Recent studies of classical Sāṃkhya have been greatly facilitated by the publication of the *Yuktiṭīpikā* (Abbrev. *YD*),\(^1\) an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (Abbrev. *SK*), which has amply provided us with new materials for investigation. It often refers to views maintained by some Sāṃkhya teachers before Ṣivaraṅkaṇa, and scarcely known from any other commentary. In many places it records at length a controversy between the Sāṃkhyaists and their opponents, through which many problems not discussed in other commentaries are clarified. A study of *YD* by P. Chakravarti, who first edited this newly discovered text, was published in 1951 under the title: *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought* (Calcutta Sanskrit Ser., XXX. Reprint: New Delhi 1975). E. Frauwallner derived much benefit from *YD* when he treated the development of Sāṃkhya thought in his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. I (Salzburg 1953). G. Oberhammer identified the śāstra, from which some passages are quoted in *YD*, as the *Ṣaṭṭhitantra* of Vārṣaganyā.\(^2\) The īśvara-doctrines referred to in *YD* were examined by G. Chemparathy.\(^3\) A. Wezler directed his attention to the stylistic peculiarities of *YD*, and set forth the view that *YD* was a commentary on a Vārttika of *SK*.\(^4\) The author of the book under review, viz., S. Murakami, has fully utilized *YD* along with other sources for the scrutiny of the philosophical thought crystallized in *SK*.

Murakami's book is a comprehensive study of Sāṃkhya philosophy in the classical period. Instead of giving an all-round treatment of various subjects that are found in this system of philosophy, Murakami takes up the concept of the soul or self (*puruṣa, ātman*) as the central
theme of his investigation, and relates all problems to this central theme. This bulky book of
nearly 1,000 pages may be divided into three parts: (1) Examination of the concept of the soul
in pre-Sāṃkhya literature (Chapter I). (2) Elucidation of the Sāṃkhya system as presented in
ŚK on the basis of a close examination of all available commentaries (Chapters II–IV). (3)
Discussion of some specific problems (Chapters V–VIII).

In Chapter I (pp. 21–144), the author tries to trace the evolution of the concept of purusa
from the early Upaniṣads to classical Sāṃkhya. On the basis of his examination of the concept
of purusa in the early, middle and younger Upaniṣads, the author draws the following conclu-
sions: (1) The purusa in the early Upaniṣads is almost identical with the ātman; it is not a
Homerically psyche (ghost-soul) as supposed by E. H. Johnston, but an animating corporeal
principle. (2) The term to distinguish the purusa as pure soul from the ātman which has various
aspects is noticeable in the middle and younger Upaniṣads. The early-Sāṃkhya materials found
in the philosophical chapters of the Great Epic and elsewhere have not been utilized by the
author for this book. Chapter II (pp. 145–256) is a thorough-going study of the commentaries
on ŚK, 17, 19 and 18, which respectively treat the arguments for the existence of the soul,
the characteristic features of the soul, and the proofs for the plurality of the soul. Chapter
III (pp. 257–308) is devoted to the study of the functions of the organs of perception
(buddhidhīriya), the mind (manas), the I-principle (ahamkāra), and the intellect (buddhi); of
the eight forms (rūpa, bhāva) and the fifty divisions (bheda) of the intellect. In Chapter IV
(pp. 309–440), the relation between the primordial matter (prakṛti, pradhāna) and the soul is
discussed. This relation is often explained in Sāṃkhya works by means of the simile of the
reflection (pratibimba), e.g., of the moon in the water, or the like. The author has gathered
from various sources passages which deal with the reflection-theory, and has thoroughly
examined them. In the remaining chapters (V–VIII) the author takes up for investigation some
specific problems in the Sāṃkhya system, making extensive use of related materials. In Chapter
V (pp. 441–534), the author discusses the problem whether the soul is one or many. In the
commentaries on ŚK 11, the soul is characterized as pervasive (vyāpin) and omnipresent
(sarvagata). This seems to mean that the one-ness of the soul was admitted by the Sāṃkhya.
In fact some commentators (G, M) clearly state that the soul is one. However, it is established
in ŚK 18 that there are many souls. The author solves this apparent inconsistency by accepting
the view set forth in J that the soul is pervasive and therefore one in the state of liberation
(moksa), but that it appears as many before the attainment of liberation. This solution is
appropriate and acceptable. Chapter VI (pp. 535–640) examines the concept of the soul in
the Vedānta and the Vaiśeṣika systems. R. Garbe was of the opinion that the pervasiveness of
the soul was admitted by the Sāṃkhya under the influence of Vedānta philosophy. The
author, however, disagrees with him, pointing to the fact that the individual self (jīva) was not
acknowledged as pervasive in the Vedānta school before Śaṅkara, when ŚK was composed. Like
the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣikas too admit the plurality of souls and yet maintain that the soul is
pervasive. Regarding the doctrine of the pervasiveness of the soul, E. Frauwallner set forth the
view that the old Vaiśeṣika idea of the individual, body-sized soul was modified at a certain
stage in the development of their philosophical thought with the prototype of the Vedānta-
Sāṃkhya soul-doctrine as its model. The author declines to accept this view. According to him,
due to the pervasiveness or the omnipresence of the soul held by the Sāṃkhya and the
Vaiśeṣikas is based on the tradition of the early Upaniṣads, as in the case of the Vedānta.
In Chapter VII (pp. 641–686), the author discusses the problem of liberation and of the
knowledge (jñāna) leading to it. According to ŚK 62, only prakṛti is concerned with bondage
and liberation, the soul being never bound nor liberated. On the other hand, all the
commentators attribute the liberating knowledge in ŚK 64 to the soul. In connection with this
problem, the author makes reference to passages in Bāhaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter 18
and Tarkaśāla, Chapter 6 (both are available in Tibetan translation), where two different
Sāṃkhya views are taken up for criticism: the view that the prakṛti is liberated and the view
that the soul is liberated. The author comes to the conclusion that the latter view represents the
ultimate standpoint of the Sāṁkhya. In Chapter VIII (pp. 687–784), the meaning of the negation of the self in SK 64 is investigated. From the explanations given by the commentators it is to be understood that the negation is intended for the removal of the false notion that takes what is not the true self, i.e., the evolutes of the praṇāti, for the self. By removing that false notion the true self is realized. The author finds a similar idea in the Maitri Upaniṣad and in the Yogasūtra and its commentaries. He further compares the concept of selflessness (nirātman) in the Maitri Upaniṣad and in the Sāṁkhya system with the concept of anātman as found in early Buddhist literature, and discusses the similarity and the difference between them. Lastly, the arguments against the Sāṁkhya idea of selflessness in Āśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa (Chapter 18) are examined.

The author has pursued with persistence in the last four chapters the problem of liberation in the Sāṁkhya system. By putting together the conclusions of these chapters, we may summarize the author’s interpretation of the central philosophy of classical Sāṁkhya as follows. The Sāṁkhya philosophy is aimed at the liberation of the self. The self is essentially one, all-pervading and always liberated, but man is ignorant of it and accustomed to consider that there are many selves, each undergoing birth and death individually. This is due to the false notion that takes internal organs, body, etc., for the self. By eradicating this false notion, man attains liberation, that is the realization of the true self as isolated from the material elements.

Sāṁkhya philosophy thus interpreted has undeniably a close affinity to early Buddhism. The author cites (p. 684) an interesting passage from YD, in which the liberation of the Sāṁkhya is identified with the nirvāṇa of the Buddhists. However, on the often-discussed problem of the relation between Sāṁkhya and Buddhism, the author refrains from drawing any definite conclusion.

In the course of his pursuit of the main subject of each chapter, the author discusses also some important problems, such as the meaning of guṇa in the Sāṁkhya system (pp. 161–172), the authenticity of Vācaspati’s ascription of some fragments to Paṇḍarika (pp. 539–544), the authorship of J (pp. 580–600), etc. Though the author has attempt to trace the historical development of the concept of puruṣa from the early Upaniṣads to classical Sāṁkhya, he generally limits the scope of his investigation to classical Sāṁkhya and does not show interest in the problems concerning the origin and evolution of some concepts of philosophical importance in the Sāṁkhya system. In his interpretation of those concepts, he simply follows the explanations of the commentators.

In his Conclusion (pp. 787–793), the author stresses that in Sāṁkhya philosophy the soul theory is as important as the evolution theory (pārīṇāmavāda) and the theory of causation (satkāryavāda).

Throughout the book the author presents in great abundance translations of the passages on which his discussions are based. This is good in principle, but sometimes he unnecessarily translates lengthy passages, so that a reader is led far away from the subject under discussion. It is often the case that several commentators give much the same explanation of a kārikā. The author untiringly translates all commentaries one by one with such remarks as that B is virtually identical with A, or that C does not differ much from A. It is tiresome to read all those commentaries in translation. The author should have avoided this useless repetition, noting only significant differences between commentaries. I will cite a few instances.

(1) In Chapter II, the author deals with the five arguments for the existence of the soul as set forth in SK 17. After examining the explanations in the commentaries on the fourth argument 'bhoktṛbhāvāt', the author introduces a lengthy discussion between the Vijnānavādins and the Sāṁkhya on the structure of bhoga (enjoyment, experience), which is found in YD. This discussion is highly technical and not easy to follow. It continues for ten pages (pp. 186–196), and after this interruption, the author proceeds to explain the fifth argument. This discussion should have been treated separately or simply omitted. (2) In Chapter VIII, the author points out that an idea akin to the Sāṁkhya concept of selflessness as expressed in SK 64 is found in the Yogasūtra 2.5, where four kinds of viparyaya are mentioned. Relevant here
is only the fourth type of viparyaya which takes anātman for ātman. However, the author translates even those passages in Vyāsa’s commentary which explain the other three viparyayas, and adds detailed notes (pp. 718–720). (3) In Chapter VII, the explanation given by different commentators of the expression ‘nāsmi, na me, nāham’ in SK 64 are examined (pp. 657–663). The author gives first a Japanese reading of P on SK 64, and then a complete translation of G on the same kārikā (8 lines in translation). He then translates M on the same kārikā from beginning to end (11 lines), without omitting such expressions as ‘apariśeṣam means nirvaśeṣam’, ‘viparyaya means saṁāṣaya’, and that which is contrary to it is aviparyaya’, and so forth. Then follow a series of translations, based on the same principle, of V2 (7 lines), YD (15 lines), J (8 lines), TK (39 lines) and lastly C (23 lines). In each of these commentaries, the number of lines which explain the phrase in question is less than half of the figures given above: M 3, V2 3, YD 6, J 4, TK 16. If the author had taken more pains to properly arrange the materials for a clearer elucidation of the subjects under discussion instead of putting everything he studied into this book, its size could have been reduced to half or at the most two-thirds.

It is good that the author presents abundantly his translations of passages of YD, which unlike other commentaries on SK is not always very clear. However, the present reviewer has been rather disappointed to find deficiencies in the translation. A few examples are given below.

YD explains at length the reasons for which the soul is recognized as akart (non-agent) on p. 84. 2–7 and p. 86. 6–26 (under SK 19). These passages are translated by the author on p. 234 and pp. 234–236. YD, p. 84. 2–3: visayesu bāhyāntākharaṇasāṁmēndhyе...
M (urakami’s translation. In my English rendering of his Japanese translation, I will try to be faithful to his wording as far as possible): ‘... when external organs approach the objects,...’ Antākharaṇa is omitted. YD, p. 84. 3–5: na ca sattvādīnām... āṅgabhāvam pratipadyate, nāpy āṅgibhāvam. M: ‘The soul’ is not understood as being a part (āṅgabhāva) of the sattvā, etc., nor [is it understood] as being the whole (āṅgibhāva) [of the sattvā, etc.].’ In this context, ‘part’ (bubun) and ‘whole’ (zentai) for āṅga and arin do not make sense. Moreover, āṅgabhāvam pratipadyate cannot be taken to mean ‘is understood as āṅgabhāva.’ A literal translation is as follows: ‘[The soul] does not attain the state of being subordinate (āṅgabhāva) to sattvā, etc., nor [does it attain] the state of being the principal (āṅgibhāva) of sattvā, etc.’ In other words, the soul does not give assistance to sattvā, etc., nor does it receive assistance from them: the soul and sattvā, etc. do not cooperate with each other. YD, p. 84. 5: evaṁ saha guṇaiḥ kāryaṁ na kurute strikumāravat. M: ‘Thus [the soul] does not produce an effect in cooperation with the elements, as [for example] a woman and a boy.’ In note 31, the author states: ‘The meaning of strikumāravat is not clear. It perhaps has the same meaning as dhātrikumāravat in p. 86. 17.’ As a matter of fact a woman (strī) cooperates with a man (puṁs, puriṣa), but not with a boy (kumāra) in order to produce an effect in the form of a baby. As will be seen below, dhātrikumāravat has a different meaning. YD, p. 86. 16–17: utpādiśayānena sthitim kurute dhātrikumāravat, sthitasyā vā prayogam rathaśakatayaṇtraprarapakavat. M: ‘For that which has been made to originate, [man] puts a stop by means of another, as in the case of a mother and a child (!). Or there is a motion (prayoga) for that which is standing still (!), as in the case of one who sets chariot, cart or machine in motion.’ This passage is an objection raised by an opponent against the Saṁkhya contention that the soul is akart because of its non-production of an effect. He argues that there are actions which are not intended to produce an effect. Murakami failed to understand the meaning of the objection. Anyena should be read with upadīta-. The verb kurute is to be supplied after prayogam (Acc., not Nom. !). ‘A mother and a child’ does not illustrate anything. My translation is as follows: ‘One provides the sustenance (sthitim kurute) of that which has been produced by another, as in the case of a foster mother and a child. Or, one effects the setting in motion (prayogam [kurute]) of that which is standing still, as in the case of...’ Wrong translations are found also in M, p. 235, 11. 6–8 and the last four lines.

One of the important subjects treated in this book is the reflection-theory. The author

Though the reflection-theory is not found in SK, it is known to be old, since it is found in an often-quoted verse ascribed to Vindhyavāsin. This theory was originally intended to explain that the buddhi (citta in Yoga literature; manas in Vindhyavāsin’s verse), which is unintelligent as an evolute (vikāra) of the prakṛti, becomes intelligent by reflecting the intelligence of the puruṣa. The buddhi is thus compared to a crystal which reflects the colour of a cushion, etc. The puruṣa, being deprived of any activity, does not undergo modifications; he simply stands near the buddhi. The reflection of the puruṣa on the buddhi is explained also by the simile of the moon in the water. In later times, a new interpretation was applied to the simile of crystal, according to which the simile is meant to explain that the functions of the buddhi are erroneously superimposed upon the puruṣa which in itself is devoid of any function, just as the colour of a cushion, etc. is superimposed on a crystal which in itself is transparent. Finally, the theory of the mutual reflection (paraspara-pratibimba), i.e. the reflection of the puruṣa upon the buddhi and that of the functions of the buddhi upon the puruṣa, was developed as we find it in the Yogavārttika and the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya. By carefully studying materials collected from various sources, the author has clarified this development of the reflection-theory. He has further examined the similes of mirror, magnet, etc., which are also intended to explain the relation between the buddhi and the puruṣa.

It is regrettable that the translations given by the author are not without defects. Sometimes the author is obviously wrong in his rendering. Moreover, there are many cases where the wording of his translation is difficult to follow. I will note only some of the defects that have come to my notice while going through the section dealing with the reflection-theory.

p. 342. 8–9: arthākāra ivābhāva yathā buddhis tathā pumān / abhāsāmāno buddhyāto buddhā manivad ucyate // (YD, p. 80. 1–2). M: ‘Just as the buddhi appears like the form of the object, even so the soul, assuming the same appearance, cognizes from it (?) by means of the buddhi, like a gem: — so it is said.’ The meaning of M is not clear. H (= reviewer’s translation): ‘Just as the buddhi [appears in the form of the object], even so the soul appears as if it had the form of the object. Therefore, it is said that the knower, [i.e. the soul], which appears by means of the buddhi, is similar to a gem.’

p. 343. 6: buddhīr upāttavīṣayendriyaavrtyupanipāt tādṛṣṭam pratipadyate (YD, p. 87. 22). M: ‘Since the buddhi conforms to the received object and the function of the sense-organ, it assumes their form.’ The same cognitive process is explained in TK ad SK 5 with the words ‘upāttavīṣayānām indriyānāṁ vṛttam satyām . . . ’ and this passage is translated by the author on the same page as follows: ‘. . . when there are the functions of the sense-organs which have received the objects . . . ’ The author should have analysed the compound ‘upāttavīṣayendriya-vṛtti’ in the light of this passage.

p. 351. 4–3*: etac cittam eva . . . cetanācetanasvarāpāpannam . . . (Yogabhāṣya 4.23). M: ‘This very mind . . . has become the essence (= own form) of the intelligent and the unintelligent . . ’ H (literal transl.): ‘. . . has taken as its nature both the intelligent and the unintelligent . . . ’. A similar mistranslation is found on p. 351. 14 for grahit-grhaṇā-grāhā-yava-svarūpa-citta-bheda.

p. 355. 8*: . . . drṣṭādyāpāpanayā buddhyā samārṣṭāḥ sabdādayah . . . (Tattvavaiśāradī 2.20). M: ‘. . . sound, etc. that are created by the buddhi on which the [soul’s] faculty of seeing is projected . . ’ H: ‘. . . sound, etc. that are touched by the buddhi . . . ’

p. 370. 4*: . . . arthabhānasya kādācittakavādyupapattaye . . . (Yogavārttika 1.4). M: ‘to
prove it to be reasonable that the perception (= appearance) of the object is accidental (gūženteki) ... 'Kādācikta may better be translated as 'occasional' (ichijiteki) or 'sporadic' (tokiori-no).

p. 371. 7: ... sarasiva tatadrumāḥ (ibid.). M: '... just as the trees [are reflected] in the pond.' Taśa (bank) is omitted.

p. 371. 11: ... saṃskāraśaṇa buddhiḥ puruṣe pratibimbitā (ibid.). M: '... the buddhi possessing the residue of the impression is reflected on the soul.' H: ‘... the buddhi of which [only] the impression is the residue [i.e. the buddhi which has ceased to function] is ...”

p. 382. 6*: M: (buddhāyavasita). The text has "adhyaśvasita (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā) on k. 297).

p. 382. 4-3*: tad evāya bhoktro'ram, na tu vikārāpattih (Pañjikā on Tattvasaṃgraha kk. 296–297). M: ‘That indeed is its (= the soul’s) nature of being an enjoyer (?), but [it (?)] does not become a vikāra.’ ‘That’ stands for the transition of the form of an object from the buddhi to the soul. Murakami’s rendering is hard to follow. I succeeded in understanding the meaning only with the help of the Sanskrit text (not only here, but also in many other passages). The latter half is obviously wrong. H: ‘... but not [the soul’s] changing into a vikāra.’

p. 383. 8-10. The author should have explained here the inconclusiveness (anaiikāntikatā) of the reason mentioned in the foregoing passage quoted from Kamalasila’s Pañjikā on the Tattvasaṃgraha.

p. 383. 12: ... pratibimbasya tādātmyena samudbhave (Tattvasaṃgraha k. 298). M: ‘If the reflection arises as the identity (doītsusei toshite) [with the soul] ...’ (!)

p. 385. 11-12: pradhānasyādayaṃ vikāra buddhir bijāsyocchāne tava (Vyomavati p. 521. 15). M: ‘The first evolute (vikāra) of the primordial matter is the buddhi, just like the growth (seichō) of a seed.’ The growth is not the first stage of the change of a seed. H: ‘... the swollen state of a seed.’

p. 385. 2* (also p. 386. 8*, 1*): -vīṣayākāraparāniṭendriya-. M: ‘the sense-organ which is transformed by dint of the form of the object.’ H: ‘... transformed into the form of the object.’

p. 386. 8-11: The Sanskrit text is awkwardly quoted here by the author. The original sentence is: puruṣo 'vikṛtātmāva ... upādhiḥ sphaṭikam atadrūpaṃ svanirbhāsaṃ svākāraṃ karoti ... The author puts a break at atad (!), and translates that portion of the sentence as follows: ‘... A limiting adjunct [for instance, the colour of a flower] makes a crystal [as it were] something other than itself.’ The reason for this awkward quotation is explained on p. 390: the author found that this passage is almost identical in wording with a verse ascribed elsewhere to Vindhyavāsin, and tried to make it a verse. However, the reading of the fourth pāda as constituted by the author (upādhiḥ sphaṭikam atad. The final -d- should be changed to -t) is not metrically correct. H: ‘The puruṣa, whose nature is unchanged, makes the unintelligent mind (manas) resemble himself through his proximity [to the latter] (Read svaṁvṛhāsam acetanam manah karoti instead of svaṁvṛhāsaṇa cetanam . . .). A limiting adjunct makes a crystal, which has not the colour of that [adjunct], resemble itself and possess its own form. [In the same manner, the puruṣa ...]’.

p. 398. 7–6*: kathāmsaksriyaḥkāṭāvāyatirekena ... anyathātvānapapateḥ (Śyādvādāmanjari XV, 11. 92–93). M: ‘Because, it would be absolutely impossible [for the puruṣa] to undergo change, were he not accompanied with action.’ The author seems to have wrongly construed kathāṁcic with anupapateḥ. This is a general statement, and it is not necessary to consider the puruṣa to be the implied subject. H: ‘Because, without being somehow accompanied with action, change would be unreasonable.’

p. 411. 2–4: antakaraṇam hi taptalohavac cetanojñivalitam bhavati. atas tasya cetanāyaṁmātayādhiṃghāṭṝvam ghaṭādiyāvṛttam upapadyate (Śaṁkhyapraśnacarabhaḥsyā 1.99, p. 48. 19–21). M: ‘The internal organ is illuminated by the intelligent (cetana), like the heated iron. Therefore, it is reasonable that the fact that it (= internal organ), as one which functions intelligently, as a controller is excluded from a jar, etc.’ (!) The term uṣṭivalita is
rendered by the author consistently as ‘terashidasareru’ (to be illuminated, lit up, p. 410. 5, 4*, p. 411. 1, 2, 5, 8), but it means ‘to be caused to flare up, shine’ (moetatasareru, kagayakasareru). The author’s translation of the latter sentence makes no sense at all. H: “Therefore, it is reasonable that the controller-hood, which is excluded from a jar, etc., belongs to it (= internal organ), for it is regarded as intelligent.”

p. 411. 5: navv evam caityanēntatākaranasoyojvalane citē saṅgitam aṅγivad eva syāt (ibid., p. 48. 21–22). M: “[Objection] If the internal organ is illuminated (terashidasareru) thus by the intelligent, it would follow that the intelligent has attachment, like fire. ‘Shūcchaku’ (attachment, adherence) for saṅga is not appropriate in this context (also in p. 421. 7: ‘mu-shūcchaku’ for asaṅga). H: “... it would follow that the intelligent has the nature of coming into contact [with the internal organ], like fire [which comes into contact with iron].”

pp. 421. 5–423. 6: (Sāmkhyapravacanabhaṣya 1.87. pp. 43. 27–44. 31). M is hardly readable, since it contains mistranslations (e.g. p. 421. 4*, p. 422. 3), mechanical word for word replacement with no care for the meaning (e.g., p. 421. 8–9, 13), inaccurate translations of indeclinables (e.g. p. 421. 6, 12), improper punctuations (e.g., p. 421. 5), ambiguous expressions (e.g. p. 422. 1–2), etc. As a matter of course it is not easy to give a lucid translation of a text of this style. However, since the author did intend to publish a translation, he should have spent more efforts to make it more accurate. A good German translation of this text was published by R. Garbe long ago, and the author could have improved his translation in many respects if he had consulted it.

Despite the fact that there are a number of weak points as mentioned above, the book is useful as it discusses some essential problems with a thoroughness hitherto not seen in books on classical Sāmkhya and at the same time furnishes us amply with materials for the understanding of the Sāmkhya philosophy. It is earnestly to be hoped that the author will in his future works arrange the materials in a better way, make efforts to prepare more accurate translations and improve the presentation of his materials.

The table of contents and a summary of each chapter are given in English (pp. 1–23). The indices (pp. 1–144) of (1) Japanese and Chinese terms, (2) Sanskrit and Pāli terms, (3) Tibetan terms, (4) Modern European terms, and (5) Citations are undoubtedly of much help for the readers of this voluminous book.

Kyoto University

MASAAKI HATTORI

NOTES

1 Two editions are now available: (1) Pulinehari Chakravarti (ed.), Yuktidīpikā, Critically edited for the first time from original manuscripts. Calcutta 1938 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, XXIII). (2) R. C. Pandeya (ed.), Yuktidīpikā, An ancient commentary on the Sāmkhya-kārikā. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. For the other commentaries on the Sāmkhya-kārikā, the following abbreviations are used: C: Sāmkhya-candrikā by Nārāyaṇatīrtha, G: Gauḍapādabhāṣya, J: Jayammagāḷa, M: Mātharavṛttī, P: Pāravītha’s Chinese translation of *Suvarṇa (or Kanaka)-saptati, TK: Sāmkhya-tattvakaumudi, V1, V2: Sāmkhyasaptavrtti (V1), Sāmkhyavṛtti (V2), ed. by E. A. Solomon.


5 The asterisk indicates that the lines are counted from the left.