the poetical figures of the second chapter of the *Kāvyādāra* will also be published in the People's Republic of China. This should allow for a future appreciation of Dpal-khang Lo-tsa-ba as a poet. Finally, the publishers should be congratulated for the outstanding quality of the publication of this lexicon. It is perhaps a matter of slight regret that, in contradistinction to Skyogs-ston's *Li-sh'i gur-khang*, no index was added to Dpal-khang-pa's work.

**Hamburg**

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**NOTES**


2 The same volume of his collected works contains on pp. 567–791 his critical bilingual edition of the *Amarakoṣā*. According to its colophon (p. 790), it was completed at some time during 1724 to 1725. The colophon, however, is a later addition to this edition for it explicitly states its indebtedness to Ngag-dbang brtson-'grus' biography which was compiled by his successor, the second 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa'i rod-rje, Dkon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po (1728–1791), for which see the *Mkhas-shing grub-pa'i dbang-phyug kun-mkhyen jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa'i rdo-rje'i rnam-par thar-pa ngo-mtshar skal-bzang jug-ngogs in The Collected Works of Dkon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po*, Vol. 2, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 270–271. At around this time Ngag-dbang brtson-'grus also wrote his commentaries to the *Kātantra* and the *Candravyākaraṇa*. However, Dkon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's listing of his writings found on p. 300 of this biography mentions neither his edition of the *Amarakoṣā*, nor his work on the MNSM.

3 See the MHTL No. 16313: *dag-yig thams-cad-las khyad-par-du 'phags-pa ni dpal-khang lo-tsa-bas mdzad-pa'i mkhas-pa'i ngag-sgron po-ta-la zhol-gyi par-ma de-yin* /.


5 The first two are listed in the bibliography to Dung-dkar Blo-bzang 'phrin-las' *Snyan-ngag-la jugs-tshul tshig-rgyan rig-pa'i sgo-byed*, Xining: Qinghai People's Publishing House, 1982, p. 621 and were at least available to the author when this work was completed in 1962. There Dpal-khang Lo-tsa-ba is styled Dpal-sgang Lo-tsa-ba Chos-dpal rgya-mtsho. The orthographic variant of "Dpal-sgang" is also met with in 'Jigs-med nam-mkha'i rdo-rje's *Gangs-can bod-kyi brda-skad ming-gzhis gsal-bar ston-pa'i bstan-bcos dgos-'byung nor-bu'i gter-chen* (completed in 1954), in *Bonpo Lexicographical Works*, Dolanji, 1976, p. 293.

6 The first Karma-'phrin-las-pa (1456–1539) was recognized and so designated by the seventh Rgyal-dbang Karma-pa Chos-grags rgya-mtsho (1454–1506), and subsequently installed at the monastery of Chos-'khor lhun-po. He later founded the famous college of Legs-bsad-ling. The third Karma-'phrin-las-pa (1631–1700?) was the nineteenth abbot of Yangs-pa-can monastery, and the fourth is presently residing in Toronto, Canada.
This work is embedded in its refutation by Mang-thos Bsdod-nams rnam-rgyal, alias Bkra-shis rnam-rgyal, alias the third Klong-chen-pa, the Gsang-sngags rnying-ma-pa’i ring-lugs-pa rnam-la rtsod-pa’i-lan legs-par bshad-pa dri-med gangga’i chu-rgyun, contained in Two Refutations of Attacks on the Nying-ma-pa School, Ngayur Nyingmay Sungrab, Vol. 2, Gangtok, 1971, pp. 1–95. The work is not dated, but Bkra-shis rnam-rgyal started it in Gnyal Yangs-pa-can and completed it in Rteses-thang monastery.

The text reads:
mkhas-pa du-mas mdzad-pa-yi //
brda-yi bstan-bcos grangs-mang yang //
’ga’-zhih tshig-rgyas dgos-don nyung //
’ga’-zhih gnyis ka ha cang bs dus //
’ga’-zhih yig-rnying dang mi-mthun //
’ga’-zhih sum-rtags sog dang ’gal //
de-phyir tshig-rnyung don rgyas-pa’i //
legs-bshad ‘di ni bdag-gis byas //

’Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa’i rdo-rje identified these also in his annotations on p. 565 of his edition of the MNMS.

Zhwa-lu Lo-tsa-ba was of course the teacher of Skyogs-ston Lo-tsa-ba, alias Smin-grub Lo-tsa-ba, Mi-bskyod rdo-rje’s teacher of linguistics. The Za-ma-tog bkod-pa has been published in Tibeto-Sanskrit Lexigraphical Materials, ed. Sonam Angdu, Vol. I, Leh, 1973, pp. 1–65. It was written in the year dngos-po (= the wood-dog year), that is, in 1514; Sonam Angdu’s text is the Dga’-ldan phun-tshogs-gling print. The first blocks for this work seem to have been prepared by Rab-brtan lhun-po of Yar-stod who, in 1526, requested the aged Zhwa-lu Lo-tsa-ba to add notes to this work as well as to provide Sanskrit synonyms. The Za-ma-tog bkod-pa also served as a major source for Legs’ Bod-kyi brda’i rnam-bshad smra-ba’i ngyi-ma-las dper-brjod me-tog-gi chun-po in The Literary Arts in Ladakh, Vol. V, Darjeeling, 1982, pp. 363–502.


Dung-dkar Blo-bzang ‘phrin-las, op. cit., p. 62 may have had such a diffuseness in mind when he characterizes such writers as Mkhas-grub Dge-legs dpal-bzang po, Rin-spungs-pa Ngag-dbang ’jig-rten grags-pa, Bod-mkhas-pa Mi-pham dge-legs rnam-rgyal, and the fifth Dalai Lama as “delighting in not being quite easily understood and in somewhat elusive phrasing”. In his view, these Tibetan authors on the whole emulated the Gauḍa school of Indian poetry and poetics.

See his Rgyan-gyi bstan-bcos me-long pan-chen bla-ma’i gsung-bzhin bkral-ba dbyangs-can ngag-gi rol-mtsho legs-bshad nor-bu’i byung-khung, Thimphu, 1976, p. 414 in his discussion of the illustrations to the lesdalmkara (Kāvyādarśa II: 268–69).


The inaugural volume of The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, the Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, was published in 1970 (cf. IIJ 16, pp. 145–147). The second volume, published in 1977, comprises the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school up to Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the Navyanyāya school, who flourished around A.D. 1350. The third volume, published in 1981, analyses the Advaita Vedānta philosophers Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana Miśra and

Śaṃkara’s pupils: Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Toṭaka, and Hastāmalaka. The use of the expression ‘up to’ in the titles of these two works is rather ambiguous. In volume two Gaṅgeśa is excluded whereas in volume three Śaṃkara and his pupils are included.

Both volumes contain a long introduction by Karl Potter followed by summaries of works. Many of the summaries in both volumes are also written by Potter himself. Ten other scholars have contributed to the second volume, three to the third volume. In the preface to the second volume Potter explains that the work is addressed to philosophers primarily, and Indologists secondarily. According to Potter philosophers without extended training in Sanskrit and Indian studies are not in a very good position to appreciate the contributions made by classical Indian philosophy towards the solution of perennial philosophical problems. He believes that this is partly due to the fact that the Indian tradition is foreign to Western philosophers and also partly to the type of translations that have been produced by Indian and Western Sanskrit scholars. Potter remarks that these translations do not always bring out what a professional philosopher will find most interesting and identifiable in the material. It is, of course, not reasonable to expect a detailed justification of these statements in a preface, but it is necessary to point out that they imply a number of presuppositions. In the first place, the existence of perennial philosophical problems which are being studied by both Western and Indian thinkers. Secondly, the possibility of extricating the treatment of these problems by Indian thinkers from the tradition to which they belong. If one accepts these presuppositions, there is a danger that more attention will be paid to those aspects of Indian thought which can be compared more easily to Western philosophical doctrines and that less attention will be paid to other aspects which may be of much more fundamental importance for the Indian tradition. It is perhaps not surprising that Potter seems to feel more at ease in his treatment of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika than in his study of the Advaita Vedānta.

The volume on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contains summaries of the works of some 50 authors, of which many are known only to specialists. As is to be expected they vary greatly in length. Detailed summaries are given of the following texts: Nyāyavārttika, Nyāyamañjarī, Vyomavatī, Nyāyavārttika-tātparyājīkā, Atmatattvaviveka and Nyāyakusumāṇjali. The so-called footnotes are to be found at the end of the volume (pp. 687–715), followed by a detailed index (pp. 717–744). The index contains a great number of technical terms both in Sanskrit and in English. In most cases Sanskrit technical terms are translated. Some Sanskrit terms are found only under their English equivalents. For instance, the index has: “injunction (vidhi, codana), negative (nisedha). Under vidhi the index refers to injunction but both codana and nisedha are not found in it. It would perhaps be useful to publish in future volumes a separate Sanskrit index comprising Sanskrit technical terms and their English equivalents.

The volume on Advaita Vedānta is almost entirely written by Potter alone. Allen W. Thrasher contributed an excellent and detailed summary of the Brahmāsiddhi (pp. 347–419) and S. Subrahmanya Sastri summarised Sureśvara’s voluminous Brhadāranyakopaniṣadbhāsyavārttika (pp. 420–520). Edeltraud Harzer translated Hacker’s German version of the Hastāmalakāsūlokah (pp. 601–602). Potter refers to the studies by Hacker and Mayeda on the authenticity of works attributed to Śaṃkara. However, he rightly includes summaries of works which are of doubtful authenticity. In his introduction on Gauḍapāda Potter writes that “Bhāvaviveka . . . offers one stanza that is identical with the fifth stanza of Book Three of the Kaṭikās” (p. 103). The same statement can be found in Max Walleser Der ältere Vedānta (Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 7 and 18) and in the introduction to Vidhushekharā Bhattacharya’s The Agamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda (Calcutta, 1943, pp. lxxv–lxxvi). However, only the first half of the stanza is the same although the word order is different, Agamaśāstra III. 5: yathaikasmin ghaṭākāse rajodhūmadibhīr yute/na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jivāh sukhādibhīh; Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya VIII. 12: ghaṭākāse yathaikasmin rajodhūmadibhīr vrте/tadvattā na hi sarveṣām sukhāder na tatha’imanah (cf. V. V. Gokhale, ‘The Vedānta-philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahṛdaya’, IIJ 2, 1958, p. 175).

In both volumes one can find numerous references to Potter’s Bibliography of Indian
Philosophies. However, one would have welcomed a brief critical review of existing translations and studies. Such a bibliographical supplement would also have enabled the editor to draw attention to recent studies which, due to the length of time needed for the compilation of the work, could not be consulted by the contributors. For instance, in the notes of his rather brief summary of the Nyāyabhuṣaṇa, Matilal refers to a few older publications. No mention is made of two important studies by Oberhammer in 1974 which probably appeared too late to be mentioned: ‘Bhāsravajjās Lehre von der Offenbarung’, WZKS 18 (1974), pp. 131—182; ‘Die Worterkennntnis bei Bhāsravajña’, Offenbarung, geistige Realität des Menschen (Wien, 1974), pp. 107—120.

All those interested in Indian philosophy will often consult these two volumes with a great feeling of gratitude to the editor, Karl H. Potter who has devoted many years to their preparation. It is to be hoped that he will be able to carry on with this project which aims at giving a survey of Indian philosophy on a scale which is without precedent in the history of Indian studies.


Dans l’avant-propos l’auteur écrit que ce livre, consacré au thème de la Jungle dans l’Inde ancienne, a son point de départ dans quelques pages d’un traité sanskrit de médecine — un catalogue des viandes, où les animaux sont classés en deux groupes: jāṅgala, “ceux des terres sèches”, et ānūpā, “ceux des terres paludéennes”. On trouvera une traduction de ce catalogue (Sūrūta, sūtra XLVI, 53—138) aux pages 120—127 de ce livre. Dans l’Inde ancienne le mot sanskrit jāṅgala désignait les ‘terres sèches’, cf. PW “jāṅgala (von jaṅgala) 1) adj. trocken, eben, sparlich bewachsen, aber dabei fruchtbar (von Gegenen: Gegens. ānūpa und marī)”. De nos jours le mot jungle désigne une forêt inextricable. L’auteur essaie d’expliquer ce retournement de sens, mais il s’efforce surtout à retrouver la valeur originelle de la Jungle telle qu’elle se manifeste dans la doctrine écologique exposée par les textes sanskrits. Dans ce livre l’auteur s’occupe de ce qu’il appelle “l’archéologie des représentations collectives.” Pour retrouver ces représentations l’auteur fait appel à beaucoup de disciplines différentes telles que la biogéographie, la zoologie, la linguistique, la pharmacie et la physiologie. Dans les trois premiers chapitres il examine la tradition dans ses relations avec les réalités géographiques. L’auteur montre que la Jungle est une catégorie de la pensée collective, parce qu’elle résume ou subsume tout un ensemble d’idées traditionnelles, à la fois juridiques et médicales, géographiques et politiques, biologiques et religieuses (cf. p. 77). En tant que fait géographique la Jungle désigne des terres sèches, mais en tant que catégorie mentale une terre inhabitable, inculte. Selon l’auteur, l’idée d’une terre “déserte, inhabitable, inculte” a entraîné l’idée de sauvagerie, de non-civilisation. Dans des textes des XIVe et XVe siècles que cite le Hobson-Jobson le mot jungle désigne la jungle à éléphants. L’auteur fait mention d’une véritable mutation dans la mentalité collective qui intervint dès le Moyen Âge, mais il n’arrive pas à l’expliquer de manière satisfaisante (p. 30).

Le retournement de sens du mot jungle est un procès historique dont les citations que l’on trouve dans le Hobson-Jobson suggèrent la direction générale. Pour arriver à une compréhension plus précise de ce procès il faudrait procéder à une enquête sur le développement du sens du mot jungle dans les textes indiens sanskrits et dans les relations des voyageurs. Une telle enquête est loin d’être facile et l’on ne pourrait guère reprocher à l’auteur de ne pas l’avoir entreprise s’il n’avait pas annoncé dans son avant-propos son intention d’expliquer “ce fait d’histoire de la sensibilité collective que constitue le retournement de notre opinion — l’opinion de l’homme moderne — sur la Jungle, passant de l’ardité à la luxuriance et de la terre en fûche à la forêt inextricable.” Avant d’arriver à l’opinion de l’homme moderne il faut s’occuper de celle de l’homme médiéval qui, comme nous avons vu tout à l’heure, parle de la jungle à éléphants alors

que pour l'homme antique la jungle est par excellence le territoire de l'antilope comme l'explique l'auteur (pp. 69–77).

L'intérêt principal de ce livre réside dans l'étude des représentations collectives qui expliquent tout un ensemble de notions sous-entendues dans les grands traités de médecine. L'auteur approche ce thème principal de son livre en se servant de toute une série de disciplines. Dans le premier chapitre “La Jungle et les bords de l'eau” l'auteur recherche les réalités concrètes qui sous-tendent la doctrine des trois terroirs, les “terres sèches” (jângala), les “terres paludéennes” (anûpa) et la “région moyenne” (sâdhârana), et il montre l'importance de la polarité des terres sèches et terres paludéennes pour la prognose médicale et pour la taxinomie des animaux et des plantes médicinales. La thérapeutique consiste à prescrire un régime approprié (sâtya) qui tient compte des qualités propres au “milieu de vie” (cara). L'auteur signale le caractère scolastique des oppositions que l'on trouve dans les traités de médecine: “La polarité des terres sèches et paludéennes n'est pas descriptive mais prescriptive. Il n'est pas question des faits physiques mais de normes brahmaniques” (p. 43).

Dans le deuxième chapitre l'auteur écrit que partout la Jungle est le produit d'un combat entre la forêt et la plaine cultivée. On peut retrouver dans les textes les traces de l'expansion de la culture paysanne qui progressait sur les plaines des grandes fleuves, un processus millénaire qui ne s'interrompt qu'aux temps de détresse (äpad): “Famines, guerres, épidémies sont autant de crises, échecs, ecules momentanés qui scandent l'immense processus historique de colonisation des terres sèches. Ce qui reprend alors possession des terres abandonnées par les paysans, ce n'est pas la forêt, mais la savane, le dynamisme envahissant des graminées” (p. 55).

La polarité de l'Indus et du Gange est le sujet du troisième chapitre “L'Indus et le Gange”. Cette polarité se manifeste dans le climat, la végétation, la faune et la géographie médicale (zones d'épidémie et zones d'endémie malarienne). L'auteur essaie de montrer comment les données empiriques se subordonnent aux schèmes de la pensée classique, en étudiant ces que les traités enseignent sur les rivières, la végétation, les quadrupèdes et la nourriture.

Dans le quatrième chapitre “La Zoologie dans la Pharmacie” l'auteur traite du catalogue des viandes de la Sûrûtasamhitâ, et en analyse surtout l'aspect linguistique. Il relève que les traités indiens sont remplis de séries de mots plus ou moins stéréotypés et que décrite une plante ou un animal consiste à nommer, en énumérant des synonymes: “connaître, c'est collectionner les noms et les formules”. Dans le catalogue des viandes on voit les résultats d'un système combinatoire dont les facettes sont les trois humeurs (dosa), les six saveurs (rasa) et les vingt qualités (guna). L'auteur emprunte la notion de “modèle à facettes” (facet design) au sociologue américain Paul Lazarsfeld pour caractériser le système de pensée de l'Âyurveda.

C'est l'étude de ce système de pensée que l'auteur poursuit dans le cinquième chapitre “La Logique et la Cuisine” où il montre que la cuisine procède comme la logique par combinaison (les mélanges, et les sauces) et transformation (les modes de cuisson): le catalogue des plats cuisinés indique d'après Dalhana “les qualités et les actions thérapeutiques qui naissent de l'art de mélanger (samyoga) et de l'art de cuisiner (samskâra) la viande, le plus important des assaisonnements” (p. 144). Dans l'Inde comme dans le monde grec et latin les connaissances sur la nature ont un caractère anthropocentrique mais ce n'est que dans l'Inde que l'on trouve des trésors de noms et l'existence d'un art combinatoire: “Sur l'inventaire des vivants, qui en lui-même occupe une place minime, s'est greffée une métalangue qui permet de formuler des jugements de valeur” (p. 146). L'auteur examine la structure des formes littéraires des taxinomies traditionnelles et signale les séries de mots et les répétitions des mêmes hémitiques dans des séquences différentes. Il remarque que le modèle d'une histoire naturelle est étranger à l'Inde: “Ce qui en tient lieu, c'est la collection, la récitation, la combinaison des formules consacrées par la Tradition” (p. 175).

Le sixième chapitre “La chair des mangeurs de chair” est consacré à la physiologie indienne. La physiologie de l'Âyurveda n'est pas une science des functions organiques mais c'est la doctrine de l'évolution des sept dhâtu ou “éléments” constitutifs du corps: chyle, sang, chair, graisse, os, moelle et sperme. C'est plus spécialement de deux de ces dhâtu, le sang et la viande que l'auteur s'occupe. Il mentionne que, dans des cas spécifiques, les traités prescrivent de boire du sang cru.
et de se nourrir de la viande bien que les textes enseignent aussi la non-violence, l’abstinence et le végétarisme: “Une thérapeutique de la force et de la virilité est insérée dans une tradition médicale et religieuse qui la dépasse et lui superpose une thérapeutique de la pureté et de la non-violence” (p. 198). Ce même thème est poursuivi dans le chapitre suivant “Note sur le végétarisme et la non-violence”. L’auteur remarque que “les raisons qui autorisent le régime carné sont de trois ordres: (1) l’activité sacrificielle; (2) les cas d’urgence vitale, famine ou maladie; et (3) le modèle de vie royal” (p. 202). L’“abstinence” (nivṛtti) ne devient possible que par le renoncement à la vie dans le monde, l’“activité” (pravr̥tti) naturelle aux créatures qui les conduit à se manger les unes les autres.

Le dernier chapitre “Les animaux dans la filière des nourritures” se pose comme objet de déterminer les positions de l’animal et de l’homme dans l’échelle des créatures. L’auteur montre qu’en combinant les idées de hiérarchie et continuité Aristote ou ses successeurs ont rendu possible le développement des sciences naturelles alors que, dans l’Inde, l’échelle des êtres ne fut jamais rien de plus qu’un principe juridique qui classe les êtres selon leurs mérites et selon leur aptitude ou leur inaptitude à pratiquer les rites. Ce que l’on trouve dans l’Inde c’est une filière des nourritures. La classification des êtres vivants se réduit à une classification des aliments et remèdes. Le médecin s’occupe avant tout de l’arthra, de la santé. C’est dans ce sens que le médecin échappe à ce schéma de classification strictement juridique et ritualiste qui sert à hiérarchiser les êtres selon leurs mérites. L’auteur remarque que l’on trouve dans l’Ayurveda les ébauches d’une pensée laïque et que les nomenclatures ayurvédiques participent d’un mouvement de la pensée vers le concret et les réalités biogéographiques. Mais ce mouvement est immédiatement arrêté et normalisé par la tradition englobante et les données réelles sont submergées dans des catalogues, produits d’un système de pensée combinatoire.

Dans ce livre l’auteur prend comme point de départ l’opposition entre les terres sèches et les terres paludéennes et montre comment, d’un côté, cette opposition se retrouve dans la réalité biogéographique, et, de l’autre, est formulée dans des taxonomies traditionnelles dont la structure est le produit d’une combinatoire logico-poétique. Pour mettre en lumière le caractère propre des doctrines médicales indiennes l’auteur attire souvent l’attention sur des points de correspondance et de divergence avec la médecine grecque. On regrette un peu que ces aperçus comparatifs soient éparpillés ici et là et que l’auteur n’en ait pas fait le bilan dans un chapitre spécial. L’intérêt de ce travail déborde largement le domaine de la médecine indienne puisque l’auteur s’intéresse surtout à l’étude des catégories de la pensée collective et à leur formulation. En étudiant soigneusement ce livre qui n’est pas toujours facile à lire le lecteur obtiendra une meilleure compréhension de la mentalité collective indienne. C’est le grand mérite de l’auteur d’avoir mis en lumière les modes de pensée et de parole qui sont à l’origine des doctrines ayurvédiques dans les traités de médecine indienne.


Dans son introduction Jacques Scheuer explique la perspective qui l’a guidé dans son étude sur Śiva dans le Mahābhārata (Mbḥ). Le Mbḥ est un ensemble uniifié et cohérent et le mythe central exprime une vision du monde dans laquelle Viṣṇu et Śiva — ou Kṛṣṇa et Rudra — occupent des positions plutôt complémentaires qu’exclusives. Les antagonismes éventuels sont commandés par les positions que ces divinités occupent dans la structure commune et les fonctions qu’on leur y fait jouer, les valeurs qu’elles représentent.

La position prise par l’auteur montre bien ce qui le sépare des interprétations proposées par de nombreux savants dans le passé. Jacques Scheuer passe rapidement en revue les tentatives de plusieurs savants de reconstruire un poème héroïque, fruit d’un âge héroïque (N. K. Sidhanta, 

Irvati Karve, M. Winternitz), les interprétations naturalistes de V. Fausböll et d’A. Ludwig et la théorie de l’inversion des deux Holtzmann. Il reproche à la méthode synthétique de Josef Dahlmann de réduire l’unité du \textit{Mbh} à l’uniformité et de ne pas avoir distingué les rôles distincts que Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa et Rudra-Śiva jouent dans le \textit{Mbh}. En ce qui concerne le travail de G. J. Held, J. Scheuer remarque qu’il a eu le mérite de considérer le \textit{Mbh} comme un ensemble et d’y jeter un regard neuf, mais il formule des réserves justifiées sur la reconstruction de la société qui aurait formé l’arrière-plan du \textit{Mbh}. Il consacre plusieurs pages aux travaux de G. Dunézil qui, selon lui, dans son interprétation de Śiva tend (a) à réduire Śiva à Asvāthāmāna; (b) à considérer les interventions de Śiva comme des développements plus récents, des ajouts ou des retouches śivaïtes; (c) à concevoir les relations de Viṣṇu et de Śiva en termes d’hostilité. Dans le tout dernier alinéa de l’introduction l’auteur écrit que la perspective et la méthode de son travail s’apparentent davantage à celles employées par M. Biardeau dans sa lecture du \textit{Mbh}. Il termine en disant: “Ceux qui sont familiers de son enseignement reconnaîtront, sans peine, tout ce que je lui dis.” Peut-être J. Scheuer aurait-il pu préciser cette dette brièvement dans l’intérêt de tous ceux qui n’ont pas pu profiter de l’enseignement de M. Biardeau surtout parce que – comme le relève l’auteur lui-même – elle n’a pas publié d’exposé d’ensemble de sa méthode et de ses résultats. Le lecteur qui est au courant de ses publications se rendra sans doute vite compte du fait que la méthode de l’auteur est identique à celle de M. Biardeau. Tout comme elle, J. Scheuer essaie de comprendre le \textit{Mbh} à partir de lui-même et du monde hindou. La perspective sous laquelle il analyse les relations et les fonctions des protagonistes est celle du structuralisme, inspiré des travaux de C. Lévi-Strauss, et qui a été adoptée aussi par M. Biardeau dans ses recherches.

L’introduction de ce livre porte les dates novembre 1972 – octobre 1975 et dans une note l’auteur écrit qu’il n’a pas tenu compte des travaux publiés depuis 1975. On trouvera dans ce livre à plusieurs reprises des interprétations que M. Biardeau a proposées dans des travaux publiés depuis 1975, et on peut se demander si J. Scheuer est arrivé indépendamment ou non aux mêmes conclusions. Ce n’est pas tellement la question de priorité qui entre ici en jeu, mais ce qui importe, c’est de savoir si c’est la même méthode qui a conduit aux mêmes résultats. Par exemple, ce n’est qu’en passant que J. Scheuer caractérise Arjuna comme le véritable personnage royal, tout à la fois guerrier et roi (cf. pp. 76 et 241). C’est un thème que M. Biardeau a longuement développé dans ses \textit{Études de mythologie hindoue} (BEFEO LXV, 1978, pp. 111sq.). Tout comme M. Biardeau, J. Scheuer retrouve dans le \textit{Mbh} les grands traits du mythe de destruction et de récréation du cosmos propre aux Purāṇa (cf. p. 18). Sur ce point il suit indubitablement les traces de M. Biardeau et il se heurte aux mêmes difficultés en ce qui concerne les distinctions entre \textit{yuga} et \textit{kalpa} (cf. pp. 328–329). Ne serait-il pas plus simple de supposer que le même thème de destruction et de récréation se trouve aussi bien dans l’épopée que dans les Purāṇa, mais dans un cadre différent? Que, de part et d’autre, on retrouve les mêmes images n’a rien d’étonnant car ces images s’imposent naturellement. Une telle hypothèse dispenserait de la nécessité de devoir rendre compte des anomalies que l’on rencontre en voulant appliquer le schéma purânique au \textit{Mbh}.

Les remarques précédentes suffiront, espérons-le, pour indiquer la méthode suivie par J. Scheuer. Pour pouvoir estimer à sa juste valeur l’importance de cet ouvrage non seulement pour l’interprétation du rôle de Śiva dans le \textit{Mbh} mais aussi pour l’exégèse de ce que l’auteur appelle le mythe central du \textit{Mbh} il faudra suivre pas à pas ses analyses pénétrantes des principaux épisodes dans lesquels Śiva agit. Le premier chapitre étudie la naissance des héros, le deuxième la naissance et le mariage de Draupadī. Le troisième chapitre analyse les deux versions de l’histoire d’Ambā et de Śikhaṇḍin. Le quatrième chapitre est consacré à l’étude de l’incendie de la forêt Khāṇḍava. Jārāsamṛtha est le sujet du cinquième chapitre qui conclut par le songe de Yudhiṣṭhira dans lequel il voit Rudra-Śiva regardant fixement vers le Sud. Selon J. Scheuer cela signifie que nous entrons dans une période de crise et de destruction. Les chapitres VI et VII qui étudient la quête des armes par Arjuna éclaircissent ses relations avec Śiva. Le huitième chapitre s’intitule ‘Śiva sur le champ de bataille’ et analyse le Nārāyanāstramokṣaparvan (7.165–
Le chapitre IX traite du massacre nocturne. La conclusion fait le bilan des chapitres précédents. J. Scheuer y souligne que Śiva est présent dans tout ce qui est violent, cruel, dangereux. Il prend sur lui la violence inhérente au sacrifice, à l'exercice de la justice, et à la guerre qui, tous les trois, sont nécessaires pour le maintien du dharma. Śiva intervient dans les périodes de crise et surtout à la fin d'un yuga. Il préside à un sacrifice démesuré qui met fin au monde sacrificiel normal, et devient le feu du Temps, le feu de la Mort (Kālagnirudra) qui détruit le triple monde.

Il faut savoir gré à J. Scheuer d'avoir cité partout le texte du Mbh, en se servant de l'édition critique et de la "Vulgate", et d'avoir traduit les citations. Dans tous les détails de ce livre se manifeste le même soin: une bibliographie détaillée et précise (indiquant même le numéro des pages de chaque publication), trois index: index des personnages du Mbh, index thématique et index des auteurs et textes cités. Il faut attirer l'attention du lecteur sur les notes qui contiennent des remarques relatives à des problèmes qui méritent d'être examinés, ou à d'autres interprétations possibles.

Dans sa préface Madeleine Biardeau n'hésite pas à recommander le livre de Jacques Scheuer comme une synthèse magistrale. C'est une opinion à laquelle on peut souscrire complètement.


In the preface to the *Bilder hundert deutscher Indologen* (Wiesbaden, 1965) Wilhelm Rau expressed the wish that a new revised and more complete edition of his book might be published in the future. This new edition contains 136 photographs. Some photographs have been replaced by new ones (those of Ziegenbalg, A. W. von Schlegel, Rosen, Benfey, Kellner, Hultzsch. Ernst Leumann, von Le Coq, Liebich and von Negelein). Photographs of scholars who were absent in the first edition are published for the first time. Among them are Adalbert Kuhn, Thibaut, Hardy, Neisser and Otto. However, most of the newly-published photographs portray scholars who have died since the publication of the first edition. This second edition has been edited with much care by Wilhelm Rau, who has not only carefully selected the new photographs but also corrected dates and names. For instance, in this new edition Winternitz's Christian name is correctly spelled Moriz and not Moritz as found in the first edition and many other publications. The only regrettable thing is that the photographs are not only reduced in size (from 10–14 to 8–11.5 cm) but also poorer in quality.

Rau's book contains photographs of German-speaking Indologists and specialists in Old Iranian. It is to be hoped that an enterprising publisher may take the initiative in publishing a collection of portraits of non-German Indologists because there are but very few publications containing photographs of Indologists. To the ones mentioned by Wilhelm Rau (pp. V–VI) one must add J. Gonda's *Indology in the Netherlands* (Leiden, 1964) which contains portraits of nineteen Dutch-speaking Indologists.


Friedrich Otto Schrader (19.3.1876 – 3.11.1961) was active in many different fields and his *Kleine Schriften* testify to the variety of his interests. His doctoral thesis *Über den Stand der
indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas (Leipzig, 1902) examines the different philosophical systems which existed at the time of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra. Of particular importance is Schrader’s exploration of the Jain sources which he had studied under the guidance of Ernst Leumann in Strassburg. Schrader’s thesis is often quoted and its reprint in the Kleine Schriften is extremely welcome (pp. V–X, 1–78). Also reprinted in this volume are almost all his articles on the Bhagavadgītā (pp. 227–294) and his book on The Kashmir Recension of the Bhagavadgītā, Stuttgart, 1930 (pp. 173–226). Not included is Schrader’s reply (JRAS, 1935, pp. 146–149) to Edgerton’s detailed review of Schrader’s book (JASOS, 52, 1932, pp. 68–75). Schrader’s theories were subjected to a detailed examination by S. K. Belvalkar (‘The So-called Kashmir Recension of the Bhagavadgītā’, New Indian Antiquary, Vol. II, No. 4, pp. 211–251) but Schrader does not seem to have tried to refute his criticisms, which Belvalkar later summarised in the introduction to his edition of the Bhiṣmaparvan (Poona, 1945–1947, pp. LXXVIII–LXXXIII).¹

The section entitled ‘Sprachwissenschaft’ contains articles on the Siamese Alphabet (pp. 343–388) and on the relations between Dravidian and Uralian (pp. 389–432). Schrader advanced the hypothesis that primitive Dravidians entered India from the north-west with Uralian elements already assimilated (cf. p. 432). Other articles deal with the postposition of the partitive genitive in the three Indian language families: Aryan, Dravidian and Munda (‘Ein syntaktisches Problem der indischen Sprachfamilien’, pp. 433–442), the etymology of anala (pp. 443–445), the influence of Dravidian in Śaṅkarānanda’s Bhagavadgītā-vyākhyā (‘A Curious Case of Idiomatic Sanskrit’, pp. 446–447), an explanation of the name Kalkī(n) (pp. 448–456) and the etymology of Sanskrit hevāka (pp. 457–459).

The other sections (1. Indische Philosophie; 2. Indische Religionsgeschichte; 4. Buddhismus; 6. Ethnologie und Prähistorie) contain mainly shorter articles and reviews. An exception is an article entitled ‘On the Relation of Herakleitos the Dark to Some Contemporaries and Predecessors’ (pp. 79–108) which was published in 1910. According to the editor, piety required the publication of this article which seems to have been dear to Schrader. Useful is the reprint of Schrader’s edition of the Bāṣkalamantropaniṣadāvrtti, which was discovered by him and first published as an appendix to his A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library (Madras, 1908, pp. 307–315).

Schrader’s Kleine Schriften have been edited with great care by Professor Sprockhoff, who has known Schrader since 1948. He has taken great pains in editing Schrader’s addenda and corrigenda (cf. Zum Geleit, p. VIII) which relate mainly to his doctoral thesis and to his article on the silver kettle found in Gundestrup (‘Indische Beziehungen eines nordischen Fundes’, pp. 469–480, 495–499). Another appendix contains a list of printing errors. The following have escaped the notice of the editor: p. 42, note 3: read svabhāvataḥ for svabhāyataḥ; p. 59, note 4: read ṣtvā for dsbhāvā; p. 63, note 6: read ātmānāḥ svabhāvāc for ātmānāḥ svabhāvaḥ; p. 75; note 1: read paryuṣyaya for paryanuyoya. On p. 487, second line from below: read Tsuji Naoshirō for Suji Naoshirō. Three Indexes (1. names and subjects; 2. texts quoted; 3. words) are due to Werner F. Menski and Ulrike Niklas (pp. 505–520). In the last index the page references are not always complete. For instance, kūṭastha 481; add 122; pari-hṛ- 325; add 985. This volume is a very welcome addition to the publications of the Glasenapp-Stiftung.

NOTE


Volume two of Emmerick’s study on the Siddhasāra contains the Tibetan version edited on the basis of three blockprints (Derge, Narthang and Peking), and an English translation. According to Emmerick, the Tibetan version provides an accurate interpretation of the Sanskrit original and is often clearer than the concisely-formulated Sanskrit. Special problems are connected with the identification of plant names. Emmerick explains the six ways in which the Tibetan translators dealt with the problem of rendering the Sanskrit plant names.

The English translation does not discuss the passages which differ from the original Sanskrit nor those which contain additional information. According to the introduction these problems will be discussed in the commentary. It is only after the publication of the commentary that it will be possible to go further into details of the translation. In reading the first few pages of the translation one notes, for instance, that in verse 2 of Chapter 1 the Sanskrit text reads *puruṣo vyādhy-adhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtاغunātmakah*. The Tibetan version seems to be based upon a slightly different text, i.e. *puruṣo vyādhy-adhiṣṭhānam mahābhūtagunātmakah*. In verse 10 of the same chapter the Sanskrit text has: *doṣa-dhātu-malādhāro dehino deha ucyate*. The Tibetan translation is rendered by Emmerick as follows: “As for the body (deha), which is the place of residence (ādhiṣṭhāro) of the humours (doṣa-), the elements (dhātu-), and the impurities (mala-), it is called (ucyate) the body (deha).” One wonders whether the Tibetan translator misunderstood the word *dehino* in the Sanskrit text or preferred to give a different interpretation. In other instances neither the Sanskrit text nor the Tibetan translation are completely clear. For instance, in verse 30 of the same chapter, the Sanskrit text has the word *sad-ātma-vān* and the Tibetan version *raññams daññ ldan-pa*. Emmerick translates this term, which I have not been able to find either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan lexicons, by ‘possesses self-control’. In verse 32 Tibetan *bag-yod-pa* corresponds in the usual way to Sanskrit *apramatta*, only it is not clear why Emmerick prefers the rendering ‘respectful’ to ‘careful’.

In his edition of the first five chapters of Vāgbhata’s *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdayasamhitā*, Claus Vogel announced his intention to publish a trilingual glossary of the medical terminology. However, since the publication of the first volume of Vogel’s work in 1965, no more has appeared. It is to be hoped that Emmerick, who in a very short time has published the complete Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the Siddhasāra and an English translation, will envisage the compilation of such a trilingual glossary. In his preface, Emmerick announces that Rahul Peter Das is already working on a project designed to index all the main Sanskrit medical works.

Emmerick’s edition and translation of the Tibetan version of the Siddhasāra is a major contribution to the study of Indian and Tibetan medicine. We are eagerly looking forward to the publication of the Khotanese and Uighur fragments and of the commentary. This enormous undertaking could not have been placed in better hands!

**NOTE**

1 In Sumatrātana’s dictionary, *raññ-bžin*, ‘own-nature’, is given as an equivalent for *raññ-ñams*.  


The translation of Arunantis Śivajñānasiddhiyār by H. W. Schomerus was found among his manuscripts and was handed over to the editors by his son, J. G. Schomerus. In the preface the editors explain that it was not possible to revise the manuscript critically in the light of the Tamil text and to take into account recent publications. Dr. Dhamotharan has verified all difficult Tamil words. Professor D. H.-W. Gensichen has contributed a brief note on H. W. Schomerus (1879–1945). Schomerus arrived in India as a missionary in 1902 and he remained there until 1912. In 1925 he was appointed to the chair of 'Missionswissenschaft' in Halle.


In his Çaiva-Siddhānta Schomerus lists translations of both the Śivajñānabodha and the ŚJS. The latter was first translated by J. M. Nallaswami Pillai, who also wrote a book entitled: Studies in Saiva Siddhānta (Madras, 1911; Dharmapuram, 1962). His translation was first published in the journal Siddhānta Dīpikā and later as a book, Śivajñāna Siddhiyār of Arunadi Śivāchārya (Madras, 1913).

According to the tradition, Arunanti lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. His work is written in the form of stanzas of four lines each. Schomerus does not give a consecutive numbering of the stanzas. According to Pjatigorskij, the total number of stanzas is 629, of which 301 belong to the parapakṣa. The stanzas are often difficult to understand without the help of commentaries. For the svapakṣa Schomerus used the commentary of Śivajñānayogī and for the parapakṣa that of Tattvapārkhāsāra. Other commentaries on the ŚJS were studied by V. A.: Devasenaṭapati in his book, Saiva Siddhānta, as Expounded in the Siva-jñāna-Siddhiyār and its Six Commentaries (Madras, 1966). Schomerus's translation of the stanzas is followed by lengthy notes which combine information found in the commentary with explanations given by the translator. It is not possible to discover in this way which information is found in the commentary. Perhaps it would not have been useful to translate the commentary in its entirety, but one would have liked to see at least an example of the way in which the commentary explains the stanzas. Moreover, the commentaries are also important because they refer to the Sanskrit āgamas of the Śaivaśarana. Mme Hélène Brunner points out that in the sixteenth century the commentators on the ŚJS made great use of the āgamas for their treatises and in order to refute their adversaries. The special importance of the parapakṣa was realised very early in the history of Tamil studies. Karl Graul (1814–1864) translated the sections on the Buddhist schools. The section on the Ājīvakas was used by A. L. Basham in his book, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvakas (London, 1951). A. M. Pjatigorski analysed and translated the section on the Lokāyāta school. Recently Munee Tokunaga studied and translated the section on the Pāncaratra. It is to be hoped that the publication of this voluminous work by

H. W. Schomerus will stimulate further research on the ŚJS, and the commentaries and the sources used both by Aruṇanti and his commentators. We must be grateful to Hermann Berger, Ayyadurai Dhamotharan and Dieter B. Kapp for having prepared this posthumous manuscript for publication.

NOTES


3 Cf. H. W. Schomerus, Der Čaiva-Siddhānta, p. 31; Munéo Tokunaga, op. cit., p. 12, n. 31.


The Chinese tradition attributes the Twelve Gate Treatise (Shih-ehr-men-lun) to Nāgārjuna. In his introduction Cheng remarks that recently a few scholars have questioned the authenticity of this treatise. According to him “the Twelve Gate Treatise is most likely an authentic Nāgārjuna book” because of its resemblance to the Middle Treatise (Chung lun). However, Cheng does not discuss the objections raised by scholars against its authenticity. In an article to which Cheng refers in a note, Richard A. Gard quotes a statement by Chōzen (1227—1307) in his Sanrongengikennyūshū: “the Shih-ehr-mēn-lun verses were composed by Lung-shu [Nāgārjuna] whereas the prose was a commentary by Ch’ing-mu [Piṅgalā]. However, another opinion says that both the verses and the prose were written by Lung-shu himself.”¹ According to Gard the Shih-ehr-men-lun is a Chinese translation by Kumārajīva of a commentary by Piṅgalā which quotes verses selected by Piṅgalā and attributed to Nāgārjuna, and the whole work is thus a compilation by Piṅgalā and not Nāgārjuna. The authenticity of the verses has been discussed in an important article by Yasui Kōsai.² Yasui points out that already at the time of Chi-tsang (549—623), some people believed that the verses were written by Nāgārjuna but the commentary by Ch’ing-mu. Chi-tsang himself believed that both the verses and the commentary were written by Nāgārjuna but he added: “It is difficult to know this matter. If there is definitely a clear proof that the prose was written by a later author, I can not contradict it.”³ It is also interesting to note that Chi-tsang quotes two theories as to be composition of the Shih-ehr-men-lun by Nāgārjuna: “Nāgārjuna wrote himself three treatises. First he composed the Wu-wei-lun (Akutobhayā) in one-hundred thousand ślokas. Thereupon he selected from it the main ideas in five hundred ślokas called Chung-lun (Madhyamakāsāstra). As to the Shih-ehr-men-lun there are two explanations. The first states that like the Chung-lun it derives from the Wu-wei. The second states that he took the essence from the Chung-lun and composed the Shih-ehr-men.”⁴

The Twelve Gate Treatise (TGT) contains twenty-six verses and a prose commentary. Richard H. Robinson examined the relation of the verses to those in other texts by Nāgārjuna and arrived at the following conclusion: seventeen are identical with verses of the Chung-lun; four are similar to Chung-lun verses. One verse is identical with verse 19 of the Śūnyatāsaptati, and four verses are unidentified.⁵ In the introduction to his translation H. U. wrote that seventeen verses were

taken from the Chung-lun and two from the Śūnyatā-saptatī, and that therefore only seven original verses were to be found in the TGT, i.e. the verses in the beginning of chapters 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11 and 12.6 Robinson attributed only one verse to the Śūnyatā-saptatī (see Chapter VII, Cheng’s translation p. 85) because a verse allegedly quoted from the Śūnyatā-saptatī in Chapter I is not to be found in this text, cf. Cheng p. 56: “As it is stated in the Seventy Treatise, [Twelve chains of] causal conditions really have no production. If they have production, do they have it in one mind-moment or in many mind-moments?” However, very similar to this verse is verse 8 of the Śūnyatā-saptatī: rten-'byun yan-lag beu-gni gsān / sdog-bsal ‘bras-can de ma-skyes // sems-gcig-la yān mi-tshad-la / du-ma-la yān mi-tshad-do //: “The twelve members of the dependent origination which possess a fruit of suffering are not produced. It [production] is not possible in a single moment (citta[kṣaṇa]) and also not in several [moments].”7

Yasui’s main argument against the attribution of the verses of the TGT to Nāgārjuna relates to the first verse of Chapter VIII which Cheng translates as follows: “By observing that the characteristics [of all things] change / We know all things are devoid of nature. Things which are devoid of nature are also non-existent, so all things are empty” (p. 89). Cheng’s rendering of the second half of this verse is too free. A more precise translation is: “Dharma-s devoid of nature are also non-existing because the dharmas are all empty.” This verse is found in a similar wording in two commentaries which exist only in Chinese translation: Ch’ing-mu’s commentary (T 1564) and Sthiramati’s commentary (T 1567).9 The Sanskrit text of this verse is verse XIII, 3 of the Middle Treatise: bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadārānāt / avabhāvo bhāvo nāsti bhāvānām śūnyatā yataḥ // According to the Akutobhayā and the commentaries written by Buddhāpālīta, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti this verse contains an argument advanced by an opponent of Nāgārjuna. In the TGT, however, this verse expresses the opinion of the author himself. According to Yasui it seems probable that the author of the TGT explained this verse wrongly as rendering Nāgārjuna’s own opinion. Another argument against the authenticity of the TGT is, according to Yasui, the fact that, as far as is known, it is never quoted in the commentaries written by Buddhāpālīta, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti.

Ui pointed out that the first verse of Chapter I of the TGT is quoted as written by Nāgārjuna in *Sāramati’s *Mahāyānāvatāra.10 Yasui remarks that the same verse is also quoted in the *Maitreyaparipṛcchopadeśa.11 According to him, this verse was either quoted from the TGT or from some other source in which it was attributed to Nāgārjuna.

The TGT was translated in 411 A.D. by Kumārajīva, a fact which is not even mentioned by Cheng. Kumārajīva is also the translator of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (T 1509) and the Daśābhūmikāvibhāṣāsāstra, two works of which the attribution to Nāgārjuna is doubtful and which exist only in Chinese translation.

Although Cheng lists Ui’s translation of the TGT in his bibliography he does not refer at all to Ui’s introduction. Hatani Ryōtai’s translation12 and Kōsai Yasui’s article are not mentioned at all. In the introduction to a translation of the TGT one would have expected a study of the problems connected with its authenticity with reference to the Japanese works mentioned above. In his introduction Cheng sketches the history of Nāgārjuna’s teachings in China and the interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness by San-lun masters and mainly Chi-tsang. On p. 9 he mentions that Hui-wen (550–577), the founder of T’ien-t’ai Buddhism, is said to have been awakened to the truth while reading verse XXIV, 18 of Nāgārjuna’s Middle Treatise. One wonders why Cheng considers Hui-wen to be the founder of T’ien-t’ai Buddhism because this honour is usually given to Chhi-i (538–597).13 Almost nothing is known about Hui-wen, not even his dates. It is not clear at all from where Cheng has taken the dates 550–577. According to Paul Magnin Hui-ssu became his pupil in 536 or 537.14 Finally, Cheng fails to point out that the story of Hui-wen’s discovery of Nāgārjuna’s Middle Treatise XXIV, 18 is found for the first time in a work written in the thirteenth century.15

In the preface the author states that he has attempted to be as close as possible to the original text but has expressed the Chinese freely when the literal Chinese would convey little or no meaning in English. In many instances, it would certainly have been possible to adhere more
closely to the Chinese text as, for instance, in the translation of the first verse of Chapter VIII which was quoted above. In any case, his translation will be useful for scholars who do not read either Chinese or Japanese. The TGT was translated into Sanskrit in 1954 by N. Aiyaswami Sastri. It is rather amazing to see that Cheng does not mention this work at all. The most difficult section of the TGT is without doubt the preface written by Seng-jui (352–436) of which Richard Robinson made an excellent translation accompanied by detailed notes. Although Cheng refers only in one note to it, it is obvious that he has made good use of Robinson’s translation and notes. Robinson’s translation is closer to the original and on the whole to be preferred to Cheng’s rendering although there is still room for improvement. For instance, the compound che-chung is rendered by Robinson as “the refutative Middle”. Cheng refers to Chi-tsong’s explanation and translates it as “a refutative and corrective exposition”. The term che-chung is well-known in classical Chinese in the meaning of a “just judgment”. In this compound che has not the meaning “to refute” but “to decide as a judge”.

NOTES

4 Ibid., p. 177b22–25.
6 Kokuyaku Daizôkyô, Ronbu vol. 5 (Tôkyô, 1921), kaidai, p. 71.
9 Vol. 30, p. 158b7,11.
10 T. 1634; vol. 32, p. 41b16–19.
15 Paul Magnin, op. cit., p. 32, n. 18.
19 Cf. F. S. Couvreur, Dictionnaire classique de la langue chinoise (Ho Kien fou, 1911), p. 819c.


In the appendix to his edition of the Jâtakamâla (Boston-London-Leipsic, 1891) Hendrik Kern published the text of a Kacchapa-jâtaka which was found in MS. P (MS. 95 Burnouf, Bibl. Nationale, Paris), one of the three manuscripts on which his edition is based. In 1893 Sergej

Ol’denburg pointed out that the same jātaka is found in the Mahāvastu (ed. Senart II 244.1 – 245.16). Yuyama has now edited these two texts on opposite pages. Text A is the version of the Kacchapa-jātaka edited by Kern, and text B the version which occurs in the Mahāvastu. In editing text A, Yuyama has consulted Kern’s MS P. Yuyama’s edition of the Mahāvastu version is based upon four manuscripts, two used by Senart (B and C) and two Nepalese manuscripts recently photographed for the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (D and E). Yuyama divides the texts into sections a–p. According to him, sections a, b, d, f, h–1 of text A are probably copied from text B. Two other passages (e and m) are taken from the Jātakamāla. The source of the verses in section g is unknown.

In the introduction Yuyama gives very detailed information on stories in which a tortoise plays an important role (pp. xi–xxii): Nobody but Yuyama could have collected so many bibliographical details! On p. xiii one must correct Jan Ensink to Jacob Ensink, and on p. xix Syrkin (a genitive!) to Syrkin. The edition of the texts is preceded by an introduction in which Yuyama pays particular attention to the metre of the verses. He also adds a translation of the verses. However, the prose passages are not translated by him, although many words and expressions are studied in the notes. It is therefore perhaps not superfluous to point out some problems in the text of these passages. Let me begin by quoting the beginning of section d of text A: bhūta-pūrṇam, bhikṣavaḥ, atitam adhvānam nagare vārāṇasi kāśi-jana-pade pāryātikā nāma nadi, tasya kule aparā-mālā-kārasya vana-mālam, asaṣa dāṇi mālā-kāro mālasyaiva taṃ velam mālā-kāra āgatvā puspāni uddhariya puspā-karanakam ādāya mālā-kāranāto nirdhāvati.1

The reading mālasyaiva is also found in MS C of text B, whereas the other manuscripts (BDE) read mālasyaiva. Yuyama remarks that mālasya signifies here ‘of the (flower) field’. As to velā Yuyama writes: “aber velā–wird hier zweifellos in seiner primären Bedeutung “Endpunkt, Grenze, Kuste” gebraucht: “an die Küste (des Flusses Pāryātikā) gelangend, . . .” (p. 28, note 15). This raises two questions. The usual word for the bank of a river is kula which occurs just before. Secondly, if velā refers to the bank of the river, the genitive mālasya cannot depend on tam velam. The following word mālā-kāra is found in all manuscripts of the two texts.

Yuyama writes: “mālā-kāra(h) muss richtig sein, obwohl es stilistisch unbeholfen ist (p. 28, n. 16).” A nominative mālā-kāra is not only stylistically clumsy but also very improbable. The passage quoted ends with the words mālā-kāranāto nirdhāvati. It is therefore most likely that mālā-kāra must be emended to mālā-kāranam “for the sake of wreaths”: “That wreath-maker now came to the border of that same field for the sake of [making] wreaths. Having collected flowers he hurried off with his basket of flowers in order [to make] wreaths.” It is difficult to explain the ablative mālā-kāranāto instead of the expected accusative. Is this due to the influence of the following word nirdhāvati? The text continues: grāmābhimukho ca prasthitoh/tatah ca nadito kacchapo uddharitvā go-mayaṃ bhakṣayati. In Text B three manuscripts (BDE) read uddhativā and one manuscript (C) uddharitvā.1 It is interesting to note that here the reading of text A agrees with MS. C of text B. Yuyama has not examined the relation of text A, which is preserved in a single manuscript (P), to the four manuscripts of text B. A systematic comparison of the readings of all five manuscripts would have to be made in order to determine this relationship. Yuyama explains uddhativā by ud- plus dhā-. It seems preferable to explain this form as a gerund of ud- plus hā-. The sense also requires an intransitive verb and not a transitive verb such as uddharati. The reading uddhativā is certainly to be preferred.

Section i tells how the tortoise escapes from the hand of the wreath-maker: tasya mālā-kāra-hastāto bhṛastō. The text continues: tatra udake vuḍḍo tāye nadiye a-vidūretvā unmuṇcitvā taṃ mālā-kāram vacaye bhāṣati. All manuscripts read vuḍḍo, which, according to Yuyama, is the past passive participle of vṛt: “bewegen, weitergehen” (p. 29, note 44). One expects rather a word signifying “entered, plunged into” but it is difficult to see how the readings of the manuscripts can be changed. Unmuṇcitvā is Yuyama’s emendation. MS P has taṃ muditvā and the Mahāvastu MSS respectively anmuṇcitvā (E), unmuṇditvā (D), dāmm uditvā (B) and taṃ uditvā (C). In view of the many different readings it is preferable to read
unmajjitvā which is well attested. The a of mājjitvā was probably changed into an u under the influence of the u in the prefix. No manuscript has the double j but the various readings (d, d and ṅc) may well be the result of a misreading of the original double j. The verb unmuṅc- is not attested anywhere and Yuyama’s explanation is rather far-fetched: “ud- plus muc-, ‘sich gefreit habend, sich freilassend (aus dem Wasser)” (p. 30, note 45).

We must be very grateful to Dr. Yuyama for having so carefully edited these texts. His work provides a solid foundation for further study of the many problems relating to the manuscript readings and the interpretation of the texts which still remain to be solved.

NOTE

1 See p. 28, note 21: “So BDE uddhahitvā”. Probably the word so has to be deleted.


The word philosophy in the title of Watanabe’s book is somewhat misleading because he is primarily concerned with the development of the logical aspects of Buddhist thought. Watanabe attempts to reveal “certain embryonic anticipations of formal logical procedures” in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma. The first part deals with the origin of abhidhamma philosophy. The author examines the meaning of the words dhamma and abhidhamma, the relationship between abhidhamma and mātikā and the systematization of the mātikās. The second part is entitled: The Development of the Dialogue Form. In the first five chapters (Chapter 6 –10) the author studies the methods of argumentation found in the Nikāyas. The eleventh chapter examines the pudgala chapter in both the Kathāvatthu and the Vījñānakāya.

Watanabe’s study is based upon a detailed study of the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. His philosophical training shows itself in the care with which he examines the meanings of words and terms. Many suttas contain dialogues which undoubtedly reflect the method of teaching of the Buddha himself, who insisted on the fact that his words ought not to be accepted on his authority. However, it is difficult to agree with Warder’s statement quoted by the author on p. 72: “The outlook is that of the making of a scientific discovery and announcing it to the world, whereupon others may investigate its truth for themselves.” Buddha’s dhamma is profound and cannot be understood by scientific thinking. However, arguments are useful, especially for the refutation of erroneous views. Watanabe shows very well how different forms of logical procedures are applied in the course of discussions. Strict logical forms are found for the first time in the Kathāvatthu. For instance, the author draws attention to the use of existential quantification and universal quantification in the pudgala chapter. In the suttas the Buddha and his chief disciples make use of many different methods of argumentation. In Chapters 6 and 7 the author gives examples of the use of metaphors, similes and analogies, the four pañhabhyākaranas and the tetralemma. Chapter 8 studies the meaning of the words takka ‘false reasoning’ and dhammatakka ‘true reasoning’. Chapters 9 and 10 deal in more detail with the forms of reasoning and argument in the suttas. The author shows the importance of negative reasoning, the frequent use of the double negative, and the development of hypothetical and alternative judgements.

Watanabe’s book is an important contribution to the study of the development of logical forms of discussion in the Pāli Nikāyas. His work must be studied carefully, especially by the reader who is not acquainted with modern logic. However, the author’s explanations are always clear and to the point and the attentive reader will certainly be rewarded for his effort.
In the eleventh chapter the author translates the major part of the *pudgala* chapter of the *Vijñānakāya* (pp. 177–203). It is a pity that his translation is not always very reliable. Although the bibliography mentions de La Vallée Poussin’s article ‘La controverse du temps et du pudgala dans le Vijñānakāya’ (*Études Asiatiques*, I, 1925, pp. 343–376), the author does not seem to have consulted it. Undoubtedly, a study of de La Vallée Poussin’s translation of the *pudgala* chapter would have prevented several mistranslations. For instance, on pp. 195 and 196 of Watanabe’s book, we find the following passage: ‘Venerable one, the Buddha explained with perfect self-confidence (*vaiśāradya*) as follows: “I was perfectly enlightened as to dharmas (principles). In spite of the fact that I was enlightened with perfect enlightenment, if strivers, brahmans, its Devas, its Māras, its Brahmas in this world said together that he was not enlightened, I did not see any reason for doubt [Note 1: At this point, we follow a free translation, because the Chinese version seems to make no sense.] Because I was enlightened, I was full of peace (*kṣema*), free from fear (*abhaya*) and gained self-confidence; and I myself established the great wheel of truth in the place called the basis of a great man (*ārṣabha*-sthāna) and roared like a lion in the assembly.” Venerable one, if so, why do you not blame the Buddha for his ignorance?’

The difficulties in the Chinese version (T 1539, p. 544a4–10) are entirely due to incorrect punctuation. In the Taishō Daizōkyō the punctuation is notoriously bad and must often be completely ignored. The canonical text quoted is very close to Aṅguttara II, 8 and to Yāsomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. U. Wogihara), pp. 645.33–646.4: *samyaksambuddhaya bata me sato ime dharmā anabhisambuddhā ity atra mām kaścic chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā saha dharmaṇa codayet. smāryet. tatrahaṁ nimittam api na samanupasyāmi. evam cāham nimittam asamanupasyan kṣemapratptas ca viharāmy abhayapratptas ca vaiśāradya-pratptas ca udāram ārṣabham sthānam pratiśānaṁ brāhmaṁ cakram pravartayāmi. parsadi samyak simhanādam nādi. idam prathamam vaiśāradyaṁ.*

The Chinese text can be translated as follows: ‘Venerable one, the Bhagavat made the following declaration with regard to self-confidence: “I have perfectly understood these dharmas. If a śramaṇa, or a brahman, or a god, or a Māra, or a Brahman, etc., with justice, charges me or reminds me that I have not perfectly understood these dharmas, I do not see any ground for that. Because I see that there is no ground for that, I abide in peace, free from fear and full of self-confidence. I claim the best, the first place. I set in motion the brahma-wheel. I roar the lion’s roar in the assembly.” Venerable one, if so, do you not blame the Buddha of ignorance?’ — The last sentence refers to the existence of a seventh consciousness not perfectly understood (*abhisambuddha*) by the Buddha. If the *pudgalavādin* maintains that there is such a consciousness, the Buddha would be guilty of ignorance.

The Buddha explains to Ānanda that he does not keep his fist closed (*acāryamūṣti*). Watanabe translates: “Ānanda, the *tathāgata* never keeps his hand closed (*acārya-mūṣti*: teacher’s fist) in teaching. If I maintain reserve, another ātman (may) be conscious of it. I am afraid of this” (p. 196). La Vallée Poussin translates this passage as follows: “Ānanda, en ce qui concerne les dharmas, le Tathāgata ne fait pas le maître qui ferme la main, qui cache, qui, dans la crainte que d’autres ne sachent, n’explique pas ce qu’il connaît” (p. 368). I believe the passage should be translated as follows: “Ānanda, with regard to the dharma, the *tathāgata* does not have the teacher’s fist. That is to say I hide for fear that others would know that I do not know.” On p. 199 Watanabe translates: “Because the contact from which principles (dharmas) arise is the fifth dharma.” La Vallée Poussin has: “En raison d’aucun des dharmas dont le sparśa est le cinquième …” (p. 371). Watanabe’s translation sometimes omits words which are found in the original. For instance, on p. 194 he translates: “In this sense through the continuance of skandhas (groups) there is benevolence.” The text mentions the series of *skandas* which are assumed (*upātta*), cf. de La Vallée Poussin, p. 367, n. 3. On the same page Watanabe gives *maitrīsamāprāpta* as the Sanskrit equivalent for meditation charged with benevolence. The correct Sanskrit term is of course *maitrīsamāpattī*. A. K. Warder states in his preface that “The most valuable part of Professor Watanabe’s study is his full account of
the *Vijñānakāya* version of the debates against the ‘Person’ (Vajjiputtaka or Vātsiputriya) School, which had not so far been adequately analysed and compared with the *Kathāvatthu* Record.” Watanabe’s analysis remains valid but it is to be regretted that his translation of the *pudgala* chapter of the *Vijñānakāya* is marred by misunderstandings which could easily have been avoided by a careful study of de La Vallée Poussin’s translation which is by far to be preferred to the translation of the *Vijñānakāya* in the *Kokuyaku issaikyō*. Since the publication of this work many Japanese scholars do not seem to take the trouble to study carefully the Chinese Buddhist texts.

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**NOTES**


2 Literally: ‘I, myself, proclaim that I reside in the honourable position of the great *rṣi*.’