

# ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ

*of*

Āchārya Samantabhadra

*Edited and Translated by*

**Saratchandra Ghoshal**



## Āpta-mīmāṃsā

A Sanskrit treatise with 114 verses in ten chapters, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* means 'propounding the evident one.' It expounds the Jaina concept of 'omniscient' in a philosophical-cum-logical manner. As a matter of fact, it is an eulogy. It is more popularly called *Devāgamā-stotra* after the first word in its first verse. This fashion of nomenclature was followed in the outstanding eulogies—*Bhaktāmara*, *Kalyāṇa-mandira*, *Viṣāpahara*, *Ekībhāva* etc.

The magnanimous considerations, thorough discussions, perfect solutions on the one hand, and wide coverage, aphoristic phraseology, skilful presentation and poetic flavour make this text so copious and compendious that pioneers like Akalāṅka, Vidyānandī and Vasunandī chose it for their voluminous commentaries, respectfully called *Aṣṭaśatī*, *Aṣṭasahasrī* and *Vṛtti*.

Known for his short commentaries on and translations of ancient texts into English, Sarat Chandra Ghoshal has made this text easier to grasp and additionally charming, particularly for the researchers in Indian religions and philosophy. It is a must for the entrant into the field of logic.

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




# ĀPTA - MĪMĀṂSĀ of Āchārya Samantabhadra

Edited with Introduction, Translation, Notes and An Original  
Commentary in English

by  
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Bharatiya Jnanpith

ISBN 81 - 263 - 0724 - 2

Moortidevi Granthamala : English Grantha No. 13

**ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ of Āchārya Samantabhadra**

Edited by Saratchandra Ghoshal

Published by

Bharatiya Jnanpith

18, Institutional Area, Lodi Road

New Delhi - 110 003

Printed at

Nagri Printers, Delhi - 110 032

**First Edition : 2002**

**Price : Rs. 150**

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To  
The Loving Memory  
of  
Jaina-dharma-bhūṣaṇa  
Brahmachari Sital Prasad



## A GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION

### Vowels

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ऋ
a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	r̥
ए	ऐ	ओ	औ	अं	अः	
e	ai	o	ou	aṁ	aḥ	

### Consonants

क	ख	ग	घ	ङ
ka	kha	ga	gha	ṅa
च	छ	ज	झ	ञ
cha	chha	ja	jha	ña
ट	ठ	ड	ढ	ण
ṭa	ṭha	ḍa	ḍha	ṇa
त	थ	द	ध	न
ta	tha	da	dha	na
प	फ	ब	भ	म
pa	pha	ba	bha	ma
य	र	ल	व	
ya	ra	la	va	
श	ष	स	ह	
śa	ṣa	sa	ha	

## Introduction

*Āpta-Mīmāṃsā* is a celebrated work written by the Digambara scholar Saint Samantabhadra. According to a tradition current amongst the Digambara Jains, this work is the opening portion of a commentary by the same author known as *Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya* on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* by Umāsvāmī. This commentary in full has not been discovered.

The tradition about the existence of *Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya* is supported by references to the same in different works. Abhaya-chandra Sūri (14th century A.D.) in his *ṭikā* on the *sūtra Upajñāte* (*Śakaṭāyana Vyākaraṇa*, III, 1-182) has referred to *Mahābhāṣya* of Samantabhadra (सामन्तभद्रं महाभाष्यम्). Malliṣeṇa-sūri in his *Syādvādamāñjarī* (*Śaka* era 1214) has mentioned *Gandhahasti* (यद्यपि अवयव-प्रदेशयोर्गन्धहस्त्यादिषु भेदोऽस्ति). Dharmabhūṣaṇa in his *Nyāyadīpikā* has mentioned : “It has been said by the Svāmī in *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* at the beginning of *Mahābhāṣya*” (तदुक्तं स्वामिभिर्महाभाष्यस्यादावाप्तमीमांसाप्रस्तावे). Laghu Samantabhadra (not Svāmī Samantabhadra), who must have flourished later than Vikrama 12th century (because he makes mention of Vasunandī), also says that *Devāgama* was the *Maṅglāccharaṇa* of *Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya* of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*.<sup>1</sup>

This work is also known as *Devāgama Stotra*, because the first word of its first verse is *Devāgama*. Samanta-bhdara in the last verse of his work says that by the preceding verse he has made *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (Determination of the Trustworthy). So the name *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* came also to

1. “तत्त्वार्थाधिगमस्य मोक्षशास्त्रस्य गन्धहस्त्याख्यं महाभाष्यमुपनिबध्वन्तः...श्रीस्वामिसमन्त-भद्राचार्यास्तत्र किल मंगलपुरःसर-स्तवविषयपरमाप्तगुणातिशयपरीक्षामुपक्षिप्तवन्तो देवगमाभिधास्य प्रवचनतीर्थस्य सृष्टिमापूर्याचक्रिरे।” *Viśamapadatātāparya-ṭikā* by Laghu Samantabhadra on *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

be applied to this collection of one hundred and fourteen verses.

Some commentators of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* accept that the following is the opening verse of the said work :

“मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं भेत्तारं कर्मभूताम् ।

ज्ञातारं विश्वतत्त्वानां वन्दे तद्-गुणलब्धये ॥”

i.e. “I bow to him who is the guide on the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of *karmas* and the knower of the principles of the universe, so that I may attain these qualities<sup>c</sup> belonging to him.”

These commentators urge that at the beginning of the *Mokṣa-śāstra*, i.e., the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, the above mentioned salutation has been laid down. He who is thus saluted is *Āpta*. So Samantabhadra, at the beginning of his commentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, has examined the qualities of *Āpta* in his attempt to explain the opening verse of the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*.

Vidyānandī who wrote a commentary (named *Aṣṭasahasrī*) on *Aṣṭasatī* of Akalaṅka has accepted the fact that the verse मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं is the opening verse of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* and that consequently Samantabhadra has discussed *Āpta* described in the verse. Vidyānandī says: “This work named *Devāgama* has established the *Āpta* which is the subject-matter of praise composed at the beginning of the *Śāstra*, i.e. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. Vidyānandī himself later on clearly mentions : “By that *Āpta* of the most excellent qualities praised by the sages for liberation and auspiciousness at the beginning of *Niḥśreyasa-śāstra*”.<sup>1</sup>

Vidyānandī has again in his *Maṅgalāccharaṇa* to *Aṣṭasahasrī* said : “I am now adoring the work of the determination of the trustworthy (*Āpta-mīmāṃsā*) which is the subject-matter of praise in the beginning of the

1. “तदेवं निःश्रेयस-शास्त्रस्यादौ तन्निबन्धनतया मंगलार्थतया च मुनिभिः संस्तुतेन निरतिशय-गुणेन भगवताप्तेन ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.



*Śāstra (Tattvārtha-sūtra).*"<sup>1</sup> While explaining verse 114 of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, Vidyānanda writes : "This establishment, after examination of the omniscient *Arhat*, is made as he is the same as *Āpta* praised at the beginning of the work as the guide to the path of liberation, the destroyer of mountains of *karmas* and the knower of the principles of universe." The epithets 'the guide to the path of liberation', 'the destroyer of mountains of *karmas*' and 'the knower of the principles of universe'<sup>2</sup> are identical with the disputed opening verse of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* already quoted. In the colophon of his original work *Āpta-parikṣā*, Vidyānanda has accepted the verse as the opening verse of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. In *Āpta-parikṣā*, arguments for establishing the *Āpta*, as based on this verse, are employed, Vidyānanda expressly says in this colophon that Svāmi (Samantabhadra) had made a *Mīmāṃsā* (referring to *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*) of that praise which has been embodied in the beginning of *Tattvārtha-śāstra*.<sup>3</sup>

Some have however expressed the view that above-mentioned situation is no part of *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. J. L. Jaini writes "There is no sufficient reason to hold that these verses were composed by the author of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. In the commentaries on *Tattvārtha-sūtra* such as *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika* by Akalaṅkadeva and *Sarvārtha-sidhhi* by Pūjyapāda, these verses are not found. The last verse (e.g. मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं etc.) appears to be the

1. "शास्त्रावताररचितस्तुतिगोचराप्तमीमांसितं कृतिरलंक्रियते मयाऽस्य ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

2. "शास्त्रारम्भेष्वभिष्टुतस्याप्तस्य मोक्षमार्गप्रणेतृतया कर्मभूभृद्-भेतृतया विश्वतत्त्वानां ज्ञातृतया च भगवदहर्तु-सर्वज्ञस्यैव....व्यवस्थापनपरा परीक्षेयं विहिता ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

3. "श्रीमत्-तत्त्वार्थशास्त्राद्भुत-सलिलविधेरिद्धरत्नोद्भवस्य  
प्रोत्थानारम्भकाले सकलमलभिदे शास्त्रकारैः कृतं यत् ।  
स्तोत्रं तीर्थोपमानं प्रथितपृथुपथं स्वामिमीमांसितं तत्  
विद्यानन्दैः स्वशक्त्या कथमपि कथितं सत्यवाक्यार्थसिद्धयै ॥

इति तत्त्वार्थशास्त्रादौ मुनीन्द्रस्तुतिगोचरा ।

प्रणीताप्तपरीक्षेयं कुविवादनिवृत्तये ।।"

*Āpta-parikṣā*, verses 123, 124.

*Maṅgalācāraṇa* of *Sarvārthasiddhi*.<sup>1</sup> J.L. Jaini also says that *Tattvārtha-sūtra* is written in the form of aphorisms and it is unusual to find a verse at the beginning of any work composed in aphorisms. This objection can be met by showing that there are works written in aphorisms beginning with a verse, for example, *Parikṣāmukha*, a work written in aphorisms by Mānikyanandī, opens with a verse.

In *Aṣṭaśatī*, a commentary on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* also, Akalaṅka has nowhere suggested that Samantabhadra has taken the verse (मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं etc.) as the basis of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*. Akalaṅka simply says “*Devāgama* etc. are written for establishing an examination of the excellence of qualities for the great *Āpta* which is the subject-matter of praise at the beginning of a work for auspiciousness.” Vidyānanda has also written a commentary on *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. This commentary is known as *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika*. In this commentary, however, he has not explained the opening verse (मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं etc.).<sup>2</sup>

In this connection, we may mention that Acharya Jugal Kishore holds the view that from a verse in the *praśasti* of the drama named *Vikrānta-kaurava* as well as the work *Jinendrakalyāṇābhudaya*, it appears that *Gandhahasti-bhāṣya* and *Devāgama* are two different works of Svāmi Samantabhadra.<sup>3</sup> If *Devāgama-stotra* be a part of the *Bhāṣya*, the names of both of these works should not have been mentioned, as the mention of only the *Bhāṣya* would have been quite sufficient. He also says that Vasunandi has written in his *Vṛtti* on verse 114 of

1. *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* edited by J.L. Jaini. Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. II, page 4.

2. The opening verse of *Parikṣāmukha* is :

“प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद् विपर्ययः ।

इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ॥”

3. “तत्त्वार्थसूत्रव्याख्यागन्धहस्ति-प्रवर्तकः ।

स्वामि समन्तभद्रोऽभूद् देवागमनिदेशकः ॥”

*Āpta--mīmāṃsā* that this verse shows the end of the subject.<sup>1</sup> In *Aṣṭa-śati* and *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* also, he says that it is found that Samantabhadra has written the work, completing the same in ten chapters.<sup>2</sup>

The word *Āpta* literally means "he who has attained or achieved". By *Āpta* in *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, *Sarvajña* or the omniscient is meant (आप्तमीमांसा सर्वज्ञविशेष-परीक्षा—*Aṣṭa-śati* and *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*). In Jainism, Kundakunda first mentioned the doctrine of omniscience and was followed in this respect by Umāsvāmī (*Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I, 10, 11, 29). Denial of omniscience is made by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his expositions on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* philosophy. Kumārila's view is that a human being cannot see all things in all places and at all times. There is a limit to human vision or knowledge beyond which these cannot proceed. Things which are beyond the senses cannot be perceived. The proofs (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda-arthāpatti* and *abhāva*) cannot establish omniscience. Those who profess to be omniscients, e.g. Gautama Bhuddha in Buddhism or *Tīrthanīkaras* in Jainism do not agree in their views. So omniscience is an impossibility. As a result, opinion of no human being is to be regarded as infallible. Only Vedic injunctions are infallible and should be followed instead of the injunctions of Buddha or *Tīrthanīkaras*. By performance of sacrifices as prescribed in the *Vedas*, a potential after-state is created which brings all desired fruits (*Śloka-vārtika*, Verse 111 and those following the same).

Kundakunda demonstrated that the help of senses is not required in omniscience. Omniscience is not magnified sense-perception. It is direct experiential knowledge. *Ātmā* and Knowledge are co-extensive and co-existent (*Pravachanasāra*, I, 23). The soul (*Ātmā*) knows itself, other objects than itself, as well as those which result from the combination of soul and matter, physical and karmic (Ibid, I, 36). Owing to knowledge-obscuring *karmas*, the

1. 'शास्त्रार्थोपसंहारकारिका' Vidāyanandī also writes that Samantabhadra herein shows that he has fulfilled his purpose (कृतकृत्यः निर्वृद्धतत्त्वप्रतिज्ञः)

2. "इति स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदविहितेयमाप्तमीमांसा ।" *Aṣṭaśati*

"इति देवागमाख्ये स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदे शास्त्रे विहितेयमाप्तमीमांसा ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.



ability of soul to have knowledge is obscured. When all the four obscuring and obstructive *kārmās* are destroyed, the Soul becomes possessed of omniscience (Ibid, I, 15-16). This knowledge is gained without the aid of sense-organs. It is *atindriya-jñāna*, also known as *ṣṣāyika-jñāna*, because it arises after the *nitānta ṣṣaya* (total destruction) of obscuring and obstructive *kārmās*. The *Kevalins*, *Tīrthanīkaras* and *Siddhas* have this omniscience.

Akalaṅka in his commentary on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (entitled *Aṣṭasatī*) and Vidyānandī in his *Aṣṭasahasrī* refute the arguments of Buddhists and Kumārila.

The time when Svāmī Samantabhadra flourished cannot definitely be ascertained. A discussion on this point has been advanced by Acharya Jugal Kishore in his Introduction to *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakaḥāra*. Samantabhadra flourished after Umāsvāmī or Umāsvāti and Kundakunda and before Pūjyapāda. Umāsvāmī, according to one view, flourished in about Vikrama Saṃvat 281. Samantabhdara's time, according to this calculation, will be about 265 A.D. According to another view, Umāsvāmī flourished in about Vikrama Saṃvat 360 or 362. Samantabhadra's time, according to this calculation, will be about 400 Vikrama Saṃvat (342 A.D.). According to a third view, Umāsvāmī's time is about Vikrama Saṃvat 220. Samantabhadra, in that case, flourished in the second or third century A.D. According to a fourth view, Umāsvāmī lived about Vikram Saṃvat 444. Samantabhadra will then be of the 5th century A.D.

The time of Pūjyapāda is more certain. Dr. Buhler in *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XIV, page 355, has established that Pūjyapāda lived in the fifth century A.D. It has been ascertained that Pūjyapāda lived before 482 A.D. This Pūjyapāda has mentioned Samantabhadra in his work, *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* (Vol. 4, p. 140)—“चतुष्टयं समन्तभद्रस्य”. So it is definite that Samantabhadra lived before 482 A.D.

The view of Lewis Rice, as set forth in his Intrdocution to *Inscriptoins at Śravaṇabelagola* that “Samantabhadra flourished in the first or second century

A.D.", that of Edward P. Rice in his *History of Canarese Literature* (following the Canarese work *Karnāṭaka-Kavi-Charita* by R.S. Narsinhāchārya and the Hindi work *Karnatak Jaina Kavi* by Nathuram Premi) that "Samantabhadra is by Jaina tradition placed in the second century", that of M.S. Ayangar in his *Studies on South Indian Jainism* that "Samantabhadra was the first of a series of celebrated Digambara writers who acquired considerable prominence in the early Rāshtrakūṭa period", and that of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhushana in his *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic* that "Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A.D." have been very ably criticised by Pandit Jugal Kishore. The curious reader may look up the detailed criticism in Pandit Jugal Kishore's Introduction already mentioned.

Kundakunda flourished before Umāsvāmī. The different views about the approximate date of the latter have already been mentioned. Kundakunda's date was before this. A.N. Upādhye has in his Introduction to *Pravachanasāra* has after a very careful discussion on all points, come to the conclusion that "Kundakunda's age lies at the beginning of the Christian era."

The style of writing and the language employed also support the view that the order of sequence was—(1) Kundakunda, (2) Umāsvāmī and (3) Samantabhadra. Kundakunda wrote in Prakrit verses. Earlier works on Jainism were all in Prakrit. The use of Sanskrit language came in later. The form of *Sūtra* was first employed in Sanskrit works and Umāsvāmī's work (*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*) was in the form of aphorisms. Samantabhadra began to write in Sanskrit verses. This use of Sanskrit verse was made by all later writers, though some exception is found in works like *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* by Hemchandra and *Parikṣāmukha* by Māṇikyanandī.

As to the life of Samantabhadra, very little is known. Pandit Jugal Kishore from a line<sup>1</sup> in a manuscript copy of

1. "इति फणिमण्डलालंकारस्य उरगपुत्रधिपसूनोः श्रीस्वामिसमन्तभद्रमुनेः कृतौ आप्तमीमांसायाम् ।"

*Āpta-mīmāṃsā* found in the library of Daurbali Jinadas Shastri of Śravnabelagola has concluded that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler of Urugapur and from the colophon<sup>1</sup> of *Stutividyā* or *Jina-stuti-śatam* or *Jina-śataka* or *Jina-śatakalanākāra* (these are different names of the same work), has mentioned that Śāntivarman was the name of Samantabhadra before he became a saint. In my opinion, subject to correction by any later discovery of trustworthy materials, the line in the manuscript written by an unknown person at an unknown time is no authority for holding that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler of Urugapur. I am also of opinion that from the nature of writings of Samantabhadra, it is very unlikely that he should be the author of a treatise of *Alaṅkāra*, devoting himself to highly artificial poetry. That Narsimha<sup>2</sup>, a commentator of this work or Ajitasena<sup>3</sup> in his *Alaṅkārachintāmaṇi* has mentioned Samantabhadra to be its author, might be due to following a tradition. Such is the case of poet Kālidāsa being considered the author of *Nalodaya*, a highly artificial poem. From comparing the language and the method of writing, it has been established that this *Nalodaya* cannot be the work of the celebrated poet Kālidāsa, the author of *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam*, *Raghuvamśam*, *Meghdūtam* etc. Pandit Jugal Kishore has himself expressed doubt regarding a line<sup>4</sup> referred to by Pandit Banshidhar but which could not, on a reference to him, be substantiated as coming from any authentic source. So it is not justifiable even to discuss the possibility of Śāntivarman being king Śāntivarman of Kadamba dynasty.

Hastimalia (Vikram 14th century) in his *Vikrānta-*

- 
1. "शान्तिवर्मकृतं जिनस्तुतिशतम् ।"
  2. "तार्किकचूडामणि श्रीमत्समन्तभद्राचार्यविरचितम् ।"
  3. "श्रीमत् समन्तभद्राचार्यजिनसेनादिभाषितम् ।  
लक्ष्यमात्रं लिखामि स्वनामसूचितलक्षणम् ।"
  4. "इति फणिमण्डलालंकारस्य उरगपुराधिपसूनुना शान्तिवर्मनामा श्रीसमन्तभद्रेण ।"



*kaurava*<sup>1</sup> and Ayyappārya in his *Jinendra-kalyāṇābhya-daya*<sup>2</sup> have mentioned that Samantabhadra belonged to Mūlasaṅgha.

In the *Jaina Paṭṭāvalis*, in one place Samantabhadra being in the line with Kundakunda, is accepted as belonging to Nandigaṇa or Deśiyagaṇa; while in the *Paṭṭāvali* of Senagaṇa, he is said to belong to this Gaṇa. The four kind of division in *Saṅghas* took place after Akalaṅka. Samantabhadra, who lived long before this, cannot therefore be relegated to a particular *Saṅgha*. In Inscription No. 64 in 'Inscriptions in Sravanabelagoḷa' by Lewis Rice, we find that the line of *Gurus* of Samantabhadra was Bhadrabāhu, Chandragupta, Kundakunda, Umāsvāti alias Gridhrapichcha and Valākapichcha.<sup>3</sup>

According to tradition, Samantabhadra was at one time attacked with a kind of disease known as *Bhasmaka* which causes excessive hunger. According to Āyurveda Śāstra, *vāyu*, *pitta* and *kapha* are the essentials in a human body and when *kapha* (phlegm or saliva) becomes reduced by eating bitter articles and dry rice, *vāyu* and *pitta* increase and hunger, developed to the extreme by *vāyu*, immediately reduces to ashes (*Bhasma*) everything eaten.<sup>4</sup> The only way to cure this disease is to eat in profuse quantity rich food which is also delicious to taste. This being opposed to the vow of a Jaina Saint, Samantabhadra resolved to lay down his life by *Sallekhanā*, as allowed in Jainism. But his preceptor forbade him to have recourse to this action. Samantabhadra, thereupon, laid down the symbols of a

1. "श्रीमूलसंघव्योम्नेन्दुभारते भावितीर्यकृत् ।  
देशे समन्तभद्राख्यौ मुनिर्जीयात् पदद्विकः ॥"
2. "श्रीमूलसंघ व्योम्नेन्दुभारते भावितीर्यकृत् ।  
देशे समन्तभद्राख्यौ जीयात् प्राप्तपदद्विकः ॥"
3. "एवं महाचार्यपरम्परायां स्यात्कारमुद्राकिततत्त्वदीपः ।  
भद्रः समन्ताद्गुणतो गणीशः समन्तभद्रोऽर्जाद्य वादि-सिंहः ॥"
4. "कट्वादिस्नानभुजां नराणां क्षीणे कफे मारुतपित्तवृद्धौ ।  
अतिप्रवृद्धः पवनान्वितोऽग्निर्भुक्तं क्षणाद् भस्म करोति यस्मात् ॥" *Bhāva-prakāśa*.

Digambara saint and adopted at different times dresses and symbols of a hermit of the Śaiva sect, a Buddhist monk or a wandering beggar. He took meals which would cure his disease.<sup>1</sup> He was cured by partaking of large offerings to Śiva in a temple by a king named Śivakoṭi. Śivakoṭi, learning about the extra-ordinary power of Samantabhadra in eating such a large quantity of food as is not possible for an ordinary human being, had the doors of the temple, where Samantabhadra used to take his meals, closed one day. Samantabhadra began to praise the twenty-four *Jinas* and when his praise to Chandraprabhu (the eighth *Tirthankara*) came to be recited, a miracle happened. In place of the *Śiva-linga* which was in the temple, an image of *Tirthankara* Chandraprabhu appeared. Samantabhadra finished the praise of the remaining *Tirthankaras*. The King Śivakoṭi and his brother Śivāyana, seeing this miracle, became Jains, accepting Samantabhadra as their spiritual preceptor.

This traditional account of Samantabhadra's *Bhasmak* disease, his bringing of Chandraprabhu through the *mantra* given to him by divine Padmāvati, is referred to in a verse<sup>2</sup> in an inscription dated Śaka Samvat 1050 known as *Malliṣena-praśasti* (No. 67—*Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola* by Lewis Rice).

In the work *Rājāvali-kathā* in Canarese language and *Ārāḍhanākathākoṣa* in Sanskrit verse by Brahma Nemidatta, following *Ārāḍhanā-sāra* of Prabhāchandra, the substance of the above traditional account is given with some variation in detail as to the places visited by Samantabhadra during his wanderings in different guises.

1. Charaka describes how this strange hunger can be overcome :

“तमेत्यग्निं गुरुस्निग्धशीतमधुरविज्वलैः ।

अन्नमानैर्नयेच्छान्तिं दीप्तमग्निमिवाम्बुभिः ॥”

2. “वंद्यो भस्मकभस्मसातृकृतियहः पद्मावती देवता

दत्तोदात्तमद-स्वमंत्रवचनव्याहृतचन्द्रप्रभः ।

आचार्यस्य समन्तभद्रगणभृद्येहे काले कलौ

जैनं वर्त्म समन्तभद्रमभवद् भद्रं समन्तान्मुहुः ॥”

Edward P. Rice in his *History of Canarese Literature* has mentioned on the basis of *Rājāvali-kathā* : “It is told of him that in early life he (Samantabhadra) performed severe penance and on account of a depressing disease was about to make the vow of *Sallekhanā* or starvation; but was dissuaded by his *Guru* who foresaw that he would be a great pillar of the Jaina faith.”

Nemidatta has quoted two verses said to have been spoken by Samantabhadra to Śivakoṭi. Both of these two verses could not, however be uttered by a Jaina Saint who is absolutely free from any pride or self-aggrandisement. In the first verse, Samantabhadra is made to say : “I was a naked Digambara saint in Kāñchī (Kanjivaram), in Lāmbuśa (this place has not been identified). I had a grey body (being smeared with ashes) in Puṇḍra (Gaṇḍa in Bengal) and Uḍra (Orissa). I was a begging Buddhist monk in the town of Daśapura (Mandasa). I was a wanderer eating sweets. In Bēnares, I was a person performing penance (with ashes on my body)—white like a moon (or white like Śiva). O king! I am a Jaina ascetic. He who has power may hold a discourse with me.”<sup>1</sup> This is supposed to have given the places visited by Samantabhadra while he was ill.

The second verse is copied from that found in an inscription (No. 54 — *Inscriptions at Sravanabelgola*) about a century before Nemidatta's *Ārāadhanā-kathā-koṣa* was compiled. The verse is as follows : “Frist, I beat the drum in the town of Pāṭaliputra (Patna); then I did so in Mālava (Malwā), Sindhu (Indus), Dhakka (not definitely identified—some say a place in Punjab and others say Dacca in Bengal), in Kāñchipura (Kanjivaram) and Vidiśā (Vilsā). O king! I have now come to Kaṇṇāṭaka (Kanhada

1. “कांच्यां नगनाटकोऽहं मलमलिनतर्नुलाम्बुशे पाण्डुपिण्डः

पुण्डोद्रे शाक्यभिक्षुर्दशपुरनगरे मिष्टभोजी परिव्राट् ।

वाराणस्यामभूवं शशिधरधवलः पांडुरांगस्तपस्वी

राजन् यस्यास्ति शक्तिः स वंदतु पुरतो जैननिर्ग्रन्थवादी ।।”

or Canara) full of heroes and learned men; and I am moving about like a tiger for discourse.”<sup>1</sup>

Edward P. Rice says : “He (Samatabhadra) was a brilliant disputant and a great preacher of the Jaina religion throughout India. ...It was the custom in those days, alluded to by Fa Hian (400) and Hiun Sang (630), for a drum to be fixed in a public place in the city and any learned man, wishing to propogate a doctrine or prove his erudition and skill in debate, would strike it by way of challenge or disputation. ...Samantabhadra made full use of this custom and powerfully maintained the Jaina doctrine of *Syādvāda*”. M.S. Rāmsvāmi Ayangar in his ‘*Studies in South Indian Jainism*’ has also mentioned : “It is evident that he (Samantabhadra) was a great Jaina missionary who tried to spread far and wide Jaina doctrines and morals; and that he met with no opposition from other sects, wherever he went.” Though, in our opinion, Samatabhadra himself could not have made a boast of his prowess, as alleged by Nemidatta, we have no hesitation to accept that he preached and propogated the principles of Jainism by visiting many places throughout India. That he defeated those who came to discuss with him, is established by numerous references in Jaina works and Inscriptions.<sup>2</sup>

Nothing more in detail has yet been ascertained regarding the life of Samantabhadra.

1. “पूर्व पाटलिपुत्रमध्यनगरे भेरी मया ताडिता  
पश्चान्मालवसिन्धुद्वक्कविषये काञ्चीपुरे वैदिशे ।  
प्राप्तोऽहं करहाटकं बहुभटं विद्योत्कटं संकटं  
वादार्थी विचराम्यहं नरपत्ने शार्दूलविक्रीडितम् ॥”

The metre of this verse in Sanskrit prosody is known as *Śārdūlavikrīḍita* (शार्दूलविक्रीडित). So the last word is significant in conveying a double sense.

2. “यद्वचोवज्रपातेन निर्भिन्नाः कुमताद्रयः ।” *Ādipurāṇa* by Jinasena.  
“कुवादिविद्याजयलब्धकीर्तयः ।” *Varāṅgacharita* by Vardhamāna-sūri.  
“दुर्वादिववादकंङ्नां शमनैकमनौषधिः ।” *Hanumachcharita* by Brahma Ajit.  
“जयन्ति वाग्वज्रनिपातपाटितप्रतीपराद्धान्तमहीध्रकोटयः ।” *Gadya-chintāmaṇi*

by Vāḍibha Siṃha

Other works of Samantabhadra are *Yuktyanusāsana* (a commentary on it by Vidyānandī has been found), *Svayambhū-stotra* (with a commentary by Prabhāchandra), *Stutividyā* or *Jinastutiśatam* or *Jinaśatakam* or *Jinaśatakālankāra* (with commentary by Narsimha) and *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākāchāra*.

There are inferences that there were other works of Samantabhadra such as *Jīva-siddhi*, *Tattvānuśāsana*, a Prakrit Grammar, *Pramāṇapadārtha*, a commentary on *Karma-prābhṛta* and *Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya*. Though references to these works are found in works of Jaina writers of a very late date, nothing definite can be said unless manuscripts of these are discovered.

In presenting an exposition by an original commentary in English of this abstruse work of Samantabhadra, I am fully aware of my short-comings to do full justice to this most difficult task. I have lost the help of Jainadharmabhūṣaṇa Brahmachari Shital Prasad at whose earnest desire, my friend Pandit Ajit Prasad, M.A., LL.B. asked me to take up this work. Brahmachariji was from the start of this series, entitled the 'Sacred Books of the Jainas', devoted his heart and soul to the undertaking. His was a noble soul devoted entirely to the propagation of Jainism. Not daunted by his failing health, he was always, even on a sick-bed, eager to clear all doubtful points. And it is with the saddest heart that I now bring before the public my own endeavours, unassisted by the deep erudition of the departed scholar. By dedicating this work to his loving memory, I have but feebly expressed the thoughts that

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“यदीयवाग्वज्रकठोरपातश्चूर्णीचकार प्रतिवादिशैलान् ।”

(Inscription no. 258, Śāka Samvat 1355, *Inscriptions at Sravana-belagola*)

“अवदुततमटति झटिति स्फुटपटुवाचाटधूर्जटेरपि जिह्वा ।

वादिनि समन्तभद्रे स्थितवति तव सदसि भूप कास्थान्येषाम् ।।”

*Malliseṇa-praśasti* (Inscription No. 67, Śāka Samvat 1050, *Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola*).

pass my mind. The co-operators of this Series have, one after another, left this world and no words can describe the void which they have created. Prof. Hermann Jacobi, Kumar Devendra Prasad, J.L. Jaini, C.R. Jain, Mahāmahopādhyāya S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Puranchand Nahar, Pannalal Paliwal—to speak about a few of the leading helpers—have all gone away. Only Pandit Ajit Prasad<sup>1</sup> remains and may he live long to bear the torch illuminating Jainism. In the twilight of my own life, in which ill-health and bereavements are casting their shadows, I am not sure whether I shall appear any more before the readers, bringing out any subsequent volume. But I sincerely believe that more capable hands of an ever-increasing band of competent scholars would take up the standard and bring out to the world the unique doctrines of *Syādvāda*, the most wonderful tenet of Jainism, which is sure to find out its proper place amongst the philosophical doctrines of the world.

June, 1944  
Cooch Behar

—S. C. Ghoshal

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1. Pandit Ajit Prasad died on September 17, 1951

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# Chapter I

देवागम-नभोयान-चामरादि विभूतयः ।

मायाविष्वपि दृश्यन्ते नातस्त्वमसि नो महान् ॥१॥

devāgama-nabhoyāna-chāmarādi-vibhūtayāḥ,  
māyāviṣvapi dṛśyante nātas-tvamasi no mahān.

Coming down of heavenly beings, movements in sky, waving of whisks and other symbols of majesty (of a *Tirthaṅkara*) are seen even in magicians. You are not our worshipful lord because of these things.

## COMMENTARY

According to the Jaina view heavenly beings come down on earth on special occasions in the life of a *Tirthaṅkara*.<sup>1</sup> These occasions are: conception, birth, adoption of ascetic vows, attainment of perfect knowledge and liberation. A *Tirthaṅkara* has eight symbols of majesty (*prātihāryas*), viz.,<sup>2</sup> Aśoka tree, throne, the triple canopy, halo of glory, divine discourse, shower of flowers, waving of sixtyfour flywhisks and heavenly music. The *Tirthaṅkaras*, it is said, move in the sky, on golden lotuses.<sup>3</sup> It is mentioned in this verse that these should not be accepted as essentials of *Āpta*, for magicians might show these to the people and deceive them.

Vasunandī in his *Vṛtti* writes : “Āchārya Samantabhadra might have seen the omniscient and spoken thus : ‘O Lord! praise means the recital of greatness, but your greatness being not cognizable by senses, is beyond my perception. So, how can I praise

1. “स्वर्गावतरण-जन्मनिष्क्रमणकेवलज्ञानोत्पत्तिमुक्तिगमनस्थानेषु आगमनं आगमः अवतारः ।”  
*Vṛtti* by Vasunandī

2. “आदि-शब्देन अशोकवृक्षसुरदुन्दुभिसिंहासनादीनि परिगृह्यन्ते ।” Vasunandī.

3. “नभसि गगने हेममयाम्भोजोपरि यानं नभोयानम् ।” Vasunandī.

you?' The Lord might have replied: 'My son! as others praise me understanding my greatness through advent of *devas* etc., why do you not adopt the same policy?' In reply Samantabhadra urges in this verse that 'Such things can be shown even by magicians deceiving our senses. So these cannot be the reasons for which you are the greatest of the great for us.'<sup>1</sup>

The practices of magicians showing heavenly beings are mentioned in Hindu, Jain and Buddhist works of ancient India. In Act IV of *Ratnāvalī*, a Drama by Śrīharṣa, a magician flourishing a fan of peacock feather, tells the king, "I shall show the gods like Hari, Hara, Brahmā etc. and the wives of *siddhas*, *chāraṇas* and *suras* dancing in the sky."<sup>2</sup>

Then he shows his feats. All present look up with wonder. The king, leaving his throne, exclaims, "Wonder, wonder. See, queen! this is Brahmā on the lotus. This is Śaṅkara adorned on the forehead by the crescent of the moon. This is Viṣṇu, the killer of the Demons, bearing a bow, a sword, a mace and a discus in his hands. This is Indra, on the elephant, Airāvata. The other Gods are (also) here. The celestial nymphs are dancing in the sky with anklets ringing on their moving feet."<sup>3</sup>

In the Prakrit drama, *Karpūra-mañjarī* of Rāja-śekhara, Bhairavānanda tells the king, "I shall show the moon

1. "श्रीसमन्तभद्राचार्यः सर्वज्ञं प्रत्यक्षीकृत्यैवमाचष्टे, हे भट्टारक, संस्तवो नाम माहात्मस्याधिक्यकथनम्। त्वदीयं च माहात्म्यमतीन्द्रियं मम प्रत्यक्षगोचरम्। अतः कथं मया स्तूयसे? अत आह भगवान्, ननु भो वत्स, यथाऽन्ये देवागमादिहेतोर्मम माहात्म्यवबुध्य स्तवं कुर्वन्ति तथा त्वं किमिति न कुरुषे? अत आह अस्माद्धेतोर्न महान् भवान् मां प्रति, व्यभिचारित्वादस्य हेतोः, इति व्यभिचारं दर्शयति।" Vasunandī.
2. "ऐन्द्रजालिकः। (पिच्छिकां भ्रमयन्) हरिहरब्रह्मणमुहं देवं दंसेमि देवराजं च। गगणे वि सिद्धचारणसुरबहुसत्त्वं च णच्चतं॥" *Ratnāvalī*, Act IV.
3. "सर्वे सविस्मयं पश्यन्ति। राजा (ऊर्ध्वं दृष्ट्वा आसनादवतरन्) : आश्चर्यम्, आश्चर्यम्। देवि, पश्य, एष ब्रह्मा सरोजे रजनिकरकलाशेखरः शंकरोऽयं दोर्भिर्द्वैत्यान्तकोऽसौ सधनुरसिगदाचक्रचिह्नैश्चतुर्भिः। एषोऽप्यैरावतस्थस्त्रिदशपतिरमी देवि देवास्तथान्ये नृत्यन्ति व्योम्नि चैताश्चलचरणरणनूपुरा दिव्यनार्यः॥" *Ratnāvalī*, Act IV.

which has descended to the earth. I shall stop the sun half way in the sky. I shall bring the wives of the Yakṣas, the Suras and the Siddhas. There is nothing in this world which I cannot do. So tell me what I shall do.”<sup>1</sup>

In all ancient works, a *maṅgalācaraṇa* is written at the very beginning. The object of the work is next explained. Prabhācandra in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa* had quoted the following verses to prove the importance of setting out the purpose of a work :

“At the beginning of every *śāstra*, the object with its connection should be mentioned, for a listener pays attention to only a definite subject and things connected with the same. Who will pay attention to a treatise or do any kind of work till its necessity is patent? That *śāstra* for which no necessity is explained is not desired by the wise. So at the outset, the necessity is to be explained.”<sup>2</sup>

Akalaṅka says that both *maṅgalācaraṇa* and the setting out of the purpose have been mentioned in the first verse. The praise of the omniscient in an attempt to examine his characteristics is the *maṅgalācaraṇa*. The necessity of the work is also indicated by laying down that it is characterised by faith (*śraddhā*) and knowledge of the qualities (*guṇajñatā*)<sup>3</sup>. *Śraddhā* and *guṇajñatā* have been

1. “दंसेमि तं पि ससिणं वसुहावतिष्णं  
यंभेमि तस्सवि रविस्स रहं णहद्धे ।  
आणेमि जक्खसुरसिद्धगणंगणाओ  
तं णत्थि भूमिवलए मह जं ण सज्जं॥  
ता भण किं करीअदु ।” *Karpūra-maṅjari*, ‘Yavanikāntara’ I.
2. “सिद्धार्थं ज्ञातसम्बन्धं श्रोता श्रोतुं प्रवर्तते ।  
शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥”  
“सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्यचित् ।  
यावत् प्रयोजनं नोक्तं तावत् तत् केन गृह्यताम् ॥”  
“अनिर्दिष्टफलं सर्वं न प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिः ।  
शास्त्रमाद्रियते तेन वाच्यमग्रे प्रयोजनम् ॥” *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*.  
The first and the second verses are written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and form verses 17 and 12 of his *Śloka-vārtika*, I.1.1.
3. “देवागमेत्यादिमंगलपुरःसर-स्तवविषयपरमाप्तगुणातिशयपरीक्षामुपक्षिपतैव स्वयं  
श्रद्धागुणज्ञतालक्षणं प्रयोजनमाक्षिप्तं लक्ष्यते, तदन्यतरापायेऽर्थस्थानुपपत्तेः ।” *Aṣṭaśatī*.

explained as *darśana* or faith arising out of knowledge following the examination of Jaina *Nayavāda* and *Syādvāda*. By establishing the omniscient in this work, a sound foundation will be laid for faith.

अध्यात्मं बहिरप्येष विग्रहादिमहोदयः ।

दिव्यः सत्यो दिवौकस्स्वप्यस्ति रागादिमत्सु सः ॥२॥

**adhyātmam bahirapyeṣa vigrahādi-mahodayaḥ,  
divyaḥ satyo divaukas-svapyasti rāgādimatsu saḥ.**

2. External physical excellence and internal good qualities, wonderful yet true, are found even in heavenly souls who are full of attachment (*rāga* etc.)

### COMMENTARY

In the first verse it has been mentioned that omniscience is not established from advent of celestical beings on the occasions of birth etc. of a Tirthankara or from other marks of glory like movement in the sky or possession of various symbols of majesty. Magicians can show such tricks. Owing to the possibility of our having a false sight of these in magic, we cannot say that

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Mahāmahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya Gaṇi in his commentary on *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* has written, “*śraddhā* and *guṇajñātā* are called *darśana*. These are kinds of knowledge to examine *Naya* and *Syādvāda*.” (श्रद्धागुणज्ञते नयस्याद्वाद-परीक्षाजन्यज्ञानविशेषौ दर्शनशब्दवाच्यौ ।) He has quoted the following verse from *Sanmati-prakarana*:

“एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्दहमाणस्स भावओ भाणे ।

पुरिसस्साभिणिवोहे दंसणसद्दो हुवइ जुत्तो ॥”

“the word *darśana* (faith) is fit to be applied in *abhinibodha* (*mati-jñāna*), i.e., knowledge derived from the *bhāvas* of a man having belief in the things laid down by the Jina.”

Pandit Bansidhar has explained *śraddhā* as “great attachment to the knowledge that this is to be revered, (प्रेरकत्वं वाराध्यत्वेन ज्ञानं भक्तिस्तत्रात्यन्तम- नुरागः श्रद्धा ।)

The interpretation of Mahāmahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya seems to be more apt.

these establish the omniscient.

In the present verse, it is urged that there might be things not false which are present internally and externally in a being and these might establish the omniscient. For instance it might be said that lustre or absence of hunger, thirst, old age, death, sweats a shadow, in bodies of celestial beings are not false signs like those shown by magicians, but those really exist. But the author says that though these might exist in the dwellers of heaven, such appearances do not establish omniscience, for such celestial beings are subject to passions (*kaṣāya*), anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*) from which the omniscient is entirely free.

According to the Jain doctrine *jīvās* are of various kinds. Among these are celestial beings, human beings, sub-human beings and dwellers in hell. The celestial beings are of four kinds, residential (*Bhavana-vāsin*), peripatetic (*Vyantara*), stellar (*Jyotiṣka*) and heavenly (*Vaimānika*).<sup>1</sup> These celestial beings have internal qualities, viz., freedom from sweat etc. and external qualities, viz, emitting sweet scent<sup>2</sup>. It is said that though magicians can show false images of heavenly beings, these characteristics will be absent in such false sights. Those who practise Yoga say that the test of finding whether the sights of Gods and Goddesses are real is to look for such characteristics, because a magician will not be able to reproduce these in a false show of celestial beings.

It might be urged, that as magicians fail to show these, the same are neither false nor mundane. So we should accept these as identifying essentials of the omniscient.<sup>3</sup> To this, a reply is given that it cannot be so, for the omniscient is free from *ghātiya karmas*, but the celestial beings who possess similar specialities are not free from these, as

1. "देवाश्चतुर्णिकायाः ।" *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, IV.1.

2. "आत्मानमधिश्चित्य वर्तमानोऽध्यात्ममन्तरंगो विग्रहादिमहोदयः शश्वन्निःस्वेदत्वादिः परानमेक्षत्वात्, ततो बहिर्गन्धोदकवृष्ट्यादिर्बहिर्गो देवोपनीतत्वात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasri*.

3. "स च सत्यो मायाविष्वसत्त्वात् । दिव्यश्च मनुजेन्द्राणामप्यभावात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasri*.

they are possessed of the four kinds of passions, viz, anger, pride, deceit and greed.<sup>1</sup>

Akalaṅka, therefore, says, “the internal and external excellence of bodies etc., though not found in shows of magicians, cannot be accepted as proving the omniscient, for these are seen in celestial beings whose passions have not disappeared. So, you are not praised as our Lord even for this.”<sup>2</sup>

According to Jaina doctrine, “condition of existence (*gati*) is the state (of a soul) brought about by the operation of the body-condition-making (*gati-nāma-karma*) or it is the cause of the soul’s passing in either of the four conditions of existence. The four kinds of the conditions of existence are : Hellish (*Nāraka*), Sub-human (*Tiryancha*), Human (*Manuṣya*), Celestial (*Deva*).”<sup>3</sup>

“*Devas* (celestials) are so called because they always amuse themselves with their eight heavenly acquisitions and have shining heavenly constitutions.”<sup>4</sup>

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1. अथ यादृशः घातिक्षयजः स भगवति, न तादृशो देवेषु येन अनैकान्तिकः स्यात् ।” *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*.

From one point of view *karmas* are subdivided into two classes, *ghāti* (destructive) and *aghāti* (non-destructive) : “ताणं पुण घादिति अघादिति य होंति सण्णाओ ।” (*Gommaṭasāra, Karma-kāṇḍa*, verse 7). By *ghāti karmas*, perfect knowledge, perfect conation, infinite power, purified right belief, purified qualities (as conduct, charity etc.), sensitive (knowledge) and other subsidential thought-activities are destroyed, *vide*:

“केवलणाणं दंसणमणंतविरियं च खयियसम्मं च ।

खयियगुणे मदियादी खओवसमिए य घादी दु ॥”

*Gommaṭasāra, Karma-kāṇḍa*, verse 10.

2. “बहिरन्तःशरीरादिमहोदयोऽपि पूरणादिष्वसम्भवी व्यभिचारी स्वर्गिषु भावादक्षीणकषायेषु । ततोऽपि न भवान् परमात्मेति स्तूयते ।” *Aṣṭa-śatī*.
3. “गइउदयजपज्जाया चउगइगमणस्स हेउ वा हु गई ।  
णारयतिरिक्खमाणुसदेवगइत्ति य हवे चदुधा ॥”

*Gommaṭasāra, Jīva-kāṇḍa*, verse 146.

“नारकतैर्यग्योनमानुषदैवानि ।” *Tattvārthādhiḡama-sūtra*, VIII, Verse 10.

4. “दीव्यंति जदो णिच्चं गुणेहिं अट्ठेहिं दिव्वभावेहिं ॥  
भासंतदिव्वकाया तम्हा ते वण्णिया देवा ॥” *Ibid*, verse 151.



It is said that the celestials have eight acquisitions which become their nature. These are: *aṇiman* (the power to make their bodies small), *mahiman* (the power to extend their bodies), *laghiman* (the power to make their bodies light), *gariman* (the power to make their bodies heavy), *sakāma-rūpita* (the power to adopt any form and any number of bodies at one time), *vaśitva* (the power to subjugate others), *īśitva* (the power by which they can exhibit superiority) and *prākāmya* (the power to act as they desire).<sup>1</sup>

According to Yoga philosophy also *Aṇiman*, *Laghiman*, *mahiman*, *prāpti*, *prākāmya*, *vaśitva*, *īśitva* and *yatra-kāmāvasāyitva* can be attained by practising Yoga.<sup>2</sup> According to this view even human beings can attain such power by Yogic practices.

According to Jainism, in case of liberated souls (Siddhas), *karmas* disappear altogether and that stage is higher than that of the celestial beings. The omniscient (*Kevalin*) also is in higher state. So the excellent qualities of celestial beings are not accepted in this verse as characteristics of the omniscient.

Both in the Hindu and Jain philosophies occult powers are not the highest goal to be achieved by souls. In all such philosophies it is accepted that such powers naturally come at a particular state of development and are often a source of obstruction to future development, by causing a feeling of arrogance to arise in the mind of the possessor. The souls who disregard such powers,

1. The 'Sacred Books of the Jainas', vol. V. (*Gommaṭasāra*, *Jīva-kāṇḍa*), page 100.

2. "ततोऽणिमादि-प्रादुर्भावः कायसंपत्तद्धर्मानभिघातश्च ।" *Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra*, *Vibhūtipāda*, aphorism 46.

In Hindu philosophy *aṇimā*, *laghimā*, *īśitva*, *prākāmya* and *vaśitva* mean the same as explained in the Jaina doctrine as mentioned above. *Garimā* and *mahimā* are taken to be synonymous in philosophy meaning the same as *mahimā* in Jaina philosophy. *Yatra-kāmāvasāyitva* means infallibility of their wishes and *prāpti* is the power to attain a thing which is at a distance.

advance to further stages of development. These powers are, therefore, not accepted in establishing the existence of the omniscient for such powers are found in souls in much lower stages of development.<sup>1</sup>

तीर्थकृत्समयानां च परस्पर-विरोधतः ।

सर्वेषामाप्तता नास्ति कश्चिदेव भवेद् गुरुः ॥३॥

**tīrthakṛt-samayānām cha paraspara-virodhataḥ,  
sarveṣāmāptatā nāsti kaśchideva bhaved guruḥ.**

3. Trustworthiness of everyone cannot be accepted, as the doctrines of *Tīrthakṛts* are contradictory to one another. Only one of them can be accepted as the Lord

### COMMENTARY

*Tīrthakṛt* is one who prescribes means for escape from *saṁsāra* (worldly existence). If it be urged that the omniscient is established from the qualification of his being a *Tīrthakṛt* (advisor of escaping from mundane existence), we might reply that though this quality is

1. It may not be out of place to cite here an instance how a false sight of God can be shown to people even in modern age of civilization. In the diary of Kuladānanda Brahmachārī, dated the 19th April 1891, the following incident in the life of his preceptor Āchārya Bijoykṛiṣṇa Gosvāmī is mentioned. On the above date the Āchārya himself spoke about this incident to his disciple. One day in Brindāvan, a *Sādhu* told the Āchārya that he will show him the image of Viṣṇu. The Āchārya was asked to sit fixing his gaze on a room in front of him. The *Sādhu* sat near him and began to recite a *mantra*. A little after the Āchārya saw a figure of Viṣṇu. The body had four arms but had not the usual conch, discus, mace and lotus respectively in the arms. The Āchārya became suspicious and began to recite *mantras*. The image began to tremble and was soon transformed into the horrible form of an evil spirit. Mentioning this incident, the Āchārya told his disciple that evil spirits can assume forms of gods and goddesses but cannot assume the peculiar symbols of the latter. (*Sree Sree Sadgurusāṅga*, Vol. III, pages 11-13). Instances of spirits assuming forms of departed persons are mentioned in works describing seances.

absent in celestial beings like Indra etc., it is found in Buddha and others.<sup>1</sup> In the second verse, it has been mentioned that excellence of heavenly bodies of celestial beings does not constitute the essential of the omniscient. It may be urged : “Be it so. But we might say that celestial beings are not *Tirthakṛts*. We may hold that a *Tirthakṛt* is the omniscient; holding this as the distinctive feature of the omniscient.” To this the reply is, that this cannot be accepted, for there are many who are accepted as *Tirthakṛts*. Buddha, Kapila and others are known as *Tirthakṛts* from *śāstras*. So if we accept this view Buddha, Kapila and others will be the Lord of the Jains and so will deserve praise.<sup>2</sup>

If we might say, what is the harm in holding that all these *Tirthakṛts*, Buddha, Kapila etc. are omniscient as well, as accepted by the Jains. The reply to this is that all these lay down different doctrines contradictory to one another. If they were all omniscient they could not have laid down contradictory doctrines.<sup>3</sup> In other words all the founders of different religions cannot be held to be trustworthy because they contradict one another. So it is urged that only one of them can claim to be the best and most reliable.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has refuted in his commentary on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, the view of Samantabhadra that there is an omniscient being as laid down in *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*. Kumārila is the author of commentaries *Śloka-vārtika*, *Tantra-vārtika* and *Tup-ṭikā* which expound the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini. The *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy has also been expounded by Prabhākara. The views of Prabhākara and Kumārila are different at many points. The views of Prabhākara are also known as the views of the Guru and the same as those of Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa. Akalaṅka

1. “न हि तीर्थकरत्वमाप्ततां साधयति, शक्रादिष्वसम्भवि, सुगतादौ दर्शनात् ।” *Aṣṭaśati*.

2. “यथैव हि भगवति तीर्थकरत्वसमयोऽस्ति तथा सुगतादिष्वपि । सुगतस्तीर्थकरः कपिलस्तीर्थकर इत्यादिसमयाः सन्ति इति सर्वे महान्तः स्तुत्याः स्युः ।” *Aṣṭasahasri*.

3. “न च सर्वे सर्वदर्शिणः परस्परविरुद्धसमयाभिधायिनः ।” *Aṣṭaśati*.

in his *Aṣṭa-śatī* on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* has not replied to the criticisms of Kumārila regarding Samantabhadra's establishing the omniscient, but Vidyānandi in his *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* has attempted a refutation of the views of Kumārila. For this reason, western scholars hold that Kumārila was later than Akalaṅka but prior to Vidyānandi.<sup>1</sup>

Kumārila says "If Buddha be omniscient, why cannot there be correct knowledge that Kapila also is omniscient? If both of them be accepted as omniscient, why are there differences of opinion between them?"<sup>2</sup>

So, we might hold that being a *Tīrthakara* does not establish the greatness of any one. Accordingly, we might hold that none is omniscient.<sup>3</sup>

Kumārila says that it is well-known that people desirous of welfare, gain the same from the *Vedas*. There is no necessity of praising any being as omniscient.<sup>4</sup>

Vidyānandi says that the present verse can be interpreted in another way as refuting the views of such

1. "Kumārila's date is determinable within definite limits; he used the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari; neither Hiuen-Tsang nor I-tsing mentions him; he was before Śaṅkara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, but is not answered by Akalaṅka in his *Aṣṭa-śatī* which comments on the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyānandi and Prabhāchandra who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyānandi assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakīrti and Prabhākara, on the latter point arguing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit of date is, therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Śaṅkara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the Śaṅkaravijaya of Mādhava and the pseudo-Ānandagiri, would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer." *The Karma-mīmāṃsā* by A.B. Keith, pages 10-11.
2. "सुगतौ यदि सर्वज्ञौ कपिलो नेति का प्रमा। तावुभौ यदि सर्वज्ञौ मतभेदः कथं तयोः।" Verse quoted in *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
3. "तीर्थकरत्वाख्यो न कस्यचिन्महत्त्वं साधयतीति कश्चिदेव गुरुर्महान् भवेत्? नैव भवेदित्यायातम्।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
4. "अतएव न कश्चित् पुरुषः सर्वज्ञः स्तुत्यः। श्रेयोऽर्थिनां श्रुतेरेव श्रेयःसाधनोपदेश-प्रसिद्धेरित्यपरः।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*. (By *apara*, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is meant.)

persons like Kumārila who deny the existence of the omniscient. According to this interpretation 'tirthakṛt' would mean "those who destroy the Tirtha, i.e. the omniscient" and would specially refer to the Mimāṃsakas who refute the existence of the omniscient. 'Tirthakṛt-samaya' would mean the different views of such deniers of the omniscient: for example, some hold that *bhāvanā* results from Vedic injunctions, while others urge that *niyoga* is signified from such injunctions. Owing to this difference of opinions none of these views can be tenable.<sup>1</sup> In other words, as the Mimāṃsakas hold different views, none of them can be accepted as reliable.

दोषावरणयोर्हानिर्निःशेषाऽस्त्यतिशयनात् ।

क्वचिद्यथा स्वहेतुभ्यो बहिरन्तर्मलक्षयः ॥4॥

doṣāvaraṇayorhānir niḥśeṣāstyatisāyanāt,

kvachid yathā svahetubhyo bahirantar-malakṣayaḥ.

4. As from causes belonging to itself, destruction of external and internal impurities (takes place), so in some

1. "तं प्रत्यपीयमेव कारिका योज्या । तीर्थं कृन्तन्तीति तीर्थकृतो मीमांसकाः सर्वज्ञागमनिराकरणवादित्वात् । तेषां समयास्तीर्थकृतसमयास्तीर्थच्छेदसम्प्रदाया भावनादिवाक्यार्थप्रवादा इत्यर्थः । तेषां च परस्परविरोधादाप्तता संवादकता नास्तीति कश्चिदेव सम्प्रदायो भवेद् गुरुः संवादको नैव भवेदिति व्याख्यानात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

Vasunandi also writes in his *Vṛtti* :

"तीर्थं सर्वज्ञं कृन्तन्ति छिन्दन्ति इति तीर्थकृतः समया आम्नायाः सम्प्रदाया येषां ते तीर्थकृत-समयाः, तेषाम् अन्योन्यविरोधात् । सर्वं निरवशेषमवगतं अगम्यावगमनं वा इच्छन्ति अभ्युपगच्छन्ति इति सर्वेषः । तेषां सर्वेषाम् आप्तता परमार्थवादित्वं नास्ति न विद्यते । अतः कः आत्मजीवः निश्चेतनोऽचेतनो भवत्येव । एवकारः अवधारणार्थः । भवं संसारं यान्ति गच्छन्ति इति भवेतः तेषां भवेतां शंखचक्रधरादीनामित्यर्थः । गुरुर्नाथः । भवेद् गुरुः भवेतां गुरुः । न च लब्धात्मस्वरूपाणाम् । किमुक्तं भवति—तीर्थकृच्छेदकाम्नायानामपि सर्वमेकेन प्रमाणेन षड्भिरभ्युपगच्छताम् आप्तता नास्ति परस्परविरोधात् । अतो यतिपतिरेव स्यान्नान्यः ।" The interpretation of *sarveṣām* and *bhaved* by subtle derivation in the *vṛtti* appears to be far-fetched. It is said that by *sarveṣām* it is meant those who wish to understand everything and *bhaved guruḥ* means Lord Indra etc. who come to *samsāra*.

(soul) owing to a particular excellence, destruction of faults and impediments happens (takes place).

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, it is mentioned that though all *Tīrthankaras* cannot be trustworthy as urged in the previous verse, it is quite possible that in some souls, a particular stage of development produces excellence which destroys the *doṣas* (faults) and *āvaraṇas* (obstructions). This is like the purifying of a piece of metal like gold which might have external impurities like mud etc. attached to it and internal impurities like alloy mixed with the same. By washing or scouring we can do away with the external impurities and by melting we can destroy the alloy bringing out the pure gold. In a soul also *karmas* internally obstruct right faith or right knowledge and externally produce faults like attachment, *moha*, ignorance etc. When these *karmas* are destroyed, the soul becomes pure and fit for omniscience.<sup>1</sup>

According to Jainism, "the union of soul with matter results in the generation of different kinds of forces, some of which are obstructive of the pure natural functions of spirit..... The soul is subject to the following eight kinds of forces: (1) *Jñānāvaraṇīya* (the knowledge-obstructing), (2) *Darśanāvaraṇīya* (the perception-obstructing), (3) *Vedanīya* (which regulates the experiences of pleasure and pain), (4) *Mohanīya* which is of two kinds (a) *Darśana-mohanīya* (which stands in the way of the adoption of the right faith) and (b) *Chāritra-mohanīya* (which prevents one from following the right path in practice), (5) *Āyuh* (the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body), (6) *Nāma* (the group of forces which organize the

1. "एतदुक्तं भवति। कस्मिंश्चिदतिशायनाद्दोषावरणयोर्हानिरस्ति। यथा धातुपाषाणस्य अन्तर्मलक्षयः। स कश्चिद् भवत्येव गुरुरिति संबन्धः। एकत्र स्वहेतवः सम्यग्दर्शनादयः। अन्यत्र पिण्डीबन्धन-प्रयोगादयः। तथा एकत्र बहिर्मलः शरीरेन्द्रियादिकम्। अन्तर्मलः कर्म। अन्यत्र बहिर्मलः किटुकादिकम्। अन्तर्मलः कालिमादि।" Vasunandi.

body and its limbs), (7) *Gotra* (which attracts the soul into a new 'womb' upon which depends the *Gotra*, i.e., family or lineage of the individual) and (8) *Antarāya* (which prevents effectiveness and interferes with energy in general). Every unredeemed soul is under the sway of the above mentioned forces. ...Of these the first, second, fourth and eighth kind of forces are called *ghātiya* (destructive) because they stand in the way of the soul... They have to be overpowered before the desired perfection can be attained by the soul."<sup>1</sup>

"As regards the scientific nature of this enumeration, observation shows that the soul involved in the cycle of transmigration is unable to enjoy its natural perfection in respect of knowledge, perception and happiness, which therefore must be held in abeyance by some kind of force operating on it. We thus get three different kinds of forces, namely, (1) those which obstruct knowledge (*Jñānāvaraṇīya*), (2) those that interfere with perception and (3) those which stand in the way of happiness, leaving the soul to experience pleasure and pain through the senses (*Vedanīya*). Besides these, observation also proves the existence of another kind of force which does not permit the adoption of the Right Faith. The energies falling under this head are divisible into two classes: those which interfere with the very acquisition of faith, and those that offer opposition to its being put into practice. To the former class belong such forces as prejudice, bigotry, false belief and all those other kinds of mental energy, passions and emotions of the worst (*anantānubandhī*) type, whose uncontrolled and uncontrollable impetuosity deprives one of the full and proper exercise of the faculty of reflection, the most essential requisite for the discernment of truth; in the latter type, fall all those deep-rooted traits of mind, anger, pride, deceit and greed of different degrees of intensity other than the *anantānubandhī* already referred to which rob the mind of determination and serenity,

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1. *The Householder's Dharma* by C.R. Jain, pages XXXVI-XL.

and prevent concentration of attention, also certain minor faults, such as joking, attachment and the like, and bodily habits and propensities (e.g., laziness) which are prejudicial to an attitude of self-control. Thus the fourth kind of force consists of two distinct types, namely (1) *Darśanāvaraṇīya* which does not allow one to adopt the right faith, and (2) *Chāritra-mohanīya* which acts as an obstacle on the practical side of *Dharma* (religion).

“Apart from the above, we must allot separate places to the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body (*Āyuh-karma*) and to the energies responsible for the making of that body and its limits (*Nāma-karma*). The status, descent, lineage and the like of the soul, which really depends on the ‘womb’ into which it is attracted by the operation of the forces of chemical affinity and magnetism residing in its two inner bodies, the *Kārmaṇa* and the *Taijasa*, is also the outcome of a distinct type of energy, which is for that reason, to be treated as a class by itself (*Gotra-karma*). Lastly, we also notice that souls differ from one another in respect of physical prowess and the power to do or achieve what is desirable and desired. There are several kinds of energies which limit the power and effectiveness of the soul, and they constitute the type known as the *Antarāya karma*. These are the eight main kinds of forces operating on the soul in its unemancipated state.”<sup>1</sup>

“The only enemy of the soul is the force of its own *karmas* (actions) which it can destroy, by becoming fully self-conscious. On the destruction of its bonds, the soul becomes deified, and cannot be overcome afresh by *karmas* or any other force; for it is only liable to be affected by its own desires which are destroyed for good at the moment when omniscience is attained.”<sup>2</sup>

1. *The Householders Dharma* by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXVII, Note.

2. *The Householders Dharma* by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXI.



“Every soul is potentially omniscient, in the fullest sense of the term. Consciousness being the very nature of the soul, and all things being knowable by nature, perfection in knowledge must be predicated in respect of the essential nature of each and every individual. Ready assent will be lent to this proposition by any one who will recognise the fact that all things in nature are knowable, which means, not that there is nothing unknown to us today, but that which will never be known by any one at all is non-existent; for that which will never be known to any one will never be known, much less proved to be existing, and without strict proof, existence cannot be conceded in favour of anything whatsoever. It is not even permissible to hold that the ‘unknowable’ might mean an agglomeration of a certain indefinite number of attributes some of which may never be known, for we shall never have any reason whatsoever for alleging the existence of any of those unknowable attributes beyond a wilful refusal to be reasonable. Thus there is no escape from the position that all things are knowable.

“Now since the natural properties of a substance are to be found in all its units or individuals, it is obvious that what is known to one individual is capable of being known by all others. It follows from this that if there be an infinity of ideas, each of which is known to only one individual at a time, the consciousness of each and every soul is potentially able to know the whole infinity of them. Hence, each and every soul is potentially omniscient, that is to say, the consciousness of every living being is endowed with the capacity to know all things, unlimited by time or space. There is nothing to be surprised at in this conclusion, since knowledge merely means a state of consciousness, which being an affection or modification of the substance of its being, is felt by the soul. This amounts to saying that the soul is made of pure intelligence, in different language the *jīva* is a pure embodiment of knowledge.

“The soul is also endowed with faculties of

clairvoyance, telepathy and the like, of which the ordinary humanity is almost wholly ignorant in our day. The researches of reliable bodies of men, such as the Psychical Research Society, as well of private individuals of undoubted veracity, prove the fact that the soul possesses a faculty of perception which is altogether independent of senses. The ancients who made a regular study of the subject and whose powers of observation were far in excess of our own, also bear powerful witness to the existence of this hidden source of perception.

The super-sensuous faculty of perception otherwise known as inner illumination enjoyed by advanced ascetics and saints, is a direct manifestation of this power, which is inhibited by the impetuosity of will running wild in pursuit of sense-gratification. A careful study of the lives of saintly personages yields the important truth that this faculty is also unlimited like the faculty of knowing of which it is an inseparable associate by nature, since knowledge and perception are dependant on one another to a considerable extent. We may, therefore say that the soul's faculty of perception is also infinite potentially."<sup>1</sup>

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his exposition of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy (*Śloka-vārtika*, verses from 141) has refuted the existence of an omniscient being. According to the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā view expounded by Kumārila "Vedic injunctions are of the highest authority; the performance of the sacrifice is the highest duty which when performed gives rise to some unprecedented cosmic potency (*apūrva*), a potential after-state of acts, which brings about all the fruits for the performer of the sacrifice. These tenets cannot allow any one to claim omniscience for the simple reason that if any one were to be omniscient outside the Vedic fold, his words would be looked upon as infallible and the Vedic authority would be questioned. Kumārila says that the human being might see only the general aspect of things, and hence it is not possible to believe that a man can

1. *The Householders Dharma* by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XIX - XXI.

see all things in all places and of all times. The omniscient will have to be a dirty being, because, being necessitated by the function of seeing, he will have to come into contact with so many dirty things. There is a limit to visionary and knowing ability, and it cannot be stretched beyond that; so none can be able to see things which are super-sensuous. None of the five proofs can justify any one's omniscience. The so-called omniscients do not agree among themselves; their words are against *Vedas*, whose authority is unquestionable; and no omniscient is ever come across by anybody: so omniscience is an impossibility. The all-knowledge attributed to Brahman means only self-knowledge."

This attack of Kumārila has twofold handicaps : first, his hands are tied down by the above tenets of his school and, secondly, he has not distinguished sense-perception from omniscience : he attacks omniscience as if it is sense-perception intensified and magnified. Kundakunda has plainly told us that "senses have no part to play in omniscience; it is the spirit, being a knower by nature and essentially constituted of knowledge that comes face to face with the complex reality, and comprehends it immediately and simultaneously in its entirety with no effort on his part and with no effect on his spiritual constitution."<sup>1</sup>

This verse of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* is perhaps the first in Jaina literature where an attempt to establish omniscience by reasoning is made. *Kevala-jñāna*, which is the same as omniscience, was mentioned by Kundakunda, who was earlier than Samantabhadra, but he had taken it, as will appear from the commentary on the following verse of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* as an essential characteristic of the Holy One. He did not make any attempt to justify the existence of quality or refute any argument against it. The *Niryuktis* make some reference to this subject, but the voluminous literature which subsequently grew up refuting and

1. *Pravachana-sāra* edited by A.N. Upadhye, Introduction, page LXXVIII. For a detailed comparative discussion, the reader may consult pages LXXII-LXXX.

conunter-refuting omniscience is later than the day of Samantabhadra. Siddhāsena took up this subject in the second canto of *Sanmati-prakaraṇa* and Abhayadevasūri in his commentery to this work, has discussed the matter in detail. Pātrakesarī in his *Pañchanamaskāra-stotra* has defined *kevala-jñāna*.

Akalaṅka in his *Aṣṭa-śatī* (commentary on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*) elaborated the point. Kumārila attacked the view of omniscience accepted by the Buddhists and Jains in *Śloka-vārtika* as already mentioned. The Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita in *Tattva-saṅgraha* (and Kamalaśīla in his commentary to this work) refuted Kumārila's arguments and Vidyānandī in *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* (commentary on *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*) has refuted Kumārila and Śāntarakṣita. Special works establishing omniscience were written by Anantakīrti known as *Bṛhatsarvajña-siddhi* and *Laghusarvajña-siddhi*.

सूक्ष्मान्तरित-दूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा ।

अनुमेयत्वतोऽन्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ॥5॥

sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyachid  
yathā,  
anumeyatvato'gnyadiriti sarvajña-saṁsthitih.

5. The existence of the omniscient (is established) as objects which are minute, covered or distant are directly knowable by some persons and as fire etc. are known from inference.

### COMMENTARY

To every person all objects are not capable, at all times, of direct perception. An object may be very minute. Its existence might not be seen by the eye. But its presence can be established by inference. For example, in chemical experiments, if a particular colour results from adding a substance, we infer that a certain substance is the cause

of the same. Atoms etc. are established not by sight of the eye. Again, objects might be far off from us and accordingly beyond sense perception. Mountains or oceans far away are mentioned by Vasunandi as illustrations of this. Further, a thing might be hidden by some covering and for this reason it might be beyond the direct perception of our senses. But still, these are capable of being known by persons.

It cannot be urged that a person within a room covered from our sight by walls, is non-existent. It cannot be said that the moon and the stars are non-existent during the daytime because we do not see these. It is ludicrous to mention that persons living in the past whom we do not now see were non-existent. We cannot say that things in distant countries do not exist. We can know from books or reliable persons the existence of persons or things in the past or in distant countries.

Again, in inference, we establish the existence of fire by seeing smoke from distance. Here, though fire is not the object of our direct perception, there is no doubt about its existence.

As things can thus be known without direct perception, it is not absurd that an omniscient should be able to have perception of all things existing at all times. Kundakundāchārya says, "For him who is evolving into knowledge the modifications of all substances are perceptible; he does not know them by means of effects such as *avagraha*."<sup>1</sup>

Amṛtachandra Sūri explains this as follows: "Since the perfect sage does not obtain knowledge by the aid of the senses, through the precedent series of *Avagraha* (the taking of the object of knowledge by the senses), *Īhā* (the readiness to know more of the things perceived) and *Avāya* (finding out the perfection or otherwise of a thing), and since he himself, at the moment of the annihilation of all obscurations (*āvaraṇas*), accepted the

1. *Pravachana-sāra, Śruta-skandha*, I.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 13.

function of a cause (*Kāraṇa*), the innate nature of knowledge which has no beginning, no end, no cause (*hetu*) and has nothing in common with anything else, evolves, becoming the psychic exertion of arising absolute-knowledge, which immediately follows the annihilation of *āvaraṇas*. Therefore, the modifications of all the substances are perceptible for him, since they conjointly become a basis for his consciousness inasmuch as all substances, times, places, and forms of being (*bhāva*) are appropriated by him simultaneously.<sup>1</sup>

“Nothing whatever is imperceptible to the Holy One at the very moment of the destruction of all obscurations; for he has surpassed the senses, each of which takes up its respective objects and causes the setting to work the forces necessary for the arising of mundane distinctions (*parichhitti*); he is rich at all points (since they have for him the same savour), in all qualities of the senses, in the form of the distinctions (*parichhidā*) in touch, taste, smell, colour and sound; he himself illuminates the self and the other by his completeness; he has become miraculous (*lokottara*) knowledge without restraint; so nothing is imperceptible to him, owing to the simultaneous grasping of all substances, places, times and forms of being.”<sup>2</sup>

Kundakunda says : “The Holy Absolute Knower does not seize or release; does not evolve into anything else; but without exception he sees and knows everything all round.”<sup>3</sup>

Amṛtachandra explains this as follows. “This self, according to its innate nature, of no seizing, no releasing, no evolution into anything else, evolves owing to its characteristic nature of absolute (*Kevala*) knowledge, which is its own principle (*tattva*). And thus, standing forth like a genuine jewel of motionless and radiant light, it possesses an everywhere glittering efficacy of vision

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, I.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 13.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

and knowledge; so then it becomes by itself, in itself, aware of the self in its entirety without remainder. Or to explain otherwise, by a simultaneous, intuitive perception (*sākṣāt-karaṇa*) of the multitude of all things, wavering of notion is excluded, and there is cessation of all supposed acts such as grasping and releasing. In this way, the Self (as Absolute-knower) by first evolving into all distinguishable appearances and then again not evolving into any appearance, sees and knows everything without exception everywhere whilst remaining in isolation.”<sup>1</sup>

In *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, an attempt has similarly been made to establish that because things are not perceptible ordinarily by senses, their existence cannot be denied, for their existence can be known by inference and even if these be not known by inference, their existence is established by scriptures of an *Āptā*.

“सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥” *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, verse 6.

In the next verse, it is also mentioned that there cannot be direction of things which are at a great distance or very near (such as collyrium applied to eyes which cannot see it), or where there is a defect in vision or hearing as in the case of a blind or deaf person, or where attention is fixed to another object, e.g., a man attentively reading a book may not see a man passing by, or where the thing is very small like atom, or where there is something intervening or obstructing the perception, or where something obscures another as the sun obscuring the moon or the stars during daytime, or where similar things, e.g. waters of river and ocean get mixed up where they meet. We cannot say in such cases that these do not exist.

“अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातात्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।

सौक्ष्म्यावधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥” *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, verse 7.

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, I.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 19.

स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् ।  
अविरोधो यदिष्टं ते प्रसिद्धेन न बाध्यते ॥6॥

sa tvamevāsi nirdoṣo yukti-śāstrāvirodhivāk,  
avirodho yadiṣṭam te prasiddhena na bādhyate.

6. Only you, whose words are unopposed to logic and scriptures are free from all faults because what is your desire is not opposed to proof.

### COMMENTARY

In *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* it is mentioned that Samantabhadra in one of his verses in *Bṛhat-svayambhū-stotra*, while praising Sambhava Jina, has mentioned:

“त्वं संभवः संभवतर्षरोगैः संतप्यमानस्य जनस्य लोके ।

आसीरिहाकस्मिन् एव वैद्यो वैद्यो यथा नाथ रुजां प्रशान्त्यै ॥” Verse 11.

i.e. “You, O Sambhava, in this world you have suddenly appeared like a physician ministering to the cure of diseases, as a healer of people suffering from the thirst of worldly desires.”

This verse of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* is accordingly explained by Vidyānandī with analogy to the above praise.<sup>1</sup>

It is mentioned by Vidyānandī that as a physician in mitigating a disease becomes faultless when he applies reasoning as well as medical science, so one who follows reasoning and scriptures in laying down liberation and its causes, is free from blemishes. The faults such as ignorance, attachment, aversion etc. are never present in a perfect soul.<sup>2</sup> Vasunandī says that here absence of *Avidyā* arising from attachment or freedom from hunger,

1. “कथमत्र कारिकायामनुपात्तो भिषग्वरो दृष्टान्तः कथ्यतं इति चेत् स्वयं ग्रन्थकारेणान्यत्राभिधानात् ।” *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*.

2. “दोषास्तावदज्ञानरागद्वेषादयः ....प्रमाणबलात् सिद्धः सर्वज्ञो वीतरागश्च सामान्यतो यः स त्वमेवार्हन् युक्तिशास्त्रविरोधिवाक्त्वात् । यो यत्र युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् स तत्र निर्दोषो दृष्टो, यथा क्वचिद् व्याध्युपशमे भिषग्वरः । युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् च भगवान् मुक्तिसंसारतत्कारणेषु, तस्मान्निर्दोष इति निश्चयः ।” *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, I. 6.



thirst is mentioned by the word “fault-less.”<sup>1</sup> It is urged that the omniscient Lord is free from faults and his words, following reasoning and the scriptures, are not opposed to the celebrated *Anekānta* view (or in another sense being not opposed to any *pramāṇa* or proof). In other words, as a physician can prove that he is faultless by using reasoning and quoting works on medical science, so the words of a perfect soul are free from faults as these follow reasoning (which is not opposed to any *pramāṇa*) and are in perfect agreement with the scriptures.<sup>2</sup>

Vasunandi raises a question, how can a perfect soul have a desire. He replies that this is merely suggested by implication. Really a perfect soul has no desire. In *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakaḥāra* (I.8) Samantabhadra has mentioned that an *Āpta* who gives instructions, does good to the people, without being actuated by gain, fame, worship etc. A drum giving out sound at the touch of a beater does not want anything for itself:

“अनात्मार्थं विना रागेः शास्ता शास्ति सतो हितम् ।

ध्वनन् शिल्पिकरस्पर्शान् मुरजः किमपेक्षते ॥”

त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां सर्वथैकान्तवादिनाम् ॥

आप्ताभिमानदग्धानां स्वेष्टं दृष्टेन बाध्यते ॥7॥

*tvanmatāmṛta-bāhyānām sarvathaikāntavādinām,*  
*āptābhimāna-dagdhānām sveṣṭam dṛṣṭena bādhyate.*

7. The views of those who are opposed to your

1. Samantabhadra in his *Ratnakaraṇḍa-śrāvakaḥāra* (I.6) has mentioned: “An *Āpta* is one who is free from hunger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, pain, pride, attachment, aversion and infatuation.”  
“क्षुत्पिपासाजरातङ्क-जन्मान्तकभयस्मयाः ।  
न रागद्वेषमोहाश्च यस्याप्तः स प्रकीर्त्यते ॥”
2. “यत्र यस्याभिमतं तत्त्वं प्रमाणेन न बाध्यते स तत्र युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् । यथा रोगस्वास्थ्यतत्कारणतत्त्वे भिषग्वरः । न बाध्यते च प्रमाणेन भगवतोऽभिमतं मोक्षसंसार-तत्कारणतत्त्वम् । तस्मात् तत्र त्वं युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् । इति विषयस्य युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधित्व-सिद्धेर्विषयिण्या भगवद्वाचो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधित्वसाधनम् ।”  
*Aṣṭasaḥasrī.*

view, sweet as nectar, and who always profess only one aspect (of everything) are opposed to *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (or impliedly by objects having many-sided aspects).

### COMMENTARY

The author says that religious teachers or philosophers who do not follow the *Anekāntavāda* (the theory of manysided aspects of a thing) of the Jains take false pride that only they are reliable persons. But really their views are opposed to reasoning and can be refuted by *Anekāntavāda*. The *Anekānta* view has been compared to nectar as it leads to happiness destroying all misery and leads to liberation. Those who do not follow the *Anekānta* view are refuted by the Jaina view. In the previous verse it has been mentioned, "Your views are free from faults, being supported by logical reasoning following the established methods of proof." In this verse, it is said that the views of others who do not follow your view, are opposed to reasoning.

In this verse, the views like the *Śūnyavāda* of the Buddhists, *Advaitavāda* of the Vedāntists etc. are said to be opposed to reasoning and the *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda* of the Jains is mentioned as the correct view.

The subject of *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda* or *Saptabhaṅgī* is the most important in Jaina philosophy. A short description of this is given below :

"A single substance is endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite classes of substances... A substance is endowed with qualities and modifications; though the substance is the same, it comes to be different because of its passing through different modifications; so when something is to be stated about a substance, viewed through a flux of modifications, there would be seven modes of predication; according to some modification or other, it is stated that a substance (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is indescribable, (4) is

and is not, (5) is and is indescribable, (6) is not and is indescribable, and (7) is, is not and is indescribable.”<sup>1</sup>

The seven forms are accordingly: (1) *syād asti* (it is); (2) *syād nāsti* (it is not); (3) *syād avaktavya* (it is indescribable); (4) *syād asti nāsti* (it is and it is not); (5) *syād asti avaktavya* (it is and is indescribable); (6) *syād nāsti avaktavya* (it is not and is indescribable); (7) *syād asti nāsti avaktavya* (it is, it is not and is indescribable).

“The word ‘*syād*’ may be paraphrased: the proposition holds true, provided you take it in the right sense, in the correct proportion, with other notions.”<sup>2</sup>

*Sapta-bhaṅga* means seven turns or seven varied forms of idea of expression.<sup>3</sup>

In this sevenfold way a substance is described “(1) as being, with reference to itself, (2) as not being, with reference to another, (3) as indescribable, simultaneously with reference to itself and another, (4) as successively being and not being, with reference to itself and another, (5) as being and indescribable, with regard to reference to itself, and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another, (6) as not being and indescribable, with regard to reference to another, and simultaneity with reference to itself and another (7) as being, not being, and being indescribable with regard to reference to itself, reference to another and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another.”

“With reference to each single property of substance, with its unlimited number of properties, this seven-fold formula of restriction, interposing with its partly meant and partly not-meant affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*pratiśedha*)... the invariably enunciated word ‘*syāt*’ dispels the entire infatuation of contrariety.”<sup>4</sup>

“The Jaina *siddhānta* insists on the employment of the word *syāt* before every judgment or statement of fact,

1. *Pravachanasāra*, Introduction by A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIII.

2. *Pravachanasāra*, Cambridge University Press, page 91.

3. *Ibid*, page 92.

4. *Ibid*.

though in ordinary parlance and composition, it is generally dispensed with. There are three kinds of judgment—the affirmative, the negative and the one which gives expression to the idea of indescribability. Of these, the first kind affirms and the second denies the existence of a quality, property or thing, but the third declares an object to be indescribable. A thing is said to be indescribable when both existence and non-existence are to be attributed to it at one and the same time. These three forms of judgment give rise to seven possible modes of predication.”<sup>1</sup>

“There are seven modes of expressing the is-ness or is-not-ness of thing; and these modes are all inter-related, and each presupposes the others, each implies the others. In accepting all these seven modes and so speaking correctly we do not mislead the person spoken to.... To speak correctly under this doctrine, the statement is commenced with an adverb ‘*syāt*’ to indicate that there are six other implied ways of speaking about the subject. For instance, the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example). And in addition to this one kind there are five more kinds of tacit expressions implied by the one positive statement. The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates all of the qualities of a thing.”<sup>2</sup>

“Synthesis is the putting together of aspects in thought to realise that the truth consists in the irresolvable combination of all the possible aspects; and to speak the truth correctly all the seven modes of expression must be accepted. The subject is now how we should express ourselves when we make a statement about a thing. It is an important subject and the doctrine is found only in the Jaina philosophy. It is the doctrine of the non-violation of the parts, elements, properties or aspects

1. *The Practical Path*, C.R. Jain, p. 12

2. *Jainism*, H. Warren, pages 20-21.

of things; it is the ~~method of knowing~~ <sup>method of speaking</sup> or speaking of a thing synthetically.”<sup>1</sup>

“The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience.<sup>2</sup> The senses are the indirect means of knowledge, and whatever they apprehend is partial .... The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid only from a particular view-point... When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is *Syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to a conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements.”<sup>3</sup>

In the doctrine of *Asti-nāsti*, there is a similarity between Jaina *Syādvāda* and Hegels view that “affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity ‘is’ and ‘is not’ which are really identical and same for they are the aspects of the same reality.” The whole of Hegelian

1. *Jainism*, H. Warren, p. 20.

2. The existence of an omniscient being has been established by Samantabhadra in verse 5 of *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*. As regards ordinary human beings, the excellence of *Anekānta* view as opposed to other views which are mentioned as unreliable, is laid down in this verse.

3. *Pravachana-sāra*, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIV.

metaphysics however is not accepted by the Jainas. "Unlike Bradley, the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism, the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance, is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same."<sup>1</sup>

The *Saptabhaṅgī* will be taken up in detail in verses 14-16 of this work, where further elucidation of the subject will be made.

कुशलाकुशलं कर्म परलोकश्च न क्वचित् ।

एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु नाथ स्वपरवैरिषु ॥8॥

kuśalākuśalaṁ karma paralokaścha na kvachit,  
ekānta-graha-rakteṣu nātha sva-para-vairiṣu.

8. O Lord ! to those who accept only one-sided doctrine and whose doctrine is opposed to what they themselves accept and what are accepted by others, beneficial or its opposite actions and the other world etc., cannot (exist).

### COMMENTARY

According to Jainism, *yoga* is a faculty of the soul which attracts matter according to the influence of *karmas*. This *yoga* is set in by the activity of body, speech or mind.<sup>2</sup> The name "*āsrava*" is given to this *yoga*.<sup>3</sup> The *āsrava* is of two kinds, *śubha* or good which is the inlet of virtue or meritorious *karmas* and *aśubha* or bad which is the inlet of vice or demeritorious *karmas*.<sup>4</sup> In this verse by *kuśala* and *akuśala*, these two varieties of *Āsrava*, viz. *śubha* and *aśubha*, are denoted. 'Paraloka' is the attainment of another state after death. By implication that which

1. *Sacred Books of the Jainas*, vol. III, page LXXX.

2. "कायवाङ्मनःकर्म योगः ।" *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, VI. 1.

3. "स आस्रवः ।" *Ibid*, VI. 2.

4. "शुभः पुण्यस्याशुभः पापस्य ।" *Ibid*, VI. 3.

causes a particular state after death, viz., meritorious or demeritorious *karmas* are also indicated by this word<sup>1</sup>. By the word 'and', liberation etc. are implied.<sup>2</sup> All these are not possible if we accept the view of those who lay down everything to be transient<sup>3</sup> (like the *Kṣaṇika-vāda* of the Buddhists). For how can a future state of happiness or misery arising from meritorious or demeritorious *karmas* exist, if everything is transient.<sup>4</sup> So the views of *Śūnyavādins* (Buddhists), *Advaitavādins* (Vedantists) who lay down everything as illusion (*Māyā*) etc. become opposed to what they themselves accept. Naturally, these views are also opposed to those of the Jainas. In this verse, it is laid down that who maintain only one-sided doctrine cannot be taken as *Āpta* as their accepted principles such as *karmas*, beneficial or harmful or a future state of existence, become opposed to their own doctrines.

**भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपह्नुवात् ।**

**सर्वात्मिकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमतावकम् ॥९॥**

**bhāvaikānte padārthānām abhāvānāmapahṇavāt,  
sarvātmakam anādyantam asvarūpam atāvakam.**

9. If it be accepted that objects are eternal, it would be opposed to your doctrine and these will become pervading in everything, without beginning or without end and opposed to its own nature.

### COMMENTARY

There are two views, viz., all objects are eternal or that all objects are not eternal. The Jaina view is that

1. "प्रेत्यभावः परलोकः, तद्ध्येतुर्वा धर्मोऽधर्मश्च, कारणे कार्योपचारात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasri*.
2. "च-शब्दानुनिःश्रेयसादिपरिग्रहः ।" *Ibid*.
3. "एतत् सर्वम् एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु अनित्यैकान्ताद्यभिनिवेश-पर-वशीकृतेषु मध्ये न क्वचित् संभवति, तेषां स्ववैरित्वात् ।" *Ibid*.
4. "पुण्यं पापं च कर्म तत्फलं कुशलमकुशलं च स्वं, तत्सम्बन्धः परलोकादिश्च तस्य स्वयम् एकान्तवादिभिरिष्टत्वात् ।" *Ibid*.

“the object of knowledge (*artha*) is made up of substances that are characterised by qualities, and with which, moreover, are associated the modifications.<sup>1</sup> (1) Origination and destruction simultaneously take place in qualities and modes, when their substratum, namely the substance, permanently retains its existential character.<sup>2</sup> (2) There are two classes of substances: sentient comprising *jīvas* alone, and insentient (*ajīva*) comprising matter (*pudgala*), the fulcrum of motion (*dharma*), the fulcrum of rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*). To give their characteristics: *jīva*, or the soul or spirit, is constituted of sentiency and manifestation of consciousness; *pudgala* or matter is insentient and endowed with colour, taste, smell and touch to its last subtle condition; *dharma* is the condition of movement; *adharma* is the condition of rest; *ākāśa* or space gives room; and *kāla* or time marks the continuity. Excepting *pudgala* all are non-concrete or formless (*amūrta*), i.e., devoid of sense-qualities and not amenable to sense-perception.”<sup>3</sup>

“Jainism does not accept creation in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika sense or emanation, whether actual or apparent in the Vedāntic sense. With it the world is existential and real. Since it is not created by any one on the analogy of a carpenter or a smith, the cosmic constituents enumerated by Jainism are such that they are capable of explaining the diverse phenomena by their mutual interaction. The ontological start is that of realistic dualism or even pluralism. The world of existence is constituted of two substances, life and non-life, which are not philosophical postulates but reals as spirit and matter which are pluralistic, constitutionally eternal, and not liable to lose or to interchange their nature.”<sup>4</sup>

*Abhāva* or non-existence has been accepted as a *Padārtha* in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It has been accepted

1. *Pravachana-sāra*. II. 1.

2. *Ibid*, II. 5, 7, 37.

3. *Pravachana-sāra*, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXII.

4. *Ibid*, p. LXIII.



as a kind of proof in manuals of Vedānta literature and in Nyāya philosophy. This *abhāva* is of four kinds: (1) *prāgabhāva*, (2) *pradhvamsābhāva*, (3) *atyantābhāva* and (4) *anyonyābhāva*. In *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* we find, "Non-existence is of four kinds: (1) antecedent, (2) emergent, (3) absolute and (4) reciprocal. Antecedent is the non-existence in the cause (e.g., the lump of clay) of the effect (e.g., jar) previous to its production. It is expressed in the knowledge 'a thing will be'. Emergent is the non-existence of the jar, consequent as its destruction by a pestle. Of this non-existence also there is an end in the destruction of the parts, which compose the jar... Absolute is the non-existence of something in a substrate through trivial time. Thus there is an absolute non-existence of colour in air... Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the consciousness 'this is not that'. ... This reciprocal non-existence is of two kinds, so far as it is dependent on a limiting condition or independent of such. The former kind is that whose existence is pervaded by the existence of a limiting condition. (Thus, wherever there is differentiation of *ākāśa* there is existence of a limiting condition, e.g. a jar.) The latter kind is that which is destitute of such an existence. Thus the differentiation of *ākāśa*, in its own nature undifferentiated, through the differences of its limiting conditions, e.g. jars and the like, is an example of the former kind. Or, of the sun through the water-vessels (which are its limiting conditions when the sun is reflected in their water); and so, too is the differentiation of Brahma, in its own nature undifferentiated by means of the differences in the internal organs (which are its limiting conditions). The non-existence (difference) of a piece of canvas in a jar is an example of the second kind."<sup>1</sup>

1. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, A.Venis, Chapter VI. See also *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, edited and translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 152-179. The original text, of which a translation is given above, is:

“स च अभावश्चतुर्विधः। प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः, अन्योन्याभावश्चेति। मृत्पिण्डादौ कारणे कार्यस्य घटादेरुत्पत्तेः पूर्वं योऽभावः स प्रागभावः, स च भविष्यतीति

The Nyāya view is also the same. For example, in *Tarka-saṅgraha* of Annam Bhaṭṭa we find : “Antecedent non-existence is without beginning and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction has a beginning, and has no end. (Such is the non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered independently of the three times (past, present and future). For example (such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that): there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example (such difference is referred to when it is remarked that): a jar is not a web of cloth.”<sup>1</sup>

Laugākṣi Bhāskara in his *Tarka-kaumudī* has mentioned that *abhāva* is of two kinds, (a) *anyonyābhāva* and (b) *saṃsargābhāva*. The second, *saṃsargābhāva*, has three varieties, viz., (i) *prāgabhāva*, (ii) *pradhvaṃsābhāva* and (iii) *atyantābhāva*. All these four varieties are the same as described before.<sup>2</sup>

प्रतीति-विषयः। तत्रैव घटस्य मुद्गर-प्रहारानन्तरं योऽभावः स प्रध्वंसः। ध्वंसस्यापि स्वाधिकरणकपालनाशे नाश एव। ...यत्राधिकरणे यस्य कालत्रयेऽपि अभावः सोऽत्यन्ताभावः। यथा वायौ रूपस्यात्यन्ताभावः। ...‘इदमिदं न’ इति प्रतीतिविषयोऽन्योन्याभावः। ... पुनरपि भेदो द्विविधः, सोपाधिको निरुपाधिकश्चेति। तत्र उपाधिसत्ताव्याप्यसत्ताकत्वं सोपाधिकत्वं तत्तुल्यत्वं निरुपाधिक्यत्वम्। तत्र आद्यो यथा एकस्यैव आकाशस्य घटाद्युपाधिभेदेन भेदः। यथा वा एकस्य सूर्यस्य जलभाजनभेदेन भेदः। तथा च एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽन्तःकरणभेदात् भेदः। निरुपाधिकभेदो यथा घटे पटभेदः।”

1. “अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः। उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य। सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः। उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य। त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोऽत्यन्ताभावः। यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति। तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोऽन्योन्याभावः। यथा घटः पटो न भवति।” *Tarka-saṅgraha*.
2. “तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽभावोऽन्योन्याभावः। स च घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः। अन्योन्याभावभिन्नोऽभावः संसर्गाभावः। स त्रिविधः। प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति। उत्पत्तेः प्राक् समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य संसर्गाभावः प्रागभावः। स चेह कपाले घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः। उत्पत्तेरनन्तरं समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य

Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* (II. 2, 8) and Kaṇāda in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (IX. 1) have accepted *abhāva* as a separate *padārtha* from *bhāva*.

Haribhadra Sūri in his *Śaḍdarśana-samuchchaya* has written that the view of Jaimini, the propounder of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy is that *abhāva* is a *pramāṇa* to establish the existence of a thing where the five other *pramāṇas* fail to establish it.<sup>1</sup> The five other *pramāṇas* are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda* and *arthāpatti*.

The Sāṅkhya philosophy does not accept that *abhāva* is a separate *padārtha*. The Sāṅkhya "believes in real matter and an infinite plurality of individual souls which are not emanations of a single world-soul. The Sāṅkhya adopts the view that the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and developed states of one and the same substance. Development is the coming to light of what is latent or hidden even as destruction is disappearance into the original cause. There is no such thing as utter annihilation. Applying this principle, the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is said to be *Prakṛti* (nature). The world is the transformation of *Prakṛti* (nature) which cannot be equated with any one of the stages of its evolution....

The first product of the evolution of *Prakṛti* (nature) is *mahat*, the great, or *Buddhi* (intelligence). Self-sense (*Ahaṅkāra*) on the principle of individuation, arises next. From this, in its *sattva* aspect, arises the *manas* (internal organ), the five organs of perception and the five of action. From the same in the *tamas* aspect, the five fine elements (*tanmātrās*) arise. The *rajas* element helps both.

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संसर्गाभावः प्रध्वंसः । स चेह कपाले घटो ध्वस्त इति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । त्रैकालिकः  
संसर्गाभावोऽत्यन्तभावः । स चेह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादिप्रत्ययसिद्धः । एवमन्येषामत्रैकान्तभावः ।  
यथान्धकारस्यालोकाभावे यत्रालोको नास्ति तत्रैवान्धकारव्यवहारात् ।" *Tarka-kaumudi*.

1. "प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।

वस्तुसत्तावबोधार्थं तत्राभावप्रमाणता ॥" *Śaḍdarśana-samuchchaya*, 76.

From the five fine elements, by a preponderance of *tamas*, the five gross elements are produced.”<sup>1</sup>

“*Puruṣa* is the intelligent self, for whose experience *Prakṛti* (nature) evolves. It is a mere witness, a solitary indifferent spectator. It is pure consciousness while *Prakṛti* (nature) is unconscious. It is inactive, unalterably constant and devoid of the *guṇas* while *Prakṛti* is active, alterably constant and consists of them. *Prakṛti* and its products depend for their manifestation on the light of *Puruṣa* (self) which does not depend on anything else for illuminating objects. The Sāṅkhya believes in a plurality of selves. If the self were one, all should become few when one attained freedom which is not the case. Freedom is not coalescence with the absolute spirit but isolation from *Prakṛti*.”<sup>2</sup>

Samantabhadra in this verse criticises the views of those who, like the followers of Sāṅkhya philosophy, believe in the perpetual existence of objects. In *Aṣṭasahasrī*, it is explained that if we accept the *padārthas*, e.g., twentyfive *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, the result will be a denial of all the four kinds of *abhāva* (as already described).<sup>3</sup> Denial of each kind of *abhāva* will lead to a different kind of fault and by a denial of four kinds of *abhāva*, four kinds of fault will arise. This is shown below.

If *prāgabhāva* is not accepted, the view of the Sāṅkhya

1. *Indian Philosophy*, S. Radhakrishnan. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th edition, Vol. XII, p. 251.

The Sāṅkhyas believe in the existence of the twentyfive *tattvas*. *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti*, *Mahat*, *Ahaṅkāra*, mind, the five *tanmātrās* (*rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparsa* and *śabda*), the five *bhūtas* (*kṣiti*, *ap*, *tejas*, *marut* and *vyoma*), the five organs of perception (*chakṣus*, *karna*, *nāsikā*, *jihvā* and *tvak*) and the five organs of action (*vāk*, *pāda*, *pāṇi*, *pāyu* and *upastha*). “मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥” *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 3.

2. *Indian Philosophy*, S. Radhakrishnan. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 14th edition, Vol. XII, p. 251.
3. “पदार्थाः प्रकृत्यादीनि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि... तेषामस्तित्वमेवेति निश्चयो भावैकान्तः । तस्मिन्प्रभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वेषामितरेतराभावादीनामभावानामपहवः स्यात् । ततः सर्वात्मकत्वाद्विप्रसङ्गः ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

philosophy, viz., *Mahat* arises from *Prakṛti*, then *ahankāra* and from it the sixteen varieties (mind, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action and the five *tanmātrās*) and from the five *tanmātrās* the five elements appear,<sup>1</sup> cannot stand and all these become without any beginning. (because we deny their *prāgabhāva* or previous non-existence).<sup>2</sup>

If *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is not accepted all these *tattvas*, which the Sāṅkhya says arise from *Prakṛti*, will become eternal. But the Sāṅkhya has laid down that the five elements, earth etc., merge in the five *tanmātrās* which again with five organs of sense and five organs of action as well as mind merge in *ahankāra*. *Ahankāra* merges in *mahat* which merges in *Prakṛti*. This merging will become impossible on denial of *pradhvaṃsābhāva* described before.<sup>3</sup>

If *anyonyābhāva* be denied, the twentythree principles leaving aside, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* will not exclude one another, but each will involve the other and thus will become all-pervading. But definitions have been given in Sāṅkhya philosophy distinguishing these twentythree principles which are called *vyakta* from *Prakṛti* which is called *avyakta*.<sup>4</sup>

If *atyantābhāva* be denied, the qualities of all the twentyfive *tattvas* cannot be distinguished each from the other; so these will lose their identity. If there is no

1. "प्रकृतेर्महांसुततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः । तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पंचभ्यो पंचभूतानि ॥" *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 22:
2. "प्रागभावस्य अपह्वे महदहंकारादेर्विकारस्य अनादित्वप्रसंगः । .... तथा च .... सृष्टिक्रमकथनं विप्रतिषिध्यते ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
3. "प्रध्वंसाभावस्यापह्वे तस्यानन्तप्रसंगात्, पृथिव्यादीनि पंच महाभूतानि पंचसु तन्मात्रेषु लीयन्ते पृथिव्या गन्धरूपरसस्पर्शशब्दतन्मात्रेषु प्रवेशात्, सलिलस्य रसादिषु, तेजसो रूपादिषु, वायोः स्पर्शतन्मात्रयोः, आकाशस्य शब्दतन्मात्रानुप्रवेशात्; तन्मात्राणां च पंचानां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां कर्मेन्द्रियाणां च मनसा सह षोडशकस्य गणस्याहंकारेऽन्तर्भावस्तस्य च महति महतः प्रकृताविति संहारनिवेदनमतिव्याकुलं स्यात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
4. "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिंगम् । सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥" *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 10.  
"तत्र व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्तावदितरेतराभावस्यापह्वे व्यक्तस्याव्यक्तात्मकत्वे सर्वात्मकत्वम् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

distinction (if *vyakta* and *avyakta* be of the same kind without there being any distinction of inherent qualities) no one will be able to find out the real nature of a *tattva* because the real nature is only understood when we take into account the distinguishing characteristics which are nothing but absence of particular qualities as the basis of differentiation.<sup>1</sup>

The four defects, viz., *anādi*, *ananta*, *sarvātmaka* and *asvarūpa*, accordingly arise by denial of *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, *anyonyābhāva* and *atyantābhāva* respectively. These four defects, says Samantabhadra, do not exist in Jaina view as the Jainas do not deny non-existence wholesale.

कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निहन्वे ।

प्रध्वंसस्य च धर्मस्य प्रच्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥१०॥

kārya-dravyamanādi syāt prāgabhāvasya nihnave,  
pradhvaṃsasya cha dharmasya prachyave'nantatām  
vrajet.

10. The denial of antecedent non-existence, an effect and a substance will become without beginning. On denial of the quality (of non-existence) consisting of destruction, (the same) will become eternal.

### COMMENTARY

We have already described the four varieties of *abhāva* in the commentary to the previous verse. In this verse the first and second *abhāvas* (viz., *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva*) are mentioned and in the next verse the third and fourth *abhāvas* will be mentioned.

Vasunandi says that by '*kārya*' we mean that which is made such as a pitcher and '*dravya*' signifies that which gets another condition (or modification). In a

1. प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरत्यन्ताभावादिह प्रकृतेः पुरुषात्मकत्वे सर्वात्मकत्वमेव ।... ततः सर्वमस्वरूपं स्वेनासाधारणेन रूपेण कस्यचित् तत्त्वस्य व्यवस्थानाघटनात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

clod of earth, the existence of pitcher is wanting. This is antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*). Similarly when we break the parts of a pitcher, emergent non-existence (or destruction) which is known as *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, arises. By denial of the first kind of *Abhāva*, all objects will be without any beginning and by denial of the second, everything will become eternal.

सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे ।

अन्यत्र समवायेन व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ॥11॥

**sarvātmakam tadekam syād anyāpoha-vyatikrame,  
anyatra samavāyena vyapadiśyeta sarvathā.**

11. The denial of *anyonyābhāva* (i.e., every substance) will embody everything (and there will therefore be only) one substance. In the other case (i.e., in the case of *atyantābhāva*), by wholesale acceptance (of everything including absurdities) everything can be postulated.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, Samantabhadra describes the third and fourth *abhāva* viz., *anyonyābhāva* which is called *itaretarābhāva* by Vasunandī in his *vṛtti* and in the *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*. It is urged by Vasunandī that by *anyonyābhāva* we establish such prepositions as “there is non-existence of a canvas in a pitcher” as at a certain time these exist having qualities quite separate. If we deny the existence of this *abhāva*, there will be only one substance in the universe as the distinguishing characteristics will disappear and this one substance will embody everything (e.g., become *sarvātmaka*).

The second line of this verse has been differently interpreted by Vasunandī and Vidyānandī. Vasunandī's *vṛtti* has been quoted above and English translation according to the same has been given. Vasunandī interprets this line in the *Vṛtti* as follows. In absolute non-existence such as the non-existence of *pudgala* (matter)

in *jīva* (soul), the qualities of *pudgala* are absent at all times and under all circumstances in *jīva*. Such absolute non-existence, for example, is the absense of “horns in a hare.” If we refuse to deny the existence of this *abhāva*, nothing will exist as one will be utilised in describing all manners.

In *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, however, the second line has thus been written :

“अन्यत्र समवाये न व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा।”

The explanation is thus attempted. If the qualities of one are accepted in another (by denial of absolute non-existence of some qualities of a substance in another substance) there is *anyatra samavāya*, i.e., connection of qualities in another substance, e.g., if we predicate sense in an insentient substance, the ideas, ‘this has consciousness’ and ‘this does not have consciousness’ cannot be expressed, showing their distinction.<sup>1</sup>

Akalaṅka says that the view of the Buddhists, which also like the Sāṅkhya view already discribed, denying the existence of *Abhāva*, is refuted in this verse. We see that some quality exists in something at a certain time. By denial of absolute non-existence, the position will be that every quality will exist in everything at all times.<sup>2</sup>

Prabhākara, one of the expounders of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, has not accepted *abhāva* as a *pramāṇa*, but Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has accepted *abhāva* (or *anupalabdhi* as a *pramāṇa*). We have already quoted Haribhadra Sūri’s verse in this respect. Mr. Keith summarises the view of Kumārila thus:

“Causation, however, affords Kumārila an argument in favour of his thesis of the reality of non-existence. That entity he classifies as prior, as the non-existence of

1. “स्वसमवायिनः समवायान्तरे समवायः अन्यत्र समवायः, अत्यन्ताभावव्यतिक्रमः। तस्मिन् सर्वस्येष्टं तत्त्वं सर्वथा न व्यपदिश्येत। स्वेष्टात्मना व्यपदेशेऽनिष्टात्मनोऽपि व्यपदेशप्रसंगात्, तेनाव्यपदेशे स्वेष्टात्मनाप्यव्यपदेशापत्तेः स्वयमिष्टानिष्टात्मनोः कालत्रयेऽपि विशेषानुपगमात्।”

*Aṣṭasahasrī.*

2. “अत्यन्ताभावापाकृतौ न क्वचित् किञ्चित् कथञ्चित् न वर्तेत। तथा सर्वं सर्वत्र सर्वथोपलभ्येत।” *Aṣṭaśatī.*



curd in milk; subsequent on destruction, as the non-existence of milk in curd; mutual, as the non-existence of the horse in the cow and vice versa; and absolute, as the non-existence of a horn on the head of the hare. Without the recognition of the first two kinds, he contends, there could be no idea of causation: in its prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect, in its destruction that of the milk as the cause. Everything has two aspects: as regards its self, it exists; as regards anything else, it is non-existent; and both these aspects are real and necessary to each other. It is only through this fact that we can say 'there is no jar on the ground', as that we can ever differentiate things, which is possible only on the ground of a real existence of non-existence. It is impossible to perceive this entity, for perception must deal with the existent; the process of intellection is, therefore, purely mental; the ground is seen; the jar remembered, and then ensues the purely mental cognition styled negation, which must be distinguished from inference on any other form of knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्नवादिनाम् ।

बोधवाक्यं प्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥12॥

abhāvaikānta-pakṣe'pi bhāvāpahnava-vādinām,

bodha-vākyaṁ pramāṇaṁ na kena sādhanadūṣaṇam.

12. To those who deny existence, the view of (uniform) non-existence is not supported by any proof either used for one's own self or for convincing others. Hence how can there be establishment (of their view) on refutation of the view of their opponents?

### COMMENTARY

In verses 8 and 9, the defects in the view of those who accept existence as the only view have been pointed

1. *Karma-mīmāṃsā*, A.B. Keith, p. 60.

out. In this verse the view of those who accept non-existence as their doctrine is refuted.<sup>1</sup>

There are some who deny existence altogether ; such as the Mādhyamikas or Śūnyavādins or Nihilists (a sect of Buddhist philosophers). They follow the view that non-existence is the only reality. There was a very old view in Hindu philosophy, known as *Vijñānavāda* which accepted all objects of knowledge apart from knowledge, as unreal. In *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* (III. 18) this view has been mentioned. This view has been refuted in the *Vedānta-sūtras* (II. 2. 28 and 29). This view has given the example of dreams to establish unreality of objects of knowledge but Śaṅkarāchārya in his commentary on *Vedānta-sūtra* "*vaidharmyāchcha na svapnādivat*" has pointed out that the knowledge in our waking stage is quite different from that when we dream.

*Vijñāna* of the Buddhists is the special knowledge that everything is momentary.<sup>2</sup> In *Kṣaṇika-vāda* of the Buddhists, *vijñānas* rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set.<sup>3</sup> Kundakunda has mentioned "substantial reality cannot be denied, as *Śāśvata-vāda*, *Uchchheda-vāda*, *Bhāva-vāda* and its opposite, *Vijñāna-vāda* and its opposite, *Śūnyavāda* and its opposite are not reasonable."<sup>4</sup>

1. "भावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि कुशलाकुशलकमदिरघटनां प्रदर्श्य अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भृशं न घटेत इति प्रदर्शयन् आह ।" Vasunandī.
2. "तत्र विज्ञानमिति विशिष्टं ज्ञानं सर्वक्षणिकत्वम् ।" *Śaḍḍarsāna-samuchchaya*, commentary of Maṇibhadra on verse 5.
3. "सर्वसंस्काराः क्षणिकाः, सर्वेषां विश्वत्रयविवरविवर्तमानानां घटपटस्तम्भाम्भोरुहादीनां द्वितीयादिकक्षेपे 'स एवायं, स एवायम्' इत्याद्युल्लेखेन ये संस्कारा ज्ञानसन्ताना उत्पद्यन्ते ते विचारगोचरगताः क्षणिकाः ।" *Śaḍḍarsāna-samuchchaya*, Maṇibhadra's commentary on verse 7.
4. "सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भव्यमभव्यं च सुण्णमिदरं च ।  
विण्णाणमविण्णाणं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सद्भावै ॥"

*Pañchāstikāya-sāra*, verse 37.

*Śāśvatavādins* or Realists are the *Sarvāstivādins* of the Buddhist philosophy. They maintain the reality of everything. They are divided into two groups, (i) *Sautrāntikas* and (ii) *Vaibhāṣikas*.

In this verse it is urged that the nihilistic view cannot be proved. There are two kinds of inference, *svārthānumāna* (inference for one's own conviction) and *parārthānumāna* (inference to convince others). Neither of these kinds of inferences can establish nihilism. So there can be neither *sādhana*, i.e., establishment of the preposition or *dūṣaṇa* (refutation of opposite view).

*Svārthānumāna* is inference for one's own self. This inference is drawn after repeated observations. For example, a man repeatedly sees in the kitchen and other places that there is fire where there is smoke and realises that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke. Afterwards he goes to a hill and sees smoke and remembering the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, he concludes that the hill has fire as it has smoke. This is the inference for one's self.

The above example may be used for *parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others) thus : 1. This hill is full of fire. 2. Because it is full of smoke. 3. Whatever is full of smoke, is full of fire. 4. So is this hill full of smoke. 5. Therefore this hill is full of fire.

This five-limbed syllogism is accepted by Gautama in his Nyāya philosophy. Jaina logicians, however, hold that the first two limbs are sufficient, the others being redundant.<sup>1</sup>

By the word *bodha* (understanding) in the verse *svārthānumāna* is meant and by *vākya* (syllogism) *parārthānumāna* is signified. By none of these two kinds of inferences, nihilism can be proved. So a question has been put : "How can it be established or the views of others opposing it can be refuted?"

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1. For a detailed description of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, see *Parikṣāmukha* translated into English by S.C. Ghoshal, p. 117 (*Sacred Books of the Jaiṇs*, Vol. XI).

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥13॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidvīṣām,  
avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.

13. The view of those who do not follow the logic of *Syādvāda* and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribability without any limitation is also not tenable.

### COMMENTARY

Vasunandī says that after showing the defects of views of those who maintain either existence without any limitation or non-existence without any limitation, in this verse it is mentioned that the view of those who accept both existence and non-existence without any limitation, is not proper.<sup>1</sup>

The logic of *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda* accepts existence or non-existence or indescribability with limitation. Leaving out the limitation, it is impossible to maintain the embodiment of existence and non-existence in the same substance because this will be quite inconsistent.<sup>2</sup> This will be developed in the following verse.

In *Aṣṭa-śatī*, amplified by *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, it is explained that the Sāṅkhya view of simultaneous existence and non-existence is hereby refuted, if we remember the definition of *vyakta* and *avyakta*<sup>3</sup> which has been given in

1. "भावाभावैकान्तपक्षे विरोधं निरूप्य उभयैकान्तवादिनामपि न किञ्चित् संगच्छत इत्याह ।"
2. "भावाभावयोरैकतरप्रतिक्षेपैकान्तपक्षोपक्षिप्तदोषपरिजिहीर्षया सदसदात्मकं सर्वमभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि वाणी विप्रतिषिध्येत, तयोः परस्परपरिहारस्थितिलक्षणत्वात् । न हि सर्वात्मना कचिदर्थं सन्तं तथैवासन्तमाचक्षाणः स्वस्थः, स्वाभ्युपेतैतर-निरासविधानकरणाच्छून्यावबोधवत् ।" *Aṣṭaśatī*.
3. "त्रैलोक्यस्य व्यक्तात्मनाऽपेतत्वसिद्धेः अव्यक्तात्मनास्तित्वव्यवस्थितेः हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिंगम् । सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥" इति वचनात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*

the commentary on verse 9.

In the second line of this verse, the *Anirvāchyavāda* (the view expounding indescribability) has been attacked. Śaṅkarāchārya in expounding *Advaitavāda* has laid down that the world is neither *sat* (existent) nor *asat* (non-existent). “Śaṅkara in his system asks whether there is anything in experience which may be regarded as foundational and discusses the claims of the different factors of experience of that title. Our senses may deceive us and our memory may be an illusion. The walking tracts may not be different from dream-walks where also we visit places, handle shadows and battle with ghosts. Though all objects of experience may be open to doubt, there is something which is beyond all doubt. Everyone is conscious of the existence of one’s own self and no one thinks ‘I am not’. The self cannot be doubted or denied, for it is the essential nature of him who denies it. Though we cannot know it by thought, it does not entirely escape us... This self is distinct from the body, the senses and the understanding. It is the principle of consciousness which is unaffected when the body is reduced to ashes and the mind perishes. It is one, universal and infinite...

“We cannot conceive the relation between the world and the absolute. The question of relation has meaning only if we have two ‘distincts’, but the world is not distinct from Brahman. The finite is the infinite hidden from our view through certain barriers. When we intuitively recognise the absolute, the relative disappears; when we discuss about the relative there is no absolute to which it has to be attached. The problem arises on account of a confusion of standpoints. If Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world it is only in the sense that the world cannot be explained apart from Brahman, though the latter is in no way touched by the world of appearance. Brahman is the basis of the apparent existence of the world.”<sup>1</sup> Śaṅkara therefore has laid down the view of *Anirvāchyavāda*.

1. *Indian Philosophy*, S. Radhakrishnan. *Encyclopaedia Britanica*, 14th edition, Vol. 12, p. 252.

कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत् ।  
तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥ 14 ॥

**kathañchit te sadeveṣṭam kathañchidasadeva tat,  
tathobhayamavāchyam cha naya-yogānna sarvathā.**

14. With the application of *naya*, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence (is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and non-existence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects.

### COMMENTARY

It has been shown that it cannot be maintained that existence or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence or indescribability without any limitations, is possible. In this verse, the Jain view that with limitations existence etc. can be accepted is laid down.<sup>1</sup>

A brief description of *Anekāntavāda* or *Syādvāda* has already been given. The different aspects are considered from different stand-points. The Jain view is that objects in their entire character are understood only by an omniscient being. The work, *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, has begun with obeisance to the omniscient and established omniscience by arguments refuting the view of those, who, like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, have attacked omniscience. Then Samantabhadra has refuted the view of those who hold an entirely one-sided aspect of a thing. From this verse the author begins to establish the *Syādvāda* or *Anekāntavāda* of Jainism. Siddhasena has written : A thing which might be conceived from many points of view, is entirely knowable only by the omniscient. But a thing

1. "एकहेतुया यदि सर्वथा सदसदुभयावक्तव्यरूपं तत्त्वं नास्ति, कथं तर्हि इत्याह ।"  
Vasunandī.

conceived from one particular point of view, is the object of *naya* (or partial knowledge).<sup>1</sup>

“A *naya* deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word ‘*syāt*’ to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular stand-point but it is not so from other points of view. ‘*Syāt*’ suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. This is the differentiating point which helps in accuracy of expression by a scholar of the Jaina school of thought. Jaina school of philosophy (like the *kṣaṇikavāda* of the Buddhists) might say that all that exists is momentary and another school might say that reality is permanent (like the *Śāśvata*vādins or *Sarvāstitva*vādins as already described). Jainism reconciles both these seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that the first view is true from the stand-point of modifications only which are subject to change every moment and the second view is also correct from the standpoint of elements of which the thing is composed. Onesided systems of philosophy deny the existence of attributes other than what they adopt, whereas the Jaina point of view admits their existence though these are not described being not of primary importance.”<sup>2</sup>

The *nayas* have been broadly classified as (i) *dravyārthika* which has the following varieties: (a) *naigama*, (b) *saṅgraha*, (c) *vyavahāra* and (ii) *paryāyārthika* which has the following varieties: (d) *rju-*

1. “अनेकात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम्।

एकदेशविशिष्टोऽयं नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥” *Nyāyāvātāra*, 29.

2. *Parikṣāmukha*, translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 199-200 (*Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. XI).

sūtra, (e) śabda, (f) samabhirūḍha and (g) evambhūta.<sup>1</sup>

In *dravyārthika naya*, the statements refer only to the general attributes of a substance and not to the modifications which the substance is constantly undergoing. In *paryāyārthika naya*, the statements refer to the constantly changing conditions of a substance.

The seven *nayas* are briefly illustrated below.

"I. *Naigama*, not literal or figurative: When we speak of a past or future event as a present one, we have an illustration of this *naya*. It is of three kinds relating to past, present and future. If we say on the Diwali day 'Lord Mahāvira attained liberation today', we mean that this day is the anniversary day of the past event. Again, we see a man booking his passage and on our query, he says, 'I am going to England'. This is a figurative way of speaking about a present event. Further when we see a man making a fire, and on our questioning him, he says, 'I am cooking', he really speaks of a future event for which he is making only a preparation.

II. *Samgraha*, common or general: When we use a word denoting a class to mean the whole, we have an example of this *naya*. By using the word '*Dravya*' we take the six kinds of *dravyas*<sup>2</sup> taking only the general attributes of *dravya* (substance) and not considering the distinguishing features.

III. *Vyavahāra*, distributive: When we divide or separate a general term into its classes, orders, kinds or specialities, we have an example of this *naya*. For example, when we speak of *dravya* (substance) implying its six subdivisions of (soul, matter, space, time, media of motion and rest), we have an example of this *naya*.

By *saṅgraha naya* the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular

1. नैगमसंग्रहव्यवहारजुसूत्रशब्दसमभिरूढैवंभूता नयाः ।" *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, I. 33.

2. *Jīva* (soul), *puṅgava* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time) are the six *dravyas* in Jainism.



properties and by *vyavahāra naya* the particular properties alone are considered.

IV. *Rju-sūtra*, the straight expression: This *naya* takes into account (1) the actual condition at a particular moment and (2) the actual condition for a long time. The first variety is called *sūkṣma* (fine) and the second *sthūla* (gross). A soul with a momentary good thought is an example of the former while a man with a human condition for a life-time is an example of the latter. By this *naya* a thing as it exists at present is considered without any reference to the past or future. The followers of this *naya* say that it is useless to ponder over things as they are in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment.

V. *Śabda*, Descriptive: This *naya* includes grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. From this point of view we can use the present for the past tense, plural for the singular number, feminine for the masculine gender, etc. An example of the first is when we speak 'In 1066 we see the Normans attack the Anglo-saxons'. The second is illustrated by the use of 'you' for one man. The third is exemplified by the use of a masculine name e.g. Lord Nelson for a vessel which is used in feminine gender.

VI. *Samabhirūḍha*, specific: This *naya* is employed when we give a word, a fixed meaning out of several which it has. This is exemplified by the use of the word 'nut' to denote an extra smart man or 'Dreadnought' to denote a particular kind of war-ship.

VII. *Evambhūta*, active: When we restrict the name to the very activity which is connected with the name we have an example of this *naya*, e.g., when we call Stratford-on-Avon by that name only so long as the town stands at the banks of the river Avon."<sup>1</sup>

In this verse, it is made clear that according to the

1. *Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. II, p. 45.

*nayas* detailed above, the Jainas accept a substance to exist from a particular aspect, not to exist from another aspect, both to exist and not exist from a third aspect or be indescribable from a fourth aspect.

It must be remembered that “these *nayas* deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision, but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of views. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular *naya* is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all these standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid *nayas* are inter-dependent and when they become independent the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the interdependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose.”<sup>1</sup>

सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत् स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयात् ।

असदेव विपर्यासान्न चेन्न व्यवतिष्ठते ॥15॥

sadeva sarvaṁ ko nechchhet svarūpādi-  
chatuṣṭayāt,  
asadeva viparyāsān-na chen-na vyavatiṣṭhate.

15. Who does not hold everything to exist from the four (aspects) *svārūpa* etc. (*sva-rūpa*, *sva-kṣetra*, *sva-kāla* and *sva-bhāva*)? On the contrary, who does not hold non-existence (with reference to the absence of these four, viz. *rūpa*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*)? If this be not (accepted), nothing can exist.

1. *Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Vol XI, pages 203-204.

## COMMENTARY

The seven modes of predication (*Saptabhaṅgī*) will now be taken up and discussed.

First, it is laid down that there are four aspects, viz., *rūpa* or *bhāva*, *dravya* (matter), *kṣetra* (place) and *kāla* (time). Whenever we predicate either affirmatively or negatively, our predication depends on these four aspects. When we predicate a particular form, matter, place or time with reference to a particular substance, we necessarily deny all these four belonging to alien substances as existing in the particular substance. For example, when we say "A pitcher (*ghaṭa*) exists," this statement can be examined from four different aspects, viz., with reference to *dravya*, i.e., the substance of which the pitcher is made, e.g., clay, *kṣetra*, i.e., the place where the pitcher is; *kāla*, i.e., the time during which the pitcher exists; and *bhāva*, i.e., the form or attributes of the pitcher. If it be an earthen pitcher, it exists in the form of clay and not of gold or other substance. It exists in a particular place when we speak about it and not in anything else. The pitcher exists also in a particular time when we speak about it and not in any other time. It also has a particular shape or colour as distinct from other shapes or colours. This is the first mode of predication, viz., *syādasti* of the *Saptabhaṅgī*, e.g., in a certain sense, the pitcher exists in the above four aspects. Thus the existence of a pitcher is affirmed as real with reference to *sva-rūpa*, *sva-dravya*, *sva-kṣetra* and *sva-kāla*. By the word "*svarūpādi-chatuṣṭayāt*" (from the four, *sva-rūpa* etc.) this is indicated.

The second mode of predication *syān-nāsti* (in a certain sense, it is not) is established by the denial of *para-rūpa*, *para-dravya*, *para-kṣetra* and *para-kāla*. For example, in the case of a jar, the attributes of another thing, viz., a cloth, being quite foreign, would be *para-rūpa*. A golden pitcher would be an example of *para-dravya* in the case of an earthen pitcher. *Para-kāla* would refer to the time when the pitcher before formation by the potter was mere clay or when after its destruction would be mere

shreds. Any other place where the pitcher is not situated would be its *para-kṣetra*.

Thus, the existence of a thing depends on its four aspects, *svarūpa* etc. and the non-existence of the same depends on its *pararūpa* etc. "The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *svarūpa* but differentiates itself from *pararūpa*. In experience, we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A jar is seen not merely as a jar, but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the jar at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non-self."<sup>1</sup>

By the words "if this be not (accepted) there will be nothing at all" the following is meant. "One individual jar has its individuality as *svarūpa*, and every other jar will be *pararūpa*. Jar 'A' exists on account of *svarūpa* and does not on account of *pararūpa*. If non-existence is associated with *svarūpa*, then there will be no jar at all; if existence follows from *pararūpa* then all jars will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones... If the jar exists in *parakṣetra* also, then there will be no place without a jar... If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory... If a thing exists in *parakāla* also as in *svakāla*, then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in *svakāla*, as in *parakāla*, then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration."<sup>2</sup> Similar absurdity will arise if we accept that a jar exists in *para-dravya* or it does not exist in *sva-dravya*.

क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तिः ।

अवक्तव्योत्तराः शेषास्त्रयो भंगाः स्वहेतुतः ॥16॥

**kramārpita-dvayād dvaitaṁ sahāvāchyamaśaktiḥ,  
Avaktavyottarāḥ śeṣāstrayo bhaṅgāḥ svahetutaḥ.**

1. *Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Vol. III, p. LXXIII.

2. *Ibid*, pages LXXI and LXXII.

16. By consecutive application of the two, we get the category where both (existence and non-existence) can be predicated. Owing to absence of power of expression, the category of indescribability arises (when all qualities are desired to be expressed at the same time). From its own cause, the remaining three categories followed by *avaktavya* arise.

### COMMENTARY

The remaining modes of predication are referred to in this verse.

The third mode is *syādasti-nāsti*. It has already been mentioned in the commentary to the previous verse that every substance “when thought of in respect of its substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time of existence (*kāla*) and attributes (*bhāva*), does in a certain sense exist; and when the substance, place, time and attributes of other things are thought of, the thing itself does not exist. So in this third way of speaking, two natures of the thing (existence of the thing and non-existence of other things) are considered, first one and then the other. For example, the jar is a jar and is not cloth.”<sup>1</sup>

The fourth mode is *syād-avaktavya*. “This fourth way of speaking denies the possibility of mentioning at one and the same moment what the thing is and what it is not. The necessity for this way of speaking is that these two natures (what it is and what it is not) exist in a thing at one and the same time (or simultaneously), but it is impossible to express them simultaneously; when we see that there are two trees, a mango-tree and an orange-tree, they both exist simultaneously, but they come to our knowledge first one and then the other, and not simultaneously.”<sup>2</sup>

The fifth mode is *syād-asti chāvaktavya*. “In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is that

1. *Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy*, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 38-39.

2. *Ibid*, p. 39.

finds expression, and the reason for adding *avaktavya* is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is, we wish to mention also that the thing has simultaneously negative attributes (is-not-ness) but that it is impossible to express them simultaneously. There is a jar here; but, as it is impossible to say simultaneously both what it is and what it is not, the word *avaktavya* is inserted in this statement.”<sup>1</sup>

The sixth mode is *syān-nāsti chāvaktavya*. “In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is not that finds expression. And the reason for adding *avaktavya* is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is not, we wish to mention that the thing has at the same time positive attributes (is-ness) but that it is impossible to give them expression while we are proving what the thing is not.”<sup>2</sup>

The seventh and the last mode is *syād-asti-nāsti chāvaktavya*. “In the seventh mode of speaking one expresses first what the thing (jar, for instance) is, and then what it is not; and one adds that it is impossible to express both what it is and what it is not simultaneously. When one is talking of the attributes of a thing there is existence, and when he is talking of the attributes of another thing there is non-existence in the first thing, but it is impossible to express them both at the same time.”<sup>3</sup>

Kundakunda in his *Pañchāstikāya-sāra* (verse 14) has described the *Saptabhaṅgī* : “Accordingly as *dravya* is viewed from different aspects of reasoning, it may be described by the following propositions: (1) perhaps it is, (2) perhaps it is not, (3) perhaps it is both (is and is not), (4) perhaps it is indefinable, (5) perhaps it is and is indefinable, (6) perhaps it is not and is indefinable, and (7) perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable.”<sup>4</sup>

1. *Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy*, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 39.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

3. *Ibid.*

4. “सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं।

दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥”

*Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. III, p. 11.

“*Avaktavya* should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then *avaktavya* itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.”<sup>1</sup>

This viewing of things from particular aspect has now being given an important place by less modern philosophers of the West. We find in Wolfenden’s *The Approach to Philosophy* that special sciences deal “with some specially selected aspect of the general world and its conclusions apply to that special aspect alone. Any characteristics which a thing may possess in any other relations or for other purposes are irrelevant. To the psychologist people are their actions; to the physiologist they are more or less efficient organisms; to the chemist they are various collections of elements; to the physicist they are forces in motion. These same people may also be good husbands or good squash players, but these aspects of their whole personality are at the moment irrelevant. They may become relevant when the statistician enquires into these sides of their natures.”<sup>2</sup> *Anekāntvāda* or *Syādvāda* accepts different points of view. When we want to lay stress upon one point, the many are left in the background but are admitted by implication and not totally denied. The truth will be one in the many or many of the one. This is the utility of the use of ‘*syāt*’. “The quality predicated is ‘probably’ or ‘perhaps’ true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject.”<sup>3</sup>

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has criticised the *Saptabhāṅgī* saying that in the same manner hundred *bhāṅgīs* can be formed.<sup>4</sup> But the answer to this is that though many things can be said regarding a substance, the possible ways of

1. *Pañchāstikāya-sāra* (Chakravarti), p. 13.

2. *Pravachana-sāra* (Upadhye), p. XC.

3. *Pañchāstikāya-samayasāra* (Chakravarti), p. 12.

4. “सप्तभंगीप्रसादेन शतभंग्यपि जायते।”

speaking about its attributes will always be seven in number. The predication (and not the innumerable attributes present, past or future) will be in one of these seven ways. "The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates one of the qualities of a thing."<sup>1</sup>

अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि ।

विशेषणत्वात्साधर्म्यं यथा भेदविवक्षया ॥17॥

**astitvaṁ pratiṣedhyenāvinābhāvyeka-dharminī,  
viśeṣaṇatvāt sādharmaṇ yathā bhedavivakṣayā.**

17. As (we express) homogeneousness with the desire of establishing the difference (of its opposite), so according to qualification, (there is) existence in a single substance which is co-existent with its opposite.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, it is established by argument how existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same substance.

In Nyāya philosophy the familiar example of an inference is "the hill is full of fire because there is smoke on it." We establish the existence of fire (*sādhya*) by smoke (*sādhana*) through illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*). This *dṛṣṭānta* may be given affirmatively, e.g., "where there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen" or negatively "where there is no smoke there is not fire as in a lake". The inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) is shown in these cases by *sādharmya* (homogeneousness) or *vaidharmya* (heterogeneousness). The two syllogisms will be as follows : this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, just as the kitchen (homogeneous example). this hill has no smoke, because it has no fire, just as a lake (heterogeneous example).

1. *Jainism* (H. Warren), p. 21.



Fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen, and by the homogeneous example inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhya*) and the middle term (*hetu*) is established. Similarly the heterogeneous example reassures the connection by contrariety, viz., by showing that absence of the major term (*sādhya*) is attended by the absence of the middle term (*hetu*).<sup>1</sup>

In this verse, it is mentioned that in a *dharmī* (thing possessing qualities, e.g., a *jīva*), existence has inseparable connection with non-existence. "For instance the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example)."<sup>2</sup>

This inseparable connection is similar to *sādharmya* (homogeneousness) and *vaidharmya* (heterogeneousness) in the middle term (e.g., smoke in the example of syllogism already given). Akalaṅka has given this in the shape of a syllogism.<sup>3</sup>

नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि ।

विशेषणत्वाद्वैधर्म्यं यथाऽभेदविवक्षया ॥18॥

**nāstitvaṁ pratiṣedhyenāvinābhāvyaekadharmini,  
viśeṣaṇatvād-vaidharmyaṁ yathā'bhedā-vivakṣayā.**

18. As we express heterogeneousness with the desire of establishing non-difference, so according to qualification, (there is) non-existence in a single substance

1. "साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्यत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् ।

साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ॥

साध्ये निवर्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसंभवः ।

ख्यायते यत्र दृष्टान्ते वैधर्म्येणेति स स्मृतः ॥" *Nyāyāvatāra*, verse 18 and 19.

"यो यो धूमवानसावसावग्निमान् यथा महानसः इति साधर्म्योदाहरणम् ।

यो योऽग्निमात्रं भवति स स धूमवान् भवति, यथा महाह्रदः, इति वैधर्म्योदाहरणम् ॥"

*Nyāya-dīpikā*, Prakāśa III.

2. *Jainism* (H. Warren), p. 21.

3. "तस्माद् यद् विशेषणं तत् प्रतिषेध्यविनाभावि क्वचिद् धर्मिणि, यथा साधर्म्यं भेदविवक्षया, कृतकत्वादौ विशेषणं चास्तित्वं ततः प्रतिषेध्यधर्मप्रतिबन्धि ।"

which is co-existent with its opposite.

### COMMENTARY

If someone says that as you accept existence inseparably connected with non-existence, so when its opposite will come, viz., non-existence will be predicated, you will have to accept its contrary, viz., existence. Thus, when a substance does not absolutely exist, such as flowers in the sky or horns of a hare, you should also accept its existence.<sup>1</sup> A reply is given that by inference we establish the reality of substances capable of our understanding and our example of homogeneousness or heterogeneousness applies to the establishment of such substances only.<sup>2</sup>

The non-existence of horns of a hare can be proved by inferential process, but it does not mean that its real existence arises from *Saptabhaṅgī*. A *dharmī* is known sometimes by *pramāṇa*, sometimes by *vikalpa* (imagination) and sometimes both by *vikalpa* and *pramāṇa*.<sup>3</sup> An example of the first is "this mountain has fire"; that of the second is "there exists an omniscient being"; that of the third is "sound is not eternal."<sup>4</sup>

When we see smoke and infer fire, the object in which the fire is (e.g., the mountain) is known by *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. But in the case of our belief in the existence and non-existence, viz., "the omniscient exists" or "horns of the ass do not exist", the *sādhya* consisting

1. "भवतु तावदस्तित्वं जीवादौ नास्तित्वेनाविनाभावि । नास्तित्वं तु कथमस्तित्वाविनाभावि, ख-पुष्पादौ कथञ्चिदप्यस्तित्वासंभवादिति मन्यमानान् प्रत्याहुः ।" *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*.
2. "न हि स्वेच्छाप्रकृतुधर्मधर्मिव्यवस्थायां परमार्थावतारः स्यात् तदसमीक्षिततत्त्वार्थै-  
लोकप्रतीतिवशाद् भेदाभेदव्यवस्थितिस्तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तये समाश्रियत इति बालाभिलापकल्पं  
भावस्वभावोपरोधात् ।" *Aṣṭaśatī*.
3. "प्रसिद्धत्वं च धर्मिणः क्वचित् प्रमाणात्, क्वचिद् विकल्पात्, क्वचित् प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याम् ।"  
*Nyāya-dīpikā*.
4. "तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धो धर्मो यथा धूमवत्त्वादग्निमत्त्वे साध्ये पर्वतः खलु प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते ।  
.. उभयसिद्धो धर्मो यथा शब्दो परिणामी कृतकत्वाद् इत्यत्र शब्दः ।" *Nyāya-dīpikā*.

of existence or non-existence is preceded by our such belief. So these are cases of *vikalpa-siddhi* of the *dharmī*.<sup>1</sup>

Refutation of a non-existent thing by argument does not therefore lead to its existence by *Sapta-bhaṅgī*.

विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा विशेष्यः शब्दगोचरः ।

साध्यधर्मो यथा हेतुरहेतुश्चाप्यपेक्षया ॥19॥

*vidheyapratishedhyātmā viśeṣyaḥ śabda-gocharaḥ,*  
*sādhya-dharmo yathā hetur-ahetuśchāpyapekṣayā.*

19. The minor term is understood by sound, as it comprises the major term and its opposite. (This is) as, according to the desire of a speaker, the relationship of the major term is or is not with the middle term.

### COMMENTARY

In the example of inference "the mountain has fire as it has smoke", the mountain is the *pakṣa* (minor term), fire is the *sādhya* (major term) and smoke is *hetu*, *linga* or *sādhana* (middle term).

Now the word *vidheya* in the verse may be taken to mean *astitva* (existence). Its *pratishedhī* (opposite) will be *nāstitva* (non-existence). A substance which has these qualities, viz., *jīva* etc. might be considered as a *pakṣa* (minor term) in a syllogism. The qualities of *sādhya* would be its manifestation etc. These qualities are considered *hetu* (middle term) when we desire to establish their non-eternal aspect and *ahetu* (not the middle term) when we consider their eternal aspect. The example will be "Where the substance exists, the qualities

1. "विकल्पसिद्धो यथा, सर्वज्ञः अस्ति सुनिश्चितासंभवबाधकप्रमाणत्वाद् इत्यस्तित्वे साध्ये सर्वज्ञः । अथवा खरविषाणं नास्तीति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरविषाणम् । सर्वज्ञो ह्यस्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राङ् न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धः । अपि तु प्रतीतिमात्रसिद्ध इति विकल्पसिद्धोऽयं धर्मः । तथा खरविषाणमपि नास्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राग् विकल्पसिद्धम् ।" "विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्तयोरैव साध्यत्वमिति नियमः ।" *Nyāya-dīpikā*.

exist” or “where the substance does not exist, the qualities do not exist.” In this manner, existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same thing as it can be established by process of inference as shown above.<sup>1</sup> In the familiar example, when the major term is fire, smoke becomes *hetu* but when the major term is water, smoke becomes *ahetu*. As in the same substance, the existence or absence of fire is established by different syllogisms, viz., through inseparable connection of fire and smoke or inseparable connection of absence of smoke in water, so there is no absurdity in holding existence and non-existence in the same substance by *Sapta-bhaṅgi*.

By a similar process of inference it can be established that substances, *jīva* etc., can be known by words.<sup>2</sup>

शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या यथोक्तनययोगतः ।

न च कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति मुनीन्द्र तव शासने ॥20॥

śeṣabhaṅgāścha netavya yathokta-naya-yogataḥ,  
na cha kaśchid-virodho'sti munindra tava śāśane.

20. According to the connection of proper *nayas*, the remaining categories also are to be applied. O ! the best of the *Kevalins*, in your doctrine, there is no fault whatever.

### COMMENTARY

The categories *syād-asti* and *syān-nāsti* have been fully explained regarding their application. The other five categories, *syād-avaktavya* etc. (as mentioned before), are

1. “विधेयमस्तित्वम्, प्रतिपेक्ष्यं नास्तित्वम्... तौ आत्मानौ स्वभावौ यस्य स विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा, अर्थः सर्वो जीवादिरिति पक्षः । विशेष्यत्वादिति हेतुः, विशेष्य इति हेतुनिर्देशात् ।... साध्यो धर्मो साध्यधर्माधारतया तस्य साध्यव्यपदेशात्, तथोपचारस्य दृष्टान्तधर्मिव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् । तस्य धर्मो विवर्त्त उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादिः । स यथा हेतुरनित्यत्वसाध्यापेक्षया, नित्यत्वसाध्यापेक्षयाहेतुश्च, गमकत्वागमकत्वायोगात्, तथा साध्याविनाभावेतरसद्भावादिति दृष्टान्तः । इत्यनुमानात् सत्त्वेतरात्मकः कथंचित् जीवाद्यर्थः सिद्ध्यत्येव ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
2. “शब्दगोचरो जीवादिः विशेष्यत्वात् तद्वत्, इत्यनुमानात्तस्य साधनात् ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

to be applied in a similar manner according to the different standpoints of a speaker. Owing to difference in *nayas*, different categories will arise.

So it is urged that there is no contradiction in Jain doctrine. In doctrines defects like contradiction, doubt etc. arise because the propounders only insist upon one aspect of things, refusing to admit the different aspects of objects, which really is the true nature of substances.

एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्यामनवस्थितमर्थकृत् ।

नेति चेन्न यथाकार्यं बहिरन्तरुपाधिभिः ॥21॥

**evaṃ vidhi-niṣedhābhyāmanavasthitamarthakṛt,  
neti chenna yathākāryam vahirantarupādhibhiḥ.**

21. In this manner, a substance understood by existence and non-existence becomes the cause of an effect. If you say no, the proper cause of an effect can not exist.

### COMMENTARY

“The Bauddhas who are known in philosophy as *Kṣaṇika-ekānta-vādins*... emphasize upon the fleeting nature of all existence... Thus the Bauddhas are exactly our ‘flowing philosophers’ holding everything to be ‘mere currents of incessant change’. Jainism waged a fierce war with them in old times, although by some irony of fate, in our own days, distinguished antiquarians piously confused one belligerent with the other...

Nothing is; but everything is not as soon as it is. The moment that it lives, is also the moment that it ceases to live. There is no being; all is always becoming. But is becoming possible for what is not being?

Cause and effect are in reality two phases of one and the same thing. The two are relative terms, with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But *Kṣaṇikavāda* makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause

nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to mere sequence in time. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare time-successions, as the *Kṣaṇikavādins* in ancient India or Comte and Mill in modern Europe tried to hold. The *Kṣaṇikavādins* were not satisfied with these arguments and they rejoined by insisting that the 'unity of nature' between cause and effect as understood by Jainism was a fictitious or *aupachārika* one. It is, said they, an illusion, or as Mill would say, a mental habit and not a real fact. What is an illusion or mental habit? We think a cat as being 'a lion' or 'like a lion' by illusion or mental habit; but is this possible without our ever having seen some lion? Even an illusion pre-supposes a reality of which it is an illusion. The fiction of causal relation is therefore founded upon unquestionable facts."<sup>1</sup>

In this verse it is urged that it is only when a substance is understood by two categories, viz., existence and non-existence, that it can become cause of an effect. For example, gold, when transformed into an ear-ring, becomes an *upādāna kāraṇa* of an ornament. In denial of this aspect of categories, the proper cause of an effect will cease to exist.

धर्मं धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो धर्मिणोऽनन्तधर्मणः ।

अङ्गित्वेऽन्यतमान्तस्य शेषान्तानां तदङ्गता ॥22॥

dharme dharme'nya evārtho dharmiṇo'nanta-  
dharmaṇaḥ,  
aṅgitve'nyatamāntasya śeṣāntānām tadaṅgatā.

22. The implication of infinite qualities of a substance

1. *An Introduction to Jainism*, A.B. Hatthe, pages 113-116.

is different in each category. When one among these is given prominence, the others become subsidiary.

### COMMENTARY

“A *naya* deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes, but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word ‘*syāt*’ to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular standpoint but it is not so from other points of view. *Syāt* suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them.

*Nayas* deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of view. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular *naya* is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all those standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid *nayas* are interdependent and when they become independent, the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the inter-dependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose. This principle is applied to the doctrine of *nayas*.

Āchārya Amṛtachandra Sūri has mentioned that as a milk-maid draws part of the rope of the churning rod

by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd, so the Jaina doctrine of *naya* gives prominence to a particular attribute leaving aside the other views and by this means churns the nectar of reality (*tattva*):

“एकेनाकर्षन्ती श्लथयन्ती वस्तुतत्त्वमितरेण ।

अन्तेन जयति जैनी नीतिर्मन्याननेत्रमिव गोपी ॥” (*Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*, verse 225.<sup>1</sup>)

एकानेकविकल्पादावुत्तरत्रापि योजयेत् ।

प्रक्रियां भङ्गिनीमेनां नयैर्नयविशारदः ॥23 ॥

**ekāneka-vikalpādāvuttaratrāpi yojayet,  
prakriyāṁ bhaṅginīmenāṁ nayairnayaviśāradaḥ.**

23. One adept in the use of *naya* should apply this method consisting of categories, as in the divergence of one or the many etc.

### COMMENTARY

This method of the application of different categories will be shown further on, as the author will proceed to criticise the theory of *Advaitavāda* etc. It will then be seen that the theory of *Syādvāda*, will refute the one-sided theories of *Advaitavādins*.

### End of Chapter I

1. See *Parikṣāmukha* (S.C. Ghoshal) *Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. XI, page 199-204.



## Chapter II

अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते ।

कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ॥24 ॥

**advaitaikāntapakṣe'pi dṛṣṭo bhedo virudhyate,  
kāraḥkāṇāṃ kriyāyāścha naikam svasmāt prajāyate.**

24. Also, according to *Advaitaikānta* view, the perceptible differences, e.g. of instrumental cause, predicates etc. become impossible. One cannot be born (or produced) of itself.

### COMMENTARY

The view of those who follow the doctrine of *Advaitavāda* is refuted in this verse. The doctrine of *Advaitavāda* as preached by the celebrated *Śaṅkarāchārya* is that all the phenomenal universe and all the spiritual world is one homogenous spirit (Brahma) containing and absorbing all the illusory manifestations in the universe. Two objections are raised in this verse to oppose this view. The first is, self cannot create the self. "That means that *Advaitism* cannot explain without some duality to help how the all-in-all gave rise to itself or to the other-than-itself."<sup>3</sup> The second objection is that if we follow *Advaitavāda*, the universally accepted duals like the doer (*kāraka*) and its action (*kriyā*), the things inferred (*parichhchedya vastu*) and the inference (*pramāṇa*) cannot exist. As visible differences cannot be accounted for by adoption of only Brahma, a doctrine of *Māyā* had to be introduced by the *Advaitavādins* to explain such differences. The Jaina view is that the acceptance of *Māyā* at once does away with the absolute Brahma and as soon as Brahma begins to work, its essential characteristic

vanishes. In other words, the Jaina doctrine urges that the attempt of *Advaitavādins* to connect the ideal with the real world has failed.

कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं च नो भवेत् ।

विद्याविद्याद्वयं न स्यात् बन्धमोक्षद्वयं तथा ॥25॥

karma-dvaitam phala-dvaitam loka-dvaitam cha no  
bhavet,  
vidyāvidyā-dayam na syāt bandha-mokṣa-dvayam  
tathā.

25. If we accept the *Advaitavāda*, there will not be the two kinds of *karmas* (good and evil), the two kinds of results of these *karmas*, (viz., *punya*, *pāpa*, virtue and vice), the two kinds of *loka* (mundane and the other world). Even *vidyā* (the true knowledge) and *avidyā* (absence of true knowledge) will cease to exist. There will also be non-existence of *bandha* (bondage) and *mokṣa* (liberation).

### COMMENTARY

The argument against *Advaitavāda* which is mentioned in this verse is that if we accept this view, there would be no distinction between an auspicious and an inauspicious action (*śubha* and *aśubha karmas*), virtue (*punya*) and vice (*pāpa*), the mundane world (*ihaloka*) and the other world (*paraloka*), the true knowledge (*jñāna*) and ignorance or absence of true knowledge (*ajñāna*), bondage (*bandha*) and *mokṣa* (liberation). All these different kinds of conceptions are admitted even by *Advaitavādins*. But by accepting *Brahma* as the only real thing in existence, these distinctions will disappear.

हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः ।

हेतुना चेद् विना सिद्धिर्द्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम् ॥26॥

**hetoradvaita-siddhiśched dvaitaṁ syāddhetu-  
sādhyaḥ,  
hetunā ched vinā siddhir-dvaitaṁ vānmātrato na kim.**

26. If the establishment of *Advaita* be from *hetu* (the middle term), there will be duality of *hetu* (the middle term) and *sādhya* (the major term). If the establishment be without the middle term, why not *Dvaitavāda* be accepted from mere words?

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, another argument against *Advaitavāda* is advanced. Can *Advaitavāda* be proved by logical process of reasoning or do you say that *Advaitavāda* is not proved by any logical process of reason but is its own justification? Both these questions are taken up and decided in this verse.

Now, in an inference, we prove a thing through universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) which is a kind of relationship between the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*). For example, we infer fire (which is the major term or *sādhya*) from smoke (which is the middle term or *Hetu*) through the relationship of universal concomitance, viz., where there is fire, there is smoke.

If you say that *Advaitavāda* is established by inference, you must accept a major term and middle term. This is against the view that there is nothing but one (*Advaita*). *Hetu* (the middle term) and *sādhya* (the major term) being used in a reasoning to establish *Advaitavāda*, it must bring in duality (*Dvaitavāda*), the very opposite of *Advaitavāda*.

If you say, that *Advaitavāda* is not established by reason but by itself, the reasoning will be absurd. Nothing can be its own proof. If from mere words, a thing is established, anybody can establish anything by merely uttering it in words ("स्वाभिलापमात्रादर्थसिद्धौ सर्वं सर्वस्य सिद्ध्येत्"—*Aṣṭaśatī*). Further, if *Advaitavāda* can be proved by itself without the help of any reasoning, *Dvaitavāda* can also

be said to be established in this manner, which will give a deathblow to the former.

अद्वैतं न विना द्वैतादहेतुरिव हेतुना ।

संज्ञिनः प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेध्यादृते क्वचित् ॥27॥

**advaitam na vinā dvaitādaheturiva hetunā,  
sañjñīnaḥ pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyādr̥te kvachit.**

27. As without *ahetu*, (there is) no *hetu*, so without *dvaita*, there cannot be *advaita*. Regarding every thing there cannot be refutation, if there be no object to be refuted.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, it is urged that *Advaitavāda* must accept *Dvaitavāda* on the principle that to establish a thing by refuting another, there must be an object to be refuted. Without *Dvaita*, there cannot be *Advaita* as without an *ahetu* there cannot be a *hetu*. "It is a universal law of the mind to have its negative ideas based upon the knowledge of its positive ideas. You know a 'flower' and it is because you know it that you can say that there is no 'flower in the sky'. You know that fire is inferred from the existence of smoke (*hetu*) and only from this knowledge it is that you can say that you cannot draw the same inference from the existence of water (*ahetu*). Similarly when you know that there is dualism (*Dvaita*) in the universe, then and then only, you can imagine its negative, the absence of dualism (*Advaita*)."<sup>1</sup>

पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक्कृतौ ।

पृथक्त्वे न पृथक्त्वं स्यादनेकस्थो ह्यसौ गुणः ॥28॥

**pṛthaktvaikāntapakṣe'pi pṛthakatvādpṛthakkṛtau,  
pṛthaktve na pṛthaktvaṁ syādanekastho hyasau  
guṇaḥ.**

1. *An Introduction to Jainism* by A.B. Latthe. p. 122.

28. Also, in the one-sided view which holds the separate existence (of many objects), there will not be individuality owing to non-separation of an object and its qualities. Further, there will be no separate existence, if the object and its qualities are held to be inseparable. It is certain that a quality can exist (in many objects).

### COMMENTARY

Refutation of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views, viz., that there is separate existence of different properties and of their qualities is made in this verse. If we urge that everything is separate from everything else, we come to a view insisting on many being true as opposed to *Advaitavāda* which insists on only one being true. As Jainism fights against all one-sided (*ekānta*) views, a refutation of this view follows the refutation of the Vedānta view (*Advaitavāda*). "If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all, e.g., materiality (a *guṇa*) is the property common to *guṇins*, *ghaṭa* (a pitcher), *paṭa* (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality their independence also will be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing in common and hence, even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the *Nyāya* (and Vaiśeṣika school) is vitiated by the very presuppositions of their own school."<sup>1</sup>

सन्तानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरंकुशः ।

प्रेत्यभावश्च तत्सर्वं न स्यादेकत्विहणवे ॥29॥

santānaḥ samudāyaś-cha sādharmaṃ cha

niraṅkuṣaḥ,

pretyabhāvaścha tatsarvaṃ na syādekatva-nihṇave.

29. If we deny similarity or identity (in one sense) there will not be any gradual flow consisting of cause

1. *An Introduction to Jainism*, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

giving rise to an effect, or the existence (of different qualities) in a single object, or similarity or birth following death, for all of these would become impossible.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse the view of the Buddhists, who hold existence to be separate and momentary, is refuted.

We know that gradual change happens from one substance to another, e.g., milk changes into curd. The flow of cause producing effect in such cases shows that there is a continual connection between the two. Momentary existence of two separate substances in such cases would be opposed to reality. Further we know that in an object, there are different qualities, form, colour etc. But if we accept like the Buddhists the theory of changes following each other in succession, all these qualities become fictitious for there would remain nothing stable of which these can be properties. "If knowledge consists of passing sensations without the unity of apperception to connect them, there is no *pratyavijñā* or recognition, e.g., this house as being the one that I visited yesterday."<sup>1</sup> There will also be no knowledge of similarity on the same principle. If nothing remains stable, the persistence of human personality after death which is accepted by the Buddhists becomes impossible by their own doctrine. So the Jains do not accept the Buddhist view that in our mind we get unconnected but successive sensations received from objects.

सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेत् ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाद् द्विधाप्यसत् ।

ज्ञानाभावे कथं ज्ञेयं बहिरन्तश्च ते द्विषाम् ॥30॥

sadātmanā cha bhinnam chet jñānam jñeyād  
dvidhāpyasat,  
jñānābhāve katham jñeyam bahirantaścha te dviṣām.

1. *An Introduction to Jainism*, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

30. If knowledge be different from the object known, these will be separate in their real existence. It will cease to exist in twofold manner. To those who are against this view, how can there be an object known internally or externally in absence of knowledge.

### COMMENTARY

Another argument is adduced to refute the view of those who accept the reality of separate existence of different things. If you say that everything has a separate real existence, you must accept the separate existence of knowledge and the object known. The result would be that both would become non-existent, for how can there be knowledge if there be not the thing known? There might be internal or external object of knowledge. But every such object would become non-existent, if there be no knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Again, if knowledge be non-existent, the object of knowledge will also become non-existent as the object of knowledge depends on knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

So the view of the Buddhists like that of the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy who hold the one-sided view of separate existence, is refuted.<sup>3</sup>

In the verse, "your opponents" mean those who are opposite to Jain *Anekāntavāda*. The *Āpta* is adored as 'You' as in previous verses.

सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां विशेषो नाभिलष्यते ।

सामान्याभावतस्तेषां मृषैव सकला गिरः ॥31॥

**sāmānyārthā giro'nyeṣāṃ viśeṣo nābhilapyate,  
sāmānyābhāvatasteṣāṃ mṛṣaiva sakalā girah.**

1. "सदात्मना सत्सामान्यात्मना भिन्नमेव ज्ञानं ज्ञेयात् इति चेत्, द्विधाप्यसदेव प्राप्तं ज्ञानस्य असत्त्वे ज्ञेयस्य असत्त्वप्रसंगात् । ततो बहिरन्तश्च न किञ्चित् कथंचिदपि ज्ञेयं नाम त्वद्दृष्टिषां प्रतीयेत ।" *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*.
2. "तदभावे बहिरन्तर्वा ज्ञेयमेव न स्यात्, तदपेक्षत्वात् ।" *Aṣṭaśati*.
3. "ततः श्रेयानयम् उपालम्भः पृथक्त्वैकान्तवाचां तायागतानां वैशेषिकवत् ।" *Aṣṭaśati*.

31. The doctrine of those who profess generalization, does not touch the differentiation. All of their words become false for absence of generalization.

### COMMENTARY

All objects have two kinds of properties, viz, *sāmānya* (general or generalizing) and *viśeṣa* (specific or differentiating). The general properties express the genus (*jāti*) etc. and the specific properties describe the species, differences and distinctions. From general properties, we get the idea of *jar-ness* in hundred pitchers and from specific properties people distinguish their own pitchers from others.<sup>1</sup>

In this verse, the view of the Buddhists who suppose a general property (*Sāmānya*) without reference to the specific properties of a thing is refuted. It is urged that this view is absurd as everything becomes non-existent being devoid of its differentiating quality. For example, 'the horn of an ass' is without any differentia because it is totally non-existent. In the same way a thing is without its differentia only when it is considered to be totally non-existent.

By the word *Anyeṣām* and *Teṣām* in the verse the Buddhists are meant. It is laid down that all their words are false as in absence of differentiation, generalization cannot exist and without generalization, no process of inference can proceed.

1. अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्यविशेषा उभयात्मकाः ।  
सामान्यं तत्र जात्यादि विशेषश्च विभेदकाः ॥  
ऐक्यबुद्धिर्घटशते भवेत् सामान्यधर्मतः ।  
विशेषाच्च निजं निजं लक्षयन्ति घटं जनाः ॥



विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥32॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidviṣāṁ,  
avāchyatāikānte'pyuktiṁnāvāchyamiti yujyate.

32. The particular view of those who are antagonistic to the doctrine of *Syādvāda* that a thing can have both aspects together (cannot stand) as it is an impossibility. The view of those who hold that a thing is inexpressible cannot stand, being indescribable.

### COMMENTARY

Akalaṅka explains this verse as follows: It is not possible that an object possessing qualities should have two natures opposed to each other existing at the same time. For example, existence and non-existence, oneness or many-sidedness, cannot be jointly predicated of the same thing, as one will oppose the other and existence of both will be self-contradictory; barren woman and a child cannot be connected together.<sup>1</sup>

Again, those who maintain the *avaktavya* view, viz., that everything is unknowable, are inconsistent with themselves. Some knowledge about a thing must exist before we can call it unknowable. So Jainism urges that uncertainty in knowledge is not an acceptable position.

अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तुद्वयहेतुतः ।

तदेवैक्यं पृथक्त्वं च स्वभेदैः साधनं यथा ॥33॥

anapekṣe pr̥thaktvaikye hyavastu dvayaahetutaḥ,  
tadevaikyaṁ pr̥thaktvaṁ cha svabhedaiḥ  
sāadhanam yathā.

1. "अस्तित्वनास्तित्वैकत्वानेकत्ववत् पृथक्त्वेतर-परस्परप्रत्यनीकस्वभावद्वयसंभवोऽपि मा भूद्विप्रतिषेधात् । न खलु सर्वात्मना विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽस्ति तदन्योन्यविधिप्रतिषेध-लक्षणत्वाद्बन्ध्यासुतवत् ।" *Astaśati*.

33. Because of two reasons, those which are not related or are entirely separate, cannot become anything. Just as in the case of a *sādhana*, there is unity and diversity according to its variety.

### COMMENTARY

There might be an argument like this. Diversity is not existent because it is not connected with or related to unity. Again, unity alone cannot be in existence, because it is void of diversity. Though by showing the absurdity of such a reasoning the view of those who hold the *Ekānta* view can be refuted by our previously showing<sup>1</sup> the twofold reasoning based (i) on unity and diversity as well as (ii) on neutrality. As fire is established from the existence of *pakṣa*, smoke, and non-existence of water (which is *vipakṣa*), so substances like *jīva* are established by a dual process of reasoning, e.g., substances like *jīva* become one when regarded through the existence of *pakṣa*, and they are regarded as different when they are established through difference.<sup>2</sup>

A thing has different varieties and different qualities. Without a noun there cannot be adjectives such as "horns of a hare." Again without qualifying adjectives differentiating a substance, we cannot have an idea of the latter. To meet both these points, acceptance of *Anekāntavāda* is necessary, that is to say unity and diversity are not absolute realities.<sup>3</sup>

सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्-द्रव्यादिभेदतः ।

भेदाभेदविवक्षायामसाधारणहेतुवत् ॥34॥

sat-sāmānyāttu sarvaikyam pṛthag-dravyādi-  
bhedataḥ,  
bhedābheda-vivakṣāyāmasādhāraṇa-hetuvat.

1. See Verse 24 and the following.
2. "यस्मादवस्त्वैवानपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ऐक्यपृथक्त्वनिरपेक्षहेतुद्वयात् प्रतिपादिते प्राक्, तस्मात्तदेवैक्यं पृथक्त्वं च जीवादिवस्तु कथंचिदेकत्वपृथक्त्वप्रत्ययहेतुद्वयादवसीयते । यथा साधनं सत्त्वादि पक्षधर्मत्वसपक्षसत्त्व-विपक्षासत्त्वलक्षणैर्भेदैः विशिष्टमेकं प्रसिद्धमुभयोः ।" *Aṣṭasahasri*.
3. "एकत्वपृथक्त्वे नैकान्ततः स्तः प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधादिति स्पष्टयति ।" *Ibid*

34. The unity is regarding existence which is inherent (in everything) and the diversity is regarding the difference in *dravya* etc. This is like the uncommon *hetu* when one wishes to speak about unity or diversity.

### COMMENTARY

By the word *hetu* employed here, the *hetu* as employed in inference (*anumāna*) is to be understood. Such a *hetu* is of two kinds: *jñāpaka* (that which makes a thing known, viz., smoke leading to the knowledge of fire) or *kāraka* (that from which a thing is made, viz., clay from which a pitcher is manufactured). We have different intentions when we speak of these different kinds of *hetu*. So when we intend merely to speak of existence, all substances (*jīva* etc.) are the same, but when we wish to express the difference according to *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* (already explained before) they are different.<sup>1</sup>

विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च विशेष्येऽनन्तधर्मिणि ।

सतो विशेषणस्यात्र नासतस्तैस्तदर्थिभिः ॥35॥

**vivakṣā chāvivakṣā cha viśeṣye'nanta-dharminī,**  
**sato viśeṣaṇasyātra nāsatastaistadarthibhiḥ.**

35. Those wishing for it, want to speak or not about an existing quality of a substance possessing infinite qualities, and not of non-existing (qualities).

### COMMENTARY

This verse attempts to refute the view of the Buddhists who say that unity and divergence cannot be established by one's desire to speak or not about a

1. "सत्तामान्यं विशेषणमाश्रित्य सर्वेषां जीवादीनामैक्यमिति नैकत्वप्रत्ययो निर्विषयः, तस्य सत्तामान्यविशेषत्वात्, पृथक् सर्वं जीवादि द्रव्यादिपदार्थभेदमाश्रित्यानुभूयते। ततो न पृथक्त्वप्रत्ययोऽपि निर्विषयः, तस्य द्रव्यादिभेदविषयत्वादिति निवेदितं बोद्धव्यम्। हेतुरत्र ज्ञापकः कारकश्च उच्यते।" *Aṣṭasahasri*

certain quality of a substance, as both of these are unreal. For example, when we speak about unity, we deny the existence of diversity and vice versa. The reply is that when we want to speak about anything, we accept its existence. We never want to speak about anything which is non-existent. Otherwise we cannot have any action performed. By merely saying "a man, and fire" we cannot get cooking. There must be action to get cooking. The connection between qualities which we hold to be non-existing, when we want to speak about it, is merely an analogy.<sup>1</sup> In reality existence or non-existence of qualities are not opposed to proof. For, when we establish identity of substance on certain qualities, we overlook other qualities leading to diversity; and when we establish diveragence we overlook the qualities leading to unity on a certain basis. Absolute existence or non-existence of qualities cannot happen. These are employed as one intends to emphasize one or the other.

प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ भेदाभेदौ न संवृती ।

तावेकत्राविरुद्धौ ते गुणमुख्यविवक्षया ॥36 ॥

pramāṇagocharau santau bhedābhedau na saṁvṛti,  
tāvekatrāvirudhau te guṇamukhya-vivakṣayā.

37. Unity and diversity are real and can be established by *pramāṇa*. These are not imaginary. These are not opposed to in their existence in a single substance as we desire to speak either about the primary or secondary (qualities).

### COMMENTARY

The one-sided view that substances are different or the same, that everything is one, cannot be maintained. By employment of syllogism, it can be proved that oneness or many-sided-ness of substances are real and not

1. "विधिप्रतिषेधधर्माणां सतामेव विवक्षेतराभ्यां योगस्तदर्थिभिः क्रियेत, अन्यथार्थनिष्पत्तेरभावात् । उपचारमात्रं तु स्यात् । न चाग्निर्माणवक इत्युपचारात् पाकादावुपयुज्यते ।" *Aṣṭaśati*.

illusory or imaginary. It is when we want to establish the primary qualities showing unity, we speak about one-ness; and when we want to emphasise the secondary qualities showing divergence, we speak of many-sidedness. It is therefore not impossible that both of these can be predicated of a substance. The *Anekāntavāda* of the Jainas accepts these different ways of expression in preference to *Ekāntavāda* of the Vedantists or others.

**End of Chapter 2**

## Chapter III

नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते ।

प्रागेव कारकाभावः क्व प्रमाणं क्व तत्फलम् ॥37 ॥

nityatvaikāntapakṣe'pi vikriyā nopapadyate,  
prāgeva kārakābhāvaḥ kva pramāṇam kva tat-  
phalam.

37. In the view of those who hold absolute permanent existence, there cannot be any modification. For, at the beginning there is want of an instrumental cause. How can there be a cause or its effect?

### COMMENTARY

This verse discusses the Sāṅkhya view holding that a *Puruṣa* exists without any kind of change. If it be accepted beforehand that the eternal *Puruṣa* is void of change, then there cannot be any modification arising from it. There must be a cause giving rise to an effect. By denying the cause we also deny the effect. So the theory of the Sāṅkhya that the substances with all their varieties are created by the conjunction of the *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti* is not maintainable. For, one devoid of change, cannot give rise to any modification.

प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं व्यक्तं चेदिन्द्रियार्थवत् ।

ते च नित्ये विकार्यं किं साधोस्ते शासनाद्बहिः ॥38 ॥

pramāṇakārakairvyaktaṁ vyaktaṁ chedindriyārthavat,  
te cha nitye vikāryaṁ kiṁ sādhoste śāsanād-bahiḥ.

38. If these be revealed by *pramāṇas* and *kāraṇas* like substances known by the senses, these are also eternal.

How can these be subject to modification? These inconsistencies, O Lord! are excluded from your doctrine.

### COMMENTARY

If it be argued that even if we do not admit modifications, we can hold that *mahat*, *ahankāra* etc., as accepted by the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, are things established by *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* etc.) or by *kāraṇas* (*kartr*—subject, *karma*—object etc.). To support this, we might urge the example that by senses we get knowledge of objects as by the eye we see things. In reply to this, we say that *pramāṇas* and *kāraṇas* being accepted as eternal by the followers of the Sāṅkhya view, modifications cannot arise owing to absence of cause. In *Anekāntavāda*, however, there being no adherence to any absolute view-point, such defects are not possible.

यदि सत् सर्वथा कार्यं पुंवन्नोत्पत्तुमर्हति ।  
परिणामप्रकृप्तिश्च नित्यत्वैकान्तवाधिनी ॥३९॥

*yadi sat sarvathā kāryaṃ puṁvannotpattumarhati,*  
*pariṇāma-prakṛptiścha nityatvaikāntavādhinī.*

39. If the effect is always in existence, it cannot come into being (as it will be) similar to *Puruṣa* (whose eternal existence is admitted by the followers of Sāṅkhya). If there be an idea of modifications, it will entirely oppose (the view of) its eternal existence.

### COMMENTARY

If the effects be held to be always eternal, there cannot be any question of their happening in existence from causes, for these effects are accepted as eternal like the *Puruṣa* of the Sāṅkhya view. The idea that we may consider the existence of modification by change is untenable, for that would be opposed to its eternal existence. That is to say, by accepting effects to be eternal, their causes are denied,

and if modification by changes is admitted, it bars eternity.

पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात् प्रेत्यभावः फलं कुतः ।  
 बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषां न येषां त्वं नासि नायकः ॥40 ॥  
 puṇya-pāpa-kriyā na syāt pretyabhāvaḥ phalaṁ  
 bandha-mokṣau cha teṣāṁ na yeṣāṁ tvaṁ nāsi  
 nāyakaḥ.

40. There will be no virtuous or sinful acts. How can there be re-birth as fruits (of the same). O Lord! whom you do not guide cannot (establish) bondage or liberation.

### COMMENTARY

If *Prakṛti* be accepted as eternal like *Puruṣa*, there will be no virtuous or sinful acts, for, *Prakṛti* being eternal, cannot have these variations. And the view that re-birth happens according to good or bad acts done in this life, then becomes untenable because if the cause of being born in different manner in the next life be absent, how can the effect take place? Naturally, bondage or liberation will become untenable under this view.

This point has already been discussed in verse 8 where it has been shown that to accept the view of the *Ekāntvādins* would lead to denial of virtuous or sinful acts and the next life.<sup>1</sup>

क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसंभवः ।  
 प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भः कुतः फलम् ॥41 ॥  
 kṣaṇikaikāntapakṣe'pi pretyabhāvādyasambhavaḥ,  
 pratyabhijñādyabhāvānna kāryārambhaḥ kutah  
 phalam.

41. In the view of those who accept *Kṣaṇikaikānta*

1. “कुशलाकुशलं कर्म” (Verse 8)। “इत्यत्र तदसंभवस्य समर्थितत्वात्।” *Aṣṭasahasri*.



(absolute transitoriness), existence after death etc. is impossible. As there will be no *Pratyabhijñā* etc. there cannot be any beginning of any effect leading to any fruit.

### COMMENTARY

This verse is to refute the view of the Buddhists who hold the transitory nature of knowledge. For, to accept this transitory nature, we shall have to deny memory etc. Because, as soon as knowledge disappears, being transitory, it cannot remember what it had experienced before and comparing it what it experiences now. It cannot say that it remembers the same as experienced before. Existence after death is accepted to be regulated by the action and intentions of a being in this life. But if everything disappears as transitory, such actions and intentions cannot be causes in regulating rebirth which is accepted by the Buddhist philosophy. Innumerable stories are current in Buddhistic literature regarding the previous lives of Buddha.

If a man does not remember his previous experience, how can he act to satisfy his desire by doing necessary acts. One collects firewood, cooking pot, rice and water, wishing to cook food. Without *pratyabhijñā* (memory) this action (*kāryārambha*) can never take place, and the fruits of the act (*phala*) can consequently never happen.

यद्यसत् सर्वथा कार्यं तन्मा जनि खपुष्पवत् ।

मोपादाननियामोऽभून्माश्वासः कार्यजन्मनि ॥४२॥

yadyasat sarvathā kāryaṁ taṁmā jani khapuṣpa-vat,  
mopādānaniyāmo'bhūn-māśvāsaḥ kāryajanmani.

42. If the effect be always non-existent, it cannot in that case ever happen, (as) a flower in the sky (can never get into existence). The rule of (existence according to) material will not (in that case exist) and there will be no expectation in the rising of the effect.

## COMMENTARY

Another argument is preferred against the Buddhists in this verse. That which is entirely non-existent like 'a flower in the sky' or 'horns of a hare' cannot come into existence. So it cannot be said that effects are non-existent from before. Again, substances are created from materials, e.g., a pitcher is made from clay, a cloth is made from threads etc. Connection between material and the substances produced will disappear, if effects (like pitcher, cloth etc.) are regarded as *asat*. Further, we shall not in that case be unable to expect what would be created from which (viz., a pitcher from clay or a cloth from threads). But in our practical experience we find that there is an essential connection between the material and the thing produced from the same. We expect that such and such a thing would be produced from such a material.

न हेतुफलभावादिरन्यभावादनन्वयात् ।

सन्तानान्तरवन्नैकः सन्तानस्तद्वतः पृथक् ॥43 ॥

na hetuphala-bhāvādiranyabhāvādananvayāt,  
santānāntaravannaikaḥ santānas-tadvataḥ pṛthak.

43. Being different and unconnected, relationship of cause and effect cannot exist, as one cannot be like another *santāna*. For, a *santāna* and that having a *santāna* are quite different.

## COMMENTARY

The view of the Buddhist *Kṣaṇikavāda* recognising different moments and substances or knowledge modified by these moments and unconnected with one another, but taking rise one after the other is untenable. For it is accepted that a moment and the substance or knowledge modified according to a particular moment are different. These being quite distinct and unconnected with one

another cannot bear the relationship of cause and effect. If all existence is of a fleeting nature, and everything, mere currents of incessant change, how can the relationship of cause and effect exist between unconnected and different substances?

अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं संवृतिर्न मृषा कथम् ।

मुख्यार्थः संवृतिर्नास्ति विना मुख्यान् संवृतिः ॥44 ॥

anyeṣvananyaśabdo'yaṁ saṁvṛtirna mṛṣā katham,  
mukhyārthaḥ saṁvṛtirnāsti vinā mukhyānna

saṁvṛtiḥ.

44. This word without difference is applied to others in fiction. (If so) why this fictitious application is not false? The real object cannot be fictitious and without a real object there cannot be any application by analogy.

### COMMENTARY

This is another argument to refute the Buddhists who hold the view of *Kṣaṇikavāda*. It is urged by the Buddhists that there is no being. Everything is always becoming. To refute this view it is mentioned by the Jains that becoming is not possible for what is not being. "Cause and effect are in reality two phases of one and the same thing. The two are relative terms with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But *Kṣaṇikavāda* makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to a mere 'sequence in time'. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare time-succession."<sup>1</sup>

1. *Introduction to Jainism*, pages 114-115.

Again, if it be urged that the word meaning the present moment (*ananya-śabda*) is applied to other moments (*anyeṣu*) only by a fictitious application is an illusion or a mental habit and not a real fact. In answer it is urged that an illusion presupposes a reality of which it is an illusion. When we speak of a man to be like a lion, we must have seen a lion. The lion (*mukhyārtha*) cannot be an illusion and without it (*vinā mukhyāt*) a comparative application based on fictitious application is not possible. The fiction of causal relation is founded upon unquestionable facts.

चतुष्कोटैर्विकल्पस्य सर्वान्तेषूक्त्ययोगतः ।

तत्त्वान्यत्वमवाच्यं च तयोः सन्तानतद्वतोः ॥45॥

*chatuṣkoṭervikalpasya sarvānteṣūktyayogataḥ,  
tattvānyatvamavāchyam cha tayoh santāna-tadvatoḥ.*

45. As it is not fit to speak about the fourfold alternation regarding all qualities, nothing can be said about one-ness or many-ness of *santāna* and a substance possessing *santāna*.

### COMMENTARY

The Buddhists might resort to the argument of unknowability. "The (causal) relation is (i) either true or (ii) untrue, or (iii) is both true and untrue, or (iv) is neither true nor untrue. If cause and effect are one, there is no reason why we should distinguish them. If they are distinct, it is useless to find out relations as there is no certainty in the relations. To say that both the alternatives are true, is opposed to experience. Lastly, to deny both the alternatives, would be to deprive everything of its nature. So, they conclude that nothing can be said on the point. The answer to this... is that if you call all relations to be unknowable, the things of which they are the relations also become unknowable by the same mode of reasoning. Again, the four-fold alternation (*chatuṣkoṭi-vikalpa*) by being called unknowable becomes immediately known. And also, if

everything changes totally every moment, what reason have we to accept an opinion that also changes with every passing moment?" (*Introduction to Jainism*, pages 116-117.)

अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटिविकल्पोऽपि न कथ्यताम् ।

असर्वान्तमवस्तु स्यादविशेष्यविशेषणम् ॥46॥

avaktavya-chatuṣkoṭi-vikalpo'pi na kathyatām,  
asarvāntamavastu syādaviśeṣya-viśeṣaṇam.

46. Do not say the indescribability of the fourfold alternation. For, then, (the result) will be non-existence of all qualities as well as substances possessing qualities and nothing can then be said to exist.

### COMMENTARY

In the commentary to the previous verse, the point taken up here has been explained. The Buddhists are told "Do not say that fourfold alternations are unknowable." For then the distinctions will disappear, as one thing will overlap another. The qualifying attributes will be absent and the substances qualified in this manner will also totally disappear. This theory of the Buddhists will lead to the destruction of all knowledge, as all properties of objects become fictitious for the reason that nothing will remain stable of which they may be the properties.

द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन निषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः ।

असद्भेदो न भावस्तु स्थानं विधिनिषेधयोः ॥47॥

dravyādyantara-bhāvena niṣedhaḥ sañjñinaḥ sataḥ,  
asadbhedo na bhāvastu sthānam vidhi-niṣedhayoḥ.

47. Denial of qualities of other objects regarding *dravya* etc. is made only in case of an existing object. The distinction regarding non-existent substances cannot become subject matter of affirmation or negation.

## COMMENTARY

It has already been explained that existence of every substance is taken with respect to its own *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*, that is to say, it exists with regard to these four limitations, but it does not exist in relation to *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* of another substance. The point is that existence and non-existence in such a case are connected with a thing which has existence and not with a thing which has no existence. Limitations of a non-existing substance can never become a determinant regarding existence or non-existence.

अवस्त्वनभिलाष्यं स्यात् सर्वान्तैः परिवर्जितम् ।  
वस्त्वेवावस्तुतां याति प्रक्रियाया विपर्ययात् ॥48 ॥

*avastvanabhilāpyaṁ syāt sarvāntaiḥ parivarjitam,*  
*vastvevāvastutām yāti prakriyāyā viparyayāt.*

48. Void of all qualities, everything would become non-existent, being indescribable. By a reversion of the process (of reasoning), non-existence is affirmed of existent objects only.

## COMMENTARY

By affirming absolute indescribability, the result would be that every substance, being devoid of differentiating qualities, would become non-existent. We establish the existence of a pitcher by a negative process of reasoning that it is not a cloth or another object. So the adoption of the view of absolute indescribability is opposed to all reason and experience.

सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्यास्तेषां किं वचनं पुनः ।  
संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैवैषा परमार्थविपर्ययात् ॥49 ॥

*sarvāntāśchedavaktavyās teṣāṁ kiṁ vachanaṁ*  
*saṁvṛtiś-chen-mṛṣaivaiṣā paramārtha-viparyayāt.*

49. If all the qualities are indescribable, how can we even speak of the same? If (you say) that it is illusory, then it must be false, being opposed to reality.

### COMMENTARY

Before we call a thing 'unknowable', we must have some knowledge about it. We cannot say all qualities or properties to be unknowable because it is for the above reason a self-contradictory position. The very affirmation of unknowability cannot take place. If anyone tries to avoid this by saying that this is not real but fictitious, the result would be that it is false. Without any real substance being in existence, there cannot be any illusion or fictitious appliance of the same. The *Avaktavya-vādins* are therefore inconsistent with themselves.

अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किमभावात् किमबोधतः ।

आद्यन्तोक्तिद्वयं न स्यात् किं व्याजेनोच्यतां स्फुटम् ॥50॥

aśakyatvādvāchyam kiṁ abhāvāt kimabodhataḥ,  
ādyantokti-dvayaṁ na syāt kim vyājenochyatām  
sphuṭam.

50. Is indescribability due to want of power, or for non-existence, or for want of knowledge? The first and the third (alternatives) cannot happen. What is the use of evasion? Speak clearly.

### COMMENTARY

The person holding the view that everything is indescribable is asked a question in this verse. There can be three possibilities in indescribability. The first is want of power. The Buddhists say that Buddha is possessed of the power of ten thousand elephants. It cannot therefore be said by the Buddhists that indescribability arises out of want of power. It cannot again be said that it is non-existent for the very proof

will become non-existent in such a case, and non-existence cannot therefore be established by any process of reasoning. Thirdly, if you say that indescribability is due to want of knowledge, this also is open to objection as the Buddhists accept Buddha as omniscient. So none of those three alternatives are tenable to establish indescribability.<sup>1</sup>

In *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, it is mentioned that want of tongue etc. which are the vocal organs may lead to absence of power. Again, a man who has taken the vow of silence or one who does not utter any word through modesty or fear might be said to be wanting in power. But all persons at all times are not affected by such disabilities. So this cannot establish indescribability.

हिनस्त्यनभिसन्धात् न हिनस्त्यभिसन्धिमतु ।

बद्ध्यते तद्व्यापेतं चित्तं बद्धं न मुच्यते ॥51॥

hinastyanabhisandhātṛ na hinasty-abhisandhimat,  
badhyate tad-dvyayāpetam chittam baddham na  
muchyate.

51. One who does not determine to kill, will kill. The man who determines to kill does not kill. A soul cannot get bondage in both these cases and being in bondage cannot be liberated.

### COMMENTARY

The Buddhists hold that mind is formed of unconnected but successive sensations from objects. If this view is accepted, we are faced with this absurdity. When a butcher kills an animal, the mind that determines upon the killing is not the mind that kills the animal at the next moment. So the mind at the latter moment commits an act without any motive or responsibility. Again, if we hold that all killing is sin, and the butcher

1. In *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, the ten powers of Buddha are enumerated as *kṣamā*, *maitrī*, *dhyāna*, *dāna*, *vīrya*, *śīla*, *prajñā*, *karuṇā upāya* and *pramoda*.



will have to suffer the consequences of his act, we may say that cannot be possible for the mind that planned the act and that which executed the act are quite different from the mind that has to suffer the consequences. "The Buddhistic theory of changes following each other in unbroken succession being so changing without cause, the killing of animals by a butcher is not caused and therefore implies no responsibility."<sup>1</sup> Bondage from *karma* cannot therefore arise from such circumstances and there cannot also be liberation because all knowledge and volition will be without the unity of apperception to connect them.

This is another argument against the *Kṣaṇikavādins*.

अहेतुत्वान्नाशस्य हिंसाहेतुर्न हिंसकः ।

चित्तसन्ततिनाशश्च मोक्षो नाष्टाङ्गहेतुकः ॥52 ॥

**ahetukatvānnāśasya hiṁsāheturna hiṁsakaḥ,  
chittasantatināśāścha mokṣo nāṣṭāṅga-hetukaḥ.**

52. Because destruction is without any cause, the person causing injury cannot be the cause of injury. There would be no *nirvāṇa* or destruction of chain of minds. There will be no liberation by eight causes.

### COMMENTARY

The Buddhists accept that destruction takes place of itself. To accept such a view would be to deny that a person injuring another is the cause of such injury. Further, the *nirvāṇa* as also liberation resulting from eight causes<sup>2</sup> as accepted by the Buddhists will also become untenable for these also being without any cause cannot happen.

In other words, it is urged that you accept that *nirvāṇa* is caused by the disappearance of the chain of minds and that *mokṣa* (liberation) is caused by eight

1. *Introduction to Jainism*, A. B. Latthe, p. 118.

2. The eight causes of *mokṣa* are (i) *samyaktva*, (ii) *sañjñā*, (iii) *sañjñī*, (iv) *vākkāyākarma*, (v) *antarvyāyāma*, (vi) *ājīva*, (vii) *smṛti*, (viii) *samādhi*.

things. But by denying any cause at all of destruction, you preach against your own supposition regarding causes of destruction producing *nirvāṇa* or causes producing liberation.

विरूपकार्यारम्भाय यदि हेतुसमागमः ।

आश्रयिभ्यामनन्योऽसावविशेषादयुक्तवत् ॥53 ॥

*virūpakāryārambhāya yadi hetu-samāgamah,  
āśrayibhyām ananyo'sāvaviśeṣādayuktavat.*

53. If cause comes in to produce unconnected effects, it will become one with its effects, for there will be no distinction, as (this will be) like unconnected (ideas).

### COMMENTARY

The Buddhist view is attacked in another way. Suppose a pitcher is broken by a man. The act produces destruction of the pitcher as well as production of broken parts. Now the cause of destruction and production is one and the same in such cases. This will make the view of the Buddhists, viz.: destruction arises of itself and is not caused by anything, untenable. The cause ('*asau*' in the verse) is equally and solely connected with the effects ('*āśrayibhyām*' in the verse), viz., the destruction of the pitcher and creation of the shred. The destruction and production in such a case are identical ('*aviśeṣād*' in the verse).

When we see a *śimsapā* tree, we form an idea that it is a tree as well as that it is *śimsapā*. Again when we see a picture, we have a knowledge of it simultaneously with the knowledge of its colour, blue etc. In these cases, the separate entities of knowledge become welded together and the causes are not different. If different causes be accepted in such cases, the fault would be loss of coherence.<sup>1</sup>

1. "यथैव हि शिंशपात्ववृक्षत्वयोश्चित्रज्ञाननीलादिनिर्भासयोर्वा तादात्म्यमापन्नयोरयुक्तयोः कारणसन्निपातो न भिन्नः संभवति, एककारणकलापादेव आत्मलाभादन्यथा तादात्म्यविरोधात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

स्कन्धसन्ततयश्चैव संवृतित्वादसंस्कृताः ।

स्थित्युत्पत्तिव्ययास्तेषां न स्युः खरविषाणवत् ॥54॥

*skandha-santatayaśchaiva samvṛtitvādasamskṛtāḥ,*  
*sthityutpattivayāsteṣaṁ na syuḥ kharaviṣāṇavat.*

54. The connections of *skandhas* also are unreal, being illusory. These cannot arise, exist or disappear just as in the example of "horns of an ass."

### COMMENTARY

The Buddhists accept five *skandhas*: (1) *rūpa*, (2) *vedanā*, (3) *viññāna*, (4) *sañjñā* and (5) *saṁskāra*.<sup>1</sup> These being regarded as fictitious applications will necessary be illusory and unreal. There are three stages of a substance— its natural state, e.g., clay; its appearance in a particular form, e.g., a pitcher; and its destruction, e.g., breaking of the pot into shreds. Horns of a hare cannot have these stages being entirely non-existent. The five *skandhas* of the Buddhists also will become the same, being unreal and illusory. Fictitious relation of cause and effect between the *skandhas* cannot be conceded if the Buddhist wants to take his stand on this point, because all fictions or illusions are unreal and cannot have *sthiti*, *utpatti* and *vināśa*.

The *Kṣaṇikaikānta* view is thus refuted like the *Nityaikānta* view.<sup>2</sup>

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥55॥

*virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya-*  
*vidviṣāṁ,*  
*avāchyataikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate.*

1. "रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरमाणवः सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्ताः परस्परसंबद्धा रूपस्कन्धाः । सुखदुःखादयो वेदनास्कन्धाः । सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानभेदा विज्ञानस्कन्धाः । वृक्षादिनामानि (शब्दाः) संज्ञास्कन्धाः । ज्ञानपुण्यपापवासनाः संस्कारस्कन्धाः ।" Pandit Bansidhar in his note on *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
2. "ततो न क्षणिकैकान्तः श्रेयान्नित्यैकान्तवत् सर्वथा विचारसहत्वात् ।"

55. The view of those who do not follow the logic of *Syādvāda* and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribability without any limitation is also not tenable.

### COMMENTARY

It cannot be urged by the Buddhists to escape the absurdity of their position that permanence and non-permanence should jointly be accepted. For this would be impossible as simultaneous existence of life and death.<sup>1</sup> Absurdity will arise in accepting indescribability as in the case of a man who says "I am under the vow of silence and never speak."<sup>2</sup>

नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात्तदविच्छिदा ।

क्षणिकं कालभेदात् ते बुद्ध्यसंचरदोषतः ॥56॥

*nityam tat-pratyabhijñānānnākasmāttadavichchhidā,*  
*kṣaṇikam kālabhedāt te buddhyasañcharadoṣaḥ.*

56. That (*jīva* etc.) is permanent, from *pratyabhijñāna*. It is not sudden, having a connection. Owing to difference in time they are momentary, for otherwise there would be the fault of non-flowing of knowledge.

### COMMENTARY

After refuting the view of *Ekāntavādins*, the *Anekānta* view is now established. We see a man named Devadatta and subsequently we recognise him as such. This process is *pratyabhijñāna*. The seven *tattvas* of Jainism, *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* are eternal. These are recognised by *pratyabhijñāna* when the same is without

1. "नित्यत्वेतैरैकान्तद्वयमप्ययुक्तमङ्गीकर्तुं, विरोधाद् युगपज्जीवितमरणवत् ।" *Aṣṭaśati*.

2. "सर्वधानभिलाषं तत्त्वम् इत्यभिलपत एव वचनविरोधात् सदा मौनिव्रतिकोऽहम् इत्यादिवत् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

any hindrance. A wrong recognition is known as recognition without any basis (*akasmāt*).<sup>1</sup> It is not possible to know one substance and another at the same time, denying the movement through inclination of mind passing from one to the other. Avoiding this fault, the *Anekānta* view is that according to modifications, the seven tattvas may in one sense be recognised as transitory for there is a difference in time in seeing and recognition.<sup>2</sup>

न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात् ।

व्येत्युदेति विशेषात्ते सहैकत्रोदयादि सत् ॥57॥

na sāmānyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayāt,  
vyetyudeti viśeṣātte sahaikatrodayādi sat.

57. It does not come into existence or go out of existence according to *sāmānya svabhāva* (common nature). This is clear from its existence in a general way. It comes into existence or goes out of existence according to its *viśeṣa svabhāva* (nature peculiar to itself). *Sat* is simultaneous possession in one of *udaya* (birth) etc.

### COMMENTARY

According to Jainism “everything has its natures, both those peculiar to itself and those in common with other things.”<sup>3</sup> “Any substance, any real, concrete, existing thing or being can be looked upon in a general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in common with other things (*sāmānya svabhāva*) and at the same time it has natures peculiar to itself (*viśeṣa svabhāva*). For instance, this book is matter, in common with all other material things, and at the same time it is a

1. “सर्वं जीवादितत्त्वं स्यान्नित्यमेव प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् । न अकस्मात् तत् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तस्य अविच्छेदेन अनुभवात् । निर्विषयं हि प्रत्यभिज्ञानं अकस्मादिति प्रसिद्धम् । यथा तादृशे तदेवेदम् इति, तत्रैव वा तादृशमिदमिति भ्रान्तं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।” *Aṣṭasahasri*.

2. “ततः क्षणिकं कालभेदात् दर्शनप्रत्यभिज्ञानसमययोरभेदे तदुभयाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।” *Aṣṭaśati*.

3. *Jainism*, H. Warren, p. 18.

particular matter, viz., paper. According to Jainism there is no such thing as matter (*pudgala*) or any substance (*dravya*) only in general; wherever there is matter, it is matter of a particular kind; paper for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (*dravya*) it is substance of a particular kind; matter (*pudgala*) for instance, not space.<sup>1</sup> Space is substance according to Jainism.

Now, *sat* (being or is-ness) is the differentia of substance.<sup>2</sup> *Sat* is simultaneous possession of *utpāda* (birth or coming into existence), *vyaya* (death, decay or going out of existence) and *dhrauvya* (permanence or continuous sameness of existence).<sup>3</sup>

From the point of view of the permanent nature of the thing (*Dravyārthika naya-sāmānyātmanā* in the verse), there is no birth or death (existence or disappearance). From this point of view we hold that differences of time, space and modifications inhere together in a substance and though there might be differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, there is always unity in the mass.

Again, from the view of *Paryāyārthika naya* we hold that substance is the subject of qualities (*guṇa*) and modifications (*paryāya*). "The quality stays with the substance and is constant; the modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; form is a constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are modifications."<sup>4</sup>

From the two previous points of view taken together, we define that substance is that in which there are origination, destruction and permanence. "With the origination of a new mode of existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction

1. *Jainism*, H. Warren, p. 17.

2. "सद्द्रव्यलक्षणम् ।" *Tatvārthādhigama-sūtra*, V. 29.

3. "उत्पादव्ययधौव्ययुक्तं सत् ।" *Ibid*, V. 30.

4. *Jainism*, Herbert Warren, p. 15-16.

of a house, there is the origination or coming into existence of a heap of debris, while the bricks etc. are the same. The substance is neither destroyed nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between the parts, in this case.”<sup>1</sup>

“The important matter is this: birth or death (*utpāda* and *vyaya*) are of a condition of a *dravya* (substance). The *dravya* is uncreated and indestructible; its essential qualities remain the same (*dhrauvya*); it is only its *paryāya* or condition, that can and does change. And it is logically necessary from the first position taken up by Jainism, namely, that substances and attributes are distinguishable but not distinct. The attributes are not all fixed; they come and go (*utpāda*, *vyaya*) but the substance remains (*dhrauvya*).”<sup>2</sup>

कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतोर्नियमाल्लक्षणात् पृथक् ।

न तौ जात्याद्यवस्थानादनपेक्षाः खपुष्पवत् ॥58॥

**kāryotpādaḥ kṣayo hetor niyamāllakṣaṇāt pṛthak,  
na tau jātyādyavasthānād-anapekṣāḥ kha-puṣpavat.**

58. The appearance of *kārya* is the cause of destruction of cause. But surely according to differentia these are separate. Because *jāti* etc. exists in both of these, they cannot be said to be (non-existent) like ‘a flower in the sky’ because they are not absolutely interdependent.

### COMMENTARY

To give a familiar example, a potter prepares a pitcher of clay. The potter is the instrumental cause, but the clay is the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*). When a pitcher is produced, this *kārya* necessarily means destruction of clay in its original form (*upādāna kāraṇa*). But the inherent qualities of existence, being capable of being perceived by the senses exist both in the pitcher

1. *Jainism*, Herbert Warren, p. 16.

2. *Outlines of Jainism*, J.L. Jaini, pages 11-12.

as well as in clay. It cannot be urged that there is no connection between the original clay and the pitcher. So *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* cannot be said to be non-existent like 'a flower in the sky.' The above example will show that in some respect these are identical, while in another respect these are different. This appreciation of different aspects in a single substance is the bedrock of *Anekāntavāda* of the Jaina philosophy.

घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् ।  
शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं, जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥59॥

*ghaṭa-mauli-suvarṇārthī nāśotpāda-sthitiṣvayam,*  
*śoka-pramoda-mādhyasthyaṁ jano yāti sahetukaṁ.*

59. A person wishing a pitcher, ornament or gold gets grief, joy or indifference caused by destruction, creation and permanent existence.

### COMMENTARY

An example is given how from a cause the three, *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya* can arise. Suppose, there is a golden pitcher. It is broken and transformed into an ornament or it is kept only in its material, named gold. A person who wishes for a pitcher feels grief when it is broken (*vyaya* or *nāśa* or destruction). He who wishes for ornament becomes joyful when it is manufactured (*utpāda*) with the gold of the pitcher. And one who is satisfied merely with gold, remains unaffected whether the pitcher be destroyed or ornament be not manufactured. Gold as a material always remains the same (*dhrauvya*). It appears in the form of an ornament (*utpāda*) disappearing as a pitcher (*vyaya*). All substances have these threefold qualifications. (See verse 57.)

पयोव्रतो न दध्यति न पयोऽति दधिव्रतः ।  
अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात् तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम् ॥60॥



**payovrato na dadhyatti na payo'atti dadhi-vrataḥ,  
agorasa-vrato nobhe tasmāt tattvaṁ trayātmakam.**

60. One who has made a vow to drink only milk, does not drink curd. One who has taken a vow to drink curd only, does not drink milk. The person who has taken a vow not to drink anything yeilded by a cow, does not drink either. So substances possess threefold qualifications.

### COMMENTARY

Another example is given to elucidate the Jaina view that all substances have threefold qualifications, viz., *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. Milk is derived from a cow, curd is prepared from milk. One who will drink only milk, disregards curd and one who will only drink curd, disregards milk, though curd is produced from milk. Again, one who will not drink either of these, disregards them both. Now though the same thing is changed by a process, it is not equally acceptable to all. So prominence is given to one aspect of substances, disregarding the other aspects, though it must be understood that by doing so, the other aspects are not at all denied.

**End of Chapter III.**

## Chapter IV

कार्यकारणनानात्वं गुणगुण्यन्यतापि च ।  
सामान्यतद्वदन्यत्वं चैकान्तेन यदीष्यते ॥61॥

**kārya-kāraṇa-nānātvaṁ guṇa-guṇyanyatāpi cha,  
sāmānya-tad-vadanyatvaṁ chaikāntena yadiṣyate.**

61. If those holding *Ekānta* view, accept difference of cause and effect or qualities and things possessed of the same and difference between common existence, and *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*. (The answer is given in the next verse).

### COMMENTARY

In this chapter the *Ekānta* view of the followers of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools of philosophy, viz., everything is separate from everything else, is refuted.

The view opposed to Jainism is laid down in this verse. The *Ekānta* view is that a *kārya* (pitcher) etc. is different from its causes (e.g., its *upādāna* cause, clay). Again the quality, e.g., form etc. (*guṇa*) of a thing is different from the substance having the same (*guṇin*). Further, the existence features common to one genus (*sāmānya*) are different from those possessing it (*tadvat*, viz., cow etc.). If this view is held, the result will be faulty as shown in the next verse.

एकस्यानेकवृत्तिर्न भागाभावाद् बहूनि वा ।  
भागित्वाद् वास्य नैकत्वं दोषो वृत्तेरनार्हते ॥62॥

**ekasyāneka-vṛttirna bhāgābhāvād bahūni vā,  
bhāgitvād vāsyā naikatvaṁ doṣo vṛtterenārhatē.**

62. In the non-Jaina view the fault would be—one would not have application to many as there will be no

differentiation. There would be many (*kāryas*). Again owing to difference, there would be no one-ness.

### COMMENTARY

The fault would be this. A pitcher (which is an *avayavī*, having form) will have no application to the forms (*avayavas*) giving rise to it. Because there will be absence of parts. If absolute separation of parts be accepted from the thing made up of the same, viz., that of threads from the cloth, then one (viz., cloth) cannot have connection with many (threads) forming its parts. Again, being separate, its one-ness cannot be affirmed.

“If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all, e.g., materiality is the common property of *ghaṭa* (a pitcher), *paṭa* (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality, their independence also would be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing upon all in common and hence even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Naiyāyikas (and Vaiśeṣikas) is vitiated by the very presupposition of their own school.”<sup>1</sup>

देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद् वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत् ।

समानदेशता न स्यान् मूर्तकारणकार्ययोः ॥63॥

**deśa-kāla-viśeṣe’pi syād vṛttiryuta-siddhavat,  
samānadeśatā na syān mūrta-kāraṇa-kāryayoḥ.**

63. There will be existence like things separate in time and place. There will not be oneness in place in the case of cause and effect having form.

1. *An Introduction to Jainism*, p. 125.

## COMMENTARY

A pitcher and a cloth, for example, are accepted as separate by the Naiyāyikas not only from themselves but also from their parts (*avayava*). The result would be that the parts and the objects having parts might be said to exist in different place and time which is absurd. If they try to escape by saying that we accept existence in the same place we urge that even this is not possible for things having form (*avayavi*) which cannot exist with their parts (*avayavas*) in the same place. These will occupy different space, like an ass and an elephant.<sup>1</sup>

*Yutasiddha* and *ayutasiddha* are special terms used in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies. Among two things, if one cannot exist without the other, both of these are known as *ayutasiddha*. *Yutasiddhi* is separate or inter-dependent existence. This co-inherence (*samavāya*) will further be illustrated in the next verse. According to Nyāya philosophy this co-inherence exists between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its *viśeṣa*.

*Samavāya* will be mentioned in the following verse. In the *Bhāṣya* by Praśastapāda on the Vaiśeṣika philosophy “*Samavāya* is defined by the notion *ayuta-siddhi* and *yutasiddhi* with the help of *samavaya*. *yutasiddhi* is (1) the independent possession of movement of two or one of two eternal things; thus a moving atom is *yutasiddha* in comparison with another atom or physical space; and (2) the relation of *samavāya* in separate existences in the case of transient substances; thus a stick and (the body of) the bearer of the stick are *yutasiddha*, since they are both transient and inhere in separate groups of atoms. On the other hand, *samavāya* exists between objects which are not *yutasiddha*, and one of which is that which contains (*ādhāra*), whilst the other is that which is

1. “अवयवावयविनोः समानदेशे वृत्तिर्न भवेत्, मूर्तिमत्वात् खरकरभवत्।” *Aṣṭaśati*.

contained (*ādheya*); thus there is *samavāya* between the aggregate and its portions, the quality and the substance, the genus called substance (*dravyatva*) and the particular substance, existence and the thing existent.”<sup>1</sup>

आश्रयाश्रयिभावान्न स्वातन्त्र्यं समवायिनाम् ।

इत्युक्तः स सम्बन्धो न युक्तः समवायिभिः ॥64॥

āśray āśrayi-bhāvān-na svātantryam samavāyinām,  
ityuktaḥ sa sambandho na yuktaḥ samavāyibhiḥ.

64. If it be said that one being dependent on another there is no difference of *samavāyins*, (we reply) that that relation of coinherence is not connected with *samavāyins*.

### COMMENTARY

*Samavāya* (co-inherence) in *Nyāya* philosophy is described as ‘intimate relation’. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, different and eternal substances.<sup>2</sup>

The Naiyāyikas might say, the *samavāyin* (a cloth, for example) is not separate from its parts (threads) because these have co-inherence. The Jaina view is that this view cannot be made relevant with the doctrine of cause and effect. As the Naiyāyikas accept that from the material threads, (*upādāna kāraṇa*) a cloth is woven by a weaver, (instrumental *kāraṇa*), the view of co-inherence will destroy the theory of causation.

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, B. Faddegon, p.70, note 1.

2. “नित्यसंबन्धः समवायोऽयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये च ।” *Tarka-saṅgraha*.

सामान्यं समवायश्चाप्येकैकत्र समाप्तिः ।

अन्तरेणाश्रयं न स्यान्नाशोत्पादिषु को विधिः ॥65॥

sāmānyam samavāyaś-chāpyekaikatra samāptiḥ,  
antareṇāśrayam na syānnāśotpādiṣu ko vidhiḥ.

65. *Sāmānya* and *samavāya*, being complete in one substance, will not exist without an *āśraya*. So what will be the rule about the causation, destruction etc.

### COMMENTARY

The view of the Vaiśeṣikas is refuted. They hold that in reality the relationship of *samavāya* is with *sāmānya* (that which is the unchangeable substratum in different things) and the relationship of one *samavāya* with another (having no real connection) is merely a supposed or fictitious relationship.

In a permanent thing, the existence of *sāmānya* and *samavāya* will be complete. So each will lose its *āśraya*, and without *āśraya* their existence will be impossible, e.g., a cloth cannot exist without threads, or common properties cannot exist without individuals possessing the same. When existence itself will become impossible in this manner, on what basis will creation, destruction etc. will stand? The Vaiśeṣikas hold that “formerly a thing (pitcher etc.) did not exist in the place of its existence; it does not leave its former recipients after its existence; it itself occupies its place after existence, and being indestructible is not destroyed even after the destruction of *āśraya* and each of *samavāya* and *sāmānya* is complete in the thing :” This view will become untenable, being unable to explain destruction or creation of a substance.<sup>1</sup>

1. “उत्पित्सु-प्रदेशे प्राग् न आसीत्..., नान्यतो याति..., स्वयमेव पश्चाद्भवति..., आश्रयविनाशे च न नश्यति..., प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तं च इति विरोधात् ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*. The following verse laying down the same has been quoted by Pandit Bansidhar:  
“न याति न च तत्रास्ते न पश्चादस्ति नाशवत् ।  
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसन्ततिः ॥”

सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः सामान्यसमवाययोः ।

ताभ्यामर्थो न सम्बद्धस्तानि त्रीणि खपुष्पवत् ॥66॥

**sarvathā'nabhisambandhaḥ sāmānya-samavāyayoḥ,  
tābhyāmartho na sambaddhastāni trīṇi khapuṣpavat.**

66. Being in every respect unconnected, *sāmānya* and *samavāya* are also not connected with a substance. So all these three (are non-existent) like a flower in the sky.

### COMMENTARY

There is no possibility of any relationship between *sāmānya* and *samavāya*. So a substance also is not connected with either of these. The Vaiśeṣikas accept *samyoga* of *dravyas* only and *samavāya* as previously explained happens in the case of *Ayutasiद्धi*. The very existence of *sāmānya*, *samavāya* and substances will therefore be impossible.

अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां संघातेऽपि विभागवत् ।

असंहतत्वं स्याद्भूतचतुष्कं भ्रान्तिरेव सा ॥67॥

**ananyataikānte'ṇūnāṃ saṅghāte'pi vibhāgavat,  
asamhatatvaṃ syādbhūtachatuṣkam bhrāntireva sā.**

67. In the *ekānta* view that atoms are always separate even in fusion there will be non-cohesion, for there will be individual separate existence even in combination just as when they are separate (in division). So the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) would become illusory.

### COMMENTARY

This verse refutes the Buddhist view analogous to that of the Vaiśeṣikas that there are eternal atoms corresponding to the four elements—earth, air, fire and water. *Vijñānavādin*s among the Buddhists cannot be said to accept real atoms as they deny the reality of substance. The Jaina view is that the primary atom is

not of four kinds according to the above-mentioned view, but it is only one in nature, though it is the constitutive basis of the four *dhātus* (elements) or modes of physical existence. The atom, according to Jainism, has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements.

Umāsvāmī has mentioned that matter has two chief forms, atom and molecule. Molecules are formed in three ways: (a) by division (*bheda*), e.g., when a penny will be cut into smallest possible pieces, each piece will retain the composition of the matter of the penny, (b) by fusion (*saṁghāta*), e.g., when water is formed by two parts of hydrogen and one of oxygen, (c) by both, viz., a mixed process of division and fusion as in cooking. Atom is obtained only by division (to an infinite extent) and molecules can sometimes be decomposed into their visible parts by division and union, e.g., marsh gas treated with chlorine gives methyl chloride and hydrochloric acid.<sup>1</sup>

The argument used by the Jains as laid down in this verse is that if it be accepted that atoms have eternal separate existence, then they cannot produce anything by fusion (*saṁghāta*) by losing their separate entity. So they must be accepted to remain the same in the case of division (*bheda*) as in the case of fusion (*saṁghāta*) which is absurd according to experience. By supporting the theory of the divisibility in cases of atoms in fusion, the existence of the elements will become impossible.

कार्यभ्रान्तेरनुभ्रान्तिः कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम् ।

उभयाभावतस्तत्स्थं गुणजातीतरच्च न ॥68॥

kārya-bhrānteraṇubhrāntiḥ kāryaliṅgaṁ hi kāraṇam,  
ubhayābhāvatastatsthaṁ guṇajātītarachcha na.

68. If *kārya* be illusory, atoms will also be illusory,

1. "अणवः स्कन्धाश्च ।", "भेदसंघातेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते ।", "भेदादणुः ।", "भेदसंघाताभ्यां चाक्षुषः ।"  
Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Chapter V, Verses 25-28.



because a cause is known from its effect. If both of these are non-existent, then *guṇa*, *jāti* and the other (*kriyā*) cease to exist.

### COMMENTARY

The *ekānta* view that atoms are always separate on the ground that the idea of thickness etc. as gained in the sensation through eyes is illusory, is refuted in this verse. If the things seen be regarded as illusory, the atoms also are illusory, for effect shows the cause. If the effect be illusory, there cannot be any cause in reality and the atoms which are regarded as the cause, cannot be said to exist.

Again, if the existence of both, viz., the atoms and the substances produced by them be denied, *guṇa* e.g. qualities (*rūpa*, form etc.), *jāti* (genus) and *kriyā* (action) will become non-existent. For, how can these exist, when the very objects are illusory? There cannot be any smell of 'a flower in the sky'.<sup>1</sup>

एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः शेषाभावोऽविनाभुवः ।

द्वित्वसंख्याविरोधश्च संवृतिश्चेन्मृषैव सा ॥69॥

ekatve'nyatarābhāvaḥ śeṣābhāv'ovinābhuvah,  
dvitvasaṅkhyāvirodhaścha saṁvṛtiśchen mṛṣaiva sā.

69. If there be identity (of cause and effect), each of these will be non-existent. The other will become non-existent as one cannot exist without the other. There will be opposiiton to the number 'Two'. (If you say) it is merely fictitious, that must be false.

### COMMENTARY

This verse refutes the Sāṅkhya view about the identity of cause and effect. Cause and effect are not

1. "गगनकुसुमस्याभावेऽपि तद्वृत्तिसौरभाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

identical for in that case, why do you mention the two, viz., the cause (*Pradhāna*) produces the *kāyas* (*mahat*, *ahankāra* etc.). The effect will disappear, if it is identical with the cause. And with the disappearance of the effect the cause will also disappear; for in the case of cause and effect, one cannot exist without the other. "These two are relative terms with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other."<sup>1</sup> If you urge that the *kārya* is embodied in the cause without having any separate existence and the cause is eternal<sup>2</sup>, the answer is; the use of the number 'two' will become faulty in such a case. The difficulty cannot be avoided by saying that the mention of 'two' is fictitious, for in that case everything will become illusory. Without number, things counted cannot exist and an object void of all qualities such as being counted, must be non-existent.<sup>3</sup> So the Sāṅkhya view is as untenable as the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view, already discussed, regarding cause and effect.

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेषुक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥70॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidviṣām,  
avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.

70. For translation, see verse 13.

### COMMENTARY

The simultaneous existence of *avayava* and *avayavi*, *guṇa* and *guṇī*, *sāmānya* and that possessing the same

1. *An Introduction to Jainism* by A.B. Lathe., p. 114

2. "यदि पुनः कार्यस्य कारणेऽनुप्रवेशात् पृथग्भावाभावेऽपि कारणमेकमास्ते एव नित्यत्वाद् इति मतम्, तदा द्वित्वसंख्याविरोधोऽपि ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

3. "परमार्थतः संख्यापाये संख्येयाव्यवस्थानात्, सकलधर्मशून्यस्य कस्यचिद् वस्तुनोऽसंभवात् ।" *Ibid*.

cannot be established, as the same is opposed to the view of all of those who will accept only *ekānta* view. They also cannot maintain that these are indescribable from *ekānta* side. In *Syādvāda*, however, there is no flaw as by the adoption of different *nayas*, we can say of every substance that they are describable in one sense viz., *vyañjana-paryāya* and indescribable in another sense, viz., *artha-paryāya*.<sup>1</sup>

द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।

परिणामविशेषाच्च शक्तिमच्छक्तिभावतः ॥71॥

*dravya-paryāyayoraikyam tayloravyatirekataḥ,*  
*pariṇāma-viśeṣāchcha śaktimachchhaktibhāvataḥ.*

71. There is unity of *dravya* and *paryāya* because they do not have *vyatireka* (divergence). This is also established from particular *pariṇāmas* and from possession of energy, having the quality of potentiality.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, the Jaina view of *dravya paryāya* is given. Umāsvāmī says, "Substance is possessed of attributes and modifications."<sup>2</sup> "*Guṇas* or attributes

1. "स्याद्वादाभ्युयगमे तु न दोषः, कथंचित् तथाभावोपलब्धेः ।" *Aṣṭa-śati*.

"सर्वं हि वस्तु व्यञ्जनपर्यायात्मकतया वाच्यमर्थपर्यायात्मकतया वाच्यमिति स्याद्वादिभिर्व्यवस्थाप्यते ।" *Aṣṭa-sahasri*.

*Paryāya* or mode of existence is viewed from two different aspects *artha-paryāya* and *vyañjana-paryāya*. "*Dravya* is but an entity that is continually changing... Permanancy through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment... This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *artha-paryāya*... *vyañjana-paryāya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence, as a pot for example, for a certain duration of time. This *paryāya* of pot is *vyañjana-paryāya* of *pudgala*." (*Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. III, *Panchāstikāyasāra*, Introduction, p. xxi)

2. "गुणपर्ययवद् द्रव्यम् ।" *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, V. 38.

depend upon substance (and are never without it). An attribute (as such) cannot be the substratum of another attribute (although of course, many attributes can co-exist in one and the same substance at one and the same time and place). There cannot be any attribute of an attribute"<sup>1</sup> "The becoming of that is modification. *Pariṇāma* or modification of a substance is the change in the character of its attributes."<sup>2</sup> *Guṇas* or attributes co-exist with a substance and *paryāyas* or modifications succeed one another.

*Dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *guṇas*. The yellow colour, malleability etc. are the qualities of gold. *Dravyas* also with their inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. *Paryāya* is this mode of existence. The mode might change, a golden ring might be changed into an ear-ring. But this creation of a new mode, e.g., ear-ring and destruction of ring are relevant only to *paryāyas* while the *dravya* (gold) remains the constitutive substance. *Dravya* is eternal. It cannot be created or destroyed. Creation and destruction are relevant only to *paryāya* of any one of the *dravyas*. *Dravya* and *paryāya* are, in this way, identical. One does not succeed the other as we can find from the illustration given above about particular modifications of gold, succeeding one after the other, while the *dravya* remains the same.

There are special energies of every substance. These consist of the power to work continually. From this, it is established that modifications continually take place keeping *dravya* the same. Thus, through the energies of the sameness which develop the gold and which are a successive procedure in the nature of particular divergences, the gold will become the very modifications, ring etc.

1. "द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः।" *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, V. 41.

2. "तद्भावः परिणामः।" *Ibid*, V. 42.

संज्ञासंख्याविशेषाच्च स्वलक्षणविशेषतः ।

प्रयोजनादिभेदाच्च तन्नानात्वं न सर्वथा ॥72॥

sañjñā-saṅkhyā-viśeṣāch-cha svalakṣaṇa-viśeṣataḥ,  
prayojanādibhedāchcha tannānātvaṁ na sarvathā.

72. Its variety is not absolute, but in accordance with particulars, viz., nomenclature, number etc. and according to its particular distinguishing marks and according to divergence of purpose.

### COMMENTARY

This verse is a continuation of the preceding one. *Dravya* and *paryāya* are spoken of as different though in reality they are not so, when we intend to emphasise the difference of name or number or when we take into account the different characteristics of a particular thing, distinguishig it from others, or according to different necessities etc. We have one necessity regarding *dravya* and another regarding *paryāya*, as we have different necessities regarding the flowers or fruits of a tree.

“The substance is one in view of its substantiality, but it comes to be manifold because the modifications pervading it for the time being.” “To illustrate: Soul is a substance; manifestation of consciousness is its quality; and its modifications are hellish, sub-human, human and divine embodiments which are caused by *Nāma-karma*, or even the state of a *Siddha*; behind all these modifications the soul is essentially the same and permanent.”<sup>1</sup>

End of Chapter IV.

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXV.

## Chapter V

यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यान्न द्वयं व्यवतिष्ठते ।

अनापेक्षिकसिद्धौ च न सामान्यविशेषता ॥73॥

yadyāpekṣika-siddhiḥ syānna dvayaṁ  
vyavatiṣṭhate,  
anāpekṣika-siddhau cha na sāmānya-viśeṣatā.

73. If dependent existence be accepted, the two cannot exist. If independent existence be accepted, there cannot be the quality of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

### COMMENTARY

The first line of this verse refutes the Buddhist and the second, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view. If we can use the view, the result would first be that owing to dependence on relation (*apekṣā*), the two, viz., a thing possessed of qualities and the qualities, cannot have simultaneous existence. Such will also be in the case of cause and effect.

If on the contrary, we take the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view of the independence, the existence of *anvaya* (*sāmānya*) and *vyatireka* (*viśeṣa*)<sup>1</sup> accepted by them will disappear. The existence of one of these is related to the other. Divergence and identity are only relative. They are connected with *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*<sup>2</sup>. This point will be elucidated further in verse 75 where the Jain view will be mentioned.

1. “अन्वयो हि सामान्यं, व्यतिरेको विशेषः । तौ च परस्परापेक्षौ व्यवतिष्ठते । तयोरनापेक्षिकसिद्धौ च न सामान्यविशेषता ।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

2. “तस्यानपेक्षापक्षेऽपि नान्वयव्यतिरेकौ स्यातां, भेदाभेदयोरन्योन्यापेक्षात्मकत्वाद्विशेषेतरभावस्य ।”  
*Aṣṭaśāti*.

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥74॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidviṣām,  
avāchyataikānte' apyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.

74. For translation, see verse 13.

### COMMENTARY

The Ekānta view that *apekṣā* and *anapekṣā* as shown in the two lines of the previous verse, are both applicable simultaneously, is not tenable. Nor we can say that it is indescribable.

धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः सिद्ध्यत्यन्योन्यविक्षया ।

न स्वरूपं स्वतो ह्येतत् कारकज्ञापकाङ्गवत् ॥75॥

dharmadharmyavinābhāvaḥ siddhyatyanyonya-  
vikṣayā,  
na svarūpaṁ svato hyetat kāraka-jñāpakāṅgavat.

75. The non-difference of *dharma* and *dharmin* and not their ownself, is established from one being dependent on the other. They have no separate manifestation. This is established from itself like limbs implying a *kāraka*.

### COMMENTARY

Before we speak of *dharma* (quality) or a *dharmin* (substance possessed of a quality), their own nature has already been established. These are established through dependence of one on the other. This is established by themselves, as we have knowledge of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*)<sup>1</sup>.—We express universal

1. “धर्मधर्मिणोरविनाभावोऽन्योन्यापेक्षयैव सिद्ध्यति, न तु स्वरूपं, तस्य पूर्वसिद्धत्वात्। स्वतो ह्येतत् सिद्धं सामान्यविशेषवत्।” *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

concomitance in two ways, affirmatively called *anvaya*, e.g., 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called *vyatireka*, e.g., 'where there is no fire there is no smoke.' *Sāmānya* is self-established and is known from *anvaya* dependent on *vyatireka*. *Viśeṣa* also is self-established and is known from *vyatireka* dependent on *anvaya*.<sup>1</sup> The identity where one looks at the other is accepted in Jainism and this will be further clear from the illustration given below;

The example is given of a relation expressed by a grammatical case. The function of a grammatical nominative (*kartṛtva*) is not inter-dependent of the relation of the accusative towards the verb (*karmatva*) because the nominative ends in settlement of an accusative and the relationship of an accusative also is derived from the knowledge of the nominative<sup>2</sup>. But the real nature of the nominative or the accusative is not dependent one on the other.<sup>3</sup>

### End of Chapter V.

1. "सामान्यं हि स्वतः सिद्धस्वरूपं भेदापेक्षान्वयप्रत्ययादवगम्यते। विशेषोऽपि स्वतः सिद्धस्वरूपः सामान्यापेक्षव्यतिरेकप्रत्ययादवसीयते।" *Aṣṭasaḥsri*.
2. "नापि कर्तृत्वव्यवहारः कर्मत्वव्यवहारो वा परस्परानपेक्षः, कर्तृत्वस्य कर्मनिश्चयावसेयत्वात्। कर्मत्वस्यापि कर्तृप्रतिपत्तिसमधिगम्यमानत्वात्।" *Ibid*.
3. "न हि कर्तृस्वरूपं कर्मपेक्षं, कर्मस्वरूपं वा कर्त्रपेक्षम्।" *Ibid*.

Vidyānandin has given the *Sapta-hharigī* thus:

"(1) स्यादापेक्षिकी सिद्धिः, तथा व्यवहारात्। (2) स्यादनापेक्षिकी, पूर्वप्रसिद्धस्वरूपत्वात्। (3) स्यादुभयी क्रमार्पितद्वयात्। (4) स्यादवक्तव्या, सहापितद्वयात्। (5) स्यादापेक्षिकी चावक्तव्या च, तथा निश्चयेन सहापितद्वयात्। (6) स्यादनापेक्षिकी चावक्तव्या च, पूर्वसिद्धत्वसहापितद्वयात्। (7) स्यादुभयी चावक्तव्या च, क्रमाक्रमार्पितोभयात्।"



## Chapter VI

सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं न प्रत्यक्षादितो गतिः ।

सिद्धं चेदागमात् सर्वं विरुद्धार्थमतान्यपि ॥76॥

siddham cheddhetutaḥ sarvaṁ na pratyakṣādito

gatiḥ,

siddham chedāgamāt sarvaṁ viruddhārtha-matāny-  
api.

76. If everything be established by *anumāna*, there cannot be any knowledge through *pratyakṣa* etc. If everything be established by *āgama*, the views of the opposite schools are also established.

### COMMENTARY

Vidyānandī says that in this world the thing to be obtained is first mentioned and then the means to obtain that thing is discussed. Without necessity, even a fool does not work. So the necessity is first established. To get crops we must do works like ploughing etc. To have *mokṣa* (liberation) we must also pursue the proper path, which, according to Jainism, consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. It is only the Charvāka school of philosophy that does not recognise the next world or liberation.<sup>1</sup> All other schools of Indian philosophy keep liberation as their goal. In this verse, the goal has been

1. “इह हि सकललौकिकपरीक्षकैः उपेयतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्योपायतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते, कृष्यादिषु प्रवर्तमानानां व्यवस्थित-शस्याद्युपेयानामेव तदुपायव्यवस्थापकप्रयत्नोपलम्भात्, ‘प्रयोजनमनमुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते’ इति प्रसिद्धेः, मोक्षार्थिनां च प्रेक्षावतां व्यवस्थितोपेय-मोक्षस्वरूपाणामेव तदुपायव्यवस्थापनव्यापारदर्शनात्, अव्यवस्थितमोक्षतत्त्वानां तदुपायव्यवस्थापनपराङ्मुखत्वात् चार्वाकादिवत् ।” *Aṣṭasahasri*.

described in the previous verses and now the way to attain that goal is discussed.

In this verse the view of that school of Buddhists who say that everything is only established by *anumāna* (inference), is refuted. To accept this view would be to discard other *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* and *āgama*. It is our everyday experience that we get knowledge of objects through the senses (*pratyakṣa*). We also get knowledge of things beyond the immediate perception of the senses through *āgama*, viz., of the existence of distant countries like Malaya or Kashmir. There are many persons who urge that without the logical process of reasoning of *anumāna*, we would not accept the proof, even if it be seen by our eyes<sup>1</sup>. For example, we may see a mirage but the water there is not true. To these the reply is that there may be fallacies of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* as of other *pramāṇas*, but from this example, you cannot say that you would not accept any *pramāṇa* other than *anumāna*.

Again, to establish everything by *āgama*, would lead to the difficulty of accepting the conflicting views of scriptures of every school, for each regards his own scripture as authoritative. So the *ekānta* view of *anumāna* alone or *āgama* alone as proof is not acceptable.

The Jaina view is that *pramāṇa* is of two kinds, *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* (the latter including *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka*, *anumāna* and *āgama*).<sup>2</sup>

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्धिषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥77॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidviṣām,  
avāchyataikānte'pyuktimāvāchyamiti yujyate.

1. "युक्त्या यन्न घटमुपैति तदहं दृष्ट्वापि न श्रद्धये इत्यादेरेकान्तस्य बहुलं दर्शनात् ।"

*Aṣṭa-śati*

2. The reader is referred to *Parikṣāmūkha* by S.C. Ghoshal, Chapters II and III, for a detailed description of these *pramāṇas*.

77. Translation in verse 147.

### COMMENTARY

The *ekānta* view that both *anumāna* and *āgama* are simultaneously capable of being *pramāṇa*, is untenable. Neither can it be said that the same is indescribable.

वक्तॄन्नाप्ते यद्धेतोः साध्यं तद्धेतुसाधितम् ।  
 आप्ते वक्तॄन् तद्वाक्यात् साध्यमागमसाधितम् ॥78॥  
**vaktaryanāpte yaddhetoh sādhyam taddhetu-**  
**sādhitam,**  
**āpte vaktari tad-vākyāt sādhyamāgamasādhitam.**

78. What is known by a process of reasoning in the case of a speaker who is not reliable, is established by *anumāna*. That which is established from the word of a reliable person is done by *āgama*.

### COMMENTARY

The Jaina view is that *anumāna* and *āgama* are two among other varieties of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. The words, signs etc. of a person who has no motive for deceiving or misleading any one, are reliable. Such a person is known as *āpta* and the knowledge derived from words etc. of an *āpta* is called *āgama*.

It is mentioned in this verse that where the speaker is reliable, we get a thing established by *āgama pramāṇa*. But where the speaker is not reliable we employ the process of reasoning known as *anumāna* and establish *sādhya* (e.g., fire) from *hetu* (e.g., smoke). The *anekānta* view is not one-sided as criticised in verse 76.

**End of Chapter VI.**

## Chapter VII

अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाखिलम् ।

प्रमाणाभासमेवातस्तत्प्रमाणादृते कथम् ॥79॥

**antaraṅgārthataikānte buddhivākyam mṛṣākhilam,  
pramāṇābhāsamevātas-tat pramāṇādṛte katham.**

79. In the *ekānta* view of the reality of thought alone, *anumāna* and *āgama* must be false. From it there will be a fallacy, but how can there be a fallacy without *pramāṇa*?

### COMMENTARY

This verse refutes the view of Vijñānādvaita-vādins among the Buddhists who hold that thought only is real. In that view there is no necessity of any play of knowledge, deriving from external objects either through the process of inference or through *āgama*. For everything else than thought, is un-real. You cannot urge that we accept these as fallacies. We reply that they must first accept *pramāṇas* (*anumāna*, *āgama* etc.) before our accepting their fallacies. "The opposite of it is *ābhāsa* of the same."<sup>1</sup> There must first be acceptance of the nature, number, object and result of *pramāṇas* before we can proceed to speak the opposite of the same. But by denying the reality of anything beyond one's own knowledge, the necessity of the existence of *pramāṇa* itself is denied. So fallacies of the same must also be said to be non-existent. Consequently this *ekānta* view of the Vijñānavādins is not tenable.

The view of the Vijñānandins is that the inward world is only real. This world consists of five groups (*skandhas*),

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1. *Parnikṣāṃukha*, VI, 1.

viz., the group of sensation (*rūpaskandha*), the group of knowledge (*vijñānaskandha*), the group of feeling (*vedanāskandha*), the group of verbal knowledge (*sañjñāskandha*) and the group of impressions (*saṃskāra-skandha*). These taken together contain the basis of all personal existence.<sup>1</sup>

साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेर्यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ।

न साध्यं न च हेतुश्च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदोषतः ॥80॥

**sādhya-sādhana-vijñapter-yadi vijñapti-mātratā,  
na sādhyam na cha hetuścha pratijñā-hetu-doṣataḥ.**

80. If the knowledge of *sādhya* and *sādhana* be merely thought, there will be no *sādhya* or *hetu* owing to fault of *pratijñā*.

#### COMMENTARY

If you say that everything internal or external (mental process or material objects) are all thought realities, defects will arise as follows.

In *Parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others), the following may be taken as an instance :

1. This hill (*pakṣa*) is full of fire (*sādhya*). This is the proposition or *pratijñā*.

2. Because it is full of smoke (*sādhana*), this is *hetu*.

3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen, this is *dṛṣṭānta* (example).

4. So is this hill full of smoke. This is *upanaya* (application).

5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire, this is *nigamana* (conclusion).

The Jaina logicians hold that the first two links are sufficient; but they have described the others as the same might be necessary for understanding of persons of limited knowledge.

1. See *Sacred Books of East*, Vol. XXXIV, p. 403.

Now there will be a fault in the proposition of Vijñānavādins when they will establish the quality of non-manifest *Viśeṣya* and *Viśeṣana*.<sup>1</sup> For example, the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from this word will be identical or different. Identity cannot be accepted as the Vijñānavādins maintain the difference of qualities and objects possessing qualities and a difference between *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta*. Again acceptance of reality of knowledge only will be barred by the maintenance of its divisions. By accepting difference of the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from it, and the qualities (*viśeṣana*), there will be opposition to their own proposition<sup>2</sup>. So it has been mentioned in this verse that *sādhya*, *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* will not exist following fault in *pratijñā*, if it be conceded that thought only is the cause of knowledge of *sādhya* and *sādhana*.

बहिरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते प्रमाणाभासनिहवात् ।

सर्वेषां कार्यसिद्धिः स्याद् विरुद्धार्थाभिधायिनाम् ॥81॥

**bahiraṅgārthataikānte pramāṇābhāsanihnnavāt,  
sarveṣām kārya-siddhiḥ syād viruddhārthā-  
bhidhāyinām.**

81. In the *ekānta* view of (the reality of) everything outside (knowledge), fallacies are denied. So all that expresses the opposite thing will be established.

### COMMENTARY

If all external things be accepted as real, there cannot be any fallacy. The result would be that such a sentence,

1. "विज्ञानवादिनोऽप्रसिद्धविशेष्यत्वमप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वं च प्रतिज्ञादोषः स्यात्, नीलतद्विषयो विशेष्योस्तदभेदस्य च विशेषणस्य स्वयमनिष्टः ।" *Aṣṭasahasri*.
2. "प्रतिज्ञादोषस्तावत् स्ववचनविरोधः साध्यसाधनविज्ञानस्य विज्ञप्तिमात्रमभिलपतः प्रसज्यते । ...स्वोक्तधर्मधर्मिभेदवचनस्य हेतुदृष्टान्तभेदवचनस्य चाद्वैतवचनेन विरोधात्, संविदद्वैतवचनस्य च तद्भेदवचनेन व्याधातात्, तद्वचनज्ञानयोश्च भेदे तदेकत्वसाधनाभिलापविरोधात्, तदभिलापे वा तद्भेदविरोधात् ।" *Ibid*.

viz., "One hundred elephants are standing at the tip of the finger", will have to be accepted. For examples of all kinds of fallacies, *Samuddeśa* VI of *Parinkṣāmukha*<sup>1</sup> may be referred to. Even things seen in a dream will be true in following the *Ekānta* view of the reality of everything external.

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥82॥

**virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya-  
vidviṣāṁ,  
avāchyataikānte'pyuktiṁnāvāchyamiti yujyate.**

82. Translation in verse 13.

### COMMENTARY

The *ekānta* view of the simultaneous reality of both internal thoughts and external objects is untenable. The person holding such a view cannot also escape by saying that he is unable to describe it.

भावप्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिह्नवः ।

बहिः प्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणं तन्निभं च ते ॥83॥

**bhāvaprameyāpekṣāyāṁ pramāṇābhāsa-nihnavah,  
bahiḥ prameyāpekṣāyāṁ pramāṇaṁ tannibhaṁ cha  
te.**

83. In accepting knowledge as the only object, fallacy is denied. Your *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇābhāsa* (fallacy) deal with external objects only.

### COMMENTARY

According to the Buddhists, *rūpaskandha* comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc. The sense organs

1. *Sacred Books of the Jaimas*, vol XI

and the objects perceived by the senses are called *bhautika*. The *viññānaskandha* comprises the series of self-cognition and in addition the knowledge interminate and indeterminate, of external things. The *vedanāskandha* comprises pleasure, pain etc. The *sañjñāskandha* comprises the cognition of things by their names. The *saṃskāraskandha* comprises passion, aversion etc. The *viññānaskandha* is *chitta*, the other *skandhas* are *chaitta*.

The Buddhists accept that *pratyakṣa* is knowledge of itself of all *chittas* and *chaittas*. So they admit that whenever there is knowledge of a substance by itself, it is *pratyakṣa*. In that case there cannot be any fallacy as everything will become *pratyakṣa*, because all knowledge from its own illumination will become *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* and its fallacy can only exist in connection with the external objects.

जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः संज्ञात्वाद्धेतुशब्दवत् ।

मायादिभ्रान्तिसंज्ञाश्च मायाद्यैः स्वैः प्रमोक्तिवत् ॥84॥

jīva-sabdaḥ sabāhyārthaḥ sañjñātvāddhetu-śabda-  
vat,  
māyādibhrānti-sañjñāścha māyādyaiḥ svaiḥ  
pramoktivat.

81. The word *Jīva* is connected with its external object, because it has a name like the word *hetu*. The names denoting delusion like illusion etc. (are also connected) with their own illusory (objects) as the words of *pramāṇa* (express their own meaning).

### COMMENTARY

This verse is in reply to the argument of those who say that *jīva* is non-existent. We say that the existence of *jīva* can be established by proof. A word has three connections: an external object, form like that of a pitcher etc., and knowledge of its meaning. So because *jīva* bears



a name, it is connected with an external object. The example is that of the word *hetu* which establishes the above mentioned connection of three kinds. The Buddhists also accept *hetu* in establishing fire from smoke.

If you urge, what should then happen in cases where the names are given of delusions, such as dream, magic? The reply is, in those cases there is a connection between the word and the object which is attempted to be conveyed by it, though we understand their real falsity through fallacy. The view that all words express merely their meaning and do nothing else is thus refuted.

बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्तास्तिस्रो बुद्ध्यादिवाचिकाः ।

तुल्या बुद्ध्यादिबोधाश्च त्रयस्तत्प्रतिबिम्बकाः ॥85॥

**buddhi-śabdārtha-sañjñāstāstisro budhyādi-**

**vāchikāḥ,**

**tulyā buddhyādibodhās-cha trayastatpratibimbikāḥ.**

85. The nomenclatures of *buddhi* (apprehension), *śabda* (word) and *artha* (object) express *buddhi* etc. (respectively) and are therefore three. Knowledge of apprehension etc. is the same. The three reflect these.

### COMMENTARY

A word is connected with the object it denotes, and the apprehension which it causes. This threefold relation must be remembered. For example, when one says 'cow', the apprehension of a cow is the mental idea of a cow. The man who hears it has knowledge of the import of the word. If one says "he has spoken the word 'cow'", the speaker is concerned merely with the word 'cow' and the person hearing the same would confine his apprehension merely to the word and nothing else. Thirdly, when a man says "Bring the cow for milking", the hearer has knowledge of the external object denoted by the word, viz., a particular animal having udder etc.

Thus the knowledge of apprehension, the word itself and the object expressed by the word reflects each of the three, viz., *buddhi*, *śabda* and *artha*'.

वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातृणां वाक्यबोधप्रमाः पृथक् ।

भ्रान्तावेव प्रमाभ्रान्तौ बाह्यार्थौ तादृशेतरौ ॥86॥

**vaktr-śrotr-pamātrṇām vākyabodha-pramāḥ pṛthak,  
bhrāntāveva pramā-bhrāntau bāhyārthau tādrś-  
etarau.**

86. The true knowledge arising from knowledge due to words is different in case of the speaker, the hearer and the person who resorts to proof (to ascertain its nature). In delusion the external object will be connected with correct knowledge and fallacy according to that or its opposite.

### COMMENTARY

One utters words and another hears the same. The latter or any other person finds out the reality of the sense of the word by *pramāṇa* (*pratyakṣa* or *prokṣa*). If the speaker has no knowledge of the words he speaks, how could he utter the same? Without words, the hearer cannot have any knowledge. The man requiring proof of the word deals in a different way, from the speaker and the hearer. So we must accept the threefold nature of knowledge in such cases.<sup>1</sup>

When there is true and false knowledge, the external object is also true or false. Some cases of apprehension will be valid and others invalid by reference to external factors. The theory of intrinsic validity or the reverse is not accepted in Jainism.

1. "वक्तुरभिधेयबोधाभावे कुतो वाक्यं प्रवर्तेत? तस्याभिधेयबोधनिबन्धनत्वात् । वाक्याभावे च श्रोतुरभिधेयज्ञानासंभस्तस्य तन्निमित्तकत्वात् । प्रमातुः प्रमित्यभावे च शब्दार्थयोः प्रमेययोरव्यवस्थानादिष्टतत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्वक्त्रादित्रयस्य बोधादित्रयं पृथग्भूतमुपेयम् ।"

बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं बाह्यार्थे सति नासति ।  
सत्यानृतव्यवस्थैवं युज्यतेऽर्थापत्यनाप्तिषु ॥87॥

**buddhi-śabda-pramāṇatvaṁ bāhyārthe sati nāsati,  
satyānṛta-vyavasthaivaṁ yujyate'arthāptyanāptiṣu.**

87. The correctness of the apprehension and word happens when there is external object; otherwise not. The establishment of truth and falsity is appropriate when an object is got or not.

### COMMENTARY

*Pramāṇa* or fallacy can only happen when there are external objects. A word or knowledge proceeding from it results in getting a desired object, when there is such an external object. When there is no such object, it cannot be attained.

This lays down a view which is opposed to the doctrine of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy, the cardinal doctrine of which is the intrinsic validity of apprehension. The Jaina view is that words become true only when it leads to external objects meant by it and are false when there are no such objects. When mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, or in the dream-state the cognitions are erroneous having no real external object corresponding to the same.

**End of Chapter VII.**

## Chapter VIII

दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद् दैवं पौरुषतः कथम् ।

दैवतश्चेदनिर्मोक्षः पौरुषं निष्फलं भवेत् ॥88॥

daivādevārtha-siddhiśched daivaṁ pauruṣataḥ  
katham,  
daivataśchedanirmokṣaḥ pauruṣaṁ niṣphalaṁ  
bhavet.

88. If objects be attained by *Daiva*, how can *Daiva* arise from *Puruṣakāra*? If *Daiva* be said to arise from *Daiva*, it cannot be established. *Puruṣakāra* then becomes useless.

### COMMENTARY

In this chapter the question of respective power of *Daiva* (predestination) and *Puruṣakāra* (attempts by self) is discussed. If you say that objects are attained only according to what has been preordained, the question arises, does this preordination result from *Puruṣakāra* or from *Daiva*? We see a man ploughing a field, cultivate crops on the same and harvest it. It cannot be said that in this case predestination results from the attempts of the man (*Puruṣakāra*). The object attained here, viz., crop is clearly due to the efforts of the man and does not depend on *Daiva*. So we cannot say that in such a case *Daiva* results from *Puruṣakāra*. If you say that *Daiva* arises from another *Daiva*, *Puruṣakāra* becomes useless and we see actually in the world that things are attained by efforts of men.

पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत् पौरुषं दैवतः कथम् ।

पौरुषाच्चेदमोघं स्यात् सर्वप्राणिषु पौरुषम् ॥89॥

**pauruṣādeva siddhiśchet pauruṣaṁ daivataḥ  
 katham,  
 pauruṣāchchedamoghaṁ syāt sarvaprāṇiṣu  
 pauruṣam.**

89. If (you say) objects are attained only through *Puruṣakāra*, how can *Puruṣakāra* result from *Daiva*? If results follow only from *Puruṣakāra*, there would be infallible attainment of objects through efforts by all beings.

### COMMENTARY

It cannot be said that objects are attained only through personal effort without being affected in any way by predestination. For we see, that all efforts of every being do not succeed. There must then be something to prevent *Puruṣakāra* in such cases.

**विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।  
 अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥90॥  
 virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya  
 vidviṣām,  
 avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvachyamiti yujyate.**

90. See verse 13.

### COMMENTARY

The one-sided (*ekānta*) view that attainment of objects proceeds only from *Daiva* or only from *Pauruṣa* is untenable. It cannot be said to be indescribable. The *Syādvāda* view is given in the next verse.

**अबुद्धिपूर्वपेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वदैवतः ।  
 बुद्धिपूर्वव्यपेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वपौरुषात् ॥91॥  
 abuddhi-pūrvāpekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭaṁ svadaivataḥ,  
 buddhi-pūrvavyapekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭaṁ svapauruṣāt.**

91. When desired or undesired objects are attained without there being any known action, this is one's own *Daiva*; and when desired or undesired objects are attained by action, it is from one's own *pauruṣa*.

### COMMENTARY

The Jaina view is that when one engages in discriminating good or bad actions and begins to act accordingly, the results flowing from it are caused by *Pauruṣa* and when things (for or against us) happen without there being even any thought of the same (not to speak of efforts) the result is from *Daiva*.<sup>1</sup>

### End of Chapter VIII.

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1. "ततोऽतर्कितोपस्थितमनुकूलं प्रतिकूलं वा दैवकृतं, तद्विपरीतं पौरुषापादितम् ॥" *Aṣṭaśatī*.

## Chapter IX

पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात् पुण्यं च सुखतो यदि ।

अचेतनाकषायौ च बध्येयातां निमित्ततः ॥९२॥

pāpaṁ dhruvaṁ pare duḥkhāt puṇyaṁ cha sukhato  
yadi,

achetanākaṣāyau cha badhyeyātām nimittataḥ.

92. If there be sin from pain caused to others and virtue from happiness (caused to others), the unconscious instruments and those free from *kaṣāyas*, will get bondage being instrumental cause.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse the view of those, who hold that sin arises from causing pain to others and virtue from happiness caused to others and not from predestination, is refuted. It is urged that to hold this view, the unconscious objects, viz., poison or weapons which are used to kill others will be the cause of bondage. If you say that only animate beings are meant, the fault would be that even a Jina, free from all *kaṣāyas* will become subject to bondage for bondage results from happiness and misery. If you say that he has no intention (*manah-saṅkalpa*), it cannot be accepted that bondage from *puṇya* and *pāpa* results from happiness or misery caused to others.

*Kaṣāyas* are of four kinds: *krodha* (anger), *māna* (pride), *māyā* (deceit) and *lobha* (greed). A Jina is free from all these.

The Jaina view is this. *Yoga* is the name of a faculty of the soul itself to attract matter, under the influence

of past *karmas*. The activity of mind, body and speech brings this faculty into play.<sup>1</sup> This *Yoga* is the channel of *āsrava* or inflow of *karmic* matter into the soul.<sup>2</sup> *Āsrava* is of two kinds—*śubha* or good which is the inlet of *punya* (virtue) or meritorious *karmas*; and *aśubha* or bad which is the inlet of *pāpa* (vice) or demeritorious *karmas*.<sup>3</sup>

In *Aṣṭa-sahasrī*, it is mentioned, *Daiva* is of two kinds, *punya* and *pāpa*, which cause good or evil to beings. In *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, it is mentioned “*Punya* or meritorious *Karmans* are the following (1) pleasure-bearing (*sadvedya* or *sātāvedaniya*) (2) producing good age (*śubhāyu*), (3) good body-making (*śubha-nāma*), (4) determining high family (*śubha-gotra*). The *karmas* other than these are *pāpa* (or demeritorious *karmas*).”<sup>4</sup> To remove the doubts as to the cause of *āsrava* of *punya* and *pāpa*, the subject is taken up in this chapter.<sup>5</sup>

पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात् पापं च सुखतो यदि ।  
वीतरागो मुनिर्विद्वांस्ताभ्यां युज्यान् निमित्ततः ॥93॥

*punyaṁ dhruvaṁ svato duḥkhāt pāpaṁ cha sukhato  
yadi,  
vītarāgo munir-vidvāns-tābhyāṁ yuñjyān nimittataḥ.*

93. If it be certain that *punya* (virtue) results from pain caused to oneself and *pāpa* (vice) from happiness caused to oneself, a soul void of *rāga* and *dveṣa* (such as a *Jina*), a learned *muni*, would become attached by these causes.

1. “कायवाङ्मनःकर्म योगः ।” *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, VI, 1.

2. “स आस्रवः ।” *Ibid* VI, 2.

3. ‘शुभः पुण्यस्याशुभः पापस्य’, *Ibid*, VI, 3.

See, S.B.J., vol. II, page 124.

4. Chapter VIII, Verses 25 and 26

5. “द्विविधं हि दैवं, पुण्यं पापं च प्राणिनामिष्टानिष्टसाधनमुक्तं ‘सद्देव्यशुभायुर्नामगोत्राणि पुण्यम्’, ‘इतरत् पापम्’ इति वचनात् । तदास्रवनिमित्तविप्रतिपत्ति-विपत्त्यर्थमिदमुक्तम् ।”  
*Aṣṭasahasrī*.



## COMMENTARY

A person practising penances and void of *rāga* (attachment) or *dveṣa* (aversion) often causes pain to his body. To hold that from this pain, there would be *punya*, will mean that he will have bondage from this *punya* and would not be able to attain liberation. Further, a learned *muni* has pleasure from equanimity resulting from knowledge of realities. To hold that *pāpa* results from one's own happiness would mean that such a person would have bondage from this cause. The view that *punya* and *pāpa* are derived from causing pain or pleasure to oneself is untenable. The result would be that no one would attain liberation which happens only when there is no possibility of any bondage resulting from *punya* or *pāpa*.<sup>1</sup>

विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।

अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥94॥

virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvād-nyāya-  
vidviṣāṁ,  
avāchyatāikānte'pyūktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.

94. For translation, see verse 13.

## COMMENTARY

It cannot be said by those opposing the *Syādvāda* view, that the view of verse 92 and verse 93 is not maintainable separately. They can be asserted jointly. It cannot also be urged that it is indescribable (from the *ekānta* view) without considering the various aspects as laid down by *Syādvāda*.

1. "आत्मसुखदुःखाभ्यां पापेतरैकान्तकृतान्ते पुनरकषायस्यापि ध्रुवमेव बन्धः स्यात् । ततो न कश्चिन्मोक्तुमर्हति, तदुभयाभावासंभवात् ।" *Aṣṭaśatī*.

विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत् स्वपरस्थं सुखासुखम् ।  
पुण्यपापास्रवौ युक्तौ न चेद् व्यर्थस्तवार्हतः ॥95॥

viśuddhi-saṅkleśāṅgaṁ chet svaparasthaṁ sukhā-  
sukham,  
puṇya-pāpāsravau yuktau na ched vyarthastav-  
ārhatāḥ.

95. It is proper that *āsrava* (influx) of *puṇya* (virtue) and *pāpa* (vice) happens through pleasure or pain caused to others or one-self, if the same consists of *viśuddhi* or *saṅkleśa*. Otherwise, the view of the Arhats will be untenable.

### COMMENTARY

The Jaina view, regarding the influx of *karma* (*āsrava*) consisting of *puṇya* and *pāpa*, is that the cause of such influx depends on *viśuddhi* and *saṅkleśa* relating to happiness or misery of one's own or of others.<sup>1</sup>

*Saṅkleśa* is the result of *ārta* and *raudra dhyāna* and its absence is *viśuddhi*, i.e., the existence of the soul in its innate nature.<sup>2</sup>

*Dhyāna* or concentration is confining one's thought to one particular object.<sup>3</sup> *Dhyāna* is of four kinds : *ārta*, *raudra*, *dharmya* and *śukla*. The last two are the causes of liberation.<sup>4</sup> The first two are the causes of bondage.

*Ārta-dhyāna* (painful concentration) is of four kinds. The first is repeatedly thinking about separation from an unpleasant object (*aniṣṭa saṃyogaja*).<sup>5</sup>

The second *ārta-dhyāna* is repeated thinking of re-union with a pleasing object on being separated from it.

1. "आत्मनः परस्य वा सुखदुःखयोः विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गयोरेव पुण्यपापास्रवहेतुत्वम् ।" *Aṣṭaśatī*.

2. "आर्तरौद्रध्यानपरिणामः संक्लेशः, तदभावो विशुद्धिरात्मनः स्वात्मन्यवस्थानम् ।" *Ibid*.

3. "...एकाग्रचिन्तानिरोधो ध्यानम्..." *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, 1-27.

4. "आर्तरौद्रधर्म्यशुक्लानि ।" "परे मोक्षहेतू ।" *Ibid*, IX, 28-29.

5. "आर्तममनोज्ञस्य सम्प्रयोगे तद्विप्रयोगाय स्मृतिसमन्वाहारः ।" *Ibid* IX, 30

This is the opposite of the first and is known as *iṣṭa-viyogaja* as explained above.<sup>1</sup>

The third *ārta-dhyāna* is repeated thinking about becoming free from troubles, e.g., a disease.<sup>2</sup>

The fourth is constant thought of gaining objects in future life, being not able to get these in this life.<sup>3</sup>

*Raudra-dhyāna* (wicked concentration) is also of four kinds: delight in causing hurt (*himsānanda*); delight in falsehoods (*anṛtānanda*); delight in theft (*steyānanda*) and delight in preserving objects of sense-enjoyment (*viśaya-samrakṣaṇānanda*).<sup>4</sup>

According to Jainism there are different stages of spirituality (*guṇasthānas*) of a man. *Ārta-dhyāna* is possible in persons in the first four : fourth (*avirata*), fifth (*deśavirata*) and the sixth (*pramatta-saṃyata*) stages.<sup>5</sup>

In the *avirata* stage, a person is without any vows. In the *deśa-virata* stage, he has only partial vows and in the *pramatta-saṃyata* he keeps the vows imperfectly. In *pramattasaṃyata* stage, however, there is no *nidāna* (the fourth kind of *ārta-dhyāna*).

*Dharmya-dhyāna* is of four kinds: (a) contemplation of the principles taken on the faith of the scriptures which are the teachings of Arhats (*ājñā-vichaya*); (b) contemplation about the way in which the wrong belief, knowledge and conduct can be removed (*apāya-vichaya*); (c) contemplation about the fruition of different kinds of *karmas* (*vipāka-vichaya*); and (d) contemplation about the nature and constitution of the universe (*saṃsthāna-vichaya*).<sup>6</sup> *Dharmya-dhyāna* is possible for persons who are in the fourth to seventh spiritual stages of development.

1. "विपरीतं मनोज्ञस्य ।" *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, IX, 31.

2. "वेदनायाश्च ।" *Ibid*, IX, 32.

3. "निदानं च ।" *Ibid*, IX, 33.

4. "हिंसानृतस्तेयविषयसंरक्षणेभ्यो रौद्रमविरतदेशविरतयोः ।" *Ibid*, IX, 35.

5. "तदविरतदेशविरतप्रमत्तसंयतानाम् ।" *Ibid*, IX, 34.

6. "आज्ञापायविपाकसंस्थानविचयाय धर्म्यम् ।" *Ibid*, IX, 36.

*Śukla* (pure) *dhyāna* is of four kinds: (a) absorption in the meditation of the self but unconsciously allowing its different attributes to replace one another (*prthaktva-vitarka*); (b) absorption in one aspect of the self without changing the particular aspect concentrated upon (*ekatva-vitarka*). (c) the very fine vibratory movements in the soul, even when it is deeply absorbed in itself in a *Kevalin* (*sūkṣma-kriyā-pratipāti*); (d) total absorption of the soul in itself fixed steadily and undisturbably without the least motion or vibration (*vyuparata-kriyā-nivṛtti*).<sup>1</sup>

The first two kinds of *śukla-dhyāna* are possible in those who know the fourteen *Pūrvas* and are present in the eighth to twelfth spiritual stages.<sup>2</sup> The last two kinds are peculiar to *Kevalins* (who have perfect knowledge).<sup>3</sup> The third arises in the thirteenth and the fourth in the fourteenth or the highest stage of development.

It will now be understood how according to Jainism influx of *karma* leading to *pāpa* happens through *ārta* and *raudra dhyānas* and how the opposite *punya* comes from its absence. The soul gradually develops itself through different stages and sheds off impurities. Influx (*āsrava*) of impure *karmas* is stopped, shedding off those which have already got connection with the soul (*nirjarā*) and then liberation (*mokṣa*) is attained.

From *śukla-dhyāna*, no impurity can arise. "Who so, having destroyed the stains of infatuation and being detached from sense-objects, restrains his mind and abides in his innate nature, becomes a contemplator of the self."<sup>4</sup>

Amṛtachandra in explaining this verse of Kundakunda says: "To the self whose stains of infatuation are destroyed belongs detachment from sense-objects, because

1. "पृथक्त्वैकत्ववितर्कसूक्ष्मक्रियाप्रतिपातिव्युपरतक्रियानिवर्त्तिनि ।" *Tattovārthādhigama-sūtra*, IX, 39.

2. "शुक्ले चाद्ये पूर्वविदः ।" *Ibid*, IX, 37.

3. "परे केवलिनः ।", *Ibid*, IX, 38.

4. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegon. II, 104.

it abstains from activity towards the 'other' (substance) whereof that infatuation is the root. Then comes restraint (*nirodha*) of the internal sense which has nothing else for refuge because there is no other substance which could be its resting place (*adhikaraṇa*), like a flying bird for which there is only one bark in the mid-ocean. Thereupon, through the disappearance of flightiness, whereof that (not-restrained internal-sense) is the root, comes steadfastness in his innate nature, which is unlimited innate intelligence. And that, because of being an unperturbed, deeply attentive thoughtfulness, proceeding (*pravṛtta*) from its own nature, is entitled 'contemplation' (*dhyāna*). Hence contemplation, as being an abiding in one's inborn nature is the self, since it is not anything other than the self."<sup>1</sup>

### End of Chapter IX.

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1. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegon. II, 148.

## Chapter X

अज्ञानाच्चेद् ध्रुवो बन्धो ज्ञेयानन्त्यान् केवली ।

ज्ञानस्तोकाद् विमोक्षश्चेदज्ञानाद् बहुतोऽन्यथा ॥96॥

**ajñānāchched dhruvo bandho jñeyānantyānna kevali,  
jñāna-stokād vimokṣaśchedajñānād bahuto'anyathā.**

96. If *bandha* (bondage) be certain from *ajñāna* (want of knowledge), a *kevalin* (can never be liberated) for knowable things are infinite. If you say that there is liberation with a little knowledge, there will be liberation by other means from greatness of *ajñāna* (ignorance).

### COMMENTARY

This verse refutes the view that *ajñāna* is the cause of *āśrava* of *puṇya* and *pāpa*.

According to Jainism, when there is an influx of matter into the soul, certain energies (*karmas*) are produced which consist of bondage of the soul with matter. This bondage is called *bandha*. First of all there is an influx of *karmas* through *āśravas*. Then follow some activities of consciousness which attach themselves to the soul and produce a peculiar kind of bondage which is called *bhāva-bandha*. *Bhāva-bandha* is followed by a union of *jīva* with actual *karmas* consisting of interpenetration of the soul by the *karmas* and the bondage resulting from this is known as *dravya-bandha*. Excited by *kaṣāya* (attachment and aversion) a *jīva* assimilates *pudgalas* fit for *karmas* and this is known as *bandha*.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Aṣṭasahasrī*, it is mentioned that this verse

1. “सकषायत्वाज्जीवः कर्मणो योग्यान् पुद्गलानादत्ते स बन्धः ।” *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra*, VIII, 2.

refutes the Sāṅkhya view that liberation happens from *jñāna* and *bandha* (bondage) from *ajñāna*.<sup>1</sup> According to the Sāṅkhya view, when there is knowledge that the soul is different from the *prakṛtis* and *vikṛtis*, there is liberation and ignorance of this leads to bondage.

It is urged that as there are innumerable things, it is not possible to have a knowledge of everything and in that case even a *Kevalin* cannot get liberation. It cannot again be said that a slight knowledge will do and full knowledge of everything is not necessary. The fault will remain that in case of limited true knowledge, of only certain objects, there will be false knowledge regarding a large number of other objects, and as false knowledge will lead to bondage, liberation can never take place.

Akalarka says: "If the view that bondage follows from *ajñāna*, be accepted, no one will attain liberation, for in everyone *ajñāna* might sometimes arise, the knowable things being infinite. The other view, viz., that liberation might result from a little knowledge, is also untenable for there will be *ajñāna* on various points which must oppose liberation and cause bondage".<sup>2</sup>

**विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् ।**

**अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नवाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥97॥**

**virodhānnbhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya-vidviṣāṁ,  
avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.**

97. For translation, see verse 13.

1. Vide : "ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ।" *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, verse 44.

2. "यदि बन्धोऽयमविज्ञानान्नेदानीं कश्चिन्मुच्यते, सर्वस्य क्वचिदज्ञानोपपत्तेर्ज्ञेयानन्त्यादिति ।" Before becoming a *Kevalin*, a soul cannot become omniscient. यदि पुनर्ज्ञाननिर्हासाद् ब्रह्मप्राप्तिस्ज्ञानात् सुतरां प्रसज्येत ।"

## COMMENTARY

The position that both the views in verse 96 might be amalgamated or that it is unknowable, is untenable.

अज्ञानान्मोहतो बन्धो नाज्ञानाद् वीतमोहतः ।

ज्ञानस्तोकाच्च मोक्षः स्यादमोहान्मोहितोऽन्यथा॥98॥

ajñānān-mohato bandho nājñānād vītamohataḥ,  
jñāna-stokāchcha mokṣaḥ syādamohān mohiton-  
yathā.

98. *Bandha* follows from *ajñāna* if there be *moha*, but not from *ajñāna* where *moha* has disappeared. When there is no *moha*, *mokṣa* (liberation) takes place even from little *jñāna* but not where *moha* exists.

## COMMENTARY

The Jaina view is expounded in this verse. It is urged that *moha* decides everything in this case. Svāmi-Kārtikeya has said that *āsravas* are certain movements of *jīva* resulting from actions of speech, mind and body either accompanied by or bereft of *moha-karma*.<sup>1</sup> We have mentioned in the commentary to verse 96 that *karmas* take possession of a soul through *āsravas*. There are eight kinds of *karmas*, viz., *jñānāvaraṇīya*, *darśanāvaraṇīya*, *mohanīya*, *antarāya*, *āyu*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *vedanīya*. When a person wants to have liberation he attempts to have right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.<sup>2</sup> When he attains these three, he becomes free from the first four kinds of *karmas* known as *ghātiya* (destructive) *karmas*. The influx of *karmas* can be stopped by *saṁvara*. By this stoppage fresh *karmas* cannot enter the soul. But even after stopping the entrance of fresh *karmas*, it is necessary to purge the soul of *karmas* which have already taken possession of the same.

1. "मणवयणकायजोया जीवपयेसाण फंदणविसेसा । मोहोदयेण जुता निजुता वि य आसखा होंति॥" Svāmi-Kārtikeyānupreksā. Verse 88.

2. Vide verse 39 of *Dravya-saṅgraha*, S.B.J., vol. I.



This can be done by *nirjarā*. Then only the *karmas*, *vedanīya*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *āyu* which cause wordly existence, disappear and a being attains liberation.<sup>1</sup>

*Mohaniya* are “energies, the nature of which is to infatuate us so that we cannot distinguish between right and wrong belief (*darśana-mohaniya*) and so that we are prevented from acting rightly (*chāritra-mohaniya*). Thus there are two chief kinds of these forces; first that which obstructs our faculty of realising and relishing the truth, and secondly that which in its operation makes us unable to act rightly; it is moral uncleanness and non-perception of what is right. Right action as here meant is right action accompanied by the conviction that it is right.”<sup>2</sup> The Delusive *karmas* are of twenty-eight kinds.<sup>3</sup>

When *moha* (infatuation) disappears, liberation can take place even if *ajñāna* in some matters exists. If there be infatuation, there must be bondage.

“He who has become and remains pure according to his power by means of psychic-exertion, i.e., evolution of his intelligence, obtains an excellent efficacy of purity which springs up at every step, and an intelligence completely free from blemish, because the very strong knot (*granthi*) of infatuation bound together all the *samsāra* through, is untied; he obtains an efficacy of self expanding without obstacles, because he has thrown aside all *karmas* which obscure knowledge and faith (*jñānāvaranīya* and *darśanāvaranīya*) and those *karmas* which obstruct (*antarāya*); having himself become thus, he reaches the boundary of all things which can be known. Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable; so then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of

1. “जो संवरेण जुत्तो णिज्जरमाणो घ सव्वकम्माणि ।

ववगदवेदाउस्सो मुयदि भवं तेण सो मोक्खो ।” *Pañcūstikāya-sāra*, verse 153.

2. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 34

3. See *Outlines of Jainism*, p. 32.

knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable.”<sup>1</sup>

कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः कर्मबन्धानुरूपतः ।

तच्च कर्म स्वहेतुभ्यो जीवास्ते शुद्ध्यशुद्धितः ॥99॥

kāmādiprabhavaśchitraḥ karma-bandhānurūpataḥ,  
tachchha karma svahetubhyo jivāste śuddhya-  
śudditaḥ.

99. According to the bondage of *karma*, the results of *kāma* (attachment) etc. are varied. That *karma* arises from its own cause. The *jīvas* are from *śuddhi* (purity) or *aśuddhi* (impurity).

### COMMENTARY

According to Jainism, matter is concrete and possessed of sensory qualities to its last unit and the world is full of material bodies. “The universe is in all directions densely packed as room filled, with material bodies fine and gross, unadaptable and adaptable.”<sup>2</sup> Possession of potentiality for evolving *karmic* matter exists only in cases of not excessive fineness or grossness. “Aggregates adaptable to *karma*-condition, when they meet with a soul’s evolution, attain the state of *karmas*; but they are not made to evolve by the soul.”<sup>3</sup> That is to say the molecules of matter which are capable of becoming *karmas* come into contact with developments of the soul which is without passion and are transformed into *karmas*.

The Jaina view is that the soul is associated with matter from time immemorial and both are eternal and not created by any supreme being. The rise of *kāma* (attachment) etc., as mentioned in this verse, is various

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, by B. Faddegon, page 9.

2. *Pravachana-sāra*, II. 76.

3. *Ibid* VI, 77.

and happens from the eight kinds of *karmas*, *Jñānāvaraṇīya* etc. As seeds produce a plant and plant produces seeds so this eternal chain of bondage and the cause of bondage goes on.

“Actions of the soul cause the assimilation or binding (*bandha*) of fresh *karmic* matter in the *karmic* body which envelops the soul. This *karma*, thus bound, is for a longer or shorter time in a latent condition (*sattā*); every moment when the soul is in action some of this gets collected. *Karma* is used and is then said to be in a rising condition (*udaya*); but simultaneously and in consequence fresh *karma* is bound”.<sup>1</sup> “*Karma* particles in the origination stage are declared by the best of Jinas (to come forth) necessarily. He who is filled with infatuation, attachment or aversion for them, experiences bondage. The soul abiding in the cycle of existences of necessity possesses particles of material *karma* in the origination stage. And he who being conscious of their existence evolves into infatuation, attachment or aversion, joins himself with action, which consists in evolution into the knowable thing. Therefore he experiences bondage, which is the fruit of action. So then action and the fruit of action originate from the arising of infatuation, but not from knowledge.”<sup>2</sup>

There are two kinds of mundane (*saṃsāri*) *jīvas* according to Jaina view. These are *śuddha* (pure) or *aśuddha* (impure) or according to another nomenclature *bhavya* or *abhavya*, i.e., qualified or not-qualified for being at sometime liberated from *saṃsāra*.

“The not-qualified (*abhavya*) do not believe, when they hear that among joys the highest happiness is that of those whose destructive *karmas* have vanished; but the qualified admit it. To those who have abundance of infatuating and other *karmas* there may be here a semblance of joy; but because of hindrances to their

1. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegon, p. 26

2. *Ibid*, pages 26-27

inner nature and because of perturbation it is an unreal (*apāramārthika*) 'joy.' But the holy absolute sages, whose destructive *karmas* are annihilated being free from repugnance to their innate nature and from perturbation have a joy supremely real, since the above-described cause is present and the definition applies. But those not-qualified who have not this belief are far from the nectar-beverage of the joy of liberation and only see the water-mass of a mirage.<sup>1</sup>

शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती ते पाक्यापाक्यशक्तिवत् ।

साद्यनादी तयोर्व्यक्ती स्वभावोऽतर्कगोचरः ॥100॥

śuddhyaśuddhī punaḥ śakti te pākyaāpākya-śakti-  
vat,  
sādyanādi tayorvyakti svabhāvo'tarka-gocharaḥ.

100. The quality of *śuddhi* and *aśuddhi* are again like the power of being cooked or not. Their manifestations are having a beginning or eternal. Its nature cannot be established by process of reasoning.

### COMMENTARY

It has been mentioned in the previous verse that some *jīvas* believe and some not. This quality is like that of some pulses which can be cooked and which cannot be cooked. There are some pulses which cannot be made edible by cooking inspite of all efforts. This is compared to *aśuddha* or *abhavya* quality of a *jīva* which hinders their belief and prevents their liberation. On the other hand there are *jīvas* having *śuddha* or *bhavya* quality who easily believe and can proceed to the path of liberation without any hindrance.

The power (*śakti*) is with reference to its appearance, being considered only in respect of its modification (*paryāya*). It may be said to have a beginning. According

1. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegon, p. 41

to its *dravya-bhāva*, it is eternal.<sup>1</sup> The manifestation is accordingly of these two kinds according to different view points.

तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत् सर्वभासनम् ।  
क्रमभावि च यज्ज्ञानं स्याद्वादनयसंस्कृतम् ॥101॥

**tattvajñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ te yugapat sarvabhāsanam,  
kramabhāvi cha yaj-jñānaṁ syādvāda-naya-  
saṁskṛtam.**

101. The knowledge of realities and *pramāṇa* at once illuminates every object. The knowledge which is derived gradually is purified by *naya* of *Syādvāda*.

### COMMENTARY

Upto this, the subject of *prameya* (knowable) has been treated. Now *pramāṇa* is established.

One who has thrown aside all *karmas*, which obscure knowledge and faith (*āvaraṇīya*), which obstruct (*antarāya*) and which infatuate (*mohaniya*), reaches the summit of all things knowable<sup>2</sup>. "Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable. So then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable."<sup>3</sup>

"This omniscience is supersensuous; therein the apprehension of the objectivity takes place directly by the soul without the aid of sense-organs; there are no sensational stages, but the apprehension is sudden and simultaneous; it is endowed with the potencies of all the senses together as it were; and there is nothing that is

1. "शक्तेः प्रादुर्भावापेक्षया सादित्वम् । ततः शक्तिर्व्यक्तिश्च स्यात्सादिः, स्यादनादिरित्यनेकान्तसिद्धिः ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

2. *Pravachana-sāra*, B. Faddegon, I. 15.

3. *Ibid*, p. 9.

not visualised in omniscience.”<sup>1</sup> “The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities or modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience.

The senses are the indirect means of knowledge and whatever they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by several blind persons, each of whom touches only different part of its body and forms a wrong idea. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial, and it is valid only from a particular view-point : this leads to the *Nayavāda* of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be derived and that is *Syādvāda*, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications, and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements (*Sapta-bhaṅgī*).<sup>2</sup>

उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानधीः ।

पूर्वं वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥102॥

**upekṣā-phalamādyasya śeṣasyādānahānadhīḥ,  
pūrvam vājñāna-nāśo vā sarvasyāsyā svagochare.**

102. The result of the former is indifference and that

1. *Pravachana-sāra*, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXIV.

2. *Ibid*, page LXXXIV.

of the latter is desire to get or leave. The result of the former might again be said to be destruction of ignorance in all substances connected with it.

### COMMENTARY

The substance of this verse is summarised in *Parikṣāmukha* thus “the result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things).”<sup>1</sup> In *Nyāyāvatāra* it is mentioned that “the immediate result of *pramāṇa* is the removal of ignorance. The mediate effect is happiness and indifference or equanimity to a *Kevalin* (possessed of omniscience) and to others a desire to accept (desirable objects) and leave (undesirable objects).”<sup>2</sup> In *Sarvārtha-siddhi* we have “The result (of *pramāṇa*) is said to be the absence of false knowledge resembling darkness, on the destruction of false knowledge.”<sup>3</sup> Hemachandra says “When *pramāṇa* arises in a person, the correct knowledge of an object is established. The immediate result is therefore the destruction of false knowledge or the idea of leaving (the undesirable) etc.”<sup>4</sup> The primary result is correct knowledge. The secondary result arises after we ascertain an object correctly by *Pramāṇa*.

वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति-विशेषकः ।

स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात् तव केवलिनामपि ॥103॥

vākyeṣvanekānta-dyoti gamyaṁ prati-viśeṣakaḥ,  
syānnipāto'rtha-yogitvāt tava kevalināmapi.

1. “अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ।” *Verse V*, 1.
2. “प्रमाणस्य फलं साक्षादज्ञानविनिवर्तनम् ।  
केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः॥”
3. “अन्धकारकल्पाज्ञानाभावः अज्ञाननाशो वा फलमित्युच्यते ।”
4. “तस्यां सत्यामर्थप्रकाशसिद्धेः ।” *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I, 1, 38.  
“अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्वा ।” *Ibid*, I, 1, 39.  
“हानादिबुद्ध्यो वा ।”, *Ibid*, I, 1, 41.

103. The (use) of indeclinable *syāt* in sentences signifies the *Anekānta* (many-sided view) and qualifies the meaning and being connected with the substance, happens in your case as well as those of the *Kevalins*.

### COMMENTARY

The seven modes of expression in Jainism (*Saptabhaṅgī*) have already been described. The word *syāt* is used in the beginning of each sentence laying down one mode of expression. This means that the proposition is true, provided you take it in the right sense, viz., in the correct proposition with other notions. The word *syāt* accordingly warns us that only a partial view is being expressed according to our present intention in applying a particular proposition and it is not an absolute proposition denying the other varied aspects of a substance.

In this verse by 'Kevalin' *Śruta-kevalins* are meant, for by the use of the word 'tava' (your), *kevalins* are all included. During sixtytwo years after Mahāvīra (up to 465 B.C.) three *Kevalins* (Gautama, Sudharma and Jambū) were the propagators of Jainism. After them upto 365 B.C. five *Śruta-kevalins*, viz., Viṣṇunandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu were the same.

स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः ।

सप्तभङ्गनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकः ॥104॥

syādvādaḥ sarvathaikānta-tyāgāt kimvṛttachid-  
vidhiḥ,

saptabhaṅga-nayāpekṣo heyādeya-viśeṣakaḥ.

104. The word '*syāt*' leaves out the absolute one-sided view point. (Its interpretations) are words derived from '*kim*' and (derivations) '*chit*' etc. This depends upon the sevenfold *Saptabhaṅgī Naya* and is distinguished by things to be discarded or acquired.



## COMMENTARY

The *Saptabhaṅgī* Naya has already been described in detail. The use of 'syāt' characterises this. This proves that the absolute one-sided view cannot be accepted.

The sense of 'syāt' is also expressed by words such as 'kathañchit', 'kinchit', 'kathañchana' etc. These are derived by affixes 'chit', 'chana' etc. to the words 'katham' 'kim' etc.

स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशने ।

भेदः साक्षादसाक्षाच्च ह्यवस्त्वन्यतमं भवेत् ॥105॥

**syādvāda-kevalajñāne sarvatattva-prakāśane,  
bhedaḥ sākṣādasāksāchcha hyavastva-  
nyatamaṁ bhavet.**

105. *Syādvāda* and *Kevala* knowledge (omniscience) illuminate all the *tattvas* (principles). Their difference is from *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. That which is beyond these two kinds of knowledge is not a substance.

## COMMENTARY

The seven principles (*tattvas*) of Jainism are *jīva*, *ajīva*, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. As these are established by *Syādvāda* and *Kevala* knowledge, these are said to illuminate all *tattvas*.<sup>1</sup> Immediate perception falls under *Kevalajñāna* and mediate perception falls under *Syādvāda*. There cannot be any substance which is not the subject of perception of either of these two knowledges.

सधर्मणैव साध्यस्य साधर्म्यादविरोधतः ।

स्याद्वादप्रविभक्तार्थविशेषव्यञ्जको नयः ॥106॥

**sadharmaṇaiva sādhyasya sādharmyādavirodhataḥ,  
syādvāda-pravibhaktārthā--viśeṣavyañjako nayaḥ.**

1. "जीवादयः सप्त पदार्थास्तत्त्वं, 'जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धसंवरनिर्जरा मोक्षास्तत्त्वम्' इति वचनात् । तत्प्रतिपादनविशेषात् स्वाद्वादकेवलज्ञानयोः सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशकत्वम् ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.

106. *Naya* signifies the particular nature of a substance taken (as a proposition) by *Syādvāda* through *sādhya* (major term) and by *dr̥ṣṭānta* (illustration) the quality of similarity being universally concomitant.

### COMMENTARY

After dealing with *pramāṇa*, *naya* is described. Briefly speaking, objects possess many different characteristics and may be taken from different standpoints. By omniscience alone, their entire character is understood. The scope of *naya* (one-sided method of comprehension) is to take them from a certain stand-point.<sup>1</sup> For a detailed exposition of *naya*, reference may be made to *Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Vol. XI<sup>2</sup>.

नयोपनयैकान्तानां त्रिकालानां समुच्चयः ।

अविभ्राट्-भावसम्बन्धो द्रव्यमेकमनेकधा ॥107॥

*nayopanayaikāntānām trikālānām samuchchayaḥ,*  
*avibhrāt-hāvasambandho dravyamekamanekadhā.*

107. Substance (*dravya*) is the collection of three times (past, present and future) brought by *naya* and *upanaya* (branches of *naya*). Having non-separate connection of existence, it is one and many (from different points of view).

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, the subject of *dravya* is taken up. *Dravya* is a generic name for soul, matter, time, space and the principles of motion and rest. It comes into (*utpāda*) or goes out of existence (*vyaya*), while its continuous sameness (*dhrauvya*) remains. The inner nature or essential attributes (*dhrauvya*) always remains the same through

1. "अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।

एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः॥" *Nyāyāvātāra*, 29.

2. *Parikṣāmukha*, *Samuddeśa* VI, V. 74, pp. 198-204

its modifications (*utpāda* and *vyaya*). By *naya* and its branches we grasp the different modifications in the past, present and future of substances remembering that there is a continuous sameness of existence throughout. "The substance is during the times of its several particularities, not other than the particularity of each time, because it has the nature of it, as in the case of fire which has the nature of the collected (material) of grass, or leaves or wood"<sup>1</sup>. When one looks at the modification-aspect (*paryāyārthika*) of substances, these are many, but when one looks to the substance-aspect (*dravyārthika*), it is only one. For a detailed exposition of the subject, see *Sacred Books of the Jains*, Vol. III.<sup>2</sup>

मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेन्न मिथ्यैकान्ततास्ति नः ।

निरपेक्षा नया मिथ्या सापेक्षा वस्तु तेऽर्थकृत् ॥108॥

*mithyā-samūho mithyā chenna mithaikāntatāsti naḥ,*  
*nirapekṣā nayā mithyā sāpekṣā vastu te'rthakṛt.*

108. If you say that collection of falsehoods must be false, we reply that in our view there is not absolute one-sided falsity. The *nayas* which are unconnected with one another are false, but they being connected imply objects.

### COMMENTARY

The Naiyāyika may argue, if you accept *sunaya* and *durnaya* (correct and false *naya*) from a collection of false knowledge, falsity will arise. In reply it is mentioned that in *durnaya* there is only a refutation of what is not our object to establish. It is in that sense that it is disconnected and false. But when *nayas* are taken in a connected tissue they are all true and there is no shadow of falsity.

1. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegon, p. 91

2. *Pañchāstikāya-sāra* by A. Chakravarti, Introduction, p. XXIII-XXV

नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन विधिना वारणेन वा ।  
तथाऽन्यथा च सोऽवश्यमविशेष्यत्वमन्यथा ॥109॥

niyamyate'rtho vākyena vidhinā vāraṇena vā,  
tathā'anyathā cha so'vaśyamaviśeṣyatvamanyathā.

109. By a proposition, something is affirmed or denied. A substance is regulated thus or otherwise. If this is not accepted, it must become a non-substance.

### COMMENTARY

In this verse, it is mentioned how a substance characterised by many-sidedness, can be established by a proposition so that a person can be induced to act according to it.<sup>1</sup>

A substance is established by affirmation or negation. From a merely one-sided view, there will be no difference between existence and non-existence of a substance. As the knowledge is varied according to *pramāṇa* and *naya*, its object is also of many kinds.<sup>2</sup>

तदतद्वस्तु वागेषा तदेवेत्यनुशासति ।  
न सत्या स्यान् मृषावाक्यैः कथं तत्त्वार्थदेशना ॥110॥  
tadatad-vastu vāgeṣā tadevetyanuśāsati,  
na satyā syān mṛṣāvākyaīḥ katham tattvārtha-  
deśanā.

110. This proposition implies that or not-that substance, by 'that only'. If this be not true, how can there be teaching of reality by false proportions?

### COMMENTARY

The one-sided view of the meaning of a proposition

1. "नन्वेवमनेकान्तात्मार्यः कथं वाक्येन नियम्यते यतः प्रतिनियते विषये प्रवृत्तिलोकस्य स्यादित्यारेकायामिदमभिदधते ।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
2. "यत्सत्तत् सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकमर्थक्रियाकारित्वात् स्वविषयाकारसंवित्तिवत्॥" *Aṣṭasati*.

cannot be accepted, for this will be false and how can there be realisation of truth through false propositions? So the *Anekānta* view that a proposition has connection with itself as well as with its opposite must be accepted. By denying the opposite, a substance is established through *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* etc.<sup>1</sup> That is to say, we mention that a substance is 'this, and not this' and do not hold only that 'it is this' for the latter is false and cannot lead to correct knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थप्रतिषेधनिरङ्कुशः ।

आह च स्वार्थसामान्यं तादृग् वाच्यं खपुष्पवत् ॥111॥

*vaksvabhāvo'nya-vāgartha-pratiṣedha-niraṅkuśaḥ,*  
*āha cha svārtha-sāmānyam tādṛg vācyaṁ kha-*

*puṣpavat.*

111. The nature of a word is that it, without any obstruction, denies the meaning of another word. If only it is said that it expresses the *sāmānya* of its own meaning, the interpretation would be (impossible) like a sky-flower.

### COMMENTARY

When we say 'bring a pitcher', it necessarily opposes bringing of other things. The inherent nature of a word is therefore its own meaning apart from, and in opposition to the meaning of other words.

In every substance there is knowledge of its general and special characteristics. "The objects of *pramāṇa* are *sāmānya*, common qualities, i.e., generic attributes, or *viśeṣa*, distinguishing attributes, i.e. differentia. This

1. "प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयभूतं विरुद्धधर्माध्यासलक्षणमविरुद्धं वस्तु ।...तदुक्तं—

'विरुद्धमपि संसिद्धं तदतद्रूपवेदनम् ।

यदीदं स्वयमर्थेभ्यो रोचते तत्र के वयम् ॥" *Aṣṭasahasri*.

2. "तदेवेत्येकान्तेन प्रतिपादयन्ती मिथ्यैव भारती, कथमनयार्थदेशनम्? इत्येकान्ते वाक्यार्थानुपपत्तिरालक्ष्यते ।" *Aṣṭasāti*.

twofold distinction is applied to substances, attributes and modifications.”<sup>1</sup> We do not find anywhere *sāmānya* without *viśeṣa* or *viśeṣa* without *sāmānya*.<sup>2</sup> The Chārvāka view of *sāmānya* without *viśeṣa* is an impossibility.

To exemplify, we have a general knowledge that this is a man. A particular man has special qualities, viz., he is a Brahmin, etc. Again he grows up leaving his childhood, youth and becomes old. But throughout his different ages, he maintains his essential characteristics. This acceptance of a change, leading to the many-sidedness of a thing, is a peculiarity of the Jain doctrine establishing *Anekāntavāda*.

“The substance is an existent, the quality is an existent and the modification is an existent”<sup>3</sup>. “As one pearl necklace extends itself over a triplicity, namely, the necklace, the string and the pearl so the one substance extends itself over a triplicity, viz., the substance, the quality and the modification.”<sup>4</sup>

सामान्यवाग् विशेषे चेन्न शब्दार्थो मृषा हि सा ॥

अभिप्रेतविशेषाप्तेः स्यात्कारः सत्यलाञ्छनः ॥112॥

*sāmānya-vāg viśeṣe chenna sabdārtho mṛṣā hi sā,*  
*abhipreta-viśeṣāpteḥ syātkāraḥ satya-lāñchhanāḥ.*

112. The *sāmānya* word if not connected with *vaśeṣa*, will be false. To attain particular object the word ‘*syāt*’ is the sign of truth.

### COMMENTARY

The two dogmas of *Mādhyamika* philosophers of Buddhism are refuted by the Jain doctrine of *Syādvāda*.

1. *Outlines of Jainism*, p.115.

2. कूर्मरोमादिवत् न च सामान्यं विशेषपरिहारेण विशेषो वा सामान्यपरिहारेण क्वचिदुपलभामहे ।”  
*Aṣṭaśati*.

3. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddegan, Ch-II, Verse 15

4. *Ibid*, p. 83

These are the *Śūnyavāda* and *Apohavāda*. The former laid down the nothingness, absence, shallowness or contradictoriness of everything; the latter upheld the impossibility even of defining.” For genera do not exist in nature, or even in our mind. If you will define a cow, you may say that it is not a horse, not an elephant, in short, not a non-cow, but really you do not get further by that.”<sup>1</sup> The Jain view as laid down in the previous verses refutes these views and lays down *Anekāntavāda* distinguished by the use of the word ‘syāt’.

विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं प्रतिषेध्याविरोधि यत् ।

तथैवादेयहेयत्वमिति स्याद्वादसंस्थितिः ॥113॥

**vidheyamipsitārthāṅgaṁ pratiṣedhyāvirodhi yat,  
tathaivādeya-heyatvamiti syādvāda-saṁsthiṭiḥ.**

113. That which is mentioned as the object of our desire, refuting its opposite goes in the same manner as its acceptance or discarding. *Syādvāda* is established in this way.

### COMMENTARY

When we want to have a pitcher, we say ‘bring a pitcher.’ This necessarily goes to mean that we do not want to have a picture. The acceptance of pitcher and discarding other things necessarily comes from our intention. In this manner, the seven modes of predication (*Sapta-bhaṅgi*) are accepted by refuting opposites and accepting *viśeṣa*.<sup>2</sup>

इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा विहिता हितमिच्छताम् ।

सम्यङ्मिथ्योपदेशार्थविशेषप्रतिपत्तये ॥114॥

1. *Pravachana-sāra* by B. Faddagon, Note, p.8.

For refutation, see pages 84-85

2. “तद्विधेयप्रतिषेधात्मविशेषात् स्याद्वादः प्रक्रियते सप्तभङ्गीसमाश्रयात् ।” *Aṣṭaśati*.

**itīyamāpta-mīmāṃsā vihitā hitamichchhatām,  
samyāṇ-mithyopadeśārtha-viśeṣapratipattaye.**

114. This *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (establishment of the Omniscient) is composed for those who seek liberation, for attainment of proper objects from correct and false teachings.

### COMMENTARY

Some read 'हितमिच्छता' meaning the author "with the object of conferring" benefit to the people. But Akalaṅka accepts the reading 'हितमिच्छताम्' and explains it as "निःश्रेयसकामिनां" i.e., those who seek liberation. *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* is explained by Akalaṅka as "thorough examination of the omniscient" (*Sarvajña-viśeṣa-parīkṣā*).

The object of this work is correct teaching (*samyag-upadeśa*) which lays down that the path to liberation consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Liberation cannot happen in absence of one of these. Other views regarding liberation, viz., liberation is attained through knowledge alone, are false teaching. These are refuted.<sup>1</sup>

The omniscient is established, refuting the view of those, e.g., *Mīmāṃsakas* who deny omniscience.<sup>2</sup>

In ten *parichchhedas* (chapters) this work is here finished.<sup>3</sup> Vasunandī has added a *maṇigalācharaṇa* verse after this verse, but this is neither accepted by Akalaṅka nor by Vidyānandī. This point has been dealt in detail in the Introduction.

### The End.

1. "सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सम्यगुपदेशः। तदन्यतमापाये मोक्षस्यानुपपत्तेः समर्थनात्। 'ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः' इत्यादिमिथ्योपदेशस्तस्य दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धत्वसाधनात्।" *Aṣṭasahasrī*.
2. "भगवदहर्तुसर्वज्ञस्यैवान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदेन व्यवस्थानपरा परीक्षेयं विहिता।" *Ibid*.
3. "इति देवागमाख्ये स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदेन शास्त्रे (स्वेनोक्ताः परिच्छेदा दश यस्मिन् तत् स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदमिति ग्राह्यं तत्र विहिता)।" *Ibid*.



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## Sarat Chandra Ghoshal

Academic researches in ancient Indian literature and philosophy have to depend upon Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's contribution. He was one of the few Indologists who translated the old texts into English. Well-versed in ancient Indian history, culture and archaeology, he is also known for his studies in numismatics and such other disciplines of historical value.

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