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# APROPOS OF LINDTNER'S TWO NEW WORKS OF DHARMAKĪRTI

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In two recent publications<sup>1</sup> Christian Lindtner has drawn our attention to "quotations from Dharmakīrti occurring in later philosophical works but not to be traced in any of his extant treatises".<sup>2</sup> These quotations which are to be found in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* of Bhavya<sup>3</sup>, in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasiddhi*.<sup>4</sup>, in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Kṣaṇabhāṅgādhyāya* and in various Jaina treatises have been attributed by Lindtner to two hitherto unknown works of Dharmakīrti, a *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*, on the basis of its mention in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, and a *Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā* on the basis of its mention in the *Tattvasiddhi*.

In view of these extant quotations the question of the authorship of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is irrelevant: what is important is the very existence of these and other quotations from Dharmakīrti which suggests that not all of Dharmakīrti's once extant philosophical works were transmitted or even generally preserved in the memory of his tradition. On another occasion I examined the possibility of tracing the reason for the classification of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika philosopher to one of these quotations, possibly from the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*.<sup>5</sup> The verses collected by Lindtner so far<sup>6</sup> and tentatively ascribed to the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* will probably be augmented by future research. It will be difficult to regard all of them as mere inexact variations of actually extant verses, although we know that some of Dharmakīrti's verses were changed intentionally, e.g. for polemical reasons, by later Jaina authors. A study of these fragments<sup>7</sup> will be attempted in the future and it is to be hoped that Lindtner's findings will increase the attention given to similar quotations and references to Dharmakīrti that cannot be located in his extant treatises. Here I would like to confine myself to the question of whether the *Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā*, one of the two new works newly ascribed by Lindtner to Dharmakīrti, can in fact be assumed to be by him. 1 be

A fragment and the title of a *Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā* by Dharmakīrti was found by Lindtner in the final parts of the *Tattvasiddhi*.<sup>8</sup> He edited the fragment (*yatra.....°āśrayeṇa*) determining its frame with the words *ācārya-Dharmakīrtipadair api Laukikapramāṇaparīkṣāyāṃ*, and says that "it is hardly possible to take this passage as a paraphrase as might perhaps be suggested by the Tibetan version".<sup>9</sup> For the Tibetan translation shows—as

Lindtner indicates—a terminative (.....*brtag par*) in the case of the assumed name of the text, and neither a translation corresponding to *iti* (e.g. *zes*) nor to a word of saying (e.g. *bsad pa*). I think, however, that the frame of this fragment has to be looked at in another way.

The absence of a Tibetan word translating *iti* at the end of the quotation does not pose a serious problem, although the many other quotations in this translation regularly end in *zes gsuñs pa*, when Sūtras or Tantras are quoted, or *zes bsad pa* when Ācāryas or Śāstras are quoted.<sup>10</sup> The *iti*, which is attested by the manuscripts, may have escaped the translators or may have been disregarded intentionally in view of the possibility that they took the text in question not as a literal quotation but rather as a paraphrase.

However the beginning of the text's frame would have to be interpreted quite differently to Lindtner's proposal. In accordance with the introductory mention of two other Ācāryas occurring earlier in the text which are parallel to the introduction of our text : *slob dpon chos kyi grags pa'i 'dal sñā nas kyis kyañ*, i.e. *ācārya-Dharmakīrtipādair api*, the name followed by *api* can be considered as a sufficient introduction for the following statement, be it a quotation or a mere paraphrase. The word of saying completing this elliptical introduction is lacking, of course, in the Tibetan translation, but not in the Sanskrit Mss. where the preceding part of the sentence, not adduced by Lindtner, ends in *uktam* (cf. the text below) which is to be constructed with *ācārya-Dharmakīrtipādair api*. Thus the word *laukikapramāṇaparīkṣāyām*, taken by Lindtner as the name of the source from which the following text had been quoted, could in fact also belong to this text as its first word.<sup>11</sup> The first sentence of the presumed quotation would then have to be read in a new way, i.e. as being introduced by a reference to the systematical frame within which the following statements have to be localized, and that frame is "an examination of the worldly valid cognitions".

A distinction between two types of valid cognition was formulated by Dharmakīrti at the very end of PVin I: an empirical one (*sāṃvṃyavahārika*) and a transcendental one (*pāramārthika*).<sup>12</sup> LINDTNER 1984 : 158f. gives an interesting and plausible explanation for the fact that Dharmakīrti prefers this terminology, and not the pair *laukikalokottara*. Then why would he speak of a *laukikapramāṇa* in the present case? The problem disappears when we assume that this term was not formulated by Dharmakīrti himself but by Śāntarakṣita who, as the author citing Dharmakīrti or referring to his words, uses a term synonymous to Dharmakīrti's term but thereby neglects the possibly different approach intended by Dharmakīrti's choice.

If we now look at the presumed quotation itself we have the choice of either taking the whole text up to *iti* as a quotation from a hitherto unknown text, to which Śāntarakṣita<sup>13</sup> added the systematical frame at the beginning, or taking the whole text as a reference to Dharmakīrti's and Dignāga's<sup>14</sup> positions as formulated by Śāntarakṣita himself. In the latter case only the final *iti* remains as a disturbing element. But not too much so, since it could either be taken as an *iti* of merely concluding value, simply emphasizing the conclusion of this reference, or as

the addition of a scribe who understood the preceding text as a quotation. In both cases the absence of the word in the Tibetan translation would be normal.<sup>15</sup> It is finally to be noted that none of the many quotations of verses from Tantras and Śāstras in this text is concluded by a quotative *iti*. Also some of the few prose quotations show no *iti* (K 5, 6; 14, 13), while others have it (K 5, 10; 6, 15; 8, 3). Thus the import of the presence or absence of an *iti* in our case for an argument in favour or against the preceding text's being a veritable quotation seems seriously decreased.

Looking at the text as a quotation would allow us to add another fragment to the small treasure of materials not to be found in Dharmakīrti's extant works and also attribute it tentatively to the enigmatic *Tattvanīṣkarṣa*, for the theme treated goes well with other materials collectable under this title.<sup>16</sup>

If, at the other hand, we look at it as a general paraphrase of a certain position of Dharmakīrti and Dignāga formulated by Śāntarakṣita, we have to indicate its sources in the works of these authors in as much detail as is possible with such general statements.<sup>17</sup>

In any case we have to deal with the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of this passage as well as with its translation because I believe that Lindtner's edition and interpretation can be improved upon.<sup>18</sup>

For the Sanskrit text I referred to the same two manuscripts that were used by Lindtner and to the edition of the Kameshwar Nath Mishra which is based on four further manuscripts too.<sup>19</sup> For the Tibetan text I used the Peking edition (P 4531, 40b9—41a4) and the Cone edition<sup>20</sup> (C 37a7—37b3). For the variants of the Narthang edition (N) I relied on the readings mentioned by Lindtner.

#### Sanskrit text :

*kiṃ ca nāmajātyādi<sup>a</sup>-kalpanāsamāropitam<sup>b</sup> arthānvayavyatirekānukāri<sup>c</sup> savikalpakam api<sup>d</sup> jñānam spaṣṭābham<sup>e</sup> uktam ācārya-Dharmakīrtipādair api—laukikapramāṇaparīkṣāyām<sup>f</sup> yatra grāhyagrāhakapratibhāsabhedenā<sup>g</sup> sanjāyate<sup>h</sup> tatrāspaṣṭābham<sup>i</sup> eva jñānam<sup>j</sup> spaṣṭābhatayābhāti. tadyathā nāmajātyādi<sup>k</sup>-kalpanārahitam<sup>l</sup> jñānam<sup>m</sup> spaṣṭābham<sup>n</sup> bhavati, grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittir<sup>o</sup>-bhedenā bhidyate. tena nāmajātyādikalpanām āśrityācāryeṇāpy<sup>o</sup> aspaṣṭābhatā darśitā, na grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittir<sup>p</sup>-bhedaśrayeṇa<sup>q</sup>-ti<sup>r</sup>.*

a °janyādi° AB.

b °kalpanāsamāropitam B : °kalpānām asamāropitam A (gha) : °kalpanāmāsamāropitam kha : °kalpanam samāropitam K.

c °āvyatirekānukāri K (cf. *ldog pa dan mthun pa*) : °āvyatirekāntakāri AB (kha, gha)

d savikalpakam api A, K : savikalpakapari° B.

- e *jñānam spaṣṭābham* AB : *śes pa mi gsal ba dan mñon par ldan pa yin te*<sup>21</sup> : *jñānam* [sic !] *aspaṣṭābham* K.
- f °*parikṣāyām* AB.
- g °*pratibhāsa*° corr. (not transl. into Tib.) : °*pratibhāsi*° AB : °*pratibhāso* K.
- h *saṃjāyate* corr. (Lindtner with *kun tu bskyed pa* NPC)<sup>22</sup> : *saṃjñāyate* AB, K
- i °*āspaṣṭābham* AB, K : *spaṣṭābham* Lindtner.
- j *tatra* : *de* Tib.; *aspaṣṭābham eva jñānam* not transl. into Tib.
- k *nājanyaḍi*° AB.
- l *jñānam* (K cf. *śes pa*) : *ajñānam* AB.
- m *spaṣṭābham* K (cf. *gsal bar snañ ba*) : *spaṣṭā* AB<sup>23</sup>.
- n °*saṃvitti*° is here not well translated by *rtog pa* which usually translates words for “conceptual constrution”, e.g. *kalpanā*. *rtogs pa* would be better.
- o *api* not transl. into Tib.
- p °*saṃvitti*° corr. (Lindtner), K : °*saṃvartti*° A : °*saṃvirtti*° B.
- q °*āśrayeṇe*° corr. (Lindtner), K : °*āśramene*° A : °*āśrayena* B.
- r *iti* not transl. into Tib.

### Tibetan text :

'on kyañ miñ dan rigs la sogs par<sup>a</sup> brtags pa' i don gyi<sup>b</sup> rjes su 'gro ba dan ldog pa dan mthun pa' i rnam par rtog pa dan bcas pa' i śes pa mi gsal ba dan mñon par ldan pa yin te / slob dpon chos kyi grags pa' i 'al sna nas kyis kyañ' jig rten pa' i tshad ma brtag par<sup>c</sup> gañ de<sup>24</sup> gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa' i dbye bas kun tu bskyed pa de<sup>25</sup> gsal bar snañ ba ñid du snañ ba ste<sup>d</sup> / 'di ltañ miñ dan rigs la sogs par brtags pa dan bral ba ñid kyi śes pa ni gsal bar snañ bar gyur pa yin no gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa' i rtog<sup>e</sup> pa' i dbye bas phye ba yin la / de bas na miñ dan rigs la sogs par brtags pa la brten te / slob dpon gyis<sup>26</sup> mi gsal ba ñid du bstan<sup>f</sup> te gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa yañ dag par rig pa' i dbye ba la brten pa ni ma yin no //

a *par* corr. : *pas* CP

b *gyi* P : *gyis* C

c *par* C : *par* / N (?) P

d *de gsal bar snañ ba ñid du snañ ba ste* NP : *gsal bar snañ ste* C

e *rtogs* would be preferable

f *bstan* C : *bsten* NP

### Translation :<sup>27</sup>

“Moreover, that even a conceptual cognition which superimposed conceptual constructions such as name and genus (and) agrees in presence and absence with something, has a

distinct appearance,<sup>28</sup> has been said by the reverend teacher Dharmakīrti too : Insofar as the worldly valid cognitions (*laukikapramāṇa*) are examined,<sup>29</sup> when<sup>30</sup> [cognition] occurs as divided into the reflection (*pratibhāsa*)<sup>31</sup> of an [objective part which is] grasped and a [subjective part which is] grasping,<sup>32</sup> then even a cognition of indistinct appearance shines as distinctly appearing.<sup>33</sup> To wit.: A cognition devoid of conceptual constructions such as name and genus has a distinct appearance;<sup>34</sup> it is [nevertheless]<sup>35</sup> differentiated as divided into the awareness<sup>36</sup> of the grasped and the grasping.<sup>37</sup> Therefore the teacher (Dignāga) has also<sup>38</sup> shown that [a cognition] when it rests upon conceptual constructions such as name and genus is of indistinct appearance,<sup>39</sup> but not in that it rests upon the division into the awareness of the grasped and the grasping.<sup>40</sup>

The whole passage can thus be accounted for even when we understand it not as a quotation from an unknown work of Dharmakīrti, but rather as a paraphrase in general formulations given by Śāntarakṣita with regard to a certain tenet of Dharmakīrti and Dignāga. Thus it does not seem necessary to interpret the expression *laukikapramāṇaparīkṣā* as the title of a hitherto unknown work by Dharmakīrti.

#### Abbreviations and recurring literature

C	Cone
TSi	Tattvasiddhi : P 4531
N	Narthaṅg
P	Peking
PS I	Pramāṇasamuccaya, first chapter. In HATTORI 1968
PV	Pramāṇavārtika : <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtika with a commentary by Manorathanandin</i> . Ed. RĀHULA SĀṆKR̥TYĀYANA. Patna 1938-40 [but the verses are counted with Vetter according to the tables in VETTER 1964 : 116f]
PVBh	<i>Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtikam)</i> . Ed. RĀHULA SĀṆKR̥TYĀYANA. Patna 1953.
PVin I	Pramāṇaviniścaya, Kapitel I : TILMANN VETTER, <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1. Kapitel : Pratyakṣam, Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung</i> . Wien 1966.
HATTORI 1968	<i>Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions</i> . Translated and annotated by MASAOKI HATTORI. Cambridge, Massachusetts.

- JAMBŪVIJAYA 1981 MUNI JAMBŪVIJAYA, Jainācārya-Śrī-Hemacandrasūrimukhyaśiṣ-  
yābhyām ācārya-Rāmacandra-Guṇacandrābhyām viracitāyām Drav-  
yālāṅkāra-svopajña-tīkāyām Bauddhagranthebhya uddhṛtāḥ / Studien  
zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf.  
Hrsg. KLAUS BRUHN u. ALBRECHT WEZLER. Wiesbaden.
- LINDTNER 1980 Apropos Dharmakīrti—Two New Works and a New Date, *Acta  
Orientalia* 41, 27-37.
- LINDTNER 1984 Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II, *WZKS* 28,  
(149-175) 160-162.
- VETTER 1964 TILMANN VETTER, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*, Wien.
- VETTER 1966 PVin I —translation : cf PVin I

## REFERENCES &amp; NOTES

1. LINDTNER 1980 and 1984.
2. LINDTNER 1984 : 162.
3. Peking edition No. 5254. For the question of the authorship of this text cf. DAVID SEYFORTH RUEGG, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden 1981 : 66 and note 339; CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, "Adversaria Buddhica", *WZKS* 26, 1982, (167-194) 174-182 and 182-184 for the arguments of Ejima Yasunori; D. SEYFORTH RUEGG, "Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School", in : *Indology and Buddhist Studies, Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. by L.A. HERCUS a.o., Canberra 1982, (505-530) 530. D. Seyforth Ruegg further presented a paper at the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Leiden 1987, "The literary-historical problem of Bhāvaviveka / Bhavya" (to be published by Brill 1988 ?) in which he draws attention to a number of arguments against an early date for the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.
4. TSi : Peking edition No. 4531. Editions of the Sanskrit text of the *Tattvasiddhi* are announced as forthcoming by Lindtner (LINDTNER 1980 : note 33) and by Kameshwar Nath Mishra, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath (in a paper read at the VIth World Sanskrit Conference, Philadelphia 1985). Lindtner has promised to present the evidence for the authenticity of the *Tattvasiddhi* as a work of Śāntarakṣita in the introduction to his edition.

Prof. Kameshwar Nath Mishra's edition has already been composed in Devanāgarī and a copy of his text (29 pages) was put at my disposal for which I would like to express my sincere gratitude.

5. "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika ?" (Paper read at the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Leiden 1987. To be published by Brill 1988 ?)
6. LINDTNER 1980 : 29, 31 and 1984 : 160f. and note 36.
7. No fragment in prose, except for the one examined below, has been found to my knowledge.
8. LINDTNER 1980 : 33-37.
9. LINDTNER 1980 : 35.
10. Cf. *slob dpon Nāgārdzuna' i 'zal sñā nas kyañ ..... 'zes bśad pa dañ /* TSi 30b 4f., or : *'Phags pa' i lhas kyañ ..... 'zes bśad pa yin no //* TSi 31b 4f = K 5, 6 : *punaś cōktam ācārya-Nāgārjunapādaiḥ* ....., and K 7, 14f. : *uktañ ca Āryadevena*.....In neither case is an additional mention of their works given.
11. It is also interesting to note that the *śad (dañda)* after the word *'jig rten pa' i tshad ma bṛtag par* in the Peking (and Narthang ?) edition is absent in the Cone (and Derge ?) edition.
12. PVin I 100, 20-24. The Sanskrit fragment for the passage PVin I 100, 14-24 was identified in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhūṣ 57, 14-19) in LINDTNER 1984 : 156f. and by YAMAKAMI SHŌDŌ ("Nyāyabhūṣaṇa no kenkyū (1)", *Kyōto Sangyō Daigaku Ronshū* 14, 1984, [134-167] 136f.). A fragment of Dharmottara's commentary was found by Muni Jambūvijaya in the *Dravyālaṃkārasvopajñāṭikā* (JAMBŪVIJAYA 1981 : 137; also quoted in LINDTNER 1984 : note 23).
13. Or even by Dharmakīrti himself, but then Lindtner's suggestion for an explanation of the different terminology would be invalid or could be upheld only when we assume a historical change in Dharmakīrti's attitude without, however, being able to prove it.
14. The second part of the passage refers to Dignāga. This reference must then again be taken as one made by Dharmakīrti or directly by Śāntarakṣita.
15. In the former case, because this kind of *iti* is often not translated, and in the latter, because the copy used by the translators did not have the *iti*.
16. Cf. LINDTNER 1984 : 161f.; it would be the only fragment in prose, however, found so far.
17. This will be done in my notes on the translation below.
18. Mainly because Lindtner in his attempt to make sense of the passage, used not only the Tibetan text to emend the Sanskrit text, but also corrected the Tibetan text with the help of the Sanskrit text. We all do this, of course, but with some restraint and not when the received Tibetan text as such makes sense, or when it is clear that something else has been translated or that something has been translated incorrectly. In my edition below I shall refer to Lindtner's textual proposals as well.
19. I would like to thank Christian Lindtner very much for putting copies of the relevant folios at my disposal. Ms. A means folio 106a 1-4 (the Ms. referred to by Lindtner) and

Ms. B means folio 19b 1-4. K means the text as edited by Kameshwar Nath Mishra (p. 26, 7-14) with variants indicated in his footnotes from his Mss. kha, gha. I added these variants in brackets not being able to identify for certain the Mss. with those of Lindtner's at the moment.

20. Microfiche edition of The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, Vol. 206, Tsu 26a 7-38b6.
21. Tib. *mñon par ldan pa* I do, however, not understand.
22. Cf. also *skye ba* in the formulation of PVin I 88, 12f. : *gañ dag gi blo ñid gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa' i rnam pa ñe bar ston par skye ba.....*
23. Lindtner corrects *spaṣṭam bhavati*, but the Ms. reading *spaṣṭā bhavati* must be taken as a haplography for *spaṣṭābham bhavati*.
24. According to PC; Lindtner gives *ña* as the reading of N, but this must be simply an unclear carving or printing of *de*. Lindtner proposes a correction *la* : *de* in accordance with his reading *yatra*. But the Tibetan translates rather *yat tat* instead.
25. Lindtner corrects *de la* and adds *śes pa ni* in accordance with the reading *tatra* and with the words *spaṣṭābham eva jñānam*, not accounting for *spaṣṭābham eva*, however.
26. Lindtner adds *kyañ* for *api* of the Mss.
27. In translating, especially the various terms, I follow Lindtner's words as far as possible.
28. This statement, that conceptual cognition which is normally of indistinct appearance can said to be distinct in a certain sense, corresponds exactly to the meaning of the reference to Dignāga below. The Tibetan translation has *mi gsal ba dañ mñon par ldan pa yin* for the predicate *spaṣṭābham* and seems to misunderstand Śāntarakṣita's intention in favour of the more evident theorem. But I do not understand the second part of the Tibetan predicate.
29. This would be stated by Śāntarakṣita in order to indicate the frame of reference for the following general paraphrase of Dharmakīrti's tenets in support of his statement that even a conceptual cognition (*savikalpakam api jñānam*) is of distinct appearance (*spaṣṭābham*). Dharmakīrti's position is only meaningful as far as the worldly valid cognition is concerned, for the dichotomy of "grasped and grasping" is left behind when the transcendental cognition (*pāramārthikam pramānam*) comes into focus (cf. LINDTNER 1984 : 157f.).
30. That is in the case of Yogin having brought his meditation upon a real or unreal object to perfection (cf. PV II 285). Tib *gañ de* would be "whatever" and seems to translate the generalized relative pronoun *yat tat* ("every"). It is quite possible that this is the better reading which was corrupted into *yatra* which then motivated the change to *tatra* below, for which Tib. has only *de* for a possible *tat* or even *tat tat*.
31. °*pratibhasibheda*° of the Mss. ("a division which reflects", Lindtner) is odd, because the division itself does not reflect, i.e. lit. "have reflections".



32. Cf. PVin I 88, 12f. : *gañ dag gi blo ñid gzuñ ba dag 'dzin pa' i rnam pa ñe bar ston par skye ba.....*
33. Śāntarakṣita's formulation, that a cognition occurs as divided into its objective and subjective parts, means that only its nature is referred to. And this nature (*svarūpa*) cannot be connoted by words (*śabdārtha*). The cognition of its own nature is therefore direct (*adhyakṣa*), i.e. with distinct appearance (*spaṣṭābha*). This is also the case when we refer to a conceptual cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*), which as such, i.e. as conceptualizing an object (*artha*), is of indistinct appearance.

Śāntarakṣita paraphrases here PV II 287 which is Dharmakīrti's formulation of the idea of Dignāgas PS I 7ab (cf. below note 40). In these statements both authors seem to give an answer to the question how the originally conceptual cognitions of a Yogin can attain the quality of distinctness through the force of a perfect meditation (cf. Prajñākaragupta's introduction PVBh 331, 11-22). And Dharmakīrti says : *śabdārtahagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānam tatra kalpanā / svarūpañ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'khilam //* (PV II 287)= "A cognition which grasps the connotation of a word with regard to a certain (object) is with regard to this (object) a conceptual construction. But the nature [of this conceptual cognition] is not connoted by words. Therefore this whole (cognition) is direct with regard to this (its own nature)."

34. With regard to the character of distinct appearance (*spaṣṭābhabhāsitva*) in a cognition as being in opposition to its conceptuality PV III 498ab may be adduced : *tasya spaṣṭābhabhājitvam jalpasamsarginaḥ kutaḥ* /="How could this (conceptual cognition) which is connected with words have a distinct appearance ?" and PV III 283ab from Dharmakīrti's explanation of yogic perception : *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphuṭārthābhabhāsītā* /="There is no distinct appearance of something in a (cognition) that is connected with conceptual construction."

Distinctness and the absence of conceptual construction are closely connected in Dharmakīrti's concept of perception (*pratyakṣa*) : cf. PVin I 40, 2 for the definition of perception and PVin I 28 for the distinct cognition of the Yogin as a kind of perception (cf. also VETTER 1966 : 23f.). For conceptual construction cf. PVin I 4bc, the source of the examples "name, genus etc." is PS I 3d.

35. The Tibetan translation connects this sentence with the following, but in analogy to the full reference to Dignāga following, an antithetical connection with the preceding sentence is preferable (cf. also Lindtner's translation with "but.....").
36. The Tibetan translation with *rtog pa* is problematic. If corrected into *rtogs pa* we may assume a word that can be synonymous with *saṃvitti*, but I can offer nothing as supported by the relevant source.

For the two parts cf. e.g. PV III 320a : *tasmād dvirūpam asty ekam* and the source of these two forms of cognitions in Dignāga's PS I 11ab with the *Vṛtti* (cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.61).

It is also possible that all three parts of a cognition, i.e. objective and subjective parts and selfawareness are indicated here (cf. PV III 353 and 357, VETTER 1964 : 82), but this would be contrary to the Tibetan translation and of no import for the meaning of the reference in Śāntarakṣita's context.

Śāntarakṣita's paraphrase of Dharmakīrti's standpoint ends here in my opinion. The following sentence adds a reference to Dignāga as a second support for his intentions and does not have to be taken as a reference to Dignāga made by Dharmakīrti himself, as according to Lindtner.

*api* is not translated into Tibetan.

To my knowledge Dignāga does not consider the concept of distinctness (*spaṣṭābhata*) in his presentation of the terms of relevance here. It seems that Śāntarakṣita—following Dharmakīrti—equates Dignāga's predication that some sort of cognition "is a perception" (*pratyakṣa*)-e.g. *yatraiṣā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam* at the end of his *Vṛtti* on PS I 3d (cf. HATTORI 1968 : 25 and note 1.30)—as equivalent with the predication that "it is of distinct appearance", thus identifying the concept of being a distinct cognition with that of being a perception.

In this way he can refer to several statements of Dignāga, where perception is defined as nonconceptual, e.g. PS I 3c (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.25), then the sentence adduced above and the end of his *Vṛtti* on PS I 5 (*sarve tv avikalpakā eva*, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.44).

The whole paraphrase refers to PS I 7ab and its *Vṛtti*, where Dignāga states that even a conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) is aware of itself and that this awareness is perception (*kalpanāpi svasamvittāvīṣṭā*, cf. HATTORI 1968 : note 1.51). But this is not the case when an external object is conceptualized, i.e. connected with name, genus etc. (*nārthe, vikalpanāt*, cf. HATTORI 1968 : notes 1.51 and 52).

Śāntarakṣita reformulates this source in accordance with his point, namely that even a conceptual cognition can be said to be distinct, and says—on the basis of PS I 7ab—that Dignāga taught that a cognition is indistinct, i.e. not a perception, as far as it rests on conceptual constructions, but not as far as its own division into the two parts of an awareness of its objective and subjective parts or even into the three parts of object, subject and selfawareness (cf. above note 36) is concerned.