

1963, the year in which he became first acquainted with the *Great Exposition of Tenets* by 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa (1648–1721), one of the main sources for his book, which is based both on oral explanations and the works of 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa and other scholars such as lCang-skye Rol-pa'i rdo-rje (1717–1786). Hopkins has an admirable knowledge of literary and spoken Tibetan and he has obviously derived great profit from the teachings he has received from several learned lamas. A text such as the *Great Exposition of Tenets* is extremely difficult to understand without the help of Tibetan scholars. Hopkins' translation of a section of the chapter on the Prāsaṅgika doctrines in part six of his book is a remarkable achievement. Another important text translated in this book is a section of the first chapter of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, pp. 14.1–36.2), which is one of the principal documents on the differences between the two Madhyamaka schools, the Prāsaṅgikas (represented in this text by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti) and the Svātantrikas (represented by their founder, Bhāvaviveka). The first half of Hopkins' book comprises four parts, entitled "Meditation," "Reasoning into Reality," "The Buddhist World" and "Systems," in which he gives a comprehensive survey of Buddhist Mahāyāna philosophy, with special emphasis on the doctrines of the Madhyamaka school.

Undoubtedly, the general reader will find it easier to understand the first half of Hopkins' book than the highly complicated and technical texts translated in parts five and six. The specialist in Buddhist studies who is not familiar with the dGe-lugs-pa tradition will also find in it much to glean. However, he will probably be somewhat disturbed by the way in which Hopkins has presented his materials, i.e., by using both written texts and oral teachings. At the beginning of each section, Hopkins scrupulously enumerates his sources, and in the notes he often indicates the sources even for very small sub-sections. Nevertheless, it is not always easy to know which particular text is being used, and in the case of oral teaching one would like to know on which texts they are based. Sometimes, also, Hopkins introduces concepts that are explained much later on in his book. For instance, on p. 57 Hopkins mentions "the diamond slivers," which are only explained in note 619. In this note, Hopkins makes some remarks about the possible meanings of the Sanskrit equivalent of sliver, i.e., *kaṇa*. This suggests that the term "the diamond slivers" is based upon a Sanskrit original. However, the only authority Hopkins quotes is Kensur Lekden, although he refers

Meditation on Emptiness, by Jeffrey Hopkins. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983, 1019 pp. \$17.95/\$35.00

The publication of Jeffrey Hopkins' magnum opus shows how much progress has been made in Tibetan studies since the revolt of 1959 brought many lamas to India, Europe and America. In his introduction Hopkins retraces his studies since

vaguely to oral and written sources, adding that the oral traditions with which he has been in contact are by no means always accurate. One would like to know more about the written sources in which this term is used and explained, and in particular about Indian sources referred to by Tibetan scholars. If no Indian sources can be traced, it seems rather strange to speculate on the meaning of a Sanskrit equivalent of a term used by Tibetan scholars.

In part five of his book, Hopkins translates and explains the controversies between on the one hand, Buddhapālita, and on the other, Candrakīrti. Hopkins refers to the Sanskrit text edited by L. de La Vallée Poussin, but his translation of Candrakīrti's text seems to be based entirely on the Tibetan version. This has some strange consequences. For instance, Hopkins translates *bādhā* (Tib. *gnod-pa*) by "damage, harm" (cf. pp. 502, 526 and note 395), whereas the technical meaning of the Sanskrit term "refutation, annulment" is well-known from Sanskrit philosophical texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Even more amazing is his persistent use of the term "renowned" for *siddha* and *prasiddha* (Tibetan *grags-pa*) which results in such incomprehensible renderings as: "Therefore, some say 'There is no harm by inference that is through the force of being renowned to the other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others'." (p. 526). The Sanskrit text has: *na parataḥ prasiddhibalād anumānabādhā / parasiddher eva nirācīkṛṣitatvād iti* (35.4–5): "It is not possible to refute by inference on the strength of that which is admitted by others because it is just that which is admitted by others, that one wishes to refute." Also, in other instances Hopkins' renderings of technical terms are not very satisfactory, for example, "unmistaken" (p. 485) for *avyabhicārin* (21.5). Wrong is Hopkins' rendering of *sādhya* by "predicate of the probandum" (p. 508). The *sādhya* is the "property to be proved", i.e., the probandum.

In the *Great Exposition of Tenets* 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa quotes many texts, but often in abridged form. Hopkins has given the full quotations in his edition of the Tibetan text, which is added at the end of the book. As Hopkins remarks, these quotations constitute an anthology of the basic texts for the study of the Prāsaṅgika system. It is therefore desirable that these quotations should be carefully translated. On p. 608, Hopkins translates the following extract from the *Dhāraṇīśvara-rājaparipṛcchāsūtra*: "He leads those sentient beings to the Tathāgata's land through discourse on the irreversible wheel

[cultivation of the union of method and wisdom] and discourse on the complete purification of the three spheres [of agent, action, and object]. those sentient beings of various lineages and natures—having become equal—realize the nature of Tathāgatahood. Thus, they realize [the six perfections and so forth], the highest boon [bestowing omniscience]." The Sanskrit original of this quotation is to be found in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (ed. E.H. Johnston, p. 6.3–7): *tataḥ paścād avivartyadharma-cakrakathayā trimāṇḍalaparīśuddhikathayā ca tathāgataviśaye tān sattvān avatārayati nānāprakṛtihetukān / avatīrṇās ca samānās tathāgatadharma-tām adhigamyaṇuttarā dakṣiṇīyā ity ucyante*. The same passage is quoted in the Tibetan version of Nāgārjuna's *Sūtrasamuccaya*. Bhikkhu Pāsādika, who refers to the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, translates it as follows: "Through discourses on the 'irreversible wheel' (of the Doctrine of *ekayāna*) and the purity of the 'three spheres' (of giving, viz. the giver, recipient, and the act of giving) he causes sentient beings of diverse extraction and dispositions to enter the sphere of the Tathāgata. Having entered it and having discovered Buddhahood (*tathāgatadharma-tā*) (in themselves), they are called the highest ('field of merit') worthy of veneration."¹ It is obvious that Hopkins' rendering gives a wrong idea of the original. This is partly due to the imperfect Tibetan translation as found on page 33 of the text edited by Hopkins, but also to the fact that Hopkins has clearly misunderstood such well-known terms as *śbyin-gnas* (*dakṣiṇīyā*). In another passage, Hopkins has misread the text in Ngawang Geleg Demo's edition, p. 906.5: *'jig lta sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis . . .* Hopkins' text has *'jigs lta*, etc., and he translates this as follows: "through fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence] the Destroyers have forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed" (p. 604). In this passage the Arhats are compared to those whose Buddha lineage has been severed on account of a false notion of personality (*'jig-lta*, *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*). Twice, the text mentions those who have entered into the *yang-dag-pa nyid-du nges-pa*, which Hopkins renders as "who strictly abide in the right," and adds between brackets "in a nirvana without remainder" (pp. 603 and 606). Hopkins fails to explain this term, which corresponds to Sanskrit *samyaktvaṇīyāma* or *-niyama*, and which has been studied by Wogihara, de La Vallée Poussin, Seyfort Rugg and Rahula.² In the translation of this text, Hopkins is careless too in his renderings of technical terms. Probably nobody will recognize in "unusual attitude" Tibetan *lhag-bsam*, Sanskrit *adhyāśaya* (p. 604). On p. 617, Hopkins mistranslates a quotation

from the *Ghanavyūhasūtra*: "[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown]." A correct interpretation has been given by Seyfort Ruegg who translates: "Les différentes Terres (*bhūmi*) [sont] l'*ālaya*."³

In order not to give rise to a wrong impression, it is absolutely necessary to repeat again that Hopkins' work is a remarkable achievement. However, it is perhaps not superfluous to point out that it is not always satisfactory to rely entirely on rather recent Tibetan works and on oral explanations. There are many Sanskrit texts that have been carefully studied by several generations of scholars, and it is not advisable to neglect them. Hopkins' work could be so much more useful if he would take the trouble to pay more attention to Indian texts and to the study of the technical vocabulary that is found in these texts. It is impossible to study Tibetan Buddhism, and especially such a learned school as that of the dGe-lugs-pas, without a profound knowledge of its Indian background and of the Indian texts that are quoted over and over again.

J.W. de Jong

NOTES

1. Cf. "Linh-Son" - *Publication d'études bouddhologiques*, No. 14 (1981), p. 21.

2. Unrai Wogihara, *Lexikalisches aus der Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 28–30 (reprinted in his edition of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Tokyo, 1930–1936; 2nd. ed., 1971); L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Cinquième et sixième chapitres (Paris-Louvain, 1925), pp. 180–182; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 196–197; Walpola Rahula, *Le compendium de la super-doctrine (philosophie)*. (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*) d'Asaṅga (Paris, 1971), p. 152, n. 3.

3. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Le traité du tathāgatarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), pp. 35 and 90. See also Robert A.F. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, 1984), p. 350.

Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China. Paramārtha's 'Evolution of Consciousness,' by Diana Y. Paul. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, vii + 266 pages.

Paramārtha (499–569) is considered to be one of the four great translators of Indian texts into Chinese, the other three being Kumārajīva, Hsüan-tsang and Amoghavajra. He arrived in China in 546, but did not meet with favourable conditions and was forced to wander from one place to another. Nevertheless, he was able to translate many texts, most of which belong to the Vijñānavāda school. He was interested in particular in the Mahāyānasamgraha, and he founded the She-lun school. His interpretations of the Vijñānavāda texts were disseminated by his disciples. After the foundation of the Fa-hsiang school by Hsüan-tsang's chief disciple, Chi (632–682), the She-lun school disappeared from the scene.

Diana Paul's book is the first monograph in a Western language on Paramārtha. The bibliography comprises many Sanskrit, Chinese and Japanese sources, and among the secondary sources a number of publications by Japanese scholars are mentioned. Her work seems to be the result of many years of study during which the author discussed her ideas with colleagues both in Japan and America. The first two chapters deal with the life and times of Paramārtha and the spreading of his ideas by his disciples. Paramārtha's views on language and on the philosophy of mind are discussed in the following two chapters. His *Chuan shih lun* is analysed in the last chapter, which is followed by the translation of the text.

The reader of this book cannot but be impressed by the wide range of sources both primary and secondary. However, when one takes the trouble to check the information the author gives, one soon discovers that her study and interpretation of the sources leaves much to be desired. For instance, she writes that all biographical data presented on the figure of Paramārtha are based upon his biography in the *Hsü kao seng chuan*. The single most important secondary source in the analysis of the HSKC is Ui Hakuju's study, *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū*, vol. 6, 1930, pp. 5–130 (cp. 187, note 31). On p. 35 Paul writes that after Hui-k'ai's death in 568 Paramārtha continued to translate the *Abhidharma-kośa*. On p. 194 (note 25) she repeats the same information, referring to Paramārtha's biography, and she wonders how Hui-k'ai could have written an introduction to the *Kośa* in 567 as stated by Ui on p. 6 of his book. In the same note Paul

writes that the *Kośa* was translated in the fifth year of T'ien-chia, or 564, which clearly contradicts her previous statement that Paramārtha continued to translate the *Kośa* after the death of Hui-k'ai. Ui discusses the dates of the translation of the *Kośa* and points out that this text must have been translated in 564 and not in 563 as stated in Hui-k'ai's introduction (Ui, pp. 36–37). Subsequently the translation was carefully revised and the revision completed in 567. Ui quotes a passage from Hui-k'ai's biography which says that Hui-k'ai lectured on the *Kośa* until his death and that after his death Paramārtha continued to lecture on the same text (cf. Ui, p. 37; HSKC, p. 431b9–24).¹

Probably the first text translated by Paramārtha was the *Shih-ch'i-ti-lun* in five *chüan* (Paul, p. 25). The text is now lost, but it is certainly an incomplete translation of the first part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (cf. Ui, pp. 55–58). In a note Paul writes that “*The Treatise on the seventeen Bodhisattva Stages (Shih-ch'i ti lun)* was a commentary on a *sūtra* by the same name consisting of part of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*” (p. 188, note 43).

In her analysis of the *Chuan shih lun*, Paul discusses in detail the problem of the *amalavijñāna* and translates several passages of Paramārtha's works in which this term occurs. On p. 142 she translates one passage of the *San wu-hsing-lun* (T. 1617, p. 873c23–24) and adds “This is the only instance of *amala-vijñāna* in the SWHL”. However, a much more important passage relating to *amalavijñāna* occurs in the same text (871c28–872a15; Ui, pp. 244–245). This passage is discussed by Katsumata Shunkyō and is also partially translated by Paul Demiéville, to mention only two publications listed in the bibliography of Paul's book.²

On p. 143 Paul translates a passage of the *Chüeh ting tsang lun* relating to the *amalavijñāna* (T. 1584, 1020b12–19; 23–24; Ui, pp. 563–565). The translation contains the most amazing errors. For instance, the text has: “The *ālayavijñāna* is followed by the effects of *dauṣṭhulya*. In the *amalavijñāna* the entire *dauṣṭhulya* is absent.” Paul translates: “The *ālaya-vijñāna* is the consequent of subtle evil. The *amala-vijñāna* is followed by subtle evil.” In the corresponding passage of Hsüang-tsang's translation *dauṣṭhulya* is rendered by *ts'u-chung*. Paramārtha uses the term *ts'u-o-ku*.³ The same passage was translated correctly in 1929 by Paul Demiéville.⁴ In the remaining part of this passage as in other passages relating to *amalavijñāna*, the translation is often far from correct.

The translation of the *Chuan shih lun* also contains some very strange renderings. On page 155 Paul translates: “[Verse

VII:] This consciousness and its associated [mental] states are eliminated in the Arhat stage, being ultimately eliminated upon entering cessation-meditation (*nīrodha-samāpatti*).” This is exactly the opposite of that what is found in the text: “This consciousness and its associated dharmas are finally destroyed upon arrival in the Arhat stage and are also all destroyed upon entering the meditation of cessation.” As Ui explains, the destruction is definitive in the Arhat stage but only temporary during the meditation of cessation, because upon arising from this meditation consciousness returns (Ui, p. 447). This is of course a well-known doctrine and found, for instance, also in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun*: “Dans l'état d'Arhat, le Manas souillé (*kliṣṭaṃ manas*), tant actuel que Bijas, est absolument coupé. On dit donc qu'il n'existe pas (*na*). Quant aux Śaikṣas, dans l'état de “recueillement de cessation” (*Nirodhasamāpatti*) et lorsqu'ils pratiquent le Chemin, le Manas souillé est provisoirement “dompté” (incapable de s'actualiser). On dit donc qu'il n'existe pas” (*La Siddhi de Hsuan-Tsang* traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin, I, Paris, 1928, p. 267).

According to verse 16 of the *Trīṃśikā*, the *mano-vijñāna* is absent in five states: *manovijñānasambhūtiḥ sarvadāsaṃjñikād ṛte / samāpattidvayān middhān murchanād apy acittakāt*. La Vallée Poussin translates: “Le Manovijñāna se produit toujours excepté dans l'état de dieu inconscient, et dans les deux recueils, la torpeur et la défaillance exempts de pensée” (*La Siddhi*, p. 398). Paramārtha mentions six states: *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*, *asaṃjñīdevas*, sound sleep without dreams (*middha*), drunkenness, stupor (*murchana*) and temporary death of the mind, omitting *nīrodhasamāpatti* and adding drunkenness and temporary death of the mind (cf. Ui, p. 452). In her translation Paul manages to smuggle into the text the two *samāpattis*: “[cessation] meditation without conceptualization (*nīrodha-samāpatti*), [meditation associated with the third level or *dhyāna* in] heavens without conceptualization (*asaṃjñī-samāpatti*), dreamless sleep, drunken stupor, unconsciousness, or a coma” (p. 158). No note accompanies her translation, which clearly was made without understanding the Chinese text and without consulting Ui's commentary.

Diana Paul is not more successful in her interpretation of Sanskrit texts. She translates verse 17 of the *Trīṃśikā* as follows: “Evolution of consciousness is discrimination that is falsely discriminated; therefore, it does not exist. Thus, all is Consciousness-Only” (p. 239, note 42). The Sanskrit text is: *vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate / tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñāptimātrakam*. Paul's translation (“discrimination is falsely discrimi-

nated") sins both against Sanskrit grammar and the meaning of the verse. The interesting fact is that this verse is interpreted in two different ways by Hsüan-tsang and Sthiramati. This is clearly explained by La Vallée Poussin, who points out that Hsüan-tsang understands: "Ce développement du Vijñāna est la pensée et le "pensé", ce qui pense (cogitat) et la chose qui est pensée (cogitatur). Par conséquent (*tena*) cela (*tad* = Ātman et Dharma) n'existe pas. Par conséquent tout cela est Vijñapti-sans-plus." Sthiramati makes a break after *vikalpaḥ*: "Le développement du Vijñāna est le Vikalpa, imagination; ce qui est imaginé par cette imagination (*tena* [*vikalpena*]), cela n'existe pas; par conséquent . . ." (*La Siddhi de Hsüan-tsang*, p. 416).

In other instances Paul advances new interpretations which are completely unacceptable. On p. 134 she refers to the following passage of Sthiramati's commentary on verse 1 of the Triṃśikā: *vijñānaṃ punaḥ pralīyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'stīty abhyupeyaṃ* / (ed. Sylvain Lévi, p. 16.16–17). Paul suggests that *vijñānasya* may modify *pariṇāma*, although she concedes that "the more common reading by Buddhologists" connects it with *pralīyasamutpanna* (cf. p. 225, note 94). One wonders whether there is one reputable Buddhist who accepts this interpretation. We have not taken the trouble to consult all the existing translations of the Triṃśikā, but Sylvain Lévi, Jacobi and Ui all connect *vijñānasya* with *pralīyasamutpanna*. Another new interpretation is given on p. 138 for the following sentence: *tena grāhyagrāhakeṇa paratantrasya sadā sarvakālaṃ atyantarahitatā yā sa pariṇipannasvabhāvaḥ* (Triṃśikā, ed. Sylvain Lévi, p. 40.4–5). Paul writes: "Grammatically, this phrase . . . could be translated in the following manner . . . : 'Because always and in all times what is separate from the dependent nature through the agency of the perceiver and the perceived is called the absolute nature.'" Paul adds that "from the context of the *bhāṣya* this reading is unlikely," but even to suggest the possibility of such an interpretation is unwarranted.

The above remarks are the result of an examination of only a few passages taken more or less at random from Paul's book; other examples could be adduced. Paramārtha is a very important figure and it is to be hoped that he will receive due attention from Western scholars. In the first place it will be necessary to give a complete translation of his biography and those of his main disciples. In translating his works it would be highly desirable to translate also the corresponding passages in Hsüan-tsang's translations. In his book, Ui has presented parallel texts followed by a detailed commentary which is extremely useful. Ui's book,

although published in 1930, is still the most important publication on Paramārtha and is indispensable for any further study of his life and ideas.

J.W. de Jong.

NOTES

1. See also Paul Demiéville, "Sur l'authenticité du *Ta tch'eng k'i sin louen*", *BMFJ*, 11, 2 (Tokyo, 1929), p. 21.
2. Katsumata Shunkyō, *Bukkyō ni okeru shinshikisetsu no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1961), p. 704; Demiéville, *op.cit.*, p. 41.
3. On the meaning of *dausthulya*, see Unrai Wogihara, *Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Leipzig, 1908), pp. 27–28; Sylvain Lévi, *Asaṅga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra*, Tome II (Paris, 1911), p. 51, note 2; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi de Hsüan-tsang*, I–II (Paris, 1928–1929), pp. 331 and 608.
4. *Op.cit.*, p. 42.

Diana Paul Replies:

I always enjoy taking the time to reply to reviews of my books that have grappled with the content and basis of the analysis. A well-thought-out review always leaves the reader with a clearer idea of the author's purport and intent for writing the book. It gives a clear exposition of the substance and thesis of the book. I am sorry to say that the reader who looks at de Jong's review will not be able to grasp the nature of my project at all. The burden on any conscientious reviewer is to pay attention to what the author *does* write about rather than being preoccupied with issues that the reviewer *wants* to raise because he or she thinks those issues are more important. It is one thing to meet on the issues and substance and to disagree or to criticize. It is quite another to read a protracted discourse that, in fact, does not acknowledge what does appear in the work. This discourse by de Jong is such a protracted one. First, the reader should note that de Jong makes note of only Chapter One (two references) and Chapter Five (three references), without discussing Chapter Two, "The Dissemination of Paramārtha's Ideas," Chapter Three, "Theory of Language in Yogācāra," and Chapter Four, "Philosophy of Mind."

My major intent was to show in simpler, readable language

and in a philosophically systematic way how Paramārtha, in his representation of Yogācāra Buddhism, thought that it was in the very nature of the structure of the mind to undergo self-analysis and eventually to be able to analyze and dissect the structures of the mind itself, assuming proper discipline and meditative training. Chapters Three and Four represent the major thrust of this intent and are entirely ignored by de Jong.

I do not plan to take each of the five examples, three of which discuss footnotes, and refute de Jong, belaboring the points on which the contents of his review are based. I think one or two examples should be sufficient to indicate that de Jong did not read my work carefully, nor did he pay close attention to detail, although on first appearance it may seem so to the reader who has not read my book.

My first example: He remarks that I claim "that all biographical data presented on the figure of Paramārtha are based upon his biography in the *Hsu kao seng chuan*." The indisputable fact is that I wrote: "All biographical data presented on the figure of Paramārtha are based upon this account (HKSC), *unless otherwise noted* (emphasis added). At one time there were three biographies of Paramārtha . . ." (p. 187, #31). De Jong goes on to describe what an important source Ui Hakuju's study is, apparently implying that I do not give credit to his contribution. In the same citation given above (p. 187, #31) I clearly assert: "Ui Hakuju has analyzed Paramārtha's biography in great detail . . . and his work is the single most important secondary source in my analysis of the HKSC."

My second example, on a question of historical dating with regard to the translation made by Paramārtha of the Kośa: The Kośa was translated in 564 and Hui-k'ai wrote an introduction even though the translation by Paramārtha had not yet been completed (p. 194, #25). The biography of Paramārtha clearly states that Paramārtha continued to translate that same text *after* Hui-k'ai's death, although he dearly missed his favorite student. Ui claims that the biography means to say that Paramārtha revised and polished an already completed text, even though the HKSC does not say that. I consider this an unsolved puzzle—that is, an alleged introduction to an incomplete translation. Ui insists that the translation was completed before Hui-k'ai's death, choosing to disagree with the only biography available to us. Ui and de Jong have the same position. I strictly adhere on this point to the biography itself. One may, of course, be unpersuaded by my arguments and side with Ui on this point.

On translation differences, I again will be brief and discuss only one example. De Jong does not like my rendering of verse VII (p. 155) and prefers Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation. The text, according to Paramārtha's rendition of this verse, does state quite clearly that the *adana-vijñāna* is eliminated absolutely in cessation-meditation, implying that the Arhat has indeed not completely attained a non-grasping, non-appropriating egolessness. This is a severe criticism made against the Arhat's spiritual attainment and quite unusual. But Paramārtha does make that claim, although Hsüan-tsang does not.

One final comment on de Jong's review: Unfortunately, for both the readers of the review and of my rejoinder, the framework for discussing my book was reduced to five very narrow points or footnotes that do not get to the substance and heart of my analysis of Paramārtha's unique contributions to an extraordinary school of thought in Chinese Buddhism. The latter would be the only proper subject for an informative review of this book and would focus on the central issues I discussed. De Jong's lengthy review apparently professes to be about the central issues but, in fact, does not show recognition of what the central issues are.

J.W. de Jong Replies:

In order not to take up too much space I will deal as briefly as possible with the remarks made by Diana Paul in her reply. Diana Paul insists that "all biographical data presented on the figure of Paramārtha are based upon this account (HSKC), unless otherwise noted" (i.e. on HSKC 2060.50.429c6–431a6). On p. 35 Diana Paul writes: "Two months later on the twelfth day, eighth month, of the second year of Kuan-t'ai (September 18, 568), Paramārtha's favorite disciple, Hui-k'ai, died." This is not found in Paramārtha's biography but in that of Hui-k'ai. However, the date mentioned here is not the twelfth day of the eighth month, but the *twentieth* day of the eighth month (HSKC 2060.50.431b15). Diana Paul continues: "Paramārtha grieved deeply for him, and, with the rest of his disciples, burned candles and incense in Fa-chun's room." This also is not found in Paramārtha's biography but in that of Chih-Chi (HSKC 2060.50.431c11–12). Then follows the sentence to which I referred in my review: "He (i.e. Paramārtha) continued to translate the *Abhidharma-kośa*."

In her reply Diana Paul writes that "the biography of Paramārtha clearly states that Paramārtha continued to translate

that same text (i.e. the *Kośa*) after Hui-k'ai's death." I am sorry to insist on the fact that this is stated nowhere in Paramārtha's biography. In my review I wrote that Hui-k'ai lectured on the *Kośa* until his death and that after his death Paramārtha continued to lecture on the same text, and I referred to both the HSKC and to Ui. I may add that the same information is given by Demiéville in an article mentioned in Diana Paul's bibliography (see *Choix d'études bouddhiques*, p. 21).

In her reply, Diana Paul writes that "Ui claims that the biography means to say that Paramārtha revised and polished an already completed text, even though the HSKC does not say that." Ui's source is not, of course, Paramārtha's biography, but Hui-k'ai's preface to Paramārtha's translation of the *Kośa* (Taishō 1559.29.161b20–22).

Diana Paul's third example is her translation of verse VII. It is rather amazing to see that she still does not recognize that her translation is wrong, as has already been pointed out by another reviewer (see Collett Cox's review in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, 45, 1, p. 126). It is absurd to say that I prefer Hsüan-tsang's translation which reads: "It (i.e. the defiled mind) does not exist for the Arhat, nor in the meditation of cessation, nor on the supramundane path" (see Ui, p. 411).

The eight (not five) points raised in my review represent only a small selection of the critical notes I made while reading Diana Paul's work. I believe that they are sufficient to show the way in which Diana Paul handled her Chinese sources and her "single most important secondary source in [her] analysis of the HSKC." Diana Paul's reply only confirms what I have already said in my review.