BOOK REVIEWS


This volume in memory of Richard Robinson (1926–1970) was originally scheduled for publication in 1973. Kajiyama explains in a note that due to the fact that his paper was written in 1972 he has been unable to incorporate the results of research done by other scholars in recent years. If this applies also to the other papers this has to be taken into account by the reader of this volume.

Of the nine articles in this volume only very few can be recommended without any reservations. Gadjin M. Nagao ("What Remains" in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness, pp. 66–82) examines the Yogācāra interpretation of a passage of the Cūlasuññatā-sutta according to which "emptiness is nonbeing on one hand but that there is, on the other, something remaining therein which, being reality, cannot be negated." This passage is quoted in Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Hsien-yang-shêng-chiao-lun. Nagao points out that the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra seems to quote from a Sanskrit version of the Cūlasuññatā-sutta. The existence of a Sanskrit version is indeed very probable because the Tibetan Kanjur contains a translation of a Śūnyatā-nāma mahāsūtra (Ōtani Kanjur Catalogue no. 956) which corresponds to the Pāli text. The same passage of the Cūlasuññatā-sutta is also quoted in the Ratnagotra-vibhāga but, as Nagao explains, in this text it is not interpreted in the same way as in the Yogācāra treatises. Nagao’s article is an expanded and corrected version of an article published by him in 1968 in the Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū (vol. xvi, pp. 497–501). The Cūlasuññatā-sutta and its treatment in Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha texts has been studied also in great depth by David Seyfort Ruegg in his La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra (Paris, 1969), pp. 319 ff.

Likewise important is Yuichi Kajiyama’s ‘Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation’ (pp. 114–143) in which he analyses Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra. Kajiyama shows that the epistemological stages distinguished by Śāntarakṣita are also found in the first Bhāvanākrama written by Śāntarakṣita’s disciple, Kamalaśīla. He translates some important passages of this text which explains how in the course of meditation different philosophi-
tical systems are investigated. His explanations of the differences between the epistemological theories of the Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas, the Satyākāravāda-yogācārins, the Alikākāravāda-Yogācārins and the Mādhayamikas are precise and lucid. His article is a very welcome contribution to the study of the Later Mādhayamikas who have greatly influenced Buddhist philosophy in Tibet.

Western scholars have paid little attention to the Hua-yen school. Francis H. Cook translates Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra (Taishō no. 1712), pp. 167–206. His introduction analyses Fa-tsang’s understanding of the doctrine of emptiness and discusses his teachings on meditation. As to the doctrine of emptiness, Francis Cook believes that the Hua-yen understanding of this doctrine does not distort its original meaning according to the Mādhayamika school. He remarks that peculiarly Chinese is its emphasis on the phenomenal shih 事 and its appreciation of the harmony of the universe. Cook’s translation is carefully done and calls for very few observations. In one important passage he has been misled by a mispunctuation in the Taishō text. Cook translates: “Because form and emptiness are not two different things, the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are neither exterminated nor achieved, and this is the practice without an abiding place” (p. 192). One must read: “the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are not different and this constitutes the practice without an abiding place.” Shih-hui’s commentary (Taishō no. 1713, p. 564c4–9) to which Cook refers on p. 181 of his article shows clearly how this sentence has to be analysed and explained. Also in a few other passages a different interpretation seems preferable. On p. 187 Cook has: “Because the heart [of the teaching] is not revealed suddenly, there is first a brief statement of the situation. Since it does not abbreviate what it is able to present (非略能具故), there follows an extended explanation.” Cook misunderstood the meaning of 具: “Since a brief statement cannot be complete, there follows an extended explanation.” On p. 188 Cook translates: “He also gets his name from contemplating beings and going to aid them freely.” Chi is “the right opportunity” (cf. Nakamura’s Bukkyōgo daijiten, p. 213b: hazumi, kikkake, ori). In the section on absolute Nirvāna (p. 199) Cook translates: “There is an allusion to a different [type of nirvāṇa] which is the small-vehicle apparitional city [in the Lotus Sūtra] which is established as a provisional device” (簡異小乘化城樞立). 簡異 means “to distinguish from”: “[The absolute Nirvāṇa] is distinguished from the small-vehicle, etc.”

It is difficult to be very enthusiastic about the remaining six articles. Elvin W. Jones has contributed a long article entitled ‘Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths’ (pp. 3–45). The first part of it traces the development of philosophical speculations about the nature of reality in ancient Greece, in pre-Buddhist India and in the different Buddhist systems. The
second part is based on the Tibetan *siddhānta* literature and the works of Tson kha pa. According to the author “To attempt to reconstruct the thought of Nāgārjuna set forth in the Kārikās and other treatises without the writings of Tson kha pa would probably be as thankless a task as to attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of Aristotle without the works of Thomas Aquinas” (p. 38). This is an astounding statement. Thomas Aquinas had no access to the Greek texts of Aristotle’s works which he knew only from Latin translations from the Greek original or from the Arabic. Moreover, in common with other scholars of his time he accepted as genuine works which had been wrongly attributed to Aristotle. Tson kha pa and the Tibetan authors of Grub mtha’s were better informed about Indian Buddhist philosophy than Thomas Aquinas was with regard to the philosophy of Aristotle. It is certainly very instructive to study the works of Tson kha pa and the Grub mtha’s but this requires a very good knowledge of Indian Buddhist texts in the Sanskrit original and in Tibetan translation. Elvin W. Jones seems to consider it superfluous to consult original Sanskrit texts with the inevitable consequence of obscuring the meaning of passages quoted by him. For instance, on p. 32 he translates a passage from the first Bhāvanākrama: *yasmād yad advayalakṣaṇam [jñānam] advayavādināṁ śresthāṁ paramārthenābhimaṇaṁ tad api nirātmakam niḥsvabhāvam advayanirbhāṣeṇa jñānena pāṣyati yogi.* Jones translates: “Thus, that understanding of nonduality which is held by the consciousness doctrine [Vijñānavāda] as the highest truth is empty, and by the wisdom of the unmanifest [nirabhāsa (sic!)] the yogin comes to see this nonduality as ultimately unreal.” One wonders what a non-informed reader can make out of this ‘wisdom of the unmanifest.’ The same passage has been translated by Kajiyama in his article (p. 140) in which he explains clearly the meaning of *advayanirbhāṣeṇa jñānam.* One must add that a rather random collection of quotations from a great number of texts, even if correctly translated, is not the best way to explain difficult philosophical notions.

The same preference for Tibetan commentaries can be found in an article by Charlene-McDermott on ‘Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of Valid Cognition in Dharmakirti and Rgyal-tshab’ (pp. 144–166). The author is inspired by Richard Robinson’s remarks on “Tibet’s rich contribution to world cultural ecology.” Charlene McDermott’s article is of little help in understanding Rgyal-tshab’s commentary, of which only very few passages are quoted. As an example of her interpretation of Rgyal-tshab (his work is not at my disposal) it is sufficient to quote one passage: *slob dpon chos ’phog gi gsung nas. lhang tshel gyis bar du chod pa bzhin du. sgom bya’i don mthong ba de ni rab kyi mtha’i gnas skabs yin la. lag mthil du she (sic) srong bzhag pa bzhin du mthong ba ni mngon sum yin no zhes gsung ngo* (cf. n. 43). The author translates: “According to what is said by the teacher Dharmottara, [at first it is] as if [one’s view] were obstructed by [a cloud] of mica; in the state [or condition] approaching the extreme limits,
one envisions the object of concentrated contemplation as if it were an āmalaka situated in the palm of one’s hand” (p. 152). Rgyal-tshab abridges the following passage from Dharmottara’s commentary (cf. Nyāyabindu, Tib. tr., Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. viii, pp. 27.16–28.1: gang gi tshe lhang tsher gyis bar du chod pa bzhi du bsgom par bya ba’i don mthong de ni rab kyi mtha’i gnas skabs yin zhing lag mthil du shel sgong bzhag pa bzhi du bsgoms pa’i don mthong ba gang yin pa de ni rnal ’byor pa’i mngon sum yin no (for the Sanskrit text see Nyāyabindu, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. vii, p. 12.1–3). The underlined words are omitted by Rgyal-tshab. However, it is difficult to admit that rnal ’byor pa’i is missing in Rgyal-tshab’s text. Dharmottara distinguishes three stages; ‘In the first stage of intense meditation (bhavānāprakāra) the vision begins to be clear; in the second stage in which the intense meditation reaches its limit (prakara-paryantāvasthā) the object is seen as it were separated by mica (Skt. abhraka; Tib. thang tsher). In the third the object is seen as an āmalaka grain placed in the palm of one’s hand. The third stage is the yogipratyakṣa. The passage translated by Charlene McDermott refers to the second and third stage: “According to what is said by the teacher Dharmottara: The vision of the meditated object as separated by mica is the state in which the intense [meditation] reaches its limit. The vision [of the object] as an āmalaka placed in the palm of the hand is the [yogi]-pratyakṣa.” Stcherbatsky translated abhraka by ‘a thin cloud.’ This accounts probably for the ‘[a cloud] of mica’ in her translation which combines Stcherbatsky’s translation with the meaning of Tibetan lhong-tsher (cf. Chos-grags’s Tibetan dictionary). If she had consulted the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Dharmottara’s commentary, she would have seen that the dot after bzhi du has to be omitted. This article shows again that the study of Tibetan works can lead to fatal consequences if not sufficient attention is given to the basic texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan.

The less said about Stefan Anacker’s ‘The Meditational Therapy of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya’ (pp. 83–113), probably the better. He ‘translates’ chapters 2, 4 and part of 5 of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya. A few examples may suffice to show how fully unprepared the translator was for his task. P. 94: “Leading towards the view of self, obstructing insights regarding this and external objects, the extinction of suffering, the Path, the Gems, others’ attainments and being satisfied with little” (satkāyadṛṣṭes tadasvastun ‘pi ca/nirodhamārgaratmesu lābhasatkāra eva ca/saṃlekhasya parijñāne). P. 95: “The fetter of envy is an obstruction to satisfaction in others’ attainments, because it wishes to see only others’ faults” (tṛgyāsaṁyogaṇaṁ lābhasthākaraṇaṁ taddoṣadārṣanāt). P. 96: “To welfare arises the lack of means to rouse oneself from inactivity, lack of complete use of one’s sense fields, and careless activity” (kuśalasya tīry ṣāvarūṇāṁ/aḥpravog ‘nāyatanāḥpravog ‘yoniṣahpravogaś ca). There is little point in trying to correct these and other nonsensical translations. For

156
an excellent translation of the entire Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya the reader
may be referred to Nagao’s translation published in 1976 in volume 15 of the
Daijō butten (pp. 215–358, 380–409).

In ‘Samathvipaśyanāyuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist
Meditation’ (pp. 46–65), Geshe Sopa presents a general overview of Buddhist
meditative practice. It is of course impossible in such a brief compass to give
a clear and precise description of the meditative practices as described in the
texts mentioned in the final note. The understanding of this complicated topic
is not promoted by the translation of technical terms which are clearly based
upon Tibetan renderings of Sanskrit terms. For instance, the author translates
nirvedhabhāṣya with “the approximations to the definitive separation.” In
Tibetan nirvedha is rendered by nes-par ’byed-pa but the meaning of nirvedha is
definite insight (niścito vedhāḥ), cf. Abhidharmakośa (ed. Pradhan), p. 386.3.
The author even creates such words as nābhisaṃskāra (pp. 47 and 48) and
translates maula with ‘mastery’ (p. 54).

Minoru Kiyota’s ‘Buddhist Devotional Meditation: A Study of the
Sukhāvatīvyūhopađesa’ (pp. 249–296) contains an analysis and translation of
the Sukhāvatīvyūhopađesa attributed to Vasubandhu. In his introduction
Kiyota discusses the attribution of the text to Vasubandhu and points out
that this was accepted by Yamaguchi. Although he mentions several of his
publications he does not mention Yamaguchi’s Seshin no jōdoron (Kyoto, 1963)
which contains a detailed explanation of the Sukhāvatīvyūhopađesa. Kiyota
declares that the issue of whether this text is a composition by Vasubandhu or
a Chinese pseudepigraphon is not a crucial issue. According to him the crucial
issue is that it is a Mahāyāna text (p. 273). Certainly nobody disputes the
Mahāyāna character of this text. However, whether the text was composed in
India or in China is of very great importance for the history of Buddhism in
India and China. Kiyota’s translation is in general adequate but suffers from
being often too loose and imprecise. For instance, a very important passage
mentions the ‘sameness dharma-body’ 平等法身 but 平等 is not translated by
Kiyota (cf. p. 284). This crucial term is not mentioned at all in the notes
although Kiyota does not hesitate to give some very elementary information
(sometimes rather curiously worded; for instance: n. 41, “Bhagavāt (sic) =
Bhagavān, meaning the glorious, divine, adorable, venerable. It refers to the
Buddha”). Kiyota’s translation of this passage (Taishō vol. 26, p. 232b1–3)
is not only incorrect but also incomplete. He omits part of a phrase 師法界身 無異
which is found in the Taishō edition used by him (cf. n. 3) but omitted in
other editions (for instance, Yamaguchi Susumu, op. cit., pp. 200–201). The
entire passage together with the explanations given by T’an-luan is translated
on p. 275 of the Hōbōgirin (fasc. 3, Paris, 1937). The Hōbōgirin explains that
‘byōdō hosshin 平等法身, Corps d’Essence d’Egalité, désigne soit un des Corps
de Buddha correspondant à une des Terres de Bodhisattvas, soit plus spécialement dans la secte Jôdo, le Corps que revêtent les Bodhisattvas dès la 8e Terre, et que peuvent même revêtir, par la grâce opérante du Buddha Amida, les Bodhisattvas des Terres inférieures."

Leon Hurvitz has contributed an article entitled ‘Fa-sheng’s Observations on the Four Stations of Mindfulness’ (pp. 207–248). Fa-sheng (Dharmaśrī?) is the author of a text consisting of 250 verses and a prose commentary (Taishō no. 1550). The Chinese title is A-p’i-t’an ksin lun (Abhidharmahādayaśāstra or Abhidharmasāraśāstra?). A second version of this text contains the same verses with a prose commentary by Upaśānta (Taishō no. 1551). A third version, due to Dharmatrāta, adds 350 verses to the original 250 verses and contains a more detailed prose commentary (Taishō no. 1552). The four smṛtyupasthānas are discussed by Dharmasrī in the beginning of chapter 5. This is a very brief passage of three verses with a short prose commentary (Taishō vol. 28, 818a-b). This passage is not very noteworthy and it is not made clear by Hurvitz why he has selected it for such extensive treatment. Although Hurvitz states that the core text of his study will be Dharmasrī’s text, he also paraphrases or translates the corresponding passages of the two other texts (II and III). Hurvitz begins by quoting the first verse of chapter 5 of III without indicating that this verse is found in III only but not in I and II. Hurvitz would have greatly facilitated a better understanding of the contents of the corresponding passages of these three texts if he had indicated the considerable differences between I and the two other texts, which incorporate several topics not treated in I.1 After translating and commenting upon the first verse of chapter 5 of III Hurvitz quotes the Sanskrit text and de La Vallée Poussin’s translation of Kośa vi. 14cd (15cd in Gokhale’s edition of the kārikās, but 14cd in Pradhan’s edition of the Abhidharmakokshabāṣya): kāyavicīttadharmaṁ duilakṣaṇaparīkṣaṇaḥ. This is followed by a translation of Vyākhyā p. 529.2–15 in which Hurvitz demonstrates once more his very poor knowledge of Sanskrit. For instance, prajñām āṃtareṇa “without knowledge” is rendered by “this side of wisdom,” jñānavadhyāḥ klesā iti “the passions are to be killed by knowledge” by “the defilements are the killers of gnosis.” Yaśomitra explains that by the dharmas mentioned in vi. 14 the dharmas other than kāya, vedanā and citta are meant, and not all dharmas collectively: dharmās tribhyo ‘nya iti asaṃbhinnayavasthām abhisamādhāyaiva ucyate “the ‘dharmas other than the three’ is used in view of their non-mixed state (i.e., they are distinguished from kāya, vedanā and citta).” Hurvitz’s translation says exactly the opposite: “The expression ‘the dharmas other than the three’ is used by naming them col-

---

1 Cf. José van den Broeck, La sauvage de l’immortel (A-p’i-t’an Kan LuWei Lun), Louvain-la-Neuve (1977), pp. 68–69.
lectively, without distinguishing the latter one from another.” Yasomitra continues by explaining that when the dharmas are mentioned collectively they include the body, etc. and all composed and non-composed dharmas: *sambhinayavasthāyāṁ tu kāyādayo 'pi nigṛhyaṁte. punah sarve saṁskṛtā asaṁskṛtāś ca dharmā draṣṭavyāḥ.* “However, in the mixed state (i.e., when the dharmas are mentioned collectively), the body, etc. are also included. Moreover, all dharmas, composed and non-composed, have (then) to be considered (as included).” Hurvitz translates: “In case a distinction were made, they would be specified as ‘body, etc.’ Then all dharmas, constituted and unconstituted, are to be [so?] viewed.” On pp. 231 and 233 Hurvitz translates two other passages of the Vyākhyā and again makes some elementary mistakes.

In the following pages (pp. 221–229) Hurvitz translates several suttas from the forty-seventh section of the Samyuttanikāya and the corresponding texts from the Chinese Āgamas. His translation of the first verse of chapter vi of i is to be found on p. 229:

> In this way the Sage severs His labors
> And his multitudinous fears. The basis [of the severance]
> And the like, the right knowledge [*cheng chih 正智, representing saṃyagjñāna?*]
> [which is] the expedient means [thereto],
> I will now tell. Listen well!

Hurvitz adds that “certain syntactic liberties had to be taken in order to preserve the order of the verses.”

The text translated by Hurvitz is as follows:

> 如此聖斷勞 衆恐怖之本
> 等方便正智 及盡煩惱怨

In 1975 Charles Willemen published a translation of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: *The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahṛdaya* (Bruxelles). His translation is as follows:

> Thus the noble eliminate hardship, the root of all fear. The right knowledge of the preparatory applications will now be explained.
> Listen well!

Willemen adds in a note: *samy* 等 *prayoga 方便.* However, 等方便 translates certainly *saṁyagyāyāma.* This is confirmed by the fact that the term 正精進 is found in ii (p. 848b24). In Chinese 等 is used to render both *sam-* and *samyak.* Hurvitz’s translation of it by ‘the like’ makes complete nonsense of the verse. It would be a waste of time and energy to point out all the mistakes committed by Hurvitz in his translations of the beginning of chapter 5 in the three texts i,
II and III. His carelessness is well shown by the fact that he overlooked completely a variant on p. 818a (note 5). The Taishô text has 彼身痛心法意正次第生. One must of course read 意止: "the applications of mindfulness to the body, to feeling, to thought, and to the dharmas are thus produced one after another" (Willemen, p. 68). Hurvitz translates: "The meanings of the said body, sensations, thought, and dharma shall now be brought forth in due order."

In translating such sometimes difficult Abhidharma texts a good knowledge of Chinese is far from sufficient. It is necessary to know well the technical terminology in both Sanskrit and Chinese in order to prevent misunderstandings. It is a particularly delicate task to trace the original Sanskrit terms. Hurvitz does not hesitate to reconstruct even entire phrases. His reconstructions of terms and phrases are often far from the mark. For instance, on p. 209 Hurvitz states that 決定分善根 may represent niyatabhāgakusalamūlāni. This Chinese expression undoubtedly renders nirvedhabhāgīyāni kusalamūlāni. Hurvitz is not aware of the fact that the same Chinese expression can be used to render different Sanskrit terms. In the texts translated by him 方便 renders both vyāyāma (see above) and prayoga (cf. Willemen, p. 229, n. 12). Hurvitz always translates it by upāya (expedient means, device).

Although Hurvitz has made much use of de La Vallée Poussin's translation of the Kośa, he has failed to see that the threefold contemplation (of asubhā, ānāpāna, and dhātu) is taught to the following three categories of men: the rāgacarita (cf. LVP, Kośa vi, p. 149), the vitarkacarita (ibid.) and the dṛṣṭicarita (LVP, Kośa iv, p. 174, n. 6). In III (p. 908b9) the text has 見行者. Hurvitz translates "he who is driven about by (false) views" which, according to him may stand for: yo dṛṣṭibhiḥ cāryate (p. 234 and note 18).

The smṛtyupasthānās are treated also in chapter 31 of the Ta chih tu lun (cf. Étienne Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, III, Louvain, 1970, pp. 1150–1176) and not in chapter 36 (Lamotte, pp. 1329–1430) as stated by Hurvitz (p. 207). The Ta chih tu lun explains that the objects of the smṛtyupasthānas are the ten material āyatanas and a small part of the dharmāyatana (i.e., the avijñāti, cf. Lamotte, p. 1170, n. 2). The same topic is treated in II according to which the specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇāni) are the ten material āyatanas and a small section of the dharmāyatana which is rūpa (p. 848c16). Hurvitz translates: "By the former [i.e., svalakṣaṇāni] are meant part of the ten rūpāyatanas and the dharmāyatana" (p. 235).

Willemen's translation of Dharmasrī's Abhidharmahṛdaya was published in 1975. Probably Hurvitz was able to see this excellent work only after having submitted his paper. Willemen's work shows how Chinese Abhidharma texts are to be translated whereas Hurvitz's article shows how they are not to be translated. Recently Mrs. I. Armelin published a French translation of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: Le cœur de la loi suprême (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1978)
which I have not yet read. I hope to be able to report on both translations in a future issue of *The Eastern Buddhist*.

The long delay in the publication of this volume has not prevented the presence of a great number of misprints. Particularly annoying are the transcription errors in Sanskrit and Tibetan words, which abound in several of the articles. However, one would gladly accept these imperfections if the contents of this volume were more satisfactory. According to the introduction “these studies and essays are representative of the work of modern Buddhist scholarship.” Happily enough, this is not the case. Let us hope that they are not even representative of Buddhist scholarship in the United States!

J. W. de Jong.