

Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā of Śubhagupta

Masaaki Hattori

In his *History of Indian Logic*, S. C. Vidyabhusana gave the Sanskr̥t name for Dge-sruṅs, the author of the *Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā* and four other treatises preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, as Kalyānagupta; while he identified Śubhagupta, who is called a follower of Dharmakīrti (*vārttikānūsārin*) by Haribhadrasūri, with Śubhākaragupta who flourished late in the 11th century. This theory, however, was criticised by B. Bhattacharya in the ~~the~~ foreword of G. O. S. edition of the *Tattva-saṃgraha*. He set forth the opinion that Haribhadrasūri must have referred to Bhadanta Śubhagupta, whose views were mentioned several times in the *Bahir-artha-parīkṣā* of the *Tattva-saṃgraha*, and doubted whether Śubhākaragupta, who was a Tāntrika, ever wrote any work on logic wherein he closely followed Dharmakīrti. Y. Miya-saka has recently disclosed, in his article on Śubhagupta's theory of the word, the view that Dge-sruṅs must be the Tibetan name for Śubhagupta.⁽¹⁾ His view is grounded on 1) that 'dge' is considered as an equivalent for 'śubha', 2) that Śubhagupta's theory of 'conventional designation' (*saṃketa*) alluded to by Haribhadrasūri is similar to Dge-sruṅs' theory expounded in his *Śruti-parīkṣā-kārikā* and 3) that Śubhākaragupta cannot be referred to by Haribhadrasūri, who, according to the recognized theory set up by H. Jacobi, is assigned to ca. 750 A. D. The writer of the present paper agrees with Y. Miya-saka in regarding Dge-sruṅs and Śubhagupta as being the same person, for this view can be verified by identifying quotations from Bhadanta Śubhagupta in the *Bahir-artha-parīkṣā* of the *Tattva-saṃgraha* (*-pañjika*) with verses in the *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā* of Dge-sruṅs. The writer has prepared the following list of identification. (Skt.: *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Tib.:

(1) Śubhagupta no Kotoba-ron, *Chizan Gakuho*, No. 22, pp. 54-55.

Bāhyārthasiddhi-k., Pek. Ed., Mdo-hgrel, CXII):

- 1) dhī-mātratve^(1') saṃsādhaye..... (p. 582, 1-2) = k. 25 (201 a, 3): blo tsam ñid du.....
- 2) tulyāpara-kṣaṇōtpādād..... (p. 552, 6-7), cf. k. 31 (201 a, 8): ḥdra baḥi skad cig.....
- 3) pratyeka-paramāṇūnām..... (p. 551, 21-22) = k. 40 (201 b, 6): rdul phran rnamś.....
- 4) Bhadanta-Śubhaguptas tv āha.....kevalam aṇava eva.....na sāvayavatvam.
(p. 556, 16 ff), cf. k. 42 (201 b, 7): de phyir phyogs chaḥi.....
- 5) nānyo 'sti grāhako.....⁽²⁾ (p. 569, 14-15) = k. 62 (202 b, 4-5): śes pa las gšan.....
- 6) punaḥ sa ev'āha—athā saha-śabda eka-kāla vivakṣayā..... (p. 567, 25 ff), cf. k. 64
(202 b, 6): dus gcig tu ni.....
- 7) saha-śabdaś ca loke.....⁽³⁾ (p. 567, 17-18) = k. 67 (202 b, 8): ḥjig rten ḥdi na.....
- 8) yadā ca sarva-prāṇabhṛtām.....⁽⁴⁾ (p. 568, 1-2), cf. k. 69 (203 a, 1-2): gal te thams
cad.....
- 9) kiṃ cānyōpalambha..... (p. 568, 2-7), cf. k. 70 (203 a, 2-3) gšan kyis dmigs pa.....
- 10) pūrvikaiva tu.....⁽⁵⁾ (p. 569, 15-16) = k. 77 (203 a, 6-7): gaṇ gis lhan cig.....
- 11) syād etat—na hi mukhyato yādṛśam..... (p. 570, 18 ff), cf. k. 80-81 (203 a, 8-b, 2):
śes pa myoñ bar.....
- 12) sākāra-jñāna-pakṣe..... (p. 570, 23-24) = k. 83 (203 b, 3): śes pa rnam bcas.....
- 13) katham tad-grāhakam..... (p. 561, 11-12) = k. 85 (203 b, 4-5): de ḥdzin byed de.....
- 14) sākāram tan nirākāram..... (p. 573, 7-8) = k. 91 (203 b, 8): rnam pa bcas sam.....
- 15) sa hy āha—yathaiva bhavatām vijñāna-vādinām..... (p. 572, 10-12), cf. k. 97
(204 a, 4-5): ji ltar khyod kyi.....
- 16) atra Bhadanta-Śubhaguptaḥ pramāṇayati—yo jñāna-ākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati
..... (p. 574, 20-22), cf. k. 7 (200 a, 5) śes pa mi bslu.....

The *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-kārika* consists of 183 couplets. Judging from the fact that prose fragments commencing with “*Bhadanta Śubhaguptas tv āha...*” etc. are often quoted by Kamalaśīla, it appears that there was originally its prose commentary, which, however, was not translated into Tibetan. It is quite obvious that this treatise is intended for refuting the Vijñānavāda theory and proving the objective reality of external object. It

(1') Text reads 'tvena

(2) For jñānāc cākṣuṣair read jñānan nākṣa-dhir.

(3) For loke 'nyon ('syān) naivānena (-ānyena) vinā read loke 'smin naivānyena vinā.

(4) Text reads sattvaṃ prāṇa-, perhaps incorrectly.

(5) For prajñānam read sajjānam.

starts with stating the Vijñānavāda doctrine that the object of eyes and other senses does not exist in the external world independently of the consciousness, just as the object seen in a dream or the second moon seen by those who are afflicted with eye-disease are not really existent, and this doctrine is criticized through various arguments. It is noteworthy that Śubhagupta evidently directs his attack toward the views of Vasubandhu and Dignāga. In the *Vimśatika-vijñaptimātrata-siddhi*, realists assail the Vijñānavādins, arguing that if the object were not real, then our purposive action tending toward it would not be fulfilled, as for instance we cannot be satisfied with meals and drinks seen in a dream. In vindication of the Vijñānavāda theory, Vasubandhu, citing an instance of nocturnal emission which is caused in spite of the absence of real woman, asserts that an action toward the object is possible even though the object is unreal.⁽⁶⁾ This thought of Vasubandhu is retorted by Śubhagupta. ^{The latter} ~~He~~ is of the opinion that the reality of an external object is proved not through the fulfilment of an action tending toward it, but through the ascertainment of the object (*arthaniscaya*). Man can act upon an illusory cognition, but he can not get then the ascertainment of the object. It might be argued that a man would not discharge semen during a dream if he had not ascertained that he is with a woman. In anticipation of this argument, Śubhagupta states that the seminal emission is the result of the carnal desire which may be aroused whether there is a real object or not. If it should be maintained that an object is unreal, then the object seen in a dream would not be distinguished from the object seen through the actual sense, both being existent only in the consciousness. But the fact is that a man does not find the child whom he got in a dream, while, if he really got a child, he can ascertain its objective reality.⁽⁷⁾ The above arguments are recognized as being levelled against Vasubandhu's theory.

Śubhagupta holds the view that the external object is the union of atoms.

(6) Cf. *Vimśatika*, k. 4 & Comm.

(7) Cf. *Bahyārtha-siddhi-k.*, kk. 124-133 (205 a, 6-b, 4).

As an atom does not exist⁽⁸⁾ independently by itself, a single atom can never be reflected in the image. We recognize the union⁽⁹⁾ of many homogeneous atoms as a single substance, just as we form the idea of continuance on really a series of similar moments. In the course of his discussion on atoms, Śubhagupta refers to the following view:—the presentation of a certain form is not produced from *that* (=external object), because (the external object which is supposed to have a visible form)⁽¹⁰⁾ is not a real substance. This is exactly the Dignāga's view set forth in his criticism of the Vasubandhu's definition of perception as being produced by that external object⁽¹¹⁾ (*tato'rthād vijñānam pratyakṣam*). A visible object must be the aggregation of many atoms, but, according to Dignāga, the aggregation is able to be apprehended by unifying through the conceptual construction a multiplicity of perception produced by each of its constituents. Hence, being a product of the conceptual construction, the aggregation is not a real substance and is incapable of producing the mental reflex of its own form. Śubhagupta contradicts the above-stated view of Dignāga, asserting that the aggregation of atoms is to be regarded as a simple substance existing objectively.⁽¹²⁾ His theory may well be identified with the realist doctrine ascribed to Vāgbhaṭa⁽¹³⁾ in the *Ālambana-parīkṣa-ṭīkā* of Vinitadeva.

As stated above, Śubhagupta is called by Haribhadrāsūri a follower of Dharmakīrti. However, the following is mentioned evidently in opposition to Dharmakīrti's theory:—there is no apprehender other than the cognition, and the cognition through senses is not produced without an object; it is on this ground that the blue (object) and its cognition are considered as being apprehended together (*saha-samvitti*) and not on the ground of their

(8) *ibid.*, k. 40 (201 b, 6).

(9) *ibid.*, kk. 31-32 (201 a, 8-b, 1).

(10) *ibid.*, k. 34 (201 b, 2).

(11) *Ālambana-parīkṣa, k. 2a = Pramāṇasamuccaya*, I, k. 16 a: yad-ābhāsā na sā tasmāt. cf. M. Hattori,

Dignāga no Chishiki-ron, *Tetsugaku Kenkū*, No. 463, Chap. IV, note 12.

(12) *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-k.*, kk. 35-36 (201 b, 2-4).

(13) Cf. S. Yamaguchi, *Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimai* p. 451.

(14) non-difference. In the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, Dharmakīrti propounds the theory that [proposition:] the blue (object) and its cognition are not different, [reason:] because they are invariably found together (*sahôpalambha-niyama*)⁽¹⁵⁾. Śubhagupta examines the meaning of the term 'together' (*saha*). If it is taken as implying simultaneity (*eka-kala*), then the reason is inconclusive, for the Buddha's intellect is not without a difference from the mind of living beings, although the former is operative simultaneously with the latter, or the mind is considered as being different from other subordinate mental activities which operate simultaneously with it.⁽¹⁶⁾ If, on the other hand, the term 'together' is to mean the sameness, then the reason is contradictory, because it is generally admitted that the term 'together' presupposes 'difference' (*anya*)⁽¹⁷⁾. Moreover, we should recognize the fact that the object which is cognized by one person is cognized also by another. Accordingly, if the term 'together' is interpreted as 'one' (*eka*) in the sense of 'by one person', then the reason is inadmissible (*asiddha*). Even when 'one' is taken in the sense of 'as one', the reason contradicts the fact that the omniscience who has insight into the minds of all living beings does not regard them 'as one'.

We have to omit, in this short paper, to enter further into details of the arguments developed in the *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā*. It, however, should not be overlooked that Śubhagupta's interpretation of '*sahôpalambha-niyama*' as the necessary relation of the cognition with the external object is undoubtedly realistic, while the above-mentioned theory of Dharmakīrti is probative of his being a Vijñānavādin. We learn from this fact that Śubhagupta was not a faithful successor of Dharmakīrti's thought. It seems likely that Śubhagupta was a teacher of Dharmottara,⁽¹⁸⁾ for the latter

(14) *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-k.*, k. 62 (202 b, 4-5).

(15) Pek. Ed. Mdo-hgrel XCV, 263 b, 4-5: lhan cig dmigs pa ñes pañi phyir // sñō (=sñon) dañ de blo gñan ma yin / cf. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, Govt. Or. Ser., p. 32: sahôpalambha-niyamād abhedo nila-tad-dhiyoñ /

(16) *Bāhyārtha-siddhi-k.*, k. 64 (202 b, 6).

(17) *ibid.*, kk. 67-69 (202 b, 8-203 a, 2).

(18) Cf. Vidyabhusana, *Hist. of Ind. Logic*, p. 328.

and his successors are known to have interpreted Dharmakīrti's theory from the Sautrāntika viewpoint; but no conclusive evidence in support of the *guru-śiṣya* relation between the two has been obtained so far. All we can say quite safely is that Śubhagupta flourished after Dharmakīrti and before Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadrasūri: that is to say, his date can be fixed at ca. 650-750 A. D.

While this paper was being printed, I was presented by Dr. E. Frauwallner with an article published in WZKSOA, Bd. I, a footnote of which urged me to refer to his another article "*Dignāga und anderes*" published in the *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*. He proved therein already the identity of Śubhagupta with Dge-sruṅs, basing upon the same sources that I made reference to. I regret for my inattention to this article. However, the list of identification and brief accounts of Śubhagupta's arguments, which were left unpublished by Dr. Frauwallner, may not be of no value.