silently	xxvii
Pâli books, &c., referred to by name	xxix
Pi/aka passages quoted	xxxix
Length of the Pi/akas	xxxvi
Results of these comparisons	xxxviii
Differences between our author and the Pi/akas	xl
Proper names outside the Pi/akas	xlili
Differences of language between our author and the Pi/akas	xlvi
The Milinda as a work of art	xlvi

TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT.

Book I. The Secular Narrative	1
Description of Sâgala	2
Previous births of Milinda and Nâgasena	4
Milinda's greatness and wisdom and love of disputation	6
Birth story of Nâgasena	10
His admission as a novice into the Order	20
His conversion	25
His attainment of Arahatsip	29
Milinda confutes Âyupâla	30
Nâgasena arrives; his character	34
Milinda goes to him	36

	PAGE
Book II. The Distinguishing Characteristics of Ethical Qualities	40
Individuality and name	41
The chariot simile	43
The riddle of seniority	45
(Interlude) How kings and scholars respectively discuss	46
No soul in the breath	48
Aim of Buddhist renunciation	49
Re-incarnation	50
Wisdom and reasoning distinguished	51
'Virtue's the base'	53
Faith	54
Perseverance	57
Mindfulness	58
Meditation	60
Continued identity and re-individualisation	63-77
Wisdom and intelligence distinguished	66
Time	77
Origin and development of qualities	82
Is there a soul?	86
Thought and sight	89
Contact, sensation, and idea	92
Book III. The Removal of Difficulties	100
Rich and poor	100
Renunciation again	101
Nirvâṇa and Karma	106
Difficulties of various kinds as to transmigration, individuality, and the Buddha	120
Book IV. The Solving of Dilemmas	137
Milinda finds dilemmas in the Holy Writ	137
And takes the Buddhist vows	138
Third meeting between him and Nāgasena	140
1st Dilemma. If the Buddha has really quite passed away, what is the good of paying honour to his relics?	144
2nd Dilemma. How can the Buddha be omniscient, when it is said that he reflects?	154
3rd Dilemma. Why did he admit Devadatta to the Order, if he knew of the schism he would create?	162

	PAGE
4th Dilemma. Vessantara's earthquake	170
5th Dilemma. King Sivi	179
7th Dilemma. Difference in prophecies as to the dura- tion of the faith	185
8th Dilemma. The Buddha's sinlessness and his suf- ferings	190
9th Dilemma. Why should the Buddha have meditated ?	196
10th Dilemma. Why did the Buddha boast ?	198
11th Dilemma. How could the Buddha revoke regu- lations he had made ?	202
12th Dilemma. Why did the Buddha refuse to answer certain questions ?	204
13th Dilemma. Contradictory statements by the Buddha as to fear	206
14th Dilemma. How can Pirit cure disease ?	213
15th Dilemma. How could the evil one turn people against the Buddha ?	219
16th Dilemma. Contradiction as to conscious crime . .	224
17th Dilemma. Contradiction as to the Buddha's wish to be the chief	225
18th Dilemma. How could a schism have arisen in the Buddha's life ?	227
19th Dilemma. Why do members of the Order accept reverence ?	232
20th Dilemma. The evil results of preaching	234
22nd Dilemma. Was not the Buddha once angry with Sudinna ?	237
23rd Dilemma. The tree talking	241
24th Dilemma. The Buddha's last meal	242
25th Dilemma. Adoration of relics	246
26th Dilemma. The splinter of rock	248
27th Dilemma. Contradictory description of the Samana	251
28th Dilemma. Buddha's boasting	253
29th Dilemma. How can the kind punish others ? . .	254
30th Dilemma. Was not the Buddha angry at Kâtumâ ?	257
31st Dilemma. How could Moggallâna have had mira- culous powers seeing that he was murdered ? . .	261
32nd Dilemma. Why should the rules of the Order be kept secret ?	264
33rd Dilemma. Contradictions about falsehood . . .	268

	PAGE
34th Dilemma. Did not the Omniscient One once doubt?	270
35th Dilemma. Suicide	273
36th Dilemma. Love to all beings	279
37th Dilemma. Wickedness and prosperity	283
38th Dilemma. Women's wiles	294
39th Dilemma. Did not the Arahats once show fear?	297
40th Dilemma. Did not the Omniscient One once change his mind?	301
Appendix. Devadatta in the <i>Gātakas</i>	303
Addenda et Corrigenda	305
Index of Proper Names	307
Index of Subjects	311

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East	317
---	-----

INTRODUCTION.

THE work of which a translation is here, for the first time, presented to the English reading public, has had a strange and interesting history. Written in Northern India, at or a little after the beginning of the Christian era, and either in Sanskrit itself or in some North Indian Prakrit, it has been entirely lost in the land of its origin, and (so far as is at present known) is not extant in any of the homes of the various sects and schools of the Buddhists, except only in Ceylon, and in those countries which have derived their Buddhism from Ceylon. It is true that General Cunningham says¹ that the name of Milinda 'is still famous in all Buddhist countries.' But he is here drawing a very wide conclusion from an isolated fact. For in his note he refers only to Hardy, who is good evidence for Ceylon, but who does not even say that the 'Milinda' was known elsewhere.

Preserved there, and translated at a very early date into Pāli, it has become, in its southern home, a book of standard authority, is put into the hands of those who have begun to doubt the cardinal points of Buddhist doctrine, has been long a popular work in its Pāli form, has been translated into Sinhalese, and occupies a unique position, second only to the Pāli Piṭakas (and perhaps also to the celebrated work of Buddhaghosa, the 'Path of Purity'). From Ceylon it has been transferred, in its Pāli form, to both Burma and Siam, and in those countries also it enjoys so high a repute, that it has been commented on (if not translated). It is not merely the only work composed among the Northern Buddhists which is regarded with reverence by the orthodox Buddhists of the southern

¹ In his 'Ancient Geography of India,' p. 186.

schools; it is the only one which has survived at all amongst them. And it is the only prose work composed in ancient India which would be considered, from the modern point of view, as a successful work of art.

The external evidence for these statements is, at present, both very slight and, for the most part, late. There appeared at Colombo in the year of Buddha 2420 (1877 A.D.) a volume of 650 pages, large 8vo.—the most considerable in point of size as yet issued from the *Siṃhalese* press—entitled *MILINDA PRASĀYĀ*. It was published at the expense of five Buddhist gentlemen whose names deserve to be here recorded. They are Karolis Piriś, Ābraham Liwerā, Luis Mendis, Nandis Mendis Amara-sekara, and Chārlis Arnolis Mendis Wijaya-ratna Amara-sekara. It is stated in the preface that the account of the celebrated discussion held between Milinda and Nāgasena, about 500 years after the death of the Buddha, was translated into the Māgadhi language by 'teachers of old' (*purwākārīn wisin*);—that that Pāli version was translated into *Siṃhalese*, at the instance and under the patronage of King Kīrtti Sṛī Rāga-siṃha, who came to the throne of Ceylon in the year of Buddha 2290 (1747 A.D.), by a member of the Buddhist Order named Hīnaṭi-kumburē Śumaṅgala, a lineal successor, in the line of teacher and pupil (*anusishya*), of the celebrated Wœli-wita Saranaṅkara, who had been appointed Saṃgha-rāga, or chief of the Order—that 'this priceless book, unsurpassable as a means either for learning the Buddhist doctrine, or for growth in the knowledge of it, or for the suppression of erroneous opinions,' had become corrupt by frequent copying—that, at the instigation of the well-known scholar Mohoṭṭi-watte Gunānanda, these five had had the texts corrected and restored by several learned Bhikkhus (*kīpa namak lawā*), and had had indices and a glossary added, and now published the thus revised and improved edition.

The *Siṃhalese* translation, thus introduced to us, follows the Pāli throughout, except that it here and there adds, in the way of gloss, extracts from one or other of the numerous *Piṭaka* texts referred to, and also that it starts with a pro-

phhecy, put into the mouth of the Buddha when on his death-bed, that this discussion would take place about 500 years after his death, and that it inserts further, at the point indicated in my note on p. 3 of the present version, an account of how the *Siṃhalese* translator came to write his version. His own account of the matter adds to the details given above that he wrote the work at the Upasatha Ārāma of the Mahā Wihāra near Sṛi-wardhana-pura, 'a place famous for the possession of a temple containing the celebrated Tooth Relic, and a monastery which had been the residence of Wœliwita Saranaṅkara, the Saṃgha-rāga, and of the famous scholars and commentators Daramiṭi-pola Dhamma-rakkhita and Madhurasatoṭa Dhammakkhanda.'

As Kirtti Sṛi Rāga-siṃha reigned till 1781¹, this would only prove that our Pāli work was extant in Ceylon in its present form, and there regarded as of great antiquity and high authority, towards the close of the last century. And no other mention of the work has, as yet, been discovered in any older *Siṃhalese* author. But in the present deplorable state of our ignorance of the varied and ancient literature of Ceylon, the argument *ex silentio* would be simply of no value. Now that the Ceylon Government have introduced into the Legislative Council a bill for the utilisation, in the interests of education, of the endowments of the Buddhist monasteries, it may be hoped that the value of the books written in those monasteries will not be forgotten, and that a sufficient yearly sum will be put aside for the editing and publication of a literature of such great historical value². At present we can only deplore the impossibility of tracing the history of the 'Questions of Milinda' in other works written by the scholarly natives of its southern home.

That it will be mentioned in those works there can be

¹ See Turnour's *Mahavansa*, p. lxviii.

² I believe that none of the many vernacular literatures of India can compare for a moment with the *Siṃhalese*, whether judged from the point of view of literary excellence, variety of contents, age, or historical value. And yet a few hundreds a year for ten years would probably suffice, on the system followed by the Pāli Text Society, for the editing and publication of the whole.

but little doubt. For the great Indian writer, who long ago found in that beautiful and peaceful island the best scope for his industrious scholarship, is already known to have mentioned the book no less than four times in his commentaries; and that in such a manner that we may fairly hope to find other references to it when his writings shall have been more completely published. In his commentary on the Book of the Great Decease, VI, 3, Buddhaghosa refers to the quotation of that passage made in the conversation between Milinda and Nāgasena, translated below, at IV, 2, 1¹. And again, in his commentary on the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* (D. III, 2, 12) he quotes the words of a conversation between Milinda and Nāgasena on the subject he is there discussing. The actual words he uses (they will be found at pp. 275, 276 of the edition of the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, edited for the Pāli Text Society by Professor Carpenter and myself) are not the same as those of our author at the corresponding passage of Mr. Trenckner's text (pp. 168, 169; IV, 3, 11), but they are the same in substance.

The above two references in Buddhaghosa to our author were pointed out by myself. Dr. Morris has pointed out two others, and in each of those also Buddhaghosa is found to quote words differing from Mr. Trenckner's text. The former of these two was mentioned in a letter to the 'Academy' of the 12th November, 1881. In the *Manoratha Pūraṇī*, his commentary on the *Aṅguttara*, on the passage marked in Dr. Morris's edition as I, 5, 8, Buddhaghosa says:—

'Imasmim pan' atthe Milinda-rāgā dhamma-kathika-Nāgasenaṭṭheraṃ puṅṅhi: "Bhante Nāgasena, ekasmim akkharakkhane pavattita-kittasamkhārā sake rūpino assa kīva mahā-rāsi bhavēyāti?"'

And he then gives the answer:—'Vāhasatānaṃ kho mahā-rāga vihināṃ addha-kūlañ ka vāhā vihi sattammanāni dve ka tumbā ekaṅkharakkhane

¹ This was already pointed out in a note to my translation of the text commented on ('Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi of the Sacred Books of the East, p. 112).

pavattitassa kīttassa saṅkham pi na upenti kalam pi na upenti kala-bhāgam pi na upentitī.'

This passage of the Milinda, referred to by Buddhaghosa, will be found on p. 102 of Mr. Trenckner's edition, translated below at IV, 1, 19. But the question is not found there at all, and the answer, though much the same in the published text, still differs in the concluding words. Mr. Trenckner marks the passage in his text as corrupt, and it may well be that Buddhaghosa has preserved for us an older and better reading.

The other passage quoted by Dr. Morris (in the 'Academy' of the 11th January, 1881) is from the Paṇḍita Sūdanī, Buddhaghosa's still unedited Commentary on the Magghima Nikāya. It is in the comment on the Brahmāyu Suttanta, and as it is not accessible elsewhere I give this passage also in full here. With reference, oddly enough, to the same passage referred to above (pp. 168, 169 of the text, translated below at IV, 3, 11) Buddhaghosa there says:—

'Vuttam etam Nāgasenattherena Milindaraññā puttḥena: "Na mahārāga Bhagavā gūyham dasseti kkhāyam Bhagavā dassetīti."'

In this case, as in the other quotation of the same passage, the words quoted are not quite the same as those given in the published text, and on the other hand they agree with, though they are much shorter than, the words as given in the Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī.

It would be premature to attempt to arrive at the reason of this difference between Buddhaghosa's citations and Mr. Trenckner's edition of the text. It may be that Buddhaghosa is consciously summarising, or that he is quoting roughly from memory, or that he is himself translating or summarising from the original work, or that he is quoting from another Pāli version, or that he is quoting from another recension of the text of the existing Pāli version. We must have the full text of all his references to the 'Questions of Milinda' before us, before we try to choose between these, and possibly other, alternative explanations. What is at present certain is that when

Buddhaghosa wrote his great works, that is about 430 A.D., he had before him a book giving the conversations between Milinda and Nāgasena. And more than that. He introduces his comment above referred to on the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* by saying, after simply quoting the words of the text he is explaining: 'What would be the use of any one else saying anything on this? For Nāgasena, the Elder, himself said as follows in reply to Milinda, the king¹—and he then quotes Nāgasena, and adds not a word of his own. It follows that the greatest of all Buddhist writers known to us by name regarded the 'Questions of Milinda' as a work of so great authority that an opinion put by its author into the mouth of Nāgasena should be taken as decisive. And this is not only the only book, outside the Pāli Piṭakas, which Buddhaghosa defers to in this way, it is the only book, except the previous commentaries, which he is known even to refer to at all. But, on the other hand, he says nothing in these passages to throw any further light on the date, or any light on the authorship, of the work to which he assigns so distinguished, even so unique, a position.

So far as to what is known about our 'Questions of Milinda' in Ceylon. The work also exists, certainly in Pāli, and probably in translations into the local dialects, in Burma and Siam. For Mr. Trenckner mentions (Introduction, p. iv) a copy in the Burmese character of the Pāli text sent to him by Dr. Rost, there is another copy in that character in the Colombo Museum², and Mr. J. G. Scott, of the Burmese Civil Service, has sent to England a Burmese Nissaya of the Milinda (a kind of translation, giving the Pāli text, word for word, followed by the interpretation of those words in Burmese³). A manuscript of the Pāli text, brought from Siam, is referred to in the Sinhalese MSS. in the marginal note quoted by Mr. Trenckner at p. vi of the

¹ Kim ettha aññena vattabbaṃ? Vuttam etam Nāgasenattheren' eva Milinda-raññā putt'heṇa . . . (Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī, loc. cit.).

² See p. 51 of the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society' for 1882.

³ This Nissaya is now in the possession of his brother, the Bursar of St. John's College, Cambridge.

Introduction to his edition. And there exists in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, a complete MS., in excellent condition, in the Siamese-Pāli character¹, while there are numerous fragments in the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale of one or more MSS. of the text, in the same Kambojan character used in Siam for the writing of Pāli texts².

It may be noticed here that there are seven MSS. of the text written in the Ceylon character known to exist in Europe. Two of them (one a very ancient one) are in the Copenhagen University Library, two in the Bibliothèque Nationale³, one in the Cambridge University Library³, and two in the India Office Library⁴. Three only of these seven have been used by Mr. Trenckner for his very able and accurate edition of the text, published in 1880.

That is all the external evidence at present available. What can be inferred from the book itself is about as follows. It consists of the discussion of a number of points of Buddhist doctrine treated in the form of conversations between King Milinda and Nāgasena the Elder (Thera). It must be plain to every reader of the following pages that these are not real conversations. What we have before us is really an historical romance, though the didactic aim overshadows the story. Men of straw, often very skilfully put together, are set up for the purpose, not so much of knocking them down again, as of elucidating some points of ethical or psychological belief while doing so. The king himself plays a very subordinate part. The questions raised, or dilemmas stated, are put into his mouth. But the solutions, to give opportunity for which the questions or dilemmas are invented, are the really important part of the work, and these are put into the mouth of Nāgasena. The dialogues are introduced by a carefully constructed

¹ By the kindness of the Master and Fellows of the College I have been allowed to collate this MS. in London.

² See 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society' for 1882, p. 35.

³ See 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society' for 1883, p. 146.

⁴ See 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society' for 1882, p. 119.

preliminary story, in which the reader's interest in them is aroused by anticipation. And the ability of this part of the work is very great. For in spite of the facts that all the praise lavished therein upon both Milinda and Nāgasena is in reality only praise of the book itself, and that the reader knows this very well, yet he will find it almost impossible to escape from the influence of the eloquent words in which importance and dignity are lent to the occasion of their meeting; and of the charm and skill with which the whole fiction is maintained.

The question then arises whether the personages were any more real than the conversations. Milinda is supposed to be the Menander, who appears in the list of the Greek kings of Baktria, since he is described in the book as being a king of the Yonakas reigning at Sāgala (the Euthydemia of the Greeks), and there is no other name in the list which comes so near to Milinda. This identification of the two names is certainly correct. For whether it was our author who deliberately made the change in adapting the Greek name to the Indian dialect in which he wrote, or whether the change is due to a natural phonetic decay, the same causes will have been of influence. Indra or Inda is a not uncommon termination of Indian names, and meaning king is so appropriate to a king, that a foreign king's name ending in -ander would almost inevitably come to end in -inda. Then the sequence of the liquids of m-n-n would tend in an Indian dialect to be altered in some way by dissimilation, and Mr. Trenckner adduces seven instances in Pāli of l taking the place of n, or n of l, in similar circumstances¹.

There remains only the change of the first E in Menander to I. Now in the Indian part of the inscription, on undoubted coins of Menander, the oldest authorities read Minanda as the king's name², and though that interpretation has now, on the authority of better specimens, been given up, there is no doubt that Milinda runs more easily

¹ 'Pāli Miscellany,' part i, p. 55.

² For instance, Wilson in his 'Ariana Antiqua,' p. 283.

from the tongue than Melinda, and Mil may well have seemed as appropriate a commencement for a Milakkha's name as -inda is for the ending of a king's name. So Men-ander became Mil-inda.

It may be added here that other Greek names are mentioned by our author—Devamantiya at I, 42, and the same officer, together with Anantakâya, Mankura, and Sabbadinna, at II, 3. There is a similar effort in these other Pâli forms of Greek words to make them give some approach to a meaning in the Indian dialect: but in each case the new forms remain as really unintelligible to an Indian as Mil-inda would be. Thus Deva-mantiya, which may be formed on Demetrios, looks, at first sight, Indian enough. But if it meant anything, it could only mean 'counsellor of the gods.' And so also both Ananta and Kâya are Indian words. But the compound Ananta-kâya would mean 'having an infinite body,' which is absurd as the name of a courtier. It may possibly be made up to represent Antiochos. What Mankura and Sabbadinna (called simply Dinna at p. 87) may be supposed to be intended for it is difficult to say¹. But the identification of Milinda with Menander is as certain as that of Kandagutta with Sandrokottos.

Very little is told us, in the Greek or Roman writers, about any of the Greek kings of Baktria. It is a significant fact that it is precisely of Menander-Milinda that they tell us most, though this most is unfortunately not much.

Strabo, in his Geography², mentions Menander as one of the two Baktrian kings who were instrumental in spreading the Greek dominion furthest to the East into India. He crossed the Hypanis (that is the Sutlej) and penetrated as far as the Isamos (probably the Jumna).

Then in the title of the lost forty-first book of Justin's work, Menander and Apollodotus are mentioned as 'Indian kings.'

Finally, Plutarch³ tells us an anecdote of Menander.

¹ Compare Mr. Trenckner's note at p. 70 of the 'Pâli Miscellany.'

² Edit. Müller, xi, 11, 1.

³ De Repub. Ger., p. 821.

He was, he says, as a ruler noted for justice, and enjoyed such popularity with his subjects, that upon his death, which took place in camp, diverse cities contended for the possession of his ashes. The dispute was only adjusted by the representatives of the cities agreeing that the relics should be divided amongst them, and that they should severally erect monuments (*μνημεῖα*, no doubt *dāgabas* or *sthûpas*) to his memory.

This last statement is very curious as being precisely analogous to the statement in the 'Book of the Great Decease'¹, as to what occurred after the death of the Buddha himself. But it would be very hazardous to draw any conclusion from this coincidence.

The only remaining ancient evidence about Menander-Milinda (apart from what is said by our author himself), is that of coins. And, as is usually the case, the evidence of the coins will be found to confirm, but to add very little to, what is otherwise known.

As many as twenty-two² different coins have been discovered, some of them in very considerable numbers, bearing the name, and eight of them the effigy, of Menander. They have been found over a very wide extent of country, as far west as Kābul, as far east as Mathurā, and one of them as far north as Kashmīr. Curiously enough we find a confirmation of this wide currency of Menander-Milinda's coins in the work of the anonymous author of the 'Periplus Maris Erythræi.' He says³ that Menander's coins, together with those of Apollodotos, were current, many years after his death, at Barygaza, the modern Baroach, on the coast of Gujarat.

The portrait on the coins is very characteristic, with a long face and an intelligent expression, and is sometimes that of a young man, and at other times that of a very old man. It may be inferred therefore that his reign

¹ Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta VI, 58-62, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas' (vol. xi of the Sacred Books of the East), pp. 133-135.

² This number would be greatly increased if the differences of the monograms were allowed for.

³ Chapter 47 of Müller's edition.

was as long as his power was extensive. All the coins have a legend in Greek letters on one side, and a corresponding legend in Ariano-pāli letters on the other side. On twenty-one out of the twenty-two, the inscriptions, according to the latest interpretations from a comparison of the best examples, are respectively,

BASILEÛS SÔTÊROS MENANDROU
and

MAHARAGASA TRADATASA MENANDRASA¹.

Wilson read² the last word Minadasa. But when he wrote, in 1840, the alphabet was neither so well known as it is now, nor had such good examples come to hand. So that though the Mi- is plain enough on several coins, it is almost certainly a mere mistake for Me, from which it only differs by the centre vowel stroke being slightly prolonged.

Fifteen of the coins have a figure of Pallas either on one side or the other. A 'victory,' a horse jumping, a dolphin, a head (perhaps of a god), a two-humped camel, an elephant goad, a boar, a wheel, and a palm branch are each found on one side or the other of one of the coins; and an elephant, an owl, and a bull's head each occur twice. These are all the emblems or figures on the coins. None of them are distinctively Buddhist, though the wheel might be claimed as the Buddhist wheel, and the palm branch and the elephant would be quite in place on Buddhist coins. It may be said, therefore, that the bulk of the coins are clearly pagan, and not Buddhist; and that though two or three are doubtful, even they are probably not Buddhist.

One coin, however, a very rare one, differs, as to its inscription, from all the rest that have the legend. It has on one side

BASILEÛS DIKAIΟΥ MENANDROU,
and on the other,

MAHARAGASA DHARMIKASA³ MENANDRASA.

¹ See Alfred Von Sallet, 'Die Nachfolger Alexander's des Grossen in Baktrien und Indien,' Berlin, 1879; and Professor Percy Gardiner's 'Catalogue of the Coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India,' London, 1886.

² In his 'Ariana Antiqua,' p. 283, London, 1841.

³ The r is a little doubtful and is written, if at all, after the dh, though intended to be pronounced before the m.

Is any reference intended here to the Buddhist Dharma as distinct from the ordinary righteousness of kings? I think not. The coin is one of those with the figure of Pallas on the side which bears the Greek legend, and five others of the Baktrian Greek kings use a similar legend on their coins. These are Agathocles, Heliokles, Archebios, Strato, and Zoilos. There is also another coin in the series with a legend into which the word Dharma enters, but which has not yet been deciphered with certainty—that bearing in the Greek legend the name of Sy-Hermaios, and supposed to have been struck by Kadphises I. If there is anything Buddhist in this coin of Menander's, then the others also must be Buddhist. But it is much simpler to take the word *dharmikasa* in the sense of the word used in the corresponding Greek legend, and to translate it simply 'the Righteous,' or, better still, 'the Just.' Only when we call to mind how frequent in the Pāli texts is the description of the ideal king (whether Buddhist or not) as *dharmiko dhamma-rāga*, we cannot refuse to see the connection between this phrase and the legend of the coins, and to note how at least six of the Greek kings, one of whom is Menander, are sufficiently desirous to meet the views of their Buddhist subjects to fix upon 'Righteousness' or 'Justice' as the characteristic by which they wish to be known. The use of this epithet is very probably the foundation of the tradition preserved by Plutarch, that Menander was, as a ruler, noted for justice; and it is certainly evidence of the Buddhist influences by which he was surrounded. But it is no evidence at all that he actually became a Buddhist.

To sum up.—Menander-Milinda was one of those Greek kings who carried on in Baktria the Greek dominion founded by Alexander the Great. He was certainly one of the most important, probably the most important, of those kings. He carried the Greek arms further into India than any of his predecessors had done, and everything confirms the view given by our author at I, 9 of his justice and his power, of his ability and his wealth. He must have reigned for a considerable time in the latter

part of the second century B.C., probably from about 140 to about 115, or even 110 B.C.¹ His fame extended, as did that of no other Baktrian king, to the West, and he is the only Baktrian Greek king who has been remembered in India. Our author makes him say, incidentally², that he was born at Kalasi in Alasandā (= Alexandria), a name given to an island presumably in the Indus, And, as was referred to above, Plutarch has preserved the tradition that he died in camp, in a campaign against the Indians in the valley of the Ganges.

[It is interesting to point out, in this connection, that the town (gāma) of Kalasi has not been found mentioned elsewhere. Now among the very numerous coins of the Baktrian kings there is one, and only one, giving in the legend, not the name of a king, but the name of a city, the city of Karisi. As this coin was struck about 180 B.C. by Eukratides, who was probably the first of these kings to obtain a settlement on the banks of the Indus, it is possible that the two names, one in the Pāli form (or more probably in the form of the dialect used by our author), the other in the local form, are identical; and that the coin was struck in commemoration of the fact of the Greeks having reached the Indus. If that be so, then that they gave the name Alasanda (Alexandria) to the island on which the town was built, and not to the town itself, seems to show that the town was not founded by them, but was already an important place when they took it.]

Beyond this all is conjecture. When our author says that Milinda was converted to Buddhism³, he may be either relating an actual tradition, or he may be inventing for his own purposes. There is nothing inherently impossible, or even improbable, in the story. We know that all the Baktrians, kings and people alike, eventually became

¹ See the chronological table in the Introduction to Professor Gardner's work, quoted below.

² See the translation below of III, 7, 5.

³ See p. 420 of the Pāli text.

Buddhist. But the passage occurs in a part of the book which is open to much doubt. We have to place against it the negative evidence that none of Menander's coins show any decisive signs of his conversion. And the passage in question goes much further. It says that he afterwards gave up the kingdom to his son, and having entered the Buddhist Order, attained to Arahatsip. The *Simhalese MSS.* add a marginal note to the effect that the whole of this passage with its context was derived from a MS. brought from Siam. Mr. Trenckner is therefore of opinion¹ that it belongs to a spurious supplement. That may be so, in spite of the fact that it is quite in our author's style, and forms an appropriate close to the book. But it is incredible that an author of the literary skill so evident throughout the work should have closed his book deliberately in the middle of a paragraph, without any closing words to round it off. The *Siamese MS.* may after all have preserved the reading of older and better *MSS.* than those in Ceylon, and the last leaf of the book may have been lost there. There must have been some conclusion, if not in the manner of the paragraph under discussion, then in some other words which we may not be able to trace. But even if our author actually wrote that Menander did become a Bhikkhu and an Arahata, that is very poor evidence of the fact, unless he not only intended what he states to be taken quite literally, but also wrote soon after the events he thus deliberately records.

Now the opinion has been expressed above that we have to deal with a book of didactic ethics and religious controversy cast into the form of historical romance. If this is correct no one would be more astonished than the author himself at the inconsistency of modern critics if they took his historical statements *au grand sérieux*, while they made light of his ethical arguments. It is true that he would scarcely have been guilty of anything that seemed grossly improbable, at the time when he wrote, to the readers whom he addressed. But if, as is most probable, he wrote in North-

¹ 'Introduction,' pp. v, vi.

Western India when the memory of the actual facts of Menander's reign was fading away—that is, some generations after his death—he may well have converted him to Buddhism, as the most fitting close to the discussion he records, without intending at all to convey thereby any real historical event.

This brings us to the next point of our argument.

We have seen that the work must have been written some considerable time before Buddhaghosa, and after the death of Menander. Can its date be determined with greater accuracy than this? The story of Nāgasena introduces to us his father Sonuttara, his teachers Rohaṇa, Assagutta of the Vattaniya hermitage, and Dhammarakkhita of the Asoka Ārāma near Pāṭaliputta, and there is also mention of a teacher named Āyupāla dwelling at the Saṅkheyya hermitage near Sāgala. None of these persons and none of these places are read of elsewhere in any Buddhist text, whether Sanskrit or Pāli. For the Asvagupta referred to in passing at p. 351 of the Divyāvadāna has nothing in common (except the name) with our Assagutta, the Rohaṇa of Aṅguttara, III, 66, is quite distinct from our Rohaṇa, and there is not the slightest reason for supposing Nāgasena to be another form of the name Nāgārguṇa, found in both the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist literatures¹, and in the Jain lists². The famous Buddhist scholar so called was the reputed founder of the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism. Our Nāgasena represents throughout the older teaching. If there is any connection at all between the two names, Nāgasena must have been invented as a contrast to Nāgārguṇa, and not with the least idea of identifying two men whose doctrines are so radically opposed. Even were there any reason to believe this to be the case, it would not help us much, for the date

¹ See the passages quoted by Dr. Wenzel in the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society' for 1886, pp. 1-4.

² See Professor Weber in the 'Handschriftenverzeichniss der königlichen Bibliothek in Berlin,' vol. v, part 2, p. 365.

of Nāgârjuna is quite as much open to dispute as that of the author of the 'Questions of Milinda'.¹

I ought to mention here that an opinion of a Nāgasena is, according to Burnouf², discussed at length in the *Abhidharma Kosa Vyākhyā*; and that Schiefner³ quotes from a Tibetan work, the Bu-ston, the statement that a schism took place under a Thera Nāgasena 137 years after the Buddha's death. It would be very interesting if the former were our Nāgasena. And if Schiefner's restoration of the name found in his Tibetan authority be correct, and the authority itself be trustworthy, it is possibly the fading memory of that Nāgasena which induced our author to adopt the name as that of the principal interlocutor in his 'Questions of Milinda.'

Finally, Professor Kern, of Leiden—who believes that Buddha is the sun, and most of his principal disciples stars—believes also not only that our Nāgasena is an historical person, but also that there never was a Buddhist cleric of that name; and that Nāgasena is simply Patañjali, the author of the Yoga philosophy, under another name. If this is not a joke, it is a strange piece of credulity.

The only reason alleged in support of it is that Patañjali has the epithets of Nāgesa and of Phamini. That he was a Hindu who believed in the soul-theory of the current animistic creed, while all the opinions put into Nāgasena's mouth are those of a thorough-going Buddhist and non-individualist, is to count as nothing against this chance similarity, not of names, but of the name on one side with an epithet on the other. To identify John Stuart Mill with Dean Milman would be sober sense compared with this proposal.

¹ Compare on this point Dr. Wenzel, *loc. cit.*, with Dr. Burgess in the 'Archaeological Reports for Southern India,' vol. i, pp. 5-9. Dr. Burgess thinks the most probable date of his death is about 200 A. D.

The identification of Nāgârjuna and Nāgasena was made independently by Major Bird in the 'Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society' for October, 1844 (who was followed by the Rev. R. Spence Hardy at p. 517 of his 'Manual of Buddhism,' published in 1860), and by Benfey in his article 'Indien' in Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopedia* (who was followed by Burnouf at p. 570 of his 'Introduction,' &c., published in 1844).

² *Loc. cit.*

³ Note to his translation of Tāranātha, p. 298.

But it is deliberately put forward to support an accusation against the Buddhists of having falsely appropriated to themselves every famous man in India¹. Any mud, it would seem, is good enough to pelt the Buddhists with. Yet who is it, after all, who really makes the 'appropriation,' the Buddhists or Professor Kern himself?

It would seem, therefore, that most of our author's person and place names are probably inventions of his own².

But it is quite different with the books quoted by our author. In several passages he has evidently in his mind certain Pāli texts which deal with similar matters. So far as yet ascertained the texts thus silently referred to, either in the present volume or in the subsequent untranslated portion of the book, are as follows :

Page of this
volume.

8 . .	Dīgha Nikāya II, 1, 2.
10 . .	„ „ II, 20.
10 . .	„ „ II, 1.
38 . .	„ „ II, 10.
38 . .	„ „ II, 11.
40 . .	Kathā Vatthu I, 1.
41 . .	Aṅguttara I, 15, 4-7.
41 . .	Dīgha Nikāya II, 17.
41 . .	„ „ II, 23.
42 . .	„ „ II, 26.
59 . .	„ „ XVII.
80 . .	Mahāvagga I, 1, 1.
129 . .	Various (see my note).
132 . .	Kullavagga IX, 1, 4.
163 . .	Kullavagga VII, 1, 27.
170 . .	Vessantara Gāṭaka.
179 . .	Sivi Gāṭaka.
204 . .	Magghima Nikāya LXIII.

¹ Kern's 'Buddhismus' (the German translation), vol. ii, p. 443.

² As these pages were passing through the press I have found Assagutta of the Vattaniya hermitage, mentioned in the last chapter of the Saddhamma Samgaha, which is passing through the press for the Pāli Text Society. But this is taken no doubt from the Milinda, and is not an independent reference to any such teacher as an historical person. (The Saddhamma Samgaha was written by Dhamma-kitti in Ceylon, probably in the twelfth century.)

Page of this
volume.

212 . .	<i>Gâtaka</i> (No. 69).
256 . .	<i>Sutta Vibhaṅga</i> (Pâr. 4).
257 . .	<i>Kâtuma Sutta</i> (No. 67).
259 . .	<i>Kullavagga IX</i> , 1, 3.
264 . .	<i>Mahāvagga II</i> , 16, 8.
275 . .	<i>Dhamma-kakka-pavattana Sutta</i> .
277 . .	<i>Āṅguttara II</i> , 1, 1.
283 . .	The 540th <i>Gâtaka</i> .
285 . .	<i>Amba Gâtaka</i> (No. 474).
285 . .	<i>Dummedha Gâtaka</i> (No. 122).
286 . .	<i>Tittira Gâtaka</i> (No. 438).
286 . .	<i>Khantivāda Gâtaka</i> (No. 313).
287 . .	<i>Kūla-Nandiya Gâtaka</i> (No. 222).
287 . .	<i>Takkha-sūkara Gâtaka</i> (No. 492).
288 . .	<i>Kariyā-piṭaka II</i> , 6.
288 . .	<i>Sīlava-nāga Gâtaka</i> (No. 72).
288 . .	<i>Sabba-dāṭṭha Gâtaka</i> (No. 241).
289 . .	<i>Apannaka Gâtaka</i> (No. 1).
289 . .	<i>Nigrodha-miga Gâtaka</i> (No. 12).
290 . .	<i>Nigrodha Gâtaka</i> (No. 445).
290 . .	<i>Mahā-paduma Gâtaka</i> (No. 472).
290 . .	<i>Mahā-patāpa Gâtaka</i> (No. 358).
294 . .	<i>Ummagga Gâtaka</i> (No. 546).
298 . .	<i>Kullavagga VII</i> , 3, 11.
302 . .	<i>Āṅguttara IV</i> , 13.

Page of the
Pāli Text.

220 . .	<i>Gâtaka</i> , No. 310 (vol. iii, p. 32).
231 . .	<i>Sutta Nipāta I</i> , 4.
236 . .	<i>Gâtaka</i> (vol. i, p. 56).
256 . .	„ (vol. iv, p. 232, line 20).
277 . .	<i>Vessantara Gâtaka</i> .
289 . .	<i>Gâtaka</i> (vol. i, p. 57).
291 . .	<i>Gâtaka</i> (Nos. 258, 541, 494, and 243).
313 . .	<i>Magghima Nikāya</i> , No. 75 (p. 502).

In several other passages he refers to a Pāli book, or a chapter in a Pāli book, by name. This is much more valuable for our purposes than the silent, and sometimes doubtful, references in the last list. So far as is yet ascertained, these references are as follows :

Page of this volume.	
1, 2 . .	Vinaya, Sutta, Abhidhamma.
21 . .	The Suttantas.
21 . .	The Abhidhamma.
21 . .	Dhamma <i>Saṅgani</i> .
21 . .	Vibhaṅga.
21 . .	Dhātu Kathā.
21 . .	Puggala <i>Paññatti</i> .
21 . .	Kathā Vatthu.
22 . .	Yamaka.
22 . .	<i>Paṭṭhāna</i> .
22 . .	The Abhidhamma Piṭaka.
25 . .	The Abhidhamma.
27 . .	The Abhidhamma.
28 . .	The three Piṭakas.
31 . .	Mahā Samaya Suttanta (No. 20 in the <i>Dīgha</i>).
31 . .	Mahā Maṅgala Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta II, 4).
32 . .	Sama-kitta-pariyāya Suttanta (unknown).
32 . .	Rāhulovāda Suttanta (No. 147 in the <i>Magghima</i>).
32 . .	Parābhava Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta I, 6).
34 . .	The three Piṭakas.
56 . .	<i>Samyutta</i> Nikāya (the words quoted are in the Sutta Nipāta).
71, 88 . .	The Abhidhamma.
137 . .	The ninefold Scriptures.
195 . .	Moliya Sīvaka chapter of the <i>Samyutta</i> .
213 . .	Ratana Sutta (in the Sutta Nipāta II, 1).
213 . .	Khandha Parittā (not traced).
213 . .	Mora Parittā (<i>Gātaka</i> , Nos. 159, 491).
213 . .	Dhagagga Parittā (in the <i>Gātaka</i> Book).
213 . .	Āśāñña Parittā (in the <i>Dīgha</i> Nikāya).
213 . .	Aṅgulimāla Parittā (not traced).
232 . .	The Pātimokkha.
264-267 . .	Pātimokkha, Vinaya Piṭaka.
Page of the Pāli Text.	
241 . .	Dhamma-dāyāda Sutta of the <i>Magghima</i> Nikāya (vol. i, p. 13).
242 . .	<i>Samyutta</i> Nikāya (vol. i, p. 67).
258 . .	Dakkhiṇā Vibhaṅga of the <i>Magghima</i> Nikāya (No. 142).
281 . .	Kariyā Piṭaka G. 53.

Page of the
Pāli Text.

- 341 . . Navaṅgam Buddha-vaṅṇanam.
 341 . . The Gāṭaka Book.
 341 . . The Dīgha Nikāya.
 341 . . The Magg'hima Nikāya.
 342 . . The Saṃyutta Nikāya.
 342 . . The Khuddaka Nikāya.
 348 . . The three Piṭakas.
 349 . . Mahā Rāhulovāda (in the Magg'hima, No. 147).
 349 . . Mahā Maṅgala Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipāta II, 4).
 349 . . Sama-kitta Pariyāya (not traced).
 349 . . Parābhava Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipāta I, 6).
 349 . . Purābheda Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 10).
 349 . . Kalaha-vivāda Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 11).
 349 . . Kūla Vyūha Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 12).
 349 . . Mahā Vyūha Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 13).
 349 . . Tuvaṭṭaka Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 14).
 349 . . Sāriputta Suttanta (Sutta Nipāta IV, 16).
 350 . . Mahā-samaya Suttanta (in the Dīgha, No. 20).
 350 . . Sakkha-paṇṇa Suttanta (Dīgha, No. 21).
 350 . . Tirokudda Suttanta (in the Khuddaka Pāṭha, No. 7).
 350 . . Ratana Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipāta II, 1).
 350 . . The Abhidhamma.
 362 . . Ekuttara Nikāya (= Aṅguttara I, 13, 7).
 369 . . Dhaniya-sutta of the Sutta Nipāta (I, 2).
 371 . . Kummūpama Suttanta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya
 (not yet printed).
 372 . . Vidhura Punnaka Gāṭaka.
 377 . . Sakka Saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (not yet
 printed).
 378 . . Dhammapada (verse 327).
 379 . . Saṃyutta (55, 7).
 381 . . Sutasoma Gāṭaka (No. 537).
 384 . . Kaṇha Gāṭaka (No. 440, vol. iv, p. 10).
 385 . . Sutta Nipāta (I, 12, 1).
 389 . . Saṃyutta Nikāya.
 392 . . Ekuttara Nikāya (= Aṅguttara X, 5, 8).
 396 . . Lomahamsana Pariyāya.
 399 . . Saṃyutta Nikāya (III, 5, 6, vol. i, p. 73).
 401 . . " " (XVI, 1, 3, vol. ii, p. 194).
 402 . . Kakkavāka Gāṭaka (No. 451, vol. iv, p. 71).
 403 . . Kulla Nārada Gāṭaka (not traced).

Page of the
Pāli Text.

403 . . . Samyutta Nikāya (not traced).
405 . . . Lakkhaṇa Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya (No. 30).
406 . . . Bhallāṇiya Gāṭaka (No. 504, vol. iv, p. 439).
408 . . . Parinibbāna-suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya (D.
XVI, 5, 24).
408 . . . Dhammapada (verse 32).
409 . . . Samyutta Nikāya (XIV, 16, vol. ii, p. 158).
411 . . . Sutta Nipāta (II, 6, 10).
414 . . . " " (III, 11, 43).

Lastly, our author quotes a large number of passages from the *Pitaka* texts, which he introduces (without naming any book) by the formulas: 'It was said by the Blessed One;' or, 'It is said by you' (you in the plural, you members of the Order); or, 'It was said by so and so' (naming some particular member of the Order). A great many of these quotations have already been traced, either by Mr. Trenckner or myself. Occasionally words thus attributed, by our author, to the Buddha, are, in the *Pitakas*, attributed to some one else. Such passages are distinguished in the following list by an asterisk added to the letter B, which marks those of them attributed by our author to the Buddha. The women quoted are distinguished by the title 'Sister.'

II, 1, 1, p. 45.	Sister Vagirâ.	Samyutta Nikâya V, 10, 6.
II, 1, 9, p. 53.	B*.	" " VII, 1, 6.
II, 1, 9, p. 54.	B.	Not traced.
II, 1, 11, p. 57.	B.	" "
II, 1, 13, p. 61.	B.	Samyutta Nikâya XXI, 5.
II, 2, 4, p. 69.	B.	Not traced.
II, 3, 1, p. 79.	B.	Magg'hima Nikâya XXI.
II, 3, 2, p. 80.	B.	" " XVIII.
III, 4, 3, p. 101.	B*.	Samyutta Nikâya II, 3, 2.
III, 4, 4, p. 104.	B.	Ânguttara III, 35, 4.
III, 6, 1, p. 114.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 1, 10, p. 145.	Sâriputta.	" "
IV, 1, 13, p. 150.	B.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 6, 1.
IV, 1, 35, p. 170.	B.	" " XIV, 3, 13.
IV, 1, 42, p. 179.	In the Sutta.	Not traced.
IV, 1, 55, p. 185.	B.	Kullavagga X, 1, 6.
IV, 1, 55, p. 186.	B.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 5, 62.

IV, 1, 67, p. 196.	You.	Not traced.
IV, 1, 67, p. 196.	You.	" "
IV, 1, 71, p. 199.	B.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 3, 60.
IV, 1, 71, p. 199.	B.	" " XIV, 3, 63.
IV, 2, 1, p. 202.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 2, 1, p. 202.	B.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 6, 3.
IV, 2, 4, p. 204.	B.	" " XIV, 2, 32.
IV, 2, 6, p. 206.	B.	Dhammapada 129.
IV, 2, 6, p. 206.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 2, 15, p. 213.	B.	Dhammapada 127, 8.
IV, 2, 20, p. 214.	You.	Not traced.
IV, 2, 20, p. 214.	You.	" "
IV, 2, 27, p. 224.	You.	" "
IV, 2, 29, p. 225.	B.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 2, 32.
IV, 2, 29, p. 225.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 2, 31, p. 227.	You.	" "
IV, 2, 31, p. 227.	You.	" "
IV, 3, 1, p. 229.	B.	Various (see note).
IV, 3, 1, p. 229.	You.	Aggañña Sutta (Dîgha).
IV, 3, 5, p. 234.	You.	Not traced.
IV, 3, 5, p. 234.	You.	" "
IV, 3, 15, p. 238.	Sâriputta.	" "
IV, 3, 15, p. 238.	B.	Pârâgika I, 5, 11.
IV, 3, 19, p. 241.	B*.	Gâtaka III, 24.
IV, 3, 19, p. 241.	B.	Gâtaka IV, 210.
IV, 3, 21, p. 242.	The Theras.	Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 4, 23.
IV, 3, 21, p. 243.	B.	" " XIV, 4, 57.
IV, 3, 24, p. 246.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 3, 24, p. 246.	B.	Mahâ-parinibbâna Sutta (D. XVI, 5, 24).
IV, 3, 27, p. 248.	You.	Not traced.
IV, 3, 27, p. 248.	You.	Kullavagga VII, 3, 9.
IV, 3, 31, p. 251.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 3, 31, p. 251.	B.	" "
IV, 3, 33, p. 253.	B.	Brahmagala Sutta (D. I, 1, 5).
IV, 3, 33, p. 253.	B.	Sela Sutta (SN. III, 7, 7).
IV, 3, 35, p. 254.	B*.	The 521st Gâtaka.
IV, 3, 38, p. 257.	B.	Dhaniya Sutta (SN. I, 2, 2).
IV, 4, 1, p. 261.	B.	Aṅguttara I, 14, 1.
IV, 4, 4, p. 264.	B.	Aṅguttara III, 124.
IV, 4, 9, p. 268.	B.	Pâtimokkha (Pâk. 1).
IV, 4, 11, p. 270.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 4, 11, p. 271.	B.	" "

IV, 4, 13, p. 273.	B.	Sutta Vibhaṅga (Pār. 3, 5, 13).
IV, 4, 13, p. 273.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 4, 16, p. 279.	B.	Āṅguttara XI, 2, 5, and the 169th <i>Gāṭaka</i> .
IV, 4, 16, p. 280.	You.	The 540th <i>Gāṭaka</i> .
IV, 4, 17, p. 283.	You.	Not traced.
IV, 4, 42, p. 294.	B*.	The 536th <i>Gāṭaka</i> .
IV, 4, 44, p. 297.	B.	Not traced.
IV, 4, 46, p. 301.	You.	" "
The Pāli Text.		
P. 211, l. 6.	B.	Muni Sutta (SN. I, 12, 3).
211, l. 8.	B.	Kulavagga VI, 1, 5.
213, l. 6.	B.	Dhammapada 168.
213, l. 7.	B.	Magghima Nikāya 77.
215, l. 10.	B.	Not traced.
215, l. 12.	B.	Āṅguttara I, 14, 4.
217, l. 9.	B.	Samyutta Nikāya XXI.
217, l. 11.	B.	Not traced.
219, l. 14.	B.	" "
219, l. 15.	It is said.	<i>Gāṭaka</i> (No. 433).
221, l. 20.	B.	Kāṭhaddanta <i>Gāṭaka</i> (vol. v, p. 49).
221, l. 24.	It is said.	Not traced.
223, l. 16.	B.	Magghima Nikāya (No. 87).
223, l. 18.	It is said.	" " "
225, l. 2.	B.	Sela Sutta (SN. III, 7, 33).
228, l. 2.	B.	Sutta Nipāta I, 4, 6 = III, 4, 26.
230, l. 13.	B*.	Kapi <i>Gāṭaka</i> (vol. iii, p. 354).
232, l. 7.	You.	Not traced.
232, l. 10.	You.	" "
235, l. 2.	B.	Magghima I, p. 177 = Vinaya I, p. 8.
235, l. 4.	B.	Magghima (No. 86).
236, l. 27.	B.	Āṅguttara I, 15, 10.
240, l. 3.	B.	Magghima Nikāya (No. 142).
242, l. 17.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
242, l. 26.	B.	Samyutta Nikāya 44.
245, l. 1.	B.	Samyutta 6, 14 (vol. i, p. 157) = Thera-gāthā 256, 7 = Di- vyāvadāna, p. 300.
253, l. 1.	You.	Not traced.
255, l. 8.	You.	" "
262.	B.	" "
323.	You.	" "

The Pāli Text. P. 333.	B.	Dhammapada 54-56 (taken in part from Aṅguttara III, 79).
366, l. 6.	B.	Samyutta XX, 8, 5.
366, l. 10.	Sāriputta.	Thera-gāthā 985.
367, l. 8.	B.	Not traced (see S. XII, 63, 8).
367, l. 19.	Mahā Kaṭṭhāyana.	Thera-gāthā 501.
368, l. 2.	B.	Samyutta 46, 7.
368, l. 6.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
368, l. 20.	Kulla Panthaka.	" "
369, l. 5.	B.	Sutta Nipāta I, 2, 12.
369, l. 22.	The Theras who held the Synod (at Rāgagaha).	Not traced.
370, l. 11.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
371, l. 14.	Upasena.	Thera-gāthā 577.
371, l. 28.	B.	Samyutta I, 17, 2 (vol. i, p. 7).
372, l. 12.	Rāhula.	Not traced.
372, l. 23.	B.	Gātaka (No. 545).
373, l. 13.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
374, l. 5.	Sāriputta.	" "
374, l. 16.	Sāriputta.	" "
375, l. 15.	B.	Magghima (vol. i, p. 33).
376, l. 3.	Anuruddha.	Not traced.
376, l. 17.	Rāhula.	" "
377, l. 14.	B.	Samyutta 55, 7.
378, l. 5.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
378, l. 17.	B.	Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta (D. XVI, 2, 12).
379, l. 1.	B.	Dhammapada 327.
379, l. 14.	B.	Samyutta 55, 7.
380, l. 1.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
381, l. 15.	B.	Sutasoma Gātaka (No. 537).
383, l. 3.	Sister Subhaddā.	Not traced.
384, l. 4.	B.	Kaṇha Gātaka (vol. iv, p. 10).
385, l. 1.	B.	(?) Magghima Nikāya (No. 62).
385, l. 28.	B.	Sutta Nipāta I, 12, 1.
386, l. 12.	B.	Dhammapada 81.
386, l. 19.	B.	Dhammapada 404 (from SN. III, 9, 35).
386, l. 26.	Subhūti.	Not traced.
387, l. 8.	B.	Dhammapada 28.
387, l. 16.	Sister Subhaddā.	Not traced.
388, l. 14.	B.	Magghima Nikāya (vol. i, p. 424).

The Pāli Text.		
P. 389, l. 9.	B.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> XVI, 3.
390, l. 17.	Vaṅṅsa.	Not traced.
391, l. 6.	Subhūti.	" "
391, l. 21.	B.	<i>Dhammapada</i> 350.
392, l. 3.	B.	<i>Anguttara</i> X, 5, 8.
392, l. 10.	B.	Not traced.
393, l. 3.	Vaṅṅsa.	" "
393, l. 25.	B.	" "
394, l. 6.	Upasena.	" "
394, l. 16.	Upasena.	" "
394, l. 28.	Sāriputta.	" "
395, l. 9.	Mahā Kassapa.	" "
395, l. 22.	Upasena.	<i>Thera-gāthā</i> 580.
396, l. 3.	B.	<i>Magghima Nikāya</i> (vol. i, p. 74).
396, l. 20.	Sāriputta.	Not traced.
397, l. 15.	Sāriputta.	" "
398, l. 5.	<i>Pindola</i> .	" "
399, l. 16.	B.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> III, 5, 6 (vol. i, p. 73).
401, l. 10.	B.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> XVI, 1, 3 (vol. ii, p. 194).
402, l. 8.	B.	<i>Kakkavāka Gāṭaka</i> (vol. iv, p. 71; not in III, 520).
402, l. 26.	Brahmā.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> VI, 2, 4 (vol. i, p. 154 = <i>Thera-gāthā</i> 142).
403, l. 13.	B.	<i>Kulla-nārada Gāṭaka</i> (vol. iv, p. 223).
403, l. 27.	B.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> (vol. iii, p. 125).
404, l. 12.	<i>Pindola</i> .	Not traced.
405, l. 3.	B.	<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i> XXX.
405, l. 22.	Anuruddha.	Not traced.
407, l. 1.	Sāriputta.	<i>Thera-gāthā</i> 982, 3.
407, l. 20.	Anuruddha.	Not traced.
408, l. 8.	B.	<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i> XVI, 5, 24.
408, l. 22.	B.	<i>Dhammapada</i> 32.
409, l. 17.	B.	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> XIV, 16 (= <i>Thera-gāthā</i> 148, 266).
410, l. 8.	Sāriputta.	Not traced ¹ .
411, l. 9.	Sāriputta.	" "
411, l. 29.	B.	<i>Sutta Nipāta</i> II, 6, 10.

¹ That is, not in the *Piṭakas*. The stanza is found in the commentary on the *Dhammapada* (Fausböll, p. 147), and also in Buddhaghosa's *Papañka Sūdanī* (see Trenckner's note)—each time with a variation at the close of the verse.

The Pāli Text.		
P. 412, l. 21.	Mogharāga.	Not traced.
413, l. 6.	Rahula.	" "
414, l. 1.	B.	Sutta Nipāta (not traced ¹).
414, l. 18.	B.	" " III, 11, 43.
415, l. 14.	B.	Not traced.
416, l. 4.	Sāriputta.	" "
416, l. 29.	Upāli.	" "
417, l. 12.	B.	" "
418, l. 1.	Moggallāna.	" "
419, l. 11.	Sāriputta.	" "

Now the Pāli Piṭakas consist of the following twenty-nine books:

Title.	No. of printed pages 8vo.	
1. The Sutta Vibhaṅga . . .	617*	} THE VINAYA PIṬAKA.
2. The Khandhakas . . .	668*	
a. Mahāvagga . . .	360	
b. Kullavagga . . .	308	
3. The Parivāra . . .	226*	
Total . . .	—	1511*
4. The Dīgha Nikāya . . .	750	} THE SUTTA PIṬAKA. (The four great Nikāyas.)
5. The Magghima Nikāya . . .	1000	
6. The Saṃyutta Nikāya . . .	1250	
7. The Aṅguttara Nikāya . . .	1500	
Total . . .	—	4500
8. The Khuddaka Pāṭha . . .	10*	} THE KHUDDAKA NIKĀYA. (The repeaters of the Dīgha add these to the Sut- ta Piṭaka. The repeaters of the Magghima add them to the Abhi- dhamma Piṭaka.)
9. The Dhammapadas . . .	40*	
10. The Udānas . . .	80*	
11. The Iti-vuttakas . . .	100*	
12. The Sutta Nipāta . . .	200*	
13. The Vimāna Vatthu . . .	85*	
14. The Peta Vatthu . . .	90*	
15. The Thera-Gāthā . . .	100*	
16. The Theri-Gāthā . . .	35*	
17. The Gātakas . . .	70	
18. The Niddesa . . .	300	
19. The Paṭisambhidā . . .	400	
20. The Apadānas . . .	400	
21. The Buddha Vaṇsa . . .	60*	
22. The Kariyā Piṭaka . . .	30*	
Total . . .	—	2000

¹ Mr. Trenckner gives no reference, and I have searched through the Sutta Nipāta, which has no index, in vain.

23. The Dhamma Saṅgami	260*	}	THE ABHIDHAMMA PIṬAKA.
24. The Vibhaṅga	325		
25. The Kathā Vatthu	440		
26. The Puggala Paññatti	75*		
27. The Dhātu Kathā	100		
28. The Yamakas	400		
29. The Paṭṭhāna	600	}	
Total Abhidhamma	2200		
	10,211		

This shows the total extent of the three Piṭakas to be about 10,000 pages 8vo. as printed, or to be printed, by the Pāli Text Society¹. If our English Bible, in the older authorised version, were to be printed in the same manner and type and on the same size of page, it would occupy about 5,000 pages. So that the Buddhist Bible without its repetitions (some of which are very frequent, and others very long), would only occupy about double the space of the English Bible. This would not have been a literature too large to be familiarly known to our author. What is the conclusion which can fairly be drawn, from a comparison of the last list with those preceding it, as to his knowledge of those books now held, by living Buddhists, to be canonical?

The answer to this question will be of some importance for another reason beyond the help it will afford towards settling the date of the original 'Questions of Milinda.' As is well known, Asoka, in the only one of his edicts, addressed specially to the members of the Buddhist Order of mendicants, selects seven portions of the Buddhist Scriptures, which he mentions by name, and expresses his desire that not only the brethren and sisters of the Order, but also the laity, should constantly learn by heart and reflect upon those seven. Now not one of the seven titles which occur in the edict is identical with any of the twenty-nine in the last list. Whereupon certain Indianists have rejoiced at being able to score a point, as they think, against these

¹ This estimate excludes the space occupied by notes. The books marked with an asterisk in the foregoing list have already been printed.

unbrahmanical Buddhists, and have jumped to the conclusion that the Buddhist canon must be late and spurious; and that the Buddhism of Asoka's time must have been very different from the Buddhism of the Pāli Piṭakas. That would be much the same as if a Japanese scholar, at a time when he knew little or nothing of Christianity, except the names of the books in the Bible, were to have found an open letter of Constantine's in which he urges both the clergy and laity to look upon the Word of God as their only authority, and to constantly repeat and earnestly meditate upon the Psalm of the Shepherd, the words of Lemuel, the Prophecy of the Servant of the Lord, the Sermon on the Mount, the Exaltation of Charity, the Question of Nicodemus, and the story of the Prodigal Son—and that our Oriental critic should jump to the conclusion that the canonical books of the Christians could not have been known in the time of Constantine, and that the Christianity of Constantine was really quite different from, and much more simple than the Christianity of the Bible. As a matter of fact the existence of such a letter would prove very little, either way, as to the date of the books in the Bible as we now have them. If our Japanese scholar were to discover afterwards a Christian work, even much later than the time of Constantine, in which the canonical books of the Christians were both quoted and referred to, he would have much surer ground for a sounder historical criticism. And he would possibly come to see that the seven portions selected for special honour and commendation were not intended as an exhaustive list even of remarkable passages, much less for an exhaustive list of canonical books, but that the number seven was merely chosen in deference to the sacred character attaching to that number in the sacred literature.

Such a book is our Milinda. It is, as we have seen, later than the canonical books of the Pāli Piṭakas, and on the other hand, not only older than the great commentaries, but the only book, outside the canon, regarded in them as an authority which may be implicitly followed. And I venture to think that the most simple working hypothesis

by which to explain the numerous and varied references and quotations it makes, as shown in the preceding lists, from the *Piṭakas* as a whole, and from the various books contained in them, is that the Pāli *Piṭakas* were known, in their entirety, and very nearly, if not quite, as we now have them, to our author. For out of the twenty-nine books of the *Piṭakas*, we find in the lists of works referred to by him the three *Piṭakas* as a whole, the *Vinaya Piṭaka* as a whole, and all of its component books except the *Parivāra* (which was composed in Ceylon), the *Sutta Piṭaka* and each of the four great *Nikāyas*, the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and each of its seven component books, and the *Khuddaka Nikāya* as a whole and several of its separate books. And when we further recollect the very large number of quotations appearing in my lists as not yet traced in the *Piṭakas*, we see the necessity of being very chary in drawing any argument *ex silentio* with respect to those books not occurring in the lists.

To sum up.—It may be said generally that while the *Sutta Vibhaṅga* and the *Khandhakas*, the four great *Nikāyas*, and the *Abhidhamma* were certainly known to our author, he very likely had no knowledge of the *Parivāra*; and it remains to be seen how far his knowledge of the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, which he happens to mention once¹ as a whole by name, did actually extend. At present it is only clear that he knew the *Khuddaka Pāṭha*, the *Dhammapada* collection of sacred verses, the *Sutta Nipāta*, the *Thera* and *Theri-gāthā*, the *Gātakas*, and the *Kariyā Piṭaka*. I hope to return to this question in the Introduction to my second volume, only pointing out here that the doubtful books (those concerning which our author is apparently silent) would occupy about two thousand pages octavo, out of the ten thousand of which the three *Piṭakas* would, if printed, consist: and that those two thousand pages belong, for the most part, precisely to that part of the *Piṭakas* which have not yet been edited, so that there they may very likely, after all, be quoted in one or other

¹ Page 342 of the printed text.

of the numerous quotations entered as 'not traced' in my lists¹.

Such being the extent, so far as can at present be shown, of our author's knowledge of the three Piṭakas, the question arises as to the degree and accuracy of his knowledge. In the great majority of cases his quotations or references entirely agree with the readings shown by our texts. But there are a few exceptions. And as these are both interesting and instructive, it will be advisable to point them out in detail.

The reference to the Avīki Hell as being outside the earth, if not at variance with, is at least an addition to the teaching of the Piṭakas as to cosmogony². But there is some reason to believe that the passage may be an interpolation, and the difference itself is not only doubtful but also of no particular importance.

The description of the contents of the Puggala Paññatti given in I, 26, does not really agree with the text. The book, in its first section, sets out six different sorts of discrimination or distinction. One paragraph only is devoted to each of the first five discriminations, and the author or authors then proceed, in the rest of the book, to deal with the details of the last of the six. Our author gives the six as the divisions of the book itself.

But I think it is clear that so far as the description is inaccurate, the error is due, not to any difference between the text as he had it and that which we now possess, but simply to our author laying too great a stress upon the opening paragraphs of the book.

In the reference to the Buddha's first sermon, the Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness (in I, 38), our author says that 'eighteen koṭis of Brahma gods, and an innumerable company of other gods, attained to compre-

¹ About half of the canonical books, besides a considerable number of the uncanonical works, have already been edited in the last few years, chiefly owing to the Pāli Text Society's labours.

² See the passages quoted in my note at p. 9.

hension of the truth.' There is no statement of the kind in the *Piṭaka* account of this event (see my translation in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 146-155). But it is not inconsistent with the Pāli, and is doubtless added from some edifying commentary.

There is a difference of reading between the lines put into Sāriputta's mouth, at II, 2, 4, and those ascribed to Sāriputta in the *Thera Gāthā* (1002, 1003). If the *Milinda* reading is not found in some hitherto unpublished passage, we have here a real case of divergence.

Perhaps the most important apparent variation between our author and the *Piṭaka* texts is the statement put by him, in IV, 4, 9, into the mouth of the Buddha, that a deliberate lie is one of the offences called *Pārāgika*, that is, involving exclusion from the Order. Now in the old Canon Law there are only four *Pārāgika* offences—breach of chastity, theft, murder, and a false claim to extraordinary spiritual powers (see my translation in vol. i, pp. 1-5 of the 'Vinaya Texts'); and falsehood is placed quite distinctly under another category, that of the *Pāṭikkīyas*, offences requiring repentance (see p. 32 of the same translation). If our author was a member of the Order, as he almost certainly was, it would seem almost incredible that he should make an error in a matter of such common knowledge, and of such vital importance, as the number and nature of the *Pārāgikas*. And indeed, in the immediate context, he refers to the *Pāṭikkīya* rule, though not in the exact words used in the text of the *Pātimokkha*. I think that he must have known very well what he was talking about. And that a passage, not yet traced, will be found in the unpublished parts of the *Piṭakas*, in which the Buddha is made to say that falsehood is a *Pārāgika*—just as a Christian might maintain that falsehood is forbidden in the Ten Commandments, and yet be perfectly aware of the exact phraseology of the Ten Words.

In IV, 4, 26, our author identifies the learned pig in the *Takkha-sūkara Gāthaka* with the Bodisat. He differs here from the *Gāthaka* Commentary, in which the Bodisat is identified with the tree-god, who acts as a kind of Greek chorus in the story. And the summaries in IV, 4, 28 of

Ruru Gâtaka, and in IV, 4, 30 of the Sabba-dâttha Gâtaka, do not exactly agree with Professor Fausböll's text¹. But the commentary is not the text; and it is well known that there are numerous such light variations in the different expansions of the verses, which latter alone form the actual text.

In IV, 4, 44 we find our author giving a version of a well-known incident in the Buddhist Gospel story different from the oldest version of it in the Piṭaka texts. This is another instance of an expansion of the original adopted from some unknown commentator, and does not argue an ignorance of the text as we have it.

I have noticed in the untranslated portion of our author, four or five cases of readings apparently different from the Piṭaka texts he refers to. These I hope to deal with in my next volume. But I may notice here that two stanzas, given on p. 414 of the text, and said on p. 413 to be 'in the Sutta Nipâta,' are not found in Professor Fausböll's edition of that work; and we have there, in all probability, another case of real divergence. But the reading in the Milinda may possibly be found to be incorrect.

The general result of this comparison, when we remember the very large number of passages quoted, will be held, I trust, to confirm the conclusion reached above, that our author knew the Piṭakas practically as we now have them, that is as they have been handed down in Ceylon.

Outside the Piṭakas there are unfortunately no references to actual books. But there are several references to countries and persons which are of importance, in as much as they show a knowledge in our author of places or occurrences not mentioned in the sacred books. It will be most convenient to arrange these passages first in an alphabetical list, and then to make a few remarks on the conclusions the list suggests. They are as follows:—

Name.	Page of the Pāli Text.
Anantakāya (Yonako)	29, 30.
Alasando (dīpo)	82, 327, 331, 359.
Asoka (dhamma-râgâ)	121.

¹ See my notes to the passages quoted.

Name.	Page of the Pāli Text.
Asokârâma (near Patna) . . .	16, 17.
Assagutta (âyasmâ) . . .	6, 7, 14.
Âyupâla (âyasmâ) . . .	19.
Ūhâ (nadî) . . .	70.
Kalasi (gâmo) . . .	83.
Kasmîra (<i>raṭṭham</i>) . . .	82, 327, 331.
Kola-paṭṭana (seaport) . . .	359.
Gandhâra (<i>raṭṭham</i>) . . .	327, 331.
Kandagutto (râgâ) . . .	292.
Kîna (? China) . . .	121, 327, 331, 359.
Takkola (? = Karkota) . . .	359.
Tissatthera (lekḥâkariyo) . . .	71.
Devamañṭiya (Yonako) . . .	22-24, 29, 30.
Dhamma-rakkhita (âyasmâ) . . .	16, 18.
Nikumba (<i>raṭṭham</i>) . . .	327.
Bindumatî (ganikâ) . . .	121.
Bhaddasâla (senâpati-putto) . . .	292.
Bharukakkha (men of) . . .	331.
Mañkura (Yonako) . . .	29, 30.
Madhura (nigamo) . . .	331.
Yonakâ (the tribe) . . .	1, 4, 20, 68.
Rakkhita-tala (in the Himâlayas) . . .	6, 7, 12, 18.
Rohana (âyasmâ) . . .	7, 10.
Vaṅga (Bengal) . . .	359.
Vattaniya (senâsanam) . . .	10, 12, 14-16.
Vigamba-vatthu (senâsanam) . . .	12.
Vilâta (<i>raṭṭham</i>) . . .	327, 331.
Saka-yavana (the countries of) . . .	327, 331.
Sanḥeyya (parivenam) . . .	19, 22.
Sabbadinna or Dinna (Yonako) . . .	29, 56.
Sâgala (nagaram) . . .	1, 3, 5, 14, 22.
Surattha (nigamo) . . .	359, men of, 331.
Suvanna-bhûmi (? Burma) . . .	359.
Sonuttara (brâhmano) . . .	9.

It will be noticed that the only names of persons, besides those occurring in the story itself, are, in one passage, Asoka and Bindumatî the courtesan, and in another Kandragupta and Bhaddasâla who fought against him. Of places, besides those in the story, we have a considerable number of names referring to the Panjâb, and adjacent countries; and besides these the names only of a few places or countries on

the sea coast. The island Alasanda in the Indus, and the town of Kalasi situated in that island, have been discussed above. The country of the Sakas and Yavanas, Gandhâra, Kashmîr, Bharukakka, Surat, and Madhura, explain themselves. Nikumba and Vilâta were probably in the same neighbourhood, but these names have not been met with elsewhere, and I can suggest no identification of them. The places on the sea coast, to which a merchant ship could sail, mentioned on p. 359, are mostly well known. Kola-pattana must, I think, be some place on the Koromandel coast, and Suvanna-bhûmi be meant for the seaboard of Burma and Siam. The author mentions no places in the interior south of the Ganges.

At four places he gives lists of famous rivers. In three out of the four he simply repeats the list of five—Gaṅgâ, Yamunâ, Akiravatî, Sarabhû, and Mahî—so often enumerated together in the Piṭakas¹. In the fourth passage (p. 114) he adds five others—the Sindhu, the Sarassatî, the Vetravatî, the Vitamsâ, and the Kândabhâgâ. Of these the first two are well known. Professor Eduard Müller suggests² that the Vitamsâ is the same as the Vitastâ (the Hydaspes of the Greeks and the modern Bihat). The Vetravatî is one of the principal affluents of the Jumna; and the Kândrabhâgâ rises in the North-West Himâlayas, and is not unfrequently referred to as the Asiknî of the Vedas, the Akesines of the Greek geographers, the modern Kinâb³.

The list is meagre enough. An ethical treatise is scarcely the place to look for much geographical or historical matter. But unless our author deliberately concealed his knowledge, and made all the remarks he put into the mouth of Nâgasena correspond with what that teacher might fairly be expected to have known, the whole list points to the definite conclusion that the writer of the 'Questions of Milinda' resided in the far North-West of

¹ See pp. 70, 87, 380 of the Pâli text.

² 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1888, p. 87.

³ See Lassen, 'Indische Alterthumskunde,' vol. i, p. 43 (first edition, p. 55 of the second edition), and the passages there quoted.

India, or in the Panjâb itself. And this is confirmed by the great improbability of any memory of Menander having survived elsewhere, and more especially in Ceylon, where we should naturally look for our author's residence if he did not live in the region thus suggested.

As my space is here limited, I postpone to the next volume the discussion as to how far the knowledge displayed by our author, the conditions of society with which he shows himself acquainted, and the religious beliefs he gives utterance to, afford evidence of his date. I will only say here that on all these points his work shows clear signs of being later than the Piṣāka texts. And in the present state of our knowledge, or rather of our ignorance, of Pāli, there is very little to be drawn from the language used by our author. In the first place we do not know for certain whether we have the original before us, or a translation from the Sanskrit or from some Northern dialect. And if, as is probably the case, we have a translation, it would be very difficult to say whether any peculiarity we may find in it is really due to the translator, or to the original author. No doubt a translator, finding in his original a word not existing in Pāli, but formed according to rules of derivation obtaining in Pāli, would coin the corresponding Pāli form. And in doing so he might very likely be led into mistake, if his original were Prakrit, by misunderstanding the derivation of the Prakrit word before him. Childers in comparing Buddhist Sanskrit with Pāli, has pointed out several cases where such mistakes have occurred, and has supposed that in every case the Sanskrit translator misunderstood a Pāli word before him¹. As I have suggested elsewhere it is, to say the least, quite as likely that the Sanskrit Buddhist texts are often founded on older works, not in Pāli, but in some other Prakrit². And it may be possible hereafter to form some opinion as to what that dialect was which the Sanskrit writers must have had be-

¹ See the articles in his 'Pāli Dictionary,' referred to under note 3, p. xi of the Introduction.

² See the note on pp. 178, 179 of my 'Buddhist Suttas.'

fore them, to lead them into the particular blunders they have made. In the same way an argument may be drawn from the words found exclusively in Milinda as to the dialect which he spoke, and in which he probably wrote. A list of the words our author uses, and not found in the *Piṭakas*, can only be tentative, as we have not as yet the whole of the *Piṭaka* texts in print. But it will be useful, even now, to give the following imperfect list of such as I have noted in my copy of Childers' 'Dictionary.'

Word.	Page of the Pāli Text.	Note.
Āḷaka . . .	418 . . .	See 'Journal,' 1886, p. 158.
Anekamsikatā . . .	93 . . .	" " " p. 123.
Āṇāpako . . .	147 . . .	Peon, officer.
Anīka//ha . . .	234 . . .	Sentinel.
Anughāyati . . .	343 . . .	Trace by smell.
Anuparivattati . . .	204, 253, 307 . . .	Turn towards.
Antobhaviko . . .	95 . . .	'Journal,' 1886, p. 124.
Āvapana . . .	279 . . .	" " " p. 157.
Asipāsā . . .	191 . . .	A caste so called.
Anupeseti . . .	31, 36 . . .	Send after.
Āsādaniyam . . .	205 . . .	Injury.
Aṭonā ¹ . . .	191 . . .	Professional beggars.
Āyūhito . . .	181 . . .	Busy.
Āyūhako . . .	207 . . .	Busy.
{ Bhaddiputtā ² . . .	191 . . .	} A caste so called.
{ Bhaṭṭiputtā . . .	133 . . .	
Bhavatīha . . .	92, 93, 342 . . .	Introducing verses.
Kāṇḍakanta . . .	118 . . .	A kind of gem.
Kavaka . . .	156, 200 . . .	Wretch.
Dhamadhamāyati . . .	117 . . .	To blow.
Ekāniko . . .	402 . . .	On the one true path.
Ghanikā . . .	191 . . .	Musicians.
Gilānako . . .	74 . . .	A sick man, a patient.
Hiriyati . . .	171 . . .	Is made afraid of sin.
Issatthako . . .	419 . . .	Archer.
Galūpikā . . .	407 . . .	Leech.
Kali-devatā . . .	191 . . .	Worshippers of Kali.
Kaṭumika . . .	78, 79 . . .	Reminding.
Kummiga . . .	346 . . .	Animal.

¹ Hīnaṭi-kumburē (p. 252) reads anāṇayo.

² The *Sinhalese* has bhaddiputrāyo.

Name.	Page of the Pāli Text.	Note.
Lakanaka . . .	377 . .	Anchor.
Laṇṇaka . . .	137, 242, 256, 362 . .	Epithet of the Nikāyas.
Laṅghako . . .	34, 191, 331 . .	Tumbler.
Lekhaniyo . . .	172 . .	Sharp (of medicine).
Mamkata . . .	384 . .	Done by me.
Manthayati . . .	173 . .	Churn.
Mazibhaddā . . .	191 . .	A caste so called.
Naṭṭhāyiko . . .	201 . .	(?) Farmer.
Nārāṭa . . .	105 . .	The weapon so called.
Niyyāmaka . . .	194, 376 . .	Pilot.
Okassa . . .	210 . .	Rudely.
Pabbatā . . .	191 . .	A caste so called.
Pakkhanno . . .	144, 390 . .	Lost, fallen.
Parimaggakā . . .	343 . .	Touchers of.
Parimutti . . .	112 . .	Release.
Pariraṅgita . . .	75 . .	Marked over.
Parisamha . . .	198 . .	Subtle.
Pariyoga ¹ . . .	118 . .	Cauldron.
Paṭisallīyati . . .	139 . .	To be secluded.
Paṭisīsa . . .	90 . .	Chignon.
Peṇāhikā . . .	402 . .	A bird so called.
Pitaka . . .	18, &c. . .	See my note to p. 28.
Pimsati . . .	43 . .	Compound (a medicine).
Ratani ² . . .	85 . .	Cubit.
Sakkika . . .	226 . .	True.
Sāmayiko . . .	22 . .	Learned in doctrine.
Supāna . . .	147 . .	Dog.
Tamyathā . . .	1 . .	See Trenckner's 'Pāli Miscellany,' p. 55.
Thāla . . .	62 . .	Gong.
Tipeṭako . . .	90 . .	Who knows the Pitakas.
Ukkhadeti . . .	241 (see 315) . .	Perfume the body.
Ūhana . . .	32 . .	Synthesis.
Ukkalati . . .	143 . .	Revoke.
Upama . . .	41, 44 . .	Cessation.
Viggādharo . . .	153, 200 . .	Magician.
Yogāvāro . . .	43, 400 and foll. . .	See my note on p. 68.
Yogin . . .	2, 400 foll. . .	Ascetic.

¹ This word has been found in the Pitakas (e.g. Magg'hima I, 480) in the sense of 'practice.'

² The Pitaka form is ratana.

This list might be considerably extended if words were included which differ from those used in the *Piṭakas* only by the addition of well-known suffixes or prefixes—such, for instance, as *viparivattati*, at p. 117, only found as yet elsewhere in the *Tela Kaṭṭhā Gāthā*, verse 37. But such words are really only a further utilisation of the existing resources of the language, and would afford little or no ground for argument as to the time and place at which our author wrote. I have thought it best, therefore, to omit them, at least at present.

If we turn from isolated words to the evidence of style it will be acknowledged by every reader that the *Milinda* has a marked style of its own, different alike from the formal exactness of most of the *Piṭaka* texts, and from the later manner of any other Pāli or Sanskrit-Buddhist authors as yet published. It is no doubt the charm of its style which has been one of the principal reasons for the great popularity of the book. Even a reader who takes no interest in the points that are raised, or in the method in which the questions are discussed, will be able, I trust, to see, even through the dark veil of a lame and wooden translation, what the merits of the original must be. And to a devout Buddhist, in whose eyes the book he was reading offered a correct solution of the most serious difficulties in religion, of the deepest problems of life,—to whose whole intellectual training and sympathies the way in which the puzzles are put, and solved, so exactly appealed,—to such a reader both the easy grace of the opening dialogue, as of a ship sailing in calm waters, and the real eloquence of occasional passages, more especially of the perorations by which the solutions are sometimes closed, must have been a continual feast. I venture to think that the ‘*Questions of Milinda*’ is undoubtedly the master-piece of Indian prose; and indeed is the best book of its class, from a literary point of view, that had then been produced in any country. Limits of space prevent the discussion of this last proposition, however interesting: and it would be, no doubt, difficult to prove that anything from India was better than the corresponding thing produced by our noble selves, or by those

whose Karma we inherit. But in ancient Indian literature there are only two or three works which can at all compare with it. It ought not to seem odd that these also are Buddhist and Pāli; that is, that they come from the same school. And while the *Dīgha Nikāya* may be held to excel it in stately dignity, the *Visuddhi Magga* in sustained power, and the *Gāṭaka* book in varied humour, the palm will probably be eventually given to the 'Questions of Milinda' as a work of art.

I am aware that this conclusion is entirely at variance with the often repeated depreciation of Buddhist literature. But the fact is that this depreciation rests upon ignorance, and is supported by prejudice. As a critical judgment it will not survive the publication and translation of those great Buddhist works which it overlooks or ignores. Some Sanskrit scholars, familiar with the Brahmin estimate of matters Indian, and filled with a very rational and proper admiration for the many fine qualities which the old Brahmins possessed, may find it hard to recognise the merits of sectarian works written in dialects which violate their most cherished laws of speech. But the historical student of the evolution of thought, and of the rise of literature in India, will more and more look upon the question as a whole, and will estimate at its right value all Indian work, irrespective of dialect or creed.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

TEMPLE,

August, 1889.

THE QUESTIONS
OF
KING MILINDA.

THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA.

REVERENCE BE TO THE BLESSED ONE, THE
ARAHAT, THE SAMMÂ-SAMBUDDHA.

BOOK I.

THE SECULAR NARRATIVE ¹.

- I. King Milinda, at Sâgala the famous town of yore,
To Nâgasena, the world famous sage, repaired.
(So the deep Ganges to the deeper ocean flows.)
To him, the eloquent, the bearer of the torch
Of Truth, dispeller of the darkness of men's minds,
Subtle and knotty questions did he put, many,
Turning on many points. Then were solutions
given
Profound in meaning, gaining access to the heart,
Sweet to the ear, and passing wonderful and
strange.
For Nâgasena's talk plunged to the hidden
depths
Of Vinaya and of Abhidhamma (Law and
Thought)

¹ Bâhira-kathâ, literally 'outside talk;' so called in contradistinction to the religious character of the subjects treated of in the remaining books.

Unravelling all the meshes of the Suttas' net,
Glittering the while with metaphors and reason-
ing high.

Come then! Apply your minds, and let your
hearts rejoice,

And hearken to these subtle questionings, all
grounds

Of doubt well fitted to resolve.

2. Thus hath it been handed down by tradition—
There is in the country of the Yonakas¹ a great
centre of trade², a city that is called Sâgala, situate
in a delightful country well watered and hilly,
abounding in parks and gardens and groves and
lakes and tanks, a paradise of rivers and mountains
and woods. Wise architects have laid it out³, and
its people know of no oppression, since all their
enemies and adversaries have been put down.
Brave is its defence, with many and various strong
towers and ramparts, with superb gates and en-
trance archways; and with the royal citadel in its
midst, white walled and deeply moated. Well laid
out are its streets, squares, cross roads, and market
places⁴. Well displayed are the innumerable sorts
of costly merchandise [2] with which its shops are
filled. It is richly adorned with hundreds of alms-

¹ That is Ionians, the Pâli word for Baktrian Greeks.

² Nânâ-pu/a-bhedanam, literally 'the distributing place of
parcels of merchandise of many kinds.' Trenckner renders it
'surrounded with a number of dependent towns,' but surely
entrepôt is the idea suggested.

³ Sutavanta-nimmitam; which Trenckner renders 'pious are
its people.' But I prefer the Sinhalese interpretation.

⁴ This list recurs at pp. 34, 330 of the text. See below, p. 53.

halls of various kinds ; and splendid with hundreds of thousands of magnificent mansions, which rise aloft like the mountain peaks of the Himâlayas. Its streets are filled with elephants, horses, carriages, and foot-passengers, frequented by groups of handsome men and beautiful women, and crowded by men of all sorts and conditions, Brahmans, nobles, artificers, and servants. They resound with cries of welcome to the teachers of every creed, and the city is the resort of the leading men of each of the differing sects. Shops are there for the sale of Benares muslin, of Koṭumbara stuffs¹, and of other cloths of various kinds ; and sweet odours are exhaled from the bazaars, where all sorts of flowers and perfumes are tastefully set out. Jewels are there in plenty, such as men's hearts desire, and guilds of traders in all sorts of finery display their goods in the bazaars that face all quarters of the sky. So full is the city of money, and of gold and silver ware, of copper and stone ware, that it is a very mine of dazzling treasures. And there is laid up there much store of property and corn and things of value in warehouses—foods and drinks of every sort, syrups and sweetmeats of every kind. In wealth it rivals Uttara-kuru, and in glory it is as Âṅakamandâ, the city of the gods².

3. Having said thus much we must now relate the previous birth history of these two persons (Milinda

¹ It is worth noting, as there is a doubt about the spelling, that Hīnaśi-kumburê reads Koṭumbara, not Kodumbara.

² Here follow in Hīnaśi-kumburê's version two pages of introductory matter, explaining how he came to undertake his translation.

and Nâgasena) and the various sorts of puzzles¹. This we shall do under six heads:—

1. Their previous history (Pubba-yoga).
2. The Milinda problems.
3. Questions as to distinguishing characteristics.
4. Puzzles arising out of contradictory statements.
5. Puzzles arising out of ambiguity.
6. Discussions turning on metaphor.

And of these the Milinda problems are in two divisions—questions as to distinctive characteristics, and questions aiming at the dispelling of doubt; and the puzzles arising out of contradictory statements are in two divisions—the long chapter, and the problems in the life of the recluse.

THEIR PREVIOUS HISTORY (PUBBA-YOGA).

4. By Pubba-yoga is meant their past Karma (their doings in this or previous lives). Long ago, they say, when Kassapa the Buddha was promulgating the faith, there dwelt in one community near the Ganges a great company of members of the Order. There the brethren, true to established rules and duties, rose early in the morning, and taking the long-handled brooms, would sweep out the courtyard and collect the rubbish into a heap, meditating the while on the virtues of the Buddha.

5. One day a brother told a novice to remove the heap of dust. But he, as if he heard not, went about his business; and on being called a second time, and a third, still went his way as if he had not heard. Then the brother, angry with so intractable a novice, dealt him a blow with the broom stick.

¹ These six words are added from Hīnaśī-kumburê.

[3] This time, not daring to refuse, he set about the task crying; and as he did so he muttered to himself this first aspiration: 'May I, by reason of this meritorious act of throwing out the rubbish, in each successive condition in which I may be born up to the time when I attain Nirvâna, be powerful and glorious as the midday sun!'

6. When he had finished his work he went to the river side to bathe, and on beholding the mighty billows of the Ganges seething and surging, he uttered this second aspiration: 'May I, in each successive condition in which I may be born till I attain Nirvâna, possess the power of saying the right thing, and saying it instantly, under any circumstance that may arise, carrying all before me like this mighty surge!'

7. Now that brother, after he had put the broom away in the broom closet, had likewise wandered down to the river side to bathe, and as he walked he happened to overhear what the novice had said. Then thinking: 'If this fellow, on the ground of such an act of merit, which after all was instigated by me, can harbour hopes like this, what may not I attain to?' he too made his wish, and it was thus: 'In each successive condition in which I may be born till I attain Nirvâna, may I too be ready in saying the right thing at once, and more especially may I have the power of unravelling and of solving each problem and each puzzling question this young man may put—carrying all before me like this mighty surge!'

8. Then for the whole period between one Buddha and the next these two people wandered from existence to existence among gods and men. And our Buddha saw them too, and just as he did

to the son of Moggall and to Tissa the Elder, so to them also did he foretell their future fate, saying : ' Five hundred years after I have passed away will these two reappear, and the subtle Law and Doctrine taught by me will they two explain, unravelling and disentangling its difficulties by questions put and metaphors adduced.'

9. Of the two the novice became the king of the city of Sâgala in India, Milinda by name, learned, eloquent, wise, and able ; and a faithful observer, and that at the right time, of all the various acts of devotion and ceremony enjoined by his own sacred hymns concerning things past, present, and to come. Many were the arts and sciences he knew—holy tradition and secular law ; the Sâṅkhya, Yoga, Nyâya, and Vaiseshika systems of philosophy ; arithmetic ; music ; medicine ; the four Vedas, the Purâṇas, and the Itihâsas ; astronomy, magic, causation¹, and spells ; the art of war ; poetry ; conveyancing²—in a word, the whole nineteen³.

[4] As a disputant he was hard to equal, harder

¹ Hetu, literally 'cause.' Trenckner has 'logic (?)'; Hînañi-kumburê repeats the word.

² Muddâ, literally 'seal-ring.' The meaning of the term (which recurs in similar lists at Dîgha I, 1, 25 ; I, 2, 14 ; and below, p. 59 of the text) is quite clear, but the exact details of the 'art' are unknown. I follow Buddhaghosa's comment on those passages. Trenckner leaves the word untranslated, and Hînañi-kumburê says, 'Ængillen cel-wîma,' that is, 'adhering with the finger,' which I do not understand, unless it means the sealing of a document. At IV, 3, 25, the context makes it probable that 'law of property' would be the best rendering.

³ The number of the Sippas (Arts and Sciences) is usually given as eighteen. In the Gâtaka (p. 58, l. 29, Professor Fausbøll's edition) it is twelve.

still to overcome ; the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. And as in wisdom so in strength of body, swiftness, and valour there was found none equal to Milinda in all India. He was rich too, mighty in wealth and prosperity, and the number of his armed hosts knew no end.

10. Now one day Milinda the king proceeded forth out of the city to pass in review the innumerable host of his mighty army in its fourfold array (of elephants, cavalry, bowmen, and soldiers on foot). And when the numbering of the forces was over, the king, who was fond of wordy disputation, and eager for discussion with casuists, sophists¹, and gentry of that sort, looked at the sun (to ascertain the time), and then said to his ministers: 'The day is yet young. What would be the use of getting back to town so early? Is there no learned person, whether wandering teacher² or Brahman, the head of some school or order, or the master of some band of pupils (even though he profess faith

¹ Lokâyatas and Vitandas. Other Pâli passages, where they are mentioned, are *Kullavagga* V, 3, 2; *Ânguttara* III, 58, 1; *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini*, 96, 247; and below, § 22 (p. 17). See also Weber, 'Bhagavatî,' II, 246; Muir, 'Sanskrit Texts,' III, 95; Deussen, 'Das Vedânta-System,' 310.

² Samāṇa. There is no expression in English corresponding to this common word in Pâli texts. It means any 'religious' (in the technical meaning of that word) who is not a recluse according to the orthodox Brahman rules. It includes therefore many who were not Buddhists, and also even Brahmans if they had joined the Buddhists or Gains, or any other of the non-conforming bodies. The Samāṇas remained in one place during the rains, and for the rest of the year wandered from place to place, promulgating their particular views. They were not necessarily ascetics in any strict use of that term; though they were usually celibates.

in the Arahāt, the Supreme Buddha), who would be able to talk with me, and resolve my doubts ?'

11. Thereupon the five hundred Yonakas said to Milinda the king : ' There are the six Masters, O king !—Pûrana Kassapa, Makkhali of the cowshed ¹, the Niganttha of the Nâta clan, Sañgaya the son of the Belattha woman, Agita of the garment of hair, and Pakudha Kakkâyana. These are well known as famous founders of schools, followed by bands of disciples and hearers, and highly honoured by the people. Go, great king ! put to them your problems, and have your doubts resolved ².'

12. So king Milinda, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted the royal car with its splendid equipage, and went out to the dwelling-place of Pûrana Kassapa, exchanged with him the compliments of friendly greeting, and took his seat courteously apart. And thus sitting he said to

¹ So called because he was said to have been born in a cowshed. See the Sumaṅgala, p. 143. All these six teachers were contemporaries of the Buddha, and lived therefore about five hundred years before Milinda.

² All this is a mere echo of the opening paragraphs in the Sâmañña-phala (D. 2), where Agâtasattu is described as visiting these six famous sophists. And the plagiarism is all the more inartistic as the old names are retained, and no explanation is given of their being born twice at an interval of five hundred years. One may indeed ask what is a glaring anachronism to our good Buddhist romancer compared with the advantage of introducing the stock-names when he has to talk of heretics ? But the whole book is so full of literary skill, that it is at least strange that its author should have made this blunder ; and there are other reasons for thinking the whole episode an interpolation. (See note on §§ 13, 15.) So that probably our § 15 came originally immediately after § 10, and then (after the episode in §§ 15-36) § 37 takes up the narrative interrupted at the end of § 10.

him: 'Who is it, venerable Kassapa, who rules the world?'

'The Earth, great king, rules the world!'

'But, venerable Kassapa, if it be the Earth that rules the world, how comes it that some men go to the Avîki hell¹, thus getting outside the sphere of the Earth?' [5]

When he had thus spoken, neither could Pûrana Kassapa swallow the puzzle, nor could he bring it up; crestfallen, driven to silence, and moody², there he sat.

13. Then Milinda the king said to Makkhali of the cowshed³: 'Are there, venerable Gosâla, good and evil acts? Is there such a thing as fruit, ultimate result, of good and evil acts?'

'There are no such acts, O king; and no such fruit, or ultimate result. Those who here in the world are nobles, they, O king, when they go to the

¹ Avîki (probably 'the Waveless'). The mention of this particular hell as being outside the earth is noteworthy. One would expect to find the Lokântarika hell so described. Spence Hardy indeed goes so far as to say that the Avîki is seven hundred miles directly under the great Bo Tree at Budh Gâyâ (Manual, p. 26), which would be within the sphere of the earth. But there is nothing in the Pâli texts yet published as to its position. See *Kullavagga* VII, 4, 8; *Ânguttara* III, 56; *Gâtaka* I, 71, 96; *Pañka Gati Dîpana*, 20. There is a list of the hells at *Sutta Nipâta* III, 10, but the Avîki is not one of them. This blunder, improbable in a writer so learned as our author elsewhere shows himself, is another reason for thinking these sections to be an interpolation.

² *Pattakkhando pagghâyanto*. See my note on *Kullavagga* IV, 4, 7, and compare *Ânguttara* III, 73, 4.

³ This, again, is most clumsy, as the rival teachers must have dwelt far apart. And it will be seen that, notwithstanding the parade of the six names at the beginning of this episode, the remaining four are no further mentioned.

other world, will become nobles once more. And those who are Brahmans, or of the middle class, or workpeople, or outcasts here, will in the next world become the same. What then is the use of good or evil acts¹ ?

‘ If, venerable Gosâla, it be as you say then, by parity of reasoning, those who, here in this world, have a hand cut off, must in the next world become persons with a hand cut off, and in like manner those who have had a foot cut off or an ear or their nose ! ’

And at this saying Makkhali was silenced.

14. Then thought Milinda the king within himself²: ‘ All India is an empty thing, it is verily like chaff ! There is no one, either recluse or Brahman, capable of discussing things with me, and dispelling my doubts.’ And he said to his ministers: ‘ Beautiful is the night and pleasant ! Who is the recluse or Brahman we can visit to-night to question him, who will be able to converse with us and dispel our doubts³ ? ’ And at that saying the counsellors remained silent, and stood there gazing upon the face of the king.

15. Now at that time the city of Sâgala had for twelve years been devoid of learned men, whether Brahmans, Samanas, or laymen. But wherever the king heard that such persons dwelt, thither he would

¹ This is quite in accord with the opinions attributed to Makkhali Gosâla in the Sâmañña-phala (D. 2, 20), and in the Sumaṅgala Vilâsini on it (see especially p. 166).

² See below, p. 30.

³ This is an echo of the words in the corresponding passage of the Sâmañña-phala Sutta (D. 2, 1).

go and put his questions to them¹. [6] But they all alike, being unable to satisfy the king by their solution of his problems, departed hither and thither, or if they did not leave for some other place, were at all events reduced to silence. And the brethren of the Order went, for the most part, to the Himālaya mountains.

16. Now at that time there dwelt, in the mountain region of the Himālayas, on the Guarded Slope, an innumerable company of Arahats (brethren who, while yet alive, had attained Nirvāṇa). And the venerable Assagutta, by means of his divine power of hearing, heard those words of king Milinda. And he convened an assembly of the Order on the summit of the Yugandhara mountain, and asked the brethren: 'Is there any member of the Order able to hold converse with Milinda the king, and resolve his doubts?'

Then were they all silent. And a second and a third time he put the same question to them, and still none of all the number spake. Then he said to the assembled Order: 'There is, reverend Sirs, in the heaven of the Thirty-three², and east of the Vegayanta palace, a mansion called Ketumatt, wherein dwells the god Mahāsena. He is able to hold converse with Milinda the king, and to resolve his doubts.' And the innumerable company of

¹ This paragraph is so unnecessary after what has been said in the preceding episode, and at the same time so contradictory to the fact of two teachers at least living in or near the city, that it would really seem probable that it (or perhaps § 14) came originally directly after § 10, the rest being an interpolation, and a clumsy one.

² These are the principal gods of the Vedic pantheon.

Arahats vanished from the summit of the Yugandhara mountain, and appeared in the heaven of the Thirty-three.

17. And Sakka, the king of the gods, beheld those brethren of the Order as they were coming from afar. And at the sight of them he went up to the venerable Assagutta, and bowed down before him, and stood reverently aside. And so standing he said to him : 'Great, reverend Sir, is the company of the brethren that has come. What is it that they want ? I am at the service of the Order. What can I do for you ?'

And the venerable Assagutta replied : 'There is, O king, in India, in the city of Sāgala, a king named Milinda. As a disputant he is hard to equal, harder still to overcome, he is the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. He is in the habit of visiting the members of the Order and harassing them by questions of speculative import.'

Then said Sakka, the king of the gods, to him : 'That same king Milinda, venerable one, left this condition to be born as a man. And there dwells in the mansion Ketumatī a god, Mahāsena by name, who is able to hold converse with him and to resolve his doubts. [7] That god we will beseech to suffer himself to be reborn into the world of men.'

18. So Sakka, the king of the gods, preceded by the Order, entered the Ketumatī mansion; and when he had embraced Mahāsena the god, he said to him : 'The Order of the brethren, Lord, makes this request of you—to be reborn into the world of men.'

'I have no desire, Sir, for the world of men, so overladen with action (Karma). Hard is life as a

man. It is here, Sir, in the world of the gods that, being reborn in ever higher and higher spheres, I hope to pass away!’

And a second and a third time did Sakka, the king of the gods, make the same request, and the reply was still the same. Then the venerable Assagutta addressed Mahâsena the god, and said: ‘On passing in review, Lord, the worlds of gods and men, there is none but thee that we find able to succour the faith by refuting the heretical views of Milinda the king. The whole Order beseeches thee, Lord, saying: “Condescend, O worthy one, to be reborn among men, in order to lend to the religion of the Blessed One thy powerful aid.”’

Then was Mahâsena the god overjoyed and delighted in heart at the thought that he would be able to help the faith by refuting the heresy of Milinda; and he gave them his word, and said: ‘Very well then, venerable ones, I consent to be reborn in the world of men.’

19. Then the brethren, having thus accomplished the task they had taken in hand, vanished from the heaven of the Thirty-three, and reappeared on the Guarded Slope in the Himâlaya mountains. And the venerable Assagutta addressed the Order, and said: ‘Is there, venerable ones, any brother belonging to this company of the Order, who has not appeared in the assembly?’

Thereupon a certain brother said there was, that Rohana had a week previously gone into the mountains, and become buried in meditation, [8] and suggested that a messenger should be sent to him. And at that very moment the venerable Rohana aroused himself from his meditation, and was aware

that the Order was expecting him¹. And vanishing from the mountain top, he appeared in the presence of the innumerable company of the brethren.

And the venerable Assagutta said to him : ' How now, venerable Rohana ! When the religion of the Buddha is in danger of crumbling away, have you no eyes for the work of the Order ?'

' It was through inadvertence, Sir,' said he.

' Then, venerable Rohana, atone for it.'

' What, Sir, should I do ?'

' There is a Brahman village, venerable Rohana, called Kagangala², at the foot of the Himālaya mountains, and there dwells there a Brahman called Soṇuttara. He will have a son called Nāgasena. Go to that house for alms during seven years and ten months. After the lapse of that time thou shalt draw away the boy from a worldly life, and cause him to enter the Order. When he shall have abandoned the world, then shalt thou be free of the atonement for thy fault.'

' Let it be even as thou sayest,' said the venerable Rohana in assent.

20. Now Mahāsena the god passed away from the world of the gods, and was reborn in the womb of the wife of the Brahman Soṇuttara. And at the moment of his conception three strange, wonderful things took place :—arms and weapons became all

¹ *Paṭimāneti*. Childers does not give this meaning to the word. But it is the usual one. Compare *Sumaṅgala*, vol. i, pp. 276, 280; *Vinaya Piṭaka* IV, 212; *Kullavagga* VI, 13, 2; *Gāṭaka* II, 423.

² This is a famous place in Buddhist story. It is at the extreme limit, to the East, of the Buddhist Holy Land, the ' Middle Country.' See *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī* on D. 2, 40 (p. 173); *Mahāvagga* V, 13, 12; *Gāṭaka* I, 49.

ablaze, the tender grain became ripe in a moment, and there was a great rain (in the time of drought). And the venerable Rohana went to that house for alms for seven years and ten months from the day of Mahâsena's re-incarnation, but never once did he receive so much as a spoonful of boiled rice, or a ladleful of sour gruel, or a greeting, or a stretching forth of the joined hands, or any sort of salutation. Nay rather it was insults and taunts that fell to his share: and there was no one who so much as said, 'Be so good, Sir, as to go on to the next house¹.'

But when all that period had gone by he one day happened to have those very words addressed to him. And on that day the Brahman, on his way back from his work in the fields, [9] saw the Elder as he met him on his return, and said: 'Well, hermit, have you been to our place?'

'Yes, Brahman, I have.'

'But did you get anything there?'

'Yes, Brahman, I did.'

And he was displeased at this, and went on home, and asked them: 'Did you give anything to that hermit?'

'We gave him nothing,' was the reply.

21. Thereupon the Brahman, the next day, seated himself right in the doorway, thinking to himself: 'To-day I'll put that hermit to shame for having told a lie.' And the moment that the Elder in due course came up to the house again, he said: 'Yesterday you said you had got something at my house, having

¹ This is the ordinary polite formula used by an Indian peasant when he wishes to express his inability (or his disinclination) to give food to a mendicant friar.

all the while got nothing! Is lying allowed to you fellows?’

And the Elder replied: ‘Brahman, for seven years and ten months no one even went so far as to suggest politely that I should pass on. Yesterday this courtesy was extended to me. It was to that that I referred.’

The Brahman thought to himself: ‘If these men, at the mere experience of a little courtesy, acknowledge in a public place, and with thanks, that they have received an alms, what will they not do if they really receive a gift!’ And he was much struck by this, and had an alms bestowed upon the Elder from the rice and curry prepared for his own use, and added furthermore: ‘Every day you shall receive here food of the same kind.’ And having watched the Elder as he visited the place from that day onwards, and noticed how subdued was his demeanour, he became more and more pleased with him, and invited him to take there regularly his midday meal. And the Elder gave, by silence, his consent; and daily from that time forth, when he had finished his meal, and was about to depart, he would pronounce some short passage or other from the words of the Buddha¹.

22. Now the Brahman’s wife had, after her ten months, brought forth her son; and they called his name Nāgasena. He grew up in due course till he became seven years old, and his father said to the child: ‘Do you want, [10] dear Nāgasena, to study the learning traditional in this Brahmanical house of ours?’

¹ This custom is a rule with the mendicant friars. It is their way of ‘returning thanks,’ as we should say. See below, p. 25.

‘What is it called, father?’ said he.

‘The three Vedas are called learning (Sikkhâ), other kinds of knowledge are only arts, my dear.’

‘Yes, I should like to learn them, father,’ said the boy.

Then Sonuttara the Brahman gave to a Brahman teacher a thousand pieces as his teaching fee, and had a divan spread for him aside in an inner chamber, and said to him: ‘Do thou, Brahman, teach this boy the sacred hymns by heart.’

So the teacher made the boy repeat the hymns, urging him to get them by heart. And young Nâgasena, after one repetition of them, had learnt the three Vedas by heart, could intone them correctly, had understood their meaning, could fix the right place of each particular verse¹, and had grasped the mysteries they contained². All at once there arose in him an intuitive insight into the Vedas, with a knowledge of their lexicography, of their prosody, of their grammar, and of the legends attaching to the characters in them. He became a philologist and grammarian, and skilled alike in casuistry and in the knowledge of the bodily marks that foreshadow the greatness of a man³.

23. Then young Nâgasena said to his father: ‘Is

¹ Suvava//hâpitâ, or perhaps its use in ceremonies or sacrifices. The phrase only occurs in this passage. It is literally, ‘The three Vedas were well fixed by the boy.’ Hinañ-kumburê simply repeats the word.

² On the exact force of the special terms translated in these clauses, one may further compare the corresponding phrases used of learning the Buddhist texts in *Kullavagga* IV, 14, 17; IX, 5, 1.

³ The above are the stock phrases for the learning of a scholarly Brahman, and one or two points in the details are uncertain.

there anything more to be learned in this Brahmanical family of ours, or is this all ?'

'There is no more, Nâgasena, my dear. This is all,' was the reply.

And young Nâgasena repeated his lesson to his teacher for the last time, and went out of the house, and in obedience to an impulse arising in his heart as the result of previous Karma, sought a place of solitude, where he gave himself up to meditation. And he reviewed what he had learnt throughout from beginning to end, and found no value in it anywhere at all. And he exclaimed in bitterness of soul : 'Empty forsooth are these Vedas, and as chaff. There is in them neither reality, nor worth, nor essential truth !'

That moment the venerable Rohana, seated at his hermitage at Vattaniya, felt in his mind what was passing in the heart of Nâgasena. And he robed himself, and taking his alms-bowl in his hand, he vanished from Vattaniya and appeared near the Brahman village Kagaṅgala. And young Nâgasena, as he stood again in the doorway, saw him coming in the distance. At the sight of him he became happy and glad, and a sweet hope sprang up in his heart that from him he might learn the essential truth. And he went [11] to him, and said : 'Who art thou, Sir, that thou art thus bald-headed, and wearest yellow robes ?'

'They call me a recluse, my child' (Pabbagita : literally, 'one who has abandoned ;' that is, the worldly life).

'And why do they call thee "one who has abandoned ?"'

'Because a recluse is one who has receded from

the world in order to make the stain of sinful things recede. It is for that reason, my child, that they call me a recluse.'

'Why, Sir, dost thou not wear hair as others do?'

'A recluse shaves off his hair and beard on the recognition of the sixteen impediments therein to the higher life. And what are those sixteen¹? The impediments of ornamenting it, and decking it out, of putting oil upon it, of shampooing it, of placing garlands round it, of using scents and unguents, and myrobalan seeds, and dyes, and ribbons, and combs, of calling in the barber, of unravelling curls, and of the possibility of vermin. When their hair falls off they are grieved and harassed; yea, they lament sometimes, and cry, and beat their breasts, or fall headlong in a swoon—and entangled by these and such impediments men may forget those parts of wisdom or learning which are delicate and subtle.'

'And why, Sir, are not thy garments, too, as those of other men?'

'Beautiful clothes, my boy, such as are worn by worldly men, are inseparable from the five cravings². But whatsoever dangers lurk in dress he who wears the yellow robes knows nothing of. It is for that reason that my dress is not as other men's.'

'Dost thou know, Lord, what is real knowledge?'

'Yes, lad, the real knowledge I know; and what is the best hymn (mantra) in the world, that too I know.'

'Couldst thou teach it, Lord, to me too?'

¹ This odd idea of the 'impediments' in the wearing of hair and beard is in accord both with modern habits of shaving, and also with a good deal of early Christian and mediæval ethics.

² The lust of the eye, of the ear, &c.

‘Yes, I could.’

‘Teach me, then.’

‘Just now is not the right time for that; we have come down to the village for alms.’

24. Then young Nāgasena took the alms-bowl the venerable Rohana was carrying, and led him into the house, and with his own hand supplied him with food, hard and soft, as much as he required. And when he saw that he had finished his meal, and withdrawn his hand from the bowl, he said to him: ‘Now, Sir, will you teach me that hymn?’

‘When thou hast become free from impediments, my lad, by taking upon thee, and with thy parents’ consent, the hermit’s dress I wear, then I can teach it thee.’

25. So young [12] Nāgasena went to his father and mother, and said: ‘This recluse says he knows the best hymn in the world, but that he cannot teach it to any one who has not entered the Order as his pupil. I should like to enter the Order and learn that hymn.’

And his parents gave their consent; for they wished him to learn the hymn, even at the cost of retiring from the world; and they thought that when he had learned it he would come back again¹.

Then the venerable Rohana took Nāgasena to the Vattaniya hermitage, to the Vigamba Vatthu, and having spent the night there, took him on to the Guarded Slope, and there, in the midst of the innumerable company of the Arahats, young Nāgasena was admitted, as a novice, into the Order.

¹ Under the rules of the Buddhist Order any one can leave it as soon as he likes.

26. And then, when he had been admitted to the Order, the venerable Nāgasena said to the venerable Rohana: 'I have adopted your dress; now teach me that hymn.'

Then the venerable Rohana thought thus to himself: 'In what ought I first to instruct him, in the Discourses (Suttanta) or in the deeper things of the faith (Abhidhamma)?' and inasmuch as he saw that Nāgasena was intelligent, and could master the Abhidhamma with ease, he gave him his first lesson in that.

And the venerable Nāgasena, after hearing it repeated but once, knew by heart the whole of the Abhidhamma—that is to say, the Dhamma Saṅgani, with its great divisions into good, bad, and indifferent qualities, and its subdivisions into couples and triplets¹—the Vibhaṅga, with its eighteen chapters, beginning with the book on the constituent elements of beings—the Dhātu Kathā, with its fourteen books, beginning with that on compensation and non-compensation—the Puggala Paññatti, with its six divisions into discrimination of the various constituent elements, discrimination of the various senses and of the properties they apprehend, and so on²—the Kathā Vatthu, with its thousand sections, five hundred on as many points

¹ Compare, for instance, p. 125 of the edition of this summary of Buddhist ethical psychology, edited for the Pāli Text Society, by Dr. Edward Müller, of Bern (London, 1885).

² The six kinds of discrimination (Paññatti) referred to, are those set out in § 1 of the Puggala. The work itself is an ethical tractate dealing only with the last of the six (the discrimination of individuals). See the edition by Dr. Morris, published by the Pāli Text Society (London, 1883).

of our own views, and five hundred on as many points of our opponents' views—the Yamaka, with its ten divisions into complementary propositions as to origins, as to constituent elements, and so on—and the *Paṭṭhāna*, with its twenty-four chapters on the reason of causes, the reason of ideas, and the rest. And he said [13]: 'That will do, Sir. You need not propound it again. That will suffice for my being able to rehearse it.'

27. Then Nāgasena went to the innumerable company of the Arahats, and said: 'I should like to propound the whole of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, without abridgement, arranging it under the three heads of good, bad, and indifferent qualities.' And they gave him leave. And in seven months the venerable Nāgasena recited the seven books of the Abhidhamma in full. And the earth thundered, the gods shouted their applause, the Brahma gods clapped their hands, and there came down a shower from heaven of sweet-scented sandal-wood dust, and of Mandārava flowers! And the innumerable company of the Arahats, then and there at the Guarded Slope, admitted the venerable Nāgasena, then twenty years of age, to full membership in the higher grade of the Order.

28. Now the next day after he had thus been admitted into full membership in the Order, the venerable Nāgasena robed himself at dawn, and taking his bowl, accompanied his teacher on his round for alms to the village below. And as he went this thought arose within him: 'It was, after all, empty-headed and foolish of my teacher to leave the rest of the Buddha's word aside, and teach me the Abhidhamma first!'

And the venerable Rohana became aware in his own mind of what was passing in the mind of Nâgasena, and he said to him: 'That is an unworthy reflection that thou art making, Nâgasena; it is not worthy of thee so to think.'

'How strange and wonderful,' thought Nâgasena, 'that my teacher should be able to tell in his own mind what I am thinking of! I must ask his pardon.' And he said: 'Forgive me, Sir; I will never make such a reflection again.'

[14] 'I cannot forgive you, Nâgasena, simply on that promise,' was the reply. 'But there is a city called Sâgala, where a king rules whose name is Milinda, and he harasses the brethren by putting puzzles to them of heretical tendency. You will have earned your pardon, Nâgasena, when you shall have gone there, and overcome that king in argument, and brought him to take delight in the truth.'

'Not only let king Milinda, holy one, but let all the kings of India come and propound questions to me, and I will break all those puzzles up and solve them, if only you will pardon me!' exclaimed Nâgasena. But when he found it was of no avail, he said: 'Where, Sir, do you advise me to spend the three months of the rains now coming on¹?'

29. 'There is a brother named Assagutta dwelling at the Vattaniya hermitage. Go, Nâgasena, to him; and in my name bow down to his feet, and say: "My teacher, holy one, salutes you reverently, and asks whether you are in health and ease, in full vigour and comfort. He has sent me here to pass

¹ It would be against the rules to go at once, during the rains, to Sâgala. So he would spend that time in preparation.

the three months of the rains under your charge." When he asks you your teacher's name, tell it him. But when he asks you his own name, say: "My teacher, Sir, knows your name."

And Nâgasena bowed down before the venerable Rohana, and passing him on his right hand as he left him, took his bowl and robe, and went on from place to place till he came to the Vattaniya hermitage, begging for his food on the way. And on his arrival he saluted the venerable Assagutta, and said exactly what he had been told to say, [15] and to the last reply Assagutta said: 'Very well then, Nâgasena, put by your bowl and robe.' And the next day Nâgasena swept out the teacher's cell, and put the drinking water and tooth-cleansers ready for him to use. The Elder swept out the cell again, threw away the water and the tooth-cleansers, and fetched others, and said not a word of any kind. So it went on for seven days. On the seventh the Elder again asked him the same questions as before. And on Nâgasena again making the same replies, he gave him leave to pass the rainy season there.

30. Now a certain woman, a distinguished follower of the faith, had for thirty years and more administered to the wants of the venerable Assagutta. And at the end of that rainy season she came one day to him, and asked whether there was any other brother staying with him. And when she was told that there was one, named Nâgasena, she invited the Elder, and Nâgasena with him, to take their midday meal the next day at her house. And the Elder signified, by silence, his consent. The next forenoon the Elder robed himself, and taking his bowl in his hand, went down, accompanied by Nâgasena as his

attendant, to the dwelling-place of that disciple, and there they sat down on the seats prepared for them. And she gave to both of them food, hard and soft, as much as they required, waiting upon them with her own hands. When Assagutta had finished his meal, and the hand was withdrawn from the bowl, he said to Nāgasena: 'Do thou, Nāgasena, give the thanks to this distinguished lady.' And, so saying, he rose from his seat, and went away. [16]

31. And the lady said to Nāgasena: 'I am old, friend Nāgasena. Let the thanksgiving be from the deeper things of the faith.'

And Nāgasena, in pronouncing the thanksgiving discourse¹, dwelt on the profounder side of the Abhidhamma, not on matters of mere ordinary morality, but on those relating to Arahatsip². And as the lady sat there listening, there arose in her heart the Insight into the Truth³, clear and stainless, which perceives that whatsoever has beginning, that has the inherent quality of passing away. And Nāgasena also, when he had concluded that thanksgiving discourse, felt the force of the truths he himself had preached, and he too arrived at insight⁴—he too

¹ See the note above, p. 15.

² *Suññatā*, used here in the sense of *Nirvāṇa*. Compare *Āṅguttara* II, 5, 6; *Gāṭaka* III, 191; *Kullavagga* XII, 2, 5.

³ *Dhamma-kakkhu*. This perception of the impermanency of all things and all beings is called 'the Eye for the Truth,' and is the sign of the entrance upon the path to Arahatsip, i. e. *Nirvāṇa*. It is the same among Buddhists as conversion is among the Christians. Compare *Acts* xxvi, 18 ('Open their eyes, and turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God') and other similar passages.

⁴ *Vipassanā*. Childers says this is an attribute of Arahatsip; and Trenckner translates it 'superior intelligence.' But Arahats

entered, as he sat there, upon the stream (that is to say, upon the first stage of the Excellent Way to Arahatsip).

32. Then the venerable Assagutta, as he was sitting in his arbour, was aware that they both had attained to insight, and he exclaimed: 'Well done! well done, Nāgasena! by one arrow shot you have hit two noble quarries!' And at the same time thousands of the gods shouted their approval.

Now the venerable Nāgasena arose and returned to Assagutta, and saluting him, took a seat reverently apart. And Assagutta said to him: 'Do thou now go, Nāgasena, to Pāṭaliputta. There, in the Asoka Park, dwells the venerable Dhamma-rakkhita. Under him you should learn the words of the Buddha.'

'How far is it, Sir, from here to Pāṭaliputta.'

'A hundred leagues¹, Nāgasena.'

'Great, Sir, is the distance. It will be difficult to get food on the way. How shall I get there?'

'Only go straight on, Nāgasena. You shall get food on the way, rice from which the black grains have been picked out, with curries and gravies of various sorts.'

'Very well, Sir!' said Nāgasena, and bowing

only have it, because they have all the powers possessed by those in the previous stages of the path, and it is only superior as being above and beyond the intelligence of the worldly wise, or even of the mere moralist. It is less than the 'Divine Eye,' and Nāgasena was not yet an Arahāt. Compare the passages quoted by Childers under *Dhamma-kakkhu* and *Dibba-kakkhu*, and also *Mahāvagga* I, 6, 33; *Gātaka* I, 140; *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, 237, 278.

¹ *Yoganas*: that is, leagues of seven miles each. See my 'Ancient Coins and Measures of Ceylon,' p. 16, in Thomas's 'Numismata Orientalia,' vol. i.

down before his teacher, and passing him on the right side as he went, he took his bowl and his robe and departed for Pâ/aliputta.

33. [17] At that time a merchant of Pâ/aliputta was on his way back to that city with five hundred waggons. And when he saw the venerable Nâgasena coming in the distance, he stopped the waggons, and saluted Nâgasena, and asked him: 'Whither art thou going, father?'

'To Pâ/aliputta, householder.'

'That is well, father. We too are going thither. It will be more convenient for thee to go with us.'

And the merchant, pleased with Nâgasena's manners, provided him with food, hard and soft, as much as he required, waiting upon him with his own hands. And when the meal was over, he took a low seat, and sat down reverently apart. So seated, he said to the venerable Nâgasena: 'What, father, is your name?'

'I am called Nâgasena, householder.'

'Dost thou know, father, what are the words of Buddha?'

'I know the Abhidhamma.'

'We are most fortunate, father; this is indeed an advantage. I am a student of the Abhidhamma, and so art thou. Repeat to me, father, some passages from it.'

Then the venerable Nâgasena preached to him from the Abhidhamma, and by degrees as he did so there arose in Nâgasena's heart the Insight into the Truth, clear and stainless, which perceives that whatsoever has in itself the necessity of beginning, that too has also the inherent quality of passing away.

34. And the Pâ/aliputta merchant sent on his

waggon in advance, and followed himself after them. And at a place where the road divided, not far from Pāṭaliputta, he stopped, and said to Nāgasena: 'This is the turning to the Asoka Park. Now I have here a rare piece of woollen stuff, sixteen cubits by eight. [18] Do me the favour of accepting it.' And Nāgasena did so. And the merchant, pleased and glad, with joyful heart, and full of content and happiness, saluted the venerable Nāgasena, and keeping him on his right hand as he passed round him, went on his way.

35. But Nāgasena went on to the Asoka Park to Dhamma-rakkhita. And after saluting him, and telling him on what errand he had come, he learnt by heart, from the mouth of the venerable Dhamma-rakkhita, the whole of the three baskets¹ of the Buddha's word in three months, and after a single recital, so far as the letter (that is, knowing the words by heart) was concerned. And in three months more he mastered the spirit (that is, the deeper meaning of the sense of the words).

But at the end of that time the venerable Dham-

¹ Piṭakas. This expression is not used in the sacred books of the canon itself. When it first came into use is unknown. This is the earliest passage in which it has hitherto been found in the technical sense of a division of the Scriptures. It was in full use at the time of Buddhaghosa (see the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, pp. 15, 16, 17, 18, &c., and the *Samanta Pāsādikā*, printed in Oldenberg's 'Vinaya Piṭaka,' vol. iii, p. 293). The tertium quid of the comparison is not the basket or the box as a receptacle for preservation, but as a means of handing on (as Eastern navvies removing earth put it into baskets and pass these latter on from hand to hand). So the expression 'three baskets' means not 'the three collections,' but 'the three bodies of oral tradition as handed down from teacher to teacher.' See Trenckner's decisive argument in his 'Pāli Miscellanies,' pp. 67-69.

ma-rakkhita addressed him, and said : ' Just, Nâgasena, as a herdsman tends the cows, but others enjoy their produce, so thou too carriest in thy head the whole three baskets of the Buddha's word, and still art not yet a partaker of the fruit of Samāṇaship.'

' Though that be so, holy one, say no more,' was the reply. And on that very day, at night, he attained to Arahatship and with it to the fourfold power of that Wisdom possessed by all Arahats (that is to say : the realisation of the sense, and the appreciation of the deep religious teaching contained in the word, the power of intuitive judgment, and the power of correct and ready exposition)¹. And at the moment of his penetrating the truth all the gods shouted their approval, and the earth thundered, and the Brahma gods clapped their hands, and there fell from heaven a shower of sweet-scented sandal dust and of Mandârava flowers.

36. Now at that time the innumerable company of the Arahats at the Guarded Slope in the Himâlaya mountains sent a message to him to come, for they were anxious to see him. And when he heard the message the venerable Nâgasena vanished from the Asoka Park and appeared before them. And they said : ' Nâgasena, that king Milinda is in the habit of harassing the brethren by knotty questions and by argumentations this way and that. Do thou, Nâgasena, go and [19] master him.'

' Not only let king Milinda, holy ones, but let all the kings of India, come and propound questions to

¹ The four Paṭisambhidâs, which form the subject of one of the books of the Sutta Piṭaka.

me. I will break all those puzzles up and solve them. You may go fearlessly to Sâgala.'

Then all the Elders went to the city of Sâgala, lighting it up with their yellow robes like lamps, and bringing down upon it the breezes from the heights where the sages dwell¹.

²37. At that time the venerable Âyupâla was living at the Saṅkheyya hermitage. And king Milinda said to his counsellors: 'Beautiful is the night and pleasant! Who is the wandering teacher or Brahman we can visit to night to question him who will be able to converse with us and to resolve our doubts?'

And the five hundred Yonakas replied: 'There is the Elder, Lord, named Âyupâla, versed in the three baskets, and in all the traditional lore. He is living now at the Saṅkheyya hermitage. To him you might go, O king, and put your questions to him.'

'Very well, then. Let the venerable one be informed that we are coming.'

¹ *Isi-vâtam parivâtam (nagaram) akamsu*. The meaning of this phrase, which has not been found elsewhere, is doubtful. Trenckner renders 'making it respire the odour of saints.' The literal translation would be 'making it blown round about by *Rîshi*-wind.' Perhaps it may be meant to convey the idea of 'scented with the sweet breath of the wise.' But in any case the connotation is intended to be a pleasant one. Calling to mind the analogous phrase *viganavâtam ârâmam*, 'a hermitage with breezes from the desert.' (Mahâvagga I, 22, 17 = Kullavagga VI, 4, 8.) I venture to suggest the rendering adopted above. *Hînaṣikumburê* (p. 24) has *Rîshiwarayaṅge gamanâgamanayem ganita wa kîvara wâtayem pratiwâtaya kalâhuya*. 'They set its air in commotion produced by the waving of the robes of the coming and going *Rîshis*.'

² We here take up the original episode of Milinda as interrupted at § 15 (or if there is an interpolation at § 10).

Then the royal astrologer sent a message to Âyupâla to the effect that king Milinda desired to call upon him. And the venerable one said : ' Let him come.'

So Milinda the king, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted his royal chariot and proceeded to the Saṅkheyya hermitage, to the place where Âyupâla dwelt, and exchanged with him the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And then he said to him :

38. ' Of what use, venerable Âyupâla, is the renunciation of the world carried out by the members of your Order, and in what do you place the *sum-mum bonum* ?'

' Our renunciation, O king,' replied the Elder, ' is for the sake of being able to live in righteousness, and in spiritual calm.'

' Is there, Sir, any layman who lives so ?'

' Yes, great king, there are such laymen. At the time when the Blessed One set rolling the royal chariot wheel of the kingdom of righteousness at Benares, at the Deer Park, [20] eighteen koṭis of the Brahma gods, and an innumerable company of other gods, attained to comprehension of the truth¹. And not one of those beings, all of whom were laymen, had renounced the world. And again when the Blessed One delivered the Mahâ Samaya discourse², and the discourse on the 'Greatest Blessing'³,

¹ See my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 153-155. There is nothing about the eighteen koṭis in the Piṭaka text referred to.

² No. 20 in the Dīgha Nikāya.

³ In the Mahâ Maṅgala, translated in my 'Buddhism,' pp. 125-127.

and the Exposition of Quietism¹, and the Exhortation to Râhula², the multitude of gods who attained to comprehension of the truth cannot be numbered. And not one of those beings, all of whom were laymen, had renounced the world³.'

'Then, most venerable Âyupâla, your renunciation is of no use. It must be in consequence of sins committed in some former birth, that the Buddhist Samanas renounce the world, and even subject themselves to the restraints of one or other of the thirteen aids to purity⁴! Those who remain on one seat till they have finished their repast were, forsooth, in some former birth, thieves who robbed other men of their food. It is in consequence of the Karma of having so deprived others of food that they have now only such food as they can get at one sitting; and are not allowed to eat from time to time as they want. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life. And they who live in the open air were, forsooth, in

¹ Sama-kitta-pariyâya Suttanta. It is not certain which Sutta is here referred to. Trenckner identifies it with a short Sutta in the Aṅguttara (II, 4, 5). It is true that the ten short Suttas in A. II, 4 are (in the Burmese MSS. only) called collectively Sama-kitta Vagga. But the separate Suttas have no separate titles; the title of the Vagga is not found in the Sinhalese MSS., and is probably later than the text; and it is not, after all, identical with the title here given.

² There are several Suttas of this name in the Pâli Piṭakas. The one referred to here (and also, it may be added, in the Asoka Edicts) is probably the shorter one (*Kûla Râhulovâda Sutta*) found both in the *Magghima* (No. 147) and in the *Samyutta* (XXXIV, 120). See Trenckner's note on this passage.

³ This way of looking at gods as laymen, still 'in the world,' is thoroughly Buddhist.

⁴ The dhutaṅgas, enumerated by Childers sub voce.

some former birth, dacoits who plundered whole villages. It is in consequence of the Karma of having destroyed other people's homes, that they live now without a home, and are not allowed the use of huts. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life. And those who never lie down, they, forsooth, in some former birth, were highwaymen who seized travellers, and bound them, and left them sitting there. It is in consequence of the Karma of that habit that they have become *Nesaggikā* in this life (men who always sit) and get no beds to lie on. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life !'

39. And when he had thus spoken the venerable Āyupāla was silenced, and had not a word to say in reply. Then the five hundred Yonakas said to the king: 'The Elder, O king, is learned, but is also diffident. It is for that reason that he makes no rejoinder. But the king on seeing how silent Āyupāla had become, clapped his hands [21] and cried out: 'All India is an empty thing, it is verily like chaff! There is no one, either *Samana* or Brahman, capable of discussing things with me and dispelling my doubts ¹ !'

As he looked, however, at the assembly and saw how fearless and self-possessed the Yonakas appeared, he thought within himself: 'For a certainty there must be, methinks, some other learned brother capable of disputing with me, or those Yonakas would not be thus confident.' And he said to them:

¹ See above, p. 10, § 14.

‘Is there, my good men, any other learned brother to discuss things with me and dispel my doubts?’

40. Now at that time the venerable Nāgasena, after making his alms-tour through the villages, towns, and cities, had in due course arrived at Sāgala, attended by a band of Samanas, as the leader of a company of the Order; the head of a body of disciples; the teacher of a school; famous and renowned, and highly esteemed by the people. And he was learned, clever, wise, sagacious, and able; a skilful expounder, of subdued manners, but full of courage; well versed in tradition, master of the three Baskets (Piṭakas), and erudite in Vedic lore¹. He was in possession of the highest (Buddhist) insight, a master of all that had been handed down in the schools, and of the various discriminations² by which the most abstruse points can be explained. He knew by heart the ninefold divisions of the doctrine of the Buddha to perfection³, and was equally skilled in discerning both the spirit and the letter of the Word. Endowed with instantaneous and varied power of repartee, and wealth of language, and beauty of eloquence, he was difficult to equal, and still more difficult to excel, difficult to answer, to repel, or to refute. He was imperturbable as the depths of the sea, immovable as the king of mountains; victorious in the struggle with evil, a dispeller

¹ This is always explained as wise in the Buddhist Vedas, that is, the three Piṭakas.

² Paṭisambhidās: see above, the note on p. 29.

³ Pārami-ppatto. This is an unusual use of Pārami, but it occurs again below, p. 36, in a similar connection, and there can be no doubt of its meaning. Trenckner translates it ‘better than any one else.’

of darkness and diffuser of light; mighty in eloquence, a confounder of the followers of other masters, and a crusher-out of the adherents of rival doctrines (*malleus hereticorum*). Honoured and revered by the brethren and sisters of the Order, and its lay adherents of either sex, and by kings and their high officials, he was in the abundant receipt of all the requisites of a member of the Order—robes and bowl and lodging, and whatever is needful for the sick—receiving the highest veneration no less than material gifts. To the wise and discerning who came to him with listening ear he displayed the ninefold jewel of the Conqueror's word, he pointed out to them the path of righteousness, bore aloft for them the torch of truth, set up for them the sacred pillar of the truth¹, and celebrated for their benefit the sacrifice of the truth. For them he waved the banner, raised the standard, blew the trumpet, and beat the drum of truth. And with his mighty lion's voice, [22] like Indra's thunder but sweet the while, he poured out upon them a plenteous shower, heavy with drops of mercy, and brilliant with the coruscations of the lightning flashes of his knowledge, of the nectar waters of the teaching of the *Nirvâna* of the truth—thus satisfying to the full a thirsty world.

41. There then, at the *Saṅkheyya* hermitage, did the venerable Nâgasena, with a numerous company of the brethren, dwell². Therefore is it said :

¹ *Dhamma-yûpam*; with allusion to the sacred sacrificial post, which plays so great a part in Brahman ritual.

² Literally 'with eighty thousand:' but this merely means to say, with a large (undefined) number. See the use of the phrase in the *Nâlapâna Gâtaka* (Fausböll, No. 20).

‘ Learned, with varied eloquence, sagacious, bold,
 Master of views, in exposition sound,
 The brethren—wise themselves in holy writ,
 Repeaters of the fivefold sacred word—
 Put Nāgasena as their leader and their chief.
 Him, Nāgasena of clear mind and wisdom deep,
 Who knew which was the right Path, which the
 false,
 And had himself attained Nirvāṇa’s placid heights!

Attended by the wise, by holders to the Truth,
 He had gone from town to town, and come to
 Sāgala;
 And now he dwelt there in Saṅkheyya’s grove,
 Appearing, among men, like the lion of the hills.’

42. And Devamantiya said to king Milinda :
 ‘ Wait a little, great king, wait a little! There is an
 Elder named Nāgasena, learned, able, and wise, of
 subdued manners, yet full of courage, versed in the
 traditions, a master of language, and ready in reply,
 one who understands alike the spirit and the letter
 of the law, and can expound its difficulties and
 refute objections to perfection¹. He is staying at
 present at the Saṅkheyya hermitage. You should go,
 great king, and put your questions to him. He is able
 to discuss things with you, and dispel your doubts.’

Then when Milinda the king heard the name
 Nāgasena, thus suddenly introduced, he was seized
 with fear, and with anxiety, and the hairs of his
 body stood on end². But he asked Devamantiya :
 ‘ Is that really so?’

¹ See above, p. 34, note 3.

² The name itself, which means ‘Chief of Nāga Snakes,’ is

And Devamantiya replied : ' He is capable, Sire, of discussing things with the guardians of the world—with Indra, Yama, Varuna, Kuvera, Pragâpati, Suyâma, [23] and Santushita—and even with the great Brahma himself, the progenitor of mankind, how much more then with a mere human being !'

' Do you then, Devamantiya,' said the king, ' send a messenger to say I am coming.'

And he did so. And Nâgasena sent word back that he might come. And the king, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted his royal chariot, and proceeded with a great retinue to the Saṅkheyya hermitage, and to the place where Nâgasena dwelt.

43. At that time the venerable Nâgasena was seated with the innumerable company of the brethren of the Order, in the open hall in front of the hermitage¹. So king Milinda saw the assembly from afar, and he said to Devamantiya : ' Whose, Devamantiya, is this so mighty retinue ?'

' These are they who follow the venerable Nâgasena,' was the reply.

Then at the sight there came over king Milinda

terrible enough, especially as the Nâgas were looked upon as supernatural beings. But it is no doubt also intended that the king had heard of his fame.

¹ *Mandala-mâla*, that is a hall consisting only of a roof, supported by pillars which are connected by a dwarf wall two or three feet in height. The roof projects beyond the pillars, so that the space within is well shaded. It is a kind of open air drawing-room attached to most hermitages, and may be so small that it can be rightly rendered arbour (see above, p. 25), or sufficiently large to accommodate a considerable number. Usually of wood, sometimes of stone, it is always graceful in appearance and pleasant to use. It is mentioned in the corresponding passage of the *Sâmañña Phala* (D. II, 10).

a feeling of fear and of anxiety, and the hairs of his body stood on end¹. But nevertheless, though he felt like an elephant hemmed in by rhinoceroses, like a serpent surrounded by the Garuḍas (the snake-eating mythical birds), like a jackal surrounded by boa-constrictors, or a bear by buffaloes, like a frog pursued by a serpent, or a deer by a panther, like a snake in the hands of a snake charmer, or a rat played with by a cat, or a devil charmed by an exorcist, like the moon when it is seized by Râhu, like a snake caught in a basket, or a bird in a cage, or a fish in a net, like a man who has lost his way in a dense forest haunted by wild beasts, like a Yakkha (ogre) who has sinned against Vessavana (the king of ogres and fairies), or like a god whose term of life as a god has reached its end—though confused and terrified, anxious, and beside himself in an agony of fear like that—yet at the thought that he must at least avoid humiliation in the sight of the people, he took courage, and said to Dēvamantiya: ‘You need not [24] trouble to point out to me which is Nâgasena. I shall pick him out unaided.’

‘Certainly, Sire, recognise him yourself,’ said he².

44. Now Nâgasena was junior in seniority (reckoned from the date of his full membership in the

¹ This again, like the passage at p. 8, is an echo of the *Sâmañña Phala*. (See D. 2, 10 of our forthcoming edition, or p. 116 of Grimblot.)

² In the corresponding passage of the *Sâmañña Phala Givaka* points out the Buddha to *Agâtasattu* (§ 11, Grimblot, p. 117). This would be in the memory of all his readers, and our author alters the story in this case to show how superior Milinda was to the royal interlocutor in the older dialogue.

Order) to the half of that great company seated in front of him, and senior to the half seated behind him. And as he looked over the whole of the assembly, in front, and down the centre, and behind, king Milinda detected Nâgasena seated in the middle, and, like a shaggy lion who knows no fear or frenzy, entirely devoid of nervous agitation, and free from shyness and trepidation. And as soon as he saw him, he knew by his mien that that was Nâgasena, and he pointed him out to Devamantiya.

‘Yes, great king,’ said he, ‘that is Nâgasena. Well hast thou, Sire, recognised the sage.’

Whereupon the king rejoiced that he had recognised Nâgasena without having had him pointed out to him. But nevertheless, at the sight of him, the king was seized with nervous excitement and trepidation and fear. Therefore is it said :

‘At the sight of Nâgasena, wise and pure,
Subdued in all that is the best subjection,
Milinda uttered this foreboding word—
“Many the talkers I have visited,
Many the conversations I have had,
But never yet, till now, to-day, has fear,
So strange, so terrible, o’erpowered my heart.
Verily now defeat must be my lot,
And victory his, so troubled is my mind.”’

Here ends the introductory secular narrative
(Bâhira-kathâ)¹.

¹ See note on p. 1. This book closes in Hînaśi-kumburê’s Sinhalese version with the title ‘Pûrwa Yoga yayi;’ and is of course identical with the Pubba-yoga referred to above, p. 4, as the first division of the work.

BOOK II.

LAKKHANA PAÑHA.

THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHICAL
QUALITIES.

CHAPTER 1.

1. [25] Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Nāgasena was, and addressed him with the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And Nāgasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart of the king was propitiated.

And Milinda began by asking, 'How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your name?'

'I am known as Nāgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give such a name as Nāgasena, or Sūrasena, or Vīrasena, or Sīhasena, yet this, Sire,—Nāgasena and so on—is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter².'

¹ There is a free translation of the *Siṃhalese* version of the following dialogues (down to the end of our § 4) in Spence Hardy's 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 424-429. But it is very unreliable as a reproduction of either the *Siṃhalese* or the Pāli, and slurs over the doubtful passages.

² Na puggalo upalabbhati. This thesis, that 'there is no individual,' is discussed at the opening of the *Kathā Vatthu* (leaf ka of my MS.) Put into modern philosophical phraseology it amounts to saying that there is no permanent subject underlying the temporary phenomena visible in a man's individuality. But

Then Milinda called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness: 'This Nâgasena says there is no permanent individuality (no soul) implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him in that?' And turning to Nâgasena, he said: 'If, most reverend Nâgasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging and necessities for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such things when given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arahatsip? And who is it who destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his own? who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a word) commits any one of the five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life¹? If that be so there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds²; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil Karma³. [26]—If, most reverend Nâgasena, we are to think that were a man

I doubt whether, even in our author's time, the conception 'subject' was common ground, or that the word *puggala* had acquired that special connotation.

¹ *Paññânantariya-kammam* karoti. See my note on *Kullavagga* VII, 3, 9 ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. iii, p. 246, in the Sacred Books of the East).

² This is no doubt said in these words with allusion to the opinion ascribed in the *Sâmañña Phala* (D. II, 17) to *Pûrana Kassapa*.

³ This is the opinion ascribed in identical words in the *Sâmañña Phala* (D. II, 23) to *Agita* of the garment of hair.

to kill you there would be no murder ¹, then it follows that there are no real masters or teachers in your Order, and that your ordinations are void.—You tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing you as Nâgasena. Now what is that Nâgasena? Do you mean to say that the hair is Nâgasena?’

‘I don’t say that, great king.’

‘Or the hairs on the body, perhaps?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the fæces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all of these, that is Nâgasena ²?’

And to each of these he answered no.

‘Is it the outward form then (Rûpa) that is Nâgasena, or the sensations (Vedanâ), or the ideas (Saññâ), or the confections (the constituent elements of character, Samkhârâ), or the consciousness (Viññâna), that is Nâgasena ³?’

And to each of these also he answered no.

¹ This is practically the same opinion as is ascribed in the *Sâmañña Phala* (D. II, 26) to Pakudha Kakkâyaṇa.

² This list of the thirty-two forms (*âkâras*) of organic matter in the human body occurs already in the *Khuddaka Pâṭha*, § 3. It is the standard list always used in similar connections; and is, no doubt, supposed to be exhaustive. There are sixteen (half as many) *âkâras* of the mind according to *Dîpavaṃsa* I, 42.

³ These are the five *Skandhas*, which include in them the whole bodily and mental constituents of any being. See p. 80.

‘Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Nâgasena?’

‘No! great king.’

‘But is there anything outside the five Skandhas that is Nâgasena?’

And still he answered no.

‘Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena that we see before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth!’

And the venerable Nâgasena said to Milinda the king: ‘You, Sire, have been brought up in great luxury, as befits your noble birth. If you were to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy ground, trampling under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard sand, your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, your mind would be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of bodily suffering. How then did you come, on foot, or in a chariot?’

‘I did not come, Sir, on foot [27]. I came in a carriage.’

‘Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is the chariot?’

‘I did not say that.’

‘Is it the axle that is the chariot?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?’

And to all these he still answered no.

‘Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?’

‘No, Sir.’

‘But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?’

And still he answered no.

‘Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no such thing as a chariot! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom then are you afraid that you speak untruth? And he called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness, saying: ‘Milinda the king here has said that he came by carriage. But when asked in that case to explain what the carriage was, he is unable to establish what he averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in that?’

When he had thus spoken the five hundred Yonakas shouted their applause, and said to the king: ‘Now let your Majesty get out of that if you can?’

And Milinda the king replied to Nāgasena, and said: ‘I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things—the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad—that it comes under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of “chariot.”’

‘Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of “chariot.” And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned me about—[28] the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five constituent elements of being—that I come under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of “Nāgasena.”

For it was said, Sire, by our Sister Vagirâ in the presence of the Blessed One :

“Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of its various parts that the word ‘chariot’ is used, just so is it that when the Skandhas are there we talk of a ‘being¹.’”

‘Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done, Nâgasena!’

2. ‘How many years seniority have you, Nâgasena?’

‘Seven, your Majesty.’

‘But how can you say it is your “seven?” Is it you who are “seven,” or the number that is “seven?”’

Now that moment the figure of the king, decked in all the finery of his royal ornaments, cast its shadow on the ground, and was reflected in a vessel of water. And Nâgasena asked him: ‘Your figure, O king, is now shadowed upon the ground, and reflected in the water, how now, are you the king, or is the reflection the king?’

‘I am the king, Nâgasena, but the shadow comes into existence because of me.’

‘Just even so, O king, the number of the years is seven, I am not seven. But it is because of me, O king, that the number seven has come into existence; and it is mine in the same sense as the shadow is yours².’

¹ From the *Samyutta Nikâya* V, 10, 6.

² Hardy (p. 427, § 4 of the first edition) has quite missed the point of this crux.

‘Most wonderful again, and strange, Nāgasena. Well has the question put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved!’

3. The king said : ‘Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?’

‘If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (*pandit*), well; but if you will discuss as a king, no.’

‘How is it then that scholars discuss?’

‘When scholars talk a matter over one with another then is there a winding up¹, an unravelling; one or other is convicted of error², and he then acknowledges his mistake; [29] distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions³; and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O king, discuss.’

‘And how do kings discuss?’

‘When a king, your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: “Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!” Thus, your Majesty, do kings discuss⁴.’

‘Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let your reverence talk unrestrainedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid!’

¹ *Âveśhanam*; not in Childers, but see *Gâtaka* II, 9; IV, 383, 384; and Morris in the ‘*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*,’ 1887.

² *Niggâho kariyati*, as for instance below, p. 142.

³ *Paṭiviseso*; not in Childers, but see again *Gâtaka* II, 9.

⁴ Hardy, loc. cit. § 5, puts all this into the mouths of ‘the priests.’

‘Very good, your Majesty,’ said Nâgasena, with thankfulness.

‘Nâgasena, I have a question to ask you;’ said the king.

‘Pray ask it, Sire.’

‘I have asked it, your Reverence.’

‘That is answered already.’

‘What have you answered?’

‘To what, then, does your Majesty refer?’

But Milinda the king thought: ‘This Bhikkhu is a great scholar. He is quite capable of discussing things with me. And I shall have a number of points on which to question him, and before I can ask them all, the sun will set. It would be better to carry on the discussion at home to-morrow.’ And he said to Devamantiya: ‘You may let his reverence know that the discussion with the king shall be resumed to-morrow at the palace.’ And so saying, he took leave of Nâgasena, and mounted his horse, and went away, muttering as he went, ‘Nâgasena, Nâgasena!’

And Devamantiya delivered his message to Nâgasena, who accepted the proposal with gladness. And early the next morning Devamantiya and Anantakâya and Mankura and Sabbadinna went to the king, and said: ‘Is his reverence, Nâgasena, to come, [30] Sire, to-day?’

‘Yes, he is to come.’

‘With how many of the brethren is he to come?’

‘With as many as he likes.’

And Sabbadinna said: ‘Let him come with ten.’ But the king repeated what he had said. And on Sabbadinna reiterating his suggestion, the king rejoined: ‘All this preparation has been made, and I say:

"Let him come with as many as he likes," yet Sabbadinna says: "Let him come with ten." Does he suppose we are not capable of feeding so many? Then Sabbadinna was ashamed.

4. And Devamantiya and Anantakâya and Man-kura went to Nâgasena and told him what the king had said. And the venerable Nâgasena robed himself in the forenoon, and taking his bowl in his hand, went to Sâgala with the whole company of the brethren. And Anantakâya, as he walked beside Nâgasena, said:

'When, your reverence, I say, "Nâgasena," what is that Nâgasena?'

The Elder replied: 'What do you think Nâgasena is?'

'The soul, the inner breath which comes and goes, that I suppose to be Nâgasena.'

'But if that breath having gone forth should not return, or having returned should not go forth, would the man be alive?'

'Certainly [31] not, Sir.'

'But those trumpeters, when they blow their trumpets, does their breath return again to them?'

'No, Sir, it does not.'

'Or those pipers, when they blow their pipes or horns, does their breath return again to them?'

'No, Sir.'

'Then why don't they die?'

'I am not capable of arguing with such a reasoner. Pray tell me, Sir, how the matter stands.'

'There is no soul in the breath. These inhalations and exhalations are merely constituent powers

of the bodily frame,' said the Elder. And he talked to him from the Abhidhamma ¹ to such effect that ¹ Anantakâya confessed himself as a supporter of the Order.

5. And the venerable Nâgasena went to the king, and sat down on the seat prepared for him. And the king provided Nâgasena and his following with food, both hard and soft, as much as they required : and presented each brother with a suit of garments, and Nâgasena himself with a set of three robes. And then he said to him : ' Be pleased to keep your seat here, and with you ten of the brethren. Let the rest depart.'

And when he saw that Nâgasena had finished his meal, he took a lower seat, and sat beside him, and said : ' What shall we discuss ?'

' We want to arrive at truth. Let our discussion be about the truth.'

And the king said : ' What is the object, Sir, of your ² renunciation, and what the summum bonum at which you aim ?'

' Why do you ask ? Our renunciation is to the end that this sorrow may perish away, and that no further sorrow may arise ; the complete passing away, without cleaving to the world, is our highest aim.'

' How now, Sir ! Is it for such high reasons that all members of it have joined the Order ?'

[32] ' Certainly not, Sire. Some for those reasons,

¹⁻¹ I venture to think it is incorrect to put a full stop, as Mr. Trenckner has done, after akâsi.

² Plural. ' You members of the Buddhist Order.' The question is further elaborated below, III, 1, 3, and above, I, 38.

but some have left the world in terror at the tyranny of kings. Some have joined us to be safe from being robbed, some harassed by debt, and some perhaps to gain a livelihood.'

'But for what object, Sir, did you yourself join.'

'I was received into the Order when I was a mere boy, I knew not then the ultimate aim. But I thought: "They are wise scholars, these Buddhist Samāṇas, they will be able to teach me." And by them I have been taught; and now do I both know and understand what is at once the reason for, and the advantage of renunciation.'

'Well put, Nāgasena!'

6. The king said: 'Nāgasena, is there any one who after death is not reindividualised?'

'Some are so, and some not.'

'Who are they?'

'A sinful being is reindividualised, a sinless one is not.'

'Will you be reindividualised?'

'If when I die, I die with craving for existence in my heart, yes; but if not, no¹.'

'Very good, Nāgasena!'

7. The king said: 'Nāgasena, he who escapes reindividualisation is it by reasoning that he escapes it?'

'Both by reasoning², your Majesty, and by wisdom³, and by other good qualities.'

'But are not reasoning and wisdom surely much the same?'

'Certainly not. Reasoning is one thing, wisdom

¹ Repeated below, with an illustration, Chap. 2, § 7, p. 76.

² Yoniso manasikāra. ³ Paññā. See pp. 59, 64, 128.

another. Sheep and goats, oxen and buffaloes, camels and asses have reasoning, but wisdom they have not.'

'Well put, Nāgasena!'

8. The king said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning, and what of wisdom?'

'Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off¹.'

'But how is comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, and cutting off of wisdom? Give me an illustration.'

'You remember the barley reapers?'

'Yes, certainly.' [33]

'How do they reap the barley?'

'With the left hand they grasp the barley into a bunch, and taking the sickle into the right hand, they cut it off with that.'

'Just even so, O king, does the recluse by his thinking grasp his mind, and by his wisdom cut off his failings. In this way is it that comprehension is the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom.'

'Well put, Nāgasena!'

9. The king said: 'When you said just now, "And by other good qualities," to which did you refer?'

¹ In the long list of the distinguishing characteristics of ethical qualities given by Buddhaghosa in the *Sumaṅgala*, p. 63, *pagānana* is the mark of *paññindriya*, *aviggāya akampiyam* of *paññabala*, and *tad-uttariyam* of *paññā* simply. He gives no 'mark' of *yoniso manasikāra*.

‘Good conduct, great king, and faith, and perseverance, and mindfulness, and meditation¹.

‘And what is the characteristic mark of good conduct?’

‘It has as its characteristic that it is the basis of all good qualities. The five moral powers²—faith, perseverance, mindfulness, meditation, and wisdom—; the seven conditions of Arahatsip³—self-possession, investigation of the Dhamma, perseverance, joy, calm, meditation, and equanimity—; the Path; readiness of memory (unbroken self-possession)⁴; the four kinds of right exertion⁵; the four constituent bases of extraordinary powers⁶; the four stages of ecstasy⁷; the eight forms of spiritual emancipation⁸; the four modes of self-concentration⁹; and the eight states of intense contemplation¹⁰ have each and all of them good conduct (the observance of outward morality) as their basis. And to him who builds upon that foundation, O king, all these good conditions will not decrease¹¹.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Just, O king, as all those forms of animal and vegetable life which grow, develope, and mature, do so with the earth as their basis; just so does the recluse, who is devoted in effort, develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

¹ *Sīlam*, *saddhâ*, *viriyam*, *sati*, *samâdhi*.

² *Indriya-balâni*. ³ *Bogghaṅgâ*. ⁴ *Satipaṭṭhâna*.

⁵ *Sammappadhâna*. ⁶ *Iddhipâda*. ⁷ *Ghâna*.

⁸ *Vimokhâ*. ⁹ *Samâdhi*. ¹⁰ *Samâpatti*.

¹¹ The above-mentioned meritorious conditions are those the sum of which make Arahatsip.

‘Just, O king, as all the occupations which involve bodily exertion are carried on in ultimate dependence upon the earth, just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’ [34]

‘Give me a still better illustration.’

‘Just, O king, as the architect of a city, when he wants to build one, first clears the site of the town, and then proceeds to get rid of all the stumps and thorny brakes, and thus makes it level, and only then does he lay out the streets and squares, and cross-roads and market places, and so build the city; just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.’

‘Can you give me one more simile?’

‘Just, O king, as an acrobat¹, when he wants to exhibit his skill, first digs over the ground, and proceeds to get rid of all the stones and fragments of broken pottery, and thus to make it smooth, and only then, on soft earth, shows his tricks; just even so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue. For it has been said, Sire, by the Blessed One :

“Virtue’s the base on which the man who’s wise
 Can train his heart, and make his wisdom grow.
 Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu, undeceived,
 Unravel all the tangled skein of life².”

¹ *Laṅghako*, not in Childers; but compare *Gâtaka* I, 431, and below, pp. 191, 331 of the text.

² This verse occurs twice in the *Samyutta* (I, 3, 3, and VII, 1, 6).

“This is the base—like the great earth to men—
And this the root of all increase in goodness,
The starting-point of all the Buddhas’ teaching,
Virtue, to wit, on which true bliss depends¹.”

‘Well said, Nāgasena!’

10². The king said, ‘Venerable Nāgasena, what is the characteristic mark of faith?’

‘Tranquillisation, O king, and aspiration³.’

‘And how is tranquillisation the mark of faith?’

‘As faith, O king, springs up in the heart it breaks through the five hindrances—lust, malice, mental sloth, spiritual pride, and doubt—and the heart, free from these hindrances, [35] becomes clear, serene, untroubled.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Just, O king, as a suzerain king, when on the march with his fourfold army, might cross over a small stream, and the water, disturbed by the elephants and cavalry, the chariots and the bowmen, might become fouled, turbid⁴, and muddy. And

¹ *Vara-pâtimokkhiyo*, a poetical expression found only in this passage, and of the exact connotation of which I am uncertain. It is not in Childers; and *Hīnaśi-kumburê* gives no assistance. The whole line may mean, ‘The scheme of a virtuous life as laid down in the most excellent *Pâtimokkha*.’ See the use of *Samyutta-Nikāya-vare* below, p. 36 of the text. On the whole section compare M. P. S. I, 12.

² This section is summarised in Hardy’s ‘Manual of Buddhism,’ pp. 411, 412 (1st edition).

³ *Sampasâdana* and *sampakkhandana*. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., does not give faith in his list, but he gives the power of faith (*saddhâ-bala*), and as its ‘mark’ ‘that it cannot be shaken by incredulity.’

⁴ *Lu/ita*, not in Childers; but compare *Aṅguttara* I, 55, and ‘Book of the Great Decease,’ IV, 26–32.

when he was on the other side the monarch might give command to his attendants, saying: "Bring some water, my good men. I would fain drink." Now suppose the monarch had a water-clearing gem¹, and those men, in obedience to the order, were to throw the jewel into the water; then at once all the mud would precipitate itself, and the sandy atoms of shell and bits of water-plants would disappear, and the water would become clear, transparent, and serene, and they would then bring some of it to the monarch to drink. The water is the heart; the royal servants are the recluse; the mud, the sandy atoms, and the bits of water-plants are evil dispositions; and the water-cleansing gem is faith.'

'And how is aspiration the mark of faith?'

'In as much as the recluse, on perceiving how the hearts of others have been set free, aspires to enter as it were by a leap upon the fruit of the first stage, or of the second, or of the third in the Excellent Way, or to gain Arahatsip itself, and thus applies himself to the attainment of what he has not reached, to the experience of what he has not yet felt, to the realisation of what he has not yet realised,—therefore is it that aspiration is the mark of faith.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Just, O king, as if a mighty storm [36] were to break upon a mountain top and pour out rain, the water would flow down according to the levels, and after filling up the crevices and chasms and gullies

¹ Udakappasâdako mañi. Doubtless a magic gem is meant: with allusion particularly to the Wondrous Gem (the Mañi-ratana) of the mythical King of Glory (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256).

of the hill, would empty itself into the brook below, so that the stream would rush along, overflowing both its banks. Now suppose a crowd of people, one after the other, were to come up, and being ignorant of the real breadth or depth of the water, were to stand fearful and hesitating on the brink. And suppose a certain man should arrive, who knowing exactly his own strength and power should gird himself firmly and, with a spring, land himself on the other side. Then the rest of the people, seeing him safe on the other side, would likewise cross. That is the kind of way in which the recluse, by faith¹, aspires to leap, as it were by a bound, into higher things. For this has been said, O king, by the Blessed One in the *Samyutta Nikâya* :

“By faith he crosses over the stream,
By earnestness the sea of life ;
By steadfastness all grief he stills,
By wisdom is he purified².”

‘Well put, Nâgasena !’

¹ In the Buddha, in the sufficiency of the Excellent Way he taught, and in the capacity of man to walk along it. It is spoken of slightly (compared with Arahatsip) in *Mahâvagga V*, 1, 21—in the *Mahâparinibbâna Sutta VI*, 9 (of Ânanda, who has faith, compared with the brethren, who have entered one or other of the stages of the Excellent Way)—and in *Ânguttara III*, 21 (in comparison with intuitive insight and intellectual perception). For this last comparison see further the *Puggala Paññatti III*, 3. From these passages a fair idea of the Buddhist view of faith could be formed. Although the Buddhist faith and the Christian faith are in things contradictory, the two conditions of heart are strikingly similar both in origin and in consequence.

² This verse is not yet reached in the Pâli Text Society's edition of the *Samyutta*, but it is found also in the *Sutta Nipâta-I*, 10, 4.

II¹. The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of perseverance?'

'The rendering of support, O king, is the mark of perseverance². All those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Just as a man, if a house were falling, would make a prop for it of another post, and the house so supported would not fall; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'Just as when a large army has broken up a small one, then the king of the latter would call to mind every possible ally and reinforce his small army³, and by that means the small army might in its turn break up the large one; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away [37]. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "The persevering hearer of the noble truth, O Bhikkhus, puts away evil and cultivates goodness, puts away that which is wrong and developes in himself that which is right, and thus does he keep himself pure."'

¹ This section is summarised by Hardy, loc. cit. p. 409.

² Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., says that *paggaha* (tension) is the mark of *viriyindriya*.

³ *Aññamaññam* *anusâreyya* *anupeseyya*. This is the way in which Hīnañ-kumburê understands this doubtful passage. Hardy has bungled the whole simile. Both the words are new, and I am not sure that the first does not after all come from the root *sar*, to follow.

‘Well put, Nāgasena !’

12. The king said : ‘What, Nāgasena, is the characteristic mark of mindfulness¹?’

‘Repetition, O king, and keeping up².’

‘And how is repetition the mark of mindfulness?’

‘As mindfulness, O king, springs up in his heart he repeats over the good and evil, right and wrong, slight and important, dark and light qualities, and those that resemble them, saying to himself : “These are the four modes of keeping oneself ready and mindful, these the four modes of spiritual effort, these the four bases of extraordinary powers, these the five organs of the moral sense, these the five mental powers, these the seven bases of Arahātship, these the eight divisions of the Excellent Way, this is serenity and this insight, this is wisdom and this emancipation³.” Thus does the recluse follow after

¹ Sati, summarised in Hardy’s ‘Manual,’ p. 412.

² *Api/āpāna* and *upagāṇhana*, both new words. This definition is in keeping with the etymological meaning of the word *sati*, which is ‘memory.’ It is one of the most difficult words (in its secondary, ethical, and more usual meaning) in the whole Buddhist system of ethical psychology to translate. Hardy renders ‘conscience,’ which is certainly wrong; and Gogerly (see my ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 144) has ‘meditation,’ which is equally wide of the mark. I have sometimes rendered it ‘self-possession.’ It means that activity of mind, constant presence of mind, wakefulness of heart, which is the foe of carelessness, inadvertence, self-forgetfulness. And it is a very constant theme of the Buddhist moralist. *Buddha-ghosa*, loc. cit., makes *upa/āhāna*, ‘readiness,’ its mark.

³ These are the various moral qualities and mental habits which together make up Arahātship, and may be said also to make up Buddhism (as the Buddha taught it). It was on these that he laid special stress, in his last address to the members of the Order, just before his death (‘Book of the Great Decease,’ III, 65, in my ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ pp. 60–63); and the details of them will be found in the note to that passage.

those qualities that are desirable, and not after those that are not; thus does he cultivate those which ought to be practised, and not those which ought not. That is how repetition is the mark of mindfulness.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the treasurer of the imperial sovran¹, who reminds his royal master early and late of his glory, saying: "So many are thy war elephants, O king, and so many thy cavalry², thy war chariots and thy bowmen, so much the quantity of thy money, and gold, and wealth, may your Majesty keep yourself in mind thereof.'

'And how, Sir, is keeping up a mark of mindfulness?'

'As mindfulness springs up in his heart, O king, he searches out the categories of good qualities and their opposites, saying to himself: "Such and such qualities are good, and such bad; [38] such and such qualities helpful, and such the reverse." Thus does the recluse make what is evil in himself to disappear, and keeps up what is good. That is how keeping up is the mark of mindfulness.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the confidential adviser of that imperial

¹ *Kakkavattissa bhandâgâriko*, no doubt with allusion to the *gahapati-ratanam*, one of the seven treasures of the mythical King of Glory (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 257). It is particularly interesting to me to find here the use of the word 'treasurer' instead of 'householder;' for it was in that exact sense that I had understood the word *gahapati* in that connection, at a time when, in the then state of Pâli scholarship, it seemed very bold to do so.

² Literally 'horses.' The whole list is again a manifest allusion to the corresponding one in the Sutta of the Great King of Glory.

sovrán¹ who instructs him in good and evil, saying: "These things are bad for the king and these good, these helpful and these the reverse." And thus the king makes the evil in himself die out, and keeps up the good.'

'Well put, Nâgasena!'

13². The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of meditation³?''

'Being the leader, O king. All good qualities have meditation as their chief, they incline to it, lead up towards it, are as so many slopes up the side of the mountain of meditation.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'As all the rafters of the roof of a house, O king, go up to the apex, slope towards it, are joined on together at it, and the apex is acknowledged to be the top of all; so is the habit of meditation in its relation to other good qualities.'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'It is like a king, your Majesty, when he goes down to battle with his army in its fourfold array. The whole army—elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and bowmen—would have him as their chief, their

¹ *Pariñâyaka*, the seventh treasure of the King of Glory. (Compare the 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 259.) It will be seen that our author is in substantial agreement with the older tradition, and does not, like the *Lalita Vistara*, understand under this officer a general.

² Omitted by Hardy.

³ *Samâdhi*. *Buddhaghosa*, loc. cit. p. 65, gives also 'being the chief' as its mark, but he previously (p. 64) gives *avikkhepa*, 'serenity,' as the mark of *sammâ-samâdhi*, and also (p. 63) of *samâdhindriya*, while 'being unshaken by spiritual pride' is his mark (p. 63) of *Samâdhi-bala*.

lines would incline towards him, lead up to him, they would be so many mountain slopes, one above another, with him as their summit, round him they would all be ranged. [39] And it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One : " Cultivate in yourself, O Bhikkhus, the habit of meditation. He who is established therein knows things as they really are¹."

' Well put, Nâgasena !'

14. The king said : ' What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of wisdom² ?'

' I have already told you, O king, how cutting off, severance, is its mark³, but enlightenment is also its mark.'

' And how is enlightenment its mark ?'

' When wisdom springs up in the heart, O king, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth⁴, and it makes the Noble Truths plain. Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.'

' Give me an illustration.'

' It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness,

¹ *Samyutta Nikâya* XXI, 5.

² *Paññâ*. Hardy in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others.

³ See above, p. 51.

⁴ *Vidamseti*, not in Childers ; but compare *Theri Gâthâ*, 74 ; *Ânguttara* III, 103 ; and *Gâtaka* III, 222.

cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.'

'Well put, Nâgasena!'

15. The king said: 'These qualities which are so different¹, Nâgasena, do they bring about one and the same result?'

'They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions.'

'How is that? Give me an illustration.'

'They are like the various parts of an army—elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers—who all work to one end, to wit: the conquest in battle of the opposing army.'

'Well put, Nâgasena!'

Here ends the First Chapter.

¹ That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, § 9.

BOOK II. CHAPTER 2.

1. [40] The king said : ' He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or become another ? '

' Neither the same nor another.'

' Give me an illustration.'

' Now what do you think, O king ? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up ? '

' No. That child was one, I am another.'

' If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no ! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king ! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth ¹ ? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man ? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another ? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off ² ? '

' Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that ? '

The Elder replied : ' I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.'

' Give me an illustration.'

¹ On these four stages see *Gâtaka* IV, 496, and *Samyutta* X, 1, 3.

² Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this.

‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?’

‘Yes, it might do so.’

‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?’

‘No.’

‘Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third?’

‘No.’

‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third?’

‘No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.’

‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness¹.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

¹ Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: ‘In the same way, great king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyâna, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.’ (1) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph.

The meaning is really quite plain in both the Pâli and the Sinhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series;—a continuity dependent

‘It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee?’

‘Certainly not; but they are produced out of it.’

‘Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.’

‘Well put, Nâgasena!’

2¹. The king said: ‘Is a man, Nâgasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact?’

‘Yes, O king.’

‘And how does he know it?’

‘By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote², of rebirth.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the

on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in which the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy.

On the phrase *apubbam akariyam* see Dr. Morris’s note at p. 101 of the Pâli Text Society’s Journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes.

¹ Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112.

² That is to say, *Taṇhâ* and *Upâdâna*.

stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled ?'

'Yes, he ought to know it.'

'But how ?'

'He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.'

'Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.'

'Well explained, Nâgasena !'

3¹. The king said: 'He who has intelligence, Nâgasena, has he also wisdom ?'

'Yes, great king.' [42]

'What ; are they both the same ?'

'Yes.'

'Then would he, with his intelligence — which, you say, is the same as wisdom — be still in bewilderment or not ?'

'In regard to some things, yes ; in regard to others, no.'

'What would he be in bewilderment about ?'

'He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.'

'And wherein would he not be in bewilderment ?'

'As regards that which has been accomplished by insight — (the perception, that is,) of the imper-

¹ Summarised in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 414.

² *Ñâna* and *paññâ*.

manence of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul¹.

‘Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.’

‘When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.’

‘And what, Nāgasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom?’

‘When the reasoning wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains—the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.’

‘Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.’

‘It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘In Eastern districts [43] the peasants have a custom of arranging five pots full of water behind

¹ That is, he might still be wrong on matters of mere worldly knowledge, but would be clear in his mind as to the fundamental truths of religion. Compare the analogous distinctions often drawn as to the inspiration of Scripture, or the infallibility of the Pope.

each hut with the object of putting out at once any spark of fire that may be kindled. Suppose now the house had caught fire, and they had thrown those five potfulls of water over the hut, and the fire had gone out, would those peasants then think of still going on using the water-pots ?'

'No, Sir, the water-pots would be done with. What would be the use of them (on that occasion) any more ?'

'The five water-pots are the five organs of moral sense—faith, to wit, and perseverance in effort, and mindfulness, and meditation, and the reasoning wisdom. The peasantry are the recluse, who is devoted in effort¹; the fire is sinfulness. As the fire is put out by the water in the five pots, so is sinfulness extinguished by the five organs of moral sense, and when once extinguished it does not again arise².'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'It is like a physician who goes to the sick man with the five kinds of drugs made from medicinal

¹ *Yogâvaṅkaro*; one of the technical terms in constant use by our author, but not found in the Pāli Piṭakas. Hardy renders it, 'who is seeking Nirvāṇa;' but though this may be suggested by the term, it is not its meaning. Literally it is 'he whose sphere, whose constant resort, is Yoga.' Now yoga is 'diligence, devotion, mental concentration;' and there is nothing to show that our author is using the word as an epithet of Arahatsip. It seems to me, therefore, that the whole compound merely means one of those 'religious,' in the technical sense, who were also religious in the higher, more usual sense. It would thus be analogous to the phrase *saṃgāmâvaṅkaro*, 'at home in war,' used of a war elephant in the *Samgāmâvaṅkara Gâtaka* (Fausböll, II, 95), and of a soldier below, Mil. 44.

² This must, I think, be understood in a modified sense, for the first of the four Great Exertions (*Sammappadhânas*) is the effort to prevent sinful conditions arising.

roots¹, and grinding them up, gives him to drink, and thereby his sickness passes away. Would the physician in that case think of making any further use of the medicine ?'

'Certainly not, the medicine has done its work. What would be the use of any more ?'

'Just so, O king, when sinfulness is destroyed by the five moral powers, then reasoning ceases, but knowledge remains.'

[44] 'Give me a further illustration.'

'It is like a warrior, at home in war, who takes five javelins and goes down to battle to conquer the foe. And when he has cast them the enemy is broken. There is no need for him to go on casting javelins any more.'

'Well put, Nāgasena !'

4. The king said : 'He who will not be reborn, Nāgasena, does he still feel any painful sensation ?'

The Elder replied : 'Some he feels and some not.'

'Which are they ?'

'He may feel bodily pain, O king ; but mental pain he would not.'

'How would that be so ?'

'Because the causes, proximate or remote, of bodily pain still continue, he would be liable to it. But the causes, proximate or remote, of mental agony having ceased, he could not feel it. For it has been said by the Blessed One : "One kind of pain he suffers, bodily pain : but not mental."'

'Then why, Sir, does he not die ?'

'The Arahāt, O king, has need neither to curry

¹ *Pañka mūla bhessaggāni* : not the five principal sorts of medicine mentioned by Childers.

favour nor to bear malice. He shakes not down the unripe fruit, but awaits the full time of its maturity. For it has been said, O king, by the Elder, Sâriputta, the Commander of the faith [45]:

“It is not death, it is not life I welcome;
As the hireling his wage, so do I bide my time.
It is not death, it is not life I want;
Mindful and thoughtful do I bide my time¹.”

‘Well put, Nâgasena!’

5. The king said: ‘Is a pleasant sensation, Nâgasena, good or evil or indifferent?’

‘It may be any one of the three.’

‘But surely, Sir, if good conditions are not painful, and painful ones not good, then there can arise no good condition that is at the same time painful?’

‘Now, what do you think, great king? Suppose a man were to hold in one hand a red-hot ball of iron, and in the other a lump of icy snow, would they both hurt him?’

‘Yes; they both would.’

‘But are they both hot?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘But are they both cold?’

‘No.’

‘Then acknowledge yourself put in the wrong! If the heat hurts, and they are not both hot, the pain cannot come from the heat. If the cold hurts,

¹ These verses are nearly the same as those put in reverse order into Sâriputta’s mouth in the Theri Gâthâ, 1003, 1002. And the first two lines, as Dr. Rost was good enough to point out to me, are identical (except as to a slight grammatical variation) with Manu VI, 45.

² And the same, therefore, of pleasant sensations that are evil.

and they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. How then, O king, can they both hurt you, since they are not both hot, nor both cold, and (as one is hot and the other cold) the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold?’

‘I am not equal to argument with you. Be so good, Sir, as to explain how the matter stands.’

Then the Elder reasoned with king Milinda, persuading him by talk on the subject drawn from the Abhidhamma, such as : ‘There are these six pleasures, O king, connected with life in the world, and these other six with renunciation. There are six griefs connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. There are six kinds of indifference to pleasure and to grief connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. [46] Altogether there are thus six series of six, that is to say, thirty-six kinds of sensations in the present, and the like number in the past, and the like in the future. And adding all these up in one total we arrive at one hundred and eight kinds of sensation.’

‘Well put, Nâgasena !’

6¹. The king said : ‘What is it, Nâgasena, that is reborn?’

‘Name-and-form is reborn.’

‘What, is it this same name-and-form that is reborn?’

‘No : but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.’

¹ This dialogue is in Hardy, p. 429 (No. 7).

‘If that be so, Sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma¹?’

The Elder replied: ‘Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the owner of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and charge him with the crime. And the thief were to say: “Your Majesty! I have not taken away this man’s mangoes. Those that he put in the ground are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished.” How then? would he be guilty?’

‘Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.’

‘But on what ground?’

‘Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which resulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).’

‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘It is like rice or sugar so stolen, of which the same might be said as of the mango. [47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set

¹ Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112.

another man's field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: "Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man's field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty." Now would the man, O king, be guilty?'

'Certainly, Sir.'

'But why?'

'Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.'

'Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: "What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?" And he should reply: "I've not set your village on fire! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing." Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?'

'In the villagers' favour.'

'But why?'

‘Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.’

‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price¹ for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: “Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?” And the other were to reply: “It’s not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another.” Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?’

‘In favour of the first.’

‘But why?’

‘Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.’

‘Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form

¹ *Suṅkaṃ* datvā. Literally ‘paying a tax.’ So early were early marriages! Compare *Therī Gāthā*, 402. *Hinaṃ-kumburē*, p. 58, has *wœ/up dī*, ‘having provided her with means of subsistence.’ But, of course, the *Suṅka* must have been a price paid to the parents.

which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying: "I will come for it to-morrow;" and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: "It was not curds I bought of you; give me my vessel of milk." And the other were to reply: "Without any fault of mine¹ your milk has turned to curds." Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?'

'In favour of the herdsman.'

'But why?'

'Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.'

'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

7². The king said: 'Will you, Nâgasena, be reborn?'

¹ Agânato: there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean 'to me not knowing it,' or 'to you not knowing it.' Hinañ-kumburê takes the latter interpretation, and renders: 'O come! Do you not know that your milk has become curds?' (Embala, tâge kiri mawû bawa no dannehi dœyi.)

² Not in Hardy.

‘Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall; but if not, not¹?’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king²: and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly?’

‘Most certainly not.’

‘Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall; and if not, not?’

‘You are ready, Nāgasena, in reply.’

8. The king said: ‘You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does “name” mean in that expression, and what “form”?’

‘Whatever is gross therein, that is “form”: whatever is subtle, mental, that is “name.”’

‘Why is it, Nāgasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately?’

‘These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other; and spring into being together.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or

¹ See above, Chapter I, § 6, p. 50.

² This simile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 (p. 93).

an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature¹.

‘You are ready, Nāgasena, in reply.’

9. The king said: ‘You speak, Nāgasena, of time immemorial. What does this word “time” mean?’

‘Past time, O king, and present, and future.’

‘But what? is there such a thing as time?’

‘There is time which exists, and time which does not.’

‘Which then exists, and which not?’

[50] ‘There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being)², O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing

¹ *Evam etam dīgham addhānam sambhāvitam*: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: ‘They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.’ But even the Sinhalese text cannot be made to mean this.

² *Samkhârâ*. See the full list in my ‘Buddhism,’ pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the *Piṭakas*, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (*Karma*). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in ‘*Vinaya Texts*,’ I, 76.

effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not ; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirvâṇa in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not—because of their having been quite set free¹.

‘ You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.’

Here ends the Second Chapter.

¹ Parinibbutattâ. Hardy renders this whole clause (the last lines): ‘ Nirvâṇa is attained, time is no longer.’ But this is one of the endless confusions arising out of not knowing the distinction between Nirvâṇa and Parinirvâṇa. To a man who had ‘attained Nirvâṇa’ there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence. The Sinhalese is perfectly clear.

BOOK II. CHAPTER 3.

1. The king said : 'What is the root, Nâgasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time ?'

'Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the Confections, by reason of the Confections consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense¹, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming birth, by reason of birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain, and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent.'

'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.'

2. The king said : 'You say that the ultimate point of time is not apparent. Give me an illustration of that.'

'Suppose, O king, a man were to plant in the ground a tiny seed, and that it were to come up as a shoot, and in due course grow, develope, and mature until it produced a fruit. [51] And then the man, taking a seed from that fruit, were again to plant it in the ground, and all should happen as before. Now would there be any end to this series ?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

¹ Sa/âyatanaâni, that is the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (as the organ of touch), and mind (or, as we should say, brain).

‘Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘The hen lays an egg. From the egg comes a hen. From the hen an egg. Is there any end to this series?’

‘No.’

‘Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

Then the Elder drew a circle on the ground and asked the king: ‘Is there any end to this circle?’

‘No, it has no end.’

‘Well, that is like those circles spoken of by the Blessed One¹. “By reason of the eye and of forms there arises sight², when these three come together there is touch, by reason of touch sensation, by reason of sensation a longing (*Tanhâ*, thirst), by reason of the longing action (*Karma*), and from action eye is once more produced³.” Now is there any end to this series?’

‘No.’

¹ *Hīnaśi-kumburê* applies this to the previous words (the circles of the chain of life quoted in § 1 from the *Mahāvagga* I, 1, 2), and he is followed by Hardy, p. 434. Trenckner makes it apply to the following words, giving the reference to No. 18 in the *Magghima Nikāya*, and I think he is right. Whichever way it is taken, the result is much the same.

² *Kakkhu-viññāna*. It is not clear from the terse phraseology of this passage whether this is supposed to be a subjective stage preliminary to the ‘touch’ (*phasso*), or whether it is inclusive of it. (Compare *Dhamma Saṅgani*, 589, 599, 620.) I am inclined to think it is the former. But if the latter be meant it might be rendered ‘there arises that consciousness (of existence) which is dependent upon the eye.’ See below, § 4.

³ That is, another eye in another birth.

Then setting out a precisely corresponding circle of each of the other organs of sense (of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind¹), he in each case put the same question. And the reply being always the same, he concluded :

‘Just so, O king, the ultimate point of time in the past is not apparent.’

‘You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.’

3. The king said : ‘When you say that the ultimate point is not apparent, what do you mean by “ultimate point”?’

‘Of whatsoever time is past. It is the ultimate point of that, O king, that I speak of.’

‘But, if so, when you say that it is not apparent, do you mean to say that of everything? Is the ultimate point of everything unknown?’

‘Partly so, and partly not.’

‘Then which is so, and which not?’

‘Formerly, O king, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is unknown. But that, which has not been, becomes; as soon as it has begun to become it dissolves away again. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is known². [52]

‘But, reverend Sir, if that which was not, becomes, and as soon as it has begun to become passes again

¹ In the text the whole sentence is repeated of each.

² That is, ‘the beginning of each link in the chain—the beginning of each individuality—can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any “ultimate point” of all the chains.’

away, then surely, being thus cut off at both ends, it must be entirely destroyed¹?’

‘Nay, surely, O king, if it be thus cut off at both ends, can it not at both ends be made to grow again²?’

‘Yes, it might. But that is not my question. Could it grow again from the point at which it was cut off?’

‘Certainly.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

Then the Elder repeated the simile of the tree and the seed, and said that the Skandhas (the constituent elements of all life, organic and inorganic) were so many seeds, and the king confessed himself satisfied.

4. The king said: ‘Are there any Confections³ which are produced?’

‘Certainly.’

‘Which are they?’

‘Where there is an eye, and also forms, there is sight⁴, where there is sight there is a contact through the eye, where there is contact through the eye there is a sensation, where there is sensation there is a longing⁵, where there is longing there is a grasping⁶, where there is grasping there is a becoming,

¹ That is, ‘each individuality must be separate. The supposed chain does not really exist.’

² There is an odd change of gender here. Possibly the word ‘ignorance’ has been dropped out. Trenckner says the passage is corrupt, and the Sinhalese is so involved as to be unintelligible.

³ Saṅkhârâ, potentialities, possible forms, of sentient existence.

⁴ Kakkhu-viññâna. See note 2 above, p. 80.

⁵ Tanhâ, thirst.

⁶ Upâdâna, a stretching out towards a satisfaction of the longing, and therefore a craving for life, time, in which to satisfy it.

where there is becoming there is birth, and at birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair begin to be. Thus is the rise of the whole of this class of pain.—Where there is neither eye nor form there is no sight, where there is not sight there is no contact through the eye, where there is not contact there is no sensation, where there is not sensation there is no longing, where there is not longing there is no grasping, where there is not grasping there is no becoming, where there is not becoming there is no birth, and where there is not birth there is neither old age nor death nor grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. Thus is the ending of all this class of pain.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

5. The king said: 'Are there any Confections (qualities) which spring into being without a gradual becoming?'

'No. They all have a gradual becoming.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Now what do you think, great king? Did this house in which you are sitting spring suddenly into being?'

[53] 'Certainly not, Sir. There is nothing here which arose in that way. Each portion of it has had its gradual becoming—these beams had their becoming in the forest, and this clay in the earth, and by the moil and toil of women and of men¹ was this house produced.'

¹ It is a small matter, but noteworthy, that the Buddhist texts always put the women first.

‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal on a mandolin¹, no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound?’

¹ *Vînâya pattam*. I don't know what this is. The *Simhalese* merely repeats the words.

‘Of course there would.’

‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus¹, no twirling-stick¹, and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix¹, and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear?’

‘Yes, certainly.’

[54] ‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!’

‘Give me one more illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not?’

‘Yes.’

‘Just so, great king, there is no Confection which

¹ *Arani*, *arani-potako*, and *uttarârani*. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The *Sim*-halese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively *ya/a liya*, ‘under wood,’ *matu liya*, ‘upper wood,’ and *uturu liya*, also ‘upper wood.’ This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to *Hinafi-kumburê* as it is to us.

has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be !'

'Give me another illustration.'

'Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image ?'

'No.'

'But given these things, there might be a reflection ?'

'Yes, Sir, there might.'

'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be !'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

6. The king said : 'Is there, Nâgasena, such a thing as the soul¹ ?'

'What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu) ?'

'The living principle within² which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and discerns things (conditions, "dhammâ") through the mind—just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.'

The Elder replied : 'I will tell you about the five

¹ Vedagû, see below, III, 5, 6, p. 111, not found in this meaning in the Piṭakas.

² Abbhantare gîvo, also not found in this sense in the Piṭakas. Attâ, rendered just above 'image' or 'reflection,' is the word used in them for soul. Hînañ-kumburê renders this here by prâṇa gîwa, 'breath-soul.' See below, III, 7, 15, p. 132 ; and above, II, 4, p. 48 ; and II, 2, 6, p. 71.

doors¹, great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste, and smell odours, and feel touch, and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?’

‘No, Sir.’

‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions? And so with each of its windows?’

‘No, Sir.’

[56] ‘Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so?’

‘Yes, I should know it.’

‘And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so?’

¹ It is odd he does not say six.

‘Yes, I should know it.’

‘Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness¹?’

‘Yes, it would know it.’

‘But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man’s mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not?’

‘No, Sir.’

‘But why not?’

‘Because the honey could not get into his mouth.’

‘Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately².’

‘I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.’

Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying: ‘It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions—contact,

¹ This list recurs below, II, 4, 1.

² That is: ‘Your “living principle within” cannot make use of whichever of its windows it pleases. And the simile of a man inside a house does not hold good of the soul.’ See the end of II, 3, 16.

sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention¹—arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. [57] And so herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu)².

7. The king said: 'Does thought-perception³ arise wherever sight arises⁴?'

'Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.'

'And which of the two arises first?'

'First sight, then thought.'

'Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying: "Do you spring up there where I have?" or does thought issue command to sight, saying: "Where you spring up there will I."'

'It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.'

'Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does?'

'Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit⁵, and because of there being an association.'

'How is that? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.'

'Now what do you think, great king? When it rains⁶, where will the water go to?'

¹ The last four are *ketanâ*, *ekaggatâ*, *gîvitindriyam*, and *manasikâro*; and in the Sinhalese are simply repeated in their Sinhalese form.

² This conclusion is all wrong in Hardy, pp. 457, 458.

³ *Mano-viññânam*.

⁴ *Kakkhu-viññânam*.

⁵ *Kinnattâ*, which Hînañi-kumburê renders *purudu bæwin*.

⁶ *Deve vassante*: 'when the god rains.'

‘It will follow the slope of the ground.’

‘And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to?’

‘It would go the same way as the first water had gone.’

‘What then? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying: “Do you go where I have?” Or does the second issue command to the first, saying: “Whithersoever you go, thither will I?”’

‘It is not so, Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.’

‘Just so, great king, [58] is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sight-perception issue command to the mind-perception, saying: “Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up;” nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying: “Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up.” There is no conversation, as it were, between them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.’

‘Now give me an illustration of there being a door.’

‘What do you think, great king? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. If a man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out?’

‘By the gate, certainly.’

‘And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out?’

‘The same way as the first.’

‘What then? Would the first man tell the second:

“Mind you go out the same way as I do”? Or would the second tell the first: “The way you go out, I shall go out too”?’

‘Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.’

‘Just so, great king, with thought and sight.’

‘Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.’

‘What do you think, great king? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go?’

‘The same as the first.’

‘But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone?’

‘No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.’

‘Just so, great king, with sight and thought.’

‘Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.’

‘In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks¹, in the art of arithmetic pure and simple², in the art of estimating the probable

¹ Muddâ. Hīnaśi-kumburê is here a little fuller than Buddha-ghosa at vol. i, p. 95 of the Sumaṅgala. He says: yam se ceṅgili purukhi alwâ gena saññâ koṭa kiyana hasta mudra sâstraya, ‘the finger-ring art, so called from seizing on the joints of the fingers, and using them as signs.’

² Gaṇanâ. Hīnaśi-kumburê says: akkhiḍra wu gaṇam sâstraya, ‘the art of unbroken counting,’ which is precisely Buddha-ghosa’s explanation (confirming the reading we have there adopted), and probably means arithmetic without the aids involved in the last phrase. We have here in that case an interesting peep into the

yield of growing crops ¹, and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.'

And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch: that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from [80] the natural causes above set out.

8. The king said: 'Where thought (mental perception ²) is, Nāgasena, is there always sensation?'

'Yes, where thought arises there is contact, and there is sensation, and there is idea, and there is conceived intention, and there is reflection, and there is investigation ³.'

9. 'Reverend Sir, what is the distinguishing characteristic of contact (Phassa)?'

'Touch ⁴, O king.'

'But give me an illustration.'

'It is as when two rams are butting together, O

progress of arithmetical knowledge. When our author wrote, the old way of counting on the fingers was still in vogue, but the modern system was coming into general use.

¹ Saṅkhā, literally 'calculation,' but which Hardy amplifies into Kshetraya vṛksha vilokaya koṭa phala pramāṇaya kiyannāwū saṃkhyā sâstraya.

² Mano-viññāṇa as all through the last section. The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c.

³ K'etanā, vitakko, and viññāro. See fuller further on, §§ 11, 13, 14.

⁴ Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumāṅgala.

king. The eye should be regarded as one of those two, the form (object) as the other, and the contact as the union of the two.'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'It is as when two cymbals¹ are clashed together. The one is as the eye, the other as the object, and the junction of the two is like contact.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

10. 'Reverend Sir, what is the characteristic mark of sensation (Vedanâ)?'

'The being experienced, great king, and enjoyed².'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the case of the man³ on whom the king, pleased with a service he has rendered him, should bestow an office. He while living, through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think: "Formerly I did the king a service. For that the king, pleased with me, gave me this office. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations."—And it is like the case of the man [61] who having done good deeds is re-born, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy conditions of bliss in heaven. He, while living there in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think: "Formerly I must have done good deeds. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations." Thus is it, great king, that the being experienced and enjoyed is the characteristic mark of sensation.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

¹ Sammâ, compare Theri Gâthâ, 893, 911.

² Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., only gives the first of these.

³ See for a similar illustration above, II, 2, 7, p. 76.

11. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of idea (*Saññā*)?'

'Recognition, O king¹. And what does he recognise?—blueness and yellowness and redness and whiteness and brownness.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the king's treasurer, O king, who when he sees, on entering the treasure, objects the property of the king of all those colours, recognises (that they have such). Thus it is, great king, that recognition is the mark of idea.'

'Very good, Nāgasena!'

'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of the conceived purpose (*Ketanā*)?'

'The being conceived, O king, and the being prepared².'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the case of a man, O king, who should prepare poison, and both drink of it himself, and give of it to others to drink. He himself would suffer pain, and so would they. In the same way some individual, having thought out with intention some evil deed, on the dissolution of the body after death, would be reborn into some unhappy state of woe in purgatory, and so also would those who followed his advice.—And it is like the case of a

¹ So also Buddhaghosa, *Sumaṅgala*, p. 63.

² Buddhaghosa, *loc. cit.*, gives no mark of *Ketanā*, but he gives both it and 'the being prepared' as the marks of the Confections. It is not clear from the *Milinda* alone how to render the term *Ketanā*, but I follow *Anguttara* III, 77 (where it is placed on a level with aspiration), and *Dhamma Saṅgani* 5 (where it is said to be born of the contact of mind, perception, and exertion).

man, O king, who should prepare a mixture of ghee, butter, oil, honey and molasses, and should both drink thereof himself and give of it to others to drink. He himself would have pleasure, and so would they. [62] In the same way some individual, having thought out with intention some good deed, will be reborn, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy state of bliss in heaven, and so also would those who follow his advice. Thus is it, great king, that the being conceived, and the being prepared, are marks of the conceived purpose.'

'Very good, Nāgasena !'

12. 'What, Nāgasena, is the distinguishing characteristic of perception (*Viññāna*)?'

'Recognition¹, great king.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'It is like the case of the guardian of a city who, when seated at the cross roads in the middle of the city, could see a man coming from the East, or the South, or the West, or the North. In the same way, O king, he knows an object which he sees with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells by his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognises by his mind. Thus is it, great king, that knowing is the mark of perception.'

'Very good, Nāgasena !'

13. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of reflection (*Vitakka*).'

¹ *Vigānana*. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., and below, III, 7, 15, p. 131.

‘The effecting of an aim¹.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘It is like the case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of wood. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

14. ‘What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nâgasena, of investigation (Viññâra)?’

‘Threshing out again and again².’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape [63], makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape³. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great king, that threshing out again and again is the mark of investigation.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

Here ends the Third Chapter⁴.

¹ Appanâ, which Hînañi-kumburê renders pihi/ana. Buddhaghosa, p. 63, gives abhiniropana as its mark, which comes to much the same thing.

² Anumaggana. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 63. The word is not in Childers, but see Morris in the Journal of the Pali Text Society, 1886, p. 118.

³ Anuravati anusandahati. Not in Childers. Hînañi-kumburê says pasuwa anurâwanâ kere da anuwa pihi/â da.

⁴ The following two sections form an appendix to this chapter corresponding to that formed by the last three sections of Book III, Chapter 7. The numbering of the sections is therefore carried on in both cases.

BOOK II. CHAPTER 3.

15. The king said : ' When those conditions (whose marks you have just specified) have run together, is it possible, by bending them apart one to one side and one to the other¹, to make the distinction between them clear, so that one can say : " This is contact, and this sensation, and this idea, and this intention, and this perception, and this reflection, and this investigation² " ? '

' No : that cannot be done.'

' Give me an illustration.'

' Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce, and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cummin seed³, and pepper, and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him : " Pick out for me the flavour of the curds, and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cummin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it." Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say : " Here is the sourness, and here the saltiness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness⁴ " ? '

¹ Vinibbhugitvâ vinibbhugitvâ. This question is identical with the one asked of the Buddha at *Magghima Nikâya* 43, p. 293. Compare also p. 233 and *Tela Kaṭṭha Gāthā* 59.

² This list differs from that in II, 3, 8, by the addition of *viññāṇa*.

³ *Gīraka*. Compare *Gātaka* I, 244; II, 181, 363. *Hīnaṣikumburē* translates it by *duru*, and Hardy by 'onions' (p. 439).

⁴ This is the same list as is found above, II, 3, 6; and below, III, 4, 2, and the items are not intended to correspond with the condiments in the list above.

‘No, that would not be possible [64]. But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.’

‘And just so, great king, with respect to those conditions we were discussing.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena !’

16. The Elder said: ‘Is salt, O king, recognisable by the eye ?’

‘Yes, Sir, it is.’

‘But be careful, O king.’

‘Well then, Sir, is it perceptible by the tongue ?’

‘Yes, that is right.’

‘But, Sir, is it only by the tongue that every kind of salt is distinguished ?’

‘Yes, every kind.’

‘If that be so, Sir, why do bullocks bring whole cart-loads of it ? Is it not salt and nothing else that ought to be so brought ?’

‘It is impossible to bring salt by itself. But all these conditions¹ have run together into one, and produced the distinctive thing called salt². (For instance) : salt is heavy, too. But is it possible, O king, to weigh salt ?’

¹ Not saltiness only, but white colour, &c. &c.

² He means the king to draw the conclusion that that distinct thing is only recognisable by the tongue ; so the senses are not interchangeable. In other words it is true that salt seems to be recognised by the sight, as when people load it into carts they do not stop to taste it. But what they see is not salt, what they weigh is not salt, it is whiteness and weight. And the fact of its being salt is an inference they draw. So, great king, your simile of the soul being inside the body, and using the five senses, as a man inside a house uses windows, does not hold good. See the conclusion above of II, 3, 6, p. 88.

‘Certainly, Sir.’

‘Nay, great king, it is not the salt you weigh, it is the weight.’

‘You are ready, Nâgasena, in argument.’

Here ends the questioning of Nâgasena by Milinda¹.

¹ This is again most odd. One would expect, ‘Here ends the questioning as to characteristic signs.’ See the note at the end of last chapter.

BOOK III.

VIMATI-KKhedana-pañho.

THE REMOVAL OF DIFFICULTIES.

CHAPTER 4¹.

1. [65] The king said: 'Are the five *Āyatanas*, *Nāgasena*, (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body,) produced by various actions, or by one action?' (that is, the result of various *Karmas*, or of one *Karma*.)

'By various actions, not by one.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Now, what do you think, O king? If I were to sow in one field five kinds of seed, would the produce of those various seeds be of different kinds?'

'Yes, certainly.'

'Well, just so with respect to the production of *Āyatanas*.'

'Very good, *Nāgasena* ²!'

2. The king said: 'Why is it, *Nāgasena*, that all men are not alike, but some are short-lived and some long-lived, some sickly and some healthy, some ugly and some beautiful, some without influence and some of great power, some poor and some wealthy, some low born and some high born, some stupid and some wise?'

¹ The chapters go straight on because Books II and III are really only parts of one Book. See above, p. 4.

² The meaning here is not easy to follow, as the word *Āyatana* is used either for the organs of sense, or for the objects of sense; and there is nothing in the context to show which is meant. Probably the idea is that good sight, hearing, &c. in one birth are each the result of a separate *Karma* in the last birth. But I am by no means sure of this, and the *Simhalese* (p. 76) is just as ambiguous as the *Pāli*.

The Elder replied : 'Why is it that all vegetables are not alike, but some sour, and some salt, and some pungent, and some acid, and some astringent, and some sweet ?'

'I fancy, Sir, it is because they come from different kinds of seeds.'

'And just so, great king, are the differences you have mentioned among men to be explained. For it has been said by the Blessed One : "Beings, O brahmin, have each their own Karma, are inheritors of Karma, belong to the tribe of their Karma, are relatives by Karma, have each their Karma as their protecting overlord. It is Karma that divides them up into low and high and the like divisions¹."

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

3. The king said : 'You told me, Nâgasena, that your renunciation was to the end that this sorrow might perish away, and no further sorrow might spring up².'

[66] 'Yes, that is so.'

'But is that renunciation brought about by previous effort, or to be striven after now, in this present time ?'

The Elder replied : 'Effort is now concerned with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.'

'Give me an illustration³.'

¹ Mr. Trenckner points out that this quotation is from the *Magghima*, No. 135. The doctrine is laid down frequently elsewhere also in the *Piṭakas*. See, for instance, *Āṅguttara* IV, 197 (pp. 202-203 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pāli Text Society).

² Above, II, 1, 5, p. 50, and compare I, 38.

³ These three illustrations recur (nearly) below, III, 7, 3, pp. 125-126.

‘ Now what do you think, O king? Is it when you feel thirst that you would set to work to have a well or an artificial lake dug out, with the intention of getting some water to drink?’

‘ Certainly not, Sir.’

‘ Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.’

‘ Give me a further illustration.’

‘ Now what do you think, O king? Is it when you feel hungry that you set to work to have fields ploughed and seed planted and crops reaped with the intention of getting some food to eat?’

‘ Certainly not, Sir.’

‘ Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.’

‘ Give me a further illustration.’

‘ Now what do you think, O king? Is it when the battle is set in array against you that you set to work to have a moat dug, and a rampart put up, and a watch tower built, and a stronghold formed, and stores of food collected? Is it then that you would have yourself taught the management of elephants, or horsemanship, or the use of the chariot and the bow, or the art of fencing?’

‘ Certainly not, Sir.’

‘ Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do. For it has been thus said, O king, by the Blessed One:

“ Betimes let each wise man work out

That which he sees to be his weal!

Not with the carter’s mode of thought, but firm

Let him, with resolution, step right out.
 As a carter who has left the smooth high road,
 And turned to byways rough, broods ill at ease ¹—
 (Like him who hazards all at dice, and fails)—
 So the weak mind who still neglects the good,
 And follows after evil, grieves at heart,
 When fallen into the power of death, as he,
 The ruined gamester, in his hour of need ².”
 [67] ‘Very good, Nāgasena!’

4. The king said: ‘You (Buddhists ³) say thus :
 “The fire of purgatory is very much more fierce
 than an ordinary fire. A small stone cast into an
 ordinary fire may smoke for a day without being
 destroyed ; but a rock as big as an upper chamber
 cast into the furnace of purgatory would be that
 moment destroyed.” That is a statement I cannot
 believe. Now, on the other hand you say thus :
 “Whatsoever beings are there reborn, though they

¹ *Ghâyati*. It is an odd coincidence that this word, which means either to burn or to meditate, according to the root from which it is derived, can be rendered here either ‘burn’ or ‘brood’ in English. In fact it is the second, not the first, root that is here intended, as is plain from such passages as *Gâtaka* III, 354, where the compound *pagghâyati* means ‘to brood over a thing.’

² Quoted from the *Samyutta Nikâya* II, 3, 2 (p. 57 in M. Feer’s edition, published by the Pâli Text Society). The readings there differ slightly from those of our text here, and the verses are put into the mouth of Khema, the god, instead of being ascribed to the Buddha. *Hīnaśi-kumburê* (p. 79) agrees with M. Léon Feer in reading *mando* for *mano* in the last line ; and I have followed them in my translation. There are several stanzas in the *Gâtaka* book of carters lost in the desert, but there is nothing to identify any one of them with the story referred to.

³ ‘You’ in the plural : that is, ‘you Bhikkhus.’ So also above, pp. 30, 50.

burn for hundreds of thousands of years in purgatory, yet are they not destroyed." That too is a statement I don't believe.'

The Elder said: 'Now what do you think, O king? Do not the females of sharks¹ and crocodiles and tortoises and peacocks and pigeons eat hard bits of stone and gravel?'

'Yes, Sir. They do.'

'What then? Are these hard things, when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed?'

'Yes, they are destroyed.'

'And the embryo that may be inside the same animals,—is that too destroyed?'

'Certainly not.'

'But why not.'

'I suppose, Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.'

'Just so, great king, it is through the influence of Karma that beings, though they have been for thousands of years in purgatory, are not destroyed. If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One: "He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted²."'

'Give me a further illustration.'

¹ It may be noticed that the particular feminine forms chosen are in each case unusual, being in *inî* instead of the simple *f*. The first animal, the *Makariniî*, is said by Childers to be a mythical animal, but it is clear from Buddhaghosa on *Kullavagga* V, 1, 4, that an ordinary animal is meant, and that is so I think here, though the translation 'shark' is conjectural.

² From *Anguttara* III, 35, 4 (p. 141 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society).

‘Now what do you think, O king? Do not the females of lions and tigers and panthers and dogs eat hard bits of bone and flesh?’

‘Yes, they eat such things.’

‘What then? are such hard things, [68] when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed?’

‘Yes, they are destroyed.’

‘And the embryo that may be inside the same animals,—is that too destroyed?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘But why not?’

‘I suppose, Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.’

‘Just so, great king, it is by the influence of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, are not destroyed.’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘Now what do you think, O king? Do not the tender women—wives of the Yonakas, and nobles, and brahmins, and householders—eat hard cakes and meat?’

‘Yes, they eat such hard things.’

‘And when those hard things have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, are not they destroyed?’

‘Yes, they are.’

‘But the children in their womb,—are they destroyed?’

‘Certainly not.’

‘And why not?’

‘I suppose, Sir, they escape destruction by the influence of Karma?’

‘Just so, great king, it is through the influence

of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, yet are they not destroyed. If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One : " He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted." "

‘ Very good, Nâgasena ! ’

5. The king said : ‘ Venerable Nâgasena, your people say that the world rests on water, the water on air, the air on space¹. This saying also I cannot believe.’

Then the Elder brought water in a regulation water-pot², and convinced king Milinda, saying : ‘ As this water is supported by the atmosphere, so is that water supported by air.’

‘ Very good, Nâgasena ! ’

6. The king said : ‘ Is cessation Nirvâṇa³? ’

‘ Yes, your Majesty’ [69].

‘ How is that, Nâgasena ? ’

‘ All foolish individuals, O king, take pleasure in

¹ This is not a distinctively Buddhist belief. It was commonly held at the time by other teachers. Compare ‘ Book of the Great Decease,’ III, 13 (in ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ Sacred Books of the East, vol. xi, p. 45).

² Dhamma-karakena. The passages show that this was a pot so made, that no water could pass from it except through a filtering medium. When not being actually used the water was no doubt kept at a certain height in it by the pressure of the atmosphere. I do not know of any specimen preserved in our modern museums or figured on ancient bas-reliefs, and the exact shape is unknown. It must be different from the one represented in plate xlviii of Cunningham’s ‘ Bhilsa Tope.’ See *Kullavagga* V, 13, 1 (note); VI, 21, 3; XII, 2, 1; *Mahāvamsa*, p. 60.

³ Nirodho nibbānan ti.

the senses and in the objects of sense, find delight in them, continue to cleave to them¹. Hence are they carried down by that flood (of human passions), they are not set free from birth, old age, and death, from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair,—they are not set free, I say, from suffering. But the wise, O king, the disciple of the noble ones, neither takes pleasure in those things, nor finds delight in them, nor continues cleaving to them. And inasmuch as he does not, in him craving² ceases, and by the cessation of craving grasping² ceases, and by the cessation of grasping becoming² ceases, and when becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation birth, old age, and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. Thus is the cessation brought about the end of all that aggregation of pain. Thus is it that cessation is Nirvâna.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

7. The king said : 'Venerable Nâgasena, do all men receive Nirvâna ?'

'Not all, O king. But he who walks righteously, who admits those conditions which ought to be admitted, perceives clearly those conditions which ought to be clearly perceived, abandons those conditions which ought to be abandoned, practises himself in those conditions which ought to be practised, realises those conditions which ought to be realised—he receives Nirvâna.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

¹ *Agghosâya tittḥanti*. Compare *Ânguttara* II, 4, 6, and *Therî Gâthâ*, 794.

² *Taṇhâ*, *Upâdâna*, *Bhava*.

8. The king said : ' Venerable Nâgasena, does he who does not receive Nirvâna know how happy a state Nirvâna is ¹ ?'

' Yes, he knows it.'

' But how can he know that without his receiving Nirvâna ?'

' Now what do you think, O king ? Do those whose hands and feet have not been cut off know how sad a thing it is to have them cut off ?'

' Yes, Sir, that they know.'

' But how do they know it ?'

' Well, by hearing the sound of the lamentation of those whose hands and feet have been cut off, they know it.'

[70] ' Just so, great king, it is by hearing the glad words of those who have seen Nirvâna, that they who have not received it know how happy a state it is.'

' Very good, Nâgasena !'

Here ends the Fourth Chapter.

¹ The opposite point (whether he who has Nirvâna, knows that he has it) is discussed above, II, 2.

BOOK III. CHAPTER 5.

1. The king said: 'Have you, Nāgasena, seen the Buddha?'

'No, Sire.'

'Then have your teachers seen the Buddha?'

'No, Sire.'

'Then, venerable Nāgasena, there is no Buddha¹!'

'But, great king, have you seen the river Ūhā in the Himālaya mountains?'

'No, Sir.'

'Or has your father seen it?'

'No, Sir.'

'Then, your Majesty, is there therefore no such river?'

'It is there. Though neither I nor my father has seen it, it is nevertheless there.'

'Just so, great king, though neither I nor my teachers have seen the Blessed One, nevertheless there was such a person.'

'Very good, Nāgasena!'

2. The king said: 'Is the Buddha, Nāgasena, pre-eminent?'

'Yes, he is incomparable.'

'But how do you know of one you have never seen that he is pre-eminent.'

'Now what do you think, O king? They who have never seen the ocean would they know con-

¹ This dialogue is so far identical with VI, 1, 1. It is a kind of parody on Gotama's own argument about the Brahmans and Brahma ('Have they seen God,' &c.) in the *Tevigga Sutta* I, 12-15, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 172-174.

cerning it: "Deep, unmeasurable, unfathomable is the mighty ocean. Into it do the five great rivers flow—the Ganges, the Jumna, the Akiravati, the Sarabhû, and the Maht—and yet is there in it no appearance of being more empty or more full!"?

'Yes, they would know that.'

'Just so, great king, when I think of the mighty disciples who have passed away then do I know that the Buddha is incomparable.' [71]

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

3. The king said: 'Is it possible, Nâgasena, for others to know how incomparable the Buddha is?'

'Yes, they may know it.'

'But how can they?'

'Long, long ago, O king, there was a master of writing, by name Tissa the Elder, and many are the years gone by since he has died. How can people know of him?'

'By his writing, Sir.'

'Just so, great king, whosoever sees what the Truth¹ is, he sees what the Blessed One was, for the Truth was preached by the Blessed One.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

4. The king said: 'Have you, Nâgasena, seen what the Truth is?'

'Have not we disciples, O king, to conduct ourselves our lives long as under the eye of the Buddha, and under his command²?'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

¹ Dhammam, here nearly=Buddhism. See below, III, 5, 10.

² Mr. Trenckner thinks there is a lacuna here; and Hīnaś-kumburê's version perhaps supports this. He renders the passage, 'How can a man use a path he does not know? And have not we

5. The king said : 'Where there is no transmigration, Nâgasena, can there be rebirth ?'

'Yes, there can.'

'But how can that be ? Give me an illustration.'

'Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp from another lamp, can it be said that the one transmigrates from, or to, the other ?'

'Certainly not.'

'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.'

'Give me a further illustration.'

'Do you recollect, great king, having learnt, when you were a boy, some verse or other from your teacher ?'

'Yes, I recollect that.'

'Well then, did that verse transmigrate from your teacher ?'

'Certainly not.'

'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

6. The king said : 'Is there such a thing, Nâgasena, as the soul¹ ?'

'In the highest sense, O king, there is no such thing².'

our lives long to conduct ourselves according to the Vinaya (the rules of the Order), which the Buddha preached, and which are called the eye of the Buddha, and according to the *Sikkhâpada* (ethics) which he laid down, and which are called his command ?' But there are other passages, no less amplified in the *Siṃhalese*, where there is evidently no lacuna in the Pâli ; and the passage may well have been meant as a kind of riddle, to which the *Siṃhalese* supplies the solution.

¹ Vedagât. See above, II, 3, 6, p. 86 (note).

² Mr. Trenckner thinks there is a lacuna here. The *Siṃhalese* follows the Pâli word for word.

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

7. [72] The king said: ‘Is there any being, Nâgasena, who transmigrates from this body to another?’

‘No, there is not.’

‘But if so, would it not get free from its evil deeds.’

‘Yes, if it were not reborn; but if it were, no¹.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, a man were to steal another man’s mangoes, would the thief deserve punishment?’

‘Yes.’

‘But he would not have stolen the mangoes the other set in the ground. Why would he deserve punishment?’

‘Because those he stole were the result of those that were planted.’

‘Just so, great king, this name-and-form commits deeds, either pure or impure, and by that Karma another name-and-form is reborn. And therefore is it not set free from its evil deeds?’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

8. The king said: ‘When deeds are committed, Nâgasena, by one name-and-form, what becomes of those deeds?’

‘The deeds would follow it, O king, like a shadow that never leaves it².’

‘Can any one point out those deeds, saying: “Here are those deeds, or there”?’

‘No.’

¹ This is an exact repetition of what we had above, II, 2, 6.

² These last words are a quotation of those that recur at Samyutta III, 2, 10, 10, and Dhammapada, verse 2.

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Now what do you think, O king? Can any one point out the fruits which a tree has not yet produced, saying: “Here they are, or there”?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Just so, great king, so long as the continuity of life is not cut off, it is impossible to point out the deeds that are done.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

9. [73] The king said: ‘Does he, Nâgasena, who is about to be reborn know that he will be born?’

‘Yes, he knows it, O king.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose a farmer, O king, a householder, were to put seed in the ground, and it were to rain well, would he know that a crop would be produced.’

‘Yes, he would know that.’

‘Just so, great king, does he who is about to be reborn know¹ that he will be born.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena²!’

10. The king said: ‘Is there such a person as the Buddha, Nâgasena?’

‘Yes.’

‘Can he then, Nâgasena, be pointed out as being here or there?’

‘The Blessed One, O king, has passed away by that kind of passing away in which nothing remains which could tend to the formation of another indi-

¹ That is before he is born.

² This is all very parallel to II, 2, 2.

vidual¹. It is not possible to point out the Blessed One as being here or there.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Now what do you think, O king? When there is a great body of fire blazing, is it possible to point out any one flame that has gone out, that it is here or there?'

'No, Sir. That flame has ceased, it has vanished.'

'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him, that he is here or there. But in the body of his doctrine he can, O king, be pointed out. For the doctrine² was preached by the Blessed One?'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

Here ends the Fifth Chapter.

¹ Anupâdisesâya nibbânadhâtuyâ.

² Dhamma. See above, III, 5, 3.

BOOK III. CHAPTER 6.

1. The king said: 'Is the body, Nâgasena, dear to you recluses?'

'No, they love not the body.'

'Then why do you nourish it and lavish attention upon it?'

'In all the times and places, O king, that you have gone down to battle, did you never get wounded by an arrow?'

'Yes, that has happened to me.'

'In such cases, O king, [74] is not the wound anointed with salve, and smeared with oil, and bound up in a bandage.'

'Yes, such things are done to it.'

'What then? Is the wound dear to you that you treat it so tenderly, and lavish such attention upon it?'

'No, it is not dear to me in spite of all that, which is only done that the flesh may grow again.'

'Just so, great king, with the recluses and the body. Without cleaving to it do they bear about the body for the sake of righteousness of life. The body, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One to be like a wound. And therefore merely as a sore, and without cleaving to it, do the recluses bear about the body. For it has been said by the Blessed One:

"Covered with clammy skin, an impure thing and foul, Nine-apertured, it oozes, like a sore¹."

'Well answered, Nâgasena!'

¹ I have not been able to trace this couplet. On the sentiment compare the eloquent words of the young wife at vol. i, p. 200 of my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' and Sutta Nipâta I, 11.

2. The king said: 'Did the Buddha, Nâgasena, the omniscient one, foresee all things?'

'Yes. The Blessed One was not only omniscient. He foresaw all things.'

'Then why was it that he was in the habit only from time to time, and as occasion arose, of laying down rules for the members of the Order?'

'Is there any physician, O king, who knows all the medicinal drugs to be found on the earth?'

'Yes, there may be such a man.'

'Well, O king, does he give his decoctions to the patient to drink at a time when illness has already set in, or before that?'

'When the malady has arisen.'

'Just so, great king, the Blessed One, though he was omniscient and foresaw all things, laid down no rule at an unseasonable time, but only when need arose did he establish a regulation which his disciples were not to transgress as long as they lived.'

'Well answered, Nâgasena!'

3. [75] The king said: 'Is it true, Nâgasena, that the Buddha was endowed with the thirty-two bodily marks of a great man, and graced with the eighty subsidiary characteristics; that he was golden in colour with a skin like gold, and that there spread around him a glorious halo of a fathom's length?'

'Such, O king, was the Blessed One.'

'But were his parents like that?'

'No, they were not.'

'In that case you must say that he was born so. But surely a son is either like his mother, or those on

¹ This is how Hīnaī-kumburê understands the passage.

the mother's side, or he is like his father, or those on the father's side !'

The Elder replied : ' Is there such a thing, O king, as a lotus flower with a hundred petals ?'

' Yes, there is.'

' Where does it grow up ?'

' It is produced in mud, and in water it comes to perfection ¹.'

' But does the lotus resemble the mud of the lake, whence it springs up, either in colour, or in smell, or in taste ?'

' Certainly not.'

' Then does it resemble the water ?'

' Nor that either.'

' Just so, great king, is it that the Blessed One had the bodily signs and marks you have mentioned, though his parents had them not.'

' Well answered, Nâgasena !'

4. The king said : ' Was the Buddha, Nâgasena, pure in conduct (was he a Brahma-kârin) ?'

' Yes, the Blessed One was pure.'

' Then, Nâgasena, it follows that he was a follower of Brahmâ ².'

¹ Âsîyati. See Dr. Morris in the ' Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1884, p. 72.

² There is an untranslatable play here upon the name of the god, which is used in its sense of ' pure, best,' in the expression ' pure in conduct.' The first question really amounts to : Was the Buddha's conduct ' Brahma,' that is, ' best,' which has come to have the meaning ' pure' for the same reason that our expression ' a moral man' has often that particular connotation ? It is quite true that the etymological meaning of the word is neither ' best' nor ' pure' ; but when our author wrote the secondary sense had completely, in Pâli, driven out the etymological sense.

‘Have you a state elephant, O king?’

‘Certainly.’ [76]

‘Well now, does that elephant ever trumpet (literally “cry the heron’s cry”¹)?’

‘Oh, yes.’

‘But is he, then, on that account a follower of the herons?’

‘Of course not.’

‘Now tell me, great king, has Brahmâ wisdom (Buddhi), or has he not?’

‘He is a being with wisdom.’

‘Then (on your argument) he is surely a follower of Buddha².’

‘Well answered, Nâgasena!’

5. The king said: ‘Is ordination³ a good thing?’

‘Yes, a good thing and a beautiful.’

‘But did the Buddha obtain it, or not?’

‘Great king, when the Blessed One attained omniscience at the foot of the tree of Knowledge, that was to him an ordination. There was no conferring of ordination upon him at the hands of others—in the way that the Blessed One laid down regulations for his disciples, never to be transgressed by them their lives long⁴!’

‘Very true, Nâgasena!’

¹ This technical term for an elephant’s trumpeting is not infrequent. See, for instance, *Gâtaka* I, 50.

² As a matter of fact Brahmâ, the nearest approach in the Indian thought of that time to our idea of God, is always represented, in Buddhism, as a good Buddhist. See, for instance, ‘*Buddhist Suttas*,’ p. 116, and my note at p. 117.

³ Upasampadâ. Admission to the higher grade in the Order.

⁴ Mr. Trenckner again suspects something dropped out in this reply. But the connection of ideas seems to me quite sufficient.

6. The king said: 'To which of these two, Nâgasena,—the man who weeps at the death of his mother, and the man who weeps out of love for the Truth (Dhamma),—are his tears a cure?'

'The tears of the one, O king, are stained and hot with the three fires of passion. The tears of the other are stainless and cool. Now there is cure in coolness and calm, but in heat and passion there can be no cure¹.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

7. The king said: 'What is the distinction, Nâgasena, between him who is full of passion, and him who is void of passion?'

'The one is overpowered by craving, O king, and the other not.'

'But what does that mean?'

'The one is in want, O king, and the other not.'

'I look at it, Sir, in this way. He who has passion and he who has not—both of them alike—desire what is good to eat, either hard or soft. And neither of them desires what is wrong.'

'The lustful man, O king, in eating his food enjoys both the taste and the lust that arises from taste, [77] but the man free from lusts experiences the taste only, and not the lust arising therefrom.'

'Well answered, Nâgasena!'

The *Sinhalese* follows the Pâli, but that of course only shows that the text before the translator was here the same as in Mr. Trenckner's edition.

¹ The point of this lies in the allusion to the coolness and calm of Nirvâna, or Arahatsip, which is the dying out of the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion. The word used for coolness, Sitala, is one of the many epithets of Arahatsip.

8. The king said : ' Venerable Nâgasena, where does wisdom dwell ?'

' Nowhere, O king.'

' Then, Sir, there is no such thing as wisdom.'

' Where does the wind dwell, O king ?'

' Not anywhere, Sir.'

' So there is no such thing as wind.'

' Well answered, Nâgasena !'

9. The king said : ' When you speak of transmigration¹, Nâgasena, what does that mean ?'

' A being born here, O king, dies here. Having died here, it springs up elsewhere. Having been born there, there it dies. Having died there, it springs up elsewhere. That is what is meant by transmigration.'

' Give me an illustration.'

' It is like the case of a man who, after eating a mango, should set the seed in the ground. From that a great tree would be produced and give fruit. And there would be no end to the succession, in that way, of mango trees.'

' Very good, Nâgasena !'

10. The king said : ' By what, Nâgasena, does one recollect what is past and done long ago ?'

' By memory.'

' But is it not by the mind², not by the memory², that we recollect ?'

' Do you recollect any business, O king, that you have done and then forgotten ?'

' Yes.'

' What then ? Were you then without a mind ?'

¹ *Samsâra.*

² *Kittena, no satiyâ.*

‘No. But my memory failed me.’

‘Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

11. The king said: ‘Does memory, Nâgasena, always arise subjectively, [78] or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside¹?’

‘Both the one and the other.’

‘But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin, and never artificial?’

‘If, O king, there were no artificial (imparted) memory, then artisans would have no need of practice, or art, or schooling, and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

Here ends the Sixth Chapter.

¹ I follow Hîna/i-kumburê’s interpretation of the difficult words in the text, which Mr. Trenckner says is corrupt. Ka/umika is ‘artificial,’ like the Sanskrit *krîtrima*. It has only been found as yet in our author.

BOOK III. CHAPTER 7.

1. The king said : ' In how many ways, Nâgasena, does memory spring up ? '

' In sixteen ways, O king. That is to say : by personal experience ¹, as when the venerable Ananda, or the devoted woman Khugguttarâ, or any others who had that power, called to mind their previous births—[79] or by outward aid ², as when others continue to remind one who is by nature forgetful—or by the impression made by the greatness of some occasion ³, as kings remember their coronation day, or as we remember the day of our conversion—by the impression made by joy ⁴, as when one remembers that which gave him pleasure—or by the impression made by sorrow ⁵, as when one remembers that which pained him—or from similarity of appearance ⁶, as on seeing one like them we call to mind the mother or father or sister or brother, or on seeing a camel or an ox or an ass we call to mind others like them—or by difference of appearance ⁷, as when we remember that such and such a colour, sound, smell, taste, or touch belong to such and such a thing—or by the knowledge of speech ⁸, as when one who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others and then himself remembers—or by a sign ⁹, as when we recognise a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign—or from effort to recollect ¹⁰, as when one by

¹ Abhigânato. ² Ka/umikâya. ³ O/ârika-viññânato.

⁴ Hita-viññânato.

⁵ Ahita-viññânato.

⁶ Sabhâga-nimittato.

⁷ Visabhâga-nimittato.

⁸ Kathâbhiññânato.

⁹ Lakkhanato.

¹⁰ Saranato.

nature forgetful is made to recollect by being urged again and again : “try and think of it”—or by calculation¹¹, as when one knows by the training he has received in writing that such and such a letter ought to follow after such and such a one—or by arithmetic¹², as when accountants do big sums by their knowledge of figures—or by learning by heart¹³, as the repeaters of the scriptures by their skill in learning by heart recollect so much—[80] or by meditation¹⁴, as when a Bhikkhu calls to mind his temporary states in days gone by—by reference to a book¹⁵, as when kings calling to mind a previous regulation, say : “Bring the book here,” and remind themselves out of that—or by a pledge¹⁶, as when at the sight of goods deposited a man recollects (the circumstances under which they were pledged)—or by association¹⁷, as when one remembers a thing because one has seen it, or a sound because one has heard it, or an odour because one has smelt it, or a touch because one has felt it, or a concept because one has perceived it.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

2. The king said : ‘Your people say, Nâgasena, that though a man should have lived a hundred

¹¹ Muddâto (see above, p. 6).

¹² Gananâto.

¹³ Dharanato. The noun dhâranakâ is only found here (where I follow the Sinhalese interpretation) and at *Gâtaka* II, 203 (where it means ‘debtor,’ as in Sanskrit).

¹⁴ Bhâvanato. For a translation of the full text, here abridged in the text, see ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ pp. 215, 216 (§ 17).

¹⁵ Potthaka-nibandhanato.

¹⁶ Upanikkhepato.

¹⁷ Anubhûtato, perhaps ‘experience.’ There are really seventeen, not sixteen, so some two must have been regarded by the author as forming one between them. These may be Nos. 1 and 14, or more likely Nos. 4 and 5.

years an evil life, yet if, at the moment of death, thoughts of the Buddha should enter his mind, he will be reborn among the gods. This I don't believe. And thus do they also say: "By one case of destruction of life a man may be reborn in purgatory." That, too, I cannot believe.'

'But tell me, O king. Would even a tiny stone float on the water without a boat?'

'Certainly not.'

'Very well; but would not a hundred cart-loads of stones float on the water if they were loaded in a boat?'

'Yes, they would float right enough.'

'Well, good deeds are like the boat.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

3. The king said: 'Do you (recluses), Nâgasena, strive after the removal of past sorrow?'

'No.'

'What then? Is it future sorrow you strive to remove?'

'No.'

'Present sorrow, then?' [81]

'Not that either.'

'Then if it be neither past, nor future, nor present sorrow that you strive to remove, whereunto is it that you strive?'

'What are you asking, O king? That this sorrow should cease and no other sorrow should arise—that is what we strive after.'

'But, Nâgasena, is there (now) such a thing as future sorrow?'

'No. I grant that.'

'Then you are mighty clever people to strive after the removal of that which does not exist!'

‘Has it ever happened to you, O king, that rival kings rose up against you as enemies and opponents?’

‘Yes, certainly.’

‘Then you set to work, I suppose, to have moats dug, and ramparts thrown up, and watch towers erected, and strongholds built, and stores of food collected¹?’

‘Not at all. All that had been prepared beforehand.’

‘Or you had yourself trained in the management of war elephants, and in horsemanship, and in the use of the war chariot, and in archery and fencing?’

‘Not at all. I had learnt all that before.’

‘But why?’

‘With the object of warding off future danger.’

‘How so? Is there such a thing (now) as future danger?’

‘No. I must grant that.’

‘Then you kings are mighty clever people to trouble yourselves about the warding off of that which does not exist!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

‘Tell me, O king. Is it when you are athirst that you set to work to have wells dug, or ponds hollowed out, or reservoirs formed, with the object of getting something to drink?’

‘Certainly not. All that has been prepared beforehand.’

‘But to what end?’

‘With the object of preventing future thirst.’

‘How so? Is there such a thing as future thirst?’

¹ All that follows only differs by slight additions from III, 4, 3 above, pp. 100-102.

‘No, Sir.’

‘So you are mighty clever people, O king, [82] to take all that trouble to prevent the future thirst which all the time does not exist!’

‘Give me a further illustration.’

[Then the Elder referred, as before, to the means people always took of warding against future hunger, and the king expressed his pleasure at the way in which the puzzle had been solved.]

4. The king said: ‘How far is it, Nāgasena, from here to the Brahma world¹?’

‘Very far is it, O king. If a rock, the size of an upper chamber, were to fall from there, it would take four months to reach the earth, though it came down eight-and-forty thousand leagues² each day and night.’

‘Good, Nāgasena! Now do not your people say that a Bhikkhu, who has the power of Iddhi and the mastery over his mind³, can vanish from Gambu-dīpa, and appear in the Brahma world, as quickly as a strong man could stretch forth his bent up arm, or bend it in again if it were stretched out? That is a saying I cannot believe. How is it possible that he could traverse so quickly so many hundreds of leagues?’

The Elder replied: ‘In what district, O king, were you born?’

¹ One of the highest heavens.

² *Yogana*, a league of seven miles.

³ *Ketovasippatto*, which *Hīnaṣi-kumburē* renders *mano vasi prāpta wū*. I know of no passage in the *Piṭakas* where the phrase occurs in connection with Iddhi; but it is often used by our author. See, for instance, just below, III, 7, 9.

‘There is an island called Alasanda¹. It was there I was born.’

‘And how far is Alasanda from here?’

‘About two hundred leagues.’

‘Do you know for certain of any business you once did there and now recollect?’

‘Oh, yes.’

‘So quickly, great king, have you gone about two hundred leagues.’

‘Very good, Nāgasena!’

5. The king said : ‘If one man, Nāgasena, were to die here and be reborn in the Brahma world, and another were to die here and be reborn in Kashmīr, which of the two would arrive first?’

‘Both together, O king.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘In what town [83], O king, were you born?’

‘There is a village called Kalasi. It was there I was born.’

‘And how far is Kalasi from here?’

‘About two hundred leagues.’

‘How far is Kashmīr from here?’

‘Twelve leagues.’

‘Now, great king, think of Kalasi.’

‘I have done so.’

‘And now, think of Kashmīr.’

‘I have done so.’

‘Well, which did you think of quickest?’

‘Of each in the same time.’

‘Just so, great king, would it take no longer to be reborn in the Brahma world than to be reborn in Kashmīr. And tell me, O king. Suppose two

¹ Alexandria (in Baktria) built on an island in the Indus.

birds were flying, and one were to alight on a tall tree, and the other on a small shrub. If they settled both at the same moment, whose shadow would first fall to the ground ?'

'The two shadows would fall together.'

'Just so, great king, in the case you put.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

6. The king said : 'Venerable Nâgasena, how many kinds of wisdom are there ?'

'Seven, O king.'

'And by how many kinds of wisdom does one become wise ?'

'By one : that is to say by the kind of wisdom called "the investigation of the Truth¹."'

'Then why is it said there are seven ?'

'Tell me, O king. Suppose a sword were lying in its sheath and not taken in the hand, could it cut off anything you wanted to cut off with it ?'

'Certainly not.'

'Just so, great king, by the other kinds of wisdom can nothing be understood without investigation of the Truth.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

7. The king said : 'Which, Nâgasena, is there more of, merit or demerit ?'

'Merit.' [84]

'But why ?'

'He who does wrong, O king, comes to feel remorse, and acknowledges his evil-doing. So demerit does not increase. But he who does well feels no remorse, and feeling no remorse gladness will

¹ Dhamma-vikaya-samboggaṅgena.

spring up within him, and joy will arise to him thus gladdened, and so rejoicing all his frame will be at peace, and being thus at peace he will experience a blissful feeling of content, and in that bliss his heart will be at rest, and he whose heart is thus at rest knows things as they really are¹. For that reason merit increases. A man, for example, though his hands and feet are cut off, if he gave to the Blessed One merely a handful of lotuses, would not enter purgatory for ninety-one Kalpas. That is why I said, O king, that there is more merit than demerit.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

8. The king said : 'Whose, Nâgasena, is the greater demerit—his who sins consciously, or his who sins inadvertently ?'

'He who sins inadvertently, O king, has the greater demerit.'

'In that case, reverend Sir, we shall punish doubly any of our family or our court who do wrong unintentionally.'

'But what do you think, O king ? If one man were to seize hold intentionally of a fiery mass of metal glowing with heat, and another were to seize hold of it unintentionally, which would be more burnt ?'

'The one who did not know what he was doing.'

'Well, it is just the same with the man who does wrong.'

'Very good, Nâgasena !'

9. The king said : 'Is there any one, Nâgasena,

¹ The above is a paragraph constantly recurring in the Pâli Piṭakas. See, for instance, Dīgha II, 75 ; Aṅguttara III, 104 ; and Mahāvagga VIII, 15, 13 (where I have annotated the details).

who can go with this bodily frame to Uttara-kuru or to the Brahma world, or to any other of the four great continents (into which the world is divided)?'

'Yes, there are such people.'

'But how can they?' [85]

'Do you recollect, O king, having ever jumped a foot or two feet across the ground?'

'Yes, Nâgasena, I can jump twelve feet.'

'But how?'

'I fix my mind on the idea of alighting there, and at the moment of my determination my body comes to seem light to me.'

'Just so, O king, can the Bhikkhu, who has the power of Iddhi, and has the mastery over his mind, when he has made his mind rise up to the occasion, travel through the sky by means of his mind.'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

10. The king said: 'Your people say there are bones even a hundred leagues long. Now there is no tree even one hundred leagues in length, how then can there be bones so long?'

'But tell me, O king. Have you not heard of fishes in the sea five hundred leagues in length?'

'Yes. I have heard of such.'

'If so, could they not have bones a hundred leagues long?'

'Very good, Nâgasena!'

11. The king said: 'Your people, Nâgasena, say that it is possible to suppress the inhaling and exhaling (of one's breath).'

'Yes, that can be done.'

'But how?'

‘Tell me, O king. Have you ever heard of a man snoring¹?’

‘Yes.’

‘Well, would not that sound stop if he bent his body?’

‘Yes.’

‘Then surely if that sound would stop at the mere bending of the body of one who is untrained alike in body, in conduct, in mind, and in wisdom—why should it not be possible for the breathing of one trained in all these respects, and who has besides reached up to the fourth stage of the ecstatic contemplation², to be suppressed?’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

12. The king said: ‘There is the expression ocean, Nâgasena. Why is the water called ocean?’

The Elder replied [86]: ‘Because there is just as much salt as water, O king, and just as much water as salt, therefore is it called ocean³.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

13. The king said: ‘Why, Nâgasena, is the ocean all of one taste, the taste of salt?’

¹ Kâka~~kk~~hamâno. See Gâtaka I, 60, 24; 160, 18. Hîna/i-kumburê renders it ‘sleeping with a snore (gorawamin) like the sound of crows (kâka).’

² Ghâna.

³ Samudda. The answer (to give opportunity for which the question is invented) is a kind of punning etymology of this Pâli word for ocean. Our author seems to take it as meaning ‘equal water-ness,’ from sama and ud(aka). The real derivation is very different. It is from the root ud, which is allied to our ‘wet’ and the Greek *ύδρς*, and the prefix sam in the sense of completeness. It is difficult to reconcile the reply to this. There is a kind of conversation condemned in the Digha I, 1, 17, and elsewhere as samuddakkhâyika, which is explained in the Sumaṅgala, p. 91, as deriving samudda from sa, ‘with,’ and muddâ, ‘a seal ring.’

‘Because the water in it has stood so long, therefore it is all of one taste, the taste of salt¹.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

14. The king said: ‘Can even the most minute thing, Nâgasena, be divided?’

‘Yes, it can.’

‘And what, Sir, is the most minute of all things.’

‘Truth (Dhamma), O king, is the most minute and subtle. But this is not true of all qualities (Dhammâ). Subtleness or the reverse are epithets of qualities. But whatever can be divided that can wisdom (Paññâ) divide, and there is no other quality which can divide wisdom.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena!’

15. The king said: ‘These three, Nâgasena,—perception, and reason, and the soul in a being,—are they all different both in letter and in essence, or the same in essence differing only in the letter?’

‘Recognition, O king, is the mark of perception, and discrimination of reason², and there is no such thing as a soul in beings³.’

¹ In the same way the Buddhist religion (the Dhamma-Vinaya) is said in the *Kullavagga* IX, 1, 4, to be ‘all of one taste, the taste of salvation, emancipation’ (Vimutti).

² So also above, II, 3, 12. Here the words are *Vigânanalakkhanam viññânam*, *pagânanâ-lakkhana paññâ*, which the Ceylon translator amplifies into ‘As a peasant, on seeing grains of gold, would recognise them as valuable, so is it the characteristic of *viññâna* to recognise *aramunu* (objects of sense) when it sees them. As a goldsmith, on seeing grains of gold, would not only know they were valuable, but also discriminate their value (as large or small), so is it the characteristic of *paññâ*, not only to recognise, but also to discriminate between the objects of sense.’

³ See above, II, 3, 6, and II, 3, 16. *Hînaî-kumburê* here renders

‘But if there be no such thing as a soul, what is it then which sees forms with the eye, and hears sounds with the ear, and smells odours with the nose, and tastes tastes with the tongue, and feels touch with the body, or perceives qualities with the mind?’

The Elder replied: ‘If there be a soul (distinct from the body) which does all this, then if the door of the eye were thrown down (if the eye were plucked out) could it stretch out its head, as it were, through the larger aperture and (with greater range) see forms much more clearly than before? Could one hear sounds better if the ears were torn away, or smell better if the nose were cut off, or taste better if the tongue were pulled out, or feel touch better if the body were destroyed?’

[87] ‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Then there can be no soul inside the body.’

‘Very good, Nāgasena!’

16. The Elder said: ‘A hard thing there is, O king, which the Blessed One has done.’

‘And what is that?’

‘The fixing of all those mental conditions which depend on one organ of sense, telling us that such is contact, and such sensation, and such idea, and such intention, and such thought¹.’

‘Give me an illustration.’

‘Suppose, O king, a man were to wade down into the sea, and taking some water in the palm of his hand, were to taste it with his tongue. Would he

gīvo by the ‘life (or perhaps living principle, *gīvitā*) inside the forms produced out of the four elements.’

¹ *Phasso, vedanā, saññā, ketaṇā, kittaṃ.*

distinguish whether it were water from the Ganges, or from the Jumna, or from the Aśiravatī, or from the Sarabhū, or from the Mahtī?

‘Impossible, Sir.’

‘More difficult than that, great king, is it to have distinguished between the mental conditions which follow on the exercise of any one of the organs of sense!’

‘Very good, Nāgasena!’

Here ends the Seventh Chapter¹.

17. The Elder said: ‘Do you know, O king, what time it is now?’

‘Yes, Sir, I know. The first watch of the night is now passed. The middle watch is now going on. The torches are lit. The four banners are ordered to be raised, and appropriate gifts to be issued to you from the treasury.’

The Yonakas said: ‘Very good, great king. Most able is the Bhikkhu.’

‘Yes, my men. Most able is the Bhikkhu. Were the master like him and the pupil like me, [88] a clever scholar would not take long in getting at the truth.’

Then the king, pleased with the explanations given of the questions he had put, had Nāgasena robed in an embroidered cloak worth a hundred thousand², and said to him: ‘Venerable Nāgasena, I hereby order that you shall be provided with your daily meal for eight hundred days, and give you the

¹ See the note at the end of Book II, Chapter 3, § 14.

² That is kaḥāpaṇas, ‘half-pennies.’

choice of anything in the palace that it is lawful for you to take.' And when the Elder refused, saying he had enough to live on, the king rejoined : ' I know, Sir, you have enough to live on. But you should both protect me and protect yourself—yourself from the possibility of a public rumour to the effect that you convinced me but received nothing from me, and me from the possibility of a public rumour that though I was convinced I would give nothing in acknowledgement.'

' Let it be as you wish, great king,' was the reply.

Then the king said : ' As the lion, the king of beasts, when put into a cage, though it were of gold, would turn his face longingly to the outside ; even so do I, though I dwell in the world, turn my thoughts longingly to the higher life of you recluses. But, Sir, if I were to give up the household life and renounce the world it would not be long I should have to live, so many are my foes.'

Then the venerable Nāgasena, having thus solved the questions put by Milinda the king, arose from his seat and departed to the hermitage.

18. Not long after Nāgasena had gone, Milinda the king thought over to himself whether he had propounded his questions rightly, and whether the replies had been properly made. And he came to the conclusion that to questions well put replies had been well given. And Nāgasena likewise, when he reached the hermitage, thought the matter over to himself, and concluded that to questions well put right replies had been given.

Now Nāgasena robed himself early in the morning, and went with his bowl in his hand to the palace,

and sat down on the seat prepared for him. And Milinda saluted the venerable Nâgasena, [89] and sat down respectfully at his side, and said to him : ' Pray do not think, Sir, that I was kept awake all the rest of the night exulting in the thought of having questioned you. I was debating with myself as to whether I had asked aright, and had been rightly answered. And I concluded that I had.'

And the Elder on his part said : ' Pray do not suppose, great king, that I passed the rest of the night rejoicing at having answered all you asked. I too was thinking over what had been said by us both. And I came to the result that you had questioned well, and that I had rightly answered.'

Thus did these two great men congratulate each the other on what he had spoken well.

Here ends the answering of the problems of
the questions of Milinda.

BOOK IV.

MENDAKA-PAÑHO.

THE SOLVING OF DILEMMAS.

CHAPTER 1. [90]

1. Master of words and sophistry, clever and wise
 Milinda tried to test great Nāgasena's skill.
 Leaving him not ¹, again and yet again,
 He questioned and cross-questioned him, until
 His own skill was proved foolishness.
 Then he became a student of the Holy Writ.
 All night, in secrecy, he pondered o'er
 The ninefold Scriptures, and therein he found
 Dilemmas hard to solve, and full of snares.
 And thus he thought: 'The conquering Buddha's
 words
 Are many-sided, some explanatory,
 Some spoken as occasion rose to speak,
 Some dealing fully with essential points.
 Through ignorance of what, each time, was meant
 There will be strife hereafter as to what
 The King of Righteousness has thus laid down
 In these diverse and subtle utterances.
 Let me now gain great Nāgasena's ear,
 And putting to him that which seems so strange
 And hard—yea contradictory—get him
 To solve it. So in future times, when men
 Begin to doubt, the light of his solutions
 Shall guide them, too, along the path of Truth.'

¹ Vasanto tassa kkhâyâya, literally 'abiding under his shadow.'
 Compare Gâtaka I, 91.

2. Now Milinda the king, when the night was turning into day, and the sun had risen, bathed, and with hands clasped and raised to his forehead, called to mind the Buddhas of the past, the present, and the future, and solemnly undertook the observance of the eightfold vow, saying to himself : ' For seven days from now will I do penance by taking upon myself the observance of the eight rules, and when my vow is accomplished will I go to the teacher and put to him, as questions, these dilemmas.' So Milinda the king laid aside his usual dress, and put off his ornaments ; and clad in yellow robes, with only a recluse's turban¹ on his head, in appearance like a hermit, did he carry out the eightfold abstinence, keeping in mind the vow—' For this seven days I am to decide no case at law. I am to harbour no lustful thought, no thought of ill-will, no thought tending to delusion. Towards all slaves, servants, and dependents I am to show a meek and lowly disposition. [91] I am to watch carefully over every bodily act, and over my six organs of sense. And I am to fill my heart with thoughts of love towards all beings.' Keeping this eightfold vow, establishing his heart in this eightfold moral law, for seven days he went not forth. But as the night was passing into day, at sunrise of the eighth day, he took his breakfast early, and then with downcast eyes and measured words, gentle in manner, collected in thought, glad and pleased and rejoicing in heart, did he go to Nâgasena. And bowing down at his feet, he stood respectfully on one side, and said :

3. ' There is a certain matter, venerable Nâgasena,

¹ *Pa/isîsakam*. See *Gâtaka* II, 197.

that I desire to talk over with you alone. I wish no third person to be present. In some deserted spot, some secluded place in the forest, fit in all the eight respects for a recluse, there should this point of mine be put. And therein let there be nothing hid from me, nothing kept secret. I am now in a fit state to hear secret things when we are deep in consultation. And the meaning of what I say can be made clear by illustration. As it is to the broad earth, O Nāgasena, that it is right to entrust treasure when occasion arises for laying treasure by, so is it to me that it is right to entrust secret things when we are deep in consultation.'

4. Then having gone with the master to a secluded spot he further said: 'There are eight kinds of places, Nāgasena, which ought to be altogether avoided by a man who wants to consult. No wise man will talk a matter over in such places, or the matter falls to the ground and is brought to no conclusion. And what are the eight? Uneven ground, spots unsafe by fear of men, windy places, hiding spots, sacred places, high roads, light bambû bridges, and public bathing places.'

The Elder asked: 'What is the objection to each of these?'

The king replied: 'On uneven ground, Nāgasena, [92] the matter discussed becomes jerky, verbose, and diffuse, and comes to nothing. In unsafe places the mind is disturbed, and being disturbed does not follow the point clearly. In windy spots the voice is indistinct. In hiding places there are eavesdroppers. In sacred places the question discussed is apt to be diverted to the serious surroundings. On a high road it is apt to become frivolous, on a

bridge unsteady and wavering, at a public bathing place the discussion would be matter of common talk. Therefore is it said¹:

“ Uneven ground, unsafe and windy spots,
And hiding places, and god-haunted shrines,
High roads, and bridges, and all bathing ghâts—
These eight avoid when talking of high things.”

5. ‘ There are eight kinds of people, Nâgasena, who when talking a matter over, spoil the discussion. And who are the eight ? He who walks in lust, he who walks in ill-will, he who walks in delusion, he who walks in pride, the greedy man, the sluggard, the man of one idea, and the fool.’

‘ What is the objection to each of these ? ’ asked the Elder.

‘ The first spoils the discussion by his lust, the next by his ill-will, the third by his delusions, the fourth by his pride, the fifth by his greed, the sixth by his sloth, the seventh by his narrowness, and the last by his folly. Therefore is it said :

“ The lustful, angry, or bewildered man,
The proud, the greedy, or the slothful man,
The man of one idea, and the poor fool—
These eight are spoilers of high argument.”

6. ‘ There are nine kinds of people, Nâgasena, who let out a secret that has been talked over with them, and treasure it not up in their hearts. And who are the nine ? The lustful man reveals it in obedience to some lust, the ill-tempered man in con-

¹ It is not known where the verses here (or the others quoted in these two pages) are taken from.

sequence of some ill-will, the deluded man under some mistake. [93] The timid man reveals it through fear, and the man greedy for gain to get something out of it. A woman reveals it through infirmity, a drunkard in his eagerness for drink, a eunuch because of his imperfection, and a child through fickleness. Therefore is it said :

“The lustful, angry, or bewildered man,
The timid man, and he who seeks for gain,
A woman, drunkard, eunuch, or a child—
These nine are fickle, wavering, and mean.
When secret things are talked over to them
They straightway become public property.”

7. ‘There are eight causes, Nāgasena, of the advance, the ripening of insight. And what are the eight? The advance of years, the growth of reputation, frequent questioning, association with teachers, one’s own reflection, converse with the wise, cultivation of the loveable, and dwelling in a pleasant land. Therefore is it said :

“By growth in reputation, and in years,
By questioning, and by the master’s aid,
By thoughtfulness, and converse with the wise,
By intercourse with men worthy of love,
By residence within a pleasant spot—
By these nine is one’s insight purified.
They who have these, their wisdom grows¹.”

8. ‘This spot, Nāgasena, is free from the objections to talking matters over. And I am a model companion for any one desiring to do so. I can keep a

¹ Pabhiggati in the text appears not to be an old error. The Sinhalese repeats it, but leaves it untranslated.

secret, and will keep yours as long as I live. In all the eight ways just described my insight has grown ripe. It would be hard to find such a pupil as you may have in me.

[94] 'Now towards a pupil who conducts himself thus aright the teacher ought to conduct himself in accordance with the twenty-five virtues of a teacher. And what are the twenty-five? He must always and without fail keep guard over his pupil. He must let him know what to cultivate, and what to avoid; about what he should be earnest, and what he may neglect. He must instruct him as to sleep, and as to keeping himself in health, and as to what food he may take, and what reject. He should teach him discrimination¹ (in food), and share with him all that is put, as alms, into his own bowl. He should encourage him, saying: "Be not afraid. You will gain advantage (from what is here taught you)." He should advise him as to the people whose company he should keep, and as to the villages and Vihâras he should frequent. He should never indulge in (foolish) talk² with him. When he sees any defect in him he should easily pardon it. He should be zealous, he should teach nothing partially, keep nothing secret, and hold nothing back³. He should look upon him in his heart as a son, saying to himself: "I have begotten him in

¹ Viseso. It does not say in what, and the *Simhalese* simply repeats the word.

² Sallâpo na kâtabbo. The *Simhalese* merely repeats the word, which is often used without any bad connotation. See, for instance, *Gâtaka* I, 112.

³ So that, in the author's opinion, there is no 'Esoteric Doctrine' in true Buddhism. See the note, below, on IV, 4, 8.

learning¹." He should strive to bring him forward, saying to himself: "How can I keep him from going back?" He should determine in himself to make him strong in knowledge, saying to himself: "I will make him mighty." He should love him, never desert him in necessity, never neglect him in anything he ought to do for him, always befriend him—so far as he can rightly do so²—when he does wrong. These, Sir, are the twenty-five good qualities in a teacher. 'Treat me altogether in accordance therewith. Doubt, Lord, has overcome me. There are apparent contradictions in the word of the Conqueror. About them strife will hereafter arise; and in future times it will be hard to find a teacher with insight such as yours. Throw light for me on these dilemmas, to the downfall of the adversaries.'

9. Then the Elder agreed to what he had said, and in his turn set out the ten good qualities which ought to be found in a lay disciple: 'These ten, O king, are the virtues of a lay disciple. He suffers like pain and feels like joy as the Order does. He takes the Doctrine (Dhamma) as his master. He delights in giving so far as he is able to give. On seeing the religion (Dhamma) of the Conqueror decay, he does his best to revive it. He holds right views. Having no passion for excitement³, he runs

¹ So also in the Vinaya (Mahāvagga I, 25, 6).

² In the well-known passage in the Vinaya in which the mutual duties of pupils and teachers are set out in full (Mahāvagga I, 25, 26, translated in the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, pp. 154 and foll.) there is a similar injunction (25, 22 = 26, 10) which throws light on the meaning of dhammena here.

³ Apagata-ko/ūhala-maṅgaliko. 'Laying aside the erroneous views and discipline called ko/ūhala and maṅgalika,' says the Sinhalese.

not after any other teacher his life long. He keeps guard over himself in thought and deed. He delights in peace, is a lover of peace. He feels no jealousy, [95] and walks not in religion in a quarrelsome spirit. He takes his refuge in the Buddha, he takes his refuge in the Doctrine, he takes his refuge in the Order. These, great king, are the ten good qualities of a lay disciple. They exist all of them in you. Hence is it fit, and right, and becoming in you that, seeing the decay of the religion of the Conqueror, you desire its prosperity. I give you leave. Ask of me whatever you will.'

[Here ends the introduction to the solving of dilemmas.]

THE DILEMMAS.

[ON HONOURS PAID TO THE BUDDHA.]

10. Then Milinda the king, having thus been granted leave, fell at the feet of the teacher, and raising his clasped hands to his forehead, said: 'Venerable Nāgasena, these leaders of other sects say thus: "If the Buddha accepts gifts he cannot have passed entirely away. He must be still in union with the world, having his being somewhere in it, in the world, a shareholder in the things of the world; and therefore any honour paid to him becomes empty and vain¹. On the other hand if he

¹ 'Because honours should be paid, in the way of worship, to those who have so passed away, and to them only,' is the implied suggestion, as if it were common ground to the Buddhists and their opponents. But there is no such doctrine in the Pāli Piṭakas, and could not be. The whole discussion breathes the spirit of a later time.

be entirely passed away (from life), unattached to the world, escaped from all existence, then honours would not be offered to him. For he who is entirely set free accepts no honour, and any act done to him who accepts it not becomes empty and vain." This is a dilemma which has two horns. It is not a matter within the scope of those who have no mind ¹, it is a question fit for the great. Tear asunder this net of heresy, put it on one side. To you has this puzzle been put. Give to the future sons of the Conqueror eyes wherewith to see the riddle to the confusion of their adversaries.'

'The Blessed One, O king,' replied the Elder, 'is entirely set free. And the Blessed One accepts no gift. Even at the foot of the Tree of Wisdom he abandoned all accepting of gifts, how much more then now when he has passed entirely away by that kind of passing away which leaves no root over (for the formation of a new existence). For this, O king, has been said by Sâriputta, the commander of the faith ² :

"Though worshipped, these Unequalled Ones, alike
By gods and men, unlike them all they heed
Neither a gift nor worship. They accept
It not, neither refuse it. Through the ages
All Buddhas were so, so wil. ever be ³!"'

¹ *Apatta-mânâsanam*. 'Of those who have not attained to the insight of the Arahats,' says the Si halese by way of gloss.

² This verse is not found in our printed texts. The Thera Gâthâ (981-1017) has preserved thirty-seven of the verses attributed to Sâriputta, but this is not one of them.

³ Hīnaśī-kumbhūrē, who quotes the Pāli verses, reads *pūga-yantā*, and *sādiyanti*.

11. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, a father may speak in praise of his son, or a son of his father. But that is no ground for putting the adversaries to shame. It is only an expression of their own belief. Come now! Explain this matter to me fully to the establishing of your own doctrine, [96] and to the unravelling of the net of the heretics.'

The Elder replied: 'The Blessed One, O king, is entirely set free (from life). And the Blessed One accepts no gift. If gods or men put up a building to contain the jewel treasure of the relics of a Tathâgata who does not accept their gift, still by that homage paid to the attainment of the supreme good under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom do they themselves attain to one or other of the three glorious states¹. Suppose, O king, that though a great and glorious fire had been kindled, it should die out, would it then again accept any supply of dried grass or sticks?'

'Even as it burned, Sir, it could not be said to accept fuel, how much less when it had died away, and ceased to burn, could it, an unconscious thing, accept it?'

'And when that one mighty fire had ceased, and gone out, would the world be bereft of fire?'

'Certainly not. Dry wood is the seat, the basis of fire, and any men who want fire can, by the exertion of their own strength and power, such as resides in individual men, once more, by twirling the fire-stick, produce fire, and with that fire do any work for which fire is required.'

¹ Tisso sampattiyo. That is, to another life as a man, or as a god, or to Arahatsip here, on earth, in this birth.

'Then that saying of the sectarians that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain" turns out to be false. As that great and glorious fire was set alight, even so, great king, was the Blessed One set alight in the glory of his Buddhahood over the ten thousand world systems. As it went out, so has he passed away into that kind of passing away in which no root remains. As the fire, when gone out, accepted no supply of fuel, just so, and for the good of the world, has his accepting of gifts ceased and determined. As men, when the fire is out, and has no further means of burning, then by their own strength and effort, such as resides in individual men, twirl the fire-stick and produce fire, and do any work for which fire is required—so do gods and men, though a Tathâgata has passed away and no longer accepts their gifts, yet put up a house for the jewel treasure of his relics, and doing homage to the attainment of supreme good under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom, they attain to one or other of the three glorious states. [97] Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.'

12. 'Now hear, too, another reason for the same thing. Suppose, O king, there were to arise a great and mighty wind, and that then it were to die away. Would that wind acquiesce in being produced again?'

'A wind that has died away can have no thought or idea of being reproduced. And why? Because the element wind is an unconscious thing.'

'Or even, O king, would the word "wind" be

still applicable to that wind, when it had so died away ?'

'Certainly not, Sir. But fans and punkahs are means for the production of wind. Any men who are oppressed by heat, or tormented by fever, can by means of fans and punkahs, and by the exertion of their own strength and power, such as resides in individual men, produce a breeze, and by that wind allay their heat, or assuage their fever.'

'Then that saying of the sectarians that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain" turns out to be false. As the great and mighty wind which blew, even so, great king, has the Blessed One blown over the ten thousand world systems with the wind of his love, so cool, so sweet, so calm, so delicate. As it first blew, and then died away, so has the Blessed One, who once blew with the wind so cool, so sweet, so calm, so delicate, of his love, now passed away with that kind of passing away in which no root remains. As those men were oppressed by heat and tormented with fever, even so are gods and men tormented and oppressed with threefold fire and heat¹. As fans and punkahs are means of producing wind, so the relics and the jewel treasure of the wisdom of a Tathâgata are means of producing the threefold attainment. [98] And as men oppressed by heat and tormented by fever can by fans and punkahs produce a breeze, and thus allay the heat and assuage the fever, so can gods and men by offering reverence to the relics, and the

¹ That is, the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion, the going out of which is the state called, par excellence, 'the going out' (Nirvâṇa).

jewel treasure of the wisdom of a Tathâgata, though he has died away and accepts it not, cause goodness to arise within them, and by that goodness can assuage and can allay the fever and the torment of the threefold fire. Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.'

13. 'Now hear another reason for the same thing. Suppose, O king, a man were to make a drum sound, and then that sound were to die away. Would that sound acquiesce in being produced again?'

'Certainly not, Sir. The sound has vanished. It can have no thought or idea of being reproduced. The sound of a drum when it has once been produced and died away, is altogether cut off. But, Sir, a drum is a means of producing sound. And any man, as need arises, can by the effort of power residing in himself, beat on that drum, and so produce a sound.'

'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One—except the teacher and the instruction he has left in his doctrine and discipline, and the jewel treasure of his relics whose value is derived from his righteousness, and contemplation, and wisdom, and emancipation, and insight given by the knowledge of emancipation—just so has he passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains. But the possibility of receiving the three attainments is not cut off because the Blessed One has passed away. Beings oppressed by the sorrow of becoming can, when they desire the attainments, still receive them by means of the jewel treasure of his relics and of his doctrine and discipline and teaching. Therefore is it, great king, that

all acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit. And this future possibility, great king, has been foreseen by the Blessed One, and spoken of, and declared, and made known, when he said: "It may be, Ânanda, that in some of you the thought may arise: [99] 'The word of the Master is ended. We have no Teacher more!' But it is not thus, Ânanda, that you should regard it. The Truth which I have preached to you, the Rules which I have laid down for the Order, let them, when I am gone, be the Teacher to you ¹." So that because the Tathâgata has passed away and consents not thereto, that therefore any act done to him is empty and vain—this saying of the enemy is proved false. It is untrue, unjust, not according to fact, wrong, and perverse. It is the cause of sorrow, has sorrow as its fruit, and leads down the road to perdition!

14. 'Now hear another reason for the same thing. Does the broad earth acquiesce, O king, in all kinds of seeds being planted all over it?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Then how is it those seeds, planted without the earth's consent, do yet stand fast and firmly rooted, and expand into trees with great trunks and sap and branches, and bearing fruits and flowers?'

'Though the earth, Sir, gives no consent, yet it acts as a site for those seeds, as a means of their development. Planted on that site they grow, by

¹ Book of the Great Decease, VI, 1, translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 112.

its means, into such great trees with branches, flowers, and fruit.'

'Then, great king, the sectaries are destroyed, defeated, proved wrong by their own words when they say that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain." As the broad earth, O king, is the Tathâgata, the Arahata, the Buddha supreme. Like it he accepts nothing. Like the seeds which through it attain to such developments are the gods and men who, through the jewel treasures of the relics and the wisdom of the Tathâgata—though he have passed away and consent not to it—being firmly rooted by the roots of merit, become like unto trees casting a goodly shade by means of the trunk of contemplation, the sap of true doctrine, and the branches of righteousness, and bearing the flowers of emancipation, and the fruits of Samanaship. [100] Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are still of value and bear fruit.'

15. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Do camels, buffaloes, asses, goats, oxen, or men acquiesce in the birth of worms inside them?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Then how is it then, that without their consent worms are so born, and spread by rapid reproduction of sons and grandsons?'

'By the power of evil Karma, Sir.'

'Just so, great king, is it by the power of the relics and the wisdom of the Tathâgata, who has passed away and acquiesces in nothing, that an act done to him is of value and bears fruit.'

16. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Do men consent, O king, that the ninety-eight diseases should be produced in their bodies?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Then how is it the diseases come?'

'By evil deeds done in former births.'

'But, great king, if evil deeds done in a former birth have to be suffered here and now, then both good and evil done here or done before has weight and bears fruit. Therefore is it that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not consenting, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.'

17. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Did you ever hear, O king, of the ogre named Nandaka, who, having laid hands upon the Elder Sâriputta, was swallowed up by the earth?'

'Yes, Sir, that is matter of common talk among men.'

'Well, did Sâriputta acquiesce in that?'

[101] 'Though the world of gods and men, Sir, were to be destroyed, though the sun and moon were to fall upon the earth, though Sineru the king of mountains were to be dissolved, yet would not Sâriputta the Elder have consented to any pain being inflicted on a fellow creature. And why not? Because every condition of heart which could cause him to be angry or offended has been in him destroyed and rooted out. And as all cause thereof had thus been removed, Sir, therefore could not Sâriputta be angered even with those who sought to deprive him of his life.'

‘But if Sâriputta, O king, did not consent to it, how was it that Nandaka was so swallowed up?’

‘By the power of his evil deeds.’

‘Then if so, great king, an act done to him who consents not is still of power and bears fruit. And if this is so of an evil deed, how much more of a good one? Therefore is it, O king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.’

18. ‘Now how many, O king, are those men who, in this life, have been swallowed up by the earth? Have you heard anything on that point?’

‘Yes, Sir, I have heard how many there are.’

‘Then tell me.’

‘*Kiñka* the Brahmin woman, and Suppabuddha the Sâkyan, and Devadatta the Elder, and Nandaka the ogre, and Nanda the Brahman—these are the five people who were swallowed up by the earth.’

‘And whom, O king, had they wronged?’

‘The Blessed One and his disciples.’

‘Then did the Blessed One or his disciples consent to their being so swallowed up?’

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘Therefore is it, O king, that an act done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not consenting thereto, is nevertheless of value and bears fruit.’

‘Well has this deep question been explained by you, venerable Nâgasena, and made clear. You have made the secret thing [102] plain, you have loosed the knot, you have made in the jungle an open space, the adversaries are overthrown, the wrong opinion has been proved false, the sectaries have been covered

with darkness when they met you, O best of all the leaders of schools !'

[Here ends the question as to not consenting to honours paid ¹.]

[THE OMNISCIENCE OF THE BUDDHA.]

19. 'Venerable Nāgasena, was the Buddha omniscient ?'

'Yes, O king, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually (consciously) present with him. The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection.' But if he did reflect he knew whatever he wanted to know ².

'Then, Sir, the Buddha cannot have been omniscient, if his all-embracing knowledge was reached through investigation.'

'[If so, great king, our Buddha's knowledge must have been less in degree of fineness than that of the other Buddhas. And that is a conclusion hard to draw. But let me explain a little further.] Suppose, O king, you had a hundred cart-loads of rice in the husk, and each cart-load was of seven ammanas ³ and a half. Would a man without consideration be able to tell you in a moment how many laks of grains there were in the whole ⁴ ?'

¹ This title and the subsequent ones to the various questions are added from the *Sinhalese*. They are probably the same titles as those referred to by Mr. Trenckner in his preface as being in his Burmese MS.

² So again below, § 27.

³ An ammanas is about four bushels.

⁴ Mr. Trenckner has marked this passage as corrupt, and I do not pretend to understand it either. The *Sinhalese* is also very

20. 'Now there are these seven classes of minds. Those, great king, who are full of lust, ill-will, delusion, or wrong doing, who are untrained in the management of their body, or in conduct, or in thought, or in wisdom,—their thinking powers are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is it so? Because of the untrained condition of their minds. It is like the slow and heavy movements of a giant bambū—when it is being dragged along with its wide-spreading, extensive, overgrown, and interlaced vegetation, and with its branches intricately entangled one with the other. So slow and heavy are the movements of the minds of those men, O king. And why? Because of the intricate entanglements of wrong dispositions. This is the first class of minds.'

21. 'From it the second class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who have been converted, for whom the gates of purgatory are closed, who have attained to right views, who have grasped the doctrine of the Master—their thinking powers, so far as the three lower stages¹ are concerned, are brought quickly

involved and confused. I have added the words in brackets from the *Siṃhalese*, and translated the rest according to the general sense of the *Siṃhalese* and the figures of the Pāli. Hardy gives his 'version' at p. 386 of the 'Manual of Buddhism.' It says, 'In one load of rice there are 63,660,000 grains. Each of these grains can be separately considered by Buddha in a moment of time. In that moment the seven-times gifted mind exercises this power.' The last sentence is a misunderstanding of the opening words of our next section (IV, 1, 20).

¹ That is, of the Excellent Way. They are the three Fetters—Delusion of self, Doubt, and Dependence on rites and ceremonies and outward morality—which the *Sotâpanno* has conquered, broken.

into play, [103] and act with ease. But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those three stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a clean trunk as far as the third knot, but above that has its branches intricately entangled. So far as regards the smooth trunk it would travel easily when dragged along, but it would stick obstinately as regards its upper branches. This is the second class of minds.'

22. 'From these the third class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Sakad Âgâmins¹, in whom lust, ill-will, and delusion are reduced to a minimum,—their thinking powers, so far as the five lower stages are concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those five stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a clean trunk as far as the fifth knot, but above that has its branches intricately entangled. So far as regards the smooth trunk it would travel easily when dragged along, but it would be moved with difficulty as far as its upper branches are concerned. This is the third class of minds.'

¹ Disciples who will return only once to this world, there attain Arahatsip, and therefore pass away.

23. 'From these the fourth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Anâgâmins¹, who have completely got rid of the five lower fetters, —their thinking powers, so far as the ten stages² are concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. [104] But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those ten stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a smooth trunk as far as the tenth knot, but above that has its branches intricately entangled. This is the fourth class of minds.'

24. 'From these the fifth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Arahats, in whom the four Great Evils³ have ceased, whose stains have been washed away, whose predispositions to evil⁴ have been put aside, who have lived the life, and accomplished the task, and laid aside every burden, and reached up to that which is good, for whom the Fetter of the craving after any kind of future life has been broken to pieces⁵, who have reached the higher insight⁶, who are purified as regards all those conditions of heart in which a

¹ Who will not return even once to this world, but attain Arahatship in heaven.

² This is noteworthy, for their mind is not yet quite clear as regards the higher five stages. But it is on all fours with the last section.

³ Lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance.

⁴ Kilesâ.

⁵ Parikkîna-bhava-samyoganâ.

⁶ Patta-paśisambhidâ.

hearer can be pure,—their thinking powers, as regards all that a disciple can be or do, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as to those things which are within the reach of the Paṭṭeka-Buddhas (of those who are Buddhas, but for themselves alone) they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their having been made pure as regards all within the province of a hearer, but not as regards that within the reach of those who are Buddhas (though for themselves alone). It is like the movement of a giant bambū which has been pruned of the branches arising out of all its knots—and which, therefore, when dragged along moves quickly and with ease, because of its smoothness all along, and because of its being unencumbered with the jungly growth of vegetation. This is the fifth class of minds.'

25. [105] 'From these the sixth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Paṭṭeka-Buddhas, dependent on themselves alone, wanting no teacher, dwellers alone like the solitary horn of the rhinoceros, who so far as their own higher life is concerned, have pure hearts free from stain,—their thinking powers, so far as their own province is concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as regards all that is specially within the province of a perfect Buddha (one who is not only Buddha, that is enlightened, himself, but can lead others to the light) they are brought with difficulty into play, and move slowly. And why is this so? Because of their purity as regards all within their own province, and because of the immensity of the province of the omniscient Buddhas. It is like a man, O king, who would fearlessly cross, and at will,

by day or night, a shallow brook on his own property. But when he comes in sight of the mighty ocean, deep and wide and ever-moving, and sees no further shore to it, then would he stand hesitating and afraid, and make no effort even to get over it. And why? Because of his familiarity with his own, and because of the immensity of the sea. This is the sixth class of minds.'

26. 'From these the seventh class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are complete Buddhas¹, having all knowledge, bearing about in themselves the tenfold power (of the ten kinds of insight), confident in the four modes of just self-confidence, endowed with the eighteen characteristics of a Buddha, whose mastery knows no limit, from whose grasp nothing is hid,—their thinking powers are on every point brought quickly into play, and act with ease. Suppose, O king, a dart well burnished, free from rust, perfectly smooth, with a fine edge, straight, without a crook or a flaw in it, were to be set on a powerful crossbow. Would there be any clumsiness in its action, any retarding in its movement, if it were discharged by a powerful man against a piece of fine linen, or cotton stuff, or delicate woolwork?'

'Certainly not, Sir. And why? Because the stuff is so fine, and the dart so highly tempered, and the discharge so powerful.'

[106] 'And just in the same way, great king, are the thinking powers of the Buddhas I have described brought quickly into play, and act with ease.

¹ That is as distinguished from the last—not only themselves enlightened, but able to teach, leaders of men.

And why? Because of their being purified in every respect. This is the seventh class of minds.'

27. 'Now of these, O king, the last—the thinking powers of the omniscient Buddhas—altogether outclasses the other six, and is clear and active in its high quality that is beyond our ken. It is because the mind of the Blessed One is so clear and active that the Blessed One, great king, displays the double miracle. From that we may get to know, O king, how clear and active His mental powers are. And for those wonders there is no further reason that can be alleged. (Yet) those wonders, O king, [caused by means of the mind (alone) of the omniscient Buddhas¹] cannot be counted, or calculated, or divided, or separated, (For) the knowledge of the Blessed One, O king, is dependent upon reflection², and it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know. (But) it is as when a man passes something he already has in one hand to the other, or utters a sound when his mouth is open, or swallows some food that he has already in his mouth, or opens his eyes when they are shut, or shuts them when open, or stretches forth his arm when it is bent in, or bends it in when stretched out—more rapid than that, great king, and more easy in its action, is the all-embracing knowledge of the Blessed One, more rapid than that his reflection. And although it is by reflection that they know whatever they want to know, yet even when they

¹ There is surely something wrong here; either in the Pāli, or in my interpretation of it, which follows the *Sinhalese* (p. 130).

² Here the opening argument of § 17 is again taken up.

are not reflecting the Blessed Buddhas are not, even then, anything other than omniscient.'

'But, venerable Nāgasena, reflection is carried on for the purpose of seeking (that which is not clear when the reflection begins). Come now. Convince me in this matter by some reason.'

'Suppose, O king, there were a rich man, great in wealth and property—one who had stores of gold and silver and valuables, and stores of all kinds of wheat, one who had rice, and paddy, and barley, and dry grain, and oilseed, and beans, and peas, and every other edible seed, who had ghee, and oil, and butter, and milk, and curds, and honey, and sugar, and molasses, [107] all put away in store-rooms in jars, and pots, and pans, and every sort of vessel. Now if a traveller were to arrive, one worthy of hospitality, and expecting to be entertained; and all the prepared food in the house had been finished, and they were to get out of the jar some rice ready for cooking, and prepare a meal for him. Would that wealthy man merely by reason of the deficiency in eatable stuff at that unusual time be rightly called poor or needy?'

'Certainly not, Sir. Even in the palace of a mighty king of kings there might be no food ready out of time, how much less in the house of an ordinary man.'

'Just so, great king, with the all-embracing knowledge of a Tathâgata when reflection only is wanting; but which on reflection grasps whatever he wants. Now suppose, O king, there were a tree in full fruit, with its branches bending this way and that by the weight of the burden of the bunches of its fruit, but no single fruit had fallen from it.

Could that tree rightly, under the circumstances of the case, be called barren, merely because of the want of a fallen fruit ?'

'No, Sir. For though the falling of the fruit is a condition precedent to its enjoyment, yet when it has fallen one can take as much as one likes.'

'Just so, great king, though reflection is a necessary condition of the knowledge of the Tathâgata, yet on reflection it perceives whatever he wants to know.'

'Does that happen always, Nâgasena, at the moment of reflection ?'

'Yes, O king. Just as when the mighty king of kings (the *Kakkavatti*) calling to mind his glorious wheel of victory wishes it to appear, and no sooner is it thought of than it appears—so does the knowledge of the Tathâgata follow continually on reflection.'

'Strong is the reason you give, Nâgasena, for the omniscience of the Buddha. I am convinced that that is so.'

[Here ends the question as to the omniscience of the Buddha being dependent on reflection¹.]

[WHY DEVADATTA WAS ADMITTED TO THE ORDER.]

28. 'Venerable Nâgasena, who was it that admitted Devadatta² to the Order ?'

¹ At III, 6, 2 there is another problem raised as to the omniscience of the Buddha.

² He is the Judas of the Buddhist story, who tried to have the Buddha killed, and to seduce his disciples from him.

‘Those six young nobles, O king, Bhaddiya and Anuruddha and Ānanda and Bhagu and Kimbila and Devadatta, [108] together with Upāli the barber as a seventh—they all, when the Master had attained to Buddhahood, left the Sākya home out of the delight they felt in him, and following the Blessed One renounced the world¹. So the Blessed One admitted them all to the Order.’

‘But was it not Devadatta who, after he had entered the Order, raised up a schism within it?’

‘Yes. No layman can create a schism, nor a sister of the Order, nor one under preparatory instruction, nor a novice of either sex. It must be a Bhikkhu, under no disability, who is in full communion, and a co-resident².’

‘And what Karma does a schismatical person gain?’

‘A Karma that continues to act for a Kalpa (a very long period of time).’

‘What then, Nāgasena! Was the Buddha aware that Devadatta after being admitted to the Order would raise up a schism, and having done so would suffer torment in purgatory for a Kalpa?’

‘Yes, the Tathāgata knew that.’

‘But, Nāgasena, if that be so, then the statement that the Buddha was kind and pitiful, that he sought after the good of others, that he was the remover of that which works harm, the provider of that which works well to all beings—that statement must be wrong. If it be not so—if he knew not that Deva-

¹ Hīnaśi-kumburê takes kulâ as an ablative.

² These are all termini technici in Buddhist canon law. The meaning is that other divisions in the Order do not amount technically to schism. See the *Kullavagga* VII, 1, 27, &c.

datta after he had been admitted to the Order would stir up a schism—then he cannot have been omniscient. This other double-pointed dilemma is put to you. Unravel this tough skein, break up the argument of the adversaries. In future times it will be hard to find Bhikkhus like to you in wisdom. Herein then show your skill !’

29. ‘The Blessed One, O king, was both full of mercy and had all knowledge. It was when the Blessed One in his mercy and wisdom considered the life history of Devadatta that he perceived how, having heaped up Karma on Karma, he would pass for an endless series of Kalpas from torment to torment, and from perdition to perdition. And the Blessed One knew also that the infinite Karma of that man would, because he had entered the Order, become finite, and the sorrow caused by the previous Karma would also therefore become limited. [109] But that if that foolish person were not to enter the Order then he would continue to heap up Karma which would endure for a Kalpa. And it was because he knew that that, in his mercy, he admitted him to the Order.’

‘Then, Nāgasena, the Buddha first wounds a man and then pours oil on the wound, first throws a man down a precipice and then reaches out to him an assisting hand, first kills him and then seeks to give him life, first gives pain and then adds a subsequent joy to the pain he gave.’

‘The Tathāgata, O king, wounds people but to their good, he casts people down but to their profit, he kills people but to their advantage. Just as mothers and fathers, O king, hurt their children and even knock them down, thinking the while of their

good ; so by whatsoever method an increase in the virtue of living things can be brought about, by that method does he contribute to their good. If Devadatta, O king, had not entered the Order, then as a layman he would have laid up much Karma leading to states of woe, and so passing for hundreds of thousands of Kalpas from torment to misery, and from one state of perdition to another, he would have suffered constant pain. It was knowing that, that in his mercy, the Blessed One admitted Devadatta to the Order. It was at the thought that by renouncing the world according to His doctrine Devadatta's sorrow would become finite that, in his mercy, he adopted that means of making his heavy sorrow light.

30. 'As a man of influence, O king, by the power of his wealth or reputation or prosperity or birth, when a grievous penalty has been imposed by the king on some friend or relative of his, would get it made light by the ability arising from the trust reposed in him ; [110] just so did the Blessed One, by admitting him to the Order, and by the efficacy of the influence of righteousness and meditation and wisdom and emancipation of heart, make light the heavy sorrow of Devadatta, who would have had to suffer many hundreds of thousands of Kalpas. As a clever physician and surgeon, O king, would make a grievous sickness light by the aid of a powerful medicinal drug, just so did the Blessed One, in his knowledge of the right means to an end, admit Devadatta to the Order and thus make his grievous pain light by the aid of the medicine of the Dhamma, strong by the power of mercy¹. Was then, O king,

¹ Kâruṇṇabalopatthaddha. Compare *Gâtaka*, vol. i, verse 267, and *Sutta Vibhaṅga* I, 10, 7.

the Blessed One guilty of any wrong in that he turned Devadatta from being a man of much sorrow into being a man of less sorrow ?'

'No indeed, Sir. He committed no wrong, not even in the smallest degree¹.'

'Then accept this, great king, to the full as the reason for which the Blessed One admitted Devadatta to the Order.'

31. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, for the Blessed One's having admitted Devadatta. Suppose men were to seize and hurry before the king some wicked robber, saying : " This is the wicked robber, your Majesty. Inflict upon him such punishment as you think fit ! " And thereupon the king were to say to them : " Take this robber then, my men, outside the town, and there on the place of execution cut off his head." And they in obedience to his orders were to take that man accordingly towards the place of execution. And some man who was high in office near the king, and of great reputation and wealth and property, whose word was held of weight², and whose influence was great, should see him. And he were to have pity on him, and were to say to those men : " Stay, good fellows. What good will cutting off his head do to you ? Save him alive, and cut off only a hand or a foot. I will speak on his behalf to the king." And they at the word of that influential person were to do so. Now would the officer who had acted so towards him have been a benefactor to that robber ?'

¹ Gaddûhanam pi. It is the Sanskrit dadrûghna.

² Âdeyya-vakano. See my note, *Kullavagga* VI, 4, 8, and also *Puggala Paññatti* III, 12, and *Pañña Gati Dîpana*, 98.

‘He would have saved his life, Sir. And having done that, what would he not have done?’

‘But would he have done no wrong on account of the pain the man suffered [111] when his hand or foot was cut off?’

‘The pain the thief suffered, Sir, was his own fault. But the man who saved his life did him no harm.’

‘Just so, great king, was it in his mercy that the Blessed One admitted Devadatta, with the knowledge that by that his sorrow would be mitigated.’

32. ‘And Devadatta’s sorrow, O king, was mitigated. For Devadatta at the moment of his death took refuge in Him for the rest of his existences when he said :

“In him, who of the best is far the best¹,
The god of gods, the guide of gods and men,
Who see’th all, and bears the hundred marks
Of goodness,—’tis in him I refuge take
Through all the lives that I may have to live.”

2 ‘If you divide this Kalpa, O king, into six parts, it was at the end of the first part that Devadatta created schism in the Order. After he has suffered the other five in purgatory he will be released, and will become a *Pakkaka-Buddha*³ under the name of *Atthissara*.’

‘Great is the gift bestowed, Nāgasena, by the Blessed One on Devadatta. In that the Tathāgata

¹ Literally, ‘is the best of these eight’—the eight being those walking in the Excellent Way, the four *magga-samaṅgino* and the four *phala-samaṅgino*. See *Puggala Paññatti* VIII, 1.

² The *Siṃhalese* inserts a paragraph here not found in Mr. Trenckner’s text.

³ See above, p. 158.

has caused him to attain to the state of a Pakkeka-Buddha, what has he not done for him ?'

'But inasmuch as Devadatta, O king, having made a schism in the Order, suffers pain in purgatory, has not therefore the Blessed One done him wrong?'

'No, Sir. That is Devadatta's own fault ; and the Blessed One who mitigated his suffering has done him no harm.'

'Then accept this, O king, to the full as the reason for the Blessed One admitting Devadatta to the Order.

33. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, for his having done so. [112] Suppose in treating a wound full of matter and blood, in whose grievous hollow the weapon which caused it remained, which stank of putrid flesh, and was made worse by the pain that varied with constantly changing symptoms, by variations in temperature, and by the union of the three humours,—windy, bilious, and phlegmatic¹,—an able physician and surgeon were to anoint it with a rough, sharp, bitter, stinging ointment, to the end that the inflammation should be allayed. And when the inflammation had gone down, and the wound had become sweet, suppose he were then to cut into it with a lancet, and burn it with caustic. And when he had cauterised it, suppose he were to prescribe an alkaline wash, and anoint it with some drug to the end that the wound might heal up, and the sick man recover his health—now tell me, O king, would it be out of cruelty that the surgeon thus smeared with ointment, and cut with the lancet, and cauterised

¹ The interpretation of some of the medical terms in this paragraph is very uncertain. See pp. 134, 252, 304 of the text.

with the stick of caustic, and administered a salty wash ?'

'Certainly not, Sir ; it would be with kindness in his heart, and intent on the man's weal, that he would do all those things.'

'And the feelings of pain produced by his efforts to heal—would not the surgeon be guilty of any wrong in respect of them ?'

'How so ? Acting with kind intent and for the man's weal, how could he therein incur a wrong ? It is of heavenly bliss rather that that kindly surgeon would be worthy.'

'Just so, great king, was it in his mercy that the Blessed One admitted Devadatta, to the end to release him from pain.'

34. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, why the Blessed One did so. Suppose a man had been pierced by a thorn. And another man with kindly intent and for his good were to cut round the place with another sharp thorn or with a lancet, and the blood flowing the while, were to extract that thorn. Now would it be out of cruelty that he acted so ?'

'Certainly not, Sir. For he acted with kindly intent, and for the man's good. And if he had not done so the man might have died, or might have suffered such pain that he would have been nigh to death.'

'Just even so, great king, was it of his mercy that the Tathâgata admitted Devadatta, to the end to release him of his pain. If he had not done so [113] Devadatta would have suffered torment in purgatory through a succession of existences, through hundreds of thousands of Kalpas.'

‘ Yes, Nāgasena, the Tathāgata turned Devadatta, who was being carried down with the flood, with his head against the stream ; he again pointed out the road to Devadatta when he was lost in the jungle ; he gave a firm foothold to Devadatta when he was falling down the precipice : he restored Devadatta to peace when he was swallowed up of desolation. But the reason and the meaning of these things could no one have pointed out, Nāgasena, unless he were wise as you !’

[Here ends the dilemma about Devadatta.]

[VESSANTARA’S EARTHQUAKE.]

35. ‘ Venerable Nāgasena, the Blessed One said thus : “ There are these eight causes, O Bhikkhus, proximate or remote, for a mighty earthquake ¹. ” This is an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be supplemented, a statement to which no gloss can be added. There can be no ninth reason for an earthquake. If there were, the Blessed One would have mentioned it. It is because there is no other, that he left it unnoticed. But we find another, and a ninth reason, when we are told that on Vessantara’s giving his mighty largesse the earth shook seven times ². If, Nāgasena, there are eight causes for an earthquake, then what we hear of the earthquake at Vessantara’s largesse is false. And if that is true, then the statement as to the eight

¹ From the Book of the Great Decease, III, 13, translated at p. 45 of my ‘ Buddhist Suttas,’ vol. xi in this series.

² See the Vessantara Gâtaka, and compare Gâtaka I, p. 74.

causes of earthquakes is false. This double-headed question, too, is subtle, hard to unravel, dark, and profound. It is now put to you. [114] No one of less knowledge can solve it, only one wise as you.'

36. 'The Blessed One made the statement you refer to, O king, and yet the earth shook seven times at Vessantara's largesse. But that was out of season, it was an isolated occurrence, it was not included in the eight usual causes, and was not therefore reckoned as one of them. Just, O king, as there are three kinds of well-known rains reckoned in the world—that of the rainy season, that of the winter months, and that of the two months *Âsâ/ha* and *Sâvana*. If, besides these, any other rain falls, that is not reckoned among the usual rains, but is called "a rain out of season." And again, O king, just as there are five hundred rivers which flow down from the *Himâlayas*, but of these ten only are reckoned in enumerations of rivers—the *Ganges*, the *Jumna*, the *Akîravatî*, the *Sarabhû*, the *Mahtî*, the *Indus*, the *Sarasvatî*, the *Vetravatî*, the *Vitamsâ*, and the *Kandabhâgâ*—the others not being included in the catalogue because of their intermittent flow of water. And again, O king, just as there are a hundred or two of officers under the king, but only six of them are reckoned as officers of state—the commander-in-chief, the prime minister, and the chief judge, and the high treasurer, and the bearer of the sunshade of state, and the state sword-bearer. And why? Because of their royal prerogatives. The rest are not reckoned, they are all called simply officers. [115] Just as in all these cases, great king, the seven times repeated earthquake at the largesse of Vessantara was, as an isolated and extra-

ordinary occurrence, and distinct from the eight usual ones, not reckoned among those eight causes.'

37. 'Now have you heard, O king, in the history of our faith of any act of devotion being done so as to receive its recompense even in this present life, the fame of which has reached up to the gods?'

'Yes, Lord, I have heard of such. There are seven cases of such actions.'

'Who were the people who did those things?'

'Sumana the garland maker, and Eka-sâtaka the brahman, and Punna the hired servant, and Mallikâ the queen, and the queen known as the mother of Gopâla, and Suppiyâ the devoted woman, and Punna the slave-girl. It was these seven who did acts of devotion which bore fruit even in this life, and the fame of which reached even to the gods.'

'And have you heard of others, O king, who, even in their human body, mounted up to the blessed abode of the great Thirty-three?'

'Yes, I have heard, too, of them.'

'And who were they?'

'Guttila the musician, and Sâdhîna the king, and king Nimi, and king Mandhâtâ—these four. Long ago was it done, this glorious deed and difficult.'

'But have you ever heard, O king, of the earth shaking, either now or in the past, and either once or twice or thrice, when a gift had been given?'

'No, Sir, that I have not heard of.'

'And I too, O king—though I have received the traditions, and been devoted to study, and to hearing the law, and to learning by heart, and to the acquirements of discipleship, and though I have been ready to learn, and to ask and to answer questions, and to sit at the feet of teachers—I too have never heard

of such a thing, except only in the case of the splendid gift of Vessantara the glorious king. And between the times of Kassapa the Blessed One, and of the Blessed One the Sâkya sage, there have rolled by hundreds of thousands of years, but in all that period I have heard of no such case. [116] It is at no common effort, O king, at no ordinary struggle, that the great earth is moved. It is when overborne by the weight of righteousness, overpowered by the burden of the goodness of acts which testify of absolute purity, that, unable to support it, the broad earth quakes and trembles and is moved. Then it is as when a wagon is overladen with a too heavy weight, and the nave and the spokes are split, and the axletree is broken in twain. Then it is as when the heavens, overspread with the waters of the tempest driven by the wind, and overweighted with the burden of the heaped-up rain-clouds, roar and creak and rage at the onset of the whirlwind. Thus was it, great king, that the broad earth, unable to support the unwonted burden of the heaped-up and wide-reaching force of king Vessantara's largesse, quaked and trembled and was moved. For the heart of king Vessantara was not turned in the way of lust, nor of ill-will, nor of dullness, nor of pride, nor of delusion, nor of sin, nor of disputation, nor of discontent, but it was turned mightily to generosity. And thinking: "Let all those who want, and who have not yet come, now arrive! Let all who come receive whate'er they want, and be filled with satisfaction!" it was on giving, ever and without end, that his mind was set. And on these ten conditions of heart, O king, was his mind too fixed—on self-control, and on inward calm, and on

long-suffering, and on self-restraint, and on temperance, and on voluntary subjugation to meritorious vows, and on freedom from all forms of wrath and cruelty, and on truthfulness, and on purity of heart. He had abandoned, O king, all seeking after the satisfaction of his animal lusts, he had overcome all craving after a future life, his strenuous effort was set only towards the higher life. He had given up, O king, the caring for himself, and devoted himself thenceforth to caring for others alone. His mind was fixed immovably on the thought: "How can I make all beings to be at peace, healthy, and wealthy, and long lived?" [117] And when, O king, he was giving things away, he gave not for the sake of rebirth in any glorious state, he gave not for the sake of wealth, nor of receiving gifts in return, nor of flattery, nor of long life for himself, nor of high birth, nor of happiness, nor of power, nor of fame, nor of offspring either of daughters or of sons—but it was for the sake of supreme wisdom and of the treasure thereof that he gave gifts so immense, so immeasurable, so unsurpassed. It was when he had attained to that supreme wisdom that he uttered the verse:

"Gāli, my son, and the Black Antelope,
My daughter, and my queen, my wife, Maddi,
I gave them all away without a thought—
And 'twas for Buddhahood I did this thing¹."

38. 'The angry man, O king, did the great king Vessantara conquer by mildness, and the wicked man by goodness, and the covetous by generosity,

¹ From the *Kariyā Piṭaka* I, ix, 52. See Dr. Morris's edition for the Pāli Text Society, p. 81.

and the speaker of falsehood by truth, and all evil did he overcome by righteousness¹. When he was thus giving away—he who was seeking after righteousness, who had made righteousness his aim—then were the great winds, on which the earth rests below, agitated by the full force of the power of the influence that resulted from his generosity, and little by little, one by one, the great winds began to blow confusedly, and up and down and towards each side the earth swayed, and the mighty trees rooted in the soil² began to totter, and masses of cloud were heaped together in the sky, and terrible winds arose laden with dust, and the heavens rushed together, and hurricanes blew with violent blasts, and a great and terrible mighty noise was given forth. And at the raging of those winds, the waters little by little began to move, and at the movement of the waters the great fish and the scaly creatures were disturbed, and the waves began to roll in double breakers, and the beings that dwell in the waters were seized with fear and as the breakers rushed together in pairs the roar of the ocean grew loud, and the spray was lashed into fury, and garlands of foam arose, and the great ocean opened to its depths, and the waters rushed hither and thither, the furious crests of their waves meeting this way and that; and the Asuras, and Garuḥas, and Yakkhas, and Nāgas³ shook with fear, and thought in their alarm: “What now! How now! is the great ocean being turned upside down?”

¹ On this sentiment Mr. Trenckner calls attention to the analogous phrases at Dhammapada, verse 223.

² Sīnapattā: which the Sinhalese renders *poḷo talehi kal gewī patra wæḥṣmaṭa pæminiyāwu wrīkshayo*.

³ Fabulous beings supposed to occupy these fabulous waters.

and sought, with terrified hearts, for a way of escape. And as the water on which it rests¹ was troubled and agitated, then the broad earth began to shake, and with it the mountain ranges and the ocean depths, [118] and Sineru began to revolve, and its rocky mountain crest became twisted. And at the trembling of the earth, the serpents, and mungoes, and cats, and jackals, and boars, and deer, and birds became greatly distressed, and the Yakkhas of inferior power wept, while those of greater power were merry.'

39. 'Just, O king, as when a huge and mighty cauldron² is placed in an oven full of water, and crowded with grains of rice, then the fire burning beneath heats first of all the cauldron, and when that has become hot the water begins to boil, and as the water boils the grains of rice are heated and dive hither and thither in the water, and a mass of bubbles arises, and a garland of foam is formed—just so, O king, king Vessantara gave away whatsoever is in the world considered most difficult to bestow, and by reason of the nature of his generosity the great winds beneath were unable to refrain from being agitated throughout, and on the great winds being thrown into confusion the waters were shaken, and on the waters being disturbed the broad earth trembled, and so then the winds and the waters and the earth became all three, as it were, of one accord by the immense and powerful influence that

¹ This conception of the earth resting on water and the water on air is Indian, and forms no part of distinctively Buddhist teaching.

² Mahati-mahâ-pariyogo; not in Childers nor in the Sanskrit Petersburg Dictionary. Hînaśi-kumburê renders it itâ mahatwu mahâ bhâganayak,

resulted from that mighty giving. And there was never another giving, O king, which had such power as that generosity of the great king Vessantara.

40. 'And just, O king, as there are many gems of value found in the earth—the sapphire, and the great sapphire, and the wish-conferring gem, and the cat's eye, and the flax gem¹, and the Acacia gem², and the entrancing gem, and the favourite of the sun³, and the favourite of the moon⁴, and the crystal, and the kaggopakkamaka⁵, and the topaz, and the ruby, and the Masâra stone⁶—but the glorious gem of the king of kings is acknowledged to be the chief of all these and surpassing all, for the sheen of that jewel, O king, spreads round about for a league on every side⁷—just so, O king, of all the gifts that

¹ Ummâ-puppha; rendered diya-mendiri-pushpa in the *Simhalese*. Clough gives diyameneri as a plant 'commelina cucullata.'

² Sirîsa-puppha; rendered mârâ-pushpa in the *Simhalese*, mârâ being the seed of the 'adenanthera pavonia.'

³ Suriya-kanto, which the *Simhalese* merely repeats.

⁴ Kanda-kanta; and so also in the *Simhalese*. These are mythic gems, supposed to be formed out of the rays of the sun and moon respectively, and visible only when they shine.

⁵ The *Simhalese* has kaggopakramaya, which is not in Clough.

⁶ Masâra-galla, which the *Simhalese* renders by masâra-galya, which Böhlingk-Roth think is sapphire or smaragd, and Clough renders 'emerald,' and the commentary on the *Abhidhâna Padîpikâ*, quoted by Childers, says is a stone produced in the hill of Masâra (otherwise unknown).

On similar lists of gems elsewhere see the *Kullavagga* IX, 1, 3, and my note at pp. 249, 250 of the 'Buddhist Suttas' (vol. xi of the 'Sacred Books of the East').

⁷ So also in the *Mahâ-Sudassana Sutta* I, 32, translated in the 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256. Compare above, p. 35 of the text.

have ever been given upon earth, even the greatest and the most unsurpassed, that giving of the good king Vessantara is acknowledged to surpass them all. And it was on the giving of that gift, O king, that the broad earth shook seven times¹.

41. 'A marvellous thing is it, Nāgasena, of the Buddhas, and a most wonderful, that the Tathāgata even when a Bodisat (in the course of becoming a Buddha) [119] was so unequalled in the world, so mild, so kind, and held before him aims so high, and endeavours so grand. You have made evident, Nāgasena, the might of the Bodisats, a most clear light have you cast upon the perfection of the Conquerors, you have shown how, in the whole world of gods and men, a Tathāgata, as he continues the practice of his noble life, is the highest and the best. Well spoken, venerable Nāgasena. The doctrine of the Conqueror has been exalted, the perfection of the Conqueror has been glorified, the knot of the arguments of the adversaries has been unravelled, the jar of the theories of the opponents has been broken in pieces, the dilemma so profound has been made clear, the jungle has been turned into open country, the children of the Conqueror have received the desire of their hearts². It is so, as you say, O best of the leaders of schools, and I accept that which you have said!'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the earthquake at Vessantara's gift.]

¹ There is here a long paragraph in the *Simhalese* omitted in the *Pāli*.

² *Nibbāhana*; rendered *abhiwarddhiya* in the *Simhalese*.

[KING SIVI¹.]

42. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say thus : " King Sivi gave his eyes to the man who begged them of him, and when he had thus become blind, new eyes were given to him from heaven²." This statement is unpalatable³, it lays its speaker open to rebuke, it is faulty. For it is said in the Sutta : " When the cause has been utterly destroyed, when there is no longer any cause, any basis left, then the divine eye cannot arise⁴." So if he gave his eyes away, the statement that he received new (divine) ones must be false : and if divine eyes arose to him, then the statement that he gave his eyes away must be false. This dilemma too is a double-pointed one, more knotty than a knot, more piercing than an arrow, more confusing than a jungle. It is now put to you. Rouse up in yourself the desire to accomplish the task that is set to you, to the refutation of the adversaries !'

¹ The story is given at length in the Sivi Gātaka, No. 499 (vol. iv, pp. 401-412 of Professor Fausböll's edition).

² There is nothing in the text of the Gātaka (p. 410) of the new eyes being 'divine' or 'from heaven.' There new, ordinary eyes arose to him as the result of his virtue.

³ Sa-kasa/aṃ. Kasa/a cannot mean simply 'insipid' as Dr. Edward Müller suggests at p. 43 of his 'Pāli Grammar,' for it is opposed to dullness, insipidity (manda) at Aṅguttara II, 5, 5. It must mean there 'wrong, not only by omission, but by commission.' Compare its use in the Dhammapada Commentary, p. 275; Gātaka I, 108, II, 97; and in the commentary on the Puggala IV, 24. Mr. Trenckner points out in his note that it is often written saka/a, and is no doubt the same as the Sanskrit word so spelt, and given by Wilson. (It is not in Böhlingk-Roth.)

⁴ I don't know which Sutta is referred to.

‘King Sivi gave his eyes away, O king. Harbour no doubt on that point. And in stead thereof divine eyes were produced for him. Neither on that point should you harbour doubt.’

‘But then, Nāgasena, can the divine eye arise when the cause of it has been utterly destroyed, when no cause for it, no basis, remains?’

‘Certainly not, O king.’

‘What then is the reason [120] by which in this case it arose, notwithstanding that its cause had been utterly destroyed, and no cause for it, no basis, remained. Come now. Convince me of the reason of this thing.’

43. ‘What then, O king? Is there in the world such a thing as Truth, by the asseveration of which true believers can perform the Act of Truth¹?’

‘Yes, Lord, there is. And by it true believers make the rain to fall, and fire to go out², and ward off the effects of poison, and accomplish many other things they want to do.’

‘Then, great king, that fits the case, that meets it on all fours. It was by the power of Truth that those divine eyes were produced for Sivi the king. By the power of the Truth the divine eye arose when no other cause was present, for the Truth itself was, in that case, the cause of its production. Sup-

¹ This paragraph is very different in the *Simhalese*, and much longer than the *Pāli*.

² See the beautiful story of the Holy Quail (translated in my ‘*Buddhist Birth Stories*,’ p. 302), where even so weak a creature as a baby quail is able, by such a mystic Act of Truth, to drive back the great and powerful Agni, the god of fire, whom the Brahmins so much feared and worshipped.

pose, O king, any Siddha (accomplished one¹) on intoning a charm², and saying: "Let a mighty rain now fall!" were to bring about a heavy rainfall by the intoning of his charm—would there in that case be any cause for rain accumulated in the sky by which the rain could be brought about?

'No, Sir. The charm itself would be the cause.'

'Just so, great king, in the case put. There would be no ordinary cause. The Truth itself would be sufficient reason for the growth of the divine eye!'

44. 'Now suppose, O king, a Siddha were to intone a charm, and say: "Now let the mighty blazing, raging mass of fire go back!" and the moment the charm were repeated it were to retreat—would there be any cause laid by which would work that result?'

'No, Sir. The charm itself would be the cause.'

'Just so, great king, would there in our case be no ordinary cause. The power of the Truth would be sufficient cause in itself!'

45. 'Now suppose, O king, one of those Siddhas were to intone a charm, [121] and were then to say: "Let this malignant poison become as a healing drug!" and the moment the charm were repeated that would be so—would there be any cause in reserve for that effect to be produced?'

'Certainly not, Sir. The charm itself would cause the warding off of that malignant poison.'

'Just so, great king, without any ordinary cause the Truth itself was, in king Sivi's case, a sufficient reason for the reproduction of his eyes.'

¹ 'One who knows a powerful charm (or perhaps Vedic verse, mantra),' says Hīna/i-kumburê.

² *Saṅkṣa*, literally truth. (Satya-gāyanā in the Sinhalese.)

46. 'Now there is no other cause, O king, for the attainment of the four Noble Truths. It is only by means of an Act of Truth that they are attained. In the land of China, O king, there is a king of China, who when he wants to charm the great ocean, performs at intervals of four months a solemn Act of Truth, and then on his royal chariot drawn by lions, he enters a league's distance into the great ocean. Then in front of the head of his chariot the mighty waves roll back, and when he returns they flow once more over the spot. But could the ocean be so drawn back by the ordinary bodily power of all gods and men combined?'

'Sir, even the water in a small tank could not be so made to retire, how much less the waters of the great ocean!'

'By this know then the force of Truth. There is no place to which it does not reach.'

47. 'When Asoka the righteous ruler, O king, as he stood one day at the city of Pâtaliputta in the midst of the townsfolk and the country people, of his officers and his servants, and his ministers of state, beheld the Ganges river as it rolled along filled up by freshets from the hills, full to the brim and overflowing—that mighty stream five hundred leagues in length, and a league in breadth—he said to his officers: "Is there any one, my good friends, who is able to make this great Ganges flow backwards and up stream?"'

"Nay, Sire, impossible," said they.

'Now a certain courtesan, Bindumati by name, was in the crowd there at the river side, [122] and she heard people repeat the question that the king had asked. Then she said to herself: "Here am I, a

harlot, in this city of Pāṭaliputta, by the sale of my body do I gain my livelihood, I follow the meanest of vocations. Let the king behold the power of an Act of Truth performed even by such as I." And she performed an Act of Truth¹. And that moment the mighty Ganges, roaring and raging, rolled back, up stream, in the sight of all the people !

'Then when the king heard the din and the noise of the movement of the waves of the whirlpools of the mighty Ganges, amazed, and struck with awe and wonder, he said to his officers : "How is this, that the great Ganges is flowing backwards?"'

'And they told him what had happened. Then filled with emotion the king went himself in haste and asked the courtesan : "Is it true what they say, that it is by your Act of Truth that this Ganges has been forced to flow backwards?"'

"Yes, Sire," said she.

'And the king asked : "How have you such power in the matter? Or who is it who takes your words to heart (and carries them out)? By what authority is it that you, insignificant as you are², have been able to make this mighty river flow backwards?"'

'And she replied : "It is by the power of Truth, great king."

'But the king said : "How can that power be in you—you, a woman of wicked and loose life,

¹ That is to say, in the words of the Quail story (loc. cit. p. 305), she 'called to mind the attributes of the Buddhas who had passed away, and made a solemn asseveration of the faith' that she had in the truth they had taught.

² Anummatto, which the Sinhalese translates as a feminine.

devoid of virtue, under no restraint¹, sinful, who have overstepped all limits, and are full of transgression, and live on the plunder of fools?"

"It is true, O king, what you say. That is just the kind of creature I am. But even in such a one as I so great is the power of the Act of Truth that I could turn the whole world of gods and men upside down by it."

'Then the king said: "What is this Act of Truth? Come now, let me hear about it."

"Whosoever, O king, gives me gold—be he a noble or a brahman or a tradesman or a servant—I regard them all alike. When I see he is a noble I make no distinction in his favour. If I know him to be a slave I despise him not. Free alike from fawning and from dislike do I do service to him who has bought me. This, your Majesty, is the basis of the Act of Truth by the force of which I turned the Ganges back."

48. 'Thus, O king, is it that there is nothing which those who are steadfast to the truth may not enjoy. And so king Sivi gave his eyes away to him who begged them of him, [123] and he received eyes from heaven, and that happened by his Act of Truth. But what is said in the Sutta that when the eye of flesh is destroyed, and the cause of it, the basis of it, is removed, then can no divine eye arise, that is only said of the eye, the insight, that arises out of contemplation. And thus, O king, should you take it.'

'Well said, Nāgasena! You have admirably

¹ *Khinnikāya*. Compare *Gâtaka* II, 114, and the *Sutta Vibhanga* on *Pâkittiya* 26.

solved the dilemma I put to you; you have rightly explained the point in which I tried to prove you wrong; you have thoroughly overcome the adversary. The thing is so, and I accept it thus¹’

[Here ends the dilemma as to king Sivi’s Act of Truth.]

[THE DILEMMA AS TO CONCEPTION.]

49. This dilemma goes into details which can be best consulted in the Pāli.]

[THE DURATION OF THE FAITH.]

55. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: “But now the good law, Ānanda, will only stand fast for five hundred years².” But on the other hand the Blessed One declared, just before

¹ This idea of the power of an Act of Truth which Nāgasena here relies on is most interesting and curious. The exact time at which it was introduced into Buddhism is as yet unknown. It has not been found in the Piṭakas themselves, and is probably an incorporation of an older, pre-Buddhistic, belief. The person carrying it out is supposed to have some goodness, to call that virtue (and perhaps, as in the case of the quail, the goodness of the Buddhas also) to mind, and then to wish something, and that thing, however difficult, and provided there is nothing cruel in it, then comes to pass. It is analogous to the mystic power supposed to reside in names. Childers very properly points out that we have a very remarkable instance of an Act of Truth (though a very un-Buddhistic one) in the Hebrew book of the Kings II. i. 10: ‘And Elijah answered and said to the captain of fifty: “If I be a man of God, then let fire come down from heaven, and consume thee and thy fifty!” And there came down fire from heaven, and consumed him and his fifty.’ A great point, both in this legend and in the story of the quail, is that the power of nature to be overcome is one looked upon by the Brahmans as divine.

² Kullavagga X, 1, 6, translated in ‘Vinaya Texts,’ vol. iii, p. 325.

his death, in response to the question put by Subhadda the recluse : "But if in this system the brethren live the perfect life, then the world would not be bereft of Arahats¹." This last phrase is absolute, inclusive ; it cannot be explained away. If the first of these statements be correct, the second is misleading, if the second be right the first must be false. [131] This too is a double-pointed question, more confused than the jungle, more powerful than a strong man, more knotty than a knot. It is now put to you. Show the extent of the power of your knowledge, like a leviathan in the midst of the sea.'

56. 'The Blessed One, O king, did make both those statements you have quoted. But they are different one from the other both in the spirit and in the letter. The one deals with the limit of the duration of the doctrine², the other with the practice of a religious life—two things widely distinct, as far removed one from the other as the zenith is from the surface of the earth, as heaven is from purgatory, as good is from evil, and as pleasure is from pain. But though that be so, yet lest your enquiry should be vain, I will expound the matter further in its essential connection.'

57. 'When the Blessed One said that the good law³ would only endure for five hundred years, he said so declaring the time of its destruction, limiting the remainder of its existence. For he said : "The good law, Ânanda, would endure for a thousand years if no women had been admitted to the

¹ Book of the Great Decease, V, 62, translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 108.

² Sâsana.

³ Saddhammo.

Order. But now, Ânanda, it will only last five hundred years." But in so saying, O king, did the Blessed One either foretell the disappearance of the good law, or throw blame on the clear understanding thereof ?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Just so. It was a declaration of injury done, an announcement of the limit of what remained. As when a man whose income had been diminished might announce publicly, making sure of what remained: "So much property have I lost; so much is still left"—[132] so did the Blessed One make known to gods and men what remained when he announced what had been lost by saying: "The good law will now, Ânanda, endure for five hundred years." In so saying he was fixing a limit to religion. But when in speaking to Subhadda, and by way of proclaiming who were the true Samanas, he said: "But if, in this system, the brethren live the perfect life, then the world would not be bereft of Arahats"—in so saying he was declaring in what religion consisted. You have confounded the limitation of a thing with the statement of what it is. But if you like I will tell you what the real connection between the two is. Listen carefully, and attend trustfully to what I say.'

58. 'Suppose, O king, there were a reservoir quite full of fresh cool water, overflowing at the brim, but limited in size and with an embankment running all round it. Now if, when the water had not abated in that tank, a mighty cloud were to rain down rain continually, and in addition, on to the water already in it, would the amount of water in the tank decrease or come to an end ?'

‘Certainly not, Sir.’

‘But why not, O king?’

‘Because of the continual downpour of the rain.’

‘Just so, O king, is the glorious reservoir of the good law of the teaching of the Conqueror ever full of the clear fresh cool water of the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, and continues overflowing all limits even to the very highest heaven of heavens. And if the children of the Buddha rain down into it continuously, and in addition, the rainfall of still further practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, then will it endure for long, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. This was the meaning of the Master’s words when he said: “But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in perfectness of life, then will the world not be bereft of Arahats.”’

59. ‘Now suppose again, O king, that people were to continually supply a mighty fiery furnace with dried cow-dung, and dry sticks, and dry leaves—would that fire go out?’

[133] ‘No indeed, Sir. Rather would it blaze more fiercely, and burn more brightly.’

‘Just so, O king, does the glorious teaching of the Conqueror blaze and shine over the ten thousand world systems by the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life. And if, O king, in addition to that, the children of the Buddha, devoting themselves to the five¹ kinds of spiritual exertion, continue zealous in effort—if cultivating a longing for the threefold discipline, they train themselves therein—

¹ *Pañka*-*padhānaṅgani*. This is curious. In the *Piṭakas* there are four kinds only.

if without ceasing they carry out to the full the conduct that is right, and absolutely avoid all that is wrong, and practise righteousness of life—then will this glorious doctrine of the Conqueror stand more and more steadfast as the years roll on, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. It was in reference to this, O king, that the Master spake when he said: “But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in perfectness of life, then will the world not be bereft of Arahats.”’

60. ‘Again, O king, suppose people were to continually polish with fine soft red powder a stainless mirror that was already bright and shining, well polished, smooth, and glossy, would dirt and dust and mud arise on its surface?’

‘No indeed, Sir. Rather would it become to a certainty even more stainless than before.’

‘Just so, O king, is the glorious doctrine of the Conqueror stainless by nature, and altogether free from the dust and dirt of evil. And if the children of the Buddha cleanse it by the virtue arising from the shaking off, the eradication of evil, from the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, then will this glorious doctrine endure for long, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. It was in reference to this that the Blessed One spake when he said: “But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in righteousness of life, then will not the world be bereft of Arahats.” For the teaching of the Master, O king, has its root in conduct, has conduct as its essence, and stands fast so long as conduct does not decline¹.’

¹ There is a paragraph here in the *Sinhalese* not found in the *Pāli*.

61. 'Venerable Nāgasena, when you speak of the disappearance of the good law, what do you mean by its disappearance?'

'There are three modes of the disappearance, O king, of a system of doctrine. And what are the three? The decline of attainment to an intellectual grasp of it, the decline of conduct in accordance with it, and the decline of its outward form¹. [134] When the attainment of it ceases, then even the man who conducts himself aright in it has no clear understanding of it. By the decline of conduct the promulgation of the rules of discipline ceases, only the outward form of the religion remains. When the outward form has ceased, the succession of the tradition is cut off. These are the three forms of the disappearance of a system of doctrine.'

'You have well explained, venerable Nāgasena, this dilemma so profound, and have made it plain. You have loosed the knot; you have destroyed the arguments of the adversary, broken them in pieces, proved them wrong—you, O best of the leaders of schools!'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the duration of the faith.]

[THE BUDDHA'S SINLESSNESS.]

62. 'Venerable Nāgasena, had the Blessed One, when he became a Buddha, burnt out all evil in himself, or was there still some evil remaining in him?'

¹ *Linga*, possibly 'uniform.' Either the Order or the yellow robe, for instance, if the system were Buddhism. See below, IV, 3, 2.

‘He had burnt out all evil. There was none left.’

‘But how, Sir? Did not the Tathâgata get hurt in his body?’

‘Yes, O king. At Râgagaha a splinter of rock pierced his foot¹, and once he suffered from dysentery², and once when the humours of his body were disturbed a purge was administered to him³, and once when he was troubled with wind the Elder who waited on him (that is Ânanda) gave him hot water⁴.’

‘Then, Sir, if the Tathâgata, on his becoming a Buddha, has destroyed all evil in himself—this other statement that his foot was pierced by a splinter, that he had dysentery, and so on, must be false. But if they are true, then he cannot have been free from evil, for there is no pain without Karma. All pain has its root in Karma, it is on account of Karma that suffering arises⁵. This double-headed dilemma is put to you, and you have to solve it.’

63. ‘No, O king. It is not all suffering that has its root in Karma. There are eight causes by which sufferings arise, by which many beings suffer pain. And what are the eight? Superabundance of wind, [135] and of bile, and of phlegm, the union of these humours, variations in temperature, the avoiding of

¹ See *Kullavagga* VII, 3, 9.

² See *Mahâparinibbâna Sutta* IV, 21.

³ *Mahâvagga* VIII, 1, 30-33.

⁴ This is, no doubt, the occurrence recounted in the *Mahâvagga* VI, 17, 1-4. Childers translates *vâtâbâdha* by ‘rheumatism,’ but I adhere here to the translation adopted there. It is said in the *Mahâvagga* that Ânanda gave him, not hot water, but gruel. But the two are very similar, and in the *Theri Gâthâ* 185, referring to the same event, it is hot water that is mentioned.

⁵ That is, there can be no suffering without sin. Compare the discussion in St. John’s Gospel, ch. ix.

dissimilarities, external agency, and Karma. From each of these there are some sufferings that arise, and these are the eight causes by which many beings suffer pain. And therein whosoever maintains that it is Karma that injures beings, and besides it there is no other reason for pain, his proposition is false.'

'But, Sir, all the other seven kinds of pain have each of them also Karma as its origin, for they are all produced by Karma.'

'If, O king, all diseases were really derived from Karma then there would be no characteristic marks by which they could be distinguished one from the other. When the wind is disturbed, it is so in one or other of ten ways—by cold, or by heat, or by hunger, or by thirst, or by over eating, or by standing too long, or by over exertion, or by walking too fast, or by medical treatment, or as the result of Karma. Of these ten, nine do not act in a past life or in a future life, but in one's present existence. Therefore it is not right to say that all pain is due to Karma. When the bile, O king, is deranged it is so in one or other of three ways—by cold, or by heat, or by improper food. When the phlegm is disturbed it is so by cold, or by heat, or by food and drink. When either of these three humours are disturbed or mixed, it brings about its own special, distinctive pain. Then there are the special pains arising from variations in temperature, avoidance of dissimilarities, and external agency¹. And there is the act that has Karma as its fruit, and the pain so brought about arising from the act done. So what

¹ As was pointed out above, IV, 1, 33, many of these medical terms are very doubtful.

arises as the fruit of Karma is much less than that which arises from other causes. And the ignorant go too far [136] when they say that every pain is produced as the fruit of Karma. No one without a Buddha's insight can fix the extent of the action of Karma.'

64. 'Now when the Blessed One's foot was torn by a splinter of rock, the pain that followed was not produced by any other of the eight causes I have mentioned, but only by external agency. For Devadatta, O king, had harboured hatred against the Tathâgata during a succession of hundreds of thousands of births¹. It was in his hatred that he seized hold of a mighty mass of rock, and pushed it over with the hope that it would fall upon his head. But two other rocks came together, and intercepted it before it had reached the Tathâgata; and by the force of their impact a splinter was torn off, and fell upon the Blessed One's foot, and made it bleed. Now this pain must have been produced in the Blessed One either as the result of his own Karma, or of some one else's act. For beyond these two there can be no other kind of pain. It is as when a seed does not germinate—that must be due either to the badness of the soil, or to a defect in the seed. Or it is as when food is not digested—that must be due either to a defect in the stomach, or to the badness of the food.'

65. 'But although the Blessed One never suffered pain which was the result of his own Karma, or brought about the avoidance of dissimilarity², yet

¹ So below, IV, 3, 28.

² Visama-parihâra-gâ both in the Sinhalese and the Pâli.

he suffered pain from each of the other six causes. And by the pain he could suffer it was not possible to deprive him of life. There come to this body of ours, O king, compounded of the four elements¹, sensations desirable and the reverse, pleasant and unpleasant. Suppose, O king, a clod of earth were to be thrown into the air, and to fall again on to the ground. Would it be in consequence of any act it had previously done that it would so fall ?'

'No, Sir. There is no reason in the broad earth by which it could experience the result of an act either good or evil. It would be by reason of a present cause [137] independent of Karma that the clod would fall to earth again.'

'Well, O king, the Tathâgata should be regarded as the broad earth. And as the clod would fall on it irrespective of any act done by it, so also was it irrespective of any act done by him that that splinter of rock fell upon his foot.'

66. 'Again, O king, men tear up and plough the earth. But is that a result of any act previously done ?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Just so with the falling of that splinter. And the dysentery which attacked him was in the same way the result of no previous act, it arose from the union of the three humours. And whatsoever bodily disease fell upon him, that had its origin, not in Karma, but in one or other of the six causes referred to. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, by him who is above all gods, in the glorious collection called the *Samyutta Nikâya* in

¹ Water, fire, air, and earth (âpo, tego, vayo, paṭhavi).

the prose Sutta, called after Moliya Sīvaka : “ There are certain pains which arise in the world, Sīvaka, from bilious humour. And you ought to know for a certainty which those are, for it is a matter of common knowledge in the world which they are. But those Samanas and Brahmans, Sīvaka, who are of the opinion and proclaim the view that whatsoever pleasure, or pain, or indifferent sensation, any man experiences, is always due to a previous act—they go beyond certainty, they go beyond knowledge, and therein do I say they are wrong. And so also of those pains which arise from the phlegmatic humour, or from the windy humour, or from the union of the three, or from variation in temperature, or from avoidance of dissimilarity, [138] or from external action, or as the result of Karma. In each case you should know for a certainty which those are, for it is a matter of common knowledge which they are. But those Samanas or Brahmans who are of the opinion or the view that whatsoever pleasure, or pain, or indifferent sensation, any man may experience, that is always due to a previous act—they go beyond certainty, they go beyond common knowledge. And therein do I say they are wrong.” So, O king, it is not all pain that is the result of Karma. And you should accept as a fact that when the Blessed One became a Buddha he had burnt out all evil from within him.’

‘ Very good, Nāgasena ! It is so ; and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha’s
sinlessness]

[ON THE ADVANTAGES OF MEDITATION¹.]

67. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say that everything which a Tathāgata has to accomplish that had the Blessed One already carried out when he sat at the foot of the Tree of Wisdom². There was then nothing that he had yet to do, nothing that he had to add to what he had already done. But then there is also talk of his having immediately afterwards remained plunged for three months in ecstatic contemplation³. If the first statement be correct, then the second must be false. And if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. There is no need of any contemplation to him who has already accomplished his task. It is the man who still has something left to do, who has to think about it. [139] It is the sick man who has need of medicine, not the healthy; the hungry man who has need of food, not the man whose hunger is quenched. This too is a double-headed dilemma, and you have to solve it!'

68. 'Both statements, O king, are true. Con-

¹ *Paṭisallāna* (not *samādhi*), rendered throughout in the *Simhalese* by *wiweka*.

² I have not been able to find this statement in any of the *Piṭaka* texts.

³ Here again our author seems to be referring to a tradition later than the *Piṭakas*. In the *Mahāvagga* (see our version in the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, pp. 74-81) there is mention only of four periods of seven days, and even during these not of *paṭisallāna*, but of *samādhi*. The former of these two terms only occurs at the conclusion of the twenty-eight days (*Mahāvagga* I, 5, 2). Even in the later orthodox literature the period of meditation is still not three months, but only seven times seven days. See the passages quoted in Professor Oldenberg's note at p. 75 of the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i.

temple has many virtues. All the Tathâgatas attained, in contemplation, to Buddhahood, and practised it in the recollection of its good qualities. And they did so in the same way as a man who had received high office from a king would, in the recollection of its advantages, of the prosperity he enjoyed by means of it, remain constantly in attendance on that king—in the same way as a man who, having been afflicted and pained with a dire disease, and having recovered his health by the use of medicine, would use the same medicine again and again, calling to mind its virtue.'

69. 'And there are, O king, these twenty and eight good qualities of meditation in the perception of which the Tathâgatas devoted themselves to it. And which are they? Meditation preserves him who meditates, it gives him long life, and endows him with power, it cleanses him from faults, it removes from him any bad reputation giving him a good name, it destroys discontent in him filling him with content, it releases him from all fear endowing him with confidence, it removes sloth far from him filling him with zeal, it takes away lust and ill-will and dullness, it puts an end to pride, it breaks down all doubt, it makes his heart to be at peace, it softens his mind, [140] it makes him glad, it makes him grave, it gains him much advantage, it makes him worthy of reverence, it fills him with joy, it fills him with delight, it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things, it puts an end to rebirth, it obtains for him all the benefits of renunciation. These, O king, are the twenty and eight virtues of meditation on the perception of which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. But it is because

the Tathâgatas, O king, long for the enjoyment of the bliss of attainment, of the joy of the tranquil state of Nirvâna, that they devote themselves to meditation, with their minds fixed on the end they aim at.

70. 'And there are four reasons for which the Tathâgatas, O king, devote themselves to meditation. And what are the four? That they may dwell at ease, O king—and on account of the abundance of the advantages of meditation, advantages without drawback—and on account of its being the road to all noble things without exception—and because it has been praised and lauded and exalted and magnified by all the Buddhas. These are the reasons for which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. So it is not, great king, because they have anything left to do, or anything to add to what they have already accomplished, but because they have perceived how diversified are the advantages it possesses, that they devote themselves to meditation.'

'Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to meditation.]

[THE LIMIT OF THREE MONTHS.]

71. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "The Tathâgata, Ânanda, has thought out and thoroughly practised, developed, accumulated, and ascended to the very height of the four paths to saintship¹, and so mastered them as to be able to use them as a means of mental advancement, and as a basis for edification—and he therefore, Ânanda,

¹ *Kattâro iddhi-pâdâ.*

should he desire it, might remain alive for a Kalpa, or for that portion of a Kalpa which has yet to run¹." And again he said: "At the end of three months from this time the Tathâgata will die²." If the first of these statements were true, then the limit of three months must have been false. If the second were true, [141] then the first must have been false. For the Tathâgatas boast not without an occasion, the Blessed Buddhas speak no misleading words, but they utter truth, and speak sincerely. This too is a double-headed dilemma, profound, subtle, hard to expound. It is now put to you. Tear in sunder this net of heresy, put it on one side, break in pieces the arguments of the adversary !'

72. 'Both these statements, O king, were made by the Blessed One. But Kalpa in that connection means the duration of a man's life. And the Blessed One, O king, was not exalting his own power when he said so, but he was exalting the power of saintship. It was as if a king were possessed of a horse most swift of foot, who could run like the wind. And in order to exalt the power of his speed the king were to say in the presence of all his court—townsfolk and country folk, hired servants and men of war, brahmins, nobles, and officers: "If he wished it this noble steed of mine could cross the earth to its ocean boundary, and be back here again, in a moment³!"

¹ Mahâparinibbâna Sutta III, 60, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 57, 58.

² Ibid. III, 63, translated loc. cit. p. 59.

³ So it is said of the 'Horse-treasure' of the Great King of Glory in the Mahâsudassana Sutta I, 29 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256), that 'it passed over along the broad earth to its very ocean boundary, and then returned again, in time for the

Now though he did not try to test the horse's speed in the presence of the court, yet it had that speed, and was really able to go along over the earth to its ocean boundary in a moment. Just so, O king, the Blessed One spake as he did in praise of the power of saintship, and so spake seated in the midst of gods and men, and of the men of the threefold wisdom and the sixfold insight—the Arahats pure and free from stain—when he said: "The Tathâgata, Ânanda, has thought out and practised, developed, accumulated, and ascended to the very height of the four powers of saintship, and so mastered them as to be able to use them as a means of mental advancement, as a basis for edification. And he therefore, Ânanda, should he desire it, might remain alive for a Kalpa, or the part of a Kalpa that has yet to run." And there was that power, O king, in the Tathâgata, he could have remained alive for that time: and yet he did not show that power in the midst [142] of that assembly. The Blessed One, O king, is free from desire as respects all conditions of future life, and has condemned them all. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One: "Just, O Bhikkhus, as a very small quantity of excrement is of evil smell, so do I find no beauty in the very smallest degree of future life, not even in such for the time of the snapping of the fingers¹." Now would the Blessed One, O king, who thus looked upon all sorts and conditions of future life

morning meal, to the royal city of Kusâvatî.' It is, of course, the sun horse which is meant.

¹ I have not traced this quotation in the Piṭakas, but it is probably there.

as dung have nevertheless, simply because of his power of Iddhi, harboured a craving desire for future life ?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'Then it must have been to exalt the power of Iddhi that he gave utterance to such a boast.'

'Very good, Nāgasena ! It is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the three months.]

Here ends the First Chapter.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 2.

[THE ABOLITION OF REGULATIONS.]

1. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "It is by insight, O Bhikkhus, that I preach the law, not without insight¹." On the other hand he said of the regulations of the Vinaya: "When I am gone, Ānanda, let the Order, if it should so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts²." Were then these lesser and minor precepts wrongly laid down, or established in ignorance and without due cause, that the Blessed One allowed them to be revoked after his death? If the first statement had been true, the second would have been wrong. If the second statement were really made, [143] then the first was false. This too is a double-headed problem, fine, subtle, abstruse, deep, profound, and hard to expound. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

2. 'In both cases, O king, the Blessed One said as you have declared. But in the second case it was to test the Bhikkhus that he said it, to try whether, if leave were granted them, they would, after his death, revoke the lesser and minor regulations, or still adhere to them. It runs as if a

¹ Not traced as yet.

² Mahāparinibbāna Sutta VI, 3 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 112). The incident is referred to in the *Kullavagga* XI, 1, 9, 10, and in his commentary on that passage Buddhaghosa mentions the discussion between Milinda and Nāgasena, and quotes it as an authority in support of his interpretation.

king of kings were to say to his sons : " This great country, my children, reaches to the sea on every side. It is a hard thing to maintain it with the forces we have at our disposal. So when I am gone you had better, my children, abandon the outlying districts along the border." Now would the princes, O king, on the death of their father, give up those outlying districts, provinces already in their power ?'

'No indeed, Sir. Kings are grasping. The princes might, in the lust of power, subjugate an extent of country twice or thrice the size of what they had, but they would never give up what they already possessed.'

'Just so was it, O king, that the Tathâgata to test the Bhikkhus said : " When I am gone, Ānanda, let the Order, if it should so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts." But the sons of the Buddha, O king, in their lust after the law, and for emancipation from sorrow, might keep two hundred and fifty regulations¹, but would never give up any one that had been laid down in ordinary course.'

3. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when the Blessed One referred to " lesser and minor precepts," this people might therein [144] be bewildered, and fall into doubt, and find matter for discussion, and be lost in hesitation, as to which were the lesser, and which the minor precepts.'

'The lesser errors in conduct², O king, are the lesser precepts, and the lesser errors in speech³ are the minor precepts: and these two together make up therefore " the lesser and minor precepts." The

¹ The regulations in the Pâtimokkha, which include all the most important ones, are only 220 in number.

² *Dukkaṭṭam*.

³ *Dubbhâsitaṃ*.

leading Elders too of old, O king, were in doubt about this matter, and they were not unanimous on the point at the Council held for the fixing of the text of the Scriptures¹. And the Blessed One foresaw that this problem would arise.'

'Then this dark saying of the Conquerors, Nāgasena, which has lain hid so long, has been now to-day uncovered in the face of the world, and made clear to all.'

[Here ends the problem as to the revocation of rules.]

[ESOTERIC TEACHING.]

4. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "In respect of the truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps something back²." But on the other hand he made no reply to the question put by the son of the Mālunkya woman³. This problem, Nāgasena, will be one of two ends, on one of which it must rest, for he must have refrained from answering either out of ignorance, or out of wish to conceal something. If the first statement be true it must have been out of ignorance. But

¹ In the *Kullavagga* XI, 1, 10, it is one of the faults laid to Ānanda's charge, at the Council of Rāgagaha, that he had not asked for a definition of these terms.

² Mahāparinibbāna Sutta II, 32 (another passage from the same speech is quoted below, IV, 2, 29).

³ See the two Mālunkya Suttantas in the *Magghima Nikāya* (vol. i, pp. 426-437 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pāli Text Society). With regard to the spelling of the name, which is doubtful, it may be noticed that *Hīnaśi-kumburē* has *Mālunka* throughout.

if he knew, and still did not reply, then the first statement must be false. This too is a double-pointed dilemma. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

5. 'The Blessed One, O king, made that first statement to Ânanda, and he did not reply to Mâluṅkyâ-putta's question. But that was neither out of ignorance, nor for the sake of concealing anything. There are four kinds of ways in which a problem may be explained. And which are the four? There is the problem to which an explanation can be given that shall be direct and final. There is the problem which can be answered by going into details. There is the problem which can be answered by asking another. And there is the problem which can be put on one side.

'And which, O king, is the problem to which a direct and final solution can be given? It is such as this—"Is form impermanent?" [145] "Is sensation impermanent?" "Is idea impermanent?" "Are the Confections impermanent?" "Is consciousness impermanent?"

'And which is the problem which can be answered by going into details? It is such as this—"Is form thus impermanent?" and so on.

'And which is the problem which can be answered by asking another? It is such as this—"What then? Can the eye perceive all things?"

'And which is the problem which can be put on one side? It is such as this—"Is the universe everlasting?" "Is it not everlasting?" "Has it an end?" "Has it no end?" "Is it both endless and unending?" "Is it neither the one nor the other?" "Are the soul and the body the same

thing?" "Is the soul distinct from the body?" "Does a Tathâgata exist after death?" "Does he not exist after death?" "Does he both exist and not exist after death?" "Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?"

'Now it was to such a question, one that ought to be put on one side, that the Blessed One gave no reply to Mâluṅkyâ-putta. And why ought such a question to be put on one side? Because there is no reason or object for answering it. That is why it should be put aside. For the Blessed Buddhas lift not up their voice without a reason and without an object.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! Thus it is, and I accept it as you say?'

[Here ends the dilemma as to keeping some things back¹.]

[DEATH.]

6. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One: "All men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death²." But again he said: "The Arahât has passed beyond all fear³." How then, Nâgasena? does the Arahât tremble with the fear of punishment? [146] Or are the beings in purgatory, when they are being burnt and boiled and scorched and tormented, afraid of that death which would release them from the burning fiery pit of that awful place of woe⁴? If the Blessed One, Nâgasena,

¹ See my note below on IV, 4, 8. ² Dhammapada 129.

³ Not traced in these words, but identical in meaning with Dhammapada 39.

⁴ Maha-nirayâ kavamânâ, 'when they are on the point of passing away from it.' For in Buddhism the time comes to each

really said that all men tremble at punishment, and all are afraid of death, then the statement that the Arahats has passed beyond fear must be false. But if that last statement is really by him, then the other must be false. This double-headed problem is now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

7. 'It was not with regard to Arahats, O king, that the Blessed One spake when he said: "All men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death." The Arahats is an exception to that statement, for all cause for fear has been removed from the Arahats¹. He spoke of those beings in whom evil still existed, who are still infatuated with the delusion of self, who are still lifted up and cast down by pleasures and pains. To the Arahats, O king, rebirth in every state has been cut off, all the four kinds of future existence have been destroyed, every re-incarnation has been put an end to, the rafters² of the house of life have broken, and the whole house completely pulled down, the Confections have altogether lost their roots, good and evil have ceased, ignorance has been demolished, consciousness has no longer any seed (from which it could be renewed), all sin has been burnt away³, and all worldly conditions have been overcome⁴. Therefore is it that the Arahats is not made to tremble by any fear.'

being in Niraya (often translated 'hell') when he will pass away from it.

¹ That is from him who attained Nirvâna in this life. Compare 1 John iv. 18.

² Phâsû for Phâsukâ. Compare Dhammapada 154, Manu VI, 79-81, and Sumaṅgala, p. 16.

³ Hīnaśi-kumburê adds 'by the fire of tapas.'

⁴ Eight are meant—gain, loss, fame, dishonour, praise, blame, pleasures, pains.

8. 'Suppose, O king, a king had four chief ministers, faithful, famous, trustworthy, placed in high positions of authority. And the king, on some emergency arising, were to issue to them an order touching all the people in his realm, saying: "Let all now pay up a tax, and do you, as my four officers, carry out what is necessary in this emergency." Now tell me, O king, would the tremor which comes from fear of taxation arise in the hearts of those ministers?'

'No, Sir, it would not.'

'But why not?'

'They have been appointed by the king to high office. Taxation does not affect them, they are beyond taxation. It was the rest that the king referred to when he gave the order: [147] "Let all pay tax."'

'Just so, O king, is it with the statement that all men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death. In that way is it that the Arahāt is removed from every fear.'

9. 'But, Nāgasena, the word "all" is inclusive, none are left out when it is used. Give me a further reason to establish the point.'

'Suppose, O king, that in some village the lord of the village were to order the crier, saying: "Go, crier, bring all the villagers quickly together before me." And he in obedience to that order were to stand in the midst of the village and were thrice to call out: "Let all the villagers assemble at once in the presence of the lord!" And they should assemble in haste, and have an announcement made to the lord, saying: "All the villagers, Sire, have assembled. Do now whatsoever you require." Now when the lord, O king, is thus summoning all the heads of

houses, he issues his order to all the villagers, but it is not they who assemble in obedience to the order; it is the heads of houses. And the lord is satisfied therewith, knowing that such is the number of his villagers. There are many others who do not come—women and men, slave girls and slaves, hired workmen, servants, peasantry, sick people, oxen, buffaloes, sheep, and goats, and dogs—but all those do not count. It was with reference to the heads of houses that the order was issued in the words: "Let all assemble." Just so, O king, it is not of Arahats that it was said that all are afraid of death. [148] The Arahata is not included in that statement, for the Arahata is one in whom there is no longer any cause that could give rise to fear.'

10. 'There is the non-inclusive expression, O king, whose meaning is non-inclusive, and the non-inclusive expression whose meaning is inclusive; there is the inclusive expression whose meaning is non-inclusive, and the inclusive expression whose meaning is inclusive. And the meaning, in each case, should be accepted accordingly. And there are five ways in which the meaning should be ascertained—by the connection, and by taste, and by the tradition of the teachers, and by the meaning, and by abundance of reasons. And herein "connection" means the meaning as seen in the Sutta itself, "taste" means that it is in accordance with other Suttas, "the tradition of the teachers" means what they hold, "the meaning" means what they think, and "abundance of reasons" means all these four combined¹.'

¹ This is much more obscure in Pāli than in English. In the Pāli the names of each of the five methods are ambiguous. 'Connection,' for instance, is in Pāli *âhaṅkā-pada*, which is only

11. 'Very well, Nâgasena ! I accept it as you say. The Arahat is an exception in this phrase, and it is the rest of beings who are full of fear. But those beings in purgatory, of whom I spoke, who are suffering painful, sharp, and severe agonies, who are tormented with burnings all over their bodies and limbs, whose mouths are full of lamentation, and cries for pity, and cries of weeping and wailing and woe, who are overcome with pains too sharp to be borne, who find no refuge nor protection nor help, who are afflicted beyond measure, who in the worst and lowest of conditions are still destined to a certainty to further pain, who are being burnt with hot, sharp, fierce, and cruel flames, who are giving utterance to mighty shouts and groans born of horror and fear, who are embraced by the garlands of flame which intertwine around them from all the six directions, and flash in fiery speed through a hundred leagues on every side—can those poor burning wretches be afraid of death ?'

'Yes, they can.'

'But, venerable Nâgasena, is not purgatory a place of certain pain ? And, if so, why should the beings in it be afraid of death, which would release them from that certain pain ? What ! Are they fond of purgatory ?'

'No, indeed. They like it not. They long to be released from it. It is the power of death of which they are afraid.'

'Now this, Nâgasena, I cannot believe, that they, who want to be released, should be afraid of rebirth.

found elsewhere (see *Kullavagga* VI, 4, 3, and my note there) as the name of a kind of chair. And there is similar ambiguity in the other words.

[149] They must surely, Nāgasena, rejoice at the prospect of the very condition that they long for. Convince me by some further reason¹.'

12. 'Death, great king, is a condition which those who have not seen the truth² are afraid of. About it this people is anxious and full of dread. Whosoever is afraid of a black snake, or an elephant or lion or tiger or leopard or bear or hyena or wild buffalo or gayal, or of fire or water, or of thorns or spikes or arrows, it is in each case of death that he is really in dread, and therefore afraid of them. This, O king, is the majesty of the essential nature of death. And all being not free from sin are in dread and quake before its majesty. In this sense it is that even the beings in purgatory, who long to be released from it, are afraid of death.'

13. 'Suppose, O king, a boil were to arise, full of matter, on a man's body, and he, in pain from that disease, and wanting to escape from the danger of it, were to call in a physician and surgeon. And the surgeon, accepting the call, were to make ready some means or other for the removal of his disease—were to have a lancet sharpened, or to have sticks put into the fire to be used as cauterisers, or to have something ground on a grindstone to be mixed in a salt lotion. Now would the patient begin to be in dread of the cutting of the sharp lancet, or of the burning of the pair of caustic sticks, or of the application of the stinging lotion?'

'Yes, he would.'

¹ Kāranena, perhaps he means 'by an example.'

² *Adiṣṣa-sakkānam*. It may also mean 'who have not perceived the (Four Noble) Truths.'

‘But if the sick man, who wants to be free from his ailment, can fall into dread by the fear of pain, just so can the beings in purgatory, though they long to be released from it, fall into dread by the fear of death.’

14. ‘And suppose, O king, a man who had committed an offence against the crown, when bound with a chain, and cast into a dungeon, were to long for release. And the ruler, wishing to release him, were to send for him. Now would not that man, who had thus offended, and knew it, be in dread [150] of the interview with the king?’

‘Yes, Sir.’

‘But if so, then can also the beings in purgatory, though they long to be released from it, yet be afraid of death.’

‘Give me another illustration by which I may be able to harmonise¹ (this apparent discrepancy).’

‘Suppose, O king, a man bitten by a poisonous snake should be afraid, and by the action of the poison should fall and struggle, and roll this way and that. And then that another man, by the repetition of a powerful charm, should compel that poisonous snake to approach to suck the poison back again². Now when the bitten man saw the poisonous snake coming to him, though for the object of curing him, would he not still be in dread of it?’

‘Yes, Sir.’

‘Well, it is just so with the beings in purgatory.’

¹ Okappeyyam. See the Old Commentary at Pâkittiya I, 2, 6.

² On this belief the 69th Gâtaka is founded. See Fausböll, vol. i, pp. 310, 311 (where, as Mr. Trenckner points out, we must read in the verse the same word *paṭṭhākam* as we have here).

Death is a thing disliked by all beings. And therefore are they in dread of it though they want to be released from purgatory.'

'Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the fear of death.]

[PIRIT.]

15. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One :

"Not in the sky, not in the ocean's midst,
Not in the most secluded mountain cleft,
Not in the whole wide world is found the spot
Where standing one could 'scape the snare of death¹."

But on the other hand the Pirit service was promulgated by the Blessed One²—that is to say, the Ratana Sutta and the Khanda-parittâ and the Mora-parittâ and the Dhagagga-parittâ [151] and the Âñânâ/iya-parittâ and the Aṅguli-mala-parittâ. If, Nâgasena, a man can escape death's snare neither by going to heaven, nor by going into the midst of the sea, nor by going to the summits of lofty palaces,

¹ Either Dhammapada 127, which is the same except the last word (there 'an evil deed'), or Dhammapada 128, except the last line (which is there 'where standing death would not overtake one').

² This is a service used for the sick. Its use so far as the Piṭakas are known has been nowhere laid down by the Buddha, or by words placed in his mouth. This is the oldest text in which the use of the service is referred to. But the word Parittâ (Pirit) is used in *Kullavagga* V, 6, of an asseveration of love for snakes, to be used as what is practically a charm against snake bite, and that is attributed to the Buddha. The particular Suttas and passages here referred to are all in the Piṭakas.

nor to the caves or grottoes or declivities or clefts or holes in the mountains, then is the Pirit ceremony useless. But if by it there is a way of escape from death, then the statement in the verse I quoted is false. This too is a double-headed problem, more knotty than a knot. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

16. 'The Blessed One, O king, said the verse you have quoted, and he sanctioned Pirit¹. But that is only meant for those who have some portion of their life yet to run, who are of full age, and restrain themselves from the evils of Karma. And there is no ceremony or artificial means² for prolonging the life of one whose allotted span of existence has come to an end. Just, O king, as with a dry and dead log of wood, dull³, and sapless, out of which all life has departed, which has reached the end of its allotted period of life,—you might have thousands of pots of water poured over it, but it would never become fresh again or put forth sprouts or leaves. Just so there is no ceremony or artificial means, no medicine and no Pirit, which can prolong the life of one whose allotted period has come to an end. All the medicines in the world are useless, O king, to such a one, but Pirit is a protection and assistance to those who have a period yet to live, who are full of life, and restrain themselves from the evil of Karma. And it is for that use that Pirit was appointed by the

¹ See last note. *Hīna/i-kumburē* renders 'preached Pirit,' which is quite in accordance with the *Pi/akas*, as the *Suttas* of which it is composed are placed in his mouth.

² *Upakkamo*. Compare the use of the word at *Kullavagga* VII, 3, 10; *Sumaṅgala* 69, 71. *Utpatti-kramayek* says the *Siṃhalese*.

³ *Ko/āpa*. See *Gātaka* III, 495, and the commentary there.

Blessed One. Just, O king, as a husbandman guards the grain when it is ripe and dead and ready for harvesting from the influx of water, but makes it grow by giving it water when it is young, and dark in colour like a cloud, and full of life—just so, O king, should the Pirit ceremony be put aside and neglected in the case of one who has reached his allotted term of life, [152] but for those who have a period yet to run and are full of vigour, for them the medicine of Pirit may be repeated, and they will profit by its use.'

17. 'But, Nâgasena, if he who has a term of life yet to run will live, and he who has none will die, then medicine and Pirit are alike useless.'

'Have you ever seen, O king, a case of a disease being turned back by medicine?'

'Yes, several hundred times.'

'Then, O king, your statement as to the inefficiency of Pirit and medicine must be wrong.'

'I have seen, Nâgasena, doctors administer medicines by way of draughts or outward applications, and by that means the disease has been assuaged.'

'And when, O king, the voice of those who are repeating Pirit is heard, the tongue may be dried up, and the heart beat but faintly, and the throat be hoarse, but by that repetition all diseases are allayed, all calamities depart. Again, have you ever seen, O king, a man who has been bitten by a snake having the poison resorbed under a spell (by the snake who gave the bite¹) or destroyed (by an antidote) or having a lotion applied above or below the spot²?'

¹ See above, IV, 2, 14.

² All this sentence is doubtful. Dr. Morris has a learned note on the difficult words used (which only occur here) in the 'Journal

‘Yes, that is common custom to this day in the world.’

‘Then what you said that Pirit and medicine are alike useless is wrong. And when Pirit has been said over a man, a snake, ready to bite, will not bite him, but close his jaws—the club which robbers hold aloft to strike him with will never strike; they will let it drop, and treat him kindly—the enraged elephant rushing at him will suddenly stop—the burning fiery conflagration surging towards him will die out—the malignant poison he has eaten will become harmless, and turn to food—assassins who have come to slay him will become as the slaves who wait upon him—and the trap into which he has trodden will hold him not.

18. ‘Again, have you never heard, O king, of that hunter who during seven hundred years failed to throw his net over the peacock who had taken Pirit, but snared him the very day [153] he omitted to do so¹?’

‘Yes, I have heard of it. The fame of it has gone through all the world.’

‘Then what you said about Pirit and medicine being alike useless must be wrong. And have you never heard of the Dānava² who, to guard his wife,

of the Pāli Text Society’ for 1884, p. 87. *Hīnañ-kumburê*, p. 191, translates as follows: *Mahā ragāneni, wisha wināsa karannāwû mantra padayakin wishaya baswana laddāwû, wisha sanhinduwana laddāwû, ûrddhādho bhāgayehi awushadha galayen temana laddāwû, nayaku wisin dash/a karana laddāwû kisiwek topa wisin daknâ ladde dœyi wiññāla seka.*

¹ This is the *Mora-Gâtaka*, Nos. 159, 491, or (which is the same thing) the *Mora-Parittā*.

² An Asura, enemy of the gods, a Titan. *Rakshasa* says the *Simhalese*.

put her into a box, and swallowing it, carried her about in his stomach. And how a Vidyâdhara¹ entered his mouth, and played games with his wife. And how the Dânaava when he became aware of it, vomited up the box, and opened it, and the moment he did so the Vidyâdhara escaped whither he would²?’

‘Yes, I have heard that. The fame of it too has gone throughout the world.’

‘Well, did not the Vidyâdhara escape capture by the power of Pirit?’

‘Yes, that was so.’

‘Then there must be power in Pirit. And have you heard of that other Vidyâdhara who got into the harem of the king of Benares, and committed adultery with the chief queen, and was caught, and then became invisible, and got away³?’

‘Yes, I heard that story.’

‘Well, did not he too escape capture by the power of Pirit?’

‘Yes, Sir.’

‘Then, O king, there must be power in Pirit.’

19. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, is Pirit a protection to everybody?’

¹ They are a kind of genii, with magical powers, who are attendants on the god Siva (and therefore, of course, enemies of the Dânavas). They are not mentioned in the Piṭakas.

² I don't know where this story comes from. It is not in the Piṭakas anywhere. But Hīnaśi-kumburē gives the fairy tale at full length, and in the course of it calls the Vidyâdharas by name Wāyassa-putra, ‘Son of the Wind.’ He quotes also a gāthā which he places, not in the mouth of the Bodisat, but of Buddha himself. I cannot find the tale either in the Gâtaka book, as far as published by Professor Fausböll, or in the Kathâ Sarit Sâgara, though I have looked all through both.

³ See last note.

‘To some, not to others.’

‘Then it is not always of use?’

‘Does food keep all people alive?’

‘Only some, not others.’

‘But why not?’

‘Inasmuch as some, eating too much of that same food, die of cholera.’

‘So it does not keep all men alive?’

‘There are two reasons which make it destroy life—over-indulgence in it, and weakness of digestion. And even life-giving food may be made poisonous by an evil spell.’

‘Just so, O king, is Pirit a protection to some and not to others. And there are three reasons [154] for its failure—the obstruction of Karma, and of sin, and of unbelief. That Pirit which is a protection to beings loses its protecting power by acts done by those beings themselves. Just, O king, as a mother lovingly nourishes the son who has entered her womb, and brings him forth with care¹. And after his birth she keeps him clean from dirt and stains and mucus, and anoints him with the best and most costly perfumes, and when others abuse or strike him she seizes them and, full of excitement, drags them before the lord of the place. But when her son is naughty, or comes in late, she strikes him with rods or clubs on her knee or with her hands. Now, that being so, would she get seized and dragged along, and have to appear before the lord?’

‘No, Sir.’

‘But why not?’

¹ Upakârena, which the Sinhalese repeats and construes with poseti.

‘Because the boy was in fault.’

‘Just in the same way, O king, will Pirit which is a protection to beings, yet, by their own fault, turn against them.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena! The problem has been solved, the jungle made clear, the darkness made light, the net of heresy unravelled—and by you, O best of the leaders of schools!’

[Here ends the dilemma as to Pirit.]

[MÂRA, THE EVIL ONE.]

20. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, your people say thus: “The Tathâgata was in the constant receipt of the things necessary for a recluse—robes, food, lodging, and the requisites for the sick.” And again they say: “When the Tathâgata entered the Brahman village called the Five Sâla trees he received nothing, and had to return with his bowl as clean as before.” If the first passage is true the second is false, and if the second passage is true [155] the first is false. This too is a double-headed problem, a mighty crux hard to unravel. It is now put to you. It is for you to solve it.’

21. ‘Both statements are true, but when he received nothing that day, that was the work of Mâra, the evil one.’

‘Then, Nâgasena, how was it that the merit laid up by the Blessed One through countless æons of time came to end that day? How was it that Mâra, who had only just been produced, could overcome the strength and influence of that merit? In that case, Nâgasena, the blame must fall in one of two

ways—either demerit must be more powerful than merit, or the power of Māra be greater than that of the Buddha. The root of the tree must be heavier than the top of it, or the sinner stronger than he who has heaped up virtue.'

22. 'Great king, that is not enough to prove either the one or the other of your alternatives. Still a reason is certainly desirable in this matter. Suppose, O king, a man were to bring a complimentary present to a king of kings—honey or honeycomb or something of that kind. And the king's doorkeeper were to say to him: "This is the wrong time for visiting the king. So, my good fellow, take your present as quickly as ever you can, and go back before the king inflicts a fine upon you." And then that man, in dread and awe, should pick up his present, and return in great haste. Now would the king of kings, merely from the fact that the man brought his gift at the wrong time, be less powerful than the doorkeeper, or never receive a complimentary present any more?'

'No, Sir. The doorkeeper turned back the giver of that present out of the surliness of his nature, and one a hundred thousand times as valuable [156] might be brought in by some other device.'

'Just so, O king, it was out of the jealousy of his nature that Māra, the evil one, possessed the Brahmans and householders at the Five Sāla trees. And hundreds of thousands of other deities came up to offer the Buddha the strength-giving ambrosia from heaven, and stood reverencing him with clasped hands and thinking to themselves that they would thus imbue him with vigour.'

23. 'That may be so, Nāgasena. The Blessed

One found it easy to get the four requisites of a recluse—he, the best in the world—and at the request of gods and men he enjoyed all the requisites. But still Mâra's intention to stop the supply of food to the Blessed One was so far carried out. Herein, Sir, my doubt is not removed. I am still in perplexity and hesitation about this. My mind is not clear how the Tathâgata, the Arahât, the supreme Buddha, the best of all the best in the world of gods and men, he who had so glorious a treasure of the merit of virtue, the unequalled one, unrivalled and peerless,—how so vile, mean, insignificant, sinful, and ignoble a being as Mâra could put any obstacle in the way of gifts to Him.'

24. 'There are four kinds, O king, of obstacles—the obstacle to a gift not intended for any particular person, to a gift set apart for some one, to the gift got ready, and to the enjoyment of a gift. And the first is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the actual gift of a thing put ready to be given away, but not with a view to or having seen any particular donee,—an obstacle raised, for instance, by saying: "What is the good of giving it away to any one else?" The second is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the actual gift of food intended to be prepared to be given to a person specified. The third is when any one puts an obstacle in the way when such a gift has been got ready, but not yet accepted. And the fourth is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the enjoyment of a gift already given (and so the property of the donee).'

25. 'Now when Mâra, the evil one, possessed the

Brahmans and householders at the Five Sâla trees, the food in that case was neither the property of, nor got ready for, nor intended to be prepared specially for the Blessed One. [157] The obstacle was put in the way of some one who was yet to come, who had not arrived, and for whom no gift was intended. That was not against the Blessed One alone. But all who had gone out that day, and were coming to the village, failed to receive an alms. I know no one, O king, in the world of men and gods, no one among Mâras or Brahmas, no one of the class of Brahmans or recluses, who could put any obstacle in the way of an alms intended for, or got ready for, or already given to the Blessed One. And if any one, out of jealousy, were to raise up any obstacle in that case, then would his head split into a hundred or into a thousand pieces.'

26. 'There are four things, O king, connected with the Tathâgatas, to which no one can do any harm. And what are the four? To the alms intended for, and got ready for the Blessed One—to the halo of a fathom's length when it has once spread out from him—to the treasure of the knowledge of his omniscience—and to his life. All these things, O king, are one in essence—they are free from defect, immovable, unassailable by other beings, unchangeable by other circumstances¹. And Mâra, the evil one, lay in ambush, out of sight, when he possessed the Brahmans and householders at the Five Sâla trees. It was as when robbers, O king,

¹ Aphasâni kiriyâni, which I do not pretend to understand, and Mr. Trenckner says is unintelligible to him. Hīnaś-kumburê has: Anya kriyâwak no wœdagannâ bœwin apusana (sic) kriyâyo ya.

hiding out of sight in the inaccessible country over the border, beset the highways. But if the king caught sight of them, do you think those robbers would be safe ?'

'No, Sir, he might have them cut into a hundred or a thousand pieces with an axe.'

'Well, just so it was, hiding out of sight, that Mâra possessed them. It was as when a married woman, in ambush, and out of sight, frequents the company of her paramour. [158] But if, O king, she were to carry on her intrigues in her husband's presence, do you think she would be safe ?'

'No, Sir, he might slay her, or wound her, or put her in bonds, or reduce her to slavery.'

'Well. It was like that, hiding out of sight, that Mâra possessed them. But if, O king, he had raised any obstacle in the case of an alms intended for, got ready for, or in possession of the Blessed One, then his head would have split into a hundred or a thousand pieces.'

'That is so, Nâgasena. Mâra, the evil one, acted after the manner of robbers, he lay in ambush, possessing the Brahmans and householders of the Five Sâla trees. But if the same Mâra, the evil one, had interfered with any alms intended for, or made ready for the Blessed One, or with his partaking thereof, then would his head have been split into a hundred or a thousand pieces, or his bodily frame have been dissipated like a handful of chaff.'

'Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to Mâra's interference with alms.]

[UNCONSCIOUS CRIME.]

27. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say: "Who-soever deprives a living being of life, without knowing that he does so, he accumulates very serious demerit¹." But on the other hand it was laid down by the Blessed One in the Vinaya: "There is no offence to him who acts in ignorance²." If the first passage is correct, the other must be false; and if the second is right, the first must be wrong. This too is a double-pointed problem, hard to master, hard to overcome. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

28. 'Both the passages you quote, O king, were spoken by the Blessed One. But there is a difference between the sense of the two. And what is that difference? [159] There is a kind of offence which is committed without the co-operation of the mind³, and there is another kind which has that co-operation. It was with respect to the first of the

¹ Not traced as yet, in so many words. And though there are several injunctions in the Vinaya against acts which might haply, though unknown to the doer, destroy life (such, for instance, as drinking water without the use of a strainer), when these are all subjects of special rule, and in each case there is an exception in favour of the Bhikkhu who acts in ignorance of there being living things which could be killed. (See, for instance, Pāṭittiya 62, on the drinking of water.)

² Agānantassa nāpatti. Pāṭittiya LXI, 2, 3 (in the Old Commentary, not ascribed to the Buddha).

³ Saññā-vimokkhā. I am not sure of the exact meaning of this difficult compound, which has only been found in this passage. Hīna-kumburē (p. 199) has: Mahā ragāneni, kīttāngayen abhāwayen midena bœwin saññā-wimoksha-namwā āpattit atteya, &c. (mid = muk).

two that the Blessed One said: "There is no offence to him who acts in ignorance¹."

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to sins in ignorance.]

[THE BUDDHA AND HIS FOLLOWERS.]

29. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "Now the Tathâgata thinks not, Ânanda, that is he who should lead the brotherhood, or that the Order is dependent upon him²." But on the other hand when describing the virtues and the nature of Metteyya, the Blessed One, he said thus: "He will be the leader of a brotherhood several thousands in number, as I am now the leader of a brotherhood several hundreds in number³." If the first statement be right, then the second is wrong. If the second passage is right, the first must be false. This too is a double-pointed problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

30. 'You quote both passages correctly, O king. But in the dilemma that you put the sense in the one passage is inclusive, in the other it is not. It is not the Tathâgata, O king, who seeks after a following, but the followers who seek after him.

¹ The Sinhalese has here a further page, giving examples of the two kinds of offences referred to, and drawing the conclusion for each.

² Book of the Great Decease, II, 32 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 37), just after the passage quoted above, IV, 2, 4.

³ Not in any of the published texts. Metteyya is, of course, the Buddha to come, the expected messiah.

[160] It is a mere commonly received opinion, O king, that "This is I," or "This is mine," it is not a transcendental truth¹. Attachment is a frame of mind put away by the Tathâgata, he has put away clinging, he is free from the delusion that "This is mine," he lives only to be a help to others². Just as the earth, O king, is a support to the beings in the world, and an asylum to them, and they depend upon it, but the broad earth has no longing after them in the idea that "These belong to me"—just so is the Tathâgata a support and an asylum to all beings, but has no longing after them in the idea that "These belong to me." And just as a mighty rain cloud, O king, pours out its rain, and gives nourishment to grass and trees, to cattle and to men, and maintains the lineage thereof, and all these creatures depend for their livelihood upon its rain, but the cloud has no feelings of longing in the idea that "These are mine"—just so does the Tathâgata give all beings to know what are good qualities and maintains them in goodness, and all beings have their life in him, but the Tathâgata has no feelings of longing in the idea that "These are mine." And why is it so? Because of his having abandoned all self-regard³.

'Very good, Nâgasena! The problem has been well solved by variety of examples. The jungle has been made open, the darkness has been turned

¹ Sammuti . . . na paramattho.

² Upâdâya avassayo hoti.

³ Attânudi//hiyâ pahînattâ. See the passages quoted by Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1886, pp. 113, 114.

to light, the arguments of the adversaries have been broken down, insight has been awakened in the sons of the Conqueror.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha and his following.]

[SCHISM.]

31. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "The Tathâgata is a person whose following can never be broken up." And again they say: "At one stroke Devadatta seduced five hundred of the brethren¹." If the first be true the second is false, but if the second be correct then the first is wrong. [161] This too is a double-pointed problem, profound, hard to unravel, more knotty than a knot. By it these people are veiled, obstructed, hindered, shut in, and enveloped. Herein show your skill as against the arguments of the adversaries.'

32. 'Both statements, O king, are correct. But the latter is owing to the power of the breach maker. Where there is one to make the breach, a mother will be separated from her son, and the son will break with the mother, or the father with the son and the son with the father, or the brother from the sister and the sister from the brother, or friend from friend. A ship pieced together with timber of all sorts is broken up by the force of the violence of the waves, and a tree in full bearing and full of sap is broken down by the force of the violence of the wind, and gold of the finest sort is divided by

¹ Neither of these phrases is to be found in the published texts in these words. But the latter sums up the episode related in the *Kullavagga* VII, 4, 1.

bronze. But it is not the intention of the wise, it is not the will of the Buddhas, it is not the desire of those who are learned that the following of the Tathâgata should be broken up. And there is a special sense in which it is said that that cannot be. It is an unheard-of thing, so far as I know, that his following could be broken up by anything done or taken, any unkindly word, any wrong action, any injustice, in all the conduct, wheresoever or whatsoever, of the Tathâgata himself. In that sense his following is invulnerable. And you yourself, do you know of any instance in all the ninefold word of the Buddha of anything done by a Bodisat which broke up the following of the Tathâgata ?'

'No, Sir. Such a thing has never been seen or heard in the world. It is very good, Nâgasena, what you say : and I accept it so.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to schism.]

Here ends the Second Chapter.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 3.

[PRECEDENCE OF THE DHARMA.]

1. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "For it is the Dhamma, O Vāsettha, which is 'the best in the world'¹, as regards both what we now see, and what is yet to come²." But again (according to your people) the devout layman who has entered the Excellent Way, for whom the possibility of rebirth in any place of woe has passed away, who has attained to insight, and to whom the doctrine is known, even such a one ought to salute and to rise from his seat in token of respect for, and to revere, any member of the Order, though a novice, and though he be unconverted³. Now if the Dhamma be the best that rule of conduct is wrong, but if that be right then the first statement must be wrong.

¹ This is a quotation from a celebrated verse, which is, as it were, the national anthem of those who, in the struggle for religious and ceremonial supremacy between the Brahmans and the nobles, took the side of the nobles (the Khattiyas). As might be expected it is not seldom found in the Buddhist Suttas, and is often put in the mouth of the Buddha, the most distinguished of these Khattiyas who were transcendental rather than military. It runs: 'The Khattiya is the best in the world of those who observe the rules of exogamous marriage, but of the whole race of men and gods he who has wisdom and righteousness is the best.' See, for instance, the *Ambaṭṭha* Sutta, in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, and the *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī* on that passage. By 'best in the world' is meant 'entitled to take precedence before all others,' not best in the moral sense.

² From the *Aggañña* Sutta in the *Dīgha Nikāya*.

³ I cannot give any authority for this, but it is no doubt correct Buddhism according to the spirit of the *Piṭakas*.

This too is a double-pointed problem. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' [162]

2. 'The Blessed One said what you have quoted, and you have rightly described the rule of conduct. But there is a reason for that rule, and that is this. There are these twenty personal qualities, making up the Samanaship of a Samana, and these two outward signs¹, by reason of which the Samana is worthy of salutation, and of respect, and of reverence. And what are they? The best form of self-restraint, the highest kind of self-control², right conduct, calm manners³, mastery over (his deeds and words⁴), subjugation (of his senses⁵), long-suffering⁶, sympathy⁷,

¹ Liṅgāni. See above, IV, 1, 61.

² Aggo niyamo. Hīnaśi-kumburē takes agga in the sense of Arahātship: 'Niwan dena pratipattiyeṇ yukta bawa.' Niyama is a self-imposed vow.

³ Vihāra, which the Sinhalese glosses by: 'Sansun iriyā-patha viharanayeṇ yukta bawa,' ('because he continues in the practice of tranquil deportment.')

⁴ Samyama. 'Kāya wāk samyamayeṇ yukta bawa.'

⁵ Samvaro. 'Indriya samvarayeṇ yukta bawa.'

⁶ Khanti, which the Sinhalese repeats.

⁷ Soraṭṭam. 'Because he is docile and pleasant of speech,' says the Sinhalese: 'Suwaṭṭa kīkaru bhāwayeṇ yukta bawa.' It is an abstract noun formed from surata, and does not occur in Sanskrit, though Böhtlingk-Roth give one authority for it (under sauratya) from a Buddhist work, the Vyutpatti. It is one of the many instances in which the Buddhist ethics has put new and higher meaning into current phrases, for in Sanskrit literature surata (literally 'high pleasure') is used frequently enough, but almost without exception in an obscene sense. The commentary on Gāṭaka III, 442 only repeats the word. It is there, as here, and in the Vyutpatti, and at Aṅguttara II, 15, 3, always allied with khanti. My translation follows Childers (who probably follows Böhtlingk-Roth); but the Sinhalese gloss here makes me very doubtful as to the exact connotation which the early Buddhists associated with 'high pleasure.'

the practice of solitude¹, love of solitude², meditation³, modesty and fear of doing wrong⁴, zeal⁵, earnestness⁶, the taking upon himself of the precepts⁷, recitation (of the Scriptures)⁸, asking questions (of those wise in the Dhamma and Vinaya), rejoicing in the Sīlas and other (rules of morality), freedom from attachment (to the things of the world), fulfilment of the precepts—and the wearing of the yellow robe, and the being shaven. [163] In the practice of all these things does the member of the Order live. By being deficient in none of them, by being perfect in all, accomplished in all, endowed with all of them does he reach forward to the condition of Arahatsip, to the condition of those who have nothing left to learn; he is marching towards the highest of all lands⁹. Thus it is because he sees him to be in the company of the Worthy Ones (the Arahats) that the layman who has already entered on the Excellent Way thinks it worthy in him¹⁰ to

¹ Ekatta-kariyâ = 'Ekalâwa hoesirimen yukta bawa.'

² Ekattâbhirati.

³ Paṭisallanaṃ, not samâdhi. Kīttekâgratâ says the Sinhalese.

⁴ Hiri-otappaṃ.

⁵ Viriyam, 'the zeal of the fourfold effort (pradhâna) towards the making of Arahatsip,' is the Sinhalese gloss.

⁶ Appamâdo, 'in the search for Arahatsip,' says Hīnaṭi-kumburê.

⁷ Sikkhâ-samâdanaṃ. 'Learning them, investigating their meaning, love of the virtuous law laid down in them,' expands Hīnaṭi-kumburê.

⁸ Uddero. There is a lacuna here in the Sinhalese. It has nothing more till we come to the shaven head.

⁹ Amṛita mahâ avakâsa bhūmiyaṭa says the Sinhalese (p. 205).

¹⁰ Arahati. I have endeavoured to imitate the play upon the words.

reverence and to show respect to the Bhikkhu, though he may be, as yet, unconverted. It is because he sees him to be in the company of those in whom all evil has been destroyed, because he feels that he is not in such society¹, that the converted layman thinks it worthy of him to do reverence and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu. It is because he knows that he has joined the noblest brotherhood, and that he himself has reached no such state, that the converted layman holds it right to do reverence and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu—because he knows that he listens to the recitation of the Pâtimokkha, while he himself can not—because he knows that he receives men into the Order, and thus extends the teaching of the Conqueror, which he himself is incapable of doing—because he knows that he carries out innumerable precepts, which he himself cannot observe—because he knows that he wears the outward signs of Samanaship, and carries out the intention of the Buddha, while he himself is gone away far from that—because he knows that he, though he has given up his hair and beard, and is unanointed and wears no ornaments, yet is anointed with the perfume of righteousness, while he is himself addicted to jewelry and fine apparel—that the converted layman thinks it right to do reverence, and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu.'

3. 'And moreover, O king, it is because he knows that not only are all these twenty personal qualities which go to make a Samana, and the two outward signs, found in the Bhikkhu, but that he carries them

¹ N'atthi me so samayo ti: E sâmagrî lâbhaya ma/a nœtœyi sitâ.

on, and trains others in them, that the converted layman, realising that he has no part in that tradition¹, in that maintenance of the faith, thinks it right to reverence and to show respect to the converted Bhikkhu. [164] Just, O king, as a royal prince who learns his knowledge, and is taught the duties of a Khattiya, at the feet of the Brahman who acts as family chaplain², when after a time he is anointed king, pays reverence and respect to his master in the thought of his being the teacher, and the carrier on of the traditions of the family, so is it right for the converted Bhikkhu to do reverence and to pay respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu.'

4. 'And moreover, O king, you may know by this fact the greatness and the peerless glory of the condition of the Bhikkhus—that if a layman, a disciple of the faith, who has entered upon the Excellent Way, should attain to the realisation of Arahatsip, one of two results must happen to him, and there is no other—he must either die away on that very day, or take upon himself the condition of a Bhikkhu. For immovable, O king, is that state of renunciation, glorious, and most exalted—I mean the condition of being a member of the Order!'

'Venerable Nâgasena, this subtle problem has been thoroughly unravelled by your powerful and great wisdom. No one else could solve it so unless he were wise as you.'

[Here ends the problem as to the precedence of the Dharma.]

¹ Âgamo, which the Sinhalese repeats.

² Purohita, which the Sinhalese repeats.

[THE HARM OF PREACHING.]

5. 'Venerable Nāgasena, you Bhikkhus say that the Tathāgata averts harm from all beings, and does them good¹. And again you say that when he was preaching the discourse based on the simile of the burning fire² hot blood was ejected from the mouths of about sixty Bhikkhus. By his delivery of that discourse he did those Bhikkhus harm and not good. So if the first statement is correct, the second is false; and if the second is correct, the first [165] is false. This too is a double-pointed problem put to you, which you have to solve.'

6. 'Both are true. What happened to them was not the Tathāgata's doing, but their own.'

'But, Nāgasena, if the Tathāgata had not delivered that discourse, then would they have vomited up hot blood?'

'No. When they took wrongly what he said, then was there a burning kindled within them, and hot blood was ejected from their mouths.'

'Then that must have happened, Nāgasena, through the act of the Tathāgata, it must have been the Tathāgata who was the chief cause³ to destroy them. Suppose a serpent, Nāgasena, had crept into an anthill, and a man in want of earth were to break into the anthill, and take the earth of it away. And by his doing so the entrance-hole to the anthill

¹ I cannot give chapter and verse for the words, but the sentiment is common enough.

² This is not the Āditta-pariyāya given in the Mahāvagga I, 21, and the Aggikkhandūpama Sutta in the 7th Book of the Aṅguttara.

³ Adhikāra. Pradhāna is the Sinhalese translation.

were closed up, and the snake were to die in consequence from want of air. Would not the serpent have been killed by that man's action ?'

'Yes, O king.'

'Just so, Nâgasena, was the Tathâgata the prime cause of their destruction.'

7. 'When the Tathâgata delivered a discourse, O king, he never did so either in flattery or in malice. In freedom both from the one and from the other did he speak. And they who received it aright were made wise¹, but they who received it wrongly, fell. Just, O king, as when a man shakes a mango tree or a jambu tree or a mee tree², such of the fruits on it as are full of sap and strongly fastened to it remain undisturbed, but such as have rotten stalks, and are loosely attached, fall to the ground—[166] so was it with his preaching. It was, O king, as when a husbandman, wanting to grow a crop of wheat, ploughs the field, but by that ploughing many hundreds and thousands of blades of grass are killed—or it was as when men, for the sake of sweetness, crush sugar-cane in a mill, and by their doing so such small creatures as pass into the mouth of the mill are crushed also—so was it that the Tathâgata making wise those whose minds were prepared, preached the Dhamma without flattery and without malice. And they who received it aright were made wise, but they who received it wrongly, fell.'

8. 'Then did not those Bhikkhus fall, Nâgasena, just because of that discourse ?'

¹ *Bugg'hanti*: unto Arahatship adds *Hina/i-kumburê*.

² *Madhuka*. See *Gâtaka* IV, 434. The *Sinhalese* (p. 208) has *mîgahak* (*Bassia Latifolia*).

‘How, then, could a carpenter by doing nothing to a piece of timber, and simply laying it by¹, make it straight and fit for use?’

‘No, Sir. He would have to get rid of the bends out of it, if he wanted it straight and ready for use.’

‘Just so, O king, the Tathâgata could not, by merely watching over his disciples, have opened the eyes of those who were ready to see. But by getting rid of those who took the word wrongly he saved those prepared to be saved. And it was by their own act and deed, O king, that the evil-minded fell; just as a plantain tree, or a bambû, or a she-mule are destroyed by that to which they themselves give birth². And just, O king, as it is by their own acts that robbers come to have their eyes plucked out, or to impalement, or to the scaffold, just so were the evil-minded destroyed by their own act, and fell from the teaching of the Conqueror.’

9. ‘And so [167] with those sixty Bhikkhus, they fell neither by the act of the Tathâgata nor of any one else, but solely by their own deed³. Suppose, O king, a man were to give ambrosia⁴ to all the people, and they, eating of it, were to become healthy and long-lived and free from every bodily ill. But one man, on eating it, were by his own bad digestion, to

¹ Rakkhanto, which Hîna/i-kumburê expands in the sense adopted above.

² Plantains and bambûs die when they flower. And it was popular belief in India that she-mules always died if they foaled. See *Kullavagga* VI, 4, 3; VII, 2, 5; *Vimâna Vatthu* 43, 8; *Samyutta Nikâya* VI, 2, 2.

³ Hîna/i-kumburê here inserts a translation of the whole of the Sutta referred to.

⁴ Amatam, with reference, no doubt, to Arahatsip, of which this is also an epithet.

die. Would then, O king, the man who gave away the ambrosia be guilty therein of any offence ?'

'No, Sir.'

'Just so, O king, does the Tathâgata present the gift of his ambrosia to the men and gods in the ten thousand world systems ; and those beings who are capable of doing so are made wise by the nectar of his law, while they who are not are destroyed and fall. Food, O king, preserves the lives of all beings. But some who eat of it die of cholera¹. Is the man who feeds the hungry guilty therein of any offence ?'

'No, Sir.'

'Just so, O king, does the Tathâgata present the gift of his ambrosia to the men and gods in the ten thousand world systems ; and those beings who are capable of doing so are made wise by the nectar of his law, while they who are not are destroyed and fall.'

'Very good, Nâgasena ! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma on the harm resulting from preaching.]

[THE SECRETS OF A TATHÂGATA.]

11. [This dilemma treats of one of the thirty bodily signs of a 'great man' (Mahâpurusha) supposed to be possessed by every Tathâgata, but as it deals with matters not usually spoken of in this century, it is best read in the original.]

[THE FOOLISH FELLOW.]

15. [170] 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Elder Sâriputta, the commander of the faith : "The

¹ Visûkikâya, which Hîna'i-kumburê renders: *Agîrṇa wa wiwekâbâdhayen*. So above, IV, 2, 18.

Tathâgata, brethren, is perfect in courtesy of speech. There is no fault of speech in the Tathâgata concerning which he should have to take care that no one else should know it¹." And on the other hand the Tathâgata, when promulgating the first Pârâgika on the occasion of the offence of Sudinna the Kalanda², addressed him with harsh words, calling him a useless fellow³. And that Elder, on being so called, terrified with the fear of his teacher⁴, and overcome with remorse, was unable to comprehend the Excellent Way⁵. Now if the first statement be correct, the allegation that the Tathâgata called Sudinna the Kalanda a useless fellow must be false. But if that be true, then the first statement must be false. [171] This too is a double-pointed problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

16. 'What Sâriputta the Elder said is true, O king. And the Blessed One called Sudinna a useless fellow on that occasion. But that was not out of rudeness of disposition⁶, it was merely pointing out the real nature (of his conduct) in a way that would do him no harm⁷. And what herein is meant by

¹ I don't know where such a phrase is put into Sâriputta's mouth: but a similar one, as Mr. Trenckner points out, is ascribed to the Buddha at *Âṅguttara* VII, 6, 5.

² Kalanda-putto, where Kalanda (or Kalandaka as some MSS. of the Vinaya spell it) is the name of the clan (see Pârâgika I, 5, 1), not of the father.

³ See the whole speech at Pârâgika I, 5, 11.

⁴ Garuttâsena. Tâso is not in Childers, but occurs *Gâtaka* III, 177, 202.

⁵ There is nothing in the Vinaya account of this result.

⁶ *Duṭṭha-kittena*, which *Hīnaṣi-kumburē* repeats.

⁷ *Asârambhena yâthâva-lakkhaṇena*. For *yâthâva*, which is not in Childers, see Buddhaghosa in the *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini*, p. 65, and Dhammapâla on Theri Gâthâ, 387. *Hīnaṣi-kumburē*

“pointing out the real nature.” If any man, O king, in this birth does not attain to the perception of the Four Truths, then is his manhood (his being born as a man) in vain¹, but if he acts differently he will become different. Therefore is it that he is called a useless fellow². And so the Blessed One addressed Sudinna the Kalandā with words of truth, and not with words apart from the facts.’

17. ‘But, Nāgasena, though a man in abusing another speaks the truth, still we should inflict a small³ fine upon him. For he is guilty of an offence, inasmuch as he, although for something real, abused him by the use of words that might lead to a breach (of the peace)⁴.’

‘Have you ever heard, O king, of a people bowing down before, or rising up from their seats in respect for, or showing honour to, or bringing the complimentary presents (usually given to officials) to a criminal?’

‘No, if a man have committed a crime of whatever sort or kind, if he be really worthy of reproof and punishment, they would rather behead him, or tor-

translates: Upadra karaṇa sitakin ut no wanneya, swabhāwa lakshaṇayen maya ehi wadāla kisiwek æt nam, ē swabhāwa lakshaṇaya maya.

¹ Mogham. So at *Gâtaka* III, 24.

² Mogha-puriso, the same word as I have translated elsewhere ‘foolish fellow,’ following Childers. But I never think that the word means always and only ‘in vain, useless.’ See *Gâtaka* I, 14; III, 24, 25; *Sutta Nipâta* III, 7, 20; *Mahāvagga* VIII, 1, 5; *Kullavagga* V, 11, 3; *Āṅguttara* II, 5, 10; *Sumaṅgala Vilâsini*, p. 55.

³ Literally, ‘a fine of a kahâpana,’ a copper coin worth in our money about a penny. See my ‘Ancient Coins and Measures,’ p. 3.

⁴ *Visum vohâram âkaranto*. The *Sinhalese* (p. 224) has Wen wû wakana wû wyawahârayekin hœsiremin.

ture him¹, or bind him with bonds, or put him to death, or deprive him of his goods².'

'Did then the Blessed One, O king, act with justice or not?'

'With justice, Sir, and in a most fit and proper way. And when, Nâgasena, they hear of it the world of men and gods will be made tender of conscience, and afraid of falling into sin, struck with awe at the sight of it, and still more so when they themselves associate with wrong-doers, or do wrong.'

18. [172] 'Now would a physician, O king, administer pleasant things as a medicine in a case where all the humours of the body were affected, and the whole frame was disorganised and full of disease?'

'No. Wishing to put an end to the disease he would give sharp and scarifying drugs.'

'In the same way, O king, the Tathâgata bestows admonition for the sake of suppressing all the diseases of sin. And the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, soften men and make them tender. Just as hot water, O king, softens and makes tender anything capable of being softened, so are the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, yet as full of benefit, and as full of pity as the words of a father would be to his children. Just, O king, as the drinking of evil-smelling decoctions, the swallowing of nasty drugs, destroys the weaknesses of men's bodies, so are the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, bringers of advantage and laden with pity. And

¹ Hananti. But *himsât kereti* says the *Siṃhalese*.

² *Gâpentī*. Dr. Edward Müller thinks this a misprint for *gâhâpentī* (*Pâli Grammar*, p. 37). *Dhanaya hânayen nirdhanika kereti* is the *Siṃhalese* version.

just, O king, as a ball of cotton falling on a man raises no bruise, so do the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, do no harm.'

'Well have you made this problem clear by many a simile. Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[End of the dilemma as to the Buddha's harsh words to Sudinna.]

[THE TREE TALKING.]

19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Tathâgata said :
 "Brahman! why do you ask an unconscious thing,
 Which cannot hear you, how it does to-day?
 Active, intelligent, and full of life,
 How can you speak to this so senseless thing—
 This wild Palâsa tree¹?"

[173] And on the other hand he said :

"And thus the Aspen tree then made reply :

'I, Bhâradvâga, can speak too. Listen to me².'

'Now if, Nâgasena, a tree is an unconscious thing, it must be false that the Aspen tree spoke to Bhâradvâga. But if that is true, it must be false to say that a tree is unconscious. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

20. 'The Master said, Nâgasena, that a tree is unconscious. And the Aspen tree conversed with Bhâradvâga. But that last is said, O king, by a common form of speech. For though a tree being unconscious cannot talk, yet the word "tree" is used

¹ Gâtaka III, 24. It is not the Tathâgata, but the Bodisat, who speaks.

² Gâtaka IV, 210, where the verses are ascribed to the Buddha.

as a designation of the dryad who dwells therein, and in that sense that "the tree talks" is a well-known expression. Just, O king, as a waggon laden with corn is called a corn-waggon. But it is not made of corn, it is made of wood, yet because of the corn being heaped up in it the people use the expression "corn-waggon." Or just, O king, as when a man is churning sour milk the common expression is that he is churning butter. But it is not butter that he is churning, but milk. Or just, O king, as when a man is making something that does not exist the common expression is that he is making that thing which all the while as yet is not, [174] but people talk of the work as accomplished before it is done. And the Tathâgata, when expounding the Dhamma, does so by means of the phraseology which is in common use among the people.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the talking tree.]

[THE BUDDHA'S LAST ILLNESS.]

21. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Elders who held the Recitation¹:

"When he had eaten Kunda's alms,
The coppersmith's,—thus have I heard,—
The Buddha felt that sickness dire,
That sharp pain even unto death²."

¹ The Council of Râgagaha is meant, at which the Pi^ṭakas were recited. All the so-called Councils are exclusively 'Recitations' (Samg^ātīyo) in Buddhist phraseology. But 'Council' is the best rendering of the word, as Recitation implies so much that would be unintelligible to the ordinary reader.

² Book of the Great Decease, IV, 23.

And afterwards the Blessed One said : " These two offerings of food, Ānanda, equal, of equal fruit, and of equal result, are of much greater fruit and much greater result than any others¹." Now if sharp sickness fell upon the Blessed One, Nāgasena, after he had partaken of Kunda's alms, and sharp pains arose within him even unto death, then that other statement must be wrong. But if that is right then the first must be wrong. How could that alms, Nāgasena, be of great fruit when it turned to poison, gave rise to disease, [175] put an end to the period of his then existence, took away his life ? Explain this to me to the refutation of the adversaries. The people are in bewilderment about this, thinking that the dysentery must have been caused by his eating too much, out of greediness.'

22. ' The Blessed One said, O king, that there were two almsgivings equal, of equal fruit, and equal result, and of much greater fruit, and much greater result than any others,—that which, when a Tathāgata has partaken of it, he attains to supreme and perfect Buddhahood (Enlightenment), and that when he has partaken of which, he passes away by that utter passing away in which nothing whatever remains behind². For that alms is full of virtue, full of advantage. The gods, O king, shouted in joy and gladness at the thought : " This is the last meal the Tathāgata will take," and communicated a divine power of nourishment to that tender

¹ Book of the Great Decease, IV, 57, but with a slightly different reading.

² Book of the Great Decease, loc. cit. The Sinhalese gives the whole context in full.

pork¹. And that was itself in good condition, light, pleasant, full of flavour, and good for digestion². It was not because of it that any sickness fell upon the Blessed One, but it was because of the extreme weakness of his body, and because of the period of life he had to live having been exhausted, that the disease arose, and grew worse and worse—just as when, O king, an ordinary fire is burning, if fresh fuel be supplied, it will burn up still more—or [176] as when a stream is flowing along as usual, if a

¹ *Sûkara-maddava*. There is great doubt as to the exact meaning of this name of the last dish the Buddha partook of. *Maddati* is 'to rub,' or 'to press,' or 'to trample,' and just as 'pressed beef' is ambiguous, so is 'boar-pressed' or 'pork-tender' capable of various interpretations. The exegetical gloss as handed down in the *Mahâ Vihâra* in Anurâdhapure, Ceylon, in the now lost body of tradition called the *Mahâ Aññakathâ*, has been preserved by *Dhammapâla* in his comment on *Udâna* VIII, 5 (p. 81 of Dr. Steinthal's edition for the Pâli Text Society). It means, I think, 'Meat pervaded by the tenderness and niceness of boar's (flesh).' But that is itself ambiguous, and *Dhammapâla* adds that others say the word means not pork or meat at all, but 'the tender top sprout of the bambû plant after it has been trampled upon by swine'—others again that it means a kind of mushroom that grows in ground trodden under foot by swine—others again that it means only a particular kind of flavouring, or sauce. As *Maddana* is rendered by Childers 'withered,' I have translated it in my 'Buddhist Suttas' (pp. 71–73) 'dried boar's flesh.' But the fact is that the exact sense is not known. (*Maddavâni* *pupphâni* at *Dhammapada* 377 is 'withered flowers,' according to Fausbøll. But it may be just as well 'tender flowers,' especially as *Mârdava* in Sanskrit always means 'tender, pitiful,' &c. This is the only passage where the word is known to occur in Pâli apart from those in which *sûkara-maddava* is mentioned.) The *Siṃhalese* here (p. 230) repeats the word and adds the gloss: *E tarunu wû ūru mamsayehi*.

² *Gatharaggi-tegassa hitam*. On this curious old belief in an internal fire see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 260.

heavy rain falls, it will become a mighty river with a great rush of water—or as when the body is of its ordinary girth, if more food be eaten, it becomes broader than before. So this was not, O king, the fault of the food that was presented, and you can not impute any harm to it.'

23. 'But, venerable Nâgasena, why is it that those two gifts of food are so specially meritorious?'

'Because of the attainment of the exalted conditions which resulted from them¹.'

'Of what conditions, Nâgasena, are you speaking?'

'Of the attainment of the nine successive states which were passed through at first in one order, and then in the reverse order².'

'It was on two days, was it not, Nâgasena, that the Tathâgata attained to those conditions in the highest degree?'

'Yes, O king³.'

'It is a most wonderful thing, Nâgasena, and a most strange, that of all the great and glorious gifts which were bestowed upon our Blessed One⁴ not one can be compared with these two alms-givings. Most marvellous is it, that even as those

¹ Dhammânumaggana-samâpatti-varena: which the *Simhalese* merely repeats. For *Anumagganâ* see the text above, p. 62, and *Sumaṅgala Vilâsinî*, p. 65.

² See the full description in the *Book of the Great Decease*, VI, 11-13. ('*Buddhist Suttas*,' pp. 115, 116.) The *Simhalese* is here greatly expanded (pp. 230-233).

³ So our author must have thought that the nine *Anupubba-vihâras* occurred also after the alms given to Gotama before he sat under the Bo Tree, but I know of no passage in the *Piṭakas* which would support this belief. Compare the note 2 in vol. i, p. 74 of the '*Vinaya Texts*,' and the passages there quoted.

⁴ *Buddha-khette dânam*, 'gifts which had the Buddha as the field in which they were bestowed, or sown.'

nine successive conditions are glorious, even so are those gifts made, by their glory, [177] of greater fruit, and of greater advantage than any others. Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha's last illness.]

[ADORATION OF RELICS.]

24. 'Venerable Nāgasena, the Tathāgata said: "Hinder not yourselves, Ānanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathāgata¹." And on the other hand he said:

"Honour that relic of him who is worthy of honour, Acting in that way you go from this world to heaven²."

'Now if the first injunction was right the second must be wrong, and if the second is right the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

25. 'Both the passages you quote were spoken by the Blessed One. But it was not to all men, it was to the sons of the Conqueror³ that it was said: "Hinder not yourselves, Ānanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathāgata⁴." Paying reverence is not the work of the sons of the Conqueror, [178] but rather the grasping of the true nature of all

¹ Book of the Great Decease, V, 24.

² Not found in any of the Pīṭaka texts as yet published.

³ Gīṇa-puttāṇam. That is, the members of the Order.

⁴ Here again Hīnaśī-kumburē goes into a long account of the attendant circumstances (pp. 233, 234).

compounded things, the practice of thought, contemplation in accordance with the rules of *Satipatthâna*, the seizing of the real essence of all objects of thought, the struggle against evil, and devotion to their own (spiritual) good. These are things which the sons of the Conqueror ought to do, leaving to others, whether gods or men, the paying of reverence ¹.

26. 'And that is so, O king, just as it is the business of the princes of the earth to learn all about elephants, and horses, and chariots, and bows, and rapiers, and documents, and the law of property ², to carry on the traditions of the Khattiya clans, and to fight themselves and to lead others in war, while husbandry, merchandise, and the care of cattle are the business of other folk, ordinary Vessas and Suddas.—Or just as the business of Brahmins and their sons is concerned with the *Rig-veda*, the *Yagur-veda*, the *Sâma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, with the knowledge of lucky marks (on the body), of legends ³, *Purâṇas*, lexicography ⁴, prosody, phonology, verses, grammar, etymology, astrology, interpretation of omens, and of dreams, and of signs, study of the six *Vedāṅgas*, of eclipses of the sun and moon, of the prognostications to be drawn from the flight of comets, the thunderings of the gods, the junctions of planets, the fall of meteors, earthquakes, conflagrations, and signs in the heavens and on the earth, the study of arithmetic, of cas-

¹ This is really only an expansion and a modernisation of the context of the passage quoted.

² *Lekha-muddâ*. See the note above on I, 1, 10.

³ *Itihâsa*, 'the *Bhârata* and the *Râmâyana*,' says the *Simhalese*.

⁴ 'Of names of trees and so on,' says *Hīnaśi-kumburê*.

uistry, of the interpretation of the omens to be drawn from dogs, and deer, and rats, and mixtures of liquids, and the sounds and cries of birds—while husbandry, merchandise, and the care of cattle are the business of other folk, ordinary Vessas and Suddas. So it was, O king, in the sense of “Devote not yourselves to such things as are not your business, but to such things as are so” that the Tathâgata was speaking [179] when he said: “Hinder not yourselves, Ānanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathâgata.” And if, O king, he had not said so, then would the Bhikkhus have taken his bowl and his robe, and occupied themselves with paying reverence to the Buddha through them¹!

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to reverence to relics.]

[THE SPLINTER OF ROCK.]

27. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, you Bhikkhus say that: “When the Blessed One walked along, the earth, unconscious though it is, filled up its deep places, and made its steep places plain².” And on the other hand you say that a splinter of

¹ This certainly looks as if our author did not know anything of the worship paid to the supposed bowl of the Buddha, or of the feast, the Patta-maha, held in its honour. The passage may therefore be used as an argument for the date of the book. Fâ-Hien saw this bowl-worship in full force at Peshawar about 400 A. D. See Chapter xii of his travels (Dr. Legge’s translation, pp. 35-37).

² Not found as yet in the Piṭakas.

rock grazed his foot¹. When that splinter was falling on his foot why did it not, then, turn aside? If it be true that the unconscious earth makes its deep places full and its steep places plain for him, then it must be untrue that the splinter of rock hurt his foot. But if the latter statement be true, then the first must be false. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

28. 'Both statements, O king, are true. But that splinter of rock did not fall of itself², it was cast down through the act of Devadatta. Through hundreds of thousands of existences, O king, had Devadatta borne a grudge against the Blessed One³. It was through that hatred that he seized hold of a mighty mass of rock, and pushed it over with the hope that it would fall upon the Buddha's head. But two other rocks came together, and intercepted it before it reached the Tathâgata, and by the force of their impact a splinter was torn off, and fell in such a direction that it struck [180] the Blessed One's foot.'

29. 'But, Nâgasena, just as two rocks intercepted that mighty mass, so could the splinter have been intercepted.'

'But a thing intercepted, O king, can escape, slip through, or be lost—as water does, through the fingers, when it is taken into the hand—or milk, or buttermilk, or honey, or ghee, or oil, or fish curry,

¹ Kullavagga VII, 3, 9. Compare the *Samyutta Nikâya* I, 4, 8; IV, 2, 3 (pp. 27 and 110 of M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pâli Text Society).

² Attaro dhammatâya.

³ So above, IV, 2, 64, and below, IV, 4, 41.

or gravy—or as fine, subtle, minute, dusty grains of sand do, through the fingers, if you close your fist on them—or as rice will escape sometimes when you have taken it into your fingers, and are putting it into your mouth.’

30. ‘Well, let that be so, Nāgasena. I admit that the rock was intercepted. But the splinter ought at least to have paid as much respect to the Buddha as the earth did.’

‘There are these twelve kinds of persons, O king, who pay no respect—the lustful man in his lust, and the angry man in his malice, and the dull man in his stupidity, and the puffed-up man in his pride, and the bad man in his want of discrimination, and the obstinate man in his want of docility, and the mean man in his littleness, and the talkative man in his vanity, and the wicked man in his cruelty, and the wretched man in his misery, and the gambler [181] because he is overpowered by greed, and the busy man in his search after gain. But that splinter, just as it was broken off by the impact of the rocks, fell by chance¹ in such a direction that it struck against the foot of the Blessed One—just as fine, subtle, and minute grains of sand, when carried away by the force of the wind, are sprinkled down by chance in any direction they may happen to take. If the splinter, O king, had not been separated from the rock of which it formed a part, it too would have been intercepted by their meeting together. But, as it was, it was neither fixed on the earth, nor did it remain stationary in the air, but fell whithersoever

¹ Animitta-kata-disâ, which the *Siṃhalese* (p. 238) merely repeats.

chance directed it, and happened to strike against the Blessed One's foot—just as dried leaves might fall if caught up in a whirlwind. And the real cause of its so striking against his foot was the sorrow-working deed¹ of that ungrateful, wicked, Devadatta.'

'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to the splinter grazing the Buddha's foot.]

[THE SAMANA.]

31. 'Venerable Nāgasena, the Blessed One said: "A man becomes a Samana by the destruction of the Āsavas²." But on the other hand he said:

"The man who has these dispositions four

Is he whom the world knows as Samana³."

And in that passage these are the four dispositions referred to—long-suffering, temperance in food, renunciation⁴, and the being without the attachments⁵ (arising from lust, ill-will, and dulness). Now these four dispositions are equally found in those who are still defective, in whom [182] the

¹ Dukkhanubhāvanā—the sorrow being Devadatta's subsequent existence in purgatory.

² That is 'of sensuality, individuality, delusion, and ignorance.' I don't know which is the passage referred to.

³ Also not traced as yet in the texts.

⁴ Vipphānā, not in Childers, but see Sutta Nipāta V, 14, 4, 5. Hīna-kumburē (p. 239) renders it ālaya hōrfma.

⁵ Ākinkaṇṇa, not having the three kiṇṇanas mentioned. Hīna-kumburē (p. 239) takes it to mean the practice of the Ākiṇṇāyatana meditation. But if so that would surely have been the word used.

Âsavas have not yet been completely destroyed. So that if the first statement be correct, the second is wrong, and if the second be right the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

32. 'Both statements, O king, were made by the Blessed One. But the second was said of the characteristics of such and such men; the first is an inclusive statement—that all in whom the Âsavas are destroyed are Samanas. And moreover, of all those who are made perfect by the suppression of evil, if you take them in regular order one after the other, then the Samana in whom the Âsavas are destroyed is acknowledged to be the chief—just, O king, as of all flowers produced in the water or on the land, the double jasmine¹ is acknowledged to be the chief, all other kinds of flowers of whatever sort are merely flowers, and taking them in order it is the double jasmine that people most desire and like. Or just, O king, as of all kinds of grain, rice is acknowledged to be the chief, all other kinds of grain, of whatever sort, [183] are useful for food and for the support of the body, but if you take them in order, rice is acknowledged as the best.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the dilemma as to what constitutes a Samana.]

¹ Varsikâ (Dâsaman mal, jasminum zambac).

[THE BUDDHA'S EXULTATION.]

33. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said : " If, O Bhikkhus, any one should speak in praise of me, or of our religion (Dhamma), or of the Order, you should not thereupon indulge in joy, or delight, or exultation of mind¹". And on the other hand the Tathâgata was so delighted, and pleased, and exultant at the deserved praise bestowed on him by Sela the Brahman, that he still further magnified his own goodness in that he said :

" A king am I, Sela, the king supreme
Of righteousness. The royal chariot wheel
In righteousness do I set rolling on—

That wheel that no one can turn back again²!"

Now if the passage first quoted be right then must the second be wrong, but if that be right then must the first be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

34. [184] 'Both your quotations, O king, are correct. But the first passage was spoken by the Blessed One with the intention of setting forth truthfully, exactly, in accordance with reality, and fact, and

¹ From the Brahma-gâla Sutta in the Dîgha Nikâya (I, 1, 5).

² From the Sela Sutta in the Sutta Nipâta (III, 7, 7). Professor Fausbøll in his translation of this stanza (at vol. x, p. 102 of the 'Sacred Books of the East') draws attention to the parallel at John xviii. 37. 'Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born. And for this cause came I into the world that I should bear witness unto the truth'—where 'truth,' if one translated the verse into Pâli, would be correctly rendered by Dhamma, 'righteousness, religion, truth, essential quality.' Professor Fausbøll's version of the stanza runs : 'I am a king, O Sela, an incomparable religious (Dhamma-râga) king, with justice (Dhamma). I turn the wheel, a wheel that is irresistible.'

sense, the real nature, and essence, and characteristic marks of the Dhamma. And the second passage was not spoken for the sake of gain or fame, nor out of party spirit, nor in the lust of winning over men to become his followers. But it was in mercy and love, and with the welfare of others in view, conscious that thereby three hundred young Brahmans would attain to the knowledge of the truth, that he said: "A king am I, Sela, the king supreme of righteousness."

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to exultation of mind.]

[KINDNESS AND PUNISHMENT.]

35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "Doing no injury to any one

Dwell full of love and kindness in the world¹."

And on the other hand he said: "Punish him who deserves punishment², favour him who is worthy of favour." [185] Now punishment, Nâgasena, means the cutting off of hands or feet, flogging³, casting into bonds, torture⁴, execution, degradation in rank⁵.

¹ From the 521st Gâtaka.

² The crux lies in the ambiguity of this phrase as will be seen below.

³ Vadha, which is ambiguous, and means also 'killing.' The Sinhalese repeats the word.

⁴ Kâraṇâ, which Hînaśi-kumburê renders *tœlîmaya*, 'flogging.'

⁵ Santati-vikopanam, literally 'breach of continuity.' Hînaśi-kumburê explains it to mean 'injury to the duration of life,' and this may be the author's meaning, as he is fond of heaping together a string of words, some of which mean the same thing. But as

Such a saying is therefore not worthy of the Blessed One, and he ought not to have made use of it. For if the first injunction be right then this must be wrong, and if this be right then the injunction to do no injury to any one, but to dwell full of love and kindness in the world, must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

36. 'The Blessed One, great king, gave both the commands you quote. As to the first, to do no injury to any one, but to live full of love and kindness in the world—that is a doctrine approved by all the Buddhas. And that verse is an injunction, an unfolding of the Dhamma, for the Dhamma has as its characteristic that it works no ill. And the saying is thus in thorough accord with it. But as to the second command you quote that is a special use of terms [which you have misunderstood. The real meaning of them is: "Subdue that which ought to be subdued, strive after, cultivate, favour what is worthy of effort, cultivation, and approval"]. The proud heart, great king, is to be subdued, and the lowly heart cultivated—the wicked heart to be subdued, and the good heart to be cultivated—carelessness of thought is to be subdued, and exactness of thought to be cultivated—[186] he who is given over to wrong views is to be subdued, and he who has attained to right views is to be cultivated—he who is not noble¹ is to be subdued, and the noble one is

santati means also 'lineage, descent,' the phrase may equally well refer to the sort of punishment I have ventured to put into the text.

¹ Ariyo and anariyo used technically in the sense of one who has not, and one who has, entered upon the Noble Eightfold Path.

to be cultivated—the robber¹ is to be subdued, and the honest brother is to be cultivated.’

37. ‘Let that be so, Nāgasena. But now, in that last word of yours, you have put yourself into my power, you have come round to the sense in which I put my question. For how, venerable Nāgasena, is the robber to be subdued by him who sets to work to subdue him?’

‘Thus, great king—if deserving of rebuke let him be rebuked, if of a fine let him be fined, if of banishment let him be banished, if of death let him be put to death.’

‘Is then, Nāgasena, the execution of robbers part of the doctrine laid down by the Tathāgatas?’

‘Certainly not, O king.’

‘Then why have the Tathāgatas laid down that the robber is to be taught better?’

‘Whosoever, great king, may be put to death, he does not suffer execution by reason of the opinion put forth by the Tathāgatas. He suffers by reason of what he himself has done. But notwithstanding that the doctrine of the Dhamma has been taught (by the Buddhas)², would it be possible, great king, for a man who had done nothing wrong, and was walking innocently along the streets, to be seized and put to death by any wise person?’

‘Certainly not.’

¹ Coro probably here used figuratively of a member of the Order who is unworthy of it, and injures believing laymen. So the word is used, for instance, in the introductory story (in the Sutta Vibhaṅga) to the fourth Pārāgikā—where four sorts of such religious ‘robbers’ are distinguished (compare our ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’). But the king takes it literally.

² The three words in brackets are Hīnaśī-kumburē’s gloss.

‘But why?’

‘Because of his innocence.’

‘Just so, great king, since the thief is not put to death through the word of the Tathâgata, but only through his own act, how can any fault be rightly found on that account with the Teacher?’

‘It could not be, Sir.’

‘So you see the teaching of the Tathâgatas is a righteous teaching.’

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the problem as to kindness and punishment.]

[THE DISMISSAL OF THE ELDERS.]

38. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One :

“Anger I harbour not, nor sulkiness¹.”

But on the other hand the Tathâgata dismissed the Elders Sâriputta and Moggallâna, together with the brethren who formed their company of disciples².

¹ From the Dhaniya Sutta in the Sutta Nipâta (I, 2, 2).

² The episode here referred to will be found in the *Magghima Nikâya*, No. 67. *Hînaśi-kumburê* gives it in full. The Buddha was staying at the *Âmalakî* garden near the Sâkya town called *Kâtumâ*. There the two elders with their attendant 500 disciples came to call upon him. The resident Bhikkhus received them with applause, and a great hubbub arose. The Buddha enquired what that noise was, like the chattering of fishermen when a net full of fishes was drawn to shore. *Ânanda* told him. Thereupon the Buddha called the brethren together, made a discourse to them on the advantages of quiet, and ‘sent away’ the visitors. They went to the public rest-house in the town. The town’s folk enquired why, and

How now, Nāgasena, [187] was it in anger that the Tathāgata sent away¹ the disciples, or was it in pleasure? Be so good as to explain to me how this was². For if, Nāgasena, he dismissed them in anger, then had the Tathāgata not subdued all liability to anger in himself. But if it was in pleasure, then he did so ignorantly, and without due cause. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

39. 'The Blessed One did say, O king :

" Anger I harbour not, nor sulkiness."

And he did dismiss the Elders with their disciples. But that was not in anger. Suppose, O king, that a man were to stumble against some root, or stake, or stone, or potsherd, or on uneven ground, and fall upon the broad earth. Would it be that the broad earth, angry with him, had made him fall ?'

' No, indeed, Sir. The broad earth feels neither anger against any man nor delight. It is altogether

when they heard the reason, went to the Buddha, and obtained his forgiveness for the offending brethren. The incident is the basis of another question below, IV, 4, 41.

¹ *Paṇāmesi* means, in the technical legal phraseology of the Buddhist canon law, 'formally dismissed, sent away, did not allow them any more to be his disciples.' On this technical meaning of the term, compare *Mahāvagga* I, 2, 27, and *Kullavagga* XII, 2, 3. (Childers does not give this use of the word.) But it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which the Buddha could so have dismissed his two principal disciples. So I think we must take the word in a less formal sense—such, for instance, as we find in *Thera Gāthā* 511, 557.

² *Etam tāva gānāhi imam nāmāti*. I follow Hīnaś-kumburē's rendering (p. 244) of this difficult phrase, according to which there ought to be a full stop in the text after *paṇāmesi*, and these words are supposed to be addressed to Nāgasena by Milinda. But I am not at all satisfied that he is right, and the text may be corrupt.

free from ill-will, neither needs it to fawn on any one. It would be by reason of his own carelessness that that man stumbled and fell.'

'Just so, great king, do the Tathâgatas experience neither anger against, nor pride in any man. Altogether free are the Tathâgatas, the Arahât-Buddhas, alike from ill-will, and from the need to fawn on any one. And those disciples were sent away by reason of what they themselves had done. So also the great ocean endures not association with any corpse. Any dead body there may be in it that does it promptly cast up, and leave high and dry on the shore¹. But is it in anger that it casts it up?'

'Certainly not, Sir. The broad ocean feels neither anger against any, nor does it take delight in any. It seeks not in the least to please any, and is altogether free from the desire to harm.'

'Just so, great king, do the Tathâgatas feel neither anger against any man, nor do they place their faith in any man. The Tathâgatas, the Arahât-Buddhas, are quite set free from the desire either to gain the goodwill of any man, or to do him harm. And it was by reason of what they themselves had done that those disciples were sent away. Just as a man, great king, who stumbles against the ground is made to fall, so is he who stumbles in the excellent teaching of the Conqueror made to go away. Just as a corpse in the great ocean is cast up, [188] so is he who stumbles in the excellent teaching of the Conqueror sent away. And when the Tathâgata sent those disciples away it was for their good, and their

¹ This supposed fact is already the ground of a comparison in the *Kullavagga* IX, 1, 3, 4 ('*Vinaya Texts*,' III, 303).

gain, their happiness, and their purification, and in order that in that way they should be delivered from birth, old age, disease, and death.'

'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the dismissal of
the Elders.]

Here ends the Third Chapter.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER 4.

[THE MURDER OF MOGGALLÂNA.]

1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "This is the chief, O Bhikkhus, of those of my disciples in the Order who are possessed of the power of Iddhi, I mean Moggallâna¹." But on the other hand they say his death took place by his being beaten to death with clubs, so that his skull was broken, and his bones ground to powder, and all his flesh and nerves bruised and pounded together². Now, Nâgasena, if the Elder, the great Moggallâna, had really attained to supremacy in the magical power of Iddhi, then it cannot be true that he was beaten to death with clubs³. But if his death was on that wise, then the saying that he was chief of those possessed of Iddhi must be wrong. How could he who was not even able, by his power of Iddhi, to prevent his own murder, be worthy nevertheless to stand as succour to the world of gods and men? This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

2. 'The Blessed One did declare, O king, that Moggallâna was chief among the disciples in power

¹ From the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* I, xiv, 1 (page 23 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pāli Text Society).

² Parikatto, which the *Siṃhalese* version renders *garhâ wemin*.

³ 'By robbers,' adds *Hinañi-kumburê*, so there is no question of martyrdom.

of Iddhi. And he was nevertheless beaten to death by clubs. But that was through his being then possessed by the still greater power of Karma¹.

3. 'But, venerable Nāgasena, [189] are not both of these things appurtenant to him who has the power of Iddhi—that is the extent of his power, and the result of his Karma—both alike unthinkable? And cannot the unthinkable be held back by the unthinkable? Just, Sir, as those who want the fruits will knock a wood apple² down with a wood apple, or a mango with a mango, so ought not the unthinkable in like manner to be subject to restraint by the unthinkable?'

'Even among things beyond the reach of the imagination, great king, still one is in excess above the other, one more powerful than the other. Just, O king, as the monarchs of the world are alike in kind, but among them, so alike in kind, one may overcome the rest, and bring them under his command—just so among things beyond the grasp of the imagination is the productive effect of Karma by far the most powerful. It is precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all the rest, and has them under its rule; and no other influence is of any avail to the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end³. It is as when, O king, any man has committed an offence against the law⁴.

¹ Kammādhigahitenāpi, which the *Siṃhalese* merely repeats. Compare the use of *adhigaṇhāti* at *Āṅguttara Nikāya* V, 31 (*adhigaṇhāti taṃ tena*, 'surpasses him in that'), and see below.

² *Kapittham* (*Feronia Elephantum*), which the *Siṃhalese* renders *Diwul gedī*.

³ 'No good action has an opportunity at the time when evil Karma is in possession of a man,' says *Hīnaśi-kumburē* (p. 250).

⁴ *Pakarane aparaggāṭi*, literally 'against the book,' the book

Neither his mother nor his father, neither his sisters nor his brother, neither his friends nor his intimate associates can protect him then. He has fallen therein under the power of the king who will issue his command respecting him. And why is that so? Because of the wrong that he has done. So is it precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all other influences, and has them under its command, and no other influence can avail the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end. It is as when a jungle fire has arisen on the earth, then can not even a thousand pots of water avail to put it out, but the conflagration overpowers all, and brings it under its control. And why is that so? Because of the fierceness of its heat. So is it precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all other influences, and has them under its command; and no other influence can avail the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end. That is why the venerable one, great king, the great Moggallāna, when, at a time when he was possessed by Karma, he was being beaten to death with clubs, was yet unable to make use of his power of Iddhi¹.

‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the problem as to the murder of Moggallāna.]

of the law being, no doubt, understood. But the *Siṃhalese* has ‘against any one.’

¹ Iddhiyā samannāhāro nāho si. See the use of this word, which is not in Childers, at p. 123 of the *Sumaṅgala* (on *Dīgha* I, 3, 24). The *Siṃhalese* goes on to much greater length than the *Pāli*, giving the full religious life history of the famous disciple (pp. 250, 251).

[ON SECRET DOCTRINE.]

4. [190] 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "The Dhamma and the Vinaya (Doctrine and Canon Law) proclaimed by the Tathāgata shine forth when they are displayed, and not when they are concealed¹." But on the other hand the recitation of the Pātimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya Piṭaka are closed and kept secret². So that if, Nāgasena, you (members of the Order) carried out what is just, and right, and held of faith in the teaching of the Conqueror then would the Vinaya shine forth as an open thing. And why would that be so? Because all the instruction therein, the discipline, the self-control, the regulations as to moral and virtuous conduct, are in their essence full of truth and righteousness, and redounding to emancipation of heart. But if the Blessed One really said that the Dhamma and Vinaya proclaimed by the Tathāgata shine forth when displayed and not when kept secret, then the saying that the recitation of the Pātimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya must be kept secret must be wrong. And if that be right, then the saying of the Blessed One must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

5. 'It was said, O king, by the Blessed One that the Dhamma and Vinaya proclaimed by the Tathā-

¹ From the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* III, 124 (vol. i, p. 283 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pāli Text Society).

² In the Vinaya (*Mahāvagga* II, 16, 8) it is laid down that the Pātimokkha (the rules of the Order) is not to be recited before laymen. I know of no passage in the Piṭakas which says that it, or the Vinaya, is to be kept secret.

gata shine forth when displayed, and not when kept secret. And on the other hand the recitation of the Pâtimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya Piṭṭaka are kept close and secret¹. But this last is not the case as regards all men. They are only kept secret up to a certain limit. And the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is kept secret up to that certain limit on three grounds—firstly because that is the traditional custom² of previous Tathâgatas, secondly out of respect for the Truth (Dhamma), and thirdly out of respect for the position of a member of the Order³.

6. 'And as to the first it was the universal custom, O king, of previous Tathâgatas for the recitation of the Pâtimokkha to take place in the midst of the members of the Order only, to the exclusion of all others. Just, O king, as the Kshatriya secret formulas (of the nobles) are handed down among the nobles alone, and that this or that is so is common tradition among the nobles⁴ of the world and kept secret from all others—[191] so was this the universal custom of previous Tathâgatas, that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha should take place among the

¹ This is, so far as I know, the earliest mention of this being the case. There is nothing in the Pâtimokkha itself (see my translation of this list of offences against the rules of the Order in vol. i of the 'Vinaya Texts' in the S.B.E.) as to its recitation taking place in secret, and nothing in the Vinaya as to its being kept secret. But the regulations in the Vinaya as to the recitation of the Pâtimokkha forbade the actual presence of any one not a member of the Order, and as a matter of fact any one not such a member is excluded in practice during its recitation now in Ceylon. But it would be no offence in a layman to read the Vinaya, and learned laymen who have left the Order still do so.

² *Vamsa* (repeated in the *Siṃhalese*).

³ *Bhikkhu-bhūmiyâ* (also repeated in the *Siṃhalese*, p. 252).

⁴ *Khaṇḍīyânam* (but the *Siṃhalese* has *Sakyayangê*).

members of the Order only, and be kept secret from all others. And again, just as there are several classes of people, O king, known as distinct in the world—such as wrestlers, tumblers, jugglers, actors, ballet-dancers, and followers of the mystic cult of the sun and moon, of the goddess of fortune and other gods¹. And the secrets of each of these sects are handed on in the sect itself, and kept hidden from all others. Just so with the universal custom of all the Tathâgatas that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha should take place before the members of the Order only, and be kept secret from all others. This is why the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, up to that extent, kept secret in accordance with the habit of previous Tathâgatas.'

7. 'And how is it that the Pâtimokkha is kept secret, up to that extent, out of reverence for the Dhamma? The Dhamma, great king, is venerable and weighty. He who has attained to proficiency in it may exhort another in this wise: "Let not this Dhamma so full of truth, so excellent, fall into the hands of those unversed in it, where it would be despised and contemned, treated shamefully, made a game of, and found fault with. Nor let it fall into the hands of the wicked who would deal with it in all respects as badly as they." It is thus, O king, that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, up to that

¹ There are twenty classes of these people mentioned in the text, and the meaning of most of the names is obscure. The *Simhalese* simply repeats them all, adding only the word *bhaktiyo*, 'believers in,' to the names of the various divinities. The classing together of jugglers, ballet-dancers, and followers of the numerous mystic cults, so numerous in India, is thoroughly Buddhistic, and quite in the vein of Gotama himself—as, for instance, in the *Mahâ Sîla* (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 196).

extent, kept secret out of reverence for the Dhamma. For if not, then it would be like the best, most costly, and most rare red sandal wood of the finest kind, which when brought to Savara (that city of the outcast *Kandâlas*¹) is despised and contemned, treated shamefully, made game of, and found fault with.'

8. [192] 'And how is it that the Pâtimokkha is kept secret, up to that extent, out of reverence for the position of a member of the Order? The condition of a Bhikkhu, great king, is in glory beyond the reach of calculation by weight, or measure, or price. None can value it, weigh it, measure it. And the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is carried on before the Bhikkhus alone, lest any one who has occupied that position should be brought down to a level with the men of the world. Just, O king, as if there be any priceless thing, in vesture or floor covering, in elephants, chargers, or chariots, in gold or silver or jewels or pearls or women, or in unsurpassable strong drink², all such things are the appanage of kings—just so, O king, whatever is most priceless in the way of training, of the traditions of the Blessed One, of learning, of conduct, and of the virtues of righteousness and self-control—all these are the appanages of the Order of Bhikkhus. This is why the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, to that extent, kept secret³.'

¹ Added from the Simhalese.

² *Niggita-kamma-surâ*, rendered in the Simhalese (p. 254), *gaya-grîhita-kṛtya-surâ-pânayen*.

³ It will be noticed that there is no mention here (in a connection where, if it had then existed, it would almost certainly have been referred to) of any Esoteric Buddhism. So above, at

‘Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the problem as to the secrecy in which the Vinaya is kept.]

[THE TWO KINDS OF FALSEHOOD.]

9. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One that a deliberate lie is an offence of the greatest kind (involving exclusion from the Order ¹).

IV, 1, 8, it is stated that a good Buddhist teacher should keep nothing secret from his pupil. And even in so old a text as the ‘Book of the Great Decease’ (Chap. II, § 32, p. 36 of my translation in the ‘Buddhist Suttas’), it is said of the Buddha himself that he had ‘no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps some things back.’ This passage is itself quoted above at IV, 2, 4, as the basis of one of Milinda’s questions; and is entirely accepted by Nâgasena, that is, by our author. The fact is that there has never been any such thing as esoteric teaching in Buddhism, and that the modern so called esoteric Buddhism is neither esoteric nor Buddhism. Its tenets, so far as they are Indian at all, are perfectly accessible, are well known to all those who choose to study the books of Indian mysticism, and are Hindu, not Buddhist. They are, indeed, quite contradictory to Buddhism, of which the authors of what they ignorantly call Esoteric Buddhism know but very little—that little being only a portion of those beliefs which have been common ground to all religious teachers in India. If one doctrine—more than any other—is distinctive of Buddhism, it is the ignoring, in ethics, of the time-honoured belief in a soul—that is, in the old sense, in a separate creature inside the body, which flies out of it, like a bird out of a cage, when the body dies. Yet the Theosophists, who believe, I am told, in seven souls inside each human body (which would be worse according to true Buddhism than seven devils), still venture to call themselves Buddhists, and do not see the absurdity of their position!

¹ Sampagâna-musâvâda pâragikâ. This is curious as according to the Pâtimokkha it is Pâṭittiya, not Pâragikâ. Compare Pâragikâ 4 with Pâṭittiya 1. (‘Vinaya Texts,’ S. B. E., vol. iii, pp. 5 and 32.)

And again he said: "By a deliberate lie a Bhikkhu commits a minor offence, one that ought to be the subject of confession made before another (member of the Order)¹." Now, venerable Nāgasena, what is herein the distinction, what the reason, that by one lie a Bhikkhu is cast out of the Order, and by another he is guilty only of an offence that can be atoned for. If the first decision be right, then the second must be wrong; but if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

10. [193]² 'Both your quotations, O king, are correct³. But a falsehood is a light or heavy offence according to the subject matter. For what do you think, great king? Suppose a man were to give another a slap with his hand, what punishment would you inflict upon him?'

'If the other refused to overlook the matter, then neither should we be able to pardon his assailant⁴, but should mulct him in a penny or so⁵.'

'But on the other hand, suppose it had been you

¹ I cannot trace these identical words in the Piṭaka texts. But the general sense of them is exactly in agreement with the first Pāṭiṭiya rule.

² Hīnaśi-kumburê here inserts a summary of the Introductory Story (in the Sutta Vibhaṅga) to the 4th Pārāgikā. All this (pp. 254-256) stands in his version for lines 1-3 on p. 193 of the Pāli text.

³ The Pāli repeats them word for word. As I have pointed out above, they are not really correct.

⁴ So Hīnaśi-kumburê, who must have had a different reading, and I think a better one, before him.

⁵ A kaḥāpaṇa. See the discussion of the value of this coin in my 'Ancient Coins and Measures,' pp. 3, 4.

yourself that he had given the blow to, what would then be the punishment ?'

'We should condemn him to have his hands cut off, and his feet cut off, and to be skinned alive¹, and we should confiscate all the goods in his house, and put to death all his family to the seventh generation on both sides.'

'But, great king, what is the distinction? Why is it that for one slap of the hand there should be a gentle fine of a penny, while for a slap given to you there should be so fearful a retribution ?'

'Because of the difference in the person (assaulted).'

'Well! just so, great king, is a falsehood a light or a heavy offence according to the attendant circumstances.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the degree of offence in falsehood.]

[THE BODISAT'S CONSIDERATION.]

11. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One in the discourse on the essential conditions²: "Long ago have his parents been destined for each Bodisat, and the kind of tree he is to select for his Bo tree, and the

¹ *Yâva sîsam kalîrakkheggam khedâpeyyâma*, which the Sinhalese merely repeats. It is literally 'We should have him "bambû-sprout-cut" up to his head.' What this technical term may mean is not exactly known—possibly having slits the shape of a bambû sprout cut all over his body.

² *Dhammatâ-dhamma-pariyâye*. I don't know where this is to be found.

Bhikkhus who are to be his two chief disciples, and the lad who is to be his son, and the member of the Order who is to be his special attendant." But on the other hand he said: "When yet in the condition of a god in the Tusita heaven the Bodisat makes the eight Great Investigations—he investigates the time (whether the right moment had come at which he ought to be re-born as a man), and the continent (in which his birth is to take place), and the country (where he is to be re-born), and the family (to which he is to belong), and the mother (who is to bear him), and the period (during which he was to remain in the womb), and the month (in which his birthday shall come), and his renunciation (when it shall be)¹. [194] Now, Nāgasena, before knowledge is ripe there is no understanding, but when it has reached its summit there is no longer any need to wait for thinking a matter over¹, for there is nothing outside the ken of the omniscient mind. Why then should the Bodisat investigate the time, thinking to himself: "In what moment shall I be born²?" And for the same reason why should he investigate the family, thinking to him-

¹ These eight Investigations (*Vilokanāni*) have not yet been found in the *Piṭaka* texts. But, when relating the birth of the historical Buddha, the *Gāṭaka* commentary (vol. i, p. 48, of Professor Fausböll's edition) mentions the first six of them (substituting *okāsa* for *desa*), and calls them, oddly enough, the Five Great Investigations. In the corresponding passage in the *Lalita Vistara* only the first four are mentioned. The last two of the above eight seem very forced.

² *Nimesantaram na āgameti*, for which *Hīnañ-kumburē* (p. 256 at the end) has *nivesantara*. Neither word occurs elsewhere.

self: "In what family shall I be born?" And if, Nāgasena, it is a settled matter who shall be the parents of the Bodisat, then it must be false that he "investigated the family." But if that be true, then must the other saying be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

12. 'It was both a settled matter, O king, who should be the parents of the Bodisat, and he did investigate into the question as to which family he was to be born into. But how did he do so? He thought over the matter as to whether his parents should be nobles or Brahmans. With respect to eight things, O king, should the future be investigated before it comes to pass. A merchant, O king, should investigate goods before he buys them—an elephant should try with its trunk a path it has not yet trod—a cartman should try a ford he has not yet crossed over—a pilot should test a shore he has not yet arrived at, and so guide the ship—a physician should find out the period of life which his patient has lasted¹ before he treats his disease—a traveller should test the stability of a bambû bridge² before he mounts on to it—a Bhikkhu should find out how much time has yet to run before sun turn before he begins to eat his meal—and Bodisats, before they are born, should investigate the question whether it would be right for them to be born in the family of a noble or of a Brahman.

¹ Âyum oloketvâ, which the *Sinhalese* (p. 257) repeats. This implied meaning is doubtful.

² Uttara-setu, a word which does not occur elsewhere. Hīnañ-kumburê renders it He-danda, which Clough explains as a foot-bridge usually made of a single tree.

These are the eight occasions on which investigation ought to precede action.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the Bodisat's consideration.]

[ON SUICIDE.]

13. [195] 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One : "A brother is not, O Bhikkhus, to commit suicide. Whosoever does so shall be dealt with according to the law¹." And on the other hand you (members of the Order) say : "On whatsoever subject the Blessed One was addressing the disciples, he always, and with various similes, preached to them in order to bring about the destruction of birth, of old age, of disease, and of death. And whosoever overcame birth, old age, disease, and death, him did he honour with the highest praise²." Now if the Blessed One forbade suicide that saying of yours must be wrong, but if not then the prohibition of suicide must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

14. 'The regulation you quote, O king, was laid down by the Blessed One, and yet is our saying you refer to true. And there is a reason for this, a

¹ Literally 'is not to throw himself down,' and I think 'from a precipice' is to be understood, especially as the nearest approach to the words quoted, that is the passage in the Sutta Vibhaṅga on the 3rd Pârâgika (III, 5, 13), has that meaning.

² Here again the passage referred to is not known.

reason for which the Blessed One both prohibited (the destruction of life), and also (in another sense) instigated us to it.'

'What, Nâgasena, may that reason be?'

'The good man, O king, perfect in uprightness, is like a medicine to men¹ in being an antidote to the poison of evil, he is like water to men in laying the dust and the impurities of evil dispositions, he is like a jewel treasure to men in bestowing upon them all attainments in righteousness, he is like a boat to men inasmuch as he conveys them to the further shore of the four flooded streams (of lust, individuality, delusion, and ignorance)², he is like a caravan owner to men in that he brings them beyond the sandy desert of rebirths, he is like a mighty rain cloud to men in that he fills their hearts with satisfaction, he is like a teacher to men in that he trains them in all good, he is like a good guide to men in that he points out to them the path of peace. It was in order that so good a man as that, one whose good qualities are so many, so various, so immeasurable, [196] in order that so great a treasure mine of good things, so full of benefit to all beings, might not be done away with, that the Blessed One, O king, out of his mercy towards all beings, laid down that injunction, when he said: "A brother is not, O Bhikkhus, to commit suicide. Whosoever does so shall be dealt with according to the law." This is the reason for which the Blessed One prohibited (self-slaughter). And it was said, O king,

¹ Sattânam, in which gods are included.

² The four oghas; also called Âsavas. The former term is used of them objectively, the latter subjectively.

by the Elder Kumâra Kassapa, the eloquent, when he was describing to Pâyâsi the Râganya the other world: "So long as Samanas and Brahmans of uprightness of life, and beauty of character, continue to exist—however long that time may be—just so long do they conduct themselves to the advantage and happiness of the great masses of the people, to the good and the gain and the weal of gods and men!¹"

15. 'And what is the reason for which the Blessed One instigated us (to put an end to life)? Birth, O king, is full of pain, and so is old age, and disease, and death. Sorrow is painful, and so is lamentation, and pain, and grief, and despair. Association with the unpleasant is painful, and separation from the pleasant². The death of a mother is painful, or of a father, or a brother, or a sister, or a son, or a wife, or of any relative. Painful is the ruin of one's family, and the suffering of disease, and the loss of wealth, and decline in goodness, and the loss of in-

¹ This Kumâra Kassapa is said at *Ânguttara* I, xiv, 3 to have been the most eloquent of the early disciples. Another eloquent little outburst of his is preserved for us in verses 201 and 202 of the *Therâ Gâthâ*. 'O for the Buddhas, and their doctrines! O for the achievements of our Master! Thereby may the disciple realise the Truth. Through countless æons of time has Selfness followed on Selfness. But this one is now the last. This aggregation (of mental and material qualities which forms me now again into an individuality) is at last the end, the end of the coming and going of births and deaths. There will be no rebirth for me!' But where the verses are so full of allusions to the deepest Buddhist psychology, it is impossible to reproduce in English the vigour of the original Pâli. Selfness (*Sakkâya*) is the condition of being a separate individual.

² All this is from the celebrated discourse, the 'Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness' (in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 148).

sight. Painful is the fear produced by despots, or by robbers, or by enemies, or by famine, or by fire, or by flood, or by the tidal wave, or by earthquake, or by crocodiles or alligators. Painful is the fear of possible blame attaching to oneself, or to others, the fear of punishment, the fear of misfortune. Painful is the fear arising from shyness in the presence of assemblies of one's fellows, painful is anxiety as to one's means of livelihood, painful the foreboding of death. [197] Painful are (the punishments inflicted on criminals), such as being flogged with whips, or with sticks, or with split rods, having one's hands cut off, or one's feet, or one's hands and feet, or one's ears, or one's nose, or one's ears and nose. Painful are (the tortures inflicted on traitors)—being subjected to the Gruel Pot (that is, having boiling gruel poured into one's head from the top of which the skull bone has been removed¹)—or to the Chank Crown² (that is, having the scalp rubbed with gravel till it becomes smooth like a polished shell)—or to the Râhu's Mouth³ (that is, having one's mouth held open by iron pins, and oil put in it, and a wick lighted therein)—or to the Fire Garland⁴ or to the Hand Torch⁵ (that is, being made a living torch, the whole body, or the arms only, being wrapped up in oily cloths, and set on fire)—or to the Snake Strips⁶ (that is, being skinned in strips from the neck to the hips, so that the skin falls in strips round the legs)—or to the Bark Dress⁷ (that is, being skinned alive from the neck downwards, and having each strip of

¹ *Bilaṅga-thālikam.*

² *Saṅkha-mundikam.*

³ *Râhu-mukham.*

⁴ *Goti-mālakam.*

⁵ *Haṭṭha-paggotikam.*

⁶ *Eraka-vattikam.*

⁷ *Kṛaka-vāsikam.*

skin as soon as removed tied to the hair, so that these strips form a veil around one)—or to the Spotted Antelope¹ (that is, having one's knees and elbows tied together, and being made to squat on a plate of iron under which a fire is lit)—or to the Flesh-hooks² (that is, being hung up on a row of iron hooks)—or to the Pennies³ (that is, having bits cut out of the flesh, all over the body, of the size of pennies)—or to the Brine Slits⁴ (that is, having cuts made all over one's body by means of knives or sharp points, and then having salt and caustic liquids poured over the wounds)—or to the Bar Turn⁵ (that is, being transfixed to the ground by a bar of iron passing through the root of the ear, and then being dragged round and round by the leg)—or to the Straw Seat⁶ (that is, being so beaten with clubs that

¹ *Eneyyakam*.

² *Balisa-mamsikam* (so the Sinhalese, Mr. Trenckner reads *Balisa*).

³ *Kahâpanakam*.

⁴ *Khârâpatikkhakam*.

⁵ *Paligha-parivattikam*.

⁶ *Palâla-pîthakam*. I follow throughout Hînañi-kumburê's interpretation (pp. 260, 261) of these pretty names, which could be well matched in the West. That some Indian kings were cruel in the extreme is no doubt true. But it must not be supposed that this list gives the names of well-known punishments. It is merely a string of technical terms which is repeated by rote whenever tortures have to be specified. And the meaning of its terms was most likely unknown to the very people who so used them. For the whole list (which is taken by our author from the Pâli *Piṭakas*) is explained by Buddhaghosa in his commentary, the *Manoratha Pîṭakā*, on *Āṅguttara* II, 1, 1, as edited by Dr. Morris at pp. 113, 114 of the first edition of his *Āṅguttara* for the Pâli Text Society, 1884. But Buddhaghosa's explanations differ from Hînañi-kumburê's in several details; and to nearly half the names he gives alternative meanings, quite contradictory to those that he gives first. So the list had its origin some centuries (say 400–500) B.C., and was certainly

the bones are broken, and the body becomes like a heap of straw)—or to be anointed with boiling oil, or to be eaten by dogs, or to be impaled alive, or to be beheaded. Such and such, O king, are the manifold and various pains which a being caught in the whirlpool of births and rebirths has to endure. Just, O king, as the water rained down upon the Himālaya mountain flows, in its course along the Ganges, through and over rocks and pebbles and gravel, whirlpools and eddies and rapids¹, and the stumps and branches of trees which obstruct and oppose its passage,—just so has each being caught in the succession of births and rebirths to endure such and such manifold and various pains. Full of pain, then, is the continual succession of rebirths, a joy is it when that succession ends. And it was in pointing out the advantage of that end, the disaster involved in that succession, that the Blessed One, great king, instigated us to get beyond birth, and old age, and disease, and death by the realisation of the final end of that succession of rebirths. This is the sense, O king, which led the Blessed One to instigate us (to put an end to life).'

‘Very good, Nâgasena ! Well solved is the puzzle (I put), well set forth are the reasons (you alleged). That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the problem as to suicide.]

not understood in the fifth century A. D. ; and was probably therefore unintelligible also, at least in part, to our author.

¹ Ūmika-vaṅka-kaḍḍika. I don't pretend to understand this last word. Dr. Morris, at p. 92 of the 'Pāli Text Society's Journal' for 1884, suggests *velika*. Perhaps it was simply *adika* after all, with or without *m* euphonic.

[A LOVING DISPOSITION.]

16. [198] 'Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "Eleven advantages, O brethren, may be anticipated from practising, making a habit of, enlarging within one, using as a means of advancement, and as a basis of conduct, pursuing after, accumulating, and rising well up to the very heights of the emancipation of heart, arising from a feeling of love (towards all beings)¹. And what are these eleven? He who does so sleeps in peace, and in peace does he awake. He dreams no sinful dreams. He becomes dear to men, and to the beings who are not men². The gods watch over him. Neither fire, nor poison, nor sword works any harm to him. Quickly and easily does he become tranquillised. The aspect of his countenance is calm. Undismayed does he meet death, and should he not press through to the Supreme Condition (of Arahātship), then is he sure of rebirth in the Brahma world³." But on the other hand you (members of

¹ This same string of words, except the first, is used of the Iddhi-pādas in the Book of the Great Decease, III, 3 (p. 40 of vol. xi of the S. B. E.). The words 'towards all beings' are not in the text. But this is the meaning of the phrase used, and not love to men only, as would be understood if they were not inserted in the translation.

² Amanussa. This means, not the gods, but the various spirits on the earth, nayads, dryads, fairies, &c. &c. As here, so again below, IV, 4, 41, the amanussā are opposed to the devatā, mentioned in the next clause here. In older texts the devatā include the amanussā.

³ From the Aṅguttara Nikāya, Ekādasā Nipāta; quoted in full, with the context, in the Introductory Story to the 169th Gāṭaka (vol. ii, pp. 60, 61 of Professor Fausböll's edition).

the Order) say that "Sâma the Prince, while dwelling in the cultivation of a loving disposition toward all beings, and when he was (in consequence thereof) wandering in the forest followed by a herd of deer, was hit by a poisoned arrow shot by Piliyakkha the king, and there, on the spot, fainted and fell¹." Now, venerable Nâgasena, if the passage I have quoted from the words of the Blessed One be right, then this statement of yours must be wrong. But if the story of Prince Sâma be right, then it cannot be true that neither fire, nor poison, nor sword can work harm to him who cultivates the habit of love to all beings. This too is a double-edged problem, so subtle, so abstruse, so delicate, and so profound, that the thought of having to solve it might well bring out sweat over the body even of the most subtle-minded of mortals. This problem is now put to you. Unravel this mighty knot². Throw light upon this matter³ to the accomplishment of the desire of those sons of the Conqueror who shall arise hereafter⁴.

'The Blessed One spake, O king, as you have quoted. And Prince Sâma dwelling in the cultivation of love, and thus followed by a herd of deer when he was wandering in the forest, was hit by the poisoned arrow shot by king Piliyakkha, and then and there fainted and fell. But there is a reason for that. [199] And what is the reason? Simply that those virtues (said in the passage you quoted

¹ Mr. Trenckner points out that this story is given in the 540th Gâtaka.

² See p. 105 of the text.

³ *Kakkhum dehi*. So also p. 95 of the text.

⁴ *Nibbâhana*; not in Childers, but see p. 119 of the text.

to be in the habit of love) are virtues not attached to the personality of the one who loves, but to the actual presence of the love that he has called up in his heart¹. And when Prince Sâma was upsetting the water-pot, that moment he lapsed from the actual feeling of love. At the moment, O king, in which an individual has realised the sense of love, that moment neither fire, nor poison, nor sword can do him harm. If any men bent on doing him an injury come up, they will not see him, neither will they have a chance of hurting him. But these virtues, O king, are not inherent in the individual, they are in the actual felt presence of the love that he is calling up in his heart.'

'Suppose, O king, a man were to take into his hand a Vanishing Root of supernatural power; and that, so long as it was actually in his hand, no other ordinary person would be able to see him. The virtue, then, would not be in the man. It would be in the root that such virtue would reside that an object in the very line of sight of ordinary mortals could, nevertheless, not be seen. Just so, O king, is it with the virtue inherent in the felt presence of love that a man has called up in his heart.'

'Or it is like the case of a man [200] who has entered into a well-formed mighty cave. No storm of rain, however mightily it might pour down, would be able to wet him. But that would be by no virtue inherent

¹ Bhânanâ is really more than 'cultivation.' It is the actual, present, felt sense of the particular moral state that is being cultivated (in this case, of love). I have elsewhere rendered it 'meditation': but as the ethical doctrine, and practice, are alike unknown to us, we have no word that exactly reproduces the connotation of the Pâli phrase.

in the man. It would be a virtue inherent in the cave that so mighty a downpour of rain could not wet the man. And just so, O king, is it with the virtue inherent in the felt presence of love that a man has called up in his heart¹.

¹ This is no quibble. The early Buddhists did believe in the power of a subjective love over external circumstances. It is true that the best known instances in which this power is represented as having been actually exercised, are instances of the power of love over the hearts of other beings, and hence, indirectly, over their actions. Thus when Devadatta had had the fierce, manslaying elephant Nālāgiri let loose against the Buddha (*Kullavagga* VII, 3, 11, 12), Gotama is said to have permeated him with his love, and the elephant then went up to him only to salute him, and allowed himself to be stroked, and did no harm. And when the five disciples had intended, when he went to Benares, to show him no respect, the Buddha, in like manner, is said to have 'concentrated that feeling of his love which was able to pervade generally all beings in earth and heaven,' and to have 'directed it specially towards them.' Then 'the sense of his love diffused itself through their hearts. And as he came nearer and nearer, unable any longer to adhere to their resolve, they rose from their seats, and bowed down before him, and welcomed him with every mark of reverence and of respect' ('Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, p. 112).

And when he wished to convert Roga the Mallian, the Buddha is said, in like manner, to have 'suffused him with the feeling of his love.' And then Roga, 'overcome by the Blessed One by the sense of his love—just as a young calf follows the kine, so did he go from apartment to apartment' seeking the Blessed One (*Mahāvagga* VI, 36, 4).

And again, when the Bhikkhus told the Buddha of a brother having been killed by a snake-bite, he is represented (in the *Kullavagga* V, 6) to have said: 'Now surely that brother had not let his love flow out over the four royal kinds of serpents. Had he done so, he would not have died of the bite of a snake.' And then he is said to have enjoined the use of a poem of love to snakes (set out in the text quoted) as a safeguard against snake-bite. This goes really much further than the other instances, but no case is given of that safeguard having been actually used successfully. And I know of no case in the Pāli Piṭakas of the felt presence

‘Most wonderful is it, Nâgasena, and most strange how the felt presence of love has the power of warding off all evil states of mind ¹.’

‘Yes! The practice of love is productive of all virtuous conditions of mind both in good (beings) and in evil ones. To all beings whatsoever, who are in the bonds of conscious existence ², is this practice of love of great advantage, and therefore ought it to be sedulously cultivated.’

[Here ends the problem as to the power of love.]

[DEVADATTA.]

17. ‘Venerable Nâgasena, is the consequence the same to him who does good and to him who does evil, or is there any difference in the two cases?’

‘There is a difference, O king, between good and evil. Good works have a happy result, and lead to Sagga ³, and evil works have an unhappy result, and lead to Niraya ⁴.’

of the feeling of love being said to have actually counteracted either fire, or poison, or sword.

It is noteworthy that the *Simhalese* inserts here six pages (265-271) of matter not found in the Pâli. But as it gives at length the story of Prince Sâma, it is taken, I presume, from the *Gâtaka* book.

¹ This is something quite different from what was said before.

² Ye viññâna-baddhâ, sabbesam, which the *Simhalese* takes as a gloss on ‘good and evil ones,’ and renders viññâna prati wû da. But I prefer Mr. Trenckner’s punctuation.

³ That is to a temporary life in heaven.

⁴ That is to life in a temporary hell (or purgatory).

‘But, venerable Nâgasena, your people say that Devadatta was altogether wicked, full of wicked dispositions, and that the Bodisat¹ was altogether pure, full of pure dispositions². And yet Devadatta, through successive existences³, was not only quite equal to the Bodisat, but even sometimes superior to him, both in reputation and in the number of his adherents.

18. ‘Thus, Nâgasena, when Devadatta became the Purohita (family Brâhman, royal chaplain) of Brahmadatta, the king, in the city of Benares, then the Bodisat was a wretched *Kandâla* (outcast)⁴ who knew by heart a magic spell. And by repeating his spell he produced mango fruits out of season⁵. This

¹ Bodhi-satto (Wisdom-Child). The individual who (through virtue practised in successive lives) was becoming the Buddha.

² ‘Wicked’ and ‘pure’ are in the Pâli *kaṇhe* and *sukka*, literally, ‘dark’ and ‘light.’ The only other passage I recollect where these names of colours are used in an ethical sense is the 87th verse of the Dhammapada. Professor Max Müller there renders: ‘A wise man should leave the dark state (of ordinary life), and follow the bright state (of the Bhikshu),’ (S. B. E., vol. x, p. 26.) But the words should certainly be translated: ‘A wise man should put away wicked dispositions, and cultivate purity of heart.’ Bhâvetha could never refer to adopting or following any outward profession. It is exclusively used of the practice, cultivation, of inward feelings. And the commentary, which is quoted by Professor Fausböll, takes the passage in the Dhammapada in that sense, just as *Hīnaṭi-kumburê* (p. 271) does here.

³ Bhavetha bhavetha, which would be more accurately rendered ‘in the course of his gradual becoming.’

⁴ *Kavaka-kandâla*. The *Kandâlas* are a well-known caste still existing in India—if indeed that can rightly be called a caste which is beneath all others. *Khavaka* is not in Childers, but is applied below (p. 256 of our text) to Mâra, the Buddhist Satan. See also the next note.

⁵ This is not a summary of the 309th Gâtaka, for it differs from that story as published by Professor Fausböll (vol. iii, pp.

is one case in which the Bodisat was inferior to Devadatta in birth, [201] inferior to him in reputation.'

19. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, a mighty monarch of the earth¹, living in the enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, then the Bodisat was an elephant, decked with all manner of ornaments that the king might make use of them. And the king, being put out of temper at the sight of his graceful and pleasant style of pace and motion, said to the elephant trainer with the hope of bringing about the death of the elephant: "Trainer, this elephant has not been properly trained, make him perform the trick called 'Sky walking.'" In that case too the Bodisat was inferior to Devadatta,—was a mere foolish animal².'

20. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man who gained his living by winnowing grain³, then

217-30), and also from the older and shorter version contained in the Old Commentary on the Pâtimokkha (on the 69th Sakhiya, Vinaya IV, pp. 203, 204). [The name of that story in Professor Fausböll's edition is *Khavaka-Gâtaka*, but throughout the story itself the word *Kandâla* is used in the passages corresponding to those in which Professor Fausböll has *Khapaka* (sic),—a coincidence which throws light on our author, *Khavaka-kandâla*.] The story here referred to is the *Amba Gâtaka* (No. 474) in which the word *Khavaka* does not occur.

¹ 'Of Magadha,' says *Hînaśi-kumburê* (p. 272).

² This is the 122nd *Gâtaka*, there called the *Dummedha Gâtaka*. The king has the elephant taken to the top of the Vepulla mountain outside Râgagaha. Then having made him stand first on three feet, then on two, then on one, he demands of the trainer to make him stand in the air. Then the elephant flies away to Benares!

³ *Pavane na//hâyiko*. But as *Hînaśi-kumburê* renders all this: 'a farmer in Benares who gained his living by husbandry,' I would suggest *pavanena //hâyiko* as the right reading.

the Bodisat was a monkey called "the broad earth." Here again we have the difference between an animal and a man, and the Bodisat was inferior in birth to Devadatta ¹.'

21. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, by name Sonuttara, a Nesâda (one of an outcast tribe of aborigines, who lived by hunting), and was of great strength and bodily power, like an elephant, then the Bodisat was the king of elephants under the name of the "Six-tusked." And in that birth, the hunter slew the elephant. In that case too Devadatta was the superior ².'

22. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a wanderer in the woods, without a home, then the Bodisat was a bird, a partridge who knew the Vedic hymns. And in that birth too the woodman killed the bird. So in that case also Devadatta was the superior by birth ³.'

23. 'And again, when Devadatta became the king of Benares, by name Kalâbu, then the Bodisat was an ascetic who preached kindness to animals. And the king (who was fond of sport), enraged with the ascetic, had his hands and feet cut off like so many bambû sprouts ⁴. In that birth, too, Deva-

¹ I cannot unfortunately trace this story among the *Gâtakas*.

² I do not know which *Gâtaka* is here referred to.

³ This must be the 438th *Gâtaka*, there called the Tittira *Gâtaka*. In the summary Devadatta is identified with the hypocritical ascetic who killed and ate the wise partridge.

⁴ This is the 313th *Gâtaka*, there called the Khanti-vadi *Gâtaka*. The royal sportsman has first the skin, and then the hands and feet of the sage cut off, to alter his opinions. But the sage simply says that his love to animals is not in his skin, or in his limbs, but in his heart. Then the earth swallows up the cruel monarch, and the citizens bury the body of the sage with all honour. In the summary Kalâbu, the king, is identified with Devadatta.

datta was the superior, both in birth and in reputation among men.'

24. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a woodman, then the Bodisat was Nandiya the monkey king. And in that birth too the man killed the monkey, and his mother besides, and his younger brother. So in that case also it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth ¹.'

25. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a naked ascetic, by name Kârambhiya, then the Bodisat was a snake king called "the Yellow one." So in that case too it was Devadatta [202] who was the superior in birth ².'

26. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a crafty ascetic with long matted hair, then the Bodisat was a famous pig, by name "the Carpenter." So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth ³.'

27. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king among the Ketas, by name Sura Parikara ⁴, who had the power of travelling through the air at a level above men's heads ⁵, then the Bodisat was a Brah-

¹ This is the 222nd *Gâtaka*, there called the *K'ûla Nandiya Gâtaka*.

² This is probably the 518th *Gâtaka*. See Mr. Trenckner's note.

³ This must be the 492nd *Gâtaka*, the *Takkha-sûkara Gâtaka*, in which the hero is a learned pig who helps the carpenter in his work, and the villain of the story is a hypocrite ascetic with matted hair. But it should be added that though in the summary (Fausbøll, vol. iv, p. 350) Devadatta is identified with the ascetic, the Bodisat is identified, not with the learned pig, but with the dryad.

⁴ He is called *Upakara* both in the 422nd *Gâtaka* (of which this is a summary) and in the *Sumaṅgala* (p. 258). The *Gâtaka* (III, 454) also gives a third variation, *Apaṭara*.

⁵ *Purisamatto gagane vehâsaṅgamo*. The *Gâtaka* says simply *uparikaro*, which must mean about the same.

man named Kapila. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth and in reputation.'

28. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, by name Sâma, then the Bodisat was a king among the deer, by name Ruru. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth ¹.'

29. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a hunter wandering in the woods, then the Bodisat was a male elephant, and that hunter seven times broke off and took away the teeth of the elephant. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in respect of the class of beings into which he was born ².'

30. 'And again, when Devadatta became a jackal who wanted to conquer the world ³, and brought the kings of all the countries in India under his control, then the Bodisat was a wise man, by name Vidhura. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in glory.'

31. 'And again, when Devadatta became the

¹ This must be the 482nd *Gâtaka*. It is true that the man is there called Mahâ Dhanaka (Fausböll, vol. iii, p. 255), and the Bodisat is not specially named Ruru, nor is he a king of the herd, but is only a stag of the kind of deer called Ruru, who lives alone. But a comparison of the poetical version of the same story in the *Kariyâ Piṭaka* II, 6 (p. 87 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society) shows that the same story is here referred to.

² This is the 72nd *Gâtaka*, the *Silava Nâga Gâtaka*. (Fausböll, vol. i, p. 319.)

³ *Khattiya-dhammo*; literally, 'who had the nature of a Kshatriya.' This expression is not found in the *Gâtaka* referred to, No. 241 (vol. ii, p. 242 and foll. in Professor Fausböll's edition), and the Bodisat is there called *purdhita* not *pandita*, and his name is not given as Vidhura. The jackal also came to grief in his attempt to conquer Benares. But there is no doubt as to that story, the *Sabba Dâḥa Gâtaka* being the one here quoted.

elephant who destroyed the young of the Chinese partridge, then the Bodisat was also an elephant, the leader of his herd. So in that case they were both on a par¹.

32. 'And again, when Devadatta became a yak-kha, by name Unrighteous, then the Bodisat too was a yak-kha, by name Righteous. So in that case too they were both on a par².'

33. 'And again, when Devadatta became a sailor, the chief of five hundred families, then the Bodisat too was a sailor, the chief of five hundred families. So in that case too they were both on a par³.'

34. 'And again, when Devadatta became a caravan leader, the lord of five hundred waggons, then the Bodisat too was a caravan leader, the lord of five hundred waggons. So in that case too they were both on a par⁴.'

35. [203] 'And again, when Devadatta became a king of deer, by name Sâkha, then the Bodisat was a king of deer, by name Nigrodha. So in that case too they were both on a par⁵.'

36. 'And again, when Devadatta became a commander-in-chief, by name Sâkha, then the Bodisat

¹ This is the 357th *Gâtaka* (Fausböll, vol. iii, pp. 174) and which is one of those illustrated on the Bharhut Tope (Cunningham, Plate 109).

² In the *Gâtaka* text (No. 457, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 100 and foll.), there are both *devaputtâ*, 'gods,' not *yakkhâ*. This is by no means the only instance of the term *yakkha* being used of gods.

³ I cannot trace this story in the printed text of the *Gâtakas*.

⁴ This is the *Apannaka Gâtaka* (No. 1, vol. i, pp. 98 and foll. in Professor Fausböll's edition), translated in the 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, pp. 138-145.

⁵ The *Nigrodha Miga Gâtaka* (No. 12, vol. i, pp. 145 and foll. in Fausböll), translated in 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, pp. 198 and following.

was a king, by name Nigrodha. So in that case too they were both on a par¹.

37. 'And again, when Devadatta became a brahman, by name *Khandahâla*, then the Bodisat was a prince, by name *Kanda*. So in that case that *Khandahâla* was the superior².'

38. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, by name Brahmadatta, then the Bodisat was his son, the prince called Mahâ Paduma. In that case the king had his son cast down seven times, from the precipice from which robbers were thrown down. And inasmuch as fathers are superior to and above their sons, in that case too it was Devadatta was the superior³.'

39. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, by name Mahâ Patâpa, then the Bodisat was his son, Prince Dhamma-pâla; and that king had the hands and feet and head of his son cut off. So in that case too Devadatta was the superior⁴.'

40. 'And now again, in this life, they were in the Sâkya clan, and the Bodisat became a Buddha, all wise, the leader of the world, and Devadatta having left the world to join the Order founded by Him who is above the god of gods, and having attained to the powers of Iddhi, was filled with lust to become himself the Buddha. Come now, most venerable Nâgasena! Is not all that I have said true, and just, and accurate?'

¹ The Nigrodha Gâtaka (No. 445, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 37 and foll.).

² I cannot trace this story among the published Gâtakas.

³ This is the Mahâ Paduma Gâtaka (No. 472, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 187-195). It was a case of Joseph and Potiphar's wife.

⁴ This tragical story is No. 358 in the Gâtaka collection (Fausböll, vol. iii, pp. 177-182).

41. 'All the many things which you, great king, have now propounded, are so, and not otherwise.'

'Then, Nāgasena, unless black and white are the same in kind, it follows that good and evil bear equal fruit.'

'Nay, not so, great king! Good and evil have not the same result. Devadatta was opposed by everybody. No one was hostile to the Bodisat. And the hostility which Devadatta felt towards the Bodisat, that came to maturity and bore fruit in each successive birth. And so also as Devadatta, when he was established in lordship over the world, [204] was a protection to the poor, put up bridges and courts of justice and rest-houses for the people, and gave gifts according to his bent to Samānas and Brahmans, to the poor and needy and the way-farers, it was by the result of that conduct that, from existence to existence, he came into the enjoyment of so much prosperity. For of whom, O king, can it be said that without generosity and self-restraint, without self-control and the observance of the Upasatha¹, he can reach prosperity?

'And when, O king, you say that Devadatta and the Bodisat accompanied one another in the passage from birth to birth, that meeting together of theirs took place not only at the end of a hundred, or a thousand, or a hundred thousand births, but was in fact constantly and frequently taking place through an immeasurable period of time². For you should regard that matter in the light of the comparison drawn by the Blessed One between the case of the

¹ The Buddhist Sabbath, on which see my 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 139-141.

² So also above, IV, 2, 64, and IV, 3, 28.

purblind tortoise and the attainment of the condition of a human being. And it was not only with Devadatta that such union took place. Sâriputta the Elder also, O king, was through thousands of births the father, or the grandfather, or the uncle ¹, or the brother, or the son, or the nephew, or the friend of the Bodisat; and the Bodisat was the father, or the grandfather, or the uncle, or the brother, or the son, or the nephew, or the friend of Sâriputta the Elder.

‘All beings in fact, O king, who, in various forms as creatures, are carried down the stream of transmigration, meet, as they are whirled along in it, both with pleasant companions and with disagreeable ones—just as water whirled along in a stream meets with pure and impure substances, with the beautiful and with the ugly.

‘And when, O king, Devadatta as the god, had been himself Unrighteous, and had led others into unrighteousness of life, he was burnt in purgatory for an immeasurable period of time ². [205] But the Bodisat, who, as the god, had been himself Righteous, and had led others into righteousness of life, lived in all the bliss of heaven for a like immeasurable period of time. And whilst in this life, Devadatta, who had plotted injury against the Buddha, and had created a schism in the Order, was swallowed up by the earth, the Tathâgata,

¹ That is ‘father’s younger brother.’ The Pâli has no word for uncle generally, the whole scheme of relationship being different from ours, and the various sorts of uncles having, in the Pâli scheme, different and distinct names.

² ‘Fifty-seven ko/is and sixty hundreds of thousands of years,’ says the text, with touching accuracy.

knowing all that can be known, arrived at the insight of Buddhahood¹, and was completely set free (from the necessity of becoming) by the destruction of all that leads to re-existence.'

'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say².'

[Here ends the dilemma as to Devadatta's superiority to the Bodisat in previous births.]

¹ So Hīnaṣi-kumburē, who takes sabbadhamme as accusative to *buggāhitvā*, and understands the phrase as above translated.

² This discussion is very interesting, both as a specimen of casuistry, and as an exposition of orthodox Buddhist belief. And it is full of suggestion if taken as a statement of the kind of reason which led the Buddhist editors of the earlier folk-lore to identify Devadatta with the characters referred to by king Milinda. But the facts are that those editors, in using the old stories and legends for their ethical purposes, always identified Devadatta with the cruel person in the story, and paid no heed to the question whether he was superior or not in birth or in the consideration of the world, to the person they identified with the Bodisat. In searching through the four volumes of the published *Gātakas*, and the proof-sheets of the fifth volume with which Professor Fausbøll has favoured me, for the purpose of tracing the stories referred to by our author, I find that Devadatta appears in sixty-four of them, and that in almost every one of these sixty-four he is either superior in birth, or equal to the character identified with the Bodisat. This is not surprising, for it is not unusually the superiors in birth who are guilty of the kind of cruelty and wickedness which the Buddhist editors would ascribe to Devadatta. So that our author, had he chosen to do so, might have adduced many other instances of a similar kind to those he actually quotes. I add in an appendix the full list of the Devadatta stories in the *Gātakas*. It is clear our author had before him a version of the *Gātaka* book slightly different from our own, as will be seen from the cases pointed out in the notes in which, as to names or details, the story known to him differs from the printed text. And also that here (as at III, 6, 2) he would have been able to solve his own dilemma much better if he had known more of the history of those sacred books on the words of which it is based.

[WOMEN'S WILES.]

42. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One :

" With opportunity, and secrecy,

And the right woo'r, all women will go wrong—

Aye, failing others, with a cripple even ¹."

But on the other hand it is said: "Mahosadha's wife, Amarâ, when left behind in the village while her husband was away on a journey, remained alone and in privacy, and regarding her husband as a man would regard his sovran lord, she refused to do wrong, even when tempted with a thousand pieces ²." Now if the first of these passages be correct, the second must be wrong; and if the second be right, [206] the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

43. 'It is so said, O king, as you have quoted, touching the conduct of Amarâ, Mahosadha's wife. But the question is would she have done wrong, on receipt of those thousand pieces, with the right man: or would she not have done so, if she had had the opportunity, and the certainty of secrecy, and a suitable wooer? Now, on considering the matter, that lady Amarâ was not certain of any of these

¹ It is not meant that men would not. But that is too clear to be even worthy of mention, whereas with regard to women the question is worth discussion. Our author is mistaken in ascribing this verse to the Buddha. It is only found (as has been pointed out by Mr. Trenckner) in a *Gâtaka* story, No. 536, and is a specimen, not of Buddhist teaching, but of Indian folk-lore. There is a very similar sentiment in *Gâtakâ*, No. 62 (vol. i, p. 289).

² This story will be found in the *Ummagga Gâtaka*, No. 546.

things. Through her fear of censure in this world the opportunity seemed to her not fit, and through her fear of the sufferings of purgatory in the next world. And because she knew how bitter is the fruit of wrong-doing, and because she did not wish to lose her loved one, and because of the high esteem in which she held her husband, and because she honoured goodness, and despised ignobleness of life, and because she did not want to break with her customary mode of life—for all these reasons the opportunity seemed to her not fit.

‘And, further, she refused to do wrong because, on consideration, she was not sure of keeping the thing secret from the world. [207] For even could she have kept it secret from men, yet she could not have concealed it from spirits¹—even could she have kept it secret from spirits, yet she could not have concealed it from those recluses who have the power of knowing the thoughts of others—even could she have kept it secret from them, yet she could not have concealed it from those of the gods who can read the hearts of men—even could she have kept it secret from the gods, yet she could not have escaped, herself, from the knowledge of her sin—even could she have remained ignorant of it herself, yet she could not have kept it secret from (the law of the result which follows on) unrighteousness². Such were the

¹ Fairies, nayad, dryads, &c. &c.—not gods.

² Adhammena raho na labheyya. I am in great doubt as to the real meaning of these words, which Hīnaś-kumburê (p. 286) renders merely adharmayen rahasak no labannê. They look very much like a kind of personification of Karma. The phrase is really very parallel to the saying in Numbers xxxii. 23, ‘Be sure your sin will find you out’—namely, in its results—and is as true ethically as it is difficult grammatically.

various reasons which led her to abstain from doing wrong because she could not be sure of secrecy.

‘And, further, she refused to do wrong because, on consideration, she found no right wooer. Mahosadha the wise, O king, was endowed with the eight and twenty qualities. And which are those twenty-eight? He was brave, O king, and full of modesty, and ashamed to do wrong, he had many adherents, and many friends, he was forgiving, he was upright in life, he was truthful, he was pure in word, and deed and heart¹, he was free from malice, he was not puffed up, he felt no jealousy², he was full of energy, he strove after all good things³, he was popular with all men, he was generous, he was friendly⁴, he was humble in disposition, he was free from guile, he was free from deceit, he was full of insight, he was of high reputation, he had much knowledge, he sought after the good of those dependent on him, his praise was in all men’s mouths, great was his wealth, and great his fame. Such were the twenty-eight qualities, O king, with which Mahosadha, the wise, was endowed. And it was because she found no wooer like unto him that she did no wrong⁵.’

¹ *Soḷeyya-sampanno*, which *Hīnaśi-kumburē* renders *suvaḷa guṇayen samanwibawa*: that is, ‘compliant, attentive to what is said.’ But I prefer to take the expression in the sense explained at length in *Anguttara* III, 119. See also *Gātaka* I, 214; *Milinda*, p. 115.

² *Anusuyyako*. See *Gātaka* II, 192, and *Milinda*, p. 94.

³ *Āyūhako*. *Hīnaśi-kumburē* (p. 286) renders this word, which is only found here, by *Dhana piris rōes kirim cettēya*, ‘one who has heaped up goods and men.’ But see *Milinda*, p. 181, and Dr. Morris in the *Pāli Text Society’s Journals* for 1885 and 1886.

⁴ *Sakhilo*, ‘kindly in speech,’ says the *Simhalese*.

⁵ This is all very well, but it does not confirm, it explains away, the supposed quotation from the Buddha’s words.

‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’

[Here ends the dilemma as to the wickedness of women¹.]

[ON THE FEARLESSNESS OF THE ARAHATS.]

44. ‘Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: “The Arahats have laid aside all fear and trembling².” But on the other hand when, in the city of Rāgagaha, they saw Dhana-pālaka, the man-slaying elephant, bearing down upon the Blessed

¹ The position of women in India, at the time when Buddhism arose, was, theoretically, very low. The folk tales are full of stories turning on the wiles of women, and the Hindoo law-books seem never tired of the theme of her uncleanness, her weakness, and her wickedness. But, except in matters of property, the bark was I think worse than the bite. Among the people, in the homes of the peasantry, the philippics of the Brahmin priests were not much regarded, and the women led lives as pleasant as those of their male relations, and shared in such mental and physical advantages as their male relations enjoyed. The influence of Buddhism must have been felt in two directions. In the first place the importance attached to the celibate life must have encouraged the kind of view taken of women among Catholics in mediæval times (the Brahmin view being much akin to those that were promulgated by Luther). On the other hand the fact that women were admitted to the Order, and that the still higher aim of Arahatship was held to be attainable by them, must have helped to encourage a high esteem for women. We have many instances of women who were credited with the insight of Arahatship. A whole treatise in the Buddhist sacred books, the Theri Gāthā, is devoted to hymns and poems ascribed to them, and many of these reach a very high level of intelligent and spiritual emotion.

² I do not know the exact passage referred to, but there are many of similar tendency in the sacred books. See, for instance, Dhammapada, verses 39, 188, 214, 351, and 385; and Sutta Nipāta, verses 15, 70, 212, 621, and 965.

One, all the five hundred Arahats forsook the Conqueror and fled, one only excepted, Ānanda the Elder¹. Now how was it, Nāgasena? Did those Arahats run away from fear—or did they run away willing to let the Blessed One be destroyed, and thinking: “(Our conduct) will be clear (to him) from the way in which he himself will act²,” [208] or did they run away with the hope of watching the immense and unequalled mighty power which the Tathāgata would exhibit? If, Nāgasena, what the

¹ Here again we have a variation between our author's words and those of the Piṭakas. In the *Kullavagga* VII, 3, 11, 12 (translated in pp. 247–250 of vol. iii of the ‘Vinaya Texts’ in the ‘Sacred Books of the East’), we have the oldest versions of this story; and there the elephant is called, not Dhana-pālaka, but Nālāgiri, and the number of attendant disciples (who are not called Arahats) is not given as five hundred. The Buddha is simply said to have entered Rāgagaha ‘with a number of Bhikkhus.’ Nothing also is said, either of their running away, or of Ānanda's remaining behind. It is, no doubt, an easily explicable and very pretty alteration of the story, which exhibits Ānanda, the beloved disciple, as acting in this way. But it is none the less an alteration.

It should be added that Nālāgiri (it should be Nālāgiri) in the Vinaya text is a personal name of the elephant, but may be derived from its place of origin. (See the references to a famous elephant named Na/āgiri in the Megha Dūta and Naḍāgiri in the Kathā Sarit Sāgara XI, 42, XII, 10, XIII, 7, 29. But Pāṇini VI, 3, 117, gives the latter as the name of a mountain.) So while there may be a variation in the legend, it may also be that we have only two names for the same elephant, just as one might speak of the Shetland pony (named) Brownie. And the stanza quoted below (p. 410 of the Pāli text) shows that the name Dhana-pālaka was given already in older texts to the Nālāgiri elephant.

² Paññāyissati sakena kammena, ‘It will be plain to the Buddha (that is, he will be able to judge of our motives) from his own kindness and goodness,’ according to the Sinhalese (p. 287). But the expression is a very strange one, and perhaps, after all, it merely means, ‘The matter will turn out according to his Karma.’

Blessed One said as to the Arahats being devoid of fear be true, then this story must be false. But if the story be true, then the statement that the Arahats have put away fear and trembling must be false. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

45. 'The Blessed One did say, O king, that Arahats have put away all fear and trembling, and five hundred Arahats, save only Ānanda, did, as you say, run away when the elephant Dhana-pālaka bore down upon the Tathâgata that day in Râga-gaha. But that was neither out of fear, nor from willingness to let the Blessed One be destroyed. For the cause by which Arahats could be made to fear or tremble has been destroyed in them, and therefore are they free from fear or trembling. Is the broad earth, O king, afraid at people digging into it, or breaking it up, or at having to bear the weight of the mighty oceans and the peaked mountain ranges?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'But why not?'

'Because there is no cause in the broad earth which could produce fear or trembling.'

'Just so, O king. And neither is there any such cause in Arahats. And would a mountain peak be afraid of being split up, or broken down, or made to fall, or burnt with fire?'

'Certainly not, Sir.'

'But why not?' [209]

'The cause of fear or trembling does not exist within it.'

'And just so, O king, with Arahats. If all the creatures of various outward form in the whole

universe¹ were, together, to attack one Arahāt in order to put him to fear, yet would they bring about no variation in his heart. And why? Because there is neither condition nor cause for fear (in him, whence fear could arise). Rather, O king, was it these considerations that arose in the minds of those Arahats: "To-day when the best of the best of men, the hero among conquerors, has entered into the famous city, Dhana-pālaka the elephant will rush down the street. But to a certainty the brother who is his special attendant will not forsake him who is above the god of gods. But if we should not go away, then neither will the goodness of Ānanda be made manifest, nor will the elephant actually approach² the Tathāgata. Let us then withdraw. Thus will great masses of the people attain to emancipation from the bonds of evil, and the goodness of Ānanda be made manifest." It was on the realisation of the fact that those advantages would arise from their doing so, that the Arahats withdrew to every side.'

'Well, Nāgasena, have you solved the puzzle. That is so. The Arahats feared not, nor did they tremble. But for the advantages that they foresaw they withdrew on every side.'

[Here ends the problem as to the panic of the Arahats.]

¹ Literally, 'In the hundreds of thousands of world systems.'

² A//hānam-anavakāsataya, 'Because of the absence of condition and opportunity.'

[ON CAUSING THE OMNISCIENT ONE TO CHANGE HIS MIND.]

46. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say that the Tathâgata is all wise¹. And on the other hand they say: "When the company of the members of the Order presided over by Sâriputta and Moggallâna had been dismissed by the Blessed One², then the Sâkyas of Kâtumâ and Brahmâ Sabanipati, by means of the parables of the seed and of the calf, gained the Buddha over, and obtained his forgiveness, and made him see the thing in the right light³." Now how was that, Nâgasena? Were those two parables unknown to him that he should be [210] appeased and gained over to their side, and brought to see the matter in a new light? But if he did not already know them, then, Nâgasena, he was not all-wise. If he did know them, then he must have dismissed those brethren rudely and violently⁴ in order to try them; and therein is his unkindness made manifest. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.'

47. 'The Tathâgata, O king, was all-wise, and yet, pleased at those parables, he was gained over by them, he granted pardon to the brethren he had sent

¹ This question is also discussed above, III, 6, 2.

² This episode has already been referred to above, and will be found set out in full in the *Kâtumâ Sutta*, No. 67, in the *Magghima Nikâya* (pp. 456-462 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pâli Text Society).

³ *Nigghattam akamsu*. Compare *Gâtaka*, vol. i, p. 495.

⁴ *Okassa pasayha*, which the *Simhalese* (p. 289) renders *âkaddhanaya ko'a abhibhavanaya karanâ*. See Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1887, p. 148.

away, and he saw the matter in the light (in which the intercessors on their behalf wished him to see it). For the Tathâgata, O king, is lord of the Scriptures. It was with parables that had been first preached by the Tathâgata himself¹ that they conciliated him, pleased him, gained him over, and it was on being thus gained over that he signified his approval (of what they had said). It was, O king, as when a wife conciliates, and pleases, and gains over her husband by means of things that belong to the husband himself; and the husband signifies his approval thereof. Or it was, O king, as when the royal barber conciliates and pleases and gains over the king when he dresses the king's head with the golden comb² which belongs to the king himself, and the king then signifies his approval thereof. Or it was, O king, as when an attendant novice, when he serves his teacher with the food given in alms which his teacher has himself brought home, conciliates him and pleases him and gains him over, and the teacher then signifies his approval thereof.'

'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'

[Here ends the problem as to the all-wise Buddha being gained over by intercession³.]

Here ends the Fourth Chapter.

¹ This is quite correct. They are in the fourth book of the *Ânguttara Sutta*, No. 13.

² *Paṇaka*, a word only found in this passage. *Hīnaśi-kumburê* (p. 280 at the end) renders it *raṇ paṇâwen*.

³ Other cruxes arising out of the dogma of the Buddha's omniscience are discussed above, III, 6, 2.

APPENDIX.

DEVADATTA IN THE GĀTAKAS.

No. of Gātaka.	Character filled by Devadatta.	Character filled by the Bodisat.
1	Merchant	Merchant
3	"	"
11	Deer (Kāḷa)	His father
12	Deer (Sākha)	Deer (Nigrodha)
20	Water sprite	Monkey
21	Hunter	Kurunga deer
33	Quail	Quail
51	Minister	King
57	Crocodile	Monkey king
58	Monkey king	His son
72	Woodman	Elephant
73	King	King
113	Jackal	Tree god
122	King	Elephant
131	Piliya	Samkha
139	Fisherman	Tree god
141	Chameleon	Iguana
142	Drunkard	Jackal
143	Jackal	Lion
160	Vinḷaka (a crow)	King of Videha
168	Hawk	Quail
174	Monkey	Brahman
184	Groom	Minister
193	Cripple	King Paduma
194	King	Countryman
204	Crow	Crow
206	Hunter	Kurunga deer
208	Crocodile	Monkey
210	Bird	Bird
220	Unjust judge	Just judge
221	Hunter	Elephant
222	"	Nandiya (monkey king)
231	Elephant trainer	Elephant trainer

240	King Pingala	Prince
241	Jackal	Minister
243	Musician	Musician
277	Ascetic	Pigeon
294	Jackal	Tree god
295	"	" "
303	Lion	Bird
313	King Kalābu	Kundaka (a brahman)
326	Brahman	God
329	Kālabāhu (a woodman)	Parrot
335	Jackal	Lion
342	Crocodile	Monkey
353	Pingiya (a purohit)	Teacher
357	Mad elephant	Elephant king
358	King Patāpa	His son
367	Doctor	Hag
389	Crow	Brahman
397	Jackal	Lion
404	Monkey king	Monkey king
416	King of Benares	His son
422	King of Ketiya	Brahman
438	Ascetic	Partridge
445	Sākha (a minister)	Nigrodha (a king)
448	Hawk	Cock
457	Adhamma (a god)	Dhamma (a god)
466	Carpenter	Carpenter
472	King of Benares	Prince Paduma
482	Man	Ruru deer
503	Thief	Parrot
505	Ascetic	Prince Somanassa
506	Snake charmer	Snake king

64 in all.

Professor Fausbøll has kindly allowed me to look at the advance sheets of his fifth volume, so that the above list is complete down to No. 513. There may be a few more instances in the remaining 37 Gātakas not yet printed.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page xiii. *Srī-wardhana-pura*. It should have been pointed out that this city is not (as stated by Emerson Tennant at vol. i, p. 414 of his 'Ceylon') the same as the modern town of Kandy, but was in the Kurunægalla district, and (as pointed out by Mr. K. James Pohath in the 'Ceylon Orientalist,' vol. iii, p. 218) about three and a half miles distant from the modern Damba-deniya.

P. 2, note 2. Mr. Trenckner in his 'Pāli Miscellany' (London, 1879) has translated and annotated the whole of Book I, that is, to the end of p. 39 of this translation.

P. 6, line 1, read 'to Tissa the Elder, the son of Moggali.'

P. 10, note 1. It is strange that when it occurred to me that §§ 10-14 are an early interpolation I failed to notice the most important, and indeed almost conclusive argument for my suggestion. It is this, that the closing words of § 14 are really in complete contradiction to the opening words, and that they look very much as if they had been inserted, after the interpolation, to meet the objection to it which would at once arise from the expression in § 16, that the venerable Assagutta 'heard those words of King Milinda.' As it originally stood the words he heard were those of § 10. After the interpolation these words had to be reinserted at the end of § 14, in spite of their being in contradiction to the context.

Pp. 14 foll., for 'Rohana' read 'Rohana.'

Pp. 15, 16. This whole episode as to the charge of lying is repeated by Buddhaghosa (in the Introduction to his *Samanta Pāsādikā*, p. 296 of vol. iii of Oldenberg's *Vinaya*), but as having happened to Siggava in connection with the birth of Moggali-putta Tissa. A modern author would be expected to mention his source, but Buddhaghosa makes no reference whatever to the Milinda. Perhaps the episode is common stock of Buddhist legend, and we shall find it elsewhere.

P. 32, line 1, add after 'Quietism' 'and the discourse on losses (*Parābhava Suttanta*).' [See p. xxix, where the reference is supplied.]

P. 53. 'Virtue's the base.' It should have been pointed out that this is the celebrated verse given by the Ceylon scholars to Buddhaghosa as the theme of the test essay he was to write as a proof of his fitness. If he succeeded in the essay they would then entrust him with all their traditions for him to recast in Pāli. The 'Path of Purity,' which opens with this verse, was the result.

P. 185, § 49. On the question discussed in this section the curious may compare what is said by Sir Thomas Brown in his 'Enquiries into Vulgar and Common Errors,' Book VII, Chapter xvi (p. 304 of the London edition of 1686). He gives several instances of supposed cases of conception without sexual connection mentioned in western writers, and comes to the conclusion, apropos of the supposed generation of the magician Merlin by Satan, that 'generations by the devil are very improbable.'

I had desired to dedicate this translation of the Milinda to Mr. Trenckner, to whose self-denying labours, spread over many years, we owe the edition of the Pāli text on which the translation is based, and without which the translation would not have been attempted. But I am now informed that any dedication of a single volume in the series of the 'Sacred Books of the East' is not allowable, as it would conflict with the dedication of the entire series. Had I known this when the Introduction was being written, a more suitable acknowledgment of the debt due to Mr. Trenckner than the few words on page xv, would have been made at the close of the Introductory remarks. I am permitted therefore to add here what was intended to appear in the dedication as an expression of the gratitude which all interested in historical research must feel to a scholar who has devoted years of labour, and of labour rendered valuable by the highest training and critical scholarship, to a field of enquiry in which the only fruit to be gathered is knowledge.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

- Abhidharma Kośa Vyākhyâ, quoted, page xxvi.
- Agathokles, king of Baktria, xxii.
- Agita, the teacher, 8, 41.
- Ākesines, the river, xlv.
- Ākiravatî, the river, xlv, 171.
- Ālakamandâ, city of the gods, 3.
- Alasanda (Alexandria), on the Indus, xxiii, 127.
- Amarâ, Mahosadha's wife, 294.
- Amara-sekara, Mr. C. A. M., xii.
- Amara-sekara, Mr. N. M., xii.
- Ānanda, the teacher, 163, 191, 257.
- Anantakâya, attendant on Menander, probably = Antiochos, xix, xlii, 48.
- Anuruddha, the Sâkyan, 163.
- Apollodotus, king of Baktria, xix, xlii.
- Archebios, king of Baktria, xxii.
- Ariano-pâli, legends on coins, xxi.
- Āsâlba, a month, 171.
- Asiknî, the river, xlv.
- Asipâsâ, a caste, xlv.
- Asoka, emperor of India, xxxvii, xlii, 182.
- Asokârâma, near Patna, xliii, 26.
- Assagutta of the Vattaniya hermitage, xxv, xliii.
- Āsvagupta, not the same as last, xxv.
- Ātibissara, = Devadatta, 167.
- Aviki, purgatory, xl, 9.
- Āyupâla, of the Saṅkheyya hermitage, a Buddhist teacher, xxv, xliii, 30 foll.
- Barygaza, in Gujarat, xx.
- Benares, 31.
- Benfey, Professor, quoted, xxvi.
- Bhaddasâla, the general, xliii, 292.
- Bhaddi-(or Bhāsi-)puttâ, a caste, xlv.
- Bhaddiya, the Sâkyan, 163.
- Bhagu, the Sâkyan, 163.
- Bharukakka, men of, xliii, 331.
- Bindumati, a courtesan, xliii, 182.
- Bird, Major, quoted, xxvi.
- Brahmâ, the god, 118, 301.
- Brahma-world, heaven, 126.
- Buddhaghosa's 'Path of Purity,' xi, 306; his quotations of the Milinda, xiv-xvii.
- Budh Gâyâ, in Behar, 9.
- Burgess, Dr., quoted, xxvi.
- Burmese translations of the 'Questions of Milinda,' xi, xvi.
- Burnouf, quoted, xxvi.
- Bu-ston, a Tibetan work, quoted, xxvi.
- Ceylon, xi, xiv; its literature, xiii.
- Childers, Professor, quoted, xlv, 185, 230, 244.
- Cunningham, General, quoted, xi.
- Dâgabas, sepulchral heaps, xx.
- Dânava, Titan, 216.
- Daramisipola, a Ceylon scholar, xiii.
- Devadatta, the heresiarch, 153, 163 foll., 193, 249, 282 foll., 303.
- Devamantiya, = Demetrios, xix, xliii, 22, 24, 37, 47.
- Dhamma-kitti, author of the Saddhamma Saṅgaha, xxvii.
- Dhammakkhanda. See Madhurasatora.
- Dhammapâla, quoted, 244.
1. Dhamma-rakkhita. See Daramisipola.
2. Dhamma-rakkhita, one of Nâgasena's teachers, xxv, xliii, 16, 18.
- Dhana-phâlaka, elephant, 297.
- Dinna, attendant on king Milinda, 87.
- Divyâvadâna, quoted, xxv.
- Ekasâraka, a Brahman, 172.
- Elijah, his 'Act of Truth,' 185.
- Eukratides, king of Baktria, xxiii.
- Fâ-Hien, the traveller, 248.
- Fausböll, Professor, quoted, 244, 253.

- Gandhâra, the country, xliii, 327, 331.
 Gangâ, the Ganges river, xliv, 5, 171, 182.
 Gardiner, Professor, quoted, xxi.
 Garuḍas, snake-eating birds, 38, 175.
 Gopâla-mâtâ, queen, 172.
 Guṇânanda. See Mohorri-watte.
 Guttila, musician, 172.
- Hardy, Rev. R. Spence, quoted, xxvi, 40, 61, 64, 77.
 Himâlayas, mountains, 11, 171, 278.
 Hînarî-kumburê Sumaṅgala, translates the Milinda into Siṃhalese, xii, xiii.
 Hydaspes, the river Bihat, xliv.
 Hypanis (the Sutelj), xix.
- Indra, the god, 37.
 Indus, river, 171.
 Isamos (the Jumna), xix.
 Itihâsas, 6, 247.
- Jains, their founder, 8.
 Jâli, Vessantara's son, 174.
 Jumna, river. See Isamos, Yamunâ.
 Justin, quoted, xix.
- Kâbul, Menander's coins found there, xx.
 Kadphises, a coin of his referred to, xxii.
 Kaṅgaṅala, in the Terai, 14, 18.
 Kâlâbu, king, 286.
 Kalanda, a clan, 238.
 Kalasi, a town on an island in the Indus, xxiii, xliii, 83, 127.
 Kali-devatâ, a sect so called, xlv.
 Kandabhâgâ, the river, xlv, 171.
 Kandaḡutta, king, xliii, 292.
 Kârambhiya, ascetic, 287.
 Karisi. See Kalasi.
 Kashmîr, Menander's coins found there, xx, xliii, 82.
 Kassapa, the Buddha, 4, 173.
 Kathâ Sarit Sâgara, quoted, 298.
 Kâtumâ, a Sâkyan town, 257, 301.
 Kern, Professor, quoted, xxvi.
 Ketumatî, a mansion in heaven, 11.
 Khugguttarâ, 122.
 Kimbila, the Sâkyan, 163.
 Kina, perhaps China, xliii, 121, 327, 331, 359.
 Kîñḍî, a Brahman woman, 153.
- Kirtti Sṛî Râga-simha, king of Ceylon, xii, xiii.
 Kola-parrana, seaport, xliii, 359.
 Kolumbara, its stuffs, 3.
 Kumâra Kassapa, 275.
 Kunda, the coppersmith, 242.
 Kuvera, the god, 37.
- Lassen, Professor, quoted, xlv.
 Legge, Professor, his version of Fâ-Hien, 248.
 Liwera, Mr. A., xiii.
 Lokâyatas, a sect so called, 7.
- Maddî, wife to Vessantara, 174.
 Madhura, the city, xliii, 331.
 Madhurasat-tora, a Buddhist scholar, xiii.
 Mahâ-bhârata, called an Itihâsa, 247.
 Mahâsena, a god, 11.
 Mahî, the river, xlv, 171.
 Mahosadha and his wife, 294.
 Makkhali (of the cowshed), 8.
 Mallikâ, queen, 172.
 Mâlunkya-putta, 204 foll.
 Manibhaddâ, a caste so called, xlvi, 191.
 Maṅkura, attendant on Menander, xx, 29, 30, 48.
 Mandhâtâ, king, 172.
 Manoratha Pîrasa, quoted, xiv.
 Mâra, the Evil One, 219.
 Masâra, mountain, 177.
 Mathurâ, Menander's coins found there, xx.
 Megha Dûta, quoted, 298.
 Menander-Milinda, identity of the names, xviii; notices of in classical writers, xix; coins of, xx-xxii; date and birthplace of, xxiii; his conversion to Buddhism, xxv-xxvii.
- Mendis, Mr. L., xiii.
 Milinda, the Questions of, in Ceylon, xii, xiii; in Buddhaghosa, xiv-xvi; MSS. of, xvii; is a religious romance, xvii; the charm of its style, xviii.
 Milinda Prashnaya, xii.
 Moggallâna, his death, 261 foll.
 Mohorri-watte Guṇânanda, a Buddhist scholar, xii.
 Morris, the Rev. Dr., quoted, xiv, xv, 46, 65, 174, 278, 301.

- Müller, Prof. Ed., quoted, xlv, 179, 240.
- Nāgarguna, founder of the Mahāyāna school, xxv; identified wrongly with Nāgasena, xxvi.
- Nāgasena, xxv, xxvi, and passim.
- Nāgesa, epithet of Patañjali, xxvi.
- Nāṅgiri, elephant and mountain, 298.
- Nanda, the Brahman, 153.
- Nandaka, an ogre, 153.
- Nandiya, monkey king, 287.
- Nesāda, outcasts, 286.
- Niganṭha Nāta-putta, founder of the Jain sect, 8.
- Nikumba, the country, xliii, 327.
- Nimi, king, 172.
- Nyāya philosophy, 6.
- Pabbatā, a caste so called, xlvii, 191.
- Pāṭittiya rules, xli.
- Pakudha Kakāyana, the teacher, 8, 42.
- Pāli Text Society, xxv, xxvii, xl, xlv, 46, 65.
- Pāṇini, quoted, 298.
- Papañka Sūdani, quoted, xv.
- Pāragika offences, xli.
- Pāraliputta, the modern Patna, 26, 182.
- Patañjali, not the same as Nāgasena, xxvi.
- Pātimokkha, xli.
- Pātimokkha, recitation of, 264 foll.
- Pāyāsi the Rāganya, 275.
- Phanin, epithet of Patañjali, xxvi.
- Piliyakkha, king, 280.
- Piris, Mr. K., xii.
- Plutarch, quoted, xix, xxii.
- Pragāpati, the god, 37.
- Punnā, slave girl, 172.
- Punna, a servant, 172.
- Pūrāna Kassapa, the teacher, 8, 9, 41.
- Purānas, 6, 247.
- Rāgagaha, 191, 298; council held at, 242.
- Rāhula, son of the Buddha, 32.
- Rakkhita-tala, in the Himālayas, xliii, 6, 12, 18.
- Rāmāyana, called an Itihāsa, 247.
- Roga, the Mallian, 282.
1. Rohana, a Buddhist teacher mentioned in the Ānguttara, xxv.
 2. Rohana, Nāgasena's teacher, xxv, xliii.
- Sabba-dinna, attendant on Menander, xix, xliii, 20, 47, 56.
- Saddhamma Saṃgaha, a Pāli historical work, xxvii.
- Sādhina, king, 172.
- Sāgala, capital of Baktria, xviii, xliii, 2, 23.
- Saka, a country, xliii, 327, 331.
- Sākha, general, 291.
- Sakka, king of the gods, 12.
- Sākyan, member of the clan, 153.
- Sallet, Alfred von, quoted, xxi.
- Sāma, prince, 280 foll., 288.
- Saṅgaya, the teacher, 8.
- Saṅkheyya, a hermitage, xliii, 17, 22.
- Sāṅkhyā philosophy, 6.
- Santushita, a god, 37.
- Sarabhū, the river, xlv, 171.
- Sarasaṅkara. See Wēliwira.
- Sarassatī, the river, xlv, 171.
- Savara, city of the Kāṇḍālas, 267.
- Schiefner, Prof., quoted, xxvi.
- Siamese translations, &c., of the 'Questions of Milinda,' xi, xvi, xvii, xxiv.
- Sindhu, the Indus river, xlv.
- Sineru, king of mountains, 152, 176.
- Sivaka, 195.
- Sivi, king, 179.
1. Sonuttara, a Brahman, xliii, 14.
 2. Sonuttara, an outcast, 286.
- Srī-wardhana-pura, a city in Ceylon, xiii, 305.
- Sthūpas. See Dāgabas.
- Strabo, quoted, xix.
- Strato, king of Baktria, xxii.
- Subhadda, recluse, 186.
- Sudinna, of the Kalanda clan, 238.
- Sumana, garland maker, 172.
- Sumaṅgala Vīlāsini, quoted, xiv, xv, 131, 263.
- Suppabuddha, a Sākyan, 153.
- Suppiyā, devotee, 172.
- Suratba, Surat, xliii, 331, 359.
- Sutta Nipāta, xlii.
- Suvanna-bhūmi, the country, xliii, 359.
- Suyāma, a god, 37.
- Sy-Hermaios, king of Baktria, xxii.
- Takkola, the place, xliii, xlv, 359.
- Theosophists, sect of, 268.

- Tissa, son of Moggallî, 6.
 Tissa-thera, a writer, xliii, 71.
 Trenckner, Mr., xv-xix, xxiv, xxxi, 25, 28, 32, 49, 80, 175, 179, 294, 306.
 Tusita heaven, 271.
 Ūhâ, a river, xliii, 70.
 Upâli, the barber, 163.
 Uposatha Ârâma, in Ceylon, xliii.
 Uttarakuru, 3.
 Valêshika philosophy, 6.
 Vaṅga, Bengal, xliii, 359.
 Varuṇa, the god, 37.
 Vattaniya, a hermitage, xliii, 10-16.
 Vedas, the four, 6, 247; the three, 17, 34.
 Vegayanta, palace of the gods, 11.
 Vessantara, the king, 170 foll.
 Vessavana, king of the fairies, 38.
 Vetravatî, the river, xliv, 171.
 Vidhura, sage, 288.
 Vigamba-vatthu, a hermitage, xliii, 12.
 Vilâta, a country, xliii, 327, 331.
 Vitamsâ, the river, xliv, 171.
 Vitandas, a sect so called, 7.
 Weber, Prof., quoted, xxv.
 Wenzel, Dr., quoted, xxv, xxvi.
 Wilson, H. H., quoted, xxi.
 Wœliwira Saranaṅkara, a Buddhist scholar, xii, xiii.
 Yakkha, ogre, 38, 176.
 Yâma, the god, 37.
 Yamunâ, the Jumna river, xliv, 171.
 Yavana, Baktria, xliii, 327, 331.
 Yoga philosophy, 6.
 Yonakas, the Greeks (Ionians) attendant on Menander, xix, xlii, 1, 4, 20, 68.
 Yugandhara, a peak of the Himâlayas, 12.
 Zoilos, king of Baktria, xxii.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

- Acrobats, page 53.
 'Act of Truth,' 180 foll.
 Alkaline wash, in medicine, 168.
 Alms, customs of the Buddhist Order in regard to, 14-16, 20.
 Alms-halls, 2. See Rest-houses.
 Altruism, Buddhist, 174.
 Ambrosia, 35, 236.
 Animals, their reasoning powers, 51.
 Arahat, the great, is Buddha, 8; others, 11, 12; their knowledge of others' thoughts, 18, 23; nature of their wisdom, 29; does not fear death, 70; description of, 157; have no fear, 206 foll., 297 foll.
 Arahatship, above ordinary morality, 25; its seven conditions, 52, 58; the highest of all lands, 227.
 Architects, 2, 53.
 Arithmetic, 6, 91.
 Army, its four divisions, 7, 54, 60, 62.
 Arts and sciences, the nineteen, &c., 6.
 Aspiration of reward, on doing a good act, 5; duty of, 55.
 Association of ideas, 89-92.
 Assurance of salvation, the Arahat's final, 65.
 Astrologer, the royal, 31, 247.
 Astronomy, 6.
 Atonement, 14.
 Baby, is it the same as the grown man? 63.
 Bambû, simile of the giant-, 155 foll.; dies in reproduction, 236.
 Barber, 19, 302.
 Barley reapers, simile of, 51.
 Bathing places, public, 140.
 Becoming, 83; sorrow of, 149; freedom from, 293.
 Boat, similes of, 124, 227.
 Body, the thirty-two parts of the human, 42; the love of the, 114; bodily marks, the, 32, 117, 237; made of four elements, 194.
 Bones, hundred leagues long, 130.
 Book, 123; of the law, 262.
 Brahman, works in the fields, 15; duties of a, 247.
 Brand marks, on cattle, 122.
 Breath, no soul in the, 48.
 Bridges, 140, 272, 291.
 Brooms, 4.
 Buddha, the, is incomparable, 108; is not still alive, 144 foll.; gifts to, 144 foll.; distinction between *Paññaka*- and Perfect-Buddhas, 158; the best of men, 178; sinlessness of, 191.
 Burning glass, 85.
 Calf, similes of, 282, 301.
 Carpenter, simile of, 236.
 Carriages, 3, 91.
 Carter, should test a ford, 272.
 Casuists, 7; casuistry no branch of education, 17.
 Cat's eye, the gem, 177.
 Cattle, brand marks on, 122.
 Cauterising a wound, 168, 211.
 Ceremonies, observed by kings on visiting *Samanas*, 30, 31, 37, 49.
 Character, of the ideally good layman, 296.
 Chariot, simile of, 43; parts of, 44.
 Charms, intoning of, 181.
 City, description of a wealthy, 2; foundation of, 53; with one gateway, simile of, 90.
 Clocks, want of, 7.
 Clod, thrown in the air, simile of, 194.
 Cloth goods, 3.
 Combs for the hair, 19.
 Comets, 247.
 'Confections,' 42, 83, 205, 207.
 Contact, 92.
 Conversion, what it consists in, 25.
 Conveyancing, as an art, 6.
 Copper ware, 3, 96.

- Cotton stuffs, 159.
 Counting. See Arithmetic; by the finger-joints, 91.
 Courtesan, story of, 183 foll.
 Courts of justice, 291.
 Criminal, the condemned, similes of, 165-6, 211.
 Crops, estimation of growing, 91.
 Cymbals, simile of, 93.
 Dacoits, 33.
 Dart, simile of the perfect, 159.
 Dead body, always cast up by the sea, 259.
 Death, the fear of, 206-212, 278, 279.
 Death of the Buddha, the legend of, explained, 242 foll.
 Delusion of self, 207, 226.
 Dependents, kindness to, 138.
 Dice-playing, 103.
 Digestion, 193, 236.
 Diseases, ninety-eight kinds of, 152; caused in ten ways (one of which is medical treatment), 192; cured by Pirit, 225.
 Divination, practised by Brahmans, 247.
 'Divine Ear,' the, 11.
 'Divine Eye,' the, 26, 179.
 Divining other people's thoughts, 18, 23.
 Dreams, interpretation of, 247.
 Drugs, five kinds of, 69.
 Drum, simile of, 149.
 Dryads, 242.
 Ear, the divine, 11.
 Earth, the broad, similes of, 52, 150, 194, 258, 299.
 Earthquakes, 170 foll.
 Eclipses, 247.
 Education, 17, 50, 63.
 Egoism, delusion of, 207, 226.
 Elements, the four, 194.
 Elephants, 3, 38, 126, 211, 267, 272.
 Embroidery, 134.
 Embryo, four stages of the, 63, 105.
 Esoteric teaching, none in Buddhism, 138, 142, 267.
 Estimating growing crops, 91.
 Eunuchs, cannot keep a secret, 141.
 Evil, origin of. See Pain. Conquest of, by good, 174.
 Excitement, condemned, 143.
 Exorcism, 38.
 Eye, the Divine, 26.
 'Eye of the Truth,' 25.
 Fairies, 38.
 Faith, 52, 56.
 Fans, 148.
 Finger-joints, used to count with, 91.
 Fire, similes of, 73, 146, 188, 234, 244.
 Fire-extinguishing apparatus, 68.
 Fire-stick apparatus, 85.
 Flame, simile of, 64.
 Flavours, the six, 88.
 Flood, simile of, 2, 56.
 Floor coverings, 267.
 Food, Indian idea of, 26.
 Fossil bones, 130.
 Future life, the craving after, condemned, 174, 200.
 Garlands, habit of wearing, 19.
 Gayal, kind of buffalo, 211.
 Gems, various kinds of, 177.
 Generosity, the mighty power of, 173-5.
 Gestation, period of, is ten months, 16.
 Ghee, 65, 75, 161, 249.
 Gold and silver, 3, 59, 267.
 Grammar, 17.
 Granary, 65, 161.
 Guilds of traders, 3.
 Hair, the sixteen impediments of wearing, 19; hair-dyeing and shampooing, &c., *ibid*.
 Head-splitting, belief as to, 222.
 Heads of houses, 209.
 Health and wealth, explained, 97.
 Hell, none in Buddhism. See Purgatory.
 Hen and eggs, similes of, 76, 77, 80.
 Highwaymen, 32, 222.
 Honey, the man in the trough of, 88; the drink of, 95; slips through the fingers, 249.
 Horripilation, 38.
 Horses, 3; the swift, simile of, 199.
 House-building, 57, 83; house of life, 207.
 Humours, the three, in medicine, 168, 191.
 Husbandry, 215, 235, 247, 285.
 Iddhi, powers of, 261.
 Ideas, mark of, 94; association of, 89-92.

- Income, simile of, 187.
 Indeterminate questions, 205.
 Individuality, 40-45, 50, 64, 67.
 Indivisibility, denied, 132.
 Insight, the eight causes of its ripening, 141, and see Conversion.
 Intoxicating drinks, 41.
 Investigation, characteristic of, 96;
 why the Buddha investigates, 272.
 Invisible, story of the magician, 217;
 root to make one, 281.
 Iron, 70.
 Jasmine, the chief of flowers, 252.
 Javelins, 69.
 Karma, 3, 12, 18, 32, 41, 71, 80, 103,
 163, 191, 214, 262-4.
 King of kings, the mythical, 162, 177,
 199.
 Kings, their manner of discussing,
 46; their tyranny, 50; their
 greed, 203; they take the best
 of everything, 267.
 Lamps, 61, 64, 67, 73, 110.
 Lancet, surgeon's, 168-9, 211.
 Law, of property, 247. See Peace,
 breach of, and Conveyancing,
 and Punishments, and Book.
 Laymen, includes the gods, 32.
 Learning by heart, 17, 22, 28, 34,
 123, 172.
 Letter-writing, 67.
 Leviathan, 187.
 Lexicography, 17.
 Lie, a deliberate, excludes from the
 Order, 268.
 Lions, 135, 211.
 Log, the dry, simile of, 214.
 Looking-glass, 86, 189.
 Lord of a village, 208.
 Lotions, medicinal, 211, 215.
 Lotus flower, simile of, 117.
 Love to all beings, 138, 279 foll.; of
 teacher to pupil, 142; duty of,
 254.
 Lucky marks, 32, 117, 237, 247.
 Magic, 6, 181, 217.
 Mandolin and its parts, 84.
 Market places, 2, 53.
 Marks on the body, as omens of
 future greatness, 17.
 Marriage by purchase, 74.
 Medicine, 6, 191, 197, 214. See
 Physician, Surgery.
 Meditation, 13, 18, 52, 196 foll.
 Memory, 120-122.
 Merchant, should test goods, 272.
 Milk and butter, simile of, 65, 75.
 Mindfulness, 52, 58.
 Minds, seven classes of, 154.
 Ministers of state, the six, 171.
 Miracles at conception of Nāgasena,
 14.
 Money, 17, 59, 134, 267.
 Mules die in giving birth, 236.
 Music, 6.
 Muslim, of Benares, 3.
 Mutilation, of criminals, 63, 166,
 270, 276.
 Name, soul not implied in, 41.
 'Name-and-form,' 71 foll., 77.
 Nirvāṇa, a state of mind to be at-
 tained in, and which ends with,
 this life, 36, 41, 78, 106. See
 Arahatship.
 Novice, the intractable, 4; Nāga-
 sena becomes a, 20; his duties
 as, 24, 302.
 Ocean, taste of, 131, 133; always
 casts up a dead body, 259.
 Offences, conscious and unconscious,
 224.
 Official gratitude, 76, 93, 197.
 Ogres, 38.
 Oil, for the hair, 19.
 Ointment, for a wound, 168.
 Omens, interpretation of, 247.
 Omniscience of the Buddhas, 117,
 154-162, 271, 301 foll.
 Pain, origin of, 83, 191, 195.
 Paṭṭhaka-Buddhas, 158.
 Peace, breach of the, in law, 239.
 Perception, characteristic of, 95, 132.
 Perseverance, 52.
 Physician, 68, 69, 112, 165, 168,
 211, 40, 272.
 Pilot, should test the shore, 272.
 Pipers, 48.
 Pirit, 213.
 Pledge, deposit of, 123.
 Poison, simile of, 94; antidotes to,
 215; love counteracts, 279.
 Pork, the Buddha's last meal of, 244
 foll.

- Posthumous honours, 144 foll.
 Potter and the pots, simile of, 84.
 Precepts, abolition of the minor, 202.
 Present to a king, simile of, 220.
 Prophecy, 6, 185.
 Punishments, 63, 223, 239, 254, 269.
 Punkahs, 148.
 Pupil, his duty to his teacher, 144.
 Purgatory, 94, 101, 125, 163, 167, 206, 210, 283.
 Purity, the power of, 173.
 Purohita, family chaplain, 282.

 Rain, three seasons of, 171; produced by charms, 181.
 Rain water, similes of, 90, 226, 245, 274, 278.
 Rams, simile of two butting, 92.
 Reasoning contrasted with wisdom, 50.
 Recognition, mark of perception, 132.
 Reflection, characteristic of, 95.
 Re-incarnation, 207, and see next.
 Re-individualisation, 50, 72-75.
 Relationship, scheme of, 292.
 Relics, of the Buddha, 144 foll., 246.
 Renunciation, 31, 49, 98, 251, 271.
 Rest-houses, public, 291.
 Rhinoceros, 38.
 Rice, simile of cartload of, 154; simile of boiling, 176; is the chief of all grains, 252.
 Robber, figuratively, of a bad monk, 256.

 Sandal-wood dust, 29.
 Schism, 163, 227.
 Scholars, their manner of discussing, 46.
 Schooling, 63, and see Education.
 Season, the rainy, 7, 24.
 Secret wisdom, 139.
 Sects, 3, 7, 8, 144, 266.
 Seed-fruit-seed, succession of, 80.
 Seed, simile of, 301.
 Seeds, edible, 161.
 Sensation, results of a, 82, 83, 89, 92; characteristics of, 93; kinds of, 194.
 Shadow of a man, 45; abiding under another's, 137.
 Shampooing the hair, 19.

 Ship, simile of, 227.
 Shops, 2, 3.
 Shrines, god-haunted, 140.
 Sins, the five, 41; will find you out, 295.
 Snake-charmers, 38, 212, 215.
 Snakes, 211.
 Snoring, how to stop, 131.
 Snow, 70.
 Son in the faith, 142.
 Sophists, 7.
 Sorrow, 125, and see Pain.
 Soul, no such thing as, 40-45, 48, 67, 86-89, 111, 132.
 Spells, 6.
 Splinter of rock, incident of, 193 foll., 249 foll.
 State officials, the six, 171.
 Suffering, cause of, see Pain; various kinds of, 275.
 Sugar, 72; sugar mill, 235.
 Suggestion, as source of memory, 121.
 Suicide, 69, 273.
 Surgery, 168.
 Swallowed up by the earth, 152.
 Syrups and sweetmeats, 3.

 Tank, simile of the full, 187.
 Taxation, 208.
 Teacher, his fees, 17, 25; his duties to his pupil, 142.
 Thought-perception, 89.
 Tidal-wave, 276.
 Time, definition of, 77; root of, 79; ultimate point of, 80-82.
 To pay, 177.
 Torture, 239; various kinds of death with, 276, 277.
 Transmigration, 111, 118, 120.
 Travellers, hospitality towards, 161.
 Treasurer, the royal, 59.
 Trees, disciples compared to, 151; simile of the barren, 162; talking trees, dilemma of, 241.
 Trumpeters, 48.
 Truth, is the most minute of all things, 132; its power, 182.
 Turbans, 138.
 Tutor's fees, 17.
 Twirling-stick, 85, 146.

 Uncle, no word for in Pāli, 292.
 Unguents, for the hair, 19.

-
- Vanishing root, 281.
 Village organisation, 208-9.
 Vow, the eightfold, of a layman, 138.
 Waggon, 3, 27; parts of, 44; simile
 of path of, 91; of load of rice,
 154; breaking up of, 173; rec-
 koned among valuable things,
 267.
 Wandering teachers, 7, 34.
 Water-clearing gem, 55.
 Water, earth rests on, 106, 175.
 Water-pot, the regular, 106.
 Weapons, 69.
 Wheel of victory, 162; of the king-
 dom of righteousness, 31, 253.
 Wife. See Marriage.
 Wind, simile of, 147-8; as medical
 term, 191.
 Wisdom, distinct from reasoning,
 50; mark of, 51, 61; of Arahats,
 29; seven kinds of, 128.
 Women, put before men, 83; their
 fickleness, 141; in the Order,
 187; reckoned among valuable
 things, 267; their wives, 294;
 their management of their hus-
 bands, 302. See Marriage.
 Woollen stuffs, 3, 28, 159.
 Worms in the body, 151.
 Wound, treatment of, 168.
 Writing a letter, 67.
-

TRANSLITERATION OF ORIENTAL ALPHABETS ADOPTED FOR THE TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.

CONSONANTS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zaid.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.	
	I Class.	II Class.									
		III Class.									
Gutturales.											
1 Tenuis	k	क	ک	گ	ک	ک	כ	k	
2 " aspirata	kh	ख	خ	خ	خ	خ	כ	kh	
3 Media	g	ग	گ	گ	گ	گ	ג		
4 " aspirata	gh	घ	غ	غ	غ	غ	ג		
5 Gutturo-labialis	q	ق	ק		
6 Nasalis	h (ng)	ङ	{ 3 (ng) } { 4 (n) }		
7 Spiritus asper	h	ह	ه (h)	ه	ه	ه	ה	h, hs	
8 " lenis	,		
9 " asper faucalis	'h		
10 " lenis faucalis	'h		
11 " asper fricatus		'h		
12 " lenis fricatus		'h		
Gutturales modificatae (palatales, &c.)											
13 Tenuis		k	. . .	क	ع	ع	ع	k	
14 " aspirata		kh	. . .	ख	kh	
15 Media		g	. . .	ग		
16 " aspirata		gh	. . .	घ		
17 " Nasalis		ñ	. . .	ङ		

CONSONANTS (continued).	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit	Zend.	Pehlevi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
18 Semivocalis	y			य	𐬨	𐬨	ي	ي	י	y
19 Spiritus asper		(y)			𐬨	𐬨				
20 " lenis		(y)								
21 " asper assibilatus		s		श	𐬨	𐬨	س	س	ש	s
22 " lenis assibilatus		z			𐬨	𐬨	ز	ز	ז	z
Dentales.										
23 Tenuis	t			त	𐬨	𐬨	ت	ت	ת	t
24 " aspirata	th			थ	𐬨	𐬨	ث	ث	ת	th
25 " assibilata	d		TH	द	𐬨	𐬨	ذ	ذ	ד	
26 Media	dh			ध	𐬨	𐬨	ذ	ذ	ד	
27 " aspirata					𐬨	𐬨	ذ	ذ	ד	
28 " assibilata			DH		𐬨	𐬨	ذ	ذ	ד	
29 Nasalis	n			न	𐬨	𐬨	ن	ن	נ	n
30 Semivocalis	l			ल	𐬨	𐬨	ل	ل	ל	l
31 " mollis 1		l		ळ	𐬨	𐬨	ل	ل	ל	
32 " mollis 2			L		𐬨	𐬨	ل	ل	ל	
33 Spiritus asper 1	s			स	𐬨	𐬨	س	س	ס	s
34 " asper 2			s (ʃ)		𐬨	𐬨	س	س	ס	
35 " lenis	z				𐬨	𐬨	ز	ز	ז	z
36 " asperimus 1			z (ʒ)		𐬨	𐬨	ز	ز	ז	
37 " asperimus 2			z (ʒ)		𐬨	𐬨	ز	ز	ז	

Dentales modificatae
(linguales, &c.)

38 Tenuis	t	...	ठ
39 " aspirata	th	...	ठ
40 Media	d	...	ड
41 " aspirata	dh	...	ड
42 Nasalis	n	...	ण
43 Semivocalis	r	...	र
44 " fricata	r
45 " diacritica	R
46 Spiritus asper	sh	...	ष
47 " lenis	zh

Labiales.

48 Tenuis	p	...	प
49 " aspirata	ph	...	फ
50 Media	b	...	ब
51 " aspirata	bh	...	भ
52 Tenuissima
53 Nasalis	m	...	म
54 Semivocalis	w
55 " aspirata	hw
56 Spiritus asper	f
57 " lenis	v	...	व
58 Anusvāra	वं
59 Visarga	h	...	ः

VOWELS.	MISSIONARY ALPHABET.			Sanskrit.	Zend.	Pehlvi.	Persian.	Arabic.	Hebrew.	Chinese.
	I Class.	II Class.	III Class.							
1 Neutralis	0									ㅅ
2 Laryngo-palatalis	ə									ㅅ
3 " labialis	ɔ									ㅅ
4 Gutturalis brevis	a			अ	𐬀	𐬀	𐬀	ا	א	ㅅ
5 " longa	ā	(a)		आ	𐬁	𐬁	𐬁	آ	א	ㅅ
6 Palatalis brevis	i			इ	𐬂	𐬂	𐬂	ي	י	ㅅ
7 " longa	ī	(i)		ई	𐬃	𐬃	𐬃	ی	י	ㅅ
8 Dentalis brevis	ɛ			ए	𐬄	𐬄	𐬄	ه	ה	ㅅ
9 " longa	ē			ऐ	𐬅	𐬅	𐬅	ه	ה	ㅅ
10 Lingualis brevis	ɹ			उ	𐬆	𐬆	𐬆	و	ו	ㅅ
11 " longa	ṛ			ऊ	𐬇	𐬇	𐬇	و	ו	ㅅ
12 Labialis brevis	u			उ	𐬈	𐬈	𐬈	و	ו	ㅅ
13 " longa	ū	(u)		ऊ	𐬉	𐬉	𐬉	و	ו	ㅅ
14 Gutturo-palatalis brevis	e			ए	𐬊	𐬊	𐬊	ه	ה	ㅅ
15 " longa	é (ai)	(e)		ऐ	𐬋	𐬋	𐬋	ه	ה	ㅅ
16 Diphthongus gutturo-palatalis	āi	(ai)		आ	𐬌	𐬌	𐬌	ه	ה	ㅅ
17 " "	ei (ēi)			इ	𐬍	𐬍	𐬍	ه	ה	ㅅ
18 " "	oi (ōu)			ई	𐬎	𐬎	𐬎	ه	ה	ㅅ
19 Gutturo-labialis brevis	o			उ	𐬏	𐬏	𐬏	و	ו	ㅅ
20 " longa	ō (au)	(o)		ऊ	𐬐	𐬐	𐬐	و	ו	ㅅ
21 Diphthongus gutturo-labialis	āu	(au)		आ	𐬑	𐬑	𐬑	ه	ה	ㅅ
22 " "	eu (ēu)			इ	𐬒	𐬒	𐬒	ه	ה	ㅅ
23 " "	ou (ōu)			ई	𐬓	𐬓	𐬓	ه	ה	ㅅ
24 Gutturalis fracta	ä			अ	𐬔	𐬔	𐬔	ه	ה	ㅅ
25 Palatalis fracta	ī			इ	𐬕	𐬕	𐬕	ه	ה	ㅅ
26 Labialis fracta	ū			उ	𐬖	𐬖	𐬖	ه	ה	ㅅ
27 Gutturo-labialis fracta	ö			ऊ	𐬗	𐬗	𐬗	ه	ה	ㅅ

Clarendon Press, Oxford.



I. LITERATURE AND PHILOLOGY.

SECTION I.

DICTIONARIES, GRAMMARS, ETC.

ANGLO-SAXON. An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, based on the MS. Collections of the late JOSEPH BOSWORTH, D.D., Professor of Anglo-Saxon, Oxford. Edited and enlarged by Prof. T. N. TOLLER, M.A. Parts I-III. A—SAR. 4to. 15s. each. Part IV. *In the Press*.

ARABIC. A Practical Arabic Grammar. Part I. Compiled by A. O. GREEN, Brigade Major, Royal Engineers. *Second Edition, Enlarged.* Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

CELTIC. Ancient Cornish Drama. Edited and translated by E. NORRIS, with a Sketch of Cornish Grammar, an Ancient Cornish Vocabulary, etc. 2 vols. 1859. 8vo. 1l. 1s.

The Sketch of Cornish Grammar separately, stitched, 2s. 6d.

CHINESE. A Handbook of the Chinese Language. By JAMES SUMMERS. 1863. 8vo. half bound, 1l. 8s.

ENGLISH. A New English Dictionary, on Historical Principles: founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological Society. Vol. I. A and B. Imperial 4to. half morocco, 2l. 12s. 6d. .

Part IV. Section II. C—CASS (beginning of Vol. II.) 5s.

Part V. CASS—CLIVY. 12s. 6d.

Part VI. *In the Press*.

Edited by JAMES A. H. MURRAY, LL.D., with the assistance of many Scholars and men of Science.

Vol. III (E, F, and G). Part I. Edited by HENRY BRADLEY. *In the Press*.

Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

ENGLISH, continued.

ENGLISH. An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *Second Edition.* 4to. 2l. 4s.

— A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 5s. 6d.

— A Concise Dictionary of Middle English, from A.D. 1150 to 1580. By A. L. MAYHEW, M.A., and W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D. Crown 8vo. half roan, 7s. 6d.

GREEK. A Greek-English Lexicon, by H. G. LIDDELL, D.D., and ROBERT SCOTT, D.D. *Seventh Edition, Revised and Augmented throughout.* 4to. 1l. 16s.

— An intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, abridged from LIDDELL and SCOTT's Seventh Edition. Small 4to. 12s. 6d.

— A Greek-English Lexicon, abridged from Liddell and Scott's 4to. edition, chiefly for the use of Schools. Square 12mo. 7s. 6d.

— A copious Greek-English Vocabulary, compiled from the best authorities. 1850. 24mo. 3s.

— **Etymologicon Magnum.** Ad Codd. mss. recensuit et notis variorum instruxit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 1848. fol. 1l. 12s.

— **Suidæ Lexicon.** Ad Codd. mss. recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi III. 1834. fol. 2l. 2s.

HEBREW. The Book of Hebrew Roots, by ABU 'L-WALID MARWÂN IBN JANÂH, otherwise called RABBÎ YÔNÂH. Now first edited, with an appendix, by Ad. NEUBAUER. 1875. 4to. 2l. 7s. 6d.

— A Treatise on the use of the Tenses in Hebrew. By S. R. DRIVER, D.D. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

ICELANDIC. An Icelandic-English Dictionary, based on the MS. collections of the late RICHARD CLEASBY. Enlarged and completed by G. VIGFÚSSON, M.A. With an Introduction, and Life of Richard Cleasby, by G. WEBBE DASENT, D.C.L. 4to. 3l. 7s.

— A List of English Words the Etymology of which is illustrated by comparison with Icelandic. Prepared in the form of an Appendix to the above. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. stitched, 2s.

— An Icelandic Primer, with Grammar, Notes, and Glossary. By HENRY SWEET, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— An Icelandic Prose Reader, with Notes, Grammar and Glossary, by Dr. GUDBRAND VIGFÚSSON and F. YORK POWELL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

-
- LATIN.** A Latin Dictionary, founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary, revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D., and CHARLES SHORT, LL.D. 4to. 1l. 5s.
- A School Latin Dictionary. By CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D. Small 4to. 18s.
- Scheller's Dictionary of the Latin Language, revised and translated into English by J. E. RIDDLE, M.A. 1835. fol. 1l. 1s.
- Contributions to Latin Lexicography. By HENRY NETTLESHIP, M.A. 8vo. 21s.
- MELANESIAN.** The Melanesian Languages. By ROBERT H. CODRINGTON, D.D., of the Melanesian Mission. 8vo. 18s.
- RUSSIAN.** A Grammar of the Russian Language. By W. R. MORFILL, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- SANSKRIT.** A Practical Grammar of the Sanskrit Language, arranged with reference to the Classical Languages of Europe, for the use of English Students, by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Fourth Edition.* 8vo. 15s.
- A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Etymologically and Philologically arranged, with special reference to Greek, Latin, German, Anglo-Saxon, English, and other cognate Indo-European Languages. By Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. 4to. 4l. 14s. 6d.
- Nalopákhyanam. Story of Nala, an Episode of the Mahá-Bhárata: the Sanskrit text, with a copious Vocabulary, and an improved version of Dean MILMAN's Translation, by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Second Edition, Revised and Improved.* 8vo. 15s.
- Sakuntalā. A Sanskrit Drama, in Seven Acts. Edited by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 21s.
- SYRIAC.** Thesaurus Syriacus: collegerunt Quatremère, Bernstein, Lorschbach, Arnoldi, Agrell, Field, Roediger: edidit R. PAYNE SMITH, S.T.P. Vol. I, containing Fasc. I-V, sm. fol. 5l. 5s.
Fasc. VI. 1l. 1s. Fasc. VII. 1l. 11s. 6d. Fasc. VIII. 1l. 16s.
- The Book of Kalilah and Dimnah. Translated from Arabic into Syriac. Edited by W. WRIGHT, LL.D. 8vo. 21s.
-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARIES.

- Cotton's Typographical Gazetteer. 1831. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Typographical Gazetteer. Second Series. 1866. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Ebert's Bibliographical Dictionary, translated from the German. 4 vols. 1837. 8vo. 1l. 10s.
-

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

SECTION II.

ANGLO-SAXON AND ENGLISH.



HELPS TO THE STUDY OF THE LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE.



A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY on Historical Principles, founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological Society. Imperial 4to. Parts I-IV, price 12s. 6d. each.

Vol. I (A and B), half morocco, 2l. 12s. 6d.

Vol. II (C and D). *In the Press.*

Part IV, Section 2, C—CASS, beginning Vol. II, price 5s.

Part V, CASS—CLIVY, price 12s. 6d.

Edited by JAMES A. H. MURRAY, LL.D., sometime President of the Philological Society; with the assistance of many Scholars and Men of Science.

Vol. III (E, F, and G). Part I. Edited by Mr. HENRY BRADLEY. *In the Press.*

Bosworth and Toller. An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, based on the MS. collections of the late JOSEPH BOSWORTH, D.D. Edited and enlarged by Prof. T. N. TOLLER, M.A., Owens College, Manchester. Parts I-III. A—SAR. 4to. stiff covers, 15s. each. Part IV. *In the Press.*

Earle. A Book for the Beginner in Anglo-Saxon. By JOHN EARLE, M.A. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— The Philology of the English Tongue. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Mayhew and Skeat. A Concise Dictionary of Middle English, from A.D. 1150 to 1580. By A. L. MAYHEW, M.A., and W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D. Crown 8vo. half roan, 7s. 6d.

Skeat. An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, arranged on an Historical Basis. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *Second Edition.* 4to. 2l. 4s.

A Supplement to the First Edition of the above. 4to. 2s. 6d.

— A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 5s. 6d.

— Principles of English Etymology. First Series. The Native Element. Crown 8vo. 9s.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-
- Sweet.** An Anglo-Saxon Primer, with Grammar, Notes and Glossary. By HENRY SWEET, M.A. *2nd Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- An Anglo-Saxon Reader. In Prose and Verse. With Grammatical Introduction, Notes, and Glossary. *Sixth Edition, Revised and Enlarged.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- A Second Anglo-Saxon Reader. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Old English Reading Primers :
- I. Selected Homilies of Ælfric. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d.
- II. Extracts from Alfred's Orosius. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d.
- First Middle English Primer, with Grammar and Glossary. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Second Middle English Primer. Extracts from Chaucer, with Grammar and Glossary. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- History of English Sounds from the Earliest Period. With full Word-Lists. 8vo. 14s.
- A Primer of Phonetics. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Elementarbuch des Gesprochenen Englisch. Grammatik, Texte und Glossar. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo., stiff covers, 2s. 6d.
- Tancock.** An Elementary English Grammar and Exercise Book. By O. W. TANCOCK, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
- An English Grammar and Reading Book, for Lower Forms in Classical Schools. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Saxon Chronicles. Two of the Saxon Chronicles parallel (787-1001 A.D.). A Revised Text. Edited, with Introduction, Critical Notes, and Glossary, by CHARLES PLUMMER, M.A., on the basis of an Edition by JOHN EARLE, M.A. Crown 8vo., stiff covers, 3s.

Specimens of Early English. A New and Revised Edition. With Introduction, Notes, and Glossarial Index.

Part I. From Old English Homilies to King Horn (A.D. 1150 to A.D. 1300). By R. MORRIS, LL.D. *Ed. 2.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 9s.

Part II. From Robert of Gloucester to Gower (A.D. 1298 to A.D. 1393). By R. MORRIS, LL.D., and W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Specimens of English Literature, from the 'Ploughmans Crede' to the 'Shepheardes Calender' (A.D. 1394 to A.D. 1579). With Introduction, Notes, and Glossarial Index. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Typical Selections from the best English Writers, with Introductory Notices. In 2 vols. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d. each.

Vol. I. Latimer to Berkeley.

Vol. II. Pope to Macaulay.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

A SERIES OF ENGLISH CLASSICS.

(CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED.)

Ormulum, The, with the Notes and Glossary of Dr. R. M. WHITE. Edited by R. HOLT, M.A. 2 vols. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*

CHAUCER.

I. The Prologue, the Knightes Tale, The Nonne Preestes Tale; from the Canterbury Tales. Edited by R. MORRIS, LL.D. A New Edition, with Collations and Additional Notes by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*

II. The Prioresses Tale; Sir Thopas; The Monkes Tale; The Clerkes Tale; The Squieres Tale, &c. Edited by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4*s.* 6*d.*

III. The Tale of the Man of Lawe; The Pardoneres Tale; The Second Nonnes Tale; The Chanouns Yemannes Tale. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *New Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4*s.* 6*d.*

IV. Minor Poems. Edited by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Crown 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.*

V. The Legend of Good Women. By W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Crown 8vo. 6*s.*

Langland, W. The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, in three Parallel Texts; together with Richard the Redeless. By WILLIAM LANGLAND (about 1362-1399 A.D.). Edited from numerous Manuscripts, with Preface, Notes, and a Glossary, by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. 2 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*

— The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, by WILLIAM LANGLAND. Edited, with Notes, by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4*s.* 6*d.*

Gamelyn, the Tale of. Edited, with Notes, Glossary, &c., by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. Stiff covers, 1*s.* 6*d.*

WYCLIFFE.

I. The Books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon: according to the Wycliffite Version made by NICHOLAS DE HEREFORD, about A.D. 1381, and Revised by JOHN PURVEY, about A.D. 1388. With Introduction and Glossary by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3*s.* 6*d.*

II. The New Testament in English, according to the Version by JOHN WYCLIFFE, about A.D. 1380, and Revised by JOHN PURVEY, about A.D. 1388. With Introduction and Glossary by W. W. SKEAT, Litt.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6*s.*

Minot (Laurence). Poems. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by JOSEPH HALL, M.A., Head Master of the Hulme Grammar School, Manchester. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4*s.* 6*d.*

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Spenser's Faery Queene. Books I and II. Designed chiefly for the use of Schools. With Introduction and Notes by G. W. KITCHIN, D.D., and Glossary by A. L. MATHEW, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. each.

Hooker. Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. Edited by R. W. CHURCH, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. [See also p. 43.]

OLD ENGLISH DRAMA.

I. York Plays.—The Plays performed by the Crafts or Mysteries of York, on the day of Corpus Christi, in the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries; now first printed from the unique manuscript in the library of Lord Ashburnham. Edited, with Introduction and Glossary, by LUCY TOULMIN SMITH. 8vo. 1l. 1s.

II. The Pilgrimage to Parnassus, with the Two Parts of the Return from Parnassus. Three Comedies performed in St. John's College, Cambridge, A.D. MDXCVII–MDCI. Edited from MSS. by W. D. MACRAY, M.A., F.S.A. Medium 8vo. Bevelled Boards, Gilt top, 8s. 6d.

III. Marlowe's Edward II. With Introduction, Notes, &c. By O. W. TANCOCK, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. Paper covers, 2s.; cloth, 3s.

IV. Marlowe and Greene. Marlowe's Tragical History of Dr. Faustus, and Greene's Honourable History of Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay. Edited by A. W. WARD, Litt. D. *New and enlarged Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d.

SHAKESPEARE. Select Plays. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers.

Edited by W. G. CLARK, M.A., and W. ALDIS WRIGHT, D.C.L.

The Merchant of Venice. 1s. Macbeth. 1s. 6d.

Richard the Second. 1s. 6d. Hamlet. 2s.

Edited by W. ALDIS WRIGHT, D.C.L.

The Tempest. 1s. 6d. Midsummer Night's Dream. 1s. 6d.

As You Like It. 1s. 6d. Coriolanus. 2s. 6d.

Julius Cæsar. 2s. Henry the Fifth. 2s.

Richard the Third. 2s. 6d. Twelfth Night. 1s. 6d.

King Lear. 1s. 6d. King John. 1s. 6d.

Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist; a popular Illustration of the Principles of Scientific Criticism. By R. G. MOULTON, M.A. *Second Edition, Enlarged.* Crown 8vo. 6s.

Bacon.

I. Advancement of Learning. Edited by W. ALDIS WRIGHT, D.C.L. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

II. The Essays. With Introduction and Notes. By S. H. REYNOLDS, M.A. *In preparation.*

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

MILTON.

- I. *Areopagitica*. With Introduction and Notes. By JOHN W. HALES, M.A. *Third Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
 II. *Poems*. Edited by R. C. BROWNE, M.A. In two Volumes. *Fifth Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d.
 Sold separately, Vol. I. 4s.; Vol. II. 3s.

In paper covers :

- Lycidas*, 3d. *L'Allegro*, 3d. *Il Penseroso*, 4d. *Comus*, 6d.
 III. *Paradise Lost*. Book I. Edited by H. C. BEECHING, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d.; in Parchment, 3s. 6d.
 IV. *Samson Agonistes*. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by J. CHURTON COLLINS, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s.

Bunyan.

- I. *The Pilgrim's Progress*, *Grace Abounding*, *Relation of the Imprisonment of Mr. JOHN BUNYAN*. Edited, with Biographical Introduction and Notes, by E. VENABLES, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s. In Parchment, 6s.
 II. *Holy War*, &c. *In the Press*.

Clarendon.

- I. *History of the Rebellion*. Book VI. Edited by T. ARNOLD, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
 II. *Characters and Episodes of the Great Rebellion*. Selections from Clarendon. Edited by G. BOYLE, M.A., Dean of Salisbury. Crown 8vo., gilt top, 7s. 6d. [See also p. 44.]

Dryden. *Select Poems*. (*Stanzas on the Death of Oliver Cromwell; Astræa Redux; Annus Mirabilis; Absalom and Achitophel; Religio Laici; The Hind and the Panther.*) Edited by W. D. CHRISTIE, M.A. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— *An Essay of Dramatic Poesy*. Edited, with Notes, by THOMAS ARNOLD, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Locke. *Conduct of the Understanding*. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, &c., by T. FOWLER, D.D. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.**Addison.** *Selections from Papers in the Spectator*. With Notes. By T. ARNOLD, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d. In Parchment, 6s.**Steele.** *Selections from the Tatler, Spectator, and Guardian*. Edited by AUSTIN DOBSON. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s. In Parchment, 7s. 6d.**Pope.** *Select Works*. With Introduction and Notes. By MARK PATTISON, B.D.

- I. *Essay on Man*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
 II. *Satires and Epistles*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Parnell. *The Hermit*. Paper covers, 2d.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gray. Selected Poems. Edited by EDMUND GOSSE, M.A.
Extra fcap. 8vo. In Parchment, 3s.

— *The same*, together with Supplementary Notes for
Schools by FOSTER WATSON, M.A. *Stiff covers*, 1s. 6d.

— Elegy, and Ode on Eton College. Paper covers, 2d.

Goldsmith.

I. Selected Poems. Edited with Introduction and Notes, by
AUSTIN DOBSON. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d. In Parchment, 4s. 6d.

II. The Traveller. Edited by G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L.
Stiff covers, 1s.

III. The Deserted Village. Paper covers, 2d.

JOHNSON.

I. Rasselas. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by
G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L. Extra fcap. 8vo. Bevelled boards, 3s. 6d.
In Parchment, 4s. 6d.

II. Rasselas; Lives of Dryden and Pope. Edited by
ALFRED MILNES, M.A. (London). Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d., or Lives
of DRYDEN and POPE only, *stiff covers*, 2s. 6d.

III. Life of Milton. By C. H. FIRTH, M.A. Extra
fcap. 8vo. cloth, 2s. 6d. *Stiff covers*, 1s. 6d.

IV. Wit and Wisdom of Samuel Johnson. Edited by
G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

V. Vanity of Human Wishes. With Notes, by E. J.
PAYNE, M.A. Paper covers, 4d.

BOSWELL.

Boswell's Life of Johnson. With the Journal of a
Tour to the Hebrides. Edited by G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L., Pem-
broke College. 6 vols. Medium 8vo. Half bound, 3l. 3s.

Cowper. Edited, with Life, Introductions, and Notes, by
H. T. GRIFFITH, B.A.

I. The Didactic Poems of 1782, with Selections from
the Minor Pieces, A.D. 1779–1783. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

II. The Task, with Tirocinium, and Selections from the
Minor Poems, A.D. 1784–1799. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Burke. Select Works. Edited, with Introduction and
Notes, by E. J. PAYNE, M.A.

I. Thoughts on the Present Discontents; the two
Speeches on America. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

II. Reflections on the French Revolution. *Second
Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

III. Four Letters on the Proposals for Peace with the
Regicide Directory of France. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

-
- Burns.** *Selected Poems.* Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and a Glossary, by J. LOGIE ROBERTSON, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Keats.** *Hyperion, Book I.* With Notes by W. T. ARNOLD, B.A. Paper covers, 4d.
- Byron.** *Childe Harold.* With Introduction and Notes, by H. F. TOZER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d. In Parchment, 5s.
- Scott.** *Lay of the Last Minstrel.* Edited by W. MINTO, M.A. With Map. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. Parchment, 3s. 6d.
- *Lay of the Last Minstrel.* Introduction and Canto I, with Preface and Notes, by the same Editor. 6d.
- *Marmion.* Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by T. BAYNE. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Campbell.** *Gertrude of Wyoming.* Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by H. MACAULAY FITZGIBBON, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Shairp.** *Aspects of Poetry; being Lectures delivered at Oxford,* by J. C. SHAIRP, LL.D. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Palgrave.** *The Treasury of Sacred Song.* With Notes Explanatory and Biographical. By F. T. PALGRAVE, M.A. Half vellum, gilt top, 10s. 6d.
-

SECTION III.

EUROPEAN LANGUAGES. MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN.

(1) FRENCH AND ITALIAN.

- Brachet's** *Etymological Dictionary of the French Language.* Translated by G. W. KITCHIN, D.D. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- *Historical Grammar of the French Language.* Translated by G. W. KITCHIN, D.D. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Saintsbury.** *Primer of French Literature.* By GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- *Short History of French Literature.* Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- *Specimens of French Literature, from Villon to Hugo.* Crown 8vo. 9s.
-
- Beaumarchais' Le Barbier de Séville.** Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by AUSTIN DOBSON. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
-

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Corneille's Horace. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Molière's Les Précieuses Ridicules. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by ANDREW LANG, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

Musset's On ne badine pas avec l'Amour, and Fantasio. Edited, with Prolegomena, Notes, etc., by W. H. POLLOCK. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Racine's Esther. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Voltaire's Mérope. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

* * * *The above six Plays may be had in ornamental case, and bound in Imitation Parchment, price 12s. 6d.*

MASSON'S FRENCH CLASSICS.

Edited by Gustave Masson, B.A.

Corneille's Cinna. With Notes, Glossary, etc. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d.

Louis XIV and his Contemporaries; as described in Extracts from the best Memoirs of the Seventeenth Century. With English Notes, Genealogical Tables, &c. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Maistre, Xavier de, &c. Voyage autour de ma Chambre, by XAVIER DE MAISTRE. **Ourika,** by MADAME DE DURAS; **Le Vieux Tailleur,** by MM. ERCKMANN-CHATRIAN; **La Veillée de Vincennes,** by ALFRED DE VIGNY; **Les Jumeaux de l'Hôtel Corneille,** by EDMOND ABOUT; **Mésaventures d'un Écolier,** by RODOLPHE TÖPFFER. *Third Edition, Revised.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— **Voyage autour de ma Chambre.** Limp. 1s. 6d.

Molière's Les Fourberies de Scapin, and Racine's Athalie. With Voltaire's Life of Molière. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— **Les Fourberies de Scapin.** With Voltaire's Life of Molière. Extra fcap. 8vo. stiff covers, 1s. 6d.

— **Les Femmes Savantes.** With Notes, Glossary, etc. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth, 2s. Stiff covers, 1s. 6d.

Racine's Andromaque, and Corneille's Le Menteur. With LOUIS RACINE's Life of his Father. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Regnard's Le Joueur, and Brueys and Palaprat's Le Grondeur. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Sévigné, Madame de, and her chief Contemporaries, Selections from their Correspondence. Intended more especially for Girls' Schools. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

- Blouët.** *L'Éloquence de la Chaire et de la Tribune Françaises.*
 Edited by PAUL BLOUËT, B.A. Vol. I. Sacred Oratory. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Gautier, Théophile.** *Scenes of Travel.* Selected and Edited
 by GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Perrault's Popular Tales.** Edited from the Original Editions,
 with Introduction, etc., by ANDREW LANG, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo.,
 paper boards, 5s. 6d.
- Quinet's Lettres à sa Mère.** Selected and Edited by GEORGE
 SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Sainte-Beuve.** *Selections from the Causeries du Lundi.*
 Edited by GEORGE SAINTSBURY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Dante.** *Selections from the Inferno.* With Introduction
 and Notes. By H. B. COTTERILL, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Tasso.** *La Gerusalemme Liberata.* Cantos i, ii. With In-
 troduction and Notes. By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

(2) GERMAN AND GOTHIC.

- Max Müller.** *The German Classics, from the Fourth to the
 Nineteenth Century.* With Biographical Notices, Translations into
 Modern German, and Notes. By F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A. A New
 Edition, Revised, Enlarged, and Adapted to WILHELM SCHERER'S
 'History of German Literature,' by F. LICHTENSTEIN. 2 vols. Crown
 8vo. 21s.
- Scherer.** *A History of German Literature* by WILHELM
 SCHERER. Translated from the Third German Edition by Mrs. F.
 C. CONYBEARE. Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.
- Skeat.** *The Gospel of St. Mark in Gothic.* By W. W.
 SKEAT, Litt. D. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth, 4s.
- Wright.** *An Old High German Primer.* With Grammar,
 Notes, and Glossary. By JOSEPH WRIGHT, Ph.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- *A Middle High German Primer.* With Grammar,
 Notes, and Glossary. By JOSEPH WRIGHT, Ph.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

LANGE'S GERMAN COURSE.

*By Hermann Lange, Lecturer on French and German at the Manchester
 Technical School, etc.*

- I. Germans at Home ; a Practical Introduction to German
 Conversation, with an Appendix containing the Essentials of German
 Grammar.** Third Edition. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- II. German Manual ; a German Grammar, Reading Book,
 and a Handbook of German Conversation.** 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

III. Grammar of the German Language. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

IV. German Composition ; A Theoretical and Practical Guide to the Art of Translating English Prose into German. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 4s. 6d. [*A Key to the above, price 5s. Just Published.*]

German Spelling ; A Synopsis of the Changes which it has undergone through the Government Regulations of 1880. 6d.

BUCHHEIM'S GERMAN CLASSICS.

Edited, with Biographical, Historical, and Critical Introductions, Arguments (to the Dramas), and Complete Commentaries, by C. A. BUCHHEIM, Phil. Doc., Professor in King's College, London.

Becker (the Historian). Friedrich der Grosse. Edited, with Notes, an Historical Introduction, and a Map. 3s. 6d.

Goethe :

- (a) Egmont. A Tragedy. 3s.
- (b) Iphigenie auf Tauris. A Drama. 3s.

Heine :

- (a) Prosa : being Selections from his Prose Writings. 4s. 6d.
- (b) Harzreise. Cloth, 2s. 6d. ; paper covers, 1s. 6d.

Lessing :

- (a) Nathan der Weise. A Dramatic Poem. 4s. 6d.
- (b) Minna von Barnhelm. A Comedy. 3s. 6d.

Schiller :

- (a) Wilhelm Tell. A Drama. Large Edition. With Map. 3s. 6d.
- (b) Wilhelm Tell. School Edition. With Map. 2s.
- (c) Historische Skizzen. With Map. 2s. 6d.

Modern German Reader. A Graduated Collection of Extracts from Modern German Authors :—

Part I. Prose Extracts. With English Notes, a Grammatical Appendix, and a complete Vocabulary. *Fourth Edition.* 2s. 6d.

Part II. Extracts in Prose and Poetry. With English Notes and an Index. *Second Edition.* 2s. 6d.

German Poetry for Beginners. Edited with English Notes and a complete Vocabulary, by EMMA S. BUCHHEIM. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Chamisso. Peter Schlemihl's Wundersame Geschichte. Edited with Notes and a complete Vocabulary, by EMMA S. BUCHHEIM. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

- Lessing.** The Laokoon, with Introduction, English Notes, etc. By A. HAMANN, Phil. Doc., M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Niebuhr:** Griechische Heroen-Geschichten (Tales of Greek Heroes). With English Notes and Vocabulary, by EMMA S. BUCHHEIM. Second, Revised Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth, 2s., stiff covers, 1s. 6d.
Edition A. *Text in German Type.*
Edition B. *Text in Roman Type.*
- Schiller's** Wilhelm Tell. Translated into English Verse by E. MASSIE, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

(3) SCANDINAVIAN.

- Cleasby and Vigfússon.** An Icelandic-English Dictionary, based on the MS. collections of the late RICHARD CLEASBY. Enlarged and completed by G. VIGFÚSSON, M.A. With an Introduction, and Life of Richard Cleasby, by G. WEBBE DASENT, D.C.L. 4to. 3l. 7s.
- Sweet.** Icelandic Primer, with Grammar, Notes, and Glossary. By HENRY SWEET, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Vigfússon.** Sturlunga Saga, including the Islendinga Saga of Lawman STURLA THORDSSON and other works. Edited by Dr. GUDBRAND VIGFÚSSON. In 2 vols. 8vo. 2l. 2s.
- Vigfússon and Powell.** Icelandic Prose Reader, with Notes, Grammar, and Glossary. By G. VIGFÚSSON, M.A., and F. YORK POWELL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- **Corpus Poeticum Boreale.** The Poetry of the Old Northern Tongue, from the Earliest Times to the Thirteenth Century. Edited, classified, and translated, with Introduction, Excursus, and Notes, by GUDBRAND VIGFÚSSON, M.A., and F. YORK POWELL, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 2l. 2s.
- **The Landnámabók.** Edited and translated by the same. *In the Press.*

SECTION IV.

CLASSICAL LANGUAGES.

(1) LATIN.

STANDARD WORKS AND EDITIONS.

- Ellis.** Harleian MS. 2610; Ovid's Metamorphoses I, II, III, 1-622; XXIV Latin Epigrams from Bodleian or other MSS.; Latin Glosses on Apollinaris Sidonius from MS. Digby 172. Collated and Edited by ROBINSON ELLIS, M.A., LL.D. (Anecdota Oxon.) 4s.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-
- King and Cookson.** *The Principles of Sound and Inflexion, as illustrated in the Greek and Latin Languages.* By J. E. KING, M.A., and CHRISTOPHER COOKSON, M.A. 8vo. 18s.
- Lewis and Short.** *A Latin Dictionary, founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary, revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D., and CHARLES SHORT, LL.D.* 4to. 1l. 5s.
- Nettleship.** *Contributions to Latin Lexicography.* By HENRY NETTLESHIP, M.A. 8vo. 21s.
- *Lectures and Essays on Subjects connected with Latin Scholarship and Literature.* By HENRY NETTLESHIP, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- *The Roman Saturna.* 8vo. sewed, 1s.
- *Ancient Lives of Vergil.* 8vo. sewed, 2s.
- Papillon.** *Manual of Comparative Philology.* By T. L. PAPILLON, M.A. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Pinder.** *Selections from the less known Latin Poets.* By NORTH PINDEB, M.A. 8vo. 15s.
- Sellar.** *Roman Poets of the Augustan Age. VIRGIL.* By W. Y. SELLAR, M.A. *New Edition.* Crown 8vo. 9s.
- *Roman Poets of the Republic. Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 10s.
- Wordsworth.** *Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin. With Introductions and Notes.* By J. WORDSWORTH, D.D. 8vo. 18s.
-
- Avianus.** *The Fables. Edited, with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Commentary, etc., by ROBINSON ELLIS, M.A., LL.D.* 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Catulli Veronensis Liber.** *Iterum recognovit, apparatus criticum prolegomena appendices addidit, ROBINSON ELLIS, A.M.* 8vo. 16s.
- Catullus, a Commentary on.** By ROBINSON ELLIS, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 18s.
- Cicero.** *De Oratore. With Introduction and Notes.* By A. S. WILKINS, Litt.D.
- Book I. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 7s. 6d. Book II. 8vo. 5s.
- *Philippic Orations. With Notes.* By J. R. KING, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- *Select Letters. With English Introductions, Notes, and Appendices.* By ALBERT WATSON, M.A. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 18s.
- Horace.** *With a Commentary. Vol. I. The Odes, Carmen Seculare, and Epodes.* By E. C. WICKHAM, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 12s.
-

- Livy**, Book I. With Introduction, Historical Examination, and Notes. By J. R. SEELEY, M.A. *Second Edition*. 8vo. 6s.
- Nonius Marcellus**, de Compensiosa Doctrina (Harleian MS. 2719). Collated by J. H. ONIONS, M.A. (Anecdota Oxon.) 3s. 6d.
- Ovid**. P. Ovidii Nasonis Ibis. Ex Novis Codicibus edidit, Scholia Vetera Commentarium cum Prolegomenis Appendice Indice addidit, R. ELLIS, A.M. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- P. Ovidi Nasonis Tristium Libri V. Recensuit S. G. OWEN, A.M. 8vo. 16s.
- Persius**. The Satires. With a Translation and Commentary. By JOHN CONINGTON, M.A. Edited by HENRY NETTLESHIP, M.A. *Second Edition*. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Plautus**. Bentley's Plautine Emendations. From his copy of Gronovius. By E. A. SONNENSCHN, M.A. (Anecdota Oxon.) 2s. 6d.
- Scriptores Latini rei Metricae**. Edidit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 8vo. 5s.
- Tacitus**. The Annals. Books I–VI. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by H. FURNEAUX, M.A. 8vo. 18s.

LATIN EDUCATIONAL WORKS.

GRAMMARS, EXERCISE BOOKS, &c.

ALLEN.

Rudimenta Latina. Comprising Accidence, and Exercises of a very Elementary Character, for the use of Beginners. By JOHN BARROW ALLEN, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

An Elementary Latin Grammar. By the same Author. *Fifty-Seventh Thousand*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

A First Latin Exercise Book. By the same Author. *Fourth Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

A Second Latin Exercise Book. By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

* * A Key to First and Second Latin Exercise Books, in one volume, price 5s. Supplied to *Teachers only* on application to the Secretary of the Clarendon Press.

An Introduction to Latin Syntax. By W. S. GIBSON, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

First Latin Reader. By T. J. NUNNS, M.A. *Third Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

A Latin Prose Primer. By J. Y. SARGENT, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Passages for Translation into Latin. For the use of Passmen and others. Selected by J. Y. SARGENT, M.A. *Seventh Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

* * A Key to the above, price 5s. Supplied to *Teachers only* on application to the Secretary of the Clarendon Press.

Exercises in Latin Prose Composition; with Introduction, Notes, and Passages of Graduated Difficulty for Translation into Latin. By G. G. RAMSAY, M.A., LL.D. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Hints and Helps for 'Latin Elegiacs. By H. LEE-WARNER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

* * A Key to the above, price 4s. 6d. Supplied to *Teachers only* on application to the Secretary of the Clarendon Press.

Reddenda Minora, or Easy Passages, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation. For the use of Lower Forms. Composed and selected by C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

Anglice Reddenda, or Extracts, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. *Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Anglice Reddenda. Second Series. By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

A School Latin Dictionary. By CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D. Small 4to. 18s.

LATIN CLASSICS FOR SCHOOLS.

Caesar. The Commentaries (for Schools). With Notes and Maps. By CHARLES E. MOBERLY, M.A.

The Gallic War. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

— Books I and II. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

— Books III, IV, V. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— Books VI, VII, VIII. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

The Civil War. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— Book I. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Catulli Veronensis Carmina Selecta, secundum recognitionem ROBINSON ELLIS, A.M. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

CICERO. Selection of Interesting and Descriptive Passages. With Notes. By HENRY WALFORD, M.A. In three Parts. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Each Part separately, limp, 1s. 6d.

Part I. Anecdotes from Grecian and Roman History.

Part II. Omens and Dreams: Beauties of Nature.

Part III. Rome's Rule of her Provinces.

CICERO. De Senectute. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by L. HUXLEY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

— pro Cluentio. With Introduction and Notes. By W. RAMSAY, M.A. Edited by G. G. RAMSAY, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— Select Orations (for Schools). In Verrem Actio Prima. De Imperio Gn. Pompeii. Pro Archia. Philippica IX. With Introduction and Notes by J. R. KING, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— In Q. Caecilium Divinatio, and In C. Verrem Actio Prima. With Introduction and Notes, by J. R. KING, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d.

— Speeches against Catilina. With Introduction and Notes, by E. A. UPCOTT, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— Selected Letters (for Schools). With Notes. By the late C. E. PRICHARD, M.A., and E. R. BERNARD, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

— Select Letters. Text. By ALBERT WATSON, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s.

Cornelius Nepos. With Notes. By OSCAR BROWNING, M.A. *Third Edition.* Revised by W. R. INGE, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Horace. With a Commentary. (In a size suitable for the use of Schools.) Vol. I. The Odes, Carmen Seculare, and Epodes. By E. C. WICKHAM, M.A. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.

— Selected Odes. With Notes for the use of a Fifth Form. By E. C. WICKHAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Juvenal. Thirteen Satires. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by C. H. PEARSON, M.A., and HERBERT A. STRONG, M.A., LL.D. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Also separately:—

Part I. Introduction, Text, etc., 3s. Part II. Notes, 3s. 6d.

Livy. Books V–VII. With Introduction and Notes. By A. R. CLUER, B.A. *Second Edition.* Revised by P. E. MATHESON, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

— Book V. By the same Editors. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— Books XXI–XXIII. With Introduction and Notes. By M. T. TATHAM, M.A. *Second Edition, enlarged.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

— Book XXI. By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— Book XXII. With Introduction, Notes, and Maps. By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-
- Livy.** Selections (for Schools). With Notes and Maps. By H. LEE-WARNER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. In Parts, limp, each 1s. 6d.
- Part I. The Caudine Disaster.
- Part II. Hannibal's Campaign in Italy.
- Part III. The Macedonian War.
- Ovid.** Selections for the use of Schools. With Introductions and Notes, and an Appendix on the Roman Calendar. By W. RAMSAY, M.A. Edited by G. G. RAMSAY, M.A. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s. 6d.
- **Tristia.** Book I. The Text revised, with an Introduction and Notes. By S. G. OWEN, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- **Tristia.** Book III. With Introduction and Notes. By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Plautus.** *Captivi.* Edited by WALLACE M. LINDSAY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Plautus.** *Trinummus.* With Notes and Introductions. (Intended for the Higher Forms of Public Schools.) By C. E. FREEMAN, M.A., and A. SLOMAN, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- Pliny.** Selected Letters (for Schools). With Notes. By C. E. PRICHARD, M.A., and E. R. BERNARD, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- Sallust.** With Introduction and Notes. By W. W. CAPES, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Tacitus.** The Annals. Books I-IV. Edited, with Introduction and Notes (for the use of Schools and Junior Students), by H. FURNEAUX, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.
- The Annals. Book I. With Introduction and Notes, by the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp. 2s.
- Terence.** *Andria.* With Notes and Introductions. By C. E. FREEMAN, M.A., and A. SLOMAN, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- *Adelphi.* With Notes and Introductions. (Intended for the Higher Forms of Public Schools.) By A. SLOMAN, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- *Phormio.* With Notes and Introductions. By A. SLOMAN, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- Tibullus and Propertius.** Selections. Edited by G. G. RAMSAY, M.A. (In one or two parts.) Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.
- Virgil.** With Introduction and Notes. By T. L. PAPILLON, M.A. Two vols. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. *The Text separately, 4s. 6d.*
- *Bucolics.* Edited by C. S. JERRAM, M.A. In one or two Parts. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- *Georgics.* By the same Editor. *In the Press.*
-

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

- Virgil.** Aeneid I. With Introduction and Notes, by the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d.
 — Aeneid IX. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by A. E. HAIGH, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d. In two Parts, 2s.

(2) GREEK.

STANDARD WORKS AND EDITIONS.

- Allen.** Notes on Abbreviations in Greek Manuscripts. By T. W. ALLEN, Queen's College, Oxford. Royal 8vo. 5s.
Chandler. A Practical Introduction to Greek Accentuation, by H. W. CHANDLER, M.A. *Second Edition.* 10s. 6d.
Haigh. The Attic Theatre. A Description of the Stage and Theatre of the Athenians, and of the Dramatic Performances at Athens. By A. E. HAIGH, M.A. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Head. Historia Numorum: A Manual of Greek Numismatics. By BARCLAY V. HEAD. Royal 8vo. half-bound, 2l. 2s.
Hicks. A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions. By E. L. HICKS, M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
King and Cookson. The Principles of Sound and Inflexion, as illustrated in the Greek and Latin Languages. By J. E. KING, M.A., and CHRISTOPHER COOKSON, M.A. 8vo. 18s.
Liddell and Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon, by H. G. LIDDELL, D.D., and ROBERT SCOTT, D.D. *Seventh Edition, Revised and Augmented throughout.* 4to. 1l. 16s.
Papillon. Manual of Comparative Philology. By T. L. PAPHILLON, M.A. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 6s.
Veitch. Greek Verbs, Irregular and Defective. By W. VEITCH, LL.D. *Fourth Edition.* Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Vocabulary, a copious Greek-English, compiled from the best authorities. 24mo. 3s.

Aeschinem et Isocratem, Scholia Graeca in. Edidit G. DINDORFIUS. 1852. 8vo. 4s.

Aeschines. See under *Oratores Attici, and Demosthenes.*

Aeschyl quae supersunt in Codice Laurentiano quoad effici potuit et ad cognitionem necesse est visum typis descripta edidit R. MERKEL. Small folio, 1l. 1s.

Aeschylus: Tragoediae et Fragmenta, ex recensione GUIL. DINDORFII. *Second Edition,* 1851. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

— *Annotationes* GUIL. DINDORFII. Partes II. 1841. 8vo. 10s.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-
- Anecdota Graeca Oxoniensia.** Edidit J. A. CRAMER, S.T.P.
Tomi IV. 1835. 8vo. 1l. 2s.
- **Graeca e Codd. mss. Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis.**
Edidit J. A. CRAMER, S.T.P. Tomi IV. 1839. 8vo. 1l. 2s.
- Apsinis et Longini Rhetorica.** E Codicibus mss. recensuit
JOH. BAKIUS. 1849. 8vo. 3s.
- Aristophanes.** A Complete Concordance to the Comedies
and Fragments. By HENRY DUNBAR, M.D. 4to. 1l. 1s.
- **J. Caravellae Index in Aristophanem.** 8vo. 3s.
- **Comoediae et Fragmenta, ex recensione GUIL. DINDORFII.**
Tomi II. 1835. 8vo. 11s.
- **Annotationes GUIL. DINDORFII. Partes II.** 8vo. 11s.
- **Scholia Graeca ex Codicibus aucta et emendata a GUIL.**
DINDORFIO. Partes III. 1838. 8vo. 1l.
- ARISTOTLE.**
- **Ex recensione IMMANUELIS BEKKERI.** Accedunt Indices
Sylburgiani. Tomi XI. 1837. 8vo. 2l. 10s.
The volumes (except vol. IX) may be had separately, price 5s. 6d. each.
- **The Politics, with Introductions, Notes, etc., by W. L.**
NEWMAN, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. Vols. I and II.
Medium 8vo. 28s.
- **The Politics, translated into English, with Introduction,**
Marginal Analysis, Notes, and Indices, by B. JOWETT, M.A. Medium
8vo. 2 vols. 21s.
- **Ethica Nicomachea, ex recensione IMMANUELIS BEKKERI.**
Crown 8vo. 5s.
- **Aristotelian Studies. I. On the Structure of the**
Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. By J. C. WILSON, M.A. 8vo.
Stiff covers, 5s.
- **The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics,**
described in relation to Bekker's Manuscripts and other Sources. By
J. A. STEWART, M.A. (Anecdota Oxon.) Small 4to. 3s. 6d.
- **On the History of the process by which the Aristotelian**
Writings arrived at their present form. By R. SHUTE, M.A. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- **Physics. Book VII. Collation of various mss.; with**
Introduction by R. SHUTE, M.A. (Anecdota Oxon.) Small 4to. 2s.
- Choerobosci Dictata in Theodosii Canones, necnon Epimerismi**
in Psalmos. E Codicibus mss. edidit THOMAS GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi III.
1842. 8vo. 15s.
-

Demosthenes. Ex recensione GUIL. DINDORFII. Tomi IX. 1846-1851. 8vo. 2l. 6s.

Separately:—

Textus. 1l. 1s. Annotations. 15s. Scholia. 10s.

Demosthenes and Aeschines. The Orations of Demosthenes and Aeschines on the Crown. With Introductory Essays and Notes. By G. A. SIMCOX, M.A., and W. H. SIMCOX, M.A. 8vo. 12s.

Euripides. Tragoediae et Fragmenta, ex recensione GUIL. DINDORFII. Tomi II. 1833. 8vo. 10s.

— Annotations GUIL. DINDORFII. Partes II. 1839. 8vo. 10s.

— Scholia Graeca, ex Codicibus aucta et emendata a GUIL. DINDORFIO. Tomi IV. 1863. 8vo. 1l. 16s.

— Alcestis, ex recensione G. DINDORFII. 1834. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Harpocrationis Lexicon. Ex recensione G. DINDORFII. Tomi II. 1854. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Hephaestionis Enchiridion, Terentianus Maurus, Proclus, etc. Edidit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi II. 1855. 10s.

Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae. Recensuit I. BYWATER, M.A. Appendicis loco additae sunt Diogenis Laertii Vita Heracliti, Particulae Hippocratei De Diaeta Lib. I., Epistolae Heracliteae. 8vo. 6s.

HOMER.

— A Complete Concordance to the Odyssey and Hymns of Homer; to which is added a Concordance to the Parallel Passages in the Iliad, Odyssey, and Hymns. By HENRY DUNBAR, M.D. 4to. 1l. 1s.

— Seberi Index in Homerum. 1780. 8vo. 6s. 6d.

— A Grammar of the Homeric Dialect. By D. B. MONRO, M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

— *Ilias*, cum brevi Annotatione C. G. HEYNII. Accedunt Scholia minora. Tomi II. 1834. 8vo. 15s.

— *Ilias*, ex rec. GUIL. DINDORFII. 1856. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

— Scholia Graeca in Iliadem. Edited by W. DINDORF, after a new collation of the Venetian MSS. by D. B. MONRO, M.A., Provost of Oriel College. 4 vols. 8vo. 2l. 10s.

— Scholia Graeca in Iliadem Townleyana. Recensuit ERNESTUS MAASS. 2 vols. 8vo. 1l. 16s.

— *Odyssea*, ex rec. G. DINDORFII. 1855. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

— Scholia Graeca in Odysseam. Edidit GUIL. DINDORFIUS. Tomi II. 1855. 8vo. 15s. 6d.

— *Odyssey.* Books I-XII. Edited with English Notes, Appendices, etc. By W. W. MERRY, D.D., and the late JAMES RIDDELL, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 16s.

Oratores Attici, ex recensione BEKKERI :

- I. Antiphon, Andocides, et Lysias. 1823. 8vo. 7s.
- II. Isocrates. 1823. 8vo. 7s.
- III. Isaeus, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, etc. 1823. 8vo. 7s.

Paroemiographi Graeci, quorum pars nunc primum ex
Codd. mss. vulgatur. Edidit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 1836. 8vo. 5s. 6d.

PLATO.

- **Apology**, with a revised Text and English Notes, and a Digest of Platonic Idioms, by JAMES RIDDELL, M.A. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- **Philebus**, with a revised Text and English Notes, by EDWARD POSTE, M.A. 1860. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- **Sophistes and Politicus**, with a revised Text and English Notes, by L. CAMPBELL, M.A. 1867. 8vo. 18s.
- **Theaetetus**, with a revised Text and English Notes, by L. CAMPBELL, M.A. *Second Edition*. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- **The Dialogues**, translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. JOWETT, M.A. 5 vols. medium 8vo. 3l. 10s.
- **The Republic**, translated into English, with Analysis and Introduction, by B. JOWETT, M.A. Medium 8vo. 12s. 6d.; half-roan, 14s.
- **Index to Plato**. Compiled for Prof. Jowett's Translation of the Dialogues. By EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A. 8vo. Paper covers, 2s. 6d.

Plotinus. Edidit F. CREUZER. Tomi III. 1835. 4to. 1l. 8s.

Polybius. Selections. Edited by J. L. STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, M.A. With Maps. Medium 8vo. buckram, 21s.

SOPHOCLES.

- **The Plays and Fragments.** With English Notes and Introductions, by LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A. 2 vols.
Vol. I. Oedipus Tyrannus. Oedipus Coloneus. Antigone. 8vo. 16s.
Vol. II. Ajax. Electra. Trachiniae. Philoctetes. Fragments. 8vo. 16s.
- **Tragoediae et Fragmenta, ex recensione et cum commentariis GUIL. DINDORFII.** *Third Edition*. 2 vols. Fcap. 8vo. 1l. 1s.
Each Play separately, limp, 2s. 6d.
- **The Text alone, with large margin, small 4to.** 8s.
- **The Text alone, square 16mo.** 3s. 6d.
Each Play separately, limp, 6d.
- **Tragoediae et Fragmenta cum Annotationibus GUIL. DINDORFII.** Tomi II. 1849. 8vo. 10s.
The Text, Vol. I. 5s. 6d. The Notes, Vol. II. 4s. 6d.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

Stobaei Florilegium. Ad mss. fidem emendavit et supplevit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi IV. 1822. 8vo. 1l.

— **Eclogarum Physicarum et Ethicarum libri duo.** Accedit Hieroclii Commentarius in aurea carmina Pythagoreorum. Ad mss. Codd. recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi II. 1850. 8vo. 11s.

Thucydides. Translated into English, with Introduction, Marginal Analysis, Notes, and Indices. By B. JOWETT, M.A., Regius Professor of Greek. 2 vols. Medium 8vo. 1l. 12s.

XENOPHON. Ex rec. et cum annotatt. L. DINDORFII.

I. *Historia Graeca.* *Second Edition.* 1853. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

II. *Expositio Cyri.* *Second Edition.* 1855. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

III. *Institutio Cyri.* 1857. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

IV. *Memorabilia Socratis.* 1862. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

V. *Opuscula Politica Equestria et Venatica cum Arriani Libello de Venatione.* 1866. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

GREEK EDUCATIONAL WORKS.

GRAMMARS, EXERCISE BOOKS, &c.

Chandler. *The Elements of Greek Accentuation:* abridged from his larger work by H. W. CHANDLER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Liddell and Scott. *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon,* abridged from LIDDELL and SCOTT's Seventh Edition. Small 4to. 12s. 6d.

Liddell and Scott. *A Greek-English Lexicon,* abridged from LIDDELL and SCOTT's 4to. edition. Square 12mo. 7s. 6d.

Miller. *A Greek Testament Primer.* *An Easy Grammar and Reading Book* for the use of Students beginning Greek. By the Rev. E. MILLER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Moulton. *The Ancient Classical Drama.* *A Study in Literary Evolution.* Intended for Readers in English and in the Original. By R. G. MOULTON, M.A. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.

Wordsworth. *A Greek Primer,* for the use of beginners in that Language. By the Right Rev. CHARLES WORDSWORTH, D.C.L. *Seventh Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

— *Graecae Grammaticae Rudimenta in usum Scholarum.* Auctore CAROLO WORDSWORTH, D.C.L. *Nineteenth Edition.* 12mo. 4s.

Passages for Translation into Greek Prose. By J. YOUNG SARGENT, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Exemplaria Graeca. Being Selections from "Passages for Translation into Greek Prose." By the same author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Models and Materials for Greek Iambic Verse. By the same author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

- Græce Reddenda.** By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Reddenda Minora**, or Easy Passages, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
- Anglice Reddenda**, or Extracts, Latin and Greek, for Unseen Translation. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Anglice Reddenda.** *Second Series.* By the same Author. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- Golden Treasury of Ancient Greek Poetry.** By R. S. WRIGHT, M.A. *Second Edition.* Revised by EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., LL.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Golden Treasury of Greek Prose**, being a Collection of the finest passages in the principal Greek Prose Writers, with Introductory Notices and Notes. By R. S. WRIGHT, M.A., and J. E. L. SHADWELL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

GREEK READERS.

- Easy Greek Reader.** By EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A. In one or two Parts. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- First Greek Reader.** By W. G. RUSHBROOKE, M.L. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Second Greek Reader.** By A. M. BELL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Specimens of Greek Dialects; being a Fourth Greek Reader.** With Introductions, etc. By W. W. MERRY, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Selections from Homer and the Greek Dramatists; being a Fifth Greek Reader.** With Explanatory Notes and Introductions to the Study of Greek Epic and Dramatic Poetry. By EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

GREEK CLASSICS FOR SCHOOLS.

- Aeschylus.** In Single Plays. Extra fcap. 8vo.
- I. Agamemnon. With Introduction and Notes, by ARTHUR SIDGWICK, M.A. *Third Edition.* 3s.
 - II. Choephoroi. By the same Editor. 3s.
 - III. Eumenides. By the same Editor. 3s.
 - IV. Prometheus Bound. With Introduction and Notes, by A. O. PRICKARD, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2s.

London : HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

Aristophanes. In Single Plays. Edited, with English Notes, Introductions, &c., by W. W. MERRY, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo.

I. *The Acharnians.* Third Edition, 3s.

II. *The Clouds.* Third Edition, 3s.

III. *The Frogs.* Second Edition, 3s.

IV. *The Knights.* Second Edition, 3s.

V. *The Birds.* 3s. 6d.

Cebes. *Tabula.* With Introduction and Notes. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Demosthenes. *Orations against Philip.* With Introduction and Notes, by EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., and P. E. MATHESON, M.A.

Vol. I. *Philippic I. Olynthiacs I-III.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

Vol. II. *De Pace, Philippic II, De Chersoneso, Philippic III.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Euripides. In Single Plays. Extra fcap. 8vo.

I. *Alcestis.* Edited by C. S. JERRAM, M.A. 2s. 6d.

II. *Hecuba.* Edited by C. H. RUSSELL, M.A. 2s. 6d.

III. *Helena.* Edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc., for Upper and Middle Forms. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. 3s.

IV. *Heracleidae.* By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. 3s.

V. *Iphigenia in Tauris.* By the same Editor. 3s.

VI. *Medea.* By C. B. HEBERDEN, M.A. 2s.

Herodotus. Book IX. Edited, with Notes, by EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.

— *Selections.* Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by W. W. MERRY, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Homer.

I. *Iliad, Books I-XII.* With an Introduction and a brief Homeric Grammar, and Notes. By D. B. MONRO, M.A. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.

II. *Iliad, Books XIII-XXIV.* With Notes. By the same Editor. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.

III. *Iliad, Book I.* By D. B. MONRO, M.A. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

IV. *Iliad, Books VI and XXI.* With Introduction and Notes. By HERBERT HAILSTONE, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d. each.

Homer (*continued*).

V. *Odyssey*, Books I–XII. By W. W. MERRY, D.D.
Fortieth Thousand. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

Books I and II, separately, each 1s. 6d.

VI. *Odyssey*, Books XIII–XXIV. By the same Editor.
Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.

Lucian. *Vera Historia*. By C. S. JERRAM, M.A. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

Lysias. *Epitaphios*. Edited, with Introduction and Notes,
by F. J. SNELL, B.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

Plato. *Meno*. With Introduction and Notes. By St.
GEORGE STOCK, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— *The Apology*. With Introduction and Notes. By St.
GEORGE STOCK, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Sophocles. For the use of Schools. Edited with Introduc-
tions and English Notes. By LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., and EVELYN
ABBOTT, M.A. *New and Revised Edition*. 2 vols. Extra fcap. 8vo.
10s. 6d.

Sold separately: Vol. I, Text, 4s. 6d.; Vol. II, Explanatory Notes, 6s.

Or in single Plays:—

Oedipus Coloneus, *Antigone*, 1s. 9d. each; *Oedipus Tyrannus*,
Ajax, *Electra*, *Trachiniae*, *Philoctetes*, 2s. each.

Sophocles. *Oedipus Rex*: Dindorf's Text, with Notes by the
present Bishop of St. David's. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d.

Theocritus (for Schools). With English Notes. By H.
KYNASTON, D.D. (late SNOW). *Third Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

XENOPHON. *Easy Selections* (for Junior Classes). With a
Vocabulary, Notes, and Map. By J. S. PHILLPOTTS, B.C.L., and C. S.
JERRAM, M.A. *Third Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— *Selections* (for Schools). With Notes and Maps. By
J. S. PHILLPOTTS, B.C.L. *Fourth Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

— *Anabasis*, Book I. Edited for the use of Junior Classes
and Private Students. With Introduction, Notes, etc. By J. MARSHALL,
M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

— *Anabasis*, Book II. With Notes and Map. By C. S.
JERRAM, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.

— *Anabasis*, Book III. With Introduction, Analysis,
Notes, etc. By J. MARSHALL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Xenophon (*continued*).

- Vocabulary to the Anabasis. By J. MARSHALL, M.A.
Extra fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
- Cyropaedia, Book I. With Introduction and Notes. By
C. BIGG, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Cyropaedia, Books IV and V. With Introduction and
Notes. By C. BIGG, D.D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Hellenica, Books I, II. With Introduction and Notes.
By G. E. UNDERHILL, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s.
- Memorabilia. By J. MARSHALL, M.A. *In the Press.*

SECTION V.

ORIENTAL LANGUAGES*.**THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST.**

TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS, AND EDITED BY
F. MAX MÜLLER.

First Series, Vols. I—XXIV. Demy 8vo. cloth.

- Vol. I. The Upanishads. Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER.
Part I. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. II. The Sacred Laws of the Âryas, as taught in the
Schools of Âpastamba, Gautama, Vâsishthâ, and Baudhâyana. Trans-
lated by Prof. GEORG BÜHLER. Part I. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. III. The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Con-
fucianism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Part I. 12s. 6d.
- Vol. IV. The Zend-Avesta. Part I. The Vendidad. Trans-
lated by JAMES DARMESTETER. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. V. The Pahlavi Texts. Translated by E. W. WEST.
Part I. 12s. 6d.
- Vols. VI and IX. The Qur'ân. Translated by E. H.
PALMER. 21s.
- Vol. VII. The Institutes of Vishnu. Translated by JULIUS
JOLLY. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. VIII. The Bhagavadgîtâ, with The Sanatsugâtîya, and
The Anugîtâ. Translated by KÂSHINÂTH TRIMBAK TELANG. 10s. 6d.

* See also ANECDOTA OXON., Series II, III, pp. 32, 33, below.

The Sacred Books of the East (*continued*).

- Vol. X. The Dhammapada, translated from Pāli by F. MAX MÜLLER; and The Sutta-Nipāta, translated from Pāli by V. FAUSBÖLL; being Canonical Books of the Buddhists. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XI. Buddhist Suttas. Translated from Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XII. The Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, according to the Text of the Mādhyandina School. Translated by JULIUS EGGEING. Part I. Books I and II. 12s. 6d.
- Vol. XIII. Vinaya Texts. Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part I. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XIV. The Sacred Laws of the Āryas, as taught in the Schools of Āpastamba, Gautama, Vāsishtā and Baudhāyana. Translated by GEORG BÜHLER. Part II. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XV. The Upanishads. Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part II. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XVI. The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Part II. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XVII. Vinaya Texts. Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part II. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XVIII. Pahlavi Texts. Translated by E. W. WEST. Part II. 12s. 6d.
- Vol. XIX. The Fo-sho-hing-tsan-king. A Life of Buddha by Asvaghosha Bodhisattva, translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 420, and from Chinese into English by SAMUEL BEAL. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XX. Vinaya Texts. Translated from the Pāli by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and HERMANN OLDENBERG. Part III. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XXI. The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka; or, the Lotus of the True Law. Translated by H. KERN. 12s. 6d.
- Vol. XXII. Gaiṇa-Sūtras. Translated from Prākṛit by HERMANN JACOBI. Part I. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XXIII. The Zend-Avesta. Part II. Translated by JAMES DARMESTETER. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. XXIV. Pahlavi Texts. Translated by E. W. WEST. Part III. 10s. 6d.
-

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST. (Second Series.)

Vol. XXV. *Manu*. Translated by GEORG BÜHLER. 21s.

Vol. XXVI. *The Satapatha-Brâhmana*. Translated by JULIUS EGGELENG. Part II. 12s. 6d.

Vols. XXVII and XXVIII. *The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism*. Translated by JAMES LEGGE. Parts III and IV. 25s.

Vols. XXIX and XXX. *The Grihya-Sûtras, Rules of Vedic Domestic Ceremonies*. Translated by HERMANN OLDENBERG.

Part I (Vol. XXIX). 12s. 6d.

Part II (Vol. XXX). *In the Press*.

Vol. XXXI. *The Zend-Avesta*. Part III. Translated by L. H. MILLS. 12s. 6d.

Vol. XXXIII. *Nârada, and some Minor Law-books*. Translated by JULIUS JOLLY. 10s. 6d.

Vol. XXXIV. *The Vedânta-Sûtras, with Saṅkara's Commentary*. Translated by G. THIBAUT. 12s. 6d.

The following Volumes are in the Press :—

Vol. XXXII. *Vedic Hymns*. Translated by F. MAX MÜLLER. Part I.

Vol. XXXV. *Milinda*. Translated by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

ARABIC. *A Practical Arabic Grammar*. Part I. Compiled by A. O. GREEN, Brigade Major, Royal Engineers. *Second Edition, Enlarged*. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

CHINESE. *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan*. Compiled by BUNYIU NANJIO. 4to. 1l. 12s. 6d.

— *Handbook of the Chinese Language*. Parts I and II. Grammar and Chrestomathy. By JAMES SUMMERS. 8vo. 1l. 8s.

CHINESE. *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms; being an Account by the Chinese Monk FÂ-HIEN of his travels in India and Ceylon (A.D. 399-414) in search of the Buddhist Books of Discipline*. Translated and annotated, with a Korean recension of the Chinese Text, by JAMES LEGGE, M.A., LL.D. Crown 4to., boards, 10s. 6d.

Oxford : Clarendon Press.

CHALDEE. Book of Tobit. A Chaldee Text, from a unique MS. in the Bodleian Library; with other Rabbinical Texts, English Translations, and the Itala. Edited by AD. NEUBAUER, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.

COPTIC. Libri Prophetarum Majorum, cum Lamentationibus Jeremiae, in Dialecto Linguae Aegyptiacae Memphitica seu Coptica. Edidit cum Versione Latina H. TATTAM, S.T.P. Tomi II. 1852. 8vo. 17s.

— Libri duodecim Prophetarum Minorum in Ling. Aegypt. vulgo Coptica. Edidit H. TATTAM, A.M. 1836. 8vo. 8s. 6d.

— Novum Testamentum Coptice, cura D. WILKINS. 1716. 4to. 12s. 6d.

HEBREW. Psalms in Hebrew (without points). Cr. 8vo. 2s.

Driver. Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel. By S. R. DRIVER, D.D. 8vo. 14s. *Just Published.*

— Treatise on the use of the Tenses in Hebrew. By S. R. DRIVER, D.D. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

— Commentary on the Book of Proverbs. Attributed to Abraham Ibn Ezra. Edited from a Manuscript in the Bodleian Library by S. R. DRIVER, D.D. Crown 8vo. paper covers, 3s. 6d.

Neubauer. Book of Hebrew Roots, by Abu 'l-Walid Marwān ibn Janāh, otherwise called Rabbi Yōnāh. Now first edited, with an Appendix, by AD. NEUBAUER. 4to. 2l. 7s. 6d.

Spurrell. Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis. By G. J. SPURRELL, M.A. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

Wickes. Hebrew Accentuation of Psalms, Proverbs, and Job. By WILLIAM WICKES, D.D. 8vo. 5s.

— Hebrew Prose Accentuation. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

SANSKRIT.—Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Etymologically and Philologically arranged, with special reference to Greek, Latin, German, Anglo-Saxon, English, and other cognate Indo-European Languages. By Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. 4to. 4l. 14s. 6d.

— Practical Grammar of the Sanskrit Language, arranged with reference to the Classical Languages of Europe, by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Fourth Edition.* 8vo. 15s.

— Nalopākhyānam. Story of Nala, an Episode of the Mahābhārata: the Sanskrit Text, with a copious Vocabulary, and an improved version of Dean Milman's Translation, by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Second Edition, Revised and Improved.* 8vo. 15s.

— Sakuntalā. A Sanskrit Drama, in seven Acts. Edited by Sir M. MONIER-WILLIAMS, D.C.L. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 1l. 1s.

SYRIAC.—*Thesaurus Syriacus*: collegerunt Quatremère, Bernstein, Lorschach, Arnoldi, Agrell, Field, Roediger: edidit R. PAYNE SMITH, S.T.P. Vol. I. containing Fasc. I-V. Sm. fol. 5l. 5s.

Fasc. VI. 1l. 1s. Fasc. VII. 1l. 11s. 6d. Fasc. VIII. 1l. 16s.

SYRIAC (*continued.*)

- **The Book of Kallilah and Dimnah.** Translated from Arabic into Syriac. Edited by W. WRIGHT, LL.D. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*
- **Cyriilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini Commentarii in Lucae Evangelium quae supersunt Syriace.** E MSS. apud Mus. Britan. edidit R. PAYNE SMITH, A.M. 4to. 1*l.* 2*s.*
- Translated by R. PAYNE SMITH, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 14*s.*
- **Ephraemi Syri, Rabulae Episcopi Edesseni, Balaei, etc., Opera Selecta.** E Codd. Syriacis mss. in Museo Britannico et Bibliotheca Bodleiana asservatis primus edidit J. J. OVERBECK. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*
- **John, Bishop of Ephesus.** The Third Part of his Ecclesiastical History. [In Syriac.] Now first edited by WILLIAM CURETON, M.A. 4to. 1*l.* 12*s.*
- Translated by R. PAYNE SMITH, M.A. 8vo. 10*s.*

SECTION VI.

ANECDOTA OXONIENSIA.

(Crown 4to., stiff covers.)

I. CLASSICAL SERIES.

- I. **The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics.** By J. A. STEWART, M.A. 3*s.* 6*d.*
- II. **Nonius Marcellus, de Compendiosa Doctrina, Harleian MS. 2719.** Collated by J. H. ONIONS, M.A. 3*s.* 6*d.*
- III. **Aristotle's Physics. Book VII.** With Introduction by R. SHUTE, M.A. 2*s.*
- IV. **Bentley's Plautine Emendations.** From his copy of Gronovius. By E. A. SONNENSCHNEIN, M.A. 2*s.* 6*d.*
- V. **Harleian MS. 2610; Ovid's Metamorphoses I, II, III. 1-622; XXIV Latin Epigrams from Bodleian or other MSS.; Latin Glosses on Apollinaris Sidonius from MS. Digby 172.** Collated and Edited by ROBINSON ELLIS, M.A., LL.D. 4*s.*

II. SEMITIC SERIES.

- I. **Commentary on Ezra and Nehemiah.** By Rabbi Saadiah. Edited by H. J. MATHEWS, M.A. 3*s.* 6*d.*
- II. **The Book of the Bee.** Edited by ERNEST A. WALLIS BUDGE, M.A. 21*s.*
- III. **A Commentary on the Book of Daniel.** By Japhet Ibn Ali. Edited and Translated by D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, M.A. 21*s.*
- IV. **Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles and Chronological Notes.** Edited by AD. NEUBAUER, M.A. 14*s.*

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

ANECDOTA OXONIENSIA (*continued*).

III. ARYAN SERIES.

- I. Buddhist Texts from Japan. 1. *Vagrakkhedikā*. Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER. 3s. 6d.
- II. Buddhist Texts from Japan. 2. *Sukhāvati Vyūha*. Edited by F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A., and BUNYIU NANJIO. 7s. 6d.
- III. Buddhist Texts from Japan. 3. The Ancient Palm-leaves containing the *Pragñā-Pāramitā-Hridaya-Sūtra* and the *Uśaiśa-Vigaya-Dhāraṇī*, edited by F. MAX MÜLLER, M.A., and BUNYIU NANJIO, M.A. With an Appendix by G. BÜHLER. 10s.
- IV. *Kātyāyana's Sarvānukramanī of the R̥gveda*. With Extracts from *Shadguruśiṣya's* Commentary entitled *Vedārthadīpikā*. Edited by A. A. MACDONELL, M.A., Ph.D. 16s.
- V. *The Dharma Saṃgraha*. Edited by KENJIU KASAWARA, F. MAX MÜLLER, and H. WENZEL. 7s. 6d.

IV. MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN SERIES.

- I. *Sinonoma Bartholomei*. Edited by J. L. G. MOWAT, M.A. 3s. 6d.
- II. *Alphita*. Edited by J. L. G. MOWAT, M.A. 12s. 6d.
- III. *The Saltair Na Rann*. Edited from a MS. in the Bodleian Library, by WHITLEY STOKES, D.C.L. 7s. 6d.
- IV. *The Cath Finntrága, or Battle of Ventry*. Edited by KUNO MEYER, Ph.D., M.A. 6s.
- V. *Lives of Saints, from the Book of Lismore*. Edited, with Translation, by WHITLEY STOKES, D.C.L. 1l. 11s. 6d. *Just Published*.

II. THEOLOGY.

A. THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, ETC.

- COPTIC.** *Libri Prophetarum Majorum, cum Lamentationibus Jeremiae, in Dialecto Linguae Aegyptiacae Memphitica seu Coptica.* Edidit cum Versione Latina H. TATTAM, S.T.P. Tomi II. 1852. 8vo. 17s.
- *Libri duodecim Prophetarum Minorum in Ling. Aegypt. vulgo Coptica.* Edidit H. TATTAM, A.M. 1836. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- *Novum Testamentum Coptice, cura D. WILKINS.* 1716. 4to. 12s. 6d.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

D

ENGLISH. The Holy Bible in the **Earliest English Versions**, made from the Latin Vulgate by JOHN WYCLIFFE and his followers : edited by FORSHALL and MADDEN. 4 vols. 1850. Royal 4to. 3l. 3s.

Also reprinted from the above, with Introduction and Glossary by W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D.

I. The Books of Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

II. The New Testament. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.

— **The Holy Bible : an exact reprint, page for page, of the Authorised Version published in the year 1611.** Demy 4to. half bound. 1l. 1s.

— **The Holy Bible, Revised Version*.**

Cheap editions for School Use.

Revised Bible. Pearl 16mo., cloth boards, 1s. 6d.

Revised New Testament. Nonpareil 32mo., 6d. ; Brevier 16mo., 1s. ; Long Primer 8vo., 1s. 6d.

— **The Oxford Bible for Teachers**, containing supplementary, HELPS TO THE STUDY OF THE BIBLE, including summaries of the several Books, with copious explanatory notes ; and Tables illustrative of Scripture History and the characteristics of Bible Lands with a complete Index of Subjects, a Concordance, a Dictionary of Proper Names, and a series of Maps. Prices in various sizes and bindings from 3s. to 2l. 5s.

— **Helps to the Study of the Bible**, taken from the OXFORD BIBLE FOR TEACHERS. Crown 8vo., 3s. 6d.

— **The Psalter**, or Psalms of David, and certain Canticles, with a Translation and Exposition in English, by RICHARD ROLLE of Ham-pole. Edited by H. R. BRAMLEY, M.A., Fellow of S. M. Magdalen College, Oxford. With an Introduction and Glossary. Demy 8vo. 1l. 1s.

— **Studia Biblica.** Essays in Biblical Archæology and Criticism, and kindred subjects. By Members of the University of Oxford. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

— **Lectures on the Book of Job.** Delivered in Westminster Abbey by the Very Rev. G. G. BRADLEY, D.D. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

— **Lectures on Ecclesiastes.** By the same Author. Cr. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

— **The Book of Wisdom : the Greek Text, the Latin Vulgate, and the Authorised English Version ; with an Introduction, Critical Apparatus, and a Commentary.** By W. J. DEANE, M.A. 4to. 12s. 6d.

— **The Five Books of Maccabees**, in English, with Notes and Illustrations by HENRY COTTON, D.C.L. 1832. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

* *The Revised Version is the joint property of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge.*

Oxford : Clarendon Press.

ENGLISH (*continued*).

-
- **List of Editions of the Bible in English.** By HENRY COTTON, D.C.L. *Second Edition.* 1852. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- **Rhemes and Doway.** An attempt to shew what has been done by Roman Catholics for the diffusion of the Holy Scriptures in English. By HENRY COTTON, D.C.L. 1855. 8vo. 9s.
- GOTHIC.** *Evangeliorum Versio Gothica, cum Interpr. et* Annot. E. BENZELII. Edidit E. LYE, A.M. 4to. 12s. 6d.
- **The Gospel of St. Mark in Gothic,** according to the translation made by WULFILA in the Fourth Century. Edited by W. W. SKEAT, Litt. D. Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s.
- GREEK.** *Old Testament. Vetus Testamentum ex Versione* Septuaginta Interpretum secundum exemplar Vaticanum Romae editum. Accedit potior varietas Codicis Alexandrini. Tomi III. 18mo. 18s.
- *Vetus Testamentum Graece cum Variis Lectionibus.* Editionem a R. HOLMES, S.T.P. inchoatam continuavit J. PARSONS, S.T.B. Tomi V. 1798–1827. folio, 7l.
- *Origenis Hexaplorum quæ supersunt; sive, Veterum Interpretum Graecorum in totum Vetus Testamentum Fragmenta.* Edidit FRIDERICUS FIELD, A.M. 2 vols. 1875. 4to. 5l. 5s.
- *Essays in Biblical Greek.* By EDWIN HATCH, M.A., D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- **New Testament.** *Novum Testamentum Graece. Anti-* quissimorum Codicum Textus in ordine parallelo dispositi. Edidit E. H. HANSELL, S.T.B. Tomi III. 8vo. 24s.
- *Novum Testamentum Graece. Accedunt parallela* S. Scripturae loca, etc. Edidit CAROLUS LLOYD, S.T.P.R. 18mo. 3s. On writing paper, with wide margin, 10s. 6d.
- Critical Appendices** to the above, by W. SANDAY, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth, 3s. 6d.
- *Novum Testamentum Graece juxta Exemplar Millianum.* 18mo. 2s. 6d. On writing paper, with wide margin, 9s.
- *Evangelia Sacra Graece.* Fcap. 8vo. limp, 1s. 6d.
- **The Greek Testament, with the Readings adopted by** the Revisers of the Authorised Version:—
 (1) Pica type, with Marginal References. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.
 (2) Long Primer type. Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
 (3) The same, on writing paper, with wide margin, 15s.
- **The New Testament in Greek and English.** Edited by E. CARDWELL, D.D. 2 vols. 1837. Crown 8vo. 6s.
-

GREEK (*continued*).

- The Parallel New Testament, Greek and English; being the Authorised Version, 1611; the Revised Version, 1881; and the Greek Text followed in the Revised Version. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Diatessaron; sive Historia Jesu Christi ex ipsis Evangelistarum verbis apte dispositis confecta. Ed. J. WHITE. 3s. 6d.

- Outlines of Textual Criticism applied to the New Testament. By C. E. HAMMOND, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- A Greek Testament Primer. An Easy Grammar and Reading Book for the use of Students beginning Greek. By E. MILLER, M.A. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Canon Muratorianus: the earliest Catalogue of the Books of the New Testament. Edited with Notes and a Facsimile of the MS. in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, by S. P. TREGELLES, LL.D. 1867. 4to. 10s. 6d.

HEBREW, etc. Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis. By G. J. SPURRELL, M.A. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

- Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel. By S. R. DRIVER, D.D. 8vo. 14s.
- The Psalms in Hebrew without points. Stiff covers, 2s.
- A Commentary on the Book of Proverbs. Attributed to ABRAHAM IBN EZRA. Edited from a MS. in the Bodleian Library by S. R. DRIVER, D.D. Crown 8vo. paper covers, 3s. 6d.
- The Book of Tobit. A Chaldee Text, from a unique MS. in the Bodleian Library; with other Rabbinical Texts, English Translations, and the Itala. Edited by AD. NEUBAUER, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Hebrew Accentuation of Psalms, Proverbs, and Job. By WILLIAM WICKES, D.D. 8vo. 5s.
- Hebrew Prose Accentuation. By the same. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae, a J. LIGHTFOOT. A new Edition, by R. GANDELL, M.A. 4 vols. 1859. 8vo. 1l. 1s.

LATIN. Libri Psalmorum Versio antiqua Latina, cum Paraphrasi Anglo-Saxonica. Edidit B. THORPE, F.A.S. 1835. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

- Nouum Testamentum Domini Nostri Iesu Christi Latine, secundum Editionem Sancti Hieronymi. Ad Codicum Manuscriptorum fidem recensuit IOHANNES WORDSWORTH, S.T.P., Episcopus Sarisburiensis; in operis societatem adsumto HENRICO IULIANO WHITE, A.M. *Partis Prioris Fasciculus Primus. Euangelium Secundum Mattheum.* Quarto, Paper covers, 12s. 6d.
- Old-Latin Biblical Texts: No. I. The Gospel according to St. Matthew, from the St. Germain MS. (g₁). Edited with Introduction and Appendices by JOHN WORDSWORTH, D.D. Small 4to., stiff covers, 6s.

LATIN (*continued*).

- **Old-Latin Biblical Texts: No. II.** Portions of the Gospels according to St. Mark and St. Matthew, from the Bobbio MS. (k), &c. Edited by JOHN WORDSWORTH, D.D., W. SANDAY, M.A., D.D., and H. J. WHITE, M.A. Small 4to., stiff covers, 21s.
- **Old-Latin Biblical Texts: No. III.** The Four Gospels, from the Munich MS. (q), now numbered Lat. 6224 in the Royal Library at Munich. With a Fragment from St. John in the Hof-Bibliothek at Vienna (Cod. Lat. 502). Edited, with the aid of Tischendorf's transcript (under the direction of the Bishop of Salisbury), by H. J. WHITE, M.A. Small 4to. stiff covers, 12s. 6d.

OLD-FRENCH. Libri Psalmorum Versio antiqua Gallica e Cod. ms. in Bibl. Bodleiana adservato, una cum Versione Metrica aliisque Monumentis pervetustis. Nunc primum descriptis et editis FRANCISCUS MICHEL, Phil. Doc. 1860. 8vo. 10s. 6d.

B. FATHERS OF THE CHURCH, ETC.

- St. Athanasius:** Orations against the Arians. With an Account of his Life by WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D. Crown 8vo. 9s.
- **Historical Writings, according to the Benedictine Text.** With an Introduction by W. BRIGHT, D.D. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- St. Augustine:** Select Anti-Pelagian Treatises, and the Acts of the Second Council of Orange. With an Introduction by WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D. Crown 8vo. 9s.
- Barnabas,** The Editio Princeps of the Epistle of, by Archbishop Ussher, as printed at Oxford, A.D. 1642, and preserved in an imperfect form in the Bodleian Library. With a Dissertation on the Literary History of that Edition, by J. H. BACKHOUSE, M.A. Small 4to. 3s. 6d.
- Canons of the First Four General Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon.** Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- **Notes on the above.** By WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D. Crown 8vo. 5s. 6d.
- Catenae Graecorum Patrum in Novum Testamentum.** Edidit J. A. CRAMER, S.T.P. Tomi VIII. 8vo. 2l. 4s.
- Clementis Alexandrini Opera, ex recensione Guil. Dindorfii.** Tomi IV. 8vo. 3l.
- Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini in XII Prophetas.** Edidit P. E. PUSEY, A.M. Tomi II. 8vo. 2l. 2s.
- **in D. Joannis Evangelium. Accedunt Fragmenta Varia necnon Tractatus ad Tiberium Diaconum Duo.** Edidit post Aubertum P. E. PUSEY, A.M. Tomi III. 8vo. 2l. 5s.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

- Cyrelli Commentarii in Lucae Evangelium quae supersunt Syriace.** E MSS. apud Mus. Britan. edidit R. PAYNE SMITH, A.M. 4to. 1l. 2s.
- — — Translated by R. PAYNE SMITH, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 14s.
- Dowling (J. G.).** Notitia Scriptorum SS. Patrum aliorumque vet. Eccles. Mon. quae in Collectionibus Anecdotorum post annum Christi MDCC. in lucem editis continentur. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Ephraemi Syri, Rabulae Episcopi Edesseni, Balaei, aliorumque Opera Selecta.** E Codd. Syriacis mss. in Museo Britannico et Bibliotheca Bodleiana asservatis primus edidit J. J. OVERBECK. 8vo. 1l. 1s.
- Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri XV.** Ad Codd. mss. recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi IV. 8vo. 1l. 10s.
- Evangelicae Demonstrationis Libri X. Recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. Tomi II. 8vo. 15s.
- contra Hieroclem et Marcellum Libri. Recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 8vo. 7s.
- Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, according to the text of BURTON, with an Introduction by W. BRIGHT, D.D.** Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- — — Annotationes Variorum. Tomi II. 8vo. 17s.
- Evagrii Historia Ecclesiastica, ex recensione H. VALESII.** 1844. 8vo. 4s.
- Irenaeus: The Third Book of St. Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, against Heresies.** With short Notes and a Glossary by H. DEANE, B.D. Crown 8vo. 5s. 6d.
- Origenis Philosophumena; sive omnium Haeresium Refutatio.** E Codice Parisino nunc primum edidit EMMANUEL MILLER. 1851. 8vo. 10s.
- Patrum Apostolicorum, S. Clementis Romani, S. Ignatii, S. Polycarpi, quae supersunt.** Edidit GUIL. JACOBSON, S.T.P.R. Tomi II. Fourth Edition. 8vo. 1l. 1s.
- Reliquiae Sacrae secundi tertique saeculi.** Recensuit M. J. ROUTH, S.T.P. Tomi V. Second Edition. 8vo. 1l. 5s.
- Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Opuscula.** Recensuit M. J. ROUTH, S.T.P. Tomi II. Third Edition. 8vo. 10s.
- Socratis Scholastici Historia Ecclesiastica.** Gr. et Lat. Edidit R. HUSSEY, S.T.B. Tomi III. 1853. 8vo. 15s.
- Socrates' Ecclesiastical History, according to the Text of HUSSEY, with an Introduction by WILLIAM BRIGHT, D.D.** Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

- Sozomeni Historia Ecclesiastica.** Edidit R. HUSSEY, S.T.B.
Tomi III. 1860. 8vo. 15s.
- Tertulliani Apologeticus adversus Gentes pro Christianis.**
Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by T. HERBERT BINDLEY, M.A.
Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Theodoreti Ecclesiasticae Historiae Libri V.** Recensuit
T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 1854. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- **Graecarum Affectionum Curatio.** Ad Codices mss. recensuit T. GAISFORD, S.T.P. 1839. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

C. ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, ETC.

- Baedae Historia Ecclesiastica.** Edited, with English Notes,
by G. H. MOBERLY, M.A. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Bigg.** The Christian Platonists of Alexandria; being the
Bampton Lectures for 1886. By CHARLES BIGG, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Bingham's** Antiquities of the Christian Church, and other
Works. 10 vols. 8vo. 3l. 3s.
- Bright.** Chapters of Early English Church History. By
W. BRIGHT, D.D. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 12s.
- Burnet's** History of the Reformation of the Church of England.
A new Edition. Carefully revised, and the Records collated with the
originals, by N. POCOCK, M.A. 7 vols. 8vo. 1l. 10s.
- Cardwell's** Documentary Annals of the Reformed Church of
England; being a Collection of Injunctions, Declarations, Orders, Articles
of Inquiry, &c. from 1546 to 1716. 2 vols. 8vo. 18s.
- Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents** relating to Great
Britain and Ireland. Edited, after SPELMAN and WILKINS, by A. W.
HADDAN, B.D., and W. STUBBS, D.D. Vols. I and III. Medium
8vo. each 1l. 1s.
- Vol. II, Part I. Medium 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Vol. II, Part II. Church of Ireland; Memorials of St. Patrick.
Stiff covers, 3s. 6d.
- Formularies of Faith** set forth by the King's authority during
the Reign of Henry VIII. 8vo. 7s.
- Fuller's** Church History of Britain. Edited by J. S. BREWER,
M.A. 6 vols. 8vo. 1l. 19s.
- Gibson's** Synodus Anglicana. Edited by E. CARDWELL, D.D.
8vo. 6s.
- Hamilton's** (Archbishop John) Catechism, 1552. Edited, with
Introduction and Glossary, by THOMAS GRAVES LAW, Librarian of the
Signet Library, Edinburgh. With a Preface by the Right Hon. W. E.
GLADSTONE. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.

- Hussey.** Rise of the Papal Power, traced in three Lectures. By ROBERT HUSSEY, B.D. *Second Edition.* Fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Inett's** Origines Anglicanae (in continuation of Stillingfleet). Edited by J. GRIFFITHS, M.A. 3 vols. 8vo. 15s.
- John, Bishop of Ephesus.** The Third Part of his Ecclesiastical History. [In Syriac.] Now first edited by WILLIAM CURETON, M.A. 4to. 1l. 12s.
- The same, translated by R. PAYNE SMITH, M.A. 8vo. 10s.
- Le Neve's** Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae. Corrected and continued from 1715 to 1853 by T. DUFFUS HARDY. 3 vols. 8vo. 1l. 1s.
- Noelli (A.)** Catechismus sive prima institutio disciplinae Pietatis Christianae Latine explicata. Editio nova cura GUIL. JACOBSON, A.M. 8vo. 5s. 6d.
- Prideaux's** Connection of Sacred and Profane History. 2 vols. 8vo. 10s.
- Primers** put forth in the Reign of Henry VIII. 8vo. 5s.
- Records of the Reformation.** The Divorce, 1527–1533. Mostly now for the first time printed from MSS. in the British Museum and other Libraries. Collected and arranged by N. POOCK, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 1l. 16s.
- Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum.** The Reformation of Ecclesiastical Laws, as attempted in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Elizabeth. Edited by E. CARDWELL, D.D. 8vo. 6s. 6d.
- Shirley.** Some Account of the Church in the Apostolic Age. By W. W. SHIBLEY, D.D. *Second Edition.* Fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Shuckford's** Sacred and Profane History connected (in continuation of Prideaux). 2 vols. 8vo. 10s.
- Stillingfleet's** Origines Britannicae, with LLOYD's Historical Account of Church Government. Edited by T. P. PANTIN, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 10s.
- Stubbs.** Registrum Sacrum Anglicanum. An attempt to exhibit the course of Episcopal Succession in England. By W. STUBBS, D.D. Small 4to. 8s. 6d.
- Strype's** Memorials of Cranmer. 2 vols. 8vo. 11s.
 Life of Aylmer. 8vo. 5s. 6d.
 Life of Whitgift. 3 vols. 8vo. 16s. 6d.
 General Index. 2 vols. 8vo. 11s.
- Sylloge Confessionum** sub tempus Reformandae Ecclesiae editarum. Subjiciuntur Catechismus Heidelbergensis et Canones Synodi Dordrechtanae. 8vo. 8s.

D. LITURGIOLOGY.

Cardwell's Two Books of Common Prayer, set forth by authority in the Reign of King Edward VI, compared with each other. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 7s.

— History of Conferences on the Book of Common Prayer from 1551 to 1690. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Hammond. Liturgies, Eastern and Western. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and a Liturgical Glossary, by C. E. HAMMOND, M.A. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

An Appendix to the above, crown 8vo. paper covers, 1s. 6d.

Leofric Missal, The, as used in the Cathedral of Exeter during the Episcopate of its first Bishop, A.D. 1050–1072; together with some Account of the Red Book of Derby, the Missal of Robert of Jumièges, and a few other early MS. Service Books of the English Church. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by F. E. WARREN, B.D., F.S.A. 4to. half morocco, 1l. 15s.

Maskell. Ancient Liturgy of the Church of England, according to the uses of Sarum, York, Hereford, and Bangor, and the Roman Liturgy arranged in parallel columns, with preface and notes. By W. MASKELL, M.A. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 15s.

— Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiae Anglicanae. The occasional Offices of the Church of England according to the old use of Salisbury, the Prymer in English, and other prayers and forms, with dissertations and notes. *Second Edition.* 3 vols. 8vo. 2l. 10s.

Warren. The Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church. By F. E. WARREN, B.D. 8vo. 14s.

E. ENGLISH THEOLOGY.

Beveridge's Discourse upon the XXXIX Articles. 8vo. 8s.

Biscoe's Boyle Lectures on the Acts of the Apostles. 8vo. 9s. 6d.

Bradley. Lectures on the Book of Job. By GEORGE GRANVILLE BRADLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Bradley. Lectures on Ecclesiastes. By G. G. BRADLEY, D.D., Dean of Westminster. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Bull's Works, with NELSON's Life. Edited by E. BURTON, D.D. 8 vols. 8vo. 2l. 9s.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

-
- Burnet's Exposition of the xxxix Articles.** 8vo. 7s.
- Burton's (Edward) Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Divinity of Christ.** 1829. 8vo. 7s.
- **Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Doctrine of the Trinity and of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost.** 1831. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Butler's Works.** 2 vols. 8vo. 11s.
- **Sermons.** 5s. 6d. **Analogy of Religion.** 5s. 6d.
- Chandler's Critical History of the Life of David.** 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Chillingworth's Works.** 3 vols. 8vo. 1l. 1s. 6d.
- Clergyman's Instructor.** *Sixth Edition.* 8vo. 6s. 6d.
- Comber's Companion to the Temple; or a Help to Devotion in the use of the Common Prayer.** 7 vols. 8vo. 1l. 11s. 6d.
- Cranmer's Works.** Collected and arranged by H. JENKINS, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College. 4 vols. 8vo. 1l. 10s.
- Enchiridion Theologicum Anti-Romanum.**
- Vol. I. JEREMY TAYLOR'S Dissuasive from Popery, and Treatise on the Real Presence. 8vo. 8s.
- Vol. II. BARROW on the Supremacy of the Pope, with his Discourse on the Unity of the Church. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Vol. III. Tracts selected from WAKE, PATRICK, STILLINGFLEET, CLAGETT, and others. 8vo. 11s.
- [**Fell's**] **Paraphrase, etc. on the Epistles of St. Paul.** 8vo. 7s.
- Greswell's Harmonia Evangelica.** *Fifth Edition.* 8vo. 9s. 6d.
- **Prolegomena ad Harmoniam Evangelicam.** 8vo. 9s. 6d.
- **Dissertations on the Principles and Arrangement of a Harmony of the Gospels.** 5 vols. 8vo. 3l. 3s.
- Hall's Works.** Edited by P. WYNTER, D.D. 10 vols. 8vo. 3l. 3s.
- Hammond's Paraphrase on the Book of Psalms.** 2 vols. 8vo. 10s.
- **Paraphrase etc. on the New Testament.** 4 vols. 8vo. 1l.
- Heurtley.** *Harmonia Symbolica: Creeds of the Western Church.* By C. HEURTLEY, D.D. 8vo. 6s. 6d.
- Homilies appointed to be read in Churches.** Edited by J. GRIFFITHS, M.A. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
-

HOOKE'S WORKS, with his Life by WALTON, arranged by JOHN KEBLE, M.A. *Seventh Edition*. Revised by R. W. CHURCH, M.A., Dean of St. Paul's, and F. PAGET, D.D. 3 vols. medium 8vo. 1*l.* 16*s.*

— the Text as arranged by J. KEBLE, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 11*s.*

Hooper's Works. 2 vols. 8vo. 8*s.*

Jackson's (Dr. Thomas) Works. 12 vols. 8vo. 3*l.* 6*s.*

Jewel's Works. Edited by R. W. JELF, D.D. 8 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 10*s.*

Martineau. A Study of Religion : its Sources and Contents: By JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D. *Second Edition*. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 15*s.*

Patrick's Theological Works. 9 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*

Pearson's Exposition of the Creed. Revised and corrected by E. BURTON, D.D. *Sixth Edition*. 8vo. 10*s.* 6*d.*

— Minor Theological Works. Edited with a Memoir, by EDWARD CHURTON, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 10*s.*

Sanderson's Works. Edited by W. JACOBSON, D.D. 6 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 10*s.*

Stanhope's Paraphrase and Comment upon the Epistles and Gospels. A new Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. 10*s.*

Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae. 2 vols. 8vo. 9*s.*

— Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion ; being a vindication of ARCHBISHOP LAUD's Relation of a Conference, &c. 2 vols. 8vo. 10*s.*

Wall's History of Infant Baptism. A New Edition, by HENRY COTTON, D.C.L. 2 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*

Waterland's Works, with Life, by Bp. VAN MILDERT. A new Edition, with copious Indexes. 6 vols. 8vo. 2*l.* 11*s.*

— Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, with a Preface by the late Bishop of London. Crown 8vo. 6*s.* 6*d.*

Wheatly's Illustration of the Book of Common Prayer. 8vo. 5*s.*

Wyclif. A Catalogue of the Original Works of John Wyclif. By W. W. SHIRLEY, D.D. 8vo. 3*s.* 6*d.*

— Select English Works. By T. ARNOLD, M.A. 3 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 1*s.*

— **Triologus.** With the Supplement now first edited. By GOTTHARD LECHLER. 8vo. 7*s.*

III. POLITICAL SCIENCE.

A. HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, ETC.

Baker's Chronicle. Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swyne-broke. Edited with Notes by EDWARD MAUNDE THOMPSON, Hon. LL.D. St. Andrews; Hon. D.C.L. Durham; F.S.A.; Principal Librarian of the British Museum. Small 4to., stiff covers, 18s., cloth, gilt top, 21s.

Bluntschli. The Theory of the State. By J. K. BLUNTSCHLI. Translated from the Sixth German Edition. 8vo. half bound, 12s. 6d.

Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.; including BOSWELL'S Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides, and JOHNSON'S Diary of a Journey into North Wales. Edited by G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L. In six volumes, medium 8vo. With Portraits and Facsimiles. Half bound, 3l. 3s.

Burnet's History of His Own Time, with the suppressed Passages and Notes. 6 vols. 8vo. 2l. 10s.

— History of James II, with Additional Notes. 8vo. 9s. 6d.

— Life of Sir M. Hale, and Fell's Life of Dr. Hammond. Small 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers, preserved in the Bodleian Library. In three volumes. 1869-76.

Vol. I. From 1523 to January 1649. 8vo. 18s.

Vol. II. From 1649 to 1654. 8vo. 16s.

Vol. III. From 1655 to 1657. 8vo 14s.

Calendar of Charters and Rolls preserved in the Bodleian Library. 8vo. 1l. 11s. 6d.

Carte's Life of James Duke of Ormond. A new Edition, carefully compared with the original MSS. 6 vols. 8vo. 1l. 5s.

Casauboni Ephemerides, cum praeftatione et notis J. RUSSELL, S.T.P. Tomi II. 8vo. 15s.

CLARENDON'S History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. Re-edited from a fresh collation of the original MS. in the Bodleian Library, with marginal dates and occasional notes, by W. DUNN MACRAY, M.A., F.S.A. 6 vols. Crown 8vo. 2l. 5s.

— History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. To which are subjoined the Notes of BISHOP WARBURTON. 1849. 7 vols. medium 8vo. 2l. 10s.

— History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England. Also his Life, written by himself, in which is included a Continuation of his History of the Grand Rebellion. Royal 8vo. 1l. 2s.

-
- Clarendon's Life**, including a Continuation of his History.
2 vols. 1857. medium 8vo. 1*l.* 2*s.*
- Clinton's Fasti Hellenici**. The Civil and Literary Chronology of Greece, from the LVIth to the CXXIIIrd Olympiad. *Third Edition*.
4to. 1*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*
- Clinton's Fasti Hellenici**. The Civil and Literary Chronology of Greece, from the CXXIVth Olympiad to the Death of Augustus. *Second Edition*. 4to. 1*l.* 12*s.*
- Epitome of the Fasti Hellenici. 8vo. 6*s.* 6*d.*
- Fasti Romani. The Civil and Literary Chronology of Rome and Constantinople, from the Death of Augustus to the Death of Heraclius. 2 vols. 4to. 2*l.* 2*s.*
- Epitome of the Fasti Romani. 8vo. 7*s.*
- Cramer's Geographical and Historical Description of Asia Minor**. 2 vols. 8vo. 11*s.*
- Description of Ancient Greece. 3 vols. 8vo. 16*s.* 6*d.*
- Earle**. Handbook to the Land-Charters, and other Saxon Documents. By JOHN EARLE, M.A., Professor of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Oxford. Crown 8vo. 16*s.*
- Finlay**. A History of Greece from its Conquest by the Romans to the present time, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864. By GEORGE FINLAY, LL.D. A new Edition, revised throughout, and in part re-written, with considerable additions, by the Author, and edited by H. F. TOZER, M.A. 7 vols. 8vo. 3*l.* 10*s.*
- Fortescue**. The Governance of England: otherwise called The Difference between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy. By Sir JOHN FORTESCUE, Kt. A Revised Text. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc., by CHARLES PLUMMER, M.A. 8vo. half bound, 12*s.* 6*d.*
- Freeman**. History of the Norman Conquest of England; its Causes and Results. By E. A. FREEMAN, D.C.L. In Six Volumes. 8vo. 5*l.* 9*s.* 6*d.*
- The Reign of William Rufus and the Accession of Henry the First. 2 vols. 8vo. 1*l.* 16*s.*
- A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England. *Second Edition*. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2*s.* 6*d.*
- Gardiner**. The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution. 1628-1660. Selected and Edited by SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, M.A. Crown 8vo. 9*s.*
- Gascoigne's Theological Dictionary** ("Liber Veritatum"): Selected Passages, illustrating the Condition of Church and State, 1403-1458. With an Introduction by JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, M.A. Small 4to. 10*s.* 6*d.*
-

- George.** Genealogical Tables illustrative of Modern History. By H. B. GEORGE, M.A. *Third Edition.* Small 4to. 12s.
- Greenwell.** British Barrows, a Record of the Examination of Sepulchral Mounds in various parts of England. By W. GREENWELL, M.A., F.S.A. Together with Description of Figures of Skulls, General Remarks on Prehistoric Crania, and an Appendix by GEORGE ROLLESTON, M.D., F.R.S. Medium 8vo. 25s.
- Greswell's** Fasti Temporis Catholici. 4 vols. 8vo. 2l. 10s.
 — Tables to Fasti, 4to., and Introduction to Tables, 8vo. 15s.
 — Origines Kalendarie Italice. 4 vols. 8vo. 2l. 2s.
 — Origines Kalendarie Hellenice. 6 vols. 8vo. 4l. 4s.
- Gross.** The Gild Merchant: a Contribution to English Municipal History. By CHARLES GROSS, Ph.D. 2 vols. 8vo. *Nearly ready.*
- Hodgkin.** Italy and her Invaders. With Plates and Maps. By THOMAS HODGKIN, D.C.L. Vols. I-IV, A.D. 376-553. 8vo. 3l. 8s.
 — The Dynasty of Theodosius; or, Seventy Years' Struggle with the Barbarians. By the same Author. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Hume.** Letters of David Hume to William Strahan. Edited with Notes, Index, etc., by G. BIRKBECK HILL, D.C.L. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Jackson.** Dalmatia, the Quarnero, and Istria; with Cettigne in Montenegro and the Island of Grado. By T. G. JACKSON, M.A. 3 vols. With many Plates and Illustrations. 8vo. half-bound, 2l. 2s.
- Kitchin.** A History of France. With numerous Maps, Plans, and Tables. By G. W. KITCHIN, D.D. In three Volumes. *Second Edition.* Crown 8vo. each 10s. 6d.
 Vol. I. to 1453. Vol. II. 1453-1624. Vol. III. 1624-1793.
- Knight's** Life of Dean Colet. 1823. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Lucas.** Introduction to a Historical Geography of the British Colonies. By C. P. LUCAS, B.A. With Eight Maps. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.
 — Historical Geography of the Colonies. Vol. I. By the same Author. With Eleven Maps. Crown 8vo. 5s.
- Lloyd's** Prices of Corn in Oxford, 1583-1830. 8vo. 1s.
- Luttrell's** (Narcissus) Diary. A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs, 1678-1714. 6 vols. 8vo. 1l. 4s.
- Magna Carta**, a careful Reprint. Edited by W. STUBBS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Oxford. 4to. stitched, 1s.
- Metcalf.** Passio et Miracula Beati Olai. Edited from a Twelfth-Century MS. by F. METCALFE, M.A. Small 4to. 6s.

OXFORD, University of.

Oxford University Calendar for the Year 1890. Crown 8vo. 6s.

The Historical Register of the University of Oxford. Being a Supplement to the Oxford University Calendar, with an Alphabetical Record of University Honours and Distinctions, completed to the end of Trinity Term, 1888. Crown 8vo. 5s.

Student's Handbook to the University and Colleges of Oxford. Tenth Edition. Revised to December 1888. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The Examination Statutes ; together with the present Regulations of the Boards of Studies and Boards of Faculties relating thereto. Revised to the end of Trinity Term, 1889. 8vo., paper covers, 1s.

Statuta Universitatis Oxoniensis. 1889. 8vo. 5s.

Statutes made for the University of Oxford, and the Colleges therein, by the University of Oxford Commissioners. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Also separately—University Statutes 2s.; College Statutes 1s. each.

Supplementary Statutes made by the University of Oxford, and by certain of the Colleges therein, in pursuance of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge Act, 1877; approved by the Queen in Council. 8vo. Paper covers, 2s. 6d.

Statutes of the University of Oxford, codified in the year 1636 under the Authority of ARCHBISHOP LAUD, Chancellor of the University. Edited by the late JOHN GRIFFITHS, D.D. With an Introduction on the History of the Laudian Code by C. L. SHADWELL, M.A., B.C.L. 4to. 1l. 1s.

Enactments in Parliament, specially concerning the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Collected and arranged by J. GRIFFITHS, D.D. 1869. 8vo. 12s.

Catalogue of Oxford Graduates from 1659 to 1850. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Index to Wills proved in the Court of the Chancellor of the University of Oxford, &c. Compiled by J. GRIFFITHS, D.D. Royal 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Manuscript Materials relating to the History of Oxford ; contained in the Printed Catalogues of the Bodleian and College Libraries. By F. MADAN, M.A. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Pattison. Essays by the late MARK PATTISON, sometime Rector of Lincoln College. Collected and arranged by HENRY NETTLESHIP, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 24s.

Ranke. A History of England, principally in the Seventeenth Century. By L. VON RANKE. Translated under the superintendence of G. W. KITCHIN, D.D., and C. W. BOASE, M.A. 6 vols. 8vo. 3l. 3s.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

- Rawlinson.** A Manual of Ancient History. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A. *Second Edition.* Demy 8vo. 14s.
- Ricardo.** Letters of David Ricardo to T. R. Malthus (1810-1823). Edited by JAMES BONAR, M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Rogers.** History of Agriculture and Prices in England, A.D. 1259-1793. By JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, M.A.
 Vols. I and II (1259-1400). 8vo. 2l. 2s.
 Vols. III and IV (1401-1582). 8vo. 2l. 10s.
 Vols. V and VI (1583-1702). 8vo. 2l. 10s.
- First Nine Years of the Bank of England. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Protests of the Lords, including those which have been expunged, from 1624 to 1874; with Historical Introductions. In three volumes. 8vo. 2l. 2s.
- Sprigg's** England's Recovery; being the History of the Army under Sir Thomas Fairfax. 8vo. 6s.
- Stubbs.** Select Charters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional History, from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward I. Arranged and edited by W. STUBBS, D.D., Lord Bishop of Oxford. *Fifth Edition.* Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- The Constitutional History of England, in its Origin and Development. *Library Edition.* 3 vols. Demy 8vo. 2l. 8s.
 Also in 3 vols. crown 8vo. price 12s. each.
- Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History, delivered at Oxford 1867-1884. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Tozer.** The Islands of the Aegean. By H. FANSHAWE TOZER, M.A., F.R.G.S. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Wellesley.** A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties, and other Papers of the MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K.G., during his Government of India. Edited by S. J. OWEN, M.A. 8vo. 1l. 4s.
- Wellington.** A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties, and other Papers relating to India of Field-Marshal the DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G. Edited by S. J. OWEN, M.A. 8vo. 1l. 4s.
- Whitelock's** Memorials of English Affairs from 1625 to 1660. 4 vols. 8vo. 1l. 10s.

B. ENGLISH AND ROMAN LAW.

- Anson.** Principles of the English Law of Contract, and of Agency in its Relation to Contract. By SIR W. R. ANSON, D.C.L. *Fifth Edition.* 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Law and Custom of the Constitution. Part I. Parliament. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Bentham.** An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. By JEREMY BENTHAM. Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d.

- Digby.** An Introduction to the History of the Law of Real Property. By KENELM E. DIGBY, M.A. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Grueber.** Lex Aquilia. The Roman Law of Damage to Property: being a Commentary on the Title of the Digest 'Ad Legem Aquiliam' (ix. 2). With an Introduction to the Study of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. By ERWIN GRUEBER, Dr. Jur., M.A. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Hall.** International Law. By W. E. HALL, M.A. *Third Edition.* 8vo. 22s. 6d.
- Holland.** Elements of Jurisprudence. By T. E. HOLLAND, D.C.L. *Fourth Edition.* 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- The European Concert in the Eastern Question, a Collection of Treaties and other Public Acts. Edited, with Introductions and Notes, by T. E. HOLLAND, D.C.L. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Alberici Gentilis, I.C.D., I.C., De Iure Belli Libri Tres. Edidit T. E. HOLLAND, I.C.D. Small 4to. half morocco, 21s.
- The Institutes of Justinian, edited as a recension of the Institutes of GAIUS, by T. E. HOLLAND, D.C.L. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 5s.
- Holland and Shadwell.** Select Titles from the Digest of Justinian. By T. E. HOLLAND, D.C.L., and C. L. SHADWELL, B.C.L. 8vo. 14s.
- Also sold in Parts, in paper covers, as follows:—
- Part I. Introductory Titles. 2s. 6d.
- Part II. Family Law. 1s.
- Part III. Property Law. 2s. 6d.
- Part IV. Law of Obligations (No. 1). 3s. 6d.
- Part IV. Law of Obligations (No. 2). 4s. 6d.
- Markby.** Elements of Law considered with reference to Principles of General Jurisprudence. By Sir WILLIAM MARKBY, D.C.L. *Fourth Edition.* 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Moyle.** Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutionum Libri Quattuor; with Introductions, Commentary, Excursus and Translation. By J. B. MOYLE, D.C.L. *Second Edition.* 2 vols. 8vo. 22s.
- Pollock and Wright.** An Essay on Possession in the Common Law. By Sir F. POLLOCK, M.A., and R. S. WRIGHT, B.C.L. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Poste.** Gaii Institutionum Juris Civilis Commentarii Quattuor; or, Elements of Roman Law by Gaius. With a Translation and Commentary by EDWARD POSTE, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 18s.
- Raleigh.** The English Law of Property. By THOS. RALEIGH, M.A. *Just ready.*

Stokes. The Anglo-Indian Codes. By WHITLEY STOKES, LL.D. Vol. I. Substantive Law. 8vo. 30s. Vol. II. Adjective Law. 8vo. 35s.

— Supplement to the above, 1887, 1888. 2s. 6d.

Twiss. The Law of Nations considered as Independent Political Communities. By SIR TRAVERS TWISS, D.C.L.

Part I. On the rights and Duties of Nations in time of Peace. New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo. 15s.

Part II. On the Rights and Duties of Nations in time of War. Second Edition, Revised. 8vo. 21s.

C. POLITICAL ECONOMY, ETC.

Rogers. A Manual of Political Economy, for the use of Schools. By J. E. THOROLD ROGERS, M.A. *Third Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Smith's Wealth of Nations. A new Edition, with Notes, by J. E. THOROLD ROGERS, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.

IV. PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC, &c.

Bacon. *Novum Organum.* Edited, with Introduction, Notes, &c., by T. FOWLER, D.D. *Second Edition.* 8vo. 15s.

— *Novum Organum.* Edited, with English Notes, by G. W. KITCHIN, D.D. 8vo. 9s. 6d.

— *Novum Organum.* Translated by G. W. KITCHIN, D.D. 8vo. 9s. 6d.

Berkeley. The works of GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne; including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, and an Account of his Life and Philosophy, by ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, LL.D. 4 vols. 8vo. 2l. 18s.

The Life, Letters, &c., separately, 16s.

— Selections. With Introduction and Notes. For the use of Students in the Universities. By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, LL.D. *Third Edition.* Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Bosanquet. *Logic*; or, the Morphology of Knowledge. By B. BOSANQUET, M.A. 8vo. 21s.

Butler's Works, with Index to the Analogy. 2 vols. 8vo. 11s.

Fowler. The Elements of Deductive Logic, designed mainly for the use of Junior Students in the Universities. By T. FOWLER, D.D. *Ninth Edition,* with a Collection of Examples. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

-
- Fowler.** *The Elements of Inductive Logic*, designed mainly for the use of Students in the Universities. *Fourth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s.
- *The Principles of Morals* (Introductory Chapters). By T. FOWLER, D.D., and J. M. WILSON, B.D. 8vo. boards, 3s. 6d.
- *The Principles of Morals. Part II.* By T. FOWLER, D.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Green.** *Prolegomena to Ethics.* By T. H. GREEN, M.A. Edited by A. C. BRADLEY, M.A. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Hegel.** *The Logic of Hegel*; translated from the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.* With *Prolegomena* by WILLIAM WALLACE, M.A. 8vo. 14s.
- Hume's** *Treatise of Human Nature.* Reprinted from the Original Edition in Three Volumes, and Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. Crown 8vo. 9s.
- Locke's** *Conduct of the Understanding.* Edited by T. FOWLER, D.D. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s.
- Lotze's** *Logic, in Three Books; of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge.* English Translation; Edited by B. BOSANQUET, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s.
- *Metaphysic, in Three Books; Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology.* English Translation; Edited by B. BOSANQUET, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s.
- Martineau.** *Types of Ethical Theory.* By JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D. *Second Edition.* 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 15s.
- *A Study of Religion: its Sources and Contents.* *A New Edition.* 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 15s.

V. PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS.

- Acland.** *Synopsis of the Pathological Series in the Oxford Museum.* By Sir H. W. ACLAND, M.D., F.R.S. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Aldis.** *A Text-Book of Algebra: with Answers to the Examples.* By W. S. ALDIS, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Aplin.** *The Birds of Oxfordshire.* By O. V. APLIN. 8vo. with a Map and one coloured Plate. 10s. 6d.
- Archimedis** quae supersunt omnia cum Eutocii commentariis ex recensione J. TORELLI, cum novâ versione Latinâ. 1792. Fol. 1l. 5s.
- Baynes.** *Lessons on Thermodynamics.* By R. E. BAYNES, M.A. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

BIOLOGICAL SERIES. (Translations of Foreign Memoirs).

- I. *Memoirs on the Physiology of Nerve, of Muscle, and of the Electrical Organ.* Edited by J. BURDON-SANDERSON, M.D., F.R.S.S.L. & E. Medium 8vo. 1l. 1s.
- II. *The Anatomy of the Frog.* By Dr. ALEXANDER ECKER, Professor in the University of Freiburg. Translated, with numerous Annotations and Additions, by GEORGE HASLAM, M.D. Medium 8vo. 21s.
- IV. *Essays upon Heredity and kindred Biological Problems.* By Dr. AUGUST WEISMANN, Professor in the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. Authorised Translation. Edited by EDWARD B. POULTON, M.A., F.L.S., F.G.S., SELMAR SCHÖNLAND, Ph.D., and ARTHUR E. SHIPLEY, M.A., F.L.S. Medium 8vo. 16s.

BOTANICAL SERIES.

- History of Botany (1530-1860).* By JULIUS VON SACHS. Authorised Translation, by H. E. F. GARNSEY, M.A. Revised by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S. Crown 8vo. 10s.
- Comparative Anatomy of the Vegetative Organs of the Phanerogams and Ferns.* By Dr. A. DE BARY. Translated and Annotated by F. O. BOWER, M.A., F.L.S., and D. H. SCOTT, M.A., Ph.D., F.L.S. Royal 8vo., half morocco, 1l. 2s. 6d.
- Outlines of Classification and Special Morphology of Plants.* A new Edition of SACHS' Text-Book of Botany, Book II. By Dr. K. GOEBEL. Translated by H. E. F. GARNSEY, M.A., and Revised by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S. Royal 8vo., half morocco, 1l. 1s.
- Lectures on the Physiology of Plants.* By JULIUS VON SACHS. Translated by H. MARSHALL WARD, M.A., F.L.S. Royal 8vo. half morocco, 1l. 11s. 6d.
- Comparative Morphology and Biology of Fungi, Mycetozoa and Bacteria.* By Dr. A. DE BARY. Translated by H. E. F. GARNSEY, M.A., Revised by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S. Royal 8vo., half morocco, 1l. 2s. 6d.
- Lectures on Bacteria.* By Dr. A. DE BARY. *Second Improved Edition.* Translated by H. E. F. GARNSEY, M.A. Revised by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- Introduction to Fossil Botany.* By Count H. VON SOLMS-LAUBACH. Authorised English Translation, by H. E. F. GARNSEY, M.A. Edited by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S. *In the Press.*
- Annals of Botany.* Edited by ISAAC BAYLEY BALFOUR, M.A., M.D., F.R.S., SYDNEY H. VINES, D.Sc., F.R.S., and W. G. FARLOW, M.D. Vol. I. Royal 8vo., half morocco, gilt top, 1l. 16s.
- Bradley's Miscellaneous Works and Correspondence.* With an Account of Harriot's Astronomical Papers. 4to. 17s.

- Chambers.** *A Handbook of Descriptive Astronomy.* By G. F. CHAMBERS, F.R.A.S. *Fourth Edition.*
 Vol. I. The Sun, Planets, and Comets. 8vo. 21s.
 Vol. II. Instruments and Practical Astronomy. *Immediately.*
- Clarke.** *Geodesy.* By Col. A. R. CLARKE, C.B., R.E. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- Cremona.** *Elements of Projective Geometry.* By LUIGI CREMONA. Translated by C. LEUDESORF, M.A. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
- *Graphical Statics. Two Treatises on the Graphical Calculus and Reciprocal Figures in Graphical Statics.* By the same Author. Translated by T. HUDSON BEARE. Demy 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Daubeny's** *Introduction to the Atomic Theory.* 16mo. 6s.
- Donkin.** *Acoustics.* By W. F. DONKIN, M.A., F.R.S. *Second Edition.* Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Etheridge.** *Fossils of the British Islands, Stratigraphically and Zoologically arranged. Part I. PALAEOZOIC.* By R. ETHERIDGE, F.R.S.S. L. & E., F.G.S. 4to. 1l. 10s.
- EUCLID REVISED.** Containing the Essentials of the Elements of Plane Geometry as given by Euclid in his first Six Books. Edited by R. C. J. NIXON, M.A. *Second Edition.* Crown 8vo. 6s.
 Sold separately as follows:—
 Book I. 1s. Books I, II. 1s. 6d.
 Books I–IV. 3s. Books V, VI. 3s.
- Euclid.** *Geometry in Space.* Containing parts of Euclid's Eleventh and Twelfth Books. By the same Editor. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
- Fisher.** *Class-Book of Chemistry.* By W. W. FISHER, M.A., F.C.S. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.
- Galton.** *The Construction of Healthy Dwellings.* By Sir DOUGLAS GALTON, K.C.B., F.R.S. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Hamilton and Ball.** *Book-keeping.* New and enlarged Edition. By Sir R. G. C. HAMILTON, and JOHN BALL. Extra fcap. 8vo. limp cloth, 2s.
Ruled Exercise books adapted to the above may be had, price 1s. 6d.
- Harcourt and Madan.** *Exercises in Practical Chemistry.*
 Vol. I. *Elementary Exercises.* By A. G. VERNON HARCOURT, M.A., and H. G. MADAN, M.A. *Fourth Edition.* Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Madan. *Tables of Qualitative Analysis.* By H. G. MADAN, M.A. Large 4to., paper covers, 4s. 6d.
- Hensley.** *Figures made Easy. A first Arithmetic Book.* By LEWIS HENSLEY, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6d.
- *Answers to the Examples in Figures made Easy, together with two thousand additional Examples, with Answers.* Crown 8vo. 1s.

- Hensley.** *The Scholar's Arithmetic.* Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
 ——— *Answers to Examples in Scholar's Arithmetic.* 1s. 6d.
 ——— *The Scholar's Algebra.* Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Hughes.** *Geography for Schools.* By ALFRED HUGHES, M.A., late Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Part I. *Practical Geography.* With Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
- Maclaren.** *A System of Physical Education: Theoretical and Practical.* By ARCHIBALD MACLAREN. Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Maxwell.** *A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism.* By J. CLERK MAXWELL, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2 vols. 8vo. 1l. 11s. 6d.
 ——— *An Elementary Treatise on Electricity.* Edited by WILLIAM GARNETT, M.A. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Minchin.** *A Treatise on Statics with Applications to Physics.* By G. M. MINCHIN, M.A. *Third Edition.* Vol. I. *Equilibrium of Coplanar Forces.* 8vo. 9s. Vol. II. *Statics.* 8vo. 16s.
 ——— *Uniplanar Kinematics of Solids and Fluids.* Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Müller.** *On certain Variations in the Vocal Organs of the Passeres.* By J. MÜLLER. Translated by F. J. BELL, B.A., and edited by A. H. GARROD, M.A., F.R.S. With Plates. 4to. 7s. 6d.
- Nixon.** See EUCLID REVISED.
- Phillips.** *Geology of Oxford and the Valley of the Thames.* By JOHN PHILLIPS, M.A., F.R.S. 8vo. 21s.
 ——— *Vesuvius.* Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Prestwich.** *Geology, Chemical, Physical, and Stratigraphical.* By JOSEPH PRESTWICH, M.A., F.R.S. In two Volumes.
 Vol. I. *Chemical and Physical.* Royal 8vo. 1l. 5s.
 Vol. II. *Stratigraphical and Physical.* With a new Geological Map of Europe. Royal 8vo. 1l. 16s.
 New Geological Map of Europe. In case or on roller. 5s.
- Price.** *Treatise on Infinitesimal Calculus.* By BARTHOLOMEW PRICE, M.A., F.R.S.
 Vol. I. *Differential Calculus.* *Second Edition.* 8vo. 14s. 6d.
 Vol. II. *Integral Calculus, Calculus of Variations, and Differential Equations.* *Second Edition.* 8vo. 18s.
 Vol. III. *Statics, including Attractions; Dynamics of a Material Particle.* *Second Edition.* 8vo. 16s.
 Vol. IV. *Dynamics of Material Systems.* *Second Edition.* 8vo. 18s.
- Pritchard.** *Uranometria Nova Oxoniensis.* A Photometric determination of the magnitudes of all Stars visible to the naked eye, from the Pole to ten degrees south of the Equator. By C. PRITCHARD, D.D., F.R.S. Royal 8vo. 8s. 6d.
 ——— *Astronomical Observations made at the University Observatory, Oxford, under the direction of C. PRITCHARD, D.D.* No. 1. Royal 8vo. paper covers, 3s. 6d.

- Rigaud's** Correspondence of Scientific Men of the 17th Century, with Table of Contents by A. de MORGAN, and Index by J. RIGAUD, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 18s. 6d.
- Rolleston and Jackson.** Forms of Animal Life. A Manual of Comparative Anatomy, with descriptions of selected types. By GEORGE ROLLESTON, M.D., F.R.S. *Second Edition.* Revised and enlarged by W. HATCHETT JACKSON, M.A. Medium 8vo. 1l. 16s.
- Rolleston.** Scientific Papers and Addresses. By GEORGE ROLLESTON, M.D., F.R.S. Arranged and edited by WILLIAM TURNER, M.B., F.R.S. With a Biographical Sketch by EDWARD TYLOR, F.R.S. 2 vols. 8vo. 1l. 4s.
- Smyth.** A Cycle of Celestial Objects. Observed, Reduced, and Discussed by Admiral W. H. SMYTH, R.N. Revised, condensed, and greatly enlarged by G. F. CHAMBERS, F.R.A.S. 8vo. 12s.
- Stewart.** An Elementary Treatise on Heat, with numerous Woodcuts and Diagrams. By BALFOUR STEWART, LL.D., F.R.S. *Fifth Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Vernon-Harcourt.** Treatise on Rivers and Canals, relating to Control and Improvement of Rivers, and Design, Construction, and Development of Canals. By L. F. VERNON-HARCOURT, M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 1l. 1s.
- Harbours and Docks; their Physical Features, History, Construction, Equipment, and Maintenance; with Statistics as to their Commercial Development. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.
- Walker.** The Theory of a Physical Balance. By JAMES WALKER, M.A. 8vo. stiff cover, 3s. 6d.
- Watson and Burbury.**
- I. A Treatise on the Application of Generalised Coordinates to the Kinetics of a Material System. By H. W. WATSON, D.Sc., and S. H. BURBURY, M.A. 8vo. 6s.
 - II. The Mathematical Theory of Electricity and Magnetism. Vol. I. Electrostatics. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Vol. II. Magnetism and Electrodynamics. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
- Williamson.** Chemistry for Students. With Solutions. By A. W. WILLIAMSON, Phil. Doc., F.R.S. Extra fcap. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
- Westwood.** Thesaurus Entomologicus Hopeianus, or a Description of the rarest Insects in the Collection given to the University by the Rev. William Hope. By J. O. WESTWOOD, M.A., F.R.S. With 40 Plates. Small folio, half morocco, 7l. 10s.

VI. ART AND ARCHÆOLOGY.

- Butler.** Ancient Coptic Churches of Egypt. By A. J. BUTLER, M.A., F.S.A. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s.
- Head.** Historia Numorum. A Manual of Greek Numismatics. By BARCLAY V. HEAD, Assistant-Keeper of the Department of Coins and Medals in the British Museum. Royal 8vo. Half morocco, 42s.

London: HENRY FROWDE, Amen Corner, E.C.

Jackson. Dalmatia, the Quarnero and Istria; with Cettigne in Montenegro and the Island of Grado. By T. G. JACKSON, M.A., Author of 'Modern Gothic Architecture.' In 3 vols. 8vo. With many Plates and Illustrations. Half bound, 42s.

MUSIC.

Hullah. Cultivation of the Speaking Voice. By JOHN HULLAH. *Second Edition.* Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Onseley. Treatise on Harmony. By Sir F. A. GORE OUSELEY, Bart. *Third Edition.* 4to. 10s.

— Treatise on Counterpoint, Canon, and Fugue, based upon that of Cherubini. *Second Edition.* 4to. 16s.

— Treatise on Musical Form and General Composition. *Second Edition.* 4to. 10s.

Troutbeck and Dale. Music Primer (for Schools). By J. TROUTBECK, D.D., and F. DALE, M.A. *Second Edition.* Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

Robinson. A Critical Account of the Drawings by Michel Angelo and Raffaello in the University Galleries, Oxford. By J. C. ROBINSON, F.S.A. Crown 8vo. 4s.

Tyrwhitt. Handbook of Pictorial Art. With coloured Illustrations, Photographs, and a chapter on Perspective by A. Macdonald. By R. St. J. TYRWHITT, M.A. *Second Edition.* 8vo. half morocco, 18s.

Upcott. Introduction to Greek Sculpture. By L. E. UPCOTT, M.A. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.

Vaux. Catalogue of the Castellani Collection of Antiquities in the University Galleries, Oxford. By W. S. W. VAUX, M.A. Crown 8vo. 1s.

VII. PALAEOGRAPHY.

Gardthausen. Catalogus Codicum Graecorum Sinaiticorum. Scriptis V. GARDTHAUSEN Lipsiensis. With six pages of Facsimiles. 8vo. linen, 25s.

Fragmenta Herculaneusia. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oxford copies of the Herculanean Rolls, together with the texts of several papyri, accompanied by facsimiles. Edited by WALTER SCOTT, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Royal 8vo. 21s.

Herculaneusium Voluminum Partes II. 1824. 8vo. 10s.

