BOOK REVIEW


Professor D. S. Ruegg has made a brilliant contribution to the cause of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist studies by presenting in this voluminous book an exemplary exposition of the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha*, which is of great importance in the history of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *tathāgatagarbha* means the embryo of the *tathāgata* that exists in all sentient beings (*sattva*) without exception and functions as a cause of the final liberation of the sentient beings. The deep significance of the *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine is found in that the said soteriological aspect of the doctrine is closely combined with the metaphysical and gnosological aspects, since the *tathāgatagarbha* is considered as equivalent to the Ultimate Reality (*dharmadhātu, dharmatā*, etc.) that becomes the sphere of operation of the pure intuitive knowledge. The *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine was preached in a number of Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the *Tathāgatagarbha-s., Śrīmālādeviśīṃhanāda-s.*, etc., and was systematically expounded in the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga* (= *RGV*) and some other śāstras.

The *RGV*¹ was first translated by E. Obermiller from the Tibetan version in 1931.² The publication of E. H. Johnston’s edition of the Sanskrit text in 1950³ provided a new stimulus to the study of this important treatise. Several passages and verses were presented in translation by E. Conze⁴ and E. Frauwallner⁵ in their books describing the development of the Buddhist thought. J. Takasaki prepared a new complete translation, which was published in 1966 with the introduction containing an analysis of the structure of the text and a brief sketch of the genealogy of the *tathāgatagarbha*-theory based on his examination of the sūtras and the śāstras. A Japanese translation was made by H. Ui and was published together with his studies of the related materials.

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in 1959. The present book is a valuable addition to the literature of this field of study.

Ruegg made it his chief aim to study the *tathāgatagarbha*-theory in its classical form as presented in some fundamental śāstras. Since the investigation of the sūtras involves a number of yet unexplored problems, philological, historical and doctrinal, he thought it preferable to begin with the study of the śāstras, which would provide him with "point de repère" for the study of the doctrines propounded in the sūtras in unsystematic manner and often by means of parables and images difficult to interpret. He treats almost all the important conceptions related to the *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine with extensive references to the Indo-Tibetan materials. His method is mainly descriptive: he presents in systematic arrangement the materials as they are rather than attempting historical and philosophical speculations. The book comprises four Parts: — I. La théorie mahāyāniste du "gotra". II. L'Éveil universel et le Véhicule unique. III. La théorie du "tathāgatagarbha". IV. La luminosité naturelle de la Pensée. In Parts I and II, importance is placed on the theories expounded in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra (= AA)* and its commentaries. A detailed examination of the *RGV* is made in Part III.

The *AA* is a treatise to which a great importance was attached in the later period of the Mahāyāna Buddhism in India. The *gotra*-theory put forward in it is acknowledged to be very close to the *tathāgatagarbha*-theory, inasmuch as the *gotra*, the germ of the enlightenment, is identified therein with the Ultimate Reality. A solid foundation for the study of the *AA* was laid by E. Obermiller and Th. Stcherbatsky, but there still remains much room for further investigations. In his examination of the *gotra*-theory in the *AA*, Ruegg utilized abundantly the commentaries written by Indian and Tibetan authors, thus richly contributing to the advancement of the study of the *AA*.

Both the *AA* and the *RGV* are reckoned, according to the Tibetan tradition, among the "Five Treatises of Maitreya". Whether Maitreya (-nātha) was a historical personage or not has often been discussed by scholars. Regarding this problem, Ruegg accepts on the one hand P. Demiéville's opinion that Maitreya was "l'inspirateur céleste" of Asaṅga, and admits on the other hand the difference in doctrine between the treatises attributed to Maitreya and Asaṅga's own works. He draws the conclusion that Asaṅga as the author of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, etc.,
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worked at the same time as a redactor on the old materials to compose them into the Mahāyānasūtra-lamkāra (= MSA), etc., under “l’inspiration maitreyenne”.

The problem of the authorship of the RGV is most complicated, because the Chinese tradition attributes this treatise not to Maitreya but to Chien-hui (= Sāramati). Ruegg expresses disagreement with him with the observation that the difference in doctrine between the MSA and the AA, both of which are attributed to Maitreyanātha by Frauwallner, is even greater than that between the MSA and the RGV. Moreover, the Kārikāsaptati ascribed to Asaṅga does not contain the abhidharma analysis of mental phenomena, which is acknowledged by Frauwallner to constitute a characteristic feature of Asaṅga’s works. Taking these facts into consideration, Ruegg admits the possibility of Asaṅga’s authorship of the RGV. This, however, is not the final solution of the problem. There is, in the Chinese Tripiṭaka, another treatise ascribed to Sāramati, namely, the *Dharmadhūtunirvīṣeṣaśāstra (Taishō 1626–1627), which expounds the tathāgatagarbha-theory like the RGV. There is also a concrete account regarding the dates and the works of Sāramati recorded by Fa-tsang (643–712) and Yüan-ts’ē (613–696) on the basis of Devaprajña’s information. It may therefore be difficult to delete the name Sāramati in the history of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Ruegg suggests a hypothesis that “sāramati” is an epithet of Maitreya, like “vyavadātasamaya” in the colophon of the Sanskrit manuscripts of the MSA (p. 46), but the present reviewer would rather accept the view held by Johnston and Frauwallner that Sāramati was a writer who lived some time after Nāgārjuna and before Asaṅga.

It is to be noted in this connection that, along with the declaration of the doctrine of śūnyatā found in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, the admiration of the Buddha constituted an important factor of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the early Mahāyāna sūtras, the Buddha is praised as possessing innumerable merits, and the idea that the tathāgata is all-pervasive and eternal is expressly propounded (cf. Avatāṃsakasūtra, Saddharma-puṇḍarikāsūtra). The tathāgatagarbha-doctrine may well be considered to be on the extension line of this current of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, since the all-pervading Buddha is understood to exist in every
sentient being. The doctrine of śūnyatā was systematically expounded by Nāgārjuna and Arādeva. Sāramati represented another aspect of Mahāyāna Buddhism, extolling with positive expressions the merits of the Buddha as identified with the Ultimate Reality, eternal and universal.

Obermiller reported that there was a divergence of opinion among the Tibetan scholars regarding the doctrinal standpoint of the RGV. According to him, the earlier scholars recognized it as a work of the Yogācāra-vijñānavāda school, while the scholars of the later period, Tsoṅ kha pa, etc., read in it the extreme monistic view of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. More detailed information is given in the introduction of the present book (p. 60 ff.), according to which the three different interpretations were put on the RGV. The first and the second are the same as those reported by Obermiller. Ruegg mentions the names Bston (1290–1364), etc. for the first interpretation, and R ma’ ba (1349–1412) (towards the end of his life), etc. for the second, with the remark that the latter interpretation was authorized by Tsoṅ kha pa (1357–1419) and his followers of the dGe lugs pa school. The third interpretation is represented by the Jo naṅ pas and some others, according to whom the RGV is a work written from the standpoint of the ‘dbu ma chen po’ (Grand Madhyamaka) as distinguished from the Madhyamaka acknowledging Nāgārjuna as the highest authority. The Jo naṅ pas criticized the doctrine of ‘raṅ stoṅ’ (void-of-own-being, sva-bhāvaśūnya) put forward in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and Nāgārjuna’s works, and established, in opposition to it, the doctrine of ‘gžan stoṅ’ (void-of-the-other), which means the absolute that is established in reality and is void of all relative and phenomenal factors heterogeneous to it. The doctrine held by the Jo naṅ pas was rejected by the dGe lugs pa teachers because of its tendency to hypostatize the śūnyatā. Ruegg himself seems to have been influenced by the dGe lugs pa interpretation in recognizing the RGV as a treatise of the Mādhyamika. However, the doctrine of the unhypostatized śūnyatā was not monopolized by the Mādhyamika. It is propounded also in the Vijñānavāda treatises, for example, in the first chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga. Seeing that the neither-nor dialectics that characterize the Mādhyamika arguments are not presented in the RGV, I cannot but feel hesitation in ascribing the RGV to the Mādhyamika.

One of the great merits of the present book is the extensive references
to the works of the Tibetan authors (cf. the list of Tibetan sources on pp. 22–27). The Tibetan authors are deeply versed in the philosophical thinking of the Indian Buddhist masters of the later period. They follow closely the Indian traditions and further develop the doctrines with critical insight. Under the circumstance that the later development of the Buddhist doctrines in India remains obscure in many respects, much value is to be attached to the works of the Tibetan authors. We are deeply obliged to Ruegg for his presenting us richly the accurate translation of the Tibetan materials.

It seems that the importance of the RGV was recognized in India by the Buddhist masters of the later period. As far as we know no commentary was written in India on the RGV prior to the Upadeśa of Sajjana, who lived in the 11th century. The quotations from the RGV are found in the Sākārasiddhi of Jñānaśrimitra and the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇījīka of Prajñākaramati, but not in the earlier works. The AA also acquired increasing importance in the later period of the Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, when synthesis of the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra traditions was attempted. Reflecting the later phase of the Indian Buddhism, the Tibetan authors made elaborate studies of the doctrines of Maitreya as exposed in the AA as well as in the RGV, which are introduced to us by Ruegg throughout the present book.

The richness of the materials utilized and the orderliness of the arrangement of the materials in the present book may be shown by briefly summarizing the contents of Part I. Part I consists of three chapters dealing with the gotra-theory of (1) the Vijñānavādins, (2) the Mādhyamikas, and (3) the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and its commentaries respectively. In the Vijñānavāda works, the gotra chiefly means the spiritual ‘lineage’, which is regarded as the basic principle of the classification of sentient beings into some categories from the religious point of view. In accordance with the difference of the gotra, sentient beings are destined to take the vehicle (yāna) of the śrāvaka, the pratyeka-buddha or the bodhisattva, which carries them to their respective goals. Those who are deprived of the gotra either temporarily or permanently cannot attain the liberation. Ruegg clarifies this gotra-theory of the Vijñānavādins by carefully tracing the relevant passages of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and the śāstras of that school. Among the śāstras, Ruegg takes up first the MSA (chapter III) and the Bodhisattvabhūmi
(= BBh) (gotra-paṭala in the ādāra-yogasthāna) which give a detailed discussion of the gotra. He translates these śāstras with the notes indicating the related materials, and in connection with the BBh, refers also to the gotrabhūmi section of the Śrāvakabhūmi (= ŚBh). The distinction between the gotra existent in sentient beings by nature (prakṛtistha) and the gotra acquired through efforts (paripuṣṭa, samudānīta) is found in both the MSA and the BBh. Important is the concept of śadāyatanaviśeṣa (a particularity of the six [internal or cognitive] bases), which is used in the BBh to characterize the prakṛtistha-gotra. The fact that the same concept appears in the ŚBh seems to show that it was originally formed in the abhidharma of a certain Hīnayāna sect, but Ruegg does not discuss the origin of this concept. Perhaps it is connected with the Sautrāntika concept of bija or śakti, since it signifies a latent force or the capacity that is inherent in the six internal bases and becomes actual under certain conditions. Tson kha pa’s criticism and rGyal tshab rje’s Mādhyamika reinterpretation of the term śadāyatanaviśeṣa are introduced in the sections dealing with the writings of these Tibetan authors (pp. 103-104, 157).

In the above-mentioned śāstras and also in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, there are frequent occurrences of the terms that are closely related with the gotra-theory, such as dhātu, bija, kula, etc. The passages where these terms occur are all carefully examined in Chapter I. One may expect here a reference to the *Vijñāptimātratā-siddhi (Taisho 1585) of Dharmaśāla/Hsūan-tsang, but the theories put forward in it are very complicated and they are treated separately in the Appendix II: Sur les notions de bija, d’āśraya, de vāsanā, et de dhātu (pp. 472-495).

After describing the gotra-theory of the Vijñānavādins, Ruegg presents a translation of a section of the Legs bṣad gser phreñ, wherein the author Tson kha pa criticizes the Vijñānavāda theory (pp. 101-107). Tson kha pa sharply observes that the prakṛtistha-gotra of the Vijñānavādins is of the nature of saṃskṛta inasmuch as it is regarded as the capacity to produce the pure (anāsrava). Obviously he makes this criticism with the background of the doctrine set forth in the AA and its commentaries that the gotra is equivalent to the undifferentiated Reality (dharma-dhātu).

For the study of the gotra-theory of the Mādhyamikas, Ruegg refers
to some sūtras beginning with the *Daśadhammakāsūtra* and the *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Caṇḍrakīrti. His selection of the materials is based on the relevant section of the *Legs bṣad gser phreṅ*, which is made accessible to us in good translation at the end of Chapter II (pp. 118–122). Owing to his profound scholarship in Tibetan Buddhism, we are now able to learn in full detail Tṣoṅ kha pa’s view of the *gotra*-theories of the different schools, which was briefly introduced to us some decades ago by Obermiller.15

In the *AA* and its commentaries the *gotra* is identified with the Ultimate Reality which is undifferentiated and universal. After giving valuable information regarding the doctrinal standpoint of the Indian and the Tibetan commentators of the *AA*, Ruegg explains the *gotra*-theory in the *AA*, attaching importance to *AA*, I.37–39, where the *gotra* is recognized as the basis (*pratiṣṭhāḥ*) of the thirteen aspects of the practice (*pratipatti*) of the bodhisattva, and where the distinction of the *gotra* is ultimately annulled with the following statement: *dharmadhātor asambheded gotrabheda na yuyyate / ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedāḥ parigiyate //*

The résumés of the topics of *AA*, I.37–38 by ‘Jam dbyaḥs bṣad pa (1648–1722) and Kloṅ rdol bla ma (1719–1805), and the discussions on the *gotra* found in the *Yid kyi mun sel* of Ņa dbon kun dga’ dpal (14th century), who gave instruction on the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* to Tṣoṅ kha pa, and in the *rNam bṣad sīṇ po’i rgyan* of rGyal tshab rje (1362–1432), a high disciple of Tṣoṅ kha pa, are made available to us in translation with copious notes (pp. 134–173). Especially in the last mentioned work a penetrative interpretation of the *AA* from the Mādhyamika standpoint is fully displayed, and it is understandable that the later philosophical manuals (yig cha) of the dGe lugs pa school were written on the basis of this work.

In Part II, Ruegg examines the *ekayāna*-theory as put forward in some Mahāyāna sūtras, in the *AA* and its commentaries, and in the works of the Tibetan authors. As the difference of the yāna (vehicle) leading to the liberation is grounded on the difference of the *gotra*, the *ekayāna*-doctrine must be supported by the thought that the *gotra* is ultimately undifferentiated, but in the Mahāyāna sūtras the *ekayāna*-doctrine is advocated without reference to the *gotra*-theory. It is the commentaries of the *AA* and of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* that furnished a solid foundation to the *ekayāna*-theory through the identification of the *gotra* with the undifferentiated Reality.
While making a detailed study of the *RGV* in Part III, Ruegg stresses the importance of the verses I.154–155, which condense the teaching of the *RGV*. Verse 154, which is found also in some other Buddhist works with variants, expresses the idea of the immutability of the ultimate Reality (*dhātu* = *tathāgatagarbha* = *śūnyatā*), and verse 155 states that the ultimate Reality is void (*śūnyā*) of the separable and accidental properties while it is not void (*aśūnyā*) of the inseparable supreme properties. According to the introduction to these verses, they are intended to repudiate the two wrong views prevalent among the undisciplined bodhisattvas that the *śūnyatā* means the destruction of the existent things and that there is something called *śūnyatā* distinct from color, etc. The latter view has a tendency to hypostatize the *śūnyatā*. How to defend the doctrine of the *śūnyatā* from the hypostatization is a delicate problem, and Ruegg deals with this problem in Chapter VIII: La notion de la Réalité absolue dans le *RGV* et dans des textes parallèles (pp. 319–392), displaying his philological acumen combined with philosophical insight.

In the prose commentary on the said two verses of *RGV*, there is a quotation of the phrase: *yat yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam... yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṁ bhavati tat sad ihāsti...* This phrase is located in the *Cūlasuññatasutta* and is found quoted in many works of the Vijñānavāda school. Ruegg carefully examines the different interpretations put on this phrase in different works, and through this process makes clear that the doctrine of the *śūnyatā* in the *RGV* is free of hypostatization. (1) In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the phrase is taken to imply a distinction between that which is not found in things, i.e. the permanence, etc. in the *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu*, and that which is found there, i.e. the non-substantiability (*nairātmya*). (2) According to the *BBh* and Vasubandhu’s commentary on the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the phrase is intended to reject the nihilist view of the *śūnyatā* with the thought that, although the things mentally constructed are unreal, the basis (*āśraya*) of the mental construction is real. (3) The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* makes an allusion to this phrase in the passage explaining the concept of the ‘relative voidness’ (*itareśvarāśūnyatā*), which may, with reference to some other sources, be associated with the notion of a hypostatic reality similar to the concept of ‘gžan ston’ of the Jo naṅ pas. (4) The *RGV* quotes this phrase with a view to rejecting both the nihilist and the substantialist interpretations.
of the śūnyatā and establishing the true meaning of the śūnyatā, that is, the voidness of the relative and phenomenal properties accidental to the Ultimate Reality and the non-voidness of the supreme properties inseparable from the Ultimate Reality.

Directing his notice to the affinity of the idea expressed in I.154 to Vedāntic thought, Ruegg quotes the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 5.1.1: ...

... pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate, and points out the curious correlation between the notion of ‘Full’ (pūrṇa) in the Brahmanism and that of ‘Void’ (śūnya) in the Buddhism. But he refrains from making a hasty comparison of Buddhism with the Vedānta system and limits the scope of his study to the Buddhist sources, primarily intending to locate the doctrine of the RGV in the history of the Buddhist thought. The works of the Tibetan authors, including rGyal tshab rje’s commentary on the RGV (rgyud bla’i dar ūk), are abundantly referred to, together with Indian materials, in the footnotes of Part III.

Ruegg’s translation of the Indian and the Tibetan materials is done with impeccable accuracy, but I should like to note down here my disagreement with him just in one minor point. Ruegg translates ‘śūnyatāvikṣiptacitta’ in the introduction to RGV, I.154–155 (Skt. text, p. 75.13) as ‘(les Bodhisattva...) qui ont l’esprit perturbé par la śūnyatā’ (pp. 313–315). I would translate it as ‘(the bodhisattva) whose mind is distracted from the śūnyatā’. The following paraphrase of this compound in the prose commentary seems to support my understanding: yeṣām itaḥ śūnyatārthanyād bahiś cittaṁ vikṣiptye visarati... (Skt. text, p. 76.12) – those whose mind is distracted or goes forth dispersedly outwards from this mode of the sense of the śūnyatā... (Ruegg’s translation on p. 315: les personnes dont l’esprit perturbé vers l’extérieur loin du mode du sens de la śūnyatā se disperse...). Reference is to be made to the term ‘vikṣepavikalpa’ used in the Mahāyānasamgraha to indicate the ten types of mental construction (vikalpa). It is explained there that each type of mental construction is rejected in the Prajñāpāramitāśūtras by a certain phrase, and Asvabhāva states clearly, in his commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha, that the vikṣepavikalpa means the mental construction that distracts the mind from the nirvikalpaśūna (= prajñāpāramitā).

The same thought is expressed as follows in the Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṁgraha of Dignāga: daśabhiś cittavikṣepaiś cittaṁ vikṣiptam anyataṁ / yogyaṁ bhavati bālānāṁ nādvayajñānasādhane // (v. 19). Needless to say,
the advayajñāna is equivalent to the prajñāpāramitā (cf. v. 1). The idea of the distraction of the mind from the prajñāpāramitā found in these sources may be fitly applied for the interpretation of the compound ‘śūnyatāvīkṣiptacitta’.

The tathāgatagarbha-doctrine is closely connected with the notion that the mind (citta) is luminous (prabhāsva) by nature, which can be traced back to the Pali canon. Part IV is devoted to the exhaustive study of the Mahāyāna sources of this notion. Appendix I deals with the terms ‘gotrabhū’. etc, in the Pali canon and the gotra-theory in the Abhidharmakośa. The concept of bija, etc. important to the Sautrāntikas and the Vijñānavādins are studied in Appendix II. In Appendix III, Ruegg acknowledges the analogy between the notion of the tathāgatagarbha and that of the sarvajñābija in the Yogasūtra, I.25, and conjectures the possibility that the two notions grew from the common idea held in the milieu in which the mutual relation of Buddhism and Brahmanism was maintained.

The grammatical analysis of the term ‘tathāgatagarbha’ is made in the Conclusion as follows: – In the Indian sources, the term ‘tathāgatagarbha’ is generally a determinative compound (tathāgatasya/tathāgatānāṃ garbhaḥ). However, by reason of the identification of the tathāgata as the result (=nirmalā tathatā) with the garbha as the cause (=samalā tathatā), the same term in the formula ‘sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ’ and the like is sometimes analyzed as a possessive compound (e.g., Comm. on RGV, I.148: tathāgatas tathataisāṃ garbhāḥ sarvasattvānām). When translating the said formula, the Tibetans usually add to ‘de bzin gṣegs pa’i sniṅ po’ (tathāgatagarbha) the particle ‘can’ (possessing). This does not necessarily mean that the Tibetans analyzed ‘tathāgatagarbha’ as a possessive compound. Rather they intended to make clear the distinction between the tathāgatagarbha and the sattva who possesses it, i.e., the gūna and the guṇin in grammatical terminology.

The book is beautifully printed. ‘Errata et Addenda’ (6 pages) is attached to the book with the author’s regret at the unfavorable conditions for the proof-reading which were created in Paris by events in 1968. There are some typographical errors which escaped the author’s attention. I shall note here only one: p. 42, l. 3, read Devaprajñā instead of “prajñā. Professor Ruegg is to be highly commended for his excellent achievement in the study of the tathāgatagarbha-theory as presented in the śāstras. It
is to be hoped he will further explore the domain of the sūtras and produce in the near future a result comparable in its scholarly value to the present book.

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NOTES

1 The text of the Ratnagotravibhāga as we possess it now is a combination of the basic text in verse and the commentary (Vyākhyā) in verse and prose. An attempt to reconstitute the original text by extracting a certain number of verses from the present text was made by J. Takasaki, cf. Introduction, II, and Appendix I of the book mentioned below in n. 6. L. Schmithauser proposed an emendation to the original text prepared by Takasaki, cf. ‘Philologische Bermerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhāga’, WZKSA, XV (1971).


The articles discussing this problem are referred to on p. 50ff.


H. W. Bailey and E. H. Johnston, ‘A Fragment of the Uttaratantra in Sanskrit’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, VIII (1935), pp. 77–83; Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 255. Johnston changed the name Sāramati restored from the Chinese to Sthiramati with the remark that Sāramati is a somewhat unusual form (*op. cit.*, p. 81). In support of this opinion, de Jong says, “Usually, personal names ending in -mati have as first element an adjective or a participle” (*op. cit.*, p. 38, n. 10). However, we know such names as Guṇamatī, Ratnamatī and Prajñākaramatī. Johnston held the opinion that Sāramatī “belonged to the Mādhyamika school, but to a section teaching a doctrine more advanced than that of Nāgārjuna...” (*op. cit.*, p. 82). It may be better not to apply the appellation ‘Mādhyamika’ to Sāramatī. Frauwallner distinguishes ‘die Schule Sāramatis’ from the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra.


*Mahāyānasamgraha* (= MS), Tibetan version, Peking ed., Mdo-hgre 6LVI (Li), fol. 19b.6ff. The ten types of mental construction are enumerated in *MSA*, XI.77, but the term ‘vikṣepavikalpa’ does not occur there.

The Chinese text of the MS does not contain the quotation from the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. The explanation found in the Tibetan text of the MS coincides with that given in the prose commentary of *MSA*, XI.77.

*Mahāyānasamgrahapāṇi-bandha*, Tibetan version, Peking ed., Mdo-hgre LVI (Li), fol. 280b.1–2: rnam par gyeṅ bar byed pas rnam par gyeṅ ba stey, de ḋid rnam par rtog pa’o (vikṣipatiti vikṣepah, sa eva vikalpaḥ). gaṇ las rnam par gyeṅ bar byed ce na, rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye sles las so (kasmād vikṣipatiti cet, nirvikalpaṇānāt).