



p. 34 'he should know' : almost certainly 'one/you should know'.

p. 35 'The Buddha said' : read 'The Buddha would say' (cf. note *ad* p. 28 above).

p. 40 'On entering Parinirvāṇa the Tathāgata advises: 'I shall not show the treasury of the Dharma of the highest teaching (*gsuñs pa*) to the disciples who are the śrāvakas . . .' The translation should read: 'When I enter Parinirvāṇa, I do not reveal to those disciples who are śrāvakas the treasure of the supreme Dharma (*bla-na med-pa'i chos-kyi gter*) uttered in a veiled manner by the Tathāgata (*de-bžin-gsēgs-pas dgoñs-te gsuñs-pa*)' (cf. Yuyama's version of the Chinese original on p. 34; note also that the Tog Palace Kanjur edition of the text clarifies the syntax somewhat by reading *gsuñs-pa'i*).

p. 41 Similarly, Yuyama's 'For this reason (*don*) I advise the highest: I shall bestow the teaching (*gsuñs-pa*), the treasury of the Dharma, on the bodhisattvas' should be 'For this reason I shall hand over the treasure of the supreme and veiled Dharma (*bla-na med-pa dgoñs-pa chos-kyi gter*; *gsuñs-pa* does not appear) to the bodhisattvas.'

Despite these minor points, there is no doubt that Yuyama has produced a valuable study of this fragment of an important Buddhist sutra. Not only is it a fitting tribute to Prof. J. W. de Jong of the A. N. U., whose 60th birthday it honours, but one hopes that it also foreshadows further work of a similar calibre on the same text.

University of Canterbury

PAUL HARRISON

Robert A. F. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*. Reason and Enlightenment in the Central Philosophy of Tibet. Princeton N. J. Princeton University Press. 1984. xviii, 443 pp. \$65.00.

The *Essence of True Eloquence* was written by Tsoñ-kha-pa in the winter of 1407–1408. It is one of the most important works written in Tibet and is often referred to by Tibetan scholars. Thurman's translation of this difficult text is an extremely important contribution to Buddhist and Tibetan studies because of the pivotal role of Tsoñ-kha-pa in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. His work is the culmination of a process of assimilation and systematization of Buddhist doctrines which had continued since the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet and especially since the later spread of Buddhism (*phyi-dar*) in the eleventh century. His work has had a decisive influence not only on the doctrines of the school who claims him as its founder, but also on those of other schools.

One of the great merits of this translation is the great care with which Thurman

has defined and translated the technical terms which abound in this text. They are listed in an English-Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary which will be very useful for the reader who wants to know the Sanskrit and Tibetan forms. Thurman has spared no efforts to explain the difficulties of the text by the addition of many notes. The introduction, which occupies more than 170 pages, will be of great help in understanding Tsoṅ-kha-pa's text. At the same time Thurman analyzes with great penetration some of the fundamental problems in the understanding of the Madhyamaka school. Of special interest is the last section of his introduction which is divided into four parts. In the first, Thurman makes use of the philosophical ideas of Wittgenstein, especially the later Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, to elucidate Tsoṅ-kha-pa's main ideas. The second part deals with the distinction between *neyārtha* and *nītārtha* which plays such an important role in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In the third part Thurman analyzes the process of critical discrimination (*vipaśyanā*); and the last part is devoted to the much discussed problem of the ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka philosophy. Thurman distinguishes two schools of interpretation: the monistic absolutists who believe that Madhyamaka dialectics lead to a mystic leap into union with the absolute; and the existential relativists who believe that Nāgārjuna was concerned with epistemology and not ontology. According to the latter school, Nāgārjuna's basic message is that language is antinomial and all rational activity pointless. Thurman rejects both interpretations and tries to show that Nāgārjuna teaches a thesis, namely, that everything is indeed empty of intrinsic reality. The "intuitive wisdom" he recommends to terminate misknowledge is not uncultivated, native intuition but "wisdom" (*prajñā*) the "critical investigation of facts" (*dharmapraṇicaya*), which only becomes "intuitive" when it has firmly reached its conclusion and transcended misleading thinking. Thurman points out in what way Tsoṅ-kha-pa has further developed these basic ideas of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Without any doubt, this part of his introduction is of the greatest importance for the study of the Madhyamaka philosophy in India and Tibet. Where one hesitates to follow Thurman's interpretation is in his absolute rejection of mysticism. Thurman speaks of a "mystic abandonment of reason in fixated alienation" and of a "mystic absolutism that demands that the philosopher should throw away his reason as hopelessly inadequate to some ineffable Absolute". There are different forms of mysticism, and the one described by Thurman is only one of many. There exists also an intellectual, speculative mysticism which is far from rejecting reason but aims rather at transcending reason.

If, notwithstanding all Thurman's efforts, it is still difficult to understand Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Essence of True Eloquence* it is certainly not his fault. Tsoṅ-kha-pa refers implicitly or explicitly to many texts and to different schools of thought, but mostly without entering into a detailed discussion of the arguments on which his reasoning is based and of the doctrines of his adversaries. As Thurman remarks:

“The *Essence* gives the essential keys, but most of us need an enormous background study to really appreciate it” (p. 163, n. 222). A work such as the *Essence of True Eloquence* will only become more accessible when more of the basic texts of Tibetan Buddhism have been translated and explained. It is to be hoped that future works of this kind will attain the same degree of excellence as is to be found in Thurman’s book.

Thurman’s work, though admirable, is not free from some minor blemishes. His knowledge of Chinese versions of Buddhist texts seems to be rather limited, for otherwise he would not have stated that Yuan-tsho’s commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra appears to have been lost in the original Chinese, since Nanjio has no record of it (p. 205, n. 50). This commentary is not recorded by Nanjio, and neither is it published in the Taishō edition, but it is to be found in the supplement to the Kyōto edition (*Dainihon zokuzōkyō*) published in Kyōto in 1905–1912. According to Demiéville, Paramārtha’s commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is continually quoted by Yuan-tsho (Chinese: Yüan-ts’ê) and was reconstructed by Ou-yang Chien on the basis of these quotations.<sup>1</sup> In the Chinese text of Yüan-ts’ê’s commentary, the beginning of the eighth chapter and the entire tenth chapter are missing. They have been reconstructed into Chinese from the Tibetan translation by Shōju INABA.<sup>2</sup>

Thurman quotes many Sanskrit passages in his notes, but almost always with many mis-spellings especially with regard to the diacritics. It is also rather careless to write *śaithiliko* and *shikṣāpadeṣu* in the same line (p. 213, n. 11). It is not possible to make use of these Sanskrit quotations without having recourse to the editions referred to.

In his bibliography Thurman mentions an English translation of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra which he has edited (p. 404).<sup>3</sup> It is, therefore, strange to see a number of serious mistakes in his translations of several passages of this text. Tson-kha-pa quotes verse 1 of chapter VI:

*na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate /  
na vardhate nāpi viśudhyate punar viśudhyate tat paramārthalakṣaṇam //*

Thurman translates: “The nature of the ultimate is that which purifies. It is not existent, not non-existent, not the same, and not other, not produced and not ceased, not decreased and not increased, nor even is it to be purified” (p. 219). The same verse is translated correctly by Peter Oldmeadow as follows: “It does not exist, nor does it not exist; it is not thus nor is it otherwise; it is not born nor does it perish; it does not decrease nor does it increase; it is not purified yet it is purified. This is the characteristic of the absolute.”<sup>4</sup> On p. 224 of Thurman’s work the following passage is to be found: “Vasubandhu explains that there is no reality because the realities otherwise insisted upon by the naive, such as

the imagined reality, or purity, happiness, permanence, and self, do not exist. “Otherwise” means they persist in their convictions through (the misapprehension of) substantial difference of subject and object.” In a note Thurman says that Tsoñ-kha-pa here refers in general to the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā by Vasubandhu without indicating where he has found this information. As a matter of fact, Tsoñ-kha-pa refers here to the following passage of the bhāṣya on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra: *yathā bālānām svabhāvagrāho nityasukhaśucyātmā vā 'nyena vā parikalpita lakṣaṇena tathāsau svabhāvo nāsti tasmāḍ api niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ dharmānām iṣyate* (commentary on XI. 50). Peter Oldmeadow translates: “(This means) absence of own-being [of dharmas] is maintained because own-being does not exist as it is apprehended by the immature as permanent, happy, pure, a self or by some other imagined characteristic” (*op. cit.*, p. 97). It is surprising that Thurman has not been able to discover that Tsoñ-kha-pa refers to this passage because, following it, Tsoñ-kha-pa quotes verses 51 and 52 of the same chapter eleven. The Sanskrit text of verse 51 is missing in the manuscript, and Thurman quotes Lévi’s restoration in his edition without pointing out that Lévi has given a revised restoration in his translation:

*niḥsvabhāvatayā siddhā uttarottaraniṣrayāt /  
anutpannāniruddhādisāntaprakṛtinirvṛtāḥ //.*

L. de La Vallée Poussin suggested a slightly different restoration of the second line <sup>5</sup>.

*anutpādānirodhādisāntiprakṛtini[r] vṛtiḥ /*

Thurman translates: “Realitylessness is established since each (thing) is the basis of each subsequent one, and hence (are established) non-production, non-cessation, primordial peace, and natural liberation” (p. 224). Peter Oldmeadow’s translation, which I have slightly changed, is as follows: “Because of absence of own-being are established through successive dependence of one on the other non-production, non-cessation, primordial peace, and natural liberation.” (*op. cit.*, p. 97). The Tibetan translation of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra reads: *ño-bo ñid ni med-pa yis*, whereas Tsoñ-kha-pa’s text has: *ño-bo ñid ni med-pa yin*. The reading *yis* is confirmed by the commentary: [*siddhā*] *niḥsvabhāvatayā 'nutpādādayaḥ*, Tib. *ño-no ñid med-pas ni skye-ba med-pa la sogs-pa grub-ste /*.

On p. 338 Thurman translates a quotation from Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā: “We say ‘what’s the use of such application of fine analysis to mundane conventions?’ as the superficial is found to have its self-existence merely by erroneous cognition.” (*dpyad-pa žib-mo 'jig-rten-gyi tha-sñad la bcug-pa 'dis ci-dgos žes kho-bo cag kyañ de-skad-du smra-ste kun-rdzob phyin-ci-log tsam-gyis bdag-gi ño-bo yod-par rñed-pa*). In a note he refers to Candrakīrti’s commentary on verse 32 of chapter

seven and adds that it is not sure that this is the exact passage intended because Candrakīrti repeats this statement often. As a matter of fact, this passage is found only in one passage of the Prasannapadā, p. 68.7–8: *vayam apy evaṃ brūmaḥ / kim anayā sūkṣmekṣikayā laukikavyavahāre 'vatārikayā / tiṣṭhatu tāvad eṣā viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasattākā*. The expression *sūkṣmekṣikā* occurs in only one other passage of the Prasannapadā, but in a different context (p. 418.12).

On p. 230 Thurman translates a quotation from the Pramānavārttika (pratyakṣa chapter, verse 4): “If (one objects): “everything is without (functional) power (ultimately),” (we answer) “the power of the seed, etc., is visible in the sprout, etc.” (And if one) maintains “that is superficial (only),” (we answer) “then how could (the sprout) even come to be?” (*gal-te thams-cad nus-med-na / sa-bon sogs ni myug-sogs-la // nus mthoñ gal-te de kun-rdzob / 'dod-na ji-ltar de-ltar 'gyur*). The Sanskrit text which Thurman gives in a note with many errors is as follows:

*aśaktaṃ sarvaṃ iti ced bījāder ankurādiṣu /  
drṣṭā śaktiḥ: matā sā cet samvṛtyā, 'stu yathā tathā //*

Thurman has misunderstood *astu yathā tathā*, “let it be whatever way you like”. Dharmakīrti replies that it does not matter whether it is superficial, because cognition functions also on the superficial plane, cf. Prajñākaragupta’s bhāṣya (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana, p. 186.5–6): *astu yathā tathā samvṛtyā etāvatā'pi pramāṇāpramāṇavyavasthitir . . .*; Manorathanandin’s commentary (ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, p. 101): *astu yathā tathā / sāmṛtam api kāryakāraṇabhāvam āśritya sādhyasādhanaḍivavahārasamvādasampratyayāt samāpto lokavyavahārah*. Thurman’s wrong translation is due to the fact that he did not pay any attention to the Sanskrit text of this verse.

Thurman gives a literal translation of one passage of the Prasannapadā (p. 30.1–11), but wrongly translates the first part of it: “[That is not so;] because, when as here the negation of production is accepted as probandum, [Bhavaviveka] himself postulates that it would be a grievous error for its basis, the subject [of the syllogism], to have an intrinsic nature established merely by erroneous [cognition]. The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different. And when through error the non-existent is considered existent, like fine hairs seen by the ophthalmic, then where will there be perception of that touching the category of the real? And when, through non-erroneous [cognition], there is no imposition of the unreal, like real hair seen by the visually acute, then where will there be a perception of that touching the category of the unreal . . .?” (p. 335, n. 138). The Sanskrit text is as follows: *yasmād yadaivotpādapratīṣedho 'tra sādhyadharmo bhipretah, tadaiva dharminas tadādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasya*

*pracyutiḥ svayam evānenāṅgīkṛtā / bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau / tad yadā viparyāseṇa asat sattvena gṛhyate taimirikeṇeva keśādi tadā kutah sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhiḥ / yadā cāvīparyāsād abhūtaṃ nādhyāropitaṃ vitaimirikeṇeva keśādi tadā kuto 'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhir . . . ;* “because, when here the negation of production is intended as probandum, he himself accepts the disappearance of its basis, the subject [of the syllogism], as its existence is established merely by erroneous cognition. The erroneous and the non-erroneous are different. Therefore when through erroneous cognition the non-existent is apprehended as existent, just as [non-existent] hairs, etc. [are apprehended] by the ophthalmic, then how will there be perception of even a fraction of something really existing? When, through non-erroneous cognition, the non-existent is not superimposed, just as hairs, etc. [are not superimposed] by one who is free from ophthalmia, then how will there be perception of even a fraction of something not really existing . . . ?” Candrakīrti explains that the production of a non-existing thing cannot be proved because it exists only due to an erroneous cognition just as an ophthalmic sees non-existing hairs because he suffers from ophthalmia. As de La Vallée Poussin pointed out, Stcherbatsky completely missed the meaning of this passage by changing *abhūtaṃ* to *bhūtaṃ*.<sup>6</sup> Thurman’s translation of *sadbhūtapadārthaleśa* by “that touching the category of the real” is incomprehensible. Stcherbatsky has “a bit of a really existing thing” and de La Vallée Poussin “quoi que ce soit de réel.”

Thurman is an extremely gifted scholar of whom we may expect to see much more excellent work in the future. It is to be hoped that he will not become too absorbed by his Tibetan studies, but will pay equal attention to Sanskrit studies, because Indian Buddhist texts form the basis for the study of both Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> P. Demiéville, *JA* 1936, p. 647, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Enjiki, Gejimmikkyō-sho san-itsu bubun no kenkyū*, Kyōto, 1972.

<sup>3</sup> On p. 404 this translation is said to be forthcoming, but, on p. 417, 1980 is given as date of publication.

<sup>4</sup> *Reality as understood in the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, University of Sydney. Department of Religious Studies. Fourth Year Honours Thesis. 1984, p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> Étienne Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (Louvain-Paris, 1935), p. 193, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 1 (1932), p. 390.