APROPOS OF LINDTNER'S TWO NEW WORKS OF DHARMAKĪRTI

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In two recent publications Christian Lindtner has drawn our attention to "quotations from Dharmakīrti occurring in later philosophical works but not to be traced in any of his extant treatises". These quotations which are to be found in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa of Bhāva, in Śantaraksita's Tattvasiddhi, in Jñānaśrimitra's Sākārasiddhiśāstra and Kṣanabhār-gādhyāya and in various Jaina treatises have been attributed by Lindtner to two hitherto unknown works of Dharmakīrti, a Tattvaniśkāra, on the basis of its mention in the Madhyama-karatnapradīpa and the Sākārasiddhiśāstra, and a Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā on the basis of its mention in the Tattvasiddhi.

In view of these extant quotations the question of the authorship of the Madhyamaka-ratnapradīpa is irrelevant: what is important is the very existence of these and other quotations from Dharmakīrti which suggests that not all of Dharmakīrti's once extant philosophical works were transmitted or even generally preserved in the memory of his tradition. On another occasion I examined the possibility of tracing the reason for the classification of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika philosopher to one of these quotations, possibly from the Tattvaniśkāra. The verses collected by Lindtner so far and tentatively ascribed to the Tattvaniśkāra will probably be augmented by future research. It will be difficult to regard all of them as mere inexact variations of actually extant verses, although we know that some of Dharmakīrti's verses were changed intentionally, e.g. for polemical reasons, by later Jaina authors. A study of these fragments will be attempted in the future and it is to be hoped that Lindtner's findings will increase the attention given to similar quotations and references to Dharmakīrti that cannot be located in his extant treatises. Here I would like to confine myself to the question of whether the Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā, one of the two new works newly ascribed by Lindtner to Dharmakīrti, can in fact be assumed to be by him.

A fragment and the title of a Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā by Dharmakīrti was found by Lindtner in the final parts of the Tattvasiddhi. He edited the fragment (yatā.....āśrayeṇa) determining its frame with the words ācārya-Dharmakīrti padair api Laukikapramāṇapari kṣayānti, and says that "it is hardly possible to take this passage as a paraphrase as might perhaps be suggested by the Tibetan version". For the Tibetan translation shows—as
Lindtner indicates—a terminative (......brtag par) in the case of the assumed name of the
text, and neither a translation corresponding to iti (e.g. zes) nor to a word of saying (e.g. bsdad
pa). I think, however, that the frame of this fragment has to be looked at in another way.

The absence of a Tibetan word translating iti at the end of the quotation does not pose
a serious problem, although the many other quotations in this translation regularly end in ŭes
gsuns pa, when Sûtras or Tantras are quoted, or ŭes bsdad pa when Acûryas or Sûstras are
quoted.10 The iti, which is attested by the manuscripts, may have escaped the translators or
may have been disregarded intentionally in view of the possibility that they took the text in
question not as a literal quotation but rather as a paraphrase.

However the beginning of the text's frame would have to be interpreted quite differently
to Lindtner's proposal. In accordance with the introductory mention of two other Acûryas
occurring earlier in the text which are parallel to the introduction of our text: slob dpon chos
kyi grags pa'i žal sna nas kyis kyan, i.e. acûrya-Dharmakîrtipâdadair api, the name followed by api
can be considered as a sufficient introduction for the following statement, be it a quotation
or a mere paraphrase. The word of saying completing this elliptical introduction is lacking,
of course, in the Tibetan translation, but not in the Sanskrit Mss. where the preceding part
of the sentence, not adduced by Lindtner, ends in uktam (cf. the text below) which is to be
constructed with acûrya-Dharmakîrtipâdadair api. Thus the word laukikapramânaparikṣâyam,
taken by Lindtner as the name of the source from which the following text had been quoted,
could in fact also belong to this text as its first word.11 The first sentence of the presumed
quotation would then have to read in a new way, i.e. as being introduced by a reference to
the systematical frame within which the following statements have to be localized, and that
frame is "an examination of the worldly valid cognitions".

A distinction between two types of valid cognition was formulated by Dharmakîrti at
the very end of PVin I: an empirical one (sâmyavahârika) and a transcendentual one
(parâmârtika).12 LINDTNER 1984: 158f. gives an interesting and plausible explanation
for the fact that Dharmakîrti prefers this terminology, and not the pair laukikalokottara. Then
why would he speak of a laukikapramâna in the present case? The problem disappears when
we assume that this term was not formulated by Dharmakîrti himself but by Sûntarakṣita who,
as the "author citing Dharmakîrti or referring to his words, uses a term synonymous to
Dharmakîrti's term but thereby neglects the possibly different approach intended by Dharma-
kîrti's choice.

If we now look at the presumed quotation itself we have the choice of either taking the
whole text up to iti as a quotation from a hitherto unknown text, to which Šûntarakṣita13 added
the systematical frame at the beginning, or taking the whole text as a reference to Dharmakîrti's
and Dignâga's14 positions as formulated by Šûntarakṣita himself. In the latter case only the
final iti remains as a disturbing element. But not too much so, since it could either be taken
as an iti of merely concluding value, simply emphasizing the conclusion of this reference, or as
the addition of a scribe who understood the preceding text as a quotation. In both cases the absence of the word in the Tibetan translation would be normal. It is finally to by noted that none of the many quotations of verses from Tantras and Śāstras in this text is concluded by a quotative iti. Also some of the few prose quotations show no iti (K 5, 6, 14, 13), while others have it (K 5, 10; 6, 15; 8, 3). Thus the import of the presence or absence of an iti in our case for an argument in favour or against the preceding text’s being a veritable quotation seems seriously decreased.

Looking at the text as a quotation would allow us to add another fragment to the small treasure of materials not to be found in Dharmakirti’s extant works and also attribute it tentatively to the enigmatic Tattvanīṣkarṣa, for the theme treated goes well with other materials collectable under this title.

If, at the other hand, we look at it as a general paraphrase of a certain position of Dharmakirti and Dignāga formulated by Śāntarakṣita, we have to indicate its sources in the works of these authors in as much detail as is possible with such general statements.

In any case we have to deal with the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of this passage as well as with its translation because I believe that Lindner’s edition and interpretation can be improved upon.

For the Sanskrit text I referred to the same two manuscripts that were used by Lindner and to the edition of the Kameshwar Nath Mishra which is based on four further manuscripts too. For the Tibetan text I used the Peking edition (P 4531, 40b9—41a4) and the Cono edition (C 37a7—37b3). For the variants of the Narthang edition (N) I relied on the readings mentioned by Lindner.

Sanskrit text:

kim ca nāmājācyādīka kalpanāsamāropitam arthānvayavatirekānukārik savikalpakam api jñānaṃ spastabhām uktaṃ ācāra-dharmakīrtipādair api—laukikapramāṇaparīksayāṁ yatra grāhyagrahakratibhasahedanā samjñayate tatrāspastabhām eva jñānam ānī spastabhātayābhāti. tadyathā nāmājācyādi—kalpanārāhitaṃ jñānam ānī spastabhām mu bhavai, grāhyagrahakasamvīttim bhedena bhidyate. tena nāmājācyādikalpanām āśrityācāryenaṇḍ less apaśtabhata darsitā, na grāhyagrahakasamvītibhedābhaneṣṭrayeṣṭi.

a "janyādī" AB.
b "kalpanāsamāropitam B : kalpānāṃ samāropitam A (ghś) : kalpanāmāsamāropitam kha : kalpanāṃ samāropitam K.
c "āvyatirekānukāri K (cf. ldog pa đaṭ mthun pa) : āvyatirekāntakāri AB (kha, gha)
d savikalpakam api A, K : savikalpakapari B.
e  jñānam spaṭābham AB :  ṣes pa mi gsal ba dañ mñon par ldan pa yin te²¹ : jñānam
     [sic !] aspaṭābham K.

f  °parikṣāyāṃ AB.

g  °pratīhāsa° corr. (not transl. into Tib.) : °pratīhāsi AB : °pratīhāso K.

h  samjñāyate corr. (Lindtner with kun tu bskyed pa NPC)²² : samjñāyate AB, K

i  °aspaṭābham AB, K : spaṭābham Lindtner.

j  tatra : de Tib. : aspaṭābham eva jñānam not transl. into Tib.

k  nājanyādi° AB.

l  jñānam (K cf. ṣes pa) : ajñānam AB.

m  spaṭābham K (cf. gsal bar snaḥ ba) : spaṭā AB²³.

n  °samvitti° is here not well translated by rtog pa which usually translates words for
     “conceptual constrution”, e.g. kalpanā. rtogs pa would be better.

o  api not transl. into Tib.

p  °samvitti° corr. (Lindtner), K : °samvartti° A : °samviritto° B.

q  °āśrayene° corr. (Lindtner), K : °āśramene° A : °āśrayena B.

r  īti not transl. into Tib.

Tibetan text :

'on kyan mīn'daṅ rigs la sogs par丛书 brtags pa'i don gyiḥ rjes su 'gro ba dañ ldog pa don
     mthun pa' i ram par rtog pa dañ bcas pa' i ṣes pa mi gsal ba dañ mñon par ldan pa yin te / slob
     dpon chos kyi grags pa' i zal sīa nas kyi kyan' jig rten pa' i tshad ma brtags pa'o' ghan de²⁴ gznü
     ba dan' 'dzin pa' i dbye bas kun tu bskyed pa de²⁵ gsal bar snaḥ ba nīd du snaḥ ba ste⁶ / 'dil ma
     mīn daṅ rigs la sogs par brtags pa dañ bral ba nīd kyi ṣes pa ni gsal bar snaḥ bar gyur pa yin no
     gznü ba dañ 'dzin pa' i rtog pa' i dbye bas phye ba yin la / de bas na mīn daṅ rigs la sogs par
     brtags pa la brten te / slob dpon gyis²⁶ mi gsal ba nīd du bstam te gznü ba dañ 'dzin pa yahn du
     par rig pa' i dbye ba la brten pa ni ma yin no //

a  par corr. : pas CP

b  gyi P : gyis C

c  par C : par / N (?) P

d  de gsal bar snaḥ ba nīd du snaḥ ba ste NP : gsal bar snaḥ ste C

e  rtogs would be preferable

f  bstam C : bsten NP

Translation :²⁷

"Moreover, that even a conceptual cognition which superimposed conceptual constructions such as name and genus (and) agrees in presence and absence with something, has a
distinct appearance,\(^{28}\) has been said by the reverend teacher Dharmakīrti too: Insofar as the worldly valid cognitions (laukikapramāṇa) are examined,\(^{29}\) when\(^{30}\) [cognition] occurs as divided into the reflection (pratibhāsa)\(^{31}\) of an [objective part which is] grasped and a [subjective part which is] grasping,\(^{32}\) then even a cognition of indistinct appearance shines as distinctly appearing.\(^{33}\) To wit.: A cognition devoid of conceptual constructions such as name and genus has a distinct appearance;\(^{34}\) it is [nevertheless]\(^{35}\) differentiated as divided into the awareness of the grasped and the grasping.\(^{36}\) Therefore the teacher (Dignāga) has also\(^{37}\) shown that [a cognition] when it rests upon conceptual constructions such as name and genus is of indistinct appearance,\(^{38}\) but not in that it rests upon the division into the awareness of the grasped and the grasping.\(^{39}\)

The whole passage can thus be accounted for even when we understand it not as a quotation from an unknown work of Dharmakīrti, but rather as a paraphrase in general formulations given by Śāntarakṣita with regard to a certain tenet of Dharmakīrti and Dignāga. Thus it does not seem necessary to interpret the expression laukikapramāṇaparikṣā as the title of a hitherto unknown work by Dharmakīrti.

Abbreviations and recurring literature

C
TSi
N
P
PS I
PV
PV Bh
P Vin I
HATTORI 1968

Cone
Tattvasiddhi: P 4531
Narthang
Peking
Pramāṇasamuccaya, first chapter. In HATTORI 1968
Pramāṇavārttika: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Ed. RĀHULA SĀṆKṛTYĀYANA. Patna 1938-40 [but the verses are counted with Vetter according to the tables in VETTER 1964: 116f.]
Pramāṇavārttikabhbāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pṛṃṇavārttikam). Ed. RĀHULA SĀṆKṛTYĀYANA. Patna 1953.
Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣaparicchedha of Dignāg’s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated by MASAAKI HATTORI. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
REFERENCES & NOTES


2. LINDTNER 1984 : 162.


4. TSi : Peking edition No. 4531. Editions of the Sanskrit text of the Tattvasiddhi are announced as forthcoming by Lindtner (LINDTNER 1980 : note 33) and by Kameshwar Nath Mishra, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (in a paper read at the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Philadelphia 1985). Lindtner has promised to present the evidence for the authenticity of the Tattvasiddhi as a work of Śāntarakṣita in the introduction to his edition.

Prof. Kameshwar Nath Mishra’s edition has already been composed in Devanāgarī and a copy of his text (29 pages) was put at my disposal for which I would like to express my sincere gratitude.
7. No fragment in prose, except for the one examined below, has been found to my knowledge.
10. Cf. slob dpon Nāgārjuna ‘i žal sīna nas kyaṅ .......żes bṭad pa daṅ // TSI 30b 4f., or : ‘Phags pa’i lhas kyaṅ ......żes bṭad pa vin no // TSI 31b 4f = K 5, 6 : punaś coktam ācārya-Nāgārjunapādāle ... ... , and K 7, 14f. : uktaṅ ca Āryadevena ... ... In neither case is an additional mention of their works given.
11. It is also interesting to note that the šad (danḍa) after the word ‘jig rten pa’i tshad ma brtag par in the Peking (and Narthang?) edition is absent in the Cone (and Derge?) edition.
13. Or even by Dharmakīrti himself, but then Lindtner’s suggestion for an explanation of the different terminology would be invalid or could be upheld only when we assume a historical change in Dharmakīrti’s attitude without, however, being able to prove it.
14. The second part of the passage refers to Dignāga. This reference must then again be taken as one made by Dharmakīrti or directly by Śāntarakṣita.
15. In the former case, because this kind of iti is often not translated, and in the latter, because the copy used by the translators did not have the iti.
16. Cf. LINDTNER 1984 : 161f.; it would be the only fragment in prose, however, found so far.
17. This will be done in my notes on the translation below.
18. Mainly because Lindtner in his attempt to make sense of the passage, used not only the Tibetan text to emend the Sanskrit text, but also corrected the Tibetan text with the help of the Sanskrit text. We all do this, of course, but with some restraint and not when the received Tibetan text as such makes sense, or when it is clear that something else has been translated or that something has been translated incorrectly. In my edition below I shall refer to Lindtner’s textual proposals as well.
19. I would like to thank Christian Lindtner very much for putting copies of the relevant folios at my disposal. Ms. A means folio 106a 1-4 (the Ms. referred to by Lindtner) and
Ms. B means folio 19b 1-4. K means the text as edited by Kameshwar Nath Mishra (p. 26, 7-14) with variants indicated in his footnotes from his Mss. kha, gha. I added these variants in brackets not being able to identify for certain the Mss. with those of Lindtner's at the moment.


21. Tib. m yön par ldan pa I do, however, not understand.

22. Cf. also skye ba in the formulation of PVin I 88, 12f. : gaṅ dag gi blo ṇid gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa' i rnam pa ne bar ston par skye ba.....

23. Lindtner corrects spaṭam bhavati, but the Ms. reading spaṭā bhavati must be taken as a haplography for spaṭābham bhavati.

24. According to PC; Lindtner gives ṇa as the reading of N, but this must be simply an unclear carving or printing of de. Lindtner proposes a correction la: de in accordance with his reading yatra. But the Tibetan translates rather yat tat instead.

25. Lindtner corrects de la and adds ṇes pa ni in accordance with the reading tatra and with the words spaṭābham eva jñānam, not accounting for spaṭābham eva, however.

26. Lindtner adds kyaṅ for api of the Mss.

27. In translating, especially the various terms, I follow Lindtner's words as far as possible.

28. This statement, that conceptual cognition which is normally of indistinct appearance can said to be distinct in a certain sense, corresponds exactly to the meaning of the reference to Dignāga below. The Tibetan translation has mi gsal ba daṅ m yön par ldan pa yin for the predicate spaṭābham and seems to misunderstand Śāntarakṣita's intention in favour of the more evident theorem. But I do not understand the second part of the Tibetan predicate.

29. This would be stated by Śāntarakṣita in order to indicate the frame of reference for the following general paraphrase of Dharmakīrti's tenets in support of his statement that even a conceptual cognition (savikalpakam api jñānam) is of distinct appearance (spaṭābham). Dharmakīrti's position is only meaningful as far as the worldly valid cognition is concerned, for the dichotomy of "grasped and grasping" is left behind when the transcendent cognition (pāramārhikam pramāṇam) comes into focus (cf. LINDTNER 1984 : 157f.).

30. That is in the case of Yogan having brought his meditation upon a real or unreal object to perfection (cf. PV II 285). Tib gaṅ de would be "whatever" and seems to translate the generalized relative pronoun yat tat ("every"). It is quite possible that this is the better reading which was corrupted into yatra which then motivated the change to tatra below, for which Tib. has only de for a possible tat or even tat tat.

31. "pratibhāsibheda" of the Mss. ("a division which reflects", Lindtner) is odd, because the division itself does not reflect, i.e. lit. have reflections".
32. Cf. PVin I 88, 12f.: gañ dag gi blo ńid gzuñ ba dag 'dzin pa' i mnam pa ęe bar ston par skye ba......

33. Śāntarakṣita’s formulation, that a cognition occurs as divided into its objective and subjective parts, means that only its nature is referred to. And this nature (svarūpa) cannot be connoted by words (śabdartha). The cognition of its own nature is therefore direct (adhyaṅkṣa), i.e., with distinct appearance (spaṣṭābha). This is also the case when we refer to a conceptual cognition (sāvikālpa-kajñāna), which as such, i.e., as conceptualizing an object (artha), is of indistinct appearance.

Śāntarakṣita paraphrases here PV II 287 which is Dharmakīrti’s formulation of the idea of Dignāga’s PS I 7ab (cf. below note 40). In these statements both authors seem to give an answer to the question how the originally conceptual cognitions of a Yogi can attain the quality of distinctness through the force of a perfect meditation (cf. Prajñākaragupta’s introduction PVBh 331, 11-22). And Dharmakīrti says: śabdarthagrahi yad yatra taj jñānam tatra kalpanā / svarūpa ni saśabdarthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'khilam // (PV II 287)= “A cognition which grasps the connotation of a word with regard to a certain (object) is with regard to this (object) a conceptual construction. But the nature [of this conceptual cognition] is not connoted by words. Therefore this whole (cognition) is direct with regard to this (its own nature).”

34. With regard to the character of distinct appearance (spaṣṭāvabhāsīva) in a cognition as being in opposition to its conceptuality PV III 498ab may be adduced: tasya spaṣṭāvabhāsaṁ jālapasamāsargināḥ kutaḥ // “How could this (conceptual cognition) which is connected with words have a distinct appearance?” and PV III 283ab from Dharmakīrti’s explanation of yogic perception: na vikalpānubāddhāyastī sphutārthāvabhāsīta // “There is no distinct appearance of something in a (cognition) that is connected with conceptual construction.”

Distinctness and the absence of conceptual construction are closely connected in Dharmakīrti’s concept of perception (pratyakṣa): cf. PVin I 40, 2 for the definition of perception and PVin I 28 for the distinct cognition of the Yogi as a kind of perception (cf. also VETTER 1966 : 23f.). For conceptual construction cf. PVin I 4bcf, the source of the examples “name, genus etc.” is PS I 3d.

35. The Tibetan translation connects this sentence with the following, but in analogy to the full reference to Dignāga following, an antithetical connection with the preceding sentence is preferable (cf. also Lindtner’s translation with “but......”).

36. The Tibetan translation with rtog pa is problematic. If corrected into rtogs pa we may assume a word that can be synonymous with samvitī, but I can offer nothing as supported by the relevant source.

For the two parts cf. e.g. PV III 320a: tasmād dvirūpam asty ekam and the source of these two forms of cognitions in Dignāga’s PS I 11ab with the Vṛtti (cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.61).
It is also possible that all three parts of a cognition, i.e. objective and subjective parts and self-awareness are indicated here (cf. PV III 353 and 357, VETTER 1964: 82), but this would be contrary to the Tibetan translation and of no import for the meaning of the reference in Śāntarakṣita’s context.

Śāntarakṣita’s paraphrase of Dharmakīrti’s standpoint ends here in my opinion. The following sentence adds a reference to Dignāga as a second support for his intentions and does not have to be taken as a reference to Dignāga made by Dharmakīrti himself, as according to Lindtner.

*api* is not translated into Tibetan.

To my knowledge Dignāga does not consider the concept of distinctness (*spaśtabhatā*) in his presentation of the terms of relevance here. It seems that Śāntarakṣita—following Dharmakīrti—equates Dignāga’s predication that some sort of cognition “is a perception” (*pratyakṣa*)—e.g. *yatraisā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyākṣam* at the end of his *Vṛtti* on PS I 3d (cf. HATTORI 1968: 25 and note 1.30)—as equivalent with the predication that “it is of distinct appearance”, thus identifying the concept of being a distinct cognition with that of being a perception.

In this way he can refer to several statements of Dignāga, where perception is defined as nonconceptual, e.g. PS I 3c (*pratyākṣam kalpanāpogham*, cf. HATTORI 1968: note 1.25), then the sentence adduced above and the end of his *Vṛtti* on PS I 5 (*sarve tv avikalpaka eva*, cf. HATTORI 1968: note 1.44).

The whole paraphrase refers to PS I 7ab and its *Vṛtti*, where Dignāga states that even a conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) is aware of itself and that this awareness is perception (*kalpanāpi svasamvittavistā*, cf. HATTORI 1968: note 1.51). But this is not the case when an external object is conceptualized, i.e. connected with name, genus etc. (*nārthe, vikalpanāti*, cf. HATTORI 1968: notes 1.51 and 52).

Śāntarakṣita reformulates this source in accordance with his point, namely that even a conceptual cognition can be said to be distinct, and says—on the basis of PS I 7ab—that Dignāga taught that a cognition is indistinct, i.e. not a perception, as far as it rests on conceptual constructions, but not as far as its own division into the two parts of an awareness of its objective and subjective parts or even into the three parts of object, subject and self-awareness (cf. above note 36) is concerned.