BHARTRHARI'S FAMILIARITY WITH JAINISM*

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In memory of my teacher Dr. L. van Daalen

0.0 In comparison with many authors of Indian philosophical texts, Bhartrhari is remarkably non-polemic. His attitude, both in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā and in the Vākyapadīya, may be described not only as 'encyclopedic', in the sense that he seems to be eager to discuss all important views on a certain subject, but also as 'perspectivistic', in the sense that he seems to acknowledge that each view represents a possible and in its own theoretical context valid perspective.¹ Different views are enumerated and contrasted, and sometimes positively or negatively reassessed, but hardly ever fully rejected.²

Bhartrhari refers to the different views in a very concise way, and for modern students of his works the precise identity of those who held the views remains often unclear. Of those (apart from grammarians, and authors of

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See my article "Bhartrhari's Perspectivism (1): The Vrtti and Bhartrhari's Perspectivism in the first Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya" (forthcoming, b) for a provisionary discussion of Bhartrhari's perspectivism. I hope to discuss it in a philosophically more comprehensive way in a future article.

² Cf. Houben, 1992: 23-24. K.A.S. Iyer speaks of Bhartṛhari's "spirit of accommodation" (K.A.S. Iyer, *Bhartṛhari*, a Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries, Poona, 1969:75-82).

Sikṣā and Nirukta) whose views Bhartrhari frequently takes up for discussion, K.A. Subramania Iyer has mentioned Vaiśeṣikas, Mimāmsakas, Sāmkhyas and Buddhists (Iyer, 1969:72). Iyer has not mentioned the Jainas, and one may wonder whether they remained outside the scope of Bhartrhari's encyclopedic approach. This, however, is not the case. Bhartrhari is aware of Jaina philosophers and refers to them explicitly in at least one place in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā. Other passages in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā and Vākyapadīya are remarkably well compatible with Jaina ideas. They may have been intended as references to their views, although their name is not explicitly mentioned.

As is well known, the early Jainas wrote their scriptures in Ardhamāgadhī, and they attributed to this language a high status. Still, at a certain point in their tradition they started to write also in Sanskrit. One of the is the Sanskrit Tattvārthasūtra works in earliest Jaina Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (TS), which may have been written not long before Bhartrhari.³ In the Jaina tradition the TS was to acquire an important position as a basic text accepted and commented upon by both the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras. We may assume that Bhartrhari, as a Sanskrit grammarian, was more familiar with this Jaina work in Sanskrit than with the earlier works in Ardhamāgadhī.

0.1 In this paper, without aiming completeness, I will discuss a few indications and possible indications of Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism in the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā (MBhD) and Vākyapadīya (VP), including two places in VP Kāṇḍa 2 which seem to refer to a technicality in Jainendra-vyākaraṇa. This would show that Bhartrhari was not only familiar with the Jaina doctrines, but also with their literature in the field of grammar. Finally, in the concluding section I will mention some possible implications of

Neither in the case of the author of the TS nor in the case of Bhartrhari is it possible to give a definite date. According to Zydenbos Umāsvāti's commentary on the TS was probably written in the fifth century, while the Sūtra-text must have originated still earlier (Zydenbos, 1983:12). See also Bronkhorst, 1985. As for Bhartrhari, "If reliable information about Bhartrhari's life is not available, his date is not definitely known either" (Iyer, 1969:2). Still, Bhartrhari must have preceded Dinnāga (cf. Iyengar (1951) and Jambuvijaya (1954:230)). Frauwallner has proposed as the date of Bhartrhari 450-510 A.D. and of Dinnāga 480-540 A.D (Frauwallner, 1959:83ff, 1961:125); cf. also Sadhu Ram (1952), and Scharfe (1977:170).

Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism for our understanding of Bhartrhari's perspectivism and his philosophy of language.

- 1.1.1 The Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā refers to the Jainas by the name of 'followers of the Arhat' in MBhD 1:19.11. Bhartṛhari starts to discuss the following phrase in the Mahābhāṣya: siddhā dyauḥ siddhā pṛthivī siddham ākāsam. His first remark on this phrase is: ārhatānāṁ mīmāṁsakānāṁ ca naivāsti vināsa⁴ eṣām. "For the followers of the Arhat and the Mīmāṁsakas there is no destruction of these (namely heaven, earth and the intermediate space)."
- 1.1.2 The TS chapters 3 and 4 discuss the Jaina views on the three lokaregions, lower, middle and heavenly. The different living beings and their lifetimes in these regions are described in detail, but nothing is said about a complete destruction of the loka itself. Chapter 5 discusses the substances recognized by the Jainas, namely dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala, (together constituting ajīva) and as the fifth jīva, the soul. These substances are considered to be permanent (TS 5.1-3). The specific Jaina view on what is real and their view on permanence is discussed in TS 5.29-30.5 From the different statements referred to above it can be inferred that the author of the TS, although he did not do so explicitly and did not use the terms used in the MBh, rejected a complete destruction of heaven, earth, and intermediate space. In this respect he did not deviate from the earlier, canonical texts.6
- 1.2.1 Here, we should also mention MBhD 1:16.28-29, which forms part of an enumeration of different views on what a permanent śabda would mean: kecid evaṁ manyante | ya evaite prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ ta evaite nityāḥ | prakṛtau bhavāḥ prākṛtāḥ. Joshi and Roodbergen translate this as follows: "Some think like this: Those words only, which are prākṛta 'original' are eternal. (The word) prākṛtāḥ (is derived in the sense of) prakṛtau bhavāḥ 'arising from the origin' (pl. nom. masc.)" (Joshi-Roodbergen, 1986:86-87). In a note they add:

Delete the visarga of *vināsaḥ* in the MBhD (cf. MS, reproduced in Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1980: p. 8, section a, line 4).

TS 5. 29: utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat; 5.30: tadbhāvāvyayam nityam: "That which is associated with (the three features) origination, destruction and permanence is sat 'real'. That which does not deviate from its essence is permanent."

Cf. Dixit, 1971, p. 33 (in a section devoted to the Bhagavati-sūtra): "In the field of cosmography some of the most basic Jaina positions are that *loka* (world) has got a particular shape, that *loka* is surrounded by *aloka* (non-world), that *loka* and *aloka* are two beginningless and endless entities."

"The opinion referred to may be that of Jaina grammarians who wanted to upgrade the status of Ardhamagadhi, their canonical language, as against Sanskrit" (Joshi-Roodbergen, 1986:86-87, note 315). Unfortunately, the reference in the MBhD is too short for a precise understanding of the view. It is nowhere said what the *prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ* are, nor what the *prakṛti* is from or in which they arise.⁷

1.2.2 Later Sanskrit and Prakrit grammarians used to derive the word prākrta as a designation of the Prakrit-languages mostly in the following way. The prākrta sabdāḥ or Prakrit words would derive from their basis, prakrti, which are the Sanskrit words. Sanskrit would thus be the eternal basis of all the Prakrit-languages, which developed from Sanskrit. This derivation would provide an answer to the question what the prākrtāḥ sabdāḥ are, and what the prakrti is, but not very satisfying ones. For, this way the view would be identical with the view which the MBhD mentions next, the view that there was an original, pure language (daivī vāk), which became spoiled by incompetent speakers in the course of time. A more important drawback of this interpretation is that the prakrti, namely the Sanskrit words are considered to be permanent (nitya), but not the prākrta-sabdāḥ derived from this basis, whereas it was said in the MBhD that the prākrta-sabdāḥ are 'permanent' (nitya).

1.2.3 From the 11th-century Jaina-scholar and commentator Namisādhu we know of quite a different explication of the word *prākṛta* as a designation of

VP 1.77-79 discuss the difference between prākṛta dhvani 'fundamental sound' and vaikṛta dhvani 'derivative sound'. In the Vṛtti and in Vṛṣabha's Paddhati it becomes clear that both are 'sound' as opposed to the meaningful śabda or sphoṭa. Vṛṣabha explains the idea of prākṛta dhvani as follows: dhvanisphoṭayoḥ pṛṭhaktvenānupalambhāt taṁ sphoṭaṁ taṣya dhvaneḥ prakṛtim iva manyante l tatra bhavaḥ prākṛtaḥ, "Because dhvani and sphoṭa are not perceived separately, people think the sphoṭa to be the basis of that (prākṛta) dhvani. Prākṛṭa (should be derived as) tatra bhavaḥ 'arising in that' (namely in the prakṛṭi, 'basis')." (Iyer, 1966:142, line 16-17). In this view, the prākṛṭa dhvani (which one may also call prākṛṭa śabda, śabda in the sense of 'sound' or 'phoneme') is not permanent (although its temporal distinctions are superimposed on the permanent śabda or sphoṭa). The reference in the MBhD to permanent prākṛṭāḥ śabdāḥ, therefore, cannot be a reference to this view of prākṛṭa dhvani.

E.g. Hemacandra (12th century A.D.), 1.1: Prakṛtiḥ saṁskṛtam; tatra bhavaṁ tata āgataṁ vā prākṛtam. For more quotations see Acharya, 1968:39; Pischel, 1981:1.

languages. According to his explanation, "prakṛti is the natural use of speech made by all beings of the world which is not refined by grammar etc.; that which is derived from this [prakṛti], or this [prakṛti] itself, is prākṛta." After giving a different possible etymology for prākṛta, according to which it would be that which is created first (prāk kṛta), Namisādhu goes on to explain how Prakṛti and Sanskrit are in his view related: "prākṛta is the speech easily intelligible to children, women etc., and the source of all other speeches. It is of a homogeneous character like rain falling from the clouds. That same speech, being differentiated according to differences in place and on account of refinement, obtains the subsequent divisions into sarṅskṛta and other speeches. For this reason, the author [Rudraṭa] first mentions [in śloka 2.12 of the Kāvyālarhkāra] Prākṛta and then Sarṅskṛta and other speeches. It is called Sarṅskṛta on account of being refined by Pāṇini and others, in the rules of their grammar." 10

1.2.4 With this interpretation we would get a sensible alternative view on the permanence of \$abda\$, suitable to the context of Bhartrhari's enumeration. The prākṛtāḥ \$abdāḥ are what we would call Prakrit words; the prakṛti from or in which they arise is the natural speech of the common people. The prākṛtāḥ \$abdāḥ are in this view not derived but original, and may be considered permanent, not in an absolute, metaphysical sense, but in the sense that they are naturally spoken by common people. Finally, the non-eternal counterparts of these prākṛtāḥ \$abdāḥ are the refined, saṁskṛta words regulated by grammatical rules, and other derived speech varieties. The view which thus comes to the fore is sufficiently distinct from the next view about the daivī vāk to deserve separate mentioning.¹¹

Namisādhu on Rudraṭa's Kāvyālamkāra 2.12: prākṛteti sakalajagajjantūnām vyākaraṇādibhir anāhitasamskāraḥ sahajo vacanavyāpāraḥ prakṛtiḥ, tatra bhavam saiva vā prākṛtam. (ed. R.D. Sukla, 1966:31; Cf. Acharya, 1968:40).

Namisādhu on Rudraţa's Kāvyālamkāra 2.12: prākṛtam bālamahilādisubodham sakalabhāṣānibandhanabhūtam vacanam ucyate meghanirmuktajalam ivaikarūpam | tad eva ca deśaviseṣāt samskārakaraṇāc ca samāsāditaviseṣām sat samskṛtādyuttaravibhedān āpnoti | ata eva sāstrakṛtā prākṛtam ādau nirdiṣṭam tad anu samskṛtādīni | pāṇinyādivyākaraṇoditasabdalakṣaṇena samskaraṇāt samskṛtam ucyate (ed. R.D. Sukla, 1966:31-32; Cf. Acharya, 1968:40). Kāvyālamkāra 2.12 enumerates different 'speeches' as follows: prākṛta-samskṛta-māgadha-pisācabhāṣās ca sūrasenī ca | ṣaṣṭho 'tra bhūribhedo deśaviseṣād apabhramsaḥ ||

Neither the view that Prakrit derives from Sanskrit, nor the opposite view can do full justice to the linguistic situation in ancient India (cf. Pischel, 1981, §§1-9, 16). By the time Namisādhu wrote

1.2.5 That we are probably on the right track in our attempt to reconstruct a more complete view on the basis of the few hints given in the MBhD becomes clear from another text which must have been later but still fairly close in time to the MBhD, namely the ancient Vrtti on the VP. The Vrtti on VP 1.182 (Iyer, 1966:234), explaining a view which according to the kārikā should be opposite to the 'daivī vāk'-view, says the following: 12

But those who propound the impermanent, who do not accept that correct words lead to *dharma* 'merit', (and who) consider the established fixity of correct forms to be similar to the conventions among wrestlers, say that the collection of correct [namely, Prakrit] words is *prākrta* in the sense of 'arising from the *prakrti*'. But later on a changed form [namely, Sanskrit] has been established, which was arrived at through accentuation and phonological and morphological modification 13 by persons with impaired understanding.

The view as explained here in the Vṛtti squares nicely both with the view explained by Namisādhu and the concise reference in the MBḥD. The interpretation of *prākṛta* as that which is derived from *saṃskṛta* would make little sense in either the view explained in the Vṛtti, or in the reference in the MBhD.

1.2.6 Neither in the MBhD nor in the VP-Vṛtti, is it clearly stated who the adherents to this view were. In the case of Namisādhu we know that he was a Jaina. In the MBhD, where the prākṛtāḥ śabdāḥ are said to be permanent, the reference may also be to the Jainas. The Vṛtti on VP 1.182, however, professes to explain the view of the anityadarśin-s mentioned in the verse. The word anityadarśin-s would rather suggest a reference to the Buddhists who propound the impermanence of everything, than to the Jainas, who accept

his commentary, the Prakrits were purely literary languages. Pischel wanted to reserve the term Prākrit for the standardized, literary language, and the term Apabhramśa for the old spoken varieties (Pischel, 1981, §5). For the ancient Sanskrit grammarians, however, anything non-Sanskrit would be Apabhramśa (cf. Deshpande, 1993:3-4).

anityavādinas tu ye sādhūnām dharmahetutvam na pratipadyante, mallasamayādisadṛśīm sādhuvyavsthām manyante, te prakṛtau bhavam prākṛtam sādhūnām sabdānām samūham ācakṣate / vikāras tu paścād vyavasthāpitaḥ, yaḥ sambhinnabhuddhibhiḥ puruṣaiḥ svarasamskārādibhir nirṇīyate iti.

For the expression svara-samskārau cf. Suklayajuhprātisākhyam 1.1 (Kāsī Skt. Granthamālā 179, ed. and tr. Shrimati Indu Rastogi 1967); Yāska's Nirukta, 1.12, 14, 15; 2.1; and Cardona, 1988:654: "Yāska uses svarasamskārau with reference to accents (svara) and the derivational formation of words from bases and so on."

permanent entities. The Buddhists would in general agree with the Jainas in rejecting Sanskrit as the prakrti or 'basis': they attributed the role of 'basic language' (mūlabhāsā) to Māgadhi, the language in which the Buddha would have preached. 14 I am not aware that the Buddhists ever used the name prākrta for this 'basic language' Magadhi. This makes it unlikely that the passage in the Vrtti ("the collection of correct [namely, Prakrit] words is prākrta in the sense of 'arising from the prakrti'") directly refers to the Buddhists. Therefore, we may assume that anityadarsin refers specifically to the view on language, and therefore to all those who do not accept śabda as nitya. The anityadarśin-s could then include both the Buddhists and the Jainas, 15 and the reference to the Jaina view on Prakrit by the author of the Vrtti would be fully justified. Otherwise, if anityadarśin was intended as a reference to the Buddhists by the kārikā author, we have to assume that the reference in the Vrtti to the anti-Sanskritic, Jaina view in which the prākrta collection of 'correct words' is opposed to the changed form (vikāra) which is regulated 'by persons with impaired understarting', is a bit out of place in the explanation of kārikā 1.82.

2.0 Another possible indication of Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism is found in the first Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Kārikā 110 of this Kāṇḍa reads as follows:

vāyor aṇūnām jñānasya sabdatvāpattir iṣyate l kais cid darsanabhedo hi pravādeṣv anavasthitaḥ ||

This may be translated as:

It has been accepted by different (thinkers) that (respectively) wind, atoms, cognition, become language; indeed, the difference in viewpoints among the doctrines remains unsettled.

Of the different views referred to here, the view that atoms become language has been taken by different scholars as a reference to the traditional Jaina view on speech and language.¹⁶

¹⁴ Cf. J. Muir, 1874:53.

The Brahmanical Naiyāyikas and Vaiseṣikas also reject a permanent sabda, but they would not consider the Prakrit words correct and the Sanskrit words derived from them. Cf. Joshi, 1967:70-72.

Pt. Sūryanārāyaņa Šukla, 1937, avataraņikā to 110 (VP 1.113); Gaurinath Šāstri, 1959: 52; Šānti Bhikşu Šāstri, 1963, notes on 110 (VP 1.113).

2.1 In the Vṛtti on this kārikā, the first two of the three views are further explained in two verses (śloka-s).¹⁷ The two śloka-s explaining the view that atoms become language are as follows.

aṇavaḥ sarvasaktitvād bhedasamsargavṛttayaḥ l chāyātapatamaḥsabdabhāvena pariṇāminaḥ ll svasaktau vyajyamānāyām prayatnena samiritāḥ l abhrāṇīva pracīyante sabdākhyāḥ paramāṇavaḥ ll

The first of these two verses may be translated without many problems as:

Atoms, because they have all capacities, are transformed when they separate and combine into shadow, heat, darkness, and sound.

This is very much reminiscent of TS 5.23-25, which explain the Jaina view on matter or *pudgala*. According to these sūtras, ¹⁸

The pudgala-s are characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour.

They are also characterized by sound, binding, subtleness, grossness, configuration, splitting, darkness, shadow, hot radiation and non-hot radiation.

Pudgala is of the form of an atom and of the form of an aggregate.

2.2 Unlike the Vaiseṣikas, the Jainas do not accept different sorts of atoms for earth, water, fire and air. Instead, the atoms are uniform and are at the basis of all different material things on account of different configurations between them. Here, the second verse in the Vṛtti explaining the atom-view seems to present a problem. In this verse it is said that śabdākhyāḥ paramāṇavaḥ are accumulated like clouds when their own capacity manifests itself, and when they are stirred by an (articulatory) effort. That the verse seems to speak of atoms which are specifically śabdākhyāḥ, was for Virendra Sharma (Sharma,

These verses (VP1.111-116) belong to the Vṛtti and not to the kārikā-text according to the criterion that a verse genuinely belonging to the kārikās should have been recognized as such in the Vṛtti. Verses 1.111-116 explaining the three views, are not separately commented upon in the Vṛtti, from which one may infer that they formed part of the Vṛtti itself (Iyer, 1966:x; Aklujkar, 1971). This criterion can be strictly adhered to only if we assume that the Vṛtti-author was identical with the author of the kārikās (most recently: Aklujkar, 1993). If the Vṛtti is not by the same author (cf. Bronkhorst, 1988; Houben, forthcoming a and b), it is possible that the Vṛtti-author assigned the status of 'illustrative statement' to kārikās which he did find in the kārikā-text he was commenting on.

TS 5.23: sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇa-vantaḥ pudgalāḥ; 5.24: śabda-bandha-saukṣmya-sthaulya-saṁsthāna-bheda-tamaś-chāyā-tapo-dyota-vantaś ca; 5.25: aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca.

1977:13, 17) the main reason to consider the attribution of the atom-view to the Jainas as impossible.¹⁹

2.3 However, if we understand the verse this way, it would no longer be an illustration of one of the three views according to which "something becomes \$abda" (1.110). If something becomes \$abda, this something can obviously not already be \$abda. Kārikā 1.110 mentioned three 'things' which become \$abda according to different views. If we read the second verse in a slightly different way, there is no conflict with this statement in 1.110. The first verse speaks clearly of atoms which transform into several things, among them \$abda. If this is true for the second verse also \$abdākhyāh is not an epithet of the atoms before they are accumulated on account of their capacity and on account of a specific effort, but it tells us something about the product which arises from this accumulation. The word \$abdākhyāh would express the vikārya karma, one of the three types of karma accepted by the Sanskrit grammarians (cf. VP 3.7.45-50). Accordingly, the verse may be translated as follows:

The ultimate atoms, when their own capacity manifests itself, instigated by effort, accumulate like [atoms into] clouds and appear as sounds.

It is therefore very well possible that not only the first but also the second verse explaining the atom-view of 1.110 referred to the Jaina-view on sound and speech.

2.4 The Jainas, as correctly pointed out by Sharma (1977:13-17), seem not to have been the only ones to think of sound and speech as configurations of subtle matter. The Vṛtti explaining 1.110, after having illustrated the three views referred to in the kārikā with several verses, remarks that all this is just an example (nidarśanamātraṁ cedam, VP I:175.5). Next, it is said that the views of Śikṣā-s, and of authors of Sūtras and Bhāṣyas is manyfold (bahudhā śikṣāsūtrakārabhāṣyakāramatāni dṛṣyante, VP I:175.5-6). Several (mostly untraced) quotations from Śikṣā-authors follow, and in one it is said that breath puts subtle parts together which become a compact mass of sound (prāṇo...sūkṣmāṁṣaṁ...saṁhanti | sa...sabdaghanaḥ...). Instead of the word aṇu the word sūkṣmāṁṣaṁ is used here, but this might refer to the same concept. It is likely that the Jainas had not only their own Sanskrit

Biardeau (1964:146 note 1) understood the second verse as a reference to a different view among the atom-views.

grammarians, but also their own phoneticians; and it is therefore not impossible that the Sikṣā-author referred to here in the Vṛtti was a Jaina phonetician. Yet, from a remark at the end of the Vṛtti on 1.110 one would infer that the Vṛtti was only referring to Sikṣā-s belonging to different Vedic schools (VP I:177:5, ityevamādi pratišākham...), at least in the passage from bahudhā sikṣāsūtrakārabhāṣyakāramatāni dṛṣyante (VP I:175.5-6) onward. (The two verses VP 1.113-114 need not be included in the reference ityevamādi pratišākham...) Moreover, different kārikās speak of sound as something that can be accumulated and diffused (VP 1.106, 108; 3.9.63-64), even though this is only seemingly so from the point of view of the permanent sabda or sphoṭa; nothing indicates that Bhartṛhari would here refer to a view of the Jainas. The Vṛtti on 1.48 speaks suddenly (i.e. without specific indication in the kārikā) of a 'subtle pervading sound' (sūkṣme vyāpini dhvanau) which is accumulated like a cloud-mass.

2.5 It may therefore be that also among the Brahmanical authors, for instance authors of Sikṣā-s, there were some who worked with a theory of subtle, material sound and speech. Among the important philosophical systems, it was Sāṁkhya which considered audible sound a derivative of sabdatanmātra, the subtle element of sound.²⁰ In Sāṁkhya, however, the atoms are specific, unlike the atoms in at least the first of the two verses in the Vṛtti on kārikā 1.110; this verse is, as we have seen, remarkably close to the TS. Whatever we have to think of other places where Bhartṛhari refers to a view according to which sound is made of atoms, the emphatic denial that these verses refer to Jaina ideas (Sharma, 1977:13, 17) is without any reasonable basis.²¹ If the atom-view in kārikā 1.110 is correctly illustrated by the two

Nāgeša explained the anu-s which transform into sabda as sabdatanmātrādi, thus suggesting that they referred to a Sāmkhya-view (Nāgeša's Uddyota on Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa on the MBh on P. 1.4.29).

^{21 (}a) According to Sharma's confused argumentation on pp. 11-12, the two verses do not refer to the Sārnkhya view because the atoms are of a single general nature (have the same jāti, universal) and transform into different specific entities (including śabda) according to the first verse, and they cannot refer to the Jaina-view because they are specifically called śabda according to the second verse. However, atoms that are accepted to be of a single general nature, and transform into shadow, etc., are indeed very much in accordance with the Jaina view. The verse in which they are called śabda could refer to a different view (note 19), or rather, as explained in section 2.3, it should be interpreted both in accordance with the first verse according to which one type of atom has all

verses in the Vrtti (1.113-114), then we have to accept that Bhartrhari referred at least at this place to the view of the Jainas.

3.0 Two kārikās in Vākyapadīya book 2 are possibly indicative of Bhartṛhari's familiarity with quite a different Jaina text. Both seem to refer to a technicality in the Jainendra-vyākaraṇa, a Jaina Sanskrit grammar adapted from Pāṇini by replacing, for instance, long technical terms by shorter ones (cf. Tripathi, 1956; Scharfe, 1977:168-169).

The two kārikās are 2.40 and 444:

so 'yam ity abhisambandho buddhyā prakramyate yadā | vākyārthasya tadaiko 'pi varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ kva cit || 2.40 || anekasakter ekasya pravibhāgo 'nugamyate | ekārthatvam hi vākyasya mātrayāpi pratīyate || 2.444 ||

The translation of these kārikās does not present many problems:

If the relation of identification is adopted by the mind, then, in some cases a single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of a sentence.

Of one [entity] with many capacities, a division is understood; for it is understood in just (one) unit $(m\bar{a}tr\bar{a})$ that the sentence has a single meaning.

The interpretation of these kārikās in the larger context of the discussion in the VP does not present many problems either. The subject in the second Kāṇḍa of the VP is the nature of the sentence and the sentence meaning and of words and their meanings. The problem is discussed from different angles.

capacities, and in accordance with 1.110 according to which something (which is not yet *Sabda*) is transformed into *Sabda*.

- (b) Sharma argues, further, that the view with atoms should be in accordance with the sphota theory (Sharma, 1977:16-17). It is, however, very clear that Bhartrhari intended to discuss or at least refer to many different views, and was not simply explaining a single theory to the exclusion of others (cf. darsanabheda in 1.110, bhinnam darsanam in 1.75 and vādās trayo 'bhivyaktivādinām in 1.80).
- I:177:5, ityevamādi pratisākham... by reading nidaršanamātrarh cedam, bahudhā etc. (VP I:175.5-6) as a continuous statement (Sharma, 1977:13, n. 4). While the verses VP 1.113-114 are not necessarily included in the reference to the authors 'belonging to each branch (of the Veda)', it is on the other hand to be admitted that any explicit reference to the Jainas, in spite of the remarkable similarity of VP 1.113-114 with their views, is rigourously avoided. The same is true in other situations where Bhartrhari seems to refer without much doubt to Buddhists and/or Jainas, and the Vṛtti, most probably making use of material derived from Jaina sources, avoids an explicit reference to them (see above, section 1.2.5, and below, section 3.5-9). Sharma's conviction that VP 1.113-114 have nothing to do with Jaina doctrine is therefore closely related to his acceptance of the Vṛtti as a work of Bhartrhari, the author of the kārikās (cf. Sharma, 1977:12, 13). The justifiability of this acceptance is, however, disputable (cf. Bronkhorst, 1988, and Houben, forthcoming, a and b).

Kārikās 2.40 and 444 occur both in the context of passages in support of the view that the sentence meaning, and by implication also the sentence, is one and indivisible, although secondarily a division in words and word meanings may be adopted. The unity and indivisibility of the sentence is demonstrated by the fact that, theoretically, a whole sentence meaning could be expressed by a single phoneme. The unity of meaning of a sentence becomes this way clear in one small (prosodial) unit (mātrā).

- 3.1 Because kārikā 40 speaks of the adoption of the relation of identification, it seems that the author asks us to imagine a situation in which the meaning of a whole sentence is by convention equated with a single phoneme. Even if we are favourably disposed towards the view that the sentence is one and indivisible, this argument given in support of it seems a bit vague and far-fetched. Puṇyarāja's commentary and the later interpreters are not of much help, because they only explain the general implication of the kārikās in the wider context. It is only the Vṛtti, the most ancient commentary available, which seems to make the example used in the kārikās more concrete.
- 3.2 The Vṛtti refers to a problem in the technical understanding of Pāṇini's grammar which received some attention in the Vārttika's and in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, and which was also important in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. The problem is connected with sūtra P 1.1.45, which defines the technical term samprasāraṇa as follows: ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam. This means:

When i, u, r and l (in all possible prosodic varieties) replace y, r, l, v, this is called samprasārana or 'vocalization'.

In the Mahābhāṣya (MBh) the question is asked, whether samprasāraṇa should be considered the technical term for the phonemes ik (i, u, r, l) and their prosodic variants²²) when they replace yaṇ (y, r, l, v); or whether it is rather the technical term for the sentence: ig yaṇaḥ 'i, u, r, l. replace y, r, l, v'. In the discussion in the MBh it is pointed out that in some technical contexts the term is required as denotative of the phonemes which replace the other phonemes, in others as denotative of the sentence that some phonemes replace others. The sūtra that is mentioned as specifically requiring the sentence interpretation of

The phrase 'and their prosodic variants' is to be understood wherever I refer to the phonemes indicated by *ik*.

samprasāraṇa is P. 6.1.13 (ṢyaNaḥ samprasāraṇam putrapatyos tatpuruṣe). The last Vārttika on sūtra 1.1.45 accepts that the term samprasāraṇa is, according to the technical context, both a term for the phonemes and a term for the sentence. (Patañjali continues to consider other possibilities to solve the technical problems. Whatever Patañjali's ultimate position may be (something which is not always unequivocally clear), the idea that a word refers to a whole sentence presents no problem to him.)

3.3 The Vṛtti refers to samprasāraṇa both in the Vṛtti on 40 and in the Vṛtti on 444 (Iyer, 1983:209-210; 314). The idea expressed in the kārikās could accordingly be that because the single word samprasāraṇa expresses the meaning of the sentence ig yaṇaḥ, the sentence meaning must be accepted as one. This is the interpretation of the later commentator Puṇyarāja when he explains 2.444. But then it remains a bit strange that the long term samprasāraṇa is called a mātrā in the kārikā. For mātrā is not only the general word for 'measure' or 'small element', but it is also the term for a single prosodial unit equivalent to the time needed to pronounce a short vowel.²³ According to Puṇyarāja, the term samprasāraṇa is called a mātrā in the kārikā because it is just a single, small element. The reference to samprasāraṇa would in this way be of no use in kārikā 40, which speaks of a single phoneme which is expressive of the sentence meaning. Puṇyarāja has therefore to remain very abstract in his explanation of this kārikā.

The Vrtti on 40, however, does refer to the term samprasāraṇa. In addition, it seems to give two times an example of the 'single phoneme' mentioned in the kārikā. Unfortunately, it is not very clear to which phonemes he refers. Iyer's edition has samprasāraṇam iti vādīti vā, and in the next sentence bhami ityekavarṇayā. In a footnote to the first passage he remarks that the manuscript he used for the passage is illegible, and that Charudeva Shastri read quite something else, namely bha bhi iti vā. Iyer does not note that

The grammarians considered the time needed to pronounce a consonant equal to half a mātrā. But in prosody, especially of metres regulated by the number of syllabic instants, a syllable measures either one or two mātrā-s or prosodial units. Thus, syllables such as bha, bhi, ghu, ji, etc., if not followed by certain sounds or combinations of sounds, would count as one mātrā and not as one-and-a-half. Cf. Weber's edition, translation, and study of Pingala's Chandas (Weber, 1863: esp. 290-326); Appendix A of Apte's Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 1. For the date of Pingala's Chandaḥśāstra, "the earliest comprehensive treatment on Vedic and Sanskrit metres," cf. Van Nooten, 1993:31-33.

at the second place Charudeva Śāstri reads *bhabhi* (as a single word). It may be that Iyer's *bhami* at the second place is just a printing error for *bhabhi*, for this is what Charudeva Śāstri has and Iyer does not note the difference. Charudeva Śāstri, on his part, does not indicate that his source was doubtful or problematic, as he does at several other places. Because it is not clear on what Iyer's *vādīti* (at the first place) is based, nor what it should mean, it seems best to stick to Charudeva's reading until better evidence becomes available.²⁴

The relevant passage in Charudeva's text of the Vrtti on 2.40 is as follows:

nāvaSyam vicchinnapadarūpavigraha eva Sabdaḥ paurvāparyayuktam anugatavibhāgam evārtham pratyāyayati | yadā hi vākyārthasyaivegyaṇaḥ sthāne bhavatīty evamāder buddhiviṣayaḥ samprasāraṇam iti vā, bha bhi iti vā so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ kriyate, atho (JH: atha?) yathaivegyaṇa ityanena paurvāparyānupātinī pratipattir bhavati | evam apaurvāparyayā bhabhi ityekavarṇayā tasyārthasya samjīfayā pratyastamitapaurvāparyaḥ sa evārthātmā pratīyate |

It is not necessarily only a linguistic unit which may be analysed in the form of separate words that expresses the meaning endowed with sequence, and with division understood. For if, for a sentence meaning, such as "ik comes in the place of yan," the relation of identity is created as an object of the mind: "[the meaning of the sentence "ik comes in the place of yan," is] samprasāraṇa," or "[the meaning of the sentence "ik comes in the place of yan," is] bha (or) bhi," then, just as there is an understanding which follows a sequence with this (sentence): "ik [comes] in the place of yan,", similarly the same unit of meaning is understood with suppressed sequence through the technical term for that meaning consisting of a single phoneme "bha, bhi."

3.4 At this point the available philological evidence cannot help us much further in the interpretation of the passage with *bhabhi* or *bha bhi*. We may therefore try to approach the problem from a different angle. The term samprasāraṇa, according to the discussion of the relevant sūtra P. 1.1.45 in the Vārttikas and in the Mahābhāṣya, may stand for the sentence *ig yaṇaḥ*. The

In his foreword to Iyer's edition of the second Kāṇḍa of the VP (Iyer, 1983:xvii), Aklujkar, explaining the features of his own forthcoming edition, claimed to have rediscovered, in 1977, the original MS of the photocopy and transcript used by Iyer for the Vṛtti on the second Kāṇḍa (for 2.40 this is the only source; for 2.444 another fragmentary MS is available, called P in Iyer's edition). Cf. also Aklujkar's article on the number of kārikās in the second Kāṇḍa (Aklujkar, 1978). It seems that both Iyer and Charudeva Shastri based themselves on the same transcript (in Devanāgarī) of the Malayalam original rediscovered by Aklujkar (cf. Aklujkar, in Iyer, 1983:xvii, and Charudeva Shastri, introduction to vol. 1, (his MS ṭa)). Moreover, Iyer did not use the transcript directly, but had to make do with an imperfect photocopy and partly transcript of it (Aklujkar, in Iyer, 1983:xvii).

author of the Vṛṭṭi apparently equates this technical term samprasāraṇa with a technical term consisting of a single phoneme.²⁵ This single phoneme would express the meaning of the sentence. This would suit the statement in the kārikās. But is it just a purely hypothetical example, or was there any concrete basis for Bharṭṛhari's statement? In order to find an answer, we have to widen our horizon a bit and try to imagine the grammatical activities with which Bharṭṛhari may have been familiar. In the concluding passage of the second Kāṇḍa mention is made of a grammarian Candra. This may be a reference to the Buddhist grammarian Candragomin. But in Candragomin's grammar nothing is found about a single phoneme which would denote ig yaṇaḥ. In fact, Candragomin tried to avoid as much as possible the use of technical terms, ²⁶ apparently trying to make the grammar this way more easily accessible.²⁷

3.5 The Jainas, when they had started to use Sanskrit, wrote not only doctrinal works in this language, but also works on technical subjects, including Sanskrit. The oldest Jaina grammar we know of is the Jainendra-Vyākaraṇa (JV), attributed to Pūjyapāda Devanandin. The date is not certain, but the work may very well have originated around the fifth century, i.e. around the time when Bhartrhari was living and working.²⁸ While

Por the grammarians' understanding of varṇa, 'phoneme' (a, i, k, v, etc.), cf. the discussion in the MBh about the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of phonemes (MBh 1:30). In the work of later grammarians (after Bhartrhari), varṇasphoṭa, as the smallest meaningful unit, "stands virtually for the notion of morpheme" (Joshi, 1967:74).

²⁶ Cf. Scharfe, 1977:165, and the expression Candropajñam asamjñakam vyākaraṇam.

This would be in accordance with the need of Buddhist communities which adopted Sanskrit as a language for their sacred books. Buddhist monks with a non-brahmanical or non-sanskritic background had to become acquainted with this language. Cf. Scharfe, 1977:162-165.

In the section devoted to Jaina grammarians in Scharfe's Grammatical Literature, the author observes that some scholars place Devanandin even before Candragomin (whom he attributes to the 5th century; VP 2.486 probably refers to this Buddhist grammarian), whereas others put him later than the authors of the Kāśikā (early 7th century) (Scharfe, 1977:168). Later on, however, Scharfe gives some reasons why an early date of Devanandin would be more probable, without, however, drawing any explicit conclusion (Scharfe, 1977:168-169). According to Abhyankar and Shukla (1977:162), Devanandin wrote his grammar in the fifth century A.D, according to Pt. Nathuramji Premi in the sixth century of the Vikrama Era (in an introductory essay on Devanandi and his Jainendravyākaraṇa, in Tripathi, 1956:17-37). Yudhiṣṭhira Mimāṁsaka places Devanandin 'before 500 Vikrama Era' (saṁ. 500 vi. se pūrva, Yudhiṣṭhira 1984:489, 657), or, more precisely, 'between the latter half of the fifth century Vikrama Era and the firt quarter of the sixth' (vikrama ki pāṁcviṁ śati ke uttarārdha se ṣaṣṭhī śati ke prathama caraṇa ke madhye' Yudhiṣṭhira, 1984:494).

Candragomin improved upon Pānini's grammar by reducing the number of technical terms, the JV tried to outdo Panini in something for which he is most brevity.²⁹ One of the devices used in the JV to reach famous, namely maximum brevity is the replacement of long technical terms by shorter ones. Otherwise, the JV follows the rules of Pānini very closely, and maintains also their original order to a great extent. The JV became this way more compact than Pānini's grammar, but also much more technical, with a great number of new one-syllabic terms denoting a host of technical notions. The five-syllable term samprasārana is of course a good candidate for replacement by a shorter term. The JV replaced it by ji. The sūtra where it is defined is otherwise identical to Pānini's rule, and it has moreover the same number, namely 1.1.45. P 1.1.45 thus becomes JV 1.1.45 ig yano jih. The sūtra which was mentioned in the MBh discussion as a sūtra where the sentence interpretation of samprasāranam is definitely needed, namely P. 6.1.13 (syanah samprasāranam putrapatyos tatpuruse), is also present in the JV. (There it becomes sūtra JV 4.3.9 (se syasya putrapatyor jih).)

3.6 By now it must be clear that the technical term *jiḥ* of JV 1.1.45 perfectly fits into the slot of the two evidently corrupt places with *bha bhi iti / bhabhi iti/dīti / bhami iti* in the Vṛtti on 2.40. In the light of the wider context of the Pāṇinian and non-Pāṇinian grammatical literature discussed above, it seems more than likely that the Vṛtti is referring to this sūtra *ig yaṇo jiḥ*, the JV's recast of P. 1.1.45. This was no more recognized by the later grammarians from Puṇyarāja onwards, who were very familiar with the Pāṇinian tradition but apparently not with the JV. Instead of the syllables *bha*, *bhi*, or *di* which the Vṛtti would mention according the available printed sources, the original Vṛtti must have had *ji*, a technical term consisting of a single phoneme, *j*, and an *i* added to make utterance (and hearing) possible.³⁰ But because the meaning of

For brevity or the principle of economy in Pāṇini's grammar see: Buiskool, 1939:1, 155; Cardona, 1969 and 1976:204-205 and references; Kiparsky, 1991:239-261; and, most recently, Smith, 1992, and Bhate, 1993.

In the critical investigation of the meaning of each and every phoneme, already the MBh had to accept that some phonemes were possibly present (or sometimes absent) only to make utterance and hearing of other, more crucial phonemes, possible. Cf. the use of the phrase uccāraṇasāmarthyāt (e.g. MBh 1.3.9, 1:265.10), and the terms mukhasukhārtha (e.g. MBh 1.1.1, 1:42.23-24, contrasted with asaṁdehārtha), śravaṇārtha (e.g. MBh 1.3.2, 1:260.11-14). According to the Kāśikā on P. 2.4.36 the phoneme i of jagdhi is for the sake of utterance (ikāra uccāraṇārthaḥ, nānubandhaḥ); similarly the i of cli in P. 3.1.43 (Kāśikā: ikāra uccāraṇārthaḥ, cakāraḥ svarārthaḥ).

- this syllable was no longer recognized, the relevant passages could easily become corrupt. The first step of the corruption may have been made when a 'knowledgeable' scribe emended an ununderstood ji which he found in his source, to a Pāṇinian technical term with which he was familiar: bha, or, in the form in which it occurs several times in the MBh, bham.
- Not only does the term ji perfectly fit into the passage of the Vrtti explaining 2.40, also the kārikā itself, if we try to forget the Vrtti for a while, becomes less vague and richer in meaning. How does the term ji suit 2.444? According to 2.444, "it is understood in just (one) unit (mātrā) that the sentence has a single meaning" (see above, section 3.0). Again, the statement seems vague and cryptical, unless we connect it with the concrete example of ji standing for the sentence ig yanah (bhavati). Punyarāja, oblivious of the JV's technical term ji, is forced to interpret mātrayā in the kārikā unconvincingly as a reference to the whole term samprasārana as a single unit samprasāranam ityevam ekasaṁkhyena laghiyastvān vyapadisyate). Something similar was already done by the author of the Vrtti, but he explained mātrā as a reference to 'samprasāraņa and so forth' (Iyer, 1983:314.5). Of course, the implication of a reference to ji, prosodically equivalent to a single mātrā and standing for the sentence ig yanah (bhavati) is that also the term samprasārana and in fact any word and sentence is to be considered as a single unit. The crucial step of the example of ji is presupposed but no longer emphasized in the Vrtti on 2.444 and was completely forgotten since Punyaraja. As explained above (section 3.3 and note 23), the word mātrā may refer to any (small) unit, but in the context of linguistic units it denotes especially a well-defined prosodial unit.
- 3.8 If we now cast a glance at another work attributed to Bhartrhari, namely the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā, we find that there too, Bhartrhari showed much interest in the problem of referring to a whole sentence or complex expression through one single term. The problem is inevitably discussed when the MBhD comments on the samprasāraṇa sūtra P. 1.1.45 (MBhD 8:1-3). In the second Āhnika the problem is even discussed at a place where it is by no means called for from the point of view of the MBh on which the MBhD is commenting: The MBhD suddenly asks how the word idam in a phrase in the MBh can possibly refer to a whole sentence-meaning and starts an elaborate discussion (MBhD 2:16.23-17.2). Commenting on the MBh on P 1.1.44, the MBhD investigates in great detail how vibhāṣā can be the name of the expression na

- $v\bar{a}$ (MBhD 6b:23.18-25.2). The broad outlines of the discussion in the MBh are followed in the MBhD, but the issues raised in the MBh are treated in an extremely elaborate and rather independent way.
- 3.8 While the interest shown in the MBhD for the problem of how a single term may refer to a complex expression or sentence corresponds with the two kārikās and the theme of the second Kāṇḍa of the VP, we miss in the MBhD any reference to the extreme case of only one single phoneme referring to a whole sentence meaning. If the MBhD is accepted as Bhartrhari's earlier work, we may surmise that Bhartrhari, while writing that work, was not yet acquainted with the JV. This could either mean that Bhartrhari had not yet widened his horizon to include the grammar of the Jainas in all its technical details, or that that grammar was at that time not yet written. Once Bhartrhari became familiar with that grammar, the fact that a whole sentence was conventionally equated with a single phoneme impressed him so much that he referred to it in two kārikās.
- 3.9 As for the author of the Vṛṭṭi, he shows awareness of the relevance of the technical term ji for the interpretation of kārikā 2.40. But he seems to admit this relevance only grudgingly. In his interpretation of 2.444, where this term seems equally relevant, it is even more relegated to the background in his explanation. Above we have seen how explicit references to the Jainas are avoided in the Vṛṭṭi's treatment of VP 1.110 and 113-114 (cf. note 21(c)). This contrasts with the explicit and non-polemical references to the Jainas and Buddhists in the MBhD, and it reinforces our impression that the Vṛṭṭi is not by the same author as the one who wrote the VP-kārikās and the MBhD.31
- 4.0 We have thus seen that Bhartrhari shows explicit awareness of the Jainas in the MBhD, and that some of his statements gain in significance if we assume that he was referring to views and works of the Jainas. Apparently, Bhartrhari's horizon included the non-Vedic schools such as that of the Jainas. This means that we, as modern students of Bhartrhari, also have to widen our horizon to include these schools, in order to be able to fully appreciate the accomplishment of Bhartrhari.

Cf. Bronkhorst, 1988 and Houben, forthcoming, a and b. It is also possible that earlier, explicit references in the Vrtti to Jainas have disappeared at a certain stage of the transmission of the text, in a period of strong tensions between Brahmans and non-Brahmans.

In our introductory paragraph, we have also made the very general remark that Bhartrhari's attitude may be described as 'encyclopedic' and as 'perspectivistic'. It is well-known that the Jainas developed a characteristic approach to Indian philosophy which may also be called 'encyclopedic' and as 'perspectivistic'. It would be difficult to determine to what extent Bhartrhari was influenced by the Jainas in his perspectivistic attitude, to which extent he followed in this respect other sources such as his own grammatical tradition, and to what extent he followed his personal inclinations and insights. Whereas a more profound reflection on the similarities and contrasts between Bhartrhari's perspectivism and that of the Jainas must be reserved for a later occasion, it seems admissable to assume that there was at least some reinforcement from early Jaina 'perspectivism' on Bhartrhari's attitude, and vice versa from Bhartrhari's attitude on later exponents of the Jaina approach of anekāntavāda such as Mallavādin.³²

Cf. Halbfass, 1988:268-269, 355, and Frauwallner's introduction to Jambuvijaya's edition of Mallavādin's Dvādasāranayacakra (Dvādasāram nayacakram, ed. Jambuvijaya, vol. 1, Bhavnagar 1966).

ABBREVIATIONS

JV = Jainendravyākaraņa. Ref. to Tripathi's edition (Tripathi, 1956).

MBh = Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. References to (number of volume):(page).(line) in Kielhom's edition, usually preceded by the number of Pāṇini's sūtra commented upon.

MBhD = Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā. Ref. to the recent Poona edition, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1985-1991). The only available manuscript was reproduced in Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1980.

MS = manuscript.

TS = Tattvārthādhigamasūtra. Ref. to H.R. Kapadia's edition (Tattvārthasūtram, ŚriUmāsvātivācakamukhyasandrbdham. Edited by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, Bombay, 1926). Cf. also Dixit, 1974.

VP = Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya; references to the kārikās (with two or three arabic numerals separated by periods) follow W. Rau's critical edition of the kārikās (Rau, 1977).

VP I = Iyer's edition (Iyer. 1966). [References to this edition: VP I:(page).(line).]

VP II = Iyer's edition (Iyer, 1983). [References to this edition: VP II:(page).(line).]

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