

ANUOGADDĀRĀIM

(English Translation)

TAIKEN HANAKI

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General Editor

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(English Translation)

By

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(Research Scholar. 1966-69)

**RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF PRAKRIT, JAINOLOGY
& AHIMSA, VAISHALI, (Muzaffarpur), BIHAR.**

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The Government of Bihar established the Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology & Ahimsa at Vaishali (Muzaffarpur) in 1955 with the object, inter alia, to promote advanced studies and research in Prakrit and Jainology, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Vaishali Research Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last few years, namely, the Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning at Darbhanga, the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad for Research and Advanced Studies in Hindi at Patna, and the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist learning and Pali (the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara) at Nalanda (Patna).

As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship this is the Research volume 5, which is the English Translation of *Aṅuogaddārāṃ* by Mr. Taiken Hanaki, a Japanese Research Scholar of the Institute. The Govt. of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service to the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the fulness of time.

GENERAL EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

1. For the English translation of the *Aṇuogaddārāṃ* the following editions of the text have been consulted:

- (A) *Aṇuogaddārāṃ*, published in the *Jaina Āgama Granthamālā* (Vol. I) by Sri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay, 1968.
- (B) Śrī-Anuyogadvārasūtram, with the Vṛtti of Maladhāriya-Hemacandra-Sūri. (Ācārya Śrīmad-Vijayakamala-Sūrīś-varaji-Jaina-Granthamālā, Vol. I. Bhavnagar, 1939).
- (C) Śrīmad-Anuyogadvārasūtram with the Vṛtti of Maladhāriya-Hemacandra-Sūri (Sresthi Devacandra Lalbhai Jaina Pustakodhāra).
- (D) Śrī-Anuyogadvārasūtram with Vṛtti of Maladhāriya-Hemacandra-Sūri (Śrīmatī Āgamodayasamiti, Bombay, 1924).
- (E) *Aṇuyogadārasuttaṃ*, published in the *Śūttāgame*, Vol. II, edited by Puppha Bhikkhu (Published in 1954 by Babu Ramlal Jain, Secretary, Śrī Sūtrāgama Prakāśaka Samiti, Gurgaon Cantt).

The paragraph numbers given are in accordance with the text of (A) which has been used as the basis for the translation, unless otherwise indicated.

A few observations have been made by the translator in the footnotes to clarify the meanings of some words and throw light on a number of problems.

2. A critical study of the *Aṇuogaddārāṃ* is given here, mentioning the problems discussed and evaluating the light they throw on the exegetical method followed by Jaina philosophers in ancient times. This text gives an outline of the method to be adopted in explaining a scriptural text, specifically the *Sāmāiya* chapter (vide *sutta* No. 74-75) of the *Avassaya Suya* which deals with the obligatory religious duties prescribed in Jainism. The *nikṣepas* and *nayas* played a vital role in such explanation—a fact which is amply illustrated by our Text. Sometimes the Text would appear elaborating irrelevant matters. But a look at the methods followed by ancient etymologists and exegetists, such as Yāska, Buddhaghosa, and others, will help the reader to appreciate the background and understand the purpose behind such digressions. The ancient Jaina thinkers cultivated a comprehensive

outlook, and attempted to extend their horizon of knowledge as far as possible, bringing all possible topics within its ken. They imbibed the spirit behind the famous *Āyāraṅga* maxim: One who knows one thing knows all things, and one who knows all things knows one thing.¹

3. What is *anuyoga*? The *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti* (126) considers the words *aṇuoga*, *nioga*, *bhāsā*, *vibhāsā* and *vattiya* (Skt. *vārtika*) as synonymous. These five words come under *attha* (124) which is considered a synonym of *pavayaṇa*² (125). *Anuyoga* is thus a part of the *pavayaṇa*, scripture. It stands for connection (*aṇuoyaṇam*) of the *sūtra* with its meaning,³ that is, disquisition on the meaning of the *sūtra*. The text of the *sūtra* is read in the first quarter and its *anuyoga* is undertaken in the second quarter of the day.⁴ The *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* (130) has given a number of examples to explain the difference between *bhāsā*, *vibhāsā* and *vattiya*. Thus the *bhāsaga*, the author of *bhāsā*, is like a carver who gives the preliminary shape to a piece of wood, the *vibhāsaga* is like the carver who adds some rough contour to the wood, and the author of the *vattiya* is like the maker of the finished carving. Other examples given there are of a doll (*poṭṭha*⁵), a painting, a jeweller, an unblown lotus, and a guide (*desia*). As regards the scope of *anuyoga*, it is said to be limited to the scriptural knowledge alone which, like a lamp, is dependent on others for its production, and is also capable of revealing truth to others. The idea is that the scriptural knowledge, being a representation of the thoughts of others, deserves interpretation for the revelation of its meaning to others. Other forms of knowledge, such as perception, clairvoyance and the like—being neither dependent on others for their origin, nor capable of revealing truth to others—do not deserve *anuyoga*, which is a kind of interpretation.⁶ As an ideal example of the application of *anuyoga*, we can refer to the section of the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya* from the *samudāyārtha-dvāra* up to the *anugamadvāra-vivarāṇa* (*VBh* (A), 833-1010).

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1. *Āyāraṅga Sutta* (I. 3. 4. 1): je egaṃ jāṇai se savvaṃ jāṇai, je savvaṃ jāṇai se egaṃ jāṇai.
 2. *Pavayaṇa* (*pravacana*), *sutta* (*sūtra*) and *attha* (*artha*) are related terms. The first stands for the *śruta-jñāna* in general and the remaining two are its components.—*VBh* (A), 1364, with Auto-Commentary.
 3. *VBh* (B), 1386.
 4. *Ibid.*, 1403.
 5. The *Bṛhadvṛtti* (or *VBh* (B), 1425), explains the word as *leṭṭyam*, clay-modelling.
 6. *Ibid.*, 838-9.

4. The Text starts by determining the place of the *Avassaya Suya* in the Jaina Canon, called *suya-nāna*. It is designated as an *aṅgabāhira-ukkāliya*¹ *suya-khamdha*, consisting of *ajjhayaṇas*.

Here the division of the scripture into *kāliya* and *ukkāliya* categories deserve attention. Usually '*kāliya*' means 'what is prescribed to be studied in the last quarter of the night and the first quarter of the day'.² But from the *Vavahāra* (*sutta* nos. 298ff.), it appears that the *suttas* which, for their study, required a monk to be of a definite standing in respect of the period of his monkhood were called *kāliya*, some of the *Suttas* mentioned here being common to the list of the *kāliya* *Suttas* of the *Nandi* (*sutta* no. 84). Further light on the nature of the *kāliya* *Sutta* is derived from the *Āvaśyaka-Niryukti*, verses 762 and 763, which define a *kāliya* *Sutta* as one where the *nayas* are not applied (*mūḍhanaiyaṃ*³) for its elucidation, and assert that there was, however, a period when every *Sutta*, including the *kāliya*, was explained with reference to the four *Anuyogas* (viz. *caraṇa-*, *dharma-*, *saṃkhyā-*, and *dravya-anuyoga*) through the *nayas*—a method which continued till the times of Ajja Vaira whose disciple Ajja Rakkhia separated the four *Anuyogas* (*ibid.*, 774) to serve the needs of the future generation of disciples feared to be of weak intellect. The *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*, while distinguishing *gamiya* and *agamiya*, says that the *agamiya* which is composed in heterogeneous styles such as the *gāthā*-verses and the like, is mostly *kālika*.⁴ In another place, the *Bhāṣya* says that the *kāliya-suya* constitutes the first *Anuyoga* (viz. the *caraṇakaraṇānuyoga*) and the *Mahākappasuya* and the *Cheasuya*, being concerned with *caraṇakaraṇānuyoga* fall under the *kāliya*.⁵ The Commentators Ācārya Haribhadra and Maladhārī Hemacandra here explain *kālika* as standing for the eleven *Aṅgas*, the reason being that they

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1. Jinabhadra regards the *Sāmāyīa Ajjhayaṇa* (which is a part of the *Avassaya Suya*) as *Kalika* (vide *VBh* (A), Auto-Commentary on 915).
 2. Commentary, p. 6A; *divasa-niśā-prathama-carama-pauruṣi-likṣaṇe kāle dīyate nānyatre 'ti kālikam Uttarādhyayanādi; yattu kälavelāmātravarjaṃ śeṣakālānīyamena paṭhyate tadutkālikam Āvaśyakādi.*
 3. The reading *gūḍha* for *mūḍha*, noticed in the footnote 5 of the *VBh* (A) Part I, p. 177, appears correct. In this connection, one should mark the word *Ṣiṅgūhiya* in the following verse :
*śānuggaho 'ṇuoge viṣuṃ kāsī ya suyavibhāgeṇa /
suhagahaṇānimittam nae ya sunigūhiyavibhāge //—VBh* (B), 2291.
 4. *VBh* (A), Auto-Commentary on verse 546: *gāthādyasamānagrantham agami-kam, taeca prāyeṇa kālikam.*
 5. *VBh* (B), 2294-5.

are studied in accordance with the rules of study such as proper time, etc. (*ihaikādaśāṅgarūpaṃ sarvaṃ api śrutam kāla-grahaṇādividhinā 'dhīyata iti kālīkam ucyate*). It is thus found that the expressions *agamika* and *kālīka* were synonymous (vide *Nandi* 78) and the *kālīka* was mainly concerned with the first *Anuyoga*. The *Vavahāra* (*sutta* nos. 298 ff), referred to above, prescribes definite times for the study of various scriptural texts, including the *Aṅgas*, and as such is not antagonistic to this finding. The *Nandi* (80-82), however, first divides the *aṅgabāhira* as *Āvassaya* and *Āvassagavairitta* (non-*Āvassaga*), and then goes on to subdivide the latter as *kālīya* and *ukkālīya*, thus leaving the question whether the *Aṅgas* are *kālīya* or *ukkālīya* untouched. The question of the *Āvassaga* as *ukkālīya* is also left unbroached. The inclusion of the *Mahākappasuya* under *ukkālīya* by the *Nandi* (84) goes against the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya* referred to above. The list of the *ukkālīya* texts perhaps changed from time to time, depending on the list of the *kālīya* texts accepted as such by the ascetic community of the time.

5. After thus determining the place of *Āvassaya Suya* in the Jain canon, our Text proposes to explain the words (i) *āvassaya*, (ii) *suya*, (iii) *khamdha* and (iv) *ajjhayana*, one by one, with reference to *nikkheva* which is a time-honoured Jain method of explaining individual words, devised to enable the disciple to get to the core of the meaning, shorn of all its unwanted association. In fact, *anuyoga* stands for this method¹ including, of course, the other doors viz. *uvakkama*, *aṅugama* and *ṇaya* (vide *sutta* No. 75) and also *nikkheva* as explained in *sutta* No. 534-600. The Prakrit language of the scripture appears to have necessitated this method for arriving at the correct meaning of its ambiguous vocabulary. The importance attached by the Jain philosophers to *śruta-jñāna* as a substitute for the personality of the omniscient revealer of truth, and their *dravya-bhāva* doctrine were responsible for the invention of the method of *nikkheva*. The *nāma-nikkheva* recognizes the primary aspect of a word as a verbal symbol capable of serving the purpose of naming a thing or a person. The *thavaṇā-nikkheva* serves the purpose of attributing an extended function to an object named after a thing or a person known actually to exercise that function. The *davva-nikkheva* is concerned with the potential attributes of an object, as opposed to its actual condition at the time. The *bhāva-nikkheva* determines the essence or the actual states signified by a word. These are the four main *nikkhevas* which can be applied to any word. But there are also others depending on the subject matter (vide *sutta* No. 8).

1. *VBh* (A), 838 with the Auto-Commentary.

For instance, the word *uvakkama* in *sutta* No. 76, is proposed to be explained through six kinds of *nikkhevas*. In fact, the number depends on the exegetist, and it is also not always possible to predict the course he might adopt for explaining a word by means of *nikkheva*, as much will depend on his peculiar approach to the subject. Sometimes the application of *nikkhevas* is made complicated by the introduction of *nayas* simultaneously with them. An appreciation of the relation between *nikkheva* and *naya* will enable the reader to get over the complication. While in *nikkheva* it is possible to assign any intended meaning to a word, the *nayas* are restricted in their application. For instance, according to *davvanikkheva*, it is possible to conceive a person who knows *āvassaga* without being attentively conscious of it at the moment, but such conception is an absurdity according to the three *saddanayas* (vide *sutta* No. 14-15). Further light on the interrelation will be thrown in the course of our study (vide *infra*, 9 (i)).

6. The word *āvassaya* (same as *āvassaga* meaning obligatory duties) is subjected to four *nikkhevas*, viz. *nāma*, *thavaṇā*, *davva* and *bhāva* (vide *sutta* No. 9-29). Our Text here can be considered as the *locus classicus* on the subject of *nikkheva*.

7. The *nāma-nikkheva* is used to examine whether a word as a meaningless (*arthaśūnya*) proper noun, or in a sense which is untrue (*ayathārtha*) of the word (being not satisfied by its etymology), or in a sense which is true (*yathārtha*) of the word.¹ *Āvassaya* as a meaningless proper noun can be assigned to any object—living (e. g. a person), non-living (e. g. a thing) or a mixture of living and non-living (i. e. a garden). This is *āvassaya* as name.

8. The *thavaṇā-nikkheva* serves the purpose of ascertaining whether a word is used either for such real-like things as a painting, a clay-model, a carving, and a sculpture, or for such imaginary article as a piece of fossil—all these representing a deity or any other object intended to be thus symbolized for a specific purpose such as worship, veneration, and the like. Such representations may be made temporarily or on a permanent basis. It is this type of activity of the human mind which is responsible for the construction of images and temples as well as personification of religious objects for the purpose of spiritual exaltation. *Āvassaya* thus personified is called *thavaṇāvassaya*.

9. The *davva-nikkheva* is analysed in combination with the concepts of *āgama* and *no-āgama*. *Āvassaya* being the subject to be explained

1. *VBh* (B), 848.

here, it will be relevant to discuss these concepts, as also the connected concepts of *davva* and *bhāva* with reference to that theme. Now, *āvassaya* has two sides, viz. theoretical and practical. The theoretical side again is twofold, viz. (a) recitation of the text, and (b) pondering over (*aṇuppehā*¹) its subject matter. Similarly, the practical side is also twofold, viz. (a) consciousness (*uvaoga*) of the meaning and purpose of the practice, and (b) the actual practice of the *āvassaya*. *Āgama* stands for the theoretical side.² Mere recitation without pondering is *davva-āgama*; recitation accompanied with pondering, or even mere pondering³, is *bhāva-āgama*. Similarly, mere practice of the *āvassaya* without the consciousness of the meaning and purpose of the practice, as also the material body of the person who knew or is destined to know the *āvassaya* is *davva-āvassaya*; practice accompanied with the consciousness of its meaning and purpose is *bhāva-āvassaya*. *Davva* sometimes stands for what is potentially latent and *bhāva* for what is actually patent. *Davva* is sometimes also used in the sense of a remote or indirect cause. The meaning of *no-āgama* as *davva* and *bhāva* is also to be understood in the same way, keeping in mind the five different implications of the particle 'no', viz. (a) absolute negation, (b) affirmation of some other relevant or allied facet, (c) perversion, (d) partial negation, (e) the physical acts such as wiping the mouth-cloth, cleaning with duster, and so on which are included in the *āvassaya* which is essentially a spiritual state.⁴

Let us now follow our Text on the analysis of *āvassaya* through *davva-nikkheva*. *Āvassaya* as *davva* is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, *āgamao*, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge, *no-āgamao*. As our main concern here is *davva*, the *āgama* and

1. Vide *sutta* No, 14 where it is said that *davva*, being without consciousness (thinking or attention), excludes the aspect of 'pondering over' (*aṇuppehā*).
2. Cf. Commentary (p. 13A) : *āvaśyakopayogādhiṣṭhitahaḥ sādhvādideho vandanakādi-sūtroccāraṇalakṣaṇaś cāgamaḥ*-. Here the meaning of *āgama* is extended to the physical body, as *davva āvassaya* is under discussion.
3. About the importance of *bhāva*, vide *VBh* (B), 860, with *Bhadvṛtti*.
4. The Commentary gives only two implications, viz (a) and (d), at pp.17A-17 B, and attempts to subsume (e) under (d), at p.27 B, and (b) and (c) under (a), at p.22 A and 23 B respectively. Ācārya Jinabhadra (*VBh* (A), 864) interprets *no-āgama* as mixture of *jñāna* and *kriyā*. The author of our Commentary, Maladhārī Hemacandra (c. 12th century A. D.) does not notice this view of Jinabhadra (489-593 A. D.), though he has explained this view in his Commentary called *Bhadvṛtti* on Jinabhadra's *VBh* (B), 869 and 883-889. Our implication (b), which is positive, finds striking support in *VBh* (B), 889, where the positive meaning, viz. 'mixture', of the particle 'no' is asserted.

no-āgama mentioned here are also to be construed as *davva*, and not *bhāva*.

9 (1). The *āvassaya* as *davva* with scriptural knowledge *āgamao dāvāvassayaṃ* (*sutta* No. 14), is illustrated by the example of a person who is reciting the *āvassaya* text with care and without fault, but is not pondering over it, and is, moreover, without the consciousness of the meaning and purpose of the practice of *āvassaya* as prescribed in the scripture, though he is actually engaged in its practice.

Here our Text also examines the *āvassaya* as *davva*, with scriptural knowledge, through various *nayas*. The *negama-naya*, being a matter-of-fact way of approach to things, looks at *āvassaya* as personified and identified with the person embodying such *āvassaya*. The *vavahāra-naya* follows suit. According to these two *nayas*, therefore, there are as many *davva-āvassayas* as there are persons bereft of the consciousness (*aṇuvautta*) of the meaning and purpose of *āvassaya*. According to the *saṃgaha-naya*, which sees things as grouped together under a genus, there is only one *davva-āvassaya* characterizing all such persons as belonging to a class. According to the *ujjusuya-naya*, there is only one *davva-āvassaya* characterizing one single particular individual at a particular moment—the past and future *davva-āvassayas*, as well as other *davva-āvassayas* at the same moment having no relation with it. According to the three *sadda-nayas*, which emphasize the functional aspect of an object, the expression *āgamao dāvāvassayaṃ* is a self-contradiction. *Āgama* necessarily presupposes some kind of knowledge, while *davva* has been explained as ‘absence of consciousness’. To be a knower and at the same time to be bereft of consciousness is a case of blatant self-contradiction which proves the absurdity of the concept of *āgamao-dāvāvassayaṃ*.

9 (ii). Now, we come to the *āvassaya* as *davva* without scriptural knowledge, *no-āgamao dāvāvassayaṃ* (*sutta* No. 16), which is stated to be threefold, viz. (1) the lifeless body of the person who knew the *āvassaya*, (2) the live body of a person who is destined to learn the *āvassaya* in the future in that very body, and (3) what is other than these two bodies. The third variety is again subdivided into three subvarieties, viz. (a) worldly, or popular, (b) belonging to perverse instruction, that is, heretical, and (c) extra-worldly, that is, truly religious. In the first two varieties, the body is *dāvāvassaya* in the sense that it was the substratum (material cause) in the past or is destined to be the substratum of *āvassaya* in the future, the particles ‘no’ (in *no-āgama*) being used in both these cases in the sense of absolute negation of *āgama* (knowledge).

In the subvariety (a) of the third variety, the particle 'no' is used in the sense of affirmation of the popular notion of *āvassaya* as rites and customs of the people, which, being purely physical acts, are absolute negation of *āgama* which is spiritual in essence.

In the subvariety (b), the particle 'no' is used to denote the heretical rituals which belong to perverse scripture; and as these rituals are purely physical acts, here also the particle 'no' denotes absolute negation of *āgama* which is, as noted above, spiritual in nature.

In the subvariety (c), the particle 'no' stands for the partial negation of the genuine discipline in that the essential part of the *āvassaya*, viz. knowledge of its precepts and prescriptions, is negated in toto, though its formal side, viz. recitation, physical gestures, etc., is practised according to the established custom. In fact, in all these subvarieties, the *āvassayas* are practised by people only formally without being conscious of their meaning and purpose, nor pondering over them. The *davva*-aspect of these *āvassayas* is explained by the Commentary (pp. 22 A and 24 B) by taking the word *davva* in the sense of a remote or indirect (*apradhāna*) cause of the attainment of salvation.

Our text here mentions a large variety of rituals practised by different heretics as part of their worship of various gods and goddesses. The passage which describes the popular rites and customs is reminiscent of the ornate style of the literary texts of the Jaina scripture. The disciple was provided with a huge material for comparative studies in religion and philosophy through such application of *nikkhevas*. An all-round scholarship was the aim to achieve which the exegetists introduced all sorts of subjects in order to explain the essence of their doctrine and discipline.

10, The *bhāva-nikkheva*, like the *davva-nikkeva*, is also analysed in combination with the concept of *āgama* and *no-āgama*.

10 (i). The *āvassaya* as *bhāva*, with scriptural knowledge, *āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ*, is represented by a person who is pondering over the meaning of *āvassaya*, being fully conversant with it, is experiencing gradually higher spiritual elevation, and is fully engrossed in *āvassaya*.¹

10 (ii). The *āvaśyaka* as *bhāva*, without scriptural knowledge, *no-āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ*, is not capable of being explained with reference to lifeless or live bodies, like the *āvassaya* as *davva*, without scriptural knowledge (vide supra, 9 (ii)), inasmuch as the *bhāva āvassaya* is

1. Commentery (p. 25 B) *āvaśyakapadārthajñās tajjanitasamvegena viśuddya-mānapariñāmas tatra co 'payuktaḥ sādhvādir āgamato bhāvāvaśyakam*.

concerned with the soul itself engaged in the *āvassaya* at the present moment. It is, therefore, straightway divided as (a) worldly or popular, (b) belonging to perverse instruction, that is, heretical, and (c) extra-worldly, that is, truly religious (vide *sutta* No. 25).

In the case of (a), the particle 'no' in *no-āgamao* is used to indicate the popular notion of *āvassaya*, such as the regular study of the *Bhārata* (*Mahābhārata*) in the forenoon and *Rāmāyaṇa* in the afternoon. Here the Commentary (p. 26 A) says that such study is *bhāva*, because the reciter and the listners become engrossed in the meaning of the text; it is *no-āgama*, because it involves such acts as turning the leaves of the book, manual gestures, and the like, which are partial negation of *āgama* (that is knowledge), being associated with and, at the same time, falling apart from the latter. The Commentary also admits such texts as *no-āgama* in the sense of a popular *āgama*, on account of their being acceptable to the people at large. The expression *no-āgama* is thus explained both as a negative and a positive word. It is negative as meaning 'absence of *āgama* qua knowledge' in the physical activities of the speakers and the listners; it is positive as standing for an *āgama* (true knowledge) in the opinion of the populace.¹ Such study is moreover an *āvassaya* in that it is undertaken as an obligatory duty by those who believe it.

In the case of (b), the particle 'no' in *no-āgamao* is used to indicate a perverted doctrine. According to the Commentary (p. 26 B) the particle is used in the sense of partial negation indicating both the positive and the negative aspect of the heretical *āvassaya*, the presence of *āgama* qua the heretic's knowledge of the meaning of the *āvassaya* being the positive and absence of *āgama* qua knowledge in the heretic's physical movements in performing the *āvassaya* being the negative side. The *bhāva*- and *āvassaya*-features are to be understood as in the case of (a).

In the case of (c), the particle 'no' is used in the sense of partial negation in that it stands for wiping the mouth-cloth, cleaning with the duster, and so on—which, being purely physical acts as opposed to the knowledge of *āvassaya*, are *no-āgama*, that is, a part of *āgama*, the other complementary part being the knowledge of *āvassaya*. The *āvassaya* here is *bhāva*, because the person concerned has completely identified himself with the *āvassaya* that he is practising.

1. Commentary (p. 26 A) : *kriyālakṣaṇe deśe āgamasya bhāvāt no-āgamatvam... deśe tvāgamo 'sti, laukikābhīprāyena bhāratāder āgamatvāt.*

10 (iii). Here a review of the various senses of the expressions *āgama* and *no-āgama* as explained in the Commentary will be worth-while.

In *āgamao davvāvassayaṃ* (vide supra, 9 (i)), the word *āgama* stands for 'correct recitation' only, excluding the aspect of 'pondering over' which is an essential connotation of the word *āgama*. This is implied by the assertion : *no anuppehāe, kamhā ? aṇuvaogo davvamiti kattu* (*sutta* No. 14).

In *āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ* (vide supra, 10 (i)), the word *āgama* is used in the sense of 'pondering over the meaning, being fully conversant'.

In *no-āgamao davvāvassayaṃ* (vide supra, 9 (ii)), the word *no-āgama* is used in the following senses: absence of knowledge in the case of 1, 2, 3(a), 3 (b); formal acts such as recitation, physical gestures, etc, in the case of 3(c).

In *no-āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ* (vide supra, 10 (ii)), the word *no-āgama* is used in the following senses: formal acts such as turning of leaves of the book, and the like, as well as 'popular knowledge', in the case of (a); 'presence of heretical knowledge' as well as 'absence of heretical knowledge' in the case of (b); physical acts in the case of (c). Under (a), the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* as texts for obligatory study are *no-āgama* in the sense of sham simulation of genuine *āgama*. Similarly under (b), the heretical *āvassaya* is considered *no-āgama* in the sense of a counterfeit *āgama*. Under (c), which is concerned with the genuine *āvassaya* (of the Jaina), the word *no-āgama* is interpreted as standing for the physical activities involved in performing the *āvassaya*, and not as meaning a false *āgama*. But the problem of the relation between *bhāvāvassaya* and *no-āgama* remains unsolved. If the *āvassaya* is *bhāva*, how could it be *no-āgama*? How could *no-āgama* interpreted as a purely physical activity be reconciled with *bhāva* which, being an *upayoga*, is essentially spiritual in nature?

The question is not raised in the Commentary. In *āgamao davvāvassayaṃ*, the *davva* affects the meaning of *āgama* adversely in that *āgama* gives up its aspect of 'knowledge' or 'pondering over' (as we put it)—a fact which is admitted by the Commentary.¹ Compensatingly, here,

1. Cf. Commentary (pp. 13B & 14A): *atrāha-nanvāgamaṃ aśritya dravyāvaśyākam ityāgamarūpam idaṃ dravyāvaśyākam ityuktam bhavati, etac cāyuktam, yata āgamo jñānam, jñānaṃ ca bhāva eveti katham asya dravyatvam upapadyate? satyam etat, kintvāgamasya kāraṇam ātmā, tadadhiṣṭhito dehaḥ, śabdaś copayogasūnya-sūtroccāraṇarūpa ihāsti, na tu sākṣād āgamaḥ, etac ca tritayam āgamakāraṇatvāt kāraṇe kāryopacārād āgama ucyate, kāraṇam ca vivakṣitabhāvasya dravyam eva bhavatītyuktam evetyadoṣaḥ.*

in the case of *no-āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ*, the *bhāva* should favourably affect the meaning of *no-āgama* by extending it to 'correct recitation' and not allowing it to be limited to mere physical activities such as wiping the mouth cloth, cleaning with the duster, and so on. The connotation of *no-āgama* here should be understood as identical with the connotation of *āgama* in *āgamao davvāvassayaṃ*, as reflected by the *Sutta* No. 14 and explained by the Commentary, though the solution is not as satisfactory as it should be.

10 (iv). It is refreshing to note in this connection that Ācārya Jinabhadra (*VBh* (A), 864) has avoided the difficulty by interpreting *no-āgama* as standing for a mixture of knowledge (*jñāna*) and activity (*kriyā*).

10 (v). The final outcome of this lengthy consideration of *āvassaya* through *nikkheva* is the determination of the nature of *āvassaya* as prescribed in the *Sutta*. Ācārya Jinabhadra (*VBh* (A), 865) sums up the discussion by asserting that the *loguttaraṃ no-āgamao bhāvāvassayaṃ* is found to be the bonafide subject matter of the Śāstra (on account of its comprehensive character as a discipline recognizing *jñāna* and *kriyā* as the two equally essential factors of a true path to salvation):

loguttaraṃ pasatthaṃ satthe tenādhikaro' yaṃ.

11. Our Text (*sutta* No. 29) considers the following terms as synonymous: *āvassaya*, *avassakaraṇijja*, *dhuva-niggaha*¹ *visohi*, *ajjhayaṇa-chakka-vagga*,¹ *nāa*, *ārāhaṇā* and *magga*.

12. The word *suya* is explained through *nikkheva* in *sutta* No. 30-50. The same method as adopted in the case of the word *āvassaya* is followed here up to the second variety (vide supra, 9 (ii)) of *no-āgamao davvasuyaṃ*. The third variety (*sutta* No. 39) is illustrated by what is written on leaf or recorded in books, which is *davvasuya* in that it is the cause of *bhāvasuya* and is *no-āgama* because of the absence of the other conditions of *āgama*, viz. the soul, body and sound (Commentary, p. 31A). Now taking the Prakrit word *suya* for *sūtra* (thread), the text enumerates a large variety of materials used for making thread, which throws welcome light on various kinds of cloth manufactured in those days. The text now divides the *bhāvasuya* as *āgamao* and *no-āgamao*. The *āgamao bhāvasuyaṃ* is represented by a person who knows the meaning of the *āgama*, that is, scripture, and is at the moment conscious (*upayukta*) of the *śruta*. *Āgama* means knowledge of *śruta* (scripture) and *bhāvasuya* stands for the state of the soul in which there is direct

1. For splitting up of these terms, vide Translation, footnotes on the words.

experience of the essence of *śruta*. The *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* is twofold: *loiam* (worldly) and *loguttariam* (extra-worldly). Under the former come the non-Jaina literature such as the *Bhārata*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the like, including the Vedas and its ancillary literature. The translator has utilized the latest researches in determining the correct titles of the treatises mentioned in our Text. Under the extra-worldly class are mentioned the twelve *Āngas* of the Jaina scripture. The Commentary (p. 34A) explains the word *no-āgama* as meaning the external conduct prescribed in the *Āngamas* thus assigning the sense of partial negation to the particle 'no'.

13. Ācārya Jinabhadra has discussed the meaning of the particle 'no' at length while explaining *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* in his *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-Bhāṣya*, 880-893 (Benares Edition). He is in favour of *no-āgama* as meaning 'mixture of knowledge, conduct, etc'.¹ The particle 'no' cannot here stand for absolute negation for in that case *no-āgama* would mean 'negation of *āgama*' which will not fit in with *bhāva-suya* (in *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam*) which is synonymous with *āgama*. If, in order to avoid this contingency, the exact scriptural text of which a person is conscious at the moment be regarded as *āgama*, and the rest (of the text) as *no-āgama*, that will be a case of *āgamao dāvvasuyam* which is exemplified by a speaker who is not attentively conscious of the *śruta*, instead of being an instance of *bhāvasuya*.² If, again, the potential existence of scriptural knowledge (*śrutalabdhi*) also be regarded as *bhāvasuya* in order to get over the difficulty, then the person reading or speaking a *śruta*-text without being attentively conscious of it should be regarded as *bhāvasuya*—an outcome which nullifies *dāvvasuya*.³ Ācārya Jinabhadra solves the difficulty by assigning to the word *āgama* the sense of 'pure scriptural consciousness, not mixed up with such physical activities as good conduct and the like'⁴ and interpreting the expression *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* as 'the attentive consciousness of the *suya*, mixed up with good conduct, etc.', taking the particle 'no' as standing for 'mixture'.⁵ The particle 'no' cannot stand for absolute negation, because then either the entire *bhāvasuya* will become *no-āgama*, which is absurd, or all forms of knowledge other than *śruta-jñāna* will pass as *bhāvaśruta*. Nor can it stand for partial negation, because then the implication of the expression *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* will be

1. VBh (B), 884.

2. Ibid., 881.

3. Ibid., 882.

4. Ibid., 883 : āgama suovaogo suddho ciya na caraṇāisaṃmisso.

5. Ibid., 884.

that only a part of the *Āgama* (the *Āyāraṅga*, etc.) is *bhāvaśruta* which is absurd. The *bhāvaśruta* is one composite whole and cannot be conceived as only a part of *jñāna*, *darśana* and *cāritra*—the trio which makes up the *śruta*. Moreover, if the particle 'no' is taken to mean 'partial affirmation' which is entailed by 'partial negation', then even a person who has been designated as *āgamao bhāvasuyam* should also be regarded as *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam*, because it is not possible for anybody to be attentively conscious of the entire *Āgama*.¹ It is admitted that usually the particle 'no' is used in the following five senses : (1) a part, e. g. *no-ghaṭa* means a part of *ghaṭa*; (2) other than that, e. g. *no-ghaṭa* sometimes means *paṭa*, etc.; (3) substance, e. g. *no-ghaṭa* sometimes refers to an independent object which was a part of a *ghaṭa* previously; (4) negation of an act, e. g. 'no *pacati*' means 'he is not cooking'; and (5) negation of a state, e. g. '*no-śayyate*' means 'not in the state of slumber'. But a word should be explained, asserts Jinabhadra, with reference to the context; the particles are indeed capable of expressing an infinite variety of meanings, and therefore, the sense of 'mixture' should be considered consistent (with the usage).²

Ācārya Jinabhadra however is prepared to accept the particle 'no' to denote 'a part' if the term *suya* is restricted to mean a part of the undivided spiritual trio of *jñāna*, *darśana* and *kriyā*,³ because in that case the terms *no-āgama* and *bhāvasuya* will have even connotation.

Some Ācāryas explained *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* as *śrutopayoga* (attentive scriptural consciousness) accompanied with *śabda* (words uttered). But as *śabda* is *davvāgama* and *śrutopayoga* is *bhāvāgama*, the mixture of the two is all the more *āgama*, and not *no-āgama* as it is intended to be by these Ācāryas. The additional factor, viz. *śabda* cannot account for the designation of *no-āgama*, because *śabda*, being *āgamao davvasuyam*, cannot be *no-āgama* (that is, *anāgama*).⁴ There were some other thinkers who interpreted *no-āgamao bhāvasuyam* as 'the *śruta* which is not sheltered by any person'. But this is considered untenable, because if the *śruta*, even when it is sheltered in a

1. Ibid, 887.

2. Ibid., 889 : *saccamayam desāisu tahavatthavasena saddaviṇiogo / amiyatthā ya nivāyā jujjai to mīsabhāve vi //*

3. *VBh* (A), 885 (Auto-Commentary) : *aviśeṣita-jñāna-darśana-kriyopayogaika-deśatyāc chrutasya no-āgamata iti no-śabdo deśavacano 'pi syāt.*

4. *VBh* (A), 886-887.

person, is not called *bhāvaśrūta*, when that person is merely reciting, without being attentively conscious of it, how could an impersonal *śrūta* (that is, *śrūta* written in books) be called *bhāvaśrūta* ?¹

The upshot of the application of *nikkhevas* to the word *suya* is the bringing home to the disciple its exact connotation, viz. the complete discipline consisting of *jñāna*, *darśana* and *cāritra*.

14. Our text (vide *sutta* No. 51) completes the topic of *suya* by giving the following names of it: *suya* (*śrūta*), *sutta* (*sūtra*), *gaṃṭha*, *siddhamta*, *sāsana*, *āṇa*, *vayaṇa*, *uvadesa*, *paṇṇavaṇa*, *āgama*.

15. The *sutta* No. 52-71 deal with the *nikkhevas* of the word *khaṃdha* which stands for a 'division' of the *śrūta*. Here also the same method as adopted in the case of the word *āvassaya* is pursued up to the second variety of *no-āgamao dāvakkhaṃdha*. The third variety, viz. *jāṇayasarīra-bhaviyasarīra-vairitta dāvakkhaṃdha*, is given as threefold, viz. sentient, non-sentient and a mixture of the sentient and the non-sentient, for examples of which vide Translation, *sutta* No. 62-64. Jinabhadra explains the *āgamao bhāvakkhaṃdha* as 'the attentive consciousness of the meaning of a division (of the *śrūta*)' and the *no-āgamao bhāvakkhaṃdha* as 'the totality of *jñāna* and *kriyā*' and further asserts that the collection of the six chapters, *Sāmāiya*, etc., embodied in the person of one who is attentively conscious of the trio of *jñāna*, *darśana* and *kriyā*, is called *no-āgamato bhāvaskandha*, because the particle 'no' is used in the sense of 'a state of mixture'.²

The purpose of this consideration of the meaning of *khaṃdha*, like that of *āvassaya* and *suya*, is obviously to clear the term of its unintended connotational associations, thus aiding clarity of thought. The Jaina conception of the triple nature of the path to salvation is also sought to be brought home to the disciple. Neither abstract contemplation, nor lifeless ritualism is religion. The *no-āgama bhāva* variety of *nikkheva* represents the complete connotation of a word. And thus viewed, religion is an integrated whole of *jñāna*, *darśana* and *cāritra*, according to the Jaina philosopher. Ācārya Jinabhadra has rightly interpreted the text of the *Aṇuogaddārāṃ* by explaining the particle 'no'

1. Ibid., 888.

2. VBh (B), 898-9: āgamabhāvakkhaṃdho khaṃdha-payatthovaogaparīṇāmo /
no-āgamao bhāvammi nāṇa-kiriya-gaṇsamūho //
sāmāyāyāṇaṃ chaṇhājjhayaṇāṇa so samāyeso /
no āgamo tti bhaṇṇai noṣaddo mīsabhaṇṇammi //

Vide also the Auto-Commentary on VBh (A), 894.

as standing for 'a state of mixture', which is borne out by the fact that, in the *sutta* No. 71, the totality of the six chapters constituting the *Āvassaya-suya-khaṃdha*, is stated to be the *no-āgamao bhāvakhaṃdha*. The English translation of *no-āgamao* as 'without scriptural knowledge' is, therefore, not expressive of the full connotation of the word.

The topic is brought to an end by the enumeration of words which stand for various kinds of groups or collections (*sutta* No. 72).

16. Now, instead of examining the word *ajjhayaṇa* through *nikkheva*, as promised in *sutta* No. 7 (vide supra, 5) our Text (*sutta* No. 73) gives a list of the six topics constituting the subject matter of the *Āvaśyaka sūtra*—a digression which takes the reader's breath away by keeping him in suspense until he arrives at the *sutta* No. 534. The digression however is defended on the ground that the treatment of *ajjhayaṇa* through *nikkheva* will form a part of the *ohanipphaṇṇa nikkheva*, the first variety of *nikkheva* which is the second *anuyoga-dvāra* (vide *sutta* No. 534). The treatment is postponed in the interest of brevity to avoid reduplication.¹ The *Aṇuogaddārāim* (vide *sutta* No. 75) provide an introduction to the *Sāmāya* chapter of the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* and in this connection, they lay down four doors of disquisition (*anugaddārā*), viz. *uvakkama*, *nikkheva*, *anugama* and *naya*. The word *ajjhayaṇa* is treated through *nikkheva* while explaining the first of the three varieties of the second *dāra*, and this is but done at the right place. Our Text has so far been engaged in defining the background of *Sāmāya* which is the first chapter of the *Āvassaya-suya-khaṃdha* by explaining the words *āvassaya*, *suya* and *khaṃdha* through *nikkheva*. It now gets down to brass tacks by enumerating in the *sutta* No. 74 the titles of the six chapters of the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* and counting the four doors of disquisition (in *sutta* No. 75) with reference to *Sāmāya*, its first chapter.

17. The first door of disquisition, viz. *uvakkama*, is considered, following the stereotyped method of *nikkheva* under six heads, viz. (i) *nāma*, (ii) *thavaṇā*, (iii) *davva*, (iv) *khetta*, (v) *kāla*, and (vi) *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 76). This door is considered yet in another way, which is more specific and appropriate, under the following six categories: (a) *āṇupuvvī*, (b) *nāma*, (c) *paṃāṇa* (d) *vattavvayā*, (e) *atthāhigāra*, and (f) *samoyāra* (*sutta* No. 92).

The function of *uvakkama* is to initiate the collection of allied matter and foster a world view to find the exact context of the subject to be subjected to disquisition. This is demonstrated by Ācārya

1. VBh (B), 903.

Jinabhadra who gives a bird's-eye view of the above named *bhāvovakkama* (vide (vi) above) and the six categories, (a) to (f); showing their bearing on the study of the *Sāmāyā Ajjhayaṇa*.¹ His terse summary is given below to facilitate the comprehension of the scheme of the *Aṇuogaddārāṃ*.

Bhāvovakkama (see (vi) above), that is, divining the intentions of the preceptor in order to follow his wish obediently is an essential duty of the disciple engaged in the study of *Sāmāyā*.² Under *āṇupuvvī* (see (a) above), the possible number of places occupied by the *Sāmāyā Ajjhayaṇa* in all possible permutations of the six *Ajjhayaṇas* of the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* is considered. The total number of permutations of the six *Ajjhayaṇas* is $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6$, that is, 720, out of which the first is *puvṇāṇupuvvī* and the last is *pacchāṇupuvvī* and the remaining 718 fall under *añāṇupuvvī*.³ As regards *nāma* (vide (b) above), the *Ajjhayaṇa* belongs to the *bhāva* called *kṣāyopaśamika*, enumerated under six-named (objects).⁴ With reference to *paṃāṇa* (vide (c) above), the *Ajjhayaṇa* is viewed from various angles. Thus it is *guṇa* (*sutta* No. 427), *jīva guṇa* (*sutta* No. 428), *jñāna* (*sutta* No. 436), *āgama* (*sutta* No. 467), *lokottara* (*sutta* No. 469), and so on. In connection with *vattavvayā* (vide (d) above), it should be said that the *Ajjhayaṇa* is a precept of one's own doctrine (*sutta* No. 522). As regards *atthāhigāra* (vide (e) above), the *Ajjhayaṇa* is concerned with *sāvajja-joga-virai* (*sutta* No. 526 (i)). The sixth category, viz. *samoṃāra* (vide (f) above), has been illustrated in the above quoted cases where the *Ajjhayaṇa* has been allocated its proper place in the *āṇupuvvī nāma*, etc.

The above account of the place of the *Sāmāyā Ajjhayaṇa* in the exposition, in the *Aṇuogaddārasuttāṃ*, of various topics selected for discussion under the above mentioned heads and categories reveals the vastness of the context in which scriptural texts were studied and explained to the disciples.

The first door of disquisition occupies more than 85% of the whole text of the *Aṇuogaddārasuttāṃ*, and introduces a good many ancient methods of classification and exposition of subjects which deserve careful study. We shall notice some of these discussions of the Text in the present dissertation after giving a brief account of the other three doors.

1. VBh (B), 917-927.

2. This is *pasattha no-āgamao bhāvovakkama* (*sutta* No. 89).

3. VBh (B), 940-942. Cf. *sutta* No. 205.

4. VBh (B), 945. For the meaning of the word *kṣāyopaśamika*, vide *sutta* No. 245-247, and also *sutta* No. 233.

The remaining three doors of disquisition, viz. *nikkheva* (*sutta* No. 534-600), *aṇugama* (*sutta* No. 601-605), and *naya* (*sutta* No. 606), are discussed in progressively curtailed details—so much so that the fourth door (viz. *naya*) which is a very important Jaina doctrine, is finished in only five *gāthā*-verses.

18. The *nikkheva* is in request after the *uvakkama* because, the latter collects and names the topics to be explained through the former.¹ The *uvakkama* provides the context and defines the position of *Sāmāiya Ajjhayaṇa* which is then to be understood through *nikkheva*. This is exactly the function that our Text (*sutta* No. 534) assigns to *nikkheva* by dividing it as (a) *ohanipphaṇṇa*, that is, pertaining to general nomenclature; e. g. the word *Ajjhayaṇa* which stands for a general title of a scriptural text; (b) *nāmanipphaṇṇa*, that is, pertaining to a particularized name, e. g. *Sāmāiya* which is the name of the first chapter of the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*; and (c) *suttālāvaganipphaṇṇa*, that is, pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta*, e. g. *karemi bhamte sāmāyaṃ*, etc., which is a *sutta* of the *Sāmāiya Ajjhayaṇa*.

Under (a), the word *ajjhayaṇa* and other three allied words, viz. *ajjhāṇa*, *āya* (or *āa*), and *jhavaṇā*—all of which are general names connected with *Sāmāiya*—are treated though the four *nikkhevas*, the method being almost the same as followed in the case of the word *avassaya*, with occasional variations necessitated by the peculiarities of the topics that crop up. As regards the bearing of these *nikkhevas* on the *Sāmāiya*, Jinabhadra says that the connotation of these words as explained under the *bhāva-nikkheva* (excepting the instances of *apasattha* in *sutta* No. 577 and 590) is to be identified as *Sāmāiya*.²

Under (b), the word *Sāmāiya* is treated similarly. Our Text (*sutta* No. 599) gives six verses in connection with *no-āgamao bhāva-sāmāiya*, which will bear quoting :

It is said by the omniscient that *sāmāiya* is (possible) in him whose soul is engaged in self-restraint, self-regulation and austerity //127//

It is said by the omniscient that *sāmāiya* is (possible) in him who is evenly disposed towards all creatures, mobile and immobile //128//

1. *VBh* (B), 994: *nāsassa va saṃbhaṃḍhanamuvakkamo*.

2. *VBh* (B), 959. for the meaning of the four words, vide *VBh* (B), 960-961.

As suffering is not dear to me, so is it for all creatures—knowing (this), he does not (himself) kill, not get killed (by others), behaves with equanimity (*samamaṇati*), (and) is therefore (called) a *samaṇa* (ascetic) //129//

There is none, among the living creatures, who is an object of hatred or attachment to him, and so he is a *samaṇa*—this is yet another derivation (of the word *samaṇa*) //130//

He who is like a serpent (having no dwelling place of his own), a mountain (unshakable in adversity), fire (having insatiable desire for acquisition of knowledge), the ocean (in depth), the firmament (being without support), a cluster of trees (being unmoved in joy and suffering), and also like the bee (with indefinite livelihood), the deer (being in perpetual fear from the world), the earth (being tolerant of all pains), a lotus (being above the world though born in it), the sun (being the revealer of truth), and air (being absolutely free), is a *samaṇa* //131//

If he is good-minded (*sumaṇa*), then he is a *samaṇa*, provided he is not evil minded in thought, is evenly disposed towards his own men as well as (other) people, and is also indifferent to honour and insult //132//

The division (c), viz. the *nikkheva* pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta*, is rightly postponed¹ for treatment under the third door of disquisition, viz. *aṇugama*, where it fits in as a prelude to the *suttapphāsiyaṇijjuttiaṇugama* (*sutta* No. 602 (c)) and a postlude to the *suttāṇugama* (*sutta* No 60I),² which will be discussed in the paragraph that follows.

19. *Aṇugama*, the third door of disquisition, treads on the heels of *uvakkama* and *nikkheva*,³ and with it, the exposition of the actual text begins. The entire *uvakkama* and the first two divisions of *nikkheva* were concerned with the background and the preliminaries. Of the two broad divisions of *aṇugama*, viz. (i) *suttāṇugama* and (ii) *ṇijjutti-aṇugama*, the former relates to the correct utterance (recitation) of the text (*sutta*); the first two (a-b) subdivisions (*sutta* No. 602) of the latter, viz. *nikkheva-ṇijjutti-aṇugama* and *uvaghāta-ṇijjutti-aṇugama*, are concerned with

1. Vide *sutta* No. 600.

2. VBh (B), 1009-1010.

3. VBh (B), 971.

the preliminaries, while the third (that is, the last) subdivision, viz. (c) *suttapphāsiya-nijjutti-aṇugama* (sutta No. 602), with the third division of *nikkheva* as its prelude, is concerned with the actual text. The sequence of the doors can be represented thus:

Serial no. of doors	Subject Matter
1. <i>Uvakkama</i>	preliminaries (world view)
2. <i>Nikkheva</i>	
(a) <i>ohanipphaṇṇa-nikkheva</i>	preliminaries (concerning general title)
(b) <i>nāmanipphaṇṇa-nikkheva</i>	preliminaries (concerning the specific text)
3. <i>Aṇugama</i>	
(ii) (a) <i>nikkheva-nijjutti-aṇugama</i>	preliminaries (before and after the text is taken up for exposition—vide Commentary, p. 239 B)
(ii) (b) <i>uvaghāta-nijjutti-aṇugama</i>	preliminaries (Introduction to the background of the text)
(i) <i>suttāṇugama</i> (correct recitation)	actual text
2. <i>Nikkheva</i>	
(c) <i>suttālāvaganipphaṇṇa-nikkheva</i> (application of the <i>nikkhevas</i> to the uttered text)	actual text
3. <i>Aṇugama</i>	
(ii) (c) <i>suttapphāsiya-nijjutti-aṇugama</i> (exposition of the text)	actual text.

The first broad division of *aṇugama*, viz. *suttāṇugama* is not explained separately in our Text. But it appears described under *suttapphāsiya-nijjutti-aṇugama* (sutta No. 605). The proper recitation of the text (*saṃhiyā*) and disjunction and parsing of words (*pada*=*padaccheda*) constitute the *suttāṇugama*.¹ This is followed by the application of the *nikkhevas* (viz. *nāma*, *thavaṇā*, etc) to those words—a process called *suttālāvaga-nipphaṇṇa-nikkheva*. Then follows the *suttapphāsiya-nijjutti-aṇugama* which is done by means of paraphrasing (*payattha*), expounding of compound words (*payaviggaha*), anticipation of objections (*cālanā*),

1. VBh (B), 1000, with the *Bṛhadvṛtti*. Commentary (p. 244A): askhalita-padoccāraṇaṃ saṃhitā...padaṃ tu karomi 'ty ekaṃ padaṃ, bhayānta iti dvitīyam, sāmāyikam iti tritīyam ityādi.

and establishment (*pasiddhi*) of the correct meaning.¹ This is followed by consideration of issues through the *nayas*. All these four go hand in hand in respect of each *sutta*.²

Of the three subdivisions of the *nijjuttī-aṅgama*, the first two, viz. *nikkheva-nijjuttī-aṅgama* and *uvaghāta-nijjuttī-aṅgama* still remains to be discussed. The *nikkheva-nijjuttī* has been exemplified while explaining the words like *āvassaya* and the like through the four *nikkhevas* (*sutta* No. 9 ff.).³ The *uvaghāta-nijjuttī* deserves special attention. The terms *uvaghāta* (Skt. *upodghāta*) and *uvakkama* (Skt. *upakrama*) appear strikingly similar and therefore a controversy was raised about their differentiation. Ācārya Jinabhadra avers that while the *upakrama* is restricted in its function to simple enumeration of plausible topics, the *upodghāta*, being of the nature of an exposition, sets itself the task of elucidating those topics.⁴ Moreover, the *upakrama* presents a topic for consideration through *nikkheva* whereas the *upodghāta* prepares the ground for the exposition of the *sutta* (text), which immediately follows it.⁵ Our Text (*sutta* No. 604) gives a list of twenty-five topics, enumerated in two basic⁶ *gāhā*-verses, which constitute the subject matter of the *upodghāta* at the end of which the *Sāmāyīya*-text is taken up for exposition under *suttāṅgama*.⁷ These verses are found incorporated in the *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* as verses 78 and 79, and again, as verses 135 and 136,⁸ and appear quoted there from some earlier source by its author, Ācārya Bhadrabāhu. As regards the definition of the word *nijjuttī* and its purpose, it is said:⁹

nijjuttā te atthā jaṃ baddhā teṇa hoti nijjuttī /
tadha vi ya icchāvei vibhāsituṃ suttaparivādī //

The subjects (literally 'meanings') are already properly determined (*nijjutta*); because they are fixed (*baddha*), and therefore, there is determination (*nijjuttī*). (Though the subjects are already determined),

1. VBh (B), 1009-1010.

2. VBh (B), 1001.

3. Commentary, p. 239 B.

4. VBh (A), 988 (Auto-Commentary): uddesaṃātraniyata upakramaḥ, ayaṃ tu taduddiṣṭa-vastu-prabodhanārthaḥ prāyeṇopodghātaḥ kṛto yato 'yam arthāṅgamaḥ.

5. Ibid., 989 (Auto-Commentary): adhyayana-nyāsāya sambandhanam upakramaḥ, tadante 'bhidhānāt. ayaṃ tu sūtravyākhyāna-vidher upodghāto yatas tadante sūtravyākhyāḥ" rabhyata iti.

6. Prakrit *mūla*. Such verses are called *uddāna* in Pali.

7. VBh (B), 2800-2801.

8. VBh (A), 968 and 969, 1482 and 1483.

9. *Āvaśyaka Niryukti*, 88 (VBh (A), 1082).

yet the scriptural tradition tempts one to expound (*icchāvei vibhāsitaṃ*). *Nijjutti* thus means determination of meaning. Further light on the nature of *nijjutti* is thrown in the following statement¹ of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu in connection with his enumeration of the scriptural texts on which he proposes to write *nijjutti* :

etesim̐ nijjuttim̐ vocchāmi ahaṃ jīṇovadesenaṃ /
āharaṇa-hetu-kāraṇa-padanivahaṃ iṇaṃ samāseṇaṃ //

Here *nijjutti* is defined as *āharaṇa-hetu-kāraṇa-padanivaha*, that is, a treatise expounding a subject through examples and illustrations (*āharaṇa*), reasoning (*hetu*), and by relating causes and conditions (*kāraṇa*). The *Avas̥yaka Nir̥yukti* itself is an example of *nijjutti* par excellence.

20. The fourth, which is the last, door of disquisition, viz. *naya*, is very briefly treated (*sutta* No. 606) in five terse *gāhā*-verses which form the basic text for discussions on the subject in the *Avas̥yaka Nir̥yukti* (754-758) and the *Viśeṣāvas̥yaka-Bhāṣya* (Benares Edition, 2181-2185). The *Aṇuogaddārāṃ*'s treatment of *nayas* in other places of the Text will be discussed in some detail later on (vide infra, 93-96).

21. As proposed earlier (vide supra, p. 20, last 3 lines), we shall now notice some of the important issues introduced and discussed in our Text in connection with the first door of disquisition, viz. *uvakkama*.

22. Under the stereotyped consideration (vide supra, 17) of *uvakkama*, the two meanings of the term *uvakkama*, viz. embellishment (*parikamma*) and destruction of the thing (*vatthuvināsa*), (vide *sutta* No. 79-84) are considered with reference to the biped, the quadruped and the non-ped (such as trees and fruits), which as explained in the Commentary, throws an interesting sidelight on the ways of fostering fitness in professions, dressing of animals and promotion of horticulture. The ascertainment of the hour of the day is called *kālovakkama* (*sutta* No. 86). The *uvakkama* that is considered indispensable for *sāmāyia* is represented by *pasatthe no-āgamato bhāvovakkame* (*sutta* No. 91), consisting in unqualified obedience to the teacher.

23. The six categories, viz. *āṇupuvvī*, *nāma*, *paṃāṇa*, *vattavvayā*, *atthāhigāra* and *samoyāra*, under which the concept of *uvakkama* is considered in *sutta* No. 92 occupy an important place in the exegetical literature of the Jainas.² Of these, the first, viz. *āṇupuvvī*, is considered

1. Ibid., 86 (1703).

2. For example, Ācārya Virasēna, in his *Dhavalā*, applies the first five of these categories to the consideration of the *avayāra* of *jīvatthāṇa*.

—*Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, I. M. 72 ff.

in great detail by our Text (*sutta* No. 93-207), under ten heads: (i) *nāma*, (ii) *thavaṇā*, (iii) *davva*, (iv) *khetta*, (v) *kāla*, (vi) *ukkittaṇa*, (vii) *gaṇaṇa*, (viii) *saṃthāna*, (ix) *sāmayāri*, and (x) *bhāva*.¹

24. The third variety of the *no-āgamao davvāṇupuvvī* is divided as *uvaṇihiyā* (arranged, regular) and *aṇovaṇihiyā* (not-arranged, irregular). Now, *āṇupuvvī* means a series, *anukrama* and *anuparipāṭi* being its synonyms. The Commentary, explains it as 'a collection of three or more things' (p. 46B). The idea of 'serial arrangement', which is etymologically implied in the term *āṇupuvvī* is absent in the second division, viz. *aṇovaṇihiyā*, which is therefore translated as not-arranged or irregular. But to define an *āṇupuvvī* as any collection of three or more things, arranged or not-arranged, obviously goes against common-sense. The problem is noticed by the Commentary which, however, explains it away by pointing out that three or more atoms are capable of being arranged in a desired order, and so the connotation of the term can be extended to cover the irregular collection of things (Commentary, p. 47B).

A material body consisting of three or more atoms is called *āṇupuvvī*; a body consisting of two atoms is called *avattavva* (Skt. *avaktavyaka*) and a single atom is called *aṇāṇupuvvī*. The latter two also are included in the concept of *āṇupuvvī*.²

25. The *aṇovaṇihiyā davvāṇupuvvī* is considered (*sutta* No. 98) in five stages, viz. assignment of verbal symbol to the object (*aṭṭhapayapa-rūvaṇayā*), expression of its possible divisions through verbal symbols (*bhaṃgasamukkittaṇayā*), verbal symbols as attached to the objective divisions (*bhaṃgovadaṃsaṇayā*), compatible subsumption (*samoयāra*) of the divisions, and their exposition (*aṇugama*). These five stages appear to have constituted a general rule for explaining the nature of an object. The assignment of a name to the object is the first stage which is followed by the second consisting in consideration of all possible divisions that the object could be susceptible to. In the third stage, the divisions are verified with reference to the object. The relation of subsumption between the divisions is considered at the fourth stage followed by the fifth in which the object is subjected to exposition (*aṇugama*)

1. Sometimes (vide *Ibid.*) the *āṇupuvvī* is straightway divided as *puvvaṇupuvvī*, *pacchāṇupuvvī* and *jatthataṭṭhāṇupuvvī* (=our *aṇāṇupuvvī*)—which our Text mentions under *uvaṇihiyā davvāṇupuvvī*, etc. (vide *infra*, paragraph 24).
2. The use of the terms *āṇupuvvī*, *avattavva* and *aṇāṇupuvvī* to denote material bodies composed of three (or more) atoms, two atoms and one single atom respectively is not found in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* XXV 4. 739, where simply the terms *tipaesia*, *dupaesia* and *paramāṇu-poggala* are used.

with reference to a number of issues (*sutta* No. 105, 122, 149), usually nine, viz. ascertaining whether the denotation of the word is real (*saṃtapayaparūvaṇayā*), quantity of matter (*davvapamāṇa*), place (*khetta*), range of tactile contact (*phusaṇā*), duration (*kāla*), interval of time (*aṃtara*), occupied space (*bhāga*), modes (*bhāva*), and numerical comparison (*appābahu*). These issues of reference are universally accepted¹ in Jainism as constituting a questionnaire for instituting an enquiry on metaphysical problems. The application of *nayas* is also made *pari passu* while considering the *davvāṇupuvvī* through the five stages and nine issues of reference. The *negama* and *vavahāra-naya* recognize the numerical plurality of the *davvāṇupuvvīs*, while the *saṃgaha-naya* takes them as numerically one represented by the genus comprising the individual *ānupuvvīs*.²

26. The *uvanīhiyā davvāṇupuvvī* (*sutta* No. 131) is illustrated by the series of six substances, viz. *dhammatthikāya*, etc. arranged from beginning to end (*puvvaṇupuvvī*), end to beginning (*pacchāṇupuvvī*), and lumped together non-serially with any substance placed at any place (*aṇāṇupuvvī*), the total number of permutations in the third case being $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6$, that is, 720, less 2 (that is, the *puvvaṇupuvvī* and the *pacchāṇupuvvī*, which are arranged serially).

27. The *khettāṇupuvvī* is similarly discussed. While considering the *uvanīhiyā khettāṇupuvvī*, our Text (*sutta* No. 160-179) gives the names of the *aholoya*, viz. *Rayanappabhā*, etc.; *tiriyaloya*, viz. *Jambuddīva*, etc.; *udḍhaloga*, viz. *Sohamma*, etc.

28. The *kālāṇupuvvī* also receives a similar treatment. The measurements of time, viz. *samaya*, *āvaliyā*, etc. are given in *sutta* No. 202 [2].

29. In the *ukkittaṇāṇupuvvī*, the names of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkaras* are counted (*sutta* No. 203 [2]).

30. In the *gaṇaṇāṇupuvvī*, the numbers, *ega*, *dasa*, *saya*, etc. up to *dasakoḍisaya* (that is, ten thousand million) are given (*sutta* No. 204 [2]).

31. In the *saṃthāṇāṇupuvvī*, the six configurations, viz. *samaca-uraṃsa* (symmetrical), etc. are given (*sutta* No. 205 [2]).

1. For example, the same issues (excepting *bhāga*) are enumerated in the *Ṣaṭkha-ṇḍāgama*, I, *sūtra* 7.

2. Cf. Commentary (p. 63 B) : *pūrvam ekas tripradeśika ānupūrvī, aneke tripradeśikā ānupūrvya ityādyuktam, atra tu saṃgrahasya sāmānyavāditvāt sarve' pi tripradeśikā ekaivānupūrvī.*

32. The *sāmāyārāṇupuvvī* contains the ten *sāmāyārīs*, viz. *icchākāra*, etc. (*sutta* No. 206 [2]).

33. The *bhāvāṇupuvvī* is concerned with the six states of the soul, viz. *udaia*, and the like (*sutta* No. 207 [2]).

34. Now we come to the second *uvakkama*, viz. *nāma* which, after the pattern of the *Thāṇaṅga Sutta*, gives the divisions of some selected topics under *egaṇāma*, *du-ṇāma*, etc. up to *dasa-ṇāma* (*sutta* No. 208-312).

35. Under *ega-ṇāma*, the term *nāma* is defined as 'any names that might be assigned to substances, or attributes, or modes, (*sutta* No. 209).

36. Under *du-ṇāma* (*sutta* No. 210-216), the dichotomic division of object deserves special attention. The binary classification starts from the pair, viz. species (*viśesa*) and genus (*avīśesa*), and covers the whole range of Jaina Botany and Zoology, and a part of Physics (the remaining part being left to be included under *ti-ṇāma* in the *sutta* No. 217-225, as also the denizens of the hells and heavens.

37. Under *ti-ṇāma*, the classification of the trio of *davva*, *guṇa* and *pajjava* is made to cover a part of Jaina Physics and Chemistry (*sutta* No. 217-225).

38. The *catu-ṇāma* enumerates four kinds of morphological changes (grammatical) with appropriate illustrations (*sutta* No. 227-231)

39. Under *pañca-ṇāma*, five categories of words, viz. *nāma*, *nipāta* *ākhyāta*, *upasarga* and *miśra* are illustrated (*sutta* No. 232).

40. The six states of the soul, viz. *udaia*, *uvasamia*, *khaia*, *khaovasamia*, *pārināmia* and *sannivātia* are discussed in detail under *chaṇāma* (*sutta* No. 233-259). The *Bhagavatī Sūtra* (XVII. 1.592) refers to this discussion of the *Aṇuogaddārāim* for a complete treatment of the six *bhāvas*. It appears that all available details of the subject were collected together from different sources and embodied in our Text by the compilers of the *Āgamas* when it was felt necessary to eliminate reduplication and reduce the unwieldy bulk of the scriptural corpus.

41. Each *bhāva* is considered in its double aspect of cause and effect. Thus *udaya* stands for the state of rise of the eight types of *kammas*, which is the cause of a state of the soul, called *udayanipphanṇa*, which is the effect of the rise of those *kammas* (*sutta* No. 234-238). The *udayanipphanṇa* is divided as *jīvodayanipphanṇa* and *ajīvodayanipphanṇa*. The former stands for various forms of life (such as *ṇeraia*, *tirikha*, *maṇussa*, etc.), passions (*kaṣāya*), gender (*veda*), *lessā*, etc. that are the effects of the rise of *kammas*. The *ajīvodayanipphanṇa* refers to

the physical appurtenances of the soul, such as the various bodies (*orāliya*, *veuvviya*, etc.) and their sub-products.

42. The *uvasamīa bhāva* stands for the subsidence of the *mohaṇijja-kamma*, and its effect (*uvasamanipphanṇa*) is the subsidence of the *kasāyas*, *daṃsaṇamohaṇijja*, *carittamohaṇijja*, etc., culminating in the eleventh spiritual stage called *uvasaṃta-kasāya-chaumattha-vītarāga*. (*sutta* No. 239-241).

43. The state of complete eradication of the entire range of *kammās* is called *khaya*, its effect (*khayanipphanṇa*) being illustrated by such perfect states of the soul as the state of omniscience and the conditions that accompany it (*sutta* No. 242-244).

44. The *khaovasamīa bhāva* means the subsidence-cum-destruction of the four *ghāi-kammās*, and its effect (*khaovasamanipphanṇa*) stands for all those states of the soul which are the resultants of this *bhāva*. All varieties of knowledge (excepting omniscience), intuition (excepting *kevala-daṃsaṇa*), *khaovasamīya caritta*, and so on, are given as illustration of such resultants (*sutta* No. 245-247).

45. The *pāriṇāmiya bhāva* is divided as 'with beginning' and 'without beginning'. All those objects which have beginning fall under the former category while the eternal substances, viz. *dhammatthikāya*, *adhammatthikāya*, *āgāsatthikāya*, *jīvattthikāya*, *poggalatthikāya*, *addhāsamāya*, *loa* (*loāgāsa*), *aloa* (*aloāgāsa*), *bhavasiddhiya* souls and *abhavasiddhiya* souls, are enumerated under the latter (*sutta* No. 248-250).

46. The various combinations of the above mentioned five *bhāvas*—taken two, three, four and five at a time—are given as constituting the category of the *sannivāiyya bhāva*. Our Text gives appropriate illustrations for each of these combinations (*sutta* No. 251-259).

47. Under the *satta-ṇāma*, the seven musical notes are given (*sutta* No. 260). The seven places of their origin, their association with living objects, the note-characteristics, the musical-scales, their six faults and eight merits, and other necessary details are given in this connection. The whole description is found verbatim in the *Ṭhāṇaṃga Sutta*, VII, 677.

48. Under *aṭṭha-ṇāma*, the eight grammatical case-endings are given, (*sutta* No. 261). This passage also is found reproduced verbatim in the *Ṭhāṇaṃga Sutta*, VIII, 771.

49. The *nava-ṇāma* enumerates and defines with interesting illustrative verses the nine poetic sentiments, viz. heroism (*vīra*), love (*siṃgāra*), wonder (*abbhua*), anger (*rodḍa*), shame (*velaṇa*), disgust

(*bībhacca*), mirth (*hāsa*), pity (*kaluṇa*), and tranquillity (*pasanta*) (*sutta* No. 262). The *Thāṇaṅga Sutta* does not mention these sentiments, though the words *simḡāra*, *kaluṇa*, *bībhacca* and *rodḡa* are found there as four *kāmas* (*Thāṇaṅga Sutta*, IV, 457).

50. Under *dasa-ṇāma*, the various usages of words are classified in ten groups which are as follows (*sutta* No. 263-312).

51. Sometimes words are used to denote objects which possess the attribute implied by their etymology. Thus the word 'forgiver' (*khamaṇa*) is used in the sense of one who forgives (*khamati*). Such usage is called *goṇṇa* (derived from the word *guṇa*, attribute, *sutta* No. 264).

52. When a word is used in a sense contrary to the etymological meaning (e. g. word *sa-mudda* is used to denote an ocean which is *a-mudda* (bereft of *muddā*)), the usage is called *no-goṇṇa* (*sutta* No. 265).

53. Sometimes the commencing words of a text are used to denote the whole text. Such usage is called *ayāṇapadeṇaṃ* (through the commencing expressions). For instance, *Asaṃkḡayaṃ* is the name of the fourth chapter of the *Uttarajḡhayana-sutta*, which begins with the word *asaṃkḡeyaṃ* (*sutta* No. 266).

54. When an idea is sought to be expressed by a word which stands for just the opposite idea, the usage is called *paḡipakkhapadeṇaṃ* (*sutta* No. 267). For example, sometimes *visa* (posion, a bitter word) is called *mahura* (sweet). This is a kind of euphemistic usage.

55. When a predominant feature is used to denote the whole thing, it is an usage called *pāhaṇṇayāe* (Skt. *pradhānatayā*). For instance, a row where the majority are mango trees is called a 'mango grove' on account of the predominance of a particular kind of trees (*sutta* No. 268).

56. When a word is used to stand for an eternal principle, the usage is called *aṇāḡiyasiddhamteṇaṃ* (*sutta* No. 269). The word *jīva* (soul) is an example in point, inasmuch as it is an eternal principle of consciousness.

57. When a name is used with reference to another name, the usage is called *nāmeṇaṃ* (*sutta* No. 270). When a person is named after the name of his grandfathe's father, it is a case of this kind of usage.

58. When something is named after a prominent part of it, the usage is called *avayaveṇaṃ* (*sutta* No. 271). The use of the word 'tusker' for a boar or an elephant on account of their possessing 'tusk' is an example of this kind of usage. Our Text extends such usage to cover

cases where the nature of an object is determined by a mark characterizing it. In this connection a verse is quoted for the purpose of illustration, which runs as follows :

One should identify a soldier by means of his waistband, a lady by her garment, (the contents of) the pot as boiled from a single boiled grain and a poet by a single stanza.

59. The usage, called *saṃjogenaṃ*, is discussed under four heads, viz. *davva*, *khetta*, *kāla* and *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 272-281). *Samjoga* means 'association'. When the denotation of a word (e. g., *gomia*, master of cows) is associated with a *davva* (e. g. cows in the case of *gomia*), the usage falls under the first head. The usages under the other heads are also to be similarly understood. The words *Bhāraha*, *Eravaa*, etc. fall under *khetta*. *Susama-susama*, *susama*, etc. which are cycles of time fall under *kāla*. *Bhāva* stands for good and bad states of the soul. For example, *nāṇi* (possessor of knowledge) refers to a good state, while *koḥi* (possessor of anger) to a bad condition of the soul.

60. The tenth usage called *pamāṇenaṃ* is explained with reference to four *nikkhevas*, viz. *nāma*, *thavaṇā*, *davva* and *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 282-312).

60 (i). The assignment of the name *pamāṇa* to any object, living or non-living, is called *nāmapamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 283).

60 (ii). The *thavaṇappamāṇa* is sevenfold (*sutta* No. 284-291) according as the name used has reference to *nakkhatta* (e. g. *Kattia*, one born in the lunar mansion of Kattiā), *devaya* (e. g., *Aggidiṇṇa*, *Aggi* being the name of a god), *kula* (family, e. g., *Ikkhāga*, a person belonging to the *Ikkhāga* family), *pāsaṇḍa* (heretic or heresy, e. g., *Kāvāliyaa*), *gaṇa* (group, e. g. *Malladinna*, *Malla* being the name of an ancient clan), *jīviyāheṇu* (name given to ensure survival, e. g. *Ujjhiyaa* which means 'a child which has been abandoned and disowned by his parents'), and *ābhippūyanaṃ* (names assigned according to one's wish, e. g. *Aṃbaa*, *Niṃbaa*, etc. which are given without any specific end in view). The examples given in our Text in this connection provide rich informations about lunar mansions, gods, ruling families, heretical schools and the ancient custom of assigning peculiar names to children to ensure their survival.

60 (iii). The *davvappamāṇa* refers to the six substances of Jaina philosophy, viz. *dhammatthikāya*, etc. (*sutta* No. 292).

60 (iv). The *bhāvappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 293-312) deals with grammatical compounds, nominal terminations, verbal roots and etymology of words. A grammar skeleton is provided here, perhaps keeping in view the sense of 'essence' (here 'summary') usually associated with the term *bhāva*.

61. We have now discussed the contents of our Text as regards the second category of *uvakkama*, viz. *nāma*. Ācārya Virasena, in his *Dhavalā*¹, instead of giving the above ten varieties of *nāma*, gives only one variety of it, which is identical with our variety called *dasa-nāma* (vide supra, 50). His immediate interest, unlike that of our Text which sets itself the task of providing a norm for exposition of the scripture, being the determination of the meaning of the expression *jīvatthāṇa*, it is but proper for him to leave *ega-ṇāma*, *du-ṇāma*, etc. out of account. Ācārya Virasena's order of enumeration is slightly different from ours in that in his arrangement our fifth and sixth items interchange their places and our *pamāṇa* is inserted by him after *nāma*. His interpretation of the terms also differs in some cases, the cleavage being complete in the case of *ādānapada*, *pratipakṣa* and *pramāṇapada*. The *Aṇugaddārāṃ* appear to propound an ancient view prevalent among the exegetists of old days. The style of presentation and the interesting details given vouch for the antiquity of the treatment of the subject recorded in our Text.

62. Now we come to the third variety of *uvakkama*, called *pamāṇa* which is very elaborately dealt with in our Text (*sutta* No. 313-520) providing some unique informations on a number of important subjects.

63. The *pamāṇa* is considered under four heads, viz. *davva*, *khetta*, *kāla* and *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 313).

64. The *davvappamāṇa* is divided as *padesanipphaṇṇa* and *vibhāganipphaṇṇa* (*sutta* No. 314). Under the first division fall the material monads, duads, triads, etc. up to decads and also material bodies consisting of numerable, innumerable and infinite number of atoms. Under the second, five kinds of measures, viz. *māṇa*, *ummāṇa*, *omāṇa*, *gaṇima* and *paḍimāṇa* are explained.

65. *Māṇa* is twofold, viz. measure for cereals, and measure for liquids. The measures (weighing pots which were wooden) for cereals are as follows (*sutta* No. 318) :

1, Vide *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, I, pp. 74.79.

2	asatī	=	1	pasatī ¹
2	pasatīs	=	1	setiyā
4	setiyās	=	1	kulaya
4	kulayas	=	1	patthaya
4	patthayas	=	1	āḍhaya
4	āḍhayas	=	1	doṇa
60	āḍhayas	=	1	small size kumbha
80	āḍhayas	=	1	medium size kumbha
100	āḍhayas	=	1	full size kumbha
800	āḍhayas	=	1	vāha.

In this connection, our Text gives the following names of receptacles used for storing cereals—*muttolī*, *murava*, *iḍḍara*, *alimda*, and *apavāri* (*sutta* No. 319). The liquids were measured by adding one fourth part extra to the quantity contained in the measures for cereals. The extra quantity added here was in imitation of the extra quantity of cereals placed conically at the top of the measures used for weighing cereals. The measures for liquids are as follows (*sutta* No. 320):

1	causatṭhiyā	(1 māṇī/64)	=	4	palas
1	battīsiyā	(1 māṇī/32)	=	8	palas
1	solassiyā	(1 māṇī/16)	=	16	palas
1	aṭṭhabhāiyā	(1 māṇī/8)	=	32	palas
1	caubhāiyā	(1 māṇī/4)	=	64	palas
1	addhamāṇī	(1 māṇī/2)	=	128	palas
1	māṇī		=	256	palas

The following liquid-containers are mentioned in this connection: *vāraga*, *ghaḍaga*, *karaga*, *kalasiya*, *gaggari*, *daiya*, *karodī*, and *kumḍia*.

66. The second kind of measures called *ummāṇa* which were used for weighing such articles as leaves, incense, sugar, molasses, and the like are listed as follows (*sutta* No. 322-323):

2	half-karisas	=	1	karisa (vide footnote on <i>pasatī</i> in 65)
2	karisas	=	1	half pala (that is; 1 <i>pala</i> = 4 <i>karisas</i>)

1. 1 *asai* = 1 handful of sericals (Commentary, p. 140 B).
 1 *prasṭa* = 2 *palas* (Monier's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. *prasṭa*).
 1 *pala* = 4 *karisa* (vide infra, 66)
 1 *karisa* (Skt. *karṣa*) = 16 *māṣas* = 80 *rettis* = 1/4 *pala* = 1/400 *Tulā* = about 176 grains troy—Monier's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. *karṣa*. The *karṣa* is thus also the equivalent of the *suvaṇṇa* of our Text (vide infra, 69 where 16 *kammamāṣas* (*māṣas* referred to above) are equated to 1 *suvaṇṇa*). In our Text (vide infra, 66), 1 *tulā* = 105 *palas*, which roughly tallies with Monier's description.

2 half-palas = 1 pala
 105 palas = 1 tulā
 10 tulās = 1 addha-bhāra
 20 tulās = 1 bhāra

67. The third kind of measures called *omāṇa* were used for measuring the length, breadth, height, etc. of various objects. The terms, *daṇḍa* (stick), *dhaṇū* (bow), *juga* (yoke), *ṇāliyā* (bamboo), *akkha* (axle) and *musala* (pestle) are all synonymous words standing for a length of four cubits.¹ The term *rajjū* stands for forty cubits. The cubit was the unit of measure for houses, stick for land, bow for road, and bamboo for walls (*sutta* No. 324).

68. The fourth kind of measures, called *gaṇima*, consist of numbers used for counting, viz. *ekka* (one), *dasaga* (ten), *sata* (hundred), and so on. The purpose of these measures is to enable one to keep accounts of one's income and expenditure (*sutta* No. 327).

69. The fifth kind of measures, viz. *paḍimāṇa*, used for weighing gold, silver, jewels, pearls, etc., are given as follows (*sutta* No. 328-329) :

5 guṃjās	= 1 khammamāsaa
4 kāgaṇīs	= 1 kammamāsaa
3 nipphāvas	= 1 kammamāsaa
12 kammamāsaa	= 1 maṃḍalaa
48 kāgaṇīs	= 1 maṃḍalaa
16 kammamāsaa	= 1 suvaṇṇa (= 1 karisa, vide supra, footnote on <i>pasatī</i> in 65 where 16 <i>maṣas</i> are quoted as equivalent to one <i>karisa</i>)
64 kāgaṇīs	= 1 suvaṇṇa.

70. Now we come to the second division of *pamāṇa*, called *khetta-ppamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 330). It is also divided as *padesanipphaṇṇa* and *vibhāganipphaṇṇa*. Under the former fall the measures of space occupied by one, two, three or more space-points, the maximum limit being the space occupied by an innumerable number of space-points which is coextensive with the *loḅgāsa*. Under the latter (*sutta* No. 332) the units are *aṅgula*, *vihatthī*, *rayaṇī*, *kucchī*, *dhaṇū*, *gāyua*, *joyaṇa*, *sedhī*, *payara*, *loga* and *aloga*². The most basic unit here is *aṅgula* which is of three kinds,

1. The term cubit (*hattha* or *rayaṇī*) will be defined later on (vide infra, 71).
 2. *Aloga* is infinite in extension, and so could be left out of the consideration in this connection.

viz. *āyaṅgula*, *ussehaṅgula* and *pamāṅgula*. All other units are to be understood with reference to these three basic units.

71. The *āyaṅgula* (Skt. *Ātmāṅgula*) is an ever changing measure, being equal to the breadth of the finger of a person, which varies from age to age, and also from person to person (*sutta* No. 334). The breadth of Lord Mahāvīra's finger is taken as the standard. According to one calculation, Lord Mahāvīra's one *aṅgula*=2 *ussehaṅgulas*, and one *pamāṅgula*=500 *aṅgulas* of Lord Mahāvīra.¹ We thus get the equation 1 *pamāṅgula*=500 *āyaṅgulas* (Lord Mahāvīra's *aṅgulas*)=1000 *ussehaṅgulas*.

As regards the relation between an *aṅgula* and *vihatthī*, etc. the following equations are given (*sutta* No. 335, 337), which are true for all the three kinds of *aṅgulas*, their values being however determined by the above equation.

$$6 \text{ aṅgulas} = 1 \text{ pāda}$$

$$2 \text{ pādas (or 12 aṅgulas)} = 1 \text{ vihatthī}$$

$$2 \text{ vihatthīs (or 24 aṅgulas)} = 1 \text{ rayaṅī (cubit)}$$

$$2 \text{ rayaṅīs (or 48 aṅgulas)} = 1 \text{ kucchī}$$

$$2 \text{ kucchīs (or 96 aṅgulas)} = 1 \text{ daṇḍa (also called dhaṇū, juga, nāliyā, akkha and musala)}$$

1. It is said that Lord Mahāvīra was 7 cubits in height by *ussehaṅgula*, that is, 7×24 or 168 *ussehaṅgulas*. Now, according to one tradition, he was $3\frac{1}{2}$ cubits by *āyaṅgula*, that is, $3\frac{1}{2} \times 24$ or 84 *āyaṅgulas*. From this it follows that 84 *āyaṅgulas* (Lord Mahāvīra's *aṅgulas*)=168 *ussehaṅgulas*, that is, Lord Mahāvīra's one *aṅgula*=2 *ussehaṅgulas*. But there are two other traditions of $4\frac{1}{2}$ and 5 cubits, which make Lord Mahāvīra's one *aṅgula* equal to $168 / (4\frac{1}{2} \times 24)$ i. e. $14/9$ *ussehaṅgulas*, or $168 / (5 \times 24)$ i. e. $12/5$ *ussehaṅgulas* (Commentary p. 158 B). Our Text (vide *sutta* No. 334, verse 97) gives 108 *āyaṅgulas* as the height of superior men.

The height of Cakravartī Bharata is given as 120 *pamāṅgulas* or 500 *dhaṇūs* by *ussehaṅgula*, i. e. $500 \times 4 \times 24$ or 48,000 *ussehaṅgulas*. This means that one *pamāṅgula*= $48000/120$ or 400 *ussehaṅgulas*. Now as the *pamāṅgula* is $2\frac{1}{2}$ *ussehaṅgulas* in breadth, it can be considered ($400 \times 2\frac{1}{2}$) i. e., 1000 *ussehaṅgulas* in length, assuming it to be only one *ussehaṅgula* in breadth. This makes the length of one *pamāṅgula* (with breadth of one *ussehaṅgula*) equal to one thousand *ussehaṅgulas* (Commentary, p. 159A), that is, 500 *aṅgulas* of Lord Mahāvīra, if Lord Mahāvīra's one *aṅgula* were equal to 2 *ussehaṅgulas* as given in one of the three traditions. This is also in conformity with our Text (*sutta* No. 358): *taṃ samaṇassa bhagavao Mahāvīrassa addhaṅgulaṃ, taṃ sahaṣṣaṅgulaṃ pamāṅgulaṃ bhavati.*

2000 dhaṇūs=1 gāuya

4 gāuyas=1 joyaṇa

1 sūti-aṅgula = a straight line which is one aṅgula (length) × 1 *paesa* (breadth). (suti-aṅgula is replaced by seḍhī-aṅgula in the cause of pamāṇaṅgula, vide *sutta* No. 361, and also infra, 73)

1 payaraṅgula = 1 sūti-aṅgula × 1 sūti-aṅgula

1 ghaṇaṅgula = 1 payaraṅgula × 1 sūti-aṅgula

Our Text (*sutta* No. 334) gives some interesting details about the definition and purpose of the three kinds of *aṅgulas* which deserves notice in this connection.

The *āyaṅgula* is the breadth of the finger of different persons born at different times, their face being twelve *āyaṅgulas* and the whole body nine times their face. The standard weight of a human body is given as one *doṇa* (i. e. 512 *pasatīs* or 1024 *palas*) or $\frac{1}{2}$ *bhāra* (that is, 1050 *palas*).¹ Superior men are 108 *āyaṅgulas* (in height), inferior 96 and the mediocre 104. The system of *āyaṅgula* is used for the purpose of measuring wells, ponds, parks, gardens, moats, ramparts, etc. (*sutta* No. 336.)

72. For the determination of an *ussehaṅgula*, our Text (*sutta* No. 339-344) starts from the definition of a material atom which is divided as subtle (*suhuma*, theoretical) and practical. The practical atom is composed of an infinite-infinite¹ number of subtle atoms, and is yet not capable of being dissected by the sharpest razor or disintegrated by heat, however intense. An infinite number of such practical atoms make one *ussaṇhasaṇhiyā* which provides the initial unit for determining the nature of an *ussehaṅgula* according to the following equations.

8 ussaṇhasaṇhiyās=1 saṇhasaṇhiyā

8 saṇhasaṇhiyās=1 uḍḍhareṇū

8 uḍḍhareṇūs=1 tasareṇū

(vide Translation, *sutta* No. 344)

8 javamajjhas=1 aṅgula (*ussehaṅgula*)

The system of *ussehaṅgula* is used as a standard for measuring the heights of the bodies of hell-beings, animals, human beings and gods (*sutta* No. 346).

1. Vide supra, 65, 66.

Our Text (*sutta* No. 347-355) here gives an elaborate list of the heights of the bodies of various beings, an abridged account of which is given below.

<i>Class of beings</i>	<i>Normal body</i>		<i>Created body</i>	
	minimum	maximum	minimum	maximum
<i>Neraiya</i>	amg. ¹ / asam. ²	500 dhaṇūs	amg. / sam. ³	1000 dhaṇūs
(i) <i>Rayaṇa-ppabhā</i>	amg./asam.	7 dhaṇūs 6 amg.	amg./sam.	15 dhaṇūs 2 rayaṇīs 12 amg.
(ii) <i>Sakkara-ppabhā</i>	amg. / asam.	15 dhaṇūs 2 rayaṇīs	amg./ sam.	31 dhaṇūs 1 rayaṇī

And so on, the maximum lengths being doubled successively.

(vii) *Tamatamā* amg./asam. 500 dhaṇūs amg./sam. 1000 dhaṇūs

Deva (bhavanavāsī)

(i) *Asurakumāra* amg./asam. 7 rayaṇīs amg./sam. 100,000 joyaṇas

Same description for (ii) *Nāgakumāra*, etc. up to (x) *Thaṇṇiyakumāra*.

Tirikkha

Pudhvikāya amg./asam. amg./asam.

Same description up to *bāyara-vāukāiya*.

Vaṇassaikāya amg./asam. 1000 joyaṇas + extra

Beimḍia amg./asam. 12 joyaṇas

Teimḍiya amg./asam. 3 gāuyas

Caurindiya amg./asam. 4 gāuyas

Paṃcindiya amg./asam. 1000 joyaṇas

Maṇussa

Sammucchima amg./asam. amg./asam.

Gabbhavakkaṃṭiya amg./asam. 3 gāuyas

Deva

Vāṇamaṃṭara] Same as in the case of *Asurakumāras*.
Jotisiya]

1. amg. = amgula.

2. asam. = asaṃkhejja.

3. sam. = saṃkhejja.

Class of beings	Normal body		Created body	
	minimum	maximum	minimum	maximum
Sohammakappa	amg./asam.	7 rayaṇīs	amg./asam.	100,000 joyaṇas
Similarly, Isāṇakappa,.....up to Accuyakappa.				
Sanamkumāra	amg./asam.	6 rayaṇīs	(same as in	Sohamma- kappa)
Māhinda	amg./asam.	6 rayaṇīs	do	
Bambhalamtaga	amg./asam.	5 rayaṇīs	do	
Mahāsukkasahassāra	amg./asam.	4 rayaṇīs	do	
Aṇaya, etc.	amg./asam.	3 rayaṇīs	do	
up to Accuta				
Gevejja	amg./asam.	2 rayaṇīs	Nil	
Aṇuttarovavāiya	amg./asam.	1 rayaṇī	Nil	

73. The *pamāṇaṅgula* is defined as equal to 100 times the *addhaṅgula* of Lord Mahāvīra, which (viz. the *addhaṅgula*) again is given as equal to the edge of the *kāgaṇi*-jewel of a Cakravartī emperor, the edge being also stated to be one *ussehaṅgula* in breadth (*sutta* No. 358). The *kāgaṇi*-jewel is a cube weighing eight *suvaṇṇas*.¹ By means of the system of *pamāṇaṅgula*, the length, breadth, height, depth and circumference of the hells, heavens, continents, mountains, etc. are measured (*sutta* No. 360).

Innumerable *koḍi*-*koḍis* of *joyaṇas* make one *sedhī*; *sedhī* multiplied itself makes one *payaraṅgula*, and a *payara* multiplied by *sedhī* makes a *loga* (*sutta* No. 361).

74. The third division of *pamāṇa* is *kālappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 363-365), which again is twofold, viz. *padesanipphaṇṇa* and *vibhāgaṇipphaṇṇa*. Under the former, the durations of one time-point, two time-points, and so on, up to a duration of an innumerable number of space-points are given. Under the latter are included *samaya* (time-point or instant), *āvaliyā*, *muhutta*, *divasa*, *ahoratta*, *ṭakkha*, *māsa*, *saṃvacchara*, *juga*, *paliyā*, *sāgara*, *osappi* and *pariyatta*.

75. Our Text (*sutta* No. 366) attempts at defining a time-point (*samaya*, instant) by giving the example of a young tailor of strong physique tearing up a piece of cloth. Is the time taken in tearing up the cloth equal to one instant? The reply is No, because the piece of cloth has a number of threads which are not torn up simultaneously. The threads again are made up of fibres which in their turn consist of an

1. An attempt at finding out an absolute standard of weight is clearly discernible here.

infinite number of atomic conglomerates. While the upper conglomerate is not broken up, the lower one cannot be torn asunder. The upper conglomerate is broken up at a moment which is different from the moment when the lower conglomerate is torn up. A time-instant however is still more subtle. It is not possible to demonstrate its nature by such examples. An innumerable number of such time-instants are said to make one *āvaliyā* (*sutta* No. 367) which is the unit of time to start with for the purpose of practical measurement of time. In this connection our Text gives the following equations (*sutta* No.367) :

numerable number of *āvaliyās* = *ūsāsa* = *nīsāsa*
ūsāsa + *nīsāsa* of a person in perfect health = *pāṇu*
 7 *pāṇus* = *thova*
 7 *thovas* = *lava*
 77 *lavas* = *muhutta*
 or 3773 *ūsāsas* (+ *nīsāsas*) = *muhutta*
 30 *muhuttas* = *ahoratta*
 15 *ahorattas* = *pakkha*
 2 *pakkhas* = *māsa*
 2 *māsas* = *uū*
 3 *uūs* = *ayaṇa*
 2 *ayaṇas* = *saṃvacchara* (*vāsa*)
 5 *saṃvaccharas* = *juga*
 20 *jugas* = 100 *vāsas* (*saṃvaccharas*)
 84,00,000 *vāsas* = *puvvaṃga*
 $\text{puvvaṃga} \times \text{puvvaṃga} = \text{puvva}$
 $\text{puvva} \times \text{puvvaṃga} = \text{tuḍḍiṃga}$
 $\text{tuḍḍiṃga} \times \text{puvvaṃga} = \text{tuḍḍia}$
 $\text{tuḍḍia} \times \text{puvvaṃga} = \text{aḍaḍaṃga}$
 $\text{aḍaḍaṃga} \times \text{puvvaṃga} = \text{aḍaḍa}$

This list is followed by *apapaṃga*, etc. up to *sisapaheliyā*, and after this the counting is made by means of similes which are explained, along with the purpose it serves in the *sutta* No. 368-398.

76. The similes are twofold, viz. *paliiovama* and *sāgarovama*, the former again being of three kinds, viz. *uddhārapaliiovama*, *addhāpaliiovama*, and *khettapaliiovama*. The *uddhārapaliiovama* is further divided as *suhuma* (conceptual) and *vāvahāriya* (practical). *Paliya* means a circular store of a specific size. It is filled up with hair-tips which are then taken out each at one instant.¹ The number of instants required in the

1. For the size of the store, the nature of hair-tips, and the process of filling up, vide Translation, *sutta* No. 372, 374; also 379, 381, 394, 396.

process of emptying the store represents the number called *vāvahāriya uddhārapaliōvama*. Ten *koḍākoḍī* of this number is the *vāvahāriya uddhāra sāgarovama* (*sutta* No. 372, verse 107). Now if the above hair-tips are each divided in innumerable parts, and then taken out each part at one instant, the number of instants thus required represents one *suhuma uddhāra paliōvama*. Ten *koḍākoḍī* of this number is called *suhuma uddhāra-sāgarovama*. (*sutta* No. 374, verse 108). By the numbers represented by these *suhuma uddhāra-paliōvama* and *suhuma uddhāra-sāgarovama*, the number of islands and oceans are counted, which is given as $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the *uddhāra-sāgarovama* (*sutta* No. 376).

77. The *addhāpaliōvama* is similarly divided as *suhuma* and *vāvahāriya*. In the case of these stores, each hair-tip or part of hair-tip is taken out after an interval of one hundred years, which makes these numbers represent much higher numbers (*sutta* No. 379). The *sāgarovamas* in these case are to be understood in the same manner as in the case of the *uddhārapaliōvama*. The longevity of the hell-beings, animals, human beings, and gods is measured by the *suhuma addhāpaliōvamas* and *suhuma addhāsāgarovamas* (*sutta* No. 382).

78. Some of the examples of longevity given in *sutta* No. 383-391 are broadly as follows :

Class of beings	Longevity	
	minimum	maximum
<i>Ñeraiya</i>		
(i) <i>Rayaṇappabhā</i>	10,000 years	1 <i>sāgarovama</i>
(ii) <i>Sakkarappabhā</i>	1 <i>sāgarovama</i>	3 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
(iii) <i>Vāluṇyappabhā</i>	3 <i>sāgarovamas</i>	7 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
(iv) <i>Paṃkappabhā</i>	7 <i>sāgarovamas</i>	10 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
(v) <i>Dhūmappabhā</i>	10 <i>sāgarovamas</i>	17 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
(vi) <i>Tamappabhā</i>	17 <i>sāgarovamas</i>	22 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
(vii) <i>Tamatamā</i>	22 <i>sāgarovamas</i>	33 <i>sāgarovamas</i>
<i>Deva</i> (<i>Bhavanavāsi</i>)		
(i) <i>Asurakumāra</i>	10,000 years	1 <i>sāgarovamas</i> + extra
<i>Asurakumārī devī</i>	10,000 years	$4\frac{1}{2}$ <i>paliōvamas</i>
And so on.		
<i>Tirikkha</i>		
<i>Puḍhavīkāiya</i>	<i>aṃtomuhutta</i>	22,000 years
<i>Vaṇassaikāiya</i>	<i>aṃtomuhutta</i>	10,000 years
<i>Beiṃḍiya</i>	<i>aṃtomuhutta</i>	12 years
<i>Teiṃḍiya</i>	<i>aṃtomuhutta</i>	49 days
<i>Paṃciṃḍiya</i>	<i>aṃtomuhutta</i>	3 <i>paliōvamas</i>

Manussa

Sammucchima	aṃtomuhutta	aṃtomuhutta
Gabbhavakkamṭiya	aṃtomuhutta	3 paliovas

Deva

Vāṇamaṃtara	10,000 years	1 paliovama
Vāṇamaṃtarī devī	10,000 years	$\frac{1}{2}$ paliovama
Jotisiya	1/8 paliovama + extra	1 paliovama + 100,000 years
Joisī Devī	1/8 paliovama	$\frac{1}{2}$ paliovama + 50,000 years

And so on.

Savatṭhasiddha	33 sāgarovamas	33 sāgarovamas
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78. Now we come to the *khettapaliovama* (*sutta* No. 392-398) which represents a still higher number. This is also divided as *suhuma* and *vāvahāriya*. Here, in the case of the *vāvahāriya*, the space-points pervaded by the hair-tips (the number of space-points being greater than that of the hair-tips) are conceptually taken out each at one instant. In the case of the *suhuma*, the space-points pervaded or not by the parts (sic.) of hair-tips, in other words, the total number¹ of the space-points of the store are taken out each at one instant.² The conception of *sāgarovama* in these cases is the same as in the other two kinds of *paliovas*. The substances enumerated in the *Ditṭhivā* are measured by means of the *suhuma khettapaliovama* and *sāgarovama*.

79. The *sutta* No. 399-426 give an account of the substances described in Jaina philosophy, in confirmation of the vastness of the contents of the *Ditṭhivā*. In this connection, various kinds of bodies associated with different kinds of living beings are detailed at length, demonstrating the Jaina thinker's love for mathematical estimate of things and speculations about supersensuous objects.

80. *Bhāvappamāṇa*, the fourth division of *pamāṇa*, is explained in *sutta* No. 427-520. It is divided into three categories, viz. (I) *guṇappamāṇa* (ii) *ṇayappamāṇa* and (iii) *saṃkhappamāṇa*.

81. The *guṇappamāṇa* is twofold, viz, *jīvagūṇappamāṇa* and *ajīvagūṇappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 428). Under the latter, colour (*vaṇṇa*), smell (*gaṃdha*), taste (*rasa*), touch (*phāsa*) and figure (*saṃthāṇa*) and their subvarieties are mentioned (*sutta* No. 429-434). The former, that is,

1. The Commentary (p. 178A) gives the reason why our Text says 'space-points pervaded or not' instead of directly referring to the total number of the space-points of the store.

2. Vide Translation, *sutta* No. 394, 396.

jīvagunaḥappamāṇa is threefold, viz. (a) *ñānagunaḥappamāṇa*, (b) *daṃsaṇagunaḥappamāṇa* and (c) *carittagunaḥappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 435). Of these three, the *ñānagunaḥappamāṇa* deserves special attention in view of the fact that it propounds an ancient theory of knowledge as adopted by the Jaina philosopher from an ancient non-Jaina text on logic.

82. The *ñānagunaḥappamāṇa* is expounded with reference to the four time-honoured categories of valid knowledge propounded by the Nyāya school, viz. *pratyakṣa* (Pkt. *paccakkha*), *anumāna* (Pkt. *aṇumāṇa*), *upamāna* (also *aupamya*, Pkt. *ovamma*), and *āgama* (Pkt. also *āgama*).

83. Following its own tradition, our Text (*sutta* No. 437-439) divides *pratyakṣa* as *inḍiyapaccakkha* (perceptual cognition through the five sense-organs) and *no-inḍiyapaccakkha* (direct intuition by the soul, without the help of the sense-organs), the latter comprising the three supersensual kinds of knowledge viz. *avadhi-*, *manahparyāya-*, and *kevala-jñāna*.

84. The category of knowledge, called *aṇumāṇa*, or inference, is stated (*sutta* No. 440) as having three varieties, viz. *puvvaṇṇam*, *sesavaṇṇam* and *ditṭhasāhammaṇṇam*. This is comparable to the Nyāya logician's *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* varieties of *anumāna* (*Nyāyasūtra*, I, 1.5). The illustrations of these varieties quoted in our text are not found in the extant Nyāya treatises. Nor are they strictly logical. They perhaps represent an ancient tradition, probably a popular version of the strictly logical expositions of the concepts. The Nyāya school had a long history which is now not known to us. The logical ideas developed slowly and passed through various stages. Our Text might be representing one such stage.

85. The example of the recognition of a lost child by some characteristic mark previously known (*sutta* No. 441) need not be rejected as a genuine example of inference of the *pūrvavat* type. The expression '*puvvalimgeṇa kenai*' is significant. The inference is of course not based on invariable concomitance. But the concept of logical relationship fully developed only after the Buddhist logicians took the field.

86. The exposition of *sesavaṇṇam* appears plausible. The concepts of *kajja*, *kāraṇa*, *guṇa*, *avayava* and *āsaya* referred to by our Text (*sutta* No. 442-447) vouches for its authenticity. The knowledge of a conch

1. The full verse runs as follows : (verse 115, *sutta* No. 441):
 mātā puttamaṃ jahā natṭhamaṃ juvāṇamaṃ puṇarāgataṃ /
 kāi paccabhiḥajjā puvvalimgeṇa kenai //

from its sound is an inference of cause from its effect (*kajja*). Under inference of *kajja* from *kāraṇa*, simply the causal relation is exemplified. Our Text thus asserts: the threads are the cause of cloth, and not the cloth of threads; a lump of clay is the cause of a pitcher, and not the pitcher of the lump of clay. As an instance of the knowledge of *guṇin* from *guṇa*, the example of the inference of a flower from its smell is given. The knowledge of a peacock from its feathers is given as a case of the inference of the whole from its part (*avayava*). The knowledge of fire from smoke is given as an instance of inference from *āsaya* (Skt. *āśraya*).

87. The *ditthasāhamma* variety of inference (*sutta* No. 448-450) is stated to be twofold: *sāmannadittha* and *visesadittha*. 'Like one coin are many coins, and like many coins is one coin' is an example of the former. Here the nature of a particular coin is sought to be inferred from the knowledge of the nature of such coins in general, or the nature of coins in general is sought to be inferred from the knowledge of the nature of a particular coin. The *visesadittha* type of inference is illustrated by the recognition of a previously seen person from among many persons.

88. Inference is further classified according as its object is a past, present or future event (*sutta* No. 451-453). The inference of good rainfall in the past is made from green forests, bumper crops, and overflowed lakes at the present time. From an abundant availability of alms, a bumper harvest in the present is inferred. The future good rainfall is inferred from the clearness of the sky, a dark mountain, clouds with (yellow) lightning, thunder of clouds, whirl-wind (rotating clockwise), a red and humid evening, and the like¹.

Contrariwise, the absence of rainfall, lack of bumper harvest, and future drought are inferred from dry forests and empty lakes, and so on, which are reverse to the above mentioned conditions (*sutta* No. 454-457).

89. The third category of knowledge, viz. *ovamma* (analogical knowledge) is twofold: *sāhammovaṇṭita* and *vehammovaṇṭita* (*sutta* No. 458-466). The former again is of three kinds, viz. *kiṃcisāhammovaṇṭita* (e. g., as the Māṃdara mountain, so the mustard seed in point of being possessed of a form or shape); *pāyasāhammovaṇṭita* (e. g., as the cow, so the gayal in point of its hoof, hump, tail, etc.); and *savvasāhammovaṇṭita* (e. g. the *arhats* have acted like *arhats*). The *vehamma-dhammovaṇṭita* is also similarly of three kinds.

1. For a similar example vide *Nyāyamañjarī*, I, p. 117.

90. The fourth category of knowledge (*sutta* No. 467-470) is *āgama* which is divided as worldly and extra-worldly, the former consisting of false scripture, e. g., *Bhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa* and the like, and the latter comprising the twelve *Aṅgas* revealed by the omniscient *jinās*. Or, the *āgama* is threefold, viz. *suttāgama*, *atthāgama* and *tadubhayāgama*. Or, it is threefold, viz. *attāgama* (revealed by oneself), *aṇaṃtarāgama* (revealed by an immediately preceding authority), and *paraṃparāgama* (handed down from generation to generation).

91. The *daṃsaṇaguṇappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 471) refers to *cakkhu-*, *acakkhu-*, *ohi-*, and *kevaladaṃsaṇa*. By the eye one intuits the objects like jar, cloth, etc. from a distance. The other four sense-organs, as also the mind, intuit the objects which are in touch with them (*acakkhu-daṃsaṇaṃ acakkhu-daṃsaṇissa āyabhāve*). *Ohi-daṃsaṇa* intuits all material substances, but not all their modes. The *kevala-daṃsaṇa* intuits all the substances in all their modes.

92. The *carittaguṇappamāṇa* is concerned with the five *carittas*, viz. *sāmāya*, *chedovatṭhāvaṇa*, etc. (*sutta* No. 472).

93. Now we come to the *nayappamāṇa* (*sutta* No. 473-476) which is the second category of *bhāvappamāṇa*. Here the seven *nayas* are explained through the examples of *patthaya* (a measuring pot), *vasahi* (abode) and *paesa* (space-point).

94. Suppose a person goes to the forest with an axe in hand to fetch wood for making a measuring pot called *patthaya*. Now, being asked about his mission, he says—I am going for a *patthaya*. This is an example of impure (*avisuddha*) *negama*. Here the final effect (*patthaya*) stands for the material cause (viz. wood). If the wood that is being cut is identified with the final effect, it is a case of pure (*visuddha*) *negama*. The third stage of chiselling the wood is called purer *negama*; and so on, till one arrives at the actual *patthaya* which is a case of the purest *negama*. Our Text (*sutta* No. 474) seeks to explain the *vavahāra naya* also after a similar pattern. The *patthaya* full of the contents to be measured is a case of *saṃgaha naya* which does not differentiate the measure from the thing measured. According to the *ujjusuya naya* which emphasizes difference of things, the measure as well as the thing measured in the *patthaya*. The three *saddanayas* stand for the formal cause, that is, the essence or idea of the *patthaya*.¹

95. In the case of *vasahi* (abode), the seven *nayas* are illustrated with reference to the gradual exactitude of the abode of a person. The

1. tiṇhaṃ saddaṇayāṇaṃ patthayūhigārājāṇao patthao jassa va vaseṇaṃ patthao nipphajjai (*sutta* No. 474).

proposition 'I live in the universe' is an example of impure *negama*. From the standpoint of a relatively pure *negama naya*, one should say 'I live in the planet called earth (the third planet in order from the sun)'; and so on, till we arrive at the proposition 'I live in the inner apartment' which is a case of pure *negama*. The *vavahāra naya* is like the *negama*. According to the *saṃgaha naya* which strives for higher exactitude one would say 'I am seated in the chair'. The *ujjusuya naya* asserts that a person lives in the space-points actually occupied by him. 'One lives in oneself' is the proposition approved by the three *saddanayas* (*sutta* No. 475).

96. The example of space-point (*sutta* No. 476) deserves special consideration on account of its stressing a novel aspect of the *nayas*. Each succeeding *naya* tries to remove the ambiguity inherent in the *naya* that precedes it. Suppose in describing a space-point, one says 'A space-point is that which is a space-point of six (substances), viz. space-point of *dhamma*, space-point of *adhamma*, space-point of *āgāsa*, space-point of *jīva*, space-point of *khaṃdha* (material body), and space-point of a part (*desa-paesa*, here part stands for a part of any of the five substances)'. This is a case of *negama*. From the standpoint of *saṃgaha*, one would question the significance of the last phrase on the ground that a part is nothing apart from the five substances mentioned in the first five phrases. One should therefore say 'A space-point is that which is a space-point of five (substances), viz. space-point of *dhamma*, etc. up to space-point of *khaṃdha*'. This is an ambiguous proposition according to the *vavahāra naya*. Each substance has a different kind of space-point, and so the proposition should be framed thus : The space point is of five kinds viz. space-point of *dhamma*, etc. up to space-point of *khaṃdha*. The upholder of the *ujjusua naya*, however, finds fault with this proposition too. 'The space-point is of five kinds' is an ambiguous statement in that it leaves undecided whether each of the five space-points, viz. space-point of *dhamma*, etc., is of five kinds, thus raising the total variety of space-points to twenty-five. The proper form of the proposition, according to the *ujjusuya naya*, therefore, should be "The space-point is to be provisionally distinguished (thus)—there may be a space-point of *dhamma*, there may be a space point of *adhamma*, there may be a space-point of *āgāsa*, there may be a space-point of *jīva*, there may be a space-point of *khaṃdha*". This is also not considered sufficiently unambiguous by the exponent of the *saṃpati saddanaya*. The proposition 'The space-point is to be provisionally distinguished, *bhaiyavvo padeso*'¹

1. Here and onward we give the Prakrit terms in order to utilize them for explaining the nuances of the Sanskrit compounds.

implies that a *dhammapadesa* may also be a *dhammapadesa* or an *adhammapadesa*, or an *āgāsapadesa*, or a *jīvapadesa*, or a *khaṃdhapadesa*; similarly, an *adhammapadesa* may also be a *dhammapadesa*, and so on up to *khaṃdhapadesa*; similarly, a *jīvapadesa* may also be a *dhammapadesa*, and so on up to *khaṃdhapadesa*; similarly, a *khaṃdhapadesa* may also be a *dhammapadesa*, and so on up to *khaṃdhapadesa*. This would obviously lead to a logical seesaw. The proposition therefore should be presented thus : *dhamme padese se padese dhamme, ahamme padese se padese adhamme, āgāse padese se padese āgāse, jīve padese se padese no-jīve, khaṃdhe padese se padese no-khaṃdhe*. The words *no-jīva* and *no-khaṃdhe* have a special significance. *Dhamma*, *adhamma* and *āgāsa* are unitary substances and as such their space-points are connected with one single substance. But the souls and material bodies are many, and as such a space-point of a soul, or a space-point of a material body, is restricted to that very soul or material body. '*Jīve padese se padese no-jīve*' means 'a space-point of a particular *jīva* is the space-point of only one individual of the whole class of *jīvas*'. (The particle 'no' is here used in the sense of 'a part', in the present case in the sense of 'only one individual'). The significance of *no-khaṃdha* is also to be similarly understood. Here the space-point of a *jīva* or a material body is to be considered as related with that particular *jīva* or material body, its identity with *jīva* or matter as a whole category being left undetermined. The propounder of the *samabhirūḍha naya* leads us to one step further by analysing the implication of the *karmadhāraya* compounds proposed by the follower of the *sampati saddanaya*. The identity of substance with its space-point is here sought to be firmly established by expounding the compound as *dhamme ya se padese ya se se padese dhamme*, and so on. But the exponent of the *evambhūta naya* is not satisfied with this analysis of the propounder of the *samabhirūḍha naya*. According to him, a word stands for a whole (*kaṣiṇaṃ*) object which is complete in itself (*paḍipunṇaṃ*), without any residue (*niravasesaṃ*) and comprehended in one single sweep (*egagahaṇagahitaṃ*). The part as well as a space-point is unreal (*avatthū*).

Here in this analysis of the example of space-point, our Text adopts a method which may be considered a precursor of an elaborate discussion of the last three *nayas* with reference to the rules of grammar. The theory presented appears ancient and not coversant with the later developments in the field.

97. The third category of *bhāvappamāṇa* is *saṃkhappamāṇa* which is considered under eight heads, viz. *nāma*, *ṭhavaṇā*, *davva*, *ovamma*, *parimāṇa*, *jāṇaṇā*, *gaṇaṇā* and *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 477). The first three

heads are treated in the stereotyped way (*sutta* No. 478-491) and the *jāṇaṇā* (*sutta* No. 496) and *bhāva* (*sutta* No. 520) are disposed of very briefly.

98. Under the *ovamma-saṃkhā* (determinative knowledge by means of comparison), illustrations of comparison of the existent with the existent, the existent with the non-existent, the non-existent with the existent, and the non-existent with the non-existent, are given. An interesting example of comparison of the non-existent with the existent in which a decayed leaf is imagined to address the newly sprouting leaves is as follows (*sutta* No. 492 [4], *gāthās* 121-122):

As you (are at present), so (had) we (been in the past). You will also be (in the future) like us—thus addresses a grey leaf while falling down, to the newly sprouting leaves.

Neither there is nor will there be such a dialogue between the sprouting and the grey leaves. Such comparison has indeed been made for the enlightenment of the competent person (fit for spiritual emancipation).

99. Under the *parimāṇasaṃkhā*, the contents of the *kāṭiyasūya* and *ditṭhivāyasūya* are enumerated (*sutta* No. 493-495).

100. The *gaṇaṇāsaṃkhā* deserves special notice here. The number 'one' does not lend itself to counting. 'Two' etc. are numbers proper which are classified as (1) numerable, (2) innumerable and (3) infinite. Of these, the numerable is threefold: (a) minimum, (b) maximum, and (c) intermediate (neither minimum nor maximum). The three varieties of the innumerable are (a) low-grade (*paritta*), (b) self-raised (*jutta*) and (c) innumerable-innumerable, each of which again is minimum, maximum and intermediate. The infinite is also to be divided after the pattern of the innumerable with the only exception that the infinite-infinite has no maximum. The definitions of these classes and subclasses of number are as follows (*sutta* No. 507-519) :

101. The minimum numerable number is 2 which is followed by the intermediate numerable numbers until the maximum numerable number is arrived at by the process described in *sutta* No. 507-508 (vide Translation). Let us abbreviate this maximum numerable number as max. num. Now max. num. + 1 = minimum low-grade innumerable number (which is abbreviated as min. lg. innum.). The min. lg. innum. is followed by numbers which are called intermediate (abbreviated as inter.) lg. innum. numbers until we arrive at the max. lg. innum. which is (min. lg. innum.)^{itself} - 1, the number (min. lg. innum.)^{itself} representing the min. *jutta* innum., as also the *āvaliyā*. This is followed

by numbers which are called inter. *jutta* innum. numbers until one arrives at the max. *jutta* innum. which is $[(\text{min. } jutta \text{ innum.})^2]^{itself} - 1$, the number $[(\text{min } jutta \text{ innum.})^2]^{itself}$ representing the min. innumerable-innumerable. This is followed by numbers which are called inter. innumerable-innumerable until we arrive at the max. innumerable-innumerable-innumerable which is $(\text{min. innumerable-innumerable})^{itself} - 1$, the number $(\text{min. innumerable-innumerable})^{itself}$ representing the min. lg. infinite. This is followed by numbers which are called inter. lg. infinite numbers until one arrives at the max. lg. infinite which is $(\text{min. lg. infinite})^{itself} - 1$, the number $(\text{min. lg. infinite})^{itself}$ representing the min *jutta* infinite, as also the number of *abhavasiddhiya-jīvas*. This is followed by numbers which are called inter. *jutta* infinite numbers until one arrives at the max. *jutta* infinite which is $[(\text{min. } jutta \text{ infinite})^2]^{itself} - 1$, the number $[(\text{min. } jutta \text{ infinite})^2]^{itself}$ representing the minimum infinite-infinite. This is followed by numbers which are intermediate (neither minimum nor maximum) infinite-infinite numbers.

102. We now come to *vattavayā* (*sutta* No. 521-525) which is the fourth variety of *uvakkama*, devoted to the consideration of the validity of doctrines through the application of *nayas*. The *negama*, *saṅgaha* and *vavahāra nayas* recognize and discuss threefold doctrine, viz. one's own, the heretical and the mixture of the two. The *ujjusua naya* considers the third as redundant. The three *saddanayas* recognize only one doctrine, because it considers the heresies as no doctrines at all (*sutta* No. 525 [3]).

103. The fifth variety of *uvakkama* is *atthahigāra* which determines the subject matter of the scriptural text. The subject matter of the six chapters of the *Āvassaya-sūya* is recounted in this connection (*sutta* No. 526).

104. The sixth, which is the last, variety of *uvakkama*, called *samoyāra*, expounds the relation of inclusion or subsumption. The inclusion of substances under themselves is called *āyasamoyāra*. The plums are contained in a plate through the relation called *parasamoyāra*. A pillar is included in itself as well as in a building as its part. Our Text (*sutta* No. 531-533) illustrates this kind of relation also with reference to *khetta* (geographical divisions) and *kāla* (divisions of time) and *bhāva* (states of the soul, viz. anger, pride, etc.).

105. The first door of disquisition, *viz uvakkama*, thus provides a very comprehensive background for the exposition of scripture. The other three doors have already been discussed (*vide supra*, 18-20).

106. My thanks are due to Mr. Taikena Hanaki who worked as a Research Scholar at the Institute for more than two years to finish this translation with immense industry and devotedness. We are also indebted to Muni Puṅyavijayaji for his critical edition of the *Aṅuoga-ddārāim*, on which the translation is based. The appendixes attached to the critical edition are exhaustive and can be consulted with great benefit for tracing the Prakrit equivalents of the English words used in the translation. We have also attached short indexes at the end of the translation, which may prove useful to the reader.

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Vaishali,
Mahavira Jayanti,
April 19, 1970.

NATHMAL TATIA

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Obeisance to Lord Mahāvīra Vardhamāna.

Obeisance to the Sthaviras, the possessors of the Disquisition.

AṆUOGADDĀRĀIM

(The Doors of Disquisition)

composed by Śrī Āryarakṣita Sthavira.

[Sutta 1 : Benediction]

1. (In Jainism), the knowledge is stated to be fivefold, viz. (a) perceptual cognition (*ābhiñibohiyaṇāṇa*), (b) scriptural knowledge (*suyaṇāṇa*), (c) clairvoyance (*ohiṇāṇa*), (d) telepathy (*maṇapajjayaṇāṇa*) and (e) omniscience or perfect knowledge (*kevalaṇāṇa*).

[Suttas 2-5 : Disquisition on Āvassaga proposed]

2. Of these varieties of knowledge, the four (viz. perceptual cognition, clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience) are to be left out, are worthy of being left out, are not ordered for study, are not prescribed for firm study, are not prescribed to be taught to others. (In the present), only the scriptural knowledge comes up to be ordered for study, to be prescribed for firm study, to be prescribed to be taught (to others) and to be subjected to disquisition (for others).

3. If the scriptural knowledge comes up to be ordered for study, to be prescribed for firm study, to be prescribed to be taught (to others) and to be subjected to disquisition (for others), does the scripture included in the Aṅgas (*aṅgapavittḥa*) come up to be ordered for study, to be prescribed for firm study, to be prescribed to be taught (to others) and to be subjected to disquisition (for others); or does the scripture that is outside the Aṅgas (*aṅgabāhira*) come up to be ordered for study, to be prescribed for firm study, to be prescribed to be taught (to others) and to be subjected to disquisition (for others)? The order for study and so on might relate to both—the scripture that is included in the Aṅgas and the scripture that is outside the Aṅgas (*aṅgabāhira*). But with reference to the present context, (what comes up is) the disquisition on what is outside the Aṅgas.

4. If there come up the order for study, etc., of the scripture that is outside the Aṅgas, do they, viz. the order for study, etc.,

refer to the scripture that is studied at a particular time of the day (*kāliya*, Skt. *kālika*)¹; or do they, viz. the order for study, etc., refer to the scripture that is not studied at a particular time of the day (*ukkāliya*, Skt. *utkālika*) ? The order for study, etc., might relate to both—the scripture that is studied at a particular time of the day and the scripture that is not studied at a particular time of the day. But with reference to the present context, (what comes up is) the order for study, etc., of the scripture that is not studied at a particular time of the day.

5. If the order for study, etc., refer to the scripture that is not studied at a particular time of the day, do they pertain to the order for study, etc., of the *Āvassaga* (Skt. *Āvaśyaka*); or do they relate to the scripture other than the *Āvassaga* (*āvassagavairitta*, Skt. *āvaśyakavyatirikta*) ? The order for study, etc., might relate to both—the *Āvassaga* and the scripture other than the *Āvassaga*. But with reference to the present context, (what comes up is) the disquisition on the *Āvassaga*.

[Suttas 6-8 : Subjection of the terms *Āvassaya* (sic), etc., to **nikkheva** proposed].

6. If the disquisition comes up of the *Āvassaya*, is the *Āvassaya* one *Aṅga* or many *Aṅgas* or one scriptural division (*suyakkhaṇḍha*) or many scriptural divisions or one chapter (*ajjhayaṇa*) or many chapters or one section (*uddesa*) or many sections ? The *Āvassaya* is neither one *Aṅga* nor many *Aṅgas*; it has one division and not many divisions; it has not one chapter but (it has) many chapters; it has neither one section nor many sections (because its chapters are not divided into sections).

7. I, shall, therefore, apply the *nikkheva* (*nikṣepa*) to *Āvassaya*, the scripture (*suya*), the division (*khaṇḍha*) and the chapter (*ajjhayaṇa*).

8. (On this, the verse runs):

One should fully apply to a subject, whatever *nikkhevas* are known about that subject. And to those (subjects) whose *nikkhevas* are not known, one should apply the four (viz. *nāma*, *thavaṇā*, *davva* and *bhāva*) ||1||

1. Usually '*kāliya*' means 'what is to be studied in the last quarter of the night and first quarter of the day'. But from the *Vavahārasutta*, X, 20, it appears that the suttas to study which a monk was required to be of definite standing in respect of the period of his monkhood were called '*kāliya*'.

[Suttas 9—29: Āvassaya subjected to nikkheva]

9. Now, what is the *Āvassaya*? The *Āvassaya* is stated to be fourfold, viz. (i) *Āvassaya* as name (*nāmāvassaya*), (ii) *Āvassaya* as arbitrary attribution (*thavaṇāvassaya*), (iii) *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (*davvāvassaya*), and (iv) *Āvassaya* as essence (*bhāvāvassaya*).

10. Now, what is the *Āvassaya* as name (*nāmāvassaya*)?¹ The *Āvassaya* as name stands for a living being (*jīva*), or a non-living thing (*ajīva*), or many living beings, or many non-living things, or a mixture of them, or many mixtures of them to whom the name *saṃkhā* is given. This is the *Āvassaya* as name.

11. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as arbitrary attribution (*thavaṇāvassaya*²)? The *Āvassaya* as arbitrary attribution is made indeed in (things) which are real-like or imaginary such as a wood-work, or a painted figure, or a doll made of cloth-pieces (*pothakamma*), or clay figures, or knotted dolls, or figures made by folding cloth-pieces, metal figures, garment made by joining many cloth-pieces, or the fossil³ of the two-sensed organism called *candanaka* (which is kept in front by Jaina monks as *sthāpanā-ācārya*), or a cowrie—taken for one or many *āvassayas*. This is the *Āvassaya* as arbitrary attribution.

12. What is the difference between the *Āvassaya* as name and *Āvassaya* as arbitrary attribution? The name is life-long but the arbitrary attribution can be temporary or life-long.

13. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (*davvāvassaya*⁴)? This (substance-potential) is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) (with reference to a person) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

1. The Commentary, p. 10 A, explains 'nāma' as follows :

yad vastuno 'bhidhānaṃ sthitamanyārthe tadarthanirapekṣam /
paryāyānabhidheyaṃ ca nāma yādṛechikaṃ ca tathā ||

2. The Commentary, p. 11 B, explains the word *thavaṇā* as follows :

yat tu tadarthaviyuktaṃ tadabhiprāyeṇa yac ca tatkarāṇi /
lepyādikarma tat sthāpaneti kriyate 'lpakālaṃ ca ||

3. Pkt. *akkha* Skt. *akṣa*. The Commentary, p. 12 A, explains it as '*candanaka*'. Cf. *Uttarādhyāyana*, xxxvi, 136.

4. The Commentary, p. 13 A, explains '*davva*' as follows :—

bhūtasya bhāvino vā bhāvasya hi kāraṇaṃ tu yal loke /
tad dravyaṃ tattvajñaiḥ sacetanācetanam kathitam ||

The Prakrit word for substance-potential is *davva* (Skt. *dravya*) which is explained as "what flows", that is, "what passes through different states". The abiding cause of past and future states is called *davva*. It is of two kinds—(1) sentient and (2) non-sentient.

14. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (with reference to a person) with scriptural knowledge? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (with reference to a person) with scriptural knowledge is concerned with a person by whom the *Āvassaya* treatise (literally, the expression *āvassaya*) has been studied (from beginning to end), retained (in mind), controlled¹, measured (as regards number of verses, words, syllables, etc.), controlled perfectly, is (as firmly known) as one's own name², pronounced (at the time of learning) with the same accent (as that of the teacher), with unimpaired syllable, without any added syllable, without any reversed syllable, without stumbling, without mixing up (of different *suttas*), without repeating by joining different *suttas* having a similar meaning³, perfect (in metre and meaning)⁴, perfect in accent, free (from indistinctness) at the throat and lips, and learnt from the instruction of the teacher (and not stolen from the book)⁵. Such a person is (*Āvassaya* as substance-potential by virtue of his scriptural knowledge) on account of his instruction, asking, repeated study, and religious discourses, and not on account of his pondering over (the meaning of the treatise). Why so? Because *davva* stands for absence of attention (that is, absence of thinking).

15 [1]. (Next, the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential is considered through the *nayas* or seven different standpoints, viz. *negama*, *saṅgaha*, *vavahāra*, *ujjusua*, *sadda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evaṃbhūta*). According to (the standpoint of) *negama* (which includes both genus and species), one person without attention (or active thinking of *Āvassaya*) is one *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge; two persons without attention (or active thinking of *Āvassaya*) are two *Āvassayas* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge; three persons without attention (or active thinking of *Āvassaya*) are three *Āvassayas* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge. Similarly there are as many *Āvassayas* as substance-potential with scriptural knowledge as there are persons without attention (or active thinking).

15 [2]. Similar is the case according to (the standpoint of) *vavahāra* (pragmatic standpoint) also.

15 [3]. According to (the standpoint of) *saṅgaha* (synthetic standpoint), one person without attention (or active thinking) being one *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge

1. *jitam*. *VBh.* (B), 851, explains it as 'what is recalled quickly'.
2. *nāmasamaṃ*. *VBh.* (B), 852: *jaha sikkhiyaṃ sanāmaṃ taha taṃ pi tahā ṭhiyāi nāmasamaṃ*.
3. For a different meaning, vide *VBh.* (B), 855.
4. Vide *VBh.* (B), 856.
5. *VBh.* (B), 857: *guruṃvāyaṇovayātaṃ na coriyaṃ potthayāo vā*.

or many persons without attention (or active thinking) being many *Āvassayas* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge are (synthesized into) one *Āvassaya* as substance-potential.

15 [4]. According to (the standpoint of) *ujjusua* (straight-forward standpoint), there is only one person without attention (or active thinking) being one *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge; this *naya* does not accept difference (of many *Āvassayas* as substance-potential as past, or future, or other than itself, as this *naya* is concerned only with the present moment, as also the particular thing).

15 [5]. According to the (standpoints of) the three *saddanayas* (verbal standpoints), a knower without attention (or active thinking) is unreal. Why so? (Because) if a person is knower, he cannot be without attention (or active thinking); again, if he is without thinking, he cannot be the knower. Therefore (according to this *naya*), there cannot be an *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge¹. This is *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

16. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower (of *Āvassaya*) (*jāṇagasariṭradavvāvassaya*), (ii) the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the person competent (to know the *Āvassaya* in future) (*bhaviyasariṭradavvāvassaya*), and (iii) the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person (*jāṇagasariṭrabhaviyasariṭra-vatirittam davvāvassayaṇ*).

17. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of the *Āvassaya* treatise—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded (from breath), has been made separate (from breath), and has left nourishment; (the body) abandoned by the soul. [The body of the knower of the *Āvassaya* is called *Āvassaya* because it was the cause of the past knowledge of the *Āvassaya*.

1. Here we have followed the reading given in footnote 4 on p. 62 of the *Mjv* edition.

It is without scriptural knowledge (*no-āgama*), because there is no such knowledge at the moment. But if it is devoid of the soul, how can it be the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, there being no possibility of knowledge at any time? And in that case any thing such as a piece of stone will also turn out to be the *Āvassaya*, because its material particles could be incorporated at some time in the body of the person knowing the *Āvassaya*. The answer is that the bodies of knowers of *Āvassaya* in the past in the following states are liable to arouse consciousness of the *Āvassaya* when looked at and hence they can be called *Āvassaya*] : a body which is lying on bed, on bed cover, on surface of stone-slab, occupied by emancipated souls (in the past), having seen which (viz. body) someone would say, "Ah ! by this body-conglomerate indeed the treatise named *Āvassaya* was properly understood (from the teacher), spoken (to the disciples), explained, shown (in practice), pointed out and propounded (through various *nayas* 'standpoints'), in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina". What is the example in point ? (In reply, it is said), 'This was a pot of honey', 'This was a pot of ghee'. This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

18. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person ? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth, and will study, living in this very body-conglomerate accepted (by him), in future time, in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina, but is not studying (at present) the treatise of the *Āvassaya*. What is the example in point ? (In reply, it is said) 'This will be a pot of honey', 'This will be a pot of ghee'. This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

(Here the pot which is meant to contain honey or ghee in future is popularly called honey-pot or ghee-pot, though it is empty at present. Similarly the body of the person who is destined to learn the *Āvassaya* in future is called *dravyāvaśyaka*, though the body is yet to become the ground of such learning, and is devoid of it at present though the person is competent to learn the *Āvassaya*).

19. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) worldly, (ii) belonging to perverse instruction and (iii) extra-worldly.

20. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is worldly ? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is worldly is (as

follows): The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential—viz. washing of mouth, cleaning of teeth, (rubbing of) oil, combing (of hair), (throwing of) mustard seeds and bent grass (on head), (looking into) the mirror, (burning of) incense (for perfuming clothes), (taking of) flowers and garlands, (use of) perfume (such as sandal-paste), (chewing of) betel-leaf, (putting on of) shawl, and so on—is performed by persons who are royal authorities (kings and princes), nobles, governors (of isolated places), family-heads, fabulously wealthy persons, traders, military generals, caravan leaders, etc.¹—in the next early morning at the rise of dawn (at the end) of a very clear night; in the morning which is grey and when there is soft opening of the blossomed lotuses and (the eyes of) deer; when the sun which awakens the mass of lotuses in the lotus-pond and is as red as the *Butea Frondosa* (*kimsuya*) flower which is like red *aśoka* flower, as the mouth of a parrot and as the (red) half of *guñjā* (seed of creeper); and when the sun, with a thousand rays, is burning in brilliance. After that, they go to the royal palace, temple, pleasure garden, park (for picnic, etc.), assembly or water shed (for supply of waters to travellers). This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is worldly. (This is the first variety of the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person).

21. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, belonging to perverse instruction? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential belonging to perverse instruction is (as follows): The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential—viz. smearing (the floor of the temple with dried cow-dung), act of sweeping, sprinkling (of water), (burning of) incense, (offering of) flowers, perfume (such as sandal-paste), garland and so on to (gods or goddesses such as) *Inda*, or *Khaṃda*, or *Rudda*, or *Siva*, or *Vesamaṇa*, or *Deva*, or *Nāga*, or *Jakkha*, or *Bhūya*, or *Mugumḍa*, or *Ajjā*, or *Kottakiriya*—is performed by those who are heretics (observing different *vratas* 'abstinence')²; viz.

- (1) *Caraga*— (those who carry *dhāṭi* while going about begging or go out while eating);
- (2) *Cīraga*— (those who put on the tattered clothes thrown on the carriage-road, or have paraphernalia made of tattered clothes only);
- (3) *Gammakhaṇḍiya*—(those who put on robes made of skin or keep paraphernalia made of skin);

1. For the meanings of these words, see *Uvāsagadaśāo*, 12, and *The Jinist Studies*, by Otto Stein (Jaina Sāhitya Saṃśodhaka Studies No. 3, Ahmedabad, 1948, p. 69 ff.). Vide infra, *sutta* No. 309.

2. See Amulyachandra Sen: *Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature* (Viśva-Bhāratī Studies, No. 3) Calcutta, 1931, pp. 39 ff.

- (4) *Bhicchumḍaga*—(those who take food only obtained by alms and never take cow's milk, etc., got by themselves; according to others, the word stands for Buddhist monks);
- (5) *Pamḍuraṅga*— (those who besmear their body with ashes);
- (6) *Gotama*— (those who receive grains as alms by means of displaying young bull which has got training in various kinds of falling to another's feet, etc., and is decorated with ornament such as necklace of cowries and the like);
- (7) *Govvatia*—(those who imitate cow's movement by going, standing or sitting with a cow and also eat grass, leaves, flowers, fruits and so on like the cow. Their purpose was to live like animals);
- (8) *Gihidhamma*—(those who live householder's life and say 'neither there was nor would there be a code as good as the householder's life (*āśrama*). The wise men follow it, but the impotent men resort to ascetic life');
- (9) *Dhammacimṭaga*—(those who follow the '*Dharmasaṃhitā*' written by saints like *Yājñavalkya* and others);
- (10) *Aviruddha*—(those who are obedient, being not opposed to gods, kings, mother, father, animals, and so on. They are *Vainayikas*);
- (11) *Viruddha*—(those who did not believe in merit, sin, next world, etc. They were *Akriyāvādins*);
- (12) *Vuḍḍha*—(old ascetics who were born beforehand at the time of the first *Tīrthāṅkara* and took ordination when they became old);
- (13) *Sāvaga*—(the *Brāhmaṇas* who were *Śrāvakas* in the beginning at the time of Bharata, and afterwards became *Brāhmaṇas*)¹;

in the next early morning at the rise of dawn...(exactly as described in *sutta* No. 20)...up to...burning in brilliance. This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, belonging to perverse instruction. (This is the second variety of *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person).

1. The Commentary, p. 23 A, gives another interpretation of *vuḍḍhasāvaga*, according to which the compound word stands for *Brāhmaṇas*. The word can be equated with the *Pāli* word *Buddha-sāvaka* meaning 'disciple of the Buddha'.

22. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is extra-worldly ? The *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is extra-worldly is (illustrated) by (persons who are) *yoigns* devoid of the qualifications¹ of (a genuine) ascetic, have no sympathy for the six kinds of beings (viz. earth, fire, water, wind, plants and moving beings), are as unrestrained as (untrained) horses, are not controlled by hook like (mad or wild) elephants, with massaged (thighs), (with hair and body) polished (with oil, water, etc.), with anointed lips, and (body) covered with grey (washed) garment, dwell (and move about) according to their whim without sanction of Jinas and perform the *Āvassaya* (necessasy religious duty) at the two times (morning and evening). This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, which is extra-worldly. (This is the third variety of *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person). This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *Āvassaya* as substance-potential.

23. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence (*bhāvāvassaya*)² ? The *Āvassaya* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

24. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence, with scriptural knowledge ? The *Āvassaya* as essence, with scriptural knowledge is the knower who is attentive (to that knowledge of *Āvassaya*). This is the *Āvassaya* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

25. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence, without scriptural knowledge ? The *Āvassaya* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz., (i) worldly, (ii) belonging to perverse instruction and (iii) extra-worldly.

26. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence, which is worldly ? The *Āvassaya* as essence, which is worldly, is (the study or hearing of the (*Mahā*) *bhūrata* in the forenoon and the *Rāmāyaṇa* in the afternoon. This is the *Āvassaya* as essence, which is worldly.

1. These qualifications are of two kinds, viz. fundamental (*mūla*) and secondary (*uttara*). The former includes cessation from injury to living beings, etc., and the latter stands for acceptance of pure (prescribed) food, etc.

2. The Commentary, p. 25 A, explains '*bhāva*' as :—
bhāvo vivakṣitakriyānubhūtiyukto hi vai samākhyātaḥ /
sarvajñair indrādivad ihendanakriyānubhavāt //

The *bhāva* stands for the actual exercise of activity connoted by the root of the word sought to be explained.

27. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence, belonging to perverse instruction? The *Āvassaya* as essence, belonging to perverse instruction, relates to those who are heretics (observing different *vratas*) viz. *Caraga*, *Ciraga* upto *Sāvaga* (exactly as described in *sutta* No. 21) performing the *Āvassayas* as essence, by means of clasped hands for the sake of sacrifice, oblation (to fire), recitation (of *mantras*), making sound by the mouth (imitating the bull, etc, at the time of worshipping the deity), bowing down, and so on. This is the *Āvassaya* as essence, belonging to perverse instruction.

28. Then what is the *Āvassaya* as essence, which is extra-worldly? The *Āvassaya* as essence, which is extra-worldly, refers to those who are monks, or nuns, or lay men, or lay women whose consciousness is fixed on that (*Āvassaya*), whose mind is fixed on that (*Āvassaya*), whose colour index is according to that (*Āvassaya*), whose determination is fixed on that (*Āvassaya*), whose intense exertion is directed to that (*Āvassaya*), who are attentive to the meaning of that (*Āvassaya*), whose paraphernalia (body, duster, mouth-cloth, etc.) are employed for (the sake of) that (*Āvassaya*), who are practised in concentration (of mind) on that (*Āvassaya*), without diverting their mind to anything else—performing the *Āvassaya* both times (at sunrise and sunset). This is the *Āvassaya* as essence, which is extra-worldly. This is the *Āvassaya* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *Āvassaya* as essence.

29. Of that (*Āvassaya*), these are the synonymous names composed of different accented vowels and different consonants, as (mentioned in the following verses) :—

- (i) what is obligatory (being daily religious duties), *āvassayaṃ*;
- (ii) what must be done, *avassakaraṇijjam*;
- (iii) what restrains the moral activity or its resultant, viz. the world, *dhuvaniggaho*¹;
- (iv) purification, *visohi*;
- (v) the section of six chapters, *ajjhayaṇa-chakka-vaggo*²;
- (vi) the right path, *nāo*;
- (vii) practice (for the sake of salvation) *ārāhaṇā*; and
- (viii) the way (to salvation), *maggo* //2//

As this is to be performed as obligatory duty during day and night by the monk and lay man, this is named *Āvassaya* (literally obligatory duty) //3//

This is that *Āvassaya*.

1. Sometimes *dhuva* (eternal doctrine) and *niggaha* (self-restraint) are regarded as two separate synonyms. —*Bṛhadvṛtti* on *VBh* (B), 876.

2. Sometimes *ajjhayaṇa-chakka* and *vagga* are considered as separate synonyms. —*Ibid*.

[Suttas 30-51; Suya subjected to nikkheva]

30. Then what is the *suya* (scripture)? The *suya* or scripture is stated to be fourfold, viz. (i) scripture as name, (ii) scripture as arbitrary attribution, (iii) scripture as substance-potential and (iv) scripture as essence.

31. Then what is the scripture as name? The scripture as name stands for a living being, living beings, ... (as described in *sutta* No. 10). This is scripture as name.

32. Then what is scripture as arbitrary attribution? The scripture as arbitrary attribution is made about (things which are real-like or imaginary such as) wood-work, ... up to ... taken for one or many scripture (as described in *sutta* No 11).

33. What is the difference between scripture as name and scripture as arbitrary attribution? The scripture as name is life-long but the scripture as arbitrary attribution can be temporary or life-long.

34. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential? The scripture as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

35. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge? The scripture as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned (with a person by whom) the treatise named 'scripture' has been studied, retained (in mind), controlled, (as described in *sutta* No. 14), and not on account of his pondering over (the meaning of the treatise). Why so? Because *dava* stands for absence of attention (active thinking).

(Here the issue is considered through the *nayas* or standpoints). According to (the standpoint of) *negama*, a person without attention (or active thinking of scripture) is one scripture as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge... (as described in *sutta* No. 15). According to the (standpoints of) the three *saddanayas* a knower without attention (or active thinking) is unreal. Why so? Because if a person is knower, he cannot be without attention (or active thinking). Again if he is without attention, he cannot be the knower. According to these *nayas*, therefore there cannot be scripture as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.¹

This is the scripture as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

36. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge? The scripture as substance-potential, without

1. Here we have followed the reading given in footnote 3 on p. 66 of the *MJV* edition.

scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower, (ii) the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person, and (iii) the scripture as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

37. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower ? The scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of the treatise named 'scripture', a body which is devoid (of the consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), seceded (from breath,...as described in *sutta* No. 17), having seen which, some one could say, "Ah ! by this body-conglomerate indeed the treatise named 'scripture' was properly understood...(as described in *sutta* No. 17)...in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina" ...'This was a pot of ghee'. This is the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

38. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person ? The scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth,...(as described in *sutta* No. 18)...will study in future time, the treatise named 'scripture', in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina...(as described in *sutta* No. 18)...'This will be a pot of ghee'. This is the scripture as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

39. Then what is the scripture as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? The scripture as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is a document written on leaf (palm leaf, etc.) or in books (*pothaya*¹ which also means cloth, plaster, etc.).

40. Or the scripture (*sutta*) (as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person) is stated to be fivefold, viz.² (i) produced from egg (*aṃḍaya*), (ii) produced

1. See *sutta* No. 11.

2. Here *sutta* is interpreted as *sūtra* 'thread'. The Commentary, p. 31 A, explains this irrelevant digression as due to the peculiarity of the Prakrit language in which *suya* may mean both *śruta* and *sūtra*. The widening of the horizon of the disciple's knowledge is also given as the reason for such diversions.

from hemp (*boṃḍaya*¹), (iii) produced from insects (*kīḍaya*), (iv) produced from hair (*vālaya*), and (v) produced from bark (*vakkaya*).

41. Then what is (the example of thread) produced from egg? (The reply is: the thread) produced from egg is the womb (egg) of the *haṃsa*², etc. This is what is produced from egg.

42. Then what is (the example of thread) produced from hemp? (The reply is: the thread) produced from hemp is (thread) made from cotton, etc. This is what is produced from hemp.

43. Then what is (the example of thread) produced from insects? (The reply is: the thread) produced from insects is stated to be fivefold, viz. (i) (thread of) silk, (ii) (thread of silk produced in) *Malaya* (Western Ghats), (iii) (thread of another kind of silk called) *aṃsua*, (iv) (the same thread of silk called) *aṃsua* made in *Cīna* (China), and (v) (the thread of silk produced from) red (saliva, vomitted) by insects. This is what is produced from insects.

44. Then what is (the example of thread) produced from hair? (The reply is: the thread) produced from hair is stated to be fivefold, viz. (i) cobweb thread, (ii) (thread made) of camel hair, (iii) thread made of deer hair, (iv) (thread made) of mouse hair, and (v) (thread made of) fine residual fragments of various kinds of hair. This is what is produced from hair.

45. Then what is (the example of thread) (produced) from bark? (The reply is: the thread) produced from bark is (thread of) hemp³, etc. This is what is produced from bark. This is the scripture as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is the scripture as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the scripture as substance-potential.

46. Then what is the scripture as essence? The scripture as essence is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

47. Then what is the scripture as essence, with scriptural knowledge? The scripture as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower who is attentive (to that knowledge of the scripture). This is the scripture as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

1. The word *boṃḍa* is *Deśī*, which means 'nipple'. See *Deśīnāmamālā* of Hemacandra, ed. by R. Pischel, Bombay Sanskrit Series No. xvii, 1938, Glossary p. 65.

2. According to the Commentary, p. 31 A, the *haṃsa* is of two kinds, (i) a kind of four-sensed worm and (ii) the five-sensed *haṃsa* (= swan).

3. Prakrit *sāṇamāṣī* has another variant *atasīmādī*, *atasī* meaning linseed.

48. Then what is the scripture as essence, without scriptural knowledge? The scripture as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) worldly and (ii) extra-worldly.

49. Then what is the scripture as essence, which is worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge)? The scripture as essence, which is worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge) is what is ideated through whimsical intellect (*buddhi*) and thought (*matī*)¹, by those who are ignorant and have perverse belief. (Such ideation is exemplified in books) such as (*Mahā-*)*bhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Āmbhīya*²..., *Māsuraśakṣa*³..., *Koṭillaya* (*Kauṭilya*), *Ghoḍamuha* (*Ghoṭakamukha*)⁴, *Sagabhaddiyā* (? *Śakataḥhadrikā*), *Kappūsiya* (? *Karpasika* ? *Kalpasūra*), *Nāgasuhuma* (? *Nāgasūkṣma*, ? *Nyāyasūkṣma*, subtle logic), *Kaṇagasattarī* (*Kaṇakasaptatī*, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*), *Vaisesiya* (*Vaiśeṣika*), *Buddhavayaṇa* (*Buddhavacana*), *Vesīya* (*Vaiśika*, concerning prostitutes), *Kavīla* (*Kāpīla*), *Loyāyaya* (*Lokāyata*), *Satthitamta* (*Śaṣṭitantra*, a lost *Śāṃkhya* work), *Mādhara* (*Mādhara*, probably *Sāṃkhyanāśaka Mādhava* referred to in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 569), *Purāṇa*, *Vāgarāṇa* (*Vyākaraṇa*), *Nāḍaga* (*Nāṭaka*), and so on, or seventy-two arts (*kalā* which literally means 'the discriminative knowledge' of the seventy-two arts which are described in the treatises like the *Samavāyaṅga*), the four *Vedas* with their auxiliaries (*aṅgas* which are six in number)⁴ and sub-auxiliaries (*uvamgas* which are commentaries on these).

This is the scripture as essence, which is worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge).

50. Then what is the scripture as essence, which is extra-worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge)? The scripture as essence, which is extra-worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge) is the basket (of books) of *Gaṇadhara*s (*gaṇipīṭaka*)⁵ (which consists) of twelve

1. The Commentary, pp. 32 B & 33 A, explains *buddhi* as *ihā* and *avagraha* and *matī* as *apūya* and *dhāraṇā*. For meanings of *ihā*, etc., see *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* by Nathmal Tatia, Banaras, 1951, p. 30ff.
- 2....2. The text reads *haṇ bhīmāsurokkaṇ* which has been emended as *āmbhīyaṃ māsurakkham*. The *Āmbhīyas* are referred to by Kauṭilya in his *Arthaśāstra* and the reconstructed text of *Masurākṣa's Daṇḍanīti* has been published from Santiniketan.
3. *Ghoṭakamukha* was the author of the *Kaṇvāsamprayukta* section of the science of erotics (*Kāmaśāstra*, I. 1.12).
4. *Aṅga* means six limbs of the Vedas, viz. (i) *sikṣā*, (ii) *kalpa*, (iii) *vyākaraṇa*, (iv) *chandas*, (v) *nirukta* and (vi) *jyotiṣa*.
5. The Commentary, p. 34 A, explains *gaṇī* as *ācārya*.

Aṃgas which are exposed by those who are the Arhats, the lords, holders of knowledge and intuition which have originated (in them)¹, who are knowers of the past, present and future, are omniscient, all-seeing, are visited, extolled and worshipped (with flowers, etc.) in the three worlds, and are the holders of uninterrupted and excellent knowledge and intuition, viz. (1) *Āyāra*, (2) *Sūyagaḍa*, (3) *Thāṇa*, (4) *Sama-vāa*, (5) *Viyāhapaṇṇatti*, (6) *Ñāyādhammakahāo*, (7) *Uvāsagadasāo*, (8) *Aṇṭtagaḍasāo*, (9) *Aṇṭtarovavāiadasāo*, (10) *Paṇhavāgaranāiṃ*, (11) *Vivāgasuya* and (12) *Diṭṭhivāa*.

This is the scripture as essence, which is extra-worldly, (as also without scriptural knowledge). This is the scripture as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is the scripture as essence.

51. Of that (*suya*), these are the synonymous names composed of different accented vowels and different consonants, as (mentioned in the following verse):

(1) *suya* (*śruta*, what is learnt by hearing from the teacher), (ii) *sutta* (*sūtra*, the indicator of meaning), (iii) *gaṃṭha* (*grantha*, collection of scattered meanings), (iv) *siddhaṃṭa* (which leads to the established truth), (v) *sāsana* (instruction), (vi) *āṇa* (*ājñā*, command of the Jinās), (vii) *vayaṇa* (*vacana*, sermon), (viii) *uvadesa* (*upadeśa*, precept), (ix) *paṇṇavaṇa* (*prajñāpāna*, communication), and (x) *āgama* (words of a reliable authority)—these are the synonyms of *sutta*, having the same meaning //4// This is the scripture.

[Suttas 52-72 : Khamdha subjected to nikkheva]

52. Then what is the *khamdha* (division) ? The *khamdha* is stated to be fourfold, viz. (i) *khamdha* as name. (ii) *khamdha* as arbitrary attribution, (iii) *khamdha* as substance-potential, and (iv) *khamdha* as essence.

53-55. [The *khamdha* as name and arbitrary attribution are to be spoken of here according to the order already mentioned previously in *sutta* No. 10, 11 and 12 in connection with *Āvassaya*].

56. Then what is the *khamdha* as substance-potential ? The *khamdha* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

1. The idea is that the Jinās do not have omniscience without beginning. They became omniscient as the result of spiritual efforts. The Jaina philosophers reject the concept of God as eternally free and omniscient.

57-61. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge? The *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned with a person by whom the *khaṃdha* treatise has been studied, the rest being the same as spoken of in the case of *Āvassaya* as substance-potential only substituting (the word) *khaṃdha* (for *Āvassaya*)...up to...Then what is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential other than body of the knower and the body of the competent person (as in *sutta* No. 14-19) ? The *khaṃdha* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) sentient, (ii) non-sentient, and (iii) (sentient and non-sentient) mixed together.

62. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential which is sentient ? The *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is sentient is stated to be manifold, viz. the horse-conglomerate¹, the elephant-conglomerate, the *kinnara*-conglomerate (*kinnara* is mythical being with human figure and a head of horse or with a horse's body and the head of a man), the *kimpurisa*-conglomerate (*kimpurisa* is mongrel being or evil being similar to men), the *mahoraga*-conglomerate (big serpent), the *gaṃdhavva*-conglomerate (demigod or celestial musician) and the *usabha* (bull)-conglomerate².

This is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is sentient.

63. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is non-sentient ? The *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is non-sentient is stated to be manifold, viz. (a material body) consisting of two space-points (*du-paesi*)³, (a material body) consisting of three space-points, ...up to (a material body) consisting of ten space-points, (a material body) consisting of numberable space-points, (a material body) consisting of innumerable space-points, (material body) consisting of infinite number of space-points.

This is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is non-sentient.

64. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, which is a mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) ? The *khaṃdha* as

1. That is, the soul which has taken the shape of a horse. As the soul has extension in space, it is conceived as a *skandha* composed of innumerable space-points.
2. The *MJV* edition and the Commentary, p. 35 B, does not include the word *gaṃdhavvakhaṃdha* in the text. The Commentary says that sometimes *gandharvaskandha* and the like are included in the text. It also adds: *Pasūpasaya-vihaga-vānarakhaṃdheti kvacid dṛśyate*, that is in some versionst he conglomerates of goat, spotted antelope, bird and monkey are found.
3. The word *paesa* (Skt. *pradeśa*) means a space-point occupied by an atom,

substance-potential, which is a mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) is stated to be manifold, viz. the vanguard troop (*khamḍha*) of an army (composed of elephants, horses, chariots, infantry and various weapons), the intermediate troop of any army, and the rear troop of an army. This is the *khamḍha* as substance-potential, which is a mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient).

65. Or, the *khamḍha* as substance-potential other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person, is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) complete *khamḍha*, (ii) incomplete *khamḍha*, and (iii) *khamḍha* composed of many substances.

66. Then what is a complete *khamḍha*? The complete *khamḍha* is (the same as described in *sutta* No 62, viz.) the horse-conglomerate, the elephant-conglomerate,...up to bull-conglomerate.

This is the complete *khamḍha*¹.

67. Then what is an incomplete *khamḍa*? An incomplete *khamḍha* is the *khamḍha* of material body consisting of two space-points and so on, ... (as described in *sutta* No 63)..., or a material body consisting of infinite number of space-points.

This is the incomplete *khamḍha*².

68. Then what is *khamḍha* composed of many substances? A *khamḍha* composed of many substances is what is devoid (of sentience) in part (that is, nail, tooth, hair, etc.) or is full (of sentience) in part (that is, back, belly, leg, etc.).

1. According to the present Commentary, p. 37A, the *sacittakhamḍha* (vide *sutta* No. 62) stands for the pure soul, but the *kṛtsnaskandha* stands for soul and body together. Taking the word '*kṛtsna*' as meaning *absolutely* full and complete, the commentator discusses the different volumes of the bodies of a horse and an elephant. He asserts that as the number of *pradeśas* in the soul of a horse is equal to the number of *pradeśas* in the soul of an elephant, both the horse and elephant are *kṛtsna*, and as such there is no relative difference of magnitude. The *pradeśas* of their bodies also make no difference, because the total of the *jīva-pradeśas* and *pudgalapradeśas* is always the same in each case. Our Commentary, here refers to another view in which the word '*sacitta*' is taken to mean 'the soul and body together', the '*kṛtsna*' to mean only soul, which is a complete and indivisible entity. This explanation is rejected by our commentator as uncalled for. But to us, that appears to be more cogent because the word '*sacitta*', on the face of it, implies the body and soul together. Moreover the word '*kṛtsna*' gives an impression of an entity which is a complete and indivisible whole — a characteristic which is satisfied by the soul-substance.

2. This *sutta* means that a material body consisting of two space-points, for instance, is incomplete compared with a material body consisting of three space-points, and so on.

This is the *khaṃdha* composed of many substances. This is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *khaṃdha* as substance-potential.

69. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as essence? The *khaṃdha* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

70. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as essence, with scriptural knowledge? The *khaṃdha* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower who is attentive (to that meaning of '*khaṃdha*'). This is the *khaṃdha* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

71. Then what is the *khaṃdha* as essence, without scriptural knowledge? The *khaṃdha* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is obtained by the (correlated) unity of the collection of the sum of the six chapters, viz. *Sāmāia*, etc.—(which is called the *Āvassagasuyakhaṃdha*, (i. e.) *bhāvakhaṃdha*).

This is the *khaṃdha* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *khaṃdha* as essence.

72. Of that, these are the synonymous names composed of different accented vowels and different consonants as (mentioned in the following verse) :

gaṇa (group or tribe), *kāya* (body), *nikāya* (class), *khaṃdha* (aggregate), *vagga* (company), *rāsi* (heap) and *puṃja* (mass), *piṃḍa* (clod) and *niyara* (collection); *saṃghāya* (close union), *ākula* (congregation) and *samūha* (gathering)—these are the synonyms of *bhāvakhaṃdha* ||5||

This is the *khaṃdha*.

[Sutta 73: The topics of the Āvassaga]

73. Of the *Āvassaga*, these are the topics (as mentioned in the following verse):

(i) *sāvajja-joga-virati*—abstinence from (all) blameworthy actions (such as killing of living beings etc., which are included in the first chapter called '*Sāmāiya*');

(ii) *ukkittana*—praising (of the twenty-four *Tīrthamkaras*, in the second chapter called '*Cauvīsattava*'); and

(iii) *guṇavao paḍivatti*—offering of homage to the venerable (in the third chapter called '*Vaṃḍaṇaya*');

(iv) *khaliassa niṃḍaṇā*—deprecation of transgressions (in the fourth chapter called '*Paḍikkamaṇa*');

(v) *vaṇatigicchā*—healing of sores (in the fifth chapter called ‘*Kāussagga*’); and

(vi) *guṇadhāraṇā*—cultivation of good virtues (in the sixth chapter called ‘*Paccakkhāna*’) //6//

[Sutta 74 : The chapters of the Āvassaga]

74. (Verse): This is the condensed meaning of the *Āvassaga*, stated in brief. Henceforward, I shall, again, enumerate the chapters one by one //7// Thus,

- | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. <i>Sāmāya</i> , | 2. <i>Cauṇṣatthava</i> , | 3. <i>Vaṇḍaṇaya</i> |
| 4. <i>Padikkamaṇa</i> , | 5. <i>Kāussagga</i> , | 6. <i>Paccakkhāna</i> . |

[Sutta 75 : Enumeration of the names of the Doors of Disquisition]

75. There, the first chapter is (called) *Sāmāya*. (And) it has these four doors of disquisition (*aṇuogaddāra*), viz.

1. *uvakkama* (introduction by collecting together materials from distance and arranging them in order to make the *nikkheva* of the topic possible; initial study; world view);
2. *nikkheva* (assignment by name, arbitrary attribution, and so on);
3. *aṇugama* (exposition in accordance with the context);
4. *ṇaya* (partial exposition of particular aspects from relevant standpoints).

[Suttas 76-91: The Door of Disquisition called Uvakkama]

76. Then what is the *uvakkama*? The *uvakkama* is stated to be sixfold, viz.

- (i) *uvakkama* as name,
- (ii) *uvakkama* as arbitrary attribution,
- (iii) *uvakkama* as substance-potential,
- (iv) *uvakkama* of land,
- (v) *uvakkama* of time,
- (vi) *uvakkama* as essence.

77. The name and arbitrary attribution are already explained (in *sutta* No. 10 and 11 in connection with *Āvassaya*).

78. Then what is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential? The *uvakkama* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge and (ii) without scriptural knowledge...up to

then what is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential other than body of the knower and the competent person ? The *uvakkama* as substance-potential other than body of the knower and the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz. (i) sentient, (ii) non-sentient, and (iii) (sentient and non-sentient) mixed together.

79. Then what is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, which pertains to sentient (object) ? The *uvakkama* as substance-potential, which pertains to sentient (object), is stated to be threefold, viz.

(i) pertaining to biped beings (as dancer, singer, etc.);
 (ii) pertaining to quadruped beings (as horse, elephant, etc.); and
 (iii) pertaining to beings without foot (as mango tree, etc.);
 each of which is, again, stated to be twofold, viz.

(a) in embellishment (*parikamma*, by producing special qualities in the thing),

(b) in destruction of the thing.

80. Then what is the *uvakkama* pertaining to biped beings ? (The *uvakkama*) pertaining to biped beings relates to such biped beings as actors, dancers, rope dancers, wrestlers, boxers, jokers, story tellers, jumpers or swimmers, singers (playing *rāsa*), fortune-tellers, acrobats, mendicants (who get alms by showing picture, etc., in hand), (beggars who play on) the musical instrument known as *tūṇa*, lute players, (beggars who carry) baggages slung at the end of a wooden pole (*kāya*), and bards.

This is the *uvakkama* pertaining to biped beings.¹

81. Then what is the *uvakkama* pertaining to quadruped beings ? (The *uvakkama*) pertaining to quadruped beings (refers to that) of horses, elephants, and so on.

This is the *uvakkama* pertaining to quadruped beings.²

1. A very interesting feature of *upakrama*, the first door of explanation, should be noticed here in connection with *dravyopakrama*. The Commentary, p. 41 A-B, explains *dravyopakrama* as *dravyasya upakramaṇam*, for instance, the embellishment of an actor or dancer (which is a *dravya*) by special ways and means such as ghee and the like, in order to make them fit for their profession. Such embellishment is a kind of *parikarma*. The destruction of a thing (*vastuvināsa*) is also given as a kind of *dravyopakrama*. The *dravyopakrama* as described in the *sutta* No. 79 is to be understood in these two senses, viz. *parikarma* (that is, embellishment, decoration or nourishment of a person or a thing) and *vastuvināsa* (that is, destruction of a person or a thing).

2. The *uvakkama* of quadruped animals stands for their special training or their destruction by means of weapons.

82. Then what is the *uvakkama* pertaining to beings without foot ? (The *uvakkama*) pertaining to beings without foot (refers to that) of mango fruit or tree, hog-plum and so on.

This is the *uvakkama* pertaining to beings without foot.¹

This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential which pertains to sentient (objects).

83. Then what is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of what is non-sentient ? The *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of what is non-sentient is (illustrated by *parikamma*) of sugar, etc., of molasses, etc., of sugar candy, etc.

This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of what is non-sentient².

84. Then what is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of (the sentient and the non-sentient) mixed together ? The *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of (the sentient and the non-sentient) mixed together is (illustrated by) the same horse etc. (mentioned in *sutta* No. 81) decorated with *thāsaga* (bubble-shaped ornament), necklace of bulls, and so on.

This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, of (the sentient and the non-sentient) mixed together. This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, other than body of the knower and the competent person. This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *uvakkama* as substance-potential.

85. Then what is the *uvakkama* of land ? The *uvakkama* of land consists in making the land fit (to sow seeds) by plough and light stick (to cut grasses), and so on.

This is the *uvakkama* of land³.

86. Then what is the *uvakkama* of time ? The *uvakkama* of time is the ascertainment of the hour (of the day) done by means of tubular vessel and the like.

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1. Here *parikamma* consists in creating a special quality in them, so that those trees could age, or those fruits ripen prematurely. The act of cutting them in order to destroy them is also included in the *uvakkama* of trees and fruits.
 2. Here *parikamma* consists in creating special qualities of sweetness, etc., in material such as sugar, etc. The *vattuvināsa* consists in their destruction.
 3. *Khetta* generally means 'agricultural field'. The *uvakkama* as embellishment of such field is effected by cultivating it by means of plough before sowing seeds. Another aspect of *uvakkama* is *vattuvināsa*, which is done by keeping elephants in the field, the excreta of elephants being considered harmful to the fertility of the soil.

This is the *uvakkama* of time.¹

87. Then what is the *uvakkama* as essence ? The *uvakkama* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

88. (Then what is) the *uvakkama* as essence, with scriptural knowledge ? The *uvakkama* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower (of the meaning of the word *uvakkama*) who is consciously attentive (to the word *uvakkama*). (This is the *uvakkama* as essence, with scriptural knowledge).

89. (Then what is) the *uvakkama* as essence, without scriptural knowledge ? The *uvakkama* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be twofold, viz. (a) meritorious (*pasattha*); and (b) non-meritorious (*apasattha*).

90. (Then what is) the *uvakkama* as essence, (without scriptural knowledge), which is non-meritorious ? (The *uvakkama* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, which is non-meritorious is illustrated in the stories) of a *Brāhmaṇī*² (wife of *brāhmaṇa*), a prostitute, a minister, and so on (who ascertained the predilections or intentions of the son-in-law, the princely paramours, and the like, by their activities). (This is the *uvakkama* as essence which is non-meritorious).

91. (Then what is) the *uvakkama* as essence, (without scriptural knowledge), which is meritorious ? The *uvakkama* as essence, (without scriptural knowledge), which is meritorious, is (illustrated in case of disciples, etc., ascertaining the wishes) of the teacher, etc. (This is the *uvakkama* as essence which is meritorious. This is the *uvakkama* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This the *uvakkama* as essence.³

1. Here *parikamma* aspect of *uvakkama* means the determination or measure of time by means of a metal tube or pivot shadow or movement of stars at night. The *vatthuvinūsa* aspect of *uvakkama* in this case, is exemplified by occasional natural catastrophe on account of stellar movement.
2. For Prakrit word, *ḍoḍiṇi*, there is no equivalent Sanskrit word. We depend on the Commentary, p, 44 B.
3. While explaining *ṇo-āgamato bhāvovakkama*, the Commentary, pp. 44 B-46 A, says that the word '*bhāva*' here means '*abhi-prāya*', that is, the intention, liking, or predilection, and '*uvakkama*' means *upakramaṇa*, that is, correct knowledge. The correct knowledge is '*praśasta*', that is, meritorious, when it leads to spiritual elevation. It is *apraśasta*, that is, non-meritorious when it further the worldly end. The Commentary here raises a pertinent question. The *bhāvovakkama* serves a useful purpose by conferring an advantage—may it be worldly or spiritual—no such purpose is served by the *uvakkama* as *nāma*, *ṭhavaṇṇō*, *davva*, etc. In reply, it is asserted that the disciple should know many things in order to efficiently serve his teacher or the order of monks of which he is a member. His knowledge about food, drink, robe, utensils, medicine, agriculture, astronomy and so on is useful. The scripture should

[Suttas 92-533 : Another view of the Door of Disquisition called uvakkama]

92. Or, the *uvakkama* is stated to be sixfold, viz.

- (i) *āṇupuvvī* (serial);
- (ii) *nāma* (name);
- (iii) *paṃāṇa* (standard);
- (iv) *vattavayā* (precept);
- (v) *atthāhigāra* (purview of the topics);
- (vi) *samoyāra* (compatible inclusion).¹

[Suttas 93-207 : The door of āṇupuvvī—a variety of the Door of Disquisition called uvakkama]

93. Then what is the serial (*āṇupuvvī*)? The serial is stated to be tenfold, viz.

- (i) the serial as name (*nāṃāṇupuvvī*);
- (ii) the serial as arbitrary attribution (*thavaṇāṇupuvvī*);
- (iii) the serial as substance-potential (*davvāṇupuvvī*);
- (iv) the serial of space-parts (*khettāṇupuvvī*);
- (v) the serial of time (*kālāṇupuvvī*);
- (vi) the serial of proclamation (*ukkittāṇupuvvī*);
- (vii) the serial of counting (*gaṇāṇupuvvī*);
- (viii) the serial of configuration (*saṃthānāṇupuvvī*);
- (ix) the serial of the correct behaviour of monks (*sāmāyāriyāṇupuvvī*);
- (x) the serial of states or modes (*bhāvāṇupuvvī*).

94-95.² The (serial as) name and arbitrary attribution have been explained (in *sutta* No. 10 and 11).

provide an opportunity to the disciple to learn these subjects during the courses of studies he was required to undertake during his career as student and teacher. This appears to be the reason why the Jaina philosophers explain, under *nikṣepa* and *naya*, all possible questions relating to subjects which sometimes appear to be irrelevant and remotely connected with the subjects in point. Sometimes subjects are discussed in order to maintain symmetry of treatment, for instance, *nāmovakkama* and *thavanovakkama* are explained, even though they are not useful in the present context. The Commentary indeed concedes that the whole discussion of *uvakkama*, made so far, is not useful, though asserting that it would be of use in other contexts. The Commentary now introduces the fresh discussion of *uvakkama* which it characterizes as scholastic as distinguished from the foregoing discussion which is only popular according to it.

1. For 'Compatible inclusion', we shall sometimes use simply 'compatible' and sometimes simply 'inclusion' the implication being the same in both cases, the difference being only on emphasis.
2. The passage that follows is according to the footnote 3 on p. 75 of MJV edition:

Then what is the serial as substance-potential ? The serial as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz. (i) with scriptural knowledge, and (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

Then what is the serial as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge ? The serial as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned with a person by whom the treatise (dealing with) 'serial' has been studied (from beginning to end), retained (in mind), controlled, measured, controlled perfectly...(as described in *sutta* No. 14), and not no account of his thinking (of the meaning of the treatise). Why is it so ? Because *davva* stands for the absence of attention.

(Now the issue is considered through the *nayas* or standpoints.) According to (the standpoint of) *negama*, a person without attention (or active thinking of serial) is one serial as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge...(as described in *sutta* No. 15). (According to the standpoints of the three *saddanayas*), a knower without attention is unreal. Why is it so ? Because if a person is knower, he cannot be without attention. Again, if he is without attention, he cannot be the knower. Therefore there cannot be the serial as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

This is the serial as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

Then what is the serial as substance potential, without scriptural knowledge ? The serial as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower,
- (ii) the serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person,
- (iii) the serial as substance-potential, other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

Then what is the serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower ? (The serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is) such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of the treatise '*āṇupuvvī*'—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded from breath), has been made separate (from breath), and has left nourishment; the rest is to be spoken of as in the case of *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (in *sutta* No 17),...This is the serial as substance-potential (namely) the body of the knower.

Then what is the serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person ? The serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth (will study);...The rest is as in the case of *Āvassaya* as substance-potential (in *sutta* No 18)...

This is the serial as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

Then what is the serial as substance-potential, other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? The serial as substance-potential, other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person, is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) (the serial which is) arranged (traditionally),
- (b) (the serial which is) not-arranged (traditionally)¹.

96. Of them, what is (traditionally) arranged serial is to be postponed (for discussion afterwards *sutta* No.131, because it is to be discussed only briefly).

97. Between them what is not-arranged (traditionally) is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) according to the standpoints of *negama* and *vavahāra*, and
- (ii) according to the standpoint of *saṅgaha*.²

98. Then what is the not-arranged serial as substance-potential, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* ? The not-arranged serial as substance-potential, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word (*saṃjñin* and *saṃjñā*),

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1. The words are 'uvaṇihiyā' (Skt. *aupanidhikī*) and 'aṇovāṇihiyā' (Skt. *anaupanidhikī*). *Aupanidhikī* means a serial arranged according to some principle, that is, systematically or traditionally (translated as *arranged*), the opposite of *aupanidhikī* is *anaupanidhikī* (translated as *not-arranged*).
 2. Though there are seven *nayas* in all, the present discussion is confined to only three *nayas*—*negama*, *vavahāra* and *saṅgaha* divided into two groups, the first group comprising the first two *nayas*, and the second comprising the *saṅgaha naya*. Of the seven *nayas*, the *negama*, *vavahāra* and *saṅgaha* are called *dravyāstika nayas* because they take note of only the substance aspect of reality, and the other four are mainly concerned with the transitory or phenomenal phases of it. Now as the present text is concerned with *dravya-upakrama*, it is but proper that the problem should be discussed from the standpoints which are *dravyāstika*. Among the *dravyāstika-nayas*, again, the *negama* and *vavahāra* are *aviśuddha* and *saṅgaha* is *viśuddha*. And this justifies the above mentioned grouping of *negama* and *vavahāra* together in one group and *saṅgaha* in another.

- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors (vide *sutta* No. 105) of exposition).

99. Then what is the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The enunciation of meaning and word, according to (the standpoint of *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

A serial triad (body composed of three space-points), a serial tetrad (body composed of four space-points),... (up to) a serial decad (body composed of ten space-points), a serial body composed of numera-ble space-points, a serial myriad (body composed of innumerable space-points, a serial body composed of infinite space-points (one single) material atom which is a non-serial and a duad (body composed of two space-points) which is unspeakability (as serial or non-serial)¹; many serial triads,... (up to) many serials (each) composed of infinite space-points, many non-serials (each) consisting of (one single) material atom, and many unspeakabilities (each) consisting of a duad.

This is the enunciation of meaning and word, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

100. What is the purpose of the enunciation of meaning and word, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is): Through this enunciation of meaning and word, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the enumeration of divisions is, indeed, made.

101. Then what is the enumeration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The enumeration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

101 [1]. (i) There is a serial; (ii) there is a non-serial; (iii) there is an unspeakability; (iv) there are many serials; (v) there are many non-serials; (vi) there are many unspeakabilities.

101 [2]. Or (i) There is a serial and a non-serial; or (ii) there is a serial and many non-serials; or (iii) there are many serials and non-serials; or, (iv) there are many serials and many non-serials. Or, again, (i) there is a serial and an unspeakability; or (ii) there is a serial and many unspeakabilities; or (iii) there are many serials and

1. A serial must have at least three components—beginning, end and middle. There cannot be a serial without these three constituents. A monad therefore is not a serial, nor is so a duad which is called unspeakable, being incapable of being spoken of as a serial or a non-serial (which is a monad).

an unspeakability; or (iv) there are many serials and many unspeakabilities. Or, again, (i) there is a non-serial and an unspeakability; or (ii) there is a non-serial and many unspeakabilities; or (iii) there are many non-serials and an unspeakability; (iv) there are many non-serials and many unspeakabilities.

101 [3]. Or (i) there is a serial, a non-serial and an unspeakability; or (ii) there is a serial, a non-serial and many unspeakabilities; or (iii) there is a serial, many non-serials and an unspeakability; or (iv) there is a serial, many non-serials and many unspeakabilities; or (v) there are many serials, a non-serial and an unspeakability; or (vi) there are many serials, a non-serial and many unspeakabilities; or (vii) there are many serials, many non-serials and an unspeakability; or (viii) there are many serials, many non-serials and many unspeakabilities. These are the eight divisions (each composed of three viz. serial, non-serial and unspeakability, each taken as singular or plural).

Thus there are twenty-six divisions in all.

This is the enumeration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*

102. What is the purpose of this enumeration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is); Through this enumeration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) (*negama* and *vavahāra*, the illustration of divisions is, indeed, made.

103. Then what is the illustration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The illustration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

103 [1]. (i) There is a serial triad; (ii) there is a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom; (iii) there is a duad which is an unspeakability; (iv) there are many serial triads; (v) there are many non-serials, each consisting of (one single) material atom; (vi) there are many duads, each of which is an unspeakability.

103 [2]. ¹Or, (i-iv) there are four divisions (obtained by combination) of serial triad (one or many) and non-serial (one or many) consisting of (one single) material atom. Or, (v-viii) there are four divisions (obtained by combination) of serial triad (one or many) and duad (one or many) which is unspeakability. Or (ix-xii) there are

1. The following is according to the footnote 5 on p. 77 of the MJV edition with expansion of the last eight *bhaṅgas* in 103 (c) which is according to the MJV edition,

four divisions (obtained by combination) of non-serial (one or many) consisting of (one single) material atom and duad (one or many) which is unspeakability.

103 [3]. Or, (i) (there is a division of) a serial triad, a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom and a duad which is unspeakability; or (ii) (there is a division of) a serial triad, a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom, and many duads each of which is an unspeakability; or (iii) (there is a division of) a serial triad, many non-serials, each consisting of (one single) material atom, and a duad which is an unspeakability; or (iv) (there is a division of) a serial triad, many non-serials, each consisting of (one single) material atom, and many duads, each of which is an unspeakability; or (v) (there is a division of) many serial triads, a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom, and duad which is unspeakability; or (vi) (there is a division of) many serial triads, a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom, and many duads, each of which is an unspeakability; or (vii) (there is a division of) many serial triads, many non-serials, each consisting of (one single) material atom, and a duad which is unspeakability; or (viii) (there is a division of) many serial triads many non-serials, each consisting of (one single) material atom, and many duads, each of which is an unspeakability, This is the illustration of divisions, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

104. Then what is the compatible inclusion? The compatible inclusion is (stated as follows) :

104 [1]. Where do the serial substances exist compatibly, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances? (In reply, it is said that) according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances exist compatibly with the serial substances, and do not exist compatibly with the non-serial substances, nor do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances.

104 [2]. Where do the non-serial substances exist compatibly, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances? (In reply, it is said that) according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, (the non-serial substances) do not exist compatibly with the serial substances, (but) do exist compatibly with the non-serial substances, (and) do not exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances.

104 [3]. Where do the unspeakable substances exist compatibly, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances? (In reply, it is said that) according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, (the unspeakable substances) do not exist compatibly with the serial substances, nor do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances, but they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances.

This is the compatible inclusion.

105. Then what is the consideration (through the doors of exposition)? The consideration (through the doors of exposition) is stated to be ninefold as (in the following verse)¹:

- (i) ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, and
- (ii) the numerical measurement;
- (iii) the place (where a thing exists), and
- (iv) (the range of) tactile contact;
- (v) the duration, and
- (vi) the interval (of time);
- (vii) the spatial part (occupied),
- (viii) the mode or state (of the substance), and
- (ix) (comparison of the aspect of being) less or more (in number) //8//

106 [1]. Do the serial substances (such as the triads and the like which constitute the denotation of the word 'serial substances') exist or not exist, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is that they) exist necessarily.

106 [2]. Do the non-serial substances exist or not exist, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is that they) exist necessarily.

106 [3]. Do the unspeakable substances exist or not exist, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is that they) exist necessarily.

107 [1]. According to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, are the serial substances numerable or innumerable or infinite (in number) ?

1. Cf: *Tattvārthasūtra*, I. 8.

107 [2]. (They are) neither numerable nor innumerable, but (they are) infinite. Similarly, the (other) two (viz. the non-serial substances and the unspeakable substances are to be spoken of as infinite).¹

108 [1]. In what part of the world, do, according to (the stand-points of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances exist? (Do they exist) in the numerablth part, or in the innumerablth part, or in many numerablth parts, or in many innumerablth parts (of the world), or in all (parts of the) world? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, (that is, one material body), it can exist in the numerablth part, or can exist in the innumerablth part, or can exist in many numerablth parts, or can exist in many innumerablth parts (of the world), or can exist in the whole world. In respect of many substances (that is, many material bodies), they can exist necessarily in all (that is, each part of the) world (inhabited space).

108 [2]. Do according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, there exist the non-serial substances in the numerablth part of the world...(as in 108 [1],...or in all (parts of the) world? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance (that is, one material atom), it cannot exist in the numerablth part, can exist in the innumerablth part, cannot exist in many numerablth parts, cannot exist in many innumerablth parts, and cannot exist in all (parts, that is, whole of the) world. In respect of many substances (that is, material atoms), they can exist necessarily in all (that is, each part of the) world.

108 [3]. Similarly, the unspeakable substances also (are to be spoken of).

109 [1]. Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances touch the numerablth part or the innumerablth part or many numerablth parts or many innumerablth parts of the world or all (parts of) the world? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they (any of them) touch the numerablth part of the world,...(up to)...touch all (parts of) the world. In respect of many substances, they necessarily touch all (parts of) the world.

1. It has been said that there are infinite number of material monads, duads, triads, etc., in the world. The Commentary, p. 55 A, explains that though the number of *pradēśas* in the *loka* are stated to be only *asamkheya*, there is no difficulty in admitting an infinite number of monads, duads, triads, etc., filling up the *loka*. The transformations of matter are unthinkable. It is found that even the small space covered by a room can contain any number of lamps, each spreading through the whole space of the room. So there is no contradiction in admitting more than one material atom residing in the same space-point at the same time.

109 [2]. Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the non-serial substances touch the numerablth part of the world,...(up to)...touch all (parts of) the world? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they (any of them) do not touch the numerablth part, do touch the innumerablth part, do not touch many numerablth parts, do not touch many innumerablth parts, and do not touch all (parts of) the world. In respect of many substances, they necessarily touch all (parts of) the world.

109 [3]. Similarly, the unspeakable substances are to be spoken of.

110 [1]. (Regarding duration, it is asked): how long according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, do the serial substances endure in time? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they (any of them) endure for one instant (*samaya*) in the minimum and for innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, they necessarily endure for all the time.

110 [2]. Similarly, the two (viz. the non-serial substances and the unspeakable substances) are also to be spoken of).

111 [1]. (Regarding the interval of time, it is asked): how long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the serial substances in time? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it is one instant in the minimum and infinite time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

111 [2]. How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the non-serial substances in time? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it is one instant in the minimum and innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

111 [3]. How long, according to (the standpoints of) *nagama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the unspeakable substances in time? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it is one instant in the minimum and infinite time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

112 [1]. (Regarding the spatial part occupied, it is asked): In how many parts, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, of the remaining substances (that is, the non-serial and the unspeakable) can the serial substances exist? Can they exist in the numerablth part,

(or) in the innumerablth part, (or) in many numerablth parts, (or) in many innumerablth parts? (The reply is that) they cannot exist in the numerablth part, nor in the innumerablth part, nor in many numerablth parts, (but) they can necessarily exist (only) in many innumerablth parts.¹

112 [2]. In how many parts, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, of the remaining substances (that is, the serial and the unspeakable) can the non-serial substances exist? Can they exist in the numerablth part, (or) in the innumerablth part, or in many numerablth parts, (or) in many innumerablth parts? (The reply is that) they cannot exist in the numerablth part, (but) can exist in the innumerablth part, cannot exist in many numerablth parts, nor in many innumerablth parts.

112 [3]. Similarly, the unspeakable substances also (are to be spoken of).

113 [1]. (Regarding the mode or state, it is asked): In what state, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, do the serial substances exist? Can they exist in the state of rise (of *karman*), or in the state of subsidence (of *karman*), or in the state of destruction (of *karman*), or in the state of subsidence-cum-destruction (of *karman*), or in the state of innate change (*pariṇāma*), or in the state which is a mixture (of the above mentioned states)? (The reply is that) they can necessarily exist in the state of innate change (*pariṇāma*) which has beginning (in time)².

113 [2]. Similarly, the non-serial substances and the unspeakable substances are also to be spoken of.

1. The Commentary, p 60 A, explains that the number of the serial substances is innumerable times greater than the number of monads and duads combined together. It quotes a scriptural text in support of this calculation. The expression *asaṅkhejjesu bhāgesu* apparently means 'in many innumerablth parts (of the remaining substances)'. Thus explained, the text will mean that if the total number of the remaining substances is hypothetically one hundred, the number of the serial substances will be hypothetically only eighty (*śatasyaṣṭīiriva*). But this apparent meaning is not acceptable on account of its conflict with the other scriptural text quoted by the Commentary.

2. *Pariṇāma* means the change of the substance assuming different forms. This change is of two kinds, viz. (i) with beginning and (ii) without beginning. The change of the material substances (*puḍgala*) as monad, duad, triad, etc., has always a beginning, while that of the non-material substances, like *dharma*, *adharmā*, etc., is without beginning.

114 [1]. (About the comparison of the aspect of being less or more in number, it is said): which according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, O Lord, of these—serial substances, non-serial substances, and unspeakable substances,—are, between themselves, (comparatively) less, more, equal and extra-plus, in respect of substance, space-point and substance-cum-space-point ?

According to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, O Goyama, the unspeakable substances are the least of all, in respect of substance; the non-serial substances are extra-plus (in number), in respect of substances; and the serial substances are innumerable times greater (in number), in respect of substance.

114 [2]. According to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, in respect of space-point, the non-serial substances are the least of all, because of their being devoid of space-point; the unspeakable substances are extra-plus (in number), in respect of space-point¹; the serial substances are infinite times (greater than the unspeakable substances), in respect of space-point.

114 [3]. (Now) in respect of substance and space-point (jointly), (it is said that) the unspeakable substances are the least of all, in respect of substances; the non-serial substances are extra-plus, in respect of substances and (on account of) their being devoid of space-point; the unspeakable substances are extra-plus, in respect of space-point (in comparison with the non-serial substances); the serial substances are innumerable times (greater in number than the unspeakable substances), in respect of substance; the same, in respect of space-point, are infinite times (greater in number than the unspeakable substances).²

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1. It should be noted here that 'in respect of substances', as distinguished from 'in respect of space-point' means 'so far as the substance units are concerned'. The number of material monads in the world is extra-plus in comparison with the number of duads, so far as the substance-units are concerned. But, so far as the number of space-points occupied by the monad and the duad substances are greater in number than the monad substances, because if the ratio of monads and duads as substance-units is 100:60, the ratio of the space-points occupied by them is 100:120, (*avaktavyakadravyāṇi pradeśārthatayā 'nānupūrvīdravyāṇaṃ viśeṣādihikāni, yataḥ kilāsatkalpanayā avaktavyakadravyāṇāṃ ṣaṣṭiḥ anānupūrvīdravyāṇāṃ tu śatam, tato dravyārthatāvicāre etānitarāpekṣayā viśeṣādihikānyuktāni, atra tu pradeśārthatāvicāre' nānupūrvīdravyāṇāṃ niṣpradeśatvāt tad eva śatam avasthitam, avaktavyakadravyāṇāṃ tviha pratyekaṃ dvipradeśatvād dviguṇitāṇāṃ viṃśatyuttaram, pradeśaśatam iti teṣāṃ itarebhyaḥ pradeśārthatayā viśeṣādihikatvaṃ bhāvanīyam* (Commentary, p. 62 A).
 2. The Commentary (p. 62) here raises a question as to the necessity of considering the question of number (as less or more) jointly in respect of substance-units and space-points. In fact, no new information is apparently provided

This is the consideration (through the doors of exposition). This is the not-arranged serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

115. Then what is the not-arranged serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The not-arranged serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word,
- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors of exposition).

116. Then what is the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows):

A serial triad (body composed of three space-points), a serial tetrad... (up to)... a serial decad, a serial body composed of numerable space-points, a serial myriad (body composed of innumerable space-points), a serial body composed of infinite space-points, a non-serial (one single) material atom, and the duad which is unspeakability.¹

in the joint consideration. The Commentary, however, considers the following statement of the scripture as giving new knowledge of the problem :

- (i) *aṇūpuvūvīdavuṃāim dattuṃhayāe apaesaṭṭhayāe viśesāhīṃ,*
- (ii) *āṇūpuvūvīdavuṃāim dattuṃhayāe asaṃkhejjaguṇāim tūim ceva paesaṭṭhayāe aṇaṃtaguṇāim.*

In the first statement, it is clearly laid down that the non-serial substances are extra-plus in number in respect of substance-units and as substances devoid of space-points. Here the two informations which were given separately before are joined together (*dravyārthatayā apradeśārthatayā ca viśiṣṭāny-anānuṣṭhānāni avaktavyakadavyebhyo viśeṣādḥikāni*).

In the second statement, it is asserted that the serial substances are only *innumerable* times greater in number (than the unspeakable substances) in respect of substance-units, but the former are *infinite* times greater in number than the latter, so far as the number of space-points occupied by the two categories of substances are concerned. Here also what was stated separately before is mentioned jointly in order to give a comparative estimate.

1. From the standpoints of *negama* and *vavahāra*, each triad, tetrad, etc., is considered to be a separate entity. Thus there can be many triads, many tetrads and so on. But according to the standpoint of *saṃgaha* all triads fall under one class, that is, triad-class, Similar is the case of other serials

This is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of *saṃgaha*.

117. What is the purpose of this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* ? (The reply is) : through this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is indeed, made.

118. Then what is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* ? The enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows) :

There is (i) a serial, there is (ii) a non-serial, there is (iii) an unspeakability; or, there is (iv) a serial and a non-serial; or, there is (v) a serial and an unspeakability; or, there is (vi) a non-serial and an unspeakability; or there is (vii) a serial, a non-serial and an unspeakability. Thus there are seven divisions. (For such enumeration according to the standpoints of *negama* and *vavahāra*, vide *sutta* No.101.)

This is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

119. What is the purpose of this enumeration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha* ? (The reply is) through this enumeration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha*, the illustration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha* is indeed made.

120. Then what is the illustration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha*? The illustration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows):

There is (i) a serial of triad (body composed of three), there is (ii) a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom, there is (iii) a duad which is an unspeakability; or, there is (iv) a serial triad and a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom; or, there is (v) a serial triad and a duad which is an unspeakability; or, there is (vi) a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom and a duad which is an unspeakability; or, there is (vii) a serial triad, a non-serial consisting of (one single) material atom, and a duad which is an unspeakability.

such as tetrads, pentads, etc. In fact, all serials themselves fall under one common class called 'serial class' according to the standpoint of pure *saṃgaha* (*viśuddhasaṃgrahanayamatena tu sarveṣāṃ tripradeśikādīnām anantānukaparyantānāṃ skandhānām ānupūrvītvasāmānyavyatirekādyatireke cānupūrvītvābhāvaprasaṅgāt sarvāḥpīe kaviānupūrvīti*, Commentary, p. 63 B, lines 8-9).

This is the illustration of divisions according to (the stand-point of) *saṃgaha*.

121. Then what is the compatible inclusion according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The compatible inclusion according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows) :

Where, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, do the serial substances exist compatibly? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances? (The reply is that) according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the serial substances exist compatibly with the serial substances, and do not exist compatibly with the non-serial substances, nor do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances.

Similarly, the other two also exist compatibly with their respective counterparts.

This is the compatible inclusion (according to the standpoints of *saṃgaha*).

122. Then what is the consideration (through the doors of exposition) ? The consideration is stated to be eightfold as (in the following verse):

- (i) ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, and
- (ii) the numerical measurement,
- (iii) the place (where a thing exists), and
- (iv) (the range of) tactile contact;
- (v) the duration, and
- (vi) the interval (of time);
- (vii) the spatial part (occupied), and
- (viii) the mode or state;

(but there is) no (comparison of the aspect of being) less or more (in number)¹ //9//

123. (About ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, it is asked): Do, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the serial substances exist or not exist ? (The reply is that) they necessarily exist.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

124. (About numerical measurement, it is asked): Are, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the serial substances numerable or

1. Cf. *sutta* No. 105.

innumerable or infinite (in number) ? (The reply is that) they are neither numerable, nor innumerable, nor infinite, but they are necessarily one heap.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

125. (About the place where a thing exists, it is asked): In how many parts of the world, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, do the serial substances exist ? Do they exist in one numerablth part, or in one innumerable part, or in many numerablth parts, or in many innumerable parts (of the world), or in all (parts of) the world ? (The reply is that) they cannot exist in one numerablth part, nor in one innumerable part, nor in many numerablth parts, nor in many innumerable parts. They necessarily exist in all (parts of) the world.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

126. About the range of tactile contact it is asked) : Do, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the serial substances touch one numerablth part, or one innumerable part, or many numerablth parts, or many innumerable parts of the world; or do they touch all (parts of) the world ? (The reply is that) they do not touch one numerablth part, ...(up to)...they necessarily touch all (parts of) the world.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

127. (About the duration, it is asked) : How long, according to (the standpoint of *saṃgaha*, do the serial substances endure in time ? (The reply is that they necessarily endure for) all the time.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

128. (About the interval in time it is asked) : How long, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, is the interval of the serial substances in time ? (The reply is that) there is no interval (between the serial substances).

Similarly, the other two (are to be spoken of).

129. (About the spatial part occupied, it is asked) : In how many parts of the remainig substance, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, do the serial substances exist ? Do they exist in one numerablth part, or in one innumerable part, or in many numerablth parts, or in many innumerable parts ? (The reply is that) they cannot exist in one numerablth part, nor in one innumerable part, nor in many numerablth parts, nor in many innumerable parts, but they necessarily exist in one-third part¹.

1. There are, according to the standpoint of *saṃgaha* three heaps—viz. the heap of the serials, the heap of the non-serials, and the heap of the unspeakables. If there were three space-parts in all, each heap will occupy one space-part, that is, each will occupy one-third of the whole space.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

130. (About the mode or state, it is asked) : In what state, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, do the serial substances exist ? (The reply is that) they necessarily exist in the state of innate change with beginning.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

There is no (comparison of the aspect of being) less or more.

This is the consideration (through the doors of exposition). This is the not-arranged serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*. This is the not-arranged serial as substance-potential.

131. Then what is the arranged¹ serial as substance-potential ? The arranged serial as substance-potential is stated to be three-fold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last, and
- (iii) the non-serial.

132. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows) :

(1) *dhammatthikāya* (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, helping the movement of souls and material bodies) : (2) *adhammatthikāya* (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, helping the souls and material bodies to rest); (3) *āgāsattikāya* (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, giving accommodation to other substances); (4) *jīvatthikāya* (the spiritual substance which is imagined as a collection of parts); (5) *poggalatthikāya* (the material substance which is a collection of parts); and *addhāsamaya* (time-instant).

This is the serial from the first.

133. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above) : (1) *addhāsamaya*; (2) *poggalatthikāya*; (3) *jīvatthikāya*; (4) *āgāsattikāya*; (5) *adhammatthikāya*; and (6) *dhammatthikāya*.

This is the serial from the last.

134. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of collection of the six substances, (the total

1. Vide *sutta* No. 95,

number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in six).¹

This is the non-serial.

135. (Now the arranged serial is explained with reference to *poggalatthikāya*): Or, the arranged serial as substance-potential is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

136. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (as follows): One single material atom, (then) a duad consisting of two space-points, (then) a triad consisting of three space-points ...up to...a decad consisting of ten space-points, (then) a body consisting of numerable space-points, (then) a body consisting of innumerable space-points, and (lastly) a body consisting of infinite space-points.

This is the serial from the first.²

137. Then what is the serial from the last? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above): a body consisting of infinite space-points, (then) a body consisting of innumerable space-points, (then) a body consisting of numerable space-points,...up to a decad consisting of ten space-points,...up to...(then) a triad consisting of three space-points, (then) a duad consisting of two space-points, and (lastly) one single material atom.

This is the serial from the last.

138. Then what is the non-serial? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of infinite numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in infinite number).

1. The total number of the permutations comes to $1 \times 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6 = 720$ of which the first is the serial from the first, the last is the serial from the last and the rest are called non-serial.
2. This arranged serial as substance-potential is possible only in the case of the *poggalatthikāya* and not in the case of the remaining substances, because the first three are each of them only one substance. The *jīvas* are many in number, but the number of space-points in each of them is equal. As regard the time-instant, it is one and without space-points. So the explanation of these substances as arranged serials is not possible.

This is the non-serial. This is the arranged serial as substance-potential. This is the serial as substance-potential other than the knower. This is the serial as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the substance-potential.

139. Then what is the serial of space-parts (*khettāṇupuvvī*)¹? The serial of space-parts is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) (the serial which is) arranged, and
- (b) (the serial which is) not-arranged.

140. Of them, what is arranged is to be postponed (for discussion in *sutta* No. 160).

141. What is not arranged, between them, is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*,
- (ii) according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

142. Then what is the not-arranged serial of space-parts according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The not-arranged serial of space-parts according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word,
- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors of exposition).

143. Then what is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

A serial (body) occupying three space-points,...up to...a serial (body) occupying ten space-points,...up to...a serial (body) occupying numerable space-points, a serial (body) occupying innumerable space-points²; a non-serial (that is, monad or a composite body) which occupies only one single space-point, and the unspeakable (that is, a duad or a composite body) which occupies only two space-points; many serials (bodies) occupying three space-points,...up to...many serials (bodies) occupying ten space-points,...up to...many serial (bodies) occupying innumerable space-points; many non-serials (that is monads

1. Vide *sutta* No. 93.

2. The bodies occupying infinite space-points are not mentioned here, because the space of the world has only innumerable space-points.

or composite bodies) occupying one single space-point, and many unspeakables (that is, duads or composite bodies) occupying two space-points.

This is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

144. What is the purpose of this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is): through this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is indeed made.

145. Then what is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows) :

There is a serial, there is a non-serial, there is an unspeakable. Thus twenty-six divisions are to be spoken of about this serial of space-parts too (in the same way) as in the case of the serial as substance-potential (vide *sūtra* No. 101 [1]-[3]...up to...this is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

146. What is the purpose of this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* ? Through this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is indeed made.

147. Then what is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* ? The illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows) :

There is a serial (body) occupying three space-points, there is a non-serial (monad or composite body) occupying one single space-point, there is an unspeakable (duad or composite body) occupying two space-points, there are many non-serials (monads or composite bodies) occupying one single space-point, there are many unspeakables (duads or composite bodies) occupying two space-points; or, there is a serial (body) occupying three space-points and a non-serial (monad or composite body) occupying one single space-point. Thus, twenty-six kinds of divisions are to be spoken of (here) as in the case of the serial as substance-potential (vide *sūtra* No. 103 [1]-[3];...up to...this is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

148 [1]. Then what is compatible inclusion ? The compatible inclusion is (as follows) :

Where do according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances exist compatibly ? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances ? Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substance ? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances ? (The reply is that) the serial substances exist compatibly with the serial substances, do not exist compatibly with the non-serial substances, nor do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances.

148 [2] Similarly, all the three are to be spoken of as existing compatibly with their respective counterparts. This is compatible inclusion

149. Then what is the consideration (through the doors of exposition) ? The consideration is stated to be ninefold as (in the following verse):

- (i) ascertaining whether the words stands for something real, and
- (ii) the numerical measurement;
- (iii) the place (where a thing exists), and
- (iv) (the range of) tactile contact;
- (v) the duration, and
- (vi) the interval (of time);
- (vii) the spatial part (occupied),
- (viii) the mode or state (of the substances), and
- (ix) (the comparison of the aspect of being) less or more (in number) //10//

150. Then what is 'ascertaining whether the work stands for something real' ? (About ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, it is asked): Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances (which is the meaning of the word *āṇupuvvī-davvāṇi*) exist or not exist ? (The reply is that) they necessarily exist.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

151. (About numerical measurement, it is asked): Are, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances numerable, innumerable or infinite ? (The reply is that) they are innumerable, (but) not numerable, nor infinite.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

152 [1]. In what part of the world, do, according to (the stand-points of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the substances of the serial of space-parts exist? (Do they exist) in the numerablth part, or in the innumerablth part...up to...in all (parts of) the world? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they can exist in the numerablth part of the world, or can exist in the innumerablth part, or can exist in many numerablth parts, or can exist in many innumerablth parts, or can exist in the world less by one part¹. In respect of many substances, they necessarily exist in all (parts of) the world.

152 [2]. (In reply to the similar) question about the non-serial substances, (according to the standpoints of *negama* and *vavahāra*, it is said that) in respect of one substance, they cannot exist in the numerablth part they can exist in the innumerablth part, they cannot exist in many numerablth parts, nor in many innumerablth parts, nor in all (parts of) the world. In respect of many substances, they can necessarily exist in all (parts of) the world.

152 [3] Similarly, the unspeakable substances are also to be spoken of.

153 [1]. (About the range of tactile contact, it is asked) : Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances touch a numerablth part, or touch an innumerablth

1. The *sūtra* says that the serial of space-points (*kṣetrānupūrvī*) does not pervade the whole *loka*. The Commentary explains this by pointing out that the *loka* cannot at any time be devoid of the *anānupūrvī* and *avaktavyaka dravyas*, alongside the *ānupūrvīdravyas*. If the *ānupūrvīdravya* occupied the whole of the *loka* there would be no space left for the *anānupūrvī* and *avaktavyaka dravyas*. The Commentary admits the possibility of a material super-body occupying the whole *loka*, but asserts that even in that case, one space-point for the non-serial *anānupūrvī* and two space-points for the *avaktavyaka* are conceived as left vacant, though in fact, the serial of space-points exists even in those space-points. The Commentary here quotes the following ancient verse in support of its position,

mahakhaṇḍhāpunṇe 'vīya avattavvaga' nānupūrvīdavoṣāim |

jaddesoḅādhāim iaddeseṇaṃ sa loḅūṇo || (Commentary, 74 A, line 3)

The Commentary here raises a pertinent objection. While explaining the *dravyānupūrvī*, the *sūtra* No. 108 [1] admitted that the *ānupūrvīdravyas* pervade whole of the *loka*. Why should it not then accept that the *kṣetrānupūrvī* also pervades the whole *loka*? The commentator says that the objection is inspired by a confusion between *dravya* and *kṣetra*. The *ānupūrvī*, *anānupūrvī* and *avaktavyaka dravyas* can exist together in the same space, but two space-parts cannot exist together. In the present context, the *ānupūrvī* or *anānupūrvī* or *avaktavyatā* of *kṣetra* is being considered, and so the problem simply does not arise.

part,...up to...or touch all (parts of) the world ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they touch a numerablth part, touch an innumerablth part, touch many numerablth parts, or touch many innumerablth parts, or touch the (whole) world less by one part. In respect of many substances, they necessarily touch all (parts of) the world.

153 [2] The non-serial substances and the unspeakable substances are to be spoken of just as in the case of place (*sūtra* 152 [1]), only substituting 'touch' (for 'exist in').

154. (About the duration, it is asked) : How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, do the serial substances endure in time ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they endure for one instant in the minimum and for innumerable instants of time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, they necessarily endure for all the time.

Similarly, the other two also (are to be spoken of).

155. (About interval of time, it is asked): How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the serial substances in time? Of all the three (viz. serial, non-serial and unspeakable substances) in respect of one substance, it is for one instant in the minimum and for innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

156. (About spatial parts, it is asked): In how many parts, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, of the remaining substances, can the serial substances exist ? All the three (are to be spoken of) as in the case of the serial as substance-potential (in *sutra* No. 112 [1]—[3]).

157. (About the mode or state of substance, it is asked): In what state, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* can the serial substances exist ? (The reply is that) the three (viz. the serial, non-serial and the unspeakable substances) necessarily exist in the state of innate change with beginning.

158 [1]. (About the comparison of the aspect of being less or more in number, it is asked): Which of these, O Lord, viz. the serial substances, the non-serial substances, and the unspeakable substances—are, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, between themselves, (comparatively) less, more, equal and extra-plus (*visesāhiyā*), in respect of substance, space-point, and substance-cum-space-point ? According to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, O Goyama, the

unspeakable substances are the least of all¹, in respect of substance; the non-serial substances are extra-plus (in number) in respect of substance; and the serial substances are innumerable times (greater in number) in respect of substances.

158 [2]. In respect of space-points, according to (the stand-points of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the non-serial substances are the least of because of their being devoid of any space-point; the unspeakable substances are extra-plus (in number), in respect of space-points; the serial substances are innumerable times (greater in number) in respect of space-points.

158 [3]. In respect of substance and space-point (jointly), according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the unspeakable substances are the least of all in respect of substance; the non-serial substances are extra-plus (in number) in respect of substance, because of their being devoid of space-point; the unspeakable substances are extra-plus in respect of space-point (in comparison with the non-serial substances); the serial substances are innumerable times (greater in number than the unspeakable substances) in respect of substance, and they are, in respect of space-point, innumerable times (greater than the unspeakable substances).

This is the consideration (through the doors of exposition). This is the non-arranged serial of space-parts according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

159. ²Then what is the not-arranged serial of space-parts, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*³? The not-arranged serial

1. On p. 77 B, the Commentary explains, from the arrangement :: of space-points, that the total number of *anānupūrvīs* (being 5) is the least, and the numbers of the *avaktavyas* and *ānupūrvīs* are progressively higher, being 8 and 16 respectively. But here in this *sūtra* it is said that the number of *avaktavyas* is the least. The Commentary (p.78 B) explains that this is so if the arrangement of atoms of the whole universe were taken into consideration, though, he admits this could be certified only by the knowledge of the omniscient person (*kevalin*). It however gives an example how the number of *avaktavyas* could be less than the number of *anānupūrvīs* in an arrangement of material bodies. Suppose three material bodies are arranged in a straight line. In this case, the number of *avaktavyas* is two while the number of *anānupūrvīs* is three and this is true of all such arrangements.

Now, if the universe was mostly composed of material atoms arranged in straight lines, the number of *anānupūrvīs* would far exceed the number of the *avaktavyas* which are material duads composed of two contiguous atoms.

2. We here follow the text given in footnote 3 on p. 90 of the MJV edition.
3. Vide *sūtra* No. 140.

of space-parts, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word,
- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors of exposition).

Then what is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows):

A serial (body) occupying three space-points,...up to...a serial (body) occupying innumerable space-points, and a non-serial (of monad or composite body) occupying one single space-point, and an unspeakable (duad or composite body) occupying two space-points.

This is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

What is the purpose of this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? (The reply is that) through this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is indeed made.

Then what is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows) :

There is a serial, there is a non-serial, there is an unspeakability. Or, there is a serial and a non-serial (and so on). Thus it is to be spoken of as in the case of the serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* (in *sūtra* No. 118)...up to...this is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

What is the purpose of this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *saṃgaha*? (The reply is that) through this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is indeed made.

Then what is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? The illustration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* is (as follows) :

There is a serial (body) occupying three space-points, there is a non-serial (monad or composite body) occupying one single space-point,

there is an unspeakable (duad or composite body) occupying two space-points. Or, there is a serial (body) occupying three space-points and a non-serial (monad or composite body) occupying one single space-point (and so on). Thus it is to be spoken of the serial of space-parts too as in the case of the serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* (in *sūtra* No. 120)...up to ...this is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

Then what is the compatible inclusion ? The compatible inclusion is (as follows) :

Where do, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* the serial substances exist compatibly ? Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances, or exist compatibly with the non-serial substances or exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances ? (The reply is that all) the three exist compatibly with their respective counterparts.

This is the compatible inclusion.

Then what is the consideration (through the doors of exposition) ? The consideration is stated to be eightfold as (in the following verse);

- (i) Ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, and
 - (ii) the numerical measurement;
 - (iii) the place (where a thing exists), and
 - (iv) (the range of) tactile contact;
 - (v) the duration, and
 - (vi) the interval (of time);
 - (vii) the spatial part (occupied), and
 - (viii) the mode or state;
- (but there is) no (comparison of the aspect of being) less or more (in number) //1¹//

About ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, it is asked) : Do, according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* the serial substances exist or not exist ? (The reply is that) they necessarily exist. Similarly, all the three (are to be spoken of).

The remaining doors (of this consideration) in this serial of space-parts are also to be spoken of as in the case of the serial as substance-potential according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* (in *sūtras* No. 124-130)...up to. This is the consideration.

1. This No. is given in the footnote 3 on p. 90 of the MJV edition.

This is the not-arranged serial of space-parts according to (the standpoint of) *saṅgaha*. This is the not-arranged serial of space-parts.

160. Then what is the arranged serial of space-parts¹? The arranged serial of space-parts is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

161. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (as follows): the lower world, (then) the middle world, (and then) the upper world.

This is the serial from the first.

162. Then what is the serial from the last? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above): the upper world, (then) the middle world, (then) the lower world.

This is the serial from the last.

163. Then what is the non-serial? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of three, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in three).

This is the non-serial.

164. The serial of space-parts of the lower world is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

165. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (as follows) : (i) *Rayaṇappabhā* (lustre of jewel), (then) (ii) *Sakkappabhā* (colour of pebbles), (then) (iii) *Vāluappabhā* (colour of sand), (then) (iv) *Paṃkappabhā* (colour of clay), (then) (v) *Dhūmappabhā* (colour of smoke), (then) (vi) *Tamappabhā* (colour of darkness) (and then) (vii) *Tamatamappabhā*² (colour of thick darkness).

This is the serial from the first.

166. Then what is the serial from the last? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above) : (vii) *Tamatamappabhā*...up to...(i) *Rayaṇappabhā*.

This is the serial from the last.

1. Vide *sutta* No. 139.

2. Vide *TS*, III. 1, which has *mahātamaḥ*,

167. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of seven (underworlds, the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from, 1 (one) (and ending in seven).¹

This is the non-serial.

168. The serial of space-parts of the middle world is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

169. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (stated in the following verses) :

Jambuddīva, (then the ocean of) *Laaṇa*, (then the land of) *Dhāyāi*, (then the ocean of) *Kāloya*, (then the land of) *Pukkha*, (then the ocean of) *Puṣkaroda*, (then the land of) *Varuṇa*, (then the ocean of) *Varuṇoda*, (then the land of) *Khīra*, (then the ocean of) *Khīroda*, (then the land of) *Ghaya*, (then the ocean of) *Ghṛtoda*, (then the land of) *Khoya*, (then the ocean of) *Ikṣurasa*, (then the land of) *Nandī*, (then its ocean), (then the land of) *Aruṇavara*, (then its ocean), (then the land of) *Kuṇḍala*, (then its ocean), (then the land of) *Ruyaga*; ||11|| (All these lands and oceans) beginning from *Jambuddīva* are indeed (situated) without any intervening (land or ocean), and the rest are (preceded as well as followed by) innumerable (lands and oceans which are being enumerated. These are): *Bhuyagavara*, *Kusavara* *Koṃcavara*, *Ābharāṇa*, and so on ||12|| And (next there are the lands and oceans of) *Ābharāṇa*, *Vattha*, *Gaṇḍha*, *Uppala*, *Tilaya*, *Pauma*, *Nihi*, *Rayāṇa*, *Vāsahara*, *Daha*, *Nadī*, *Vijayā*, *Vakkhāra*, *Kappindā*, ||13|| *Kuru*, *Mandara*, *Āvūsā*, *Kūḍā*, *Nakkhatta*, *Canda*, *Sūrā*, *Deva*, *Nāga*, *Jakkha*, *Bhūya*, and *Sayambhura-maṇa* ||14||

This is the serial from the first.

170. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above): *Sayambhura-maṇa*...up to...*Jambuddīva*.²

This is the serial from the last.

1. The total number of these permutations is 5038, which is equal to $7-2$

2. We have followed the reading given in footnote 3 on p. 92 of MJV edition.

171. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of innumerable numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in the innumerable number).

This is the non-serial

172. The serial of space-parts of the upper world is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

173. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is as follows) : *Sohamma Īsāṇa Saṇṅkumāra, Māhīṇḍa, Bāmbhaloa, Laṇṭaa, Mahāsukka, Sahassāra, Āṇaa, Pāṇaa, Āraṇa. Accuta, Gevajjavimāṇa, Anuttaravimāṇa, and Īsipabbhārā.*

This is the serial from the first.

174. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above *Īsipabbhārā* ...up to...*Sohamma*.)

There is the serial from the last.

175. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of fifteen numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in fifteen).

This is the non-serial.

176. Or, the arranged serial of space-parts is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

177. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows) : (a body) occupying one single space-point, (then) (a body) occupying two space-points,...up to...(a body) occupying ten space-points,...up to...(a body) occupying innumerable space-points.

This is the serial from the first.

178. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above) : (a body) occupying innumerable space-points...up to...(a body) occupying one single space-point.

This is the serial from the last.

179 Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of innumerable numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers from 1 (one) (and ending in the innumerable number).

This is the non-serial. This is the arranged serial of space-points. This is the serial of space-parts.

180. Then what is the serial of time ?¹ The serial of time is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) (the serial which is) arranged, and
- (b) (the serial which is) not-arranged.

181. Of them, what is arranged is to be postponed (for discussion in *sūtra* No. 201).

182. What is not-arranged, between them, is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*,
- (ii) according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

183. Then what is the not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* ? The not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation between) meaning and word,
- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors of exposition).

184. Then what is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *negama* and *vavahāra* ? The enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

1. Vide *sūtra* No. 93.

A serial staying for three instants (*samaya*),...up to...a serial staying for ten instants, a serial staying for numerable instants, a serial staying for innumerable instants, a non-serial staying for one instant, an unspeakable staying for two instants; many serials staying for three instants...up to...many serials staying for numerable instants, many serials staying for innumerable instants, many non-serials staying for one instant, and many unspeakables staying for two instants.

This is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

185. What is the purpose of this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is that) through this enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is indeed made.¹

186. Then what is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

There is a serial, there is a non-serial, there is an unspeakable. Thus, twenty-six kinds of divisions are to be spoken of about the serial of time too (in the same way) as in the case of the serial as substance-potential (in *sūtra* No 101 [1]-[3])...up to...This is the enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

187. What is the purpose of this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? (The reply is that) through this enumeration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is indeed made.²

188. Then what is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*? The illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra* is (as follows):

There is a serial staying for three instants, there is a non-serial staying for one instant, there is an unspeakable staying for two instants; there are serials staying for three instants, non-serials staying for one instant, (and) unspeakables staying for two instants. Thus, twenty-six kinds of divisions are to be spoken of (in the same way) as in the case of the serial substance-potential (in *sūtra* No. 103 [1]-[3])

1. We have followed the reading given in footnote 4 on page 94 of the MJV edition.

2. We here follow the reading given in footnote 8 on p. 94 of the MJV edition.

...up to... This is the illustration of divisions according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

189 Then what is the compatible inclusion? The compatible inclusion is (as follows):

Where do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *bavahāra*, the serial substances exist compatibly? Question: Do they exist compatibly with the serial substances? (Do they exist compatibly with the non-serial substances? Do they exist compatibly with the unspeakable substances? The reply is that) they exist compatibly with the serial substances and not with the non-serial substances, nor with the unspeakable substances. Thus, the other two also exist compatibly with their respective counterparts.¹

This is the compatible inclusion.

190. Then what is the consideration (through the doors of exposition)? The consideration is stated to be ninefold as (in the following verse²):

- (i) ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, and
- (ii) the numerical measurement;
- (iii) the place (where a thing exists), and
- (iv) (the range of) tactile contact;
- (v) the duration, and
- (vi) the interval (of time);
- (vii) the spatial part (occupied),
- (viii) the mode or state, and
- (ix) (the comparison of the aspect of being) less or more (in number) //15//

191. (About ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, it is asked): Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances exist or not exist? (The reply is that) all of the three necessarily exist.

192. (About numerical measurement, it is asked): Are according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the serial substances numerable or innumerable or infinite? (The reply is that) all of the three (are) not numerable, (are) numerable, (are not) infinite.

193. (About the place where a thing exists, it is asked): Do, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, the

1. We here follow the reading given in footnote 1 on page 95 of the MJV edition.

2. The verse is not given in full in the text.

serial substances exist in the numerablth part, or exist in the innumerablth part, or exist in many numerablth parts, or exist in many innumerablth parts of the world, (or exist in all parts of) the world ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it can exist in the numerablth part, can exist in the innumerablth part, can exist in many numerablth parts, can exist in many innumerablth parts, or can exist in the world less by one part¹. In respect of many substances, they can necessarily exist in all (parts of) the world. ²The non-serial substances can exist similarly (as stated in *sūtra* No. 152 [2]). [Or, from another view-point³, it (that is, the non-serial) exists in (places of) all the (five) queries (viz. the numerablth part, the innumerablth part, many numerablth parts, many innumerablth parts, and the world less by one part].⁴ Similarly, the unspeakable substances are also (to be spoken of) as in (the case of) the serial of space-parts (*sūtra* No. 151 [3]). [From another view-point, it (that is, the unspeakable substance) exists in (places of) the first four queries, excluding the superboddy (which stays for eight time-instants, and not for only two time-instants for which an unspeakable stays].⁵

194. (The range of) tactile contact of the serial of time is to be spoken of similarly (as in *sūtra* No. 153 [1]-[2]).

195 [1]. (About the duration, it is asked) : How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, do the serial substances endure in time ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they endure for three instants in the minimum and endure for innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, they endure for all the time.

195 [2]. How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, do the non-serial substances endure in time ? The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they endure for one instant, neither less nor more. In respect of many substances, they endure for all the time.

1. For the reading followed by us vide footnote 5 on p. 95 of MJV edition. The Prakrit word for 'less by one part' is *desūṇe*. The Commentary (p. 86 B) notes a variant *padesūṇe*, the meaning of *desa* and *padesa* being given as the same. For justification of the concept, vide supra footnote 1, on p. 52.
2. What follows is according to the Bhawnagar 1939 edition.
3. This refers to the concept of *kālānupuvvā* as standing exclusively for the time-aspect of a material body, irrespective of its constituent space-points. Thus a super-body pervading the whole *loka* (short only of one part) for one time-instant is a non-serial. This explains how a non-serial can exist in the numerablth part, etc., up to the world less by one part.
4. The bracketed portion, according to the Commentary (pp. 87 A-B) is not usually found in the text, though explained in the *Tīkā* and the *Cūrṇī*.
5. The bracketed portion is according to the Commentary, p. 87 B.

195 [3]. How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* & *vavahāra*, do the unspeakable substances, endure ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, they endure for two instants, neither less nor more. In respect of many substances, they endure for all the time.

196 [1]. (About the interval of time, it is asked) ∴ How long according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the serial substances in time ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it is for one instant in the minimum and for two instants in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

196 [2]. How long, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, is the interval of the non-serial substances in time ? (The reply is that) in respect of one substance, it is for two instants in the minimum and for innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

196 [3]. Then comes the query about the unspeakable substances, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*. In respect of one substance, (the interval) is for one instant in the minimum and for innumerable (instants of) time in the maximum. In respect of many substances, there is no interval.

197. In how many parts, according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*, of the remaining substances, can the serial substances exist ? (This is the question). (The reply is) as in the case of the serial of space-parts (in *sūtra* No. 156).

198. The mode or state is also (to be) similarly (spoken of). (The aspect of) less or more is also to be similarly understood...up to... This is the consideration. (vide *sūtras* No. 157-158).

This is the not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoints of) *negama* and *vavahāra*.

199. Then what is the not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoint of) *saṅgaha* ?¹ The not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoint of) *saṅgaha* is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) the enunciation of (the relation) meaning and word,
- (ii) the enumeration of divisions,
- (iii) the illustration of divisions,
- (iv) the compatible inclusion,
- (v) the consideration (through the doors of exposition).

1. Vide *sūtra* No. 181.

200. Then what is the enunciation of meaning and word according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*? According to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, the enunciation of meaning and word, (etc.)—(that is) the five doors—are to be spoken of in this serial of time (in the same way) as mentioned in the case of the serial of space-parts according to *saṃgaha* (in *sūtra* No 159) only substituting the word *thi* ('staying for *such* time') (for 'occupying *such* space-points')...up to...This is the not-arranged serial of time according to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*.

This is the not-arranged serial of time.

201 [1]. Then what is the arranged serial of time ?¹ The arranged serial of time is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

201 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (as follows): What endures for one instant, what endures for two instants, what endures for three instants...up to...what endures for ten instants...up to...what endures for numerable instants, (and) what endures for innumerable instants.

This is the serial from the first.

201 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above): What endures for innumerable instants...up to... what endures for one instant.

This is the serial from the last.

201 [4]. Then what is the non-serial. The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of permutations of) the series of the collection of innumerable numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in the innumerable number).

202 [1]. Or, the arranged serial of time is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

202 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (as follows) : *samaya* (instant which stands for the minimum

1. Vide *sūtra* No. 180.

time-unit), *avaliyā* (innumerable time-units), *aṅṅāpāṇū*¹, *thova* (seven *pāṇus*), *lava* (seven *thovas*), *muhutta* (77 *lavas*). *ahoratta* (thirty *muhuttas*, or one full day and night), *pakka* (15 *ahorattas*, or a half month), *māsa* (2 *pakkas*, or one month), *udu* (2 *māsas*, or one season), *ayaṇa* (3 *uus*, or a half year), *saṃvacchara* (2 *ayaṇas*, or one year), *juga* (5 *saṃvaccharas*), *vāsasaa* (20 *jugas*, or 100 years), *vāsasahassa* (10 *vāsasaa*, or 1000 years), *vāsasayasahassa* (100 *vāsasahassa*, or one *lakṣa*), *puvvaṅga* (84 *lakṣas*), *puvva* (square of *puvvaṅga*), *tuḷiyaṅga* (*puvva* × *puvvaṅga*), *tuḷiya* (*tuḷiyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *aḷaḍaṅga* (*tuḷiya* × *puvvaṅga*), *aḷaḍa* (*aḷaḍaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *avavaṅga* (*aḷaḍa* × *puvvaṅga*), *avava* (*avavaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *huhuyaṅga* (*avava* × *puvvaṅga*), *huhuya* (*huhuyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *uppalaṅga* (*huhuya* × *puvvaṅga*), *uppala* (*uppalaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *paumaṅga* (*uppala* × *puvvaṅga*), *pauma* (*paumaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *naliṅga* (*pauma* × *puvvaṅga*), *naliṇa* (*naliṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *atthaniuraṅga* (*naliṇa* × *puvvaṅga*), *atthaniura* (*atthaniuraṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *auyaṅga* (*atthaniura* × *puvvaṅga*), *auya* (*auyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *nauyaṅga* (*auya* × *puvvaṅga*), *nauya* (*nauyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *pauyaṅga* (*nauya* × *puvvaṅga*), *pauya* (*pauyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *cūliyaṅga* (*pauya* × *puvvaṅga*), *cūliyā* (*cūliyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *sīsapaheliyaṅga* (*cūliyā* × *puvvaṅga*), *sīsapaheliyā* (*sīsapaheliyaṅga* × *puvvaṅga*), *paliovama* (*sīsapaheliyā* × *puvvaṅga*), *sāgarovama* (*paliovama* × *puvvaṅga*), *osappiṇī* (*sāgarovama* × *puvvaṅga*), *ussappiṇī* (*osappiṇī* × *puvvaṅga*), *poggalapariyaṭṭa* (*ussappiṇī* × *puvvaṅga*), *atitaddha* (*poggalapariyaṭṭa* × *puvvaṅga*), *anāgataddhā* (*atitaddhā* × *puvvaṅga*), and *savvaddhā* (*anāgataddhā* × *puvvaṅga*).²

This is the serial from the first.

202 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above) : *savvaddhā*, *anāgataddhā*...up to...*samaya*.

This is the serial from the last.

202 [4]. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of infinite numbers (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in the infinite number).

This is the non-serial. This is the arranged serial of time. This is the serial of time.

1. The Commentary, p. 90 B, divides this into two, that is *āṇa* and *pāṇu*; *āṇaṇ* = innumerable *āvalikās* = one *ucchvāsa*. The fourth measurement of time, according to the Commentary, is *niḥśvāsa* = innumerable *āvalikās*. The fifth is *pāṇu* which is equal to one *ucchvāsa* + one *niḥśvāsa*.

2. Vide inf: a, *sūtra* No. 367.

203 [1]. Then what is the serial of proclamation ?¹ The serial of proclamation is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

203 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows, which gives the names of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras) : (i) *Usabha*, (ii) *Ajia*, (iii) *Sambhava*, (iv) *Abhiṇḍana*, (v) *Sumati*, (vi) *Paumappabha*, (vii) *Supāsa*, (viii) *Candappaha*, (ix) *Suvihī*, (x) *Sītala*, (xi) *Sejjaṃsa*, (xii) *Vāsupujja*, (xiii) *Vimala* (xiv) *Aṇanta*, (xv) *Dhamma*, (xvi) *Santi*, (xvii) *Kumthu* (xviii) *Ara*, (xix) *Mallī*, (xx) *Muṇisuvva*, (xxi) *Nami*, (xxii) *Ariṭṭhaṇemi*, (xxiii) *Pāsa*, and (xxiv) *Vaddhamāṇa*

This is the serial from the first.

203 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above) ; (xxiv) *Vaddhamāṇa*, (xxiii) *Pāsa*...up to... (i) *Usabha*.

This is the serial from the last.

203 [4]. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of twenty-four, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in twenty-four).

This is the non-serial. This is the serial of proclamation (of names of twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras).

204 [1]. Then what is the serial of counting ?² The serial of counting is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

204 [2]. Then what what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows) :

Ega (one), *dasa* (ten), *saya* (hundred), *sahassa* (thousand), *dasasahassa* (ten thousand), *sayasahassa* (hundred thousand), *dasasayasahassa* (ten hundred thousand), *koḍi* (ten thousand thousand), *dasakoḍi* (ten koḍi), *koḍisaya* (hundred koḍi), and *dasakoḍisaya* (thousand koḍi).

1. Vide supra, sūtra No. 93.

2. Vide supra, sūtra No.93.

This is the serial from the first.

204 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above): *dasakoḍisaya* (thousand *koṭi*),...up to... *ega* (one).

This is the serial from the last.

204 [4]. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of thousand *koṭi* numbers, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in thousand *koṭi*).

This is the non-serial. This is the serial of counting.

205 [1]. Then what is the serial of configuration¹ (of *jīva* with five sense-organs) ? The serial of configuration is stated to be three-fold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

205 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows):

(i) *samacauramṣa* (symmetrical), (ii) *niggohamaṇḍala* (symmetrical in the upper part), (iii) *sādi* (symmetrical below the navel), (iv) *khujja* (hunchbacked), (v) *vāmaṇa* (dwarfish), and (vi) *huṇḍa* (unsymmetrical).

This is the serial from the first.

205 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above): (vi) *huṇḍa* (unsymmetrical)...up to...*samacauramṣa* (symmetrical).

This is the serial from the last.

205 [4]. Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of six, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in six).

This is the non-serial. This is the serial of configuration (of *jīva* with five sense-organs).

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No, 93.

206 [1]. Then what is the serial of the correct behaviour (of monks)?¹ The serial of the correct behaviour is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

206 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first? The serial from the first is (given in the following verse):

(i) *icchā (kāra)* (seeking permission of the preceptor), (ii) *micchā (kāra)* (blaming oneself for sins committed by oneself), (iii) *tahakkāra* (assent to preceptor's orders), (iv) *āvasiyā* (utterance of the words 'I go' to the teacher at the time of leaving for some necessary work), and (v) *nisihiyā* (utterance for the sake of avoiding generation of fear among other monks at the time of entering the place), (vi) *āpucchānā* (asking permission of the teacher to do something), and (vii) *paḍipucchā* (asking permission of the teacher again for the same work which was once forbidden), (viii) *chaṇḍaṇā* (entreatment or invitation for things already acquired), and (ix) *nimantaṇā* (invitation for things to be acquired in the future); and (x) *uvasaṃpayā* (submitting oneself wholly to the preceptor by the words 'I belong to you' in order to acquire the knowledge)². These are the ten kinds of correct behaviour to be followed in proper time. //16//

This is the serial of the correct behaviour from the first.

206 [3]. Then what is the serial from the last? The serial from the last is (as follows which is the reverse of the above): (x) *uvasaṃpayā*,...up to...(i) *icchā (kāra)*.

This is the serial from the last.

206 [4]. Then what is the non-serial? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by) deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of ten, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in ten).

This is the non-serial. This is the serial of the correct behaviour of monks).

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 93.

2. We have read *uvasaṃpayā ya 10 kāle* instead of *uvasaṃpayā ya kāle 10* of the MJV edition.

207 [1]. Then what is the serial of the states or modes (of *jīva*)?¹ The serial of the states is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) the serial from the first,
- (ii) the serial from the last,
- (iii) the non-serial.

207 [2]. Then what is the serial from the first ? The serial from the first is (as follows) :

(i) *udaia* (the state of rise of *karmans*), (ii) *wasamia* (the state of subsidence of *karmans*), (iii) *khatia* (the state of destruction of *karmans*), (iv) *kkaovasamia* (the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*), (v) *pāriṇāmīā* (the state of innate change) and (vi) *sannivātia* (the state which is a mixture of the above states).

This is the serial from the first.

207 [3] Then what is the serial from the last ? The serial from the last is (as follows, which is the reverse of the above) : (vi) *sannivātia*...up to...(i) *ūdaia*.

This is the serial from the last.

207 [4] Then what is the non-serial ? The non-serial (in the above case is obtained by deducting 2 (two) from (the total number of the permutations of) the series of the collection of six, (the total number of permutations being obtained) by the mutual multiplication of the consecutive numbers beginning from 1 (one) (and ending in six).

This is the non-serial.

This is the serial of the state or modes.

Here ends (the description of) the word *āṇupuvvī* (serial).²

Here the first division of *uvakkama*, called *āṇupuvvī* ends. Now we come to the second division called *nāma* which stands for 'name' in the sense of an expression meaning person or thing. In this section, a whole class of objects intended to be expressed by one, two, three...up to...ten words, are mentioned in order to illustrate their divisions into categories approved in different branches of knowledge.]

[Suttas 208-312 : The door of nāma (name)—a variety of the Door of Disquisition called uvakkama]

208. Then what is the name ?³ The name is stated to be ten-fold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 93.

2. The subject of *āṇupuvvī* is covered by the *sūtras* 93-207.

3. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 92.

- (i) one-named;
- (ii) two-named;
- (iii) three-named;
- (iv) four-named;
- (v) five-named;
- (vi) six-named;
- (vii) seven-named;
- (viii) eight-named;
- (ix) nine-named;
- (x) ten-named.

209. Then what is one-named ? The one-named (is explained in the following verse) :

Whatever names there are of substances, attributes and modifications have been assigned the designation of 'name' (used in singular number) in the touchstone of *Āgama* (scripture) //17//

This is one-named (that is, any thing in the world can be expressed by a 'name', all words being 'names' in essence).

210. Then what is two-named ? The two-named are stated (to fall) in two groups, such as

- (i) monosyllable, and
- (ii) multisyllable.

211 Then what is the monosyllable ? The monosyllable is stated to be manifold, viz., *hrī*, *śrī*, *dhī*, *strī*. This is the monosyllable.

212. Then what is the multisyllable ? The multisyllable (words are) *kaṇṇā*, *vīṇā*, *latā*, *mālā*, (etc.). This is the multisyllable.

213. Or, the two-named (objects) are stated (to fall) in two groups, such as

- (i) name of *jīva*, and
- (ii) name of *ajīva*.

214. Then what is the name of *jīva* ? The name of *jīva* is stated to be manifold, viz. *Devadatta*, *Janṇadatta*, *Vinṇudatta*, and *Somadatta*. This is the name of *jīva*.

215. Then what is the name of *ajīva* ? The name of *ajīva* is stated to be manifold, viz. *ghaḍa* (pitcher), *paḍa* (cloth), *kaḍa* (mat), *raha* (chariot), (etc.).

This is the name of *ajīva*.

216 [1]. Or, the two-named (objects) are stated to be two-fold, viz.

- (i) specialized, and
- (ii) generalized.

216 [2]. (Thus) 'substance' is a generalized (genus), while soul-substance and non-soul substance are specialized (species).

216 [3]. (Similarly, when) the soul-substance is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—living beings in hell, animal creatures, human beings, and gods.

216 [4]. (Similarly, when) a being in hell is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are beings living in *Rayaṅgabhā*, in *Sakkarābhā*, in *Vāluṅgabhā* in *Paṅkabhā*, in *Dhūmābhā*, in *Tamā*, and in *Tamatamā* (regions of the hell). (Similarly, when) a being living in the hell named *Rayaṅgabhā* is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—the developed and the undeveloped beings (of that hell). Similarly,...up to (when) a being living in the hell named *Tamatamā* is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—the developed and the undeveloped beings (in that hell).

216 [5] (When) a being in the animal world is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—beings with one sense-organ, two sense-organs, three sense-organs, four sense-organs, five sense-organs.¹

216 [6]. (Similarly, when) a being with one sense-organ is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—the earth-bodied beings, water-bodied beings, fire-bodied beings, air-bodied beings, and plant-bodied beings. (Similarly when) an earth-bodied being is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—micro-organic earth-bodied beings and macro-organic earth-bodied beings. (Similarly, when) a micro-organic earth-bodied being is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—the developed micro-organic earth-bodied beings and the undeveloped micro-organic earth-bodied beings. (Similarly, when) a macro-organic earth-bodied being is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—the developed macro-organic earth-bodied beings and the undeveloped macro-organic earth-bodied beings. Similarly, the water-bodied beings, fire-bodied beings, air-bodied beings and plant-bodied beings are to be spoken of by the differentiae, viz. generalized, specialised, developed and undeveloped.

216 [7]. (Similarly, when) a being with two sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed beings with two sense-organs and the undeveloped beings with two sense-organs.

1. 'five sense-organs' is not found in the MJV edition.

Similarly, the beings with three sense-organs and four sense-organs are to be spoken of.

216 [8]. (Similarly, when) a being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are—aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, and aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs.

216 [9]. (Similarly, when) an aquatic being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are agamic (*sammucchima*) aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, and aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb. (Similarly, when) an agamic aquatic being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed agamic aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs and the undeveloped agamic aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs. (Similarly, when) an aquatic being of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, and the undeveloped aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb.

216 [10]. (Similarly, when) a terrestrial being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are quadruped terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, and reptile terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs. (Similarly, when) a quadruped terrestrial being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are agamic quadruped terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, and quadruped terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb. (Similarly, when) an agamic quadruped terrestrial being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed agamic quadruped terrestrial beings of animal world with five sense-organs, and the undeveloped agamic quadruped terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs. (Similarly, when) a quadruped terrestrial being of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed quadruped terrestrial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, and the undeveloped quadruped terrestrial

beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb. (Similarly, when) a reptile terrestrial being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are reptile terrestrial beings crawling on breast of the animal world with five sense-organs, and reptile terrestrial beings crawling on arms of the animal world with five sense-organs. These (reptile beings crawling on breast and arms) are also to be spoken of as agamic beings (which are) developed and undeveloped, and beings coming out of womb (which are) developed and undeveloped.

216 [11]. (Similarly, when) aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are agamic aerial being of the animal world with five sense-organs, and aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb. (Similarly, when) an agamic aerial being of the animal world with five sense-organs is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed agamic aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, and the undeveloped agamic aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs. (Similarly, when) an aerial being of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, and the undeveloped aerial beings of the animal world with five sense-organs, coming out of womb.

216 [12]. (Similarly, when) a human being is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are agamic human beings, and human beings, coming out of womb. (Similarly, when) an agamic human being is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the developed agamic human beings, and the undeveloped agamic human beings. (Similarly, when)¹ a human being, coming out of womb, is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are (human beings) of *kammabhūmi* (region where spiritual action is possible; and a *Tīrthaṅkara* can take birth); and of *akammabhūmi* (the non-spiritual region); and of island in the salt ocean; beings who are numerable years old (and innumerable years old); beings developed and undeveloped.

216 [13]. (Similarly, when) a god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods who are *Bhavaṇavāsī*,

1. What follows is according to the reading given in footnote 1 on p. 104 of MJV edition, the bracketed portion—'and innumerable years old'—being according to Puppha Bhikkhu's edition.

Vānamāntara, *Joisia* and *Vemāṇia*. (Similarly, when) a *Bhavaṇavāsi* is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Asurakumāra*, *Nāgakumāra*, *Suvaṇṇakumāra*, *Vijjukumāra*, *Aggikumāra*, *Dīvākumāra*, *Udadhikumāra*, *Disākumāra*, *Vātakumāra*, *Thaṇiyakumāra*—about all of whom, the differentiae viz. ‘generalized’, and ‘specialized’, ‘developed’ (and) ‘undeveloped’ are to be spoken of.

216 [14]. (Similarly, when) a *Vānamāntara* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Pisāa*, *Bhūta*, *Jakkha*, *Rakkhasa*, *Kiṇṇara*, *Kimpurisa*, *Mahoraga*, and *Gaṇḍharva*—about all of whom, the differentiae viz. ‘generalized’ (and) ‘specialized’, ‘developed’ (and) ‘undeveloped’ are to be spoken of.

216 [15]. (Similarly, when) a *Joisia* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Canda* (moon), *Sūra* (sun), *Gaha* (planet), *Nakkhatta* (constellation) and *Tārārūva* (lunar mansions)—about all of whom, the differentiae viz. ‘generalized’ (and) ‘specialized’, ‘developed’ (and) ‘undeveloped’ are to be spoken of.

216 [16]. (Similarly, when) a *Vemāṇia* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Kappovaga* and *Kappātītaa*. (Similarly, when) a *Kappovaa* (sic) god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Sohammaa*, *Isānaa*, *Saṇamkumāraa*, *Māhimḍaa*, *Bambhalogaa*, *Laṃtayaa*, *Mahāsukkaa*, *Sahassāraa*, *Āṇoyaa*, *Pāṇayaa*, *Āraṇaa* and *Accutaa*—about all of whom the differentiae, viz. ‘generalized’ (and) ‘specialized’, ‘developed’ (and) ‘undeveloped’ are also to be spoken of.

216 [17]. (Similarly, when) a *Kappātītaa* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Gevejjaa* and *Aṇuttarovavūia*. (Similarly, when) a *Gevejjaa* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as lower *Gevejjaa*, middle *Gevejjaa* and upper *Gevejjaa*. (Similarly, when) a lower *Gevejjaa* is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as the lowest gods of lower *Gevejjaa*, the middle gods of lower *Gevejjaa*, and the upper most gods of lower *Gevejjaa*. (Similarly, when) a middle *Gevejjaa*, god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are the lowest gods of middle *Gevejjaa*, the middle gods of middle *Gevejjaa*, and the upper most gods of middle *Gevejjaa*. (Similarly, when) an upper *Gevejjaa* is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as the lowest gods of the upper *Gevejjaa*, the middle gods of upper *Gevejjaa*, and the

upper most gods of upper *Gevejjaa*. About all of these, the differentiae viz. 'generalized' (and) 'specialized', 'developed' (and) 'undeveloped' are to be spoken of.

216 [18]. (Similarly, when) an *Aṇuttarovavāia* god is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are gods such as *Vijayaa*, *Vejayamṭaa*, *Jayamṭaa*, *Aparājiyaa*, and *Savvatṭhasiddhaa*—about all of whom, the differentiae, viz. 'generalized' (and) 'specialized, 'developed' (and) 'undeveloped' are also to be spoken of.

216 [19]. (Similarly, when) a non-soul-substance is (considered as) generalized (genus), the specialized (species) are *dhammatthikāa*, *adhammatthikāa*, *āgāsathikāa*, *poggalatthikāa* and *addhāsamaa*. (Similarly, when) a *poggalatthikāa* is (considered as) generalized (genus) the specialised (species) are—a single material atom, a thing consisting of two space-points, a thing consisting of three space-points,...up to...a thing consisting of infinite space-points.

This is the two-named.

217. Then what is three-named.¹ The three-named (classification of objects) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) substance-name (*davvanāma*),
- (ii) attribute-name (*guṇaṇāma*), and
- (iii) modification-name (*pajjavaṇāma*).

218. Then what is the substance-name ? The substance-name is stated to be sixfold, viz.

- (i) *dhammatthikāa* (substance, co-existent with *logāgāsa*, which helps the movement of souls and material bodies);
- (ii) *adhammatthikāa* (substance co-extensive with *logāgāsa*, which helps the souls and material bodies to rest);
- (iii) *āgāsathikāa* (substance, which is imagined as a collection of parts, giving accommodation to other substances; it has two parts, viz. (i) *logāgāsa* which contains other substances, and (ii) *alogāgāsa* which is pure space),
- (iv) *jīvatthikāa* (living beings, souls);
- (v) *poggalatthikāa* (matter); and
- (vi) *addhāsamaa* (time-instant).

This is the substance-name.

219. Then what is the attribute-name ? The attribute-name is stated to be fivefold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No, 208.

- (1) colour-name;
- (2) smell-name;
- (3) taste-name;
- (4) touch-name;
- (5) figure-name;

220. Then what is the colour-name ? The colour-name is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) name as black colour;
- (ii) name as blue colour;
- (iii) name as red colour;
- (iv) name as yellow colour;
- (v) name as white colour.

This is the colour-name.

221. Then what is the smell-name ? The smell-name is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) name as sweet smell; and
- (ii) name as bad smell.

This is the smell-name.

222. Then what is the taste-name ? The taste-name is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) name as bitter (*titta*) taste;
- (ii) name as pungent (*kaḍuya*) taste;
- (iii) name as astringent (*kasāya*) taste;
- (iv) name as sour (*ambila*) taste; and
- (v) name as sweet (*mahura*) taste.

This is the taste-name.

228. Then what is the touch-name ? The touch-name is stated to be eightfold, viz.

- (i) name as hard touch;
- (ii) name as soft touch;
- (iii) name as heavy touch;
- (iv) name as light touch;
- (v) name as cold touch;
- (vi) name as hot touch;
- (vii) name as sticky touch;
- (viii) name as dry touch.

This is the touch-name.

224. Then what is the figure-name ? The figure-name is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) name as round-figure (consisting of at least twenty space-points, as a plane figure, and forty as a solid);
- (ii) name as circular-figure (consisting of at least five space-points, as a plane figure, and seven as a solid);
- (iii) name as triangular-figure (consisting of at least three space-points, as a plane figure, and four as a solid);
- (iv) name as rectangular-figure (consisting of at least four space-points, as a plane figure, and eight as a solid);
- (v) name as elongate-figure (consisting of at least two space-points, as a linear figure, six as a plane figure, and twelve as a solid).

(For further details see *Bhagavatī*, XXV. 3)

This is the figure-name. This is the attribute-name.

225. Then what is the modification-name? The modification-name is stated to be manifold, viz. one unit (=minimum) of black, two times black, ...up to... infinite times black; one unit (=minimum) of blue, two times blue...up to... infinite times blue. Similarly, red, yellow and white are also to be spoken of. (About smell)—one unit (=minimum) of sweet smell, two times sweet smell, ...up to... infinite times sweet smell. Similarly, bad smell too is to be spoken of. (About taste)—one unit (=minimum) of bitter taste, ...up to... infinite times bitter taste. Similarly, pungent, astringent, sour, and sweet (tastes), are also to be spoken of. (About touch)—one unit (=minimum) of hard touch, ...up to... infinite times hard touch. Similarly, soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, sticky, and dry (touches) are also to be spoken of.

This is the modification-name.

226. (Here there are six verses dividing all names into three categories of masculine, feminine and neuter and giving the endings of those names in different genders) :

This name again is of three kinds, (according to their genders), viz. (i) feminine, (ii) masculine and (iii) neuter. I shall speak of the explanation of the endings of the three //18//

The endings of masculine (names), among them, are four, viz. *ā*, *ī*, *ū*, and *o*. The same are (true) of feminine (names), excepting 'o' //19//

Of the neuter (names), the endings—*aṃ*, *iṃ*, and *uṃ* are to be understood. Now, I shall give the examples of each of these three (genders) //20//

Of the masculine (words, the examples are as follows) : ending in *ā*, as *rāyā*; ending in *ī* as *girī* and *siharī*; ending in *ū* as *viṅhū*; and ending in *o* as *dumo* //21//

Of the feminine (words, the examples are) : ending in *ā* as *mālā*; ending in *ī* as *sirī* and *lacchī*; ending in *ū* as *jambū* and *vahū* ||22||

Of the neuter (words, the examples are) : ending in *aṃ* as *dhannaṃ*; ending in *iṃ* as *acchiṃ* which is neuter; and ending in *uṃ* as *pīluṃ* and *mahuṃ* ||23||

This is the three-named.

227. Then what is four-named ?¹ The four-named (classification of objects) is stated as the four categories (of changes in words), viz.

- (i) (made) by addition of a letter (*āgama*);
- (ii) (made) by dropping a letter (*lova*);
- (iii) (made) by (preservation of) the original form
payai, *prakṛti*);
- (iv) (made) by (radical) change of form (*vigāra*).

228. Then what is (name made) by addition of a letter ? (The name made) by addition of a letter is (illustrated in the following) : *padmāni*, *payāṃsi*, and *kuṇḍāni* (in all these words the *n*-element is added).

This is (the name made) by addition of a letter.

229. Then what is (the name made) by dropping a letter ? (The name made) by dropping of a letter (is illustrated in the following) : *te + atra = te'tra*, *poṭo + atra = poṭo'tra*, *ghato + atra = ghato'tra*, *ratho + atra = ratho'tra*.

This is (the name made) by dropping of a letter.

230. Then what is (the name made) by (preservation of the) original form ? (The name made) by (preservation of the) original form is (illustrated in the following) : *agnī + etau (= agnī etau)*, *paṭū + imau (= paṭū imau)*, *śāle + ete (= śāle ete)*, and *māle + ime (= māle ime)*.

This is (the name made) by (preservation of the) original form.

231. Then what is (the name made) by change of form ? (The name made) by change of form is (illustrated in the following) : *daṇḍasya + agram = daṇḍāgram*, *sā + āgatā = sā'gatā*, *dadhi + idam = dadhīdam*, *nadī + ihate = nadīhate*, *madhu + udakam = madhūdakam* and *bahu + ūhate = bahūhate*.

This is (the name made) by change of form. This is the four-named.

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No 208.

232. Then what is five-named ?¹ The five-named (classification of objects) is stated as the five categories (of words), viz.

- (i) name (*nāmika*);
- (ii) indeclinable (*naipātika*);
- (iii) verb (*ākhyātika*);
- (iv) prefix (*aupasargika*); and
- (v) mixture of them (*miśra*),

(For instance), the word 'aśva' is a name (standing for a thing), the word 'khalu' is an indeclinable, the word 'dhāvati' is a verb, the word 'pari' is a prefix, and the word 'samyata' is a mixture (of prefix and name).

This is the five-named.

233. Then what is the six-named ?² The six-named (classification of objects) is stated as the six categories (of the states of the soul), viz.

- (i) the state of rise (fruition) of *karmans* (*udaia*);
- (ii) the state of subsidence of *karmans* (*uvasamia*);
- (iii) the state of destruction of *karmans* (*khaia*);
- (iv) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* (*khaovasamia*);
- (v) the state of innate change (*pāriṇāmia*);
- (vi) the state of mixture of them (*sannivātia*).

234. Then what is the state of rise of *karmans* ? The state of rise of *karmans* is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the state of rise of *karmans*;
- (2) the state produced by the rise of *karmans*.

235. Then what is the state of rise of *karmans* ? The state of rise of *karmans* is the (state of souls that has emerged) on account of the rise (fruition) of the eight species of *karmans*.

This is the state of rise of *karmans*.

236. Then what is the state produced by the rise of *karmans* ? The state produced by the rise of *karmans* is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the soul;
- (ii) the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the non-soul.

237. Then what is the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the soul ?

1. Vide supra, sūtra No. 208.

2. Vide supra, sūtra No. 208.

The state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the soul is stated to be manifold, viz. beings in hell, animal creatures, human beings, gods, earth-bodied beings...up to...beings with movable bodies, beings possessed of the passion of anger,...up to...beings possessed of the passion of greed; beings possessed of female sex (and sex-passion for union with a male), possessed of male sex (and sex-passion for union with a female), neuter sex (and strong sex-passion directed towards both male and female); beings with black colour-index (*kanha lesa*), and similarly beings with blue, grey, fiery, lotus (pink) and white colour-index; beings with wrong faith; beings lacking self-control; ignorant beings; being absorbing food (except when it is in *viggaha-gati*, transmigration with one or more turns); beings with the cover (of knowledge-obscuring *karmans*); (omniscient) beings with activity; beings involved in worldly life; and beings not possessed of (disembodied) emancipation.

This is the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the soul.

238. Then what is the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the non-soul? The state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the non-soul is stated to be fourteen-fold, viz. (i) the gross (*orāliya*) body (of animals and human beings) or (ii) the substance changed by the action of the gross body, (iii) the transformation (*veuvviya*) body or (iv) the substance changed by the action of the transformation-body. Similarly, it is to be spoken of (v-vi) the translocation (*āhāraga*) body, (vii-viii) the fiery (*teyaga*) body and (ix-x) the karmic body. (The substance) changed by action of (those bodies, manifested as various) (xi) colour, (xii) smell, (xiii) taste, and (xiv) touch.

This is the state produced by the rise of *karmans* in the non-soul. This is the state produced by the rise of *karmans*. This is the state of the rise of *karmans*.

239. Then what is the state of subsidence of *karmans*?¹ The state of subsidence of *karmans* is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the state of subsidence of *karmans*; and
- (2) the state produced by the subsidence of *karmans*.

240. Then what is the state of *karmans*? The state of subsidence of *karmans* is (state of the soul) on account of the subsidence of *karmans* which delude (the right attitude of the soul).

This is the state of the subsidence of *karmans*.

241. Then what is the state produced by the subsidence of *karmans*? The state produced by the subsidence of *karmans* is stated to

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 233.

be manifold, viz. (the states of) beings with subsided anger...up to... with subsided greed, with subsided affection, with subsided hatred, with subsided intuition-deluding *karmans*, with subsided conduct-deluding *karmans*, with subsided deluding *karmans*, whose attainment of right intuition is subsided, whose attainment of right conduct is subsided, who—on account of the (complete) subsidence of attachment—is free from passions, though possessed of the cover (of ignorance).

This is the state produced by the subsidence of *karmans*. This is the state of subsidence of *karmans*.

242. Then what is the state of destruction of *karmans*?¹ The state of destruction of *karmans* is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) the state of destruction of *karmans*; and
- (ii) the state produced by the destruction of *karmans*.

243. Then what is the state of destruction of *karmans*? The state of destruction of *karmans* is (state of the soul) on account of the destruction of the eight species of *karmans*. This is the state of destruction of *karmans*.

244. Then what is the state produced by the destruction of *karmans*? The state produced by the destruction of *karmans* is stated to be manifold, viz.

(a) (The states of the soul who is) holder of complete knowledge and intuition which have arisen, Arhat, Jñā, and Omniscient (*kevalin*), whose obscuration of perceptual cognition is destroyed, whose obscuration of scriptural knowledge is destroyed, whose obscuration of clairvoyance is destroyed, whose obscuration of telepathy is destroyed, whose obscuration of perfect knowledge is destroyed, who has no obscuration, who is without obscuration, who is with obscuration destroyed, who is free from *karmans* obscuring knowledge;

(b) (the states of the soul who) has pure intuition, has complete intuition, has destroyed light slumber, destroyed deep slumber, destroyed sound slumber while sitting or standing, destroyed intensive slumber while walking, destroyed slumber while acting in unconscious state, has destroyed obscuration of eye-intuition, destroyed obscuration of intuition by sense-organs other than the eye, destroyed obscuration of clairvoyance-intuition, destroyed obscuration of perfect intuition, has no obscuration, is without obscuration, with obscuration destroyed, is free from *karmans* obscuring intuition;

1. Vide supra *sūtra* No. 233.

(c) (the states of the soul who) has destroyed pleasurable-feeling-producing *karmans*, destroyed painful-feeling-producing *karmans*, has no feeling, is without feeling, has destroyed feeling, is free from *karmans* which produce auspicious and inauspicious feelings;

(d) (the states of the soul who) has destroyed anger, ...up to...has destroyed greed, has destroyed affection, has destroyed hatred, has destroyed *karmans* deluding right faith, has destroyed *karmans* deluding right conduct, has no delusion, is without delusion, has destroyed delusion, is free from deluding *karmans*;

(e) (the states of the soul) who has destroyed the longevity of beings in hell, destroyed the longevity of animal creatures, destroyed the longevity of human beings, destroyed the longevity of gods, has no longevity, is without longevity, has destroyed the longevity, is free from *karmans* determining longevity;

(f) (the states of the soul) who is free from (the following *karmans*): (four) states of existence, (five) classes of beings, (five kinds of) bodies, the chief and secondary parts of bodies, (five) bindings, (five) conglomerating *karmans*, (six) firmness of joints, (six) configuration (*saṃthāṇa*)¹ determining *karmans*, and *karmans* which determine groups of various kinds of bodies, has destroyed auspicious name, has destroyed inauspicious name, has no name, is without name, has destroyed name, is free from *karmans* determining auspicious and inauspicious names;

(g) (the states of the soul) who has destroyed the high family status, destroyed the low family status, has no family status, is without family status, has destroyed family status, is free from *karmans* determining auspicious and inauspicious family status;

(h) (the states of the soul) who has destroyed obstruction of the power of giving, has destroyed obstruction of the power of receiving, has destroyed obstruction of the power of enjoying temporary things, has destroyed obstruction of the power of enjoying semi-permanent things, has destroyed obstruction of will power, has no obstruction, is without obstruction, and has destroyed obstruction, is free from obstructive *karmans*;

and who is (thus) emancipated, enlightened, freed, finally liberated, has finished (birth and death), and has destroyed all kinds of suffering.

This is the state produced by the destruction of *karmans*. This is the state of destruction of *karmans*.

1. Vide footnote 9 on p. 110 of the MJV edition.

245. Then what is the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* ?¹ The state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*;
- (2) the state produced by the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

246. Then what is the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* ? The state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* is (attained) by subsidence-cum-destruction of the four destructive *karmans*, viz. by the subsidence-cum-destruction of (i) (*karmans*) obscuring knowledge (*nāṇāvaraṇijja*), (ii) (*karmans*) obscuring intuition (*daṃsaṇāv-araṇijja*), (iii) deluding *karmans* (*mohaṇijja*) and (iv) obstructive *karmans* (*antarāyia*).

This is the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

247. Then what is the state produced by the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* ? The state produced by the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* is stated to be manifold, viz.

(a) Attainment of perceptual cognition on account of the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*...up to... the attainment of telepathy on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*;

(b) attainment of perverted sensuous knowledge on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*, attainment of perverted scriptural knowledge on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*, attainment of perverted clairvoyance (*vibhaṅganāṇa*) on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*;

(c) attainment of eye-intuition on account of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*, attainment of other than-eye-intuition on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*, attainment of clairvoyant intuition on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*;

(d) similarly, (there are the states of) attainment of right faith, attainment of wrong faith, and attainment of right-cum-wrong faith;

(e) attainment of equanimous conduct on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*; similarly, (there are the states of) attainment of re-initiation, attainment of purity by refraining from sin, and attainment of conduct where only subtle types

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 233.

of passions arise; similarly, (there are the states of) attainment of right conduct and wrong conduct (jointly);

(f) attainment of (the power of) giving on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*; similarly, (there are the states of) attainment of (the power of) receiving, attainment of (the power of) enjoying temporary things, attainment of (the power of) enjoying semi-permanent things, attainment of will power on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*; similarly, (there are the states of) attainment of will power of the wise (free from all desires), attainment of will power of the fool (not free from desires), attainment of will power of the wise-cum-fool (only partially free from desires);

(g) (the following states occur on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* obscuring sensuous knowledge): (there are the states of) attainment of (the power of) auditory sense-organ on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*...up to...attainment of the (power of) tactile sense-organ on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*.

(h) (The attainment of states that occur on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* obscuring scriptural knowledge is given as follows : there is the state of) the holder of the *Āyāra* on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*; similarly, (there are the states of) holder of the *Sūyagada*, holder of the *Thāṇa*, holder of the *Samavāya*, holder of the *Vivāhapaṇṇatti*, holder of the *Nāyādhammakahā*, holder of the *Uvāsagadasā*, holder of the *Antagadadasā* holder of the *Aṇuttarovavāiadasā*, holder of the *Paṇhavāgarāṇa*, and holder of the *Vivāgasua* which is due to subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*; and there is the state of) holder of *Ditthivāya* on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*. (And there are the states of) holder of the nine *Puṇṇas* on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*...up to...holder of the fourteen *Puṇṇas*. (And there are the states of) *Gāṇī* on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans* and teacher on account of the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of (relevant) *karmans*.

This is the state produced by the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*. This is the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

248. Then what is the state of innate change ?¹ The state of innate change is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the state of innate change with beginning; and
- (2) the state of innate change without beginning.

249. Then what is the state of innate change with beginning ? The state of innate change with beginning is stated to be manifold, as (given in the following verse) :

Old spirituous liquor, old molasses, old ghee, and old rice, clouds and cloud-trees, evening, and imaginary towns in the sky //24//

(And these are additional examples) : the fire falling from heaven, conflagration of directions, roaring of thunder, lightning, thunderstorm, mixture of light of sunset and moon-rise on the first three days of the bright half of a month, fiery ghosts, mist, frost, rising of dust, the lunar eclipses, solar eclipses, halo round the moon, halo round the sun, double moon, double sun, rainbow, parts of rainbow, bright and fierce laugh of a monkey, lines appearing under the solar disc after sunrise and before sunset, the countries (of *Bharata*, etc.), mountains (such as *Himavat*, etc.), villages, towns, houses, mountains, underground regions, abodes of *Bhavaṇapati*, the hells which are *Rayaṇappabhā*, *Sakkarappabhā*, *Vāluṇappabhā*, *Paṅkappabhā*, *Dhumappabhā*, *Tamā*, *Tamatamā*, (the abodes of gods which are) *Sohamma*, *Īsāṇa*...up to...*Āṇa*, *Pānaa*, *Āraṇa*, *Accua*, *Gevejja*, *Aṇuttarovaṇḍiyya*, *Īsīpabbhārā*, material monad, (consisting of one single material atom), duad (body composed of two space-points),... up to...a body composed of infinite space-points.

This is the state of innate change with beginning.

250. Then what is the state of innate change without beginning ? The state of innate change without beginning is (as follows) :

²*Dhammatthikāa*, *adhammatthikāa*, *āgāsattthikāa*, *jīvatthikāa*, *poggala-tthikāa*, *addhāsamaa*, the inhabited world (*loa*), beyond world (*aloa*)³, (soul fit to attain) complete salvation from worldly existence, and unfit to attain salvation from worldly existence.

This is the state of innate change without beginning. This is the state of innate change.

251. Then what is the mixture (of them) ?⁴ The mixture (of them) is (as follows) : The name 'mixture' is given to all such states as

1. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 233.

2. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 218.

3. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 218, for the meanings of *loāgāsa* and *aloāgāsa*,

4. Vide supra, *sūtra* No. 233

are produced by the (A) combination of two, (B) combination of three, (C) combination of four, (D) combination of five of the states, viz. the state of the rise of *karmans*, the state of the subsidence of *karmans*, the state of the destruction of *karmans*, the state of the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*, and the state of innate change. Of them, the combinations of two are ten, the combinations of three are ten, the combinations of four are five and the combination of five is only one.

252. Here, the ten which are obtained by the combination of two states are these: (1) There is a name produced by the state of the rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans*; (2) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*; (3) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (4) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (5) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*; (6) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (7) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (8) there is a name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (9) there is a name produced by the the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (10) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

253. (i) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise (of *karmans*) and the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans*.

(2) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is an example of the state of rise of *karmans* and the right faith is (an example of) the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*.

(3) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction

of *karmans*—this is the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(4) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) state of rise of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(5) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*? The (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the right faith is (an example of) the destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*.

(6) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(7) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(8) What is the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(9) What is the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(10) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

254. Here, the ten which are obtained by the combination of three are these: (1) There is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*; (2) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (3) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (4) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (5) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (6) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (7) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (8) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (9) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (10) there is a name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

255. (i) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the right faith is (an example of) destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans*.

(2) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are

an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(3) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(4) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(5) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(6) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(7) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The (subsided) passions are (an

example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of the *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(8) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(9) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(10) What is the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

256. Here, the five which are obtained by the combination of four states are these : (1) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*; (2) there is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (3) There is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (4) there is a name produced by the state

of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change; (5) there is a name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

257 (1). What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans*.

(2) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(3) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(4) What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of

karmans, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

(5) What is the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The (subsided) passion are (an example of) the state of subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

258. Here, the one which is obtained by the combination of five states is (as follows): There is a name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

259. What is the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change? The human (state of existence) is (an example of) the state of rise of *karmans*, the (subsided) passions are (an example of) the subsidence of *karmans*, the right faith is (an example of) the state of destruction of *karmans*, the sense-organs are (an example of) the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* and the soul is (an example of) the state of innate change—this is (the example of) the name produced by the state of rise of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence of *karmans* plus the state of destruction of *karmans* plus the state of subsidence-cum-destruction of *karmans* plus the state of innate change.

This is the mixture. This is the six-named (objects).

260 [1]. Then what is the seven-named (objects)?¹ The seven-named (objects) are stated to be the seven musical notes (in the following verse), viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No., 208.

- (i) *Sajja* (Skt. *ṣaḍja*, i.e. the note produced by six parts of the vocal organ, viz. nose, throat, chest, palate, tongue and teeth);
- (ii) *risabha* (Skt. *vṛṣabha*, this note resembles the roaring of a bull, which is caused by the wind rising from the navel, striking at the upper part of the throat);
- (iii) *gaṃdhāra* (this note is so called because it carries various smells, it is produced by wind which rises from the navel and strikes at the heart and the throat);
- (iv) *majjhima* (this note is a loud sound which rises from the navel, striking at the chest and heart, and reaches back the navel);
- (v) *pañcama* note (this note is so called because it rises from five parts, viz. chest, heart, throat and head);
- (vi) *dhevaa* or *drevaa* (this note is called ‘*dhevaa*’ because it follows all other notes); and
- (vii) *nesāa* (this note is called *niṣāda* because all the notes reside in it, and it overcomes all other notes).

These are given as the seven notes //25//

260 [2]. Of these seven notes, the seven places (of origin) of notes are stated (in the following verses), viz.

(One should speak) the (i) *sajja* with the tip of the tongue, the note (ii) *risaha* with chest, the (iii) *gaṃdhāra* with (the wind) coming out of the throat, the (iv) *majjhima* with the middle part of the tongue //26//

One should speak the (v) *pañcama* with the nose, the (vi) *dhevaa* with the teeth and lips and the (vii) *nesāa* with upraised eye-brows. (Thus, these seven) places of (the origin of) the notes are explained //27//

260 [3]. The seven notes are stated to be associated with living beings (as stated in the following verses), viz.

(i) The peacock makes the note of the *sajja*, (ii) the cock makes the note of the *risabha*, (iii) the swan makes the note of the *gaṃdhāra* and (iv) the sheep or ram makes the note of the *majjhima* //28//

Then, in the spring season when flowers blossom forth (v) the Indian cuckoos make the note of the *pañcama* (vi) the cranes and curlews make the sixth note, and (vii) the elephant makes the seventh note called *nesāa* //29//

260 [4]. The seven notes are (again) stated to be associated with non-living objects (in the following verses), viz.

(i) The drum makes the note of the *sajja*, (ii) the bugle (made of cow's horn, etc.) makes the note of *risaha* (sic), (iii) the (military drum made of) conch shell makes the notes of the *gaṃdhāra*, and (iv) the cymbal (*jhallaṇī*) makes the note of the *majjhima* //30//

(v) The musical instrument *gohiyā* (used with tumblers) fixed on the earth with four legs makes the note of the *paṃcama*, (vi) the big kettledrum makes the note of *dhevaia* (sic), and (vii) the huge drum makes the seventh note //31//

260 [5]. Of these seven notes, the seven note-characteristics (=gains) are stated (in the following verses):

(i) By means of the *sajja*, one gains a livelihood and his achieved (gain) does not perish. He further (gains) oxen, sons, friends, and becomes beloved of women //32//

(ii) By means of the *risaha* (sic), one gains lordship, commandership, wealth, garments, perfume, ornaments, women and beds //33//

(iii) Those who have the knowledge of the science of the music of the *gaṃdhāra* and others who have consummate knowledge of the treatises (four *Vedas*, etc.) gain a commendable livelihood, excel in art and become wise poets //34//

(iv) Those who practise the note of the *majjhima* live a happy life and, depending upon the note of the *majjhima*, eat, drink and offer (presents to others) //35//

(v) Those who practise the note of the *paṃcama* are the lords of the earth, are brave men entertaining other people, and are the leaders of many peoples //36//

(vi) Those who practise the note of the *dhevaia* live a miserable life, put on ugly clothes (*kucelā*), have bad conduct, are thieves, and *caṃḍālas* (low caste men with a *brāhmaṇī* mother and a *śūdra* father) and boxers¹ //37//

(vii) But those who practise the note of *nesāya* are doers of quarrel, are pedestrians, bearers of letters, wanderers and load-bearers² //38//

1. We have rendered the text given in footnote 4 on p. 118 of the MJV edition. The other reading is :--

dhevayasaramaṃtā u havaṃti kalahappiyā /
sāṇḍiyā vagguriyā soyariyā macchabaṃdhā ya //37//

2. Here also we have rendered the text given in footnote 4 on p. 118 of the MJV edition. The other reading is :--

caṃḍālā muṭṭhiyā metī, je yaṇṇe pāvakarino /
goghātagā ya corā ya nesītaṇ saramassitā //38//

260 [6]. Of these seven notes, three musical scales (*gāma*) are stated, viz.

- (i) musical scale of *saija*;
- (ii) musical scale of *majjhima*;
- (iii) musical scale of *gaṃdhāra*.

260 [7]. Of the *saija* musical scale, seven melodies (regulated rises and falls of sounds through the *gāma*) are stated (in the following verse), viz.

- (1) *maggī*,
- (2) *koraviā*,
- (3) *harī*, and
- (4) *rayaṇī*, and
- (5) *sārkaṇṭā*,
- (6) *sārasi*, the sixth, and
- (7) *suddhasaijā*, the seventh //39//

260 [8]. Of the *majjhima* musical scale, seven melodies are stated (in the following verse), viz.

- (1) *uttaramaṃdā*,
- (2) *rayaṇī*,
- (3) *uttarā*,
- (4) *uttarāyasā (tā)*,
- (5) *assokaṇṭā*, and
- (6) *sovīrā*, (and)
- (7) the seventh is *abhīrū* //40//

260 [9]. Of the *gaṃdhāra* musical scale seven melodies are stated (in the following verses), viz.

- (1) *naṃdī*, and
- (2) *khuddimā*,
- (3) *pūrimā*, and
- (4) the fourth (is) *suddhagaṃdhārā*,
- (5) the fifth melody is *uttaragaṃdhārā* //41//
- (6) the sixth is to be known as *suttḥuttaramāyāmā* of necessity, and
- (7) then the *uttarāyatā koḍimā* (is) the seventh melody //42//

260 [10]. Where do the seven notes come from? What is the origin of song? What is the time-length of the breath? Or how many are the special tones of song? //43//

The seven notes come out of the navel, lamenting is the origin of song; the breaths have the same length as the metrical quarter (in a stanza), and there are three tones of a song //44//

That is, those (who sing a song) start in soft tone at the beginning, (they) raise the tone high at the middle part and finish in low tone at the end. And (thus) a song has three special tones //45//

There are six faults, eight merits, three metres, and two languages (in singing a song). The nicely trained man who will know (these) will sing on the stage //46//

The six faults of singing are to be known in (the following) order, viz. (1) (What is sung with) frightened (mind), (2) (what is sung) too quickly, (3) with unrestrained breath and also too quickly, (4) with excessive sound of cymbal, (5) with loose harsh sound (like the sound of crow), and (6) with nasalized sound //47//

The eight merits of singing are (as follows) : (1) perfect (with all notes of sounds in proper order), (2) charming (with feeling in singing), (3) decorated (with tunes), (4) clear, (5) without discordance, (6) sweet (like the tone of cuckoo), (7) harmonious, and (8) excessively soft //48//

And a song is sung with clearance in breast, throat, and head, and is soft and (properly) regulated, and well composed in words (to be sung), and (accompanied with) harmonious clapping of hand and instrumental music (of the sound of the footsteps of dancing girls), and is harmonious with the seven musical notes //49//

The seven notes are harmonious in respect of (1) letters (long, short, protracted, nasal), (2) words, (3) clapping (of hands or drum), (4) the note of stringed instrument (*laya*), (5) the first pitch in which a song is begun, (6) expired breath and inspired breath, and (7) movement of fingers //50//

A song should be (1) without any fault, (2) possessed of significant meaning, (3) well reasoned, (4) decorated with figures of speech, (5) well concluded, (6) expressive of kind, consistent and blameless meaning or accompanied with alliteration, (7) well measured, and (8) sweet //51//

There are only three types of metre, viz. uniform (wherein all the quarter-verses are identical in structure), semi-uniform (wherein only the first and third on the one hand, and second and fourth quarter-verses on the other hand are identical in structure), and wholly uneven (where all the quarter-verses are different in structure). There is no fourth (type) //52//

There are only two languages, viz. Sanskrit and Prakrit. The praiseworthy *Isibhāsiyas* (words spoken by the wise) are sung in totality of the notes (of the *sajja*, etc.) //53//

260 [11]. What sort of woman sings in sweet (tone) ? What sort of woman sings in rough and harsh tone ? What sort of woman sings with skill ? What sort of woman sings slowly and quickly ? What sort of woman sings out of tune ? //54// [five-footed verse].

¹A woman 'with fair skin' (*gorī*) sings sweet (songs). A woman 'with dark skin' (*sāmā*) sings roughly and in harsh tone. A woman of 'black colour' (*kālī*) sings with skill. A 'one-eyed woman' (*kāṇā*) sings slowly, and a 'blind woman' (*amdhā*) sings quickly. A woman of 'tawny colour' (*piṅgalā*) sings out of tune //55// [five-footed verse].

There are seven notes, three musical scales, twenty-one melodies, forty-nine tones coming out of the (seven) strings, the totality of the notes are finished (here) //56//

This is the seven-named (object).

261. Then what is the eight-named ?² The eight-named (objects) are illustrated as the eight kinds of the case-endings of words (in the following verses), viz.

(i) The first case-ending is used for indication (of the meaning of the word, including its gender and number, *niddesa*), (ii) the second is used for advice (*uvaesaṇa*), (iii) the third is used for instrument (*karana*), (iv) the fourth is used for the recipient (of the gift, *saṅgha-yaṇa*) //57//

(v) The fifth is used for the object from which (something) is separated (*apāyāṇa*), (vi) the sixth is used to indicate the relation of 'one's own and 'master' (*sassāmiṅvāyaṇa*), (vii) the seventh is used to mean the receptacle (of something, *sannidhāṇa*), and (viii) the eighth is used in addressing (*āmaṅtanī*) //58//

Among these (eight), (i) the (example of the) first case-ending in the sense of indication is 'he' (*so*), 'this (person)' (*imo*), or 'I' (*ahaṃ*). (ii) The (example of the) second in the sense of advice is 'speak or make this (*imaṃ*) or that' (*taṃ*) //59//

(iii) The (example of the) third in the sense of 'instrument' is '(this) was done or spoken *by him* (*teṇa*) or *by me*'. (*mae*). (This is apparently a case of third case-ending in the nominative sense. But if the preceptor is the ultimate doer, his subordinate monks are the instruments in learning the scripture or doing some work ordered by the preceptor. In this latter way, the case-ending under consideration may be taken in the instrumental sense). (iv) The (example

1. We have followed footnote 5 on p. 120 of the MJV edition.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 208.

of the) fourth is the form 'Oh ! obeisance to the oblation (*sāhāe*, *svāha* personified as a daughter of *Dakṣa* and wife to *Agni*)' in the sense of recipient of a gift //60//

(v) The (example of the) fifth in the sense of the object from which (something) is separated is 'Take away from or take 'from this (*etto*)' or 'from that (*ito*)'. (vi) The (example of the) sixth is 'of this (*tassa*)', or 'of one who is gone (*imassa va gayassa*)' in the sense of relation of master (and one's own) //61//

(vii) The (example of the) seventh is 'This is *in this* (*imanmi*)' in the sense of support, time, and state and (viii) the (example of the) eighth is used in the sense of addressing, e.g., 'Oh ! young man (*he jvāṇa*)' //62//

This is the eight-named (example of objects).

262 [1]. Then what is the nine-named?¹ The nine-named (objects) are illustrated as nine sentiments of poetry (in the following verses), viz.

(By nine poetic sentiments the following) are to be understood,

- (i) heroism (*vīra*),
- (ii) love (*siṅgāra*), and
- (iii) wonder (*abbhua*), and
- (iv) anger of fury (*rodḍa*),
- (v) shame (*velaṇa*),
- (vi) disgust (*bībhaccha*),
- (vii) mirth (*hāsa*),
- (viii) pity (*kaluṇa*), and
- (ix) tranquillity (*pasamta*) // 63//

262 [2]. Of these (nine sentiments), the sentiment of heroism has (the characteristic) marks, viz. absence of repentance, patience and energy (respectively) in (the acts of) (i) charity, (ii) practice of austerity and (iii) destruction of the enemy //64//

The (example of the) sentiment of heroism is:

'He indeed is a great hero who, abandoning (his kingdom, and having received ascetic ordination, effects the destruction of the party of great enemy, viz. lust and anger //65//

262 [3]. The sentiment named love causes the desire for union with (objects of) enjoyment, and its (characteristic) marks are adornment (with bracelet, etc.), amorous movement (such as

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 208,

casting of glance of love, etc.), sensual gestures, smile, amorous sports and play //66//

The (example of the) sentiment of love is :

‘dark coloured’ woman (*sāmā*) shows to young men her girdle (emitting) sweet (note), charming on account of amorous movement, producing noisy sound, and causing strong passion in the hearts (of young men //67//

262 [4]. The sentiment named wonder is that which causes surprise, is (often) novel (that is, not enjoyed previously), as also that which was experienced before, and is characterized by the rising of joy and sorrow //68//

The following is (the example of) the sentiment of wonder :

What else could be more wonderful in this world of living beings than this that through the scripture of the Jinās, the objects of all the three (periods of) time become known //69//

262 [5]. The sentiment named anger arises from the imagination and (hearing of) stories of fearful figure (of demons), voice (of demons), and darkness, and is characterized by bewilderment, illusion, sorrow, and death //70//

The (example of the) sentiment of anger is :

‘You, surcharged with excessive anger, are angry indeed, as you are killing the animal, appearing like a demon making fearful sound, with your face deformed by curls in the forehead, with biting lips and covered with blood here and there //71//

262 [6]. The sentiment named shame (*velāṇaa*) is caused by transgression of the bounds of modest behaviour, secrecy, and wives of respectable persons and is characterized by generation of (feelings of) shyness and fear //72//

The following is (an example of the) sentiment of shame :

Is there anything more shameful than this popular ceremony of which I feel so ashamed, as in this matrimony, the elders worship the bride’s garment //73//

262 [7] The sentiment named disgust is caused by the (bad) smell and repeated association with impurity (of urine and excreta), corpse, and disagreeable sight, and is characterized by renunciation and absence of violence //74//

The following is (an example of) the sentiment of disgust :

The blessed men give up the abominable body which is polluted with various dirt and which has bad smell, being of the nature of cavities filled with impurity and filth at all times //75//

262 [8]. The sentiment named mirth is effected by the metamorphosis of form (such as a male appearing as a female), age (such as a youth appearing as an old man), dress and language, and is characterized by brightening (of eyes) and (is attended with) cheerfulness of the mind //76//

The following is (an example of the) sentiment of mirth :

Look : how the 'dark coloured' woman, looking at her husband's young brother who was asleep, but is just awoke after being besmeared with black ink (around his face), laughs with her abdomen bent on account of the trembling of her weighty breasts //77//

262 [9]. The sentiment named pity is caused by the separation from the lover, capture, killing, disease, death and fear and is characterized by sorrow, lamentation dismal (*paṇṇāya*) and weeping //78//

The following is (an example of) the sentiment of pity :

(Some old woman says to a young girl) : Oh daughter ! Your face has become feeble, fatigued with excessive contemplation (of the lover) and with eyes frequently overflowing with tears //79//

262 [10]. What is caused by faultless equilibrium of mind and which is (attended) with placid state (of mind) and is characterized by unruffledness, is to be known as the sentiment of tranquillity //80//

The following is (an example of) sentiment of tranquillity :

'Look how the lotus of the saint's face shines in excessive beauty, being unruffled on account of good nature and calmed down, tranquillized and gentle appearance //81//

These nine sentiments of the poetry which (usually) originate from the thirty-two kinds of faults¹, are to be known through the (above) verses, as pure (in some poetry) as well as mixed (in others) //82//

This is the nine-named (example of objects).

263. Then what is the ten-named ?² The ten-named (example of objects) is stated to be tenfold (thus): (names)

- (i) according to the attributes (denoted by the word) being true (of the meaning of the word)—*gonṇa*;
- (ii) according to the attributes (denoted by the word) being not true (of the meaning of the word)—*no-gonṇa*;

1. Vide Commentary, p. 128b.

2. Vide supra, *sūta* No. 208.

- (iii) according to the commencing words (of the chapters, etc., of the scripture)—*āyāṇapadeṇaṃ*;
- (iv) according to the words being opposite (in meaning to the actual word used)—*paṭipakkhapadeṇaṃ*;
- (v) according to the prominence—*pāhaṇṇayāe*;
- (vi) according to the beginningless (eternal) doctrine—*aṇḍīyasiddhamteṇaṃ*;
- (vii) according to the names—*nāmeṇaṃ*;
- (viii) according to the part (of a whole object denoted by the word)—*avayavenaṃ*;
- (ix) according to the combination—*saṃjogenaṃ*
- (x) according to the standard—*paṃāṇeṇaṃ*.

264. Then what is (the name) according to the attributes being true? (The names) according to the attributes being true are (as follows) :

‘One who forgives’ is the forgiver (*khamatīti khamāṇo*).

‘What heats’ is the heater (= sun, *tapatīti tavaṇo*).

‘What burns’ is the burner (= fire, *jalatīti jalaṇo*).

‘What blows’ is the blower (= wind, *pavatīti pavaṇo*).

This is (the name) according to the attributes being true.

265. Then what is (the name) according to the attributes being not true? (The names) according to the attributes being not true are (as follows) :

A (bird is called) *sakuṃṭa* (though) being without *kuṃṭa* (*akuṃṭa* = without the weapon called *kuṃṭa*). A (casket is called) *samugga* (though) being without *mugga* (*amugga* = without kidney beans). The (ocean is called) *samudda* (though) being without *mudda* (*amudda* = without finger-ring). The (chaff is called) *palāla* (though) being without *lāla* (*alāla* = without saliva). A (bird is called) *sakuliyā* (though) being without *kuliyā* (*akuliyā* = without wall). The (*palāsa* tree or leaf is called *palāsa* (though) it does not eat flesh (*no palam asati*). The (white ant is called) *mātivāhaa* (though) it is not *mātivāhaa* (*amātivāhaa* = not carrying mother). A (kind of insect is called) *bīyavāvāa* (though) it is not *bīyavāvāa* (*abīyavāvāa* = anything which does not pervade seeds). A three-sensed insect is called) *indagovāa* (though) it does not protect Indra.

This is (the name) according to the attributes being not true.

266. Then what is (the name according to the commencing words (of the chapter, etc., of the scripture) ? (The names) according to the commencing words (of the chapters etc. of the scripture) are (as follows) :

¹*Dhammo maṅgalaṃ* (the name of the first chapter of the *Dasaveyāliyasutta*, which begins with 'dhammo').

Cūliyā (the name of the second *cūliyā* of the *Dasaveyāliyasutta* which begins with 'cūliyā').

Āvaṃṭī (the name of the first, second and third *uddesas* of the fifth chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Āyāraṅga*, as all the three begin with 'āvaṃṭī').

Cāuraṃgiṃṃaṃ (the name of the third chapter of the *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, which begins with 'cattāri').

Asaṃkhayaṃ (the name of the fourth chapter of the *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, which begins with 'asaṃkhayaṃ').

Āhattahīyaṃ (the name of the thirteenth chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'āhattahīyaṃ').

Addaiṃṃaṃ (the name of the sixth chapter of the second *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'purākaḍaṃ').

Jaṇṇaiṃṃaṃ (the name of the twenty-fifth chapter of *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, which begins with 'māhaṇakulasambhūo').

Purisaiṃṃaṃ (another name of the sixth chapter of the *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, usually known as *Khuddagaṇiyamaṅṭhiṃṃaṃ* which begins with 'jāvanta').

Usukariṃṃaṃ (the name of the fourteenth chapter of the *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, which begins with 'devā').

Elaiṃṃaṃ (the name of the seventh chapter of the *Uttarajjhayaṇasutta*, which begins with 'jahāesaṃ').

Vīriyaṃ (the name of the eighth chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'duhā').

Dhammo (the name of the ninth chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'kayare').

Maggo (the name of the eleventh chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'kayare').

Samosaraṇaṃ (the name of the twelfth chapter of the first *Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga*, which begins with 'cattāri').

Gaṃṭha (the name of the fourteenth chapter of the first (*Suyakkhamdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṅga* which begins with 'gaṃṭhaṃ').

1. What follows is mainly according to the footnotes 12-14 on p. 124 of the MJV edition though incorporating the additional item of the MJV edition also.

Jamaīyaṃ (the name of the fifteenth chapter of the first *Suyakkhaṃdha* of the *Sūyagaḍaṃga*, usually known as *Āyāṇiya*, which begins with 'jamaīyaṃ').

This is (the name) according to the commencing words (of the chapter, etc. of the scripture).

267. Then what is (the name) according to the words being opposite (in meaning) ? The following are (the examples of) names according to the words being opposite:

When people settle in new settlements like—village, mine (*āgara*), town, town surrounded by boundary wall made of earth (*kheḍa*), city surrounded by low rampart, isolated town (*maḍaṃba*), city connected by roads and rivers, market city (where merchandise from various countries are imported), hermitage and city where fair is held—the (jackal which is) *asivā* (inauspicious) is called *sivā* (meaning 'what is auspicious'). (Similarly, on other occasions) fire (*aggi*, which is hot) is called cool (*sīyala*), poison (*vīsa*) is called sweet (*mahura*), acid (*aṃbila*) is called sweet (*sāuya*) at liquor merchant's shop, what is *latta* (red-coloured) is called *alatta* (= *aratta*, literally not red), what is *lāua* (gourd) is also called *alāua* (not-*lāua*, though the negative sign is without any negative meaning), what is *sumbhaa* (making beautiful colour) is called *kusumbhaa* (*ku*+*sumbhaa*, 'ku' meaning 'bad'), who is talkative is called a liar.

This is (the name) according to the words being opposite.

268. Then what is (the name) according to the prominence? The following are (the examples of names) according to the prominence:

(A forest where the majority of the trees is *asoka* is called) the forest of *asoka* (Jonesia) trees, (similarly, we say) the forest of *sattavaṇṇa* (*Alstonia scholaris*) trees, the forest of *campaka* (*Michelia*) trees, the forest of mango trees, the forest of *nāga* (*Mesua Roxburghu*) trees, the forest of *punnāga* (*Rottleria Tinctoria*) trees, the forest of *ucchu* (sugar-cane) plants, the forest of vine creepers, and the forest of *sāla* (*Vatica Robusta*) trees.

This is (the name) according to the prominence.

269. Then what is the name according to the beginningless (eternal) doctrine? The following are (the examples of the names) according to the beginningless (eternal) doctrine:

Dhammatthikāa (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts helping the movement of the souls and material bodies);

Adhammatthikāa (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, helping the souls and material bodies to rest);

Āgāsattikāa (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, giving accommodation to other substances);

Jīvatthikāa (the spiritual substance, imagined as collection of parts);

Poggalatthikāa (the material substance, which is a collection of parts);

Addhāsamaa (time-instant).

This is (the name) according to the beginningless (eternal) doctrine.

270. Then what is (the name) according to the name? The following are (the examples of names) according to the names:

When (a child or descendant is) named after the name of his father and grandfather (or, father's a grandfather) (it is an example of name according to the names).

This is (the name) according to the names.

271. Then what is (the name) according to the part (of a whole object denoted by the word) ? (The examples of the name) according to the part (of a whole object) are (given in the following verses) :

(A bull is called) *siṃgī* (on account of having *siṃga*, horns as a part of its body). (Similarly, a peacock is called) *sihī* (=having crest), (an elephant is called) *visāṇī* (=having tusk), (a wild boar is called) *dādhī* (=having tusk), (a bird is called) *paḅbhī* (=having wings), (a horse as well as similar animals is called) *khurī* (having hoof), (a lion as well as similar animals is called) *ṇahī* (=having nails), (a sheep as well as similar animals is called) *vālī* (=having tail), (all animals with two legs are called) *dupaya* (biped), (all animals with four legs are called) *cauppara* (quadruped), (all animals with many legs are called) *bahupaya* (multiped), (a monkey as well as similar animals is called) *ṇaṃgūlī* (=having tail), (a lion as well as similar animals is called) *kesarī* (=having mane), and (a bull as well as similar animals is called) *kakūhī* (=having hump) //83//

One should identify a soldier by means of his waistband, a lady by her garment, (one should ascertain the contents of) the pot as (perfectly) boiled from a single boiled grain and (one should identify) a poet by a single stanza //84//¹

This is (the name) according to the part (of a whole object).

272. Then what is (the name) according to the combination? (The name) according to the combination is stated to be fourfold, viz.

1. The verse is repeated in *sutta* No. 446 (verse 116).

- (i) combination with substances;
- (ii) combination with place;
- (iii) combination with time;
- (v) combination with states.

273. Then what is (the name according to) the combination with substances ? (The name according to) the combination with substances is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) sentient;
- (2) non-sentient;
- (3) (sentient and non-sentient) mixed together.

274. Then what is (the name according to the combination with substance, which are) sentient ? (The name according to the combination with substances which are) sentient is (as follows) :

A *gomia* (master of cows) is (so called) because of (his having) cows, a *māhisia* (master of she-buffaloes) is (so called) because of (his having) she-buffaloes, a *ūraṇia* (master of ewe) is (so called) because of (his having) ewe, an *uṭṭavāla* (master of she-camels) is (so called) because of (his having) she-camels.

This is (the name according to the combination with substances, which are) sentient.

275. Then what is (the name according to the combination with substance, which are) non-sentient ? (The name according to the combination with substances, which are) non-sentient is (as follow) :

A *chattī* (a man holding an umbrella) is (so called) because of (his having) an umbrella, a *damḍī* (a man holding a stick) is (so called) because of (his having) a stick, a *padī* (a man possessed of garment) is (so called) because of (his having) a garment, a *ghaḍī* (a man possessed of pot) is (so called) because of (his having) a pot, a *kaḍī* (a man possessed of mattress) is (so called) because of (his having) a mattress.

This is (the name according to the combination with substances, which are) non-sentient.

276. Then what is (the name according to the combination with substances, which are) a mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) ? (The name according to the combination with substances which are a mixture (of the sentient and non-sentient) is (as follows) :

A *hālia* (ploughman) is (so called) because of (his having) a plough (as well as bulls, i.e. a mixture of sentient and non-sentient things), a

sākaḍḍia (carter) is (so called) because of (his having) a cart (as well as bulls), a *rahia* (charioteer) is (so called) because of (his having a chariot (as well as horses), a *nāvīa* (boatman) is (so called) because of (his having) a boat (as well as passengers).

This is (the name according to the combination with substances, which are) a mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient things).

This is (the name according to) the combination with substances.

277. Then what is (the name according to) the combination with places?¹ (The name according to) the combination with places is (as follows):

The *Bhārāha* (people born in *Bhārata* are so called because of their birth in: *Bharata*), (Similarly), *Eravaa*, *Hemavaa*, *Eraṇṇavaa*, *Harivassaa*, *Rammayavassaa*, *Puvvavidehaa*, *Avaravidehaa*, *Devakuraa*, *Uttarakuraa*; or *Māgahaa* (the inhabitants of *Magaha*), (similarly), *Mālavaa*, *Soraṭṭhaa*, *Marahaṭṭhaa*, *Komkaṇaa*, *Kosalaa*.

This is (the name according to) the combination with places.

278. Then what is (the name according to) the combination with time?² (The names according to) the combination with time are (as follows):

A *susamasusamaa* (is so called because of one's birth at a time of *susamasusamā* 'happiness plus happiness'), a *susamaa* (is so called because of one's birth at a time of *susamā* 'happiness'), a *susamadūsamaa* (is so called because of one's birth at a time of *susamadūsamā* 'pain plus happiness'), (similarly), *dūsamasusamaa*, *dūsamaa* and *dūsamadūsamaa*. Or, a *pāvusaa* (is so called because of one's birth in the rainy season. (Similarly), *vāsārattaa* (in the rainy day), *saradaa* (in the autumn season), *hemaṇṭtaa* (in the winter season), *vasamṭtaa* (in the spring season), and *gimhaa* (in the summer season).

This is (the name according to) the combination with time.

279. Then what is (the name according to) the combination with states?³ (The name according to) the combination with states is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) auspicious (knowledge, etc.);
- (2) inauspicious (anger, etc).

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 272.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 272.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 272.

280. Then what is (the name according to the combination with states, which are) auspicious ? (The names according to the combination with states, which are) auspicious are (as follows) :

A *nāṇī* (man having knowledge is so called) because of (his) knowledge (which is an auspicious state), a *daṃsaṇī* (man having faith is so called) because of (his) faith (which is an auspicious state), a *carittī* (man having good conduct is so called) because of (his) good conduct (which is an auspicious state).

This is (the name according to the combination with states, which are) auspicious.

281. Then what is (the name according to the combination with states, which are) inauspicious ? (The names according to the combination with states, which are) inauspicious are (as follows) :

A *koḥī* (man who is angry is so called) because of (his) anger, a *mānī* (man who is proud is so called) because of (his) pride, a *māyī* (man who is deceitful is so called) because of (his) deceit, a *lobhī* (man who is greedy is so called) because of (his) greed.

This is (the name according to the combination with states, which are) inauspicious. This is (the name according to the combination with states. This is (the name) according to the combination.¹

282. Then what is (the name) according to the standard ?² (The name according to) the standard is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (i) standard as name;
- (ii) standard as arbitrary attribution;
- (iii) standard as substance-potential;
- (iv) standard as essence.

283. Then what is (the name according to) the standard as name ? The standard as name (*nāmapamāṇa*) means the name 'pamāṇa' given to a living being, a non-living thing, many living beings, many non-living things, a mixture of them, and many mixtures of them. This is the standard as name.

284. Then what is the standard as arbitrary attribution ? The standard as arbitrary attribution is stated to be sevenfold (in the following verse), viz.

The sevenfold names as arbitrary attribution are with reference to)

- (1) lunar mansions (*ṇakkhatta*);
- (2) gods (*devaya*);

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 272.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 263.

- (3) family genealogy (*kula*);
- (4) heretics or heresy (*pāsamaḍa*);
- (5) groups (*gaṇa*); and
- (6) (names given to children) to ensure (their) survival (*jīviyāheu*);
- (7) name (given) according to (one's) wish (*ābhippāyanaṇāma* //85//

285. Then what is the name according to the lunar mansions ?
The following are the names according to the lunar mansions :

A person born in the lunar mansion of *Kattiyā* (Pleiades) is (named) *Kattia*. (Similarly, the following names are formed): *Kattidiṇṇa* (a person bestowed by the *Kattiyā*), *Kattidhamma* (a person following *Kattiyā* in his religion), *Kattisamma* (a person looking to *Kattiyā* for happiness), *Kattideva* (a person honouring *Kattiyā* as god), *Kattidāsa* (a person who is servant to *Kattiyā*), *Kattiseṇa* (a person who is a defender of *Kattiyā*), *Kattirakkhā* (a person protected by *Kattiyā*). (Similarly), a person born in the lunar mansion called *Rohiṇī* (Aldebaran, wheeled vehicle) is (called) *Rohiṇia*, (similarly,) *Rohiṇidiṇṇa*, *Rohiṇidhamma*, *Rohiṇisamma*, *Rohiṇideva*, *Rohiṇidāsa*, *Rohiṇiseṇa*, and *Rohiṇirakkhā*. Similarly, the names are to be framed according to the names of all the lunar mansions. The following are the epitomic verses (giving the names of the lunar mansions) :—

(i) *Kattiyā* (Pleiades), (ii) *Rohiṇī* (Aldebaran), (iii) *Migasira* (Orionis), (iv) *Addā* (Orionis), and (v) *Puṇavasū* (Geminorum), and (vi) *Pussa* (Cancri); then (vii) *Assilesā* (Hydrae), (viii) *Maghā* (Leonis), and two (ix-x) *Phagguṇīs* (Leonis) (of *Uitarā* and *Puvvā*) //86//

There are also (xi) *Hattha* (Corvi), (xii) *Cittā* (Spica), (xiii) *Sādī* (Arcturus), (xiv) *Visāhā* (Librae), and (xv) *Aṇurāhā* (Scorpionis), (xvi) *Jeṭṭhā* (Scorpionis), (xvii) *Mūla* (Scorpionis), (xviii) *Puovāsāḍhā* (Sagittarii), (and) similarly (xix) *Uttarā(-sāḍhā)*, Sagittarii) //87//

There are again (xx) *Abhiṇī* (Lyra), (xxi) *Savaṇa* (Aquilae), (xxii) *Dhanūtṭhā* (Delphinis or Dolphin), (xxiii) *Satibhisadā* (Aquarii), and two (xxiv-xxv) *Bhaddavayās* (Pegasi) (eastern and nothern), (xxvi) *Revati* (Piscium), (xxvii) *Assiṇī* (Arietis), and (xxviii) *Bharaṇī* (Arietis). This is the serial order of the lunar mansions //88//¹

This is (the name) according to the lunar mansions.

1, See *Antiquities of India*, by Dr. L. D. Barnett, Calcutta, 1964 (second reprint) p. 210ff.

286. Then what is the name according to (the names of) gods ? The following are (the examples of) the names according to gods :

A person born (by the grace) of the god *Aggi* is (called) *Aggia*. (Similarly the following names are formed) : *Aggidinṇa*, *Aggidhamma*, *Aggisamma*, *Aggideva*, *Aggidāsa*, *Aggiseṇa*, and *Aggirakkha*. Similarly, the names of all the gods (who are the presiding deities) of the lunar mansions are to be spoken of. There are also the following epitomic verses (giving the names of gods) :

(i) *Aggi*, (ii) *Payāvai*, (iii) *Soma*, (iv) *Rudda*, (v) *Aditī*, (vi) *Bahassa*,
(vii) *Sappa*, (viii) *Piti*, (ix) *Bhagu*, (x) *Ajjama*, (xi) *Saviyā*, (xii) *Tatṭhā*,
(xiii) *Vāyu*, and (xiv) *Imdaggi* ||89||

(xv) *Mitta*, (xvi) *Imda*, (xvii) *Nirati*, (xviii) *Au* (= *Ambas*), (xix) *Vissa*,
and (xx) *Bambha*, and (xxi) *Viṅhū*, (xxii) *Vasu*, (xxiii) *Varuṇa*, (xxiv)
Aya, (xxv) *Vivaddhī*¹, (xxvi) *Pusa*, (xxvii) *Asa*, and (xxviii) *Jama* ||90||

This is the name according to gods.

Then what is the name according to family genealogy ? The following are (the examples of) the names according to family genealogy :

Ugga, *Bhoga*, *Rāiṇṇa*, *Khattia*, *Ikkhāga*, *Ṇāta*, and *Koravva* (which are names according to family genealogy).

This is the name according to family genealogy.

288. Then what is the name after the heretics or heresies ? The following are the names after the heretics or heresies :

*Samaṇaa*², *Paṃḍuraṃgaa*³, *Bhikkū*⁴, *Kāvāliyaa*, *Tāvasaa*, and *Parivvāyaga*.

This is the name after the heretics or heresies.

289. Then what is the name (formed) according to (the name of) the groups (of people) ? The following are (the examples of) the names (formed) according to (the names of) the groups (of people):

1. Prakrit *vivaddhī*. Another reading for this is *Ahirbudhna*, according to the Commentary, p. 134 B.
2. According to the Commentary, p. 134 B, *Samaṇas* fall in five classes, viz. *niḅgaṃṭha*, *sakka*, *tāvāsa*, *geruṇa* and *ājīva*.
3. He is affiliated to the *Naiḅvāyikas*—Commentary, p. 134 B.
4. He is affiliated to the *Buddhadarśana*—Commentary, p. 134 B.

Malla, Malladinna, Malladhamma, Mallasamma, Malladeva, Malladāsa, Mallaseṇa and *Mallarakkhīa* (which are connected with the *gaṇa* known as the *Mallas*).

This is the name (formed) according to (the names of the groups (of people)).

290. Then what is (the name given to children) to ensure (their) survival? The following are (the examples of the names given to children) to ensure (their) survival :

Avakaraa (a child taken from dust-bin), *Ukkuruḍḍaa* (a child taken from a place for depositing refuses), *Ujjihiyaa* (a child that is thrown away), *Kajjavāa* (a child recovered from excreta), a *Suppaa* (a child recovered from a winnowing basket).

This is (the name given to children) to ensure (their) survival.

291. Then what is the name (given) according to (one's) wish:

Aṇḍaa, Niṃḍaa, Babūḷaa, Palāsaa, Siṇḍaa, Piluyaa, and Karīraa.

This is the name (given) according to (one's) wish. This is (the name as) standard as arbitrary attribution.¹

292. Then what is (the name as) standard as substance-potential?² (The examples of) the standard as substance-potential are sixfold as follows :

- (1) *Dhammatthikāa* (the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, helping the motion of the souls and material bodies), ...up to... (6) *Addhāsamaa* (time-instant).³

This is (the name as) the standard as substance-potential.

293. Then what is (the name as) standard as essence?⁴ (The name as) standard as essence is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) formed by compounds (*sāmāsīa*);
- (2) formed by nominal terminations (*taddhitaa*);
- (3) standing for verbal roots (*dhātua*);
- (4) formed by according to etymology (*niruttiā*).

294. Then what is (the name) formed by compounds? (The examples of the names) formed by compounds are (illustrated by) the seven compounds (mentioned in the following verse), viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 282 and 284.
 2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 282.
 3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 132.
 4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 282.

- (i) the coordinative (*daṁda*), and
- (ii) the possessive (*bahuvvīhī*),
- (iii) the descriptive determinative (*kammadhāraa*), and
- (iv) the numeral (*diggu*),
- (v) the dependent determinative (*tappurisa*),
- (vi) the indeclinable (*avvābhāva*), and
- (vii) single stem denoting meanings of two or more stems (*ekkasesa*) is the seventh //91//

295. Then what is the coordinative compound ? (The examples of) the coordinative compound are (as follows):

dantoṣṭham meaning *dantāḥ* (teeth) and *oṣṭhau* (two lips),
stanodaram meaning *stanau* (two nipples) and *udaraṃ* (belly),
vastrapātram meaning *vastram* (cloth) and *pātram* (bowl),
aśvamahiṣam meaning *aśvaḥ* (horse) and *mahiṣaḥ* (buffalo),
ahinakulam meaning *ahiḥ* (snake) and *nakulaḥ* (mongoose).

This is the coordinative compound.

296. Then what is the possessive compound ? (The examples of) the possessive compound are (as follows) :

The mountain on which the trees of *Kuḍaya* and *Kalaṁba* are in blossom (*phullā jammi girimmi kuḍayakalaṁbā*) is expressed as 'imo giri phulliyakuḍayakalaṁbo'.

This is the possessive compound.

297. Then what is the descriptive determinative compound ? (The examples of) the descriptive determinative compound are (as follows):

The bull which is white is white-bull (*dhavalavasaho*). The deer which is black is black-deer (*kiṇhamigo*). The cloth which is white is white-cloth (*setapaṭo*). The cloth which is red is red-cloth (*rattapaṭo*).

This is the descriptive determinative compound.

298. Then what is the numeral compound ? (The examples of) the numeral compound are (as follows):

Three bitter things collectively (*tiṇṇi kaḍugā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tikaḍugaṃ*'. Three sweet things collectively (*tiṇṇi mahurāṇi*) are (all at once) expressed by '*timahuraṃ*'. Three attributes collectively (*tiṇṇi guṇā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tiguṇaṃ*'. Three cities collectively (*tiṇṇi purā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tipuraṃ*'. Three sounds collectively (*tiṇṇi sarā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tisaraṃ*'. Three lotuses collectively (*tiṇṇi pukkharā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tipukkharāṃ*'. Three drops collectively (*tiṇṇi*

biṇḍuyā) are (all at once) expressed by '*tibiṇḍuyam*'. Three paths collectively (*tiṇṇi pahā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*tīpaham*'. Five rivers collectively (*paṃca ṇadio*) are (all at once) expressed by '*paṃca-ṇadam*'. Seven elephants collectively (*satta gayā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*sattagayam*'. Nine horses collectively (*nava turagā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*navaturagam*'. Ten villages collectively (*dasagāmā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*dasagāmam*'. Ten cities collectively (*dasa purā*) are (all at once) expressed by '*dasapuram*'.

This is the numeral compound.

299. Then what is the dependent determinative compound ? (The examples of) the dependent determinative compound are (as follows) :

A crow in a holy place (*titthe kāgo*) is expressed by '*tīthakāgo*'. An elephant in the forest (*vaṇe hatthī*) is expressed by '*vaṇahatthī*'. A wild boar in the forest (*vaṇe varāho*) is expressed by '*vaṇavarāho*'. A buffalo in the forest (*vaṇe mahiso*) is expressed by '*vaṇamahiso*'. A peacock in the forest (*vaṇe mayūro*) is expressed by '*vaṇamayūro*'.

This is the dependent determinative compound.

300. Then what is the indeclinable compound ? (The examples of) the indeclinable compound are (as follows) :

Aṇugāmam (near the village), *anunadīyam* (near the river), *aṇuphariham* (near the ditch), *aṇucariyam* (in accordance with good conduct).

This is the indeclinable compound.

301. Then what is the single stem compound (denoting the meanings of two or more stems) ? (The examples of) the single stem compound (denoting the meanings of two or more stems) are (as follows) :

As is one man (*purisa*), so are many men; as are many men, so is one man. As is one silver coin (*karisāvaṇa*), so are many silver coins; as are many silver coins, so is one silver coin.¹ As is one corn (*sālī*), so are many corns; as are many corns, so is one corn. [The meaning is:

The expression 'a man (*purisa*)' denotes 'all men' (=men as class). The expression 'a silver coin (*karisāvaṇa*)' denotes 'all silver coins'. The expression 'a corn (*sālī*)' denotes 'all corns'.]

This is the single item compound (denoting the meanings of two or more stems). This is (the name formed by) compounds.²

1. The passage is repeated in *sutta* No. 449.

2. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 294.

302. Then what is (the name) formed by the nominal terminations?¹ (The name) formed by the nominal terminations is stated to be eightfold (in the following verse):

(The names) formed by the nominal terminations are of eight kinds (expressing eight different meanings), viz.

- (i) profession (*kamma*),
- (ii) handicraft (*sippa*),
- (iii) reverence (*silaa*),
- (iv) relation (*saṃjoga*),
- (v) vicinity (*saṃvāa*),
- (vi) authorship (*saṃjūha*),
- (vii) wealth or power (*issariya*),
- (viii) progeny or descendants (*avacca*) ||92||

303. Then what is the name expressing profession? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing profession:

²(A person engaged in the profession of carrying grassloads is called) *taṇahāraa*, (a person engaged in the profession of carrying wood is called) *kaṭṭhahāraa*, (a person engaged in the profession of carrying or cutting leaves is called) *paṭṭahāraa*, (a cloth-merchant is called) *dossia*, (a thread dealer is called) *sottia*, (a cotton merchant is called) *kappāsia*, (a pot maker is called) *kolālia*, and (a person dealing in wares or grocery is called) *bhaṃḍaveyālia*.

This is the name expressing profession.

304. Then what is the name expressing handicraft? The following are (the examples of) the name, expressing handicraft:

(A cloth dealer is called) *vatthia*, (a person who plays on stringed instrument is called) *taṃtia*, (a darn-worker is called) *tunṇāa*, (a weaver is called) *taṃtuvāa*, (a garment (?) maker is called) *paṭṭakāra*, (a person who separates cotton seeds is called) *uetta*³, (a basket maker is called) *baruḷa*, (the maker of rope of the *mumja* grass is called) *mumjakāra*, (a carpenter is called) *kaṭṭhakāra*, (an umbrella-maker is called) *chattakāra*, (a leather strap maker is called) *vajjhakāra*, (a cloth-maker or a book-maker is called) *poṭṭhakāra*, (a painter or draftsman is called) *cittakāra*, (an ivory worker is called) *daṃtakāra*, (a painter or a person who smears is called) *leppakāra*, (a person

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 293.

2. Here we have followed the reading given in footnote 1 on p. 131 of the MJV edition.

3. Vide footnote 3 on p. 131 of the MJV edition.

who manufactures lime is called) *sellakāra*,¹ (a hut maker or architect who constructs a cellar is called) *kottimākāra*.

This is the name expressing handicraft.

305. Then what is the name expressing reverence ? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing reverence :

Ascetic (*samaṇa*), *Brāhmaṇa* (*māhaṇa*), and any kind of guest (*savvātikā*)².

This is the name expressing reverence.

306. Then what is the name expressing relation ? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing relation :

A king's father-in-law (*raṇṇo sasurae*), a king's brother-in-law (wife's brother) (*raṇṇo sālāe*), a king's sister-in-law's husband (*raṇṇo saḍḍhūe*), a king's son-in-law (*raṇṇo jāmaue*), a king's brother-in-law (sister's husband) (*raṇṇo* (sic) *bhaginīvatī*).

This is the name expressing relation.

307. Then what is the name expressing vicinity ? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing vicinity :

The mountain-village (*giriṇagaram*) means a village near the mountain. *Vedisam nagaram* means a village near *Vidisā*, *Bennāyaḍam* (literally, bank of *Bennā* river) means a village near the river *Bennā*, *Tagarāyaḍam* means a village near the river *Tagarā*.

This is the name expressing vicinity.

308. Then what is the name expressing authorship ? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing authorship :

Taraṅgavatikāra (the author of the *Taraṅgavati*), *Malayavatikāra* (the author of the *Malayavati*), *Attāṇusattikāra* (the author of the *Attāṇusatti*), *Bimḍukāra* (the author of the *Bimḍu*).

This is the name expressing authorship.

309. Then what is the name expressing wealth or power ? The following are (the examples of) the name expressing wealth or power :

Royal authority (*rāṇsara*), the noble (*talavara*), governor (*māḍambā*), family-head (*koḍumbā*), fabulously wealthy person (*ibbha*), trader (*setthā*), caravan leader (*satthavāha*), and military general (*seṇāvā*).³

1. Vide footnote 3 on p. 131 of the MJV edition.

2. Vide footnote 4 on p. 131 of the MJV edition.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 20.

This is the name expressing wealth or power.

310. Then what is the name expressing progeny or descendants ? The following are (the example of) the name expressing progeny or descendants :

Titthayaramāyā (the mother whose son is *titthayara*), *Cakkavattimāyā* (the mother whose son is a *cakkavatti*), *Baladevamāyā* (a mother whose son is *baladeva*), *Vāsudevamāyā* (a mother whose son is *vāsudeva*), *Rāyamāyā* (a mother whose son is a king), *Ganimāyā* (a mother whose son is *gani*), *Vāyagamāyā* (a mother whose son is *vāyaga*).

This is the name expressing progeny or descendants. This is (the name) formed by the nominal terminations.¹

311. Then what is (the name) standing for verbal roots ?² The following are (the examples of the name) standing for verbal roots :

Bhū (is a verbal root) in the sense of 'to exist' (and is in the active form. *Edha* (is a verbal root) in the sense of 'to increase or to rise'. *Sparaddha* (is a verbal root) in the sense of 'to exercise rivalry or envy'. *Gādhṛ* (is a verbal root) meaning 'to stand firmly', 'to desire' and 'to string together'. *Bādṛ* (is a verbal root) meaning 'to agiate'.

This is (the name) standing for verbal roots.

312. Then what is (the name) formed according to etymology ?³ The following are (the examples of the name) formed according to the etymology :

A *mahiṣaḥ* is so called because 'it lies down on the earth (*mahyāṃ śete*)'. A *bhramaraḥ* (bee) is so called because 'it wanders (*bhramati*) and makes noise (*rauti*)'. A *musalaṃ* (mace) is so called because 'it shines or rises again and again (*muhurmuhurlasati*)'. A *kapitthaṃ* (fruit of wood apple) is so called because 'it hangs down like an ape or monkey and makes the sound of 'ttha' (*kapiriva lambate tthacca karoti*)'. A *cikkhallaṃ* (mud or mire) is so called because 'it makes the sound 'cit' and is a creek (*ciditi karoti khallaṃ ca bhavati*)'. An *ulūkaḥ* (owl) is so called because 'it has erect ears (*ūrdhvakatṇaḥ*)'. A *mekhalā* (girdle) is so called because 'it is a garland of the sky (*khasya mālā*)'.

1. Vide supra, sutta No, 302.

2. Vide supra, sutta No 293.

3. Vide supra, sutta No. 293.

This is (the name) formed according to etymology. This is (the name as) standard as essence.¹ This is the name as standard.² This is the ten-named (objects).³ This is the name.⁴

//Here ends (the description of) the word *nāma* (name)//⁵

[Suttas 313-520: The door of standard]

313. Then what is the standard (*paṃāṇa*) ?⁶ The standard is stated to be fourfold, viz

- (i) standard (of measurement) of substances,
- (ii) standard (of measurement) of lands,
- (iii) standard (of measurement) of time,
- (iv) standard (of measurement) of states.

314. Then what is the standard (of measurement) of substances ? The standard (of measurement) of substances is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) concerned with the space-points (of the thing to be measured); and
- (ii) concerned with the various types (of measures).

315. Then what is (the standard of measurement) concerned with the space-points ? (The examples of the standard of measurement) concerned with the space-points are (as follows) :

A material atom, duad (consisting of two space-points),...up to... a thing consisting of infinite space-points.

These are (the examples of the standard of measurement) concerned with the space-points.

316. Then what is (the standard of measurement) concerned with the various types (of measures) ? (The standard of measurement) concerned with various types (of measures) is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (i) measurement of quantity (*māṇa*),
- (ii) measurement of heavier weights (*ummāṇa*),
- (iii) measurement of length (*omāṇa*),
- (iv) measurement by counting (*gaṇima*),
- (v) measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights (*paḍimāṇa*).

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 232.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 263.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 263.

4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 208.

5. The subject of *nāma* is covered by the *suttas* 208-312.

6. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 92.

317. Then what is the measurement of quantity ? The measurement of quantity is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) standard of measurement of quantity of cereals (*dhannamāṇappamāṇe*), and
- (2) standard of measurement of quantity of liquids (*rasamāṇappamāṇe*).

318. Then what is the standard of measurement of quantity of cereals ? The standard of measurement of quantity of cereals is (as follows) :

two *asatīs* (one *asatī* = one handful of grains) make one *pasatī*,
 two *pasatīs* make one *setiyā*,
 four *setiyās* make one *kulaa*,
 four *kulaas* make one *pattha*,
 four *patthayas* (sic) make one *ādhaya* (= 8 seers),
 four *ādhayas* make one *doṇa* (= 32 seers),
 sixty *ādhayas* make one smallest pot,
 eighty *ādhayas* make one middle pot,
 one hundred *ādhayas* make one biggest pot,
 eight hundred *ādhayas* make one *vāha* (load).

319. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement of quantity of cereals ? (The reply is that) by means of this standard of measurement of quantity of cereals is obtained the knowledge of the determination of the standard of measurement of cereal-weight of cereals kept in *muttolī* (a kind of receptacle which is narrow at the top and bottom and a bit expanded in the middle), *murava* (covering of a cart), *iddara* (a basket made of bark-rope), *aliṇḍa* (round tub-like vessel), and *apavāri* (granary).

This is the standard of measurement of quantity of cereals.

320. Then what is the standard of measurement of quantity of liquids ? The standard of measurement of quantity of liquids is (as follows) :

The standard of measurement of quantity of liquids is made by the addition of one fourth part, the crest being inward, to the (vessel which is) standard of measurement of quantity of cereals. (The measures for this purpose are), viz.

causatthiyā (measurement of weight equal to one sixty-fourth part of *māṇī* = $256/64$ *palas*) = 4 *palas*;¹

battisiyā (measurement of weight equal to one thirty-second part of *māṇī*) = 8 *palas*;

1. Vide footnote 11 on p. 133 of the MJV edition.

solasiyā (measurement of weight equal to one sixteenth part of *māṇī*) = 16 *palas*;

aṭṭhabhāiyā (measurement of weight equal to one eighth part of *māṇī*) = 32 *palas*;

caubhāiyā (measurement of weight equal to one fourth part of *māṇī*) = 64 *palas*;

addhamāṇī (measurement of weight equal to one half of *māṇī*) = 128 *palas*;

māṇī (measurement of weight) = 256 *palas*;

two *causatthiyās* make one *battīsiyā*;

two *battīsiyās* make one *solasiyā*;

two *solasiyās* make one *aṭṭhabhāiyā*;

two *aṭṭhabhāiās* (sic) make one *caubhāiyā*;

two *caubhāiās* make one *addhamāṇī*;

two *addhamāṇīs* make one *māṇī*.

321. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement of quantity of liquids? (The reply is that) by means of this standard of measurement of quantity of liquids is obtained the knowledge of the determination of the standard of measurement of liquid-weight of liquids kept in *vāraga* (a small pot), *ghaḍaga* (pot), *karaga* (water pot), *kalasiya* (pitcher),¹ *gaggari* (water jar)¹, *daiya* (leather water bag)¹, *karōḍi* (skull or basin)¹, and *kumḍia* (pitcher made of gourd)¹.

This is the standard of measurement of quantity of liquids. This is the measurement of quantity.²

322. Then what is *ummāṇa*, that is, the standard of measurement of heavier weights?³ The word *ummāṇa*⁴ (measure of heavier weights) stands for 'the thing so measured', (by) for instance, *addhakarisa* (half the weight of *karisa* = $\frac{1}{2}$ *pala*), *karisa*, *addhapala*, *pala*, *addhatulā*, *tulā*, *addhabhāra*, *bhāra*, two *addhakarisas* = one *karisa*, two *karisas* = one *addhapala*, two *addhapalas* = one *pala*, one hundred and five *palas* = one *tulā*, ten *tulās* = *addhabhāra*, and twenty *tulās* = *bhāra*.

1. Vide footnote 14 of the MJV edition.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 317.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 316.

4. *utmāna* = *unmāna* (Pkt. *ummāṇa*). Here the minimum measure is $\frac{1}{2}$ *karisa* which is equal to 40 *guṇjās* or 8 *kammamāsas*. Vide infra, *sutta* No 380 where 16 *kammamāsas* are equated to 80 *guṇjas*. Now, as 16 *māsas* is given as the equivalent of 1 *karisa* (vide Monier's Sanskrit-English Dictionary s.v. *kaṛṣa*), $\frac{1}{2}$ *karisa* = 8 *māsas* (*kammamāsas*) = 40 *guṇjās*.

323. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement of heavier weights ? (The reply is that) by means of this standard of measurement of heavier weights is obtained the knowledge of the determination of standard of measurement of heavier weights of objects, viz. leaves, incense, fragrant substance (*tagara*), *coyaya* (a kind of fruit), *kumkuma* (saffron), sugar, molasses, candied sugar and so on.

This is the standard of measurement of heavier weights.

324. Then what is *omāṇa*, that is, the standard of measurement of length ?¹ The word '*omāṇa*' stands for 'the thing whose length is measured', for instance, *hattha* (cubit), or *daṇḍa* (stick), or *dhanua* (bow), or *juga* (yoke), *nāliyā* (bamboo), or *akkha* (axle), or *musala* (club). (On these, the verses run):

The words '*daṇḍa*', '*dhanū*', '*juga*', '*nāliyā*', '*akkha*', and '*musala*' are (each) of the length or four cubits. And know a *rajju* (rope) as (equal to) ten *nāliyās*, as the term expressing measure of length//93//

Know regarding these terms expressing measures of length that a cubit is applied as the measure for house, a stick for land, a bow for road, a well (and the like), (are measured) by bamboo//94//

325. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement of length ? (The reply is that) by means of this standard of measurement of length is obtained the knowledge of the determination of the standard of measurement of length of objects of the nature of wells (and the like, *khāya*), palace-platforms (etc.) made of bricks (*ciya*), sawn boards (etc. *karagacita*), mats (*kaḍa*), cloth (*paḍa*), boundary walls (*bhitti*), and moats (*parikkheva*).

This is the standard of measurement of length.

326. Then what is *gaṇima*, that is, the standard of measurement by counting ?¹ The standard of measurement by counting stands for 'the thing counted'. (The means of counting are), for instance, *ekka* (one), *dasaga* (ten), *sata* (hundred), *sahassa* (thousand), *dasasahassa* (ten thousand), *satasahassa* (hundred thousand), *dasasatasahassa* (one million) and *koṭī* (ten million).

327. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement by counting ? (The reply is that) by means of this standard of measurement by counting is obtained the knowledge of the determination of the standard of measurement by counting of the money pertaining to

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 316.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 316.

the income, expenditure and wages¹ for servants (*bhitaga*), wages (*bhiti*), food (*bhatta*), *veyaṇa* (remuneration, that is, money paid for the things made).

This is the standard of measurement by counting.

328. Then what is *paḍimāṇa*, that is, the standard of measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights ?² The word '*paḍimāṇa*' stands for 'the thing measured by such weight' (by means of), for instance, *gumjā* (red and black berry used as the smallest of the jeweller's weights), *kāgaṇī* (coin weighing $5/4$ of one *gumjā*), *nipphāva* ($4/3$ of *kāgaṇī*, or $5/3$ of one *gumjā*), *kammamāśaa* (= three *nipphāvas*), *maṇḍalaa* (= twelve *kammamāśaas*) and *suvaṇṇa* (= sixteen *kammamāśaas*). Five *gumjās* make one *kammamāśaa*, and with reference to *kāgaṇī*, four *kāgaṇīs* make one *kammamāśaa*, three *nipphāvas* make one *kammamāśaa*, Thus one *kammamāśaa* is 'made by four (*kāgaṇīs*)'; twelve *kammamāśaas* are equal to one *maṇḍalaa*; similarly, one *maṇḍalaa* (is) forty-eight *kāgaṇīs*; sixteen *kammamāśaas* are one *suvaṇṇa*, thus one *suvaṇṇa* is sixtyfour (*kāgaṇīs*).

329. What is the purpose of this standard of measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights ? (The reply is that) by this standard of measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights is obtained the knowledge of the determination of the standard of measurement by means of artificial weights of things such as gold, silver, jewels, pearls, conch, *silā* (diamond of inferior quality)³, and coral.

This is the standard of measurement (of gold, etc.) by means of artificial weights. This is (the standard of measurement) concerned with the various types (of measures)⁴. This is the standard of measurement of substances.⁵

1. The reading *ḍvayaniḍvīsaṃsiyāṇaṃ* has been mended by us as *ḍvaya-niḍvīsa-saṃsiyāṇaṃ*, as the word *niḍvīsa* meaning 'wages' is relevant here, for, Pali *niḍvīsa* and Sanskrit *nivveśa*, the following quotation may be noted:

nābhinandāmi maraṇaṃ nābhinandāmi jīvitaṃ/
kālaṃ ca paṭikaṅkhāmi nibbisaṃ bhatako yathā//—*Theragāthā*, 606.
nābhinandeta maraṇaṃ nābhinandeta jīvitaṃ/
kālameva pratikṣeta nirveśaṃ bhṛtako yathā//—*Manu VI. 45*.

Cf. also *niḍvīsa*—in *sutta* No. 472 infra.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 316.
3. The Commentary, explains *śilā* as *rājapaṭṭaka* or *gaṇḍhapattā*. *Rājapaṭṭaka* means a diamond of inferior quality. (Vide Monier's *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*).
4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 316.
5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 313.

330. Then what is the standard (of measurement) of lands?¹ The standard (of measurement) of lands is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) concerned with the space-points (of land to be measured), and
- (ii) concerned with the various types (of other measurements of land).

331. Then what is (the standard of measurement of land) concerned with the space-points? (The examples of the standard of measurement of land) concerned with the space-points are (as follows) :

A body occupying one space-point, a body occupying two space-points, ...up to...a body occupying numerable space-points, a body occupying innumerable space-points.

This is (the standard of measurement of land) concerned with the space-points.

332. Then what is (the standard of measurement of land) concerned with the various types (of other measurements of land)? (The standard of measurement of land) concerned with various types (of other measurements of land) is given (in the following verse) :

(The standards of measurement of land, concerned with various types of other measurements of land) are to be understood as *aṅgula* (breadth of finger), *viḥatthi* (= 12 *aṅgulas*), *rayañī* (= 24 *aṅgulas*), *kucchī* (= 48 *aṅgulas*), (then *damḍa*), *dhañū*, (*juga*, *nāliyā*, *akkha* and *musala*—each of *damḍa* etc. being equal to 96 *aṅgulas*); *gāyā* (= 2000 *dhañūs*), *joyāna* (= 8000 *dhañūs*), *sedhī* (innumerable *koṭī* × *koṭī* *joyānas*), *payara* (*sedhī* × *sedhī*) and *loga* (world, *payara* × *sedhī*) as well as *aloga* (non-world, which is infinite) //95//²

333. Then what is an *aṅgula*? The *aṅgula* is threefold, viz.

- (i) *āyaṅgula* (breadth of one's own finger, that is, breadth of the finger of conspicuous personalities of different ages),
- (ii) *ussehaṅgula* (a determinate measure obtained at the end of a series starting with the measure of a practical material atom, each succeeding measure beginning from *saṅhasaṅhiyā* being 8 times its immediately preceding measure³. This is used for measuring the space occupied by various living beings⁴),

1. Vide su pra, *sutta* No. 313.

2. Vide infra, *sutta* No. 345 and 361.

3. Vide infra, *sutta* No. 344.

4. Vide infra, *sutta* No. 346.

(iii) *paṃāṇaṃgula* (which is a higher measure used for measurement of continents, islands, hells, heavens, etc.).

334. Then what is the *āyaṃgula* ? The *āyaṃgula* is (the breadth of) the finger of different persons born at different times, their face (*muha*) being (of the length of) twelve *āyaṃgulas* of their own, and the (whole) man being of the standard (*paṃāṇa*) which is nine times (the length of) the face. (The volume of water displaced by the body of) a man is (equal to the hollow of a pot holding) the quantity (*māṇa*) of one *doṇa*¹ (of cereals). A man is of the weight (*ummāṇa*) which is equal to half a *bhāra*². (On this, the verses run):

The superior men (such as *cakravartin*, etc.) are to be known as possessed of the standard of (proper) '*māṇa*', '*ummāṇa*' and endowed with (auspicious) marks (conch, *svastika*, etc.) and signs (on their body, such as black marks like sesamum, and so on), and qualities (forbearance, etc.) and are born of superior families //96//

The superior men, again, are in height one hundred and eight *āṃgulas* (of their own), the inferior are ninety-six *āṃgulas* and the mediocrities are (one hundred) and four //97//

Whether inferior or superior, the persons who (on account of their bad *karman*), are devoid of effective voice (that is, voice which is weighty and acceptable to all), buoyancy and power must act, being helpless, as menial servants to the superior persons //98//

335. By this standard of *āṃgula*—

six *āṃgulas* make one *pāda* (foot),
two *pāyas* (sic) make one *vihatthī*,
two *vihatthīs* make one *rayaṇī*,
two *rayaṇīs* make one *kucchī*,
two *kucchīs* make one *daṃḍa*, *dhaṇū*, *juga*, *nāliya*, *akkha*, and
musala (all of which are equal in measure),
two thousand *dhaṇūs* make one *gāyua*,
four *gāuyas* make one *joyaṇa*.

336. What is the purpose of this standard of *āyaṃgula* ? (The reply is that as regards the purpose to be served) by this standard *āyaṃgula*, (different) people born at different times measure with their own *āyaṃgula* (such objects as) well (*agaḍa*), lake (*daha*), river, dug out pond (*talāga*), rectangular reservoir (*vāvī*), such reservoir with lotus, or reservoir (*pukkharāṇi*), a long lake (*dīhiyā*, canal), zigzag lake (*gumjāliya*), natural tanks, or rows of such tanks or rows of tanks with

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 318.



2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 322.


sluice-gates for transfer of water, or rows of water-pits; pleasure gardens, park for picnic, forests (with ordinary trees near a town), forest with the same kind of trees, forest with different kinds of trees of superior quality, rows of the same kind or of different kinds of trees; temples, assemblies, shed for supply of water to travellers, *stūpas* (mounds), ditch with equally wide bottom and top, moat (ditch with narrow bottom and wide top); wall, rampart (*atṭāлага*), walk (*cariya*, which is eight cubits in breadth between the wall and the fort for the movement of elephants, etc.), doors, ornamented gateways (*gopura*), arch (*toraṇa*), palace, house, thatched porch, caves (*leṇa*), market, triangular place for marketing (*simghāḍaga*), meeting place of three roads, meeting place of four roads, meeting place of six roads (*caccara*), temples of fourfaced deities (*caumuha*), highways (*mahāpaha*), paths; cart, chariot, vehicle, *jugga* (a two-cubit sedan chair with square seat), *gilli* (an ornamented seat on elephant's back), *thilli* (ornamented saddle), covered palanquin (*sīya*) and palanquin as long as a man (*saṃdamāṇiya*); shallow steel plate (*lohī*), steel cauldron, (steel) spoons, seat, bed, pillar, earthen pot (*bhaṃda*), and bell-metal vessel (*matta*) and other accessories (*uvagaraṇa*), etc.; and the modern *joyanas* (are also measured by this *āyaṃgula*).

337. This (*āyaṃgula*) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) *sūtiāṃgula* (rectilinear),
- (2) *payaraṃgula* (plane surface),
- (3) *ghaṇaṃgula* (cube).

(1) The *sūtiāṃgula* (sic) is a one *āṃgula* long row of space-points, with (a thickness equal to) one space-point (the breadth also being equal to one space-point, for instance, ...which is a row of three space-points).

(2) The *payaraṃgula* is (equal to) *sūyī* multiplied by *sūyī* (for instance,  which is a square consisting of nine space-points, there  being three space-points on each side).

(3) The *ghaṇaṃgula* is (equal to) *payara* multiplied by *sū* (sic) (for instance,  which is a cube consisting of 27 space-points).

338. Which of these *sūtiāṃgula*, *payaraṃgula* and *ghaṇaṃgula*— is, O Lord, relatively less or greater or equal or extra-plus ? (The reply

is that) the *sūtiṃḡula* is the least of all, the *pataraṃḡula* (sic) is innumerable times (greater than the *sūtiṃḡula*), and the *ghaṇaṃḡula* is innumerable times (greater than the *payaraṃḡula*).

This is the *āyaṃḡula*.

339. Then what is the *ussehaṃḡula*?¹ The *ussehaṃḡula* is stated to be manifold (in the following verse), viz.

There are—atom (*paramāṇū*), mote (*tasareṇū*, literally 'movable' (by air)), mote raised by chariot (*rahareṇū*), and tip of hair (*aggayaṃ ca vālassa*), nit (*likkhā*), louse (*jūyā*), and barley (*java*) which increase in (geometrical) progression (the succeeding one being) eight times (the preceding one) //99//

340. Then what is the atom? The atom is stated to be two-fold, viz².

- (1) subtle (*suhuma*, theoretical), and
- (2) practical (*vavahāra*).

341. Of them, (the atom) which is subtle, is to be left unexplained (in the present context).

342. Then what is the practical. (As regards) the practical (material atom), a practical material atom is produced by the integration of the assemblage of groups of infinite times infinite number² of suble material atoms.

343 [1]. Should, O Lord, it (the practical material atom) occupy the edge of a sword or edge of a razar? Yes, it can occupy. And at that time, is it pierced through or broken into pieces? (Answer): such incident is not possible, the weapon does not prevail there indeed.

343 [2]. Should, O Lord, it pass through a fiery body? Yes, it does pass through. At that time, O Lord, should it burn? (Answer): such incident is not possible, the weapon (of fire) does not prevail there indeed.

343 [3]. Should, O Lord, it pass through the great cloud called *Pukkhalaṣaṃvaṭṭaya*? Yes, it does pass through. At that time, does it become wet with water? (Answer): such incident is not possible, the weapon (of water) does not prevail there indeed.

343 [4]. Should, O Lord, it go swiftly against the stream (in the midst) of the big river called *Gaṅgā*? Yes, it does go swiftly. At

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No, 333.

2. *aṇaṃtāṇaṃtāṇaṃ*—vide footnote 3 on p. 137 of the MJV edition.

that time, does it meet obstruction (from the stream) ? (Answer) : such incident is not possible, the weapon (of stream) does not prevail there indeed.

343 [5]. Should, O Lord, it bathe into the whirlpool of water or a drop of water ? Yes, it does bathe. At that time, does it rot or dissolve (in water) ? (Answer) : such incident is not possible, the weapon (of water) does not prevail there indeed. (On this, a verse runs) :

The omniscients call that an atom which is not capable of being pierced through or broken (into pieces) even by a very sharp weapon; that (they call) the first unit of standard (of measurement) //100//

344. By the integration of the assemblage of groups of infinite practical material atoms, there arise gradually (what is) called a very very fine (*ussaṅhasaṅhiyā*), or (what is) called a very fine (*saṅhasaṅhiyā*), or (what is) called a floating mote (*uḍḍhareṇū*), or (what is) called a mote (*tasareṇū*), or (what is) called a mote raised by chariot (*rahareṇū*).

eight *ussaṅhasaṅhiyās* make one *saṅhasaṅhiyā*,

eight *saṅhasaṅhiyās* make one *uḍḍhareṇū*,

eight *uḍḍhareṇūs* make one *tasareṇū*,

eight *tasareṇūs* make one *rahareṇū*,

eight *rahareṇūs* make one *vālagga* (hair-tip) of the human beings of *Devakuru* and *Uttarakuru*,

eight *vālaggas* of the human beings of *Devakuru* and *Uttarakuru* are equal to one *vālagga* of the human beings of *Harivāsa* and *Rammagavāsa*,

eight *vālaggas* of the human beings of *Harivāsa* and *Rammagavāsa* are equal to one *vālagga* of the human beings of *Hemavayavāsa* and *Heranṇavayavāsa*,

eight *vālaggos* of the human beings of *Hemavayavāsa* and *Heranṇavayavāsa* are equal to one *vālagga* of the human beings of *Puvvavideha* and *Avaravideha*,

eight *vālaggas* of the human beings of *Puvvavideha* and *Avaravideha* are equal to one *vālagga* of the human beings of *Bharaha* and *Eravaya*,

eight *vālaggas* of the human beings of *Bharaha* and *Eravaya* are equal to one *likkhā* (nit),

eight *likkhās* are equal to one *jūyā* (louse),

eight *jūyās* make one *javamajjha* (middle part of a barley corn),

eight *javamajjhas* make one *ussehamgula* (the breadth of a finger).

345. By this standard of *amgula*—

six *amgulas* make one *pāda*,

twelve *aṅgulas* make one *vihatthī*,
 twenty-four *aṅgulas* make one *rayaṇī*,
 forty-eight *aṅgulas* make one *kucchī*,
 ninety-six *aṅgulas* make one *daṇḍa*, or *dhaṇū*, or *juga*, or
nāliyā, or *akkha*, or *musala*,
 two thousand *dhaṇūs*, by this standard of *dhaṇū*, make
 one *gāyā*,
 four *gāyās* make one *joyāṇa*.

346. What is the purpose of this (standard of measurement of) *ussehaṅgula*? (The reply is that) by means of this *ussehaṅgula*, the space occupied by the bodies of hell-beings, animal beings, human beings and gods is measured.

347 [1]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of hell-beings? It is, Gotama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
- (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is ... maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 500 *dhaṇūs* in the maximum. Of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 1,000 *dhaṇūs* in the maximum.

347 [2]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of hell-beings in the land of *Rayaṇappabhā*? It is, Goyama (sic), stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
- (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and seven *dhaṇūs*, three *rayaṇīs* and six *aṅgulas* in the maximum. Of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and fifteen *dhaṇūs*, two and a half *rayaṇī* in the maximum.

347 [3]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of hell-beings in the land of the *Sakkarappabhā*? It is, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and

- (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and fifteen *dhaṇūs*, two and a half *rayaṇīs* in the maximum. Of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and thirty-one *dhaṇūs* and one *rayaṇī* in the maximum.

347 [4]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of hell-beings in the land of the *Valuyapabhā*? It is, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
 (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and thirty-one *dhaṇūs* and one *rayaṇī* in the maximum. Of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and sixty-two *dhaṇūs* and two *rayaṇīs* in the maximum.

347 [5]. Similarly, the question about all types of land is to be asked.

In respect of the land of the *Paṅkappabhā*, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and sixty-two *dhaṇūs* and two *rayaṇīs* in the maximum; the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one hundred and twentyfive *dhaṇūs* in the maximum.

In respect of the land of the *Dhumappabhā*, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one hundred and twenty-five *dhaṇūs* in the maximum; the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and two hundred and fifty *dhaṇūs* in the maximum.

In respect of (the land of) *Tamā*, the (normal) body which is... maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and two hundred and fifty *dhaṇūs* in the maximum; the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and five hundred *dhaṇūs* in the maximum.

347 [6]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of hell-beings in the land of the *Tamatamā* ? It is, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
- (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and five hundred *dhaṅṅūs* in the maximum. Of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *dhaṅṅūs* in the maximum.

348 [1]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of the *Asurakumāras* ? It is, Gotama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
- (ii) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and seven *rayaṅṅūs* in the maximum; the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one hundred thousand *joṇaṅṅas* in the maximum.

348 [2]. Similarly, it is to be spoken of up to *Thaṅṅiyakumāras* (vide, *sūtra* No. 216 [13]) by (following) the method (adopted in the case) of the *Asurakumāras*.

349 [1]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of the earth-bodied beings ? It is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also.

Similarly, it is to be spoken of the micro-organic earth-bodied beings, jointly (of undeveloped and developed), and (separately) of undeveloped and developed (beings); and also of the macro-organic beings jointly (of undeveloped and developed), and (separately) of undeveloped and developed (beings.)

Similarly, it is to be spoken of up to the macro-organic undeveloped and developed air-bodied beings (vide *sūtra* No, 216 [6]).

349 [2]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of plant-bodied beings ? It is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and a little more than one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; (the bodily occupation of) the micro-organic plant-bodied beings of all the three varieties—viz. (i) jointly (undeveloped and developed), (ii) undeveloped, and (iii) developed also—is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; (the bodily occupation of) the macro-organic plant-bodied beings is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and a little more than one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; (the bodily occupation) of (the macro-organic plant-bodied beings which are) undeveloped is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; (the bodily occupation) of (macro-organic plant-bodied beings which are) developed is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and a little more than one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

350 [1]. (Similarly) the question about (the bodily occupation of) two-sensed beings¹ is to be asked. Regarding question about two-sensed beings, (their bodily occupation) is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and twelve *joyaṇas* in the maximum; (the bodily occupation) of (two-sensed beings which are) undeveloped is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; (the bodily occupation) of (two-sensed beings which are) developed is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and twelve *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

350 [2]. (Next comes) the question about (the bodily occupation of) three-sensed beings; (it is), Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *gāyayas* in the maximum; (the bodily occupation) of (three-sensed beings which are) undeveloped is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; (the bodily occupation) of (three-sensed beings which are) developed is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *gāyayas* in the maximum.

350 [3]. (Next comes) the question about the bodily occupation of four-sensed beings; (it is), Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and four *gāyayas* in the maximum; (the

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 216 [7].

bodily occupation) of (four-sensed beings which are) undeveloped is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* both in the minimum and the maximum. As regards the question about (the bodily occupation) of (four-sensed beings which are) developed, it is (equal to) a numerablth part of and *aṅgula* in the minimum and four *gāuyas* in the maximum.

351 [1]. As regards the question of the bodily occupation of the animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

351 [2]. The question about (the bodily occupation of) aquatic beings of the animal world with five sense-organs; Goyama, is also like this, and like this is also the (question about) the agamic aquatic beings with five sense-organs. (In respect of the question about agamic aquatic beings with five sense-organs, Goyama, it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum)¹; in respect of the question about undeveloped agamic aquatic beings with five sense-organs, it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed agamic aquatic beings with five sense-organs, it is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about aquatic beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about undeveloped (aquatic beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about developed (aquatic beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

351 [3]. In respect of the question about the quadruped terrestrial beings (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and six *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the agamic quadruped terrestrial beings (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and

1. The bracketed portion is from Puppha Bhikkhu's *Suttāgame* Part II, p. 1127.

'several' (*puhatta*)¹ *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic quadruped terrestrial beings (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed agamic quadruped terrestrial beings (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the quadruped terrestrial beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and six *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped quadruped terrestrial beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed (quadruped terrestrial beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and six *gāuyas* in the maximum.

In respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped (agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed (agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped (terrestrial reptile

1. The Commentary, p. 183 B, explains *puhatta* as : *dvi-prabhṛtyā navabhyāḥ sama-yoprasiddhyā pṛthaktvam ucyate*, that is, any number between 2 and 9.

beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed (terrestrial reptile beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

In respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, (with five sense-organs), it is, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, (with five sense-organs), it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed agamic terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs), it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *dhaṇūs* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, (with five sense-organs), coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *gāuyas* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped (terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question up to about the developed terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, (with five sense-organs), coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *gāuyas* in the maximum.

351 [4]. In respect of the question about the aerial beings of the animal world, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *dhaṇus* (sic) in the maximum; about the agamic aerial beings of the next three kinds it is to be spoken of as in the (corresponding) cases of the agamic reptile beings crawling on arms. (In respect of the question about the aerial beings with five sense-organs), coming out of womb, it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *dhaṇus* in the maximum; in respect of the question about the undeveloped

(aerial beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed (aerial beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), it is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and 'several' *dhanus* in the maximum.

351 [5]. Here, there are epitomic verses which are as follows, viz.

There is (the maximum length of) one thousand *joyaṇas* (in the case of agamic aquatic beings with five sense-organs), 'several' *gāuyas* (in the case of agamic quadruped beings), and then 'several' *joyaṇas* (in the case of agamic reptile beings crawling on breast); however, of the two agamic beings (i.e., reptile beings crawling on arms, and aerial beings) (the maximum length) is 'several' *dhanus*—(this is) about the height of agamic beings //101//

There is (the maximum length of) one thousand *joyaṇas* (in the case of aquatic beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb), six *gāuyas* (in the case of quadruped beings, coming out of womb) and then one thousand *joyaṇas* (in the case of reptile beings crawling on breast, coming out of womb) and 'several' *gāuyas* in the case of reptile beings crawling on arms and 'several' *dhanus* in the case of birds—(all this relates to beings coming out of womb) //102//

352 [1]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of human beings? It is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *gāuyas* in the maximum.

352 [2]. In respect of the question up to the agamic human beings, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also.

352 [3]. (In respect of the question) up to the human beings, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *gāuyas* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped human beings, coming out of womb, it is Goyama, (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the maximum also; in respect of the question about the developed human beings, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *gāuyas* in the maximum.

353. Of the *Vāṇamaṃtara* (gods), the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life and the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose are to be spoken of just as in the case of the *Asurakumāras*.

354. (The bodies of the) *Jotisiyas* are (also to be spoken of) just as in the case of the *Vānamāntaras*.

355 [1]. How big, O Lord, is (the bodily occupation) of the *Sohammaya* gods ? It is, Gayama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) the (normal) body which is got at the time of birth and maintained till the end of life, and
- (2) the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose.

Of them, the (normal) body which is...maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and seven *rayaṇīs* in the the maximum; of them, the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is (equal to) a numerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and one hundred thousand *joyaṇas* in the maximum.

355 [2]. As in the case of *Sohamma* (sic), so also is to be spoken of (the gods) in the *Isāṅkappa*.

355 [3]. The questions about the gods in the remaining *kappas* up to the *Accuyakappa* are to be spoken of just as in the case of the question about the *Sohamma* gods.

In *Saṅamkumāra*, the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and six *rayaṇīs* in the maximum; the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose is to be spoken of just as in the case of the *Sohamma*.

About the *Māhiṅda* (*kappa*) also, it is to be spoken of just as in the case of *Saṅamkumāra*.

In *Bambhaloga* and *Lamtaa*, the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and five *rayaṇīs* in the maximum; about the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose, it (is to be spoken of) just as in the case of the *Sohamma*.

In *Mahāsukka* and *Sahasāra*, the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and four *rayaṇīs* in the maximum; about the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose, it (is to be spoken of) just as in the case of the *Sohamma*.

In the four (that is) *Ānata*, *Paṇata*, *Āraṇa* and *Accuta* also, the (normal) body which is maintained till the end of life is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *aṅgula* in the minimum and three *rayaṇīs* in the maximum; about the body which is created afterwards to serve some purpose, it (is to be spoken of) just as in the case of the *Sohamma*.

355 [4]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of the *Gevejjaya* gods ? The body of the *Gevejjaya* gods is said to be of one kind (only), viz. the normal body which is maintained till the end of life, and that is (equal to) a $\frac{1}{2}$ innumerablth part of an *amgula* in the minimum and two *rayaṇīs* in the maximum.

355 [5]. How big, O Lord, is the bodily occupation of the *Aṅuttarovavāyīya* gods ? The body of the *Aṅuttarovavāyīya* gods is said to be of one kind (only), viz. the normal body which is maintained till the end of life, and that is (equal to) an innumerablth part of an *amgula* in the minimum and one *rayaṇī* in the maximum.

356. This (above described *ussehamgula*)¹ is stated to be threefold in brief, viz.

- (1) *sūtamgula* (rectilinear);
- (2) *payaramgula* (plane surface);
- (3) *ghanamgula* (cube).

The *sūtamgula* is one *amgula* long row of space-points, with (a thickness equal to) one space-point (the breadth also being equal to one space-point), the *payaramgula* is (equal to) *sū* multiplied by *sū*, and the *ghanamgula* is (equal to) *payara* multiplied by *sū*.

357. Which of these—*sūcīamgula* (*sic*), *payaramgula*, and *ghanamgula* is, O Lord, relatively less or greater or equal or extra-plus ? The *sūtamgula* is the least of all, the *payaramgula* is innumerable times (greater than the *sūtamgula*), and the *ghanamgula* is innumerable times (greater than the *payaramgula*).

This is the *ussehamgula*.²

358. Then what is the *paṃāṇamgula* ?³ The *paṃāṇamgula* is stated (as follows):

(There is) the *kāgaṇī*⁴ jewel stated to be possessed by every king who is the emperor of (the whole) world up to the four ends, which is (equal to) eight *sovaṇṇīas*⁵ (in weight), has six surfaces, twelve

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 339.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 339.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 333.

4. This is one of the fourteen jewels of a *Cakravartin*, which consist of *Ithi* (lady), *Seṇāvai* (military general), *Gāhāvai* (house-holder), *Purohīya* (priest), *Vadḍhai* (architect-engineer), *Āsa* (horse), *Haṭṭhi* (elephant), *Asi* (sword), *Daṇḍa* (stick), *Cakka* (discus), *Chatta* (umbrella), *Gamma* (shield), *Maṇi* (precious stone) and *kāgaṇī* (a cubical jewel). Vide *Samavāyanga* 48 (*Suttāgame* Part I, p. 327, lines 27-29).

5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 328 for *sovaṇṇa*.

edges, eight corners and shaped like the configuration of an anvil, and each side of it is (equal to) the breadth of one *ussehaṅgula* which is (equal to) half of (the thickness) of the *aṅgula* of the Ascetic Lord *Mahāvira*. One thousand times of it is one *pamāṇaṅgula*.

359. By this standard of *aṅgula*,
 six *aṅgulas* make one *pāda*,
 two *pādas* or twelve *aṅgulas* make one *vihatthī*,
 two *vihatthīs* make one *rayaṇī*,
 two *rayaṇīs* make one *kucchī*,
 two *kucchīs* make one *dhaṇū*,
 two thousand *dhaṇūs* make one *gāuya*,
 four *gāuyas* make one *joyaṇa*.

360. What is the purpose of this *pamāṇaṅgula*? The reply is that) by means of this *pamāṇaṅgula*, the length, breadth, height, depth and circumference of the *Puḍhavi* (of *Ratnaṅgula*, etc.), *Kaṁḍas* (regions, e. g., of *Ratnakamḍa*, etc.), *Pāyālas* (*Pātālakalaśas*, pitcher-shaped deeps),¹ *Bhavaṇas* (abodes of the *Bhavaṇapati* gods), the layers of the *Bhavaṇas*, hellish abodes, the rows of hellish abodes, the layers of hellish abodes, *Kappas* (abodes of gods, viz. *Saudharmika*, etc.), *Vimāṇas* (related to the *Graiveyaka* gods), rows of the *Vimāṇas*, the layers of the *Vimāṇas*, *Taṅkas* (mountains with broken summits), *Kūdas* (peaks of mountains), *selas* (mountains without peaks), *siharīs* (mountains with peaks), *pabbhāras* (slightly inclined mountains), *Vijayas* (viz. the kingdom of *Kaccha*, etc. vide *Tḥāṇḅga*, 8, p. 293 of *Suttāgame*, part. 1), *Vakkhāras* (a class of the mountains of the shape of elephant tusk, viz. *Vidyutprabhā*, etc.), *vāsas* (continents), *vāsaharas* (countries, viz. *Bhāratavarṣa*, etc.), *vāsaharapavvayas* (the mountains dividing the seven *kṣetras*, viz. *Bharata*, etc.), *velās* (sea-shore where water flows in eddies), *veiyas* (surrounding walls, such as *paumavara*, etc.), *dāras* (gates such as *Vijaya*, etc.), *torāṇas* (archways), *dīvas* (islands), and *samuddas* (oceans) are measured.

361. This (viz. *pamāṇaṅgula*) is stated to be threefold in brief, viz.

- (1) *sedhīaṅgula* (rectilinear);
- (2) *payaraṅgula* (plane surface);
- (3) *ghaṇaṅgula* (cube).

The *sedhī* is (a row of) innumerable *koḍākoḍī* (10^{14}) *joyaṇas* (that is, the *loga* when folded into a cube, has the rectilinear length of innumerable *koḍīkoḍī* *joyaṇas* which is equal to 7 *rajjus*), the *patara* is (equal

1. Vide the Commentary of *Jīvājīvaṇṇati*, 3. 156 and *Pravacanasāroddhāra* Part II, p. 443 ff.

to) the *sedhī* multiplied by *sedhī* (that is 7×7 square *rajjus*), and the *loga* is *patara* multiplied by *sedhī* (that is $7 \times 7 \times 7$ cube *rajjus*), the numerable *logas* are (equal to) numerable times of *loga*, the innumerable *logas* are (equal to) innumerable times of *loga*, and the infinite *logas* are (equal to) infinite times of *loga*.¹

362. Which of these—*sedhiṅgula*, *payaraṅgula*, and *ghaṇaṅgula*—is relatively less or greater or equal or extra-plus? The *sedhiṅgula* (sic) is the least of all; the *payaraṅgula* is innumerable times (greater than the *sedhiṅgula*); the *ghaṇaṅgula* is innumerable times (greater than the *payaraṅgula*).

This is the *pamāṇaṅgula*. This is the standard concerned with the various types of land.² This is the standard of measurement of lands.³

363. Then what is the standard (of measurement) of time?⁴ The standard (of measurement) of time is stated to be twofold, viz.

(i) concerned with the time-points; and

(ii) concerned with the various types (of time).

364. Then what is (the standard of measurement of time) concerned with time-points? (The examples of the standard) concerned with time-points are (as follows):

A thing staying for one instant, a thing staying for two instants, a thing staying for three instants,...up to...a thing staying for innumerable instants.

This is (the standard of measurement of time) concerned with time-points.

365. Then what is (the standard of measurement of time) concerned with various types (of time)? (The standard of measurement of time) concerned with the various types (of time) is (given in the following verse):

(There are) *samaya* (instant), *āvaliyā* (series of instants), *muhutta*, *divasa* (one day), *ahoratta* (one day and night), *pakkha* (half of a month, fortnight), *māsa* (one month), and *samvaccara* (one year), *juga*, *paliya* (store), *sāgara* (ocean), *osappi*, *pariatta* ||103||

366. Then what is the instant (time-point)? I shall here explain the instant (thus):

1. Vide footnote 9 on p. 146 of the MJV edition.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 332.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 330.

4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 313.

(Suppose) there is a particular person, a son of a tailor, who is young, strong, is at a proper period of time, youthful, without disease and with steady forearm; has strong hands, and feet, with developed sides, back and thighs, has the two arms just like the bolt of a twin and a pair of *tāla* tree (palmyra tree); has the skin of his body made massive (by) hitting by means of leather-stick (*cammettaḡa*),¹ wooden club and fist; is capable of physical exercise of scaling, swimming and running quickly; is possessed of internal energy; knows what to do, is clever, learned, proficient, wise, skilful and expert in minute arts. He takes up a big piece of cotton cloth or a silken cloth and quickly (*sayarāham*) tears a cubit of it. Here a questioner asked the teacher thus : Is the time, taken by the son of a tailor quickly to tear a cubit of the big piece of cotton cloth or the silken cloth, equal to one (time) instant ? (The teacher replied) : Such assertion is not possible. Why ? Because one piece of cotton cloth is produced by the integration of the assemblage of groups of numerable number of threads. While the upper thread is not cut, the lower thread cannot be cut. The upper thread is cut at a time which is different from the time when the lower thread is cut. Therefore this is not one instant.

To the teacher explaining thus, the questioner again asked thus: Is the time taken by the son of a tailor in cutting the upper thread of the big piece of cotton cloth or silken cloth one instant? (The teacher replied): No, it is not. Why ? Because one thread is produced by the integration of the assemblage of groups of numerable number of fibres. While the upper fibre is not cut, the lower fibre cannot be cut. The upper fibre is cut at a time which is different from the time when the lower fibre is cut. Therefore this is not one instant.

To the teacher explaining thus, the questioner again asked thus: Is the time taken by the son of a tailor in cutting the upper fibre of thread one instant ? (The teacher replied): No, it is not. Why ? Because one fibre is produced by the integration of the assemblage of groups of infinite number of (atomic) conglomerates. While the upper conglomerate is not broken, the lower conglomerate cannot be broken. The upper conglomerate is broken at a time which is different from the time when the lower conglomerate is broken. Therefore this is not one instant. Finer still than this, O young ascetic, is the (time-) instant stated to be.

367. What is produced by the integration of the assemblage of groups of innumerable number of instants is called *āvaliyā*.

1. Skt. *carma-yaṣṭi* (*carmadaṇḍa*).

numerable number of *āvaliyās* = one *ūsāsa* (expiration),
numerable number of *āvaliyās* = one *nīsāsa* (inspiration).

(On this, the verses run):

One *ūsāsa* and *nīsāsa* of a man who is pleased, not pained by old age and untroubled (by disease) is said to be one *pāṇu* (breath) //104//

Seven *pāṇus* make one *thova*, seven *thovas* make one *lava*, by seventy-seven *lavas* (is made what) is called one *muhutta* //105//

Three thousand seven hundred and seventy-three (3773) *ūsāsas* (meaning *ūsāsa* and *nīsāsa*) are called one *muhutta* by all omniscients //106//

By this standard of *muhutta*,

30 *muhuttas* make one *ahoratta* (one day and night),

15 *ahorattas* make one *pakkha* (half of a month),

2 *pakkhas* make one *māsa* (one month),

2 *māsas* make one *uū* (one season),

3 *uūs* make one *ayaṇa* (half of a year, the period of duration of the sun's passage, north and south of the equator),

2 *ayaṇas* make one *saṃvacchara* (one year),

5 *saṃvaccharas* make one *juga*,

20 *jugas* make one *vāsasaya* (one hundred years),

10 *vāsasatas* (sic) make one *vāsasahassa* (one thousand years),

100 *vāsasahassas* make one *vāsasayasahassa* (one hundred thousand years),

84,00,000 *vāsas* make one *puvvaṃga*,

84,00,000 *puvvaṃgas* make one *puvva*,

84,00,000 *puvvas* make one *tuḍiyamga*,

84,00,000 *tuḍiyamgas* make one *tuḍiya*.

¹Similarly, *aḍaḍamga*, *aḍaḍa*, *apapamga*, *apapa*, *hūhuyamga*, *hūhuya*, *uppalamga*, *uppala*, *paumamga*, *pauma*, *nalīnamga*, *nalīna*, *atthanīpuramga*, *atthanīura* (sic), *auyamga*, *auya*, *nauyamga*, *nauya*, *pautamga*, *pauta*, *cūliyamga*, *cūliyā*, *sisapaheliyamga*, and 84,00,000 *sīsapaheliyamga* make one *sisapaheliya* (=84,00,000²⁸ years).

Thus far indeed is counting. This much indeed is subject to counting². From this onward (another standard through) similes (*ovamia*) prevails.

1. Vide footnote 4 on p. 149 of the MJV edition.

2. Vide footnote 9 on p. 149 of the MJV edition.

368. Then what is (the number of time-instants indicated by standard) through similes ? (The number indicated by standard) through similes is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) (number indicated by standard) through the simile of a store (of corns, *paliovama*);
- (ii) (number indicated by standard) through the simile of ocean (*sāgarovama*).

369. Then what is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of a store ? (The number indicated by standard) through the simile of a store is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (A) (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store *uddhārapaliovama*, the number being equal to the number of the time-instants required for emptying the store, taking out *each content at one time-instant*);
- (B) (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store (*addhāpaliovama*, the number being equal to the number of the time-instants required for emptying the store, taking out *each content after an interval of one hundred years*); and
- (C) (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store (*khetta-paliovama*, the number being equal to the number of time-instants required for emptying the store of all its space-points, taking out *each space-point at every time-instant*).

370. Then what is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store ? (The number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) conceptual (that is, a store containing fine material which is conceptual); and
- (2) practical (that is, a store containing gross material).

371. Of them, what is conceptual is to be postponed (for consideration later on in *sutta* No. 374.

372. Of them, what is practical is (as follows):

(Suppose) there is a particular (circular) store (of corns), which is (by *ussehamgula*) one *joyana* in length and breadth, and one *joyana* upward in height. As regards its surrounding wall (*pariraa*, that is,

the circumference), it is three times (of one *joyana*, that is, three *joyanas*) and extra-plus. That store is completely filled ('filled up to the ear'), made tight and packed with many *koṭis* (one *koṭi*=1,00,00,000) of hair-tips grown in one day, two days, three days,...up to seven days in the maximum. The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair-tips emit bad smell. Now, the time required for taking out these hair-tips one by one at each instant till the store becomes empty, free from dust (of hair-tips), without defilement (of hair-tips) and clean (gives an idea of the practical 'number').

This (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the practical number (indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store. (Here, runs a verse):

(The number) which is (equal to) 'ten times of *koḍākoḍī*' (10×10^{14}) of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure (*parimāṇa*) of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean (*uddhārasāgarovama*) ||107||

373. What is the purpose of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store and the practical number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean? Of the practical number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store and the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean, there is no purpose; (it is) explained only for the (general) explanation (of its definition).¹

This is the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying of a store.

374. Then what is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store? The conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store is (as follows) :

(Suppose) there is a particular (circular) store, which is (by *ussehaṅgula*) one *joyana* in length and breadth and one *joyana* in depth. As regards its surrounding wall (*parikkheva*, that is, circumference) it is three times (of one *joyana*, that is, three *joyanas*) and extra-plus. That store is completely filled, made tight, and packed with many *koṭis* of hair-tips grown in one day, two days, three days,...up to seven days

1. The purpose of explaining the practical *paliovama* and *sāgarovama* is to give a general idea of such big numbers, so that the learner may easily understand still bigger numbers indicated by conceptual *paliovama* and *sāgarovama*.

in the maximum. There each hair-tip is cut into innumerable parts. Each such (part of) hair-tip is (equal to) an innumerable part of the visible (particle), and is also (equal to) innumerable times the bodily occupation of micro-organic moss (which is finer than the part of hair-tip mentioned above). The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair tips emit bad smell. Now, the time required for taking out these hair-tips one by one at each instant till the store becomes empty, free from dust, without defilement (of hair-tips) and clean (gives an idea of the conceptual 'number').

This (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store. (Here, runs a verse) ;

(The number) which is (equal to) 'ten times of *koḍḍākoḍḍī*' of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean //108//

375. What is the purpose of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean ? By means of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying an ocean, (the number of) islands and oceans is obtained (by calculating the number of instants taken) in emptying (the store or the ocean).

376. How many are the islands and oceans, O Lord, stated (to exist) by means of such (calculation by) emptying ? The (number of) islands and oceans (obtained through calculation) by emptying is stated, O Goyama, to be (equal to) two and a half ($2\frac{1}{2}$) times (the number) indicated in emptying one *uddhārasāgarovama*.

This is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the store. This is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying a store.¹

377. Then what is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store ?² (The number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store is stated to be twofold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 370.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 369.

- (1) conceptual (that is a store containing fine material which is conceptual); and
- (2) practical (that is, a store containing gross material).

378. Of them, what is conceptual is to be postponed (for consideration later on in *sutta* No. 381).

379. Of them, what is practical is (as follows):

(Suppose) there is a particular (circular) store, which is (by *ussehamgula*) one *joyaṇa* in length and breadth and one *jyaṇa* in depth. As regards its surrounding wall (that is, circumference), it is three times (of one *joyaṇa*, that is, three *joyaṇas*) and extra-plus, That store is completely...up to...packed with many *koṭis* of hair-tips grown in one day, to days, three days, (etc.). The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair-tips emit bad smell. Now, the time required for taking out these (hair-tips) one by one in every one hundred years till the store becomes empty, free from dust, without defilement (of hair tips) and clean (gives an idea of the practical number).

This (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store. (Here, runs a verse):

(The number) which is (equal to) 'ten time of *koḍākoḍi*' of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean //109//

380. What is the purpose of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store and (the practical number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean? of these (viz. the practical number indicated by standard through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store and the practical number indicated by standard through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean), there is no purpose, (it is) explained only for the general explanation (of its definition).

This is the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store.

381. Then what is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a

store ?¹ The conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store is (as follows):

(Suppose there is a particular (circular) store which is (by *ussehaṅgula*) one *joyaṇa* in length and breadth and one *joyaṇa* in depth. As regards its surrounding wall (that is, circumference) it is three times (of one *joyaṇa*, that is, three *joyaṇas*) and extra-plus. That store is completely...up to...packed with many *koṭṭis* of hair-tips grown in one day, two days, three days, (etc.) There each hair-tip is cut into innumerable parts. Each such (part of) hair-tip is (equal to) an innumerable part of the visible (particle) and is (equal to) innumerable times the bodily occupation of micro-organic moss (which is finer than the part of hair-tip mentioned above). The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair-tips emit bad smell. Now the time required for taking out these hair-tips one by one in every one hundred years till that store becomes empty, free from dust, without defilement (of hair-tips) and clean (gives an idea of the conceptual number).

This, (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store. (Here runs a verse) :

(The number) which is (equal to) 'ten times of *koḍākoḍī* of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean //110//

382. What is the purpose of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean? By means of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying an ocean, the longevity of hell-beings, animal beings, human beings, and gods is measured.

383 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration (longevity) of the hell-beings stated to be? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and thirty-three *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 377.

383 [2]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the hell-beings in the land of *Rayaṇappabhā* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and one *sāgarovama* in the maximum.

How long, O Lord, is the duration of the undeveloped hell-beings in the land of *Rayaṇappabhā* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, *aṃtomuhutta* (less than one *muhutta*) in the minimum and *aṃtomuhutta* in the maximum also.

How long, O Lord, is the duration of the developed (hell-beings in the land of *Rayaṇappabhā* stated to be ? It is, Goyama,) ¹ ten thousand years less *aṃtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *sāgarovama* less *aṃtomuhutta* in the maximum.

383 [3]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the hell-beings in the land of *Sakkarapabhā* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, one *sāgarovama* in the minimum and three *sāgarovama* in the maximum.

383 [4]. Similarly, it is to be spoken of the questions about the remaining *pahās* (hells). Of the hell-beings in the land of *Vālyapabhā*, it is three *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and seven *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. Of the hell-beings in the land of *Paṃkapabhā*, it is seven *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and ten *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. Of the hell-beings in the land of *Dhūmapabhā*, it is ten *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and seventeen *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the hell-beings in the land of *Tama* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, seventeen *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-two *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the hell-beings in the land of *Tamatamā* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, twenty-two *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and thirty-three *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

384 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the *Asurakumāras* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and a little more than one *sāgarovama* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the *Asurakumāra* goddesses stated to be ? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and four and a half (4½) *paliovamas* in the maximum.

384 [2]. (How long, O Lord, is the duration of the) ² *Nāgakumāras* ? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and a little less than two *paliovamas* (or two *paliovamas* less one part) in the maximum. (How long, O Lord, is the duration of the) ³ *Nāgakumāra* goddesses ? It is,

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1. The bracketed portion is indicated by *jāva* in the text.
 2. The bracketed portion is indicated by *jāva* in the text.
 3. The bracketed portion is indicated by *jāva* in the text.

Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and a little less than two *paliovamas* in the maximum.

384 [3]. Similarly, it is to be spoken of up to the *Thañiyakumāra* gods and goddesses just as in the case of the *Nāgakumāra* gods and goddesses.

385 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the earth-bodied beings stated to be? It is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and twenty-two thousand years in the maximum.

(Now) the questions about the micro-organic earth-bodied beings, jointly (about developed and undeveloped), and (separately) about undeveloped and developed (are asked). In respect of the question about these three (that is, jointly about undeveloped and developed, and separately about undeveloped and developed)—it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the macro-organic earth-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and twenty-two thousand years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped macro-organic earth-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed macro-organic earth-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and twenty-two thousand years less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

385 [2]. Similarly, the questions about the beings possessed of the remaining kinds of bodies are to be spoken of.

Of the water-bodied beings, (the duration is), Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and seven thousand years in the maximum. Of the three micro-organic water-bodied beings jointly (undeveloped and developed), and (separately) undeveloped and developed—(the duration is) one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the macro-organic water-bodied beings, (it is), Goyama, just as in the case of jointly (undeveloped and developed); of the undeveloped macro-organic water-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the developed macro-organic water-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and seven thousand years less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

385 [3]. Of the fire-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three days and nights in the maximum. Of the three micro-organic fire-bodied beings—jointly (undeveloped and developed), and (separately) undeveloped and developed—it is one

amtomuhutta in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the macro-organic fire-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three days and nights in the maximum. Of the undeveloped macro-organic fire-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the developed macro-organic fire-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three days and nights less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

385 [4]. Of the air-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three thousand years in the maximum. Of the three micro-organic air-bodied beings—jointly (undeveloped and developed), and (separately) undeveloped and developed—it is one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the macro-organic air-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three thousand years in the maximum. Of the undeveloped macro-organic air-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the developed macro-organic air-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and three thousand years less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

385 [5]. Of the plant-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and ten thousand years in the maximum. Of the three micro-organic plant-bodied beings—jointly (undeveloped and developed), and (separately) undeveloped and developed—it is one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the macro-organic plant-bodied beings? It is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and ten thousand years in the maximum. Of the undeveloped macro-organic plant-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. Of the developed macro-organic plant-bodied beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and ten thousand years less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

386 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the two-sensed beings? It is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and twelve years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped two-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed two-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and twelve years less one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

386 [2]. In respect of the question about the three-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and forty-nine days and nights in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped three-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed three-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and forty-nine days and nights in the maximum.

386 [3]. (How long, O Lord, is the duration of) the four-sensed beings ? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and six months in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped four-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed four-sensed beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and six months less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

387 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the five-sensed animal beings ? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliivamas* in the maximum.

387 [2]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the aquatic animals with five sense-organs ? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvakodī* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the agamic aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvakodī* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed agamic aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvakodī* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvakodī* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed aquatic animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvakodī* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

387 [3]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs stated to be ? It is,

Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the agamic quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and eighty-four thousand years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed agamic quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and eighty-four thousand years less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed quadruped terrestrial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

How long, O Lord, is the duration of the terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḥoḍi* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and fifty-three thousand years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and fifty-three thousand years less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḥoḍi* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed terrestrial reptile animal beings

crawling on breast, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḷoḍḍi* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

In respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḷoḍḍi* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and forty-two thousand years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms, with five-sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed agamic terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and forty-two thousand years less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the terrestrial reptile beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḷoḍḍi* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed terrestrial reptile animal beings crawling on arms, with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *puvvaḷoḍḍi* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

387 [4]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the aerial animal beings with five sense-organs stated to be? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of a *paliyama* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the agamic aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and seventy-two thousand years in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped agamic aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed agamic aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and seventy-two thousand years less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb,

it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of a *paliovama* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect, of the question about the developed aerial animal beings with five sense-organs, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and an innumerablth part of a *paliovama* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

387 [5]. Here, there are epitomic verses (which run as follows):

(The maximum duration of the) agamic (beings) is one *puvvakodī* (in the case of the aquatic beings), eighty-four thousand years (in the case of the quadruped beings), fifty-three (thousand years in the case of the reptile beings crawling on breast), forty-two (thousand years in the case of the reptile beings crawling on arms) and seventy-two (thousand years) of birds (as the longest longevity) //111//

The longest longevity in the case of the beings coming out of womb is one *puvvakodī* (in the case of the aquatic beings), three *paliovamas* (in the case of the quadruped beings), and one *puvvakodī* (in the case of the reptile beings crawling on) breast and arms, and an innumerablth part of a *paliovama* (sic) (in the case of the aerial beings) //112//

388 [1]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of human beings stated to be? It is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* in the maximum.

388 [2]. In respect of the question about the agamic human beings, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also.

388 [3]. In respect of the question about the human beings, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the undeveloped human beings, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum also. In respect of the question about the developed human beings, coming out of womb, it is, Goyama, one *am̐tomuhutta* in the minimum and three *paliovamas* less one *am̐tomuhutta* in the maximum.

389. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the *Vāṇamaṅtara* gods stated to be? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and one *paliovama* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the *Vāṇamaṅtara* goddesses? It is, Goyama, ten thousand years in the minimum and half a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [1]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Jotisiya* gods? It is, Gotama, a little more than one eighth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and one hundred thousand years in excess of one *paliovama* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Joist* (sic) goddesses? It is, Goyama, one eighth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and fifty thousand years in excess of half a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [2]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods of the *Camdavimāṇa* (celestial abode of the moon)? It is one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and one hundred thousand years in excess of a *paliovama* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the goddesses of the *Camdavimāṇa*? It is one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and fifty thousand years in excess of half a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [3]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods of the *Sūravimāṇa*? It is one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and one thousand years in excess of a *paliovama* in the maximum. In respect of the question about the goddesses of the *Sūravimāṇa*, it is, one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and five hundred years in excess of half a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [4]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Gahavimāṇa* gods? It is one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and one *paliovama* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Gahavimāṇa* goddesses? It is one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and half a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [5]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Nakkhattavimāṇa* gods? It is, Goyama, one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and half a *paliovama* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Nakkhattavimāṇa* goddesses? It is, Goyama, one fourth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and a little more than one fourth of a *paliovama* in the maximum.

390 [6]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Tārāvimāṇa* gods? It is, Goyama, a little more than one eighth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and one fourth of a *paliovama* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Tārāvimāṇa* goddesses? It is, Goyama, one eighth of a *paliovama* in the minimum and a little more than one eighth of a *paliovama* in the maximum.

391 [1]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the *Vemāṇiya* gods? It is, Goyama, one *paliovama* in the minimum and thirty-three *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the *Vemāṇiya* goddesses? It is, Goyama, one *paliovama* in the minimum and fifty-five *paliovamas* in the maximum.

391 [2]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the *Sohamma Kappa* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, one *paliovama* in the minimum and two *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the (married)¹ goddesses in the *Sohamma Kappa* ? It is, Goyama, one *paliovama* in the minimum and seven *paliovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the unmarried goddesses in the *Sohamma Kappa* ? It is, Goyama, one *paliovama* in the minimum and fifty *paliovamas* in the maximum.

391 [3]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the *Isāṇa Kappa* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, a little more than one *paliovama* in the minimum and a little more than two *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the (married) goddesses in the *Isāṇa Kappa* ? It is, Goyama, a little more than one *paliovama* in the minimum and nine *paliovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the unmarried goddesses in the *Isāṇa Kappa* ? It is, Goyama, a little more than one *paliovama* in the minimum and fifty-five *paliovamas* in the maximum.

391 [4]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the *Sanamkumāra Kappa* stated to be ? It is, Goyama, two *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and seven *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

391 [5]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the *Māhimda Kappa* ? It is, Gotama, a little more than two *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and a little more than seven *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

391 [6]. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the *Bambhaloa Kappa* ? It is, Goyama, seven *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and ten *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

391 [7]. Similarly, how long is the duration (of the gods) *Kappa*-wise stated to be ? It is, to be spoken of as follows:

in *Lamṭaa*—ten *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and fourteen *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

in *Mahāsukka*—fourteen *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and seventeen *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

in *sahassāra*—seventeen *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and eighteen *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

in *Āṇaa*—eighteen *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and nineteen *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

1. Vide Puppā Bhikkhu's *Suttāgame*, Part II, p. 1139, line 5.

in *Pāṇaa*—nineteen *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

in *Āraṇa*—twenty *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-one *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

in *Accua*—twenty-one *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-two *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

391 [8]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the lowest of the lower (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is, Goyama, twenty-two *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-three *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the middle of the lower (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is, Goyama, twenty-three *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-four *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the uppermost of the lower (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-four *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-five *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the lowest of the middle (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-five *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-six *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the middle of the middle (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-six *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-seven *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the uppermost of the middle (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-seven *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-eight *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the lowest of the upper (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-eight *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and twenty-nine *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the middle of the upper (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is twenty-nine *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and thirty *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. (How long), O Lord, (is the duration) of the gods in the uppermost of the upper (group of) *Gevejja Vimāṇas* ? It is thirty *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and thirty-one *sāgarovamas* in the maximum.

391 [9]. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in *Vijaya*-, *Vejayamta*-, *Jayamta*-, and *Aparājita-Vimāṇas* ? It is, Goyama, thirty-one *sāgarovamas* in the minimum and thirty-three *sāgarovamas* in the maximum. How long, O Lord, is the duration of the gods in the *Savvatthasiddha Mahāvīmāṇa* ? It is, Goyama, thirty-three *sāgarovamas* without any minimum or maximum.

This is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instant required for emptying a store¹. This is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of time-instants required for emptying a store.²

392. Then what is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store ?³ (The number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) conceptual (that is, a store containing fine material which is conceptual); and
- (2) practical (that is, a store containing gross material).

393. Of them, what is conceptual is to be postponed (for consideration later on in *sutta* No. 396.

394. Of them, what is practical is (as follows) :

(Suppose) there is a particular (circular) store (of corns), which is (by *ussehamgula*) one *joyana* in length and one *joyana* in depth. As regards its surrounding wall (that is, circumference), it is three times (of one *joyana*, that is, three *joyanas*) and extra-plus. That store is completely...up to (vide *sutta* No. 372)...packed with many *koṭis* of hair-tips grown in one day, two days, three days, (etc., vide *sutta* No. 372). The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair-tips emit bad smell. The space-points of that store, which are pervaded (*apphunna*) by the hair-tips, are taken out one at each instant; the instants required till that store becomes empty,...up to (vide *sutta* No. 372)... clean (gives an idea of the practical 'number').

This (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store. (Here runs a verse) :

(The number) which is (equal to) ten times of *koḍākoḍī* of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean //113//

395. What is the purpose of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 381.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 377.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 369.

and (the practical number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean ? Of the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store and (the practical number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean, there is no purpose; (it is) explained only for the general explanation (of its definition).

This is the practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store.

396. Then what is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store ?¹ The practical (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store is (as follows) :

(Suppose) there is a particular (circular) store (of corns), which is (by *ussehamṅgula*) one *joyaṇa* in length and breadth and one *joyaṇa* in depth, and its surrounding wall (that is, circumference) is three times (of one *joyaṇa*, that is, three *joyaṇas*) and extra-plus. That store is completely filled, made tight and packed with many *koṭis* of hair-tips grown in one day, two days, three days, up to seven days in the maximum. There each hair-tip is cut into innumerable parts. Each such (part of) hair-tip is (equal to) an innumerable part of visible (particle), and is also (equal to) innumerable times the bodily occupation of micro-organic moss (which is finer than the part of hair-tip mentioned above). The fire cannot burn, the wind cannot blow away nor putrefy, nor damage nor can quickly make these hair-tips emit bad smell. The space-points of that store, which are pervaded or not pervaded by the hair-tips, are taken out one at each instant; the instants required till that store becomes empty, free from dust, without defilement (of hair-tips) and clean (gives an idea of the conceptual 'number').

This (that is, the number of time-instants required for emptying the store) is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store.

397. At this, a questioner asked the teacher: Are there the space-points of the store, which are not pervaded by these hair-tips ? Yes, there are. (Question) : What is the example in point ?

(Answer) : (Suppose) there is a particular granary, full of gourds, and there the citron fruits are inserted, these also are accommodated. Again the *Billa* fruits are inserted, and these also are accommodated.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 392.

Again the hog-plum (Emblie Myrobalan) fruits are inserted, and these also are accommodated. Again the plum (jujube) fruits are inserted, and these also are accommodated. Again the gram-corns are inserted, and these also are accommodated. Again the pulse-grains are inserted, and these also are accommodated. Again the mustard-grains are inserted, and these also are accommodated. Again the sand of Gaṃgā is inserted, and these also are accommodated.

Thus, by this example, (it is seen that) there are space-points of the store, which are not pervaded by those hair-tips. (Here runs a verse) :

(The number) which is (equal to) ten times of koḍākoḍi of (the number indicated by) such stores is the measure of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean //114//

398. What is the purpose of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean ? By means of the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store and (the conceptual number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of an ocean, the substances (mentioned) in the *Ditthivāa* are measured.

399. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the substances stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) the soul-substances; and
- (ii) the non-soul-substances.

400. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the non-soul-substances stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) the non-soul-substances without form; and
- (b) the non-soul-substances with form.

401. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the non-soul-substances without form stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be tenfold, viz.

- (1) *Dhammatthikāya* (that is, the substances, imagined as a collection of parts, helping the movement of souls and material bodies);
- (2) the parts of *Dhammatthikāya*;
- (3) the space-points of the *Dhammatthikāya*;
- (4) *Adhammatthikāya* (that is, the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, helping souls and material bodies to rest);
- (5) the parts of *Adhammatthikāya*;

- (6) the space-points of *Adhammatthikāya*;
- (7) *Āgāsatthikāya* (that is, the substance, imagined as a collection of parts, giving accommodation to other substances);
- (8) the parts of *Āgāsatthikāya*;
- (9) the space-points of the *Āgāsatthikāya*;
- (10) the time-instant (*Addhāsamaya*).

402. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the non-soul substances with form stated to be?¹ They are, Goyama, stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) material bodies (*khaṃdha*);
- (2) parts of material bodies;
- (3) space-points of material bodies;
- (4) material atoms.

403. Are they, O Lord, numerable, innumerable or infinite? They are, Goyama, not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite. In what sense, O Lord, is it said that (these are) not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite? The material atoms (monads), Goyama, are infinite; the duads (that is, bodies consisting of two space-points) are infinite;...up to...the bodies consisting of infinite space-points are infinite. In this sense, Goyama, it is said that (these) are not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite.

404. Are the soul-substances, O Lord, numerable, innumerable or infinite? (They are), Goyama, not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite. In what sense, O Lord, is it said that (they are) not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite? The hell-beings, Goyama, are innumerable; *Asurakumāras* are innumerable;...up to...*Thaṇṇiya-kumāras* are innumerable; the earth-bodied beings are innumerable;...up to...the air-bodied beings are innumerable; the plant-bodied beings are infinite; two sensed beings are innumerable;...up to... four-sensed beings are innumerable; five-sensed animal-beings are innumerable; human beings are innumerable; *Jōisīyas* are innumerable; *Vāṇamamtariyas* are innumerable; *Vemāṇīyas* are innumerable; the liberated (souls) are infinite. In this sense, it is, Gotama, said that (they are) not numerable, nor innumerable, but infinite.

405. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the bodies stated to be? There are, Goyama, five (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) gross body (*orālia*);
- (ii) transformation-body (*veuvvia*);
- (iii) translocation-body (*āhāraa*);
- (iv) fiery body (*teyaa*);
- (v) karmic body (*kammaa*).

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 400.

406. How many (kinds of) bodies, O Lord, are there of hell-beings stated to be ? (They have), Goyama, three (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) transformation-body;
- (ii) fiery body;
- (iii) karmic body.

407. How many (kinds of) bodies, O Lord, are there of *Asurakumāras* stated to be ? (They have), Goyama, three (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) transformation-body;
- (ii) fiery body;
- (iii) karmic body.

Similarly, the same three (kinds of) bodies are to be spoken of in each case up to *Thaṇḍiyakumāras*.

408 [1]. How many (kinds of) bodies, O Lord, are there of the earth-bodied beings stated to be ? (They have), Goyama, three (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) gross body;
- (ii) fiery body;
- (iii) karmic body.

408 [2] Similarly, the same three (kinds of) bodies are to be spoken of the water-bodied beings, fire-bodied beings and plant-bodied beings.

408 [3]. How many (kinds of) bodies, O Lord, are there of the air-bodied beings stated to be ? (They have), Goyama, four (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) gross body;
- (ii) transformation-body;
- (iii) fiery body;
- (iv) karmic body.

409. (The bodies) of (beings which are) two-sensed, three-sensed and four-sensed are just as in the case of the earth-bodied beings.

410. (The bodies) of five-sensed animal beings are just as in the case of the air-bodied beings.

411. How many (kinds of) bodies, O Lord, are there of human beings ? (They have), Goyama, five (kinds of) bodies, viz.

- (i) gross body;
- (ii) transformation-body;

- (iii) translocation-body;
- (iv) fiery body;
- (v) karmic body.

412. (The bodies) of *Vāṇamāntaras*, *Joisiyas* and *Vemāṇiyas* are also to be spoken of as three in each case just as in the case of the hell-beings, viz.

- (i) transformation-body;
- (ii) fiery-body;
- (iii) karmic body.

413. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies stated to be? There are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls (*baddhellaya*); and
- (2) abandoned by the souls (*mukkellaya*).

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*. In point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *logas*.¹

Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are infinite, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) infinite *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*. In point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) infinite number of *logas*. In point of substance, (the abandoned bodies) are infinite times (the number of) souls unfit for liberation and an infinite part of the (souls in) disembodied liberation.

414. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs* in point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *sedhīs* and an innumerable part of *patara*.

Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are infinite, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken

1. *Loga* means the inhabited part of space, beyond which there is *aloga*. The number of bound bodies is said to be innumerable times more than the number of space-points in the *loga*.

out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) infinite *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*. As regards the rest (viz. *khetta* and *davva*), these (transformation-bodies) also are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies which are abandoned by the souls (vide *sutta* No. 413).

415. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the translocation-bodies stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls may exist or may not exist. If they exist, they are one or two or three in the minimum, and 'several' (varying from two to nine) thousand in the maximum. What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies (vide *sutta* No. 413).

416. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the fiery bodies stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with souls are infinite, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) infinite *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*. In point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) infinite number of *logas*. In point of substance, they are infinite times (the number of) souls in disembodied liberation, an infiniteth part short of the total number of souls.

Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are infinite, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) infinite *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*. In point of space, (the abandoned bodies occupy the space-points covered by) infinite number of *logas*. In point of substance, they are infinite times the total number of souls, and infiniteth part of the square of the total number of souls.

417. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the karmic bodies stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

The karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of the fiery bodies.

418 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of hell-beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls do not exist indeed. Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies (vide *sutta* No. 413) in general (without reference to particular kind of living beings).

418 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of hell-beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇṇis* and *osappiṇṇis*. In point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *seḍhīs*, (or) an innumerable part of *payara*,¹ the spread-number (*vikkhambhāsūyī*) of those *seḍhīs* is (to be calculated as follows): (i) the first square root of (the space-points of a *payara* of) one *aṅgula*, multiplied by its second square root; or (ii) the cube of the second square root of the (space-points of a *payara* of) one *aṅgula*.²

Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

418 [3]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the translocation-bodies of hell-beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls do not exist indeed.

1. Innumerable *seḍhīs* = *payara* / innumerable *seḍhīs* (vide supra, *sutta* No. 361). Here *payara* stands for innumerable *seḍhīs* × innumerable *seḍhīs*.

2. If the space-points of *payara* are x in number, the spread-number = $x^{1/2} \times x^{1/4}$, that is $x^{3/4}$. Or $(x^{1/4})^3$, that is $x^{3/4}$.

Of them, what are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

418 [4]. The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their transformation-bodies.

419 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of *Asurakumāras* stated to be? They are, Goyama, to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies of the hell-beings (vide *sutta* No. 418 [1]).

419 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of *Asurakumāras* stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇṭis* and *osappiṇṭis*; in point of space, (the bound bodies occupy space-points covered by) the innumerable *seḍḍhīs*, (or) an innumerable part of *payara*.¹ The spread-number (*vikkhambhasū*) of the *seḍḍhīs* is (equal to) an innumerable part of the first square root of (the space-points of a *payara* of) one *aṅgula*. (Of them), what are abandoned by the souls are just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

419 [3]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the translocation-bodies of *Asurakumāras* stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

(They are) to be spoken of just as in the case of their gross bodies (vide *sutta* No. 419 [1]).

419 [4]. The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their transformation-bodies (vide *sutta* No. 419 [2]).

419 [5]. The same is to be spoken of up to (the case of) *Thaṇḍiyakumāras* just as in the case of *Asurakumāras*.

420 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of the earth-bodied beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

1. Vide footnote on *payara* in *sutta* No. 418 [2].

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Similarly, it is to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of the earth-bodied beings stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls do not exist indeed. What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

Similarly, the translocation-bodies are to be spoken of.

The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their gross bodies.

420 [2]. Similarly, all bodies of the water-bodied beings and the fire-bodied beings are to be spoken of just as in the case of the earth-bodied beings.

420 [3]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of the air-bodied beings stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

(They are) to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies of the earth-bodied beings.

Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of the air-bodied beings stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, which taken out one at one time-instant are exhausted in a (period of) time which is (spread over) an innumerable part of (the number indicated by) a (*khetta*)*palioavama*, though (in fact, they) cannot be taken out (it being impracticable to count the air-bodied beings).

The abandoned (transformation bodies) are to be spoken of just as in the case of the abandoned gross bodies in general.

The translocation-bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of the transformation-bodies of the earth-bodied beings.

The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of the earth-bodied beings.

420 [4]. The gross bodies, transformation-bodies and translocation-bodies of the plant-bodied beings are to be spoken of just as in the case of the earth-bodied beings.

Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the fiery and karmic bodies of the plant-bodied beings? The fiery and karmic bodies of the plant-bodied beings are also, Goyama, to be spoken of just as in the case of the fiery and karmic bodies in general.

421 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of the two-sensed beings stated to be? They are, Gotama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*; in point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *sedhīs*, (or) an innumerable part of *payara*.¹ The spread-number (*vikkhaṃbhasūyī*) of these *sedhīs* is innumerable *koḍākoḍī* of *joyaṇas* which are (equal to the sum) of the innumerable square roots (such as first, second, third,...)² of the *sedhī*; (according to another calculation) it is obtained by way of emptying a (fully occupied) *payara* of the gross bodies bound with two-sensed beings. This (process of emptying is done) in a (period of) time spreading over innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs* (calculated) through space, (if a space-point which is equal to) an innumerable part of a *payaramgula*, (is taken out) in one unit of time, viz. one innumerable part of an *āvaliyā* (from the *payara*, the number of time-units required is equal to the number of bound gross bodies of the two-sensed beings).

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

1. Vide supra, footnote on *payara* in *sutta* No. 418 [2].

2. For instance, if one *sedhī* = x, then the spread-number = $x^{1/2} + x^{1/4} + x^{1/8} + \dots$

The transformation-bodies and translocation-bodies which are bound with the souls do not exist. What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their gross bodies.

421 [2]. (The case) of three-sensed and four-sensed beings are to be spoken of just as in the case of the two-sensed beings.

422 [1]. Similarly, the gross bodies of animal beings with five sense-organs are to be spoken of.

422 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of animal beings with five sense-organs stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*; in point of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *seḍhīs* or (an) innumerable part of *payara*.¹ The spread-number (*vikkhambhasūyī*) of those *seḍhīs* is (equal to) an innumerable part of the first square root of (the space-points of a *payara* of) one *amgula*.

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

The translocation-bodies are just as in the case of the two-sensed beings, and the fiery and karmic bodies are just as in the case of the gross bodies.

423 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of human beings stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls,

Of them, what are bound with the souls may be numerable, or may be innumerable. (They are) numerable in the state of being minimum (in number). (Here numerable means) numerable *koḍīs*

1. Vide supra, footnote on *payara* in *sutta* No. 418 [2].

containing twenty-nine digits;¹ (according to another calculation), it is above 'three *jamalapayas*' (a number containing twenty-four digits) and below 'four *jamalapayas*' (number containing thirty-two digits); or (according to a third calculation), it is the sixth square (2^{64}) multiplied by the fifth square (2^{32}); or (according to yet another calculation), it is a number which gives ninety-six *cheyanaga* (that is, a number which consecutively divided ninety-six times by two, finally gives a whole number viz. one). (They are) innumerable in the state of being maximum (in number). (Here, innumerable means if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappinīs* and *osappinīs*. In respect of space, the (length of a) *sedhī* is (equal to the space) occupied by the gross human bodies thrown (in that space), for a (period of) time spreading over innumerable *ussappinīs* and *osappinīs*; in respect of space, the first square root of (the number of space-points occupied by) one (*payara*)*amgula*, multiplied by the third square root (of the same).

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

423 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of the human beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are numerable, (which) taken out one at one time-instant are exhausted in numerable time, though (in fact, they) cannot be taken out.

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the general gross bodies (abandoned by the souls).

423 [3]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the translocation-bodies of human beings stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls may exist and may not exist. If they exist, there are one or two or three in the minimum and 'several' thousand in the maximum.

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

1, Vide footnote 11 on p. 170 of the MJV edition.

423 [4]. The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their gross bodies in general.

424 [1]. The gross bodies of *Vāṇamaṅṭaras* are to be spoken of just as in the case of the hell-beings.

424 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of *Vāṇamaṅṭaras* stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is spread over innumerable *ussappiṇṭs* and *osappiṇṭs* in respect of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *sedhṭs*, (or) an innumerable part of *payara*¹. The spread-number (*vikkhaṃbhasū*) of those *sedhṭs* is (equal to) a part of *payara*, which is equal to the square of numerable hundred *joyaṇas*.

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

424 [3]. The translocation-bodies of both kinds are to be spoken of just as in the case of those of *Asurakumāras*.

424 [4]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the fiery and karmic bodies of *Vāṇamaṅṭaras* stated to be? The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their transformation-bodies.

425 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of the *Joisiyas* stated to be? They are, Goyama, to be spoken of just as in the case of the hell-beings.

425 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of *Joisiyas* stated to be? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are...up to (vide *sutta* No. 424 [2])...The spread-number (*vikkhaṃbhasūcī*) of those *sedhṭs* is (equal to) a part of *payara*, (which is equal to) the square of two hundred and fifty-six *aṅgulas*.

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

1. Vide *supra*, footnote on *payara* in *sutta* No. 418 [2].

425 [3]. The translocation-bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of the hell-beings.

425 [4]. The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their transformation-bodies.

426 [1]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the gross bodies of *Vemāṇiyas* stated to be ? They are, Goyama, to be spoken of just as in the case of the hell-beings.

426 [2]. Of how many kinds, O Lord, are the transformation-bodies of *Vemāṇiyas* stated to be ? They are, Goyama, stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) bound with the souls; and
- (2) abandoned by the souls.

Of them, what are bound with the souls are innumerable, (because if stocked in a store and taken out one at each time-instant) they are taken out in a (period of) time which is (spread over) innumerable *ussappiṇīs* and *osappiṇīs*; in respect of space, (the bound bodies occupy the space-points covered by) innumerable *sedhīs* (or) an innumerable part of *payara*.¹ The spread-number (*vikkhambhasūī*) of those *sedhīs* is (to be calculated as follows) : (a) the second square root of (the space-points of *payara* of) one *aṅgula* multiplied by its third square root, or (b) the cube of the third square root of (the space-points of *payara* of) one *aṅgula*.²

What are abandoned by the souls are to be spoken of just as in the case of the gross bodies in general.

426 [3]. The translocation-bodies are just as in the case of the hell-beings.

426 [4]. The fiery and karmic bodies are to be spoken of just as in the case of their transformation-bodies.

This is the conceptual (number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store.³ This is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of emptying the space-points of a store.⁴ This is (the number indicated by standard) through the simile of a store.⁵ This is (the standard of measurement of time)

1. Vide supra, footnote on *payara* in *sutta* No. 418 [2].

2. The value of both these calculation is the same. The value according to (a) is $x^{1/4} \times x^{1/8} = x^{3/8}$; the value according to (b) is $(x^{1/8})^3 = x^{3/8}$.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 396.

4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 392.

5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 369.

concerned with the various types (of time).¹ This is the standard (of measurement) of time.²

427. Then what is the standard (of measurement) of states ?³ The standard (of measurement) of states is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) standard of attributes (*guṇappamāṇa*);
- (ii) standard of standpoints (*ṇayappamāṇa*);
- (iii) standard of number (*saṃkhappamāṇa*. *Saṃkha* also means conch-shell, the Prakrit word *saṃkhā* standing for either of the Sanskrit words *saṃkhyā* and *śaṅkhāḥ*).⁴

428. Then what is the standard of attributes ? The standard of attributes is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) standard of attributes of the soul;
- (ii) standard of attributes of the non-soul.

429. Then what is the standard of attributes of the non-soul ? The standard of attributes of the non-soul is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (a) standard of colour-attributes;
- (b) standard of smell-attributes;
- (c) standard of taste-attributes;
- (d) standard of touch-attributes;
- (e) standard of figure-attributes.

430. Then what is the standard of colour-attributes ? The standard of colour-attributes is stated to be fivefold, viz.

(1) standard of black colour-attribute...up to...(5) standard of white colour-attribute. (Vide *sutta* No. 220).

This is the standard of colour-attributes.

431. Then what is the standard of smell-attributes ? The standard of smell-attributes is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) standard of sweet smell-attribute; and
- (2) standard of bad smell-attribute.

This is the standard of smell-attributes.

432. Then what is the standard of taste-attributes ? The standard of taste-attributes is stated to be fivefold, viz.

1. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 365.

2. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 363.

3. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 313.

4. The Commentary, p. 213 B, explains the word '*saṃkhā*' as : *saṃkhā iti prākṛto-ktau saṃkhyā śaṅkhās ca praiṅyante, tato dvayasyāpi grahaṇam.*

- (1) standard of bitter taste-attribute...up to... (5) standard of sweet taste-attribute. (Vide *sutta* No. 222).

This is the standard of taste-attributes.

433. Then what is the standard of touch-attributes ? The standard of touch-attributes is stated to be eightfold, viz.

- (1) standard of hard touch-attribute...up to... (8) standard of dry touch-attribute.

This is the standard of touch-attributes. (Vide *sutta* No. 223).

434. Then what is the standard of figure-attributes? The standard of figure-attributes is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (1) standard of round figure-attribute (like a bangle)...up to...(5) standard of elongate figure-attribute. (Vide *sutta* No. 224).

This is the standard of figure-attributes. This is the standard of attributes of the non-soul.¹

435. Then what is the standard of attributes of the soul ?² The standard of attributes of the soul is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) standard of attributes of determinate knowledge;
(ii) standard of attributes of indeterminate intuition; and
(iii) standard of attributes of conduct (or behaviour).

436. Then what is the standard of attributes of determinate knowledge ? The standard of attributes of determinate knowledge is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) perceptual cognition (*paccakkha*);
(2) inferential knowledge (*añumāṇa*);
(3) analogical knowledge (*ovamma*);
(4) scriptural knowledge (*āgama*).

437. Then what is the perceptual cognition ? The perceptual cognition is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) perceptual cognition through the sense-organs; and
(ii) perceptual cognition without the sense-organs.

438. Then what is the perceptual cognition through the sense-organs ? The perceptual cognition through the sense-organs is stated to be fivefold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 429.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 428.

- (1) perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of ears;
- (2) perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of eyes;
- (3) perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of nose;
- (4) perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of tongue;
- (5) perceptual cognition through the sense-organ of touch.

This is the perceptual cognition through the sense-organs.

439. Then what is the perceptual cognition without the sense-organs ? The perceptual cognition without the sense-organs is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) perceptual cognition called clairvoyance;
- (ii) perceptual cognition called telepathy;
- (iii) perceptual cognition called omniscience (or perfect knowledge).

This is the perceptual cognition without the sense-organs. This is the perceptual cognition¹.

440. Then what is the inferential knowledge ?² The inferential knowledge is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) (inference by) a previously known characteristic (*puvvavaṃ*);
- (ii) (inference by) the remainder (between two related facts, *sesavaṃ*);
- (iii) (inference by) a known common characteristic (*ditṭha-sāhamavaṃ*).

441. Then what is (inference by) a previously known characteristic ? (The inference by) a previously known characteristic (is exemplified in the following verse) :

Some mother, for instance, would recognize her (own) son who had left (in the childhood) and has returned, having become young, by means of some previous characteristic sign //115// (namely) by scar (*khata*) or wound (*vaṇa*) or mole or characterizing mark (*laṃchāṇa*) or freckle (*tilāa*).

This is (the inference by) a previously known characteristic.

442. Then what is (inference by) the remainder (between two related facts) ? (The inference by) the remainder is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (1) by effect;
- (2) by cause;

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 437.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 436.

- (3) by attribute;
 (4) by a part of body;
 (5) by support.

443. Then what is (inference) by effect ? A conch (is inferred) by its sound; a drum (is inferred) by its beating sound; a bull (is inferred) by its roaring; a peacock (is inferred) by its cry; a horse (is inferred) by its neighing; an elephant (is inferred) by its trumpeting; and a chariot (is inferred) by its rattling.

This is (the inference) by effect.

444. Then what is (the inference) by cause ? (The inference) by cause is (illustrated as follows):

The threads are the cause of cloth, a cloth is not the cause of threads; the grassy fibre is the cause of mat, a mat is not the cause of grassy fibre; a lump of clay is the cause of a pitcher, a pitcher is not the cause of a lump of clay.

This is (the inference) by cause.

445. Then what is (the inference) by attribute ? (The inference) by attribute is (illustrated as follows):

Gold is (inferred) by the streak on touchstone; flower is (inferred) by its smell; salt is (inferred) by its taste; liquor is (inferred) by its relish; and cloth is (inferred) by its touch.

This is (the inference) by attribute.

446. Then what is (the inference) by a part of body ? (The inference) by a part of body is (illustrated as follows):

A buffalo (is inferred) by (its) horn; a cock (is inferred) by (its) crest (of hair on its head); an elephant (is inferred) by (its) big tooth (tusk); a peacock (is inferred) by (its) feather; a horse (is inferred) by (its) hoof; a tiger (is inferred) by (its) nail;¹ a *chamari* (yak) (is inferred) by (its) hair-tip; a monkey (is inferred) by (its) tail; a lion (is inferred) by (its) mane; a woman (is inferred) by (her) bangle; a biped is a human being, etc.; a quadruped is an ox, etc.; a multiped is a myriapod etc.; a bull is (inferred) by its hump.

(On this, runs a verse):

One should identify a soldier by means of his waist-band, a lady by her garment, (one should ascertain the contents of) the pot as (perfectly) boiled from a single boiled grain and (one should identify) a poet by a single stanza //116//²

1. For what follows vide footnote 7 on p. 175 of the MJV edition.

2. The verse is repeated in *sūtra* 271 (verse 84).

This is (the inference) by a part of body.

447. Then what is (the inference) by support ? (The inference) by support is (illustrated as follows):

Fire (is inferred) by smoke; water (is inferred) by cranes; rain (is inferred) by formation of clouds; and son of a good family (is inferred) by his good conduct.

(On this, runs a verse in Sanskrit):

The interior mind is inferred by the visible gestures, postures, actions, speech and changes in eyes and facial appearances //117//

This is (the inference) by support. This is (the inference) by the remainder (between two related facts).¹

448. Then what is (inference by) a known common characteristic ?² (The inference by a known common characteristic is stated to be twofold, viz.

(1) known in general;

(2) known in particular.

449. Then what is (the inference by a known common characteristic which was) known in general ? (The inference by a known common characteristic which was) known in general is (illustrated as follows):

As is one man, so are many men; as are many men, so is one man. As is one silver coin, so are many silver coins; as are many silver coins, so is one silver coin.³

This is (the inference by) a known common characteristic which was) known in general.

450. Then what is (the inference by a known common characteristic which was) known in particular ? (The inference by a known common characteristic which was) known in particular is (illustrated as follows):

A man, for instance, recognizes a particular man seen previously in the midst of many men, as 'He is that man'; (he) recognizes a particular silver coin seen previously in the midst of many silver coins as 'This is that silver coin'.

Of this (inference), there are three kinds of comprehension, viz.

(a) comprehension of (the object of) the past time;

(b) comprehension of (the object of) the present time;

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 440.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 440.

3. The passage is repeated in *sutta* No. 301.

(c) comprehension of (the object of) the future time.

451. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time is (illustrated as follows) :

Having seen forests with growing grasses, or the earth with grown up crop, and wells, tanks, rivers, canals, and ponds—(all) full (of water), it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *was* (in the past) good rain.

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time.

452. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time is (illustrated as follows) :

Having seen a monk, who went out for begging alms, offered enough food and drink, it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *is* (in the present) bumper harvest (*subhikkha*, literally, abundant supply of alms).

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time.

453. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time is (illustrated in the following verse) :

The clearness of the sky, a dark mountain, clouds with (yellow) lightning, thunder (of clouds), whirl-wind (rotating clockwise), a red and humid evening //118//

Having seen (such signs), or (others such as) *Vāruṇa* (originated from the constellation of *Ārdra*, *Mūlā*, etc.), or *Māhīmā* (originated from the constellation of *Rohiṇī*, *Jyeṣṭhā*, etc.), or any other auspicious omen (*uppāya*, which is necessarily followed by rain) it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *would be* (in the future) good rain.

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time.

454. By the contrary of these very (signs), there occur three kinds of comprehension, viz.

- (a) comprehension of (the object of) the past time;
- (b) comprehension of (the object of) the present time;
- (c) comprehension of (the object of) the future time.

455. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time is (illustrated as follows) :

Having seen forests devoid of growing grasses, or the earth without grown up crop, and dried up wells, tanks, rivers, lakes, and ponds, it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *was* (in the past) bad rain.

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the past time.

456. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time is (illustrated as follows):

Having seen a monk, who went out for begging alms, not getting alms, it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *is* (at present) famine.

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the present time.

457. Then what is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time? (The inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time is (illustrated in the following verse):

¹The directions are smoking, the evening is *viti* (?)², the earth is 'not filled up' (that is, empty), the wind is indeed (coming from) the south-west quarter. These indeed prognosticate (*niveyamti*) bad rain //

Having seen the constellation of *Aggeya* (litreally, concerning fire) or *Vāyava* (literally, concerning wind) or other inauspicious omen, it is proved by it (viz. inference) that there *would be* (in the future) bad rain.

This is (the inference by) comprehension of (the object of) the future time.

This is (the inference by a known common characteristic which was) known in particular.³ This is (inference by) a known common characteristic.⁴ This is the inferential knowledge.⁵

558. Then what is the analogical knowledge?⁶ The analogical knowledge is stated to be twofold, viz.

1. Vide footnote 2 on p. 177 of the MJV edition.
2. *Sañjhāviti*--the word appears to refer to a particular condition of the evening (cf. *sañjhā* in verse 118 of *sutta* No. 453).
3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 450.
4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 448.
5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 440.
6. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 436.

- (1) achieved through similarity; and
- (2) achieved through dissimilarity.

459. Then what is (the analogical knowledge) achieved through similarity. (The analogical knowledge) achieved through similarity is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) (achieved through) least similarity;
- (b) (achieved through) partial similarity; and
- (c) (achieved through) complete similarity.

460. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) least similarity ? (The analogical knowledge achieved through) least similarity is (illustrated as follows) :

As the *Māṃḍara* mountain, so the mustard seed (in point of being possessed of a form or shape); as the mustard seed, so the *Māṃḍara* mountain. As the ocean, so the puddle (in point of being receptacles of water); as the puddle, so the ocean. As the sun, so the fire-fly (in point of being bright and flying through the sky); as the fire-fly, so the sun. As the moon, so the water-lily (in point of being white); as the water-lily, so the moon.

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) least similarity.

461. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) partial similarity ? (The analogical knowledge achieved through) partial similarity is (illustrated as follows):

As the cow, so the gayal (in point of its hoof, hump, horn, tail, etc.); as the gayal, so the cow.

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) partial similarity.

462. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) complete similarity ? (The analogical knowledge achieved through) complete similarity is (illustrated as follows):

There is no analogical knowledge through complete similarity, yet an object is (sometimes) compared with itself. For instance, (it is said that) the *arhats* have acted like *arahats*; a *cakkavatti* (paramount emperor) has acted like a *cakkavatti*; a *Baladeva* has acted like a *Baladeva*; a *Vāsudeva* has acted like a *Vāsudeva*; a monk has acted like a monk,

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) complete similarity.

This is (the analogical knowledge) achieved through similarity.¹

463. Then what is (the analogical knowledge) achieved through dissimilarity ?² (The analogical knowledge) achieved through dissimilarity is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) least dissimilarity;
- (b) partial dissimilarity;
- (c) complete dissimilarity.

464. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) least dissimilarity ? (The analogical knowledge achieved through) least dissimilarity is (illustrated as follows):

As the calf of a speckled cow, not so the calf of a black cow; as the calf of a black cow, not so the calf of a speckled cow.

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) least dissimilarity.

465. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) partial dissimilarity ? The analogical knowledge achieved through) partial dissimilarity is (illustrated as follows):

As the *vāyasa* (crow), not so the *pāyasa* (milk-pudding, because though the words *vāyasa* and *pāyasa* have the syllables 'yasa' as their common feature, the first stands for a sentient being while the second denotes non-sentient matter); as the *pāyasa*, not so the *vāyasa*.

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) partial dissimilarity.

466. Then what is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) complete dissimilarity ? The analogical knowledge achieved through) complete dissimilarity is (illustrated as follows):

There is no (analogical knowledge through) complete dissimilarity, yet an object is (sometimes) compared with itself. For instance, (it is said that) a mean person has acted like a mean person;³ a servant has acted like a servant; a crow has acted like a crow; a dog has acted like a dog; a being has acted like a being.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 459.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 458.

3. The element of dissimilarity in this example is brought out by the Commentary, p. 201 B as follows: Even a mean person ordinarily does not commit such a great sin, what to speak of a person who is not mean (*nīco'pi prāyo nāvāṇṇavidhaṅ mahāpāpam ācarati kiṃ punar anīcaḥ*). The examples that follow are also to be understood similarly.

This is (the analogical knowledge achieved through) complete dissimilarity. This is (the analogical knowledge) achieved through dissimilarity.¹ This is the analogical knowledge.²

467. Then what is the scriptural knowledge ?³ The scriptural knowledge is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) wordly; and
- (2) extra-worldly.

468. Then what is (the scriptural knowledge which is) worldly. (The scriptural knowledge which is worldly is what is ideated through whimsical intellect and thought, by those who are ignorant and have perverse belief. (Such ideation is exemplified in books) such as *Bhāraha* (*Mahābhārata*), *Rāmāyaṇa*,...up to...four Vedas with their auxiliaries and sub-auxiliaries. (Vide *sutta* No. 49).

This is (the scriptural knowledge which is) worldly.

469. Then what is (the scriptural knowledge which is) extra-worldly ? (The scriptural knowledge which is) extra-worldly is the basket (of books) of *Gaṇadhara*s (which consists) of twelve *Aṅgas*—which are exposed by those who are the *arhats*, the lords, holders of knowledge and intuition which have originated (in them), who are knowers of the past, present and future, who are visited, extolled and worshipped (with flowers, etc.) in the three worlds, who are omniscient and are all-seeing, viz. *Āyāra*...up to...*Diṭṭhivāa*. (Vide *sutta* No. 50).

This is the scriptural knowledge which is extra-worldly.

470. Or, the scriptural knowledge is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) scriptural knowledge of the text (*sutta*);
- (2) scriptural knowledge of the meaning (of the text);
- (3) scriptural knowledge of both (the text and the meaning).

Or, the scriptural knowledge is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) scriptural knowledge acquired by oneself (without teacher's instruction);
- (2) (the *gaṇadhara*'s) scriptural knowledge (of the meaning) acquired in immediate succession (from the *Tiṭthagara*);
- (3) scriptural knowledge handed down from generation to generation.

In the case of the *Tiṭthagaras*, the scriptural knowledge of the meaning is acquired by themselves (because they are omniscient).

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 463.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 458.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 436.

In the case of the *gaṇadharas*, the scriptural knowledge of the text (*sutta*) is acquired by themselves (because the text, *sutta*, is composed by themselves), (but) the scriptural knowledge of the meaning is acquired (by them) in immediate succession (because the meaning is known by them from the *Titthagaras*). In the case of the pupils of the *gaṇadharas*, the scriptural knowledge of the text (*sutta*) is acquired in immediate succession (from the *gaṇadharas*), while the scriptural knowledge of the meaning is handed down from generation to generation (because the meaning is handed down to the pupils from the *Titthagaras* through the *gaṇadharas*). Beyond this, there is no scriptural knowledge either of the text (*sutta*), or of the meaning, which is acquired by oneself or in immediate succession, but (only) a scriptural knowledge which is handed down from generation to generation.

This is (the scriptural knowledge which is) extra-worldly. This is the scriptural knowledge.¹ This is the standard of attributes of determinate knowledge.²

471. Then what is the standard of attributes of indeterminate intuition?³ The standard of attributes of indeterminate intuition is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) standard of attribute of eye-intuition;
- (2) standard of attribute of non-eye-intuition;
- (3) standard of attribute of clairvoyance-intuition;
- (4) standard of attribute of omniscient-intuition.

(1) The eye-intuition of a man who is capable of eye-intuition is in respect of the material objects such as pitcher, cloth, mat, chariot, and so on.

(2) The non-eye-intuition (which includes intuition by the other four sense-organs and mind—all of which intuit the object which is in touch with them, unlike the eye which intuits the object from a distance) of a man who is capable of non-eye-intuition is in respect of (the objects which are in touch with) the self.

(3) The clairvoyance-intuition of a man who is capable of clairvoyance-intuition is in respect of all material substances, but not in respect of all (their) modifications.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 467.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 436.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 435.

(4) The omniscient-intuition of a man who is capable of omniscient-intuition is in respect of all substances and all (their) modifications.

This is the standard of attributes of indeterminate intuition.

472. Then what is the standard of attributes of conduct (or behaviour) ?¹ The standard of attributes of conduct is stated to be fivefold, viz.

- (1) the s. a. c. viz. *sāmāya* (abstinence from all blamable actions such as killing of living beings, etc.);
- (2) the s. a. c. viz. *chedovatthāvaṇṇiya* (re-initiation after rectification);
- (3) the s. a. c. viz. *parihāraṇvisuddhi* (purity produced by special austerities);
- (4) the s. a. c. viz. *suhumasamparāya* (where only the subtle passions arise);
- (5) the s. a. c. viz. *ahakkhāya* (perfect conduct).

(1) The s. a. c. viz. *sāmāya* (abstinence from all blamable actions such as killing of living beings, etc.) is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) temporary (*ittaria*); and
- (ii) life-long (*āvakahā*).

(2) The s. a. c. viz. re-initiation after rectification is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) with transgression (*sātiyāra*); and
- (ii) without transgression (*nirātiyāra*).

(3) The s. a. c. viz. purity produced by a special austerity² is stated to be twofold (with reference to the austerities), viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 435.

2. A batch of nine monks perform this austerity either under a *ūrthāṅkara* himself or under a monk who has performed such austerity under the *ūrthāṅkara*; it cannot be performed under anyone else. One of these nine monks is called *kalpasthita* in whose presence the whole course is undertaken. A group of four monks observe the austerity, and are called *parihārika*, and the remaining four who render service to them, are called *anuparihārika*. About the nature of the austerity, it is said that the *parihārikas* undertake fasting by dropping meals up to the 4th, 6th or 8th meal in the maximum in the hot season; up to the 6th, 8th or 10th meal in the maximum in the cold season; and up to the 8th, 10th or 12th meal in the maximum in the rainy season. The *kalpasthita* and the four *anuparihārikas* usually do not fast, but live on boiled cereal without salt, oil, etc. This continues for six months, after which period the functions of the *parihārikas* and the *anuparihārikas* are interchanged for the next six months. Then in the thirteenth month, one of the eight becomes a second *kalpasthitika*, and the remaining seven serve the two *kalpasthitikas* for the next six months. Thus the austerity is completed in eighteen months.

- (i) the austerities which are being performed (or the persons performing the austerities)—*nivvisamāṇaa*;¹ and
- (ii) the austerities which have been performed (or the persons who have performed the austerities)—*nivvittikāyia*.

(4) The s. a. c. viz. where only the subtle passions arise is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) that which is gradually polluted (as in the case of the person who is descending down the spiritual ladder); and
- (ii) that which is gradually purified (as in the case of the person who is climbing up the spiritual ladder).

(5) The s. a. c. viz. the perfect conduct is stated to be twofold viz.

- (i) liable to fall (in the case of the person who has only *suppressed* his passions);
- (ii) not liable to fall (in the case of the person who has *destroyed* completely his passions).

(Alternately the s. a. c. viz. the perfect conduct is stated to be twofold, viz.)

- (i) in the case of a *chaumattha* (a person whose veil of ignorance is not destroyed, but who has suppressed his passions);
- (ii) in the case of an omniscient.

This is the standard of attributes of conduct. This is the standard of attributes of the soul.² This is the standard of attributes.³

473. Then what is the standard of standpoints?⁴ The standard of the standpoints is stated to be threefold, viz.

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1. The meaning of *nivvisa*—is not known. The possibility of its connection with Pali *nibbisa* in the sense of 'wages' as 'reward' is worth consideration of. footnote on 'wages' in *sutta* No. 327 *supra*.
 2. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 435.
 3. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 428.
 4. Vide *supra*, *sutta* No. 427. Properly speaking, the *nayas*, on account of their being varieties of knowledge, should have been included under the standard of attributes of the soul (vide *sutta* No. 435), that is, under the standard of attributes (vide *sutta* No. 428). But the standpoints are treated separately in order to distinguish them from the perceptual cognition, inferential knowledge, etc. (vide *sutta* No. 436), and also in order to consider them elaborately—Commentary, p. 212 B.

- (i) by the illustration of the *patthaya* (a pot for measuring cereals, that was prevalent in the *Magadha* country);
- (ii) by the illustration of abode (*vasahi*);
- (iii) by the illustration of space-point.

474. Then what is (the standpoint) by the illustration of the *patthaga* (sic)? (The standpoint) by the illustration of the *patthaga* is (as follows):

(Suppose) someone goes towards the forest, taking an axe (in his hand); On seeing him, someone asks: 'Where do you go?' (Here), (from) the impure (standpoint of) *negama* (popular standpoint) (he) says: 'I go for a *patthaga*'. Seeing him cutting (a tree), someone asks: 'What do you cut?' (Here), (from) the purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I cut a *patthaya*'. Seeing him chiselling, someone asks: 'What do you chisel?' (Here), from the purer (standpoint) of *negama* (he) says: 'I chisel a *patthaya*'. Seeing him scratching, someone asks: 'What do you scratch?' (Here), from a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I scratch a *patthaya*'. Seeing him engraving, someone asks: 'What do you engrave?' (Here), from a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I engrave a *patthaya*'. Thus, there is a *patthaa* (sic) denoted by a (proper) designation (viz. *patthaa*) from purer (standpoint of) *negama*.

(The *patthaa*) of *vavahāra* (pragmatic standpoint) also (is to be explained) similarly.

The *patthaa* from (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* (synthetic standpoint) is what is (actually) filled (with grains), completely filled (with grains), (and wherein the contents) to be measured have been put. (Here the *patthaa* is doing its function of measuring grains).

From (the standpoint of) *ujjusaya* (straight-forward standpoint) the *patthaa* is the *patthaa* (pot for measuring cereals) as well as the (substance, such as cereals, which is to be) measured.

From (the standpoints of) the three *saddanayas*, (the word *patthaa* stands for) the knower of the purview of the meaning (of the word) '*patthaya*'; or, (the knowledge of *patthaa* in the person) under whose control, the *patthaa* is manufactured.

This is (the standpoint) by the illustration of the *patthaya*.

475. Then what is (the standpoint) by the illustration of abode? (The standpoint) by the illustration of abode is (as follows):

(Suppose) some person asks another person: 'Where do you live?' (Here), (from) the impure (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in the world'.

(Question): The world is stated to be threefold, viz. (1) upper world (heavens), (2) lower world (hells) and (3) middle world (*tiriya-loa*). (Now), do you live in all these (regions of the world)?' (Answer): (From) a purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in the middle world'.

(Question): 'In the middle world, there are stated to be innumerable islands and oceans, beginning from the *Jambuddīva*, etc., and ending in *Sayambhūramaṇa* (vide *sutta* No. 169). Do you live in all these (regions)?' (Answer): (From) the purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in the *Jambuddīva*'.

(Question): 'In the *Jambuddīva*, there are stated to be ten regions (*khettas*), viz. (1) *Bharaha*, (2) *Eravaa*, (3) *Hemavaa*, (4) *Erannavaa*, (5) *Harivassa*, (6) *Rammagavassa*, (7) *Devakurā*, (8) *Uttarakurā*, (9) *Puvvavideha*, and (10) *Avaravideha*. Do you live in all these (regions)?' (Answer): (From) a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in the land of *Bharaha*'.

(Question): 'The land of *Bharaha* is stated to be twofold, viz. (1) the southern half of *Bharaha* and (2) the northern half of *Bharaha*. (Now), do you live in both (these two regions)?' (Answer): (From) a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in the southern half of *Bharaha*'.

(Question): 'In the southern half of *Bharaha*, there are many settlements such as village, town, town surrounded by boundary wall made of earth, city surrounded by low rampart, isolated town, city connected by roads and rivers, market city (where merchandise from various countries is imported), mine, and city where fair is held, (vide *sutta* No. 267). (Now), do you live in all these (places)?' (Answer): (From) a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in *Pādaliputta*'.

(Question): 'In *Pādaliputta*, there are many houses. (Now), do you live in all these (houses)?' (Answer): (From) a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in *Devadatta's* house'.

(Question): 'In *Devadatta's* house, there are many rooms. (Now), do you live in all these (rooms)?' (Answer): (From) a still purer (standpoint of) *negama* (he) says: 'I live in an inner room'.

Thus, from the pure (standpoint of) *negama*, the person (actually) living (there) lives (and not a person who has gone out of the place).

(The subject matter) of *vavahāra* (is to be explained) similarly.

From (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha*, a person (actually) lying on bed lives (*vasai*) (the meaning of the word *vasai* being 'to lie').

From the (standpoint of) *ujjusua*, he lives in those space-points of space, which he is occupying.

From the (standpoints of the) three *saddanayas*, he lives in his own self.

This is (the standpoint) by the illustration of abode.

476. Then what is (the standpoint) by the illustration of space-points ?¹ (The standpoint) by the illustration of space-point is (as follows) :

The *negama*² says: 'The space-point is of the six (substances), viz. (1) space-point of (the substance of) *dhamma*, (2) space-point of (the substance of) *adhamma*, (3) space-point of (the substance of) *āgāsa*, (4) space-point of (the substance of) a soul, (5) space-point of a material body, and (6) space-point of a part (of these five substances).'

To the *negama* speaking thus, the *saṅgha* says: "What you say, viz. 'The space-point is of the six' is not (correct). Why ? Because (your last category, viz.) 'space-point of a part', is of any one substance (and not of any other thing). What is the example in point ? (The reply is): (Suppose) my ass is purchased by the servant; (here) the servant is also mine, the ass is also mine (and so the proposition is redundant). Therefore don't say: 'The space-point is of the six (substances); (but) say: 'The space-point is of the five (substances), viz. (1) space-point of *dhamma*, (2) space-point of *ahamma* (sic), (3) space-point of *āgāsa*, (4) space-point of a soul, and (5) space-point of a material body'."

To the *saṅgha*, speaking thus, the *vavahāra* says: "What you say, viz. 'The space-point is of the five (substances)' is not (correct). Why ? Your statement 'The space-point is of the five (substances)' would be proper if (the particular space-point were common to all the five substances) as (is the case with) a common property belonging to a group of five persons—such as silver, or gold, or money, or grains. You should not therefore say 'The space-point is of the five (substances)', but you should say: 'The space-point is of five kinds, viz. (1) space-point of *dhamma*, (2) space-point of *ahamma*, (3) space-point of *āgāsa*, (4) space-point of a soul, and (5) space-point of a material body'."

To the *vavahāra*, speaking thus the *ujjusua* says: "What you say, viz. 'The space-point is of five kinds' is not (correct). Why ? Because

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 473.

2. Here 'the *negama*' means 'the person speaking from the standpoint of *negama*'. The expression 'the *saṅgha*' etc. are also to be understood similarly.

if (in) your (opinion), space-point is of five kinds, then (in) your (opinion) each space-point is of five kinds, and thus your (total) kinds of space-point becomes twenty-five. Therefore don't say that a space-point is of five kinds; (but) say: a space-point is to be provisionally distinguished (*bhāṭiyavvo*) (thus): there may be a space-point of *dhamma*, there may be a space-point of *adhamma*, there may be a space-point of *āgāsa*, there may be a space-point of a soul, and there may be a space-point of a material body'."

To the *ujjusaya*, speaking thus, the *sampati-saddanaya*¹ says: "What you say, viz. 'A space-point is to be provisionally distinguished is not (correct). Why? Because if your space-point is to be (simply) distinguished, then your (1) 'space-point of *dhamma*' might also be (distinguished as) a space-point of *adhamma*, or a space-point of *āgāsa*, or a space point of a soul, or a space-point of a material body; (similarly) (2) a space-point of *adhamma* might also be a space-point of *dhamma*, or a space-point of *āgāsa*, or a space-point of a soul, or a space-point of a material body; (similarly) (3) a space-point of *āgāsa* might also be a space-point of *dhamma*, or a space-point of *adhamma*, or a space-point of a soul, or a space-point of a material body; (similarly) (4) a space-point of a soul might also be a space-point of *dhamma*, or a space-point of *adhamma*, or a space-point of *āgāsa*, or a space-point of a material body; (similarly) (5) a space-point of a material body might also be a space-point of *dhamma*, or a space-point of *adhamma*, or a space-point of *āgāsa*, or a space-point of a soul. Thus, your (opinion) will lead to (a fallacy called) *regressus ad infinitum*. Therefore don't say that the space-point is to be (simply) distinguished; (but) say:—'*dhamma quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā dhamma*; *adhamma quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā adhamma*; *āgāsa quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā āgāsa*; a soul *quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā* a particular soul (*ṇo-jīva*)²; a material body *khaṇḍha quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā* a particular material body (*ṇo-khaṇḍha*)'."

1. Cf. *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I. 35, where *sāmprata* is given as a variety of *śabda-naya*.
2. The word 'ṇo' here stands for a part, and thus the word *ṇo-jīva* stands for a part of the whole category of souls (*jīvatihikāya*). As the space-point of one particular soul as substance cannot exist in all the souls (called *jīvatihikāya* which consist of infinite number of souls), the word *ṇo-jīva* is used to refer to the space-point of a particular soul. The meaning of *ṇo-khaṇḍha* in the immediately following line of the text is also to be similarly understood.

To the *saddanaya*, speaking thus, the *samabhirūḍha* says, “What you say, viz—‘*dhamma quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā dhamma*...up to... a material body *quā* a space-point, that is, a space-point *quā* a particular material body’—is not (correct). Why ? There are two compounds here, viz. (1) dependent determinative compound and (2) descriptive determinative compound. It is not known by which (kind of compound) do you (intend to) speak; (do you intend to speak) by dependent determinative compound, or by descriptive determinative compound ? If you (intend to) speak by dependent determinative compound, then don’t say thus; but if you (intend to) speak by descriptive determinative compound, then you should specifically say thus—‘(that is) *dhamma* and that (is) also a space-point, that is a space-point *quā dhamma*; (that is) *ahamma* and that (is) also a space-point, that is a space-point *quā ahamma*; (that is) *āgāsa* and that (is) also a space-point, that is a space-point *quā āgāsa*; (that is) a soul and that (is) also a space-point, that is a space-point *quā* a particular soul; (that is) a material body and that (is) also a space-point, that is a space-point *quā* a particular material body’.”

Now, to the *samabhirūḍha*, speaking thus, the *evambhūa* says: “Whatever you say, all that (should mean what is) whole, complete, without any remainder, comprehended in one sweep; for me the part is also unreal, for me the space-point is also unreal.”

This is (the standpoint) by the illustration of space-point. This is the standard of standpoints.¹

477. Then what is the standard of *saṁkhā* ?² The standard of *saṁkhā* is stated to be eightfold, viz.

- (i) *saṁkhā* as name;
- (ii) *saṁkhā* as arbitrary attribution;
- (iii) *saṁkhā* (conch-shells) as substance-potential;
- (iv) *saṁkhā* (determinative knowledge) by comparison;
- (v) *saṁkhā* (number) as compass (*parimāṇa*);
- (vi) *saṁkhā* (determination) as *jāṇaṇā* (knowledge);
- (vii) *saṁkhā* (number) as counting;
- (viii) *saṁkhā* (conch-shells) as essence.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 473.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 427. The word *saṁkhā* is used in various senses, sometimes in the sense of number (Skt. *saṅkhyā*), sometimes in the sense of conch-shells (*saṅkhyāḥ*), sometimes in the sense of discriminative knowledge (*saṅkhyānam*), and so on. The particular meaning is to be understood from the context.

478. Then what is *saṃkhā* as name ? The *saṃkhā* as name stands for a living being or a non-living thing, or many living beings, or many non-living things, or a mixture of them or many mixtures of them, to whom the name *saṃkhā* is given.

This is *saṃkhā* as name.

479. Then what is *saṃkhā* as arbitrary attribution ? The *saṃkhā* as arbitrary attribution is made indeed in (things) which are real-like or imaginary such as wood-work, or doll made of cloth pieces, or a painted figure, or clay figures...up to... This is the *saṃkhā* as arbitrary attribution (vide *sutta* No. 11, substitute *saṃkhā* for *āvassaya*).

480. What is the difference between (*saṃkhā* as) name and (*saṃkhā* as) arbitrary attribution ? (The *saṃkhā* as) name is (mostly) life-long but (the *saṃkhā* as) arbitrary attribution can be temporary or life-long.

481. Then what is *saṃkhā* (conch-shell) as substance-potential ? The *saṃkhā* (conch-shell) as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) (with reference to a person) with scriptural knowledge ;
- (ii) without scriptural knowledge.

482-486. (Vide *sutta* No. 14-18, substitute *saṃkhā* for *āvassaya*).¹

487. Then what is *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? The *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) *egabhavīa* (literally, who is with an interval of only one life, viz. the present one; in the immediately next birth, he is bound to be born as a conch-shell, though he has not yet actually bound the life of the next birth);
- (2) *baddhāua* (one who has bound the longevity of the conch-shell for the immediately next birth);
- (3) *abhimuhaṇāmagotta* (literally, who has arrived in front of the *nāma* and *gotra-karman* of a two-sensed being named *śaṃkha*, and is bound to be born as *śaṃkha* in the next time-instant or latest by an *aṃtarmuhūrta*).

488. As regards the being with an interval of only one life, how long, O Lord, does (the designation of) 'a being with an interval of only one life' continue in time ? (Answer): (It continues for) one

1. Vide footnote 6 on p. 184 of the MJV edition.

amtomuhutta (in the case of the earth-bodied beings, etc.) in the minimum and one *puvakoḍī* (in the case of fish, etc. who live for one *puvakoḍī*) in the maximum.

489. As regards the being who has bound the longevity (of a conch-shell), how long, O Lord, does (the designation of) 'a being who has bound the longevity (of a conch-shell)' continue in time? (Answer); (It continues for) one *amtomuhutta* in the minimum and one third part of a *puvakoḍī* in the maximum (because the longevity of the next birth is bound latest an *amtomuhutta* and earliest one third of a *puvakoḍī* before death).

490. As regards the being who has arrived in front of the *nāma* and *gotta*, how long, O Lord, does (the designation of) 'a being who has arrived in front of *nāma* and *gotta*', continue in time? (Answer): (It continues for) one instant in the minimum and one *amtomuhutta* in the maximum.

491. Now, what kinds of conch-shell (among the above three) are desired (to be meant) by a particular *naya*? There, the *negama*, *saṃgaha* and *vavahāra* desire (all) the three kinds of conch-shells, viz. (1) *ekkabhaviya* (sic), (2) *baddhāyua* (sic), and (3) *abhimuhanāmagotta* (sic). The *ujjusua* desires (only) two kinds of conch-shells, viz. (1) *baddhāyua* and (2) *abhimuhanāmagotta*. The three *saddanayas* desire the *saṃkhā* as *abhimuhanāmagotta*.

This is the *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.¹ This is the *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge.² This is the *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as a substance-potential.³

492 [1]. Then what is *saṃkhā* (determinative knowledge) by comparison?⁴ The *saṃkhā* by comparison is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (i) there is an existent (fact) compared with (another) existent (fact);
- (ii) there is an existent (fact) compared with a non-existent (object);
- (iii) there is a non-existent (object) compared with an existent (fact);

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 487.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 484.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 481.

4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477.

(iv) there is a non-existent (object) compared with a non-existent (object).

492 [2]. Among these, an existent (fact) is compared with another existent (fact, when) for instance, the (limbs of) *arhats* who exist (in reality) are compared with existing great cities, existing gates, and existing chests, as (in the following verse):

All the twenty-four *Jinas* have their chests like the gate of a great town, arms like the bar (of the gate), voice like the rumbling of a drum, (and) have their breasts marked with the *śrīvatsa* (sign) //119//

492 [3]. An existent (fact) is compared with a non-existent (object), (when) for instance, the longevities of the hell-beings, animal beings, human beings and gods, which are existent (facts), are compared with *paliovamas* and *sāgarovamas* (which are only conceptual, and) not real facts.

492 [4]. A non-existent (object) is compared with an existent (fact), as (illustrated) in (the following verses):

A leaf—with decayed end, dislocated from the stalk, falling down, sapless, in (immediate) danger (of separation from the tree) and which has reached the time (of death)—utters (as it were) the (following) verse: //120//

As you (are at present) so (had) we (been in the past). You will also be (in the future) like us—(thus) addresses a grey leaf, while falling down, to the newly sprouting leaves //121//¹

Neither there is, nor will there be such a dialogue between the sprouting and the grey leaves. Such comparison has indeed been made for the enlightenment of the competent person (fit for spiritual emancipation) //122//

492 [5]. A non-existent (object) is compared with another non-existent (object), for instance, as is the 'horn of an ass', so is the 'horn of a hare'.

This is the *samkhā* by comparison.

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1. The Commentary, p. 215 B, shows how a non-existent object is compared with an existent fact in this verse. In the clause 'as you (are at present), so (had) we (been in the past)' (*jaha tubbhe taha amhe*), the previous condition (viz. the state of sprouting of the grey leaf) which is nonexistent at present, is compared with the (present) condition of the sprouting leaves, which is an existent fact. Similarly in the clause 'you will also be (in the future) like us' (*tumhe vi a hohihā jahā amhe*), the future condition of the sprouting leaves, which is non-existent at present, is compared with the condition of the green leaves, which is an existent fact (at present).

493. Then what is *saṁkhā* (number) as compass (*parimāṇa*)?¹ The *saṁkhā* (number) as compass is stated to be twofold, viz.

(1) the *saṁkhā* (number) as compass of the scripture that is studied at a definite time; and

(2) the *saṁkhā* (number) as compass of the scripture of *Diṭṭhivāya*.

494. Then what is the *saṁkhā* (number) as compass of the scripture that is studied at a definite time? The *saṁkhā* (number) as compass of the scripture that is studied at a definite time is stated to be manifold, viz.

- (i) number (*saṁkhā*) of modifications (*paññāvasaṁkhā*²);
- (ii) number of letters (*akkharasaṁkhā*);
- (iii) number of conjunct letters (*saṁghāyasaṁkhā*);
- (iv) number of words (*padasaṁhā*);
- (v) number of quarters of a verse (*pādasamkhā*);
- (vi) number of *gāhās* (*gāhāsaṁkhā*);
- (vii) number of *ślokas* (*ślogasaṁkhā*);
- (viii) number of special metres called *veṣṭaka* (*veḍhasaṁkhā*);
- (ix) number of *nijjutīs* (*nijjutisaṁkhā*);
- (x) number of doors of disquisition (*aṇuogadārasaṁkhā*);
- (xi) number of sections (*uddesagasaṁkhā*);
- (xii) number of chapters (*ajjhayaṇasaṁkhā*);
- (xiii) number of scriptural divisions (*suyakhaṁdhasaṁkhā*);
- (xiv) number of *aṅgas* (*aṅgasaṁkhā*).

This is the *saṁkhā* as compass of the scripture that is studied at a definite time.

495. Then what is *saṁkhā* as compass of the scripture of *Diṭṭhivāya*? The *saṁkhā* as compass of the scripture of *Diṭṭhivāya* is stated to be manifold, viz.

- (i) *saṁkhā* or number of modifications...up to... (x) number of doors of disquisition (vide preceding para);
- (xi) number of *pāhuḍas*;
- (xii) number of *pāhuḍiyā*;
- (xiii) number of *pāhuḍapāhuḍiyā*;

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477.

2. The word *paññava* is explained in the Commentary, p. 216A, as *pariyāyā dharmā iti yāvat*. The *paññava* here is probably the same as the Pali word *pariyāya*, for instance, in *dharmapariyāya* which means 'disquisition on the dhamma'. Vide *Pali-English Dictionary*, P.T.S., s. v. *pariyāya*.

(xiv) number of *vatthu*;

(xv) number of *puvva*.

This is the *saṃkhā* (number) as compass of the scripture of *Ditṭhivāya*. This is the *saṃkhā* (number) as compass.¹

496. Then what is *saṃkhā* (determination) as *jāṇaṇā* (knowledge) ?² The determination as knowledge (is illustrated as) what one knows, one knows, for instance, words (are known by) a grammarian; mathematics (is known by) a mathematician; astrology (is known by) an astrologer (*nemittia*); the time (is known by) a time-knower (*kālanāṇī*, probably astronomer); medicine (is known by) a doctor.

This is the determination as knowledge.

497. Then what is *saṃkhā* (number) as counting ?³ The number as counting (is as follows) :

(The number) 'one' does not lend itself to counting. (The number) 'two', etc. (are proper) numbers (which are known) as

- (1) numerable;
- (2) innumerable; and
- (3) infinite.

498. Then what is the numerable (number) ? The numerable (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number), *jahaṇṇaa*;
- (b) maximum (number), *ukkosaa*;
- (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum), *ajahaṇṇamaṇukkosaa*.

499. Then what is the innumerable (number) ? The innumerable (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) low-grade innumerable (number), *parittāsaṃkhejjaa*;
- (ii) innumerable (number) 'obtained by raising a number to the power of itself' (briefly 'self-raised'), *juttāsaṃkhejjaa*;
- (iii) innumerable-innumerable(number), *asaṃkhejjāsaṃkhejjaa*.

500. Then what is the low-grade innumerable (number) ? The low-grade innumerable (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number);
- (b) maximum (number);

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 493.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477,

- (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum).

501. Then what is the innumerable (number) self-raised. The innumerable (number) self-raised is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number);
 (b) maximum (number);
 (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum).

502. Then what is the innumerable-innumerable (number) ? The innumerable-innumerable (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number);
 (b) maximum (number);
 (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum).

503. Then what is the infinite (number) ?¹ The infinite (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) low-grade infinite (number);
 (ii) infinite (number) self raised;
 (iii) infinite-infinite (number).

504. Then what is the low-grade infinite (number) ? The low-grade infinite (number) is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number);
 (b) maximum (number);
 (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum).

505. Then what is the infinite (number) self raised ? The infinite (number) 'self raised' is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) minimum (number);
 (b) maximum (number);
 (c) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum).

506. Then what is infinite-infinite (number) ? The infinite-infinite (number) is stated to be twofold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No.497.

- (a) minimum (number);
 (b) neither minimum nor maximum (number, that is, an intermediate number between the minimum and the maximum)

[The maximum of infinite-infinite is not admitted—
 Commentary, p. 217 B]

507. How much is the minimum numerable (number)?¹ (The minimum numerable number) is number 'two', (and) after that there are the (numerical) places which are neither minimum nor maximum (numbers), (continuing) till the maximum numerable (number) is not arrived at.

508. How much is the maximum numerable (number)?² I shall explain the maximum numerable number (thus): Suppose there is a circular store (*palla*) which is stated to be one hundred thousand *joyaṇas* in length and breadth, and—three hundred thousand, sixteen thousand, two hundred twenty-seven (3, 16, 227) *joyaṇas*, and three (3) *kosas*, and twenty-eight hundred (2800) *dhaṇus*, and thirteen and a half ($13\frac{1}{2}$) *aṅgulas* and extra-plus—in circumference. [This is the measure of the *Jambuddīva*]. This *palla*³ is filled with mustard-seeds (*siddhatthaya*). Then those mustard-seeds are emptied in islands and oceans, one (mustard-seed being thrown) in an island and one in the ocean (consecutively). The total number of islands and oceans (thus) touched by (all) those mustard-seeds, thus thrown one after another, (make) such (a vast) area called circular store (*palla*). This (latter) *palla* is filled with mustard-seeds. Then those mustard-seeds are emptied in islands and oceans, one (mustard-seed being thrown) in an island and one in the ocean (consecutively). The total number of islands and oceans (thus) touched by (all) those mustard-seeds, thus thrown one after another, (make) such (a vast) area of circular store. (Now) the first stick (*sālagā*) (is to be thrown) there (in the *palla* thus made). Indescribable (number of) *logas* (islands and oceans) are thus filled by such sticks, but yet (even by the total number of mustard-seeds thus used, one) does not arrive at the maximum numerable number. What is the example in point? (Suppose) there is a platform filled with hog-plum fruits. When one hog-plum fruit is placed there, that is accommodated, when another is placed, that also is accommodated, yet another is

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 498.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 498.

3. The Commentary, p. 218 A, gives its depth as one thousand *joyaṇas*.

placed, that also is accommodated. When (hog-plums) are thus placed again and again, there will be a (last) hog-plum which being placed, the platform will be (completely) filled (with hog-plums) (and there will be another) hog-plum which will not find place there.

509. Thus when (the number) 'one' is added to the maximum numerable (number described above), there is the minimum low-grade innumerable number, and after that there are places of neither minimum nor maximum (numbers) till the maximum low-grade innumerable (number) is not arrived at.

510. How much is the maximum low-grade innumerable (number)?¹ The maximum low-grade innumerable (number) is (equal to) the minimum low-grade innumerable (number) raised to the power of itself, less one.² Or, the maximum low-grade innumerable (number) is (equal to) the minimum innumerable (number) self-raised,³ less one.

511. How much is the minimum innumerable (number)?⁴ The minimum innumerable (number) self-raised is (equal to) the minimum low-grade innumerable number raised to the power of itself, in its completeness. Or, the minimum innumerable (number) self-raised is (equal to) the maximum low-grade innumerable (number), plus one.

An *āvaliyā* (vide *sutta* No. 367) also (stands for) the same (number of time-instants, that is, the minimum innumerable (number) self-raised). (And) after that there are places which are neither minimum nor maximum, till the maximum innumerable (number) self-raised is not arrived at.

512. How much is the maximum innumerable (number) self-raised? The maximum innumerable (number) self-raised is (equal to) the (number represented by) an *āvaliyā* multiplied by the minimum innumerable (number) self-raised, raised to the power of itself, less one. Or, the maximum innumerable (number) self-raised is (equal to) the minimum innumerable-innumerable (number), less one.

513. How much is the minimum innumerable-innumerable (number)? The minimum innumerable-innumerable (number) is (equal to the number represented by) *āvaliyā* multiplied by the minimum

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 500.

2. Suppose the minimum low-grade innumerable is x , then the maximum low-grade innumerable number = $x^x - 1$.

3. Vide the next *sutta*, No. 511.

4. Vide *sutta* No. 499 and 501.

innumerable (number) self-raised, raised to the power of itself, in completeness. Or, the minimum innumerable-innumerable (number) is (equal to) the maximum innumerable (number) self-raised, plus one. (And) after that there are places which are neither minimum nor maximum, till the maximum innumerable-innumerable (number) is not arrived at.

514. How much is the maximum innumerable-innumerable (number)? The maximum innumerable-innumerable (number) is (equal to) the minimum innumerable-innumerable number to the power of itself, less one. Or, the maximum innumerable-innumerable (number) is (equal to) the minimum low-grade infinite (number).

515. How much is the minimum low-grade infinite (number)? The minimum low-grade infinite (number) is (equal to) the minimum numerable-numeruble number raised to the power of itself, in its completeness. Or, the minimum low-grade infinite (number) is (equal to) the maximum innumerable-innumerable (number), plus one. (And) after that there are places which are neither minimum nor maximum, till the maximum low-grade infinite (number) is not arrived at.

516. How much is the maximum low-grade infinite (number)? The maximum low-grade infinite (number) is (equal to) the minimum low-grade infinite number raised to the power of itself, less one. Or, the maximum low-grade infinite (number) is (equal to) the minimum infinite (number) self-raised.

517. How much is the minimum infinite (number) self-raised? The minimum infinite (number) self-raised is (equal to) the maximum low-grade infinite (number) raised to the power of itself, in completeness. Or, the minimum infinite (number) self-raised is (equal to) the maximum low-grade infinite (number), plus one.

(The number of the souls) who are not fit to get salvation is also the same. (And) after that there are the places which are neither minimum nor maximum, till the maximum infinite (number) self-raised is not arrived at.

518. How much is the maximum infinite (number) self-raised? The maximum infinite (number) self-raised is (equal to the number represented by the souls) who are not fit to get salvation multiplied by the minimum infinite (number) self-raised, raised to the power of itself, less one. Or, the maximum infinite (number) self-raised is (equal to) the minimum infinite-infinite (number), less one.

519. How much is the minimum infinite-infinite (number) ? The minimum infinite-infinite (number) is (equal to the number represented by the souls) who are not fit to get salvation multiplied by the minimum infinite (number) self-raised, raised to the power of itself, in its completeness. Or, the minimum infinite-infinite (number) is (equal to) the maximum infinite (number) self-raised, plus one. (And) after that there are places which are neither minimum nor maximum.

This is the number as counting.¹

520. Then what is *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as essence ?² The conch-shells as essence are those souls who realize (or suffer from) the *nāma-karman* leading to the life of conch-shells and *gotta-karman* assigning their status (*gotta*) to the conch-shells.

This is the *saṃkhā* (conch-shells) as essence. This is the standard of *saṃkhā*.³ This is the standard of states.⁴ This is the standard.⁵

//Here ends (the description of) the word *paṃāṇa* (standard). (The description is covered by the *suttas* 313-520)//

[Suttas 521-525 : The door of Precept]

521. Then what is the precept (*vattavvayā*) ?⁶ The precept is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) precept of one's own doctrine (Jaina doctrine);
- (ii) precept of other's doctrine (non-Jaina doctrine);
- (iii) precept of both one's own doctrine and other's doctrine.

522. Then what is the precept of one's own doctrine ? The precept of one's own doctrine is (there) where indeed one's doctrine is properly stated (e. g. there are five *astikāyas*, viz. *dharmāstikāya* etc.), defined (e. g. the *dharmāstikāya* has the characteristic of helping motion), explained (e. g. the *dharmāstikāya* is conceived to have innumerable 'space-points'), exemplified (by means of illustration, e. g. the *dharmāstikāya* is like water which is the support of fish for its movement), and again confirmed (by means of *upanaya*, which confirms that like

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 497.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 477.

4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 427.

5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 313.

6. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 92.

water, the *dharmāstikāya* is the support of the movement of souls and material bodies), and (finally) propounded.

This is the precept of one's own doctrine.

523. Then what is the precept of other's doctrine? The precept of other's doctrine is (there) where indeed other's doctrine is properly stated, ...up to...(finally) propounded (vide *sutta* No. 522).

This is the precept of other's doctrine.

524. Then what is the precept of both one's own doctrine and other's doctrine? The precept of both one's own doctrine and other's doctrine is (there) where one's own and other's doctrine are properly stated, ...up to...(finally) propounded (vide *sutta* No. 522).

This is the precept of both one's own doctrine and other's doctrine.

525 [1]. Now, which standpoint¹ desires which (kind of) precept? There, the *negama*, *saṅgaha*² and *vavahāra* desire (all) the three kinds of precept, viz. (i) precept of one's own doctrine, (ii) precept of other's doctrine, and (iii) precept of both one's own and other's doctrine.

525 [2]. The *ujjusua* desires (only) two kinds of precept, viz. (i) precept of one's own doctrine and (ii) precept of other's doctrine. (According to this *naya*), there (in the third category), indeed, what is (called) the precept of one's own doctrine properly belongs to the precept of one's own doctrine, and what is (called) the precept of other's doctrine properly belongs to the precept of other's doctrine. Therefore, there are (only) two kinds of precept, there is not three kinds of precept.

525 [3]. The three *saddanayas* (standpoints of *sadda*) desire (only) one, viz. the precept of one's own doctrine, there is no precept of other's doctrine. Why? Because other's doctrine, being a perverse faith, is false, fallacious, unreal, inactive (*akiriya*), wrong way (and) wrong teaching. Therefore, all (worthy precepts) are the precept of one's own doctrine, there being neither the precept of other's doctrine, nor the precept of both one's own and other's doctrine.

This is the precept.

1. Here the standpoint (*naya*) is personified as the holder of a standpoint.
2. Vide footnote 5 on p. 192 of the MJV edition.

[Sutta 526: The door of Purview of Topics]

526. Then what is the purview of topics (*atthāhigāra*) ?¹ The purview of topics (stands for) the purview of the meaning of individual chapters, (etc.) (in the *Āvassagasutta*); for instance (on this, runs a verse):

- (i) the abstinence from (all) blamable actions (such as killing of living beings, etc. which are included in the first chapter called 'Sāmāia'),
- (ii) the praising (of the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkaras* in the second chapter called 'Cauvisatthava'), and
- (iii) the offering of homage to the venerable (in the third chapter called 'Vamaṇaya'),
- (iv) the deprecation of transgressions (in the fourth chapter called 'Paḍikkamaṇa'),
- (v) the healing of sores (in the fifth chapter called 'Kāussagga'), and
- (vi) the cultivation of good virtues (in the sixth chapter called 'Paccakkhāna') //123//

This is the purview of topics. (Vide *sutta* No. 73).

[Suttas 527-533: The door of Compatible Inclusion]

527. Then what is inclusion (*samoyāra*) ?² The inclusion is stated to be sixfold, viz.

- (i) inclusion as name;
- (ii) inclusion as arbitrary attribution;
- (iii) inclusion as substance-potential;
- (iv) inclusion of space;

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 92. The Commentary, p. 227 A, clarifies the difference between *vaktavyatā* (precept) and *arthādāhikāra* (purview of topics), by asserting that the latter pervades the whole of chapter from its beginning to end, while the former is restricted to a particular place. Thus, the theme of a whole chapter is *arthādāhikāra* and the meaning of the particular portion of it is *vaktavyatā*.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 92. The Commentary, p. 53 B, defines *samavāṭṭāra* as: *samyag avirodhenā' vataranaṃ vartanaṃ samavāṭṭāro' virodhavṛttitā procyate*. For the use of the word 'inclusion' or 'compatible' for *samoyāra*, vide footnote on *samoyāra* under *sutta* No. 92 supra.

- (v) inclusion of time;
- (vi) inclusion as essence.

528-529. Then what is inclusion as name? (The inclusion as name and arbitrary attribution (and a part of substance-potential) (are as) were described previously ...up to (vide *sutta* No. 10-18 substitute 'inclusion' for *āvassaya*). This is the inclusion as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

530 [1]. Then what is inclusion^{*} as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the competent person? Inclusion as substance-potential (namely) other than body of the knower and the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) self-inclusion (that is, inclusion in one's own state);
- (2) non-self-inclusion (that is, inclusion in other's state);
- (3) dual inclusion (that is, inclusion in both one's own and other's state).

All substances indeed include (themselves) in their own states through self-inclusion. (The inclusion) through non-self-inclusion (is illustrated) as 'plums in a plate'. (The inclusion) through dual inclusion (is illustrated) as 'pillar in a house as well as in itself', as 'neck in a pitcher as well as in itself'.

530 [2]. Or, inclusion as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is stated to be (only) twofold, viz.

- (1) self-inclusion; and
- (2) dual inclusion.

(For example), the *causatthiyā* (measurement of weight equal to one sixty-fourth part of a *māṇī*)¹ includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *battīsiyā* (measurement of weight equal to one thirty-second part of a *māṇī*), and also in its own state. The *battīsiyā* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *solasiyā* (measurement of weight equal to one sixteenth part of a *māṇī*), and also in its own state. The *solasiyā* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *aṭṭhabhāiyā* (measurement of weight equal to one eighth part of a *māṇī*), and also in its own state. The *aṭṭhabhāiyā* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the

1. Vide supra, *sutta*, No. 320 for this and other measures mentioned here.

caubhāiyā (measurement of weight equal to one fourth part of a *māṇī*), and also in its own state. The *Caubhāiyā* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *addhamāṇī* (measurement of weight equal to a half *māṇī*), and also in its own state. The *addhamāṇī* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in a *māṇī*, and also in its own state.

This is the inclusion as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the competent person. This is the inclusion as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the inclusion as substance-potential.

531. Then what is inclusion of space ? The inclusion of space is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) self-inclusion; and
- (2) dual inclusion.

(For example), the *Bharahavāsa* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, and through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *Jambuddīva* and also in its own state. The *Jambuddīva* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the middle world, and also in its own state. The middle world includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the world, and also in its own state. The world includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in 'beyond world' (*alōa*), and also in its own state.

This is the inclusion of space.

532. Then what is inclusion of time?¹ The inclusion of time is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) self-inclusion; and
- (2) dual inclusion.

(For example), (a time-) instant includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in the *āvaliyā*, and also in its own state. Similarly, *āṇāpāṇū*, *thova*, *lava*, *muhutta*, *ahoratta*, *pakka*, *māsa*, *uū*, *ayaṇa*, *saṃvacchāra*, *juga*, *vāsasata*, *vāsasahassa*, *vāsasatasahassa*, *puvvaṃga*, *puvva*, *tuḍiyamga*, *tuḍiya*, *aḍaḍamga*, *aḍaḍa*, *avavamga*, *avava*, *huhuyamga*, *huhua*, *uppalamga*, *uppala*, *paumamga*, *pauma*, *naliṇamga*, *ṇaliṇa*, *atthiniuramga*, *atthiniura*, *ayamga*, *aua*, *ṇauyamga*, *ṇaua*, *ḥauyamga*, *ḥaua*, *cūliyamga*, *cūliyā*, *sīsapaheliyamga*, *sīsapaheliyā*,

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 527.

paliovama. *Sāgarovama* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in *osappiṇī* and *ussappiṇī*, and also in its own state. *Osappiṇī* and *ussappiṇīs* include (themselves) in their own states through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (they) include (themselves) in *poggalāpariyatta*, and also in their own states. *Poggalāpariyatta* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in *tītaddhā* (past time) and *aṇāgataddhā* (future time), and also in its own state. *Tītaddhā* and *aṇāgataddhā* include (themselves) in their own states through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (they) include (themselves) in *savvaddhā* (all time), and also in their own states. (Vide *sutta* No. 202 [2]).

This is the inclusion of time.

533. Then what is inclusion as essence (that is, conditions of the souls) ?¹ The inclusion as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (1) self-inclusion; and
- (2) dual inclusion.

(For example), anger includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, (it) includes (itself) in pride, and also in its own state. Similarly, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, deluding *karmans*; (and) the eight species of *karmans* include (themselves) in their own states through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, include (themselves) in the six kinds of states (of the soul), and also in their own states. Similarly, the six kinds of states,² the soul; (and) the soul as *atthikāya* includes (itself) in its own state through self-inclusion, (and) through dual inclusion, includes (itself) in all substances, and also in its own state. Here, (runs) an epitomic verse:

(There are) anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment and deluding (*karmans*), (eight) species (of *karmans*), states (of the soul), soul, soul as *atthikāya*, and substances //124//

This is the inclusion as essence. This is the inclusion. This is the *uvakkama* (introduction by collecting together materials from distance and arranging them in order to make the *nikkheva* of the topic possible).³

//Here is the end of the first door called *uvakkama*//

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 527.
2. This is not found in the MJV edition, but is mentioned in the Commentary, p. 230 A. The MJV edition is here defective. Vide *Suttāgame*, Part II, p. 1157 lines 23-24.
3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 92, and also No. 76.

[Suttas 534-600 : The door of Assignment]

534. Then what is *nikkheva* (assignment) ?¹ The *nikkheva* is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) pertaining to general nomenclature (*ohanipphanna*);
- (ii) pertaining to particularized name (*nāmanipphanna*); and
- (iii) pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta* (*suttālavaganipphanna*).

535. Then what is (*nikkheva*) pertaining to general nomenclature ?² (The *nikkheva*) pertaining to general nomenclature is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (a) *ajjhayaṇa* (chapter; concentration of mind);
- (b) *ajjhāna* (inexhaustible);
- (c) *āa* (acquisition);
- (d) *jhavaṇā* (attenuation; eradication).

536. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* ? *Ajjhayaṇa* is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) *ajjhayaṇa* as name;
- (2) *ajjhayaṇa* as arbitrary attribution;
- (3) *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential;
- (4) *ajjhayaṇa* as essence.

537. (*Ajjhayaṇa* as) name and arbitrary attribution (are as) were described previously. (Vide *sutta* No. 10-12).

538. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential? *Ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

539. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge ? *Ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned with a person by whom the *ajjhayaṇa* treatise has been studied, retained (in mind), controlled, measured, controlled perfectly...up to (vide *sutta* No. 14-15 [1], substitute *ajjhayaṇa* for *avassaya*)... Similarly there are as many *ajjhayaṇas* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, as there are persons without attention (or active thinking). Similar is the case according to (the standpoint of)

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 75.

2. We have translated *oha* as general nomenclature. *Oha* stands for the general title of a book in the scripture.

vavahāra (pragmatic standpoint). According to (the standpoint of) *saṃgaha* (synthetic standpoint), one person...or many persons,...up to (vide *sutta* No. 15 [3]-15 [5])...This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge

540. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge? *Ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower;
- (ii) *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person;
- (iii) *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

541. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower? The *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of the '*ajjhayaṇa*' treatise—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded (from breath), has been made separate (from breath), and has left nourishment; (the body) abandoned by the soul...up to (vide *sutta* No. 17)...“Ah! by this body-conglomerate indeed the treatise named *ajjhayaṇa* was properly understood (from the teacher), ...up to...propounded (through various standpoints), in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina. What is the example in point? (In reply, it is said), ‘This was a pot of ghee’, ‘This was a pot of honey’.”

This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

542. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person? The *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth, and will study, living in this very body-conglomerate accepted (by him), in future times in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jinās, but is not studying (at present) the treatise of the *ajjhayaṇa*. What is the example in point? (In reply, it is said,) ‘This will be a pot of honey’; ‘This will be a pot of ghee’.

This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person. (Vide *sutta* No. 18).

543. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? The *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is that which was written on leaf and in book.

This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential.

544. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as essence ? The *ajjhayaṇa* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

545. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge ? The *ajjhayaṇa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower who is attentive (to the knowledge of *ajjhayaṇa*).

This is the *ajjhayaṇa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

546. Then what is *ajjhayaṇa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge ? *Ajjhayaṇa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is (given in the following verse):

Concentration of the mind (*ajjhappassānayaṇam*), attenuation of the accumulated *karmans*, (and) non-accumulation of new (*karmans*) (are effected by *ajjhayaṇa*), (and) therefore (the teachers) desire *ajjhayaṇa* (= *ajjhappassa ānayaṇam*) ||125||

This is *ajjhayaṇa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is *ajjhayaṇa* as essence. This is *ajjhayaṇa*.¹

547. Then what is *ajjhīṇa* ?² The *ajjhīṇa* is stated to be four-fold, viz.

- (1) *ajjhīṇa* as name;
- (2) *ajjhīṇa* as arbitrary attribution;
- (3) *ajjhīṇa* as substance-potential;
- (4) *ajjhīṇa* as essence.

548. (*Ajjhīṇa* as) name and arbitrary attribution (are as) were described previously. (Vide *sutta* No. 10-12).

549. Then what is *ajjhīṇa* as substance-potential ? *Ajjhīṇa* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 536.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 535.

550. Then what is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge ? *Ajjhāna* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge is concerned with a person by whom *ajjhāna* treatise has been studied, retained (in mind), controlled, measured, controlled perfectly,...to be spoken of just as in the case of *ajjhāyana* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 539) up to...This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

551. Then what is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge ? *Ajjhāna* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower;
- (ii) *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person;
- (ii) *ajjhāna* as substance potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

552. Then what is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower? *Ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of '*ajjhāna*' treatise—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded (from breath), has been made separate (from breath), and has left nourishment,...(these are) to be spoken of just as in the case of *ajjhāyana* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 541) up to...This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

553. Then what is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person? *Ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth, ...(these are to be spoken of) just as in the case of *ajjhāyana* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 542) up to...This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

554. Then what is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person? *Ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is a line (passing) through whole space (both *loka* and *aloka*).¹

1. Such line is *ajjhāna* (Skt. *akṣīṇa*), because it is not exhausted at any time even if its space-points are taken out one by one continuously.

This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is *ajjhāna* as substance-potential.

555. Then what is *ajjhāna* as essence? *Ajjhāna* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

556. Then what is *ajjhāna*, as essence with scriptural knowledge? *Ajjhāna* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower who is attentive¹ (to the knowledge of *ajjhāna*).

This is *ajjhāna* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

557. Then what is *ajjhāna* as essence, without scriptural knowledge? *Ajjhāna* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is as (described in the following verse):

As from one (single) lamp, light up a hundred lamps, and yet that lamp (continues) to glow. Like lamp are the teachers who shine (themselves) and also enlighten others² //126//

This is *ajjhāna* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is *ajjhāna* as essence. This is *ajjhāna*.

558. Then what is *āa* (acquisition) ?³ *Āa* is stated to be four-fold, viz.

- (1) *āa* as name;
- (2) *āa* as arbitrary attribution;
- (3) *āa* as substance-potential;
- (4) *āa* as essence.

1. Such attentive knower is the person who is conversant with the fourteen *puvvas*. The number of modes of the knowledge of such a person, even when he has fixed his attention on scripture only for an *antarmuhūrta*, is so vast that those modes cannot be exhausted, if taken out one by one, even in an infinite number of *utsarpiṇīs*. This explains why the knowledge of such person is *ajjhāna* (Skt. *akṣiṇa*, inexhaustible). --Commentary, p. 233 B.

2. The teachers are like inexhaustible (*ajjhāna*) lamp: The teacher engaged in imparting knowledge of the scripture is called 'teacher with scriptural knowledge'. But his vocal and physical movements, while he is engaged in teaching, are 'without scriptural knowledge'. Thus the whole situation can be viewed as a mixture of both 'with scriptural knowledge' and 'without scriptural knowledge'--which is exactly the meaning of the word '*no-āgamao*'. This is therefore an apt illustration of *no-āgamato bhāvajjhāne*--Commentary, p. 233 B.

3 Vide supra, *sutta* No. 535.

559. (*Āa* as) name and arbitrary attribution (are as) were described previously. (Vide *sutta* No. 10-12).

560. Then what is *āa* as substance-potential ? *Āa* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

561. Then what is *āa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge ? *Āa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned with a person by whom *āa* treatise has been studied, retained (in mind), ...up to (vide *sutta* No. 14)...‘Why so ?’ Because *davva* stands for absence of attention (that is, absence of thinking)...up to (vide *sutta* No. 15 [1])...there are as many *āyas* (sic) as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, as there are persons without attention (or active thinking)...up to (vide *sutta* No. 15 [2]—15 [5])... This is the *āa* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

562. Then what is *āa* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge ? *Āa* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) *āa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower;
- (ii) *āa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person;
- (iii) *āa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

563. Then what is *āa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower ? The *āa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of *āya* (sic) treatise—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded (from breath), has been made separate (from breath), has left nourishment, ... the rest is just as in the case of *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No 541) up to...This is *āa* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

564. Then what is *āya* (sic) as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person ? *Āya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth, ...the rest is just as in the case of the *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 542) up to...This is *āya* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

565. Then what is *āya* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person ? *Āya*

as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) worldly;
- (2) belonging to perverse instruction;
- (3) extra-worldly.

566. Then what is (*āya* as substance-potential, which is) worldly ? (*Āya* as substance-potential, which is) worldly is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) the sentient;
- (b) the non-sentient; and
- (c) mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient).

567. Then what is the sentient ? The sentient is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) (*āya* or acquisition) of bipeds;
- (ii) (*āya* or acquisition) of quadrupeds;
- (iii) (*āya* or acquisition) of non-peds.

(*Āya*) of bipeds (means acquisition) of servants, maid-servants; of quadrupeds (means) acquisition of horses, elephants; of non-peds (means) acquisition of mango trees, hog-plum trees.

This is the sentient.

568. Then what is the non-sentient ? The non-sentient (means) the *āya* (acquisition) of gold, silver, jewel, pearl, conch-shell, diamond of inferior quality, coral, ruby, (and real property).

This is the non-sentient.

569. Then what is mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) ? The mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) (means) *āya* (acquisition) of servants, maid-servants, horses, elephants ornamented (with gold chains, etc.) and decorated with (musical instruments like) cymbal (etc.).

This is the mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient). This is (*āya* as substance-potential, which is) worldly.

570. Then what is (*āya* as substance-potential) belonging to perverse instruction ? (*Āya* as substance-potential) belonging to perverse instruction is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) the sentient;
- (b) the non-sentient; and
- (c) mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient).

These three are just as (in the case of *āya* as substance-potential, which is) worldly up to (vide *sutta* No. 567-569)... This is (*āya* as substance-potential) belonging to perverse instruction.

571. Then what is (*āya* as substance-potential, which is) extra-worldly ? (*Āya* as substance-potential, which is) extra-worldly is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) the sentient;
- (b) the non-sentient; and
- (c) mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient).

572. Then what is the sentient ? The sentient is *āya* (acquisition) of disciples and female disciples.

This is the sentient.

573. Then what is the non-sentient ? The non-sentient is *āya* (acquisition) of (mendicant's bowls, garments, blankets, foot-duster.

This is the non-sentient.

574. Then what is mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) ? The mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient) is *āya* (acquisition) of disciples, female disciples, with articles such as bowls etc.

This is the mixture (of the sentient and the non-sentient). This is (*āya* as substance-potential, which is) extra-worldly. This is *āa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.¹ This is *āa* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge.² This is *āa* as substance-potential.³

575. Then what is *āa* as essence ?⁴ The *āa* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

576. Then what is *āa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge ? *Āa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower who is attentive (to *āa*).

This is *āa* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

577. Then what is *āa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge ? *Āa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) auspicious; and
- (ii) inauspicious.

578. Then what is (*āa* as essence, which is) auspicious ? (*Āa* as essence, which is) auspicious is stated to be threefold, viz.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 565.
 2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 562.
 3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 560.
 4. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 558.

- (1) *āa* of determinate knowledge;
- (2) *āa* of intuition;
- (3) *āa* of correct conduct.

This is (*āa* as essence, which is) auspicious.

579. Then what is (*āa* as essence, which is) inauspicious ? (*Āa* as essence, which is) inauspicious is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) *āa* of anger;
- (2) *āa* of pride;
- (3) *āa* of deceit;
- (4) *āa* of greed.

This is (*āa* as essence, which is) inauspicious. This is *āa* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is *āa* as essence. This is *āya* (sic).¹

580. Then what is *jhavaṇā* (eradication) ?² *Jhavaṇā* is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) *jhavaṇā* as name;
- (2) *jhavaṇā* as arbitrary attribution;
- (3) *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential;
- (4) *jhavaṇā* as essence.

581. (*Jhavaṇā* as) name and arbitrary attribution (are as) were described previously. (Vide *sutta* No. 10-12).

582. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential ? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

583. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge ? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge, is concerned with a person by whom '*jhavaṇā*' treatise has been studied, retained (in mind), controlled, measured, controlled perfectly, the rest is to be spoken of just as in the case of *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 539) up to... This is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, with scriptural knowledge.

584. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge ? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (i) *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower;

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 558.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 535.

- (ii) *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person;
- (iii) *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person.

585. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower is such a body of the knower who knows the purview of the meaning of the '*jhavaṇā*' treatise—the body which is devoid (of consciousness and has reached the state of unconsciousness), has seceded (from breath), has been made separate (from breath), has left nourishment,...the rest is just as in the case of *ajjhayaṇa* as substance-potential (vide *sutta* No. 541) up to...This is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the knower.

586. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person is (the body of) a soul which has come out of womb through birth, and will study, (being in this very body-conglomerate) accepted (by him) in future time, in accordance with the purpose envisaged by the Jina, but is not studying (at present) the treatise of *jhavaṇā*. What is the example in point? (In reply, it is said), 'This will be a pot of honey', 'This will be a pot of ghee'. This is the *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

587. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person? *Jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is to be spoken of just as in the case of *āa* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person (vide *sutta* No. 565-574) up to...This is the *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of competent person. This is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is *jhavaṇā* as substance-potential.

588. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as essence? *Jhavaṇā* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

589. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as essence, with scriptural knowledge? *Jhavaṇā* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower of the purview of the *jhavaṇā*-treatise and is attentive (to *jhavaṇā*).

This is the *jhavaṇā* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

590. Then what is *jhavaṇā* as essence, without scriptural knowledge? *Jhavaṇā* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (i) auspicious; and
- (ii) inauspicious.

591. Then what is (*jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) auspicious? (*Jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) auspicious is stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) *jhavaṇā* of anger;
- (2) *jhavaṇā* of pride;
- (3) *jhavaṇā* of deceit;
- (4) *jhavaṇā* of greed.

This is (*jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) auspicious.

592. Then what is (*jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) inauspicious? (*Jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) inauspicious is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (1) *jhavaṇā* of determinate knowledge;
- (2) *jhavaṇā* of indeterminate intuition;
- (3) *jhavaṇā* of correct conduct.

This is (*jhavaṇā* as essence, which is) inauspicious.

This is (*jhavaṇā* as essence, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *jhavaṇā* as essence. This is *jhavaṇā*.¹ This is (the *nikkheva*) pertaining to general nomenclature.²

593. Then what is (the *nikkheva*) pertaining to particularized name?³ (The *nikkheva*) pertaining to particularized name is *Sāmāia*. This is briefly stated to be fourfold, viz.

- (1) *sāmāia* as name;
- (2) *sāmāia* as arbitrary attribution;
- (3) *sāmāia* as substance-potential;
- (4) *sāmāia* as essence.

594. (*Sāmāia* as) name and arbitrary attribution (are as) were described previously. (Vide *sutta* No. 10-12).

595. *Sāmāia* as substance-potential is also like that...up to... This is *sāmāia* as substance-potential (namely) body of the competent person.

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 580.

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 535.

3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 534. We have translated *nāma* as particularized name. While *ogha* stands for a general title of a book, *nāma* stands for the name of particular chapter. Thus if *Āvaśyaka*, which is the title of a book, is *ogha*, *Sāmāyika*, which is the designation of one of its chapters, is *nāma*.

596. Then what is *sāmāia* as substance-potential (namely other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person? *Sāmāia* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person is that which has been written on leaf and in book.

This is *sāmāia* as substance-potential (namely) other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person. This is *sāmāia* as substance-potential, without scriptural knowledge. This is the *sāmāia* as substance-potential.

597. Then what is *sāmāia* as essence? *Sāmāia* as essence is stated to be twofold, viz.

- (a) with scriptural knowledge; and
- (b) without scriptural knowledge.

598. Then what is *sāmāia* as essence, with scriptural knowledge? *Sāmāia* as essence, with scriptural knowledge, is the knower of the purview of the *Sāmāiya* (sic)-treatise and is attentive (to *Sāmāia*).

This is *sāmāia* as essence, with scriptural knowledge.

599. Then what is *sāmāia* as essence, without scriptural knowledge? *Sāmāia* as essence, without scriptural knowledge, is (given in the following verses) :

It is said by the omniscient that *sāmāiya* is (possible) in him whose soul is engaged in self-restraint, self-regulation and austerity //127//

It is said by the omniscient that *sāmāiya* is (possible) in him who is evenly disposed towards all creatures, mobile and immobile //128//

As suffering is not dear to me, so is it for all creatures—knowing (this) he does not (himself) kill, nor get killed (by others), behaves with equanimity (*samamaṇatī*), (and) is therefore called *samaṇa* (ascetic) //129//

There is none, among all living creatures, who is an object of hatred or attachment to him, and so he is a *samaṇa*—this is yet another derivation (of the word *samaṇa*) //130//

He who is like a serpent (having no dwelling place of his own), a mountain (unshakable in adversity), fire (having insatiable desire for acquisition of knowledge), the ocean (in depth), the firmament (being without any support), a cluster of trees (being unmoved in joy and suffering), and also like the bee (with indefinite livelihood), the deer (being in perpetual fear from the world), the earth (being

tolerant of all pains), a lotus (being above the water though born in it), the sun (being the revealer of truth), and air (being absolutely free), is a *samaṇa* //131//

If he is good-minded (*samaṇa*), then he is *samaṇa*, provided he is not evil minded in thought, is evenly disposed towards his own men as well as (other) people, and is also indifferent to honour and insult //132//

This is *sāmāia* as essence, without scriptural knowledge (*no-āgamato*).¹ This is *sāmāia* as essence. This is *sāmāia*.

This is (the *nikkheva*) pertaining to particularized name.²

600. Then what is (the *nikkheva*) 'pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta*' ?³ (The *nikkheva*) 'pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta* now raise the desire for the *nikkheva* pertaining to the utterance of a particular *sutta*, but that is not being explained (here) through *nikkheva*, though that is relevantly due here (as in the foregoing cases of *ohanipphaṇṇa* and *nāmanipphaṇṇa*). Why? (Answer) : For the sake of brevity; after this, there is the third door of disquisition, called *aṇugama*; what is explained there through *nikkheva* is (virtually) explained here through *nikkheva*; or, what is explained here through *nikkheva* is (virtually) explained there through *nikkheva*. Therefore it is not explained here through *nikkheva*, (but) it is rather (intended to be) explained there⁴ through *nikkheva*.

This is the *nikkheva*.⁵

[Suttas 601-605 : The door of Aṇugama]

601. Then what is *aṇugama* (exposition in accordance with context) ?⁶ The *aṇugama* is stated to be twofold, viz.

1. As *no-āgama* stands for a mixture of *āgama* and *anāgama*, there is no inconsistency in admitting the *Sāmāyikādhyaṇa* as *no āgamato bhūvasāmāyikam*, because it is a combination of *jñāna* (knowledge) which is *āgama*, and *kriyā* (action) which is *anāgama*. — Commentary, p. 238 A.
2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 593.
3. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 534. We have translated *suttāṭāvaga* as 'the utterance of a particular *sutta*'. While *ogha* stands for the general title of a book such as the *Āvassaga*, and *nāma* stands for the particularised name of a chapter of the book such as the *Sāmāyika*, *suttāṭāvaga* refers to a particular *sutta* of that chapter, e. g. *karemi bhāṇte sāmāyaṃ*.
4. Vide infra, *sutta* No. 605 About the respective subject matter of *sūtrāṇugama*, *sūtrāṭāpakaniḷḷeṣa* and *sūtrasparśika-niryukti*, vide Commentary (p. 244 A) : *sūtram sapadacchedam tavad abhidhāya...sarvo' pi sūtrasparśikaniryukteḥ*. Vide *V Bh (A)*, 997.
5. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 534.
6. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 75.

- (i) exposition of *sutta* (*suttānugama*); and
- (ii) exposition of the related topics (*nijjuttianugama*).

602. Then what is the exposition of the related topics ? The exposition of the related topics is stated to be threefold, viz.

- (a) exposition of the related topics through *nikkheva*;
- (b) exposition of the related topics through introduction (*uvaghāta*);
- (c) exposition of the related topics, touching the *sutta* (*suttaphāsiya*).

603. Then what is the exposition of the related topics through *nikkheva* ? (Answer): It has already been stated (previously by way of explaining the words *āvassaga*, *sāmāia*, etc. through the *nikkhevas* of *nāma*, *thavaṇa*, etc.).

This is the exposition of the related topics through *nikkheva*.

604. Then what is the exposition of the related topics through introduction ? The exposition of the related topics through introduction is to be known from these two (basic) verses (the topic, here *sāmāia*, being explained with reference to the items mentioned therein). For instance,

- (1) *uddesa* (general title, e. g. *ajjhayaṇa* which is the name of a general treatise. This is the same as the *oghanipphaṇṇa nikkheva*. Cf. *Bṛhadvṛtti* on *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 975); and
- (2) *niddesa* (name of a particular chapter, e. g. *Sāmāia* which is the name of the first chapter of the *Āvassagasutta*. This is the same as the *nāmanipphaṇṇa nikkheva*); and
- (3) *niggama* (the ultimate source, e. g. Lord *Mahāvīra* is an original promulgator of *sāmāia*);
- (4) *khetta* (place of origin, e. g. *Mahāseṇavanujjāna* was the place of the origin of *sāmāia*—*Āvaśyaka Niriyukti*, 734);
- (5) *kāla* (time of origin e. g. the eleventh day of the bright half of *Vaisāha*, when Lord *Mahāvīra* attained omniscience, was the date of the origin of *sāmāia*, *AN*, 734);
- (6) *purisa* (human source, e. g. Lord *Mahāvīra* is the source of *sāmāia*); and
- (7) *kāraṇa* (the reason of learning, e. g. *Goyama* and others learnt *sāmāia* from Lord *Mahāvīra* for the acquisition of knowledge, *AN*. 745);

- (8) *pacaya* (realization or conviction e. g. Lord *Mahāvīra* preached *sāmāia* having realized that he was omniscient, and his disciples learnt it, being convinced that Lord *Mahāvīra* was omniscient, *AN*, 750);
- (9) *lakkhaṇa* (defining characteristic, e. g. defining characteristic of *sammattasāmāia* is to have faith (*saddahana*), and so on, *AN*, 753);
- (10) *naya* (standpoint);
- (11) *samoyāraṇā* (application or non-application of *nayas*, e. g. the *nayas* were applied to the undifferentiated *aṇuyogas*, but are not applied to *kālīka-śruta*, *AN*, 762);
(Now follow the door called) *anumaa*¹ (that is, what is desired, which is distributed under the following queries) |||133||
- (12) *kiṃ* (the object desired, e. g. the *vavahāra naya* desires *sāmāia* as the path of salvation, *AN*, 789);
- (13) *kaivīhaṃ* (varieties, e. g. there are three varieties of *sāmāia*, *AN*, 796);
- (14) *kassa* (the possessor, e. g. the person who is engaged in self-restraint, self-regulation and austerity is the possessor of *sāmāia*, *AN*, 797);
- (15) *kahiṃ* (the place, e. g. *sāmāia* can be attained in the upper, lower and the middle region, and so on, *AN*, 807);
- (16) *kesu* (the scope, e. g. *sāmāia* as *sammatta* has its scope over all substances and modes, that is, one can have right attitude (*sammatta*) towards everything, *AN*, 830);
- (17) *kahaṃ* (the condition, e. g. the conditions of attainment of *sāmāia* are human birth, etc., *AN*, 831);
- (18) *kicciraṃ* *havai kālaṃ* (the minimum and maximum duration, e. g. the maximum duration of

1. The MJV text counts *aṇumaa* as the 12th item. But we have followed the Commentary, p. 240A.

sāmāia as *sammatta* and *sua* is sixty *sāgarovamas*, and so on, *AN*, 849);

- (19) *kai* (the number of possessors, e. g. the number of persons possessing *sāmāia* as *sammatta* and partial *virai* is equal to the number of space-points in the innumerablth part of a *kṣetra-palyopama*, *AN*, 850);
- (20) *saṃtaraṃ* (interval, e.g. the maximum interval between *sāmāia* lost and *sāmāia* regained is equal to innumerable *pudgalaparāvartas* with reference to a single soul, *AN*, 853);
- (21) *avirahitaṃ* (uninterrupted possession, e. g. the uninterrupted possession of *sāmāia* as *sammatta*, *sua* and partial *virai* for a person is possible for a number of instants which is equal to the innumerablth part of an *āvaliā*, *AN*, 854);
- (22) *bhava* (number of births, e. g. the maximum number of births during which a person can possess *sāmāia* as *sammatta* and partial *virai* is equal to the number of the space-points in the innumerablth part of a *kṣetra-palyopama*, *AN*, 856);
- (23) *garisa* (attainment, e. g. the attainment of *sāmāia* as *sammatta*, *sua* and partial *virai* can be several between 2 and 9) thousand times in the maximum in one birth, *AN*, 857);
- (24) (*pharasa* or) *phāsaṇa* (act of touching, e. g. a person possessed a *sāmāia* as *sammatta* and *virai* can touch the whole *loka* in the maximum, *AN*, 839);
- (25) *nirutti* (etymology, e. g. the following words give the etymology of *sāmāia* : *sammāditṭhi*, *amoho*, *sohi*, etc., *AN* 861) //134//

This is the exposition of the related topics through introduction.

605. Then what is the exposition of the related topics touching the *sutta* ? The exposition of the related topics, touching the *sutta* is (made thus) : A *sutta* is to be uttered-without stumbling without mixing up (of different *suttas*), without separating by joining different *suttas* having a similar meaning, perfect (in metre and

meaning), perfect in accent, free from (indistinctness) at the throat and lips, and learnt from the instruction of the teacher. (Vide *sutta* No. 14); then (that is, after uttering it correctly), one will know whether that is an expression concerning one's own doctrine or an expression concerning other's doctrine, or an expression concerning bondage, or an expression concerning emancipation or an expression concerning *sāmāya* or an expression concerning *no-sāmāya*. Then when that is (correctly) uttered, by some revered monks, some topics are understood, and some are left un-understood by some. Therefore, for the understanding of the un-understood (topics), I shall explain the words one by one. (Here, runs a verse):

Know that the characteristic features (of exposition) are sixfold, viz. (1) the (correct) utterance of the text (*saṃhitā*), (2) disjunction and parsing of) words, (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5) anticipation of objections, and (6) establishment (of the correct meaning //135//

This is the exposition of the related topics, touching the *sutta*. This is the exposition of the related topics. This is the exposition in accordance with context.¹

[Sutta 606 : The door of Standpoint]

606. Then what is a standpoint (*naya*) ? Seven basic standpoints have been stated, for example,

- (1) *negama* (popular);
- (2) *saṃgaha* (synthetic);
- (3) *vavahāra* (pragmatic);
- (4) *ujjusua* (straightforward);
- (5) *sadda* (verbal);
- (6) *samabhirūḍha* (restricted);
- (7) *evambhūta* (functional).

On this, (run the verses):

That which ascertains (the object) by various ways of knowledge (is *negama*)—this is the etymology of (1) *negama*. The definition of the remaining *nayas* also I shall propound here, please listen //136//

(They) briefly speak of the (2) *saṃgaha*-statement as (expressing) the general condensed meaning. The (3) *vavahāra* expresses the determinate (practicable) meaning in respect of all substances //137//

1. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 601. •

2. Vide supra, *sutta* No. 75.

The (4) *ujjusua* variety of *naya* is to be known as comprehending only the (immediately) present object. The (5) *saddanaya* expects a still more specialized present object //138//

In the (6) *samabhirūḍha naya*, the transference (of words) from its object (to another object) is unreal. The (7) *evambhūta* distinguishes between the word, its meaning, and both of them (viz. word-cum-meaning) //139//

Only when the acceptable and the non-acceptable objects have been known, one should exert—the instruction such as this is indeed the *naa* //140//

Having listened to the manifold assertions of all the *nayas*, the ascetic establishes himself by his conduct and knowledge in that *naya* which is the consensus of all *nayas* //141//

This is the *naya*.

//Here end of the doors of disquisition//

In this (*sutta*), there is a total of 1604 *gāhās* and this is spoken of as consisting of 2,000 *anuttūhubha* metres //142//

The doors of *uvakkama*¹, etc. of the great *Anuogaddāra* are like the great gates of a town. The letters, dots and moras are scribed for release from worldly suffering //143//

The *Anuogadāra-sutta* ends here.

1. Vide footnote 6 on p. 205 of the MJV edition.

APPENDIX I : PRAKRIT WORDS

(References are to the sutta No.)

- akkha (two kucchīs or four cubits), 324 (93), 335, 345.
akkhaliyaṃ (without stumbling), 14.
ajahaṇṇamaṇukkosa (neither minimum nor maximum), 498, 500-2,
504-6, 507, 509, 511, 513, 515, 517, 519.
ajjhayaṇa-chakka-vaggo (synonym of āvassaya), 29 (2).
ajjhayaṇe (chapter), 535; subjected to nikkheva, 536-46.
ajjhīṇe (inexhaustible), 535; subjected to nikkheva 547-57.
atthakāṇṇie (kāgaṇirayaṇe, possessed of eight corners), 358.
atthapadaparūvaṇayā (enunciation of the relation between meaning
and word), 98.
atthabhāiyā, atthabhāiyā (a measure of liquids), 320.
attha-sovaṇṇie (kāgaṇirayaṇe, equal to eight sovaṇṇiyas in
weight), 358.
addhāijja (two and a half), 347 [5].
aṇaccakkharaṃ (without any added syllable), 14.
aṇapphupṇā (not pervaded), 396, 397.
aṇavagalla (not pained by old age), 367 (104).
aṇavatthā (regressus ad infinitum), 476.
aṇaṃta (infinite), 497, 503-506, 515-519.
aṇaṃtarāgame (scriptural knowledge acquired in immediate succession
from tithagara), 470.
aṇaṃtānaṃta (infinite-infinite), 503, 506, 519.
aṇāgayakālagahaṇaṃ (inference by comprehension of future time), 450,
453, 457.
aṇāṇupuvvī (one single atom which is non-serial), 99, passim; (non-
serial=not arranged serially), 131, 134, passim.
aṇāḍipāriṇāmie (state of innate change without beginning), 248, 250.
aṇāḍiyasiddhamteṇaṃ (according to the eternal doctrine), 263, 269.
aṇugame (consideration through the doors of exposition), 98; ninefold
105; passim. Vide next entry.
aṇugame (exposition in accordance with context, the third door of dis-
quisition), 75; classified 601. Vide preceding entry.
aṇuppehāe (on account of pondering over), 14.
aṇumaē (the door of what is desired), 604 (133).
aṇumaṇe (inferential knowledge), 436; varieties & their definitions
440-457.

- aṇuvaogo (absence of attention), 14, 482, 561.
 aṇegakkharie (multisyllable), 210, 212.
 aṇovanihiyā (aṇupuvvī, not-arranged), 95, 97-130; passim.
 aṇṇamaṇṇabbhāso (mutual multiplication), 134, 167, 171, 175, 510-9.
 attāgame (scriptural knowledge acquired by oneself), 470.
 atthāgame (scriptural knowledge of the meaning of the text), 470.
 atthāhigārā (topics), 73.
 atthāhigāre (purview of the meaning, the fifth variety of uvakkama), 92;
 illustrated 526.
 addāga (mirror), 20.
 addhakariso (kind of ummāṇa), 322. Vide Introduction, 65 (footnote)
 & 66.
 addhatulā (kind of ummāṇa), 322. Vide Introduction 65 (footnote)
 and 66.
 addhapalaṃ (kind of ummāṇa), 322. Vide Introduction 65 (footnote)
 and 66.
 addhapaṃcamāṇi (four and a half), 384 [1].
 addhabhāro (kind of ummāṇa), 322. Vide Introduction 65 (footnote)
 and 66.
 addhamāṇī (a measure of liquids), 320.
 addhāpaliovame (simile of time-instants required for emptying a store),
 369; definition and purpose 377-82.
 addhāsamae (time-instant), 132, 133; passim.
 apavāri (granary), 319.
 appābahum (comparison of the aspect of being less or more in number,
 the ninth variety of aṇugama), 105; illustrated 114; passim.
 apphunnā (pervaded, touched), 394, 396, 508.
 abbhūo (sentiment of wonder), defined & illustrated 262 (68-9).
 abhavasiddhiyā (unfit to attain salvation), 250; their number 517.
 amiliyaṃ (without mixing up of different *suttas*), 14, 605.
 aliṃda (round tub-like vessel), 319.
 aloe, aloge (beyond world), 250.
 avaccāmeliyaṃ, aviccāmeliyaṃ (without repeating by joining different
suttas having a similar meaning) 14, 605.
 avattavvāe (a duad which is unspeakability), 99.
 avatthū (unreal), 15 [5].
 avayaveṇaṃ (according to the part of the whole object denoted by the
 word), 263; (inference by a part of body) 442, 446.
 avassakaraṇijja (synonym of āvassaya), 29 (2).
 avirahitaṃ (the twenty-first constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama),
 604 (134).
 avvāiddhakkharaṃ (without any reversed syllable), 14.

- asatī (handful of grains), 318.
- asamkhejjae (innumerable), 497; classified 499-502; defined 509-14.
- asamkhejjāsamkhejjae (innumerable-innumerable), 499, 502, 513-4.
- ahigaraṇīsamṭhāṇasamṭhīe (kāganirayaṇe, shaped like the configuration of an anvil), 358.
- ahīṇakkharaṃ (with unimpaired syllable), 14.
- aṃgula (breadth of finger), 332; classified 333.
- aṃtaraṃ (interval of time, the sixth variety of aṃugama), 105; illustrated 111: passim.
- aṃtomuhutta (less than a muhutta), 383 [2]; passim.
- āe, āye (acquisition), 535; subjected to nikkheva, 558-79.
- āgamao, āgamato (with scriptural knowledge), 13-15; passim. Vide Introduction, 9-10.
- āgame (scriptural knowledge), classified and illustrated, 467-70.
- āgarisa (the twenty-third constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṃugama), 604 (134).
- āḍhayaṃ (=four patthayas), 318.
- āṇupuvvī (serial, first variety of uvakkama), 92, classified and described, 93-207.
- āpucchaṇā (asking permission of the teacher to do something), 206 (16).
- ābhīṇibohiyaṇāṇaṃ (perceptual cognition), 1.
- ābhippāyayaṇāme (names given according to one's wish), 284 (85).
- āyata-samṭhāṇa—(elongate-figure), 224.
- āyabhāve (in touch with the self—this is about acakkhudaṃsaṇa), 471.
- āyasamoyāre (self-inclusion), 530-3.
- āyaṃgule (breadth of one's own finger), 333; defined 334; purpose 336; classified 337.
- āyāṇapadeṇaṃ (according to the commencing words), 263.
- ārāhaṇā (synonym of āvassaya), 29 (2).
- āvakaḥiyā (ṭhavaṇā, lifelong) 12, 33, 55, 480.
- āvaliyā (produced by the assemblage of innumerable instants), 367; defined 511.
- āvasiyā (utterance of 'I go' to the teacher at the time of leaving for some necessary work), 206 (16).
- āvassayaṃ (obligatory acts, text embodying such acts), 29 (2).
- āsaṇaṃ (inference by support), 442, 447.
- āhāragāṃ (translocation body), 238.
- icchā-(kāro) (seeking permission of the preceptor), 206 [2] (16).
- iḍḍara (basket made of bark rope), 319.
- ittiriyā (ṭhavaṇā, temporary), 12, 33, 55, 480.
- ibbha (fabulously wealthy person), 20, 309.

- iṁdiyapaccakkhe (perceptual cognition through sense-organs), 437-8.
 ukkāliya (scripture not studied at a particular time), 4. Vide
 Introduction, 4.
 ukkittaṇa (a topic of āvassaya), 73 (6); 526 (123).
 ukkittaṇāṇupuvvī (serial of praising), 93, 203.
 ukkosae (maximum), 498, 500, passim.
 ukkosae kumbhe (hundred āḍhayas), 318.
 ujjusuo (straightforward standpoint), defined 606 (138); 474-6; 491;
 525 [2].
 uḍdhareṇū (eight saṅhasaṅhiyās), 344.
 uttaraveuvviyā (body created afterwards to serve some purpose), 347;
 passim.
 udaie (state of fruition of karmans), 233; classified 234.
 udae (rise of karmans), 234; defined 235.
 udayanipphaṇṇe (state produced by the rise of karmans), 234; classi-
 fied and described 236-8.
 uddese (the first constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (133).
 uddhārapaliovame (the simile of emptying a store), 369; twofold 370;
 definition & purpose 371-5.
 ummāṇe (measurement of heavier weights), 316; varieties and
 purpose 322-3.
 uvakkame (the first door of disquisition; initial study, world view),
 75; classified & classifications explained 76-91; second explana-
 tion 92-533.
 uvaghāta-nijjutti-aṇugame (exposition of related topics through intro-
 duction), 602; twenty-five constituents 604.
 uvaṇihiyā, ovaṇihiyā (āṇupuvvī, traditionally arranged), 95, 131-138;
 passim.
 uvasamanipphaṇṇe (state produced by the subsidence of karmans),
 239; classified 241.
 uvasamie (state of subsidence of karmans), 233; classified 239.
 uvasame (subsidence of karmans), 239; defined 240.
 uvasampayā (submission to the preceptor by the words 'I belong to
 you' in order to acquire knowledge), 206 (16).
 ussaṅhasaṅhiyā (assemblage of infinite practical material atoms), 344.
 ussehaṅgula (eight javamaṅghas), 333, 344; defined 339-44; purpose 346.
 ūsāso (numerable āvaliyās), 367.
 ekko (the number 'one' which does not lend itself to counting), 497.
 evaṁbhūta (naya, functional standpoint), defined 606 (139); 474-6.
 omāṇe (measurement of length), 316; varieties & purpose 324-5.
 orāliṁ (gross body), 238.
 ovaṇihiyā, vide uvaṇihiyā.

- ovamasamkhā (determinative knowledge by comparison), 477; illustrated 492.
- ovamie (indicated through similes) 367, 368.
- ovamme (analogical knowledge), 436; classified and defined 428-66.
- ohanipphaṇṇe (nikkheva pertaining to general nomenclature), 534; fourfold 535.
- ohiṇāṇaṃ (clairvoyance), I, 439.
- kai (the nineteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- kaivihāṃ (the thirteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604, (134).
- kajjeṇaṃ (inference by effect), 442-3.
- kaṭṭhakamme (woodwork), 11, 32, 54, 479.
- kammagaṃ (karmic body), 238.
- kammamāsa (one māsa), Introduction 65 (footnote); also 328.
- kariso (one-fourth pala), 322. Vide Introduction 65 (footnote) & 66.
- kaluṇo (sentiment of pity), defined & illustrated 262 (78-9).
- kassa (the fourteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- kahaṃ (the seventeenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- kahiṃ (the fifteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- kaṃṭhotṭhavippamukkaṃ (free from indistinctness at the throat and lips), 14.
- kāgaṇī (a measure of gold, one-fourth of a kammamāsa), 328.
- kāganirayaṇe (kagani-jewel), 358 (footnote).
- kāraṇa (the seventh constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (133).
- kāraṇeṇaṃ (inference by cause), 442, 444.
- kāla (the fifth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (133).
- kālappamaṇe (standard of measurement of time), 313; classes and subclasses 363-5.
- kālāṇupuvvī (serial of time), 93; 180-202.
- kāliya (scripture studied at a particular time), 4. Vide Introduction 4.
- kālo (duration, the fifth variety of aṇugama), 105; illustrated 110; passim.
- kālovakkame (ascertainment of the hour of the day), 76,86.
- kicciraṃ (the eighteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- kiṃ (the twelfth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).

- kiṃcivehamme (analogical knowledge achieved through least dissimilarity), 463-4.
 kiṃcisāhamme (analogical knowledge achieved through least similarity), 459-60.
 kucchī (two rayaṇīs), 335.
 kuppāvayaṇe (belonging to perverse instruction), 19; enumerated 21
 kulao (four setiyās), 318.
 kevalaṇṇaṃ (omniscience or perfect knowledge), 1, 439.
 kesu (the sixteenth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
 koḍumbiya (family head), 20, 309.
 khaie (state of destruction of karmans), 233; classified 242.
 khae (destruction of karmans), 242; defined 243.
 khaovasamanipphanne (state produced by the subsidence-cum-destruction of karmans), 245; classified and illustrated 247.
 khaovasamie (state of subsidence-cum-destruction of karmans), 233; classified 245.
 khaovasame (subsidence-cum-destruction of karmans), 245; defined and illustrated 246.
 khayanippanne (state produced by the destruction of karmans), 242; classified and illustrated 244.
 khetta (place where a thing exists, the third variety of aṇugama), 105; illustrated 108; passim; (the fourth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (133).
 khettpaliovame (simile of emptying space-points of a store), 369; definition and purpose 392-8.
 khettpamāṇe (standard of measurement of lands), 313; classes & subclasses 330-2.
 khetṭāṇupuvvī (serial of place), 93; 139-79.
 khettoakkame (making land fit for cultivation), 76, 85.
 gaṇaṇāṇupuvvī (serial of calculation), 93, 204.
 gaṇaṇāsamkhā (numebr as counting), 477; classified and defined 497-519.
 gaṇime (measurement of counting), 316; varieties & purpose 326-7.
 gāyamaṃ (two thousand dhaṇūs), 335.
 gaṇadhāraṇā (a topic of avassaya), 73 (6); 526 (123).
 gaṇappamāṇe (standard of attributes), 427, classes & subclasses, 428-72.
 gaṇeṇaṃ (inference by attribute), 442, 445.
 guruvāyaṇovagayaṃ (learnt from the instruction of the teacher and not stolen from the book), 14.
 gaṇjā (one-fifth of kammamāsa), 328.
 goṇṇe (according to the attributes denoted by the word being true of the meaning of the word), 263.

- ghaṇaṅgule (cube), defined 337 (āyaṅgula); defined 356 (ussehaṅgula); defined 361 (pamāṅgula).
- ghosasaṃam (pronounced with the same accent as that of the teacher), 14.
- caubhāiyā (a measure of liquids), 320.
- cauraṃsa-saṃṭhāṇa—(rectangular-figure), 224.
- causaṭṭhiyā (a measure of liquids), 320.
- cammeṭṭaga (leather-stick), 366.
- carittagaṇappamāṇe (standard of attributes of conduct); 435; classes 472.
- chattale (kāgaṇirayaṇe. possessed of six surfaces), 358.
- chaṃdaṇā (entreatment for things already acquired), 206 (16).
- cheyanaḡadāi, 423 [1].
- jamalapaya, 423 [1].
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- javo (eight jūyās), 339, Vide preceding entry.
- jahaṇṇae (minimum), 498, passim.
- jahaṇṇae kumbhe (sixty āḡhayas), 318.
- jāṇaḡasarīra-bhaviyasarīra-vairittam (other than the body of the knower and the body of the competent person), 16.
- jāṇaṇāsamkhā (determination as knowledge), 477; illustrated 496.
- jitam (controlled), 14.
- jīviyāheum (names given to children for ensuring their survival), 284 (85).
- juge (two kucchīs), 335.
- jūyā (eight likkhās), 344.
- joyaṇam (four gāuyas), 335
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- paḍivattī (guṇavao, a topic of āvassaya), 73 (6); 526 (123).
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- parikamme (embellishment by producing special qualities in the thing), 79.
- parijitaṃ (controlled perfectly), 14.
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- paliovame (the simile of a circular store), 368; varieties 369.
- pasatī (two asatīs), 318.
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- pādo (six aṅgulas), 335.
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- purise (the sixth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjuttī-aṇugama), 604 (133).
- puvvaṃ (inference by a previously known characteristic), 440, defined 441.
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maṇḍalao (twelve kammamāsaas), 328.

māḍambiya (governor), 20, 309.

māṇī (a measure of liquids), 320.

māṇe (measurement of quantity), 316; varieties & purpose 317-321.

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 vihatthī (two pādas), 335.
 vitivadejjā (should pass through), 343 [2].
 viro (sentiment of heroism), defined & illustrated 262 (64-5).
 veuvviyaṃ (transformation-body), 238.
 velaṇao (sentiment of shame), 262 (72-3).
 vehammovaṇite (analogical knowledge achieved through dissimilarity),
 458; classified & defined 463-6.
 sadda-(naya, verbal standpoint), defined 606 (138); 474-6; 483 [5];
 491; 525 [3].
 saṇhasaṇhiyā (eight ussaṇhasaṇhiyās), 344.
 satthavāha (caravan leader), 20, 309.
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 samoyāraṇā (the eleventh constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama),
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- samoyare (compatible inclusion, the sixth variety of uvakkama), 92, classified and illustrated 527-33. Vide preceding entry.
- sammucchima (agamic), 216 [9], passim.
- sayarāham (quickly), 366.
- savvavehamme (analogical knowledge achieved through complete dissimilarity), 463, 466.
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- savvāgāsaseḍhi (line passing through whole space), 554.
- saṃkhappamāṇe (standard of saṃkhā), 427; eightfold 477.
- saṃkhejjae (numerable), 497; classified 498.
- saṃgaha (naya, synthetic standpoint), defined 606 (137); 115-120, passim, 474-6.
- saṃjūhanāme (name expressing authorship), 308.
- saṃjogenaṃ (according to the combination), 263.
- saṃthāṇāṇupuvvī (serial of figure), 93; 205.
- saṃtapayaparūvaṇayā (ascertaining whether the word stands for something real, the first variety of aṇugama), 105; illustrated 106; passim.
- saṃtara (the twentieth constituent of uvaghāya-nijjutti-aṇugama), 604 (134).
- saṃpatisaddanao, 476 (footnote).
- saṃpayam samabhirūḍham, 476.
- sāgarovame (simile of occan), 368; definition and purpose 372 (107), 373, 374 (108), 375, 379 (109), 380, 381 (110), 382, 394 (113), 395, 397 (114), 398.
- sādi-pāriṇāmie (state of innate change with beginning), 248; classified & illustrated, 249.
- sāmaṇṇaditṭham (inference by a common characteristic known in general), 449.
- samalero (speckled), 464.
- sāmāyārāṇupuvvī (serial of correct behaviour), 93; 206.
- sāvajja-joga-viratī (a topic of āvassaya), 73.
- sāhammovāṇite (analogical knowledge achieved through similarity), 458; classified and defined, 459-62.
- sikkhitam (studied from beginning to end), 14.
- siṅgāro (sentiment of love), defined & illustrated, 262 (67-8).
- suttappāsiya-nijjutti-aṇugame (exposition of the related topics, touching the sutta), 602; demonstrated, 605.
- suttāgame (scriptural knowledge of the text), 470.
- suttāṇugame (exposition of sutta), 601; also see 605.

- suttālavaganipphaṇṇe (nikkheva pertaining to the utterance of a particular sutta), 534; 600.
- suyaṇṇaṇṇam (scriptural knowledge), 1.
- suvaṇṇo (sixteen kammamāsaas), 328. Vide Introduction, 65 (foot-note) & 69.
- suhume (conceptual), 370, passim.
- sui-aṅgule, sūci-aṅgule, sūti-aṅgule (rectilinear space), defined 337 (āyaṅgula); defined 356 (ussehaṅgula).
- setṭhi (trader, banker), 20, 309.
- seḍhi-aṅgule (variety of paṇṇaṅgula), defined 361.
- seṇāvai (military general), 20, 309.
- setiyā (2 pasatīs), 318.
- sesavaṇṇam (inference by the remainder between two related facts), 440; classified and defined 442-447.
- solasiyā (measure of liquids), 320.
- sovaṇṇie (vide suvaṇṇo), 358.
- hāso (sentiment of mirth), defined & illustrated 262 (76-7).

APPENDIX II : ENGLISH WORDS

(References are to the sutta No.; single reference is given in each case)

- agamic : sammucchima, 216 [9].
analogical knowledge : ovamma, 436.
arbitrary attribution : thavaṇṇā, 9.
arranged : uvaṇṇihiyā, 95.
ascertaining : parūvaṇṇayā, 105.
assignment : nikkheva, 534.
attention : uvaoga, 14.
attribute : guṇa, 217.
chapter : ajjhayaṇa, 6.
circular-figure : vaṭṭa-saṃṭhāṇa, 224.
clairvoyance : ohiṇṇāṇa, 1.
compatible inclusion : samoyāra, 98.
competent : bhaviya, 16.
complete : kasiṇa, 65.
conceptual : suhuma, 370.
consideration : aṇugama, 98.
destruction : khaa, 242.
developed : pajjattaa, 216[4].
disquisition : anuyoga, 2.
division : khaṃdha, 7.
duration : kāla, 105.
elongate-figure : āyatasamṭhāṇa, 224.
enunciation : parūvaṇṇayā, 98.
enumeration of divisions : bhaṃgasamaukkittañayā, 98.
essence : bhāva, 9.
extra-worldly : louttariya, 19.
fiery-body : teyaa, 405.
generalized : avisesia, 216 [1].
gross-body : orālia, 405.
illustration of divisions : bhaṃgovadaṃsaṇayā, 98.
inclusion : samoyāra, 527.
incomplete : akasiṇa, 65.
inferential knowledge : aṇumāṇa, 436.
infinite : aṇaṃta, 107 [1].
innate change (state of) : pāriṇāmia, 233.

- innumerable : asaṃkhejja, 107 [1].
 interval : aṃtara, 105.
 knower : jāṇaya, 16.
 less or more : appābahu, 105.
 life-long : āvakahiyāṃ, 33.
 matter : poggalatthikāya, 218.
 mode : bhāva, 93.
 modification : pajjava, 217.
 name : nāma, 9.
 non-sentient : acitta, 61.
 non-serial : āṇāṇupuvvī, 99.
 not-arranged : aṇovaṇihiyā, 95.
 numerable : saṃkhejja, 107 [1].
 numerical measurement : davvapamāṇa, 105.
 omniscience : kevalaṇāna, 1.
 perceptual cognition : ābhiṇibohiya-ṇāṇa, 1; pacakkha, 436
 perverse instruction (belonging to) : kuppāvayaṇiya, 19.
 place : khetta, 105.
 pondering over : aṇuppehā, 14.
 practical : vāvahāriya, 370.
 precept : vattavvayā, 92.
 purview of meaning : atthāhigāra, 92.
 rectangular-figure : cauraṃsa-saṃthāṇa, 224.
 rise : udaa, 234.
 round-figure : parimaṃḍala-saṃthāṇa, 224.
 scriptural knowledge : suyaṇāṇa, 1; āgama, 436.
 scripture : suya, 7.
 sentient : sacitta, 61.
 serial : āṇupuvvī, 92.
 serial from the first : puvvāṇupuvvī, 131.
 serial from the last : pacchāṇupuvvī, 131.
 spatial part : bhāga, 105.
 specialized : visesia, 216 [1].
 standard : pamāṇa, 92, 313.
 standpoint : naya, 15 [2].
 state : bhāva, 93.
 subsidence : uvasama, 239.
 subsidence-cum-destruction : khaovasama, 245.
 substance : davva, 217.
 substance-potential : davva, 9.

- tactile contact : phusaṇā, 105.
 telepathy : maṇapajjava-ṇāṇa, 1.
 temporary : ittiriya, 33.
 thinking : uvaoga, 14.
 time-instant : addhā-samaya, 218.
 transformation-body : veuvviya, 405.
 translocation-body : āhāraa, 405.
 triangular-figure : taṃsa-saṃṭhāṇa, 224.
 undeveloped : apajjattaa, 216 [4].
 unspeakability : avattavvaa, 99.
 with scriptural knowledge : āgamato, 13.
 without scriptural knowledge ; no-āgamato, 13.
 worldly : loia, 19.

APPENDIX III : SELECTED PROPER NAMES

(References are to the sutta No.)

- Attāṇusaṭṭhikāre, 308.
Addaijjaṃ (Sūyagaḍaṃga, II.6) 266.
Aviruddha (a heretical sect), 21.
Asaṃkhayaṃ (the fourth chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
Āvaṃṭī (Āyāraṃga, I. 5. 1-3), 266.
Āhattahiyaṃ (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 13), 266.
Āmbhiyaṃ, 49 (footnote).
Usukārijjaṃ (the fourteenth chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
Elaijjaṃ (the seventh chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
Kaṇagasattari (the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Íśvarakṛṣṇa), 49.
Kappāsiya, 59.
Kāusaggo (the fifth chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
Kāvila (Kapila), 49.
Koḍillaya (Kautilya), 49.
Gaṃthe (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. I4), 266.
Giriṇagaram, 307.
Gihidhamma (a heretical sect), 21.
Gotama (a heretical sect), 21.
Govvatiya (a heretical sect), 21.
Ghoḍamuha, 49 (footnote).
Cauvīsatthao (the second chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
Cammakhaṃḍiya (a heretical sect), 21.
Caraga (a heretical sect), 21.
Cāuraṃgijjaṃ (the third chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
Ciriga (a heretical sect), 21.
Cūliya (the second cūliya of the Dasaveyāliyasutta), 266.
Jañṇaijjaṃ (the twenty-fifth chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
Jamaīyaṃ (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 15), 266.
Tagarā, 307.
Tagarāyaḍaṃ, 307.
Taraṃgavatikāre, 308.
Dhammaciṃtaga (a heretical sect), 21.
Dhammo (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 9.), 266.
Dhammo maṅgalaṃ (the first chapter of the Dasaveyāliyasutta), 266.
Nāgasuhuma, 49.
Nāḍaga (Nāṭaka), 49.

- Paccakkhāṇaṃ (the sixth chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
 Paḍikkamaṇaṃ (the fourth chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
 Paṇḍaraṃga (a heretical sect), 21.
 Pāḍaliputta, 475.
 Purāṇa, 49.
 Purisaijjaṃ (the sixth chapter of the Uttarajjhayaṇasutta), 266.
 Bimḍukāre, 308.
 Buddhavayaṇa, 49.
 Bennā, 307.
 Bennāyaḍaṃ, 307.
 Bhāraha (Mahābhārata), 49.
 Bhicchumḍaga (a heretical sect), 21.
 Maggo (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 11), 266.
 Malayavatikāre, 308.
 Māḍhara (Māṭhara), 49.
 Māsuraḅkkaṃ, 49 (footnote).
 Rāmāyaṇa, 49.
 Loyāyaya (Lokāyata), 49.
 Vaisesiya (Vaiśeṣika), 49.
 Vaṃḍaṇaṃ (the third chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
 Vāgaraṇa, 49.
 Viruddha (a heretical sect), 21.
 Viriyāṃ (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 8.), 266.
 Vuḍḍha (a heretical sect), 21.
 Veda, 468.
 Vedisāṃ, 307.
 Vesiya, 49.
 Saḡabhaddiyā, 49.
 Saṭṭhitāṃta (Śaṭṭitantra, a lost Sāṃkhya work), 49.
 Samosaraṇaṃ (Sūyagaḍaṃga, I. 12), 266.
 Sāmāiya (the first chapter of the Āvassaya), 74.
 Sāvaga (a heretical sect), 21.

APPENDIX IV : THE GATHAS

jattha ya jaṃ jāṇejjā ṇikkhevam ṇikkhive ṇiravasesam /
 jattha vi ya na jāṇejjā caukkayam ṇikkhive tattha //1//
 —Sutta No. 8.

āvassayam avassakaraṇijja dhuvaniggaho visohi ya /
 ajjhayanachakkavaggo nāo ārahaṇā maggo //2//
 —Sutta No. 29.

samaṇeṇa sāvaṇe ya avassakāyavvayam havati jamhā /
 aṃto aho-nisissa u tamhā āvassayam nāma //3//
 —Sutta No. 29.

suya sutta gamtha siddhamta sāsaṇe āṇa vayaṇa uvadese /
 paṇṇavaṇa āgame yā egaṭṭhā pajjavā sutte //4//
 —Sutta No. 51.

gaṇa kāya nikāya khamdha vagga rāsī puṃje ya piṃda niyare ya /
 samghāya ākula samūha bhāvakhamdhassa pajjāyā //5//
 —Sutta No. 72.

sāvajjajogaviratti ukkittāṇa guṇavao ya paḍivatti /
 khaliyassa niṃdaṇā vaṇatigiccha guṇadhāraṇā ceva //6//
 —Sutta No. 73.

āvassagassa eso piṃdattho vaṇṇito samāseṇam /
 etto ekkekkaṃ puṇa ajjhayaṇam kittaissāmi //7//
 —Sutta No. 74.

samtapayaparūvaṇayā davvapamāṇam ca khetta phusaṇā ya /
 kālo ya aṃtaram bhāga bhāva appābahum ceva //8//
 —Sutta No. 105.

samtapayaparūvaṇayā davvapamāṇam ca khetta phusaṇā ya /
 kālo ya aṃtaram bhāga bhāva appābahum natthi //9//
 —Sutta No. 122.

samtapayaparūvaṇayā davvapamāṇam ca khetta phusaṇā ya /
 kālo ya aṃtaram bhāga bhāva appābahum ceva //10//
 —Sutta No. 149.

jambuddive lavaṇe dhāyai-kāloya-pukkhare varuṇe /
 khīra-ghaya-khoya-naṃdī aruṇavare kuṃḍale ruyage //11//
 —Sutta No. 169.

jambuddivāo khalu niraṃtarā, sesayā asaṃkhaimā /
 bhuyagavara-kusavarā vi ya koṃcavarā bharaṇamāyā //12//
 —Sutta No. 169.

ābharāṇa-vattha-gaṃdhe uppala-tilaye ya pauma-nihi-rayāṇe /
vāsahara-daha-ṇaḍṭo vijayā vakkhāra-kappimā //13//
—Sutta No. 169.

kuru-maṃdara-āvāsā kūḍā nakkhatta-caṃda-sūrā ya /
deve nāge jakkhe bhūye ya sayambhuramaṇe ya //14//
—Sutta No. 169.

saṃtapayaparūvaṇayā davvapamaṇaṃ ca khetta phusaṇā ya /
kālo ya aṃtaraṃ bhāga bhāva appābahuṃ ceva //15//
—Sutta No. 190.

icchā-michā tahakkāro āvasiyā ya nisihiyā /
āpucchaṇā ya paḍipucchā chaṃdaṇā ya nimaṃtaṇā /
uvasaṃpayā ya kāle sāmāyārī bhave dasavihā u //16//
—Sutta No. 206[2].

ṇāmāṇi jāṇi kāṇi vi davvāṇa guṇāṇa pajjavāṇaṃ ca /
tesim āgamaṇihase nāmaṃ ti parūviyā saṇṇā //17//
—Sutta No. 209.

taṃ puṇa ṇāmaṃ tivihāṃ itthī purisaṃ ṇapumaṃsagaṃ ceva /
eesim tiṇhaṃ pi ya aṃtammi parūvaṇaṃ vocchaṃ //18//
—Sutta No. 226.

tattha purisassa aṃtā ā i ū o ya hoṃti cattārī /
te ceva itthiyāe havaṃti okāraparihiṇā //19//
—Sutta No. 226.

aṃ ti ya im ti ya um ti ya aṃtā u ṇapumaṃsagassa boddhavvā /
etesim tiṇhaṃ pi ya vocchāmi nidaṃsaṇe etto //20//
—Sutta No. 226.

ākāraṃto rāyā ikāraṃto giri ya siharī ya /
ūkāraṃto viṇhū dumo oamṭāo purisaṇaṃ //21//
—Sutta No. 226.

ākāraṃtā māla ikāraṃtā siri ya lacchī ya /
ūkāraṃtā jambū vahū ya aṃtā u itthiṇaṃ //22//
—Sutta No. 226.

aṃkāraṃtaṃ dhannaṃ imkāraṃtaṃ ṇapumaṃsakaṃ acchim /
umkāraṃtaṃ piluṃ maḥuṃ ca aṃtā ṇapumaṃsaṇaṃ //23//
—Sutta No. 226.

juṇṇasurā juṇṇagulo juṇṇaghayaṃ juṇṇatamaḍulā ceva /
abbhā ya abbharukkā saṃjhā gaṃdhavvaṇagarā ya //24//
—Sutta No. 249.

sajje risabhe gaṃdhāre majjhime paṃcame sare /
dhevae ceva ṇesaē sarā satta viyāhiyā //25//
—Sutta No. 260 [1].

sajjaṃ ca aggajjhāe ureṇa risahaṃ saraṃ /
kaṃṭhuggateṇa gaṃdhāraṃ majjhajjhāe majjhimāṃ //26//
—Sutta No. 260 [2].

nāsāe paṃcamaṃ būyā daṃtoṭṭieṇa ya dhevataṃ /
bhamuhakkheveṇa ṇesāyaṃ saraṭṭhāṇā viyāhiyā //27//
—Sutta No. 260 [2].

sajjaṃ ravai mayūro kukkuḍo risabhaṃ saraṃ /
haṃso ravai gaṃdhāraṃ majjhimāṃ tu gavelagā //28//
—Sutta No. 260 [3].

aha kusumasambhave kāle koiḷā paṃcamaṃ saraṃ /
chaṭṭhaṃ ca sārasā kuṃcā ṇesāyaṃ sattamaṃ gao //29//
—Sutta No. 260 [3].

sajjaṃ ravai muyaṃgo gomuhī risahaṃ sara /
saṃkho ravai gaṃdhāraṃ majjhimāṃ puṇa jhallarī //30//
—Sutta No. 260. [4].

caucalaṇapatiṭṭhāṇā gohiyā paṃcamaṃ saraṃ /
ādaṃbaro dhevaiyaṃ mahābherī ya sattamaṃ //31//
—Sutta No. 260 [4].

sajjeṇa lahai vittim kayam ca na viṇassaī /
gāvo puttā ya mittā ya nārīṇaṃ hoti vallaḥo //32//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

risaheṇaṃ tu esajjaṃ seṇāvaccamaṃ dhaṇāṇi ya /
vattha gaṃdhamalaṃkāraṃ itthīo sayāṇāṇi ya //33//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

gaṃdhāre gītajuttiṇṇā vajjavitti kalāhiyā /
havaṃti kaiṇo paṇṇā je aṇṇe satthapāragā //34//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

majjhimasaramaṃtā u havaṃti suhajīviṇo /
khāyatī piyatī detī majjhimassaramassio //35//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

paṃcamassaramaṃtā u havaṃti puhavīpati /
sūrā saṃgahakattāro aṇṇaṇaṇāyagā //36//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

dhevayasaramaṃtā u havaṃti duhajīviṇo /
kucelā ya kuvitti ya corā caṃḍāla-muṭṭhiyā //37//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

ṇesāyasaramaṃtā u hoṃti kalahakārayā /
jaṃghācarā lehaḥārā hiṃḍayā bhāravāhiyā //38//
—Sutta No. 260 [5].

maggī koravviyā hari ya rayaṇi ya sārakaṃtā ya /
 chaṭṭhi ya sāsasi nāma suddhasajjā ya sattamā //39//
 —Sutta No. 260 [7].

uttaramaṃdā rayaṇi uttarāyasā (tā) /
 assokaṃtā ya sovira abhīrū bhavati sattamā //40//
 —Sutta No. 260 [8].

naṃdī ya khuddimā purimā ya cauthī ya suddhagaṃdhārā /
 uttaragaṃdhārā vi ya paṃcamiyā havai mucchā u //41//
 —Sutta No. 260 [9].

suṭṭhuttaramāyā mā sā chaṭṭhā niyamaso u nāyavvā /
 ahauttarāyatā koḍimā ya sā sattamī mucchā //42//
 —Sutta No. 260 [9].

sattassarā kato sambhavaṃti gīyassa kā havati joṇi /
 katisamayā ūsāsā kati vā gīyassa āgārā //43//
 Sutta No. 260 [10].

satta sarā nābhīo sambhavaṃti, gītaṃ ca runnajoṇiyaṃ /
 pāyasamā ussāsā, tiṇṇi ya gīyassa āgārā //44//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

ādimau ārabhaṃtā, samuvvahaṃtā ya majjhagārammi /
 avasāṇe ya jhavaṃtā, tinni vi gīyassa āgārā //45//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

chaddose aṭṭhaguṇe tiṇṇi ya vittāṇi doṇṇi bhaṇitto /
 jo nāhi so gāhiti susikkhito raṃgamajjhammi //46//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

bhīyaṃ duyamuppicchaṃ uttālaṃ ca kamaso muṇeyavvaṃ /
 kākassaramaṇunāsam chaddosā hoṃti gīyassa //47//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

puṇṇaṃ rattam ca alaṃkiyaṃ ca vattam tahevamavighuṭṭham /
 mahuraṇi samaṃ sulaliyaṃ aṭṭha guṇā hoṃti gīyassa //48//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

ura-kamṭha-siravisuddham ca gijjate mauya-ribhiyapadabaddham /
 samatāla paḍukkhevam sattassarasiḃharam gīyaṃ //49//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

akkharasamaṃ payasamaṃ tālasamaṃ layasamaṃ gahasamaṃ ca /
 nissasiussasiyasamaṃ saṃcārasamaṃ sarā satta //50//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

niddosaṃ sāvamaṃtaṃ ca heujuttamalaṃkiyaṃ /
 uvaṇiyaṃ sovaṇāraṃ ca miyaṃ mahurameva ya //51//
 —Sutta No. 260 [10].

samaṃ addhasamaṃ ceva savvattha visamaṃ ca jaṃ /
tiṇṇi vittappayārāṃ cautthaṃ novalabbhai //52//

—Sutta No. 260 [10].

sakkayā pāyayā ceva bhaṇiṭṭo homṭi duṇṇi u /
saramaṃḍalammi gijjaṃte pasatthā isibhāsiyā //53//

—Sutta No. 260 [10].

kesi gāyati mahuraṃ kesi gāyati kharaṃ ca rukkhamaṃ ca /
kesi gāyati cauraṃ kesi ya vilambiyamaṃ dutamaṃ kesi vissaraṃ
puṇa kerisi //54// —Sutta No. 260 [11].

gori gāyati mahuraṃ sāmā gāyati kharaṃ ca rukkhamaṃ ca /
kāli gāyati cauraṃ kāṇā ya vilambiyamaṃ dutamaṃ aṃdhā, vissaraṃ
puṇa piṅgalā //55// —Sutta No. 260 [11].

sattassarā tayo gāmā mucchaṇā ekkavīsatiṃ /
tāṇā egūṇapaṇṇāsaṃ sammatamaṃ saramaṃḍalamaṃ //56//

—Sutta No. 260 [11].

niddese paḍhamā hoti bitiyā uvadesaṇe /
taiyā karaṇammai kayā cautthi sampayāvaṇe //57//

—Sutta No. 261.

paṃcamī ya apāyāṇe chaṭṭhi sassānivāyaṇe /
sattamī saṇṇidhāṇatthe aṭṭhamā”maṃṭaṇi bhava //58//

—Sutta No. 261.

tattha paḍhamā vibhatti niddese so imo ahaṃ va tti /
bitiyā puṇa uvadesa bhaṇa kuṇasu imaṃ va taṃ va tti //59//

—Sutta No. 261.

tatiyā karaṇammai kayā bhaṇiyamaṃ va kayamaṃ va teṇa va mae vā /
haṃḍi ṇamo sāhāe havati cautthi payāṇammai //60//

—Sutta No. 261.

avaṇaya giṇha ya etto ito tti vā paṃcamī apāyāṇe /
chaṭṭhi tassa imassa va gayassa vā sāmisaṃbamaḍhe //61//

—Sutta No. 261.

havati puṇa sattamī taṃ imammai ādhāra kāla bhāve ya /
āmaṃṭaṇi bhava aṭṭhamī u jaha he juvāṇa ! tti //62//

—Sutta No. 261.

vīro siṃgāro abbhavo ya rodho ya hoi bodhavvo /
velaṇao bībhaccho hāso kaluṇo pasāṃto ya //63//

—Sutta No. 262 [1].

tattha pariccāyammai ya tava-carāṇe sattujaṇaviṇāse ya /
aṇaṇusaya-dhiti-parakkamacīṇho vīro raso hoi //64//

—Sutta No. 262 [2].

so nāma mahāvīro jo rajjaṃ payahiūṇa pavvaio /
 kāmakkohamahāsattupakkhanigghāyaṇaṃ kuṇai //65//
 —Sutta No. 262 [2].

siṃgāro nāma raso ratisaṃjogābhilāsasaṃjaṇaṇo /
 maṃḍaṇa-vilāsa-bibboya-hāsa-lilā-ramaṇaliṃgo //66//
 —Sutta No. 262 [3].

mahuraṃ vilāsalaliyaṃ hiyayummādaṇakaraṃ juvāṇaṇaṃ /
 sāmā sadduddāmaṃ dāeti mehalādāmaṃ //67//
 —Sutta No. 262 [3].

vimhayakaro apuvvo va bhūyapuvvo va jo raso hoi /
 so hāsa-visāyuppattilakkaṇo abbhuto nāma //68//
 —Sutta No. 262 [4].

abbhuyataramiha etto annaṃ kiṃ atthi jīvalogammi /
 jaṃ jīṇavayaṇeṇa'tthā tikāljuttā vi ṇajjaṃti //69//
 —Sutta No. 262 [4].

bhayajaṇaṇarūva-saddaṃdhakāraciṃtā-kahāsamuppanno /
 sammoha-sambhama-visāya-maraṇaliṃgo raso rodho //70//
 —Sutta No. 262 [5].

bhiudīvidambiyamuhā ! saṃdatṭhotṭha ! iya ruhiramokiṇṇa /
 haṇasi pasuṃ asuraṇibhā ! bhīmarasiya ! atirodda rodho'si //71//
 —Sutta No. 262 [5].

viṇayovayāra-gujjha-gurudāramerāvatickamuppaṇṇo /
 velaṇao nāma raso lajjā-saṃkākaṇaliṃgo //72//
 —Sutta No. 262 [6].

kiṃ loiyakaraṇto lajjaṇiyataraṃ ti lajjiyā homo /
 vārijjammi gurujaṇo parivaṃḍai jaṃ vahūpottim //73//
 —Sutta No. 262 [6].

asui-kuṇava-duddamaṇasaṃjogabbhāsagaṃdhanipphaṇṇo /
 nivveya'vihimsālakkaṇo raso hoi bībhatso //74//
 —Sutta No. 262 [7].

asuimalabbhariyanijjhara sabhāvaduggaṃdhi savvakālaṃ pi /
 dhaṇṇā u sarīrakaliṃ bahumalakalusam vimuṃcaṃti //75//
 —Sutta No. 262 [7].

rūva-vaya-vesa-bhāsāvivarīyavilambaṇāsamuppanno /
 hāso maṇappahāso pakāsaliṃgo raso hoti //76//
 —Sutta No. 262 [8].

pāsuttamasīmaṇḍiyapaḍibuddhaṃ deyaraṃ paloyaṃti /
 hī ! jaha thaṇabharakaṃpaṇapaṇamiyamajjhā hasati sāmā //77//
 —Sutta No. 262 [8].

piyavippayoga-baṃdha-vaha-vāhi-viṇivāya-sambhamuppanno /
sociya-vilaviya-pavvāya-runnaliṃgo raso kaluṇo //78//

Sutta No. 262 [9].

pajjhātakilāmiyayaṃ bahāgayapappuyacchayaṃ bahuso /
tassa viyoge puttaya ! dubbalayaṃ te muhaṃ jāyamaṃ //79//

—Sutta No. 262 [9].

niddosamaṇasamāhāṇasambhavo jo pasamtabhāveṇaṃ /
avikāralakkhaṇo so raso pasanto tti ṇāyavvo //80//

—Sutta No. 262 [10].

sabbhāvanivvikāraṃ uvasanta-pasanta-somadiṭṭhiyaṃ /
hī ! jaha muṇiṇo sohati muhakamalam piṇvarasīryamaṃ //81//

—Sutta No. 262 [10].

ee ṇava kavvarasā battisādosavihisamuppanṇā /
gāhāhiṃ muṇeyabbā, havaṃti suddhā va mīsā vā //82//

—Sutta No. 262 [10].

siṃgī sihī visāṇī dāḍhī pakkhī khurī nahī vālī /
dupaya cauppaya bahupaya ṇaṃgūlī kesarī kakuḥī //83//

—Sutta No. 271.

pariyarabaṃdheṇa bhaḍaṃ jāṇejjā, mahiliyaṃ nivasaneṇaṃ /
sittheṇa doṇapāgaṃ, kavimaṃ ca egāi gāhāe //84//

—Sutta No. 271.

ṇakkhatta-devaya-kule pāsamaḍa-gaṇe ya jīviyāheumaṃ /
ābhippāyuaṇāme ṭhavaṇānāmaṃ tu sattavihaṃ //85//

—Sutta No. 284.

kattiya rohiṇi migasira addā ya puṇavvasū ya pusse ya /
tatto ya assilesā maghāo do phagguṇiyo ya //86//

—Sutta No. 285.

hattho cittaṃ sādī [ya] visāhā taha ya hoi aṇurāhā /
jetṭhā mūlo puṇvāsādhā taha uttarā ceva //87//

—Sutta No. 285.

abhiṃ savāṇa dhaṇiṭṭhā satibhisadā do ya hoṃti bhaddavayā /
revati assiṇi bharaṇī esā nakkhattaparivāḍī //88//

—Sutta No. 285.

aggi payāvai some rudde aditi bahassāi sappe /
piti bhaga ajjama saviyā taṭṭhā vāyū ya imdaggaṃ //89//

—Sutta No. 286.

mitto imdo ṇiriti āu visso ya baṃbha viṇhū ya /
vasu varuṇa aya vivaddhī pūse āse jame ceva //90//

—Sutta No. 286.

damde ya bahuvvīhī kammadhārae diggu ya /
tappurisa avvaibhāve ekkasese ya sattame //91//

—Sutta No. 294.

kamme sippa siloe saṃjoga samīvao ya saṃjūhe /
issariā'vacceṇa ya taddhitaṇāmaṃ tu aṭṭhavihaṃ //92//

—Sutta No. 302.

damḍaṃ dhaṇū jogaṃ ṇāliya ya akkha musalaṃ ca cauhatthaṃ /
dasanāliyaṃ ca rajjuṃ viyāṇa omāṇasaṇṇāe //93//

—Sutta No. 324.

vatthummi hatthamijjaṃ khitte damḍaṃ dhaṇuṃ ca paṃthammi /
khāyaṃ ca nāliyaṃ viyāṇa omāṇasaṇṇāe //94//

—Sutta No. 324.

aṃgula vihatthi rayaṇī kucchī dhaṇu gāuyaṃ ca bodhavvaṃ /
jayaṇaseḍḍhi payaraṃ logamaloge vi ya taheva //95//

—Sutta No. 332.

māṇummāṇa-pamāṇe juttā lakkhaṇa-vamjaṇa-guṇehiṃ uvaveyā /
uttamakulappasūyā uttamapurisā muṇeyavvā //96//

—Sutta No. 334.

hoṃti puṇa ahiyapurisā aṭṭhasataṃ aṃgulāṇa uviddhā /
chaṇṇauti ahamapurisā cauruttara majjhimillā u //97//

Sutta No. 334.

hiṇā vā ahiyā vā je khalu sara-satta-sāraparihiṇā /
te uttamapurisāṇaṃ avasā pesattaṇamuvemti //98//

—Sutta No. 334.

paramāṇū tasareṇū rahareṇū aggayaṃ ca vālassa /
likkhā jūyā ya javo aṭṭhagaṇavivaḍḍhiyā kamaso //99//

—Sutta No. 339.

sattheṇa sutikkheṇa vi chettuṃ bhettuṃ va jaṃ kira na sakkā /
taṃ paramāṇū siddhā vayaṃti ādi pamāṇāṇaṃ //100//

—Sutta No. 343.

jayaṇasahassa gāyapuhatta tatto ya jayaṇapuhattaṃ /
doḥhaṃ tu dhaṇupuhattaṃ sammucchima hoi uccattaṃ //101//

—Sutta No. 351 [5].

jayaṇasahassa chaggāyāim tatto ya jayaṇasahassaṃ /
gāyapuhatta bhuyage pakkhīsu bhava dhaṇupuhattaṃ //102//

—Sutta No. 351 [5].

samaya''valiya-muhuttā divasa-ahoratta-pakkha-māsā ya /
saṃvacchara-juga-paliyā sāgara-osappi-pariattā //103//

—Sutta No. 365.

ha tṭhassa aṇavagallassa niruvakiṭṭhassa jaṃtuṇo /
ege ūsāsa-nīsāse esa pāṇu tti vuccati //104//

—Sutta No. 367.

satta pāṇūṇi se thove, satta thovāṇi se lave /
lavāṇaṃ sattahattarie esa muhutte viyāhie //105//

—Sutta No. 367.

tiṇṇi sahaṣṣā satta ya sayāṇi tehattariṃ ca ussāsa /
esa muhutto bhaṇṇo savvehim aṇaṃtanāṇihim //106//

—Sutta No. 367.

eesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havejja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ vāvahāriyassa uddhārasāgarovamassa egassa bhava
parimāṇaṃ //107// —Sutta No. 372.

etesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havejja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ suhumassa uddhārasāgarovamassa u egassa bhava
parimāṇaṃ //108// —Sutta No. 374.

eesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havijja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ vāvahāriyassa addhāsāgarovamassa egassa bhava
parimāṇaṃ //109// —Sutta No. 379.

eesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havejja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ suhumassa addhāsāgarovamassa egassa bhava parimāṇaṃ //110//
—Sutta No. 381.

sammuccha puvvakoḍi, caurāsitiṃ bhava sahaṣṣāim /
tevaṇṇā bāyālā, bāvattarimeva pakkhiṇaṃ //111//

—Sutta No. 387 [5].

gabbhammi puvvakoḍi, tiṇṇi ya poliovamāim paramāum /
ura-bhuyaga puvvakoḍi, paliuvamāsamkhabhāgo ya //112//

—Sutta No. 387 [5].

eesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havejja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ vāvahāriyassa khettasāgarovamassa egassa bhava
parimāṇaṃ //113// —Sutta No. 394.

eesim pallāṇaṃ koḍākoḍi havejja dasaṇṇiyā /
taṃ suhumassa khettasāgarovamassa egassa bhava parimāṇaṃ //114//
—Sutta No. 397.

mātā puttam jāhā nattham juvāṇaṃ puṇarāgataṃ /
kā paccabhijāṇejjā puvvalimgeṇa keṇai //115//

—Sutta No. 441.

pariyarabam̄dheṇa bhaḍaṃ, jāṇijjā mahiliyaṃ nivasaneṇaṃ /
sittheṇa doṇapāgaṃ, kama ca ekkāe gāhāe //116//
—Sutta No. 446.

iṅgitakāritairjñeyaiḥ kriyābhirbhāṣitena ca /
netra-vaktravikāraīśca gr̥hyate'ntargataṃ manah //117//
—Sutta No. 447.

abbhassa nimmalattaṃ kasiṇā ya giri savijjuyā mehā /
thaṇiyam̄ vāubbhāmo sam̄jhā rattā ya niddhā ya //118//
—Sutta No. 453.

dhūmayam̄ti disāo saṅjhāvīti metiṇī apaḍibaddhā /
vāyā ṇaṃ ṇerutiya kuvuṭṭhimete pakuvveṃti //
vide sutta 457 (footnote 2 of the MJV edition).

puravarakavāḍavacchā phalihabhuyā dūṃdubhitthaṇiyaghoṣā /
sirivacchaṃkiyavacchā savve vi jīṇā cauvisam̄ //119//
—Sutta No. 492 [2].

parijūriyaperam̄taṃ calaṃtabeṃtaṃ paḍaṃta nicchīraṃ /
pattaṃ vasaṇappattaṃ kālappattaṃ bhaṇai gāhaṃ // 120//
—Sutta No. 492 [4].

jaha tubbhe taha amhe, tumhe vi ya hohihā jahā amhe /
appāheti paḍaṃtaṃ paṃduyapattaṃ kisalayaṇaṃ //121//
—Sutta No. 492 [4].

ṇavi atthi ṇavi ya hohī ullāvo kīsala-paṃdupattāṇaṃ /
uvamā khalu esa kayā bhaviyajaṇavibohaṇaṭṭhāe //122//
—Sutta No. 492 [4].

sāvajjajogavirattī ukkittaṇa guṇavao ya paḍivattī /
khaliyassa niṃdaṇā vaṇatigiccha guṇadhāraṇā ceva //123//
—Sutta No. 526.

kohe māṇe māyā lobhe rāge ya mohaṇijje ya /
pagaḍi bhāve jīve jīvatthiya savvadavvā ya //124//
—Sutta No. 533.

ajjhappassā" ṇayaṇaṃ, kammāṇaṃ avacao uvaciyāṇaṃ /
aṇuvacao ya navāṇaṃ, tamhā ajjhayaṇamicchaṃti //125//
—Sutta No. 546.

jaha dīvā divasataṃ paippae, dippae ya so dīvo /
dīvasamā āyariyā dippaṃti, paraṃ ca dīveṃti //126//
—Sutta No. 557.

jassa sāmāṇio appā'sam̄jame ṇiyame tave /
tassa sāmāiyam̄ hoi, ii kevalibhāsiyam̄ //127// —Sutta No, 599.

jo samo savvabhūesu tasesuṃ thāvaresu ya /
tassa sāmāiyam̄ hoi, ii kevalibhāsiyam̄ //128// —Sutta No. 599.

jaha mama ṇa piyam̄ dukkhaṃ jāṇiya emeva savvajīvāṇaṃ /
na haṇai na haṇāvei ya samamaṇatī teṇa so samaṇo //129//
—Sutta No. 599.

ṇatthi ya se koi veso pio va savvesu ceva jivesu /
eeṇa hoi samaṇo, eso anno vi pajjāo //130// —Sutta No. 599.

uraga-giri-jalana-sāgara-nahatala-tarugaṇasamo ya jo hoi /
bhamara-miga-dharaṇi-jalaruha-ravi-pavaṇasamo ya so
samaṇo //131// —Sutta No. 599.

to samaṇo jai sumaṇo, bhāveṇa ya jai ṇa hoi pāvamaṇo /
sayāṇe ya jaṇe ya samo, samo ya māṇā' vamāṇesu //132//
—Sutta No. 599.

uddese niddese ya niggame khetta kāla purise ya /
kāraṇa paccaya lakkhaṇa ṇaye samoyāraṇā 'ṇumae //133//
—Sutta No. 604.

kiṃ kaivhaṃ kassa kaḥiṃ kesu kaḥaṃ kicciraṃ havai kālaṃ /
kai saṃtara mavirahitaṃ bhavā'' garisa phāsaṇa niruttī //134//
—Sutta No. 606.

saṃhitā ya padaṃ ceva padattho padaviggaho /
cālaṇā ya pasiddhī ya, chavvihaṃ viddhi lakkhaṇaṃ //135//
—Sutta No. 605.

ṇegehiṃ māṇehiṃ miṇāi ttī ṇegamassa ya niruttī /
sesāṇaṃ pi nayāṇaṃ lakkhaṇamiṇamo suṇaha vocchaṃ //136//
—Sutta No. 606.

saṃgahiyapimḍiyatthaṃ saṃgahavayaṇaṃ samāsaḷo beṃti /
vaccai viṇicchiyatthaṃ vavahāro savvadavvesuṃ //137//
—Sutta No. 606.

paccuppannaggāhī ujjusuo ṇayavihī muṇeyavvo /
icchai visesiyataraṃ paccuppaṇṇaṃ ṇao saddo //138//
—Sutta No. 606.

vatthūo saṃkamaṇaṃ hoi avatthuṃ ṇaye samabhiruḍhe /
vaṃjaṇa-attha-tadubhayaṃ evambhūo visesei //139//
—Sutta No. 606.

ṇāyammi giṇhiyavve agiṇhiyavvammi ceva atthammi /
jaiyavvameva ii jo uvaeso so nao nāma //140//
—Sutta No. 606.

savvesiṃ pi nayāṇaṃ bahuvihavattavvayaṃ nisāmettā /
taṃ savvanayavisuddhaṃ jaṃ caraṇaṇaṇatthio sāhū //141//
—Sutta No. 606.

solasasayāṇi cauruttarāṇi gāhāṇa jāna savvagaṃ /
dusahassamaṇuttḥubhachamḍavittaparimāṇao bhaṇiyaṃ //142//
—Sutta No. 606.

nagaramahādārā iva uvakkamadārāṇuogavaradārā /
akkhara-bimḍū-mattā lihiyā dukkhakkhayatḥhāe //143//
—Sutta No. 606.

APPENDIX V : INDEX OF THE GĀTHAS

(References are to the sutta No.)

- akkharasamaṃ payasamaṃ 260 (50).
aggi payāvai some 286 (89).
ajjhappassāṇayaṇaṃ 546 (125).
abbhassa nimmalattaṃ 453 (118).
abbhuyataramiha etto 262 [4] (69).
abhiṃ savaṇa dhaṇiṭṭhā 285 (88).
avaṇaya giṇha ya etto 261 (61).
asui-kuṇava-duddamsaṇa 262 [7] (74).
asuimalabhariyanijjhara 262 [7] (75).
aha kusumasambhāve kāle 260 [3] (29).
aṃkāraṃtaṃ dhannaṃ 226 (23).
aṃgula vihatthi rayaṇi 332 (95).
aṃ ti ya iṃ ti ya uṃ ti ya 226 (20).
ākāraṃtā mālā 226 (22).
ākāraṃto rāyā 226 (21).
ādimau ārabhaṃtā 260 [10] (45).
ābharāṇa-vattha gaṃdha 169 (13).
āvassagassa eso 74 (7).
āvassayaṃ avassakaraṇijja 29 (2).
iṅgitākāritairjñeyaiḥ 447 (117).
icchā-micchā-tahakkāro 206 [2] (16).
uttaramaṃdā rayaṇi 260 [8] (40).
uddese niddese ya 604 (133).
ura-kamṭha-siravisuddhaṃ 260 [10] (49).
uraga-giri-jalaṇa-sāgara 599 (131).
ee ṇava kavvarasā 262 [10] (82).
eesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 372 (107).
eesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 379 (109).
eesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 394 (113).
eesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 397 (114).
eesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 381 (110).
etesiṃ pallāṇaṃ 374 (108).
kattiya rohiṇi migasira 285 (86).
kamme sippa siloe 302 (92).
kiṃ kaivhaṃ kassa kaḥiṃ 604 (134).
kiṃ loiyakaraṇo 262 [6] (73).

- kuru-maṃḍara āvāsā 169 (14).
 kesi gāyati mahuraṃ 260 [11] (54).
 kohe māṇe māyā 533 (124).
 gaṇa kāya nikāya khaṃdha 72 (5).
 gabbhammi puvvakoḍi 387 [5] (112).
 gaṃdhāre gītiḷuttinṇā 260 [5] (34).
 gorī gāyati mahuraṃ 260 [11] (55)-
 caucalaṇapatiṭṭhāṇā 260 [4] (31).
 chaddose aṭṭhaguṇe 260 [10] (46).
 jattha ya jaṃ jāṇejjā 8 (1).
 jassa sāmāṇio appā 599 (127).
 jaha tubbhe taha amhe 492 [4] (121).
 jaha divā divasataṃ 557 (126).
 jaha mama ṇa piyaṃ dukkhaṃ 599 (129).
 jaṃbuddivāo khalu 169 (12).
 jambuddive lavaṇe 169 (11).
 juṇṇasurā juṇṇagulo 249 (24).
 jyaṇasahassa gāuyapuhatta 251 [5] (101).
 jyaṇasahassa chaggāuyāiṃ 351 [5] (102).
 jo samo savvabhūesu 599 (128).
 ṇakkhatta-devaya-kule 284 (85).
 ṇatthi ya se koi veso 599 (130).
 ṇavi atthi ṇavi ya hohi 492 [4] (122).
 ṇāmāṇi jāṇi kāṇi vi 209 (17).
 ṇāyammi giṇhiyavve 606 (140).
 ṇegehiṃ māṇehiṃ 606 (136).
 ṇeṣāyasaramaṃtā u 260 [5] (38).
 tatiyā karaṇammi kayā 261 (60).
 tattha paḍhamā vibhatti 261 (59).
 tattha pariccāyammi ya 262 [2] (64).
 tattha purisassa aṃtā 226 (19).
 taṃ puna nāmaṃ tivihāṃ 226 (18).
 tiṇṇi sahaṣṣā satta ya 367 (106).
 to samaṇo jai sumaṇo 599 (132).
 daṃḍaṃ dhaṇū jugaṃ ṇāliyā 324 (93).
 daṃde ya bahuvvīhi 294 (91).
 dhūmāyaṃti disāo (Translation 457).
 dhevayasaramaṃtā u 260 [5] (37).
 nagaramahādārā iva 606 (143).
 naṃdi ya khuḍḍimā pūriṃā 260 [9] (41).
 nāsāe paṃcamaṃ būyā 260 [2] (27).
 niddese paḍhamā hoti 261 (57).

- niddosamaṇasamāhāṇa 262 [10] (80).
 niddosaṃ sāravaṃtaṃ ca 260 [10] (51).
 paccuppannaggāhī 606 (138).
 pajjhātakilāmiyayaṃ 262 [9] (79).
 paramāṇū tasareṇū 339 (99).
 pariḷḷariyaperamaṃtaṃ 492 [4] (120).
 pariyarabamdhena bhaḍaṃ 271 (84); 446 (116).
 paṃcamasaramaṃtā u 260 [5] (36).
 paṃcamī ya apāyāṇe 261 (58).
 pāsuttamasīmaṃḍiya 262 [8] (77).
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 puravarakavāḍavacchā 492 [2] (119).
 bhayajaṇaṇarūva-saddaṃdhakāra 262 [5] (70).
 bhiuḍḍivīḍambiyamuḥā 262 [5] (71).
 bhīyaṃ duyamuppiccaṃ 260 [10] (47).
 maggī koravvīyā 260 [7] (39).
 majjhimasaramaṃtā u 260 [5] (35).
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 mātā puttāṃ jahā naṭṭhaṃ 441 (115).
 mitto imdo ṇiriti 286 [90].
 risaheṇaṃ to esajjaṃ 260 [5] (33).
 rūva-vaya-vesa-bhāsā 262 [8] (76).
 vatthummi hattha mijjaṃ 324 (94).
 vatthūo saṃkamaṇaṃ 606 (139).
 viṇayovayāra-gujjha-guru 262 [6] (72).
 vimhayakaro apuvvo 262 [4] (68).
 vīro siṃgāro abbhūo 262 [1] (63).
 sakkayā pāyayā ceva 260 [9] (53).
 sajjaṃ ca aggajjhāe 260 [2] (26).
 sajjaṃ ravai mayūro 260 [3] (28).
 sajjaṃ ravai muyaṃgo 260 [4] (30).
 sajjeṇa lahai vittim 260 [5] (32).
 sajje risabhe gaṃdhare 260 [1] (25).
 satta pāṇṇi se thove 267 (105).
 satta sarā nābhīo 260 [10] (44).
 satta sarā kato sambhavaṃti 260 [10] (43).
 satta sarā tayo gāmā 260 [11] (56).
 sattheṇa sutikkheṇa vi 343 [5] (100).
 sabbhāvanivikāraṃ 262 [10] (81).
 samaṇeṇa sāvayeṇa ya 29 (3).

- samayāvaliya-muhuttā 365 (103).
 samaṃ addhasamaṃ ceva 260 [10] (52).
 sammuccha puvvakoḍi 387 [5] (111)
 savvesiṃ pi nayāṇaṃ 606 (141).
 saṃgahiyapiṇḍiyatthaṃ 606 (137).
 saṃtapayaparūvaṇayā...appābahum̐ ceva 105 (8); 149 (10); 190(15).
 saṃtapayaparūvaṇayā...appābahum̐ natthi 122 (9).
 saṃhitā ya padaṃ ceva 605 (135).
 sāvajjajogavirati 73 (6); 526 (123).
 siṃgāro nāma raso 262 [3] (66).
 siṃgī sihī visāṇi 271 (83).
 suṭṭhuttaramāyāmā 260 [9] (42).
 suya sutta gaṇṭha siddham̐ta 51 (4).
 so ṇāma mahāvīro 262 [2] (65).
 solasasayāṇi cauruttarāṇi 606 (142).
 haṭṭhassa aṇavagallassa 367 (104).
 hattho cittā sādī 285 (87).
 havati puṇa sattamī taṃ 261 (62).
 hīṇā vā ahiyā vā 334 (98).
 hoṃti puṇa ahiyapurisā 334 (97).

ABBREVIATIONS

AN—Āvaśyaka-Niryukti published in Śrīmadāvaśyakasūtrapūrvavibhāgaḥ, Bombay, 1916.

Commentary—Maladhārīya Hemacandra's commentary on Śrī-Anuyogadvārasūtram, Bhāvanagara, 1939.

MJV—Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay-26, 1968.

Nandi—Nandisuttaṃ, Sri Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya, Bombay-26, 1968.

Vavahāra—Suttāgame edition.

VBh (A)—Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya with Auto-Commentary, L. D. Bhāratīya Sanskṛti Vidyā Mandira, Ahmedabad-9, 1966.

VB (B)—Do, with the Bṛhadvṛtti, Benares, Vīra Saṃvat 2441.

