

APOHA AND PRATIBHĀ

The *apoha*-theory which aroused much controversy concerning the meaning of the word among the Indian philosophers in the classical period was first expounded by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. The fifth chapter of this comprehensive work, which is devoted to the elucidation of the *apoha*-theory, begins with the following verse:

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate*¹

That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because [the word as the basis of] it expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as [the inferential mark] 'kṛtakatva' or the like [establishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark].

As is clear in this verse, the function of a word is recognized by Dignāga as identical with the function of a *liṅga* (inferential mark) in the process of inference. That a *liṅga* functions to prove the *sādhya* (that which is to be proved) through the 'exclusion of others' (*anya-vyavaccheda*, °*apoha*) is discussed by Dignāga in the second chapter of the same work, where he deals with the inference for one's own sake (*svārthānumāna*).² Take for instance the case in which one infers fire on the mountain from smoke, its *liṅga*. What is cognized by means of inference in this case is not an individual fire that possesses various attributes peculiar to it, such as flame, heat, and so on, but it is 'fire in general' common to all individual fires. However, there is no 'fire in general' as a real entity. What really exists is each individual fire possessing particular attributes. The 'fire in general' is nothing other than a concept which is produced in the mind through the process of thought-construction. One knows from experience that what is not fire, e.g., earth, water, or the like, does not possess smoke. Therefore, on seeing smoke, he understands that the object to be inferred is not a non-fire. By excluding the non-fire, he forms the notion of 'fire'. The fire thus conceived is shorn of particular color, flame, heat, etc. that constitute the characteristic features of each individual fire existing in the external world. It

is 'fire in general' which is a mere concept having no objective counterpart. With this clear view of the process of inference, Dignāga asserted that a *linga* established the *sādhya* by means of the 'exclusion of others'.

The word functions exactly in the same way to denote the object. The thing which is to be denoted by the word has various aspects, and no single word is concomitant with all of them. A word stands for only one aspect of the thing.³ Accordingly, one applies various words to express one and the same object: *vrkṣa* (tree), *pārthiva* (the earthy), *dravya* (substance), *sat* (existent), and so on. If a word had direct reference to the real entity, all these words would be regarded as synonymous with each other, since they all refer to one and the same thing. Or, there would be the absurdity that one thing has as many distinct realities as there are the words expressing it. It is, therefore, hardly maintained that the word denotes a real object. The thing in itself, which exists as the indivisible unity of various aspects, is grasped in its totality only by means of perception free of conceptual construction. The function of the word consists solely in differentiating the directly perceived object from the other things. The word '*vrkṣa*' differentiates the object from those which are not tree. The same object may be referred to by the word '*dravya*' when it is to be differentiated from non-substances. Accordingly, as the object is distinguished from different things, the different words are applied to the same object. Thus it is to be concluded that the word refers only to that portion (*aṁśa*) of the object which is differentiated from the other things. Since the object itself is an indivisible entity, the portion for which the word stands is nothing other than the product of mental construction. It is a concept formed through the mental act of 'differentiation from others' (*anyāpoha*).

On the basis of this keen observation, Dignāga made elaborate arguments against the opponents who held that the word had direct reference to the individual (*vyakti*), the universal (*jāti*), the relation between the two (*sambandha*), or the possessor of the universal (*jātimat*), and firmly established the theory that a word expresses the object qualified by the exclusion of the other things (*arthāntaranivṛtti*, *anyāpoha*).⁴

Individual trees are totally different from each other, but the 'differentiation from non-trees' is common to them all. Dignāga admits that the 'differentiation from others' is of the nature similar to the universal (*sāmānya*) which is assumed to be real by the Naiyāyikas and other realists. Like the universal, the 'differentiation from non-trees' is single (*eka*) in many trees, eternal (*nitya*) as it resides even in a newly grown tree, and completely subsistent in each individual tree (*pratyekaparisaṁāpti*).⁵ However, it is not a positive entity like the universal. It is simply attributed to the object through mental construction, and as such it has no objective reality.

After clearly proving that the meaning of the word is nothing other than *anyāpoha*, Dignāga proceeds to set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*).

*apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vivecitah
vākyārthah pratibhākyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajāyate*⁶

This meaning of the word [i.e., *apoha*] has been clarified after extracting the word from the sentence. The meaning of the sentence, which is called *pratibhā* (intuition), first arises by dint of that [meaning of the word].

In his own commentary on this verse, Dignāga gives the following explanation:

Although a word [in a sentence] has no meaning, its meaning is to be determined by extracting the word from the sentence and assuming [its meaning] in accordance with the traditional theories (*āgama*). Since a single [word] is not used, [it is to be extracted from the sentence,] just as base (*prakṛti*) and affix (*pratyaya*) [being extracted from a word]. As the apprehension of the meaning of words according to the traditional theories of other [schools] is not appropriate, in this [treatise], another meaning [i.e., *apoha*] has been laid down, which is also the assumed [meaning]. [Though a single word is unreal, its meaning is to be assumed,] because, *pratibhā* [as the meaning of the sentence] first arises, for a man who is not conversant with the relation between speech and meaning, by dint of the understanding of the meaning of the [component] words. The sentence and its meaning are *śabda* and *artha* in the primary sense, because they are not divisible [into components]. . . .⁷

It is to be noted that *pratibhā* is recognized in this statement as the meaning of the sentence. The concept of *pratibhā* is of great importance in the philosophy of word and meaning of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari. In the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari sets forth his doctrine of *pratibhā* in some verses, beginning with:

*vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhānyaiva jāyate
vākyārtha iti tāṃ āhuḥ padārthair upapāditām*⁸

When the meanings [of the words in a sentence] are understood by separating [the words from the sentence], there arises *pratibhā* which is different [from the meanings of the words]. That [*pratibhā*] effected by the meanings of the words is called the meaning of the sentence.

It cannot be denied that the meaning of a sentence is grasped only when the meaning of each constituent word is known. However, the meaning of a sentence is not a mere sum total of the individual meanings. Bhartṛhari laid emphasis on the fact that the individual meanings are mingled together (*upaśliṣṭa*) in one consciousness which flashes on the listener immediately after the speaker's utterance of the sentence. This consciousness is not brought forth through the process of relating with each other the different concepts formed one by one in accordance with the gradual utterances of the constituent words. It is immediate and intuitional. Bhartṛhari regarded this immediate consciousness as the real meaning of the sentence, and expressed it with the term '*pratibhā*'.⁹

It is known that Dignāga owed much to Bhartṛhari for the formulation of his philosophical thoughts.¹⁰ Most probably the concept of *pratibhā* was adopted by him from the work of this grammarian-philosopher. The term '*apoddhāra*', which is employed by Dignāga in the above-cited verse to mean the extraction of a word from the sentence, is often used in the *Vākyapadīya* in the same technical sense. Also in paralleling the *apoddhāra* to the grammatical analysis of a word into base and affix, Dignāga seems to have followed the precedent found in the *Vākyapadīya*:

*yathā pade vibhajyante prakṛtipratyayādayaḥ
apoddhāras tathā vākye padānām upavarṇyate*¹¹

It is emphatically asserted by Bhartṛhari, who is known to be the upholder of the *akhaṇḍa-pakṣa* (the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit), that the words constituting a sentence are not significant by themselves. Dignāga shows his close affinity in thought to Bhartṛhari by the phrase in his *Vṛtti* that a single word in a sentence has no meaning, which phrase is commented on by Jinendrabuddhi in his *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* with a quotation from the *Vākyapadīya*:

*asataś cāntarāle yāñ chabdān astīti manyate
pratipattur aśaktiḥ sā grahaṇopāya eva saḥ*¹²

It is [due to] the incapacity of the hearer that he takes the unreal verbal elements, which are in the midst [of the indivisible unit of word], as really existent. [In fact,] they are nothing other than the means of the apprehension.

Reference to the *Vākyapadīya* is made by Jinendrabuddhi also in his commentary on Dignāga's statement that a single word is not used. He says that, in the case of the word '*plakṣaḥ*' being uttered alone, such verb as

‘*asti*’ or ‘*bhavati*’ is understood to be with it by implication, and cites the following verse from the *Vākyapadīya*:

*yac ca ko 'yam iti praśne gaur aśva iti cocyate
praśna eva kriyā tatra prakrāntā darśanādikā*¹³

When the [single] word ‘cow’ or ‘horse’ is uttered in answer to the question ‘what is this’, [it is assumed that the verb ‘is seen’ is combined with that word, because] there has proceeded the act of seeing or the like in the questioning itself.

All these may prove that Dignāga set forth his view on the meaning of the sentence under the influence of Bhartṛhari. The term ‘*pratibhā*’ does not occur elsewhere in the works of Dignāga’s.

In his further discussion, Dignāga emphasizes that a sentence generates an idea (*vikalpa*) in the mind of the listener without reference to the external object. “There are people who, leaving aside *pratibhā*, consider that something else, [for example,] the external object or the relation [of the objects denoted by different words], is the meaning of the sentence. Even for them, that [which is recognized by them as the meaning of the sentence] is [in fact] nothing other than the idea. If you ask why, [we answer:]—

Even when there is no external object, through repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), there arises from [hearing] the sentences various ideas, each conforming to its own cause.

“Even when there is no external object, by dint of the impression (*vāsanā*) left by the repeated practice [of forming the idea] in respect to the object, there arises from [hearing] the sentences various ideas, each conforming to [the impression as] its own cause. For example, [there arises the idea of tiger] from [hearing] the sentence ‘a tiger is coming’, [despite that there is no real tiger]. From hearing a poem, there arises for a man who has passion the idea conforming to passion and for another man who is detached from passion the idea conforming to aversion, although there is no difference [in phrase].”¹⁴

The influence of Bhartṛhari is noticeable more clearly in this passage. Bhartṛhari also maintains that *pratibhā* as the meaning of the sentence occurs in the mind without reference to the external object. According to him, there is no essential distinction between the word and the meaning, both being two divisions of the *śabdabrahman*, the ultimate reality which is of the nature of the word.¹⁵ The *śabdabrahman* takes the form of *pratibhā* before it is manifested as the phenomenal words.¹⁶ As the primary evolver of the

śabdabrahman, *pratibhā* transcends the temporal sequence of sounds and the diversity of form that characterize the phenomenal words, and it is recognized as the original form of the phenomenal words (*vāgvikārāṇām prakṛtiḥ*).¹⁷ It resides in the mind of the speaker before he utters the sounds, and through the sounds that constitute the phenomenal words the listener is awakened to *pratibhā*.

The thought that *pratibhā* is effected by repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) is also found expressed in the *Vākyapadīya*:

*abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ
bālānām ca tiraścām ca yathārthapratipādane*¹⁸

It is held by some others [who maintain the *akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*] that every word becomes the cause of *pratibhā* by repeated practice, just as in the case of teaching the meaning to children and animals.

The practice of apprehending the meaning of speech is repeated not only in the present life but also in the past life, so that even children and animals are evoked to *pratibhā* by dint of the impression (*saṃskāra*, *bhāvanā*) of repeated practice. It is through *pratibhā* that they understand what to do (*itikartavyatā*).¹⁹

It is understood that Dignāga was primarily concerned with the meaning of a word when he formulated the *apoha*-theory. Regarding the meaning of a sentence, he simply accepted Bhartṛhari's doctrine, without discussing the problem how the meaning of a single word is related to the meaning of the sentence. In consonance with Bhartṛhari, he maintained the indivisibility of a sentence, and admitted that the utterance of a sentence immediately produced *pratibhā* in the mind of the listener. It might, therefore, be assumed that Dignāga attributed to the sentence the faculty of expressing its meaning directly, not indirectly through the exclusion of the other meanings. However, at the close of his discussion on *pratibhā*, Dignāga states that the *pratibhā* generated by a certain sentence pertains to the object which is differentiated from the objects meant by the other sentences.²⁰ In this statement it is clearly noticed that Dignāga applied the *apoha*-theory to the scrutiny of the meaning of a sentence. *Pratibhā* is, according to him, the internal awareness of the idea, which is produced by a sentence. The ideas that arise in the minds of different persons on their hearing the same sentence are not the same with each other, so that each person has his own *pratibhā* which is not communicable to any other person. However, they are generalized and regarded as the object denoted by the sentence, because they have a common feature in that they are distinguished from those produced by another sentence. It is thus to be affirmed that a sentence

denotes its object through the 'differentiation from others' (*anyāpoha*). Dignāga admitted as a psychological fact that *pratibhā* flashed upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis that a sentence expressed its meaning through the exclusion (*apoha*) of the other meanings. Because of the brevity of his discussion on the meaning of the sentence, and because of his heavy dependence on Bhartṛhari, his theory seems not to have been duly understood by his opponents.

Dignāga's theory of *apoha* was vehemently attacked by the realists, who held that either an individual (*vyakti*) or a universal (*sāmānya*, *jāti*) was the meaning of a word. Uddyotakra criticized Dignāga in the course of his discussion on the word-meaning in the *Nyāyavārttika*, II.2.66, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa devoted one chapter of his *Ślokavārttika* comprising 176 verses for the refutation of the *apoha*-theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail of their arguments, but one verse in the relevant chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* deserves special notice, since Kumārila refers to Dignāga's view of *pratibhā* in it. As a Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila maintains that a word is denotative of the universal (*ākṛti*, *jāti*),²¹ which, according to him, is a real entity and is directly perceived. To disprove the *apoha*-theory, he lays stress on the fact that, on hearing the word 'cow', we have the notion of 'cow' and not that of 'non-non-cow'. In the process of his close examination of Dignāga's arguments, he points out the inconsistency found there with the following words:

*asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe vākyārthaḥ pratibhā yathā
padārtho 'pi tathā syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate*²²

[You admit that,] even when there is no external object, there is *pratibhā* [in the mind of a man immediately after his hearing a sentence, which *pratibhā* is recognized by you] as the meaning of the sentence. It may be [consistent for you to hold] that the meaning of a word is [directly apprehended] in the same manner. Why is *apoha* [unnecessarily] devised [by you]?

The first pāda of this verse is made to conform to Dignāga's expression in the above-cited section. Kumārila considers it hard to maintain that the two verbal units, sentence and word, express their respective meanings in different manners. From his view-point, it is inadmissible for Dignāga, who admits that a sentence generates *pratibhā* which is of positive form (*vidhirūpa*), to deny to a word the faculty of producing a positive knowledge. He is not unconscious of Dignāga's application of the *apoha*-theory to the case of *pratibhā*, but he places emphasis on that a positive

cognition is derived from a sentence as well as a word, and ignores Dignāga's logical analysis with the remark that the cognition does not carry with it, apart from its own form, any other portion that might be characterized as the 'differentiation from the other cognitions'.²³

Kumārila's criticism gave an incentive to the Bauddhas to modify the *apoha*-theory. The thought that a word has as its direct import a positive image is found clearly expounded by Śāntarakṣita in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā of his *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

Śāntarakṣita closely follows Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in repudiating the objective reality of the universal that is supposed by the realists to reside in many individuals. Against the view held by the realists including Kumārila that a real universal is apprehended by means of a word, Śāntarakṣita proves the conceptual nature of the universal by the example which was originally adduced by Dharmakīrti: some plants, *dhātrī*, *abhayā*, etc., which are totally different from one another and in which no universal is found to reside, are classed under the general concept 'herb', because they all have the power of producing the same effect, that is, the curing of fever.²⁴ It is thus the concept that unifies many individuals, and the word which is applied indiscriminately to many individuals stands for this concept. Up to this point, Śāntarakṣita does not deviate from his predecessors. However, he changes the negative tone of the *apoha*-theory to the positive by giving weight to the fact that there appears in the conceptual cognition the image of a thing (*artha-pratibimba*, °-ākāra). This image is formed on the basis of the perceptions of the individuals, and for this reason it is apt to be apprehended as the real object.²⁵ It is, he asserts, this image that is directly referred to by a word. *Apoha* is for him a name applied to this image.

It is not that Śāntarakṣita disregarded the process through which the concept is formed. He states as the main reason for which the image is called '*apoha*' that it is distinguished from the image produced by another word (*anyasmād apohyate*).²⁶ However, he is chiefly concerned with the psychological fact that the image of an object appears immediately in the mind of the man who hears a word. As a matter of fact, '*apoha*' is a negative. Śāntarakṣita explains the meaning of '*apoha*' in terms of the two kinds of negation: *paryudāsa* and *niṣedha* (or *prasajyapratiṣedha*).²⁷ A *paryudāsa* implies the affirmation of something other than what is negated, while a *niṣedha* has no affirmative implication. According to Śāntarakṣita, *apoha* as the function of a word is a *paryudāsa*, because the word 'cow', for example, generates the image of cow by negating the non-cow.²⁸

Dignāga admitted that *pratibhā* was directly derived from a sentence, but an objection was raised to him by Kumārila, who considered that the

apoha-theory was inconsistent with the idea of *pratibhā*. With a view to defending the *apoha*-theory against Kumārila's objection, Śāntarakṣita makes the following statement:

pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajāyate
*pratibhākyo jhaṭ ity eva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ*²⁹

That *apoha* which is in essence the image and which is called *pratibhā* is instantly produced [not only from a sentence but] also from a word. This indeed is for us the meaning [of a sentence and] of a word as well.

Evidently, '*pratibhā*' and '*pratibimba*' (image) are regarded by Śāntarakṣita as synonymous with each other. According to him, both the sentence and the word function to produce immediately in the mind of the listener a positive image, which is expressed by the term '*pratibhā*' or '*pratibimba*'. This image is also named '*apoha*', since it is differentiated from the image generated by the other sentences or words. The inconsistency found by Kumārila in Dignāga's view is thus dissolved by Śāntarakṣita with the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory.

Dignāga maintained in concert with Bhartṛhari that the meaning of a sentence was not dissolvable into the meanings of the component words. The alteration of Dignāga's view was made by Śāntarakṣita also on this point, and the incentive to it was given by Kumārila. For the purpose of proving that the *apoha*-theory does not hold good with the meaning of a sentence, Kumārila contends that it is impossible, in respect to the meaning of a sentence, to indicate the counter-correlate (*apohya*) which is to be excluded. It is not right, he means, to assert that the sentence, for example, '*caitra gām ānaya*' (Caitra! Bring the cow), functions to exclude *a-caitra*, etc., because the exclusion of *a-caitra* is the meaning of the word and not that of the sentence.³⁰ In answer to Kumārila's criticism, Śāntarakṣita states:

A certain number of word-meanings which are conjoined with each other are called the meaning of the sentence. It is quite clear that those which are dissimilar (*vi-jātiya*) to the word-meanings are the counter-correlates of the word-meanings as well as of the meaning of the sentence, because there is no meaning of the sentence apart from the word-meanings. When the meaning of the sentence '*caitra gām ānaya*' is comprehended, the exclusion of the other agents, the other objects, etc. is understood by implication.³¹

The theory that the meaning of a sentence is the relation of the individual meanings expressed by the component words (*abhihitānvaya*) is known to

have been maintained by Kumāṛila.³² According to him, the syntactic unity of a sentence is based on mutual expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), logical competency (*yogyatā*) and phonetic contiguity (*āsatti*, *saṃnidhi*) of the words constituting the sentence, and by virtue of these three conditions, the meanings denoted by the individual words are related with each other to constitute the meaning of the sentence. In the above-cited statement it is noticed that Śāntarakṣita is very close to Kumāṛila in holding that the meaning of the sentence is nothing other than the conjunction of the individual word-meanings.³³ The ground for advancing this view was prepared by Śāntarakṣita through the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory, according to which the positive images are directly produced by the words constituting the sentence.

With a view to meeting the objections raised by Kumāṛila, Śāntarakṣita introduced a modification on the *apoha*-theory, thereby granting to a certain extent the realist contention that the cognition derived from a word is of positive form. His interpretation of the *apoha*-theory was criticized by the Bauddha logicians of the later period because of the over-emphasis on the affirmative aspect of the *apoha*-theory.

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NOTES

¹ *PS*: *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, V, k. 1, cited in *TSP: Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), p. 539.17–18.

² Cf. *PS*, II, k. 13 and *Vṛtti*. The Tibetan text and a Japanese translation are given in H. Kitagawa, *Indo-koten-ronrigaku no Kenkyū – Jinna no Taikei* – (A Study of Indian Classical Logic – Dignāga's System –), Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1965, p. 462, p. 112. Cf. also E. Frauwallner, 'Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,' *WZKSÖ*, III(1959), p. 102.

³ *PST*: *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* of Jinendrabuddhi, Tibetan version, Sde-dge ed., 237b.7–238a.2 (Peking ed., 269a.3–5): The thing to be denoted by the word (*abhidheyārtha*) has many portions (*aṃśa*): *sattā*, *jñeyatva*, etc. The word, for example, 'vrkṣa' is not inseparably related to all of them. It denotes that [portion of the thing] to which it is [inseparably] related through the exclusion of the other things (*arthāntaravyavaccheda*), just as *kṛtakatva* or any other [inferential mark establishes the *sādhya* through the exclusion of those which do not possess the inferential mark]. This thought is expressed by Dignāga in *PS*, V, k. 12, cited in *Ślokaṇvārttikaṭīkā (Śāṅkarikā)*, ed. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1946, p. 46.7–8: *bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ / svasambandhānurūpyeṇa vyavacchedārthakārya asau //*

⁴ *Vṛtti* ad *PS*, V, k. 36d, cited in *Pramānavārttika-Svavṛtti* (ed. R. Gnoli, Roma: IsMEO, 1960), pp. 62–63: *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvan āha*.

⁵ *Vṛtti* ad *PS*, V, k. 36d, cited in *TSP*, p. 389.9–12: *sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyā-nucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparīsamāptes' ca yathākramam jātidharmā ekatva* [-nityatva-] *pratyekaparīsamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhante*.... As the characteristic features of *sāmānya*, Praśastapāda mentions *nityatva*, *ekatva* and *svaviśayasarvagatatva*, cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (Vizianagram Skt. Ser., vol. 4), p. 314. Explicit mention of *pratyekaparīsamāpti* is not found in the extant Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika works of the early period. The clear expression is given in *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kashi Skt. Ser., 104), p. 284.27–28: ...ucyate pratipiṇḍam kārtsnyenaiva jātir vartata iti. Cf. *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, ed. Kielhorn, Vol. I, p. 243.24–25: *evam tarhy. .(ākṛtiḥ) pratyekam ca parīsamāpyate yathādityaḥ*.

⁶ *PS*, V, k. 46, cited in *TSP*, p. 363.15–16.

⁷ *PSV*: *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, (K): Kanakavarman's version, Peking ed., 168a.7–168b.1, (V): Vasudhararakṣita's version, Peking ed., 82b.2–4 (Sde-dge ed., 77a.2–4).

⁸ *VP*: *Vākyapadīya*, II. 143. The verse number of *VP* is given in accordance with M. Biarreau, *Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha*, Paris 1964 for I (Brahmakāṇḍa), and with K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (ed.), *Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari*, Poona 1965 for II (Vākyakāṇḍa). The doctrine of *pratibhā* is expounded in *VP*, II.143–152. Cf. also *ibid.*, I.118, II.117, etc.

⁹ Bhartrhari's doctrine of *pratibhā* is discussed in K.A. Subramanya Aiyar, 'Pratibhā as the meaning of a sentence,' *Proceedings and Transactions of the Tenth All-India Oriental Conference*, Madras 1941, pp. 326–332; Gaurinath Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959, pp. 244–264; S. Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique Indienne*, Paris 1959, p. 77 ff.; M. Biarreau, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Paris – La Haye 1964, p. 315 ff. For the concept of *pratibhā* in wider scope of Indian literature, vide Gopinath Kaviraj, 'The doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy,' in *Aspects of Indian Thought*, Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 1966, pp. 1–44; J. Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, The Hague 1963, pp. 318–348.

¹⁰ The close relation of Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā* to the *Vākyapadīya* is made clear in E. Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–116. *VP*, II. 158 and 155 are quoted by Dignāga in his *Vṛtti* on *PS*, V, k. 50; and *VP*, III.14.8 is found cited in *PSV*, (V) 70b.8 (66b.6–7).

¹¹ *VP*, II.10. Cf. *ibid.*, III.1.1: *dvidhā kaiścit padaṃ bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi ca / apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat //*

¹² *VP*, I.85. This is cited in *PST*, 287b.3 (324a. 7–8) as follows: *gaṇ smras pa / med kyaṇ naṇ gi ba yi ni // sgra rnamṣ yod do ṣes sems te // rtogs pa po yi nus med de // ḥdsin paḥi thabs kho na deḥo // ṣes so /*

¹³ *VP*, II.271. This is cited in *PST*, 287b.6–7 (324b.3–4) as follows: *de skad du yaṇ bśad*

pa / gaṇi yaṇi ḥḍi ci ṣeṣ dris śig // ba laṇi rta ṣeṣ kyaṇi brjod paḥi // dri ba kho na bya ba ste // de la rab ṣugs mthoṇi baḥi phyir // ṣeṣ so / The thought that a single word is recognized as being accompanied by the verb 'asti' is found expressed in *VP*, II.270: *yac cāpy ekaṃ padaṃ drṣṭaṃ caritāstikriyaṃ kvacit / tad vākyāntaram evāhur na tad anyena yujyate* // Cf. *Yogabhāṣya*, III.17: *sarvapadeṣu cāsti vākyasaktiḥ, vrkṣa ity ukte 'stīti gamyate...*

¹⁴ *PSV*, (K) 168b.2–5, (V) 82b.5–83a.1 (77a.2–7).

¹⁵ Cf. *VP*, II.31cd: *ekasyaivātmano bhedaḥ śabdārthāḥ aprthaksthitaḥ*.

¹⁶ Bhartṛhari recognized three stages through which the *śabdabrahman* evolves into articulate speech, namely, the *paśyanti*, the *madhyamā* and the *vaikharī*, cf. *VP*, I.142. In Vṛṣabhadeva's *Paddhati* on *VP*, I.14, *pratibhā* is identified with the *paśyanti*: '*pratibhām... itī yeyam samastaśabdārthakāraṇabhūtā buddhiḥ yām paśyantīty āhuḥ*.'

¹⁷ Cf. *Vṛtti* on *VP*, I.14.

¹⁸ *VP*, II.148. This verse is cited with slight modification in *TS: Tattvasaṃgraha* (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), k. 891.

¹⁹ Cf. *VP*, II.146: *sākṣāc chabdena janitām bhāvanānugamena vā / itikartavyatāyām tām (=pratibhām) na kaścid ativartate* // *ibid.*, I.121: *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / yām pūrvāhitasamkāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate* //

²⁰ Cf. *PSV*, (K) 168b.5–6, (V) 83a.1–2 (77a.7–77b.1).

²¹ The *Mīmāṃsā* view that a word denotes *ākṛti* is established in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, I.3.30–35 (*Ākṛtiśaktyadhikaraṇa*), and the same view is found maintained in the *Vṛttikāragrantha* cited in *Śābarabhāṣya*, I.1.5, cf. *Bibl. Ind. ed.*, p. 14.17–18: *atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko 'rthaḥ. sāsnādiviśiṣṭā ākṛtir iti brūmaḥ*. Kumārila supports this view through detailed discussions in *ŚV: Mīmāṃsāslokaavārttika*, *Ākṛtivāda* and *Vanavāda*. He takes the term '*ākṛti*' as synonymous with '*jāti*' and '*sāmānya*', cf. *ŚV, Ākṛtivāda* 3: *jātim evākṛtim prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā / sāmānyam tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhi-nibandhanam* //

²² *ŚV*, Apohavāda 40 (=TS, 922).

²³ *Ibid.*, Apohavāda 41 (TS, 923): *buddhyantarād vyavacchedo na ca buddheḥ pratiyate / svarūpotpādamātrāc ca nānyam aṃśam bibharti sā* //

²⁴ *TS, TSP*, 1004. Cf. *ibid.*, 722–725; *Pramāṇavārttika*, I.74–75.

²⁵ *TS*, 1005: *tān (=arthān) upāśritya yaj jñāne bhāty arthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthāimatābhāve 'py arthā ity eva niścitam* // Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, I.76–77.

²⁶ Śāntaraṁśita gives four reasons for which the image of an object (*arthapratibimba*) is called '*apoha*'. The first reason '*pratibhāsāntarād bhedaḥ*' is, according to Kamalaśīla's interpretation, adduced on the basis of the primary sense of the word '*apoha*' (*mukhyataḥ*): *apohyata ity apohaḥ, anyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti vyutpatteḥ*. The other reasons are based

on the figurative sense of the word (*upacārāt*). They are: (1) that the image is the cause for attaining to the real thing which is excluded from the other things (*anyavyāvṛtta-vastu*), (2) that it arises through [the perception of] the real thing which is excluded from the other things (*aśliṣṭa-vastu* = *anyato vyāvṛttaṃ vastu*), and (3) that it is erroneously taken for the particular which is excluded from the dissimilar things (*vi-jātiya-parāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam*). Cf. *TS*, *TSP*, 1006–1008ab.

²⁷ The two terms ‘*paryudāsa*’ and ‘*prasajyapraṭiśedha*’ (‘*niśedha*’ in *TS*, 1003) are variously rendered by modern scholars: ‘exception limitative’ and ‘prohibition valable après application (virtuelle)’ in L. Renou, *Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit*, Paris 1957, p. 202, p. 230; ‘Exklusion’ and ‘reine Negation’ in E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti’s Hetubinduḥ*, Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wien 1967, p. 165; ‘limitation (al negation)’ and ‘negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying’ in G. Cardona, ‘Negation in Pāṇinian rules,’ *Language*, 43 (1967), p. 34; ‘nominally bound negative’ and ‘verbally bound negative’ in B.K. Matilal, *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968 (HOS 46), p. 156, etc.

²⁸ Śāntarakṣita distinguishes two kinds of *paryudāsa*: mental (*buddhyātmaka*) and ontological (*arthātmaka*), cf. *TS*, 1003. According to him, *apoha* is primarily mental, but it has ontological implication, because the individuals to which the image pertains are ontologically differentiated from the dissimilar things, cf. *TS*, *TSP*, 1008.

²⁹ *TS*, 1027.

³⁰ *ŚV*, Apohavāda 143cd (= *TS*, 977cd). Cf. *TSP*, p. 384.12–15: *yā cātra ‘caitra gām ānaya’ ityādāv acaitrādivyavacchedarūpānyanivṛttir avayavaparigraheṇa varṇyate, sā padārtha eva syāt, na vākyārthaḥ. tasyānavayavasyetthaṃ vivektum aśakyatvād ity avyāpini śabdārthavyavasthā.*

³¹ *TS*, 1159–61: ... / *padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyate // teṣāṃ ca ye vijātiyās te ‘pohyāḥ supariṣphuṭāḥ / vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo ‘nyo naiva so ‘sti hi // caitra gām ānayetādīvākyārthe ‘dhigate sati / kartṛkarmāntarādīnām apoho gamyate ‘rthataḥ //*

³² Cf. Bishunupada Bhattacharya, *A Study in Language and Meaning* (A Critical Examination of Some Aspects of Indian Semantics), Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1962, p. 158 ff.; Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar 1963 (The Adyar Lib. Ser., vol. 91), p. 203 ff.

³³ According to Kamalaśīla, the word-meanings stand in the causal relation to each other, cf. *TSP*, p. 435.2: ‘*sahitāḥ*’ (in *TS*, 1159) *iti parasparam kāryakāraṇabhāvena sambaddhā ity arthaḥ.*