

AN ACCOUNT OF

JAINISM.

The divisions of the subject.



In response to the repeated invitations of the Local Union Club, I stand here to give you a short account of Jainism. I divide the subject into

nine parts, thus:—

- (1) The meaning of Jainism.
- (2) Its principles.
- (3) The stages of initiation.
- (4) The nature of sin and virtue.
- (5) The nature of the bandage of *Karm*
(action)
- (6) The nature and path of deliverance.
- (7) Image-worship.
- (8) The resemblance of other religions with
Jainism; and
- (9) The happiness of this world and the

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national welfare arising from Jainism.

I shall now briefly speak about each of these points.

Jainism is the religion preached by the Meaning of 'Jineshwars.' Those who have conquered love, hate, sensual desire, and such other passions, or, those who have vanquished the eight *Karmans, are *Jins* and those who are the best of them are the Jineshwars. Frequently they are also called *वीतराग* i. e. those who are free from all passions, *अर्हंत* i. e. those who are revered by Indra and others, *सर्वज्ञ* i. e. Omniscient, *परमेष्ठि* i. e. those who have occupied the highest place and *शास्ता* i. e. those who show the right path. There are hundreds of other names which also indicate their nature. The present Jains of India are divided into three sections, viz, the Digambars, the Shwetambaras and the Dhundias. There is no difference between these sections compared. as regards their principles. They all

*The eight *Karmas* are explained further. (P. 7)

believe in the Seven principles, the twenty-four Teerthakars, the principle of non-killing, and Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct. The difference comes in only with reference to image-worship, the nature of ascetics, and some other minor points. The images worshipped by the DIGAMBARs are naked and they are not adorned with any ornaments or glass-made eyes. The SHWETAMBAR images differ in all these points, while the DHUNDIAS would accept no images whatever. At present, I am going to speak principally about the Digambaras; yet there is very little in the following that is contrary to the doctrines of the other sections.

There are Seven Principles of Jain religion, The seven namely, [1] *Jeeva* or Life [2] *Ajiveva* Principles. or matter [3] *Asrava* or the path of *Karm* [4] *Bndha* or the bandage of *Karm* [5] *Sanvar* or the prevention of *Asrava*, [6] *Nirjara* or the partial destruction of *Karm* and [7] *Moksha* or Total Deliverence. The Essence of

a thing is its principle (*Tatva*.) The principle of *Moksha* is the highest of these. It is defined as the “freedom of a Soul from every *Karm*.” The happiness of even a Chakravarti or Emperor, nay, even the glory of Indra in the heaven The impor- is perishable and consequently pain-
tance of ful. Death is the fate of all of these
Moksha. and the thought of that fate eclipses
all these worldly pleasures. The succession
of births and deaths is a mighty source of
affliction and as long as one is subject to it, there
is no peace for him. The pleasures of the senses
are all transient and painful in result and hence
they are called Shadows of Happiness. True
happiness must be free from every possibility
of pain even in the future. This can only be
found in *Moksha* and hence its importance. The
way to the *Moksha* is the main object of every
Jain work. To whom is the Deliverence possi-
ble? This question is answered by saying that
only animate beings can attain that highest
of states and we have therefore to come to Jeeva

which is defined as the sentient or knowing

The or animate being. This sentience is its classifica- essence. It is divided according to the tion divisions of knowledge to which it explained. attains. Sentience is divided into Knowledge (*Dnyan*) Faith (*Darshan*) etc. But it is impossible for the Jeeva to walk on upon the path of Total Deliverence as long as it is associated with another principle, the Ajeeva or matter. This A jeeva is in all respects the opposite of *Jeeva*. The association of these two is never complete i. e. their separation is always potential. Gold may be mixed with any other metal but it can be separated at any time. Hence even when together, the two are possessed of their peculiar virtues. Matter or *Ajeeva* is divided into *Pudgal*, *Dharm*, *Adharm*, *Akash* and *Kal*. A *Pudgal* is either a material or its bundle. *Dharma* helps the *Jeeva* associated with *Pudgal* to progress, just as water helps on the movements of a fish. *Adharma* entices a man from the true path just as the shadow of a

tree does to a man travelling in the hot sun. *Akash* is the space in which all things exist. *Kal* is that through which things grow new and alter.

Asrava is the third principle. It is defined as " what forms the inlet for auspicious and ominous Karmans. " These inlets are opened in The Asra- the case of the soul when it feels love vas, or hatred for whatever it sees or knows through its seeing or knowing power (*Darshan* or *Darshan*) just as water is let into the boat through its holes. When the soul feels its love or hatred rightly, the Asrava is an " Auspicious (*Shubha*) Asrava " and when wrongly, it is " Ominous (*Ashubha*) Asrava. " The soul is either in an " auspicious " or " unauspicious " or " pure " state. The first is superior to the second; but it is not capable of carrying the soul to *Moksha* as it is tainted with passions, which being of an auspicious nature may at the most lead to the heavens in after life or the eminence of a *Chakravarti* (Emperor) in this

life. The ominous *Asrava* inflicts the pain
 That are of hells, beastly life and human pover-
 ominous ty, diseases, seperation, ugliness etc.
 The "Pure" temper is the one that tends to
 lasting welfare and leads to *Moksha*. it is devoid
 of any passions at all. The *Karman* is prima-
 rily divided into eight classes: [1] The *Dnyana*
-Varaniya [2] The *Darshana-Varaniya* [3]
 The eight The *Mohaniya* [4] The *Vedaniya* [5]
Karmas. The *Ayu* [6] The *Nam* [7] The *Gotra*
 and [8] The *Antaraya*. Corresponding to
 these, there are different *Asravas*. For instan-
 ce, to have no taste for learning, to impede the
 progress of knowledge, to conceal wisdom, to
 be jealous of others' learning – all these produce
 the *Asravas* of the *Dnyana-Varaniya Karman*.
 By imputing untrue faults to the Omniscient
 Lord or the Gospel of the Jins or the school
 of Jain Ascetics, the soul incurs the *Asravas*
 of the *Darshana-Varaniya Karmans*. The
 violent nature of passions leads to the *Asravas*
 of the *Charitra-Mohaniya Karman*. To make

new beginnings and to keep up too big an establishment produce the *Asravas* of birth in hell. Deceptive and seductive conduct leads to the *Asravas* of birth in beastly class. Small beginnings and limited establishment endow a soul with human life. Self-control with a view to get something, partial self-control, enjoyment without addiction and penance without right knowledge lead to birth in heaven. Simply faith of the right kind gives the *Asravas* of only *Kalpvasi* gods and not of the *Bhavan*, *Vyantr* and *Jyotish* Gods. To guide the actions of mind, speech and body on a wrong path and to be overtalkative, gives rise to the *Asravas* of the Karman of inauspicious name. On the contrary, guileless native and moderate talk gives the *Asravas* of auspicious name. The *Asravas* of the name of *Teerthunkar* are the results of pure faith, complete modesty, faultless conduct, unremitting love of learning, indifference to worldly life, charity and penance to the best of one's ability, reverence for asce-

tics, assistance to the needy, reliance upon the teachings of *Arhats*, *Acharyas* and the well-read, unfailing observance of the sixfold daily duties like *Sāmayik* and *Pratikraman*, promotion of the cause of religion by self-sacrifice and spread of knowledge & sympathy with the pious. The *Asravas* of the low *Gotra Karman* are the results of censuring others, praising oneself, concealing the merits of others and pretending to have what one really has not. Conduct opposite to it leads to higher *Gotra Karman*. Obstruction to good cause brings on the *Asravas* of *Antaraya*. The causes of the *Asravas* of the eight kinds of *Karmas* will be known from this.

4 Now the principle of *Bandh* or bondage. It is defined as the mutual entrance, into each other's spheres, of the soul and the *Karman*. When the soul is attacked by the passions like anger and love, it takes on the *Pudgal* [material] particals fit for the bondage of the *Karmas*, just as a heated iron-ball takes up

water-particals in which it is immersed. This is the *bandage* of the *Karmas*. The *bandage* The fourfold is fourfold; (1) *Prakrati Bandh* (2) *Sthiti Bandh* (3) *Anubhag-Bandh* and (4) *Pradesh Bandh*. There are eight primary and hundred and forty-eight secondary *Prakritis* or qualities of the *Karmas* as a thing has the quality of being sour, salty and so on. One obstructs knowledge, another obstructs intuition (insight), another confuses truth and falsehood, another leads to wrong path, another causes the illusion of pleasure and pain and so on. The primary *Prakritis* correspond

The to each of the eight *Karmas*. That *Prakritis*. which obstructs knowledge is the *Dnyanavaraniya Prakrati*; that which obstructs insight, is the *Darshanavaraniya Prakrati*; that which produces the illusion of pleasure and pain is the *Vedaniya Prakrati*; that which makes the mind suspicious about the true good and creates the passions is the *Mohaniya Prakrati*; that which gives rebirth is the *Ayū pra-*

kruti; that which gives name is the *Nâm*; that which causes the differences like the lower and the higher is the *Gotra prakriti* and that which comes in the way of our charity, enjoyment etc, is the *Antaraya prakriti*. The secondary *prakritis*, here omitted for brevity, should be referred to in the *VIII th.* Chap. of the commentary of the *TATVARTH SUTRA*. The staying of these *bandhas* of the *prakritis* for a definite period, is the *Sthiti Bandh*. The *Anubhag Bandh* is the undergoing of the results of the *Karmas* in that period. The detailed association of the numberless spaces of the *Karmas* according to their names, with all the space of the soul, is called the *Pradesh Bandh*.

The Vedant speaks of the bandage of *Karma* as being *Sanchit*, *Karyamân* and *Prarabdh*. In Modes of the same way *Jainism* divides it into the *Karman Satta*, *Bandha* and *Udaya*. The first means the previous bandage which is yet to be exhausted; *Bandh* is the new acquisition of *Karm* and *Udaya* is the beginning of the work

of old *Karmas*.

Now the principle of *Sanvar* which means The *Sanvar* the prevention of *Asravas* described principle before. This *Sanvar* is the stopping of the entrance of the *Karman* into the soul just like stopping the holes in a boat to prevent water from coming in. This can be done, by observing the three *Guptis*, the five *Samitis* the ten *Dharmas*, the twelve *Anūprékshas*, the twenty-two *ParishahaJayas*, the five *Charitras* and the twelve *Tapas*. The three *Guptis* The *Goptis* are (1) fixing the mind (2) keeping silent and (3) stopping the movements of the body. As they cannot be observed at all times, the five *Samitis* are prescribed for observance. (1) The *Irya Samiti* is such behavior as gives The *Samitis* trouble to no life while walking, sitting or sleeping. (2) The *Bhasha Samiti* consists in being careful to speak what is true, useful and endearing. (3) The *Eshana Samiti* is taking care not to eat what is forbidden, what might be burdensome and troublesome

to others and what might give rise to idleness inebriation and disease. To be careful not to give pain to any life in the taking up or keeping down of the Pinchhi etc [of the ascetics] is called the *Adan Nikshepan Samiti*. The last *U. Dharma Samiti* is the care to be taken to harm none in answering calls of nature. These five *Samitis* lead to *Sanvar*.

The ten Dharmas causing the same are (1)

The ten *Forgiveness* (2) *Humility* (3) *Fraud-*
 Dharmas *lessness* (4) *Truthfulness* (5) *Indi-*
 or duties *fference* towards the wealth and pover-
 ty of others. (6) *Subduing* the mind and the
 senses (7) *Tapas* or prevention of the desires
 (8) *Charity* towards deserving objects [9] *Be-*
 ing without any thing with oneself and [10]
Celebacy. The *Anuprekshas* which also cause
Sanvar, twelve in number, are as follows:—

[1] The *Anitya Anupreksha* is meditation over the transience of one's body, wife, children and wealth. [2] The *Asharan* is the meditation over the ability of the Dharma alone to

The twelve make one free from worldly sufferings *Anupreks-* and the cycle of births and deaths. [3] has.

The thought that this cycle of births and deaths is not ended although one is from immemorial times born in the heaven, the hells this human life, the life of beasts and so on, is called the *Sanvar Anupreksha*. [4] To think that one alone has to bear all the results of one's actions, is the *Ekatva Anupreksha*. To think that the soul is apart from the body called one's own by illusion, is the *Anyatva Anupreksha*. [6] To always remember that the body, composed of the sevenfold seamen, is so dirty that souls become themselves dirty by its contact and that it can never become pure by any amount of bathing, is the *Ashauchyanupreksha*. [7] The thought of the *Asravas* being the cause of the Pains of life, is the *Asravanupreksha*. [8] The *Sanvaranupreksha* is thinking over the means of preventing *Asravas*. [9] The *Nirjaranupreksha* is thinking over the actions that will lead to freedom.

from bandage. [10] To think that the universe was created by none is the *Lôkanupreksha* (11) The *Bodhi Durlabhh* is the thought that the true knowledge of the soul and its true good, is very difficult to obtain and that one has not attained it in long ages in which one was again and again born and dead. 12) To think that the religion of non-killing is prescribed by the *Jineshvars* who are full of truth forgiveness etc; that one is moving constantly in to the *Sansâr* owing to one's ignorance of this and that its observance would easily lead to the *Moksha* as well as the position of the *Indra* and the *Chakra varti*, is the last *Anupre. ksha* called the *Dharmanupreksha*. All these cause *Sanvar*.

Now the enduring of the twenty-two *Paree* The shahas is also a cause of *Sanvar*. The parshahas. Pareeshahas are:— (1) Hunger (2) Thirst (3) Cold (4) Heat (5) The biting insects (6) Nakedness (7) Indifference (8) Woman (9) Action (10) Sitting (11) Bedd-

ing (12) Crying (13) Killing [14] Begging
 [15] Loss [16] Disease [17] Touch of grass
 [18] Dirt [19] Modes of hospitality (20)
 Knowledge (21) Ignorance (22) Want

of faith These parishahas cause *Sanvar* if they are suffered as occasions arise. The fivefold conduct is also a cause of *Sanvar*. Its first element is *Samayika* which means the

The five performance of the six necessary elements duties to be hereafter enumerated of conduct e. g. the application of the mind to religious meditation or its concentration by occupying a sitting or standing posture for a fixed period in the morning, at midday, in the evening and at midnight. The second is *Chhedopasthapan* which consists of taking some penance or reentering the ascetic life, on account of some fault of the man. Third is *Parihar Vishudhi* which means the avoidance of any injury while moving about. Sukshm Samparaya is the endeavour to root out the residue of passions after its tumult has subsided.

The fifth consists in observing the rules of highest character.

The twelve kinds of *Tapas* or "the checks to the *Tapas* the career of desires," are enumerated in the last foot-note. We have thus seen what are the factors of the principle of *Sanvar*.

6 Now comes *Nirjara* which is defined as the

The partial destruction of the *Karmas*. principle of One kind of it is the destruction of *Nirjara* the *Karmas* by their being suffered out and another kind is its bringing to maturity by some means before its ordinary period. Partial destruction here means that some of the *Karmas* are yet to run their course.

7 Then comes *Moksha* which is defined as *Moksha* "freedom from every *Karman*." In this state, material body disappears and only the soul consisting of infinite wisdom and insight remains. We have thus treated of the *Seven Principles*. Now I take up the third part of my lecture.

Every Jain work asserts that true

The three insight, true knowledge and Jewels right conduct are the path of Deliverence. These are the Three Jewels. True insight is faith in the seven principles explained before. It is also defined as faith in True the God who is faultless, omniscient Insight and author of the Scriptures; in those scriptures that are dictated by such Gods that are consistent with everything, that expound the principles and that refute the false doctrines; and in those Teachers who have abandoned sensual enjoyments, any new work or unnecessary equipment of worldly existence and who are absorbed in the acquisition of wisdom, concentration and penance. True True knowledge is such as depicts things as Knowledge they are, and as is based on faith without doubt or perversity. Right conduct is a man's observing in action what he knows Right and believes through True Faith and conduct Knowledge. This conduct is either complete or incomplete according as a man is

an ascetic or a layman. I shall take up the latter first. A man is not a *Shravaka* (a Jain A *Shravaka* layman) if he only knows and believes rightly and does not yet begin living by that belief or knowledge, which alone entitles him to that position. A *Shravaka* is also called a *Desh Vriti* i. e. one who observes the vows [rules of conduct] only partially. He has eleven stages through which he is to rise up.

The first is the *Darshan Stage*. Here a man must have his faith free from the five *Darshan Stage* and twenty faults and must be free from the seven vices, namely, (1) Gambling (2) Flesh-eating (3) Drinking (4) Debauchery (5) Hunting (6) Theft and (7) Defiling other men's wives.

The second is the *Vrita Stage*. Here the five *Anu*, the three *Gun* and the four *Shiksha Vritas* or vows have to be observed, without any defects. The first *Anu Vrita* consists of abandoning in intention kill-

ing generally. A man observing it should not intentionally kill or make any one else kill any life higher than the *One-Sense* life. It entails avoidance of five faults connected with it, which are [1] not cutting a limb of an animal [2] binding it up (3) beating it with sticks etc (4) working it beyond its capacity and [5] under feeding it. The second *Anu vrata* The *Satya* is Truthfulness in a general sense. *Anu-Vrita*. With it are connected five faults to be avoided by one who keeps it. They are, (1) to speak ill of others (2) to divulge any one's secret [3] to censure others [4] to fabricate false writings and [5] to doctor accounts. The third *Anu Vrita* is general abstinence from The *Ach*-stealing. To take without its owner's *aurye Anu*-permission what is kept, lying, for-
vrita. gotten or not one's own, is general stealing. The five faults of the *Vow* are (1) to make some one else steal (2) to buy stolen property (3) to disobey law (4) to make false measures & (5) to adulterate commodities for

sale. The fourth is the *Alardening* of sexual The Brahma relation with any but one's own wife.

Charjya In observing it, too, five faults have to be guarded against, namely, [1] to bring about others' marriages [2] to relish naked sexuality [3] to indu'ge indecent talk [4] to be too fond of sensuality and [5] to frequent the houses of prostitutes. The fifth is the circumscription of worldly equipments. It means that a man should make up his mind as to what are his needs and then limit his ambition there and that he should live within his means. The five faults to be avoided here are (1) to undertake unnecessary enterprise (2) to lay by too much (3) to admire with satisfaction other men's wealth [4] to be covetous and [5] to bear too much burden. These five vows observed without faults and the abandon ment of intoxicants, animal-food and honey, make up the eight primary qualities of a lay-man. They are essential to make him a *Shra-vak*. The faults connected with each of the

vows do not constitute, if not observed, non-observance of the Vows themselves, but only they sully the complete purity of a man's character.

The three *Gun Vritas* that follow are [1] The *Gun Dig* (2) *Anarth Dand* and (2) *Vritas Bhogopabhoga*. The first is a vow not to go beyond a certain distance in any of the ten directions. Its " faults " are:— [1] going higher (2) lower or (3) more obliquely than is vowed (4) increasing the limits once settled upon and (5) forgetting the limits. The second is taking care not commit causeless sins even within the limits e. g. not doing such things as preaching wrong conduct without one's own concern, giving others tools of life-killing, brooding over evil things, hearing or reading vicious songs or stories, and making idle tricks. Its " faults " are (1) speaking indecently, (2) drawing indecent pictures [3] talking excessively (4) increasing the furniture of enjoyment and (5) undertaking work

without realising its extent. The avoidance of these “ faults ” makes the *Vow of Anarth Dand* complete. The third *Vow* consists of measuring the objects of *Bhog* (enjoyment once only) like food, water etc and of *Upbhog* [enjoyment over again of one and the same thing] such as clothes, ornaments, houses etc. and also it consists in not eating roots of trees, onions, butter, flowers of *Nim* trees, the *ketaki* flowers and such things as do not hurt one's health. The faults of this *Vow* are [1] liking the objects of enjoyment (2) entertaining the memory of past pleasures (3) coveting the objects of pleasure (4) thirsting for the objects of enjoyment and (5) imagining enjoyment where there is none. These three are called *Gun Vritas* as they raise the *Anu* (small) *vritas* to *Maha* (great) *vritas*, (as regards the limits excluded etc.)

The four *Shiksha Vows* are *Dêshavakashika* (2) *Samayika* (3) *Proshadhopavas* and (4) *Dana*. The first aims at converting the

Anu Vows into Mahāvritas by always tending to narrow the limits of the former Vows. Its observance entails avoidance of five The Shik- faults which are (1) sending men sha Vritas. beyond the limits (2) sending verbal messages beyond the limits (3) ordering things from beyond the limits (4) making signs by physical movements and (5) by movements of outward objects.

The second is *Sāmāyika*. It consists in a man's *Sāmāyika* fixing a certain time every morning noon and evening and spending that time in devotion, reading the scriptures and concentration sitting or standing in some lonely place. At this a man should confess and repent all the evil done, spoken or thought of. This is called Pratikraman, which is a part of *Samayika*. A resolution not to commit the same mistake over again, is called Pratyakhyan, which also is included in *Samayika*. It is a great penance and it purifies the mind. To these there praising the greatness of the God, making

three salutations to each of the four directions and giving up desires over the body are added to make up the Six Necessities. The five faults to be avoided here are [1] non-fixing of the body [2] the mind and [3] the tongue to one purpose, [4] non-reverence towards the *Samayika* and [5] forgetting the lessons or the rites of the *Samayika*. The avoidance of these makes the *Samayika* faultless.

The third *Shiksha Vrita* is *Prôshadhôpavas*. A man observing it has to keep a complete or partial fast on the prescribed i. e. every eighth day of the Hindu fortnight. All the day is to Proshadho. be spent in a lonely place in reading pavas. scriptures or meditating over asceticism. The best form of this Vow is in observing it for the whole day prescribed, in addition to the preceding and following twelve hours. To be faultless, its observance must avoid (1) spreading the bed (2) observing the calls of nature (3) taking up necessary tools, without examination and cleaning of the ground, (4)

non-reverence for the rite and [5] forgetting it.

The last Vow is *Dán* or *Varyyavritya*, also *Dan* or called *Atithi Sanvibhag*. It consists charity of giving food, medicine, safety and knowledge to needy men. If the *Dan* leads to or encourages laziness, grossness, madness, disease or sin, it is no *Dan* at all. So one must be very careful in giving in charity. The five faults to be avoided here are (1) giving food kept in an objectionable pot (2) concealed in it (3) giving it through others (4) giving it out of envy and (5) not giving it in time. A man who observes these twelve Vows without faults and the three Shalyas, is a man in the second stage.

The three Shalyas are (1) *Maya* (illusion) The Shalyas (2) *Mithyatva* (falsehood) and (3) or darts *Nidan* (covetous-ness,). The first is the pang of fraud, the second is the pang of false faith and the third is the pang of coveting certain things. A layman who observes

the *Vows* must be unaffected by these darts.

Such a man has to observe the last *Salle-Sallekhana khana* at the time of dying. He or peaceful should give up all love for his wife, death children and friends and hatred towards his enemies. Pardon should be sought from all and extended to all. The idea of houses etc being one's own should be thrown aside. The dues should be paid up. The remaining estate should be given to children, wife, servants and in charities. The actions of the closing life should be reviewed. Evils should be repented. There should be no pain, no fear, no anxiety; but attention should be fixed on scriptures being read at the time. Food should be diminished gradually until it should be substituted for *Kanji* and further for water merely. Lastly strict fasting should be kept. The five salutations namely to the Arhats, the Sidhas, the Acharyas, the Upadhyayas and the Sages should be recited till the soul calmly leaves the body. This *Vow* is to be

observed only when a man feels certain that death is near at hand. The faults to be avoided in the complete observance of this *Vow* are (1) a desire for prolonging the days of life, (2) or for hastening death, (3) fearing death and its pain (4) remembering friends & relations and (5) wishing for certain fruits of the [meritorious] acts done. A man who dies a *Sallekhana* death, surely reaches the heavens or attains the *Moksha*.

Then comes the third, the *Samayika* stage. It consists in the faultless keeping of the *Samayika Vow*. The fourth stage is named after The *Sama-* and consists in the regular observance of the *Proshadhopavas Vow*. The fifth, called the *Sachitt-tyaga* stage, is the one in which a man does not eat fruits, vegetables, roots, branches, seeds and flowers that are not dried or ripe or boiled. The sixth consists in abandoning the habit of eating, drinking, licking and chewing beetlenuts and *pan* from sunset to sunrise. The seventh stage re-

quires complete celibacy and conquest of the sexual desire. The eighth is that stage of life in which engagements like commerce, agriculture, service etc are completely abandoned.

The next The ninth stage is reached when a

Stages man gives up the ten external appendages summarised such as wealth, corn, cattle etc and keeps the mind unruffled.

The tenth stage requires a man to be free from interfering with and consenting to occupations, marriages etc. The final stage of a layman is that in which he leaves home altogether, goes to some ascetic from whom he takes vows, lives by mendicacy, dons a very small piece of cloth only and practices Tapas all the time. A man rising to a higher stage must rise by each successive stage along the march and must keep all the practices of each stage below.

Tapas is twelvefold; [1] Fasting [2] Eating Tapas less than a full meal [3] fixing dinners [4] omitting some *Ras* [ghee etc] from

the dinner [5] sitting and sleeping in a lonely place [6] putting the body to exercise. This is extenal Tapas. The internal Tap is [1] Doing penance [2] keeping restraint [3] serving the Teachers [4] Reading the Shastra daily [5] indifference towards one's own body and [6] concentration of mind.

The fifty three rites prescribed for a layman The fifty are the eight primary qualities, the three rites twelve Vows, the twelve Tapas, one *Samyabhava* or equanimity, the eleven Stages, the four *Danas*, the habit of drinking water passed through cloth, giving up night-meals and the three jewels. They are all detailed before.

The six daily duties of a man are (1) worship, (2) business for livelyhood by means of (*a*) the sword, (*b*) the pen (*c*) the plough, (*d*) the scale (*e*) the tools of arts like carpentry, mechanics, drawing and (*f*) the rod of the herdsman. No one should be idle and burdensome to others. One who handles the sword

has to perform six duties, viz:— self-protection, maintaining purity of heart, up-holding the royal family and treating his subjects and his sons alike and subduing his foes. [3] Charity. [4] Reading and thinking. [5] Self restraint; and [6] Penance.

The fifty-three ceremonies of the *Manupurusa* I shall now briefly enumerate the fifty three ceremonies through which a man living in family life is to pass.

(1) Conception-ceremony. When a woman attains puberty, she and her husband should on the sixth day there-after go to the temple, perform worship and at night should go together only for the sake of progeny. Cohabitation without Ritu i. e. the time just following the monthly course, is prohibited.

(2) Propitiation. In the third month after conception, worship, music etc should be performed to keep the pregnant woman delightful.

(3) *Super-propitiation*. The above cere-

monies should be performed in the fifth month, after conception.

(4) *Dhriti Kriya*, means that worship should be performed, in the seventh month, for the sake of the child to be born.

(5) *Moda Kriya* consists in the writing of the primary letters असिआऊस on the body of the pregnant woman in the ninth month etc.

(6) Birth- ceremony. It consists in worship etc at the birth of a child.

(7) *Naming*. It is to be done on the twelvth day after birth with worship of the Gods, the Preceptors and the family priests.

(8) *Bringing* out the child from the delivery room in the second, third or the fourth month.

(9) *Laying* up the child on a bed.

(10) *Feeding* the child with boiled rice in the eighth month or so.

(11) *First Anniversay*, to be performed with feasts etc.

(12) *Keshavaya* i. e. the ceremony of keeping hairs after shaving for the first time.

13 *Lipi Sankhyan* means that the child in its fifth year should be taught to write *Om* at the hands of the priest.

14 *Thread-ceremony*. This consists in giving the boy, now eight years old, the five *Anu Vritas*.

15 *Student-hood*, wherein the boy should keep the vows, study religion and other subjects.

16 *Completion of the Vows*, means that the boy should, after completing studies take up asceticism if he likes or should be a householder i. e. should take on the habiliments of a layman instead of a celibate, should abandon intoxicants, flesh, honey, the five Udum-bars and the five sins beginning with killing, and should adopt one of the six ways of lively-hood.

17 *Marriage*. When the man wishes to marry he should select with his parents' consent a good girl from a proper family and marry her in the presence of Fire. For a week

after marriage, they should keep on celibacy whereon they should go together on some pilgrimage. After returning, the marriage-thread on the wrist should be untied. Cohabitation is allowed once in a month just at the time of *Ritu*. Weaker persons should keep longer intervals.

(18) *Varnlabh* requires that the married persons, after taking some property from their parents, should make a separate house-hold.

(19) *Kulcharya* i. e. the six daily duties of an householder should be performed.

(20) *Excellence in Layman's duties* should be attained through wisdom, character etc, with a view to become lay-preceptor.

(21) *Quietude* to be got by assigning family-affairs to the care of the sons.

(22) *Desertion* of the house should come when a man is sure that the family would do without him.

(23) The *Pre-ascetic life*, i. e. the life of the layman in the last stage, should be taken

up.

(24) *Jin Rupata* consists in the throwing up of the clothes and taking on the life of an ascetic without any bandage.

(25) *Concentrated Study* should now begin when there should be no talk on any thing but study.

(26) *Teerthankar Bhavana* consists in studying the sixteen *Bhavanas*, the first of which is *Darshan Vishudhhi*.

(27) The duties of a leading ascetic – *Acharya* – should then be performed.

(28) *Preaching* and correcting the wrong going men.

(29) *Becoming an Acharya*.

(30) *Handing over the place* to a pupil and taking to lonely meditation.

(31) The attempt at total concentration.

(32) Total concentration.

(33) Attaining Indra's birth after death.

(34) Accession to Indra's throne.

(35) Giving of *Vimans* and *Riddis* to

others.

(36) Enjoyment of Indra-ship.

(37) Abandoning the place.

(38) To be conceived to become a Teerthankar.

(39) The shower of Jewels upon the newborn.

(40) To be born and worshipped by Indra on the *Meru* mountain.

(41) Worship of the to-be Teerthankar by the Indras.

(42) Heir-apparentship.

(43) Empire.

(44) Acquisition of the *Chakra* i. e. the nine stores and the fourteen jewels.

(45) Starting for universal conquest.

(46) Celebration of the conquest.

(47) Proper regulation of the subsidiary kings.

(48) Giving over the empire to the son and becoming an ascetic.

[49] To attain Absolute knowledge.

[50] Raising up of the *Samava Saran*.

[51] Preaching the truth by the Teerth-aakar.

[52] Drawing the soul into itself.

[53] Final Deliverence.

This is the progress of the layman to *Moksha*.

Now a few words about asceticism, which The Jain comes after the eleventh stage of monk. laymanship. An ascetic has to possess twenty-eight Primary Qualities, namely, the five great *Vows* [the *Anuvritas* in a stricter form], the five *Samitis*, the six necessities beginning with *Sāmdāyika*, abandonment of the objects of the five senses, throwing off clothes, drawing out the hair with one's own hands, one meal a day, standing up while taking his meal, eating the food taken only in the palms of the hands, non-bathing and non-rubbing of the teeth. The secondary qualities of an ascetic are eighty four lacks and they may be referred to in special works on the subject. But their absence does not make the ascetic defecti-

ve. But no defect in the twentyeight primary qualities is allowable in an ascetic.

An ascetic should come for his meal to the town from his lonely abode; he should try five houses and should take his meal in the first of them where he may be willingly welcomed; if he is nowhere called in, he should return to his study and meditation and only try in the same way for his dinner the next day. He should eat whatever is given without asking any thing else. In summer, he should practise his penance on the top of a hill; in winter, by the side of a river, and in autumn, under a tree.

We now come to the fourth part of our lecture the nature of merit and sin. The theory False belief, killing, falsehood, theft of Papa and debauchery, unlimited luxury, covetousness, anger, pride, fraud, love, biting behind one's back, idleness, grossness, eating uneatables—all these are sins. Compassion, benevolence gentleness, charity, self-sacrifice, celebacy, appreciation, sympathy,

praise of gods, reverence for the teachers, studiousness, modesty, philanthropy, self-maintenance in a right-ful way, pilgrimage etc are prescribed to be merits [virtues]. There is no virtue in baths [of sacred rivers, as Brahmins hold]. The layman should bathe for cleanness and health but there is no bearing of river-baths or seabaths on the virtues of a man. There is no religious significance of the eclipses or the equinoxes. There is no *Shradh* [the anniversary of dead forefathers] no Paksha, Illusory no giving of the Pinda to departed methods of souls, no worship of the cow, no Punya worship of the *Tulsi* shrub or the Vad tree. We shall take up the fifth part of the lecture viz- the nature of the binding of *Karm*.

This topic has been mostly dealt with in the second part of the lecture. The soul is roving in worldly existence owing to its connection with *Karman* from times without beginning. The connection breaks off only by the extirpation of the latter. Insight and know-

ledge are the essences of the soul. Whatever is believed and known by the soul, attracts the soul with love or hatred. The development of this love or hatred is the bandage of *Karman*. Here comes our next subject.

Moksha, its nature and its path. It has been already explained to be freedom of Moksha of the soul from every *Karman*. In the progress of the soul from the state of bandage to total freedom, there are successive changes in its state, called *Gunasthanas*, fourteen in number.

The first is *Mithyatva Gunasthan*, where the soul is completely immersed in all the *Karmas*. The soul does not know its true good. When by some cause it happens to have faith in the right path, it reaches the third or the fourth step of merit. On the fourth step, the faith is pure.

On the third it is mixed with a certain amount of illusion and thus that step is called the step of mixed merit.

The soul sometimes falls back to the first step. On its way back, it passes the second step, called the *Sasadan* Step.

Until the fifth step is ascended, faith alone is right, on reaching which the soul must also guide its conduct rightly. So a man who observes either one or all of the *Vows* belonging to the eleven stages of laymanship, is on this – the *Sanyatasanyat* — step of merit.

Keeping the great *Vows* of the ascetics, a man rises to the sixth Step. Here the sins due to physical grossness, are alone committed by the soul.

These too disappear before the next – the *Apramatta* – Step is reached.

The eighth Step, as its name indicates, gives the man experience of an unique nature. Here a man increases his concentration by the *Yogas* and the coils of *Karman* are fast unloosened.

The ninth step – called the *Anivritth karan*— makes very small changes in the above.

On the next step, the passions become very weak and so it is called the *Sookshma – Sam-paraya*.

On the eleventh, the passions are passified. But from here a descent to the sixth step is possible.

The first three classes of *Karmas* have to be totally destroyed in order to reach the twelfth step. The first two parts of pure contemplation are present here. Any explanation of the Jain Yoga would carry us beyond the scope of the lecture and so the point has to be rather dropped in obscurity here.

This concentrated contemplation carries the soul up to the thirteenth Step, where eternal wisdom, illimitable insight, everlasting happiness and unbounded prowess bless the soul. When this absolute knowledge is acquired, Kuber and other heavenly beings raise the *Samavasarana* where the twelve conferences meet to hear eternal wisdom from the *Keralin*. After prayers are offered, the *Keralin* goes ab-

out preaching truth until, when the days of deliverance approach, he takes to the third part of pure contemplation (*Shukla Dhyan*). Here the soul reaches every part of the universe and is yet within the body whose connection alone remains now. The last part of contemplation follows on, when the fourteenth step is ascended, the body disappears like burnt camphor. This is the *Nirvan*.

The going of the Soul to the pure place, called the *Shidha Shila*, from whence it returns not, is the *Moksha*. Innumerable delivered souls exist and are to be there for ages that never were begun and which never close. The *Sidhha* soul has eight characteristics (1) Rightfulness (2) Absolute knowledge (3) Illimitable insight (4) Boundless prowess (5) Minuteness (6) Power to reach every where (7) Power to be big and small and (8) Unaffectedness. This *Moksha* is obtained by means of the three jewels whose acquisition is gradual through the fourteen steps of merits, described before.

We now take up Image-worship. The *Image* or the picture is intended to give us a view of the all-knowing beings in their concentrated posture — the high-souled beings who attained Godhood by the slow path along the fourteen Image-wor- *Gunasthanas*, after throwing off the ship Justi- sensual life for the sake of asceticism. fied.

Even now, photos and statues of great men are placed in private houses and public situations in order that they should remind us of their virtues. Images are worshipped with the same object, and the worship is not of the stone or metal of which the images are made but of the virtues they represent. They also teach us vividly what the posture of contemplation with concentration is. The images are either in sitting or erect postures and the postures are called *Padmasan* or *Kayotsarga* respectively. The erect image has its feet close to each other, the hand left straight down and the half-closed eyes pointed to the end of the nose. In the sitting attitude, the eyes are in

the same position but the feet are twined into each other and the up-turned palms of the hands are placed together in the centre of the folded feet. Neither cloth nor ornament has any place on the images. No female image is to be in their vicinity. It is in fact an embodiment of a perfectly dispassionate mind in complete self-concentration.

The best attitude of Yoga as given in the Illustrated *Bhagavadgita* ch. VI transcribed by a Brahmin work is found in these images. Says the Gita:— "With body, head and neck erect and immoveable; with eyes directed straight to the end of the nose and without trembling; with the mind kept at complete rest and fearless; keeping celibacy; subduing the heart; devoted to me (the God); a man should remain, with faith on me, in the state of concentration. He who thus concentrates the attention and pacifies the mind in contemplation, becomes united with me and obtains final

peace.” §

A similar description is met with in V, 26, 27, and 28 of the same (non-Jain) work. ¶

§ समं कार्याशिरोध्रावं धारयन्नचलं स्थिरः ॥
 सम्प्रेक्ष्य नासिकाग्रं स्वं दिशश्चानवलोकयन् १३
 प्रशान्तात्मा विगतभीर्ब्रह्मचारिव्रते स्थितः ॥
 मनः संयम्य मच्चित्तो युक्त आसीत मत्परः १४
 युञ्जन्नेवं सदात्मानं योगी नियतमानसः ॥
 शान्तिं निर्वाणपरमां मत्संस्थामधिगच्छति १५

Bhagavadgita ch. VI 13, 14, 15.

¶ कामक्रोधविमुक्तानां यतीनां यतचेतसाम् ॥
 अभितो ब्रह्मनिर्वाणं वर्तते विदितात्मनाम् २६
 स्पर्शान्कृत्वा बहिर्बाह्यांश्चक्षुश्चैवान्तरे भ्रुवोः ॥
 प्राणापानौ समौ कृत्वा नासाभ्यन्तरचारिणौ २७
 यतेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिर्मुनिमोक्षपरायणः ॥
 विगतेच्छाभयक्रोधो यः सदा मुक्त एव सः २८

Bhagavadgita ch. V.

The householder worships the images with
 Worship eight classes of things while the asce-
 described ties only offer salutations to them.
 The eightfold worship is (1) *Bathing* the ima-
 ge with water; (2) *Sprinkling* of *Keshar* and
Chandan; before the image; (3) offering rice
 in front; (4) placing flowers before the image;
 (5) offering (Boiled rice) *Naivedya* (suger-
 candy etc.); (6) keeping up a light near the
 image; (7) burning incense; (8) offering fru-
 its. There are different hymns to be sung in
 offering each of these things. The eight toge-
 ther make the *Arghya*. The offerings are to
 be poured into three cavities in ground with
 the three fires in them — the *Ahavaniya*, the
Garhapatya and the *Dakshin* fires. Wroships
 are classed into [1] the worship of *Arahants*,
 [2] the worship of *Sidhas* etc; all the wor-
 ships consisting of praise of the virtues of the
 objects of worship. The offerings are called
Nirmalya and they are not to be taken for use
 or eaten by any one. It is said to be a great

sin to do so.

So far for image-worship. I will now point out the Resemblance of Jainism with other religions. The chief doctrines of Jainism are [1] the independent existence of the soul, [2] the observance of the five *Vows*, [3] the abandoning of animal-food and intoxicants, [4] the theory of actions meeting with their requisite

Jainism fruits necessarily and [5] the conception of *Moksha*. Jainism shares these views with many other religions. The Hindus, the Parsees, the Islamites, the Christians and the *Budhas* admit the immortality of the soul. The Mohametans and the Christians do not believe in rebirth; but still they hold that the soul survives death and reaps the fruits of its actions by the decree of God. So the immortality is still unchallenged. About the *Vows* of *Jainism*, the Hindu work known as the *Divine Lay* speak in very similar terms thus:—

“ Religion is defined as Non-killing; killing is

irreligious. So, those who desire piety should be compassionate towards beings. Non-killing, Truth, Non-stealing, Celibacy—in these four, every duty has been included. ” *

About the non-eatables in Jainism, the *Maha Bharat* says:— “ Pilgrimage, meditation and penance are in vain for those who use intoxicants, take their dinners at night and who eat roots of trees. ” †

The *Bhāgavat* says with regard to the same subject:—

Abandoning intoxicants, animal food and honey; giving up eating the five Udumbaras (fruits full of minute lives); not eating at

* अहिंसा लक्षणो धर्मो ह्यधर्मः प्राणिनां वधः ॥

तस्माद्धर्मार्थिभिर्लोके कर्तव्या प्राणिनां दया १

• अहिंसा सत्यमस्तेयं तथा मैथुनवर्जनम् ॥

चतुर्वर्त्तेषु सूक्तेषु सर्वे धर्माः प्रकीर्तिताः २

† मद्यमासाशनं रात्रौ भोजनं कन्दभक्षणम् ॥

ये कुर्वन्ति वृथा तेषां तीर्थयात्रा जपस्तपः १

night; this is the characteristic of a Brahmin.”§

So again says the Shiva Dharma:—

“ In liquars, flesh, honey and butter removed (from curds) innumerable small lives take birth and die away. ”

These are Hindu authorities to which may be added the *Parsee*, the *Mussalman* and the *Christian* as regards non-killing, eating flesh and drinking wines.

Ferdosi, the author of the *Persian* sacred work, the *Shahanama*, says:—

“ The son-in-law of the prophet Mohamed, *Alli* prohibited flesh-eating. *Akabar* [the emperor] desisted from flesh-eating every Friday, Sunday, eclipsed day and the whole of the *Faruardin* month. *Mohamad* himself has strictly ordered non-killing in front of the *Kayaba* at Mecca. Even a *Mohamadan* passing through the *Salekashareayat* to the *Tareekat*

§ मद्यमांसमधुत्यागी त्यक्तोदुम्बरपञ्चकः ॥

निशाहारपरित्यक्त एतद्ब्राह्मणलक्षणम् ?

does not eat flesh. Drinking and debauchery are strictly prohibited to the Islamites. The *Koran* commands truthfulness and non-stealing. Of the Ten Commandments, those that refer to non-killing, stealing, purity of character, drinking etc. are quite in consonance with Jainism. The Bible prescribes vegetarianism:—

“ Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth and every tree which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. ”

[Genesis chapt I, 29.]

“ While the flesh was yet between their teeth, ere it was chewed, the wrath of the LORD was kindled against the people, and the LORD smote the people with a very great plague. ”

(See verse 33 and also verses 19 and 20)

General Booth of the Salvation Army, himself a vegetarian, preaches that creed to all his followers. Vegetarian societies are founded

everywhere in Europe and they justify vegetarianism on hygienic, economical, ethical and religious grounds.

So it will be seen that on vegetarian and temperance grounds, many other religions agree with *Jain* doctrines. It was an error of Shankaracharya to stigmatise *Jainism* as being atheistic. In writing his commentary on the Sutra नैकस्मिन्नसंवात् Shankar has tried to refute the *Syadvad* of *J* in Logic. This attempt displays the ignorance of Shankar about the doctrine criticised and his prejudice against *Jainism*. *Anekant* means the existence of many qualities in one and the same object. The same man is spoken of as father, uncle, father-in-law, son-in-law and so on, in his different relations. To his son, he is father; to his nephew, he is uncle. So again, a man is both wise and ignorant—the first with reference to an ignorant man, the second with reference to a wise man. Every thing is existent in some respects from the point of view of the *Swachatusaya* and

non-existent in some respects from the point of view of the *Parachyatustaya*. * There is nothing existent or non-existent in all respects. Even Shankaracharya him-self avails him-self of the same mode of reconciling opposite views by calling the one true 'ordinarily' or *Vyavahartah* and its opposite as also true *Paramarthatah* i. e. from the stand-point of the highest considerations. For instance, the inconsistency of the Gita in the following. The Gita says in one place that the universe is not created by any one. † This view is contradicted by the

* The *Swachatustaya* are *Swaroop*, *Swadravya*, *Swakshetra* and *Swakal*. These mean respectively, one's own nature, material, place and time. *Parchatustaya* similarly are the nature, material, place and time of others. See further note on Anekant Logic.

Editor.

‡ न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः ॥
 न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते १
 नादत्ते कस्यचित्पापं न कस्य सुकृतं विभुः ॥
 अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः २

same work when it says that God pervades every being and puts in illusion by means of his *Maya*. \$

To say that God does nothing and also that he does every-thing is obviously contradictory. This is reconciled by saying that the two are true from two different points of view.

Even now we look at everything from ethical, hygienic and other points of view. This subject is very clearly explained by Dr. Bhandarkar, M. A. Ph. D. LL. D etc. in his report regarding the Deccan College Manuscripts. He says:—

“There are two ways of looking at things, one called *Dravyarthikanyaya* and the other *Paryayarthikanyaya*. The production of a jar is the production of some thing not previously existing, if we take the latter point of view, i. e., as a *Paryaya* or modification; while it is not

§ ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ॥

ब्रामयन् सर्वभूतानि यंत्रारूढानि मायया १

the production of something not previously existing, when we look at it from the former point of view, *i. e.*, as a *Dravya* or substance. So when a soul becomes, through his merits or demerits, a god, a man, or a denizen of hell, from the first point of view, the being is the same, but from the second he is not the same, *i. e.*, different in each case. So that, you can affirm or deny something of a thing at one and the same time. This leads to the celebrated *Saptabhanginyaya* or the seven modes of assertion. You can affirm existence of a thing from one point of view (*Syad asti*), deny it from another (*Syan nasti*); and affirm both existence and nonexistence with reference to it at different times (*Syad asti nasti*). If you should think of affirming both existence and nonexistence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that thing cannot be so spoken of (*Syad avaktavya*); similarly under certain circumstances the affirmation of existence is not possible (*Syad asti avaktavya*); of

non-existence (Syad nasti avaktavya) and also of both (Syad asti nasti avaktavya). What is meant by these seven modes is that a thing should not be considered as existing everywhere, at all times, in all ways, and in the form of every thing. It may exist in one place and not in another, at one time and not at another, &c. It is not meant by these modes that there is no certainty or that we have to deal with probabilities only, as some scholars have thought. All that is implied is that every assertion which is true is true only under certain conditions of space, time &c. This is the substance of the section which treats of Dravyasamanya or Dravya generally."

Had *Jainism* been atheistic, the Vedas would not have referred to it in respectful terms. Says the Rig Veda:—

ॐ तैलोक्यप्रतिष्ठितानां चतुर्विंशतितीर्थकराणां ॥

ऋषभादिवर्द्धमानान्तानां सिद्धानां शरणं प्रपद्ये १

" I bow down to the twentyfour

Vedas Sidhas, from *Rishabh* to *Vardhaman* on Jainism celebrated in all the three worlds. "†

Similarly,

(Says the *Yajaman*) " We propitiate the naked Gods who are holy, and who purify others. " §

So again, vide *Yajur Veda*, XXV, 19. ¶

† This passage seems to be spurious from its language as well as from its reference to *Vardhaman*.

Ed.

§ ॐ पवित्रं नममुपवि (ई) प्रसामहे येषां नम्रा

(नम्रये) जातिर्येषां वीरा ॥

¶ " ॐ नमोऽर्हन्तो ऋषभो "

ॐ ऋषभं पवित्रं पुरुहूतमध्वरं यज्ञेषु नम्रं परमं माहसं
स्तुतं वारं शत्रुंजयं तं पशुरिन्द्रमाहुरिति स्वाहा । उत्त्रा-
तारमिन्द्रं ऋषभं वपन्ति अमृतारमिन्द्रं हवे सुगतं
सुपार्श्वमिन्द्रं हवे शक्रमजितं तद्वर्द्धमानपुरुहूतमिन्द्रमा-
हुरिति स्वाहा । ॐ स्वस्ति न इन्द्रो वृद्धश्रवाः स्वरितनः
पूषा विश्ववेदाः स्वति नस्तार्क्ष्यो अरिष्टनेमिः स्वस्ति (contd.)

The same *Veda* refers to *Nemi*, one of the Jain Teerthankars. *

Thus it will be seen that many Jain prophets like *Rishabh*, *Suparshva*, *Nemi* and *Vardhaman* are worshipped and praised in the *VEDAS*. Hence *Jainism* cannot be called *Nāstika* (in the sense of 'profane' or 'un-vedic'). It also appears to be prior to the *Vedas*.

Non-Jain Rama says in *BRAHADYOGAVASHI* references *SHTHA* that he wished to get peace to Jainism " like *Jin.* †

DAKSHIN-MURTA-SAHASRANAMA says: "Said shiva ' a Jain is one who loves Jainism, subdues anger and conquers disease. ' " ‡

(concd.) नो ब्रह्मस्पतिर्दधातु दीर्घायुस्त्वाय बलायुर्वा शुभजातायुः॥

ॐ रक्ष रक्ष अरिष्टनेमि स्वाहा । वामदेवशान्त्यर्थ-

मुपविधीयते सोऽस्माकं अरिष्टनेमि स्वाहाः ॥

† राम उवाच— नाहं रामो न मे वांछा भावेषु च न मे मनः॥

शांतिमास्थतुमिच्छामि चात्मन्येव जिनो यथा॥

‡ शिव उवाच— जैनमार्गरतो जैनो जितक्रोधो जितामयः ॥

Bhartrihari speaks of the dispassionateness of the Jinas as being matchless- §

Such instances may be multiplied many-fold; but it will take long time.

These references further support our point. PANINI's authority may be added to this. He defines Nastikas as those who deny the existence of post-mundane worlds. ¶ The Jains

§ एको रागिषु राजते प्रियतमादेहार्द्धधारी हरो ।
 नीरागेषु जिनो विमुक्तललनासङ्गो न यस्मात्परः ॥
 दुर्वारस्मरबाणपन्नगविषव्यासक्तमुग्धो जनः ।
 शेषः कामविडम्बितो हि विषयान्भोक्तुं न भोक्तुं क्षमः ॥

The usual reading of this Shloka substitutes जन for जिन in l. 2. But the reading here adopted is met with in a Jain work, some centuries old, the *MOKṢHMARGAPRAKASHA*. Besides, it gives a better meaning to the shloka. Editor.

¶ सूत्र अस्ति नास्ति दिष्टं मतिः ॥

परलोकः अस्ति इति मतिर्यस्यास्तीति आस्तिकः ।

परलोको नास्ति इति मतिर्यस्यास्तीति नास्तिकः ।

दैवमस्ति इति मतिर्यस्यास्तीति दैष्टिकः ॥

can of course stand on this ground in trying to rebut the charge. They accept sixteen *Swargas* or heavens, seven hells, and this world, through which a soul wanders according to its *Karmas*.

Some, however, base their charge upon the non-creation theory of Jainism. Jainism holds Non-crea- that God is the creator of the uni- tion theory verse only from certain points of view, not absolutely. In so far as he explained to the world the true good of the soul, pointed out to all the means of lively-hood, and inculcated the truth of the law of *Karmas*, God is called the maker of the universe. But Jainism denies that God is the source of all human actions, good and bad; for, this is opposed to the very nature of God. To say that a thief commits theft because he was so moved by God's will and yet God punished him for the theft, is clearly inconsistent. There can be no satisfactory solution of the difficulty here arising. Hence it is that great philosophers

have denied creation by God. For example see the passage quoted from the Bhagavat Gita, on page 53. Here the will of God being the source of any activity is denied. The falling of the rain, the milk in the breast of the mother, the heat given out by fire or the light of the sun are not creations of God but they *exist* by their own nature. If God is to take credit for these, it is as well that he should be censured for creating famines, plagues, inundations and earthquakes. The Hindu Vedant says that the origin of evils is in the तमो गुण of God and of good things, in the सत्त्व गुण of God.

The Christians and the Moslems consider Satan to be the doer of evils. God is said to be full of all the best qualities but not of all the vices. The Jains go further and limit the duty of God to explaining the right path. Christianity concurs with it in saying that God has handed over the duty of giving judgments to his Son. In substance this doctrine means that God is

the legislative power while his Son is the executive. This resembles the *Jain* doctrine in many respects, in so far as it holds that the Teerthakars do not have the 'executive' power in them.

Aristotal, the celebrated Greek philosopher Aristotal who lived in 384 B. C. refers to on creation God in these terms:—

“ Not taking cognizance of, and not regarding the affairs of the world, which owed not its existence to him, to which his presence and influence do not extend. ”—

We shall now take up the last part of our discourse— the individual and national welfare arising from Jainism. From the above account, some may be led to think that Jainism aims at after-life happiness and that there is no provision in it for worldly and natural happiness. But the fact is that Jainism is a source of happiness in this world and even from a national point of view. Worldly comfort consists in

materials like food, clothes, wealth etc. Now the Jains, a million and a half in all, are spread over Lahore and Kashmere in the North, Mysore Material and Rameshwer in the South and prosperity Bombay, Gujerat and Karachi in the of the Jains west. But not one will be found to wander over public streets in search of food. Famine, fire or floods may have reduced some to destitution; but they are very few. Most of the Jains are merchants, money-lenders or landholders. A few are servants. But they are well-doing men as a class. Some are owners of lacks. A few are owners of crores too. Thus the Jains are a materially prosperous class. We shall consider their ethical condition now.

The proportion of jaol-going population is a good index to the moral condition of a community. The following table, drawn from the Jaol Adminstration Repot of the year 1891 for the Bombay presidency gives useful figures.

Moral condition of the Jains.

Religion.	Population in 1891.	Total prisoners in 1891	Proportion of persons to prisoners
Hindus	14657179.	9714.	1509.
Mohamedans.	3501910.	5794.	604.
Christians.	158765.	333.	477.
Parsees.	73945.	29.	2549.
Jews.	9639.	20.	481.
Jains	240436	39.	6165.

The last column shows that the Jains stand highest in morality. The figures from a later Report i. e. for the year 1901 show an improvement even over this. That is, out of 7355 Jains, only one man was in prison in that year.

The following table will show that an observance of the five *Anu Vritas* described before without committing any " faults " pertaining to them, is practically tantamount to complete conformity with the principles of morality

enforced by the Indian Penal Code.

The Vows and the Penal Laws.

Ch.	Substance of the sections.	Sections	The equivalent writ etc.
I	Preamble	1	Command to take the shastra as an authority.
II	Definitions	6-52	The definitions of sins and the Vows.
III	Punishments	53-75	Penances.
IV	General exceptions	76-106	There is no sin unless an action is actuated by passion.
V	Abetment	107-120	The five Vows and the "faults"
VI	Offences	121-130	<i>Virudhrajya-</i>

Ch.	Substance of the sections.	Sections.	The equivalent vrit etc.
	against the State		<i>tikram tyag.</i>
VII	Offences against the army and navy	131-140	"
VIII	Offences against public tranquility	141-160	The <i>Ahinsa</i> vow and its "faults"
IX	Offences committed by public servants	161-171	The "faults" of <i>Satya Vow</i> and <i>Acharya</i> vow with its "faults"
X	Contempt of court &c.	172-190	See ch. VI above
XI	False statements &c	191-229	<i>Anrit, Mithyo-padcs</i> h and vi-

Ch.	Substance of the sections.	Sections.	The equivalent of etc.
XII	False coin- age etc	230-263	<i>rudhrajyatikrim tyag.</i> <i>Pratirupaka vyavahar and V. Rajyatikram tuag.</i>
XIII	Offences regarding weights&c.	264-267	<i>Heenadhik Ma- nonman atichar tyaga.</i>
XIV	Offences against health, sa- fety, etc	268-294	The avoidance of the "faults" of the first two <i>Auvritas.</i>
XV	Offences against religion etc	295-298	"
XVI	Offences against	299-377	The <i>Ahinsa</i> vow with its "faults"

Ch.	Substance of the sections.	Sections.	The equivalent writ etc.
XVII	person Offences against property.	378-462	The complete <i>Achaurya</i> vow.
XVIII	Regarding false docu- ments &c	463-489	<i>Kootlekhkriya</i> & <i>Pratirupaka</i> <i>Vyavahar</i> .
XIX	Regarding failure to perform services &c	490-492	The <i>Satya</i> vow.
XX	Offences about ma- rriages.	493-499	<i>Parastree Tyaga</i>
XXI	Defama- tion	499-502	The <i>Satya</i> vow & <i>Rahobhyakh- yan tyaga</i> .
XXII	Intimida-	503-510	The <i>Satya</i> vow.

Ch.	Substance of the sections.	Sections.	The equivalent of etc.
XXIII	tion Attempt to commit offences.	51I	The five vows.

Thus if a man but observes the *Vows* avoid-
 Repentence ing their faults, he has no fear from
 the Penal Code. A *Shravaka* every day
 recites the *Pratikraman* which gives him the
 habit of being free from offence. Some of the
Gathas in it are given bellow in English:—

I forgive all. Let all forgive me. I am friend
 to all; enemy to none. I unloosen the knot of
 anger, hatred, pleasure, humility, eager desi-
 re, fear, pain, liking and aversion.

After recounting the wrongs done by mind,
 tongue or act, goes on the man:—

“ Ah! what evil have I done! Ah! what evil

idea have I entertained! Ah! what wicked words have I uttered! I repent it; my heart is deeply afflicted!”

The Pratikraman proceeds to recount the “faults” of vows committd, to confess and repent them and then Pratyakhyan—or a determination not to recommit the same—follows. This is to be found in *Shrāvaka pratikramana*.

I have hitherto described how Jainism affects the national welfare and morality of people. National welfare depends on the moral condition of society. Morality begets mutual trust which strengthens union. Union makes great achievements possible. The Joint-stock companies of Bombay, Ahmedabad etc. are supported greatly by Jain capital. Of late, however, the Jains have been confining their attention to secondary matters to the detriment of their primary interests. So they have not only lost learning and political power but they have come to lose every influence in the administration of the country. If they

attend to their chief principles, they will achieve their own and their national good. Jainism offers direct happiness by the aid of the law of cause and effect. No miracles are invented for the purpose. The results good or bad that it promises, are proved to be so with convincing reasons.

Several things are to be told with various objects; of these objects the principle and secondary ones differ according to the circumstances; for instance, the Jain religion prescribes drinking of water after filtering and boiling it and this command is zealously obeyed by the Jains. In this, non-killing (अहिंसा) is said to be the primary object; yet sanitation too is one of its motives. It is also meant for preventing poisonous germs from entering the stomach. So also, non-killing is the principle object in disallowing eating at night. Still the object of sanitation goes along with it. Poisonous bacteria multiply numerously at night. Hence the modern science of medicine advises to stay at

night out of the town in the days of plague and to take care about their entrance into the eatables. Also if there is no objection to eat at night, there remains no rule as to how for meals should be taken at night. Consequently eating at night goes on up to 11 or 12. Owing to this eating irregularly at night, sound sleep cannot be obtained and we cannot get up early in the morning. So the violation of the laws of sanitation gives rise to diseases due to indigestion.



SOME ASPECTS OF JAIN PHILOSOPHY



Very few men will be found ready to hear the claims of a religion that is professed by only a million and a half people, to be considered as being one of the gretest faiths preached for the moral welfare of humanity. The standard by which the common run judges of the soundness of a theory, is the number of men who are willing to say 'yes' to it. When a comparative study of religions is begun, the attention of the scholar at once fixes itself upon those only that are numerically strong beyond comparison. While Hinduism or Christianity counts tens of millions, it is only with some difficulty that Jainism can advance a little further than the first unit. It is only of late

that the great Comparative Religionists of the west have had their eyes slowly opened to the hitherto ignored treasures of philosophy going under the common name of Jainism. But the question still remains, why this faith should show such a small number of adherents, if, as is claimed, its tenets possess that power to appeal to the sentiments of the highest men which all great principles are said to possess. While considering this problem, the critics of Jainism in modern times naturally avail themselves of the charge laid at the doors of this religion by its Vedic opponents. It is asserted with some show of reason that Jainism has failed to capture the hearts of mankind as it has rebelled against the very authority that holds sway over men civilized and uncivilized. The absence in Jainism of a creator who is only to be prayed to grant any boons that a disciple may chance to ask for, is thus said to be the reason why it claims such a small number of followers. This may or may not be so.

We shall have to consider this aspect of the question later on. It may, however, be said here that for the scholar and the thinker, the question is not whether a religion satisfies the craving of a more or less unthinking mob; for, on this theory, the sacrificial rites of Aryan and Unaryan barbarians which seek to propitiate the gods by offerings of lives, may pretend to stand on higher grounds than those that are occupied by the best and subtlest speculations of our highest heads. In giving a verdict on such a charge as this, it is necessary therefore to see if it stands the test of intellectual and moral criticism. Judged from this standpoint, the war waged by Jainism against the fictitious power that professes to be able to set all Law at defiance and work miracles for the satisfaction of its favourites, is a war in the cause of truth and morality. There can be no indictment of Jainism on this ground. It would be better to examine the nature of its teaching, its aims and objects and its triumph-

hs in ages gone by, before we give our judgment as to the cause of the small number of its professors. This we shall be able to do not in the beginning, but in the end of our inquiry. Yet the very first step we have to take is to mark.

THE THEOSOPHICAL NATURE OF JAINISM.

which shows why the charge has at all come into vogue and the way in which it is to be answered. Jainism is in fact neither a religion nor a sect nor a school of Philosophy. It is the essence, the abstract, the undercurrent, in short, the religion of religions. It may be defined almost in the same terms as were used by Zeller or Ferrier in forming a definition of philosophy in general. Jainism is a purified system of rational knowledge holding only such principles as appeal to reason *qua* reason. It is not Vishnu that the Jains adore; it is not Shankar that they accept as their God. Neither is Budha or Christ their object of worship. Yet in one sense it is Vishnu (the pro-

tector) it is Shankar (the doer of good) it is Budha (the awakened) and it is also Christ as the teacher of right that are raised to the universal adoration of men and animals. Even the Twenty-four Teerthankers of every age in the unending and unbegun series of ages, do not command our reverence as being Shri Vrishabha or Shri Vardhaman or any so and so. It is every Jin as such that is our God and more than a God. A *Jin* is not a particular personality or even a cut and dry principle; it is an eminence of position attained by illimitable excellence in knowledge, conduct, joy &c. Every soul may aspire to reach it by a long series of lives in which it may free itself from the trammels of worldly action. And whoever succeeds in this—the path of success is sure though slow and clear though difficult—may command our reverent homage. It is in this spirit of adoring whatever is best wherever it may be found, that the Acharya Akalanka offers his salutation to बुद्धवा वर्द्धमानं

शतदलनिलयम् केशवं वा शिवम् वा The faith which a Jain is asked to lay in his God, his Scripture and his Preceptor is also of a very logical nature. The faith of *Jainism* is the faith in truth (*Samyaktva*) and it is only faith as long as the knowledge of truth has not realized it into Absolute Wisdom. The Jain faith is only provisionally blind — nay, it is never blind; it is opposed to sight and is a vague appreciation of truth as a result of past ages of ever developing knowledge. It is not the usual *Bhakti* or the feeling of worship; but it is an *insight* (*Darsan*) into the truths of the universe that is itself accountable in every detail and is destined to be justified by increased knowledge or the widened circle of light. A very illustrative instance as to how their Insight works may be found in the faith which the Jain Shashtras dictate. Our acceptance of those scriptures relies on their being proved to be “ impossible to be transgressed ”; if freedom

for the soul is wished for and also to be "fully consistent with what is seen and desired." A stricter test than this could scarcely be found to examine a religion. The first ground on which this Religion appeals to all truth-loving souls is therefore an appeal of reason to criticise itself by the most logical standards. It is not a name that is the rallying point of its disciples. But as a path that leads by critically examined steps to a consummation which is universally wished for, Jainism claims our earnest consideration.

THE THEORY OF GOD.

The same critical nature of *Jain* Philosophy may be prominently found at work in the conception of God. *Swami Samant Bhadra's Apt mimansa* illustrates the way in which an intelligent Jain would set about his enquiry of Godhood. This sage has in mind the task of composing a great commentary upon the *Tatvarth Sutras*. Naturally the first thing that occurs to him is the invocation of Divine blessings.

But his mind is so ablaze with criticism that he could begin nowhere with closed eyes. So he asks himself at his very first step, why should I call you my God? Is it your entrance into this world accompanied by all the splendour of Indras and more, that entitles you to my homage? Is it your power to work through the sky? The plain answer is in the negative. These may be the powers of an enchanter, says the Acharya. Do then the two classes of *mahodayas* (e. g. good form, immunity from physical pains etc.) constitute your claim to our reverence? Here also the answer is, no; for, it is argued, such glories may be found in the heavenly deities who are still haunted by passions. Are you then our God by being the founder of a religion? No. There are others too who have founded religions. Thus he goes on discussing one after another the various attributes that are considered the essence of true godliness by some school or other. Finally the conclusion arrived

at is that God is not the creator of the world. He is entitled to our reverence only on the ground of his being omniscient. Such a theory cannot but dispel the innumerable superstitions that cling to any other notion of God. The Jain God is the wise man's God. But the mass of mankind still likes to lean upon some imaginary entity that would be ready to offer its rescuing hand to any one suffering from any cause. Such an entity must be endowed with capacity to do and undo any-thing that suits the devotee. Hence the conception of Jainism is always open to misunderstanding and as such calls for a few remarks in this place.

There may be difficulties in the way of belief in an uncreated universe; but those in the way of the dogma of creation, are greater and more insuperable difficulties. Hinduism or Vedism, the contemporary opponent of Jainism in this respect, is not a pure type of the creation-theory. Hence the antagonism of the

two was not so marked in this field. The perpetual existence of Brahma out of which every visible existence grew, was the root of many opinions that favoured the Jain theory. At the best, the Hindu creator; must be a mere architect planning his work. Even this is not allowable in the school represented by the best-known critic of Jainism, *Shankaracharya*. Adwaitism is not at all better than Jainism, if the doctrine of non-creation is to be taken as a defect. Keeping aside its moral results for a moment, Jainism might still hold that for Adwaitism, a different theory is impossible and in-consistent. Clearly therefore the ascription of a title of notoriety to Jainism by *Shankar* and his school, is one of the lower expedients to which worsted adversaries stoop in their baser moments. The advocates of the Jain theory need not be content with this negative advantage, for they may well claim for more.

GOD AND MAN.

There are various ways of conceiving the

inter-relations of the two terms with which Indian Logic has ever to deal, God and man. Jainism was bold enough to occupy that end of the line which is conspicuous for bringing together the terms at the nearest points. Indeed, Adwaitism is the school which avowedly achieves this most successfully. But its success is the result of annihilation of the one term for the benefit of the other, with the effect that the annihilation of the one leads to the evaporation of the other. Adwaitism thus destroys not only man to give advantage to God but practically the Adwait Brahma is its own Mahesh. As soon as it tries to establish absolute superiority where only a relative existence is possible, it cuts the tree under its feet and falls flat with what it fells. The God is empty, with all his essence centred in a mere, lifeless word. Where Adwaitism thus fails, Jainism removes the difficulty by making the separation between God and man actual and yet retains the advantage of a theory that

exalts man to the very God-hood, by making the union potential. Yet the potentiality is not the irresistible current of uncontrolled events; this would, like Adwaitism, make men Gods only awaiting their time. It is only the conditional possibility of the soul to attain the union which ever presupposes actual independent existence but total similarity in essence and attribute—conditional upon the soul going through a voluntary trial through ages. The trial is the existence of the soul in this world or in the two worlds above and below. This leads to the cardinal theory of Jainism, the theory of *Karman*. It is this principle that makes it so preeminently a school of activity, not a mechanical but a voluntary activity for heaven or hell, as one chooses. But the total significance of this theory cannot well be understood without its complementary notion of the *Jagat Karan Vada*, or,

THE CREATION CONTROVERSY.

Our philosophy handles the question from the

logical, epistemological and moral points of view. And the handling is as critical as it is finishing. † If God created the universe where was he before creating it? If he was not in space, where did he localise the universe? “How could a formless or immaterial substance like God” continues the author of the *Great Puran* — Shri JinSenacharya— “create the world of matter? Was he a mere architect? If not, whence could he bring his material? What was the source of his material? If there was any, who created the source? And whence was that ‘who’? If the material is to be taken as always existing, why not take the world itself as unbegun? If the creator was uncreated, why not suppose

† The basis of the Jain doctrine of non-creation is thus summarised:—

भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थिय भावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जएसु भावा उप्पादवये हि पकुव्वन्ति ॥

Samaya Sār by Kundkuudachārya.

the world to be itself self-existing? ” Again, “ Is God self-sufficient? If he is, he need not have created the world. If he is not, like an ordinary potter, he would be incapable of the task, since, by hypothesis, only a perfect being could produce it. ” “If he is to be said to have created the world with an aim, it is what no one will allow. If it is a mere play of his will, it would be making God childish. If you say that God is an agency through which he creates every-thing according as is determined by his *Karman*, then, this makes him dependent upon others (for his activity.) If he is only a *निमित्त* (or an agent through whom something produces something) in the production of what is caused by *Karman*, why needlessly should his aid be presumed when everything is complete by itself? ” Further on, the Acharya speaks almost in the strain of Morley in one of his ~~works~~ on the French Revolution Literature when he says “ If God is benevolent and if he has created the world out of his

grace, he would not have brought into existence misery as well as felicity." The sage then goes on to ask of his opponents, why the world should be destroyed by him who gave it birth. If it is to stop the evil-doing of the wicked, why did he create the evil-doers at all? Then comes the teleological explanation of creation, so piously stuck to by even critical heads. * The answer briefly is that

* We might very well place by the side of this, a passage from Weber who while writing about Epicurus, says:—

"How can we assume that a world full of evils is the creation of the Gods? What have we? Barren deserts, arid mountains, deadly marshes, uninhabitable arctic zones, regions scorched by the southern sun, briars and thorns, tempests, hailstones and hurricanes, ferocious beasts, diseases, premature deaths; do they not all abundantly prove that the Deity has no hand in the governance of things? ... It is possible, nay, certain that Gods exist; all the notions of the earth agree to that. But these supremely happy beings who are free from passion, favouritism and all human weaknesses, enjoy absolute repose." *P. 137 History of Philosophy by A. Weber.*

“ the variety in the world ” that is what strikes the teleologist — “ is caused by the variety of the *Karman* which is the action of the soul. ” The soul is therefore the cause of everything through its own actions — of every evil by its evil actions and of every good by its good actions. The soul is its own God. But then,

WHO ARE THE TRUE GODS ?

Jainism transforms the Adwait doctrine in its characterisation of divinity. The soul has the capacity either to degrade itself to the depths of the *Nigôda* or the lowest of the seven hells or exhalt itself to the uppermost regions of unending Felicity, Absolute Wisdom, Total Insight and Unlimited Prowess. This Quadruple of Illimitables or *Anant Chatusthya* is not meant to meddle with the affairs of the world. The souls that attain this height are absolutely free from the contaminations of the worldly goods and evils. The Gods are related to the world only as its supreme teachers, inculcating

lessons in the “ Three jewels. ” As teachers, however, they work only during a short period that intervenes between the fourth and the fifth or the last *Kalyan* or epoch of their worldly life. And then only, it is the influence of the *Punya* of the audience who gather around the Holy Teachers during those fixed periods that inspires the *Kevalins* in their *Pre-nirvan* periods, says the great author of the *Samaya Sar*, to undertake the work of expounding the path of salvation. Thus though the Gods are in a way related to the world as its teachers, they are, to use an usual Jain simile, lotuses in water i. e. related and yet aloof from the element, from which they grow and still remain free.

Says Lucretius (II, 646.) :—

Omnis enim per se divom nature necesse est
 Immortali avo summa cum pace frvater,
 Semota a nostris relens subjunctaque louje.
 Nam privata dolore ommi, privata periclis,
 Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,

Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur
ira. ¶

Well may these words apply to the Gods of Jainism. This description of the Gods is not however the nature of what are styled Devas residing in the heavens, in Jain literature. These are in the essence beings like men, only enjoying higher, longer and more intense pleasure. But they have pains going along with their pleasures and especially they are at a disadvantage when compared with us, in being compelled to descend to human life before it is even possible for them to attain the Nirvan. They are 'men writ large.' The Jins, — this is the proper term for the true Gods of

¶ Mr. Morley, in his Gladstone III 19, translates these lines thus. "For the nature of Gods must ever of itself enjoy repose supreme through endless time, far with drawn from all concerns of ours, free from all our pain free from all our perils, strong in resources of its own, needing nought from us; no favour win it, no anger moves."

Jainism — are perfectly free from any passion that we know of. Their images are emblems of this feature of the Jains — I mean, the Digamber-Jains. They are absolutely naked from head to foot. This is very often made a point of ridicule by partisan cavillers of Jainism but we might, with Milton, say:—

Then was not gvilty shame; dishonest Shame
Of natures work, Honour dishonovrable,
Sinbred, how have ye troubled all mankind
With shevs instead, mere shews of seeming pure
And banisht from man's life his happiest life
Simplicity and Spotless innocence!

Paradise Lost IV 313-18

This principle of Jainism has influenced the subsequent doctrines of the religion in many ways. The question of the creation of the universe as apart from man does not bear a direct relation with practical life and therefore a theory of creation assumes its fullest importance only as applied to man and his inner nature. If you deny the divine origin of things, what is the basis of morality? What

is the root of human activity? What is the exact nature of the *Karman*? How far is the soul determined by his *Karmas*? What liberty of action does Jainism allow? Is the Jain Ethics a deterministic system like that of the Vedic pantheism? What is the influence of Dharma on human actions as moulded by the previous *Karman*? Why did the holy teachers labour, if the *Karman* was the master of man's destiny? Such questions that form the very essence of morality crop up in view as soon as we come face to face with the genesis of human activity. We can hope to give but a brief reply to these problems, in the spirit of Jainism. So we might begin by asking ourselves,

WHY DOES MAN ACT?

Who else, if not God, makes him a hero in the strife of life? Whence is the strife at all? It is one of the paradoxical but still true premises from which every system has to start that gives an answer to this question.

The *Karman* is in point of its origin as original as the soul itself. The two are packed together from unbegun times. And the strife springs up as soon as the soul sets about freeing itself from this company, and ends when it attains *Môksha*. Not that every soul is on its way to liberation; for some of the souls do not take heed of the lessons taught by those who have accomplished liberation and hence they weave every day a web of *Karman* round their own selves which gets more tangled at every step. The soul is thus the efficient cause of man's activity and his destiny. But in its own pure nature, the soul is a principle of rationality only. It becomes a cause only when combined with the material of its work, the *Karman*. The final cause is the *Moksha*, which is attained by true Insight which is acquired either by the effects of previous good acts or by the teachings of the *Shastras*. This insight or as it may be styled, this faith is never a sufficient cause of deliverance as is held

by the followers of the *Bhagawat Dharma* like *Tukaram*. Faith is the basis on which the ladder of wisdom and character is to be placed to reach the Highest Place. But it is only a basis. Wisdom is supposed to be the path of beatitude by Vedantins like *Shankaracharya* but knowledge without action is brain without hands. Nor is the Nirvan reached by the vast, almost bewildering, mass of ritual that is performed to propitiate the stoned Gods of the temples. In its original, Jainism allows but a small part of the incumbrances that have grown upon the superstitious ignorance of the faithless followers. The celebrated Jain Acharya, Shri *Kundkunda*, points out three "pure" modes of worship which chiefly consist in the consecration of the soul to the way of life lived by the holy Teachers. The 'unpure' path of approaching the Highest is of course image-worship of the twentyfour. But even this worship consists of very simple ritual. And simple as it is, it occupies a very

subordinate part in the system of Jain practices, which are more

A SCHOOL OF ETHICS

than a system of ritual. Everything is for the development, the purification and the freeing of one's own self. There is no dependence on any power beyond that which every one may lay his hands to. There is no favour sought, no fear entertained but that which is one's due, due by one's own good or bad actions. The *Karman*, though powerful as long as one is in its clutches, can be torn into tatters by any; only he must bear and forbear. The veil of bandage can be removed, however thick and heavy it may be, by any soul, however weak it may look; only it must take the tools suited to the work. And those tools are offered to all without any expectation in return. There is no son of God, through whom the soul must seek to be saved; there is no prophet commanding the devoted **मामेव शरणं ब्रज** from the coachman's box of a warrior's

chariot. From the fold of Jainism, no one is shut out, whatever his caste and birth may be. Thus the Jain ritual is a system of equality and a bond of brotherhood. It is a moral system being a system of inward inspiration, a system that subdues the low and ignoble in the heart of man. It is not an aimless asceticism that burns out all the man and thus empties the system of its whole content and that grows up on the soils of pessimism. Self subjection does not in Jainism mean the destruction of all the self but it is only a subjection that raises man's higher nature supreme. Nor is self-conquest the end and aim of man. Truly does Shri Gunbhadra start his "*Self-discipline*" आत्मानुशासनम् by telling his self "Oh soul! greatly doest thou fear misery and long for happiness. I will tell thee the path of that [सुख] which thou thus longest for." It should be also remembered that Jainism is a true moral philosophy on another ground, although it is suspected

to teach man utter depreciation of worldly life. The soul that was destined to attain Nirvan within the span of its running life was the soul that went through all the important epochs of man's life as we understand it. Nay, it is the principle of Jainism that the life we live, is the one on which the existence of its ascetics depends and through which its purified asceticism grows. While describing the value of human life, an ancient Jain teacher says:— It is in human life that Tapas, the great Vows, concentration or even Salvation is possible. † Nothing could give life a nobler ideal and a more glowing hue.

THE FREEWILL THEORY

Here we might resume our question as to whether the theory of determination by the

† मणु अगईए वि तओ अणुअगईए महव्वयं सयलं ।

मणुअगईए ज्ञाणं मणुअगईए वि णिव्वाणं ॥

The Anuprekshas of Swami Kārtika.

Karman allows room for Freedom of will. The pantheistic systems of the east are charged with being unmoral in tendency in as far as they make the human a part and parcel of the divine soul. The essential unity of the two is rightly considered to be a deathblow to moral feeling. If the part is what the whole has made it, there is no responsibility for wrong or credit for right. It is not however clear, how Christian morality which asserts that the human soul is the creation of God, can answer 'nay' to the same charge, although its necessity is more indirect than that of Adwaitism. If the God is the father of all we have, if he is the ultimate authority of our moral intuitions, if his guarantee it is that makes the ethical *Ought* a categorical imperative, why is not the evil that makes us fall away from the path marked out for the righteous and that made Eve taste the fruit of knowledge — why is that evil not ascribed to the same source of the universe, the source

that created light as well as darkness, the heaven as well as the hell. It is a higher notion of Zoroastrianism than of the Islamites or the Christians to say that there are two equally original and independent sources of good and evil. This dualism may have its difficulties; but from the moral point of view, to hold that the same being of infinite goodness should have as well been the parent of so much vice and misery is a poorer idea than that of the struggle of Angra Mainyas and Spenta Mainyas, and if pantheism makes moral responsibility impossible, unitarian theology makes evil as necessary as good and thus makes moral conduct absurd. Free from the creation theory, Jainism makes its Gods neither the claimants of credit for our own virtue nor the unrelenting punishers of sins that we are *his* instruments in committing. The holy teachers of the Jains offer advice but even that is not in the form of commands. They tell universal truths which are their own justification.

They are not to be accepted as being sanctified in their birth from God; but as being intrinsically adapted to the highest *djos* of man, they appeal to him with natural *cree*. The Dharma of the Jains is the condition, the *sine qua non* of the progress of the soul but it helps on such souls as are bent upon movement. Water enables the fishes to move about only if they choose to do so. It is for them to see whether they shall move or stand still. Similarly the soul may select to extricate itself from the whirlpools of life; the Dharma comes to its help. But it may delude itself and covet what drives it in and in. The Dharma is potential steam which has to be worked by the internal driver of the engine to cover the distance between *Sansar* and unending felicity. Jainism is thus the most libertarian ethics possible. No one could for a moment say that moral freedom consists in total irresponsibility. And so, if Jainism makes men suffer long series of troubles and difficulties for sins commi

tted in present or past lives, it makes its ethics no less libertarian. But at any moment, the teachings of the liberted may take effect and from that point of time, the Jain Dharm launches the soul upon its slow voyage to freedom. The choice is not instantaneously full with its distant results; for the *Karman* may not be at that moment fully exhausted. But the ball has nevertheless been set in motion and the force must transmit itself to the end in spite of resistance. Instant escape is impossible. Even the soul may have advanced too far to be influenced by the holy teaching. The old hag who was carried by force to the presence of lord Mahavir, tore open her eyes, to avoid even the sight of the Teacher. But there is nothing incompatible with morality in this necessary determinism inseparable with human nature, a determinism which is the condition of freedom with responsibility.

We have hitherto outlined the most salient

features of Jainism with necessary brevity. But we cannot conclude our review without noticing some of the charges to which it is said to be open. Mr. Apte's* able paper tries to account for the later insignificance of the Jains as a martial race by ascribing the supposed weakness of the Jains to their principle of non-killing. Mr. Apte supports his view with a quotation from Col. Tod. His view seems plausible owing to the excesses to which that principle is reduced by a *small number* of modern Jains. In accounting for the peculiarities of a race, it should be remembered, principles expounded in writings that are not reached by many, should not be compelled to yield more than they imply. In the first place, it should be admitted that theories fashion the minds of their advocates as much as they receive their colour from the

* This reference is to a lecture by Mr. V. G. Apte
B. A. Editor Dnyan Praksh.

minds they occupy. It may be as true that the Non-killing theory in its extreme form, may have caused some minds to be averse to warlike pursuits, as that the originally simple and sensible *Ahinsa* may have — nay, is admitted on all hands to have — been reduced to its absurdities and immasculated forms by some of the later Jains who were already being borne along the current of foreign domination. The debasement of the principle may be the result of the degraded ages and the minds that made the ages so. We should also note that we are always apt to attach too much value to doctrines and too little to men. Then it is also important to examine what really the Jain Shastras teach. The full *Ahinsa* implies absolute freedom from the conditions of the world and hence the Jains who are on the higher stages of asceticism are directed to desist from killing by means that so unnecessarily meet with ridicule from unsympathetic observers. The

ordinary householder has no such hard and fast rule to obey. He is not to kill from motives afforded by passions. That alone is killing which gives " pain to lives owing to our minds, tongue or body being affected by passion " (*Shri Uma Swami*) This allows latitude enough for any ordinary life to carry on his usual avocations that necessarily imply a certain amount of unintentional harm to others. The Kshatriya is yet more plainly enjoined to follow his duty and do his Dharm by being a true and generous warrior. The ultimate goal is total non-killing. And even in the preliminary stages, a Jain has to avoid pain to others as far as possible. This is what is taught by European utilitarianism with the improvement that animals are placed upon the same footing as man in counting up the results of an action. It is to be left to the readers to judge whether the change is for the better or for the worse. That it is more comprehensive and wider in range, is plain enough. As to

the propriety of this enlargement of the moral sphere, it depends on the moral susceptibilities of the man to decide the point.

The above is not a sketch of Jain philosophy in any way. It is an endeavour to point out to thoughtful students of comparative religion and moral philosophy that a vast and fruitful field is all but unexplored by them. True that scholars like Jacobi have been spending good deal of valuable labour upon this subject. I profess to enlighten none of this class. Yet I may venture to say that the labours hitherto spent are chiefly confined to the literery aspects of Jain scholarship. The few works translated into English are only works of secondary value from ethical and theological standpoints. The above will clearly bring out the fact that Jainism is as vigorous and practical a school of thought as any European school and that it adds to its logical keenness all the thoroughness of a well-cut Eastern system. It would be a material

benefit to the task I have in view, if attention were paid to the great principle of *Aneakant Vad*, which anticipates the logic of paradoxes with which Hegel astonished the world. I hope the above will convince the indefatigable European scholar to look upon Jainism as a system pregnant with various lines of useful research and not as the chimera of a few fantastical, unpractical minds. The small number of a million and a half who profess the creed is not an index to the unpracticality of Jainism. The counting itself is at fault. The name may be borne by a small number; but Jainism is no name of a prophet. It claims its conquests in every section of the Indian community where it was Jainism that spread humanity and manliness. The Vedic sacrifices were discontinued; the Budhistic atheism was exposed; the Hindu philosophy was brought nearer to truth by the post Budhic revivalists; the defects of Adwaitism were brought home to the minds of the Hindus

and cruelty to the most trifling life was stopped or softened in vast populations all over India. It is not a small record. But here too, it does not end. Jainism is truth and truth is Jainism. It contains the best-known truth and wins wherever truth wins. Can we not then say, with a German professor,

जिणपवयणं पसिद्धं जंबूदीवम्हि चेव सव्वम्हि ।
किर्त्तिं जसं च अचिरा पावेज्जउ सयलपुढविये ॥



ANEKANT LOGIC.

Logic, as applied to our present subject, is not a term denoting formal laws of thought. It constitutes the essence of Jain philosophy, without an adequate conception of whose importance, it would be impossible to realise the place of Jainism in the great philosophical systems of the world and the contribution it has made to the progress of human thought. As will be indicated further on, *Anekant Logic* is the doctrine which means to examine the very foundations of knowledge and also to explain the ontological problems that have beset philosophical speculations in all times. The value that Jainism itself attaches to this basis of its philosophy may appear extravagant to any superficial observer. It is asserted by a great Jain Acharya that

this *Logic* is as important as the Absolute Wisdom possessed by the *Kevalin*. It differs from the latter only in being indirect as distinguished from 'immediate' which is the characteristic of Absolute Wisdom. This loss caused by its being 'mediate' [अप्रत्यक्ष or श्रुत] is fully made up by its exclusive capacity to demonstrate the truth of Absolute Wisdom to mankind. Thus Absolute Wisdom itself, not to speak of inferior degrees of knowledge, is baseless without the *Anekant Logic*. Obviously, the reason of this is that this *Logic* it is that guarantees our capacity to know and provides us with criteria by which we should be able to test our knowledge. In one word it may be called the 'method' of philosophy or that instrument of thought by which *Tatva Dnyan* or philosophy is polished (*Sanskritam*) It bears therefore the all-comprehending sense that ' *Logic* ' is invested with in Hegel. It is in Jainism what the Science of Ideas is in Plato or the Metaphysic is in Aristotle.

A science that carries so much importance must be necessarily misunderstood and misconstrued. From its very nature, it is open to misconception. It is a very complicated theory and as such, minds of limited capacity can but grasp only this aspect or that of this many-sided system. It strikes, moreover, by its paradoxes which appear from level-grounded standpoints as consisting of diametrically opposed elements. Their connection can only be brought into a comprehensive view by one who takes his stand upon a higher platform. The untrained eye fixes itself only on one point at a time and hence the difficulty in understanding what is but clear as daylight to one who possesses the philosophic insight of *Anekant Logic*. The beginnings of philosophy are therefore always monistic. So much so, that the very idea of philosophy is at first considered to consist in ascertaining the one under the many or earlier still, as in the physical philosophers of Greece, the

highly immaterialised material substratum of the universe. All truth is here embraced by the *one*, beyond which nothing is. This doctrine, to be classed under the *Bhavaikant* school according to Jain terminology, received its highest form in the Eleatic philosophy of Ionia. The *Bhavaikant* doctrine holds that *being* [existence] is the only property of all things. *Being alone is; all else is not.*

Anekant Logic [has therefore to combat this monism (*Ekant Vad*) first. Monism is according to *Anekant*, self-destructive. It ignores one side of the antinomy. It is therefore called **स्वपरवैरि** or enimical to self and non-self. *Bhavaikant* makes mind and matter identical. It renders knowledge impossible by wiping out the difference between subject and its object. The *Sankhyas* who hold the same view make their **पुरुष**, the permanent being, alone existent. But how can the school that makes

पुरुष permanent on the ground that it is [सत्], cease to make *Prakratis* also permanent i. e. synonymous with *Purush* from whom they are so fictitiously distinguished? Again, the denial of all *non-being* by the *Bhavaikantis* means that the four kinds of *Abhavas* are unreal. But by denying, e. g., *pragabhava* and *pradhransabhava* i. e. the absence of an effect before its production, and after its destruction, everything becomes eternally existing, which means that no change or evolution is possible in the world. Similarly the denial of *Anyonyabhava* or the absence of a thing at a place where another thing exists, would result in reducing all the diversity in the universe to blank uniformity. Lastly the denial of *Atyantabhava* i. e. the non-being of one thing what its radical opposite is would lead to the confusion of every-thing with everything else.

We therefore discard this form of monism and take up the next that follows to see if it

satisfies our needs. Thought is said to move to and fro like the pendulum of a clock. As the school of Parmenides was followed by that of Heracleitus, *Bhavaikant* was followed by its opposite counter-part, the *Abhavaikant*. Both agree in being confined to an absolutely one-sided view of the universe; but the latter takes up just the end of the stick that their predecessors totally failed to grasp. *Abhavaikant* means that form of monism which holds every-thing to be *Asad-roop* or non-being. It is hard to understand what this exactly means. But in its most obvious form, it is met very easily by Jainism by saying that if every-thing is unreal, the reasoning which tries to prove all else unreal cannot save itself from the same fate. The Baudhas, who are known in philosophy as *Kshanikekānt Vadis*, are however too hard to be thus summarily silenced. They slightly differ from their speculative kinsmen in emphasising upon the fleeting nature of all existence which

is, in its ultimate results, the same view as is taken by the *Abhava Vadis*. Thus the Baudhas are exactly our “*flowing* philosophers” holding every-thing to be ‘mere currents of incessant change.’ Jainism waged a fierce war with them in old times, although by some irony of fate, in our own days, distinguished antiquarians piously confused one belligerent with the other. We shall only briefly recount some of the principle objections against our Indian Heracleitians.

Nothing *is*; but every-thing *is not*, as soon as it *is*. The moment that it lives, is also the moment that it ceases to live. There is no *being*; all is always *becoming*. But is *becoming* possible for what is not *being*? Cause and effect are in reality two phases of one and the same thing. The two are relative terms, with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But *Kshanika Vad* makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause nor effect

in any case. Causation is thus reduced to mere 'sequence in time.' But even this idea of mere time-relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare time-successions, as the Kshanika vadis in ancient India or Comte and Mill in modern Europe tried to hold. The vadis were not satisfied with these arguments and they rejoined by insisting that the 'unity of nature' between cause and effect as understood by Jainism was a fictitious or *Aupacharika* one. It is, said they, an illusion, or as Mill would say, a mental habit and not a *real* fact. What is an illusion or mental habit? We think of *Manavaka* (a cat) as being 'a lion' or 'like a lion' by illusion or mental habit; but is this possible without our ever having seen some lion? Even

an illusion pre-supposes a reality of which it is an illusion. The 'fiction' of causal relation is therefore founded upon unquestionable facts.

The Baudhas were not satisfied as yet. They took the last argument of the empirical school, the argument of unknowability. The relation is either true or untrue or is both true and untrue or is neither true nor untrue. If cause and effect are one, there is no reason why we should distinguish them. If they are discrete, it is useless to find out relations as there is no certainty in the relations. To say that both the alternatives are true, is opposed to experience. Lastly, to deny both the alternatives, would be to deprive every-thing of its nature. So, they conclude, that nothing can be said on the point. The answer to this sophistry is that if you call all relations to be unknowable, the things of which they are the relations also become unknowable by the same mode of reasoning. Again, the four-fold alter-

nation' (चतुःकोटिविकल्प) by being called unknowable becomes immediately known. And also if every-thing changes totally every-moment, what reason have we to accept an opinion that also changes with every passing moment?

This brings us to another set of objections to the hypothesis of flux. In ancient India, both the ontological and epistemological aspects of the problem of philosophy went hand in hand. The Baudhas whose ontology we are considering, also held that the mind is formed of the unconnected but successive sensations received from objects. This is met with by pointing out that on this theory, the mind that determines upon 'killing an animal' is not the mind that kills it the next moment; hence this latter commits the act without any motive and responsibility. And further the mind that has to suffer the consequences of this sin is neither the mind that planned the act nor the one that executed the plan. That

is, the Budhistic theory of changes following each other in unbroken succession, being so changing without cause, the killing of animals by a butcher is not caused and therefore implies no responsibility. The same objection applies to the theory of cognition as well as that of volition. If knowledge consists of passing sensations without the 'unity of apperception' to connect them, there is no *प्रत्यभिज्ञा* or recognition of for, example this house as being the one that I visited yester-day. The sensationl theory, therefore destroys all knowledge by making both the subject and the objective world unstable. All properties of objects become fictitious as there remains nothing stable of which they may be the properties. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of the persistence of human personality after death becomes out of the question. This deals a death-blow upon the theory on which all religion stands and which is so deeprooted a conviction that a theory of

such meagre pretensions as the Kshanika Vad can never hope to be in the least countenanced by any school, especially if it goes counter to that conviction.

With another swing, the pendulum of Indian thought reaches the celebrated view of *Adwait Ekanit* philosophy which has captured in our times the hearts of some of the most remarkable orientalist of the West. Jainism did not however meet in this school as dogged a foe as it is popularly believed to have met. It is only the fame of the best-known advocate and defender of this school that has invested the controversy with much interest for the ordinary reader. Adwaitism is refuted on many grounds by Jain writers; but it will be here sufficient to indicate a few of them. Adwaitism is only a form of the Bhavaikant doctrine that we have before reviewed. The two are related to each other just as Platonic pantheism is related to the principles of the Eleatics. As plato developed and dramatised

the Eleatic *Being*, the *Adwait* school polished and refined the *Bharaikant* doctrine by introducing more spiritual notions into the former school. Not only all the phenomenal universe, but all the spiritual world also is one homogeneous spirit containing and absorbing all the illusory manifestations in the universe. Adwaitism starts with this theory and thereon tries to explain — or explain away — all the external as well as internal world. Thus it is as unqualified and positive an *Ekant Vad* (monism) as any and naturally, it is open to all the general attacks on that *Vad*. No monism can consistently justify its right to leap upon the world of real facts from its original and legitimate position. The failure of Plato's attempt to connect his Ideal with the real world is also a failure to which the Adwait school is obviously doomed. Visible differences cannot be accounted for by unaided *Brahma*. The intervention of *mayja* may put its shoulder to *Brahma's* wheels; but

the entrance of the *maya* is the warning bell for the pantheistic Brahma to exit at once. In any case, therefore, the world that is to be explained by the Brahma sounds the death-knell of the Brahma as soon as it begins its work. Monism — and of course, Adwaitism — carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.

So the first objection is that Adwaitism digs the grave for the universally accepted duals like the doer and his action, the premiss and its inference and so on. Secondly, self cannot *create* the self. That means that Adwaitism cannot explain without some duality to help how the all-in-all gave rise to itself or to the other-than-itself. Again, has the Adwait doctrine any evidence to prove its truth? It may have it or it may be its own justification. In the former case the evidence brings in a duality; in the latter case, Adwaitism is condemned as unproved as nothing can be its own proof. If it is its

own sufficient proof, why not extend the same right to Dwaitism and say that it is equally proved by its own nature? Yet again, it is a universal law of the mind to have its negative ideas based upon the knowledge of its positive ideas. You know a "flower" and it is because you know it that you can say that there is no "flower in the sky." You know that fire is inferred from the existence of smoke; and only from this knowledge it is that you can say that you cannot draw the same inference from the existence of water. Similarly, when you know that there is dualism in the universe, then and then only, you can imagine its negative, the absence of dualism.

Another logical difficulty arises when we further consider this doctrine. Adwaitism holds that every-thing is homogeneous with every-thing else by its common property. But the supposition of a common property without reference to the special properties of things is itself absurd. For example, 'the horn of the

ass' is without any differentia because it is totally non-existent. In the same way, a thing is without its differentia only when it is considered to be totally non-existent. Hence, on the assumption of Adwaitism, every-thing becomes *असत्* as being devoid of any differentiating quality.

Finally comes the ethical argument against the pantheistic conception of this school. There would be no distinction between an auspicious and an inauspicious action, virtue and sin, knowledge and ignorance or Beauty and worldly misery. This criticism is met with by the assertion that *Vedant* removes the separate existence of individual souls and makes them "bubbles on the surface of water." This is said to go a long way in making altruistic morality acceptable to man. This interpretation of Adwait theory has led some *savants* of the west to applaud Vedic pantheism for its cosmopolitan tendencies. But in its logical foundations as well as practical re-

sults, this theory is singularly wanting in strength and consistency. Morality consists essentially in struggle and consequently, pantheism, which by hypothesis makes struggle absurd, destroys the basis of moral conduct. Then again, the school which inherits the practical legacies of Vedant is the school that advises man to "defend his wife at the expense of his wealth and to defend *himself* at the expense of his *wealth and wife*." Surely this is not a doctrine to be championed by moral philosophy.

The logical successor of this Vedantic Idealism, is the *Nyaya* school. It occupies the exact opposite of Advaitism by holding that every-thing is separated from every-thing else. If Advaitism may be called the Nominalism of India, this may fitly deserve the title of Realism. While the former insists on the *one* being true, the latter insists on the many being true. The idea is the truth; this Platonic maxim may be applied to explain

vedant. The individual is the reality; this is the thesis of the Naiyayiks. Jainism sets itself against every *Ekant* doctrine and evolves the truth by a combination of them. We have above shown that idealism is an empty generalisation without the individuals to be generalised. The antithesis may be similarly refuted. If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all. *E. G.*, materiality is the property common to घट, पट &c. If not so, being devoid of individuality, their independence also would be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing upon all in common and hence, even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Naiyayiks is vitiated by the very presuppositions of their own school.

This will bring out the standpoint of Jain logic. The idea is not true; also, the individual is not true. What is the truth? They

are both true from different points of view. When the speaker lays stress on the *one*, he is speaking of the *many* with only an implication. If the many are to the front, the one is not ignored but referred to only as secondary. The truth is neither in the *one* nor in the *many*; but it lies in the *one in the many* or *the many of the one*. Every individual implies an idea; and every idea presupposes the individuals. Existence as well as knowledge are governed by this relativity. Being possessed of the सद्गुण or the quality of existence, all things are one. So again, looking at the *Paryayas* or modifications, or again considering the differences due to material, place, time and quality (द्रव्य, क्षेत्र, काल, भाव), it is manifest that every-thing is different from every-thing else. Transferring the same idea to modern philosophy, the subject is the origin of all knowledge, because, he is the one in the many and thus he it is that makes the many possible. Exactly the same

applies to the objects that give the subject all its contents. The subject differs from the objects by his rationality and the objects are different from the subject by their *Satswaroop* or the quality of *being*. ' This is not tenable since also the subject is characterised by the *Satswaroop*. The difference would deprive both the knower and the known of their reality. If the known is without *Satta*, the known would be non-existent. If the known are *Asat*, the knower who is constituted by the known would also become *Asat*. So in *reality* or सत्ता, there is no disparity between the subject and the object. The difference is only कथंचित् i. e. here, from the standpoint of rationality residing in the one and the materiality residing in the many.

This will make clear to a certain extent what the essence of the *Anekant* doctrine is. But the usual formula by which this doctrine is known to the world is a little dry and hence it is understood by very few men;

The usual formula is framed in the form of Sutras, a form which Indian scholars were very fond of in olden days. Obviously, that mode was useful in an age in which writing was unknown. But as time went on, the disciples of every faith degenerated and with that degeneration, the significant sutras of the older age begin to loose their meaning to the un-informed mind and critics, sometimes through bias but often through ignorance, began to turn and twist the meaning of opposite parties to suit their own purpose. The epigrammatic form of the sutras rendered the meaning borne by them open to mis-interpretation and irrelevant refutation. The seven-fold *Syad Vad* * illustrates this more vividly than any other doctrine. The fundamental theory underlying this *syad vad* is that every thing in the universe is related to every-thing else and hence we ought not to narrow our

[* Vide pp 54 - 56 *Supra*.

vision by taking account of only this relation or that. It is but very crude and primitive philosophy to ignore the variety of things and their relations and to say that the side of the shield that faces you, is the all-in-all of the shield. It is a very imperfect appreciation of the magnitude and multiplicity of the problem and its facts to generalise until there is no possibility of extending the process. *Ekant Vad* is necessarily such generalisation. The *Syad Vad* opposes all sorts of one-sided theories. It asserts apparently contrary predicates of one and the same thing. In the eyes of unrestrained absolute generalisers like the Ekantists, such reconciliation of opposites is an impossibility. Every statement that we make is qualified by its *paryayas*. There are four classes of things which give rise to such modifications and make contrary predicates consistent. Time and space are the two causes that make variety of predication possible and that would easily be recognised by students of

European thought. The *syad vad* says that every assertion is variable with every change in time and space. This is a common way of putting the deeper theory of time and space being the essential 'forms' of every perception. They are two invariable agents in our determinations of objects. Every mode of looking at a thing must take into account these factors. If you introduce the slightest variation in any one of these two, the whole view is changed.

The other two variants are *द्रव्य* and *भाव*. The recognition of *Dravya* or matter as being an eternal coefficient in the products of our existence and knowledge, solves certain obvious difficulties. Idealism is nursed by every school that neglects the essential relation of matter to knowledge, without it, everything becomes a 'fiction' or a mere *flatus vocis*. By postulating matter as an original ingredient in knowledge, the endless webs of idealists are relegated to the realms of shadows

and phantoms. The last factor is equally necessary for an adequate explanation of the universe. Matter without **માવ** or property is an unfounded abstraction. In this abstraction, indeed, it would be sufficient to create some indefinite and hazy counterparts corresponding to our ideal universe. But how to explain the variety in material experience and actual knowledge? That is done by attributing certain properties to certain Matter.

These four factors of knowledge necessarily lead to changes in our conceptions of things corresponding to changes in the factors themselves. In substance, this is what *Syad Vad* teaches. The variety of standpoints recognised by this school is sometimes compelled to yield scepticism in knowledge. But, as Dr. Bhandarkar points out, this objection is groundless. One of the seven modes of predication expounded by the **સત્યમંગી** is positively intended to oppose scepticism. The **અવક્તવ્ય** vadis are always severely dealt with

as being inconsistent with themselves. To call a thing 'unknowable' is to affirm some knowledge about it. Hence uncertainty in knowledge is a self-contradictory position, according to our theory. There was very keen controversy and an amount of hair-splitting over the attempt of our school to reconcile existence and non-existence as residing in one thing. The answer to such criticism is that antagonism is only relative in the universe. But as "we are immersed in the conflict and occupied with our adversary, we cannot at the same moment rise to the consciousness of that power which is working in him and in us alike." † As Hegel would put it, being and non-being are identical. The *Adwait* and the *Prithaktva* of objects, idealism and realism, universals and particulars, unity and difference, subject and object, these are relatively opposite to each other; but

† Dr. Caird.

they are not parallels to run into eternity without for a moment converging towards each other. The absolute parallel is a fiction in true philosophy. It is only our narrowness of view that our horizon closes with a widening gulf. But this is forgetting the very ground of all opposition, the ground which makes the absolute-ness of every opposition unthinkable and without which opposition would have nothing to stand on. This is to stop with half the truth; for it is ignoring the integrating force in all nature which includes and transcends differentiation.

Appendix. A

JAIN KINGS.

The Jains are celebrated in ancient history and there were many Jain kings in those days. King VAJRA KARAN who ruled in DASHANAGARA (the present MANDESSORE) was a Jain and bowed before none but the *jain* Gods. It is said that there was a great fight between this Jain king and SINHODAR, the SARVABHAUM king of UJJAIN,, in consequence of the insult which the Jain king offered to the latter by refusing to offer salutation to him, in which SINHODOR was worsted. SHISHUPAL, the ruler of CHANDERI near LALITSUR, was a Jain. GANDHARVASEN and SHRIVARMA, the kings of Ujjain, are described by some authors as being Jains but to me, it is still a question. The VALLABH king KUMARPAL was a great patron of Jainism. Maharaja SAMPADI, the greatgrandson of the famous BAUDH king ASHOKA had embraced this faith. ASHOKA himself is held by certain scholars to have been a Jain before he was converted to BUDHISM. While writing about the UDAIPUR royal family, Col. Todd says in his *Annals of Rajasthan* that even uptil now, the Queen of Udaipur receives with great ceremony any Jain ascetic who might happen to visit the city. The origin of this custom was that the famous Rana of Udaipur, Pratab Sinha was assisted by a great Jain, named Bhamasa, with an army of ten thousand men, when the king was in great stress in his

struggle with **AKABAR**. The story of **PANNADAI** is known to us all. It is said that it was a Jain, by name **Asasa**, who gave refuge to that noble woman and the prince whom she had saved from **Vanveer** at the cost of her own son. At **MAMDU** or **Mandapachal**, a Jain served the **Mohamedan** king of the place as his **Dewan**.

ARE THEY ATHEISTS?

There is a good deal of controversy as to whether Jainism is atheistic or not. **Shankaracharya** and following him, many European orientalists answer the question in the affirmative. But to call the Jains atheistic is a misunderstanding. According to their view, the *Karman* and the Universe are unbegun, indestructible and everexisting. Whatever we do i. e. our *karman* is sure to produce its results on us. God will not interfere to undo these effects even if we prayed to the utmost. That God is omniscient, perpetually living and auspicious in nature, is admitted by the Jains. But that he will ever be kind to us beyond our deserts is denied by them. The Law of *Karman* is universally true. The soul of man elevates itself by the path of the three jewels i. e. True Faith, Knowledge and Conduct and after attaining *Nirvana* or *Moksha* (i. e. freedom from all bondage of passions) it becomes divine. The God is not the creator, protector and destroyer of the Universe. He is only the most perfect soul.

So they believe in God but differ as to his work. On

this difference, they are charged with atheism. If so, Shri KRISHNA who, in his *DIVINE LAY* says: "*The Lord does neither create the actor nor the actions of the world, nor does He determine what actions shall bear what fruits. This is all natural. Nor does He take anyone's merits or sins. When ignorance throws a veil on wisdom, people go astray*"—surely, the Divine singer of these lines must be called an atheist. So the way to consider this problem is to accept the meaning of an atheist as given by Panini who defines a *Nāstika* as, '*one who does not accept the truth of after-death existence*' of the soul. The Jains who believe in the *Swargas* or heavens & the hells are to be considered as perfectly theistic. The *Digambers* and the *Shwetambaras* differ as to the number of heavens but there is no doubt that there are other worlds besides this which the soul has to pass through before final liberation. But if the atheists are those who deny the absolute authority of the Vedas, the Jains in company with the Moslems, the Christians and the Brahmos will have no doubt to be styled as atheists! In fact, the Jains can under no circumstances be called *Nastiks* (in a derogatory sense.)

—*Transcribed from Mr. Apte's Marathi Lecture on Jainism.*



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Errata.

<i>P.</i>	<i>L.</i>	<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct.</i>
95	8	to	on
130	18	it	which

