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SUMMARY:

1. Introduction.

As is well known, the investigation of the real object of perception was one of the main themes among philosophical schools in India. In the historical development of this philosophical inquiry, the problem of the whole (avayavin) and its parts (avayavāḥ) was fully disputed between the Nyāya- and Vaiśeṣika schools, on one side, and Buddhist logical and epistemological school, on the other. The former held that the real object of ordinary perception is the whole which is supposed to be a separate entity, completely different from its

parts. That is to say, they insisted that what is perceived should not be the parts but the whole itself, since its parts, i.e., atoms, are never perceptible. On the contrary, Buddhists denied the existence of the whole. They said that the so-called avayavin is never perceived anywhere, as something different from its parts; the object of perception is rather an assemblage of atoms manifested in one's own mind. This theory of an assemblage was fortified by Dharmakīrti's well-known atīśaya-theory. However, the Naiyāyika Vācaspatimiśra never yielded an inch and criticized Dharmakīrti's theory, saying that there is no room for the atīśaya of atoms without admitting the existence of the whole!.

2. Buddhist Refutation of the Whole.

Various types of arguments were used to refute the whole before Dharmakīrti: for example, arguments in terms of the non-perception of the whole, of the impossibility of it having weight independent of the weights of its parts, and of its independent colour. Among them, the most popular was 'vṛttyanupapattē (because there cannot be any consistent relationship between the whole and its parts)' which was discussed for over a millennium.

Why did the Buddhists refute the existence of the whole? It was natural for the Mādhyamikas such as Nāgārjuna to refute it, since they held that everything is empty. It was natural also for the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra philosophers, for they thought that the object of perception is, as stated above, not the whole, but the internal manifestation of an assemblage of atoms. Furthermore, Dignāga's Qu-yin-jia-she-lun attractively describes the three kinds of phenomenal entities within the context of the Buddha's sermons. According to him, the Buddha(s) did not preach that phenomenal entities are one and the same (eka) or different (anya). However, Dignāga says, this fact does not mean that the Holy One admitted the ekatva or anyatva of phenomena; to the contrary, by keeping silent on this problem, the Buddha realized his deep intention to let the people emancipate themselves from afflictions without thinking about such puzzling affairs. The same text also reveals the difference between the Buddhist concept of an assemblage of atoms and the Naiyāyika's concept of the whole, for Dignāga exemplifies an assemblage as 'a body' (śarīra/kāya) and 'woods' (vana), the latter of which is, together with 'an army' (senā), not formally admitted as the whole by Naiyāyikas (at least not by Uddyotakara, n.10).

3. Theoretical Developments in the Post-Dharmakīrtian Period. (A Logical Problem.)

Dharmakīrti, in a part of his PVin II which has PVSV and PV II as its

background (n.13), refuted the oneness of the whole, as a result of which later Buddhist philosophers theorized-- the importance of which is not always recognized by scholars-- that the object wrongly connected with contradictory properties (viruddhadharmasamsarga, -adhyāsa) is not one but many. Sāntarakṣita/ Kamalaśīla, Dharmottara, Jitāri and Aśoka made syllogisms for refuting the oneness of the whole, making use of the above thesis as their major premise (vyāpti). On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas such as Bhāṣarvajña who criticized Dharmakīrti and Vācaspatimiśra who refuted a syllogism made by Dharmottara-- as well as the Vaiśeṣikas such as Vyomaśiva-- severely censured each Buddhist syllogism to the effect that if it is not prasaṅga- but svatantra-sādhana, it commits the fallacy of non-existence of the locus (āśrayāsiddha, or āśrayāsiddhi=asiddhatva), along with other arguments. As far as we can survey the extant texts, Saṅkara-svāmin, mentioned in the Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā, seems to be the earliest Naiyāyika who criticized Buddhist syllogisms, dividing them into prasaṅga- and svatantra-sādhana. We can surmise that this kind of criticism must have been made not only by the above mentioned Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas but also by others of the same period in reaction to syllogisms made by Sāntarakṣita/ Kamalaśīla and Dharmottara which were not clearly prasaṅga- or svatantra-sādhana. In this way, the problem of āśrayāsiddhi in the refutation of the whole must have been discussed typically in ca 10th century. This same problem arised during discussions in a different context: the vyatireka-type of Kṣapabhaṅga-anumāna. It was finally solved by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti to the effect that, roughly speaking, employment of an unreal subject/ locus (dharmin) can be admitted in the case of a negative statement-- e.g., "A hare's horn is not blue"-- even if the syllogism belongs to the svatantra-sādhana.

How did Buddhist philosophers before them think about this problem of the refutation of the whole? Though we may not be able to answer definitively, we can find at least one interesting solution in Aśoka's Avayavinirūkarāṇa. He says that he is able to refute the oneness of the whole without making use of the whole as a subject only if the gross blue object (sthūlo nīlādir arthaḥ) is employed as a subject/ locus of the syllogism, because the gross object which is really perceived (pratyakṣa) is none other than the so-called avayavin which opponents assume to be a single entity and real! There must have also been other texts expressing answers to this problem of the minor premise.

4. Concluding Remarks.

In conclusion, we can suppose that āśrayāsiddhi was variously and repeatedly discussed in the contexts of refuting unreal objects and

establishing a vyatireka-type of Kṣaṇabhaṅga-inference in the last half of the 9th century and 10th century, as is typically seen in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa. Further, such dialogues provide a hint of a new direction which was to be developed later by Jñānaśrī's Kṣaṇabhaṅga-theory.

Lastly, a by-product of the above survey is the identification of a Skt. fragment collected by Muni Jambuvijayaḥ with Dharmottara's PVin (n.23).