

Shinkan Murakami, *Sāṅkhyā Tetsugaku Kenkyū* – Indo Tetsugaku ni okeru Jiga-kan – (A Study of the Sāṅkhyā Philosophy – Concepts of the Self and Liberation in Indian Philosophy –). Tokyo, Shunjūsha, 1978. xxii, 794, 23, 144 pp.

Recent studies of classical Sāṅkhyā have been greatly facilitated by the publication of the *Yuktidīpikā* (Abbrev. *YD*),¹ an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (Abbrev. *SK*), which has amply provided us with new materials for investigation. It often refers to views maintained by some Sāṅkhyā teachers before Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and scarcely known from any other commentary. In many places it records at length a controversy between the Sāṅkhyas and their opponents, through which many problems not discussed in other commentaries are clarified. A study of *YD* by P. Chakravarti, who first edited this newly discovered text, was published in 1951 under the title: *Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhyā System of Thought* (Calcutta Sanskrit Ser., XXX. Reprint: New Delhi 1975). E. Frauwallner derived much benefit from *YD* when he treated the development of Sāṅkhyā thought in his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. I (Salzburg 1953). G. Oberhammer identified the *śāstra*, from which some passages are quoted in *YD*, as the *Śaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣaganya.² The Īśvara-doctrines referred to in *YD* were examined by G. Chemparathy.³ A. Wezler directed his attention to the stylistic peculiarities of *YD*, and set forth the view that *YD* was a commentary on a Vārttika of *SK*.⁴ The author of the book under review, viz., S. Murakami, has fully utilized *YD* along with other sources for the scrutiny of the philosophical thought crystalized in *SK*.

Murakami's book is a comprehensive study of Sāṅkhyā philosophy in the classical period. Instead of giving an all-round treatment of various subjects that are found in this system of philosophy, Murakami takes up the concept of the soul or self (*puruṣa*, *ātman*) as the central

theme of his investigation, and relates all problems to this central theme. This bulky book of nearly 1,000 pages may be divided into three parts: (1) Examination of the concept of the soul in pre-Sāṃkhya literature (Chapter I). (2) Elucidation of the Sāṃkhya system as presented in *SK* on the basis of a close examination of all available commentaries (Chapters II–IV). (3) Discussion of some specific problems (Chapters V–VIII).

In Chapter I (pp. 21–144), the author tries to trace the evolution of the concept of *puruṣa* from the early Upaniṣads to classical Sāṃkhya. On the basis of his examination of the concept of *puruṣa* in the early, middle and younger Upaniṣads, the author draws the following conclusions: (1) The *puruṣa* in the early Upaniṣads is almost identical with the *ātman*; it is not a Homeric psyche (ghost-soul) as supposed by E. H. Johnston, but an animating corporeal principle. (2) The trend to distinguish the *puruṣa* as pure soul from the *ātman* which has various aspects is noticeable in the middle and younger Upaniṣads. The early-Sāṃkhya materials found in the philosophical chapters of the Great Epic and elsewhere have not been utilized by the author for this book. Chapter II (pp. 145–256) is a thorough-going study of the commentaries on *SK*, 17, 19 and 18, which respectively treat the arguments for the existence of the soul, the characteristic features of the soul, and the proofs for the plurality of the soul. Chapter III (pp. 257–308) is devoted to the study of the functions of the organs of perception (*buddhīndriya*), the mind (*manas*), the I-principle (*ahamkāra*), and the intellect (*buddhi*); of the eight forms (*rūpa*, *bhāva*) and the fifty divisions (*bheda*) of the intellect. In Chapter IV (pp. 309–440), the relation between the primordial matter (*prakṛti*, *pradhāna*) and the soul is discussed. This relation is often explained in Sāṃkhya works by means of the simile of the reflection (*pratibimba*), e.g., of the moon in the water, or the like. The author has gathered from various sources passages which deal with the reflection-theory, and has thoroughly examined them. In the remaining chapters (V–VIII) the author takes up for investigation some specific problems in the Sāṃkhya system, making extensive use of related materials. In Chapter V (pp. 441–534), the author discusses the problem whether the soul is one or many. In the commentaries on *SK* 11, the soul is characterized as pervasive (*vyāpin*) and omnipresent (*sarvagata*). This seems to mean that the one-ness of the soul was admitted by the Sāṃkhyas. In fact some commentators (*G*, *M*) clearly state that the soul is one. However, it is established in *SK* 18 that there are many souls. The author solves this apparent inconsistency by accepting the view set forth in *J* that the soul is pervasive and therefore one in the state of liberation (*mokṣa*), but that it appears as many before the attainment of liberation. This solution is appropriate and acceptable. Chapter VI (pp. 535–640) examines the concept of the soul in the Vedānta and the Vaiśeṣika systems. R. Garbe was of the opinion that the pervasiveness of the soul was admitted by the Sāṃkhyas under the influence of Vedānta philosophy. The author, however, disagrees with him, pointing to the fact that the individual self (*jīva*) was not acknowledged as pervasive in the Vedānta school before Śaṅkara, when *SK* was composed. Like the Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas too admit the plurality of souls and yet maintain that the soul is pervasive. Regarding the doctrine of the pervasiveness of the soul, E. Frauwallner set forth the view that the old Vaiśeṣika idea of the individual, body-sized soul was modified at a certain stage in the development of their philosophical thought with the prototype of the Vedānta-Sāṃkhya soul-doctrine as its model. The author declines to accept this view. According to him, the doctrine of the pervasiveness or the omnipresence of the soul held by the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas is based on the tradition of the early Upaniṣads, as in the case of the Vedānta. In Chapter VII (pp. 641–686), the author discusses the problem of liberation and of the knowledge (*jñāna*) leading to it. According to *SK* 62, only *prakṛti* is concerned with bondage and liberation, the soul being never bound nor liberated. On the other hand, all the commentators attribute the liberating knowledge in *SK* 64 to the soul. In connection with this problem, the author makes reference to passages in Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter 18 and *Tarkajvālā*, Chapter 6 (both are available in Tibetan translation), where two different Sāṃkhya views are taken up for criticism: the view that the *prakṛti* is liberated and the view that the soul is liberated. The author comes to the conclusion that the latter view represents the

ultimate standpoint of the Sāṃkhyas. In Chapter VIII (pp. 687–784), the meaning of the negation of the self in *SK* 64 is investigated. From the explanations given by the commentators it is to be understood that the negation is intended for the removal of the false notion that takes what is not the true self, i.e., the evolutes of the *prakṛti*, for the self. By removing that false notion the true self is realized. The author finds a similar idea in the *Maitri Upaniṣad* and in the *Yogasūtra* and its commentaries. He further compares the concept of selflessness (*nirātman*) in the *Maitri Upaniṣad* and in the Sāṃkhya system with the concept of *anātman* as found in early Buddhist literature, and discusses the similarity and the difference between them. Lastly, the arguments against the Sāṃkhya idea of selflessness in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita* and Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (Chapter 18) are examined.

The author has pursued with persistence in the last four chapters the problem of liberation in the Sāṃkhya system. By putting together the conclusions of these chapters, we may summarize the author's interpretation of the central philosophy of classical Sāṃkhya as follows. The Sāṃkhya philosophy is aimed at the liberation of the self. The self is essentially one, all-pervading and always liberated, but man is ignorant of it and accustomed to consider that there are many selves, each undergoing birth and death individually. This is due to the false notion that takes internal organs, body, etc., for the self. By eradicating this false notion, man attains liberation, that is the realization of the true self as isolated from the material elements.

Sāṃkhya philosophy thus interpreted has undeniably a close affinity to early Buddhism. The author cites (p. 684) an interesting passage from *YD*, in which the liberation of the Sāṃkhyas is identified with the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhists. However, on the often-discussed problem of the relation between Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, the author refrains from drawing any definite conclusion.

In the course of his pursuit of the main subject of each chapter, the author discusses also some important problems, such as the meaning of *guṇa* in the Sāṃkhya system (pp. 161–172), the authenticity of Vācaspati's ascription of some fragments to Pañcaśikha (pp. 539–544), the authorship of *J* (pp. 580–600), etc. Though the author has attempted to trace the historical development of the concept of *puruṣa* from the early Upaniṣads to classical Sāṃkhya, he generally limits the scope of his investigation to classical Sāṃkhya and does not show interest in the problems concerning the origin and evolution of some concepts of philosophical importance in the Sāṃkhya system. In his interpretation of those concepts, he simply follows the explanations of the commentators.

In his Conclusion (pp. 787–793), the author stresses that in Sāṃkhya philosophy the soul theory is as important as the evolution theory (*pariṇāmanavāda*) and the theory of causation (*satkāryavāda*).

Throughout the book the author presents in great abundance translations of the passages on which his discussions are based. This is good in principle, but sometimes he unnecessarily translates lengthy passages, so that a reader is led far away from the subject under discussion. It is often the case that several commentators give much the same explanation of a *kārikā*. The author untiringly translates all commentaries one by one with such remarks as that B is virtually identical with A, or that C does not differ much from A. It is tiresome to read all those commentaries in translation. The author should have avoided this useless repetition, noting only significant differences between commentaries. I will cite a few instances.

(1) In Chapter II, the author deals with the five arguments for the existence of the soul as set forth in *SK* 17. After examining the explanations in the commentaries on the fourth argument '*bhoktrbhāvāt*', the author introduces a lengthy discussion between the Vijñānavādins and the Sāṃkhyas on the structure of *bhoga* (enjoyment, experience), which is found in *YD*. This discussion is highly technical and not easy to follow. It continues for ten pages (pp. 186–196), and after this interruption, the author proceeds to explain the fifth argument. This discussion should have been treated separately or simply omitted. (2) In Chapter VIII, the author points out that an idea akin to the Sāṃkhya concept of selflessness as expressed in *SK* 64 is found in the *Yogasūtra* 2.5, where four kinds of *viparyaya* are mentioned. Relevant here

is only the fourth type of *viparyaya* which takes *anātman* for *ātman*. However, the author translates even those passages in Vyāsa's commentary which explain the other three *viparyayas*, and adds detailed notes (pp. 718–720). (3) In Chapter VII, the explanation given by different commentators of the expression '*nāsmi, na me, nāham*' in *SK* 64 are examined (pp. 657–663). The author gives first a Japanese reading of *P* on *SK* 64, and then a complete translation of *G* on the same *kārikā* (8 lines in translation). He then translates *M* on the same *kārikā* from beginning to end (11 lines), without omitting such expressions as '*aparīṣeṣam* means *niravaśeṣam*', '*viparyaya* means *saṁśaya*, and that which is contrary to it is *aviparyaya*', and so forth. Then follow a series of translations, based on the same principle, of *V*₂ (7 lines), *YD* (15 lines), *J* (8 lines), *TK* (39 lines) and lastly *C* (23 lines). In each of these commentaries, the number of lines which explain the phrase in question is less than half of the figures given above: *M* 3, *V*₂ 3, *YD* 6, *J* 4, *TK* 16. If the author had taken more pains to properly arrange the materials for a clearer elucidation of the subjects under discussion instead of putting everything he studied into this book, its size could have been reduced to half or at the most two-third.

It is good that the author presents abundantly his translations of passages of *YD*, which unlike other commentaries on *SK* is not always very clear. However, the present reviewer has been rather disappointed to find deficiencies in the translation. A few examples are given below.

YD explains at length the reasons for which the soul is recognized as *akartṛ* (non-agent) on p. 84. 2–7 and p. 86. 6–26 (under *SK* 19). These passages are translated by the author on p. 234 and pp. 234–236. *YD*, p. 84. 2–3: . . . *viśayeṣu bāhyāntaḥkaraṇasāmnidhye* . . . *M* (urakami's translation. In my English rendering of his Japanese translation, I will try to be faithful to his wording as far as possible): ' . . . when external organs approach the objects, . . . ' *Antaḥkaraṇa* is omitted. *YD*, p. 84. 3–5: *na ca sattvādīnām . . . aṅgabhāvaṃ pratipadyate, nāpy aṅgibhāvaṃ*. *M*: '[The soul] is not understood as being a part (*aṅgabhāva*) of the *sattva*, etc., nor [is it understood] as being the whole (*aṅgibhāva*) [of the *sattva*, etc.]' In this context, 'part' (*bubun*) and 'whole' (*zentai*) for *aṅga* and *aṅgin* do not make sense. Moreover, *aṅgabhāvaṃ pratipadyate* cannot be taken to mean 'is understood as *aṅgabhāva*.' A literal translation is as follows: "[The soul] does not attain the state of being subordinate (*aṅgabhāva*) to *sattva*, etc., nor [does it attain] the state of being the principal (*aṅgibhāva*) of *sattva*, etc." In other words, the soul does not give assistance to *sattva*, etc., nor does it receive assistance from them: the soul and *sattva*, etc. do not cooperate with each other. *YD*, p. 84. 5: *evam saha guṇaiḥ kāryaṃ na kurute strīkumāravat*. *M*: 'Thus [the soul] does not produce an effect in cooperation with the elements; as [for example] a woman and a boy.' In note 31, the author states: 'The meaning of *strīkumāravat* is not clear. It perhaps has the same meaning as *dhātrīkumāravat* in p. 86. 17.' As a matter of fact a woman (*strī*) cooperates with a man (*pums*, *puruṣa*), but not with a boy (*kumāra*) in order to produce an effect in the form of a baby. As will be seen below, *dhātrīkumāravat* has a different meaning. *YD*, p. 86. 16–17: . . . *utpāditasyānyena sthitiṃ kurute dhātrīkumāravat, sthitasya vā prayogaṃ rathasakatayantraprerakavat*. *M*: 'For that which has been made to originate, [man] puts a stop by means of another, as in the case of a mother and a child (!). Or there is a motion (*prayoga*) for that which is standing still (!), as in the case of one who sets chariot, cart or machine in motion.' This passage is an objection raised by an opponent against the Sāṃkhya contention that the soul is *akartṛ* because of its non-production of an effect. He argues that there are actions which are not intended to produce an effect. Murakami failed to understand the meaning of the objection. *Anyena* should be read with *utpādita*-. The verb *kurute* is to be supplied after *prayogaṃ* (Acc., not Nom. !). 'A mother and a child' does not illustrate anything. My translation is as follows: "One provides the sustenance (*sthitiṃ kurute*) of that which has been produced by another, as in the case of a foster mother and a child. Or, one effects the setting in motion (*prayogaṃ* [*kurute*]) of that which is standing still, as in the case of . . ." Wrong translations are found also in *M*, p. 235, 11. 6–8 and the last four lines.

One of the important subjects treated in this book is the reflection-theory. The author

spends as many as one hundred and one pages (pp. 340–440) to elucidate this theory, translating and analysing materials collected from the following sources: Commentaries on *SK*: *YD*, *TK*; *C*. Yoga literature: *Yogasūtra* (*YS*), *YS-bhāṣya*, *YS-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa*, *Tattvavaiśārādī*, *Yogavārttika*, *Rājamārtanda*. Śāṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Bauddha literature: *Tarkajvālā*, *Prajñāpradīpa* with Avalokitavrata's commentary, *Tattvasaṃgraha* with *Pañjikā*. Vaiśeṣika literature: *Vyomavatī*, *Nyāyakandalī*, *Kiraṇāvalī*. Jaina literature: *Yogabindu*, *Anyayoga-vyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* and *Syādvādamāñjarī*, *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* and *Laghuvṛtti* on *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and its commentaries by Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha.

Though the reflection-theory is not found in *SK*, it is known to be old, since it is found in an often-quoted verse ascribed to Vindhyavāsin. This theory was originally intended to explain that the *buddhi* (*citta* in Yoga literature; *manas* in Vindhyavāsin's verse), which is unintelligent as an evolute (*vikāra*) of the *prakṛti*, becomes intelligent by reflecting the intelligence of the *puruṣa*. The *buddhi* is thus compared to a crystal which reflects the colour of a cushion, etc. The *puruṣa*, being deprived of any activity, does not undergo modifications; he simply stands near the *buddhi*. The reflection of the *puruṣa* on the *buddhi* is explained also by the simile of the moon in the water. In later times, a new interpretation was applied to the simile of crystal, according to which the simile is meant to explain that the functions of the *buddhi* are erroneously superimposed upon the *puruṣa* which in itself is devoid of any function, just as the colour of a cushion, etc. is superimposed on a crystal which in itself is transparent. Finally, the theory of the mutual reflection (*paraspara-pratibimba*), i.e. the reflection of the *puruṣa* upon the *buddhi* and that of the functions of the *buddhi* upon the *puruṣa*, was developed as we find it in the *Yogavārttika* and the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*. By carefully studying materials collected from various sources, the author has clarified this development of the reflection-theory. He has further examined the similes of mirror, magnet, etc., which are also intended to explain the relation between the *buddhi* and the *puruṣa*.

It is regrettable that the translations given by the author are not without defects. Sometimes the author is obviously wrong in his rendering. Moreover, there are many cases where the wording of his translation is difficult to follow. I will note only some of the defects that have come to my notice while going through the section dealing with the reflection-theory.

p. 342. 8–9: *arthākāra ivābhāti yathā buddhis tathā pumān / ābhāsamāno buddhyāto buddhā maṇivad ucyate* // (*YD*, p. 80. 1–2). M: 'Just as the *buddhi* appears like the form of the object, even so the soul, assuming the same appearance, cognizes from it (?) by means of the *buddhi*, like a gem: — so it is said.' The meaning of M is not clear. H (= reviewer's translation): 'Just as the *buddhi* [appears in the form of the object], even so the soul appears as if it had the form of the object. Therefore, it is said that the knower, [i.e. the soul], which appears by means of the *buddhi*, is similar to a gem.'

p. 343. 6: *buddhir upāttaviśayendriyavṛttyupanipātāt tādrūpyaṃ pratipadyate* (*YD*, p. 87. 22). M: 'Since the *buddhi* conforms to the received object and the function of the sense-organ, it assumes their form.' The same cognitive process is explained in *TK* ad *SK* 5 with the words '*upāttaviśayānām indriyānām vṛttau satyām . . .*' and this passage is translated by the author on the same page as follows: ' . . . when there are the functions of the sense-organs which have received the objects . . . ' The author should have analysed the compound '*upāttaviśayendriya-vṛtti*-' in the light of this passage.

p. 351. 4–3*⁵: *etac cittam eva . . . cetanācetasasvarūpāpannam . . .* (*Yogabhāṣya* 4.23). M: 'This very mind . . . has become the essence (= own form) of the intelligent and the unintelligent . . . ' H (literal transl.): ' . . . has taken as its nature both the intelligent and the unintelligent . . . '. A similar mistranslation is found on p. 351. 14 for *grahīṭṛ-grahaṇa-grāhya-svarūpa-citta-bheda*-.

p. 355. 8*: . . . *dr̥ścchāyāpannayā buddhyā saṃsr̥ṣṭāḥ śabdādayaḥ . . .* (*Tattvavaiśārādī* 2.20). M: ' . . . sound, etc. that are created by the *buddhi* on which the [soul's] faculty of seeing is projected . . . ' H: ' . . . sound, etc. that are touched by the *buddhi* . . . '

p. 370. 4*: . . . *arthabhānasya kādācitkatvādyupapattaye . . .* (*Yogavārttika* 1.4). M: 'to

prove it to be reasonable that the perception (= appearance) of the object is accidental (*gūzenteki*) . . . ' *Kādācitka* may better be translated as 'occasional' (*ichijiteki*) or 'sporadic' (*tokiori-no*).

p. 371. 7: . . . *sarasīva taṭadrumāḥ* (*ibid.*). M: ' . . . just as the trees [are reflected] in the pond.' *Taṭa* (bank) is omitted.

p. 371. 11: . . . *saṃskāraśeṣā buddhiḥ puruṣe pratibimbītā* (*ibid.*). M: ' . . . the *buddhi* possessing the residue of the impression is reflected on the soul.' H: " . . . the *buddhi* of which [only] the impression is the residue [i.e. the *buddhi* which has ceased to function] is . . . "

p. 382. 6*: M: (*buddhyavasita*). The text has °*adhyavasita* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* on k. 297).

p. 382. 4–3*: *tad evāśya bhoktrtvam, na tu vikārāpattiḥ* (*Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṃgraha* k. 296–297). M: 'That indeed is its (= the soul's) nature of being an enjoyer (?), but [it (?)] does not become a *vikāra*.' 'That' stands for the transition of the form of an object from the *buddhi* to the soul. Murakami's rendering is hard to follow. I succeeded in understanding the meaning only with the help of the Sanskrit text (not only here, but also in many other passages). The latter half is obviously wrong. H: " . . . , but not [the soul's] changing into a *vikāra*."

p. 383. 8–10. The author should have explained here the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatā*) of the reason mentioned in the foregoing passage quoted from Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.

p. 383. 12: . . . *pratibimbasya tādātmyena samudbhava* (*Tattvasaṃgraha* k. 298). M: 'If the reflection arises as the identity (*dōitsusei toshite*) [with the soul] . . . ' (!)

p. 385. 11–12: *pradhānasyādyo vikāro buddhir bījasyocchūnateva* (*Vyomavatī* p. 521. 15). M: 'The first evolute (*vikāra*) of the primordial matter is the *buddhi*, just like the growth (*seichō*) of a seed.' The growth is not the first stage of the change of a seed. H: " . . . the swollen state of a seed."

p. 385. 2* (also p. 386. 8*, 1*): *-viṣayākārāparinatendriya-*. M: 'the sense-organ which is transformed by dint of the form of the object.' H: " . . . transformed into the form of the object."

p. 386. 8–11: The Sanskrit text is awkwardly quoted here by the author. The original sentence is: *puruṣo 'vikṛtātmaiva . . . upādhiḥ sphaṭikam atadrūpaṃ svanirbhāsaṃ svākāraṃ karoti . . .* The author puts a break at *atad* (!), and translates that portion of the sentence as follows: ' . . . A limiting adjunct [for instance, the colour of a flower] makes a crystal [as it were] something other than itself.' The reason for this awkward quotation is explained on p. 390: the author found that this passage is almost identical in wording with a verse ascribed elsewhere to Vindhyavāsin, and tried to make it a verse. However, the reading of the fourth *pāda* as constituted by the author (*upādhiḥ sphaṭikam atad*. The final -*d* should be changed to -*t*!) is not metrically correct. H: "The *puruṣa*, whose nature is unchanged, makes the unintelligent mind (*manas*) resemble himself through his proximity [to the latter] (Read *svanirbhāsaṃ acetanaṃ manāḥ karoti* instead of *svanirbhāsaṃ cetanaṃ . . .*). A limiting adjunct makes a crystal, which has not the colour of that [adjunct], resemble itself and possess its own form. [In the same manner, the *puruṣa* . . .]".

p. 398. 7–6*: *kathamcitsakriyākatāvyatirekeṇa . . . anyathātvānupapatteḥ* (*Syādvādamāñjarī* XV, 11. 92–93). M: 'Because, it would be absolutely impossible [for the *puruṣa*] to undergo change, were he not accompanied with action.' The author seems to have wrongly construed *kathamcid* with *anupapatteḥ*. This is a general statement, and it is not necessary to consider the *puruṣa* to be the implied subject. H: "Because, without being somehow accompanied with action, change would be unreasonable."

p. 411. 2–4: *antahkaraṇaṃ hi taptalohavac cetanojjvalitaṃ bhavati. atas tasya cetanāyamānatayādhiṣṭhātrtvam ghaṭādivyāvṛttam upapadyate* (*Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 1.99, p. 48. 19–21). M: 'The internal organ is illuminated by the intelligent (*cetana*), like the heated iron. Therefore, it is reasonable that the fact that it (= internal organ), as one which functions intelligently, as a controller is excluded from a jar, etc.' (!!) The term *ujjvalita* is

rendered by the author consistently as 'terashidasareru' (to be illuminated, lit up, p. 410. 5, 4*, p. 411. 1, 2, 5, 8), but it means 'to be caused to flare up, shine' (*moetatasareru*, *kagayakasareru*). The author's translation of the latter sentence makes no sense at all. H: "Therefore, it is reasonable that the controller-hood, which is excluded from a jar, etc., belongs to it (= internal organ), for it is regarded as intelligent."

p. 411. 5: *nanv evam cañtanyenāntahkaraṇasyojjvalane citeḥ saṅgitvam agnivad eva syāt* (*ibid.*, p. 48. 21–22). M: '[Objection] If the internal organ is illuminated (*terashidasareru*) thus by the intelligent, it would follow that the intelligent has attachment, like fire.' 'Shūchaku' (attachment, adherence) for *saṅga* is not appropriate in this context (also in p. 421. 7: 'mu-shūchaku' for *asaṅga*). H: "... , it would follow that the intelligent has the nature of coming into contact [with the internal organ], like fire [which comes into contact with iron]."

pp. 421. 5–423. 6: (*Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* 1.87. pp. 43. 27–44. 31). M is hardly readable, since it contains mistranslations (e.g. p. 421. 4*, p. 422. 3), mechanical word for word replacement with no care for the meaning (e.g., p. 421. 8–9, 13), inaccurate translations of indeclinables (e.g. p. 421. 6, 12), improper punctuations (e.g., p. 421. 5), ambiguous expressions (e.g., p. 422. 1–2), etc. As a matter of course it is not easy to give a lucid translation of a text of this style. However, since the author did intend to publish a translation, he should have spent more efforts to make it more accurate. A good German translation of this text was published by R. Garbe long ago, and the author could have improved his translation in many respects if he had consulted it.

Despite the fact that there are a number of weak points as mentioned above, the book is useful as it discusses some essential problems with a thoroughness hitherto not seen in books on classical Sāṃkhya and at the same time furnishes us amply with materials for the understanding of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. It is earnestly to be hoped that the author will in his future works arrange the materials in a better way, make efforts to prepare more accurate translations and improve the presentation of his materials.

The table of contents and a summary of each chapter are given in English (pp. 1–23). The indices (pp. 1–144) of (1) Japanese and Chinese terms, (2) Sanskrit and Pāli terms, (3) Tibetan terms, (4) Modern European terms, and (5) Citations are undoubtedly of much help for the readers of this voluminous book.

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NOTES

¹ Two editions are now available: (1) Pulinbehari Chakravarti (ed.), *Yuktidīpikā, Critically edited for the first time from original manuscripts*. Calcutta 1938 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, XXIII). (2) R. C. Pandeya (ed.), *Yuktidīpikā, An ancient commentary on the Sāṃkhya-kārikā*. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. For the other commentaries on the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, the following abbreviations are used: C: Sāṃkhya-candrikā by Nārāyaṇatīrtha, G: Gauḍapādabhāṣya, J: Jayamaṅgalā, M: Mātharavṛtti, P: Paramārtha's Chinese translation of *Suvarṇa (or Kanaka)-saptati, TK: Sāṃkhya-tattvakaumudī, V₁, V₂: Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (V₁), Sāṃkhyavṛtti (V₂), ed. by E. A. Solomon.

² G. Oberhammer, "The Authorship of the Śaṣṭitantram," *WZKSO* IV (1960), pp. 71ff.

³ G. Chemparathy, "The Testimony of the Yuktidīpikā concerning the Īśvara Doctrine of the Pāsupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas," *WZKSO* IX (1965), pp. 119–146.

⁴ A. Wezler, "Some Observations on the Yuktidīpikā," *ZDMG*, Supplement II (XVIII Deutscher Orientalistentag, 1972), pp. 434–455. It is to be hoped that the new edition of *YD*, modelled on Kielhorn's critical edition of the *Mahābhāṣya*, announced by Wezler will be published in the near future.

⁵ The asterisk indicates that the lines are counted from the left.