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it can also be attained in any of the four dhīyānas as well as in the so-called “state between [the First and the Second] Dhyāna” (dhīyānāntara)\textsuperscript{158} \textsuperscript{159}. Texts which only state its acquisition in the Fourth Dhyāna (as does the Ster.Det.Descr.) can be explained as referring to the Enlightenment of the Buddha which actually took place in the Fourth Dhyāna\textsuperscript{160}. The opinion of texts like the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta (ch. I) that Liberating Insight is also possible in the first three Spheres beyond Visible Matter is referred to the Path of (repeated) Practice (bhāvanāmārga)\textsuperscript{161}. Even the view that Nirvāṇa is the content of Liberating Insight could easily be integrated into the theory of Liberation through Insight into the four Noble Truths by understanding the Insight into the Truth of Cessation as a comprehension of Nirvāṇa similar to that of the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta\textsuperscript{162}. Nirvāṇa, however, being conceived in Sarvāstivāda as an unconditioned entity called Cessation by Comprehension (pratisaṅkhyaṁnirdho) (or better as a class of such entities)\textsuperscript{163}. There is, in Sarvāstivāda, no final Liberation by a mystical ecstasy into a supramundane sphere, no liberating function of the attainment of samīnāvedayitanirodha (cp. ch. H), which is regarded by the Sarvāstivādins to be an entity that is only simila r to Nirvāṇa\textsuperscript{164} and to be attained in a state of absorption completely devoid of any kind of consciousness or mental factors whatsoever\textsuperscript{164a}. Yet even the principle of gradual detachment from spheres of mundane existence by means of the meditative realization of the next higher sphere has found its place in the Sarvāstivāda system in the form of the “Mundane Path of Practice” (laukiko bhāvanāmārga)\textsuperscript{165} which, however, is only an intramundane process which cannot go beyond the Sphere of Neither-Consciousness-nor-Non-consciousness\textsuperscript{166} because there is no further mundane sphere and because Nirvāṇa and samīnāvedayitanirodha have no longer any cosmological value, not even in an analogous sense.

2.

As for the (later) Pāli school (Theravāda), the main sources on which its theory of Liberating Insight is based appear to be Suttas like AN 10.6 discussed in ch. J.

\textsuperscript{158} Cp. AK(Bh) 448,7 ff.; AKp VIII 180 f.; FRAUWALLNER, A.St. IV (1972), p. 96; dhīyānāntara or dhīyānāntarikā (AKBh 68,19), which is defined as a variety of the First Dhyāna without vicāra, was introduced in order to integrate the samādhi which has no vicāra but only vicāra, of passages like DN III 219 and SN IV 360.

\textsuperscript{159} FRAUWALLNER, A.St. III, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{160} Cp. AK(Bh) 451,18–452,2 (ms. reads caturtha instead of caturbhya).

\textsuperscript{161} Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 368,4 f. (AKp VI 238); the non-occurrence of (supramundane) Liberating Insight in naivasaṁjñānasaṁjñāyatana is stated, e.g., in AKBh 386,10 f.; AKVy 570,9 f.; Vi 433 c 11 ff.

\textsuperscript{162} Cp. the ākaras of nirodhasatya which include Śaṁta and pranīta (cp. AKBh 400,6 and 11; 401,5 f.; FRAUWALLNER, A.St. III, p. 82).

\textsuperscript{163} Cp. AKBh 327,12 f.: "pratisamkhyānirrodho yo visamyoga" (AK I,6a) iti nirodhasatyam. As for pratisamkhyānirrodha, see, e.g., AK(Bh) 3,24 ff.; FRAUWALLNER, Ph.B. 129 f.

\textsuperscript{164} Cp., e.g., AKBh 363,13 f.; Abhidharmadipā(vṛtti) 93,5 f.; Vi 782 c 18 ff.; Abhidharmasāra (T 1552) 932 c 8.

\textsuperscript{164a} AKBh 69,24 ff.; 73,3 f.

\textsuperscript{165} Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 368,7 ff. (AKp VI 238 f.).

\textsuperscript{166} Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 366,14 ff. (AKp VI 233); FRAUWALLNER, A.St. III, p. 96.
5 and the Mahāmāluṇkyasutta (see esp. ch. J.4). The Theravadins seem to have interpreted the latter as treating of not only Liberating Insight proper but also the decisive preparatory phase. To this phase belong, according to them, the entrance into the four dhyānas and the first three States Beyond Visible Matter\(^{167}\) (which they understand as alternative but not necessary\(^{168}\) starting-points\(^{169}\)) and insight into the negative nature\(^{169a}\) essentially impermanence, disagreeableness, and Nothing-or-being-a-Self\(^{170}\) of the dhammas that constitute those meditative states (a comprehension which they consider to be the result of a long process of analytical observation or contemplation that only takes place after one has emerged from meditative concentration\(^{171}\)). Liberating Insight proper has Nirvāṇa for its sole object\(^{172}\). Thus it corresponds only to the last element of the description of Liberating Insight in the Mahāmāluṇkyasutta, to the element which corresponds to Suttas like AN 10.6, viz. the comprehension of Nirvāṇa as peaceful and excellent. Yet, the Nirvāna-experience of later Theravadins seems to be less intellectual\(^{173}\). Nevertheless, it is not a mystico-existential anticipation of Nirvāṇa as in the “samīnāvedayitanirodha-Liberation theory” — in Theravāda too, samīnāvedayitanirodha has come to be regarded as a completely non-conscious state, altogether dissociated from Liberating Insight — but a mystical cognition (nāna) or intuition (nānadassana)\(^{174}\) taking place in one of the four, or the five\(^{175}\).

167 They are considered to be special applications of the Fourth Dhyāna: FRAUWALLNER, A.St. IV (1972), p. 105; NYANATILOKA, B. Wb., p. 92.
168 There are followers of a Path of pure or mere analytical insight (sukkhavipassaka or suttavipassanāyānīka, cp. VisM XVIII.5; VIII.237; NYANATILOKA, B. Wb., p. 216) who do not enter into the dhyānas before attaining Liberating Insight proper (cp. VisM XXI.112).
169 VisM XVIII.3; cp. also XXI.112–114.
169a As for insight into the negative nature of dhammas as a (merely) preparatory stage which does not necessarily include finding pleasure in Nirvāṇa, cp. SN III 134 (… mayham pi kho etam evam hoti – ‘rupam aniccam, … anattā, …’; ti; atha ca pana me… nibbāne cittam na pakkhandati nappāsiddati…). This Sutta, by the way, seems to have had considerable influence on the Śrāvakabhūmi (Śrībh 496 ff.), according to which, nevertheless, Liberating Insight consists in a vision not of Nirvāṇa alone but of all the four Noble Truths (Śrībh 500, 15 ff.).
170 Cp. Ps III 146.8 f.: nissattattathena suññato, na attathena anattato.
171 VisM XVIII.3; cp. also the explanation of the phrase (of the Mahāmāluṇkyasutta) so tathā thito (MN I 436,3) as tāya tilakkhanārammanāya vipassanāya thito (Ps III 146,25 f. = Mp IV 196,23 f. [ad AN 9.36, see ch. K]) instead of the more natural explanation tasmīṁ pathamajjhane thito (Mp IV 196,6 f.).
172 See n. 178.
173 Cp. Ps III 146,18 ff. (= Mp IV 196,16 ff.) which refers the respective portion of the Mahāmāluṇkyasutta both to preparatory insight and to Liberating Insight proper (i.e. to the maggacitta) and makes it clear that [in the case of Liberating Insight proper] one does not verbalize [its contents] in the form “this is peaceful, this is excellent” but only focusses one’s mind on [Nibbāna] while penetrating into it in such a form (imīna…ākāreno tam paṭivijhanto).
174 Cp. VisM XXII.2.
175 In the pattern of five dhyānas, an additional dhyāna has been inserted in which there is only vicāra but no vitarka and which thus corresponds to the dhyānāntara of the Sarvastivādins (see n. 158); cp. FRAUWALLNER, A.St. IV (1972), p. 96.
“Liberating Insight” and “Enlightenment” in Early Buddhism

*dhyānas*. It is only the principle that Craving for mundane things or existence can be extirpated only by a realization of the Supramundane, i.e. Nirvāṇa, that the Theravādins, seemingly on lines of Suttas like AN 10.6, have taken over from the “*saṃñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory”.

However, the statements on Liberating Insight in some Theravāda sources, especially the *Pāṭisambhidāmagga* and the Visuddhimagga, present additional difficulties. The text of the Visuddhimagga, it is true, is quite unambiguous in declaring that only Nirvāṇa is the object (*ārammana*) of the moment of Liberating Insight (i.e. the *magga-kkhaṇa*). On the other hand, the text asserts the doctrine that this very same Liberating Insight (*maggānā*) fulfils a fourfold function (*kicca*) and that in this one moment all the four Noble Truths are “attained” (*abhīsam-i*). But the term “attainment” (*abhisamaya*) does not seem to be used in a univocal sense in this context; for the text specifies that the Truth of Suffering (*dukkhasacca*) is “attained” in the sense of “knowing completely” (*pariṅnā*), the Truth of Origination (*samudayasacca*) in the sense of “elimination” (*pahāna*), the Truth of Cessation (*nīrodhasacca*), i.e. Nirvāṇa, in the sense of “realization” (*sacchikiriya*), and the Truth of the Path (*maggasacca*) in the sense of “practising” (*bhāvanā*). It seems that, in the case of the Truth of Origination and the Truth of the Path, “attainment” (*abhisamaya*) does not mean a gnoseological act. The same ought to be true also of the Truth of Suffering, and there seems to be an effort to interpret the term *pariṅnā* accordingly, viz. as *pahānapariṅnā*, provided that this term is intended to mean “*pariṅnā* [consisting in] elimination”. But such an interpretation of *pariṅnā* is rather strange; it would be far easier to interpret not *pariṅnā* but *sacchikiriya* in a non-gnoseological sense (viz. as realization = Verwirklichung [of the cessation of the respective Causes of Suffering]), and to retain the gnoseological value of *pariṅnā*. Such an interpretation, however, would not fit the basic position of the Visuddhimagga, but it is actually found in an explanation of “comprehension or attainment [of all the four Noble Truths] by one [single moment of Insight]” (*ekābhīsamaya*) referred to in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

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177 According to FRAUWALLNER, *A.St. IV* (1972), p. 124 f., this text was the latest of all Abhidharma works to be incorporated in the Theravāda canon.

178 Cp., e.g., VisM VIII.236; XXI.71; 124; XXII.13; 40; 127; Ps III 146.21 (= Mp IV 196,19); cp. also Patīs I 116 f.

179 VisM XXII.92 ff.

180 Ibid.; cp. also Patīs I 118.

181 VisM XXII.108; cp. also XX.3 f.

182 Cp. VisM XXII.96: *yathā nāvā orimāṃ tīram paṇahati, evam maggaṇānam dukkham pariṇāṇati*. – Of course, grammatically it would be equally possible to explain the compound *pahāna-pariṅnā* in the sense of “complete knowledge [leading to] elimination”; if this is the right interpretation, my presumption that the term *pahānapariṅnā* aims at avoiding or veiling the gnoseological meaning inherent in the term *pariṅnā* would seem to be not to the point.

183 AK Bh 352,2 f.; cp. also 351,14 f.
The pattern looks like an attempt at harmonizing the old doctrine of Liberating Insight as comprehension of the four Noble Truths with doctrines according to which its actual content is only one of these Truths: the Truth of Suffering (dukkhasatya, cp. ch. I), or the Truth of Cessation (nirodhasatya), i.e. Nirvāṇa, as in the Visuddhimagga.

Yet, the situation in the Visuddhimagga (and already in the Patisambhidamagga) is still more complex, because there are passages which give a logical meaning to the term abhisamaya in the case of all the four Noble Truths. It seems that in the one moment of Liberating Insight (maggakkhana), although it realizes Nibbāna as its sole object, yet the other Truths, too, are somehow seen or understood184. The question is which kind of “understanding” (paṭivedha) is intended. The Paramatthamaṇḍūsā uses the negative term asammoha (paṭivedha)185 which may indicate that there is no actual cognition of the other Truths, as in the case of the Truth of Cessation which is said to be manifested distinctly (paccakkhadakaraṇa)186, but only some implicit or virtual kind of “knowledge” on the basis of which afterwards a completely clear and adequate actual cognition of anyone of the Truths and their aspects can arise187. This appears to be a different attempt at harmonizing, which, however, in the Visuddhimagga does not seem to be clearly distinguished from the first one.

3.

It is not possible to give in this paper a detailed exposition of the doctrine of Liberating Insight as set forth in Harivarman’s Tattva- or Sattvaśīdhi188, but a few provisional hints should be to the point.

184 VisM XXII.92 (nirodhaṃ ārammaṇanāṃ karitvā cattāri pi saccāni pāpuṇāti passati paṭivijñhāti) and 103; Paṭis I 119.
185 PMaṇi, vol. III, p. 1634, 1. 15: asammohasena paṭivijñhātī (referring to dukkhasacca); 1. 16: asammohato abhisameti (referring to samudayasacca); 1. 18 f.: maggam asammo hasato paṭivijñhātī; 1. 23 f.: nirodhasacca ekam ārammaṇapāṭivedhena, cattāri pi saccāni asammohasapāṭivedhena maggaṇāṇam (subject!) paṭivijñhātī; p. 1637, 1. 10 ff.: maggaṇāṇaḥ hi nirodham eva ārammaṇam karontam pi yo so dūkkhādusā . . . saccāttho, tappaticchā daka-sammoha-viddhamsanena tam . . . paṭivijñhantam . . . pavattati (cp., however, also n. 186); p. 1640, 1. 20 and 22 f.: na hi dūkkhāparipātīnāsādusāpāṭivedhena nībhānaṃ kātun na sakkuneyyāni. nibbānaṃkātun pana tattha itaradvayena (i.e. with regard to Nibbāna as well as to the other two, viz. dukkha- and samudayasacca) sammohasaṃviddhamsentena sakkā kātum . . .
186 PMaṇi III, p. 1634, 1. 20 f. (ad VisM XXII.92): nirodham ’ti nibbānaṃ. ’sacchikiriyābhisa manena’ ti paccakkhaṇakaranasankhātena paṭivijñhātena. Cp., however, also p. 1637, 1. 10 ff., where paccakkhaṇa karontam eva (or read iva?) refers to the saccatttha of all Truths.
187 FUKUHARA, Jōjitsuron no kenkyū (1969), was, unfortunately, not accessible to me. – I do not refer, in my notes, to N. AYASWAMI SASTRI’s retranslation of Harivarman’s work into Sanskrit (Baroda 1975), which poses serious methodological problems.
Harivarman expressly rejects the opinion of the Vaibhāsikas according to which Liberation is achieved by the full comprehension of the four Noble Truths: for according to him the usual canonical explanation shows that the four Noble Truths refer to Conventional Truth (sāṃvrtisaṭya) only. Thus, the doctrine of Liberating Insight propounded in the Sīra.Det.Descr. (ch. C) is rejected or, more precisely, referred to another stage of the Path of Liberation.

In some passages, a decisive role in the process of extirpating Defilements is accorded to the comprehension of Suffering, i.e. the comprehension of the skandhas as impermanent (anitya) and disagreeable (duḥkha), and especially as empty (śūnya) and essenceless (anātman). Occasionally, Emptiness is defined as non-existence, in the five skandhas, of a substantial Living Being or Person, i.e. in the sense of pudgalanairātmya, whereas Essencelessness means non-existence of the skandhas themselves, i.e. dharmanairātmya.

Yet in other passages Harivarman emphasizes that insight into the negative nature of all mundane factors (in the sense of the canonical doctrine of ch. I) is not yet Liberating Insight proper. Strictly speaking, the Defilements are eliminated only by insight into the Truth of Cessation (niruddhasaṭya) which alone is Ultimate Truth (paramārtha-saṭya). In this insight, which is closely related to, and obviously immediately provoked by, the insight into the Essencelessness of the skandhas, there is no longer any perception or notion of mundane factors, but mind has for its object Cessation only, which is unconditioned (asamśkṛta), because all dharmas, on account of their intrinsic Essencelessness, have ceased ab aeterno.

Harivarman’s view that the decisive phase of Liberating Insight is insight into the Truth of Cessation (i.e. Nirvāṇa) is in keeping with the principle that seems to underly the “sāṃjñāvedayitanirodha-Liberation theory” (ch. H), viz. that detachment from all the mundane spheres can only be achieved by an experience of, or insight into, the supramundane sphere, i.e. Nirvāṇa. In fact, this principle is expressly stated by Harivarman when he says that the notion of disagreeableness with regard to all conditioned dharmas becomes definite only after insight into the

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189 TSi 362 c 5 ff., esp. c 27 ff. and 363 a 16 f. and 19 ff.
190 TSi 363 a 19–23.
191 Cp. TSi 363 a 7 f.
192 Cp., e.g., TSi 372 a 28 – b 1.
193 TSi 372 b 2; 362 b 2.
194 Ibid.
195 TSi 365 b 15 f.
196 Cp. TSi 362 b 2 f.; 332 c 20 ff.
197 Cp. TSi 323 c 12 f.; 324 c 3; cp. also 372 b 3; 363 a 28; b 13. Cp. also Sh. KATSURA, Harivarman on Satyadvaya, in: IBK 54/1979, p. 960.
198 Cp. TSi 365 b 25 ff.
199 Cp. TSi 372 b 2 f.; cp. also 370 b 28.
200 Cp. TSi 332 c 11 f.
201 Cp. also TSi 362 b 1; c 1 f.; 346 a 10 f.
Truth of Cessation, i.e. Nirvāṇa\textsuperscript{202}; in the same way as, e.g., a person who has not yet attained to the bliss of the First Dhyāna cannot become detached from sensual pleasures (i.e. from kāmadhātu)\textsuperscript{203}. Harivarman even accepts that samjñāvedayitanirodha implies complete extinction of Cankers or Defilements\textsuperscript{204}, although only in the context of the eight Liberations (vīmokṣa), not in the context of the nine Successive States (anupūrvavivāhāra), where it only means (temporary) suppression of mind and mental states\textsuperscript{205}. He explains samjñāvedayita as “mental states (vedayita = citta)\textsuperscript{206} having conditioned [factors] for their object (samskṛtālambana)\textsuperscript{207}. These, of course, are eliminated in Liberating Insight which, as stated before, has for its sole object or content Cessation which is unconditioned\textsuperscript{208}. Yet according to Harivarman, Liberating Insight does not require a state of mystical ecstasy, not even entrance into one of the four dhyānas, but can be achieved also on the ordinary mental level of kāmadhātu\textsuperscript{209}. In this sense, Harivarman is even more “intellectualist” than the Sarvāstivādins who had admitted, as the lowest mental level in which Liberating Insight can take place, a state inserted in between the ordinary state of mind and the First Dhyāna\textsuperscript{210}. Therefore, Harivarman’s position seems to be most closely related to the canonical texts discussed in ch. J. 5, and at the same time to the Pali version of Mahāmālānukṣyasutta (ch. J. 4) if the comprehension or contemplation of the negative nature of mundane factors it contains is interpreted as referring to the phase preparatory to Liberating Insight as was also done in the later Pali School (cp. ch. N. 2). On the whole, the similarity of Harivarman’s view on Liberating Insight with that of the Pali school is obvious; one of the most important differences is his more intellectualist conception of the Truth of Cessation and Insight into it; another is the fact that he interprets anātman in the sense of dharmanairātmya and thereby obtains an organic link between contemplation of the negative nature of mundane existence and insight into the Truth of Cessation.

4.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism such a distinction between the comprehension of Essencelessness (as the true nature of mundane factors) and the comprehension of the truth of Cessation (as the Cessation of all mundane existence ontologically anticipated from time immemorial), a distinction which is at many

\textsuperscript{202} TSi 363 b 13–15 and 18 f.
\textsuperscript{203} TSi 363 b 16 f.
\textsuperscript{204} Cp. TSi 339 b 13.
\textsuperscript{205} Cp. TSi 344 c 29 ff.; 339 b 28 f.; 340 a 3.
\textsuperscript{206} TSi 345 a 16 f.
\textsuperscript{207} TSi 345 a 17 f.; but seemingly otherwise 339 c 8 f.
\textsuperscript{208} Cp. TSi 339 c 12.
\textsuperscript{209} Tsi 339 a 2 ff.; cp. Mus. p. 203.
\textsuperscript{210} See ch. N. 1. – anāgama is expressly rejected by Harivarman (TSi 339 a 5 ff.; cp. Mus. p. 203 f.).
points palpable enough in Harivarman’s text211, is usually not made. This means that, from the point of view of content, the “positive” and the “negative” tradition came to be fused (the accent, it is true, varying from system to system). With regard to its formal aspect, however, the Mahāyāna descriptions or theories of Liberating Insight, as far as I can see, refer to a clearly mystical experience, which resembles samādhiyayatanirodha or nirodhasamāpatti in its aspect of a mystico-existential anticipatory realization of Nirvāna, though it is usually212 clearly distinguished from it, probably because nirodhasamāpatti had come to be regarded as a completely non-conscious (or at least subconscious) state, whilst mystical experience is, of course, consciousness, though, in Mahāyāna, a transconceptual one.

*Abbreviations:

(Abbreviations of titles of Pali texts not listed below correspond to those of the CPD!)

AK(Bh) = Abhidharmakāsa (bhāṣya) of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967.
AN = Aṅguttaraniyā (PTS ed.).
CPD = V. Trenckner et al., A Critical Pali Dictionary, Copenhagen 1924—.
DhCPS = Dhammacakrapratvartanasūtra (see ch. B).
DN = Dighaniyā (PTS ed.).
EAC = Ekottarāgama (T 125).
EB = G. P. Malalasekera et al., Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Colombo 1961—.
FRAUWALLNER, A. St. = E. Frauwallner, Abhidharma-Studien, in: WZKS(O) 7/1963 (= I); 8/1964 (= II); 15/1971, 69–102 (= III); 15/1971, 103–121 and 16/1972 (= IV); 17/1973 (= V).
Hōb = Hōbōgirin, dictionnaire encyclopédique du Bouddhisme, Tokyo 1929—.
IBK = Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).
MAc = Madhyamāgama (T 26).
MN = Majjhimanikāya (PTS ed.).

211 Cp., e.g., TSi 362 b 2. But cp. also passages like TSi 370 b 28 f. and c 10 ff., or 365 c 1 f., where the distinction seems doubtful.
212 An exception seems to be Kāśyapaparivarta (ed. Staël-Holstein) § 144; cp. Mus. p. 222.
NYANATILOKA, B. Wb. = Nyanatiloka, Buddhistisches Wörterbuch, Konstanz o.J.
SĀc = Samyuktāgama (T 99).
SN = Samyuttanikāya (PTS ed.).
Ster. Det. Descr. see ch. C!
SWTF = Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, hrsg. unter der Leitung von H. Bechert, Göttingen 1973–.
T = Taishō edition of the Tripitaka in Chinese.
TSi = *Tattva- (or Satya-)siddhi of Harivarman (T 1646).
Vi = (Mahā-)Vibhāsā(-śāstra) (T 1545).
Yc = Chinese version of the Yogācārabhūmi (T 1579).
YM = Sanskrit manuscript of the Yogācārabhūmi kept in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.
(In the case of AN, DN, MN, Patīs, and SN, references are to PTS-ed., though, for practical reasons, the texts quoted are from Nālandā-ed.)

Addenda:

ad ch. A. 1: One could, of course, contrast 'Liberating Insight' (ājñā) with 'Supreme) Perfect Enlightenment' (anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ) (cp. T. TAGAMI, Aññācitta no imi to seikaku, in: Komazawa-Daigaku Bukkyōgaku-bu Ronshū 2/1971, pp. 75 ff., esp. 82 ff.); but apart from the question of its antiquity this opposition may seem to imply an emphasis on qualitative difference, whereas for some of the materials discussed in this paper exactly the opposite is true (cp., esp., ch. C.).

ad n. 8: I should have added SH. MIYAMOTO, The Buddha’s First Sermon and the Original Pattern of the Middle Way, in: IBK 26/1965, pp. 855–845, esp. 852, and particularly A. HIRAKAWA, Shitaisetsu no shujusō to hokkan, in: Bukkyō Kenkyū 5/1976, pp. 1 ff. Both scholars favour the authenticity of (at least the content of) the account of Enlightenment given in the DhCPS.

ad n. 11: An opinion on the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version of the DhCPS similar to that of KUSAMA is given by A. HIRAKAWA, op. cit. (add. ad n. 8), p. 6 f.

ad n. 19: Of course, kāmaśava could also be understood as a Karmadhāraya if kāma is taken in the subjective sense (cp. also K. R. NORMAN, Elders’ Verses 1134: “kāma etc. were the means by which karman flowed in”), but I do not see how such an interpretation would be possible in the case of bhavāsrava.

ad n. 23: Cp. also AN II 198 where the āsravas, said to originate in avidyā (and other factors), do not themselves include avidyā, but are glossed by the expression
vighātapa rilāhā (cp. also MN I 9 ff.; 361 ff.; AN III 387 ff.; MVu III 338) which
seems to mean “afflictions” in some passages, but evil emotions like annoyance/
frustration and anguish/distress (or burning desire? cp. abhijjha-domanassa) in
others, thus appearing to stand, somehow, half-way between Defilements and Suffer-
ing, or to comprise aspects of both. I am not certain whether this concept of
āsravas may contribute to the interpretation of the Ster.Det.Descr., but it should
perhaps be considered in connection with its conjectural prefiguration (see n. 27).

ad n. 26: Cp. also Dhp 190–192 = Udānavarga XXVII.33–35.

ad n. 50: Cp. also L. HURVITZ, The Eight Deliverances, in: Studies in Pali and
Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain (Delhi 1979), p. 152. — In Āyāraṅga II.15 quoted by
C. CAILLAT, Deux études de moyen-indien, JA 1960, p. 43, kāna phāse pālie
tīri . . . refers to the monastic vows (mahawaya); but surely CAILLAT’s explana-
tion of kāna as an upalaksana for kāya-vān-manobhiṅ (op. cit., p. 62, n. 12) is
commentatorial and can hardly be accepted as the original meaning.

ad ch. H: The original meaning of nirodhasaṃapatti (a term which, however,
does not occur in the Pāli canon where we only find expressions like saṃñāvedaya-
ti nirodhaṃ upasampajja viharati or saṃapajjati) has been discussed in a most
stimulating article by H. NAGASAKI, Metsujinjō ni tsuite, in: Ōtani Gakuho 39.2/
1959, pp. 64 ff. According to NAGASAKI, nirodhasaṃapatti originally was noth-
ing but a (metaphorical) designation for Nirvāṇa in terms of meditative concentra-
tion (pp. 65 f.; 70 f.; 73 ff.), for in the context of the anupūrṇavīhāras Nirvāṇa is
attained, NAGASAKI says (p. 70 f.), subsequent to the 8 meditative concentrations
(saṃāpatti), and moreover it is, like meditative concentration, a state of tranquillity
(p. 65 f.). Later on, the metaphoricality of the usage was forgotten and nirodha-
saṃapatti came to be understood as being realiter a certain type of meditative con-
centration, first considered to be accessible to released persons only, but later
devaluated to a stage below Nirvāṇa and preceding it (pp. 72 f.; 75 f.). In my
opinion, NAGASAKI is right in emphasizing the original identity of saṃñāvedayita-
nirodha and Nirvāṇa. But I think that the wording of the vimoksas and anupūrṇa-
vihaṇa patterns, which after all describe attainment to saṃñāvedayīnirāme with
exactly the same expressions as attainment to the preceding stages, should be taken
seriously, its purport being that what is attained is a temporary meditative or
mystical ascent to the level of Nirvāṇa (in the sense of f i n a l Nirvāṇa definitively
attained by the Arhat after death, as a state where all ideations and feelings will
have ceased), and that this mystical anticipation of final Nirvāṇa e f f e c t u a-
t e s Nirvāṇa in the s p i r i t u a l sense, i.e. the vanishing of the āsravas. As against
this, to NAGASAKI, the attainment of saṃñāvedayīnirāme is to be i d e n t i f i e d
with Nirvāṇa in the sense of the vanishing of the āsravas (p. 71), an assumption
which forces him to interpret the term ‘saṃñāvedayīnirāme’ to mean “cessation
of the ideations and feelings of a w o r d l y p e r s o n (prthagana) and their com-
munication into the ideations and feelings of an ārya” (p. 72). Such an interpretation,
though in fact also advocated by Harivarman in the context of the 8 vimoksas (TSi
337 a 27 f.; b 11 f.; c 8 ff.; cp. ch. N.3), does not seem to be supported by any tex-
tual evidence in the canon. Moreover, it would imply an analogous artificial interpre-
tation of the ārūpyas; for only if the ārūpyas were regarded as a gradual emptying and diminution of worldly samjñā alone would it be understandable that they lead to elimination of worldly samjñā alone (which I grant may imply elimination of the āsravas). But in the canonical vimokṣa and anupūrvavāhāra formulas, no such restriction to worldly samjñā is expressed or even hinted at.

ad n. 70: Different interpretations of the term dharmacakkhu and the sentence “yam kiñci samudayadhammam . . .” are given by K. MIZUNO, Abhisamaya (genkan) ni tsuite (Tōkai Bukkyō 7/1961), p. 54; idem, Genshi-bukkyō ni okeru satori (Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nempō 31/1966), pp. 8 f.; A. HIRAKAWA, op. cit. (add. ad n. 8), pp. 21 f.; idem, Genshi-bukkyō ni okeru hō no iml (Waseda-daigaku Daigakuin Bungaku-kenkyū-ka Kyō 14/1968), p. 23. For my own view of the sentence “yam kiñci . . .”, I should like to point out to SN 23.13–46, but I admit that the passage may need reconsideration.

ad n. 121 (p. 233): As for the problems of constructions like tam santam idam atti tī pajānāti, cp. VON HINÜBER, Kasussyntax, § 89. The passage may need reconsideration. — The word-order (idam atti, not atti idan as in Ps IV 152, 9) seems to imply emphasis on idam (cp. ICKLER, op. cit. [n. 59], p. 92).

n. 147a: This seems to imply that what had been the decisive feature of the state of saññāvedayitaniruddha for the old positive-mystical current, viz. its being an anticipatory mystical ascent to the sphere of Nirvāṇa, has been given up or has at least lost its functionality in the present Sutta in its received form — a fact which may perhaps also account for the choice of a different term (viz. animitto cetosamādhi).

ad n. 182: ENOMOTO, Āsrava (ro) no seiritsu . . . [see n. 22], p. 42, has shown that the notion of “abandoning” is closely associated to the word pariññā already in texts like Dhp and Sn, and that the term pahānapariññā has a Jainist equivalent in the form of pratyākhyānapariññā.

Moreover: AKBh 322,6 f. (dve hi pariññae – jñānapariññā prahānapariññā ca. . . . prahānapariññā . . . prahāṇam eva.) and the Sūtra quoted AKVy 503,29 ff. ( . . . pariññā katamā? yad atra cchandarāgoprahāṇam.).